DARAAN
Iito4-10310-10020, (2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | -~-—

TRANSMITTAL SLIP |

FORM HO OA 1 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO. 1957—-O-430445 (@)
1FEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED. :

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' Attachn.ent

{CLASSIPIERTIONT
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

In reply refer to
Action Memorandum No. _!

Date TA ril 1905

A @$ >!

Deputy Director for Plaas
Deputy Director for Intelligence

TO : Deputy Disector for Science k Technology
Deputy Director fer support

Agreement Between the United states Secret service
aad the Central Intelligence Agency Concerning
SUBJECT : Prealdential Protection ln the Ucited states

REFERENCE: b-ercorandam from DOCI te LD/1L, LbO/F, and OD/ 4,
; — dated $ June 1963, subject: The CIA Role in Support
of Presidential Trips Abrosd

kh Attached for the information of addressees is a copy of subject
agreement developed by the Chief of the Secret service and re, in accordance
with the recommendations of the Warren Comrnissies and the actions of the
Preeident's Cemmittes on the Warren Report.

2. The Deputy Director for Plans is responsible for insuring
Agency con:pliance with this agreement and for n:aintaining the active Liaison
with the Secret Service. The staff fanction in this regard ie being perfors-ed
in. the Counter Intelligence Scaff af the DD/P. All Agency conponente in
Haisen with the Secret Service are to keep the Counter Intelligence stati
informed of their dealings with the Jocret Service, The Counter Intellizesce
Stall will provide advice te other Agency components wha receive requests
for support frem the Secret Service.

3. This agreement does mot amend or alter currert Agency policy
as expressed in ny a:emorandun: ef 8 June 1983 concerning support of

| Fresicential trips abroad. An additional ayreer-ent with the jecret service,

iuvolving CLA aod other Governz.ent agencies dealing with } residential treve}
abroad, ie in procesa of developi:.ent.

(Signed) Marshall §. Carter
warohall 5, Cartier
SUSPENSE DATE: ticutenant General, USA

Deputy Cirector
Co

ce: OGC a {-.
ny {s (CLASSIFICATION)

cet

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ZCUZ>PRPOZmMZ ZORnHo>d

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CONFIDENTIAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND

PROTECTION IN THE UNITED STATES

I, Purpose of Agreement

i

t .

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CONCERNING PRESIDENTIAL
' A. The purpose of this Agreerrent is to define the types of infor-
i

| mation, administrative assistance and support to be furnished by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to the United States Secret Service so

|

that the Service may best fulfill its responsibilities to protect the person

of the President of the United States while he is in the United States. The

separate Agreement with the Secret Service.

!
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CIA role in support of Presidential trips abroad is the subject of a
B. The terms of this Agreement shall be applied to the protection
of members of the President's immediate family, the President-elect,
| the Vice President or other officer next in the order of succession to
|
|

the office of President, the Vice Presiijent-elect and former Presidents.
| .

| OU. General Responsibilities

i

A. The Secret Service has the responsibility for protecting the
person of the President, It undertaker to identify individuals who, b--.ause
| of their individual propensities or cnazacteristics, are dangerous 9~ .ho
may pose a threat to the person of the President. It arranges whatever
action is required to counteract any th eat to the person of ‘ e President

posed by such individuals.

{! CON TIDE TIAL

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gn a cS ee te ww mw etm . Fn A nel en TR

CONFIDENTIAL

| B. The CIA has primary responsibility for the clandestine collection
tH ;

' of foreign intelligence information, and for the correlation, evaluation

1 and dissemination within the Government of foreign positive and counter
intelligence. It gathers end maintains biographic and other data on

| organizations and individuals, official and non-official, for the purpose of
performing its statutory junctions. It also originates, and receives from
other sources, reports on organizations and individuals. However, the

|
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; Agency has no police, sulpoena or law-enforcement powers or internal-
| .
| security functions.

i

Ill. Information to be Revorted by CIA

A. The CIA will furnish to the Secret Service information that comes :
into its possession of the type set forth in Appendix A to this Agreement
! concerning individuals coming to its attention of the classes set forth in
:; Appendix B to this Agree:nent. The information may be furnished in more
«

than one report, and in emergency situations priority attention will be

i given to its preparation and delivery.

B. After reportir.g an individual to the Secret Service, the CLA

| will thereafter--unless the Secret Service otherwise requests--report to
{ the Secret Service additional information which it thereafter receives or

obtains concerning such individual.

