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178-10004-10056

ASSASSINATION FILES
MISC, ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (9)

Document Information

CIA

DIRECTOR, CIA

[Restricted]

11/14/1962
33

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
CUBA

CIA

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

MEMORANDUM
Top Secret

1B; 1C

Redact
08/04/1993

39

Date:

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178-10004-10056
SCI.

Fees, 14 November 1962
_ THE WaT fisuse asin

MEMORANDUM FUK: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT .  : CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up

in Cuba,

A, The Background

1 July - 16 October 1962

1. The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military
base must have been made by the spring of 1962, and prepara-

| tions within the USSR must ‘have been under way from that ~—
time on, There also must have been planning activities in.

CONTAINS
SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

the "Escalante affair."

Cuba, particularly reconnaissance and survey work... The
only indication of these operations which has so far been
found is a Single intercepted personal message on 11 April
to a RusSian in Cuba who had previously been at the
Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not
judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion » by
itself in current intelligence publications.

2. Thus, until the first evidence of the deployment
began to come in late in July, Washington had no warning
‘of the USSR's intention,
Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet~
Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in
Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in

Intelligence officers dealing with

This attitude was reflected in

reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in
the month, The President's Intelligence Checklist, which

| i will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of.
CIA reporting to the President, Secretaries of State and

Defense, General Taylor,

and McGeorge Bundy, reported on

4 July that Raul was "probably seeking more Soviet military
aid and, specifically, more advanced equipment such as the
MIG-21s_ and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR is
already providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq." The

Checklist of 19 July, however, noted that Raul had left
Moscow without the usual publicity and.communiqué, and

surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit
was unproductive,' (The Central Intelligence Bulletin,
whenever coordination permitted, carried material generally .
Similar to the content of the Checklist.)

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3, The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem
in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62, The Situation
and Prospects in Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962, as
the intelligence foundation.for MONGOOSE, This estimate
Stated that:

a. "By force of circumstances, the USSR is
becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve
and strengthen the Castro regime, The USSR,
however, has avoided any formal commitment to
protect and defend the regime in all contingencies,"

b, "We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will
provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major
independent military operations overseas, We also
believe it unlikely that the Blcc will station in
Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least
for the period of this estimate.” ~

c. "The Soviets...would. almost.certainly
never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's
Sake," but "have sought to create the impression
that Cuba was under the protection of their missile
power..."

d. "We believe that the Blec will continue to
limit its military assistance to Cuba /to defensive
weapons7. Such a policy would not preclude the
provision of. more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-
air missiles, and modern radars, or even the pro-
vision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers..."

Pare

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|B. The Soviet Operation Begins

4, During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships
‘carrying equipment and personnel for. the build-up made
their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in
the period 26-29 July.. Knowledge of some of these move—
ments reached CIA through routine intelligence coverage
of Soviet shipping before the ships reached Cuba. No
particular significance is normally attached to such
voyages. However, evidence gradually accumulated that
the "behavior pattern" of these ships was similar to that
of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that
even greater security measures than usual were in effect,
that a number of the ships were coming from Baltic rather
than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger.
ships, and finally that there was a general movement of
| Bloc. shipping toward Cuba: on an unprecedented scale.

5. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual
activity in any intelligence publication was ‘a note ina
daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal
use, Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet
Ships were en route to Cuba which had declared for other |
destinations, this paper stated on 1 August that "at |
lease some, if not all, of the ships involved probably
are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba."
This statement was in direct contradiction to ‘NS! <i
ment on-the; same information, ive, , that it-tend
corroborate port by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana
(earlier int Htéd=byNSA) that Raul Castro had asked ©
the USSR to take back excess war materiel.

6, CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over inter-"
pretation:of intelligence on the movement of shipping to
Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting dif-
ficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence
Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 August
of the first item on the Cuban build-up in that publica-
tion. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily
Intelligence Summary said that "The high volume or
Shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade
between the USSR and Cuba..." There were further dif-
ficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the
interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-
loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was

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right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a
long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photo-
graphy on deck cargoes and faster service in returning

, these pictures to Washington.

7. The Checklist reported the accumulating informa-
tion fully to the President. On 4 August, it stated
that "Eleven Soviet. ships are on their way to Havana
and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such
a. delivery would not be far short of the total amount
of arms delivered in the‘first half of 1962." On
9 August, it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been

arriving on an unprecedented scale. since mid-July. . Some i

32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe
to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total.
capacity of about 3,000. persons have already arrived.

Some of the personnel are said to.be Soviet technicians,
and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe
there Aare any combat troops among them."

8. The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy
Committee, emphasizing the arrival’ of Soviet military
equipment "and technicians. Two days later, at a MONGOOSE
meeting, he again stressed the importance of this. intel-.
ligence and raised questions as to what purpose was behind
the sudden movement of men and materiel. He said that
the United States must face the possibility of the USSR
locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify
because of US missile bases in places like Italy and
Turkey. .

