12A8e84
104-10336-10034
re ry

[2c 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF vn |

1
SN!

uy

17 September 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ms. Laura Denk
Executive Director, ARRB

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer, HRP/OIM

SUBJECT: CIA-IR-35, Source Identified in RIF Number
104-10151-1-206

1. The following is in response to subject request.

2. Searches were made for information responsive to
subject request and materials were provided for examination
by the ARRB staff. From that examination, staff members
selected a number of documents. Those documents have now
been included within the Lee Harvey Oswald 201 file to be
processed and released to NARA.

3. This concludes the Agency’s action on this request.
If you have any questions, please advise.

J. Barry Ha son

ve

13-00000_,

MEMORANDUM

September 12, 1998

To: Laura Denk
Executive Director
ce: Bob Skwirot
CIA Team Leader

From: Michelle Combs Mirtle Zh

Associate Director for Research and Review

| Subject: CIA-IR-35 Source Identified in RIF 104-10151-10206

In CIA Informal Request for Additional Records and Information CIA-IR-35, the
Review Board requested additional information on a source identified-in RIF number
104-10151-10206 as having given the CIA additional information on Lee and Marina
Oswald and their time in the Soviet Union. At the request of the Review Board, the CIA
searched its compartmented files and databases for additional information on this
source and the raw intelligence information given by this source to the CIA. CIA
provided the source’s 201 file which was examined by the Review Board staff. No
assassination records were designated from this 201 file. CIA also provided sections of
briefing reports, an audiotape, and portions of transcripts of conversations between the
source and interviewers on Lee Harvey Oswald. A final memorandum from this source
was also found to be located in the post-1978 volume of Oswald’s 201 file. All of these
materials were designated as assassination records and will be included in the JFK
Collection at the National Archives.

Given the recentness of the information and the sensitivity of the source, the Review
Board agreed to protect the source’s true name and cryptonym. Documents from this
source are identified as the product of “a yalued American intelligence source who was
a senior, but not general rank, official in the intelligence service (KGB) of the former
USSR; specifically, he served in the Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for
internal counter-intelligence efforts.”

e:\combs \cia-ir35.wpd
File 4.20.1 and 4.20.4

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OIM-98-0084
06 August 1998

MEMORANDUM FOR: (U) Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: (U) Lee S. Strickland
Chief, Information Review Group
Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of [IUDECANTER /Cryptonym

1. (S) The CIA Deputy Executive Director has asked that I
respond to the Assassination Records Review Board (“ARRB” or
“Board”) regarding their current deliberations as to postponement
of certain very limited information in one document To
specifically, the actual cryptonym of a CIA source (jIJDECANTER) .
It is our considered judgment that the release of this’ cryptonym,
in the particular context of the given document (SX-59777 of
15 December 1991), and juxtaposed with the Los Angeles Times
article of 29 December 1997, would provide an identifiable
benefit to the Russian counterintelligence effort and concomitant
damage to US intelligence interests.

2. (S) Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose
and objectives, this memorandum also proposes a substitution of a
fictitious cryptonym (e.g., “TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym
: ITJDECANTER in this or any other document where it appears and
“would otherwise be releasable.

3. (U) As a preliminary matter, I would respectfully ask
the Board and staff to note the classified nature of this
memorandum, to limit access to those individuals properly
cleared, and to return it to Agency representatives at the
conclusion of your deliberations.

4. (S) As the Board is aware, the relevant document has
been released almost in its entirety. The released version
reports that a Soviet official (Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided

CL BY:,0619849 C/IRG/OIM
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Dec! On: X1

Drv From: HUM 4-82

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oo BL (CG) The practice of counterintelligence

SECRET .

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (IJDECANTER }Cryptonym

information to the effect that OSWALD was a KGB source. It
continues by stating that CIA did not believe ZHURAVLEV to be a
credible source. It continues by stating that this CIA
assessment is supported by reporting from another source
(Gidentity redacted but, in fact, LJDECANTER). It concludes by
“Stating that this source’ (LIDECANTERY has had his
fully established [by CIA]." It is this final fact which is
critical to our request. By having released this substantive
information --_ "bona fides established" -- and by otherwise
having (IJDECANTER/ known to the public in true name and crypt, we
must protect the cryptonym here so that the key intelligence

judgment of CIA is not _compromised. oe .

