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COLLECTIONS:
KELEASE my é ULL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence 2000 j

ee
Executive’ Registry

Fa

VIA | : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM . : S. D. Breckinridge
. Principal Coordinator, HSCA
; Office of Legislative Counsel

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Assassinations
Request for Access to the "Hart Report"

1. Action Requested: That you approve the recommendation at —
paragraph 14 for limited access of selected House Select Committee
on Assassinations (HSCA) staff members to a classified, sanitized |
version of the Hart Report.

2. Background: As you know, the HSCA Staff Director, Mr. Blakey,
has requested you in a letter dated 9 May 1978 (Tab A), to provide access -
to a report prepared by John Hart in 1977 on the subject of the Agency's
handling of the Nosenko case. This request is part of an inquiry into
hypotheses arising from Epstein's book Legend, in which the. view is
presented that Nosenko was a dispatched agent with the mission of
concealing KGB ties with Lee Harvey Oswald. Central to HSCA interest.
is the question of Nosenko's bona fides. Additional to that issue, interest
has developed in the manner in which Nosenko was treated during the period

that his bona fides were suspect. These two issues are treated separately
below.

: oo, ; I

i 3. The Hart report is directed at the handling of the Nosenko case,
addressing the actions and conduct of various officers in the Agency. These
matters cannot be treated without also considering the question of Nosenko's
bona fides, so there also is considerable review of the methodology employed

-and the analyses of those handling the matter. Mr. Blakey states in his

. letter that he has been. informed that the report contains no information on

; the issues of bona fides, being concerned instead only with personnel and

internal procedures. This understanding on his part is incorrect, and
his letter suggests that he himself has reservations about it.

4
ee

SECRET


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4. The Agency has made available to the HSCA two studies conducted
in 1967 and 1963 by SE Division, both of which questioned Nosenko's
bona fides. A subsequent study by the Office of Security in 1968 has also
been made available; it reached a conclusion contrary to the preceding
studies and supports Nosenko's bona fides. Other Soviet defectors have been
interviewed by the HSCA staff, as well as knowledgeable CIA officers and
retirees. As a result, much of the information on the ease has been
revealed to the Committee.

5. The two SE Division studies, concluding that Nosenko was a KGB
agent, were superceded by the Office of Security study, which prevailed.
The HSCA investigators reportedly have problems with how the earlier two
studies could be rejected so shortly after their completion. As a result,
the HSCA seems focused on the issues as viewed at that time. The Hart
report has the advantage of having been prepared after a ten year period,
during which experience with the validity of Nosenko's information provides
the basis for an objective re-examination. Itis relevant to HSCA interests
that the Hart Report constitutes a convincing statement of the bona fides
of Nosenko. Access to this portion of the Hart Report would help broaden

_and complete the understanding of the HSCA of the matter. .

6. Because of the above, the Agency has everything to gain and nothing
to lose in providing the Hart Report for its review of the issue of Nosenko's
bona fides.

I

7. In addition to the central issue of Nosenko's bona fides, Chairman
Stokes has expressed interest in the treatment accorded Nosenko during the
period that his bona fides were in question. Nosenko reportedly has provided
the HSCA with some detail on this. . We have made the point that how
Nosenko was treated was a result of the issue, not a part of it. When we
questioned the relevance of this line of inquiry to the HSCA charter,

HSCA staff representatives assert that their charter extends to the conduct ©
of the intelligence agencies in the Warren Commission inquiry which
includes this- The rationale appears a bit contrived and stretched in terms
of the real issues. How Nosenko was treated may indicate how concerned

‘CIA was with the man's bona fides, but so far as relating further to the

inquiry concerning President Kennedy's assassination, it seems marginal at
best. The rationale is so far-fetched that we have been led to Consider that its
dramatic qualities are attractive for the projected TV spectacular this

coming September. It also doubtless provides an opportunity for public
criticism for those staff members who have been. acknowledged by Mr.

Blakey as hostile to the Agency.

CEROCT |

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8. If the rationale of the HSCA for pursuing the question of
Nosenko's treatment is contrived, and largely peripheral to the real
purpose of the Committee, as we believe it to be, it should be faced
in those terms. No one would disagree with there being relevant
inquiries, but it is hardly proper to take an internal critique and turn.
it against the Agency on a point irrelevant, to the central purpose of the
inquiry. The HSCA staff position is tendentious, and reflects on its
face a hostile attitude that the Committee may not otherwise want to be
so obvious. The Committee has the right to determine what is relevant
to its charter, but the Agency should also assert.a similar right to: defend
itself from truly peripheral and hostile fishing expeditions.

9. Therefore, while we believe that the Hart Report should be made
available to the HSCA staff, we do not believe that such action should be
taken prior to attempting to limit the use made of information contained
in the Report not related to the issue of Nosenko's bona fides.

it
10. There are aspects of the Hart Report that contain information on

foreign liaison services that should not be exposed to the HSCA. There is,
therefore, a question of some sanitization to be conducted prior to the

; Report's being made available.

ll. A version of the Report has been prepared for the FBI in which the
names of employees below the DCI have been removed, as well as certain
modifications in more dramatic rhetorical phrases. That version is in
other respects faithful to the original Report. It provides. a-working basis
for further sanitization. Sanitization prior to review is not foreign to the
HSCA, as the Directorate of Operations has had a continuing policy of
selected sanitization. Extending this practice to the Hart Report would .
be consistent with the extant working relationship with HSCA. The Report
will remain classified. ; :

12. If the paper is made available, classified and sanitized, it should be

on a highly restricted basis; the HSCA wants six named persons to have
access toit, whichis at least three times the number needed for bona fide
researcn purposes.

13. Staff Position: This paper favors making a sanitized version of the
paper, in classified form, available to a limited number of the HSCA staff
representatives at the CIA Headquarters Building at Langley. Any such
release should be preceded by appropriate discussions limiting use of the
material by the Committee. The General Counsel is of the opinion (Tab B)

oo

Ve aeiors
wake:

Renter etic esos nt enna ep ent ema

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“SEO

riat if the paper is withheld, anda court test results, the Agency

sjust expect to fail in withholding the paper. The Office of the General
‘counsel, the Office of Security, SE Division and CI Staff favor making the
paper available under the conditions set forth above.

14. Recommendation: That you approve granting access to a limited
number of staff members of the HSCA to a classified, sanitized version of
the Hart Report. Such access shall bé conditioned on agreement to limit
ase of materials contained in the Report to those matters relating to the
sjuestion of Nosenko's bona fides.

S.D. Breckinridge

Attachments
CONCURRENCE: . .
Slcuep . . 31 MAY 1978
~ General. Counsel : : ; ) Date
- Chief, SE Division . Date
~ Chief, CI Staff Date
1 JUN 1978
- Director’ ot Sef oe Date
78/ Prank tO, Gary ant ¢
APPROVAL: .
(ke , Director of Central Intelligence . Date
mi ; ; .
pISAPPROVA
Director of Central Intelligence et Date

pe
\

7
sh}

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SUBJECT: House. Select Committee. on Assassinatiozs
Request for Access to the "Hart Repert™.

Distribution:

Orig - Adse
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OGC
1 - C/SE Div .
1 - C/CI Staff
1- - SA/DO/O
1 - D/OS
1 - OLC/Subj
1 - OLC/Chrono

OLC/SDB/ksn (30 May 78)

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, Ol, aa
a yg ey payee
OLA WLECTIONS
11 March 1993
,
NOTE FOR: irector for Operations
FROM: eter Earnest

“ Chief, Media Relations
SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
; Specialist on the Kennedy Assassination

The WASHINGTON POST is preparing a series of articles on L
the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Kennedy .
assassination.

With the help of CIC, we recently arranged for George
Lardner and Walter Pincus of the WASHINGTON POST to interview a
former KGB officer Yuri Nosenko about his knowledge of Lee i
Harvey Oswald during the time Oswald lived in the Soviet
Union. To ensure that Nosenko's resettlement identity and
location would remain protected, I made the arrangements for .
Nosenko to come to Washington for the interview.

The POST reimbursed Nosenko for expenses and paid him a
$250 consulting fee. The interview was done on Wednesday,
3 March, at the POST offices downtown. I did not remain for
it. Lardner and Pincus also hosted a lunch for Nosenko which
was attended by Ben Bradlee. Lardner and Pincus were very
pleased with their session with Nosenko and appreciative of
our making it possible. I also spoke afterwards with Nosenko
who said he was satisfied with how the interview was ;
conducted and with the financial arrangements.

Shortly after the interview, Lardner faxéd me a list of
the questions that he and Pincus had prepared for themselves .
to use in checking out: Nosenko's information. They asked if
there was anyone at the Agency they could talk to about the
individuals named. I told them that developing information
in response to:-their questions would probably take a good
deal of research arid that I doubted the Agency would be able
to take on such a task at this time for the POST. However, I
said I-would take it up with the appropriate offices.

Although I told the POST that I do not believe anyone
would be willing to undertake research on their questions,
I'm wondering if there is anyone around who might be
knowledgeable of Nosenko's information who would be willing
to talk with Lardner and Pincus on background based on
his/her existing knowledge. I think Lardner and Pincus would
be grateful for making such a person available even if


13-00000_

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request

all their questions aren't answered. Considering that they
are trying to do serious research on the Kennedy
assassination, I think any effort on our part to help them
would be seen as a gesture of good will.

A

: a > |

Peted Earnest

Attachment:
As stated

Agree to having a specialist talk to them on background
about the Nosenko information if an appropriate person is
available.

No, do not want anyone from the DO talking about the
Nosenko information.

13-00000

SUBJECT: WASHINGTON POST Request to Talk to an Agency
specialist in the Kennedy Assassination

DCI/PAI/Earnest :ncbx37758 (11 March 1993)
Distribution:

Original Addressee ~
ADDO

SA/DDO

'DO Registry
D/PAI

D/DO/CIC
C/DO/NROC
C/DO/CE

c/CSI

C/History Staff

PRERPPBPP PPP

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Names of Russians we should try to track down about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko and the
JFK assassination:

1. oO M. Gribanoy, head of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB in the early 1960s
where Nosenko says he worked, primarily against American tourists, as deputy chief of the Seventh
eee a eae ee nent he tala Gabeave ia,
structed bim, after the JFK assassination, to retrieve the Oswald file from the Minsk KGB right

away.
2. iy Koralenko, deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate or one of its departments, at
pecs Nosenko said when the file arrived from Minski, he and Koralenko were
the allimportant first volume’and finding KGB had nothing to do with Orwald-when a
RGB oficar from tha Fiat Denarbment came in and picked it up on Grianov's orders, to review i
and write a summary of
3 The cticer wht cicked it up was Col: Ma tveey, deputy chief{I think) of First(or American) De-
partment, Second Chief Directorate. Unhave first name.
4. Chief of this First Department was Col. Sergei M. Fedoseyev or Fedoseey and presumably he
would have had a hand in or supervised preparation of the preva or summary.
5. Gribanov and more than 40 other KGB officers were k ed ott because of Nosenko's defection,
scconiing to Nosenko. That right? Whar hay,
| Rastrusin, Fe 1950 0 ecnied one oficer ia KGB responsible for Intourist mat-
says that it was Rastrusin who told him about Oswald and how he wanted to stay in
Soviet Union. 'Nosenko said Rastrusin said Oswald “doesn't present interest” to KGB and Nosenko
checked out with his superiors. Word came back not to bother with Oswald. Nosenko was told to tell
Rastrusin to tell Intourist to deal with him.

neat day and said we got a roblem. Oswald tried to kill self, ete. KGB

returned
washed bands of he decided to let Intourist deal him. Intourist then part of Ministry of For-
eign Trade. Nosenko said be believes question of what to do with Oswald was run to top of that min-

istry and beyond, to Khruschev or one of his deputies. In any case, decision was made to let Oswald

stay in Minsk. But Newenyo$ arate
8. In the fall of 1963, a Service No. 2(counterintelligence in foreign

countries), First Chief Directorate, told Nosenko orally that Menon City station had just sent a cable.

about a request by Oswald for a visa to re-enter Soviet Union. What should be done?

Nosenko said be said, ‘wait a second. How come he’s back in America?’ At that point, Nosenko said |

he hadn’t know Oswald had gone back.
. 9. Novenko said he sald lets go to chef of department who he identified 28 a Col. Chelnekow or
Chetnenko(but later seemed to say his timing might be off and somebody else may of
Noeenko’a department at the time). Tn any cate, Nosenko quoted chief assaying, in effect, T remem
ber this crary nut. No. No. No. Tell them we don’t have any interest.’

Cable back to Mexico City advising KGB there get rid of Oswald by telling him to go back to his
own country and apply for 3 visa at Soviet Embassy in Washington, etc. etc.

Col. Grusdey, was chief of the KGB department in Minsk that was responsible for foreigners

then
11, - Olea Nechioorenko, one of three KGB officers stationed in Mexico City who reportedly inter-
rogated or dealt on his visit to Embassy there. Now living in Moscow area.

Other two Mexico City officers, both still alive in Russia: V: tikov and Pavel Yatzkov.


13-00000

3 March 1994

Memo’ to: C/HRG
Subject: Mangold Litigation a

Today I alerted OGC (Theresa Wilcox/E eye)
the JFK collections contains a significant number of
documents on Nosenko (5-6000 pages) which may impact on the~
Mangold litigation. As I understand it, the Mangold
Litigation is over the Angelton files and is several years
old. According to JFK reviewers at the FBI, documents on
Nosenko's defection and treatment are part of case. I
talked with Theresa Wilcox who is the para-legal handling
the litigation, however, she was not familiar. with the” :
documents involved. She will consult with «By the. lawyer
on the case, and get back to me. =

I consider the ball in OGC's court. I propose that we
continue to review the Nosenko files. If there are Mangold
or other consideration to address, we can do so after the
HRG review is complete.

Barry

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INTERNAL USE ONLY
23 March 1994

Memorandum For: C/HRG
Subject: Nosenko and the Mangold Litigation

I received a call from (Kathy Kelly, oGC, this morning
concerning the Nosenko files in the JFK files. I described
the files again (about 4000+ pages that include transcripts
of all his interrogations and numerous studies on his bona
fides and treatment by the Agency including the Solie and
Hart reports and an 835 page comprehensive study). Since
Nosenko is an important figure in the JFK assassination
story and the files are part of the sequestered collection,
HRG is reviewing the files under the JFK Assassination
Records Collections Act. However, we were aware that some
of the documents were part of the Mangold litigation and
wanted to make sure that they were properly coordinated.

®athy Kelly)said that the Mangold litigation should not be a

factor in HRG's review. If the files were subject to the
JFK Records Act, they should be processed under that Act.
When the review is: complete, a list of the documents
released should be provide so that OGC can treat them the
same in the Mangold case.

I also talked with Kathy Stricker (yesterday) to get some
background on the handling of Nosenko files and what were
the "secrets" given what we know is publicly available. She
said for years the agency "glomared" Nosenko except for the
Oswald information: however, once Golitsyn became public
that ended. Today, the battle over his bona fides and how
he was treated are public knowledge. The Agency up until a
couple years ago had not released some of the studies (she
mention Solie) but she was not sure that this was still the
case or if it was possible to continue to deny them. DO has
protected the information provided by Nosenko on other
Soviet sources and leads. for possible recruitment. This
type of information should continue to be protected.

