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14-0000

an ee NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER

a

A. Introduction

During his 11 or 12 years' service in the KG3 Second Chief
Directorate, NOSENKO said, he rose from case officer ty deputy
chief of a department and from lieutenant to lieutenant colonel
(or, as he has stated more recently, only to the rank 9£ captain).
An English speaker, he had specialized. in operations against
American targets in the USSR as he Steadily advanced to higher
positions in the U.S, Embassy Section of the American Department
(from entry on duty with the KGB in 1952 or 1353 until 1955,
and from January 1960 to January 1962) and in the Tourist Depart - .
ment (from June 1955 to January 1960, and from January 1962 until
the defection). His duties took him to England in 1957 and 1958,
Cuba in 1960, and Bulgaria in 1961 as well as to Switzerland in
1962 and 1964; also, NOSENKO made numerous trips within the USSR
in connectioci with operations, inspections, ard conferences,
Commendations, twice accompanied by bonuses, were awarded to him :
by the KGB Chairman in 1956, 1959, and 1961 and by the head of : :
the Second Chief Directorate in 1957 and 1958: he was Gne of 3
70 Second Chief Diracterate officers awarded the Order wf the . |

‘Red Star in 1962; and in the Same year he received a meal for
completing ten years of “irreproachable service, "* Thus,
according to NOSENKO, his defection ended a promising career

marked by promotions, responsible positions, extensive travel,
and many honors.

NOSENXO has discussed a large number of KGB operations, in-
eluding some in which he had a personal role, either ag a par-
ticipant or as a supervisor, and others conducted by other KGB
personnel in the First and Second Chief Directorate about which
he learned through his professional and persoral contacts,. . j
Those in which he played a personal role are covered in this
part of the paper, All are included in Part VI, The text of
the paper distinguishes the information from collateral sources
and investigations from the details which NOSENKO has provided
oh the same topics. : .

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NOSENKO has admitted recently, however,
any awards at all in the KGB,


B. Entry into the KGB

NOSENKO has provided a wide range of dates for his entry
on duty with the KGB and has offered disparate descriptions of . .
the circumstances and procedures involved in his becoming a ar
KGB staff officer, His statements on these two topics are To :
presented under separate headings below. . ; :

1. Date of Ertr

A range of dates between early 1952 and 2 April 1953 has
been given by NOSENKO as the time when he entered on duty with
the KGB, but he has been most consistent in placing his entry
in the month of March 1953.* in summary, he has said the
beginning of 1952 (statement of 31 January 1964), May 1952 with
no day (statement of February 1964), 5 or 7 September 1952
(statement of 6 April 1964)..March 1953 with no day (statements
of 9 June 1962, 24 April 1966 and. 27 October 1966), 12 or 15 or
17 March 1953 (statement of 8 April 1964), 13 or 15 March 1953
(statement*of 26 July 1965). ard 2 Aprii 1953 (statement of
-17 April 1966). When last questioned about this subject, on
27 October 1966, NOSENKO acknowledged that he had lied when he
had earlier reported his entry as occurring in 1952, His state-

. ments about the entry date are arranged in chronological order
, below,

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9 June 1962 (first CIA meeting with NOSENKO): “in the
beginning of 1953 I came to Moscow /fFrom duty with the GRU in
Primorsk/, This was 1953, in the beginning. in January. Well,
I came on leave to Moscow. I was staying ac my father's dacha
there... I was then in the Navy GRU. So I ceme to Moscow on
leave and, while I was home_near Moscow at my father's dacha,
ce, ; - {General Bogdan Zakharovich/ KOBULOV’* dropped in on us. A con-
oe versation simply began. He said: ‘What are you doing?' I said:
‘I'm working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm work-
ing in the Baltic. I came kere on leave.’ KOBULOV said: 'How
do you like the work?’ I replied: ‘Well, speaking honestly, I
don't like the work.' ‘Well,' he said, 'You better come to work
with us, Where do you want to co? Into antelligence or counter-
intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I

wee hice ote

4

i . * Several of NOSENKO's remarks about his date of entry into
_ the KGB were made during CIA questioning about how and

: when he first learned of the KGB agent “‘ANDREY": the lead -
i ‘esa | to "ANDREY" was one of the two pieces of information which rr ec
H NOSENKO offered to sell when he approached CIA in 1962
H (see Part II.B.); the "ANDREY’ case is discussed at
i greater length in Part VI.D.3.b. - , :
|
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sails bdladtaaent ~

'** Other sources have reported that KOBULOV was expelled ;

from the State Security apparatus in 1946 and that he did

not return to a position of authority until a few days

, after Lavrentiy BERIYA became MGB-MVD. Minister on 9 or

' 10 March 1953. As of 1952, KOBULOV was working in East

Germany for both Wismut A.G., a uranium ore-mining con-

- cern, and for the Soviet contingent to the Allied Control

' . Commission. KOBULOV was arrested at the same time as
BERIYA, along with others in the KGB. See Part V.B.2.
for further references to KOBULOV,. . : Loe -

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-eonsider that only people who have seven, even ten years’ ex-
perience in counterintelligence work should be sent so intelli-
gence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence.
Then they know how counterintelligence operates... Well, when
KOBULOV asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: ‘It is
better, of course, to go into counterintelligence.' ‘Well,' he
said, ‘Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.’
This was simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later
I got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and
told me to stop by. I went. ‘Come into this room,' /they told
me/, ‘it's not necessary to fill out a questionnaire (anketa).
We have already obtained your personal fiie from the GRU, Go
directly to the central entrance, A pass has already been
-issued for your the pass is already there. Go to the Secre-
tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOHULCV,' Well, I went. KOBULOV
had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his
assistant received me. ‘How_about working in the American De-
partment?' he /the assistant/ asked. ‘Well, good. Go there
right.now,! Well, I wert to the Second Directorate... His
ZKOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-
rate, the American Department, the First Section, working with

American correspondents...in ‘53, in March, in March '53. STALIN

had just died."*

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87.

“31 January 1964: Yuriy Ivanovich GUK was reassigned from.

_the KGB_Second Chief Directorate "in something lixe 1952,"
“WOSENKO said, "exactly just about the time when I came from

the GRU to the KGB, He was already gone by that time."*

February 1964: After his defection on 4 February 1964,

-NOSENKO prepared an official statement about his biography.

He said that he had entered the KGB in 1952, and he shifted

‘the dates of most of the events during the. 1945-1955 period. one |

year backwards from the version given in 1962. This was dis-
cussed with NOSENXO, and. he repeated the new dates; he then
studied and approved an official statement on his biography
(for the Intelligence Community) which contained the new dates,
including his claim that he entered on duty with the KGB in
about May 1952. : :

6 April 1964: Confronted with the above inconsistencies,
NOSENKO said that he returned to Moscow in August 1952 and during
the same month had a conversation with KGB persornel about getting
a job. The interview continued with the following dialogue:

Question: You came (to Moscow) in January?

NOSENKO: No, it wasn't January, it was the second part of
1952. Yes, before that I was in the GRU...
Maybe - if I tell you 7 - 7 September - maybe
it was 5, I don't know. :

Question: ...What date did you enter on duty with KGB?
NOSENKO: I don't remember.
Question: Early September 1952?

NOSENKO: Early September 1952, yes... I came and the

first few days was sitting in a room with
KUTYREV, RAKOVSKIY, and GROBOV, in Room 615.
Yes, it was 7 September when I had joined...

7 or 5... And so the first few weeks I had been
reading cases, studying forms; I worked like
that (during) December, January, February...
No, it was March, yes, after STALIN's death,
after the reorganization. And at the end of

March I was transferred to the attaches cases...**

_*® This would place the entry date some time at the beginning

of 1952, for the KGB defector GOLITSYN has reported that
GUK was transferred from the Second Chief Directorate in
January 1952. ; :

** NOSENKO later settled on June or July 1954 as the time of, .
_ this transfer. Part V.C. covers the period when, according
°* - . ¢@ NOSENKO, he was engaged in operations against the U.S.

: military attaches in Moscow. oo ,

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, @ April 1964: The interrogator pointed out to NOSENKO that
he had on different occasions dated his entry into the KGB as
‘January 1952, March 1953, and in September 1952. The questioning
continued: oo ey

Question: Which is the truth? ~ ty

NOSENKO: After the death of STALIN, in_March 1953. Why
did I say it /the other dates/? You see, I~
finished the Institute in 1949.. Then I defended
my diploma, and then came the State exams. I
passed all the exams except one - “Foundations o
Marxism-Leninism! the philosophy. And I had to
take all the examinations over again. All of oo a
them. -I took four, passed three, flunked one. 4
Just the same, all four had to be taken over |
again. For that reason 1 graduated, cr I received
the diploma from the Institute in 1950, although
officially I graduated in 1949. This is an un- i
pleasant ching and I did not want to mention it. :
And right after that I was sent to the GRU.* The
rest is just as I told you, word-for-word. This
was the only thing. And then, after I said it,

I did not want to correct it. To twist around
again. And the mistake I made was about my work
in the KGB. It was not 1952, of course, but . i
1953... It was 12 or 17 or 15 March. KOBULOV ;
accepted me right away. STALIN was still not :
dead and I was already accepted. March 1953,
about the 15th, about 15 March 1953.

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26 July 1965: "At the end of 1952 I came to Moscow from
Sovetsk in Primorskiy Kray; near Baltiysk. I had worked in the
Naval Intelligence Point (MRP) there. My aim in coming to
Moscow was to cet out of this work in the MRP. I couldn't
stand that work. I couldn't stand that work... I arrived in
Moscow at the end of 1952, December... I don't remember exactly
the date of the order appointing me an officer in the KGB, It
was 13 or 15 March 1953.” :

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- 17 April 1966 (letter to CIA case officer): “From August '
- 4952 until 1953 I worked at the Intelligence Point of the Naval
i _ Intelligence cf the 4th Fleet in, Sovetsk, where I received the
{ . rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Service. From 2 April
“ 3953 until 4 February 1964 I worked in the Second Chief Direc-

torate of the MGB-KGB,."

renewable. lt t=.

: ; 24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement): "In
- _ the middle of March /1953/ KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel
ae -  SAVITSKIY called me at home and told me to come to see KOBU- ety
— LOV... I worked in the First Section, First /American/ Depart-
ment from the middle of March 1953 until July 1955."

a ; 27 October_1966: NOSENKO reaffirmed that he. entered the
(4, .. KGB in mid-March 1953, He said that he had lied when he earlier.
‘ae said that he had joined the KGB in 1952, and that he knew he was
/.°. lying at the times he made these statements. Asked why he had -
- lied, he replied: “There was no sense." NOSENKO then went on
. to explain that because he was only an average student and
because he was a heavy drinker, he had been found unsuitable

T-Since April 1966, NOSENKO has said he joined the GRU in
1951, a year later. . . oo ae :


14-0000

by the KGB entry commission when he first applied in 1950.
Therefore, NOSENKO continued, he hed been trying to conceal
this fact from CIA by moving events back a year, for he thought
CIA would not have believed him if he reportea that he was
first rejected by the KGH and was later accepted. ;

2. Circumstances and Procedures of Entry

Although NOSENKO has consistently associated his entry into
the KGB with his discussions with General KOBULOV,* he has been : -F
inconsistent concerning the content of their conversation, when
it occurred, its relationship in time to other events (see
Part IV.B.), and where it took place, at his father's dacha or
at KOBULOV's dacha. Also, whereas NOSENKO said in 1962 that
there were virtually no administrative formalities prerequisite
to his entry, he recalled in 1964 tnat he had had conversations
with various KGB personnel officers and (at home) had completed
a KGB questionnaire and a biographic form. NOSENKO was question-
ed at length on these points during 1964 and 1965. As a resvlt,
he provided lengthy descriptions of his various interviews at .
KGB Headquarters and of the questionnaire and other documents he
completed. In April 1966, however, NOSENKO reverted to his boo
original statement of 1962: There were no interviews with KGB
personnel officers, and he implied that he had filled out no i 3
official forms. His various statements are presented in chrono-
logical order below.

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9 June 1962: "KOBULOV was at our dacha. Well, he is a great 7
friend of my father, He was First Deputy to BERIYA, and my |
father was Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry... A conversa- i :
tion simply began. He said: 'What are you doing?’ I said: 'I'm
working in GRU. I worked in the Far East and now I'm working
on the Baltic. I came here on leave.' KOBULOV said: ‘How do
you like the work?' I replied: ‘Well, speaking honestly, I

ae don't like the work.' ‘'Well,' he said, ‘You better come to work
oY with us. Where do you want to go? Into intelligence or counter-
7 intelligence?'... I did not want to go into intelligence. I
consider that only people who have seven, even ten years’ ex-.
perience in counterintelligence work should be sent to intelli-
gence. After this, let them go into positive intelligence. Then
they know how counterintelligence operates...Well, when KOBULOV
-asked me where I wanted to work, I answered: ‘It is better, of
course, to go- into counterintelligence.' ‘Well,' he said,
‘Good. Look, drop in to see me for a minute sometime.' This
was Simple conversation. Nothing official. A week later I
got a telephone call. They were calling from Personnel and
told me to stop by. I went. ‘Come into this. room,' /they told
me/, ‘it's not necessary to’ fill out a questionnaire (anketa).
: We have already obtained your personal file from the GRU. Go
s4. +. +.  @ireetly to the central entrance. A pass has already been _ ned
: issued for you; the pass is already there: Go to the Secre-. a
tariat of Bogdan Zakharovich KOBULGV.' Well, I went. KOBULOV ~
had been summoned somewhere high up in the government, and his
assistant received me. 'Hew about working in the American De- . ;
partment?' he /the assistant/ asked. ‘Well, good.. Go there. | bo
.. Fight now.' Well, I went to the Second Directorate... His “
. ZKOBULOV's/ assistant sent me directly to the Second Directo-
rate, the American Department, the First Section; working with
_ American correspondents." mo ve A

Letineeimnteeenacnm amen ect cates meee

* See Part V.B.1. for further references to. KOBULOV.

14-0000

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8 April 1964: "It: was February {1952]. KOBULCV was in
Pebruary - in Moscow. He was our friend. He said: '0.K.,
George. 1'11 help you if you want, with the KGB.' I remember

-exactly. Yes. It was-in February. I saw him at the cottage... - -*

By this timé=i had been in Moscow six weeks... KOLULOV was in
February. He went to see my father at the Ministry. It was

the end of the day. It was late and my father invited him to
come along to’ the summer home. It happened to be a Saturday.
KOBULOV's wife: stayed in Germany. He was just here for a short
TDY.* My father invited him to spend. Saturday night. and Sunday
at the dacha... On Sunday we were playing billiards and KOBULOV
asked me what I was doing. I told him ‘nothing,’ that I was at
the disposal of the {GRU} Frersonnel Department. I said: ‘I
don't want to go back to Baltiysk, to the Baltic Sea, because I
don't like the work there. I'm not doing anything there. I get
no satisfaction from the work.‘ He said: ‘well, you should be
utilized somehow... Do you want me to call the KGB Personnel -
them look you over?’ I told him: "All right.' He called, and
he must have given our number to them, our home phone. I was
called subsequently by the Personnel Department of the KGB. In
February. They told me to come see them at House No. 12. They
had a pass for me... So I went. Picked up my pass and went....
(NOSENKO next gives a description of his route to the KGB build-

ing, his. receipt of a pass, and his visit to the Central KGa
‘personnel Office.] They talked to me. This man - I don't know

who or what he was - asked where I worked before and all that.
He said: 'O.K. We'll request your file from GRU. We will check

. you out and will let you know whether or not we will take you.'

That's all.” NOSENKO was asked whether he completed any forms
or questionnaires. "No. Not there. They gave me three copies
of forms to take home. There were so many questions. About my
parents, my education, my residences, addresses. I filled all
this out... Finally I completed all three copies and called
them. I was told that this time I would not need a pass,. that

I should just go to the entrance, and the person [the personnel
officer] would. come down-and take the papers from me. I went,
brought the papers, and he took them from me, and also three

copies of my handwritten autobiography... Then I was called by

the personnel people once more. And at that time another
officer talked to me, and this time I knew who was talking to
me, because I was told to yo to talk to ROZHENKO [first name
‘unknown, later identified as a Section Chief in the Personnel
Department]. This was in March... Just as soon as STALIN died,
KOBULOV came back from Germany immediately. He must have been
summoned by BERIYA or someone. And so, in just a few days -
evidently he did not forget ~ I gota call. It was Bogdan
gZakharovich's assistant. He told me to go to the central
entrance, that I didn't need a pass. I remember it as if it
just happened. I went in the uniform of a lieutenant, but with
a civilian overcoat. This was, maybe, the 10th of March... I
sat down [in KOBULOV's office]. I thought it would be for five
minutes. I waited there almost two hours, The assistant came
out a few times and told me that Bogdan zakharovich is very,
very busy, but that he would give me an escort. Some senior
lieutenant came up to me and told me to follow him... We went —

“yp to the sixth floor of the old building. I remembér: it as

though it just happened. I sat there about five or seven
minutes. Then I was told to go in. I announced myself. He
said: ‘Yes, I know. Sit down. My name is SHUBNYAKOV, Fedor

Grigoryevich." He told me he was the Deputy Chief of the”

- Second Chief Directorate and that they had talked things over

and decided. He said that they wanted to offer me a position.
in counterintelligence, in the First Department, the American |

¥WOSENKO had been told by his interrogator shortly before -

that KOBULOV had been stationed in Germany and not in Moscow. _

eodoat sialic tation.

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He was filling in for the Chief of the First. Department...
He took-me to his office... dell, they decided to put me in

Department... “Then he asked /A. Phd GORBATENKO to come in.

the First /U. S. Embassy/ Section and called Yev¢ geniy KOZLOV,
the Chief of the Section.- He ceme in and said‘ Well, hello;
Yuriy Ivanovich. I heard of you. Well, if you're finished
with him, I'11 take him along wath me and show him around.'*
He took me and talked to me for a while and then told me to
report... Either the 12th or the 17th. I don't remember,”

, d5 April 1964: NOSENKO again described the KGB question-
naire and autobiographic forms he had filled out at home and
recalled that he had also signed a secrecy agreement in the
personnel office. He also remembered that he had made several
additional phone calls to the KGS personnel office and described
his second visit there to talk ts ROZHENKO: “At the end of
February I was told again to sttp in the Pass Office and pick up
a pass and go to the same floor, but another room. They told me
I would have to talk to ROZHENKO today. He was a Cnief of
Section, of the Personnel Section, So we had a talk. It was
the same thing again: He said: 'Tell me about yourself.‘ But
he just wanted to look me over. -And after that they said: ‘All
right, we_have not gotten all your documents yet from your

fmilitary/ district. So wait.'"

26 April 1965: NOSENKO recounted his conversation with
KOBULOV, saying that it took piace at KOBULOV's dacna in Usov,
where he and his parents were visiting in January 1953, NOSENKO
continued: "I was called at my family's dacha in February.

They said it was State Security calling and that I was to
report. I did this on the next day. Probably I then reported.

to House No. 12. As officer talked to me about my” education,
service, and so on. Biographic questions. Then he gave me a
blank for my autobiography and a four to six-page anketa (bio-
graphic form). I filled these cut at home. The next day I
called in and was told to come to the Eighth Entry. The officer
came down, and 1 gave him the forms and photographs of myself.
They said they would call me. i did nothing from January to
March. January was leave. In February and March I was at GRU
Personnel's disposal." After STALIN's funeral NCSENKO was
summoned to KOBULOV's office. His assistant, SAVITSKIY, told
NOSENKO to wait. After more than an hour had passed, SAVITSKIY
sent him to SHUBNYAKOV's office. There he learned that he would
be assigned to the U.S, Embassy Section and was introduced to
the Chief of the American Department, GORBATENKO, The official
order appointing NOSENKO was issued the same day, the 13th or

15th of March 1983,

24 April 1966 (signed autobiographical statement: Again
NOSENKO said that he had spoken with KOBULOV at the KOBULOV
dacha and set the date at 1 January 1953. The document con-
tinued as follows: "I saw KOBULOV for the second and last time
on the day of STALIN's funeral in my father's office in the
Ministry of Shipbuilding in March: 1953. “I had come from the
sanitorium to Moscow and dropped in to see my father at work... |

' In his office I ran into KOBULOV as they were gathering to go

to the Dom Soyuzov for the funeral. KOBULOV said he would

“ eoncern himself with the question of my entry inte the KGB.
“The same day I returned to the sanitorium, and several days

‘later, having completed my treatment, I returned to Moscow.

In the middle of March, KOBULOV's assistant, Colonel SAVITSKIY,

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a galled me at heme and told me to come see KOBULOV. KOBULOV .
co didn't see me and SAVITSKIY directed me to the Deputy Chief
-_ : (x.@£.the Second Chief Directorate, Colonel SHUENYAKOV...
. ° SHUBNYAKOV told me that an order had been signed appoir.ting
Se .me @ case officer in the First Section of the First Depart-
3 “ment, Second Chief Directorate. SHUBNYAKOV called the Chief
. : i oF the First Department, Lieutenant. Colonel GORBATENKO, and
teal _«- introduced me. Then I went to the First Department and was

med .~ introduced to the Deputy Chief of the First Department and the ..

? Chief of the First Section, KOZLOV. KOZLOV. sdid_I would_take

: over the cases of Senior Case Officer, Captain /Anatoliy/

! PORMOZOV and suggested that I. begin work the same day. I was
accepted for work in the MVD in precisely this way. It is
necessary to note that none of the workers of the MVD Personnel
Administration spoke to me, either before or after the signing
of the order assigning me to the Second Chief. Directorate of

the MVD."

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C. To June 1955 (American Pepartment)
1. Introduction *.” pe

' .with STEIGER and Edmund STEVENS, both of whom were American

93.

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Depending upoi which date he has given fer entering the KGB,
NOSENKO's first assignment in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
American Department, working on American correspondents living
in Moscow, lasted for about six to eighteen months. From that
job, he said, he moved in 1954 to operations against U.S.. Mili-
tary Attaches assigned to the Moscow Embassy, remaining in the
game section until being transferred in June 1955. His activi-
ties, as NOSENKO described them, and pertinent collateral infor-
mation on his targets while he was in the U.S. Embassy Section
are reviewed below. , ;

2. Operations Against Correspondents

On the day cf his acceptance into the KSB, NOSENKO was
taken directly to the offices of the U.S. Embassy Section.
There he met the section chief, V.A. KOZLOV, wno told NOSENKO
that he would take over the work of the departing case officer,
Captain Anatoliy TORMOZOV, in operations against American cor-
respondents in Moscow.

a. KGB Files on SHAPIRO, GILMORE, SALISBURY and WHITNEY

When NOSENKO reported for work the following day, accord-
ing to statements made on 8 April 1964, he found a desk in Room

615, “There were three other guys sitting there. At first I

was running traces, and at the same time I was reading. the files
on journalists... I think there were seven files in all, and I
didn't see any other." NOSENKO listed these files as those on
Henry SHAPIRO, Eddy GILMORE (as well as one cn GILMORE's wife
SEREBRYAXOVA and her sister CHERNYSHEVA), Harrison SALISBURY
and Thomas WHITNEY.*

During the 1962 meetings with'CIA, NOSENKO identified
SHAPIRO as an "old agent of ours." He said that WHITNEY “worked
for.us while he was in Moscow and gave us some material, but he
refused to work for us when he left the country and would not
contact us in the United States." GILMORE, NOSENKO said, was an

active recruitment target in 1953 and 1954, but NOSENKO did not

know whether he was recruited. Likewise, he did not know the
status of SALISBURY as of 1953.

NOSENKO stressed that the files he was given to’ read during
the early period of his KGB service were developmental files
(delo formulyar) rather than the operational files of the agents.
The developmental files were less sensitive, and from them "you
would never be able to figure out whether he [the subject of
the file) is an agent or not." NOSENKO explained that, once a
person becomes an agent, another file is set up, and these agent

7 a - ; ; ..
*"“NOSENKO made clear that he was not the case officer responsi-
ble for the more important correspondents: "KOZLOV himself

SHAPIRO, with SHAPIRO's wife. I also know that KOZLOV was
working with WHITNEY and with (Andrew J.] STEIGER... For

each of these persons there was an operational file which I
did not see." According to. NOSENKO, he was in no way involved.

correspondents “recruited as agents by the KGB. =

was working with them, the chief of the section himself--with _

kta LUBE a Odom


14-0000

Sear

an. eee

either orally or in writing. If, for example, [V.H.] KOVSHUK

_ Selected and handled the agent who was placed in SHAPIRO's office
_ @8 a secretary; this agent had earlier worked in the offices of
_ Moscow News, an English-language newspaper published in Moscow.

files were held by the chief of the section, KOZLOV. NOSENKO
Btated that he read the files on these seven persens "slowly
and made some extracts for myself in my personal log--such things
as notations of their dates of arrival, things I could not remem- eels ‘
ber." He was also given the files.on the agents surrounding . _ |
these correspondents, their drivers, maids, and ccoks. oe

b. Agents Reporting on Correspondents

;
NOSENKO said he was responsible for haridling the agents who. : i

were reporting on SHAPIRO, WHITNRY, SALISBURY and the GILMOREs
and met with them regularly to learn whether "anything was new, . a
who did SHAPIRO meet, what might be interesting in his behavicr, : a ?
what might be suspicious in his behavior, who he is contacting,
etc." He then reported to KOZLOV and would sometimes prepare 4
written report of his conversations with the agents. Asked to
describe these meetings, NOSENKO replied: "Let us take the same
Case o£ SHAPIRO. Y would meet drivers about three times. a month
or even two times. At the meeting I would ask the driver what
was new in SHAPIPRC's behavior since our last meeting, whether

et Bolla ended Neb hee

SHAPIRO had suspicious contacts with foreigners, akout his meet-

ings with Russians, were they conducted openly or, perhaps, was
SHAPIRO walking behind the person he met, And then the man
{agent} would begin his report. Of course, if he spots anything
suspicious he calls immediately, and I would see nim the next
morning. Otherwise, I would tell him at the meeting that I
would see him again in about ten days or in two weexs, but if
there was something interesting he should call immediately.

It was the same with the maid and the cook. Upon returning to
the office I would have to report to KOZLOV about my meetings,

slab nan ee te ed

{also of the U.S. Embassy Section) had a meeting with his agents, Do
he too had to report immediately to KOZLOV or as soon as conveni-
ent to both. If the meetings were taking place late in the day
and lasted until midnight or later and. there were no written
materials submitted at the meeting, I could go heme and then re-
port the next morning." - ,

mvthlnalisn atm b avltigte omit

agents surrounding the correspondents. "At first he was teach-
ing me. Then he would go in cases when something interesting
would begin to develop, even when it hadn't yet begun to develop
but when there may have been a hint in a case of some other case
officer." ,

KOZLOV accompanied NOSENKO to meetings with the various :
B
i

NOSENKO's agent network consisted mainly of domestic and i
clerical personnel in contact with the correspondents and their boo.
families. Asked to describe them, he said on 15 April 1964: . a
"My first agent was a woman agent, a cook, who was working at
GILMORE's place. She also worked at the Associated Press later. {
Her codename was 'AGLODINA', a funny one. My second agent was ~ H
a chauffeur whose codename, I think, was 'SERGEY'. I think. he '
was driving WHITNEY. Then I also had SHAPIRO's chauffeur, a
funny little fellow. In other words, charwomen, chauffeurs, | °.
this was my.agentura [agent network]." Although NOSENKO was’
able to give'a breakdown of this network in terms of the number
and type of agents targetted against particular individuals, he
had forgotten their true names and could not-provide detailed
personality information on any of them.. He explained: "I don't
remember now. They all passed by like a river because they were
turned over often." NOSENKO did recall that it was he. who

sak Baia


He first identified GILMORE's cook, "AGLODINA," as Yelena
S. KOSIENKO in the fall of 1965, while reviewing a list of Sov-
jets employed by Americans in Moscow. He. told CIA at that time
‘that he had taken over KOSIENKO from TORMOZOV upon entering the
U.S. Enbassy Section in 1953, and that she subsequently worked
for and reported on GILMORE'’s successor, Richard KASISCHKE. |
NOSENKO said that KOSIENKO "never provided any interesting in-
formation.”

NOSENKO estimated that he was responsible for handling 10
to 12 agents in operations against the correspondents. This,
he said, was a normal load, although more experienced case offi-
cers might have as many as 15. In April 1964 NOSENKO broke his
agentura down as follows:

Target , Agents

Eddie GILMORE Two agents, the cook and the driver;
: one operational contact, a part-time
cleaning girl; and a girlfriend of
GILMORE's sister-in-law, who reported
on the sister-in-law and GILMORE's

wife.
Thomas WHITNEY One agent, his driver.
Henry SHAPIRO Three agents, SHAPIRO's secretary

and his cahuffeur, plus an old woman
who was a relative of SHAPIRO's wife
and lived with the SHAPIROs in Mos-
cow. (The secretary and chauffeur
later worked for Kenneth BRODNEY and.
reported on him to NOSENKO; BRODNEY
temporarily took SHAPIRO's place in
Moscow.)

Harrison SALISBURY Two agents, SALISBURY's driver, "SER-
GEY" and a part-time cleaning girl.

NOSENKO classified two other of his agents as "neutral," in
that they did not have specific targets on whom to report. The
first of these was the director of MOSGRAN, a Russian-language
training program for foreigners in Moscow, His cryptonym was
"RAKETA," but NOSENKO could not recall his true name. The sec-
ond, “VOLODINK,“ was a female teacher in this same program who
instructed some of the correspondents, including BRODNEY, and
Embassy employees in their homes; he could not recall the true
name of "VOLODINK.” When NOSENKO was relieved of his responsi-
bility for the correspondents in 1954, he turned over all of his

‘agents to other case officers in the U.S. Embassy Section with

the exception of "RAKETA" and “VOLODINK,” whom he continued to
handle in his work with military attaches. -

c. Information from Other Sources -

SHAPIRO was identified as a KGB agent. by GOLITSYN in 1961,
before the lead was received from NOSENKO, and he had previously

> been suspected as such on the basis of his long stay in Moscow,
-- his wnusually good access to Soviet information sources, and his-

marriage to a Soviet national. SHAPIRO was mentioned as a KGB

se citehla ed AMD EME Ckt

anita

i
4

Bisco modes idea a

Te aaa a

agent by a eryptonym (known to NOSESKO_ and contirmed by GOLI ‘
eppearing in the CHEREPANOV papers." Be

The KGB defector Nikolay: KHOKLOV’ had earlier identified the.
Polish-born wife of WHITNEY’as a KSB agent, an allegation which.
she denied, and it had been ‘long assumed that WHITNEY too had
reached some sort of accommodation with the KGB because of this

fact and because of the > Leng, duration (of his tour as a correspond-

ent in Moscow.

GILMORE also had been suspected by CIA before NOSENKO's in-
formation was received. He served in Moscow for: 12 years, from
1941 to 1953, and 1s married to a Soviet national.

SALISBURY served two short tours, of about one year each,
in Moscow during the 1950's. During the second of these, he
became enamored with the Pole who was to become WHITNEY's wife
(see above) and was during this period a subject of criticism ky
other American correspondents in Moscow for his pro-Soviet arti-
cles, When WHITNEY married the Pole shortly after STALIN's
death, SALISBURY returned to the United States and his articles
took on an anti-Soviet tone.

WOSENKO claimed no involvement with | the other two American
correspondents whom he identified as KGB agents, STEVENS and
STEIGER, both the subjects of a considerable amount of derogatory
information in CIA files. They are discussed in Part VI.D.z.
under the heading of NOSENKO's American ieads.

3. Operations Aqainst Military Attache Personnel

Some time in the first half of 1954 NOSENKO was, relieved of
his responsibilities for the correspondent cases, and from then
until his transfer from the American Department he handled KGB
Second Chief Directorate operacions against the officer person-
nel of the U.S, Military Attache's office. NOSENKO's account of
the turnover of the correspondent files to his successor and of
the acceptance of the attache files is presented below,

- 8 April 1964: "I took over the Military Attache cases

from Nikolay KHRENOV... When I was leaving in 1955, I turned

the attache files over to Valeriy BUDYLDIN."

- 10 April 1964: "I made a mistake... I said I accepted
the cases from KHRENOV when I was taking on the Militery Attache
work, This is not right. KHRENOV was not working in the First
(U.S, Embassy) Section; he was working in the First (American)
Department. I took over the cases from--let's see, there was
ZHUKOV and Vladimir Aleksandrovich CHURANOV, and here was my
table. (desk), and I accepted the cases from Pavel Fedorovich

’ PANKRATOV. This was in the beginning of 1954.”

- 15 April 1964: NOSENKO said that he thought he turned
over the correspondent files to,.F.V. KISLITSYN (who returned: :.
to the USSR from Australia in‘May 1954). NOSENKO asked when::

the PETROV's defected in Australia; he explained that he was

eae Dogs ane

See Part V.D.7.c. for a detailed discussion of the CHEREPANOV

Papers.

BEd teens

a sects sa ec cica iba Eaten

i
a
4


1400000

not sure about KISLITSYN and could have given them to another

officer. “If KISLITSYN came {back from Australia] in 1953, then

it was to KISLITSYN. Otherwise, it was someone else,®

= 18 June 1964: "“KISLITSYN came into the First Section in
1954 and I gave him the files on American correspondents. BUDYL-
DIN also joined the section this year and took the files on the

Attache and his assistants from PANKRATOV. BUDYLDIN left
later that year and turned those filea over to me... Yuriy
LEONTIYEV joined the section in 1955, and I gave him the files
on the Army Attache and his assistants."

NOSENKO has also been indefinite as to the date he. assumed
responsibilities for the attaches. As noted above, he said on
10 April 1964 that he received the files in the beginning of
1954. He had earlier said that he worked on the correspondents .
"only about six months." If the date of March 1953, which ne
most often gave for his entry ‘nto the KGB, is correct this would
place the turnover in the fall of 1953. On other occasions he
has said specifically that he turned over the correspondent cases
and began work against the attaches in January 1954, on still
others that this occurred in May 1954. In February 1965, NOSENKO
said that he could not remember when he changed assignments.

ween areceemiinn tert ese

4
1
g

14-0000)

- 98.

a. Agents Reporting on: Military Attaches

. . Asked in April 1964 to describe the agent network
(agentura) at his disposal in operations against U.S. Mili- H
tary Attaches during this period which began in 1954, NO- © t
SENKO replied: “There were two maids, a cook, drivers*... : |
about ten persons, plus the agent ‘SERVIZNIY' and the one 7 - }
with the code name 'DMITRIYEV'.,. These additional two ; be
agents, about 12 or 13 agents altogether.“ With one ex- : A : os
ception, this network remained constant until NOSENKO trans= : a ae
ferred from the U.S. Embassy Section in mid-1955. He met : |
each agent about once a week, except for the chauffeurs who

were met three times a month in a safehouse or on the

street. According to NOSENKO, this network was "just a

supporting agentura, which vary seldom was worthwhile," the }
main source of information on the Military Attaches being the :
microphones in their offices.** .

i ible

ss

wee se hawe et Lata dale

Newly added to the network while NOSLNKO held this
position was a maid inserted to report on Army Attache Earl
L,. MICKELSON and his successor, Fillmore K. MEARNS. Her . ,
name, .NOSENKO thought, was NOVIKOVA. She was an English-
speaking university graduate but "hid her knowledge of : i
English in order to overhear conversations or read letters : ot
without taking them outside." :

: Besides NOVIKOVA, NOSENKO named one other maid who was : :
his agent, Mariya NEVEROVA, code nane "SHVEDOVA," and she :
Was targetted against the Assistant Army Attache, Ira
RICHARDS. He described NEVEROVA as a “little, old,’ thin”
oman," from whom he never obtained anything of interest.
They met in a safehouse on Kuznetskiy Most.

Of the KGB agents among the chauffeurs, NOSENKO identi-
fied Nikolay SHNYRYEV, who was used by various of the at-
. taches. "He reported where they went, what they said,
whether they took notes or photographs, whether they had
unusual packages with them, and so on."

When viewing photographs in September 1964, WOSENKO t

. dGentified Vladislav VOROBYEV as the agent "SERVIZNIY." He
had been working in the Embassy since its establishment,
starting first as a messenger boy and, in NOSENKO's time,
performing clerical tasks. VOROBYEV had no direct connec-
‘tion with the Military Attaches, and NOSENKO said he himself
did not know why he had been given VOROBYEV to handle in
1954. The main function of this agent was delivering to
NOSENKO copies of the unclassified telephone listings of the
Embassy, issued monthly.

“DMITRIYEV's" true name may have been Dmitriy KUKOLEV:
NOSENKO saw this name on a 1962 phone list and thought, but ;
was not sure, that this was his agent. . An electrician who an . sot
worked on the Embassy's electrical wiring systems and eleva- : Ss
tor, "DMITRIYEV" reported to NQSENKO on antenna wires and

sing bang ©

. 8 ~The Military Attaches used a pool of. five drivers at random, |
NOSENKO said. Apart from the permanent driver for the senior
- attache, none were targetted. against individual members of the

attache office. ©  ~
&* See Part V.E.3.g. on electronic operations against the U.S.
Embassy. a . . oe, .

we

ERS oO ne NTE I tn RRNA RNS

other wires he had observed in the. Embassy as well as on the
-gecurity measures on the top floors. Like VOROBYEV, “DMITRI-
YEV" had no direct connection with the Hilitary. Attaches.

In September 1964 NOSENKO was shown a sertes of 260 bio-
graphic cards on Soviet citizens employed by the American En-
bassy in Moscow. Each card contained a photograph of the per-.
son involved and short bicgraphic notes, including his name
and job in. the Embassy. The first time.he went through these: ’.
cards, NOSENKO was permitted to see only, the photographs; NO~ > ie
SENKO did not identify the photographs of SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV . - \o

- but said that the face of VOROBYEV was familiar, adding that
‘ he thought his name was VOROBYEV., When shown the biographic

information on SHNYRYEV and KUKOLEV, he identified each of them
as his agents during the 1954-1955 period in the American De- : .
partment and equated them to the cryptonyms given previously. ‘
In the case of SHNYRYEV, when shown the bicgraphic information,
which listed SHNYRYEV as “chauffeur for the Military Attache,"
NOSENKO exclaimed: “Oh my God, this is my own agent." He
later said it was a good photograph of SHNYRYEV.

4

wethadbdins

“

wh
ie

f

dv inid Abell cie wot

b. NOSENKO's Targets -

. As the Second Chief Directorate case officer responsible ;
-for operations against American Military (Army) Attaches sta- . ;
tioned in Moscow,* his main task was not to recruit them but !
rather was to prevent the attaches from collecting intelligence.
He has used this statement about his main task (identical with i
that of other U.S. Embassy Section officers working against t
the Army and Navy Attaches) to support his claim that no U.S.
Armed Forces Attaches vere recruited by the KGB from 1953 un-
til his defection in 1964. He has also said that this is one
reason he knows relatively little about the personal backe
grounds of his various targets during this period--the empha-
; sis was on surveillance instead of development for recruitment—
“ purposes. Asked in February 1965 to list the Army Attache per~
gonnel for whom he was directly responsible during 1954 and
° 1955, NOSENKO gave the following names: "MICKELSON, MEARNS,

ean ated oe cuelabae ne

RICHARDS, FELCHLIN, BENSON, MULE, STROUD, and CARDELLA."** His
knowledge of the activities of these targets and of KGB action
against them, coupled with information from other sources, is
discussed in the following paragraphs.

van SU HROR acd cenneuteba ddan ss

WNaval Attaches were handled by ZHUKOV during this period, NO-
SENKO said, while Air Attaches were initially handled by CHURA-
NOY, When CHURANOV left the section in early 1954, he turned
over the Air Attache files to PANKRATOV, who turned them over
later in the year to KHRENOV. : :

poe **This is the order given by NOSENKO. The list comprises two
be generations of Army Attaches in Moscow and is neither in al-
phabetical order nor in terms of date of service in Moscow.
It is, however, in descending order of rank from Colonel MICKEL=
SON through Captain MULE ‘to ‘Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA. —
Questioned about these officers in a different: context, NOSENKO 6 |
indicated knowledge of their ranks. Not mentioned by NOSENKO toe ~ |
_ was George VAN LAETHEM, Assistant Army Attache in Moscow from ies
- August 1951 to August-1953 (prior to the time when NOSENKO said ©) §
_he was responsible for work against the military attache office). = oye
VAN LAETHEM returned to Moscow in 1955, however, and was ate ; vot
tached to the Army Attache staff again from 19 March to 19 May
+ 1955, during which time NOSENKO claimed he was still responsible —|
_ for this group. . . Se re

hauchidbtuad igeioe

5 aeiase a eA AAR AME Tom THT de yee


14-D0000 . RE ES

. , ; — 00 :
acc a ae ate be 7 en eRe ec HOMES SESE RIAU MIRCEA I 8 SRP sss

(i) MICKELSON

NOSENKO has identified Earl L. MICKELSON as a colonel

and the Military Attache in Moscow during 1954 and 1955,
PANKRATOV was the case officer originally handling MICKEL-
SON, and the case was turned over to NOSENKO in 1954.
When asked about agents who might have been working against
MICKELSON, NOSENKO said that there was one cook, a KGB

. operational contact whose name he did not recall, and

-  MICKELSON's maid, whose name NOSENKO believed was NOVIKOVA;
the cook and NOVIKOYA went to work for MICKELSON after NO-
SENKO had left the U.S. Embassy Section, In addition to
these two, the only other source reporting on MICKELSON was
his chauffeur, whose name. NOSENKO also did not remember.
NOSENKO said that the KGB learned nothing interesting about — .
MICKELSON from concealed microphones, telephone taps, or H
surveillance, and that no operational approach or recruit-
ment was attempted. There was, in fact, no anteresting or :
derogatory information on MICKELSON from any source. t :

aes:

f
Fo ae adel in neath al

Sentences

According to information in CIA files, MICKELSON was
involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union
which NOSENKO has not reported. In May 1954 he was arrested
in Tbilisi on the (false) charge of having photographed 4
bridge, but he persuaded the Militia not to press charges.
In August 1954 MICKIISON was arrested again for illegal
photographs souti of KHARKOV; on this occasicn he was held
for two hours before being released. 7 i

(ii) MEARNS

NOSENKO identified Fillmore K.. MEARNS as MICKELSON's
replacement and said that he was the responsible case of- a
ficer. There were two agents and one operational contact
working against "EARNS. Of these, NOSENKO could recall the
name only of NOVIXOVA, the same maid who reported earlier on
MICKELSON. Besides being told to attempt to overhear MICKEL-
SON's conversations NOVIKOVA was instructed to search his
clothing and tu copy any notes she might find, but she
never overheard or found anything of interest to the KGB.
NOSENKO recalled that MEARNS' personal effects were searched
by the KGB while they were being shipped to Moscow from the
United States, and that all his service records had been
discovered and photographed.* NOSENKO described MEARNS
as being more "active" in Moscow than MICKELSON had been and
said that information from concealed microphones showed °:
him to have a strong character. Nothing of interest con-
cerning him was received from these microphones or from tele-
phone taps. ,

Ves
~s

aan te eee

a ene an

a AUC

CIA has no derogatory or otherwise significant informa-
i. tion on MEARNS, who replaced MICKELSON.

‘ (ii4) RICHARDS
: , NOSENKO identified Ira B. RICHARDS as a lieutenant

ea colonel who served as the Assistant Army Attache in Moscow.
: ; NOSENKO’ said that he was the case officer working against

1 - ®NOSENKO has told this same story about MICKELSON. i

sea meant ate
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14-D0006

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Aare rae

101.

RICHARDS. The one agent reporting on RICHARDS whom NOSENKO
could name was the maid Mariya NEVEROVA, KGB cryptonym
“SHVEDCVA," but she had never provided any worthwhile in-
formation about RICHARDS. In addition, some Soviet drivers
reperted on RICHARDS, but nothing useful was obtained from i
then.
i
t
!

Ay.
vintualadylaaeand

According to CIA records, RICHARDS served in Moscow
from July 1954 to July 1956. There was a microphone in the
office which he shared first with MICKELSON and later with
MEARNS. RICHARDS confirmed that Mariya NEVEROVA was his
maid and described her as a "mousy" woman who had a heart
attack during the period sne was employed by him. (This
incident was not recalled by NOSENKO.) For about four
months of his Moscow tour, RICHARDS took Russian-language
lessons from Ludmila GROMAKOVA in his apartment. During
these lessons, KICHARDS often discussed labor conditions and, ,
wages in the United States and, on one occasion, had her ;
record her speech on his tape recorder. GROMAKOVA was preg~
nant and unmarried at the tine. (NOSENKO has named GROMAKOVA
as a KGB agent in another context but has not mentioned her
contacts with RICHARDS.) * RICHARDS identified one “Volodya"
(i.e., first name Vladimir) as his principal driver. About
62 years old in 1954, Volodya was the son of a rich jeweler
in Moscow during the Revolution. Volodya himself was well
educated and, on one occasion while picnicking outside Mos-
cow, he spoke intelligently with RICHARDS about the Revolu-
tion, propaganda, and news media. (NOSENKO did not know of
Volodya.) Purther details from RICHARDS are given in the
following,section on FELCHLIN.

PepCrew tr] ee reenter. Cand

eS acelateacee

aay

(iv) FELCHLIN

panera ars

NOSENKO identified Howard L. FELCHLIN as a lieutenant
colonel who served as Assistant Army Attache in Moscow and
stated that he was FELCHLIN's case officer. FELCHLIN was in {
the Soviet Union during 1954 and part of 1955, until being
declared persona non grata. NOSENKO did not recall the
name: of any agents specifically targetted against FELCHLIN,
although he thought FEL_.CHLIN must have had a maid and she
wenuld have been a KGB agent. Additionally, NOSENKO said,
the Assistant Military Attaches shared a pool of cars and
drivers, and these were his agents. Unable to recall the
precise date of FELCHLIN's expulsion, NOSENKO related it to
some event regarding Soviets stationed in the United States
for which the Soviet Government decided to reply in kind.
HNOSENKO was imprecise as to the pretext used to expel FELCH-
LIN, but said the action was based on information which had
been accumulated from a number of sources and incidents.

‘ For example, FELCHLIN had been caught taking some photographs
and a report had been written; along with other similar
indications of FELCHLIN's activities and reports of agents
in contact with PELCHLIN, the report was filed away for pos-
sible future use. NOSENKO was questioned further on FELCH-
LIN during the February 1965 interrogations. He said then
that FELCHLIN alone had been declared persona non grata,

and that no other attaches had been involved. NOSENKO

Ene Dees

;

3

i.
i

4
a

:

Fs See Part V.E.3.d., which discusses coverage of John ABIDIAN
to whom she also taught Russian. .

em a a ee a toe


14-0000

ataancers il

= RT SORTS Re a a ape aR aN She Satan et eee ee AEST EO
102.

explained his having but few details concerning this action
by the fact that it took place after NOSENZO had trans-
ferred from the American Department to the Tourist Depart-
ment in June 1955. MNCSENKO knew nothing of FE
background.

Other sources have reported that FELCHLIN visited the i
USSR as a merchant seaman and a diplomatic courier before |
arriving in duly 1953 as Army Attache. He served in the H
latter capacity for one year, until July 1954, when he was |
asked to leaye the country. (He had previously served in
Austria and West Germany and had been in official, contact |
with known GRU officers at both posts, as well as in the
United States.) During his entire tour in Moscow he was
the subiect of intensive KGB interest. Shortly after his oe ;
arrival, in September 1953, FELCHLIN, with fellow Assistant . :
Army Attache Martin J. MANHOFF, and two Air Force attaches ;
took a train trip to Siberia, the first such trip permitted 4
American attaches in many years. Six months later, on i ;
25 March 1954, the Soviet newspaper Trud carried an article
saying that FELCHLIN and his companions had lost some of
their “spy documents" on the. train, FELCHLIN said this
charge was false. On another eccasion, while travelling
with a British Miiitary Attache, FELCHLIN returned to his
train compartment to find a scantily clad Soviet female in
his bunk, (NOSENKO recalls neither of these incidents.)
In June 1954, while in the company of Lieutenant Colonel F.J,
YEAGER, an Assistant Army Attache, FELCHLIN was arrested in
Kiev by a Soviet Army officer for photographing a military
target. (NOSENKO has never mentioned YEAGER's name; when
told the name and asked for an identification, NOSENKO
said that he had heard it and that he thought YEAGER was
the Air Force Attache.) A large crowd gathered and, after
some jostling, FELCHLIN and YEAGER were taken to a Militia
station where they were ordered to signa confession. They
were held eleven hours, and their arrest caused the american
ambassador to deliver a strong protest note. FELCHLIN was
told on 3 July 1954 that he had 48 hours to get out of the
Soviet Union. No specific charges were mentioned. Major |

Woe ies athhiabide BERR sae

carer

cate Decca ate

Walter A. McKINNEY, the U.S. Air Attache and one of FELCHLIN'S
travelling companions at the time the “spy notes" were f
allegedly lost, was declared persona non grata at the same
time.*

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Queried concerning SHNYRYEV, RICHARDS and FELCHLIN
immediately recognized his photograph and name as one of the
general chauffeurs assigned to the Office of the Military
Attache at the Moscow Embassy; RICHARDS was taken on his
first trip outside Moscow by SHNYRYEV. He remarked that the

My

¥ Ambassador BOHLEN successfully insisted, against initial
Soviet refusal, that his personal plane be allowed into the
USSR to fly FELCHLIN and McKINNEY out. In February 1965
NOSENKO was asked to describe the unusual circumstances
under which FELCHLIN left. NOSENKO said he could not, in-
asmuch as he was no longer in the American Department at
the time. Told that the expulsion took place in 1954,
NOSENKO said this was not the correct date.

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103.

attaches referred to SHNYRYEY as either "Nikolay Perviy”
(Nicholes the First) or "Nikolay Vtoroy" (Nicholas the
Second) to distinguish him from the other chauffeur with
the same name. FELCHLIN said that SHNYRYEV drove primarily
for the Military Attache himself, but sometimes drove for
the AssiStant Military Attaches, and he remembered that
SHNYRYEY was not well, suffered from war wounds, and had
continuing chest or lung trouble. (Asked whether SHNYRYEV
had any medical problem, NOSENKO said he was not aware of
any.)

a
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et ha aetna Moone

FELCHLIN said his maid Dora FiDOPOVA (not specifically

named by NOSENKO) was in her 50's. when she spoke with

FELCHLIN about a job, she asked for shout 120 rubles a month, . ;

which seemed excessive, so PELCHLIN offered BO. PEDOROVA :

refused and iefit. ‘two days later she returned and accepted.

She spoke little English. Other maids came to the back

door of FELCHLIN's apartment to “chit” with her, and sus-

pecting that they were reporting to FELOROVA, PELC ULIN

teased her about it. FEDORJVA's previous employer at the

Embassy gave her full name to columnist Drew PEARSON with

@ statement that sne was one of the chief spies and the lceal t
"boss" cf the Embassy network. PEARSOU printed the allega-

tion. In the sunmer of 1953 or 1954, according te PELCHLIN,

the maid approached FELCHLIN wath the article, waved it in

his face, and accused him of beirmy PEARSON'S source. (NO-

SENKO did not reccegnize FELOROVA's name and did not recall

hearing cr reading of this incident.)

Pee Abe eee teria le a 6

(v) BENSON {

NOSENKO identified his target John S, BENSON as a
major and Assistant Army Attache in Moscow. He did not
recall the names cf any agents working against BENSON but
said that BENSON was with MULE and STROUD (see below) in
Stalingrad in 1955 wwnen ali three were caught by the KGE
with electronic "spying" devices. They were declared per-
sona non grata. The KGS had no other derogatory information

n BENSON from any cther source.

“oO

(vi) STROUD

es pteemenerpe ae:
ee tee Be

NOSENKO identified William R. STROUD as a captain and an
Assistant Army Attache. The only agents working against him
» were the Military Attaches‘ drivers. From concealed micro-
phones, the KGB Second Chief Directorate learned before
STROUD's arrival in Moscow that he was an expert in the use of
. electronic spying apparatus. He was with BENSON and MULE
in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata along with
them (see below). Other than this, FOSENKO said, the KGB
knew nothing unusval or interesting about STROUD from any
source.

1
i

CIA files show that STROUD was, with BENSON and MULE,
the victim of the Soviets' seizure of technical equipment
in Stalingrad and was declared persona non grata on 7 May
' 1955. On 31 January 1955 he travelled to Kharkov from Mos-
cow with First Secretary Frank SISCOE to interview an Ameri-
can defector living there. (According to NOSENKO, SISCOE
was suspected by the KGB of being a CIA officer; SISCOE was,
-, 1, dn fact, a CIA cooptee.)

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(vii) MULE . 7 4

NOSENKO identified Walter MULE as an Assistant Army
Attache and said that he was the case officer responsible
for him. NOSENKO described an operational approach to MULE,
in which he himself participated: In 1953 or 1954 there
had been several defection 2pproaches to Soviets in the
United States on the basis of money and the promise of a
new life. After the KGB Second Chief Directorate decided to
try the same measures, MULE was selected because he was only
a captain despite his lengthy service in the Aray and because
material from concealed microphones indicated that he was
often disparaged by the other attaches. When MULE received
letters from home, he threw them in the trash, and the
maids turned these over to the KGB; from this mail it was
understood that MULE did not have a house in the United
States but lived with his family in a trailer. The father
of two children, MULE had sent his wife from Moscow to Ger- a . H
meny for an abortion, as a third child would have imposed
too great an economic burden. On the basis of all this the
KGB appointed N.M. BURODIN, a recruiter of the American De~
partment, to attempt to defect MULE, Together with BORODIN,
KOVSHUK, and L.A. LEBEDEV (from the Second Chier Directorate's :
special technical section) NOSENKO travelled to Leningrad i
for the operation. LEBEDEV installed a ciock containing a
concealed camera as well as microphones in MULE's hotel
room, and BORODIN entered the room to await MULE's return.
When MULE started to enter the room, he caught sight of :
BORODIN and tried to back out, but NOSENKO anc and KOVSHUK '
closed. the door from, the hali and prev

vented nis, escape. *
Tne “MULE thé Facts the KGB had accdmulated
bout” “HIS 1aCK of success in the Army, the disdain of his

thee ttle ted ied come

fellow attaches, und his shortage of money end then offered \
him a job as a "consultant." BORODIN had either $5,000 or
$10,C00 in an envelope to encourage MULE to accept. Ac- \

cording to NOSENKO, MULE refused outright, telling BORODIN
to get out, that he would not talk to hin, and that he was
a captain in the American Army. |

CIA files show that MULE reported this incident. He
said that he was locked in his hotel room and subjected to |
a recruitment attempt by an MVD agent calling himself Jack
SIEGAL, who offered him $10,000 for "work" on a long-range
basis.. SIEGAL emphasized that MULE would not be required :
to procure documents from the Embassy, and according to
MULE, SIEGAL was aware of facts concerning MULE's personal /
life that could have been obtained only from listening de- /
vices in MULE's apartment or office. SIEGAL left after about
20 minutes, having warned MULE not to report the incident.
CULE was unable to identify NOSENKO's photograph.
a en eee

i (viii) PNG of BENSON, MULE, and STROUD ; !

After NOSENKO had been transferred to. the Tourist De-
partment in 19535, BENSON, MULE and STROUD were the targets
of a KGB operation which resulted in all three men being

wether anne: ween

*Precisely the same role was played by NOSENKO in the re-
cruitment approach to James STORSBERG, according to NOSENKO.
(See Part V.E.3.c.ii.)

|
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‘+ pfece of electronic equipment which American Intelligence ~ .

BE EE Fate

declared persona. non grata, NOSENKO gave the following
account of this inéidcnt: For some time the Second Chief
Directorate had beon trying to acquire a small, convenient

officers vere known tu be using during their travels inside |
the Sovict Union, As early as the beginning of 1954, the *
American Department had been given authorization from the
Central Courittee of the Communist Party to steal tais
equipment from the Americans, provided that the success of ':
such an operation was assured: Before his transfer to the" -
Tourist Department in 1955, NOSENKO hiaself had helped to
develop plans for the vperation and had even arranged an
abortive ettespt to steal the equipment from an attache at

a railroad station outside Moscow. While BENSON, MULE,

and STROUD were or one of their trips (after NOSENKO's trans €
fer) it was learned that they had the equipment with them, i
and the KCB decided to take it from them in Stalingrad.

To carry out the operation, Lieutenant General P.V. EDOTOV,
then Chief of the KGB Sccond Chief Directorate, and A,M.
GORBATENKO, Chier of the American Department, flew with
other personnel from the American Department to Stalingrad.
The hotel rooms of BENSON, STROUD and MULE were watched
‘constantly from a visual observation post, and it. was noted
that they never ate in the hotel restaurant but always in
their rooms. It was also noted that the apparatus was
placed under a pillow before they began to eat. while they
were seated at the table having dinner, therefore, the KGB
officers suddenly entered the room and seized the equipment.
In order to partially cover the illegality of this act, it
was decided to make a show of expelling BENSON, MULE and
STROUD from the Soviet Union, and this was done via the
persona non grata action.

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According to information from other sources, the equip-
ment was seized from BENSON, MULE, and STROUD on 5 May 1955,
and the three were declared persona non grata on 7 May (a
month before NOSENKO ciained to have transferred to the
Tourist Department).* When the 7 May date was given to
NOSENKO during the February 1965 interrogations, he replied
that the operation was handled at a higher level, that he
did not directly participate in it, but that he had been
involved in the earlier planning to seize the equipment. | ;
It was pointed out to him that he had always sald he was in
the Tourist Department at the time of this operation, and
that he had consistentiy said that he transferred from the
American to the Tourist Department in June 1955. -NOSENKO
shrugged, but offered no comment. 7 os :

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rae

*TheGigmsource Kaarlo R. TUOMI, who served in the United
States as a GRU Illegal from 1958 to 1963, reported to CIA
in.1964 that while working as a KGB informant in Kirov in
- the early 1950's, he was targetted against three U.S. Mili-
tary. Attaches travelling on a train. TUOMI believed thet.” .-
- he might have contributed information leading to the three
: Americans (as he later read in the Soviet press) being de-
clared persona non grata. It would appear that TUOMI's
targets were BENSON, MULE, and STROUD. :

vet abe ag


106.

(ix) CARDELLA

* NOSENKO said that in 1954 and 1955 there was an admini-
strative officer in the Embassy by the name of James CARDELLA.
The KGB had no interesting or unusual information cencerning
CARDELLA from any source, ard NOSENKO could say nothing more
about hin. oon mo,

CIA files show that Chief Warrant Officer CARDELLA served
in Moscow from September 1953 until June 1955. Other than the
fact that a microphone was discovered in CARDELLA's Moscow Em-
bassy office in 1964, no significant collateral information
concerning him is available.

(x) VAN LAFRTHEM

NOSENKO identified George VAN LANTHEM as an Assistant Air.
Attache at the U.S. Embassy against whom an cperation was at-
tempted in 1953 or 1954. Ne said that during this period a,
Russian actress, Alla LARIONOVA, was placed on a train going
from Berlin to Moscow with the mission of striking up an acquain-
tance with VAN LAETHEM which could be followed up in Moscow.

She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address-and tele-

phone: ‘number. Although she was certain that she would hear from
him, he never did call her in Moscow. NOSHNKO said tnat he had

heard about this from P.F. PANKRATCY, the case officer handling

LARIONOVA. He added that CHURANOY was the case officer respon-

sible for VAN LAETHEM, as he was for all members of the Air At-

tache's office at that time. NOSENKO knew of no other interest

or activity concerning VAN LAETHEM.

CIA records show that VAN LALTEEM was not an Assistant Air
Attache but an Assistant Army Attache, serving in Moscow from
March 1951 to March 1953.* As cryptographic security officer
and officer in chargz of the Embassy code room, he had super-

‘visory responsibility for the military code clerks and mechanics,

including Dayle SMITH, and he was on fairly close personal terms
with Sergeant Roy RHODES until the latter's departure from Mos-
cow in January 1953; VAN LAETHEM's duties also carried respon-
sibility for sensitive electronic activities in the Embassy.**
He was again in Moscow from 19 March to 19 May 1955 (at a time
when NOSENKO claims to have been the KGB case officer for U.S.
Army Attaches). Although this trip was always intended to he

_ only a TOY, it was represented to the Soviets as a PCS Assistant

Army Attache assignment because of the extremely sensitive na-
ture of his business there. He was project officer for. the en-
tire electronics program at the Embassy, and went to Moscow to
review the operations including the planned use of the new
electronic equipment which was seized from BENSON, MULE, and
STROUD in Stalingrad in May 1955 (see above). .

«

_® “Although VAN LAETHEM completed his two-year tour in Moscow in

March 1953, just at the time NOSENKO said he: entered the KGB;
he was succeeded in his post by Walter MULE, for whom NOSENKO

“" has claimed full responsibility. Thus, the fact of his osis
' tion as Assistant. Army Attache_ana MULE’S. predecessor would

‘presumably be available to NOSENKO. .

“Each time NOSENKO gave CIA the story of the recruitment of

,,Each reference to Roy RHODES was followed by a statement that
**it-was through RHODES that the KGB learned of the existence of

access to such information.

“ WANDREY® in the June 1962 meetings, he related it to Roy RHODES.

special electronic equipment -in the U.S. Embassy. RHODES had no

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— 107.

‘ was created to operate with and sgainst foreign travellers.

2. Soviet Homosexual Agents.

D. June 1955 to January 1960 (Tourist Department)

1. lotroduction -

By his account’ NOSENKO served in the Amer ican-Canadian-:
British Section of the Tourist Department,* KGB Second Chief
Directorate, from June 1955 (shortly: after, the department

in the USSR) until his transfer to another department in
that directorate in January 1960. He wasS.a case officer |
until appointed Deputy Chief of the Section about June 1958.
In statexents made prior to April 1966, NOSENKO claimed to
have been twice promoted during this four and one-half year
period--to captain in July 1956 and to major in August or
September 1959--but in a signed statement of April 1966 he
said he remained a captain from 1956 until his defection.

. ,NOSENKO has described his personal and- direct partici-
pation in the section' s activities as consisting of:.

i
4
4
:

i
j
-Recruitment of two Soviet. nationals as homosexual I
agents,** with NOSENKO their handler from the outset until ‘ !
they were dropped in 1962 or 1963.

-Recruitment and handling of Soviets as agents tar- :
getted against American tourists; their number varied fron j
eight to 14 and many were employed by Inturist. i

-Operations involving :4 foreigners who visited the
USSR for various lengths of time. |

-Recruitment and handling of the American Express Com- |

pany representative in Moscow, whom NOSENKO continued to
meet following his reassignment in January 1960.

4
a
4

-Decision in October 1959 that Lee Harvey OSWALD was .
of no operational interest to the KGB, and subsequent par- _ ot
ticipation in the KGB investigation of OSWALD" s activities
in the USSR.

Each of these categories is discussed separately below.

: Because he had been seen meeting a foreigner ina
public lavatory in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB concluded
that A.1I. VOLKOV might be a homosexual and hence of some
operational value. The KGB therefore mounted an operation
which verified this possibility in 1987: A homosexual agent
of the Moscow Criminal Investigations Department provoked .
VOLKOV into a compromising ‘situation... Then VOLKOV, who had - 7
previously been a KGB agent but was at this time deactivated; °
was called to KGB Headquarters where, after NOSENKO interro-
gated hin, he admitted his homosexuality and agreed” to

we)

" *These | components : are also known as the. First’ Section: and .
- Seventh Department, respectively.

. -**tThis tern refers to agents whose homosexuality: is ex-
; ploited py .the KGB against certain male targets. .

NOSENKO's proposal to work for the KGB nmong homosexuals.

VOLKOV helped NOSENKO the following year to recruit a hoao- .

sexual acquaintance, Aleksey (patronymic not recalled).
YEFREMOV. The two agents subsequently worked as a team
against foreigners under NOSENKO's direction; in addition

-to specific targets, they had the general assignment of

associating with foreign visitors in Moscow for the pur-
pose of spotting possible homosexuals. NOSENKO described
on 12 June 1962 his use of these agents: “Although I am

a chief of section there I have all sorts of.agents. I
have a good agent apparatus. I have beautiful girls,
beautiful girls, whom I can use as I like--anything you
want. I have homosexuals, pederasts, and, in particular, 1
have one special pair. I am afraid they are known to both
you and the British. I permitted this pair to work in

general [without specific assignments]. TI send them. out to,

look on their own. I give them money and tell them te go
out. ‘Stroll about. Here are theater tickets. ‘Look around,
but only Americans. Look for American pederasts.' They are
& couple, that is, they love each other. They are able to
do anything desired, cither active or passive, anything.

They call me at night: ‘Yuriy Ivanovich. There is a mister
so-and-so here. He wants to go to bed with us.'' I say:

“*Well, let him. We'll talk about it tomorrow.' So the next

day-they go to a special hotel room. Wo make photographs.
Then we think about what he represents. Is he worth it?
Then, as Chief, I recommend that he be recruited or not--
depending on his position, that he can give, what he can
tell. If he can give something, I say: ‘Well, let's have
a go figrat'|. After this, I speak to these boys: ‘Well,
go to bed with him again, one or both of you, as you wish.
Do whatever is wanted.' All this is seen [observed by the
KGB]. The [hotel] administrator enters. ‘What are you
doing?' The administrator calls the Militia. An akt is
drawn up. ‘Well, you are a foreigner. This is not our
business. We don't know what to do with you.' Then the
Chief arrives: ‘What's up. Aha, I see.' Well, then a con-
versation begins: ‘Listen, what shall we do? Pederasty is
punishable by three to five years and now, on the basis of

recent legislation, by up to eight. Understand, if your

friends find out that you are a pederast--and how can they
help but find out?..."

When NOSENKO moved from the Tourist Department to the
Second Chief Directorate's American Department in January
1960, he took VOLKOV and YEFRENOV with him. They were
never used against targets in the U.S. Embassy; but, NOSENKO:
said, the Tourist Department “used to call me on homosexual
prospects." VOLKOV and YEFREMOV continued as active KGB
agents until some time in 1960 or 1961, after which they
could not be used further since they had become too well
known, and NOSENKO finally retired their files to KGB
archives in 1962 or 1963. The last operation in which these
two agents participated was: during January 1962.

During interrogation on these agénts, NOSENKO ‘has been

- . unable to tell. where they lived in Moscow, their family

situation, or other such details. He said that he never
met either in a safehouse (always on the street) and never
met either of them alone, without: the other: being present.

} i
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- 109.

NOSENKO has described eleven KGB approaches to Americans ©

- based on compromising evidence obtained with the assistance

. Of VOLKOV and/or YEFREMOV and several other cases in vhich
Americans. were suspected of being homosexuals on the basis
of the evaluation of these two. Additionally, CIA records

- indicate that at least. six Americans, not reported on by
NOSENKO, have had contacts with one or both of these agents

.in Moscow. Of these six, three were CIA agents, one a U.S,
graduate student, another a psychiatrist visiting Soviet
institutions, and the last. Charles W. THAYER, the well-known
diplomat and author. With one or possibly two exceptions, all
the contacts of VOLKOV and YEFREMOY reported by NOSENKO. or ;
other sources took place during the period from April to” ~ | : .
November 1959. The known exception was the KGB approach to . ; i
W.E. JOHNSON in January 1962;* the possible exception was | sO
the contact with the American psychiatrist, which took place {
in 1959 or early 1960 but cannot be dated precisely. Finally, ; ; |
NOSENKO has described the contacts between VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Lad
and the American Robert BARRETT in the. summer of 1959 but :
doeg not know of their contacts in the summer of 1961, mae S , :
shortly before BARRETT was approached on the basis of con-~ me 4

' promising information obtained in 1959.** ‘

wont fittbabarecdutiaactelnas.

“3. Other Soviet égents ct . :

The Tourist Department, just established when NOSENKO
was transferred to it in mid-1955, had no agent network for
operations against American and British tourists. Conse- i
quently, NOSENKO said, he and the other case (officers had i
to “start from the beginning.” a . |

|

cients

As a first step, NOSENKO was introduced by a fellow

officer to a number of "trusted persons" in Inturist; these
were not agents, he explained, but "just persons Known to
me the KGB so that a KGB man could approach one of them with
: questions about somebody or something." NOSFNKO began to

collect information on these individuals and others with the
aim of formalizing their recruitment; by the end of 1955,
he estimated, he had a network of about eight agents, all

_ of then Inturist interpreters. During the following four |

{
;
|

years, the number of agents whom NOSENKO handled varied:
Agents would be transferred from one case officer to another,
. some would leave Inturist, and "things were sort of changing
‘all the time, bacK and forth." In 1956, NOSENKO said, he had
about ten agents, in 1957 there were. about 12, in 1958 about .
‘eight, and at the end of 1959 (when he was preparing to return
; to the American Department) he had approximately 12 to 14.
. . .NOSENKO has provided information on five: of these agents, : 1. an
ey ’" ° @ll of whom he says he recruited from within Inturist during | pO Ee
1855. These were: — a

Larissa SOBOROVA; An: Inturist interpreter and. one of oe ;
the first Inturist agents recruited by NOSENKO.: SOBOROVA :
- was NOSENKO’S agent until 1959 (when she married and retired)
-...’ and reported to him on all foreigners with whom she worked as

<a interpreter. She worked with NOSENKO in the operation

rr re

*See Part . ‘Ve F.4
#*See Part Vv. D.4.m.

‘ ‘a j wun”

against Ee Pierre the summer of 1957.*

“ WOSENKO reported specifically on her possible sexual involve-
ment with two other tourists, one American and the other British,
during 1957-1953. NCSENKO.menticred at one point that he “even

tola Larissa about his last name."

— Vladiair KUROMTSEV: KG3 cryptonym “LESZDEV," recruited
in 1955. (NOSENKC has also said that MUROHTSEV had been a
Second Chief Directorate ayent "since 1958,") MUROMTSEY wag
called into the army in akout 1959 and was senc to some Soviet
Air Force academy in Central Asia, where he dorked as an inter-
» preter for Syrian students studying there. During this period,
. his file was helé by the local KGF in Central Asia. Later he
returned to Moscow and sas reactivated by the Second Chief
Directorate.

seutstbdubeRh aah

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= tmenetecrennnre tee mane

- Nikolay ROGOV: KGS cryptonym “Gzero,” recruited in 1955,
ROGOV had formerly peen 42 “confidential contact” of the KGB.
He worked in the central office of Inturist which assigned
interpreters to British ana Americen citizens visiting the
Soviet Unicon.

ne mo
costal cae nat aida 0

5 . ’
- Natalya SHULGINA: Recruited by NOSENKO in 1955, an

Inturist interpreter. Shown SHULGINA's photscraph on 6 February

 °9964, NOSENKO failed to recognize yir when he was given her nene,

-- “ however, he sai@ that this was a Second “hye Drréctorate agent,
on whom Boris RELITSKIY had reported to C1lA,** NC3ENKO's only °
other statement on SHULGINA was made on 17 Aprii 19€4, when
discussing the agents he acquired in 1955. He eaid: “So, for
exemple, I had this SORUROVA. then 1 had MUROMTSEV, TI recruited
him. Who else? Natalya SHULGINA, KUENSAROVA, Well, enyway, '
during this short peried. during 1955 untid the end of ‘55, I }
had about eight pesple, all of them traaslatets from Inturist." hs
NOSENKXO therefore said he handled SHULGIUNA and tnplied shat _be
recruited her. (Information from other sources indicates that :,
SHULGINA worked for two ycars as secretary/interpreter for the
NEC correspondent in Moscow, Irving R, LEViNE. who arrived in : i
the Soviet Union in July 1955. aAlthouzh there 13 no evidence
that SHULGINA was directly involved. the KGB attempted to re-
eruit LEVINE in Kovember 1955, She has travelled abroad twice,
the first time to Paris in i956 and the secend time as an inter-
preter at the Brussels Fair in the sunmer of 1958, As NOSENKO
Po indicated, BELITSKIY reported on SHULGINA, wno hs said was a
elose friend. BELITSKIY said that she was directly involved,
probably as the principal, in a sexual entrapment operation,
‘in the recruitment of a member of the British Parliament.
BELITSKIY reported to CIA on SHULGINA in October 1962; NOSENKO .
said his last connection with the BELITSKIY case. was in Geneva . .
‘ gn the spring of 1962.) an ae . a

wet A cals OM ada ahaha at

a ceed oat BA ab ie ye

we ep cee at ". Tamara KUNGAROVA: Inturist interpreter recruited in eee a
i 1955 (according to NOSENKO's statement in April 1964 - see _ a
i above on SHULGINA). In October 1964, NOSENKO said she was trans-

i ferred as an agent to the Tourist Department by the British

are discussed in Part V.D.4.d.

**NOSENKO reported in 1962 that the KG3 controlled BELITSKIY,
a source of CIA (see Part .VI.D ee Se le


- Commonwealth Department in 1957 or the beginning of 1958.

| Operation against an American professor, which did not
reach the point of a recruitment approach. Between 1957
. or 1958 and 1960 she was working against an American tourist
‘named Philip NIELSEN who was suspected of connection with

lieved there was no recruitment. Mrs. NIELSEN died in 1965,

_ target..

. about 1960, when she became an instructor in the Greek

- She reported to NOSENKO any information which she obtained

‘of Agriculture to interpret during meetings between Soviet

. once participated in a conversation he had with Iowa farmer

.., States and was used by the KGB Legal Residency in Washington,

*NIELSEN was, in fact

jpeg aaa ila sinh isnt

In 1957 or 1959 she was involved in a sexual compromise

CIA and who was under study for recruitment by the KGB.* —
KUNGAROVA later married NIELSEN and the two “lived “in ty +:
England. The KGB was still interested in NIELSEN at the
time NOSENKO left the Tourist Department, but NOSENKO be~

Besides those in Inturist, NOSENKO has named several :
other agents whom he recruited or was given while in the . oe
Tourist Department. These included tha following: ; i

~Aleksey A. DMITRIYEV: KGB eryptonym "TOMO," a can- |
didate member of the Academy of Sciences USSR anda speciale .

ist on Japan and Thailand. DMITRIYEV speaks Japanese and

English and worked at the Japanese exhibition in Moscow.

NOSENKO did not indicate how. DMITRIYEV was used cperationally !
or how he was connected with the American-Canadian-~British

ros cnes ms sition setealel woghadee

tte Mba weet:

.-(fnu) IVANOV: A lawyer employed by the Institute of
Foreign Trade in Moscow. NOSENKO did not personally re- !
cruit this agent. IVANOV moved to Moscow from the Baltic .
area and his previous handlers there notified the Center,
suggesting that the agent might be of use in the capital.
NOSENKO contacted IVANOV and later turned him over to the
British Commonwealth Department of the Second Chief Direc-
torate whicu, NOSENKO believed, “planted him in the British
Trade Mission or something like that."

oan eet oe a he ae

-Marina RYTOVA: KGB cryptonym "KRYMOVA," born about

1923 or 1924 and educated at the Military Institute of
Foreign Languages, a special school which also had Communist
students from foreign countries. There she studied military
subjects as well as foreign languages. She speaks English
and Greek well. NOSENKO could not recall who recruited her,
but she was turned over to him by I.4. KONSTANTINGV, a
Tourist Department case officer, in 1956 or 1957. At that
time she was working as an interpreter at the Russian :
Permanent Exhibit in Moscow and continued in this job until

language school of the Institute of International. Reélations.:.
on foreign delegates or foreign tourists who visited the
Exhibit in Moscow. As she was often invited by the Ministry

officials and delegates from America, England,,and Greece,
she also reported.this information to NOSENKO. RYTOVA
served several times as an interpreter for KHRUSHCHEV and:
GARST, In 1959 or 1960 she was sent. as-interpreter with a.
small delegation which visited GARST's farm in the United

'

dei im ear ree

in contact. with CIA at the time (see. -

pthoee et
“dp. .

Part VI.D.2.)., ||


See Part V.D.5. for further

D.C., to report on observations. enroute and while there. -

RYTOVA is married to a man. who vorke in cne of the military
effices in Moscow and is a captain ora major. They have *.

