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| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

NARA

Church Committee
WH

Schlessinger, Jr.
Kennedy, John F
CIA Reorganization

15

Paper, Textual
Declassified

SANIT ED Mu Ls dolaA Sir

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

f aubmit the following viewa aa one whe worked in OSS during the
war and served as 3 pertadic CIA consultant in the years eince.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very goad. In the
nature of clandestine operations, the triumpha of an intelligence
agency are unknown®; all the public hearg dbout (or ehould hear
about) are ite crrora, But, again tn the nature of the cage, an
agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few
visible errorg. The important thing te recognize today, in my
judgment, i¢ that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has
about used up ite quota. ite margin for future orror fe practically

non-existent, One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably

in US policy, e¢ home aa well as abroad. And, until CIA ie vieibly
reorganized, it will (ae in the Algerian instance} be widely hlamed for
Gevelepmente of which i¢ ic wholly innocent.

The argument of thie memorandum to that CIA's treuble can be traced
to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate;
and that thid autonomy fe due to three main causes: (1) dn inadequate
Gactrine of clandestine operations; (2} an inadequate conception of
the relationship between operations and policy; (3} an inadaquate

«te ahould he «« a gros and repeated Cu failing hae been {its

eccadional réadineda to euccumb to the temptations of favorable
publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operationg were almost
nullified by the Dood of self-congratulatory publicity wiitch followed
them fe. g., the articles by Richsrd and Gladye Harkness, “The
Mysterious Doings of CLA," Saturday Eve Poet, Oct. 30, NN, 6,
1}, 1954). :

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ao
conception of the vetationghip betwen operations and intelligence.

The memorandwn digo suggests ways in which ¢ome of thuse prab-
leme can perhape be allevisted.

1 SIA Autonseny

CIA conducts three main fostan of eeezet work: elesdsotineg fntelite
genee collections cavert political operations; and

pargmilitery
- activities. i carvieg on thege functions with relative autonomy.
‘The vegsone for the sufsnomy are histaricst.

When CIA began, the State Department, atl thinking teo mach to
tezrne of ite traditional migsions in foreign affeiza, iocked an this
new ventore with cuppicion dad tenpunced the epportuaity to ecize
establich any effective eyetem ef clearance far GEA activities: and

come ambascadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA wae up to
in their cousteiee. After 1953 the face that the Sceretary of Stato and
the Divsctor of Content intelligence ware brothers farther cantirmed
GiA's indepandence from eugervisten by State Department deske:

in the meantime, GIA grow in otze and power, Busing the fies it
pantensn ta the quality of

a isege comber of able ani depen winded men, fF
cated batillaat estiviate ta ite evath, tho mare eameatum iso operations
developed, ‘and the greater rote it played tn tie intetation af policy.

By the time that State had begun te he folly aware af the pecbierse
crasted by an active and autvcomoss CIA, tt had tong since minced

tia change to eatanlteh tke wom clttmate ¢ | While State roo
tained @ peevitton aver covert politeat opeyations, thie wse
ca come dagneolloe vy Ca teteney co pees ¢ prope coeraio
é figocer Collection: ant aad ## bad Lot ground ta euch

arene ae over plies porting ad even nto fasteanace of
overt diplomatic 4c 2

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sees,

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For ites part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paral-
leling already existing functions of the State Department, and of ©

the Defense Uepavtment eg well. Today it bas ite own political
deeke and military staffa; it haa in effeet its own foreign services

it has (or hae had) ite own combat forces; it even hae {te ows air
force. its annual budget ie about times that of the State Depart-
ment. The contemporary CIA possesses many ef the characteristics
of a state within a sfate.

I Doctrine

Though GlA's autonomy developed for hiatarical reasons, it hae been

able to endure becauge there ip no doctrine governing our donduct of
clandestine operations, The prublem of doctrine fer CIA te the extent
te which {te various clandestine missions are cormpatibie with a frce
and open society.

