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The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich

NOSENKO

February 1967


14-0000

The Bona Fides of NOSENKO

I. INTRODUCTION
II. SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Introduction
B. First Geneva Phase (June 1962)
C. Second Geneva Phase (January-February 1964)
D. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964 to Present)
III. OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES ,
A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO in Geneva
B. Reasons for NOSENKO's Presence in Geneva
“4. TDY in 1962
. 26 The 1964 TDY
C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENKO
1, Introduction ,
2. Collaboration in 1962
a. Readiness to Report to CIA
b. Attitude Toward Defection
; ec. Motivation
; 3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)
4. The Letter of July 1964
D. Pattern of Activity in Geneva
1. Introduction

2. Official Duties in Geneva

3. Visits to the KGB Legal Residency
4. Association with TSYMBAL

5. Association with Other Soviets

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA
= ‘Timing of Defection . ,

F. The Recall Telegram

TOP SEcrey

MPP eter nets:

~

o 7D f&® F&F WwW WwW Ww

tlie ab ae aes

Sreare

sade Sh dct bere cassis

—

.

G. Soviet Official Reactions 40
H., Reactions of NOSENKO's Family 42
I, Repercussions Within the KCB 44°
1. SENSITIVE SOURCE 44
2. SEISITIVE SOURCE 46
3. SGURCE 46
4. KGB Handlers of Agents 47
IV. NON-KGB ASPECTS OF NOSENKO's LIFE 48
. A. Introduction , : 48
RB, NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography 48
. C. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB 79
- 1. Family Life 79
1 2. Venereal Disease 80
.* 3, Affiliation with Communist Party Organs 81
4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO 82
’ D. Soviets! Statements About NOSENKO g3 - X44
V. NOSENKO's KGB CAREER Ses
A, Introduction 85
*B. Entry into the KGB 86
1. Date of Entry 86
2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry 89
C. To June 1955 (American Department) 93
1. Introduction 93
; 2. Operations Against Correspondents 93
a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY, 93
and WHITNEY a :
b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents 94
c. Information from Other Sources 95
3. Operations Against Military Attache Personnel 96

- a. Agents Reporting on Military Attaches

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June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1.
2.
3.

4.

NOSENKO's Targets
(i) MICKELSON
(id) MEARNS

(1414) RICHARDS |

(iv) FELCHLIN
(v) BENSON
(vi) STROUD

(vii) MULE

(viii) ENG of BENSON, STROUD and MULE
(ix) CARDELLA
(x) VAN LAETHEM

Introduction

Soviet Homosexual Agents

Other Soviet Agents

Operations with Foreign Visitors

a.

b.

Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)
Recruitment of BURGI (1956)
Approach to @ (1957)

Contact with Gana GE (1957)

Recruitment of 4

Recruitment of HARRIS (1958)
Compromise of KRAFT (1958)

Recruitment of DREW (1959)

Recruitment of # (1959)
Recruitment of & 1959)
Recruitment of (1959)

Recruitment of

Compromise of BARRETT (1959) ..

. Compromise of WILUERFORD (1959)

. y ~

EE es TP SE et os

Beka tien in ates +

aad gt :
= Fore agit SPT ae FET

99
100°
100
100
101
103
103
104

104

106
107
107
107
109
112
112
113
120
121
121
122
123
123

124

124

124,
125.
126.
127

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5, The FRIPPEL Case (1959-63) 129

a. NOSENKO's Information 129
b. FRIPPEL's Information . 133
6, Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963) 136
a. Statements to the FBI 137
b. Statements to CIA 141
a) KGB Interest in OSWALD . 141
(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD 142
(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure 142
from the USSR
(iv) OSWALD's Visit to the Soviet 143
Embassy in Mexico
{v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible 144
KGB Involvement in the Assassination
7, Supervisory Responsibilities and Knowledge 145
of Tourist Operations
a. Information from NOSENKO 145
b. KGB Knowledge from George BLAKE 146
c. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document 147
8. TDY's to London (1957 and 1958) 150

January 1960 to January 1962 (American Department) 152

1, Introduction 152
2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy 153
Section
3. Duties and Knowledgeability 157
a. Introduction ~ 157
b. Functions as Deputy Chief and Acting 158
Chief of Section
(i) Access 158
(44) Duties 159

(444) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's 163 _

Absence

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ec. Supervisor of All Code Clerk Operations
(i) Introduction
(ii) Approach to STORSBERG
(a) NOSENKO's Information
(b) Information from STORSBERG
(c) Information from PREISFREUND
(a) Information from GOLITSYN
(e}) Information from Cther Sources

(iii) TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk
Cases

(a) Introduction
(b) False Identity for Travel

(c) The Early 1960 TDY (JENNER
Case)

(a) The November 1966 TDY (GARLAND
Case)

(iv) KCB-Polish UB Activities Against
MORONE

(a) Introduction
(b) NOSENKO's Information
(c) Information from Other Sources

(v) Developmental Operation Against
WIVUS

{a) Introduction
(b) Information from NOSENKO
ec) Information from Other Sources
(vi) Approach to KEYSERS
. a 7 . . (a) Introduction
_ . “(b) Information from NOSENKO

(e) Information from Other Sources

a. 7 NOSENKO' 8 Responsibilities for Coverage
of ABIDIAN

(4) Introduction

B RQA AS . Ma,
Weak! eT. fe Seen

slate et oy Gib BTA tae oe Be Soke git

186
186
187

196

201

201

201

209

209
209
211

213
' 213

213

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(ii) Duties as Case Officer

(441) ABIDIAN's Letter Mailings

(iv) ABIDIAN’s Servicing of the Pushkin
Street Lead Drop

Supervisor of Activities Against American
Service Attaches

Knowledge of the Target

(4) Introduction

(1i) Physical Premises

(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy -Cover

Electronic Operations Against the U.S.

' Embassy

(i) Introduction
(4i) Microphones in the Chancery
(a) NOSENKO's Sources

(b) Number and Locations of
_ Microphones

(c) Receptivity and Audibility of
Microphones

(a4) Amount, Type, and Value of
Production

(i4i) Microphones in the North Wing
(iv) Monitoring/Jamming Beam

Handler of KGB Agents

4. Overseas Assignments

a.

F, January 1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department)
1. Date of Transfer

"2. Punctions and Activities.

Attempt to Obtain Assignment to Ethiopia
(1960) .

U.S. Visa Application (19€0)
The Cuba TDY (1960)
The Bulgaria TDY and the LUNT Case

5. Transfer to the Tourist Department

236

240
240
240
242
248

248
248
249
252

257

260

267
270
272
274

274 -

‘274

276

' 279

284

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-
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3. NOSENKO's Agents 287
a. Arsene FRIPPEGL 287 .
bp. dohan PRELSFREVUAD 263
c. VOLKOVY and YEFREMOV 288 5
a. 289
e. Marina RYTOVA 283
4. Approach to W. EE, JCHNZON 289
@. NOSENKO's Information 239 : 2
b. Information from JOHNSON : 292
5. Attempt to Recruit PRALNS 233
a. intormation frem NOSENKO 293
b. Information from BRAUNS 294
6. The SVENCHAUISKIY Case 295
a. Information from NOSENKC 295
b. Information from Other Sources 296
7. KOTEN's Arrest and the KGE Agent BExgoe 298
a. Information from NOSENKO 298

b. Information from Other Sources Concerning 300

KOTEN
SENSTOTE S0u0RCE

c. GEE

Peporting on [REESE 302

8. Arrest Of BARGHOORN 304
a. Information frou NOSENKO 304
b. Information from BARGHOORN 308
9. GRU Agent: John Andrew SHUBIN 310
a. Introduction 310
b. NOSENKO's Information 310 :
c. Information from Of & Sensitive Source 311 ;
a. Information from Other Sources 312
10. BOLSHAKOV, Robert Kennedy, and the Cuban 313 : a
Missile Crisis : £
a. Introduction 313 : s
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b. Soviet Sources During the Crisis 315
: Cc. NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV 316 .
; ad. Information from WRERE) Sensitive Source 318 1
: G. NOSENKO's KG8 Promotions and Awards 319 ;
H iT
i l. Rank 319
2. Awards and Decorations 322
H. NOSENFKO's Relationship with GRIBANOV 327
1. Information trom NOSEMKO 327
i a. Summary : 327
b. Details 327
2. Informaticn 336
I. Confirmation from Cther Sources 3338
1. Introduction 338
2. SENSITIVE SOURCE 338
3. Ey eee Bs, sensitive source 340
4. : ise «= Sensitive source 341
5. 2S Source : 342
6. GAMKRELIDZE 342
7. GCOLITSYN 343
8. 345
9. 347
10. eS 347 :
11. Soviet Journalist KOROLEV 347
; | | WI. PRODUCTION : 349 :
7 A. Positive Intelligence Information : 349
; B. Soviet Intelligence Personalities 350 3
C. KGB Headquarters 352 oe . 7
. 1. Structure and Functions 352 ‘ y
2. Modus Operandi : ; ; 359
3. Staff Procedures _ 360
Cn
wee Poa “A
TOP SECRET = : 4
~ sa . we 1

unt

D. KGB. Activities.

“ab

1. "@perations Against Americans .
2.- Tabulation of American Leads
‘az Successful Recruitment Approaches
b. Development Operations
¢. Unsuccessful Approaches
a. Investigations
3. Selected Cases of Recruited Americans

a. "SASHA"

(i) NOSENKO's Information on the
Agent

(ii) NOSENKO's Sourcing

(iii) GOLITSYN's Lead to “SASHA"
b. “ANDREY" (Dayle W. SMITH)

(i) Introduction

(ii) NOSENKO's Information - 1962

(iii) NOSENKO's Information - 1964

(iv) | NOSENKO's Sourcing

(v) Results of Investigations

ec. KGB Agent in Paris (Sgt. Robert Lee
JOHNSON)

(4) Introduction

(44) The Lead from NOSENKO

(iii) NOSENKO's Sourcing

(iv) | JOHNSON and MINTKENBAUGH

(v) information from Cther Sources
(a) JOHNSON's Statements

(b) MINTKENBAUGH's Statements

“ayes > SOHNSON ;
(e) Soviet Concern about Mrs.
JOHNSON's Illness .

(c) Hedwig JOHNSON's Statements

- (a) Mental Condition of Hedwig

412
412p
413
413
413
416
419
419
427

427
428
433

"436

437

alata ads

Sait

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2


14-0000

(vi) Damage by JOHNSON to U.5.

Interests

Unsuccessful Approaches to U.S. Citizens

a.

The HARMSTONE Case

(4) Introduction

(ii) Information
(iii) Information
Edward Ellis SMITH
() Information
fii) Information
(iii) Information
The BINDER Case

(4) Information

(ii) Information

from NOSENKO

from Other Sources

from NOSENKO -
from GOLITSYN

from SMITH

from NOSENKO

from BINNER

Operations Involving Other Westerners

ae

Tabulation

(4) Introduction

(ii) Agent Leads

(a) Afghanistan (1)

1b) Argentina (2)

(c) Australia (1)

(a) Austria (3)

(e) Belgium (6)

(£) Brazil (2)
(g) Canada (5)
(h) Egypt (1)
(i) Finland (9)
gj) France (9)

Qk) Germany: (9)

(1) Greece

TOP SECEE

Sate RT seated tt

Data betatl

(1)

463
463
463
464
465
468
468
463
469
470
470
470
474
474
474
475
475
475
476
476
477

. 479

479

Sees sre

fe Rea timate: ncHlages.

3
2
H
{
a
a
i
Js
3
i
t

2 tai Sova akin ae tined:


(441)

(m) India (2)

(n) Indonesia (1)

(o) Iran (1)

(p) Israel (2)

(q) Italy (6)

(cr) Japan (8)

{s) Mexico (2)
(t+) The Netherlands (2)

(a) Norway (1)

(vy) Peru (1)

(w) Sweden (3)

(x) Switzerland (2)

(y) Tunisia (1)

(z) United Kingdom (7)

(aa) Uruquay (1)

(bb) Venezuela (1)

Investigations and Development

Cases

b. The VASSALL Case

(i)
(ii)
(i4i)

Information from NOSENKO
Information from GOLITSYN

Information from VASSALL

c. The Lilegal gue

(1)
(ii)
(iid)
(iv)

(i)

Introduction

Information from NOSENKO
Activities in Germany

Cperation in Canada

_ @e _Introduction

-. ‘The BELITSKIY Operation

b. information from NOSENKO

- Statements in 1962

Serre verona

Stanuh.. eae Seba les

22 wlaie.

et sAltataet

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sible habit Ai Li

Jeu te a


(ii) Statements in 1964

(i44)}%' BELITSKIY Photograph 521

Information ‘grom Other Sources 522

Investigations 530

Compromise of POPOV 530 :

(4) Introduction 530 | .

(ii) CIA Operation with POPOV 530

(iii) Cause and Date of Compromise 532 . - it 4
(a) Information from NOSENKO $320 4
(b) Informaticen from ee sour 2 : :
(c) Infromation from the 533

CHEREPANOV Papers :

(a) Information from GOLITSYN = 533 : '

Compromise of PENKOVSKIY ~ 535 .

(4) Introduction 535

(ii) Resume of the PENKOVSKIY Case 535 .

(iii) Statements by NOSENKO 536 i
(a) 536. ;
(b) Reports on the Compromise 538 .

(iv) Information from GiRaiem SENSITIVE 544 DURCE

ieee Oo ts ede

(v) Information from “Q6@EERZEPSENSITIVE 544 SOURCE -
(vi) Information from 545 Source
(vii) Information from Seas 545 |
(viii) formation from* 546 1 i

§ a i 4
(ix) Information from Official KGB . 546 | an {

Report . weed Apenemnasy
(x) Information from WYNNE 546 '
Compromise of CHEREPANOV 548 4
(i) Introduction 548

(ii) Earlier Information on CHEREPANOV 548 |

(441) Reports by Americans

553

*

d.

e.

-(y) information from & +

(iv) Information from NOSENKO.

source

(vii) Information from

(viii) Infermation froa We sensitive
(ix) Contents of CHEREPANOY Package

(x) NOSENKO's Comments on the
CHEREPANOV Paipecs

Reports on KAZAN-KCMAREK
(i) Introduction °
(ii) Statement by i.CSENKO

(iii) Statement

Alfred SUELINGER s
the FBI

Suspected Source of

(i) Introduction

(i) NOSENKO's Information
SanS ITIVE SURE

(iii) GRD Information

(iv) SLESINGER's Information

6. Technical Penetrations o1 the West German

Embassy
° a. Introduction
: >. Information from NOSCNKS
: c.
d, Evidence of Technical Penetration

a.

b.

ee

"¥.S. Evaluations

~ “G). NSA Report

9. Cryptologic Successes Against the U.S,
Enkessy

Introduction

Information from NOSENKO

(4) Br -aking U.S, Ciphers

(ii).
(iii)

Handling Deciphered Cables

Methods of Cryptologic Attack.

(vi) Information from FREE sensitive
papas arias

571
571
572
573
574

574
576
378
530

583

583

585

585.

587

ee

i
A
4
4
4

4
a
4

¢


Se

PSE OT £S Teg

(ii) USIB Security Comnittee Report 593 | 3

E, NOSENKO and GOLITSYN - 594 4
1. Introduction oe 594 ‘ 4

2. Background Information on GOLITS‘t! 594 | ‘4

3. GOLiTSYN Leads and Information from NOSENKO 595 4

&@. Microphones in the U.S. Emrassy 595 , d

b. Other Leads Corroborated by NOSENKO 596 ;

sans eeate demise

ec. Leads Conflicting with NOSENKO Reports 597

eso ord

a. Leads to Cperations Against U.S. Embassy 597
Not Covered by NGSENKO

4. NOSENKO's Information on GOLITSYN 599
F. Surveillance of Soviets in the United States 609 7
1. Information from NOSENKO : 600 ;
2. Information from Other Sources 601 ; :
a. GOLITSYN 601 ‘
b. sensitive source . 602 " 4
c. CHEREPANOV Document 602 ;
L VII. SPECIALISTS’ ASSESSMENTS OF NOSENKO . 603
: ' A. Opinions on Intelligence and Personality 603 \.
. 1. Graphological Analysis 603 |
2. Reports by Psychologist 605
a. Psychological Testing Results 605

b. Alternative Psychological Explanations 609

Tate eet ok

ec. Psychological Interrogation 611

tte yt Ane

3. Report by Psychiatrist 613

'
i
“os B. Views of Intelligence Personnel
. 1. Statement by DERYABIN

a. Introduction

b. DERYABIN's Comments
--Remarks by CIA Handlers .

“ae Introduction

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Lot a vee “ye

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14-0000

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Bele Page F
ld _ =
mo b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings 626 , :
: ;
c. NOSENKC'g Behavior Urder Interrogation 627
(4) Introduction 627 :
: j :
(14) Manner of Recounting Events 627 { :
{
i
(iii) Evasion, Imorovisation, and Other 628 I
Defenses :
d. Additional Observations 630 ,
: '
(i) inquisitiveness about CIA 630
(44) Acceptance of Contrary Information 631 :
from Other Sources ,
e@. Discussions with NOSENKO about his own 631
Performance :
C, Polygraph Testing 632 °
1. Test in April 1964 632
2. Test in October 1966 on Lee Harvey OSWALD 638
a. Introduction 638 .
'
b. Results 638 '
!

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2
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“eR QINEC NEE erremapET eR eee
Fay le ln cite


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ri
2
<

1.

2.

_

NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES:

A. Introduction

Introduc tion

KGS Crgasization, Personalities,

B, Evaluation of Production

Operational Leads

a, Introduction

b. Operations Involving Americans

(i)

(iz)

(aiid

c. Operations Involving Other Westerners

(i)

(ii5

Consis

Introduction

Discussion

a. Introduction

b. Discussion

c. Remarks

The BELITSKIY Case

a. Introduction

be. Discussion

c. Remarks

(i)
rete)

(iii)

me)
(4a) |
an)

a)
Go
(iii)

. tw)

Investigations

Compromise of POPOV

Introduction
Discussion

Remarks"

Compromise of PENKOVSKIY

Introduction
Discussion

Remarks

"Compromise of CHEREPANOV .

Introduction

The Summary on LANGELLE -

Remarks
TA OF nO

Completeness, Accurary, Detail an
tency of Reporting

Damage to the Soviets

importance Or Usefulness

Technical Operations Against the U.S. Enkassy

‘The Operational Plan in Draft

7

‘ALYSIS AND pocenprrcnr-alaaaanary vi

647

665

re rn

4
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4

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_ Evaluation of Sourci J
1. Introduction

2. Discussion

3. Remarks 677
D. Examination of NOSENKO's Intelligence Carcer (678 ; 4
1. Introduction 678 *s “9
ore : 2. Naval GRU Service 679 ‘ 4
@. Introduction 679 ' _
- b. Discussion - 679 | i
* c. Kemarks 682 i 4
3. Entry into the KGB ; . 683 4

e a. Eligibility 683

b. Date of Entry : 683.

. ec. Circumstances of Entry 684 :
d. Remarks 685 _ :
4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section 685 ‘ 4

: 4. Introduction 685 ’ A
; b,. Work Against American Correspondents 686 | , 5
. ec. Work Against Army Attaches 686
i d. Additional Reporting 690
' e. Remarks ; ; 690 {

: 5. Tourist Department (June 1955 to January 1960) 692 ‘ |
‘ a. Introduction 692 i
oS me _ be The Early Period (1955 to 1958) 692 3
- (i) General - 692 i
| : (ii) The BURGI Case 693 il

c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section _ 695 :

ad. Knowledge of Section's Staff and Agent
Personnel 7 . , ;

e. Knowledge of Section's Activities
a) BLAKE
“€ii) GOLITSYN Document

‘ (iii) Tourist Agents |

NOSENKO's Tourist Paper

ge The OSWALD Case

Te
,

Peespey ee

ade adel iter cbt aa ieas PFE REO amd ep at egtten fe gem de tee amin agen en


seth aaleen Raa eR Nemes in. ous
h. BOSENKCte

“iy Dice RS oe Spi ia oe
GCreratioaal Accivi

“ a <i} . Cereral - oe 698
va (ai) - The Homosexuals YEFREMOV and YOLKOV 698 i. :
(,ii) Homosexual Entraprént Operations 699 if 4
Civ) The Agent PRIPPEL 9700 | 4
o i. kKemarks _ 702 i 4
, i 6. u.s. En.bassy Section (1960-1361) 705 : _ a.
° a. introduction 705 4
b. Entry anto the Section: 705 y 4
c. Functions as Deputy Chief 706 j
: a. Knowieéseanility as Deputy and Acting Chief 707 F
G. Knowledgeability of U.S, Eckassy bhysical 703 i
Security \ :
£. Knowledgeabi lity ehout American intelligence 709 ;
Personnel : ' ;
g.- Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Cpe .tions 709 j
(i) the SYTORSBEKG Case 711i :
(ii) 'The JENNER Case 713 | |
(421) The GARLAND Case) 714 | }
(iv) The MCRONE Cese 715 |
a (v) The KEYSERS Case 717 |
(vi) Other Code: Clerk Cases ’ 718
i

1 4
vod

h. Responsibility for and Knowledge of ABIDIZN 720

i i. Repocting on ABIDIAT's Visit to the Pushkin 722
Street Dead Drop

j. Responsibility of Supervising Military Attache 725

Operations .
k. TOY to Bulgaria and the LUST Case 726
| “qhe U.S. Visa and the Cuba TDY os 727 :
1. Personal Handling of Agents 729
¢i) YEFREMOV and VOLKOV 729
(iid #RIPPEL TR
(iii) | DMITRIYEV, 18
(iv) RYTOVA oe 729
- - &) LEVINA g 7
(vi) | Sohan PRE1SFREUND

wi Ga

‘Transfer ‘to the Tourist ‘bepartment

+ *


E.

Introduction
Absences from Moscow
Personal Perticipation in Operations
(i) The ¥.E, JOHNSON Provocation
(ii) The BARGHCORN Provocation-Arrest
(iin) The Approach to BRAUNS
(ivi The Arrest of KOTEN
d. Agexts Handled by NOSENXO
(i) FRIPPEL
(ii) SVENCHANSKIY
e. ‘The GSWALD Investication
£. The CHEREPANCV Investigation

g. Remarks

Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1.

KGB Awards and Ranks
a. Awards

b. Ranxs

c. Remarks
Affiliation with Comaunist Party Organs
a. Introduction

b. Discussion

ec. Remarks
Schooling

a. Introduction

b. Discussion

ec. Remarks

Appraisals of NOSENKO, His Motivation, and Other
Operational Circumstances ~ Se

1.
2.

=e

Introduction

NOSENKO

Motivation
Operational Circumstances
a. Presence in Ceneva (1962)

b. Presence in Geneva (1964)

738

739
739
740
740
741
742
742
742

742

- 743

744
144
744
744

746

746

748

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va0eap 73.53 to KGB Kel.cency and Avadladbisaaly = 4.”

‘a. Timing of 1962 Contact 982

e. Willingness to Meet CIA. 753

f. The Recall Telegram oo 753

“gq. Remarks 753

G. Sources Supsorting NOSENXO 756

1, Introduction 756

. 2. Corresoration of NOSENKO's Intelligence Career 756
3. Remarks , 757 ; 4
re H. Alternative Fxplanatiors . 7159 4
: 1. Intrcduction 759 . 4

2. First Alternative ‘ 759
a. Faulty Memory ’ 759 ;

a b. Selective Memory 75S

: c. Embellishment. 761

° ad, ‘Combination of Above 762 !
e. Insanity 763 i 5
3. Second Alternative 763 | ]
: 4, Third Alternative . 763 | |
5. Remarks 764 :
. “Ie Summary ef Conclusions . 765 | 4
| ——


ILLUSTRATIONS

: Photograph of NOSENKO and his father,

a the Minister of Shipbuilding

\ Photograph of NOSENKO and NCSENKO's Family
Finnish Travel Manifests: March-April 1960
Finnish Travel Manifest: November 1960
TDY Authorization

: Translation of TDY Authorization

.. ,

Facing Page 11

Facing Page 43

Facing Page 194
Facing Page 197
Facing Page 319

“Facing Page 320

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Bee

NOSENKO is ‘evaluated and analyzed.

I. INmopuerToH
This review presents the facts and observetions which bear
on the bona fides of the Sovict defector Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO,

The highlights of NOSE%KO's biography, as he has given it to -

CIA, are as follows: He was born 20 October 1927, the first son
of Ivar Isidorovich NOSENKC, shipyard worker who in 1939 was to
become Soviet Minister of Shipbuilaing. After Graduating in 1951
from the Institute cf International Relations in Moscow, where
he specialized in internatiunal law and the English language,
NOSENKO entered the Chief Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the
Soviet Navy, serving first as a translator essigned to the intel-
ligence staff of the Seventh (Far Eustern) Fleet and then as a
senior translator and political officer at en intellicence unit
of the Fourth (Baltic) Fleet. In mid-March 1953,. immediately
following STALIN's death, O3ENKO left the Naval GRU to-become a
junior case officer in the KCB. He was assigned to:the U.S.
Embassy Section of the American- Departuent, KGB Second Chief
Directorate, from 1952 to mid-1955. During this pericd he was
initially responsible for operational accivity surrounding Am-
erican journalists in Moscow and later for operations against
U.S. Army Attaches at the-fmbassy. When transferred to the newly
Organized Tourist Departmen: of the Second Chief Direcrorate in
1955, NOSENKO had as his targets vi-itors to the Soviet Union
from the United States and the countries of tne British Common-
wealth. Having handled a nuimoer of successful tourist opera-
tions, NOSENKO in 1958 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the
section responsible for operations against American, 8ritish,
and Canedian nationals, Eighteen months later NiUSENKO returned
to the U.S, Embassy Section as its Deputy Chier. Between January
1960 and January 1962 he was second-in-charge of all KGB activ-
ities against the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and personally super-
vised operations against the Embassy Security Officer, the
Second Chief Directorate’s most important counterintelligence
target at the time, and against American code clerks, collec-
tively the Directorate’'s most important recruitment targets.

At ths-ec December 1961 NOSENKO again was transferred to
the’Tourist Department, this time as Chief of the American-
Britign-Canadian Section. Six months later he was made Deputy
Chief of the Tourist Department, and in mid-1963 he became its
First Deputy Chief.

