157-10011-10066 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
JFK Assassination System Date: - —7/30/201
Identification Form .

Agency Information

4

AGENCY:  SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10011-10066

RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

’ ORIGINATOR: ROCK
FROM: ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO: FILE

TITLE: | FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE: 02/24/1975
PAGES: 13

SUBJECTS :
ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
BREWER, GEORGE
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : ~ Unclassified ‘
RESTRICTIONS : — Consulted; 1A; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — (05/31/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

vol }
BY 50955 Docld: 32203834 Page 1

Date:05/30/94
. Page:1
3 JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO : FILE

TITLE :
FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE : 02/24/75
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
r BREWER, GEORGE

“ TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 3, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HY 50955 Docld:32203834 Page 2

= oo | ~ ee Maseal”

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNFTED-STATES

Washington, DC 20500 PBGb-I|

Nelson A, Rockefeller, David W. Belin,
Chairman February 24, 1975 . Executive Director
John T. Connor ; .
t ota Oalton ; N&TE? Dpeidents wae thet Page Numbers a
erwin N. Griswolc . pan . ; a,
Lane Kirkland iNndicgted were Net spec i freafly
Lyman L. Lemnitzar

me ome « Are :
Ronald Reagan ntrenecd in +he GOS cr pt.

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

SECRET/SENSITIVE | — SSCI Box 286, Folder 11 -

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE ee Hy
FROM: JAMES N. ROBTHE — Record Number 157-10011-10066 ~

NM lee ee a
SUBJECT: Further Information obtained from George Brewer

(See February 18 Interview)

fa

On Monday, February 24, I again spoke with George Brewer in the Commission
offices from approximately 9:00 am until 10:15 am. The following additional
information was obtained.

Technical Operations

In 1960 and 1961, Brewer was primary involved in Bay of Pigs operations (pro-
viding support to the liami Field Office in smuggling friendly Cubans into the
United States). Ne was engaged in little technical activity curing that time.
Between 1962 and 1965, he was involved in approximately 30 technical operations,
only four of which were telephone taps (the rest were mike and wire cases).
During that same perioi four or five other Support agents . were also engaged
in technical activities, each performing approximately the same amount of tech-
nical work that Brewer was performing. Some of the agents doing technical work
were Jack Cryer, Shes and Bill Simpson, the latter being a former in-
structor of Brewer's. Both Cryer and Simpson had been doing technical work for
quite some time (throughout the 50's), a ae Cu 5t- 52)

La a,

In 1965 or 1966, following President Johnson's Executive Order precluding wire
taps without court order or without approval of the Attcrney General in security
cases, technical work performed by Brewer and others at the Washington Field
Office almost stopped completely. Brewer can recall only two taps that were
placed during that period. One of these was placed in a Safe House in the
Washington area, and the other was placed in a New York apartnent in connec-
tion with Project PARAGON. Brewer assumes that the appropriate approvals were
obtained prior to his placing these taps. TID yay C1149~43)

Most of the technical operations in the early 1960's were performed at the re-
quest of the Operations Directorate. While Brewer was not privy to the purpose
for cach technical operation that he performed, he believes that many involved

CIA HAS NO OBJECT" mas
sheet | FICATIC?
| —e . EOS OF THIS DUcUwclT

oe MAY 94-
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ro.

oe SECRET/SENSITIVE ; ~2-
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Safe Houses for use by defectors and the wiring of operations assets’ apart-

ments or other premises where conversations with assets|would be forth-

coming. For instance, in 1962 the apartment of a defector (Golitzen) was \
wired. It was believed that Golitzen had become unhappy with CIA treatment

and was considering leaving the country. A telephone tap was placed on his

phone to attempt to verify this. Brewer believes that these cases involved
positive foreign intelligence gathering as opposed to being security cases.

From the names of the individuals whose conversations were to be recorded,

Brewer presumes that most of these technical operations|were directed against
foreigners.