&"(Giy -— and

hence the issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from
four basic questions:

e what information was compromised?

e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the

information?

what understanding of the information did the
service(s) have?

what information did the intelligence service(s)
believe and thus act on to its benefit and to the

detriment of the United States?

6. (C)
be acquired through a combination of confessions,

interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

and four, however,
for both the acquiring intelligence service and the target

intelligence service.

polygraph

7. (S) With further respect to question three, if a

foreign government fully understands the substance (i.e., the

they will be able to exploit the information fully and

import), y
A perfect

the damage will be far beyond the ostensible value.
example of this is the Boyce/Lee espionage case.
compromised was a seemingly innocuous operational | manual for « a

wo _ - oe 7

SECRET

The informatio

"... bona fides:

The first two questions are largely factual and can

Questions three
are the most difficult and the most important

oy)

aS

13-00000

SECRET .

SUBJECT: (S) Protection of (TIDECANTER/Cryptonym

ca it —— _

a Tm -

satellite. What the Soviets were able to deduce was devastating
to American intelligence. The Soviets, based on other
information they had acquired through signals intelligence,
concluded that an imaging satellite they had believed to be non-
operational was in fact operational and actively imaging their
territory. Since the Soviets had believed it was non-
operational, they had taken no countermeasures (i.e.,
concealment) and the US had acquired a treasure trove of
intelligence. Immediately upon learning the true status, they
took extensive countermeasures and invaluable intelligence was
directly and immediately lost.

8. (S) With further respect to question four, we have the
quintessential factor for exploitation. If the foreign service
believes its asset, they act on the information to the detriment
of the United States; if they do not, the United States may
escape damage fully or to some degree. This is the critical
question that a foreign country must answer and it is the

critical information that we must protect vis-a-vis defectors in
our fold.

9. (S) In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by
what the Russian government knows by virtue of their own
knowledge and what they have acquired from the substantially
released document and the Los Angeles Times article. The
Russians. know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER) defected to
the United States; they know or suspect what he told the US; they
know or suspect that we fully understood the import of what he
said; they do not know, however, whether we believed him and thus
incorporated his information into our operational practices and
activities. And it would be critically damaging today to confirm
to the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and allow

them to have the ultimate benefit from what heretofore has been a
US intelligence success.

10. (C) Indeed, as a reference point for this discussion,
we can look briefly to the NOSENKO story. Here, also, the
Russians knew the first three parts of the puzzle. What they did
not know was whether we had accepted his story or not. Indeed,
the CIA did not know the answer for a long period of time and
this lack of knowledge was crippling to our FI effort against the

Soviet Union and our entire CI program for a substantial period
of time.

3

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xy


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SUBJECT:

11.

The CIA to date has released all of the substantive information

relating t
protect hi

SECRET

(S$) Protection of 'IJDECANTER/Cryptonym

(S) In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key. A

o IJDECANTER in this particular document. But we must \,
s cryptonym here, in this particular document, if we 7

are to preclude a substantial CI benefit to the Russian Federal i|
Security Service when they assess this new information in light

of their previous knowledge and acquired information, includin
(of course, information « on the public. record _via the media.

12. ~(S) While the foregoing showing of intelligence damage

is the most critical and legally compelling issue, there are
three additional points of relevance vis-a-vis harm:

J

e First, is foreign relations. In our judgment, the ; a

Russians are fully expect that, after Aldrich Ames, the a
[ United States is considering avenues of reprisal. This Ly
j specific release might well be viewed as a public move a

Nn to embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate.
\\~ tensions. . | a

‘

e Second, is another potential intelligence benefit to

the Russian service. (This specific release could ~- oN

arguably provide ‘them with insights “into our capabality — ~
[tS assess the bona fides of defectors. The Russian |

service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does not 4

| know this. for certain:-~-~~"~

\ cere en ESET FL PSS mee a

e And third, there is an equitable issue. i The CIA has. 7 .\
~

fo never officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a’ deféctor

/, in-our custody~and under our’ control; “thé CIA has \\

'f pledged to protect the relationship; but we agree that

| it is publicly known at least to some degree. However,

| because his wife, child and father remain in Russia

; today, we would urge the Board to be cautious and j
| consider postponement also for this reason. Quite j
i candidly, I can not predict with any certainty. whether..-7/
i the. Russian.government. today would take” action against »
~ _the family from this proposed release. ; But I would

urge caution here since the information at issue is
minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and
arguably harmful to living persons.

