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Tioa-10338-10018 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992, Mere

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OCI No. 1586/64 4
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY uy
Office of Current Intelligence

4 June 1964

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Cuban Subversion in Latin America
. Since July 1963

1. Cuban subversive efforts in Latin America
are ‘continuing at a steady pace, despite recent
major setbacks in such countries as Venezuela and
Brazil, From July 1963 through December, when
Havana evidently believed a "second Cuba" was likely
in Venezuela, Cuban propaganda stressed.the inevi-
tability of Castro-inspired revolutions in the ‘
hemisphere. Since the first of this year, however,
Cuban leaders have muted direct exhortations to vio-~
lence and have emphasized other policy priorities.
Nevertheless, the Cuban potential for subversion in
Latin America remains high.

2. In his speech of 26 July 1963, Castro re-
captured much of the militant tone of his speeches
in late 1962. He made it clear that he regards
Cuba as the main source of inspiration and guidance
for inevitable revolutions in the rest of Latin
America, He claimed that what has been done in
Cuba can take place "exactly the same way in many
Latin American countries." The hemisphere's mili-
tants, he said, must take advantage of conditions
presently favoring revolution and "open the breach."
On 28 September, Castro said that while "imperial-
ists believe they can destroy the Cuban revolution,"
the Cubans believe that before that could be acconm-
plished "many other revolutions like ours will ap-

. pear on the. continent." On 24 November, Che
Guevara said the spreading of revolution in the
hemisphere "is also our responsibility and it is
part of our daily preoccupation."

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3. What emerged from these and other Cuban
pronouncements was the apparent conviction of
Castro and his aides that further Communist revolu-
tions in Latin America are inevitable, that Cuba
can speed up the process, and that in Cuba's own
interest it is urgent that revolutionary action be
initiated wherever possible and as soon as pos-
sible. It is logical to assume that despite recent
official soft-pedaling of the issue, the basic
Cuban viewpoint remains the same. Cuban leaders
continue to believe that the very presence of their
regime will inspire other Latin American revolu-
tionaries to action, and undoubtedly will continue
to give assistance to these efforts.

4. Cuba's policy of revolution in the hemi-

_ sphere has suffered severe defeats, however, since

the 3-ton Cuban arms cache was discovered on a
Venezuelan beach on 1 November 1963. For example,
OAS action stemming from that discovery is pending;
despite the Cuban-supported terrorist campaign,
constitutional government in Venezuela was success-—
fully transferred following President Leoni's dra-
matic election victory last December; and the out~-
breaks of violence in Panama last January failed to
upset constitutional processes there. The April re-
volt in which President Goulart of Brazil was over-
thrown was also a severe defeat for Havana. These
reverses may have produced a feeling in Havana that
a breathing spell is mecessary. In addition, Castro
may have peen cautsones to moderate his revolutionar

year ‘has "Been "{osienated "the year of the economy."
This and Cuba's all-out campaign to obtain needed
commercial and industrial goods from West

also may be factors prompting Havana to lessen its
public expressions of support for revolution. More-
over, Castro may believe that a soft-pedaled policy

on revolution now may pay dividends after the US
elections in November. He probably assumes that
conditions for a US~Cuban modus vivendi--on his
terms--will be more favorable then.

5. Nevertherless, evidence presented in the
accompanying country-by-country index shows that
Cuba has continued since the first of the year to
promote, finance, and otherwise support pro-Castro
groups and individuals in Argentina, Brazil, (be-
fore the April revolt), Chile, Panama, British

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Guiana, and other countries. Indeed, on at least
two recent occasions, Che Guevara was quoted as
restating familiar Cuban views on revolution. In
an interview published in an Italian newspaper in
March, Guevara reiterated that the road to "national
liberation" in Latin American must take a turn to
violence. He emphasized that violence would be
"necessary" in "almost all" Latin American countries,
for "there is no other way." In an April interview
in Algiers, Guevara said: "It is very, very, very,
very, but very, hard to achieve liberation in Latin
America by employing peaceful means."

