176-10030-10422

| RECORD NUMBER
RECORD SERIES

FROM
TO

DATE

PAGES :

SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
: Unclassified

CLASSIFICATION

DATE OF LAST REVIEW

Document 1a.

AGENCY : .
: 176-10030-10422
: Sorensen Papers
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : .
: Schlesinger, Jr.
: President Kennedy
TITLE :
: 6/30/1961

RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
: 8/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

NARA

Memo to President CIA Reorganization
15

CIA

Memoranda

1c

Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA,

NW 49061 DoclId:32622644 Page 1

visible errors.

NW 49061 Docla:32622644 Page 2”

7 Ga balance, CIA's
ebout} are its errors.

‘judgment, is that th

es that thie autonoray is dus to three main causes: |
doctrine of clandestine operations; - (2) an tnadequeta conception of.

SECRET Se sanr7r2cb
VERSION ;
NUA-ENTING OF

; 7 ;
ARERBIC.C. afor

AQU

June 30, “1961

a MLMORANDUM FC. THE PRESIDENT

| SUBJECT: CLA Reorganization

I submit the following views ‘as one who worked in CSS during the
' wer and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

record has probably been very good. In the
‘nature uf clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence
agency are unknown; all the public hears about (or should hear:
But, again in the nature of the case, an
“agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned {sw ~
. The important thing to recognise teday,-in my —
the CLA, as at present named and constituted, ha
about used up its quota. Bs margin for future error is practically
non-existent. " Cne more CIA debacle wilh shake faith considerab!;.
in US ‘policy, at home ae well as abroad, And, until CIA is visibly _
‘reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely & blamed for
_ Sexelopmente of whieh it. is ) polly & fonocent. _ -


SECRET | \o

2.

-  esnception of the. reintionship between operations and intelligence..
.. The memorandum also suggests waye in which sems of these prob-
lems can perhaps be slevinted:

Me 7 . _ Lok CIA Autonomy
. . CIA. ‘conducts three :: ain forme of eecret work: clandestine tntelll- a

gence collection; co~ert pelitical operations} aod paremilitary
. activities, it carri:s a: these functions with relative gutenemy.
The reasoag for the autonomy are historical.

‘Whaea CIA began, the State Department, atill thinking tee mach in
: ‘terms. of its traditienal missisas in foreign affairs, losked onthic
">, new venture with suspleion and renounced the oppertanity to seize
. fiym contrel of CLA. aperations. ie did net, for example, tryto
establish any effective system of clesrance far CIA activities; and
_ some ambassadors trankly preferred not to know what CiA wea up to
_ lJ. da their countries. Aer 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and
the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers fsrther. confizmed .
‘CIA's independence trom eupervision by State Department desks.

THE DETERIORATION oo

“In the masutime, CIA grew in olae sind power. Daring the Sensis ie ee
_begha in some arese te cutstrip the State Department in the quality of
ite personnel. - ‘Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even |:
‘mere perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his peeple courageces pro-. hal
tection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able te attract and held
- ag larga number of adie and independent-minded men. The mere it-.
added brilliant activists to ie staff, the mere mementum ite opersticns

. y the time that State had begun to be fally swere ef the prebiens .
created by an active. snd sutoncmoss CIA, it had long since missed.
‘the chance to establish its. own ultimate authority, . While Btate re: TES

HW 49061 Docid:32622644 Page 3°...) ..-

2. SECRET. it Ao
oe ’

Yor its part. CIA bed developed a whole esrics of functions peral-
loling alyeady existing functions of the State Department, and of

the Defense Ceparts:.2nt aa well. Today it has ite own political
desks and military safle; it hag in effect its own foreign service;

it has (or bes bad) !:6 own combat forces). it even bes its own sir
force. Rs annual Vudget to about times that of the State Depart-—
ment, The contemporary CIA poseesces reay of the charactoristice

ef a state within & st2te. .