From the time he first contacted CIA in Geneva ,in 1962,

_ NOSENKO's status has been under examination. Only now, three

years following his defection in Fepruary 1964, is Gefinitive
study of the bona fides question possible: the voluminous and
diverse reports by NOSENKO, coupled with collateral information,
required that much time for assimilation, correlation, investiga-
tion, and evaluation. NOSENKO's own testimony, interspersed with
representative subsidiary cases stemming from or related to his
reports, constitutes a larse part cf the evidence. This review
also draws upon statements and actions by other Soviets, colla-

tions with materials from other sources, and opinions by special-.

ists of various kinds. These factual elements are presentec
without comment or interpretation, except in the penultimate
section of the review where the evidence on the bona fides of

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2.

This review is presented in the following format:

2 Part IIs A summary of developments in the KOSENKO case from

1962 to the present, including hi3 clandestine
meetings with CIA, his defection, and the subsequent
debriefings and interrogations,

Pert III: A discussion of the operational circumstances of
NOSENKO's 1962 contact with CIA and his defection
two years later. Included is discussion of CIA's
information concerning NOSENKO prior to his First
contact in Geneva, ROSENKO's explanation of the -
reasons for his presence in Geneva in 1962 and 1964,
NOSENKO‘s motivations first for establishing clendes-
tine contact with American Intelligence and later for
‘defecting to the United States, NOESENKO's pattern of
activity 1n Geneva in 1962 and 1964, and the reactions
of the Soviets. both official and unofficial, to the
defection,

Part IV: The non-KG3 aspects of NOSENKO's life, both before
and after he joined Soviet State Security Service,
as he described them and as others have reported them.

Part Vs The positions and responsib.Llities of NOSENKO in the
KGB, the operations with which he was associated,
his travels abroad. the awards and promotions which
he received and other Soviet sources' statements
on these points.

Part VI: NOSENKO‘s production, especially in counterintelli-
gence matters not dissussed in the preceding section.
Key cases are discussed in detail and other leads
are summarized,

Part VII: Specialists’ assessments of NOSENKO: by the CIA
: graphologist who studied his handwriting; by the
CIA psychologist and psychtatrist who examined him;
by the former KGB officer Peter DERYABIN; by the CIA
case officers who handled him: and by the CIA poly-
graph operator who tested him.

Part VIII: Interpretation of the evidence and conclusiens about
the bona fides of NOSENKO.

Part IX: The implications of the conclusions in Part VIIT for
certain other sources, -

There ere several sources currently or formerly associated
with the Soviet Intelligence services who are repeatedly referred
to in this review. They include the following:

- Anatoliy Mikhailovich GOLITSYN, a KGB officer who
-defected in Helsinki to U.S. authorities on 15 December

1962. sensitive. source

sensitive source

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cane ee veh *

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doa

:3 5,0) 7 * = Aleksandr Nikolayevich CHEREPAYOV, a KGB officer
eo whoes case iu reviewed in Part VI.D.7.c.

4

former «|
Directorate

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All pertinent material received by CIA prior ta 15 Jenvary
1967 has been taken into occount in chis review of NOSENKO's
bona fides,

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“JY, ‘SUMMARY OF CPERATIONAL DEVELGPMENTS —

oA Introduction

:. ’ Prem the CIA side, the KOSEKKO case can be divided into '
three periods: the first Geneva phase of June 1962, the second
Geneva phase of January-February 1964, and the post-defection

handling of NOSENKO from Ferruary 1964 to date. The rest of.

Part II is separated into these three periods accordingly.

The NOSENKO case ovened on 5 June 1962 in the corridors of
the Palais des Nations in Geneva during the United Nations Dis-
armament Conference. A then-unidentified Soviet, known to him
by sight from conference ncetings,. approached U.S. Foreign Ser- 4
vice Officer David MARK with the suggestion that they get to-
gether for a talk tha following day. In the late afternoon of
6 June, the same Soviet motioned MARK aside and said that he
would like to taik to him privately as soon as possible. He
told MARK that he was “net going to pump him for information,
‘but simply wanted to teli 1 some things." A luncheon meeting
was arranged for 9 June, alchough the Soviet clearly preferred
an earlier date. MARK advised CIA of the appointment, explain-
ing that he thought the upproach so unusual that it might be
an offer of cooperation or defeztion. He said he belicved the :
Soviet to be Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, a member of the Scviet ;
delegation to the arms talxs. |

i

-
B. Firat Geneva Phase (June 1962) ; oo i

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At the 9 June lunchecen with MARK, NOSENKO told MARK that
he, NOSENKO, was a XGB ccunterintelligence officer sent to
Geneva to ensure the security of the Soviet delegation. He knew : i
that MARK had previously served in Moscow and believed he was
connected with American Inteiligence.* He needed approximately
900 Swiss francs immediately to cover KGB operational funds which
he squandered on liquor ana a prostitute in Geneva, and he offered |
for this amount to sell two pieces of information to American H
Intelligence. The first of these was the identity of a former
U.S. Embassy employee in Moscow who was a KGB agent an’, as of |

wi belted Tia Started dee

1962, was “near ciphers” in the Washington area; the second was
the identity of a Soviet in Nosccw who, although ostensibly a
CIA agent, was actually planted on American Intelligence. Al-
though NOSENKO at first told MARK that he would stop at the sale
of these two items, he later stated: "I know you won't let me
alone now." At another point NOSENKO said: "I will not work in
Moscow, but I come out about once a year." NOSENKO also gave |

sabe ee tate Ro DE anton

MARK a brief chronological account of his personal and profes-
sional past. MARK explained’ that although he was not an intel-
ligence officer, he could place NCSENKO in contact with the
Intelligence Chief in Geneva later that same day.

RY

SR Salar Dette ac octronte

MARK introduced NOSENKO to a CIA officer at 2000 hours that
evening, and a three-nour reeting followed at a CIA safehouse in
Geneva. Describing himseif as a KG¥ Major experienced in opera-
tions against the. Ameriéan Embassy in Moscow and against tourists
and other travellers to the Soviet Union, NOSENKO told the CIA

* Another Soviet source, S@ygpeperms has also reported that the :
_ KGB suspected MARK to ke an American Intelligence officer; a
‘although he has never served in CIA, MARK did engage in a num ~ x
_ber of operational support activities on behalf of CIA while
stationed at the U.S. Embassy in Hoscow-


4.

. officer of his financial difficulcies and repeated his offer to
“7%, gell two items of information. He said that the need for money
was his inmediate motive for contactirg CIA, althcugh in the en-
suing discussion he said also that he was dissatisfied with the
Communist regime in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO emphasized, never-
: theless, that he had no intention of heccming an American agent--"
‘ this was to be a one-time transaction, and after that he would
have no further contact with CIA,

é
renee

‘ Despite this original reticence, NOSENXO supplied consider-
able biographic information on himself and also discussed in
general terms certain additional KGB operations as well as KGB :
organization and operational methods in Mesecow, He understocsl, 5
as he had told MARK earlier in the day. that CIA ‘souid wane more !
information than the two atems which he originaily offered, and
he agreed to meet again two days later.

stad ae tlthdaans casa attbEC

NOSENKO met CIA representatives four more times in Geneva
in June 1962. alwavs in the same saferouse. With the second
meeting on 11 June. his initial reservations disappeared almost
entirely. He answered most questions put to him on KGB organi-
zation and operations. most of his information seeing concerned
with the Second Chief Direccorate. responsible for counterintel- ;
Jagence and security within the USSR, NOSENKO seemed to be what 5
he claimed to be: a KGB officer in a sensitive position with i 4
knowledge of important KGB operations, . :

NOSENKO rerurned to Moscow on 15 June, having promised to
do everything within the limits imposed by person ral security con-
siderations to collect information of interest; the areas of CIA
interest had been ouriined to him. The only restrictions he
placed on his cooperation were his absolute refusal to permit
operational contact with him inside the USSR and his request
that no mention of his collaboration be made in correspondence
to Moscow. He promised to notify CIA. via an adé@ress he was
given, when he came to the West again,

: Cc... Second Geneva Phase _ (January-Februar y. 1964) -

: NOSENKO accompanied the Soviet deiecation to a later ses-

sion of the Disarmament Conference (one having gone by in the

: interim without hig participation). arriving in Geneva on

i . 19 January 1964, The next day he sent a cable to his CIA accom-

: . modaction address announcing his presence, At the first of the

i ; new series of meetings on 23 January he announced that he had
decided to defect to the United States citing as reasons his

_ continuing disaffection with the Soviet regime and the fact that
he probably would not have further opportunities to travel to the
West in the foreseeable future. Although he impi1ed that he
wanted to defect as soon as possibile. he agreed to remain in
‘place in Geneva for at least two or-three weeks while arrange=- -— —_- 2
ments for his reception were being made in Washington, NOSENKO
had brought a large amount of new information, much of it in’
scribbled notes, on KGB operational activity collected in the
18 months since his last meeting with CIA. Twelve more meetings
were held in a Geneva safehouse over the next twelve days, yary-
ing in length from one anda half to six hours.

BD. Post-Defection Handling (February 1964-Present)

: On 4 February, four days before the date tentatively
selected for NOSENKO's defection, he reported that.a cable had-
been received from KGB Headquarters ordering his immediate re- |
turn to participate in a KGB conference on foreign tourism to —

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nd WOSENKO was driven across the border to Germany that same

: (7%: aight. Debriefings resumed in a Frankfurt safehouse. The de-
» . | e@&sion was reached on 11 February to bring. NOSENKO to the :
.. 1» United States, and in the early even.ng of 12 February he and

a . dis CIA escorts arrived in Washington via commercial aircraft,
sav s.* thence to a safehouse in the Washington area,

the Soviet Union 2. Bxfiltration plans.vere,.then-iaplemented,—s-« ;

Bret:

At the request of the Swiss and Soviet Governments, NOSENKO © i

met on 14 February with representatives of their respective I

. Washington Embassies in the offices of the U.S. Immigration and i
_— Naturalization Service. He told both that he had defected of ot

: : his own free will after careful consideration and that he had no. : |

i

1

baad iatiile.

desire to return to the Soviet Union. In answer to the questions
of the Soviet representatives, he orally renounced his status and
‘ rights as a citizen of tne USSR.

wet

CIA completed its initial debriefings of NOSENKO on 18 Febru- 4
ary, and on 24 February he was introduced to representatives of ; ;
the FBI for questioning. At abcut the same time, there was a
marked decline in NOSENKO's discipline: He became evasive and
uncooperative, refusing te answer some of the questions of his
debriefers, both CIA and FBI; his nightlife.in Washington and
nearby cities was punctuated by drinking bouts, crude behavior,
and cisputes with his security escort. He explained these : :
actions by saying that he was under great tension as a result of : 4
his defection, abandonment of his wife and children, and the
disgrace that he had brought to his family name. It was against :
this background that CIA acceded to NOSENKO's demand for a vaca~ '
tion. On 12 Maren, therefore, NOSENKO left Washington with a :
‘CIA case officer and two CIA security guards for a two-week .
vacation in Hawaii. There his behavior deterioriated still fur-
ther: He drank heavily and almost constantly; he engaged in !
sexual acts with a number of prostitutes; he was loud and crude 1
in publ‘c places; and he spent money extravagently ($800 on . :

woikticasethal «

wee eseanbsiniten

one prostitute) and conspicuously (a $100 bill for a restaurant
tip). .

Jit eet lbia Mba Seiten

During NOSENKO's absence, cdnsultations were held with
the FBI concerning steps to be taken to restrict his movements
and activities. Both agencies feared that his behavior would :
bring about unwanted attention and publicity, perhaps police
arrest, and that doubts about his bona fides, which were be-
coming known to a widening group of people in the U.S. Govern-
ment, might be inadvertently revealed to NOSENKO himself. The !
; FBI on ] April said it would “not interpose objection" ‘to ‘the i
: CIA plan to limit NOSENKO's freedom of movement. The Acting ‘
: Attorney General, the Department of State, and the White House j
: were also notified of the CIA plan at this time. ;

seedy wth a Eee sete,

L ; In the morning of 4 April NOSENKO was driven to another. '
safehouse in a Washington suburb, ostensibly only. for a poly-
jo... .- QgYyaph examination. At the safehouse NOSENKO was given a rou-
; tine polygraph examination, lasting over three hours; he

. oo + an ee

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|
| . -* See Parts III E and III F for further discussions of this
cable.
i

14-0000

|

—- ss

"reacted significantly” to questions concerning his intentions
in defecting tn the United States and other related matters.* -
He was then told that he would remain at this safehouse, which
thencefcrward was his regular placa of residence. Since this
time NOSENKO has had contacts with CIa personnel only, has been
under full-time guard, and has not been permitted access to
news media.

Detailed interrogation of, NOSENKO was begun on 4 April 1964
in order to obtain information which he had been reluctant to
give in debriefings, and to clarify contradicticns in what he
had already reported. This phase of the interrogations was termi-
nated on 24 April 1964. .

Despite the searching nature of the questions and the im-

‘plicit and explicit doubts of his veracity, NOSENKO proved him-

self willing to answer, or to try to answer, questions put to

- him. Because much more information pertinent to the question of

his. bona fides had to be obtained, a new phase of interrogation
was begun in mid-May 1964. Different interrogators were intro-
duced and questioning was resumed in a neutral, non-hostile man-
ner. The period of neutral questioning continued until mid-Novem-
ber 1964. .

After further consultations with the FBI, a new sound of
hostile interrogations began on 26 January 1965. NOSENXO was
questioned for a total of about 140 hours by individual interro-
gators and by interrogation teams consisting of two or three
men, and he was directly challenged on many of his previous re-
ports. He admitted that certain of his earlier statements had
been incorrect, and that ne could not explain contradictions in
his testimony. Nevertheless, NOSENKO maintained he had keen
basically truthful, and that he had come to the United States
solely for the reasons he had originally given. This interro-
gation was broken off on 5 March 1965.

Questioning of NOSENKO during the summer and autumn of 1964
and the interrogations of January and February 1965 concentrated
on the pexiod of his claimed service in the U.S. Embassy Section
of the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, from
January 1560 to January 1962, Among the reasons for selecting
this particular period were the comparatively large amount of
collateral information available against which NOSENKO's state-
ments could be checked; the importance of the U.S. Embassy and
its personnel as.the outstanding KGB Second Chief Directorate
targets; their importance from the standpoint of American .
security; and the extent of NOSENKO's knowledge about the aéti-
vities of the U.S. Embassy Section, in his capacity as its
Deputy Chief. . -

In keeping with Soviet practice, CIA asked NOSENKO in
February 1965 to sign a series of interrogation reports, so-
‘called “protocols,” most: of which concern: the- period of: his
Claimed service in the American Department. . These_were written

by the CIA interrogators, and they were designed to incorporate

*—See Part VII.c. for a further discussion of the polygraph.
tests. : - Se oe _

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:

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14-0000

NOSERKO's exact statements and meaning on various specific sub-
Sects. The protocols were in no way presented to HOSENKO as
documentary portions of a "confesaion,” but rather as distilled
and final statements of what he did end did not know concerning
particular topics. NOSENKO wes asked to read each page of each
protocol carefully and to sign his name at the bottom te indi-
cate that: he underatood and agreed with its contents; he was
allowed the use of a dictionary and was permitted to ask any
questions and make any changes that he wished. (Amendmants were
entered by the interrogators and were initialed >y NCSENKO.)
NOSENKO was asked, after reading.each page and after completing
the entire protocol, whether he understood what was written there
and whether there were any more changes he wished to make. He ,
was then asked-to sign and date the statement, "I have read and ,* F
understood this report and certify it as correct," at the end of . ,

the final page. With one exception, which will be noted later, ¥ d
he did so calmly and without objections, although on one or two - st .

of them he remarked that his statements were presented in such

a manner as to make them look foolish; although invited to do

so, he was not able to suggest any.changes of fact or presenta-
tion which would. make them more accurate. Commenting cn the .
use of interrogation reports, NOSENKO said on 4 March 1965:

"My life story is absolutely correct. Anytning I have signed ;
is absolutely correct. 1 absolutely understand what I am doing . J 4
when I am signing any paper. This is an official document, and ;
I fully understand what I'm doing when I sign it as being abso- : F

lutely correct."

: In May 1965 a CIA psychologist questioned NOSENKO in detail
on his life from birth until 1953, when he said he entered the
KGB, -in an attempt to gain additional insights into his charac-

ter and personality. A
a]

Further questioning was conducted from 26 July until 14 August
1965 with the participation of Peter DERYABIN, a former KGB offi-
cer. These interrogations, the first to be held in Russian,
were for the purpose of using DERYABIN's first-hand experience
in the KGB to obtain a clearer understanding of NOSENKO's per-
sonal and professional background. .

: : There were no further debriefings or interrogations until
i 18 October 1966. On this date NOSENKO was polygraphed on the
case of Lee Harvey CSWALD. ; :

po. During the period 19-25 October 1966, NOSENKO was questioned for
! seven days on specific aspects of selected topics ranging from his

i identity to his involvement in and knowledge of specific KGB opera-
tions. Questioning was in both Russian and English.

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A. Earlier Information on NOSENKO ‘in Genéva

_ photograph at two separate points on hia TDY route to Cuba.

Seca OPERATIONAL CIRCCHSTANCES

HOSENKO'e nane first came to tho attention of CIA in October
1960 when he applied at the American I[zbassy in Moscow for a visa
to enter the United States as a member of an automotive delega-
tion. The following sonth CIA obtained copies of his passport

There was no indication of intelligence effiliation, and when I
NOSENKO arrived under true name with the Soviet delegation in en
Geneva in Karch 1662. he was accorded no more than the interest : I
routinely given by Western intelligence services to Soviets :
travelling abroad.* After arriving in Switzerland, however, but :
before establishing contact with CIA, NOSFNKO was involved in
at least two incidents which brovght him to the special notice I
of the British, Lwiss, American, and possibly the West German
services.

The first of these occurred in April 1L9€2. At a cocktail
party in Geneva, NOSENKO met a female sccretary employed by the
British Foreign Office. Me saw her several days later in the ;
corridors of the Prlais des Nations aud asked her to have dinner i
with hin, and a date was made for several evenings later. Ac- Be
cording to the sceretary's later account as repurted by her : i
superiors: "They talked about Marxism, the Chinese, Yugoslavia, ; 4
and love; NOSENKO was obviously smitten with her, became verbally i i
amorous, and told her that he would like to take her off to a.
desert island.'"' The girl felt that NOSFNKO probably was not
interested in her for intelligence purposes, but seemed to be . :
genuinely attracted by her. From her conversations with NOSENKO a ;
she was able to report that "he had been in submurines during
the war and, according to himself, had risen to the rank of !
Commander. He was e member of the Communist Party. His father i
was in the Ministry of Shipping. Ne himself had served in the i
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1948 and 1949 ond had apparently

'
i

coed nt Sabine digs Nabe Sete

visited England but had not been stativnced tf "' NOSENKO
also told her that he was acquainted with of the
2 Spublishing house in Lundon.** When NOS O became too
persistent in his attentions, the secretary reported the contact ;
to her superiors, was withdrawn immediatcly from Switzerland, :
{

and later resigned from the Foreign Officc.

This same incident also brought NOSENKO to the attention
of the Swiss service, which later reported it to CIA, without
details, as an attempt on NOSENKO's part to recruit the girl.

ween oats lab wen

*Although NOSENKO was described in reports (held by CIA) con-

cerning recruitment approaches to fmcricans in Moscow prior to

tis first arrival in Geneva, there was no basis in these re- :
ports to identify the Soviet described as NOSENKO. Tie name cece becifers
NOSENKO did not appear in these earlier reports. 1 oe

fc a ta

ache renee

is auc Was one of NOSENKO's targets during a 1957 trip
to Soviet Union. NOSENKO used the. alias NIKOLAYEV in his en)
contacts with Sg and, in CIA debriefings, gave this. as the od
reason he was forced to use the name NIKOLAYEV in the two trips
he made to London in 1957 and 1959. The secretary knew NOSENKO
by >) name, (Sce Parts V.D.3.d. and V.E.8. for discussion of


terse ee ener aa nin dp ace  tt nme nt

CA

NOSENKO's interest in her was not only sexual, but also in

hg-to-this-report;~“after-a-time-it-be 2 "
information to which she had access in the course cf her duties."
A officisl in Geneva told CIA that LOSENKO had definitely
tried to recruit the secretary and that he attempted to cbtain
“disarmament secrets” from her. ; .

At his seoond reeting with CIA on 11 June 1962, XOSENKO
described the same incident, in the context cf reporting a pcs-
dkle KGB penetration of British counterintelligence: “I decided
to try to take this English girl to bed, And this had nothing
to do with work. No, it was simply (sex)...And Yurxha {Yuriy
GUK, First Chief Directorate officer in Geneva} said to me: —
‘Listen, Yura. Se careful, because we have people cven in
british counterintelli,ence.'" NOSENKO described the incident
as follows:

“After I had been here a week or two there was a
reception for members of the delegation and at it I saw
a certain English girl. Then RUSK gave a reception and she
was there again. I came to the reception, she saw me,
and I went up to her. She said that it was very nice to
make my acquaintance, and that's all, M.S. ROSOV (TSY!IGAL)
was there. He saic to me: ‘Yura, it looks to me lixe you
are coing to bed with that girl.’ J answered: ‘What do
you mean, Mikhail Scepanovich? “She just interests me.'

I had aiready decided to try to get ner in |.ed...But,
listen further. After this she used to qo to tie Disarma-
ment Conferences. Weli, to mako it short, I asked this
girl for a date. She is Scottish, Scottish, net English,
and works in an office here. We agreed to reet ata
restaurant. I asxe:i my friends which restaurant here is
the best, where there isn't a crowd. We went to the restau-
rant and sat there all evening--all alone. ‘ihcre were just
the two of us. The restaurant is under the ground and is
called 'Day and Night' in Russian, "Jour et huit.' We

sat there and then she asked me.where we could reet ayain.
A day later we met again, Again in the restaurant and then
we took a walk. She got me bothered and then gave me the
brush-off. I called her once, She wasn’t at home. I
called again. Again she was out. I called a third time.
She wasn't there. She thought that I was an intelligence
officer and that I was interested in her for this reason.
This, honestly, wasn't so. TI had only one thing in mind.
She was quite a woman...But the English yirl felt that

she was being developed. I met three times with her.

Three times we were at the restaurant and she told them
Iher superiors] this. She knew that I am Russian. She
told them this and they [NOSENKO whistled, apparently sig-
nifying that they terminated the relationship] at once.

She knew from the very beginning that I am Russian, from
the very beginning. In short, I told her a lot of things--
well, you know--so to get her into bed. Well, we were
walking on the quay and I said to her: "How about going
up to your place?’ she answered: 'I can't." ‘Why?’ I
gaid, ‘I'll take off my shoes: and come on tiptoe." She
answered: ‘Is it: possible for me’ to come to you?! 1.

said: ‘You can't come to my place. There would be a
knock on the door at once. The Swiss would tell the
Americans and that would be the end. I can't do this.'

So all I could do was have her. next to the parapet. But
the English felt--and nothing was heard about this, but

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she. is no longer here. She gqct into. i
"for he ause maybe they have “Because
they--the Foreign Uffice--keep. ealy. .< Speaking honeshly,.
as a human being, T.am concerned that they might fire -
‘her. Because there was nothing more to it than this one-
thing.”

The second event bringing NOSDNYC to special notice occurred
at about the same time thac NOS O establi contact with oe
CIA and may, in fact, have been the incident which he said drove °| oy

him to contact Pavid MARK On 15 after .
_ NOSENKO approached MARK) ; the :
ov a permanent representative oie i

host at luncneon, American Ambassacor TUBBY, that two girls

from the Ba~Ta-Clan Club, a strip-teaso bar in Geneva, had come

é consulate apparently seeking visas. The girls

two Soviets, one about 30 and the other akcut 40

sited the club recently (no date was provided by ;
- According to the girls, @ERReGE Bsaid, the i

two Soviets had attempted to pass themseiv off as Americans

and had spent “hundreds" of francs @rinking at the club. The

name which Gage ari gave Ambassador TUBBY for one of these
Soviets "sounded ULISENKOV." 9 Fro. their descriptions, the

two qoviess were Inost certainly NOSENKO and Lis friend A.K. KIS-
LOV,.* his firss neeting with CIA NOSENKO said that a week

and a nate earlicr he spent 1500 Swiss francs in a single night

of drinking and women with KISLOV. ‘he necessity of repaying

this mone y, taken from KGB operational funds, was the inmediate
cause of his contact with CIA, according to NCSEUF

ct
oO
e
- Q.
foe ant
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had told o
who haé vi

POPE T Ee eek ue NE ete guenmegianerye Aire eee eps yo

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*See Part III.D. for furthér information on KISLOV.


"4, TDY in 1962 -

w Reasons

_ renee rasimew it rnetnenicening meet abner sonic
for ROSENKO's Presence. in Geneva (1962 and 1964)

When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva forthe first tine on
10 March 1962, he wan listed officially as a Soviet Ministry of

' Foreign Affatys “export” with the Delegation to the disarmament

talks. Early during his second meeting with CIA on 11 June 1962,
NOSENKO was asked to oxplain precisely why he had been sent out

‘to Geneva. He repliod as follows: "Right now, I came to pro~
vide counterintelligence support to the Disarmament Delegation....

There is a special [kGB}] department for delegations, a special
one, recently created, And-the chief of this departrent is
simultaneously a deputy chief of the [Second Chief] Directorate.
He is both chicf of the department and deputy chief of the
directorate so that there will be a person who can be held re-
sponsible if anything happens. Understand? The chief of the
directorate [O.. GNRIMANOV|] hated to sign all sorts of recom—
mendations and so on, when somcone can run off in Belgium or
wherever he may be. ‘This happened nore than once, and he was
summoned before the [CPsu! Central Committee. Therefore, he
decided to create a now position. Tne person holding it is
simultaneously chic! of the department and deputy chief of the
directorate and personally signs off on all matters concerning

. exits [from the USSN|], This was in order to avoid being called

on tie carpet...so that blame would fall not on the chief of
the directorate, but on his deputy, who is in charge of this
department and who signed off...

“This department," NOSENKO continued, “is concerned with
departures abroad, that is, it checks all Sovict citizens who

intend to travel abrond, both alone and as members of delegations.