Kathy Stricker's comments are consistent with HRG's handling
of the Nosenko files. We are considering all of the files
as related; his bona fides is a key element of the story and
there was a large amount of information including parts of
the studies on him in both the Oswald 201 and the JFK hard
copy collection. We have deleted information provided on
other sources and operations not related to the JFK story.
‘We are also recommending release of the rest of the studies.
Although they contain potentially embarrassing information
for the Agency (as did the IG report on the Castro plots),
there doesn't appear to be grounds for denying under the JFK
Act. . .

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~

-

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

Restrictions on Declassifying Material on Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO

The following should be used as guidelines in
declassifying material files pertaining to the career and
"bona fides" of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO

1. CIA Knowledge of Russian intelligence tradecraft.
Specific information in the files about KGB targetting of
American citizens could reveal to the Russian Intelligence
service our knowledge of their tradecraft. Since the
Russian services continue to target Americans, this
information should continue to be protected.

2. To protect a CIA asset. Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO
remains an asset of this agency, and is under contract.
Moreover, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVRR)
remains interested in NOSENKO's whereabouts and activities.
Russian intelligence services since the Second World War
have tried to track their defectors. There are indications
that the Russian services remain interested in the NOSENKO
case.

o At the time of his arrest,(Rick Ames had some }
(HOSENKO files (AESAWDUST) jin his possession. The US
“@ounterintel igencé Cémmunity is unsure if this

material was passed €o the Russian service,)

--Following NOSENKO's brother and mother's visit to the
United States, both were questionned by the Russian
service about NOSENKO's activity and place and
residence.

Leca\ pos beam

ea.

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000
. . P.374

eraion, Vineuia Cernion, Virginia 22071

Dear Bob,
It was very good to meet with you again in Washington on June 12.
I am writing to confirm our recent convereation about the CIA's release
of documents about me to the National Archives. is i explained to you at .
cur meeting, I am very. displeased that this was done without my knowled-
@e and especially eince ny photograph was officially releaeed by the
Agency fcr the first time in thirty years.

Y
As you know, it hes come to my attention that the CIA released these
meny hundreds of pages to the public without consulting me or telling
ne that this was going to be done. I have already seen copies of two of
these reports totalling more than 7CO pages. One is the October 1968
‘report sunporting me by Bruce Solie; the other was a February 1968 re-
port by the CI Steff which attacked my credibility. (This latter report
contains a cory of my photo from the late 19608. I consider thie a breach
of my personal security.)
I also consider many of the details in both of these reports to be of a
very personal nature. Other pages deal with with some very sensitive
cages’ which I gave the Agency about other people. The information in
these reports was given freely and accurately by me to the CIA officers
in the 1960s under terms of strict confidentiality. Although it is very
difficult for me to say this, I feel that my trust in the Agency has now
been seriously dameged.
This releese particularly troubles me because for: the past thirty years
I have renaineé very loyal to the Agency and considerate ef its wishes. .
For instance, despite many requests, I have only, apoken to a few jouré
nalists, and only when the Agency advised me +o, I have never sought

13-00000 ....
oy SSEP 16 94° @9:S1AMm

P.4/4

1

age 2

. CB my own to publish my story in an article or took. But now, the OIA
has not returned this courtesy. Insteed, 4t has released sensitive
information to the public without speaking to me first.

Under the circumstances, I would like to respectfully request the
following: ;

1. That you show this letter to DDO Ted Price, Directer James Woolsey,

and the current heads of the CIA's Freedom of Information Office and
Historical Review steff ~- so thet they ere aware cf what has happened. |

2. I would like te receive, in writing, an explanation frem these res—
ponsible.ef whr this release was done,

3. I weuld like te receive a list ef the majer reperta absut me which
have already been released. Aside from the twe reperte thet I already
have seen, I would like te receive copies cf any ether major studies

that have been released. (For instance, if there are reperts released
by Peter Bagley, Newton Miler, James Angleton, the CI Staff end John

Hart, then I would like to see them as well.)

4. I would like te be given the Agency's written assurance that further
releases will not ocour witheut consulting me first.

Bab, you should know that before I wrete this letter I have speken
‘abeut this matter with my geed friend George Kalaris. He tes was troub-
led by what I teld him, and he advised me that I sheuld ask the &gency
for an explanation. :

Beb, I apolegize fer troubling you with this matter, but I have neo one
else to turn te fer assistance.

Please let me knew if there is any respense as seen as possible.

Respectfully yeurs,


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avert”

SEP 16 794 @9:5@AM -

Draft letter to Nosenko from FRE PDO: ae

Dear .-

eG

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter
expressing concern that US Government declassification of
material could compromise your privacy and security.

In regard to your question about the documents that have
already been released, rest assured that I have directed
officers responsible for FOIA requests to take special care
in reviewing information concerning you in light of your
-special circumstances. We will make full use of all

*" possible vaxceptions to FOIA-mandated declassification in

order to protect your privacy.

‘

As you know, in 1992 Congress passed the JFK Assassination.
Records Collection Act, which required all US Government
agencies to release any records related to théVassassinatio
of President Kennedy. As Deputy Director for Operations, I
am of course committed to fully supporting the DCI in
meeting this requirement, but I also appreciate your concern
about the files. on you that are related to the >
assassination. I have therefore directed a senior officer
n the DO to meet with the officials in the Agency's |
1-stets who are involved in the declassification
This officer has had extensive discussions with

eo —
7a of fe e.

program.

_tgnbers' of the *Gtany and has worked closely with them to

dentify those portions of the files that include personal

2°" | and operational information.

AOE Ste: ra) See te preter? ae
As a result of this effort, we have ostponed~release~of ~any]

Seat rte information touching on your private life or on operational

information pertaining to your debriefings. Under the JFK
law, a Presidential Review Board will make the‘ final

- decision on the disposition of the material. This Agency

values the sacrifices you have made for our country, and we
will present the Board with the strongest possible case for
protecting information that could affect your privacy and
security.

Best wishes,

7 Meena
Soe aes


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«e- ;
. ‘ UNCLASSIFIED
17 April 1997
ne ~ .
_ Sue Amianoy SA/CIC, gave to Gary Brenneman to give to Barry
Harrelson, Historical Review Group, X31825,
entitled:

2 soft files
1. "WARREN COMMISSION/OSWALD"
2. "DOCUMENTS YURI Ivanovich NOSENKO/OSWALD"

found by (Al Bonner) in the vault.

(7 - APE) - 7 ?-

UNCLASSIFIED

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30 April 1997

Note To: ARRB Staff

Subject: CIC Soft files:
1. Warren Commission/Oswald .
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

The attached files were located in CIC. They are soft
(or working) files containing information on Nosenko, Warren
Commission and Oswald. It is not clear if the files date,
from the Warren Commission period, or were created in
1975/76 (latest. date of documents) in response to a request
or investigation.

Most of the documents are in the sequestered collection
(OGC folders). The other documents may be in the Norsenko
material put aside for discussion with the ARRB or in the
Microfilm part of the sequestered material (the Microfilm is
not indexed document by document) .


13-09000 ,
‘egy. * >

Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only

30 April 1997

Note for the Record
Subject: CIC Oswald/Nosenko' related soft files:

1. Warren Commission/Oswald
2. Documents Yuri Ivanovich NOSENKO/Oswald

1. I advised Sue Amiand, SA/CIC, that most of the
documents in the two folders: are duplicates of documents in
the CIA JFK Collection sequestered by the HSCA. The other
documents are related to Nosenko, but do not mention Oswald.

‘These decuments are probably); duplicated in the Nosenko

material set aside for discussion with the ARRB. I
recommended that we make the folders available to the ARRB
staff. She concurred.

2. Documents will be made available to. Michelle Combs,
ARRB staff, on her next visit.

1

Barry

Administrative - HRG Internal Use Only

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o 7 SECRET Qe

TO: (Eileen M. Wukitch
FROM: { James W. Zirkle
DATE: 08/01/97 09:54:03
SUBJECT: #%j)Re: The Nosenko Papers

CL BY:(2034442

CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

Eileen: Let me introduce myself. | am CiC/Legal. C/CIC asked me to touch base with you
concerning any possible ARRB release of privacy information concerning Nosenko. While we are
aware that such a decision to release is within the Board's discretion, we do believe that the
Agency, when giving this information over to them, should request that the Board protect such
information to the maximum extent possible. {f | can be of help in that regard just let me know.
Jim

From the Desk of Dennis_D. Lamb \

NOTE FOR: Ron L. Seckinger
FROM: Dennis D. Lamb
DATE: 07/31/97 10:44:28
SUBJECT: The Nosenko Papers

cx By: (6790423
CL REASON: 17.5{c)
DECL ON: X71

DRV FROM: HUM 4-82

At about 1020 hrs on Tuesday, 31 July, | received a call from@ileen Wukitch\of the Agency's
External Support Group/Historical Collection Staff regarding Michelle Combs's interest in reviewing
the Nosenko papers for the upcoming meeting of the Assassination Records Review Board (ARRB/
on 5 August. CWukitch sai Combs, an ARRB staffer, is planning on taking 20 pages of the Nosenko
material with her. Wukitch wants to know whether we would like copies of the material Combs is
taking. | said yes. ‘ukitch said Combs appears understanding of our concerns in this case and to
this end wanted the following questions answered so she could put a human touch on our concerns
in explaining our position to the ARRB.

7. ts Nosenko married? (No ane in CIC/AG knows.)

2. What part of the country is he living in? {This is known, but I can't see why she or the
ARRB needs to know.) yt

3. Did the Soviets actually sentence Nosenko to death? Or was this just his claim. (No one
in CIC/AG know, but it appears reasonable to assume that the Soviets did sentence him to death.)

4, Nosenko's current age? (No one in CIC/AG knows off hand. Henry's observation was
that Combs can find this out from open literature.)

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According to\Wukitch} Combs also wants to take to the ARRB two letters pertaining to the affair:
the letter Nosenko wrote in 1994 objecting to the release of his material without his being consulted
or advised, and the letter Ted Price wrote to him in response assuring him that everything possible
would be done to prevent further release of his papers. | don't see any problem with this since the
papers would support our position--unless the ARRB starts thinking about releasing the fetters also.

( Wukitchsaid she told Combs CIC would have(Bob Pringle; former Chief of AG/FIOB currently
serving as Officer in Residence at the University of Kentucky, flown in to address the ARRB if this
appears necessary. Combs will pass this on to the ARRB. (Wukitch\noted that Combs alluded to
the possibility that that ARRB might want to talk with Nosenko himself.

y

Cc:

ce: lane B. ENGBERTWancy T. BRUNQNE, Edgar C. BAUML{Bennis D. Lamb) Curtis L. )
@

MACKIAI cqueline Frankfor DCI<Ron L. Seckingen

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MEMORANDUM

_ August 5, 1997 | _ CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
. DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
To: T. Jeremy Gunn RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
From: Michelle Combs
Subject: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

Ihave prepared this memorandum at your request for the upcoming meeting where the
Board will be briefed on issues related to the Soviet defector, Yuriy Nosenko.

Summary and Recommendation

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3500 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 have been released to the public
as open in full or with only minor redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the Kennedy
assassination.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is our
judgment that the remaining 2300 pages are unrelated to the assassination of President
Kennedy and we recommend that they be processed as “NBR.” These NBR records
consist of such items as general family and professional contact information, Soviet
.intelligence methodology and operations, and Soviet navy information dating to
Nosenko’s early career in Soviet Naval Intelligence. I suggest that we review carefully
these 2300 records to ensure that there is no assassination-related material, and, to the
extent this is correct, we should process them as “NBRs.”

Background on Nosenko

KGB Lieutenant Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko first secretly contacted the CIA in _
Geneva in June 1962. One and a half years later on February 4, 1964, he defected to the
_ United States for what he said were ideological reasons. His.case became the single
most difficult counterintelligence case in the Agency’s history to date. Nosenko’s
information on the assassination of President Kennedy made his bona fides of more
importance than simply a means to determine his true identity or whether he was the
prototype of a KGB disinformation plot against Western intelligence agencies.

The conflict over Nosenko began two and a half years prior to his actual defection, in

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December 1961, when Anatoliy Golitsyn, a KGB defector, predicted that the KGB would
dispatch false defectors after him to discredit him and confuse Western intelligence
agencies as part of a massive disinformation campaign. Golitsyn, who had described a
darkly intentioned monolithic Russian master deception plan and Soviet intelligence
agencies of brutal efficiency, claimed that Nosenko was the most important of these
fake defectors and that any Soviet sources who came later and supported Nosenko’s
bona fides would also be false. Golitsyn was wholly believed by Counterintelligence
Chief James Angleton, who shared Golitsyn’s world view. Golitsyn argued that any
CIA officers who believed Nosenko should be considered as moles themselves.

Nosenko’s first four meetings with the CIA in Geneva in June 1962 produced an

- intelligence bonanza and the two CIA officers (George Kisevalter and Peter Bagley)

who.met with him believed he had conclusively proved his bona fides. During his
debriefings in 1964, Nosenko provided detailed information about Lee Harvey
Oswald’s stay in the USSR which, he said, had come across his desk routinely as the
deputy chief of the Second Chief Directorate (SCD) department responsible for
watching American visitors in the USSR.

With Golitsyn arguing against Nosenko’s bona fides, plans were made in March 1964,
to imprison Nosenko and begin hostile interrogations to find any shifts in his
information. On April 2, Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms and Soviet Division
Chief David Murphy met with the Deputy U.S. Attorney General and obtained legal
approval from the Justice Department to imprison Nosenko so that he could not
communicate with his supposed KGB controllers. On April 4, he was imprisoned in an
attic room in a CIA safe house near Washington. Nosenko was kept in solitary.
confinement, subjected to physical and mental torture, and submitted to hostile
interrogations from April 4, 1964 to October 27, 1967 first at the safe house and then ina
specially built cement house in Virginia. Despite over three-years of severe treatment,
Nosenko’s original story remained unchanged, no “confession” was forthcoming, and
no evidence was produced indicating he was, as Golitsyn still claimed, a fake defector.

On August 8, 1968, Nosenko was polygraphed for the third time by an Office of

Security specialist. During the examination, Nosenko was asked whether he had told
the truth about Oswald and the Kennedy assassination; the polygraph operator found
only positive responses to the questions. Security Officer Bruce Solie submitted a
comprehensive report in October 1968 which evaluated all of Nosenko’s information, to
date, and concluded that he was what and who he ‘had claimed to be all along. After a
review of his case by the Soviet Division, Nosenko was finally released from CIA
custody on March 1, 1969 and employed as an independent consultant by the CIA.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

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In the 35 years since Nosenko first approached the CIA in Geneva, no prima facie
evidence has ever emerged to prove that he was a KGB provocation and subsequent

_ defectors have affirmed him as a bona fide defector. He has identified many hundreds. :
of Soviet intelligence officers, provided a considerable quantity of useful information on
the organization, doctrine and methods of the KGB, and conducted numerous special

~ studies on Soviet subjects. Today, Nosenko is seventy years old, recently retired as a
contractor from the CIA, an American citizen, married, and living quietly in the
Sunbelt.

