Tie 104-10832-4 10332- 10002

| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

~ oe | | 010 23-188

25 June 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group =,
Chief, Information Management Service
Director, Center for the Study of Intelligence

FROM: John Berg
. Special Assistant to the Associate Deputy
Director for Operations
SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records  <-~
REFERENCE: A. Memorandum from DDO dated 9 June 1993:
Subject: Release of JFK Assassination ~
Records -- Differences;

B. Memorandum by Dave Gries of 22 June 1993:
Subject: JFK Assassination Records-- Proposal
for discussion

1. Regarding the items discussed in the referenced memos,
it appears that a further interpretation is required.

~-On the subject of cryptonyms, we cannot give wholesale
approval for their release, but if the crypts have been

- previously blown or exposed they can be released. There may be

cases in which, if the crypt has been retired, does not relate
to existing or another project and does not contain a valid .
digraph, it may also be released. Note, however, that crypts
which are related to a series (ZZBOAT/1, ZZBOAT/2 etc.), would,
when exposed, link operations or assets to one another or which
refer td other operations or projects cannot be released.

--Qn-the subject of pseudonyms, if the pseudonym has been
previously blown, there is no objection to its release. Note
that release of pseudonyms serves to link officers with
assets/operations and this “guilt by association” could lead to
futher, undesireable, exposures. Care must also be taken so
that the release of pseudonyms is not done in such a manner so
as to enable a researcher to accummulate through an inspection
of numerous documents the approximate size of a given station.-

(The sense of this is to mean that only a small number of

pseudonyms would be considered for release.)

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Release of JFK Assassination Records

-=On the subject of cable, dispatch and file numbers,~there
is no objection to the release of this information as it
pertains to Mexico City, to include 201 numbers of key players
in the JFK story. All hqs cable numbers can be released as can
dispatch numbers to Mexico City. The release of cable/dispatch
numbers from other Stations can only be done if. there has been
prior public identification of a Station in that location. The
release of file numbers pe se, however, would reveal the
methodology by which we file/store and retrieve information--
which is still in practice today and thus we cannot approve it
on a blanket basis. Blanket release of 201 numbers: reveals
similar information as well as targeting/acquistion
methodologies which we similarly need to continue to protect.

2- I realize that the above guidelines continue to mean

‘that much information will be “blacked out." As bad as it may

appear, none of this information is substantive and its
omission does not detract from the “story.” ‘Its release,
however, could permit detailed analyses of our commo,
methodology, contacts and staffing which we cannot accept.

New Subject: Release of William Pawley’s name

3. It is agreed. that an attempt will be made to locate
Pawley's next of kin to request their permission to release
information pertaining to his relationship with CIA. I£ the
next of kin cannot be indentified or located, the subject can
be revisited. (Note: the information in the Congressional
record or in the book “Deadly Secrets” notes that there was
contact and even support between Pawley and the CIA but does
not identify the full extent of that relationship.) _ -

(ptt pL

SECRET

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1 November 1993

_MEMORANDUM FOR: \ Linda. Flor a}

C/MRS/LA/MRS
FROM : Joanne Harris
SUBJECT : JEK Project - Review of Cuban Files

I reviewed 106 files to ascertain the status of Cuban assets which
were listed in the attached. Seventeen were found to be former assets,
pre-1970, and most of the seventeen were involved in the Bay of Pig Operation.
Additionally, the following five appear to be candidates for protection
from public disclosure. ~

a. (AMIRE/1] ~ 201- 274049

A Career Agent, AMIRE/1|\died of natural causes in October
or November 1968. The DCI sent a letter of condolence to his wife.

b. WILDCAT = 201-294213

FBI Double Agent, PNINFINITE assisted in ops in Mexico.
He was still active as of March 1982.

c. “‘WKSCARLET/3._ - ~ 201+300985
Formally terminated in 1974. Caracas Station}had contact
with him until circa 1976, at which time he was implicated in bombing of a
Cuban plane and was incarcerated in Venezuela. As of March 1993, he was still
involved in questionable activities.
d. AMICE-14 -' 201-307337
. Worked for PNINFINITE through early 1970's.
e. AMMUG/1 - 201-749651
Cuban defector, He was terminated in 1967, but was used
through 1971.

SFERET

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a

‘7. June 1995

Memo for File

Subject: ARRB request re “slug line” deletions

The policy of deleting ALL crypts & designators in the slug
line was questioned by ARRB members at the 18 May meeting
with CIA. The DO representatives present (Sander) & McNair)
deferred to the Office of Communications.

