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HY 40955 Dacld: 327423486

Document Information

SSCIA
SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.

NOTES ON GORDON GRAY

07/04/1975
72

ASSASSINATIONS
CIA

TRUJILLO
LUMUMBA, PATRICE
GRAY, GORDON

REPORT
Declassified
1B; 1c
Redact
05/05/2000

CCBOX 450

Page 1

Date : 08/06/95
Page : 1

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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
TO : :
TITLE : NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
DATE : 07/04/75
PAGES : 72
SUBJECTS : GRAY, GORDON
ASSASSINATIONS
TRUJILLO

LUMUMBA, PATRICE

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET

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DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
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COMMENTS : CCBOX 450

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HY 50955 Docld: 324235486 Page 2

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Tokmm Buk Files

From: Frederick a ee
Re:. Notes on. GORDON GRAY
Date: 7/4/75 - .
ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY _
Page Subject
wena ge 2262 aLographical background - — .
RE EBX
_._____.. #fig@x—____ — —-— - ~ -
2268 ' Opinions on PFIAB generally
_ ~ 2072- Never heard of Egecutive Action 7
- 2273 - - "T know of no plan,plot, operational organization that”
ae _ _ _ ever came to President Eisenhower with respect #0 any
assassinations," HHH (2272- 3)
2273 ta 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point progran,. ‘Saka:
ee sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda,
and the the training of Cuban refugees"
2274 There was oné wm “well known individual” on PFYAB
who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you
considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in Nor:
Vietnam". fham@iixmemithemxma Gray says that "Agency police:
° was agatist assassination on the ground that it didn't
. accomplish anything"
2275 "I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
——S capabitity Phe oes over Seen suchorized at any righ
level. of government’
2276 Bumgetdem At a meeting with Gray and a representative

of the Cit in—-1958,"the-President—teld me—that—he—wante:

the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all. activities of this

—--__ governmnent—_which—_impinged upon the sovereignty or—the——
' people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was
—very-sensitive_—tothenecessity_of having the top people

in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon

the widdom,—and—in-some cases, feasibility of those ————
kinds of operations.”

Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint ‘Congress:
al goversight committee because of danger of leake

Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office:

(either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for In

RB ERUSEBLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's
report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Rom. Rep. .wan'

ares

high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subseque

received authorization to provide them by_ the Assist. Se

hower Admin. (11/29/60;
“furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. ~~
-~"T would think our concern was, if we had that kind of

1/12/61) at. which it was agreed.

eoncérn, was with béine of Asststance to the dissidents,
and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 4


Tokux Euk Files
Frederick Bar ,

From:

Re: Notes on
Date: 7/4/75

Page
2262
REKX
Sixax
2268

2272.
2273.

2273

2274

2275

2276

2278-
2281

2292

2293

~

4

HW 50955. Doctd:

GORDON GRAY

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Subject

- Slographical--background oe , : . ve ne woe

‘Opinions on PFIAB generally

Never heard of Emecutive Action:
"I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that |
ever came to President Eisenhower with respect 0 any
assassinations," XKH (2272-3)

“In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sakmk

sabotage, stepped up economic Sanctions, Propaganda, _
and the tke training of Cuban refugeas"

' There was one wa "well known individual” on PFIARB

9

32493488

who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you a
considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North |
Vietnam", Lhem@hiamaninhemxma Gray says that "Agency policy
was against assassination on the ground that it didn't °° > 7
accomplish anything",

"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational
capability that has ever been authorized at any high
level of government" .
ee a . oo, - 2
Rugeinenm At a meeting with Gray and a representative
of the CIA-in 1958, “the: President told me that he-wanted |
the 54/12 gropp to’ pass upon all activities of this :
government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the...
people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was"
very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people
in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon
the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those
kinds of operations."

Gray is unenthusiastic about Proposal for Joint Congression
al goversight committee because of danger of leake

Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer" -
(either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)

E FRUSEHLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's 7
report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Bom. Rep. wanted*¢
high powered rifles with telescopic Scopesx and subsequentl™::

Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-
hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it Was agreed to
furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep,. °
--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of
concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,
and not assasssination, or that kind of activity." ,

Page a.

Token Kuk Files

“From: Frederick Bar t .

Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY

Date: 7/4/75

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Page Subject.

2262. Slographical background

REERX

@iedx _ .

2268 Opinions on PFIAB generally

2272 Never heard of Executive Action :

2273 "I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that
ever came to President Eisenhower with respect &o0 any _ 7
assassinations, "4KH(2272~3)

2273 In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, sma
Sabotage, Stepped up economic Sanctions, Propaganda, _
and the tke training of Cuban refugeas"

2274 There was one we "well known individual” on PFIARB me
who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you *
considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North |
Vietnam", themikmenihemxms Gray says that "Agency policy
was against assassination on the ground that it didn’t"
accomplish anything".

2275 "I know of-no (assassination) plan or operational
capability that has ever been authorized at any high
level of government! .

aa ate we . . . . . - - oe , ~ oS

2276 Emzeinhem At a meeting with Gray and a representative

- of the CIA in 1958, "“the- President told me that he wanted-7
the 54/12 Sropp to pass upon all activities of this 7

| government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the.

people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was
very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people
in government from the appropriate agencies Pass upon
the widdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those
kinds of operations."

2278-9 Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congression
al Roversight committee because of danger of leake

2281 Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer"
(either the DCI or a 8pecial Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)

2292 KR ERUSILLO: “Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's ;
report. in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Ron. Rep. wanted:
high powered rifles with telescopic Scopesx and subsequentl™-
received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy ™™"
of State through the DCI. .

2293 Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisen-

HW 50955 Docld:32423466 Page 6

‘concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents,

hower Admin, (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to
furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. ——
--"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of

and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

ae ;

These documents were pulled from a i
Spécial Group file by John Bayly. .
They should be replaced after we
xerox those minutes we intend to |
use as exhibits for the Gray testimony.

Atached mre /t a
a 01h Mtewe fr
a4 Bn exh br F, : | :

Page 7?

HW 50955  Dooldaf32493408

. GORDON GRAY

Chronolo and Issues

Biographical Background

" 19h2-1947

1949-1950
1950-1951
1951

29512-1955

1955

1958
1958-1961

1961-1975

U.S. Army (Private to Captain) ;

Department of Army (ultimately Secretary
of the Army)

Special Assistant to President TRUMAN

Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological
Strategy Board, which involved close

contact with intelligence community

, President, University of North Carolina

Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (ISA)

Director, Office of Defense Mobilization

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISE ENHOWER)
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)

Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelli-

gence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK

7]

Chronology of Events

1959

November 4

Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba
Propaganda Project" for use of radio trans-
mitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project
would meet with high level approval" provided
it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.

famover ok

“Issues and Questions

GRAY represents President EISENHOWER
at Special Group meetings.

Page a

HW 50955 Docld? 32423488

1960 (Cont'd)

February 12

February 17

March 9

March 14

April 7.

A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day:
The only record of this meeting in the NSC
minutes states: "On instructions from the
Executive Secretary no memorandum was written."
(NSC Minutes)

Special Group approves evaluation of agents
for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed

this matter with his associate” (Eisenhower)

and reported two tactical objections.
(SG Minutes)

GRAY tells Special Group that any covert-action
like sugar. mill sabotage should be undertaken
only after overall consideration of "whether

_and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO.