File 4.0.2 Nosenko
Combs e:\nosenko.wpd

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6 October 1997

Note To: DO

From: Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
Historical Review Group

Subject: Nosenko records in JFK Collection

The ARRB (JFK Board) staff has agreed to accept CIA's
designation of 25 folders of the Nosenko material in the JFK
sequestered collection as “not believed to be relevant”
(NBR). The staff plans to present their proposal to the JFK
Board at the 14 October meeting. The Board requires a
description of all NBRs to be made available to the public.
Please review the attached draft prepared by ARRB staff
member, Michelle Combs, for classification and public
release. The ARRB staff needs a response by COB Thursday if
possible. HRG/DO JFK reviewers here have no problem with
the draft and recommend release. If you have any questions,
call me on 31825. Thanks.

Barry

Per ple cal\ Ges Denes Lal 5 Ock q ry
\- 0 + ew (Gaver Wes nwo pre blu wt
aNheclrod dascr-p ho ot Nesunko

Qles, Ba—


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Folder Summaries of the Nosenko Material Not Believed to be Relevant to the JFK
Assassination

Reel 45, Folder 3

During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko’s bona
fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions
which cover Nosenko’s family, background, early career and Komsomol experiences. —

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s career, Party membership, Komsomol personalities and
procedures, military personalities and experiences, and his incarceration by CIA.

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains a 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s military career, KGB buildings, personalities and
procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division

'(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on plans

to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR’s belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Folder 8A contains the 263 page “Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko” 1 October 1968 report by Bruce Solie, Deputy Chief of the Security
Research Staff which concludes that Nosenko is a bona fide defector and should be
believed. A sanitized version of the Solie report has been released to the public. The
NBR document in folder 8B is a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by
N. Scott Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC/CI/SIG) based on the comments and
questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn’s comments on
inconstancies he believes exist in Nosenko’s testimony and his recormmendations for
further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

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Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835
page study “The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” by Peter Bagley. It records Peter
Deryabin’s conclusions on Nosenko’s bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

1 45, Folder

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript-of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB
buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to abbreviations in the
transcript is also included.

Reel 45, Folder 19
This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV of the 835 page study “The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

intelligence officer. The conclusion of the report is that Nosenko i is adispatched agent
under the control of the KGB. ;

Reel 45, Folder 20
This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer, and KGB buildings,
personalities, and procedures. ,

Reel 45, Folder 21
This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of ani interrogation session by Peter

Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s experiences in and knowledge of Komosol and
Communist Party: personalities, buildings, and procedures.. I

Reel 45, Folder 24

This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, II, III, and IV, of the 835 page study “The Case
of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB)
in 1967.

Reel 45, Folder 25

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V of the 835 page study “The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division (DC/SB) in 1967.

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This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study “The
Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley of the Soviet Division

~ (DC/SB) in 1967.

Reel 46, Folder 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have been released to the
public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogations sessions with Peter
Deryabin in July and August 1965, an unsigned May 1965. memo for Chief, SR/CI on the
3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 paper
analyzing, Noseniko’s sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
Chief, SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the CIA
in June 1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a
reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of
handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the Clandestine Services’
handling of the Nosenko case. The Hart report endorses the conclusions reached in
October 1968 by the Office of Security (the Solie Report) that Nosenko is a bona fide
defector.

Reel 46, Folder 5

This folders contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
during Lee Harvey Oswald’s residence there. Some documents have been released to the
public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 “homework assignment”
prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces, and a four page memorandum
on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970’s.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s background, marriage, and divorce.

Reel 62, Folder 3
This folder contains a 75 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter

Deryabin which detail Nosenko’s career progress, and a disciplinary problem and its
impact on his promotion schedule in the KGB.

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. This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions

by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and.a particular KGB operation
targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted a against an American
tourist.

~ Reel 62, Folder 7

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent under KGB
control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko says that he has been
telling Deryabin the truth all along.

1 older

This folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
handling of Nosenko and is. labeled “TS Material from Deryabin Safe.” This folder was
not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released
to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various US
Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko’s day to day
handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko, a
report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko’s request for political
asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent contractor,
and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case and his
handling.

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10/09/87 1HU Lo:UU FAA zuz 1z4 U457 AKKD “giuua

MEMORANDUM
HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
October 9, 1997 0 RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
cc: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director
. From: Michelle Combs We
Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection

Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,
memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released in
redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the
JFK Act before we submit them to the Board.

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my
judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as “NBR.” These NBR
records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family.
and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information.dating to Nosenko’s early career
in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by
the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko’s bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the
JFK Act, establishes Nosenko’s bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the _
Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed
carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and.
identified for processing and review.

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ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

a .

16 October 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO

DO JFK Board Focal Point
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: CSI/HRG
SUBJECT: Agenda for ARRB meeting 17 November 1997
REFERENCE:

The following issues are tentatively scheduled for action at the next JFK Board meeting:
1. Date of release of Nosenko material; see memo on results of Oct. meeting.

If you or CIC have any comments on the proposal to change the release date (subject of Agency review and appeal) from 2017 to 2010,
please provide them to me by 23 October.

2. State cover,

This issue originally surfaced in April and was scheduled but not addressed at the September meeting.. | recommend that you review the
material we sent the ARRB staff for the September meeting to determine if you want to provide additional "evidence". Are there other

components that should be consulted on this issue? (Sue Burggraty as involved in discussions in April.

3. DRE Monthly Reports. This is along standing request from the Board staff. Please provide a status of the request by October 21.

cc: John Pereira @ DCI
Eileen Wukitch/@ DO

Sent on 16 October 1997 at 04:57:17 PM

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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FAY Ree! “Tet Ay ae he Nosenxo

28 October 19937

SUBJECT: Disclosure of Information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko

w6

1. The Board intends to decfassity and release for public
consumption, approximately 2400’pages of counterintelligence
staff studies, interrogation reports, file reviews, and bona
fides studies on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. These studies contain
sensitive personal and operational material completely unrelated
and irrelevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President Kennedy. It has been officially stated and documented
that the remaining Nosenko records have been carefully reviewed
to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper
understanding of the assassination. Mr. Nosenko has adhered time
and time again to the stipulations of his Memorandum of
Understanding not to divulge his relationship with this Agency,
even in view of the less than satisfactory conditions this Agency
forced upon him during his early resettlement. Public disclosure
of the remaining documents would constitute an unwarranted.
invasion of his personal and professional privacy not to mention
the breech of trust on the part of this Agency to protect his
right of privacy and above all, his security. This trust was
reconfirmed in a personal letter from the former DDO, Ted Price, ©
in September 1994, stating that we would take special steps to
protect any sensitive information touching on Mr. Nosenko’s
private life or on operational information pertaining to his
debriefings. The letter further states that this Agency valued
the sacrifices he made for our country, and every effort would he
made to protect information that could affect. his privacy and
security. The question has been asked before. Should we not’
show the same integrity that we expect from those who put their

' lives on the line in defense of our national interests?

2. Furthermore, the recruitment of sources of high
intelligence value has always been this Agency’s top priority.
Public disclosure of this information could do irreparable damage
to our ability to attract individuals who admire the US and might
be disposed to collaboration. Disclosure of cooperation with the
USG would cause any potential source to think twice before
placing his life in the hands of an organization who cannot
protect his information. For those individuals such as Mr.
Nosenko, who placed their trust in this country in the past,
entered our resettlement program, and are now US citizens, the
indiscriminate release of information, some of it very personal

cu py {0489514 }
REASON 1,5(c)
DECL Xl

DRV DEF 2-82

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om. sty EM

enrol
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SUBJECT: |

and with no real relevance to any national issue, seriously

erodes this Agency’s credibility. and undermines our Resettlement
Program.

2
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SEGRER

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oo SECRET
CL BY: 611637
CL BEASOE: Section 1.5 C
‘Dect om: XT
pav Fem: LOC 5-82
5 November 1997
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
; Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
‘Kathryn Dyer @ DCI
pel
FROM: ; J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: , CSHHRG
SUBJECT: | 17 November JFK Board Meeting- CIA issues (update)

REFERENCE:
1. The following CIA items are on the agenda for the 17 November ARRB meeting:
e 6s) Reconsideration of the release of¥arrenton, Wa. as the location of the CIA Record Center.

In addition to written evidence being prepared by DA, the:Agency has been. offered the opportunity to brief the Board.

© = Chairman Tunheim's proposal to advance the opening date of the Nosenko NBR {f jot Believed Relevant) material fram the 2017 per

the JFK.Act to the year 2010.

The ARRB staff disagrees with.the Board on this issua and will recommend that the release date remain 2017. However, they are not
confident that the Board will accept their recommendation and has requested the Agency's position on the 2010 date. If the Agency
opposes the 2010 change in the date, | will need a memo from the DO explaining why. We could offer a compromise--accept the 2010
date provided the Agency has the same right in 2010 as: 2017 to review and appeal the'release of the records. | have ask OGC for a legal
‘opinion. Please note that this decision affects only those documents designated "NBR" by ARRB. The documents declared to be
Assassination Records (AR) will be're-reviewed and released, either sanitized or in full, during the‘coming year.

e ‘s) Proposed release of reference to CIA employee being under ¢i .

We have provided written evidence (DO note coordinated évith Stattand copyof MOA between CIA and Staté]
staff, some Board members consider CIA use of state cover ps an “open secret" arid are inclined to release.
opportunity to brief the Board. . ;

. According to the ARRB
Ve have been offered the

. SECRET

oe ; SECRET

e = Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) financial records.

ARRB staff plans to recommend to the Board that monthly summaries be considered ARs and the remaining material be designated NBR.

Samples of these documents have been provided to DA, DO, and DCI/IRO. if you have ariy comments or objections, please forward them
to me by COB Wednesday. .

e@ Documents containing long lists of names, crypts, companies, etc. These include both Agency documents and notes of HSCA
staffers. (FYI - no action required at this time)

The ARRB staff will ask the Board to delay processing of such documents and, in some cases, declare them NBR. The staff considers
them marginal to the story and believes that they are not worth the time involved.

TS) 2. We need to advise the ARRB staff no later than COB 12 November (Wednesday), if we plan to brief the Board on Waprentomn,
and/or State Cave Written evidence is due to ARRB staff by COB 13 November (Thursday). They need at least one day to review the
material and prepare their presentations fer the Beard.

ce: CFileen Wukitchy@ DO

Becky Rant @ DA

SECRET

SECRET

CL BY: 611637

€1 BEASON: Section 1.5 6
Dect om X1

onv Fem: COV 2-87

21 November 1997

MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI
Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA

CGinda Cipriank@ DCI

FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: CSI/HRG
SUBJECT: ARRB meeting 17 November - Results
REFERENCE:

1. Reconsideration of the release of CIA Records Center:
The Board accepted the Agency's request for reconsideration; postponed until 2017.
2. ClA use of State Cover:
The Board did not find the Agency's evidence persuasive; released.
This determination affects 16 documents ( 3 duplicates) that were pending Board action. Future documents will be impacted by this
decision. Copies of the documents have been sent to DO and OGC for reconsiderationfappeal review.
3. Release date of Nosenko NBR.cecords:’
The Board moved the release date from 2017 to 2010 giving the Agency the right to review and appeal! at that time.
4. Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) Financial Records:
The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that only "General Statement for Month" records
for January 1960 and to January 1995 be processed as Assassination Records, and that the approximately 6,000 remaining pages of
financial records be declared to have "no believed relevance (NBR)" to the JFK assassination.

5. Ramparts Damage Assessment Document:

The Board accepted the ARRB staff's recommendation (concurred in by CIA) that the paragraphs on the one relevant

SECRET

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SECRET

organization be ard¥essed as a assassination record, and that the remainder of the CIA Ramparts Memorandum be declared NBR. The
memorandum discusses the truth or fallacy of the allegations in Ramparts the Agency used non-governmental organizations for support
and funding of worldwide anti-Communist operations. Over one hundred organizations are mentioned in the Ramparts article. The
relevant organization is thei{fitérnational| Rescue Commuttes; the {RC aided Oswald on his return to the US.

6. Book Cables Dissemination Lists: a
The Board accepted the Agency's request that book cable dissemination list be protected in full even if they contain Stations
that are releasable. a

7. Document # 104-10072-10232 :

The Board rejected the Agency's request to protect the full crypt (SREUCK), The document has been sent to the DO for
reconsideration{appeal review. ~ .

8. Other Documents:
The Board accepted the Agency's and ARRB staff's recommendations on 204 additional documents. , 5
Reconsideration and Appeals:

If the Agency wishes to ask the Board to reconsider a decision or plans to appeal to the President, the ARRB staff has
requested that it be notified prior to the letter to the Agency informing the DCI of the Board's decision. We expect the letter on or around
Dec. 1st; the Board's determinations will also be published in the Federal Register an that date. As mandated by the White House, the
Agency has seven days after notification to appeal a JFK Board decision to the President.

ce: “ leet Wiikitely @ DO
Kathryn-Dyer @ OCI
- Becky Dyer @ DA

Sent on 21 November 1997 at 05:04:45 PM

SECRET

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roe

7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham @ DO
OFFICE:

DATE: 10/10/97 12:10:24 PM
SUBJECT: Nosenko Records

| have reviewed the descriptions of the folders proposed by the ARRB Staff. While | see this as a success to have them support our
position and have some concern about the detail included within the descriptions. We had an occasion in the past to ask for a legal
opinion about a former employee's access rights to Nosenko's file and were told he is entitled protection under the Privacy Act. Nosenko
has already personally expressed (in a letter to the Agency) his concern and objection about potential release of information about him. |
think we should carefully consider the amount of detail included in the public release and whether it violates his rights under the Privacy
Act.

| trust the judgment of those that have reviewed these descriptions as to content in relationship to other released material and
classification but | just want to raise a mild concern about the detail contained in the descriptions of folder content. | will not object to
the these if everyone feels compelled to accept them to protect the success we have achieved as long as they are determined to not be in
violation of his privacy rights.

In future efforts to protect NBR information, | would like to see fess detail in the description if at all possible.

ce: Gilgen M. Wukitg>@ DO,‘Lee E. Carle'¥- @ DO
Sent on 10 October 1997 at 12:10:24 PM ~ “~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

13-00000

Classification of Material Transmitted

HISTORICAL REVIEW GROUP
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE
Phone # 703-613-1806

PLEASE DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

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RECEIVING FAXNO. SY3- £3 YE

DATE TRANSMITTED: whe PAGES TRANSMITTED: We
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MESSAGE:

Classification of Material Transmitted


13-00000,/o9/97 THU 15:00 FAX 202 724 0457 AtUCs : ; _ wove

~MEMORANDUM

October 9, 1997

To: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director

ce: Tom Samoluk
Deputy Director

From: _ Michelle Combs PO

Subject: Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko in the CIA Sequestered Collection
Microfilm Containing Information of No Believed Relevance to the
Assassination of President John F. Kennedy

The information on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CIA Sequestered
Collection microfilm consists of approximately 3600 pages of interviews, transcripts,

memos, and reports. Of the total, approximately 1200 pages have been released to the
public as open in full or with redactions. Of the 1200 released pages, roughly 800
contain information directly relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy. Although all of these 800 pages have been released. in
redacted form, we have asked the Agency to re-review them under the standards of the —
JFK Act before we submit them to the Board. :

After my review of the Nosenko records and our discussion of the issues, it is my’
judgment that the remaining approximately 2400 pages are unrelated to the
assassination of President Kennedy and should be processed as "NBR." These NBR.
records, which are described on the attached list, consist of such items as general family
and professional contact information, Soviet intelligence methodology, personalities,
and specific operations, and Soviet Navy information dating to Nosenko’s early career
in Soviet Naval Intelligence. Much of the information consists of various attempts by
the Agency in the 1960's to establish Nosenko’s bona fides. The October 1968 Solie
Report, which has been released in redacted form and will be re-reviewed under the -
JFK Act, establishes Nosenko’s bona fides. The conclusions of the Solie report were
reaffirmed in a 1976 report by John Hart. A brief summary of the conclusions of the.
Hart Report will also be processed for release.

