157-10014-10117 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: VUT2015

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RECORD NUMBER :

SSCIA
157-10014-10117

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-23 ; . :
Document Informati on
ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TITLE: RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
DATE: 00/00/1975
PAGES: 103
SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : — Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS: = Redact
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/21/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
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HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 1

; Date : 08/07/95
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117
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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA .
FROM : !
TO : 7
TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
DATE : 00/00/75
PAGES : 103
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

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HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 2


M.

HW 50955 Docld:32493505

4/26/61
5/2/61

5/4/61
5/5/61
5/24/61

6/10/61
7/8/61
9/1/61 |

11/1/61

11/2/61

“y/4/o1

11/22/61

8/10/62

8/12/62

8/14/62

5/27/75

Page 4

a TABLE

a
We
a

Mi,
va
yy

GOODWIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK

bE CONTENTS _

|
'

Summary) on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova.

Memo to Bundy re "Cuba Problem" from Goodwin.

Memo to’ Goodwin re "Possible Covert Activities against
Cuba," from Bissell.

’ Draft of NSC Action No. 2413.

Draft Record of Actions, 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61)..

Menorandum of Conversation with Dick Bissell, Tracy

Barnes, , by Goodwin.

Memorandum for the President re "CIA Reorganization,"
’ from Schlesinger. ;

Memorandum for Mr. Richard Goodwin re "Cuban Covert
Plan," from Schlesinger.

Memorandum to the President re Cuban Task Force ©

_ Meeting, 8/31, from Goodwin.

Memorandum to the President, "Eyes Only for the
President ,"" re concept of a “command operation'' for
Cuba, from Goodwin.

Memorandum, Eyes Only for the President and the
Attorney General," re "operation should be organized —
with five staff Components," from Goodwin.

Memo , "Eyes Only," re recommendations that the Cuban
Operation be organized. in five components."
Memorandum to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, Director
of CIAsi AG, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Lansdale, Richard Goodwin
re"...sunmary of the major decisions which have been
ads ‘in’ regard to the Cuba’ Operations" from Goodwin.

Memoraridum for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special
Group | (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August, 1962.

Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, Robert Hurwitch,
State, ‘Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense, Don Wilson, USIA

re "Alternate Course B," from Lansdale.

Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "Operation
MONGOOSE , " from Harvey.

Summary of Goodwin Interview w. Aaron re "Intelligence
Activities in Latin America.” ;

Table of Contents - 2.

by

i Q. 6/10/75 Szule Testimony before SSC, excerpt.

R. 7/17/75 Sumaty of documents produced by Goodwin on 7136/75,
by meena. ,

S. 5/13/61 _ Memorandum to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in

the Dominican Republic."

T. 5/29/61 Drafts and original of cable from State Dept. to
\ (date of cable) Dearborn.

'

ie A ee

HY 50955 Docld: 324235505 Page 5

July 17, 1975 .
\
To: F.A.O. Schwarz/Curtis sypothers
. i

From: - Joseph E. DiGenova

Re: Richard Goodwin Materialls and Summary

a

“Summary

A. Goodwin Interview of July 16, 1975
Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time
on,July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba

. | .
Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had pre-

viously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force
: |
that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project.

In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be-

very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present te
i Ae oe ye
; ' vee
during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad 7
Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro. poo

(See Szulc's testimony infra.) | He spoke with the President

after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about
. . . { .

assassination: "We can't get into that -- we'll all be

targets." He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything

to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts. With regard

oe

to the August 10, 1962, meeting, which he attended, Goodwin

Ro.

gir

HWS50955 Docld:32493505 Page 6

\ 1

noted that Mecone | never made any oration - upon the. immorality

-of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meet~

ing and said that "assassination was not shot down". “When
pressed for details at this point, and after being shown
the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he

said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made

any more statements about who gaid and did what. He noted, o—
however, that in (1966 while in pers with Robert Kennedy that
Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions

i

about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said
t .

"Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life."
co t oem
At the conclusion of the interview he turned over ,
to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he

had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to_

this summary...

_B. Goodwin Interview of May 27, 1975 , : —

During the course of |this earlier interview, }

Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the

Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as

follows:
In general, Goodwin had not heard much

specific talk of assassination, although

it would not have surprised him if it had

gone on. He mentioned one specific in-
stance in which’ he had heard talk of

HW 50955 Docla: 33423505 “Page 7

assassinating Castro. After the Bay of
Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established,
first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by
Goodwin in his capacity as White House a
Staff Officer. At a.meeting of the Task a
Force, held at the State Department,
McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro",
someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell,

then asked if McNamara meant "Executive |
Action". McNamara responded that he did
and stressed his interest in the idea.
However, Goodwin did not bring the topic
up later in the meeting after McNamara
left. (See interview infra.)

Cc. The Goodwin Documents

The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished.

the Committee are of no startling significance. One docu-

ment, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin,
is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli
. connection or the efforts: to assassinate Castro. Bissell

notes, "I have not attempted to, provide you with much

detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with

Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell

to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An

Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the

President discusses the need for revamping of the "intelli-
;

gence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that

memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not ‘able to

tere ger apie wee ne

control its operatives once they are in the field and of

the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo. )

ae atte

HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 8. 9 | vs ny oa

The other documents ‘indicate the thinking that went on up

to the point where the Lansdale group was established as

the coordinated effort against |Cuba.

Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin

|
-- What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August
10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended?

~- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to —
in his initial interview where McNamara broached the sub-
ject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused
them and are they one and the same?

-- How does he explain McCone' $§ recollection of having given
an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when :
it was brought up at the August 10 meeting?

-- Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at
that meeting?

~~ What discussion, if any, followed?

fea Sy ee ee rs eR es ae

HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 9 | ss

‘_MEMOR ANDUM

“Fo

Herve are a few scattered thoughts on

Cuba is a threat to the eccurity cd

3 McGeorge Bundy
From: Dick Goodwin

1. As a direct military mence

- be ingfensificd as communist arris sh

ipmcs we COM

SO

increased danger will ko minimal, oe

defonse of any Amevic

an nation which: ag ate

mice
ad

moves 5 by Castre could bg iramedinte

intervene in case of Ga

2, As an e:morter of revolution:

used as a base for exp

oy by our forces, Sirallavly we could

&

we

Deoft
4/26/61

the "Cube" problem,

the United Sintes in twe basic Way Si.

wee

aon, ¢. yaenace which will

vik. Towover, oven this

fray putes t Smee hl pn me rn tk mL
veaty Goilgations <.mmilus ta ts-

cod directly, Any militar;

stvo military old to queritla opcvcticns in the Americas.

ort of the commurist

H

There ia no coult that Cuba i is being

fidelista revolution, This ic

done through the actual supply of dundg and technical assistance to insurgent

elements, through wi

spread and rea asonskly eZviective propaganda apparatus

including aA news service aad radio ne

‘example of the allicnce between fidclic

identification wit! a

even here, in the las

eflectivencas. This has come because a of

welfare of the peop

{

throzts aad throuch Che use: of Guba as an

mo and necessary social reform +~

lo.

This throat is csicnificant == eapeciclly in the Carribean areca, However,

sics months there has becna significant decline ia Cuban

e

ol

a

o growing isolation of communist-«

fie edlista cl ements fvom the Democvatig lott ao Castro's pro-Govict bont has

HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 10


. “© .
; ;
i ert cars Te
. orn oo
; t oto
: . ‘ : fo
. ont Oey an Pe a pee mame ate CVEent’ 2 -
becomes more apparent; ami ac Castro hac become insreactngy CFF atic in
: Was = en, ent ey rye brainy at 18 egg on em ed Wat yey
7 uis persorcl tehnvior. Pacts S ectens, $2 eaot, thet, the count sists ave
24 ae a * ~— Ma mine sea + nal eee af % “
looking foz anothe?, more stable, hero -- morhaps Cardenas of towleo.
: a wth ‘ ama a ttntne Getieeues of HG tepeaegam guepene ae
3, While this means & ceclining imiucuce o- Hdelisuse over POpLler
~~ pa a « = aes ’ 7 4 Ram ween ye 2 Pa yee meet ot
movernonts; Ht does not necessarily essen the important of Cuban-Saviste *.
War metat mined Ce tant eo, me ntetionecy PAGVaress ra : La
Chinese materict and tecacc- rick to gevoboucnesy mgvernents, Tt ta dine
' ne a. van hy oes Ve mee ee om 1 a ete 2a eat yay eee ’ apna
portant to wemomber that cyon + Castro were Were cob tomereavy We would
. eat fetes evi | cee : my ot Sig te San Tye ero 4 Pann
, not have solved tic prowie: Cs comimaniyt imeauence 2h fae f.srt in fact,
le wens we ey ome 2 vm gy te a) TT wa tte Ae he Wage aed 2 Rate . .
most of the gveniest Cnages spota (2.G. XS stheast Drasil, Gosumecs achk-
sete . tae Soraineted te eepeen es due : _ 4
counirys eoraraunist corsingtos oes pat ChGVGLnGNSs ott. } da pot ove elehnss
s 2 an . « 7 Tey fe a Bigs fee nee « Sina ot ee est Snooty
their existence oF strength to Gastro, tut ba deccd 20% independent leadszshipe.
~ alt ore as ate
steckbhy growinge a

This danger has boon

mocts will

y
\
a$ mee eet ee wae . ne & Pavey Fe Be PO ay de
amiieCOmaer es many WPove 69 tenaats enh GALE oe m
|
4.4% * @ a?
Cubs for leadersaige

*
gegen es

ha ee, . ‘A
6 yor Masses n

support, tic prokwly de

wan peoples tho

fT

oh

om
ad

its impact en the ©

slithes of undezgrouad organi

|
!
|
|

9 Bocld: 4 0 Page .
55 i 32473505 1i i

‘efficiency of his police

Sthy chCe

: we needa
covarisbe renescssmacue f the velserablity of his regima -- the cenzee of
'
shining position of the Cutan ccsnomy and
|

ce, the possi-

oot
stat

a nosessment it is.

’

HW 50955  Docld:32423505 Page i2

SSscre?t
a Be

imposeible to realistically determine wunt alternative courses of action aro

open to wg. toy

2 To mect the military throat i can work out defense agreements

a

, 5 Se elas ; ; tat eee
with Ccutwal American nitions aleng the Mags cugaestad with Professor Berle,

|

)

arms limitation conference. This conference should dcal with mothods of
ctopping external arms ghipmeuts in the content of the over-all limitations

*

i
ri

which are desparately needed in Latin America, Wo chould decide, before

; ;
this meeting, whothor tue risks in on OAS blochade of arms shipments to Cuba

are outweighed by the dangers Involved in halting and searching international
, ; \
shipping.

4, Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latla America

: ae e H td « e rene
to see how far they ave witling to go in! terms of collective action, This chould

|
. . { .
be done via a personal cmissary. Although we should have a reasonably cleaz
|

idoa of what we waut to do, this should ba 2 gonuina consuliation among ailies,

—

All the muyried proposals for OAS actioa, ectc., depend on tha reaction of other

Latin nations «= a roaction as yot undctermined,
ot tos
5. Underlying all these proposals ia the fecling that we should not move
|

quichly in direct action against Cuba, Ido not believe that there is any course

of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and

conditions.

ae)

ty —
Q
ya)
3

y : : : i 8 . , .
3, Wo should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-Amorican . |
;
I

ae


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bas Ereatre)
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fitemmnts to stool vest emert fi Gnastiveiem
1, We Ghould provide Carribcan nations with the technical help
(es Ge radar to spot incoming planes) and navy p — assictouce to meet the
danvers of arms chipmcnts fcom Cuba uvcgont ¢Lements in thoze notiond,

(2 Theve are two or tirce verl Cancer spots (2, rr. Dowtzlean Republic
and init) where we chevld now bo ceveloping duimocratic alternatives to tz
id | bee ee opt - 2 .'
present regime a= orenuiniog reglicement coveramentc, If we do not do ents

then the inev! table changes in ceveran
Regimes. wh oa De smacceatic alternatly
tacans of prec joltating the £212 of ‘weiiio ond Buvalter end nossibly Samone,
in this way we can exert manbinna contecl over the type of replecemiont povern~
ment -- the timing aad iniiative ¢ shor tld be curs.
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liberal forces ia Latia america, rather than thvongh UsLA alone, the more
eii fective will be oar propaganda.

Conetal otuntéerecovamnnist osrations

i,
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td

terns moericas showd hove Owo basic clemens
rae ON SG
. |
I
the organization of a atcong pout icel countereforce, We have

ady inctressent ia the newly orgen

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. j
|
2 May L961
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin” ,
Assistant Special Counsel to the
President
| ; ;
SUBJECT: . Possible CovertActivities ayainst Cuba . r
. . ‘.
Attached is a brief statement re garding covert operations
against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject
and our conversations over the past few days, I have not hee en.
attempted:to provide you with much detail,
. !
|
(oad M. Bissell, ma) :
Deputy Director i
| (Plans)
Attachment: Paper as stated above
j
|
1 He
\
moe

ike “Soot


A need ee

f
{

(2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr, Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the

President

SUBJECT:

1

t

| :
Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations

‘against Cuba, In view of your familiarity with this subject

and our conversations over the past few days, I have not

attempted to provide you with muc

_Attachment: Paper as stated abov:

i

{
'
|
4

h detail.