Since GOLITSYN [defected] in Finland, we have an order that no
delegation is to be let out without an operational worker, not -
a single delegation,,, With me it happened as follows: I was
not planning to go. They told me: ‘You are going.’ I said:
‘I can't. I have a section. I have 15 people there, all
operating people. Am I supposed to dump them? What can I do?’
"No, you are going,' was the reply. ‘And what did the chief
order?' I asked. Tho chief {NOSENKO was referring to GRIBANOV
when he spoke of the “chief".] said: . 'GROMYKO is going this
time, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is going, and somebody
on an appropriate level must go with him. Not a case officer,
not a senior case officer, not a deputy, but the chief of a
section, or the deputy chief of a department, or a department
chief." Well, I was the most junior section chief. I was
called in to my chiof, my immediate chief, who is concerned
with the Seventh Department. They had told him that it would
be for a month and on this basis he gave me permission. And

I have been here sinco 10 March."

Later during this second meeting NOSENKO volunteered that

_in addition to his sceurity officer functions in Geneva, he had

wooo

United States on numerous occasions since 1942, when he was

a special assignment to check on P.F. SHAKHOV, a senior advisor
to the Soviet Delegation,* SHAKHOV had been noted in contact

*CIA records show that SHAKHOV has served in and visited the

assigned. at the Soviet Consulate General in New York. He

crate Ob ee F

deatakiten

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ethene tee

:
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th David MARK, believed by the KGB to be a CIA officer; =
NOSENKO reported, and on this basis the KGB suspected that ~
SHAXHOV might be an American age-t. NOSENKO described the

. various ways he had tested these suspicions in Geneva. He
first gave SHAKHOV disinformation and looked for indications
that he passed it on to American contacts. Next, SHAKHOV was
told to perform countersurveillance tasks during a meeting by -
NOSENKO with an imaginary agent, while other KGB officers
checked for signs tiiat SHAKHOV had forewarned the Americans
about the meeting. Finally, NOSENKO revealed to SHAKHOV the
location of a KGB "dead drop" and checked back five days later.
to see whether the specially prepared materials which had. been
placed in it had been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO'sS con-~
clusion from all this, he told CIA, was that SHAKHOV was ab-
solutely free of suspicion, and it was his intention to report
this finding when he returned to KGB Headquarters. tg

i
i

b

EWR VELA

B

On later occasions NOSENKO reported that SHAKHOYV had
previously served with the Ministry. of Foreign Affairs in the
United States and that during this period he acted as an agent-
recruiter for the KGB. In 1966 NOSENKO named one person whon
SHAKHOV had spotted and developed in the United Statcd, Ges
See SHAKHOV, according to NOSENKO, was not and never :
haa been a KGB officer. Asked why SHAKHOV was permitted to 3
travel abroad when he was suspected of being an Ancrican agent,
NOSENKO explained that since SHAKHOV belonged to the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, the KGB could do nothing about his trips

casi ssatihie.

wh noah Le

"bt the

weenie alte

abroad. "There was ne proof, only suspicions," and furthermore,
SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of the head of the
.Sovict Delegation, S.K, TSARAPKIN. : 54

NOSENKO was questioned again about his 1962 assignment to
Geneva during the February 1965 interrogations. His answers
were incorporated in a "protocol" which NOSENKO certified as
being correct on 26 February 1965. The protocol states:
“GRIBANOV had nothing at all to do with my assignment to Geneva
in 1962. I think that the fitness report written about me for
this trip was signed by (F.D.] BOBKOV, since he was the Deputy
Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the
Seventh [Tourist] Department. I did not personally discuss
this trip with GRIBANOV before ny departure from Moscow. My
candidacy for this assignment was supported by [S.G.] BANNIKGV,
the Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, who super-

; vised the work of the Eleventh [Soviet Delegations] Department
' _ which had the investigative file on SHAKHOV. BANNIKOV was
iooG concerned with the question of who should go as case officer on

Lactobebhitall lew asin hes ve

BC RnMRRE Ee Tn6) Tae we mS NOE

: _ attended the 1945 Conference on International Organization in San
foc Francisco, the 1955 Paris Summit Conference, and many disarmament ;
is, . . conferences over the years, and he has attended a number of ses- —_ '

Son ee ertentrie H

}

aah pide nse tee

| - sions of the UN General Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV arrived

: in New York as a member of the Soviet Mission to the UN in 1963.

: The Soviet defectors PETROV and DERYABIN have reported that. ;
Be, SHAKHOV's face ig familiar to them; RASTVOROV identified ‘him as

: an MVD officer whom he is certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in |
Moscow; and ntified m as an “employee o

_ KGB." 5 »\howaver, Saray said that SHAKHOV is "clean, a

' ‘pure diplomat'"\and that, to his knowledge, SHAKHOV was nof en-

, @aged in any Soviet intellig pee activity gf that time.

 e¥or further particulars on
|, Part VI.D.6 : .


‘this trip because SHAKHOV, who was. suspected cf possibly being.
a Western agent, was to be in the delegation. When the Eleventh
Department was looking for a case officer to rake this trip

they wanted to have a chief of section because of the serious~
ness of the SHAKHOV case. When they asked in the Seventh ‘
Department [V.D.] CHELNOKOV agreed that I should take the as-
signment. There was no background or neightorhood investigation
conducted on me in connection with ny being approved for this
trip.* My assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department,
by the Personnel Office of the Second Chief Directorate, by

the Central Personnel Office of the KGB and by the Certral
Committee of the CPSU." : .

NOSENKO was asked why he had been selected to make this
trip immediately after assuming the duties of the Chief of the
American Tourist Section, on the eve of the tourist season,
and at a time when he had no deputy. He explained that it
was not thought that the assignment would last so long, and
CHELNOKOV, his superior and friend, had decided to let him go

as a "treat."

During interrogations of October 1366 NOSENKO was ques-

- tioned further about his 1962 assignment to Geneva as a security
officer. He said that in this capacity he would necessarily
know the identity of all other KGB officers serving with the
Soviet Disarmament Delegation in Geneva. There were only,
besides himself, the KGB First Chief Directorate officers M.S.
7SYMBAL and I.S. MAYOROV. (CIA, however, has tentatively
identified three other delegation members as KGB staff officers:
A.K. KISLOV, observed in Washington ard in Moscow in what
appears to have been KGB operational activity; V.G. FILATOV, who
served as an alternate handler in the KGB operation with the
NATO officer Georges PAQUES; and Oleg GRINEVSKIY
of the permanent Soviet Delegaticn whot handled a Gee ;
double agent during this same conference.) NOSENKO incsiuced
GRINEVSKIY in the list of his own agents in Geneva in 1962
and said that, in Moscow, GRINEVSKIY was handled by an offi-
cer of the Intelligentsia and Correspondents Department of
the Second Chief Directorate. KXISLOV, according to NCSENKO,

_ was an operational contact in Moscow of the Austria~Germany~
-.Seandanavia Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate

and was used in operations against the West German Embassy

there, NOSENKO also said that KISLOV had been a KGB operational

contact during his earliex tour in the United States but was
neither then nor later a KGB officer. He characterized FILA-

TOV as a Ministry of Foreign Affairs.official and stated that

he is “definitely not an intelligence officer." ;

_ NOSENKO was also requestioned during these interrogations
on his investigation of SHAKHOV. After saying on the morning
of 19 October 1966 that he had been personally told by the

*"NOSENKO has said that in 1960 he was turned down for a‘per-
manent assignment to Ethiopia because of his excessive drink-
ing. (See Part V.E.¢.a) _ :

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Napiity Chief of” “hee seeene Chie? Diréctorate-that-the SHA (HOV ~
investigation was the main reason for his assignment to Geneva

in 1962, NOSENKO later in the day stated: "My main task was to-

check the security of the delegation, plus SHAKHOV, You can’t.
separate these tasks."

In this questioning NOSENKO described the basis for the
suspicions of SHAKHOY, the lack of results from earlier inves-
tigations, and his own preparation for this assignment. He
said that as a representative of the Soviet Delegations De-
partment of the Second Chief. Directorate, M.G. SITNIKOV had
conducted investigations-of SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1961, but
SITNIKOV was unable to resolve the questions concerning him.
Because of the failure of these early efforts, the KGB decided
to send "a senior guy" to the Disarmament talks in 1962, and
NOSENKO was chosen. "to finish things up." ‘Before leaving Mos-
cow in March 1962, NOSENKO therefore discussed the SHAKHOV
case with: SITNIKOV and with one (fnu) LYALIN, the Soviet Dele—
gations Department officer in charge of the SHAKHOV case; he
also read various materials-on the case, including an investi-
gative plan drawn up by LYALIN. NOSENKO's description of these
preparations provided the basis for the quest iofing which
followed:

Question: Why was SHAKHOV under suspicion in June 1962?

KOSENKO; He was working with different delegations at
different conferences and, being in Geneva,
it was noticed that there was something which
can he described as a connection with David
MARK, who was considered a CIA officer.* Also,
little, little, little things before.

When did SHAKHOV and MARK first meet? How did
it begin?

Question

NOSENKO: In '60 or '61 there was a’contact with MARK.
I don't remember who reported it. The report
was maybe from SITNIKOV in Geneva. MARK was
known to the Second Chief Directorate as the
Rezident [CIA Chief of Station] in Moscow.
After Woscow he went to Geneva, and it was con-
Sidered he must be the Rezident in Geneva.
All the KGB officers going there were told to
pay attention to hin.

Question: What about the report?
NOSENKO: Maybe the officers saw the two going to the

toilet. Maybe there was.a contact. The file
said "maybe." I was sent to Geneva to carry

*As stated earlier, MARK was not a CIA officer in Moscow,
although he did perform certain clandestine tasks for CIA. He
had no CIA missions in Géneva in 1962. Within the context of

‘discussion of NOSENKO's security officer duties during October

1966, NOSENKO was asked to name any CIA officers he knew to-be
present in Geneva during the 1962 disarmament talks. MARK was

ae ‘

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little things. MARK maybe tursed his head a...
certain way when SHAKHOV was talking. [S.M.]--
GOLUBEY, formerly of the Fourteenth [Covnterin-
tell‘ gence] Department, was in the Soviet Dele-
gation with SHAKHOV,* He noticed little details.
When the officers in the United States decided
to terminate SHAKHOV {as an agent], they wrote

@ report on him which said he was Liking life

in the U.S.--American products, money. He was
pictured as not good and, in addition, he was
not wanting to work as an agent.

2. The 1964 TDY

NOSENKO's 1964 trip to Geneva, commencing on 19 January, was

also in the capacity of security officer with the Soviet Dis-
armament Delegation. He said he was the only security officer
for the group, which consisted of about 25 persons, and again
he was officially listed as an "expert." NOSEXKO reported that
he had three or four agents within the delegation and an equal
number of operational contacts. The only person whom he was
instructed to watch in particular was A.A. TKACHEY, an inter-
preter, who had travelled to Austria in 1960 ard 1961 and who,

the KGB had noted, was in the habit of going about by himself.
Other than this, according to NOSENKO, his responsibilities
were general in nature.

NOSENKO explained during the February 1965 interrogations
how he was selected for this TDY. The protocol he signed on
26 February 1965 states: “GRIBANOV hac absolutely nothing to
do with my:assignment to Geneva in 1964. The fitness report
on me for this trip was signed by [F.D,] BOBKOV. For the 1964
trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of the
CPSU was required for me or for any other members of ‘the dele-
gation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. It was ny own
personal wish to make this trip in 1964 and I had discussed the
question with [V.D,] CHELNOKOV even in 1963 and had received
his agreement. I had also talked about this with {M.v.]
KHLOBUSTOV«; and [G.] PANCHENKO [both of the Soviet Delegations
Department]. After it had been decided that I would go, in
about the beginning of January 1964, [N.T.] ZHARIKOV, the Chie?
of the Department, suggested that a case officer might not be
‘required with this delegation. KHLOBUSTROV, PANCHENKO, and
[A.G.] KOVALENKO [Chief of the Tourist Department and NOSENKO's
immediate supervisor} supported me for the assignment as a
‘personal favor to me." ‘With regard to GRIBANOV's knowledge pf
his assignment to Geneva this second time, NOSENKO said'that he
feared that if GRIBANOV learned about the TDY he would have said,

‘= :-"What, again?" and would not have permitted him to go. It was

for this reason that NOSENKO did not discuss the trip with GRI-
BANOY, he said, and he did not believe that GRIBANOV, in fact,
knew anything about it. ° Loo _

u

’ *GOLUBEV was also identified by Gay as a First chief Directo- —

rate counterintelligence officer. According to Gieryr was
one of several KGB officers forced to leave the Unite tates

-.4n 1964 because he was well known to NOSENKO.. There is no re-
cord in CIA files that GOLUBEV has ever been to Switzerland.

put measures to check... There vere many little,

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ypstuerzae

C. Motivations and Intentions of NOSENXO

1. Introduction

_ NOSENKO has not indicated that his professional status in
the KGB, his standard of living in the Soviet Union, or his
family life prompted him to volunteer to American Intelligence
in 1962 and to defect to.the United States in 1964. He initially.
told CIA that he had been. unusually successful during his ten-
year carcer as a KGB counterintelligence officer; his closest
friends and the people whom he admired most were members of the.
KGB; he enjoyed his work. The NOSENKO ‘family held a high social
position, and. their economic situation was "luxurious by. Soviet
standards." NOSENKO described his family life as close and
harmonious. He spoke with fondsess and pride about his two
daughters, of his wife's: tolerance and understanding, of the
companionship she gave him; He.expressed love and a sense of
responsibility for his widowed szother, who heavily cepended
upon him after the death of his father in 1956. The elder
NOSENKO won his son's aduwiration for having worked his way up
from an apprentice pipefitter in a shipyard to the position of
Soviet Minister of Shipbuilding. The NOSENKO nane is hcnored
in the home town of Nikolayevsk, where the shipyard has been
renamed for the former minister and where a statue of him has
beén erected in the town square. By his own account, NOSENKO
thus had had a rewarding home life and a successful and enjoy

“able career in the KGB.

‘2. Collaboration in 1962

At the outset in 1962, NOSENKO said he wanted to limit his
reports to two items of information. Before the first meeting
with CIA was over, he went beyond these two items to give de-
tails on the KGB Second Chief’ Directorzte and nther operations,
and he offered to meet again. (Four more meetings ensued in

1962, with NOSENKO providing additional information on the KGB.)

He would not defect, NOSENKO said, unless his personal safety
was endangered by the KGB. Motivations in coming to Americen
Intelligence, according to NOSENKO, were his financial emergency
in Geneva and his disaffection for the Soviet regime.

a. Readiness to Report to CIA

During his 9 June meeting with David MARK, NOSENKO said he
realized, even before talking to representatives of American
intelligence, that they would not be satisfied with the two

items of information alone--he expected them to insist on more.

He was introduced by MARK to a CIA case officer later the sane
day, and at the start of the meeting, the following dialogue
took place: .

XOSENKO: You see, I am not plannirg to be your agent...
and don't think that I am going to work with
you in Moscow. No. No...

Case As you have’ said, I am-an intelligence officer
Officer: as are you. And I think that we will understand
. one another.

NOSENKO: You want to place our relationship on an agent
basis. . ..

eee ag aig

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14-00000*

Case
Officer:

NOSENKO:

Case
Officer:

NOSENKO:

Case
Officer:

i se NOSENKO:

Of course.

Never in my life I will go in contact [with |
CIA] in Moscow or the USSR, never in my life.
I also know about Langelle and POPOV;* I know
this matter.. When it was abroad it was fine,
but when you decided to mect him in Moscow...
You want more than I came with the intention
of saying. You want to change this to a long-

_term relationship. Understand me. I am now

the chief of a section. Before my departure
{from Moscow] a decision was being reached--
and I have just spoken with my wife in Moscow--
I am supposed to become the deputy chief of a
department. Do you understand what this is?

Why are you telling me this?

Because I wanted to come [to C1A] only for a
business deal, to give you these two cases,
to receive money for this, and that's all.
Goodbye. Perhaps, sometime, when I come
abroad, we will meet one another and perhaps
I will give you somethi..3. God knows. But
I don't want te do this now. I don't want

to and I am not prepared within myself for this...

I am giving two interesting cases. The most
interesting ones. I say to you honestly, the
two most interesting ones. in the first of

then PANDREY''**), I took nb part. In the second
[ BELITSK1Y***] I took part, even here.

I want you to understand that these two matters
that you spoke to Mr. MARK about are of great
importance to us. But I don't have to tell you
that. You know that. But we are not going to
play like children. You know nerfectly well
that it is worth every franc... What I want
to tell you is this: of course I will ask you
more, and of course 1 want to know as much as
you know. If you refuse to answer, that's your
business. :

Y will tell what I am able to tell. What I
know, I will tell. Of course, you yo.;self
understand that there are things concerning our
internal system that I cannot report to you.
You yourself understand this.

*The compromise: of the CIA ‘source in the GRU, P.S, POPOV, is
_discussed in Part VI.D.7.a.' .

; **The case of "“ANDREY," the KGB eryptonyn | for the agent Dayle
. SMITH, is discussed in Part VI.D.3.b.

“e**BELITSKIY, a KGB-controlled double agent, is discussed in

Part VI. D. 6

<n RE RR REE erinee:

ventana beatiaaE be a Seabee

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‘and generally the functions and operating techniques of the

., respectively. NOSENKO did not supply the names at this time. eo

owimuaWihen..the.CIA.officer said the. he understood NOSENKO had
been in the KGB since shortly after the war, NOSENKO, without” ””
further prompting, gave a detailed statement of his own personal
past and his professional career. ‘In tunis statement he described
his education, his service in the GRU, his entry into the KGB

various components of the KGB Second Chief Directorate in which
he had served, along with the inclusive dates of his service

in each. This account was very similar to that given MARK
earlier in the day. Still without prompting, he discussed
several specific KGB operations against Americans inside the
Soviet Union, one involving the recruitment of a Yale University
professor on the basis of homosexual compromise and the other

an unsuccessful attempt to recruit an American code clerf.-
NOSENKO said he was personally involved in both cases.*

The question of his further assistance was then raised

again: The CIA officer asked NOSENKO to tell more about the \ 4
Yale professor, but NOSENKO demurred, stressing that the agree- . i 3
ment involved only two pieces 6f information and ignoring the : j
fact that he had already given considerably more: :

A

NOSENKO:. I have told you enough for this day, and I vill
tell you only these two cases which I wanted to
tell you, and it is enough for this day.

Case How do you imagine that this is enough? You
Officer: know that we work much the same way. : |

ie.

NOSENKO: Yes.

Case You know what interests us, of course.
Officer:
NOSENKO: I know it. Today I gave only two things.
Let's meet one another [again].

Case Good. But let me say this: What you tell me

Officer: ‘Issyour business. I am not going to try to !
bring any pressure at all...There is no argu-

ment about it. I am not going to say: ‘Please |

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$

2 Galan Medal dition

see us in Moscow.' I don't want to see you

in Moscow because it's too difficult. It is
completely impossible. That's it. No more on
that subject.

NOSENKO: I said to David [MARK] before meeting you that
I don't want to meet anyone anymore, not anyone.

Case All right. Agreed. °
Officer:

4d
i
A

NOSENKO: In another place. I don't know whether I will
come back here in a month or not...I personally
don't want to, either, because my wife will be

_Moaning at home. But-I am afraid they will make
me come, because I know-the delegation. I know

*Richard BURGI and Joseph MORONE; see Parts: V.D.$.b. and V.E.3.c.,

seer

en Ei atinem ace Lite brite dere Be

‘person was responsible for the compromise... Next time."

"In that case we can meet.
Case . ':::You know that I would not bring any pressure.
Officer:. That's something we understand because we are

': both in this business. ‘You and I are in the
game business, so you can't--

NOSENKO: Let me interrupt. Why are we bargaining so

. now? So that I will say something more to
you. I said: ‘Let's meet again.' Maybe I
will tell [more]. Now I will give you only
these two items because we have made a deal.
I will tell you about these two cases. Let's
meet again, if you insist. I understand that -
you want more. Well, I will think a bit about
what I know. ;

Case That's all right.
Officer: .

NOSENKO: We can meet when I am abroad perhaps...You must

‘ understand me. This has not.come to me simply.
I had time tbh think for a long time. I thought
for a long time. You see, it's very difficult
for me, very difficult for me. and after I go
it will also be very difficult for me.

Case But you knew that when you came. Why did you
Officer: come to us? Why to the American rezidentura
(CIA Station} and not to the British?

NOSENKO: I came here because you are strong, strong...
You don't have to explain to’me. I know what
makes me go. ‘I told you it is hard for me.

I still need to think. That's all. But I

can no longer take a step back because the step
forward has already been taken. I won't re-
fuse if we meet before my departure. If you
like, on Monday, on Tuesday, any day. Monday
is better for me. Not Sunday, because I have
to be there with my own [people].

This exchange was followed by a lengthy description of the two
leads which NOSENKO had come to sell, the BELITSKIY and the
"ANDREY" cases, °

As NOSENKO was about to leave this first meeting, his case
officer asked when they might meet again. NOSENKO suggested
that they meet two days later, on Monday., around noontime as
it would be easier for him to get away unnoticed at lunchtime.
He then said that the case officer was probably trying to get

. everything down on tape and asked that this be stopped because

of the risk to his secvrity resulting from such a permanent re-
cord of their conversations. NOSENKO said: "I will not tell
you. anything particularly interesting. But I can tell you some-

thing. But not today. ‘I can tell how LANGELLE blew POPOV--not

LANGELLE, but because of whom and why we found him--for your
future use, so that you will know how to operate. But LANGELLE
was not guilty. It was not LANGELLE who was guilty. Another

. ; ey

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“or of the degree of this cooperation was never raise aga ne ©

“the very start’ of the second neeting;—~ on tl-dune;~he- said rere
“I am tortured all the time by a single thought. | Everything .

“now depends upon you, only on you. The slightest careless move

“by your people and it will be the end of me.“ Although he

sometimes voiced moral compunctions, from this point on NOSENKO
expressed his primary personal concern as being his own secu-
rity vis-a-vis the KGB. :

b. Attitude Toward Defection

While willing to meet with CIA representatives during
future trips outside the Soviet Union, which he estimated would
occur about once a year, NOSENKO in 1962 refused tc consider
defection except in circumstances where his personal security
would be endangered. Wis devotion to his'wife and children, and
the probability that the KGS would take reprisals against them
if he fled were, he said, the primary considerations behind this
‘yefusal. (Without elaborating on the reasons, NOSENKO said on !
another cccasicn that he would not want to leave the USSR even i
on a permanent KG3 assignment and accompanied by his family.) ne
Other considerations included his widowed mother's dependence _ |
on him and his love of Russia and the Russian people, as opposed H
to the regime. For these reasons, NOSENKO said, he could not |
defect as PETROV, GOLITSYN, and KHOKLOV had done. ;

@. ‘Motivation a , . . Lai

NOSENKO told David MARK on 9 June 1962 that he wanted to
contact American Intelligence because he was in trouble over
the loss of KGB operational funds, for which he had to account
prior to his imminent departure for the Soviet Union. His KGB
career would be ruined if he was caught misusing this money,
NOSENKO added, and because he had nowhere else to turn, he was
willing to sell two items of information to MARK. The amount
needed to cover the loss was 900 Swiss francs, or about $210,
and this was the price asked for the information.

NOSENKO's statements of motivation to his CIA case officers
during subsequent meetings are given below:

9 June 1962: In his first meeting with a CIA officer NO-

SENKO. asked whether MARK had relayed the reasons why he wanted
to meet with American Intelligence. He then very briefly re-

. peated what he had told MARK concerning the loss of his opera~

"* And he doesn't sense any improvement [in his position] within the

tional funds. The case officer remarked that there must be
something more to it, upon which NOSENKO said that this was not,
in fact, his main motivation: "I have been working in this
business’ for a long time and I know what I am doing. I have
heard more than is written [in the newspapers]. A reorganization
has been started in the USSR. In short, they have begun to do
away with the ministries and the sovnarkhozy. But this is pre-
‘mature. Right now our agriculture is falling apart at the seams
and our industry is at the point of collapse because this re-
organization, this innovation, is too early. And this is not
just me, a young man, talking. I mingle with ministers, with my
father's friends, and I hear what they are saying. :And how much
does a worker earn? 600-800 rubles in old money, now 60-80.

total population. ‘These are empty words only. We have exceeded
the United States in per capita production of butter and milk. .

‘. But how can it be said that we have surpassed you when they are

gli. ls

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_ on the wrong track. Aluo, look at the serious situation in

’ they have had floods. These rains are also very sertcus. It

‘I do not believe in what is being done. I do:not believe-in

: luxurious. Her apartment is enormous--150 square meters. For
' America this is nothing, but for Moscow this is enormous. We

internal resentment (nadlom), and you feel that some big mistakes
have been permitted, that management ag a whole is somehow off

Czechoslévakia now, in Gecmany--in the GDR. It is very se¥ious.
Ih Poland they have just had a poor harvest. Everywhere: there

means that the system, the whole socialist system cannot [cope?--
one word on the tape cannot be distinquished here]. Do you
understand what is wronq? Faith in the future is being lost. A
Why have I told you this? Because under other circumstances : -
perhaps I would not have come to this. So this is the reason : a
for what has happened to me. This is perhaps the incident that

drove me into contact with you. It all somehow grew within me.

God knows,"

re ensebeietan, Ringers a

11 June 1962: During the second meeting, NOSENKO himself
raised the Issue of motivation. His case officer had just said
that CIA would respect his wishes in connection with a particu-
lar request when GSENKO said: "Speaking of respect, how can
there be respect? I don't even respect myself for what I have
done. But, but, take the press bulletin, the communique of ;
the Summit Conference in Moscow on various questions. Again : ; i
lies, lies, lies, to show that we have had great successes. I
can't sce them [the successes]. No, excuse me, I know somewhat
more than the rank and file Soviet man because I work under this 4
system. JI can see what is’ being dene and what is not baing done.
Lies, more lies. This was my mood. I say, ‘How much is it pos-
sible to deceive the people, the Soviet people? How far can
you go?7' Our people ure very poor. It is somewhat difficult
to arouse a people such as this. If we stir ourselves up we
will know how to stand up for ourselves. But I feel for my
people. How often can you say that things wiil be good; how
often can you say that we have achieved big successes? Where
are they? Show me them. I can see no trace of them. This is
what I say...that there is resentment in my soul. Do you under=
stand? A terrible resentment. I love my country. You may say
that this is nothing. But I tell you that I cannot act like
GOLITSYN, like KHOKLOV, like PETROV, because I want to be there. .
I want to be with my family, That's all. But I feel that not 3
only the government is making mistakes. I feel that there are
faults throughout the entire system of socialism. ‘hat I mean
is that things are bad in Czechoslovakia, things are bad in Po-
land, things are bad with KADAR [in Hungary], they are starving
in China. This means that there are great mistakes. Well,
that's all. What did you want to ask me, please?"

wins

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3
4

At the close of this meeting, NOSENKO stressed that money

was unimportant as a motive for a continuing relationship: "My

name must not be used anywhere, even in your offices. Understand?