Per’ 6 June 1995. discussion with{Don. Hatch}, DA/IRO, “the slug
line is strictly an internal distribution line”, and the
release of crypts or other designators in the slug line is
not a communications issue; slug crypts are not “commo
generated”. The DA has no objéction to the release of
otherwise releasable crypts in the Slug line of CIA cables.

The DA response was provide tow. Gunn, ARRB staff, and Bill
McNair, DO/IRO, via phone on 6 June 1995.

nad PS oon

CC: HRG reviewers
DO reviewers

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Bas

Assassination Records Review Board
600 € Street NW = 2nd Floor = Washington, DC 20530

June 6, 1995

Mr. John Pereira

Director

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear John:

As you know from our meeting with you on May 18, 1995, as well as from previous
meetings with ARRB staff members, CIA’s current practice of redacting the sluglines
from its cables in the JFK Assassination Collection is of interest to the Assassination
Records Review Board. Asa result of discussion on this topic at the May 18 meeting,
the Board in fact asked those present from CLA to provide it with any additional
information available in support of this practice.

If you have any further information in support of redacting otherwise releasable

_¢eryptonyms when present in cable sluglines, we would appreciate receiving it by this

afternoon, so we can present it to the Board at its meeting tomorrow morning.
With many thanks for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

21h

David G. Marwell
Executive Director

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. 27 September 1995

Note to: HRG and DO reviewers

Subject: Phone call from Bill McNair, 21 September, 1995, re
AM crypts

Bill left the following message on my voice mail:

“I have just talked with(Peg Sanders) DC/LA Division,
and unless we see a. specific incident where giving up an AM
crypt.will betray an asset, then let it go . I don't
believe there is any place we will see that. She is will to
give up-d1l AM crypts simply because there are so many
iterations going back...and things have been: changed.”

Barry
‘ HRG Senior Reviewer

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SECRET _ aw arsa

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Historical Review Group.

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
DO, Focal Point. for ARRB
SUBJECT: Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators and ‘Employee. True
Names —

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO has

considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been
addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK
collection and by stating our position up front we hope to
facilitate the Board’s review and to reach an agreement that will
be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency. .

Cryptonyms ~ Except for cryptonyms related to-
operational assets or activities involving Mexico or “Miami,
the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and
withhold only the two-letter digraph. Treating cryptonyms -
in this manner will. protect the nationalities of individuals
and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JFK
investigation and render an easier reading of the written.
material.

Country File Designators - We will delete the first
element of operational activity and operational interest
files in those instances when the credibility of’ the.
narrative is not affected. The first element of the file
number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the
country name which is easily discernible, whereas the
subsequent two elements relate to type of activity or
interest and specific subject.

Action Indicator (Slug)-Lines - Generally, we will

release the entire-action indicator line of a document.
Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

a . GL By(0695930) ~
RD ©. 4 DECL OADR 2
a : " " DRV HUM 4-62 -

SECRET

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“SECRET

SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyms, Country Designators, Action

Indicators and Employee True Names

context identifies a source or a relationship with a
specific liaison service.

True Names of Staff Employees - In most instances we

will release names of employees who have retired in an overt
status and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a
document. We will continue to protect the true names of
employees cited as serving in a field position. References
to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since
pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between
Headquarters and the field. .

pre y . Wickham, Jr.

SECRET

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eee
. 7 , , ge Ce Cey

8 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
; ARRB Staff
FROM: . Barry Harrelson,
; CIS/CSI/HRG
SUBJECT: ° Issues re Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators. and
Employee True Names (U)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point. .for. the
ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country’ .
designators, action indicators and employee true names. “the
memorandum is intended to provide guidance to you and your
staff and complements information provided in previous
discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity to discuss
these issues with your staff. (U)

Attachment

Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment. , . ‘

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CONFIDENTIAL
24 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
_ATIN: | JFK Project Officer

ee Oo
FROM: Prieda’ Omasta~<-% ;
Associate Information Review officer, DDA

SUBJECT: ‘ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is further to our memorandum dated 16 June
1998 (attached) wherein the Directorate of Administration
(DA) asked to provide a determination with respect to the

release of. ISOLATION, _ISOMETRIC or ISOTROPIC;

2. -On 16 June, we advised you that these three terms
together with the term'MKCOSMOS were reviewed and the DS&T
determined that’ ISOTROPIC, and’ MKCOSMOS' must be withheld in

_ their entirety and the DA determined that \ISOLATION and

‘ISOMETRIC must be withheld as well. Please be advised that
the association to this Agency of the locations referred to
by these four crypts is classified in light of the fact that
the locations, themselves, are under military cover.
Accordingly, any crypts, slugs, or other words associated
with the locations and linking them with the CIA must not be
released. .