4

(Repo te keed U Beatl de

Richard M, Bissell, Jr,
- Deputy Director
(Blans) ,


2 Way 1961

tr my anes “sy

: yvret 4
ee ed

As indicated by the combined INR /ONE estimate, anti-Castro
activity within Cuba will probaoly be muted at least for the next
several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way
suspect have been arrested, A recent report from the Swiss
Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100, 000,
All internal services will continue to work ona theory of repression

4

plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be

‘very difficult to.carry on any clandestine operations and itis doubtful

; ; |
that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening

the Castro regime,

‘In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition

|

laree and that such opposition

ro)

to the regime among individuals still at

is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover,

there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces

and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with

these individuals, At the very least these agents can and will continue

to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency, ‘In addition,

certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be

infiltrated, could'attempt to carry out some sabotage, Individual
acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small

amounts of material, Successive acts of sabotage or extensive

33493505 Page 18

'

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ar

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i

;
_
i

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i


mca ay

bale. F qt

th a.

|

sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in

terms of loss of men, Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting

in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining
ft :

. ; i :
its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program

might be developed,

A capability also exists for types of. maritime operations including

:
! i

infiltration and exfiltration of individuals} landing and caching of arms, '
under-water sabotage of shipping and sinall raider operations. Under
. i
present circumstances it would seem wrong to atteinpt these except on eee
a very limited scale and,in all likelihood, raider operations should not
:’ !
'

be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been

obtained,

The Agency also has a small air armjincluding some transport b
aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26), ras
Although it is not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that [o.:

. . | Pos
Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the mornent, Looe
. &
air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible ja
exception of supply flizhts to support opposition elements unable’ to :
survive without such support. Even withirespect to such operations, Po
however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful I a
, Bare se’.
}
7 ke

night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great
a . , . i .
4 ;

to justify the risk, B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against

chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if

HUSH par RUCTE ATA RINT. ARMA APS:


H

successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotaye, In. view
t :
|

of the risks involved, however, and the poor denialbility of U.S. :
. . . é
; i
support where aircraft are involved, /it is recommended that such

operations be avoided at least for the present.
Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted. an independent MAP

capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage

_ - and defection operations into Cuba, He recognizes a necd for U.S,
support but is very firm in his. desire to operate as independently
as possible of any official U.S. connection. His initial request

t

is for five boats, some materiel andjsome money, He admits,

however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real :
estate, some help with training and communications will be required,

He offers to share bis information with the U.S, Government, seek

U.S, advice and, at least fora period of time, be willing to operate wade
. : . ! ‘ . ee
with the Revolutionary Council, The|Council's views are being ~ ee
mee,
canvassed and Ray has been asked to| prepare a prospectus giving , f Tale

in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future

and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts

prove successful, :

The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support
within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the |

Council and with the U.S, are satisfactory.

re “rik “ot
rhe NG om

HW 50955 DocTd:32423505. Page 20.

prem tty

o . ing weal

In addition to the activities described above, propapanda
activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines
and newspapers can be continucd independently by the Azency or

t

in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council, Moreover, limited

‘political action operations are possible, As to both propaganda

and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type
of activity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions
with respect to the operations described above, Consequently,

these will be noted here as mere possibilities,


Be

whe be. value

Ee

HY 50945 Docld:32423505 Page 22

DRAET TOP SECRET

Y. $. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(vISG Action Mo. 2413-c; Mane “for usc, sama subject, dated nay 4, 1961)

Agreed thet the political objective of U. 8. policy te~

ward Cuba ie to bring about the downfall of the Ceatro

regize.

Agreed thet the United States ahould not undertake mil-
itary intervention in Cuba nov, but should do nothing
that would foreclosa the possibility of military inter-

vention in ehe futures 7 a

Agread that the Cuban aficuation should be kept under
conatan: review, in the light of the possibility that

actions by Castro would proupt 6 reconsideration of _ oo x a

the dectaten aot to intervang.. _ a -

Agread that the United States should not ispose a naval

or alr blockade against Cuba at this tine.

Noted the importance the President » attaches to obtain= coe
ing timely and adequate intelligence aa to Cuban mili-"
tary capabilities, especially tha enhancement of such .

capabilitias by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance,

taking into account the possibility of U. 8. inter«
vention at a future OY date. |

DRAFT : TOP SECRET

&- Hoted the tapextanca the President attaches to publica~
tion in tha Free World press of tha terroristic actions

of the Castre ragine.

18 hy Hp? ” ny pyre tnt ar OL

a Noted the President's direction that the Taek Forea on
Cuba mako a datatled study of possible wealmesses and

. wulearabilities in the elements which exart control in

Cuba today.

for tha

i. Agxseed that no separate Cuban military force should be.
organized im the United States, bue thet Cuban nationals

would ba encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces ~

and trained in-speciel_units-conmmteting-o§-Sparich--
. speskinguatierais, under a plan to be presented by
the Secratary of Dafanse in connection with hie review

of U. S. conventional forces, .

al © ‘under the {rection of
scence, wo prepare a
pordt ions a t to Cuba,”
ideration of/the PresideAt.


. - de Agreed that Cuban nationals now in the United States

fl he,

. de, 4g As opt

ey co
Van tee yaa oy poo

' “7

ale on ey

s ret

oA fn vet}

-, :, Other countries wader .t the Battle dct.

DRAFT TOP SECRET

wilt ba given refugee statue and assisted, under a.
program te be developed and directed by the Socretary
of Health, Education & Walfera, in carrying. on their
*}"| €oxrmer occupations.

encouraged te locate in other areas,

‘Refugees now in Miemi will be

Cuban nationals

entering the United States will be given refugee status. |

o Agreed net te iepose a, complets trade embargo on Cuba
for the present, but if later actions by Castro resulted
in @ decision te do so, all trade with Cuba would be. .

stopped. The Secretary o£ State agreed to send to the

Progident per an analypis o£ how a U. &. embarge on

trade with Cuba would affect our trade relations with

1. Noted that eha President would discuss with Canada the
position ef Canadian subsidiaries of BU. 8. corporations
in the event of U. S. impositions im trade enbargoes

on Cuba,
. 7 a
m. Agreed that tha United States should at once initiate
nagot tation te enlarge the willingness of other Ameri~
can states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS

. arrengenents te quarantine Castre, ouch ae Q breaking

|, dtplomatie relations with Cubes (2) controling


ee
a “hag

Se

Be

Docld: 32423505 Page 25

' tion

“! eglexration ef t

DRA ET _. ROP SECRET

aubverolvs activictes of Cubsn ageotss q3) preventing |

tions vith cubes! 3) ereating & Caribbean security

forces 6) iatlating a naval patrol to prevent Cuben

inves lon of over, states in the Caribbean; and (7) de-

punciation of Castre as an agent of international come

munies by | all nations of this: hemisphere.

Agreed that the Alitance ‘For Progress should be

stroagthencd by ‘such measures &s Q rapid inp lementas

projects; (2) ace

other Latin Amex>

of colected gocial davelopuent
the “top lementab los of
ican aid; and (3) provision ef additional resources

for Batin American economic and social development,

; including consideration 9 of a svppienental eppropetay a a” oe

_ - tion for development loans.

Agreed chat tis uU. &. Information Agency would pa

expand its exiating program ia Latin America rather

chan initiate electronic warfare egainst the Castro

regime. eye
Do ype’ cea ate hE Lod

Agreed that U. S. military officers, wder genedal

guidance ro ba prepared by tha Department of State,

would discuss, the Castro threat. £0 all Letina Anarica.. -

with Latin. Avorican officers .


TOP SECRES

eb te! Agresd that the Secreta ry of State should prepere &

. Be
i |
( repert ou & possible ‘new juridteal basis for effec-

‘give anti-comauniet action.

Tun P ICAN RSPUBL HATEL

| pf Wy 8, POLICY TOR
on Cubs would prepare prooptly

Agreed that the cask Force
cy aad long-range plans for an
t of crises in Haiti or the ©

both emergen ti-communist

noved the President's view that

 Domintean Republics —
throw of .

the Uaited states should not initiate the over

Trujilla ‘before we knew what govarmecnt. would sueceed
“y action ageing Teajthto should be. on tat - ve

ot him, and chat

° muletlacerals, -
o. ork Sw af ey “ty

Demy aren

i Ad ie,
ye

ao
. f . fe . ‘4

F
fm

ae

HW ales DocId: 32423505, ‘Page 26 a

intervention in the oven :

TOP SECRET

copy No, 5G} =

oo

DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS
483rd NSC Meeting
(5/5/61),

7
|
1. U.S, POLICY TOWARD IRAN
Agreed that a Task Force should be established under. the Assistant

Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate

& report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on

May 19.
2. U, S, POLICY TOWARD KOREA CO 7 Cites
Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for greene

Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate |
t
i]

@ report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on |

May 19, _
inte
3. U.S, POLICY TOWARD CUBA —
(NSC Action No, 2413-c; Memo for Nsc, sama subject, dated May 4, 1961) a
a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall I
of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not .
likely to achieve this end, the matter should be ‘reviewed at
intervals with a view to further action, |
b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military in- |
tervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would fore- | ;

closa the possibility of military intervention in the future.

a TOP SECRET


3.

Ee

Io.

DRAFT! TOP SECRET

Ur-8. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) .

Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade
or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither
course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, - .

Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely
and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, e2-

pecially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet bioc

“military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible in-

tervention may be maintained at an adequate level.

Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the

‘Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regiue,

and to possible political action to end the current terror,
Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence

Agency, with other departoents, should make a detailed study of

_ possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which

exert control in Cuba today,

Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be

improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized
asa government- in-exile, support should be given to it insofar

as it continues to represent. substantial Cuban sentiment,

Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized

in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged

to enlist in the U. S, armed forces under plans to be developed

by the Secretary of Defense,

“25 ; TOP SECRET

en aye
eee

Tepper
t

yo eee ek
. » + .


DRAFT ! TOP SECRET
i

3. Us S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued) |

i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U, 5. visitors' visas

will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to

be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, “Education

and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations, Refugees
now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas, Cuban

nationals entering the United States will be given refugee’ status, -e

All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and

it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizen-

ship.

4. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade.embargo on Cuba, The

Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis

of the effects of a U, S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation
to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is im- |
I

posed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain excep=
tions for Canada and with Réd Cross distribution of drugs,

k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation
to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in
bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro,
such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) control-
ling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms

r

shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba:

(5) creating a a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval

patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Carib-

bean; and (7) denunciation of Castro. as an agent of internat ional ee

communism by all nations of| this hemisphere.

-3- . TOP SECRET

Ke ha
HY 50955. “Doel :

3. U, S<¢ POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

de.

Be

‘be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assis-
I

DRAFT : ; TOP SECRET

Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by
such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social de-
velopment projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of
other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional re=- -
sources for Latin American economic and social development, in-
cluding consideration of a supplemental appropriation for devel-
opment loans of the order of $200-$400 million,

Agreed that the U. 8, Informat fon Agency would expand its existe
ing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare
against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should. be made
available to non-U, S,. groups.

Agreed that U, S. military officers, under general guidance to

be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro

threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a
. {

possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action,
Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of

State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should

tant to the Special Counsel ‘to’ the President,

abe _ TOP SECRET

ety
ites
HW 50955 _


TOP SECRET

rel

: - DRAFT

4 4, U, Ss POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HALTI

Agreed that the Task Force 7) ‘Cuba would prepare promptly both emer-

gency and Long-range plans for anti- ~communist intervention in the

i
A
i

“event of crises in Haitl or jhe Dominican Republic, Noted the

President! s view that the united States should not initiate the

een ee TY

overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed .

him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

e

t
f
i
i

5. U, S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

“agreed that the ‘Task Fore | on Guba would consider what can be done

in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over

; i
in ‘that country. :
H

6, U. 8. POLICY IN MATNLAND SOUTHEAST ASTA
a, Noted that efforts mn be made to reassure Sarit and Diem

that we are not “abandohing Southeast Asia.

b; Noted-the President! 8 view that sarit could be told that we are

considering inclusion (of U. “Ss. troops in SEATO forces to be sta~

i
tioned in Thailand, | the timing to be dependent on developments

during or after the fortheoning l4-nation Geneva Conference.

c, Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending

recommendations to the President promptly on the number of vu. S

training troops to be stationed in Thailand,

TOP SECRET

|
.7 7
|
|


} May 24, 1961

| sexpert MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH:

Dick Bissell
Tracy Barnes

Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities
, 4n Guba should be made before the President returns from his European

/ However there are a few things he thought should be done immediately:

1, That he revise the internal CLA organization in preparation for possible
covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miami. —

2. That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban pilots be continued as pilote under
commercial cover {n Central America! and perhaps one or two American
. companies, No commitment should be made to them that they would be
used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not... _. .....
"ge any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skills | a
alive and to keep them available. =|

3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan aituation. We have left a lot of
Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation. He would
‘Like to pull this equipment out of there, turning some of the B 26's over
;_ to Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilota to remain there to train.
" Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request
7 and would only be done if he insisted upon it as a re-payment for services
.' gendered, I streseed that no Americans should be involved in the train~

ing of Nicaraguan pilots. . | ; aa on.

4 He would like to train a few Cubans) as radio operators. They would be een
trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others
were belng trained. This amounts to training some individual agents for
possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men
trained. It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeks.
5. ‘In addition, the Agency would like l survey the various potential insur-
__-vecttonary groups which now exist. There are several of these groups,
- three or four of which claim to have aa underground in Cuba. We should
“speak to them, We should tell them we could. make absolutely no commits ss ks
>| ment_as to any future activities. However, he would like from them an ie:
_ assesment of what they thought they could do in the future and -- if they
“were to be active -- what holp they would require from the United States.

TOP SECRET


.
TOP SECRET

ue . : 7 ; | - 2|-

; |
_"’' This would enable us to make a jadgment as to whether we should ene.
... gage in covert activity based partly upon this information -- informa-
: tion which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required
and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been
done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groups contacted would include
the@Council, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR.

6. In addition, he waa informed that Swan radio could not be used by-the
“"." USLA, They are unable to assimilate it into their system, I suggested |
owice > that we might try to And a good Latin [American group, e.g., The League
of Democratic Partics or the Institute lof Political Education run by Jase
Figures, touse it, I said that for the. Pouncil to operate the station did
not. seem to me to be desirable.

vos. J, I discussed the general situation in Miami and the various newspaper
reports. I pointed out that the RIA agents now in Miami ware known to

everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were

-.. identified with pre-invasion activities, Their presence I felt only in-

tensified the rivalry among Cuban groups and served as a focal point of

discontent. I requested that this group be broken up and that to the ex-

tent agents were necessary new peopls «~ people not identified with the

; pre-invasion activities -- should be sent to Miami.

. @. It was agreed that no future covert activities should be conducted fn |
‘ the Miami area and that the groups with whom we dealt should be scattered
“in other cities throughout the SoutSeastern part of the country. 1 said that
. working in Miami was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city
room of a newspaper.

9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be informed that we were making
a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be told nothing more.
specific than that. :
10. I also referved to the newspaper stories which reported that Batistiancs
- were belag used supported by U.S. “Cla funds, They said this wae not
-accarate. They said that this would be very carefully looked into and that
the most specific instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos
should be supported directly or indirectly by the U.S. government.

Hy 50955 ‘Dectd: 32423505 Page 33

i
[;
wae . : i
a
TOP SE ECRET

A

3°

11. lam strongly of the opinion that wa must clear up the Miami ; area

ag soon as possible, Therefore, I will get Ribicoff to expedite the

Refugee program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds
im order to get these people into jobs, Schoole, ete, in ather parts of
ao the country. Unless we do this we ure /going to have continually in-
hie creasing problems in the Miami aren,

¥,
+

Richard N. Goodwin

AAT See HEAT
WL HGORGS PDoananesiaees

re
aye
perigee


ty A

dyuae 3G, PI -,

hihdbe Sleds epee Bug, THO NAD E NT

ce a ee or Rega oles 200

aT ‘.
i
tt

fogubosyidt tie fll ods views Re ana whe woyhked In CES dosing tee

Lay mod meeved 2g a pew iedh n@ CLA conwalsamt in the yeare inet,

Ly
i
i
!