The approximately 2400 pages of proposed Nosenko NBR records have been reviewed |
carefully to confirm that they contain no material helpful to a deeper understanding of
the assassination. During the review some additional material, not previously released,
which may add to an understanding of the Nosenko story, was marked relevant and
identified for processing and review.

13-0000, 08/97 1HU 15:0U FAA zuz 124 U4aar AKU wy uve

NER Folder Summaries

Each folder also contains an HSCA signature sheet. At least one member of the HSCA.
reviewed all but the last of the folders listed below.

Reel 45, Folder 3

‘During July and August 1965, Peter Deryabin, a Soviet defector, conducted a series of
interrogations of Nosenko in conjunction with CIA efforts to establish Nosenko’s bona
fides. This folder contains one 66 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation
sessions which cover Nosenko’s family, background, early career, and Komsomol
experiences.

Reel 45, Folder 4

This folder contains a 76 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s career, Party membership, Komsomol
personalities and procedures, military personalities and procedures, and his (then

- current) incarceration by the CIA. :

Reel 45, Folder 5

This folder contains one 59 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s military career, KGB buildings, personalities
and procedures, and other Soviet intelligence people, roles, and titles.

Reel 45, Folder 6

‘ All the documents in this folder, but one, have been released to the public. The NBR
document is a five page February 1964 memo from the Director of the Soviet Division
(C/SR) David Murphy to the Deputy Director for Plans (DD/P) Richard Helms on
plans to debrief Nosenko based on C/SR’s belief that Nosenko is a Soviet plant.

Reel 45, Folder 8B

. This folder contains a 135 page report on Nosenko prepared in April 1969 by N. Scott
Miler of the Counterintelligence Staff (DC /CI/SIG) based on the comments and
questions of Anatoliy Golitsyn. The report contains Golitsyn’s comments on
inconsistencies he believes exist in Nosenko’s testimony and his recommendations for
further questioning. Golitsyn believed Nosenko was a dispatched agent.

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10/08/97 THU 15:01 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB

BS

Reel 45, Folder 13

This folder contains one document. The document is a ten page extract from the 835
page study "The Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” written by Peter Bagley of the
Soviet Branch (DC/SB) in 1967. The document records Peter Deryabin’s conclusions on
Nosenko’s bona fides. Deryabin does not believe Nosenko.

Reel 45, Folder 17

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer, his marriage, and KGB

buildings, personalities, and procedures. A two page key to the abbreviations in the

transcript is also included in this folder.

Reel 45, Folder 19

This folder contains pages 349-602, part IV, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yuriy
Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley in 1967. The study analyzes Nosenko’s
biography, case work, and responsibilities as a Soviet intelligence officer. The
conclusion of the report is that Nosenko is a dispatched agent under the control of the

_ KGB.

Reel 45, Folder 20

This folder contains an 89 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s career as a KGB officer and KGB buildings,
personalities, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 21

This folder contains an 85 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s experiences in and knowledge of Komsomol and

Communist Party personalities, buildings, and procedures.

Reel 45, Folder 24

- This folder contains pages 1-84, parts I, I, II, and TV, of the 835 page study "The Case

of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko” prepared by Peter Bagley.

i) VUG

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Reel 45, Folder 25 .

This folder contains pages 85-348, part V, of the 835 page study "The Case of Yury
Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Reel 46, Folder 2A

This folder contains pages 603-835, parts VII, VIII, and IX of the 835 page study "The
Case of Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko" prepared by Peter Bagley.

Re ‘0. 2B

This folder contains a variety of documents, some of which have already been released
to the public. The NBR documents include: 14 reports of interrogation sessions with
Peter Deryabin in July and August 1965; an unsigned May 1965 memo for Chief SR/CI
on the 3-13 May interrogation sessions with a psychologist, an unsigned May 1965 ;
paper analyzing Nosenko’s sessions with the psychologist which refutes the reported
conclusions of the psychologist, and a November 1968 Memorandum of Transmittal to
SB/CI/K on the 15 Deryabin-Nosenko July-August 1965 transcripts.

Reel 46, Folder 3

This folder contains most of the 186 page report by John Hart commissioned by the
CIA in June.1976. Chapter X, pages 159-176 inclusive are missing. The report is a
reinvestigation of the Nosenko case in the context of reviewing the techniques of
handling Soviet agents and defectors. It is highly critical of the handling of the
Nosenko case by the Clandestine Service. The Hart Report endorses the conclusions
reached in October 1968 byth the Office of Security (the Solie Report) ¢ that Nosenko is a
bona fide defector.

Reel 46, Folder

This folder contains documents pertaining principally to personalities in the Minsk area
during Lee Harvey Oswald’s residence there. Some documents in this folder have been
released to the public. The two NBR documents include: a nine page 1964 “homework —
assignment” prepared by Nosenko on KGB leadership in the provinces and a four page
memorandum on KGB personalities in the Minsk area in the mid 1970's.

Reel 62, Folder 2

This folder contains an 82 page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by Peter
Deryabin which covers Nosenko’s background, marriage, and divorce.

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Reel 62, Folder 3

This folder contains a 74 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by Peter
Deryabin which detail Nosenko’s career progress and a disciplinary problem and its
resulting impact on his promotion schedule. _-

Reel 62, Folder 5

This folder contains two verbatim transcripts (33 and 46 pages) of interrogation sessions
by Peter Deryabin which cover specific KGB operations and a particular KGB operation
targeted against an American tourist. |

Reel 62, Folder 6

This folder contains one 22 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Perter Deryabin which cover a particular KGB operation targeted against an American
tourist.

«

Ree Fo

This folder contains one 84 page verbatim transcript of two interrogation sessions by
Peter Deryabin which cover Nosenko’s education, Navy career, and a particular KGB
operation targeted against an American tourist.

Reel 62, Folder 8

_ This folder contains an eight page verbatim transcript of an interrogation session by
Peter Deryabin in which Deryabin encourages Nosenko to confess that he was sent
under KGB control and to think about becoming a double agent. Nosenko responds
that he has been telling Deryabin the truth all along.

Reel 62, Folder 9

The folder contains 51 pages of 12 Deryabin reports on his interrogation sessions with
Nosenko in July and August 1965. The information in these reports summarizes
information detailed in the actual interrogation transcripts.

Reel 62, Folder 10

This folder contains a mix of intra and inter-Agency memoranda pertaining to the
handling of Nosenko and is labeled “TS Material from Deryabin Safe.” This folder was
not examined by the HSCA staff. Thirty-seven pages of documents have been released

wWuUuue

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to the public. The 97 pages of NBR documents include: correspondence with various
US Government agencies and the Attorney General, memoranda on Nosenko’s day to
day handling, emergency procedures for Office of Security guards assigned to Nosenko,
a report to the CIA Inspector General on the Nosenko case, Nosenko’s request for
political asylum, copies of his subsequent contracts with the CIA as an independent
contractor, and additional reports, memos, and briefings concerning the Nosenko case
and his handling.

Combs e:\nosenko4.wpd
File 4.20.5, 4.0.2, and 2.4

13-00000

: CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIF!C
September 22, 1998 ‘ RELEASE CG

IN THIS DOCU

' CRMATION

Tor _ ‘Laura Denk
_ “Executive Director

Bob Skwirot.
CIA Team Leader

we “Associate Director for Research and Review
Subjéct: 7 Working Files on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko Containing Information Not
retell Believed Relevant to the Asiassination of President John F. Kennedy .

Previously, the Review Board voted to declare NBR approximately 2400 pages. of
_ material'on Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko contained in the CLA sequestered collection
microfilm urirelated to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

‘The Review Board staff has since examined an additional two boxes of working files on
Noseriko pr duced as a result of the search for records related to'the Kennedy...
a ; material. either vay dedi or is the gah copy of tee sequestered

m, to be NBR. The files See ames sich

2 Board decare the contents ofthe to boxes of working les on


13-00000

SECRET

CI-277-94
31 August 1994

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating

to Yuriy Nosenko

ca

1. On 3 August I had a series of discussions with the
staff of, the Center for the Study of Intelligence (CST) at.
the Center's office in the Ames Building. Our discussion °
centered on the disposition of more than 3,200 pages
relating to the career of former KGB officer--and current
CIA independent contractor-~Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko. The
documents are being reviewed for declassification and

release as required by the JFK law.

2. The Declassification Problem: CSI's de-
classification staff has carefully reviewed the Nosenko
material. Ellie Neiman--a career Directorate of Operations
officer--is representing the DO in the review process.

Ms. Neiman noted that the material can be divided into two

parts:
Approximately 800 pages that deal with Nosenko's infor-
mation about Lee Harvey Oswald's life in the Soviet Union
and his relationship with the KGB. ;

A body of counterintelligence staff studies, inter-
rogation reports, file reviews, and bona fides studies on
Nosenko totaling some 2,400 pages. These studies contain
sensitive personal and operational material. For

example:
-~ Information on how CIA conducted operations in

Moscow ("sticks and bricks"), material on how
bona fides analysis is conducted, and details on
how we evaluated the KGB's operations.

CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR \
‘DRV HUM 4-82:-

WARNING NOTICE
,INTELLIGENCE SOURCES -
"OR METHODS INVOLVED


13-00000

w é SECRET

SUBJECT: Discussions with the Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko

,

-- Extensive personal details on US citizens the KGB.
assessed and pitched (approximately 100 cases)
and on. Americans Moscow Station used as assets.
One US citizen the KGB developed is now a
senior professor of history in California.
3. Nosenko's Sensitivities: I discussed with
Ms. Neiman Nosenko's concern about the impact of the release
of information on his personal life. I informed hef.-of
Nosenko's recent letter to the DCI complaining about the |
release of material related to his association with CIA, and
of his concern that future releases would endanger his
privacy and security. The bona fides studies dwell in great
detail on Nosenko's personal life, - including his problems
-with venereal disease and his relationships with women.
Since the bona fides were based on detailed analyses of
Nosenko's life, their release would reveal modus operandi of
sensitive clandestine operations and further embarrass a man
who has served as a CIA employee for more than three
decades.

”
a

4. Following my discussions with Ms. Neiman, I met
with John Pereira, Acting Director of CSI, and Barry
Harrelson, a member of his staff. I recommended: that CIA
move to release the material dealing with Oswald, but--
citing the operational costs, embarrassment to prominent
American citizens, and threat to Nosenko's privacy~-strongly

suggested that the other material be held back. Mr. Pereira

agreed to take these points into consideration, noting that
the law did allow CIA to withhold certain information to
protect national security or for reasons of privacy. He
told me in closing that later this year .the Agency would
have to justify to the Congressionally-mandated review board
the reasons for withholding. I promised that I would raise
the issue with the Chief of the Counterintelligence Center
and said. I believed we could provide the justification.

Robert Pringle

13-00000

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko 7

. ff : 2 Sept 744.
John Pereira (AD/CSI) Date

fs/ 25
Barry Harrelson’ (CSI) . Date

a.

Ellie Neimah 7 . Date

: . SECRET ee i
} f] 4

13-00000 |.

SECRET

SUBJECT: Discussions with Center for the Study of
Intelligence on the Release of Material Relating
to Yuriy Nosenko

DO/CIC/AG/FIOB/RPringle:ek/76246 (31 Aug 94).

Distribution:
Orig - John Pereira, Barry Harrelson, Ellie Neiman

for Concurrence and Return to CIC/AG .
AD/CSI-
CSI (Harrelson)
- Neiman
{ c/cic Chrono
- CIC/AG Chrono
-CIC/AG Defector File

Hehe
it

po SECRET

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580 531

: of the factors I . _
‘ed if, and I will continas sider in conn, EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF DAVID MURPHY BE
reuence, not opinion... Be pe It

; ‘ORE THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON. ASSAS-
INATIONS ON: AUGUST 9, 1978 so
deent him.to Miner, 0°74: When they oo

INTRODUCTION
Your knowledge of Nosenko, based on v,. ; : oe intelli fi h
‘d on your knowledge 5 on your kn, i ing heard from Nosenko and from an intelligence officer who
> credible when he save they nena and me aved him to be bona fide, the committee spoke to the CIA official

iad overall responsibility for the interrogation of Nosenko dur-
ho pe years 1964-67 > when. Nosenko was kept in solitary confine-
hin,

Among othe: che was.asked about the reason Nosenko

What is meant by interview, 5 AE
Ting to is a KGB officer speaking taupe

§ “a8: 8° KGB officer, b “placed ‘in solitary: confitiement, about why he questioned No-
i credibnwenko saya that never wake’s credibility, and ‘about: Nosenko’s charge that his statements

to the. Agency were inaccurate because he had been drugged by the

- best ledge, :
of his knowledge, T will have to—z s of that transcript follow.,
Ppen ” aaroRRPTS.OF DEPOSITION of DAVID Munpity Berors House SeLEor CoMMITTEE ON
the KGB didn't have a large bo co, ASSABSINATIONS ON AvGUST 99,1978 ~ :
er done to check out the ge book on ASS. /

feasibility of ita ; -Kuzin. When Nosenko defected in' 1964, when he came to the United States,
devo by Rane cxperlences of other defectors whe in the custody of the Central Intelligence Agency at that time?
7 KG : Cers? Was that ever done: "vr. Mozruy. I don’t. want té be cute’by saying I believe so. I am not exactly
L ntaryi ‘ So gure of the legal—_t mean what his legal status was. Insofar as physical facts,
vas in the custody of theIO::.
nr Kiem, What division or. unit of the Central Intelligence Agency had pri-
” mary responsibility for Nosenko? : /

. Some who were in Russia ‘in ap

2d, possitie. roximate pe : My, Munpsry. The Soviet Russian Division.
reriod ot Ge pecans pot would almost have ty ; Mr, Kz. Of which you were the Chief?
1e comparison. should be Witereational situation 3 Mr. Murray. Yes, sir. -

the approximate | . Mr. Kumn, And what yéar did you leave the Soviet Russia Division?

many He detector tac : . Mugriy. Beginning in'1968.

now He detector tests, to.yo : Mr Krzrn, And up until what year did the Soviet Russia Division have
snare nsibility for Nosenko?

yo : respo ‘or ‘0°

test tone - comple’ valle test valid? ” Mr. Mounpny. I don’t recall the exact time but it was certainly up until the

: 3 th; f 1967.
se front war offles seusston concerning the | poly. Pie Kazim. ihe investigation by Bruce Solie began at the end of 1967. At that
ind I will only confine myeee not an operator, — time did the control or responsibility over Nosenko change from the Soviet
; nesti : Russia Division to another division? .
Oneonta sngormation into a ore iat Mr. ‘Munpar, My recollection is that it changed in the spring or early summer
aly to not be valid, to b a, is of 1967 and the responsibility was turned over to the Office of Security of which

ur knowledge?

€ completely iny: olie was a member. : .