3. We hope the information provided above will assist
you.

Attachment: As Stated
CONFIDENTIAL

CL BY: (393504 -.

CL REASON: 1.5(c¢)

DECL ON: X1
DRV FROM: LOC 1-82

SECRET
16 June 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Historical Review Program
ATIN: i

FROM: Frieda
Associate Information “Review Officer, DDA

SUBJECT: (ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC, ISOTROPIC, MKCOSMOS

1. This is in response to your request that we review
the attached material and provide you with a determination
as to whether {ISOLATION, ISOMETRIC or {ISOTROPIC can be
released. We also reviewed the material with respect to

‘MKCOSMOS : as well.

2. The Directorate of Administration (DA) has
completed its. review and we have determined that ISOLATION
and ‘ISOMETRIC; must continued to be withheld. We ‘forwarded’
your request to the Directorate of Science and Technology -
(DS&T) and DS&T has determined that’ ISOTROPIC. and /MKCOSMOS
must continue to be withheld as well: I have identified
below the documents in which these terms are used.

Document No. Crypts

104-10177-10248 ‘ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
104-10177-10228 ISOLATION and ISOTROPIC
104-10177-10231 ISOLATION and ISOMETRIC
104-10177-10230 ISOMETRIC and MKCOSMOS _

3. Copies of the documents referred to above are
returned herewith with these terms highlighted in yellow for
deletion. Also returned are three documents that did not
contain this information (10197, 10198 and 10199). This
concludes DA action on this request. If you have any
questions, please call Frieda on 31201 or Becky on 31204.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF ATTACHMENTS

Attachments: As Stated


13-00000

SECRET

OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
- Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of }IJDECANTER Cryptonym

1. (S) This memorandum responds to the Assassination
Records Review Board (“ARRB” or “Board”) regarding their current -
deliberations as to postponement of certain very limited
information in one_document -- specifically, the actual cryptonym
of a CIA source (LJDECANTER) . It is our considered judgment that
the release of this_ cryptonym, in the particular context of the ©
given document (SxX- 59777 of “15 December 199k),

(with — the . Los “Angéles Times article ‘Of. | "29. December . 4994 would
“provide al an identifiable benefit to the Russian
counterintelligence effort and concomitant damage to US
intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose
and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a
fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym
‘IJDECANTER|} in this or any other document where it appears and
would otherwise be releasable. ,

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask
the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this |

. memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly

cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the
conclusion of your deliberations.

‘4.  (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has
been released almost in its entirety. The released version
reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

CL BY! 0619849 C/IRG/OIM .

. : . CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Decl On: X1

Orv From: HUM 4-82.

SECRET

oko ’ IR >

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SECRET

SUBJECT: .(S) Protection of [IJDECANTER\Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It
continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a
credible source. It continues by, stating that this CIA
assessment is supported by reporting from another source
(identity..redacted_but,_in fact, IJDECANTER).. It concludes_by____ #

stating that this source (TUDECANTER) has had his "... bona fides
. fully established {by CIA]." It is this final fact which is?
er itical to our request. By having released this substantive.”

info ation -- "bona fides ... established" ~- and by otherwise
having; IJDECANTER known. to the public in true name and <rypt, we | |
must protéet the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence “fe

el
A a en tr

judgment ofc is not compromised. ta
5. (C) The. practice of counterintelligence” (CI) -- and ;

hence the issue of{\damage to national security. 7~ proceeds from

four basic questions: oy

¢ what information. was compromised?

«¢ what foreign intelligence sérvice(s) - received the
information? . fo

e what understanding of te information did the
service(s) have? Mi

* what information did the intelligence service(s) |
believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the

detriment of tHe“United States? A - |

6. (C) The first two questions are largely factual ‘and can
; , be acquired through/a”combination of confessions, polygraph
°*; interviews, and/or assumptions based on access. Questions three
and four, however,’ are the most difficult and the most important
\ for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target

na

7. 5 va With further respect to question three, if a
impor) (they wilt fully understands the substance (i.e., a
)

import they will be able to exploit the information fully and:
the da mage will be far beyond the ostensible value. A perfect
exa pLé of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case. The information
cont 9romised was a as 8 Ssemingry innocuous operational manual for a |

eS

i [Le — | (So

SECRET


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SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [[UDECANTER \Cryptonym