Ie prokaby baen vexy yoo, In the

joma, the irbneopha of aa bitelligaacs
ageMey are uoknarp?; all € the puldic heave about (er ahoeld boas
shevtt are a crvera, But, apals in the neater of the cas, aa

| . ggavey dadicahre bw » atandeats ane aetivity cao aitowd éasnned fee

top bmhedca, CDSs xecaerd |

we

panne fees

awe Gl ciaadessting Sve a

witilde agree, Sosa dns ypertad thing te recagalss tesay, in ray |
jedgagat, da thet ths wt, | [ae at pracant gure ant mor etttuted. SM
nheewt owad up ite gues, itn margin for future eraoy ie sractiondty
mesuienent, tnd mere OFA dobacte will ohake tatu gancianenuiy :
ip OU poiley, af bien ae ne ae abroad, Aud, until CIA je vialoly
rsergusianad, U will (aa ba hae Algoringa lostancap bo widely blamed for
fovalaoeantea af whidk ib ie) whedhy pbibatetot. Bice
i ;
the sygunant of thia werasgenadumr in that CLAle qvenbla can he cracad
ty the aufonausy with whieh thes ageeay hae bem parmittad ta opseetes
aud that tate augauamuyp ba fre to farce main caysuns Fh} ae treticns rhe:
“icogeine of clandeattes eAerayc ouayp (8) oe Laasleuunts soerartden ce! -
the xaletlonbip hotweas eppaat Sou ata policg; (3) a0 lnedacarate”

Oey shoud we ~= B Bewas ie weperied GLA Catlins hw bia Loe
grcanicnst seating en to caged te tiow hencpicelae ad Oevaratls

 publiahty, tha Crewe VnAis Guel tenatan cgarvadds cal sete abreast:
muliliied by the Moon af oe era ageedusdieny ob whian Epil cn
than le. ge, the vetlel} bal Rkegeodl anh (ipctee Soekes Ge “TI ue
téyater leas Leibogm af cua,

13, 1284). .

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eed eanneedekadatotbenchuten aecaatemaiamel abbded sae tenietehhahitanaend Fae Ae eat ee ea

agit tiki Leaaran bees

ee Ponwdertnae Dig wan seaweeds,

i


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va - oo . Se CREEL

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i

cuncepilan of the relaittonrhin, between cperstiens amd imelligence.
Tha memoerantam aise cuRESate waye in which some ef thapa prab-
lems can pexbeps be stevia.
|
k. CIA CIA Autonomy it

GLA condncta three nosin for ena of ageret works clantestins intelli-
gence enllaction;. covert political cperatinags; aod paramilitary

-gativities, It carsicg, on thege fuacticns with relative autonorny. | .
the ressens far tha Rutonen.y are nisterical. :

When OLA began, the State Lbpertineut, etaid thinking too miuch is
torma of ite traditionnt missions in foreign afalea, lowked on this
new venture with suspicios abd renunpunced the opportunity to aeize
firm control of CIA operations, It did net, for example, try to
esteblilah any afinctive systedn of clearance for CIA activities; and
gorae ambacsaders frankly pretexsed not to know what CIA waa upto
in theie countries. After 1953. the fact that the Secretary of Stata and
the Divector of Cevtral Intalligence were brothers further confirmed
CiA's indspeadones froan supery Saion by State Department éeeke.

, In the menntima, CIA grew th sigs and power, Lnying ths fiftion is
begaa in seme arose to eutstrip the State Department in tha quality of
ite porgencal, Partly because CLA peid higher salaries and even —
more parhaps because Allen: Dallen gave hin paogle courageous pro-
tection against McCasthylis | attacks, CIA wee able te attract and hold |

' 9 large number of able and Ludepondent--minded mon, Tke mers it
_ eédied brilliant activists ta is octal, the mere momentum ite operations
develeped, anc the greater vale it played in the iniifetion of policy.

By the time that ftnve had begun to be fully aware of the probleme
 gvested by as active end autemon:ous CiA, tt bad leng since missed

the chance ta establitt ita orm ultimmte authority. While Sinte ra.

tained a neminal suparvisiealover covert political epsrations, this was.

to come degren offant by CLASa temdency bo pregent @ proposed operation

almest as a int pccemolt RAs State never hed title to certral overt

clendestine intelligosse elections and it bed low aronnd ta such

ares as over’ pulltiez] reper ting ail oven in the rofimtonence el

evar ‘iplomatic contacts. ‘ t

*
i
|

i
rm
}


For ita part, CEA had developed & whale enrigs af functions paral

' Ieling already oxieting funeticna of the State Departmen, aad of
the Defease Departarvmt as. well, Taday it bag its oon palitices
assks and military staffs; if has tn effect ite own fereiga gorvice;
it hag (or boa had) ite own combat forces; it even hae ite own alr
force, Ka arnval budget is akhovi  tlinee that af the State Degare-
man. The contemporary, CIA possssace mony of the characteristics -
ef & state within a Bia.

; i
4
th Bleectrina y
Taough CLS's eutenomy developed tor historical reaaanas, it has ten:
abla to endure becsusa there ia ne cectrins governing aur conduct ut
clandeating operations, Tha problem cf doctrine for CIA ta the aucent

to which ite varicus slandeating misetous are corepatikie with a free
and open gaciety. ,

‘

Rin idte te argue that te¢ause the Carnmuniste can do guch-and-much,
we are {roe to da it feo, Communisra is a creed surtared in cone
epirsey! and the whole potne ef Cofnrauniet eociel and political er gani-
zation le to make conepiracy effective. Mf 'ighting ire with fire’ meana
contracting the freedoms troditionally enjayed by Amertcasa in ordar
to giva more freadom to CLA, no one saricusly wisnas te do that, Yat
Ido nat {eal that we heave tried rigorously to think through the liraila
which the maintenance of an open society places on ascret activity.
Ural thlg ia done, CIA's role will net be clearly ésfined ard under -
eteed, The prebdlem which must be faced ia: what cort of aceret
activity ia consistent with the preservation ef 4 free gecial order?

Wo rmuat begin, I believe, ly accepting the feet tint the Unitad Gratas
will continue to be @ netion In which polleictass vill ack questions end
roake epeechss, rénoariera will dig aw sterics, newsnspere will put.
lish editoviala, individuals, eriven by promptings ct conacience, will
blurt ont things harroful tothe state, and ea om We do not wish to
change theses things and could nat do ao elttyus victeting the eggenca
ef cur secioty, Thesr thinga make up the framework in which CLA
mugs operate, ia ghert, they constitute the problem: aod, ag
Cenaral Marghall used to aay, "There's ne point in fighting the
problen. "

ean aus on

ae

ae nOO55 Doct

2 REN PY I
39495505 Page: 37


4.

peatetesae. tt , pormtani tle sae ae. ao they @ ton net t ceerupt the tha
ad practicas of ef « wv secie Ye 84 ond nd EDst Ebs¢ they 65299 to ha

principloas Row
pernlacthla when thar eaenet, ia it fo GaTYUDs nore priaciplas aud
neverna sorcaramerncinege-tenceennts werespncarreameanat es spemscoat an won al

wile wears
bv oneee vs menage rata oe manag
|

practices.

nach form of seerst activity ibresents ite own problarm, Clandautlue
iealligence cellection bag been a traditionnl function af the natlonal
einte. Ite rules and usayse are falrly woll established, In the
main, aeplonege, cacsueted with discrotien, should present no e
‘genat problem. Hewever, whan conducted with aa egen checkbook
aad a broad orandste, even espionage can bagin te paab againet tha
lirnite of eecrat activity in un.open society, Urensider later, for
eanmoplea, the quiseilen ed the Contre! lad Amorican Source (CAS) and -
whetner the overdaing of CAS 13 not beginning to harm other activitica
ef tho govaynment, . -
Cevert political operations praesn?t a trickler prethlam. QCscagiens
ariss when it is neceseery to.eubsidles newspipers, politicians asd
oveznisations in ether counts les. But corruption of thea political Hla
of another mation ia not a responaibility to be Matty gesamed, |
wonder whether CIA hea ent done teo much of thin for the joy of is.
Paramililary activitiaa arcate on oven more cificult preblem, if
enly bscauso the problems ef canceslinont area so moth more Gificult.

In general, Lopeld euggsct that any secret oparation whess wucces2 is
dependent on the eupgreasion. of nsws, on lying te Cangresemen end
journalists and o2 the Cecaption of tha electorate cheuld ho undertaken
only when the orlate is se conniiavable that the galing really sean to
cutwaigh tha diszdvantagee. | Thie suggsete thet ths eine af the pre-
posed eroratinn may be ef crusind aperteance. Sarath emraticnag can
be dove with a minimum ef accompanying coreugtion, The groster
the vieibility ef the cneraztion, the more ite euecase depends co
thwarting the impolece and denying the valuez of aa opza aecioty,
the risking lt beceres, atk the rove urgonk it ig that an everwheluiing
cnae bs mada for Ka merasity.

|
tn short, when confeonted with aprepessd operation, wa mast mol only
ank whether tha oparation le technically fensibia in ita awn tazime; we
must agk whether Me quecuas recuivas our apes egciesy te bs In any
gavigue way falso $e ite avn principles.

Hy 50955 — ‘Docld: 32423405 Page 36 ’ 4

| 5.
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a

1 cpevations aad Sylicy
1, Speuatiens an RNSy

away 22 Hye

Clandestine sctivitier abcd ba agnzsaed net eniy ia the context

of theily veletionahl; ty an open secluty st shee in tixg cgmext of thalz

ralaticnsbip ta United ELReS feroign policy. ,
!

Cis wpervations have nm teen bate eliectively evkerdinata to U. g.

feveign polley. | i .

“A, Glandesting treeligencs collection 9+ °F chavter, tree frou
Seate Legaxtsiene ctowtcol, this fact anports American foreign policy
we aomoltiteds of mmcGeraysinente when CLA ta dleesverad recruiting
BEER OF develgcisy eourees tn @ fyinelly countrys The veces?
Sngaosee LHSLe hon CLA, without notice fo the: Cengul Genored,

tried ta gsulvest & pinmber of tha Ipacial Branch ef the Jingapore
Felice provides as tnetyuctive eutmopld. After complications cf -
adicraus conplositys inelnding an attempt to gubject the recruit to

2 lewdetector tent, tt tarned out that the rocruit kd long since

infer med hie superistd od tha CIA approach acd wee leading CLA

imo atrep which, whis Springs produced eenaiiexakie embartass-
mex? to relations between the US and the fingagpere gavernoment. - ,
There hays been trowkice of a cemparabie rert in Pakictaa and in
Jagan (where a group of Chineso Nationale werd erniggled iato Sasebe
to work in a CLAWNDA apesation).

CA bas easad that, in gach ensas, neither the Earckoosy ner the Dapari
ment ia Washington is narmally isformed of this type cA aneration.

th abort, no sae knows how many potential problams fer US ferciga
palley e~ end hew much potential frictlen with islendiy states << are
being created 6t this moment by CLA elendestine intelligence eperails.
Surely thera ig on argument fox pevmibsting Sinte tS éyeide whesher th
ndvantage to be goings by tha apsration {3. Ge the information desiva:
fyvam en agent withly the Special Branch of the Slagapore Poliez) ont~
weighs the riek (6.8. axseperating tho lecnl goveramert ered shaking
ite confidence both in our purpUese aud in cor 6eDR5T) Clendeatine
injohlignnes oparstions pheulé plainly be clagzod roth with the Nagert
mort of Siate and (enve for encentiocal inetances ad su ARTE6Ment o
the Beoretary of State) with gha Local U.S. Aimbacsedore

5
is
hl
H
4

ag.

4

a


&.

- 2. Covert politiens cpsrnitgas toshniesily geqaire State
Department clearance. In praciice, however, CEA haa often bean
able to seiga the Initiative in ways which erduce State's role almost
to that cf a rubber stan,

This hag bore pavtly tha eonos quence cf the supesisr drive asd
activiam of CIA personnel, sapacially a9 compared with (he diffidence

. of State Department pereoncel, For cnample, whan men coms to CLA

_ with the angignment of develaping covert political campaigaa or

organizing cenpa or prepezing for paramilitary warlsre, theee men
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and seal; they probably feel thar =”
they are noi cerning theiz pay unlese, cay, they organias aa many
cougs 08 poautble, || Bae concept of ‘contingency pleaning’ has
Jegitimatized tao coucrate praparation ef cperations oti) preaumally
tae hypeshetical arog £03 people did net at {iret notice thas ‘eantingsacy
planning, ' whan cagriad to the etage of recruitment and traloing of
porscnaes, crates & youted interest which cften tranclorms contin~
geacies inte apparent escoasitics, Thus, if @ grcep ia assembled
and revved up ono continganty basis, thea the failuve to caryy the
project through (it to argued) will invite the disapzoingment end
alienation of the greupi Ge the preosure lnercaces to fallow through
ea what had etoyted 29 3 pore eseculation. Thies wae a canteen factor,
of eqarse, in the Cuban daticion -« ths fact that distamiment of the
Cuban force in Guetemota fuct ocamed te cronte ten many problems and
arobaryesemante, Having csterad inte relaticns with perenmalities in
foreign lamde, CLA koe pometiines esomed te fen that we must thera--
after de pretty much what they wen -- or ding they will biew security
OF even go over to the Communists, Thies eppreach baa mode us on
etcaaion ths prisonszs of cana own agents.

2We heecine prisoners of cal ggenta in anetier senge tea, Tho Cubsn
spleade loayee the strong impression that CLA te mot able te ceatrol las
own lew-lerel sporativas. While the CLA pengie in Washinzien ara mon
ef exzeptionaliy high quality, tho mon attracted to field Jobs are somee
timas tough asd even viclocs progle motivated by évives of thet oun

and net necesenzily in pelitics! o¢ cran moral eympathy with the nurpoaes
ef the eparotion. Such actions as locking up tha Revolutienasy Counail,
such enterprises ss Operation 40 in Miand whera CIA egents eopertadly
trained Cubons in methode of tortura, ouch erisedts a3 the datentien and
third degrees repertadly administered to Dr. Aodalfa Nodal Tarsda aod

16 ether democratic Crbane thie Fereusry -- all (hice scegeat that things
go am under CLA epenparenip: mith which CLA in Ww AON ston $a only Ciroby
acquataied, ;

|

+f) Cys

"page xo.