It would be the end of me, I am not afraid of this. The devil

with them. Because I have had such a life. I lost my father, ’
everything. Why do I say this? I did not come to you simply ; seat nncaetett
because I needed money. I don't need it. I came because Tt am
resentful inside. Do you understand this internal resentment?

robbs dave, see

hans

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4

this. Listen to me. Let me speak honestly. Have I not had the
chance to live as a person should? My father was a big man. He 1
had a dacha and a state-owned automobile... I have my own Volga . :
[automobile]. My mother was given a dacha for life... It's

Bs


14-0000,

as

_” NOSENKO said that he realized that the reason he had given for

, , Headquarters. ae

Biways.bad.a lot of money,.especially.during..the ware :Salaxy inne
OF 15,000 or 20,000-pius--25,009, There was much money. She is
a rich woman. She has paintings by Ayvazovekiy, Makovakiy. Even
if she had insufficient. money, she could always sell her posses-
Sions. What do I want to say? That I've never wanted for money.
Never...As I said, perhaps the thing which drove me to you was not
. Money, but this great, great resentment.”

The subject of motivation was not discussed
curing the third and fourth meetings with NOSENKO. As he was
about to leave the Geneva safehouse after the fifth and final
.session, however, NOSENKO again touched on the economic inequi-
ties existing inside the Soviet Union and raised a new reason for
cooperating with CIA,. his basic sympathy for the American people.

coming to us, his need for money, was "not good." Before he

_ and his case officers parted, KOSENKO said, he wanted to em-
phasize "without attempting to justify himself" that he had
"always felt a certain sympathy toward the American people.” He
explained that it was not the technical progress of the United
States which attracted him, nor was it the high standard of
living of the American people. It was rather the openness and
directness with which the Americans whom hz had met and seen
‘handled themselves. As examples he cited his American targets
in Moscow and Secretary of State Dean RUSK, whom he had seen in

. Geneva. ’ 3

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Although NOSENKO did mention the difficult economic situa- =
tion in the USSR on a few other occasions, he did not relate }
these remarks specifically to his motives for volunteering to H
CIA. The above excerpts are representative of his total state- :
ment on motivation during the 1962 meetings.

3. Decision to Defect (January 1964)

On arrival for his first meeting with CIA during the second
Geneva phase, on 24 January 1964, NOSENKO said that after long
and careful consideration since the 1962 meeting series, he had
decided to defect. He once again criticized the Communist regime
along the same lines as during earlier meetings, but his immedi-
ate motivation seemed to hava nothing to do with this. NOSENKO
explained that he had recently been promoted to the position of
First Deputy Chief of the Seventh (Tourist) Department of the KGB
Second Chief Directorate, and that because of the stature and
responsibilities of his new job, there would be *-w opportunities,
‘if any, for him to visit the West in the future. Therefore, he
had decided to seize the opportunity at hand and to flee to the
United States at once, leaving his family behind.’ He foresaw no
possibility of his wife and children being permitted to leave the
USSR for the "next twenty years." NOSENKO told CIA that "the
hardest thing is to part with my family." He had, however, care-
fully considered their fate as the close relatives of a defector, et
aa he knew that, because of his mother's position in Soviet so~. : a
ciety, no harm would come to them,

neato nae ahh esha mack ove

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needa tech,

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. Whereas. NOSENKO declared his intent to-defect immediately,
the CIA case officers at this first meeting in 1964 persuaded
him to remain in place for at least two or three weeks on the
grounds that, first, CIA would benefit much from this, and

. Second, arrangements for his transfer to and reception in the
United States would have to be coordinated in advance with CIA

ty

14-09000°

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_ in the United States. In this connection, he said, he would
prefer to act as a CIA consultant, particularly on counterintel- :
_ligence matters because he was a specialist in this field; he ee

‘recruiting other Soviets.

™ Por ets ems re

"During this first meeting NOSENKO made no monetary request
of CIA and asked only for reasonable assurance of a secure future *% °:

é

would be able to give CIA leads and assistance in spotting and

The next five meetings with NOSENKO were devoted exclusively
to debriefings on the activities of the KSB Second Chief Direc-
torate. Althorgh his impending defection was mentioned, his
reasons for taking this step were not discussed. In the mean-
time, NOSENKO's first CIA handler flew to Washington for dis-
cussions regarding the defection and, on his return, told . i
NOSENKO that the CIA leadership had asked why, specifically, ;
NOSENKO had decided to come to the United States at that tima.

The answer was that NOSENKO, "after coming back and seeing that

there was no more chance to come to the West, or little more -
chance," felt that this was his one opportunity to come and make

his life with the Americans. Therefore, he was going to seize

the opportunity while he had it. Asked about this, NCGSENKO con-

firmed that this was his reason, and added: "I may never have

another chance, and in addition, I've had sufficient time since

our last meeting here in Geneva [1962] to weigh everything and to x
consider everything." Later in this same meeting, NOSENKO again :
mentioned his lack of interest in money and his feelings about
Geserting his family: "I understand [that it will be difficult
to adjust to a new life in America} and know that for some time :
I will be sick within. And I know that a certain pericd of 3
time must elapse before this can heal. I even spoke to you ‘
bluntly about my [financial] security. I am absolutely un-

mercenary and have never had any appreciation for money or ‘
wealth...My most difficult and sorest spot of all is my family. : :

ci dihdaiteie no

2 opbb asthe

This is the nost basic and most difficult spot of all. And I . 4
know perfectly well that I must go through an illness over 4
this. For this the only and the best doctor is time. I don't j

‘1

expect to have a new family there. Of course, I don't know--
but at least I'm speaking from the way I feel now. I have a

strong liking for children--nct only for my own, but for ail

children and, losing my own, I am fully conscious how I must

suffer through this. In time I will get used to it. I know

one can get used to almost anything."

At this meeting, NOSENKO agreed to remain in place for
approximately another week, and the tentative date of 8 Febru-
ary was selected for the defection.

NOSENKO's motives for the defection were not. mentioned
for five more meetings. Then, on 4 February 1964, he telephoned
the Geneva safehouse to say he wanted to defect at once. Ar-
riving shortly thereafter, he announced that he had been or- :
dered to return to Moscow the following day and, therefore, had : nes
to leave Switzerland before morning. He stated his reasons
formally in an asylum request, written at the time:

"This decision was made by me, not now, at the
moment I write this r2quest, but several years ago.
._. Having worked for many years in the KGB and knowing
" more than the average soviet citizen about the policy of
the Soviet government, about the direction which this
‘government has chosen to take, and about the law and
order in the USSR, I have come to the decision that


and work for the welfare of

4. The Letter of July 1964 |

The most complete explanation given by NOSENKO of his
motives for first contacting CIA and«later defecting to the-
United States is contained .in a letter to his CIA case officer

<= dn July 1964. He described this letter as "an exposition of

? all those reasons and roct causes which led to the decision |

to leave the Soviet Union” and further explained that “every- i

thing put down here is lacking in a whole series of lesser L-

details which to a greater or lesser degree played their : . i

3 xole.“ Nevertheless, he said, he had tried in this letter !

> “to set down the main things to show how, when, and why the

decision was born, grew, and hardened within m2 to completely i

alter the course of my life.” This letter is preserted below

in its entirety. Most of the biocraphical and operational

details mentioned in the letter are covered separately in other a

parts of this paper. : . : i

saved

ay BE a
wnteaes tie.

Bw anoe: Se tee at

"1, My life, my childhood and youth passed in ;
very comfortable circumstances since the positicn of i
my father gave us the opportunity to live without lacking .
£0€ anything. And the only difficult periods of my ;
life (before the death of my father) were: study in :
the naval schools in kuybyshev, Baku and Leningrad; :
and the beginning of my working life, the pericd in :
the Far East (1950-1952). The opportunity to be
always well-dressed, to have a sufficient amount :
of money, to have my own car, to be able to use the ,
car given me by. my family and also my father's car, ;
the opportunity to travel to the South and to vaca- '
tion in the best sanitariums, dachas, and so forth;
all this unquestionably left its mark on me and. be- © .
came something of a habit. After the death of ry i
; father, my successful progress in-my work gave me a
: higher salary, and although I did not have all that i
which I had while my father was alive, still I did not sos i
experience any serious difficulties. But already I
wanted to live still better.

A eerste deans emt Act eed

nmetar satin Diya adit me

"2. Up to 1953, over the course of my entire
life--at school, in the Institute, at work, at home
in the family--it was always pounded into my head
that STALIN was a great genius, that he was good, keen,
etc., and the thought never occurred to me to question
his words or his deeds because everything that he
: : ; . said, and everything he did,were completely axiomatic.
7 The arrestSand trials only involved traitors and it...
H was considered and explained that the people who — ‘
suffered innocently, especially in 1937 and 1938, “
suffered only because at the head of the NKVD in 1937,
1938, was the betrayor of the people YEZHOV. Not
: even the shadow of doubt fell on the name of STALIN.
i .: Soon after STALIN's death in 1953 I read a certain
: . document given me by my father. This was a secret
i 2 8.) . + letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU on the et
io. ou 7 2. “ease of the doctors;' it was not.addressed to all _— =
wb o's ¢Ommunists but only to members and candidate members pel.
.’ @£ the Central Committee. I was deeply shaken by this . TP
- : letter which described in detail how these people, . wo,

wen OPRELY
Te? Seote!

ae ptt Bag OE ot anblinanti ms atin ed


—the cult of STALIN and -mich that I heard in the KGB

» tried, as an engineer, to prove that a certain deci-~

“important specialists in the field of medicine, were
brought to such a condition that they condemned them-

selves; that is, they confessed to things which had
never happened, to things which they had never done.
They were simply forced to give the evidence which was

needed _by the ‘Investigators.: ~The secret lstters-o1

about the reign of STALIN, all this left its mark and I
forced me to think deeply about the real truth and to i
look at everything more critically. Already I no +t
longer had faith in all those ideas which for years : |
b
|

had been pressed into my head.

"3. The new leaders (KHRUSHCHEV and Company)
used the same methods but already diluted with the
water of democracy, with playing up to the people Q
and attempts to convince them that a new era would - it
arise, a new and better life, and that now the Party ; !
was always going to concern itself with the welfare
of tne people. In fact, it was a struggle for power
and the use of all. means in this struggle,“even
microphones (they listened to the conversations of ;
BERIYA and his friends; later they listened to the mo
conversations of MOLOTOV, MALENKOV, KAGANOVICH, and :
others). -KHRUSHCHEV'sS endless blabbing about suc-
cesses, when in fact they didn't exist, the figures
about how the USSR had. passed the USA in the produc- ‘
tion of butter and milk, when in the stores they were
available cnly infrequently. The endless promises : :
of a better life when in fact nothing of the sort is
taking place. All this similarly forced me to re-
evaluate not only the events which were taking place
in the country, but already the entire adeclogy of
the Party, its external and internal course.

ethan

sean sat thes oD

' "4. The events in Novocherkassk where about 20,000 |
to 25,000 people rose up and the way in which this |
popular indignation was suppressed by trocps with many
casualties. This also made a deep impression on me.

t

menentedscttalda ebb kes tk +

When I was resting in the summer of 1961 in Nikolayev,
from my relatives--my father's brothers--I understood
well the real relation of the workers both to the
leadership and to the Party as a whole. At the same
time I saw how the workers really lived, how they eat,
what they have and what they san buy with their wages.

ae
sudnbe leds we ental aamstevas .

"5. QI heard a great deal from my father about
the domestic policies of KHRUSHCHEV in regard to the
development and the course of construction in industry, ©
about his complete illiteracy in engineering techno-
logy and industrial economics, about incorrect deci-
sions in regard to many industries, and this was not | Fh Be sé
only the opinion of my father, but also of other impor-
tant leaders in various fields of industry (MALYSHEV,
VANNIKOV, AKOPOV, and others). But-no one dared to
open his mouth and when in December 1955 my father

sho maistoet sae

sion would be incorrect, he received such a rebuff.
from KHRUSHCHEV. that he was profoundly shaken and in
the opinion of my mother this brought him to his ill-
ness in.1956 and his death in August 1956. :


14-0000

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i
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i
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Hungary sh

‘Gn 1956 after the death of STALIN and while I was ae me df

-. > that I would not be able to work in the KGB unless I .
Wg a-member of the Party....And if I worked somewhere ‘.

“‘She-events in-Germany~and especially 10. czmsasce
cowed with absolute clarity the bankruptcy -

of communist ideology. What was especially important
for me was the fact that in these countries it was: ©
a protest not of individuals or groups, but of the:
entire people who could no longer @ndure a regime
imposed on them by force. Here it is necessary to
emphasize that the life of the people in these coun~
tries was much better than that of the people in the
USSR (1 saw for myself how people live in Czecho-
slovakia, in Germany, and beyond any doubt they live
better than the entire people of the Soviet Union).

Bs
i q

_ 7, The split of the international communist
movement became for me a clear fact and confirmed
my opinion that the theory of communism is a theory
built on sand and that it is practiced according to
the needs of the leadership of the Party at a.given i
stage of life and that in reality full material wel-
fare would never be enjoyed by the people but cnly
by the leadership and the Party and the government. : i

See ee

"g. Working in the KGB I came to understand
much and became conscious of the contradiction between
the internal and external course of the USSR. Such ;
questions as disarmament, the ban on atomic weapons, the : i
positicen of the USSR in the United Nations--all these ad i
are used only in the interest of propaganda and as : :

a screen for carrying out of the policies needed by. . |
the communist party. (I was myself present at the ; :
negotiations in Geneva and saw the ‘politics of the i
Soviet delegation.) :

"9, My trips abroad opened my eyes wide to the ;
true reality. With my own eyes, I saw how people '
jive, how much they earn, how they can dress and live :
on their wages, and I paid special attention to the
life of ordinary people and not to that of scientists, |
engineers, etc. And all the propaganda about the i
enormous armies of unemployed in the countries of the |

i
I
'

a Rh eT A ele eee

West, about the ‘heavy exploitation’, and the ‘un-
believably difficult life' flew immediately out of

my head. And that which I met with in my work, the
sending of Soviet citizens abroad--who gets sent where
and how, etc.--this finally debunked this propaganda.
Many of my acquaintances~-GUK, CHURANOV and others--
think back with great pleasure about life abroad.

ovina on AEE isla

. , "10, I entered the KOHSOMOL completely without
‘thinking about it. The time came, the right age, and- ; a ; a

I became a Komscmolnik like all the others. It was

different in regards to the Party: I joined the Party

working in the KGB and already at that time there was
a lack of faith and indecisiveness in me. My father
continually inststed on this, saying that without the

Party I would never move ahead and would not have ~
success in life. But I myself understood and saw

else, I would truly never move ahead in my career

Aan MED Get Rew “eae LE

eh aaron de tm ate DA kee nena arr RIN HE Ag ge . a

. unless T entered the Party. But From Che GELy Des REE ET eae Mia
ginning of my entry into the Party, I deeply hated

all the Party talmudism and dogmatism. All the

Party meetings were literally a torture. Especially

when I became the deputy chief of the section, the

chief of the section, and the deputy chief of the

department, because then I had to speak at these

meetiags. Because this meant to lie, to twist my

soul, and to attempt to show myself as deeply dedi- t
cated to the Party and its course.

"11. In 1960 my oldest girl's asthmatic attacks
became worse. The question of a change of climate
was raised. At that time the SCD needed to send an
officer to Ethiopia for two to three years to conduct
counterintelligence work among the Soviet specialists
there. It cost me a great deal of effort to personally
talk GRIBANOV into letting me go. The Party and work i

i 4
i i
i

references had been confirmed, all the questionnaries . ! j
were already filled out, the photos had been submitted; : I
that is, all the formalities had been accomplished. i :

But at the very last moment the Central Personnel of

the KGB began to protest against my go&ng with my _!

family to Ethiopia. The reason for this was that from

the house check made at my place of residence they

received information that I sometimes came nome in

a drunken condition and on this ground had quarrels

with my wife. A tour abroad with my family was neces~

gary because of the health of my daughter (since 1963

the illness has become better) and also it would :
have been advantageous from the financial point of :
view. From this time on I understood that Personnel
Wold not let me go abroad with my family.

"12, Knowing many officers in the FCD, i began
to understand that being sent abroad is entirely :
determined, not by knowledge, experience in work and :
success, but only by the absolute ‘cleanliness' of ;
the person's autobiography and complete assurance as

to his limitless dedication to the Party and the
“government. But not only being sent abroad but the |
assignment of personnel in the First and Second Chief i
Directorates and the entire KGB depends on the reasons |
|

wee thd Metis md OB a

indicated by me and also on good reiations with the
kadership and good connections with workers in Central

Personnel.

"13. I lived about 11 years with my wife and our }
: Life was not a hell. It is true that there were i
quarrels and basically they boiled down to the fact — aot |

fal deta

that she took an extremely unfavorable attitude to-
wards my delays at work and also when I would be de-
layed with some of my friends and acquaintances after
work and would come home with a few drinks under my
belt. Of course, I loved an@ love.my.children and only
the fact that they are taken care of financially until
they grow up and have received an education to some
extent consoled me in taking the decision to leave the
USSR. What do I have in mind when I speak of financial
‘security? After the death of my father, the family
received a large monetary allowance, plus the money

oma be taate vee

wate

ihrer LOY
glk en ee ee See

ae a eee)


~ borrow from (at this time GUK was’‘pimselif in finan-

- decision to leave the USSR at the first opportunity

“would be of the maximum value for you. My assignment
_-to- the position of deputy chief of the Seventh Depart~

that my mother had saved and valuable property, etc.
yother inany “times offered’ to’ divide all this: in ==
three parts: for me, my brother, and for her, but I~
suggested that we not do this before her death. And,

of course, my mother will not leave my children without
attention, and my share of the property and the money
will be given to my children. ; . a

"14, If the defections of =PETROV, RASTVOROV and
DERYABIN passed without evoking any particular _ ‘
thoughts, the defection to the United States of GOLIT=-
SYN, whom I had heard of as an intelligent person and
a capable officer, undoubtedly caused me to think
very deeply. Because to act thus, it is necessary
to have not only boldness and decisiveness, but also
great. strength of will. And already I put to myself
the question, will I be able to act thus in view of
the dissatisfactions and disillusionments which had
accumulated inside of me?

"15. Being in Geneva in 1962, not long before
my departure I myself of my own desire entered into
contact with you. The reason for this was the loss
of money received by me for operational expenses. TI
would have been unable to accumulate such a sum of
money before my departure and there was nobody to

cial difficulty and at the same time he was already
preparing for his return home). To tell the truth
about the loss of the money would have meant that it
would be necessary to explain where and in what cir-
cumstances it had been lost. This would have risked
expulsion from the KGB and a serious reprimand from
the Party. Not to tell the truth, to think up some
sort of a story--they wouldn't believe, and worst of
all, they might think that I had appropriated the
money, that is, stclen it. And this would be for me
the worst of all and I would,’ of course, in such
event have told the truth,

"16. To tell the truth, it was only after my
return home from Geneva in 1962 that I gradually, not
immediately, began fully to realize all the seriousness
of my contact with you and its full meaning. And
although I did not give you any promises cr assurances
about our continued contact in the future, I under-
stood that you sooner or later would set yourself the
task of continuing our contact. And here it was that
weighing up all the reasons and causes which I have
.indicated above that in 1962 I took for myself the

and that I started to work towards being sent on a trip. -
abroad. : ; :

“17. Of course, I wanted to come abroad with some
sort of ‘baggage’, that is, with materials which could .
be useful and necessary for you. In this entire period : 4
up to January 1964 I tried to collect information which : 5

‘ment in-July 1962 gave me a greater. opportunity than ~
before. But at the same time this assignment almost: _

soe ein MEERA petal Beas acre ingha seta 2 ae etek

1400000 . : 7 . .
weegcluded the possibility of a trip abroad ane Le wai
mmly with great difficulty that I was able to get away —
_ for the trip in January 1964.. It was necessary to con-
_ vince CHELNOKOV and then to ask CHELNOKOV to convince
7 BOBKOV and in 1963 tc convince KOVALENKO. In this i
: advanced many reasons: that I had not spent all the -
"money (in foreign currency);.that the medicine which
, I bought for my daughter had proven very successful ©
“7 "" an@ that I needed to buy some more medicine to carzy
“ * ‘out one more series of treatments; that this trip
would not be a long one and that since I was already
the deputy chief of the Department I would not be able
to travel abroad any more arid so, therefore, this trip
would probably be my last. Of course, all this was —
said at convenient moments and outside of work.
Things were easier with the Eleventh Department (which
deals with trips abroad) because I was on good terms ; Lo, j
with PENCHENKO who covered Switzerland, besides which ~ : 3
when I came back from Geneva in 1962 I had prought him
a number of presents.

"18. The publication in 1963 by the foreign press : ;

of the VASSALL case put me on my guard since in the .
newspaper Times it said outright that the English
learned about him thanks to the Americans who learned :
about VASSALL in the spring of 1962. Fortunately, the ;
leadership of the FCD,as I learned from GUK, CHURANCV, :
and TARABRIN, cama to the conclusion that here the
Americans had been helped by GOLITSYN. But at the :
same time the FCD was not completely sure of this.
But the publication in the American press of Alsop's
articles on the CIA alarmed me extremely. This ar-
ticle in one spot said plainly that as far as is known
the KGB does not have any sources in the CIA while at
the same time the CIA has penetrated the KGB. From
this moment, Ido not concea 1s fact, egan to

- 7" " " ¢ee) afraid that the KGB would somehow learn of my con-
tact with you. This article deeply ‘interested’ the
KGB. : : :

chatted aut Re ee ee

got: a pass in the Second Department and went in order |
to look at him myself. For sometimes it is enough 4
to simply look at a man, to see how he holds hinselif 4
and to hear how he speaks in order to form some sort 4

j
|
"19. During the clased trial of PENKOVSKIY I :

: o of an initial opinion of him. Personally, I liked how
: . a PENKOVSKIY held himself at the trial; I liked his ap-
pS pearance and I understood that everything which had.
been said in the KGB about him and-the sort of person
they were trying to make him out to be (that he was
morally degraded, that he had descended and sunk into

a swamp) that all this was nonsense, bluff, and chatter.
And PENKOVSKIY, the same as GOLITSYN, gave me a feeling
of. greater confidence in the correctness of the deci-
sion taken by me to leave the Soviet Union.

1 4 :
+ R

1 . : : w
' : a r. : ,

26 July 1964 Signed: Yu. NOSENKO"

eT ee

TOP SECRET


Oe .......__......... rw eee

ann enetaec arpa we 7 OS ENO ° a ACE iyietes- “ta Geneve seep RL ET
i. Introduction

The extent to which NOSENKO made himself available for
meetings with CIA in Ceneva in 1962 and 1964 is reviewed here
in connection with his statements about the KGB duties assigned
to him for these trips, his visits to the XGB Legal Residency,
and his personal assoc1ation with other Soviets. Although
NOSENKO was not precise about how he spent his deys and nights
in Geneva, he did indicate that he was his own boss, disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little to
do. At the first meeting with CIA in 1962 he accounted for his
freedom of movement by saying: "Tt can come and co as Ipleage
at any time. (Ambassador) ZORIN knows wno I am, almost the
entire delegation knows who I am, pecause I don't need to pre-
tend. Nobody pays any attention to me. They know thet T am
not a Ministry of Foreign Affai.s man (at the conference
sessions). I sit, listen, leaf through some papers. For this
reason I can leave the conference at any time, cr I do not come
at all, and no one will sey a word to me." CIA made no attempt
to place NOSENKO under surveillance in 1962 and 1964, and there
is no evidence from other sources confirming or disproving
HOSENKO's statements about his activities while away from the
CLA safehouse. ,

2. Official Duties in Geneva

In 1962 NOSENKO said he was the sole KGB officer in the
94-man Soviet delegation to the Disarmament Conference and 4s
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of the
entire delegation.” To assist him in carrying out these security
officer functions, NCSENKO had the services of a number of
coopted informants of the KGB who were serving in the delega-
tion. In addition, NOSENKO had the specific mission of check-
ing on suspicions atteched to one of the delegation members,

P. F. SHAKHOV** but ry the time he established contact with CIA,
he said, this assignment had already been completed.

In 1964, NOSENKO said his only operational task then was to
hendle the general security responsibilities for the Soviet
delegation, as he had done in 1962. There was no specific
mission such as the ome concerning SHAKHOV in 1962.

NOSENKO nas described his investigations of SHAKHOV, but
he has never indicated either that he conducted security checks
: of other delegation members in 1962 an@ 1964, or that he re-
i ceived any security-type information (except on SHAKHOV) from
‘ the KGB cooptees. who were supposed to be reporting to him.
‘ Likewise, NOSENKO hes not said that he prepared communications
, for KGB Headquerters regarding his clandestine assignments in
Geneva.

3, Visits to the KG3 Legal Residency

Virtually every day, NOSENKO told CIA in 1962, he went to
the KGB Legal Residency in Geneva, and if he stayed away for
more than a day or two, the Legal Resident, S. I. GAVRICHEV,
would invariably ask NOSENKO where he had been keeping himself.