9. Soviet operations in August involved primarily
the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast
defense missile positions. By the middle of August

CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee
reporting which, while understandably garbled and
fragmentary, enabled analysts to pinpoint areas of con-
struction and identify some of the equipment coming in.
On 18 August, the Checklist reported "There are grounds
for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military
equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be
connected with the beginning of construction of surface-
to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that

the shipments have included quantities of electronic,
transportation and construction €quipment,.some of it
similar to Soviet equipment which showed. up in Indonesia
for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the

arriving Soviets are construction personnel. .'' There were .
further Checklist items along the same line on 23 and 28
August. Le
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C. The July Overflight Program ny
. 10, On 10 Juiy, General Taylor, motivated primarily by
the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chi-
“nese Communist military activities in Fukien, had. asked the
DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activi-
ties. The end-product of this exercise was a series of mem-
oranda dated approximately 16 July from the DD/I to the DCI.
The one on Cuba recommended that U-2 flights over Cuba be
‘continued at their current level of two a month. It cited
inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba
had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of
submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false," and
that "our most important need is for any evidence of the de~
ployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba." This
proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July and
later by the President. © — ,

11. The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized ~
for. August was flown on 5 August, probably just too soon ‘to
detect significant reflections of the Soviet équipment enter—
ing the island at that time. The second mission was orig-
inally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather.
The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly
the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation
with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed
its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mis-
sion was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th,.
held up.for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August.
(See Para 19) . -

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D. Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response ; oe Men

12. On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary
.Rusk's office at which were also present Secretary. McNamara,
Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, Generals Taylor.
and Lemnitzer, and McGeorge Bundy. He told this group that in-
formation available since 10 August indicated the extent of So-
viet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that .
this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installa-
tions or missile sites, probably ground-to-air. The DCI again
raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBMs in
Cuba, and there developed a discussion of possible US courses
- of action in case they did so. It was agreed that the DCI would
fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that
Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would dis-
cuss the situation with the President on 23 August.

. 13.. At the meeting of the 23rd, a number of actions were
decided upon: to deal with what was agreed to be a critical
problem for the United States. These actions were formalized

in NSAM 181. (In addition, the President asked for a continu-
ing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and
equipment in Cuba). Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the
highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet
military development in Cuba, including the: probable es tablish-
ment of surface-to-air. missile sites, and the danger of surface- |
to-surface missiles. Furthermore the President had taken ac-
tion on the intelligence received. There was at this time no.
evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being
installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route
from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the
President and his advisors. a .

14. ‘The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt
with: a) release of information, b) MONGOOSE, -and c) "An anal-~

_. ysis /which7 should be prepared of the probable military, po-

jitical and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba

of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles
which could reach the US." The first two subjects are outside
the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a memorandum
dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/I.
This paper, which had the benefit of preliminary results of the
29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of sur-
face-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet mis-—
Sile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious
threat to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "determined US at-
tack." It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nu-
clear warheads would constitute a very significant military

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threat to the continental US." ‘The memorandum concluded that
introduction of any missiles "will have a substantial political
and psychological impact, while surface- to- surface missiles
would create a condition of great alarm.

“_.. “15, In a memorandum of 27 August, General Carter reported
to Mr. Bundy what actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM.

-181.. He named the officers responsible for the three items
mentioned above and listed the following additional measures;

a. Task Force W was to look into the possibility of
removing restrictions on mounting clandestine operations out
of Guantanamo. ;

b.. The Board of National Estimates was to establish
a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and
types of Communist. Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and
types. of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construc-
tion, particularly missile sites.

” ec. The Board ° was: also- to assess the physical and
psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile
installations in Cuba. (The two Board actions, which were
later synthesized in the paper which eventually appeared on
19 September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by
the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August) .

. d. CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily
‘ paper on Cuba , including current intelligence, estimative as-
-sessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to the
President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemitzér, Rusk, Taylor,
and Robert Kennedy. (This paper, the Cuban Highlights memoran—
dum, was issued by CIA beginning 27 August, uSing a philosophy
and format Similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials
were later added to its distribution. It was discontinued on |'
19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded
that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban re—
porting in regular intelligence publications). ,

e. CIA would arrange intelligence collection over-
flights "as frequently as the situation demands." (The results
of this action make up the central theme of this paper.)

£. Task Force W was to prepare a plan of operations:
for MONGOOSE B Plus.

16. The minutes of USIB show that at its next meeting,

29 August, Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military build-
up in Cuba, to be submitted to USIB at its next regular meeting.

