Vie 104-10308- (10308-10062. 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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Deputy Chief, WH/SA

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FROM NG ester
Chief of Station, JMWAVE: Wo D£cf Cte

Operat ional/TYPIC/AMLEO aa = oan’
7 thsuccesstul anti ltcation Attempt by M/V ADA{ 9-12 Ma 1964

Zs REQUIRED - REFERENCES

Action Required: None, FYI

References: A. BARR-1606, dated 13 May 1964
B. BARR-1607, dated 13 May 1964
C. WAVE-6458, dated 13 May 1964
D. WAVE-6433, dated 13 May 1964
E. WAVE-6463, dated 13 May 1964
F. BARR-1612, dated 14 May 1964
G. BARR-1614, dated 14 May 1964
H. BARR-1619, dated 15 May 1964
I. UFGA-15986, dated 20 May 1964
J. WAVE-6844, dated 21 May 1964
K. UFKA- 130, dated 14 May 1964

GENERAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION

1. During the past year and a half AMLEO-3 has been placated,
and kept. under control, by the continuous effort of KUBARK to assist
him’ in obtaining asyltim for his wife and family in a third country
diplomatic installation in Cuba, Since the failure of the last
asylum attempt for Mrs, AMLEO-3 in March 1964, as reported in refer-
ence I, and the refusal of Mrs. AMLEO-3 to even consider taking asylum
without advance guarantees of a salvo conducto; AMLEO-3 lost what
little optimism he had remaining for a safe method of bringing his
wife and children out of Cuba, After the failure of the asylum
attempt in March 1964, Mrs, AMLEO-3.again.renewed. her attack upon
AMLEO-3 by phone. and letter, urging him to rescue her by any means
at his disposal, and by her efforts she has successfully convinced him
that his family will escape only if she can arrange an exfiltration
mounted from inside the island, or if AMLEO-3 sends someone to get. her
or comes himself to exfiltrate her and their children. Up until
recently the C/O has been able to persuade AMLEO-3 that undertakings
of this nature were foolhardy unless carried out by trained maritime
assets skilled in clandestine infiltration and exfiltration, and
equipped with the proper vessels and support to carry out the mission

successfully, Now that the KUBARK asylum efforts have been discon- 1
‘tinued, and AMLEO-3 is aware that KUBARK will not sponsor any maritime

aan Cc eee8saea
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| exfiltration attempts to rescue his family, he has decided that he
would prefer to terminate his relationship with KUBARK so that he can
carry out™such exfiitration attempts on his own in a completely
independent manner,

2. Since November 1963, JMWAVE has noted in all AMLEO progress
reports that Mrs. AMLEO-3 was dabbling in exfiltration attempts in-

i side Cuba, and has also successfully managed to pry funds out of
! AMLEO-3 in attempts to buy her way into such efforts. As a result
i AMLEO-3 has Porrowed money from AvSHED=1_and family relatives in the \
L U.S. attemfting to support his wife in these attempts, and is now in :
j debt_to these individuals to the tune o 55;900.00, On 5 May 1964,
AMLEO-3 informed his C/O, that he had recentiy heard from his wife via
the (Japanese diplomatic’ ourier channel) and in her letter she had é

tol im that She planned to participate in an exfiltration attempt ils
wpe anaes

from_inside the he-weekénd oF I0 May I964. AMLEO-3 requested /
the C/O to alert QKMAGNET €6 this attempt, and Said that he expected
to have confirmation of the attempt by 1900 hours on 10 May 1964,
Nothing was heard from AMLEO-3 the night of 10 May 1964, but the fol-
lowing morning, at 0840 hours 11 May 1964, AMLEO-3 contacted the C/O
and-gave him the following information:

"The exfiltration of my family will begin on the night
of 11 May 1964, and the group will consist of some 11
adults and children. They plan to depart from Playa
de Guanabo, between Havana and Matanzas, during the
night of 11 May 1964 and expect to arrive in Key West,
Florida sometime on 12 May 1964,"

| AMLEO-3 claimed he knew nothing about what type of boat the group

‘ planned to USé, nor the exact timé of departure, route the boat woul

follow, etc. It was not until 13 May 1964, that AMLEO-3 mentioned

to Bruce P. VEDDER and Leon C, FLUTEO, during a routine operational

meeting, thajhe had sponsored and masterminded the-ahorted exfiltrattio

operation,_and_that_the- operation -had_heen mounted from the U.S,, and
e C/

a

a er

not ‘from inside the island, as he had previously claimed to th 0.

