178-10003-10090 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
. JFK Assassination Sysiem Date:

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: KISS/SCOW
RECORD NUMBER: — 178-10003-10090

RECORD SERIES: CHURCH COM.

AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 7506462 (2)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: = NSC
FROM:
TO: RECORD

TITLE: | MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62

DATE: 09/06/1962
PAGES: 5

SUBJECTS :
“CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITUES

DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM

CLASSIFICATION: — Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1c
CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 07/16/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :; Attached to 1781000310069. Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET.

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. DRAFT MONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62
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‘MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD sop ty
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SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on a
‘Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962

‘PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin;
Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and
General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow

178-10003-10090
178-10004-10264

1. Sabotage Operation .

General Carter reported that information should be available by
‘Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr.
. Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the

dntormation is obtained.

2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st.
~ He noted that some of the: ‘oparetional. representatives had . questioned
whether this was responsive to the changed situation ogee, by the
4dssuance oF NSAM 181, but said that ‘this plan had been ‘prepared within
the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16).
Me, Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to.NSAM 181] has
; ‘been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified

; -the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that‘the approach

- taken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory.

“3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities
Jisted in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not
~given to the paper at this meeting.)
a. “Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that

' he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal

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is prepared. After considerable discussion, it’ was agreed that

details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of

the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method

and place of launching, the technical details of the release of
“leaflets, etc., etc.

b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of
arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group
agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S, objectives
toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with
a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should
be done with: the idea of providing a-pretext--for further action,

ce. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported
by State, said that Radio Swan (aumber 23) should be continued even
though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of

’ the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr.
Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount
against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would.
not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group

_ asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such
intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared. .

d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed
at Bloc personne] in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than

- just to the latter. | .

e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose

was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce.

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£, General Carter poinbed out that reference to support of ali
Cuban exile groups (number 48) is -mpractical. The word was changed
cto selected.
Be ‘Mr. ‘Martin cautioned that results of mumber 50 (actions to
be undertaken by other ‘Hemisphere governments) would mot ‘be expected
. overnight. | .
_ -ih, General Canter wrged that, dim conection vweiitth mumber 22
- (submarine tbroadcasts),, General iansdale ghowild ibe gitven:more latitude
. dn working wp other deception possibilities. Mr. Bunthy Felt, on the
ether thand, that :particularily because of the possible Cuban counter-
| mensures which thad been outlined iby Mr. Murrow, ithe Group should look
at other possibilities in some detail.

4, Ceneral Carter felt thet a Geteroinetiion should “be made as

tho thow Sar tthe W'S. is prepared tte po im economic Iharransing actions.
He emphasized tthat sabotage operations such as tthnase unter number a7

WLLL mot im themeelwes be especially effective iin re the Cuban
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4, Whe Group itthen burned to a discussion of mumber 32 (agricultural

sabotage). General Carter emphasized ‘tthe extreme senpitivity of any

such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
ithing golmg wrong, iparideulerily ‘LE there weme abviious attribution to

the U.'S. ‘He went. on ito say, ihowever,, that it would ibe possible to
wxcoomplish tohis purpose iby methoils wore subtile tthan tthose indicated in
fhe paper. He mentioned specifically ithe possibility wf producing crop

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7 -4-

failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear

to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about
any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result
of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must i

avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless

‘they could be completely covered up.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which

could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can
be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatior

to use such-materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
‘.

bh

6. Tt: was-suggested.that.the -matter.of.attacking and larrassing 6

Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against»

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked

into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government,
within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great

degree. ,

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.
Photocopy”

from
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’

He mentioned as examples what the’ U.S. response should be in the event
of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mcunted.
. - The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger
, " plans already prepared, rust be pursued.
| ; , : Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the
. MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy chat General Lansdale's group,
a particularly the State representative, fat do the initial exploration
_ of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the
‘Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General
Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates
' were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible
decisionsof this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time

available for MONGOOSE operations. Yhie matter was left open for further

consideration at a meeting next week.

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Photocopy
from
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