(SG Minutes)

At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that:
a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being
worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any

ian for the removdl of Cuban leaders should be

a package deal, since many of the leaders around
CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO," (NSC Minutes)

At a Special Group meeting, after a paper
titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba"
was read, there was "a general discussion as
to what would be the effect on the Cuban_

scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO. and CHE GUEVARA
should disappear simultaneously. (SG Minutes)

"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what
happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO

ean be kept out of the Dominican Republic.”

Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military, inter-
vention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

Why were no minutes written?

Does context show that phrase "his _
associate" refers to President
EISENHOWER?

Did such consideration involve
assassination plotting? |

Was this "package deal" the simultaneous
triple assassination plot that was
mentioned on November 3, 19607

Does this simultaneous disappearance
plan refer to assassination planning?

Is there a connection between this
Special Group discussion and the NSC
discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan
to remove Cuban leaders?

Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out
of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the
Dominican Republic? |

Page 9

324235466 ©

BW 50955 Doctld

1960 (cont'd)

April 14

April 14

June 30

July 1

July 5.

At an NSC meeting. presided over by Vice President

NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position

continued to weaken and was now quite precarious.

{he] thought further attempts will be made to kill

or oust TRUJILLO." Under Secretary of State
DILLON said “if TRUJILLO could be removed from

power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO

elements were prevented from seizing power
in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign
throughout Latin America would receive a
great boost. The Vice President agreed that
retting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable
development for us." (NSC Minutes)

Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that
one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO
was an assassination that would make CASTRO

a martyr. (NSC Minutes)

GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about
all that it can afford to take from the
CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)

Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemis-
phere Division to the Acting DCI recommending
delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic
scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The ;
memo said: “approval for delivery of these
arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."

President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of
State HERTER and others to discuss the ;
Dominican Republic. "The President thought
we should knock out of any documents on file
any reference to starting a revolution."
(Conference Memorandum)

Issues and Questions

Were these U.S.

DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S.
had an active interest in removing TRUJILL(

attempts to kill TRUJILLO?

What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"? .*

Does this show that assassination was not
a favored alternative because it would

produce martyrdom?

General atmosphere of vehement opposition

to CASTRO.

Was the Special Group aware of this action
Was the President aware of. the plan?

Purpose

of weapons?

HW 50955 Docld! 32423488

Page 10

1960 (cont'd)

July 7

July 21

Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the
Venezuelan government wants, the United States
to lead the way in breaking relations with
TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan
government was engaged in an all-out effort,
through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, .
condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO. . .
[Because] they have convincing evidence that
TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination
attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela
, . . BETANCOURT believes another attempt will
be made momentarily and therefore it [his
government } wants a showdown without dela ."
(NSC Minutes)

"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and. the
intelligence community agrees, that the
roblem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the

‘problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even

though CASTRO is the greater threat."
(NSC Minutes)

The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT
was told that the U.S. cannot act without
ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor. The U.S.
will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of .
Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to

TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that

a government in exile should be ready to go
into the Dominican Republic in the event of
TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)

GRAY said “his associates" would favor the

’ development of sabotage operations in CUBA.

(SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

'The U.S. .was under pressure to move

against TRUJILLO.

Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT
make him "fair game" for assassination in
the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.

Did the U.S. determine a successor?
Did the U.S. “act?

pad

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is=]

i=]

=H

ia)

mM

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"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisen- we
hower.— a
Does sabotage imply the further. steps 4

of assassination?

HW 50955

LE aH ey

1960 (cont'a)

‘July 28

August 12

August 16

August 25

August
(approx)

TOP SEGRE) ;

j
| Issues and Questions

President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting:

“Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get ; Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?
our Latin American friends to reach a proper ; ,

level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO."

In this regard, "the President said if we

attempted to take any action with respect to

Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation,

we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes)

BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget
for Cuban operations which was to be laid
before “higher authorities" for decision.
(SG Minutes)

Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to , ' aware of this? Co
be treated with lethal poison for use against :
CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21).

After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA
operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented,
however, that his associates had expressed

Is this circumlocutious order for
assassination from the President? An
‘indication that at the least, assassina-
tion was within the range of acceptable
means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?

and he wondered whether the plans as outlined
would be sufficient to accomplish this .-.. . It
was finally agreed that planning for the Congo

would not necessarily rule out 'consideration'
of an articular kind of activity which
might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA."
SG Minutes; emphasis added)

At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS ‘suggested that
the U. S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful
means." (NSC Minutes)

BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts . Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES
with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation aware of this? Was it authorized by

Page 12.

e32493488

thee

HY 409545 Docld:

1960 (cont'd

September 8

September 21

‘October 2)

a

November 3

During brief discussion of CONGO developments,
“GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in
the field are fully aware of the top-level

feeling in Washington that vigorous action would

not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)

Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that

"LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a
reat danger as long as he was not disposed
of." (NSC Minutes

At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported
that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted
to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of
October. The U.S. had prior information

of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO ...
(NSC Minutes)

At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT.
“asked whether any real planning has been done

‘in taking direct positive action against FIDEL,

RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without
these three the Cuban government would be
leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded
that it would be necessary to act against all
three simultaneously."

The minutes further state: "General CABELL
pointed out that action of this kind is
uncertain of results and highly dangerous
in conception and execution, because the
instruments must be Cuban. He felt that,
particularly because of the necessity of
simultaneous action, it would have to be
concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is
beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)

Issues and Questions

Against LUMUMBA personally? —

Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of"
LUMUMBA by assassination?

. Did. this information prompt the U.S.

to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA
in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?

Was MERCHANT referring to an assassina-
tion of Cuban leaders?

Shortly before this, CIA had made the
assassination contract with the Mafia.
Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA
contract? . Was General CABELL expressing

a traditional CIA objection to assassina-

tion proposals? If so, on what other
occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA
objection?

Bage 13

ihr

HW 50955 Docld!32423498

1960 (cont'd)

December 29

1961,

January 12

Late Jan.—
Early Feb.

Ata Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave
the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan
for proceeding with certain limited covent

activities directed against the TRUJILLO

regime, but "he also emphasized that the
roposed actions would not of themselves -
bring about the desired result in the near
future, lacki some decisive stroke against.
TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes Source:
Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott,

of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960,
02752)

. 5
Special Group approves the State Department

proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited
Supplies of small arms and other material
Should be made available for dissidents inside
the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." SG Minutes;
emphasis added) a

DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish
an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project

. SRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying

that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by

the White House” to establish such a

capability, including the capability to assassina-
ate political leaders.

Issues and Questions

TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 3
1961.

Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group
propose to approve aiding Dominicans
who might assassinate TRUJILLO to
effect such a "decisive stroke"?

Were these assassination-type weapons?

If not, was this Special Group action -
used as implicit authority for sub-

‘sequent provision of weapons for the.

assassination of TRUJILLO?

Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated
or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis
tration?