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Presumably lr. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181,
In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum
already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts
of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly over-
,taken by the photography which became available after 29 August.
At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write

it were deferred until the new information could be digested,
This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19
September, Its substance will be discussed later. (See Paras,
26-29) . aan :

17. Also at the 29 August USIB. meeting, two other perti-
nent subjects were discussed. First, General Carter and Mr.
Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey

and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see
para. 6). Second, General Carter informed the Board that he

had two days earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possi-
bility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft

and that Lemnitzer had replied that something "could be dug up."
The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction
telephoned from out of town by the DCI, who was concerned over
the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather. (The DCI
departed Washington on leavevon 23 August, went first to the
West Coast, left the country on 30 August for the Riviera, and
returned to Washington on 23 September.) On 30 August Lemnitzer
told the Special Group of this discussion with General Carter,
The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it
"when specific targets and information needs could be identified,"

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-E, Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase)

18. During the last week in August, CIA continued to
follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping
. information, communications intelligence, and agent and
“refugee sources, The Checklist of 29 August reported that:

"There is no Sign of a let-up in the movement
of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.

"By latest count, there have during the
past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban
ports by Bloc vessels and 20- 35 by ships
under Communist charter. ;

"We note that deliveries of industrial
equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary
items are being made largely on chartered
Western ships, probably because so many
Soviet ships are involved in hauling military
gear."

19, The first hard evidence « on what the Soviets were
up to in Cuba was provided by photography of the 29 August
mission, The President was told, in the Checklist of
31 August that: ~—

“preliminary information from the 30 fSic7 August
U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the .
western half of the island. Manning of this many
sites would require some 1500-2000. Bloc troops. We
are able to report on the basis of what is known so
far that construction of the sites appears to be
fairly advanced and that there are canvas—covered
missiles in the vicinity of some sites, The existence
of additional sites can probably be assumed,

"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet
missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined
number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet
tanks for some time, but this is our first indica-
tion that they now have boats of this type. They
appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting .
two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated
range of 35 nautical miles." —

After further analysis this information appeared in the
Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September. On the 4th
and 5th, General Carter briefed a number of congressional
leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed
Services Committees. In a White House statement, also of
4 September, the President publicly confirmed the presence
of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats,

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20. The 29 August mission had confirmed the establish—
ment of a misSile defense of Western Cuba, The first mission
for September (of the two which had been authorized as a

_routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July; see para 10)
was flown on Schedule on 5 September and revealed similar
defenses in Las Villas Province. In retrospect, it can be
seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded the areas
in. which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned,
Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September
missions, however, gave no recognizable evidence that any
such construction was then.under way (although re-examination ©
showed a few vehicles and some construction material at. .
Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August). In fact, there was probably
no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the'time (see
discussion in paras, 36-39). .

91. More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had,
by about 6 September, led CIA analysts to suspect the presence

of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface-- ~

at Banes, on the northeastern coast. General Carter so-°
informed the President and the Secretaries of State and
Defense on 6 September. No equivalent of such a weapon had
heen identified in the USSR in earlier U-2 photography.
Lacking such background, further information and study were
necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the
missiles. Programs for both were set in motion,

_... 22, .COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State,

on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnais—
sance:of Banes. The next day, General Carter in a memorandum
to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions,
(including Special Group approval) to provide for the employ-
ment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type

- reconnaissance” against the cruise-missile site at Banes.

At the Special Group meeting of 14 September, a JCS repre-
sentative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of

' certain targets in Cuba; hewever, the Secretary of Defense
was recorded-.as not wanting the operation considered further
until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets .
were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been ,
overtaken by the decision. on U-2 coverage taken on 10
September (see paras 24-25).. Meanwhile, further analysis

of the 5 September photography had resulted in a. CIA study
dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the
Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense
missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central
Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September. _ ~

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. 23; One additional item was picked up by the 5 September
mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara
airfield, along with several others still in crates, This
was not reported by CIA in the Checklist, but was reported in
‘the Central intelligence Bulletin or 8 September, © Actually,
‘these MiG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs)
had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet. ship
which had been photographed en route, but the, photographs were
not received in Washington for several weeks, Upon the —
arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying
MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the Central intelli—
gence Bulletin of 27 September~-with DIA withholding con-
currence (see para. 6)--that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had
been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported
in the Checklist of 27 September. — oo:

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F, -The New Overflight Program

24. The results of the 29 August and 5 September mis-
sions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites, led to
‘a full review of the overflight program for Cuba. This took |
“place in the White House on 10 September. Among those pre-
sent were Mr. Rusk, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
General Carter, and General Lansdale. The decisions of this
meeting are crucial to the record, and some discussion of ——
the atmosphere in which they were taken is required. There
were three major factors:: 3
a. On 30 August, a SAC U-2 had overflown Sakhalin
Island. The USSR had protested on 4 September, the US had ~
acknowledged the overfiight, and the incident has received
major play in the world press. This had been followed on 8
September by the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist
China, accompanied by even greater publicity. As a result,
most of the participants were--to varying degrees—-reluctant
to chance another U-2 incident at this time. ‘This meant.
that they were naturally hesitant to authorize any flights.
over areas where SA-2s might be operational.

‘ b. Second, there is no record that the MRBM
problem was discussed. The hard intelligence gathered

so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was

still up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense
‘of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required.

