1404-10330-10060] , (2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 f***
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15 October 1996

al
mEMoraibum FOR: Assassination Records Review
: Board

FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia)

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the
Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed
below.)

1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position
on the review and declassification of foreign government
information that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has
come to CIA's attention because of the recent review by the JFK
Board of “Australian Tiaison=documents. The Agency believes it is
important to address this issue at_ this time because this is the
first instance that this type of foreign liaisonsdocument has
been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such
information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo
will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a:-United States
Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination -
and declassification of foreign gevernment information jbut will
also address the spécific issue of the six “Australian documents "
- (documents: 104-10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10080,
104-1,)Q32-10081, 104-10009-10222, 104-10009-10224) .

2. (S) Conclusion: CIA does not object to the release of the
information in these six documents, but is only concerned about
protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency
does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the
redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the
tAUStralian Tettérs) the Agency has no authority to unilaterally
agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal
obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign
government prior to declassifying their information. However,
for réasons_described hérein, it—is-not possible to even seek the)

(éonsent of thé “Australians at this time, nor?would it be likely)

ithat. the Australians woWld give it. Rather than going_to, the .._!

‘Australians against its better.judgment or requesting the °
~*~ + oe -

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se rene et TH

CL BY: (2224130. °
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5

DRV FM: LIA 3-82


1300000 tt
. SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

\President to agree tio the unilateral declassification of foreign’)

( government information, - CIA proposes that the release of the | .. 4

_taustralian documents be either _Rostponéd” for a short time or that *->
zai . ; Aerie Mae ee ve earn sek wee
a Subs eitution be made

3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the
declassification and dissemination of foreign government
information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as
Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive
Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including
(1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element
thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the
information and/or the source of the information, are to be held
in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States
pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign
government, or any element thereof, requiring that the
information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in
confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)

4. (U) Foreign government information is subject to a
classification determination under E.0. 12958, section 1.5(c).
When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to
protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O.
requires that foreign government information shall either retain
its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification
that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to
that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id.
at 1.7({e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard
foreign government information under standards that provide a
degree of protection at teast equivalent to that required by the .
originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).

5. (U) Pursuant to his authority as head of the
nae ence community to protect all classified information from
unau rized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has
issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for
the declassification and dissemination of foreign government
information. Intelligence obtained from another government or
from a combined effort with another government, may not be
released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6
attachment -3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that
would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign
countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at c.5.

6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation
between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and
government components is classified SECRET unless a different
classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such
infeamation may be declassified only with the mutual consent of
the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.
DCID 1/10-

2

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13-00000

* SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
(Australia,

ee ae

the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.

DCID _1/10-1.
7.. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of

suchscéordination with foreign governments prior to the release
of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or
for that matter any (USG) agericy fail to coordinate where
required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned
E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has
developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of
coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to
share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed
it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to
the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could
not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government
“information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to
pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.

8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,
CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of foreign
government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to
its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with
another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's
documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to
the public FBI information located in CIA files without
coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority
to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or
information in its files.

en gee
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(ers alia: As two of the documents. |
at issue here are letters from the Australian servicé (104-100095 \.
|. 102247~104-10012-10080)\ CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and
‘ “agreement with the Australie

9. (8) Ccoordination..with A

nS to seek the consent of the

‘Rustralians»prior to their release, even in redacted form. The

Oo —_— cat noire . . . meas ek g RATAN gl permite a RON emt > q acta ‘ .
! assué 6f coordinating with the cAiistralian, servicé.is a timely
tone. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to
i ‘the foreign government and seéking their consent for declas-
sification. However, several events that have occurred in the
last few months depict just how seriouslyéAlstrdlia\considers any
| findication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their .
4 classified information. Based on the incidents described an
wwibelow, it is CIA's position that even asking the ~Australians>for
_onsent to release would threaten the current relationship.

\

L

{ 1

. le Within the last year, a demarche was made by the (Australian nt
\ government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-

Lee

-

aa

sification legislation expressly spell out that no information

\ i
| { provided to the USG by theyAustralian Séxrvicé}be declassified |. .
. wakh®ut its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided

. | for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting N
|_that—this denarche -is-not -between-intelligence_services_but — ~
ee pee EN ee cee en ea fet. . —— a et

3
SECRET


13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

fa WE EE eee Lt yrs
f rather between governments -- it waS literally delivered by Rk
 q the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council ands_| :
ff te the U.S. Ambassador to Austxalia... “he manner in which the
yy Augtralians treated the demarché demonstrates that the a j
y °° Pp ction of classified information is receiving top priority
{ in the Australian government and is not just a concern of . 3
i their intelligence community. S

a TUTE : °
A _p On two recent but’ separate occasions the Australian sevice ~ ~~¥
| passed to CIA information indicating that there would be 4
assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA
-) =<requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but
| the Australians refused. They argued that the information was
ro not specific-enough and would endanger a source. The
/ , Australians stated that if they believed thé’ information was ;
| useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were .
OY concerned that CIA had even asked to pass,on this information,.—
nog) and queStioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to ~ . mt
“|, # share their information with third parties. Finally, they
i stated that the easiest way to protect their information was Ss
4 simply not to..pass it to CIA anymore. a

a = a

48 Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service _ |
\ “approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency
~ employee allegedly_may have disclosed their classified
‘\ information. The Australians believe that this disclosure" 5
id may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources »=————"- '
3 ina country of particular interest to them. The DDCI a bo
Loe promised the head of the Au: Australian service to launch _an : i |
\ investigation into the matter