, one daughter, approximately 14 years old.

_ -¥evgeniya ("Jane") DANKO: KGB cryptonym “OKSANA."
She worked in the American Express Company offic¢ in Moscow
for Arsens FRIPPEL and leter for FRIPPEL's successor,
Michael JELISAVCIC.* DANKO: was handled by I.A. KONSTANTINOV
from about 1955 to 1957-and was then turned over to NOSENKO.
She reported on JELISAVCIC, who was not approached, according
to NOSENKO. ae oo

4. Operations with Foreign Visitors

NOSENKO said he participated in 14-operations with
foreign visitors to the USSR while a member of the American-
Canadian Section of.the Tourist Department. Nine of these
operations resulted in recruitmenis (excluding one who later
was recruited by another element of the KGB, but including
another whom NOSENKO classified as a borderline case). Of
the remaining five operations which did not end with a re-

- cruitment, no approach was contemplated by the KGB in one

case, one target rejected NOSENKO's proposal, the KGB was
unable to obtain compromising material for an approach to a
third, and for political reasons the KGB decided against
approaching the final two.

Although the information from NOSENKO on the timing of
these operations does not always agree with that from other
sources, these cases can be grouped chronologically as
follows: 1955 ~ one; 1956 ~ one; 1957 - three; 1958 = two;
and 1959 — seven. The operations in 1955, 1956 and, with.
one exception, 1959 were homosexual provocations. The re-
cruitment of Arsene FRIPPEL in 1959 was based on heterosexual
compromise.

These fourteen operations are summarized briefly below
in the approximate order in which the cases began. For
each case, NOSENKO's information is followed by a summary of
the results of CIA investigations. The description of the
BURGI case is more detailed than the others, for reasons in-

-dicated in the text.

a. Attempted Entrapment of MALIA (1955)

- - KOSENKO's Information: Martén MALIA, a graduate ‘student,
spent about four months in the USSR in 1955 and was sus-~
pected of having connections with American Intelligence.

“~~ moward the end of his stay, while under surveillance, MALIA
_ was observed in contact with a Soviet citizen believed to

be a homosexual. The Soviet was detained by the KGB, and
NOSENKO eventually obtained a.confession that he had had .

_ homosexual relations, with MALIA, After. NOSENKO. had arranged -
for the Soviet to introduce MALIA to a-KGB homosexual agent, ~

the latter enticed MALIA to a specially equipped hotel room
in Moscow; NOSENKO was on the scene (but not directly in
‘touch with MALIA) when the introductions:were made in a

a 23 weed os tree?

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‘details on FRIPPEL and JELISAVCIC.

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Moscow restaurent, and from an observation point in a
neigrboring hotel rooa he watched the KGB agent and MALIA
having relaticns. With MALIA insisting on the lights being:
; turned off, however, .4t was impossible to obtain compro-
ae miging phctcgraphs (the KGB did not yet have infra-red
photographic equipmont, NOSENKO said) and therefore no re«
a cruitment approach was made to MALIA. During this and a

-- - 4 later trip to Moscow in 1961, MALIA was "yery cautioug,"

; and the KGB never again succeeded in exploiting MALIA's
homosexuality for a recruitment approach.

a Investigation Results: MALIA, a U.S. Navy intolligence
~ officer during World War. 11, has visited the Soviet Union

in 1955 and twice tn 1962. While buying books for the
Library of Congress and. several universities in 1955, MALIA |
travelled over 10,000 miles throughout the USSR, which was
sufficiently unusual at the time to attract press publicity. .
in 1955 and 1962 he nad contacts with dissident Soviet :
citizens and clandestinely brought to the est literature i
for fublishing abrord. In December 1963 MALIA was the
subject of an attack in the Soviet press which charged that
during 1662 he had “spent his time in Moscow looking for
dissension in the ranks of young intellectuals at druvken -
debauches." MALIA lad been in periodic contact with CIA
An recent years; in the spring of 1963 he claimed to have '
had'no involivezents with blackmarketeers, hor.ogexuals, or |
females iunide the Soviet Union at any time. ile made a i i
similar statencnt toRageRyes in October 1963. MALIA has - Ff :
not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's informa- i
tion about him. \

ey Sy
weensell antl able bi on

atatabede bie hdl Sabato ot

b. Recruitment of BURGI (1956) : : '

NOSENKO's Information: At the first meeting in 1962
and despite his stated fear for his own security and his
deternination to discuss only the two leads he wished to sell i
CIA, NOSENKO described his recruitment of Yale Professor
Richard BURGI on the basis of a homosexual provecation oper~
ation which began in Moscow and culminated with an approach
in Kiev in June 1956. NOSENKO reported that he received a
Jetter of commendation (blagodarnost') and a bonus of one : ;
month's pay for this recrulfwent, Lut in 1966 ne retracted |

this claim. The BURGI case was the first operation in which
NOSENKO had direct contact with a foreign target of the KGB, H
and NOSENKO said he counted it as a turning point in his i
. - personal and professional life: It was with this success-
. ful operation, NOSENKO stated, that he “began to grow" from - .

; ' & spoiled’ playboy into a responsible and effective counter- aa bet
intelligence officer. The BURGI operation was the first :
recruitment carried out by the Tourist Department after it coat ee

set oss "ws was created in 1955, according to NOSENKO. In 1964 NOSENKO :
reported for the first time that his superior, A.S. KOZLOV,
Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, had also taken part -
in this operation, but that he, NOSENKO, was the ‘responsible . Cet
case officer. In August 1965, when asked who had recruited: To
BURGI, NOSENKO: replied: "“KOZLOV and NOSENKO."~ Asked who - .
recruited him first, NOSENKO said: "KOZLOY, naturally, He
. Was the Deputy Chief of the Department.- The collection of
> the materials [in preparation for the approach] was in the

- hands of Case Officer NOSENKO." Because of ‘the personal and
general significance ascribed to this operation by NOSENKO,
it is discussed in detail here: a oo :

fact


ot tae pee ee

In August 1365 NOSENKO reported that at the time of
BURGI's arrival in the USSR, his file contained a copy of
his visa application (anketa), “maybe” an excerpt from a
cable sent by the Soviet Embassy in the United States saying
that a visa had been granted, 2 routine note from Inturist
giving BURGI's anticipated date of arrival and his itinerary
inside the Soviet Union, and the results of traces of the
general KGB Archives and of the First Chief Directorate
archives. NOSENKO himself ran the traces, which proved to
be negative; there was no information on record concerning
BURGI, and since no other names were mentioned in the
material available on BURGI, no other traces were made. The
KGB interest in BURGI derived exclusively from the fact that
he was a professor of Slavic studies and therefeore had con~
tact with students who might some day work for the U.S.
State Department, American Intelligence, and othcr target
organizations. NOSENKO did not recall who first suggested
an attempt to recruit him. .

When BURGI arrived in the Soviet Union, he came in
contact witi a number of KGB agents, and their reports were
placed in the unofficial file maintained by NOSENKO.* NO-
SENKO could not recall in 1965 how many such agents there may
have been, theiy names, or what they might have reported
concerning BURGI. (BURGE had an Inturist interpreter but
NOSENKO did not know whether he was & KGB agent.) From some
source, name forgotten by NOSENKO, the KGB cbtained indica-
tions that BURGI was a homosexual, and it was decided to
try to obtain the grounds for recruitment by homosexual com-
promise, NOSENK® therefore approached Yu.A, LOPUKHOV, an
officer of the Britis: Department who handled the homosexual
agent Viktor BELANOYSKIY, and asked permission to use his
agent in setting up the compromise. After permission had
been received to mount an operation on this basis, LOPUKHOV
ond NOSENKO met with BELANOVSKIY and instructed him to make
BURGI's acquaintance in a hotel dining room. The compromise
proceeded according to plan: BELANOVSKIY met BURGI, the
fact of mutual homosexuality was recognized, and BURGI was
invited to BELANOVSKIY's hotel room where homosexual acts
took place and photographs were made. NOSENKO was in the
adjoining room and directed the compromise. He did not meet
BURGI at this point, however,

As the result of NOSENKO's special request, the com-
promising photographs were ready by the following day. A
veport of the compromise and a request for permission to

‘attempt recruitment were then submitted to NOSENKO's superiors.

The request came back with the approving signatures of O.¥M.
GRIBANOV and A.S, FEKLISOV, the Chief of the American Depart-
ment of the First Chief Directorate, which had expressed
interest in using BURGI in the United States. BURGI's itin-
erary called for him to fly from Moscow to Kiev a short

while after this episode and, having called the Kiev KGB with
instructions, NOSENKO and KOZLOV flew there the day before to
prepare the operation. BURGI arrived the next morning and
was met at the airport by (fnu) KHODAKOVSKIY, an officer of
the Second Directorate in Kiev who operated under Inturist

*NOSENKO explained that no official files were kept on tourists
until 1960--only "collections of materials."

.

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4.00000

cover. NOSENKO was unable to recall how the car was ac-
quired, whether it was a KGB or Iniurist yehicle, who the
driver was, whether he was in the employ of the local KGB,
or other details.

seat df nui?

In accordance with the operational plan, the local KGB
officer told BURGI enroute to the city that all the hotels
in Kiev were full at the moment because of various confer-—
ences, but that Inturist had arranged for him to stay for
about a day in a private apartment im the center of town; a
he would be moved to a hotel as soon as possible. When the .

ear arrived at the apartment building on Kreshchetik Ulitsa
in Kiev, NOSENKO, KOZLOV, V.S. PETRENKO, a local KGB officer,
and (fnu) KASTYKAITE. a woman housekeeper, were waiting for
them. NOSENKO could not remember how or whether he intro-
duced himself to BURGI. The recrnitment conversation, he
said, was handled by “KOZLOV-NOSENKO," but NOSENKO had for-
gotten by 1965 who said what: "I don't remember wnat I
talked about and I don't remember what KOZLOV talked about.
Many things were discussed. It started with how he Liked
his stay inithe Soviet Union... Then we slowly proceeded
to say how unfortunate it was that information had been re- :
ceived about his conduct in Moscow. We told him that his
homosexual activities were known, that this was punishable
under Soviet law according to article.so-and-so of the :
eriminal code, ete., that he was not a diplomat, had no : 1
diplomatic immunity, that he could be taken to court ac- ; :
cording to the Soviet law... well, he was scared, confused,
upset, and felt uncomfortable. Then we slowly proceeded to
say that all that could be smoothed out, but, you understand,
the basis was prepared for the man to say: ‘All right, I
agree to help.'... We showed him the pictures. He was
embarrassed of course--he was naked. Then we prepared the
basis: ‘You have a noble task. You teach; you have stu-
dents; the students might become future specialists on
Russia or might work as diplomats, etc., but many of these
students could be used by intelligence. They might be sent
somewhere with special tasks. Maybe you will tell us who
among the students is preparing for government service,
how they are distributed, etc.'... During the first conver-
sation everything was made completely clear... He was not
at all willing to help or work for Soviet Intelligence. He
was told that he must understand that in this case ‘helping
Soviet Intelligence’ was a very broad term. JI remember that
I told him: ‘Understand, nobody is going to ask you that
you help our friends over there, or me, if I should be there,
or that you do anything bad or conduct any kind of subver-
sive activities, that you organize explosions or murder.’
After the Soviet Union, he was supposed to go to italy,
to visit the Russicum of the Vatican, and here KOZLOV
grabbed the subject and began to ask questions about this
school. He told us a bit about the Russicum and we asked
him to write about it and he wrote down some names of the
_ professors who teach Russian subjects..." According to
‘ NOSENKO, the discussion lasted about five hours; at its end.
BURGI signed a short statement that he agreed ''to assist . .
, the organs of Soviet Intelligence."’ NOSENKO first said that
. : it was he who took this statement from BURGI but later said
BS he could not remember whether he or KOZLOV did this. BURGI
was then taken to a hotel.

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This was the first time NOSENZO met BURGI. ‘Following
- the recruitment, he moved tnto the same hotel, a floor
; above PURGI, and for the remainder of BUNKGI's stay in Kiev
* became his constant companton and guide. An attempt was . °
made"to snooth out all the dirty business that had teen
brought up during tha recruitment talk." NOSENKO took
- * BURGI to an old cathedral in Kiev; with KOZLOV and PZTRENKO
they visited a kolkhoz and the writer SHEVCHENKO's grave in
nearby Kaniv. The subject of homosexuality “as not raised

; again. From Kiev, BURGI went directly to the West, without 4
; returning to Moscow. Before the approach, NOSENKO had 4
' visited the Amesican Department of the First Chief PDirecto- {
rate end had arranged with its chief, WEKLISOV, for 2 ree AL 3.
contact plan in Mew York City should BURGI be reeruited. { a
Before he left BURG was briefed on these avranjements, j
which calied lor a first meeting in the New York Public : 4
Library. BURGI was given a recognition siunad end a KGB 4
eryptonym, but the latter was nor diseussed with Kim. 4
About five days after returning to Moscow, NOSENKO j

turned over #1] his matorials on whe BURGI speration to the ; ;
First Chief Directorate. Somewhat latev sy GUSKOV, i 4
Chief of the Ak nadian-British Tourist Section, i i
KOZIOV, and “GSENHO visiced FERLISCO¥ in the Firet Chief ! 4
Directorate and oxpressed an interest in further cuvelop- i i
ments in the case, FEKLISOY told then that RBUHGI hed ar- ' i

rived for his first moeting, but the KGB had not established
contact; the first meeting in New York City took place the
second or third time BURG] appeared and the New York Legel
Residency continued to meet with him until the Revolution -in
Hungary in late 1956. NOSENKO Later heard from someone in
the American Department, First Chief Directorate that the
case was closed, For their roles in this first recruitment
ef the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said in 1965, he ana
KOZLOV received letters of commendation and ponuses of one
month's pay by order of KGB Chairman SEROVY: PETRENKO was
given a letter of commendation and half a month's salary;
and even KASTYKAITE, the housekeeper, got a commendation.

In October 1966, however, NOSENKO said his only KGB award
was for his lengevity of service.

Investigation Results: BURGI was first intervieved on
22 hove ber 1957 concecnine his reeruitwent vy the XB.
Rar ea ¥ MESES SOAS cs ETN hl ee Bae Ey
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: the responsibie case of ?icer TRiN of . 1
; the Sixth Seetionr ‘ot che Tourist ae Lig section
: - was then responsible for operations oveign sean vn. ‘
Since VEXKENIKIN spoke no German and & known to
speak English, SOSENKO was selected to sas epproach
because he “knew English a little." When asked why a German-~
speaking KCB case officer was not used, NUSENKO ars*ered:
"The higher-ups ssid ‘yo work « tase, to and that és
‘all." After beirg rebuffed by Mm “fake saw hin .
Several more times. during the if it. oo, but when 3
"+s NOSENKO attempted te rencw contact upon Qe return to ,
“es “the Soviet Unton in 1958, the latter refuse vce him. ve

“ “Investigation Results: WQRBRD os. isterviewed by
‘CIAf on 19"July 1555, and, white scnci yo uneco mMerative,
De described aticild approach" in Mosco. duriag 1956 or 1957).
hoo lee: .which-may be. the one-deoscribed by. NOSENKO. . (He. wes pot |.
: questioned on the identities of the. Sovicts involved.)  ~
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acquaintance ana

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officer, ¥. ARKHIPOV, mado

handled the entire operation asi

self wlavec a role. It had sone becn determined that

1 wad 2a fordness for girl ENKO therefore presented ‘
himscif to iim, using the newac UESERoV' or MSERGEYEV" and

--- posing as a painter, and told GRR hat he could findioyomen

ms for him. A party was arranged, witn «a KGB agent as

*See Part, V.0.8 for more discii sof this. point.

ssion

s described,

*sThis incident.

in Part. THT.As


‘w4-con0p ” #

" asked

122.

‘date and a Second Chic? Directorate secretary as. NOSENKO'S
F r

Late the evening MOSESKU and tite date texcused
and Phea sesual relativre with the tex Y

Photegrapr secae wero tannin by. the ROD
SENKO and aw ose anotnet the nowt day.
nounecd. tha: wv: nad sone artictés, ceneres and the itac,

that he want to vcll cn the rkcet. NOSENKO offered

to arrange the sule acd took (toe ¢ dingy section of
“Moscow. AS they arcived befor. 2 smabi howse. NCTENKO -

sella, Art this
an aporeacned and

vo wive fizc. the thin
fh Of2icer poring as. 2°
for blackaneketeuring.
station,. ras recruited hy Kos. &
the Touris: : tment. undas threat of imprisyonneat.
(it was DUSAL wae

m cnt r}
nrrested the tac

a

‘a.itia

d had the photofrephs tal previous
evening.) hero was no teether contact with avter
he left the CSSR, however, teon on his ret ye Oslo hea

publtched an crtdicte in watch he deserthbod J.is experiences,

Paes

“put not all of then.

inverti

NOSKEKO's Information: 8OSENAY in 1S82 recruited Giselia
NARRIS, an exployce of the Americnoa “xpress Coupany in Sale
Lake City, based on ker romantic and sexual involvement with
a Soviet citizen. The Seviet teld HARRIS that he was in
trouble with Soviet authorities and persuaded her to acccnpany
hin to the police. HARRIS agrecd to meet and cooperate with
the Soviets if they estabJished contact with her in Salt Lake
City, but the case was turned over to the First Chie? Directo-
rate, and NOSENKO was unaware of any further contact with her.

vmamermeretie | merres

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14-0000

 NOSENZO's Information: Virgil KRAFT, a clergyman from the
: “Chicego area, visited the Soviet Unicn as a tourist in 1957 or
1952, and NOSEN®S was acsiqned to bo the responsible case offi-:
cer. During an earlier trip to the US&R, the KGS had learned,
KRAFT had been intimate with a Seviet woman. NOSENKO arranged
for her to come to Moscow from hiey, waera 5.2 was living in
1957 or 1954, in orcer to compromise “RAPT. Although his wife
was accompanying him in Moscow, KRAFT and the Sovict woman were
intimate in the latter's recom in the Gr-nd Hotel. NOSENKO was
present at the tine supecvising the operation, Photegraphs
were taken. Then militiazen broke into che room, -finding KRAFT
- and the woman in the nude; a recruitment. approach was then made
: ' by DUBAS, the Chief of the Tourist: Department. -(NOSENKO had
been the case officer and had handled the operation thus far,
but he tock no part in the confrontation cr recruitment approach
“because DUBAS wanted it for himself.") Although the recruit-
ment was not firm, KRAFT and BUBAS "had an agreement" that i
nothing would be done about the compromise if KRAFT did not
criticize the Soviet Union in lectures about his trip there :
which he was to give in the United States. DUBAS ayain con-. i
tacted KRAFT when he came to Moscow in 1963, end after this his i
file was turned over to the First Chief Directorate, NGSENKO
récalieé that the first Chief Directorate "said that KRAFT was
not in a good reyion of the United States. Ard also it smelled
ike he had spoken of the apnroacn made to hin." Therefore,
WOSENKG concluded, he probably had not keen contacted in the
United Stites. -

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“fh. Reeruitment of DREW (1959)

t _ ° NOSENKO'S Information: Geerge DREW, an Rrerican who : .

“yisited the Sovict Union in the spring of 1959, ha@ originally: | _

peen the respensibility of V.M. IVANOV, a case officer of the os
section dealing with American and Canadian tourists. By chance,

_ however, BREW became involved with NOSENKG's homosexual agents oboe, Menecas
hey reported this oo

VOLKOV and YEFREMOV (see Part v.D.2), and th
to NOSCENKO, then the deputy enief of the section. NOSENKO and

IVANOV discussed the case with DUBAS and possibly GUSKOV, the
section chief, and NOSENKO flew alone to Leningrad to make the
approach. (IVANOV ‘was not considered ‘to be sufficiently ex-
oo _ perienced and his English was not gocd.) NOSENKO arranged for 7
; 1+ - DREW to be compromised in a Leningrad hotel room with a homo- =
..ie-gexual agent of the local KGB handled by a Leningrad officer, .
(fnu) PERELETOV. Using the aame "My, SERGEYEV," NOSENKO


14.00000° FS”

- ” oe Aad
alone..ro¢ruited DREW in an office ef the hotel. The KGB First
‘Chief Directorate was interested in CREN's recruitment ke |

seause he might be able te spet othes homcsexucis, pussibly some
in the U.S. Government. : oO

Resale

St

_vietenwreasrellay- een cheba ne bapa

Recruitment of Ks 41959)

. , 4

NOSENKO'S nfort veson: In dh or possibly July 1959 , 1 i

NOSENKO personally recruited a QigeistAe subject", opie heaneae re 5

QF ee s in a room of the mot@f"Astoria in Leningrad arcer !
@xattdgyhud been compromised by NOSENEO'’s homosexual agants VOL-

KOV and YEFREMOV (see Parc wlp.2.). The case’ was then turned 4

over to Yc. A. TARABRIN, at that tine Caief ef the British De- 3

partment of the Firs: Chier Pirectoiate. t iMQ furnished 4

. no more infermation on this case and did not 7 its current g

; . tstus, but he believed the G8 hus not been in contact with i

; iy stp subsequently. 4

tTaivestigation

CP

Results:

j. Recruitment of CB (1935 ;

NOSENKO'sS Information: Ey himself NOSENXO revruited aay

Te, Se ce EN “eapin the “eva! ov vo (mow the Bucharest)
fo Hotel in iloscew in July 14%, afte. GEReBR had been compromised
by either VOLKOV or YLPREI homesexuai 4 (see Part

V.D.2.)-. GSR is a Giay ‘nand his case was also :

turned over to TARABRI*. :

; .

I a

ae NOSENKO's Information: SENK
eruited the Moscow representative o

: . NOSENKO explained his involvement with British nationals

: _....,. by saying that, after 1958, the Tourist Department had two

i ’ geographic sections, one dealing with U.S. and UK citizens —

_, and the other with tourists from other countries. NOSENKO _

“>: Was involved in the first of these, "so they“assigned them 4
to me. nn oe, “ ed


7225,

Si ; ENFO did not 2
pol in Mosec# during the cusner of 1999, o0:,
approach wiz tased cn hisosexuali compron.se any

visited the
-Qfuxual agents
grasent to be
Vio. e.i, Accidentally
voplvicns to NOSENKO.
sted authority

a recruit

OOH
Soyvict Un
FOLECV and
come rcqu
met >
NOSE
to take covrre:i

vad

Mont «epprcach, and the case to
SAENS hod ty of A.A.

(a
VELITSEIY, another secifice:.) Phet
homosexual relaticrs octwoen \ ; two suparate
occasions in Hoscow. NS velioad to Gengorod
he wes “arrested” hy KOS offacers (pesing as mijitianen) while
he was engnecd in relavions with a ho nt of opera-
tional contect From Cudcssa. HOSERLO ene to bring
this homosexual to Uengcrod; he did not 1 his name,

buken of

as

“y

:
but supsiied CIA with a physical deseription.  (NOSENEO could

6

give ne background on the agent and when asked why not, said
he "wasn’t interestcd. MERTENS was n brought before
NOSENKO, who recruited niin during a se on Lasting approxi-
,Mately five hours. NOSENnO later trav with MERTENS when
he visited ivov and Minsk before leavil USSR. NOSENKO
’ said that he had used the name "George" ™ ENS, but he

-could not recall what Inst name he had «:-

get

z
;

Invéstigation Results: GR SRIREP are ct fs aad

@—NOSENKO EXplained chat the Tourist Department in 1959 had

a section dealing with commercial representatives, which.

: was responsible fer the man, but had asked NOSENKO's
section for help. “they said they didn't have any agents

or anything and didn't know what to cc. So. somebody said,

‘Well look, why don't you ask the chief-of the section? :

. He's a specialist on homosexuals and can arrange every—
‘thing for you.' So I wound up handling the case, and TARA-

BRIN (of the First Chief Directorate) said I should report

“to him.” In-this passage NOSENKO seemed to be-referring.

to himself, although he said he was ‘eputy chief of the

section; the chief cf the section at that time, M.A. LEONOV,

- is not known to have participated in operations stemming. -
from the homosexuality of the prospective agents.. :

awa

pet wate thy caked das

tee etl Mn oe


4000007 Ro e+

bye bd 2 te
DENG Bs

by ¥5e a ae
tae

gona)

Comprerndse cf :

NOSENKO's Infermation: Bosc. 2 UARRETT, a quide at the U.S. 3
Exhibition in Nescow in 1999, had vecome friendiy with the horce %y 4
sexual agents VELEOV and YRFRIMNOV (seo Part W.0.2.), whom he ! 3
met at the fairground. Although BRBBETE was not a honesexual, 4
VCLEOV succeeccd--after a long period of develorment-cin involve od
ing nim in homosexual acts, which were photographed by FGb i 3

efficer for ‘ ?

adjoining hotel case
. {or arranging the

worn taken, and

hact been much con-

necause of the

tiny: for VOLKOV. to

J that he “had te ;

then well" because “they i

ration. fhe photographs

them rn 1359 becauss

recruitment of U.S.

persennel from a

VCLKOV and YEFPRIMOV, MOSENKO wes

compromise, Was present when thet I

has cescribed the occeasien in cerail.

‘plaining among une photographic tecani

“amount sf time y were forced

' succead in his mission, aml NOSEUN4C

provice them with drinks and trost

were a big help" to him in this cp

were good, but the KGis was unable to use

of a general ban placed by SHELEFIS on t

Fehibition guides due to the poss |

CuURV's planned visit to the United States.* (625

however, thac BARKE?T was recruited on the basis of the 1959 .
7 phetegraphy wien he returned with another exhibition in 1961.
ae whis recruitment was carried our vy aotnuer component of the

KGB Second Chief virectorate, aud NOSLSKO had noching to do ‘

with it.**)

{
q
a
A
JS
‘g
A
4

, See the discussion of the WILLERFORD case, below, for addi-

_, tional information on SHELEPIN's prohibition.
wt *#* In 1961, shortiy before his recruitrent, BARPETT had osten-
“to: - gaibly accidental contact with YOLKOV and YEFREMOV in Moscow.
: NOSENKO has not mentioned this.

ma vee, Doane ered

etme ye ee ne oe


n. Compromise of: WILLEPPORD cee

NOSERKO 's- Thformetioa: ¥Yrederick WLILLERPGPD was , BARRETT'S
roommate ,during the 1959 exhibition in Hoscow. initially he
Was a target of the lecal HGE ovyanization for the city of
Moscow, which keiieved WILLERFORD to Le-an PEL agent and had
been collecting aterials on him. At the Sane time and, with-
out knowing of the interest of the leval organization, VOLKOY
and YEFRENOV had mede WILLERFORD's acguaintcnce, and NOSRNKO
had arranged fer cOmpromising photogrupi:s of ORD and
YEFREMOV in a Moscow hotel room. NOSENKO watehad WILLERFORD
and YEFRAMOV through a two-way mirror and wag able to-describe
the scene in detail. It was only after this compromising mater
ial hed been obcained that NOSENKO learned cf the local KGB's
interest in WILLERYORD. OSENKG'’s department and the local KGS
unit thea made a joint requese for operational appreval to
approach WILLERPCED, but permissicn was refused because of the
general ban on recruiftmént ipproiches: ae this time; —the-case
file was ¥Etdlned by the Hoocow RCS ‘organization, and NOSENKO

did not know whether WLLLERFORD has teen apprceached subsequently.

Note: There is a simi slarity between NOSENKO'S descrip-
ticn of the ban on recruitment approaches in 1959, which
prevented the Tourist E fren taking advantage

of its compremising p! phy of BARFET?’ and WILLER=
FORD, and information provided by the earlier defector,
GOLITSYN. GOGLITSYN reported chat en american employed

at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, possibly a code clerk, was
prepared for recruitment on the basis of homosexual com-
‘premise during 1959 and 1966. According to information

he said he iearned from U.s. Embassy Section case offi-
cer, G.I. GRYAZNOV, the KGB had chotegraphs of the
American in various stages of a homosexual act, and

there was no questicn about the recruitment being achieved:
"The only question was to where." At the time, however,
SHELEPIN had just become Chairman of the KGS and was
stressing ideological rather than blackmail recruitments.
He was shown these particular phctogrechs but decided that
‘an appreacnh on their basis would be too crude and that
another way should be found. although SHELEPIN did not
exclude the use of these photographs sone time in the
future, according to GOLITSYN, he had reservations against
using them at that time for fear of the propaganda reper-:
cussions if the attempt should fail and be exposed pub-
licly. GOLITSYN did not know whether the recruitment was
subsequently carried out. The essential differences. be-
 » tween this account and that of NOSENKO are that GOLITSYN
.- implied the tan was in effect at least into 1960 and that

‘

GOLITSYN appeared to ke speaking of a general prohibition, |

i
i
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j

so otcpatthas SEES Ait ws

4
4
i
4

potter ba oaidts etter, eederes ob


14-D0000 =

: : . whereas NOSENKO related the ban specifically and only to
ae . ‘the U.S. Exhibiticn at Sokolniki Park which ended on
4 September 1959.* :

ee ee UEEEanEERaEEEREEEEnaEE!

* In speaking of the 1959 U.S. Exhibition at Sokolniki
ae Park, Moscow, Samu told ¢ that both the.
KGB and the GRU launched an ra effort to recruit
Americans employed at the Exhibition. All officers at GRU
Headquarters were assigned to this task, and some were used
by the KGB in an attempt to ccmpromise the Americans;

V.A. GRUSHA (identi ficd by NOSENKO as a KGB officer special-
izing in American operations of the Pirst Chief Directorate)
directed many of these KGB activities in which GRU person-
nel were involved. As a resuit of this endeavor, "more
than one American” was recruited, and Qigeyae indicated
‘that the technique of compromise-~such as “bed pictures
was employed. When questioned on this subject
Bits] Nien reported that to handle the Exhibition, the
cpsu Centra! Comnittee issued a special directive to form

a committee headed by the KGB (GRUSHA was: in charge of cone

ue. . Saas contributed personnel. Its purposes were two-
’ : fold: protective, that is, to prevent propaganda, to dis-

rupt presentations, and’ to conduct - ‘counterintelligence .

and to coat.

3
sevens mete

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7
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“4
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4
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14-0000 7 Wt toa +3

-S. She FRIPPEL Case (1939-196 3}
weeny As a member of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO in 1959
rpersonally took part in the veeruitment of the Averican Express
“Company representative in Moscow, Arsene FRIPPEL, fe continued

to be one of this agenc's two KGB handlers after trunsferring
to the American Department in 1960, and FRIPPEL was asked to
(report on the U.S. Embassy as well as on two- Embassy offvcials
in particular. FRIPPEL left the Moscow job in i961 but returned
“on trips to the USSR in 1262 and 1963, when NOSENEO met him.
|The caly recruited American WHOA WOSEUES avey handled as_
$ RTT ee
EhLS,

Rts
q 1nE accounts 4.
; PEEL Glifer in several de- +
teils, but both agree that FIPPEL provided the KGB with no i
significant information, ‘hese two versiens are presented sepa-
rately helow. oa . ; L.

bila cnacadttlel .

i

4, NOSENKO's Informatica

NOSENKO first mentioned FRIVPEL luring the third meeting
in Geneva in 1€62 while cascussing KGB successes in tioscow: }
"There was another ayent {KGh crypconym] ‘ARTUR.’ He was not
a correspondent, ie knew me as George, Yuriy Ivanovich, and
my last name as NIOLAYEV, He was a permanent representative,
not in the Fmbassy, but cf the Anerican Ixpross Company in Mos-
cow. PRIPPEL. Arthur FRIPPRL. But he also has the eryptonyn
‘ARTUR.' He liked drinking, always drank. He was also strongly
attracted to women, I provided him with veantiful women... Well,
we decided to have a taix with him. Why? ‘hat could he give? .
He new works in the American Express Company {main office in
New York City]. A new department has now “sen oryaniczed for
the Soviet Union and the Pecp@s' Nemoeruicies. And he is chief
of the Gepartment... He is no lorgeor in Mcscow, but he was here
two and a half or three years. We hepe that he will return.
We are waiting for him to come hack. ‘We know that the company
wants to send him‘again, because he knows the Russian language
very well. He is, in fact, an emigre, this PRIPPEL. And he
also did a gcod and intelligent job of establishing relations
with Inturist. Ne had very good relationships with ANKULINOV,
the Chairman of Inturist, and with other people, hoth the chiefs
and the low-level workers... But, why was FRIPPEL recruited?

.I was interested in knowing precisely Ly whem, by name, and how
approaches were being made to our deleyations (in the United
States], i.e., I was interested in him from the point of view.

'of counterintelligence, not intelligence. What kinds of
approaches are taking place to cur people in America and by
whom? This is what interested us. But he didn't know anything.

“ He’ couldn't say anything. He provided only superficial infor-
: mation, nothing more."

wa ee ee ce

ne

4
4
}

~ NOSENKO was then asked whether FRIPPEL would not have been
useful for coverage ,of. Americans visiting the Soviet Union.
He replied that the KGB had already had great success in this
by other means and launched into 2 long description of the .
methods of covering foreign tourists in the USSR.” |;

-": ‘. NOSENKO was present in the adjoining room when FRIPPEL was
. Compromised by a Soviet female agent, Klara Konstantinoyna — oo
_GORBACHEVA. NOSENKO described the compromising scene in detail.
‘as well as the attempt by.a KGB technician to take motion pic-
: tures of these activities through a two-way mirror, and the
“confrontation with the militiamen who broke into the room.

idee oe

TOP SECRET

ayenite We MN


¥ See Part V.E.3. regarding NOSENKO's duties in. the U.S.

Embassy Section.

After returning to Geneva in 1964 and during subsequent’

debriefings and interrogations, NOSENKO made the following
' additional statements concerning the FRIPPEL case: De

~ Although he had personally recruited FRIPPEL, he
did not do so'#lone; Col, V.0. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief
(and later Chief) of the Tourist Department, was present;
he and NCSENKO "carried out the recruitment together” in
early September':1959. NOSENKO was, hcewever, FRIPPEL's
case officer. -* ; :

: - NOSENKO attricuted his involvement. in the FRIPPEL
recruitment to the following: "In 1952, after 1958,
when I became the Deputy Chief of the section, my area.
of activity was narrowed down, I didn't handle all the
tourists at that time. I worked as the Deputy Chief of
the section and 1 had my own little area--for example, the
permanent representative of the American Express Company,
and besides that I kegan to collect all the material on
all American tourist firms which have anything to do with
Inturist and who send tourists to the USSR."

- FRIPPZL never provided any information of value to
Soviet tourist operations.

- When NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy
Section of the American Department in 1460, he took FRIPPEL
with him because FRIPPEL was acquainted with some Ameri-
cans at the Embassy. NOSENKO was asked to question FRIPPEL
about the U.S. Embassy and such Embassy officers as George
WINTERS and Lewis W. BOWDEN, but FRIPPEL never told NOSENKO
anything along this line.*

~- FRIPPEL provided no interesting information during
NOSENKO's two meetingd with him in 1962 and 1963, when
FRIPPEL returned to the Soviet Union as a tour guide.

- NOSENKO met “pretty steadily“ with FRIPPEL during
the period to January 1961, and once NOSENKO and his wife,
in company with CHELNOKOV and his wife, had diriner at
FRIPPEL’s home, where they met Mrs. FRIPPEL. Odette
FRIPPEL was unaware of her husband's status as a KGB agent,
and therefore NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV used Inturist cover
for their acquaintance with FRIPPEL. Although unusual for
KGB Second Chief Directorate case officers to visit agents
in their homes with wives present, NOSENKO explained that
he went because he "was invited," and CHELNOKOV went "be-
cause he was also involved in the recruitment.”

- First as Deputy Chief of a section of the Tourist
Department and later as Deputy Chief and Acting Chief of
the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department,
NOSENKO continued to meet with FRIPPEL in Moscow hotels
and restaurants. Throughout this period, he was almost’.
invariably accompanied by CHELNOKOV: “Perhaps one time
I met with FRIPPEL alone, otherwise it was always with

roe

ee eee erte + M

vewtinmintlenata be iettlbalieckse taal Ebi

ssmeniiiting SEUNIE obl tts, ote ete tachi Leena

hd Sues.

131. .

‘ CHELNOKOV." Usually NOSENKO would arrange these meetings

with FRIPPEL at CHELNOXOV's request and the two continued

to meet with FRIPPEL, despite his lack of production, be-

cause they “kept hoping he would give something.” Ina
different context, but speaking of CHELNOKOV, NOSENKO ex-
plained: “You see, never-mind if you are a chief ora
deputy chief of a department, you must have one, two, or
three agents. GRIBANOV insists, so that you don't forget
how to work. The Chiefs of the [Second Chief] Director-

ate do not cemand that they have 12 or 13 agents, but they |

must -have two or three. They will have important agents
or those in leading positicns." ; :

- NOSENKO continued to act as FRISPEL's case officer
after FRIPPEL had left the Soviet Union and NOSENXO had
been transferred and promoted to the position of Deputy
Chief of the Tourist Department. He met twice with FRIP-
PEL during this latter period when FRIPPEL visited the ~
Soviet Union as a guide with groups of foréign visitors.

Both of these meétings were handled by NOSENKO alone, with-

out CHELNOKOV.

~- The first meeting took place in the summer of 1962,
after NOSENKO had returned to Moscow from Geneva. FRIPPEL
had arrived in the Soviet Union as a guide for some Ameri-
can journalists. (NOSENKO was unable to give the compo- ©
sition of the journalist group or to recall where they
Stayed in Moscow and where else they ‘travelled in the Sov-
jet Union.) NOSENKO contacted him in Moscow to learn what
questions the newsmen intended to ask KHRUSHCHEV during
a scheduled interview; subsequently NOSENKO acknowledged
that standard practice required visiting journalists to
submit their intended questions for KHRUSHCHEV in writing
to Soviet authorities prior to interviews. After the
interview, he recontacted FRIPPEL to learn the reaction.
of the journalists to their talk with the Soviet leader.
NOSENKO could not recall their specific reaction to the
KHRUSHCHEV interview but did remember that they were
“satisfied." Another reason for contacting FRIPPEL,
NOSENKO added in a later discussion, was to learn whether
any of the journalists might hve joined the group at the
last moment in the United States, which might suggest
intelligence connections on their part.*

~ NOSENKO met. FRIPPEL alone for the second and last
time during March 1963. Since FRIPPEL was a guide for
tourists aboard the ship "Olympia," which stopped for a
day in Yalta and Odessa, NOSENKO flew to Odessa from Mos-
cow and accosted FRIPPEL in the lobby of the hotel where
the tourists were having dinner. Finally able to get away

.

* NOSENKO had Garlier said on-several occasions that one of
the things KGB sources in foreign tourist companies abroad .
were instructed to report to the KGB was any last-minute

additions to a tour group to the USSR; this might signify

intelligence affiliation. . . oo

AGP Seogey

=)
amd eiseandii, coal

4
4
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manent cots


14-0000 +

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from his group, FRIPPEL called on NOSENKO in the latter's °
hotel room, and the two drank and talked,  NOSENKO had. .
given FRIPPEL a bottle of vocka as a gift, and FRIPPEL
Baid he wanted to give NOSENKO some whiskey in return.:
They drove in NOSENKO's car to the port, where NOSENKO
waited in the car while FRIPPEI. went aboard for the
whiskey. (He had invited NOSENKO to visit the ship but
could not obtain a pass for hin.) When FRIPPEL returned.
he brought another American, so NUSENKO had to invent for
himself a sutitable cover (Inturist) on the spot. ‘The three
returned tc the hctel and crank some more, everyone getting
drunk. During this contact, FRIPPEL reperted "nothing of
importance," and his most interesting news was that he
might again ve raassigned to Moscow in Decerber 1963 as

the Americen Express Company representative. *

sannerbiatitle a

- On 3 February 1964, wnile reviewing the CHEREPANOV
papers** in Geneva, NOSENKG wis asked about the following
pasgage which appearad in tie *GB operational plan against :
BoybEN, dated Tcebruary 1965 end signed by V.A. KUSKOV cf :
the.U.S5. Embassy Section: “He (DOWDEN) shewed himself
to be an indisecreet person... Ircnically, cne uay as
though by chance, he :} blurce:} out to our agent ;
SHMEPOVA {the fact of} ercpis" affiliation with Ameri- . 5
can Intelligence." *** IKO confirmed that the "ARTUR" .
ef the Cu NOV papers Was PRIPPEL, but he said he }s \
“gould not say" whether ¥F?PPEL had any affiliation with , er
American Intelligence. ; : 4

tite ewt

: 1
w-XIGSENRO said he later read a report that FRIPPEL had been i j
reassigned, and it was therefore unlikely that his agent t 3
would return to Moscow; this report was submitted by ~ | 4

V.V. KOSTYRYA (alias VLADIMIROV), a member of the KGB Legal i 4
Residency and overtly an Inturist cmployve in New York City, i i

' wlio was a former Second Chief Uirectorate colleague of
, NOSENKO.

** The CHEREPANOV Papers are discussed in detail in Part
VI.D.7.c. a,

*#** There is no other report of BOWDEN making such a remark
and no basis for it. Although never contacted by or
associated with CIA in any way, FRIPPEL during 1960 was
under consideration for operational use in Moseéw, and

_in this ccanection backargund inguiries about him were
: submitted to t2,FRi. ‘hs OSTEAUP ieee ce eine
+= ne)

€

While in the Soviet Union in August 1962 and shortly be-
E — fore his recruitment on homosexual grounds {see Part
a - -¥¥.p.2.), the American Spencer ROBERTS was approached on
the beach at Sochi by a young Soviet male. ROBERTS and A
the Soviet, who spoke French, svon became friends, and ;
. the Soviet told ROBERTS that he had been used as an agent
: in several cperations against French-speaking foreigners
- §n the USSR. One of these was FRIPPEL, the Soviet said,
adding that FRIPPEL was suspected by the KGB of being an
American Intelligence agent. NOSENKO, who has provided
‘much detail on the ROBERTS case, did not. mention the .
- gnidentified Soviet in this context or while discussing
' PRIPPEL. -— : Lo: oo. woe, oo.

mimeceib dpe tain sini Serene Hs a

Save we)
Wuu ane

2 AUP bein te rcatenbi’

setae a! Bestia des

ene te:

Spel cea,

en ann nents ae

¥— Gee Yart ilz.- ‘s emphatic refusal boos
during the meetings to have a racks with cia in-
sice the Soviet Union. During the Ccteher 1966 incerrcaations,
NGSENKO said that in 1°62 he had “absolutely no icea® concern--
..-. dmg the possibility of ClA.using PRIPPE!L.as.an intermediary
for contact inside the Soviet Union, 7 . ou. .


14-00000 *

one anoth:
tioned on the

#e In February
_ Depar tines ia
PEL applied: for a new
to cepart the united $
-'POlympia® fora ernis

toox place. , my
Novewker 1961 FRIF+ a ;
that ne intended -" -
iZ-aboar? the -
Sovres Union. é


14-0000 *

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x

at

ROSENKO said it was “impossible” that he should have to
request permission to board the vessel.

In February 1965, KOSENKXO did not recall having told FRIP-
PEL these details of his life and said that, if he had done
so, it was while he was drunk, ”: :

¥

i
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j
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i-
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4

6. Lee Harvey OSWALD (1959-60 and 1963).

As in the FRIPPEL case, NOSENKO was:.involved with Lee
Harvey OSWALD during both periods of his ‘assignment to the
Tourist Department of the Second Chief Directorate (1955-

1960 and 1962-1964).* While Deputy Chier Of the American-
British-Canadian Tourist Section, NOSENKO had a direct hind

in the decision in October 1959 that USWALD was of no oper-
ational interest to the KGB And should be returned immediately
to the United States. Before President Kennedy's assassi- .
nation in November 1963, when NOSENKO was again in the .
Tourist Department as its Doputy. Chief, he was present. at the
time the KGB Second Chief Virectorate iearned of OSWALD's -
application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City to re-enter
the USSR. After the assassination, he also played a role in
the KGB investigations of OSWALD's activities during residence
in the Soviet Union from October 1959 untii June 1902.

Collateral information relating to OSWALD's stay in the
Soviet Union, and particularly concerning any connections he
may have had with Soviet intelligence, is meager and indirect.
It derives almost entirely from indications cf primary
interest by the KGB (among all Soviet Government organs) in
every defector to the USSR, aad from infererces which may be
drawn from certain entries in OSWALD's "Historical Diary" and
certain statements made by his wife, Marina, during inter-
views on behalf of the Warren Commission. After President
Kennedy's death, the Soviet Government provided the United
States with official documents and letters pertaining to
OSWALD's defection to the USSR, his suicide attempt, his
marriage, and other events inside the Soviet Union. This
information from the Soviet Government generally agrees with
the information from NOSENKO. The materials furnished by

the Soviet Government make no mention o* any Soviet Inte)-

ligence interest, or lack thereof, in OSWALD.

In this sense NOSENKO's information is unique: It was
and remains the only such information available on the 32
months of OSWALD's life in the USSR.** NOSENKO's access to

W—¥or continuity of presentation, botn periods Of NUSENKO's
alleged involvement, 1959-1960 and 1963, are discussed in
this part of the paper, :

.-**® Independent sources, however, reported on visits by OSWALD

to tne Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City between 29
September and 5 October 1963 and on his (apparently overt) con-

.\ tact with a KGB officer under Consular cover at the Soviet =.
- Embassy there. NOSENKO originally said he knew nothing of any
. guch contact. In October 1966 he revised this to say that

OSWALD did not have contact with the KGB in Mexico City, NOSENKO
explained that he had been sitting in the office of Tourist De-
partment Chief, K.N. DUBAS, when a cable arrived at Moscew Head-
quarters from the KGB legal. Residency in Mexico. The cable,

. which NOSENKO said he did not personally see, reported that

OSWALD had visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. requesting
permission to return to the USSR and that he had dealt with — .

'. Soviet Foreign Ministry personnel only. ;

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information on £CB involvement with
tine of OSVALD's request to sin i
-clusively from the claimed fect that he, NOSENAG, +
Chief cf the KGB Section” dealing with Agircican te
at thet tice. [le scid he kne. cf later developrents
of his position as Renucy Chief of the Touris: users

Crom wid- 1902 until bed. The ceatral chem ak Nest!
formation, os given to CiA avd the FSI, is ria: tne
determined ag varly cs 16 Gctoser 1555, when OSUALS
first declatation cf inteuc to nan the USSR,

wes “not nortal™ and there: tyvashed its hands™ ov

ives xe
18 Deputy

catirely. Accofelng x , owe had no epeveti
katerest dn ¢CNALD atte ecoul ¥
debrief him during spent ‘ALCON

or during his trip erely tre kilicag

President,

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y wi ALPES
&¥ OSWALD atteripted

American Embassy cn
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received permission

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ship at.the
. loaving the
on concluded he
i onva years
the tine

ta renounce his U.
31 Octcber,

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TNCCOERNO Tater toa Cin on one Goeasien That P

skimmed the file’ and on another that he had it in his pos- “5

sessicn about 20 minutes. in October i296 he again said that

he read the file and that while doing so hw saw = picture cf

. OSWALD for the first time, ‘NOSENKC. added that. he. pever met

2 . + .., OSWALD personally. : :
ro. y 8 In October lyod (NG

SEXKO said he leained ‘that Si:

a poor shat from Vo V.KRIVOSHEY, a fellow KGB officer who had ¥
beentold this while visiting Minsa. : . x
Led


gaan ER I EES

wnoibabibtt

one etn
ohana Cied wars Sram,

b, Statements to CIA

On the basis cf the FBI interviews of NOSENKO and the
similar information which he had previously provided CIA,
further debricfings were conducted by CIA on 3 and 2?. July

7964, New and explanatory infcrmation received during these
debriefings is presented below. :

ee BRAT alee

i

(i) KGB Interest_in OSWALD _ |
Until CSWALD mentioned to the Inturist guide his desire

to remain in the Sovict Union, he WES treated routinely by . |
the KCB, When OSWALD mice his request, this was reported
imaediately to the Tourist Department, and it was from this
moment that the KGB began to pay attenticn to hin, Ail
available materials on him were thereupon collected and
examined--the visa application, Inturist reports, interpreters' |
reports, reports fro: hotel agents, and the results of e
check of KGB Archives. KRUPNOV interviewed the interpreter
to whom OSWALD had stated his desire. Although the KGB con-
sidered it possible that OSWALD might be an American agent,
the KGB did nothing to investigate this possibility as "this
would be done after the person is allowed to stay in the

" Soviet Union." Surveillance of OSWALV was not increased
after his request, and OSWALD was not interviewed by the
KGB in an attempt to establish his intentions. There was
no attempt to debrief OSWALD because “he was not an inter-
esting person and-wasn't normal," OSWALD wa's never questioned *
on his past nor asked to write an autobiography.** From the

- +. ... ROSEN provided details on this point «0 CIA (see Delow) and
made a similar statement when asked in 1964 why KGB agent .
Tamara KUNGAROVA had been permitted to marry an American (her own
developmental target) and then emigrate to England; See Part V.D.5.
®*& When he appeared at the U.S. Labassy to renounce his citizens.
ship on 31 October 1959, OSWALD told the counsellor officer that
he had been a radar operator in the Marine Corps and had told a
Soviet official that he would give the Soviets any information
concerning the.-Merines and radar which he possessed. :

Ce gi gman te

ps .

*” materials and reports. immediately available it was decided — -

. \Jeave the USSR when ais visa expired, . OSWALD's suicide

‘interest or contact with. OSWALD after the initial assess-

_important, The KGB never considered recruiting her as an

“ would probably

“(iii) OSWALD's Marriage and Departure from the USSR

_ OSWALD as fear of becoming involved with an unstable -per--
son. ; a : Oo

that something wes not’ quite normal about OSWALD, and the.
KGB therefore had Inturist tell him that he would have to

attempt supported the Tourist Department's feelirg that ;
it had been right in deciding to refuse OSWALD's request =‘ oo r
for citizenship, particularly as the hospital also re- oe .

ported that he was not normal, and the Tourist Department = — . . |.
decided: “We will do nothing; we don't want to know hin."

Inturist was subsequently told: "'There is no KGB interest

in him. Do what you want'... The KGB thought that he was

of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he was.

not normal, and that he should leave the country." The

Tourist Department and the KGB in general thereupon "washed

their hands" of this matter, ‘

{
i
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Pi
2

there anything in OSWALD's file to indicate that the KGB
attempted to debrief him on his past service in the U.S.
Marine Corps or other matters; this was because "he is a
very little person and also it is felt that he is not nor-
mal, so the KGB is afraid to do this with him."* The GRU ;

was not informed of OSNALD's defection, Neither was any
attempt made to exploit OSWALD for propaganda purposes

in Moscow or in Minsk. In short, there was no intelligence

at tars alasnidas

AQ
i
There was never any operational use of OSWALD nor was . oS |

einen seal Spat ote

ment of abnormality.

poorenerne

(ii) KGB Interest in Marina OSWALD : a

The XGB had no knowledge or interest in Marina (nee
PRUSAKOVA) until she and OSWALD applied for permission to
register marriage, In fact the KGB did not know that she
was a friend of OSWALD until this point, for there was no
surveillance on OSWALD to show that he knew her. When the
KGB learned of their relationship, checks were made of the
Archives of the Minsk KGB as well as neighborhood checks and
checks at her place of employment. The people where she
lived and worked and went to school considered her a simple
girl, not very clever, only fair in her studies, not an active
member of the KOMSOMOL. She was a simple "philistine,” an
uncultured girl more interested in gossip than in anything

siete aie wick cew Kot

: aes
eR NORE stent renmtrinyrmine na =
na SEBS

informant on. OSWALD "because it was considered dangerous to

recruit a wife to report on her husband." Nor was it con-

sidered to recruit her for use after she arrived in the

United States, "because she would tell him and also. she ,
tell the Americans, based on the assessment :

of the type of person she was." “bo po

2 SBR ee ae, oy

i

; NOSENKO was asked why there were so few difficulties
in the way of Marina's marriage to a foreigner and her
departure from the Soviet Union. lie replied: “"The Soviet
law allows any Soviet citizen to marry a foreigner, It was

W-NOSENKO subsequently defined this KUb reservation about od

wee ty

kk te


14-0000 *

asy” n this case because OSWALD was already living and. -
working in the Soviet Union. It would be sore difficult,
of course, with tourists or others who are in. the Soviet
‘Union only for a short period and Want: to. marry Soviet.
. Citizens."* | Asked whether it. is not. unususliy difficult
| for Soviet citizens to leave the Soviet Union, NOSENKO
- explained: "In this. case it was easier becausé Marina
- Was already married to a foréignéer."”. NOSENKO was fext :
asked what: Office or level of the Government or Party’ . >
“must make the final decision regarding Marina's marriage ;
to OSKALD. He described the procedure -a$ follows: "They
would come to the Regional Registration Office to apply
to register their marriage, [There] they will be told
that they will have to wait a week or two while they think
it over to be sure they want to get marriec, During this
period the necessary checks are conducted, The Regional -: i
Office would call the Militia, and the Militia would call
the Minsk KGB, The Minsk KGB said that it is all Tight
for them to get married--that the KGB has no objection,
But it is the law that allows them to be married. There
are no formal approvals necessary," ,

wo Tai SS fa

vote eee pepe!

Wabi. ban evetileaibice

Concerning the decision to permit the ccuple to leave
the USSR, NOSENKO said on 3 July 1964 that the decision
would be made cn the local level, in Minsk, and that there i
is no need to check in Moscow. On 27 July 1964 he corrected
this statement to say that, while local authorities make :
the decision, it must be approved in Noscow by, he thought, :
the Ministry for the Preservation of Public Order (MOOP), i

(iv) OSWALD's Visit to Soviet Enbassy in Mexice

Asked whether he had any information oa OSWALD's. visit
to *:xico in September 1963, NOSENKO said that he knew oncy
that OSWALD had applied at the Soviet Embassy there to come |
to the Soviet Union. The Mexico €ity Legal Residency of the
KGB reported his visit to Headquarters by cable, requesting
inforr:*ion; this was the first that the KGS First Chief
Directorate had heard of CSWALD. M.1, TURALIN, Deputy Chief
of Service Number Two (KGB counterintelligence abroad),
thereupon phoned V.K, ALEKSEYEV, Chief of the Sixth Section
of the Tourist Department, whom TURALIN knew personally, to
‘learn whether any information was available. NOSENKO believed
that ALEKSEYEV then came to V.D. CHELNOKOV or A,G. KOVALENKO
-to. ask about OSWALD, and NOSENKO thought that he himself was
prescnt at the time, ALEKSEYEV was given the background on

‘ OSWALD, including his suicide attempt and the fact that he
 W@S not considered normal, and was told to advise the First —_

Chief Directorate that OSWALD should not be permitted to re-
enter the Soviet Union, ALEKSEYEV then telephoned TURALIN
to relay this message, NOSENKO did not know to whom OSWALD
had spoken at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico.City, and he knew

By the time OSWALD applied for permission to marry, he had

already written the American Embassy. in Moscow, through Soviet

mails, of his desire to return to the United. States. The letter, |

- dated 5 February 1961, was mailed’ from Minsk’ aad was received by —
the Embassy in Moscow on 13 February, The OSWALDs - were

Married on 30 April 1961. .~ BR ot aye,

settee aaotd tnt

valesanlioe witch


tatives

o-contacts“between OSWALD: and “Cubans” or” represen
of the Cuban Governzent there or elsewheres =

(v) NOSENKO's Comments on Possible KGB Involverent in the |
| Assassinztion ; j ; j Loe
When first discussing the OSWALD case with NOSENKO on 23

January 1964, a CIA case officer commented: “It isa very un-

fortunate thing that these prior events occurred in the Soviet
Union," (NOSENKO apparently. misunderstood the case officer's
intent, which was not to imply that the KGB was behind the
assassination, dy that tho fact of OSWALD's "defection"
Placed the USSR under probably tunround dc suspicion.) NOSENKO's
inmediate response to this remark was: "That is not correct,
This is putting a false color to it, I am your friend, I am
completely with you, and I will continue to work with you and :
agzcinst the Soviet Union in all respects. But the truth %
Should always remain the truth. No matter how I may hate: ,
anyone, I cannot speak against my convictions, and since I

know this case I could unhesitantly sign off to the fact that _ :
the Soviet Union cannot be tied into this in any way, I say ¢

this because I know they were frightened of this man [OSWALD]

and that everything should havé bzen said to him or that he

should have been in any way worked on, in any was. [by the KGB}

-eGod forbid!... I know this because I sat on this matter for

several days after the tragic matter occurred to the President,
_To_investigate in detail if anything had been done, particularly

by the local authorities, that is, by the local KGB in .
Belorussia..., I had to make a complete investigation and . :|
even sent several workers down there to investigate--not : i
trusting official papers. Even without specific orders 1 had ‘
to make a complete investigation on my end of things because oF

this is a serious matter when the head of a government is. :
assassinated.., If you want to know, it would be a greater — :
advantage to the Soviet Union if the President were still.
Kennedy because he was a personage who was a realist and looked
at many things in the eye boldly... In the history of any
intelligence service there have been assassinations of one
-kind or another. I can say this: That in our organization,
not even speaking of myself, many persons were shocked by

the assassination--to think that this should happen in the
twentieth century and in, of all places, the most powerful
government in the world,” ,

2

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Detaled ih cre rnind mn tetoee we

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_which had theretofore concerned itself with operational. activity .

a. _ Information from NOSENKO _ ,

‘In June 1958 there was a reorganization within’ the. Tourist
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. The Second Section,

‘against foreign tourists from ail countries, was broken down into

separate sections; one section.dealt with tourists from the United.

States, Canada, and Great Britain, the other with tourists from

Europe, Latin America, and all other countries, NOSENKO said ; pol:

that he was promoted at this time to the position of Deputy Chief a: Sars

of the first of these new sections. ; Po.
}

NOSEKKO's involvement in at least one major case, Lee Harvey
OSWALD, stems entirely from his having held this position. It
is also on this basis that he was able to claim awareness of all : 4
recruitments from among American tourists from mid-1958- until he
returned to the American Department at the beginning of 1960.
His knowledge about recruitments is based additionally, he said,
on the fact that some time between May and October 1959, during
the tourist season, he was ordered by Ye. S. KIRPICHNIKOV, °
GRIBANOV' 8 secretary, to gather facts for GRIBANOV concerning the
use of tourist cover by foreign intelligence organizations during
the period from 1955 through 1958, NOSENKO gathered this material
from earlier annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talk- i 5
ing | with various case officers in the department, * ; ‘ :

' On the basis of his general and supervisory experience in : :
the Tourist Department as well as his research for this paper, 3
NOSENKO had the following to say about Tourist Department opera-
tions prior to 1960 (taken from the protocol he signed on this
subject on 25 February 1965):

during this period and very little was known by the KGB
about the use of tourism by Anerican Intelligence at the
time I wrote the report in 1959. No agents were definitely
uncovered among American tourists during the years 1958 or
1959 and, until 1960, no tourists were ‘caught in the act'
of mailing letters, servicing deaddrops or contacting.
agents, except one whose name I remember as McGUIRE. I do

i
t
“Operations against tourists were developing slowly
|
i

0 doe E tS ee

Asse

®* Questioned on this paper in February 1965, NOSENKO said he

did not remember whether he discussed it with GRIBANOV, nor

_ could he recall any examples of the material he included in

it, what the paper said about -CIA tourist operations, or what

other U.S. Intelligence organizations were using tourism as

‘an operational cover in this period. He did remember,. how-

ever, that it incorporated statistical data on the growth . 4
of foreign tourism, i


not. know any details concerning the operational activity.
_,, Which led to the discovery of McGUIRE's letter mailing. *

: "I know of no case in which an American tourist was
definately uncovered as an agent of Anerican Intelligence
and thereafter approached for recruitment by the KGB during
this period. :

. "YE do not know of any such American tourists who were
CIA agents, and who were recruited by the KGB during this
period.

“In addition to McGUIRE, the Seventh Department de-
veloped suspicions concerning a number of tourists, but
didn't learn of any specific intelligence connections.
Some were taking pictures, others were disseminating
literature. Although various operational measures were
taken against them, including vyemka {covert baggage
search) end the use of KG3 agents, none of these tourists
received real operational developmenc.'

b. KGB Knowiedge from George ELAKE

During the first week of June 1959, a three-day meeting was
held in London, ingland, between representatives of CIA and the
British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, commonly referred to as
MI-6) on the subject of ‘legai-cravel” mtelligence operations
against the USSR. At the conclusion of this meeting there was
drawn up a 19 page document summarizing what had been discussed
at the meetings. This summary spelled our CIA operational doc-
trine pertaining to tourist operazions, including agent-spotting
techniques, criteria for agent seiection. agent assessment, agent
training, and tasks to be carried out by tourist agents @auring
the coming (1959) tourist season. It stressed CIA's reliance
on tourists for the spotting, recontacting, assessing, and
communicating with clandestine assets in the Soviet Union. A
copy of the document as well, presumably,as other British docu-
ments relating to the joint meetings was given to George BLAKE,
who has admitted having made a photographic copy which he passed
to the KGB. He gave the KGB this information in the summer of
1959.

* One Robert Alan MCGUIRE, a former: staff empioyce-of CIA, .
travelled to the Soviet Union as a tourist during April and’
May 1958. Although he was debriefed on his return, he had
no connection with CIA in preparation for this trip and
mailed no letters for CIA inside the USSR, While in the
Soviet Union, McGUIRE was approached on numerous occasions
by Soviets seeking blackmarket deals. American girls, and
assistance in defecting to the Americans. While en route to
Leningrad, his brief case was overtly searched by a customs:
employee, who confiscated a Radio Liberation script. McGUIRE
reported that he was compelled to sign a document which stated
that the script had been confiscated, but the reasons for the
action were left blank. NOSENKO, who has reported none of.
these details, appears to have confused MCGUIRE with Edward
McGOWAN, a CIA agent who mailed a letter in Minsk in August

. 1958 and was detected doing so by the KGB; NOSENKO said ~~.

MCGUIRE mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959...

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A second joint meetin
mitted providing the KGB with a copy of the 2I-page summary of
the sessions.* St Coe le. oo

eT sH re ig

¢. GOLITSYN's Tourist Document

Khen he defected to C1A in December 1961, GOLITSYN brought
with him a top secret MGB document dealing with the use by
American Inteiligence of tourists fer espionaye inside the Sov-
det Union ana with KGS countermeasures.** This study relied
heavily upon the two dvcuments supplied to the KGB by BLAKE,
and although it purports to be a study of American tourist cpera-
tions during 1960, it cites as exampics many cascs which occurred
in earlier years. In these examples, the American agents de--
tected by the “4G are named and their coerational roles accurately
Gescribed. (AS noted above, NOSENKO gaia that McGUIRE/HcCGOWAN -
was the only American definitely Jetermined to hav2 intellicence
connections prior to 1960.) Cited belew are excerpts frem the
GOLITSYN document, along with additional information from CIA
recores and investigations. .

, whe document states: "MeGCwAN, Edward, born i935, passing
himself off aS a post-graduate student vf Harvard University,
in Moscow, after a thorcugh check [for surveillance] sent an
espicnage letter containing secret writing. Further investiga-
tion of McGOWAN showed that he specialized for a long period of
time on Russian and Polish questicns at the Russian Researca
Center of Harvard University, «5 ch is a branch of CIA. Us
to the USSR at the expense of PCCKEFELLER and MORGAN, who ar
financing the so-called ‘Research! work cn Russia.”

came
e

WOTRYS Cecurred ata time that NOSUNKO claims to nave been in
the American Department. buring the 1962 meetings in Geneva,
when NOSENKO said ne was Chief of the American fourist Section,

é was aSxed about BLAME, He replies only that BLAKE had been

an agent of the British Department of the Second Chief Direc-

orate” and that he was not ncariy as valuable as the Canacian

‘bohassadocBei age” cr "the other Englishman" (VASSALL) .

t the time of mis defection, NOSENKC said he was First Deputy

Chief of the entire Tourist Department. Asked about BLAKE

after his defection, !OSUNKO replied: “Who's EPLAXE?" During

the February 1965 interrogaticns, NOSENKO was first asked
whether the KGR had received any significant information con-
cerning the use of courism as operational cover by CIA during

1260 and 1961, when he was in the jmerican Department, and

was then asked specifically whether the KGB obtained docu-

mentary information on this subject from an agent source, He

_replied "no" to both questions. .. '

** This document was transmitted from KGB Headquarters in Moscow
to the KGB Legal Residency in Helsinki on 7 April 1961. In
content it is similar to the general description of the docu-

.ment which NOSENKO said he himself wrote. NOSENKO said in
1964 that he knew GOLITSYN had passed CIA this report and that
it had been written in the Tourist Department. . « .

wy on this’save subject took’ p_ace an. oo

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During his trip to the Soviet Union. in the summer..of 1958,
“MCGOWAN mailed in Minsk an operational letter containing secret
‘writing. In the CIA debriefing upon his return to’ the United...
States, McGOWAN described a number of incidents in the USSR. - On,
20 August 1958, for example, while staying at the Metropol Hotel-

in Moscow, McGOWAN met Alan BALLARD* and Gertrude. SAMUALS, fel-
low Americans, and the three of them were .phcotcyraphed by a sur-_
veillance team when leaving the hotel. Within several days of

his arrival in Moscow, McGOWAN found he wes incempatible with

his female Inturist interpreter/guide and succeeded in having

her replaced. ifig new guide was V.L. ARTEMO¥, who assured that-
McGOWAN had female companionship for the remainder of his visit. ws

The document from GOLITSYN also states: "SIMARD, Lionel, i
- born in 1939, a college instructor, expressed an abnormal inter-

est towards military literature of the USSR; ne made contact

with Soviet citizens and attempted to slip into the area of ship- ¢
building factories in Leningrad. Later it was recorded that this

*pedagogue', while in Moscow, sent espionage letters containing
secret writing, The letter contained the ccordinates of a deac-
drop for an American agent."

wo pene detndeabintisl.,

SIMARD went to the USSR as a CIA agent in August 1959, and
he believed that he was under complete KGB ceverage while there,
He was in and out of Moscow four times during his trip, and each ;
time he was assigned hotel rooms known to contain various KGB i
observation equipment. On one occasicn SIMAPD was introduced to
and went out to dinner with Svetlana K. IVANOVA, who attempted ‘ A
to cultivate him.*** The characterization of his activities in | j
the GOLITSYN cocument is correct. NOSENKO has not mentioned ! H
SIMARD. :

Meee wate bee

Another part of the document supplied by GOLITSYN says:
“An American, Whitmore GRAY, born 1932, an assistant professor
at Michigan University, sent three espionage letters containing
secret writing, wnile in Kiev. In Stalingrac he was cetained
while he was photographing a military factory."

GRAY arrived in Kiev on 3 November 1959 after having been
trained by CIA in countersurveillance and briefed on his letter-
mailing missicn and other assignments in the Soviet Union. Be-
tween midnight that night and one o'clock the next morning he mailed
four operational letters. No surveillance was noted during the

¥ NOSENKO reported on a 1959 trip to the Soviet Union by

BALLARD, but said he was not aware of earlier ones.

** This is the same ARTEMOV identified by NOSENKO as a fellow
ease officer in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American De-
partment and as the man with whom he worked on the BELITSKIY
case in Geneva in 1962. ARTEMOV appeared again in operations
against American tourists in 1959 when he was assigned as
Iinturist guide/interpreter for a group of Americans which in-
cluded a CIA officer. On one occasion, when.,.this officer re--
turned unexpectedly to his hotel from the ‘theater’ to-which
ARTEMOV had escorted him, he caught ARTEMOV searching his
hotel room. NOSENKO has not mentioned these contacts of :
ARTEMOV, which took place at the time he said he was Deputy’
Chief of the section dealing with American tourists, In «* _—
October 1966, in answer to a specific question, NOSENKO stated °
that ARTEMOV never had any connection. with the American Section
of the Tourist Department. . .

“NOSENKO has identified IVANOVA as an: -agent of the U.s.: ‘Embassy
Section of the American Department, but has not described her:
earlier activities against. tourists.

_ wae


‘he left Kiev and later in Yalta. .He. was. ‘approached on’ 17 Novem-

"group, John Milton FRANCIS, born 1934, an instructor of Russian
at a college of Yale University; when in Odessa with a group of

"ut GRAY detected surveillance daily ‘thereafter until

Kgs"

ber in Saku by an attractive woman who persistently offered her
services despite his refusal, and on.18' November by a girl in
Tbilisi who occupied'a seat next to his in a theater and made
similar overtures. ‘GRAY was’also approached by blackmarketeers
and by purportedly disaffected young men. On 13 November he
was arrested in Stalingrad while. photographing ‘industrial in-
stallations and was reieased after interrogation and~ confiscation
of his film. NOSENKO made no references to GRAY. .
— Panera ana ——

The KGB document elsewhere states: "A guide of a tourist

tourists-~American students--separated himself from. the group —
and.travelled through the city alone. ina notebook which was
lost by him, notes and sketches were found which pointed to the ,
fact that he utilized his trip-for the purpose of selecting i-
suitable places for the placing cf deaddrops, or for checking ; }
those deacddrops which were earlier selected by American agents. . .
In Moscow he selected routes which were used.to check and dis- — :
discover the existence. of surveillance, utilizing passable backyards

and following skillful methods. At the present time FRANCIS is -

the chief interpreter of the State. Department, servicing Soviet .
delegations in the USA." y

i
a
A
4
3
3
4
5

FRANCIS did have such a mission in 1958 and brought back a
notebock with sketches of the sites he selected. He did not
mention losing his notebook. In 1954 and 1955 FRANCIS was in .
frequent contact with V.V. KRIVOSHEY in Berlin; KRIVOSHEY, who _ _ 4
served there until the late 1950's, has been identified as a KGB : : ,
First Chief Directorate officer who later became an officer in .
the Correspondents Department, KGB. Second Chief Directorate.* f
FRANCIS was also a student of Richard BURGI at Yale in 1956, the .f
year that NOSENKO was involved in BURGI's recruitment (see Part

Phe a ats Ho

V.D.4.b.). NOSENKO has not mentioned the FRANCIS case and did
not recognize his name.

canna helene Ubi

Besides these and other examples in the document GOLITSYN ,

gave CIA, there are indications of KGB awareness of the clandes- H
tine activities of many other CIA contacts who travelled to the i
Soviet Union as tourists during the period from 1955 to 1960. |
i

4

wee

Pessecenn bic

seine Shade

eS
i

*¥-KRIVOSHEY was a participant in the. Sgt. Robert Lee JOHNSON
case to which NOSENKO provided the, lead. (see Part VI.D.3.c.).

sae Pees Fol oe ep re

ee ee

‘TDY's to London (3957 and 1953} -
NOSENKO reported that his first ocfisiaut cravel outside
‘the Scviet Union occurred in the fall of 2 ./ ‘raen ae was

selected to accompany uw group of athletes . ia nad been invited

to visit London, As he explained on & Avrit 1904, it is
necessary for a sccurity officer to accousa.y way sucn dcle-

- gation, and the Eleventh Departnent of ths Jeco.d thief birec-
torate, responsible for recruiting Secoud Chief Jirectorate
officers for this purpose, telephoned a... ..0005, Cuiel
of the Tourist Departrent, to request ai el licey who spoke
English, DUBAS asked NOSEXKO whether Ge vais te uake the
trip. NOSENKO replied: “why not? Ll have never ben abroad
yet," 0SENKO consequeniiy travelled te London, using the
alias Yuriy tvaunovich SITKOLAYEV ang posing as "Lie uevputy
chief of tie delegation, lie was speciricaliv instructed to
observe one menber of the delegation, a vonan nites HYARIMYATE,
whose father had been hitled in a Soviet prison and whose
political reliability (nas uncertain, Additionally, ie had
the general task of watching ali siembers of tue-delegaticn
for possibly suspicious contacts with foreigners. Tan dese-
gation consisted of approximately 09 persons ane te help hin
in carrying out these duties, / MY was assigned thres or

four agents and several operaticnual contacts anong the deie

gation. members, lie was the only staif security officer

making this trip.

he second trip to London tock place a year later, in
the fall of 1958, again as a security watchdog, inis time
he accompanied 2 delegation of li or 12 boxers, and again he
used the alias AIKOLAYEV and the cover position of deputy
chief of the celcgation, NOSENKU was the only sccurity oc-
ficer with the deicgaticn, and he had two agents and two
operational contacts anong the boxers. this asuignnent was
general; noocdy in particular was kept under observation,
and the KGB had no derogatory informaticn concerning any
members of tne dcicgation,

NOSENKO has associuted his use of the NIKOLAYEV alias
in London with the use of the same name with the S3ritish
subjects itis and GSB (see Part V.D.4.d.) shortly before
the first of these two trips. On 17 April 1964 NOSENKO ex-
plained this situation as follows: "With S ft
Toused the name NIKOLAYEY, Yuriy Ivanovich, a representative
of the Ministry of Culture. And then when the question was
raised of sending me in 1957 with the delegation to iingland,
I was forced to go there as NIKOLAYEVY. I was forced to,
And again under the cover of the Ministry of Culture, Be-
- Cause [of this] I went as the assistant ead of the dele-

- gation, representing the Ministry of Culture. I didn't

go under my own nanc because it was decided that when

these people eae came back to England, they
would tell who they were with [report their contacts in

the USSR}. They would probably question Oren especially

as one who usec to work in intelli igence. + aki would say:
‘There was this man from the Ministry of Culture, NIKOLAYEV..
lie was with us all the time, even went to Leningrad with
us." So they would say: 'Iicw does he look (what docs he
look like}]?' ie would say: ‘lie locked’ so-and-so." So,

a

I
}

sete mennertnimnemiment te sie

vorbis ban ak he

Sepa IM ae ete SEE ETH TARR

re

Ne

a

2g

eset


of course,.I- would’ go.‘there the same year. I'd go.there, and. .-
, they would Took at me and say: ‘Ilicw come this’ man--his name is’
‘NOSENKO, ana-yet he is very similaz.to the: one described by

‘1. That was why it was decided I have to go again’ under the nema
““NIKOLAYEV. Just.a, matter of conspiracy. Since I already becaze -
known “as NIKGLAYEV to the Eritishers, this would bs-noticeable.*

asst

. .£
. . 5


of ccurse, I would go th
they would look at me an

ere the sane year, I'd go thera, and
this man--his name is
2 one de
ave .toO.go again uncler the none
Since I already hesare
this would te neticeable.® .

‘How come
NOSENY.O, and yet he is verv similar to th
That was why it was. decided I h
NIKCLAYEV. Just a matter of conspir
known 28 NIKOLAYCV to the British

ceseenSihgrste he dd Ai lib

pave thes HM a tft abs eat ere

ih,

the


B January 1960 to January. 1962 (american, Department)
". 1. Introduction

NCSENKO claims to have served as Deputy Chief -of the U.S.
Embassy Section of the American Department, GB Second Chief
Directorate, from sometime in January 1960 until the first days
of January 1962.* This section, in his. words, was working ~

against "the most important counterintelligence target in the

Soviet Union," the permanent Anerican representation in Moscow.
It regarded every Américan stationed there as a possible spy-
and, simultaneously, as a taraet for eventual compromise and
recruitment. —

The functions of the U.S. Embassy Section were described by

_NOSENKO as being, first, to control all contacts by Embassy per-

sonnel with Soviet citizens; second, to evaluate information
collected from all possible sources on American Embassy employees;
and third, to use this information as a basis for planning and
carrying out recruitment approaches. The Americans' personal-
ities, jobs, personal relationships, weaknesses, daily routines,
security precautions, contacts with Soviet citizens, and the
major and minor scandals ‘in their Moscow lives formed the basis

‘for this work. To gather such information, the section's officers

directed and debriefed large numbers of agents and informants,
including the indigenous employees of the Embassy, Soviet citizens
moving in Embassy social circles, and third-country nationals with
American contacts; the officers also assigned tasks to and assim-
flated the reports from the numerous surveillance teams at their
Gisposal, and they read and tried to-exploit materials from tele-
phone taps and microphones. placed in the offices and homes of

the Americans. Each officer had a limited number of American

targets and attempted to become thoroughly familiar with -achr

annually, they submitted detailed operational plans to exploit

the knowledge they had gained of their target. During 1960 and
1961, NOSENKO said, special emphasis was placed within the section
on "identifying intelligence officers at the Embassy and active
development of them, the acquisition of ciphers, and the detailed
and painstaking study of code clerks, creating the conditions on
the basis of which they can be recruited."