The establishment of SA-2s and. other advanced defensive
systems had: been foreseen in the NIE of 1 August -and

‘their probable arrival had peen fully reported during the
intervening period. Hence confirmation came not as a shock,
but as. a problem to be dealt with deliberately. (it may
even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by
the President's decisions of 23 August, the known usually
being less alarming than the unknown.) The participants
therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic
coverage of the rest of Cuba, from which the full story of
what the USSR had put into the island could be developed..
They felt no immediate need fer re-coverage of the areas
covered by the two previous missions.

c. Finally, the participants were operating in
the atmosphere of the time. The Cubans had been claiming
that U.S. invasion was imminent. The Soviet diplomatic
and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention

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on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year,
thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would not
come until after the US election. In fact, the USSR in its .
statement of the following day (11 September) on Cuba stated
this explicitly. There were vague hints of Khrushchev's in-
tent to attend the UNGA in New York. Khrushchev appears now
to have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behind
which to carry out the deployment of strategic forces into

Cuba, but those present at the meeting of 10 September did

not have the benefit of. this hindsight. Furthermore, they

must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially

the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Admin-
istration in the election campaign then beginning. ;

25. At the meeting, the Secretary of State objected to
the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the
remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5
September missions. He insisted, instead, that coverage of.
the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights
over: international waters would not be combined with over-
flights of Cuban territory. To meet his’ wishes, the program
was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peri-

‘ pheral. One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and

the other over the part of Cuba east of 77° West to cover.
Guantanamo and Banes. One peripheral flight was to cover

.the north coast of eastern Cuba, the other the South coast.

The overflights would be quick "in-and-out" operations, while
all four were to be designed for maximun safety. (There.
is apparently no written record that a decision was made not
to fly over known SA-2 sites, but in obtaining approval for
the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they
did ‘not do so.) Later the DCI negotiated with the Depart-
ment of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mis-
sion over the Bay of Pigs area of. Cuba proper. The Presi-
dent’ approved this program, authorizing three flights in
September in addition to the one remaining of the normal
September allocation (Special Group action of 19 July).
Thus, the record shows that the President authorized every-
thing the Special Group requested.

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G. SNIE 85-3-62

26. The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was
also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of
SNIE 85-3-62, The Military Build-up in Cuba, passed by USIB
on 19 September, This estimate, which was generated by the
issuance of NSAM 181, must be viewed as a symptom of the state
of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington gen-
erally during.the first half of September. There were no dis-
sents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final
draft. Its key findings are as follows:

-a. "We believe that the USSR-values its position in
Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from
it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build-
up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against
what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that
the US.may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it..
The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhanc-
ing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet.
military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recog—
nize .that the development of an offensive military base in
Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat
their present purpose." ;

b. “The Soviets themselves are probably still uncer-
tain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed
they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions
as they go along." - So

--e. “As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted
to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive
in purpose but of a more 'offensive' character: e.g., light bomb-
ers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-
surface missiles...."

* ‘d, “However, they are well aware that the question of
offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a
major political issue.”

; e. "The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear
striking forces which would be used against the US would be in-
compatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It
would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level

of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed. thus
far...However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly

considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the

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Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility
and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. There-
fore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though ©
it would run counter to current Soviet policy."

f. “Soviet planners might see some utility in deploy-
ing MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited
number of ICBMS now believed to be operational in the USSR and
to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched misSiles."

— g. "The establishment on Cuban Soil of a significant
strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp de-
parture from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far

not been installed even in Satellite territory...The Soviets
might think that the political effect of defying the US by sta-
tioning Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position
would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it, How-

ever, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not -

be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction."

h.. "Although the Soviets may see some military advan-—
tages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be ;
great and the political implications would run counter to the |
kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America.

They do not. propose to win the region for communism by military
conquest, They count instead on a process of political action....'

27. In commenting on these statements it must first be rec-
ognized that the judgment’on the degree of risk which the USSR
was willing to accept was gravely in error. It should also be
recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support
of this judgment; deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear
weapons outside the USSR was without precedent. Further, while
the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in
the period 7-15 September, (see para. 37) the first reports from
ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington -
by 19 September; there was no evidence available that MRBMS were
on the way. What the estimate failed to do, however, was to give
adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were mov-
ing and.to the great probability that the new installations were
manned by Soviet personnel, The community was still thinking in
terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid pro-
grams for the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in
the 1960-62 period) when there was already good evidence that
the Cuban program had departed from this pattern. ;

- 28, Moreover, the Indonesian program too had broken the
pattern only a month before, when the USSR showed itself will-
ing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the .

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sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet
interests. The original contracts for Indonesia had been
‘roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq. They included
14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARS, 26 TU-l6s (12 equipped with air-to-
surface missiles) and 12 submarines, all to be manned by In~
-donesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the re~
quired training of personnel, However, as the crisis over
West New Guinea approached its climax of. August, Soviet eager-
ness to embroil the Indonesians in. open warfare with the. Dutch
led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the
use of Soviet personnel to operate some of the weapons being
provided. Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually con-.
ducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command. Thus by
mid-August. the USSR had shown itself willing to take some risk
-of military engagement with an ally of the United States, al-
-beit the degree of risk involved -was far less than in the Cu-~
ban venture.