6. A number of reliable clandestine sources
have provided information on the many facets of
Cuba's subversive effort in Latin America, The most

serio xm _ of subversion from Havana is its, txrain-
Ing of other Latin Americans in the practical_arts_
of guerrilla warfare. As_many as 1,500 received
such training” in “1962. It is estimated that several
hundreéd” GE iirico unre EE ere PPaSNS who

traveled to Cuba in 1963 also received such train-
ing. It has been learned that_"scholarship students"
who go to Cuba ostensibly to study "agriculture" re-
ceive “guerrilla warfare training. This instruction
encompasses _ the use and management of communications
equipment ; “the techniques of military - intelligence,
including methods of establishing intelligence net-
works to obtain information from peasants; training
in a variety of weapons, including rifles and small
arms, which aré“Yeadily available in most Latin
American countries; training in explosives, and
training in guerrilla _tactics, including instruc-~
tion on how to” “S6perate “independently in the country-
side for extended periods of time. A separate train-
ing school reportedly trains Communist. youth 3 from
other “Latin _American_ countries. The school's one-
yédr course is divided between the study of Commu-
nist theory and practical training in political
agitation and subversive activities. Reports from
returning trainees confirm that the Cubans are de-
veloping extensive files on most Latin American
countries on subjects pertinent” to “the” planning

and development of further, subversive activity
Detailéd-quéstionnaires submitted to GipmEsReemmry
trainees requested comments on possible air drop
zones, weather conditions, locations of military
bases, competence of local authorities, border and
frontier controls, and a long list of similar ques-
tions, Ov casa designed to build up a body of basic
knowledge oan srghepeAS

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7. \GLatin Americans returning to their coun-
tries after having received training in Cuba often
take a round-about route to conceal the fact hat
the have been | in Cuba . : aibete

as weg: iteaes bic TED They then go through
Europe to some other Latin American country, from
which they enter their own, Cuba gives these
travelers documents which show no indication that

they had been in Cuba. Some guerrilla warfare

trainees are chosen for intelligence assignments
and are given Special training in clandestine cam-
munications, which permits them to. maintain a con-
‘tact with Cuba after they have returned home.

8. In addition, Latin Americans who receive
guerrilla warfare and other types of training in
Cuba are encouraged, on their return home, to pass
on what they have learned. Cuba-trained men are
known to have been conducting g Such training in
Costa-Rica; “Panama,” British Guiana, Peru, aid” élse-
where, “thus, ‘the Castro-oriented revolutionary “ef-
fort in Latin America has a potential for steady
growth even if there should be a lessening in the
actual training program in Cuba,

9. Numerous reports have alleged that Cuba
is supplying arms clandestinely to some Central
and South American-based extremist groups. Only
in the case of the arms cache discovered in Vene-
zuela on 1 November, however, has there been in-
controvertible proof of Cuban complicity in such
efforts. A good deal of the undeniably extensive
arms traffic which goes on in several areas of the
hemisphere is basically a continuation of long-
established patterns of arms smuggling between
nationals of the countries involved. Cuba does
possess over 100 fishing vessels and some cargo
planes which are well-suited to gun-running or
air drops, but we cannot confirm that they are used
for this purpose. In addition, Cuban leaders have
always stressed the importance of Latin American
revolutionaries procuring their own weapons from
local sources, Moreover, some financing from
Havana undoubtedly is used to buy arms.

10. Another important aspect of Havana's ef-~
forts in Latin America is centered on supporting
and guiding hemisphere front organizations. Havana
has long sought to establish a new hemisphere-wide

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labor organization which could serve as a platform
for spreading pro-Castro propaganda among urban
labor movements. The embryonic Single Center of
Latin American Workers (CUTAL), which held its con-
stituent congress in Brazil in January 1964, ends
Havana's quest. This Brazilian congress was such

a total failure, however, that it is doubtful if

in the near future CUTAL will provide Havana with
the type of organization it envisaged. Cuba's sup-
port for the 9 March Second Latin American Youth
Congress (LAYC) also was well established. This
conference, too, ended in near-failure. Havana now
is attempting to organize another hemisphere "soli-
darity-with-Cuba" congress in Montreal, Canada in
July. This proposed congress--which, however, is
being officially discouraged by the Canadian govern-

. ment--would be. modeled on a similar effort staged

in Niteroi, Brazil in March 1963.

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ANNEX

Country-by-Country Rundown on Cuban Subversion

‘1. Argentina

Clandestine reporting for the past year con-
firms that the Cubans are cooperating with small
extremist Peronist groups in an attempt to estab-
lish a coordinated subversSive effort in Argentina.
Ext reme-le oti Peronists

appears to be the principal Support agent of a
group of Argentine terrorists and left-wing Peron-
ists believed to be directed and supported *GyaRRnEe

Last January, @igkes@g traveled to the provinces
of Jujuy and Salta, near the Bolivian border where
Argentine police discovered pro-Castro guerrilla
camps in March, Some guerrillas who were arrested
in that raid are known to have had guerrilla war-
fare training in Cuba. Among the propaganda items
found at these camps was a book written by Jorge
Ricardo Masetti, who was in Cuba in 1963 as a
director of Prensa Latina. He is thought to be
"Commandante Sé@gundo™ and is probably in charge
of the Small guerrilla bands discovered in north-
ern Argentina in March and April. One of the FAL
rifles found in the hands of the guerrillas pos-
Sessed the same ‘specifications as those found in

‘the 1” November ‘ Venezue. harms cache.