Done taee Harvey Oswald wag a minor acpect Mr. Kiem. As Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, did you have the primary

8s responsibility for what happened to Nosenko? And when I say happened, where
ate: . he was kept, what he was asked?
art tobeemgrald aspect? ur. Moneiy, Twas responsible for the case.
‘it recei >. . KLEIN. aoe . :
Lee Ha ved the full consideration and the Mr. Mugpxy. Although the case was handled by one of the groups within the
us amount of frend ne eee Division.

vi

tio.
en that Nogenko was not | pestred 7a 1864.

) Mr. Kuz. But they would réport to you?
arvey Oswald, would. that beet in his rela- . ce. dees

Mr. Murrry. Yes.

\8 bona fide? nt as to 8 * Tg * . * *
I would have to consider, Mr. Kixin. There came a time in 1964, Apri) 4, I believe, when the treatment
sible that he could be lying about Oswald and coments by Nosenko greatly changed in that hostile interrogations began, is that
€ was lying about Oswald. Mr. Muzpuy. I am not sure I agree with the formulation of the question.
Mr. Kien. Well, elaborate. . ,
. Ty ‘Mr. Munpxy. No; the previous pattern of voluntary discussion of issues under
he was lying about Oswala consideration changed and Nosenko was not permitted to evade questions or to

‘whether he was bona fide? do you think that decide when he would or would not wauit to respond.

Mr. Krzr. Could you describe for us what the pattern was before, as far as
conditions and how it was changed?


13-00000

532

Mr, MurrHy. Well, the pattern before was one of pretty much permitting.
Nosenko to call.the shots. In other words, we wanted his cooperation and we
wanted to discuss these things in a reasonable manner, but his preference was
not to sit still for a full day’s briefing, to want to go out socially all the time,
which made it difficult the next day to continue to work. And the most important
aspect, I think, of the change was the decision to confront him with inconsisten-
cies as opposed to taking what he said and passing it on.

Mr, Kie1n. What about the day-to-day living conditions, were they changed?

Mr. Murpuy. Well, he was not permitted to leave. He was not permitted to
depart.

Mr. Krern. Other than that, his day-to-day treatment, not the actual interroga-

_ tion sessions, but his food intake, his recreation, was that changed at that time?

Mr. Murpiy. I don’t think so, not.that early. I don’t’ emember that:
* * * 5 s s

Mr. Krew. Subsequent to April 4, is it correct that Nosenko + was interrogated —
by people from the Soviet Russia Division?

(Mr, Mureny. That is right.
' Mr, Kizrn. And how were the particular subareas on which he was interrogated. :
chosen?

Mr. Murprry. I am not sure. I don’t know. Subject areas? This is a guess, this is |
a recollection, but I think the decision was made based on what the CIA people
thought offered the best opportunity to get an admission and to break on that.
In other words, I think it was based on points that they had collateral on. By |.
that I mean other information which said what this man is saying is not the truth -

or this man does not know about this and, therefore, let us hit him hard on this: -

And so it was a fully tactical, these were tactical considerations relating to pos-.
session of information in the "hands of the interrogators which then offered the
best opportunity to get through and get the truth.

\One breakthrough it was felt, as is normally the case, gives you other break-
throughs. The decision on what subjects to be interrogated was essentially a fac-
tor of the tactics of the debriefing.

Mr. Krern. Would it.be fair to say that after April 4 the subject areas were
determined by a desire to try to catch him, to break him, as opposed to a desire
to gain knowledge that would be of use to you in your role as an intelligence
agency? In other words, knowledge of the operation.

Mr. Murpuy. That is an accurate impression. The answer is yes because by
the end of April there was a view that the man was not telling the truth, that
parts of what he was saying were known to be untrue and that, therefore, ‘made
no sense, and although the reasons for his behavior and his "statements were
not clear, it made no sense then, it did not appear to make sense to accept as
valid any data he might provide ‘unless you could be sure that that data was in
fact correct, and there were so many doubts about this, leaving aside the moti-
vation for it, the contradictions or the way in which he presented it, that the
information was not considered acceptable.

. * * s * * *

0 Mr. Krein. Were you aware of the substance of what Nosenko had to say about
swe.

Mr. Murpuy. From the very first. I mean, when he first said it back in February
or March.

. Mr. Kuiern. Do you recall now the substance of it?

‘Mr: Murpny. No; not exactly, anything I said would be polluted by so much
back and forth. I know that the thrust of the message was that Oswald was
never of interest to the Soviet Intelligence Services, that he was never debriefed
by them, and I can guarantee that because I was personally involved in the
affair. There is more detail, but I can’t really pin it down.

Mr. Kiet. Did you accept this statement by Nosenko?

Mr. Murray. I did not. I did not believe that it would be possible for the
Soviet Intelligence Services to have remained indifferent to the arrival in 1959
in Moscow of a former Marine radar operator who had served at what was an
active U-2 operational base. I found that to be strange. It was only later, I think,
that as the Nosenko case and its other ramifications began to emerge that it
sbenied to me that the Oswald story became even more unusual.

I think I mentioned the other day it seems to me almost to have been tacked on
or to have been added as though it didn’t seem to be part of the real body of


13-00000

532

xefore was one of pretty much

words, we wanted ‘his cooperation and’ we
reasonable manner, but his preference wag
ng, to.want to go out socially all the tim

$ Sontinue to work. And the most important

2 decision to conf: is]

a ad Da oon ront him with inconsisten-
ay conditions, were they

Tmitted to leave. He was not permiten to

’-to-day treatment, not the actual

recreation, was that changed at ta noes

that early. I don’t remember that.”...<.. *
e . * 6: eo

is it correct z

is At cox that Nosenko was interroga

ular subareas on which he was interrogated .

kuow. Subject areas? This is
? a guess,
ne was made based on what the CIA pests
get an. admission. and to break on.that.
on points that-they had collateral on. By
aid what this man is saying is not the truth.

and, therefore, ‘let us hit him hard on this. . ; ,

vere tactical considerations relating to.

£ the interrogators which then’ offered ‘the oe

et the truth,

normally the case, gives you oth
ts to be interrogated was essentially « Co.

that after April 4 the sub areas
ject

ae e reak him, as opbeeed toa desire
the opeeticn your role as an intelligence
impression. The answer is yes beca
it the man was not telling.the truth, thes
tr his behavior and hiss eres me
K . 8
id not appear to make sense to anne
‘s you could be sure that that data was in

ubts about this, leaving aside the moti-

2 ;
oey in which he presented it, that the

* * * *
ubstance of what Nosenko had to say about ©

‘ean, when he first said it back in February

anes of it?
& I said would be polluted b
ist of the message was that Oswald waa
rnee te Te that he was never debriefed
personally

cally pint qn involved in the
rent by Nosenko?

eve that it would be possib}
er erarent to the arrival in 1900

‘ served at what w:

sade ae ee
me even more unusual. ‘9 emerge that it
eems to me almost to have been tack
dn’t seem to be part of the real bode ot

wert te em

-_

533

the other things that he had to say, many of which were true. You understand
that Nosenko was—much of what hé said was true. :

Mr. Krern. You are talking about other areas? . to :
Mr. Mourpery. Yes, sir. This one seemed to be tacked on and didn't have much

relationship, and it seemed to be so totally dependent on not just one coincidence

but a whole series of coincidences, for him to have been there.and all that sort
of thing. That is what I mean. . : :
€ -) 2 * * . * *

Mr. Kizrn, Do you recall any other specifics about what you could not accept
in Nosenko’s statements about Oswald?

Mr. Morrxy. Yes, that they just—this is part.of the first one—no contact was
ever made, that he went up to. Minsk and lived happily and well with no contact.
The Soviet Union with foreigners don’t do that.-I mean, ‘he is the only person.
Read the accounts of what happened to this poor. gentleman, what happened to
Jay Crawford in Moscow and their intensive debriefing of him on the layout of
the American Embassy. It didn’t seem to be possible. f .

“Now, again, that does not constitute proof, d n't constitute any breakthrough.
It seemed to me to be strange. : : rr

Mr. Kiem. Would you distinguish between first the fact: that nobody debriefed
Oswald when he first came to the Soviet Union, nobody tried to find out what he
knew as @ marine, as a radar operator, and, second, the fact that once they

. dedided to allow him to stay, nobody-debriefed him to find out if he was some

kind of a Western security agent or working. for OIA? = .

Mr. Museny. Yes, they would be two different points. 'The first. point clearly
involves the KGB and GRU. This is simply a chap arriving with this background
and no one taking the time just from a military intelligence technical point of
view, telling us how it worked when this thing came in at 90,000 feet. what did the
blips look like. I don’t think they had many American radar operators handling
operational traffic involving U-2’s. * 7

Mr. Kizmv. How would you react to a statement by Nosenko that although
the KGB knew Oswald was a marine, they did not bother to question him,
and because of that, never knew that he was a radar operator or that he
worked at the base from which the U-2’s took off and landed?

Mr. Munpxy. I think it would be strange. .

My other point, going back to your first question, that is, the first aspect of
your question, which is the initial arrival and lack of debriefing. There is no
indication here that the GRU was advised, which in the case of a defector,
there is no operational interest in a defector. GRU would be properly the out-
fit that would want to be talking to any marine. They will talk to a marine
about close order drill. You follow me? It doesn’t require that he be known to
have been a radar operator or that he be known to have been a——they would
talk to him about bis military affiliation just as we would. : .

1 realize that there is a body of thought which says that some people think
the Soviets are 10-foot tall. I don’t believe they are. I think they are very,
very, very much the other way. What I find difficult on the part of many Ameri-
cans is that they will not ascribe to the Soviets the same elemental competence
that we have. That is all I ask. And, therefore, we in Germany will talk to a
private in the Hast German Border Gi The GRU would be interested
in. talking to a private. He was a corporal in the Marine Corps, who had stated
to a consul in a consular office, which is manned by the Soviets, Soviet locals
and what have you, fully accessible to the Soviets, unlike the higher floors of the
Embassy, that he wanted to talk about his experiences, that he wanted to tell all.
I guess I found it difficult to believe this is one of the things that made, or many
other aspects of the case, but this is one of the things that created an atmosphere

- of disbelief that there must be something to this case that is important, vitally
important to the Soviet Union and we can't understand it. .
bet may be right, he may be right, but at the time it was very hard to
ve. - :

: s * * : * * *

Mr. Kuern. And on the basis of your experience and knowledge gained over
almost 30 years, is that what is giving you trouble with Nosenko’s statements
about Oswald? -

Mr, Munpry, And other things.

Mr. Kxemy. Do you know of comparable situations where somebody wasn't
questioned like this, was just left alone, as Nosenko says Oswald wis?


13-00000

534

Mr, Murpry. I honestly couldn’t find anyone, or I am not aware of anyone
that the division or the CI Staff, that is, those officers concerned with this
case, were handling {it directly. I don’t know of any former Soviet intelligence

officer or other knowledgeable source to whom they spoke about this matter _—
who felt this would have been possible. If someone did, I never heard of it.

Mr. Kiein. During this interrogation period, beginning in April 1964, would
it be fair to say that the questions relating to Oswald and the problems which
you have just been discussing relating to Oswald constituted a major area
for questioning and in interrogating Nosenko?

Mr. Morpuy. Probaby not.

Mr. Kix. Why would that have been?

Mr. Murpxy. Because there were many other areas which posed.equally inter- .

‘esting aspects yet about which we knew much more and which had occurred

abroad and involved collateral knowledge, which obviously" is not easy for us
to obtain in the Soviet Union.

Mr. Kiem. Who in the Soviet ‘Russia division made the decision ¢ as to who.
would question Nosenko, subsequent to April 4?

Mr. Morpxy. (OIA employee], chief of the group.

Mr.:-Kietn. And do you know of any criteria that he used to ‘piek’ his inter-
rogators?

Mr..Mureny. Some knowledge of Russian, as Nosenko’s English was not good,

_the fact that he had been exposed. Well, that is one of the aspects of the CIA

interrogation. You try not to use too many people because you then lose. In the

_ first. place, you are dealing with a potentially hostile guy who is Hable to go

back to the Soviet Union, or return to the other side, and so you don’t want to
expose too many officers, plus the fact it is not a good idea to simply bring a lot ;
of people in. You have to have people who studied the case and became in depth, ~
know it in depth and therefore, so they use the officers that they had available
and there. were a variety of criteria. ©

Mr. Kuern. As I mentioned to you in our conversations about a week ago, it is
‘our information that the person who interrogated Nosenko about the Oswald
matter had no background whatsoever in Oswald, he didn’t know anything
about Oswald’s background or really about Oswald at all. Is. there any reason
that such a person would be used. that you can tell us?

Mr. Muppsy. I am not sure I understand. I thought the point was that he had,
he was not a man of a lot of background in the CI debriefings or interrogations.
I wasn’t sure of the point he didn't know. about Oswald. I am not sure very
many of us knew very much about Oswald than was available at the time.

Mr. Kier. Two points——

Mr. Murpxry. The reason that the chap was chosen was because he was level-
headed, extremely toughminded, and was going to be with the case for the
long pull. He was not going to be changed. That is why he was used. And his
career since then has borne out the judgment of many, he is a very good officer.

Mr. Kiem. But wouldn’t——

Mr. Mourpxry. I don’t know that he didn’t, that he wasn’t what you are saying,
he knew nothing at all about Oswald’s case. I find that difficult to believe. But I
don’t know.

-Mr. KizIn. Well, if I asked you to consider a hypothetical situation, where I
told you the officer who interrogated Oswald knew nothing about Oswald other
than what he learned from Nosenko, would you think that was unusual that
they would not, if they didn’t have somebody already who knew about Oswald, at
least given somebody a thorough briefing from A to Z, everything that the CIA
knew about Oswald, would you think it was unusual, that they didn’t do that?

Mr. Murpnry. I would certainly think so.

Mr. Kre1n. The second part of my question was the other point I made to you
a week ago when we spoke, to our knowledge, let me be frank, we spoke to the
Particular officer in a deposition, so that our knowledge is gained from that,
it is possible that since I have not seen the typed up deposition that what I say
might not be exactly what the deposition says, but my recollection of it is that
he also had little or no prior interrogation experience, and my question is would

Mr. Murrxy. That wouldn’t surprise me because there were very few people,
relatively few people, in the Division or indeed elsewhere who had a lot of
interrogation experience. We hadn't done a lot of very many hostile CIA debrief-
ings. People who might have been used were probably otherwise, either abroad, -


13-00000

one, or I am not aware of anyone

those ‘officers concerned wi ;
of any former Soviet intelligen

om they spoke about this matter .

omeone did, I never heard of it

rd, ‘beginning: in April 1904, weeta
‘0 Oswald and the problems which
Oswald constituted’ a major area

er areas which posed equally
ich more and which had ovctirred
hich obviously is not easy for ug

si cls y :
rh on made the decision as to who. |

oup.
cia that he used to pick his inter-

is Nosenko’s English was no!
ft is one of the aspects of the Ore

sople because you then lose. In :
ly hostile guy: who, is liable to go:
her side, and 20 you don’t want to_

't a good idea to simply bring a
died the case and beeen in septs
‘he officers that they had available

nversations about a. week :

ogated Nosenko about the Dewnla

pewald, jhe didn’t know anything
wv a Tj

‘a tel t s there any reason:
ought the point was tha

1e CI debriefings or interrogations

bout Oswald. I am not sure very

lan was available at the time.

i chosen was because he was level-
ping to be with the case for the
Chat is why he was used. And his
of many, he is a very good officer.

zat he wasn't what you are
find that difficult to helieve Butt

‘a hypothetical situation, wher
er
knew nothing about Oswald other
you think that was unusual that
: dready who Imew about Oswald, at
a A to Z, everything that the CIA
unusual, that they didn't do that?

was the other point I mad

, let me be frank, we spoke to the
r knowledge is gained from that,
ped up deposition that: what I say
8, but my recollection of it is that
yerience, and my question is would

cause there were very few
leed elsewhere who had Ape:
of very many hostile CIA debrief-
probably otherwise, elther abroad,

oo ee
oo _
-
. ~~

‘“gquads and

-¢ould be used to interrogate him?. .

| We thought Wwe Were go
area at that time. =~

. those years, it is your statem:

535

’ might have had experience, but I know it might sound strange, There just wasn’t

id squads. of highly trained fluent Russian speaking CI expefienced:

interrogators. * wm Bot
. Krern. One thing I would point out to you is that I have listened to a

there was no Russian. -

Mr. MurrHy. Yes,. . . cs ! .
Mr. Kien. My question is, was the questioning of Nosenko considered a major.

operation in the Bureau in 1964? :

Mr. Mugrxy: It was an important operation, an important case. : .
tion experience who

° Mr.
nuinber of tapes,-and all of the ones I have listened to were totally in English,

‘Mr. Kiztn. And yet’ there was nobody with interroga!