FSherty
b8t
1

i has meant too thatthe Gtata Depertment, aftes apprised of an

optratien only in ite leter stagon, is umier great preacure te —_
endorse the cporation as eleready mounted besaues of the alleged

evil congseyuonces of onarclelug 2 vete, Lwell remember Tom

Mann's remark the day the decision was m2de to go ahesd on Cuba:

"l would never have favered inltinting this cperatlon: bet, aince te

aa gone aa far as it has, Ido not think we can elek ceiling it off.

Moreover, mi & tisas when there io increasing pramium on activist,

Eiate, when it quaations CIA cparationa or Initiztives, caste Koslf tn

aprinay, sisey, sogative rele. _ The advecate of clandestine activiiies .

gterma ough’ and coalietic! the eppeanst hee te invoke euch istengiblea

G3 the vepuictien of the United Statea, world publis epinfion, "What

do we say in th, Uniteal Nations ?T", ote., arnt eorine hopelessly

ideallatic, legalistia end ‘act *

The reouig of ClA'a initiative in covert polities] encrations has boon

t craste aitusticns which have forced pelicy on the State Departront.

This waa oot the ortginnl idee behind CIA, Aa Allen Dullss wrese |

in hie 1947 memorandum to the Sonata Armed Serviees Coammilice,
"Tha Central [atelilgenca Agency shewd hava rothing to de with palley. "
_ Yont, in tha ycare elnce, CLA has, in effoct, ‘nade’ pelicy in many
parte uf the world, A numbar of gowarnments etill in power kvow

that thoy have even been targnta of CLA attemrta m8 overthray «+ nf

& State of rind celeulated to etimulate friendly feallngs toward the

United Statea, nd maaln, cf courea, isa prime owarmple, —

Thia experience auggests that the preasat syetawn by which CIA retifies
Etate of a projected covert operation {9 inscaqrats to pretect US

tntereate, Thar mugt he some means by which ete can he infozmod
ef euch cocrations a¢ an early enough etaga te aifeet the conception
and prellminary planning ¢€ the eperntingn, Ctharwise CLA will con-
tinve to confrom Meta with Propovitiona having pstential limpet on
foreign policy but 6s tos lage | & point to subject thet anges? te reascn~
aNe gontrci. i

3% Ths e Contralles Av mestean Soures 3 (CAL) vopreesngts a particuing
agpect. of CIA's aneraachmosn on policy ermaking fanstiesa. CIA taday
bag nearly ag many peaple under ficial carvas erarvege ao ‘Stxte <»
39900 to B7OG. About £500 of these are undo Etat Department cover

Be |

RoR SaRE To
af 7


8 e
|

(eha other 2209 are preanemntly ander militazy < or other neneZtats
ofllcim cover), Cripinally the uge cf Siete Lepartenart cover for ~
CIA personnal was suppuotd to be etrictly limited and temporary.
Tha Wablen-Carrer-Jeckoon repoct etated tn 1943, “The CIA seovuld

eat use Biete Departrent cover #9 4 oimple anawer te all ite problenis,
put ghauld procetd to daveley ie own ovtaida cuver and evertusily in
this way end through Ineveased efficiency of ite overceas perscanrl,
find o way tu temper its decsands ypen the Siais Dopartmerst. " Mange
theless CLA haa menclly tneveaaed ita requiaittans for afficial cover.

@
There agen g¢veral rcagena why CLA haa abandoned its original tatentinc.
of develesing sytters cf private caver. i la easier to arrange cores
oecurh Siete; itis less acpensive; it ia quicker; if fecilltates tc.
sueurity of apecatinna aa well na of corarnunteationa; it insurae &
pleasanter iife fos the CJA pouple, but the affect is ta further the
GLA aencroathmant on the treditional functions ad State.

In ser;ne missioas, I landesstéind, CAS pereunnel cutaumbers regular
S1Bte Department personnel, [a the American Embagsy in Vienna,

out of 20 persons ilyted in tha Octobar 1940 Feretgn Bervice Liat es.
being {on tha Politiess Section, 16 are CAS paraonasl) ef the 3) officers .
listed oe engaging {a raporting activities, evey half are CAS, i tha
13 efficere listed in the Political Saction in cur Embaasy in Chile,
liara CA6. Gn tha dey of Preaident Kennedy's Inauguration 4? porcant

ef the political clficors aarving in United States Embaesios ware CAG

Samatimes the CIA iclscion shicf has been ta tha country longer, bag
nope enoeoy at his disposal, wields mere inflogres land ie abler) thas
tha Ambeseador., CUlten bo has direct eccess te the local Prime
Minister. Somatiniss fas during a eritical period ta Leon) be purausa
a differeat polley frora that ef the Ambassetor. Aloe be la goneraily
wall known lecally ao the CHA roprenerintivas

In the Paris Lmenasy today, | ‘there ars 128 CLA poeple. CLA in Parise

hae long gince bagun te mova isto avenn cf political gaporting morsvally
accupied by State. |The CLA mon daing overt lateral politienl reperting —

outnumber thege in the Embkasoy's political secthoa by 16-2. CLA kas
even sought to monspeliza contact with certain French pelldical parsenalt-
tle, amang ther tha Pronident of tha Natiocal Agacrably. CIA cceupica |

the top Door of the Paria Lenhassy, @ feat wall icnown locally; | awl ca


3.
“the might of the Goaerola! vevelt ia Algeria, possezo=by noted
‘with amugemsang that tha top flear was ablane with Mette. (Lam

infosmed that Ambagender Gavin waa oble to evters extrance that
night te the CIA offices only wrath csffieulty.)

CLA ig apparently nov firmly crmindgted to tha CAS approach an a
pormanend sabztion fer ite problems. BS le presaing ta have CLA

rsaphs given the rank of Ceunaeeler, Belers Stata lesoe contred of

rose Bat more of its pragumed overeess poreonne)l, amd boferce CAS
heegnws parrangotly integvoted lwie the Farsigs ervice, if would oa
gaan Limpertans (a) so Resure evary ambssradoe the fiom contre)

aver the lennl CAS astetlioa naminglly promiged ia the NOC Directive

cf dannexy 19,1963, amd (L) ite review ths currem CAS algustion with

ap oye toa steady rocuction ef CAS persensal,

4, Faramilitary warfare, gather, ta regarded tn soma quarters
aaa purely rezhaient meters, oauily detechalie frem policy and there.
fora & proper (unction of the Department of Defense, Yot there ia
almest no CIA function raged peculiarly dependant on the political
context then pavamilliery warlore.

These ave several ranaonn fee this. Fer ona thing, a pavamiiitacy
opeyatinn ie la ita otters 3 large end eitzinviaile epereticn and thareby,
ao suggested above, clavhes with the preaupreritions ef eur cpen |
soclety. (These ceariderctigss nead not agply, hewoves, to th

training of, say, the auth Virtonrnece in guorrille tactios er ts the
eugpert of alrnedy ealeting querrils activities,} Yer sucther, Ui
moral and polittend Fe oe af Clrest raremniiitery fstlure is acute for
va, Communists, whon they stimulate poramiitary activity, avo
daing what the world oxeects|frem them: when we de it, we appaar
to betray ous ewn proisesed | principles and tharefars canncé alinzd te
éompoand delinquency by detaat ', Mereover, ee tae reqent Alanriae
apleeda chewed, onte wo eonvines the werl4d that we axe ceonssiticd to a
paramilitary endenyer, we will bo blamed foe 231 ecria ef things. And,
na the recent tractera-far ~prlecusra egissde ehiwsl, chen wa do sand
moan te poasihie death, wa eanect lightly write them eff aad claze the
bookha, Thea Cernrevintste, on the other han, have ne sormmlaa akoat
Ueaaids Bing @ lealng phan

|

|

i
|


SLOREL 19,

Niereaver, fuarsillea wowiare As fought, much more than military
mtn orticarily realise, fa ex! lPesiogtcal centext, Ths gnarrliia
suceacde when hie pregsam onliets graterests npperts and & is
very Gifierlt indeed to bert him when the countrpaise is with bln.
Yoa Mook told Genazal MaretioN in 1946.act to wersy ebost the
querrilian in Indoneving “sro are sending $C, 00 men ont there
and wilh clean the efteation up in the three montha,"” Meggbsll,
eng bad had axpartesce fighting guo7ritias in the Philipgisaa,

yeplied, “Tt won't be eo ensy. You will find thet thay will bleed

you to death." Cppzus and Algeria Wlustrate the éiiReulty. of ever~
coming guerrills racistanca through sheer wolghs ef military force. °

Sarloue guerrilla mer vomente! havea baan defeated anly threo times cinca
the end of the Second Worlké ¥, ars in Grases, baraves Tite's defecticn
closed tha northern tos ate} In the Philipgines; mad in Malaya. In.

tha last two cas6e the guere dla rosietance exded kocause of far

combination. cf peliitent es gyi mlligary Conatermereuzes. | The Gtruggle

‘in AMaleya, ae Fheid NMozghal Tompler underet toon feed seid), waa for

the minds and hearts ef the peoples it therefera iovelved net ealy

paramilltary operatians bul @ vast educational program, exgaalsation
ef trade caatons, politics! reform sod an offar ef national indepanence,
if the guerrillas powsy lieg in hie revolutiocary pregrem, tie answer
lies in past in meating the neove which anahle the gusrrilte te rowse
the esuutrycide, my fthie vt a political goal, ' wrete Mao Tea-tung,
“guorrilla werlare nest faith, an it musi Uf ite politien] ebjectives co
not evincida with the. nopirsticas ef ths propio ami (f their apmpathy,
ceaperation asvi aasistusce cannot be gained,” lle aided, “Po wa
want the support of tha mannes? M wa do, wa aval go ameng to _
289003 arques them ta activity; ecncern oureeives with thois wead
aed woe." |
For thoes reasons, porecntitery variance canoe be ecasthersd ag
primarily a milltary WOERIAS RB to prbuarty & polltder’ wanpen end -

“snus therefore be aub§ ected ta alove and earciul petities! creratg he

B& prebably shauwd be retained ina recenetitutag CU rather thna

‘ ewansflarred to Dafenza. |

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1

55 Docid: 32423505 . Page 44

ik. “

 §. Haw to _Estattioh ‘ich Felicy Cantrel? Hora l wonder whether the
Pritioh experignes “rilght not not ba of vals. The noteble foxture of the -
British intelligences system in the determiration to keep clandestine
ectivity under otrist Foreign Cifles econtrcl, This contrel lo achicved '
fga number of ways! -

&) Secrat hittiNgence fervice (Mi-6) itself operates under
the direction of the Joini Intelligence Cemmitios, which has a
Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Pitrich Dean, who |
is now tha Britich representative et the UX) asd which includes ’
the Service Intelligence diractera end representatives of the a
Colonial Offics aod the Commonwaalth Relations Office as well
as the Chief of 54,

&) bnale political warfare directives are originated, act
by 355, bet by the ivermation Research Department ina the
Foreign Offics, aften in consultation with an imerdepertmental
Working Group on Esternsticanl Commnmist Fronts, aod omiar
the ultimate centrol of the Superintending Undar-fleeretary of
the Permanont Undey-Secretasy' 8 Deparimert tn the Foreign
ss . Cékiee.

¢) SIS covert pslitical action campalqaa moat net only tan
form to Foreign Cifics dizostives but mat ba cleared with the
eppropzstate Fereim Office gvogrenbkical Geakus

to, Se &) working grougs under IAD cheismanship gerera ogerae
tiene la epecial arcas, such en, fer exasenp hte GSino-Seviat vola-
thans or the Waxid Youth Fentival,

e) a Pereign Offices Stal Lisieen Officer eite nam te the 613
Chief, and Feraign Oniea i cificiate eorve tanre af deity in SB
aecticna,

ALD theas devices might ba s¢apisd for use by the Siete Dopartnaret,
Organizationally, thie would meta ibaa the intalligenes sgontdy weald
setain oporetionnl aumarcayy bus that its operntions wentd bo at th
paints eubject te Mate Doyartos ut clearante «> © elsatences ta be

Tepe et Pp Pe NR
BW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 45

enforced by directives, by Suara Department chairmanship of -
working groans, and by the infiltration of State Derarimant

porsonnel ints the intelligance ageacy.
Otrvlousily thie osteus would act succeed, hawover. walsea the
soate Dapartroent Maslf ware prepared) te overcome its lebrod

hablies of dination, neguttviem aod delay anf to taxa a firm and
porpoesiul Bip © onthe situztion,

Iv. Gcorntions and teteitigones

Tha gelationship where egasttigne and intelligence raises particu.

 lagly perplexing quectionn, ‘Intelligence! includes two separable

activities: clancedtion cellactios; and sescerch, aealysie andi
orzivstion, Tha Uvet decle with that amzll portion ef row ixtelll-
genes procured by aceret meang (Mr. Dulles estmated in 1947 thet
"a aroper snalygio cf tho inteliigance obtainahie by. . . avert,
nermal, and sbovebornd meane wenld sugply us with ever 06 percent,
i ehould oatimaio, of the taformation required for the guidance of our
antional policy"}; 2 secand involves the colleen and intirpretation

_ of ali forme of intelligeaca, however obtained and the production of.

agiimated.

Under the Britich syutem, elandestine collection ie entrusted to tho
Sserat Intelligence Gcervicoe, The resserah, ensiyets and estimating |
function te located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American eystom, CiA hee roaponsthility for both
clesstecting collection acd wesaaych and acalpnine Tho Stata Depart-

- mert’s Buresu of Inteli{ganea amd Reezarch oles hag rescares usd

analysis raeponsibilitiess Bae, im practice, GiA has eciabiiched
contrel over the machiaevy fer pradacieg natieoa’ eatimetes in auch
& wy as to reduco State's contribution ta aubmitting ite views to CLA

for acceptance or rejection in cthar words, where in Greet Britain

the Foreign Oifica playa the exoriinating rete in che inteliigense Sield,

in the United Statee that sale hso been aaaumand by Clits


13,
i :
| The argument agatdot incorporating the researeh and estirante
function in State was made by Oulles in 19471 "For the proper -—
. Judging cf the aitaation in ray foreign country it {9 important that
information should bs processed by an agency whose duty if {9 to
weigh facts, and to draw canclutions fram those facts, without |
having either the facta or the conclusions warped by the ineviteble.
and oven preper projudices of the mea whooa duty it ie te determine
policy and whe, having ome determined a pelicy, are too likely to
be blind to aay facts which might tend to prove the policy te be
faulty." a , on

_—s- Preeisely the came argument cen be used with equal effect against
uh tha incorporstion of ths rezearch end astimnte fuaction in CIA -- |
i.e., if intelligence fa tee cleeely connectad with operations, thea
thone committed te a particular operetion will tend te select out the

intelligence which valicstes the operatica.

