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104-10214-10034

| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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WSLE OF CONTENS

BO oo ee we
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fail re oars
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Greration Lanwet 2. 6 6 6 8 ee ee ee ee ee te ee
State asks Farland if he could eagineer e ecup
Farland replies that he could . 6. 6 6 6 0 eee ee ee ee

Farlenod says the dissidents need guas
The U.S. Ls prepared tc assist in overthrowicg Trujillo ..
Rusotica asks wist iper rifles be ted ran dissicen ts

Acting DCL approves air crop o7

Spectal Group epproves snall am oa

COS asks that one w boa be sont in each DOU rrr
Tearbvorn learns o7 plen <s assassinate ty inte ptirg auto
wWinpy Berry asks for sutmachine gums for pilot oe we we
Dearborn asks for three 3S-caliber piswsis fo esidents
The plot to kill Trujillo et his mistress’ spercmeat ee ee

COS protes‘ss restriction om pouchirg weapons ~
liqs guidance a on policy and objectives . . - - ee
Station asks permission to pass three carbines to dissicents
Has aporoves rast ing careings see eet eee eee
ihe carbines are pessed ta the dissidents

Request foe pouch waiver ref pouching summachine gums ...-
Sutmachine guns pouched
Pleas Prom dissidents that submachine guns be passed to then

-Hgs informs the station not repeat not to yess submachine gums
_ Post-Bay of

isa stamddrm cable . 2 ee ele ee ee es
Station ackncviedges reveipt of submachine gims

Draft cable (not sent) arvroving relesse cf submachine guns
State Departcent disapproves passing submachise guns

The whereabouts of the three carbines . . - - see - -
Special Group confirms ro i submachine guns to diss igerz
ace dissidents’ 25sassins i are firm... - ee ee

Dearbees and
Critic No. lon the asses
Vice President Johnson asxs acout arzus dalivery - +--+...
Discovery of U.5. involvement with assassination group
Recepitulation oP ams passed or consicered

Tre rotivations of the assassias

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14-09000

so Rafael Trujillo, the Deniniecen dictetor, was essacsinated at
4 about ten p.m. cn the night of 30 May 1961. It was Trujiliots
custem to visit one of his xletresses at his ranch at San Cristeval

abcul cace a week. Cn most of his travels he rode in a Carysler

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y stereotyped pattern of action:

after his nightly walx, he dississed his companions; changed into a

ss

Ehaki uniform; aad set out gor San Cristotel in an unescorted 1957

Chevrolet, always driven by the sare chauffeur.
On the night of the Slaying, the Chevrolet was intercepted on

a four-lane highway on the outskirts of Ciudad Trujillo by elfgat

x : armed assassins in three cars. Trujillo vas killed by gunfire, and
Fy his body was removed from the scene by the assassins. Trojillo’s

chauffeur was seriously wounded, was left behind by the assassins,

4 and survived. All of the assassins escaped from the scene. (One was

. never caught and vas eventually granted amnesty. Two were killed

. ° -

. while resisting arrest. Tee others ...were arrested, confessed,.

and were later executed tefore coming to trial. About eight or nine

ate

others, who vere in on or mew o° the plot but did not per~icimate

sete nat

in the actual assassination, were killed

resisting arrest, or by suicide to avoid arrest and torture.

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There were reports in Ciudsd Prujillo ay che time teat the

U.S. Consulate ad been tn scme way involved with the plotters.

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Eventually, after the survivi

&

plotters were granted amnesty
many of the details care cut. Norman Call, a reporter with the

San Juan Star, wrote an article thar appeared in The New Republic

issue of 13 April 1963. Excerpts folloy:

The assassination of the Daninican Republic's Rafael L.
os Trujillo was carried out with essistance from the US Central
' . Intelligence Agency. Arms Por the May 30, 1961 slaying of the
. 69-year-old dictator on a Vonely stretch of highwaymear his
: capital were smuggled by tne CIA into the country at toe
request of the assassins.

a, ; The CIA began shipping arzs to the Dominican Revublic in ‘
Ci. ad late 1950, followicg a series of talks tetween US Consul Henry
Dearborn, Chief Political Officer John Parfiela of the US
Consulate, and Luis Aciama Tio. Also involved in the plot was .
Antonio Imbert, who had been Governor of Porto Pleta province.

4&3 Trujillo's political and Mrancial problems deepened,
talks continued between Dearbon, Parfield and leaders of the
anti-Trujillo conspirecy. Toward the end of 1960, contact vas
established between Amiama and a CLA agent who .
named Plato Cox.

«+ Was

o

The key link betieen the assassins and the CIA in the aras
shipments was’a long-time American civilian resident of Ciudad :
Trujillo, Lorenzo Berry, otherwise known as "dinpy,” who operated :
@ supermarket ina fashionable neighborhood where Trujillo alsa
lived. "Wimpy" was put under brief arrest after the eilling but
was later allowed to leave the country. -

The weapons vere inported in small parts, to ba assembled
dater by the plotters, anong the routine grocery shitments ?or

the supermarket arriving regularly in the capital's port. The

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fun. parts encered the Republic in spectally-carked food. cans,
watch vere later turned over to the conspirators. ;

: Plans for the intended assassination vere worked out during
the same-period-in.whicn the abortive assault.on Cuba was. being...
prepared. Esvever, when the ClA-crganized April 17,1961, 0° 2
invasion at tre Ray of-Pigs failed and world attention was’
focused on Washington's ‘complicity in that cperation, a post-
ponement of the attempt on Trujillo's life was ordered because
of the embarrassment enoiner such failure might cause the
United States. But the order, to hold up cane too late. ‘The
needed weapcas were already in the hanas of the conspirators; = -
who reiused eppeals Wy Téarcdorn and Barrield to delay the
_ assassination. They insisted on moving at the first opportimity.
Tails came on May 30,-when frujillo end his chauffeur drove out
into the country in an. usescorted.1957 Chevrolet for a
-yendezvous at a San Crisioval estate, la Furcdacion, with '
Trujillo's 2)-year-oid mistress, Mona Sanchez.

It can be reported on excellent authority that close
associates of the slain dictator knew of the US role within
a few days following the killing.

. Dearborn, Barfieid-and Berry bad meanvhile been rushed ,
out of the Dominican Republic by-US officials. . .. + -
Since the ouster of the Trujillos, Berry ("wimpy") has
yeturned to operate his handsomely appointed supermarket,
where he greets customers with calm and courtesy, as if
Trujillo: had:never-: lived... :

Peon? AEs SOA:

We interviewed Richard Bissell (then DD/P), J. C. King (then |

‘Chief, WH Division), and J. D. Esterline (then Chief of Operations,

WH Division). King recalls the Agency's role as being limited to

monitoring internal plotting against the Trujillo regine "put. not

pushing or instigating." Esterline, like King, recalls that the

gency was not directly involved in coup plotting. He described the,-

AIS CI TIMARU eae RRA AG PENN Ne bite ATE


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furnishizg of weapons os 2 symbol--sczething that-~.<
tangible evidence of U.S. support. Bissell rerem’

role. 85. 5. being somewhat more. posi. tive than te

and Esterline. Be viewed the Agency's rele: as

to an indigenous group wnose intended actions were in the U.S.

agen

terest. Ee descrived the affair es "a falziy normel operation

involving meetings, discussions, and a rorzal approvals." de do rot
have firm information as to whether or not any of the weapons
supplied by CIA werefactusLly used in the assassination of Trujillo.
Both Esterline and King. relieve they vere not. Bissell, powever,
has 1 a vague impression trat one of them was.

The Agency officers nost immediately involved with the plotters

are: now. widely: scattered. Lear Reed,-vho was chief of ‘station:
until October 1960,. ts now retired. Robert Oven, vho was chief

of station at the time of the assassination, is. dn Farts... Charles -
Cookson, the station's operations officer, is in Brazil. Tsabel
cintren, the station's aduinistrative assistant vho vas used as a’ "

: communications Link and in the passing of the arns, resigned in 196%

and is believed to be living in Puerto Rico. Red Holsan, the head-

quarters branch chief, is in Guatemala City. We eiected not to call

. back any of these people for interviews. While they might be able -

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to furnish sinor detat}s that ere pissin rem the written records,

we think it. valizely teat i y would: be Fe bie: "to. ada. ‘Significantly . ears

to the quite . complete record ‘that appears dn tne EMDZED operational
“files. :

Agency activities a2 at. replacing the Trujillo regize were
assigned the cryptonja EMDZ=D. One segment of |} D was known as

EMSLEW, the cryptonya tor the Operation to rerove “Trujillo by

* violent action. We have reviewed the voluninous 2MDEZD files. Most
of this account is draw fron then. Many of the more significant
documents were not put iato the EWEED files ‘but were kept ina
private file ‘by J.C. King. He zade that file availnble to us.

_ We also have studied anotzer- Particularly useful document. The

Dominican Military Intellizence Service (sm) officer put in charge
investigation of the

of the/Trujillo assassination was @ navy lieutenant named ‘Ortiz: -

“The Dominican Republic assigzed hin to its embassy in Ottava in
‘November 1961 vhen the Trujillo family's attempt to regain Power

7 failed, - The New York field office, of the Fal held extensive
interviews with hin from 6 April through 10 May 1962. The result

: WBS, a massively-detatled, 162-page report on the plot and on ‘the
assassination as reconstructed by the SIM, from its interrogations

: of. the persons it apprehenced.


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Torts

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peep ELIA HT NIB I ARTI WE ON REE TES

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“ascertain from the files the rature ond the extentof U.S. support

the story is itz failure to identify the individuals with whom the

a the course of

U.S. policy with respect to the overtnroy of Trujillo. We also can

of the plotter rs, including the passing to trem of weapons out cf the
U.S. Consulate in Ciudad Trujille. Wat we cacy not discover from the

files, despite quite massive docmentation, is how the coup group

was organized. The best single account ve find, and it is not wholly

accurate, is in a book by Robert Crassweller.* The wain flaw in

U.S. Goverment vas actually working. Excerpts follow: Dae os

The plot was organized on the basis of two groups of
conspirators linked together by a liaison that later proved
too fragile to bear the stresses laid upon it. Each group
had its purpose and its separate Personnel.

The function of the Action Group was to assassinate
Trujillo and immediately present proof of its succes, in
the form of Trujillo's corpse, to the second group, the
Political Group. The latter would then launch a coup, ;
taking over the machinery of the government and the Armed:
Forces.

ee The Action Group consisted of eight men. It t appears to

"have been Organized originally ty General Antonio Inbert -
Barreras and Salvador Estrelle. .... . They were joined

’ by Lieut. Amado Garcia Guerrero, a nexiher o? the military
corps attached to Trujillo in tre National Palace; Antonio
de la Maza, the brother of Octavio de la Maza, who had teen
killed by the goverment beceuse of his invol venent in the

* + Robert D. Crassweller, Trufiiio: The Lite and Tises ota
-Caribbean Dictator (New Yora: MacMilian Co., 1965)

Calintez case z 3 O° Pastoriza; and Petro :
Livio Cedeno. The eigath xenver, Ma asl Caceres Tuati, was in _ ot, . 4
Moca 02, tie utgat © oP the 20th and sew none o? the action.

: The Political Group had a-less G@istinct membership. :t
incluéed Luis Amiaza Tis, Modesto Diaz, Ceneral Juan Teczes
Diaz, and several others. At the very top it had the cupport

£ Geseral Roman Fernandes, Ceeretary of State for the Arned
Forces, ana his brother Bibin. ....: -

* The over-all authorit ty appears to: have centered principally - : : : . whe
in General Diaz, probably the only ome woo had sufficleat . : vos
prestige to command authority. .....