As Deputy Chief of this section, NOSENKO has said, he had
access to all information concerning its activities: "Nothing
was hidden" from him. On this basis, he expressed certainty
that in 1960 and 1961 the KGB did not recruit any Americans
associated with the Embassy, that no Americans assigned to the
Embassy were being handled in Moscow as KGB agents in this.
period, and that, in fact, the KGB had recruited no American
Embassy personnel since "ANDREY."** From continuing friendships
with his fellow-officers of 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO has also
claimed certainty that there were no KGB recruitments from the
time he left the section in January 1962 until the January 1964
trip to Geneva. .
* In debriefing and interrogating NOSENKO, CIA placed partic-

ular emphasis on his activities during the period January

1960 to January 1962, since this information was of ‘special
importance to U.S. Government security. :

* See Part VI.D.3.b. for a discussion of the case of the KGB |
+ agent “ANDREY" (Dayle SMITH), whose recruitment has been
variously. dated by NOSENKO between the years 949 ana 1953.

cnwetftienbt tarrione rte

a awdathe tise

eesmntah abetiiattediies

S reaemiewe ree:

sebdatte cabbie at alesse aoe

bab latoate

+ es aaairig eMC tees

ete he

whawswe

4


14-0000

‘Pourist Department's American Section because (as he explained: --
ion 29 January 1965) the Tourist Department, which had earlier...
' operated against members of delegations and various other a

. RYTOVA, and the homosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLKOV, NOSENXO turned

“PIMOFEYEV. and the latter to V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the”.

“to the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963.** x

nedtIhT1S PRS" OHS FBPTSCEN-NOSENKO™US"Deputy-Chiet-Of-the

eategories of foreign visitors, was being reorganized in January,
1960 €or work against tourists alone and the Deputy Chief slot. o :
was eliminated.” With the exception of A. A. DMITRIYEV, Marina ns

over all of his agents to another officer in the section named ; a
TIMOFEYEV. NOSENKO said on 29 January 1965 that he had two. 4 Le
separate files on his agent Arsene FRIPPEL, a developmental file ee
and an operational file, and:that he turned the former over to SO

Tourist Department. During later.interrogations, however, NOSENKO

has said that he continued to handle FRIPPEL while in the U.S.
Embassy Section and was the case officer during FRIPPEL's visits

2. NOSENKO's Transfer to the U.S. Embassy Section

In December 1959, while serving as Deputy Chief of the
American-Britisn-Canadian Section of the Tourist Department,
NOSENKO learned from K. N. DUBAS, the department Chief, of plans
to transfer him to the U.S. Embassy Section as Deputy Chief.
NOSENKO said he was cpposed to the move and wanted to remain in :
the Tourist Department: "I was used to it there and wanted to i
continue, I wanted to stay in the Tourist Department. . This I
fthe transfer/ was no promotion. Here I was the Deputy Chief :
of section and would be the same there. But, of course, its more -
important there. The American Department is, of course, the most !
important. But here I was working against American tourists.
This is also important. Furthermore, I showed Znad, proven/ my-
self there in '55, ‘56, '57, '58, and '59 and was considered to
be not a bed case officer. And here, in the american Department, .

I must show /prove/ myself with new pecple." NOSENKO therefore i
asked DUBAS in December 1959 to "please fight for me to stay." f
DUBAS later told NOSENKO that he had twice spoken to Second |

i

Chief Directorate Chief O. M. GRIBANOV on his behalf, but to
no avail. In January 1960 the official orders transferring
NOSENKO were issued. .

se edean KL aang ee natae esi

Rise.

On the day NOSENKO reported to V. A. KLYPIN, Chief of the
American Department, to begin his new job, he was told to report
to GRIBANOV's office. To GRIBANOV NOSENKO again expressed mis-
givings about the change of assignment. GRIBANOV replied that
DUBAS had spoken to him about this but that he, GRIBANOV, “had
his own plans and that was all.” GRIBANOV told NOSENKO that

* There was no change in the functions of NOSENKO's section,
however; as before, it continued to be responsible for
operations against tourists from the United States,
England, and Canada. :

ae FRIPPEL has reported that NOSENKO: continued to meet him
until he left the Soviet Union. in January 1961 and again
when he returned as a guide to tourist groups twice in
1962 and once again in 1963; see Part V.D.5.

“he thought NOSENKO could-bring."fresh air" to the U.S. Embassy

."to operations against American code clerks, the “number one

“154.

Section's operations and that he was to pay particular attention

target."* Neither GRIBANOV nor KLYPIN told NOSEXKO why he had _
been selected for this position or who had recomnended him for
it.

NOSENKO was asked on 17 April 1964 whom he had relieved
upon reporting for duty in the U.S. Embassy Section. He replied:
"Nobody." He was then asked to identify the persons from whom
he had assumed certain of his Cuties as Deputy Cnief of the
section (these are ciscussed in detail below). “OSENKO said that
he took the responsibility for maintaining the section file on
the security of the U.S. Embassy from the Chief of the section,
V. M. KOVSHUK.** Regarding his responsibility as case officer for
the Security Officer of the Embassy, NOSENKO explained that be-
cause former Security Officer Russell LANGELLE had been declared
persona -non grata in OctoLer 1959 and because his successor John
ABIDIAN was not to arrive until Merch 1960, no ore in the section
had this responsibility wher he, NOSENKO, arrived in January . i
1960. Asked who had been LAYGELLE's case officer, NOSENKO re- . x
plied: “LANGELLE was handled by seversl people - by /A.S./ MALYU- a
GIN, then after that by /V.A./ KUSKOV, then by KOVSHUK, then

bay

seen ib ia cats deans A:

pete hae Lee

* In late December 1961, GOLITSYN also commented on this subject
to his CIA handling officer: "The task of strengthening of
wor: against the Americans has been a standing requirement, a
both in the past and most particularly at this time. This CC
work was particularly intensified after the appointment of
SHELEPIN to the KGB... In 1960, it was cecommended in the
KGB to intensify the work acainst the Americans at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, and against American colonies in other
countries... This question of intensifying work against the
Americans was up before the Collegium of the KGB, Thereafter,
there was a directive from SHELEPIN regarding the intensifi-
cation of work against the American cipher-clerks.”

atta dts MUR, alle cate a

|

**There is an apparent contradiction between NOSENKO's desig-

nation of KOVSHUK 25 Chief ofthe Firat (0.8 ss Sec
tion if 1960 and information earlier supplied by pabaseyy Ne
GOLITSYN told CIA of a conversation he had with KOVSHUK in
January 1961 in Moscow (see Part V.E.3:c.2. concerning a
recruitment approach to the American code clerk James STORS-
BERG) but at that time described KOVSHUK only as an American
Department officer, without indicating his position. The
only time that GOLITSYN has given a position for KOVSHUK was
in the context of questioning concerning KHRUSHCHEV's "Secret
Speech" denouncing STALIN in 1956; ,GOLITSYN: said that ac this
time KOVSHUK was Chief of the American Department (sic) of
the Second Chief Directorate. On 16 February 1962 GOLITSYN
identified Vladimir PETROV as. Chief of the "section concerned
- with the American Embassy of the American’ Department of the
. Second Directorate” in 1960., NOSENKO had identified PETROV
as Chief of the Second Section of the American Department,
‘Which was concerned with the penetration of U.S. intelligence
operations inside the Soviet Union.


14-0000

esr nencecnmmeesnesenahines mee yet ciees

‘He is an Armenian. His Deputy -is Colonel Mikhail BAKHVALOV."

officers who had been assigned to-the American Department | ~- .«

PIN. Yes. LANC ; s before my “tivo” : ins
on 24 Jtine 1964, NOSENKO stated: © “In1959 and. possibly in 1958,
Mikhail Pedorovich BAKHVALOV was the Deputy Chief of the U.S.) -
Embassy Section. I replaced him in this position in 1960 and |
he went to the Fifth (Zastern Countries) Department as Deputy” -
Chief,"* On 8 September 1964 NOSENKO volunteered for. the first oe Bot aed ;
time that BAKHVALOV, as Deputy Chief of the section, had been =~ fo oe
the case officer for LANGELLE, Under interrogation in early ~ a
1965, NOSENKO added’ that. BAKHVALOV had also been responsible for — 4
maintaining the file on the security of the U.S. Embassy. At ; eA
this time he explained his earlier statement by saying that BAKH-. E
VALOV had left the section before his arrival and had given the Sg
file to KOVSHUK to hold for his successor. The file continued to y-
be charged officially to BAKHVALOV, however, even though he.was | :
no longer in the section, and NOSENKC arranged for the official - so
change of custody siortly after reporting for duty (see Part V.E.

3.£.). NOSENKO said further, in January 1965, that BAKHVALOV

had shared responsibility for supervising code clerk operetions -

with KOVSHUK before tiOSENKO arrived to assume these duties him-_

self. NOSENKO had been given a number of opportunities prior

to 24 June 1964 to identify BAKHVALOV as his predecessor, bu

he did not do so. These are summarized below: .

ie

RY eon it ale Gi

ye eae TR Te

25 January 1964: In a discussion of the Fifth (Eastern
Countries) Department of the Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO
said: "the Chief of this department is Colonel Artem DAVIDYAN.

bee be Abe dh penttadine

27 February 1964: NOSENKO was shown a photograph of V.A.
ALEKSEYEV, a Soviet who was in Japan from July to September- .
1961 as a member of a trade delegation, NOSENKO immediately uo
recognized the face as that of the Deputy Chief ef the Fifth
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. He said that he
did not know this person's last name, but that his first name
and patronymic were Mikhail Fedorovich. shen shown the last
name ALEKSEYEV, NOSESKO recognized it as an alias, but pro-
vided no further information concerning his true identity or
earlier service in the American Department. ;

ae ieedanh SEE aa ICE bed ee e+

10 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list in writing the
names of KGB officers who had received various awards for
their service. He wrote: "The following got either the
Order of the Military Red Banner or the Order of the Red Star,
I'm not sure which: Mikhail BAKHVALOV, Deputy Chief of a
section in an unremembered department of the Second Chief
Directorate."

wake haben catdiiee.

18 June 1964: NOSENKO was asked to list all the

tye

abasbawd era's ne.

for each year since he joined the KGB. He named the chiefs an’

and deputies of the U.S. Embassy Section from 1953 through ae
1956. When he came to 1957, however, he said that he could ; Ct Bee Staged
not provide accurate information as to which officers were :
assigned to the section for that year through 1959 (he was

” a
a ‘
*

,

. With reference to the Fifth Department, NOSENKO has
_furnished only one other item of information: he re-
ported: that in 1958, or as late as the fall of 1959,
the Israeli Section was transferred to this department:
“after having been a component of the American Depart-
ment. ; _ .


4.005007

1956 and January. 1960, when NOSENKO said he had returned. He’
provided 14 names, but BAKHVALOV's was not among them, Asked
...to name the officers who had left the section in the same period,

‘aliegealy in the Tourist Department in ‘this period)” and could
not describe their functions. On this basis. NOSENKO was then
asked to list the officers who had joined the section between.

he named five, again omitting BAKHVALOV,

sot cheba

ae eth GEAR Fany weenebtibeb dates

Naebteae +

dave

|
3
3
4
{
4

Hom es ee a ne a cr


. 3. Duties: and Knowledgeability aa

ree. Introduction.

Shortly after reporting for duty. in. “the U.S. ‘Enbassy’’
Section and following his. short discussion with GRIBANOV, \
NOSENKO met with Department Chief KLYPIN. and. Section Chief ,
KOVSHUK to discuss his responsibilities and functions in. ; i
the section, Repeating what GRIBANOV had already said, ; l
KLYPIN stressed that NOSENKO's most important single respon-. f
yt, sibility in ‘the section would be supervision. of all KGB

aay operational activity against American military and. State on
Department code clerks stationed in Moscow. As for.the . oo
other Americans at the Embassy, KLYPIN suggested a division a r
of labor. under which KOVSHUK would be responsible for super-

vising operations against State Department personnel and | 4

NOSENKO would Supervise work against <he Arny, Air Force, ; | 24

and Naval attaches and their assistants.* NOSENKO was also : 4

made respnnsible for maintaining certain files in the section. i

On 19 February 1965 NOSENKO signed an interrogation proto-- 4

col. which he agreed contained a listing of his principal . i

responsibiliciies during 1960 and 1961. It read in part: :

"During' the egtire eriod in tke First [U.S. . :

Embassy] Section, ‘irst [American] Department in : :

1960 and 1961 my position was Deputy Chief of Section. :

My responsibilities were the following: :

t 4

-General Deputy to the Chief of the First Section, ; j

: . ; Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOVSHUK, and Acting Chief of _ ;
fA tyaae Section in his absence.

«Immediate supervisor for the operational work
against American code clerks. In this capacity I '
closely guided the work of case officers Gennadiy
GRYAZNOV and Vadim KOSOLAPOV. ; :

Case officer for U.S. Embassy Security Officer,
John ABIDIAN.

I
-For about the first six months of 1960, super- Eo.
visor of the work against the offices of the U.S. Mili- foes
tary, Naval, and Air Attaches.

-I maintained the file on American Embassy security.

~-I maintained the log books for the reports sent

‘to the First (U.S. Embassy] Section by the Operational
Technical Directorate, KGB, based on the information
obtained from all the microphones installed in the

. American Embassy. I read all the reports:and gave the

_ a pertinent reports to the appropriate case officers in

the Section. In my absence this work was done by KOVSHUK
or GRYAZNOV.** —

*NOSENKO mentioned his responsibility for supervising at-
tache operations for the first time in 1965. These functions”
ere discussed below. .

Foe, ge.

a **The final sentence was added at NOSENKO's request at the
time the protocol was signed.


: ‘-.During this period I was the agent handler for
‘agents 'SHMELEV’, ‘GRIGORIY', 'PROKHOR', ‘ARTUR’ and
*SARDAR'. * Loe Be : SO tae

. “Throughout this entire period I sat in room 618
of KGB Headquarters at House Number 2, Dzhershinskiy” .
Square, Moscow. GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV shared this. of-
fice with me throughout most of this period. "

iit,

‘b. Functions as General Deputy and Acting Chief of Section. :
(i) Access

sein Peni e merits aidan
ees

Since his defection NOSENKO has maintained under re-
peated interrogation that as general deputy to KOVSNUK, with
the responsibility of taking over in KOVSHUK's absence, he
had acces. to all information on the section's activities
and was obliged to keep current. on this information. On
this basis he has been able to assure his questioners that
the KGB was completely unsuccessful in its attempts to re-
cruit Americans assigned to the Enbassy in these two years.
NOSENKO has also said at various times that his access to
section files and his discussions with section officers made
it certain that there were also no successes fron 1953 to i
1960 and from January 1962 to January 1964. His statements ‘
‘on this subject during the February 1965 were distilled in :
a pro rocon which NOSENKO signed on 20 ) February (quoted in : , i.
full : 3

Mibniticid bbs.

A

4 we LAS the only Deputy to the Chief of the

American Embassy Section, First Department, Second

Chief Directorate, KGB, Vladislav Mikhaylovich KOV- 4
SHUK, from January 1960 to January 1962, one of my func. _ oh
tions was to serve as KOVSHUK's general deputy and to : a
assume the rights and responsibilities of Chief of the me
Section during KOVSHUK's absence. In order to perform +
this function I had the right and the obligation of t
knowing the- details about every important activity of
the section against the American Embassy and its per-
sonnel. No activity of this nature was withheld from
me.

"2. As Deputy Chief of the Section I know defi-
nitely that no U.S. officials serving in the Embassy
ch were agents of the KCB or reporting unofficially in
fo any way to the KGB during my service in the Section.
: There were no approaches or recruitments made by the
‘Section during the period January 1960 to January 1962
against personnel of the American Embassy, including
personnel of the State Department, the offices of the
Military Attaches (Army, Navy, and Air), the Department
of Agriculture and USIA, including Marine guards, Army
sergeants, State Department code clerks and Army code
clerks except against STORSBERG and KEYSERS, both un-
successful approaches.. : ee,

i
i
i

*VOLKOV, YEFREMOV, Johan PREISFKEUND, FRIPPEL, and =
respectively, who are discussed: in other parts

paper. At other times NOSENKO has named additional agents |

he handled in this period; they are discussed below.


+a408q0

a

_ “3, "There: were no “approaches. or recruitnents :
made. against any employees of the United States. -:

‘ Government who were assigned to the ‘American. Embassy ©
on temporary duty during this period. I have read and
understood this report and certify it as correct."

(ii) Duties

- On 29 January 1965, NOSENKO was questioned concerning
his supervisory duties.as Deputy Chief of the section, par-
ticularly his function of supervising activity against code
clerks. The transcript of this discussion is ‘quoted here: -

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have
mentioned did you have to devote the most time?

' Answer: I don't know.
Q: What was the most important?
A: Everything was important.
Q: . Whom did you supervise in the American Embassy
Section?
AE GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPOV, [Vladimir] DEMKIN, and later

[Yevgeniy] GROMAKOYSKIY who worked with DENKIN.
Then there was [N.A.] GAVRILENKO, [I.Ya.| KURI-
LENKO; and BELOGLAZOV: working with the Attaches.

Q: They were all in the First Section?

A: Yes. ,

Q: What were their responsibilities?

A: -GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV had all the code clerks. .
DEMKIN was charged with all persons living in ‘
Americe House, except code clerks. GROMAKOVSKIY
helped him. GAVRILENKO had the Air Force Attaches
and [their] assistants, and also he had the plane
of the Ambassador. He must think about watching
the pilots who were living in a hotel. KURILENKO--
Army Attache and assistants; BELOGLAZOV--Navy ;
Attache, assistants, and Marines.

:Q: What is your understanding of the meaning of the

. word | “supervisor"?, :
‘A: Persoraiiy to be at the head, to direct.
°Q:° 7 7 So, : > wr aesponsaviiities of supervising all

th. work a:adscsi an! ine code clerks, this meant
that ooo. a te tue ead of this work, that you were
direc: ing ints work, that you, were participating.
+ in discussio s'concerning this work, and in these
discussions you were talking about what measures
. were necessary.

rages

Beant

scence tn pte amare aneet o

oe shai ABAD a

wooo Bi age a Led eater.

4

paid eet

4

setae bbe we Hw be Meads ba


14-0000

as

at]

oe

“little questions which the case officer must de--
‘cide himself. When it was necessary. ae oF

And. participating personally. when nec

‘cer appears. But, maybe, for the sake of the file, ~ .

Tupting?y “when necessary sy because” theres:

essary?

Yes...

What sort of case officer questions were you
ansver ing?

All kinds. If I couldn't answer them, if ny
authority isn't enough for this, it is necessary
to discuss them with KOVSHUK. I was discussing .
with KOVSHUK, with KLYPIN, with [KLYPIN's suc- p
cessor as Chief Of the Amcrican Department,

S.N.] PEDOSEYEV. Several tines, not once, we

were Giscussing questions with GRIBANOV. Also, j
coucerning measures, concerning future steps. i
When it was necessary. .

—
aan

What other duties did you have as a supervisor? : .

~ saawaitiacind od Te labs,

I told you. When it was necessary I was going : .
to agent meetings with case officers. When it j
was necessary. Or, besides, I net perso ally i
with "PROKHOR’ [PREISFREUND| or ‘£23 et ei :
“PROKHOR" was working agninst STORSURGS, 'SARDAR" . i

x

against ZUJUS. I was working nyself with them.
You personally worked agents "PROKHOR" and "SARDAR"?

Yes.

.

When did you find it necessary to go to an agent | 4
mecting with a case officer?

Well, for cxanmple, DENKIN would come to me and
say: "You know Ella [UMANETS, an agent in
America House]. Ella said that NORONE had looked i

at her and was smiling." This is just an [hypo- j
thetical] example....Okay, I am going with hin, Jon

hearing Ella myself,.[to learn} what happened,
jwhether] it is possible to make something or not.

You met Ella and talked with her?
Yes, with DEMKIN. Very, very difficult to say,

why and how we are going. When it was necessary
to go. .

As a rule did you try to make it a practice to ae
visit the agents of the section who were working tO
against the American target?

Yes, I am telling you. There was such an‘agent,
Inga [VARLAMOVA]. GRYAZNOV was meeting with her.

It might be necessary to go to meet her. But, we : pe
‘knew how Inga was afraid of intelligence. And, ar
you see, they don't like it when a new case offi- hose


1400000,

weaeneeet Satie: ror

“e: -""- gyou do not believe GRYAZNOV. ‘No. But, you see, -

meeting apartment) is an apartment occupied by a tenant who

‘it was necessary to. go, to hear her.. Not because —

' to hear from the source jemphasized], directly, _
what is going on, and how it is going on, to get
a feeling. Because the source will tell the case.
officer, then the case officer will tell you.
Maybe sometimes he will not give you every detail,

nie i

teig tall aiid said Bane.

every intonation. But in some cases, it is neces- j
sary to feel this. But, of course, it depends on } a
the agent, on the target, whether you will go or oo. 4
not go. It's very difficult, again, to say. : |
Q: Could you say that you met 50 per cent of the -
section's agents?
A; No, I can't say. . a
Q: Fifty per cent or 75 per cent? . j
A: I can't answer you. . 7 i
Q: What about your functions as a supervisor in re- :

gard to safehouses, to "K.K.'s" and "Ya.K.'s",*

A: Oh. I myself had a file on my flat, a yavochneaya
kvartira, which I brought from the Seven
[Tourist Department]. It was my own. GRYAZNOV
had his own yavochnaya kvartira. KOSOLAPOV had
also his own yavochnaya_kvartira. And not one of
us had a conspirative apartment. :

a

ered 3 ad

Q: And you took the "Ya.K.'' from...

A: (Interrupting.) Which I had from the Seventh.
And, by the way, when 1 was leaving the First
[ American} Department, 1 took this file again
to the Seventh.

se eV es

Q: And not one of you had a conspirative flat.

A: No, artes the section had only--how many?--
[P.I.] MASSYA had one conspirative. [V.P.]
Rae had one conspirative, and then there was
one conspirative flat, where, in fact, an agent }
was living. In the First Section there were :
three or four conspirative flats.

. QQ: .- But among you, GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV there was i
Lo none? , 4
As Only "Ya.K.'s"”. . a an 4

so. : poet ee coe . nee ce a as t sega, Baye “8
*A "K.K." [konspirativnaya kvartira--conspiratorial apart- : : 4
ment) is de¥Finéd by ROSESRO as 'a Safehouse ‘or apartment owned — 7 %

and maintained 'by the KGB. A "Ya.K." (yavochnaya kvartira-~
is perhaps subsidized-by the KGB and absents himself when

.,. there is a need to use the apartment for meetings or other
/ activities. The "K.K." is used for more sensitive operational —
-. purposes, he said.

vont BF 2 oe 162

taheenrect te
ioe

Who kept a record of these three?
The case officers.
Where was your "Ya. Ko"?

Vorovskogo Strect.

And where was GRYAZNOV's?

S A: GRYAZNOV's was on Kachalogo Street.
Q: And KOSOLAPOV's? , ,
Ati Don't remember. Don't remember. (Pause.) It
me an-® was in the vicinity of the Suvorovskiy Boulevard. ad
KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. In the region. of Arbat a
Square. KOSOLAPOV's or DEMKIN's. KOSOLAPOV's. 4
DEMKIN's I don't remember. 4
Q@: And you didn't have any responsibility for super- 4
vising the activity that went on at these flats? y
A: 1 don't understand. i
i
Q: : Was there some central control of the use of. the 4
"Ya K's"? :
A: What kind of control? j
; Q: Who would be using then, when they would be using

them, under what conditions? ;

WER Adie eth

| A: No. The case officer who was working with it
decides how to use this flat or how not to use
it, et cetera, et cetera. Besides that, very
often we were using rooms in hotels.

aad

Q: So GRYAZNOV would take any of his operational
activity to his "Ya.K."?

He would also meet with his agents, with his
operational contacts in hotel rooms. KOSOLAPOV
was meeting his agents in his own “Ya. K."'3 NO—
SENKO was meeting his agents or operational con-
tacts in his own "Ya.K.".

Could GRYAZNOV or KOSOLAPOV ever: use these "Ya.K.'s" -
without your knowing about it? oe ss

Of course. It's their owz flat. . ot . :

ON ta et dy ee

But you're supervising their work?

Must I kéep them like alittle, little child? |.
No,’ no, They don't have to report to me; "Today
I go to meet my agent at my flat."

They can use them whenever they like without checking
- with you as supervisor? . : . ”

= of course, of course. They are meeting their own
- agents. So : . a :

. , You have no idea who: they are meeting, or when
_they-are meeting them? Soe eh i OE

¥hen: they are meeting an active development agent, hy

they tell me afterwards. They are telling "this,
this, this, this" and I am answering "this, this,
this." But usually they are going to meet maids
‘or they don't have to report. There is nothing
active and there is....The file is going on.

What about operational vehicles? Automobiles?
You see, we had one automobile for the whole
department. Besides this, we could apply, when
necessary, to the officer on duty for the Second
Chief Directorate and he would give a car, be-:
cause he has a number of cars at his disposal.:

Approximately how much of your time did you spend
supervising GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV?

I can't say.

‘Yas it the most important function?

‘Yes, it was important. All work in the First

Section was important. This was the most impor-
tant. But one day I could devote the whole day
to code clerks, the next day maybe half the day,
maybe two hours in the day. The rest of the day
I will be absent. I will be meeting with KLYPIN,
or 1 will be having a meeting with surveillance,
or I will be at ancther place. The third day,
again, maybe the whole day, maybe part of it.

No, I can't tell you. It depends on the situa-
tion.

(411) Additional Duties in KOVSHUK's Absence

As Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, one of

NOSENKO's responsibilities was to serve as Acting Chief
when KOVSHUK was absent from the office. NOSENKO recalled

leave p

*- that he fulfilled this function during KOVSHUK's two 30-day
eriods in 1960 and 1961, but he did not remember

when this leave occurred in those years. He also served as
Acting Chief for about a month in the summer of 1960 when

KOVSHUK was in the KGB hospital with heart trouble and for a

week or two some time in 1961 when KOVSHUK was ill again..

’ NOSENKO was unable to recall any operational or. inspection

trips that KOVSHUK made in 1960 or 1961, and the only other
specific time that he could remember KOVSHUK being absent
was for several days in connection with preparations for
President Eisenhower's planned visit to the Soviet Union in

1960.

NOSENKO's description of -his duties in KOVSHUK’s ab-"
: tees. was summarized in a protocol which
ae 3

. °."Y do not remember any particularly important ;
operational decisions I made as Acting Chief of Sec-
_ tion, nor any unusual things that happened during

he signed on -3, March

Dygtramen eee

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these times. The only specific responsibility KOVSHUK ".
_ head. which I. handled in his absence was to report to -

the Chief of the First Department about all mail going ok
out of the First Section. I did not meet- any of KOV- .
Lo SHUK's agents during his absences because there was. ‘no
3 necessity to do so. His only Russian agent whoa 1°
remember was Ilya GLAZUNOV (.KGB cryptonym “VRUBEL" | ,
whom he transferred to FEDYANIN in 1960, I thisk. The
only other agent of KOVSHUK's whom I vemember was the
correspondent Edmund STEVENS.* The only. thing that was
‘different for me as Acting Chief of the Scction was a
that I had to go every day tv see the Chief of the De= -.  - 4
partment. a}

An dtrciach ad ttt

se igeshitnhvanapren meme seu magtancn

on Sd

c. Supervisor of all Code Clerk Operations
(i) Introduction

Among the numerous KGB activities against American code
clerks in Moscow which NOSENKO has discussed are five opera~
tions wherein the KGB intended or effected approaches for ;
recruitment/defection ‘purposes. According to NOSENKO, none
was successful... The five major cases are reviewed separately ,
below, one of them in tae context of duty trips abroad by .
NOSENKO' s subordinate KOSOLAPOV, ** . d

Ne teaan 6 aekal Ts nh edi

NOSENKO said that, upon assuming responsibility for
supervising operations against American code clerks, he
found a very "difficult situation." Prior to the assignment
of KOSOLAPOY to the U.S. Embassy Section in late 1959, all
operations against code clerks had been handled by A.S, MALYU-~ :
GIN, but during MALYUGIN's two years of effort. there had }
beer no operational approaches and no successes. When Poa

stent tee

Z

cine teeny falls Ue atisbreenee

*The Edmund STEVENS case is.discussed in Part V.C.2.

**GOLITSYN on 20 March 1962 identitied KOSOLAPOV's photograph
as that of a veteran KCB officer with whom ke was personally
‘acquainted. GOLIISYN said that KOSOLAPOV had entered the KGB
in about 1952 and had served for two or three years as a
member of the First [American] Department of the KGB First
Chief Directorate under United Nations cover in New York City;
subsequently he had worked for two or three years in the
First Chief Directorate at KGB Headquarters. According to
GOLITSYN, the bachelor KOSOLAPOV was transferred to the KGB i
Second Chief Directorate some time prior to 1960 in line with. ; j
- a KGB policy for only married men to be sent abroad. As of: : 4
|e
od

et Vata RS 2S wilt eat

avers peda reer n on

1960, GOLITSYN said, KOSOLAPOV was working against code clerks
stationed in the American Embassy in Moscow. He added that
KOSOLAPOV speaks excellent English. Prior to GOLITSYN's
identification, CIA had no indication of intelligence acti-
. a vity on KOSOLAPOV's part. Between February 1953 and Aprii
j 1955 he was assigned to the United. Nations: Secretariat Trans-.. . :
So lation Unit as a translator; in August 1958 he had been an ne ae
interpreter at the Geneva Conference on Nuclear Test Detection; | q
in September 1959 he accompanied KHRUSHCHEV on his trip to ~
the United States (see Part V.E.3.d. which desoribes the ~
. Yole of NOSENKO's target. John ABIDIAN in connection with the
_ _KHRUSHCHEV trip). KOSOLAPOV's English is flawless.


REE EA ET

Cpe pe ee aos ~ SP YR Leen : PPh pt gee tote erten

KOSENKO took Over tixen wire no active devclopzental opera~
tdons ngainst Ciule vppeRy uncterway, and the only agents or”
operational contau(y seine used against thes. were poorly
educated maids ail svper Bkes, none of vhon had accomplished
See eee te ATPON bbs, » foreign agent3 were bing used

nM operations Bes bens ‘poo Ners and at the tine
NOSENKO had nu ageieit cade roc Persone House, or in
tne Embassy, viel wonsd te used in these operstions.

to the U.S. Estansy 6 otiuna as a second assistant to NOSENKO
in his code cl<ih w tivities, From this point on, NOSENKO,
KOSOLAPOV, and Ch¥sseoy phered the same KGB Neadquarters
office (Roca Gli), nore ali KGB files on Ancricen code
clerk:, as welt i ‘ye fh1ee on agents available for work
against then, were essed ty one iarie sife, accessible to
all three officers, xogtszo supervised all of the sectiun's
work along these iyas, and no provocations, compromises,
recruitment atlesus, or seeeuitments could have been planned
or carried Out Vithewrt tin prior knowlege and agreement

wsien TLL ddadieod gle.

iecardaste ls:

- AGOLITSYN fargt seq GRYAZNGV an a case officer of the
Anerican Departacni, second Chier Directorate, on 31 Decen-
ber 1961, lic etl w* that time that ne had been personally ;
acquainted with Girézeoy yince 1945 and that, as of tho i
spring of 1960, Ghiis.ay wis “working only against code : !
clerks of the Auerinen Embassy in Moscow.” GRYAZNOV had

In January v5 fouruary of 1960 GRYAZNOVS was essigaed a
i
|
i

sremelacs adie atast nce ts

travelled tO Cha i feu States at sane ‘ i '
GOLITSYN tdded, 47 ->a~-nyemge ere Bee Por |
Fag PT SI i : es ead +
a taeda BG “Be 4 of
ope zak, bit : ps ess On | doo,
§ June 1962 Geilis rn told CIA that — had been a classmate of :

GRYAZSOV during tot and 1946 at the "SMFRSiI" counterintelli-
gence echool tn Mor ows he deseribed GRYAZNOV as a specialist
in operations @ydisent American code clerks, saying that :
GRYAZNOV was "Very »sportenced" and had nad "some successes."
As an example, he ttu of having spoken to GRYAZNOV in the F
spring of 1960 wikis, ne, GOLITSYN, was visiting the U.S,
Embassy Section of én. American Department in connection with |
his forthcoring anuiynment as a First Chief Directorate
counterintelligene.: articer in Helsinki. GOLITSYN had com—
plained to GRYA‘NWuy that the KGB had no U.S. assets in Helsinki
oe at the tine, ail ty CIA he quoted GRYAZNOV as replying:
i ; " “Maybe we will help you." According to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV
oS, went on to explain that he was handling an agent, a code
oi... @lerk in the U4, fyyassy in Moscow, wio wes about to be ,
transferred, perlieys to Helsinki; he told GOLITSYN that the = © "7"
RGB had receitven iformation from this American code clerk
and classified itis a a “real agent." NOSENKO has not .
mentioned such an tyvent (iho Has yet to be identified) and
. has denied that ths GH had any agents in the U.S. Embassy |
at this tine. GOLitsyN identified a photograph of G.I. LAPIN,
_ Who travelicd with tie Maiseyev Dance troup to the United
States and Canada i 1958, as being identical with GRYAZNOV,
_\CIA had no prior thdication of intelligence activities by |.
GRYAZNOV, under the alias LAPIN, and had no traces on GRYAZNOV
n true name. gs, ot : ee ; .

(eemmnreaseceriiem neni: ater tte meter tenntieeete iat

‘ q
mee


ee

b

had been no such success with American military ciph

when he was in Moscow. If KOSENKO went anay on w te tu 4
said, he would‘have been told about any such autivigy Naw
his return. Ss y pad.

When XOSENKO took over responsibility for dparat ne i ;

against code clerks, he read available files on targngn vo i
agents, discussed the situation with “ALYUGIN, bry y "H
U.S. Embassy Section case officer responsible for Lt y nA
of America House), GRYAZNOV, and KOSOLAPOV, and repay) iene

findings and recommendations to his supertors, movi gages

KLYPIN. Several changes were made as a result, fy Vighyy,, 4
ducing a new program for the work of the sectigi, a a hee ot ab wamene “4
suggested the use of third—country nationals Chen AM dans ( : ; .
and not Sovict) for agent work against code clerin; 4), ti. tomomreatnes ; 4
with this suggestion, be personally recruitcd Ailing, (tht to : 4
tary officer, <EaZ7aF, eryptonym "“SARDAR"), aera 4
him against the Amcrics House, (After his first ray Via ted |

as specifically targetted against military cons yy tt 3
Matthew 2UJUS.) Another such agent directly hemltod are ;
SENKO was the Finnish businessman Johan PREISFUNtUL, in en i
figured in the case of the military cede clerk Jemen pete ij
BERG, NOSENKO-also suggested initiating activity guajiay :
clerks prior to their arrival in the USSR and PVOCAT A Gy tnde i
proposed that operational measures be undertakon ar Whey 3
operational poss4bilities be studied in Helsinhi, th. nfs {
through which most of the code clerks passed an thea, o v i
to Moscow. nl J i

Finally, according to NOSENKO, none of the uporayy,
against code clerks was successful during the two Year yo
spent as Deputy Chicf of tho American Fabassy Heatdun. yin
did the KGB have any success between January 10653 ody,
ary 1964, when NOSENKO left Moscow for Geneva. ilu tbwveqe
that GRYAZNOV would have told him if any succengful dupe ;
had taken place during this latter period. "UDF UR hog

weit attain item ele

(141) Approach to STORSBERG

From the start of his association with CIA, NOS\4;
emphasized that the primary mission of the U.A, Frbas..
tion in 1960 snd 1951, during his incumbency as bupy
of Section, was the recruitment of an American mbites,
grapher. He has cxplained the special stress pincod yA 1b be=
_requirement (vis-a-vis the recruitment of Stain DOA ane fits
code clerks) by saying that, while the KGB had brokuy neat
U.S. State Department cipher systems and could read at pein
messigcs up_fo_and Including those classified. “giere pi, fneeee |

{

Avg ' _ :
HBG bee gor * on a

‘remained secure in this period. NOSENKO also hag as
repeatedly that. the KGB had not been able to reeruty any A
can code clerk, cither State Department or military, upd merle
the years since the recruitment of “ANDREY" in 1989. % neg

a aan

*See Part VI.D.3.b., which discusses the "ANDREY* Chay,


14-0000 *

rts. ea

On the several operations against military code clerks
which. KOSENKO has described and in which he has claimed a
personal role, his greatest detail and emphasis has been given
to the case of James Harry STORSPERG. In 1962 NOSENKO said
that, in line with GRIKANOV's instructions that he pay parti-
cular attention to code clerk operations, he Gevoted most of
his time for almost a year to the STORSBERG operation, and
played a persona) role in the unsuccessfui KGE approach; he
descrited in the first person his conversation with STCRSBERG.
During the 1964 to 1966 period, KUSENKO denied not only that
he had personally participated in this way but also that he
had ever claimed to have dcdcne: he continued to say, however,
that he supervised the cperation from beginning to end. Ac-
cording to NOSENKO, =his operation got under way with the re-

“eruitmernt of a third-neational agent (Johan PREISFREUND, a

Finn) some time in the first, half of 1960, Tne specific aim

in using this agent was to involve STORSBERG in compromising

detivities, which would then form the basis for the approach.
The operation dregged on through 1969 ana until the spring,
summer, of autum: of 1961; at this time N.S. SKVORTSOV, a KGB
officer, was introduced in the guise of a wealthy French busi-
nessman to continue the development of compromising iunforma-
tion. PEREISFREUND was then withdrawn from the operation,
Several weeks later STORSEERS wa: approached, principaily on
the basis of his financial need, sut he rejected the KGB bid
and the ¢peratior.was over. NOSENKO was certain that STORS-
BERG had not reported the epproach and said that the KG3 would
use this fact as an additionsl eiement of pressure should
STORSBERS again te posted outside the United States. NOSENKO
also kr.ew that GCLITSYN had reported to CIA concerning KGB
modus operandi in this case as well as PREISFREUND's part in
it.

GOLITSYN in early 1962 had, in fact, told CIA about

PREISFREUND having been used by the KGB in an operation again
an American stationed in Moscow, Contrary 29 NOSENKO's infor

mation, be said that this American hed been epproached--and
@cruited--by the KGB at the end of 1960.
aa .

A second item from GOLITSYN may also relate to the STORS~-

. BERG operation: GOLITSYN told:of learning in the sprirg of

1960 that the KGB had developed a military code clerk in Mos-'
cow to the point that recruatment was virtually assured. Ac-
cording to U.S. Army records, only two military code clerks
were stationed there at that time, STORSBERG and his superior
William S. HURLEY, the military communications officer who
additionally performed cryptographic duties. NOSENKO has -
said that there «as no KGS operation against HURLEY, and

“HURLEY has reported no approach. |

In addition to the detailed information given by NOSENKO
on this case, the FBI and Army Intelligence have ‘interviewed

" STORSEERG (who confirmed NOSENKO's account and denied recruit-
‘ment) and CIA has talked to the KGB agent PREISFREUND (who
also generally. confirmed the information iven by NOSENKO

but-did not know the outcome of the case). The results of

. these interviews, together with information from GOLITSYN and —
/from other sources, are summarized in this.

order below.

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.

January 1960: STORSSERG arrived in Moscow (this date was
suppiied by the inter:ogator and was accepted
~ by BOSENKO es accurate, which it is).

Early 1960: PREISFREUND was recruited by KOVSHUK. (This
was consistent with earlier statements, and
NOSENKO had always said ne first met PREISFREUND
a Week 7 recruicment, On 21 Octo- 4
S *KO said that he and , :
Sf ‘un the middle of 1960, 4

in the summer cz 1960. He subsecuently stayed !
with tne qenera: Gate mid-i9€0_') :

Summer 1969: PREISFREUND First supplied a woman to STCRSBERG,
Early 196i: Compromisir of STCORSRERG and a

Soviet femal obtained at the Hotel

Peking in

About May EIEFREUND wes withdsa.n from the operation
1961: ORTZOV, alias MITHAUD, was introduced.
(NCSENXO dated this by ssying it was about
three weeks before the approach to STORSBERG.)
June 1961° Unsuccessful XGE approach to STORSBERC in the

Leningrad Hotel, Moscow. (Earlier on 20 October
1966 NGSENKO had said that the approacn was made
“a ronth or a month anc 2a half betore STORSBERG
left Moscow," Told that STORSBERG was reassigned
in November 1961, NOSENXO said that the approach
was in “June 1961, 1.e., five months before
STORSBERG's departure date. STCREBSERG has re-
ported that the approach was in Gcrober 1961;

see below.)

NOSENKO was questioned further on the STORSSERG case later
in the October 1966 interrceatiors. He asserted on 21 October
that he had first met PREISFRELND in the summer of 1960 and
that he continued to meet with him in his case officer capacity
after the unsuccessful approach to STORSBERG. HKe saw PREIS~
FREUND most recentiy. he said. im Moscow during 1963. NOSENKO
also explained how PREISFREUND first came to knew his true
name: Initially NOSENKO was introduced to PREISFREUND only
by first name and catronymic. Yuriy <vanovich: en one occasion,
however, NOSENKO was visiting PREISFREUND's hotel room in
Moscow and “lost his XGB certificate’ there. Thereafter
PREISFREUND knew him as NOSENKO, On 25 October 1966, NOSENKO

i repeated his earlier statements that the STORSBERG case was

the only one in which PREISFREUND participated, although he
May have reported casually on other Americans he met during

his visits to America House. For the first time he specific-
ally named GRYAZNOY as the case officer holding the operational
file on STORSSERG, He continued to maintain that he, NOSENKO,
supervised the operation against STOKSBERG,

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"This is in reference to NOSEKSO's statement that PREISFFEUND

- invelved STORSBERG in speculation which PREISFRUEND also
ot : claimed; sec also GOLITSYN's second lesi, discussed below.

“demands made of PREISFREUND by the KGB. PREISFREUND added:

| ¥"Kecording to NOSENKO, this was Irina LEBEDOVSKAYA, an

(c) Information from PREISFREUND

CIA initially interviewed PREISFREUND on 8 July 1965 in
Helsinki. (NOSENKO himself had suggested that PREISFREUND
would confirm his story of the STORSBERG case.) During this

first meeting with him, PREISFREUND correctly identified photo-
graphs of KOVSHUK, NOSENKO, and STORSBERG. He maintained, how-
ever, that his relationship with KOVSHUK and NOSENKO was strictly
on a business level, that he had never had anything to do with :
the KGB, and that he did not know what the initials "KGB" stand. .-
for. Toward the end of this meeting, PREISFREUND allowed that

he may have been unwittingly involved in some activity acainst
STORSBERG and agreed to tell the "entire truth” the following day.

ces eetenereeep te

On 9 July 1965 PREISFREUND described how he had been caught
in a blackmarket opgraticn in Moscow and was, on this basis, re-
cruited by KOVSHUK “either at the end of 1959 or early 1960." ;
Several weeks later, he said, he was approached by NOSENKO who '
explained that KOVSHUK was unavailable and that the KGS wanted
him, PREISFREUND, to arrange an introduction between STORSBERG
and a Soviet female, Irina, the daughter of a Soviet general.*

PREISFREUND then left Moscow, and when he returned about two

months later, he took STO2SBERG to che Peking Restaurant, where ;
the introduction was effected. PREISFREUND, STORSBERG, Irina, :
and another girl then went to PREISFREUND's hotel, where STORS- :
BERG and Irina were intimate. |

bata

PREISFREUND said on 10 July 1965 that he was fairly certain ;
his vecruitment took place in early 1960, probably in March or _— :
April. At the time KOVSHLK had refused to explain what: the KGB |
wanted him to do; he said only that they would talk about it a”
later but assured PREISFREUND that he would not be asked to
undertake anything detrimental to Finnish interests; nor did
KOVSHUK establish any means of communications with PREISFREUND,
telling him only that the KGB would know where to find nim.
PREISFREUND subsequently visited the USSR on several occasions,
but no contacts were made. Just as he was beginning to believe
that the affair had been forgotten, NOSENKO contacted him at
his room in the Berlin Hotel in Moscow. Asked tc explain his
earlier statement that NOSENKO first met with him two weeks
after the recruitment, PREISFREUND said he could not remember
exactly how long it was, but that it was definitely on another
trip to Moscow and that it was probably several months later.

2 wan nada Ayr ta le

PREISFREUND was asked how he had first met STORSBERG. . He
first replied that it had been at America House and recalled,
that NOSENKO had simply told him to go there and "find Jim;"
it was only with some difficulty that he finally managed to
strike up an acquaintance at the bar. On second thought, PREIS-—
PREUND said, he may have first met STORSBERG at the sauna in
the Finnish Embassy in Moscow through a mutual Finnish acquaint-
ance. Throughout this initial period, NOSENKO and KOVSHUK made
repeated promises that once the introduction of STORSBERG to
the Soviet female had been accomplished, there would be no more

agent of the U.S. Embassy Section who was. handled by A.V
.SUNTSOV.. .. . -.. 7 re et

14-0008, 4 Gt

-

-me about helping me out in iny cusiness ‘and 50.0N,. ‘but they never
did a damn thing for me, “On the contrary. The comly promise they:
“kept was that I would not. be asked to'’do anything except the

_ signed visas. He was told this was correct and was asked for
>the true name. PREISPREUND replied: “GOLUB? Yes?"

“that the Soviet authorities suspected him of complicity in

‘coming trip.*** He said that he was F2 reicularly concerned about

"Both. NOSENKO and FOVSHUK: used. to “make. all. ‘sort of. promises ‘to.

STORSBERG job. But, as for the rest of it, they didn’ t help me
at all.”

. PREISPREUND was eventually successful, he said, in introduce
ing STOPSBERG to Irina as NOSENVO wished and the three of then
returned to PREISFRELO's hetel room on a summer evening. PREIS~
FREUND slept in the hotel corridor while STORSBERG and Irina
shared his bed. We told his CiA interviewers on 16 July 1965 ‘
that at one poiat during the evening he cauyht a glimpse of | . i

no epee ne iene ecimnremnar 1a

NOSENKO in the corridor wearing a rubber. apren and from this de-
duced that NOSENNO hal been teking surreptitious photographs of

STORES BERG and Trins vogether.* On ord
SHUK, it was the last time he

:rs from NOSENKO ara nove
IHERG, **

meeting PREISEREUNS

Toward the end of the i0
2 recruitment and

said that about six nontia «

the beginning of his involveme GS. "The jcb," he i
said, "dragged cut & long time i that this was 4
the only operation in-wnich he parc foipoted and that he aad :

toid to the beet of his ability all he knew of it. He acmitted
that he was a heavy drinker and said thet for thiz reazon he
could not be Sure abcut his dates. PHREISFRNUND added that he
would not have forgotten, however, if he had performed other
services for the K&B.

PREISFREUND was shown GOLIUSYN's photograph and remarxed:
“das he here ‘lin Finland)? I doa't know nin." Shown the photo-
graph during a later meeting, he said that he had once invited
a large group of Soviets to go fishing with him in Finland and
that this perscn may have been acong them. When given the name
KLIMOV, which GOLITSYN used in Finland in 1960 and 1961, and
told that it was an alias, PREISFREUND asked whether KLIMOV had

At the close cf the 10 July 1°55 meeting, PREISFREUND men-
tioned to his interviewers that he was planning to travel to
Leningrad by automotile with his family for about five days,
beginning on or about 23 July. He said that he had learned from
his business contacts in Moscow and from hotel personnal there

NOSENKO's defection and was therefore apprehensive of the forth-

* ROSELKO has not mentioned this.

‘ee ‘PREISFREUND could not date this ‘occasién precisely; he said
it was eae before the | time he. ner e caused a

sions with v. Ya. CRE
Guards), Directorate § : :
‘sentative of that servi ° for whom
PREISFREUND was. working during. “his frequent visits. to the
Cnviet Union. CHEKALOV. told .the. representative of the @agr”

of American ‘Intelligence.

14-00000 . * -

what his response should be if the KGS accused him of confessing
to American Intelligence and asxed his interviewers to brief —
him in this regard. Ouring the final CIA meeting on 13 July
1965 PREISFREUND said that he had decided that the situation

was too dangerous; he would not be going to the USSR after all.
Reliable information shows, however, that he did go to the Sov- i i
jet Union several days later, returning to Helsinki on 24 July oe :
1965. .

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182. i
(d) Information from GOLITSYN

GOLITSYN, who had served the ¥GB most recently as a counter-
intelligence officer in Heisinki during 1966 and 1961, reported
separately two possibly related leads to operations against Am-~-
erican personnel assigned to the United States Enbassy in Moscow,
One of these was a developmental operation against a military
code clerk which the KGB felt was aimost certain of success, the.
other a recruitment approach to an Emoassy employee which GOLIT-
SYN was told had beén successful. GOLiTSYN learned these two oo 4
items of information from different Kivu Second Cnief Directorate |
officers at different times.

Font base ne nee aitinte ebb

GOLITSYN provided the first of these leads on 23 December i
1961, when he reported information he said he Learned during 3
conversations with his perscnal friend GRYAZNOY at KGR Heada-

quarters in Moscow some time between April and July 1966.* At

that time GOLIPSYN was visiting the American Pepartihent of the

Second Chief Directorate in connection vith his preparations

for assignment in Helsinki as a First Chief Cirrectcrate counter-

intelligence officer. GRYAZNOV told GOLITSY: that he, GRYAZNOV,

had personally prepared an cperation involving an American mili-

tary code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 per cent sure"

that the recruitment approacn to this code clerk would be suc-

cessful. GOLITSYN subsequently narrcewed the time of his conver-

gation with GRYA2NOV down tc "April or May 1960" and quoted

GRYAZNOV as saying that the KGB "is certain that the recruitment :
is preparea and will be successful." GOLITSYN also said that .
the recruitment plan for this operation "evidently involved a .
woman," but could provide no further details. During these same
talks, according to GOLITSYN, GRYAZNOV said that although the
KGB had earlier recruited U.S. Department of State code Clerks
in Moscow, this would be the first recruitment of a code clerk
in the office of the American Military Attache since the estab-
lishment of the Second Cniecf Directorate's American Department
(in the 1940's). i

GOLITSYN reported on the second operation on 26 February

1962, while discussing the KGB agent PREISFREUND. GOLI'TSYN
said that he first met PREISFREUND when the latter went to the
Soviet Embassy in Helsinki in connection with an application
for travel to the USSR. On several later occasions, GOLITSYN
said, the two men had drinks together in Helsinki cafes.
According to GOLITSYN, PREISFREUND had been used in the recruit-
ment in Moscow of at least one American who “could have been a
code clerk or a diplomat." He also knew that the recruitment
had been accomplished "in 1960, at the end of 1960" and that

. PREISFREUND, having met the target at America House in Moscow,
had helped to set up the target for the recrurtment approach
by involving him in speculatory activities and by arranging his
introduction to various KGB female agents. GOLITSYN thought
that PREISFREUND had dropped out of the case after “he had helped
to create the circumstances" and had not taken a direct part in

t
i
}

a

I ®Acecording to NOSENKO, he himself was GRYAZNOV's superior at :
} : this time. NOSENKO did not recall visits by GOLITSYN to the
U.S. Embassy Section in 1960.

Veber one

183.

the approach, which «as made by KGB officers.
by the FBI on 18 Jun ; 2 é

AS

Thie second leac, GOLITSY! said, stemmed frcm his conversa-
tions with KOVSNUK whom he said was the "assistant" (chief) of
--the American Department,* while GOLITSIN was temporarily in Moscow
during "December 1960."** GOLITSYN related that he had visited
the American Department to request permission to use PREISFREUND
operationally in Helsinki. This request was refused with the
explanaticn: “You see, he (PREISFREUND) helped us in one recruit-
ment now, and it is necessary to be cereful for amut six months

_ : i
apliidis, osdaciviticisias  abealllly

jase boar wnnebdL Biba,

* GOLITSYN could mean either Pemoshchik (assistant)or Zames-itel' ;
(deputy). The CHEREPANOV papers snow that KOVSHUK was Deputy :
Chief of the Department as late us 1959, NOSENKO said that, as 3
a result of a drinking incident, ZOVSHUK was demoted from De- A
puty Chief of the American Department to Chief of its American : _ ot
Embassy Section in 1959 and hetd this position until early 1962,

GOLITSYN said he had known KOVSIUK for about ten years and i
characterized him as a capable officer with about 15 years of ‘
KGB experience, at least ten of them in the American Department,

Seconé Chief Directorate. In about 1956, according to GOLITSYN, :
KOVSHUK was handling KG3 agent Henry SHAPIRO. CiA records show |
that in addition, KOVSHUK was involved in the Mcscow and Wash- fos
ington phases of the "ANOREY" case (he was identified by Dayle '
SMITH; see Part VI.BD.3.b.) and in the Zevelopment in Moscow of :
CIA officer George WINTERS (who identified his photograph; see i
Part VI.D.7.c.). According io NOSEWKO, KOVSHUK took personal

part in the recruitments of Roy REODES and Dayle SMI7H, in the

approach to Army Attache Walter MULE, code clerk Louis MANNHEIM,

State Department Officer Richar2 HARMSTONE, and code clerk

James STORSBERG, and in the interrogations of CIA officers

Russell] LANGELLE and Richard JACOB,

be tanestbadeisngy atone

elit Les

**GOLITSYN's passport and travel records heid by CIA confirm that | 4
GOLITSYN travelled only twice to the Soviet Union after his :
arrival in. Helsinki on 20 July 1960. The first of these trips

_ was on 19 January 1961, «hen he flew directly from Helsinki to

Moscow; he returned to Helsinki by rail a week later, on 28

January. GOLITSYN's second trip to the Soviet Union was from

9 to 15 April 1961, when he appears to have spent all or most

ef this period in Leningrad. A Finnish national, whom GOLITSYN

had been developing in Helsinki, has reported that he met with

GOLITSYN in Leningrad on a daily basis from 10 through 13 April

1961. Moreover, GOLITSYN has never mentioned being in Moscow

during this time. ‘Since GOLITSYN remained in Helsinki from

April until December 1961, when he defected, it appears that

he erred by one month in reporting the date of his conversa- ‘

- tiona in the American Department and that he learned of the :

*.geecond lead some time during the week of 19 January 1961. This.

is the same conversation of which NOSENKO spoke several times ~

in 1962 and subsequently (see above). NOSENKO has always

Maintained that’ he was’ out of Moscow on leave at the time of

" GOLITSYN's visit and that this was in the summer of 1961. When

he was told in February 1965 that GOLITSYN was in Moscow. in..

January i961, NOSENKO replied that CIA was either wrong or |.

Was attempting to deceive him. NOSENKO declined to change. -

his. story of the summer leave. ke


isa.

(e) Information from other Sources

; Infornation available to CIA indicates that the Attaches of"
the three U.S. military services represented in Moscow shared :

a single cryptographic center as of 1960 and 1961 and that,
except for overlapping assignients during periods of turnover,

there was normally only one military code clerk assigned to the
_ Embassy at any particalar time. This military coce clerk was

responsible for enciphering and deciphering the traffic of all
In practice, at least one other men-

three military services.
Ler of the Attache staff in Moscow has held a cryptographic

clearance and has been trained and has performed the function -

of back-up for the military code clerk during periods of the
latter's absence from the Moscow Embassy or inability to per-
form his functions for other reasons. ‘

STORSBERG was the only military code clerk assigned to the
Moscow Embassy from February 1960, when his predecessor, Everett
HOBSON, was reassigned, until September 1961, when his successor,
Mathew Z2UJUS, arrived. STORSBERG himself arrived in Moscow in

,

January 1960 and departed in November 1961.

4

During the period of STORSBERG’s tour in Moscew, back-up
cryptographic duties

a number of occasions, including the night of the approach to

STORSBERG, and he could be loosely termed a code clerk.* Addi-
tionally, he performed repair work on the cryptographic machines
and directed certain other sensitive activities at the Embassy.

HURLEY's tour in Moscow began shortly before: STORSBERG's, in
December 1959, and he served there until June or July 1962.

The only other person performing official functions in the
1960-1961 period was James KEYSERS,

military code room during the
who arrived in Moscow on 22 December 1960 and was assigned to

the office of the Air Force Medical Officer. As a concurrent
secondary assignment, KEYSERS worked as a clerk-typist in the

office of the Air Attache. Prom February until mid-April 1961,
as a collateral duty, KEYSERS worked in the joint military code
room where he was in training to serve as back-up cryptographer.

He was relieved of this duty in April 1961 for reasons of low

¥—ithough NOSENKO has distinguished between STORSBERG's func-
tion as "military code clerk" and HURLEY's duties as “mili-

tary code machine mechanic,” he said on one occasion that
he considered both to be within the general category of

"military code clerks." NOSENKO reported that there was no

KGB operation against HURLEY.

se renner a nape

were performed by the Military Communica-
tions Officer, CWO-2 HURLEY. HURLEY performed these duties on

ine bide aber HIS CI RL a

4

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14-0000

ine on
‘

185.

aptitude and lack of interest; in June 1961 he was removed from
Moscow because of reported homosexual activities.*

ene ere

i
|
NOSENKO has described an cperation against KEYSERS (see |
7 ' below), but because of the date of KEYSERS* arrival in Moscow, i
he must be ruled out as a candidate for the first of GOLIT-
SYN's two leads discussed above. On the basis of available
information, it appears that the subject of this lead must f
have been either STORSBERG or HURLEY, the only two "military |

4
1

code clerks" in Moscow in the spring of 1960, The subject
of GOLITSYN's second lead could have been STOPSBERG, HURLEY,
or, in fact, anyone else at the Enbassy, although GOLITSYN
suggested that he might be a code clerk and might be a mili-
tary man. 3y his statement that there was no KGB operation
against HURLEY, together with his description of the opera-
tion against STORSBERG beginning in the spring of 1960 and
his (and PREISFREUND's) assertion that PREISFREUND took part
in only one operation for the KGB--that against STORSBERG--
‘ NOSENKO has said in effect that both of GOLITSYN's leads were
: to the STORSBERG cperation, which ended in failure. This con-
oo" €licts with GOLITSYN's report that PREISFREUND was involved
: in a successful recruitment operation in late 1960. There are
also inconsistencies between the NOSENKO and GOLITSYN leads .
as regards the progress. of the operation. .GOLITSYN reported Pen
_ that recruitment of a code clerk was. "99 per cent" assured
in May-June 1960, whereas NOSENKO and PREISFREUND describe
-an operation which, at best, was just becoming active at that Le
time. GOLITSYN, in reporting his second lead, said that the *
. operation in which PREISFREUND participated culminated "in 4
- late 1960;" NOSENKO reported that the only’ operation in which
PREISFREUND took part ended in an unsuccessful approach to
STORSBERG in “mid-1961° or,..on other occasions, in "autumn
1961." MT

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bitacaiceraretche sree ener oe


14-0000

TDY's by KOSOLAPOV on Code Clerk Cases:

(444)
(a) «Introduction

. According to NOSENKO, the U.S. Embassy Section officer
KOSOLAPOYV travelled only once to Helsinki, and KOSOLAPOV at:
that time succeeded in his mission of accompanying--together
with a KGB female agent--a suspected American code clerk, Paul
Prancis JENNER, by train to Moscow. (The KGB later learned
that JENNER was nct a code clerx but a pouch clerk who also met
couriers at the Moscow airport, NOSENKO said, and this KGB igen-
tification of JENNER's specialty is confirmed by U.S, Department
of State files.) The report by NOSENXO on KOSCLAPOV is contra-~
dicted Ly two sources, travel records available to CIA and the
KGB defector GOLITSYN.

ae

Sith

:

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A

Statements made by JENNER in 1960 and 1962 parallel those i
of NOSENKO in 1964 and 1965 to the extent that two young Soviets,
aman and a woman, did converse with him on the train, and later
JENNER did encounter the same woman at a Moscow airport. Never- - |
theless, travei records contradict NOSENKO's statement that
KOSOLAPOV was the Soviet male aboard the train with JENNER on the

' 24-hovr journey. : .

pede

Although NOSENKO insisted that KOSOLAPOV was on a single
TDY to Finland, in early 1960, travel records show that KOSOLA-
POV (under a different identity) went to Helsinki in both the
Spring and fall of 1960. Travel records on the second Helsinki
TDY Sy KOSOLAPCV, on which NOSENKO has not reported, are borne
out by GOLITSYN. GOLITSYN said that KOSOLAPOV, in order to lay
the groundwork fcr a future relationship in Moscow, accompanied
a U.S. Embassy code clerk by train from Helsinki about November
196C, or perhaps as late as the beginning of 1561. Again on
the basis of travel records, it has been determined that on
16 November 1960 KOSOLAPOV was a fellow passenger of an American
code clerk named John W. GARLAND on the daily train from Hel-
sinki to Moscow.

EEN eRe peeneee ene T He ni en

rasta yre bent te

The following discussion of the TDY's of KOSOLAPOV is
divided into three parts: KOSOLAPOV's false identity for
travel, the early 1969 TDY, and the November 1960 TOY. Each
part incorporates the information from all sources, including
NOSENKO. . .

(b) Palse Identity for Travel

Vadim Viktorovich KOSOLAPOV was born in Perm' on 19 Febru-
ary .1928. According to travel records, one Viktor Dmitriyevich . a
KOLOSOV, born in Perm‘ on 19 March 1927, was in Finland from
31 March to 2 Arril 1960, in Finland from 12 to 16 November 1960,
-and in Denmark from 25 October to 1 November 1961.* In July 1965,
Johan PREISFREUND (see Part V.E.3.c.ii.,on STORSBERG operation)
identified for CIA a photograph of KOLOSOV as that of a KGB offi-
cer named Vadim (last name unknown) who approached him in Moscow

-. FNOSENKO reported that KOSOLAPOV travelled to Copenhagen in

- 1961 to recontact the YOUNGERs, an American man and wife who

"were arrested for espionage and recruited by the KGB while_
touring the USSR in 1961 (see Part VI.D.2.).0° 2 3


14-0000

in the fall of 1954 to ask whetlier ne knew anything about NOSENKO's
defecticn. Shewn KOLGSOV's photograph in Octcher. 1966, NOSENKO
innediately icentified Ain ‘as: KOSOLAPOV. a “4

aes
atiy Cin prepare

Toteccs, wien KessakO read if signed, corroborating its accu- |
racy. This protccol reads: | ; . aa
“I do not knew about this trip of KOSOLAPOV's to i 4
Helsinki in Novemker 1969, I do not know that he i 3

accompanied a cciz clerk back to Moscow at thut time.

be od

“Y wos KOSCLAPCV's direct supervisor from January $

1960 to January 13€2 anc would have to know and approve 4

any operaticrai cwravel by KOSOLAPSY outsice the USSR. 4

In the case of his trip in March 1960 to Helsinki te : “4
accompany Paul JE TR, I talked with him about it, and -
then approved after he wrote it, tne cable to the Hei- :

» Sinki rvesidenzura (Legal Residency) informing thei of j
his mis¢cic i course received ais report after” 4
the trip. i

1 2

' "Normaliy, I would know about iprvove this trip ‘ ?
in advance. If I were away at the ¢ , rormally I i j
would hava heard about the trip upon ry re EUurn. How= !

ever, I cont: rement anything about wiis in either

hetore or after nos CV's trip to leinxi- If ther i {
were further developments in this case, i certainly | '
would have known about them."* : r 4

a

(c) The Early 21960 TDY (JENNER _Case 3
| |

i

SENKO reminded Ais interviewer that he had travelled to
Cuba in November 1960. He was toid that CIA travel records
show that he trensitt ted Amsterdam cn a direct flight to Cuba
from Moscow on 15 November 1960, three days after KOSOLAPOV - panne ste
arrived in Helsinki. NOSENKO was then asked if he would have
learned of the trip in any case, whether or not he was in
Moscow, and he stated. that -he would have... 0. | :


14-D0800 |

NOSENYO was interrogated by CIA on the JENNER case on
15 February 1965. On the basis of this interrogation, a proto-
col was drawn up in question-and~answer form, incorporating
NOSENKO's reepenses, end cn 1% February 1965, NOSENKO signed «: :
the protecol, atteuting to its accuracy. ‘he following is taken ‘
from this signed statement: -

Question: Did you supervise the work against JENNER?

NOSENKO: Yes.

Question: Did you read the file oa JENNER? |

|

NOSENKO: I dont remember.

NOSENKO: Yes, I read materiais on JENNER, everything which

westion: Did you read re,orts on JEWNER? '

~ di

NOSENKO 1 ia JENUE |
cane into the section on JENNER and the other code '
clerks.

Question: Did you ever see JENNER personally?
NOSENKO: Yes. We had his enketa [visa application]. .
Question: What was the operational plan on JENNER?

NOSENKO: Sefore his arrival we had onty the anketa, nothing
more. He was listed as secretary/arcaivist, * and
there was a date on this anketa which was the date
he was dve to cross the’ Finnish border--the ‘middle
of the month, the 15th. It was the beginning of
_ 1960, not long after I had arrived in the First
‘lie, - 4s 6 Department. We decided to create an active opera-
: ; tion. We knew the date, and we thought he was to

¥ The position Of secretary/archivist at the U.S. Embassy in
_ in Moscow was usuezlly occupied by a code clerk, but as pre
:  whously stated, this was not true in. JENNER'S .case.


i
H
:
i
H
i
!
H

"Question:

NOSENKO:

be a code clerk, We wanted to send KOSOLAPOV to Hel-
- ginki with ‘the mission of returning with JENNER on: - |
the same train; during which time XOSOLAPOV was to

study his behavior. JENNER was young and so was
KOSOLAPOV. : . pee a
How old was JENNER at the time?

I don't know. We sent GRYAZNOV's agent, a ballerina,

to Vyborg as part of this operaticn. I think her
first name is Yeva, but I don't remember her last

- mame; her code name was "SOLISTKA"... She was placed

Question:
NOSENKO:

‘Question:

NOSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

’ NOSENKO:

-. Question: .

4

on the train in Vyborg as if she nad been visiting
someone there and was returning to Moscow. The main
idea was to place an agent near JENNER before he
even arrived in ‘ioscow. .We wrote a proposal to the
Chairnan of the KGB-giving the reasons for doing this.
We explained that we had usually only one year in
which to work. The agent "SOLISTKA” met JENNER and
spoke with him. KOSOLAPOV also became acquainted
with JENNER and spoke with him, but I can't say that
they were all speaking together at one time. She
gave JENNER a telephone number.

A KGB telephone number?

Of course not; it was her own telephone number, but
he didn't call her. We then noticed that he wasn't
working in the code room but in the mail room. 0O.K.,
that was interesting too. We waited one or two
months for the call to come, but nothing happened.
When JENNER once went to the railroad station or
airport alone to meet the couriers, we sent her with
GRYAZNOV by car in an attempt to have them meet
again. JENNER saw her but aid not approach [her].
Instead, he turned in the other direction. Only
later did we learn that he is a very quiet person.
There was nothing else on JENNER at all except a
suspicion that he may have been a homosexual, but
there was no proof. He was like a child.

How much time did you have between the time of the
anketa's arrival and the time of JENNER'S arrival?

A month, plenty of time to prepare.

A month?

-Well, approximately a month. The usual approval

from the Central Committee was necessary so that
KOSOLAPOV could go abroad. .

Who wrote this?

I prepared the kharakteristika’lofficial form) on
KOSOLAPOV for this TDY and gave it to the Personnel
Office. oy re :

JENNER?

Whose idea was it for this Helsinki operation against ‘

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aad eee

oe ha nndig anal hg Shao Creal oo

bidet.

a aman db ie

“> WOSENKO: —

‘Qeestion:

“ WISENKO:

fuestion:

BOSENKO:

‘Gaestion:

NOSENKO:

Question:

_ NOSENKO:

=“.

“It was the idea of ‘the group. |

“pid you advise KOSOLAPOV on: what his

before he left--what: he was to

Iwas discussing this case with GRYAZNOV and xOSO-

“role was. to be
do?

LAPOV, and maybe we discussed it with KOVSHUK on the

day. before KOSOLAPOV left.

Was “SOLISTKA" an experiencac agent?

She had been working before 19
for how long.

Who handled her before GRYAZNO
I don't know.

How did you coordinate this tr

- other units, for example, with

Directorate (FCD)?

KOSOLAPOV wrote a cable saying
for two or three days.

Did you approve this cable?

I didn't sign it, but I read i
to KLYPIN for his signature.
KOSOLAPOV took it to the Secon
FcD.

What cover did KCSOLAPOV use f
I don't remember.

What name did KOSOLAPOV use?

I don't remember if he used hi

“What other correspondence was

Correspondence?

60, but I don't know

Vv?

ip of KOSOLAPOV'Ss with =
the [KGB] First Chief

that he was coming
t, and then we took it

Once it was signed,
d [European] Department,

or this trip?

Ss own name or.another.

there?

What other cables or letters were sent'to or rev
ceived from the Helsinki Rezidentura {Legal Resi-

dency of the KGB] concerning this operation, KOSOLAPOV'S

trip?

Only this cable, nothing else.
cuss with the Rezidentura the

- : KOSOLAPOV was to dis-

possibility of obtaining

their help in Helsinki with the work against code
clerks, to seewhat agents they had, or. to study the

situation, the possibilities.

against the code clerks in hotels and restaurants,
' to use girls... TR

with whom was KOSOLAPOV to speak in Helsinki?

oY 4

‘We wanted to use agents

i
t
‘|
!
‘


14-p0600

” NOSENKO:.

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:
. NCSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO 3

Question:
: NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO?:

Question:
NOSENKO:

' Question:
"NOSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO:

He spoke with the Resident. and the teputy Resident.
He discussed this question with them.and they said.

oe Also on 15 February 1965 NOSENKO made the following addi-
: tional statement not included
> "SOLISTKA.

they would see about it, but we were told that the,
Residency has more important questions. - :

What was more important than the work against code
clerks?

They didn't tell us.

| eee epee tie»

at

Well, wasn't there some sign, some hint as to what
was so important?

sua

me

te

Coée clerks in Helsinki would be more important for
them; this-is the work of the FCP.

How did KOSOLAPOV know how to find JENNER, to. recog-
nize him and make costact?

Reatrarty cas copra er

KOSOLAPOV ‘had his photograph, knew his name, and
with the help of the Residency, I think, they found : i
out at the railroad station who was going on the

train. Then they bought a ticket on the same train : s
for KOSOLAPOV. We knew JENNER must cross on the ‘ i
15th. +

When did KOSOLAPOV leave for his trip to Helsinki? . i
I don't know. : i
When did he return?

I don't know, don't remember.

How long was KOSOLAPOV gone in all?

About one week, not more than one week counting
travel time.

How did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki?

By train, both ways.

was he alone on the way down or did someone go with
him?

How did you arrange for "SOLISTKA" to board the howe i

He was alone. an o, ; |
right train? : : aah

GRYAZNOV sent "SOLISTKA" alone to Vyborg and had the oo rp ofe,
local KGB:officers there meet her and place her on” | . i

the correct train. They knew the date and would  - we
establish the fact that KOSOLAPOV > was on that train

before Placing her aboard...

in the protocol: “The agent was
She was GRYAZNOV's agent even before 1960. GRYAZ-

NOV. briefed her for the. mission...” ROSOLAPOV wrote a. report. on


clap fRAS

tee

his: trip.

Nothing ‘nusual ’ ‘Or ‘interesting ’ ‘tn ite. ‘SOLTSTKA* also’

_ gave a report: to GRYAZNCY, “but there: was ‘Rothing: there, either.*

: NOSENKO was ‘questioned « on "20° ‘October "1966 ‘about’ his. respon- .
sibility for and knowledgeability of. KGB. operations against —
American code clerks.

He was required to give only brief answers, a

without discussion, to specific questions. The CIA questions. i

and his answers were as: follows:

Questio:

NOSENKO:

‘Question:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:
NOSENKO:

uestion:

NOSENKO:
Question:

". NOSENKO:

Question:

“«BQSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:
NOSENKO:

Dia you supervise all ‘code ‘clerk operations in 1960
and 1961?

Yes.

Were GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAP:V your subordinates during
this period?

Yes.

Kow many times did KOSOLAPOV travel to Helsinki in
order to travel to Moscow on the train with Ameri-

can code clerks?

I know of one.

When was that? Which one?

set abie th es tleteae tye

Don't remember. 15 March or April 1960,

Which code clerk?

ae eres

It wasn't a code clerk. When he arrived it was found i
that he worked with the mail. He came as a secre- i
tary/archivist and the First [U.S. Embassy] Section :
thought he is a code clerk. Found out later that he pos
worked on the mail.

ne ab te era

JENNER?

Yes.

Bo you know of any others?

No. What do you mean?

Only one? ; - . . a oe

Only one--JENNER.

Was the operation successful?

No it wasn't successful. But it. was interesting.
It was the first: “try to send an | officer ‘to Helsinkig®

aa

When ‘aia it happen? . oe _ Tose, en ar

- First part of: 1960. I think apeconinately: 15 March

or April.

* Other: than, the trip t to meet JENNER, did } KOSOLAPOV
make other" trips abroad?’ :

14-00000

oe te

eq
st
oa
=z
oa
2
1

NOSENKO:

vos : Helsinki, that he was going to Helsinki.:.-

\ oe . . x

"we went to Copenhagen to meet this couple ithe YOUNGERS)

and was in the United States at one of the General

, Assemblies. That's all. That was in the ‘50's. No.
_others. : ~ Ce a

‘Did KOSGLAPOV personally meet JENNER?
Yes.
Did you read his report of this meeting?

Yes.

on 26 October 1966 NOSENKO was shown the KOLOSOV photo-

the first time, the following discussion ensued:

Do you know the person in this photograph, number 17
[Vixtor Dmitriyevich KOLOSOV, empioyee of Vneshtorg,
born 19 March 1927 in Perm, USSR)? .

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim KOSOLAPOV, the former case officer

of First Chief Directorate, First Department. From-
'59, the end of '59, case officer of the First Depart-
ment, Second Chief Directorate.

We have information that a Viktor--
(interrupts) Vadim Viktorovich.

Anything else you want to say about the name?
KOSOLAPOV.

Concerning his travel to Helsinki by train in March
of 1960 under cover of Vneshtorg, does that mean
anything to you?

I was telling you that there was trip when he was
returning with Paul JENNER.

JENNER, the code clerk?

He was secretary/archivist, but he wasn't working as
a code clerk. He was working with mail. _ '

Well, according to official records he arrived in
Helsinki by train from.Moscow. so

mF
oes

“Yes.

Yoon

On the 3ist of March 1960.

TNS +

“mM

Yes. ae

And he went to meet JENNER, to come back on the
train with him. Right?

‘= was ‘thinking and I'm not sure. ‘60 or ‘61. I'm:
‘not sure. "G0 or '61. I'm not sure. I'm not sure

*60 or ‘61. I was telling '60, but i‘m net sure.
Anyway, I cannot tell exactly. I know he was in

eae tal
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A tne.

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_ Finnish Travel Manifests for 31 Haren anc! 2 April 1960 (See.

‘Part V.E.3. e.iii) ; an

31 March 1960 :

fatale O Geet ee

{

Lonticle watkastaji-te, yo ts Toperta jouee homme . 1

fore Tenske-Afouiste’?

| Keedcap Tertoleosc ee . Lm 4 :
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. Laspcatcea: - - Seren
8.12.26 | Jzezsam Jaeasua-tosr. alee (sort. vis.

syractritecores  |Rsgv.vits.)

‘ inemtaeand, Alses Tiltcla
. Udearpiatett, Golia _


st | - JUK SEGRE), .
se ate ALG RGR EA EE Mad 2 RRR REA TELS NE A

PEE DORR ES BEN RPE ETD “3 a

194. .

