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RECORD NUMBER ; 157-10014-10018
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 05-H~-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : BUNDY, MCGEORGE
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 07/11/75
PAGES : 168
SUBJECTS 3:

BUNDY, MCGEORGE
ROSTOW, WALT
CASTRO, FIDEL
cIA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 2

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HY 50955 Docld:324235406 Page 1

———ee ee

Hearing held before

Senate Select committee to study Governmental
operations with Respect to Intelligence activities
atom ‘

bee

AG
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—— cae

priday, July ll, 1975
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© Washington, D.C

neem
ape and Waste turned over

(Stenotype T
ittee for destruction)

to the Comm

WARD & PAUL

+
410 FIRST STREET, S. F-
WASHINGTON, p. C. 20008

———
(202) 544-6000


WARD & PAUL

5.E., Yeasbengton, D.c. 20003

410 First Street.

TESTIMONY OF

McGeorge Bundy

Bundy No. 1
Bundy No. 2A
Bundy No. 2B

Bundy No. 2c

Bundy No. 2D
Bundy No. 2

Bundy .No-

Bundy No.

Bundy No.
Bundy No.
Bundy No-

Bundy No.

Bundy No-.
; Bundy No.

iBundy No.

Bundy No.

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| Bundy No.

| Bundy No.

i Bundy No.

Bundy No.

iBundy No.

Bundy No. 7


WARD & PAUL

S.E- Washington, o.c. 20003"

410 Fivst Street.

Friday, July 11, 1975

united States Senate,

Select Committee to’ Study Governmental
operations with Respect to
Intelligence activities,

Washington, D- c.

the Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:40 a.M-r

in Room $-407, rhe Capitol, Senator prank Church (Chairman)

presiding.

present: Senators Church (presiding). Hart of Michigan,
Mondale, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker, Mathias and
schweiker-

Also present: Frederick A. Oo. Schwarz, gr., Chief
Counsel: Curtis R. smothers, Minority Counsel: Charles
Lombard, patrick Shea, David Aaron, Robert Kelley Frederick

Baron and Michael Madigan, professional staff Members.

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410 First Street, 5.€., Washington, D.C. 20003

HOE OD 2094 =

phe Chairman, The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. Bundy, would you please «stand and take the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you will ‘give in this
hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bundy. I do.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

TESTIMONY OF MeGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your full name and address
for the record, please?

Mr. Bundy. My name is McGeorge Bundy. I live in New
York. My home address is 1040 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. Schwarz. And you are currently the Chairman or the
President of the Ford Foundation?

Mr. Bundy. The President of the Ford Foundation.

Mr. Schwarz. In the Kennedy Administration what position

did you hold?

Mr. Bundy. I was Special Assistant for National Secur-

ity Affairs.

Mr. Schwarz. And you held that all the way through the

| Kennedy Administration and for how many years in the Johnson

Administration?
Mr. Bundy. I held that office from the beginning of the
Kennedy Administration to the end of February 1966.

Mr. Sehwarz. Prior to commencing work with the Kennedy

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Administration, had you haa anything to do with the Central

Intelligence Agency? —

Mr. Bundy- IT had a prother who worked for many years in

the Central Intelligence Ag

ency. I occasionally talked with

members of the Agency during the forties and the fifties, both

about substantive questions
conditions in the soviet Un
efforts that they were chen
graduates of colleges:

Mr. schwarz. ,YoU ment
thing of a aifferent kind i
recently, would you recount
in connection with the prob
1950's.

Mr. punéy- Well, mY
Senator Joseph McCarthy:
it, in general that he had
Alger Hiss and was therefor
as sensitive as the central

Allan Dulles ~~ and ™
quite characteristic of him
on this matter: and stood b

n fact in no sense a secur

and the defense was

continued in the Central In

of what one thought about the
ion, and occasionally also about
making to recruit talented
joned your brother. TO put some~
n the record than we have gotten
the position taken by Allan pulles

Lem that your brother had in the

brother care undex attack from
and the ground was, as I recall
peen a friend and supporter of
e not to be trusted in a place
Intelligence Agency
Yy impression is that this was

w= took an extremely firm stand
y his estimate that my prother was
ity risk, rather, to the con-

successful, and my prother

telligence Agency until the Kennedy


Phone (Ares 202)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Wasnengton, D.C. 20003

eT :

Administration came at’ which time he moved over to the

Defense Department.

Mr. Schwarz. We have indicated to you that we are going

to discuss the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and

Vietnam, although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and
minority staff have shown you some documents of that period,
some 15 years ago. Before I get to those three countries,

I would like to ask you some questions about a subject
called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the subject
called Executive Action?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear of it?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I have told your staff, that
difficulty for me, because I cannot pinpoint the time at
which I heard of it. My impression was that it was some
in the early months of 1961.

Mr. Schwarz. And do you have a recollection as to the
context in which you heard about it, the person from whom you
heard about it, and will you provide to the Committee your
full recol’cction of the subject of Executive Action in the
early 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Would it help if I try to describe ina
general way what I now understand of this matter, the
part which is recollection and the part which is clarified

by discussions with the staff and what I now think about it?

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WARD & PAUL

ALO First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C, 20003

Mr. Schwarz. would you distinguish, though, the part
that is recollection and the part that is based upon other
matters?

Mr. Bundy. That is exactly what I would like to do.

The part that is recollection is very vague. And I
would say that I have no recollection of more than one conver-
sation on this subject. And the impression that sticks in
my mind is that I was told about it in a general way. “and
it was described to me as an effort to study through the
possibilities by which one might act against an individual
in a context other than that of espionage and counter~espionage,
a context more political.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say “act against an individual",
act in what fashion?

Mr. Bundy. Act in a variety of fashions, as I recollect
it, but up to and including killing the individual.

The two things that I think are clear in my recollection

about that -- three -- one, that it was a concept presented

or described to me -- I was in effect being briefed on it.

two, that it was entirely an untargetted -- that it
was in no sense a plan to do anything to anyone.

And third, and I think quite important, that it was
not anoperation which had any specific target.

Mr. Schwarz. You said you were in effect briefed on

By whom?

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WARD & FAUL

S.£., Washington, o.c. 20003

S10 First Street,

Mr. Bundy. - that is what I don't know. I cannot
recollect who it was. And I think it inapproprate to guess
when I have no recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. What time? I don't mean what time of day,
but what time?

Mr. Bundy. As I Saye sometime I think in the early
months of 1961. And searching memory is an uncertain busi-
ness, but it sticks in my mind that { heard about it in’ the
rooms of the Fxecutive Office Building. And that
would place it in time, because I moved from .the Executive
office Building to the West Basement of the White House sometim
after the Bay of Pigs, perhaps in May-

Mr. Schwarz. So based on that fact you place it in
time sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs and sometime after-~

Mr. Bundy. After my arcival in Washington.

Mr. Schwarz. And when did you arrive in Washington?

Mr. Bundy. About the 1Oth of January. I would place
qt more closely, because I think it was after I was in the
ottice of the Special Assistant, which, of course, was occupied
until the 20th of January by others.

Mr. Schwarz. So you place it after the 20th of January,

but before the Bay of Pigs, which was April 14 or 17?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. pid it come up in a context where you

ot

urged that such a capacity be created?

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Mr. Schwarz. What context did it come up in?

Mr. Bundy. Tt came up ina context in which it was being ~
deseribed to me by someone else. Anc that is really about
as far as I can take it with precision.

Mr. Schwarz. WAs it described to you by someone else
as a capacity in being?

Mr. Bundy. as a capacity ~~ and this is not something
I want to be too certain about, Mr. Schwarz, but my recolilec-
tion would be that it was a capacity coming into being.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, receiving that information, did you
take any steps to discourage OF dissuade the person, whoever
it was, who was describing to you the capacity coming
gnto being?

Mr. Bundy. what T recollect is that I was satisfied with

the description ft received on two points.

First, that this was not an operational activity, and
would not become guch without two conditions: first, that
there be 4 desire or 4 -yequest Or 4 guidance that there
should be planning against some specific individual; and
second, that there should be a decision to move against an
individual.

Being satisfied that these two things were not happen
ing 7-7 and I am now giving you a reconstruction rather than

a precise recollection ~~ t am confident that what I did was

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WARD & FAUL

O.C, 20003

410 First Street, 5.€., Washington,

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to place this notion Jin the category of

things with no current urgency to them, and in that sense

not a question that cried for attention in the sense that

so many others did. If I may make a straightforward compari-
son, we were, I think, even pefore the inauguration, but
certainly very quickly thereafter, very heavily engaged in

a real question of choice, which was the question of choices
around what would: you do with the Cuban brigade which led
eventually to the Bay of Pigs. And that occupied a very

Large amount of time and attention, as did the crisis in Berlin
and the crisis in Laos.

In the same period there were briefings on contingency

r the uses of nuclear weapons, other weapons, and a
and here were reports that came
naturally to the Special assistant's office, which was also
being reorganized.

So, I think that what I dia was simply to put this one
aside. t cannot claim to have thought about it seriously,
because it was in the flow of pusiness that would come to the
Special Assistant's office.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to see :£ we can be more precise

o~ .
on dates to check on what other evidence we have. We have
other evidence that discussions of this matter were going

on in the Central Intelligence Agency on the 25th and 26th

of January 1961.


oped

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003

: ron . . y

Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likeli-

hood of the conversation you have recounted taking place
prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961.

Mr. Bundy. I would rate it very, very unlikely.
This is a matter I have thought about since you did mention
those dates to me. And I would say that the chance that
within the first four days after being sworn in I would have
been drawn to consider this question is, from my side, as
near zero as I can put it. I had been teaching international
relations over a period of ten years. - TI was deeply interested
in many of the immediate problems, most notably the problem of
the crisis in Berlin and the concomitant question of relations
with the Soviet Union. And I was preoccupied with all of
the things that happened when you moved to Washington from
helping the Secretary to buy a house, and working out a
staff, and I was under instruction from the President to
reorganize the White House National Security staff. This
subject was far out of my mind, and I would not have brought
it up. I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to
me in those early days.

The Chairman. May I interrupt for a moment.

As I understand your testimony, Mr. Bundy, you were
priefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early

in 1961, and you can't remember now who it was who briefed you.

Do you recall whether or not you instructed anyone at

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WARD &@ PAUL

410 First Street, $.0., Wasningtan, D.C. 20003

the CIA to develop such a capability?

Mr. Bundy. r am sure I gave no instruction. But it is
only fair to add that I do not recall that ‘I offered any
impediment after I was briefed. .

The Chairman. But your best recollection is that some-
body toldyou that such a capability was being developed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't want to be too firm on that, but that
would be my best recollection.

The Chairman. We received testimony from Mr. Bissell.

Are you acquainted with Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, sir. I have known him a long time, and

he has been a great friend of mine.

fhe Chairman. Mr. Schwarz,-since you are very familiar

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with the record, are you going to take Mr. Bundy through the
record of Mr. Bissell's testimony?

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell testified --

The Chairman. And we have the transcript. If it would

we helpful for Mr. Bundy to look directly at the transcript.

I think he should have it.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell’s testimony was, first, that
in the first instance he said he did not recall any specific
conversation. Then, however, he said, after having reviewed
certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's
note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey

in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set

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WARD. & PAUL

$.E., Wasnington, 0.C, 20003

410 First Street,

ate * ae

. aent a ce aren?

up an Executive Action capability, then he had no reason to
doubt that testimony. And then he went on through a series
of comments to end up saying that he would have been given
that urging by either Rostow or Bundy, more likely Rostow.

First, let's focus on Rostow. Waa Rostow inveived in
the briefing? :

Mr. Bundy. No ~~ now, that I can't tell you out of my
recollection, but only out of my knowledge of the way the
office was organized. The first things we did, Walt Rostow
and I, was to work out an informal but nevertheless reasonably
clear-cut division of labor. And the whole business of
what I thought of as special group business, namely, matters
that related to covert action, and would, if they came for
division, come through the special group, fell on my side

of that division. y don't recall that. Mr. Rostow was ever

. . |
involved in any matter of this sort. \

the Chairman. It is fair to say that this was Mr. Rostow's

testimony. -

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is,. aS you SaYr a friend of
yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did
have gradations within it, ended up saying that
he believed either you or Mr. Rostow urged him to set up the

Executive Action capability. And you have testified that the


WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.€.. Wastington, D.C. 20003

fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it,
but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop.

How can you explain, if you can, the testimony of your
friend Mr. Bissell, and the contrast between that and
your testimony?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understand Mr. Bissell's testi~
mony ~~ and I should add, so that there will. be no misunder-
standing, that I have not only the advantage of discussions with

you, but I have talked with him about it -- as [I understand

that téstimony. from that conversation, he was trying to ex~

plain a situation in which he had no reason to question an Agency

history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this

matter in February 1961. And in that context -- and he had
no reason to question the report that he had received

White House encouragement -~ it is in that context that his
speculations about Mr. Rostow and about me seem to fall.

I would be surprised, if his memory were refreshed
with respect to the dates of January which you have: des-
cribed to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in
this enterprise would come in the first instance from the
Kennedy Administration.

The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the
Bissell testimony makes it-clear that Mr. Bissell himself
does not dispute the documented record. He said in effect,

if Harvey says that I told him that I had been twice instructed

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WARD &® PAUL

p.c. 20003

410 Fust Street, S.£., Washinate

by the White House to develop an Executive capability, I
have no basis on which to dispute that record.

Then when we asked him, very well, who in the White
House told you, and when were you told, he replied, it
must have been early in 1960, and I don't recall who told me,
put it must have been either Rostow or Bundy.

He then recounts that he had numerous conversations
with both of you during the period, and concludes that the
instruction must have come either from you or from Mr. Rostov.

Now, Mr. Rostow tells us he never gave such an instruc”
tion, and in fact has no memory of every having discussed
such an instruction.

Mr. Bundy. He would have in fact have had no authority
to give such an instruction.

the Chairman. That ig right.

And he pointed that out.

Mr. Bundy. And in fact I wouldn't have the authority
to give any guch instruction, and I would have been only
the channel to give such instruction.

Senator Baker. Who would have had che authopity?

mr. Bundy. If che authority were required out ide the

AGency it would have to have been the President hingelf.

The Chairman, What t would Like to ask you 77

Mr. Bundy. Could I continue with Senator Baker's

question for-one second.


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AEQ Farst Street, S.E., Wasreraten, B.C, 26603

My own impression as to this matter -- and I have already
testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of
a meeting of which there is no record -- is that had I been
briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, undirected
character, it did not appear to me to be a matter that required
further authority outside the CIA. That may or may not have
been right, but that is the quick judgment I appear to have
reached. Because I certainly did not raise the question with
others.

Senator Baker. Do you recall that, Mr. Bundy, or is that
your surmise? .

Mr. Bundy. That is my reconstruction more than my ~~
I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question, and
I did not feel, therefore, that it was a question that needed
further analysis, and it did not, so far as I know, get
further consideration inthe white House. My own recollection

is that I didn'thear the words again in any serious con-

|

text that I can recall] until this year.

The Chairman. ° And you cannot recall who it was who
briefed you? : .

Mr. Bundy. I really cannot.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you narrow the field?

Mr. Bundy. I can narrow the field. It would have to have

been a senior officer at the Agency, or someone with previous

understanding in the White House. I have no reason to suppose

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S.£., Wasrngton, O.C. 20003

10 Ferst Street,

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that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that.

The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself?

Mr. bundy. It surely might have been.

The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that
priefing, you have already testified that you interpose no
objection?

Mr. Bundy. I am pretty sure I satisfied myself as £o
the character of the enterprise. But I did not interpose an
objection.

The Chairman. Do you recall, then, having reported the
priefing to the president? ’ .

Mr. Bundy. No, t don't.

The Chairman. Did it strike you ~~ before I ask that

question, based upon your best recollection of the briefing,

were you told that this was a new capability that was being

developed, or were you told simply that the Agency possessed
such a capability? .
Mr. Bundy. I would put it that the Agency was working on
such a capability, put without any great sense of precision.
The Chairman. were you given the impression at
that briefing that the Agency was seeking your authority or
the authority of the White House?
Mr. Bundy.t think they were testing my reaction, as
I now Look back on it. But I do not recall that they were

f . .
seeking authority. If it had come to me as a matter of White

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waRD & PAUL

House authority: tT know from the context 77 MY own concept
of my job what I would have done.

qhe Chairman. . What would you have done? —

Mr. Bundy. 1 would have had to take the matter to the

pecause tT had no independent authority:

the Chairman. Anda you have testified that you did not
take the matter to the president?

Mr. Bundy- ag far as tT can recall, Mr- Chairman.

phe Chairman. Well, this is a subject dealing, 25 it
does, with the development of a capability to will that would
have peen of the character that if you had been asked for”
authority you would have discussed with the president?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

phe Chairman. : ana furthermore: is it not a subject of
a character that you would be very Likely to recall?

Mr. Bundy- tf I nad been asked for authority 1 would

recall it- 1é 1 were the initiating oF deciding agent, I

would recall that y kad had that role.
you speak of the seriousness of it. It deals with 4@

capability to kill. one of the sobering facts about coming
qnto the government from outside into a sensitive position

jike that one is the number of things on which you are priefed

v which aeal with the capability to will. contingency plans

for protecting West Berlin, contingency plans for the use of

nuclear weapons ~~ shelf plans: a shade more remote, perhaps,


WARD & PAUL

410 Fiest Street, $.€.. Wasmengron, O.C. 20003

for the use of different kinds of gases ~~ an operational plan

for the invasion of Cuba -~ these were uncertainties as to

whether there would have to he military landings in Laos. In

the context of 1961 -- and I am not in any sense trying to un~

derstate the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a

hypothetical kind of a thing with two strong locks between

it and any decision. And I'simply didn't pay it the attention
oy

then that we are paying to it now. We are right to pay

that attention now.

The Chairman. I understand that very well. And this
Committee is endeavoring in every way it can to place this
whole issue within the context of the time. Nevertheless, we
are faced with a very real dilemma. We know that at the very
time you were being briefed the Agency was not only interested
in developing a capability, but was in fact engaged ina
series of attempts to assassinate Castro, and had been in-
volved in other murder plots and murder attempts against the
leaders of certain foreign governments.

The question we are endeavoring to answer is whether
the Agency had ‘been authorized by the policy makers of the
government to engage in this activity, or whether it was

operating fast and loose on a wild gambit of its own in an

area of extreme sensitivity that could have the most serious

repercussions upon the government oF the U.S. and its

reputation in the world.

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We are told by Mr. Bissell, who apparently was not only

a very good friend of yours, but also a very good friend of Mr.