It is idle to argue that, boeauss the Communtste can do such-asd-cueh,
we are free to de it tes, Communiom tc 4 creed nurtured in cone

epiracys end -tho whole point of Communist social and potittes! organi- .

sation is to make conspiracy effective, I ‘fighting fire with fire’ means
contracting the freedome traditienally enjoyed by Americane in order
ta give more freedom to CIA, so ene serioualy wiehes to do that. Yet
i do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the Mmits
which the maintenance of an open caciety places on secret activity,
Until thie te dene, CIA's rote will not be clearly defined and under
steed: The problem which must be faced ia; what enet of secret

‘gdtivity is conatctent with the preservation ef a free social order? .

We muet begin. i believe, FF ecg ae ee ae ee ct etnne end
will continue to bs @ ndtica in which politiciane will. ack questions asd
make speeches, reportese will dig out ctertes, newspapera will pub-
Mah editertiale, individuals, dviven by pramptinge of canscience, will
bluse out thinge harmful to the state, and seam, We do not eish to
change these thingé and could net do co without violating the easence
af our aocicty.. pinee tinge make 5p the tn eee edn ee
rust operete,, In hort, they constitute the problem: aad, ae
General Maeahall used to say, "Theve's ug point to fighting the

; protien,"

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&

Thare @ follows from this, i would think, the conclusion that secret
p= B45 g aa the yr. Go ots care Eupt, the

Each form of 6ecret activity presents ite wn problem, Clandestine
inteliigance collection hge been a treditionnl functian of the agtional
otete. He reulee and usages oro fairly well cotabiiehed. In the
orest eapionage, if conducted with discretion. chouwld predext no
Howevee, when conducted with an opse checkbook

great problem.
or4.a broad mandate, even opionage con begin 60 push agaiagt the

ireite of sacest activity in.an open sestety, E concider later, for

- @zamnple, the question of the Controlied Américdn Source {CAG} and

whether the overdo verdoing of GAS te ret beginning to harm other activities

- of the goverament, .

Govert political operations prevent @ trickier probiem. Cccasicns
avige when it fo neceseary to subsidice newopspere, politicians asd
ovganiaations in other cuunteies;, But corruption of the political life
of another netton fe not @ esepensibility te be lightly aasumed. 1%
wonder whether CIA hae not-done tco much of its for the joy of it.
Pazamilitary activicies ¢7eate an even more Gifficult problem, if
oily becsuse the probleme of concealment are eg mach more difficult.

is geneval, I would cuggsat that any cecret operetion whore encoess ta
dependent on the cuppreagion of newa, on lying to Congeesamen and
fournalicts and en the Gaception of the electorate chould be. undertaken
anly when the eeicts te co considerable that the gulns seally ecem to —
outweigh the dteadvanaaue This auggeste that the of tha pros
may be of crucial importance, ‘Sprations oa
' af ancompanying corruption.
the vieibility of the onesation, the more (te euceess epente on
thwartiag the tmpuiees and denying the values-of Gn open society,
the sickier (¢ Becomes, and the more urgent ft ts tat om overwheteaing
ease bo mode for ite neesealty,.

In chort, when confronted with « proposed operation, we must aot only
ask ehethor the operation te technically fenaitis is tte own terme; we
must oak whether tte Gueceda requirns our open aociaty t be in say
cartons way falee to Ke dun Principlogy

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6

Clandestine activities diould te assessed nat ently in the centoxt

of their relationship & an cpen socisty but aldo in the context of their
eelationship to United States foreign palicy.

