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“T104-10750-10004, " *[2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION REC oe

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l October 1968

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
IN THE CASE OF

YURLY IVANOVICH NOSENKO


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1 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR: Directoz of Security

FROM Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff

NOSENKO, Yuriy Ivanovich

1. In accoxdance with the request of the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, attached is a summary with conclusiozs
concerning the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub-
conclusions are contained ia the summary conceraing several
majoy areas which were given primazy consideration in the matter
of the bona fides of NOSENKO.

2, Included in this eumraary are comments concerning
conclusions ia the previous summary and an annex containing re-
marks on three scparate subjects related to the NOSENXO caaze.

3. In brief, the conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO
ig the person he claims tobe, that he held his claimed positions in
the KGB during 1933 ~ January 1954, that NOSENKO was not dis- .
patched by the KGB, and that his previcus Hes and exaggerations
are not actually of material sizniicance at this time.

Bruce Le Solie

Attachment:
Summery

By)

CD

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BLSsko


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_ TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction

I. Summary of Developments in NOSENKO Case Since
30 October 1967

‘Ii. Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides. of Yuriy
Ivanovich NOSENKO | .. ‘

A. Is NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims
to be? ;
é
B. Is the Claimed KGB Career of NOSENKO Plausible?

C, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of
His Motivation in Contacting CIA in 1962 and For
His Defection in 1964?

D, Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CIA
Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and
Organization Reasonably Commensurate With His

' Claimed KGB Career?

E. Can the Information Furnished by NOSENKO be
Considered in Toto as Having Resulted in Material
‘Damage to the KGB and/or Has the Information
Furnished by NOSENKO Been of Significant Benefit
to Western Intelligence?

hy

Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"!
in Information Furnished by NOSENKO Which Would
Warrant a Conclusion that NOSENKO was Dispatched
by the KGB?

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G, is There Evidence of a Political or Any Other Type
Objective Which Could Justify a Dispatch of NOSENKO
by the KGB With Permission to Speak Freely to CIA
Concerning His Knowledge of the KGB and Without
NOSENKO Being Givena Specific Mission or Missions?

-H. Is There Any Evidence That the Contacts of NOSENKO in

1962 or in 1964 With CIA Were Known to the KGB Prior
to His Defection or That NOSENKO Was Ever Briefed
by the KGB Relative to His Behavior or KGB Objectives
During These Contacts or After His Defection?

IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regard to NOSENKO
A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval RU ip Any of the
Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed
B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner ‘or at the _
¢ ‘Time He Claimed ,
C.: NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Scetion
{ Throughout the 1953 ~ 1955 Period as He Claimed
- D. During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Neither a Senior
Case Officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh
Department American-British Commonwealth Section

E, NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chief of the American Embassy
Section nor a Senior Officer or Supervisor in the Section
During the Period 1961 -~ 1942 (sic)

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chief of the
: American-British Commonwealth Section and Was
Thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department,
Are Not Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB

Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between
1953 and His Defection in 1964

0oCL 604

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Annex ;

Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined -in Text

Annex C-- The Cherepanov Papers

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I, INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be
“all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-~-
° zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished ©
- by Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO, To attempt to do so would be repetitious
a 2 and confusing. to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the
formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of

_ ; primary concern,
 @é
a This summary. will not contain a detailed Psychological
assessment of NOSENKO nor will -it contain a recitation of the numerous

theories which have been promulgated in the past concerning varying

“aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily

'* directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not
‘dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively
plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in
a reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO
has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that |
these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance

ce

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. but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational
or policy nature,

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona.
fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily
on whether he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge,
and whether his 1962 ang early 1964 contacts with representatives of this
“Agency were known to the KGB. "Motivation and certain other pertinent
aspects will be considered, but his admitted Previous errors, lies and
: exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a
a . “bona fide" defector, | ;

There is. not an accurate standard or Scale of measurement

correlated to determine if he is or is not a dispatched KGB officer, For

Purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas

; 2Ppropriate,
The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The Exami- -

-F nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, " hag been considered in

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the preparation of this summary. It will be commented on in part
and this summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven
primary conclusions set forth on page 358 of the above summary.
Remarks concerning certain errors, incensiatencies, omissions and
ae pnsupported conclusions in tha previous summary ia regard to apecific
3 CBEGS OF sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this
summary will not include a point-by-potat comparison of all areas of
agreement or disagreement with information contained in the previous

summary.