Question: It’s 1960. He made a trip in 1960, in March, to
Helsinki by train using this name, KOLOSOV, and us-
ing thig cover, Vneshtorg, and we also have a report
from official Finnish sources that he left Helsinki
by train on 2 April 1960 and went to Moscow. | “"\

NOSENKO: I don't remember the dates. Con't remember. Must
be 15 March or 1 April, 15 March or 1 April,

Question: No, he didn't arrive until 31 March. We have the
official record on his travel. We have his photo
here, which you just Saw.

<i eepeee merinentereae temyyetine
oe ee CSS et

NOSENKO: On the visa certificate, anketa, wich this picture i ‘ ‘
of Paul JENNER, it was sald tnat he must come; we : |
knew that he must come 1 April or 15 March, or some- -
thing of this kind. }

Question: But we have the official records showing KOLOSOV's,
or KOSOLAPOV's, arrival on 31 March.

NOSENKOtr I cannot give you any details. All T nave saic,
everything what I knew. If you need scmethinyg on
KOSOLAPGV, I will try to remember.

Question: The interesting thing is KOLOSOV, or KOSOLAPOV, left
Helsinki on 2 April. JENNER, Paul JENNER, according
to the same official sources, left Heisinki by train
to go to Moscow on the 3lst. Two days before.

NOSENKO: They were going in one train.

Question: They weren't even on the same train.
NOSENKO: Here, please, they were going in one train.
Question: KOSOLAPOV remained in Helsinki.

i NOSENKO=s (interrupts) KOSOLAPOV in one even carriage, in one
: even carriage with Paul JENNER, Then...

: Question: (interrupts) How do you know this for sure?

NOSENKO: I was reading his report after his coming. I was
reading also the agent's report of the female agent
who was put in this carriage, in this carriage in
this train, and at the station Vyborg, the first
Soviet station, Vyborg, where she was taken by

' GRYAZNOV, and was put in the same carriage, and she

: was acquainted with JENNER. And later, it was a
try, as I was telling, to show her to JENNER, but
JENNER didn't want to have a contact with her.
That's all. It was finished... And she was acquainted
with him and was speaking with JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV
himself was speaking with JENNER... I was reading
KOSOLAPOVts otchet [official account] about his [trip].

_ a Question: That's quite possible. It’s quite possible that they

- : gave you a report to read concerning this. But it .

ye, is a fact that official records show that the two men. +
_ were not on the same train. They were two days apart.

ry

SOSENKO : No (whispered).


WHS ZMZO: Ll don’t mow.
paella

** NOSENKO has mentioned

**#*GOLITSYN identified

Question: JENNER Jeft on the 3ist.

I dcoa't know. I don't know. Maybe
this is a mistake of Pannish officials. i cen’t
but he was on the same train and he was return-

know,
xi with Paul JENNER. The sare train,

ing from Helsir.
“te te TEL SLED.

The remaining information on KOSOLAPOV's TDY in early 1960

comes from other sources:

- After arriving in Moscow on 1 April 1960, JENNER
reported that he was acproached on the train from Helsinki
by two young Russians, “a bey anc a girl, probably uni-
versity students."* The two Russians struck up a conver
gation and were soon paiting him on the question of racial
discrimination in the United States. They said that they
might see JENNER in Moscow. About three months later, on
29 June, SENKER was performing his normal duty of escort
ing Enbassy couriers to Sneremetevo Airport when he was
again approached by the kussian girl, Yuli, who acted
surprised to see hin and asked him to go outside to talk.
Yuli explained that she was waiting to say goodbye to a
friend wno was leaving on a flignt to irkutsk (JENNER had
seen tne Irkutsk flight Gapart a half hour earlier) and
told JENNER that her male companion on the train trip to
Moscow, Yura, had returned to his studies in Vyborg.
Interspersed with yuli's questions concerning JENNER'Ss
impressions and personal activities in Moscow were others
about how often he came to the airport and how he liked
his job at the Embassy. When JENNER said he must leave,
she geve him her telephone number in Moscow and insisted
that he call her.** She advised JENNER that "it would be
better if you did not mention our conversation to anyone."

jon about his Soviet companions on
the Moscow journey, JENNER also told U.S. Department of
State security officials about sexual advances made Ly
his first maid in Moscow and about provocative clothing
worn by his second maid. (NOSENKO has not indicated that
either of these two women was u KGB agent, but has said
in another context that ail maids of American code clerks

were KGB agents or informants.)

ed that I. Ye. SERGEYEV, a
1 in Helsinki, contacted

~- Besides informat

- CIA investigations show
KGB officer and the Soviet Consu

the police chief there on 31 Mare
ance in locating an American named Paul F. JENNER who was

due to arrive in Helsinki the day before.*** SERGEYEV
explained that he had some "business" with JENNER, but he

¥—KOSOLAPOV was 32 years of age at the time.

several times that GRYAZNOV's agent
“SOLISTKA" gave JENNER her telephone number.

the Helsinki police chief as a Soviet

Intelligence agent from “about 1945 on.”

h 1960 to ask his assist-

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136.

did not specify its nature. Reportecly this was the first
time that SERGEYEV had made such a request cf the police
chief.?

tL

= CIA travel records sho: that GENNER arrived in Hel- a
sinki en route to Moscow on 3% March 1960 and ceparted Ly as
train the following day. KCSCLAPOV arrived in Helsinki F “
the same day that JENNER left, 31 March 1960, and remained : 3
there until 2 April 1969 when he too cepartec for Mosccw
py train. The Finnish train manifest for 31 March 1940
indicates that there was only cone passenger abcard the
daily train leaving Helsinki ior Moscow on this cate,
Paul JENNER, listed as a U.S. citizen and secretary/archi-~
vist. The manifest for 2 April 196C carries the name
Viktor KOLOSSOV (KOSCLAPOV) and shows that no Americar
citizens were aboard.

TEN a cmweiest

(d) The November 1960 TDY (GARLAND Case)

Apart from denying that it ever took place, NCSENKO has saic
nothing about a trip to Helsinki by KOSOLAZOV in November 1360,
but GCLITSYN said such a trip cecurred anc related it te an in-
cipient KGB operation against an American code clerk.

GOLITSYN was not posted to the KGB Legal Residency in itel-
inki until July 1960, i.e., ater KCSOLAPSV's first trip to
elsinxi, under the KOLOSOV alias. He has reported that at
about the end of 1960, about November or possibly ty the begin-
ning of 1961," the KGB Second Chief Directorate sent a telegvam
to the Helsinki Legal Residency. The teicgram advisec that an
American code clerk would arrive in Helsinki in tra.sit to
Moscow; the responsible case officer would te KOSCLAPOV, who
was being sent to Helsinki under an alias anc under Vneshtorg
cover; KOSOLAPOV was to strike up an acquaintance to be con- ;
tinued with the American in Mosccw. 4

i

2c ww

The following extracts are from the transcript of GOLITSYN's
further remarks on this subject in early 1962:

Question: You say that around November 1960 KOSOLAPOV came }
to Finland? ;

GOLITSYN: Came to Finland. \

Question: He came under cover?

GCLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Under a new identity? With an alias?

GOLITSYN: Yes, as an employee of Trade Union (Vneshtorg).
But, of course, there may be scme different dates.
Jaybe November. I suppose [believe] it was the
end of 1960 or it can be the beginning cf 1961.
And he waiting for some days, a week or so.

a ae

Question: In Helsinki? a .

Sh Similar request to the police chief was made by SERGEYEV
with regard to GARLAND (see below).

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Finnish Travel Manifest for 16 November 1960
(See Part V.E.3.c.4ii)

Passintariagbaja:

Voto yhikonat.

{yoink sd arta)

Vaintdcalan pata ao)

Keuttakuliau,.

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ash =

GOLITSYN: | Yes. Maybe. § four. days; Then we knew that the Aneri-.
’ ean Embassy took a ticket for him (the American. tar- |

Be 1...) get) for the train... _ And KOSOLAPOV took a ticket.
oR . . _ “ an the same.compartment. And before the departure

me : : we knew exactly from ‘the guide [conductor] of that
train that it’s the same person--[I'm not certain -
whether he was a} code clerk or not a code clerk*--
but his name, his real name. It was listed. And I
was at the railroad station at that time. I went = -)
to see off the delegation, the Soviet delegation. **

Question: See them off?

GOLITSYN: Yes, the delegation. And I asked him, KOSOLAPOV:
“Who is this perscn? I suppose [he is an) American?"
I suppose {believe} he said: “He's a fat man, a
young fat man."
wd ll

v

Question: The American? " 5

GOLITSYN: Yes. And I suppose [believe KUSOLAPOV said] bespecta- .
cled.*** " And KOSOLAPOV and these persons were .. . :
smiling and looked through the window before depart~
ure.

Question: In the compartment? The train compartment? :

GOLITSYN: Yes, and then this other person visited Helsinki from i
KOSOLAPOV's division [the U.S. Embassy Section, Ameri-
can Department, Second Chief Directorate].****

Qvestion: When was this?

GOLITSYN: It was in surmer or maybe September or so of 1961. Hy
And I asked him. I reminded him about his case...

. te
saraincins Shea pike oats

Question: Who was this? Do you remember?

GOLITSYN: I don’t remember because he changed his name. If
‘know him but I... And I asked him how fs that case
that I helped KOSOLAPOV with? And he did not want
: “ to discuss it. That's why I came tothe conclusion
ts that this case was a success. Otherwise he would
: have told [me]. And I am not sure but I can try to rec-
ognize this person in pictures. :

FM ke ait te tn
we eee Cattle cine

.

Question: You think that you could? a nS :
* When he first gave this lead, GOLITSYN identified the . hone

American as a code clerk.

#* GOLITSYN was not asked details ofthis delegation. There
were eight Soviets, including KOSOLAPOV, on this train.

*&* KOSOLAPOV's description does not fit John GARLAND; it is,
“*. however, a fairly accurate characterization of Paul JENNER.

#4*® NOSENKO has not mentioned this TDY, and the. KGB officer
j ‘remains unidentified


mr 4 Little of one of ny

\ GOLITSYN: Yes, proka bl ly.
; friends.

Question: He looks a little like your friend?

GOLITSYN: Yes.

Question: Which one? KOSCLAFOV? -
GOLVTSYN: No, no, TAis American

She Finnish raisroiad mon
from Helsinki to Moscow or
cf eight Soviets shear 3
only American, OG2KLAnG
Sinki on 14 Nove: :
the duties of supervai
the U.S. Encessy.

i
ano) Nasco to assume
au: Grsortinent f¢ode room in

et. SERGEYRY 9

‘.k police c
cumex 1GE9 €
arsive there on

Ag he had wath
the KGh i. Biden,
(and KGS accent, according to
help in locating GARLAND. &
14 hovemcer.

£
é

GARLAND wos first Interviewed : the i bassy
Security Officer an Moscow ian cemnection swith the » GOLITSY% lead
on 17 June 1962. In this interviow © denied having mec
any Soviet of KOSCLAP iV & physical ior during the Hel-

Sinki-to-Moscow train trip and iso having ever been

spproached by Soviet Lntellicen: July 1963 Garth 2
nterviewed by the rel eens rx PETE
s ate r CE

was

-NOSENKO on 28 Jenuary 1964 identified 20 Americans em-
ployed by the U.S. Embassy in Moscow «ho were of interest to
‘the KGB because they were suspect intelligence officers or
agents, or because they feli into some other category of in-
terest to the KGR. He gave a short statement concerning each
. of these 20 persons. One of them was CARLAND, aout whom
a NOSENKO said: "code clerk, but.nothing doing.’ NCSENKO was
: -." asked on 2 September 1964 to ceview this list for the purpose |
- O£ supplying any additional inforination re might have concern- .
‘"ing the individuals named, NOSENKC srared:: “As with all ccée
- clerks, they were studying him (GARLAND) in. order to. gather
“enough material to make a recruitment. The case officer was
-KOSOLAPOV. I don't remember the names or descriptions of any
agents, and I didn't heer of any derogatory information. As
-. far as I know, there was no operatacral. approach and no re-..
2, @rudement.," Although he could not recali whether he had read’
“the KGB file on GARLAND or noc. NOSENKO on 15 February 1965 said:
he thought that he must. have read. current materials” concerning
GARLAND as they came into the U.S. Embassy Section.: NOSENKO —
also said that. there was ro operatrona! plan drawn up for GARLAND -
“because the KGB ‘had no derogatory information whatsoever corncern-
ing him. NOSENKO has not provided additional’ ‘information con-=:
: cerning GARLAND, - whom: he -had presumably never. seen, and was un:

a

tended

hasheiobdy, Mishacittind


14-0500;

to recall any background information concerning GARLAND or any -

199,

details on his travels and Acquaintances, while stationed in Hos-—
cow. rr er Era wep Z Pa :

In the context of discussion of KOLOSOV/ROSOLAPOV" travels :
to Helsinki, NOSENKO's interrogator pointed out on 26 October one :
1966 that CIA was aware of a second trip there which NOSENKO had ee:
not reported. The following is a transcript of this portion of ae
the discussion on that date:

Question: Well, we started to look for other trips by KOSO-
LAPOV, or KOLOSOV, and we did run across another
trip, again by KOLOSOV, using the same alias.

NOSENKO: To Copenhagen?
Question: No. This’was a trip to Helsinki.

NOSEKKO: Oh, I don't know. Maybe after, after ‘61 maybe.
I don't know--'62, '63, I don’t know.

caidas tad dati Se

Question: No, this was in 1960. When you say you were in
the First (U.S. Embassy] Section, First [American}
Department, Second Chief Directorate. He was on
the train, according to cf£ficiai records, on 16 Noven-
ber 1960, going from Helsinxi to Moscow.

pet eee te ha ibd ed ee le,

NOSENKO: I know about one, he has took trip, when he was re-
turning from Helsinki with Paul JENNER.

Question: We looked at everybody else, all the other records
; concerning this train trip tu see who was on the
train with KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV. KOLOSOV was the
name he used.

essed Cpt isk te,

NOSENKO: Yes?

Question: We found there was one American on that train with
* KOLOSOV going from Helsinki to Moscow.

NOSENKO: Yes? And his name? If it is not secret, if you can
say, of course?

Question: One of your targets, an American code clerk.

NOSENKO: He was, I know, going from Helsinki, only with Paul :
a JENNER. ;

Question: You don't know this man's name?

ne ee

NOSENKO: (silence) .
Question: Well, we. checked © further and we found::6ut ‘that . re a
> GOLITSYN: had told us about a trip. : .

When he was returning from Heisinki’ with Paul JENNER?
GOLITSYN was then out, yes?® ‘ ,


14-0000 *

NOSENKO:

-Question:.

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKQ:

“Question:

NOSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO: -

Question:

, ,
NOSENKO:

Question:

_Yes, I understand. And KOSOLAFOY must tell him about: —

This is not Paul JENNER. This is a different time

Ho. There wasn't such a one...’

him. ‘There was a study of him, yes, but there wasa't

GOLITSYN told us that KOSOLAPOV was travelling to,
Helsinki to meet .a cede clerk in November..1960.
You understand what I'm telling, you? yo

the code clerk, but we found out that Paul JENNER i3 an
not a code clerk when he began to work at the Embassy. ar

of year--

(interrupts) When he began to work in Embassy.

This is not March 1960. This is November 1960. A
different time. It's the sane year, but a different
time.

I know only about his trip when he was returning with
Paul JENNER. .

Well, how do you explain that this man, who's suppesed
to be under your supervision in the Embassy Section,

is aboard this train with this American code clerk, i
one of your targets, in November 1960?

I know only about one trip [by] KOSOLAPOV to Hel-
sir%é, when he was returning with Paul JENNER, about
whow he was thinking also that he was a code clerk.
Yes.

KOSOLAPOV or KOLOSOV was not on the same train with
SVENNER, We have the names; we have the facts; we
have the official records. We also have GOLITSYN's
information about November 1960. GOLITSYN went with
KOSOLAPOV to the train station to see him off.

i
‘
i
i
4
:

He must. He was working as a case officer of counter-
intelligence, of the Fourteenth Department. Of course
he must, of course he must. And KOSOLAPOV must speak
with him.

KOSOLAPOV spoke with GOLITSYN, and KOSOLAPOV rode
with this American code clerk from Helsinki on the
train back to Moscow. Sut GOLITSYN was not in Hel-
sinki when JENNER was there. It wasn't JENNER.

enti

Witn Paul JENNER I know, but I don't know of anybody Y
else... You are giving me such a big bluff. I don't :
know, I don't know, I don't know.

It's no bluff. Do you have any idea who this other
code clerk was?

Well, I'll tell you who it was... Did you ever hear
the name GARLAND? toes pet .

Yes, I heard GARLAND. And there wasn't any approach
made to GARLAND. There wasn't any attempt to recruit

recruitment or something else... — oop tte

(a) Introduction

juch reliable and sensitive information that, with the assist-~.

: “€rom the Moscow Embassy while the latter was visiting Warsaw. ~

‘order to obtain further compromising materials on this American.

KG8-Polish UB Activities Against MORONE. . -

In 1961 CIA iearned from a Polish source who furnished

ance of its Polish counterpart, the Office of Security (UB),

the KGB in November 1960 began using a female agent against : :
Joseph MORONE, a U.S. Department of State cede clerk assigned os
to the American Embassy in Moscow in August 1360. The woman Co
accompanied MORONE on a train trip from Moscow, became inti-

mate with him in Warsaw, returned tc Moscow twice in February

1961, and there had sexual relations with him, The compromising

scenes of MORONE and the Polish UB agent were photographed.

This information cn the KGB operation was received by CIA soon

after the woinan's second visit to Moscow. On the basis of this

report, MORONE was interviewed and polygraphed in Oslo in May

i961, and he was transferred to Lisben from Moscow in August

1961. .

NOSENKO gave'a few details on the same case, without men-~
tioning the name of the KGB target, during the 1962 meetings in
Geneva. In 1964 and 1965 he furnished more particulars on the
MORONE case, identifying three KG agents (besides the Polish
female) who participated in the operation, NOSENKO, however,
said that two cf them added no information of us2 to the KGB
against MORONE, and that he was unable to remember what the third :
agent reported: statements by other sources indicate that re- i
garding MORONE all three agents could have acquired information i
of operational potential for the KGB. NOSENKO has not reported,
as have other sources, that. a fourth KGB agent named Ella UMANETS
was in contact with MORONE, or that the KGB officer SKVGRTSOV~~
posing as MICHAUD--was with MORONE at America House on at least
one occasion, the night when STORSBERG says he was approached
by the KGB (see above). NOSENKO has ccnfused the MORONE case
with another by saying that a fifth XGB agent was directed
against MORONE, whereas she was apparently directed against the
American code clerk ZUJUS (see below). The sensitive source of
the original report on MORCNE stated that a KGB officer "VOLODYA"
“QWiladimir, last name unknown) personally met the Polish female
agent when she arrived in Moscow, and NOSENKO said that the
KGB officer was his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO at first
claimed a KGB photographic technician supporting the case re-
ported to him, but he retracted this remark after CIA shawed

bey ata
ceswewheds seece dela

Gace

hatin phanion Beste

‘him that travel records on NCSENKO made it impossible for the

technician to have spoken to him as he described. According to
NOSENKO, MORONE was reassigned from Moscow before the KGB could.
take further steps against the code clerk, and he speculates
MORONE's transfer was prompted by American authorities' concern
over his relationship with one of the KGB female agents.

llc ditetboes

‘(b) NOSENKO's Information

At his first meeting with CIA on.9 June 1962 NOSENKO made
a passing reference to an operation in which he had placed a
female agent of the Polish service in contact with an American

Later, NOSENKO said, he brought the same female to Moscow.in-..- ~... 5

ow .


14.00000 ""

Asked on 11 June 1962 whether he had had foreign agents
working against the U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO described his. having
introduced the idea-of using such agents to :develop-Americans.”.
-afraid of contacts with Russian girls. .He said that he himself .
had several of these third-national ‘agents, that he sometimes
would ask the German and Polish services to supply him with
agents, and that it was unnecessary for him to explain their :
intended use in operations against Americans. NOSENKO then | :
gave an example: “Listen, the serazants [enlisted men] who -- .,
lived in America House had a custom--it was to? far to go-to ,
America, so where did they go to rest fon leave]? To Finland
or Poland. Why Poland? Because they can find wonen there, the
rate of exchange is gOod, and so ou. What do we do? We planted
a female Polish agent [on an American} in Poland. Then she
comes to Moscow. We arranged a chance meeting, anc things de-
veloped. Once two guys, a Marine guard and a coje clerk went to
Warsaw, They were cn leave for a weex and a half. We knew
when they would be coing. I mace an imrediate phone call to
Warsaw. ‘Give me a woman,’ I said. ‘Geta gced whore for me
there, a pretty one but not one who strikes the.eye particu-
larly.' Well, they vent me such a girl. And I placed this
Polish agent on the same train, in the same car, even in the =~ noes
same compartment. ‘The train left. One of the Americans, the —
one in whom we were particularly interested, the code clerk,
wanted the girl and there, in the compartment, shey went to bed
together wh le the other American slept. I toid the Poles in
arsaw to give the girl an apartment and to get photographs.

They arranged an apartment and he came there. Everything was
O.K. After a week and a half he returned to Mescow, We did
not rush things. A month passed. Two months. Let's not rush,
I said. A half a year went by. I insisted thet nothing further
may be done any earlier. Then 1 said, ‘All right, let's give
him this girl, this Pole.' She arrived [in Moscow} and they met
one another. I created the conditions: we created the condi-
tions. They slept with one another once, twice. A [Soviet]
girlfriend showed up. The same thing. And he also began to
sleep with the girlfriend. Tne Pole left and he was with this
wRussian, and she was our agent. You see, first the boys are.
afraid of Russians. But (we gave hin] a Pole and then transe
ferred him te a Russian.”

sf

acy

6 a et EA Mee

Bg

Rua ye

3

NOSENKO stated on 1 February 1964: “I remember we were
working on one of the members of the guard of the American Em-
bassy, who was going to Warsaw for a good time, for a few days’
relaxation.* We wrote to our advisors [XGB officers attached
‘to the Polish UB] to do éverything possible--to get a pretty
Polish girl for the fellow and to photograph any intimate
scenes. The Poles introduced the guard to the giri, they did
have intimate relations, but they gave us photographs without ~ Lown
any intimate scenes. Just how they are sitting togéther, how
he is kissing her--that's all. Well, we got these photographs
and some time went by and then we asked that the: Poles send - . '

us this Polish girl so that she could meet him in Moscow. They.

|The guard referred to is Frank BEGGS, a marine enlisted man —
. whe accompanied MORONE to Warsaw. The. facts, however, seem
to relate to MORONE, who has described his enctunter with
the Polish girl and her subsequent recontact in Moscow.
.., BEGGS has also reported (see below) that: MORONE met a Polish
" girl/on ‘the train to Warsaw and that: she-later contacted.him
*.- $m Moscow: BEGGS has denied that. he, himself, was. contacted .
“ by any such girl in the Soviet: Union after the trip to Warsaw
with MORONE. : ee a nn?


1400000 “yt ws t,

Coe 5 UP

we setts debs.

' *ROSERKO “has 3igo mentioned a” prior Lbitios on racrurtment
attempts Guring the 1959 pokolr iki exhibition perause of the
need to avoid incidents afii Rance ts, Bu SOV LEG fed at Lor ships.

GOLTTS Sect told, CIA af. such. aspre

employee’ in, ‘i560 “Beclause i di 3 ;
. JEISENECWER®. to ‘the: Sovi md ’ Ma Le t a .

. We -2Soviet- relations. deter Loratcd.s.
*. 1960 and most of 1961 they remained? very s
‘pressures and hard lines: ‘ct lminated, Ln th
wali ‘building in. Beri 5


\. working against MORGNE was ROSEREO' s “Gubors: nat @ and Specials

ist in tode clerk operations, KOSOLAPOV:.: KOSENKO read the file

On MORONE and saw his visa. photograph, but he never saw him in..

__ person and so could not provide a physical descripticn. “NCSENKO

.. had discussed the MORONE case with KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV on a. ~
number of oceasions.

BOSENKO said that the KGB agents working on MCRONE were:

- Svetlana IVANOVA , a maid or waitress at America —
House who reported to DEMXIN, the case officer responsi-
ble for Americans living there, on everything she saw or
heard concerning MORONE. KOSOLAPGY visited her several
times with DEMAIN to discuss MORONE, and ‘ioSEN"O hinself
met her once or.twice in cre of the twe sate apartments : ;
that DEMKIN had at his cispssal. NCSENFO did act recall! og
any specific infermation on MORONE which was interestin
or useful from this source.

- Eee 2g DE an Egyptian encleved at the
Egyptian Libassy who was an agent of the Sixth (Under-
Geveloped Countries) Departeent of the *G3 Secen4a Chief :
Directorate rae visited ‘America House and met MORON,
but he dic not report anything of value vhat NOSENKO re-
membered.

wil holdl

Han

r

we he bedbetes wae lactone Te

~ Ons of two East German females imported for use

against the inhabitants of America House. In early i960
GRYAZNOV went te Hast Beriin to obtain two Cernan women ‘
who could be used for this purpose. The tirst of these i

a was Hanna, blonde, documented a3 a West German travelliag 3

to Moscow. NOSZNKO never met her but instructed PREIS-. _ 3S
FREUND (see the STORSBERG case) to taxe her to America” .
Eouse and leave her on her own. Hanna went several tines
to America House in 196], but NOSENKO can recall nothing
that she ray have repcrted on MORONE. The other East Ger-
man girl was documented as an Austrian. NOSENNO never
met her but recalled that she was asked fer her cocuments
at America House on her first or second visit there. She
replied that she had left them at her hctel, left America
House, and never returned. NOSENKO did net remember the
time when this incident occurred, beyond the fact that he
was still in the U.S. Embassy Section and that ABIDIAN

' a was the Embassy security officer at the time.* : :

army an Italian Seg at the Anerican
’ Embassy and KOSOLAPOV's agent,’ reported everything he ‘

heard or saw about Americans to KOSOLAFOV. NOSENKO re- ;
had said about MORONE

-_ called nothing specific that

: * CIA has no information concerning such an incident in 1960-

: : 1961, but the circumstancés described by ‘XOSENKO seem to

i: . : apply to those surrounding a relationship between a woman

! : named Lillian (last name not known) and the military code
Clerk ZUJUS. These details are given in Part V.E.3.c.(v).

, Im anylevent, the incident involving Lillian occurred after

the date when NCSENKO says he was transferred from the U.S.

:- Embassy Section. At the time, Hugh MONTGOMERY rather than.

ABIDIAN was. the Embassy Security Officer :

wee


.-From one of these agents, or possibly in some other man-
“ner, the KGE learned that MORONE was planning to goon leave |
to Warsaw. NOSENKO, KOSOLAPOV, and GRYAZNOV thereupon 2ecided
to employ a Polish female agent in an attempt tc compromise his.
KOSOLAPCV wrote the draft of the cperationa!l plan for the attezpt,

which was approved by GRIBANOV after some editing by NCSENKO : |

and KOVSHUK, chief cf the section. ZGSGLAPOV next met with a. a
Polish UB counterintelligence officer in KGB Headquarters to :
Giscuss the pian. The Fole was tcid that the target was a U.S.
Exbassy employee, but not that he was a code clerk; this fact
was deliberately kept from the Foles.

aconccal ES

As a result of this meeting, a Polish girl was obtained
by the Polish UB and sent to Mosccw ky train. Upen her arrival
she was met by KCSOLAPOV, who tcor her to a Moscow hotel, where
he gave her instructions concerning mer role in tne operation.
The girl was told to mect MGRULH on the train, flirt witn hin,
have him fail in love with her, continue the association, and
Study him. She was to teil him that she had becn in Moscow as
@ guest ef her uncie, a member ‘of the volishn Trade Representa-
tion in Moscow, an? that she could test him ayain on her next

visit.

sae ath i's oa Ca Ea baibives

Arrangenents wore mace wi Ocerational Technical
Directorate for a technician ec tn ine crain in the
compartrent next to that of MOF BEGGS ind for av.aio and
visual (but not photegsaphic)

and BEGGS left Moscow. :
succeed in making NORONE's :
rom the Operaticnal Teciaical

9 the day after the train

NOSENKO did not recall wh

The Polish agent did, hevever,
acquaintance, and the technici
Directorate reporte2’ pack to NOS

reached Warsaw.* The technician told } KO the girl had en- :
cased in sexval intercourse durin: the The technician —
also reported that the tape recordings othtaincd were of pos

quality.
* Because the KGS still lacked ccmpromising materials, KCSO-
LAPOV prepared a paper requesting that the girl again be brought
+o Moscew and permission to acquire compromising photegrephy
during her visit. The requests were approved by higher KGB
authority. When the girl arrived, KOSOLAPOV met her alone and
_ took her to the Hotel Peking, to a specially equipped room. ;
‘fhe girl called MORONE at Ancrica Hause, and MORONE subsequently ' |
visited her in the hotel room two or three times, during which jl
photographs were taken. These were placed in the KGB's file on
“MCRONE. He Gid not fall in love with the girl, as the KGB had 4
‘hoped, and she had no further contacts with hin. . . :
$
4

oeerenereene weentaprmerteese

* CIA travel records show that NOSENKO transitted Amsterdam on
1960-on a throush flic!

igh? ce: T. aa ¥ 3

retorn oon uma approximareiy 11 Lecezrer 1360, When told
this, NOSENKO stated that instead of talking to the teche::

- mician himself, he may have read the report and seen the film

., strips after his return. . ;

1 *

cow to Cubs

ds

wi


206.

“although the KGB had. the. compromising photography, it was-
felt that there were insufficient materials for a recruitment
approach tio MCPOME. The KGB wanted to trap him in the apart- ;
ment of a Soviet woman, to catcn him in something that is defi- ~~
nitely prohibited. For this purzose, Svetlana IVA.OVA (see
above) was supposed to lure MORCNE into the city, but befcre

anything further cozld be done, the Americans ordered MORONE
out of Moscow before the end of his tour, possibly because they
were concerned about his association with IVANOVA. Therefore,
NOSENKO said, the KGB made no operational approach to MORONE
and no recruitment of him.

~via

{c) Infornmaticn from Cther Sources |

A sensitive Polish source reported in 1961 that on 8 Novem-
ber 1960 a Polish female, an experienced English-speaking agent
of the Polish UB, arrived in Moscow wnere she was met: by a KGB
case officer named "VOLODYA." She stayed at the Hotel Warsaw
in Moscow. The ¥GB case officer, apparently from the American
Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, on 10 November
1969 pointed MORONE out to this agent at a railroad station in
Moscow. Under KGB instructions, the Folish female met MORONE
on the train te Warsaw, wnere intimacies began. In Warsaw on 4
12 November 1960 she was quite friendly with MORONZ, but pur- . j
suant to instructions, she refused all overtures to engage in 3
intimacies. The next day she took MORONE to a Polish UB safe- ’
house suitably prepared for clandestine photography, and reveal- .
ing photographs of an intimate nature were taken of MORONE 2 .
and herself. The female agent again travelled to Moscow on : . :
5 February 1961 and stayed at tne Peking Hotel. Further com-
promising photographs were taken of her and MOPONE on this
trip. The female agent travelled to Moscow a third time and
on 12 and 13 February 1961 more photographs were taxen of her
and MORONE.

ta ape atittvwisbian Satta.

ttaathh cates

woe et a yg, eter aT eee

GOLITSYN was questioned on the basis of this lead on
16 February 1962:

4 Question: Do you know anyone in the American Department of
the Second Chief Directorate who worked against the
American Embassy and used the name "VOLODYA?"

rare wee naetepliiin Sioa

GOLITSYN: Yes, I know CHURANOV. He worked at one time against . \
; the U.S. Embassy. Later he worked against.the .- ;
British Embassy and later he was sent to Denmark..

Question: When was he sent? Do you know?

7
i
a
i

GOLITSYN: It was in '57 until probably '60... I suppose that
ee : he will continue to work now in the First Chief
eo Directorate. He. transferred there, from the Second...’

Question: Do you know anyone who used the name “VOLODYA" in
the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow in the fall
of 1960?

GOLITSYN: There is another person. It is [Vladimir Ivanovich].
; i. . PETROV. He is the employee of the American Department,
Second Chief Directorate who works against the Ameri~ .
:).e@an Embassy. He evidently knows English. ...and he -
~ worked in the American Department. I. know him and I
* met him in 1960. He was. Chief of the American Section
' the Embassy Section... Coe, : aera


14-0000. “+.

atthe

rn oo. es a Be
~ Question: Well, in VOLODYA, itr. “interested in a KGB case: offi-: :
mo ao cer whe Would be working agai mat merican code clerks ©
eS Te ‘.. , am the’.fall o£. 1960, er
wes : GOLITSYN: Yes he (PETROV) is the chief of this section, That. -
~ ~~ ds why. te in the Chief o. this section where GRYAZNOV
Works. GOLITGYN hed carlier ifentified GRYAZNOV as
a code clerk specialist in th? U.S. Embassy Gection.]

Question: And GRYAZHOV is unde: nin?

GOLITSYN:s Yes, he wis an assistant at ene time, but is not
{new], and then there was the resrqanization and he
became a little “liguidated" {dowigraded in position).

In an October 1962? interview, foilowing his withdrawal from
Moscow, MORONE stated that ha had travelled with Frank BEGGS
Warsaw on 12 Nevember 1960, On the train he saw a polish girl
cutsice their comnartment and asned her wast languages she spox?
Later she entered his compartment, and when he tried to engage
in sexual relations with her, she slapped his face. A day or
two after they arrive in Warsaw, the girl c untacted him at his
hotel, and he went to her reom where they ud sexual relations,
According to MORONE, he had sexval relations with at least two
other women while in Warsaw. He cad EGGS returned to Moscow
without incident. On 6 february 1961 th: Falish girl from the
train called him at America House, and the following day he
visited her in her room at the Peking Hotel, where they had
several drinxs and sexual relations. On tiis occasion or earlier
the girl told him that she had an uncle in Moscow, MORONE Lad
den:ed being approached or reeruited hy Soviet Intelligence, a

statement which was supported by a polygraph examination admini-
stered in 1961. (Further details on this interview of MORONE
are inserted in a later paragrach contuining information from
MORONE's associates in Moscow.)

pitea aden diebatal Bhs,

‘
3
4
i

The Marine guard BEGGS has cenfirmed MORONE's account in
general, with the exception that he hus stated that the two
travelled to Warsaw on 13 Noverker 1966 and that, after meeting
the Polish girl on the train, MORONE and she got into the lower
bunk in their train Cor a Ee They arrived in Warsaw on

oy 14 November and returned the 20 BEGGS had heard from MORONE
. : that the latter had been recon vasted by the Polish girl in Mos-
OO cow in Pebruary 1961.

The U.S. military code cork STORSBEAG'haw’ xépocted that
MORONE was acquainted with "Michel MICHAUD" (SKVOPTSOV}), who
laid some groundwork | for the KS B approach to STCRS2ERG in the

, win Fenrasiy 1555) NOSENKO said that SKVORTSOV undoubtedly met
other Americans on his visits to America House, but he did. .
‘not remember who they were. He added that the KGB would not.
be interested in SKVORTSOV's contacts with other code clerks
because "we told him not to squander his forces, to concen~
erate | on. Jim [STORSBERG} . Jim \ was his target Bor

ae


Pe en ee

MOSCKE's Yellow code clerks and residents of Anerica House
have deseribed him as a heavy dvinker, a heavy gambler, and a
Jadies' ran. Various reperts indicate that 7 involved
in a currency-speculation ring operated by Aes SENG CA
KGB accent mentioned by lcs Q,,and MOPONE his confirmed tnat,
on at least cone occasion, Se TH arranged the intreduction of
MGRGNE and other code cler i

tions with cne cf them in Wa, )s Apartment in the syring of
1962.

eperen

iE was also said to be a clese friend cf the Embassy
E Bidentified by ‘ics:

as Sat oor KO as an agant cf KOSO-
LArOV, bun act ticned by himvin connectign with the MORONS
ceration. (MORKONE admitted that along with other Americans,
he ~ade it a common practice to purchase rubles illegally from
Yor ‘One report states that" ae asked a Marine guard to
uésiver blachmarket rubles ts MORU.: he ,svace Department

code reom, & restricted arca to which

number cf reports indicate thac MORONE wab "sexually intimate
with Svetlana IVANOVA, CEMXIN's ageat, and with Ella UMANDTS,
another ECS agent at America House identified by NOSENKO but
not menticned by him in cenrecticn with MORONE. (MORONE denies
having had relations with NOVA bui said that he told his
friends that he had been intimate with her. He said, however,
that he knew both IVANOVA and UMANETS well and that he had onc2
asked IVANOVA toarrange dates for him.and another code cierr
with two Russian females. IvaAtova did, and sexual relations
ensted. MORONE has also itted sexual relations with a nun-
ber of weren from varicus Western embassies in Moscow.)

Shad no access. a

woe Te neta te eat nee

o Eoviet females. MOROVE had rela-

wand

sential isiies Ceciialisialin..

catsemeeen,

3
4
i
1


TR EER IT IIa EERE BARRE SS. STR sg

BE Raa Re the “cain agent" in the KGB devclopnental opera-

OEE RED

Develconenta
Introduction
‘NOSENKO reported that he perscaaily recruited and handled

U.S. Arny Sergeant Matthew Peter ZUJUS, althaugi

the officer responsible for the ZUJUS case. a
a HA military orficer posted to Moscow for training, «© -
was used only in tais operation, bur NOSENKO continued to meet.
him even after transferring from the U.S, Embassy Section to

the Tourist Departrent. While being interrezited in February
1965, NOSENKO said that @@h could vovch for his bona fides,

and he stiggested that Cla approach 2 ™ for this purpose.

tion agi
GRYAZNOV was

2ZUJUS arrived in Moscow in Septezber 1961 to assune
tho military code clerk duties of STORSBEXG (see above),
and he remained there until January 1963, After initially
confusing ZUJUS with James KLYSERS**, NCSENKU first described
the KGB operation against hin in February 1964, According
to NOSENKO, neither BND nor any other source supplicd sig-
nificant information to the KGB, and the GB therefore did not
attempt to recruit WWJUS, Claiming not to know the nanes of
MGB agents besides ata: who particigated in the opsration,
NOSENKO nevertheless@in other contexts has mentioned two
fenale agents who reportedly associated with zuJUS. One is
Ella UMANSTS, the other an East German woman posing as an
Austrian. NOSENKO indicated the latter was in contact with
MORONE (see above}, whereas it is clear chat ZUJUS was the
Ancrican code clers who met this woman, .The date that she
and ZUJUS were together, however, falis dusing the suaner
of 1962 when, NOSENSO said,he was no loiger engaged in
operations against the U.S. Embassy.
(>) Information from NOSEXKO

The first reference by NOSEXKO to. the ZUJUS case was
made on 2 February 1964:

NOSENKO: With respect to ZUJUS, I'}] tell you exactly what we
tried to do with him because I spotted this in some
notes, This mistake [confusion of KEYSERS and 2UJUS]
nade me so mad. I completely forgot about ZUJUS
until I saw my little note. In 1901 1 recruited a

wad Ww EMASCUS, “SRE Hees meee
hs 3

= S e go ce artorme:
corres _-+ .quainted with ZUJUS. The reason why they had some-
thing in common was that sometime earlier ZUJUS had
been stationed in Lebanon and the Syrian himself was
from Damascus, which is a relatively short distance
away.;, Here js, his name. He wrote it out hinself.
Ee * and he wrote out his own address

ac

venworat hte abanantalten «

ede

Hohe bed seeded ne

enbnctebansasiiagienue abe


14-0000

RAS ae SE

here {on one of the notes NOSEDSKO brourht with hin
to the meeting]. We did not work with nin, and we
retired the case to fmehives, and did not turn him
over to anyone. He “ea eae a Bae ‘an
is ery fe EN pA nae se i iA I

1 AE Ath ER U oy a Cand the “
beginning of 1962. And when T was ‘leaving Moscow :
to come here for the Disarmament Conference in 19462

I turned him over for contact to GrYAZNOVY, I said

goodbye to hin and he was scheduled to Leave the

USSR permanently in April, back to Syria.

Fi
4
4
i
4
}
4
3

Question: Whet did you do against ZUJUS? | , }

NOSINKO: Nothing at all. He ea was merely studying
and devloping him. During the conversation [at
Americr House} they even spoke of how nice it
would be to have some Lebanese vedka, and we
speciaily had some shippped in from the [KGB Legal]
Residency {in Beirut], and the Syrian brought
it to ZUJUS saying it had come from Lis friends.
ZUJUS by character is a very quiet, uncexcitable,
calm person... Nothing disturrs him.

Oi
» over to the First Chief
or

Question: Why didn't you turn
Directorate?

NOSENKO: There was no reason for this because he was a

e ps a If we were to turn him over to
anyone EPC have been to the GRU. But we
decided to hell with it and put the case into
our Arehives.

Question: Dice ray soo @BJUS when you fecruited hin?

NOSENKO: ‘No, he didn't hardly know anyonc--even by nene. :
So we showed him phutofraphs. end wren he said
that he had met ZUJUS. then we directed him to
develop 2UJUS and not to pay attention to any~
one else... If you want to approach him you
can use ny name, simply Yuriy Ivanovich.

NOSENKO then proposed a false-flag recruitment
whereby a CIA representative would approach u 4
that he was from the KGB. A year later NOSENKO
that if C1lA talked to Pe the latter would be able to :
{ vouch for NOSENKO's bona tides. an

Speaking of his own agents on 20 April 1964, NOSENKO
said: er sm. ..1 took with nie, even though I had
transferre @ Seventh {Tourist| Department [in January
1962]. But it had been decided that no ore else knuw him ; - j
from the First [American! Department; it. would have taken . :
some time before anyone would get used to him. But he was
already working in the development of .ZUJUS. So they [the
First Department] said that they were asking me to continue
meetang with him, and they were counting on my cooperation.
They also promised to speak to CHELNOKOV [Chief of the
Seventh Department] so that I would not have to stop [j
meetings with ZUJUS."

on
Lape Bodin tnecbs

1 +

TOP SECRET

stew we MATINEE Le ott 9 ane a RI OLE EEA ER ARIE sll Nn ent om

Faeooop 1, § ~

wer

ee

*

: when reviewing lists of enpioyzes of the U.S, Exbassy: . .:
between 1260 and 1961, NOSENKO cn 19 September 1964 iden- —:
tified ZUJUS 3s STORSBERG's replacecent and said that the
case officer working agaigst hin was. GRYAZNOV. fie said that
his (NCSENKO's) agent SER vas working, against ZUJUS, but
that he did not know the names of other agents involved, nor
of any unusual or interesting inforrnation ccncerning his,
although he had read the Second Chief Directcrate file on
ZUJUS. There was no information on LUJUS froa KGB micro-
phones, telsphone taps, or surveillance. The KGB, NOSENKO
stated, did not make an operaticnal approach to ZUJu
and did not recruit hin.

KOSENKO reported on 2 february 1965 that he hiaself ;
had supervised GRYAZNOV's handling cf the cpeyation and :
personally handled the main agent, a aire NOSENKO 4
read ali current reports on LUJUS as They Ca.2 into. the : 4
U.S. Exbassy Section, and he discussed the case with : 3
GRYAZNOV, KOSOLAPGV, DEMKIN (the case offices responsible :
for the America liouse) aad his superiors, GRYAZNOV wrote
the cperationel plan,on ZUJUS, hich calied for thoroug. :
developzent by Siero in order to learn everything
possibie about hi. ae entug lly to introduce an agent
to ZUJLS through ‘@! oyetaeas to invite ZUJUS to a
restaurant in March @"Apririys2, and a "friend was to,
be introduced to 2UJUS at that tine. This had not been
accomplished as of NOSENKO's departure for Geneva in 1962,

steed

Progress was slow because 2UJUS was quiet and reserved ‘

and cften stayed atone, even in America ltouse, plus the fact
that although Wievaand ZUJUS were egguainted, they did not
become good friends. On the days@Bauay was to visit Acerice
im in hotels or restaurants (never in
every week or two, depencing
They would meet again the

a uo s report on which Americans were
drinking heavily and which were caressi the girls {roa
foreign enbassies in Moscow, Although went to America
House once cr twice 4 month and drank there with ZUJUS, he
reported little of interest, The KGB learned something
about Z2UJUS's fanily in the United States, the details of
which NOSENKO did not recall; NOSENKO was sure, however,
that there was nothing unusual or interesting about ZUJUS'Ss
family background, NOSENKO stated that the KGB was not
‘aware of any vices or vulnerabilities that ZUJUS may have -
had, There was no recruitment and no approach by the
KGB--if there had been, even after NOSENKO left che U.S.
Embassy Section, his friend GRYAZNOV would have fold hin Lame nt

ace

eet non

ote
t

abecut it.
(c) Infernation from Other Sources _

In connection with a security investigation at the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow, ZUJUS prepared a statement in January 1963
which acknowledged his having had sexual relations with only aan
one woman in Moscow, an employee of the Finnish Embassy. eel
During 2 routine debriefing by U.S. Army authorities later in .- 0 1h
1963, however, ZUJUS said that he had once had sexual relations :
with a girl who said she was an Austrian. The U.S... Embassy
Security Officer. reported in the summer of 1962 that, 2UJUS.
had been intimate with an. Austrian wonan, Lillian (last:

own), who had.gone to America House‘ with ‘saneone ©


yapoooo, pee at cet

from the United Arab Republ cand had. returned: atone: a

 Z2UJUS was a cryptographer, the manager ‘of America House

‘who learned from the Austrian. tmbassy that no passport
had been issued to this woman. ‘The Security Cificer went

few days later, when she waS,picked up ty ZUJUS. Since
decided to interview the woman. . She teld hin that she
was from Vienna and was travelling witha her ercloyer, a
Czech, The manager then reported to the Security Officer,

to America House, and asked Lillian for her passport,
she replied that she had forgetten it, and she then left
saying she was going to her hote: fcr the passport, She
never returned to Ancrica fluuse.*

The U.S. Arny report

2USUS was interviewed by a CIA representative in

November 1955, Askeu whether ne had ret y vantionals. of
Near Eastern countrics while in Moscow, eUuds named anong
Others 2 person from Peirut whe hac besn in Damascus or a
person from Damascus wha had been in beirut--he could not
remember which. ZUJUS s2id that he had been acting as
goornman at America Hcuse when this persen entered, and that
the two "shet the breeze" fer about 1s sinuteis. 2UJUS could

“not vecall what they had talxed avout, Lut their conver-

saticn apparently cid not interest the visitecr, because he
left after a short while and went to tne bar, cUJUs may

have seen the man on several other occasions, but he could
supply ne additional information. ZuJUS Jid not recall. that.
this persen gave hin Lebanese vodka, but did say he favored.
this beverage, 7ZUJUS said that he dic nct know this man's
name or why he was in Hoscew, and he could provide no physical
description.

ZUJUS said that, as manager of the America club, he had
frequent dealings with Ella UMANETS (a long-time agent named
by NOSENKO}. ZUJUS often used her as an interpreter in his
dealings with other Soviet employees of America House and was
able to provide a considerable amount of backyround infor-
mation concerning her. He repeated his earlier statements

‘that he had never deen approached or- recruited by Soviet Intel-

ligence.

- ¥ See oe NOSENKO's account of the KCD using one Of two
~ East German woucn, who represented thenselves es
Austrians, at America: House | in an operation against.
MORONE...- 7

et RR RE

Bes

on

a tithe

aria et ta

se thum cist lied iin che.

cheese ay

dmat healt Dabbalee Seiad war

waitin shew.


14-0000

Vt MARTE R IE Hg EM GRE ALAS

aS a oe

AP ARMA RO a IN aR ene? Ihe eT BOERS Be ea,

tw
7
ire)
.
’

(vi) Approach to KEYSERS
(a) Introduction

U.S. Arny Specialist Fifth Class James KEYSERS began his
tour in Moscow on 20 December Iy€0 us en assistant to the
Embassy Medical Officer, Donald C, MARTIN, an Air Force cEp-
tain; as an additional duty he was assigned administrative
functions in the office of the Air Attiche, For a short per-
iod in early 1961 KEYSERS was trained to perform backeup
cryptographic duties under Jurces STOXSBERG in the military
code room, but he was relieved of this in Anril 1963. because i
of low aptitude, laziness, and lack of interest, Because of
his admitted homosexual tendencies, coupled with his attitude
and behavior, KEYSERS was removed from ‘loscow by his American : fo
superiors in June 1961, The decision tc transfer him was
made on 13 June, and KEYSER® was informed of it the fol-
lowing day; approximately two hours before leaving America
House for the airport on 16 June, KEYSERS received a letter
from the KGB suggesting that he jefect, This was followed
by an approach to him at the Noscew airport, :

NOSENKO has ciaimed that he was the KiB cfficer who
spoke to KEYSERS on this occasicn and has said that this
incident was his only face-ts-face contact with an American
target during his 1966-1961 period of service in the U.S,
Embassy Section (excepting the alleged brief encounter with
STCRSBERG--See above), MOSENXO Sas confused the KEYSERS and
ZUJUS cases, but correcte 1 this error prior to defecting. :
In most particulars NOSENKO § account of the case matches the 2
details from KEYSERS and other sources. Hcwever, whereas
NOSENKO stated (without indicating how the KGB obtained its
information) that the KGB knew KEYSERS had not told American
authorities or having received the letter, KEYSERS did so
before leaving Moscow; this conversation tcok place in an : j
Embassy room where a kGB microphone was then located, i

(b) Information from NOSENKO '

NOSENKO first spoke of the case, without naming
KEYSERS, on 12 June 1962: “Now I remember, He came to Mos-
cow, to the Embassy, He was to replace the military cipher
clerk (STORSBERG].® We sensed at once [that he was a homo-
sexual]. Well, everything was thrown at him, I stayed with
this case constantly, I didn't spend time on anything olse.
We chased hin all over Moscow but were iate. We were in an
operational car, It happened like this. When there was
traffic, you couldn't get through. Whether we went up the
left side or on the sidewalk where people were walking, in
the opposite direction, no matter. Therefore we vero late, | '

nee mle meen ee

Jate (i1.@., could not catch him at anything). But‘ such

Althougn REYSERS trained tn Voscow to assume back-up

Cryptographic duties, he was not STORSBERG's replace-
Ment; Mathew 2UJUS, who arrived in Seotember 1961, was,

smalsdas sre tater lear Uh at

. KEYSERS was assigned to Moscow as a replacement for
1° Staff Sergeant J.C. BRADLEY, «ho had earlier been ree
; turned from Moscow for reasons of homosexuality,

word
en
MLS
+

a

“4


214.

things happen. But we were not mistaken about this fellow.
He proved to be a homosexual. ie soid himself, so to say. The
; American ice ballec (ice Capades tour) arrived. There vere .
ae many such fellows (homosexuals) with it, and he was extremely Jf
; drunk, and was embracing and kissine a man. The Americans also
saw this. And decided not to... I thought, whet to do? Let's
write him a letter, in real English, on an English typewriter.
We'll send this letter to his rocm. We knew that he was supposed
to leave today, today. Ard we wrote it: ‘Lasten. they know
about you, You heve reen veught. [It will go very bedly for you
back there. Come on. Stay here. We are waiting for you
answer.' Weli, as 1s customary, you had sémeone accompany him.
The Assistant Military Attache escorted him. I Gorn't remember
who right now. Perhaps it was NIXON, NIELSON. 2 lieutenant
colorel. What was his naze?* He accotpanied him to Finiand
ard then returned by piane. Well, there was no answer from
him to this letter. And it was already the last moment, and
suddenly--'Lasten, they ave taking you away. wait, they know
who you are, what you are, it's all over, If that's the way
it is, stay here.’ No answer. What to do? Here's what happened:
We got into a car. ‘They (KGB surveillance) hei reported that he
and the Assistant Military Attache had puiled@ our from Kropotkin-
skaya Naberezhnaya (America House) for the airport to take the
plane. So we put on ali speed to get there iirst. We got there
first, in order to have got to him. No. It was WILSON." The
-anterview then continued: NOSENKO was asked wno had accompanied
KEYSERS to the airport. He replied:

4
4
:
j
i

'

aT

poeta ets ade ee

"Yes, Lt. Col. WILSON, I believe. He didn't leave him
for a moment at tne airport. I am turning eround here, walking
there. There is coffee there and cognac. He didn't leave him.
I must separate them. O.K. So {f said ‘What about their
documents? Make some pretext to separate them.’ They were
‘peparated for two minutes. I approached him and said: ‘Hello,
helle, what acout the letter? You think about it?' He said
something to the Assistant Military Attache, that ‘they tried
to approach me.' So he was in Moscow in all only three or
four months. He gave himself away you see. If this ice ballet
had not come we would have worked on mim. At the start we did ;
not know who he was or what he was,. 1.e.. we knew that he came’ _
: to replace the military code cieck, on whom’ we had spent much :
j time." NOSENKO then moved on to a description of the STORSBERG
: operation without naming KEYSERS. — .

ae SCTE SEO STOTT

tnt tinh Sa

pe . After describing the recruitment approach to STICKSZSERG,
: NOSENKO reported on 24 January 1964: “Then his replacement ©
i . came. It was ZUJUS.** We began to study him carefully and
: it appears that both ourselves and the Americans, primarily
in the person of the Security Officer, discovered that he

.f Lot . . : oe . ;

. . sot

-This officer's name is MASON,

See NOSENKO's statements. on 28: January and 2 February.

1964 (below)... ZUJUS did in fact replace STORSBERG, who
completed. his: Moscow tour in November. 1961,. five months
‘after KEYSERS was removed from Moscow. ~


-ballet troupe in which some of the malé members were homo- -
_sexuals, He met them in the America House and his behavior

was a homosexual, It appears. thet thete was sone visiting

towards them was reported to’ the American Security Officer | :
and at the same time our agent had reported hia to us. We : {
wanted to mount an operation against him but the Americans : ip
had already: decided to give him up, All'’we could do was. es a
to have a letter delivered to him; the letter warned hin - “ :
that he was being sent cut because he was a hcmosexual

and that he would get into consequent trouble, and an offer. i
was made to him to stay in the USSR. He did not answer !
the letter and it was just prior to his actual departure.
He was escorted to. the airport by two officers of the
Military Attache's office, At the airport--I even went
there with a group of assistants to see if we could get a
few words to him to change his mind. lie left his group
for a moment to get a drink of water. When I made this
offer to him that he would not regret it if he stayed,
that he wotld receive great benefits, he panicked and ran
back to his group and shortly thereafter he flew off. If

wis

a

a cain
oy Oe Bieta ae carrot ald re

-as follows: "I was thinking last night and I realized
‘wanted to be sure to call it to your attention today. Re-

.. the code clerk, and after that a replacement came for him?
., And I said that we wanted to get a hold of hin because he

"Jim, did you think about staying perhaps? Because you

|
i

he were not spotted by you possibly we would have been abte - ae
to get at him," ,

While reviewing a list of personnel assigned to the
American Embassy in Moscow in 1963, NOSENKD said on 28
January 1964; ‘ "Matthew ZUJUS--how come? That man can't
be in Moscow, That's the homosexual code clerk ! told
you about, [the] homosexual who was urgently sent back to 3
the States with military guards. low come he is back in ’ ;
1963? In August 1963? He couldn't be there, It is :
impossible” He was asked whether he was sure cf his ;
facts, and NOSENKO answered: "Yes, this must be the i
$ame man, but this must be an error in your document.

He just cannot be in Moscow." :

NOSENKO telephoned the Geneva safehouse on 2 February
1964 and said that he wanted to come right over as he had
something important to say, The meeting with CIA opened

that 1 have made a mistake and it bothered me, so i

member when I told you we were working on Jim STORSBERG,

was a homosexual? It was not ZUJUS, but it was KEYSERS,—
In other words, everything I said about ZUJUS applies to°
KEYSERS."

"I don't remember having any face-to-face encounters
(with Americans] except when KEYSERS was leaving,’ NOSENKO
stated on 17 April 1964, "When he was being taken to the.
airport we decided, ‘Why not try, in case he's aione; why
not approach him and ask hin if he wants to stay?’ And sure
enough he stood there with these two officers and then he
walked into the restaurant alone... So I imnediately ap- z
proached him right there in the restaurant. "I don’t re- x
member what his name was--I think it was Jin.) -So I. said"

know what will happen to you when you return. Say, please.’
He looked at. me and turned around.and without saying # word —
he went into the waiting room and. started talkang -rapidl
with the officers.” ... coos ; .. 8

14-0000

- : an a ; . wort aoe cTasa in

subsequent des
ies. ard his

‘ In liescow price
: anes, KETSESS

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4

d

NOTE: Part VI.D.2., a takulation of NOSENXO'S i

leads involving American cases, includes :
several operations against U.S. cciZe

www Sterks for which he was the Supervisor; = =
. their names are Frank DAY, Robert DWELLY,
Joseph GAFFSY, John TAYLOR, and Maurice
ZWANG.

t


i4ponoo 8 i

20.00 ae

d. © NOSENKO's Reeponsibility for Coverage of “ABIDIAN” =.
(4) Introduction , ;

Pen John V. ABIDIAN served as the U.S. Embassy Security Officer

. ; oe in Moscow from 2 March 1960 until February 1962, approximately _

a the same period as NOSENKO's claimed’ service. in the U.S. Embassy
Section of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate.
During hig Moscow tour, ABIDIAN was coopted by CIA to perform a
number of operational tasks, including clandestine letter mailings

; to several CIA agents inside the Soviet Union and servicing @

i dead drop to be used only for receiving two spzcial types of
communications* from the source in the GRU, Colonel O.V. PENKOV-
SKIY.

During his 1962 meetings with CIA, NOSENKC mentioned ABIDIAN
on several occasions, identifying him as the Embassy Security
Officer and as a CIA officer. In 1962 he described ABIDIAN's

+ ereremermumeamman gave sromepreer-anaen wer

————— Letter-mait-ing-aetivitires;—and-he-setd—he-was-hivset tf concerned
’ (zganimat'sya) with ABIDIAN. After resontacting CiA in Geneva in
January 1964 NOSENKO divulged that he nad keen the KGB case
officer responsible for coverege of ABIDIAS in Moscow? for the
first time he described then a visit made by ABIDIAN to the
PENKOVSKIY dead drop site,

The discussion below is divided into three parts: NOSENKO's
case officer responsibilities and the information he Learned
about ABIDIAN, NOSENKO's knowledge of clandestine letter mailings

a by ABIDIAN, and NOSENKO's statements on ASIDIAN and the Pushkin
Street dead drop.

(ii) Duties as Case Officer

On 17 April 1964 when asked to describe his transfer from
the GZourist Department to the Anerican Department in January
4960, NOSENKO said that when he reported for duty and was inter-
viewed by V. A, KLYPIN, Chief of the American Department, and
V.M. KOVSHUK, Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, he was told
that as one of his duties he would be the case officer in charge
of ABIDIAN, whose arrival in Moscow was expected in the near
future, NOSENKO was the only KGB officer responsible for cover-
age of and activities against ABIDIAN and, NOSENKO said, ASIDIAN
was the only American target for whom he, personally, was offi-
cially accountable while in the U.S. Embassy Section.’

NOSENKO was questioned in detail concerning ABIDIAN for
six days in January and February 1965. He produced the infor-
mation in the following paragraphs at that time. :

1. @hen NOSENKO began to work in the U.S. Embassy Section,
_ABIDIAN had not yet arrived in Moscow. The section, however,

< to NOSENKO by KOVSHUK. Among this material was ABIDIAN's visa

One type was early-warning information, the other notifi-
cation: of his forthcoming absence from Moscow. Otherwise.
5:08 Of this time, PENKOVSKIY submitted information in.
Moscow via Contacts with the British Embassy and. the :
British businessman Greville WYNNE. The PENKOVSRIY came:
is discussed at greater length in Part VI.D.7.b.

TOP SECRET

already had received some information on him, and this was given - |


verona 4 a aa a eee seg” a

at,

1
i application; the negative results of checks of KGR Headquarters
files, and a report prepared by the American Department of the
* First Chief Directorate. According to this report, based on — .
! correspondence from the KGS Legal Residencies in the Unitec «: he
: States, ABIDIAN had served asa Departmen: of State Security
« Officer concerned with the personal safety of Premier KHRUSHCHEV
2 when he visited the United States in 1959: from the way ABIDIAN
had acted at that time, the Legal Residencies concluded he was an ar
intelligence officer, probably with CIA.” NOSENKO remarked that i,
the report, combined with the fact that ABIDIAN was replacing the
known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE as Security Officer, made

IDIAN one c£ the most important counterintelligence targets
of the U.S. Fmbassy Section and therefore of the entire Second
Cnief Directorate.

wives caitvedadenien

NOSENKO personally opened the KGB file on ABIDIAN and later
assigned him the cryptonym “ARSEN, “ since this cryptonyn “had been
used by personnel of che Seventh (Surveillance) Directorate, i
KGB- Second Chief Directorate, who were working against him. . 2

NOSENKO was unsuccessful in his attempts to learn more about
the life and career of ABIDIAN. He visited the Chief of the ;
American Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate, but this
unit had no information in acdition to that already included in :
the original information report. NOSENKO requested that the KGB :
Legal Residencies in the Uniced States be asked for further de- :
tails, but they were never received. For these reasons, NOSENKO :
said that he did not know and never obtained details about ASID-
IAN's education and study abroad. date of entry into the Depart-
ment of State, promotions, personal rank. previous foreign assign- . i?
ments, military service. or status as Foreign Service Reserve,
Staff oc Officer (FSR, FSS, FSO),**

cement So ee aw

* CIA records indicate that ABIDIAN studied in Paris in 1949-50
and then secured empioyment with the Department of State as
a clerk/typist. He cemained in Paris until 1954, After spe-
cial training at the CIC schoci at Fort Holabird and the

: Secret Service School, ABIDIAN served from 1956 until leaving

: for Moscow in 1960 as a special agent in the State Depart-

: _Ment's Office of Security. A iarge part of his work‘in this-
period was arranging the security of and accompanying foreign
dignitaries visiting the United States. These included the
visits of Soviet Foreign Minister SHEPILOV in November 1956,
MIKOYAN in the spring of 1959, and KHRUSHCHEV at the end of
1959. These duties undoubtedly brought ABIDIAN into contact
with a large number of KGB officers stationed in New York and
Washington.. One of the members of the KHRUSHCHEV entourage
was KOSOLAPOV who, according to NOSENKO, joined the U.S.
Embassy Section in late 1959 and, as of January 1960, became

te, Marks... subordinate an operations against American code

tis i. Clerks.

ni
4

, *#ROSENKO was. unaware of the meaning of the. initials FSR, PSS,
-and FSO, When asked whether he had. checked the Department
of: State. Biographic Register: for information on ABIDIAN's... .
“background, he replied: that this* publ rcation ‘is not. available.
dim..the U.S., Embassy Section. ‘ He ‘subsequent ly- recalled that
the Chief. of the Section; KOVSHUK,. did have a-copy dated:
about 1956, ‘which was Of no use in. gathering. information on
IDIAN...


14-0000 + 7 : os Te RS ae ee

- os)! Because ABIDIAN was ‘considered to be a‘ CIA officer, he was...
made a.“special tarcet". of surveillance from the date of his |. t
arrival. He was always under 24-hour surveiliznce by et least :
two and often three KGB teams, so thet at any hour a team was i
available to cover him if he left the U.S. #mbessy. The only t
time this intensity of coverage might heve been reduced, NOSENKO
said, was during a pericd cf about one and one-Lalf months in : a
1961, wren surveillance of the Embassy was generally reduced in po

order to allow increased coverage of #ritish tergets.* As the
responsible case officer, KUSENKO directed the sucveillance of
RBIDIAN and evaluated the operational possibilities offered by
pertinent informaticn in the surveillance reports.

Prior to ARIDIAN's arrival in Moscow, the decision was reach-
ed not to work aggressively against hin with acent contacts or
provocateurs unless ne first demonstrated some personal vulner-
ability, SCSENKO stated. It was considered better to corcentrate
on surveillance coverage ir. the hope thet, 4s LANGELLE's succes-

—== sors—he—inrght—tead-to-anetner—PGPGv there tors7—no-op erations ———
plan was written on ABIDIAN until about Cctober 1960. This plan, ;
which HOSENKO wrote, called for no direct action but did specify ;
that: 5

2 Veale tbesbi ee

vy

- ABSIDIAN's maid, Tatyana FECCROVICH, en operational
contact of the U.S. Embassy Section, was to continue to
apply metka to ABIDIAN's clothing and NEPTUNE-80 to his
shoes.*** (She put metka on ABIDLAN's clothing approxi-
mately every 14 to 21 days throughout the time she was
employed by ARIDIAN.) The only item of operation:) in-
terest from her during this period was evidence that i
ABIDIAN wes having inzimate relations with a female em-.
ployee at the embassy. FEDOROVICH was unable to find |
personal mail or persona) papers in ABIDINI's apartment. }

Bae bb dSh Lang rants

BS KOSOLAPOV's agent, was to try to
cultiva Nand report whatever he learned concern-
ing him. never obtained significant. information ; |.
j
{
!

on ABIDIAN's repsonal life. ARIDIAN, NOSFNKO saic, was

developing uk as an informant on American personnel
oo at the Embassy. Dut NOSENKO did not recall any specific
be : report of his to ABIDIAN that would have been of interest
to the U.S. Embassy Section. NOSENKO tola CIA in 1962

(ied heb alae

‘a talBidcatias,

* In another context NOSENKO said that KGB surveillance of bo i : aaa
British targets in 1961 led to the discovery of PENKOWSKIY. 4

fe

. Bo 7
***Metka and NEPTUNE-80 are surveillance techniques described : oF
_ by NOSENKO. The former. a "thief powder” applied to a
-, Clothing, leaves: a trace on anything with which it comes =
4nto contact; its use in.detecting clandestine letter :
mailings is described in greater detail below, NEPTUNE-80, ~
,a substance applied to a target's shoes,. leaves a trace on :
the ground wherever he walks .and permits the KGB to carry
out surveillance long.after the target has travelled a:
particular. route. Dogs are used.to follow: he target's:

<

** The POPOV case is discussed. in Part VI.D.7.a.


14000

thet ABIDIAN had recruited Ree t
intelligence mission in Fra Loot

the Soviet Union ip De rs
Embassy Section tnercupon tues
First Chici Directorete.*

ag were to apply KipTUNE-80 to

-~ Pwo Umbascy chavtfe
tals of DIa's cag if neces-

the floorcoaras and foot

ies si

i

sary.
: i . i 4
~ All other agents end operational contacts of ike f 4
section were to be instructed tu report every detail about : H
ABIDIAN (see below). j
- feillance teins 4 instructe@ to check all ' .
pisces where ABIDIAN mighw ce ling letners.

~ Coverace of ABTOTAN's marl

heart from tnose specified iy the
two KCB acerts or operational contay
mila GACMOKOVA and “KANO” (KCB eryptonye, hare not remem
NGSENKO!, GROMOKOVA, a Languages instructor for JU. Fabassy per-
was a KG8 egant handled by ¢ 3 s ction off1-
cer NLA. GAVRILENKO ABIDIAN tcok I
Jessons from GROMOKOVA and NOSENKO did
private or cless lessons. He @id not learn anythang cf operacion- :
al significence from GROMGKOVA'S ConLlects with ABILIaN, and there i
was no regular reporting from rer, '! “KAMO" was am agent i
Mescow City KGB organization who accsacntally met ABIDIAN at the to i

*

Who Met AN were Lytd- : i‘

u i
trer these were i

+ REED cisinea he coneccted this story for the KGB in order to
* extricate himself when the KS5 attempted to recruit him shortly
before his departure from Moscow.

*®* NOSENKO first idencified GROMCKOVA as a KGB agent when viewing
Embassy employee lists on 28 August 1964, The list on which
her name appeared indicated she wes a Russian language teacher,
and NOSENKO said she was handled by 4.A. SAVRILENKO during 1960
an@ 1961. NOSENKO was later shown GROMCKUVA's photograph and
failed to recognize it; wnen told her name, however, he again
said she wag GAVRILESKO's agent and that she was valuable be-
cause she had a good education and was able to provide per-
sonality sketches om her students. Ke did not associate her...
with ABIDIAN until he was told by his interrogators in Febru-
ary 1965 that ABIDIAN had been one of her stucents. NOSENKO
then made the above statement concerning these lessons. ABIDIAN..
a -. . yeported that he took regular language lessons from GROMOKCVA,

: ae normally three one-half hour lessons a week. beginning shortly:

: . after his arravel in Moscow and continuing until his departure.
The first few lessons were with a group of other Embassy per-
Sonnel, and then AHIDIAN switched to private lessons for the ©

- gemainder of his tour in the Soviet Union. In reporting his

*., contacts with GROMOKOVA, . ASIDTAN said he refused to be drawn ;
’ into talking about his. Embassy responsibilities during Russian.__
‘ Janguage conversation But™kept the. topic Limited to-his.past.. ?
personal life, travel, education, his fiancee, and his: trips
.@n which he saw his fiancee. ABIDIAN also: reported: that. -on |
.23 June 1960 GROMOKOVA attempted to persuade him to pass a
etter to departing personnel officer Mery GORINHA for for-
‘warding. to Jean.LIEBERMAN, a former, student. — When. ABIDIAN.
refused, saying that this is. against Soviet law, .GROMOKOVA. .
tore up the letter. - tye ‘ sit


14-0000

PARES ERIE EERE SENET NES HOLE EE EER ETE LENETEEN TEE EE LDR NEE TILE DETTE BE TE

t
By

224. .

when informed that ABIDIAS gave "KANO" his
telephone number. NOSENKO recommended that ‘KaMO" try to develop
a relationship with ABIDIAN, After arguing that this was against
the policy of taking no aggressive or provocative action against
ABIDIAN, KOVSHUK and KLYPIN finaily agreed, and "KAMO" phoned
ABIDIZN twice on KGB instructions. ABIDIAN, however, refused to
meet him, and no further action was taken. *

Baku Pestaurart.

ROSENKO did not know the room number of ABIDIAN's office in
the Embassy or on what floor it was located, but said that he
could check the room number if necessary since he had a copy of
the Embassy telephone list publisned monthly with the office room
rumber of each American employee. ATDIAN'Ss office was in the
“Zone of Security” (a.e., secure office areas). A report from
some egent, wrose name NOSENKO did not recall, indicated that
there was a sign on ABIDIAN's office door which said “Security
Offi:2." NOSENKO did not kr.ow and said he was unable to deter-
mine whether AZIDIAN had a secretary. No dictation cr conversa-—
tion was heard from AVIDIAN's office because no ZGBR micropnore
was trere, and “IGSENKO said that he did not remember any specific
interesting or important information about ABIDIAN from other
microphones in the Embassy.**

NOSENKO @i@ not know the location of ABIDIAN's apartment in
the Embassy buiiding. nor how it was furnished. He said that
he Gid not consider data of this nature to be operationally
significant unless the target had shown vulnerabilities or was
under active development.

Aware that ABIDIAN travelled from the USSR two or three times
while stationed in Moscow, NOSENKO did not know to which countries
he went or the time of year when the trips were madet** Such in-
formation, he stated, would have been of interest toa him as
ABIDIZN's case officer since, like LANGELLE s earlier trips
abroad, AZIDIAN'’s trips were presumed to be for operational pur-
poses. There was, however, no possibility for the KGB to find
out where ABIDIAN had gone;**** even if the U.S. Embassy Section
did establish where ABIDIAN would travel, nothing could be done

* See below for BEIDIAN'’s account of a similar incident involv-
ing a Soviet he met while on a trip to Armenia.

** In 1960-61 the Security Officer occupied a room where an in-
operative microphone was discovered in 1964.

*t®#ABIDIAN made at least three trips abroad during his two years
in Moscow, in August 1960 he took personal leave to visit
his fiancee, a French girl, in the south of France and met
with a CIA officer while there. In February 1961 he flew on
the Ambassador's plane to Paris for meetings with CIA and
then took personal leave to visit his fiancee. In September
1961, at CIA request, ABIDIAN again flew to France and to
New York City and Washington for briefings connected with
the handling of PENKOVSKIY in Moscow.

o¢¢% hen CIA interrogators suggested that the KGB could have

. photographed ABIDIAN's passport on his return to Moscow,
BOSENKO replied that the Second Chief Directorate does not
photograph passports of foreign diplomats entering the Soviet

. Union, hile this procedure would not be impossible, NOSENKO

. added, it was not considered so important as to justify the
special effort involved. .

1 oet Ly

vib = 4
ot ote Poe gk ag the

Een reer nee ~

Rates wht ae

tw


4-c0008% *

* 5). about it because the foreign Legal Residencies of the KGB First _
Chief Directorate wovld not accept a request for operational
action agains: an. American. diplomat coming froma Moscow.

at

In February 1965 NOSENKO was asked a number of times
whether he knew of any occasions on which AS:DiAN took trips in
the Soviet Union outside of Moscow. He replied each time that he —
knew of no such trips and that 1f ABIDIAN had made such @ trip or
trips he would have known of them and would remember them as it
would have been his responsipility as case officer to take cer-
tain actions. Among the latter he listed:

se gee ape peemannee ne
vrata sD cbaliti PEE bad.

~ Receiving notification of ABIDIAN's request to travel
from the UPDK (the Soviet Government organization which pro-
vides services to tre diplomatic community in Moscow) .

sae cree ia aad ei satins

~ Notifying the UPDK of KGE approval for the trip.

- Notifying appropriate local KGB effices on: ABIDIAN's _ _
itinerary and civing them instructions for surveillance and :
other operational activity if desired. ;

- Receiving. reading. and filing all surveillance
reports énd reports of other Operationa! activity carried
out by iocak KGB units.

NOSENKO was certain that he took none of these steps. He stated : f
further that even if he were ebsent when such a request for travel : ;
was mede. he would nave seen all documents upor his return and

that he Gia not remember seeing such cocuments in ABIDIAN's file.

?
NOSEN’O's interrogators then told NOSENKO that ABIDIAN ; i,
travelled out of Moscow from 5 to 9 October 1950.* Thereupon i
NOSENKO stated that he specifically recalled having been on leave
in October 1950. He said that he could not recall exactly the
dates of this leave (which he had not mentioned before), but he
did remember that he was away exactly 30 days since he stayed at cae
a dacha near Moscow and therefore was not allowed any travel a
time. NOSENKO said further that he also remenbered that he had

* ABIDIAN made a trip with Paul A. SMITH, the Embassy's Publi- - ;
cations Procurement Officer, to Armenia between 5 and 9 Octe- - 4
ber 1960. (ABIDIAN is of Armenian origin, and speaks the’ 2
Armenian language with a high degree of proficiency.) While _ 4
there ABIDIAN visited with various churchmen and their
parishioners ard an Armenian who had repatriated from Greece .
in 1946. They attended a service in Echmiadzin celebrating nen eerie:
the anniversary of the accession of the Katolikos VAZGEN I, : :
and ABIDIAN also visited some relatives of his in or near
. oe the city of Yerevan. After returning to. Moscow, an Armenian .
Dy : whom ABIDIAN had met on this trip tried to contact ABIDIAN
' at the Embassy. but ABIDIAN refused to see him. When NOS-
ENKO was told that on 7 October 1960 ASIDIAN attended a ser-
vice celebrating the fifth anniversary of the Armenian Kato-
‘Likes, VAZGEN I, NOSENKO recalled that ABIDIAN. had gone to
‘Echmiadzin-and that an agent had reported a contact with him
‘there. This agent, NUSENKO recalled, was a priest or a monk, ....
and the report concerned only his. conversation with ABIDIAN; ao
. ‘the agent had no further contact with. him.. NOSENKO said °-
that this’ was his sole recollection concerning. ABIDIAN's — |:
trip, and that he remembered no other details. ~


14-0000

PEC DERE LS MY RRR IME RIERA BGAN TE A EN ARE NR IBGE i at ge ao abt NE NMOS IY LY

fe

copes

saree .
ae cae ae

‘Ny wae re
:

tga teens Ube ape

226.

left the Soviet Union for Cubs two or three, but not more than
five, days efter his return £: leave; he could not recall
the date of his Geperture fer Csba ”

Except for the Americ ‘gan with whom APIDIAN was thought
to have been intimate. NOSENKY ~oula not name ASIDIAN's clese
American friends 1m Moscow or his close friends and professional
contacts with for¢éigners there.