Obviously beth arguments conclude in a case fer the establishment of
ae fairly indepondent rescarch and estimate grow, But, if the Rae

_ group ie too independent, ons runs inte the opposite danger: thet is,
: , that neither policy nor cperaiians will be eubjected te adequate -
intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuken aperetion, for example, was ont thet
intelligence and operations wore combinsd, bat preciaaly that the
Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence jadgment. The in«
; talligence branch (DDY) ef CIA was asvar informed of the extotence
; of the Cuban oparation, The Office of Natienzl Ketimates cas never
asked te comment on the agewmption, for exemple, thet discontent
hed reached the point in Cuba whare a cuccesstel lamiing cperntion
would preveke uprisings behind the lines and defestians from the
: - Milttla, Ia December end February, the Oiiies of National Estimetes
produced general oppratenie ef the Cuban situation, but these wore
whetly independent of the Cuban eperation, I gnthoy that, tf ite
opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a diflezon?
; estimate of the etate of epinien tn Cuba from thst on which the opera-
tien was bavad, There exizted, in ahort, the sidiculons altustion

ss
HW 4

| SECREL

14,

thet knowledge of the Cuban uporation, Maunied ia Mlarad bars

by any number of low-level agesta in the cpevations byanch of CIA, = -
wae denied to even the top cfficinis af the lateliigence branch, Tho
Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of tare

Saew oven loess about the Cubin operation. .

Ths protiem, then, is to have en R&E gcreup sufficiently indepoadent
oi both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case
fos veoted ideas ant intsreste -- yet sufficiently clese to be abic to .
subject projected operations or policies to tha meet intenga and
sagrching acrstiny.

Where could this group ba located? U the CLA were te became.
subordinate to State, as Mi-é is to the Foreign Offices, thon the Kk i
fuactlon might be vested In a ceerdinata aubagency, semewhat inds-
pendeat of both Stzte and CLA, yet closely casnected with beth in day~
to-day operations, The R&E subagensy weld racetve intelligence
froan CIA and from Siete, as well ac frerm tha services and, of couros,
from public sources, i would repreeent, in effect, a fuaion ef CLA/DDI
and State/Intelligonce and Reeearch, H might sles take over certain

. ef the eezvice functiona new confided to CLA o« photegraphis Iaterpre-
tation, blegraphicol dota, foreign broadenet monitoring, evert ccllec-
tien, mapy, etc. Thore wight be la addition 4 Joint Intelligence Board.
with representatives fram ali the intelligence agencios and with a

_ State Department or White House chairman,

Ve “ Condiuston,

The argument of thie ywornsrandam ineplicn a fatsly dvastie rosrrange«
mont of cur prosent intelligence aet~up, EH ales implies tha capacity

ef the State Departroeat te asaume command of the eitusiien and to do

eo in an effective and puzpaseful way. © the Hate Department ee at
present staffed ia not capable of assuming elicctive commend, this ile
rot, in my judgraent, an argument against @ resional reorganization af
intelligence, If i9 an arqpainang for a drastic overhenl of the Erata ©
Department. a


oo . eh CRLA

: | 18,

The structure whieh would intet the crlte.s? * uggesiad in this
memorandum woud be ae fallows!

1) The Sate Oepartment weeld be granted genoral
‘elesvonce gutherily over ell clavdectina acticity. Thia
_ might be afeetuated on tha Britiah model by the aggolatment
. of a Deputy Undersecretary of State fay Gdolligence, who
would act for tha Gocretazy in theae matters eed who might
serve ad chairmen of a Faint imalligence Beard, .
-_ 2) Tha Jot ingalllgance Board crud tnclads FepTes
, sentatives from all elamente in the intalligence community
and algo fram the White House.

3) The operating branchas of the progent CLA werald be
reconstituted under some binameloas titie (the Mationel Informa. ses
tion Service}. This new agency weeld be chavged with vreeponsle
bility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations
andi fer paramilitary activities, It would svbmit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence fer clearance.
In gonoral, the Agency would beer semeavhst the game reletione
ehip to State ae the Disarmament Administration and ICA
presently da

4) A oecoud temicindspendent agency would be eet up, agadin
bearing a blameless tite (the Yoruign Naosarch Agency), coordi-
nate with the operntions agency. This agenty would be chargad
with reapanelbility for collagian and interpretation, & wauld
include CLA/DIDE, the Bureau of Intelligance aad Reerarch tn
Stats, and the varleva service functions new carried on by CLA
(photographic interpratatian, biographical files, foreign breadcast
monitoring, eclantific intelligence, MmL8, overt caellaction, cic, }.
it might well ba located tn the CIA building in MeLean,

wh

Asthay Cohlesingos, jr.

ect The Attorney Ceneral
Mr, Bundy —
Mr, Dungan

. east
Rs

aes . Fane
Hy ‘50955 Doctd: 32493505 Page 49

SECRET | hae

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR, RICHARD GOODWIN .

SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan

Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) ''an island-wide
resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal
assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and
guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a
potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations
bases" inthe US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground
formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban
underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient
to overthrow Castro. | ,

Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA
specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept
CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups
most eager to control their own operations. lIe., the plan discrimi-
nates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates
against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria elimi-
nate the Manuel Ray group; yet I ¢an find nowhere in the documents
any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.

Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical
effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating
broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key prob-
lem: i.e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against
the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled
and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable

types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes,

My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and
demand that it be recast to make political sense, The key is the

ee GE
’ tee ark


te SECRET

2.

statement that our covert activity should be viewed only as the -*
covert contribution to any national program designed to. bring :
about the eventual replacement of the Castro government, "This a
is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity ,
should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba
most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for
example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity
should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban
Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper, -

It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out
in a political vacuum.

a AS. Re

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

nad

seen nope eee rece - en ni
toe : 8

“SECRET

ite)

Page 51

September 1, 1962

oop Oe

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

‘ey The Guban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31.
* ‘Deegent were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two
-., members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself, ~~.

’" “The following decisiona were made:

1, We would proceed immediately to diacuss with other Carribean govern-
ments the possibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force, Thie could
be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework
of existing treaty arrangements, ag a series of new bilateral treaties, or a |
- formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization
vung WOUL depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries aa to how they
“+"? gould accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running
‘serious internal political riske, The United States, for ita part, would pre-
fer the formal multi-lateral arrangement, Such a Carribean Security Force
would have at least four major aspects: DS ,

(1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories

.. . threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation |
of specific units for participation in neceasary multi-lateral
actiona. oi

(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information con-
cerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of
guch information. a

(3) The establishment of a Carribéan air and sea patrol to watch
for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.

(a) A training program in combatting subveraive tactics, police
organization and procedure, etc. ,

“* dt was conceded that the substantive aspecta of this arrangement could, if -
necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seck a more .

«> formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political ~~ -

'~ ‘considerations in the United States.

y SECRET
ee
HW 60995.--Dowld: 3282350 5°. Baye HB Ee

A

beater

ony aan

. P


-2-

2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba shouldibe as quiet as
. passible -- trying to ignore Castro and hia island,
Le, Cot , fo

~» 3, Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of

_  targeta important to the economy, ¢.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equip-
_ ment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert opera-
_ tions «+ which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to

_..be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for
establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within

-, that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose dea-

a truction will have the maximum economic impact,

“4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and
especially U, 5. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal
 mathods to alternpt tawilivert this trade -~ depriving Cuba of markets and
’ sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in
” thia effort, _ 7 Le uae

5, We will establish next week -- in the State. Department -- a psychological — ;
“warfare group, This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged = |
with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietiza-
‘tien of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc. -
-- much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into
. . readable, popularized form, and developing, methods of disseminating it through
_, Latin America, Such dissemination wouldbe primarily through USIA channels _ t
“but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helpingto. ©. ~
|. prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list
. of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc.
‘The basic idea is to get this stuff inte channels of Latin American communica~-
tion, instead of treating it as official U. S, Propaganda. We have selected
“gomeone to head this effort -- Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was
a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday. Evening Post) 7
for many years and who Ball highly recommends, . a
6, The CLA was asked to come up «+ within ithe week -- with a: precise, covert
procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government, |
The object of thia dialogue ~~ to explore the possibility of a split within the boo.
governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split -- was fully de- | po anos
. tailed in my last memorandum to you, This is an effort to fin§ an operational.

_ technique.

. : 4,
\
i

Richard N. Goodwin

SECRET: °


EW 40955 Docl@:32493505 #hge-

_EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 1, 1961
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, asdiiscussed
with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all- |
out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably dia-
posed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and
uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot
lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro, If not, then at lease we will
emerge with a atronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer
idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect US.

The question then ia who should head this operation. I know of no one current-
ly in Cuban affaire at the State Department whe can do it. Nor is it a very
good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activi-

 tles, Ido not think it should be centered in the CLA. Even if the CIA can find

someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to
revamp CIA operations and thinking oo and this will be vary hard to do from
the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of |
such an operation. Either I er someone else should be assigned to him as
Deputy for thie activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time

‘to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with

what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of 1 success are very
speculative, Tiare are a few answers to this:
(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of govern-
ment -- ia aware that the United States ia already helping the underground,
The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common
knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we
have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

@OP SECRET


EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT

~a-.

.(2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top
with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his
deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct _
of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed
except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came
through those channels, There are probably three or four people who could
fulfill this criterion, 7 -
This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as
the fellow in charge. This danger must'be weighed against the increased _
effectiveness of an operation under hia command.

Richard N. Goodwin

: ; ' \

i

EYES ONLY FRR’ THE PRESIDENT

‘TOP SECRET

fe ° woe . 7 : * mo cn le tas
HW 50955 Docld:32423505 “Page 55

’
4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM . | oc . |

J believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components:
l, Intelligence collection and evaluation
2, Guerilla and underground ; ,

3, Propaganda ; :
4, Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba) ; {"

5, Diplomatic relations ;
!

Kach of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to i
you. In addition you would have 4 deputy who would do the actual contact work , L

between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He ~
identified as the source of orders and directives when direct

would be the one

contact with the agencies was needed. an lehasdao

Ee eee He should be from CIA for reasons discussed below. 1
would act as Staff Assistant to yous My primary job would be to see that
current questions for decision were presented to youat your morning staff
meetings. with the alternatives fully discussed. 1 would have no direct opera~

tional duties; thus keeping in the back ground.

on EE Ee .

I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply 4 topflight guerilla
and underground man, as well as whatever additional. personnel we need I
- think this is the best way to handle it. However, st will be necessary to use
the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable to as sign
‘a CLA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and™¢

deeply involved at the command level. In this way we can probably
gle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense

on

apa

avoid an internal strug
command.

Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from !

State. I have some ideas on this and -- if you give the signal -- will discuss

it with George Ball.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TOP SECRET

geen en a

50955 Docld: 32423505

vee

TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

am ae

One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence

collection and evaluation.
b

As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence
from the Times.and work on this one =~ although we should check with Ed >

Murrow and Dick Bissell.

perhaps for a breakfast or post-breakfast meeting.

be done through your Deputy and myself. If this subject is discusse
then already too many people will know about ite

‘The first steps are {a} name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current
operations in their field, establish their authority over operations, get nec=
essary staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to
work; (c} establish the physical headquarters; {d) arrange for financing -~"

presumably coming largely from CiA.

approval.

4,
ae

Richard N. Goodwin _

‘fp

{

if

BYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

These people should have a headquarters. lt should probably be at the Pentagon .
because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work:
with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc;

{c) It is a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could re=
arrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning ~~

: ft _
This operation should not be discus sed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only”
George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McGone and Bissell should |
know of your participation. When they are named, the five section heads

will have to know =~ tre the initial organizing work and contact work should
d tomorrow

If this meets with your approval LT will begin work on the above items W
final decisions on personnel and other, matters subject, of course, to your


EYES ONLY
Bee oe | | ss Novernber 4, 1962 |

The following are some tentative recommendations meant to serve as &
basis of discussion:

I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized | im
five componente:

_ - Be Intelligence collection and evaluation
aa b. Underground and guer ila
c. Propaganda
d, Economic warfare (other than covert activities
tithin Cuba)
Ge Diglomatic relations :

Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the
_ . operational authority for each of these agpects of the operation will be in
: the hands of the eection leader who ia responsible to the chairman ofthe —
group. All of these activities will be cormpartmentalized aa much a8 posaihte,
f.e., only the chairman will be kept completely laformed on all aspects of
the eperation.

_ The operation should have ite physical headquarters in the Department of
3, Befenge, both for maniroum security and to detach it a9 much as possible |
. ... from identification a3 a CLA activity,
The first steps gre:
i, Designation of section chiefs;
2 A complete survey by each section chief of currant
operations in hia fields
3. The establishment of controk over operations by the
section chief;
4. The expansion ol operations whore feaoibie,

Bob Amery should be asked to designate one of his beat men to contralize
the intelligence collection and evaluation. —

; The Defense Departmest should designate the section chief for underground
ao and seers, activities. . 4

EYES ONLY,

TOP SECRE ET


(

EYES ONLY

oon

pace WO should discuss expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow |
“h"*"" Sad appropriate CLA officers -- not relating it to stepped up operations

- dn other fields. With these people we should sclect a single person to be

the propaganda chief, coordinating CLA and USIA operations. Ihave —

suggested that Tad Ssulc -> if he can be persuaded to take a leave of ab-

sence -- would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation.

- Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled bya’
(,. designee of the State Department, It ig important to keep the diplomatic —
ne relations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we
- con't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations inthe OAS,
e.g. voting t& send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations
are at a height and Fidel has avidence to present of U.S. participations

"The Deputy should be from CLA.

yey The President should not talk to the Prego. It may be that same eontactea - seo
with a few key newsmen should be made <= in the most general way. But i
the Presidont approaches them personally end the operation docs not succeed
tt ia inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban failure, There
are two typea of newemen involved here. There is a rather large group which

‘will hear rumors and stories of various kind, There ie nothing to be done

any approaches are to be made it should be restricted to these; although they
should never be told we are going to wage an all-out eperation. In addition,
ne much contact aad operational work as possible should be done outside the
Miami arcade Lh
h
Our next step should be to desigm te section chiefs, establish thelr authority
and have them make a complete survey of pessent operationa. Thia would in-
clude a survey of current covertioperations and capacities here and in Miami
{and anywhere else they are going on), as the first task of the Defense Depart-
ment desigace with CLA assistance. The physical headquarters should be
establiaheds
$ so. . . . ~
- Although the Attorney General should maintain a general aptrational super~
- vision, it is probably unwise for him to be the formal chairman of the group
:, because the risk of identification is fairly highe = a

re . TOP SECRET

EYES ONLY

E]

iw 50955. podsidiasl Rabbis bage: mS

‘+, bout them. Thera are a few newsmen whose contacts in the Cuban comuaunity .. -
“+ see ao extensive that they might be able to put together & coherent story. If". - :


| EYES ONLY

cero If such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, ane
other Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard
this as fairly remote in this type of operation bat the danger can be de-
creased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not so
clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General
" can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President,
..., Working with the Chairman alone ; eo o rather than extending his contacts to ine aha
' elnde all the operation chiefa. |

i
i
. :
f i
‘
TOP SECRET
EYES ONLY

|

: “RET Go ce gee ile Net et at
WY MSO. Biot IETS

Nowermnber 22, 1963 J booms

Bob «- |

if you approve this (se is baeed on a brief memo from
General Lansdale) 1 will send it on ita way. In addition ;
you thould have a meeting -- ge soon as possible <-- re

with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State, v
Defense and CIA, if you want to cali ma on this after
_ you have read the meme I will suggest @ procedure for
getting | them together, .
Richard N, Goodwin

{

TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

tae ee : reo arn cen ea ed ae
i. ate | . er : . sow te .

HW 50955 : “Doela: 32493983.- Page. e

November 22, 1961
MELIORARDUM TCh The Secretary of State
The Secretagy of Defense
The Diveotar ef CLA
The Altervey Ceneral
General Taylor

General Lensdate
. Richard Goodwin

The followicg a a sarmmary of the major decisions which have been made iu |
regard te the Cabs Operation,

i, He will go ahend with the discussed project to 5 help ¢ ar overthrow the come
munisé regime and establish a free Cuba. All available assets wih he directed _
to ele end ae 0 mastier of urgent nakione! prveritye a
20 The program will be conducted undas the general guidance of the Attorney eT od
Generel, with General Lanedale es hia cated of aperationa,

3. The progrars will be reviewed in two weoke in order te determize whether.
General Lansdale will contieue as chief of operations. .

4, The NSC 5432 group wilh be kept iotegmed af activities, oe bs

8 The Secvetarios of State and Defense aad the Director of the Central Intellle = 89 ~
gence Agency will appoint eentor officers of their department? as perageal tepre- —
sentatives to assiog the chief of operations ae required, These senior officers
shoald be able fo exercise << either themcalves op through the Sesretaries sad
Glrecter «- effective operational conteal ever all aspects of thely Department's
operations dealing with Cabae

be

6 Kaowledge of the existence of thia optratioa should be restricted to the recipients
of thia memorandum, membere of the $412 gyvoug, and the rapresentatives eppointed —
by the Secretarive and the Director. Any Gavther discemination of this knowledge

will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense, the Attorney
Generel, ov the Cited of Cperetionse

FOO SECRETEYES ONLY

HW50955 “Dovid: 324235. Page” ‘62.

MEMORANDUL For RECORD

Neve y 7S
ee

4

7 fA

NONGOosR

10 Auguste 1962

SUBJECT; Ninutes of Meeting of Spécial] Croup (Augmented) on
Operation MONGOOSE , Lo Auguse 1962
PRESENT: State: Mr, Rusk, Mr, Johnson, Mr, Martin, Mr, Goodwin,
: Mr, Yurwiteh
White House: Cenera] Taylor , Mr, Bundy
Defense/ycg. ti, Metamora Nr. ilpatric, Genera
fMinitzer, Genera] Lansdale
CIA; Mr, NcCone , Nr. Harvey
USTA: Mr, Murrow, Me. Wilson
Ll, Mix ‘NeCone Said that the ©On¢ lusion Of the Board of
Nationa] Estimates Was that the Soviets WI]L not let the Castro
Peginie fail because Of its Own Paherent) wealnescas: This Thouehe
had noe Deen COnlLained a8 such ip the Nrp. Luter in the
Mr, MeCong Sald thar he

believes vO my

Mecting |

6eY in g yeav or {Yo than

ExPlanation
Pdpers, He then ¢ BlO3§ Lo
Phase fr, now Completed, a, incensive
taken op Cuba, that we have learneg
Yet have g true 25S smene °

Of the

“S OF Iclion oy

INCCNligenes I
4 Sreat deal,
£ Fesistance Po

St Face the fact Chac Cuba

Ute is Now; he added hig. Pec-
ighe SOnSider °“SCablishing 40 MRBY
POints Ake noe

Necessarily
imategs Or by the USIB,

Insdale Gave a bries
Clined in recene
by Saying Chat during
ook has been

but Chat we

Cential

+. Nr, Rusk SUS ested fhe’

Sane 88d2 Of Bertin, the tog,

4, Perhans “Ngaginp i

Tele. oy MWOBES Led -tirag

be Close ¥Y meshed, Mr.
Chat he did

Stituce

» harraseme :

3
: Page 6
5 Docld: 32423505

5

HY 509

Leg Shipping,

SONY Digas Should

ain oy Liis POing, Saying
ls king Would con.

» Whereas VOL Idavidg

9 di lloreny Matter,

L, PHO CRTY og
| Yee WHE! HOSE ay

HHO Oy bbe ge Ay

2B

“gE

aaa,

eat ps

4, Ne. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attem
create a split between Castro and old-line Communists,
out that such a splic would be bound to be beneficial ¢
interests no matter which way thelbalance of power swun
general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a
for U.S, military intervention in Cuba under any circum
currently foreseen, However, should reasonably viable
develop to the extent for example that some provinces m
the Havana Government, then the U.S, might desire to el
to such provincial officials. .

In response to the above, Mr. MeCone pointed

pting to

lle pointed
oU.S,
8. In this
valid pretext
stances
resistance
ight oppose
ve support

out’ that at

the moment the previously~cited frictions between Castro and the

-old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's £avo
issue currently exists. There has additionally been at
teriporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. le i
this of course may be temporary. fe said that ‘there ha
Success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work fo
and that there have been some defections, :

r, and no
least a

ndicated chac

s been some

r the U.S,,

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the

MONGOOSE program. Mr, NeNamara que

the building up of agent assets within Cuba from action

stioned whether we cannot Séparate

s that would

hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world Opinion, This led to the suge

gestion by Ceneral Taylor that we should Consider chang
over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro
of causing its visible failure. ;

ing the
regime to one

In this context Mr. MeCone then- presented ‘an alternate
plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B

described by General Lansdale, which he tgaid had been P
result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in
in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the ste
should not be undertaken unless the U.S, is prepared to

attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual

repared as a
fact result

pped-up plana

accept

a)

‘use of U.S, tiilitary force. Mr. McCbne said that a stepped-up B will
risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a lungary-type blood

bath if unsupported, Not only would} the U.S. be blamed

would also be a high noise level ‘in the press and eventual

would be created which would require intervention,

» but there

On the other hand, the CEA lvariant now proposed would, in
Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers beeause it would not
invite an uprising, . Again he repeated his view that the U.S, might,

however, face a stronger Cuba in the future,

HW 50955 Docld:324273505 -Page 64

PROPERTY OF

e

THE WHITE HOUSE

ly a situacion

ON FOF

mo 7 6. The principal members lof the Special Group felt, after

. some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further
for consideration at next. Thursday's meeting of the Special Group.
Mr. NcCone was asked to stress economic sabotape, and to emphasize
measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was
emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as
to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does noc
‘wish Guantanamo used as a base for Operational activities, as
suggested by CIA. He said that ithe other Chiefs have not yet given
an opinion on this but he thoughe that they would agree with the
Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important
to the U.S, and too vulnerable tl Cuban pressure -to take the chance’
of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with
this view.

8. ‘tr. Bundy suggested chat. a hard look be taken at the
possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly
"disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert
financial and material support, with tlie idea of seeing what they
couid generate on their own, .

9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be
placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. Action to be taken:
CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, ia

accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be
ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.

Thomas A.. Parrott

cc: General Lansd At
Julien Slates mn:

Attachment |- Agenda for Meeting

eyuPERLY OF
yur WHT HOUSE gr Fict

HW 50955 DocId:32423505 Page 65

4

ji ide “SHUREROFORIN
jePECIAL HANDLI ING

iki,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTCN 25, D.C.

; | . 13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN, BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE <
LON WILSON, USIA

SK

‘From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Sk

Subject: Alternate Course B

4 In compliance with the cesires and puidance expressed in the

i ; 10 August policy-meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce
dl an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper
“Operational Plan (Aeduced Effort)’ will be used as the starting
basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy
guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only
a statement of objectives and a lixt of irnplementing activitiea. .
The list of activities will be under the headinns of: Intelligence,

Political, Economic, Paychological, Faramilitary, and Military.
f .

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in
my office, at 1460 hours, Tuesday, 14 Aucust, to complete the
outline paper for submigsion. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of
completed assigned work to this worn session, to permit each of
us to work from a full set of crafts.

Papers requires irom each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime,

f . “4, Feonomic (sabotasze, Mmited
deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion
{n other sections of the paper.

Pad

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and
Economic. :lso0, any Suggestions for inclusion in other sections
of the paper.

‘ . . ; . es) TR. aNs | ~
. oe + By CLUDED - et ang

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SECTEI-MOFGRN |

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary
{Umited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for
inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any
suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

HW 50955 DBocld:324273505 Page 67

mae - te
: . (py oes
; tae Hosa LN

( ae ~ So oe 14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT ‘3 Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action, None, This memorandum is for your information.
2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 Angust 1962,
concerning the ieinorandum of that date from General Lansdale,
: ' Attached is a copy of this rnemorandum, excised froin which are
four words in the second line of the penultimate parapraph on

page 1. ‘hese four words were "jnclading. liquidation. of leaders, i

3. ‘She question | of assassination, ‘particularly of Fidel Castro,
was brought up by secretary McNamara at the meeting of the
Special Group (Auginented) in Secretary Rusk's oifice on 10 August,
It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer toa

; comment by Mr. Kd Murrow, that this is not a subject which
has been rnade a matter of official record. Itook careful notes on
the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group
(Augmented) is not)expecting any. written comunents or study on
this point,

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, TI called

TLansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand
‘ the inadmis sibility: and stupidity of putting this type of comment in

weiting in sucha document, Ladvised Frank Mand that, as far

as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to

this and would participate in no open mecting discussing it. ;

I strongly urged Hand to recominend to Lansdale that he e: xcise

the phrase in que stion froin all copies of this Ynemoranduin, in-

cluding those disseminated to State, Defens and USTA. Shortly

thereafter, Tansdale called back and left the rnessape that

he are eed and. that he had done so,

8

’ po rVEVE’
\i eo
: ‘ Att Va bh
. a t. oy : \ ‘@ .
, | CEST

HW 50955 DoclId:32423505 Page 68

HY 409545

yo . ; . apt ats yet
Pave fee tt
Cbd s Cube

5. Bor your, information also,
the attached rnemorandum alyre
view of the possibility that this mig

‘attention, I informally jpric

Altachraent : .
Meino fx Gen Lans

earn
4

fe

Meee

Bocld:327493505 Page 69

ady h

fed Walt Elder on the above.

in your absence and since
ad been distributed and in
ht cormne to the Director's

heb 4

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, ‘Task Force W

dale did 13 Aug 62.

i Via
2 ; Ma dis 7
rtd


. ' : .
a sae
a .

INIERV{EW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 1 of 6

. | NIG iI" ae
INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN Se Nou Wag ii
“S| FILE:
Date: May 27, 1975 ; Time: 10: 00 a.m.

Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW
Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: ‘Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign
policy work for John Kennedy, ‘specializing in Latin America. After the
election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During
that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter
on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of
1962, becoming Deputy Assistant |Secretary of State for Inter-American

1

Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After

working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White

House by President Johnson, ‘in the spring of 1964, after the Panama

crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America,
- instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late

I

in 1965.

1. Assassinations:
a |

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of as~
sassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone
on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of
assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was
established, first chaired. by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his

‘capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force,

held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro,

someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

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I

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 2 of 6

FILE:
"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his

interest in the idea. However, | Goodwin did not bring the topic up later
in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reason
able even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown tha
Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced
with Raul or with Che Guevara, Lock worse than Castro. Somewhat later,
Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szule had with Kennedy in which the
President pledged not to kill castro. Szule reported that pledge in an
article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba
|
Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States
let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only but-
tress his position in Latin America. .

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every
week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division
of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor
did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin
worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and, 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was in-
volved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life.
During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed
diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominica
Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo, was about to be as-
-sassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the govern-
ment was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul
in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-
Trujillo forces. Prior to the issassination, he had transferred some

i

: weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

HW 50955 Docld:32493505 Pagé 7i ° | 5

a -.

1

, i
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page _3 of ¢

1

the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said

that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have
come as no surprise to the President. He, doubted ‘that the CIA even

would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that
sort might have been passed by ithe Special Group.

. Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact,
he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea

because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field

might regard killings of one sort or. another as within his mission in

supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone
might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that
“the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g.

by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In
general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in

"all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2. CIA Activities in Brazil: .
Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United

‘States had strongly backed Quadros and never Liked Goulart. ‘In the
period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart
factions: ‘followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the
Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections
for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congres-
_ sional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome

to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further

Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin didnot know.

‘

HY 50955 DocTd:32423505 Page 72, Vi

INTERV{EW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 4 of ¢
PILE:

3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic
forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist
influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was
applied to Chile,. and the U.S.|/ switched its support from the conserva-
tive Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only
rarely, only if Latin America vere the subject of the meeting. As he
remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera
statements, policy papers, not. descriptions ef recipients of support or
conduits. .In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati
political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the
Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know
how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem
inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, “however, the assertion that
the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washing
ton since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the

White House it did not seem so.

4. Changes during the Johnson! Administration:

‘Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy--
Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert
actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American
policy, although the President did become active in the two crises-~
Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change
in United States’ policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and

conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support

HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 73 | ?