.Fage i4

HY 50955 Docld?32423488

GORDON GRAY: Short Summary

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President
EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects
-were discussed: “any particular kind of activity which might contribute
-. to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to
TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the
U. S. wishes to move against CAS'

Gray' s testimony should involve the following questions (see attached
list of exhibits):

_ CASTRO

1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meet-
ing when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban. leaders should
be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab EB)

2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke:
at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14
Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and
Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"?.
(Exhibit at Tab F) ;

3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960,
the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to
be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab 0)

4, Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960
Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an
assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)

5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant
referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether plan~
ning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel,
Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that
Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the
fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with
the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)

TRUJILLO
1. Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination.at the April 14,

1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a
favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H) ;

RW 50955 Docld:32423488  Page.15

_

=a ; ~2-

2. Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that
Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960,
by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery
of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo Opponents?
(Exhibit at Tab YZ) ;

3. when President Eisenhower was reported at the July ‘28, 1960, NSC meet-
' ing to have said that “until Trujillo is eliminated . . .", was he
referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)

4. On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available
.“small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these
assasSination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights
‘referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12 ©
meeting) ;

5. Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of -
Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican
dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)_

LUMUMBA

1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting
that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the
necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to

‘assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was
objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)

' 2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960,
that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the
top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be
amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at
Tab S) - ,

COMMAND and CONTROL

What was the command and control system for covert action operations
in the Eisenhower Administration?

Pertinent Relationships

President. Eisenhower Gray was the President's liaison to the
: intelligence community and the National
Security Council (including | the Special

Group).
DCI Allen Dulles Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
DDP Richard Bissell - _.. Gray new Bissell well. Bissell initiated

the CIA~Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate
Castro and the Executive Action capability.

FB/RKK
(1/8/75

HW 50955 -Docld: 32423449. Page 16 _

TO: Frita Schwarz and Curt Smothers SECRET
FROM: Frederick Baron
’ DATE: July 6, 1975

GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security

Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER
at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed:

‘any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of
LUMUMBA;'' provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the Dominican
Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:

- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or
explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts
against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?

- To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders .
authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER,
Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?

- What were the general command § control practices?

Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:

- Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

- Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

-. Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division: to the Acting DCI. _

- Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS

President Eisenhower , Gray was the President's liaison to the
intelligence community and the National
_ Security Council (including the Special Group).

DCI Allen Dulles Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
DDP Richard Bissell =~ +~—«<Gray ‘mew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the
; CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO
and the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability. |

President Truman Gray was Secretary of the Anny and
Special Assistant to the President

Livingston Merchant _ Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs

representing the State Department at Special
Group meetings.

HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page i7

EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*
Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

‘Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Lumumba —
Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Trujillo —

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 18

: err) be ee weet
a \ “ ™ Nw,

3 November 1960 _ cS
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
Gen, Lansdale : ;

* J

1. . Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for
problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said’he
would check into the progress of the State Department group which
has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group leunched into a far-ranging discussion of
the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas,
supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that -
pernaps things have now progressed toa point where covert activities
of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective.
Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray
cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt
on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the
population in ways which the Communists have developed so weil, The
latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally
thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that
this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of
exiles under CIA control. Now the sare people are beginning to feel
more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic
deprivations being experienced by tne middle and upper classes, time
ts actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he
foresaw that there would occur 4 point in time beyond which covert

intervention would not do the job. - cre

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to
Nelean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.
He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to-mount a
simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt)

sy TL
peeve)

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HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 Page 19

ee nee a be ce ee meee - : : 1 ; . soe voce ee : 7 ‘

We uted “ a ae Woden

: intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the Beneral conclusion
‘of which was that such action on our Part would not be desirable, but
that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo
this would almost certainly mean war, Mr. Gray said that he had had

order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point,

‘7 He thought it essential that the Policy of the U.S. should be completely
understood by rTesponsible officials, so that any Overt Cuban act would»
be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant Stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting

_ Was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant
that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible
and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up
the mess." He Pointed out that if Castro's Support were such that an
uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would
be met by a hostile Population and we would be plunged into a situation

like Algeria,

_ Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell
outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the
‘reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited Specifically the
Possibility of U.N, investigation in Guatemala and the increased Scope
of the Program, which has been brought about by the increased strength
of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious
doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr,
Merchant said at one Point, that although this does not represent a
final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the Proposal
embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice Should
rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil ot

Mr, Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his
associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr, Merchant agreed
that this is where it Should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared
to move in that direction until a Survey has been made of the Possibilities
of keeping operations in the U.S, unrevealed,

CPE PIT — peers oubt y PROPERT.
Bevan TELE lt

TRE WHITE Hous.

HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page. 20...

Mr. Douglas said that in any cage he would be prepared to have
the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific
locations that would be suitable. ; ;

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been
done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara.
“He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be

leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be Q

necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed _-

out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous
in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans.
He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous
action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion

igs hevand anr canahilities. b

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HW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 21

,

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EOP, Nase erent cred ed

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eo +4, Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had
not taken place because of the absence of specified communication
from the DZ, and the Escarnbray operation had been canceled because
of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed. ° ——

"that the Group had no objections. The members 50 signified.

“5, U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first
flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued
that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority basis and that
some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to
make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with
him since he "would certainly not-be available to discuss anything of
this kind before the middle of next week, '' The other members appeared
to have the same reaction. a . ~

6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles —

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken
to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and
Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA
representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if
necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,
that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; -
that is, the FBl needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups
other than those under the direction of CIA..

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would
be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and
discuss the matter at firsthand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make
arrangements for this.

J 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis
Cape Canaveral .

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

4 | CE

pad fie

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eda sh, i

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BW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 22 —-

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cn this subject, which bad been discussed with the rest of the Group
- on 20 October 1960. . a ZL

: | . THOMAS A. PARROTT

| os
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HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 23

: SUNT ES

RYO ab
BYcs Gal
12 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messre. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

. . . . ~eNeet rer Ors ae )
i . ; C wT eg a , i % a
" Coy ta) ah .
: “2, Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr, Bissell summarized the.

budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release trom the
Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year,
The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter rnillion
dollars, not including provision for the replacerment of material with an
estimated value of 1,6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency -
inventory. Since 2,5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have
been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance
reauired is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr, Dulles»
stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since
there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs
will turn out to be. Mr, Bissell stated the amounts required by major
sub-headings as follows:.

Political Action Po $s 960, 000,00

Propaganda 2,152,120,00
Paramilitary ; 8,055, 753,00
Intelligence Collection ; 833, 200,00
Counter Intelligence 325, 400,00
Communications Support ; 229, 420,00
Support 731,718.00

$ 13,287,611,00 Total

: THIS Noninv.

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HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 24 mt

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It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that

the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and

scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not

\ state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the
estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was_ ,

agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher .

authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the
next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions.
involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but
because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial
expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance
that the operation was to go forward,

pees

ime

. .¢
Wee De
RICHARD M, BISSELL, JIRe ;

Deputy Director.
(Plans)

PUTO ON _ PROPER
7 ate OnLy . TRE WHITE WOUL. Uri

SEGHET ee

BW 50955 Docld: 32423483 ‘Page 25


, .
e , .
“ey .

TOHOREDU POs Acting Director of Central Intelligence —
Viss Deputy Direstor (lans)

SUDJECTs - . Glondesting Delivery of roa to Oppoattion Losdertntp
4a tho Dominican Republic.