C. The CIA will Jurnish to the Secret Service intelligence and

intelligence information tnat becomes available concerning:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(1) Groups outside the United States which advocate
assassination of government officials as a political weapon
and which appear to constitute an existing threat to the
President or any persons named in Article 1, Paragraph B.
above;

(2) Sabotage and assassination training by hostile
intelligence services or groups and the identity of persons
so trained who appear to constitute an existing threat to
the President or any person named in Article I, Para-
graph B. above;

(3) Plots in the United States or abroad to assassinate

a Chief of State or other high official.

D. . This agreement shall be reviewed by representatives of the CIA

‘and the Secret Service annually, or at such more. frequent occasions as

either the CIA or the Secret Service may request, to make certain that
the system of reporting is both practicable and productive. Revisions
may be made on the authority of the Deputy Director of the CIA and the

Chief of the Secret Service.

IV. Provision of CIA Personnel to Protect the President

.

A. On occasion the use of a large number of armed officers is
required to carry out the protective functions of the Secret Service due to
such factors as the size of the crowds, the number of persons to be pro-
tected or the existence of a national emergency. At such times CIA may,

at the request of the Secret Service, detail some of its security officers

CONFIDENTIAL

CO NIL OENTIAL

to the Secret Service in order :o augment the Service's capacity to carry

out its protective functior.s in the most secure manner.

B. Such officers detailed by tne CLA will be designated officers of
the Secret Service under the direction and operational control of the Chief
of the United States Secret Service. No person shall be so detailed unless
he has qualified in the use of firearms either in accordance with standards
established by the Chief cf the United States Secret Service, or in accord-
ance with standards established by the Director of Security of the CIA.
Persons so detailed will be authorized to carry firearms and to perform
such other protective functions and duties as are authorized by law, as

provided by section 3056 of title 18, United States Code, as amended.

V. Implementation of Agreement

A. The Secret Sezvice and the CIA undertake to maintain an active

liaison to insure the pror:pi péssage cf available information concerning
individuals reported to the Secret Service by the CIA and evaluated by

the Secret Service as darnzerous to the President or any person named in
Article I, Paragraph B. Furthermore, in order to effect the best possible
security of such persons, the Secret Service and the CIA will take such
steps as are necessary tc insure that the terms of this Agreement are

fully carried out.

Ceatral Intelligence Agency
a

—

a
Datea: 27 Mores, Qos _ By e Sse ee
Marshall S. Carter
Deputy Director

Uriicd States Secr.t Service

IGN SIDE NTIAL Chiet \

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CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX A

Information to Be Furnished on Individuals Reported by the Central

Intelligence Agency to the Secret Service

1. Identification Date. - to the extent available to CIA, name or names of |
i individual (includiag prior legal names, aliases and pseudonyms}, i
address, photogrz ph (or staternent as to availability of such), physical

, description, date and place of birth, employment and marital status;

2. Reason or Reasons for Reporting - statement of the class or classes

in Appendix B, wkich the individual reported fits;

CLA file on an ind:vidual reported which cause him to fit any class

. i
3. A summary or excerpts, as appropriate, of such portions ofany |
or classes in Appendix B.

|

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CONFIDENTIAL

Se ee mmm ee ere

2: doclinnrrmen ernie Geteininmeinymmnminnnmpeieetn a 8 Ne ee ee ee ee ee

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX B

Types of Individuals to Be Reported by the Central Intelligence Agency:

to the Secret Service

Individuals who have made threats of bodily harm against, or have
attempted to cause bodily harm to, officials or employees of Federal,
state or local Governments or foreign government officials while
they are residing in or planning an imminent visit to this country;
provided that such threats or acts are made against the Government

official or employee because of his official status;

Individuals who th:‘eaten or attempt to redress a real or imaginary
grievance against Sederal, state or local Governments or any

employee or official thereof by other than legal means;
United States citiz2ns who defect or indicate a desire to defect;

Nationals of any country in the Sino-Soviet Bloc (including the USSR
and Communist China) located in the United States, and who have
escaped from the contr6l of any such country, or who, being outside
such jurisdiction ind control, are unwilling to return thereto, and
who have been of : peciei interest or value to the United States, and
who cannot be eliriinated as a possible source of danger to the

President or any }erson named in Article I, Paragraph B;

Subversives, com nunists, racists and fascists in the United States

who meet one or riore of the following criteria:

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i rm ns ee ee ee . Se ae a ge 8 ee ee rie cre

CONFIDENTIAL

(a) Evidence of emotional instability or irrational or
suicidal behavior, particularly in persons who have a record
of transitory residence or employment;

(b) Expressions of strong or violent anti-United States
sentiment;

{c) Prior acts (including arrest or convictions) or conduct
or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antip-

athy toward good order and government,

The term ''subversives' shall mean persons (including members of
the Communist Party and Communist front organizations) who
knowingly or willfully advocate, abet, advise or teach the duty,
necessity or propriety of overthrowing or destroying the Govern-
ment of the Unitec. States or the government of any state, district
or possession the.-eoi or the government of any political subdivision
therein by force cr violence or by the assassination of any officer

of any such government.