GIA operations have uot bedn held effeceively subordinate to U.6.
forcign pelicy.

sé collection is, by charter, free from

State Department control. ‘This face expoess Américan foreign poltey

to a woultitude of embarragsemente when CIA ts diecovercd recruiting
agents or developing sources in a feiendly country. Tho receat
Singapor

e case, when CEA, without notice to the Congul General,
tried to subvert e member af the Special Branch af the Singapere -
Police provides en instructive example, After complications of
ludicrous complexity, including an attempt te dubject the recruit to

@ lie-detector test, it turncd out that the recruit had long since
lnformed bio eupertore ef tho CLA approach and wos leading CLA
into a trap which, when aprung, preduced considergbiec embarrass-
mant ¢o relations horusen the Ue Gad the Singapore goverament. |
Théve have been troubles ef a compsrabic sort ta Pakistan and ta
Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationale were emuggied into Sascho
to work in a CIA-NGSA operation. —__

CIA hes eatd that, ia such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Departe
ment ia Washington is agrmally informod of this type of.

in chort, no ene knows haw many potential peehtems for US foreign ;
policy -- and how much patcatias frictian with friendly states -- are
boing created at thiq moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations,
Sugely there ia an aggumest for permitting State to decide whether the
advantage to be gained by the operation ferg,, the information derivable
from an agent within the Special Branch of the Gtegapore Police) eut~
motghe the wish (eoge» exaaperating the local goverament and shaking
ite confidence both in cur purposes and in our senac).. Clendestine
intelligence cperations dhould plainly be cleared both with the Depart.
ment of State and (anve fer exceptional inetances and on agreement of

- the Secretary of State} with the lecal U.3,. Ambastador,

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6.

2. Covert political epesations technically require State
mavence. In practice, however, CLA has often beon

able to seize the initiative in ways which zeduce State's sate almoedt

to that of a rubber atarep.
This has been partly the censequance of the Superior drive and

.gctiviers of CIA perecune!, especially ee compared with the diffidence

of State Bepartment personnel. Yor example, when men come te CIA
with the assignment of developing cavart political campaigne or
organising coupe or prepézing for paramilitary warfare, these mea
naturally fall to work with ingenuity and real; thoy probably feel thet
they ave not earning their pay unless, aay, they organize as many
coups ss possibile. The concept of 'ceatingency planaing’ hse

legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations sul presumably

plenning, ' when carried ta the stage of recruitment end training of
personnel, creates & vosted interest which often transforma contine

project theough (lt £@ exguot) will invite the disappotatmcut and .
alienation of the grdip} a6 the peaacure increases to fellew through
on what had started a9 a pure speculation. This wae a contral facter,

@§ eaurse, inthe Cuban decision «« the fact that distandment of the

Guhan force in Guatemals just ecemed te create too many probleme and
embarresgmente. Haeving entered inte reletiens with peveaaalities in
Sorcign lanés, CA hae sometimes ecemed to feel thet we must there
efter do pretty much what they want -« oy cleo thoy will blow accurity
of oven go over te the Gommuniats. This appreach hag meds us on

_ Seaaaien the prigancee of our cum agents, 3

SWe becoma prisencre of our egente in anuther eause too. The Guban
opieode leaves the atreng impresatien that CLA te nat ablo te control its
own tow-level cperativee,, While the CIA people in Washington are man
of exceptionally high quality. the men attencted te field jobs are same-~
times tough eal aven victous peaplc motivated hy drives cftheirewa
py tnt simies Aart grerenma tiie eenpien ts ay nner Dewey? dow a
af the operatias.. Such actigne. as lecking op the Revolutionary Council,

such enterprises 86 Gpevation 40 in Miams where GIA agente reportedly
trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes os the detention and
third degree reportedly édrministered te De, Rodolf Nodal Tarafa and
46 other democratic Cubané thie Febvuary «- elf theae suggest that things
go on under CIA spentorehip with which CIA in Washington te enky dimly
sequainted..