NOSENYO received ard reed transcripts of all telephone calls
chat ABIDIAN made or receives et his office and epartment via the
Moscow city telepnone system. ie @id not remember the names or
nationalities of peccie wnon
because there was nothing of anc
NOSENKO Gig not learn anything £
BABIDIAN's relationsnip with exy é

nm these corversations.
phone transcripts about
roin Mcscow,

& NOSENKO departed Moscow for ba on 15 November 1960 and
therefore, by his own statement, would have been back from
leave by 10 November at tne earliest (five days before
Geparture). It was pointed out to NCSENKO thar. in this
case, his 30 days of leave could have becur: no earlier than
10 October and that he mu:ic therefore have been on duty on
5 October 1960 when ABIDIzZN left Moscow, In October 1966,
however, when the subject of his leaves again came up in
interrogation, he volunteered that he had lied in February
1965 when he said he had taken this leave. He said he

had no reason for this lie other than he had claimed to

be on leave “in conditions cf interrogation when lies and
truths were all a porridce.“ He told CIA. again for the
first time. that his 1960 leave was taken in January of
that year, immediately after joaning the U.S. Embassy
Section. Additional details on this January leave period
are given below, in discussion of NCSENKO's claimed
responsibility for operations against U.S, malitary
attaches in 1960.

called or who called ABIDIAN.

seen oe Peps

i
i
a

ide te cae

i

wa


14-0000 bth ae ”

cle eis 9 OE ia ERE FE HE ae CACORE TEE YEE Ae SPORE RG Eee BEAL EET BR OE

227. .

(444) ABIDIAN's Letter “Merlings

During the 19€2 meetings in Ceneva, MOSPKO reported KCB
knodledge of one type cf operational task RL by ABLDICN
in Mosco#d in edditicen to his cecruitment of fuser (see above).
This task, NOSEEKO said, involved mailing at least threce clan-
destine letters, in each cese to KG3 double asents.

| |
i - |
{ os j
{
' t

According to NOSEN on ll June 1962 GE detected all
the letters mailed ry ASIDIAN: ne saia t) wes achieved
through the use of met ailing from the Encassy,
ky Emoassy employces. LE yo mail letters
for a year and a half, beg: *BIDIAN mailed : j

several.* ABIDIAN,
Listen, we have this co
madlinas/, We have a mech
which sre mailed. Without

y Security Officer.
plete coverage of clandestine
he mechine finds the letters

machine itself.

This is a big, secret in 3. They enter

your room - you live in ao live in the - .
bassy. They /Soviet are and Simply cour

@ powder cr apply it r ciothes/. A rag, even

Ll. “ney puc it in the

and tnere 1s a crecial
cee fll setters which ere
chine, under a fotoapvarat
fiicerally a camera; NOS means sone sort of light-
gensitive device/. We new nave lz ,;machnines/ and hope to have
i100 in Moscow, And all the letters pass through the apparatus
and the machine itself selects the lctter which was mailed by
you or him. Do you understand? The machine itself finds it...
@his 18 how it was with the letters that ASIDIAN mailed. We had
them all because this machine gave chem fro us/. I even would
phone surveillance and say: ‘He's out walking around. ABIDIAN
48 out walking around, checking, cnecking.' 1 would say: ‘Drop
him. Sut give me all the letters today.’ The machine Ceter-
mines whether there is e special letter there." :

like a@ handkerchief.
ts where you mich:
ea machine et a static

medled in Moscow pass th

Three days later, et NOSENKG's fifth and final meeting
with CIA in 1962, he was asked whether he xnav to whom these
letters were addressed. XCSENKO replied: "To whem did ABIDIAY
mail letters? first he mailed a letter to a guy in Odessa.
Then ABIDIAN mailed one to still somecne else. He mailed two '
or three letters. Gne letter wes to the Saltic area. The ‘
same kind, that is we hei planted this men on you. i think |

|
{

it was to Riga, to our couble agent. And still, I think,
two or three other letters, also to double acents.** But we

* NOSENKO's information is substantially correct. ANGELLE
was Geclared persoia hon grata in connection with the arrest ;

: of CIA agent FOFOV in October 1959. Two letters were mailed,

' one on 9 December 1959 and the other on 22 February i960

; (one of which was to an agent now known to have been under
KGB control at the time); no more letters were mailed until
1 April 1961, when John ABIDIAN mailed one, again to a KGB-

4 controlled agent, LANGELLE's arrest, however, was not the

: €ause of this break in letter-mailings;: the suspension re-

sulted from other considerations.

ho
re a

cee tee tlhe

®¢¥n 1961 ABIDIAN mailed three operational letters for CIA,
one to an agent in Son 1 April, the second to an
agent in and the third to a Gig:

i

~ TOP SECRET


‘didn't ‘uncover any acents.on ‘the tesi:3 of letters he mailed,

“There weren't any. .[ was concerned with ASIDIAN; therefore I
know. I can't tell you anything about the agent in the Baltic /

area because he was handied hy the Second Section of the Am- — . a
€rican Department, the ‘Active Line - penetration. "* ‘ :

4

!
\ . : _
NOSENKO has described in greeter detail how ABIDIAN was / a
detectec mailing the letter to Cdé ' While Giscussing per- oy
sonnel assigned to the American Derartment of the Second Cnief {
Directorate, he said on 24 June 196
Konstantinovich SUMIN in the Second

a
heard that 'e was there 1n 1959... He
S

te
3
na C
64 “2 farst saw Aleksey

3 Section in 1960, altnough I

s considered a specialist
secret writing... SUMIN

7]

on working against letters containing ¢
sees all the Jetters mailed py *mer.cans. even the American
tourists. ‘The letters are caight «ither by surveillance or by
use of metka. There are severe: types of metka. with different '
colors, and one typ2 witi be use fmerican Embessy personnel, —
another type on British Encassy perso: and another type for ! —_

ame FCOUF TESTS. * THE Same Type re not ys used acéinst the same

‘ group. ‘ihey are swit. hed around An exemple 1s in 1961 when

ABIDIAN mailed a letter: to an éveni in Odessa. This was a

saws nmtathettac abd ella den,

§ ba
fe)
a
a
oO
pe

‘game’ /igra - deuble agent operation’ The agent was ‘ARK-

HANGELSKIY /KGU coyptonym/ I chink. ASIDIAN
car and walk around, visiting meny shoos on Gorkiy Street. He
went to one commission shop where there was a large mirror in
the shop window. and he woula check tor survelliance. ‘He was 1
even followed to a post office and cne of the surveillance i
mer got in there ahead of sin, but he didn't do anything. Then _

used to park his

* NOSENKO has explained that the so-called"Active Line" Section
of the American Department was concerned with the penetra-
tion of U.S. intelligence, primarily by serving up KGB-
controlled agents for recraitmen:.

baeere bbb sateen Dae

“** CIA has conducted a series of tests designed to determine
whether a substance such as metka was being used as a KGB
control device For the purpcse of these tests, articles :
of clothing worn by members of the U.S, Embassy and those } “4
of other selected Western embassies were sent back to CIA :

oO Headquarters. ‘The ciothing in each case had been sent to
Soviet dry-cleaning establishments or had been permitted
to hang unattended in unrestricted areas of the Embassy or
in the apartments of Embassy employees Special filter
paper was applied to these articles of clothing. The same
paper was applied in Moscow to desk tops, safe drawers,
and the like, The paper was then subjected to ultra-violet,
. chemical, and microscopi: analysis as well as to examination
Hl . for traces of radioactivity... Results have been consistently
i _ negative with a single ex eption. One test, on one item of
. - clothing, produced a sharply positave reaction. This article
of clothing belonged to a third nacionai diplomat who was a
CIA operetionail support agert in Moscow; he was aiso the
only person known to CIA to have been a victim of radio-
,active isotope tagging in correction with an operational
; task (not letter-ma1ling) which he had performed for CIA.
There were no positive reactions for this agent's clothing

tr


SSS SOS —-She-wae—an-operatuonal conact reporring tO BRLEMOW. She . : .

SAR LE

“he walked-by a post box on thé street and was checking it. Two:
: or. three times he was fotiowed by this post rox. but the ‘sur-
veillance never saw him mail’a lecter. Still. the KGB would .
remove the conrents of the letter box and send it in. On the : :
second or third tame “CUMIN round the letter he maiLed with :
metka. He hed also mailed a cover Letter to his parents. of a 4
. course, SUMIN also knew the addiess of the agent. since it was :
"a 'game'.“

Under inverrogztion im January 1963 NCSENKO described how
metka had be applied tro AWLDIAt' s clowning oy his maid and how,

in partacula: thiz led to the distovery of the lerters ASiDIAN i .
mailed to the agent APEHANGELSKTY in Scessa and to his parents a
in the United “1éres ‘tbe following 15 taken from the protocol :

of these interrogations which HOSEXKG s:oned as being eccurate_
on 4 March 1905: :

we Hal tad abe RS

"ABIBIAN 5 maid un Moscow was Tatyana FEDOROVICH.

started to work for ALIDIA. a few ronths after his arrival,
pe:haps three months but no longer than six months after
his arrival. [: shortiy after sneé began to work ;
for ABIDIAN in ore ts yet acquainted with her, in order .
to evaluate nec and give her General instructions about :
her work for ABIDIAN, T do not ow the ¢xact date of '
this meeting but 1t was before the fail of 1960, I wrote

the operational pian on ADIDIAN in circa October 1960. {
At this time FEDOROVICH was aiready working for ASBIDIAN. H
This operational plan steced wnat FEDOROVIC: would con- fy
tinue to put metka regulariy on AHIDIAN s clothing.

i
3

“BEDOROVICH put metka on ASIDLAY s clothing during
the entire period that € worked for him. She did this
to every two o: thice weeks except for a few times when she
: was Sick or on leave No one else had access to ABIDIAN's
4 apartment and therefore no Other perser. had the possi-
bility of putting metka on his clothing.

“I have said that ASIDIAN mailed an operational
letter to the KGb asukle agent ‘ARSHANGELSKIY’. He
mailed it at the maitvox on Tverskaya Yemskaya where he
had gone several times earsier. Surveiliance did not
see ABIDIAN mail the iettér but the mailbox was con-'
trolled and the letter to “ARKHANGELSKIY: was found,

; along with a letter to ABIDIAN’s parents. Both of these
‘soos «so Jetters had metka on them. as I was toid by SUMIN. I So eee abe

. cannot remember the date that ASIDIAN mailed this letter
- or, . except that it was sometime in 1961.'*

‘*7In a CIA interview on 8 December 1964, ABIDIAN identified a
‘photograph of Tatyana FEDOROVICH as a maid who worked for
_Marion ALRFAMONTE and Myra KEMMER. Embassy secretaries, until
| KEMMER departed Moscow in approximately July 1961. There--
. after FEDOROVICH worked part-time for ALBAMONTE and part-;
time for ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN.expleined that he had no maid at
all.for the "first, year. o.. so" of his. Moscow. tour and that .
FEDOROVICH ;was:-the only maid he. employed theres: When =~.”
ABIDIAN left Moscow, she began to work for the Embassy


14-0000

eh AAA TI GR aeRO WPCA ECR RELI REI

etna = mentee g My edn ee che =

por é

BR eR KAN an een NTE OP ge aa ORR a

(continuation of footrote from preceding page)

code clerk John GARLAND (Part V.E.3.c.i.). CIA records
show that ABIDIAN mailed the first of his clandestine
letters on 1 April 1961 and his second, the one to
“ARKHANGELSKIY", on 2 July 1961. I£ ABIDIAN's recollec-
tion is correct (a review of Embassy phene lists shows that
KEMMER wes in Moscow in June 1961, but was not there in
August of that year), it appears that FPEDOROVICH could not
have been responsible for the metka which, NOSENKO said,
led to discovery of the first of these letters: also, it
is possible that she was not employed by ABID -AN at the time
the letter to “ARKHANGELSKIY" was mailed. ABIDIAN's third
clandestine letter was mailed on 1 September 1361, appaz-
ently after FEDOROVICH came to work for him. «hen NOSENKO
was told in January 1965 that FEDOROVICHa could not have
been applying metka regularly to ASIDIAN's clothing at the
time of the "“ARKHANGELSKTY" letter-mailing, he repeated
that no ome but FEDOROVICH hed the possibility of doing

so and that he was sure she hed. When nis interrogators
suggested that FEDOROVICH may have occasionally cleaned
ABIDIAN'sS apartment on an informal basis before being
formerly hired as his maid, NOSENKO said that this was
possibly the case. iCIA does not know whether tnis was

so or not, but ABIDIAN gave his interviewer the impression
in Decemrer 1964 that he did his own housekeeping until
hiring FEDOROVICH.)

pennants ey gnigrenene: wap ied
Reg ee MRS

a
4

t
4
i
4
. :
i


Use 7 7 y
14-8000

ON :
a on wires si «so SER RET ATER ACESS PRRM 8
_ = Sree SIM erat Teac ea ae SORES SAP SIE . Y
ORI RCE _ iS .

TOP SECRET | :

231.

) ABIDIAN's Servicing of the Pushkin Street Dead Drop

;

In 1964 NOSENKO told CIA for the first time that KGB sur- _ 3

eillance had observed a visit by A3IDIAN to a probable dead 4

/ atop on Pushkin Street in Moscow at the erd of 1960. This de2d
drop figured prominently in the PENXOVSKIY case.

NOSENKO's first remarks on this subject were made on 20 April
1964: "I left /the U.S. Embassy Section’ in 1962. ‘There was an
interesting move. This address where JACOBS* was caugnt in the .
PERKOVSKIY case - the same address was visited by ABIDIAN in
1960, or at the beginning of 1961. And at that time I went there
together with /V. A./ KOZLOV, the Chief of the Surveillance
Directorate, /M. G./ MATVEYEV /Deputy Chief of the Auerican
Department/ also went there with us. We went to that address
several times, at Pushkin Street. it was very interesting, this
radiator and everything, but the only thing we did there was to
place an observation post there, end that post was there for
about three months after ABIDIAN's visit... That was in 1960,
196i... They watched for three months. The surveillance teams
had to_be occupied there for 24 hovrs every day. I was there
then /in the U3. Embassy Section for the entire time that sur-
veillance was watching the Pushkin Street site’... at the be-
‘ginning I came there two or three times, ft ceme there with
MATVEYEV once, twice with KOVSHUK: we came there with Venyamin
i KOZLOV... But no one appeared here and so they were not writing

Rey anything /meening that the Surveillance Directorate was not sub—

a Xe mitting written reports/. No one appeared. That's why, only

% es orally, KOZLOV was saying 'nothing.' A week passed - "nothing, '
4 ver the next week passed — ‘notning'... I shall tell you why ai

2 phat | Gidn't mention this to you in June i962/,. Secause I had

occasions where there were many such places, and they were

watched for nothing. And it would just pass away and ina

month it would be forgotten... So we waited a month, two,

three. Nothing. So they let it go at that and had forgotten.

Of course, the surveillance team had it_all recorded, but we °
had forgotten about that in the_First /American/ Department...

In 1962, I was in the Seventh CTourist/ Department. I trans-
ferred in January 1962," so

On the basis of information supplied by NOSENKO during
April 1964, he was questioned during January and February 1965
On ABIDIAN's visit to Pushkin Street. The following, which is ;
consistent with and somewhat more Getailed than earlier state-

od
vir piee net recorded here, is taken from these 1965 interroga- \
tions:

- amene
se og art spent BA Ee OE

- me
.

- In 1961, while NOSENKO was the responsible case
officer, the KGB followed ABIDIAN from the U.S. Embassy
to @ residential building on Pushkin Street in Moscow.

A stationary surveillance post et the Embassy saw ABIDIAN
leave with the Publications Procurement Officer of the
Embassy in a chauffeured automobile, rather than in the
car he normally used. The surveillance team assigned
specifically to ABIDIAN thereupon followed the car to

@ bookstore. Both Americans entered the bookstore, but

5 Le  . o _ .
' ® Richard JACOB, a CIA officer, was apprehended while servic- 6
- ing the Pushkin Street dead drop on 2 November 1962. oh

oa

\ . a ; : oes
\ FR? orn. : oO
ard fl

14-09000

7 AREY,

ee

a . - shortly thereafter ABIDIAN left alone. He walked around .
oot. the corner and entered a residential building next to a
Lo meat market on Pushkin Street. ABIDIAN emerged after a
. few seconds. The surveillance team saw him. go in but. did

k
F
. .
not follow him, This unusual incident was reported by nn ce
i
t

the surveillance team to the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)

Directorate, and the buil@ing was inspected that same day

by the Chief of the First Department of the. Surveillance :
Directorate, KOZLOV, together with the Deputy Cnief of the

American Department of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, i
MATVEYEV. Taking into account the character of the building ;
and its inhabitants, the duration and. circumstances of

ABIDIAN's visit, and the. suitability of the hallway -

particularly the radiater in it - for. use as a dead drop

site, it was decided by the Jeadership of the Second Chief

Directorate and the Surveillance Directorate that a station- .

ary surveillance post should immediately be set up to cover __ .

3

atertn Guthicda.

ocala

= "this location. BeGause of the short time evailable, it was
: not possible to place this post inside the building, so it

was set up across the street. In addition, the radiator i
was checked daily to see if anything, such as a macnetic :
container, had. been concealed behind it. This stationary 3
post was maintained around the clock for 30 days, after
which it was maintained from 0800 until midnight for another
two months. If a package or magnetic container had been
found behind the radiator, which was checked every morning,
it was planned to actach to jt very thin wires to trigger
a signal should someone remoye the package. At the same
time a member of the surveillance team would be stationed
on the landing of the staircase in this building, out of: }
sight from the hallway below, During the three months :
that the post was maintained, nothing was found concealed
behind the radiator, nor were any suspicious persons seen
entering or leaving the building. The post was then dis-
continued, but the addregs was placed on a list of sus-
picious places inspected daily by the Surveillance Direc-
torate. The true significance of this location became
known to the KGB only later, after the arrest of PENKOV-
SKIY in 1962. .

fe patsa toe

et BE ot

ar ercery

po. so + « NOSENKO first heard of ABIDIAN's visit to the sus-
t , ‘pected dead drop site on the day it occurred. . He was
*. sitting in KOVSHUK's office when he received a telephone
- @all from MATVEYEV telling him of the incident. Although
NOSENKO was ABIDIAN's case officer and KOVSHUK was Chief |
of the U.S. Embassy Section, the decision to place the mo
stationary surveillance post on this location was made at
a higher level; neither of them was involved in it or in
the later decision to discontinue the post. NOSENKO him-
self visited the building on Pushkin Street the following
day or the day after, but he remained only a few. minutes
- and did not recall any details of the hallway. except that
. there was a radiator theres eee, .

domi wee eee

ool aAs. -ABIDIAN's case officer, ‘NOSENKO recallea re-
ceiving the surveillance report of his visit to the
Pushkin Street building and placing this: report. in|.
ABIDIAN's. file. (This is the case file. which NOSENKO’


‘turned over to his successor, GRYAZNOV, about 28-28 December
1961, just before he transferred to the Tourist Department.)

- NOSENKO received no written reports on the results
of the stationary surveillance post, but he did discuss |
this matter with KOZLOV on an almost daily basis during
the first month of surveillance, periodically after that. :
These discussions took place either by telephone, or when “ :
KOZLOV was visiting NOSENKO's office, or when NOSENKO
visited KOZLOV's office in KGB Headquarters. From KOZLOV
or perhaps someone else, NOSENKO learned that the post had
been discontinued after 90 days. On the basis of these
conversations with KOZLOV, NOSENKO knew that nothing of
interest occurred during the period of the stationary sur-
veillance,

a
4

Bh ag ee oe

~- NCSENKO was in the U.3. Embassy Section during all
the period that the stationary surveil-lance—post—was-wateh= me

ing the Pushkin Street site and was there when he heard ot
from KGZLOV that the post hag been replaced by periodic :
inspections. :

- NOSENKO did not report this incident of surveillance
on the Pushkin Street dead drop site to his CIA contacts.
in Geneva in June 1962 because the post had already been
discontinued by this time without anything unusual or sus-
picious having been noted. Therefore he thought that this
incident would not be particularly interesting to the CIA.

Bera an gpeet ndben Mee *

CIA records show that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street
dead drop site only once, on 30 December 1961, a year later than
NOSENKO says, in response to an apparent signal from PENKOVSKIY.
The sequence of events was as follows: On 27 December 1961,
following receipt of what seemed to be the prearranged signal
from PENKOVSKIY that the drop had been loaded, Air Force Captain
Alexis DAVISON drove from his @partment to the U.S. Embassy to
alert ABIDIAN. At about 2100 hours the same night, ABIDIAN
left in his own car for Spasso House, the Ambassador's residence
where a dance was in progress, to tell the CIA Chief of Station,
Paul GARBLER, about the signa]. ABIDIAN and GARBLER left Spasso
House with the other guests at about 0200 on 28 December in
. ABIDIAN's car and drove past the telephone pole where, as part
i of his “drop loaded" signal, PENKOVSKIY was'to leave a mark. -
Later in the morning of 28 December, ABIDIAN, again in ‘his own
car drove from the Embassy to DAJIDSON's apartment, where he
‘pow: «4. first checked the telephone pple visually from the window and pee
then walked by it for a closer examination. ‘Although it was
hot certain that the telephone calls received on 27 December .
had, ‘in fact, keen a signal from PENKOVSKIY and although no -
supplementary mark was found on the telephone pole, a decision
was reached to check the drop. Therefore, at 1115 on 30 Decem-
ber 1961, ABIDIAN with Julian F. MacDONALD, an Embassy Economics
, (Officer, left the Embassy in an official car with a Soviet :
Griver and proceeded to a bookstore on the corner of Pushkin
: Street. At 1130 ABIDIAN entered the building where the drop

- site was located, determined that the drop was empty, and ;
' left one minute later -, The pair then returned to the Embassy. -

.
en es

283,

ste San ie la

res CT

“These facts were outlined tp NOSENKO during the February
1965 int rrogati Tt was pointed ou that.. by his own. most _


14-0000, 4 rae

- recent account, NOSENKO had transferred from the U,S. Embassy
Section to the Tourist Department about 28 December 1961 and ; :
that his participation in a Tourist Department approach to . 7
American citizen W. E, JOHNSON on 5 January 1962 had been con- Lo
firmed by JOHNSON himself. Therefore, NOSENXO was told, much

of what he had told CIA about his own role in the Pushkin |

Street affair became untenable. NOSENKO‘'s response to this

observation is described in Part V.F.3., which discusses

NOSENKO's approach to JOHNSON,

Also during the February 1965 interrogaticns NOSENKO refused
to sign the page of a protocol which read as follows:

"I have keen told by my interrogators that ABIDIAN's
only visit to the Pushkin Street site took place on 30 Dec-
ember 1961. Therefore, I was told that:

a. I could not have placed the surveillance ee
——— areport_in AWIDIAN'S Case file because I.had— already. ~ see
, turned over the file to GRYAZNOV. ;

b. I could not have received rep ports about the :
stationary surveillance wnile still 2SIDIAN's case j
officer, since I was already in the Seventh Depart-
ment in January 1962.

c. The three month period in which the sur-
veillance post was watching the Fushkin Street site
did not expire until 30 March 1962 - more than two
weeks after I left for Geneva. . ;

edad why tie ees

Thus I could not have known in June 1S€2 that the surveil- :
lence of the dead drop site tad failed to produce results
or that it had been discontinued.”

whereas

: Although he acknowledged having reported to CIA on his involve-

: ment with ABIDIAN as summarized jn the protocol, NOSENKO said

. the way in which the protocol was prepared made him "leok silly."
On no other occasion has NOSENKO refused to sign protocols
dealing with other subjects.

cennstie
cee tate ea ee MT ad diate

NOSENKO was questioned further during October 1966 concern-
ing ABIDIAN's visit-to-Pushkin Street. - NOSENKO reaffirmed that ~~ 3
ABIDIAN was under special surveillance coverage throughout his Pe
Moscow tour and that this surveillance detected his travel from j
a
H

; _the U.S, Embassy to Pushkin Street and back: he would date this

‘focus "only as “sometime in 1961." NOSENKO was asked whether KGB sur-
veillance had detected any wnugual movements by ARIDIAN during
the period just preceeding his visit to the PENKOVSKIY drop
site (a reference to his: movements on 27 and 28 December 1961

; as described above). He replied that he knew definitely that
i ; surveillance had reported nothing unusual and added that ;
: ABIDIAN had not succeeded in losing the KGB surveillance at
any time during this period.

‘
}
3
4
nihBsatbe

~ On 20 October 1966 NOSENKO was asked why. in his ; opinion,
ABIDIAN had gone to Pushkin Street at the time he did. In re-
sponse, he told CIA for the first time that in about.1960 an. _

aoeboo ay 8.

American tourfat or delegation member had gone to the Pushkin» ©
Street address and that it was the “opinion of the Second Chief -
Directorate” that this American had selected it as a dead drop _
site,* it was thought that ABIDIAN went there merely to check =~ te Ege d
the suitability of the. proposed site. a o

When he was asked on 20 October 1966 whether he had visited
the Pushkin Street address several days after ABIDIAN had been
seen there, as he had earlier said, NOSENKO replied: "I don't
remember. I do not want to say that I visited the dead. drop. I.
don't remember now whether I visited it or not. It seems to me : : :
that I visited it, but I don't remember. It seems that I visited
it with KOZLOV, but I cannot say ‘yes,' and I cannot say ‘no.'"

4
4

As previously indicated, NOSENKO said that on the same day
KEIDIAN was observed on Pushkin Street (i.e., on 30 December
1961} the Chief of the KGB Surveillance Directorate, KOZLOV,
inspected the Pushkin Street building. The FBI had reported,

we ae re

... Showever, that. KOZIOV was on TDY in the United States from... Loe ee Loe. 3
15 November 1961 until leaving New York City on 30. December . ; i
1351, travelling via France. The°timing of ABIDIAN's visit to ,
Pushkin Srreet, at 0330 hours New York City (Eastern Standard)
time, would appear to preclude the possibility of KOZLOV's having
gore to the dead drop site on the day NOSENKO Said he did.

fodiens

ties gan

_ ™ The Pushkin Street dead drop site was proposed by PENKOV-

: SKIY himself in the August 1960 letter by which he initi- .

Lo ally contacted CIA. .The only xnown visits by Americans to . “ : 4

- _ this address and the only onea connected with its use asa on

‘dead drop location occurréd on 12 November and 4 December

1960, when CIA officer Eugene MAHONEY checked the address
from the outside, and on 21 January 1961; when MAHONEY
returned and entered the building to check the precise

.@ead drop location. See Part V.E.3.f.. for a discussion. .

of NOSENKO's knowledge of MAHONEY. a ee


4-06800 *

Oe Supervisor of Activities Against American Service Attaches © oe go Be
L , At the beginning of the interrogation session. on 29 , . .

ie January 1965, NOSENKO was asked to list the duties he as-
. sumed upon reporting to the U.S. Embassy Section in Jan-
wary 1969. As he had on a number of earlier cccasions, .
a NOSENKO replied that he was giver responsibility for the -~ -
supervision of code clerk operations, was made the KGB
case officer for American Security Officer John ABICIAN
who waa to arrive in the near future, and was charged - i
with the Second Chief Directorate file on the security of , i
the U.S. Embassy and his section's file ca the materiacs. .
from microphones in various Exbassy officea. Later in
this same session NOSENKO recailed--and told CIA-for the
first time--that he was also given the duty of supervising
activities against cfficers assigned to the U.S. Arny,
Navy, and Air Force Attache officea~ The pertinent : - e
portion of the 29 January 1965 interrogatica was as fol- — - . ;
Owss f

sch AB bSsnbtase

ab Bee ee net

‘Qvuéstion: Who briefed you or gave you instructions cn
what was expected of you in the Section?

NOSENKOs I was speaking with GRIBANOV and KLYPIN.

Questions Wnat did KLYPIN say?

me ott A tena

NOSENKOs That “you are Deputy Chief of Section, but I

consider that you must also pay special atten~ i
tion to code clerks. We must study them and .
make an approach to one of them, It’s necessary
to work on this.” KOVSEUK was in KLYPIN's
office and I remember also that he raised the
question: “O.K. He will supervi-e this kind
of work, but maybe he can also take tne military.
All three attaches." Well, KUYPIN did not say

_ yes and dic not say no, I couldn't say anything
because I had not begun; I didn't know how auch
work this would involva. I couldn't say. And, . ;
you see, KLYPIN said: “Let's try it a short.

: ‘ period of time.” It was that way. It was
Po 7 decided that Iwill supervise the code. clerks.
: ; : and then the three attaches, And KOVSHUK took

: ; the diplomats and a whole pile of work. But,
pw gs wee wo «1 +. Of course, in the absence of KOVSHUK I nust
; ; take everything and in ry absence, RKOVSHUK
must take everything. But later, 1,2,3 -- I |
don't remember dates -- later I was not super-_ ; . . aye
_wising the military attaches but concentrated wo Ee
only on code clerks. ; ; Tos, co

Later you were not supervising military attaches,
‘but only code clerks? - De ,

‘ehree attaches. have any questions. or any papers’.
to report to the Chief of Section, they go.to ~


me, not to KOVSHUK.. They were deciding all —
a questions with me, This is what supervising

7 a : the work on these three attaches means. They .

a were deciding all questions with me. For exe. . ae :

. _ ample, the casa officers who were working ; oo .

af - against diplomats -= KUSKOV, ARTEMOV, FEDYANIN,

CBEREPANOV -~ they were reporting any questions, ; . .

any papers, to KOVSHUK. You see, there was / ae

oO such a division {of labor]. ~ ~ : . a a

Questions Am I correct that by military attaches you .
mean Army, Navy, and Air Force? - :

abate o

NOSENKOs Yes.

33

thee SR Lteaty eevonaiet

Questions Attaches and their assistants?

NOSENKO: Yes, yes, yes.

Questions: And enlisted pers5nnel? _.

NOSENKO: DEMKIN was handling enlisted perscrnel, and he
was also coming in to me for advice.

wee ee ee elem wale

Questions Roughly how long did you have the responsibil-
ities for the attaches?

NOSENKOs (paure) I don't remember, Several nonths.

dee cet le nee oe

Questions By several, you meaneee?

NOSENKO:s Five or six.

Questions And why was this responsibility removed from
you?

RNOSENKOs I didn't have time. No time, No time. You see,
‘ besides this, which is simple to explain, ther
were too many other questions which...

eet taeda titi bo ella et

Questions What occupied most of your time?

. j
NOSENKO!. Day-to-day matters. An order from the Chief of ‘
Department to study and develop this question, oad
then this question, then this question. Then . |
something to prepare for GRIBANOV, then some-
thing to prepare for KLYPIN, for his report,
then something to prepare for myself...

Question: To which of the major responsibilities you have
mentioned did you devote the most time?

NOSENKO3 I don't know.

‘ Questione. What was most important?

HOSENKOs' . They were all important.

Can you tell‘me whexe you’ were épending most. of:-
yous time to cause the removal of your respon~ -
for. military. attaches?. et

a


Mei tet

are.

HE Voy

a ae : - 7 238.

WOSENKOS No. I can't tell‘you. _ re
Questicns Who was given the respensibility for military
; attaches? - : So,
HOSENKO: Just a moment. I think ne was... I don't re-
member how, or what date, when there appeared in
the First [American] Department a Ceputy Chief an
of Departzent. It was either before I came,
or it was in January, or it was a littie bit
later. :

Questions Who was this?

a
+h
4
4
’
3
A
?

RNOSENKOs ALESHIN.,* And his job was such -- it was a
new one -- supervision of work against military
. intelligence officers, net only Americans, but
° of other departments aiso, the First, the
. -  Seconc, tne Third, the Fourth, the Fifth, Co=-
~ TO, ordination of the whole work against all miiitary
, intelligence officers. And that's why, later, -
KLYPIN and KOVSHUK said: "Well, why are you
supervising this? Let ALESHIN do it. You are
the Deputy of che Chief." It was not only be- 4
- cause of the lack of tine. Also it wasn't con- i
venient to the case officera. They were re~-
porting to me. “hen ALESHIN would invite them i
in and they would have to report tne sama thing Gg
to hin. :

1
sea

pent Wabe  ot ae

Questicns Who were you supervising?

NOSENKOs eeeGAVRILENKO had the Air Force attaches and
assistants; KURILENKO nad the Army Attache and
assistants; and BELOGLAIQV the Naval Attache,
assistants and marines.**

During interrogations on 20 October 1966, NOSENKO
chansed his earlier statement that the only operational
file he held in the U.S, Embassy Section was that on
ABIDIAN. At the same time, he described a leave period
that he had not mentioned earlier. NOSENKO said: "When
I began to work {in the U.S, Embassy Section}, after a ~
month or 80, I took the files on the Naval attaches. And

-wonssita te iieceiso«

THOSENKO had mentioned this earlier. on 18 June 1904 he was .
Op aes asked to list the names and functions of U.S. Embassy Sec- : bo eee ne oe

waM Bre atte nee k

tion officers in 1960. He said: “In 1960 the Chief of the

First Department was KLYPIN. .MAIVEYEV was still there as

First Deputy. The Second Deputy was. Yevgeniy Nikolayevich ~~. “4
_ALESHIN, He was given the special assignzent of coordinae ~ . :
ting the activities of the Second Chief Directorate. against
. @ll foreign military intelligence activity but was assigned

to. the First Department... In the First Section, KOVSHUK
_... Was the Chief and I was the Deputy Chief. In addition to

-, general functions, I had the responsibility for supervising

-' the work against code clerks anc the Embassy Security Officer.”
“@*@ In June 1964 NOSENKO explained that Nikolay DRANOV was re--
- @ponsible for the Naval Attache‘s- office in January when © ~
.WOSENKO arrived, but he was: transferred and his duties, were
taken over by BELOGLAZOV who had. been working ‘with: him
against this target. -


1400000" -

then after two months I gave then to BELOGLAZOV. I in--
mediately went cn vacation after I came.* After two weeks
I went on leave for a month. I took over the files either .
before or after the leave,*** NOSENKO was asked why he ;
had assumed responsibility only for the Naval Attaches and ; .
replied: 1t was decided by KOVSHUK. I should take only: Se — oe: a
the Navy while I was gettiag acquainted with the section. . oO “OTS
At the same time, the case officer DRANOV was retiring and : .

he handled only Naval officers. I didn't take the Army. ee |

or Air Force."

4
“4

NOSENKO was asked again on 25 October 1966 why he
was responsible only for the aval Attaches during early
1960. He answered: “I took the files only on the Navy, .
but I was working on all of them.“

a ee

a cad LetneRtees

cere EOE

©7Yn other’ contexts NOSENRO has always equated Gustody .
of a file with case officer responsibilities. There-
fore, he seems to have indicated here. that for the
" approximately two months when these files were in his et wasn
mame, he was officially the KGB case officer charged ; ms
. with the American Naval Attaches. ; .
_ #f During a subsequent ‘interrogation session, NOSENKO was

“ asked to describe the leaves he took during:1960 and

1961. He repeated that he took 4 month's leave im
- pediately upon joining the U.S. Embassy Section, “part
of January and part of Pebruary” 1960; He had gone, — co.
he said, to the Caucasus with his wife and mather. He
then addeds “You want ma to say I was not telling the ©
truth in February {1965}. when I said I. was on leave be~ .
fore. i want to Cuba. [in Nov--ber’ 1960]..: 1 -know- this." .-
(See Part V.E.3.d.,. which describes: this November 1960.
“Jeave and its relationship to NOSENKO"'s: responsibilities
as cas officer for John ABIDIAN.):. 00 veces aes


1epodop.

fii, Knowledge of the Target .
“ow Introduction —

:.. Hie position and duties as beputy Chief and sometimes
Acting Chief gave NOSENKO access to, and required hin to
know, the extent of. the U.S. Embassy Section’s knowledge.
of its target. He has therefore been questioned at length .
by CIA about the locations and cccupente oz the Embascy ; !
offices as well as about the Embassy personnel whom the KGB . ; :
had identified ag CIA officera. ‘The information from
NOSENKO on these two topics is presented below,

a eine . y ved

(44) Physical Premises

NOSENKO has said that tis knowledgo of the physical
layout of the Embassy cerivea both from his gencral super-
—--- -- =: yvisery function during 1960 and-1961 and from nis respons
_ gibilities as the officially registerad custodian of the
‘KGB's file on the security of the Embassy. According to
NOSEMMRO, he received the latter from his chief, KOVSHUK,
when he arrived in the section in January 1960; shortly
thereafter he arranged by a phone call to the Secretariat :
of the Second Chief Directorate *o have custody transferred © . _- ae
officially to his name from that of M.F. BAXHVALOV, his
predecessor as Deputy Chief of Section. NOSENKO explained
that BAKHVALOV had already left the section by this time
but that, under KGB prcce-lures, it was permissivle for an
officer to remain official custodian of a file belonging
to the U.S, Embassy Section, even after leaving the American - ; : {
Department, 80 long as he remained in the Seccnd Chief :
Directorate. Until he turned this file over to GRYAZNOV
approximately duriny the pariod 25 to 28 December 1961, no
one else had access to it other than KOVSHUK, Chief of the
section, and GRYAZNOV and KCSOLAPOY, who shared the office
and safe where this file was kept. :

oy whdainereatsctadid Babes

LD Rete adn

NOSENKO stated in February 1965 that he had never
studied the contents, nor had he paid any special attention
-to this file. Since he would necessarily have been in a
position to know, NOSENKO also said he is certain that no
operational analysis or planning. by himself cr others was
‘done on the basis of this file during his two years in the
section. The file consisted of two volumes, one for the old
building on Mokhovaya Street and the second--about one inch
eres thick--concerning the new Embassy building on Chaykovskiy - ose paar
: Street, which was occupied in 1953. It was used only for 7 F
reference purposes, for the KGB had concluded that it was
impoesible for a Soviet citizen to penetrate’ the secure i
areas of the Embassy because of the security precautions in
: a, effect. Apart from these file-custodial duties, NOSENKO was
: ++... generally interested in the floor plans of, the Embassy .by
_ wirtue of his position as Deputy. Chief of the section.
HOSENKO's knowledge of the Embassy premises is reflected in. - .
the CIA debriefing of February 1965, and these statements ©.
are given in the next paragraphs. =k yee sy re

cn a Rt.

Penta AY Allan anim,

om

spate

bes cap fetuses

rr are rT as a aes i feats one, aa . wok
“:PAll KGB: employees who went into the secure areas ("Zone -* -
‘of Security”) of the Embaszy on. the séventh through tenth floors*®
wens seventh Floor is not one of the secure areas; the |

eighth, ninth, and tenth are. tet

t


eee part V.E.3.c. reviews NOSENKO's knowledge of and parti-

were carefully questioned on: what they: saw, because these, -~

areas were of special interest to the KGB, 'NOSENKO knew
no KGB employees who entered the secure areas curing
1960 or 1961 and had no personal contact with any of them.
He did not remember any information that such KGB employees’
ever reperted to the KGB, except that Dmitriy I. KUKOLEV,
an electrician whom he personally handled in 1954-1955,

had observed antenna wiring in the atticr the details or
significance of the wiring were unknown to NOSENKO as of
1965.

NOSENKO personally psaced some reports by KGB agents
in the Embassy security file while he had custody of it.
None of the information, he said, was interesting, in-
portant, or useful enough for him to remember, and he
could not name the: agent sources of the KGB. In another
context and at another time, however, NOSENKO said he
had received a report from some agent (name unknown)
that there was a sign “Security Office" on the office —~

‘door of John V. ABIDIAN, the Embassy: Security officer.*

NOSENKO @id not study the Enbassy security pro-
cedures in detail and did not remember where the classified
trash wes burned. He said that nothing could be done with
this information operaticnally, because the trash was al-
ways burned by a U.S. sergeant or a Marine guard ac-
companied by an officer.**

The Embassy office or floor where any section was
located or any individual worked during the years 1960
and 1961 was not remembered by NOSENKO, This reply was
also given when he was asked about tha rooms and floors
for the offices of the ambassador, the political officers,
ABIDIAN, and the code clerks,*** NOSENKO said that he
eithor knew these locations at the time he was Deputy
Chief of the section or could nave found them in the
in the monthly Embassy phone lists; the KGB received these
regularly from agent sources, and the lists gave office
numbers and phone numbers.****

¥ There never has been such a sign} NOSENAO’s responsi-
bility for the KGB coverage of ABIOIAN is discussed
in, Part V.E.3.d.. All Soviets who enter the top three
floors of the Embassy have a marine escort. :

oe A check with two former Embassy security officers in-
dicates that there has never been such a regulation.
fhe trash is burned by the marine on duty who “in-
variably does it alone." One of the security officers
questioned said: “I can think of no reason why the Sov-
iets would think this to be the case, since whatever

. Collateral information they have on it would point to
_ the truth."

cipation in KGB operations against U.S. code clerks.

eee The telephone lists give only phone numbers, not office

:: mumbers. They do, however, provide apartment numbers.

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soe, ‘ th “4960 | a enataliie chamber® (acoustical room) arrived - ,
sat the Embassy for President Eisenhower's use.and for .
secret conversations. NOSENKO was not certain where it was ars
‘located or whether it was ever used, but he heard from an. -
unknown source that in 1960-1961 meetings were held in a oe
secure room in the "Zone of Security.” He did net know any ; ; ae

of the technical details of this room. .

The KGB accomplished only one theft cf classified
material in any form from the U.S. Embassy during 1969 . 4

_ and 1961. A charwoman (name or crypsonym not recalled), . 4
who worked as an agent for the KGB officer Viktor BELOG= ;
LAZOV, stole a bag of papers from the office of the Naval .
Attaches. Most of the papers were turn or crumpled. They -  . a
included a draft of a report of the Naval Attaches’ sighting :
of ships and factories while on a trip to Leningrad, Since 7
this report was of only routine interest to the KGB, NOSENKO - a

.. Said, he was unable to recall any other details of the theft, ~ : Gy
« dneluding the date, except that the charwoman was granted © ‘
a cash award, :

(iii) CIA Personnel Under Embassy Cover 3

According to NOSENKO, the Americans at the U.S, Embassy
of graatest counterintelligence interest to the KGB section
were the identified CIA officers, When questioned on 2-
September 1964 concerning his knowledge of intelligence per-
sonnel assigned to the Embassy in 1960 and 1961, NOSENKO
stated that the KGB immeciately listed any officer associated
with the offices of U.S. Armed Forces Attaches as a member
of American Military Intelligence and any diplomat.as "suspect
American Intelligence,” the latter nctaticon always meaning
CIA, One of the tasks of the section was to determine which ©
of these diplomats was the CIA "Resident" (KGB nomenclature
for.Chief of Station), which were CIA case officars, and
which were tho CIA agents or cooptees, The KGB knew that
code clerks would not be used to fulfill intelligence missions
and that the same probably held true for the Ambassador and
the Marine guards. NOSENKO on 25 February 1965 signed a pro
,tocol which included his statement that, as Deputy Chief and
occasional Acting Chief of the section, he would "necessarily
know whom thea KGB knew or suspected to be a CIA. officer in the
Embassy."

a4
d
?
4
2

NOSENKO has been shown lists of the names of all .
~-, American personnel assigned to the embassy during 1960 and Bo
1961 and on a number of occasions has been asked to select :
those known or suspected by tha KGB to be CIA officers. The . .
persons he so identified, together with his comments con- Lo 1
corning them were: - : :

“Boris KLOSSON: Considered to be the CIA *Resident*
’ dm Moscow during this period. NOSENKO did not know why
KLOSSON was considered as such but said: “Every officer ~
' im the First [U.S. Embassy] Section thought he was the
! Resident." KLOSSON may have taken David MARK's job,
WOSENKO said, and MARK had been suspected of being the
CIA Resident on the basis of: his. behavior under KGB.
. surveillance and of his: letter mailing. * NOSENKO aid.


14-0000

TREN Se RE ANE IT 8 ME EARLE SH SAE

7 a Rah orcs a chenmecerectrcmmecuet emranre erences ©

.

243.

not récall the names of KGB agents working specifically
against. XLOSSON and never read any agent or surveil-
lance report indicating that KLOSSON was engaged in
clandestine activity, NOSENKO did net know KLOSSON's
position: in the Embassy, where he had been previously
stationed, what trips he tcok inside the Soviet Union,
where he Lived in Moscow, about KLOSSON's wife or
whether he had children with him in Moscow, anything
about his personal life, the nawos of close American
friends and his Soviet contacts. “I didn't read the
file" on KLOSSON, NOSENKO said on 3 February 1965.

The responsible KGB officer, A.M, MIKHAYLOV, "was
reading [the file]. I can't tell you why [we believed
KLOSSON was the CIA Resident], There was opinicn--his
previcus position, attitude. Little, little Getails,
I don't remember.°*

-John ABIDIAN: Consicered to be a CIA officer
on the basis of his conduct as a U.S. Departnent of
State security officer in coi:nection witn Premier
KHRUSHCHEV's 1959 visit to the United States and he-=
cause he replaced known CIA officer Russell LANGELLE
in Moscow. Surveillance established the fact that he
railed operational letters and visited a possible dead
drop site in Moscow (see Part V.E.3.d.).

“George WINTERS: Known to be a CIA cfficer and
was given special attention because of his operational
activity in the POPOV case.** WINTERS was in perscnal
contact with KCOVSHUK, who used the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs as cover. The KGB case officer responsible
for covering WINTERS was V.A. KUSKOV,.

“Steve WASHENKOs: Known to be a CIA officer. As
far as NOSENKO was aware, the KGB identified WASHENKC
as a CIA officer on the basis of his mailing one or
two letters to KGB-controlled double agents in the Baltic
area, In addition, from a KGB microphone he was over-
heard dictating an intelligence report shortly after he
xeturned from a trip in the USSR.

Lewis BOWDEN; Suspected of being a CIA officer,
but NOSENKO could not recall the reasons why.*** KOVSHUK,
under Ministry of Foreign Affairs cover, was in contact
with BOWDEN.

= See below} William MORELL was identitied Dy KLOSSON to the
Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs as a CIA officer be-
fore MORELL arrived in Moscow,

** The case of GRU Lieutenant Colonel POPOV is discussed in
Part VI.D.7.a.3; further KGS information on WINTERS is re-
viewed in Part VI.D.7.C.

*** The CHEREPANOV document; which sets forth a KGB plan for
operations against BOWDEN, lists several reasons why he
was believed to be an FBI representative in the Embassy.
NOSENKO, when reading this document in Geneva in February
1964, concurred in this opinion; he referred to BOWDEN
as FBI on later occasiony also. Sea Part VI.De7.c. on
CHEREPANOV,.

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244.

- Richard FUNKHOUSER: Suspected cf being a CIA ; oN _
officer because he is a specialist on the Soviet Union, a! Se
particularly economics. NOSMNKG did not remember the ; *
names of any agents working against FUNKHOUSER nor any
derogatory information concerning him.

_* William HORBALY: Suspected of being a CIA case
officer* because the KGB heard him, by means of micro- us
phones in the Embassy, discussiny a report he had
written, or dictating it, about his cbservations on
a trip he hac taken in the Soviet Union. NOSENKO said
that he did not know the names cf agents working
against WORBALY or whether the agents obtained deroga-
tory information concerning him. As far as NOSENKO
knew, there had been no operaticnal approach to or ~ : i
recruitment. of HORBALY. 7 ; 4

4
4
:
4
E

Of the seven U.S. Embassy officers designated by j

NOSENKO as known or suspected CIA personnel, three--WINTERS, . A
- WASHENKO, and HORBALY--were in fact CIA officers. When 1
’ HORBALY was first assigned to Moscow, however, he was i

detached from overt employment as an economic analyst in

CIA. %In January 1962 he severed his connect:cns with CIA

to become a full member of the Poreign Agricuitural Ser-

vice of tha Department of Agriculture. When HORBALY first

arrived in Moscow he openly discusse4 the fact that he had come

to the Embassy from CIA. While in Mcscow he had no connection

with or knowledge of CIA clandestine activities. WASHENKO was

similarly detached from overt employment as an economic analyst

with CIA when he was assigned to Moscow, but was coopted by

CIA for limited operational support activity, chiefly mailing

agent letters. After his return from Moscow he reverted to

his overt CIA employment. John ABIDIAN was a State Department

officer coopted by CIA; although not a CIA staff employee, he

was for all intents the CIA "Resident" 1n Moscow from Febru-

ary 1960 until November 1961. The remaining three--KLOSSON,

BOWDEN and FUNKHOUSER--had no affiliation with CIA.

ee eo eS

2

PRA HNO a One ee

: During the time NOSENKO said. he belongec to the American
‘ . Embassy Section there were stationed in Moscow two CIA . : oR
: officers, Eugene P. MAHONEY and Paul GARBLER, whose status :
. as such was subsequently found to have been known to the .
KGB before their arrival in the Soviet Union. In addition, Ce te fee ape
one officer (William MORELL) was openly identified as a CIA :
employee to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs before ; .
arriving in Moscow. Furthermore, Francis STEVENS (see Page . ’
374) reported having been. asked by one of the two KGB offi- ; ,
cers trying to recruit him whether MORELL was a CIA employee;
when STEVENS replied that he did not know, the KGB officer
stated: “He openly says he does." Another officer (G. Stan-
ley BROWN), an overt CIA employee, had transferred to the
‘U.S. Department of Agriculture shortly before being assigned to
the. Embassy. The latter two were not engaged in clandestine
activities in Moscow on behalf. of CIA | but the. first. two CIA
officers were. o

stretinnine ne conerin Wee paregernen amemtamentanees clan oeaeee

: - NOSENKO. indicated that he did not ‘know about ‘the. “intel
ligence affiliation of any of theae four. persons:

Poo NOSENKO was shown a photograph. o£ MAHONEY,- whom
he did. not recognize. He was then given MAHONEY's |

mame, which he recognized as being that of an. employee
of the Administrative Section of the Embassy


14-do009

oY ee

said that, other than this, he di
about MAHONEY--his previcus carea ;
Russian language, when he arrived in Mosceow, when he a nn se
departed, where he lived, his activ2t1¢s there, or | io . oy
evicence that he was ar intellig ence officer. "It _ ; fo
‘
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G net know anything
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wasn't known he was a CIA officer,* NOSENKO said on

3 February 1965. “If there was evidence I would have
known. But there was none.” “CSENKO was told that
MAHONEY's CIA status had been revealed to the KGB by

a KGB penetration of British intell: gence {George
BLAKE]. He replied that he was certain that the U.S.
Embassy Section's file on MAHOLEY contained no infor-
mation from such a source concerning MARONEY, and that
had there been such informatics avaiiabie, he would
have been a special turget aid «ould have Leen handled
by one of the best officers im the section. NCSENKG
added that he could not understana why this infer- : See ke . a
Mation about MAHONEY was not givea to the section by
the KGB First Chief Dircctorate.

sabe il

ay Maes Seishin,

y

~ NOSENKO identifies Paul CARSLER as a naval officer 5
who worked in the office of the Naval Attache and the md
case officer working against him as BILCGLAZOV He saic
that he could provide no other detaiis on GAPBLER.
NOSEXZO specifically said thaz ne ¢ not know the names
of any agents work2ng against CARBLER, that ne knew of
no unusual or interesting .znfermaticn concerning GARBLER
contained from concealed micrcznones, telephone taps,
or surveillance, and that he cic not know whether he
had read GARBLER's file or other "materials" ccncerning

him.

1a

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gene

a

- NOSENKO did not identify William MCRELL as a CIA
« officer.* Nor did he know that while MORELL was in the
Soviet Union, he was under direct cultivation by NOSENKO’s
superior, KOVSHUK, and by K.N. SMIRNOV, a case officer
of the KGB First Chief Directorate.

- NOSENKO did not reccgnize the name of G. Stanley
BROWN. As shown on a list which NOSENKO brought to CIA,
. BROWN shared an office with HCFBALY, wnom NOSENKO said
. nL was: a suspected CIA officer; in this office was.a KGB
: ' microphone with good reception but insignificant pro-
@uctien, accorcing ts PUSENZ.. 7% Peperteily E2l0N and .
another member of the Embassy staff were under constant 4
surveillance during a trip witnin the USS2 during 1961, .
and in the same year he travelited to Leningrad with
WINTERS, correctly identified ty NCSENKO as:‘a CIA officer.

ine ett comme bp eatpenm sn

_ CIA records show that, as a staff officer, MAHONEY served
in Frankfurt during 1955 and 1956 2:4 was connected with a . i
/ joint CIA/MI-6. project which handles the NTS, a Russian enigr2 ~ mE
organization. His work brought his into liaison in true name Ly v8
with both MI-6 and the French Service; he was known to NTS an H
Personnel PY. his true. first. name. only... _ H

° that’ in late 1960 or early ‘T9361. naa U.S. *pmbassy Section.

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14.0000

’ Assistant General Sesvices Officer at the U.S. Embassy.

MAHONEY arrived. in Moscow on-4 October 1960 as the
His specific CIA mission there was to ‘support the handling

of PENKOVSKIY inside the Soviet Union. MAHONEY lived in
America House. From the start cf his tour he was active in

his attempts to familiarize himself with Moscow and he

frequently toured various areas of the city on foot. In
checking locations conriected with the PENKOVSKIY case,.
MAHONEY went to the Pushkin Street dead drop location on
two occasions during November and December 1960, and he
‘made a thorough examination of the dead drop itself as

well as of its related signal site on-21 January 1961.
Throughout, MAHONEY was subjected to intensive -KGB surveil-
lance. In a report dated 25 October 1960, ABIDIAN com-
mented on this as follows: "I find this type of coverage
(five surveillants on a recent trip to the barter shop)
completely out of character with that which is usually
given a new arrival of similar rank. ily only inference

is that the KGB has at least strong suspicions of MAHONEY's
primary role [CIA officer]. As for surveillance on my-
self, it continues to be eccasional and extremely discreet."

George BLAKE, the KGB penecration of NI-6, was arrested
in London on 14 April 1961. Iu his confession he said that
he had passed the KGB a master list of the names of persons
connected with the joint U.S.-British project with which
MAHONEY had been connnected in Frankfurt, as well as other
materials on this project. On this basis, ‘“'AHONEY was
relieved shortly thereafter of further duties connected with
support of the PENKOVSKIY operation; he was withdrawn fron
Moscow in September 1961, less than a year after his arrival.

CIA records indicate that GARBLER was detailed to CIA
by the Navy in April 1952 and served CIA under Naval cover

gin Berlin from January 1953 until July 1955. In the fall

‘of 1955, he resigned his naval commission, and in May 1956
he was assigned as a CIA officer to the U.S. Embassy in
Stockholm. GARBLER served there until August 1959 in the

cover position of Second Secretary and Political Officer (FSR).

On 3 June 1961, he returned to active duty with the Navy,

and on 31 August 1961 his appointment was announced as |
Assistant Naval Attache to Mcscow, with the rank of Commander.
In. September 1961 his official bicgraphic data was forwarded
to the office of the Soviet Naval Attache in Washington, who
had requested this information, and the same month GARBLER
made an official call at the Soviet Embassy. GARBLER arrived
in Moscow on 29 November 1961. He was the CIA Chief of .
Station there.

Prior to his affiliation with CIA, GARBLER served in
Korea and there was acquainted with George BLAKE. In April
1960 GARBLER was a participant in joint CIA-MI-6 discussions
in Washington on-the question of tourist operations into

-the Soviet Union. (see Part V.D.8); BLAKE, who had access

to information on the agenda and participants for these talks,
-- admitted after his. arrest in 1961 that he had photographed
he minutes of this meeting and had passed them to his. Soviet.

andlers. .On this basis CIA presumed that-GARBLER.was
dentified to. the KGB prior to arriving in Moscow at the

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“end of 1961. (BLAKE was arrested the previous April:) He

! was definitely identified as such in an article carried in
a in October 1963.

_ the Soviet Government newspaper Jzvestiy

. This article, entitled "A Cruel Leseon, was allegedly

written by Arthur HAMAN, an Estonian who defected to the
West in 1955 and returned to the Soviet Union in 1963; in
it HAMAN attempted to expose how “the U.S. Secret Service,
riding roughshod over Swedish sovereignty. recruits agents

for subversion and espionage against the Soviet Union and
the official U.S.

other countries...making active use of

missions in Stockholm, newsmeu: tourists..." HAAN named

GARBLER as having been involved in. this work. ‘This article,

which appeared at about the same time as the arrest of: |. ;

WENNERSTRON, described a sunber of fabricated activities
ARBLER had no connection

of CIA in Sweden and, in fact, G
with HAMAN or with anything which HANAN describes. *

ABIDIAN's visit-to the PENKOVSKLY

GARBLER's part in
in 5treet is discussed in Part

‘dead drop site on Pushk
V.E.3.d.

a Bee Page 394 fox Gther KGB operational use of HAMAN.

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g.
(i) Introduction

Electronic Operations Against the U.S. Embassy

audio and other electronic operations against the U.S. Em-. a
bagsy in Moscow: The preseace of microphones in the .
-chancery buiiding, the absencé of audio-technical devices
in the north wing of the Embassy, and the exidtence of a
beam which monitors and jams transmissions from the Embassy.
Thesé are discussed separately below. Except for knowing
that a resonant cavity (wireless) ‘microphone had been found
in the American Ambassador's residence in 1953, NOSENKO
said he was unaware of audio surveillance devices and tech-
niques (other than the chancery nicrophones) in use against
the Embassy, nor did he know of any material produced by
such measures. NOSENKO told CIA on 14 May 1964 that, to . . . -

“the best of his knowledge,“ there were no wireless micro- . -

phones (i.e., carrier transmitters and radio transmitters)

in the Embassy.* His information on KGB electronic opera- .

tions against this target dated mainly from the period when

he was Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, American .
Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate, in 1960-1961 and ; i
derives from his special responsibilities in this period;

from his 1953-1955 service in the American Department, NO- .
SENKO said, he learned only that audio installations : L
existed. ;

NOSENKO had. three basic pieces of information on KGB : 7 |
i

oy Line Strada tate

(11) Microphones in the Chancery

Frequently described by NOSENKO as his most important :
information, the microphones in the chancery building were
first mentioned by him during the 1962 meetings in Geneva.
In these and subsequent debriefings NOSENKO reported in de-.
; “tail on the ways in which he acquired this information, on
i the number and locations of the microphones, the quality of
; reception, and the value of production. He has not given
the date wheo the. microphones became operative, but pre-
sumed (in agreement with the KGB defector GOLITSYN) that
_they Ware installed prior to 1953, when the chancery was oc-
ecupied by U.S. Government representatives. ** Of the 16
, microphones listed by NOSENKO, he has stressed the impor-~
$ . ’ tance of the one in the office of the Minister Counsellor,
: the existence of which was earlier reported by GOLITSYN and
subsequently confirmed by technical investigations. In
- 1962 NOSENKO said that the audibility of the nine-year-old . .

*NOSENKO stated that the KGB knew the identity of American

counter-audio technicians and therefore turned off the micro-

‘phones whenever any of them arrived at the Embassy. Since
‘-—@ microphone-and-wire system cannot be turned off, this re-—
- mark suggests gither that there was an external power source
for the microphones, which NOSENKO has not mentioned, or. .
that NOSENKO himsel? did not | ‘have rodimentary knowledge of
such matters...

TA at

eethe investigations. by American technicians ‘leave ac. doubt.
that the precte arya shail systems would have hae: te be oy


_—

‘system var

ied from very clear'4o zero: he said in 1964.
that the quality was deteriorating and that “in & year or

two they {the microphones| will be coppletely inoperative."* |
Althougkt the microphones produced a great deal of politi- —
cal intelligence, NOSENKO said, .he found nothirg worthwhile
for use against U.S. code clerks or others. of operetional
interest to him.** All pertinent details from NOSENKO and ©
other sources on the microphone system in the chancery
biiilding is presented in the fol..uwing portions of this

paper.
(a) NOSENKO's Sources - oe

Nearly all of NOSFENKO's knowledge about the microphone
system in the chancery pbuilding was, te said, derived fron
two circumstances: Fitst, his responsibility as Deputy
Chief of the KGB's U.S. Embassy Section, for receiving and
disseminating transcripts of conversations there; and second,
a special meeting which he attended in his dual capacity as —
Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section and custodian of
the microphone information. Additional information was ob-
tained by NOSEXKO in 1962 and 1963 from G.I. GRYAZNOV, his
former subordinate and his successor as Deputy Chief of the
Section. In several discussions with GRYAZNOV duting this
period NOSENKO learned that some of the microphones were
dead while others had become less efficient since NOSENKO's
reassignment to the Tourist Department in Junuary 1962.
NOSENKO's statements concerning his major sources’ 6f infor~
mation on the microphones are presented in chronological
order below. .

“We are listening to everything the military attaches
say in Moscow, the Military, Navy and Air Force Attaches,"

. KOSENKO said on 11 June 1962. “All the reports go through

me. I read them....Only @ limited group of people read
these reports. They are all in the First Department of the

’ Second Chief Directorate. ho are thev? The Chief of the

Department (we don't give them to his deputies), the Chief

of the [U.S. Embassy] Section, and I--altogether three people.
Sometimes we report to GRIBANOV things we consider important.
We conceal the fact that we are listening to the Americans
from our workers in other departments, from the English
Department, from the French Department....We are listening

to the three attaches and the Minister Counsellor. Don't
even send coded cables about me (to Moscow). If you do it
will be the end of me....Only three people know that we

are listening to you. Even within the Second Chief Directo-

“yate it is a tremendous secret that we are listening. to you.”

tt ROSENKO was asked on 12 June 1962 about the form in which

he received the audio intercept reports and whether these

’ reports were delivered to his office: He answered: “No.

Here's how it is done. We have a special unit concerned

oo ees
*Tests of the KGB equipment by the American technicians
later. in 1964 resulted in recordings of high, intelligibility

;in, certain instances. : >». “ty

esVulnerability data’ on Americans. in Moscow c

-gnd according to the views: of the U.S. Arny Attache whose
‘office inthe Embassy was the. aite of a microphone.
wos eb ag : * ea &

oscow could be obtained.
~ from the microphone: system, according to the damage report: .
by the Security Committee of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB

3
3
4
4
i
7

j
i

adda


Question: What was the date of this? What year and month? -
“NOSENKO: Ob, I don't Fenenber, 1960...maybe the beginning

250.

with this function which is called: the Second Special
Department. It is a part of the Operationai Technical -

’ Directorate [OTU]. The Special Department has several

sections within it. Take, for example, the section under
Colonel [N.Ya.} KUZMIN. He has the entire English line,
everything. He has young girls.and boys there who have an
excellent command of English. They all sit in a room with
special equipment and listen continuously. Besides this,.
everything goes on tape and later they transcribe it. They.
listen to it two or three times so as to get every word....
{They prepare the materials.] The materials from the
American Embassy used to come to me...and 1 decided what to
keep and what not to keep. Why? A summary report would
come to me with the notation that the information in it

was Top Secret or Confidential. This was all nonsense, but- -.

J was required to return the report within two days" time.--
So, I would read through the materials to see what was use-
ful and what was not.. It’s not all suitable. And I would

"underline this { the significant items] with a pencil. No,

{1 was wrong!.:°The report first went to the thicf of de-
partment and then I underlined with a pencil what was neces-
sary and gave it back to them [the Second Special Department,
OTU]. They collected it. I signed a receipt that I had
received it from them and they gave me a receipt when 1
returned it. And then they gave me extracts. From these

.extracts alcne one cannot tell where the material cane froa,

but from the report one realizes that the Americans ere

being listened to. It is necessary to have these extracts

to place in the files. We have a tile on each person working
in the Embassy, the so-called delo-formulyar {developmental
file]. We keep one on every Embassy employee."

During the second of the 1964 series of meetings in
Geneva, on 24 January, NOSENKO took a number cf notes from
his wallet. Pointing to. one of them, he said: "This piece
of paper was kept in my operational file and it represents
the statistics for the years 1960-1961, listing those micro-
phones which are actively used in monitoring conversations
in the U.S. Embassy." This list named eleven offices and
apartments in the chancery. which contained microphones.
When asked whether he had copied the list from records or
had-drawn it up from memory, NOSENKO explained that it came
from an operational review of what "listening points we had
in the U.S. Embassy."

A detailed explanation of his ‘acquisition 0 of the written

‘list was supplied by NOSENKO on 14 May 1964:

Question: ‘How did this list come into your hands? What
— caused you to write it? .

a o-

“NOSENKO: I came to KLYPIN (Chief of. the Anerican Depart-

nent] with my working notebook. KOVSHUK [Chief .
of.the U.S. Embassy Section in the Department}
was writing and he put the list on my book.

“" KOVSHUK said this one [microphone] is working
vo WELL this one badly, and so on.

of 1961. .

| At the end’ of 1960 or the beginning of 196E.
you and KOVSHUK net. in KLYPIN's office?

etna linlanie deagptitecttee entity


cee eenantne ses deen

. NOSENKO:. Yes. Or maybe it was at a meeting. ‘It fe aif-- |.

Woes

* | 251.

aan) ce

‘ficult: to say. Maybe we went to report to KOVSHUK
in his room or maybe KOVSHUK was. writing in
KLYPIN's study room, I don't remember.

NOSENKO then described the purpose of the neeting:. To dis-

‘cuss the possibility of releusing monitor positions from

some of the chancery microphones and of assigning these re-
leased positions to. Vladimir. [patronymic unknown}. PETROV, _ _.-..
Chief of the American Department's section for work against
American tourists and delegates suspected of being con-
nected with American Intelligence; PETROV had earlicr re-
quested Englist-language monitoring positions fron the Chief
of the English-Language Section of the OTU’s Second Special
Department but had been told that all such interpreters were
already engaged on pricrity targets. At the neeting KOVSHUK
aud KLYPIN reviewed the microphone. coverage of the chancery
to decide which rooms offered.information of little value

and which monitoring positions could: be released to PETROV.
KOVSHUK drew up a list of the Embassy offices and apartments
then being covered on a full-time basis and indicated those
of lesser importance. At the end of the neeting, KOVSHUK
gave the list to NUSENKO, who retained it in his safe until
bringing it to CIA in 1964, NOSENKO has added nothing fur-
ther on the locations of microphones in the chancery building,
and much of his information concerning the quality end value
of the production by these microphones cane from this

meeting.

Since his defection, NOSENKO has spoken further on his
responsibilities in connection with the daily transcripts
received from the Second Special Department. He said on
14 May 1964: “All the materials after they were read and

‘signed were returned to the Second (Specia]j Department of the

Operational Technical Directorate. Some of the material fron
this was put in the individual file, but anyone who read

it would never know where it came from. He wouldn't know
that it came from mikes....KOVSHUK and I read all of this.
From this we gave information to those who needed it, de-
pending on their interest. If there was something inter-—

esting, it was given to KLYPIN to read. If KLYPIN saw

something intcresting he could take it ‘and give it to GRI-

BANOV. Tatyana GRISHNYAT [from the Second Special Department] .

came by car with this material. . She went to KLYPIN. Some-
times she left them with me."

A protocol signed by NOSENKO in 1965 states: "One of
my duties as Deputy Chief, First Section, First Department,

-Second Chief Directorate, was to receive, review, and give

to appropriate case officers the production from microphones

-4n the American Embassy on a daily basis. I also maintained

the control book (journal) for these trarscripts. These

"transcripts were prepared by the Operational Technical Direc-—
:torate of the KGB. Every day a.female worker of the OTU

brought me the transcripts of conversations in the Embassy

‘from the previous day. I regularly returned all of. the ori-

ginal transcripts to this female worker; they were usually
in wy possession for one day.'' In. my absence this duty was
performed by [ny superior. KOVSHUK ‘or subordinate]

ee

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252.

oe

{b) Number and Locations of Microphenes |

The information from NCOSENKO on the number and locations
of the KGB microphones in the chancery building in the U.S.
Embassy is separated from that furnished by other sources.

NOSENKGO'’S Information

Sa aaa ee eee
11 June 1962: [NOSENKO has just been essured that none

of the information he had givea CIA would be used without

first consulting with tim.) “Well, because vou are such

good guys, I will give you even wore. Have the Minister
Counsellor stop dictating to himself in his office....
Listen, move the. Minister Counsellor from his present office
to the north wing of the Embassy [wnere NOSENKO said there
were no listening devices; see below]. We are not listening
to the Ambassador. but move the Minister Counselior....

And we are listening to eal! your military atteches there.
All of them.-the Military Attache, tne Naval Attrche, the
Air Force Attache....We have four or five points [ fron which
we are getting intercepts!. #e hear the Minister Counsellor,
all three attachos-.-that's four points--and the fifth is
where one of the State Department employees sits. and yes,
there's another, a sixth point. We are listening to the
Agricultural Attache. [C, Staniey] BROWN is working there
row and someone else, a young man j Willian HORBALY}. So,

we are listening to these six points. This is our biggest
secret. Only a few people know this. [ was Deputy Caief

of the section and received this information. I decided
what to give the Chief of Pepartment and whar not to give
him, Do you understand? This is to say nothing about the
other departments and the [U.S.j Embessy Section itself."

12 June 1962: “We lost the microphone in the private
residence of the Ambassador. This was not THOMPSON, but the
one before him. BOHLEN was there then. We once had some-
thing there, but you found the [Great] Seal where it was
located. But in the Embassy itscl., in the Ambassador's
office, we have nothing. Inc one we hear now is {Minister
Counsellor] FREEKS. 8111 FREERS, in particular, walks around
his office and dictates. All this is recorded. Well, this
is important material."

14 June 1962: 'When I was Deputy Chief of the American
Embassy Section I received reports on the microphone material
daily. If there was something important in it, I reported
to the Chief of the department. The rest KOVSHUK and I
read and then distributed to the workers the parts that con-
cerned them. Well, the workers who were operating against
the three attaches knew about this [microphone} equipment....
Nothing was received from the code room. These machines
were working and there were no conversations. He was sitting
alone and there was nething. [NOSENKO is evidently describing
the military code room.|....There is a point there from which
we hear the Agricultural Attache. But there in nothing
there. They talk about what interests them in the field of
agriculture. Nothing interesting.”

24 January 1964: The late 1960/early 1961 list which

_ KOSENKO brought to CIA (see above) showed that the following
offices and apartments in the chancery contained sicrophénes:

TEP Seoaey

ESLER PRY OF

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253.

“office of the “Winister Counsellor, FREERS;

“Office of the Naval Attache, HOUGHTON;

“Ofticoe of the Milatary Attache, URBAN;

"Office of the Air Attache, NEILSEN:

“Orfice of the Assisrant Air Attache, WINDSOR;

"Office of the Assistant Air Attaches, SENTO and SACHANEN;

“Office of the Assistant Military Attaches MASON, RELTZ
and WILSON;

"Office of the Political Officer, GLEYSTEEN;

"Office of Agricultural Attactes, HORBALY and BROWN;
"Military Code Roan; :

"State Department Code Room and Telaotype Office;

“Apartments of FREERS, HOUGHTON, URBAN and NEILSEN;
"Bighth Floor Bar ‘Marines)"

Altegether, sixtecn spaces are listed, but of these NOSENKO
said that the microphone in one (the Marine bar) had never
worked and that notning of importance was learned from the
microphones in the four Eabassy apartments, This leaves
eleven; when presenting tte: list to CLA, NOSENKO said that
while he was in the U.S, Embassy Section, “there were a total
of eleven listening posts.” (tn discussing the late 1960
or early 196i meeting at which KOVSHUK and KLYPI* received
the microphone coverage, NOSENKO waid on 14 May 1954 that
it was decided to celras.. the microphone positiors in the
GLEYSTEEN office, fne UGRBAT Y-BROWN of fice, the State De-
partment code room and the tcletype office. this would
leave a total of cight ‘listening posts.")

14 May 1964: Questioned on the total number of micro-~-
phones In the US. Embassy, SOSENKO said that mary’ were
installed in the chancery building pcfore the Americans moved
in, but that he did not know how many were inetailed in all,
how many wege in any one of the rooms included in KOVSHUK's
list, or where they vere located in specifie rooms. He
did recall that nost of the microphones were placed in the
outside wall, the wali rearest Cnaykovskiy Street, as most of
the offices faced this strest and the piacement of the micro-
phones near th: outer wall would make it more difficult for
American technicians to find them if they examined only the

inner walls.

January 1965: NOSENKO volunteered that there were no
fixed microphones in America House, the residence of enlisted
men at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there was
discussion during 1960 and 1961 of using the KCB agents
employed there to place temporary audio devices for one or
two days at a time in the rooms of the Americans as well as
in the Embassy garage. These plans were vetoed, however, be-
cause such devices are too easily found. For the same refae

gon, NOSENKO said, there was no attempt made in this period

to place temporary devices in Spasso House (the Ambassador's
residence) or 1n the apartments of sucn Embassy officers

os John ABIDIAN. The KGH was "afraid that they will be
@etected and that there will be a scandal.”

TOP SECRET

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254. oS

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Information from Oth) r Sources
ee

In 1956.4 sensitive source yjholding a senior position
in the KGB sadBmitttd a vritten aeport to the U.S. Ambassador
in Woscow with ‘he cautionary semark: "Do not speak about
this information in the rooms of the American Embassy.”
The report itself contains a portion reading as follows:
"Because all reoms in tne Amurican Embassy in Moscow are
being monitored by the KiB, To atreongly ask that there be no
conversations and discussions conesrning this information
in the American Embassy. The flap involving the American '
direction-finding specialists" in Stasingrvad ducing the ;
sunmer of 1955 vas organizcd hy the KGE because conversa-
tions were overheard in ths r.ooms of the American Embassy.
As you know, as a vesult of this flap, the KOR seized valu-
able directice.finding ¢guipment from the American intelli-
gence officers. The KGB did not possess this type of
valuable equipment, and 1t would Lave been necessary for
Soviet technicians to xork and experiment for a tong time
in order to acquire such valuable equipment. The listening
devices ave so skitiftully anstailed in the walls, floors,
and ceilings of the roows of tne Americar Erbassy that it
is impossible to fand chem, cven with special-perpose instru-
ments."

ee ee

GOLITSYN, who defected in late 1961, reported the exis-
tence of a microphone in the office of the Minister Counsellor
and said tat many wore had buen installed in the chancery
prior io 1953. %:OLL25YN was deorinfed in early 1962 and
his information on this subject “as disseminated within the
U.S. Government appeoxitately two weeks before NOSENKO'S
initial contact wits Cia.) GOFLISYN said he had learned of
the microphone in the Hinuister Counsellor's office when by
chance he happencd to sce a particuiar document in an office
at KGB Headquarters. According to COLIISYN, during one of his
visits to tae American lk partment in 1960*+ he heard and saw

*This is a referencs: to ire arrest of U.S. Military Attaches
BENSON, NULE, and SiRULD and the seizure of sensitive elec~
tronic cquipment they had witn them in Stalingrad in the '
summer of 1955. NOSENKO reported that the KGB seizure of . !
this equipment was based on information obtained from micro- : y
phones in the U.S, Embassy in Moscow. See Part V.C.3.b. (viil). 1;

*#GOLITSYN has reported that he visited the U.S. Embassy Sec-
tion of the American Department on a number of occasions in
the spring of 1960 as pact of his preparation for assignment

; to Helsinki in July of that yeayv; he has also said that he t
i returned on temporary assignment te Moscow and again con- t
sulted with U.S. Embassy Section officers in December 1960. :
With regard to the latter visits, however, GOLITSYN's pass- §

port and CIA travel records indicate that he was in Moscow on i
temporary duty for two weeks in January 1961 and that he is | i
therefore a month off in his estimate of when these visits
took place. On this basis it appears that by his statement
that this incident occurred in 1960 ‘he has not been more
specific), he could have been referring to either his visits

to the American Department in the spring of 1960 or his visits
in January 1961. aan .

ae

ay

Fen EE IRA, AO NAINA

4

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14-0000

RO RTEEAREERE RPE MABE RANE SEERET ROAR eH AY “Se se sci ue AE eee Rees, Toate
; Saar se pce SR ve a. oe

255.

that a report or reports concerning the results of audio
surveillance in the U.S. Enubassy had been nisplaced-:* While
GOLITSYN was in the office, the Chief of the American De- |
partment ordered all personnel present to search for these

papers, and all the KGB officers searched again through }
their files, without success. GOLITSYN noted a large’ num !
ber of reports with red stripes across their covers, indi- - H
cating that they were the property of the Operational Teche ‘
nical Directorate, The only office in the U.S. Embassy that

GOLITSYN recalied being mentioned in connection with thi

search was. that of the Minister Counsellor.*. ° i

whe ee ee ald nae

No technical investigations were undertaken as a result
Citas yOf GOLITSYN's information, and so it was largely on the basis
Stang a. fof NOSENKO's reports that American technicians inspected the
; chancery building for the presence of microphones tn the
spring of 1964. The results have been described in the
damage report submitted by the USIB Security Committee on
7 October 1964: "On 23 April 1964, a low-impedance dynamic
microphone and associated seven-inch probe tube were dis-
covered in the wall behind a radiator in Room 1008 of the
Chancery of the U.S, Embassy in Moscow. The ceble to this
microphone was traced to a major cable run which lay several
iuches under the outside surface of the cast face of the
Chancery. This major cable run consisted of a single
twenty (20). paix and a single thirty (30) pair, lead-sheathed
augio cable which ran along the cast fuce of the Chancery
to the rcof area of the North Annex of the Embassy. At
this point, these cables were spliced into & one hundred and
one (101) pair cable along with two ten. (10). pair cables...
A number of vertical cables were found to run from the ten,
twenty, and thirty pair cabies to the various microphone
installations. Fifty (50) microphones hive been positively
identified.«* Two (2) microphones not physically located

—-~

*On 28 January 1965 NOSENKO volunteered an account of the i
loss of one of the intercept reports which the U.S. Embassy :
Section had received from the Second Special Department or
the Operational Technical Directorate “in 1960 or 1961.”