2
} —_— or
; . * I.S. MAYOROV and M.S. TSYMBAL also arrived with the delega-
gery tion in March 1962 but had left Geneva by the time NOSENKO
“  goncacted CIA. ; ; L Oe ake

i

{

| _- #® SHAKHOV is discussed further in Part Iii.3.%.
{. . ys Saattnte


14-0000

. GAVRICHEV, according to NOSENKO, treated him with deference, ~ OFS
and shortly a etter his Ser tvat-10-Geneva-in- March 1962;-NOSENKO--resamnicm —

gave a lecture on counterintelligence - ‘to the assertled members

of the Legal Residency. This lecture was given at GAVRICHEV's

request, althouch it was only after some hesitation on ‘the part
of. the Legal Resident that all of his subordinates were brought
together to heaf NOSENKO. (In return for hélping the Legal
Residency to perform counter-surveillance on; several occasions,
NOSENKO said, he was sometimes allowed by GAVRICHZV to have the
use of an operational car and driver to go shopping and. carry
out other private errands.) ;

Similarly, in 1964, NOSENKO said he was making nearly daily
visits to the Legal Residency. During the 1964 meetings NOSENKO
stated that it was his close relationship with :-M.&, TSYMBAL*
which made it possible for him to have visited the Geneva Legal
Residency so frequently, both in 1962 and 1964. “According to
the strict rules," NOSENKO told CIA, "an officer in a status
such as mine should not even go to the Residency. In this case
it is only because I.am deputy chief of a department and GAV-.
RICHEV knows my position perfectly well (it is not lower than
his), and because I have such a sympatnetic personal relation-
ship with TSYMBAL," He then went on to say that TSYMBAL “sort
of escorted me to the Residency. They coulé have simply said:
‘You are here om a mission, we have our own mission, and we
have nothing in common.'" But, NOSENKO indicated, this was
not.the case, thanks to TSYMBAL's intervention.

4. Association with TSYMBAL

At the secord meeting with CIA in 1962 NOSENKO volunteered
information on TSYMBAL's KGB background and his current missions
in Geneva, then alluded to his having spoken with TSYMBAL in
Geneva but without placing any particular emphasis on this
relationship.

In 1964, however, NOSENKO claimed that their relationship
was close, explained that it was TSYMSAL (again in Geneva at
the same time) wno gained NOSENKO's admission to the Legal
Residency, and said that he had twice gone to see TSYMBAL off
on train trips, once on 24 January when TSYMBAL wert to Bern
and again on 28 January when TSYMBAL left Lausanne for Rome.
NOSENKO told CIA he had been dealing with TSYMBAL since 1960
or 1961. At that time "We were looking over some candidates
for recruitment and came across some whose background would
have made them suitable for the Special (Illegals) Director-
ate...Then when we came (here) in 1962 for the Disarmament
Conference, I got to know him a little better - more from the

. human side. He seemed to take a liking to me for scme reason.

We had’ met in Moscow before, of course, but just in the hall.
or in the dining room. He used to say: ‘Stop in and see me,'
and I would answer: 'Well, it's kind of awkward for me to

- hang around the Special Directorate - what am I supposed to he

doing here?' He would say: 'Oh, comeon, stop in.' But I

' 4

TSYMBAL appeared in Geneva under .the last-name alias
"ROGOV" and was identified by NOSENKO as Chief of the
Illegals Directorate, KGB First Chief Directorate... Since
1956, TSYMBAL was known by CIA to be the true name for
ROGOV, and GOLITSYN reported in..1961. that TSYMBAL was
Chief of the Furopean Department, KGB First Chief
& Directorate.. .

cdot eee es eek ee SO

Peat heen wee

Dohen

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coe

14-0000

‘*#** The BELITSKIY case is discussed in greater length in —

° fe***See Parts II.B. and II.C.2.c.

 @dan't." NOSENKO also said that TSYMBAL had asked him several

times to transfer to the First Chief Directorate and had

‘ suggested that he might be assigned to the United States. In
fact, NOSENKO added, he had got into some difficzlty with 0. Me

GRIBANOV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, cyvirtue of |
TSYMBAL's efforts in 1962 to have NOSENKO transferred and his
leaving the impression with GKIBANOV that NOSENK® (who was still
in Geneva) nad agreed to this action,

Questioned in April 1964 about his association with TSYMBAL,
NOSENKC stated that he met TSYMBAL for the first time several
days before their departure for Geneva. Besides saying again
that he saw TSYMBAL almost daily at the Legal Residency and
that TSYMBAL's assistance enabled him to enter the Legal Resi-
dency, NOSENKO reported that in 1962 he went out with TSYMBAL
several times a week to eat lunch or dinner; sometimes they were
joined by I. S. MAYOROV,* sometimes by A. K. KISLOV (see next
section), and sumetimes the two ate alone. During the 1966
interrogations, NOSENKO said that, while he had seen TSYMBAL
on a daily kasis in 1962, he saw him only twice in 1964. once
when TSYMBAL travelled to Geneva from Bern for ore or two days
and later when NOSENKO saw TSYMBAL ‘off for Rome from Lausanne.

5. Association with Other Soviets

. ROSENKO said in 1962 that the other Soviets he saw most
often were A. K. KISLOV and Yu. I. GUK.** KISLOV, with NOSENKO
was one of the four members of the Soviet delegation staying
at the Hotel Ariane in Geneva, and was said to be head of the
American Section of TASS and a genuine correspondent.*** During
the 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKO reported that KISLOV was.
not a KGB officer and made no reference of his having any
affiliation with the KGB. NOSENKO did say, however, that he
had arranged for KISLOV's name to be given the KGB double
agent B. Ye. BELITSKIY**** to use as a notional source of
information on Soviet disarmament policy: BELITSKIY was to
pass this information to his CIA contacts. NOSENKO made
numerous references to drinking and carousing with KISLOV,
specifically with recard to a night in early June - when
NOSENKO was robbed of or squandered his operational funds,
which brought him to CIA - and on the night of 10 June 1962
when NOSENKC squandered 2000 Swiss frances (the money CIA had
given him) on wine and women.***** In giving NOSENKO the
money to defray these personal expenses, the CIA handlers
expressed to him their concern over the dangers to his security
arising from KISLOV's knowledge of this inexplicable source of _
income... NOSENKO replied that.there was ‘no need to be concerned’

.since KISLOV was'."too drunk -ta-know what is going on," and - in:
any event he constituted no .threat. ‘

_F MAYOROV, according to NOSENKO, was visiting Geneva in

order to have operational meetings with agents.

ae Both KISLOV and GUK are mentioned in the discussion of
the “ANDREY" case (see Part VI.D.3.b.).  GUK was also a
friend of GOLITSYN, who reported extensively on GUK's
“<eareer in the KG3 including his service in the United
States. : : teeta

“eee In'October 1966 WOSENKO named’all the Soviets Living ‘at

.the Ariane, without mentioning KISLOV. -

Part VI.D.6.

a meen

wuisincliaslecsStdedices... sacl

:

oioud eithliasd iterated dibs.

1 ee wlthee nadia babe be wos bene


14-0000

' in Moscow prior to his departure for Geneva in 1962 in order

very friendly. Por the first time, NCSENKO reported that .
KISLOV had been, a KSB operational contact while in the United
States, that he had been introduced to KISLOV by a KGB officer

to be able to exploit him during the Geneva Conference, and
that after returning from Geneva. KISLOV had been recruited as.
8 KGB agent on the basis of a favorable report NOSENKO had
prepared.

Often during the 1962 meetings NOSENKO spoke of his “big,
big friend” GUK, whom he described as the Deputy Legal Resident
in Geneva and the only "strong officer" in the KGB Legal Resi-
dency. He implied that his friendship with GUK, a former member
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, was of longstanding. NOS-
ENKO related that he and GUK were together nearly every day in
Geneva. They often went out together to chat and have a few
Grinks, and as a consequence, NOSENKO was able to elicit infor-
mation about some of GUK's operations there. In 1964 NOSENKO

‘told CIA he found it difficult to obtain information on the

activities of the Geneva Legal Residency because he no longer:
had a good friend there like GUK, who had been reassigned to
KGB Headquarters. when questioned later in 1964 about his
relationship with GUK, NOSENKO said he had come to know GUK
well only during his 1962 IDY in Geneva,

6. Availability for Meetings with CIA

In speaking to David MARK on 6 June 1962, NOSENKO expressed
displeasure over MARK's insistence on deferring their luncheon
(at which NOSENKO sought contact with American Intelligence)
until three days later. When the first meeting with CIA did
take place on 9 June 1962, NOSENKO stayed. for three hours,
and it was at his suggestion that another meeting was scheduled
for 11 June. This second meeting in 1962 lasted seven hours.
NOSENKO remained in Geneva until 15 June, and in the interim
he met CIA officers three more times for over seven hours
altogether. He offered to meet again on the day of his de-
parture, but this proposal was rejected as needlessly endan-
gering his security.

From the first 1964 meeting on 23 January to his defection
on 4 February, NOSENKO was met a total of 13 times, the sessions
lasting for five or six hours. He was able to come to the CIA
safehouse every day but one, and this opportunity was skipped

- at the request of the CIA handlers. By mutual consent, most

of the meetings started in the afternoon, but on two occasions

. NOSENKO arrived as early as 0930 hours; several meetings went

on until past midnight. . NOSENKO appeared to be totally at
the disposal of CIA, to be the master of his time, and to have
no other demands for his attention except for the visits to

the XGB Legal Residency, "looking in" on an occasional session
of the Disarmament Conference, and attendance at a reception.

- TOP SEgnEL

cent ye fee er gle ae pn eRe

maemrT 1964" ROSENKO Confirmed “that” he “had “spent mich “time with
KISLOV in Geneva two years before and that they had become

ad

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E. Timing of Defection

After telling CIA on 24 January 1964 cf his decision to
defect, NOSENKO at the same meeting concurred when-CIA gave
operational and administrative reasons for hin to stay in
‘place until the middle of February. During the week that: fol-
lowed, the date of the defection was moved up to 8 February
in accordance with NOSENKO's wishes and with his reports in-
dicating that less information of value would be forthcoming
than CIA had at first thought. On-4 February, however,
NOSENKO reported that he was being recalled to Moscow for a
conference cn tureign tourism in the USSR, and he therefore
placed himself in CIA custody on that date,* Details on
the timing of NOSENKO's defection are given in the following
paragraphs,

At the 24 January iceting tne CIA case officers agreed
in principle with NOSENKO's decisicn to defect,. NOSENKO ;
felt that it wculd be best for hia to disappear from Geneva
without a trace, leaving all his personal possessions be- i }
hind; he assured that CIA could exfiltrate hia from Switzer 3
land to the United States, lie wanted to carry out this 3
plan as soon as.possible, but the Cid officers encouraged :
him--and NOSENXO agreed--to remain in place for at least | |
three weeks more. The reasons given NOSENKO for this re-
quest were: |

{
t

- The desire to get information on the local KGB

. Legal Residency and the Soviet delegation to the Dis-

armament Conference while he still had access to this
information;

a cera een IME DIES an cro oe do

« The value of having NOSENKO present when O.M.
GRIBANOV made a visit to Geneva about 7 February a :
visit known to CIA only through NOSENKO;**
|

-e The potential value to be derived from NOSENKO's
in place spotting of CIA recruitment targets among the
Soviet representation in Geneva;

wetci Sic t Natae Satb Ria

- The necessity of making arrangements, accept-
able to NOSENKO, for his defection and resettlement.

- The events which followed NOSENKO's agreement to remain ; ,
in place for a short time longer are chronicled below: ;
. . 7” oles 5 ee

* The report of NOSENKO's recall to Moscow for the con-
ference on tourism is discussed further in Part II1.F,.

i
i
i
i
i

seg eT

GRIBANOV was in 1964 the Chief of the KGB Second Chief ,
Directorate and, according to NOSENKO and other sources, a
the sponsor cf NOSENKO's rapid rise in State Security. .. .
Several. GE@GNeT sources, have reported that GRIBANOV son be
was fired from the KGB as a result of NOSENKO's de-. ~ :

fection (Part III.1.). NOSENKO's relationship with
GRIBANOV is discussed in Part V.H.


ee ee sme entemeeemeeeee

-used its cwn batteries and generator, and therefore the

-he was told were enroute from Washington, He explained that

® From:2 to 10 February 1964 GRIBANOV was in Paris, where

"a See Part VI.D.7.c for further details on CHEREPANOV,

26 January 1964; In a three-and-a-half hour meeting,
NOSENKO emphasized that although he agreed that it was . oo aan
necessary and useful for him to remain in place until the —~ Do ;
GRIBANOV visit to Geneva, he wanted to defect as soon as
possible thereafter, h

not be coming to” Geneva after all, for KGB Chairman
SEMICHASTINYY was apparently reluctant to permit him to
travel beyond Vienna. NOSENKO said that he would probably
have definite information on GRIBANOV's trip by the end

of the week,

7

|
28 January 1964: NOSENKO reported that GRIBANOV might “ '

I

smtouibecdd a deanstsl tow.

alee,

30 January 1964; At the seventh meeting of the series, ; i
NOSENKO Said that there now appeared to be littie likeiihood
that GRIBANOV would visit Geneva or Paris.* Therefore, he ; i
wanted to defect right away, As reasons he cited the
emotional strain of any further delay and the fact.that he
and his Case officers were wasting their time working -
against the local KGB Legal Residency, which had no worth-
while or promising targets, Ile also felt that nothing of ;
value could be obtained from the Soviet delegation because i i
“TSARAPKIN himself doesn't know what he will say until he : 3
is told by Moscow the day before," The CIA handlers, however, : ‘
delayed the defection for one week by cbtaining NOSENKO's ! :
agreement to assist in an audio operation: CIA propcsed to
install listening devices in the offices of the KGB Legal
Residency, and NOSENKO said he would check certain physical
aspects of the delegation buildings. As the best time for
the defection, he suggested Saturday mcrning, 8 February,
because he probably would not be missed until the following
Monday. This date was tentatively scheduled, and NOSENKO
again repeated his desire simply to "disappear without a
trace." He also asked about exfiltration plans.

:

tee ND Sabet EON sha

sat b cmabe, sta haere dM nadots te +

51 January 1964: NOSENKO reported the results of his
reconnaissance of the KGB Legal Residency in cennection with
the proposed audio operation, which would invoive microphone
transmitters operating on a carrier current. He told CIA he
had accidentally overheard in the Residency that the building

scheme would not work. He repeated his willingness to remain-
in place until the arrival of the CHEREPANOV Papers™, which

he had felt pressure at the previous meeting because of an

imminent move by the delegation from its. hotel to the. Soviet

villa outside Geneva; at the villa his disappearance would

be noticed more quickly. This move, he had now learned, had ne
been postponed pending the arrival of a housekeeping officer

from Moscow. ; . . o

he was seen on the street with a Soviet identified by .
NOSENKO as a KGB counterintelligence officer... There is
no evidence. that he visited Switzerland,

PPI TR se teas

woot ke


1 February 1964: At NOSENKGC's request, it was firmly
agreed that tne detection would take place in the rorning
of 8 February, NCSENKO said that he assumed that exfil-
-.tration would be by automobile to West Germany and thence
by plane to the United States.* His case officers .con-
firmed that this was correct.

3 February 1964: | .OSENKO reviewed tne CHEREPANOV materials, .
whe defection was stili scheduled for Saturday, 5 February.

- 4 February 1964; NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safe-

Shouse from his hetel room in the carly afternocn and said:

u"I want to come now and not go pack,"' After arriving he
‘explained that when he dropped by the KGB Legai Residency fol-
-lowing the morning session of the bisarmament Conference,

he read a cable ordering him to return to Moscow inmediately
to prepare for a KGB conference on foreign tourism in the
Soviet Union,** The residency was arranging for a ticket for
NOSENKO to fly to Moscow via Paris the following day, and a
replacement was being readicé to assune NOSENKO's duties as
security officer for the Soviet Delegation in.Geneva; he was
not- told who the replacement would be, Before he had left

for Geneva in January, NUOSENKO then related, the Soviet Gevern-

“ment had been doliberating the question of expanding foreign
tourism in the USSR and had agreed to open a aunoer of new.
cities and tourist itineraries in this connection, SEMICHASTNYY
had now decided that it was tine to call a conference to
discuss new “tactics and strategies" for handling the in-
creased number of tourists expected. Since NOSENKO had been
placed in charge of the entire conference, he was directed

to leave at once to prepare a basic report on the KGS handling
of tourists; the report weuid be read to the conference either
by himself or by someone from the leadership of the KGB of

the Second Chief Directorate, OSENKU explained that he was
the only one who could do this jeb as Lt, Col. A.&. KOVALENKO,
the KG8 Headquarters Department senior officer, was a rel-
atively new man in this line of operations, having been

there only four or five years, perhaps less. NOSENKO also
told CIA that “by great coincidence’ he had learned, just be-
fore the cable arrived, he was being moved to the Soviet
yillga on the morning of 5 February, Ie had arranged for a
Soviet chauffeur to bring a car around at 6930 hours the

next morning for the move. His absence would be noted at
that time, and therefore "the sain thing is to cross the Swiss
border before morning.” NOSENKO felt, nowever, that there
would be ccnsiderabie confusion among the Soviets in Geneva
for a time following his disappearance, .and that there would
be no real concern until the evening.. To foster Soviet un-
certainty he had left his clothing lying around his hotel

house, NOSENKO estimated the first Soviet queries to Swiss

. ‘Reyes damn ne tstane darren me vee

room and had brought no personal effects to the CIA safe- er

4
3
t
4
4
t

oe tanta eileet fh

en meme
8
vicibainittl Biedet ealeliantta.

rate te nantes

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(


14-0000

37.
authorities would probably be made. late on 5 February or early
on the 6th. . ;

- : NOSENKO was driven to Frankfurt the night of 4 February

> and remained in a safehouse there until 11 Pebruary, when press = - i

~ publicity about the defection and Soviet demands for an immedi- me |

poe ate interview with NOSENKO prompted the Director of Central In- — .. .

_ telligence to order that he be brought to Washington as soon as oT |
possible. He arrived in the evening of 12 February. . 4 |

hat


14-D0000 °

‘questioning on this point, NOSENKO voluntarily signed a

33.
F. The Recall Telegram

On arriving at tne safenouse at 1615 on 4 February 1564
NOSENKO reiated that on the preceding day, 3 February, he nad
been to the KGB “Legal Pesadency duriny the day and again in
the evening. ("e hud met with CTA from 1200 to 1800 hours
on 3 Pebruary.) He relatud t as of that time “averything
was quiet and peaceful," an: he received four personal letters
from Moscow. NOSENEG suid that on the morning of 4 Pebruary
he had again stoppc. in the Resiaeniey, but ":
going on." Later i Gu, after
a session of the bi: fer NOS
the coded teleyran aC veh Yaiv fron Moscow , i
ordering iim to cetucn liwodictely to Moscow te participate i
in the contere Louris’

LJ, how

ROL

zoates, however, what no cable
“Moscow to Geneva from the late

-afternoon.of 3 Februnry 19€4 until the morning of 5 February, 7 .

the day. after the cefection. (Two priority cables’ of: unusual
length, 247 and 297 groups, were transmitted to Geneva at -
“1901 and 1915 hours Greenwich time on 3 February; there “was
no traffic on 4 February; and the next méssage passed was a

‘routine cable originated by Moscow at 0755 hours on 5 February.) _ oo |

On 26 October 1966, while being questicned about the
circumstances of nis defecticn, NOSENKO was asxed about this
telegram which reculled him to Moscow. NOSENKC said that
there was no such telegram, am! that he had inveated it in
order to defect as soon as possible because he was nervous
and afraid his contacts with Anerican Intelligence 21n Geneva
might be noticed by Soviet autierities. After cetailed

statement with the fcllowing wording.

., "On .4..February 1964, L.told my CIA contact in
- Geneva that a telearam from KG3 Headquarters in Moscow —

‘TOP SERET

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sreamt ar enbensbilee td!

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14-0000

q
}

e
a> The hape—sein Sanbame tN

had been coceived in the KGS Residency in Geneva ~~"
recalling me irmediately to.Moscow, I said at che
time thet this telegram said that I was recalled —
to participate in a conference.to pler KGB activity
egainst tourists for the 1964 season. I meinteined
this story as fact throughout eubsequent interviews
and interrogationa by American euthorities in 1964
and 1955. No such telegram ever existed. Ho tele- -
grem was received in Geneva. I admit that the story
was a lie. I myself invented this telegram in order
to hasten my defection. I was nervous and efraid
that my contacts with American Intelligence might be
noticed," . ~

“yop SECKEL

2 nga iRTE nts oy ERAN 4 Rare eenamioasit at

tee le ra

cate inte te eames

ets ah lta 9

reo

mab ante


14-00000

Soviet Official Reactions
‘whe Chief of the Soviet ..Deleqation:to the Dis--=  "- .
; armament Conference notified the Soviet Ambassador in Bern © LES
: shortly before noon on 6 February 1964 that NOSENKO had dis- eo
- appeared, correctly placing the date as 4 February; they - , , .
speculated that. he might have been “poisoned” or: injured in
a car accident.*. Two more days passed without Soviet authorities.
making any additional public or private statements on the subject.
Later events showing Soviet official reactions to NOSENKO's de-
fection are presented below in:chronological order:

8 February: A Soviet spokesman in’ Geneva reported to
Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert" temporarily assigned to
Geneva, had been missing for four days. se

wade sat

9 February: Evening news bro#dcasts in Geneva carried ;
reports attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO !

had disappeared. 2 ‘

cost Bias sale REE en,

10 February: Unidentified Soviet sources were quoted in {
the press as having said it was presumed that he had defected. :

: AU, S. Department of State press release was issued iden- ;
“tifying NOSENKO as a KGB officer and acknowledging his request _ : : i
. for political asylum in the United States, ; ; : 4

11 February: The Department of State was advised informally ; :
by Ampassador DOBRYNIN in Washington that a Soviet note to be : :
delivered later would ask how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, | ;
request his release, and demand an immediate interview with him.

gation to the Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press
conference in which he strongly condemned the Swiss authorities
for permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be taken
to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

nin sue Sie estates Hho

17 February: S. K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Dele- |
|
{
t

: At simultaneous press conferences in Sern and Geneva, the |
: Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooperation and noted

! the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappear- .

i ‘ance and Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authorities in

locating NOSENKO.

fa Wate coed

The Soviet note predicted by DOBRYNIN was delivered to
;the State Department, and a noncommittal reply was given to
* Apparently no effort was made to notify Moscow immediately.
Special intelligence shows that no cable traffic was passed _ a be 3
from Geneva to Moscow from 1630 hours on 3 February until : ; 5
1900 hours on 7 February: at 1915 hours on the 7th, the

Geneva Residency transmitted a short top priority cable to
Moscow, Likewise, after one routine cable on 4 February, .
the Bern Residency sent no traffic to Moscow on 5 February.
Seven cables, at least four of which were of routine pre-

. eedence, were sent to Moscow.on 6 February; thereafter there :
was no traffic from Bern to Moscow until the early morning ., oan)
-of 10 February. . : : - 4


14-0000

‘ Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the

means of NOSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

. The Swiss Enbassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
order to obtain assurance that the defection had been volun-
tary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with Swiss.
and Soviet representatives in Washington as scon as possible, -

(NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 2130 hours this same
evening.)

13_ February: NOSENKO said he had no objection to talking
to the Swiss, but he would see the Soviets only if necessary.

14 February: In Moscow, Ambassador KOHLER was summoned
to the office of Soviet Foreign Minister GROMYKO, who read
him a «statement deploring the "evasive" reply of the State

- Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington and terming the

whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a "gross provocation
by American Intelligance organs." GROMYKO repeated the demand
for NOSENKO's immediate release from American custody.

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy, Jean-Louis NATURAL,
interviewed NOSENKO at the Washington offices of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service late in the afternoon.
The Soviet confrontation immediately afterwards was handled
by Minister Counselor G, M. KORNIENKO, second to Ambassador
DOBRYNIN at the Soviet Embassy, and Third Secretary V. F.
ISAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington. (ISAKOV had been a
member of the Soviet Delegation to the 1962 Disarmament
Conference in Geneva, where NOSENKO said he had first met. him.)
NOSENKO told both the Swiss and the Soviets that he had defected
of his own free will after careful consideration and that he
had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In response to
KORNIENKO's questions, he specifically renounced his status and
rights as a Soviet citizen.

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eeeetilenalbaiabin a eaintee

erindihein ett aiear ces ane


nN

42.

H. Reactions of NOSENKO's Family

Two women who said they were the mother and wife of NOSENKO
called at the American Embassy in Moscow on five occasions
between 24 February and 23 March 1964,* and NOSENKO, who on
the basis of physical descriptions confirmed their identities,
said he had no doubt that the KGB had directed them to do this
in order to pressure him to return. The women expressed dis-
belief that NOSENKO had voluntarily betrayed his family and his
country. They sought a personal mceting with him in the United
States or erywhere else, submitted letters for him, and returned
to the Umbassy to ask whether he had replied; the younger Mrs.
NOSENKO explained that she required some definite statement in
writing from her husband so that she could plan her own future
and thac of the NOSENKO children.

NOSENKC proposed to respond to his family's letters by
writing two of his own, one wnich would be intended for KGB
consumption and the other for his wife alone. The first of
these would state NOSENKO's irrevocable decision to remain in
the United States and to sever ail ties with his family and
homeland. The second letter would be read by Mrs. NOSENKO in
the Embassy, left there, and not reported to the KGB; in it he
would express hope for a reunion, ask her to wait for him, and
tell her to indicate her willingness to join him in the West
by writing either "yes" or "no" on the letter itself. Although
NOSNEKO prepared both letters, only the first was cent to his
wife; it was mailed from Washington to the NOSENKO home in
Moscow on 7 April 1964.