é

4. ‘Dis mezorandws: racomonda action by the acting Dircetar of
Central Intelligence. such recommendation io contained in pora §,

2. Yolo setansadar Varlend vas in tho. Doainicen Republic, a prime
cipal leazer of the onscaition requestod that o Lisdted meter of ares ba)
nado available waich could be used to preaipatete tee overthrow of tho
rezine of Cornernl imfeal Loonidsy Trujillo, These arms presizably would
cba used aguinat kay nenbera of the trujillo regines.,

Within rocent tonths, the Tyo recine hee becone inerensingly
wistabla dua to prowing opposition within tho professional and middle
clasnoa to the excesses of tha dictatorghio. «alitical oprression of
thove groups haa brow:ht about suvarely strained relations betweon the
Cathalic Church amd tho Trujillo reqize. iiost kLuowlocgoable sources have
been prodiating that the fol of the recine du dminent. —

Sines the fall of tho Trujillo reriza unscara inevitablo, ia to the
_ intercat of tua Uec. thet our relations with tho opposition ba aa closa
on poraihic, rroviding the arna-as requestad would cantricute slgnifi-
contly toward this end.

3. It is proposed to proce ond doliver to undorzroursl opposition

forces in the boninican Republic twelve (12) sterilo Uese rifles, iedel

| 1903 (Springfield), with telesconie sichts, together with five hundred
(500) rounds of czvunition for ‘ease. fms ond asumition are immediately
available at HOsn0i decoty anpraxinate cost 46 22706. It is planned to
deliver those weapons by cir throurh bv) fecilities provided orrancocents
can be varxed out uith the opposition for thoir rocestion, LU! they cannat

_ bs delivered by air, plisnsa ore currently boing stinicd dn the Ca star’ for
delivery by cea, : 7

4. Approval for dolivery of thess orret han boon sven ty Ansistent i/
Socratary of Stale Joy Aubottom, vio reguerta thet the arms be placed in a
‘the hands of the opposition at the cerliest pasaible noreate [:
Q EMT TY ; ° PROT of ne y oF

rare ty aac
“ qe WHITE oust O16

-
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of CRET

HW 50955 Docld: 32423403 Page726 a


S. It 4s recomondoed that the opposition in the Dosinican Bepablia
be provided the orn as requested.

' Brox

— Chior Te
Western Lontechers Diviston

eat DDCr

CQictwas
Deputy Pirostor 7 Date the recomandation contained. in
(lana) _ paragraph § 4s epproveds
| Sanita
ernie terete net
Director of Central intelligence
O JUL joe
| Pate 2) JUL josh
DDP/WH == kb (1 July 60)
Distributions .
Qeig & 1 - Addressee
1 DDCI
1 — DDP
1 ~ C@S

4 = C/nD

PROPERTY os
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SEGRT <  omesa

HW 50955 Docld:32423493 Page“ 27 =<

_ 29 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

y ;
3, Air Drops - Cuba

‘Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in
the next three days, | _

é

t co . —_——

5. Dominican Republic Se ae

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for
‘proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the
Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given
to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para-
military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of

_ requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions
would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future,
lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it Oo a
should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that OO
“Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic.
should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The
consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent.
However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time
no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

“6, Cuba
Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with 7
Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points:

' (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of
individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if
possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with

, other countries, some time before January 20th.

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| THE WHITE Hous.

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a | _ greeer ree gy So

NW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page: 26

ae wo

© be i bee tan i

a - oo 12 January 1961

- -¥EMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meet

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant,

V f i . ;
\ . 3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front

Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General .

ing, 12 January 1961 4 |
/ _

Gray, irwin, Dulles. a

a

Goodpaster to the effect that ala i
rge delegation from the bove- i
group reportedly, will visit Washington on Saturday , overmentons
+ / °
W V5, Contingenc

. Mr. Willauer outlined 4 proposal to es .
of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff

consisting of representatives

to draw up contingency plans covering the p

overt U.5. forces.

All members agreed
Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report
for the meeting of January 19th.

é

‘ / 7, Capture of Supplics in Cuba_ .
Yn answer to a question, Mr. Barn

tablish a task force

ossible eventual use of

that such planning is an essential step.

of the task force be availabic

4

ORE

es gave details of the Cuban
e cache.

wo airdrops plus on

government's capture of materiel from t
PROPERTY Sy! d THIS DoT
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50955 Docld:32423488 Page 29

d

- f9, Dominican Republie

Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State
that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made
available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott oe
. Said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that
the plan would call for final transportation into the country being .
provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.

Vil, U-2 Flights - Vietmam
ee ne .

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the

three successful U-2 flights over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not

been.covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission

to cover that area as soon as the weather permits, :
The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after |

January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing results,

for the meeting of the 19th, . ;

| _ eranry ¢VvTe eM
oe i ate - Pe Lh
oO PRUPERRY 0

| THE WHITE HOUSE uric ;

HW 40955 Dorld:32493488 Page 30 —

. 4 Cad lee ee C)

3 November 1960 a 4
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen, Cabell,
Gen. Lansdale

/

1. . Cuba

“

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for
problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant saidhe ~-
would check into the progress of the Strate Department group which.
has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of
the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, ' '
supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that ,
perhaps things have now progressed toa point where covert activities
of the type originally envisaged for CLA to undertake will not be effective.
Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray i
cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt :
on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the
population in ways which the Communists have developed so weil. The mm
latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally
thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that
this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of
exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel
more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic
deprivations being experienced by tne middle and upper classes, time
is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he
foresaw that there would occur & point in time beyond which covert

oe
‘

intervention would not do the job. ; ; fot Tas

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to
“clean up'! the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force.
He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-pbacked exiles to mount a
- gimulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

PROPERTY [* GENT

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HW 50955 Docld:32493488 Page 31.. a ; a ~ : _

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. intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion
of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but
that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo
_ this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray’ said that he had had
‘the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in
_ erder to be able to arrive ata top-level decision on this very point. a
- He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely. —.
understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would ,
be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated thar, apart from any attack on Guantanamo,

he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting

_was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant ~ ae
‘that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible
and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up

' the mess.'' He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an
uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would
be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation
like Algeria.’

‘Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell
outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the
reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the
possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope
of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength
of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious
doubts as to whether such activity could be kept atall secure. Mr.

- Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a
final conclusion on his part, he ‘is inclined to think that the proposal
embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; thatis, the choice should : oan
rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or
preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his ©
associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed
that this.is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared
to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities
of keeping operations.in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this: connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using
a refugee organization - either an existing one or a’contrived one - to
backstop the operations. ,

pal cl ote. —
peor
ecenty To My PROPERT’ w"
ree, Ee Se Rt
wot at ae ee anor er

THE WHITE HOJS. o.)..

HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 32_ ns

me wet a me et fa os

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have. i
the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific &
locations that would be suitable. {

, :
i
f

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been LS
done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. | Og
“Be said that without these three the Cuban Government would be . ; Jy
leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded thatit would be — 7 fo
" necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed 4
out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous” ;
in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. .
He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous i
action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion _

fe

ig hevand aur canahilitier.

sy PUTS Ey pRorerry te
Spr c) Give tHe white xoust Go: ot

HW 50955 DoeId:32423488 Page 33°

HW 50955 Docld: 32423483 ._Page 34°:

. 4, Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar'de Rio supply mission had
not taken place because of the absence of specified communication
from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because
of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed See
_that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

“5, U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first
flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued
that we are analyzing the exact results ona priority basis and that
some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to
make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with .
him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of
. this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared
to have the same reaction.

6, Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles:

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken
to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and
Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA ©
representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if —
necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however,
‘that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take;
that is, the FBl needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups
other than those under the direction of CLA, © ,

The Group agreed that the best-way to attack this problem would
be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and
discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make
arrangements for this. t

J 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis|
Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

Teen

an rene rn ;

ae [ oes mR PSY
ie = Y : . f oe "
P, cs eee th a L. eee 4

) bad TH be iva

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group

on 20 October 1960. “on

. THOMAS A. PARROTT

wn .

Coed LEE es | -
Silas’ 7 Ei Uiiad -
— .

cy

HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 35.

SECRET
EVES Gl

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeti

12 August 1960-

ng - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

a aes eT OUTS _)
, (te: et, tot i ‘ wy
. a Sr a .
™ ; Ci lated ins a) Vode
: “2, Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr, Bissell summarized the

budget which had been prepared as a basis

for seeking a release from the

Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year,
The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million

dollars, not including provision for the rep

lacement of material with an-

estimated value of 1,6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency
inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have
been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance
required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr, Dulles
stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since
there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs

-will turn out to be, Mr. Bissell stated the
sub-headings ag follows: ;

amounts required by major

Political Action POE § 960, 000,00
Propaganda — : 2,152,120,00
Paramilitary 8,055, 753.00
Intelligence Collection 833,200.00
Counter Intelligence 325, 400,00
Communications Support 229, 420,00
Support = 731,718.00
$ 13,287,611.00 Total
pyuper ie S ma o
THE WHITE ROUSE OFFICE EVES GY Y

SS CSERRET

HY 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 36


_ It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that .
the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and , ,
° scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not
state that they had reviewed in any detail the mammer m which the
estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was
agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher
authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the
next ten days, This was believed to be wise, not because any actions
involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but
because the Agency would goon become committed to various substantial
expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance

that the operation was to go forward. wv.

“Wits 4, Vane

RICHARD M, BISSELL, JR. [
' Deputy Director
— : , (Plans)

tae

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HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 37


25 August 1960

. - tet

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

“1, Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly. three (or as Mr. Dulles later
described them ''2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in ©
mounting an anti- Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:
operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;
the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of —
no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alieged
leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the
latter had just Come up and that we are now in the process of assessing
.the bona fides and capabilities: of the individual. . vos

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much
in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had
expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very
straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether
the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles
replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had
every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits
or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself ina
position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of
necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the
Congo would not necessarily rule out ''consideration" of any particular

kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have
given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic
Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In
this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been

made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the , cma
assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not aeajr te
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outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, put that he is obviously
-well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other
jndividuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church

hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black
Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this,
- put added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

‘

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HW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 39°

NN V4, Cuba

_ ‘The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing
contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection ;
he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which mil
had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities ;
(after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

2. He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of
approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer
to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating —
the tactical combat phase.

* Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray
that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as
a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that -
he would like Gray to look into. ~ oy

:! One of these had to.do with the statement by Macy that in his
discussion with CLA representatives in connection with the latest
withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence!" that any

effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had
answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and
Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. ) ,

. The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

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HY 50955 -Docld:32423498 Page 40

wud “Lib wish

know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,

particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration

of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had

pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken
_with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies. )

_ In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first
‘ point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with
Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail
all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was ata loss to
understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA
is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer
to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -
and had developed at considerable.length - the thesis that our view
was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just
why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the
steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and
to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the
point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V
‘for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, . without the
participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the
country. ©

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good
deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and
cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion
of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had
issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly .
as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as —_—-
to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this
was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance
of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans!
point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do
so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future

‘ and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as
appropriate. : ,

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the. political
ideas of-these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be
clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He
added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these
politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement
of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD
together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

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to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group
views. :

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related
point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that
Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given oe
adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a
concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -
of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn

of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the
necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact
directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up. Ze.

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WW 50955 .DecId: 32423488 Page 42

While agreeing that the Government could not take an official ;

stand, Mr. Merchant. expressed his personal opinion that if the f
companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a
great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent
on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet
emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any

- economic crisis that might be precipitated in this WAYe.

Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the |
sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized ;
that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of _—
this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of .
whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro, |
Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it
wa's possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those
contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any. concerted acrass-~
the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will
have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in
Cuba. Sea

- It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be
held on Monday, March 14th,’ to consider what might and should be
done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members, .
Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps
Colonel Lansdale should attend. , oo

\

There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to
Mr. Merchant, It developed that the attachment to’this letter has now
been given the status of a JCS document but that it hassnot been forwarded ..
to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held
up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant
said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS
paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.

Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on
whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably
in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed
through the Scott office.

proper’ y

FAPTT “era Ney THE WHITE HOLS.
SEErE -Eine USLT

. . Vole

HY 50955 Docld:32423485 Page 435

7 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting,_ 7 April 1960

PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell

x%

4, Dominican Republic
’ Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add
on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered
by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting.
General Cabell replied that he would only like to add the comment
that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any
arrangements for an orderly succession to bimself, but that he will
either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice,

& la Batista.

. Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo,
specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic.
General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the
Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well
become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such,
to the country in the immediate aftermath ‘of the demise or flight of
Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that
there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move
of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect
some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the
“memory of the Marine occupation.

Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously.
of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican Republic
‘via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro. effort to be an
amphibious one. He said that this plan has not yet been formally _

poe

at 7 4. Guba
Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational

arrangements for interagency groups considering the continuing

- development of the Cuban situation. In this connection he expressed
some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or
conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him
that the top people in USLA are aware of CIA plans and there should.
be no crossing of wires. 7

wp ca peg pew ; , wire HOUSE UE
 REPRET EYES OMY oe

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28 April 1960 . ;

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD a —
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 2& Aprik 1960 : —

"PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles

Mr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an
obseryer. - :

\ . / 8. Cuba

Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the
organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been
7 established to ‘deal with the Cuban ‘situation. He noted thata number

of different groups and committees, with varying interests and
objectives, are concerning themseives with this situation and that
there seemed to him to be no "chief of staff'' to whorn all could look
as a central point,

He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr.
Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence, ae
Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himself —_——.
of the general outlines. of what has been going on in the Government. .
Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official
available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day
troubles, and that since this official should be of such a stature as
to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. Hare had been ‘decided
upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability. . -

In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought
up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations
with respect to Cuba. ; ~ .

Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at
staternents and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba.. Mr.
Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign
Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for semen
this kind of thing, and that it does not represent the feelings of
- Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's background and describe

him as a "twisted personality. " PROPESTY :
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BW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page “45

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19 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale;
Gray; Dulles and Bissell

/ 2. Cuba

; Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting
more. burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than

‘that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann

believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S.,;
but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly

if an increase in numbers is contemplated: Therefore, the only solution,

would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries;
this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists

_ with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point

with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take

another look at Cuba andif the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains’

PROPERTY
He WHITE HOU

unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This
would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a govern--
ment in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some
training in the U.S.

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HW 50955 -Docld: 32423486 Page 46


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Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training
anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we
could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that
he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of
our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before
the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than
in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embar-
rassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments
it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of
Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry
out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied
that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would .
be acceptable, particularly in the U.N,

Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with
Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have
developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investi-
gation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He ~
said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established
in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into
the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same
way as Guatemala.

Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for
constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate
future and some over a period of longer range. They include:

a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly
designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story
could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long
or how. effectively. -

b, A guarded military facility in the U.S. This !
could be handled more securely, but the existence of
an area where peculiar things are going on could not
be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be
private property such as the King Ranch, but this would
take longer to arrange than a.military base,

‘c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly
remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already

trying to get the U.S. Marines out.

20° ORs
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HW 50955 Docld:324293488 Page 47

d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure
but would require a large amount of airlift. ,

e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this
location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost
certainly know where they were. .

Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available,
such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that
the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation
with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also
that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be
effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has _
been contemplated to date. Gen, Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel
were of the same opinion.

Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the
current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was
different than itis now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable
amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray
wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be.. Mr. Dulles posemoee
acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if le
the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt -_
that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps
within the militia itself.

Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to
seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a
one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn
in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small
_ groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a
decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general
connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if itis finally decided that overt
U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained
Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued
in any case. :

Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting
the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined
urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS
investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites
to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph,

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The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas

cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time

be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or

stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a
kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined,

v3, Advice to Assistant Attorney General

Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested zavice ta Mr. Yeagley
in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not
desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that |
Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method
of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer,
but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer toa question,
Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would
satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that-he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who.

. had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley,

urba anneared ratisfied with the aral ouidance. \

Y 5, U-2 for Cuba

Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over
Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties
to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to
Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.) -

arp. TT ayy ) PROPERTY o¢
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Docld:327423488° Page 49

23 November 1960

, PRUPERT) OF
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special.Group Meeting, 23, Now - 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and
Bissell
“2, Cuba

Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the

’ meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan

would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees.
He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that

itis believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation

plus two roundtrips by C-124s, These we would request the Department
of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small

- commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell

also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be
significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else,
aa ye

The DCI agreed in general with thig preliminay ‘thinkin He
urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne
constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once.
Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras
be informed.

‘Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until

receipt of Defense's report on facilities, available in the U.S.

_ Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by
Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines, He explained that we
have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much

‘support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt

will take -piece.sm the reporied time schedule, or indeed at all, but
emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others,
so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on
very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible
major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition,
he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for
combat,’ with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might
be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the ;
immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines.

Myr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.

Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage

- Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic ‘Billy Graham) to carry

HY 409545

out activities in Cuba.

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fewer

30 November 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960 ,

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray; i
Dulles and Bissell oo

/ | OG
2. Cuba . ey es

Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving ata
consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result -
of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were
agreed: ,

7 “4 . ~

ut

he?

a, Mr. Gray's associates ‘stand ready to deny U.S.
activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become
blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to”
make it possible to deny plausibly). ,

b. Ifthe program is enlarged, additional facilities
may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No
training of Cubans:will be conducted in the U.S. under
present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of
the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala. )

c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness,
(Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's

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AW O50955 Boeld:32493498 Page 51

notice before any OAS committee actually visited
Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to
avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell
 gaid that if we do have a week, evacuation could be
carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is
required DOD assistance might be necessary.
Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell
concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency
evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary
refugees should be kept in mind. } ,

Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at
the next Presidential press conference and that we should be prepared
‘with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage
revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have
a draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrott
reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for
guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of
General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no
operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's
pursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with
investigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will ever

come to trial. ). . ; pe ee,
Ces ae

a i!

Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends’ desires
with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that the
principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point
for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with
Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be
available to deal with the FRD and to.talk to other Latin American
governments, ,

After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the
Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle
the overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work together
on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in.mind, but
responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest
with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official,

_ preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department
of State. There should be a sort of ''board of directors" to oversee

all aspects of the operation, This should be the Special Group plus
Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered.

(Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-’
man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether

2 .

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there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own
organizational: integrity.)

There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and
availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that, ___.
taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick ;
availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice.
On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recog-
nized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's
associates. ;

Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD
job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and
must be done Py the Agency.

As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have
him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government
status. Mr, Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's
talking to President Frondizi.. n

Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his
friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just
-returned from’a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the
individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said
he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's
associates.

Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request
‘to the DOD for thirty- eight NCOs and officers for service outside the
U.S.

Yadbuatt

THOMAS A, PARROTT

‘at fy aon aa j

ee!

Conetp oT ae Yoo PROPERTY 1)
t wo Bae THE WHITE HOUS2 Ui ou:

a

HW 50955 Docld:324293488 Page 53

ted tae Wy Adee ere oom

17 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, LZ. February 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles

. Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.
\ /y, Cuba

The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of
potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed
at some leagth. Within the limits outlined - that is, that no action
would be initiated under the terms of any approval reached at this
meeting, but rather that approval would cover only the identification
and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed general approval.
Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually
to proceed with operations. Mr. Irwin stated that he and Secretary

. Douglas were enthusiastic about the project. It was agreed that it
should be presented to the Secretary of State and that Mr. Gray would
discuss it further.

_ (Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter
with his associate. The latter had made two points;

a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action, ~~ Lad
feeling that if it were successful in denying money to
the Castro regime which could otherwise be used for
subversive activities, the Cuban government could
obtain offsetting funds from other sources. .

b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this
particular sabotage operation, He would agree that the
Agency could proceed to spot and assess potential agents
for a variety of possible tasks. He said that.once this

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE AS FIAF

HW 50955 Docld: 32423466

itetied 7 bet bed wiided

t i 5
4 . %,

was done anda comprehensive program of suggested
action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the
Special. Group, and if the Group recommended approval
it should probably then be discussed with him. It was
stipulated that in any case no action should take place
until his return from the trip on which he is about to
embark.

bs Cit.

Mr. Scott’‘also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly
the same point as-outlined in b. above.)

v2,

deat

a

Dominican Republic

There was a brief ‘discussion of the situation in the Dominican
Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most
interested in determining whether or nota sort of Third Force can be
identified.

Sata ons

PROPERTY o:
THE WHITE HOUSE Op fs

oo, cAney _ CUTe PMY
—- SRERLE coe Bid. .

HW 50955 Docld:32423488

meray GET

ee 7-ES EL 9

28 December 1960

‘MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD — _ —_.

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960 - |

- PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles

2. Special Meeting on Cuba

Mr. Gray said that itis desired to setup a special meeting on
Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly
to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of
events." He also said that Mr. Pawley had hada recent conference in

the White House.

Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Dougias determine

whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that .

Mr, Willauer-~wowia also be on hand. Finally, he asked that the Army

colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening description’ '

of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting.

It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the ;
- DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting. _ _.

_ . . ” ,

PROPERTY OF ;
THE WHITE HOUSE OF Fut a. IN CS etn Tons
_ ; _ PAPER 0. “AAO
(ORO y Po "DO HOP DESTINY

HW 50955 DocId:32423488 Page 56°

cit x a a ( ay Y

(SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
CONCLUDING REMARKS ,

You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think
not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your
work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need ;
fora viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within
its charter, I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is
impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is
able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our
country will be served, I believe that we will continue to need
effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers
and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be
undertaken in the interests of our National security.

Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that
there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is
improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency,
while at the same time péople seem not to be equally concerned
about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially
through its very many KGB agents here. T would hope that a

Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate

this most serious matter.

a

HW 50955 Docld?32423488 Bage 57

_ ° PERSONS/ENTITIES: » DATES: CATEGORIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS - 4
DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER July 5, 1960 | TRUJILLO

Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and
General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the |
Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which .
could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such
a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with
troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of
internal: intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The

-Prestdent--thoughtwe--shoutd-knock“out of-any“documents~on.file.any. 1° reference.to_.
Starting,.a..revolution."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STARE:

(Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) — A b lewe. DATE: _ Kelley
——=July 6, 1975

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: — CATEGORIES:

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY, March 14, 1960 7 CASTRO

DOUGLAS DILLON , MONGOOSE _

OCCURRENCE? At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon
' said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is

no. apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears.

Irideed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Commmist takeover."

"Mr. Dulles reported that a plan-to affect the situation in Cuba was being
worked on. Admtrat--Burke~suggested- that any-plan-for-the-removal- of Cuban’ leadersy
should-be=package~deat, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse:
than Castro." ;

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting,
March 10, 1960 - AlosLene

FILE:

STAFF:
Kelley

DATE July 6, 1975

St GE SE ES EE EN ES NE EN OE EE SE SY SNE SN AE SN I SD ED GI AOE Ge GEE ny SD GAD SED em AED GEE GED nh AED GE GY EE AE GP ay EDO GED ES GED GE Gd GES ED GN GEE a ES ONG ED a aS SD

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:

- CATEGORTES:

I

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS April 14, 1960 |

DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY

TRUJILLO

ecurity Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice

President N: Nixon presiding, ' ': ‘Mr. Dulles reported..Trujillo's position continued
to weaken and was now quite precarious... (he}- thought~ further. attempts: will be made
to-kilL.or. oust-Trujible."

“Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect. . .4£—Traj+be-could-be- removed
Lron-power-in—the~ Dominicanr-Republic while pro= -Castro-etements-were-prevented from
seizing-power—in-that-country,—our anti-Castro~campaten~ throughout Latin-America
would receive-a-great—boost, Fhe Vice President agreed Shae gereing ridof Trujillo
Woutd-be-a-favorabte development for- ts."

SOURCE: . “Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 4, 7).
1960) — A "€. i Kelley
PILE: HLewe ; DATE July 6, 1975

STAFF:

HW. 50955 . Docld:32423488 Page 56

a PERSONS/ENTITIES: —

VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS
‘ DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY

DATES: CATEGORIES:

April 14, 196% TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Beskkes

reported that a SR. Betancourt /no relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected
from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro:  ( ie
thet-—wertd-make-Castre-e-martyny (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure ~
of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to.a socialist dictatorship and a Batista
terror regime.

. - f f> a
. . , ~ i : } J fay vee’ fob Pa)
. ors AN. fo NM 484.) ara of BP OE AIR a a TD fae,
~ Ij } : A a ~ 4 a
Nate De Q, Case [ds ;

san

ANC lene 4

. SOURCE:

STAFF:

Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower

(Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14
6 .
Free} “Ab, leve

. PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESI- | July 7, 1960 | TRUJILLO
DENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN | CASTRO
DULLES | - MONGOOSE

At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles
stated: ''The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through
the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo.
An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact the

have convincing evidence that Trujillo was lapeee pee for the assassinat(On

attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela/*** "Betancourt believes

attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without .
delay.'" Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants
the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that

Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.

SOURCE: DTAVR:

— Presidential Papers af Dwight Hisenhower

(Whitin Vito) (NSC moat tag REN TOR, THOT NSC moat bjt, - Kart bee

ieylys 7, Wnt) . PDA EY 8, Nes
coe Vad Oe a

Ne 8 2g ee Re GI wee ee wey Nar uel oe Ont Ie mat ome DE AE BO MOE OD po oem vu me pe BS og amemem sty were ak ta we 2

PERSONS/ENTIVIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE
PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON,
ALLEN DULLES .

July 7, 1960 | TRUJILLO
CASTRO
MONGOOSE

On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting +Mre-Dudbes
eves; ‘the~intel Li genee-eommun: ty-eprees;—that-the~prebter

. jtiLo-mustbe—settied-before-the-problem-ok-Castre~can_bo-doalt-withs even-

theugh-Castre-ts—the-grerter-threat ."' . ;

The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of
Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to
Trujillo would be. The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa
Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested
a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event
of Trujillo's downfall.

a SOURCE:

STAFF:
_ _ Kelley

Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
| DATESuly 6, 1975

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting,
Pply -7, 1960) :
— Abilewe

HY 50955 Docld:32423466 Page 59


DATES: CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER July 28, 1960 | CASTRO
| TRUJILLO

MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

| frtends—te-rese-a.. pore of tri t pret It was
noted that Venezuela was trying to s

Meets tevineenen

Pee sisi jo cdo tr:
eparate the Cuban and Domincan Republic prob-
lems in OAS forms. On this matter, ''The President said if we attempted to take
any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would
be the loser.'' ‘

Dios We per ve m tp oN pctd attain ‘|

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAPF:
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960 pater kelley

. July 6, 1975
PILE: Abslewe ,

SS LS SS SY Se Ae SD AT SE a a A SU ES ST Ey MLN WY ce DG SEY aN wD SY ME em em HE I en sD GET GE wom een comm SP GAD GE SRE OD ky em tao GUE ED Ga Se ANS MN KN HN A MA ED GED SER SP re? AD ems

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: i CATEGORIES:

|
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE Aug. 25, 1960 {| LUMUMBA
STANS, MR. GRAY —

OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council
meeting that day state: "The President suggested the United Nations might re-
cognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe
and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means." (page 15)

oem

Ari:

SOURCE:
Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower
(Whit-man File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August _ Kelley

FASE 1960 ~ Ab,lewe DATE July 6, 1975

ee a hh a ee ne we eee eu wey wu ru uu nse sin ste see wan exe en

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY, | Sept. 21, 1960 | LUMUMBA

On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles
, : ecent-attennt=te-assassinate ~hedfebbed. ***Mobutu appeared
to be the effective power umumba.was-net

= 259 te rd

in the Congo

we
.

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAFF:
(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960); Kelley

FILE: ; . | DATE July 6, 1975
“WW 50955 vocrarsedatieh< Ye 60 oo _ .

"PERSONS/ENTITIFS: . DATES: _ | CATEGORIES: .
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY Oct. 24, 1960 LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On October 24, 1960 ata National Security Council meeting Mr.
Dulles reported:

"An intercepted UAR /Egypt/ message indicated that five Congolese soldiers
had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on | the 15th of October. the~UsSawhad.prier x
> = FFG Cheats atts RE Fy ea PEF Rees

itywas probable thatche wuld have-beenveawghes!. - (page 16)

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower STAPF:

(Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting, DATE: Kelley

er 24, 1960 mm JUL 6, 1975
retee yo Abilewe Y

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS Feb. 12, 1960 | LUMUMBA
| CASTRO ©
TRUJILLO
OCCURRENCE:

On Febraumedop=b06@>a special" National Security Council meeting

was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting

Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting
series of | minutes is a one- e-page notation which states: UOambpstractrorns=frur

|

|

SOURCE:
(Whitman File)
Feb. 12, 1960.