‘,. “The Action Group would remain in daily readiness. When
information in the Palace indicated that Trujillo was going
to Grive ty Estancia Fundacion .. . Garcia Guerrero in the

Palace would inform the others by persozal message. + + + + « Sos al .

The expected message from Garcia Guerrero in the Palace
came to the patient plotters at seven o ‘cloc« on the evening
of May 30. They were not fully prepared and coordinated at
this momeat, but the ezotional and impetuous de la Maza
threatened.to act by himself if the others lagged... in.any.
event, the plan went into execution. . ... . Each of then
had his revolver or pistol, and de la Maza also had his om
saved-off shotgun and to M-1l semiautcratic rifles. .....

fe

_ |The conspiracy tegan to come apart within an hour. Never
very professionally contrived, the plot vas hastened prematurely
to its culsination by the impatience of de la Maza, and it was
now afflicted with bad luck and ineptitude. Imediately after
_ the assassination, the men of the Action Group were unable to

reach General Roman. eee ee ae oe ae OE

‘The Political Group of the conspiracy’ never took up its.
| planned role. The Acticn Group scattered, leaving a trail as.
wide as a boulevard. Trujilio's body was "weft in the trunk of

eoeyhs
eee

a . > dela Maza's car, parsed in the garege of Ceneral Temas Diaz, |
ot . _.  ° where the police found it in a few hours. The conspirators;
Pe ' were all hunted dow very quickly, except for Anlana end

Us se Imbert, who maraged to conceal themselves for moaths until
_ the canzg2r had passed. : :

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Tne Far report of? tS iaterviews of Ortiz, the sr4 teeta,
.. @ives.an excellent account of way the plot fell apart after the -
assassination took place. One ‘of the ascassins, Pedro Livio Cedeno, ,
was :cerlously wounded (probably. by | fire from his own cagpanions).
.All of the assassins assembled at Generel Diaz' house after the

killing. One of then called a friead, Dr. Potert Reid Cabral, to

treat Livio. Dr. Reid found him so badly injured that surgery would

be required. Reid ard two of the assassins took Livio to a hospital.

,

While in deliriim be mumbled the nares "de la Maza” end “Juan .

Tomas." The police immediately pickea up two brothers of Antonio

de la Maza. Feither vas personally involved in the plot, but both
knew the details and the names of most of the assassins. General ;
. Diaz, Antonio de la Maz, and Lieut. Garcia Guerrero vere killed .

resisting arrest. Amiama and Imbert went into hiding and survived.

The rest were caught and interrogated follovingtorture. All
confessed.

e The confessions led ta y senti fication a of 5 persons who were in

” or on the. fringes of the Political Group: General Roman and his
brother, Aniana Tie, General- Garcia’ Urbaez, General Guarionex
Estrella, Tomas Baez Diaz, Modesto Diaz, and Miguel Angel Baez Diaz.

Lorenzo Berry (sispy) was identizied as a ccmunications Link betveen

sai shank oi Sr asa

’ the plotters and the U.S. Consulate . However, + the SIM did not

m peke


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. discover the identities o2 tke political olotters with whom the

a : Consulate

vere available for interss

were fairly widely imow wo persons not actually members so? it, there

: : appears to have deen exselians compartmentation between the Political

4
4 . and the Action Groups--pertans too much compartsentation. .The
ae assassination itsel? «a> well pleuned. General Diaz vas in over-

all charge of the Operation, but de la Maza was the ore who did all

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of the work. Fe took three cars to a local garage and had the

engines rebuill so that the cars could reach sveeds of 120 mph.

i
{ He had possession of the weepcas from the U.S. Consulate, plus |
: Several of his ow. Fe and the other Farticipants took the cars
7 . to the site selected for the xiling ard conducted dry runs each
é = night. Everything wes ready and the assassins vere lying in wait

for Trujillo on tae nignt of 23 May. At the last minute ke decided

y : : not to go.to San Cristcsel vecause he wasn't feeling too vell. The
3 ; . assassins continued their Gry runs each evening. After the assassina-

tion was carried out, essentially as it had been planned, the coup

yp wel

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that was to folloy failed--is Party because of bad luck, in part because

of poor plarnicg, and in part because of too much compartzentation.

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7 death, Was 08, told that the assassination was to be attespted on:

_ trunk, where it ves later found by the police.

“lam and then drove to the howe of General Rouen to alert hia.

“He and Roman then returned to the scene of the assassination,

Ceneral Rozaa, =ho Was. to take over the goverment after Trujillo's

May.30th. Afser the slayitz, General Diaz tried to to telepzore
General Roman but. could not reach hin. Diaz then teok the car

with Trujillo: S body still in its mms and drove to Ranan's house.
He saw'so many soldiers in she vicinity that he gave up and returned

hone, leaving the car in the (driveway with the body still is tre

What had happened was this: Former general and former head :
of the SIM, Arturo Espaillat, happened to chance upon the scene So :
while the assassination was taking Place. He was out for a drive ;
with his wife dnd was Passed by a car that he recognized as Trujillo's. i
Ee stopped at a drive-in restaurant end almost imediately beard os
shooting ahead; vhich ‘he suspected involved Trujillo. Ee drove to org.

the scene, saw what was happening, turned around, end sped back ; ot }
into town. He stopped ata military installation and gave tie

arriving simultaneously wick the police. The police found Trujillo's
chauffeur, vho was wounded but still alive. Roman end Espailiat

then vent to the hospitel to try to question the chauffeur. zaus,

General Diaz could not reach General Roman to Ainfom Roman teat

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Trujillo‘ bad teen kilied and that it was tfre for Raman to rake nis.

move to take ove: the _Soveranent. Remaz ines ony teat there hed been

ce ERS 8 poe, Rig,

a shooting involving qeujiire and “that Tratllo was nis sing. - —_ did

“not Imow whether Generel Diaz! ‘group was involved in it or not. He

was reluctant to move until ke was sure ¢h at Trujillo was dead. By ’

the tice Roman concluded that Trujillo s must de Gead, it was too late

Pee em eee ee

for nia to act; Hector Trujillo and Joazay Abbes had already taken

charge. ° Roman did pake’a couple of feeble + tries at engineering a

take over, but it is apparent that he had n no real advance plan nor

any appreciable chances of succeeding.

The assassination itself and the plotting preceding {t took

©

vivity in. opposition
to the Trujillo regime, with beta the OAS and the U.S. taking clear-

place against a’ background: of international ac

cut stands. ‘These are scme of the highlights: ;
, a. A briefing paper prepared in wi Division for the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in August 1960 states that a revolt was Planned

. - for December 1S 993 in the Dominican Republic but was delayed ©

pending receipt of arms from Verezuela. The plot was discovered |

and was rolled up in January. Yenezuela brought charges in the

‘

QAS that the Dosinican Republic was "in Plagrant

violation or

; human rights, freedom, and denocracy” following the mass arrests

in the Dominican Republic in January 1950. A coemittee of the


14-D0009°

ura ey

ATES

“OAS acstened to investigate the charges reported:on 8 June 1550...

that the Dominices goverrment was guilzy as. charged.

b. A near-miss assassination atvexpt against President

seca renee toca

i Betancourt on 24 June 1960. killed tyoi in nis entourage end

injured hin and several others. The VYerezuelan governzent

AAR ae wi

. S&nnouaced after capture of most of the assassins that the
~ .: Dominican goverrment was responsible for the attempt on Betan-
court's life and took its case to the OAS. On 20 Augilst, the

OAS voted sanctions against the Dominican Republic. Under

. Becretary of State Dillon, testifying before the House Agriculture

Comittee’on 24 August in support of a request by President

<2 Gat

Eisenhower for a cut in the Dominican Republic's sugar quota,

is reported as having said that it was hoped that econoaic

oo : sanctions would result in the downfall of Trujillo's dictator-

SUAS ANT EP SI

ship and its replacement by @ moderate and free regime. The

Unitea States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican |

Republi ic on 26 August 1960, elthough consular relations vere
Pioute 4, aw, Continued, Ce! 3 “

NLS eS:

dveseenvncn fomitinbeeas vyian


AS a. further. prelude to a. chronclog ical view of operat on":
‘ pieedies MSTEM, ve think it vould ve useful to ident zy the veopte
involved, especially since officers of the Department of State

played a very prosineant role.
af a

Washington - Devartrent cf State

Roy R. Ribottcen . Assistant Secretery of State for
Inter-American Affairs . ts

" Frace Devine a Special Assistant to Rubottcea

* Jonn C. Hill . Special Assistant to Rubottom

Chief, Wd Division

Chief, Branch III, WH Divisioa

. Ambassador until 28 June 1960. It is
pertizent to note that King and Ester-
line ettribute U.S. ard CIA invoivemeat

- 33


14-Do09 | - -

Henry Dearborn

"John D. Barfield

Lear Reed

' Robert Oven

Ca Na ET BAA ORS 8 CT,

- Charles Cookson .

Isabel Cintron
Key Dopinican Plotters
noonenaeeneenieememneeneae ad
Dr. Jordi Brossa

Juan Vicinit _

Luts Eaquero

_ Who considered hinself quite a clandestine: jee

“ plovters..

with the plotters.

" Ciutad Trujillo - CTA

, Atuinistrative Assistant ;

- Code Tames: Mr. X,-ABC, and YAGUATE

Code nare: SOCRATES

with the plotters in the Dontatcaa ”
Republic to Antascador Farland. Trey
descrite him as # former FBI eaployze

operator. Esterline, who later rerved
uader him in Panara, called him “a wild
man who buzzed the Agency to support a
move to assassinate Trujillo.” He had
direct dealinzs with a number of the key

Counsellor of Embassy until 25 August
1960 and Consul Cereral therearter. Ve
_Used the code name DELTA in correspondence < . ;;

‘Second Secretary until 26 August 1960 . -
and a consular officer thercafter, Cote ea
CIA cryptonym: EMDAZS-2 .

Chief of Station until October 1950

Chief of Station frem 20 Januery until
& Jime 1961. Code name used with the
Plotters: GALGO :

Operations Officer:

Code names: S¥ORD and EL catco


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ieee taunts mabremi dy ost

Dr. Severo Cabral :
Jose Francisco Tapia
Aullo Brea

Andres Freitas

Luis Amiama Tig

Jose Rene Roman

Juan Tomas Diaz

' Donald Reid Cabral

Lorenzo D. Berry

. unhappy exverience. The consulate :
_ Preferred to have “novaing.to.do with him,
. but the Deninican plotters brought hin tf

"Code name: CRISTOBAL’

. tions link between the plotters and

‘An Avaricdn ta the Declaican Republic
with wacm the station had had aa earlier

as 8 cutout to the consulate. Ee took
delivery from Lorenzo Berry of three
carbines passed to Zerry frog the U.S.
Consulate. for use by the plotters. Ee -
held them for a few @ays and then gave
-them back-uhea Berry insisted they be
returned. Berry then passed them to
cne of the assassins.

Code ‘names: . ESCTOR acd PLUTARCO

Code name: ANDY , ar

Code name: CIBAO

“dimpy” - Berry is a U.S. citizen vho

owed Wimpy's Supermarket in Ciudad
Trujillo. He was the main ccmmuntca- .

the U.S. Consulate. The weapons...
furnished the plotters were actually
passed to Berry. . :

Wimpy's wife - a Dominican citfzen of
Syrian extraction. She Sppears to have
been even more active in the plot than

_ber husband. It was she who had the

contacts with the Denintcaas involved.

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Doni
Consulate vere
notes. Mrs. Ber
fros or passed t
Consul General?

+

;
+

&

S Secretary or the
CIA Station‘’s administrative assistant.

Two dociuzents provide a useful point of depdture, from an

Ve i
:

hisvorical point of view. One is a semi-official letter from : _
i

Ambassador Farland in the Dominican Republi: to Assistant :

Secretary of State Rubotton. The other document is an internal
CIA staff paper revealing the relatively passive role that had

been played by CLA prior to 1960.