- Ih Deetrine

Theugh CLA's eutooway developed for histories] reasons, it has been
able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of ;
' > Clandestine cperationa, Tae prodlem of doctrine for CIA te the extent -
1 "to which its various clandestine missions are compatinie with a {rec
j 7 and open society. uo,

It ig idle to argue that, becauee the Communists can do such-and-sech,

__ we are freo to de it 1990. Communism is a ‘creed nurtured in con- 7
Spiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and pelitical orga:.i-
sation is to make couspizacy effective. If ‘fighting five with fire’ means
contracting the {recaoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order

_ to give more freedo:s to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet

I do. not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits .
which the meintenance of an open society places on secret activity.
Untll thie te done, CIA's role will sot be clearly defined and under-
stead, The proble:n which must be faced is: what sort of eecret
activity is consistent with the preservation of a free secial order’

~ We must begin, ! beliove, by accepting the tact thas the United States .
. will continue te be a astion in which politicians will ask questiens and
-. Make speeches, repostere will dig out stories, newspspers will ane -
--° lish editorials, individuale, driven by promptings ¢ of censcience, wil
“hee bears’ out things ‘harmful to the etate, and so on... Ye de not wied i
”) change these things and could not do so without violating the essence
'! ef our society,. Thege things make up the framework in which ClA-
'| lamust operate. - In ahort, they constitute the preblem; aod, as 2
: General Marshall used to @ say. “There's no point in * Highting the -
problem, " oan es

awe sane WanVa. PRI AA Dane 4

SECREN
\ew

. Thess fellows from ‘ala, I would think, the conclusion that secret
_ gstivities are permissible go long a9 they do nat corrugt ihe
, principles and practices of our society, that they cease to be
. ; permissible when their effect ia to corrupt these principles and’
eer practices.

Rach form of secre: activity presents ita own problem. Clandestine
intelligence collecti«:: hae been a traditional function of the national

etate. Hs rules and usages are fairly well established, In the

main, esoionsge, if <ouducted with discretion, should present no.

- great problem. Howsver, when conducted with an open checkbook

and a broad mandat+ even espionage can begin to push agninet the

limits of secret activity in an open society. I censider later, for
example, the questica of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and .
whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other acs wos
ox | the government. . a

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions
_ arise when it is necessary to subsidise newspepers, politicians anc
organisations in other countries. But corruption of the pelitical life —
of another nation ie not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I
wendaz whether CLA \ae set'dene toe much of thle for the Joy af it.
Paramilitary ectivities create on even more difficult problem, if .
ely because the problems of concealment are se mech more difficult.

In general, I would suggeet that any secret operation whose success is

' depencéent on the suppreesian of news, on lying te Congressmen and

journallets and on the deception of the electorate sheuld be undertaker

only when the crisis io so considerable that the gains really seer to

_° outweigh the disadvantages, Thie suggeste that the sise of. the pro- - oo
- posed operation may be cf crucial importance. - Small operations can

| “be done with a minimum ef accompanying corruption. The greater, = =~
" the visibility of the operation, the more ite success depends on 7

si eae ts uclonioa, wa ac’ aaee wagons b to tact om enews

ee "ease be made for ite necessity. —

Ia short, “vies eutsoated with 2 proposed operation, we must not |
“<gek whether the operation is technically feasible ta ite own terms;
hice userpage ee oe
__fertone way falee to Hie own principio’ we

ww AONE1 Nnata-29699K4d) Pane 5

——

i
,

«

4
i=)
and
Ke
a-4
=
o
Yoma
H 4
ul
Ee
et
[='
w
x.
=
So

+ en,

FRIST a ceke

{PHOTOCOPIED SY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY QUE T

‘
Wer 4qanez4

“ OF THE ORTGINAL

SECRET \o
. 5, Ww

I, Cperations and oliey

Clandestine activitie should be assessed not only in the context
of their relationship wo. pan society but also in the context of thei:
relaticaship to United States foreign policy. ;

“CLA operations have wot been held atfeccvely subordinates to U.S
fereign policy.