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET
SUBJECT: (S$) Protection of {TIDECANTER /Cryptonym
13. (U) I would be pleased to appear before the Board in

person to respond to any particular questions and am hopeful that
this important information can be postponed from public release.

SOS

Lee Strickland

5

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13-00000

. . . Office of
e . . LO}; a Ft
i V1:
"oman a Manage™

SECRET

CIA TALKING POINTS

re Protection of [ “IJDECANTER” Cryptonym
Before the Assassination Récords Review Board (ARRB)

26 Avucust 1998

e The ADDO -- Jim Pavitt -- has asked that I address the Board
on an issue of extreme importance to the Directorate of
Operations and the CIA.

e We request the postponement of certain very limited.
information -in one document ~~ specifically, the actual
cryptonym of a CIA source (jIJUDECANTER) .

e It is our considered judgment that the release of this
cryptonym, in the particular context of the given
document (SX-59777 of 15 December 1991), and juxtaposed
with the Los Angeles Times article of 29 December 1997,
would:

e provide an identifiable benefit to the Russian counter-
intelligence effort,

e result in concomitant damage to US counter- intelligence
interests, and,

*« have a chilling impact on cooperation of current and
prospective intelligence sources given this disclosure which
could be viewed as an official betrayal of confidence.

e Mindful, however, of the Board’s statutory purpose and
objectives, we propose however:

e a substitution of a fictitious cryptonym (e.g.,
“TRUSTED”) for the actual cryptonym |IJDECANTER in this or
any other document where it appears and would otherwise
be releasable, and/or,

CL BY:'0619849 C/IRG/OIM._!
~ CL Reason: 1.5(c)

. Decl On: X17

Drv From: HUM 4-82

SECRET

13-00000

Re Puen TOS
Bac ADU Morera) Oniiy
SECRET Do Rot Rorratiuce

if desired, a textual explanation of the cryptonym in the
nature of a factual description of the source (e.g., “a av Ne
valued American intelligence source who was a senior, but —
not general rank, official in the intelligence service

(KGB) of the former USSR; specifically, he served in the

Second Chief Directorate which was responsible for

internal counter-intelligence efforts.”

As the Board is aware, the relevant document has been released
almost in its entirety.

‘The released version reports that a Soviet official
(Boris ZHURAVLEV) had provided information to the effect
that OSWALD was a KGB source.

It continues by stating that CIA did not believe
ZHURAVLEV to be a credible source.

It continues by stating that this CIA assessmentis—_
supported by | reporting from another source (identity /

i redacted | but, “in fact, TJDECANTER)} .
It concludes by stating that this source (fJ DECAN NFER} has
had his "... bona fides ... fully established [by CIA].

It is this final fact which is critical.

By having released this substantive information -- "bona
fides _ut+ established” -- AND by otherwise having
IJDECANTER known to the public in true name and crypt,
“THEN WE MUST PROTECT the cryptonym here so that the key
intelligence judgment of CIA is not compromised.

I would appreciate a few moments to explain, with I hope some
degree of specificity, why identifiable damage would come from
this disclosure -- the disclosure of the crypt in this

‘ particular instance along with this key intelligence judgment.

2

SECRET

13-00000

. SECRET

The practice of counterintelligence (CI) -- and hence the
issue of damage to national security -- proceeds from four
‘basic questions:

e« what information was compromised?

e what foreign intelligence service(s) received the
information?

e what understanding of the information did the receiving
intelligence service(s) have? ‘

e what information did the receiving intelligence
service(s) believe and thus act on to its benefit and
to the detriment of the other party?

The first two questions are largely factual and can be
acquired through a combination of confessions, polygraph
interviews, and/or assumptions based on access.

Questions three and four, however, are the most difficult and
the most important for both the acquiring intelligence service
and the target intelligence service.

Tae _
Re eegerere cer 7 SE i CREE SSDS 4h RE TT a eo aa a a
a ena aR TAP CCAIR RAN La ore ies Miia a hat BESTE TA a Ae aa anita

ea 2

ie eae as

Question 3 is important (e.g., Boyce Lee case) but is not
really an issue here since the US fully understood the
information presented.