2. Bolivia

Cuban SubverSive activity in Bolivia has been
centered on attempts to strengthen pro-Castro
Sentiment among the followers of extremist Vice

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President Juan Lechin, Through its embassy in La
Paz, Cuba reportedly has given Lechin and his sup-
porters some arms and money to aid his bitter strug-
gle with President Paz Est

believed it necessary to organize well-armed combat
cadres from among various leftist-extremist groups.
He said Havana was prepared to supply the required

ile Bolivian tin m

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and material support to Lechin for his campaign
to unseat President Paz in the 31 May presidential
elections, Lechin was scheduled to meet with Cuban
agents in early April to discuss his financial
needs and to determine what he was prepared to of-
fer in return for the proposed Cuban assistance,

In addition, the Comittee of Anti-Imperialist
Struggle, a pro-Castro Bolivian youth group which
aspires to establish a terrorist organization on
the model of the Venezuelan Armed Forces of Na-
tional Liberation, was organized last year with
the help of Mauro Garcia, then an officer of the
Cuban embassy. Members of this group were caught
in November 1963 attempting to plant bombs at the
home of the commander of the Bolivian Air Force
and near the residence of the US Ambassador.

he Cuban government continues to regard Bolivia
as a staging area from which to Sénd trained sub~
versives into neighboring countires., It is pos-
_siblé that some Cuban support for guerrillas in
northern Argentina may have come across the border
from near-by Bolivia. Bolivia also has. long heen
a favorite transit area for terrorists returning
to Peru after having received guerrilla warfare
training in Cuba. In August 1963, a Bolivian Com-
munist Party (PCB) member in north Bolivia led

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police to an armS cache which was to be used to sup-

port guerrilla operations in Peru, Bolivian authori-
ties have uncovered and dispersed at least three pro-
Castro guerrilla groups in this area in the past year,

3. Brazil

Before the overthrow of President Goulart, Cuba
was engaged in an active subversive effort in Brazil
providing funds, guerrilla training, and propaganda -
Support to Communist and pro~Communist groups. Operat-
ing primarily through its embassy in Rio de Janeiro,
Havana collaborated closely with Francisco Juliao's
Peasant Leagues in northeast Brazil and with Leonel
Brizola, Goulart's violently anti-American brother-
‘in-law. The former Cuban ambassador privately
described Brizola as having the best prospects for
starting a Castro-stule revolution in Brazil, The
ambassador appeared to be favoring him over Juliao
from late 1963 until the April overthrow,

before the begin: ry —of Goulart's overthrow, Ha-
vana sent money to Brazil in an effort to bolster

the Brizola forces, Four—Cuban_—couriers reportedly
took the money to Brazil

Cuba also maintained a subStantial propaganda
operation in Brazil, primarily through the local
office of Prensa Latina. A Communist party member
in the state of Bahia revealed, for example, that
the local Communist newspaper was financed by Cuba,
The number of Brazilian-Cuban Cultural Institues

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had increased to the point where they covered all
major cities; Rio alone had seven. Similar or-
ganizations existed at the national level, such

as the Society of Friends of Cuba and the National
Committee Against Intervention in Cuba, Cuba also
broadcast daily to Brazil in Portuguese.

Brazil under Goulart also affordec Cuba an
excellent base for promoting hemisphere-wide, pro-
Cuban front groups. The constituent congress of
the Single Center of Latin American Workers (CUTAL)--
which is planned to replace the moribund Confedera-
tion of Latin American Workers (CTAL)--was held in
Brazilia in late January. The Brazilian delega-
tion to the Cuban-supported Second Latin American
Youth Congress (LAYC), held in Santiago, Chile on
9 March, was headed by President Goulart's nephew,
who brought a letter from the President warmly sup-
porting the conference, Brazil was also used as
a transit area for some Latin American Subversives
returning to their countries after having received
training in Cuba.

In late April, the dissident Communist Party
of Brazil (CPB), which follows a pro-Chinese line,
was reported to have directed two Cuban-trained
leaders to begin paramilitary operations in Sao
Paulo and Goias. CPB members have been encouraged
by their Cuban comrades--many have been trained in
Cuba--but Havana is not known to have given them
direct support. —~

4. British Guiana

The government of Premier Cheddi Jagan is openly
pro-Castro. Thus, Cuban activities in british Guiana,

“In contrast to subversive efforts elsewhere in the

hemisphere, are designed to support rather than to
bring down the existing regime,

Clinton Adlum, the Cuban, trade represe j
in Georgetown, is probably giving both political and
economic advice to Jagan's People's Progressive Party

PPP) >"tiiban ships call frequently at British Guiana

ports to deliver food and fuels and to pick up rice.