1. Clandestine :ctelligesce collection is, by charter, free fror.
State Degertznent comtrel, This fact expeses American foreign policy
to a muitituds of ombarrassments when CIA is discovered recruitin,
agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent
Singasore case, when CLA, without netice to the Consul General,
tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore
Police provides ac instructive example. After complications of

. ludicrons complexity, incisding an attempt to subject the recruit to

a le-deiactor test, it turned out thet the recruit kad long since
informed his superiors of tha CIA approach and wes leeding CLA

inte a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable emberrass-
ment to relations batween the US and the Singapore government.
There have been troubles of a comparabic sort in Pakisten and in
Japan (where a group of Chiness Nationals were smaggied into Sascho
to work in a CIA-NSA operation). ‘

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embsesy nor the Dopaz<-
ment in Washington is normally informed of this type of eperation.

in short, no one knows how many petential probleme fer US foreign
peliey -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are
being crested at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations.
Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the
advantage to be gained by the cperation (oe. g,, the information derivsti»
‘from en agent within the Special Branch of the Singspore Felice) out-
weighe tho riek (0, g., exasperating the iccal government and shekir;
ite confidence both in our purposes and in cur ecnse}, Clandestine

” intelligence operations should plainly de cleared beth with the Depart -

suent of State aad (eave for oxceptionel inetances sad on agreement of
the Secretary of State) with the local U.3, Ambessadcr,

Nanla-2IKIIRAA Pace

6. Ne

“a

2. Covert politival eperations technically require State

Department clearancy. In practice, however, ClA has often been
-able to seiso the initiscive in ways which reduce State's role almost
to that of 3 rubber eth

; Thia hos been partly : ue consequence of the superior drive and
activism of CLA pers-unei, especially as compared with the difficec.cz
of State Lepartrcert persornel. For example, when men come to C14
with the assignment ut developing cevert political campaigne or
organising coups or preparing for peramilitary warfare, these men
naturally fall to work with ingeavity and seal; they probably feel that
they are net earning their pay uniess, cay, they organise asf many
coupe na possible, The coacopt of ‘contingency planning’ has
legitimatisec the concrete preparation of gpereticns sti) presumahi;
in a hypothetical stage: people did not at first notice that ‘contingecy
iplansing, ' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of
personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contin-
gencies into apparent necessities, Thus, if a group is assembled
and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the
project through (it ls ergued) will invite the disappointment and
alienation of the greup; eo the pressure increases te follow through |

Toration} = 7 ae

THE DETER

To!

‘Es on what bad stasted 24 # pure apeculation. Thies was a central factor,
a= of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the
a3 Cuban force in Guatemala just seamed to exeete toe many problems and
3.S embarrasomente. Having entered inte reletions with persenalitico i=
Su foreign lanés, CIA has sometimes eaomed te feel that we must thors-
ae after do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security
og oF even go over to the Communists. This spproach hes mede us ox |
EEL. oceasien the priscnero ef our own agents. ¢

-" 9We become prisoners of our agente ia anether eenge too. The Cuba;

' episode leaves the strong impression that CLA le not able to control its:

. own low-level operatives. ‘While the CIA people in Weshingten are Foc

vias of exceptionally higk quality, the mea sttracted to Meld jobs are aorzc

a ‘times tough and even vielous peuple mativated by drives of thair ov

- |” gnd not necossasily in political or even moral eympathy with the purpuse
: "ef the operation. . Sach actions ag locking up the Revelationszy Cousci

: ..aueb enterprises as. Cperation 40 in Miami where C1A agents report et.

” aaa: - ot Le . pelt. : .

.{PHOTOCOPIED gy

W 49061 Docla:32622644° Page. 7

Wir Aank4

GINAL,

’ OF THE ord

 .. \a

it has meant too the ihe State Department, often spprised of an
operation only in its ater stagee, is under great pressure to

endorse the operatic. ac already mounted becauce af the alleged

evil consequences a exercising aveto. | well remember Tom
Mann's remark the way the decision was made to go abead on Cuba:

"I would never have isvored initiating thie cperation; but, since it

bas gone as far as it hae, I do not think we can risk calling it off.’
Moreover, at atime vhen there ie increseing premium on activioer,
State, whan it queet.cae CLA operations or initiatives, caste itself in