‘

C | 16 November 1959
a2 Sovenber 1959

Pa _ Ambassador Farland wrote an "Official-Informal” memorandum

“ "to Rubottom reporting that "the underground is more active today

: than ever in the history of the Trujillo regime.” He described the
Bo Principal opposition group as being about 2,000 strong. He said:
‘ .

oa : . ", . » within this Group there is growing militant anti-
R. : American feeling based on the premise that the United States

. should actively aid the Dominican revoluticnary (sic) for the :
overthrow of the Trejillo regine. Discussions I have heard on :
tuis subject shov aa appalling lack o? uncerstanding of the
position of the United States and its adopied doctrine o? non-
intervention. .... . This group is in possession of
clandestine broadcasting equipment which will &0 into operation :

CEE eT

4 whea the strike is mage. CAS has deen informed and Joins with : }
| me in suggesting that you pass this information to J. C. King." - 4 :
:! | :
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af NS . :
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4-90000

— 7 araore
; { ! aiid

creeps ate

co Cate?, Wy Division, @iscusses

Cr - : izon coverage Of the Domirtean on
in the event of Trujillo's removal from power. The objectives 4

. . ; sh aut : i
see Stated in the Paper were to ensure orderly transition in the event

Loe

amend

Trujillo abdicatee or was Gepesed and to prevent a takeover by

Castro-type forces. The folloving excernt reveals the level of
JE 33 =

CIA activity in the Dominican Republic prior to that time:

t
i

“The CUS Cludad Trujillo conducts ne covert orerations; | i

hovever, his official contacts with Generalissimo Trujillo ana '

oo wits the Chie? of the Dominican Security Services has enabled
a hia on occesicn to assess the attivuces and reactions of the
Fé a Trujillo government to internal opposition activities and to
~ . eriticisns: of ang activities directed against the Dominican

Other Anerican governments unfriendly

@overncent by exiles and
to the [eminican regine,"

10 March 1960
ah Rarca 1960

j This is the date of the first draft that @ppears in Agency files

of a plan to persuade Trujillo to retire. ‘The originator of the draft

1
2, ‘4S not shown, but it was to be forvarded to President Elsenhover
i . , from General Edwin Clark, a friend of the President from their years
; of militery service. The plan was for Clar to appreaca Trujillo,
i With whom he hed been on good terms in the Fast, and attempt to
: persuade Trujillo to retire. It was to be pointed out that there was
F

rte: Pe eee one we mee a

<g
om i a NT


14.99000

ae

Roti

eat

poe

oN

SE COC RON, R yA Gace A RE att

_ met with Trujillo on 2T March.

(a wetsrery

wa wishe

eee ed
wet Cited

no C22 who could succeed hin, and that to crotect his Tasily ani

to preserve his inage as El S

he should step down and

allow asylun to ve arranzea for him. Eis fently would have the
é J

i
+
i
{

weelth already outsiée the Deminican Republic, and the fortune

inside would be placed in trust, to te edsinistered (ipterrationally-
known personages for the venefit o? tne Dorinican people.

This proposition received hign-level attention in Washington,
including that of President Zisenhower, Secretary of State Herter,

and Allen Dulles. In approving Clark's apprcach to Trujillo,

the President specified that Clark should travel as a representative
of the State Departzent, rather than as a personal emissary of the

“President. General Clark traveled to the Dominican Republic and

By the time of the meeting it
appears that it had been decided that the plan vould be presented
as merely that of private citizen Clark, and that wes what was done.
The station thought it likely that Trugillo recognized the official

U.S. Govermment hand in the proposal. O? course, nothing came o? the

_ meeting. .

22 March 1960
ce Maren 1900

Ambassador Farlard, in a TOP SECRET memorandum to Rubottan,

forwarded a plan of a Dominican grous plotting Trujillo's overthroy

-18-

QlPATT_ Tira pias .
Veh ET! 7.3 ely :

5 at
eke Te, + MN Am dln rr RE a TR Reet
pw oh Lk er ae eae Bae eee # £ + oe :

aeRO mre

cameras +
:

. tenner aimee ne te

ceteeme ot alapenn ore tims one
Viees -ore

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3

é
i)
&
2
ms
o
4
mo
oO
3
co
i
a
i
oO
Hy
“Ss
5
2,
ne

of being backed by muscle, ‘The cpereticn was to
v

arrival of a "special U.S. confidential envoy"/vould tell Trujillo

ion

oO 4
6 oeNEe
we cree apie acne

to leave the country. "He tells it plainly and decisively; ne will
give hin 12 or 18 hours to do it." It woula te nade clear thar

if Trujillo refused, a porder inciéent would be contrived,

would be Sollowed by "collective intervention." Assuming

Trujillo's acceptance of the ultimatua, the plan then outlined stens

for transition vo an operating representative government. The ary
1. aN would be reduced in size. A caretaker government would prepare for
a we free elections. Ambassador Farland forwarded the plan with these

comments of nis om to Rubotton: . i

z - « « this segment of the dissidents is psychologically
+ : conditioned to a point where it will take any step excent the \
ultinate, and for the execution of the latter they exuect |
United States assistance. ..... {
. : "Dick, I think the tine bas ccme ?or certain agencies of
. our Government, without ttribution, to establish and inplement
. . a@ definite cofstructive program to influence the course of events
no : in the Deminican Republic. My conversations with the Secretary a
: and Allen Dulles empnasized the problems and the possibilities
of this type of approach. .. 2... 7

30 March & 7 April 1960

4 The Special Group considered actions that wight be taken in the ‘

n
re vebinahame tenes wamanthsmtoee +

Py
Was Sao

ft
u

soak TM eS nemmenne ne
2


Cn 20 March, Yrearing

L

event oF a flare-u

b

ny

teat Cuca mignt be involv 4, there was talk of evacuating U.S.
civillans fren Guantanamo. There was also discussion of the
possinility c? sesling off the land entrance to the Dominican Republic
from Eaiti and of the proolem of providing asylum Zor Trujillo. On
7 April, there was further talk o7 sealing off the country if Trujilte
fell, and an appraisal was made of the chances oF hi his leaving
willingly:

" ,. . it is evident that Trugillo will not consider

meving any arrangerents for derly succession to himself, but
that ke will either hang ca to the bitter end or flee the

country on snort notice, a la Batista.”

9 April 1950
State sent a cable to Farland through CIA channels, fron which

the following is an extract:

"Could you, if so instructed, ake appropriate arrangements
thin rext few weexs with eppropriate civil and military

dissicent elezerts to take over the GODR? You would be authorized

to indicate to-them that as soon as they had seized power they
should immediately request United States recoguition, and ask for
United States military assistance under Article Tiree of the Rio
Treaty in tre event of actual or threatened Castro- sponsored
invasficas or of threatened insurrection incited by pro-Castro

or pro-Coomunist elements within or outside Dopinican Republic...

"Woat, if any, aid vould be essential to dissident elements
prior to takeover... + -

Ponte RA ase Clee ce

ee ee

ORE PO SRST UA EPR, a Ew SOUR EET RNS ESSE TREEREE IED MEET ARS TEI VOT TST

fageyeecnr ts

sg BoE De TAWA SENSE CRETE epee Ev ener tac re erate 2 TE OT EE ERSTE TICE COST ERENT RSE CSTR,

seep ata

ncn einer me ee rrnner eget

1 mee view eget eee

Smite nee epee emneetinnin

MET OT EL pent = vos

centages

iia

Phe tee

abe,

a
sehasde as

eT

|
i
i
pot
, OE
bE
ry
}

Tarland catlea his reply through CIA Chanrals, in pert as follows:

:
:
= 2 4 3 $
"Under instructisn, it would be Fossisie for me to make :
Srrangerents with apprrriate civilian diss cents waose leaders
are known to me dacluéing names their seliectees for Top '
6overomental Positions, and with one oiiicvan dissicent, a
GeL4erei, wro is expecting an exchange oY passwords for purpose
secret discussions.

"Regurdless of . . in
indicaticas reflect Dominican ai

acsittedly
poorly armed, loasely o

i

ens liaison with |

. ot ey military Gissidents, wil) fing it aifficoult to effect taxa. :
(. . Over Of GODR vithout existence one or ro

—, following Cevelorments (ahi
:

or combination of
Yoich we summari K :

:
rd
8
raat
is)

fi

(1) Clandestine ar=s shiments, wit Sabotage materiel, -

ee ae toe

(2) an invasf{ion to secve as a Sigzal to the populace.

(3) Teptesentaion of th

e dissidents' "Operation Lancet.”
(4) Advance psychoicgical conditioning by radio.

(5) "Incapacitaticn or @ssassination of Trujills.?

(6) 4 carerur Step-by-step plan for th

sce period precedin
the coup and Por the pertod Tolioving it.

 Pinictm out key coorerstion't Trax Dominican
. 1
!
. poilitary dissidents, He added: :
: _ i
"One of the greatest ccatributions U.S. could make to i
fats would be to 1 [hem know we are Brerpared to assist i
i

, we ~ el -
I i ;

ee

Siicentet taint eeamattonane


taken or recommended
Dominican Republic. The Perer refers to tke nsed %%
assets, principally to custruct infiltreticn

Fidelistas. Among things recommended vere: Plocenert, of a junior

officer in the enbassy; ascigment of a full-tire ofPicer to the

headquarters desk for the covert ectica progren; authorization to use

Jose Figueres in third country operations; develoment of <
contingency Pi plan in the event Trujillo fell and hostile forces
attempted to seize power, end establisiment of a "U.S. Commi ttee

for Democracy in the Dosinican Republic.”

A menorandum written of a debriefing of Ambassador Farland reads,
in part, as follaws:

“The dissidents need gms and axmmition fron the United
States. In particular they need a susil mumber of high-powered
rifles with telescopic lenses. ‘The Ambassador said that he saw
no problem in the purchase and Celivery clandestinely of the
ams to the dissidents. But he saia, co? course, this raises
the question of whether the U.S. Goverment wants to engage in
this activity.

Fool. King said that this of course is a policy deci

sion. He
Baid that CIA could deliver the ams if this is the group we want
to supsort.

~~
ee
.
‘

ma cenit em we

sag impe tener teannenaan

Perreremareste enero veces


x
2

w
(Cument: Farland was in Washingtoa for consultatiocs.

Althouga he is listed as having served as Aubassador untli 23

June 1950, it appears that he aia not

os

ctually return to duty

in Ciuds@ Trujillo. His Successor, Yinton Chapin, was nominated

13 June, but he never took the post.)
3 June 1960

Farland met with Nelson H. Ssith, the Dominican desk officer
in WH Division. They compared lists of dissidents to see if the

names CIA had were those with whoo Farland had been dealing. Farland

"¢ — said, "Those are the boys all right.” Saith's memorandum of the
. ~~ meeting includes this carment:
r ; “Farland then told me that the underground cpposition are
z planning to assassinate Trujillo. Fe said that it is planced to
< use a powerful bembd which could be planted along the route of
é Trujillo's nightly walk and cculd be detonated by @ rezote-
2 control firing device. He intimated that this plan is pretty
. well elong and could be execttea at any time.”
Undated Working Paver (filed between papers dated 25 May end 13 June)
ee
¥ The author is not identified nor is there any indication that
y the proposal was approved. Its objective was stated thus: "fo
‘ precipitate the downfall of the Trujillo regime by 1 Auzust or as
" Soon as pessisle thereafter.” It provosed chat the U.S. becese a
x prime motive force against the Trujillo resize. "In the event ‘Trujillo
i! .
y oN -
ye fb - 23-
I
aS een
i
r . .
a
wo spi ammnn en mee ee le 1 tee > 7

i
i

rare

a ee eee

sea Namen one a

A oe eertinge or nese

e

Creasy _t

rye

ae . :
wa etnwi ee ae ee) .