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oetthermanagey of GIMPEX

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Numerous unconfirmed reports have stated that these
Ships also transport arms to British Guiana which
allegedly are then shipped elsewhere in Latin America,

The vehicle for British Guianese trade with Com-
munis€ countrieS, as well as for Cuban funding of
Jagan's regime and the PPP, is the Guyana Import Ex-
port (GIMPRX). Havana ordered payment e@piedebe2o0o“onas

(GEBSE) ember, ostensibly
for payment of goods, according to a usually reliable
source, It is unclear, however, whether the money
was ever actually paid. GIMPEX has loaned such funds
in the past both to the government and to the PPP
publishing house, Another source reports that the
publishing house passes the funds to Janet Jagan
for PPP salaries and expenses,

=.

Georgetown (ng
trained terroristS are behind much of the sporadic
violence which has occurred during the months-long
Strike by the pro-Jagan sugar workers union; it is
attempting to gain an official endorsement by the
Guianese Sugar industry. A senior (gm official

has told the US Consul General that Six or eight
Cuban-trained youths provide the technical support
for this group's growing terrorist efforts in George-
town. Another source reports Some Guianese were
recéiving guerrilla training in the interior of
the country in November 1963, preSumably for the
newly-formed Guyana Liberation Army..--——..

5. Chile

The Cuban effort in Chile concentrates on sup-
port for the presidential campaign of Salvadore
Allende, Allende is the candidate of the Communist-
dominated Popular Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP),
and he has a chance of being elected in the September
presidential elections. Allende has vis ited Cuba,
on SSveral occasions. his campaign manager was “in
Havana in Januar While there, he was promised
financial Support “tor Allende's campaign. A usually
reliable Source reports that Che Guevara recently
said: “Watch Chile, it will be the next Latin Ameri-
can country to enter our camp."

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4 J rs CAE: 4

would soon be leaving Cuba_ to return to.Chile. The
SOUrCE SALA these Chileans had veceived “political
training in Cuba and were returning with funds from
the Cuban government for Allende's presidential
campaign. Chilean police are reported to have identi-
fied 400 Chileans who have visited Cuba over the

past three years as "subverSives," but we have no
evidence of any organized guerrilla training of
Chilean _groups in Cuba.

6. Colombia

Cuba has” been providing . funds. £0. -subversiyes..
in Colombia. § Since. 1960. . The pro-Castro, Worker-
Student-beaSant Movement (MOEC), the United Front
for Revolutionary Action (FUAR)--whose members are
building up the newly activated National Liberation
Front (FLN); and the recently organized National
Liberation Movement have been the principal recip-
ients of Cuban funds, A fairly reliable Source .
veported: SEAS re: = e -
BSYOHDIS to evaluate ‘the FLN and its prospects
and to pass funds for further activity.

RW cee Leber etos: aantsa Sip hs fom Pty

Cuba has established some contact with bandit
gangs infesting — the Colombian | countryside, rmy
tYoops who are fighting” “the “bandits have’ found
Cuban propaganda in the possession of these bandits.
Some bandit leaders may have had guerrilla training
in Cuba, but Havana does not appear to have had
substantial success so far in directing bandit
activity tor political ends.

The Communist Popular Vanguard Party (PVP)
continues to send members for subverSive training
in Cuba. Some of these militant returnees have

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begun training small groups of party members, but
they appear to have no immediate plans for anti-
government action. Much of. the pro-Castro acti:
vity in Costa R Rica appears to. ynave been directed.
against neighboring Nicaragua. Cuba-trained
révolitionaries based in Costa Rica have on oc-
casion crossed into Nicaragua, The police in-
Spector at a town in the Pacific banana zone re-
ported in early February that two unidentified
Cubans who traveled from Panama to Costa Rica at-
tempted to stir up Costa Rican banana workers in
support of Panamanian charges against the US.

The Costa Rican Saciety for Friendship with
PeopleS, a small Communist-front group désiétiied”
to propagandize on behalf of the Cuban revolution
and pro-Castro "revolutionary movements" in other
Latin American countries, iS an important Havana
asset _in San Jose. ——

8. Dominican Republic

The country's two militant pro-Communist or-
ganizations, the 14th of June Political Group (APCJ)
and the Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), are faith-
ful supporters of Castro. Havana Radio quickly
voiced support for last December's abortive APCJ
guerrilla campaign, but we have no firm evidence
of Cuban material support for this effort. The
quick response from Radio Havana suggests, how-
ever, the existence of a communications link with
one or more pro-Castro organizations in the country.
Quick response by Havana to unrest in the Dominican
Republic also was reflected during the transit
workers Strike in early May.