2 prissy. sissy, negative role. Tha advocate of clandestine activitics
_seeme ‘tough' and realistic; the opponent hae te invoke such iatangibleas
‘ge the reputation of the United States, world public epinion, "What

do we say in the Unised Nations?"”, etc., and sseme bepelessly

idealietic, legalistic and ‘saft. '

The result of CIA‘s .uitiative in covert political operations has been

to create situations chich have ferced policy an the State Department.
This was set the or:;,.nal idea behind CIA. Ae Allen Dulles wrote

in hie 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committ.;c,
“Tne Central Intelligence Agency should have aothing to do with potic;.
Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, ‘made’ policy in many
parts af the world. <A number of governments still in power know

that they bave even t«on targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not

8 State of mind calculated to stinwmlate friendly feelings towerd tha

- United States. Indengeia, of course, is a prime example. |

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies
State ef a projected covert operation is inadequate te protect US
faterests. There rust be seme means by which State can be informed
of euch operations at an early enough stage te affect the cenceptian

’ and preliminary planing of the operation. Otherwise CLA will con-

tinue to confroat State with propesitions having potential impact on
tore. EO POUCY but at too late © point to gubject that impact to reasco-

' able Control.
3. The Controlied Americsn Source (CAS) representa a particular
aepect of CLA's encroachmect on policy-meking functions. CIA today

hee cearly ac many poople under official cover overeess an State -- .
3980-to 3700, About 1500 of thees are under State Department cover .

Ranta-%9699644 Pace 8B

IE TO THE DETERIORATION }

OF ‘THE ORIGINALS: 22.

PHOTOCOPIED GY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY OU

Ww 49061

we

8,

{the other 2200 are >: ssumably onder military or other nen-State

official cover). Cr: sinally the use ef State Department cover for

(CLA personne] vac s.-pposed to be atrictly limited and temporary.

The Lolies-Correa-. icksen report stated in 1948, “The CIA should

not use State Deparirient cover as a simple answer te all ite problen:z,
but should preeced tu develop its own outside cover and eventually in

this way and throug: increased efficiency of ite overseas personnel,

find a way to tempe: tis darmands upon the State Departmest.” Noxn-

theless CIA has steacily increased ite requisitions for official cover.

' There are several :«asona why CLA has abandoned its original intent...

_ ef deveiaping syste:::3 of private cover. 2 ie easier to arrange Ccex=:
thruign State; if is iess expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates tne
szcurizy <f operatic... ss well as cf communiecstiong; it insures a

_ pleasanter life for ihe CIA people. But the effect is to further the
CIA anercachmert on the trediticnal functions of State.

in some missions, | understand, CAS pevecnasl gutuumbers reguilsr
State Department persennai. in the Amorican Embassy in Vienne,
out of 20 peraons ilated in the October 1940 Foreign Service List ae
being in the Political Section, 16. are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers
listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Cfthe
13 officers listed in che Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, |
ll are CAS, Cn the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 perce:
of the political officers serving in United States Embacsiss were CA5.
Sometimes the CIA mission chicf has been fa the country lenger, ba»
more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) ths:
the Ambassador. ites be bas direct access te the local Prime
Mizister, Sometimnss (as during a critical period in Lace) he pursieo
a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is genoraliy

‘well known locally ac the CLA representative, |

In the Paris Embassy todzy, there are 128 CIA peepie. CIA in Faris
'. ‘hee tong since begun te move inte arees of political reporting normally -
occupied by State. The ClA men doing overt tnterosi political cepurti:.:
outnumber thoes in the Cmhaesy's political ec section by 10-2.. Cir hes
even sought to monopelise contact with certain French political perec:. wie
. les, among them the President of the National Aegambiy. CLA cecil: >)
the top Deor of the Faris imbassy, s fact weil known locally; and on.

“~ wat fete
a hi ie i Ci tne AAA atlantida

Docld:32622644 Page 9

3. 7: ‘

the night of the Gen- cals’ revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted
with amusement the: the top floor was eblese with lights. (Iam
Aaformed tha: Ambassador Cavin was able to secure entrance that
night to the C1A off:: es only with diffleulty. )

CLA is apparently pug firraly committed to the CAS approach es a
permanent solution :or its problems. 2&8 is preesing to have ClA
pecale given the ranz of Counselor. Before State loses control of

_tmore and more of ite presumed oversese personnel, and befere CAL:
becomes permenentiy intagrated into the Foreign Service, it would

. €eam important (2) to assure every ambassador the firm control
over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive
‘of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation wit:
an eye to a steady redaction ef CAS personnel.