Brewer is aware of a few technical operations relating to ee One in-
volved the bugging of the premises. of a former employee (pawl: © Oy
about 1964 because of his questionable associates. Another, in ieee ‘involved
a telephone tap on a newsman (although Brewer was unaware at the time the tap /
was placed that it was being directed against a newsman) . (1/49)

The Technical Division of the Office of Security may have been involved in “2g
some technical operations in the United States during the 1960's and eatlier. |
However, their primary responsibility was counter-audio work overseas. Brewer _
does not believe that they would have been involved in significant amounts of

technical work in the States. ; apete Peckiene at ‘
7 et « = ees wt pen Seer correct VP FIs as ree yey

as Bere aN i . LL & oe i , f CBee TF Late. Fee $9
y Surveillance Operations ‘

Prior to 1968, the Washington Field Office was performing some unsophisticated
surveillance. This generally related to surveillance of defectors and training
operations directed against perspective overseas CIA agents. The purpose of

the training was to assist WFO in its surveillance techniques and to determine
how wel] the perspective overseas agents could make contacts and "drops" without
being detected. The Field Office had little equipment to undertake sophisticated
surveillance at that time. (7)ju- -2e)

In 1968, with the creation of the Surveillance and Technical Unit, a much more
concentrated effort was made in the area of surveillance. C127)

Assistance to Local Police

Brewer remembers that at some point in time two sets of|/alias documents prepared
by Technical Services were given to the Metropolitan Police Department. This
included a social security card, driver's license, D. C. permit, etc.

RRR HRRERR

I again interviewed Mr. Brewer at approximately 2:30 pm on the same day, just
rior to his leaving for the Commission hearings, at which he was testifying.
indicated that it was the policy of the CIA to offer gratuities to various

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police officers in the Washington, D.C., area for their assistance to the CIA.
Each Christmas a list would be prepared of those individuals from local police
departments who had provided assistance,and appropriate gifts would be given
to these individuals, ranging from candy and liquor to $25 gift certificates.
The money for these gifts was taken from CIA's "Blue Jay'' fund, used for mis-

cellaneous sy Some police officials would not accept such gratuities.
pete FEST aan

Kas Ys algo aware of one occasion when police officials from several de-
partments were flown to a hunting lodge owned by the Agency in southern Virginia.
Brewer recalls several officers from the Montgomery County, Fairfax County (in-__
cluding (GanonciMiteener);, and Metropolitan Police Department s(including&Asehisyeciivee:
Benicimiivencs, but not (Chakigalizaision-who refused an invitation) attending, as well

as a high police official from Boston. Brewer himself attended this gathering

and indicated that as best as he can remember it was strictly a social affair.

Brewer could not recall ever having agreed to provide(GOimeomlccnane of the
Fairfax County Police Department with an automobile while $e cia was on vaca-
tion in calm although he would not deny that he may have done so.

aid) at oe 4

Brewer indicated that all gratuities given police officials were approved by
Headquarters and that none were specifically connected with any particular
request being made of the police by the CIA. CLF )

(full distribu tion) _

SNR/var
SECRET/SENSITIVE

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: * , COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

February 20, 1975

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: JAMES N. ROETHE) . >
SUBJECT: ' Summary of an Interview with George R. Brewer, Conducted :
on Tuesday, February 18, 1975, ia the Offices uf the
Commission by James N. Roethe and Robert Olsen
The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 pm on February 18, 1975, and
ended at approximately 8:30 pm on the same date. Mr. Brewer appeared
voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff.
Background of Mr. Brewer
Mr. Brewer is a graduate of the University of Maryland. Hie has been with
the CIA for over twenty years and is presently Chief of the Director's
Security Staff. The interview concerned itself primarily with the activities .
of the Washington Field Office of the Office of Security. Mr. Brewer first
worked in that office from January 1955 to Februar. 1956, -From February 1956
to April 1959 he was on Director Dulies' personal security staff. He served
with the Headquarters Field Office (now defunct) from April 1959 to August 1969
and again served with the Washington Field Office from August 1960 to July 1973, ;
when he obtained his present position, £