FILE: Ab, Lewe.

TARE:

(NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting,
Kelley
DATE sha Buy 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: : , CATEGORIES:

SOURCE:

PILE: oo l pare:

. - . \
HY 50955 Docld:32423466 Page 61 .. : “oe

MOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:

, _ short summary
If we don't re-write the Gray shemamimgyx, you
should note to the senators that since we w
drafted it we have received a new batch of
key documents from the Eisenhower library

which are reflected (quoted) in the

Gray Chronology.

[dd Nyon 6

BW 50955 Docld:32423488 Page 62 . , _

To: Files
From: Frederick Baron
Re: DELETION IN SPECIAL CROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1960

Date: July 7, 1975

In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House,
Wilderotter assured me af that after the line "beyond our gp capabil-
ities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by
Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo),
followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals .
with Southeast Asta.
‘Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to
our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on

page 3 that related to KCuba.

va

HW 50955 Docld:324293498 Page 63

| EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

castro* :
Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.
- Tumunba . .
Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

frujillo

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J, C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

‘Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

* The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for |
two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the
Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and. (2)
The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was
President Eisenhower.

HW 50855 Docld:32423488 Page 64

MiEMORANDUM

FO: . Files
FROM: Frederick Baron
DATE: July 5, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:

Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the -
DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration. Allen Dulles
was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.

Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the samme
subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning;
CGoodpaster was responsible for spot. work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he
kept cach other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert
action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would
tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert
action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident
only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John

Eisenhower. .

“J didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything
that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action

of Eisenhower's."

2. Special Group Function

At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest,

that was my role."

HY 50955 Docld:32423486 Page 65

Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said,

Ss bat 7 a

‘ : 1
copies Ul

"T want the 54/12 comnittee to consider any action that impinges Upon, .

“a

the sovereignty of another country."

Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action would
have been discussed with the State Department and would have been staffed
out before Special Group meeting. ‘Most of the rest of us did not have a chance

to reflect before the meeting."

Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12

(Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.

Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he
asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be
washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the
protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President
the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing
to him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the
right to object to an action and take it up with the President. The President .
has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and
through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would
have a chance to say "no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence
of the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assass-

jnations.

3. "His Associate"

Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the
Special Group minutes 'Mr. Gray's associate" or "His associates" to Gray's
first reaction was that “his associates" would probably refer to members

of his NSC staff.

“HW 50955 DocId: 32423488 Page 66

-3- ; . i

But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group mecting of
February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes

u

“his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.

Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was
Parrott! s phrase. ‘Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time
in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute, be
sure it referred to the President in cach case. He said that when he

attended the meetings,he would refer to "the President" directly.

(Note: Since the phrase "the President'' is never used in Parrott's
minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to

'Mr. Gray's associate” are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)

Gray recalls that. the President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles,
‘into. his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no
minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except
by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that
: Dulles was not present at this ineeting. He knows that he would have told

Dulles shortly afterwards.

Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings.
Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance,

by- deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating

to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the. Presidential
Library in Abilene, Kansas. -
Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the

“Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the

HW 50955 DoclId: 32423488 Page of

-4-

meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" for

the NSC, along with Jinmy Lay, Gray's assistant.

LUMUNBA

Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at
which it was reported that Gray commented that “his associates had expressed
extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action"
in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember
LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking -

with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA.

However, Gray docs remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to

see him removed from his position of responsibility."-

In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes
of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said ‘straightforward action’, certainly
assassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that Allen
DULLES. was consistently in opposition to assassination and “he was probably
saying to ne that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."

; | | :

With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from Robert
JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning ©
Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the sumer of
1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA or

said words to that effect.

Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA

with TWEEDY.

Lat csah -

ene ao ul

HW 50955 Docld: 32423488 Page 66

TRUJTLLO
"Tt am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the

_ assassination of TRUJILLO."

"I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have
approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group... The

DCI should have taken a suggested course

of action to the Special Group

_after checking with State."

Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would ©

connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an

individual.”

CUBA
Gray said that President E[SENHOWER would frequently remark at
meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be

carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17,
1960, Gray’ said that at some point during that period. of time, Allen
DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who
listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think
sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete
plan."' Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program:
propaganda; economic sanction, sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles.

GRAY said the President approved this Remo. (Note that Gray also said that he

made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)

iy iéie.g™ Nabe .
a Wy RL US Uf

AW 50955) BDaocld:324273468 Page 69

~G-

After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and

offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential
meetings on Cuba. ‘Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and -
‘brought them to Gettysburg, Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the.
“memos, Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in
reference. to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military
planning. EISENHOWER Suggested that the page should be retyped to change

the word “plaming". Gray said they did retype the page. .

Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHOWER's, there was no
military "plaming'', definitely EISENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being

trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.

President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to
advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the
Cuban community, But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among them-

selves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.

Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960,
Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban
operations over. 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary
operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying.
this budget before “higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to

President EISENHOWER.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960,
- at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning "for

taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said

HY 50955 Docld: 327423488 Page 70

~7-

_that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that.
the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included
assassination.’ Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such

action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the “usual DCI reaction".

Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said
that "the special mceting'’ mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President,
Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the == ~ |
President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project
for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of

meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene).

CASTRO/GANBLING SYNDICATE, OPERATION, PHASE I
, Gray said that he was completely unaware of any conversation between
Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts
for the purpose of an assassination attenpt on CASTRO. Gray also said that
he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of
the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars.
Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the

disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.
Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS.

Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have
known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he
would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I
would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President."

Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this

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-8-

matter, Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent
news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against
CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never

heard about such things.
EXECUTIVE ACTION

“"T never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to

me."
ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY

. Gray said that he remembered two ment ions of assassination: (1) When
NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bump
him off''. But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. . Assassination was
not an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, one
member consistently would ask the CIA “about bumping off the leadership in
Hanoi", Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the
member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the

name to uS.

"— followed closely any covert operations I was interested in," Gray said
that "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called"
the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such

attempts.

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interview Questdons For Gordon Gray
TRUJILLO

1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting
DCI @akexi recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles
with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo
says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN
BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM",
- ~Kmemkhem Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at
this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have
record of any authorézation until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)

~If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed
their authority? :

o~Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratior
for handling the approval of such a project?
-Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?
.~Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority
by not requesting?@% receiving approval foom the Secy of Stat

~Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?
L
2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 196%. GRAY was present.

The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside
the Dominican Republic"

-Do you Emgm remember this event? Are the minutes accuragte?

-What was the policy behind the approval?

-Weren't the weapons intended for use in assassination?

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HY 50955

To; Files
From: FDB

Re: NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)

Date: 7/5/75

Biographical Background

1951-62

1962-67

National Security Council staff member

State Department, member of Policy Planning Council

Chronology of Events

Summer, 1960

Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss

'developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that

discussion, President EISENHOWER said something --
I can no longer remember his-words ~~ that came
across to me as an order for the assassination
of LUMUMBA...There was no discussion; the meeting
simply moved on,”
-~-Johnson said he might have omitted the statement
from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.
~~ J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY
were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Roo).
-~-The formal record of decision by the NSC is.
unlikely to contain infommation on this subject,
he said.
~-The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would
be with President Eisenhower ' Ss papers. (10)

"I was surprised £...that I would ever hear a President
say anything like this in my presence or the presence

of a group of people, I was startled."

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