A positive decision in regard to NOSENKO based on all
available information should be made in the immediate future. There -
are nO ‘mown sources currently available to provide new positive
information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. It is recognized
that there fa always & possibility in the future a new source or sources
wili be able te furnish additional information in regard to NOSENKO.
However, this possibility {es exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there
ib . is sufficient information available on which to base a conclusion ia

the NOSENKO matter.

TEARS REO, wana


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i, SUMMARY oF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE ©

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967
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SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE
NM BE NAY VOL

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO mee

' have been conducted by one individual not previously ‘known personally to ,

NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENKO case since June 1962.
Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have .
been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and career
of NOSENKO without regard to whether a particular aspect had been
covered during previous interview or interviews.
NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the first few

interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and

. the interviewer has noted no significant reluctance to discuss any aspect

- of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a

reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously

considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance

was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

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interviewer would not dispute or disparage his statements without adequate

reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the .
interviewer, totally disappeared,

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first six months,

_ NOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately Oo

sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de- ,

fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CIA in 1964, KGB .
organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities. As an qxample

of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included
remarks concerning approximately/875) KGB officers, 100) KGB agents,

35 GRU officers, and 400) other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha- .
betically arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has -

materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of information

furnished by him during current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related

us "memoranda have been disseminated to the FBI and the Cl Staff. Special
"+, Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington
’ Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research .

and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-~

viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning

whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information,

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. In addition, three professionala from the SB Division have
reviewed the current information and assisted in the retrisval of
previous information irom NOSENKO and collation of current

information wits previous information. The latter is a tremendous

task because of the volume of material; the number of individual

cases involved; and the extensive information in regard to KGB
personalities, procedures, organizational structare and activities.

| The SB Division also provided the services of an expert --
translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOBENKO

by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three pro- |

- feasionals completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with

NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly
pestinent previous interviews of NOSENKO have been completed by
the Office of Security.

Approximately 7000 pages of transcripts and yelated material
have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Com-
ments concerning the value of the information contained in the above
material are contained in another section of this gummary. As of the
present time, & complete analysis is not possible since a considerable
portion of the material has not been fully processed. in the preparation
of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined.
Uscause of the voluminous information, all analytical and collation work

das not been completad; but it ia not considered that, dbased on ell

sears 6001013

foe f i

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available information, the remaining work will materially affect
the conclusions drawn in this summary,

| ‘The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on
Zz August and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty

questions of a pertinent nature were included in the polygraph tnter-—

view. No problems were encountered during the polygraph interview

and no sdditional testing of NOSENKO is anticipated, Attached isa

copy of the self-explanatory report on the results of the polygraph

interview.
Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph

intervytew on a temporarily reduced scale in order to ) permit a review

. of previous information and preparation of this ammary, There is

no doubt that future interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information
of intelligence value, but information developed thua far will permit

a Aecision in the case of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO.

Attachment;
12 Aug 68 Polygraph Rpt

Q001014

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res
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- me) oy Chief, Security Research Staff 32 August 1968
- : : : : : a a
FROM -«;_—s«sInterrogation Research Division . . 4
SUBJECT ; Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO ~ a, TRD if 67491 ee

“IDENTIFYING DATA oe oo ne:

Subject is a 40 year old former KGB Staffer who defected to the 9°.
U.S. in 1964 in Geneva.. ~

'.” BACKGROUND ’

ee . Mr. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has been de~ .
“| priefing and interrogating Subject since October 1967 in oréer to oe
'. resolve the issue whether Subject was a dispatched agent of the KGB. |
“He has conducted a vast amount of research and checking with sources
in an effort to establish the veracity of Subject's statements.