One Dominican who has received guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba organized the 14th of June Revolutionary
Movement (MR 14J) earlier this year out of the old
APCJ and MPD. The immediate aim of this new or-
ganization is to promote urban terrorism. A ter-
rorist captured by police in mid-March is said to
have told police that this group is receiving arms

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) 0: oRvanad hase ealeds prone wel litrained "Salvat
j intelligence agent, who provides intelligence on
{| selected targets. He was trained in Cuba for a

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9. Ecuador

Since the 11 July 1963 military coup, the
Hcuadorean government's careful monitoring of
anti-government activities has hampered Cuban ef-
forts there, When the junta began to exile Com-
munists and pro-Castro extremists las if :
in Havana. ¢@ D )
ease FEET S peck gold a clandestine Source—
in late March that exiles in Cuba were receiving
guerrilla warfare training before returning to
Ecuador to initiate anti-government activities.

Rafael Echeverria, leader of the hard-line faction
of the Ecuadoxvean Communist Party (PCE), is re-
portedly planning a trip to Havana in late May

_ to confer with Castro. Echeverria expects to have

laid the groundwork for guerrilla operations by
then so that he can “prove his good faith" to the
Cubans; he expects to be offered financial aid.

Other clandeStine sources report Cuban aid
has peen offered to supporters of former presi-
dent Velasco Ibarra and that aid is being of-
fered to followers of former president Arosemena.

10, El Salvador
There has been little evidence of direct Cuban-
supported subversion in El Salvador during the
past 10 months, The Castro government probably
helps members of the Salvadoran Communist Party
(PCES) and its front groups to get to Cuba for
guidance and training. Havana radio, heard
clearly in El Salvador, provides a propaganda
line which can be echoed in locally published
nist publications.

year and a half, not only in guerrilla warfare

but in clandestine communications, Like many
other Cuban agents, he is not actually working

in Salvador but in a neighboring country, from
which he deals with Salvadoran operations across
the border on direct instructions from a Cuban

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Se —
1. Guatemala
Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance
to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for
over two years. While we have no firm evidence of
substantial Cuban ass

san J
VI wTan, often used by Castro as an agent
in Central America, saw Yon Sosa in October and is
said to have urged him to work more closely with
the Guatemalan Communists.

Strong anti-Subversive measures by the Peralta
Government have curtailed, but have by no means
eliminated, the insurgency threat in Guatemala.

The assassination on 11 April of a colonel with
special antiguerrilla duties indicates the guer-
rillas are still at large in the mountainous areas
of the country. They maintain reliable communica~
tions and contacts and have the capability to stage
damaging raids on carefully chosen targets

A ” least cs ‘Guatemalans are ‘known to have
itraveled to Cuba in 1963, On the basis of clandes-—
|tine reporting, it is estimated that another 50
qtraveled secretly and that these received training
Ain guerrilla tactics or ‘political indoctrination.

Known Cuban activity in Haiti is limited to
two daily propaganda broadcasts by Havana Radio.

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A French-language transmission is aimed at the
educated class and a broadcast in Creole is beamed
to the masses. The speaker has been identified

as Rene Depestre, a top-ranking Haitian Communist
exile in Cuba. The content of Depestre's broad-
casts is consistently pro-Cuban and anti-Duvalier.
Some Haitians may have received guerrilla train-
ing in Cuba, but we have no firm evidence that any
Such trainees have returned to Haiti, The long-
time presence of many hundreds of Haitian nationals
in eastern Cuba provides Castro with material for
Sizable infiltrations into Haiti if he should so

desire. :
7 a)

Much of the pro-Castro activity in Honduras
appears to be directed toward Support of similar
activities in neighboring Nicaragua and Guatemala,
The country's rugged terrain, the absence of an
effective internal security force, and the presence
| of long-established routes for smuggling into
neighboring countries make Honduras well suited

for such a role,

13. Honduras

; ee obese
Two recent clandestine sources report the
Cuban government is dissatisfied with efforts of
the Honduran Communist Party to establish an ef-
fective guerrilla movement. Cuban leaders are
said to favor the establishment of a new organiza—

tion with no direct ties to orthodox Communist ;

' groups, The Cubans are said to have selected ;
“. Mario Sosa to organize the new movement, and to

* begin making contacts with "liberal" leaders to tf
“ investigate. their readiness for armed action

- = t 2 2
gains gnduras ' military

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14. Mexico

The Castro regime has been careful in the past
to avoid antagonizing the Mexican government, in
-view of the importance to Cuba of maintaining its
embassy and its civil air connections through Mexico.
The Cubans continue to use their embassy in Mexico
City as well as individual Mexican nationals and
exiled Central American residents there to support
subversive activities elsewhere in Central America.
The activities of Mexican journalist Victor Rico
Galan are a case in point.

