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104-10103-10079 ! 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

. Me.

SECRET - SENSITIVE
Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey

Dated 27 November 1962

This is not a controlled item

toes a

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abnemactibaomenns — am

j
4

habe.

[o SECRET - sworn]

az November 1962

Note: Discussed 27 Heyesher
18962 by DD/F with PCI
end approved generei!:
im principle by PCr,
Pully concurred (to
by BD/P.

anioraDow FoR: Director of Central Intelligence”

THROUGH: = Deputy Director (Plens)
SUBJECT: Operstional Pien for Continuing

Opere tions 4geinst Cube

os ‘Actions Tite memorandua 18 for. your information
- and pursuant to your request. - ‘Recommendations for action ere
conteined ia Prrograph V below. The purpose of this memernorus

is to delineate an operational plen for the action which we |

,belleve should be taken by CIA agsinst Cube for tie prodictabls

future. In summary the plan provides. for ccatinuting, even
intensifying, the intelligence effort sgeinst Cubs and for

the reorientation of the current effort into s long term

denied sren type of operation of the highest priority.

I. ASSUMPTIONS:

‘A. The United States Government will give public

assurances that, provided no nuclesr or offensive weapons fre

present or re-introduced into Cuba, end proy ided Cubs dces
“not take action’ to threaten the pence. ond security: of the

Western Hetaisphere, the United States goes not ingend t Dean
LETIP tS

invade Cuba ox support an Anvasion of. Cuba. A soumes Fo

ad BECRET — SENSITIVE | PAPER GO.

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io - - B, Theso assurances will preclude any ‘meaningful CIA
| ; action ‘on a phased basis ‘to provoke a revolt inside Cube, since
unless ‘there are major changes in operational and internal con-
: ditions: in Cuba, euch a revolt if provoked would be totally

deatroyed by Cuban counteraction in a matter of hours or, at

for daye unions. support a. aby. & jiajor. ‘United States

f , | he " non-tavasion assutances
re a ‘practical matter will, preclude invading Cuba on’ the pretext
ofa contrived provocation such 2S an attack on Guantanamo,
. ee CIA, operations involving a. high noise level and a
_ddmtiact: elenent of ‘attributabfiity, particularly paranilitery,
* querrdlig,:. and conimando type operations ‘will be unacceptable
ag a matter of. ‘policy.
. De The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for
the indefinite future with its security and control apparatus
relatively intact and with the capability not only of crushing
unsupported resistance activity, ‘but of ‘making operational
. conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it is
possible that recent and future developments including the
Soviet action in removing the offensive weepons. from Cube ney
7 serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no hard
indication: that the. control of the Castro-communist regime over
Cuba has been substantially weakenod.

The United States ‘assurances of. no invasion ‘and no

lpr

- gupport ofan invasion will, in effect, constitute giving te

Castro. and his regime a certain degree of Senctuary. This will


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ye severely demage the morale and motivation of anti-regine Cubens

both Angide end outside of Cubs, which will make: it ‘Aneressingiy

_ recruited, and continue or intensify our intelligence and other

efforts against Cuba and the Castro-communi st regime.

EZ | difficult for us to. recruit agents, ‘maintain sgents already
| oe Despite. ‘the: above factors Higher Authority probably

_ ee ‘against. ‘cata’ ‘and may even 1 cont Lie to contend thet the ultimate.
objective ie the overthrow of the Castro-comunist regime.
‘This. 46 an unrealistic objective, however, except. on a very |

{ long-term, bosis. a8 ‘the: United. States Governsient, we ‘believe,

[ . will be unwilling ta the: innedinte future to commit: troops

a . _ to ‘Support ‘such, an overthrow. The United Btates Governxent

a it

an Ate overt, dealings with the Cuban, exiles probably will not —

g. tie sbove, factors to then. an the context. or with the
“pluntness: stated here,

"Ge. In view of these factors, the so-cslled “Ipgck Tro",

. course of action, 1.6., unlimited support of Cuban exiles

and exile groups with no real control. or objective purposes
‘in the hope that these groups wilt be able to shake the

Castro regine y. Ail, although unrealistic, become increzs ing ty
attractive et various ‘levels in the United Ststes Government.

Be AB & “matter eof policy, political pressures and —

economic. pressures, short. of blockade, raids, and ‘aggressive

es there
4.

‘sabotage against Cuba will ‘be ‘continued.