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ft has meant too that the State Department, oftea cpprtced of an
operation only in ite tater etsges, is under great preesure fo

endorse the operation 46 already mounted beesuse of the alfegad

evi. consequences of exercising avete. i well ramember Tom
Mann's remesk the dey the deciston wes mide to eo dhead on Cubat

. “— would never have favoved initiating thie operations but, since it

- has gone aé far ae it had, f do not think we can risk calling tt off, *
Moreover, at 6 time when there ie Increaging premium on actividm,
State, when it queations CYA operations or initiative, cents itech? in

a priasy. eiasy, segative yoie. The advocate of clandestine activitios

geome "tough! and realistic: the cppanent bao to fevoke guch thiangibivs
eo the réputation of the United States, world public opinion, “What

do wo cay in the United Nations?" etc., ami aecine hopelogely
hicaliatic, legaltetic ond ‘galt. '

the eenuls of GIA's laltiative in covert polfticsd operations hae been
te create altuations which have foveed policy on the State Depavtment.
Thig wag oot the original idea behing CIA. Ao Allon Dulles wrote
. ia hia 1947 memorandum te the Geaate Armed esvicss Cormmitecy,
“Phe Central intelligence Agency should have alfhing to.do with policy. °
Yet, in the yeare since, CLA hae, in effect, ‘made’ golicy in many
parte of the world. A number of governmente stil in power kage
ane a eee eae eee co aos elec factinen waned ho
@ state of mind colenigted to stimulate fetcndly feelings toward the
United Gtatee.. Indenosis, of courag, te @ pene cmanpl ey.

Fils experience ougjette thst the prevent ayotsmn by whlch CiA nasitee
State of & projected covert cperatian te inadequate to protect US
fagereste. There must be some means by whieh State can be tufermed
_ af such operations st an catty enough stage to affect the
ané preliminary plgnning cf the operatiqn: eekse GIA vill cen
oe ontnacs beare eich peopoatiions having punsotias tsapaet ac
faxcign policy but et too lato © point to aubject that tmpect Co eagtone |

hae nearly ee many pacple under odflcial caver $3 make
$900 to 3760, Abous £560 of thaee are wider State Be attr

49061 Docld:32629331 Pane a

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&.

(the other 2200 eve presumably tinder military or other nan-+State
@riginally the uge of State Department covor for _
GIA personnel wae guppaged to be atrictly limited and temporary.

fhe Pulles-Correa-Jackgon report etated in 1948, “The ClA chauid
not use State Department caver aa 3 simple dnawer to all ite probleme,
But should proceed to davelop ite own cutside caver and eventually in
‘hie way and through increased efficiency of ite .overeeas personnel, —
find 6 way to ternper its demands upon the State Department.” None-
-thelesa CIA has staadily increased ite requigitiona for efficial cover.

official cover).

There gre eevoral reasons why CIA has abandoned ite original intentios

of developing systems of private cover.

it io eacies to arranges cover

through State; {¢ is lege azpensive; it ie quicker; it facilitates the
security of operations ae woll as of communications; {¢ insures 3
pleasanter Ufe for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the
CfA encroachment on the traditions? functiqns of State.

tn gome missions, § understand, CAS personnel qutnumbers regular
State Department pereoantl. Is the American Embasey in Vienna,

‘gut of 20 persone Hated in the October 1960 Foreign Service Lict 68
‘being in the Politics! Saction, 16 are CAS pereamels of the 31 efficera
s¢tivities, ovar half gre CAS, Of the
t3 officere listed fa the Political Sectica in our Embaesy tn Chile,

bi are CAE. On the dsy of President Kennedy's Inacguration 47 porcent
of the politica’ cfficere aerving ta United States Embasctes were CAS,
Sometimes the CIA miesion chief has béen in the country tenger, hae
more money at hie digposst, wilds more influence (nd fe abler} than
the Ambassador. Often he bas direct access to the local Prime
BMinister. Sometimes (ae Curing a critical pezied in Lacs} ke purgques
a different palicy from that of the Ambsaeados:. Also he ie gencrally
well known tecally ae the CZA representative.