3. On 14 May 1964, the C/O contacted AMLEO-3 and requested an
explanation of his sponsorship of the exfiltration operation, AMLEO-3
i claimed he no longer felt bound to confide these activities on his
part_to KUBARK,—since KUBARK had refused—to—centinue—its effort to
i rescue his wife and family from Cuba, and furthermore that he would
| ‘+; continue such unilateral exfiltration efforts with or without KUBARK
help until he either rescued his family from Cuba, or died in his
attempts to do so. AMLEO-3 claims he organized the trip of the M/V
ADA by passing himself off as a PBPRIMER, and utilized the following
individuals in the operation.

\ A. Mario REMIS.. probably identical with Mario REMIS-
! CAMEJO, A-12 834 780; PDOB) Havana, Cuba on 6/20/23; who formerly
resided at Calle 130A, #36506, Wajay, Marianao, Havana, Cuba; came
to the U.S. from Cuba in August 1962 departing from Guanabo by small
boat with five other Cuban refugees, AMLEO=-3 claims he used this
} individual as.his-principal organizer in_t pedififon, and REMIS
had agreed to go into Cuba acting’ aS a guide and leader of the group.
REMIS had previously resided in an area close to AMLEO-3's home in
Wajay, Cuba and had agreed to go ‘tq A-3's home and bring his family
gut. . REMIS-did recruit and organize the boat crew, but at the last
minute supposedly was unable to make the trip because “of-other
compitttments and instead turned his responsibilities over to the next

j
|
i
individual Daniel (RODRIGUEZ) Santos,
[

B. Daniel ODRIGUEZ) Santos is the owner of the M/V .
ADA, and brought the boat out from Cuba in his escape in November 1963:
Since REMIS could not make the trip, he and A-3 reportedly briefed
RODRIGUEZ on the location of A-3's home in Wajay, and supplied him
with a recent photograph of Mrs, AMLEO-3 and her children, and AMLEO-3.
wrote a bona fides message in his own handwriting on the back of the ©
photograph ‘and also listed his home address without revealing (he says:

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the true name of his wife, (This photograph was brought back by
RODRIGUEZ and returned to AMLEO-3). RODRIGUEZ then reportedly agreed
to lead the infiltration mission, and personally contact AMLEO-3's
family and the family of Jesus. GOMEZ Calzadilla in Guines, Cuba and
take them to the exfiltration point. RODRIGUEZ also planned to bring
out his fiancee, and the other boat crew members had agreed to bring
out one or two relatives each, the total number of passengers was not
supposed to exceed 15 persons,

C. Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, Romelio LOPEZ Sosa, and
AMBIG-4 yere_recruited by-RODRIGUEZ for the mission, and Supposedly
AMLEO-3 did not have contact with them prior to the mission, nor were
they witting that he was one of the sponsors of the mission. AMBIG~4
was to bring out his father, mother, sister, younger brother, and his
own and LOPEZ's fiancees; BLANCO his wife and daughter; RODRIGUEZ,
his fiancee, and the wives and children of AMLEO-3 and Jesus GOMEZ
Calzadilla. AMLEO-3 has never been informed by his C/O that AMBIG-4
was a KUBARK asset, and AMLEO~3 has never indicated in any way that he
knew AMBIG-4 was a KUBARK asset. Since the boat in question, the M/V
ADA, was not equipped with a radio set, AMBIG~4 was obviously not
desired for use as a radio operator by the group.

4, AMLEO-3 informed the C/O that he had previously warned his
wife that something was to happen the w weekend Of IO May 1964, and that
someone wou @ coming to see her with bona fides from him. ffs.
AMLEG-3 also was instructed to supply this contact man with all the
pesos she had at her disposal, since the infiltrees reportedly were
able to take in only $170.00 worth of pesos with them, SAnce- the
abort of the mission, Mrs, AMLEO-3 has talked to A-3 by phone at least
three times, ‘and she claims no one ever contacted her; that no one
has bothered her since the failure of the mission; and that she is

reported? r control or surveillance by the Cuban an Intelligence
Services,

\

CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF UNSUCCESSFUL EXFILTRATION MISSION OF M/V ‘ADA:
4 May - 8. May 1964

5. During this period the gasoline, food, and other necessities
were purchased along with four sets of green fatigues which the group
bought in a local Army/Navy store. They were also equipped with two
Colt .45 Cal pistols, one P-38 pistol, one Browning automatic .38 Cal
pistol, and 250 rounds of ammunition for the four weapons, These

weapons were taken on the mission for self defense purposes only.
The boat, the M/V ADA, was located at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock
Island, Key West, Florida, 7

9 May 1964

6. On 9 May 1964, at approximately 1800 hours, the M/V ADA
departed from Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock tegen? Key West, Fla for
Cuba, The crew was made up of ee eae Santos, Rogelio LOPEZ
Sosa, Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, and AMBIH-4, The M/V ADA was enroute
fo Cuba “during the remainder of 9 May 1964, and nothing unusual
_reportedly occurred during the voyage.