This document, according te NCSENKO, was “one of the reports i :
with [Minister Counsellor] FREERS dictating"; as 2 result of '
its loss, "the month of December, the whole month, the U.S. |
Embassy Section was in a turmoil” searching for the document. ‘
The month-long search and investigation was unsuccessful, : :
however, and. in the end, the case was closed with the con- : ‘
clusion that the document had probably been burned inadver-
tently, without a record of destruction having been drawn up.
In this account NOSENKO appears to date the incident in Decenm=
ber 1960, which approximates GOLITSYN's second series of

visits to the U.S. Embassy Section (and duplicated GOLITSIN's
erroneous estimate of when these visits took place). NOSENKO
has never reported that COLITSYN was present in the offices

of the U.S. Embassy Section during the search for this docu-
ment and, in fact, has denied that GOLITSYN visited the section
either in the spring of 1960 or in late 1960 or January 1961.

. Fhe only visit by GOLITSYN to the U.S. Embassy Section reported i
by NOSENKO was one in the spring or summer of i961, at which t
time NOSENKO claims to have been on leave; GOLITSYN was not
in Moscow at. the time. . . Lote . .

rene OF
7“

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SoPour nore vere. subsequently located, for a total of 84.

a.

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‘

256.

can reasonably be presumed to be in apartment 6) based on H
the symmetry of the known installatiozs. The microphones

located were situated so that all microphcnes and probes H
were behind radiators. The microphons system discovered i
covered every outside room on floors six through ten,- with :
the exception of thuse offices with doors entering onto !
baiconies and when exterior building constructions were ad-

jacent to cutside wall sections bearing radiators."

The first microphone found was in Koom 1008, in what
is now the Army Finasce office and which in 1960-1961 was
the office of the Military Attache, where NOSENKO reported
a microphone to be. All other microphones were ultimately
traced from this discovery. There were microphones in all
rooms identified by NOSENKO, and in others besides. Two of
the latter were tocperative when found--one in to Ambassa-—
dor's office where NOSENKO said no conversations were being
heard in 1960-1961 and theother in the fecurity Office where
NOSEXKO caid there was none. The damage report concluded
that all tne microptones were installed before the U.S,
Government took possession of the chancery builuing in 1953,

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_, from Ninister Counsellor FREERS' office, NOSENKO said, “but
. for the last years, even in 1960 and 1961, it was very

erg atten FESS GE” RN A ahaa ed ey
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257, : a

(c) Receptivity and Audibility of Microphones

NOSENKO nade the following evaluations of the quality
of intercept received from the chancery microphone tostalla- '
tions:
i

li June 1962: “They are dying. the microphones, and
we cannot do anything about it, because we can't get into
the Embassy | to make new installations]. In that respect i
your Embassy and the british Embassy are the only cnes we
can't get into."

¢

14 June 1962: "The most interesting materials, of :
course, ere irom the...{Note: one or two words orn the tape
are unintelligible here; from earlier and subsequent remarks,
particularly one on 24 January 1964 (see below), it is clear
that NOSENKO is speakiig of the microphone in the Minister
Counsellor's office.) And I tell you honestly that it is
becoming increasingly difficult to work with this. The
shayba {microphone;, as we call them, is fading and only two

mree people are able to make out what is being said.
That is, the tape sounds as if somewhere far, far away,
somewnere in the cellar, someone is spearing in a whisper.
It is very difficult to hear, very difficult when it is
fading. But, what can you de? They tell us categorically
and directly--KUZMIN, the Chief of the section of the Second
Special Departnent responsible for this, tells us that
soon we will not have anything there. There are a great
nunber of microphon:s there, put they don't work. J know
that there are about 20 microphones there that don't work.
They have all gone deaf."

24 January 1964: “Now, we also listened to the code
roon and the teletype orfice, but we could never get any-
thing out of the teletype office because of interference

probably speaking of machine noise|. Fron this point
pointing at the list, but not stating which microphone he

was speaking about] the reception became progressively
weaker until it finally stopped: evideatly it wore out.
Yes, there was another point in the bar on the 8th floor.
This one never worked even though it was installed. Thus,
out of the eleven points, nine were working...[NOSENKO then \
referred to information he learned in 1962 and 1963, after |

leaving the U.S. Embassy Section.] GRYAZNOV said that the
equipment is deteriorating and they are only getting snatches H :
of conversation and that in a year or two they will be com- i ;
letely inoperative. GRIBANOY is insisting on getting to i f
Precruiting code clerks at all costs.” :

“1 7-92 January:1964: "Here in HORBALY's and BRO#N's roon
[oiei ena ncenine couse tae Attaches], there is no acoustical
sic] and nothing comes from here. I'll come back to this,
but they complained that they're not getting anything. [These
microphones were installed] when this building was being
built. It wasn't later after you had moved into the building,
but when the building was under construction...[NOSENKO was
asked whether more or fewer than nine microphones are now our-
rently active.] It couldn't be more, anyhow."

14 May 1964: Very interesting information was heard

~_ TOP SecreT

econo NA ae y
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258.
difficult to hear, I was sitting with [S.G.] DMITRIYEV he . :
[Deputy Chief of the English-language Section of the Second
Special Department} aad they toid me how difficult it was. |
The mike was dying. Only very experienced interpreters . :
were sitting on this. They listened 10, 15, even 20 times : ;
to the same place [on the tape|....f After 1961] GRYAZXNOV
was telling me that they were getting xzlmost nothing from
this point. [He said this} in 1962, 1963. I was thinking
you had given a command [had cautioned FREERS]. We were
getting almost nothing. I heard this from GRYAZNOV several
times in 1963. Thr mikes wore working not bad at all in
1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Nav Air Force...

XY don't know [how receptién was in 1962). ¥ know only that
GRYAZNOV was te%ling me in 1962 and 1963 that they were getting
Little, little, and almost nothing. He said we are losing
everything. We have no materials. We have little, little
pieces, but nothing...in generai ! from all of the micro-
phones]. NOSENKO then speculated that one reason for this

was the fact that the Americans in the Exbassy were not

saying anything significant, but he said he did not know

this to be the case. Speuking of the microphone in GLEYSTEEN's
office, fre said: ‘'There was something heard. In 1960 and

1961 it was working [ remember. Reception was gcod but

there was no secret information. The mike in HORBALY's

room was gond in 1960 and 1961....1960 and 19651--good re-
cepticn." According to SNOSENKO, receptéon was good from

the State Department code and teletype room “only always

the sounds of [teletype] machines. In 1960 and 1961--machines
only....Reception was good when conversation came through.

I don't know [avout reception in 1962 and 1963]....Reception
was good [from the military code roo) in 1950 and 1961."

ha leds tm oe a Saad.

On-site tests made by American technicians after the
1964 discoveries determined that the following microphones
in the chancery (the occupants listed are those as of Decen~- .
ber 1960) were inoperative or unintelligible, but the USIB |
damage report emphasized that it had not been pnossible to }
determine how long these microphones had neen inoperative: i

~one microphone in the apartment of the senior Naval

Attache;
-Ghree microphones in the apartment of the senior Air : ;
Attache; i
~one micrephone in the apartment of the Economic Counsel-

lor;

x -the microphone in the office of the Publications Pro- i
curement Officer; }
-Yhe microphone in the Marine bar;
=the microphone in the Internal Affairs office
-the microphone in the Ambassador's office;
-the microphone in the office of the Security Officer;
=the microphone in the office of the Chief of Chancery;
~the microphone in the office of the Air Attache;
-the microphone in the office of the Assistant Air At-
tache;
=the sicrophone in the office of the Assistant Naval
; ” soe '-* Attaches;
nn . ethe ocicrophone in the Navy administrative office;
“a ’ ae =the microphone in the Air Force administrative office.

This list includes the office of the Ambassador (from which
HOSENKO said no intercepts vere being received in 2960 and

we ete

dee


0 a om gehen ae a ee he oe +

_ was nade in the office of the Security Officer.

259.

1961) and the office of the Security Officer (where NOSENXO
has said no microphone was installed}.* On-site recordings
made from twelve selected microphones in 1964 indicate that
the microphone in the office occupied by the Minister Counsel-
lor in 1960 was capable of producing tapes of "high intelli-_
gibility' as of 1964. The 1964 tests of the microphones in
the military and State Departuent code rooms in the office

of the Naval Attache also produced recordings of high inteili-
gibility. As pointed out ctelow, however, the possible pro-
duction by the code room microphones vould have been sharply
reduced by the installation of acousticai rceons during 1962.

*As noted in Part VI.D.3.e., NOSENKO reported that the U.S.
Embassy officer Richard HARMSTONE did not report his havang
been approached by the KGB for recruitment in May 1959.

HARYSTONE did, in fact, report the spproach, and the report

tan

4d

F
i
;
4


" (a), Amount, Type, and Value of Production , le

Evaluations of the quality of production have been
given by NOSENKO as well as U.S. authorities concerned
with the microphones in the chancery building.

NOSENKO's Statements

ll. June 1962: "Well, perhaps, there would be. some kind
of fitness report [{kharakteristika]. Sometires there the
Counsellor, FREERS, who was there before McSWEENEY, dict=ted
something; he said that so-and-so has such-and-such weak-
nesses. We had not known that. We are listening to your
military attaches there. We know where they intend to travel,
what they want to find-out. Ke krow waat machinery and what
targets interest then--always....They chatter sometimes.
Some of the things they say are surprisixg [from the point
of view of security]. They discuss, among other things,
where to go, what to see, what to take with them--electronic
equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic
equipment end now have permissica, if we are absolutely cer-
tain that one of your people is taking electrozic apparatus
with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to teke it,
to steal it. We now have authorization to take any necessary
steps to steal it. Because you now have improved your
equipment. We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955,
but now you nave better apparatus....Wnaat do we do [when we
know the attaches are taking special.equipment;? Well, they
are getting ready to go aad we hear that such-—and-such data
interests them. We give them disinformation; we make them
think, for example, that there are rockets there. And there's
absolutely nothing there, understand? Absolutely nothing.

We make it appear on the radio {by spurious transmissions]
that there are rockets there; we even heve patrols standing
there and everything....They talk about interesting things,
but never in my life have I heard a conversation about agent
operatioas, not once." ; .

12 June 1962: [Speaking again about coverage of the U.S.
Service Attaches] "They say: ‘Today, let's go to such-and-.
such a place.' They go to the military attache, the two
assistants, and say: ‘This region is interesting. They have
something there.* We know it at once. I personally tele- -
phone surveillance at once and tell tne Chief of the depart
ment to come at once. He arrives and I say: ‘Throw in
three, four, five brigades [surveillance teams].' We work 2l-
most openly against the attaches....FREERS, Bill FREERS, in
particular, walks around in his office and dictates, All
this is recorded. Well, this is’ very important material. We
do not know the cipher, but he dictates Top Secret and Con~
fidential cables {in the clear]. We receive the clear text

and decide at once whether there is anything serious there or

not. If we decide that this must be reported to the [KGB]
Chairman immediately, GRIBANOV may call him right away."

‘ 94 January 1964: "Now, we also listened to the code
. an

~ get much out. of the [mwilitary] code: room;. ve. could hear [the .
code clerk James} STORSBERG. svearing on occasion, and then
he would mention a group of numbers.* This was, of course

‘poom' End. teletype office, but we could never get anything —
Because of interference [teletype ‘machine noise}....We didn't ©

aed

cones esate:

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“2 recorded, and we turned it-over-a
Directorate, dealing with coding and decoding." ae

-once:to the Eighth.

14 May 1964; Discussing the list drawn up by KOVSHUK
and the decision to withdraw U.S, Embassy:.Section require~ |.
ments for full-time monitoring of certain microphones, NO-
‘ SENKO quoted KOVSHUK: "We are getting information frém the
rooms of the attaches, the Counsellor, and the Agricultural
Attache, The flats [Embassy apartments]--no; the bar--
nothing. Of course, I know it is necessary to keep the room
of the code clerks in spite of the fact that there is seldon
anything received except several numbers. The code clerk is
saying aloud several numbers. But the flats you can take,
not permanently, but temporarily." NOSENKO then continued:
"XOVSHUK said to give them these flats....But you see,
nothing was going on in these flats. They weren't speaking
or we:2 talking about steak and eggs. There was nothing
of interest from an operating standpoint. Somotimes ve
heard there would be guests. Okay. There is a possibility | 7 i
to hear something. In this case we would call DMITRIYLY
{English-language Section of Second Special Department} and
say: ‘This evening, this day, this flat. Maybe we will
get something.' The mikes were working not bad at all in
1960 and 1961 in the attache rooms--Naval, Air Force. When
the man was alone we heard nothing. But when two .or three
men were sitting in the rooms, the assistants, we heard.
For example, when they returned from a trip acd discussed
what they had seen or when they were preparing for a trip...
Bui we heard nothing about agents." :

H 4
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Later on this occasion the following diagogue took
place:

feral que es

NOSENKO; GRYAZNOV was telling me in 1962 and 1963 that
they were getting little, little, almost nothing.
He said we are losing everything. We have no
materials. We have little, little pieces, but
nothing.

| |
| i
H 4

Question: Was he talking about the Military Attaches?

NOSENKO: In general. I think they were speaking very
: little. God knows. Then, you see, we were thinking
they were taking new measures. GRYAZNOV, -
FEDOSEYEY, and KQVSHUK considered that there was
a room-in-a-room--a room {acoustic} for the
meeting. vat
Question: When did you first hear about the room-inside-the-
——— _roon? on

NOSENKO: first it was known when, I think, Eisenhower. was oF
— going to come.* In 1960 or 1961 we had informa-. ot
Ro. (o> tion that the Embassy had such a chamber made out :

“ePresident Eisenhower's trip to the USSR was scheduled for
the summer (of 1960 but:.was cancélled.over the’ U-2 incident. .
: . 1960. i


‘ef steel....In 1960 and 1961 the mike in GLEY-
STEEN's office was working, I remember, Recep- ; oo,
tion was good, but there was no secret informa- ote ON
tion. I don't know [about reception from this oo aS

mike in 1962}.

Question: What about GRYAZNOV's statement. [concerning |
diminishing production of the Embassy micrcphones]? .

NOSENKO: This was only one common phrase. He didn't tell 4
; ~ which room. I think he was speaking about the ; oe 4
group... . . |

Question: How was production from the mikes in HORBALY's
office?

ROSENKO: Not good, but we did get something which made us
aor suspect he was connected with intelligence.
HORBALY. ;

Question: What about the code room and teletype office? oo

NOSENKO: At State, yes. Only always the sounds of machines
in 1960 and 1961. Machines only. Three times
during these two years maybe somebody said one
phrase or one of the guys said several numbers.

Question; What about the military [code] area’ .

onda tt

NOSENKO: The reception was good. He [STORSBERG] seldom
spoke. Sometimes he repeated numbers to himself.
And sometimes a mechanic of code machines cane
to him, a military guy, a sergeant [Willian
HURLEY, an Army Warrant Officer). They said two.
or three phrsses. "Did you check this?" “Yes.”
"This side good." Et cetera.

sf

ele edad bt cade ee =

. Question: In all this time that you read all this material,
a _ “—=—we—== there must have been something that impressed
; you as extremely valuable.
- NOSENKO: Extremely valuable--nothing. A little was in-
= teresting from FREERS' room. It was given to the
special group of GRIBANOV. They were writing
ye vwee mba” special information to the [KGB] Chairman to the
vo _ {CPSU} Central Committee. There were political a
: . questions, for example. oo. :

pte Me Intl rtd inten n es ot

26 January 1955: The following is taken from an inter- :
rogation protocol signed by NOSENKO: "I regularly reviewed
- all of the transcripts from microphones in the American .
Eubassy for a period of approximately two years, from Janu- re
ary 1960 to January 1962. The following is the only infor- . oe ie
7 mation which I can remember as being important, interesting - = ©. to
; OF operationally useful to the KGB: : Loos .

wit
oa "

‘From the micropnone in the office of: the. . wt

a.

inister Counsellor, FREERS, I remember that’ he oc-_.
easionally dictated cables-sbout. the. Embassy's evalu-

- ation of certain declarations or acts of the: Soviet, ;
‘, Government and advised the StateDepartment on posiy..”
. tions for negotiations with the. USSR. ‘This information


was of such importance that special reports were

written to the Central Compittee of the CPSU. How-
ever, I cannot remember ary specific incidents or
events which these cables reported nor any specific

evaluations or recommendations made in these cables. .

b. -Also from the microphone in the Minister
Counsellor's office, I remenber that he dictated fitness
reports (kharakteristiki) on.about twelve officers in
the Embassy. I cannot Fremerber who any of these offi-
cers were or any dctails from the reports. There was
nothing in these reports which was interesting or
useful to the KCB.

c. From the microphone in the Military Attache's
office I remember that the Military Attaches regularly
discussed plans for trips within the USSR and the tar-
gets that they wanted to cover. They also discussed
the results.of these trips after their return. How~
ever, I cannot remember ary information about speci-
fic trips planned by specific Nalitary Attache per-
sonnel or any specific targets that they planned to
cover or any specific resulis from any trip. I do not
remember any specific operetionaL activity taken by the
organs of the KGB against Military Attaches on trips
within the USSR which was based on information obtained
from this microphone. There was no snteresting, impor-
tant, or useful information about the personal or pro-
fessional lives or about the vulnerabilities of anyone
in the Military Attache's office (Army, Navy, and Air)
obtained from this microphone.

d. I remember that from the microphones in the
State Department code room occasionally a code clerk
would read numbers. These numbers were only of inter-

est to the Eighth Directorate (Communications and Crypto-

logy) of the KGB. I do not remember any conversations
from this microphone. There was no information from
this microphone on any of the code clerks which was |
interesting, important, or useful to the U.S. Embassy
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate,

“KGB.

During the approximately two years in which I daily reviewed
the production from all the microphones in the American
Embassy I do not remember any information on any American in
the Embassy which was interesting, important, or useful to
me as the Deputy Chief of the Embassy Section. except the
points noted in the above paragraphs." :

28 January 1965: “In 1960 and. 1961 I don't remember

any report from the mikes about agents. Never. Nothing
about work with agents or work with contacts. But FREERS
or WALMSLEY {Minister Counsellor 1954-1956] were dictating
interesting opinions of the Embassy. concerning the political
situation and this material was looked at by the information.

group and

then they were preparing special reports: for.
ow . . . a : a : ;

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'


" Bvaliuetton. by Others -

Theodore F. HOFFYAN, arny Attache in Moscow from May
1959 to May 1961, has been interviewed concerning the micro-
phone discoveries. (In the spring of 1961, Colonel HOFFMAN
was succeeded by Colozel URBAN as Army Attache.) While in-
Moscow, Colonel HOFFMAN occupied room 1008, where the first
microphone was found and his statements below relate to
matters presumed to be of general and specific interest to
the U.35, Embassy Section during the period when NOSENKO
claims to have been its Deputy Chief.*

“James H. STORSBERG {military code clerk] was
dating a foreign rational, 1 believe a secretary in
the British Embassy, name not recalled. On one or

- two occasions, he was needed either to decode or to
encode for dispatching a message and was not avail-
able. He would be off with his girl friends, and we

- couldn't find him, He was verbally reprimanded in ny
office in regard to the two incidents of absenteeisn.

"M/Sgt. Peter BINDER gmanager of America House]
and I discussed frequently the administrative probleas
encountered in his operation of the America House.

We also discussed the importance of hts keeping me.
informed of the conditions, personality problems,
drinking habits, and any other incident of importance
that misht occur in the America House or the America
House ciub. All discussions were conducted in ny
office.

“In May or June 1961, James C. KEYSERS [military
code clerk} was found to have allowed one or rore

male members of...a U.S. ice review entertainment group

touring the Bloc countries to spend the night in his

room at America House. He was suspected of homosexual

activities, and he admitted to me being a participant
in homosexual activities. I believe these edmissions
and my entire discussion with KEYSERS took place in

' room 9, identified now as the shielded code room, lo-
eated on the ninth floor of the Embassy. I gave
SAVAGE [-his enlisted administrative assistant] verbal
- instructions in my office to immediately prepare the
necessary paper work for removing KEYSERS from the
station and instructed him to inform ACSI by cable as
to the details of the incident.

"I remember...a discussion I held with the U.S.
Air Attache in his office [where a KGB:microphone was
located] concerning homosexual activities on the part

of two of the Air Force enlisted personnel on station...

_The discussion in his office concerned the administra-
: tive procedures necessary in Temoving the individuals
trom Station. : ; : .

*sApart from ‘his general duties. as Deputy. Chief “of: the U.S:

: Embassy Section, NOSENKO bore special responsibilities for —-

each. of the persons mentioned by Colonel HOFFMAN: .
, Wised the KGB officers: aperat ing againet code ale
wesidents of Aserica House, and: ‘he, persona -

ayproaches to the: two: code: clorke: named,
“‘STORSBERG. a: diwous

ee

none Seep i

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wrote nb Tecieke cnasdictnit dees)

79

howe dea Pid, ain nt tes on no


 gtates: “Although there has been no’ observable indication - . or,

’.*As previously indicated, NOSENKO. said that in 1962 and 1963

- - {Summing up] "To be ‘perfectly..fraak, I would - -
assume that...some of our modus operandi, some of our co ;
targets, sone of the results, and all of our personal a ae

i

weaknesses were compromised. This is not a very de- " .
finite answer; however, it is the best estimate 1 cap Soonk..
make." . ; ; -

in ite general introduction, the USIB damage report -.

thet the Soviets have acted in any manner to the detriment.

of the United States based. upon information considered pos=- .. _ { ; j
sibly. compromised, it must be concluded that due to the ex- — ; . : 3
tensive period of penetration, the cumulative, effect has . j

rasulted in serious damage to the United States. “The i
Soviets have gained considerable knowledge as to the effective- ; 4
ness of United States operations within the,Sovict. Union, :
particularly the military attache collection progran. : , :
Soviet knowledge of U.S. enphasis upon certain intelligence’

collection areas has made it possible for them to identify

priority intelligence and probable Soviet targets and thereby

permitted them to implement specific counteractions.. The

Soviets over the years must have amassed considerable infor-

mation concerning the personal habits, problens, attitudes ,
and weaknesses of personnel assigned to tne Embassy which :
can be used by them for purposes of exploitation at any , : :
time of their choosing in the future." .

The following extract from the USIB damage report con-
cerns the declining value of the production from the micro-
phones in 1962 and 1963.*

4
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"The security practices and procedures appear to
have followed a pattern from April 1953 to May 1960, at
. which time the first plastic room was installed. A
: change occurred in the work habits in that the nore
senior State Department officers utilized the plastic
room for sensitive discussions and dictation. The
room could accommodate only a Limited portion of the
Embassy classified discussions and accordingly, a number
of classified discussions were held outside this secure
area. In the April 1953-May 1960 period it was an ac-
cepted practice for the Ambassador and the Deputy
Chief of Mission to discuss openly in their offices
routine classified operations of the Embassy and to
dictate clessified documents and telegrams....In Sep-
tember 1962, the second acoustic room was erected for
the typing section for the handling of sensitive classi-
fied material. From December 1963 to date it was indi-
cated that no classified telegrams have been dictated Lo

‘

he learned there was almost no production from the Embassy
microphones. One reason was the natural decline in effi-
ciency of equipment installed ten years previously; the KGB
her reasons were ‘the installation of
me : ightened security pro- ~


14-0000

: yeported that most cables were drafted in longhand or.

outside of the acoustic rooms....The military attaches -
typed, by the originator and then turned over to the -
code clerks for transmission. In certain instances
cables were dictated in the offices.. There were many
discussions in the offices relating to official duties,
office routine, proposed travel, personal observations
and normal office talk not specifically in themselves
considered classified, From 1953 to 1959, sensitive
classified matters were discussed in whispers or to the
accompaniment of external noises, such as radios and--
street noises....In 1959 a secure inner room Was cone
structed in the attache section and has since been -

utilized for classified discussions and debriefings...."

wee teeta eh a a, be rr ee boty ta ee gM :

Seren Ti eon tes

seer tire epee gee ee

2G earn neuen poe


“\(i£4i) Microphones in the hocth Wing.

According to NOSENKO, no microphones or other audio devices
were installed in the north wing (as distinct from the cnancery)
of the U.S. Embassy prior to its occupancy in 1962. (For this
reason, NOSENKO advised CIA in 1962 to transfer its sensitive
offices gradually--to protect NOSENKO's security--fron the
chancery to the north wing at the Embassy.) He has commented
several times on this subject, and these remarks are presented
below,

11 June 1962: “The Embassy is now located on Chaykovskiy
Street. When they decided to give the north wing to the Embassy,
I wrote an entire report about it. SNELEPIN was still there
then {as KGB Chairman. ~~ proposed that} equipment be installed
in the walls, gave the justification fer this, etc. SHELEPIN
wrote: ‘Is it worth it?" At the time trere was an improvement
in mutual relations (retween the Soviet Union and the United
States). SHELEPIN was a good lad, but feared that...and k2fore
this you found 18 or 20 microphones in the new building in War-
Saw,* SHELEPIN wrote: ‘is it worth it? We row have good re-
lations with America. It isn't worth it.' He didn't want com-
Plications., And. then time was lost. Two or three months passed
and we again wanted to try it. SHELEPIN also wanted to, but it
was already too late. ASIDIAN was going there all the time, the
Security Officer. It was already too late because this can he
done only while the building is being built. When the windows
and doors have been begun it is already too late... The north
wing was almost ready. We don't have anything there. So, you
should move the Minister Counsellor there. Move him to the
north wing from his present office... Don't do it at once. Do
it slowly. SGon't hurry; don't be in a hurry. Have him say that
he doesn't like this room and wants to move there... We hear
all the military attaches--the Milicary Attache, the Naval
Attache, and the Air Force Attache--in Moscow. Everything is
recorded. But again, don't do anything at once. Don't make
any (sudden) charges. Quietly transfer one and then another
there (to the north wing), the attache himself and his assist-
ants... You must be verv, very clever ard very. very foxy...
Gradually, gradually move them to the north wing of the build-
ing, to the north wing, in which we have absolutely nothing and
won't have anything." , :

' 31 January 1964: "When the construction of this right
(north) wing had begun, when you started the right wing, the
new addition to the building, there was a plan to install as
many (microphones) as possible--thirty, forty--stick’ them.
everywhere. It really wasn't important how many of them would
really work. The Committee (KGB) Chairman at that time was

_SHELEPIN, He didn't co for this. Whether it. was the flap
with the Poles that happened just before that* or whether it
was something else or whether it was.the international situa-

' tion, they were afraid that this may be uncovered. But then,
later, when the building was finished, and when you were ;
. finishing or putting up the addition yourself,. at that point

. it: was. too late to put these -things ‘in.:.It was. impossible

it.“

_19 microphones: in the new U.S. Embassy in: Warsa

MNOSENKO is referring to the discovery in June of. 1960 of:

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“After” being: ‘told. ‘by. CIA on: “31, January’ 1965. that a lead
cable had been found in the north wing, NOSFNKO said: "I
personally can assure you that nothing was ‘done in that
right. wing. Nothing, absolutely ‘nothing. There was ‘nothing

done there, so it must have been something else,"

No extensive counter-audio checks have yet been cerried
out in the north wing of the U.S, Embassy, and no wired -
microphones have been found there. Investigation of the :
microphones in the main section of the Embassy led, however,
to the discovery of other Soviet technical equipment installed
in the north wing. The USIB damage report.stated: "Three-
coaxial cables were discovered running parallel to the one~ -
hundred-and-one pair audio cable from the North Annex roof
grea to the basement of the North Annex...{All three cables
were severed by American technicians in 1964.] The cable
runs were as follows:

"l. The, first coaxial cable...terminated under six
inches of reinforced concrete in the North Annex attic.
The certer conductor was conuected to the lead sheath
of the 20-pair and of the 30 pair cable which in turn
come iroz the east face of the chancery. The shield of
the coaxial cable was uncunnected. :

"2, The second coaxial cable...followed the same path .
as the first coaxial cable. The shield was unterminated,
The center conductor was terminated in an insulated
metal grill. The grill is lccatred in the upper crust

of the North Annex attic floor with the long dimension
in juxtaposition to the old common wall between the
Chancery and the North Annex. The long diménsion is
normal to the street in front of the Embassy. The

grill is made of one centimeter steel reinforcing rods
spot welded into a mesh of 15 cm. (5.9 inches). The
overall dimensions of the grill are 14'4" by 4°7".

The coaxial cable was connected to one corner of the
grill....The grill is located as close as possible to
the old common wall and is about thirty feet below the
State Department code room. The grill ‘points’ in the
general direction of the code room as the plane of the
grill is parallel to the plane of the ground.

"3. The third coaxial cable ran along the approxinate
path of the uther coaxial cables to the block cf reine
forced concrete that contains the grill mentioned above.
This coaxial cable terminated in a four- inch piece of
fine Lits wire. The shiéld of the coaxial cable was
unterminated..." a

The damage: report added: . "The coaxial cables appear to be
of recent installation probably prior to Russian evacuation

“ef the North Annex. The outer shields of all the coaxial

cables. were carefully insulated. "

oO The coaxial ‘cables. and their terminations were evaluated
as follows. in the damage report: "All tests that ‘have been.
for] tne. indicate that the grill. work and. the lead sheaths =
f} the cables 20-and 30 patrs were used ag antennas.... ~
No function has been determined for the third. coaxial cable

which terminated. ana short piece of Lits wire...-The” ‘Location

anette renenernee pite ete

seater emery sr eene

8

ae ee lh ceeitibaieee

sneha nritatatabaia :

"Cc.

"d.

Ne,

roor.

Antenna for use in connection with some other
surveillance device or technique..

An alarm system to 'protect' the microphone

system.

Part of a hum removal system connected with the
_microphone installation.

Not in use,"

of the grill ‘in ‘such. close: proximity’ to. the State. Departaent -
Code. Room indicated that an operation was directed against
that area....The lead sheath may have had other uses.  ‘
possible uses that have been suggested are listed bélow.

The most likely use is as an antehna although the other pos~
sibilities have not been completely discarded.

“Antenna for collection effort directed against code

vary


“Gv)" Monitoring/Jaiming Beam

NOSENKO was questioned on 31 January 1964 about the
‘poccalled “Moscow Signal." (This is an "SY band signal
that has been directed against the top floors—-the "secure .
erea"--of the U.S, Embassy since the early 1950's from en _
apartment building located about 200 feet away. _ Detailed .
investigation of the signal has been underway since Octo-
ber 1962, but its exact pature and purpose have not yet been
established. Although there is some speculation that the
signal is meant for ‘harasezeot purposes only, the view now . .
generally accepted by U.S. technicians is that it has soma . S|
intelligezce-collection function. No change in the signal :
has beer: noted since the discovery and the cutting of the

cables referred to in the preceding section.) The inter

view went as follows: a

NOSENKO: There is a beam, there is a ray which works -.
—————~_—s agrinst the Embassy. I. know. cn 5

Question: Do you know what it is? 4

NOSENKO: No, I don't. Hut I know that they work and they
put things in, and they listen and they do some-
thing, and they... .

‘Question: (Interrupting.) Is it successful, is it working?

NOSENKO; Yes, they keep working: all’ the time. Perhaps -
periodically, but it's working. Yes, there is i
something in the back.of the Embassy on this :
Chaykovskiy Street, and there is something in
front of the Embassy, too. . :

-Question: And it is for listening in?

NOSENKO: No, it's in order to deprive you of working with
stationary equipment. .

‘ Quéstion: What do you mean--so that our receivers wouldn't
operate properly? .

NOSENKO: Look, I’m not a specialist. I don't know the
; details. I know only that the work is being
done in this particular area, in this particular
direction. But what they do, I dontt really
know.

wee ad

Question: But this is not for the purpose of obtaining in-
; formation? :

NOSENKO: Let's say you go on the air. So weifind out |
_ whether you're listening in on some of our com-~
_munications or sonething like this.

_To what extent would you in your. [American] De-

“partment,.in your {U.S. Embassy] tion; know-
‘about these technical. aspects? Would: you..have
to know. it?) Would you know the details of these
things? — . ; — oe


_- No. No. This is something that ‘the. ‘menbers of...
; “the (KGB) Eighth Directorate. {responsible for
eo a communications and ciphers}. should concern then~
i "selves with, the ones who work in OTU. This.
doesn't concern us in the American Department,
in the U.S. Eabassy ‘Section.

. Questioned again later,. NOSENKO said that the aignal

was tised to jam U.S. equipment working in the Embassy building.
>It was this system, he said, which. had determined that the

. Americans had intercepted some GRU agent radio communications.
~The beam was designed “both to-monitor- and to jam" trare~
‘‘aissions from the Embassy... NOSEXKO repeated that. "not being

' @ specialist" he was igcorant of the technical naturé of the
Job, or any further details.

h
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q
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feetamgtae ce tee


cnn at ae nf EEE ED once ate sn sence a Ne ee

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request,

NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his
true name for all travel abroad.

c. The Cuba TDY (1966)

In November 1960, after and as a result of the cancellation
of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKC travelled with
a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men~
tioned this trip on 11 June 1962, during his second meeting with

"CIA. His account of his activities was given in answer to the

question of whether he had ever visited Germany: “I have been

in Germany. Yes, yes. I wag in Cuba in '6]. Well, as NIKOLAYEV.
I was there a montn and a half. This was when your Embassy was
there and we wanted to prepare*,.. Well, I looked it cver to

see what kine of people you hed working there. They asked me

to prepare, So to speak, an accounting on how things were going.

I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just
on you. Everyone there is worxing for you. One, two, three,

five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any amcunt. I could
go to any restaurant, any show. So that's how it was with me.

The fellows reported: 'He [an funerican}] is there.' My mission
was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days,
put for a month or two, to provide an opinien, I worked pretty
cleverly on trem, He [the American] would go to a restaurant.
They would say to we: ‘He is at such-and-such a restaurait and
can be cbserved there.' I would go and observe him in the mir-

ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and
that's all. But I would watch him to see how he behaves, etc.,
etc. That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an
intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I
would go ayain and again. I would see that, yes, he is an in-
telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences
with them [the Cubans]. Tuey didn't know a thing... They had
turned ali intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party complicates it.”

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in
1962 the sudject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-
called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba
and that his function there was that of security officer

Question: When did you travel to Cuba?
NOSENKO: 1960, November and December 1960.
Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO : No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain
how this happened. I was supposed to go to America,
sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan,
automotive specialists, etc. Data had already
submitted for coordination and, in particular, my
name had been given to the American Embassy there
[Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that

i... » 2 this delegation could be accepted, but a little

“-. son, later. And my passport had already been issued.
My passport had already been signed authorizing travel
abroad, but it was a service passport, not a diplomatic
one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

¥ ‘Ben > ~ Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January

Tees.

TOP SECRET «=

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Aatbd CAs.

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14-0000

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Her: Job + was. simply ‘to. inform us. in case ‘gomethin 2g g interesting
‘happens and somebody interesting comes’ to the library, but prac-

tically nobody ever went to the library. Then, what could she

tell us akout these sergeants that were taking Russian lessons,

that she was supposed to be reporting cn? In the first place,.
they were lazy buns. They would go to a lesson once and then

..miss the next two and then perhaps go again, and again miss one

or two." In September _ 1964 NOSENKO added that LEVINA had never
been targetted ayainst any particular individual and had never
provided any interesting reports on her American contacts. At
the end of 1960 or in the beginning of 1961, NOSENKO said, she
was released from the Emtassy by Paul SMITH, possibly because
she was a little deaf and one had to epeak loudly to her to ke
understood.* NOSENKO turned LEVINA ‘over to anothér officer be-

fore he returned to the Tourist Department, and later the British
Department was planning to use her in either the British or Canad-~

ian Embassies,

+ CK tacords show that LEVINA was employed at the Embassy as
’ a librarian from January 1958 through January 1962, when she

was released. Paul SMITH was Second Secretary. of the Embassy _ .

2 “in charge of the Cultural Affairs Section and: Publications
Procurement Officer from May. 1959 until approximately Septem |

ve

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a. Attempt to Obtain Assi nment. in Ethicpia (1960) .

During the first half of 1960, NOSENKO said, he applied for
a permanent overseas assignment to Ethiopia because doctors had
prescribed a change of climate for his daughter Oxsana's asthma. .
O.M. GRIBANGV, Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, approved
his request, but then the KGS Personnel Department turned it
down when a file review revealed potentially dangerous character
weaknesses. :

dead dan.

NOSENKO described this matter on 14 April 1964 as follows:
"“Gennadiy GRYAZNOV came to the American Cepartment of the Second
Chief Dircctorate in 1958. Before 1956 he was stucying in the
Higher Schocl of the KGB and when he finished the school in 1956
he was assigned to the KGB Personne] Department, and then he came . mo. -
to the American Department in 1958. So GRYAZNOV had very good
connections in the Personnel Department. So in 1960, when I
wanted to leave, to go abroad on permanent assignment I said to
GRIBANOV: ‘Let me go for two years to Ethiopia.’ When the Per-
sonnel Department refused to let me go, I decided I'd just have +
to know what was there in my personal file. I had to learn what :
it was that was causing all this. By that time GRYAZNOV was in
the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate and hap-
pened to be the head of the Party Organization of the entire .
‘directorate, and he at cne time had worked in the Personnel Office - : : 3
himself. He ssid: 'Give me this thing and I'1l see wnat I can _
find out about it.’ So he went tc the Personnel Department and ?
through his friend there got my personal file. Then he gave me 3

we WY tee

a call and sai@ to come over. I went to his office and he locked
the door. Of course, he couldn't give me this file, couldn't

let me hold it in my hands so to speak. So he read this case

to me, this 1954 case to me, about the woman and so forth,* and
then said that at that time they made an investigation of my
previous residence. And they found out that while I was study-
ing at the Institute [cf International Affairs] and was living.
on Pervaya Meschanskaya Street, all sorts of girls visited me;
different girls, a new girl would visit me almost every week.
This was in my file. Then this case that took place in 1954.

And then in 1960--and, incidentally, GRIBANOV mentioned this to
me also--the file said that I was drinking quite a bit, and for
this reason I had many fights with my wife. And that was all
that appeared in my file. Nothing else, whatsoever, besides
these things that I just mentioned.”

b. U.S. Visa Application (1960)

NOSENKO's true name appeared with 11 others on a 20 October .
_ 1960 request to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow for visas for members : 4g
. Of a Soviet automotive exchange delegation which was scheduled _ :
Cases : . . _ . . Lae oo wad es mae

¥—NOSENKO is referring to the incident he says took place in
..1954 when he used KGB alias documentation to conceal his true
identity while. seeking treatment for-venereal-disease.. See...

a ¢

rs

to visit “the United States in mid-November 1960;*. NOSENKO was... -
listed as an engineer. employed by the State Sciertific-Tecnnical ~~
Committee (CNTK). After defecting, NOSENKO told CIA that he had
been scheduled te accompany this delegation as a security cffi- - 4
cer but that the delegation's visit to the United States had ; ot
been postponed at the last moment. He therefore did not travel

to this country.

He further explained, on 17 April 1964, why his visa appli-
cation had been submitted in true name an¢ under a different
covers “In 1957 and 1958 I want to London as NIKGLAYEV repre-
senting the Ministry of Culture. Then in 1959 I didn't ge any-
where. ‘Then when this question came up of my going to the States
in 1960, I said: ‘I'm rot going. I've been going under the
Ministry of Culture feover}] and with sports delegations. This oi
has to be changed somehov at this paint.* So we theught about i
it and finally somebedy said: 'Loux, how about this? Perhaps 4
[you can use] this committee of RULNEV's (GNiK].' Sa 1 said:

‘. "Well, it's up to you. You decice.' by that time my passport
was ready, but the Americans and the Soviets hadn't come to an
agreement yet. It was Gecided that this delegation would go to
the U.S. in 1961." NOSENKO was then asked why he coulc not

have used the NIKOLAYZV name for his trip to the United States.
He replied: "Sure, 1! could have gone a3 NIFOLAYEV, but I just
didn't want to. Pecause, look, it was krewn to us that the
British and American Incelligence exchanye information on people
they suspect of being kGb, and that the Hritish, of course,

had probably watched me when i was in England {in 1957 and 1958]
and probably there it was noticed that here's this man under

the cover cf Ministry of Culture. He's not a sportsman. It a
xind of looks suspicious. Then he goes to the Soviet Embassy. :
Also suspicious. So then I nave to go to the States. and if

I go as NIKOLAYEV I couldn't use--in that case I ccouldn’t use ;

the same cover of Ministry of Culture tecause of the type of 1 4
the delegation. I'd have to use a different cover. So I'd go * es
there and they'd say: ‘Aha, here's NIKOLAYEV under aifferent
cover now.’ But if I go as NOSENKO, the British never heard
the nane. Nobody knows the name. Everything would be 0.K."
NOSENKO was then asked why he could not have travelled under
gome other alias. He answered: “That's the way it was de-
cided, I guess so as not to get ali mixed up they decided to
gend me as NOSENKO anyway. It's up to the people who are in
charge of these operations. They are: the ones who decide."**

4
:

sealbsy,

*— This visa application was submitted approximately six months eT ee: :
after the KGB rejected his request for PCS assignment to :
Ethiopia.

#* With regard to his trips to England in 1957 and 15958, NOSENKO i 4
said that he had been forced to use the name NIKCLAYEV_ because a
this was the name he had used with British citizens © 2 me
hen they visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1957; he ag,
- could not, he said, have shown up in England with another nar. . .
as , oor ErnrEree .
upon their retucn fro 2 (pee ~P2 =U :
:-Phis apparently was not a consideration when selecting a name '.
for the U.S. visa. application, ‘for.NESENKO had used. the name. “
S°SPRGEYEV in his approach to American George: DREW in 1959 (Part
suV.D. y and the. name PETERSON: when he ‘recruited Profeasor
if Gerax ENKO was in
con a

period. . NOSENKO and other: sources have: said. that.
ted that. FRIPPEL was an American agent. (see: Part

14-0000 e/

ow

Sa:

A EA POE EE EE RT ES ag SEER 1 aS et NEP CT EA SS YP Bg NI TR RESIS BOT
. if { )

276.

Because NOSENKO's true name and photographs had been submitted
to the U.S. Fmbassy in Moscow in connection with this visa request,
NOSENKO added, it was henceforth necessary for him to use his
true name fer all travel abroad. i

ce. The Cuba TDY (1960)

In November 1960, after and as a resuit of the cancellation
of his planned trip to the United States, NOSENKO travelled with
a delegation of nickel industry experts to Cuba. He first men-
tioned this trip on 1l June 1962, during his second meeting with

‘CIA. is account of his activities was given in answer to the
question of whether he had ever visited Germany: “I have been

in Germany. Yes, yes. I wag in Cuba in '6}. Well, as NIKOLAYEV.
I was there a month and a half. This was when your Embassy was
there and we wanted to prepare*... Well, I looked it cver to

see what kind of people you had working there. They asked me

to prepare, so to speak, en accounting on how things were going.
I arrived there and asked how they were working against you, just
on you, Everyone there is worxing for you. One, two, three,
five days went by... I had unlimited funds, any arcunt. I could
go to any resianurant, any show, So that's how it was with me,
The fellows reported: ‘He {an American] is there.’ My mission
was to get a general picture. Not for one, two, or three days,
but for a month or two, to provide an opinicn... I worked pretty
cleverly on trem, He [the American] would go to a restaurant.
They would say to me: ‘He is at such-and-such a restaurant and
can be observed there.' I would go and cbserve him in the mir-
ror or somehow. I am sitting in the restaurant, drinking, and
that's all. But I would watcn him to see how he behaves, etc.,
ete, That is, I would begin to feel if he has the mark of an
intelligence officer. ...But this was not enough for me. I
would go again and again. i would see that, yes, he is an in-
telligence officer... We were asked to share our experiences
with them [the Cubans]. Tey didn't know a thing... They had
turned all intelligence work over to the Communist Party. The
Communist Party complicates it.”

In the final minutes of NOSENKO's last meeting with CIA in
1962 the sudject of his trip to Cuba came up again; NOSENKO re-
called that he had used the name NOSENKO for his trip to Cuba
and that his function there was that of security officer.
Question: When did you travel to Cuba?
NOSENKOs: 1960, November and December 1960.

Question: Under the name NIKOLAYEV?

NOSENKO : No, as NOSENKO, NOSENKO, NOSENKO. I will explain

how this happened. I was supposed to go to America,

sometime in November, with a group from Gosplan,

automotive specialists, etc. Data had already been

submitted for coordination and, in particular, my

name had been given to the American Embassy there . .

{Moscow]. But the American Embassy announced that .

; this delegation could be accepted, but a little : oe

_« ater. And my passport had already been issued. _ : a
f

me
RP ke et

My passport had already been signed authorizing travel ;
abroad, but it waS a service passport, not a diplomatic
one. And at this moment a delegation was supposed to

tate eee |

= the U.S. Embassy in Havana was officially closed on 3 January 7

ane sie ee GBT pe
: .
:
.
:

~ WP SERER of

14-0000

'®Just a minute. We have a man who has his passport all ready.
Bis passport has been formalized. NOSENKO. He was supposed to

_tinueds °So somebody said: ‘How about a visa?‘ And KUZNETSOV

bm Sh Git espe on resco st

277.

go to Cuba. GRIBANCV's deprty [S.S.]} BANNIKOV,
said that a worker [463 officer] should be sent.
But they decided not to send @ worker to Cuba.
"Why bother?" [they said]. "Is Cuba worth it?® A
Suddenly there was a phone call from the Central ; >
Committee [of the Communist Party]. Scmeone fron :
the Central Committce said: “No, there is a direc- ;
tive that one of our workers must ge nevertheless.”

And only two days remained before the departure of

the delegation. Who could they send?

Question: The first person they come across.

NOSENKO: Those who have passports. I had a passport. I was -

~~ ready. And they cGecided: "Get going immediately.”
We flew through imsterdam, through Gencva. We spent
é@ night in Amsterdam and then made a short stcp in
Geneva, then the Azores, Santa Maria Island, then we
were supposed to fly to Curacao, But we had a head-
wine and the pilots were evidently afraid that we
wouldn't have enough fuel. So the plane went out
of its way ana made a iunding on the isianc of Bar-
bados. This was net a Soviet plane, hut KLM, wwe
flew to Amsterdam on a TU-104 and then went by KLM.
Then from Curacao we flew to Aruba. We also spent
anight in Aruba, an interesting island; the water
nad natural surroundings are beautiful. From Aruba
we flew througa Kingston, through Jamaica, and then
to Cuba. And we flew the same route back, but we
aid not spend the night in Curacao. From Curacao we
landed in Caracas for about 40 minutes, and’ through
Pararariec--Duitcn Guianaccacrcss tue ocean, some
island or anotner there, and from there again Lis-
bon, Geneva, and Amsterdam. Sut here the entire
Gelegation flew [to Moscow] after a day or two and
I took a train through West Germany [to East Berlin].

All of NOSENKO's accounts since contacting CIA in 1964 have
been generally consistent with that given on 14 June 1562. His
Story has been as follows: In the latter part cf 1960, at the
game time as he was preparing for his intended trip to the
United States, a special delegation of nickel industry experts
from Gosplan, tne Soviet State Planning Commission, was prepar-
ing for departure to Cuba. The delegaticn was a routine one, 3
consisting mostly of engineers from various sections of the :
Soviet Union, and since there was no one under any sort of sus- ‘
picien, the Eleventh (Soviet Travellers Abroad) Department of
the Second Chief Directorate had decided that it would not be
necessary to include a security officer. Two days prior to the Lo
departure of the group, however, the Central Committee cf the :
Communist Party decided that a Second Chief Directorate case
officer must go along. Because of the short time remaining be- ]
fore the scheduled departure of the delegation, the Eleventh to
Department protested that it would be impossible to find a suit- :
able person and get all the necessary papers ready in time. At ~
this point, A.I. KUZNETSOV of the Eleventh Department said:

ma ee ee

ry

go to the States... and his foreign passport has been issued
and signed. Why don't you take him?" NOSENKO's statement con=-

TWPSERT =

14-0000

Ibn BE
yp

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at ad

aaa RR RET EA

gays ‘Never sind. The Cubana will give him an entry visa.’
And then I had to get a transit visa because we were flying
through Amsterdam. And this whole thing was taken care of in
two days. The Cubans gave their visa immediately anc Tae
Netherlands issgyed their visa also right away.”

NOSENKO has reported that his functions with this delega-
tion were purely of a security nature. He flew with the dele-
gation to Cuba in October or Noverber and spent abort a month
and a half there. During this time he accompanied the delega-
tion everywhere it went: “I was with the delegation. They go
to a piant--I go with chem to the plant. I was with them all
the time. They went cto ‘ifferent plants, to watch the produc-
tion. They met with some representa’ives of the so-called Insti-
tute of Agrarian Reform. They would meet with these people and
they would have many Giscussions about how to increase produc~
tion.” HOSKNKO's cover agsignaent was deputy chief of the dele-
gation and shortly before ceparting Mosccw he was introduced to
the other members as such. He had one agent within the delega-~
tion and developed several “conficential contacts” vwuring the
trip, which turned cut to be entirely uneventful and, for NOSENKO,
somewhat long and dull. ile explained that se would not have
accepted the assignment had he known how leng the trip was to be,
and that he nad really wanted to go ony t. the United States.

un his return trio to Moscow, NOSENKO was given a special
mission. As he was leaving from Havana Airport,’ the KGB Legal
Resigent in Cuba, 4.1. ALEKXSEYEV, nandead him a package with in~
structions to deliver it to Moscow. NUSENKO did npt know the
contents of the package until he arrived in Amsterdam en route
home. There the wrappings became ioose (it was bound only by
thin string) and NOSENKO toox the opportunity to determine that
it contained copies of "letters betveel. MIKOYAN and KHRUSHCHEV
concerning the prices of sugar" and drafts of agreements between
the Soviet Union and East Germany, Bulyaria, Czechoslovakia,
and Rumania. aAcriving with his Gelegation at the airpert in
Amsterdam, NOSENKO was toid that a message had keen received
from the Centra] Committee of the Communist Party instructing
that the package was to be delivered “urgently” to Che GUEVARA,
who was touring the Sateilite countries and was then in Berlin.
while the delegaticn continued on to Moscow, NOSENKO therefore
was driven to the Soviet Embassy in The Hague, and in the late
evening of his second day in The Netherlands he left by train
for East Berlin. When he arrived, however, he found that
GUEVARA had left Berlin for Hungary. NOSENKO refused to go any
further. The package was delivered to GUEVARA's deputy in
Berlin, and NOSENKO then returned to Moscow.

CIA travel records show that NOSENKO, listed. as a mineral
engineer, transitted Amsterdam en route to Cuba on 15 November
1960; and that he transitted Caracas from amsterdam on 17 Novem
ber 1960; and that on 19 November 1960 he went through Caracas
en route to Havana.* Our records also show that NOSENKO again
arrived in Amsterdam en route to Moscow from Havana on 13 Decem-
ber 1960 and that he left for Moscow on 15 December. There is
mo record that he travelled to Berlin.**.

w-€IA Obtained a photocopy of NOSENKO’s passport while he was

‘passing through Amsterdam and again through Caracas.

®% Yt appears possible that his name was not removed from the

original passenger manifest fer the 15 December flight to
Moscow and that his train trip to East Berlin went un-
noticed.

TOP seeeet

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_@. The Bulgaria TOY and the LUNT Case -

_| * In the spring of 1961, four months after returning from
Cuba, NOSENKO was sent on temporary assignment for about a.
month to Sofia, the only trip he took in other than a. security
“watchdog” capacity. According to NOSENKO, it happened this
way: “I think I first heard that I wa3 going to Bulgaria, a
week or so before I left, from S.I. YEGOROV, Chief of the
section having contact with the counterintelligence representa-
tives of the Countries of the Pecples' Democracies in Moscow...
He said: ‘You must go to Bulgaria. GRIBANOV has decided.*
He asked, ‘Do you know about this?' and I said 'No.' He said:
"KLYPIN (Chief of the American Department] mast tell you.’ But
this was the first I had heard about it. YEGOROV said that the
Minister of the Bulgarian MVR had requested the Chairman of the
KGB to send an officer from the American Department of the Sec-
ond Chief Directorate to Bulgaria for consultation with the

-'-American Department, Second Directorate of the MVR of Bulgaria._.

}
4
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4
Fi
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|

“After one or two days KLYPIN told me about it. He répeated
the same thing and after about one and a hali weeks I flew to
Sofia." The @iscussicn continued as follows:

Question: What plans were made for this trip in Moscow before
you left? What briefings or discussions were held
concerning what you were to do in Scfia?

NOSENKXO: I was told: “You are goirg for consultations. There
are KGB advisors there. They will discuss it with
you." No one was speaking with me about my trip-

Question: What discussions did you have with your department
chief, KLYPIN, about what you were to do on this
trip?

NOSENKO: Nothing. He told me: “You will go. You will see
what they are doing. You will tell them how to
work."

Question: Did you have any meetings Or discussions with the
representatives of the Bulgarian MVR in Moscow be-
fore you left?

‘NOSENKO: No.

Question: What discussions did you have with YEGOROV or his
- section about what you were going to do in Sofia?

NOSENKO: YEGOROV said: “You will go. You will tell us what
they are doing.*

Before you left Moscow for Sofia did you know any-
thing about the size of the American Department of
the Bulgarian MVR? .

te

fe

No. Nothing. we so fo,
. Did you know the names of any of the officers of the
: American Department.of the Bulgarian MVR? :

No. _

+ Flares


' NOSENKO: No, Nothing.
Question: bid ‘you know just what was the area of responsibility

of the American Department of the Bulgarian MVR?

NOSENKO: No. Nothing.

NOSENXO flew from Moscow in early April 1961 and was met .
at the airport in Sofia by A.S. KOZLOV, a former Second Chief . 3
Directorate officer whom he had known in Moscow.* The follow . : j
ing morning he was picked up in an official vehicle and wes : uo :
taken to KOZLOV's office in the Bulgarian MVR building, not far :
away. NOSENKO asked KOZLOV what was expected of him and was “3
told that "they want to know about how to work against the Ameri-
can Legation. He said he wanted me to tell them everything about
how to work, right from letter 'A.'" NOSENKO was.then intro-
duced to the Chief KGB advisor in Sofia, Mikhail YEGOROV, and
‘to the Chief of the MVR's American Department, after which he
was assigned an office in the MVR building. During the ensuing
weeks he discussed both general matters and particuler cases
with individual Bulgarian officers working agsinst the American
target. On one occasion he lectured interested MVR officers
on the principles of operations against foreign military person-
nel in Moscow, and on another he visited an MVR surveillance
post opposite tne American Legation. He discussed.KGB methods
of operations against foreign tourists. He also addressea the
entire American Department for about five hours and told them et
“what is necessary, what to pay attention to, how to work.* 4
At the end of his visit, some time in mid-May, NOSENKO conferred’ ;
with the First Deputy Minister of the MVR about what had been :
accomplished and his recommendations for improving operations
against Americans. ;

poere

As an outgrowth of his TDY to Bulgaria, NOSENKO has pro-
vided one lead tc a case in which he said he took personal part. . “4
About two weexs after arriving in Bulgaria, around the end of :
April 1961, NOSENKO was going over lists of foreigners who were i
scheduled to visit Bulgaria* in the near future, and he came ae '
across the name Horace G. LUNT. NOSENKO recalled that a man ,
named LUNT who was a Slavic linguist had been reported to him
in 1958 or 1959 by one. of his homosexual agents, VOLKOV or ,
YEFREMOV, as a possible homosexual. He asked the Bulgarians
whether this man was a specialist in Slavic languages. When
the Bulgarian officers replied in the affirmative, NOSENKO de-
cided to check his recollection against KGB records and an
immediate phone call was placed to Moscow,; asking for traces.

miclacnctie e edad he at

3
3
oy

ad earlier reported that KOZLOV had served as the
- Chief of the American Department, Second Chief Directorate,
until 1953 and that, until about two years before going to
Bulgaria as a counterintelligence advisor, he had been i.
_ Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. For the two years .
immediately prior to his Bulgarian assignment, he had been
Secretary of the Party Organization of the Second Chief -
Directorate and was relieved of all other duties. Asked ..
why KOZLOV was unable to “advise* the Bulgarians. in this —-
instance, NOSENKO said that he was too busy advising on _
higher levels and that he had been:.away from the work: for
number of years. — Lod ete els


14-0006

K reply was received almost at.onces

‘told: them that if he agreed, they should chan

es aphe.

at. once “Yes.. This is the sane’
LUNT who was in Moscow. Homosexual." NOSENKO told Cia. that
the KG2 had never done anything with its knowledge of LUNT's:
homosexual proclivities and that the Bulgarian MVR had not pre-
viously known of then. me :

HOSENKO's description of what happened next is as follows:
*®YOZLCY and the Chief of the American Department were very in-
terested, KOZLOV said: ‘George {NOSENKO].- you must help them.
They never recruited an American.’ I said that I would do what
I could. The three of us went to see General DUMKGV, the
Chief of the Second Directorate, Bulgarian MVR. T asked them
if they had a homosexual agent. They checked and said they
had one who is an operational con-sact. O.k., I said, acquaint
them, prepare a flat, make the pictures. This is the first
stage. I also told them, of course, to find out how long he
had been tuere, why, who his acquaintances were, etc. ther we
wert to YEGCROV, the senior Soviet advisor, and KOZLOV. called
GRIBANOV. GRIEANOV, I later found out, was'in a meeting with

tthe department chiefs of the Second Chief Directorate and was

not in a good mood. Why, I don't know. He didn't understand
what KOZLOV was saying. GRIBANCV thought chat I, myself, wanted
to make the approach to LUNT. KOZLOV got confused on the puone.
GRIBANOV asked to speak to me. I took the phone. ‘What are
you doing?" he said. ‘You are not at home, you are abroad.

You were sent only for consultations, but you are living as if
you were at home." I said: 'O.K., 0.K. I wasn't going to do
anything.' He hung up. I told KOZLOV that even if the Bulgar-
jans were to ask me, I could not do it myself, YEGCROV became
upset. He thought our position was bad because the Bulgarians
were asking. ‘What they ask, I will tell," I said, ‘but I am
not leaving the office to go any place or do anything. I can
only advise them on how to make the record entries after he is
caught. I can dictate the questicns to he asked. But the
approach and recruitment I cannot do myself.'

“The Bulgarians never said anything to me about active
participation, but they didn't know what to do. I told them
to get two agents. Maybe LUNT wouldn't like the first one.
The Bulgarians reported that LUNT wouldn't be there long. I
told them that if they wanted to take pictures and make a pitch
later, that's one thing. But if they wanted to do it all in |
one step, that is another. I told them they should consider the
time element... The Chief cf the American Department, KOVACHEV,.
and the chief of the section dealing with tourists and American
delegations were to make the recruitment. The approach was

"* made at the end of April, I think." ee

NOSENKO went on to say: “I was in the office during the

- approach. I told them I would not leave. ‘If you need my
‘advice,’ I said, ‘come to me.’ KOZLOV and I were sitting in

his office. It was the end of April, I think, and the next

‘day I went on holiday. I don't know where or how they ‘approached

LUNT. I only advised them that after the first conversation with
him they would know if he would be willing to cooperate. f said
they should have an apartment ready... not far from Sofia. I |
ge the place right
Take him some place nice finish the. conversation.
what I suggested." ..... Sickie

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didn't read any report of the results,and I didn't ask to see.
one. I.took a neutral position. ._ They said everytaing. was O.R. —
‘ The next day LUNT was to meet KOVACHEV and the section chief.

I went on a little trip, the May holidays, part of 30 April, 1,
2, and 3 May. ‘then I returned they said everything was O.K. and...
that he [.UsT] “had left. I asked them what they had decided for -.
the future, a contact in the United States or not. They said

? they decided against it because he was to come to Bulgaria in

' 1962 or 1963 for a Slavic conference.”

This account, which NOSENKO gave on 6 October 1964, differs
somewhaz from what he had said earlier, -on 11.June 1962, during
his second meeting with CIA. NOSENKO claimec tnen that he per
gsonally participated in the recruitment of LNT against GRIBANOV's
wishes: "They sent me in '61 to Bulgaria. ‘The Minister of Internal
Affairs there asked for a specialist to help them. I went to
help. An {American] professor arrived, a very prominent special-
ist on the Slavic countries... They [the Bulgarians} had never
tried [to recrtit} an American. ‘Let's try,' I said. The Sov-
det advisor in Bulgaria celephoned GRIBAHNOV and reported that
NOSENKO had decided that it is possible to get this American.
GRIBANGY wes in a conference at the time. GRIBANOV said: "Where
the hell's HOSENKO? Let me talk to him... What the hell are
you doing? I sent ycu only as an advisor.' Then he hung up.
What ccuid I do? The Bulicarians had already mace all prepara-~
tions... i was embarrassed, but what could I do? I left the
office of the advisor and they ‘ere waiting for me... I de-
cided to go ahead. I was sure that it would work. I felt that ;
it could be done, that this American could be firmly recruited... f
I spit on everything and went ahead with the Bulgarians. I - f
told trem to grab him. If it will be difficult for you, tell
me and I myseif can recruit him. Weil, they began and I came
there. He [NCSENKO is speaking of himself] was under the guise
of a Bulgarian and spoke in English, although my English was
poor... I said: ‘You are a pederast.' He also proved him- :
self to be a homesexual there [in Bulgaria]... ‘Well, what will ;
society think of you, those whose know you?’ Well, what did 4
this person decide? He agreed." ;

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The first time NOSENKO said that he had not participated . 3
directly in this operation was on 2 February 1964, while still

; in Geneva. He volunteered the following: “In Bulgaria in 4

i ’ April and May 1961, although I did not personally participate j
poo in this, I went there, and.I helped them there with the whole

i

: a process of recruitment of this professor. I helped the Bul- . 4

ete be -.. garians with what to do and how. He was the professor of a '
philolevy, LIuT.* hoc we deer a

. NCSENKO has also varied on the timing of the operation
‘against LUNT. In the account quoted above, he said that the
approach was made the day before he left on his. May Day holi-

@ay. On 24 April 1964 he said: “I remember that it was at

the very beginning of May that this name came up. And we got Ds
the -informaticn from Moscow the same day, telling us it was L os
the. same LUNT. I went on a trip the lst, 2nd, 3rd of May. . pre
~ hat is the 30th of April, lst and 2nd of May, and the 3rd of |
May in the morning I was back. So it was in the very beginning.
after the night of the trip. And Moscow was called right away,


14-0900

given all the: data, and- they: called. back ‘right away, and: gaid:|
"Yes, this is the samé,,.LUNT who-was in Moscow...* As--soon as -
"this was established, ‘the next day the Bulgarians’ planted this.
fe _ | bomosexual cx hin. They: planted this man either next to him
co a or in the restaurant and, well, he met LUNT and they got te-
getner and decided to meet with each other the same day or the
next day. This was all.done very rapidly."

a reemee

According to Professor LUNT, the approach actually took
place on 5 May 1961, following a visit to Moscow where he had
contacted an official in the U.S. Embassy. Ee travelled on
9 May directly from Sofia to Yugoslavia, where he at once re- — i.
ported the incident to U.S. Ambassador George MENNAN,.an aca- : , 7
demic acquaintance. LUNT told the Ambassador, and later CIA, .
that he had visited Sofia on one earlier occasion, from 8 to
28 November 1960. During this first trip he became involved
with one Georgi Velev ALEKSIEV, with whom he engaged in homo-
sexual relations on at least five separate occasions and to
whem he gave U.S. travellers checks, which ALEKSIEV intended ;
to sell on the black market. On one occasion during the first :
visit ALEKSIEV was recognized and stopped by the Bulgarian’ ~~ ;
civil police while walking cn the street with LUNT. After :
leaving Bulgaria in November 1960, LUNT received two letters :
from ALEKSIEV and prior to his next visit, cn 25 April 1961, :
LUNT wrote ALEKSIEV saying he would be returning. o

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Be "Transfer to the Tourist: Departnent in ° January: 1962

“tn the autumn of 1961 a decision was reached, on the basis

- Of NOSENKO'’s own request, to return him to the Tourist Depart-

‘ment. GRIBANOV had originally wanted to promote NOSENKO. from

the position of Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section to the

pest of Deputy Chief cf the American Department; NOSENKO's

. Superior and friend KOVSHUK had long had hts eye on this job,

however, and was the personal choice of the Chief of the Ameri-
can Department for it. (in fact, NOSENKO said, KOVSIIUK had

once held the job, lesing it in 1959 because of some misbehavior.)
NOSENKO did not want to be placed in the difficult situation
which his own promoticn to this post would have created. NOSENKO

.@escribed his transfer in the February 1965 interrogations. The

following is from a protocol signed on 26 February 1965:

"The decision for.me to return to the Seventh [Tourist]
Desartrent.in January 1962 was actually made in about Septem~
ber or October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy
Chief of the First [American] Department, but the new Chief
of the First Departnent, FEDOSEYEY,wanted KOVSKUK to take
this position. Since I did not want to be placed in this
position by GRIBANOV's order against the wishes of FEDOSEYEY,
I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be transferred back
to the Seventh Department, in any position. I had aiready
spoken to [V.D.] CHELNOKOV, who was then Chief of the
Seventh Department, about this matter and he had suggested
that I go to GRIZANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh
Department us Chief of the First [{American-British-Canadian]}
Section with the understanding that I would be appointed -
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department as soon as this
position would be vacated by [B.A.} BALDIN [who was retiring
in July 1962]. ...GRIBANOV did not teli me his reasons...
for wanting to appoint me Deputy Chief cf the First Depart-
ment in late 1961 or for appointing me Section Chief and
later Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department in 1962. He
@id not discuss witin me my personal qualifications for.
each of these positions."

Aware of his impending transfer NOSENKO took the opportunity

during December 1961 to spend several hours each day in the Tour-

ist Department. There he talked with Department Chief CHELNOKOV,
familiarized himself with certain files of the American Tourist

Section, ‘aud discussed current operations and operational possi-
bilities with the officers assigned to this section. The formal
order for the transfer was signed by GRIBANOV on 24 or 25 Detem-

ber 1961 and NOSENKO officially signed over the ABIDIAN case file —

and the U.&. Embassy security file to his successor as Deputy
Chief of the American Embassy Section, G.I. GRYAZNOV, within the

-next few-days.* As he had when he transferred from the Tourist

to the American Department in 1960, NOSENKO said, he took his |
active agents and his safehouse on Vorovskiy | Street with him when

he mturned to the Tourist Department in 1962. -

Pa

. These SpeeKTE dates were arrived at under. interrogation | in
‘February 1965. On all earlier occasions NOSENKO had said :
‘ ¢hat he was transferred in January 1962 (or some later date); .
"je said in. February 1965 that he was "officially" transferred
at the end of December and reported to his new position at
“the beginning of January (see Below).

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January.1962 to January 1964 (Tourist Department).

1. Date of Transfer

NOSENKO has given different dates for the time when he left

the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Departmer.t to become
Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the Tourist
Department. During the Geneva meetings of 1962 ne said on

-d@ifferent occasions that this occurred in January 1962 and in

February 1962; in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling between
15 and 20 January 1962; and in February 1965 NOSENKO gave the
date as 2 or 3 canuary 1962, He has also reported that he was
in the U.S, Embassy Section for three months after John ABIDIAN
serviced the Pushkin Street dead drop (on 30 December 1961, thus
placing NOSENKO in the U.S, Embassy Section until late March
1962) and that he had transferred to the Tourist Department by
the time GOLITSYN defected (which NOSENKO placed in mid-January
1962 but which actually occurred in mid-December 1961).* W.E.

JOHNSON, the target of a Tourist Department operaticn** con-

firmed that NOSENKO approached him in Moscow on 5 January 1962.

In Fabruary 1965 NOSENKO said he recalled that the correct)
date of his approach to JOHNSON was on 5 January 1962. The CIA
interviewer then reminded NOSENKO that he had earlier described
on several octasions his visit to the dead drop site on Pushkin
Street and his receipt of reports rrom the surveillance post
for three months afterwards; during all of this period, NOSENKO
had said, he was in the U.S. Embassy Section of the First Depart-
ment. NOSENKO was told that CIA records show that ABIDTAN made
only one visit to this dead drop site, on 30 December 1961, six
days before the approach to JOHNSON, He answered only that he
might have been confused, but despite any contradictions the
"facts" (his emphasis) were the important thing, not any corre~
lation of dates.

2. Functions and Activities

As Chief of the American-British-Canadian Section of the
Tourist Department (hereafter in Part V.F. referred to as the
American Tourist Section) from January to July 1962, NOSENKO
said, he was responsible for planning and coordinating all
KGB activities against such tourists in the USSR as well as
for supervising the operational work of 15 subordinate case
officers. He had no deputy. NOSENKO told CIA that he required
several months at the beginning of 1962 “to get the feel of
things"; "there were no accomplishments" on his part in the
initial period on this new job, and plans for handling the
influx of American tourists during the forthcoming 1962 season:
consisted of studying files and continuing to work against the «
tourists asin the past. NOSENKO was asked in February 1965 .

‘© Statements by NOSENKO about GOLITSYN are reviewed in

Part VI.E., and ABIDIAN's servicing of the Pushkin Street
dead drop is discussed in Part V.E.3.d.

* See Part V.F4. for details on this operation.

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236.

whether, in his first several, months in the Tourist Department,
he had originated any new methods for operations ageinst An-

@rican tourists. he replied that during this period he ‘nad ;
proposed a study of representatives of foreian tourist firms A
in Moscow with an eye toward the KGH attempting to recruit j
them.* This suggestion, NGSENKD said, had been accepted, j

In March 1965, NOSENKO was asked whar new knowledge con-
cerning the use of tourism for esplonag? purposes by foreign
intelligence organizations had been acquired by the KGB during
his two-year absence from the Tourist Department. He replied .
that. the KGB had noted an increase in automobile tourism and : ‘
that American Intelligence had increased its use of multinational ,
tourist groups. NOSENKO was then asked what new information
concerning the use of tourism as a cover for uspionage activity
had been obtained by the KGB from any agent source during this
period, NOSENKO answered that he neither knew of any such new
information nor had he heard of such an agent.**

NOSENKO has said that, in line with the wishes of the Chief
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, O.M. GRIRANOY, Ae was pro-
moted to the position of Deputy Chief of the entire Tourist
Department in July 1962, immediately efter his return from
Geneva. A year later he was made Firs: Deputy Chief of the
Department, a promotion which involved only a change in title
as there was ro Second Deputy Chief at the time. Apert from
saying he was V.D, CHELNOKOV's second-in-command from July 1962
to January 1964 and as such general supervisor of all KGB tour-
to this position; NOSENKO has not been questioned specifically
concerning these duties.

NOSENKO's first operaticnal activity after transferring to
the American Touris< Section was supervision of a homosexual
approach to wW.E, JOHNSON on 5 January 1962. Additionally, during
the 1962-64 period in the Tourist Department NOSENKO tcok part
in the recruitment approach to Horst BRAUNS, in the interrogation
of Yale University Professor Frederick BARCHOORN, and in the
arrest of the American tour guide Bernard KCTEN. For a short
time in 1963 he handled the KGB agent Alexarder SVENCHANSKIY,
owner of a tourist agency in New York City*** and a Russian
language bookstore in Chicago, Illinois, By virtue of his

*- NOSENKO said at another time that he made the same proposal
in 1958-59, forming the basis of the FRIPPEL operation {see
Part V.D.5.).

** See Part V.D.7.b., which discusses the KGB agent George

BLAKE, a staf£ officer of MI-6, who confessed after his

arrest in April 1961 that he had passed to his Soviet

handlers the complete minutes of joint meetings held by
mo, CIA and MI-6 in London in June 1959 and in Washington
@uring April 1960. These meetings were held to coordinate
the American and British programs fcr leqal travel opera- : i
tions, mainly with tourists, into the Soviet Union.
i Part ¥.D.7.c. describes a top secret KGB document on
Western tourist operations in the Soviet Union which was
peepared in 1961 in the Tourist Department of the KGB
Seconda Chief Directorate. This document, which the
@efector GOLITSYN gave CXA, quoted verbatim certain
geebions of the minutes given to the KGB by BLAKE.

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SCCKOTEN was frequently employed as a tour guide to the USSR
by this tourist agency. : : OO mo |

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14-00000,

“Gupervisozy posit! on, ‘in the ‘Tourist Department - NOSENKO. also be-
came involved with John SHUSIN, a GRU agent. (These six cases -
JOHNSON, BRAUNS, BARGHOORN, KOTEN, SVENCHANSKIY, and SHUBIN - are .
discussed below.) NOSENKO reported that his planned role in the.

approach to Natalie BIENSTOC (see Part VI,D.2.) was prevented |
by his preparations to leave for Geneva in March 1962, Finally,
NOSENKO said he participated in the KGB invescigation of Lee.
Harvey OSWALD after P-esidert KEINEDY!' 8 assassination in Novem—
ber 1963 (see Part V.D.6.).

NOSENKO has indicated that his own operational work in 1962
to 1964 was limited to those cases cited above because of the
considerable amount of time spent on temporary duty assignments
outside Moscow during these two years. In mid-February 1962,
soon after assuming the duties of Chief of the American Tourist
Section, he began to prepare for his first trip to Geneva, which
lasted from 14 March until 15 June 1962 (see Part III.B.). NOS-
ENKO estimated that he had spent a total of six months outside
Moscow in 1963 on temporary assignments. These included a two-
day trip to Odessa to meet FRIPPEL, an inspection tour of the
Leningrad KGB organization, a five-day trip to Leningrad for a
conference on border control, a week-long trip to Alma-Ata for
a conference on tourist travel with KGS representatives from
the Soviet Central Asian republics, and an eignt- or ten-day
inspection trip to the Caucasus as a member of a tean headed by
GRIBANOV. NOSENKO said he travelled to Gésrkiy Oblast on 16-17
December 1963 to. assist in the search for CHEREPANOV, who had
passed top secret documents to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow (see
Part VI.D.7.c.).