“Me: MogpHy. I am sure some of. the people had interro $
mean. [CLA:employee) himself had a lot of background in this field. I can’t explain ©
Oswald did not have prior briefing on Oswald

’ “why. the officer who debriefed him on

‘except what I mentioned to you the ‘other day; because it was not a thing’ that
ing to get through on, because we ‘were weak. in that
+o on 3 ; .« — , ; eo

Mr. Kiein, Was Nosenko ever given any drugs?

-. Mr: Murpuy. Not to my knowledge... : . .
versations in which you took: part: about

. Mr. Kiern: Were there ever any conv:

- . whether to give him drugs in order to get him to tell the truth?’ an .
> Mr. Murry. There were ‘time about various

‘ many, many conversations all the ‘
things that could be done, all the techniques that are known, ‘to get him to talk, |
but-as far.as.I. know and in discussions with the medical officer. who handled — -

decision made:or any attempt ‘made to use these,

_the case, there was never any } ; m: '
‘ed to be likely to produce results ‘and they all would

because none of them a i
be very harmful and, therefore, not produce results. ae
lost control over the’ case, ‘in

“Mr. Kiern: Between 1964 and 1967 when you )
ent that if any drugs were given to him, to get him

to tell the truth, you would have known about it, and no such thing happened?

Mr, Murpxy. That is correct.
*

* e * * *. *
Mr. Krier. Are you aware that Nosenko was given & lie detector test in 1964,
in April? : .
Mr. Morrxy. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kuzin. Do you know the result of that test?
Mr. Mugrzy. It indicated he was lying on several key points.
Mr. Kiem. Do you have any reason to believe that test was invalid?

Mr, Mugrxy. No. :
Mr. Kier. Are you aware that he was given a second He detector test in
1966? . ot
Mr. Murrry. Yes.
Mr. Kern. Do you know the result of that test?
Mr. Murpxy. Same .
eagon to believe that test. was invalid?

: thing.
Mr. Kizr. And do you have any ©
Mr. Mougruy. No; I believe the operator who gave him the test in 1966 was the

game operator who gave him the test in 1964.

Mr. Kiem. That is correct. 7 . ;
-Y. EXCERPTS OF DEPOSITION OF JAMES C. MICHAELS
‘AND ALEKSO POPTANICH, AUGUST 11, 1978, BEFORE

THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINA-
TIONS ;
INTRODUCTION

to clear'up the facts surrounding Nosenko’s claims |

the CLA should not be used to impeach his pres’
BI and CIA

Ina further effort

that his statements to the ¢ be
ent testimony, the committee took depositions from

agents who were present

during the 1964 interviews. These agents were

gation experience. I” mo

13-00000

. _ INVESTIGATION OF THE "ASSASSINATION é.
a OF PRESIDENT JOHN F FEENEY,

HOUSE. OF REPRESENTATIVE
: NINETY- FIFTH CONGRESS.

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations ,

U.8. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-872 0 WASHINGTON : 1978

"For sale by the Superintendent of Documen heaves U.5. Gov: ernment Printing Office
Washington, D.C. oo


13-00000

" September 25, 1978,

of meetings which were
Helms' recollection... I‘am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the
. wk _ calendar. ‘Although it is clear from this page that there was such a
- , meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and there-
_ ' 4 fore cannot tell you what/was discussed beyond what is stated in the
calendar itself. :

; It was 8 not my custom to make notes on suck meetings, and I”
doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by
me: However it is pogsible. that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such
notes. I believe. Mr .. Foley i is now-deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now
a judge in the District of Columbia and: perhaps he would have some —
reeollection of the meeting. ee ne sh.

“had; prior to'm ‘testimony: checked my. calendar diary for the
petted dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren
Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investi-
gation to go as far as ‘April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While.


13-00000

.. change. my testimony, it did seem to m t in fairness to both the
- +. Committee and'Mr, Helms I ahould meke it available to you.

Respectfully: yours,. ‘% a

toa

Sabb bs Taek

r,.Gary
Hon « Richard C. Helms ‘::
Edward Bennett Williams, E

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would fake yon ‘fiew Lindenbaum". -), Givil . 9:35
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oseph Dolan.-'  ) Rights © 9:35"a.1

avid Tilvaroff.. ) briefing 9:35.
Respectfully yours, 7 joan Douglas - dos, 9:35
' f Jack Rosenthal ° yeP - 9:35

_ Burke Marshall ) 9:35 .a.m.'

11:55
12:27
1:50
2:37
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4:08 Dim,
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- Uefector Case)

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v~ John Douglas : 6:56 pam. . SAW
\S dilliam Orrick / i - 7:06 p.m. . SAL
‘\ David Filvaroff ; .72:12 peme SAT
/Joseph Dolan \ 7:15 pem. SAW
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Burke Marshall. Iwriefing 9:30-a.m . SAT
ne £ ack Rosenthal , 9:30 a.m. SAW .
vee Joseph Dolan >. 9:30 am. SAW

NdeBK to Puerto Rico...” 10:15 a.m.-


13-00000

INVESTIGATION OF THE 7 .
OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY‘),

“SELBOT 0 | COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION

a OFTHE :

US. ‘HOUSE OF REPRESENPATIVES
_ | NINETY- FIFTH CONGR ss. a

 SHPTEMIBER 22; 25, AND 28,1078 Sage 2
VOLUME IV

Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Assassinations

a

ot U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
41-3730 ; WASHINGTON : 1979

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

Stock Number 052-0T0-04906-5 |


13-00000

have a say in what happens with respect 3
artainly was involved with decisions on’ #&

: to end, but Iwas not. the controlling

re were three major agency reports that
» the Nosenko case; specifically there was
by the Soviet Russia Division, another
_ | the Office of Security report, and then.a
red to as the Hart report. :

tther you are familiar with all three of 4

ll any longer whether Lread the first two }

wiefed.on their.contents. The Hart report
the agency. in early February 1973 and I
onnections with it since. =’ :

ing his defection in 1964 and upo

(missed the question.

3; asking precisely. during his defection in

in the United States, was Yuri Nosenko_

. That was an accepted procedure under ;

sragency Defector Committee ‘that defec-
mtry were handled by the CIA, through

2settling period,'whatever had to be done -

iat the legal authority under which he

k that perhaps, Mr. Chairman, if you
like to answer that question a little bit
dulge me. :
nly.

‘ before this committee in executive ses-

reviewing that transcript I noted that, °
‘er, I characterized Mr. Yuri Nosenko’s -
between 1964 and 1969 in a number of :

is an area of obvious interest to the 4
) take this opportunity to describe my 4
greater detail as to what Mr. Nosen- 4

entral Intelligence Agency was.

a lawyer nor a.judge, so I was not.
conclusions about Mr. Nosenko’s tenure }

xe Agency..I’m sorry, I am not prepared.

Geneva, Switzerland, Mr. Nosenko ree °°
ad to defect to the West. Mr. Nosenko’s ss.

npanied by a claim that he could give a

ee Harvey Oswald’s.contacts in connec- -

Oswald’s stay in the Soviet Union be-

2 the significance that Yuri Nosenko’s |

iwestigation of President Kennedy's as-

turned out to be a bona fide defector, if !

n his |
tes was Yuri Nosénko.in the custody of:

go, un September 20, 1978, I received a *

21

information were to be believed, then we could conclude that
GB and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with Lee Harvey -
ald in 1963 and therefore had ‘nothing to do with President

‘<nnedy’s murder. . a ae : .
‘Kennedy the other hand, Mr.:Nosenko had been programed in
wance by the KGB to minimize KGB connections with Oswald, if
Mr. Nosenko was giving us false information. about Oswald’s con-
tacts with the KGB in 1959 to 1962, it was fair for us to surmise
that there may have been an Oswald-KGB connection in November
1963, more specifically that Oswald was acting as a Soviet agent
hen he shot President Kennedy. _ ee ee
:-If it were shown: that. Oswald was in fact acting as a Soviet agent
~ when he shot President Kennedy, the consequences to' the United:
' States. .of America and, indeed, to the world, would have been.
staggering. Thus, it became a matter of the utmost importance to.
this.

“Mr. Nosenko arrived in the country in February 1964. By the end’
. -of March it was clear. to us that the task of evaluating Mr. Nosen-: .
: :ko’s credibility would not, be easy. oe
’ On April 2, 1964, as Deputy Director of Plans, I, along. with:..
David Murphy, Chief of the Soviet Bloc Division, and Mr. Lawrence’. |
Houston, the General Counsel to the CIA, met with Mr. Nicho-. -
atzenbach, then Deputy Attorney General: of the United:
“Mr.-J. Walter Yeagley, Chief of the Internal Security Divi-..
n. ofthe Justice Department; Mr. William E.. Foley, who. was: .
“then. Mr. Yeagley’s First Assistant in the Internal Security Divi-:
“sion; and Mr. Harold F. Riese from the Office of Legal Counsel in:

the Justice Department.
The meeting took place in Mr. Katzenbach’s office in the Justice
- Department. The purpose of the meeting was to define Mr. Nosen-
_ko’s legal status in the United States and to anticipate what kind
of legal problems might arise in connection with the Agency’s
ongoing custody of Mr. Nosenko.
'.% The Agency provided me a copy of the memorandum for the
_ record written by Mr. Lawrence Houston describing this meeting
.on: April 2, 1964, and’ a second memorandum which reflects the
‘substance of a telephone call from Mr. Foley on the following day,
April 3, 1964. These documents were in ‘part declassified by the
~Agency on September 18, 1978, and I would like to make them part
-the record of these proceedings.
‘During the meeting of April 2, 1964, the Department of Justice
‘as fully informed of Mr. Nosenko’s status with the Agency and
he Department's opinion was requested as to the scope of the
Agency's ongoing authority with respect to Mr. Nosenko.
As Mr. Houston’s memorandums relate, Mr. Nosenko’s technical

ty

1 means that the Immigration and Naturalization Service had

technically excluded Mr. Nosenko from the United States but had

_ also temporarily “paroled him” to the custody of the Central Intel-
ligence Agency. ; -

«18 my understanding that the terms of the parole provided that

Mr. Nosenko would remain in the custody of the Agency unless it

Nosenko should be deported or

‘Was determined whether Mr.
whether he should be permitted to settle in the United States.

vernment to determine the bona fides of Mr..Yuri Nosenko.;


13-00000

24

statement of some employee or something. He was designated by. the s Present Direc- i
tor to ‘come‘here and present the story because’ he was “supposed to be. the uost i
_ familiar with it since he had reviewed if for the CLA. eine “f. I

‘else in the country; namely, a device described by him as @ bank’ vault, and. then i

built a house around the bank vault to put this man in and then kept him there ,
_ under the valent of some “3 years with that kind of thing, 1,277 days to be
- specific, at be Point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put

him on their payroll and let him go.
..And.then. they gave as their—I questioned on the authority to do a thing like

that..Did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that.Mr.

Helms had‘ conferred with you and gotten’ your OK, ‘that: this would: be ‘legal. .

And Ijust-found it awfully difficult. to believe that. And that is w: —and I don’t

: -imagine.it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that
_ on would ‘not rather clearly. remember the incident if it had occurred. ° Mee

: Karzeneacn. If the facts that you have just set forth to me, Co! an, :
_ had ever. been made known to me, I would recollect it; I am certain;.and I would - |
hope to goodness I would not have given the legal advice that is claimed. .
. Mr. Saywenr. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you, .
- That ‘i is all have, Mr. Chairman. ©
oo, Having -heard Mr. Katzenbach’s testimony of. yesterday, can you
~“réconcile-his testimony to this committee with your statement just
; read to:this committee?
_ °° Mr, ‘Hetos. I can only say, Mr: Stokes, that it is: very hard to
reconcile: I think the basic point at issue here is really whether the
“meeting with him took place at all. What happened after the
meeting is something he was. not responsible;for as. far as I am
.. aware.
- Let me read to you the memorandum for the record which Mr.
Lawrence R. Houston, the. General Counsel. of CIA, wrote on April
3, 1964. I have a copy in front of me. It is headed Memorandum for
the Record and the subject is the Nosenko case.:

It reads:

Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy, and I met with Mr. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, J. Walter
Yeagley, William E. Foley, and Harold F. Ries, on April 2, 1964. Mr. Helms outlined
the problems foreseeable in our future relations with Nosenko and asked the opin-
ion of the Justice representatives on what we. could do to control the situation. I
pointed out. that his technical status is one of exclusion and parole—or more
technically, deferment arid parole.

Paragraph 2:

After some discussion, Mr. Foley stated it was his opinion that Agency representa-
tives could take any action necessary to carry out the terms of the parole. Mr.
‘Katzenbach asked Mr. Foley to check this and let me know and Mr. Foley. later
confirmed this position by telepfione. .

. Tin turn, the meeting, reviewed the parole agreement and provided an
intenrennbe thereof for Director of Security, a copy of which is attached hereto.
, Also, I informed Mr. Foley of this interpretation. Signed, Lawrence R. Houston,
General Counsel.
. The. attachment is a memorandum also dated April 3, 1964. It i is
; signed by Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel. It is a memoran-
dum for the director of security. That would be the officer. who was
the director of the security office of the Central Intelligence
oe _ Agency. The subject is Parole status of defectors:
: On 2 April 1964, we had a discussion with the Department of Justice on the status
of aliens whose inspection by INS—

ne rere na

oe 0 TY TRE EI


13-00000

Services

; PAGE &
LEVEL 1 - 20 OF 80 STORIES

Copyright 1993 American Broadcasting Companies, Inc.
All rights reserved
' ABC NEWS-
SHOW: 20/20 (ABC 9:00 pm ET)
August 27, 1993
Transcript # 1337
TYPE: Show; Show
SECTION: News; Domestic
LENGTH: 8240 words
HEADLINE: Case Closed
GUESTS: MARK LANE, Author/Attarney; GERALD POSNER, Author, "Case Closed"; Dr.
PEPPER JENKINS; Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas; URI NOSENKO, Former KGB agents;
ROBERT OSWALD, Brother
HIGHLIGHT:
Lynn Sherr reports an a new book about the JFK assassination, and interviews
author Gerald Posner, who says computer enhancements prove LeeHarvey Oswald
acted alone, and was not a Mafia or KGB agent.
BODY:
BARBARA WALTERS, ABC News: Good Evening. I' m Barbara Walters. Hugh Downs is
on vacation. This is 20/20.