In the Paste Embasvy today, there are 128 CIA pecpte. GIA ta Paste
hae tong since begun to move inte areas of political reporting
tuternal

licted as ¢

eccupied by State, The CLA men doing

in rep

. Sutnumber ¢hoae in the Embassy'e palitienl section by 1Gs2, GIA bse
oven gought to monapelise cantact with certain French polities! pergonalt. —
tied, among tham the Peeaident of the Netional Agsemity. CLA occupics

the top Alay of the Parte Pauksagy. 6 fact well konwn locally! 428 on

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ve

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the night of the Genesale' revolt ta Algeria, pagtere-by noted
with emugement that the tep fleor wae abinuee with lights. Gam .
informed that Ambaceadar Cavin wae able te decure entrance that
night to the CIA offices only with difficulty. }

CIA ie apparently sow firmly committed to the GAS approach ass
permanent golution for its prohiema. it ts pregzing to have GIA

- people. given the rank of Counselor. Sefore State loses control of

ragte and more of ite presumed overacas peragunsl, and before GAS
becomes p integgated info the Fuveign Service, it would
eeem portant {a} to aggute every ambageador the fizm control
aver the local GAS atatiun norminglly promiced in the NSC Directive

-of January 19, 1961, ond (b} to review the carsdnt CAS altuation with

an eye toe steady reduction of CAS pergannet.
y warfare, i gather, ig cegarded (n some quartere

abmatt no GLA funetian mogy pesultarty dependant on the peliecat

; content than paramilitary waelay

There are savers! reacens fer thie. Pur one thing, a paromilitaey
operation ie An ita nature @ Iavge ené attributable aparation and theechy.

support ef slready extsting gueprilie activities,} For nother, the
monet end political peice of Crest pareanitieasy fatiare $6 Spurs fat

Communiste, when they ctimulate paceeniiitary sctivity, are
dettg @hat the world eupoete from thors wher we do ft, wo appear

te betray our own professed principies and theseiges cannst atlord to

compound Gelinguenty by defeat; BMoreaver, 9a the recent Algerian |
epicede showed, once we egavines the world that wa are committed to 3
engeavor, wo will be bicmed for alk corte of things, And,

paramilitary
Ge the recent teacterseforepriganers eptsade ghowed, when we de cond —
peered a~senshmai WO cGangt lightly write them off and close the

Fhe Communietd, on the other hand, have no cerupics about

| Meaty 6 tenes

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“Khe,
SL Mer ee

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10.

Moveover, guerrilla warfare te fought, much morse than military
men ordinerily realize, in an ideological context. The guorriila

_ suceeede when his prégram enlists gregerodte dupport: and it is

very diffieult indeed to beat Rim whes the countryside t¢ with him.
Van Mook told General Marghall in 1946 not to worry about the
guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 56, 000 men out there
aud will clean the aituatién up in the three months." Marehall,
who had had exparience fighting guerrilla¢ in the Philippines,

‘replied, ‘Ts won't bs eg easy. You will find that they will bleed

you to death." Cypruea and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of over+
coming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of niilitary force.

Serious guerzitle mevementa have been defeated only three times eines
the end of the Second World War: tn Greees, because Tito’e defection

closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. fo

the last two cages tho gusrvilia resistance ended becanse re
.combination of political ang military Gountesensssures. The ctruggic

in Malaya, ae © eld Bas : dey i said}, wae for
the mings: and hanste of tho peeplar it therefore lavolved not only
paramilitary operaticns but 6 vaet educational program, organisation
of trode anions, political reform ang an affor of national independence.
If the guersilials power lice tn hie revoluttemary program, the enéwor |
lies in past tn meeting the nteds which enable the guerrilla to rouse
the countrygide.. “Without a political geal," wrote Mao Tac-tung,
guerrilla wasfare muct fall, a9 tt must {f ice solitiéal objectives do
not ot eotnciéa with the sépiestions of the people and tf their sympathy,
esoperation and agéistance cannct be:gnined,” He added, “De we
want the supgort of the mgeses? Bf we dc, we must go among the
eee Svouso ‘them to activity: concern euvecives with their weal