,» however, ta.
easant.. unrest..which

of the peasant unre
general at Tampico reported last May that the Cuban
consul there was openly preaching revolution and
distributing inflammatory propaganda and that he
had stepped up the tempo of his activities consider-

ably in recent months.

Mexicans traveted=to-Cuba—in:1963 ;
yaefrom January~through April~of

15. Nicaragua

Cuban subversive efforts aimed at Nicaragua
have been channeled principally through the National
Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated revo-
lutionary organization. Most of this group's guer-
rilla leaders were trained in Cuba in 1961-62, along
with members of various other Nicaraguan revolu-
tionary movements. Cuban aid to the FLN takes the
form of financial support, training, and guidance,
but details are lacking regarding its current size
or effectiveness. In August 1963, the FLN launched
an unsuccessful guerrilla foray into northern
Nicaragua from Honduras which cost the small organ-
ization some of its key personnel. Since then,
the FLN has been the object of harassment by both
Nicaraguan and Honduran security forces. It has
shown no capability to make another move soon.

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16. Panama

Pro-Castro and Communist elements moved quickly
to exploit the January outbreaks of violence in
Panama. For some four months preceding the 9-11
January incidents, Havana had been increasing its
pressure on its contacts in Panama to cooperate in
starting revolutionary action. Revolutionary
leaders of the Castro-supported Vanguard of the
National Revolution (VAN) were urged as early as
the threatened banana workers' strike in Ottober
1963 to cooperate in initiating an anti-government
campaign, Planning quickened after the early
November visit of Victor Rico Galan and possibly
other Castro agents. Some of the approximately
100 Panamanians believed to have received training
in Cuba were planning to give guerrilla warfare
courses in December and again in May.

Clandestine reporting also discloses Cuban
efforts to influence the outcome of the 10 May
1963 national elections. Havana is reliably re-
ported to have provided some funds for campaign
assistance to selected deputorial candidates of
the Radical Action Party (PAR).

22555 OF
ett re ada." Sur of these were VAN
members. Another group of recently-returned trainees
was reliable, reported in early May to be seeking
to establish a new revolutionary group in Panama
and to launch revolutionary activities in the near
future. —

gato Cuba~in-1963. >)

17. Paraguay

Cuban subversive efforts directed against
Paraguay continue to be confined to supporting and
xiles based for the most part
— ie y ) The Paraguayan Communist
Party (PCP) and its paramilitary front group, the
United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) are
the most prominent recipients of Cuban aid and

~12-

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

- hod

13-00000

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

attention, gbichsis-given:through-theCubanembassy .
CGreiOngey: +. Some FULNA members have received
guerrilla training in Cuba,

: A once-weekly pro-Castro broadcast in the
Guarani language has been heard in Paraguay since
mid-November 1963. The PCP is said to be kéeping
two Paraguayans in Cuba permanently to enable the
program to continue to be broadcast in Guarani.

SixeNarapiayatis traveled =to9Cibain19 63),
However, probably more exiles in Uruguay traveled
to Havana,

18. Peru

The primary recipient of Cuban assistance for
armed revolution against the Belaunde government is
the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a
militant pro-Castro organization composed of some
1,000 members and 3,500 sympathizers.
and 500 MIR members have received guerrilla, train-
ing abroad, most of them in Cuba. Police raids in
January and May probably upset the MIR's timetable
for initiating anti-government action, but the move-
ment is well-financed, well-armed, and well-organized.
It has the potential for carrying out a subversive
campaign Of considerable disruptiveness. Luis de
la Puente, the leader of MIR, has visited Cuba on
several occasions, and is on good terms with Castro.

Cuba has assisted other pro-Castro groups of
lesser importance, but such assistance has been
limited to guerrilla training. One such group, the
Army of National Liberation (ELN), organized by
Peruvian extremist students in Havana, has isolated
bands of guerrillas operating in remote areas of
the country. The National Liberation Front (FLN)
is openly pro-Castro, and has sent members to Cuba
for subversive training. Principal FLN leader
Salomon Bolo visited Cuba last September,

Castro-inspired extremists have exploited re~-
curring peasant unrest in Central Peru for the past
several months and they have been behind much of
the illegal peasant land incursions which have oc-
curred there.