¢ ~

vy

'

oo
NRA et Go ne

refused to abiicate, consideration saculd be viv

over™ actions desigred to effect his removal Prom the scene.” A

eeadline of 1 July wes proposed for ccmpleting arrangements.

<prop ati +

17 Juse 1950

Henry Dearborn, who was in charge in the Ambassador's absence, ‘
ueried State through CIA channels, asxing for con irmation on
certain points for a meeting he was having wlth a @issident deader,
Dr. Jordi Brosse. He stated his understanding of the U.S. position
45 follows:

ri a. Tae U.S. is not prepared to take overt action against
a nr the Trujillo government while it is in fll costrol.

0. The U.S. is prepared to assist the opposition Clandestinely
to develop effective forces to accomplish Trujillo's overtaroy.

ce. Assistance must continue to be channeled covertly }
until such time as the dissidents establish a provisional
goverment which controls a substentical section of the
Dosinican Republic.

20 Jue 1960

Dearborn, again through CIA channels, asked Rubottom and Farland

if he could make the same statements concerning U.S. policy ina

meeting with Juan Vicini, another dissident leader. Farland replied

in the affircative.

. . tre t
fh. so


} 4-00000

4
“E

Dearborn cabled the results of his flrest meeting with Juan

Vicini. He said that Vicini felt that the time to concentrate on,

Smee Ber

ter plansing purposes, was the period extending through the
“ineapacitatiod’ of Trujillo; too much planning for what would
a J 3 I AS,

follow risked exposure. Dearborn said that he egreed. °

Also on 28 June (although the first written record we find is
& summary memorandum prepared on 18 October), Rubottom told J.C.

King that the Goverment of the United States was orenared to

; —_ participate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the following
A al extent: "to provide a srall number of sniper rifles or other devices ‘
for the removal.of key Trujillo people from the scene. ....." j
a Rubottom added that the U.S. Government was not prepared, at this |
time, to send arms, equipsent, or paramilitary experts to assist the !
mee undergound to accomplish a revolt.
© , 29 June 1960 .

Dearborn cabled the results of his meeting with Dr. Brossa. Ee
said that Brossa had recommended a temporary standdow on "action

toward incapacitation of Trujillo" while determining Venezuela's

ui reaction to the Trujillo assassinatioa plot against Betancourt. #/¢

°
.
cer OK rem tene meeeepe em

er ee no . poe pao wee

rite
&
:


14-0000

TAK LS

Or a oe ae
oon

beard

YQ
:

J
“i
3
9
faa
fat)
me
¢
b

t the dissideats had a capability for pleking
in :
up arms at sea and for caching/nearby caves. he also described an
J

airdrop slte.

1 July 1950

A memorandum addressed to the Acting DCT recommended approval i

for the delivering of weapons to the Dominican dissidents.

"It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground
opposition forces in the Dominican Repuslic 12 sterile U.S.
rifles, Modal 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together
wits five hundred rounds of emiunition Por same. . 2...
it is plunned to deliver these veapons by air through DPD
facilities >rovided arrangements can te worked out with the

. opposition for their reception. If they cannot te delivered by
iC we air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for
delivery by sea.

"Approval for delivery of these ears bas been given by
Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottana, who requests that
x the aras be placed in the bands of the opposition at the
. earliest possible moment.

The memorandum was sigred by Rudy Gomez for Chief, WH Division; was
z ‘ concurred in by Richard Helms as Acting DD/P; and was approved by

C. P. Cabell on 2 July 1960 as Acting DCI. : :

Dearborn was informed by cable of plans to alirdrcp twelve

hepa ud

30.03 Springfields, with emmunition, and with sishts "fixed and

8
* sighted.” The cable asked for the coordinates of a suitable drop ;
2 3
ss i
site and for a four-man reception tean with flashlights. The cable :
iy -— i
ns y

.
“4
- A - -
5;
g . : *
: . nes
+} . - . .
g 2 RESP nie ern ae EE a at eg ee RADE TET Tr tere ea neo Trees ceieemeramatn ae Gyaeascenmmaermammmaces ae i
oe “t . .
:
1 “ie
i
u
z a
Z ad
2% . H
- ‘

14-0000

8 July 1960

Headquarters cabled Learcorn, in part:
" frou /ouan Victal/ and/or

hat p and capabilities are to oe

sly with action ta incacacitate Trujillo

in way of wa

O? particular importance is info re extent

esployed
and what is
of plan ofa
of military
aprarent lacs of knowledge of opposition organization, most
logical that he 1s actively collaborating wlth a group that

: must have some plan and capabi lity for action vbhich will assure

ttable interim government after removal c? Trujillo. .....
oe In your cpiniton are [iictaif 222/Brossa/ benders of sane group
z¢ or if not could the two grouvs te merged? . 1...

°

st 8 September 1960

verial support for implementation

a
pa sarticipation in preparations. In spite or /Vicint/

i The Special Group discussed a letter drafted by the Department
3
: of State for delivery to Trujillo (copy in CIA files dated 6 September)

ra proposing that he step dow. The DCT (Mr. Dulles) doubted the wisdom
a . : of putting such a proposal in writing. He preferred a personal

; appreach. The Group concluded that a rersonal approach would be
oan best and disc

issed William Pewley as 2 candidate for the Fey

ndida the job.

er

a 18 October 1940

hey

Chief, WH Division, prerared a mesorandim summarizing approvals

oo
yk ~ 2T -
y _
ii
4} yy .
: rely
a
z
eo ‘
tert eee ey . spe SR ae Temes ments

* apne ant eee ee NE nt

é
}
?

. 2
een omen = +

a angneetoveneme et nee

nee nec neeninen-§spandontens orn

14-0000

—
2 oN
i v
obtatnel for actisa in Support of the Dominican internal oppositioa.
The text states that the summary was "provided in response to your
vertal request on 13 October 1969..." his is the memorandum
to which reference is, made earlier unéer the entry for 28 June 1960.
29 December 1960
The minutes of the Special Group meeting cor this date read,
in part:
. "Biscel gaye the broad cutlices of a two-pronged plan
, for proceeding with certain limited covert activities i-Lrected
against the Trujillo regime. Ee emphasized that although
mn, suprort would be given to the Figueres group there is no
{ - : intention of establishing a pararilitary force as such... ..
~ nae He also exnphasized that the proposed actions would not of then-
selves bring about the desired resuit in the near future,
lecking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.
".... . It was noted thet Mr. Pawley feels thet
overt Intervention in the Dominican Fepublic should be
mounted sinultareously with the Cuban Operations. . ....
it was egreed that the plan is worth beginning at this tine
no watter what the eventual decisicn on overt intervention
may te."
: : (Comment: We find nothing in the files identifiable with

such a "plan." We found no other reference to any specific

plan of about this date.)
12 January 1961

The following is an excerpt ?rom the minutes of a meeting of the

ret

- 2 -
: CEPNTT CLL ayy
hairs Lite Gal : -

i

f
t
i-
i
i

i
an

7
|
|


14-D0000

Special Group cn this dete:

"Mr. Merchant explained the sealt zat

in ete?

State that limited supplies of small ams and

a. ot shoulc te made aveilavle for dissidents inside
Repuolic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe th

securely by CIA, and that the plan would call

portatica inte the group beicg provided by +

themseives. The Croup approved the project.
= Paes -

19 January 1951
a2 Snes aot

. Cable fron headguarters:

‘ : "For Dearborn: FYI and use as you consider adviseable,

. authority bes deen given t qs lor celivery to internal irons
aan of limited supply of szall arss and other material on condition
‘ a that introduction of material into LomRep te effected by Dons.
C 2 2 + + + Above coordinated with State."

MoD ets a sap

"It was confirmed (from Mr. Parrott by phone) that the -
’ Special Group row has approved that a ‘limited supply' of

: small arms and related equipment may be provided covertly to.
the Dominican resistance elements with whom we have been

e : : dealing. Tois was additional to the Special Group's apvroval

: On 29 Decenbder 1950 of. our Gperational Proposal."

t

sya’

a (Ccmzent: As noted in the entry for 2g December, we “now
a -

a sas ; .

te one of the specifics o? this Cpera tional Proposal.)

SE re rie ht ERS Sr We ee tee tee ames

=

Memorandum for the record of a discussion of Project EMDEZD by (

goes
members of the CA Staff and of WH Division: H

: . <<

|

thems

ser erent ot

| geen Nees Hip eens

teens: ences Be seen

14-0000

31 January 1941

“O?ficial-Informal” letter from Dearbora to Devine in State

Thee

seer

Department:

"With regard to the delivery of exotic equipment, ny
friends were of course delignied that such a decision had been
mace. hope that it will not be necesssry ts play caen too
long the cuestion of actual delivery since they are eager
and expectant and too great tardiness on our yart would only

‘lead then to question our sincerity.”

6 February 1961

Cable fron headquarters:

Bom "1. Realize details not now available tut Eqs would
, appreciate fdissidents'/ reaction to offer of ermed assistance
to includes /dissideats'/ current plan...

"2. Also request [Robert Owen's/ initial assessment

fSissidents' capability carry out plan of action once linitea
? . armed assistance provided."

10 February 1951

The station cabled its reply:
"Ho solid “reaction except doy as o2 9 Feb.

. . -"Initial asseesseat is /Srossa and Vicint/ could not

: . carry out plan. But with access /Dr. Severo Cabral/ he now
2 : appreaching point when will better be able evaluate group"
4 potential for action. We sone weeks away froo being able
make solid preliminary assessment. 7

"Suggest KUBARK consider sending in each pouch one szall

- 30 -

wags ea mee


14-0000

tata Se Lain

)

come inter,

: 4& February 1941
4 . ee
: :

ps

. 6 . aske
@utherity on the
Successor governnen

(Coment: We dia

cree t nes ragernye set qeepecteenen =

in CIA files.)

L 15 rebruary ayo.
& a —

a Ned Holmen, the headquarters branch chfer, net with Juan

—-
regen +

Vicinf end Donald Reid Cabral in New Yor: City. Excerpts fron his

menorandun record of the meeting follow:

w

e+ + + . Vicini played dowa scoewnhat the necessity for
_ delivery of arms, elthough he did Say that itis cesireable
a and should be a

part of the Planning. ze saia that members of
the opposition could, if they wanted co, Obtain small guanitities
ces . , a 2

an : of arms fron Army contacts... but that any arms so odtained

sy Would have to te used very Quickly before their loss is .
he ' @iscovered. For this reason, he said 14 would te desireable to
. : have ars celivered by uS that could be

stored for use at any
moment desired,

"Vicint said that the object of ebtaining this Kind ‘or help
eayway is the elimiration o¢ Trujilic and instead or using arms
or grenades he began to speak of more exoti-> materiels and methods
. a power?ul bombo that could be planted along the route of
Trujillo's evening walk and could be getonn: @ froa a nearby

3. _ a bots

nana htpaes eevee ee


14-0000

MT Sata ae tote,

o.. for)... the possibility of pofsoning
icctator's food or of putting poisson capsules in bottles
vain medicines that the dictater is knowa to take

a
@
tr 0
H
}~
>

cc retda cet se.

actical plan that they Pet forvard

WAS one that they said had alreacy been planned at one tite
5 before, They said that ween the cictator leaves his office for

his hoze there are three automosiles in his procession with the -
dictator himself in the first automonile end the tcdyguaris in
the following two. The idea that has been discussed internally
is for several trucks to block wn progress of these cars ata
given intersection at which tine young mes who telang to che
action groups woulda leap out of the trucks wi

.@renades to finish of? the dictator."