Activities at the Washington Field Office

The Washington Field Office is made up of 35-40 agents. Clericals bring the
total cf employees to about 100. It is by far the iargest security field
office. The majority of the agents are designated as field agents, whose
primary activity is investigating applicants for employment with the Agency
and some covert investigations (investigations under cover, such as investi-
gations of contractor's employees or individuals planning to be sent overseas
under cover). The remaining agents are designated as Support agents (about §
men} who provide a broad range of support to the field Agents. In 1966
Nr. Brewer, a support agent, was designated as the Washington Field Office's
liaison with the local police {including the Metronolitan Police Department,
most Suburban police departments, and the Virginia and Maryland State Police),
In November of 1968, Mr. Brower was placed in charge of a newly created
"Surveillance and Technical Unit" of the Support Squad. He remained in both
positions until he left the Office in July of 1973. Mr. Brewer emphasized
that no activity was undertaken ty the ficld office without the approval of
eadquarters. Requests for action in Mr. Brewer's areas of interest would be
eceived by headquarters security, generally from the Operations Directorate,
The "Security Support 3ranch" at headquarters would »ass the request on to the
j
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‘SECRET/SENSITIVE -2-

"Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Support"! at the field office (Mr. John
Hutchinson during most of Mr. Brewer's tenure), who in turn would ask
Mr. Brewer to carry out the request.

The following persons have headed the Washington Field Office as "Special
Agent- in-Charge":

Charles Kane 1960-1963
i Marvin Gentile 1963-1964
John Noble 1964-1968
| Ed Klippa 1968-1975
Jack Cryer Present

Covert Investigations by Field Agents

Such investigations w cre conducted much less frequently than overt investiga-
tions of applicants for employment. Several unofficial covers were used by
b

investigators to prevent the person being investigated from being exposed as
a CIA contact.

Technical Operations

(
Technical operations consisted of the planting of electronic listening devices
(King) and the telephone taps (Queen), No technical devices were planted by
the Washington Field Office after the formation in 1968 of the "Surveillance
and Technical Unit." However, Mr. Brewer has pleuted technical devices prior
to 1968: . :

1. In about 1966 Mr. Brewer planted a listening device in an apartment
at the Savoy Apartments in Yashington, D. C. (a CIA Safe House). This
device was later removed and Brewer was told it was never used,

2. - About 8 years ago Mr. Brewer placed several bugs in a Washington Safe
- House. He believes they have never been removed. They have never been
used to his knowledge.

3. ; About 10 years ago Mr. Brewer was called back from vacation to bug 4
, cadillac to be used by two Chinese generals.

4." At one time Mr. Brewer bugged hotel rooms in the Washington area where
unwitting U-2 pilot applicants were being interviewed.

5. In 1963 Mr. Brewer placed telephone taps on phones in a home in
Washington (MOCKINGBIRD case). At the time he did not know he was
tapping a news columnist's phone, but he later learned that that had
been the case. ;

6. Four houses in Miami were bugged by Mr. Brewer shortly after the Bay of
Pigs incident.

“ SECRET/SENSITIVE

an
na

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7. A hotel room in Los Angeles was bugged by Brewer several years ago. It
was to be used for some kind of interview.

8. -A.home-in Bethesda, Maryland, was also bugged before being occupied by a
Cuban National.

|
In all, Mr. Brewer believes he was involved in more than ten technical opera-
tions, but less than 100 prior to 1968. In all cases he was merely supplying
technical support for operations at the request of his superiors, and was not
witting to the actual operation. In each case he assumed the propriety and
lawfulness of the operation.

Since 1966, Mr. Brewer has been engaged in only one technical operation
(Operation PARAGON~-threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew).
When that threat was made, Brewer suggested that a line be run into the in-
forming agent's apartment. Such a line was run from that agent's telephone
(a telephone tap). This operation was approved by higher authority.

Surveillance

Surveillance was conducted off and on through the period from 1960 to 1973.
However, active surveillance did not begin until 1968 when the "Surveillance
and Technical Unit" was formed, Prior to 1968, surveillance was restricted
to training exercises and surveillance of defectors. Mr. Brewer estimated
that he engaged in about ten such operations prior to 1968. Training sur-
veillance continued after 1968, but only one surveillance of a defector was
made during that time.

In 1966 Headquarters requested that the Washington Field Headquarters form a
sophisticated surveillance unit. Such a unit was not really created until
Brewer took over the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" in 1968, After 1968
surveillance took up « large part of the time of the "Surveillance and Techni-
cal Unit's" time. The Unit consisted of 14 support agents and was expanded
to 20-24 men during some surveillances. The Washington Field Office did
surveillance for the entire country with regard to Security Office matters.