Mr. Bundy. That ig right.
The Chairman. -- a man whose credibility as a witness
would seem to have to be respected ~~ that he van at least
ged in developing such a capability on direct instructions
from the White House.
But when we pressed him for specifics, his testimony

' .
jo || becomes very vague. Ne can't remember just who it was who
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Mr. Harvey when he engaged Mr. Harvey to develop

the capability. and everyone else of high authority in

WARD & PAUL

the Administration that we have questioned so far testifies
that it was not the policy of the Administration to engage in
i assassination, and no such attempts were ever authorized,
and indeed, with the exception of one occasion in the Special
Group, the subject never even surfaced for discussion.
And when it did, if it did, it was quickly shot down.
Nevertheless; the cra was in fact embarked upon such

y . . : .
‘attempts during the period under review.

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i Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not
being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administraticn,
which is very hard for me to accept, given the reputation oF

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the witnesses that have come before us, for integrity and

410 First Street.

Psi wees. ow ti cia ER POR

truthfulness, or: that the CIA was running wild, and acting on

its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts,

prone [Ares 202) 544-6000

and not informing, let alone securing the authority from,

those in government who held the responsibility, which in a way
is even more erightening-

Now, you tell us that you remember being briefed. You
don't remember advising the President. It didn't seem too
important at the time.Did you ever follow -up on whether such
a capability had in fact been perfected by the agency?

Mr. Bundy. Tf don't recall pursuing the matter aty all,

Mr. Chairman, any more than 1 would have pursued any other

shelf capability on which no question was heing pushed fo me,

either from below or above.

WARD & PAUL

If I may-g9o back and comment on one aspect of your,
I think, important and impressive description of

the difficulty the Committee faces, I am sure that if in the

| early months of 1963 3 had known what I now know, in part from

‘the newspapers and in part from discussions with your staff,
about what was really in train, T would have had a very
different approach.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman.

S.E., Yeasnin ation, 0.c. 20003

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

i : Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified be-

470 Eeurst Street,

i fore us. And some of the minutes or notes made following one
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lof themeetings of the Special Group Augmented at least suggest

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that the question of assassination occurred. And, Mr. Rusk

said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town

Prone (Area 202)

meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings

had large attendance from all different groups and prinicples
and staff assistants and go on, and as 4 result, if there .
were matters of exceeding delicacy, that was not the forum
at which such matters would be discussed.
“would you comment on that?
Mr. Bundy. Yes. My impression would be that the

Secretary was probably referring to the much discussed meeting

of August 10, 1962.

Senator Mondale. Right.

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Bundy. That was a large meeting, 16 or 18 people.
And the comment seems to be pertinent to that meeting. The

Special Group as such, the one which I would have had in

{

mind, for example, in early 1961, was set up under 4 national
security regulation of some sort whose number was 54/12.

Senator Mondale.” That was the Special Group.

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Mr. Bundy. That was the Special Group. and the Special

in and of itself was quite a gmal) group.

senator Mondale. ‘But people would volunteer to attend -—

Mr. Bundy. No.
Senator Mondale. They would not?

Mr. Bundy. No- The meeting of August 10 is a very

410 Fest Strect, 5.£., Wastingion, O.€.

special meeting in a variety of respects. That included ~~

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The Chairman, You were present at that meeting?
Mr. Bundy. I was present. My memory is entirely
a refreshed memory on this, I had no recollection of the

meeting until recent months, But I have found a seratch

pad that I apparently doodled on on that date, and it

shows who was there, and not much else.
“Mr. Schwarz. There were some beautiful: drawings.
Mr. Bundy. There were.
They were not very beautiful drawings.
The Special Group Augmented met in August -- and this

does coincide with my general recollection of the matter --

in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most

energetically pressed by Mr. McCone with respect to, what the
hell are the Russians doing in Cuba. And that was the center
of that meeting, and the center of later meetings, and the cen-

ter of a national security action memorandum of considerable

' complexity which wag put out toward the end of August, most
& of which dealt with this question, how do we know what they
‘are going to do, what do we do if they do it, and so forth,
iwith respect to missiles in Cuba.

Te was therefore in a sense much more than an. ordinary

! MONGOOSE meeting, let alone a Special Group meeting. And

{while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as
planning session for anything as horrendous as assassina-

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| tion is implausible in the extreme. Quite serious covert

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Committee pursues its

or bad, well or badly

group.

i=

actions were discussed in the s

ho chat that group is the vunodal

Senator Mondale.

pecial Group. and as your
studies of covert action it will find

point for policy decisions, good
nandled. And that was quite 4 small

The reason Tf ask that is that it seems

7 to me that the Chairman's question pursues the two alternatives,

8 either what we now know to have occurred was ordered at the

i] highest level,

Group Augmented,

15 | were with us.

16 Now, their test

or at a very high level,
or they operated on their own,

they were out of control and irresponsible,

i sure: that we have been examining s

such as the Special
in which case

or there was some

extra communications system that went around the formal struc”

of authority that these operators testified to when they

imony. was not very specific. they said,

17 || we thought we had authority, and we think we heard from

12 somebody, and so on.

what are the ch
there was such extra

Senator paker-

pee) \

o4 || now, t don't peliever

25 difficult to reconstruct history of assassination plots,

to Senator Mondale that I am

ut
» of the Inspector General's report,

anges; based upon your experience; that
official communications and order passine
Before Mr. Bundy answers, I might say
struck by the first paragraph
which we don't have here
it says, it is

but as IT remember it,

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of the high sensitivity.’ fe) the aubject ma

teer, no written .

records were kept, and it was: not “aiscussed at open ‘meetings.
phat is generally what was said. And it seems to me that is
implying, then, that as a matter of policy there was no
cormalization of this sort of communication.

I am sorry to interrupt.

Senator Mondale. Yes. .

And in that August 10 meeting two or three principals
testified that it did come up. and in fact it is not reflected
in the notes.

Mr. Bundy. perhaps the best way for me to begin at least

with an answer to your question is to describe my

i own sense -~ my own understanding of the way in which covert

operations of all types were brought forward. and this was

| perhaps the most important and the most constantly reiterated

fact of the process that I was exposed to when I began to
consider this whole range of. subjects on coming to Washington.
And whether it was with Mr. Gordon Gray, my predecessor, or
with Allen pulles, or with incoming and outgoing friends in

the Department of State, OF with Mr. Bissell, or with anyone

' else concerned with these matters, what I learned then and

what I applied throughout my time there to the best of my
ability was that all covert operations, whether intelligence
operations, clandestine: political activity, and clandestine

propaganda activity, and clandestine subversion, OF sabotage,

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which dia occur in'the case of Cuba, all of -them took their
authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12
group.

And when there was a question in such ‘a meeting as to
whether the matter required further judgment, it was the
responsibility of the Chairman of that group to make sure that
that was checked out.

The papers will usually say, higher authority, et cetera,
et cetera, and the President's name will often not appear --
any more than the precise character of the operation is likely
to appear in the minutes for the reasons that Senator Baker
has spoken of.

But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any
sort, with one exception, which is quite different, which did
not have that channel. The exception is the Bay of Pigs,
which was so big, so complicated, and overf lowed in so many

directions, and in which the President himself was involved in
so many ways, as he fully recognized and explained at the time,
that it did not go through this Committee process, it went
through a quite Presidential process, and everybody involved
knew that. -

But with that one exception, I would have told you up
until the beginning of this current public discussion, that

was the way it went, and that nothing went outside it, and

that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies, with

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Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have

told you. oe a pie
Senator Mondale. Well, are. you wrong? .
In other words, what you testified to --
Mr. Bundy. Excuse me, T misstate myself. I beg your

; : |

pardon for interrupting. . |
|

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XY am wrong in that things happened that didn't go through

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that group.

Senator Mondale. Yes.

In other words, that is the big question, either they wer:
acting on authority, which apparently flowed around channels ~~

fhe Chairman. covertly --

Senator Mondale. Covertly ~~ or they were acting on thei:

own, and our attempts to find direct authority in these official
meetings led us nowhere. ‘ i
And your testimony is that you find it very unlikely
that there was this covert way of communicating authority.
Mr. Bundy. My testimony was that I wouldn't
have believed it existed. I have to consider the same al-
ternative that. the Chairman has so clearly pointed out. I
don't find it agreeable to conclude that the Agency was a
rogue elephant at a time when I strongly believe it was not.

. Senator Mondale. We asked General Taylor that question,

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° Mr. Bundy. General Taylor, of course <= and this ig an

4 important point -- was a-pointed to this responsibility after
5 || the Bay of Pigs, after a review of the failures that led to

6 the Bay of Pigs, and after a conclusion had been reached that .

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7 it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a parti-
8 cular responsibility for the oversight of intelligence opera-
9 tions. He was called military representative to the President,

{
10} but in the announcement of his appointment -- I happened to

11 |) lock it up the other day -- President Kennedy made it clear that

i le | he would be his representative for intelligence matters.

i
15 | And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time
14 | that he was military representative of all of the Special i
15 | Groups, 54/12, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, and the

16 | Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE. And when he said --

17 | if he has testified that his expectation would have been : !

1g || that nothing was going to go around him, he is saying exactly

19 i what I thought through the same period. :
|

26 | Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect -~ :

2] 4 The Chairman. Before I forget the question, let :

ep | me ask, since you were at the August 10 meeting, and since

2: ll we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary

; evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro dia

fl
25 — up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of zg

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subject coming up or being discussed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recollect the meeting. And I
don't recollect the subject ever coming up in a meeting of
that size, or indeed in any -- I don't have any recollection
of it coming up, although I do have a general recollection of
there being times at which this possibility was heard of. I
wouldn't want to testify that. I never heard anyone say,
there is somebody thinking about this, because that would be
different from my vague récollection.

But I have no recollection of that meeting, and there-
fore none of any specific statement made by anyone in it.

The Chairman. Senator Baker?

Senator Baker. In that connection, before I go to the
question I had in mind, is it fair to say, Mr. Bundy, that
all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning, about
MONGOOSE, about the August 10 meeting, and about the general
situation, is from reconstructed memory rather than first
impression memory?

Mr. Bundy. I-didn't want to go that far, Senator Baker.
My knowledge, my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group
Augmented were, and where they stood in the line of authority,
is very clear, and is not reconstructed. I spent five
years -~ except for the time when General Taylor was there,

I was the chairman of these things.

Senator Baker. Let's take a piece at a time, then.

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On the question of the Executive Action capability, I
believe referred to as the 2RRIFLE project --

Mr. Bundy. Imust say that if I had known that was its
name I would have looked harder, Senator Baker. .

Senator Baker. It is a fairly picturesque name -- as
to Executive Action Capability, or 2RRIFLE, do you have a
separate recollection?

Mr. Bundy. t have a recollection of what I think of
is one, I don't want to say there wasn’t more, but of
one discussion of the matter. And I know I was informed of
it: in some fashion at the time.

Senator Baker. Do you remember by whom?

Mr. Bundy. That is my difficulty, as I said earlier,

I don't know.

Senator Baker. The reason I ask is, from the other
documentation I have, which consists primarily of the
Inspector General of the CIA's report, and maybe other
material that I can't think of at the moment, it is clear
and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Ac-

tion Capability as a White House initiative, or a White House

request of considerable insistence from the White House that

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they get on with the job.
Mr. Bundy. That is totally inconsistent with my un-
reconstructed recollection.

Senator Baker. Let me track that carefully.

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Do you recall.

Mr. Bundy. T(an only speak for myself here, and for

2

5 || my colleague Rostow, and my knowledge of his assignments.

4 yt recall that his assignments would have made it wildly out

5 of place, and totally out of character, for him to gnitiate 4
6 matter of this kind. And ft recall. that 1 did not. and I

7 recall that quite independently of any reconstruction of

sg || recent months.

9 senator Baker. t would like to Limit this, then,

10 || just to youvassignment-

12 Was it your general assignment to take care of so-

12 | called covert operations? .

13 Mr. Bundy. 2t was my assignment ~- may I take a minute

14 on this?

15 Senator Baker. yes, Sir.
16 | Mr. Bundy. There were two ways in which I could become i
| 4
17 involved in covert 77 three ways- t. might have thought up ‘
,

t will have to say that f have no recollec-

18 || an idea myself.
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an independent personal motivating interest. So,there were :

20 |
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Servicess which would come to the Special Group.

And the other was when the president had an interest”

interest ~~ from time to time in these

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matters. He hada grea nterest:at teferent points in’

1961, 1962, in doing more about Cuba. And part of the more he
wanted to do was covert. “and he would aay so to me. And
I would say s0 to somebody else.

Senator Baker. Can you give us examples of that?

Mr. Bundy. No, I can’t. TI scan only gay that the kind
of things he was talking about was, why do all these raids not
get us anywhere? They say they can do something about the oil
refineries, why don't they? These are purely hypothetical,

Senator Baker, but they would be ina category, subversion

| and sabotage.

Senator Baker. WAS it Harvey that was spoken of as our
007?
Mr. Schwarz. once yesterday.
SEnator Baker. Do you remember when Mr. Harvey was
brought to see the President at the Oval office?

Mr. Bundy. I have been told about that, but I
am afraid that is non~refreshed recollection. I don't know
anything about it.

Senator Baker. Would that have been the character of
the things that the President was interested in, 007? ; :

Mr. Bundy. I am not going to try to repair the record
at this late stage and say that the president never read
Ian Fleming.

Senator Baker. Or ever seen Ian Fleming?

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‘Mr. Bundy. I don't think

ever acted Ian

the’ President
Fleming. :

Senator Baker. I think that is right. But I think it...
is important for us, Mr. Bundy, to try to establish, as the
Chairman said, the range of available information or evi-
dence that sheds »some light on the three alternative possi-
bilities, and the type of things that the President interested
himself in is terribly important in that respect.

t believe that you said you had no information or no
recollection of what particular situation, or what other
deals that were made he was interested in.

Mr. Bundy. I will put it more concretely than that.

The President said, can't we do something more about Cuba?
Why don't you get ahold of these people who are dealing with
this and see if they can't do better, and pass the word

that I am interested, that kind of thing.

Senator Baker. Do I understand that to mean that he never

spoke of a particular practice?

Mr. Bundy. I can't tell you that, because I know, the
record indeed reminds me, that particular actions that are
related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten
went to him, and some were approved and some were not.’

So, he clearly looked at them.

I would have to have the documents there in order to

be precise, and I don't have them with me.

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Senator Baker. Which documents?

Mr. Bundy. Documents which the Committee staff

has provided.

Mr. Schwarz. We have them.

Senator Baker. Tell me what they:are.

Mr. Schwarz. November 30, 1961, Tab -- is that Tab H

or Tab 4 about the November 30, 1961, which authorizes

MONGOOSE?

Mr. Kelley. Tab 4.
Mr. Schwarz. May 5, '62, Lansdale Tab 21.

Senator Baker. Let's stop there, if I may.

Do you have a copy of this memorandum, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Kelley. He will have it in a moment.

Mr. Bundy. One place these documents did not go is

into the memorabilia of former members.

Mr.

Mr. Kelley. All right, that is the chronology.

Mr. Bundy. November 30, 1961?

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. It is on page 3, the third
item.

Mr. Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4.
Senator Baker. Mine says, see Lansdale Tab 4.

Mr. Kelley. Yes. November 30, 1961.

Senator Baker. I would really prefer if someone gave

Bundy a copy of the same material I am working on.

Mr. Bundy. I have it.

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Senator Baker. président ennedy 5 decision to begin

MONGOOSE. I8 it clear, Mr. Bundy, that president Kennedy made
the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?

Mr. Bundy. No question.

Senator Baker. I notice in the staff interpretation
under the column “Issues and Questions" that they alleged
that you recall probably writing this memorandum.

Mr. Bundy. That is really a logical inference. The
President would not himself have written a long memorandum of
instructions of this kind. It is possible that General
Taylor wrote it. But I think it is more likely that I did.
But in any event, whichever of us did so was doing it as a
staff officer for the Prsident's convenience in recording
his decision.

Senator Baker. So at least to this extent there is
no question about the chain of command, or the chance to
control it, the President authorized it?

Mr. Bundy. Just to underline that point, as It recall
the paper which was shown to me, it is one from Mrs. Lincoln
to General Taylor saying, the President wants you to have
this as a description of the decisions.

Senator Baker. Would you repeat that?

Mr. Bundy. I think the covering memorandum on that —
document is from Nrs. Lincoln to General Taylor, and it says,

the President wants you to have this asa record of his

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decisions.

Senator Baker. Thank you, gir.

Do you have an independent recollection of the meeting
or the encounter with President Kennedy in connection with
MONGOOSE?

Mr. Bundy... Not a specific meeting, ‘but of the process
which led to this decision, yes. .

Senator Baker. pescribe for me, if you will, what
MONGOOSE was intended to be?

Mr. Bundy. Well, MONGOOSE in a general way was the
whole set of things to be concerned with mostly, but not only,
covert activities against the Communist regime in Cuba.

Senator Baker. The chronology also quotes the memo as
saying, one, Wwe will use our available assets to go ahead
with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow
the Communist regime.

Can you elaborate on that?

Mr. Bundy. Not without documentary assistance beyond
what T have just said. It was to be a fairly wide ranging
program. TI believe that what that really sort of implies
to me is that all departments are to cooperate, that the
Committee is to review possibilities, proposals, to seek
them out, and that the thing is to he coordinated by the

Committee, whose chairman will be -- this summary doesn't

say so, but my recollection is that the chairman was to be

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. Lansdale

The Chairman:

Item 4-of cis menozendun reads: "The NSC 54/12 Group

will be kept. closely informed of activities, and will be

available for advice. and ‘ecotimendation".

n

Does this suggest to you that the regular channel was
supposed to operate with respect to MONGOOSE, that i# to say,
a central role was to be played by the Special Group in

connection with its activities?

Mr. Bundy. It is a puzzling sentence to me as.I read

it now. And I can't give you a precise answer on that. I

this point, please.,;

think the general answer has to be that the 54/12 Group continu.

through this period. General Taylor was the chairman of
both. The overlapping of membership was extensive. And
1 think you would get a more precise answer as to the exact

relation from General Taylor than IT am in a position to give

you.

The Chairman. I have a very clear memory of General
Taylor's testimony. and his testimony was that the Special
Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation
MONGOOSE. It was further his testimony that all plans, all
operations, were to be brought to the Special Group Aug~

mented for its approval. And the approval of that Group

was necessary before any such plans were actually implemented.

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Chairman. I thought you were asking whether there was a
further requirement that it go from the Special Group
Augmented to the special. Group.. And I have no precise view
on that.

The Chairman. I see.

Now, when you refer to the NSC 54/12 Group -~

Mr. Bundy. That is what 1 think of as the Special Group.

The Chairman. That is what you think of as the Special
Group.

I asked the question because the language is a little
fuzzy. .

Mr. Bundy. It is.