From March 1964 nothing was heard from NOSENKO's relatives
until mid-1966, when Yuriy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV,** a Soviet
journalist, visited Paris and spoke with representatives of the
French magazine Paris Match. KOROLEV indicatec that he would —

¥~ Only once before had members of a defector’s family called
at a foreign embassy in Moscow. Following the defection of
Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in England in September 1963, his
wife appeared at the British Embassy to make inquiries about
him. KROTKOV, an admitted agent of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, is believed by MI-5 and CIA to remain under
KGB control. o

** CIA records show that KOROLEV was employed at the Soviet
Pavilion of the Brussels World's Fair in 1958 as a photo-
correspondent for the Soviet publication Sputnik. He visited
Japan in 1963 and the United States in February-March 1965,
at the invitation of Life magazine, as a,photographer for
Novosti, a Soviet news agency. On the latter trip he was to

_ be accompanied; by Feliks Avramovich ROSENTAL, an interpreter
but no record of ROSENTAL's arrival is available. KOROLEV

is believed to be identical:waith Yuriy KOROLEV who, as of
1964, was employed part-time for the United Press Inter-
national correspondent in Moscow, Henry SHAPIRO. Both

NOSENKO and GOLITSYN have identified SHAPIRO as an agent
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate (see Part V.C.).

shednesall


14Q0000°

|

a re

‘Like to serve as a stringer for the French journal and proposed
‘that he begin with a story on the life of the family of a.
-"Sovtet secret agent." Ag KOROLEV spoke only broken French

and Enclish, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
matter at that time. ae

On 10 October 1966, however, KOROLEV again appeared at the . :
Paris Match offices, this time with one Feliks ROSENTAL who acted
as his - interpreter. He displayed a photo spread showing NOSENKO's

wife and family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and

he submitted a-one-page document in English which gave a short. | an

account of NOSENKO's background. The document said in part:
"NOSENKO's family consists of a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and
12, a mother and a younger brother. The family is not prose-
cuted (sic) but feel very badly about the incident {the defec-
tion). Very soon the wife will apply to the International

Lawyers Organization for a divorce and compensation. It is
possible that this case will be given much publicity. His wife
has not heard from him since he defected, but it is obvious

._ that he is still in the USA." The document, which was in no way

represented as coming from a Soviet Government source, also said
that additional photographs of .NOSENKO's family in Moscow could

' be obtained and that an interview with the family and with others

knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match correspon-
dernt.* :

* According to information available to CIA, a divorce from

a defector from the Soviet Union, who is legally considered
to be an enemy of the state, is granted automatically upon
the wife's request. There is. no known precedent for either
Soviet-inspired publicity or divorce difficulties in any -
previous Soviet defection.

moe Lo: peat to Ren,

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‘(See Pa

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Sa TT
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v

SETS MATCH

©

~~

submitted to P

ographs

-

Pho
Subject 's' wife, elder dauyhter and younger daughter (circa 1965)
SECRET

pe ndovmie ate oe ene

T 1 statment nearer mena MEE gmat Oe

14-0000

14.0000"

wea ater Bieter cities

Photogravh of Subject from Photograph of Subject from pass-
passport used for temporary port used on assignment to Geneva :
assignments to England in in 1964 (see Part III.B.2)
1957 and 1958 (see Part V.D.8&)

Subject (February 1964) “Subject's father, the Minister
of Shipbuilding (1953) ©

NT a

8

v

14-0000

lL. BY FRA constiive scurer
feouliive cource Lo ,
According to GPA, it was the “unanine ts
the KGB leadership and. of “KGB officers Quits wet eee
that “NOSENKO could do a tremendous amount of hern.co tae
KGB," and that this damage would be severe for “several
years to cone." As a direct result, QQ BeBe, new
rogulations were promulgated to increase kod opezational
security in Moscow and abroad.

In addition, the defection brought about the dismissal
from the KGB of persons close to NOSENKO and tue recall of
nany officers abroad -- GW ee es LR RE Baa Patan
©EEEM -- known to and presumably eompromised by NOSENKO, *

Five months after NOSENKO disappeared from Geneva, in.
July 1964, AR. Wpsaid that 15 KCb officers had already been
fired, Among them were GRIBANOV*4 and a nunoer of his depytics

*#* See Part V.H. regarding NOSENKO's relationship with
GRIBANOV.

4

ite

eae eet Dead

samara be

ink Maa ENo i boabasol be

Label Sase

Reeeotecy Te


’ ineluding cne General BANUIK Since NOSENKO was GRIBANOV's

ware’: :

personal friend and protege, stated it had been decided
that GRIBANGY should have been aware of NOSFNKO's plans and
ultimately responsible. @@Mgi@reported further

Seiad tect that GRIBANCV had been cismissed from the KGB
and the Communigt Party immediately after the defection, ad-
ding that GRIBANOV had personally authorized NOSENXO's 1964
trip to Geneva, despite the fact that he had received a sum-
Mary statement of NOSENKO's capabilities and activities which
contained enough" compromising material" to prevent suc —_
trip under normal conditions.*" @& pe 1k reported.
having learned that GRIBANOV was the chicr of security at TO
a military plant outside Moscow and is considered 4 "“nothing."*** : x
Others dismissed from the KGB included GUK and Ye.A. TARABRPIN, : ;
Chief of the 2ritish Department, First Chief Directorate. ****

a
we ibbe bap ote abbas...

eatin otares othe

ptemk tan alee He

ae According to NOSENKO in 1965, it was BANNIKOV who sup-
ported his candidacy for the 1464 trip to Geneva; as
far as he knew, NOSENKO said, GRIBANOV was not involved.
Earlier, however, NOSENKO stated that his 1964 trip had
been approved by GRIBANOV.

. wt
pate etait the Laeame G tee

*** Reportedly GRIBANOV continued an operational contact with
a Western Ambassador in Moscow until as recently as the
autumn of 1964. This is a type of activity in which
GRIBANOV was often engaged while serving as Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate.

1

ce cdoameae teaiaeda tht ands

“as#* In 1962 NGSENKO told CIA: "“GRIBANOV and I are very friendly i

socially and we have often caroused together unofficially...
He is very friendly and we often go out drinking together."
. Under interrogation in April 1964 NOSENKO was asked speci-
__fically whether he had ever gone out socially with GRIBANOV
after working hours. He replied that he had done so on one
occasicn and that TARABRIN was present at the time. In
February 1965 NOSENKO was asked the same question and this
time answered that he had seen GRIBANOV three times socially,
; most recently in October or:November 1963; TARABRIN, he saidy,
was the only cther person present on these three occasions; ..
all three outings began as drinking. parties .in Moscow res- . -
taurants and the latter two ended at the homes cf girls
NOSENKO had been asked to procure. Although 3 indicated
that TARABRIN was Chief of the British Department at the
time he was fired, NOSENKO said he had held this position
only until 1963, when he became Deputy Chief of the newly
established Service No. 2 (Counterintelligence) of the
- First Chief Directorate. Do Cote ..

~ TOP SECRET


bt 7 '
a

:
i
4
i
H
i
!
+.
Ye

z. & source

At the time of NOSENKO's defection, ES@eum told CIA in
1964, he was in training for an illegals assignment in the
West, but these plans were cancelled partly because of the
KO case and partly for other reasons not specified to
; mm One of his handlers informed Gam RB that the
NOSENAO matter was very scricus, that the NOB was on a
“najor alert" as a result, vad that all missions had been
halted to make readjustments. °

source

In Geneva at the time of NOSENKO's defection, Seyiae
reported to CIA that just afterwards V.S.MEDVEDEV from tne
Exits Commission of the CPSU Central Committee* travelled to
Geneva to speak to the Soviets stationed there and to Soviet
d- legates to the Disarmament Conference. MNEDVEDEV under-
scoted the seriousness of the defection and urged greater
vigilance against such acts. CewEERB also reported that
the defection caused the recall cf Nina Ivanovna YEFREMEYEVA,
a KGB secretary in Geneva, and arcng the Sovicts there it was
Tumored that some 60 Soviet officials then stationed abroad
would be transferred from their assignments in consequazice of
the NOSENKO affair. V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB cfficer with the

“Soviet representation in Geneva, speculated to

® that he had been completely exposed by NOSENKO and
efore would have to return to Moscow. Y.I, GUK , said
gues, who had known and reported on GUK for years, was
discharged from the KGB because he had recommended NOSENKO's
travel to Geneva, and according to one rumor, the chief of
the department where NOSENKO had been employed would lose his
job. (This would be A.G,KOVALENXO who, according to NOSENKO,
was Chief of the Tourist Department at the time of the de-
fection.) : 7

_* NEDVEDEV, a nGB ofticer formerly stationed in New York City,

to be one of those from the CPSU Central

was said SG% ;
Committee who conduct interviews with KGB personnel gotag
abroad. identified MEDVEDEV, then a Couns
selor at the Sovict Mission to the United ‘Nations, -as ‘the -

Communist Party organizer and possisly.a member of the KGB,

“but his role is not important and he works mainly. with
the Ministry. of Forcign Affairs." - re

oe

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TOPSEGRET

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ce lied int te oye Seb,

tae sirens ee

snes wetlilake coencalle.

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14-0000

4. KGB Handlers of Agents

. icon of uKO's defection was scen in FGB's:
handling of the scoject of 7 i reccived fron
NOSENKO and Buvias usic agent.*® n 31 March 1964,
‘was questioned cy two of the KGB CFtic . possible sur-
veillince and was asked to provide passport photographs so
: that “escape” documents could be supplied to him ana his
At this same meeting, the KGB officers announced that
was being put on reserve status for an nspecified periou
told him that this decisicn had iezen mad2 about two months
earlier (i.e., about the time of NOSENKG's defecticn). At the
next meeting in November 1964, the Soviet hanclers admitted to :
. MBthat they had "some connection" with NOsSM . Al- 3
thouj:. sOSENKO probably could not identify s a KGB Lot Jot
agent, they said, there was a poss bility th ew “what : , 4

A reflect

G

we [the KGS) are doing in Canada.” 4

Also, in Paris, Sergeant Robert JCHNSON was told of = 4

NOSENKO's defection by his KGB case officer and was instructed :

to destroy anything which could identify him with Soviet Intel- .

ligence. Although the Soviet told JCANSON that there was. 7 :

nothing to worry about, he was evidently disturbed by the de~ . i 4

fection, JOHNSON said.** . at - j

i 4

j 4

. + an {
i
|
}

vated pRISA teatiiti e Lede See

BT Sas NOY


14-0000

Pe iWaewNON@KGB ASPECTS OP-NOSENKO'S~£
A.” Introduction

The biography of NOSENKO is built largely upon his ownwatate-
ments ‘to CIA, but certain portions of it have been substantiated
(as well as contradicted) by other Soviet sources. Given first
below is the NOSENKO autobiography for the pericd preceeding his
entry into the #06, then follows a surmary of his statements
about his non-professional | life since becoming a KGB officer, and
‘Qtinally there is presented a review of what other sources have
said on these subjects... A separate section of this paper, Part V,
discusses NOSENKO's career in the KGB.

Be NOSENKO's Pre-KGB Autobiography

Although several other sources have since NOSENKO's defec~
tion furnished fragmentary information concerning NOSENKO's early.
personal history, NOSENKO himself has, of course, been the prin-
cipal source on this topic. He volunteered information during
the 1962 meetings, during debriefinges in early 1964, and under
interrogation in April 1964, in 1965, and in 1956.° These vari-
ous accounts are arranged in separate columns in the following
table, and. they are organized chronologically from NOSENKO's
birth to his alleged entry into the KGS. The first column in
the table cpntains statements which NOSENKO made during the June
1962 meetings in Geneva; these were taken from the transcripts
of the meetings and, for the most part, are in NCSENKO's own
words. The column headed "1964," derived from the April 1964
interrogation, reflects a number of changes in his story before
and during that interrogation. Most of the information given

' in the "1965" column was taken from discussions with NOSENKO,

mainly on his early years, by a CIA psychologist in May of that
year; however, material from the February 1965 interrogation

and from DERYABIN's interrogation in duly and August has also
been included when it was not covered in the psychologist's ques-
tioning: and when NOSENKO signed protocols certifying his state-
ments to be correct. The "April 1966" column is comprised of
remarks by NOSENKO in a signed autobicgraphy submitted to CIA

at that time. The final column presents the results of the.
October 1966 interrogation as they pertain to NOSENKO’s early
life. From column to column appear inconsisténeies and contra-
dictions with regard to dates and locations furnished by NOSENKO,
although in 1964, again in 1965, and most recently in October
1966 NOSENKO has said that he was "now" telling the truth. The
table shows where he has admitted having previously lied about
certain events and where he seems to have forgotten his earlier
statements to CIA about the occurrence of other events affecting

his life.

This tabulation of NOSENKO's autobiography concludes in
Part V.A., in which are quoted the various dates and circum-
stances concerning his entry into the KGB which NOSENKO has
given in 1962, 1964, 1965, and 1966.

crake tion The dere ead EE

d

we anand Ee Hey

4
al
4


June 1962.

- "I was born in
ay ikolayev, my father
worked as a senior
mechanic at:.a plant

fand took. evening

icourses. Then he

- graduated from the
SNikoleayev Ship-

"My father was
Bisent to Leningrad,
fto the Sudomekh
plant, a small
yplant in Lenin-
. grad. “He was at
qthe plant for half
fa year and then be-
came director.
lenis was 1936-1937.
Then he was sent -
[te the Baltic
Shipyard in Lenin-
grad as Chief En-
igéneer., He was
-pthere.less than a
¢ year." .

1964

Born 30 October
1927 in Nikolayev,
Ukraine, USSR, where
he lived with family
until 1934.

building Institute.” |

In 1934, at age
six, entered the
“zero” (anlevoy)
class, equivalent
to kindérgarten,
in Nikolayev.

.

Moved to Lenin-
grad in 1935,
where father was
first appointed
chief engineer and
later director of
Sudomekh, Lived
at several ad-
dresses and at-
tended several
schools. [Note:
Soviet press
stated elder NOs’
SENKO was chief

‘ engincer of “Se-

veral enterprises"
in Leningrad during

49.
1965

Born 1927 in Niko-

layev where father
wags a student at the
Shipbuilding Insti-
tute. Father from
simple peasant back-
ground, while
mother's parents
were nobility.

(May)

Entered the
“vero” class in
Nikolayev in Septem=-
ber 1934, two months
before his seventh

birthday. (May)

Moved to Lenin-
grad, probably in
Spring of 1935, At-
tended three years
of school there,
completing First
Class in 1935-36,
Second Class in
1936-37, and Third
Class in 1937-38.°
(May) 7

LI aera arene

April 1966

"I, NOSENKO,
Yuriy, Ivanovich,
was born 30 Octo-
ber 1927 in Niko-
layev, an oblast
center in the
Ukrainian Repub~-
lic of Soviet
Russia." .

"In September
1934, in Niko-
layev, I entered
the ‘zero’ class.
My father was
already in. Lenin-
grad, where he
was working at
the Sudomekh
Shipyard."

“Shortly there-
after he [father]
found an apartment
and, interrupting
my studies, I
travelled to Lenin-

grad with my mother,

I did not begin

studies in the First

Class until Septen-
ber 1935 as there
were no 'zero'

classes in the Lenin-

grad schools. I
finished the Third
Class in Leningrad
in 1939."

layev, the son of

October 1966
Born 1927 in Niko- |

Ivan Isidorovicn
NOBENKO and Tamara

Georgievna NOSENKO. -

Lived in Leningrad

from 1935 to 1938.

eae a lea a

‘June 1962

— "In 1938 my
father was assigned
“t0 Moscow as Deputy
Peoples' Commissar.
I}was only.a little
‘boy. In 1939 he
was appointed
.Peoples' Commiséar,
later Minister, of
6 Shipbuilding
Ihdustry and re-
mained such until
s death in 1956."

1964

50.
1965

1935-1937; became di- ‘

- yector of Baltic

Shipyard in 1938.]

NOSENKO's father

was appointed Pirst
Deputy to the
Peoples! Commissar
of the Shipbuilding
Industry and then

_ became Commissar.

Family returned to
Moscow, and NOSENKO
entered 10-year
school located on
Ulitsa Bol'shaya
Polyanka. (Note:
Soviet press re-
ported that I.I.
NOSENKO became
Deputy Commissar in
1939 and Commissar

‘in 1940.)-

Completed the
Sixth Class at
School No. 585..
Went to Sochi:- with
parents for vaca-
tion and was there.
when war broke out.
Returned to Moscow
the next day.

In 1938 the elder
NOSENKO ‘was named
First Deputy to the
Peoples' Commissar
of Shipbuilding and
the: family returned
to Moscow. NOSENKO
entered a school on
Bol'shaya Polyanka.
lle completed the
Pourth Class in 1938-
1939 and the fifth
class in 1939-1940.
(May)

NOSENKO finished
the Sixth Class at
the 10«year school
on Bol'shaya Pol-
yanka during the
1940-1941 academic
year. Then he
travelled on vaca-
tion to Sochi,
where the family
stayed at a “rest
home" of the Coun-
cil Ministers.
Learned of war's
outbreak on the _.
radio while there

April 1966

"In 1938 my
father was summoned
to Moscow and he be=-
gan to work in the
Peoples' Commissariat
of the Shipbuilding
Industry. Having
finished the Third
Class, I moved to
Moscow with my
mother at the end
of the summer.”

"In 1941 I completed
the Sixth Class at
the 585th middle
school and went to
Sochi for a vacation.
with my father and
mother. On 21 June,
during our vacation
in the south, the war
began and for this _
reagon my parents and
I returned to Moscow
the next day."

y


wee AH

, "I studied
irst in a school
Of the Navy.
There I sailed
aboard boats and
(No
Mate given.)

“June 1962

1964

Enrolled in
Moscow Special
Naval School, but
studies did not be-
gin in Moscow be-
cause cf the war
and immediate plans
to evacuate the
school. In Sep-
tember 1941 NOSEN~
KO spent one week
digging trenches
with a group from
the school, and cn.
10 October he
travelled with the
rest of the school
to Kuybyshev.

There ha began his
studies in the
Seventh Class.

In June 1942
completed the
Seventh Class at
the Moscow Special
Naval School in
Kuybyshev. Re-
turned to Moscow in
July with about
three other boys
from the school.
Prevailed on father
to allow transfer
to “real military
school" and enrolled
in the Leningrad

51.
1965
and returned to

Moscow the next day
by train. (May)

Enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval
School which was
evacuated to-Kuyby~
shev, attended the

°1941-42 school year

in Kuybyshev.
(May)

In summer 1942
returned from Kuy~
byshev to Moscow on
leave. While there
somehow learned
that Special Naval
School to ba moved
from Kuybyshev to
Achinsk, Siberia.
Did not want to go
so far away from

home, so enrolled in
Leningrad Naval Prep
School, Baku. Spent

April 1966

"In October 1941
my mother and I
were evacuated to
Chelyabinsk, where .
I completed the
Seventh Class in
June 1942." (Note:
NOSENKO here added
a year to his life
which he had not
mentioned earlier.
To accommodate this
change he subtracted
a year from the
time he spent at the
Naval Preparatory ~
School in Baku.
below. ] 7“

See

"I completed the
Seventh Class in
Chelyabinsk. In
the beginning of
the summer of 1942
I moved from Chel-
yabingk to Gor'kiy
and soon after this
returned to Moscow.
In Moscow I was ac@-
cepted in the Spe-
cial Naval School
which in August
1942 was evacuated
to Kuybyshev. There

October 1966

Went to Chelya- |
binsk from Moscow in ~_
1941, after the start «
of the war. :

Was in Gor'kiy for... -
a time in the summer ' .
of 1942.

. {gine 1962

1964

Naval Preparatory
School which had
been evacuated

from Leningrad to
Baku. Spent summer
vacation at home in
Moscow with parents.

After 3 1/2
months in Moscow,
left by train for
Baku with a group
of about 30 other
students in Octo-
ber,. The trip
lasted 14 days. .
Route not recalled.
Arriving in Baku
joined Prep School
and spent about
a month in “quaran-
tine." Then as-
signed to the Ninth
Training Company,
in the Third Course,
equivalent to the.
Eighth Class. —
(Note: The loscow-
Rostov railroad
line was cut by the
Germans by this
time.
sible route at this

time would have been

The only pos-

$2.
1965

summer with parents
in Moscow. (May)

Went to Baku by
train in October.
Trip took two weeks.
Spent first four to
six months in Baku
in "quarantine,"
which was similar to
American bodtcamp.

‘Enrolled in the First

Course, equivalent
to the Eighth Class.
(May)

a long and circuitous

one via Tashkent i

April 1966

I entered the Eighth
Class."

{In Kuybyshev; see
above entry.]

ne eet ts

October 1966


June 1962

OER R ET etn agter

1964

Took military
oath, [Note: NO-
SENKO was 15 years
old at this time,
by law too young to
take oath. This
point stressed in
April 1964 inter-
rogations.}

Completed Third
Course (Eighth
Class) in June
1943. Took no
vacation but spent
summer working at
the school in Baku.
In September 1943
began new school
year in the Second
Course, equivalent
to Ninth Class.

Along with 15 or
20 classmates, a
NOSENKO .submitted a
collective letter .
asking to be sant

sony cytes genet ane aepee

bee Sa
53.
1965

Took military
oath at end of
"quarantine" period.
Oath administered to
make boys feel a

‘part’ of service al-

though too young.
Oath taken between
15th and 16th birth-
days, i.e., after
October 1942 and be-
fore November 1943.
NOSENKO certain he
celebrated 15th
birthday in Baku in
1942. (May)

Completed First
Course in June and
spent summer of 1943
at school. Entered
Second Course at the
Naval Prep School in
Baku in September
1943. (May)

.- Since 1942 NO=-
SENKO had had an
“obsession” about
getting into the
war. Students from

April 1966

[Studying in
Kuybyshev., See
above entries.) _

[Completed |
Eighth Class in
Kuybyshev.]

"During the summer
of 1943 I returned
to Moscow on vaca-
tion. The Special
Naval School was to
be evacuated from
Kuybyshev to
Achinsk and there-
fore, not wanting —
to go to Achinsk, I
enrolled in the
Naval Preparatory
School in Baku.

"While at the
Naval Prep School
in Baku, in Octo-
ber 1943, I joined
the KOMSOMOL.”

October 1966

"I took the mili-
tary oath in Baku.
time. This was in
1943,"

1
was 15 years old at the

[No month: given; )}

TE Mie hema mene cea Minin ritgeeplnnien, SRS Dit ae Pate 28) oo. a

et ee etek Anemone paren


" June 1962

wemenere pean miatems 4yesé +

fh

1964

to the front be-
cause they had
heard that stu~
dents at the Frunze
Higher Naval School
had gone. Request
caused an uproar

'. and investigations.

Permission denied.

Joined KOMSOMOL.:

- In January, to-
gether with class-
mate Yura RAD-
CHENKO, NOSENKO
went to the city
military commis-
sariat in Baku to
inquire about
joining a Marine
detachment. They
were turned down .
and thereupon ran
away from the Naval
Prep School. Tra-
velling by boxcar,
the two went to
Stantsiya Lazarev-
skaya via Tbilisi
and from there
walked to Tuapse in
search of the mili-

semanas yee agate ae

$4.
1965

April 1966

the Frunze Higher
Schuol had gone to
the front in 112
and some of the
older boys at the
Prep School went in
early 1943. Fired
up, NOSENKO and
about eight others
filed a petition to
be allowed to fight.
(May)

{See above entry.)

"I studied in Baku
only for half the

‘After receiving a
scolding from school
authorities for school year because
having submitted the I ran away from:
petition, NOSENKO and school, home to Mos-
several other boys cow, in the begin-
began to plot to run ning of 19441"
away to the front.

When the time came in
early 1944 only one

other boy, RADCHENKO, .
would accompany him. '
The two slipped out

of school, made their

way to the railway.
station, and found a
freight train heading
toward Tuapse. On
arriving in Tuapse

they were arrested

almost immediately

ton Se pees

October 1966. |

The story about

' going to or toward
, the front was a lie,
“NOSENKO said.


ne ise punter np yrmnnen + foe tyne agente gt rte

ae Petpet abel dee ee seme ie ee eee

ee

~ $5.

June 1962 1964 ‘ 1965 April 1966

tary front. Ar- at the station, sever-

riving in Tuapse, al days later they

they were arrested were returned to Baku

and were then re- where they managed to

turned ‘to Baku under escape. They then

guard. In Baku, travelled to Moscow

they managed to es- using: false documents .
cape again before and were arrested at - :

being returned to the:the train station on
Prep School. After arrival. (May)
hiding a few days at

the home of a girl~

friend, NOSENKO and

RADCHENKO travelled

to Moscow by train,

using forged docu-

mentation obtained

by a friend in the

Naval Prep Scheol.

They were arrested at

the Moscow Railroad

Station by military

police who had been

alerted by authori-

ties in Baku. ‘NO-

SENKO's father bailed :
him out. (Note: 1
Previous accounts ‘
varied widely. NO- '
SENKO originally said

he had participated

in the battle for

Novorossiysk with his

entire class from the

“Prunze Higher Naval

School." This battle

actually took place in

September 1942. Ona

later occasion, NOSENKO


14-000008 +
i

Seg Te rewetapeete ro ceroengpe ere

1965
said that he and

‘RADCHENKO saw com-

bat near Tuapse.}

Took Ninth Class
exams after stucying
as an "external stu-~-
dent" at the Gorniy
Institute in Moscow.
Passed these and
through father's in-
fluence was trans~—
ferred back to the’
Naval Prep School,
which had just moved
back to Leningrad
from Baku. Tra-
velled to Leningrad
to join his class in
September.

Studies did not.
start at once. NO-
SENKO and others
lived in Narva and
worked in the woods.

56.
1965

Did not want to
return to Baku as
ashamed to face class-
mates after failure
to get’ to front. Re-
mained at home and
attended adult educa-
tion courses at Gorniy.
Institute and had
special tutors in math
and Russian grammar.
Finished Ninth Class
in spring or summer
and travelled in fall
to Leningrad to rejoin
class in Prep School.
(May)

Arriving in Lenin~-
grad NOSENKO was as-
signed to a group
made up of stragglers
and was sent to the
forest near Lenin-
grad to cut wood for
the winter supply at
the school. Condi-
tions were terrible--
the work was hard and
the weather was cold,
camp, and miserable.
(May)

April 1966

"In Moscow I
finished the Ninth
Class as an exter-
nal student at
Gorniy Institate

and at the end of
the summer of 1944...
was enrolled in the
Naval School in Len-
ingrad and travelled
there in the month
of August.”