If a surveillance was conducted anywhere in the country, Brewer believes he
would: know of it. If surveillance was conducted in the territory of another
fieldi office, that field office would have been in charge, with the Washington
Office providing the Support. The following surveillance was undertaken by
Brewer's Unit:

}

1. Surveillance of Employees or Former Employees

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2.

3.

b, Project CAPUSTO (8 Ball): Employee associating with former defector

was surveilled.
Project TOMCAT: An associate of CAPUSTO was surveilled.

Project MONEY: A former employee planning to attend the SALT talks
with his new boss was surveilled. ;

Project SIESTA: Surveillance on a former employee and the suspected
Castro agent she was living with.

Project PINEAPPLE: Surveillance of a former employee living above his
means. Washisngton Field Office surveilled outside D.C. Anderson
Associates surveilled in D.C. and at subject's Arlington home. Wash-

ington Field Office did not participate in any break-in of subject's
apartment.

Project AMOS: Former employee surveilled to Champaign, Illinois.

Project PIXIF: (last job): Two employees and son of another surveilled
for suspected drug use and/or sale,

- Project PARAGON: Informer who reported threat against Director Helms

and Vice President Agnew surveilled in New York and Detroit.

. MARCHETTI: Former employee threatening to publish classified material
(which he co‘:ld not have obtained during the course of his employment)
was surveilled, Three cars were used in surveillance. No police cover.

Surveillance of Newsmen (to determine source of security leaks)

Mea’ Grewer knew that surveillance was to determine source
Sreomkew publishing of classified information. Mr. Brewer ques-
tioned his superior (John Hutchinson) about the case. He wondered why
the FBI was not involved and understood agit FBI didn't want to
OOF. LS Eee

», Mr. Brewer also questioned this surveillance, but not
ee . :
SPeongly ase Be Was relatively unknown. Further, he really didn't

Other Surveillances

_ a. A nephew of an assistant to Director McCone was surveilled after he

Doclda: 3272703834 Page 9

went berserk and threatened to go to the Russians. He was surveilled
for two days.

SECRET/SEXSITIVE

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SECRET/SENSITIVE - 53 -

In all cases of surveillance, photographs of the subject and his contacts

were taken. Further, the identity of the contact was also ascertained and
reported to headquarters. No surveillance was ever placed on a Congressman,
Senator, Judge or Justice or other public figure except the newsmen previously
mentioned. Mr. Brewer believes that there were no cases of surveillance
undertaken by his Unit which did not involve either (1) a threatened security
leak: to newsmen, or (2} a potential security violation, except Project
PARAGON .

The records kept on surveillances include the letters assigning the surveil-
lance to the Unit, the agents! logs, photographs taken and the final report
of each project. This information was all sent to Headquarters. The Field
Office would also retain copies but never made any use of these files.

Break-Ins:

Mr. Brewer's Surveiliance Unit was only involved in one break-in in connection
with Project SIESTA, involving a former employee living with a suspected
Castro sympathizer. A photographic studio, jointly operated by the employee
and her Cuban boy friend, was broken into. This didn't bother Brewer, as
there was strong evidence suggesting a possible security violation. Further,
the suspected pair ws soliciting passport photo business at CIA,which would
give them information about the travels of CIA agents. A second break-in

was effected by Anderson Associates (a CIA proprietary) in Project SIESTA.
Brewer doesn't know who headed up Anderson Associites, He believes that

Ralph True, Joe Langen and Don Connor may have hac. some connection with it.

Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was disbanded in June or July of 1972. Brewer
is not sure why the Unit was disbanded. The Washington Field Office still does
training surveillance and surveillance of defectors. There have been no in-
stances (to Brewer's knowledge) of potential employee security leaks since the
Surveillance Unit was disbanded.

1

Activity with Dissident Groups

On three occasions (in 1969, 1970 and May 1971) the CIA participated with the
‘ashington police in monitoring peace and anti-war demonstrations. In each
case a. request was made by the Washington Police Department (MPD), through

“ Gaaa think geery for assistance. The Washington Field Office of CIA
furnished six vehicles with communications gear and men to operate the gear.
Mr. Brewer believes that two CIA agents and one police officer occupied each
car, (More CIA agents than police were utilized,as MPD didn't have the neces-
sary manpower.) The only purpose of this operation was to monitor the move-
ments of the crowds. ‘There was no attempt to penetrate any dissident organi-
zation or to photograph the crowds. The CIA agents involved in the May 1,197],
operation carried police ID's. CIA also provided a fully-staffed cemmunics-
tions center at MPD to receive communications from the cars. This provided
MPD a second radio frequency and freed PD's own channels for other police
business.