THE DETERIORATION}

+

: 4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, ie regarded in some quarters -

as @ purely techsical matter, easily detachable from policy and thor<-
fore a proper function ef the Department of Defense. Yet there is
almost o0 CLA function more peculiarly copondant an the political
context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasens for this. Fer ene thing, a paramilitary
operaticn is in its nature a large and attributable operation and ther=i.,,
as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of eur open
society. (These considerations need not apply, however, ta the
training of, say, the Jeuth Vietnamese in gusrrilia tactics er to the

. Wappert of already existing guerrilla activities.) For anether, the
moral and political orice of direct peremilitary failure is acute for
us. Comrounists, when they stimalate peramilitery activizy, are
doing what the world expects from them; when we de it, we appear

- t betray cur own professed principles and therefore canuet afford to

_ Compound delinquency by defeat, Moreover, as the recent Algeriac

' episode showed, once we cenvince the world that we are committed to 2
paramilitery endeavor, we will be blamed for ali serte of things. Acc,

' . ge the recent tractora-far-prisaners episode shewed, when we do se:.1 _
men to possible death, we cannct lightly write them ef and clese the
beaka. The Communists, en the other hen@, have no serugles about

Mewidating ¢ a losing show.

HE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO

OF. THE ORIGINAL, ~.: :.

?

PHOTOCOPIED BY T

N

ert a et a iE Ag ee Las aes ene nee ent

WW 49NKf1) Danta:29672644 Paae 10

SECRET 18, Vor

Mersoves, guerrilla sarfare is fought, mech more then snilitary
mea ordinarily rea): ue, in an ideologies! context. The guerrilla
‘gusceeds when hio program enliste graserects suppost; end it is
wery difficult indsec: to beat him whea the countryside ts with Brn.
-Van Mock told Genoral Marghall in 1946 act to worry sbout the ©
- guerrillas in Indonema; “we sre sending 50, 000 men out there
: and will clean the eizuation up in the three months." Marchal,
- who bad bad experis-ca fighting guerrillas in the Piilippines,
_ replied, “It won't ts eo casy. You will find thet they will bleed

you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over-
\- + cerning guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times oince
the exd of the Gecoud Vorid tar: in Greece, because Tite's defection -
'  glosed the sorthera vorder; in the Philippines; snd in Malaya. © ic
| the lact two cases the guorrilla resistance ented because ofthe ==
' ‘eombination of political ang mil / countermeasures. The at strugaic
‘tn Malaya, 20 Field “arehal Templer under stocd (acd sald), was f:
the minds and hearts oi the people; it therefore involved net o=i;
.. paranillitary operations but a vast educational program, organization :
| of trade unions, political reform aad an offer of national independencs..
-. Ef the guerrilisls power lies in his revolutionary program, the angwer | :
" dies in part tn meeting the needs which ensbie the guerrilla to rotse -
the countryside, ‘v/ithout 6 political goal," wrete Maso Tee-tung, ©.
<. “gaerrilia warfare must fail, as it mast if ite polities! objectives. do. . a
net coiacide with the aspiraticns of the peeple and Uf thelz eympathy, =
cooperation end aseistance cannot be gained," He edded, “Dowo

"| wart the support of the masees? if ws do, we mast go amang the | a
b inasses; arouse them te activity: contora eurecives with thei weal’.

ésancferred. to ‘Defense. oe

Dovid :32622644:: PB:

; Vee
oe

5. How to Esta:Aigsh Policy Control? Here I wander whether the
British experience «ight sot be of value. The notable feature of tho
British intelligence -vetem is the determination to keep clandestine

activity under etric: “orcign Uffice contral. This contre! is achicved
: in a number of wayr

Re | Seeret intelligence Service (mt) itself operates under
a a . the direction of \n0 Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a

| Foreign Céfice .asirman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who
“he is now the Britic: representative at the UN) and which includes -
7 the Service Inte‘ligence directors aud representatives of the

‘Colonial Cfifice and the Commonwealth Relations Office ae well
as the Chief of «iS.