ANNOUNCER: From ABC News, around the world and into your home, the stories that
touch your life, with Hugh Downs and Barbara Walters - this is 20/20.

Tonight, 30 years after the Kennedy assassination, will a powerful new book end
the contraversy once and for all? Investigative journalist Gerald Posner says he
has the answers about Oswald, the magic bullet, and every conspiracy theory to
come along. Lynn Sherr's explosive report - ‘Case Closed.'

And-

SELMA SCHIMMEL, Breast Cancer Survivor: (Csp?] Wha is equipped to think of dying
in your 20's or 30's?

ANNOUNCER: -if you think it only happens to older women, you're wrong.

KERI DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
have breast cancer, and I thought they were cight.

ANNOUNCER: It's happening more and more, and doctors admit the younger you are,
the harder it is ta detect.

Dr. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Mammography.can have an error rate
ore to 40 percent in young women versus.a rate af less than 15 percent in |
older women.

LEX S#NEXIS(@E: LEXIS:NEXIS‘@ie _EXIS‘NEXIS@E:

of Mead Data Central, Inc.

13-00000

° PAGE 7
20/20 (ABC), August 27, 1993 ©

. ANNOUNCER: For women in their 20's and 30's, Dr. Timothy Johnson has some

shocking news - 'It Could Happen to You.'

Plus, can gay men be made straight? This therapist says he transforms
homosexuals. This man once preferred men. Taday, he's happy with his wife.

JOHN STOSSEL, ABC News: And now is sexuality an important part of your marriage.

RICHARD COHEN , Nicolosi Patient: Oh, yes. We have good sex, if that's what
you're asking.

ANNOUNCER: Others claim treatment is helping them-

ALEX,’ Nicolosi Patient: For the first time in my life, you know, 30. years of
my life, I feel alive. ;

ANNOUNCER: ~-but in the gay community, backlash.
GAY MAN: This is not a disease. There's no such thing as a cure.

ANNOUNCER: John Stossel brings you the hot debate over gay men. Are they ‘Born
or Bred?' Those stories tonight, August 27, 1993, after this brief message.

{Commercial break]
Case Closed

BARBARA WALTERS: The Kennedy assassination was back in the headlines all this
week when mare than 900,000 pages of previously classified government files were

finally opened after nearly 30 years. And while close to half the current

population wasn't even alive at the time, the controversy surrounding that event
continues ta haunt us all.

The fact is a majority af Americans don't believe the Warren Commission, and do
believe some form of conspiracy was involved. But now, a powerful new book
claims to have the last word. Its conclusion? Lee Harvey Oswald did indeed act
alone. The book is titled Case Closed, but is it?

(voice-over] Whatever side you're on in this still-raging controversy, you li
want to see Lynn Sherr's repart now.

LYNN SHERR, ABC News: Cvoice-aver] No period in an American presidency has been
as controversial, as thoroughly analyzed or as frequently written and speculated
about as the final six seconds in John F. Kennedy's Life.

ist NEWSCASTER: [7] Three shots were fired at the President's motorcade as it
passed out of the downtown area of Dallas.

SHERR: [voice-over] No detail about the final moments of the President's life
has been spared scrutiny. Every eyewitness account, ballistics test, photograph,
medical conclusion and investigative finding has been challenged, reinterpreted
or dismissed, then woven into countless theories. For three decades, an already
skeptical American public has been left wondering if we would ever learn the
truth about what happened in Dealey [sp?] Plaza on November 22, 1963.

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MAN: (€?] The President of the United States, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, is dead.
Let us pray.

SHERR: The official version of what happened is that from that sixth-floor
corner window, acting alone, Lee Harvey Oswald fired three shots, the third of
which ended the life of America's 35th president. But that's too simple an
explanation for a great many Americans, and for conspiracy theorists, far ton
convenient that one man alone did it. Doubters insist that the shot or shots
that killed the President came from behind that fence on the grassy knoll, or
from a railroad overpass just beyond.

MARK LANE, Author/Attarney: Shots came from at least two directions. A bullet
‘hit the President in the back. A bullet hit him in the throat. It came from the
front. A bullet hit him in the head. It came from the front. That was three
shots. At least one bullet hit Governor Connolly (sp?], One bullet missed,
struck the curb.

SHERR: Evoice-over] Attorney/author Mark Lane, one of the most persistent and
Prolific of conspiracy theorists, has long insisted that the Warren Commission
Was wrang, and covered up critical evidence that might make it possible to
identify the President's assassins.

Mr. LANE: Today, with hundreds of thousands af documents in the vaults of the
CIA, the DI (?], and the FBI and the National Archives - which we can't see --
the cover-up is continuing.

~SHERR: Cvoice-over] But another lawyer-turned-author, Gerald Posner, says
evidence available to researchers and conspiracy buffs for years led him
directly ta the only person who could possibly have shot the President.

SERALD POSNER, Author, ‘Case Closed': Lee Harvey Oswald killed Jack Kennedy,
acting alone.

SHERR: Cvoice-over] Posner, author of Case Closed, the culmination of a
three-year, exhaustive reexamination of the Kennedy assassination, concedes that
in identifying a familiar culprit, he's not likely to win aver many conspiracy
buffs. But he says the evidence didn't allow for any other suspects.

Mr. POSNER: Mast people who have written conspiracy hooks started with their
conclusion already done. They knew it was a conspiracy in their heart, and they
went around to prove that case.

SHERR: Cvaice-over] One of the major assassination controversies Posner seeks to -
resolve is the number of shots fired, where they came from, and which ones

Struck the President. Using recently-developed computer enhancements of the home
movie taken by Abraham Zapruder, Posner explained for 20/20 how he says he was
able to count the shots, for which he says Oswald had more time than the Warren
Commission believed.

Mr. POSNER: Oswald's first shot, which missed, was fired much earlier than
anyone realized - just after the car turned the corner. Evidence of this is
overlooked by mast experts. It's in the film. In the upper righthand corner of

your screen, you'll see a little girl. She's heard that shot and turned. In the
car, the President and Mrs. Kennedy and the Governor also heard the. shat and

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turned. After this shot, Oswald, still had aver eight seconds, not five, for the
next two. .

The second shot is fired. This bullet hits both Kennedy and Connolly. After
passing through Kennedy, you see it go through the Governor, as his suit lapel
flaps forward. A computer technician discovered that crucial detail just last
year.

SHERR: Cvoice-over] This is the so-called ‘magic bullet! that seemed to zigzag
through the two men.

Mr. POSNER: This computer animation illustrates that the second bullet needed no
magic. Because of the way the two men were: lined up, this bullet passed directly
through them. [t turned only after it slowed down and shattered Connolly's wrist |
- no zigs, no zags.

SHERR: How could that bullet have emerged so clean, with na flaws on it, really,
whatsoever?

Mr. POSNER: [I was skeptical about that bullet, and I think that was the thing
that stops many people from believing Oswald did it alone. It emerged sa clean
because that it went through Kennedy, it Slawed up. When it went through
Connolly's chest, it slowed up. By the time it hit the big bone in his wrist,
which everybody thinks would damage it, it was traveling at half or a third of
its speed - fast engugh to crush the bone, but not fast enaugh to deform the
bullet.

SHERR: Cvoice-over] The sudden backward motion of the President's head as the
third and final bullet struck, blowing away part of his skull, has led many ta
believe that the shot came from the front, but Posner says normal neurological
reflexes make the body stiffen when struck, causing it ta move back.

And Dr. Pepper Jenkins, one of the physicians attending the President at
Parkland Hospital, points to yet another possible factor, the brace President
Kennedy wore for his chronic back pain.

Dr. PEPPER JENKINS: He was so tightly wound into a brace that- the metal coming
up his back, and he was tied to the metal or strapped to the metal with an Ace
bandage.

SHERR: In the Zapruder film and in all the pictures we've seen- well, how do you
describe what the body is doing, having seen the brace?

Dr. JENKINS: Well, I would think you couldn' t fall forward. I think you'd have»
to fall backwards aor aside.

SHERR: Because?
Dr. JENKINS: Because the brace held him in such a position.

2nd NEWSCASTER: C7] At approximately. one o'clock, the President is dead. The
doctors were working too frantically to revive him ta notice the exact moment.

SHERR: Lvoice-over] Dr. Jenkins also has a very poignant memory of Mrs. Kennedy
sometime standing next to hia.

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Dr. JENKINS: She had such a drawn look. I really feel like she was in shock, and
she was just halding her hands, one above the other. And one of the times, she
nudged me with her elbow and handed me something in her hand, which is part of
his brain that obviously was in her lap- with his head in her lap as the car
came to Parkland. Bad moment.

SHERR: [voice-over] After examining computer animation of the presidential
limousine and its passengers, Posner sought ta show where in Dealey Plaza, the
shots came from,

Hr. POSNER: Kennedy and Connolly are placed into computer animation, and working
back from their wounds, the computer determines the only possible location for
the assassin, as indicated by the yellow shading. Notice that Oswald's
sixth-floar window is right in the center of it.

Mr. LANE: Posner believes the magic-bullet theory. Next, I guess, we're going tao
hear about the Tooth Fairy. It's just mathematically impossible. No one has ever
been able to recreate what it is said that Lee Harvey Oswald did.

SHERR: Well, they've done it- he's done it now with a computer enhancement-
Mr. LANE: I know that.

SHERR: -and he claims the computer shows that it's absolutely the way it
happened.

Mr. LANE: Well, he's entitled to his computer. The American people were there,
and they testified, and two-thirds af them said they know shots came from the
wooden fence.

SHERR: [voice-over] What. about that reported fourth shot fired. from the grassy
knoll? When the House Select Committee on Assassinations concluded in 1978 that
there was a 95-percent certainty of such a shot, conspiracy theorists were -
heartened, but the committee's finding, according to Dallas Sheriff Jim Bowles
{(sp?], was based on a static-filled Dictabelt recording of a Dallas police
motorcycle radio stuck in the on position. The sheriff says the motorcycle
wasn't even in Dealey Plaza, but the committee heard four shots. We couldn't
hear any. ;

‘Cinterviewing] You have a copy of that tape, right?

Sheriff JIM BOWLES, Dallas: I certainly do.

SHERR: Why don't you play it, and let's take a listen. Is that a shot?

‘Sheriff BOWLES: No, that's the motorcycle Slowing down, see?

jervices

SHERR: I didn't hear any shots.

Sheriff BOWLES: Neither has anyone else. They listened to the same belts we
listened to, and they claimed to hear four shots.

SHERR: So where do you think the four shots came from on the House Select .
Committee's tape?

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Sheriff BOWLES: You have to ask them.

Mr. POSNER: They clearly went down the wrong path. The National Academy of
Sciences reviewed their work later, and pointed out all the flaws in it. They
just made an error on that Dictabelt. There is no fourth shot. There's no shot
at all, even, to hear. -

SHERR: Even if people accepted the physical evidence gathered here in Dealey
Plaza, and agreed that it tended to support the Warren Commission's findings,
that would not end the speculation. Surveys show that most Americans doubt that

Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, believing instead that he was either part of or
himself became a victim of a conspiracy.

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: I didn't shot anybody, no, sir.
3rd NEWSCASTER: (71 Oswald has been shot!

SHERR: What about the Ruby- the Jack Ruby-arganized crime connection? Clearly,
there was a connection there.

Mr. POSNER: No question. AS a matter of fact, I think the Warren commision
underplayed Jack Ruby's organized.crime connections.

SHERR: Isn't there some evidence, then, that he might have been acting on their
behalf ta wipe out Oswald?
Mr. POSNER: Right. No. If he had a contract from organized crime, why didn't he
shoot Oswald when he saw him for the first time two days earlier? On the day.
Ruby finally killed Oswald, it was only by chance that their paths crossed. He ©
was not acting on behalf of organized crime. He was acting for his own
motivation, this desire, as he thought, to be a hero in Dallas, that he would
erase the stain and the stigna attached to the city that had‘been done by the
President's murder.

SHERR: You're saying Jack Ruby acted all by himself,.a lone-gunman theory once.
again?

Hr. POSNER: Without any doubt.

SHERR: Cvoice-over] Posner also explained his views on the many conspiracy
theories about the assassination.

"ROBERT F. KENNEDY: ‘Did you say, ‘That 5.0. .B., I'11 break his back'?
JIMMY HOFFA: Who?

Mr. KENNEDY: You.

Mr. HOFFA: Who's the ‘who'?

SHERR: The Mafia wanted the President killed, because that would get rid of -
Bobby Kennedy, who was going after organized crime.

Mr. POSNER: I would not be surprised if the Mafia, in 1962 or ‘63, sat ata

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table with some of its key henchman, and discussed Killing President Kennedy.
They did hate him. They might have even had a conspiracy afoot. There is no tie
between Lee Harvey Oswald and organized crime. There's not opportunity for hia
to have been their assassin. In essence, he beat the Mafia to Kennedy.

SHERR: How about, as in the Oliver Stone movie, JFK, the military industrial
complex?

Mr. POSNER: The movie, JFK, served what I call the kitchen sink. If you can't
just have one of them, let's have everybody in the plot, because they all have
some reason to knock off Kennedy.

JIM GARRISON: We have the mystery of the assassination of the President solved,
and there.is no question about it.

SHERR: What about the Garrison investigation?

Mr. POSNER: He had great delusions on the assassination. I think it’s a
disgrace. It was a travesty of justice, a miscarriage of justice. Garrison knew
it. I discovered files of his investigation - documents, affidavits, memos from
his investigators - which showed the extent of this scam that was pulled an the
American public. Here was a’ man who knew better. I think his behavior actually
crossed the line to being criminal.

SHERR: Is there any evidence- do you believe at all that Lee Harvey Oswald was
working on behalf of the CIA to kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: No. I don't believe the CIA had any connection, not only to kill the
President, but they had no connection to Oswald at all. And the reason that [
can say that so confidently to you is actually an unusual source. It's the KGB
files. The KGB files, which had surveillance on Qswald for day in and day out
for nearly two years in Russia, came to the conclusion that he was not a sleeper
agent, that he had no American intelligence contact.

SHERR: [voice-over] So if Oswald wasn't working for the CIA, how about the KGB?
After all, he spoke Russian, defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, married, a
Russian, and lived in Minsk for two years.

‘He. POSNER:.A popular early theory, popular that we now see in the documents
just released this past week in Washington. The KGB was high on the CIA'S
possible List af targets. The KGB did not want Oswald from day one. They
realized Oswald had problems, psychological problems.

URI NOSENKO, Former KGB Agent: (sp?1 I do not think that Oswald will be trusted
by any intelligence. :

SHERR: Cvoice-over] Uri Nosenka is someone who might know. Before defecting to
the United States in 1943, Nasenko was Oswald's KGB handler, and had access to
his file. He insists Oswald never worked for the KGB. Still concerned about his.
own safety, Nosenko asked 20/20 not to show his face. ,

Mr. NOSENKO: Lee Harvey Oswald was mentally unstable.