—, i -

(ee BENS aa


ee
. S7. :
1964 1965 April 1966
Studies in Tenth About three or

Class of Naval Pre~ four days before the
paratory School com- boys were to return
manced in November to Leningrad a car.
1944. : was sant for NOSEN- .
KO. 52 returned to
Leningrad to stay
in the HBotol Astoria -
with his father who
was wisiting with a
' delegation. After
this he went back to
achool, somatime in
Movember. (May)

At the end of Somatime- in Febru- "In the be-
April 1945, NOSENKO ary or March, a fé- ginning of 1945 1
was chot in the Hand mele acquaantance of accidentally shet
at a party by a = an unknown Wavy offi- myself through the
jealous ycurg offi- cer-began to flirt hand and spent
cer and was hospita- with NOSENKO. The of-about a month re-

lized. In the ent. £icer became angry, cuperating in the |

suing investigation drew hia gun and shot Navy hospital.°

he protected the NOSENKO through the

real culprit by pre- hand. The officer

tending that he had was apolegetic, and

shot himself acci- NOSENXO promised ‘not

Gantally vhile to report the inci-e

Cleaning @ gun. He dent. Tho wound

maver aayw the offi grew worse, however,

cer again, ; and NOSENXO was forced

' to enter tha hospital.

Ha told tho docter
that be had accident-
ally shot ‘himself with
@ souveniec: gun. He
was hoapitalized for
about three weeks.
(May)

ipdmre cee miaens  one aninenaettemmaeace RRQETR ATER ASET net ~evtyengme ame

NOSENKO shot him-
self through the hand. -
@his.was absolutely ac-
cicental and was not
an attempt to avoid

‘military duty. [Notes

NOSENKO made this state=

- ment in response to

a direct question. The.

question was based on
& report from epaa

> source CQVETE that

NOSENKO shot hinsel£

to avoid being sent to
the front while at=-
tending a “naval college
in Leningrad in 1942,°]


1944

June 1962

"I finished the
Naval School, then
was in the Navy. I
fought," (boyeval--
presumably in World
War II). “In 1945
I was demobilized."

perl

1964

While in the hos-
pital, NOSENKO ap-
plied for release
from military ser-
vice. This was as-
sisted by father's
friends. After
release from the
hospital he did not
want to return to
school. He called
his father and then
spent a week with
friends of the
family in Leningrad
before getting a
room in a dormitory
at the Leningrad
Shipbuilding Tekh-
nikum. Despite
failure to return to
the Naval Prep
School, NOSENKO was
erédited with satis-~
factory completion
of the school year
(Tenth Class). In
June he passed the
exams for the Second
Course at the Ship~
building Tekhnikum.
He then went to the
District Military
Commissariat and was
demobilized. He
received his mili-
tary reserve regis-
tration and a certi-
ficate of satisfac-
tory completion of

tee

Stn ersten ERVIN TnnETE RSE ot

In the hospital
NOSENKO decided he
could not return to
school as he was
asha:ed of the type
of girls he had been
with the night of
the accident and
could not stand the
thought of being
made an example of
by the school KOMSO-
MOL organization.

He left the hospital
in civilian clothes
and stayed with a
friend of his father.
He obtained a state-
ment: that he had
attended the Naval
Prep School, which
was just a report of
his courses and an
average of his marks
up to that time. Ags
the son of a minister
it was then easy for
him to enter the
Shipbuilding Tekh-
nikum whefe, with
special tutoring, he
was able to complete
the Tenth Class in
the summer. (May)

April 1966

"After this (hand

shooting] incident I.

id notcuwant to go
back to the school
and began to study
at the Shipbuilding
Tekhnikum in Lenin-
grad, in the Second
Course, in order to
complete the Tenth
Class. In May or

June 1945, with the _
help of the Director -

of the Tekhnikum, I
received documenta-
tion certifying that
I had completed the
Second Course which
made it possible fpr
me to enter the In-
atitute fof Inter-
national Relations]
and I returned to my
parents in Moscow."

SORE Maa ORT

eeemmemremen cm ae nate ry

ae 4


Huss pnemcen inte nage ain: omar erp nee meee egwyne erat

59, |
June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966

ten year's schooling.
(Note: A biographi-.
cal statement was
drawn up on the basis
of NOSENKO's state-
ments in January- : :
February 1964 and ap- so
proved by NCSENKO as
correct in February ; :
1964. This state . a - Be
ment said that he com- - : ne
pleted his 10-ear ed- . ; pps te
ugation at the Baku . ao uo
school in the spring
of 1943 and thereby anf
became eligible to 4
enter.a higher edu- . _ .
cational institution. ; Bo, fos 4

, . . ca

as

a Oar

sae beset 4

&

From 1943 to 1°45, the

statement continucd,

NOSENBO attended the

Frunze Higher Naval

School (a counterpart

of Anmapolis). After

three years there,

he decided to leave

the Navy, was demobi-

lized. and entered the

Institute of Interna- . '
tional Relations. In
October 1966, NOSENKO
said he had lied about
attending Frunze Academy.]

Ts CHUB A alan AISLE. A ne ee

“After the war I NOSENKO decided NOSENKO decided he *In July 1945 I

went to study at he did not want to would like a career entered the Insti-
the Inatitute of study further at the in the foreign ser- tute of International
International Rela- Shipbuilding Tekhni- vice ard returned to Relations." :
tions...In 1945 I kum and returned to Moscow, where he

‘was demobilized. Moscow where he passed the entrance


14-D0000 *,;

emma yvagmeretteseser ems oe stamnummarcig eam eae on

Been bate eben te nee canine tee oo a4

be ze ; . 4 ‘ 60.
‘ a June 1962. 1964 1965 April 1966

fT ; passed the entrance exams for the IIR.
q examinations for (May)

the Institute of

International Re-

lations (IIR). The

exam consisted only

of a composition,

dictation, and a

pe oo Ean Dp ane ee GRA EEO MS RTA, amas iT Ig UNE RAED BAG A weed

interview. . : en

Travelled to Travelled to East oy ,
Germany with his Germany in August 1945 _ x
father who was with father's delega- : *
leading a delega- tion. Given tempo- ,
tion. For the pur- rary commission as oy :
pose of the trip senior lieutenant for an — ort
‘only, NOSENKO was the trip. Continued to : =
issued a uniform wear uniform on return, . ow :
and documents ‘even to classes at the er
showing him to be a institute. Entered in- 3
senior lieutenant. stitute on return from an

When he returned to Germany and chose to oa
Moscow he continued specialize in English . ee Te
to pass himself off language and U.S. area oo : ;
as an officer who studies for reasons he . : : ae .
had seen combat in could not recall. (May) ot ee
the war and eventu-

ally got into ee
trouble at the in- , : ao
stitute because of : ao Loa
this. Began studies ; : Pa tas
in Faculty of In- oo pe
ternational Law and > : oo. (ee
English language in : soe
September.

fe tee hee te

Ep eel ache e recut te


ot cits ar ane

June 1962

{NOSFNKO was talk-

about .his present
“wife.] "This is my.
second wife. I was
married before... I
cannot say that I

61.

1964.

Completed first
year at Institute
of International
Relations.

Began second
year at IIR.

Completed second
year at IIR. Com-
missioned junior
lieutenant in Re-
serves.

Began third year
at IIR. .

While studying
at the IIR NOSENKO
was dating Augus-
tina Konstantinovna
TELEGINA, the
daughter of a lieu-
tenant general.

1965

With help of tem-
porary documents used
for the trip to Ger-
many, NOSENKO managed
to exempt himself from
compulsory military
training during his
first two years at IIR.
When it was found that
his claims of active
duty were false, he
was commissioned a jun-
ior lieutenant in the
Reserves along with
his classmates. (May)

In third year at
IIR NOSENKO began to
specialize in Inter-
national law. (May)

"I was a friend
and companion of
TELEGINA for some
months before her

in connection with
STALIN's campaign

April 1966

“While I was
studying at the In-
stitute, at the end
I married -
father was arrested Augustina Konstanti-
novna TELEGINA, who
was born in 1929"

of 1947,

~ In 1947. commis- .
sioned a juntor lieu-
tenant in the re-
serves. Diu not under=
go any military train- |
ing. After complet- —
ing second year at
the Institute, began
to do military trans-
lations to avoid
military service.

‘

+

June 1962

can

1964

TELEGIN was ar~
rested by STALIN,
and NOSENKO married
Augustina soon
afterwards,-in about
November 1947,

| loved her a great
# deal,..The war had
( just ended. I

| wanted peace, I

f wanted a guiet

4 corner. I wanted
| someone to look
after, me...and

L 80 we became ac=

| quainted. We

. aw each other for
about two weeks.

pF Let's get married.
| XY married her.
That’s ail." [Hotes

NOSENKQ: did not +
| date this marriage a
¥ other than to im- .

fF ply it was richt

after the war;

4 it is included

| here to place it

in the context of

‘% later statements.)

Broke off mar-~

', rdage after several
months when he found
his wife in flax
rante delicto with
fer brother. The
two were separated,

§ who is lying with but not divorced, at

% my wife? Her older this time. {[Note:

} brother. well, I. As with other dates

' slammed the door, connected with the
left, and did not go TELEGINA marriage,

>~ aback. Never went... NOSENKO has been im-
_back. That was all, precise here: in

"One Monday...at
10 o'clock [ZX came
home early from
work). Suddenly I
heard--I. approached
on tietoe--What is
this? In my bed,

-

Segemrpaememnae eo ne ence oper

Oa ange eRe aye ote Leryn tee

ver aad Roa .
. » 62.02
‘os 2965~- April 1966
against assoclates

of Marshall ZiHUKOV.

However, we never

planned to marry.

After the arrest,

however, I decided

to marry her in .

order to show my :
strength of char-
acter. I cannot ree
member the date of ©
the marriage, which
was my first, I
think that it hap-
pened in 1947, but
do not know what
season or how long
after the arrest

of TELEGIN." (In-
terrogation Pro-
tecol Signed in

' February 1965.)

“Ona morning-- "I lived with my
I cannot remember the first wife until 1949,°
date or season, but
it was in the first : . .
half of 1948--I came
early and unexpected
from my studies at
the Institute of In-
ternation Relations +
te the apartment of my
wife's mother, where .

Y sometimes met my

wife, and surprised
her in sexual inter-

aihaiine mene aameindeetemrcmreenamaianeies .--<\-... cates

NN oe Mae ici Ee Nae eer ye

because she was
pregnant at the time,"
(Protocol signed
February 1965.)

err

eT EE . SES SRE In SEE new enn ennpnieeie Sree ane mem ape 1S yoy ommaneee ROUUnEE as ETD sot 7 P
. St |
. so 6 3 . .
June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 : October 1966 hy,
* Bye bye...Well, April 1964 he said course with her |
gf you can imagine my on another occa- brother. I walked
F horror.” [Note: sion that he found out without comment. : —_ |
Portions of the his wife with her The ‘next day I re- 7 . :
¢ tape of this con- brother sometime turned to our apart- . ayy i
? versation are un- prior to June 1947.] ment where my wife “ - ne
k readable, It is and I continued to :
& clearly implied that live together, al- : a : |
% this scene took though our relation- : / i
* place at NOSENKO's ship was strained. : . :
fown home.) . I stayed with her _ |
. : t
;
|
_
Completed third : f
ae year at IIR. ‘ a
. i
“A child was . - " Girl with hare
8} born who might lip and cleft a
. § have been mine and "palate born to TELE~ :
f who might not have . GINA. NOSENKO de- 4
A been mine. God cided deformity was a
¥ knows. There was ; due to her incest- :
-€ still no child when uous relationship :
f I left. Well, I with her brother.
£ helped out. I Subsequently gave
; gent money. That's his wife a little . ,
all. But I didn't . money to help sup- . :
f see either her or | port the child, but :
the child." (Note: never considered it Q
& NOSENKO provided no his. Marriage a
® date for the above.) : cooled still further, e

but NOSNEKO continued
to live in the apart-
ment. (May)


MRR EE Ieneet tortie ter eng eee any nate = . : ie:
serneefoenarmesre dino e ; e _ascomtiggeniieemengainonce

- June 1962 1964 1965 April 1966 = ‘October 1966 .
Began fourth year : 7
at IIR.
Completed fourth i a
year at IIR. : i
: a.
Successfuliy de- . ; ; fe ce
fended his thesis on : 7 . . a ; mos “ @ a
the subject of “Dip- : yo .: . Lo. r ) a
lomatic Immunity." ; et a, : ae uA OF
Completed English . NOSENKO was through Dts FE Se a
language studies. .with courses at the ; a
. Institute in January . _ th a) Ube.
1950 and had already : . 7 _ 2 EES ot
defended his thesis rn Ms Looe, Fat tee
on “Diplomatic Imnu~ : ; vos a aa Poa

nity." The last
half-year at the In-
stitute was relatively |
free because the
students were given
time to prepare for

the state exams which
were requifed for
graduation. (May)

In March or . Before taking his "In the spring The Placement Com-
April 1950 NOSENKO final state exams, of 1950 before mission sent NOSENKO
was interviewed by NOSENKO went before the beginning of to the MGB where he was
the assignments the placement board. the state examina- told he was not a .
commission of the Here they talked tions a personnel suitable candidate. The
IIR and was tenta- about his possible placement commis- xeason was for "little
tively assigned to assignments and al- sion was created at things. TI was drunk
the GRU. Ip May though no definite the Institute and several times, only an

1950 he went to the decision was reached I declared to it my average student, etc.” ,

ks tee


June 1962

Fadl oat thet atta

1964,

CRU Pevsonnel De-
partment for an
interview with
Colonel KALOSHIN

on the instructions
of the chief of

the "secret unit"
at the IIR.

SOON a tere ae rete

65.
1965

it was suggested he
go into the-Navy.
After this, but
before the state
exams, NOSENKO
visited a special
section of the Navy
Ministry to give
them special docu-
ments for a secu-
rity check. Al-
though it was not
stated, NOSENKO be-
lieved he was slated
for Navy Intelli-
gence. (May)

Sete ayes et cetacpernnne

cba le le en ne Nee oo

April 1966

wish to work in
some sort of mili-
tary organization.
Soon thereafter

the chief. of. the
Institute's svecial
section gave me a -
telephone number
and told me to call
it, The number was
K-6...and I rea-
lized that the MGB
was interested

in me since these
numbers belonged ~
to the MGB. I
called the aumber
and was told to
come to the MGB...
(at the MGB] con-
cered my bio-
graphy and my
knowledye of the
English language..
Nothing was said

about where.it was..

intended .for.me to
work....Later the

' chief of the In-

stitute's special

section told.me my..
qualifications were ..;
not suitable.for .....:

the MGB."

_ interrogators would

October 1966 -

NOSENKO said he did
not mention this
earlier because his

not have believed that — ne
the MGB first turned §° -:. 0°
him down and they later
accented him in 1953.

_ ay

| .

e]

te

ean te
a

Ei
ns

j


: °Y finishod
the Institute of
‘International Ree
lations in 1950,
after this 7

_jworked in the GRU
‘of the Navy.°

1964

Took stata
exams for comple-
tion of the Insti-
tute. Passed
three of them but
¥lunked HMarxisn-
Leninism. Advissd
GRU and was told to
call_back when he
had. his XYIR diplo-
ma. He was ailowed

. to take the Navy

physical exam,
which lasted three
days.

Passed exams. on
second try and re-
ceived diploma of
completion of IYR.
Contacted Colonel
KALOSHIN of GRU Per-

Genet: eat
f

| ESSE rene
4 68,

1965

Aiter failing
the stata exam
NOSENKO had someone
in his father's
office call the
GRU to see what he
should do. It
turrsd out that the
security check
would take a long’
time and NOSENKO
was told to check
back after he had
paesed the exam.
(May)

NOSENKO checked
back with GRU Per-
sonnel after passing
(May)

his exams.

Octoer 1966

April 1966

"During the _
summer of 1950, -
while the stats
exams were under-
way, I began to.
process for entry : , a .
into the Navy GRU. : : ee
My processing . sy : oe
took place through a . fae
Colcnel KALOSHIN, 7 _ *
the Chief of the
GRU Personnel De-
partment. Up
until March 1951
I repeatedly
visited the Minise
try of the Navy...
I ¢illed out
guestionairas in
duplicate, wrote
two autobiographies
end submitted
copies of my diplo~
ma.® [Note: NO-
SENKO in his 1966
autobiography did
not mention
having failed the
exam in Marxiem-
Leniniasn.)

nagtgiisehe ee ne

Dp Bees ao

"Z submitted
caples of my diplo-
ma to GRU Personnel.®
{See above entry.]
NOSENKO processing
for GRU entry.

Sempre rit ae r+

67.
‘Sane 1962 1964 1965 April 1966

Giploma, trans-
cript of grades,
and other neces-
sary papers.
(Note: Previously
in 1964 NOSENKO
stated that he
graduated from the sot ;
v0 IIR, which at that :
- time was a four-
year course, in
mid-1949 and "just _
loafed around" for . .
a year. He later ~ a
changed the com~
pletion date to |
late 1949 or early oo
1950. Then he ° . i : “a
_changed this to : |
| |
a4

aN atidape ter

Sete Sat wenn

say that he failed .
exams in 1949 and _ Y
had been forced to :
wait an entire

year before he

could retake them 4
in 1950, Finally oe,
he gave the version ;

above. ]

“When they of- Entered on ac- In the autumn of {See abové entries.]
fered me [assign- tive duty with the 1950 received orders Still processing for =
ments in} Moscow, Navy on 17-19 Sep- transferring him GRU entry. :

% Leningrad and the' tember 1950, when from the Reserve to x
# Far East I took he recuived orders active duty. Offered z
a the Far East so. transferring him a choice of duty r
@ that nobody could from a junior lieu- posts, NOSENKO chose : j
F say that Yuriy NO- tenant in the Re- to go to the Far East . i

%.SENKO took advan-.. serves to a junior “in order to prove he

on oO 7 “. oe -
3 a er eee . RS kL) ate, ke ST oe od


14-0000 * +

June 1962

position.”

in
in-

"I worked
éthe field of
formation in the.

3Far Fast, in the
city of Sovetskaya
4Gavan...in the ;
ifield of informa-
tion-<radio inter-
fcept, etc. All
fyour movements,
fwhen you moved
[vessels to Che-
amul'po, Korea,
$the Korean opera-
ztion...we knew all
ithe ships there be-
fcause you talked on
- 4the air. You
}transmitted. We
knew each division,
fits name, its num-

Be ert Sele a
wee

1964

age of his father's lieutenant on ac-

tive duty. Re-
ceived orders to
the Intelligence
Staff of the Seventh
Far East Fleet,
(Note: In an eare-
lier version, NO-
SENKO said he en-
-fered the GRU in
1949, having fin-
ished the Insti-
tute of Interna-
tional Relations
the same year.]

On approxi-
“mately 1 October
1950 NOSENKO left
Moscow by train for
the Far East. The

“trip to Bukhta -

Postovaya (near
Sovetskaya Gavan),
where his unit was
stationed, took nina
or ten days. Ag-
signed to work in
the Information
Section under Cap-
tain Second Rank
KHAYTOV. Duties
included transla-
tions from Ameri-
can Naval litera-
ture and making
summaries of

American Navy OB in

pee uemenigge ee barge one Stee eee

“ages
“7 68,
1965

os

was now ready to
make a man of him-
self...in the country
God forgot." (May)

Arriving at his
duty station NO~-
SENKO was assigned
to the Information
Section. He liked
the work and did a
good job despite
the rigorous con-
ditions. During his
seevice here he rem
ceived special
mention as an out=
standing officer.
There were 300 to
350 intercept opera-
tors there. NO-
SENKO and other
officers analyzed
the take as well as
information received
from Sakhalin and
Vladivostok. (May)

April 1966

[See above entries]
Still processing
for GRU entry.

a

oo Dap OUD tbe Ete,

Gctober 1966

2 Ae ne scar meen stamee ony tae a:


 grengemmione er

. June. 1962 1964

Far East. There was
a unit involved in
radio intercept of
American Naval tar~
gets in Korean area,
but NOSENKO was not
personally concerned
with this work.

‘tha wa reported
this to Moscow. I
don't know what

‘was done with this

’ dhformation after

is. So, we were
eoncerned with

Aformation.”

Promoted to the
rank of lieutenant.

After about seven
months in the Far

eee

April 1966

~

"On 12 March 1951
two orders were is-

East, NOSENKO was pro-sued by the Naval

moted to lieutenant.
This was April 1951.
Normally one is pro-
moted from junior
lieutenant to lieu-
tenant only after a
year's service in
grade. This can be
reduced
in the Far East.
(3 May)

to six months

Ministry; one con-
cerning my enlistment
in the Navy and the
other assigning me

as a translator to
the Intelligence

Unit of the Seventh
Fleet (Military Unit
70176). The following
day at KALOSHIN's
instructions I re-
ported to the Moscow
City Military Com-
mission where 1 was.
issued my passport
and my voyen bilet.
The Commission also
issved me temporary
duty orders and tra-
vel documents. On

16 or 17 March I left
Moscow for my duty.
post. I arrived at.
Bukhta Postavaya at
the end of March and

.was made to obtain |

;, October 1966

"I lied when I: :
said I started in the ~
GRU in-1950. It was.
really March 1951.°
(Note: . No effort

a reason for this

lie or to question. :
NOSENKO on its im-
plications for his
earlier statements

about promotions, ete, )
"I was on active een
duty in Sovetskaya —~ us
Gavan~--Bukhta Posto-.- |
vaya from 1951 to :
1953."

. 438038 ddd

7
7

a.

June 1962

- mail to divorce TELE- planning to divorce

mepteags

ane alec Trae ree

1964 April 1966
began work in the
Information De=-
partment of the
Intelligence Unit
of the Seventh
Fleet.

NOSENKO involved
in apprentice work
in the Agent-Intel-
ligence Section at
Bukhta Postovaya.
This involved going
out to sea on sub-
chasers to pick up
and drop off, and
conducting meetings
with agents from
Hokkaido and Sak-
halin. NOSENKO did
not actually meet
agents, but was
merely along to learn
how they were picked
up at sea. :

Filed action by NOSENKO was

GINA in Moscow court his wife before he '
and published inten- left Moscow but did
tion notice in a local not start proceedings
Sovetskaya Gavan news— because he was afraid
paper in January or she would bring
February. charges against him
in the KOMSOMOL. .
Sometime in late 1951
or early 1952.he
published his notice


June 1962

1964

Left Bukhta
Postovaya and re-
turned to Moscow
on leave. Arrived
at the end of
April and reported
to KALCSHIN. Re-
quested transfer
from the Far East.

cet tne ten a AA

71.
1965

of intent in a local
newspaper and for-

- warded the neces-

sary papers to Mos-
cow. (May)

On 1 May 1952
NOSENKO's father was
to observe his 50th
birthday. NOSENKO's
two-ycar tour in the
Far East would not
be up until October
or November 1952, and
he was not entitled ©
to any leave until
it was ended. How=-
ever, his section
chief was very under-
standing and ar-
ranged for him to
leave in April’ so
that he could be in
Moscow for the birth-
day celebration.
NOSENKO flew to
Khabarovsk where he
had a “two-day
drunken orgy" with
another Naval offi-
cer. He then con-
tinued on to Moscow
in time for the May
Day and birthday
celebrations. The
next day he reported
to the Navy Ministry
and was told to re=-

tae

stone

“At the end of
April 1952 I left
Sovetskaya Gavan on
leave, arriving in
Moscow on 28 April,

Wap at ae war eamntn te

SRP ERNE agora ha a TEE ca a

. June 1962

fbr worked in the
ag Fast until 1952,
hén suddenly I

Fell i11. In the
Pag East. It was
this way. Then I

arrived in Moscow,
I went to the
doctor. They began
toixerty mee
Clear lungs,
lutely. They
examined ‘me one day,
t days, three
days. Clear, abso-
ltely clear. Then
bY accident, right
vooen my collar-

ne, a small, small,
rhund spot was.

ahso-

found and it turned
out to be on a
biocod vessel. It
thrned out to be at
avery early stage.
At that time they
had just discovered

streptomycin and I

was confined at
the Hertzen Sani-
torium near Mos-
w, - was there
lor two months. I
alt fine but they

1964

NOSENKS was on
leave during May
and June 1952 and
lived during this
time at the home ©
of his parents at
No. 4 Ulitsa
Gor'kogo in Mos-
cow. He received
one month leave
for his 1951 ser-
vice in the Far
East and the
other for his
1982 service
there. [Note:
NOSENKO did not
mention having had
tuberculosis
during any inter~-
rogations or state~
ments in 1964. Ac-
cording to his 1966
statements, he
spent only one
year, March 1951 to
April 1952, in the
Far East.)

1 ape samen sty apmeneg ntti

¥
ve
+1
¢

1965

turn at the end of
his leave for reas~
signment. (May)

NOSENKO was on
leave during May
and June. No de-
cision had been .
yeached with re-
gard to whether
he would return to
Sovetskaya Gavan
or not and he was
"at the disposal"
ef the” Naval Minis-
try during this
period. After the
leave, NOSENKO
waited another
month until his as-
signment was de~
cided upon. (May)
[Note: NOSENKO did
not, mention having
been hospitalized
in this period.)

cr neremmepneenr amg 0

April 1966

"while on leave
I became il] with
tuberculosis and
spent almost two
months in a sani-
torium near Mos~
cow." [Notes In
another statement,
written a week
earlier, NOSENKO
said that in
Sovetskaya Gavan
“adrunkeness and
the severe condi-
tions had their
effect on my
health and led to
an outbreak of
tuberculosis in
May 1952.")

NOSENKO confirmed
that he was at the
Herzen Sanitorium
during this period
and said that as a i
result of his illness —

-he was "coughing

up a half a glass of
blood. at a time."
His treatment con-
gisted of shots of
streptomycin.


fyuly-

ai

June 1962
gave me shots of
streptomycin every
hour for two months
and stopped this
disease at once.
After this I had
check-ups for five.
years, was car=-
ried on their books
until 1957. It was
nothing."

"They offered
me the opportunity
to study in the

‘ Military-Diploma-
tic Academy. I

oO aT eT Cesare Ee + biahoa y rape eee ce

1964

went and took a look

‘at the courses they
had to offer--Marx-
ism, Philosophy,
History, and so on.
Well, what did I
need this for? I
already knew this.
I said: .'No, I
won't go.'"

"after my ill-
ness and after the
Far East I received
orders to the Bal-
tic. On the Bal-
tic there is a city
which was formerly

a Te re .