3. NOSENKO's Agents

Mhen NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department in the
first days of 1962, he took with him the agents whom he had
been handling as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section.
These agents are listed below with a summary of NOSENKO's com-
ments concerning their use in 1962 and 1963.*

a. Arsene FRIPPEL:

FRIPPEL had been reassigned from Moscow in early 1961, but
NOSENKO continued to be the Second Chief Directorate case offi-
cer in charge of any future KGB contacts with him. (FRIPPEL
had no KGB contacts in New York City.) Describing FRIPPEL's
past service for the KGB on 15 June 1962, five months after he
said he transferred to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO said:
“FRIPPEL was afraid and gave practically nothing... He was
a weak agent... I recruited him but. speaking honestly, he =

“was not an agent." Nevertheless, NOSENKO said, the KGB hoped

that FRIPPEL would be reassigned to the USSR at some future
date. When FRIPPEL returned twice to the Soviet Union in

. 1963, NOSENKO met with him, ence in Odessa and once -in Moscow,

The oniy other “agent. whom NOSENKO handlea ‘during this

period was the American ) Alexander SVENCHANSKTY. (See
Part V.F.6.).

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288.

put FRIPPEL provided nothing useful on theze occasions.*
Whereas NCSENKO had normally met FRIFPET in the company of
CHELNOKOV during FRIPPEL's Moscow tour, he went alone to tne
tivo 1963 meetings. .

b. Johan PREISFREUND:

After GOLITSYN's cGefection, NOSEUKO said, the KG3 considered
PREISSREUND compromised to American Intelligence and therefore
ineligible for further use against Anericans at the Embassy in
Moscow. For this reeson NOSENKO was told by the U.S, Embassy
Section to continue to t.andle PREISFREUND while serviag in the

_ Tourist Depertment, but as PREISTREUND spcke only Finnish and
Russian, he was of no use against Enclish-spesking tourists.

- Although NOSENKO met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to

“Moscow in 1952 end 1953, this agent wes not used operationally.

c. VOLKOV and YEPRINOV:

ROSENKO'sS two homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV tcok
part in the entrapment aporoach ta W.EL JOHNSON several days
after NOSENKO returned ta the Tourist Department. This was
their first operational activity since 1959, for they had not
been used in any homosexual operations while HOSSIKO was in the
U.S. Embassy Section, it was, according to NOSENKO, the last
tine they were engaged in KGB activity. At the end of 1962 or
beginning of 1963 they were terminated, and their files were
sencn by NOSENKO to KGB archives. NOSENMKO explained that VOLKOV
and YEFREMOV had become too well known for their operational
activities to be of further use to the Second Chief Directorate,

2. Gaear

When NOSENKO was transferred to the Tourist Department,
he was instructed by the Americar Department Chief, S.M.
FEDOSEYEV, and V.M. KOVSHUK, Chie Enbassy Section,
to continue to handle AP ReRaS 4 KEES GAR
studying in Moscow. NCS ad personally crui techies Se
and had used him in the development cf U.S, military code
clerk Matthey ZIJUS (see Part V.E.3.c.) in 1901, an operation
which was still underway at_the time of NOSENKO's transfer.
NOSENKO continued to meet GPRS curing the first months of
1962, end he recalled that in February or March of that year
he instructed GEE to attempt to arrange a social meeting
with ZJJUS in a Moscow restaurant so that znother KGB egent
could be introduced to the KGB target. This meeting had not
taken place by Merch 1962, when NOSENKO left for Geneva. Just
before leaving Moscow, around 12 March 1962, NCSENKO turned
5 \ over to G.I. GRYAZNOV, according to NOSEIKO, tnen the
peputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. GSS) was scheduled
to finish his studies in Moscow in May 1962, and NOSENKO be-
lieved he left at that time to return to Syria.

—_—_—
© PRIPPEL reported a meeting with NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV
im Odessa in early 1962, and the records of the State
Department Passport Office indicate that FRIPPEL intended
'@o visit the USSR at that time. NOSENKO said there was
See Part V.D.5.

:
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TINOV of the Tourist Department in 1956. or 1957. At that time-

-tourist Wallace Everett JOHNSON on 11 June 1$52:° He did not name

“Churches and... insulted us, Russia, and the coverrment horribly.

_ are you? How about our connection in the States? And our

-° Magina RYTOVA: 70 1 0-% ~ Doran
Marina RYTOVA was turned over to NOSENKO by I.A. KONSTAN-

Exhibition in Moscow. In 1960 or 1961 she. became an instructor

of the Greek language at the Institute of International Relations,

and some time in 1962 she got a job at the school of the Central

Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Thereafter |

she ceased all agent work. NOSENKO was officially registered as .
her case officer until his defection in 1964. He cid not andi- . :
cate that RYTOVA took part in ary operations, from January 1962 ;
until she began work for the Central Committees. - |

she was working as an interpreter at the Russian Permanent - : _ |

on ab staacetbaht

negara ta theweien +

4. Approach to W.E. JOHNSON
a. NOSENKO's Information:

-NOSENKO first referred to his approach to the American

JOHNSON at this time: "In January of this year I recruited (an
American/. I cannot reinember his name. He is from California,

a Baptist, a young guy, healthy, somewhat fac, and he turned out
to be a homosexual.* He loved men. I have an agent network
capable of anything and, in particular, althoush I head a section
there, I have a good agent apparatus, i.e., + have beautiful
girls... and I have young pederasts, homos2xuals._ In partic-
ular, I have one special pair /VOLKOV and YEFREMOV/ - I'm afraid
that they are known to you and the English... Here is what
happened. He gave me a signature. I told him: ‘Write it your- 2
self.’ So he typed it on a typewriter, I said: 'No, I don't
want it typed. write it out longhand.'... Fe had a very re-
actionary attitude toward the Soviet Union. His attitude was
such that he insulted us terribly. He visited Baptist groups,

He sent letters, and we read them all - awful letters, i.e., the
government is lousy and everything here is poor. i said to him:
‘Write, damn it, that the best country /in the world/ is the :
Soviet Union, that the best government is the Soviet Government. r
Write, write.' In general he did everything /I asked/ but then, | }
right away, he ran to the Embassy_and told everything. This

was in January of this year /1962/. He told everything. I : !
know that he told. But he gave me his signature that he would :
help the Soviet security organs, etc. I know this. I was i
there. I decided to go to the hotel where he was staying. I i

sat down and waited. Surveillance was on the joo. ‘Tell me ; |

when he comes,' /I ordered/. I sat down, ‘He_has come,’ ithe — Uy cbt aera
surveillance_team reported/. ‘where is he?' /I asked/. ‘In ; : ,
his room,' /they said/. ‘We'll wait,‘ /I replied/. They re- . 7 :
ported that he had gone to eat in the restaurant and I went : |
there at once. He was sitting alone. I approached him: : en
‘Hello, how are you?' I didn't say anything to him, _I knew

that he had told everything in the Embassy. /T said:/ ‘How .

Hier cee

2 beste

work in the States? what do you think about it? I said to
him: ‘Will you work? Can you: give us something importent or
mot?’ He answered: ‘I have nothing.’ I. said: ‘And if I

'* Other sources, personal acquaintances of JOHNSON, have.

reported JOHNSON! s having homosexual tendencies

make: “at. public. that” ‘you are a ‘pederast, what wild’ héppen then?’
‘No,’ ne said, ‘I will do: anything you.want.’ But I couldn’ t

- tell him that I knew that he had reported everything. I said:

‘Listen, brother, I don't believe you. You ere a bad person.'
We Gecided that we couldn't do anything with him. ‘Go home,
damn yor,’ I said. ‘But if you write one insulting erricle
about Ru :3sia I will find you, even in the U.S.' He is a
Baptist and writes articles, a bright guy. And I left. He.
pushed eside his food and ran to a pay telephone and called .
@the Embassy/: ‘This afternoon in a restaurant George was
frightening me.‘ We know ke called the Embassy. de heard
everything."

NOSENKO's first reference to JCHNSON in 1964 was at a meet-
ing on 2 february, when he produced a note ‘bearing that name and
the date 5 January 1962. (“Here I have a name jotted down,
Everett wallace /sic/ JOHNSON," NOSENKO said. "The date was

.5 January 1962, but what took place i havé absolutely no recol-
- lection. I don't think it was a recruitment, but it was some
‘sort of tontact, or he was being’ studied or worked on, or some-

thing like that. But I remember nothing."

NOSENKO next mentioned his epproach to JOHNSON on 17 April
1964. Although not immediately recalling JCHNSON's name, he
eventually remembered that “it was scmething like JOHNSON,
JOHNSTON, or something that sterts with a ‘J'" and that he was

@ Raptist from the California coast. NOSEYKO placed the opera-_

ticn sometime in the summer of 1962, after his return to Moscow
from Geneva, because he also remenbered wearing "just a coat, ~
no overcoat at the time." JOHNSON, who had come to the Soviet
Union as a tourist, was known to be a socialist, and on this
basis the KGB Second Chief Directorate considered him as a
recruitment target. When the Second Chief Directorate checked
whether the KGB First Chief Directcrate would have any use for
JOHNSON as an agent, however, it learned there was no interest
in JOHNSON: He had no access to important information, and he
lived too far from the KGB Legal Residencies in the United
States for convenient contact.

Several days later KGB surveillance observed JOHNSON
mailing some letters in Moscow, When read by the KGB they were

found to be_"so bitter toward the Soviet Union, angry, critical,.

that they /the KG3/ decided something had to be done" to stop.
him from writing letters and making anti-Soviet statements on
his return to the United States. At about the same time there

‘was some sign that JOHNSON was a homosexual, and it was decided

to entrap him on this basis. The sole reason was to halt
JOHNSON's criticism of the USSR ~ no recruitment was attempted,
because neither the First nor the Second Chief Directorates
had any use for him as an agent and because the KGB had detere
mined that he probably would not accept a recruitment proposal

‘anyway. NOSENKO did not know why he was selected to make the
_ @pproach to JOHNSON, except. that "BOBKOV said I should go."

(FP. D. BORBKOV, a Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate,

_ Supervised the activities of the Tourist Department.) NOSEN-
. KO's homosexual agerts. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV were selected to
Compromise JOHNSON, ac

Seer ; * :
*"- In 1962 NOSENKO implied that the KGB received: its first
indication of ‘JOHNSON:

i
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i-
A

bisbah Site darbed dummiabuss,

vs hesmeedbeait Lan

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14-0900:

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.of him. Let's see that. his trip is cut off.'"-

* BOSENKO: _ No, it: doesn't. concern JOHNSON’ at all. .I remember

JOHNSON beceme acquainted with VOLKOV and YEFREMOV at the ee
I

Metropol Hotel. They told JCHN3SON that they had recently ar-

‘rived in Moscow and invited JOHNSON to visit their hotel room.

JOHNSON agreed because "they understood each other right away. i
They knew they were the same (i.e., homosexuals) and so he came, |
and when they were engaged in their business, our people walked i
in on them under the disguise of the hotel administrator and ; :
one militiaman," Photographs of the incident had been taken,

but these had not been developed at the time of this, the first
confrontation of JOHNSON. A report describing the circumstances

(an akt) was prepared, and JOHNSON was then transferred to another

room, By this time, NOSENKO had arrived at the hotel from his

office, ard he went into the room where JOHNSON was waiting in

accordance with KGB orders, NOSENKO discussed the situation

with JOrciscn, then asked him to type and sign a statement that

he would "not say anything derogatory about the Soviet Union."

JOHNSON did as he was told.

The following day, after the incriminating photographs had
been developed, NOSENKO approached JOHNSON in the cafe of the
Metropol Hotel and esked him whether he intended to Keep his
promise. when JOHNSON said that he planned to do so, NOSENKO
presented him with an envelope containing copies of the photo-
Graphs and said that they would be leaked to the foreign press
if JOKNSON were to break his promise. The KGS later- learned
that JOHNSON had visited (or phoned, according to a later ver-
sicn) the U.S, Embassy and assumed that he had reported the
approach. NOSENKO did not recall what name, if any, he had
used during this operation.

Questioned further on 24 April’ 1964, NOSENKO said that,
upen his arrival at the hotel immediately after the compromise,
the militiaman described the incident to him in JOHNSON's pre-
sence. Addressing JOHISON, NOSENKO had said: "How come? How
could you do such a thing? What are we going to do now? After
all, this is punishable by court and... people are given from
five to eitht years for such relations. It used-to. be three
to five, not it’s from five to eight." Frightened by this,
JOHNSON had written and signed his promise not to denigrate
the Soviet Union in the future, ; po

sme esate

NOSENKO was asked whether the KGB would mount such an _ i
Operation against any foreigner who wrote uncomplimentary

mieieesteast S Gcbstar tine «

1

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letters and articles about the USSR. He replied: "They don't - Fe cera 7

jump on everyone, and not everyone writes this. way. And not :
everything that is written this way cets into their hands. :

In this case there was a coincidence. - There was something we
could hit him on. For instance, if the fact that he. is a -
homosexual didn't come to our attention, they would probably
just say: ‘All right, to hell with him. we have to get rid

thile discussing the approach to JOHNSON on 30 January
the following dialogue took: place: ae . _

1965;

WOSENKO: This: (the ‘appréach)’ took place’in the ‘summertime.
we OF M62 or 63.0 POS my
Question: In your notes,’ you. have. the. date 5 January 1962

it was: summer; I think it was:."63 ; sini.


_“Yeourse,. pecause we haver' t seen “him yet.” -But even. that ‘first -
-eignal is very. helpful, So if he goes on a Soviet plane, they
will start watching him from the time the flight starts. - Now,.
as soon as he crosses the border, he willbe watched by the :
order guards; he will. be watched the entire route of his travel. .
“This is a very important busiress, because the main task in re-.
gard to tourists is to uncover within the gef.eral flow of tourists
those persons wao are of interest from the operational point of
view... Let's just say that this person is processing a group
of American tourists who are going to the Soviet Union, and,
when the processing is almost finished, another person is added
to the group. Nebody knows this person in the group... but he
was added_at the last mirute. So this is an indication. This is
what he /the agent/ was taught to pay attention to when he was
being trained in Moscow... Now, if some official government
agency mekes a request that a man ke sent to the Soviet Union as
.a tourist, this immediately arouses suspicion of course... In
such things he has been trained... He comes to Moscow once or
twice a year. You know, such a little Jewisn fellow - an emigre
“from Russia - in the past, you know, scared of everything. The i
. . last time he came he told us: ‘You know, I'm thinking about it 3
. oe all the time,' he says. So they esked him: ‘Are you afraid?
ahy are you shaking?’ He says, ‘Well, T'm not afraid: I'm not
shaking. But why should I be caught like an idiot...' His
pseudonym is 'NIUD' and his last name is SVEXCHANSKIY. Kell,
I'll give you all this later." :

NOSENKO told CIA on 14 February 1964 that SVENCHANSKIY was
recruited in 1961 and that in 1963 he, NOSENKO, had taken over a
the handling of this agent from Tourist Department case officer : o
Ye. N. NOSKOV.* SVENCHANSKIY had sent the KG3 many open code a
messages such as those described above, and a number of these ;
messages have been considered to have been of definite opera- ‘ :
tional interest. NSOSENKO identified SVENCHANSKIY as the presi-
dent of “Afton Tours" in New York City and the owner of a
‘Russian-language bookstore in Cnicago.

i . There was some concern on the part of the KGB at the time
of the recruitment in 1960 or 1961, NOSENXO reported on 1 March:
1965, because SVENCHANSKIY nad had contacts with AMTORG in New
York City. The KGB suspected he was an FBI agent, but in con-
tacting SVENCHANSKIY in 1960 or 1961, NOSKOV decided that this
was not so and therefore recruited him. (Asked how it was de- ©
: termined that SVENQIANSKIY was not an FBI agent, NOSENKO re-
i plied: "NOSKOV felt it:" he had no further explanation.) The
recruitment was based mainly on an agreement that. Inturist
i... . + would send more business to SVENCHANSKIY if he cooperated. rr er
sO NOSENKO also said SVENCHANSKIY had been arrested. for black- ; : _
marketeering, but he did not elaborate on this statement.- ;
NOSENKO took over the case froni NOSKOV in September 1963, and
to his name was entered ‘in the single-volume file of SVENCHANSKIY it
ool: as the handling officer as of that date. Together with NOSKOV, $
NOSENKO subsequently had two meetings with SVENCHANSKIY when }
: the latter travelled to the Soviet Union, one in September a - }
“ena one towards the. end. of 1963. : _ . te ee |
; oe 4 ae
7

Information from Other Sources: -

ga records reflect: ‘that. Alexander: ‘SVENGHANSKIY wa was “born
March 1909: in. Theodosia. cage gore ‘He: inmigrated to. the.


14-0000

‘father's papers in 4929: Wis’ cabliest “exployers were the "ALL-

hao

297

Russian ‘Textile Syndicate” from February 1928 te March 1931, / a
by AMTORG in New York City from April 1932 to May 1942, and by ‘ oo
the Soviet Government burchasing Commission in Washington from | us
May 1942 until December 1942. Uucing the Second World war,
SVENCHANSKIY served in the U.S, Ariny Air Force as “official “ :
translater” at the dhite Horse Air Base in Alaska, where he had te
frequent ccntacts ween members of Soviet aircraft crews. Fromm . :
October 1946 until December 1952, when he was dismissed for re- Hy
fusing to answer questions by the McCarran .Cc:inmittee concerning

alleged subversive activity, SVENCHANSKIY was employed at United

Nations Headquarters as a radio officer, broadcasting to the

USSR. As of early 1965, SVENCHANSKIY was liated as president of

Afton Tours, inc., New York City, and president of Cross World

Books and Periodicals, Chicacso. Afton Tours is a branch of the . q
Package bxpress and Travel Agency, which is a registered agent
of Inturist. Cross world Books and Periodicals wes registered
in 1961 as an agent of Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, tne Soviet Foreign
Trade famini stration dealing with the cistrikurion and sale of
Russian-language books, periodicals, films, and visual aids.
SVENCHANSKLY nas mace numerous trips to the USSR, including one
in August and Septenrer 1903,

paatsllbsl Neb Bigtinr disci “ok

a ca Aypeteds 2,

Allegations of SVENCHANSKIY's Communist sympathies and pro-

bable Soviet espionage a pei ES me date pack <3, io
Force service in Alaska, 4yatury stds ;
mt £ his strong pro-Suviet bi as anu Suspiciously close Ccon-

2 with Soviets. In Aujust 1950 Harry GOLD, then in prison
as an ae@mitted Soviet agent, linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet
espionage retwork in the United States.* GOLD stated that in.
March 1942 SVENCHANSKIY, under the name of SWIN, had been in-
strumental in introducing his “co-conspirator” Abraham BROTHMAN
to “another AMTORG man to engage in industrial espionage." A
CIA report of 14 November 1950 cites a “tested source" (a Czech
National employed et the United Nations) as stating: "I believe
that Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, employed in the Radio Section of
the Russian Divisioa of the United Nations, isa Communist and

Lee

take tea gyeto

beth PENTLEY, KALAXEVICH hee. since emigrated to “the Soviet

Union; he was identified as an agent of the KGS Second Chief

Directorate by COLITSYN and by NOSENKO, Virtualiy all the i !
individuals with whom SVENCHANSKIY has entered into business Jd
arrangements since leaving the United Nations have or had con- .
nections with the U.S. Communist Party or with the Soviet 4 :

Intelligence Services. His business dealings. have also brought
him into frequent contact with Soviet officiels in this country,
including a number of identified intelligence officers. (two of
them reported on + by NOSENKO) . _ _

*

the story of ‘SOLD's ‘testimony under “the headline "“Ex-U.N,
‘ Aide linked to’ Spy Ring by Gold: . the Times reported. that
-GOLD: had executed an affidavit to this’ effect the week: ‘

: feo 14 . . . i
ee oo, me
* The (21 October 135] dition of ‘the New York Times carried, ;

i
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|
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USSR in the fall of i¢e3 Almost at

from KGB Heedquarters and “the

An FBI 1
SVEN SHANSKIY &

NOSENKO wac asked in Ceneva Gn 25 January 1564 whether he
had been involved in the arrest of an rist in the
3 resoynized

= MP,
. POUre an

this as the cese of fernira ROLES a
New York City {end hence an 5 SVENCHANEKIY =
see below) who nad besa apprehended cn exual charges in Kiev.
CSENZO explains that, »hiie had no> personaliy perticipated
in the errest and hat never mec KGTON, ne hee supervised the case

Tana was report

NCOSENKO said that Kort had long boon @ momoer of the Am-
erican Communist Party and was a frequent visiter to the Soviet
Union after World War IIT. On these trips he had a large number
of contacts with dissident literary tigaures an} with soviet
citizens in general, perticvlarly among Russian Jews.** Because
of these many suspiciou. contacts, both the nog rere ane the
Second Chief Diiectorates hac come to the conclusion that KOTEIN
might well pe a provocation agent planted in or recruited from
the ranks cf the Communist barty of the United States. More-
ever, on the eve of KOVEN’s 1953 trip, the Tourist Department '

learned froma Vib. BARKOVYSKILY of the First Chirel Directorate's

Scientific and Technical (S&7) Directorate tit KOTEY was

‘rying with him the aceé ax cf relatives of an important

gent of the KGB's Cece Legal Pesidercy, and that KOTEY .
mncendea@ to visit them while in the USZ%, NOSENKO said he dic :

not know the name of this agent ere

This agert was a naturalized Anerican citizen, about 40 :
to 45 years ola, an n engineer born in Russia, who was employed ar
in an “interesting industrial company or technical organization
in the New York City area." For scme time he had been working

* CIA told NOSENKO of this information about SCKCLOW. in March
1965. He recalled that a woman named Sonya worked for .
SVENCHANSKIY but said that “we considered thac he (SVEN- A.
CHANSKIY) was doing it (spotting the tourists)." NOSENKO :
did not know of any Soviet Intelligence ties to, SQKOLOA.

“NOSENKO hes ‘explained in another context that the. Second
Cniek Directorate. is wary, of forexgn < contacts with. Soviet:

ce Bre debit nat canbe


‘here, the situation is right, the decision must be made right

actively for the $ Legal Residency: and haa provided the:
- KGB with "good, solia ormation” with “very valuaslke material
for technical intelligernce;:" at the same time the agent had been -

asking to be repatriated to the USSR, to become a Soviet citize:
but the KGB had been putting him off in order to continue to

exploit his access. Since the amount and quality of the agent's

production hed recently deteriorated, the KGB decided to accede
to his request for repatriation. Now, however, the acent de-

clined, saying that “he was not ready to go just yet. First he
was practically begging to cone to the Soviet Union ard now he

was balking." This by itself appeared suspicious to the KGB, kut
in addition, it was about this time that the egent came into con-

tact with KCTEN NOSE!::KO learned from BARKOVSELY that KOTEN.
“used to go to some booxstore that sells Soviet literature and
through a saleslady in this story whom KOTEV knows, he became
acquainted with the agent. who also used to go to this store.

After that, he used to meet with the agent without the saleslady."

On the basis of these incidents the First Chief Directorate
suspected that KOTEN had been directed specifically to this store
in order to meet and “work on" the egent and that, having learned

that the agent had relatives “in Stantsiya Loo, akout 17 kilo-
meters from Sochi... he had evidently received tne assignment
(to visit the relatives) from American Intelligence. Evidently
they had gotten on the trail of this agent and were checking on
him." The KGS also had suspicions concerning the relatives,

former kulaks who were still well-off financially. It was know.

to the KGB, for example, that the agent had written his sister
in Stantsiye Loo that he wanted to return to the Soviet Union,
and she had replied: "Is there any sense in your coming here?"

KOTEN arrived in Moscow and then travelled to Sochi. From
there he sent a telegram to the agent's sister and her husband

in Stantsiya Loo, asking them to come to Sochi to see him. When

they arrived at KXOTE!'s hotel. however, the hotel administrator
told them that “OTEN was on an excursion and refused to allow

ae meeting. KOTON then took it upon himself to travel to Stant-
siya Loo where he eventually contacted and spoxe to the rela-
tives. In the course of. this meeting KOTEY took photographs

of the sister and her husband and recorded a message from the
sister to the agent on a tape recorder he had brought along.
From this the KGB deduced that "U.S. Intelligence wants to get
documentary data" and it therefore decided to “try to get hold
of KOTEN."

There had already been some indication during XOTEN's

‘earlier trips to the USSR that he was a homosexual, but the

KGB had taken no action because KOTEN was believed to be a
loyal Communist Party member. With these recent developments,
the situation had now changed. Although NOSENKO's superiors.

were absent from KGA Headquarters at the time, immediate action.

was required. NOSENKO consequently "took the whole thing on-

myself because everybody got excited, . Everybody said: ‘Let' 8

go. American Intelligence. is active, none of our ‘bosses are

now.'" By this time: KOTEN had travelled to Thilisi, and there
a homosexual KGB agent managed to. entice him. into relations. -

ina public park. These were suitably documented, ané he was ~

then | Picked: UP. by the local Militia. (In. the: ‘absence. of: his.

3
4
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‘superiors and fearing the bos

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‘return there in the future and that he

insisted that  Mileav. acts in a public pies
end that the KGh not pacticipatys ¢ ap orenensicn.)
After question Ly the Milatia. : 5 permitted ta con-
tinue tis itinerary to Riu. whore te was sche ivled to stay

for two Gays before’ lesving the USSR

ehe Paret Chicf Dire torate, waich
increasingly concerned that the Ga petent of the #3 LAL Cr 4s
Residency “ould te apprehended by 2 TPL, wanted to get G2 OLt
of the United Sestes cefore thin happenec. ‘io ‘establis: the
true purpose" of KC s presence in the USSE and whether he w2s
an American agent, 4& well as to hold him untii the GB agent ha
arrived safely in the YSSKR (as NOSENKG told the FEI on 24 Feb-
ruary 1964), ic wes requested that VOTE! ce detained in the
Soviet Union, ‘The ducisien was made to arrest him at once on
the basis cf the cempromising materials cotained in Thilisi.
Following the arrest Ly the Kiev Militi KOTEI wes turned over
to the KGB for interrogation} the purpe NCSENKO said, was to
"break him,” to secure tie zdmission t. heacras an American
intelligence agent. At the same tine STs the GRY agent
hed failed to xcep a nuuber cf scheduled meetings with nis KSB
case officer, and the Legal Residency teared that something nad
gone wrong. He did eventually appear. h ERK

Meanwhile. was growing

svever, and NOSEAKO has
descrined the gupsequent meetings as follows: “They asked him:
‘are you going to leave the States?’ Ha said: ‘Well, I aon't
knew. I heave tu think about it seme more.’ So we said: ‘No,
you have to leave or else we will wash our hands of the whole
affair.’ £0 ne sard: You know T[ was thinking of leaving with
my wife, but my wife does not want to ieave.' To make a long
story shert, they scent three meetings trying to talk him into
leaving, and he kept hesitating. He Gicn't seen to want to
leave, so then they tole him: Loox, we are creaking off con-
tact with you. If you decide to go. you krow how to do it.

You are to 9° from the United States to some place in Europe
and go to the Soviet Embas>y there. They will give us 3 eignal
and the visa will ke issued to yon. But as far 2s we're con-
cerned, we're breaking contact with you.‘”

After this, according to NOSENXO. the KCB released KOTEN
when the Americen Communist Party and other organizations

‘strongly protested his arrest and imprisonment.

b. Information from Other Sources _Conserning KOTEN

; At the time of his arrest KOTEN wes an instructor of
Russian at New York University director of the Liprary for
Intercultural Studies. and a regular contributor ts the New
World Review and the magazine Jewish Life- S8oth the Library .
for Intercultural Studies and Jewish Life have been designated
“Copmunist fronts" by the House Committee cn Un-American

- Activities: the Hew World Review has. been cited as a propa-
_ ganda organ of the Soviet Government. KOTEN has said that,

te his. arrest and imprisonment in the USSR, he hopes to
“still loved the
Russian people and believed in the basic humanitariantsm of

despi

ee Regarding the arrest th o"York Times on 29 Auguat .
1963 carried an article under : (~Sa- iide Missing -

4

ese

q
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oa

ey


can tour
rev wEth tre
#¢ Rermar? Le.
3°23 August,

opps
Kate: of

toscow, securist travel
4 been arscestec
feize feo
POAT: 7 Mage
ust) e -he eed

BS

offense teokK pl
28 September 15
26 August, had voen rele.
Vienna: whe c.ticle ais note

¢ ecu
we et

ported Mr. Koter.'s release, Dut daciin gd te
end circumstences of his arre.t."

yy NEEOLEAN, a New ¥
allegedly
S ouy @n

- Eda GLASFR, a
office mahacer of the Four Continents
book Ouclet an New York, termed tre
“fant ic’ and “far ication.” |

nae

who returned to whe Uni
Li bein, neié, stat
we bat ne (SVENCHAIS#1tY)
would be cleared tp and

XK.
Moscow white
morals chacge
had been oss’
that HOTEN wo

ivy

Fbl sources reported thet AvTin er made che follew:a
t * ve

‘remarks concerning his errs

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Be Information, ‘fron KOSENKO-

At the first of the 1964 neéetings in Geneva NOSES “KO
described the provocation and arrest of. Yale University
Professor Frederick BARGHOORN in-‘Late 1963; he was ques-.-
tioned farther on this case on 3 February 1964 and again
while waiting in Frankfurt to leave for the United States.
NOSENKO's most comprehensive statement, from which the
following paragraphs vere largely drawn, was made on 9 June
1964.* On this last occasion NOSENKO said that the pure
pose of the KGB oferation ageinst BARGHOORN was to retaliate
for Persone non grata action taken against three Soviets os
in Néw City in the case of John W. BUTENSO and to “egy
secure a “hostage in exchange for a fourth Soviet in the .
BUTENKO case who was jailed. In Geneva, however, NOSENKO
maintained that the operation against BARGHOORN “was to
discourage future arrests such as that of IVANOV [the
jailed Soviet], not because of any special importance of
IVANOV himself."

NOSENKO said that in 1963 four KGB First Chief Direc-~
torate officers assigned to the New York Legal Residency
were caught in operational activity in the United States.
Of the four, three had diplomatic immunity, but one was a
chauffeur and had only a service passport. The three
Soviet diplomats were held three or four hours by the
fnerican authorities and then released. IVANOY, the chauf-
feur, was arrested since he did not hrave diplomatic immunity.**

GRIBANOV, Chief of the KGB Second Chief Directorate,
learned of this arrest probably the next day and was directed
by KGB Chairman SEHICHASTNYY to take "necessary measures." ; . ;
GRIBANOV thereupon called to his office NOSEXKO; A.G, Ne
KOVALENKO, Chief of the Tourist Department; and G.I. GRYAZ=
NOV and Ye.M. RASHCHEPOV, both Deputy Chiefs from the Ameri-
can Department. After explaining the arrest, GRIBANOV
asked what information the Second Chief Directorate had on
any American--U.S. Embassy employee or tourist--that could

*The detail of NOSENKO's information on the BARGHOORN case

reflects both the extent of the CIA debriefings and the

depth of his knowledge of this case. He did, in fact, fur-

nish much of this information during his first 1964 meeting

with CIA. NOSENKO was also able to describe at length. oe :
BARGHOORN's professional background, which gave rise to KGB

suspicions of intelligence affiliation, and he provided the

general outlines of cther operational activity centering

‘around BARGHOORN during his 1963 trip to the Soviet Union.

**Three Soviets were arrested in Englewood, N.J., on 30 Octo-
ber 1963 during a clandestine meeting with the KGB agent,
BUTENKO, an American engineer. Two of the Soviets, G.A.

| PAVLOV and Yu.A. ROMASHIN, were members of the Sovict Mis-
sion to the United Nations; they. claimed diplomatic immuni-

ty and were released; a few: days later ‘they were declared -
persona non grata along with a third Soviet, V.I. OLENEV,. ..
who was Damed in the charges. by the U.S. Government; but was *
not: “AETORG. ai _ Another Soviet citizen, I. AL OY,

wasted.

wah Pace

Wyse


-gerve as material for an-arrest:. RASHCHEPOV and
- gaid that at that very moment there were three or four -
American military attaches in Rostov and that, in the
opinion of the American Department, these officers might
be carrying electronic apparatus, It was known that they.

had cameres, that they had been taking photccraphs, and that

they had been observed taxing notes. If permitted, they -
could be arrested in Rostov before they took the return
plane to Moscow. GRIBANOV wanted to know what other pos-
sibilities existed and instructed the two representatives
of the American Department to write a report on this. He
also told them to request permission to arrest and search
the military attach2s.

GRIBANOV then asked what pertinent information was held
by the Tourist Department. He was told that there were re-
latively few American tourists in the Soviet Union at that
time;* these included BARGHOORN, who was mentioned to GRI-
BANOV along with one other (name not. recalled). . NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO reported, however, that the KGB had no. "strong"
materials against them. They were ordered to maze an ime
‘ mediate study of the situation and to report back to GRI-

BANOV as soon as possible. .

Returning to the Tourist Department, NOSENKO and
KOVALENKO gathered the entire American Tourist Section in
their office. In a general discussion, it was decided that
BARGHOORN was the only American on whom the KGB had anything
worth consideration. All the materi#ls on BARGHOORN were
gathered together, and NOSENKO 2nd KOVALENKO took them to
GRIBANOY, explaining that he was the only possibility.
GRIBANOV read all the materials and was pleased with them}...
he was sure that BARGHOORN was connected with American
Intelligence. He then asked what could be done. NOSENKO
and KOVALENKO reported that BARGHOORN was then in Tbilisi
and that, in fact, Ye.N. NOSKOV (case orficer, American
Tourist Section) was in Tbilisi with a woman doctor from
the KGB Operational Technical Directorate for the purpose
of working against BAPGHOORN; the doctor had some special
item which had been used to make BARGROORN so violently sick
to his stomach that he had to be hospitalized. While he
was in the hospital, a careful search had been nade of his
belongings, but nothing of operational interest had been
found. In addition, a KGB agent was placed in BARGHOORN's
room as a patient; he made anti-Soviet statements ard offered
BARGHOORN "materials," but BARGHOORN did not rise to the
bait. At the time of this meeting with .GRIBANOV, BARGHOORN
was scheduled to fly from Tbilisi to Moscow the following
morning, and the KGB knew from a phone tap that he had an
appointment with Theodore ORCHARD of the British Embassy
at the Hotel Metropol the following evening.

. It was GRIBANOV who raised the possibility of giving
_ “materials” to BARGHOORN in Moscow.. NOSENKO said that this
. would be a provocation, but GRIBANOV replied that this made
no difference to him. . He instructed NOSENKO and KOVALENKO

Led 3, =

on another. occasion “WOSENKO. estimated. their. num’ er at
about 60.0 0

Sapte chee etme o

F assseenbed ade

(ee

vadies fe.

oe ae erat

. aSdibsbebahties walate tsaenes


14-0000

> (go leeate an agent ‘who ¢ould: be. used to pass the. damaging”:

ae materials to BARGHOORN and told them to write a summary of . —
BARGHOORN's background with a proposal that the Second...
Chief Directorate arrest him “when he obtaiis materials
which are of interest to Americah, Intelligence." This was
to be sent in letter form to SCMICHASTNYY over GRIBANOV's
signature; the letter was not ‘to indicate haw BARGHOORN
was to receive the materials (i.e., the-fact of provocation
was not to be mentioned). .

GRIBANOV took a one-page letter on BARGHOORN, along oo Late
with a similar letter from GRYAZNOY and RASHCHEPOV con~ . oe
cerning the military attaches, to SEMICHASTNYY. While
the four--NOSZNKO, KOVALENKO, GRYAZNOV ard KOVALENKD=—
were waiting ix GRIBANOV's office for his return, GRYAZNOV
received a telephone call from the local KCB organization
in Rostov informing him that the military attaches were in
the air on their way back to Moscow. Shortly thereafter, -

GRIBANOV returned with the news that the Chairman of the KGB
had approved the arrests of the military attaches as well
~ * ag BARGHOORN. ({KHRUSHCHEV was absent from Moscow at the
time, but SEMICHASTNYY had called BREZHNEV and secured his
approval. *) .

When GRIBANOV learned from GRYAZNOV that the military
attaches were already on their way back to Moscow, he be~
came furious and sent GRYAZNOY out "to do the jab or die."
Meanwhile, arrangements were made with the "Department c"
(the KGB element responsible for disinformation, subordinate
to the First Chief Directorate) to provide some materials
on rockets which could be passed to BARGHOORN., While these
were being picked up, NOSENKO and KOVALENKO returned to
their office to plan the provocation.

BARGHOORN was placed under immediate surveillance upon
his arrival in Moscow. At 1810 hours a radio message was
received from one of the surveillance cars that BARGHOORN
had gone to the U.S. Embassy, and it was decided that the
begt agent (name not recalled, aged 25 to 30 years) would be
placed in contact with him as soon as he came out. The
KGB knew BARGHOORN had an appointment with ORCHARD of the
British Embassy at 1900 hours, but at 1900 hours a report
was received that BARGHOORN had left the U.S, Embassy in
the American Ambassador's car. He was alone but for the
Soviet driver. Nothing could be done while BARGHOORN was in
the moving car. A check on ORCHARD established that he was
in the downstairs hall of the hotel waiting. It was there-
fore decided to approach BARGHOORN when he left the car at : rs
the hotel. ; .
,
8
*NOSENKO placed these events on the day before BARGHOORN re-
_ turned to Moscow from Tbilisi and on the day before BARGHOORN
_. Was arrested. As indicated below, BARGHOORN returned from
. Alma-Ata to Moscow on 25 October 1963 and was arrested on
.31 October 1963, six days later. CIA records show that on.
.30 October, the day before the arrest, XHRUSECREV greeted -
Laotian Premier SOUVANNA Phouma on his arrival in Moscow and
later in the day attended a luncheon in his honor. On. 31 . .
‘October, the day. of the arrest, KHRUSHCHEV and SOUVANNA at~
_ tended: a-performance of. Swan Lake‘ in Moscow... BREZHNEV was...
pot seen in. Moscow from 29 October until. 2.Novembe.


14-0090 -,

307.

He .
Beye r Ho sooner had BARGHOORN stepped out of the. car ‘than
the" agent approached. ‘You are an American?" the agent
- asked. "Yes." "Please take it," the agent said. The.
agent put the packet containing the materials on rocketry
o ~».1 dn” BARGHOORN's inside coat pocket and then ran off.
tho dre tive.

si BARGHOORN had ‘taken only one or two steps when he was
'peized by NOSKOV and Petr POPTSOV, another case officer of
_:', the American Tourist Section, and told he was under arrest.
_; .& surveillance car pulled up. BARGHOORN was placed in the.
ear, handcuffed (on GRIBANOV's orders, because the Soviets
arrested in the United States had received similar treat-
.,ment) and driven to the 50th Section of the Militia, where
a room had been prepared.

L. 1. YEFREMOV and K,.G. KRUPNOV from the American
Tourist Section were- waiting at the Militia station, KRUPNOV
to interrogate RBARGIHOORN and YEFREMOV to be the interpreter.

.When BARGHOORN was brought into the station, an "incident
report" form was filled out, and a resolution was prepared
requesting permission to hold him 48 hours, Between 0290
and 0300 hours BARGHOORN was taken to the KGB inner prison.
At 0400 hours the Tourist Department case officers were
released with instructions to report for duty at 0930
hours. NOSENKO and the others went home.

.. ‘1+ pa, KRUPNOV began the questioning in Russian at 1000

-. +. . hours the next day. Although BARGHOORN speaks good Russian,
YEFREMOV remained in case he would be needed to interpret.
NOSENKO entered the room sevcral times during these sessions.
(Although NOSENKO did not want to reveal his face to BARG-
HOORN because he knew BARGHOORN would be released, GRIBANOV’
had.told KOVALENKO that NOSENKO should be there when they
reached the point where BARGHOORN was to tell how he obtained
the damaging materials.) The first. sessions concentrated

: on general matters, such as BARGHOORN's life history. *

re ‘After one and one half hours of questioning, BARGHOORN

rage. agreed that the materials were on him when he was arrested,
“but he maintained that they had been placed on his person.

_He said that he thought they were "newspapers or something,"

ae ’"that: he did not know what they were. -The closed package
os (> * was then opened and shown to BARGHOORN; it contained about
_ . 0°), 720 to 25 pages of information on missiles. ."BARGHOORN

“was ‘not, of course, given a close look" at the materials.

TLL On Ey AOR Beat
her BNeO GS sure!

_*In_ October 1966, NOSENKO stated his certainty that he had
a _been present on the day after the arrest. At this interro-
. “ost of t. -gation NOSENKO said KRUPNOV quest ioned BARGHOORN "concerning
MOSENKO, - 3 “personal background, employment, etc." Then NOSENKO asked

* vaiid.U.S. BARGHOORN whether he had had the incriminating materials -

to’ she FEL con -h. his person at the time of his arrest,. When BARGHOORN

cculd.te tigamftted this, NOSENKO left.. As noted- below, BARGHOORN.

mentatyvon. peported that the materials. were not discussed at this par
- tiqusar interrogation. ta Coe .


a a en

The. CIA interviewer ‘then read to him, the. report

the date of the. approach as 5 Jaauary 1962, the date ‘contained
in NOSENKO's notes, and indicated that NOSZIKO used the name
NIKOLAYEV. (see below). Acknowledging that "maybe". he had used’
the name Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV with. JOHNSON, NOSENKO
said: "I don't know why I made this mistake with the dates. I

think it (the approach) was the first or second. day that -I was in

the Seventh (Tourist) Department. I saw myself that he had
(homosexual) intercourse... Your date is absolutely right, but
this reminded me that it was soon after I had come in the
Seventh (Tourist) Department. Is this important?"

Question: How long had you been in the Seventh Lepartment?

NOSENKO: Now I remember that it was immediately > one or two
“ days. I know I returned in January 1962. I, knew I

would be going to the Seventh (Separtment) alréady in
December. I was visiting the Seventh already then.
I had not ‘too many papers to°turr over to the First °
{American Department), and now I remember that I
moved to the Seventh immediately (NCSENKO's emphasis)
after 1 January 1962.

b. information from JOHNSON:

JOHNSON reported to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on 5 January
1962 that he experienced an "incident with Soviet plainclothes-
men in the Hotel Metropol earlier that day." UCHNSON, who
arrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961, told the consular officer
that “he was dining alone in the Hotel Metropol restaurant the
evening of 4 January when he was joined at his table by a 5oviet
citizen who identified himself as a doctor from Riga. (This
was NOSENKO's homosexual agent VOLKOV.) According to JOHNSON,
little conversation transpired because the Riga ‘doctor’ spoke
English poorly. Before JOHNSON left, however, the 'doctor'
said he would like to chat with him and knew a student who
spoke English well. JOHNSON then agreed to come by the ‘doc-
tor's' room at the Metropol at 10:00 a.m. the next day. JOHNSON
said that he dropped by the ‘doctor's' reom abeut 10:00 the
morning of January 5. Soon after he entered, the '‘doctor' and
his ‘student’ friend (NOSENKO's homosexual agent YEFREMOV)
began to make homosexual advances to him. He stated that he
protested and was rising to leave when two plainclothesmen
suddenly appeared in the room and announced that all were under
arrest. JOHNSON was then taken to another room where he was
asked to sign a statement in Russian... He signed this state-
ment and was taken to a man in a third room who identified him-
self as the Chief of Police, Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLOV.* The
police chief first told him that Soviet law had been violated
and that he, JOHNSON, could be imprisoned for three, five, or
perhaps even eight years. After proceeding in this vein for

*® | NOSENKO frequently used the operational pseudonym Yuriv
Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV. He has said that he was normally

. called Georgiy, a variation of Yuriy, by family and friends
in Moscow. . : ,

ce ee ne see

Nene me neece nes ieemmrenenigl Ment

te ese wed,


_a few minutes, the police chief remarked that it was in his power
to dismies the whole affair, provided JOH<350N would do him a :
favor. The favor turned out to k2 a signed comnitment that he
would not speak ill of the Soviet Union when he returned to the
United States.” : a . -

temeteebenatam eee: menor

In the afternocn of 8 January, JOMNSON calleu the Embassy
to say that he had been recontacted by the Cnief of Police, who
reminded him of his pledge and showed him for pictures,
said: “I den't xnow where they got them, 3
During the interviews by the FBI Re
1965, JOHNSSH repeated substantially tr é:
to dery that he nad actually been compromised. In addition tc
letters to his parents, ‘JOHNSCN siid he wrote to about 20 other
People, mostly “minister Friends" abroad; apparently he die not :
tell the FBI of their content. Shown pictures of VOLKOV ara
NOSENKO’on 13 May 1965, JORNSON said he had seen VCLKOV “some :
where" and suggested that the photograph of NOSENKO was thet of
& younger man whom he hed seen in Dyakarta in 1962-1963.

Sas story, continuing.
1s

5. Attempt to Recruit BRAUNS

a. Information from NOSENKO:

NOSENKO made the following statement or 2 February 1964:
"In 1962 come U.S. citizen by the name of Eorst BRAUNS came to
the Soviet Vnion. I mentioned him to you in 1962 but at that
time could not recall his name.* we tried to recruit him but
did not succecd. He lived somewhere in Leningred, and in 1942
he went back with the German troops to Germany. And he served - :
in the.German Army, and after the war Le chengea his name and i
went to the USA and became a U.S. citizen. He is eitner a
skilled mechanic or a worker. His real name is different.- it is
Russian ~- kecause he changed his name when tie was in Germany."

ve

mee o

NOSENKC wert into the operation against BRAUNS in greater
detail on 17 April 1964: "This was /K.G./ KRUPNOV's case.
This fellow was a Russian and lived prior to the war in Lenin-
grec. In 1942 he was in Tikhvin, near Leningrad,.when the
a : Germans came, and when the: Germans were retreating they took
; him along and some other people, local people, and so he found
himself in Germany. Now, in Germany, as he told his story, ne — -
“.. “Was kept in various prison camps and when the war was over he oo
worked in West Germany and_then, in 1956 or 1957 or 1958 - rf
: don't, remember. /which year/ - he came to the United States and
i . settled down. hy we became interested in this fellow...
° ZNOSENKO thought his name was something like ‘BRUNKS' or
.. "BRONX!/ is because he came from Russia. ‘So, according to
. Soviet law, he never lost his Soviet citizenship... Leaving
., With the Germans is interpreted as treason, as being a traitor
“ @£ your country. So there was something to talk to him about. -
_, Besides, KRUPNOV found out either in the Information Section .
“@F some other section /cf the KGB First Chief Directorate/,
that the: man is. working in. some: very interesting. company that
‘makes computers:or adding machines or-some other instruments,

weer

REN a nen ar astce steno rT,

.But. when :I talked. to him he already left-the company. He
wasn't working ith this: company. any more.-.' “

+ 2%


“they. called t hint to. ‘inturists ey gave. hin’ -room in the
inturise, Zdorel/. Then KRUFNCS cransferred hin from the Inturist
to another hotel, put him ina room an the hotel, and sticted
talking to him... Txen he left him in his room and callec uz up -
said that ne needed help, thet ke can'c do anything with the

mon, I thought that he would ce arle to handle him ali by hin-
self, so I saia to KOVSHUK:* ‘I'm serry. I thought he'd be able
to handle it. He tells me that he doesn" t seem to get anywhere,
so I guess I'c have to go help Aim.’ 7 got tiere and I sea that
the man :s scared stiff. He joesnict talk about anything, doesn's
want to listen to any cf these reasons. Ho wes told that, after

all, he ag a traitor to his country, that he wene with the Ger-
TSNSeee This fellow was a coward, a real coward, so he gave his
censent, he agreed to help us.

so 7 felt -that this
the next Gay KRUFNOV
Tourist Deparemer.t/.

mt of his .5 cuite

"The next day he
acreement wasn't very
end. I went to see CIELS
Ana I told } el that this
sheky. io pure “shout it. co follow threugh? If
so, then we'll 19 to Leningrad. £9

Caiied the mar. and th O 6an pet esed to raik to
was told te go. Se 2 /tO beningre
i went tc atel recom. He pocket the “door, and he wv
let me in. The only thing, fortunately for us, the lock in
the gwoor watn't a very yood one, so we called a locksmita, and
he founc a key tnat opencd the dvor., S5 we entered che roon,
end we started tzlking to him. The fellow was terribly scared

Ste

he was sheking. £9 it was quire srvictus that he would never work
fer us. So we finally decided: ‘Look, it’s okay. We don't want

anything from you. Go ahead, in mave. CGoodoye.' And that was
all; that was the end of it. I darn't kuow whether it was 8aO0KS
Or BRONX or. some name like that which he used in the States,

but his true name was Ivslov."

In February 1965 NOSENKO said he had forgotten how he came

“to be involved in the BRAUNS cese. He also said that he dia

mot Know why BRAUNS had visited che Soviet Union, and that he
could not name any Soviet citizens with whom FRAUNS was in con-
tact in Moscow.

b. Informatio: fron RRAUNS

Interviewed by the FE

‘NOSENKO. is “‘@pparently in errer.. At this. cime.. he has re-

ported, V.M. K KOVSHUK was not _in the. Touris’
“in the Americas ‘Department...’ “He may mean “Vv
Chief £ the Touris

Department but.
~ CHELNOKCY,

scan oo cee aettne

neg eneemempeminne

3
a

2

3

2

:
:


eee

Jaf
oe

ws

ROSENKY prov ided the

i *o Alexardar SVSSICHANSKIY, KSB
. Cryptinwn "AnD," on ts Jan

a
ry (464 an the course. of discussion.
b

‘ of ESB use of foreign travel hureau persennel to spot tcurists.
, Of possible cperationai incerest. ‘Nell, here's an example: — z
- One. of cur agents is.the directer of a smell-tovrist agency, ' “
' ,NCOSENKO said, “He takes the tourist's application farm which
hes a phciograph, and if he suspects the tourist of having ties
to. American, Intelligence, he, vill.mceve the photo-slightly, for...
- : om the, £ifth ere Says ‘nation .
: ; : faprt. the end, where
camp oO gency ‘ia. :

te alls F

be.
tth a

ist/ is, sutpe

a ce

tt
wt nina a

a Following BARGHOORN's admission, another resolution
- was drawn up by’ KRUPNOV and signed by ‘KRUZNOV, KOVALENKG,

and GRIBANOV. NOSENKO and KAUPNOV then took it to the. office.
of the Chief Prosecutor where the incident report, the first
interrogation, and the first and second resolutions were
reported to (fnu) MISHUTIN (or MEISHUSTIN), the First Deputy
to the Chief Prosecutor. GRiBANOV further directed that all
materials on EBARGHOORN, including information from KGB
Archives, be given to the Department of Prosecution of the
KGB so that they could begin the legal proceedings against
BARGHOORN, After this, all- interrogations were conducted
by this department; KRUPNOV.. was dropped from the case,
but YEFREMOV continued to act as interpreter.

ee ned nents iter ee nie

b. Information from BARGHOORN

BARGHOORN, who had made five earlier trips to the :
Soviet Union since 1956, arrived there on 2 October 1963. . ;
The purpose. or his vasit, as stated in his visa application, ; ;
was to gather information for a book on how effectively the
Soviet Union was operating as a result of its political ed~
ucation and political system. His itinerary took hin to
Leningrad from 2 to 7 October, to Moscow from 7 to 10 Octo-
ber, Tbilisi from 10 to i7 October, and short visits to
Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Alm2-Ata from 17 to 25
October. He flew from Alma-Ata to Noscow on 25 October and
was scheduled to leave for Warsaw on 31 October. On the
Latter date he was arrested and held by tne KGB until : .
16 November when, at President Kennedy's intervention, he . . :
was released and left the Soviet Union. BARGHOORN had no
intelligence mission.

Upon his return to the United States, BARGHOORN was
debriefed by the U.S. Department of State and by CIA, His
information indicated a high degree of KGB operational ine
terest in him throughout the trip, including. encounters with
at least five probable KGB agents during his first week
there: an attractive waitress who invited him to “do the
town,” a disenchanted intellectual in Leningrad, an attrac-
-tive unattached girl who sat next to him on the flight from
Moscow to Tbilisi, and two young Armenians whom he met his
first day in Tbilisi.* The two Armenians were instrumental
in the drugging described by NOSENKO, At dinner in his
hotel on the day he arrived in Tbilisi, BARGHOORN met a.

nan young man claiming to be a student at the Leningrad Music . .- Oo
Conservatory. They left the hotel for @ walk and ran into ce Oe nies Set
a friend of the student, a second young Armenian, and the a
three of them went to a. cafe for coffee. None was available,” - “lee on

*Questioned about this in February 1965, NOSENKO said that
: BARGHOORN, as a suspected American Intelligence agent, wes
- ‘of operational interest throughout the trip. He vaguely re-
: called the girl on the plane but either did not know or had
. forgotten details of any other specific activity... NOSENKO .
said that none of this activity was directly related to the. -
“provocation operation, which. was: based. ona. last-minute de- -
eision. es oo _ , ;

Pitcbtik cathe Lie! oa asee meet Somer ee


but the young student went to the kitchen. "to arrange things,

and shortly thereafter "three foul-tasting cofiees” appeared...
Within an hour, BARGHOORN was .in the hospital, acutely- ill.

He wag assigned, to a room where.there was another patient,

and a woman doctor took care of his. case. fle was in the
hospital for four days. During this period his. clothes,- :
notes, and other possessions were held by hospital authori- -
ties, . 7

Upon his return to Moscow by air on 25 October,. BARG-
HOORN checked into the Metropol Hotel. The. next six days.
were occupied by sightseeing and appointments connected with
his research, In the late afternoon of 31 October he called
on friends at the U.S, Embassy for cocktails, and at. 1910,
already 10 minutes late, he left in the Ambassador's car for
a dinner appointment (prearranged. by telephone) at the Metro-

pol with Theodore ORCHARD, a british diplomat.

BARGHOORN's account of the subsequent events closely
parallels NOSENKO's. Having been handed the incriminating
materials, he was arrested, handcuffed, and taker to Militia
Station No. 58, where he was questioned briefly by a uni-
formed Militia officer. The KGB was called. Within 30
minutes a KGB captain (BARGHOORN thought his name night
have been GORBUNSKIY) arrived and began to question him,
assisted by an interpreter named YEFREMOV.* All question
were asked in Russian, and BARGHOORN answered nost of them
in English. The package of materials was opened and con-
tained, according to BARGHOORN, 13 or 14 photographs of
rockets, This session lasted until about midnight and
centered around BARGHOORN's possession of the photographs
and his "intelligence mission," He was then taken to the
Lyubyanka prison. .

Interrogations were conducted the next morning by the
original KGB officer together with his "chief," whom BARG-
HOORN subsequently identified by photograph as NOSENKO. The

"| questioning concerned BARGHOORN’s biography, and nothing was

asked about the compromising materials. The following day
the case was turned over to a KGB colonel identified as (fnu)-
PETRENKO, and BARGHOORN did not see NOSENKO or the other KGB
officer again. At this and subsequent sessions, BARGHOORN
was questioned further concerning the circumstances of his
arrest. BARGHOORN described NOSENKO as “clever and quick-
witted" and as giving "the impression that he vas not a

dedicated careerist, but opportunistic and adaptive; he - _

seemed not to care about what he was. ‘doing, but doing a good. :
job nevertheless."

*Asked why YEFREMOV used his true name during the. interro-

gations, NOSENKO said this was necessary for legal reasons,
that he had to sign documents connectéd. with the interroga-
tions. BARGHOORN confirmed that. YEFREMOV had participated .

throughout the. entire series of- interrogations and had.

-signed interrogation. reports. attesting ‘to the accuracy ‘of
"translation, . . . . ;

cians, Sine eteciiede tea et


fv Andyes SHUBES

iia.

ohn Andres ShUUEN and his voar of birth
es which NUSEMKO brought te the 1964

in Geneva. SOSENKO icentivied SEUBIN as @
ef Russias extraction, a Ressian speaker,
rofessor in New Yor Caty. aceording to
rsonally isvolved in SHUAIN's fourth trip
62 or 1963. SHlUBIN had become Enown to
gent: during his third visit te tae Soviet :

Sere

bodein te pAb wrote, GD

fessor of cconemics at New Yor Lay
kaown to the FRI Pte ak 6s
2 Ae UP na ae

eee aT Sie

pe erer es LEN Sy cape eae
he che following paragraphs
srmation irom NCSENKO and other sources on

os =

ormation

been iaprecise on daring SHUBIN's third
t Unions Hse said en 25 Januiry 19614 tnat -
cow some time during the poriod i953 to
11964 NOSESKO said ae was unsure of the
t by SHUPLN but thoucat it occurred in
any event, prier tu i9su aud wrhiie ne was
tour of duty (June 1955 to January 1960)
t De part: tL. SOSENKO indicated on 26 June
LITSK tae ease officer in the Tourist

sible for SHUBEN, and since at another time i :
VELITSKIY ctransivrred ivom th department . : :

-would apesac that he was placing the date : 4
trip es sume tine before ihe transfer. .

rted that ‘SHUBIN was placed under surveil-
during the third trip. He Las of fered : :
as to why: On 25 January 1964 NOSENKO ° Lo, > "
as that SHUBIN had visited the Soviet :
pree-on 2-February 1964 he-exprained the -- ;
dilance as having been founded on the KGB's

—s

ing for this trip, as yariously given by
nflict with the fact that SHUBIN had no ‘
rt between 1940 and 12 June 1961, according “
xplanation for this discrepancy, however,
JBIN went ta the USSR without valid docu-

Saree ree hte

wiadihik edited tnras@ine ane 6 sete

* tps

YN's own admission about having gone to — . Lo
, there is no other evidence of his travel ‘
ion prior to 19461, .. i


14200000

RUBIN, «hose fath

Lo: ,eles On Zo Fe
After geceivings
intornstics of

“7 oe
: oe

Sree TS

aie Tone
Ay x


BOLSHAKOV, Robert! Kennedy, and the Cuban Missile ‘cris is.

a. Introduction -

NOSENKO volunteered at his second meetmg with CIA
in January 1964 that G.N. BOLSHAKOY was his “old friend"
and that he was a colonel in the GRU. On. 26 January,
1 February, and 19 August 1964 he again raised BOLSHAKCV's
name, emphasizing that he was a GRU officer and a "good
friend." In the 1 February interview, after displaying an.
initial reluctance to discuss with CIA such a “sensitive”
subject, he provided a number of details on BOLSHAKOV's
alleged relationship in 1962 with the then Attorney General,
Robert Kennedy. His information on this subject, he said,
derived from his friendship with BOLSHAXOV in Moscow, where
BOLSHAKOV was reassigned (in December 1962 following -a tour
in Washington as Novosti correspondent and editor of the

magazine USSR). NXOSENKO claimed a personal role in this

affair, in that: he personally proposed to the KGB leader-
ship that the KGB. take over BOLSHAKOV's former (GRU) con-
tact with Robert Kennedy.

NOSENKO claimed that an information channel of con-
munication between BOLSHAKOV and-the Attorney Ceneral had
developed at Kennedy's initiative. He described in detaii
the circumstances of their introduction at a social function
by a journalist (whom he did not name). He said that he
"thought" that the Kennedys knew that BOLSHAKOV was a
‘military intelligence officer," and he implied that they
regarded these private conversations with BOLSHAKOV as a
useful instrument of diplomacy. According to NOSENKO, the
KGB knew that CIA was not aware of this relationship--it
was “obvious” that Robert Kennedy wanted it that way.-
NOSENKO claimed that after BOLSHAKOV left the United States
“during the Cuban missile crisis,"* no one took over his
Tole as a confidential channel to the White House. After
the assassination of the President, NOSENKO continued, the
Kennedy family tried to reestablish the relationship through
their close triend, the artist William. WALTON, during the
latter's visit to Moscow in December 1963. NOSENKO reported
that he had urged that the KGB try to take over the Robert
Kennedy operation from the GRU and that he hed proposed two
plans which would have enabled this to take place, the -
second involviag WALTON. Neither came to fruition, however.
Referring to the Cuban missile crisis, NOSEXKO said that the

atebiteiteestt eam: +

coe peuaeneee a dope ese

GRU had “played dirty" with BOLSHAKOV by forcing him to “tell
Robert" that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. whereas :

there actually were such weapons there,

According to other sources, BOLSHAKOV left Washington
for Moscow on 3 August 1962 and returned on 2 October 1962.
On 23 August, about the time that CIA was reporting urgently
to the President that "something new and different" was
going on with respect to Soviet. aid to Cuba, Ambassador
DOBRYNIN assured Theodore SORENSEN (Special Counsel to the
President) that the United States had no need to fear Soviet

OL eddie wae oe


14-00000  '* -

_ iL ueeFEKLESOVE who-served in- Washington under the alies ‘FOU

activity in Cuba. On 4 September FOBRYVEN gave Robert — | a,
Kefmedy "an unusual personal message fron: KURUSHCHEV for —. Lo
the President’:  KHKUSHCHLV pledged that he would not stir’ :

up any incidents before the upcoming U.S. cleetions. On

tho-same day, the President stated publicly chat the United

States had no proof of a Soviet. offeasive missile capability

in Cuba. Also on the sane day, the Soviet Union sent @

narsh pote to the U.S, Government concerning the (uninten-

tional) violation of Soviet airspace by an Am-rican U-2-

plane on 36 August; the note -threatened “appropriate re-

teliatory mezsures" against U.2 bases should such: ineideats

be repeated. The following day (5 September) U-? flights

over Cuba were tenporarily suspended, and they did not re- H
sume until 14 October, Cn 6 September DORRYNIN again told . :
SORENSEN that the Soviets had “done nothing naw" in Cuba

and gave his assurances that all their steps"were defensive

in nature Ord did not represent any threat to...the United

States." On 13 October DCBRYNIN irformed Chester BOWLES (a

Special Representative and Advisor to the President) thut

the USSR would never send offensive weapons to Cuba, Sinti-

lar assurances were given by KHRUSHCHEY to U.S. Ambassador

YOHLER in Moscow on 16 Octcber (the same day that the Presi-

dent was shown the U.~2 photographs which revealed the pre-

sence of offensive missiles) and by Foreign Minister GRONYXO

to President Kennedy in person on 18 October.

BY. See race'

Vw tise ak, uth

pea racigt

_- Also on 18 October, the FRI_ reported,
PRE OTIE ER ES : Ba ost

Pag tee SRE HE ay
ee 3
BOLSHAKOY told shington correspondents Joseph ALSOP acd
Charles BARTLETT that the Soviets had no offensive wi aprons
in Cuba, and satd he had been instructed hy KURVSHCEEV and
MIKOYAN on 1 October (the day before nis departure fron
Moscow) to inform Provident Kenedy of this fact. CIA hes
-po indicetion that BOLSHAXOV dulivercd this mzssage to the .
President, or ever dircetly to the Attorney Ceneral, or
that, prior to iis neeting with BEGLOY in New York City.
he nade any remar : Rest
Bppeen ee hve wee SE Oe
“ yeport of BOLSHAKOV's having played any role in the Cuban
missile crisis beyond making these remarks to ALSOP ard
BARTLETT, Discussions at the White House, State Departzert,

G3.
Siteeee he)

and Defense Department about the crisis culminated in the —_ os

- decision to—impose-a blockade. on.Cuba; this decision was :
announced by President Kennedy over nationvide television - 000
and radio on 22 October 1962. Soviet overturcs for a peace= ee
ful settlement of the situation were initiated or 26 Octo- .

ber by the KGB Legal Resident in Washington, A.S. FEKLISOV, ** ’
in contacts with tho American journalist John SCALT. FEKLI-
SOV's proposals were along tha same lines as those received

*BEGLOV came to the United States to attend the “Third Un- .

official US~USSR Conference of Public Figures," held at

Andover, Massachusetts, from 21 to 27 October 1962... Also...
present at. this conference was Boris BELITSKIY,. identified.

by: NOSENKO four months carlier as a. KCB-controlled.:source
- Of CIA. (see Part VI.D,6.). BELITSKIY" indicated at that” - .
‘time that BEGLOV might bo affiliated w Who the KGB

wis the suthor-of one of- the. <ncumentsa. among. the " CHEREP:
_.. papers: (see Part VI.D.7.c.). et


' at the White House. late that right Jin a secre

vletter: from
KIRUSHCHEV. At a facewell party for BOLSHAKOV in Decéenber
3962, Presidential Press Secretary Plerre SALINGEH asked

BOLSHAKOV who would “do his work.'' FOLSHAKOY srerlied that . .
no one would do precisely the same job, but that if SALINW. to
GER had "anything special to say," he might contact A,I,
ZINCHUK, * ; .

b. Soviet Soure:3 During the Crisis

NOSENKO has rot indicated that BOLSEAKOV had an infor- .
matlon-collection role during the Cuban missile crisis. As : ‘ i
for Soviet sourcss at this time, NOSENKO stated on several | . !
occasions in 1964, if different contexts, that the KGR “had :
not had luck in getting intelligence from high places in
the U.S. Government" in October 1462, On sore than one oc-=
.casion he said that the KUB agent "SASIIA"** was unable to ~
furnish any information of value in this révard. He said
this on 25 February 1964 and again while being questioned
about “SASHA on 4 August 1964. On the latter date NOSENKO -
said: "During the Cuban missile crisis the [KCB] First

Chief Directorate, the Intelligence, couldn't tell what the

U.S. will do. KNRUZHCHEV'** was rot satisficd with the work

of the Intelligence, No agents were producing inforsaticna

on this." NOSENKO co:.tinuecd by saying that "SASHA" reo .
ported nothing to the KGB during the Cuban missile crisis.

In fact, “he couldn’: know anything. 1 heard that this was

very tightly held information, here wore just 2 few

peoplo around President Kennedy who knew the plans, and they

. Were sworn to keep it seeret."

*ZINCHUK was: idcetificd ty DERYABIN by name ard photograph
in October 1954 as a KCB staff officer. NOSENKO has said ,
that ZEINCHUK was a KGB cooptce rather than a staff officer.

**For-a discussion-of-the "SASHA" case, see Part VILD.3.d.. °° ~~ 7 rare

***Speaking before the Suprene Soviet on 12 December 1962,

KHRUSHCHEV said that the decision to negotiate with the : ;
United States for a peaceful settliment of the Cuban situa— , H
tion had beer influenced by “information fron our Cuban .

‘comrades and other [unspecified] sources." This informa-

tion had been received, KHRUSHCHEV stated, on the morning oo ne
of 27 October 1962 (Moscow time). .AS previously indicated, ,
however, KHRUSHCHEV's secret and conciliatory letter to:

the President was received at the White House.on the night

of 26 October 1952. Lo ; :


aL” NOSENKO's Statements on BOLSHAKOV i

ovata

NOSENKO repeatedly enphasized POLSHAKOV's GRU affilia-
tion and the fact that the KCB was in no way involved in
-¢his channel to the U.S. Coverrment via Robert Kennedy. . |
He first volunteered BOLSHAKGV's name during a discussion .
of the use of Novosti as a cover organization for Soviet ©
Intelligence officers. “Yuriy BOLSHAKOV of the GRU also
sits there," he said. “He is a colonel and a friend of -
mine." Two days later, out of context with the preceding |
discussion, he introduced the name again: ‘‘Then there is
this BOLSHAKOV. He is from GRU who was in the United
States."' NOSENKO then commented that this was "a very in-
teresting case" and added: "We shall talk about it later." ; :
When his case ofiicer trereupon turned to anotner tcpic, :
NOSENKO immediately interrupted to say: “I know BOLSHAKOV
very well. He is my old friend...] met him through Yuriy —
GUK...[who]was with him in the United States...and we are
‘now very good friends, He calls me up and consults me for
advice... On 1 February 1964 NOSENKO said he thought the
Kennedy family knew BOLSHAKOV to be a military inteiligence
officer; “yet for some reason they chose him’ as a channel
between the U.S. and Soviet Governments. BOLSHAKOV, NO-
SENKO added, “reported direetiy" to the Chief of the GRU
concerning his exchanges with Robert Kennedy.

we neta abil as al ne Stra ARO,

NOSENKO said BOLSHAKOV was introduced to Robert Kennedy

. by an American journalist (unnamed) at 2 reception in the

United States. The journalist invited BOLSHAKOV to go for

a walk, and as they strolled “down an alley," there was a

man sitting on a bench dircetly ahzad of them. "The jour-

nelist said: ‘Listen, Ceorge BOLSHAKOV], are you acquainted -

with Robert Kennedy, the brother of the President and the

Chief of the Department of Justice?’ BOLSHAKOV said: ‘No.

Of course, | have heard of hin.‘ ‘Would you like me to :
introduce you?' ‘Of course,' BOLSEAKOV said, ‘please do.' ,
He led him to the man on the bench. There was this feeling :
that all this had been pr2-arranged.” . t

This. contact"was at the personal desire of Bob Kennedy...

- BOLSHAKOV was called ia for this. As you know, the whole . '
idea of this contact was to pass information to Kennedy

from KIRUSHCHEV and from Kennedy to KHRUSHCHEY....It happened
to be BOLSHAKOV, but it was not BOLSHAKOY who sought to
have the meeting..-.Then the relationship grew. BOLSHAKOV
was.a visitor in Robert Kennedy's house. They would first
talk about ordinary things, and thea the conversation cel ae -
turned to other matters..-Robert Kennedy. did not say: . a re
*Please tell KHRUSHCHEY so-and-so." He would say: ‘You
know, some of these problems seen insolvable." And BOL-
SHAKOV would say: ‘And you know, at home they think this
and that way...’ without actually saying that this was coming
from KHRUSHCHEV. But, of course, this was clear without | :
explanations. It was ar exchange of views on important poil-
tical questions of the moment. He was like an intermediate :
point...” NOSENKO commented that he personally thought . .
that it was a “case of mutual tfeelers' being sent out by ot wo te ts,
both sides—exploring somé given current political situation.” . cot

Sav bad ce bee ke

instigators |

ae . . 7

After BOLSHAKOV left Washington, KOSENKO stated,:"no
‘replaced him.as a chanrelr to the U.S. Government. Asked

“whether ZINCHUK could: have taken over upon. BOLSHAKOV"s-~--


1400000,

departure, NOSEXKO’ said: "Oh, no... There is no.contact. |
‘like there was befcre. It was broken at the time BOL-.
SHAKOV left. ZINCHUY was an agent or a coopitce....No,
there is no such contact since BOLSHAKOYV left. He passes
“no more messages.’ ee

Referring to the Kennedy-BOLSHAKOV ‘contacts; NOSEXKO-
“told CIA on 26 January 1964: “You have shown. considerable
interest in him 'BCLSIIAKOV], even after his return to the
Soviet Union...because all this was done by by-passing CIA.” | ;
He said on 1 February 1964: “It was pretty obvious-that ~~ oo, : 3
this relationship between BOLSHAKOV and Robert Kennedy had © . : 3
nothing to do with C1lA, and CIA was not witting of it. It
was at the perscnal desire of Bob Kenredy."" The KGS
determined that CIA was ucaware of the exchange between
Kennedy and BOLSHAXOV, NOSENKO reported, because when BOL-

SHAKOV was subsequently invited to a reception at the U.S.

.. Embassy. in Moscow, two CIA officers--Kenneth A, KERST and
Malcolm A, TOON*--tried to elicit information from him.
about his relatiorship with President Kennedy. “The most.
important thing" they had tried to find out, according to
NOSENKO, was whetker the President and. BOLSHAKOV had met
personally. Althsugh BOLSHAKOV did ‘not admit the fact to
them, he did have one meeting with President Kennedy—-"he
was brought in a car...and was taken through a back door
into the White House," NOSENKO said.

Bae ache SS ate Cte i.

NOSENKO reported that Willinm WALTON visited Moscow ‘in Decem-
ber 1963 and at that time went to BOLSHAKOYV, whom'he had “
“previously met at the home of Robert Kennedy. Part of
their conversations, he continued, related to Robert Kennedy's
future political plans: ‘WALTON said that Boboy...did not
expect at present to become a candidate for the vice presi-
dency. He was, perhaps, according to WALTON, thinking of
running for Governor of Massachusetts..." NOSENKO said he
felt that there were "some feelers sent out on the part of
WALTON--not exactly questions, but just a passing of opinion.
WALTON was trying to sound them out, but I think that every-
thing was left without an answer....My personal opinion. was
_ that these things were told to WALTON so that ke could pass
’ them on as, so to speak, Bouby's plans for the future."
Another topic covered in the WALTON~BOLSHAKOV discussions,
NOSENKO added, was the assassination of President Kennedy.**
“As I remember, it was WALTON's opinion~-and his opinion re-
flected the opinion of the Kennedy family--that there was ; _
——pr7n 7 po Russiap involvement “in the murder-of-the-Presidents— No — ———-——:->7-- tira
; suspicion at all." ; oe ; :
NOSENKO proposed two plans whereby the EGB could take :
over the GRU's channel to President Kennedy. Under the . . mT, i
first of these plans, the Soviet Minister of Justice would :
personally invite the Attorney Gencral ‘to come’ to the Soviet. _
Union. There the KGB would “set him up in private. living = =~ i |
quarters, give his everything he wants. .+SO that. he would be... wg j

*Neither KEKST, who NOSENKO said was. “guapected by ‘the. KGB.
of being the. CIA Chief of Station ‘in Moscow, nor ‘TOGN: ws "
. affiliated: with cra in any mere a . ; a ae

Stampede igen meen ee pe ieee ne enna

TF SECRET

1400000 =

pleased....Not’ to make an gent « or couptes: out of ht a a a es
Lut just to prozote a rapprechenent." In addi t a," Codey the * Pro 5%
baésis of what LOLSHAKOV had totd NUSENKG about "obert | :
Kennedy's taterest in a Sovier hallsrina, this: len called
for the two to vv brought together, and the ballertra, who
“ds quite free in her behavior sith the oppos tic sei,”
would dco “everything necessary for’ the State. Se fore
NOSEXKO's superiors could make a decision on this plan, :
the Fresident was assassinated and the ratter vas dropped. 2
*OSENKO conceived his second plan during WALTON's trip to
¥oscow in becember .19€3: "BOLSHAKOY told me that ho wag
going. to meet WALTON, and asked se whether te bad an ine
terest in it....I told the chiefs about ut and said: ‘Let's
utilize WALTON oursclvcs. Why should we let the GRU use
hin?'' NOSENKO suggested: that tne KGB “tell BOLSHAKOV
that we are scrking on WALTON--that-this ‘s a Number One
target o5 far rs we are concerned, ROLSHAKOV will do any-~
thing we ask him,” However, “the boss.said: ‘Well, you : - . Te
~Rnow, it will worsen relations between the KGB and’ the GRU,
48 long as they are working op it, let then do it.'"

odie,

WF aelect “a paint,

NOSENKO indicated that if the KGB had actually essuned
authority for the operation in Moscow iroa the GRU, as he
liad proposed, the KGB Legal Pesidency in Washington would
Nave then taken over, and "sumeone new" probably would have
been sent from KGS Headquarters to develop the association.
this KGB officer would have beta "Someone with a broacer
outlook who covid carry himself well in social contacts."

d. Inforration frog pa a

In addition to NOSESKO, one other Scepiet source had
Hep iicy & BOL SHAKOY as f® GRU ofricer. E . n

.

another nenber of the ; .
"recently" turned over to BOLSHAKOY an informant who was
“an Aner Sager grnernopdent based in Washington. This jour-

nalist, £2 Mies had accompanied Vice President Nixon
to the USSR in July 1939 and while there had agreed to coop-
. erate by "furnishing political information." ‘BOLSHAKOV was
| ; to “concentrate all of his efforts on this one contact."*

idea nade Le aes te oe


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Front Temporary Duty Authorization Reverse
December 1963 vt

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|
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SECRET


Committee for State Security
Under the Council of Ministers
7 USSR .
“1S December 1963_ |

ee : ast fj
® oS ivLength of tem- i
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“porary assign-
hent: — 15 days
through: ecemoer

“Authorization: directive of

|
: Effective on presentation of
‘identity decument No.: NK- 2513

Chief $s. /GRIBANOV of Directorate
: of Department

“Committee. for State Security
Front |

Issued to: Lieutenant Colonel: :
ee S«) an

ae ; uriy Ivanovich. ,
'. For duty to: TREN of Gor’ kaya
. Oblast

Chief of a Chief Directorate

under the. Council of Ministers, USSR

we te on emendloc mney rman

NOTATIONS OF PRESENCE - IN’ PLACES ”
OF TEMPORARY DUTY .