H
5
i

h varch 1961
aren Lol

Bator

Headquarters pouched to tre station a copy

of Holman's mesorendim

or his meeting, with Vicini and Reid. On lk March, the chief of station

era

cabled his assesment of the plan to intercept Trujillo's entourage

Dha

and kill him with guns and grenades:

Poel ee

ecmemenp ies

"Vicini idea . . . alzost certain fail if applied. ‘That
type attack is precisely what bodyguards appear vest qualified
cope with. Their defense Fattern and displacement vehicles
Plus police practice detour traffic biocks away from entourage
make Vicini idea fatally childish in Owen's view.”

wd

SEN TITS

a eae
Fics

SAHA OG

. i
(Comment: The assassination was actually carried out :

oY

through a variation of this Scheme. The assassins detected and ‘

took advantage ofa Stereotyred pattem in Trujillo's moverents

in which he rode at night, unescorted, on little traveled nigzways.)- i

Ste MS aS

|
a

ee ape,
wee ae

Swanetemie aeestewe mere
rob apeinie gare come meron +4

jose
ao
5 a
- Sere eeneneenar te
. an

14-0000

+
if
: !
° I
Tne station cabled headquarters on & Maren: |
: ". . . if opportunity sussort pro-US group uot to be Lost, i
. believe .. . imperative meke sure arms with amso ready for |
mediate entry DomRep .. . if necessary at air drop sites... " |
: 5 March 1941 | :
a 5 . as { i
As 9 follow-up to that cable, the station cabled a communication j i
t
from Dr. Severo Cabral: "We have in our hands chance to speedup | i
. events. Everything is being planned perfectly. Results say be | H
¥ n3 ng > E ¥ y } :
£ assured as much és human fallibility persits. ..... 7" |
|
z H :
i
_ 7 March 1961 { i
er ot ! i
zs ae | |
: Headquarters cabled the fiel3, in pert: co
. j
iM "Existing authorizatica precludes introduction ams into |
7 ~ Hy
d Don Rep by U.S. personnel. Order prepere contingency plans _
rf for possible alternate delivery metnod, request station }
sd determine additional drop zones and confirm those mentioned H
: : +
2 « « - - » Request type and quantity arms desired. ....." H \
i
f 8 March 1951
i |
8 : * , . . .
* . Cable from the station: . !
rn . | H
S ~ ~ .
2 "Brossa told Dearborn on 7 March that Dr. Severc Cabral and ' :
oa z wat + i. z . i
i. group plan try kill Trujilio ty /intercepting his zar/ et point | ;
& ‘ 1
# near faimpy's Supermarket/ - fate not sev and obviously depends | ‘
5 on Trujille traval . . . Severo Cabral 2ot aware Brossa has told
é us but interesting that Charge’ Papal Nuncieatura also aware plot i :
% exists but possibly not of rersonnel involved.” i
’ i
Ad |
3 :
3
j ae
: al ans . i
et : = -33- . - : a cb.
Boo Ne . i
2
<i +
5 i
i . . i . |
é io. |
a i .
a
ABE ECRAMne mae ae meta sgtitnnlr tN NS it eat cee a
vy

3
r
i


1400000

Has seeing commitzent gor
+

. . request urgently:
i details in order mate plans timely assistance.
iaty of plans, timing 2:

s .

additicna
Uncertat

and
ch

u

requested, ....,.%"

13 March 1961

a

Rr :

pt Satter: ee wean Ait Fe aE,

Eeadquarters cabled the station;

"Following elicited frou EMOTE-8 (Andres Freitas):
Preiteas speaks for Aniosn To group wailch includes rilitary
mbembers . . . in six brigade Eqs and which teve capadllity, ©
et appropriate tire, of taking cover milttery garriscas vita
arms already at hand, and appointing milite y/civiltan jvata
in controh provisional govt. . Reqyst following station
action with respect Aniama Tio eroup: A. Identity military
membership; B. Assess capabilities as clained; C. Indicste
if assets can be ccordinated with overall e?*5 &. Eqs pisces
Special exphasis on identifying milivary mensership Aziaca Tio
group. This important for vetting as well as enable essess .
realistically chances success7ul takeover.”

ee ee) Ree

. a. 15 March 1961

Cable froz the station:

ro
“Lorenzo (dimpy) Berry asked /a consulate employee] gor \s

small supply fregnentation grenedes ‘for ose in next week or so.'
By note, ihe chie? of station checked sack wita Wimpy and
learned the dissident group must do ELL] Troji lof this
month or drop it as number of be With loose mouths
are apperently aware renewal plan... 1. witlpy asxed for five
45 nm (sic) rapid fire weapons or sivilar,

Dietihi

2,500 rounds ammo for

Ree eta ee S

7 sO ee eee, ce me ene a rma wie fo ne MORE ACE an 2 tear
Cit

eee ae

we te ttaytin eyatee

en ae gat Bette et

Pn enter ee a ees

}
4
1


14-0000

ve tage

—/\

Pas

4
f * ole Nt
i

=», : Lk
- » OO Tragsentation grenades, . . . ten Siom tan
"

Headquarters cabled its reply:

4qs exploring possioiliti
advise ASAP. Meanvhile, request

Rerry making request on own ini
Dr. Severo Cabral? .... 2." .

!
i

L7 March 1952

t

}

oa

a . : “For issue to several fof the dissident group/ Consul j

mo Nae ‘Generel Dearborn requests three 23 calicer Smith ana Wesson H
Special pi'stois or similar and three small boxes cartrclases. j
If sending emmo complicates problez, advise end we will try i
get from Marines.

"Chief of Station reiterates suggestion. /to send in each
pouch one small size high fire power weapoo/ as Dearborn
increasingly concerned lest momentim which group has now for

assassination] decline result lack tangible or too slow action
on arms by toe U.S. Goverrment. Also security these people
increasingly of direct interest US Government which each day
_ wore involved in [the operation/. Loss of one of key peosle .
: thru capture could lead revelation details ODYCKE/SMLE=D ‘
v. : activity. Thus preferable we give them some chance defend
thenselves egainst SI4." : :

!

: 18 March 1951 -
o : Chief of Statioa Robert Oven ret for the first time with Dr. i

Severo Cabral. He cabled the results:

ae

.
.
tee Laver soeneme

ETL eg veteu er Re IT ee ea re oe

See

rd

ape

WM wet
Y

Rorrmrsiso

au

14-0000

tnt +

tios/ pian new this: Group knows
Vea ;

"Eis group Ss
identity Peuiillo'’s ais
2

ss in capi T2L.

Week OF once in two weeks. ¢.Uoes ner ape . 200; .
. lightly guarded. roux apore rently has scmeone in buil
&. _ C&2 alert thes to visit. Lhessed as aray officers, small group

will g> to entrance, distract gan with pretext, dispatch hin

. or thes in silence, enter apartment and try do [essassinatios/,
possibly including mt stress, in silence.

"To do they need five M-3 or coun mparable mechine guns and
1509 rounds e=zo for persoral defense in event Pirefignt
use gulet weapons Por. “basic job. .... . Severo Cabral
pusitica was U.S. Government get items here socnest via pouch,
or similar means. Evident he actually worried that delivery by i
otker means would coupranise entire project. Obvicus he caa ‘ !

aay
5]
ae

*
iad

. count on only one group both receive arms ard do /assassination/.

. "Dr. Severo Cabrel expects and willing risk chaos for period :

= of uncetermined lengih ater fescassination/ mainiy because for f

. cated security reasons his group canact ppreack military end hope + t

: ( é get decisive egreement support before /essassination/. |

TS ee : |

a 20 March 1951 , .

a .

ne, * Readquarters cabled the station: : , . \

: |

"Regret ns authorication exists to suspend pouch regulations 7 bos

; Sgainst shimment of arms... Will deliver to the group's 1, |

ag. representatives cutside the Dominican Republic if this feasible. :

BS Coordirated with State Department.”

fe a - 4

ui . - °

yu 22 Marca igS1

Tne station replied, in part: :

". . . we realize pemission does not now exist but

Chief of Station imows that he at last two posts received pistols
via pouch for worthy purposes, so it can te done. JuSaing =
- oe _Yef, WH not prepared take this step. If this unalteradly so then

Lt

Wika att he I me ee ee et RR ROR Ooo ee Panwa ve nen

irr ceed ER RT EN AH iA ate
nw

By


14-0000

please continue
+ « « Or izport

for arms, whaters

but the excerpt dees not fully reveal the contentious toze of the
os

cable. On 25 Marco, Headquarters, in a cable released by the DD/P

i
'
The above excerpt is the most significant point in the ‘cable,

(Bissell) undertook to set Owen straight. The cable gives a fairly
complete statement of U.S. policy and o3jectives and of Gwen's

we responsibilities. It i3 sumsarized here. We Support a program to
replace the Trujillo regize; we wish to avoid precipitate action if
pianning is not well organized, as appears to be the case; machine
guns and armunition will te supplied to demonstrate good will to the

dissidents; the requested revolvers are being pouched. Eeadquarters

4 +
ms
t
‘

enn ee ee ere nn

is planning with State egainst the eventuality of sudden action by

the dissidents that might result in the forming cf a new goverment
"If above clarifies .agqs position, Oven should proceed accordingly.
In event major points resain unclear, State Depariment preparing

k . orders permit return for consultations.” ;

: ‘ Comment: We do not know whether Om replied to this cadle
: P.

afar.

or not. We do not find a reply in the files. Owen did gO to

headquarters for consultations about 5 April, but we cannot
ag .

A - 3T-

* It is apparent from the EMOEED operational files that no ams were
ever air-drovoped or delivered by sea.

stiagLoat Ahoy MT iagy a

»
a ne RE Se nn OO

SOL SME TT ee nt ae treet Fee pe ee ee ere mn ee

eee ce ~ te eee

we
ij
a
“ mover ann.


14-06000._

establish that the trip wes a direct result of ‘this cable. Taere

etm! ON A EARN a ON BERT ZORENRNS

is some evidence that suggests that the trip may. have been in

connection with a } request from the dissidents for submachine ... «

‘guns.)

ritegl ey areas

26 verch 1961

:Cadle from the station:

STAG To riiLing tees

ms “ "For Dr. Severo Cabral request permission pass three semi-
automatic M-l carbines 30 caliver and supply ammo which avaliable
consulate from departed naval personmel. Would need from Has
nine 30 cartridge magazines for vespons. hKequest_ prompted by
- Severo Cabrai nute <5 March wnich says he cannol hoid group
togetuer beyond April 15 without arms delivery. .....
(Ccmment:. It way be helpful to interrupt the chronology
at this point. As we will later explain, these carbines were
actually passed to the dissidents. They were in the hends of
Antonio de la Maza, vho worked out the details of the assassination
- ‘ ‘and was the lead figure in carrying it out. They almost certainly |

were taken to the scere of the slaying by the assassins. We have

AEROS NW cae Se se MLM SEAL ee EVN eT Dt CB Se

no evidence that any of them vere actually fired during the shootizg.- ~ :

The little evidence ve have suggests that they were not actually

used. These -three carbines are :the: weapons referred to by various

sources as having teen passed to the plotters by CIA. We find no , : : '

° ’ evidence of aay other weapons having been passed.) po tt es Se cp Screams

_ oR tenn Wyte etceMLon ne MeN RD Ne: tech ATE MI OE aOR RTS

14-0000 -

27 Maren 1951.

Feadquarters cabled the station:

“" MPYT, ref nardware /the three pistols the station’ asked be”
_pouched/ makes fairly sizeable packege 17 lumped single shiment.. ‘
Request soonest COS estizate of risk involved sending one paczage; : L goOL
or whether split shipment ore ferable.” ; : ‘
.- (Comment: We find no indication in the files that these
‘ revolvers were ever actually pouched. We suspect they were not,

because the request for them was overtaken by subsequent events.) mo,

29 March 1961

Ecadquarters cabled the station: : : me ;

" | 4 . Hqs inclined to favor passing Severo Cabral ref
carbines and ammo. Are carbines carried on local installatioa’’-
inventory, thus requiring paper work which may olow CIA's ;
ultimate use?.. How does station propose to pass weapons in secure
manner order avoid other ODACID installation exsployees becoming:
witting they being cade available to Dominicars? Require a
Consul Cereral Dearborn's concurrence... Advise... 2. + « :
Pouchirg . . . nine magazines... ” so : :

31 March 1961
=. Se tas : .
‘The station replied: -- - = - ~ ano - nee

_ "No inventory problen.~ No parer work to skow CIA in act : w a
in. anyway. - Pian file of? serial;nimters. Will handle packaging § _ Poe
after hours. Only consulate person who kmows disposition is ; oS
Dearborn. Delivery to Wimpy Perry by the statica's female ma A
adninistrative assistant or otner CIA officer depending on what .
steps seems best here. Pearborm concurred in request end in this oT
& . message. We cannot enpnasice enough that we must make gesture of


14-p0g0g-

AOU CONE KAA O IT

wt

: .
i

7
i.