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Brewer believes that the primary purpose of ‘this operation was to render
“communications ‘assistance to the local police.’ The secondary purpose was

to monitor crowds sc as to protect CIA installations. (For example, MPD

had obtained some information that various dissident groups planned to picket
CIA Headquarters and planned to harass Director Helms during a planned. speech.)
All of these CIA operations were verbally approved by Headquarters Support
Branch (Mr. Cryer). Total period of time devoted to monitoring dissident groups
with MPD (for all three occasions) was about five days. Brewer is not aware of
any instance where the Washington Field Office tried to penetrate any dissident
groups.

Collection of Information on Dissident Groups

During the period of the demonstrations in 1969-1971, all field offices and
resident agents were requested by Headquarters to look out for literature

and other informatior which might in any way affect the CIA. No conscious
intelligence gathering of literature was requested.. Items to be looked for
included campus news clippings, etc.. This project was not a continuing one
over the three-year period when most demonstrations occurred. It was renewed
from time to time as flare-ups in activity occurred. Mr. Brower does not know
the quantity of material collected or the use made of that material. The only
information that Brewer knows was collected by the Washington Field Office
consisted of the weekly intelligence summary prepared by MPD. Headquarters
specifically asked Brewer to get the summaries (either Jack Cryer, Tex Mills
or Curt Rivers),and they were forwarded to Headquarters. No effort was made
by Brewer to obtain information concerning any dissident group's intended
activities.

Police Cover Operations

Mr. Brewer indicated that Washington Field Office agents have received police
cover from the following police departments:

1. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) During the May 1971 demonstra-
tions, MPD furnished ID's to those CIA agents monitoring the crowds along
with pelice officers, These ID cards were in fact used. No other police
cover was obtained from MPD. ”

2. Fairfax Citv Police Denartment: _In connection with Operation SIESTA
(which included a break~in at the photographic studio in Fairfax City,
operated by a suspected Castro Agent) cover was obtained from the police.
One CIA agent was given a Fairfax City police badge in case some one
walked in on the break-in, The badge was never utilized. Brewer didn't
actually remember obtaining this badge, but it was obtained by some one.

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3. Fairfax County Police Department: Apparently undercover CIA agents in the
county (under DOD cover) were being continuously harassed and challenged
in the county while on operations. They feared their cover might be
blown and feit it would be good to have police cover to prevent this
from occurring. Mr. Brewer himself may have suggested getting badges and
identification from the county police. In any event, he thought it was a
good idea and Headquarters approved it (per John Hutchinson, Assistant
Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Se poeta

Se

aaa A eens aA
some badges and’ : Col, eo:
reluctant to give CIA the badges and ID, but in ori “spring of 1972 he
changed his mind and relented. Brewer does net know if Osborn called
AC Neaescr) or if there was any arm-twis tag by the CIA. Brewer himself
did no arm-twisting. Nine patrolman's badges and one sergeant's badge
were obtained, plus ten blank ID cards. The true names of CIA agents
were placed on the cards by Brewer, It was understood that if the badges
and ID's were ever used that SeOus Duss cn would immediately be notified.
In fact, they were kept in a safe at Washingtcn Field Office Headquarters
and never used. They have recently been returned to Fairfax County.

No police cover was ever obtained by Washington Field Office, or used by them
for the purpose of performing police activity. Brewer stated that local police
were always kept informed of CIA activities in their jurisdiction.

Other Assistance Rendered CIA by becal Police

SL aia rea

Project SIESTA:

This project involveé the break-in into a photographic shop in Fairfax City.
Three Fairfax City pulice assisted in the operation. One entered the apart-
ment with several CIA agents; one stood watch on the front steps; and one
waited in a squad car outside the building. Much material in the photographic
studio was photographed. Surveillance was constantly maintained on the opera-
tors | of the studio. while the break-in was being carried out.

Use of Fairfax County Facilities:

On at least one occasion the Fairfax County police station was used | for CIA
training purposes. CIA desired to assure themselves that new recruits for
covert overseas duty could not be "broken" if siezed by foreign authorities.
Consequently, CIA officials would "arrest" these unwitting recruits on some
bogus charge and take them to Fairfax County jail where they would be subject
to strong interrogation to see if they would "break".

