PROCESSING = - :

pcr TS

PLISHED |

NO INDEXING REQUIRED |
a ONLY QUALIFIED

: ; a HEADQUARTERS DESK

a4 . i . CAN JUDGE INDEXING *

Chief of Station, JMWAVE /((L ———

BET Operational /TYPIC/AMTRUNK

Project AMTRUNK Operational Review...

7ETioa REQUIRED - AO 7 ene SRTORITY

a

ACTION: Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
termination of Project: AMTRUNK,

l. Attached herewith is an operational review of and progress
‘report on the AMTRUNK team for the period of 4 through 31 March. .
Station views on the operation are summarized below, .

' 2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
—  Mpitenzo

nesses;

CERN SC oe VarSr OTT) oS Toor ts ee SF WOnde these nee nts
st cooperate aga KUBARR only When it is to| their advantage. It
is believed that if the. operation were to develop, control would
diminish rather than increase in the advancedistages of the operation,
since the need for KUBARK assistance will decrease as operational
successes increase. It is believed tha oO
' wbesitation “selling out" the ope to any one of the major re-
tf cal groups at any ©: at he felt it advantageous to
do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is
most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
cambray, headed by.Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed
by Manuel Ray. -In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
own way with the operation. . He helieves Dal LE dS. eceiying spe
ention because of his ZRMETAL connections, and he will not ob
behind KUBARK's back to .AMT! APE/1. and ODA
a oT uthoritvi if the dperation or KUBARK handling of the|
AMTRUNKS does not progress td his liking. Since TRUNK/1, according
to AMCAPE/1,"masterminded" tHis operation in the first place, ilt may -
be assumed that the AMTRUNKS |will withhold nothing! from AMTRUNK/1,

. 2h

a de Exotest AAI TKUAK

“ scitivgeiwn, (9-6-9443
me: o.- fie i. f

a: / WHR SCY

Distribution: . a
3 = C/SAS w/attchs Saye 7 | ra
C/SAS w/attchs Maca!

wee ere ye

——_DESENSITIZ

rt 45

DATE DISPATCKZD

App f

Relat]

«ee . Po wee “rr

«) a Rahs
SN An


CQNTINUATION OF -
DISPATCH

. . ‘ ; is . .
. Notas SSPE LCA LAG) Ns 5 . ATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

B. This operation has avery high "flap potential” if any AMTRUNK
agents are picked up by. only will
KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
operation, ‘as may. also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,
and AMCAPE/] and his newspaper The latter could prove to be most
embarrassing ‘and § 5 ully recognized as a possibility, if
not a probability, in the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.
’ At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
prior to the time the team was safehoused. f th rent
AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did not satisfactor:
di j" if

TOCERTaREEGYTT on.of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-

tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
_ AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on

29 March. This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called -AMICE/14
the Cuban term for a homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban.
This in turn gives rise to the question whether AMICE/14, with a

_ possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made
‘such an approach. to AMTRUNK/3. -

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were
- - made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an

¢ ' area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
develop.

E. The Phase 1 landing point appears highly risky. It is within
five miles of a cruise missile site ‘radar, and.in an area frequently

patrolled by sea. RABEL. Pet |

arene : ; 2 Tack of co: L in the AMTRUNK operation,
poss y of the two operations crossing or targetting on the Same
individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK
group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. T of the
four have been outstanding in training. They appear to have a
number of fairly weil SIScSd SonEaete ST the inside whom they ex-
pect to be able to call on for assistance. Although they have
been out of ,direct touch with a numbex of these contacts for periods
ranging thon. to two years, this is frequently. the case in this type
of operation

’The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

iew and the sevantages and

mee ere rete and planning w
quarters' decision is to continue. with the operation at this Lime, ‘|
operational plans ‘for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as

formulated. .
‘END OF MESSAGE )

NS.
¢ dy. .

PAGE NO.

: . 3.60" 530 USE Previous EDITION. - SECRET | conrinueD” 2.


jr

CWS
-6 - 33

SALA

/q
6

f

19

Ragoved from Progeot
PE 8D F-49
. Pent 7 Pod:

es Clavsificas’

\ 31 March 1963

an PROJECT AMTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW
; . —

STATUS REPORT ON TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH.

. The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2,
‘and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #7164 -

on Plantation Key. Andrew S. PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from
headquarters, was already at the training site when the team
was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS
and Hobart J. VANDEBORN, PARMERS remained at the safesite
until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
Clandestine methods and techniques. This training included
security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,
and operational planning and reporting. The training included
group discussion and participation in a series of ‘appropriate
operational situations, several problems, and daily physical
training. During this two week period, either PEGGINS or
VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average
of two or three hours with the group in operational dis- |
cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March,

‘both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,
‘debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin

out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing
their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through
30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass

-and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons

familiarization and firing. During the period under dis-
cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed
by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series

' of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed: for
_alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were

further processed on cover and finance problems. The reé-
sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR ,
26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time.
Transmitted as attachment "A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the
AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the

training report for the week of 25 March.

AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.

ae ae

i ENA Sa aes Le


14-00000

fe . : ¢ A secondary and subordinate
i ce terre is to eee climate prevailing among the
populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission
is exploratory in nature only, throtigh the first phases of
the project. In order t6 daécomplish the foregoing missions,
.the operation Has been split into two initial phases , which

'

}

‘

will.be Gompartmented from each othér.

the, he black _infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and 3°01 h_ coast
; of Havana. province. These two individuals ut to go into
Havana fora period of of approxima telyt and then

pe ack in Sy tetvins ‘through ‘the “keys area oe the north coast

of Matanzas. Thése two individuals. will likewise go into
eriod of several weeks and then exfiltrate black:

These two ‘phases are discussed in | detail in following para~

_fi igures in Havana. ‘The following paragraphs discussing these
“phases aré not designed to be operational plans. Detailed
operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de=
veloped,

; make initial ‘contacts. among.certain select high level military.
A. AMTRUNK Personnel
1" l. , ‘2 is ajgdy year old Cuban Who is mature for his
years, anc eres experienced in eclandéstine opera-
tiéns. He attendedéG@aEn University in Havana for
}
1
1

two years, majoring “in So¢ial Studies. Prior to Fidel's
takeover A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
Autenti¢o which upheld the constitution of 1940, He supported
the revolution against Batista till it became apparent. that
Castro had Gast his lot for a Communist regime. During his
university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
in supporting anti=+Castro groups with weapons and materials.
Following thé Playa Giron invasiond great many in the Havana
underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise, He
continued in this | Work through 1961 and finally aeit Cuba
Tm Althotigh A/2.does not consider
elf an he has beén cooperative throucnout
j aie 1é “tS ‘a pensive individual who displays good
. judgement.. His present attitude towards KUBARK appears to
be one of “wait and see" i the meanwhile, he is” con~

ce i, re ac aie ete. ee te ee tne Ter Mae compet i RE a AIP rem og


14-0000

tq
pervererd
i

“quite loyal to rere Ais quick wit is. ‘apbea ling to his
fellow team membérs. He worked undér A/2 in the underground
aS an action type, principally engaging in sabotage. His
underground work began while he was in secondary school
when in 1958 he supported the révolution against Batista,
In late 1960 he sided with the counter=revolutionaries and
began full timé Anti-Castro activities, After the crack
down following the Bay of Pigs invaSion he avoidéd detection
afid continued to engagé in ‘underground activities, Finally
when the si tion bécame hopeless hé left Cuba by air for
Se} 1962. While A/3 has performéd satisfactorily
ing up to date, his performance falls far short
of the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should onl _
ot inter-
pe * Fortunately his
role in this ‘operation is comparatively minor and hé appears.
willing to Comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevértheless,
aboot contre. of. A/3 offers _ problems in the future .

SO B. TAREE

Conduct black infiltration landing at Punta La Jijira
us 3785 I) and establish contact with the farm manager at

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2
to Guanaba or Havana,

3. Although not definite, A/3 may remain at his
cao and train assets in maritimé reception and clandestine
“communications. Having compléted this he would thén be ex-

filtrated at Punta Jijira.

4, A/2 will go to Havana and obtain Safehouse and operational
support through his contacts.

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 Will tYain support ard opérational asséts in ¢landes-
tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
his exfiltration..

a Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
(AMS 3885 II).


14-0000

INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at
Punta La Jijira.is 18 May 1963. The infiltrees will make
their way to, isuacherswe farm one kilometer from the coast
and from there A/2 will ‘be provided with tranSportation to ¢go
‘to Guanabo or Havana,

2. The exfiltration of A/3 Will occur three days after his
infiltration, This arrangment, aS yet, is not definite.

3. ‘The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively Planned for 31
May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido. A/3 fééls
that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for
exfiltration but that a reconnaisanéce of the area would beé
necessary before final decision is reached. Prearranged
telegram Signal would indicate his préference.

4, The above dates fall within a favorable moon phasé for
maritimé operations. In addition the infil-éxfil schedulé
will Allow for an éxtra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
considers the minimum accéptable period of time to make his
contacts..,

OPERATIONAL ASSETS __WITHIN CUBA

ls Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and 3 the
two men will ies ex
PRE ae

ee z
F f KER from’ the point
of infiltration. tact with the manager of
the farm named && a) years of agé,
is married and has an elem ntary school education. He has

_ Avs will depend upon

He was jailed for a "brief period in the past “for counter=
revolutiotiary activities.