The Chairman. This language might suggest that there is
an. independent line of authority, and that the Special Group
Augmented or the Special Group was simply to be kept informed,
and itsiadvice and recommendations would be taken under advise-
ment.

Mr. Bundy. I think myself, Mr. Chairman, that
we don't have a very serious problem here, because 1 would
agree with General Taylor's recollection that the Special
Group Augmented was the Cuba group.

Now, the Special Group is simply the same people. less
two or three. ~ And the only real operational value of this

paragraph is that perhaps the staff officer who serviced the

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54/12 would be availa le An, a “decision ‘to the state officer
servicing the spe¢ial Group Augmented. But the decision-making
persons are usimply a smaller number ‘of the very people
that both General Taylor and I recollect. as having the main
responsibility.

fhe Chairman. So according to your best remembrance,
you would agree with the testimony we have received from
General Taylor?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would.

The Chairman. Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, perhaps we could get some help
in how the recollections come together here. I might pursue
for just a moment some of the background regarding other

sources of information you may have had regarding the subject

matter of his testimony. ;
You indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr.
Bissell about his testimony.
Did you talk with persons other than Mr. Bissell?
Mr. Bundy. Oh, yes.
Mr. Smothers. Did you talk with Mr. McNamara?
Mr. Bundy. YeS-e indeed.
Mr. Smothers. Regarding these events?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?

“Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think T have.

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Smothers:

Mr. Bundy. Yes.’ -

Mr. Smothers. Mr. MeCone?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Are there others?

Mx. Bundy. I am'sure there are. Mr. Rostow. Mz.
Goodwin. There may well be others, Mr. Schlesinger and Mr.
Dungam -- who has very little to do with it, but I talked
to them because of my own absence of recollection about the

Dominican Republic. -

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise a few questions regard-
ing those discussions, and perhaps it will be somewhat helpful
to us in trying to piece this together.

Has any documentary evidence passed between you and
the persons previously mentioned regarding the subject
matter of these hearings?

Mr. Bundy. Not that I know of.

Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. McCone provide you any documentary |
evidence?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smother. Did you receive any documentary evidence
from any source other than the staff? ;
Mr. Bundy. No -~ I beg your pardon. When I testified

before the Rockefeller Commission I asked through that

Commission whether I could -look at NCS files particularly in

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reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by

order to clarify my recollection “ of ‘the 6th of August 1962.

And I was allowed to took at at the NSAM files. ‘and my memory was
refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has.
Mr. Smothers. Have you’ made a similar request to
persons now within the Agency cor .on the White House staff?
Mr. Bundy. No. on

Mr. Smothers: Could we go back into your conversation

with Mr. Bissell? Could you describe for the Committee, please

your reaction when Mr. Bissell indicated to you that he had
in testimony before this Committee told the Committee that
either you or Mr. Rostow had asked him to establish an Execu-~

tive Action Capability?

Mr. Bundy. He didn't report it that way to me. He

others placed this event in February 1961. Testimony by
others indicated that he had said to them that he had been

encouraged to do this by the White House, and that in casting

around as to who might have encouraged, he had given the

names of Rostow and Bundy. I think this is roughly what

he said to me.
The Chairman. That was the character of his testimony?
Mr. Bundy. I told him that I thought he must

be wrong about Rostow, because that wasn't the way it worked,

and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged

him, but that I had at some stage been informed about it.

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We then went on

we agreed that whatever else-it was, it was not an operation

plan, and it was not targeted against anyone.

Mr. Smothers.

What was his reaction to your comment
that he had been informed as opposed to initiating?
Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that we had a very extended

discussion on it. I don't recall his reaction, and I don't

recall exactly how I put the point.
\ .
The Chairman. Let me just ask at that point, the way you

have characterized Bissell's testimony correspnds with my

memory of it. It is hard for me, however, to understand

how Mr. Bissell -- why Mr. Bissell would have directed Mr.

Harvey to develop such a capability, and apparently represented |

if the documents are to be believed, to Mr. Harvey that he had

been twice instructed to do this by the White House, if he

had not in fact received such authority.

Do you think that Mr. Bissell would have undertaken

and

on his own initiative to develop such a capability

represented to his subordinate that he was doing soon :

simply
instructions from the White House?
Mr. Bundy. I think there is a prior question, Mr.

Chairman, which is the credibility of the witness from whom he

is taking this recollection. : \.

The Chairman. That is fair.

Though Mr. Bissell himself did not seem disposed --

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have already explained, to speculate as to why he did or did

not give him this instru

The Chairman. ‘Did ite. Bissell at any time during the
period under question, or at any later time, ever inform
you of CIA activities or involvement in assassination attempts
against any foreign leader? . 7 .

Mr. Bundy. No.

The Chairman. Doesn't it strike you as strange, since
Mr. Bissell was aware of such attempts, that he would not
have told him?

Mr. Bundy. Well, TI don't want, for reasons that I

not. I was operating, working on the assumption that I
would know that kind of-athing if it existed.

The Chairman.Senator Mathias?

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave

the record, or Mr. Bundy's mind, or in the alternative, my

mind, ina state of confusion as to what exactly Mr. Bissell's
recollection was.

Now, he was depending somewhat on Mr. Harvey's recollec~
tion and notes in the first instance. But as I recall, he
was very clear as 4 matter of independent recollection that
he had been horsed along a couple of times by the White House
on proceeding with the development of the Executive Action

\

Capability. And that was a matter of independent recollection,

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810 First Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

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refreshing his recollection
Mr. Bundy. That, he didn't say to me, and I have no way
of commenting on it.

The Chairman. I think we must carefully review the
record on that score.

Senator Baker. It may be necessary to ask him to come
back for that purpose. .

May I ask a question there? -

Mr. Bundy, do you have any recollection of any specific
covert plans that would involve poisons, hypdermic syringes,
or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with acti-
vities against Cuba? .

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific plan.
I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection
that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with
a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I
have been able to take it in my own memory.

Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have men-
tioned it to you and what the purposes of the poison may have
been?

Mr. Bundy. Nothing at all about it in detail.

Senator Baker. A poison pen?

Mr. Bundy. No, some kind of poison about which -- one
thing that does stick in my mind is that it seems totally

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impractical because “darge group of

people ina headquarters mess; or gomething of that sort.

Senator Baker. Do you ‘remember whether the plan was
declared non-feasible or infeasible by the Department of
Defense? | : ; . .

Mr. Bundy. No, I have no such recollection.

Senator baker. Do you remember anything about a hypodermic
syringe to carry poisons in a ballpoint pen?

Mr. Bundy. That is the sort of ‘thing that I was asked
the other day, and I said I remember it, and then it seems to
me about ten seconds later was that what I was remembering was
murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba. I have no
recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba.

Senator Baker. I have another question, but I will
wait, if you have something else.

The Chairman. Go ahead, sir.
Senator Baker. Do you feel that you have a good insight
into the relationship between the President and his brother
Robert Kennedy in this respect, that is, having to do with
Cuba operations, and Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?

Mr. Bundy. I have a pretty good picture of the relation-
ship between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy on Cuba,
and on many other things. It is a recollection which grows

stronger as the administration goes on, because I got to

know them better, and, of course, they got to know me better,

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and the relatio gor, my relation with

both of them. ‘tr had known the President for many, many
years, and the Attorney General much. more priefly.

I do not -have any clear picture of the relationship
between the Attorney General and Mr. Helma. - My ccurbstone
judgment would have been that it was not close. |

Senator Baker. Based on your insight, did the Presi-
dent delegate to Robert “Kennedy substantial aspects of Cuba
policy during the period we are speaking of?
Mr. Bundy. f wouldn't put it that way, Senator
Baker. He certainly counted on the Attorney General to be

a kind of gingerman on a4 great many subjects, of which Cuba

and counterinsurgency were the two that came more closely with-

in my area of interest.
Senator Baker. Counterinsurgency meaning what?

Mr. Bundy. Counterinsurgency meaning all those efforts

like the Green Berets and organizing to be able to assist
countries threatened by Communist subversion internally.
Senator Baker. Are you speaking of counterinsurgency

as it led to Cuba, or as a general capability?

There was a separate committee, the Special

Mr. Bundy.

Committee on CI, counterinsurgency- and the Attorney General

And I used to see him playing

was an active member of that.
this very important role of poking and prodding, and why can't

you do more, and why can't you do better, and why aren't we

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siya

slates

WARD & PAUL

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| Senator Baker. Who was on that committee?

Mr. bundy. I'am sorry, I can't decide from recollection.
General Taylor was again the Chairman, but the membership was
different.

Senator Baker. Do you have minutes or records of that
group? .

Mr. Schwarz. No.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request

tify as much as we can what that group is, and make a fomral —
request for documentation.

Mr. Aaron. We have reviewed some of that «material at
the John F. Kennedy Library. It is essentially in fact the
group that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential
insurgency situations.in a number of countries. There was an
insurgency list. It did not seem to relate to the subject
we are speaking of here. So we did not request the documents.
But we could have gotten them.

Senator Baker. Will you do that, please?

Is that agreeable, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. What is your request?

Senator Baker. I would Like documentation or any records

| relating to the counterinsurgency group during the period in

question.

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i

that with Mr. Bundy's assistance after this hearing that we ident


“phe Chairma e suggest: that we designate a mem~
“FR. . .

2 | ber of the committee staff_to undertake that review, and

3

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

report back to the committee.

Would that be satisfactory?

Senator Baker. That is fine. I just want. to know if
there is any worthwhile documentation. —

The Chairman. ves. Because it may be entirely ancillary
to this issue.

Senator Baker. Let me ask Mr. Bundy this, Would that
group have been important toward American policy during this
period?

Mr. Bundy. The CI Group?

Senator Baker. Yes.

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Bundy. I would think only most marginally,
Senator Baker, simply because the existence of other groups,
the Special Group Augmented or the MONGOOSE Group, was .so

clearly dominant and was the Central Committee for that sub-

ject.

Senator Baker. The gingerbread man concept?

Mr. Bundy. The gingerman concept.

Senator Baker. The gingerman concept. There isa
difference.

Do I directly infer from that description that the

President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite

410 First Street. $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

action to move from assignment to assignment and to push peopic

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along ‘to produce a result?

Mr. Bundy. In a general way that is right. But the

form it took in the areas in which I was concerned was in one

Prone (Arma 202) 54

sense quite informal, .I know of no instance »where the Attorney

General tried to replace the normal channel. -- let's stay away |

for the moment from! the covert question and the Cuban ques-
tion, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely --
but if he felt, as he often did, that American policy in

Africa, for example, was insufficiently sensitive to the aspir-

ations of black people in Africa, he wouldn't fire off a kick, h

would come in and say, why can't you people do something about

the State Department on news and stuff.

Senator Baker. There is some evidence -- we had direct

WARD & PAUL

testimony that Mr. Helms, who was DDP at the time in ques-
tion, rather than DCI, clearly thought that the authority of
the Agency was to overthrow the Castro regime by any means, in-
cluding assassination.

And when pressed on the source of that authority he de-
signed to say that anyone specifically told him that, but
that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it. Would
this be in the gingerman concept you are speaking of?

Mr. Bundy. Now we are right at the specific point I
| would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy

when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never

410 First Street, $.E., Washington, B.C. 20003

took away from the existing channel of authority its authority

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Senator Baker.

‘Would

with whatyou describe?

what I -deacribe be consistent

Mr. Bundy. Not if it is interpreted as meaning that he

was providing a separate channel of authority.

Senator Baker. What I’ meant ‘was just what it was, and

in this respect.

Mr. Bundy. I

said, I know nothing about that.

Senator Baker.

Mr. Schwarz.

Senator Baker.

met regularly with the DDP rather than

Mr. Bundy.

‘

I have no

that is, lNelms described for us meeting with Kennedy apparently
to stimulate the Agency's activities to. produce the overthrow

of the Castro regime, and that he met regularly with Kennedy

don't know how often they met or what was

tant than his relationship to Mr. Helms.

I am correct, am I,

time was DDP and not DCI?

That-.is right.-
Do you have any
the DCI?

idea that he did.

I would have said, just in
passing, that the Attorney General's relationship to the Direc-

tor of Central Intelligence was much closer and more impor-

that Helms atthe

idea why he would have

I know that he

met often and intimately and easily with the Director of

Central Intelligence, who was a close personal friend of his.

Senator Baker. You are speaking of Mr. McCone?

Mr. Bundy.

Mr.

McCone.

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

j gince the point is impor-
tant, that when the Committee staff complete its review of the
evidence it ought ‘to be reminded to look closely at that Helms
testimony and identify exactly what words Helms might have
used to describe his relationship with Robert Kennedy.

Senator Baker. And the: time involved and what position
Helms occupied at the time.

The Chairman. I have another question.

Mr. Bundy, we also have it from Mr. Bissell that at one
time he called in an officer, a subordinate, O’Donnell,
that at one time Mr. Bissell called in a subordinate whose
name was Mr. O'Donnell, and asked Mr. O'Donnell if he would
be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba.

Mr. O'Connell testifies that he said he would not be
willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, because
he had moral compunctions against killing.

Mr. O'Donnell further testifies that he was then or
thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that
some poison had been made available -- had come to the CIA
headquarters in the Congo.

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last.

The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had
arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo.

When we asked Mr. Bissell on what authority he had asked

O'Connell as to his willingness to undertake the assassination

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410 First Street, $.E., Wasningtan, D.C. 20003

of Lumumba, he could hot provide us with that authority,
except to say that he may have done it, ‘on his own initiative.
‘Do you have any reaction to that?

Mr. Bundy. Where is it in. time?

Senator Church. It was in the fall of 1960. It was

not during the Kennedy Administeation, it preceded the Kennedy
Administration. But I asked you the question, because it
strikes me as being a very disturbing piece of testimony, that
any: man so positioned, in the CIA could not identify higher
authority for such an action, and would under oath say that it
might have been on his own initiative.

Mr. Bundy. I can't add to your comment on that, Mr.
Chairman.

The Chairman. very well.

Senator Morgan. Let me ask him a question or two, Mr.

The Chairman. Senator Morgan?

Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you recall very vividly
talking with the president on many occasions about Cuba,
is that right?

Mr. Bundy. I recall vividly that I talked to him on many
occasions, I am not very good on remembering specific dis-
cussions.

Senator Morgan. You told us a few minutes ago that he was |

constantly prodding, and why don't you do this, and why doesn't

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street. $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003

Mr. Bundy. If I may ‘correct that, I said he prodded me

from time to time, not all the time.

Senator Morgan. Quite frequentiy?.

Mr. Bundy. If wouldn't put it that often. It might have
been three or four times.

Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you were head of the Security
Council, you were his assistant?

Mr. Bundy. I am trying to give an accurate picture of
the number of times, Senator.

Senator Morgan. You are trying to give such an accurate
picture that you are not giving much of a picture at all.

Are you telling this committee that throughout the time

you assumed your duties, throughout the Cuban crisis, and all

the MONGOOSE operations, that you might have talked to him two
or three times about it?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?

Senator Morgan. Yes.

Mr. Bundy. I talked to the President, I suppose, many,
many times in the context of the events that led up to and
followed the Bay of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times,
maybe even hundreds of times, in the context of the events that
led up to and followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those are the |

two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during the

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give you 4 numbe
the distinction I am trying to make.

Senator MOrgan. You were something between himself and

the National Security Council, were you not?
Mr. Bundy. That isntt exactly the way it works.
Senator Morgan. Just tell me what aid you do.

Mr. Bundy. I am trying to.

Senator Morgan. I have been listening all morning, Mr.

Bundy, and I just don't get it.

Let me go to one other question. Was it true a while

ago when you said that Robert Kennedy was constantiy prodding

people? why can't we do more?
Mr. Bundy. Yes, that is certainly true.

Senator Morgan. 1 have no other questions.

Senator Mondale. Could: I).ask one, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Mondale. ,

senator Mondale. I don't like to ask this question,

put 1 think it is important.
Have you talked to others involved during this period

when you may have been testifying before us and before the

Rockefeller Commission, SaYr in the last five months about

| this testimony?

i _Mr. Bundy. I answered that question. Yes, I have.

Senator Mondale. Would you repeat it briefly for us?

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Mr. Smothers
Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Go ahead.

Phone (Ares 202) 544-6608

Mr. Smothers. I believe. you indicated previously, Mr.
Bundy, that you talked to. -. issell, Mr. McNamara, Mr. McCone,
Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goodwin,’ “Mr “Sehletnger, and others that may
not be on that list. - And” you. ‘indicated that you had spoken to
Mr. Bissell after his testimony regarding executive action.

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. smothers. Had you spoken with him also before that

testimony?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smothers. Did he call you or did you call him?

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Bundy. I don't honestly recall. I think I said the

other day that he had called me, but I think actually what

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4

happened that he called me, and my. first words were, I needed

aces

to call you.

Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversations with Mr.
McNamara. When did you first talk with him about these matters
being testified to?

Mr. Bundy. I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers.

Mr. Smothers. Can you give the Committee the sense of
your conversations with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. There have been a number of them. Mr.

410 Fiest Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003

McNamara and I not only have been close friends, but are very

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quently; both about ubstance of matters of international

development, and about the’ business of the Ford Foundation.

Prone (Area 202)

So, I have talked to him a. number of times both on the
telephone and face to. face. he ¢ essence of the conversation
is the exploration ‘of questions: raised or doubts raised babout

the conviction we both’ share, which is that no one in the Kennedy

Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever
gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind

for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA.

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WARD & FAUL

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with you specifically, the fact that he had received from

Mr. McCone a memorandum from Mr. MeCone.in 1967?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, he told me that.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the substance of that
memorandum? : : ct,

‘Mr. Bundy. Tf discussed ituinitially with Mr. Mecone.

Mr. smothers - pid you discuss it with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. He mentioned it to me. I don't recall much
about it.

Mr. Smothers. pid you discuss the meeting of August 10
in Secretary Rusk's office?

Mr.-Bundy. That was the first discussed because the
newspapers said that there had been 4 meeting of three, four
or five of us, and the question was whether there had been
such a meeting limited to three, four,or five. And we were abie
to satisfy ourselves ‘that that was wrong.

Mr. Smothers. That was wrong. What do you recall to

have been Mr. McNamara's reaction of the August 10 meeting?
Mr. Bundy. He didn't seem to have any that I can recall,

at least I don't recall that he told me of any reaction of

it.

Mr. Smothers. Do you recall the substance of his

‘

comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?

Mr. Bundy. No. Tf don't think he commented on it.

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wee “ on

Mr. Smothers

a.
a With ‘regard to your conversation with
; ; 3 Mr. McCone, when did this occur; approximately?
| 4 Mr. Bundy. That occurred earlier-on.
5 Mr. Smothers. Before the Rockefeller Commission inquiry? |
6 Mr. Bundy. I don't know exactl when it was. Bat it
7 was within the context of the Rockefeller Commission
8 inguiry. and not this inquiry.