“we
Ie .
'

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY . Page 5 of ¢

FILE:
for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled

by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated"

in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was

Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from

the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he

became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during
the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis
was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no

. t
reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American

“objectives could be secured through it. Counter insurgency was some-
thing different. A good deal of money was spent training police throug
AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American
militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point,
the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to
power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations
‘were considered by the Special !Group (counterinsurgency). Latin
American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin

America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia.
Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little
difference to the course of events in Latin America. “Cuba could not

in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America
without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla

movements that began had little indigenous support.

HW 50955 Docld: 32423505 Page 74

EW 50955

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 6

In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that

these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Good-

‘win often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on

occasion, specific, indicating. groups to be supported and the like.
Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin

America.

. |
6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the: activities of
intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-
day operations. “What is required is an active Congressional committee,
on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active

staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major

operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to

tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional
checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned

i

that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-
director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto

Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger,. and with Tad Szulc, In response to a

. 4
question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay

of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of

that.

Bocld: 32423505 Page 75

aint

Pnone (Area 202) 544-6000

10
iil
12
13

14

WARD & PAUL

15
16
1?
18

19
20
21
22
23

/ 24

| 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

HY 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 76

2D

1OP SECRET
| 25

the United States. Several months later, I presume because

of that trip and ‘several other contacts I maintain with
representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations

1 oe |.
and the Organization of AMerican States, beacause of my personal

friendship with a number of people at the White House and
I

Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan ‘and others, in a conversation with

Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney

General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justic

Department. We discussed in considerable langth the situation

in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some

_@ifferent possible actions by the United States government in

that context.

not ‘ 1 . .
At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General
asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his

brother. the President. I said I would of course be pleased
i a .

1

to do so.
The following day I received a call from the White House
indicating that the President would like for me to come in at

11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I
| . .

-did. And I was received by the President in the company of

Mr. Goodwin in tha Oval Office for a conversation which lasted,
if.memory serves, in excess of an hour and a half, in which the
. |

President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake

of tha Bay of Pigs, asked ma a number of questions concerning

my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the

TOP SECRET

oa
2.
rt

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

10
11
12

_ 13

WARD & PAUL

14
15
16
17
18

19

él
£2
23

24

410 First Street, S.E., Wasmington, 0.C. 20003

25

HW 50955 DoclId:32423505 Page 77

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TOP SECRET

Re

. . :
situation in Cuba, you know, what tha United States should do,
could do, might fe in terms of either in a hostile way or in
. ' . .

t

establishing some kind of a dialogue, most relevant of which

‘
I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly

| |
turned to me and: said what would you say, what would you) think,

if. I.decided to authorize. the assssination of Premier Castro?
Let me add for the record that the precise wording appears’
in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time. I am

now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather -- ° }
. : i

Mr. Aaron. ~Let me:read this into the.record. "We chatted

for a while about Cuba, . and then Kennedy ‘leaned forward jin his

rocking chair and hurled a question at me: ‘What would.you think’

“Gf I ordered Castro ‘to be; assassinated?!"

Mr.. Szulc. Iwas taken aback and so indicated to the Preside:

PP the best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a

practical matter I thought this would not make all that much
difference even if he were because I thought that by then the

Cuban structure had been bstablished to a sufficient degree

i.
H ‘
‘

where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro wouldjnot

necessarily mean':tha collapse of the governing system, if this

CO _
were. the purpose jof the United States government.

In the second place, it was more important to ma, Tisaid

to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United
States government should not be party to murders and political

{ ' ; .
assassinations at which point the President leaned back and

TOP SECRET —


me FOR GECKET 7
3 1 smiled and said, well 1 was testing you. I agree with you
om i |
g 2 completely. |
g 3 And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point
3 4 || how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United state
5 for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having
6 recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again, the
9 precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article
8 and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now. |
9 And the President added in this context that the-reason I.
10 have raised it with your or words to this effect, is because
ll I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from cartain
; y. || People, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation
on i 13 resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think
: 14 we talked about this for J few more minutes, and 1 think I
15  yapeated the points I made originally and the President said
16 he felt very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing
Wy me or trying to see what ny response as a reporter or as a
‘18 citizen would be. |
; 19 . I might: add that sevaral days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had
: 20 the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective
G ; ;
: art recollections of it, and Mr. Goodwin's recollection is exactly
z 99 the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this
z. oe
" 93 being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current
C i 24 flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if
: 25 President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination
TOP SECRET a
HW 40955 Docld:32493505 Page 78 ” ;

amt TOP
_ 2A
3 1 of Castro, he would not Likely: be discussing it with you in
(~ 3 _
; g a the full knowledge of a Yeporter and if Castro were killed
3 | .
< 3 or an attempt to kill himj would surface you would have the
8 -
& 4 professional duty to rush|to your:typewriter and report on ‘this
5 conversation, even though| it was on 2 personal basis. And
6 ||. Mr. .Goodwin's judqment, and in which I concur, was that
7 presumably the President would not have floated this issue
8 with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to
9 re-evaluate after the passaqe of time the Prasident's sincerity
10 in disclaiming any desire’ to do so.
. | :
Ll My impression at tha time’ and today fourteen years later
; . 12 is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his
f~ 3 | of
‘ 13 revulsion to such an idea! of assassination.
9 |
iia . i
: 14 Mr. Aaron. Let me ask you, when was your conversation

15 ||) with Mr. Goodwin?

16 Mr. Szule. The most] recent one?
17 Mr. Aaron. .Yes, the) one you just mentioned.
18 Mr. Szulc. Last Friday which would have been the 6th of

19 June of this year.
20 _ Mr. Aaron. May I read. into the record ‘the following
21 paragraph from your articlle. “Kennedy leaned back in his: chair

22 | smiled, and said: that he had been testing me because he was

23 under great pressure from advisers in the Intelligence

( . 24. community (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed, but

}

810 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

25 that he himself violently, opposed it on the grounds that for

_ TOP SECRET

HW 50955 Docld:32423505 Page 79

— GOODWIN] (TRUJILLO)

The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75
contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain
documents were selected from this material and are pro-
duced herein under Tabs Sand T. All of the attached
Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the
Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concern-
ing them. They are attached again herein for possible
use in connection with questions concerning handwritten
notations appearing on the documents.

TABS, May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin.
oe re CIA Covert Activities in the

Dominican epublic

Page Z of this document contains, on the
original ribbon copy, a pencilled-in circle.
Goodwin stated on/7/16/75 that this circle
was placed on the original copy of the
memorandum by himjand indicates that the
encircled material (a report of the passage

q . .
of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin

as both significant and new to him. Further,
the word “neutralize” is underscored in
pencil on the original copy of the memorandum,
Goodwin might be questioned concerning the
Significance of this underscore.

TAB T. - Various drafts, together with the

——“oTiginal of the 5/29/61 cable from the State
Department to Dearborn are attached herein.
Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting
on pages numbered 237, 238, 239, and 240 is
his handwriting. The handwriting on pages
233, 234, and 235; a subsequent draft of the
same proposed cable is not Goodwin's. 7
Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that
of President Kennedy.

HW.50955 -Docld:32493505 ‘Page 60.


{ “ot ot.
et he |

EYES Ou

MEMORANDUM: - ;

!

|

—

SUBJECT : CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic

ot

13 May 1961

Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed

against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of

the White House. |

ee te
Theis

nt


It.

PROGRAM OI COVERT ACTION FOR |THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

BACKGROUND ° i
A. On 29 December 1960 the special Group approved a plan of covert
action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which

involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo,

and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this

‘authority included authorization for CIA to make available to selected

exile groups communications and equipment support necessary for them to
develop a capability to undertake the infiltration of personnel and
equipment into the Dominican Republic. Since none of the exiled groups
had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the
Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually
used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with
whom the Agency and. the Consulate are currently in contact.

B. On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make
available to Dominican dissidents a limited supply of small arms and
other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop
the capability to receive’ these materials and that the materials be in-
troduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves.

CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS .

A. In late January 1961, CIA advised selected internal opposition
leaders that we were > prepared to make available to them limited supplies
of arms, communications, (equipment, ‘and sabotage materials which they
had repeatedly requested. provided they developed a capability to receive

‘|

4

! a
© RIES OLY
SECRET


it via air drops’ or sea infiltration.: To date the internal.opposition has
not been able to. develop this capability, nor have they been able to ~
nominate training candidates for code; radio operators or saboteurs.

This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of

throughout the Republic of “being caught or suspected of anti- trasttle,

activities,~ wand the fact that the organized internal opposition ‘apparently ~-
consigté of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. * i
cuy has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a

yery limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent

feauests from the internal’ opposition leaders for personal defense

weapons attendant ‘to their, projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO,

\ ———

tures ( (3) .38 Cal revolvers! and three |(3) carbines with accompanying

amiquni tion have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The ; f

west have repeatedly’. requested ‘additional armed support. ; 4

CA has established working: ‘relationships with selected exile™

groups. These relationships 1 have taken into account _that-President

ee rrr ~*

- Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican

President Jose Figueres as his emissary and representative to work with
Dominican exile groups. Through Figueres and with the knowledge of
President Betancourt, CIA is providibg financial support and technical
guidance to the following activities:

|
(1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose,

Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,
|


ee
Fe
an

~ a representative designated by Betancourt, and chaired by Figueres : The

council had ites first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961.

ore

Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the

concurrence of President petancourt, CIA has indicated to Betancourt

and Figueres that it is prepared: to support, the council's program in

the amount of $15,000 @ month. It is Figueres! 4nitial concept that the

council will undertake propagends activities directed against Trujillo,

ted Dominicans in democratic process, administrative skills,

and train selec

and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of res-

ponsibility in any successor government . ‘Fi gueres has also proposed

that an exile paremil

activity to date since neither petancourt nor Figueres ‘have indicated 6

clear plan for its eventual use- It is OIA! s judgment that the exile

groups represented on Figueres ' council have Little if any popular sup-

litary force be trained, put CIA has discouraged this bey

port among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages 7 :

that can and is peing gained by support of the council is the number of

with Betancourt and Figueres in atilizing them in other operations -

i
credits that this gives to the United states Government in its dealings . [ -
+ has been adamant thet no action pe taken against Castro until i

I

|
Betancour
Trujillo is disposed of. This support has served to neutralize his - . 7

attitude on that point since. it amounts, to a guarantee to Betancourt of .

the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves

to solidity the attitudes of aiseident exiled Dominicans so that they are

not anti-U. §. and will make them more approachable and amenable to

U.§. Government objectives once trujilto is overthrown. (2) . The conduct

7 EYES an iY
SECRET

MW 50955 DocId:3

Se te ote RATE ee
WIR Mnr as Ta ee


| SEGKHI
EYES ANLY

- ue

of radio propaganda from Ponee, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction

of Horacio ORNES, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Domini-
cana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as
the voice of the ORNES orgenization.

-(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to ORNES so as

to give it the capability to deliver emall quantities of arms or _Personnel

into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability
has. not been utilized to: date. It ts contemplated that both the ORNES
propaganda program and this Limited boat capability v will be absorbed by
the ‘exile council now being formed by Figueres.

.C. With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his govern-
ment as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial
support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing 4 para-military
capability in Venezuela.

i D. CIA has recently re-located Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from
2 Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Jimenez, a physician and university
professor, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence
of the internal opposition. He isicurrently working with the Puerto
Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of
the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to pro-
vide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes

and selected administrative skills. “Through Jimenez and 8 small group

of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition, |

CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the in-

A . ternal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through

BYES ANEY
SECRET
|

oleh
HW 80955

Til.

IV.

our Station in Ciudad Trujillo.

B, CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets through-
out the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.

COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED

A. -Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio
operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf".at
our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been ini-
tiated due to the internal /opposition's failure to provide individuals
who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican
Republic and willing to run | the risk of having the radio equipment in,
their possession... i !

B. Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and under-—

ground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has

- provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive

explosive materials through clandestine channels.
POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION

A, CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a

small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of

i

our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons
to the internal opposition for their: use in personal defense attendant

to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo can be developed by the

ad
i

Station.
B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic,
; i | ;

in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets

exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.

EYES ONLY
SECRET


fo

4
‘

C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no capability

to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA
could initiate operations to cache jsuch supplies off the coast of the

Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop
\
such a capability. ;

D. Initiate the training of para-military cadres. CIA has, been

“reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current
. |
information indicates that any invasion of the Republic unless massively
1
supported by overt action would be impractical.
. ; ’ i :

:

em ee oe

rene) po arassGos: Belge BF eae

oe eo ° .
4,

ee we ; oe poe MOT LI et Ete te pee om

ye , THE WHITE © luse OFFICE | ene ehh oy 17H Wer EA:
—s Pete meren ge ae we

* * SECRET mThis document consists of 2 pages

: Copy Ko. of 9 copies; Series

os a | (Lupet pavfey)

te “EOR DEARBORN FRCM DEPARTMENT

i.e President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subscquen:

4 your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest, Hope this will resolve -

uncertainties reflected ref but your comments and requests for any necessary

clarification wili be welcomed, :

2. Department appreciates Valuable work performed’ by Amo. Farland and your-

seif' and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. iiould hope

this could be retained end strengthened but only if ata cost acceptable fron

standpceint US national interest. If price tage for friendshin of dissicents,

whose action capabilities and realistic prosnects thus far repa.n unknown quant:

) ’ places too great strain upon moral position end principles for which US stances o.

iavolves risxs which in our considered judgment sneuld not be accepted, recl sur

|
you will agree we should stand firn,

“3, While fully congeizant Zunicue circumstances within Odgominican kepubi!
which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is hone theless decply concecras:
by degree to witch covert activities this case have been Yerced to cevicte &£on
normal cover and cut-out safeguards with xesufix result ISG too openly identif£ie

‘ . with what should be clandestine activities.
4, Running through entire Kitt dilemma has becn conflict between two objet
“(1} To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to cerive cre
arent . °
L among DR dissidents and Libesal elenents throughout Latin America;
. . (2) To disassociate US from. any obvious intervention in Dominican
&N : Republic and. even more so from any political assassination which migns

«

occur,

ie aan

BW 50955 Docld:32473505 Page 66.

1 spcRET PROPERTY OF
oo WHE WHITE ROUSE GFFICS

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily:
‘}
override latter, For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted

opposition leaders at this x time of Graft document which you now hold nor delivers

copy to then,

5, In May 19 meeting here with, Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman ssoush

disabuse -them expectation USG acting cither through Department or CIA could be

party to any political ‘assassination, At same time assured them this government’

y for legitimate aspirations Dominican pecple achieve represent

continuing sympath

-tive government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens,

6. In response your comment ‘re.covert activities program you should be

aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made cont#:.

upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.