SL En EE te an Sirens
— oo

_ a ne ee atm woe a
Pcareiiite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating
to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other
information they had acquired through signals intelligence,
concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-
operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their
territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-
| operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,
| concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of

i

‘| intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they
; | took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was
/ | directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to.question four, we have the
quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service
believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment
of the United States; if they do not, the United States may
escape damage fully or. to some degree. This is the critical
question that a foreign. country must answer and it is the
critical information that we must protect vis- a-vis defectors in
our fold.

oe

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by
‘| what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own
knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially
released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The
Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to
; | the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they
i,j know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he
said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus
incorporated his information into our operational practices and
activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm
[to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow
|. 1 them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a.
| US intelligence success.

apenas

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,
i we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the
Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did
not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed, —
the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and
{| this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the

Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period

of time. eee a
nen nn —
ea . 3

SECRET

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' SECRET

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER Cryptonym

poor (sy “In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.
‘The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information
relating to IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must
protect his cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we
lare to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal
Security Service when they assess this new information in light
|of their previous knowledge and acquired information, including,
- [of co gourse,—information—on_ the_public_record_via—the-media.—

a 12. (S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage
is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are
three additional points of relevance vis-a-vis harm:

e First, is foreign relations. nt, . ;
(Russians are fully - expect.that, cae ich Ames?" the.
it United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This|.
aes release might well be viewed as a public move

to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate
tensions

Oe a. = — “ sh. a a a —

e Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to

arguably “provide them-with insights into our - capability
to assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian
service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not
know_this—for-certain:

And third, there is an equitable issue. “The CIA_has. |
-never_officially. confirmed that _ PAPUSHIN’was a defector

' in our custody and under our controly the CIA has
pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that
it is publicly known at least to some degree. However,
because his wife, child and father remain in Russia
today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and
consider postponement also for this reason. Quite
Candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether |
the Russian government today would take action against | |
the family from this proposed release. But I would
‘urge caution here since the information at issue is

. minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and
|. AEguaR EY. harmful to living persons.

7 ee

‘4

SECRET

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: SECRET
SUBJECT: (S) Protection of|IJDECANTER \Cryptonym
13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in

person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that
this important information can be postponed from public release.

Lee S. Strickland

SECRET

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SECRET

SUBJECT: Protection of |IJDECANTER|Cryptonym
Fe

OIM/IRG/LSS: blo/31287 (6 August 1998)

Distribution:
Orig - Adse

- EXDIR

- ER

- D/OCA

- D/OPA . :
- Principal Deputy General Counsel
- D/OIM

- DA/IRO

DCI/IRO

- DO/IRO

- DI/IRO

- DST/IRO

- LSS signer file

- OIM/IRG Chrono

- Subject File: ARRB

PRE EHP BPR E PEP PP BP
7

g:/irg_fr’1\general\lss\arrb_ijd.doc

SECRET

13-00000 —

. ‘ - Office of

| OM,
. . Cfmation Man ae
SECRET
CIA TALKING POINTS |
re Protection of \\IJDECANTER!’ Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB)
. 26 Aucust 1998
e The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board

on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of
Operations and the CIA.

e We request the postponement of certain very limited
information in one document,_-- specifically, the actual
cryptonym of a CIA source (IJDECANTER) .

[a ee eee

e It is our considered judgment that the release of this
cryptonym, in the particular context of the given
document_(SX- 59777. of 15. December 1991), and juxtaposed

ath the Bos Angeles Times article‘ of 29 December 1997,

(MOULD fe an

e provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-
' aintelligence effort,

e result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence
interests, and, : .

e have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and
prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which
could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

e Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and
objectives, we propose however: .

e a-substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,
“TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym(TJDECANTER) in this or
any other document where it appears and would otherwise
be releasable, and/or, ,

— cL BY{ 0619849 C/IRG/OIM

, CL Reason: 1.5(c)
Deci On: X1
Drv From: HUM 4-82

SECRET

13-00000

“e As the Board is aware,

SECRET

a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the

if desired,
Ya

nature of a factual description of the source (e.g.,—

valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but

not general rank, official in the intelligence service .
(KGB) of the former USSR; 4g, ecifical: se aw B 8 ono)

the relevant document has been released

almost in its entirety.

The released version reports that a Soviet official
(Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect
that OSWALD was a KGB source...

It continues by stating that CIA did not believe
ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.

It continues by stating that this CIA assessment is
Supported Py ae from. another source’ *(#dentarty :|.