10 conversation?

9 Mr. Smothers. Are you talking about more than one

or the

I don't

; loa 11 Mr. Bundy. No, I think I talked to him on the phone
: “
4 ie : 12 and then I had a meeting with him.
; > : 13 Mr. Smothers. In either the phone conversation
. 14 meeting did you discuss Mr. McCone 's 1967 report?
_& 15 Mr. Bundy. He told me that he had heard of it.
ial 16 think he had then seen it. ,
of!

Mr. Smothers.

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You don't think he had then seen

it?

obviously

18. Mr. Bundy. . He had then seen it as of 1975. He
. 3 19 saw it in 1967.

8 20 Mr. Smothers. Can you give us a feeling for the approx-
i 21 imate time when this conversation occurred?
: 22 Mr. Bundy. I could ‘probably work it out from my own
: 23 | calendar, but I don't have it in my head. .

@ : 24 Mr. Smothers. But at this time he had not seen the

report? ,


since itis a report that -as".I under tand it, it isa

report that he made in 1967, and he had seen it then.

Mr. Smothers. Did he indicate to you that he was |
making-an effort to get that report?: a

Mr. Bundy. 1 think he told me that he had been in touch

with the Agency and would be seeing the report, but I don't

really recall.

Mr. Smothers. To go into your conversation with Mr.
Rostow, would you indicate to the Committee, please, the
substance of that conversation?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. I called him after my conversation

with Mr. Bissell, because it seemed to me that he ought to

WARD & PAUL

be informed, and the two of them ought to talke with each
other about that testimony.

Mr. Smothers. At the time you called him it was your
impression that Mr. Bissell had not talked with Mr. Rostow?

Mr. Bundy. But was planning to.

Mr. Smothers. And this was after Mr. Bissell's testi-
mony?

Mr. Bundy. That if right.

Mr. Smothers. Did you and Mr. Rostow discuss the fact
that both you and Mr. Rostow had been named as potential

sources for the Exective Action authorization?

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Mr. Bundy. My emphasis in talking about Mr. Rostow was

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es

that in my recollection that: must be wrong, and he would be

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interested in getting it’ straightened out.

Mr. smothers. Can we yo to your conversation with Mr.
Goodwin. pid you.call him or aia he cali you?

Mr. Bundy. “recalled him.

Mr. Smothers.- And the nature of that conversation?

Mr. Bundy. That conversation was about the Dominican
Republic, because of my complete failure of recollection as
to who or what the White House line of action, responsibility
and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republic in

1961. And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called

WARD & PAUL

Schlesinger, because they were the the who had been very
much involved in things like the Alliance for Progress, and
new appointments to embassies in Latin America, and Latin
American Policy generally, except for the Bay of Pigs. And
I wanted to see if they had recollections about events in.

that spring that were more extensive than mine. I didn't lear

very much, but that was the purpose of the call.

Mr. Smothers. And it it your testimony that your first
exposure to the documentary evidence beyond these recollections
was when either the Rockefeller Commission staff or this
staff showed you documents pertaining to this inquiry.

Mr. Bundy. I want to be precise about the Rockefeller

410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, O.C. 20603

Commission staff. They did not show me the documents, the

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documents?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Under what circumstance did the White House

Staff provide these documents to you? Was it at your request
or their request? |

Mr. Bundy. My request.

Mr. Smothers. When dia it occur?

Mr. Bundy. At-the time of the Rockefeller hearings.

Mr. Smothers. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. And prior to your testimony?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Who provided these documents to you?

Mr. Bundy. I never have testified on -- this is not a

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serious matter, because there is no secret about it. But I
have always taken the position that White House decisions
are for the White House to discuss, and I perfer to hold to
that position now.

Mr. Smothers. Are you saying that you do not feel at
liberty

Mr. Bundy. No, I am not saying, I am saying that I would |

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, G.C. 20003

request the committee to address that, question with the White

House.

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410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Smothers. ° The ‘question’ ts who in the White House

provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigatidn
And I believe his position is that he would prefer not to
disclose that matter, or that that is a matter for the
Committee's determination.

Mr. Bundy. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, because you
were out of the room, . that I have atwaya taken the position:
that decisions of the White House are for the White House
to discuss. I always asked permission to see documentation
and permission was given. I looked at the document, but 1
would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the
White House to discuss it.

The Chairman. What is the document?

Mr. Bundy. I just described it, it is National Security
Action Memorandum No. 1, weshowed us the National Security
Action file, which I believe your staff has.

Mr. Schwarz. We have it here.

Mr. Smothers. My question was, who had the request been

and showed him the document?

Mr. Bundy. My point is that I have tried historically
not to discuss this kind of question when it is something
that concerns the White House, but to leave it to the White
House to discuss it,.and I would prefer to hold to that

position.

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WARD @ PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Waspington, O.. 20003

_ (Off the ‘record )

Mr. Smothers. This quite frankly, Mr. Bundy, this

related to an ancillary matter that is of concern to the
committee.

You mentioned conversations with Mr. Schlesinger. Again,
were those initiated by you? '

Mr. Bundy. .The most recent one, he called me. And il
think there were earlier ones, but I don't know. Tf can't be
precise. I must say t don't know that I understand the line
of questioning. ‘phese are very important matters, and
people closely involved in them should be trying to get 4
clear sense of what each other remembers after this many
years, it seems to me this would be entirely natural.

Mr. Smothers. I don't question the fact that it is
natural, Mr. Bundy. I think one of the difficult things
for this Committee to do is to separate out, if you will,
the independent recollections from the documentary evidence
we have shown you, and from conversations with ethers -~

Mr. Bundy. You are quite right. And I have tried
quite carefully to teil. you my recollection.

Mr. Smothers. We are merely trying now to establish.
those relationships so that when we get the- point in the
record there is some question regarding the nature of the
recollection that might be of some assistance to us. That

is not an attack on your veracity, it is not an attempt to

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WAAD & PAUL

410 Furst Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C, 20003

Do you recall, Mr. Bundy, -from these conversations that

we have just mentioned, any matters which have been raised
by the participants: that may ‘be inconsistent with the
documentary record as you, have: seen. yer We know, of course,
that Mr. McNamara' 8 recollection appears to be inconsistent
with the documentary evidence regarding the August 10
meeting. .

Mr. Bundy. Well, so was mine. And I have no such
recollection.

re Smothers. I am speaking. now of the recollection of

others, if you will.

Mr. Bundy. I can't really recite on that, because I
haven't made the kind of comparison document by document
and conversation by conversation that would allow me to make
a clearcut and comprehensive answer. But I don't have any
recollection of sharp divergency of that sort.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to pick up on one
thing that you testified to that was left hanging and then
come back through your involvement with Cuba and starting

from the beginning. You testified that to your knowledge

no authorization for an assassination was given. I want to

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told at any time by: "anybody that assassination: effoftts were

actually under way with respect to Mr Castro?

Phone (Area 202)

MY. Bundy « ‘Absolutely not.
Mr. Schwarz. Were you. ever tola by anybody that the

Central Intelligence Agency had hired the Mafia to assassinate

Castro?
“Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that auzing
the MONGOOSE program Mr. Harvey was engaged in assassination
efforts upon Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in

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fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was passing
assasSination devices to a Cuban military officer?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in:
fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged
an assassination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No. _

Mr. Schwarz. Now, after the Bay of Pigs, was there a
reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba |

should be? And would you turn in that connection to Tab B, -

of the bundy Book 1 of 2 -~

410 First Streat, S.E., Washington, B.C. 20003

Senator Tower. May I raise a purely technical point. [I

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410 First Street, $-E., Wasmington, D.c. 20003

re,

Mafia was’ hired to'as! sasei ate, Castro, rT: think that was
inaccurate, because I. aon! t think, we have anything that
indicates that we contacted’ the syndicate as such, and I think
if we use, "individuals “Likely, adsociated with the Mafia,”

or something like that. -- ae ‘is a ‘Little technical.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me restate the question to make sure
that there is not a problem with the scope of my question.
And Senator Tower is correct.:

Were you ever told that the Agency had contacted a man
called John Roselli?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. A man called Sam Giancana?

Mr. Bundy. No. *

Mr. Schwarz. A man called Santos Traficante?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Any person who was a criminal or allegedly
a criminal for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection whatsoever

related to the subject we have been exploring in that group

of questions?

Mr. Bundy. No =~ you are familiar with the fact that -~
refreshed my recollection of activities associated with the

Mafia in a law enforcement context in Florida in 1964.

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Mr. Schwarz.

down right now. What happened in
Mavia and Cuba, co the best oF your recollection? | and then
we will just mark some documents. .

Mr. Bundy. Let me be clear that my recollection here is
entirely refreshed. Perhaps you would rather come back to
it?

Mr. Schwarz. Let's put it in the record here, since we
have raised the subject.

Let's mark as Bundy Exhibit 1 the: Helms memo to DCA
on the Cuban exile plan dated June 10, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as

Bundy Exhibit No. 1 for jdentificati

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{


RR ee te TTA Oe gees HEAT
Ang? s pes " ae sae : Rea teeiay Zen

red to is marked a8

Bundy exhibit No. 2A for saentification|)

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‘minutes of the
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303 Committee of 18 June ° ;

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(Document referred to is marked as

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- pundy Exhibit No. 2B for

_ fdentification.).

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titer
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for the Honorable Meceorg un al Nesistant to

the President, I. Investigation re Plans by Cuban

Exiles to assassinate Cuban Government Leaders," dated.

August 19, 1964.
* (Document referred to is marked as

Bundy exhibit No. 2p for

daentification.)

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410 First Street,

opportunity prior to the testimony, how again ig you seek

to do go, to refresh your recollection, will you recount for

the Committee what happened in the summer of 1964 in connect-

don with this matter?

Mr. Bundy. Well, it is a relatively small matter in the
eontext of what you are discussing, but what happened in the
gummer, of 1964 was that it came to our attention that there
were relations between Cuban refugees in Cuba and people
apparently associated with the Mafia. And this did not seem
to be a good idea. And this was ina period in which
sentiment had been steadily growing ‘€or gome time against
activities by cuban refugees that were wholly outside the
control and not really in the interest of the U.Ses and that
they should be associated with a criminal group.

and so when the matter came to the Special Group, the
decision was made to refer it to the Department of Justice
as a matter of internal American law enforcement. That was
done.

And the Department said that it was going after the
matter, which it then did, and reported back.

The reports don't give any conclusive picture of what
really was going on, put they do show that the Bureau went

to a number of people asking around about these matters, and

as far as 1 know, it then faded away.

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Mr. schwarz. In thé contex of discussion did
anybody from the central Inteliigence Agency or anybody
else inform you that in earlier years there had been
a relationship with «7 to use Senator Tower's caution ~~
with persons alledgedly involved with the criminal syndicate
in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castor?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, going back to the post-Bay of Pigs
period, would you put pefore the witness and mark as Exhibit
2 the National security minutes of a meeting held May 5, 1961.
It is at Tab B of the Senator's Book 1 of 2. This reflects,
am I correct, Mr- Bundy r a discussion of cuba. held with the
president and high officials of the government who are all
listed on the front page?

Mr. Bundy. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And Cuba was discussed, and it was
agreed, following the discussion that U.S. policy toward Cuba
should aim at the downfall of. Castro, and that since the
measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end,
the matter should he reviewed at intervals with a view to
further action?

Mr. Bundy. Right. ;

Mr. Schwarz. Now, can you describe the measures agreed
to at that point?

Mr. Bundy. My only way of doing that with any accuracy

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prone (Area 202)

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410 First Street, 5.

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. The document speaks for itself, then. And
you can add nothing to it?

Mr. Bundy. No. .

Mr. Schwarz. But can you say cnat the measures 41d or
did not include assassination? .

Mr. Bundy- there is nothing in my recollection and
nothing in the document that seems to me to imply assassin-~
ation.

Mr. Schwar2- Now, following this instruction, was
cuban policy reviewed again in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. SchwarZ- and ultimately out of the fall review
in 1961 came the so-called MONGOOSE program; is that correct?

Mr. Bundy- That is right.

Mr. Schwar2- Now, prior to discussing upon the MONGOOSE
program, aid you consider 4 lot of other options?

Mr. Bundy- I think we were ~~ and this is 4 nara
question, put I think what we were doing was working toward
an organization that would be able to take charge of the
complicated, varied inter-departmental kinds of things involved
in Cuba- We have been concentrating this morning on covert
actions: put there were also propaganda problems r economic i

problems, and Cuban refugee problems in Miami, and a number

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000;47-

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410 First Street, $.£., Wainington, D.c. 20003

“Anytime you get that kind of problem you have an organization

of others : ia” a : th: “one juriadiction.
‘. : re, oO . \

problem. And the solution of 1961, which took sometime to
work out, as the passage of time suggests, was the creation
of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of General
Taylor and with General Lansdale as its operating officer.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in the course of the review that did
take place prior to the establishment of that Special committee
which then got called the MONGOOSE program, was one of the
matters which was considered the assassination of Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. As I have already said, I can not tell you
that this question never came up. But rl recall no sustained
discussion of that matter in that period.

Mr. Schwarz. Whether you recall a sustained discussion
or not -"

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall a @iscussion that I can pin-

point anywhere, put over the period of 1961 to 1963 the

subject was mentioned from time to time by different individ
uals, never to me that I can recall by the President. But
it did come up’
Mr. Schwarz. And it may have come up in this period in
the fall of 1961 as something to consider, is that correct?
Mr. Bundy. As something to talk about rather than to
consider, would be my answer.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you put before the witness as Bundy

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gated October 5+ 1961: mab ¢ of the Sena!
And as Bundy qonait 9a he minutes of the special Group
meeting dated october 6 1961, which is at Lansdale Tab 2-
(pocument referred to is marked a8
Bundy exhibit No. 2 for taentification-}
(pecument referred to is marked a3
pundy Exhibit No. 3 for taentificatt in.)

(Document referred to jg marked a5

Bundy exhibit No- 3A for faentification:

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And finally, as Bundy Exhibit 3B a memorandum which we

have retyped from an indistinctcoriginal dated October 5,

1961 For the Record, ‘gigned by Mr. Parrott.
a / a
And the indistinct original is attached,
(Document réferred to is marked as

Bundy Exhibit Nu. 3B for identificati

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Phone (Area 20:

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you the question » = nN ‘No 100° you sent to the Secretary
of State the following note: "In conformation of oral
instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State
Woodward, a plan is desired ‘to the indicated contingency in
Cuba". Do you have an independent recollection of what that
indicated contingency was?

Mr. Bundy. Before seeing this document?

Mr. Schwarz. “Before ‘seeing the documents.

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Having looked at not only Exhibit 3, but
Exhibit 3A and 3B, do you agree that the contingency referred
to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related
to NSAM No. 100?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency referred to in 3B,
which is the earlier of the two following documents, is
‘gaid by Mr. Parrott to-be a plan against the contingency that
Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban
scent. And I am going to come to some of the other parts
of that document with respect to the President's interest or
not.

And the contingency in 3A, which is the minutes of the

Special Group, as characterized as follows: "Mr. Parrott also

told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in

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410 First Street,

connection with ‘the possible eneval of Castro from the
Cuban scene, and an updating of the overall plan for
covert operations". 7 :

Now, after having reviewed those documents, and in the
light: of your testimony that it is possible that the
consideration of the possibility of assassination which you
say did occur at some point; occurred in the fall of 1961,
do you agree that at that time the contingency under consider-
ation here was the possibility of the assassination of Castro?

mr. Bundy- Nos y would put it another way. The contin-
gency here is, what would we do if Castro were no longer
there. So that the question of how Castro ceased to be
there is left out of this set of papers. Clearly one of
the possibilities would be assassination, but only one of
them. What we are talking about here, as I read the docu-
ments, is a plan against the contingency that T am not reading
from the Parrott memorandum, against the contingency that
Castro would in some way OF other be removed from the Cuban
scene. NSAM 100, whose language is indirect, nonetheless
indicates: to me at least, rereading it, that the President
wanted to know what was likely to happen if Castro were no

longer there. He was, in other words, trying to get a picture

of whether that would really change things, and if so, in

what way-

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416 First Street, $.E., Wasmington, O.C. 20001

_file identified as the significant memorandum, NSAM 181.

detail that Mr. Smothers suggested
to me. Is NSAM 100 what the White House showed you, or is
it another document? .
Mr. Bundy. No, 181. But let.me be precise. I asked
to see the docunenta relating to -- from the National Security

files relating to August 1962. And they gave me the NSAM

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency to be examined,
therefore, was what would: happen -- would it help the U.S.,
that is the question, if Castro were to disappear?

Mr. Bundy. What would it be like if Castro were to
disappear? The question is open ended.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the conclusion?

Mr. Bundy. I don't remember. My unaided sense of the
matter. is that intelligent political analysis would have
suggested in 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a
single individual in a revolution: complex and general as this
would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful
effects.

Mr. Schwarz. You said that while you were clear the”
assassination was not in fact authorized, you believe that
at some point it was examined, is that a fair characterization,

Mr. Bundy. That isn't the word I used. Talk about. i

Mr. Schwarz. Talk about. And this exercise constitutes

an analysis of what Cuba/the U.S. would be like if Castro were

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Prone (Area 202) 544-6008,

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416 Fiest Street, $.E.. Washington, D.C. 20003

removed.

Mr. Bundy. It constitutes a request for such an analysis.

© Mr. Schwarz. Was the analysis made?

Mr. Bundy . I don't have any recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. If one were exploring the possibility of
assassination, I take it this kind of analysis is the:.sort

of analysis one would wish to make if one was not simply
ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first
instance.

Mr. Bundy. Let me put it another way. If people were
suggesting this to you, and you were curious about whether
it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it
without going any further with that notion itself would be
to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they
thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.

You will notice that this National Security Action
Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence
Agency, less still to the covert part of the Agency, but |
rather to the Secretary of State. And specifically clearly
the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward.

. Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates ~- and you
an opportunity to review this one before, I think --
Bundy. Which one are we now talking about?

Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo,

Bundy. Yes. I have a clearer copy now than I had

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Mr. Schwarz. cates that there was a presidential
interest in the matter: _ And then General maylor told Mr-
parrott that he prefered that the State pepartment, or Mx.
Woodward in the state pepartment, not be tola about the
presidential ynterest in the matter First, was there a
presidential gnterest in the matter? You have no reason to
doubt that there Was, I take le.

Mr. Bundy- rT am sorry, I was reading a note, and fT
didn't hear the last part of the question.

Mr. sohwarZ+ 1 asked really two questions, the first
of which is a direct question, was there a presidential
jnterest in the matter?