-13-

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~

13-00000

~SECREF

~~ NO FOREIGN DISSEM

re known. “tochave™
Taveled-to Cuba: -

19. Uruguay

We have no evidence of Cuban support for revo-
lutionary activity directed at subverting the
Uruguayan government. Uruguay's importance to
Havana lies in its value as a place where Cubans
and Cuban agents are relatively free to carry on
subversive contacts with dissidents from neighbor~
ing countries, particularly Argentines, Paraguayans,
and Brazilians. The Cubhan.embassy in Montevideo
has been particularly useful as a transit point for
air 6. Ciba of travelers’ ‘wishing to conceal
their ultimate destination. Uruguay also has been
useful to Cuba asa distribution point for. Cuban
propaganda for. neighboring | countries, Cuban propa-

_ ganda is widely disseminated in Uruguay as part of
a more subtle policy of building up Castroism among

Uruguayan leftists and intellectuals.
ieeaieiliocter: »

Plt AprLL “of CMES- VERT _ .

20. Venezuela

The current level of Cuban activity in Vene-
zuela is considered fairly low. International
reprecussions stemming fron the unprecedented dis-
covery of the huge Cuban arms cache in Venezuela
on 1 November 1963, the failure of the terrorist
campaign to disrupt the December national elections,
and the presently increased capabilities of the
Venezuelan military and security forces will prob-
ably dampen Cuban activities in Venezuela in the
short run, There is no reason to believe, however,
that these setbacks will alter Venezuela's high
priority on Cuba's target list for subversion.
Cuban support for the militantly pro-Castro Armed
Forces of National Liberation (FALN) doubtlessly
will continue, and may even increase.

_ The FALN gives signs of stepping up its activi-
ties, but on a lesser scale than at the end of 1963.
The decision in late April of the central committee
of the Communist party to continue using violence

-14-

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
-SECRETF

13-00000

activities.

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

as a political instrument probably presages a gradual
increase of terrorist incidents, Riots in mid-May
led by Communist-dominated students took place in
Caracas, San Cristobal, and Merida. At the same
time, one successful student-led robbery of a post
office occurred, as well as an attempted robbery

of the university payroll. .

Robberies have been the FALN's favorite means
in the past to obtain money to finance its terrorist

-15-

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
ASECRET

13-00000

SECRET KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA DURING 1963 SBGRETH
NATIONALITY Janvary February March April May June July August September October November December 1963
To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From To From
ARGENTINA 18 27 47) 34 12 2t 13° «14 5712 4 5 6 0 4 0 37 0 4 9 5 3 ee | 222 126
BOLIVIA ] 7 4 3 3 5 é 0 2 5 3 2 14 0 5 3 21 5 q 7 2 1 7 ie) 69 = 48
BRAZIL Wo 22,0«413 9 6 18 7 10 5 1 é 25 0 0 24 121 0 2 162 0 0 0 O 219 242
BR. GUIANA 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 i 0 0 7 10 0 0 ] 0 oO 10 QO 26 255i
CHILE 31 44 26 = 20 13 42 20 8 9 #14 3 8 20 1 22. 47) (75 1 9 70 9 54 18 7 355 316
COLOMBIA 54. 39 7 12 3 9 23-0«5 7 15 3 7 29 1 6 14 17 1 8 #14 5 1 10 4 182 122
COSTA RICA 9 0 0 2 1 0 n 1 0 8 Q 3 12 0 0 8 0 5 0 1 4 ! 10 0 47 56
DOM, REPUBLIC 0 2 0 0 0 6 2 1 4 2 0 2 7 0 1 8 19 0 nN 0 0 0 3 3. 74 , 24
ECUADOR 20 0 20 5 10 1 31 1 24 1 4 6 2 0 0 2 7 0 3 4 4 0 ] 0 121 20
EL SALVADOR 7 2 0 0 0 ie) 5 4 0 0 0 4 4 1 1 0 3 0 6 0 0 1 0 0 26:12
GUATEMALA 30.18 0 5 15 0 2 0 i 0 0 0 6 0 3 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 i 0 64 23
HAITI 0 0 4 4 0 0 18 «18 0 0 a) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 2300 22
HONDURAS ib 12 20 0 i} ie) n 0 | 8 o oul o 0 0 8 0 ) 0 0 7 0. 0 0 50 39
JAMAICA 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 33 1 0 2 1 0 fe) 1 0 0 1 0 38 6
MEXICO , 10081 22 0 26 «38 3718 34 (54 14 42 65 28 34 «63 84 36 24 7 230027 49 72 512 530
NICARAGUA 4 7 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 5 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 i 1 0 0 ' 12 9
PANAMA 4 1 20 ie} 2 1 2 3 2 0 3 0 15 0 é 0 6 13 . 1 3 0 0 0 3 61 24
PARAGUAY 2 3 0 4 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 3 0 60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9
PERU 6 2 2 4 3 ] 5 8 5 3 3 3 4 0 2 9 1 2 0 0 1 2 1 2 33° (38
URUGUAY 19 «19 16 (14 8 8 8 0 5 12 9 0 7 15 10 16 = 56 6 3. 27 1 0 6 13 158 130