_ For theee reasons, wastage cannot be considered ad

paremitiary
primarily military weapon, [ te primarily @ political weayon aud
muet therefare be aubfectad to close and careful political qverdight,
i probably ebould be retsined in @ reconstituted CIA rather than
teangloreed to Defends:

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Britigh expottence ight Get be cf value. The nottble feature of the
Britieh tatalligense ayetem ie the determination to Reep clandestine
activiey under atelot Foreign Cfkice control. Thid control ie achieved

in 8 number of waya!

pndhenrsiiieectienanipn-ptaarh-easahteirindiae Arr ttastd

@) Secret Intelligence Service {MiG} iteelf operates under
tho direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which hee a
Foreign Office chisivman (until #ecently Sip Patrick Bean, who
ta now the Britieh cepresentative at the UN) and which includes
the Susvice Intelligence Greeters and reproeantatives of the
Goloniat Offtce and tha Commonwealth Relations Cifice ae well
‘ a9 the Chief of SIS.

rh hosts pabthiet waesane disecttven Are orient ust
Lon a Research

a} working groups under IRD cheferasnehip govern epere-
tlang tn epacial area2, such aa, for example, Sino-faviet rela
slena on the Weeks Youth | Postivils .

e)} a Foreign Offtce Staff Lisicon Officer site next to the S19
Chief, and Foraign Office efficisie cerve toure of duty in S35
ecctiong,

see eoeiaal ta tones Danaeeet nt eledeande «2 & clearance te be

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2.

eatorced by directives, by State Department chatemeanship of
working groups, and by the infiltration of State Depa:
personnel inte the inteligence agency.

Gbviougly this deteup would aot euecead, however, unlees the
State Depgrtraent f were prepared to evercome ite inbred
habite of diffusion, négativiem and delay and to take 6 firm and
parposetal grip on the situation.

iv. ations and Intelligence

the relationahip between operetione aad 2 intelligence vaiace particu-
larly perplexing questions. &‘Iatelligence’ incledes two separable
activities: cigadsetine ¢olfectisas and resesech, analyete ond
evaluation. The firet desta with that smeli portian of raw intelli»
gence procured by secret means (ig. Rullvs datimated in 1947 that _
"a proper analysia of the tateiligence oitatnstio by. . . overt,
normal, and aboveboard mosses. would supply ua with ever 80 percent,
I chould eetiraste, of the information required fer the guidance of cur
national palicy"}: tho eecend tavelves the collation and interpretation
@$ oli ferme of intelitgence, however. obtained and the production of
‘detimetes,

" Under the Beitioh ayétem, clandestine collection ie entrusted to the
Secret Intelligence Services. The research, qnalyete cad ecttrantiog
function te located in the Foratgn Office Rassarch Op

Water the Amoricen gyetery CIA has sesganathility for both
clandestine collection end research ang enalysia;, The Stete Bepart+
men's Bureau of intelligences and Reeearch alee hes ecacaech and
eualyéte secponainitsie’s hut, in practice, CIA hae established
contre! over the machinery for praducing attiondt eatimetes {n ouch
@ way 06 to reduce State's contethution to submitting ita views to CIA
for Becepianes O° ee la cther words, where in Creat Britain
the Feecign Office plays the ceordinating vole in the intelligence field,
in the United States that role hae been asaumed by CLA,

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. The argument againet tucarporating the regcaech and estimate

function in State wae ouide by Dulles in 1947: “Yor the proper
judging of the situation in any fozelgn country {6 ia tmportent that
tofeymation should be processed by an agency whage duty it ie to
weigh facta, and to draw conclusions from those facte, without
baving cither the facte or the conclusions werped by the inevitable

and even proper projudices of the mén whoge duty it ie to determine

policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to
be bitnd to any facte which might tend to prove the policy to be
faulty. "

Brociaely the came Gtgument can be used with equal effect against

he incorporation of the research and estimate function in CLA a.

vee if intelligence ta tad closely ceanected with operations, then
these committed to.6 particular operation wilk tend to acicct out the
intelligesco which validates tho eperaticn,