* res

Following his
regular leave
NOSENKO was or-
dered by the Navy
to proceéd to
Berlin and Rostok,
but refused to go

. During the summer
of 1952 NOSENKO was
offered assignments
to the Military-
Diplomatic Academy,
to a special Navy
espionage school,
and to Germany, but
turned all of them
down for various
reasons. He re~
jected the opvortun-
ity to attend the
Military-Diplomatic
Academy because. he
had already had
96 per cent of the
courses in the In-
stitute. (May)

NOSENKO received

orders to Sovetsk and month of July the

"During the

NOSENKO was offered
an opportunity to
attend the Military~
Diplomatic Academy,

‘but did not want to go..

Besides, he failed the.
physical examinations.
for entrance when sugar
was discovered in his
faeces. NOSENKO drank
too much. Lo

NOSENKO. was shown
& map of. Kalinin-

arrived there in late Personnel Departe.: {gradskaya Oblast ~~

August or early Sep-
tember 1952. In

Sovetsk NOSENKO was
assigned a political

“7 wee

ment of the GRU
reached a deci~
sion concerning

the place of my

showing Primorsk to be
where he said Sovetsk:
should be located.

NOSENKO continued to ee


June 1962

the German city of
Pillau and is now
called Primorsk."
There NOSENKO was
involved in the
formation of
*“agent-observation
‘posts." Suitable
dandidates were
sg@lected from
among the crews of
‘ghips. They were
-then formed into
groups of three
men each and were
trained in radio-
@peration, daemon -
ation, etc.
fter this the
roups split up
d.their mem-.
ers wenl their
j@parate ways. In
ase of war the
groups were to be
eformed and sent
ehind enemy lines
In sabotase and
ntelligence mis-
gions. [Note:
The former German

SEER em maT re"

1964

74.
-. 1965

when he learned that officer's job and

the Naval Intelli-
gence Points (MRP's)
in Germany were
closing down

and that his final
assignment was not
definite. He then
tocx more leave
(unauthorized)

until about 29 July

,when he lefc for

y, gence Point

Bérts and ren
ported for duty to
the Intelligence
Staff of the Fourth
Baltic Fleet,

He was assigned to
a Naval Intelli-

camse

set up in Sovetsi,
a Saat town nest
Baltaysk. There he
prepared area
training materials
for and carried
supplies to agents,

but did not actually

deal with or train
them directly.
{[Note: Previously

helped train
sailors for wartime
agent missions.

His main task was
to prepare the
training plan for
the sailors, to
instruct them in
subjects such as
"The Foreign Policy
of the USSR," and
generally to see to
their needs. {May)

April 1966

further assignment
and I was ordered
to the Naval Intel-
ligence Point of
the Fourth Baltic
Flect Intell igenca
Unit in Sovetsk,
Kaliningradskaya
Oblast. Sovetsk

is located before
you go out on the.
spit of land where ~
Baltiysk (Pillau)
stands. I arrived
aun Sovetsk in
August 1952 and
began. to work in
the Naval Intelli-
gence Unit as a
senior translator.
Shortly before

my arrival the In-
telligence Point
had been moved

from Rostok, in
Germany, to Sovetsk.
(Note: It was
clear from NOSENKO's
earlier descrip-
tions that the
"“Sovetsk” which .NO-
SENKO described is,

r

October 1966

say that he was as-
signed to Sovetsk
in the summer of
1952. He was asked
why, as a son of a
minister and a& a

patient under treat=-

ment for tuberculo-
sis, he was not as-
signed to the Black
Sea or somewhere
else with a healthy
climate. NOSENKO
explained that there

“were no positions

available "elsewhere.®

in fact, Primorsk,
a smali village on
the coast. The
only place called
Sovetsk in Kalinin-
gradskaya Oblast

Gity of Pillay is during the April

now called Baltiysk,, 1964 interrogations

fot Primorsk; the NOSENKO said that he

a : : 2
atter is a small had received training

Fy near Moscow and was
then sent to Rostok
and Sassnitz before

wee


1400000 2

& No date given
for divorce.

1964

going to Bal-
tiysk/Sovetsk. He
then said this was

"a lie.and gave

the version above.
The reason for the
lie, NOSENKO said,
was that he knew
we “woulda't be-
lieve the truth"--
that he had suc-
cessfully refused
the assignment to
Germany. ]

In mid-August or
September 1952 NO-—

-SENKO returned to

Moscow from-the Bal-
tic for 7 to 10
days to complete
divorce proceedings
he had initiated

in the Far East.
This was not
counted as leave,
but as official
business, He then
returned to Sov-
etsk.

soca Spleen one permet

78.
19658

"Sometime ufter my
return to Moscow from
Sovetskaya Gavan, I
carried through with
my intention to
divorce. My di-
vorce was noted in
my Officer's Book-
let and nowhere
else. I turned this
document in to the
KGB Personnel office
when I began my KGB
Service and since
then have had_no re-
cord of the divorce.
I continued to pay
alimony to Augustina.
TELEGINA (one quarter
of my salary) until
I left the USSR in

April 1966

is about 40 kilo-
meters inland, and
NOSENKO himself ..
had saiduin 1962...
that he served.in
Primorsk. Pe

1


June 1962

‘(See next entry.]

"In the be-

the beginning.

3 ginning of 1953
3 - I came to Moscow

. [fron Primorsk]..
S was '53, in

1964

NOSENKO did
not like his work
in Sovets
and wanted to re-
turn to Moscow to
arrange for a
transfer. He
asked for annual
leave which the
unit commander re-
fused to give him
as he had none due.
NOSENKO thereupon
went to Admiral
GOLOVKO in Bal-
tiysk and with his
help obtained
leave because of
the elder NOSENKO's
influential po-
sition. NOSENKO
then returned to
Moscow shortly
before New Year's.

"TI arrived back
in Mescow in Decem-
ber 1952, just be-
fore New Year's. I
had vacation for
the month of Janu-

76.
1905

1964. She kept the

April 1966

name NOSENKO even after

she remarried.”

(Note:

This is placed here for

comparisoh with his
1964 statement. ]*

NOSENKO disliked
his job as a politi-
cal officer and was
disdainful of the

low educational level

of those he was

called upon to train,

as. well as of the
"whale stupid" pro-
gram. He remained
in Sovetsk only

until ecember 1952,
when he obtained
leave to spend the
holidays with his
parents in Moscow.
(May)

In January NOSEN-
KO and his parents
went to visit the
family of General
KOBULOV at KOBULOV's
dacha in Usov. NO-

"T remained in
Sovetsk @ Short time
and returned to Mos-
cow at the end of
the year [1952] witb
the aim of changing
my place of work...
While in Sovetsk I
received the rank of
lieutenant of the
Administrative Ser-
vice." (Note: See
1965 entry for the
spring of 1951.]}

"On 1 January 1953

my parents and I were

guests at’the dacha
of KOBULOV who at

that time was working
in GUSIMZ in East Ber-

NOSENKO was divorced from TELFGINA during his leave before ening to Sovatsk (Mav and June 1952). °

Layee ane seg ne rete eee parent

October 1966

“ENS dO

A?


ee ee OU TONES pee ete ee

©. ayne 1962
in January. Well

I came on leave to

Moscow, I was

there at my father' s

‘dacha, near Moscow.
‘KOBULOV came to
visit us at the
dacha...3 conver-
sation started.
He asked: ‘What
are you doing?'
I-answered: ‘I
am working in the
GRU...I came home
‘on leave.’ KOBU-
LOV asked: ‘How
do you like your
work?’ I said:
"Speaking frankly,
I don't." ‘Well,’
he said, ‘you
better come work
with us....Look,
drop in to sce me
for a minute some-
time.' KOBULOV.
was First Deputy
to BERIA and a :
Fetter friend of my
ther's."

0 dl tt AO

-964

ary. At the end
of January, at the
end of my vacation
I went back to GRU
Personnel and saw -
KALOSHIN...I told
him I did not like
my job, all that
typing, and he
saud: 8 ‘Well,

wait a while.

Look around.’ I
was at the dispo-
sal of the Person-
nel Department all
of February. I

had no work at all.
And since I was

_hot working, I

did not get any

pay for this month.
During this vacation
I was living with

my father and mother
on Gor'kiy Street."

"After. the New
Year I went to this
sanitorium, Kubinka,
78 or 78 kilometers -
from Moscow, and f
was there January

+ sty pares regimen carer mcenemgngeeTerr — ~asgmepers Lani”
ARR

“97,
1965

SENKO and KOBULOV :
discussed. NOS ENKO! 5...
dissatisfaction « —

-with his Sovetsk
assignment and KOBU-"

LOV suggested the

Ro ossibility of
OSENKO getting.

into State. Securizy”

work. = (Ma ay)

"IT met my [second]

wife [Lyudmila
KOZHEVNIKOVA). for. the

first time’at the
Herzen "House of
Rest," one of the

April 1966

lin with. the: WISMUTH
company,..This.was.the *

first time. I.met:

“KOBULOY;. ¢.don't re-
“member “how the ‘con-
versation came around

to me, but I told
KOBULOV about my
work in the Naval
GRU and my desire to

change my place of -4
-. work. He promised to
find me.a place .in the _.
MGB, but this promise

was ‘empty conversation. "

"From the end.of

January to the middle
of March ‘I-waes under

treatment ae the
Sanitorium near .Mos-
cow where I had been

er.

138038 dO

Teese een n ie ttt Pe tenant ears tse
: pe 3 ” .

78.

June 1962 1964 ; 1965 April 1966 October
and part of Febru- "Houses of Rest" of during the summer of |
ary. After that I the Council of Minis- 1952. Here I became =
was home." [Note: ters. I was resting acquainted with my te
This statement was there for several second wife, Lyudmila -
made on 8:dApril. days. She was there Yulianovna KOZHEV- .
As no attempt was too. It's about NIKOVA. . we
made to reconcile 65-70 kilometers
it with the pre- from Moscow, not far :
vious entry, made from Kubinka.° I
on 6 April, and be- was waiting for my
cause NOSENKO of- | status to be re-
fered no explana-' .solved...I didn't : :

‘ tion, both are want to stay alone

included here. ] at the dacha [his

father's]. She was »
studying philology :

in the third course. oof
at Moscow State Uni-

versity. She had :
been seriously ill . “
with tuberculosis

when she was 17 and

still required. treat- Lt
ments." (Interro- , 7
gation,.12 February

1965) [Note: NOSEN-

KO's explanation :

of his presence at '
the "House of Rest"

was given in response

to.the specific .....

question: "What

were you doing there?")}*

7
#
, ; eS
ay 1965 NOSENKO said: "I met my wife in a House of Rest. I had been at Sosno in January but didn't like it.

tried Dyatkino and met her.

See June 1942 entry: Red Star, on 14 January 1967, reported that seven "special naval schools" were. established
in’ 1940 in Leningrad, Moscow, Vladivostok, _Gorkiy, Kiev, Odessa, and Baku, There is no indication that any of

i
233

sandbags

+ ad tees
+
:
j

73. —— eo.
Cc. Personal Affairs Since Entering the KGB

1. Family Life

The Soviet intérnal passport which NOSENKO carried to
Geneva in 1964 confirms his claim that he married Lyudmila
KOZHEVNIKOVA on 27 June 1953. (They married approximately .
six months after he says he first met her at a sanatorium or. ~
“yest home" outside Moscow and about three months after he
says he joined the kG3.) Immediately after their marriage
the couple moved into the home of NOSENKO's new in-laws at
Ulitsa Serafimovich 2, Moscow, where they lived until obtain-
ing their own apartment on Narodnaya Ulitsa in January 1955.*
KOZHEVNIKOVA's father is Yulian Wikolayevich KOZHEVNIKOV, a
metallurgical engineer by training, who held the position of
First Deputy Chairman of the State Scientific Research Com-
mittee (GKKNIR) of the RSPSR at the time of NOSENKO's defec-

tion. **
NOSENKO said that he has two daughters by this second

marriage. According to his: passport, the eldest of these,
Oksana, was born on 21 August 1354’ and the other, Tamara, on

13 July 1958.*** NOSEUKO in 1962 displaved to his CIA handlers

a photoyraph of the two girls and their mother and made a par-
ticular point of noting the close physical resemblance between

ee

* On 23 April 1964 NOSENKO was questione? on the various
apartments he occupied in Moscow. He seid that, from the
time of his marr:age to TELEGINA until his departure for
his first GRU post in the Far Fast, he lived in an apart-
ment on Meshchanskaya Ulitsa. He gave up this apartment,
he said, in 1950, when his Navy orders came through.
Having made this statement, NOSENKO was then asked why
the 1951 Moscow telephone directory still listed him at

the Meshchanskaya Ulitsa address. He replied that he could
not explain but that he was considered to have vacated the
house in 1950. (He later said he movec to the Far East in

1951 - see Section IV.B.) NOSENKO then said that the

previous tenant at Narodnaya Ulitsa 13 had been one Nikita

ISHCHENKO. Although the phone then in the apartment was
switched to NOSENKO's name for billing purposes, NOSENKO
never bothered to have the change entered in the Moscow

phone book; he said that this would have required a visit

to a downtown office, the filling out of numerous forms,

etc.; besides he added, he did not use the telephone any~
way. Therefore, NOSENKO said, from 1955 until his defec-

tion in 1964, the telephone in his apartment was listed
under the name of ISHCHENKO. He has repeated this story
during subsequent questionings. The 1961 Moscow phone
directory carries no listing for NOSENKO; it does list

+ | JSECHENKO but gives his address as Krasnokholmskaya

i Naberezhnaya, not Narodnaya Ulitsa. . .

/ #& -@he GKKNIR of the RSFSR is now the GNTK. PENKOVSKIY worked

-under cover in the GKKNIR of the USSR. |

,##* | NOSENKO has also given his second daughter's year of birth
.- » as 1957.° In 1962. he told CIA that the older daughter was
~then studying in the first class at school; in 1965, how-

ever, he said she began school in the fall of 1962.

580th sD

q
4
if
s

A MARC Ra we wert teh


Oksana and himself. He said that he and his wife refer to her
as his “double” (kopiya). His wife, in a letter after the _.
defection, referred to Oksana as NOSENKO's kopiya.

NOSENKO's father; the Shipbuilding Minister, died of
stomach cancer in August 1956, three years after NGSENKO says
he entered the KGB Second Chief Directorate. The period of
time surrounding his father's death was, according. to NOSENKO,
a turning point in his personal and professional life. It was.
then that he "found himself" after an irresponsible past.
@rinking and wenching, and indifference to his work.

2. Venereal Disbasle

The incident which NOSENKO has most often cited as an
example of his irresponsibility in the period prior to 1956
involved his illegal use. of KGB alias documents to cover treat-
ment for a case of goncrrhea he contracted in 1954, at the time
his wife was pregnant with their first child.. The CIA psycho-
logist who questioned NOSENKO in May 1966 submitted the follow-
ing summary of NOSENKO's statements about’ this incidgent, which
are about as given earlier (during the April 1964 interroga-
tion): .

"A girl friend he had known in Lenincrad since 1945 cane
to visit relatives in Moscow in 1954. (She called him, and he
spent some time with her. She was not a prostitute, and he
had slept with her before, so he thought nothing of it. Later
he developed what he feared was a venereal disease. Since his
wife was pregnant, he was safe both from discovery and the
danger of infecting her. He searched frantically around Moscow
for a private doctor wnro treated such diseases, but could not

find one, Some of his friends at the office suggested a central

clinic that would require no documents. He went here but when
confronted with a request for documents, had the choice of
showing his KGB certificate or using a false passport he had
for business. He tried to talk the doctor into letting hin
go home to get his documents, but the doctor said ne would have
to be accompanied by a member of the militia; otherwise he
might not come back. He was required to take treatment of a
conmunicable disease. He was forced to give the false document.
He..came back for treatment about three times and was ordered
to report back in two weeks for a final check. They also
demanded the name of the girl, but he claimed he had only just
met her and did not know who she was. He forgot to go back
and a nurse visited tne safehouse about two times and left
a-note for him to report. However, he did not go to the safe-
house so knew nothing of the note. In the false passport was
a listing. of where the named person worked, a fictitious
_ factory. As the result of the clinic inquiries, the request
for information got into the hands of the section which made
the documents. NOSEMKO was called before the deputy chief of
the Directorate and severely criticized. He explained what
had happened and was given five days of house arrest. However,
the chief of his section had also gotten word of the infraction
and sentenced him to fifteen days of house arrest without even
talking to him. Ee told his wife he was going on a trip and
moved into the administrative room near the office to serve
his term, In the meantime, the Secretary of the KGB Party

+

TEP SECRET.

mn epnewrcenirenerpgrammeamani: sammie tenetnieenremren ieee! «
4
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3
3
a
a
t
i.

as dalam taaaad EOS ee A

tg
an
t.
£
wrattbte dianiden. widens

oa


8L.. :
eo

Committee called NOSENKO's father on the phone and told him
the whole story. NOSENKO's father never told either NOSENKO's
wife or mother of the incident, but did chide MOSENKO about

it. The incident was brought before the Komsomol and discussed.
A written reprimand for. immoral conduct-unauthorized use of
official documents was placed in his record. This was also

a final warning meaning that any other infraction would result
in expulsion. ..He made the statement that he had been punished
for this incident many times. He could not immediately apply
for party membership; the incident was broucht up repeatedly

in Komsomol-meetings and@ even in party meetings (after he was
accepted) as a horrible example; and it kept him from being
promoted from Senior: Lieutenant to Captain. (The Deputy-
Director who gave him five days was a member of the promotion

commission.) "

Although there have been slight changes and contradictions
in NOSENKO's numerous accounts of this story {the house arrest
Was variously reported as 5, 10, and 15 @zeye) it remained
basically consistent until the October 1966 interrogations
when he said for the first time that he contracted gonorrhea
from the girl in Leningrad in 1945 rather than 1954, In 1954,
he said, he again was infected, this time by a prostitute whom

he picked up in the vicinity of the Lenincrad Railroad Station
in Moscow. When the KGB required that he reveal the source,
_NOSENKO said, he ascribed the latter case to the original girl
‘from Leningrad. During the October 1966 interrogations NOSENKO
- also told CIA for the first time that he had had venereal
disease on two other occasions while studying at the Institute
of Internatfonal Affairs.  —-

He later began to "feel more a part of the KGB," and as
a junior KGB case officer, he personally recruited Richard
BURGI in the first successful recruitment operation ‘carried .
out by the newly-created Tourist Departmert of the Second Chief
Directorate.* “And in 1956," NOSENKO said in 1964, "before
my father's death, I was made a candidate for membership in
the Communist Party and, exactly 15 days later, was assigned

the rank cf Senicr Case Officer. I developed a pride in my-
self, (a feeling) that Ican. do things. Ycu know how it is.
When a person feels that he can, that he has some support,
then he works much better. ‘le has more initiative and so

forth."

3, Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

NOSENKO said that his formal participation in Communist
Party activities began in late 1943 or early 1944 when he.
joined the Komsomol at the Naval Preparatory School in Baku.
This step was a casual one, and he has said that he took it
without much thought, mainly because all his friends were

“4

* See Part V.D.4.b. for a description of the BURGI recruit-
_ ment operation. Until 1966 NOSENKO claimed to CIA that
he had received an award for his participation in this

operation. In the October 1966 interrogations he retracted

’ this and said that he never received eny KGB award for the
BURGI or any other operation. oo 4 -

4

j
:
or
4

{

- ot

ad

tat
4

4
4
4
H
q

be GRRL Say

‘

_'** See Part V.F.9. : : . ;
- ##*PREISFREUND: is disctissed. in detail in Part V.E.4.a..

82.

joining. When NOSENKO entered the KG3 in the spring of 1953,

he transferred routinely to the Komscmol organization there
and became Secretary of the Komsomol Organization of the
Second Chief Directorate. This was a small orgasization
consisting, NOSENKO thought, of about 17 KGB employees; he
remained its secretary until June or July 1954, when he got
into the trouble over illegal use of operational documents.
According to NOSENKO, “Immediately after this incident the
Bureau of the Komsomol was gathered, and I was immediately
removed from the position of Secretary." A week later, a
"strict reprimand" was entered in NOSENKO's Komsomol records.

In October 1954, on the eve of his 27th birthday, NOSENKO
was forced out of the Komsomol for over-age.* At that time,
the “strict reprimand" he had received several months earlier
was remitted on NOSENKO's petition, and he was permitted to
leave the organization with a clean record. He was not per-
mitted to join the Communist Party immediately, however.
NOSENKO described the situation on 15 April 1964 as follows:
“Yow I had to prove myself. Not being a candidate for Party
membership, I asked them for assignments to show my eagerness,
to prove myself. I also asked the Party Organization of the
Second Chief Directorate for some ‘putlic service' (obshchest-
venniy) assignments. I collected newspapers." For a year,
NOSENKO "made qood" by running errands and performing other
such tasks, until it was decided that he was suitable for
Party membership. He applied in January 1956 and was accepted
as a candidate member of the Party in June the same year?
full membership was granted in 1957. For over a year, from
October 1954 until January 1956, NOSENKO said, he had the
Gistinction of being the only employee of the KGS who was
neither a Komsomol nor a Party member or applicant.

4. Statements to Others by NOSENKO

Before giving CIA the foregoing details, NOSENKO had
talked about himself to several non-Soviets, including persons
invoived in cases which are reviewed in other portions of this

per. NOSENKO informed the recruitment target Horst BRAUNS
that he had two daughters.** He advised Ivan Ivanovich PREIS-
FREUND, a Finnish citizen used in the recruitment approach to
a U.S. Army sergeant in Moscow, that he was married, his
father was dead but his mother was living, he had served in
the Navy, and he had two children. PREISFREUND met the
"little girls" ard later reported to CIA that, although

““NOSENKO was a “woman-chaser," he loved his daughters very

much.*** With one KGB agent in particular, Arsene FRIPPEL,
NOSENKO was especially forthcoming: he told FRIPPEL of his

*. According to the Statutes (Ustav)of the Komsomol in effect

in 1954, the maximum age for a Komsomol member at that-time

was 25. On this basis, NOSENKO should have been excluded
in October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. When
this was explained to NOSENKO by DERYABIN in July 1965,

- NOSENKO replied that he was certain he left the Komsomol
in 1954 upon reaching the age of 27, that he was sure the

maximum age was 26 at that time, and that no special
exceptions were madé in his case. ; -

4
4
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4

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atabibSitisadn viet danni.

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PRT cr er ee

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14-00000

service in the Soviet Navy; he dwelt at length on his father's
work in the Soviet shipbuilding industry; and while using the
alias "NIKOLAYEV" with FRIPPEL, he mentioned that his father
had been employed in the town of Nikolayev. On one occasion
NOSENKO and his wife dined at FRIPPEL'3 home.* NOSENKO told
his recruitment target George DREW in April 1959 that he had
two daughters. mo,

p- Soyiets' Statements About NOSENKO

Portions of the NOSENKO autobiography have been supported .
and other portions contradicted by the statements of several ;
Soviets following the defection. The Soviets' remarks dealing
with NOSENKO's KGB career are reviewed in Part V.I., but with 3
reference to other aspects of- the background of NOSENKO:

- Letters to NOSENKO in Geneva from his wife (who i
later went to the U.S. Smbassy after his defection) in- oe 4
clude a reference to one of the daughters as his “double” q
und two other personal letters in his. possessicn at the :
time of his defection, Yu. I. GUK and‘G. I. DUCHKOV, ;
referred to visits to NOSENKO's wife add children, t

- A XGB officer in Vienna, Vladimir TULAYEV, told 4

a CIA double agent that NOSENKO, whom he knew well, came 4
* €rom a wonderful family, loved his wife and children, '
and earned a good salary. . TULAYEV later told the agent iH
that he had "friends who knew NOSENKO well. "** :

» © A Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, Feliks KOVALEV,
said to a CIA agent that NOSENKO had twice married, had
a good family background, was the son of a Minister in
the government, was notorious. for his “adventurous"
nature, and was "famous for his character."

j
|

- The Soviet Navy defector Nikolay ARTAMONOV said
he attended a naval preparatory school with NCSENKO in
1944 to 1946. (ARTAMONOV's description of the school
and of the dates involved, however, differs from

NOSENKO'sS. ensitive source

. - % reported NOSENKO is the son of a former i
Soviet Government Minister, attended naval college, shot 4
himself ta avoid going to the front with the rest of his
class, was graduated from the Institute in 1950, and
contracted venereal disease in 1950 but through his

i ‘father's influence avoided damage to his career. sensitive

£39 from conversations with fellow officers WESeiy He ~
has indicated that he does not know NOSENKO. : a

*FRIPPEL is discussed more fully. in Part V.D.5.

** In October 1966 NOSENKO failed to identify TULAYEV either . are
by name or photograph and said he didn't know him. - a


1400000

: a)
. : oo . gensitive source . co an
i = B said that when NOSENKO was a young man,~ he oo:
attended the GRU Military-Diplomatic Academy and then spent. -:
a short time, perhaps a year, in ‘the Information. Department. 5,
at GRU Headquarters. NOSENKO ted been a “very undisciplined. =~
Tee . person" while in the GRU and "not very good, "é con-
tee - tinued, and he was discharced from the GRU. However, his
oe father, an "influential person in the Ministry of Ship-
: building," was able to get NOSENKO transferred to the KG3.
GETS said he did not know NOSENKO personally, but
learned this information from "various persons" (unnamed) rn

eran .

in Moscow. : v

; . The thumbnail biography of NOSENKO which KOROLEV

: and ROSENTAL submitted to the editors of Paris Match in

ae _| .Q@etober 1966 (see Part III.H.) stated that NOSENKO was . .

oO “closely acquainted with the country's leaders, families. y
and homes" and that his “father who died several years ° : a
ago was an important official in the Party and state
organs." The document went on to say that "NOSENKO's . - 4
family consists cf a wife, 35, two daughters, 10 and 12,

mother and a brother (younger) ." KOKOLEV and ROSENTAL

also provided photographs purporting to be of NOSENKO's

wife and daughters.
source

% said she heard from her KGB friend
NOSENKO's father was a Minister or @
General of Ukrainian origin and that his mother was.Jewish
and “was always involved in some blackmarketeering." She
also said that she heard NOSENKO was a "civilian," not a

au!

ean iliamb tints Saliba ae

TTS

y. G. SVIRIN that

cee

4

. KGB officer, but was connected somehow with the KGB, (She i i
could not explain this connection other than to say that i 4

all Soviets permitted to meet foreigners are either ‘ » 0 2
officers or "relatives" of tha KGB.) : | a

! a

i 4

sedate