Mr. phere was 4 presidential ~~ there was no
dourt in mind that when I write in 4 National security
Action Memorandum a plan as desired, that the desire is not
mine- .

Mr. schwarZ- And the desire is in fact the presidents?

Mr- pundy - Yes.

Mr. SchwarZ- Now, have you any other recollection of
calling your attention to the fall of 1969?

Mr. Bundy: could I go pack and commen
question:

You correctly i out that there was concern to

keep the president’ name out of this process of request,

TOP SECRET


¥

although you’ correctly. point out ‘that the President

one who wanted to know... My impression here is that whatever

Phone (Area 202) 544-6008.

concern we have, General Taylor or I, in the frame of this
language, it was precisely to insulate the President from
any false inference that what he was asking about was
assassination. It is easy to confuse the question. What
are things going to be like after Castro, with the other
* question, and we were trying to focus attention on the
information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen
if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the
frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it.

That is the distinction, I think.

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Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any further recollection of
discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this
matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would
be like if Castro disappeared, or a scenario arising of the

specific subject of assassination.

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. Had you ever heard before I asked you
about the last night about a conversation, an alledged conver-
sation, between the President and the. Journalist Theodore

Schwartz, and or Mr. Goodwin in this timeframe?

Mr. Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers.

Mr. Schwarz. Or in Esquire magazine?

410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, O.C. 20003

Mr. Bundy. Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print.

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Mr. Schwarz. “But you have: no. independent recollection

of that or of the fact that Mr.. Schultz met with the President?

_ Prone (Area 202) 544-6908

Mr. Bundy. No. But I will say this -- and it is-a random

observation -- if I were planning an action of great:sensitivity
I: wouldn't discuss it with any :journalist, I don't think.

Mr. Schwarz. the record from Mr. Schwartz is that the
president said he was opposed ‘to assassination, but that he
brought it up in a conversation with Mr. Schwartz, saying
that he was being encouraged to order assassination.

Now, you have said that you do recall that the subject
was talked about, your words, at some point, and that it
might have been in the fall of 1961.

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't want to say that it was only in

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any given period.
Mr. Schwarz. But that one of the points in which it
might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.

Mr. Bundy. Certainly.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to come to another period
which relates to you.

Mr. Bundy. May I interrupt one second.

could we go off the record for a moment?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Let's put that on the record.

410 First Street. $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Would you restate what I have just stated?

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Mr. Bundy...
have a message through ‘the courtesy of. the “committee from the
White House that there is no objection to answering the
question as to how the White House came to show me the NSC file
When I learned of some of the’ interests of the pockefeller
Commission, it seemed to me that it would be useful if I
could refresh my recollection. I telephoned pr. Kissinger,
who-it seemed to. me would be the right person both in his
capacity as Special Assistant and. the capacity as Secretary
of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft
would show me the documents I needed, and he did not.

Mr. Smothers. Just one question.

This file contained what, now, other than the NSAM?

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Mr. Bundy. The only file that I had time to go through
that I can recollect was the NSAM file, which is a relatively
short one.

Mr. Smothers. For which time period?

Mr. Bundy. For the period surrounding August 1962.
Mr. Smothers. It was given to us as an existing file,
or matters that had heen pulled, or organized --
i
Mr. Bundy. No, they gave’ me the whole file, they were
all documents that f have been involved with, it wag nothing

new to me. But the ones I was looking for were the ones

relating to this subject.

410 First Street, 5.£., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Smothers. Were these only your documents?

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an documents
gigned by you? _

Mr. Bundy. They voulan't be, all signed by me, not
every NSMA was signed by me. But they. would ‘All be documents
for which I had responsibility.

Mr. Smothers. And the timeframe was --

Mr. Bundy. Sufficiently before and after to give me a

picture of the political context of August 1962 in relation

to Cuba.

Mr. Smothers. And do you recall when you saw this file?
Mr. Bundy. Well, as I say, it was in’ the context of my
appearance before the Rockeferrer Commission. And that would

pe early this year. I don't have the dates, and I don’t

want to make a mistake on it.

Mr. Smothers. I am not trying to pin the @ate down.
would be helpful if you remember. But we can ask.

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that we have what we

have done so for accurately summarized, and that you agree

Can I use discussion of an assassination, will you

accept that?

Mr. Bundy. It implies more seriousness and more

sustained argument than I recollect.


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Mr.

Schwarz. So your records are, with respect to

persons asking about---~

Mr.

Mr.

Bundy. OF talking about.
; r

Schwarz. 77" OF talking about assassination, that

dia occur, that it probably occurred on more than one occasion?

Mr.

Mr.

Bundy. Yes.

Schwarz. And that one of the occasions may have

been in the fall of 1961?

Mr.

Bundy. What I recoliect about the fall of 1961 is

this question, what would happen if he is not there?

Mr.

Schwarz. Which would be a relevant question to ask

if one was talking about assassination.

Mr.

of talks

Bundy. Yes. But I have no independent recollection

about assassination, Mr. Schwarz, and I musn't lead

you by saying that I aid.

Mr.

Schwarz. In any event, passing from talking about or

discussions oF. contingencies, to authorizations for action,

and specifically focusing on this concrete period, was

assassination authorized in the fall of 1961?

Mr.

Mr.

Bundy. absolutely not.

Schwarz. In fact what was authorized in the fall of

Bundy. Well, we have a long document

Schwarz. And that is the MONGOOSE program?

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Mr. pundy. “an nat the MONGOOSE ‘programs.

Mr. Schwarz. in connection with the MONGOOSE. program,
you had some. dialogue about, the Attorney General which was
quite extensive. Let me ask you one additional question on
that subject. What was the relationship personally and pro-
fessionally between the Attorney General and General Maxwell
Taylor?

Mr. Bundy. It was very close. f think that they first

et ina hardworking sense when they were ~~ 1 think they
were both members of the committee to look into what happened
after the Bay of Pigs, or if the Attorney General was not
a member he was certainly elosely interested.
Mr. Schwarz. He was a member.

Mr. Bundy. And I am sure the Attorney General was

one of the people strongly favoring the appointment of General !

taylor as the president’s military advisor. They were both

active and ardent tennis piayers, they liked each other, and

(
they visited back and forth. One ef the Kennedy children

jis named for General taylor, T think. There was 4 relation of:

real trust and confidence between them. and the measure of
its strength is that { think it easily survived later very
shart differences over Vietnam.

Mr. Schwarz. Now recognizing that, what I am asking for
you is a matter of opinion and not a fact, given your under

standing. of that relationship. will you give us your opinion

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the likelihood that Rober ‘dn the face.

gaylor's chairmanship tthe 'speckal Group Augmented = was
Maxwell Taylor understood to be the chairman of the special
Group Augmented?

Mr. Bundy. -It certainly is my understanding.

Mr. Schwarz. Would Robert Kennedy in your opinion,
in the fact of Maxwell Taylor's chairmanship of the special
Group Augmented, nave developed 4 pach-channél relationship
with someone else for the purpose of assassinating Fidel
Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with MONGOOSE, you were
a member of the special Group Augmented, were you?

Mr. Bundy. if was- y wasnit its most faithful attender,
put I was a member «

Mr. Schwarad. To the extent that you aid:attend, would
you describe the nature of the meetings, what ind of items
were brought before your what was the process for decision
making?

Mr. Bundy. Tt is very aifficult to do that without
documentary reconstruction. But in the broadest sense, T
think I can do it. The kinds of things would be Cuban exiles,
training them, how united are they, whose the leader, and
what kind of operations against the island are we able to

mount, specific proposals, just because I have seen it in

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_frequent problem. I don't recall that we worried so much

the last two or three days ~~ I saw. ‘sabotage. program which
involved, I think, oil facilities, transportation facilities,

and a couple of other categories ~~ exfiltration was a

about getting the agents in, but theré seems always to be
a great problem about getting them out. . Ana that sort of
thing that I mentioned, propaganda, there was the one island
enterprise -- was Florida doing much good, and how much
does it cost and things of that sort.

Mr. Schwarz. At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr. Harvey
state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I never heard anything from Mr. Harvey in

context in any meeting at any time on that subject.

Mr. Schwarz. And it-was clear that the President was

person basically in control, perhaps not of the details,

of the general program; is that right?

Mr. Bundy. The President had worked it. The day to

day operations where in the hands of different departments
for different categories of programs. The coordinator was
General Lansdale, and the Chairman of the Committee was General
Taylor.
Mr. Schwarz. Would you ‘turn to Lansdale Tab 38, please?
Where is the August 8 document that transmits the new

guidelines for MONGOOSE?

ur. Kelley. that ig Lansdale Tab 20.

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‘activities under the MONGOOSE? |

guidelines.
Mr.. Kelley. 38.
Mr. Schwarz. 38A.

Was there a change in or about August between what was:

characterized as Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up

Mr. Bundy. It appeared to be 50 fom the documents I have
been reviewing. I couldn't give you an independent recollectic
on that point.

Mr. Schwarz. You have got no reason to doubt that there
was some step-up commencing in August?

Mr. Bundy. I think that sounds reasonable. I just
don't have any expertise other than as a reader many years
later.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, with respect to the August 10 meeting,

NM
you have previously testified - - I am not sure you have -~

do you recall the ‘subject of assassinations being brought up?

Mr. Bundy. In the August 10 meeting? No.

Mr. Schwarz. Specifically, do you recall Mr. McNamara
ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?

Mr. Bundy. No. \
Mr. Schwarz. We have shown you notes of Mr. Harvey on

August 14, and General Lansdale's memorandum of August 13

that refers to the liquidation of leaders and certain things

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we

whited out. Do you. rem seeing those?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Do they refresh your recollection?

Mr. Bundy. No. They give me no -= they do not persuade
me. simply don't from that suddenly have any flash, so and
so gaid that, not at all. :

Mr. Schwarz. But you don't have any reason to question
them, you just don't have a recollection, is that fair?

Mr. Bundy. I simply tell you that I was in a large
meeting in which a great many subjects were discussed, and
I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Schwarz. I will pass around Mr. Bundy's notes from
the meeting. If someone thinks they should be marked we can
do that. |

Mr. Bundy. If the Committee is feeling charitable I hope |
they may not go into them.

Mr. Schwarz. ;I don't think they will, but I thought we
would pass them around in case they were.

The Chairman. Let the Senators see them.

Mr. Schwarz. We will make one observation, though. Both |
Mr. Rusk's calendar and Mr. Bundy's notes do not indicate
Mr. Lansdale's being present at the meeting, although the
minutes of the meeting do. And I take it you have no

independent. recollection of whether or not: he was not there.

Mr. Bundy. I have no objection to entering anything in

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anything that m

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thinks is

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relevant. it simply illustrates what the hand will do

while the mind is elsewhere...

Prone (Area 202)

The Chairman. can you identify what you meant by the

words, "Worms who were opposing"... ”

Mr. Bundy. "worms" was a Cuban word, gusanos, and it
was their own word for themselves, Cubans in opposition to
Castor.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, would you mark with a B your

notes of the August 10 meeting.

And Mr. Reporter, will you mark that as Bundy Exhibit 4.

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“'gokng ack to thé. doodle sheet, the
item in your handwritten underlined -- do you have this?

Mr. Bundy. The Lansdale concept?

The Chairman. Is that concept?

Mr. Bundy. Concept. 1 don't wonder you ask.

The Chairman. Do you recall what you meant by that?

Mr. Bundy. My guess -~ and this is a reconstruction
really -- is that that has to do with the Lansdale plan which
we were referring to a minute ago, his long memorandum of
August 8, outlining all the things that might now be done
under the MONGOOSE.

Mr. Smothers. Would that have been planned plus?

Mr. Bundy. We argue about plans -- this is-again
reconstruction -- and I think I saw it in some discussion --
we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-called
B Plus, which I hope you have: for the record, because that
would show what the decision was.

Mr. Schwarz. We do have it.

The Chairman. This was the 10th day of August 1962. And
that was about the time that some concern was given to be
expressed as to the possibility that the Russians were moving
into Cuba -- moving missiles into Cuba. You have on the
memorandum, I think, "USSR will put missiles". Do you recall

what you meant by that?

Mr. Bundy. I think.what that is, a hand following

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ne:
he Chairman.
Where are we, Mr. Schwarz.

please mark
{t-at Lansdale Tab 41.
(Document referred to was marked
.as Lansdale Exhibit No. 5 for

identification.)

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WARD & PAUL

410 Forst Street, $.£., Wasnngton, D.C. 20003

Mr. Schwarz.” Do you’ have

pundy?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.

Mr. Schwarz. This reflects a number of options or
study that the president called for in the light of the
evidence of new block ‘activities in cuba. Was that evidence
connected with the missiles? .

“Mr. Bundy. Weil, there was quite a buildup reported
in the press and in the intelligence initially of Soviet
military personnel, of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. And
the crucial question was, what for and what is coming. And
the Director of Central Intelligence ~~ who was proved in
the end to be right -.~ was almost alone in his belief that
this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that
could hit the U.S. And he raised these questions in the
month of August in a number of different ways. And the
National Security meeting from which this memorandum emerged

reviewed those problems, and as the memorandum itself shows,

the heavy emphasis of the President's concern and of the
Group's concern on the Likelihood that developed and what
should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.
Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters
to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the
characterization, on the soft side, Item 1, which was consider-

ation of the U.S.: pulling its'missiles near the Soviet Union out

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WARO & PAUL

ALO Forst Street. S.E£.. Washington, D.c. 20003

of Turkey, two, on th hard side,

possibilities in connection with Cuba. “Now, is that a

typical exercise that that White Hous
yourself would go through to Look at
ranging from the soft to the very tou
Mr. Bundy. Yes-
Let me say in passing that there
the problem ef getting the Jupiter mi
Mr. Schwarz. Conciliatory, woul

Mr. Bundy. It problem of actual

are military possibilities of invasio

n or some other military
@, the President and
a number of options. --

gh?

was nothing soft about
ssiles out of cuba.
d that be the word?

ly getting them out

which we came to in the following year was one which

demanded great diplomatic energy and

a

the State and Defense pepartments- B

wide range of issues charactically wo

finesse on the part of
ut you are right. A

uld be discussed. And

the President had a habit ef trying to look at problems from

many angles.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you fully in
in connection with what became the mi

Mr. Bundy. Yes-

Mr. Schwarz. Was there any disc
Fidel Castro uring that period?

Mr. Bundy. None.

touch with the president

ssile crisis.

ussion of assassinating

Mr. Schwarz. vias there agreement reached that as part

of the solution to the missile crisis that related to U.S.

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.€., Washington, O.C. 20003

action vis-a-vis. Cuba

pledge. There was an undertaking on our side that if the

offensive capabilities --.and there was an argument on what
those were -~ were removed; we on our side would undertake -~-

1 don't want to present this language as if itis deeply

mathmatically precise -- but there was an undertaking on our
side that there would not be an assassination of Cuba.

.The Chairman. Was that ever published?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. If my language is inconsistent with
what was published, then what was published should take
precedence, because I am’ only trying to report that.

Mr. Schwarz. Did this agreement exclude the sabotage
of Cuban facilities?

Mr. Bundy. Not in my view or in anyones’ view in the
U.S. Government. Just to give you an example of things it
did not exclude, it did not exclude continued surveillance,
which is not perfectly normal in relations between friéndly
states, that you overfly and check out what they are doing.
But surveillance was an explicit and public part of the
necessary concern for U.S. satisfaction with the resolution
of the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing again that this is calling for
an opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did
; anything happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of

either the President or the Attorney General that in your

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Castro?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, 8.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003

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ALO Fust Street, $-E., Washington, D.C. 20003

“ME os

enter into my judgment

Attorney General would: ever have ‘dons that, and I

to say, Mr. Chairman, that the most important point I want to

maka, just from where I stand personalty is that i find the

notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered,

arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with

what I knew of both of them. And as an example, I would cite

Gensral in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most

emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike

of the more careful approach which was aventually adopted by
the. President in the form of a quarrantine or a blockade.

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Bundy, let me put what may be
the same question a little differant way.

You came to know both the President and the Attorney

General rather intimately in the period of your long associa-
tion with them, did you not? ;
Mr. Bundy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you
believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during
that whole period, either one of them would have authorized

the assassination of Fidel Castro? ~

Mr. Bundy. I most emphatically do not.

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or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor

and only one among very Many ~~ the role played by the Attorney


WARD & PAUL

450 Forst Street, S.£., Washington, D.C, 26003

Lat me make a “more general point that: domes: ate tee

wid

another way.

If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do

something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from

the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his

style to keep the government active in looking for ways to

weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if.you, as T under~

stand it, and not éven thosa who pressed the matter most closely

as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell

you that anyone aver said to them, go and kill anyone.

Lat me say one other thing about thase two men, and that ia

that there was somathing that they really wanted dona, they did:

not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I' would

say about their character, their purposes and thair nature and
the way they confronted international affairs that I find it
incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitl
or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if
contrary to averything that I know about their character, thev
had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not
have been in any doubt about it.

The Chairman. Then have you any way to explain to the
Committee, OF any explanation to giva to the Committee, as *%o
why Mr. Helms would testify that he was under, or that he had
no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to

not only dayelop schemes, but to engag? in active attempts to

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410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, B.C. 20003

assassinate castro?

Mr. Bundy. I have no explanation of that.

Senator Mondale. ‘part of our attempt to solve this riddle
of what would appear to be a record at the highast level, which
is at least not directly an order of an assassination plot or
attempt, and square it with the fact ‘that attempts were made,
to seek to understand the personalities and motivations and
methods of operation of people further down the chain of
command.

We have heard quite a few evaluations 168. Mr. Harvey as
a free-wheeling, James Bond kind of operator, and it has been
suggested through some disquiet and apprehension at higher
Yevels about the nature of his conduct. And I would -- I don't
know. I am beginning to have doubts about Mr. Helms whom I

have always admired. There is, for example, a memorandum that

is in the record’ to Mr. Rusk in response to a memo which the

|
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Secretary wrote Mr. Helms following an article appearing in

some Cuban newspaper charging that the Mafia had been hired and
i

used by the CIA to assassinate Castro, in which Helms specifi-
cally and categorically denies flat out that any such relation-
ship existed when in fact it did and when in fact Mr. Halms was |
part of it.

Now, how do we sort this out? Is Mr. Helms someone who

might have, on his own, gone beyond the authority conferred

upon him by persons higher up?

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003

testimony that Mr. Helma and Mr. Harvey met and agreed ~not to

By i ;
“Lf -you, had asked me that question a

year ago, Senator, I would have said in my experience iwith him
he was not such an officer, but I- have no way of dealing with
the kind of thing you have just dascribed.