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Other Assistance

Almost every police department has agreed to immediately notify the CIA if
one of its agents is arrested.

Assistance Rendered to Local Police by the CIA

‘
Sem te BS CREE SFR IRIE PRE OT AEN ES

Training Programs:

In late 1971 a course in photography was offered to officers of local police
departments by the Washington Field Office, and in 1972 courses in both sur-
veillance techniques and photography were offered. Representatives from MPD
and most large suburban police departments attended. These courses were
stopped after the printing of a New York Times article criticizing the train-~-
ing of New York City police by the CTA.

Metropolitan Police Department:

1. May Day - 1971: MPD was furnished six cars equipped with communications
gear, plus two men for each car,from the Washington Field Office (WFO).
WFO also furnisheda central communications command post plus operators.
The purpose of this assistance was to permit the monitoring of crowds.

2. In about 1972, Brewer performed a telephone tap for MPD in connection
with an interna] affairs matter where eleven police officers were poten-
tially involved :n a bribe. Brewer und ioe that a court order was
obtained before the taps were pat ¢ on, zo OU

fhe could wire a “Tanp in the aparemont of a witting police ‘informant |
sho had penetrated anti-war dissident groups. Brewer passed this re-
quest on to security headquarters, and the Technical Services Division
performed the wiving. CIA did not monitor or receive copies of any con-
versations recorded. ;

Bony

‘Shortly after a CIA surveillance training course which several MPD
‘officers attended, MPD became desirous of maintaining surveillance on

one of its unwitting police informants to see if she was doing what the
police paid her to do. MPD asked Brewer if his men would assist the new

. trainees in the project. Brewer's surveillance unit did furnish assist-
ance, including four cars and at least one man for each car. These CIA
agents, together with MPD officers, surveilled the subject for one and one-
half days. This is the only time Brewer's surveillance team actualiy
provided manpower to assist NPD in a surveillance.

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‘S. - On two. or. three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field
Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to tap a _touch-tone "” |
telephone. The request caine from fitieine eieonss Jovwemnd) and Sieaelegan. |

Gein Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with hed bade andediganvan
equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn
would direct Brewer to provide the equipment.

6. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer
to provide receiving devices to MPD. Once &juceebesutdana jof MPD per-
sonally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver, It was provided
(ostensibly for training purposes) .

7. On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to
MPD on an indefinite loan.

8. The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice
on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to
time.

MPD received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up _
their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered
MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness.
Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return
all equipment previously loaned: to it by the CIA,and most was returned. Appar-
ently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other
police departments as well).

In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to ae one i ;
ands _ Gila ger ees the county police. They had already been loaned some re-
ceivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office.

Fairfax County Police Department

le, Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take
a telephone tap off a dial phone.

2. On one occasion Brewer accompanied a county police representative to U.S.
Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pick out a dial recorder for
telephone taps.

3. In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police
forces intelligence unit. The equipment has never been returned.

No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been

given conceming a specific crime or witness.

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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*SECRET/SENSITIVE _ - 10 -
~~) Other ;

1i° In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA. Head-

quarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Depart-
ments.

q

YN SA PCN AIOE BRET I OCS TEE

2. Director Helms owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion
Brewer met with the chief of police there concerning the security of the
beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave
the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the
department) for the chief's assistance.

pioieretceserpinen tryeeman ena rene ar cart

RRREKKEKRE KEK

At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer indicated that he had not
discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the
interview--except the General Counsel.

point was considering whether he should retain a luwyer. However, as we
went along he opened up considerably to the point here I now believe I have
a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field
Office. It vould appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much,
if not most, of the physical and technical surveiliance directed against
American citizens subsequent to 1968. In every case the surveillance was
directed by higher authority. It also appears that the Washington Field
Office gave substantial assistance to local police departments in the Wash-
ington, D. C. area. Much of this assistance was ooviously an appropriate
exchange of information between two intelligence units. Most disturbing is
the incident where CIA agents assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police
surveillance (a law enforcement function), but this seems to have been an

IMPRESSIONS
Mr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one —
isolated case. |

JNR/vmr
SECRET/SENSITIVE

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