PURPOSE . oy
7 C) ‘The primary. purpose of the polygraph test was to determine;
, 1. Whether Subject was a dispatched Agent of the KGB; :

2. Whether Subject had intentionally given Mr. Solie . . a |
any false information. . vt |

' PROCEDURE ~ -

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at : of
‘a safesite in the vicinity of Washington, D.C. The examination was
conducted in the English language. Subject's comprehension and the

ability to express himself in English was completely adequate for
purposes of polygraph testing. Subject was completely cooperative , :
in all respects, Subject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to- ; :

.. be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave information
2 on & topic. ;
.Y

The Tollowing relevant questions were asked during the first test;
Is your true name Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes. .

Were you born in the year 1927? Yes.

Besides the Americans, did you tell anyone else about your
intention to defect? No.

on

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Did you ever tell anyone in the KGB about your contact with
Anerican Intelligence? No.., ;

Were you given instructions by the KGB to get in contact with
American Intelligence? No.

Were you told by the KGB to defect in order to carry out an
Intelligence mission? No,

The following relevant questions were asked during the second test:

.. Did the KGB actually send a communication for your recall to
a the USSR on the day of your defection? No.

Vere you acquainted with CHEREPANOV? Yes,

Did you actually travel to Gorkiy in November 1963 to hunt for
CHEREPANOV? ‘Yes. ‘

; | Are you deliberately withholding from us any information about
the KGB recruitment of Americans? No. . J

Does the KGB have METKA and NEPTUNE 807 Yes,

Were you the responsible Case Officer for John Abidian in 1960-617
Yes, .

Do you know the true name of ANDREY or SASHA? No.
Did you ever have tuberculosis? Yes, co - oe
" ‘The following relevant questions were asked on test three:
. Did you serve in Navy Intelligence from 1951 to 1953? Yea, _
Was (SHUBIN jin the ussR during the period 1957 %0.19597 Yes, 7
; 1

To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh
Department at this time? Yes,

Did you telephone the GRU about ‘SHUBIN) at this time? Yes, a de

. Of the letter Mr. Winters. mailed? Yes. Co
ee 7  G0ULIE

' 20 the best of your knowledge, was POPOV compromised because 7 re

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td
To the be est or y Lr lnowledge, was PENKOVSKIY @ exposed to the
| KGB because or the mass Surveillan ance on the British basay?
Yes Se ‘
Was ther any nisleag: tag information in the notes You-brougit
out from the Soviet Union? yo,
Dia you inte

5, mela exaggerate
GREBANOV? No.

“e@ your Persona), 88é6oclation with |
| Are you hiding any adverse 4 ton about your. backgrouna? No.
Subject tg Polygraph test rerlee cted n Signiry

ception mint ota® “he relevant

icant responses indicative j
que stions asked, No further

this dat “2 ecause the

2 cing tf

¥ Polygraph
examin, ner did not Want to os
ad thug possibly Causing adra

nformat

nalin
8 ng was resumed on
ie questions were

6 A August 1968, The Foden "

asked on test four i
Ws Soin the KGB in March 19597 Yes, 7 oe
sre you & Xap officer from 1953 to 1964? Yes, : ¥ a vo Et
Pre you a Deputy Chie? of tue Seventh Depsirtmentt ‘Yes, 0” co oo ; ob
re you only a Captain at this tine? Yes, So CEs
re you an Office U.s, Tnbassy Section from March
st to May 19552
n958 and 19

59: were yoy the Deputy Chier
pieh-Canaatan Section

oF the pepican.
in the Seventh Departy
| January 1960 to

© Dece Yr 1961 were
of. the First Sectio on OF. ‘the First

rin the:
Yeg

You the Deputy to the
t Dep partment? Yes,
| Jana:

TY to July 1962 wer te you the Chie
he Seventh ; De epartmen ent? Yes

Lt of the Piret Section ,
you an officer L

nN the First Seectio on, - First Departme ; Sep,
P time o- the Sta. *Mngrad operatio On against (Benson, tails e} ar
h?). Yes, . oe

| G00,