_ Headquarters cable to the station:

9 April 1961,

' Headquarters asked for the station's plan for securely passing the

good will to Severo Cabral now. ‘These itens ere not what he
asked for but they are an investment in operational continulty.
Tae security ils in his havirg these iteas is no greater thaa
his having similar items delivery which done by: more complicated
and less.cecure cache or drop." . eet ame thet ay paw oe

‘

" [Passing the three. carbines] approved. Advise Hqs when
passing.of this equipment completed.

‘ (Comment: This cable was released by the 0D/P (Bissell).)

Cable from the station:

.. “ffhe pouch forwarding magazines for the three carbines/
contained 15-bullet magazines rather than 30-bullet magazines
as requested. Pls expedite pouching 9 latter type M-1 carbine
magazines.”

Se:

Cable from the station:

“/The station's female adminis rative assistant] passed
{the three carbines/ to /iimpy Berry/ April 7. No complications.”

_ (Comment:.-The files.do not contain an account of how the
carbines were actually passed. As ve will later’sée, headquarters

subsequently poucked submachine guns for fFassing to the dissidents...

subaachine guns to the dissidents. The station replied: . "Propose © os :

use essentially same technique es that for /the three carbines/.

14-00000 ,

[ie station's female aéninistrative assistant] driving own car
will go wo lozel susermarket fitsoy Berry's] for -usual Saturday
Se ea eae morning ‘Purchases. Then to consulate to get sail. Will get assist:
trom Chief of Station in loading package or packages into car
trunk with groceries: . {Statioa operations officers will then

accompany to administrative: assistant's apartment, help taze _

groceries in. If no danger signal given by operations officer,

- fiiapy. Berry/ will arrive in personal car, pic« up items fram - cee 7" plc

operations officer at partially concealed entrance to acnini-

x
3
5
R
q
Pa
g
S
&
é
e
-

strative assistant's apartment and promptly ‘leave. Cover tor

his visit will be comercial delivery.")

April 1951

mo, . Chief, WH Division, sutmitted to Chief, RI, a memorandum requesting ©

waiver of pouch restriction on pouching weapons. "The above request

_ is submitted for the following reason: Station Ciudad Trujillo kas

‘requested. that Headquarters provide four M3 machine guns and 240

_ rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance toa small action

Group to be used for self protection.” ; ; . ; vol ere
(Comment; The entry for:18-March 1951 refers to a request . a oO

for submachine guns, but there was. no follow-up on it from tae station.

Tais pouch waiver request was submitted while the chief of station sas _ ‘

‘MIRNA ALTON ITE AE Te NFER LTP NNT BS PPE PALES IY STR I Ba EES ee EEE Se


14-0000 *

73 gyey . gs

th ashi

at heatgquarters for consultations, I: is provedle that he made tre

plea in person. .

As will be seen later, tre sutzachine guns (the -so-
culled "grease guns” of World War TI) were poucked tut approval ‘was

hever given the station to Fass them to the plotters. )

ft.

Waprth 1st; 2 |, ; 7

Headquarters cabled the station:

"Equipment for Severo Cabral /Submachine guns? which subject
of Chief of Station conversations Eqs being pouched . . . 1h
April. Prior to Passing equimment, advise Has wnat scheme of
Gelivery proposed.” .

. (Comment: The delivery scheme is explained in comment on : S 5 :
the 9 April entry.) me
4 ; ; Ane i
13 April 1961 bye ty
a An extract. froma note sent to Consul General Dearborn fron: oe : ane
é ; Juan Vicint ; . Loe : i ane
4 "The three Leica cameras, model M-1 ftbe three carbines/,
. i _.With their accessories, should be in the proper hands in a day.

or tv... .. . With the’small exomt of equimment which. they
“ are receiving they can only take action at a few specific places

and therefore the probebilities are considerably reduced and mo
the tine factor, considerably extended accordingly. With the ~*~ .
rest_of tke equinment (four Leicas, node] 4-3) [tne sutmachire °
gens] the possible places of action are miltiplied and the lost
tice greatly reduced.”

“UA Apri, 1951 - ‘

Extract fron

& note from SOCRATES /Tuis Baquero/ to DELTA


14-0000

le 235 and acvessories are fr the hands :
5 of the ones Ww u Lect ‘hey need more cameras
: in order to “ “ we hope that the geno

‘ -17 April 1991

Note from YAGUATS /Guag Vicini/ and SocraTss /Tuis Eaquero/ to
&

ee DELTA /Dearbora/:

"The last word, up to the minute in the matter o? cameras:
CRISTOBAL /General Juan Tooes Diaz/ says that with the 3 Leica
cameras alread: delivered it is impossible to us the BiSlugraunic . :
Job. He needs to heave the rest of the equirment (the & 4.3 .

Leices) before ne undertakes the job. The ones already delivered

he sees then as good ccnplenentary equimment (defensive) but he

needs the others for the aggressive part of the job. It is ny

belie? that the ores alread; delivered have served a psychological

purpose also: the ten involved have always been in doubt the .
gocd faith of your people in Wash. ‘Their feeling was that in
Several months ail they nave odtained were promises. Now they
see that you actually mean cusiness. So, now, all they are doing

- dis waiting for the heavy cazeras.”

YT April 1961

oT Headevarters cabled the station:

repeat not
yo 4 ee . 05% important [che suzechine guns7 not/be
Passed to Severo Cabrel without additional Hqs approval. Please
. . advise when equipment received and proposed scheze and timing of
B delivery." :

cw

we

PARE 3 00

2

z
‘i
i
it
=

. spb ee tenes, atte mee Orin fasten iE teeesibet ate A us.

dae y eteihte Rem e  e ee e ven ~

_ ee


1400008 2

20 April 1961

Hesaguarters: cabled the stat

« Bubsiachine cus] should be held | ia scation custody till’
further notice and not repeaz not be pascéd to [ainsy Berry/.
Tais Eqs decision based on judgneat that fillicg vacuum created
by. fassass imation] ncw bigger quest “fon whan ever:view unsettled + ;
condi tions : in Carlobdeea area.

"Request station provide foll: info soonest: (ea) Eave
[the three carbires/ been delivered to Severo Cabral? (b) -
Details onan alteraate pian to deliver /summachine mus
" Mhich. would involve ground eachinz.” :

| (Commer.ti It might be noted that this cable was. sent

Just three days after the faflure uf the Liidirg at the Bay of

Pigs.)

20. April 1961

Note to DELTA /Deartorn/ from YAQIATE and SOCRATES:

. "The officers that were to co the photographic job are not
only disappointed but really angry at the refusal of the delivery
of the other Leicas. They bave decided to give up the plan and .-
disperse, because they cammot take any more risks for nothing.”

20 April 1961 ©
Cable from the station:
» "(Submachine guns here 19 April with no-entry problems
‘whatsoever. Excellent basic vrer poping means.station's plan can :.
be sinplified even mere. ‘ire ecministretive assistant, the”

Operations officer, aad the chief of station can share (celivery
@irect to drop. Request Has advise when ve may begin.”


(Cc iment: The rrecise natum of-this cellent baste

wrapping” is not further clarified in tha. f Homan Gall
, . 2

writing in The Nev Repyolic, said trat the weapoas “were chipped

to Winpy Terry ia feed'cans. ‘Tals soudds to us.as if the cubs
ons ere packed in fnsd containers Po pouching. If co, .

we wonder how Gall leerned of this. We can state with fair
confidence that. these sutzachine @AnS were never passed out of
the consulate. As late “e as the very day of the assassinati ica, Bop
Oven sent a cable protesting tse policy that fornade his Passing
‘chen. Tais sounds as if there mist have been a leak fron the
consulate--fron one of the very faw who mew of the submachine
guns. We cannot confirm that the submachine guns wre actually
packaged in food containers for pouching. ISD has no record of

, . ; o
having done so. Jake Ssterline bas a faint recollection. of food.
containers, but not in connection with pouching. )

al April 1961

Cable from headquarters to the statioa:

. . "/Submachine guns/ snould be hel? in station custody til SY ree
further notice and not Tepeat not te Passed to > Attmvy Berry].

‘ regarding aisposition of ‘the: three mvitnen,

. . ftizpy Berry] bas given fthe three carbines/ ~
-to intermediary who holding until Severo Cabral picks up...


14-0008

(Coment: Tats “iatemediary" aprears to have been Taccas
Stocke>. The sigaificance of this end tne securizy problen it
““ posed will -becane apnarent from ore of the later entries for ~.”

31 May.)
25 Avril 1961

Cable from the station:

"Foll from Dearborn: ‘I belleve political consequence o? not
aalt wing forrmoankinua a7 - cartes. T sl. =a Un chinetann ent tus
lelfvering fowneackine gucs/ so soripus I plan go Washington within

next few days for discussion with Department and CAS Hqsi” .

26 April 1961

Cable from, the station;

"/Wimpy Berry] told Chief of Station . . . Antonio de la ; :
_ Maza plans try assassinaticn between 29 April and 2 May. ~
- Severo Cabral possibly not yet aware plen. No ssifd info ose
members aszassization effert but General. Juan. Tomas Diaz. proiab’
will aid. Will use the three carbines plus whatever else can .
get. De la Maza asks Berry add the sutcachine guns if possible
o

_8 ee we . “t

; 4 30 April 1961 _
FS Cable from the station: i
zg ar - "Following from Dearborn: April 28 Lorenzo Berry as enissary
g ', Juan Vicini and Severo Cabral called on ze with foll info: . .. .
B main mission Berry was plead with me release sutmechine guas they ‘
Fe believe in Dom Rep and under ny control. Actios group has 3 , 4
s carbines, 4 to 6 12-gidge shotguns with 120 rounds and same small :

arms... ... . Action entails roadside anbush near San Cristocal

aE

BAY et eas

SEES PR itatter ua rane erent re ron ena om

me A Om Ea


ane few u@iitional weapons portant. ... . . TI replied
I had ro sulmachine guns ur “yc coatrol a aa that any U.S.
controlled itens wrich mignt t2 in Dom Rep could only be released

-on specific euthorization from Washington. I pointed out that -

; Since. the. three-‘carcines were sade available Cuban incident had |.
occurred and hoped group could understand this is period of study
and assesment. | ‘

overthroy o ? the Trujillo “regine.."

2 iay 1961 .

Draft cable prepared at headquarters:

".... . Since it appears that ENOTH group haa committed

_ itself to action with or without additional support, coupled with
fact that the carbines already made available to them for personal
defense; station authorized pass”suamacaine guns’ to: Berry for
their additional protection on their proposed endeavor. . .'