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Ve I. in view of the above assumptions prramilitary, commando
- and sabotage .o ‘operstions, except in ‘rare selective instences —
' . WALL serve Little purpose; nino they wild be counter-product tve
: since, it “undertaken, they will make the collection of intol}li-
. gence more dtefioult and should only be undertrken in those very
| few instances. where an unusually high return can be demonstrrted,
Regardiean of what other pressures are placed on CIA for -
action against Cube, it would eppear clear. that Higher Authority
wilh insist on a continued, even intensified, {utelligence
coverage of Cuba.
“In view of. ‘the policy ftectors, en iacreased use of
“notte, real estate end. ‘peeing: outside the United States,
. particularly in ‘Latin Anerice, will be both necessary snd
desirable.

~ 0: 7: Ke Adequate serial reconneissance of Cuba will continue.

eS “in “OBJECTIVES:
. Based on the above essumptions, the following objectives:
‘appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against
Cuba:
A Take all feasible clandestine action to isolate
and aggist in tsolating the Castro-conmunist regime in Cuba
from. the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
, Free World. |
Be! ” To. ‘the maximum extent. t posmibie, ‘discresit the Castro- .
ae communist reg ine in Cuba and in the Festern Hemisphere. and the
_ " xest of the world. |

~4—

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rv,

. c. Mnintein through clandestine moans, short of commando —
- and guerrilia type operations, ‘the ‘maxioum economic and ,
politicel pressures’ on the Cuban regine and econory not only
_ for the purpose of hampering‘ the Cuban regine, but for the
additional: purpose of Ansuring the maximum possible drain on

“ Bles : ‘resources, used | to, Support, Cubae gas

D. Maintain. ‘maxim ‘possible’ intelligence and counter -
“AmteLligence coverage of ‘Cuba, ‘Anoluding particular ‘emphasis

. ons

' ae Capabilities and. intentions of the. government.
; Be * Activities of the. Cuban G-2 and its other

security orgaus.
3. ‘Boviet’ and Bloc activities: in Cuba.

4.0 State of potential. resistance, including the

i / morale, and teuper of ‘the ‘populace.
a va “Militia ond wilitary order of battle and equip-

. 6. The leci of power and of possible stresses
‘and strains in the power centers in the ‘Cuban goverunont.
- 7, Relationships between Cuba, USSR, Red Chine,
the Bloc, Latin American nations snd other "re Wor ld
‘end uncommitted nations. .
8.. The level of and the weaknesses in, the Cuben
a ,

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en? Trke maximum action to induce a split in the Cubsn
— regine ond maintein the capability of capitalizing. innodintely
through clandestine means to the extent possible on any
: aignificent uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regina,
“or strains ond stresses among Cuban leadership or An: Cuben/
oy Boe, relationships,
a ITT, - OPERATIONAL, PLAN: |
Espionage and Intelligence Collection - ALL fersible _
. ‘effort should be undertoken to continue end intensify intelli-
_ gence: ¢ collection concerning Cuba. The status of our intelli-
_ gence ‘eollection, and elated operational activity, at the
: present ‘time and its development ‘during the past eix months
is delineated .1n detail in Attachment A, which was preprred tc
serve as the basis for the iG's report on this particular
| matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign
Intelligence. “You will note that this lengthy - docuzent
bresks down under numerous sub-beadings the intelligence
coverage which has been developed. by the Clandestine Service.
Set out below aro specifics of operational action it is
proposed to take to continue ond, as possible, incresse {n-
telligence coverage of Cuba. .
1. Intelligence Exploitation « of Refugees: As you
know, with the quarantine and the cessstion of air

_ ytravel the ‘heavy’ flow of Cuban refugees has dwindled

“plmost. to nothing. In v lew of this and in connection

~G~

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. with the cont ingency plonning for supporting any poneible
mplitary action an Cuba, the .Opa-Locke. Interrogation *

7 Center as such was dismantled,’ although. the personnel
of the ‘Center have been retained intect. In order to

"| Fevestablish the flow of intelligence from refugees,

ae ts Proposed that Pan American Airweys and KIM be
_ -* tadueea te ‘to. relnstitute their regular: flights from
"Havana. -to Miami. This should be done s8 soon aa

7 possible after the settlement of. the current negotintions

and UN digcussions. Coincident with this, _the Opa-Locka

refugee interrogation center will be re-established

“with the game personnel.