“99. For the record, there is no evidence that the ex-

-..-igtence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting, influence on later de-

cisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argu-
ment against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current
intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the
estimative process and provides a check on the continuing val-
' idity of standing estimates.

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H. Views of the DCI

30. The only available record of dissent from the
judgments made in Washington during the first half of
‘September, both estimative and operational, is that of the
DCI himself, who, although vacationing on the Riviera, was
kept informed by CIA cable, On 7 September, he cabled
General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions
and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet
short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in
Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US
and possibly Caribbean areas," On 10 September, the DCT
‘again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive
costly defenses being established in Cuba...appears to me
‘quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of
ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs
to be installed by Soviets after. present phase completed and
country secured from overflights, Suggest Board of National
Estimates study motives...." (The Board's response is in
effect contained in SNIE 85-3.) BO °

31. On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI
repeated these premonitions. In the latter cable he added.
‘"Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe
CIA and. community must keep Government informed of danger
of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps
possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system
operative." Finally, on 20 September, the DCI expressed
reservations on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3, which had.
“peen cabled to him, saying "as an alternative I can see that
an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with
most. important and effective trading position in connection
with all other critical areas and hence they might take
“unexpected risks in order to establish such a position,"
These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of
National Estimates,

32. AS a result of the DCI's pressure there was a
renewed examination of other methods of. reconnaissance of
Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was
in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment
of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible,
with the implicit thought that only at this point would the
Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs.)

On 19 September, at USIB, General Carter stated his desire
to use RF-101s over Cuba. He also said he thought use of
the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special

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Group, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in’
Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the |
point of decision was reached.""' The Special Group at its
next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY

,and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for -

“its use. (No FIREFLY missions have yet been attempted.)

33, Another attempt during this period to get addi-
tional coverage was the programming of ‘KEYHOLE Mission
9045 (29 September - 2 October) to photograph Cuba. The.

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results were unsatisfactory, largely because of cloud cover,

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I, CIA Reporting during September

34, The progresSive uncovering of-the Soviet program in
Cuba: was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence.
‘Pertinent samples from the Checklist are; .

a, "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at
12, but the likelihood that others are under con-
struction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to
the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations.”
(14 September) _

b. "A message interceptedyesterday on a net
serving Soviet forces in Germany called for ‘volunteers
for the protection of Cuba,' We are not sure of the |
weight to be placed on this and another iiitertept: ——
referring to the isolation of ‘volunteers.’ If valid,

_ they. would suggest that the influx of Soviet military
personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating
further." (15 September) ;

c. "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger
vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise
our estimate of technicians on the scene to about
4,200, We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence
foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey
Province." (18 September)

@. "The interception onsvs"Séptembermoftia signal
from 2 missile-associated radar, probably coming. from
the surface-to-air missile. site at Mariel, suggests
that the site is or soon will be operational.
° "The message asking for volunteers for service
in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped
up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that
a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on.

There is no indication yet of the numbers involved."
(19 September)

e, “Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's
canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve
in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen
anything like it before,
. "The move. may be purely administrative: to
replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with:
others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand,
it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel -
in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely
to be engaged in cembat. We are trying to get a better |

answer,"' (21 September) a
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£. "Our running account of the number of Soviet
dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-
July is now over 100. About 85 of ‘these probably were
carrying military hardware. oo
a . “The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered
_-«~ Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by
today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's
city limits is out of bounds except. by special per-.
mission," (27 September)

35, During this peried General Carter, at the President's
jnstructions, briefed General Eisenhower on the Cuban sSitua-—
tion on 10 September. On 12 September he briefed the House.
Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees, Although out
of time sequence, it Should also be noted here, because the -
information presented was essentially more of the same, that
the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and
Congressman Cannon on 9 October.

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J, The Soviet Offensive Deployment

36. At this point, it is necessary to retrace a few
ssteps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba.
Examination of information now available makes it possible
to outline with a fair degree of confidence a time-table of
the Soviet program which is generally consistent. from site
to site. This begins with the construction of SAM defenses,
first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay, then in
central Cuba around Sagua la Grande and. Remedios, finally in.

the rest of the island. Next, in each case, comes the eviction

of local inhabitants at each site, road improvement, and the
establishment of restricted construction areas. Finally —
comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what
appears a carefully prepared schedule. Apparently, no recog——
nizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBM sites and no.
major construction was. begun at the IRBM sites until at least
two weeks after the last 0-2 overflight of the area and until
the US had publicly. acknowledged the presence. of SA-2 sites

in Cuba. ; Oo _

37. The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM
sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR
on the ship Omsk, which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September.
A second shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on
15 September. This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by
truck at night, with the first convoys probably arriving at
the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the
earliest date at which photography might have detected the
first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal.