. oo. a .
; Z. In light foregoing sSugse ost you wi nhole further action and to =EzX exteni

a ;
feasible substantave conversations
. J

with dissidents pending receipt documents now

to be pouched.

; !
fi 4
: : i ,

; END CF MESSAGE

AWA: Podewine: jsr frufe;

\
HY 50955 Docld: 327423505 Page 69 : ,

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. HeGeorse Lundy
The White House

Following un on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at.
yesterday's meeting of the Snecial Group, I am forwarding you a
draft telecram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our
Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementiny the guidance he
will be receiving on the recently approved contincency plans.

The text of this draft telegram has been shown to the Agency and
agreed to by theme I am also forwarding copies of the exchange
with Dearborn leadinre up to the present draft telegram to him.

I mow it will be difficult for the President to find time
before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situ-
ation in the Deminican Republic, I feel that he shovld approve it

personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views

as stated in the HSC Record of Actions for May 5,

Chester Bowles

Attachments:

Tab A - Proposed outroing
telegran

Tab B = Previous exchange
of telerrams

|
a

whi? 7

Bagter

1


Sees came SECRET

PROPOSED TELEGRAM
to US Consul General in
Ciudad Trujillo

FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT
1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subse-

quent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest, Hope-this will

resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and
requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable’ work performed by Amb, Farland and your=
self and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements, Would hope
this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from
standpoint us national interest, If price tag for friendship of. dissidents, °
whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown
quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which
US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted,

feel sure you will agree we should stand firm,

3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic

which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned

by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from

ens

normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with
what should be clandestine activities. | |
4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives:
(1) To be so. associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive
credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican

Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.

SECRET ; ; \


SECRET!

-2-.

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily
override latter, For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted op-
position leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver

copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras

Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition
leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after
overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and

request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments.

If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request F
should take. . _ _ . ; . —
5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought i
disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be |
age, . . : : : b
party to any political assassination, At same time assured them this government's can
continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represen- , ean

7

tative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens,

“6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be
aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made con-

tingent upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG,

7. In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substan-
tive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to

be pouched,

END OF MESSAGE

. SECRET

ni Sage Speeta;ase 23505. Barge”

ea:
“<
‘

“ , bio Due

TOP ei THE WHELE HOUSE OFFICE

FOR DEARBORN FROM STATE

»)

1. President has now approved contingency plans dis-

cussed during your stay here with one major exception; You are note=

to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissicent

groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work £0 0 uae
strengthen pro-U.s. sentiment among dissident groups. Your
work along ehis line has been invaluable. However, we must

rot run visk: of. U.S. association with political neck ee
A “

VAS, Cw? Cron Wy é Seed puerta Cerenel bk lek Sep permary Siew! a . :
This last pz -inciple is Overr= ding and must preveil in oun ciel
situation. However, there is much you can do to prerect U.e.

al | bo.

f * interests within this framework of policy; iF cluding most o-
the. measures in which you are wow engaged. specific Anstrice
tions follow. . oe je

na

3. Continue to inform dissiden 1c elements of U.S. Super’

a7 -
aes ras ot

for thar position. In case of ¢ Gopinabiomwm over caro a
prujillo--whe the 2X “ge! not injereted by PEO U.S. groupe- the
pro-U.s. pxoup should promptly wake every effort to cong ricuce
itself as reasonable and plaugible provisional, Bovernnen’:

tt should inmediately declare susel£ such ane request agsavcance |

from U.S., Vernczucla, Colombia and OAS. If advance digcussLons. -

wae,

eV yped tn ,

HY 50955 — " Decla: 92493505.

Page 93

(B®

HW 50955 | Docld: 32423505 wae en

- show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss

; .
‘the specific ‘content of such a request and procedures for

‘and that jn the case of direct intervention it would te pre- a

PROPERLY OF
rue WHILE HOUSE OFFICE

handling it. All possible preparations should be made short -

_ of actual formulation in writing of a [saghoe, Eaoted) request in advance

of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that,
under no circumstances, can We take the chance of a communist ——
type takeover in the Dominican Republic even s£ we must intervene

without a request. | This last possibility should not be discussed |

with the dissidents.

4. Reference to multilateral action in record of actions pam

‘means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral;

ferable for forces to be multilateral. No broader interpreration -

is justified. “ALL other U.S. aetions--whether propaganda oF —
covert activities--will be continued on 4 bilateral basis.

5. Covert activitie 5 are, as you know, Very small. duc to
inability of dissidents to ‘develop a method of receiving supplics
which will effectively disassociate ULSey and failure to provide
candidates for raining as radio ‘operators or saboteurs. Our
offer to help along these Lines--provided they develop capacity

and effective cover--reimains opcn- However, you must request

perme TS

we rs
. . : 1

TOP SECRET au

~ i; . pe : Coat

Page 94


. ; TOL SECRET — PENFERTY Of
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

de -3- oo
:

\we/ : and receive further specific instructions for any specific
covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer. ~,

arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our
suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual
fact we feel that the cransfer of arms would serve very little 4
purpose and expose the United States to great danger of [leinase _—
cee WAth

Geet . .
sclosure-of-participacion 3 assassination attempt. The basic

policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help, while
carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested.

This is feasible pécause, jn actual fact, the covert helv is

ra

very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of ;

(®

information.

6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propaganda cambalen

and other external pressures.

7. -FYI, im event overthrow of Trujillo milicary forces will”
ay ead MS Ure, :

be dispatched immediately to fprosimvesiou) positions. oa receipt _

of request from provisional government, and your concurrence,

ad Le ob retard) cat ome ow

uG >
we bee If no request is reéeived and there appears to
be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made
{n Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it to

imperative that a request be obtained if ac all possible. End FY

wee ~

& :

~

TOP SECRET

HY _50955...Docld:32423505 .Page-95-

, . TO. SEUKEL Spies nn Ue
0 : ; 4 THE WHITE HUUSE OFFICE '

8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents in-

(@

forming them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate
his procedure take all ro

request. If they are favorable to t

. aa |
possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal ; t
4

of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written

document for advance transfer to you.
. : af

Daal? a .

(@

TOP SECRET ;
a ; a


nn . vty yy OF

wo —— WRITE HOUSE OFFICE
Y  TYNG SECEET | ;
Fa Si eearn -[ar et.&
1. President has nce avproved contingency olan? discussed during your
stay here with one wos major excentions; You are now to request a pre-s igned re-

quest fer help from Dominican dissident groups.

2, We consider it essential that you continue to work, to sovtrngtnen prot, S. |
Pavel f- ,
sentiment among dissident crouns, “eur work along this Line had been innpiicoude,
ke. e Se wT :

However, we 3=60 must not sidamasicxef yernit i danger of di isclosing/&.S. association

with political sosdine tion \oe-iataeventiow inthe Hondnioan Republi This last
princizle is overriding and must prevail in dovhtful situatiom However, there is po
. : .
}
i

mich you can do to protect U.S. interasts within this fre enework of policy: including

‘\

~

Need j most of the measures in which you are now en caced, Specific instructions foito:
L ne

3. Tela Conitane to inform dissident elements of U.S. support fer their

position, /In case of a singtion or overthrow 22 Trujillo--vhet ther or not
void
initiated by pre- “U.S. croup--the group ‘should ncumsscts SRO mane ant ‘irmediat

2D

reauest for assistance fron U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and the 0 vhs Bax Chis request | -
will be responded to favorably dy the Jatbod States, Tas Gori decbars

sélve3 the provisional government and reques t hel shether or not they actually
Pp *

‘are able to agsume power’. if tinge are ‘f ravereble to this procedure roxcissdt

ay

paola: soaegsb5- Ps

So ayy SECRET

R
Ben declrn heed joer ét, & ;

1. President nas nou aporoved continge?

‘one ACE wa jer excen tions You are nov to

stay here with
quest fcr help from Dominican oiss+ ident ‘ groupse
“2, We consider it essential that you ¢ contime to

sentiment anong dissident grouns. Tour work alone
Navas

eee must not Sohdsaatyermt 9

@
rl

However, We sae ‘danger 0

with politica « assdination lee datersention-

princinie ys overriding and mst prevail in ¢

much you can do protect Usde interest Wit:

most of tne measures in which you ara ner”

Cael -

4 o> ot not
@ net
ozvine® .
: ru L 1
~ ot 0 ex thro" of 7 pou} proroe
sera coup 8°

de . ot ‘

ase OF goer the pro Ve B". ye and aust
. gr? onad
aXe) Y.-S g reas
ons 3 ec
eort ©? wate by ; c
efto + neat] aS.
Ke every t te spout? Ait : corer} ane Or?
ment: ; eb

cove eneZ” .
cov 2008 ° ce con Ue? ? N

yest agguste™ an " LavUrecLe to this procedure Tose

a req . .
ch a vey

HW 5095 :
30955 Docla: 32493505

‘Page 96

cy plans disc

1) ene Borintice
rountful situations

shin whis frame

bn Sonet UE.

work to seecre: eyin .

Lv?

st OFFICE

this ine had peen iene

o
od

f£ gisclosin ing‘. 2.

slo. “oY
weve}

syork of A"

pal

request 4 pre-Sié

uesed during ~~

Bais

pwReanutiLic. Tic 7

Jeet

coer

emir

. : : er OFF ot
oo : . re WHITE yguse OFFS

7 Tg , oe HRS ; _ pyar hoe _ |
i
bate,

& , °

“@Miscuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling ite tis
* Dinesh :

“ALL possible preparations should be made short of actual pasparshéon in writing of

A steneé requost in advmce of the event. Uncerlying this procedure is the
policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist

, : in] vem , .
type takeover in tne Dintnican Republic evcu if we mst goren without a request.

. This last possitlity shoulé not be discussed with the dissidents.

he Merb taterat Reference to multilateral action in record of actions means

open ;
only that furthey sanctions will be multilateral,’ and that in the case of direct

“untervention it would be preferable for dex forfes to ve multilateral. "o

yaraden breader interpretation is justified. All other [ose actions--wwhether

propganca or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral tasis.

4

5, Covat activities are; ag you know, very small due to inability of | —

‘dissidents to develop a method of receiving sunplies which will effectively

Aly

Ne dissacoitate U.S. and failure to previde candida-cs for training as radio

So

operatce o> saboteurs, Yur offer to help along these Lines--prov.ced they

develop capacity and effective cover--rerains OPene fgvever, we you asst mepen Lend
\ ;

=).
Pee mene Lo 7 :) 7 ° s ry « “
kaye specific instructions. for any, specific covert activioy. At ide the present

time we are.unable tc transfer sere arms to dissidents, Tell then that tnis is

r '

because of our cuspicisn that method of transfer may ve u Maman peccan, Th

actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms “culad serve very little purpose

S508 Bage: 990."

yada


voy sk _ gfe

Sh re Vy Tv ak ie

\ )

and expose the United States to: greav danger of sepeltiiete

re basic pr: Ley is to muxthes continue te ho

attempt . Pepqeiiganert Th

of covert nelp, whule carefully exdnining and clearing “ne Sp

e, in actual fact, the covert help i
er clied © ‘
ancouragerent and A

This is feasible becuss 5 very Slight exc

for verbal itormations.

6, We intend to Keep UP arti-!rujillo proaganda campaign and othe

pres FTUPES
i
or ‘In event overthros/ Tyyjitho militery forces will be dispatched im.
a“
ape eo
to ec SSeedigon positions. On rocept or request, from, iooldpobyies § provisional £
{2 Lopes aye ptwherdie: liad ,

‘and your concurrence, ro request is recei

«

we twill go Ure if;
fi

Loe made in

) he eats sex any danger of commnist, tzekaover “hen decision wil
4 ‘Washington «nether bo interven egataleis. Mais maxes 1% tmoera vive trot a
ia g i

request ve oktained if at all possiole,

8. rsations smmaliate’y with dissidents infor dne

Begin conver

position ard the sbocorsbix necercity “or en jnaneciate sequest.

rrsnexes If trey are favorable to this nrocecurTe take all possivic MEESUTES

prepare for the immeditate teanemitye) of gen. a recgbst short of “he. actual

preparation of a written dosunent[Uy-the bres tients) £97 advance transfer *9

Say

Goodwin

. = ums | nnn of menor oe cme mmm OS en eee

a

iit "5b855 “b

acid:

32423505. Page 40@-—-—~-— .

isclosura: Gt j2so8s
id open offer

ecific help requested.

e

r external

yed end the eg_epre2rs

then of U.S.

M hese PITY ELE LE

+

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|
i
\

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9


2 RED i ee  POUTING.
fut’ Wii/3/DRH oo TOP SECREY ra

hig
até: 29 MAY P961

OGM CIUDAL TRUJALLO (OP-RATIGiAL UXEDIATE)

om: DIRECTOR

wee baal
DEFERRED

contr, C/WH 1-5
#0 #F DCI 6; p/oci 7, oop 8, COP 900% 10 c/ca 1 11, S/C 11-12

72.96
REP2 TRUS 0009 (is 13990) % ally Te

ROUTINE
PATIONAL DoSDavs

TO? SECxET OUT 6%)

OPES

EDs , Lo . ° . co . . 7 : . . i
oO Officer ve ; . oy
FOR CIA/ © Frost STATE -_ - _
1,_PRESIDIST HAS HO." APTLOVED couIuamicY plate PISCUSS=D DUELNG YOUR ;
STAY HERS STLTH ONS VAJOR CRM TON Yor ZAKS CT To i QUEST aA PRE@SLGD ;
REQUEST FOR HELP MO" LOWLUAN DIS SuDigiT GRWUFS, en ond

2. We CONSIDMY IT 6 SuFLAL ‘iad Yoo CONLENUS TO uOLKK 10 STREXGTIEN

Prrno-v.s. SENT. zit “CONG iti Sa): aT “cROUPS. YCUR eatin ALONG THIS LINE EAS BSSN

INVALUAELY. HOE ty ee ust HOT iin 1s K CF U. S. ASS CLANTON wlTH POLITICAL |

ASSASSINATION SLCE Uys, al MATTER oF Gr.PAL POLICY CANHOT CONDOHE: ASEASSTATLON. :

‘TULS LAST PRINCA! PLS IS OVLRIDING ALD -UST-PASVAIL Li DCULIPOL SutVATLoii. ROWEVAL,
nNOS ad .

anna ;
THERE 1S HUCH YOU CA LO TO 2%, OTECT U.S, INTENTSTS HI! ILS FOALEORK OF ,
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