: 2. Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort: will be

made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
wiability of. and, where necessary, re-catablish conmunica-
theas. with the 131. recruited agents now. resident in Cuba.
“To an extent, the’ speed and effectiveness of this effort
7 will of course depend upon the stringency of future
. Cuban security and control sction, which it is impossible

2s yet to accurstely forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-

cruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cube

| Will be reiterated ond etrengthened and every effort
“WALL, be made to increase this coverage, both. through
the. development of additional resident agents in Cubs


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d , . _
4, .Sdeisany Operations: We will continue to press

the [aison services who sre sssisting ua in the effort

3 and through the development of additional legal travellers.
1

| against Cuba for additional coverage, including the

i recruiting of regents within their own rrens for joint

{ dispstch to Cuba. The services>most effectively co-~
opereting at this point in this connection ere the

British, Dutch, French, Spanteh, Itelian, Greek,

 ‘Urugusyia, Canadian, Chilean, and Israelis Direct

approaches to several of these Services) either by you
personally or in your name, ns you prefer, ere
being separately recommended. Personal representation

} by you to the servicés>underlined sbove would be useful.
In addition, we will re-survey all other ddaison_ services ~
. with which we are in contact and reiterate to those

appearing to have any assets usable against Cuba our

extreme interest in maximum coverage of this problem.

| In connection with the ‘gon yproblem generally, we will
| endeavor to induce «ll of the WWaison services to mate
greater use of their Hhational assets, both inside and
| outside cf Cuba, Perticular attention will be given to
| possible utilizetion of the Vatican, /
a » 1.8. Maritime Operations: In eddition to increasing

{ efforts to get at serman agents end other naritime

sesets through {inison services, we will continue our
unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen and

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| _ prerticularly Cuban seanen, to increane the twenty

. officers and crew members sboard six Cubsn vessels we rre
now running as controlled agents.

. 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abropd: At

the present time we sre running 12 Cuben diplomats

stationed outside Cube as controlled agents znd have vinhle

~ operations aimed st an additional 20 Cuban diplomats.

teaie

We propose to continue pnd intensify the current progren
of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben official

represeutstive ebrornd to whom we can gein access rnd

concerning whom we have any reason to believe gs
susceptibility to approach exists. These additions!
penetrations will be attempted both through Qnilateret
operations end where eppropriate in conjunction with
9, Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations

4

Abroad: At the present time we have sudio and/or
telephone tap coverage of Cuban officirl installations
in Chile, Itsly, Mexico, The Netherlands;, England,

Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Cenaca,) No

mejor expansion of this coverage is presently

contemplated, but we will continue to survey rdditicnrt

targets of opportunity and wherever pessible instell

coverage in those cases where the additional intelli-
“gence fon this type of source over and above whet we

are now receiving would eppeer to make such Installirtion
‘ worthwhile. |

-§-


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, Gommunicetions Intelligence: Ve wlll continuc
our present CIA Close Support coverage from the KOLA

station in Wicmd at the seme level end will cont inue
to press NSA for cdditional coverage of Cuban comaunticr~
tions. As the current situstion “nermelizes"” it should

ba possible for NSA to reinstitute end perhaps even

increase their seaborne intercept coverage of. Cuban

cosrunicetions.

9. Communist Party Operations: A complete survey
bas been made world-wide of all Communist Party

penetration operations and wherever any such penetration

- can be directed against Cuba either by dispatching the

sgent to Cuba or by pointing the agent sgsinst Cubrn
targets, this will be done, except in those cases where

such action would result in unaeceptabl¢prejudice te

‘the operations in the srea where the agent is now based.

It igs believed that the. most lucrative field for the

redirection of such operations to the Cuban target will

be Latin America where there sre 65 penetrations of

verious communist parties. Of this 65, the survey
we bave conducted indicstes that 23 have some direct
pertinent access to Cuban targets. All of these 272 will

be directed against these targets unlesa in any case

~ tthere. ere , oversiding ‘reasons. to, Bae. contrary, The


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10 “[ilegs ly infiltrated Agents: The two ;

sdccoustu1 black: infiltrated teas (COBRA and AMTORRID)

whieh hsve produced: substantial intelligence will be

continued, resupplied, end roinforced but pointed

“primarily at continued intelligence collection and rt

the recruituent for intelligence collection purposes of

other. Cubans who already are legally resident in Cubs

in the areas where the terns are operating (Pinar del

‘Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the most careful Ly.

selected basis, where it appears feasible, ‘additional

_.. agents. and teens will be. infiltrated black into Cuba

‘in an effort te. duplicate the performance of the COBRA

end AMTORRID teams and particularly to. recruit ‘and, ee

Possible, train additional agents legally resident in

“Ad. Exfiltration: As feasible, sgents and potentir1

" recruits now in Cuba will. be exfiltrated tor

: . training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,

-Bnd motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated inte

Cube, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,

this will be done through legal trave) channels, but
where this is not possible, it will be done wherever

. feasible through our black infiltration-extiltration

- fachiities, primarily our maritine assets.