~ (Comment: This cable was never sent. It was authenticated
: by Ray Eervert for J. C. King, and Richard Bissell coordinated, :
t. Itwas forvaried to the [2cl for release. General Cabell
" attached’ a handwritten buck-slio: "Return to: D

“ macted upon.) ©

La

Pia a! aaa
ae

a

al


g
k May 1952

RPE HEE lareee i

The Director, ata ceeting of the Special: Group, reported ao

new aati-Trujillo plot, saying that we never mew (if one of these ,

PES A

would work or note

May 195) |

Headquarters cabled the staticn:

"Regret delay out release fot the submachine guns/ avaits
Bagh level State Deparcnent decision.”

Beéay 1961 coon

‘Beadquarters cabled.the station:..

"Btate Department has disapproved passing /submachine. guns/.

16 May 1961

Cable ‘fron the station: : . : - ‘
: "For Achilles and Coerr from Dearborn: Thomas Stocker called
. on ne night May 15. Stated he euissary fran action ‘group. which.

ot plans execute action against Trujillo night May 16. Stocker's o
mission was urgently request me:to furnish group with few machine woot,
guns which it understood US agents have in Don Rep... i. ; °

(Comment: There is an usigned and almost incempretiensible

- memorandim in the EMDEED files. It is dated 17 May 1961 and conceras Subs

a meeting with Mrs. Flerida Berry. The trensaittal dispatch makes.

Bil i

it clear that the author was Isabel Cintren, “thetstation's™-

séninistrative assistant. Thais is-our £ nterpretatioa of w

Mis s Giatmoa vas trying. to says Sone tine. during the second

wimpy Berry asked Taczas Stocker to to return, the three
carbines Eerry had given Stocker for the plotters. Stocker at
first refused but fically, agreed. /Presiumably Berry then passed _.
then to Antonio de la Maza.f/ On 15 May, Stocker again saw Berry
at the supermarket, said he had the carbines back in his possession,
and his group: planned to carry out the assassination the folleving
night, The group that: was to do the Job. was Bot the group. that
‘Bersy had been working ws th on tehalf of the consulate. ' SOCRATES
_ (luis Baq:iero) arrived at the supermarket vhdle Stocker was still
with Wimpy. After Stocker left, Mrs. Berry asked Baquero if-be.
had given the Carbines back to Stocker. Baquero said he was
certain. not,..although he and.the.man who. had the. carbines and.vas. :
to do the job aia not know each other's identities. “While Mrs. .

“Berry + was talking with Baquero, the jan to whom Berry 1 had last

given’ the weapons Ggreomably Antoato de la van arrived at the
‘supermarket. Mrs. Berry asked him if he nad returned the carbizes
to Stocker. He replied that’ ke had not that that, if she wanted’

eonfirmation, she could look in the trunk of his car where he.

always carried then.)

18 Mey 1952

_.Zhere vas discussion at a Special Group meeting.of planning vith |

respect to the Dominican Repuolic. . Chester Bcvles sata he thought
that an internal State planning ‘paper outlining an ambitious
yaraatlitary plan (and.2lleging :Specisi ‘Croup approval) exceeded
the Special Group's action. Mr. Farrott's notes supported that

inpression. The following is an excerpt fran the minutes:

"General Cabell noted that the internal dissidents were
pressizg fow the release to them of certain small arms now in
U.S. nands.in the Dominican Republic. Ee inquired whether’ the

feeling of the Creup remained that thece arms. chould ust be
passed. The members showed no inclizat: 201 to take a contrary
Position at this tine.” * :

Vay 1961

The agenda of the Special Group meeting for this date proposed .
discussion of "further guidance to Dearborn re contacts vith
dissidents.” The minutes of the meeting, hovever, make no mention

of, the mubject

eT May 964

The station. cabled:

“Department from Dearborn: 'May 26 I had long talk with -
" Andreas Freitas. ...:. . Freites made'no request for arms which *
indicates group kas accepted fact it must do with what it has.

# The ‘small ams to:.which-General Cabell referred vere the sudmachine’.
guns, which were Poucked. to the station but ‘were never. Passed to the
‘dissidents. . ‘

“Ens. SLL


14-0000

His caly statereat on

th is Fubjecs was that group bas armas but
sozewhat concerned whette 7

r enough.

‘tHe stated-acticn group planning overthrov-Trujillo for =
past 3 weeks an representing enti-comunist pro-denoc ratic
elerents cf which ke member remains on brink final perforvance
“and detercined as ever. Said he could give me no cate because
stion depends whea Trujillo, follows awaited pattern which
not known .in advance. . Group has arrangement for being informed
sufficient ay in advance to get into assigaed positioas once -
signal given. He asked if United States prepared assist pro-
United States Dominicans quickly if they succeed overthrow

“Trujilio.

"I replied . . » speed with waoich assistance could be : : pO
given would be increased considerably ir we could have prior —— . oo “
info on such subjects as timing, plans for ection, personalities - oo .
aJ..  .-imvolved. anc identity of proposed junta. .-. . . . Hé replied cbc eets
participants were not prepured give tinir nanes until afterward my
end could not give tice for reasons stated earlier. . ..- -

"Re timing Freitas stressed event could happen any day and
could in fact have happened 3 times in last .2.weeks’ except that
necessary juxtaposition of forces did not materialize.” .

. 29 May 1961

__..- Headquarters, cabled the station:

‘ oss: "For Dearborn from State ..... . We must not run risk
Of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S.. ..
- as matter of general-policy cannot condone assassination.’ Tht
-“last-principal is overriding and” must” ‘prevail An d6éubtful
situation. . . .. . You must request and receive further . pee
specific instructica for any. specific covert activity. At the : Lae - i .

present time we are unable to transfer arus to dissidents. .....” a >

Deardorn and the chief of statica sent

: ci (Coments | Both

1400000, +

in Ciudad rujillo.on 33 May but were not received in Vashingtoa

until the early morning hours of 31 May--about eight hours .

“afver the assassination took place: Excerpts follow.)
31 Mav 1051

Cable. from the station:

"State frou Teartorn.... . If attempt is made by U.S.

friends assassinate Trujillo there will be accusations against

us and best we can do.is see there is no proof. Greatest danger

point is Thomas Stocker. He was given small number arms by
dissident agent to hold several days and has told several persons

dissidents obtained these items fren consulate. Stocker toid me |.
- Same and I have inforzed him this cannot. be true or I vould know
‘and when he requested ce supply arms through him for dissidents

I told him this impossible. .....

Cable from chief of station:

"Aseuse /the 29 May policy cable from State to Dearborn/ is’
final word on present policy on which CIA work here sust be based.
This for practical purposes -retreat from -previous policy...

However 4qs aware extent to vhich U.S. Goverment ‘already:
associat?i with aseassination. If we are to at least try ‘cover
up track:.' CIA personnel directly involved in assassination
preparation must be witkcrawn now. . ... . If assassination
- tried and not successful, immediate evacuation of the chief of -
> station, the operations officer, and the administrative
assistant mancatory. . - . -

.

CB
- AY.
~PEES rey ao

Seti 1 MYpocetcemreenonttesacanmngareccime asim


14400000,

31 May) 1951

Received in Head quarters Signal Center at 0341 hours,

. Washington ‘tine: °

FLASH SECRET CRITIC CIA CIUDAD TRUJILLO “RMAER 1. APER 2.
SOURCE DISSIDENT IN DIRSCT TOUCH: WLIH DISSIDENT ACTION Group (c). =.”
SOURCE A 2330 HOURS LOCAL TIM2 30 MAY RECEIVED PREARRANGED SIGNAL
WHICH MEANT TRUJILLO MITIED BY ASSASSINATION GAMZ MICET, AMERICAN.

| CONSULATE PERSONIEL ENCOUNTERED RCADBLOCKS ON CTUDAD TRUJILLO RIO
LEADIA SUPER HIGHWAY AT ABOUT 0030 SOURS LOCAL TIME 31 MAY. Boe
“INDIVIDUALS FORMENG BLOCKS APPEARED HASTILY ORGANIZED MILITIA ONLY

FEA OF WHOM ARMED Wid FIREARMS OTHERS WITH AACHETES. NO ; =

CONFIRMATION TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION AS OF 0100 MAY 31. FILED 06002.

_ 6200 Washington tine/

ANAL: QUIS:

(Comment :. The e station's follow-up operational cable
identified the source of Crit‘c Fo. 1 as Lorenzo (wispy) Berry,

“who @ gave the information in person hed Consul General Pearbora

“and catet of Station Oven at ‘the consulates “At about 0100 hours,
: Dontatcan tise, J Andres ; Freitas _velepnozed Dearborn "to ask

oo cryvtically whether.'ve nad-the news." Freitas said he would add

“details vhen he had. them.) Co —_ 7 a

Memorandum. for. the record sigzed. by J. D. Esterline; ‘in part

_, "Fhe evening of 2 June, it was decizad to immediately *:

"move out of the Dominican Republic the Station Chief Cven, and
Case O-ficer Cookson. It was also decited that Administrative
Assistant Isabel Cintran should rot retusa to Trujillo. Accoré-,
ingly, an operaticcal immediate cable was seat to the Station
the afternoca of 2 Juce issuing aporopriate instructions.”

\

9 Jane 1961

Memorandum for the record signed by J. C. King, subject:
."High-Level Meeting on Dominican Crisis"--in part: ‘

-"The reeting vas held at 1800 hours on 5 June 1961 in Room
7514 of the Departzent of State. Among those ‘present were Vice
Presicent Ljndsa Jchnson, Secretary McNamara, General Llemnitzer,
Under Secretary Bowles, Deputy Under Secretary “Alexis Johnson,
Mr. Ed Hurrov, Chlef, USIA, Mr. Arthur Scalesinger, Mr. Richard
Goodvin, Mr. Ted Achilles, Mr. Wis Coerr,. Mr. Morales Carrion :
‘and Mr. Janeson. ; :

"Wice President. Lyndon Johnson referred: to another message ~ |
fran Consul.General Dearborn which was in an alarmist tone as to
the possibility of implicating the United States‘in the delivery of
arms to the dissidents. ‘The Vice President then asked what. :

. Was the timing and authority on the delivery of arms.” —

(Coment: Tne message to wich Vice President_Joanson-

referred is not in the EMDEED ‘operational files. We didnot ;

find a copy in.a search of Cable Secretariat archives. Jake
Esterlize, who appears to have ridden herd on post-assassination

planning, does not recail having heard of Vice Presidént Johnson's


query.

Tee record. suggests that he znew of it bat -dcestnot now

. remenver.. There is an unsigasd memoranda in
Dominican ate
The Fenorandum summarizes State Departzent- Consulate involvenent
in having weapons furnished to the dissidents. Tae routing acd
record sheet attached to the ~eporandim snows it vas originated
by Jotin Poulter, \fH3/DR2H, acd was forwarded to C/0Ps fax

(Esterline). - Esterline initialed the routing and record. sheet

oe

and returasd the pemorandia to Poulter. This ELazests to us.

that J.C. King, upon returning fren the nesting at State, asted:

Esterline to have a summary pulled toget toner.

J.C. King remenbers the. meeting.at which the Vice. President
asked about the delivery of arms. He does not nov recall the
"specific query. Re-reading his menorandim record of the meeting
leads him to believe that the Vice President's question was

atrectea to one of the State representati ves. Ee feels that,

ae, it had been directed to ‘CIA, he would have made rention of

..-that fact in-his recor2 o? the meétizg.

A renorandwm for the record prepared by J.'C. Firzg of a Walte

' House meeting on the Dominican crisis Ga’ 7 June 1961 makes no rention

“? | ~ of U.S. involvement in passing veapons to the assassins. The meeting” 6

was chaired by the President, and Vice President Johnson was present.