SHERR: Cvoice-over] But unlike Posner, Naosenko says he doesn't believe Oswald
could have shat the President for a very simple reason.

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Mr. NOSENKO: In Minsk, he was shooting rabbits with shotgun. Would. you believe

it? He never shoot a single rabbit. And here we see person shooting rifle on a
long diStance, and shooting three, four shots in several seconds. ‘

Mr. POSNER: He didn't get a rabbit, and therefore that's used as evidence that
he couldn't kill the President? But talk to those who actually knew what Oswald
was like with a gun, his brother wha used to go out with him.

ROBERT OSWALD, Brother: We have shot cottontail rabbits with .22's on the run,
Okay? We've shot squirrels in the trees with .22's.

SHERR: [voice-over] Robert Oswald Says his younger brather was always interested

‘in guns. He still has the pistol Lee Oswald bought when he was 164.

Mr. OSWALD: My experience with him in the field with a shotgun or a .22 was he
usually got his game.

SHERR: Cvoice-over] And Lee Harvey Oswald used the same rifle that killed the
President only weeks earlier in a failed attempt to murder to retired Army
general Edwin Walker. In other words, according to author Gerald Posner, Oswald,
a loser in life, wanted to accomplish something. .

MAN: £7] Lee Harvey Oswald, 0, S, W, A, L, D.
REPORTER: Did you fire that rifle?

LEE HARVEY OSWALD: That's the facts that you people have been getting, but I
emphatically deny these charges.

SHERR: Cvoice~over] If, as you say, Lee Harvey Oswald was not working with the
mob or with the CIA or with the KGB or with the military industrial complex, why
did he kill the President?

Mr. POSNER: I think that Oswald killed the President, because this was ta he
almost his fulfillment, his moment in the sun. Three-days. before Kennedy arrives
in Dallas, he's given a gift on a silver platter. Jack Kennedy's going to pass
in front of the Depositary. It's nat ideology, it's not because he's Communist,
but it's because he has that opportunity to place himself in history. Here we
are, 30 years later, talking about him. He was successful. He got his wish.

WALTERS: Well, there's a lot of proof. Is the case closed?

SHERR: Well, certainly, Gerald Posner believes 50, but out experience is that
people on the other side are so dug in, it's unlikely anything is going to
change their mind. You know, even at Dealey Plaza, there are people just walking

around, telling you what their theories are. And incidentally, Barbara, Dealey
Plaza-

WALTERS: Which is where assassination took place.
SHERR: -which is where it took place-
WALTERS: Yeah.

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SHERR: It's so much smaller in real life-

WALTERS: Really?

SHERR: ~than it appears-

WALTERS: I think of it as a huge-

SHERR: Right.

WALTERS: -kind of highway.

SHERR: It's quite small, and Posner points out that if all the eyewitnesses wha
have come forward were in fact there that day, it would have been elbow to
elbow. In fact, it was not very crowded. that day. ;

WALTERS: Nine hundred thousand documents released this week- what, 10,000 more
to come. Is that going ta settle anything?

SHERR: Unlikely. That, however, is the one area where both sides agree -
unclassify all those documents. Otherwise- and even sa, this is going to be
argued for generations to come.

WALTERS: Probably. Probably. Thank you, Lynn.

Next, most people feel that breast cancer anly attacks women over the age of 50.

Cvoice-over] But Dr. Tim Johnson reports that more and more young women are
discovering they have a special battle to Fight. What should yau knaw? After
this.

{Commercial break]

It Could Happen to You

BARBARA WALTERS: The American Cancer Society's meetings on breast cancer are
taking place in Boston this week, and from that conference come reports of a
disturbing new trend - younger women diagnosed with the disease at a growing
rate. Though diagnostic tests have improved over the years, breast cancer. in
younger women presents a special and quite serious set of problems.

{voice-over] And as Dr. Tim Johnsan reports, if you are under 40, much of what
you previous learned about the disease may not apply ta you.

TERESA ROBERSON, Breast cancer Survivor: I had lumps before, they were all- they
turned out ta be cysts. But 1 knew this was different.

GAYLE RUSSELL, Breast Cancer Survivor: I had no history of any type of cancer in
my family, so I was very surprised.

KERIL DEARBORN, Breast Cancer Survivor: And everyone told me I was too young to
have breast cancer, and 1 thought they were right.

Or. TIMOTHY JOHNSON, ABC News Medical Editor: Cvoice-over] A disease they
thought they were toa young to get, but more and more, the woman on the

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LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 80 STORIES

Copyright 1993 Chicago Tribune Company
Chicago Tribune

Octaber 3, 1993 Sunday, FINAL EDITION
SECTION: TEMPO; Pg. 1; ZONE: C
LENGTH: 1949 words

HEADLINE: THE CASE AGAINST CONSPIRACY ;
GERALD POSNER, ACTING ALONE, HAS WOUNDED THE JFK COVER-UP INDUSTRY

BYLINE: By Paul Galloway, Tribune Staff Writer.

BODY:
The rendezvous was arranged for a weeknight last fall at a ‘Turkish restaurant

near CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. The proprietor would be expecting hia.

When author Gerald Posner said he was there ta meet George and his wife, as
he had been instructed to do, the proprietor led Posner and his wife, Trisha, to
a private table in the back room.

George was the code name for Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who defected ta the
U.S. in 1964 and now Lives under another name in an undisclosed part of the’
country. Posner was researching a book about the assassination of John F.
Kennedy, and Nasenka had agreed to speak for the first time exclusively about
the Soviet intelligence agency's surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald during his
stay in the Soviet Union from late 1959 until June 1962. Nasenko had suggested
that he and Posner bring their wives, Posner said, because the sight of twa
couples dining together would serve as cover for their interview.

"Yuri supervised the Oswald file in Moscow and was familiar with the K&B

_ files on Oswald's time in Minsk, which I had seen," Posner said. "I knew he

could be extremely helpful in reconstructing that period 2f Oswald's life."

A chapter in Pasner's new book, "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
Assassination of JFK," is devoted to Nasenko and his assessments of Oswald.

As the title suggests, Posner finds Oswald ta be Kennedy's assassin, acting
alone, just as the Warren Commission said. Further, he was not a CIA agent, not
a KGB agent, not an innocent patsy but a saciopath and Loser who had grandiose
notions of making a mark in history.

Posner is as surprised at the book's: conclusion as the conspiracy buffs are
riled.

"I'm getting some very personal, vindictive calls from the conspiracy people.
If it's any consolation, I never set out to do a book that would say here is the
final answer, here is who did it," Posner said during a visit to Chicago.

Posner's intention was to write a primer of sorts about the assassination
after examining the welter of conspiracy theories to see what was credible and
what wasn't.

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Paking in the garbage

"When you read all the conspiracy books, it's apparent they can't all be
right because they flatly contradict each other," he said. "I knew there was
garbage on the record. I didn’t know how much."

After he debunked as many inaccuracies and false leads as he could, he
assumed there would be some issues that would require further investigation,
perhaps questions about acoustics or ballistics or possible Mafia involvement.

Yet toward the end of his research, Posner notified Bab Loomis, his editar at
Random House, that he had taken an unexpected turn.

“I was convinced the Warren Commission had gotten it right. The evidence was
overwhelming,” he said.

Posner also was aware, of course, that a large majority of the populace
thinks the Warren Commission had gotten it wrong, maybe on purpose.

He got a feel for such skepticism when Loomis, vice president and executive
editor of Random House, took his own poll at the next meeting of the publishing
house's top editors, who periodically gather to report on works in progress.

“Bab told them about what I'd found and asked how many believed the Warren-
Commission was right,* Posner said. "Remember, these are some of the brightest,
best-informed, best-educated. people in New York City, and no one raised a hand
except Bob Loomis."

Posner was not dismayed. “When peaple cite polls showing 70 or 80 or even 90
percent of the public as believing the assassination was the result of a
conspiracy, I say I’m surprised it's not 100 percent when you consider that
people have essentially heard only one side for three decades."

‘JFK' an ‘abominatian'

A 1978 congressional investigation estimated that ‘2,000 books, including
thase that are self-published, had been written on the subject. All but a
handful present a variety of sometimes~elaborate scenarios about plotters,
matives, killers and cover-ups, and as a rule, the conspiracy books make
bestseller lists, while the others dan't.

“Then there are the TV documentaries, which are invariably pro-conspiracy,"
Posner said. “A recent one was a five-hour British film for Arts & Entertainment
called ‘The Men Who Killed Kennedy.' “

And most influential of all, he said, is Oliver Stone's $50 million movie,
"JFK," released in late 1991.

“Half of our country's present population weren't born (as of) November 1943.
Stone's mavie is a historical abomination that's filled with demonstrable
falsehoods, but to young people, it's a documentary.

"Even if they read articles criticizing it, they say, ‘Well, Stone may have

exaggerated, but there's gat to be something there.' Believe it or not, there's
not."

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What's especially galling, Posner said, is that Stone based his movie on the
investigation of former New Orleans District Atty. Jim Garrison, including his
prosecution of businessman Clay Shaw as an alleged conspirator.

"Garrison's prosecution of Clay Shaw was disgraceful, criminal and has been
thoroughly discredited. There was coercion of witnesses and changing of ©
testimony," Posner said. "The jury took only 45 minutes to find Shaw not guilty,
and one of the jurors said it would have been 20 minutes but that several jurors
had to go to the bathroom."

Stone has said "JFK" was.a "“counter-myth" to the "myth" of the Warren
Commission.

The no-Longer magic bullet

Among the doctrines of conspiracy literature bolstered by "JFK, " Posner
noted, is that the so-called magic bullet found on Texas: Gov. John Cannally's
stretcher at Parkland Hospital was almost pristine, couldn't have struck Kennedy .
and Connally, as the Warren Commission said it did, without zigzagging in
sidair, and was probably planted.

"If ballistics tests didn't prove conclusively the bullet struck Kennedy. and
Connally, which they do, use your common sense," Posner said. "At the time the -
bullet was found, the conspirators wouldn't know if the bullets fired at "
Connally and Kennedy were still lodged in their bodies or had been recovered.

¢

"If they wanted to shield the conspiracy, there can only be three shots.

More than that, and the single assassin doesn't have time to shoot. So why risk

exposing the conspiracy by planting a fourth bullet that wouldn't match
ballistically with remnants of the ather rounds?"

And what about Jack Ruby, the Chicago native who moved to Dallas to run strip
clubs? Did he just happen by the Dallas jail on Nov. 24 and shoot Oswald on the
spur of the moment?

"Ruby's murder of Oswald does more to undermine this case in terms of getting
the truth out than anything else," Posner said. "First, it prevents the trial of
Oswald, where the evidence would have convicted him. It also gives us a second
assassin, with ties to organized crime. It's hard for people to believe this was
a coincidence, so you're aff and running with a conspiracy.”

Posner's account of Ruby’ § life and his actions during the assassination week

demolishes any notion he was a conspirator.

According to the trade journal Publishers Weekly, six books by major
publishers will appear this fall to coincide with the 30th anniversary of the
assassination, with "Case Closed" standing alone in itS anti-conspiracy stance.

Posner has been heartened by promising sales and positive reviews. "Many
readers are put off by conspiracy books that select only material that's
favorable to their position, whether it checks out or not. I think these people
are buying the book."

Thumbs up from the critics

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Three weeks after its release, it is eighth on The New York Times national
best-seller list and seventh on the Tribune's List af Chicago's best sellers.

U.S. News & World Report, which ran excerpts from "Case Closed," writes:
“Posner achieves the unprecedented. He sweeps away decades of polemical smoke,
layer by layer, and builds an unshakable case against JFK's killer . . . Lee
Harvey Oswald." It quotes. Stephen Ambrose, biographer of Dwight Eisenhower and
Richard Nixon: “The chapter on the (magic) bullet is a tour de force, absolutely
brilliant, absolutely convincing."

New York Times book critic Christopher Lehmann-Haupt writes that "Posner
effectively refutes hundreds of claims that have added up ta conspiracy
heories."

In a Tribune review, author Jeffrey Toobin writes that "Case Closed" is
“utterly convincing in its thesis, which seems, in light of ail that has
transpired over the past 30 years, almost revolutionary."

Posner, 39, didn't set out to be a writer, instead complying with the wishes
af his father, a union official in San Francisco. "My father dealt with a lot of
lawyers. He said, ‘Son, these fellows charge fees you can't believe.’ "

So Posner attended law school at the University of California at Berkeley,
where he was an honor student, then joined a prestigious Wall Street law firm,
leaving two years later to form his own firm.

In 1981 he represented Jewish victims of Dr. Josef Mengele, the notorious
Nazi war criminal who escaped from Germany after World War II and died in hiding

in South Auerica.

"It waS a pro bono case, and I sued the Mengele family and the German
government," Posner said. “Nothing came of the suit, but I accumulated 25,000
documents about Mengele, so I thought I'd write a book."

"Mengele: The Complete Story," which he co-wrote with John Ware, was
published in 1984, prompting Posner to leave the law-and write full time.

"Case Closed" is his fifth book. “A weakness of mine is that I tend to
underestimate the difficulty of each project I undertake. This was true with
this book, but as I kept going I kept finding answers to things I didn't think I
could get answers to."

The real cover-ups

Posner agrees with critics of the Warren Commission who say its investigation
was flawed.

"There was a cover-up by the FBI and the CIA, but they weren't attempting to
conceal their involvement in the murder of the president but rather their own
inefficiency and bungling," Posner said. "I go inta detail in exposing these

cover-ups, but they can't be interpreted as evidence of conspiracy."

The Warren Commission's work also was tarnished by a dubious finding of the
1978 investigation by the Hause Select Committee on Assassinations, Posner said.

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"The committee's acoustics experts tested a Dictabelt recording of radia
traffic on Dallas police channels. and said they were 95 percent certain there
had been a fourth shot, therefore a second shooter and a conspiracy."

A retest by the National Academy of Sciences discredited the committee's
experts, concluding that the recording was made a minute after the shooting,
Posner said.

Half of "Case Closed" is a meticulaus examination of Oswald's entire life,
culminating in an almost day-by-day chronicle of his movements in the last two
aonths before the assassination. “Many conspiracy books almost ignore Oswald.
But he's the key, and it's amazing how much is known about him," Posner said.
"It's certainly enough to disprove all the theories that he was a spy or a

patsy.

"My technigue was to go to Original sources. Tao many books quote secondary
sources, some of which are passing on misinformation, which means the garbage is
disseminated again and again, becoming fact.

“Here's an example. 'JFK' opens with Rose Cheramie, a prostitute, warning her
doctors that the Kennedy assassination is going to take place in Dallas and
naming Ruby as involved. I found her doctor, who said she was psychotic and
didn't mention the assassination until the day after it happened or Ruby until

the day after he killed Oswald."

Posner paused. "I can go on."

GRAPHIC: PHOTO GRAPHIC

PHOTO (color): Gerald Posner, debunker of conspiracy theorists, at Smyth
School on West 13th Street, which Jack Ruby attended. Tribune photo by Charles
Cherney. —

GRAPHIC: The three shots. From: "Case Closed: Lee Harvey Oswald and the
Assassination of JFK," by Gerald Posner (Random House, Sept. 1, 1993.)
See microfilm for complete graphic.

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

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