Senator Mondale. It shatters me bacause I have always
respected him. Because we know that these assassination attempts

occurred. We know that Mr. Helms was a part of it. We have

tell Mr. McCone what they were doing. And then wae have 4
document here ~~ well, that was Cubella -- and then we have a
mamo from Helms to Rusk which, in Minnesota: language looks
like a lie. Now, I just don't know. Maybs there are other
explanations. ~

The Chairman. The memo to Rusk had to do with Cubella
Yvather than the Mafia. .

Sanator Mondale. Is that it? It was not the Mafia?

Mr. Schwarz. It was Cubella, except if you just substitutd

Cubella for the word Mafia.

The Chairmah. What you said otherwise is correct.

Sanator Mondale. But ha was involved personally with
Cubella, wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no.

Is there a plausible explanation?

Mr. Madigan. elms has one.

Senator Baker. Helms' position is that he did not lie,

he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident,

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5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

410 First Street,

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s that right?
Mr. Madigan. r think Realms claimed thet Cubella ts in
the strict context of the memos, operating on his own.

The Chairman. well, I “pelieve rather than speculate, we
had better look back carefully, and that cought, to ba another
subject for Mr. Helms when he returns:

Senator Mondale. Well, then I wilt ‘stand correctad.

senator Hart of Michigan. Would you yield?

T want to make the same record note that I suspend the
comment f made about that document yesterday. I thought it was
a flat-out lie.

Senator Mondale. I did too. 1 withdraw that, and 1 think
it would be good if the staff would write ug a little memo.

Senator Baker. Fritz might like to know that yesterday I
asked Counsel if they, a3 4 combined staff operation, would
prepare for us, and I believe they agreed to do this, prepare
for us two briefs, one citing the tastimony and the exhibit
evidence, that would. support an infefence that the authority
was Presidential: and another prie€, eiting the record and the
exhibit evidence citing the inference that it was not. There
is an abundance of both, to be frank with you. So that we
ean lay them down side by side and make our own separate
judgment.

bo I understand the staff is going to do it?

Tha Chairman. That is right.

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003

w
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be givan 4: break, Mre Bundy:
Mr. Bundy. Do you ‘vant ne to: cone. back, Mr. Chairman?
The Chairman. - Yess pleaser: if you want to take a break
for about five or ten minutes |
anteroom, that will give us a chance to take care of this
business.
(Pause)

(Whereupon at 11: 17 a.m. the witness left the hearing

room. )

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WARD & PAUL

ALO First Street, 5-E., Washington, O.C. 20003

adeveloping problem for

reasons unexplained with, ha Justice Department. I have
already mentioned one aspect of that problem, in connection with
the failure of the Department to supply most of the material
that we have requested, though that request wag put to the
pepartment two months ago, and it has-been -decided already by
the Committea that Mr. Levy and Mr. Kalley should be brought
before the Committee in the hopes that these delays can be
overcome.

The first question before the Committee is when that can
be done. It is suggested that the Attornay Ganeral has Tuesday |
morning available. If it is all right with the Committee, I
would like to schedule his appearance, together with that of
Mr. Kelley, for Tuesday morning.

Senator Baker. vr. Chairman, I don't mean to intrude my

parsonal conveniance into this consideration unduly, but if

the Attorney General could do it at Tuesday noon, Say, it would

halp me. I have a commitment in Tennessee Monday night. Tf

I catch the Tuesday morning plane I can’t get hera until 11:5

If that's not possible, I will cancel Monday-

Tha Chairman. This is procedural in charactar, s0
not altogether important that every member be present. I think |
that from the standpoint of this Committee schedule, Tuesday
morning, the Attorney General and Nr. Kelley would bs good,

would it not?

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410 First Street, S.E.. Wasnington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Miller. Yes,

Senator Baker. Well; why don't you leave it Tuesday
morning. ‘

The Chairman.. We are only informed that he \:has Tuesday
morning available. se . .

Mr. Gitenstein..— I ‘epdke to poug Marvin, one of his
Executive Assistants, and he said Tuesday was a possibility,
Wednesday is a problem because he has a Cabinet meeting and
he wasn't sure about Tuesday and he was going to get back to
us in tha next hour or two.

Tha Chairman. Well, let's seas if we can't sat it up

Tuesday.

Senator Baker. If, you can sat it up Tuesday afternoon and

nobody objects, that would ba batter for me.

‘The Chairman. Well, if wa can, we'll set it up Tuesday
afternoon. .

Senator Mathias. What is that for?

The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for
the purpose of telling us why they can't, or why it has taken
two months and we. still are waiting for the documents, most
of the documents we requested.

Senator Mathias. Well, I won't be here, but that's no

reason.

Senator Baker. Ara you going to be here Tuesday

morning?

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C..20003

i

Senator Mathias. Don't worry aboutiit. —

The Chairman. All right.

fhe second thing I would lika to bring up in this connec
tion:.is that I was informed yesterday by the staff that the
FBI has undoubtedly received instructions that none of its
agents are to be interrogated or interviewad by the staff of”
this Committee. I would like someone who knows the details and
can ba very specific to tell the Committea the exact status of
that situation, how we have!.been informed and if we can rely on
that information as being authoritative..

Mr, ElLif£. Yesterday morning at 9:00 o'clock or shortly
thereafter, I received a phone call from the. FSI's liaison with
this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had

been arranged with the Bureau some relating to tha Huston Plan,

some relating to Martin Luther King matters. I was informed that
|
I had te address this request to the Justice Department in order

to secure approval for these staff interviews.

I than called our liaison in the Justice Department,
Special Counsel William O'Conner, and he told me I might as
well submit these requests in writing, because the Justice
Department would take at least ten days to give us an answer
on these requests and he didn't know what the answer was going
to be.

I then explored with him what some, of the reasons might he

for this delay and what the problems seemed to be, and the’

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WARD & PAUL

@1O First Street, 5.€., Wasnington, o.c. 20063

‘the Committee had notified the Department in its letter of

approve or not {involved two issues. First was that since we

explanation ‘chat he gave me

june 27th that certain cases that we were investigating were .
abuse cases meant that any interviews that would be conducted

in connection with those matters would be considered by the

Department to be demand interviews, and therefore this “b prought
into play the provisions of the Federal Ragulations which
require the Attorney General's ‘approval. ,

1

Then the question as to whether the Attorney General would
had indicated the likelihood of an abuse in a particular area
that the Department itself would have to considsr whathar it
should institute 4 eriminal investigation of that matter, and
then, if so, whether our interview would interfere with that

ongoing criminal investigation.

And second, that the Department considered that any inter-

views undertaken by the Committee in such cases might inadver-

tently immunize the subject of the interview, and he referred

generally to some cases ard we have attempted to do legal

research on those cases and find this to bea a very shaky position

but they have good lawyers over chere and if they want to come

up with a sophisticated argument, We axpect that they could be

able to do that. :
The Chairman. Lawyers can make an argument over anything.

Mr. WLELEE « phat's so. And so the final conclusion is


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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

_investitation. So this is where wea stand on this issue.

that he did anticipate that ‘subpoenas:would:-be trequired.:}.

in every inatance and this position is very difficult for us to
accept because interviews, the low-key interview in the non-
pressure situation is an opportunity to elicit information that
is not matched by the formal subpoena situation, and to be

able to proceed initially by interview and then confirm, under

oath, via subpoena, is just absolutely essential for an effectiv

We later receivad a letter pertaining to an earlier
request for interviews relating to PBI COINTELPRO disruptive

activities where we had asked for certain interviews, and this

letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there
were problems that would have to be resolved, that the charac-

terization of an area of the Committea inquiry as abuse might

significantly alter arrangements of access to witnesses who

are present employess of the Dapartment.

The Chairman. In other words, the thrust of all of this

is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry, the more
difficult it will be to obtain the information, that if we are

concerned about a possible illegality or abuse, then the

Department will make it as difficult as possible for us to

secure tha information.

Mr. glliff.. I might add that it seems *- he in the naturd

of the documents also, the more serious the allegation,’ the more

resistance there is to providing us --

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have not given us the documents on the controversial matters.

Prone (Ares 202) $44-6008°

They've given us plenty of documentation on less controversial
matters.

The Chairman. I think it is fronic, that the resistance we
from the Justice Department is so much more substantial than
ragistance we have gotten from the CIA.

Senator Baker. That's not necessarily so. I agree with

you the resistance is unfortunate and‘ inappropriate, but I
can think of a request for documentation from the CIA that is
now more than a month old and they haven't had the good grace
to tell us no. They have told as nothing.

The Chairman. But on the whole wa've gotten a greater

WARD &@ PAUL .

measure of cooperation from the CIA.
Senator Schweiker. I wonder, dows either counsel know,
Mr. Chairman, whether thé Attorney General or the FBI Director

initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to

Congress about supplying documents or materials to the

Committee?

Mr. Miller. Sanator Mathias can tell you, and Senator

Hart.

Senator Schweiker. Might there be a statement in their
testimony in confirmation, in agreeing to furnish Congress with!

materials of this nature?

410 First Street, $.E., Washington, B.C. 20003

Senator Mathias. Yes, those statements ware made, but let

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410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003

discouraging: talk with the ‘ttorney General a couple of weeks
ago. I want down to: talk te ‘him about privacy legislation and
the Department of Justied at ‘the momant is taking about as hard
a line as any kind- ‘that I ‘know of in the last fifteen years.
Its whole kind of attitude

Senator Tower.. I just wonder if wa shouldn't take this
with them.

The Chairman. I think we should, but I think we should
also, in advance of that, in view of the kinds of signals we
are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that we
believa that these objections that they are raising, or question
that they are raising, are a serious impediment procedurally
to our Committee and that we have every intention of interviewing
such agents as may be necessary, and that if necessary, wa will
subpoena them. ,

Mr. ELIIf££. Our feeling. is it is preferable not to
proceed by subpoena, but we do have a subpoena for one FBI
agent which we brought with us today which we would like to
proceed with.

1

The Chairman. Can you give us the facts of that case?
.Mr. Epstein. This is an agent who is presently in’ Atlanta

H
Gaorgia, and the information wa've received from other witnesses
. 7

was that-in 1964, I: believe, he visited a newspaper editor in-

Atlanta, closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and said he

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, $.E., Washington, O.C. 20003

noted .from reading The Constitution that wa ware picturin

Dr. King as a moral leader and. something of a hero and then this

agent went on to talk in great detail about Dr. King's personal
life which he claimed he had learned from a confidential source,
and our intarast in interviewing. this agent obviously relates
to the circumstances surrounding that visit to a newspapernan,
who directed him to ado that, what the purpose of that visit
was, Whether there was any ‘documentation --

Sanator Baker. Who was the newspaper man?

Mr. Epstein. His name was Eugene Patterson and he was
with the Atlanta constitution at that time. He's now with a
newspaper in Plordida.

The Chairman. Do you believe the subpoena now to be
necessary because of what you have been’ told by the Justice
Department?

My. ELLiff. We have other agents which we would like to

proceed with at the interview level, so wa would like to proceed

at both levels to get their reaction te both types of requests. |
What is their reaction to a subpoena going to be, what is
their reaction to a renewed request to interview going to be?

So we crystallize each issue.

Senator Tower. I still think it might be good for us to

hold that up until we talk about it, gince they ara coming in

Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime, it's not going to push

‘things too far.

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Phone {Area 202) $84-6)

PAUL

WARD &

470 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C, 20003

of it, but unless we get an extension to 1980 for this Committe

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would it be useful, at least,

if it is the feeling of the Committee to authorize you people,
or Bill, today, to say that the Committee barely suppressed its
outrage and that it won't do, and we will see you Tuesday?
Don't wait till Tuesday.

The Chairman. I think something should sabe said, actually.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, it prejudges' the hell out

The Chairman. I think you're right. Something neads to bd
said publicly that the Committee is determined that ws feel
that not only nas time ~~ we've already said, wa've already
made public the letter we have sent. I think a follow-up needs |
to be that we are concerned that impediments. that are now being |
suggested which would interfere with the Committee’s right to |
interrogate witnesses, we do not intend to allow the Committee's
work to. be obstructed and if necessary we will be prepared to

subpoena witnesses though we would hope that that would not

have to be the case.

Senator Baker. And we are going to try to work it out
from Tueday- ;

The Chairman. We're going to try to work it out from
‘Tuesday. .

Senator Baker. TI have a business matter.

The Chairman. So does Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Just one point.

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2

There is this troublesome dictum.in U.S. vs, Nixon about

might be nondiscoverable, all of which seems to bear on

Prone {Area 202) 544-6000

of foreign policy matters,
Am I correct -- I think we're going to hear a lot about
that -- but am I correct in reading that decision that it

really ‘-: almost s:atanda) wholly that they havea the duty to

produce all of the documentation and that case holds for that

proposition, so that in our CIA matters, while they might raisé

some of this dictum, the FBI has no such defense, unless wa're

really trodding on those same grounds.
Mr. Epstéin. Of course, there is another issue in the

Bureau materials, because we're on the issue of investigative

‘files, which has naver been really litigated, and that

' is thea propriety of Executive Privilege when it comes to that.

f

I might add that the importance of the issue of going

to subpoana on these really raises that, because if we go to

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subpoena on documents, then that is going to be worthless unlesg

we know in advance that we are going to win in court in a short

period of time, including whether we have jurisdiction to be
‘there.
Senator Mondale. In other words, you are saying they are

‘| going to raise the Executive Privilege defense, but that was

i the Nixon defense.
i ,
|

Mr. Epstein. 1 think that thev would’ love for us to be

410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

| . .
| the position of having to issue a subpoana for documents,

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eo

410 First Street, $.€., Wasnington. D.C. 20003

WARD & PAUL

17 a eae
becausa them it would be a year. -

. 7 ve ft .
Mr. Schwarz, The Problem i's ‘the iErvin ‘Comittee ‘was found

not :to hava ‘jurisdiction ‘to-isgue thd:subpoena,
The Chairman. Well, we know wa'ra going to do the next

step on that.

Now, may I raise one other point --

Senator Baker. That's not quite: true: The Ervin. Committed
wasn't found to have no jurisdiction or. standing to Seek the
documents or to issue subpoenas, but they failed to carry the
burden of proving that it was required under the mandate of ,
their inquiry.

Now, I have another matter,. Frank.

The Chairman. Wa have two or three matters. Can r
recognize Senator Mondale first, because he had asked it.

Senator Mondale. A few days ago, when the White House

‘

people were here, they showed us a document which we have in

our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had

~~

ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some people in

Chile and had done so with instructions that that order should

go directly to some subordinate of fictals in CIA and should he
done without advising the official channels. And it is thought |
that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was

a top official in the Chilean government Opposed to a coup.

He was a Constitutionalist.

1 '

Schneider was killed, and there was a machine gun in the

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Phone (Aras 202) 54

WARD & PAUL

410 Fivst Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

Now what I would like is,’while we finish this icycle on

assassinations, that we include among our studies of alleged

assassinations this matter.and. we request the dooumentation, of

all appropriate dociments,.-under, the: -category.of assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. Senator, when that document came to our

attention, we questioned a person who expands upon the allega-
tions contained in the documents. I wrote a letter to the

White House and ths CIA. We wanted forthwith to receive i

copies of all such documents relating to the passage of weapons.

We have had no response from the CIA.

‘

Mr. Hills, we met with in the White llouse a week ago

Tuesday or Wadnesday, and I said wa must hava the documants and
‘ha said you cannot have them until you have the briefing on
Chile, because we refuse to accept this as an assassination
plan.

The Chairman. May I make this suggestion, Senator
Mondale?

First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative
that the Committee complete its investiqation on tha issue of
the assassination of foreign government leaders before the
Yacess and issue its report. That puts us under great pressure,|
but if we don't do it, I am going to ask tha Committee to stay

on the job. I would like very much to go to China, that is my

first opportunity in forty years to go to China, and I have

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, $.€.. Washington, B.C. 20003

oe, yes : Bocas cenit Be Ee
such a trip laid on, but I am going to set it aside and ask

the Committee to continue its work right ‘into the recess until
this is done. Otherwise, wa are in a hopeless situation.

Senator Schwaiker. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we don't
finish it by then, we never will.

The Chairman. We never willi

I think we should look into this assassination, it is an
assassination. I think it's part of our vesponsibility to
look into it. But it is not an assassination, whatavear the

CIA input may have been, it is not an assassination of a head
of state, and so therefore I don't want it to, further delay
the completion of this phase of our inquiry.

Now with that in mind, I am in full accord with what
Senator Mondale says.

Senator Schweiker. Could we put it to another phase and
not in this phase?

The Chairman. Yes, we are going to have a phase on Chile,
anyway. It would fit into tha Chilean case.

' : .

Senator Mondale. I+ is significant because if we accept
their interpretation that it is not assassination, then we
avoid an understanding that we had that these documents, all
supposed to be available, then we get into ‘a discovery problem. |

In othar words, I-know what we're getting at, and I would

guess that we should proceed as rapidly as possible, but we

shouldn't hold up the cycla of -~

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“ae

thera is another question

is why I’ don't want to see it

along the same lines; and that

Phone (Aras 202)

cloud this issue, and that is the Glomar Explorer, stopped by
the NLRB proceeding was shown to have stopped in Chile just

| about a week or so before Allende was killed, just by coincidence
for mechanical repairs. I would like to find out that ons,
too.

But this is a whole new thing. This puts us into the
Chile thing. Because I'm just as interasted as you are. I
don't .see that it hurts anything to put it in. a Phase II
proposition with Chile.

The Chairman. And Fritz, we can say that the Committee

WARD & PAUL

regards it in the category of assassination, but we can differ-

entiate it from the initial report, which does deal with
foreign leaders. .
Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, before you go to
a new subject -- and I am’ uneasy raising this -~ but your
reply reminds me, you say that we are going to conclude assassina-
| tions and issue our report before we go on recess. I think thati
disposes too readily of the problem that is going to confront
us in a vary few weeks, and that is having heard all of this,

now what do we do? I don't think we have decided yet how we

are going to present, once we open the doors, we've got to know

how we are going to handle it. I don't think we ought to lock

¢ 410 First Street, $.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

‘ourselves in at the moment to a written report, as we leave town

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the first of August.

Senator Baker. I agree with you 100 percent.

The Chairman. This Committee has got to get its business
done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown is to make it
as difficult as possible for: us to cope with our work. We will
be angulfed completely if we cannot deal with this phase of
our work in the time that we have given it and put it over unt
the ‘fall... What I'm. suggesting -isi:not -just:‘aimply:'the -report ‘of
the Committee. We are going to complete our witnesses, “7.4: .

we have time to issue such a report.

I am also suggesting the recommendations the Committee will

make with respect to this issue. Wa have to put this behind
us. It is just folly not to do it, because we must get on with
the other phases of the report and thera is no reason we cannot
do it. If we can't do it by the end of this. month, then we're
not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged
to then go out on our recass and come pack and take it up anew
in the fall. It isa very clear-cut issue.