14-0000

The preceding, quite detalles, and ealcost wholly a dou “umentary

account of U.S. Goverment involvement with persons plotting

the < overtirod sof ‘Trajille ‘carries through the actual assassination:

chat vas to ‘follow

garly in the report we explained. way the cou
the assassination never. took place. Another essential pers, of ‘the - .
story is the roll-up of the essassination exoyp and the discovery .

of U.S. “4dnvolvement with them. ‘The ccnsulate cabled through CIA

channels on 9 December 1961 that ine 7 Deceate

. _ TDoeninican newspaper La Nacion carried.a story

TO " . based ca Huascar Tejeda Pinentel's statement ae

. to Judge of “Instruction that Wiepy (lorenzo A. Berry)
eo provided the caliber 30 M-1 Carasd autcmatic carbines used

to kill Trujillo.”

Wimpy's involvement with the plotters, including passing weapons
from the U.S. consulate to them, beceze Imown to the Dominican
_Miittery Intelligence. Service (SIM) as early as 3 June from-its.

_ Anteirroga tions of ‘the captured ‘assassins. The following summary

“is arava fran the Fst's report of its interviews of Ortiz, the. ‘SIM

; officer who ‘peadea. the investigation ‘of the the assassination.

Immediately after the slaying, all of the assassins assembled

at the house: of General Juan Tomas Diaz. Dr. Robert Reid Cabral
_ was called to treat the most seriously wounded assassin. Dr. Reid

was the cousin of Dorald Reia Cabral, cne of the key political plotters,

- Dut appears not to have been in on the plot himself. Since Dr. Reid

14x00000-

. a,
in being called a3 a Physician learned the igenticies of the ascassins,

General Diez 5212 be could not allow Dr. Refd to go free. General

Diaz ‘fc forced, Dr. Pai

mish refuge ‘in Reid's house for four

‘of the assassins (Cereral Diaz, Antonto de la Maza, Salvador , ane

Estrella, and Roberto Pastoriza). tA ne Other assassins vent their

Separate ways.

Within hours after entering Dr. Reid's house, General Diaz

. and nis three companions began to panic, tv might be noted here

‘that the assassins vere so sure that the coup would follow and they TE

would all be national heroes that they haa made absolutely Jrnow

plans for hiding or escape.) De la Maza called for Mrs. Reid. end - ms

ordered Dr. Reid aut of the room. De la Maza thereupon raped Mrs:

Reid in the presence of his ce=panicns. Pastoriza and 2strella \ vere

“highly incensed over the rape. Pastoriza left the house soon after

& near-fight and @ drayn-weapons confrontation. Estrella left after
@ few hours. Diaz and de le Maza left later and were killed in a.

gunfight while resisting arrest. Both Pastoriza. and Estrella vere

capturea, tortured, and confessed. Tae folloving are excerpts from

_the FBI's report of its interviews with Ortiz,

the SIM investigator.

+ + » after Pastoriza left General
a telegran eddressed to President
which said, ‘We who kaye Killed
in order to flee the Couatry.

uan Tomas Diaz composed
Roaulo Betancourt of Venezuela,
Tujillo ursen tly need your help
Signed General Jvan Tomas Diaz.'


14-0000

4
aa 4
{
Us "an
Trufflloa, and to ee
Zrem immediately to the A= =
vo code the teles i
ww fetancourt. .
t
"Reid refused to take the telegram on t! asis that he
had alveady inpliceted himsel? grestely in rough :
no fault of cin and stated that he tho was trying '
~O have hin cy asking biz to iahe i i to :
Mdimpy.! Wi thet de Maza tecate so ingensed that he i
punched Peid and rushed him around and even went so Par as to H
hold his revo ins ad of Reid's young son. Reid
then said that +b a sili the chlime: Reid family ‘
if they wished but that he would not deliver the telegram to
‘dirpy.' ,
t
"Estrella was asked to furcish what he imew concerning :
‘Wimpy's' alleged connection with the conspiracy. ¥Fstrella i
ao related that 'Wimpy' is the one who facilitated the oataining H
; of the shotgun and the automatic rifle for de la Maca and :
C at General Diaz. Ee was asked i? "dizpy' kney the purpese for

which thes® weapons vere secured and Estrella replied that ‘Wimpy!
Was aware of the purpose. Estrella further related that "Winpy’

: . works for the FSI, the State Deparssent, or same other agency :
of the U.S. Covermment. :

-"EstreLla was esxed to explain how he knew 'Wicpy' was
connected with the Americans end he replied that he nad heard
- from the other conspiretors that 'Wirpy' was the intermediary
a between tre American Consulate and the conspirators. Estrella
y Stated that 'dimpy'’ was a friend cf General Diaz, Antonio de la ,
: ; Maza and Luis Amisca Tio, and ihat 'Wimpy' bad been the inter- :
mediary through the American Consulate when these three discussed
their proposed coup with American authorities.

i "oo. . the source mentioned

. cf the conspirators whe mentioned
* were involved, they were all asked to

tL
§ officials, but nore of the conspirators were

teese officials by nace and :

functicuaries of the United States Department o
: only nane of any Aterican official which wes di

Tn rece meen mm Fee Se cone a mens Rtneenys memmerenee mee em enen
sete einer nee ce ee

4
|
2 : ivy . . . i
- i i
ge mw S .
Ses : ms : t
4
, 3 le
ied -

mesa eng ot

14-0000"

a

“ lone as tee he
ee Mee a . , .

in

Sead co

™..

« the source comme
themselves did not believe 2%

. 6 Was

Simply a method by which Amiana H 2 3 cman to give his H
approval to the plot... . 0... : cpinion ‘ i
et that time that if ths ed in

this plot, the plot would have teen much bette
the coup would have succeeded.)

y

organized and

; “4. . by the latter part 2 June 1661, the investisation :
aN, had pretty well established the identities of all the individuals c
: f ; involved in the plot, many of wees had teen arrested end ;
{ | trae" interrogated. The only ones rot ac nied for were Luis Amiama Pot
~ Tio and Antonio Invert Harreras. As previously related, General

cuan Tomas Diaz, tonio ce la Maza, and Lieutenant Arado

3 Garcia Guerrero were killed vhen resisting arrest. (At this
vO point the source related that if Geaeral Diaz, Lieut. Garcia,
: de 1a Maza, Amiama, and Invert had been capturea, and made to
ee talk, it is certain that many rany more prisozers would nave
: : been taken.)

nett dia

"As far as the source is aware, the only individuals who

‘ were arrested as a result of the assassination of Trujillo, who
Py a were brougnt before the courts were Tavares and Cenereal Roman.
red : As far as the source is aware, no other individual arrested in

eccanection with this plot wes bro
court. '‘'Winpy,' the Fes
before a court to be Reported; how
Was rot to be molested in any war <
aware, no action was takea against ‘Wimpy.?*

efore any Dominican
S$ to have been drought

crdered that he

ens eeta-tateste’ 3 cen de Oetemeemeteintcac"teemenathodahanencenmcnaammenieeneeen neta en wren tt

“TNO Ne int UF LSet Hn ofa “yay rane ema Fm

tease Se Bm Tee ee ye ate oe Bhat hee

bs

14-00000

ooh

€

and reir children were allowed ty

tic. Taey went to Florica and subsequently oF

 oeerenapteen

Berry «as given $2,000

granted the plotters in

urned to Santo Poningo and resumed :

rt

Operating their evupersarzet They, esvecially Mrs. Berry, continued

to involve themselves in political intrigues. They were staunch, . : '

Supporters cf the conservative Antonio Inbert/vessin > Yessin faction

and were involved in the actions teat led to tke overthrows of the

govermuents headed by Juan Bosch and later by Donald Reid Cabrel.

( — To recap:
a. Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom told J. C. King
7 : on 28 Jume 1960 that the U.S. Goverment was prepared to partict-

pate in the overthrow of the Trujillo regime to the extent of

providing a small oumter of sniper rifles for the removal of
key Trujillo people from the scene. Ceneral Cabell, as Acting
DCL, on 1 July 1960 approved delivering 12 Sprinsfield riPles to
the Dosinican dissidents by air drop or by sea. ‘The rifles
were never delivered.

b. On 10 February 1961 the chie? of station cabled a
Suggestion that one small-size, nigh-fire-pover weapon be

. forwarded in each pouch. ‘This suggestion was not acted upon.

ce eeige women me eee

- 59 -

,
.
sentence Rettig pee

- , sgt
4 : .
Ban

14-0000

ce

c. On 17 March 1951, the chile? of station cabled a request

of Consul Generel ‘Tearbon Tor the pouching of ‘three 38 caliber,

Smith and descon ‘Special ‘pistols for delivery to key renbers

of the dissident. group. Headquartexs was preparing to pouch

the pistols but a aprarently did not do so. ‘There is no: indication
in the EMDEED operaticral files that the pistols were actually
pouched. The request for pis sols appears to have been overtaken
by a subsqve at request Tor submachine guas. '

d. On 26 March 1961 the sta tation cabled a- request for

“pemissioa to pass three sent -autonatic MeL carbines Plus ©

‘ammunition to Dr. Severo Cabral. The carbines and ammunition
were in the consulate, having been left by departed naval personnel. -
‘The station requested that headquarters Pouch magazines. Head~-

_ quarters approved passing the carbines and ammunition -and- ‘pouched’"
the magazines. The cable authorizing passing the carbines: was
released by the w/? (Bissell). The station said it / would file

oft. the: ‘carbines! serial numbers. The station cabled ‘that. the

“carbines” were’ passed to "Wimpy" Berry by the station‘ s female
administrative assistans on 7 April 1961. , Berry, at the request
of the dissident. “Sy Gave the caroines to S. Thomas Stocker for

ot temporary safekeeping. Berry later recovered the carbines from

Stocker and gave them to Antonio de Ja Maza, who reportedly kept

14-90008)

1
Bad

them in the trunk of his automobile. It is probable that at least

one of the carbines wes taken to the Scene of the assassination

- by dela Maza, but we have no evidence that ftwas actually usea
‘in the shooting. Ortiz; the sT4 investigator, ‘tola the FBI ‘that
the assassins who were apprehended and interrogated spoke only
of the firing of a sawed-off shotgun, revolvers, and pistols.
'e.. While at headquarters for consultations in early April
1061, Chie? of Station Robert Gwen evidently provelled upon
headquarters, to pouch four M-3 submachine guns and ammunition
to the station. The submachine gms vere pruched and arrived
“at the station on 19 April 1961. Headquarters cabled the station”
on 17 April that the submachine guns were not to be passed to

the dissidents without additional headquarters approval. . Despite

General, Washington continued to refuse authorization to pass

them. We think it is safe to conclude that the. submachine gums

‘were never passed to the dissidents.

A final, and rather sorry, footnote: We do not Imow the oS

motivations of men-such as: Jordi Bressa, Juan Vicini, Severo Cabral,,.

Aniama Tio, and Antonio Imbert. The SIM interrogations of the plotters

1

i

|

i
" Yepeated pleas from the Chief of Station and from. the Consul _ 7
it captured revealed that they were not greatly notivated by a desire

14-00000 -

1

to live ina free acd democratic republic. Most o? them vere seeking

vengeance or personal gain. Cenerai Ponaa, who was to have taken over.

and form aa interin ‘government, aduitied that ke bad had no intention ©

of permitting Pree elections. He had planzed to establish himself
as the new Dominican. "c+rogmman” replacing: Trujillo. ‘General Juan
Tomas Diaz was bitter over having teea prolicly disgraced by Trujillo

and then cashiered from the aray. Antonio de la Maza also had 2

‘personal grudge. His bre ser, Octavio, rad been Killed by tke

Trujillos to conceal his aad their participation in the slaying
of Gerald Murphy.in the Galindez case. Most of the others also

had personal reasons for wishing Trujillo dead.