10 May 1964

7, YThe infiltration crew arrived in Cuba at a point approxi-
mately 4 mile east of Playa Guanabo on 10 May 1964 at 1625 hours.
There was no beach per se at this spot but reefs from 6 to 9 feet high.
They had difficulty mooring the boat because the water was turbulent
at the base of the reefs. In broad daylight, all four went ashore and
walked across the highway 'Via Blanca', There were several empty
trenches between the highway and the coast line, but the group could
detect no vigilance in the area, ‘ LOPEZ was left hidden in the bushes ©
near the highway, while the other three proceeded into Guanabo to

gb meet RODRIGUEZ’ contact. (in the CAC debriefing LOPEZ named one
guile MARTINED as RODRIGUEZ' contact in Guanabo, AMLABEL-1 states he

agxed the name of this contact several times, but Gach time LOPEZ

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maintained that he did not know, AMLEO-3 also refused to tell the
C/O who the inside contact man in Guanabo was for the group. LOPEZ
may have let the name slip during his CAC debriefing, or Piss. fabri-
cated _a-name, )

—_

8. LOPEZ. began to count cars to while away the time. During
the period 1630-1900 hours LOPEZ counted 38 6X6 type trucks with
approximately 50 militia each, all travelling in the direction of
Matanzas, One other truck, containing about 15 negroes and 6 whites,
who LOPEZ states were not Cubans, was observed going in the same
easterly direction, LOPEZ states that the traffic was unusually heavy
in both directions, RODRIGUEZ returned about 1900 and he and LOPEZ
went back to the boat, RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that he had been able to
get transportation for both AMBIG-4 and BLANCO; AMBIG-4 to Quivican and
BLANCO to Artemisa where their respective families are lacated,
RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ took the boat out about a mile, shut off the
engine and went to sleep. (The above information in para 8 is the
version AMLABEL-1 obtained from LOPEZ, )

9. qo t the AMLEO-3 version of this period, again acquired from
LOPEZ, AMLEO=3 reported the following activity: Upon his return to
the boat about 1900 hours, RODRIGUEZ saw LOPEZ and told him to wait
and then RODRIGUEZ returned to Guanabo to see his fiance and reportedly
to establish contact with friends of A-3 in the GOC. A=3 would not
say how these contacts were carried ont, but due to the time factor
it -is assiimed they could only have been done by phone. A-3 claims
the-contacts~were-as- fottiowsy ~

eco acten en eet a a

A. A high level civilian.official of the GOC, with the
‘rank of Comandante probably in MINCONS, who is “willing to collaborate
with the Rebel Army in exile, and willing to furnish their infiltrated
agents with official GOC vehicles to travel anywhere in the provinces
of Havana, Pinar del Rio, or Matanzas in order to carry out their
missions,

B. Some. unnamed. high level Cuban military officers.

the Rebel ena

hem untess they
Beer rere or : ELY.

me. ty _Stron uld prove they had strong outside

e n aC J
backing. “AMLEO-3 stated e would be more than willing to coltab-—
—“Orate with KUBARK in furthering contact with these unnamed individuals

4f_KUBARK—would-support pin in 2 cuture_extiltration to rescue his
family from Cuba. AMLEO-3 refused to provide any further information
relative to these supposed inside contacts of his. AMLEO-3 states
that RODRIGUEZ returned to the boat about 2330 hours on 10 May 1964,
and then he and LOPEZ boarded the boat and went out to sea for the
night, A-3 also stated that LOPEZ told him that at least eight local
fisherman dropped by to look at the boat while it remained at the reef,
and nothing was done to insure the cooperation of the fishermen nor
did LOPEZ attempt to hold them at the spot to prevent their informing
on the infiltration to local security authorities.