Senator Nart.of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to
me is how we report to our peers.

The Chairman. We will take that up.

Senator Schweiker. We discussed that at one meeting. We
had a little informal meeting. Maybe you missed that, Phil.

The Chairman. Thare is nothing that could be gained by

putting it off or defering it or postponing it. [It is very

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|


WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E.. Washington, O.€. 20003

| that we should complete the testimony and make our report and-

: : 4 ed .
clear that wa ara working at a’highly intensified pace in

ordar to gat the necessary avidance, and then there is no reasan
why we can't address ourselves to this question. .

Senator Hart of Michigan. The only reason that I raise
that is that I am as anxious to conclude this chapter, but this
Committee,.as a Committee, then must decide the ultimate
question: do you have open hearings? De you go to a closed
Senate?

The Chairman. That will be a top item of consideration for
the Committae. I have only deferred this discussion thinking
that we had best get all of the evidence first. That is all.

Then we will take it up at an appropriate time and discuss it.

1
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the situation
i

to ba then it is your hope that wa will finish our Executive !
Session testimony before the August recess, but not a report
to the Senate?

The Chairman. No, that is not my position. My position is

recommendation on this issue.
Senator Baker. But without prejudice to a future determina
tion of whether we have public hearings?
The Chairman. Oh, yes, that's always open to us. Rut I
let me make it -- let's not have any misunderstanding there.
‘

It is always apen to this Committee to decide whether

public hearings on this or any other issue should be arranged

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WARD @ PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

the fall. Obviously, we cannot‘have them until fall.

. My personal position is against public hearings on the
issue of assassination. But what I am proposing is that the
Committee make its report, and I think that is a question the

Committee will have to take up and decide, and I think the

appropriate way to disclose thase facts, and I personally beliew
they must be disclosed, is through a@ Yeport ofthe Committee
that is made public, and I think that report should be made
before the recess.

Senator Baker. I don't think we can do that.

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, physically we have got three |
Weeks. Whether we can hear all of these witnesses and sit down!
and prepare the report and have the Committee agree on the
report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it

in three weeks is questionable in my mind. I, like you, Want

to do it, but I wonder if we can do a workmanlike job and do

it in that time.

The Chairman. Well, let me say this,’ that the very request
that Senator Baker has made, and I hope we don't get into a tee |
prolonged ijiscussion on this issue because we Cannot dacida
it right now, but the very report that Sanator Baker has asked
for is now in the process of preparation. That report gives,
by neceSsity, as much of tha meat, the briefs that Senator

Baker has asked for, as much of the Yeport, laying out the

factual, the evidence that the Committee has seen. And I think!

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WARD & PAUL

410 Fast Street, $.£., Wasrengton, B.C. 20003

this can be done. I. know that we have to work very hard to do

it, but I know that our position will be much worse in every

‘way if we fail to do it.

Now without trying to decide that now, let us proceed.

Senator Schweiker. May I make one comment on that, Mr.
Chairman?

I have had vacillating feelings on public hearings, and I
think what I have come down on is this. I think we should go
ahead and issue a preliminary report without public hearings.

I think we should put the matter of public hearings in abeyance
until we get .into' the Chile thing and soma of the other areas
of so- ~called assassinations that may not be Presidential

assassinations per sé and leave the Committee option that we

may well want to elect to go into what happened in Chile

publicly and bring up that assassination if that is what we
determined.

I have trouble determining at this point in time whether
we should have public hearings, and I think we ought to keep
that option open aS we go ‘along.

The Chairman. I have no argument with the Senator on thet

Senator Schweiker. I know. As I Say, it reconciles with
your views and it protects the rights of those who say they

want public hearings.

The Chairman. I have no argument with that.

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WARD & PAUL

S.E., Washington, 0.€. 20003

410 First S$

ra

Senator Baker has another matter.

Senator Baker. It won't take but a brief moment.

I think I owa the Committee =: a report. on the statement
that I made to the Press a few moments ago. I did not intend
to make a statement, but that it becomes impossible to avoid
when you step outside in these circumstances.

The Chairman. It is a good thing for you that Senator

Morgan is not presant.

Sanator Baker. As some of you may know, the news last
night and again this morning carried a story to the effect that:
a Colonel, a retired Colonel in the Air Force by the name of.
Fletcher Prowdy, has alleged by Alexander Butterfield was an
associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of
the CIA when he was at the white House.

I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if
r was surprised by that, and my reply was I had-heard that
story before. I had never commented on it because I had no

proof of it. And it's raally so. As you know, in this ‘town

if you don't have confirmation of it you get into deep

ry

trouble.

Second, that I think it is worthy of looking into, and I
said I thought the Prowdy statement added a new dimension to
the rumors and I thought that. it did warrant further investicga-

tion, that I would recommend that to this Committee at the

1
appropriate time. ; ' |
|

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

“that: and I have also said that I

. Loe ¢ Ba: :
would ask the Committee for an investigation of this charge,

and Bill Miller tells me we have already received from the
Agency a preliminary report that is not satisfactory. We are
pursuing it and getting further information.

Senator Schwelker?

Senator Schweiker. I have a brief matter I «would: Hike to

seek the Committee's advice on.

''. ‘Could-we go ‘offthe-recdrd a minute?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record, )

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, 1 have
an item of business also.

When I was in Europe last week and pursuant to the
direction of the Chairman and staff If tried to contact our
friend QUWIN to try to wrap up that lihk of the chain with, I
must say, the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr. Colby,
who in fact sent a person over there to help uncover this
individual. We know who he is and where he is.

The CIA American contact talked to him, largely for the
reason that he feels extrema loyalty still to the Agency and to
one or two particular people that hea worked with and through.
He opted not to meet with me or anybody else. The feeling is,

both on my part and Mr. Colby's, that if wa got his contact in

that chain to get in touch with him directly that he would talk

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WARO & PAUL

410 First Street, $.E€., Washington, O.C. 20003

important enough for:us' €6"pursue and dtcuwould-probably involve

a couple of people going back over.
Senator Baker. What is your recommendation?
Senator Hart of Colorado. .My own feeling, based almost

purely on the principle that no, stone ‘should ba left unturned

“4g that we should do it.

There ara some unanswered questions. He was here in the
states in '63, he was not confined to one operation and we
don't know what he was doing.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would racommend that we
commission Senator Hart to do that for us. Y

Sanator Nart of Colorado. It would take the cooperation
of one of the witnesses we've had here before to do it. |

The Chairman. What is your racommendation, Senator
Hart, I'm sorry?

Senator Hart of Colorado. That we should do it, that
should get: the cooperation of Mr. O'Donnell.

The Chairman. That wa should do what?

Senator Baker. Interview QUWIN in Europe.

Senator Mathias. Which means somebody has to do it and

O'Donnell with him.

Senator Baker. Take Mathias and Hart.

The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter, if his

cover -- well, one thing this Committee must worry about --

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Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000 Bio

Senator” woul you hope to get out of

it, Gary?

‘Senator Hart of Colorado. What his orders were, what his

what he was doing in the. Congo, what he was doing over and

6 || above his Congo operations, why he was in Florida in 1963.

7 . The Chairman. Well, Gary, when you told me this, you

8 || told me that this man had said to the CIA go between who was

9 | trying to arrange this interview that first ef all he preferred
10 not to be questioned, and sacondly, if he were questioned, he
li} would lie.

12 Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the

\
1z || appointment we were trying to arrange then, and that was purely

WARD & PAUL

14 | because of his loyalties to the Agancy. The case was not

15 | presented well to him. What I am saying is if we took back his
16 | contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk,
a7 | t think the feeling of the person who had made the original

16 | contact is that he would talk.

It was not presented to him in the way that the Agency

20 || wanted him to do it.

21! The Chairman. How valuable do you think this information
a2 is to the Committee? Thi tell you my concern. My concern is

| the one thing I have feared more than anything else, .in this

oe4 | investigation is that we take some action that allows them to

410 First Street, S.£., Wasnington, D.C, 20003

25 || say that we have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad,

TOP SECRET

scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above -- well,


Phone (Ares 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

430 First Street, S.£., Washington, D.C. 20003

“the whole intelli-
gence apparatus would ‘Weed yeukened and the man in the
field would be jeopardized by investigation of this kind.

‘We take that chance with this kind of -- and what do we

learn from it? Is it worth that chance?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, that. question could be i

asked of any witness that wa have in here. Number two, the CIA,|
Mr. Colby and the Chief of Station ingiAmsterdan, have no doubts
that this can be carried out without any veouriey breach what-
soevar. Now that's the CIA. He has not worked for: them in
ten years.

The Chairman. And the CIA would be the first to jump

upon the breach and say, we told you so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the

Committee, I can't tell you what we're going to find out, it
may be zero.

Senator Mathias. ‘The Station Chief does not raise that as!
one of the dangers.

Senator Baker. Yas, thay did.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Nor does Colby.

Mr. Wides. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. The paper that
suggests the possibility that Mr. Win might have been in the
United States in 1963 is a paper involving the activity records
ef William Marvey who will be here this afternoon and that may

be that you can get more testimony under oath from him that will

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WARD & PAUL

410 Fiest Street, S.E., Wasnington, D.C. 20003

shed some light as to whether -he was just using QJWIN as a cover

which is what he told me, the designation for billing, or
whether he's willing to give out some more testimony.

The Chairman. Well, let us get that additional informa-
tion -- ; , ~ | i

Senator Baker. One further point, Mr. Chairman, that might

i
1

be of interest if my memory is correct, and I beliave it is

correct, is that the major commercial cover for the Agency in

ardam\was run by ((thediulyinecompany!
5 0 “2
Senator Hart of Colorado. ‘Frank, he's not worked for the

Agency in ten years. He's not an active agent.

The Chairman. Suppose that he were to tell us something
that is of importance, than how do we cross-examine him? Then
we have to bring him here for cross-examination, then we have
blown his cover.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say ona other thing?
I meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just so my colleagues

\

know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their

back.

I got a call last night from one of the editors of Harper’
magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to!
talk to me, and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and
I intended to call him, but I wanted you to know that.

The Chairman. That's fine.

Let's defer decision right now, on that decision, Senator -

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Let's get our w

morning.

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416 Fisst Street, $.E., Washington, D.C. 20063

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(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the witness re-entered the
hearing room.)
The Chairman. All right.

You understand that the oath still applies to this part

of the testimony?

Mr. Schwarz.will renew the questioning.

‘Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to call your attention now
to 1963, the Missile Crisis is over. Was there another reassess-
meant of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of '63?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, there was.

!

Mr. Schwarz. Again, did that reassessment of Cuban policy

!
involve a lot of reassessment of a lot of options? |
Mr. Bundy. That is my refreshed recollection.

Mr. Schwarz, All right.
We've shown you a lot-of documents, mostly by you in that

period, but some to you as well, and was one of the options the

consideration of the possibility that Mr. Castro might defect

or might ba communicated to in a way that would bring him around
more closely to the United States?
Mr. Bundy. The question of opening communications with
Fidel Castro arises in 1963, I think at more than one time,
and without having my attention drawn to specific documents, I
wouldn't be able to spell that out very much.
Mr. Schwarz. But you agree that it is in there, and it

is in there?

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410 First Street, $-E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Schwarze Now did you also consider, in the spring
1963, as you had in the fall of 1961, what would happen if
Castro died or were killed?

Mr. Bundy. What we did, we certainly posed the question,
the precise form is not clear to me, but what :I'now Know from thie
documents you have shown me, is we posed to the Director of the |
office of National getimates, a Dr. Sherman Kent -~

Mr. Schwarz. And what did Dr. Sherman Kent say in response
to that inquiry?

Mr. Bundy. Well, I would have to look at his response.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

I would like to then mark a string of documents so you
can have that in front of you.

All right, would you mark as item 6, Bundy item 6, the
Bundy memorandum to the President dated January 4, 1963, which ,

appears at Bundy Tab K.

(The document referred to

was marked Bundy Exhibit

No. 6 for identification.)

SECRET


‘ll then talk about

Phone (Area 202)

As Bundy Exhibit 6-A,, the niemorandum for the record,
Meeting on Cuba, 3 April: 63,-.between the President, the Attorney
General, yourself and ‘fiva ors ix other people.

Mr. Bundy. Right.

(The document referred to
was marked as Bundy Exhibit

'

No. 6<-A for identification. ),

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(The document referred to
was marked Bundy Exhibit

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WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.€., Wasnington, D.C. 20003

Ze dum also

dated April 11, 1963 from Mr. jordén Chase to yourself, headed
Cuban--Policy.

(The-documant referred

_to was marked Bundy
Exhibit 6-c for

identification.)


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identification.) \

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Exhibit 6-E for

identification. )


Phone (Area 202) 544-6

to was marked Bundy

Exhibit 6-F for

identification.)

WARD & PAUL

$.E., Washington. p.c. 20003

410 First Street,


Sneanctaen
gore en 4

“April 30th, the document

being dated April 29th and signed by you.
(The document referred
to was marked Bundy

Exhibit 6-G for

identification.)

WARD & PAUL

416 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington. D.C. 20003

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1963, draft memorandum

Possible U.S. Actions in: the Event of Castro's Death.

(The document referred

“to, was marked as Bundy
Exhibit 6-1 for

identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Now, ‘wou had a chance to read them

again, Mr. Bundy?
Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. In summary, Mr. Bundy, is it a fair charac~

terization of these papers that you were, iandithd Standing.

Group was, examining the question of what the situation would
be if Castro were to die?
Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we Ware examining,

certainly.

Mr. Schwarz. That was .a-gamut: of matters "I: tried to

pose at the beginning of this line of questioning?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. That was one of the things you were consider

WARD & PAUL

ing?
Mr. Bundy. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. This was a period of time, as the fall of

1961 may also have been, when people asked about or talked
about assassinations as 4 means of causing Mr. Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy. I am not aware of much conversaticn on that

subject in the spring of '63, so I would have to take your

word on that.

Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you, I have no word on that.

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think there was much discussion in

WY the spring of *63 on that subject.

410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, B.C, 20003

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's see if we can agreé on some

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Phone (Area 202)

WARD & PAUL

5.€., Washington, D.C. 20003

410 First Street,

things first.

Can we further agrae that the ultimate conclusion was that
Castro's death would not be desirable for the united States?

Mr. Bundy. The recommendation, or the assessment, which
comes back from the Offica of National Estimates, makes it
clear that the odds would be that, upon Castro's death, his
prother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with
Soviet backing and help take over control.

Then it goes on to say that there might be divisions and
splits, but that it was unlikely that anti-Comminist forces
would be able to take over without extensive U.S. help and
probably U.5. military intervention.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, I would Like to avoid having to go through every
single document.

Mr. Bundy. 50 would I.

Mr. Schwarz. And see Lif I could get you to agree with
this statement. You do agree that you were looking at 4

situation that would exist as if Castro were killed?

Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were looking at.

Mr. Schwarz. And in connection with that, was his being

‘killed by assassination one of the ways which you understood

he might be killed?
Mr. Bundy... f don't have any recollection of that point,

of it being on our minds.


phone (Area 202) 544-6000,

WARD & PAUL

S10 First Street, $.E., Wasnington, O.c. 20003

Mr. Schwarz. ALL right.

Then why wera you looking at the question 6fshis being
killed? Was there something known?

Mr. Bundy. I really don't have any independent of it.
My sense of events in 1963 is that the internal pressure from
within the Administration to "do something about Cuba" was
very much lower. There was, however, external pressure. There
wag political pressure in the United States, critics of the
Administration were making speeches about how not enough was
being done and we must get rid of the Castro regime, and as f
think I may have said earlier, and IT would like to say now,
I think that one reason for getting | an 1 estimate of this kind

emer ore mnie tet ME OE wee re

was to get it on ‘record, from, the point of view of those who

did not think we should be fussing | with ‘questions of “gasassina-

tion or anything like ite 3 s not a sound policy,
AAR wee _ " ”

cnet tae A ee Bene) nog na

leaving aside its moral meaning and wider political meaning
from the point of view of the narrow objectivas we had in Guba.
Mr. Schwarz. Who waa: taking the position. that’ assas8ina~

tion could be --

Mr. Bundy. I have no racollection on that.

Mr. Schwarz. But someone was?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.

Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection of any position
being taken pro OF con?

Mr. Bundy. 1 have no recollection of any specific


s

conversation or position that. triggered this particular

inquiry.

The Chairman. Well, isn't it perfactly plausible that

prone (Area 202)

this inquiry sought to examine what the situation would be in
the event of Castro's death by whatever maans it might occur?
Does: it necessarily follow that because the Administration
was making such a4 plausible inquiry against such a contingency
that might arise at any time that therefore it was within the

mind of the Administration to kill Castro? I don't see the

connection. ;
——

Mr. Bundy. Well, “you make my point, Mr. Chairman. That'9

just my point.
t

‘

Mr. Schwarz. Now in- connection with that, would you look

WARD & PAUL

at your own Agenda for::-the ‘April: 19th meeting, 6-G?
Under item 1 -~ you distinguish between item 1 and item

2. Item 1 is the possible use of contingencies for the

achievement of wider political objactives; and item 2 is programs |

that might be initiated by the united States government.

I call your attention to the fact that the reference to
the possible death of Castro is one of the items under item
1 and not under item 26

Mr. Bundy. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And do you regard that 4s relevant to the

exchange you had with the Chairman just now?

810 Fiest Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003

Mr. Bundy. It seems to me it bears out the Chairman's

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Phone (Area 202)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington, 0.C. 20003

point, that you’ have a number of possible things that might

happen, that you would then have something to do something
abouts or to act in the light of. ‘The other are the things
that you might do without waiting for soma contingency to
arise. .

Mr. Schwarz. Now the only remaining question I have on
this group of documents is, how was it that the subject of the
death of Castro -- do you investigate the possibilities of the
death of foreign leaders as a regular matter?

Mr. Bundy. Well, the question »)‘*After: Stalin,. What?" was
the staple of discussions in the 1940's, averywhere, academies
and I would assume inside the United States government; the
question after DeGaulle was a question about Western European
policy for a graat many years. And one could pick. - smaller
figures, more and less controversial, and have the same kind of |
question coming up, in a situation in which a particular
individual - .- is as dominant a figure in a set of events which |
it had the two, quite contrasting but heavy consequences of the |
Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, it doesn't seem to me to
be an irrational question to ask, without any relation as to
whether the United States itself would have any active advisory
role or .any role whatever in having that event come to pass.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Would you mark as Exhibit 7 the September 20 document --

which is the page -- which states the assassination of Castro

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Prone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

ALO First Street,

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to was marked Bundy

Exhibit No. 7 for

identification.)


