178-10004-10053 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
_* JFK Assassination System Date: 8/2 a
~ ; Identification Form
Agency Information
AGENCY: ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER: _ 178-10004-10053
RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION FILE
AGENCY FILENUMBER: MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM:
TO:
TITLE: DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962
DATE: 12/10/1962
PAGES: 3
SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
PFIAB
OPERATION MONGOOSE
MC CONE, JOHN
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
DOCUMENT TYPE: MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 08/03/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

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178-10004-10053
10 December 1962

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD. oo, canoe

SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign intelligence
Advisory Board, 7 December 1962

1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the
Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we
were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the
end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2.16 at 60, 000 feet.
Thére had been some trouble with the 5-58 engines, but all problems were |

soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on

‘the engines, and noted that we had had'75 hours in the air with 18 hours on

the J-58 engine. “He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to
insure that the project was receiving top priority. ‘Dr. Killian asked sf Pratt
and Whitney had their fir st team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the
problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in
Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way. |

2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a a solution to the fuel pump
problem and the DCI commented t that he believed a solution was being reached.
Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working | on an alternative fuel pump. The ©

DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small

4.

as we had hoped for, it was being worked on. a Do
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° _ 3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some
difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordina-
tion. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to ‘review the budgets
of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence
budget was 90% of the over all effort. | He said that he had discussed this with
Secretary McNamara. Dr.’ Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should |
review the whole intelligence budget.. The DCT noted that intelligence in .

Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA
and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only

10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending
935844, 000, 000 on intelligence and CIA only $363; 000, 000. ~ This was an.
increase from $2, 250, 000, 000 ia the past, but Defense had put all reconnais-
sance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did

not believe this was correct, ‘and thought it should be deleted. |

_ 4, . Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the
Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about:$50} 000,000 less than
what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the _
Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to
be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in
NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425,000; 000 versus $405, 000, 000,

. The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381, 000, 000 and taken $20, 000, 0900

for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this

unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point

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from
Gerald R. Ford Library

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Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several |
occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the
MONGOOSE project and how it was setup. He said that after his discussion
with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to
7 utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention “some of. the
activities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing
. sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about.
the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the r next few days,
and that the Russians 5 might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of
explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. ‘Langer asked if it
might n¢ not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so

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because our miliiary forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much

trouble. - a _ Fs _ a
5, Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement.

He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must

: have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively

week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the

appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of

Congress. to whom we were responsible. He noted that CLA could handle the

project more clandestinely, He had discussed this. matter with the Secretary

of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding

$140, 000, 000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance

the money. The Director said that such a.decision cannot be made retro- *

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