11 May 1964

10. After putting out to sea, RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ slept during
the night and awoke the next morning, 11 May, at about 1130 hours.to
find themselves directly across from the city of Matanzas. They
returned to the Guanabo area about 2030 hours. (LOPEZ said the boat
would only do about 4 to 6 knots). They took the boat back close to
the original landing place, waited to see some light signals indi-
cating all was clear, and when they didn't see them they decided to
go in anyway and investigate. When approximately_20_yards_off shore,
they were.fired_upon_by--automatica_weanons and-a—spotlight came on
searching for them, The boat party was not hit by the fire and re-

treated to the-—open sea,

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ll. The boat then travelled east for approximately two to three
miles down the coast from Guanabo, and they attempted to land on the
‘beach again. Due to large rocks and heavy surf they decided-not to
attempt a landing and instead anchored the boat beyond the surf line
(about 30 yards out) and both RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ swam into the beach,

RODRIGUEZ went inland and caught bus to Guanabo, and they went back
to the safehouse of(Paulo MARTINEZ 6 At the safehouse he found the
pickup team of and AMBIG-4, and some 28 people whom they had

acquired as passéngers, These passengers were all relatives of BLANCO
and AMBIG-4, and BLANCO and AMBIG-4 told RODRIGUEZ they had been unable
to locate the homes of Jasus—GOMEZCalzadilia and AMLEO-3 and therefore
had not been able to contact these families. They then returned the
bona fides photos and messages to RODRIGUEZ to take back to AMLEO-3
and GOMEZ. (AMLEO-3 commented bitterly on this point stating that
AMBIG-4 and BLANCO probably went to their own homes first, and after
seeing the number of their relatives who wanted to come, n even
tried.to_find his home nor that of GOMEZ.) RODRIGUEZ, AMBIG-4, and
BLANCO agreed upon another exfiltration point to the east of Guanabo,
and arranged recognition signals, RODRIGUEZ then returned to the boat,
leaving AMBIG-4 and BLANCO to convoy the passengers in three cars to
the exfiltration point. — .
piiiiabmaiasediendian a

12. RODRIGUEZ and LOPEZ arrived at the exfiltration point about
30 minutes after the appointedlour of 2300, and halted the boat about
100 meters offshore, They saw a light on top of the reef at which
point RODRIGUEZ told LOPEZ that the light was the proper signal,
(When asked about the recognition signals, LOPEZ stated that he did no1
know what the exact signals were, but that they involved 2 or 3 lights
and an exchange of names. He maintains that RODRIGUEZ handled all
these details). They brought the boat right up to the reef at which
point they were fired upon from the top of the cliffs from the directic
of the highway. (AMLABEL-1 asked LOPEZ how they had planned to get
women and children down these steep cliffs. LQPEZ replied that the
difficulties.involved.had..not. occurred to_them, By the same token, ©
they had no extra food on board the boat to feed the families, )

13. RODRIGUEZ shouted to LOPEZ to jump overboard to use the
boat as protection against the rifle fire. LOPEZ states that RODRIGUE:
was hit as he jumped overboard, RODRIGUEZ could not swim because of
his shoulder wound. On RODRIGUEZ' command, LOPEZ (who by this time
had RODRIGUEZ around his neck) started to swim toward shore. LOPEZ
decided this avenue of escape was foolish, and turned back toward the
boat, LOPEZ pulled RODRIGUEZ aboard. He then claims that the rifle
(FAL) and machine gun fire was redirected, at this point, in toward
land rather than out to sea toward their b3at. LOPEZ stateS fhat™
this diversion was the only thing which saved them.

14, LOPEZ started the motor and was proceeding north when he
saw the signal lights of 6 or 7 small boats ringed in a semi-circle
in front of his boat. LOPEZ apprised RODRIGUEZ (laid out flat on ‘the
deck) of this new development. Even though bleeding and barely con-
scious RODRIGUEZ asked LOPEZ if he could see the lights of Matanzas
City. LOPEZ said he could. RODRIGUEZ advised him to head toward
Matanzas hugging the coastline, The patrol craft (or fishing boats)
had since extinguished their lights. LOPEZ followed his advice and
several hours later arrived off Matanzas City having eluded the patrol
craft. RODRIGUEZ then told LOPEZ to turn the boat to the left until
the compass showed "N", straighten out and follow that course to Key
West. Three or four of the gas tanks had been pierced by the barrage,
and there was barely enough gas left to make it to Key West. Their
last remaining water tank was also shot up. They arrived at approxi-
mately 1730 hours at Sunset Harbor Marina, Stock Island, Key West,
Fla. on 12 May 1964.