“Arrived in city of Gor'kiy 16 December 1963":
“Arrived in city bf Shakhun' ye. 17 XII ‘ages

Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief ‘of Shakhun' ye Chief Militia |

Section, Militia Major

“Departed Shakhun'ye 17/X11-63
Did not use free quarters"

s./Chief of Shakhun'ye chiet Militia:

Section, Militia Major

"Left nogr kiy 17 December 1963
Did not use free quarters"

s./ (iMegibie) |

Reverse (endorsements only)

TDY authorization for Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
in connection with the search for CHEREPANOV

5

'
'
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——(illegibag

:

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i
|


:-@,  ROSENKO"s- KGB Promot ions.and Awards.

“1.” Rank

_NOSENKO has. been questioned at length concerning hig _.

“progress tnrough the KG3 ranks, from lieutenant to lieuten—.

“ant colonel. He has volunteered additional information.on
.this subject himself, iis various statements follow in
chronological order.

11 June 1962: "As a Chief of Section, I now receive
2,500 [rublés per month], plus 700 for my rank, for major,
plus pay for longevity. 1 receive more t..an 4000, i.e.,
450-470-460 [rubles per month] in new money. This is
enough for me...J am now a major but I should receive
Lieutenant colonel soon. I nave already completed my time
in grade. We have a system of tine in grade. From major
to lieutenant colonel it is necessary to have four years...

- 7" My time fn grade was up “in December, in-December”of last ~

i

year [1961]."

23: January 1964: At the first of his 1964 meetings
with CIM in Geneva NOSENKO had in his possession the ten-
porary duty authorization which he said he had been issued
in December 1963 to travel from Moscow to Gorkiy Oblast in
connection with the search for CHZREPANOV.* This official
KGK paper had been signed by O.M. GRKIBANOV, Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate, and authorized. "Licutenant Colonel
Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO to visit the local KGB organiza-
tion in Gorkiy Oblast on official business between 15 and
30 December 1963."" It bore official stamps of arrival and
departure in December 1963, as attested by officials in the
town of Shakhunya.

10 February 1964: In Frankfurt, while awaiting ex-
filtration to the United States, NOSENKO was asked to review
a biographic statement which had been prepared by his case
officers on the basis of statements he had made during the
1962 and 1964 meetings in Geneva. NOSENKO went over the
-biography carefully, noted several changes, and then stated
that it was correct. The biography included the information
that NOSENKO had served in the U.S. Embassy Section of the
American Department as a senior lieutenant from 1952 [sic]
to 1955, that he was promoted to. captain in 1956, to major

in 1959, and to lieutenant colonel in November 1963, shortly -

before leaving Moscow for Geneva. to

set nee antl Rang ld

“}

|
{

saeeneiteesnee me mene come fe ve

a

8 April 1964: NOSENKO was questioned about the date
when He bécame a senior lieutenant, and he replied: "I
think in the end of '55 or the beginning of '54 I got the
senior lieutenant." ,

‘ Question: That's less than a year after you entered the
service [KGB]. :

_ #See Part VI.D.7.c. for a description of this search snd
_-. ef KOSENKXO'’s claimed part in it.


1400000 +

"=" = <-NOSENKO? ~ Well, I had the GRU service. © That counts” two
. — years, as military service, of course. it was. - we,
considered as a continuance of military service. wo . _

_ Question: .So you got it when? At the end of 19537 - oo. Do ee.

wt Aen ote ihe

i coe, oo
"NOSENKO: . At the end of ‘53 or beginding of '54. Then I
: got captain in 1956. oe

tie

: Question: When in 19567... . _

NOSENKO: I don't remember. You see, they are not given !
exactly in February or in March. Sometimes the _ i
scheduled time passes before they give it. So,

'56.-Captain, '59--Major, and '63--...

: 16 June 1964: Asked to list in chronological order the
date Of his promotions within the KGB from the date of
entry, NOSENKO stated: “I began in the GRU as a junior
lieutenant. While in the GRY I became a lieutenant, and 1
entered the KGB with this rank in 1953. Not long after I
entered the KGB I became a senior lieutenant, but 1 don't
know the month. It was still 1953. In 1956 I was promoted
to the rank of captain. I don't know the month. I became
a major in 1959. I don't know the’month. In October 1963
I wes made # licutenant colonel....Personnel called me on
the .elephone and said I had been promoted, Later 1 was
told that GRIBANOV wanted to see me. I went to his office,
but, of course, I didn't let him know that I already knew

. that 1 had been promoted. He gave me his congratulations.
You never see the attestation. It goes into your official
file."

26 January 1965: While discussing his role as case
offictr Tor U.S. Embassy Security Officar John ABIDIAN,
NOSENKO volunteered out of context that he had never offi-
cially been a major. He explained this situation as
follows: Having been promoted to the rank of senior
lieutenant in April 1953, he vecame eligible for the rank

- Of captain in 1956. When this time came, however, he was
+, not promoted because a senior KGB official held against
ce him his illegal use of KGB documents to cover_treatment for
gonorrhea in 1954. NOSENKO therefore remained a senior
lieutenant until 1959, when he would have been eligible
for promotion to the rank of major had he received his —
captaincy on schedule. Although GRIBANOV had promised NO-_
SENKO that he would be promoted directly from senior lieu-
tenant to major, skipping the rank of captain, an admini-
strative error was made by the KGB Personnel Office, and
NOSENKO found when the orders were issued that he had inw ee
stead been promoted only to captain. Instead of rectifying -
i this mistake, GRIBANOV persuaded NOSENKO that it would be
: to his advantage to remain a captain until he became eligible :
for promotion to lieutenant colonel in 1963. NOSENKO-there- Fe,
fore was a captain from September or October 1959 until oo 4
October 1963 when; as promised by GRIBANOV, he was promoted . SS .

eS eA Hater on be

1
si a


KGB osition because of his- close. cteet ion, ea with ‘GRIBANOV,. <

ai rant: “dn “this’ manner &
turned out: that ‘he never offictally held the’ rank of major.*

vite

10 August 1965: Under questioning by. DERYABIN, NOSENKO ©

’ yepeated the chronology of his promotions. given an 26 January oe +

1865, He again explained that he:was put up for captain tn . . 5
1956, but this time said that the-.promotion had been blocked . So. ot
on the grounds that he should be made to wait because of : : Soe
shortcomings in his work. Asked why he had told CIA that he
had been a major during the 1962 meetings and again in the
“biography prepared’ in Frankfurt, NOSENKO replied that he
thought the true story would not be believed.

1
ch tee dahon ds Hote te

cates

17 April 1966: In a voluntary statement, NOSENKO wrote :
the following: “Yn March 1951, with the rank of junior lieu- '
tenant, I started service in Naval Intelligence of the Seventh . , . .
Flect in Sovetskaya Gavan....From August 1952 until 1953, 2. oe =
worked ut the intelligence base of the Naval Inte lligence i ee

the Fourtt Fleet in Sovctsk, where I received the rank of
lieutenant of the Administrative Service....In 1956 I reer
the rank of senior licutenant [in the KGB], . in December 195
the.rank of cnptain, and at the end of 19623 I I vas vremiended
for the rank of major. I have never held the rank of lieuten—
ant colonel] ond the travel erder which you know of, with the
rank of lieutenant colorcl, was ygilled out erroneously. **

19 April 1966: In a new version of his autobiography,
NOSENKO included the following statement: “in July 1956. % -
became a candidate member of the CPSU, soon after which I rew
ceived a promotion at work: I became a senior case officer
and was given the rank of senior licutenant. In August 1957
I was accepted into the CPSU, and during the second half of
1958 was appointed Deputy Chief of the Second Section, Seventh
Department. On 29 Decenber 1959 I was promoted to the rank of
captain. a —

26 October 1966: "I lied when I said I was a lieutenant wok
colonel in 195%.” Twas only a captain." Asked why he had : :

-,» Said in 1962 that he was then a major, NOSENKO replied: :

“There was no conversation about rank in 1962 About my po-
‘sition, I said I was in the Tourist Department. That's all." jj

To. summarize what NOSENKO has said about his ranks while
‘serving in the KGB: He became a senior licutenant in 1952, ‘ . :
April 1953, 1954, or 1956; a captain in 1956 or September/Octo-= : : ie
ber/December 1959; a major in December 1958 or 1959; and a :
lieutenant colonel in October/November 1963. (The latter a
claim was verified by the official KGB document listing him as
a lieutenant colonel as of December 1963.)- On the other hand, a
_ NOSENKO has indicated that his highest rank in the KGB was - SO : oo
' captain, and that he never advanced to a majority or a lieu- .- .
tenant colonelcy.

4
i
wen yaataee genres

7

*At about this tine, in early 1965, & y
NOSENKO was only a captain and had advanced to nis senior. .

reported

Se ae

& shortly after .NOSENKO's: defection,

eived: information from fellow KGB officers whitch ~

made it vappeay Atte ¢ certain" that. NOSENKO vas: a lieutonsay:.

eolonel,:. m wet a _ - wa, oe oe


- ” ov)

_ Not long after reestablishing contact with CIA in-
_ January 1964, NOSENKO Mentioned that he had received the
J Order of Lenin "shortly after the 1962. meetirgs" in Geneva
:-as a reward for the ideas which he had developed to "en-.. |.
- large the experience and improve the quality” of KGB Second. :
. Chief Directorate. staff personnel in Moscow.* During the . Yo.
- Pirst series of interrogations,.NGSENKO on 6 April 1904. — :
claimed that he was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1963 for:
his work in the Tourist Department, KGB Second Chief Direce —— Coes
torate, after receiving the Order of the Red Banner in 1962 ;
for his performances while in the American Department. ,

The following discussion of the subject took place on
6 April 1964;

ne - + NOSENKO:- Yes;—I-received a big: gold medal. -—-- - Skee aie oon:
Qucstion: It was the Order of Lenin?

NOSENKO: It was at first the Order of the Red Ranner-—the
Red Star, I mean.’ In '63 I received the Order
of Lenin. In '63.

Question; What for?

NOSENKO; GRIBANOV decided that whoever is working a long
a period in tie Second Chief Directorate--[V.D, ]
CHELNOKOV got one, [A.G.] KOVALENKO got one-—

many, many [received the Order of Lerin],**

Question: You received the Order of Lenin for this brilliant
service?

NOSENKO: No. For working in the Scventh [Tovrist] Depart-
ment, which is considered good.

Question: What is good? Were there recruitmeats? What
recruitments?

NOSENKO: You must know that the main task of the Seventh
Department is rot recruitrents. The main task is
countering the intelligence activities of the op-
position.

Question: So, the Chief and the Deputy Chief of the Seventh ‘ i
Department got the Order of Lenin? 2

NOSENKO: Yes. j

*NOSENKO has described the Order of Lenin as the highest. :
decoration for which a KGB officer can be eligible. — “ Se

**In June 1964 NOSENKO said. that the only Second Chief Direc-
. torate officer whom he. knew to have. received this award. was

¥.A. CHURANOV, Chief of the British Embassy Section, who re- ;
_ eruited William. John VASSALL (se@ PART. VI.D.5.b.). On the . :
_. game general topic, NOSENKO: asked. his CIA case officer whether __. . ob.

he, the CIA officer, had received. a medal for his: part t
Me asked this-in January

_. the: 1962 meetings with NOSENKO.
“= in& Gene oo 7


contaminate ee

Question:

NOSENHO:

Question:

KNOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO;

Question:

NOSENKO;:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO: -

CHELNOXOV and. KOVALENKO?

Yes. And CHURANOY got avd of and--who else?
{(S.M. |) FEDOSEYEV got ard ¢ .{ KOVSHCK also got
the Order, the secend time. ihe first time he
got it several years ago, -and this wis the second
time.

When did you get the Order of the Ked Star?
Red Star J’ pot---1l don't know for what.

But then one year Jater they gave you another
one, beeause this lider of the Red Star] wasn't
enowsh?

Because the awards are given out--now, wait one
moment; up until 1961], if there were any awards
for the Chekists [KLUB personnel] it was very rare,
and they were onls avarded fur a specific thing.
Such as CHURASOV, for instance. Me was rewarded
for aw specific decd ithe recruitment of VASSALL].
But in 1962, 1963--these first years--whether it
was the idea of the Party to encourage the
workers, they decided to let SAKHAROVSKIY [Chief
of the KGB First Chief Directorate] declare his
medals and GRIBANOV to ceclare’ bis medals. They
get together with their deputies and decide to
whom they will give thes. They don't say to
whom--they say, for instince: ‘One order to your
department; you decide “no Should have it.’

Like that. Then we vould get together, f[
CHELNOKOV, KOVALENKO, ard se decided [who would
get one]. In our departuentr, fV.t.} YAKOVLEV
got a medal. Who clse got a medal? In 1962, I
got one, and then LEONOV who was Chief of the
Second Section --Le gut the Order of the Red Star.
We decided on these individuals. As far as we
ourselves were concerned. tnut decision was made
by GRIBANOV and his ceputy.

Did the Seventh Department catch any spies?

Well, as I have already told you, there was this
Italian fellow BP. This was considered a
good case because the First Department Later-~
the Seventh Department cas only’ involved at the
time of the arrest--began mecting with him.

So you got the Order [of the Red Banner| in 1962
because of your work in the Tourist Department?

I think in 1962 GRIBANOV gave it to me not for
the Seventh Departmént, but for my work in the
First [American| Departrent in 1960, 1961.

You think so? .

F think so.


» FosENKo: It was just:done et the order: of. the Chairman.
Question: And the Order of Lebin, was the sata? .

KOSENKO; - The sane,’ Well, the way it saye,--"Por work well
done for the organs ofthe KGB" there ia no indi~ |
cation exactly what it io for. “_ wt —

; NOBENKO admitted on 8 April 19643 "In 1964 {in ‘Geneval . oe

-1 told 9 116 about the Order of Lenin... Bhy?. 10 ged Bu.
borst." NOSENKO.then explained what be aaid to be the true
circunstances and gave. the reason for whiob he wes to have. -
received this decoration. GRIBANOV, NOSENKD ateted, had
prozised in 1983 thet NOSENKO, CHELNOXOV, and FKOVALENKO .
would get the Order of Lenin: "He aaid: ~'I am submitting
‘your names fox the Order of Lenin for orsating ths TaOPS -_
fcentrat Operational Communications fyatem of the Socond
Chief Directorate}, ‘for thig new thing you have tried to FF i
create in tourist work.' But Decemher Tees] had gone by.- -
I left {for Goneva] and nothing happoaed."* ~~ oO :

NOSENKO was asked on 15 April 1964 to list tho dates,
reasons, and types of awards, decorations, and bonuses te
had received during hia KGB crareer, as well as to indicate

. from whom he had received eaoh of these. Hie reply was .

. as follows: "I received nothing in 1953, 1954, and 1955,
In 1986 I received a commendation and one month's pay.
SEROY, the Chairman of the KGB, awarded ne this for the
recruitment of Richard BURG! [aee Part V.D.4.b.] while I’
was working in the Seventh [Tourist] Department of the
Send Chief Directorate. It was signed by the Chairmen,
and GRIBANOV told me about it. As usual, this Order of.
the Chairman of the KGB waa circulated, and I snd ail case
officers saw my name listed. There is no certificate or
anything. “sonnel just makes-a note in your official file.
that on a certain date you received the commendation froa.

the Chairman of the KGH. .

‘From 1956 on, I received something almost every year,

but it was nothing special. Perhaps it was the KGB annivere

sary or May Day or Army Day. In. 1957 or 1958, I got someon Te
thing from GRIBANOV, Maybe it was the 40th anniversary of Te
the Soviet Army. I don’t remember. It was given to se and. Se
& group of people in the hall [auditorium] between the third ee i
and fourth ficora [of the KGB Headquartera building]. PER= ; “4
FILYEV, Deputy Chief. of the Second Chief Directorate, sade ; §

_ the presentations —§ - , Lon . _ _ .

ae "In 1959 I received a commendation and one wonth’s = - - ..

_ . pay from SHELEPIN, Chairman of the KGB, for several Yee . op?
-/- - --emultments,/ among them the professor frou Tennessee { MERTENS ]., ae ; an

.. .'. DREW, FRIPPEL, and three British people, Thore were @ix in: ~

se afte mom wae

*NOSENKO later reverted to hia original’ atatenent, which. -
_Pelated the award to. his efforts to “inspire” the. work of
.. the Tourist Department. ss oo, ae


-

all: three Americans and. three Britash. t can't remember the
‘British names just now. * .

. “In 1960 1 cot a commendation Eom: GRIBANOV’ for good work
in general. A lot of officers got this. In 19€1 I received
the Order of the Red Scar. With a group of case cfficers I got
this for general gocd work in the Second Chief Directorate,
KOVALENKO and KOYSHUK oot this too. IVASHUTIN gave it .to me

(made the presentation). Personnel maxes a note in your official

file, put you car teke the medal and the little certificate that
goes with it and either keep ic ac home or in your study reom
(office) .**

"In 1962 I got a commendation from GRIEAOV for general
good work. I also received the Unbiemished Service Award

-for.ten years'-services: -They counted this from Octobér 1950,

when I ‘joined tne GRU, and they were late by two yeers in
giving it tome. This 15 not unusual. SHCHERBAK, Deputy
Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, gave it to me in the

* See Parts V.D,4,i.and h.. Part V.D.5., and Parts ¥.3.4.i.,
j-, and k., respectively, for descriptions of these recruit-
ment operations érd NOSENKO‘s ‘role in cthem.: NOSENKO also
said during interrogation by DERYABIN :on 10 August °1965
that, in 1959, his name was submitted for the.Order of the
Red Banner in connection with these recruitments, but that
he did not get it, probably because he was trensferred to
the First Department at that time (January 1950). NOSENKO
has described the Order of the Red Banner as the third
‘highest award a KGB officer may receive. Asxed what KGB
officers had received this award, NOSENKO said on i0 June

.,1964 that GRISANOV, SAKHAROVSKIY, and several other hiagh-
ranking KGB officers were awarded 1t for the amportant role
they played in smashing the Hungarian Revolution in 1956,

** On 15 April 1964 NOSENKO had said that he received the
Order of the Red Star, along with a group of other Second
Chief Directorate officers, at the end of December 1962.

He recalled this because they were planning the. presenta-
tion for the anniversary of the KGB on 20 December, but

the presentation was delayed and was not made until the
end of the month. NOSENKO and about 70 other officers of
the Second Chief Directorate, including KOVSEUK and G.I
GRYAZNOV, received the award “simply for achieverents, for
good resuits in work.” | NOSENKO told. DERYASIN in August 1965
that the order accompanying his award had read: “For ex-
ceptional performance of mission.* . When asked what mission
was involved, NOSENKO replied that the award was just for
good work in general. .

+ sanpeckom amperes =e a

Hates wltdltcged mtieuititiere


: hall along: ‘with rt ‘certificate ‘Tn: 1963 I received. an
commendation from GRIBANOV for ‘general good work. Also,’
GRIBANOV told me that I, along with some others, was to’
receive the. Order of. Lenin on 20 December 1963, the KGB
anniversary date, but I left for Geneva,**l was to re-
ceive it for arousing [ inspiring] the Seventh Department. ”

NOSENKO said on 26 October 1966 that he never re-
ceived any KGB award or decoration for his operational ©
work. The only awards he received during his KGS career,
he said, were a Red Army anniversary medal-and the award
for satisfactory completion of ten years of service, —

. S¥NOSENKO'’s wording here reflects earlier intensive ques-
tioning concernirg the ten-year service medal. NOSENKO said
on 15 April 1964: "In 1962 I had ten years of service in
the KGB and got 2a medal for unblemished service. It is
usually given for ten years and to KCB men only....That was

in 1962. I hac ten years of service then." When it was 2

pointed out that, according to his: most recent statenent,
he had joined the KGB in March 1953 and therefore would :
have had only nine years of service in 1962, NOSENKO said he
did not understand why but that he was certain that he had
been given the medal. after his return from Geneva in 1962.° .
(The 1962 date is consistent with NOSENKO's earlier statements
that he joined the KGB in 1952.). The following day, 17 April”
1964, NOSENKO said that he. remembered why he had received
. the medal in 1962 rather than 1963; this medal, he recalled,
-is-awarded to servicemen as well. as KGB officers, and prior —
military service is taken into account in computing the --
service time for the latter, NOSENKO.had:entered the :GRU.
. &4n 1950 and therefore. should have received. the .ten-year”
“; medal in 1960. ° Because-o...a: mix-up ‘in. the- EGB- Personnel--~
- Department | he.. did. not: receive it until 1962, . ; :

cee ate natn ene

ba cretitece

BRS, ete,“


14-0096.

_-. «He. NOSENKO's Relationship with-GRISANOV.  —~

“15 “Information from NCSENKO
a. Summary ,

From the time of his first meetings with CIA in 1962, NOSENKO
maintained that he had a close personal and professional relation-
ship with Major General 0.M. GRIBANOV, Chief of tre Second Chief:
Directorate, NOSENKO has described recruitment approaches in. which
he and GRIBANOV took part together, conversations they had on opera-
tional matters, the role which GRIBANOV played in his rank promo-
tions and receipt of various awards, and his.afterhours carousing
with GRIBANOV and First Chief Directorate countcrinteiligence
officer Ye.A, TARABRIN. NOSENKO has also frequently mentioned the
role which GRIBANOV played in nig, NOSENKO's, professional advance-
ment within the KGB: GRIBANOV was wholly respensible, against
NOSENKO's wishes, for his appointment to the position of Deputy ’
Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Department in
January 1909; later, when NOSENKO rejected his offer to make hin
Deputy Chief of the entire American Department, GRIBANOV arranged
his return to the ‘fourist Department as Chief of the ‘American
Tourist Secticr. and his later appointment as Deputy Chief of the
Tourist Department, ;

NOSENKO's remarks concerning nis direct involvement with

GRIBANOV in operations against Americans are-included in other

= parts of this paper. Among them are his early statements on the
approach to code clerk James STORSSERG (Part V.E.3.c.), hig 1962
account of the arrest and attempt to recruit Cla cfficer Fussell
LANGELLE (Part Vi.D.7.a.), and Aig early reports on the attempt to
recruit CIA officer Edward Ellis SMITH (Part VI.D.2.). In all
three cases NOSENKO subsequently denied having played the role he
originally attributed to nimself and denied having had personal
contact with the Americans involved. NOSENKO has also altered his
original accounts to say that he received no awarés or decoration
for operational activity and that he had not received the promo- -
tions he claimed. : “.

b. Details

The statements of NOSENKO given below concern primarily his .
personal relationship with GRIBANOV and how GRIBANOV assisted
his rapid rise within the organization of the Seccnd Chief Direc~.
torate. ; i

12 June 1962: "Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV is a great guy. ‘
A real pal. We, so to Say, used to meet one ancther illegally
and had women together... GRIBANOV wrote a fitness report on
_ me. It was the very best that can be given, brilliant. GRIBANOV '
. Wrote the very best fitness report on me. He had an excellent ; : 1
: regard for me, excellent... I am supposed to beccme Deputy Chief =. |
of [the Tourist} Department. I believe that GRIBANOV is promot- i
ing young pecple, new people, who already have experience, good . _ ot
experience, who have made recruitments. .I know two or. three-{of | f
the people he is moving ahead]. I personally have about 12 re- : .
eruitments, four-or five of them were British and the rest Ameri-
cans. He [GRIBANOV] has his eye on me in particular, and the
question-of my advancement is right. now under consideration... I
will be Deputy Chief of Department. You must give thought to the |


oon CA PE ANN ot i nn ant ee

fact that T have been. ‘talking with ‘you. “You can ruin everything.

I have a career. I have bright prospects. vy boss GRIBANOV, ny
highest boss, has a very high degree of respect. for me. «He some-
times bawls me out and I-- Well, I make it look like. this is un-.
pleasant for me. But, in fact, it is a plessant thing because, on
inside, I am glad he is bawling me out and not someone else. I
know that if he bawls me out he has a high regard for me. He -
sometimes calls me personally {to his office] and suys: ‘You
come with me. I have to meet an ambassador.’ I go with him.

We arrive and have the conversation. He is there all night. He
comes out and says: ‘Well, where shall we go for a drink?' 1
know beforehand {that he will say this] and everything is ready
at the Aragvi Restaurant. We go there. ‘Well, what shall we
drink!' [GRIBANCY says}. I answer: ‘Well, Oleg Mikhailovich,
cognac, of course! He is the highest chief. ‘{f:'don't drink
cognac. I'11 have vodka,' I say. ‘Well, we'll have vodka then,'
[GRIBSANOV says]..." One of NOSENKO's CIA handlers suggested at
this point that GRIBANOV seemed to treat NOSENKO as an older
brother would. ‘NOSENXO replied: "That's his attituce toward me."

23 Aprid 1964
Question: «Did you ever go to GRIBANOV's house?
NOSENKO: ‘I never went in the house. I have driven to it.
Question: Did he ever come to your house?
NOSENKO: No.

Question: Were you ever out at night with him, after work?
If so, how, under what circumstances?

NOSENKO: After work? Yes, once.

Question: Who else was there?

‘NOSENKO: TARABRIN.

Question: What was the occasion?

NOSENKO: No specific reason. GRIBANOV called me at midnight.
I could hear that he was already drinking; he asked
me how long it would take me to get dressed and come

' down to the Praga Restaurant, first private room..
Afterwards we wanted to go somewhere else to finish
the evening... GRIBANOV was sloppy drunk, lay down
to rest, he needed a couple of hours of sleep. I
drove him and TARABRIN home, got him there at ‘6s 00
a.™., gave him some pills to help him: :

Question: When did you first personally meet GRIBANOV?

_NOSENKO: I might have seen him in 1953. or 1954, but I did not

have a chance to speak to him then. Once I was in two
- gxoup operational discussions (about 15 people present)
. about work against Military Attaches..in 19545 - that was
the. first time I: ever. ‘Spoke to. him.. oo .

7
3
}
i
q

let eel paler

TOP SECRET ©


NOSENKO: I don't remember. He gathered groups of people. ..

. NOSENKO: He may not have actually written. them, but he signed

’. SHUBNYAKOV, rather than GRIBANOV, was the Deputy: Director of. the

a 52g

Question: ‘when did you first have’ any personal conversation with
him? , :

Maybe I was with him with KOZLOV and others in Tourist
Department [i.e., between 1955 and 1969).

Question: When did you develop a personal relationship with him?

s.
i
t
H

NOSENKO: It is difficult to say how it got started. I was
still working in the Seventh Department. It was in . =
1958, or maybe 1957. KOZLOV suddenly called me and ; :
said 1 should immediately report to GRIBANOV. I did, 7 :
‘and GRIBANOV said.I should quickly be ready to go to . :
a reception with him at the Indian Embassy, with him
and Vera [Ivanovna] ANDREYEVA. .

Question: Why you?

“NOSENKO: I don't know... (pause) Oh, yes, this is the story.

this is it, this is why he started favoring me.

Earlier, some time in 1953, I knew some girls, Nina on
Pokrovskiy Boulevard and her girliriend, Rina GUDKOVA,
friends of (Yu.I.] GUK and [V.M.] KOVSHUK and [V.A.)
CHURANOV, CHURANOV was a friend of TARABRIN, who was

a friend of GRIBANOV. Through TARABRIN he got acquainted
with these girls, and TARABRIN brought them to GRIBANOV's
dacha one night. The girls were talkative and‘ told me
all about it, and said they'd told CHURANOV. I told
CHURANOV who warned me not to mention it. I never did,
and GRIBANOV learned about this and liked it;.he re-
marked once: "You are not a gossiper..."

Question: How did ke find out that you knew and didn't tell any-
one?

NOSENKO: 1 don't know, but he did.

Question: Who wrote your fitness reports?

NOSENKO: My last one was written by [V.D.] CHELNOKOV. The one
before that by {(V.A.] KLYPIN, in the First Department.
Before that in the Seventh Pepartment it was written
by [K.N.]} DUBAS, before him by [V.A.] KOZLOV, then
{S.V.] PERFILYEV and before then, in the Pirst Depart-
ment, by [A.M.}] GORBATENKO.

Question: Did GRIBANOV ever write a fitness report on you?

them, those reports written in connection with pro- -
motions to higher jobs or for trips abroad, or general
reviews of personnel. mo, Sos .

sag hii nadione =

15 ‘Februar 965 (from a protocol’ signed: 20 February 1965):
"Before I joined the KGB in 1953 I had never heard the name of - . a
Oleg Mikhaylovich GRIBANOV. and knew nothing: about him. As. [F.G.]J . {

Second Chief Directorate: responsible for supetvising the acti-
vitieo. of the. First’Department. of the Directorate, where I: worked,


it may have been several months after I began my. KG3 service’: rat
GRIBANOV first came to my attention. ft don’t knew when I first’
saw GRIBANOV but it may have been approximately 1953 ata meeting -
before May Day or the 7 November holiday. I’ would not necessarily
remember this as I frequently met much more important people, who
were friends of my father, and Se€ing GRIPANOV wouldn‘t have been
particularly important to me.. Sometimes during 1955 and 1955, it
was necessary to obtain the signature of a Deputy Chief of the
Second Chief Directorate on a cable that. I’ had written and, if:
SHUBNYAKC’Y was absent at the time, I would take it to GRIBANOV
for approval. Though I was only a junior case officer at the
time, I would take the cable, after it had been aprroved ky the
Chief of Section and the Chief of Department, directiy to GRISANOV,
who would simply sign it with no discussion. I do not renember how
many times I toox cables to GRIBANOV nor do I remenber the contents
of any specific one of them. The first meeting with GRIBANOV that
I specifically remember was in the summer of 1956. 1 think it was
in June. I had returned from Kiev with KOZLOV and, after writing
@ Spravka on BURGI, PERFILYFV, KOZLOV, and I went co see GRIBANOV.
‘KOZLOV didn't introduce me to GRIBANOV at that time, Dut GRIBANOV
knew that I was NOCSENKO because the plan for the BURGI operation -
said that I would participate and because PERPILYeV had made an
appointment for the three of us to speak to GRIBANUV at this time.
The meeting lasted about 30 or 40 minutes. GRIBANOY read the re-
port on SURGI's recruitment and asked some questions. KOZLO9V
answered some of these and I answered others. Other than asking
what Ukrainians took part in the Operation, 1 can recall none of
GRIBANOV's questions nor do I remember any of tae conversation
which took place at this meeting. When we were through, KOZLOV
and I left while PERFILYEV remained with GRIBANOV. Perhaps the
first time I was alone with GRIBANOV was in 1958 when I attended
a reception given by the Indian Embassy at the Sovetskaya Hotel
in Moscow. Usually [A.V.] SUNTSOV accompanied GRIBANOV on such
“occasions, butyhe was sick at the time. I don't know why SUNTSOV”
usually went with GRIBANOV, why I was selected to go, or what I
was supposed to do at the reception. I think GRIBANOV called the
Seventh Department and asked whom he could use, but I don't know
why he picked me. GRIBANOV told me that, at the reception, I was
to refer to him as Aleksey Mikhaylovich GORBUNOV. I was to
introduce myself as Yuriy Ivanovich and if anybody asked, would use
the last name NIKOLAYEV. Vera ANDREYEVA, who went with us, used
the name Vera Ivanova. After work, I went home to change ny
clothes and we went in GRIBANOV's car from the KGB to the Hotel
Sovetskaya. GRIBANOV sat in front with the driver and I sat in
back with Vera ANDREYEVA. I cannot say how many times I have seen
GRIBANOV altogether. From 1959 on 1 saw him more frequently.
Sometimes, GRIBANOV would call meetings of chiefs of secticns and
their deputies and I would take part in these, I had begun te
call GRIBANOV by his first name and patronymic in 1956, when I
was Deputy Chief of the First Section of the Seventh Department,

_ but at these meetings I called him “Comrade General." In 1959°-

'I’also went to GRIBANOV's office alone in connection with the.
FRIPPEL case and, sometime -between May and October 13959, tock

him a report that I had prepared concerning the use of. tourist

cover by foreign intelligence organizations.” — - . : .

23-24 February 1965 (from a protocol signed 26 February): —
*GRIBANOV was never. in my own office, my -home,, my parents home .-
OF my parent’s dacha, .My father never knew -him I was. never

j
+
a4
a
;

. in. GREBANOV's. home or his: dacha.. ‘I’ was never in ‘any KGB opera-. -.*...
tional apartment: with: GRIBANOV. I never introduced any of my. j~"


sents to GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV knew about, agents
Meme. 2nd.'ARTUR' (FREPPEL), but. i. never scecifacaliy
discussed them with GRISANOV. ‘I aid discuss with SkIBANOV che
agent 'PRCKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions t have been
with GRIBANOV in social circumstances.* On all three occasions
TARABKIN was also present. After two of these occasions, we
had parties with yiris. I don't remember when tie firet tine
was, but tha last time was in Saptember or Ocrcker 1963. On
this occasion tuey called me at home late et nigst and agked me
to join them at the Prague Restaurant. - I arranged for female
companionship and this party lasted until early morning.* It.
was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV sone pilis T had fsr
hengovers. I nad brougnt a supply of thes2 bacx from Geneva in
1962. A few days after this party {GRIBANOY's secretary Ye.S.)
KIRPICKNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking
me for some more of these pills. ‘this-is tne note I gava to my.
CIA case officers in 1964.*%* I have ridden in GRIBANOV‘s cars
perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an.
indien Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three times to
moetings with SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with -

3 am

_the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIBANOV played

r

absolutely no part in my entry into tae KGB. <i chink he could not

have played any perscnal part in my assignrent to the #irse

Section, First Lepartzent, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since
at that time GRIBANOY was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-

torate supervising the Second Lepartrent ana not the First De-
partment. I do not know who mace the decision to transfer me
from the First Department to the Seventh bepartment in 1955, but

I did net have any personal contact or conversatica with GRIBANOV

concerning this decision. I do act know if GRIBANOV played any
personal part in my appointment as Deputy Chiet cf Section in

the Seventh Cepartmenct in 1958. 2 da not remerber dust who was
responsible for my appointment to this position. 7 did ast per-

sonally @iscuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANGV decided

at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of che
First Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, and
this appointment took place sometire in January 1969. OUBAS,

the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told we that GRIBANOV

planned to appoint me to this pesition and that he had spoken to
GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get

. GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself abcut

‘this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had

recommended me for this new position and did not tell me eny.

reason for my having been selected. GRIBANCV did tell me that my
appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more ~

senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself

and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me to return to the Seventh
Department in January 1952 was actually made in. about September or
Octcber 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the

First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,

FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not

See below for a more detailed version of this affair. .

#¢ When NOSENKO arrived in Geneva in 1964 he was carrying a note
- addressed: "Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I." In translation the
- mote read in. full: "Yu.I., get me please some more tablets

like the one you gave me once.: {signed}: GRIBAXOV." ©

vt ata


‘own gents to "GRIBANOV..- .GRIBANOV knew: about agents
mee Bp and 'ARTUR' (FRIPPEL}, ‘put I never “specifically.
discussed them with GRIBANOV. I did discuss with GRIBANOV the
agent ‘FROKHOR' (PREISFREUND). On three occasions I have been
with GRISANOV in social circumstances... On all three occasions.
TARABRIN was also present. After two of these occasicns, we”
had parties with girls. I dén't remember when the first time
was, but the last time was in September or Octoter 1963. On
this occasion they called me at home late at. night and aeked me”
to join them-at..the Prague Restaurant. I arranged for female
companionship ara this party lasted until early morning,* It
was at this party that I gave GRIBANOV some pilis I had for
hangovers. I had brought a supply of these back from Geneva. in
1962, A few days after this party [CRIBANOY's secretary Ye.S.}- .
KIRPICHNIKOV came to my office with a note from GRIBANOV asking:
me for some more of thegye pills. -This is the note I gave to my
CIA case officers in 1964.**. Xr have ridden in GRIBANOV's cars
perhaps four or five times, once when I went with him to an
- Indian Embassy reception in 1958, perhaps two or three timés to
_meetings witn SUSLOV and two or three times in connection with
the drinking parties with GRIBANOV and TARABRIN. GRIEANOV played
absolutely no part ia my entry into the KGB. I think he could not
have played any personal part in ny assignment to the rirst
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate in 1953 since
at that time GRIBANOY was Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
torate supervising the Second bepartment and not the First De-
partment. I do not know who made the decision to transfer me
from the First Department to the Seventh Department in 1955, but
I did =ct have any personei contact or conversation with GRIBAXOV
concerning this decision. I do net know if GRIBANOV played any
personal part in ny appointment as Deputy Chief of Section in
the Seventh Department in 1958. I do not remember just who was
responsible for my appointment to this position. I did not per-
sonally discuss this appointment with GRIBANOV. GRIBANOV decided
at the end of 1959 that I would be appointed Deputy Chief of the
First Section, First Department, Seccnd Chief Directorate, and
this appointment took place sometime in January 1960. DUBAS,

the Chief of the Seventh Department in 1959, told me that GRIBANOV -

planned to appoint me to this position and that he had spoken to
GRIBANOV two or three times about it, but had been unable to get
GRIBANOV to change his plans. I spoke to GRIBANOV myself abcut
this matter once or twice. GRIBANOV did not tell me who had

. yecommended me for this new position and did not tell me any
reason for my having been selected. GRIBANOV did tell me that my
appointment was a part of his personal plan to raise to more
senior positions a number of younger officers, including myself
and Aleksey SUNTSOV. The decision for me ‘to return to the Seventh
Department in January 1962 was actually made in about. September or
- October 1961. GRIBANOV planned to appoint me Deputy Chief of the
First Department, but the new Chief of the First Department,
FEDOSEYEV, wanted KOVSHUK to take this position. Since I did not

* e below for a more detailed version’ of this affair.

#® When. NOSENKO. arrived in Geneva in 1964: he was carrying a. “note.
_ad@ressed: “Personal to NOSENKO, Yu.I."- In translation the
‘mote read in full: "Yu.I., get me please some more ‘tablets.
Tike. the one you gave. ‘me. once’. {signed} ‘GRIBANOV. ” :

fo ethevtahee tSecthaties wilt elated

alin ae etitiSnaniy Carn tad 8

| ARN Sern


'-on SHAKOV. BANNIKOV was concerned with the question of who would

my making this: second trip.”

want to be placed in this position by GRIBANOV's order against the
wishes of PFDOSEYEV, I went to GRIBANOV and requested that I be _
transferied Lack to the Seventh Department, in any position. I a at
had already spoken to CHELNOXOV, who Wa3z then Chief of the Seventh _ i
Departrent, about this matter, and he had suggested that I go to: oot : j
GRIBANOV and ask to be returned to the Seventh Departmert. GRIBANGV . : i
finally agreed that I should return to the Seventh Deoartment as. : :
Chief of the First Section with the understanding tnat I would be. .
appointed Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department 1s soon as this . e
position would be vacated by [3.A.] BALDIN. In July 1962 I was _ pO 4
appointed Deputy. Chief of the Seventh Department. Whis Gecision ; : ot 74
was made by CHELNOKOV and .GRIBANGV in accordance with the intention :
stated by GRIBANOV at the end of 1961 that I should be appointed

to this position as scon as possible. I had no further personal

di:cussions with GRIBANOV. about this appointment et this time. In

1963 CHELNOKOV [GRIBANOV's. Depucy, F.D.] BOBKGY, and GRISANOV

decided that I should be named First Deputy Chief of the Seventh”

Department. ‘they cid not ciscuss this with me beforehand and no

order was igsued about this appointment. I was sinply told that

oe a eg Rina dat ed le

- from that time I would be considered as First Deputy Chief of the

Department, At this time I was, in fact, the only Deputy Chief of
the Seventh Department, since KORCBOV did not come ts the Seventh
Department until about November cr December 1963. GRIBANOV did
net tell me his reasons for appointing me Leputy Chief of the
First Section, First Department in January 1960, for wanting to
appoint ma Deputy Chief of the First Department in late 1961, or

-for appointing me Section Chief and later Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Lepartment in 1962. He did not discuss with ma my personal
qualifications for each of these positions. GRIBANOV had nothing
at all to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1962. I thing that
the kharakteristika written about me for this trip was signed by
BOBKOV, Since he was tne Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Direc-
torate who supervised the Seventh Department. TI did not personally
discuss this trip with GRIBANOV before my departure from Moscow.

My candidacy for this assignment was supported Sy BANNIKOV, the
Deputy Chief of the Second Chief Directorate who supervised the
work of the Eleventh Department which had the investigative file

go as case officer on this trip because SHAKOV, who was suspected

-Of possibly being a Western agent, was to be in the delegation.

There was no background or neighborhood investigation conducted

on me in connection with my being approved for this trip. My
assignment was approved by the Eleventh Department, by the Person-
nel Office of the Second-Chief Directorate, by the Central Personnel
Office of the KGB and by the Central Committee of-the CPSU. GRIEANOV
had absolutely nothing to do with my assignment to Geneva in 1964. i.
The kharakteristika on me for this trip was signed by BOBKOV. For |
the [964 trip no decision of approval of the Central Committee of ; i a

dan

.the CPSU was required for me or for any of the other members of

the delegation who had been approved for the 1962 trip. KKLOBU-

', STOV, PANCHENKO, and KOVALENKO supported me for the assignment as”
@ personal favor to me. I-did not discuss my. 1964 trip to Geneva

with GRIBANOV prior to my departure. In fact, I was even afraid
that GRISANOV would find out that I was going and would object to


14-0000


23.1 Febru sary 1965 1965: NOSENKO cor d on. his: social ;
_* encounters with GRIBANOV:and- TAPABRLID he tetlovings which was’
“not included in the. protocol. -quoted above, is tater, from case
officer notes. .

Question: Teil me’ about’ thee gecasions when you were with GRIBANOV j
and TARABRIN. ‘ . of

NOSENKO: Three times--drinking in cafes. Twice afcerwards there
were girls. The most recent time was in September or
October 1963. I don't remember the first time.. In —
. 1963 I received a call from. TARABRIN at home. - Then © .
GRIBANOV got on the phone and told me to take his car a i
“and come join them at the Praga Restaurant. I didn't’ ~ te i
take his car. because I didn't want to call the duty-
officer. 1 took a cab and went to the Fraga, They
were sitting there and drinking in a private room. I
joined them. They were drinking channagne, but I took
cognac. TARABRIN suggested girls about. 1230 and GRIBANOV
made me go tc the office to get my notebook. I called
one girl I knew--her and her sister. When I got back
to the restaurant it was closed with only GRIBANOV and
TAPABRIN still there. We went to the giris' (apartment).
They weren't prostitutes exactly. I knew her before.

: :
ce EE Tt tla cor,

Question: Is this why GRIBANOV called you to the restaurart (i.e.,
te provide girls)?

NOSENKO: I think so. It was the second time I had participated
a in this. This last time GRIBANOV told the girl his
name. The girl works in the Archives of the First Cnief
Directorate. At that time of night I wasn't able to
reach anyone else. Her name is Galina Mikhaylovna.
Her mother works in the Central Committee. I don't ; :
remember her last name. GRIBANOV was drinking and she .
toid him that she had quarreled with ZAYTSEV, the Chief
of the First Chief Directorate Archives. GRIBANOV
. told her that he would give her a job and told me to
i arrange for a job in the American Department of the
Second Chief Directorate for her. Galina's flat is in
the building inhabited by Central Committee workers on | .
Kutuzovskiy Prospekt. GRIBANOV's driver drove him
home at 0600 and he was in the office py 0830.

eather we

3 March 1965: Speaking of the damage his disclosures must
have Caused the KGB, NOSENKO said: "I believe they will punish i
people in the Second Chief Directorate [SCD]... Even GRIBANOV... |
. He was personally responsible, as head of the SCD, for pushing
_ ™e ahead.” | . soa

we hate

“Question: What sort of punishment? . ee
_ gE TOR

NOSENKO:; Even firing. _ =

Question: Do you think any others would be punished, or even
fired?

NOSENKO : Maybe. KOVALENKO, BOBKOV, and feople in the Eleventh
" Department. _ Many others», 00. ee : —

FEE neces temerity tne over msm


coe

Later in the same session the interrogator. returned to this “subject:
The following is a transcript of the. discussion:.

Question:

' NOSENKO:
Question:
ROSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:
NOSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

You said you trink GRIBANOV migkt be fired. Yet, there”
is nothing in the protocol you signed {see above] about
your relations with GRIBANOV which would ceem to make
him personally responsible for you. Is there something
€lse, something you haven't told me? ,

No.

Why then do you think GRIBANOV would be fired?

(no answer) .

(repeats)

Don't know.

Well, what is your opinion at least?

Nothing, nothing. Let's not discuss this.

Why not?

It's simply my opinicn, that's all. I don't know why.
Well, what is your cpinior:?

He was responsible for my becoming Deputy Chief of
Department.

But you had already gotten ahead before: you said he
didn't help you become Deputy Chief of Section in 1958.

Yes.
Did you ever hear any gossip about his help to you?

It was said in the SCD that he helped me become Chief
of Section and Deputy Chief of Department.

Why would BOBKOV be punished?

He was “my supervisor, and in ‘61 he was Secretary of
the KGB Party Organization.

would others in the Party Organization ‘be punished?. ee

seh tngd ae nba LL el

NOSENKO:

Question:

. Would BANNIKOV be punished?

Yes, also in the Party Organization of the Seventh
Department and of the SCD. _ wee

~NOSENKO= .

No. He did nothing, just supported my | candidature for .
Geneva.

Question: .

Would KOVSHUK be punished? woe re aaa


. NOSENKO;

‘Question:

NCSENKO:
Question:

NOSENKO:

Question: :

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO

Question:

NOSENKO

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

NOSENKO:

Question:

. 335.

Of course they would speak with KOVSHUK, GUK, GRYAZNOV, |
who talked to me.

‘How about the First Chief Lirectorate and the Seventh

Directorate? ©

No. I wasn't close to them, except GUX.

How about First Chief Directorate residencies abroad?
(S.I.] GAVRICHEV might ke recalled from Geneva.

You must be withholding something about: your relation-
ship with GRIBANOV.

No, I was telling you | I visited his cffice. He told
me: ‘I found out you're drinking too much.’ I said
no, not especially. He said: ‘Stop this drinking
with KOVSHUK. It's not good for you.’

But this couldn't harm GRIBANOV's fesiticn now.

They would review my file, and find tnat it contained
the report about the woman in '54,* the fact that I
was turned down for assignment to Ethiopia, drinking,
scandals--GRIBANOV knew about this, but he approved
my appointment (to Deputy Chief of Cepartment) anyway.

Why did he promote you?

GRIBANOV thought I was a young, active guy. Six re-
cruitments--oh, they weren't much, but it sounds
great for the First Department, which was having no
success with Americans in the Embassy.

But why make you Deputy Chief of Department?

He thought I was a tough guy, good case cfficer. In
'59 I saw him often and was involved in a lot of

‘operations which were reported to him.

But it was not then, but in 1961, when he made you
Deputy Chief of Department.

(shrugs)

who would officially approve a Deputy Chief of Depart~
ment? ee -

4
3
i
3
i

NOSENKO :

Must be higher than a Department. Chief--bec. :se

GRIBANOV: signed. They could get him for his, especially

those who are, against GRIBANOV.

” WOSENKO:

‘Well, IVANOV, who wanted to get promoted to _ Deputy.

_who?

Chief of Department. in 59-60. but didn't. ‘He was in an.

". dngpection group: of the Cotlegiumy checking the: Seventh .

Department...
_ . SresaET this is a reference: ‘to. ‘NOSENKO's contracting venereal

_ disease: (see Part Iv. C22.)


14-0000

Accordir.g to :

source

. Ao EE z FRERG

Cuestion: But GRIBANOV must have approved all the other Ceputy
~ te tf or:

Departrent. Chiefs, ¢

oo. “ould the sere happen
of them defecte i? So :

NGOSENKO : Well, if 21t was from the Second Bepirtnent, for ean
no, because GRIEANOV wasn't parsonally supervising it.
“yt woule be someone else's proposal. [7 my case it was

his own. ininistive. : .

Cuestion: Was anyone in the First Chiel Direccorate punished a3
a result of GOLITSYN's detection?
Ne, absolutely not.

2. Information fron £5

Ag indicated in Part III.I., a number of sources have reporte
that GRIBANOV and other KGB officers were discharged from tne KGS
in the wake of NOSENKO's Esta PS cs

Siro fitdeeak ‘ Rs eae au
15 KGB ofticers iad aiready been dismissed from the KGB kecause
of the defection, and that SRIBANOV and’ three of his Geputics wre.
ineluded in this number. One of the deputies wes named "BAMNIK"
{BANNIKGY). GRIBANOV's guilt was said to rest in the facts that,
as Chief of the Second Chief Directcrate, he had been ultimately
responsible for NOSENKO's flight; that NOSLNKO was his perscnal
friend ane protege; and that, therefore, he snould have been aware
Of NOSENKO’s intention to defect. ;

tive ao

an

when HOSE : Leang Cconsia ion in the Soviet dele-

gatior. to go to Geneva, a summary statement cf NCSENKO's activities

and capabilities was prepared by employees of tac Secona Chief
Directorate and was sent to GRIBANOV... SR.g29 said he understood
this summary contained considerable ‘compromising’ information re-~
garding NOSENKO and, if acted on properly, would have removed
NOSENIO from future consideration ror the trip to Geneva.

Stated, however, that he understood fron conversations with other.

KGa employees, whom he could not recall specifically by name, that
GRIBAKOV read the summary material, ran a line through ail of it,

* tn addition, a western Ambaseadox with when GRIBANOV was in - me

“operational _ccntact—in-Moscew-has-—stated—that-GRIBANOV-disap—

another KGB handler. (He has also-indicated that GRIBANOV..

peared from .the scene sometime. in mid-1965 and. was. replaced by. -.

disappeared about the time of KHRUSHCHLV'S downfall in. Octeber —
1964.) ae . : we ee


oe Gee

don cen the summary, ‘Send hit to Cenevaw’. ae
wei 2 . the genezal feeling arong KGB iperscay 00 oe. |
nek thay CRIBANOY Was willing Lo overlook a lot of deficiencies —
about MCSENKO because of GRIBANOV's long-tiire ¢riendship with
NOSENHO's father." es ee
> secora me to sensitive :
DB ya CEE EY sire.
7 enh eh Hi

Ek? ¥ <n : a3, a rf, newts apes sent ae 3
ean WoV'a Cismigaay tock place inzediately after HOSENKO's
defaztion in February 1964 and-no leas than 50 other officers;

Lost of them from the Sucond Chief Ptrectorate and many of them
cicae frienda-cf GutBANov, had been fired subsequently. CiGeaee
Sar eeeibee prior to NOSENKO's defection, N
ta deputy to a Department Chief ia the Sacond Chief Direc-
torate but that he held only the rank of captdin in the KCB.
attributed NOSENKO's high position to the influence which
GRIBAROV exerted on his behalf. = : Sec ence
j rather than being fired, Major General "B; KR" (BANNIAGY)
had been appointed Acting Chief of the Second Chief Directorate in
GRIBANOV's stead.* i

eT EOS Sea
Giceetm after the defectica of NOSENKO, the Kel sonducted an ex-
tensive investigation:cf personac] in KSB Headquarters to find out
which KGB officers knew him, ‘One o. these questioned was TARASHIN,
who said he was ecquainted with NOSENKO, but that their relation-
ship was only casual and was limited to occasional official con-
tacts within the KGB. Subsequent investigation determined, however,”
that TAPABRIN and GRIBANGV were close friends socially and had
attended several parties which NOSENKO had arcanged and attended.
Girls provided by NOSENKO were at these parties.** As a result of
hie willful concealment of this information, TARABRIN, Like GRIBANOYV,
was discharged from the KGB and dismissed frem the Communist Party

of the Soviet Union. :
t

Nas [7a

ete

j
i
:
:
4
{
i

os aRigy sR BANNIKOV was the Acting Chief of the © ‘

Second Chief Directorate. NOSENKO, as noted above, said that
BANNIKOV would not be punished as a result of his defection,
NOSENKO also said that it was BANNIKOV who sponsored NOSENKO's :
1964 trip to Geneva and that GRIBANOV had nothing to do with it 4

‘ or the 1962 trip. . ; f

da eumesievaiandéuedcsupksm swe

**® These evide i @escribed by NCSENKO (see
above). wove at the time of . F
cnief—of the British —— > : :

his_removal_trcm—tne

_ .— | promoted-to the position of Deputy Chicf of the newly established” ~ ~

Department of the KGB First Chief Directorate. NOSENKO said
that TARABRIN held this post until 1963, at which time he was 7

"Service Number Two" (counterintelligence) of the First Chief

Directorate.


o

‘e Sovict scientist with suspected: intelligenca connections |

I, Cenfire atios fr fron other § Sz eHEees ©

1, introduction

Since NOSENXD's defection several Soviet sevrets and
dofectors. have provided information Supporting . AHOSENKO's
clains of having nell certain positicns in the ob at. cer-
tain tines. FN * ; gar fig

CURR Soe ek

who was appreacied by Cla, Soviet caso officers for en
EMEP double asent (a NOSENKO lead) ,and the KGB cfficer

“hand ling Roberz Les JCIINSON (also a NUSENKD lead), a Sov-

det journalist who contacted the magazins Paris Nets h

with a proposal te write an article on NOSERKO, and two
defectors, Sere of these suurces hed se ppovted NOSENKG
directly by reporting that ne was a Second Chics Diroce
torate officer in the various positions he sax. he was, -
Others have offered indirect support by confirning HOSENKU'S
knowledge of particular pieces cf iatormation cr con-
firning the validity of +nfornat yon | which NOSENKO said he
lestned while in particular kKG3 jcts, As will be noted,

- the inform eticn froa one source sonatines contradicts

that learned from another or fron NOSENKO himself.

aA

ae BED has corroborated NOSENKO's story indirectly
by acre vescriptions of the reporcussions of the defection :
within the Ko a frarticulacly, the firing of GRIRANOV) #RatREeo eR
Ee CRN TR PEER ATR RAL ang
by his staterents concerning tus Probab 1G mg ne t that ths
defection woul id have on KGS caper OR rae:

various tines 3 that NOSENKO is “nore valuaole than PEN-
KOVSKTY," that ne is wvastly more important than DERYABIN
or GOLITS YN," that th GB “will not be able tc. operate.
normal] for te veal ayy hat it is the “unanimous opinion”
© f . 7 - TAT AAT

ROSEN Could do tremendous harm to the KGB, ana
that this danage would be severo "for several years to
come", :

paihas also given indirect support to NOSENKO's
statement tnat he was Veput; Chief of sere U.S, Embassy. .
Section. ® SR eg & eye @' asia "chick". had. a

an tends

cone co tgbiane

mort ee

—aecess to de AL is ities against the U.S.Em-
bassy, and ee “Se Reieterhe loss suffered by the

KGB as a resulz a eeNRO's Knowledge of the mi¢rophones -
installed in the Embassy, (NOSENKO has said that this ine |
formation was available to hin only’ bec aut iadls was Deputy

Chief£—of the—Anericent ctlo eae PR aT ee ee

reported that NOSENKO's. position as 2. “wohief™ an the. Second... --
Chief Directorate gave | him access to the: nemes and backgrounds

: 4 Rpsever Ts no tknosn To have sraveT™ ‘specifically
thar SOSENKO was .a senior ¢fticial in the Anerican Eabassy
Section. of the: American Department | in 1960 and: ADE

c£ many KuB
and to sens

operational, 1

7
se

a Abin. tH oe on,
was Jonn UPS, ne

Tha ay

a. : erecta retrunted in

ry 13€2 on homosexual grounds; this
s

Leningrad in: Jan alg
informaticn NOSENKO Said fe learned as Chief ot tne
American Tourist Sectjs:. of tla Tuuris gare
Further exacples of Ge S nis

way are revi

the KG NGOSENKO weckeda‘in the Second Directors
he once worked against personne] of the U.5. 238y
in Moscow; later he was assigneu to work against &.S. :
journalists in Moscow. During his last years with the KGa,
he.was assigned to the task of working against *merican and


14-0000

|
_ ee 2
Eurcp ean tourists: in. Mose i
Gr eRaw, was that of be: - {
udetrtment, Second.chief.v ees 1 4
® Gare SRD NOSENKO secured tris relay eSat ion”. Le ;
 Bveese” of nelp he.receives- “21 GRIBANOV,
Chief of the, Second. Directord : through- oe i
out NOSENKO's caréer, GREGANOW ‘had’ “him and--. om ; '
suw that he was promoted..." - in
to NCSENKO!s: Ki igh
tae eee : st.
"it appeared quite coftain th ‘Of.7
-Lievtenna: Colonel. in the kob.” SN
Eh - reported havang lesrnedt KGB of-
. PACor ys ee NQSENKO vas: aly a-captain,** ~~~ ~
i , ~ <s = : . 4
he feeis that NOSENKO has agtueliy deretted or whether Aa
feels that this might be a 'trick' by the KGB. He SS
replied that from his own knowledge — this matter, he is
convinced that NOSENKO's defection is net 2 ttrick! by the
KGB.". . Co bte ee
303 ee sénsitive source.. | ~
ae tho
aah
Gti OSENKA-
from various persons ae had never knean
‘NOSENKO ‘personally.: an irportant boss
inthe Kod. Ue said he did net know. dirsctcrate oF
department NOSENKO had been in. Ze 42 con-
tinued that when NCSENKO was a young catne vas in the
’ GRU Military Academy *** and‘then [was¥ sent to the TInfer- - ; - ;
macion Department. cf the. GRU for a short tire; in all,
- * Salt \
St s i eat 7. a !
Ble Sore: s . ein a: . . . : :
*@ Untii January 1965 NOSENKO maintaingd that he had pre- | _
_ gressed through the, KGB ranks in-n 1isequence, tTom ee : 4
— -  Jiéutenantto licutenant_coleneél 26 January-1965., == == 2
: however, he said that because oc - nistrative confusion ‘
and GRIRANOV's advice he had skipred’ the rank of majer and :
- -. ARad-moved directly, from captain to Rievtenant colonel in--- = => °° 7) + 7

~ never held ‘the rank of lieutenant colons) and was really

late 1963, In April 1966 NOSENKG told Cia that he had os a f

only a captain (see Part ViG.1.J.. =

piecemgrecseamngse dalam se opm a rpsent ste ae

bey
V

“aaa The Military-Viplematic Acadezy i the strategic intel- §-~ SR
_ ligence school of the GRU... Althouga..OSENKY said he. en
“o- attended various naval-type scheals- before joining. the. =

_ GRU, he insisted that he was never er

Soviet Navy. “H
_- attend. the. it
GRU Military Acaden
‘ courses that he-had

rolled: in a. fernal
iment..of the

intelligence course of any tra
.. claimed to-ha
* Diplomiti

feck

44-00000 *

ain

y-had

perhaps a vear. . PN Sas oe es ROSE
been a very undiseip Ca person where ih lie GRE and tnot.

Suave been dascharged fron the ON, . , oo
however, tus labher. wae “Is & ry doflueitial person in”
he Ministry of Shipoualdiny, W ahtle to get NOoENKO trates

ferred to the EGB. i Tie wat che oprpion os bbe pere
‘ be

information about VOSETSXO that

very good." ile was

ae tate deat ub areata del Slee

sons from whom ie hese 5
_ NGSENKO nad given very. very inbormestion to the U.S. ‘
after his Cetcetion and that Qohad had great access
to FG information shich inc luce: , or CE covere- :
ave of puople in fooe vw. mieress ba Une ere! u og
pussies, ete. & “ esa 2 or the FS. be
assy bad feud we Mee Ed EE Ge Pott ON bead
informatian.”*
vO. ho sourcid his knowledge Of © I
io an incident which eevmued about 1950, while NOSENKO Said
he was in the Pourist Departyent.*t
4
4q
a

Wa indicatea ir Part V.E.3.p.. the final senteme is largely. _

but not entire? correct...

+*Sce Part V.F.8..


1400000

' $§, “FIRES

. | QPESERRCRTES: Wa tests sie Fase
at the time cf the defection, NOSENKO was rcoming +h Geneva
with Nikolay RESHETNYAK,: a representative of thw Inter-
national Organizations Branch of the Ukrainian Ministry
of Foreign Affairs, NESHETNYAK toldmEwer ere that NOSENKO
often left his quarters withcut saying where he was going,
but it was assumed that NOSENKO was “Intelligence” and had
gone mission.to acconmplish.**  C:SaiiRmi amy Ere r ess

erm RESHETNYAK had been interrcgate! uy th

PRS Bite ete
aaa ection with the NOSENKO- defection. HESHETAYAK also toid =253

G38 that he had attendod the Moscow. trial of NOSENAO, ~

held in absentia, at which NOSENKO was “found guilty of

treason and was sentenced to death. Sige pthought s. °

the KGB might go so far as to send somecne to the United
States -to locate and kill NOSENKO. Finally, he has -reported

_on the dismissa} of large numbers of KGB officer's, in-

cluding GRIBANOV and Yuriy GUK, and other repercussions
within the KGB of NOSENKO's detecticn (see Part 111.1.4.)

6. GAMKRELIDZE |

NOSENKO's service in the American Department was con-
fizacdin the fall of 1964. by the Soviet mathematician R.V,
GAMKRELIDZE.*** At that time an American scientist brovght. 5
up with GAMKRELIDZE the subject of the ABEL-PONERS exchango****

See rare oved oSe

a& = NOSBNKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian Ministry of | ©
Foreign Affairs officer on the stafr of the Disarnament
Delegation, Asked on 24 January 1904 whether RESHETNYAK
might be suspicious of his absences for meetings with ClA,..
NOSENKO replied: "Ile thinks I'm KGS,..so of course there's

No problem if I come back late." Gay ey i
ported that RESHETNYAK had been dis.itssed.ircm the KGB as

a result of. the defection of NOSENKO. CIA has no other
- yeports of RESHETNYAK having served in the. KGa,

#e® GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of. having connections with Soviet
Intelligence because of his statements and actions, a5 :
we l as his unusual freede= of movenent, often alone, while oe
on visits to the United States. When approached by a CIA." * |. 17. |
representative with a recruitment proposal in 1964, GAM-. . : :
KRELIDZE declined but. added that he "welcomed the op-

portunity—to-meet-with-an-American Intelligence officerss:
Since this enabled him to compare the Soviet. Intelligance
officers he has met with their American counterparts," —
During this meeting, GAMKRELIDZE raised the subject of
NOSENKO again, describing. him as “obviously a traitor to
his country." : ae :

aee®The exchange of the KGB. Illegal Rudoif Ivanovich ABEL 4
for Francis Gary POWERS, the U-2 pilot, took place.in ss: Se

February—1962:..


“' .NOSERKO.

. organization in 1961 for the MVD.. GOLITSYN said that in general,

“383.

and asked whether the Russian pecri¢ had been tole aba ite

“GAMKRELIDZE replied that they hed not boon held officialay ‘but

knew it had taken place since there + u
Moscow. As an example, he said t:
had heard about the NOSENKO defect
panding, GAMKRELIDZE stated that ¢:
the cofection “was very danagin ¢
NOSENKO was the Chief of the Amer:
identities of all Soviet agents an

iayrapeyvene™ ir

. Ws way” thac he

Doar zen Glaticance., Ee2-
“qraceyines indicated that

covet Inve liagence in thit

setion, and ne “new the

united States,"

(7. GOLITSYN

The defector COLITSYN is tne cally source Of anformation cn
NOSENFO's KGB carver who Claims teh: wily acquainted
with him. GOLIYSYN. said that he . first time in
1953 when visiting the American nt_of the HGH Serand Chief
Directorate con business, and that ard 3 e with NOSSNYO on

; “in 1959, * This

Saw

first-hand information from GOLITS

sistent either internaliy or in vomparisen with that supplied ny

-ClA has no record that GOLTITSYN, pricr to the publicity
attending NOSENKO's defection, ever mentioned him by name or in
connection with the KGB Second Chieti Dircctorate, On 19 March

962, prior to NOSENKO's first contact with CIA, GOLI'TSYN was
shown NOSELKO's name among those of other Soviets in Geneva fo.
the Cisarmament Conference He farir nd bo comment, on it.

On 26 June 1962, after CIA's initial mectings with NOSENXKO
and because of the large overlap of NUSENKO's informetion ané
contacts with GOLITSYN's, one of the CLA case officers who. nad
met NOSENKO 1n Geneva met with GOLITSYN to cbtain his comments.
cn some of the NOSENKO material. GOLLTSY! was told thar CIA had
received in Switzerland an anonymous let.er which reported cer-
tain information from within the «5B; the CIA offic:al stated
to GOCLITSYN that the information so Closely overlappes Ais own

reporting, including promanent mention of COLITSYN's friends GUK,

KOVSHUK, ané CHUPANOV, that the péssibility of disinferwation .
was suspected, perhaps in relation to GULITSYN's cwn defaction.
Ten major items from NOSENKO were discussed with GOLITSYN, all
pertaining to Secend Chief Directorate operations,’ and a list
of 15 names was shown him, identified as names of Second Chief
Directorate personnel whom the letter writer had named Among
these names was (fnu) NCSENKO, and GOLITsYN indicated he had
previously reported on him; CIA records, however, shew that .
GOLITSYN had reported only on: one Aleksandr Fedoseyevich NOSENKO,.
who had been a KGB officer in Japan when -RASTVOROV defected to
the U.S. in 1954. GOLITSYN made ro further comments on these
names, except to say that one identified as KGB had left that

lacking the full details ‘necessary for an assessment, he could
say that there were serious signs of disinformation in what he __

had ‘Seen; he wanted to.seé the full information on the case.
Subsequently GOLITSYN made numerous demands for this informa-
tion,_complaining.to Attorney..General | Robert_KENNEDY—and-senior-

of ‘the ‘Second. Chief Directorate. working. against Amex,

_pertstinerion 2

“
|

4
oF

4
oak:

Le

%
heats

‘CIA officials” because his request nad net been granted.

On 10 February 1964: NOSENKO' s: defection from the: Soviet. ‘Disarma--

ment eet ton. in Geneva, Switzerland, \ including

s publicized, -
. Woen, GORE SN: hed he

. 1962. 2. ‘
to bt: “he thereupon stated: that he recalled -KOSENK

ome. ba’ ground: on the. case and. an indica

~ QP SECRET

het

wii Sth ‘

ile


a a

reservations” about NOSENKO" 's° “bona fide . ‘Cver. the next se

- Other Embassy personnel or corr:

“with him-after work,-and Had“oncé entertained KASHCHEYEV af

cal.
months GOLITSYN was provided with macerial. from .the 1952 ‘and 1964
meetings with tIOSENKO in Switzerlami, ana at his request was sup-
plied wath all the available ‘biogrephic data to-assist him ins.)
analyzing the KG3 operation; On 29 June 1954; GOLITS Wi was inter-_
viewed in detail on the subject of NOSENKI. Ge conf ir eq NOSIN.
KO‘s identity as the son of the former Minizzer of Sh Liding

and said that he was a KGB officer who had worked in tne American
Department and the Tourist Department cf SBts Second Chiet
Directorace. He was shown a photograph of NCSENKO inot buried

in a photo spread, but singly) and he said that the ,hotograph |
depicted NOSEUKO, GOLITSYN sid he knew this because he Wed pere
sonally acquainted with KOSENKO, having met him two of three

‘tines an the U.S. Embassy Sex ctaon While tnere on -KGE Firs: Chief

Lirectorate business im 1953. He had clso seen NOSENKO cccasion-~
ally at work during 1358 and *959 and when GCLITSYN asked hin
whore he was working 1n 1969, .CSEsKG told him that he was in

the Tourist Separmment. Fineliy. GOLSTSm@ id, he and NOSEUKO
knew cre another through their ane friendshi ps with yu. Tr.
CUK, Via. CHURANOV, ana. Ye.G., KASHCHEYEV,* A. cording to GOLITSYN,

NOSENKO served in the U.S. Pion sy sect ior foom 1953 uncrl 1957
or 1958 end was specifically responsitle for KG cover2¢e of Aner-
ican military personnel «<n Mescew during the first year of this

period. For the remainder of his services in che U.S. Embassy

Section, until 1957 or 1959, GOLITSYN said. NOSENKO may have had
these.same responsibilities or ne may have been working against
vondéents. He was definitely in
the American Department during this entire period. In 1957 or
1958, NOSENKO transferred to the Tourist Department and wis a
seniors case officer there as of 1959.°* GOLINSYN was certain that
NOSENKO did not work in the American Department of the Second
Chief Directorate at any time during 1960. ‘This he said he xnew
because he hed visited the U.S. Embarsy Section on at least three
occasions during the early part of 1960 and again in about Decem-
ber 1960 (sxe, accually January 1961). *** COLITSYN sa:d that he

knew in detail who was in the section, and that he wouid nave
‘known if NOSENKO had been there, particularly if he were the

Depury Chief. ****

photograph and has consistently. denied ever seeing cr meet
ing him. After the Gefection, NCSENKO was asked what he knew
of GOLITSYN, He imnediatély gave a detailed account of
an incigent which GOLITSYN himself had previously reported
to CIA: GOLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV in 1951 or 1952 had written
a letter to the Central Committee of the Commaunist Party
proposing a reorganization and redirection of First Chief.
Directorate intelligence. activities: as a result of this
letter COLITSYN and KASHCHEYEV had been received by MALENKOV.
an@ STALIN, and their proposals were accepted. This was
NOSENKO's first mention of KASHCHEYEV, Dut he added at this
time that he was personally acquainted with chim, ‘had seen
him periodically at KGB Headouarters, sometimes: had a drink

ere ee

‘his dacha in-1953 of 1954. GOLITSYN. saw NOSENKO's reply to
his question prior to. making the above statement, and KOS2N.. .

i
i
i
j .
1
i
i
|
i
|
b
if

{rootnotes. continued on nent payee).

KO*s claims of friendships with. Yu.1. GUK and V/A. GEFRANCY
were included in the file GOLITSYN. studied.


(Continuation of footnotes fron preceding pase.)

tn This ‘chronology differs fran an that. provided by NOSENKO and
described previously: - Az “ca rding to NOSENKO,-he served in
the American Department to mid-1955, in the Tourist Depart-
ment from 1955 until Januasy 1960, in the Americdn Depert-
ment during 1960 and 196i, ard again in the Tourist Depart~
nent from 1962 until nis: Sefer tion. NOSENKO's confirmed
19565 operg  EVRGI ahd his 1957 operations - .
against nd Gisella HARRYS tend to confirm ce .¢
|
|

y
pv
2

his connecticn with tcurist operations in 1956 and 1957.

- *** GOLITSYN had spoken as early as December 1961 of these
visits to the U «8. Embassy Section.

****GOLITSYN had earlier reported that G. L. GRYAZNOV was acting
as the assistant of the chief cf section at this time. He
has never identified the Deputy Chief of the U.S. Snbassy
Section nor indicated that such a position was on the
table of organization.

~—_—

pe lenlea pele eae


vapotog + B -

“NG

=

e micrcphones in the U:S.-Emd
from the tranucript ‘of her renarkd:

Question:

Question:

Questions:

. Question:

Question:

* V.G. SVIRIN was said by

said she. Snow that.. NOSENZD: nad ‘told the Ameries

"people or-~

pin Moscow, The following: ia

Do you know anything about NOSENKO, the” ‘one whe
defected an Geneva?

I Gidn't have any real information. I heard: ecma
gossip, and the gossip was that he ia the sen of
a general, that his mother is Jewish, and that hig
nother was always involved in send Dlackmarketing,
that his father had great concern ver the famtly,
This is, you know, idle talk. I don't really knacw--
it was just gossip.

Would you say that this idle talk wus among KG!

You know, 1 didn't kncw many EG people. . Ie wag
only Wr. SVIPIN,*

But he told you about this?

We didn't tell mea, he told Pe CRS ;
husband), ah--you know, they like to think they
are all-powerful, that this min of course will
be exterminated one cay. They always repeat it,
Well, somelcdy committed suicide. ‘The old de-
fector, that GUZENKO, [ think, Yese-l read in
the paper. ;

But what vere you saying about this Geneva NOSENKO? |
Nis mother is Jewish, his. tather was a general.

What was his father in?

I really den't know.

Were there others who suffered as a result of this?
I really don't know. .I never heard. I never knew
that defector. I never knew. He wasn't a KGB
person. - . . ;

I beg your pardon?

He wasn't a KGB person, NOSENKO.

officer under cover of the State Committee- for Science: and
Technology  (GKKNR) during the period of. her husband's em.
ployment (1960-1962) there and later head of a unit con- |

ducting—operations—against—th
a friendly association with § EN:
the date of. her defection. According to NOSE

6—U.$._Fuibassy~—He-maintained-—
: pand her husband to
KO, SVIRIN was

a@ KGB officer who’ participated in che PENKOVSKTY' tnvestigation
(see. Part VI.D.7.b. ). ; -


Question: |

During a later debriefing by CIA,

‘the micro > aia age

visited the
mation that !

‘The fellow from Geneva?

No. He wasn't a KGR person.

No? What was he?

-He was 8 civilian, I think,

- You never heard anything about his family, his

friends?
No.
But you say he was not a Xud person?

I say I will tell you one thing: They don't have
much gossip on these things. It isi never safe.
So gossip isn't popular, tesides, ‘cach of then
have their own grudge, sort of department, and he
knows very little except gossip, very little gos-
Sip from outside, And so, For instance, maybe

Mr. SVIRIN wasn't in 3 position to know about

this person straight, so he repeated the tiny
scraps he heard.

And that was only that he had a Jewish mother and
a general fer 2 father, but nething about hin.
Everybody, was saying

Nothing... 1 don't Anow.,

“that he was detestable, when he ran away. Ile

tipped Americans... He tipped the Americans
about the microphones and things in the Embassy.

In the Embassy in Moscow?
In Moscow, yes.
But yet, he was not a KGB person?

But you know every Russian who is allowed to see
foreigners is. connected {in some way with the KGS].
You know, a KGB person is considered to be a person
who works at this place, as an oificer, and every-
body else involved is somehow related to the KGB
but not KGB persons themselves.

‘sourcing of this information. All of it except that concerning
Emh sth when he’

to the Soviets imc eke fact of the sicrophones to” Ue aa

authorities

TOP-SECRET

Paar Pan parereeaye

a
~¢


14-06000

e Offdcers

epee

Soviet Journalisy KORG!

. In Getober ]Gtt, Yuli. MOREV, whe Sr oes a Soviet
journalist, offered to write ‘a stery on the life er the family of :
a "Soviet secret ascent" far the french aegetin 3 Match. *** :

- The stery was to cencern NOSENKO'S family and their Tife In Hos- : a4

» Pape

cow since NOSENKO's defection. A short bictstound statement en :
MN hO which KORQLEY haaded, Faris Match editers stated in part:
. "NCSENRLO, dbout 356-38, an of (Tour of the toviet Secret Police, o
“s organitation, defected to the USA without Lis fantiy about two i :

years ago and ashed for polities) asylum in the Ul5.; it was

# The JuINSON Le ai
Part-Vvien -

WAC provided information vi SR tsee Pert Vi.d

is ddseulsed in detail in

a: ave

ae
ee Ce

e5.Ce)e Loe
eee’ Soe Part Lilt. for wore details concerning KONGLAV's ofler
te Paris: Match. an aa mo, on

cf


14-0000

eR oS arsine pregnriegth ot oe . rs tee .. ot care shh

wv
P=
locd

Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important positions in espion-
age and counterespionage departments and also was closely acquainted
with the country's leading ‘tamilies and homes."

granted to him. That was. the most serious defeat ul the Seviet

coro

we re tee me tarde