~ll-<


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a to: weaken, subvert. ox.

. _
vt
Lys pete
rps ah

. ion a _
B, Much of the: above effort, as noted will be primarily

directed towards developing all possible evidences’ ‘of stress

or strain within: the regine ond between the regine and other

_ antions, particularly the Bloc, An intensive program will

be continued _to_teke advantage of any possible opportunity
Lit the. xe ing in any spible_

ae fashion, | This is basteaily: a Jong: ‘tern effort. A great dea)
of work. already has. gone into this and the current
status ef this progran and the proposed . further expldtation
of. ‘the ‘numerous’ leads: we ‘have developed ic being. made, in
“the. dutereste of brevity in’ this menorandum, the subject of

‘p separate ‘compilaticn. the effectiveness of sssets aime rt

actually splitting the regine, i.e., 2 palrce revolt, will of

course: depend, to: an extent, on the willingness of the United
. «States Government to support them and it is entirely possible
, that’ any: ‘guch effort might: fail unless supported with militery

forces which on ‘the basis of the. sseumptions in Paragraph I
above would appear unlikely.

- Babe botsge: On the basis of the sesumptions set cut.
above, comasndo type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other

acta of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little

purpose end should. not. be undertaken except in the rare

instances where an opportunity is presented with ecceptabte

risk: to: do major ‘damage to the: Cuban e@conony . At. is proposed

' to contidue. searching for such limited opportunities, ‘put.

Bo. ) aative or wide scale program ig contemplated.

rr -I12=
yh NPB a Gea Ae BM a a

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VY , aN

D, Paranilitar, Coumndo, and Guerriile ratiority:
Given the Assumptions tn Paragraph I above, no wide scale
program of such activity should be ‘undertaken, However, we
: propese to maintain in being our present facilities and

the onpebliity of undertaking such operations in order to

. fully exploit any ‘substantial change in internal Cuban con.
ditions or ‘any substantial revolt or uprising Which might occur.
R. Economic Warfare: It is proposed ‘to contime snd _

| intensify the program @lready undertaken to deny through

‘clandestine eud covert means critical materials to the Cuben
- 7 _ Sconomy, ‘This: consists primarily of denial operations, possibly
- some preclusive buying and iadusing frimdly U.S. and allied
firns and governnents to prevent the Shipmenta of strategic
materials, to Cuba.

p-

Fs OF. Sounterintelligence: _The current couaterintelligence
) oe and counterespionage program against the Cuban G-2 and —
_ related services will be continued end as possible intensified.
“This: program has developed substantially and it should be
possible within the coming months to increase its effectiveness
considerably in countering not enly Cuban but Bloc intelli.
: gence. operations mounted against United States Llnterests
from Cuba, — oe
. G. Political Action, Propaganda, Paychologicn1 Warfare:
: ous in this field the following tasks will be continued and where
appropriate intensified: _
wood Assist and support State in any feasible acticn.
. wl3-


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to develop end exploit current OAs and Letin Anericrn .

”

attitudes favorable” to the containment rnd/or overthrow

of the Crstro~communist regine,

2, Assist State in ‘the development of post-Cratre
concepts, ‘leaders, end political _g¥roups.

Xs Stimulate, support. and guide covertly the

“ Propagende and political action activities of the cRC

end other Cuban political Groups fnd individuals, ra
eppropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
Cuba. | |

- Ge Develop,’ maintain and exploit the will of the

; Cuban people to resist Castro-communian, making maximun

use of the downgrading of Castro ond his regime during —
the missile erisis.

38. Diacredit and ridicule Castro and his regine

fn Cuba, in the Henisphere end @lsewhere, with emphosis

on the theme tho missile crisis denonstrsted con-

‘clusively that Castro 46 nothing but a mere pawn of
Soviet ‘inperialisa,

. 6 Continue "Radio Anericas" and other. CIA-
Sponsored Cuban exile radio broadcasts +: appropriate.
7. Launch propaganda balloons after an operationn}

capability has been established and policy authority is

Granted to conduct propagania: balloon operations,

8., Contime the infiltration of propagands materin1

into Cuba via open mails, legal travellers and couriers,

‘with special emphasis on selective black eperations.