15, Upon arrival in Key West, Fla, RODRIGUEZ was hospitalized
and X-Ray pictures disclosed that the bullet had entered above his
right shouder blade and came out on his right side and penetrated thro
his arm, He had four cracked ribs, and it appeared that his right
lung was not punctured, but there was some blood between his lung and
the pleura @nd the Subject was operated on successfully the morning

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of 13 May 1964, RODRIGUEZ has since been moved to Miami, and is

now hospitalized at Mount Sinai hospital, Miami, Florida, His con-
dition is now satisfactory. i

UFGA-15595 —

AFTER ACTION ‘REPORTS

16. After the abortive exfiltration attempt hy the M/V ADA, .
various relatives of people involved began to receive telephone calls
and telegrams from Cuba reporting on the arrest or safety of various
individwais. The following excerpts were taken from various BARR cabl
and debriefings of .Romelio LOPEZ Sosa and AMLEO-3:

A. On 13 May 1964, AMSWIRL-1 visited Tomas RODRIGUEZ
Fuentes, of 1021 Margaret Street, Key West, former Captain with the
National Police in Havana who had received a telegram from his daughte:
Elsa OLIVERA, at 0920 hours 13 May 1964, (She was supposed to have co
out with BLANCO and AMBIG-4 in the exfiltration). The telegram stated
(English translation) "Congratulations, we are well, love to all,
embrace, Your daughter.'", and supposedly indicated the daughter was
safe. ,

B. On 14 May 1964, AMSWIRI-1 was told by Daniel RODRIGUE'
Santos that Valentin BLANCO, relative of Armando BLANCO Lorenzo, had
received three telegrams from Cuba: the first on 10 May stated
"Armando arrived all is well" ; the second on 11 May stated, "Armando
departed, all is well"; and the third on 13 May stated, "Yesterday's
i cable no good, Armando admitted or hospitalized", meaning Armando

BLANCO had been picked up by Cuban authorities.

C. On 14 May 1964, AMLEO-3 called the C/O and informed
him that the 14 year old son of Mario REMIS (see para 3 A above) had
called his father in Miami at 1130 hours that same date, and told him
he had been arrested along with his mother and some other people while
tryingto leave“Cuiba, and that the police had let the children. free,
but continued €06 hold the adults under arrest. Reportedly only
one car had. been picked up near the exfiltration point, and the people
in the other two cars had supposedly escaped arrest for the time being
As of 23.May 1964, no other information has been reported to KUBARK
on the fate of BLANCO, AMBIG=4, Or _the passeigers who were at the
exfiltration point. = =~

GENERAL COMMENTS ON TRIP OF THE M/V ADA

17. As noted in paragraph 8 of reference J, various operational
inconsistencies still exist in the account submitted above re the
exfiitration trip of the M/V ADA to Cuba, WAVE is of the opinion
that-some—of—these—inconsistenciéS Gan be attributed to genuine con-
fusion of facts by the principal source of information, Rogelio LOPEZ
Sosa, (who did not see the infiltration team of BLANCO and AMBIG-4 ._—
again after their infiltration inland), and the withholding of facts
by_AMLEO-3 who considers_this activity.was_his_own personal bisiness—
and_had nothing to do with KUBARK. Daniel RODRIGUEZ Santos is
probably more knowledgeable of exactly what occurred during the infil-
tration, but due to his illness AMSWIRL-1 was not able to interrogate
him in Key West, and reportedly RODRIGUEZ is still very ill and
KUBARK does not consider it worthwhile to attempt an interrogation
of him at this time. It is also believed that RODRIGUEZ will withholc
information he considers privileged, and it has been noted that
AMLEO-3's principal organizer of the expedition, Ma EMIS, has
peen visiting RODRIGUEZ daily in Mount Sinai hospital in Miami, Fla.
Since the two infiltrees, BLANCO and AMBIG-4, are either under arrest
or in hiding it is doubtful that their inside activities relative to
AMLEO-3's family etc.,, will ever be completely clarified. '

18, As noted in paragraph 9 of reference J, AMLEO-3 continues
to look for methods whereby he may exfiltrate his family from Cuba,
and has reached the point where he is no longer rational in his
reasoning re the risk factors to himself or his family, AMLEO-3 is

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definitely acting out of desperation, and although he does not desire
to burn all his KUBARK bridges behind him, he feels that he must since
KUBARK will not permit him to undertake such activities while under our
control, WAVE's position on the matter has been fully stated in .
paragraph 9 of reference J, On 22 May 1964 WAVE requested BARR to con-
tact AMSWIRL-1 and inform him that KUBARK was desirous of having him
insure that the M/V ADA was not permitted to carry out further family
rescue missions to Cuba at this time.

Ch Cherry ‘4, ii) 20 de 2.

Andrew\K, REUTEMAN

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