VENEZUELA 26 9 2 3 9 9 8 0 4 4 8 0 22 0 3°00 «9 i) MN 10 6 0 3 0 139° 35

MONTHLY TOTALS 354 296 212 150 124 149 223 88 163 144 73 103° «31947 104 214 58764 76 380 69 99 126 132 2430 1863

The peaks in Januery, July, and September reflect travel of delegations to the anniversaries of the overthrow of Batista and of the " 26 July movement, and to the internotionel
architects' congress in October. 640219 3

13-00000

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA = JANUARY 1964

JANUARY
FRO

>
ie
mM
jo)
4
>
rR
He
4
K

PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA

TO M
ARGENTINA | 9 | 3 [1 UNESCO delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.
BOLIVIA 3 1 [1 attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-—
nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the
Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school,

(BRAZIL
R. GUIANA
HILE

OLOMBIA
OSTA RICA 11

JAMAICA
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
RINIDAD
URUGUAY .
ENEZUELA

29 December 1963 - not previously reported -— unknown. _

Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban

Revolution. ;

An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added
to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for
December to 25. It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to
uba for the 1 celebrations,

13 |3 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at which Venezuelan
charge against Cuba was discussed. The remainder were sent to
Habana for 2 January celebration,

attended Architects Congress
children, 3 adults, went from Mexico,

fos) e
on wu a “1 olo cS CS be

re

1 wWlole lH ot ad on
oe a
fez

va I

(or
p
to}
fs
%)
kK
(0)
fad
et
th

Sits

STS

nm

148 91

13-00000

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA — JANUARY 1964

ATIONALITY JANUARY PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA

UNESCO: delegate, 2 well-known Communists went to Cuba.

ARGENTINA 1
BOLIVIA l attending preparatory meeting of the Latin American Commu-
- nist Youth Congress in Habana, 1 will attend a course at the
Cuban equivalent of Soviet Komsomol school,
BRAZIL nen

29 December 1963 ~ not previously reported -— unknown,
Returning from Habana celebration 5th anniversary of Cuban
Revolution.

An additional 15 Colombian travellers to Cuba should be added
to the report for December 1963, which brings the total for
December to 25, It is estimated that 13 of the 25 went to
Cuba for the ] January celebrations

13 13 to Cuba to attend meeting at Habana at. which Venezuelan
charge against Cuba was discussed, The remainder were sent to
Habana for 2 January celebration,

|i_attended Architects Congress C“‘“‘CSCOCOCC(*S

5 children, 3 adults, went from Mexico,

on

R, GUIANA
HILE

OLOMBIA
OSTA RICA 11

DOM. REP, |
ECUADOR
EL SALVADOR _|
GUATEMALA _|
HAITI
HONDURAS ___
[JAMAICA |
MEXICO |
ICARAGUA
IPANAMA
PARAGUAY
PERU
SURINAM
RINIDAD
URUGUAY +
VENEZUELA |

I se bi

rv) e a
dfcleelaehefSelaifele| & =| Belo] ole

<

a) el to r te Hiwld

=

148 91


13-00000

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - MARCH-APRIL 1964

NATIONALITY MARCH-APRIL PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
TO FROM
ARGENTINA 11 10 1- Going to Cuba is an Argentine Communist Party

leader in Buenos Aires Provinee. 1 - UNESCO
delegate. 1-Returning is employee of Cuban
Construction Ministry.

i
hy

BOLIVIA 3~ Attending May Day Celebration.
BRAZIL
BR. GUIANA
CHILE 4- Labor leaders attending May Day Celebration. I6-
Returning are members of delegation from School
of Economy of University of Chile.
COLOMBIA [7 {0 |
COSTA RICA 1l~ En route to Eas ermany. 2- In attempt to
PF tT obtain release of Teodoro Picado Lara.
DOM. REP. 4- Returning from 26th July Celebration.
ECUADOR re ee
EL SALVADOR 3 PB Attending May Day Celebrations. 8-Returning
. from military training in Cuba.
| GUATEMALA [0 [0 | |
; HAITI Cn Soe
HONDURAS fof |
JAMAICA a a
MEXICO | 32 [| 24 | 3- Attending May Day Celebrations.
/ NICARAGUA | 2 | 1]
PANAMA | 2 { 14 f 3- Returnees members of Vanguard of National Action
PARAGUA a
PERU eo
SURINAN _f[O [ 01
TRINIDAD {0 | 0]
URUGUA [_14_f_i1 |
VENEZUELA $17 {| 0 |

po
NO
pent

TOTAL S$ 130

}