14-0000

2.

e, Another
single, Sth g
the form of fi
in the past.
Havana. He owns ‘a Eon EGTEREO sec

of Havana. Subject will be ‘contacted by “A/3 if he needs
t6 be safehoused in Havana,

B. age 21,
"SUPpOME

THe following assets would bé contacted by A/2 after

arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in thé order
listed, Théir function will be t6 provide safehouses and

,A/2 has maintained correspondénce With QfENDEZ

vehicles for A/2,

{ 28 years of age, born in Havana,

A ‘met her when she was a Student at the Universit
of Havana majoring in So¢ial Sciences. Presently she
lives with Her aunt in Havana and A/2 Has maintained cor-
réspondence with her. She has hélped previously in
providing safehousing for the underground. She also has

avana:. GiGdgt has nélped We in. acti cesqnemsam activi-
ties préviousl ‘He has a brother, two daughters and
€@ son now residing in the U.S, His daughters live in'

- New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about Six months

ago. Subjéct was a member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano:
an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of medrese :
at the University of Havana up until 1961 when he Tre-__
Signed. — is also a close friend of @PSszyEGRIN®

fidante during Castro' s takeover, - @ENDEZ’ has an apart-
ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the
government but is not. sympathetic to the regime, The
husband of this daughter, howevet, works. for i

born in Havana, single.
runs a shall private
in Havana. She was ALR" Ss

aT ae eM A ae ee ee TT wt rit eo aE

14-0000

¢ EB AM : ae Fete te) born in Havana, single,
mother “and father “deceased. ‘Shé_i ended the University
of Havana and Villanova fronctgeae

Havana.
lives ing

3. The following two opérational assets will be contactéd by
A/2 after he is saféhousSed in Havana. Their function will be
to spot Army officers disaffected with the Castro Regime.

3 married. Subjéct

r TD in ‘the Rebel Army but is not
presently on active duty. Hé was a friend 6f Castro's

. during the revolution and A/2 claims he still maintains

- some contact With Fidel. Hé also claims (AES has been

working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was

originally associated with thé MRR and Monte C¥isto
groups, €VAES primary interest has beén trying to or=
ganize his friends within, the Rebel Army against Fidel,
A/2 féels@AES is a véity discreet individual who has
not been identified as an anti=Castro organizer by
the G=2, A/2 clainis to be a close friend of 3
trusts him complétely, A/2 saw and talked to°URED in
prior to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refugee.

age oar 1 GOB sérved in the
According to. A/2,

Cane Scr gos). “Following “the disappearance Of
ore OUR ES was removed from the post and pre=+

sently lives on “an Army pension as well as royalties
from property confiscated by the goverriment. He said
<OUARTE started working against Gastro within the |} MRP

sééretary of the "MRD and became quite involved :
plotting against Fidel, A/2 auee stated that ait was

MRE that he was 3186, a KUBARK agent. “Eventually
(QUAREE) was placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according
“to A/2@GERED was able to évade detection. Subject
has goed connections Within the Rebel Army and re-
voOlutionary government, A/2 trusts this individual
and. has ‘Confidence din him as a botential operational

SEP RTE Na See ET OPI egg he rag mee a BE

14-0000

Lae

- c, A/2 ihay also attémpt to contact the f6llowing

Operational asSet if he has an opportunity to make
contact. .

former member of ‘the Partido. Pueblo ‘Cubano. He
fought With Raul Castro in thé Sierra CriStobal. Are
Following the Castro takéover he servéd as @eade Sis
one of thé military zones within Havana province,
Eventually | he was given Lesser assignments | and. A/2

COVER _AND > CoMMNECATTONS

1. Cover —

A/2 will be isstied documentation claiming he is an employee

of a loéGal brewery in Havana. A/3 on the othér hand will bé
issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.
Both will also be isstied drivers licenses and Additional

items such aS immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, ete,
Thé two men will also be outfitted with diSguises.

“2. Communications

Primary communications Will be established through an SW
system. Both tien will be given SW instruction and will be
issued accommodation addresses in Miami, This instruction

and these addressés in turn will be passed on to the recruited
assets in PBRUMEN for usé as the operation develops. Pre-
arranged signals will also be dévised for usé by the team via
telegram.to indicate their progress and Génfirm their place
and timé of exfiltration. Both mémbérs will also be given an
OWVL System to provide them with quick instructions in case

of an emergency.

OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION

1. The operational aspécts of Phase I portrays a mission which
has Gonsiderable potential but also considérable risk. The
area of infiltration is within five miléS of a cruisé missile
site and its accompanying radar. In addition boat patrols are
kAOWn to work this portion of ‘the coast at frequent intérvals,
‘Once infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before
their ‘first contact. However, A/3 is leary of staying at His
persorarm for any length of time and he does not Want his
‘@atnen to know of his présénce in Cuba. For this réason the
“farm will not be able to sérve as a saféhouse, A/2 plans on
leaving the farm the same day lands. This presents the

problem of what to do-with-A/ On approach is to také A/3


od ake:

wl :

td Guanabo or Havana and safehouse Him. This, however, may
jeopardize the opération becausé A/3 lacks the maturity and
patience nécessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-

‘ness. He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under=

take a clandestine assigriient on his own. When A/2 and 3
step ashore in Cuba; Control will vanish. Fortunately A/2

-haS a sufficient resource of judgement to ¢6 about his busi=

mess COmpetently. Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.,
For this reason an attempt will be made to stéer A/S towards
developing assets around his. Carne: em with maritime
reception capabilities, _

2, A/2, on the other Hand, appears to have a sufficient numbe
of supporting assets to provide for his saféty while in Havana
However, hé has not seen (WAS and WARE for over a year. In
addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army

organization and this position may dampen their effectiveness

in rééruiting. within the Army. Station reports ond Teh)
flict with A/2's evaluation of this man. While there is no
evidencé to verify that DUARTE 9 is pro=réegime,. there has been
a récent report on him from rom AMLEO/3 which claims ¢ is ah
opportunist who might work for the highest bidder. B'S
rebuttal to thesé remarks is that @ @UARTH has asS$isted him in

' the past’ and when the chips were down. he continued to aid him

in his underground neh of ga _This still jeaves a question

evaluation. | Both A and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-
curity conscious. While safehotised A/2 wroté a letter to a
contact in Miami which Was to be transmitted by his ¢ase
officer. Thé letter gave ai indication that A/2 waS sSéeking
. contacts in Havana and conveyed the impréssion that a trip
Was in the dfing. A/2 has written several other letters

not séen by his C Os which might have given the same inpres=

3 : freely

aca ae that would take them
first to Miami a and then to Cuba. Once there they would go
fathe z ew, and begin to make contacts. A/3 also
stated that a man hamed QUARTER) would be one of their con-=
tacts. This loosé talk Coupled with A/3's attitude that
KUBARK é6xXists only to serve him makes him 4 tharginal candi-=
daté for this operation. However , if A/3 is exfiltrated

“.three-days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
“. gain, his usefulness and éliminate somé of the risk he

presents.


3. ' The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
weaknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses
are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the

intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-

cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-~regime
operations at a high level within the Cuban Army, The results

‘which these anti~regime activities can accomplish is a matter

: Iv.

for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.
Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close
watching in terms of security and control for these factors
will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position
if not properly contained.

PHASE II |
A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
. beeen a)

; from y high class family.
His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in law
and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself

.graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising

lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.

Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,

A/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities,
In May 1961, at which time he‘held the position of Under-
Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground

‘activities. had come. to the attention of the government and

irr? teoeebentionl

he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.
He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late.
1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
vated. He has some experience in counter-revolutionary

activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for

learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego,
and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to

take offense ie tS Atank to state that he has a low opinion
| of -KUBARK 2 a KUBARK agent and he deeply ren
sents any implication that he is working for KUBARK. He

states that he is working for the overthrow of the sresent

regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
and advice but will not accept KUBARK control. His attitude
although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-'
sents a difficult handling problem,

2, AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a

_ Yaw graduate of the University. of Havana, He has been in-

‘volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities.

: |

= =e:

Subject arrived by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME .He

is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has
a very highly developed security consciousness, developed
from his counter-revolutionary experiences, From January
to July 1961 he made four, bi ogiesiefiltration/exfiltration

trips to and from CubaggagePEPRIiME, and has an excellent
Knowledge of the nortf@premmrenzeas area. He is easy to work

19-628" 7

. ee i re


7 - 10 _

with and has evidenced ‘little of the hostilities or anti-
KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27, _ °

3. AMTRUNK/4.. Subject is a GB year old. fisherman from the
area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963.
He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will

- be used as a maritime guide.

- INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small
boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact
individuals who formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil

‘operations. - -

2... Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline
into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans-
portation into Havana. - 7

3... Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana

'- and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4. Make all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-
tration and future infiltrations. —

5. Approach and recruit two-key individuals with contacts

- among important military figures,

6... Establish internal and external communications,

7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II.

It is
and AM

-inco Le

/4-into the « KeyS area on or about
Subjects. will take a small boat with Silent motor

: *s Sramel sein oad: _
23 April.
nto e Keys area and remain in the area for approximately

three days, during which time they will remain black, keep

the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals

known to them on Cinco Leguas,: They will make arrangements
with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14
on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)
and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas, Plans will be
: Lout at this with these contacts for a second in=
zee >Dthetatter part of May. at which time ANICE
and AMIC will again go into Cinco Leguas and expect to be
‘passed on through these contacts to Havana, Subjects will
exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met
by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV). ‘

!