38. Construction equipment and material for the
Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about —
mid-August, minor activity of an indefinite type was noted
there in the 29 August photography, and major construction
had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that ship-_
ments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal
reflects the longer lead-time required for construction of
a fixed site). It is not possible to say how soon after: .
15 September the activity might have been recognizable from
the air as an IRBM site. ;

39, The sites in Las Villas Province were established
on 2 slightly later, but similar, time scale. Equipment
for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed
at Casilda, on the south coast. The most likely ship to
have carried the large items is the Kimovsk, which docked

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there on 22 September. This equipment must. have moved to
the site during the last week of September, and was probably
detectable from photography after 1 October. The Remedios
_IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule,
but also about two weeks behind. . Photography of 5 September
‘was negative, but road improvement began shortly thereafter,
cand aflow of construction material from the port of Isabela,
on- the north coast, began. The estimated date for the be-
ginning of major construction is about 1 October. Again

the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photo-
‘graphic signature is not determinable. ;

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40, Although the sites themselves. were closed to ground
observation, the movement of equipment to them from the ports
. was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals
who later fled. to. the US. The agents reported this informa—
tion as soon as they were able, but in most cases had to de—
pend on secret writing for communication. Hence, there was a
lag of several days at least before their information became
‘available. Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer
for other, and uncontrollable, reasons--the time of the Jin-
-dividual's decision to leave Cuba, his discovery of means for.
doing so, and his delivery to an interrogation center. Many
of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construc-
tion activity. Many of them, because of the time-lags noted
above, did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October,
and some are still coming in. ;

41. Nevertheless, by-about 1 October, the San Cristobal
‘area had. been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic .
confirmation had been requested. This represents a consider-
able technical achievement.. To understand why, it is again
necessary to back-track in time. Since the moment of Castro's
triumphal march into Havana, the Intelligence Community had
been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and mis-
sile installations in Cuba. There were several hundred such
reports, claiming the presence of everything from small arms
to ICBMs, before August 1960, i.e., before the USSR had sup—
plied Cuba with any weapons at all. More specifically, CIA's
files contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not include
press items) on missile and missilé-associated activity in
Cuba before 1 Jan 1962. All of these were either totally
false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of
activity. CIf analysts had naturally come to view all such
reports with a high degree of suspicion. ;

42. On 15 February 1962 an interagency interrogation center
was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cu-
ban refugees and improv2the quality of intelligence collected
from them. It waS manned by trained bilingual interrogators
from the armed services and CIA. The establishment of Opa Locka
coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity re-
ceived in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet
buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very
rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equip-
ment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the se-
curity precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation.
(Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in

para 9). |
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_ 43, For the better part of two years, CIA had been check-
ing information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent
sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the informa—
tion was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial
‘reconnaissance. In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of
“formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba)

in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photogra-
phic-coverage. In the 7 issues of this publication between 31

May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it

_ for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity

_ which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise mis-

Sile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated those three.

44, When the first indications of build-up began to come
in in August,xthese procedures were further tightened. CIA
current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office

on about 14 August not to publish any information on the con-
struction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked
out with NPIC. (This instruction was in the field of intelli-
gence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to.
later restrictions; (see para 50). Between 14 August and mid-
October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check
on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought
‘to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A
great many more such reporis were checked with NPIC informally —
by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary
coverage or made a negative finding.

_. .. 45. On 20 August, the COMOR Targeting Working Group
(chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first compre-
hensive card file system for Cuban targets. An example of its
procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande
area. Based on refugee reporting, the COMOR Targeting Working
Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as sus-
pect missile sites. Readout of the 29 August coverage showed
an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis
for the reported activity there, and the target card was changed
to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that know-
ledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to
misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of
the SAM development,but in fact no such reports were received.

. 46. By September, the volume of agent and refugee report-
ing had become very large indeed. During the month 8&2 re-
ports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclu-
sive of telegraphic dissemination, (The CIA clandestine col-
lectors report that their output represented only the small pub-
lishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial

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proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive mis-
siles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the :
analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the
normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in tell-
‘ing an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw
-a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment
when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, .however,
recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM
equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action
upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another
location where alleged missile activity should be negated by
photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.

47. This process took about three weeks, from the date
when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to
the preparation of the target card. The two reports from Opa
Locka which triggered it were: ~ .