CONFIDENTIAL

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NEXT MONTH

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15 16 17 18 1920 21
22,25 24 25 26 27 28

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326 Friday, November 22, 1963 39

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LAST MONTH

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y

14 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting at 1600 on 13 February

1, Present were Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. McCone,
Mr. Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Alexis Johnson, Mr. Mann,
General Carter, Mr. FitzGerald, and Peter Jessup. General
Taylor and Mr. FitzGerald were present. only for the Cuban
item,

2. Prior to the arrival of Mr. Bundy, General Taylor
mentioned to Mr. Alexis Johnson an upcoming trip of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to Norfolk, Fort Bragg, and Panama, After
some jocular bantering, Mr. Johnson vetoed the Panama portion
‘of the trip, with General Taylor hoping that this denial was
purely for the physical protection of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

3. Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility that he might
go to Saigon next week to see what was going on out there. He
stated that we were not getting sufficient timely information
from the Ambassador and that while he and Mr. McNamara
might be going out later as a follow-up to their December trip,
he felt the need to go now. General Taylor pointed out that
there have been a great many visitors to Saigon in recent months
and perhaps we should give them a rest out there for a while.

In any event, he thought perhaps the newly-created NSAM com-
mittee headed by Sullivan would want to make sucha trip, General
Taylor seemed reluctant to have Mr. McCone go at this time.

Mr. Johnson said he would take a look at it and be in touch with
Mr. McCone early next week,

4, The first item on the agenda was a discussion of
the Vance memo of 10 February on "Clandestine and Covert
Activities Against Cuba.'' Mr. Vance stated that he was strongly .
for this course of action, that the risks were minimal, and that

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the JCS and Secretary McNamara also strongly supported it.
Mr. Johnson pointed out that he would be much happier if the
paper had been sent to the Cuban Coordinating Committee in

accordance with usual procedures, Mr. Vance stated that the

committee knows all about it and are for it. Mr. McCone
stated that he was disturbed over the trend of events in Cuba
and that this particular paper really does not go far enough.
He pointed out that our economic denial program was eroding
away and that the courses of action proposed by Mr. Vance's
memo gave Castro maximum grounds for righteous indignation
without really accomplishing anything, Mr. Vance stated that
prior activities in this regard had created great consternation
in Cuba, and Bundy challenged this and asked for proof, Mr,
McCone pointed out the many times that we have had to stand
down actions of this type in order to avoid raising the noise
level. General Taylor said that what we really must do is to
reaffirm the belief of the senior policy makers to the President
that a program of this type must be continued. Mr. Bundy
pointed out that the Secretary of Defense had previously stated
to the President, along with Secretary Rusk, that they were
not enthusiastic for this type of activity but he noted now that
Mr. McNamara had reversed his position. Bundy pointed out
that we have been somewhat hesitant to go ahead full force on
these actions because we did not want to prejudice our position
before the OAS in connection with the Venezuelan arms cache.
Mann stated that our entire program as regards Cuba was
ineffective insofar as it could result in any overthrow of Castro,
At about this point both Mr. Mann and Mr. McCone stated that
we should do everything possible to create provocations and
distressing actions against Castro. Bundy stated that the low
risk actions appear unrewarding and that rewarding actions have
too high a risk, Mann stated that we need to do a lot more
homework before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled)
and Bundy said in any event we must have a top-level Cabinet
Meeting with the President to discuss this whole matter, The
agenda item was left as follows:

a. Mann is to get the Crimmins staff hard at work
on the Vance paper and on other alternative courses
of action to include pros and cons, noise levels,
estimated results, etc.

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b. Mann is to send around a draft OAS resolution
which was prepared during Martin's time.

c. As to the specific paragraphs of the Vance
memo, Bundy indicated his personal views (not an
Administration commitment) that items 1 and 2a were
OK; 2b for Cuban ships only; 3a should be intensified;
3b and 3c were directly connected to a separate black-
list enterprise; 4 was OK. As for actions against
Cuban subversion in Latin America, on paragraph 1 we
should see just what our opportunities are, and on para-
graph 2 CIA should determine just what we think the
local traffic will bear and just what our capabilities
might be. .