Fecconclados-by Stating That_shie-Jource(iJOUCRNTER) bap
had-“his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA]. ae
|
|
\
:
f

—~ ee we
ae a : —_
It is this~final fact which is critical,
ee ~ a

By having released this>substantive information ~- "bona
fides eee ~-== AND by—otherwise having
IJDECANTER known-to the public in true hamé~and_ crypt,
THEN WE-MOST’ PROTECT the cryptonym here so sae thee
intelligence Judgment of CIA is not gomprami sed.— — Tt

I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some —
degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from

this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this
particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

2

SECRET

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nt

Mgr
—

‘and the target intelligence service.

SECRET
[—se "The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the
issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four

basic questions:
e what information was compromised?

°e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
information?

e what.understanding of the information did the receiving
intelligence service(s) have? oon

e what information did the receiving intelligence
service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and
to the detriment of the other party?

The first two questions are largely factual and can be
acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and
the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service

Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not
really an issue here since the US fully understood the
information presented.

aaa

Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for
exploitation.

e If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset
(e.g., a.defector), they act on the information to the
detriment of the other service.

*

3

SECRET


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SECRET

| e In the matter at hand,

= _

If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully

or to some degree.

This is the critical question that a foreign country must
answer and it is the critical information that we must

protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold.

we are very constrained by what the

Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and

In sum,

ra
i what they have acquired from the substantially released
document and the Los Angeles Times article.

The. Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (1. e., IJDECANTER)
defected to the United States;

they know or suspect what he told the US;

they know or suspect that we fully understood the import
_of what he said;

they do not know, however, whether we believed him and
thus incorporated his information into our operational
practices and activities.

And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to

the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and

allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what
heretofore has been a US intelligence success,

question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.

The CIA to date has released all of the substantive
information relating to TJDECANTER in this particular

document.

But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this
particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial
CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when
they assess this new information in light of their

7

tania eee

ee
ae,

i

1

previous knowledge and acquired information,—including,—

4

SECRET

a

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SECRET

*e Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a
devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence
organization.

e It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets
-- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA
will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at
some future point in time.

o Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take
self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current.
assets or public statements by inactive ones) ..

e Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most
assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future
assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.
Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our
ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly
against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).

e There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in
the interests of the Board’s time. They are not
insignificant, however. .

e ONE, is foreign relations.

— >
» In our judgment, the Russians are. fully_expect—that,—after——. \
| Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of

' reprisal.

This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to
embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

i ee vo — _

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TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the
Russian service.

This specific release could arguably provide them with insights
into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.

The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does
not know this for certain.

THIRD, is an equitable ‘issue.

“The CIA has never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a

defector in our custody and under our control;

The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;

“While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to

some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain
in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial
action the current government might take.

Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
the Russian government today would take action against the

family from this proposed release.

But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is
minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably
harmful to living persons.

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g:\irg_frontoffice\general\1ss\arrbijtp.doc
(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)

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CL BY1031682-1998-DO

CL REASON: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
prv Fam: COL 1-82

25 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Bob Skwirot

’ FROM: Charles A. Briggs-Y- o — ;
OFFICE: DCI/CSI/HRG
SUBJECT: Mexico City Station History

REFERENCE:

The Mexico City Station History contains at least 99 separate cryptonyms, for the.most part
concerning projects, but in some cases, individuals, covering the period (1947 to June 1969. in
every case, there is identifying information included with the crypt, ranging from a brief
parenthetical phrase to Several pages of detail. Since the information far exceeds that thought
relevant to the JFK story, both in time and substance, an approach designed to provide a maximum
amount of information and guidance for historians concerned with the JFK assassination, with a
minimum of gratuitously useable leads for curious or hostile FOIA requestors concerning CIA
activities generally, was chosen and is reflected in the version the Board has for consideration.

The norm in handling cryptonyms when the entire crypt is not released is to protect the
digraph - the location indicator. What I've done here, to avoid unraveling, in effect, the whole __
history of Station activity for subsequent curiousity seekers, is to reverse the process, releasing the
digraph and protecting the root - ‘specifically because the text identifies each crypt. The Board is
familiar with the decision to release almost all Ll-crypts in full - while protecting identifying
information. The major relevant LI projects (LIENVOY, LITEMPO, LICALLA, etc.) have had both the
full cryptonym and most of the details released. Na. : ——

Station-and-Operation Directorate divigion histories are e among the most sensitive documents
in the Agency. They are very tightly controlled within. the area divisions - they are not available to
cleared employees in other directorates or, traditionally, outside of the division within the Operations
Directorate. Thus concern about the release of the Mexico City History pages that, viewed through
the widest of lenses, do not appear to be relevant to the JFK story,is very great.

de - . .
aa See peace anrene

cc:

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