~14-.

/

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H. Exploitation of Exile Groups: We will cont inue sO

the clrhdestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence

collect inn, _psychologien1 warfare and other approved missions,

‘As fecoible, we will aot to mount es much ef this effort es
poasibie from areas outside the continental United States, rnd
particularly fron Latin America. If Higher Authority decides

“on | a “Track Two" “concept” or on. any, ‘pimilar concept which

contemplates heavy uncontrolled and oply generally directed

sction operations of Cuban groups against Cubs, it ig belleved

that’ efforts should be made to transfer 88 much 58 possible
os of the. responsibility for this non-Clandestine, non-intel ligence
“type operation into the political field, which is the province

. (Of the Department of State. _In this connection, it is believed

‘it would be rdvisable to press for tho creation within the
Pepartuent of State of an office of Cuban Exile Affairs tec

|
| tenae the overt government relationships with Cuban exile

| Groups.
- IV. ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
Maxinun dup lomentation of the above plan which provides
for the most intensive feasible collection of intelligence,
the implomentationof related programs as outlined, and the
muintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunity

ag well as take advantage of any future substantial changes

"An internal Cuben conditions will, it is believed, permit

and make advisable the following:

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oY

A, & gradual but substantial reduction in the expenditures
and pergonnel of Task Force W. ew
B, Consideration of the re-positioning of Task Force W

within the Clandestine Service, possibly ss @ major coapenent

of the WH Divinion under different diraction.

Cc, The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechanian,
D, The removal of the past frauework which required

detailed considerntion by the Special Group (Augnentea) of

even minor operations) deteils and decision by committee on

, points which it. is believed are completely within the purvier
of the. DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
Ve ‘RBCOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operational plan

is recomended.

B. It is recommended that you discuss this plan with

the Special Group (Augmented) and secure its concurrence.

c. It is recomended that you secure from the Special
Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Fan
American Airways and KL to resume their flights between Hian!
tnd Hsvena ot the appropriate tine. .

Dp. It is recommended that if any “Trock Two" concept
is proposed, you endesvor to transfer to the Department of
State all possible ‘overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

-~16-

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vat is recomended. that! the Mongoose operations
nechaniea be abolished. .
¥. «a you concur in this concept, specific recommendations
will be nade to you. concerning. the re-positioning of Teak Forae |
ow M within the ‘D/P. Coors ge aS

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
| Chiet » Task Force W

-17-

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at ' woe ;
Prafsiary

(43 Now, 1962

. mento ‘of he’ «'Ovba'eerncny wal int a drain
. “on Bloo resources,
; 2. ‘ ximua coverage of Cuban inteiliger: »
- “THIS pocuusnt IS _ . ARs
eo mse REFERENCE ©: remeron
i IN. CS HISTORECAL - . te
com eplte int

_ PAPER) BO. 1)

po. NOT ‘DESTROXY— _
4 Yr
6 or eplit

ded ftom
ag
asl ‘ication

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| AS SITWE
x -
i oa Cuban-Bloe relationshiys.

ve

Rf A See ma aoe
"Provide ‘the: fanzine tabelligence coverage of Syhe

, with particular onphats ca the following!

| Me

ae og Soviet/Cuban « and Ghinese/Cohen relationsh'pe.

‘

~ Be Kconoatc.

+. Rebaetoats
| Asotet: and support State in any feasible action to

<davelap active ons. and Latin-Averican country auppt t
the cont
for the o Sih

“SUSIE

y GROUP 1

Excluded trom eotomatic
Scvngrading and
Ltles ‘Siticaton


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er centers” of the Griben.
P, ae ge & te


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“ga

Feet ~ = genres. leanne SiSaany Im Guderangd “ty al
/veorut exe of third conmtt
Rag as

¥

e

“who have potential access tn significant Ankerrent dion

Oe vaky Cosme fee sion hiewsd « ge clwea\ Thhg pit ron
Expansion of commmisations atelligence partlauter-

ne

ay in the: o2, police, and militia nate. (thir

.. CRn NPY
Exely ta. tr. 4 automatic
GoW erac.ne ang

t:

cS opating

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_ ah Maintain, refcgaa debriefing 7 progreus.
ni Nas ons arviees"

Monti e ue
“UWacadion’
pahols Wa n

7 roe atari ae unter
SENSHTIVE. \ = HE

rasing and

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Po, FB SEER
: a SENSITIVE

AROUP 4
Paateted tren putoneatte

i syed

!