Finally, after a very short discussion on low-level reconnaissance
requirements for Cuba, General Taylor and Mr. McCone decided
to pay close attention to high-level results on Friday, Saturday,
and Sunday, and to take a fresh reading on the matter on Monday.
Action: DD/I to cover the low-level matter over the weekend,
DD/P to ride herd on the activities generated by the Vance memo,

5. The next item was a very cursory review of the
covert action programs for” ‘Japan, France, Tibet, . ‘Taiwan;. and
China. Mr. Vance asked how we could measure the effectiveness
of such actions and Mr. McCone pointed out to him that this could
not be: really adequately measured and gave all the reasons therefor,
Mr. Vance stated that he was just getting broken into this type of
activity and he would appreciate some briefings by the action
officers, (It was subsequently arranged through Pete Jessup to
have Colby and Bill O'Ryan make appointments with Secretary Vance
specifically to discuss French operations and our Far Eastern
operations,

6. Mr. McCone then brought up the matter of the SAC U-2
aircraft in Manila as covered in his memorandum of 13 February
which was not given any distribution. Mr. McCone said that ever
since 1954 it had been established policy that all reconnaissance —
flights over denied and unfriendly territory or covert flights over

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. friendly territory were a responsibility of the Director of

Central Intelligence with the customary approvals of the Special
Group and that he wished this policy reaffirmed and proper
direction be given so that the DCI would designate the organiza~
tion and resources to be used, either SAC.or CIA, Mr. Vance
stated that NRO was involved and that upon receiving the urgent
requirement from CINCPAC for this single flight and upon
learning that the Taiwan assets were stood down because of fuel
control problems, the JCS, Mr. McNamara, and he had agreed
that SAC should fly the flight. He stated that Mr. McAfee of the
State Department had been informed on Sunday night and that
the Base Commander in the Philippines also knew about it. He
stated that there were only two targets concerned and that with
luck they could be obtained with a single flight. Mr. McCone >
pointed out that the question had not been raised with him by
Steakley as to military aircraft or sanitized aircraft nor was he
aware of the cover plan that might be utilized in the event of
difficulties, Mr, Vance stated it would be the regular cover
plan of a weather ship off course. Vance said this was a one-
shot problem only and that as soon as it was completed, the
planes and crews would be withdrawn. He said both he and

‘McNamara were greatly surprised when they learned that SAC

had sent three airplanes and seven crews to perform this single
mission. He said they could understand the need for. two air-
planes in case one aborted but certainly not this large contingent.
He said this had no connection with the South Vietmam broad
coverage mapping and that the Taiwan assets should be used for
this.

7. It was apparent that all were in agreement that the
Director of Central Intelligence had the responsibility for |
approving requirements for photo coverage and for determining
the appropriate resources to be used for this coverage whenever
it required overflights of denied or hostile territory or whenever
it required covert flights over friendly territory, Mr, Bundy
stated that the DCI should prepare the necessary directive to
this effect and circulate it to the other members of the Special
Group for their approval at the next meeting. Action: DD/S&T

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to prepare for me by no later than noon Monday the simplest,
most concise, directive along the foregoing lines.

Marshall S, Carter

Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

Distribution:
Original - DDCI

1 - Elder/Enright
Paras 1-5 to Mr, Paul Eckel DDP/SGO

Paras 6 & 7 - DD/S&T

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So , f . -
QTRAL floloc ty ti.

fies GLY ck

18 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Disarmament Meeting on 18 January 1964
at the White House

‘1. At 2:45 this date Mr. Alexis Johnson informed me that
there would be a meeting with the President at 3:15 p.m., in
the White House to discuss the most recent revision of his
proposed statement to the Geneva Conference, and that I was
expected to be there. Upon arriving at the meeting place I was
handed a draft by Adrian Fisher, It subsequently developed
that McNamara, Rusk, Taylor, and the President must have
had this draft for at least long enough to have thoroughly reviewed
and considered it. In.any event, I read it immediately and was
struck by the fact that in those areas of the original draft as
given to Mr. McCone by Dr. Scoville in which the DCI had taken
exception, ameliorating language had been inserted in the new
draft to considerably temper and meet objections of Mr. McCone.
The draft was now much more a speech by the President as to
what he hoped might develop as a result of mutual give and take
rather than a statement of U. S. policy and definite intentions.