— a. An observation in Havana on 12 September of a
convoy. carrying, long canvas-covered objects which the source
identified under interrogation as resembling ss-4s. This re—-
port, which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September, contained.
sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts. —

b. An observation on 17 September of a convoy mov-
ing toward the San Cristobal area. This information, received
on 27 September, dovetailed’ in many respects with the earlier
report, :

48, The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts
to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in. fact
seen’ the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the
ss-4 identification. being genuine. A day or so earlier, a -
target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis
of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now
this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above
and other less specific information on activity in this area
which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared _
between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority require-
ment for photographic coverage. This card was used in the
targeting of the 14 October flight (see para 63). It read as
follows: "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a re-
stricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of
including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4
Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the follow-
ing four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego
del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); and
Las Pozos (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area deli-
neated for possible surface missile construction, with parti-
cular attention to SS-4 Shyster." ,

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49, Ar.<ther renort, too general to be used in the process

described o7ve, is nevertheless of interest as the first good
_ information distributed on the Soviet offensive build-up. On —
20 September, CIA disseminated an agent report that Castro's
personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, had said on 9 September "We
‘have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface
and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers,,
sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as
far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for inter~—
mediate range rockets” ~~ cht ole : .

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L. ‘Limitations on Publications

50. At some point, probably just after 27 September, an
item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might
‘have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It
could not be written because there was an injunction not to do
so. By the time that hard information began to come in early
in September, the USIB principals had become acutely conscious
of the distinction publicly made by the President between of-
fensive and defensive weapons in Cuba. . Aware that they were
dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that
"leakage" of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false, -
‘would seriously Limit the President's freedom of action in deal-
‘ing with what might become a major international crisis, they
had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such infor-
‘mation. Analysis would continue and senior policy officials
would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intel- |
ligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals.
These instructions were first issued orally, and later (on 11
October) formalized by USIB in the 'PSALM" system (X-Ray Funnel
for SIGINT). The key passages in USIB's order were: "Such
information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each
USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on“an™ ©
EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as ad-
visers to the President have a need to know," and "There is no
intent hereby, however’, to inhibit the essential analytic pro-
cess." oO

-§1, It should also be noted that the order not to publish
‘anything on missile sites without NPIC:’ corroboration (Para 44)
had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on re-

porting in late September and October if the other ban had not
been in effect is difficult to determine. , ;

52. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist,
but the Checklist writers drew for their Cuban information
largely on the Cuban Daily Summary, a compendium of reporting
on Cuba published by CIA. Since the Summary was affected by.
the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume
of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting -
the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons.

53. Moreover, neither’ the Checklist group, nor any other
current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a
Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had
been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President
and his advisors more than a month earlier (See Para 13). In
other words the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by

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time and bureaucratic process that it.reached the working level
only in the form of SNIE 85-3, which held that establishment of
such a base waS most improbable. (See, however, para 29)

54, It is difficult to say whether information from ground
‘sources would have been published had there not been a blanket
injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the
potential political impact of the reports they were receiving;
this would not have influenced them against publication, but
would have made thé.i want to be doubly sure, especially on a.
subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana. In.
addition, rigid ce partmentation was maintained between the
COMOP.-Special Gro» organization responsible for collection and
the intelligence somponents responsible for analysis. - Few, if
‘any, CIA analysts vorking on the Cuban problem even - had IDEALIST
clearances. AS & result, they did not know that no overflights
of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September
program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had. ~
no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had
requested would not be Soon forthcoming, and they might well have
delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.. .

55. Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunc-
tion against publication had not existed there would have. been
some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary,
which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite pos—
sible--but by no means certain--that they would then have been
picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they
would have survived the coordination process for the Central In-
telligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have
‘Tearned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal
slightly more than a week before he apparently did.

56. In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their
duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic cover-
‘age, but no word of their concern over activity in this area
had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly
probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at
its meeting on 9 October, when (see para. 63) it ordered a U-2
mission which covered the area. .

57. The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correla-
tion of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be
attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative
structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was de-
signed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper
work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back
into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR. They
were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnais-
Sance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as
that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact,
after readout of the 14 October mission they were. jettisoned.

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M. Progress of the September Overflight Program’ Oe GEES

58.- While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and
the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba,
_the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 Septem—
ber was being pushed forward. Unfortunately, this program
was seriously delayed by bad weather. Not until 26 September
could the first successful mission be flown, over Banes and
Guantanamo. (A mission was flown on 17 September but its
targets were completely cloud-covered) On 27 and 28 Septem—
ber the weather was bad again, but on the 29th the Isle of
Pines - Bay of Pigs mission was successfully flown. The
weather again turned bad until 5 October, when the south >
coast peripheral mission. was accomplished. The next day,
the north coast peripheral mission aborted, but was success-
fully completed. on 7 October. Se

59. Thus, completion of the September program took 26
days, from 12 September--the earliest date on which missions
approved on the 10th could have been flown--through 7 October.
On 20 of these days weather was bad over the areas not yet —
overflown (the criterion for launch was a forecast of less.
than 25 percent cloud cover). On four days successful mis~—
sions were flown. On one day a mission was launched but
aborted, and one day was used to alert a mission which was
launched the following day. Availability of aircraft was |
not a limiting factor. a

--§0. These missions accomplished their purpose, L.e.,.
they. established almost completely the location of SA-2
sites on the island. They did not--and, since they were
designed to avoid SAM-defended areas, could not--detect the
ballistic missile deployments then under way. The combined
effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and
the weather conditions of the period following was to delay
consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next
be undertaken over Cuba until early October.