Mr. schwarz. - Me. Kelley, ou take over thea ques~
eioning of Mr. Bundy ¢ with the permission of the chairman, on

that particular series of documents + which is at the heading:

september 2nth '63 on the chronology:
Mr. Kelley> Yes.
bet ma show Mr. Bundy the documents - .
Mr. Sohwar2- Well, firsts will you tall us where the
documents are: pecause I couldn't find them under the heading |
you gava US-
Mr. Kelley: Yes.
In bundy pook 2, there is at Tab A the memorandum dated |
July 25th, 1963 from Mr. Georg? penney to Mr- crimnins ,

entitled "Cuba, possible Courses of Action.

WARD & PAUL

i]

|

at Tab B of Bundy pook 2 is 4 memorandum dated September
'

20th, 1963, from Gordon Chase to Mr. Bundy, ana this memorandum |
. i ’

summarizes the Denney memorandum of July 25th-

Mr. Bundy, did you review these documents with members of
the staff earlier this week?

Mr. Bundy- Yes, I did.

mr. Kelley: po you have any independent recollection of
these documents?

Mr. Bundy. Well, 28 t read 4 document of this kind, which

comes to me from a member of my own staff, I am very often

24 | yeminded and I am in this case, that this is a document which

as | 1 aid review and that it reflects his arguments as t then hearé


Kelley. Who was Mr. Gordon Chase?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Bundy. Well, he was an assistant of mine at the time
with special responsibilities for Cuban affairs, and perhaps
more widely in Latin America. He was at that time a foreign
service officer secunded to the White House.

\Mr. Kelley. Did he have any responsibility for covert
actions? ~

Mr. Bundy. No.)

Mr. Kelley. Did he provide staff assistance ‘to you with
respect to the Special Group or the Special Group (Augmented)?

Mr. Bundy. Well, he may have done in gome excaptional

case when I needed his opinion on a matter, but in ordinary

WARD & FAUL

cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.

Mr. Kelley. What kind of things did he do with the
special responsibility for Cuba? What did that‘ involve?

Mr. Bundy. He would be keaping in touch with the Cuban
Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State,

the MONGOOSE operation having been @isbanded. He would have

D.C. 290003

been responsible for keeping me alert to matters that were
proceeding in that Task Force that might have an implication for
the White House.

Mr. Kelley. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?

Mr. Bundy. well I don't want to get this wrong, but I

think by this time it was Mr. Crimmins.

TOP SECRET |

410 Fisst Street, 5.£.. Wasmington,


WARD & FAUL

D.C. 20003

410 First Street. 5.E., Washington.

Mr. “eximmins was “the State Department and

he was @ foreign service officer?

Mr. Bundy- That is right.

Mr. Kelley- The Cuban mask Force, what Was that?

Mr. Bundy. Well, it was the successor to the MONGOOSE
group, put much 1ess oriented toward secrat operations than
MONGOOSE, and the review of secret operations then came back
under the complete control of the Special Group, by now, 1
think, called the 303 committee, which was 4 Lineal successor

of 5412.

Mr. Kelley- I call your attention now to Mr.
‘
memorandum, which is at gab A in Book 2, and it is

tt not that the memorandum is to Mr. crimmins?

Mr. Bundy - Right.

Senator Tower- Do you have any independent recollection

of this memorandum?

Mr. Bundy® - tT have no knowledge that I ever saw it, and I

did not find it familiar when t looked at it the other day.
Mr. Kelley. It is true, is it not, that Mr- Chase's memo
to you summarizes this much longer memorandum by Mr. Denney?
Mr. Bundy. Is that what it is?
Mr. Schwarz. Does it do that, Mr. Kelley, because Chase
memorandum starts by saying, here ig a summary of Paul Sakwa's

Mr. Kelley. 1 think that is an error in Mr. Chase's memo; !

1 because it is clear that what is being summarized here is Mr.


Phone (Area 202) 544-6000,

WARD & PAUL

mington, O.C, 20003

es

416 First Street, $.E

mamorandum.

Bundy. Let me rsuggest that:you. focus ‘on: Mr«: Chase's

memorandums with respect to my: recollection ‘and responsibility,

that ig: icledrly ‘the: operative’ document.

Mr. Kelley. With respect to Mr. Chase's memorandum, in
his summary of the rationale of proposals, he: states, as second ,,
"the present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes
him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded
to avoid Castro's martyrdom."

Bo you have any recollection of why he would exclude
assassination? Does that imply to you, or do you recollect,
whether Castro's assassination was being considered sand: here

is a staff paper excluding it, because. someone asked them to

| consider it?

Mr. Bundy. No, I think it's a simple statament of what
I would ragard as a rationale assessment of the situation by
whoever the original author was, and certainly by the staff
man with respsct to a subject that emarges directly from the
notion that he is an operational target, whatever that means
and goss on to say, but we don't mean assassination, because
it would maka him a martyr, what other reasons © against: that
there may be. It doesn't seam to me that you can read the
statement that assassination is excluded as an inference that
somebody else is including it.

Mr. Kelley. That's all.

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‘Atwood, or Mr. Atwood, as he may have then been called, and

the document says
it is excluded. ,
Mr. Kelley. ghat's right.
Mr. Schwarz. Nowvat that period of time in the fall of

1963, were you aware that through the offices of Ambassador

through the offices of a French journalist called Jean Daniel,
another effort was being made to establish contact with Mr.
Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I remember the Atwood effort, as I racolilect
that he came to see me about it. I don't recollect specifically
Jean Daniel, although it strikes a chord ag you mention it.

‘Mme. Schwarz. What the purpose, very briefly, of Mr.
atwood's effort?

Mr. Bundy. Wel}, as I understood it, he had been approached
by someone he knew from Cuba and had been givan to under stand

that there was interest in, Castro had an interest in, opening

communication, and he was exploring with us whether he could be
encouraged to undertaka such an explanation.

Mr. Schwarz. And .did you encourage him?

Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our massage to him, or our
if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's |
decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impression is that

we were interested, and that we did want him to explore it without

|
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engaging the President any more than he could help.

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Mc. Schwarz. But was the President in fact informed and
in fact approved the actions taken?

Mr. Bundy. That is my understanding.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it your understanding or your recollection

Mr. Bundy. It is my recollection, but it is a recollection
that is refreshed by what I have learned and hearing more about
it in the last few days.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, were you told, in the fall of 1963,
that assassination devices had been requested by a Cuban for
the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro, and that assassination |
devices ware offered to the Cuban in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Bundy. No. .

Mr. Schwarz. Now again, here, calling for a matter of
opinion, as a matter of opinion, do you believe that at the
same time, at a possible rapprochement with Mr. Castro was heind
pursued, the President would have authorized or permitted the

passage of assassination davices intended for their use on

Mr. Castro?
Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.
Mr. Schwarz. TI have nothing further on Castro.
Chairman. Is there more?
Mr. Schwarz. Well, on Trujillo and Diem, with respect to
Diem --
Mr. Smothars. Well, if you're going on to something else,

there are a couple of things.

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“Going back to ‘earli dum: which

is in the pundy matarials, bot it has’ been ited about
previously ina Committee hearinge a memorandum which will be
identified as 4 Memorandum for the Record, dated 16+:October
1962, a memorandum signed by Mr. Richard Helms.
(the document referred
to was marked Bundy
Exhibit No. 8 for

identification. }


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Phone {Area 202) 544-6008

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Mr. Smothers. Mr: Bundy, I am going to read through this

‘

memorandum and ask you a couple of questions. about that. It's
a memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE.

Reading. from this memorandum, Mr. Bundy, reading from
Paragraph 2: “The Attorney General" -- well, let me read the
entire paragraph. ,

“The Attorney General opened the meeting” -- we're talking
about a MONGOOSE meeting '-- by expressing the general dissatis-
faction of the President,” --"'dissatisfaction of the President’
in quotes ~-- “with operation MONGOOSE."

Mr. Bundy. What date are we at? The date?

Mr. Smothers. The date of the memorandum is 16 October
1962.

"He pointed out that the Operation had been underway for a
year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been
no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been
attempted had failed twice. Ha indicated that there had been
noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of
intelligence, but that other actions had failed to:influence.
significantly the course of avents.in Cuba. He spoke of the
weekly meetings of top officials on this problem, and again
noted the small accomplishments, despite the fact that Secre-
taries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and he

personally had all been charged ‘by the President with “finding

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a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal

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appointment by the president a year agow |

"The Attorney General then stated that in view of this
lack of progress, ha was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more
personal attention. In order to do this, he would hold a meeting
every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representa-
tives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwich,
Ryan and General Johnson) ."

Now, the best of our information, Mr. Bundy, is that these
meetings were in fact held on a daily basis as indicated, and
that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working |

i
group noted.

Were you aware of such meatings?

Mr. Bundy. I have no independent racollection of them, put

that does not sound implausible to me at all.

Mr. Smothers. It doesn't sound implausible to me that the |
Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group to
develop MONGOOSE activities with him?

Mr. Bundy. To report to him how they were getting on, and |
to see if he couldn't, by listening to those reports and keeping
a lively -- keeping his lively concern in their consciousness
move the thing more rapidly.

Mr. Smothers. This is your interpretation of «giving More ,
personal attention to it?

Mr. Bundy. Exactly.

Mr. Smothers. You say you had. no knowledge of these in

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Mr. Bundy. I didn't say that. I said I had no independent

Prone (Area 202) 544-6 7

recollaction of them.

Mr. Smothers. They did not coma to your attention at that
point? ;

Mr. Bundy. I didn’t say say that. f don't know that they

I don't know that they didn't,

Mr. Smothers. But your recollection at this point is that
they did not come to your attention?

Mr. Bundy. That is not my recollection: I don't recall
that one way or the other. .

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

Let me ask you then about your knowledge of the Lansdale

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situation.
Do you know General Lansdale?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Do you know his reputation for truth and

honesty?

Mr. Bundy. I don't think I have any -- his reputation for-
truth and honesty, if you ask me the question as one asks it
about, you know, all kinds of people, I have no reason to
question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have
Seen attributed to him in racant weeks.

Mr. Smothers. Wall, let me put it this way. Would you

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

beliave General Lansdale under oath?

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“Te woula depend on cwhat he said.
Mr. smothers. “It would dapena upon what he said.
Is your experience that Ceneral Lansdale is trustworthy
only on a selective basis?
Mr. Bundy. You are asking me questions about matters
assentially in which his testimony, as I hava seen it reported, |
Mr. Smothers. Wo, I am not asking you about his testimony

iam asking you if you would believe him under oath, based on

your knowladga.

Mr. Bundy. It would depend upon what he said, and if it °
was a matter on which I had my own knowladge.

Mr. Smothers. Without regard to matters that General
Lansdale has testified to befora this Committee, based on your
knowledge of him, your working relationship with him, your
knowledge of what othar People know of General Lansdale, his
Yeputation in the community, if you will, would you believe him
under oath?

Mr. Bundy. I would currently have to say that I could

give you a definite affirmative answer to that question.

Mr. Smothers, That's fine.

Now, let's go back to the period of General Lansdale's
appointment.

General Lansdale was appointed as the coordinator of the
Special Group, the Chief of Operations.

After General Taylor's efforts had been under effort for

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Prone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

20003

430 Forest Street, S$... Wasnington, D.C.

some time, six months, seven months, General Taylor comes in,

I balieve, in July after he completes his Bay of Pigs examina-
tion, General Lansdale is appointed by tha Prasident at the end
of November.

Do you have any present recollection of the circumstances
surrounding that appointment?

Mr. Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discussed earlier.

Mr. Smothers. To tha bast of your knowledge or recollectia
aid the appointment of this Chief of Staff or Chief of Operation
reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the part of
either the Attorney General or the President?

Mr. Bundy. No, the opposite. Ganeral Taylor had heavy
responsibilities in his general responsibility as military
representative of the President. He was made Chairman of the
Committee to keep oversight on this. It was inappropriate
entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he

should be the day to day action officer.

Mr. Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General |

Taylor's involvement with the development of the Special

Group. (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor?
Was it really General Lansdale's responsibility?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any knowledge of the details of
the operations of the staff. It was clear to me, and I think
to everyone else, that the man in charge of that operation, of

that Committee, was General Taylor.

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410 First Street, S.E., Wasnington. D.C. 20003

Mr. Smothers. oxay.”

Just one final series of questions.

If we might, Mr. Bundy, go back to our conversations
Yegarding your request to sea documents prior to your testimony
before the Rockefeller Commission, when you talked to Mr:
Kissinger, precisely what did you request of him?

Mr. Bundy. I said to him -- and again I cannot be precise
and I thought that there were going to be questions with respect!

|
“to which it would be much easier for me to give helpful .and more

accurate answers if I could have access to appropriate document
since I have taken no documents of that character, no official
documents of that character, from the White House. And he said

he entirely agreed and he made tha appropriate arrangements.

Mr. Smothurs. Did you ask for a timeframe for these
documents?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that I did, but when I came to
look more closely at what I needed to see, as I told you
earlier, it related specifically to the period around August
1962.

Mr. Smothers. Did the White House make the selection of
documents for you?

Mr. Bundy. No. The White House handed me a file of
documents which covered the pariod.

Mr. Smothers. They handed you a file of documents covering

roughly the August 1962 period?

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410 First Street, 5.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr: Bundy. That's right.

Mr. Smothers. Had you made a request for documents
covering this August '62 timeframe?

Mr. Bundy. I must have told him the rough period with
which I am concerned. Again, I don't understand the drift of
your question.

Mr. Smothers. Well, tha drift of my question is, if indeed
you selected the August 1962 documents, why did you select |

that?

Mr. Bundy. Because Counsel to the Reckefeller Commission
had directed my attention to thea period.

Mr. Smothers. To August 1962?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. In the file that centered roughly on this
point in this timeframe, included NSA memo 181, was the file
put together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?

Mr. Bundy. The file that came into my hands, whether
they put it together or whether it was a file drawn off the
shelf, I can't tell you. You'll have to ask them.

Mr. Smothers. Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf
File?

Mr. Bundy. I don't know what it was.

The Chairman. What is tha object of this series of
questions, Curtis?

Mr. Smothers. Wall, I am trying to determine, Mr. Chairman,

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what Mr. Kissinger was requested to do and what actually
happened.

The Chairman. Don't we have that now in the racord?
It just seems to me like wa're going over the same series of
questions.

Mr. Smothers. Well, since we don't know what was in the
file --

Mr. Bundy. Well, I thought I said-the file was a file of

National Security Action memoranda, a file which you already

have here.

Mr. Smothers. Relating to August, 1962?

Mr. Bundy. Uh-huh.

Mr. Smothers. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter ~~

Mr. Bundy. Sure.

Mr. Schwarz. You know Mr. Trujillo was killed. Did you
know or do you know that thea persons who killed him had
obtained some weapons from the United States?

Mr. Bundy. I did not know, and do not now know, of my
own knowledge that that was the case.

I did know, or at least I believe I must have been on
notice because of documents again that you have shown me, that
weapons by a decision of the Special Group in early January
had been or were being passed to Dominican dissidents.

| ;
Mr. Schwarz. Were you involved in the sending of a telegram

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to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to tha

actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo?

Prone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of it, and when I saw
those telegrams in discussions with your staff, they stirred no
recollection on my part.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to state that Mr. Richard Goodwin |
is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for
that period of time?

Mr. Bundy. It appears that way to ma, although that

appears more from the fact that important documents seem to
have been addressed to him than because of my own recollection

that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone

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conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity
with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during
that spring.

Me. Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Mr. Bissell in

Pebruary, 17th February ‘61. It is Tab R of the Trujillo
Book 1 of 2, in which you were informed that the dissidents
had been told by the United States that it was prepared to
provide them with a limited supply of arms and equipment.

When you got such information, did it trigger in your mina -

Washington, O.C. 20003

anything to the effect of, let's be concerned about how they're.

going to use those weapons, or did you just accept the informa-

416 Fisst Street. S.E.,

tion and do nothing about it?

Mr. Bundy. It is clear that the information was sent to

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410 Finest Street, SE. Washington, D.C. 20003

me and it was clear, in. that. ‘sense, that I had become responsi-

bie for knowing what was ‘in the document, but I have to say that
as I reread it I have no recollection that I aver, in fact, did

read it at the time. Whether that was because of tha flow, the
very heavy flow of other documents or because I passed it to
someone. else or because T just simply didn't get to it, I cannot
tell you, but I have no recollection‘ that I saw it. '

Mr. Schwarz. You did maka a request for a briefing paper?

Mr. Bundy. It must have been done,and it was either done
in my name or TI did it.

Mr. Schwarz. So you're not capable -- you don't remember
it. Are you capable of.making a comment on my question, which
was having received information that arms had been supplied --

Mr. Bundy. Having that information on Ty desk, anyway.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

In the light of hindsight, should persons in your position

when they receive such information inquire into the purpose for

which the arms are to be used?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would -- and my own guess on this, and
it's not much better than that, is that the decision which had
been taken only a week befora the new Administration came in,
in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in some fashion, with
the Special Group as reconstituted after the change in
Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew

that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican Republic

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Prone {Area 202) 544-6000.

410 First Street, $.€., Washington, D.C. 20003

46

and I would have to add that I did not, or I have no recollectioh
and I think I would recollect it, if I had engaged in a careful
inquiry to find out just what, who, when where and so on did
not do that, and I think -- you ask in hindsight, L.think it

would clearly ba important to have that kind of understanding,

} .
bacause as I understand the evidence that has now been developed

there was a level of communication and connection with the

plotters in the Dominican Republic which exceeded what political
authority appears to have expected or believed was going on.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you agree with one further point,
that it is very difficult for the United States to control
events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident
elements, and in particular once it's made a dacision to
cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms?

Mr. Bundy. I think that -- one thing, I don't want to
generalize here, but I think -- I would agree with the generali-
zation, let me put it that way, if I could add that in the case |
of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize
retrospectively that there was no way to hava any communication
with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if you
propose to be an effective dissident in that country under that
ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly violent
action.

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Trujillo.

One question of Vietnam.

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410 Fiest Street, S.E., Washington, 0.C. 20003

closely with the President and

‘his instruction tof: some of

“Now Diem was killed. It does not appear to

e United states wanted him killeds.
Is that fair? i. .

Mr. Bundy. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz... But the United States did want him deposed
iff a :coup could be. successful? Is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. The-United:States really had two views. Right
up tothe end, the United States hoped, hoped against hope, as
it became more and more difficult to communicate with Diem,
that he would see the, or come to share the kinds of argument,
that were mada to him, primarily by Ambassador Lodge, and that
a change in his government anda \iower, much lower, role for
his brother~ and sister-in-law would assist him in recapturing |
public confidence. That was always the preferred solution.

As prospects for that became more and more dim, the United
States did come to take the view. that there might be no alter-
native to a coup, and it certainly had the view that if there

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