Obviously both argumsuty conclude in 6 cage for eho entablichment of
a falsty iadepeadeet recessch and estimate greup, But, t tho RAE
group te too independent, ane rune inte the oppesite danger? thet ie,
aria mathee policy nae eperstions will be subjected to adaquate

intelligence checks,
The trouble withthe Coban operation, tor example, ‘wae not chat

the aagumption, for «x p
bad veushod the petab tn Gebo amece @ eucgecetat handing ¢
would preveke upetsings Behind the Haea aad defeetions fram the
RA, ta Dacemher and Febresry, the Offtce of Nations! Estimates

tion-was based, These exiated, in ghost, tthe tients

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14,

that knowledge of the Cuban operation, Gaunted in Miami bare

by any number of lowelevel ggentes in the operdtions branch of CLA,
wad denied to even the top officiate of the intelligence branch. The
Bureau of Intalligence 4nd Research of the Department of State
knew even lega about the Cuban operation.

The problem, ‘then, {a {6 have an R&E group sufficiently independent
ef both policy and opsrations te resist the pressure to make the cace
for vested ideas and intercéts -- yet qufficiently clase to be able to
subject projected operations or policies t to the moat intense and
searching écrutiny.

Whexe could thie group he tacated? If the GIA were ta become
qubordingte to State, 4d bif-G is to the Foreign Office, then the R&B
function might be vested in @ coordinate subagensy, somewhat inde-
pendent of both State and CLA, yet closely connected with beth in day~
teeday operations. The R&E eubagency would receive intelligence
from CLA and from State, 43 well ae from the services and, of course,
fvem public sources. it would represdat, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDE
and State/intéliigance and Research, it might alee take aver certain
of the gervice functiong now confided te CIA <« photographie taterpre-
tation, biographical data, foreten breadcadt monttoring, overt cellec~
tian, mépé, etc.. There might be in addition o Joint Intelligence Board
with representatives from aii the intelligence agencies and with

State Department or White House chatrman,

We. Consiuston,.

The argument of thie memeréadum tenption & fedsly Greetic rearrangee
ment of our present tatelliguace seteup. it alae implies the cagacity

: 6f the ditustion Gnd to do
go in an eifective and purposeful ways 1 the State Department o¢ at
preacnt staffed ig ned copable of ecauming effactive command, thie {s
not, in zy judgment, an argument against 6 ratiengt reorgeniastion of

intelligence. & ig dn Gxgument for a dragtic overhaul of the State
Department.

SECRET


ZT aanet

ec:

RanaTa.3necanane

SECRET
15.

‘The atructure which would meet the criteria suggested in this
memorandum would be é¢ follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general
clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This
might be effectuated on the British mode! by the appointment
of a Deputy Undersccrétary of State for Intelligence, who
would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might
serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2). The Joint Intelligence Board would include repre-
gentatives from all olements in the intelligence Somenunity
and also from the White House.

' 3) The operating branches of tho present CIA would be
reconstituted under gome blameless title (the National Informa-
tion Service}. . This new agency would be charged with responsi-
bility for clandestine callection, for covert political operations
and fer paramilitary activities. 2 would submit projects to the
Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance.

In general, the agency would bear gomewhat the same relations
ehip to State ag the Digsemament Admintstration and ICA
presently do. —

4} A acconé ecentstndopendent. ageucy would be ect w, again
bearing a blamelees title (the Foreign Reeaarch Agency}, coordic
nate with the operations agency. This agcacy would be charged
with responsibility for collation and interpretation. t¢ would

include CIA/DDL, the Bureau of Intelligence ang Recearch in

State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA
(photographic interpretation, tiegraphical files, ferdign broadcast
monitosing, scientific intelligence, mapa, avert collection, ete. },
It might well be located in the CIA building in MoLean.

; Axthue Gehieginger, je.
The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy

Mr. Dungan

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