Question 4, however, is the quintessential factor for
exploitation.

e

° If the receiving intelligence service believes its asset
(e.g., a defector), they act on the information to the

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

i . ae

‘1
1

_ e If they do not, the other service may escape damage fully
or to some degree. :

ay

This is the critical question that a foreign country must
answer and it is the critical information that we must
protect vis-a-vis defectors in our fold.

\

fis Oo

Seta

Fi) ae

In the matter at hand, we are very constrained by what the

Russian government knows by virtue of their own knowledge and
what they have acquired from the substantially released Hi
document and the Los Angeles Times article. iy

FOE Tay STE
e

ST lata EV

: e The Russians know that Sergei PAPUSHIN (i.e., IJDECANTER)
defected to the United States; . i
* they know or suspect what he told the US; i
e they know or suspect that we fully understood the import &
of what he said; 4
#
e they do not know, however, whether we believed him and °
:

thus incorporated his information into our operational
practices and activities.

And it would be critically damaging today to confirm to 4
the Russians the final piece of the PAPUSHIN puzzle and ,

allow them to have the ultimate benefit from what oi
heretofore has been a US intelligence success. ;

e In sum, question 4 -- bona fides -- is the CI key.

The CIA to date has released all of the substantive a
information relating to IJDECANTER in this particular #

document.

e But we must protect his cryptonym here, in this H
yoo particular document, if we are to preclude a substantial |
CI benefit to the Russian Federal Security Service when
they assess this new information in light of their

previous knowledge and acquired information, including,

a . ee - | ; oe | ’

SECRET

13-00000

. SECRET

~

4 of course, information on the public record via the J!
media. a

\ _

i _-

e There is additional damage that will accrue from not
officially protecting the identity of | IJDECANTER;

e Any unilateral violation of a clandestine trust has a
devastating, compounding consequence for an intelligence .
organization.

=_ mo
va - a

a “ e It insidiously feeds the concern of other foreign assets

a -- current and past -- who will logically fear that CIA
will acknowledge their own clandestine relationship at
some future point in time.

e Their fear could be sufficient to force them to take
\ self-protective measures (e.g., disengagement by current
, assets or public statements by inactive ones).

e Additionally, such violations of a clandestine trust most
assuredly impact upon the willingness of potential future
assets to establish a clandestine relationship with CIA.
Indeed, we know form experience that this complicates our
ability to obtain critical intelligence, particularly

. against the harder targets (e.g., terrorism).
iN NK , . ee

a SN co ee —

oo

® There are other damages that I will touch only briefly upon in

the interests of the Board’s time. They are not
insignificant, however.

e ONE, .is foreign relations. | _

few In our judgment, the Russians are fully expect that, after
/ Aldrich Ames, the United States is considering avenues of
‘f reprisal.

\ e This specific release might well be viewed as a public move to
embarrass them and it would serve only to exacerbate tensions.

SECRET

ny
‘S,
\

\

13-00000

SECRET

e TWO, is another potential intelligence benefit to the
Russian service. ,
i

amy
eS

Semen cee OPT OTT Tae s PE. Fa RS

The TT PY Spee Beg are Hy tat. leg Lee
eg TP OEE See BU a arti ia oon

This specific release could arguably provide them with insights
into our capability to assess the bona fides of defectors.

The Russian service knows if IJDECANTER was real; the CIA does
Nees . wpot know this” for certain.

. ao et ee
ae aye 8 7

ew eee

° THIRD, is an equitable issue.
a

ow sg la gh ea RT
a.

The CIA ‘has never “officially confirmed that PAPUSHIN was a
oe defector in our custody and under our control;

be , The CIA has pledged to protect the relationship;

ra e While we acknowledge that that it is publicly known at least to

| some degree -- nevertheless his wife, child and father remain

i in Russia today vulnerable to whatever official or unofficial

« ion fhe current government mignee take. _ we
a / Peg ae oa

* Quite candidly, I can not predict with any certainty whether
the Russian government today would take action against the
family from this proposed release.

But I would urge caution here since the information at issue is

minimal, not critical to the public understanding, and arguably
harmful to living persons.

6

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.

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g:\irg_frontoffice\general\lss\arrbijtp.doc
(last modified at 1500 hours, 25 august 1998)

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