THE DETERIORATION

; "pp baats positical wartare directives are erigiasted, act es
‘by 8B, but by tae. Information Research Department inthe. ,
Foreign Céfice, uften in consultation with an interdepartmeatal
Working Group ~a International Communist Fronts, and under

the ultimate co.:cral of the Superintending Under-Secretary of

the Permanent vader Secretary's Department in the Feseign
- Cifice, .

A,

¢) SIS covert political action campaigns wast not omy con-
‘form to Foreign. office directives but must be cleared with the
Appropriate Ferelgn Office secgraphical desks.

@ working groupe under IRD chairmanship govern opera- a7
"tiene in special areas, euch as, for example, Sine-Seviet rela-
Hong oz the World Youth Feetival. ,

=) a Forvign Office Stail Lisisen Officer cite sax to the 815
“Cates, Suit Foreign Office officials serve ware of doty tn SIS

HW 49061. DocTa:32622644. Paaé-12--


SECRET

. \o
12, os

enforced by directiv»s, by State Department chairmanship of
. working groupe, a: by the infiltratica of State Department
pereounel i into the i elligence agency.

° Cbvisusly this set-~9 would not gueceed, however, unlessthe = ss ;
State Departroeat itself were prepared to overcome Ke inbred
pabite of diffusion, -agativiam and delay ‘and te take a firm and
purposeful stip « on ine ettuation.

Vv. c rations anc istelligence

. The relationship ber waen aperationa end intelligence vaises yarticn- coe
‘1! Yaely pesplezing questions. ‘Intelligence’ includes twe eeparebic
 “." aetivities: clandéssine cellection; and research, analysis and

. ’ evaluation. The firet denle with that small portien of raw inteili-

:. gemee procured by secret means (Mz. Dulles estimated in 1947 that —

"a sroper analysie of the intelligence obtainable by. ... overt, .
i. nermal, and aboveboard meane would supply ve with over 89 percent,
“i. { ahouid estimate, of the information required fer the guidance of our
':"" gatiens) policy"); the second lovelves the collstion and interpretstic7:

of all forma of intalligence, . however ehtained axl the predusticn of
. catimates.

THE-DETERIORATION | > - _ s,

2.

Q

- uader the British ayztem, clandestine collection Ls entrusted te the
Secret Intelligence Service. The research, enalysts and estimating:
tanctien ie located in the Fereign Office Rescarch Department. :

H

a Under the American system, CLA hes reeponsibility for beth ce :
:” ‘elandestine ecllection and research and snalysie. | The State Depart -
- grent's Bureau of Intelligence and Research else hes recearch énd
 enalyels responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA hee established |

 PHOTOCOPTED. BY -T

HW 49061 DacIa:32622644 ‘" Page:

SECRET . a,
13. 7 . . .

The argument agains: incorporating the research and estimate
function in State wa. nede by Dulles in 1947: “Fos the proper
judging of the situat:on in any foreign country it is important that
_ infermation szould bs processed by an agency whose doty it is to
weigh facts, and to ‘raw conclusians from those facte, without:
having either the facta or the conelusions warped by the inevitable
and even proper prs dices of the men whoee duty it is to determine
policy and who, havic-g once determined a policy, are too likely to
be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the pelicy to be.

ot fealty."

Precisely the eame aegument | can be used with equal effect ageinst

the incorporstion oi -he resoarch and estimate function in CIA -. _

4. @., Sf ingedligencs ie too closely connected with operstiona, then =...
‘thees committed to + sarticular operation will tend te select out the 9.

a intelligence which validates the operation.

