176-10036-10173 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

« JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : Bundy
TO : Lodge
TITLE :
DATE : 10/30/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam,10/29/63-10/31/63, CIA
Reports. Box 2

rn ‘CAS 7747

SEE LPRITI 7D
VER ST Ku Ug - Bo

‘October 30, 1963

F DOWNGRADED Fo

ALS

hereee

TOP-SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

' FROM McG. Bundy, White House

1, Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a
significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see _
next para) and on one or two lesser matters eagily clarified,

2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have

. no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say

that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of

course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same

-basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay

any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give

high prospect of success . We have never considered any betrayal

of generals to Diem, and our 79109 ‘explicitly rejected that course. We

recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that

our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot
impli€D LN YouUR MESSAGE -

limit ourselves to pr oposition that only conviction of certain failure

justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for inter vention

should be that stated above. |

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a

high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals

in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are

OR-SECRET EYES ONLY

.. _ (oH [Ole
( oo ge i -

- ZOPSECRETEYES ONLY = - 2 -
better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best

' advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the
generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize heed to
bear in mind generals' interpretation of U.S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and
your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice

given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.

4, Wath Peapect to money-for Soup-gFOUP:. ou ate-atithorided.tp
ee =F nena} SS OQ
acdisbursements aszyoy"consider sectte..ad-cifective-j——

rr,

4 R. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute ‘
assessment of prospecte and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126.
we Yant continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

S.@& To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded
and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country

team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are
sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at ali stages and to
‘use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup
contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither
Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would
like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination
among generals. |

be “When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart

“will be chief of the country term. Our only modification of |

existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish

TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY -3- 10/30/63

all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate
consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know
what is said to Conein, Any disagreement among the three on
such instructions should be reported to Washington and held
for our resolutionwhen time permits.

Ce If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe
that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that
direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with
experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view
is Harkins, We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final
responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of
course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow
in paragraph t. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have
the effect suggested in your paragraph 8,

é. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions
for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct
intervention from either side, and U,S, -controlled aircraft and .
other resources will not be committed between the battle lines
or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington,

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S, authorities may

in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides,

POR-SECRET EYES ONLY

0G

- a 7

ob 10a

TOP-SECRET EYES ONLY | ae 10/30/63 |
such as removal of key personalities or relay of information.
In such actions, however, Ue Ss. authorities will strenuously avoid
appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest
- of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing
government or instrument of coup,
c. In the event. of imminent or actual failure of coup,
U. 5. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those
to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort.
We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest
and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek
protection of other Embassies in addition to our own, This point
should be made strongly if need arises.
' d, But once a coup under responsible leadership has |
begun, and within these restrictions, itis. in the interest of the U.S.
: Government that it should succeed.,.
76. We have your message about return to Washington and =

GU paw bis comment |
im, we suggest that #& be kept

as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible

you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly

sensitive to ereat disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this

should turn out to be a-week of decision, and if it can be avoided.

we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now,
HHH

ined

. my .
| “FOP SECRET EYES ONLY