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; : . Pures di MT
KK. The Special Group Decision of 9 October THE WHITE HOUSE eFEE
61. By late September the delays. in accomplishing the

.four-flight program, coupled with a mass of evidence that the
Soviet build-up was continuing, had generated a greatly
increased sense of urgency jn Washington, © It should again

pe noted, however, that high-level consideration of the .
possibility that MRBMs might be deployed to Cuba had always
been in terms of Soviet action after the SA-2 defense was

fully operational. There is. no documentary evidence of action
directed toward the overflight of SAM-defended areas until the
Special Group (Augmented) meeting of 4 October. At this
meeting the DCI pointed out that U-2 flights were now (before
‘the last two missions of the 10 September program) restricted
by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of
Cuba. According to the minutes. of this meeting "it was _
questioned /by the DCI7 whether this was a reasonable restric-—
tion at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost
certainly not operational." The Group then ordered the NRO

to prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for

presentation at the Group's meeting of 9 October.

62. On 6 October, COMOR provided to the NRO a memo-
“yandum entitled "Intelligence Justification and Requirements
for Overflight of Cuba" for use in this presentation. Para.
. Al, of this paper stated that "there is now a pressing and
continuing need for up-to-date. intelligence on the progress
of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. The very highest levels

-- ofthe government. are dependent upon. this intelligence. to

assist in making policy decisions of immediate and vital con-
cern to the nation.” Para A2., commenting on the absence of
coverage of western Cuba since 29 August, included the state-
ment that "Ground observers have, in several recent instances,
reported sightings of what they believe to be Soviet MRBMs in
Cuba, These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo
coverage." Attached to the memorandum were a number of target
lists, on which the area previously targeted around San
Cristobal appears, together with recommendations for attack
‘of particular targets by satellite, U-2, obligue, FIREFLY,

or F8U-1P/RF-101 photography. (USIB, considering this paper
on 6 October, recommended to the Special Group full coverage
of two of these lists which did not specifically include San
Cristobal, but which by its nature would have covered that
area and the other ballistic missile sites as well.)

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TOP SECRET DINAR CHESS RUFF IDEALIST Pe

63, At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's
first recommendation was "A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM
site as soon. as weather permits," This referred to the area
targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal (see Para 48). The

‘operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection
aircraft off the: coast, also was designed to pass over one
of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most. nearly opera—
tional. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the
status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved
in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as
possible, NRO's second recommendation was therefore condi-
tional: "If there is no SA~2 reaction to the initial U-2
sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island

‘by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits."
(There were also certain other recommendations for low level,
oblique, and FIREFLY missions.) - Fs

64, . The Group. gave first priority to the San Cristobal
’ mission and recommended to the President that he approve it. |
The President gave his approval--presumably learning of the .
San Cristobal reports at this time--and the mission was
immediately mounted, It was delayed by weather, however, from
10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was
transferred to SAC, There is no reason to believe that the
transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC
flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed.
track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the
planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the
primary mission waS accomplished.

.65, After this mission had been approved, but before it
had been flown, CIA received on 10 October Navy. photographs
taken two weeks earlier of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
These photographs showed clearly identifiable IL-28 crates,
which later showed up in U-2 photography of 17 Octcber--along
with a number of others which must have come in on unphoto-
graphed ships--at San Julian airfield in the western tip of
the island. The information appeared in the Checklist of
11 October. .

‘66. During this interim period, the DCI briefed the
CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 10 October on
the build-up, including the IL-28s, He also commented on
“MRBMs essentially along.the lines of his cables from Nice
(para 30), adding that there were many experts who did not
believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he
differed with them, He told the Subcommittee that he had
authority for an overflight in the next day or so, General

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Carter said much the:same thing to Senator Saltonstall. the
following day (11 October). In reply to Saltonstall's
question about Senator Keating's charges of known MRBM sites
in Cuba, General Carter said that there were refugee reports
‘but no hard evidence, and that CIA hoped to photograph the
areas in the next day or so, General Carter also briefed
Senator Stennis on 15 October (before the photography of

the previous day was available), again along the same lines,

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'. As the readout progressed during

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©. Notification of the President

67. By this time, photography from the 14 October
mission had arrived in Washington and readout had. begun.
The Director, NPIC, contacted the DD/I in the early evening
of the 15th to inform him that a possible MRBM site had been
identified in the San Cristobal area. The DD/I notified — .
General Carter (the DCI being out of town). General Carter
told him he would notify General Taylor and General Carroll
of DIA at dinner, and McGeorge Bundy if he was present.
the evening the information
became firmer and the DD/I decided not to wait until morning
to notify White House and State Department officials. About
2200 he passed the information to Mr. Bundy and Mr. Hilsman,
who notified the Secretary. of State. The following morning _
(16 October) General Carter and the DD/I briefed Bundy in
detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President.’

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