Cbvieusly both arg: ons conclude in & case fer the establishment ef!

a fairly iodependent -esearch and estimate growp. But, ifthe Rei |

 'greup {e too independent, oue rune inte the opposite danger! that te, ©) ne

| that neither policy sor. overetions will be * subjected to adequate WR
: intelligence ehecks. i

The trouble with the ‘Suban operation, for example, was net that
intelligence and eperstions were combined, bud precisely that the | sooty
Cuban-cperation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The in-:

_ talligence branch (DOD of CLA was never informed of the existence

oe would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the

WW 49061 -: Docid:32622644." Page .14 °°

- @f the Cuban operation. Tho Office ef National Estimates was never
| seked te comment. an the Besumption, for example, that discontent -_
had reached the petit in Cuba where s successful landing operation.


OcUuncl ‘ . -

\G

14,

‘that knowledge of the Cuban eperation, flaunted in Miami bare _

by any number of lc:--level agents in the operations branch of CIA,

was dented to even ine top officials of the intelligence branch, Tho
_ Bureau of Intelligence and Kessareh of the Dopertment « of State
xaew sven lses abou: the Cuban operation.

3 ‘The’ problom, then, ia to have aa R&E group p sufficiently independent

of beth policy and cverations to resist the pressure to maka the casc
fox vested ideao anc intcrests -- yet sufficiently clese to be able to
Subjact projected omerations or pelicies to the most intense sand =e
searching scrutiny

Ve nere could this gruup be located? If the CIA ware to become :
eubordinate tu State. ag 24i-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the Fé...
function might de v- sted in a coordinate subagency, somewhat inde- --
, pendent of both Stars and CLA, yet closely connected with both ind...
to-day operations. The R&F eubagency would receive intelligence ._
+ from CIA and from “tate, 20 well as from the services and, of cours, ©:
. frem public sources. It would reproseat, in effect, & fusion of CLA/it! |
and State/Intelligexce and Aeaearch. & might aleo teke over certal:
ef the service functions now confided to CIA -~ photographic interpre- - ..
tation, blographice. data, foreign brosdcast monitoring, overt collec- -
tien, maps, etc. . There might be in additien 6 Joint Intalligence Board:
with sith representatives from all the intalligence agencice oad wehe . *
State Department or White House chairman,

vw Coachusten.

. ‘The azgument of thie memorandum implies a fairly drastic feerron
‘1, aang of our presest intelligence set-up. 28 aleo implies the eapaci

. @f the State Department to assume command ef the eitustion and toc
eo in an effective and purposeful way. f the State Department ae 2
recent staffed ia not capable of assuming effective command, ithie-ts
not, : in-may judgment, an. argument against a. rational. apricot: ;

WH 49061: Docka:32622644° "Page: 15°:

ae

15,

“The astructuse- woie! would meet the criteria coggoeted | ta thie
memorandar \ would 8 as follows: t

y) The Sta: Department would be granted general = i eti«;
-cigayance auth ity ever al) clandestine activity, This —
Toight be effectuaced on the British model by the appointment ara
of a Ceputy Unt secretary of State for intelligence, who
would act fort! Secretary in theses mstters and who malght
. S8TVE &3 chairr a of a Joint intelligence Board,

2) The Jour. Intelligence Board would include rapre-
sextatives frorr «il elowente in the intelligence communty
and ales from t: whi te » House.

THE: DETERIORATION

3) The operating branches of the preaent CIA would be
reconstituted under some blamoless title (the National Informa- _
aan _tien Service), This new agency would be charged with rasponai-.
a ‘bility for clandestine collection, for covert pelitical operations =«§-_—™ o
“Ll... endfor paramilitary activities, It would eubmit projects to the |
". Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. | ae
- I general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relation- ;
ship te State as the Disaxmament Administration and A rn
/,Preeently do, an ' rer

ST

| oe ae second ‘senuiindependent ‘agency y would bee sot up. again _
o - Bearing a blamalase. title (the F oreign Research Agency), coordi -
‘nate with the eperstigne agency. “This agency would be charged -
with responsibility for collation and interpretatien, would ©
- ".. "include CLA/DDi, the Lureau of Intelligence and Research in .
Ot as : State, and the’ warioue service functions now carried .on by CIA
"| (phittographic interprctation, biographical files, foreign broadca2s:
"| monitoring, scientific Antetbigence, maps, overt collection, eic.).