_ q_imvestigation into the matters
ye THE Australian service recently expressed grave concérn to CIA
. about a book published by~an American USG official which =| ‘
| ' , alludes to a relationship between the CIA and the Australian 3
= service. Even though“this book was not an official CIA are

:; \.. acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians, —
| 3 this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect

ji that relationship. er

-_ 10. (S) Under the. circumstances, it. would be an affront to
me the Australians to be asked for their consent in light of the
yt \Nabove events which have all occurred in the last year. The- -
sAustralians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would ~~ ¥
ycertainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their }
consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the. release of
dbthe nPormation and would be obligated to do all. it_ ‘could to
prevent disclosure. It is cruct#al not only*to CIA's mission but

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SECRET


13-00000

‘ »

ee , SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign. Government Information

| Gaustealis
cise’ to the

also to the conduct _ of US foreign relations that the USG is seen i
i as abiding by its agreements with foreign services aS well as its ph
| own laws on n_the release of information, ee

f ta (s) Finally, the importance of maintaining good _
. relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a
|’*~Fesult of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison

__. _ a aaa mene TTT ae ney

counterparts, thé USG.. receives. a large volume of finished “~“
; imtelligence.. Due to our shrinking resources; much of this
yr information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it 5
-senot provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together “os
._ with the Australians around the world on joint collection a
ff

\, activities that cover the full spectrum of USG.inteTligence

" priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection

(|) efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to _

7, collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely
entirely on. the continued good will of the Australian services to

| provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S.

“{S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the
7 kenge two proposals for the Board's consideration. First-— !
the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a ae
short period (we propose 10 months) at which tint CIA can S|
reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible :
that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that -/
{ it would be possible: to seek their consent for release in full. 7
i, However, should we seéek-the consent of the Australians at a
a future date and the Australians object“fo the release of the j

wen

: {, Gocuments, we would ask-that the Board seriously consider any

its" negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and™

if abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to

{ - coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of

4 Summary: OF the Australian documents for immediate rélease. This

Ss would hide the fact that the letter came from the

| Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the
letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the

ii Australians to seek their consent, which we would havesto do even

Wk in in the case.of redactions. | wale! CT ne eae eee ae per

et Te raglan, Uf ee aes Ene Fo

13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is”

| willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually

| agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any

| approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its
‘obligations and commitments to foreign governments would
seriously undermine the vigorous. and healthy diplomatic as well
\as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.

a ea EO, =
ee aoe arenes °

——Srge (S) With, regard to eo the remaining four do documents (104—

10012-10078, 104- -10012-10079, .104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222, $<

these are CIA documents and with the ‘redactions proposed by “they

ere hn ae Se eon! Ct —_ ad eed

i SECRET

13-00000 |
ws SECRET

SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
Australia:

— : a se

eee

jgovernment . ‘As such, CIA consents to the™ release of these.
aan documents with the redactions proposed. (Pye the Board. . ; i
i 15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to’:
any wkifer foreign government information that may exist in the
| files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to
xequest their consent in the release of their information when it
would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with
| Australia\make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this \
\ . ‘(€ime, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA
believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it
would not be possible to request the consent of the service, cra
- proposes.that the documents. either be postponed from release or
’ that CIA “and Board' s staff coordinate a summary.

val Sa
94 Gouin ‘

John F. Pereira

Attachment

6

SECRET


13-0Q000. . °

Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on US. legislation on declassification.
= <a F aoe —— _ "*

His Was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, / Ambassador Perkins by Philip oy
=o E ee EF

wn eseee . ne
(Roc tfien Director of the Office of National peeemenis CNA in September 1995. ~

This -demarche was also given to-Sandy Berger at,the-National Security Council by
“a

‘Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995. >

4
t,


13-00000

“ "CONFIDENTIAL

AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON
BXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 ——
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

The Australlan government wishes to register fis concern over the 17 Apri

“Order on Classified National Security Information and the apparent omission of any
pt x explicit provision to. protect foreign-sourced information or documentation from
auromatic declassification once it ix over 25 years old.

The Australian governitient unders

improving access to government. information, but aré maintaining provisions to
_ protect forelgn-sourced Information — including U.S, information,

We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign government to the
information or documentation of-another government without pri
‘clearance. Australlan-sourced information was and continues to be pas
government on the understanding that It will be protected. We adopt precisely the
samie approach to information that tho U.S. shares with us.

; sulla f the. Austra &n governnicnt, not
be in keeping with the. 1962: U. S.-Australla General Security: of Info

countries and compromise intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S.
depends in part),

. Australian concerns could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of 4
= {oreign-sourced materlal was embodted in the Information Securlty Oversight Office

= ¥ Implementation directive to U.S. agencies. — :
C — such an approach should not impede or delay the declatstfication process —

“= Austrulia is not seeking this, Por example, catogorics of sensitivity for Au

‘could be identified. A reasonable tlmc Limit could be put on Ausculian response
mé¢_aftéc which the U.S." co free to declassify (we have a sie
; urrangement with the U.K.) ; ; ~~