2. The President entered the room shortly, accompanied
by Bill Moyer and Jack Valenti. Others present were Rusk,
McNamara, General Taylor, Dr. Seaborg, Adrian Fisher, and
myself. Alexis Johnson was not present.

3. The President opened by stating that he had read the
revised draft and wanted to know if there were any objections to
it. Dr. Seaborg pointed out that he had some hesitancy about
opening totally his closed-down plants for international inspection
(paragraph 3, page 3) but that there were many ways of deter-
mining whether or not the reactor was in fact shut down -- he
simply did not want to give carte blanche to inspectors overrunning
the entire plant. This position was adopted. Dr. Seaborg then


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said that he wanted it understood that the closing down of the .
plants was not necessarily a permanent commitment and that
whenever it became necessary or desirable, in the absence
of international agreement to the contrary, we should retain
complete freedom of action to reopen a reactor any time we
chose. This position was agreed,

4, Mr. McNamara pointed out that he had been working
steadily the last few days to get agreement in the Pentagon on
a paper substantially in accord with this draft and that the only
thing that now gave them a problem was subparagraph (c) on
page 4 as to the establishment of nuclear-free zones. He said
if this could be deleted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the
Department of Defense would buy the paper. Their concern
was that we would get so involved in these zones that we would
lose freedom of action to shift nuclear weapons through the
Canal Zone, for example, or by air through overflights.
Secretary Rusk pointed out that they had discussed this a num-
ber of times before, that it was nothing new, and that he would
hope we could establish nuclear-free zones in Latin America
and Africa for example. The President said that when the
crunch came he depended on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that
he must have them on his side. Accordingly the paragraph on
nuclear-free zones was eliminated.

5. I then stated that the President should know that there
was on record a letter from Mr. McCone pointing out some
problem areas that could develop in a number of these points,
particularly as to our getting bac gnto a position of letting up
on the need for full and adequate verification. I further said
that aside from the intelligence aspects of the problem, there
were certain policy matters as regards reaction of West Germany,
and particularly France, that should be considered. The President
then asked for Mr. McCone's letter and glanced through it rather
hurriedly. General Taylor asked to see the letter and he did the
same. I-then gave a copy to Secretary Rusk, particularly pointing
out those portions of DCI's letter concerning his membership on
the Committee of Principals and his reservations at the policy


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level. Mr. Rusk indicated he had seen Mr. McCone's letter.
(Subsequently Mr. Adrian Fisher stated that they had worked
all afternoon and. most of the night in revising the original

draft to meet the objections raised by the DCI and he thought

that they had moderated their language and weasel-worded the
statement adequately to meet DCI's objections.) The President
then asked me if I had any specific, further objections to the
statement now that the nuclear-free zone problem had been
eliminated and that the DCI's letter was on record. 1 stated
that depending upon what was actually finally determined as an
international agreement, we might be in serious trouble on

‘verification but that this problem would come later. I felt that

as a statement by the President there was adequate protection

in future negotiations to ensure the best interests of the United
States, (I subsequently checked with Adrian Fisher who assured
me that there was no backoff in ACDA and State from the require-
ment for adequate verification and that the additional words
inserted in the latest draft were specifically to meet DCI's prior
objections. In other words, DCI's letter of comment is a matter
of record with the President and the other principals at the
meeting, and the President commented that the Central Intel-
ligence Agency was certainly a smooth-operating outfit. It was
obvious that he had his tongue in his cheek in this regard to
indicate that we not only covered our rear but our flanks as well.)
The President then directed a number of actions as regards
Congressional briefings, preparation of a talk for him to make

to the American public in explanation of his Geneva Conference
statement, In connection with this speech for American con-
sumption, he directed that it be prepared so that any tenant
farmer could understand it -- ten words per sentence, four sen-
tences per paragraph, and four-letter words throughout.

6. This ended discussion of the Geneva Conference statement,
7. New subjects:

a. There was then a discussion of a letter to Khrushchev
but I was not aware of the contents nor were the contents

mentioned. _-The discussion revolved around the date at which
such a letter would be made public.

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b, The President then expressed his great concern
over the emergent situation in Panama. He said that he
had proposed injecting himself directly into the problem
yesterday with a public statement and approaches to the
OAS specifically to lay down publicly exactly what the facts
were as regards Panamian aggression, intrusions into the
Zone, killing of American soldiers with rifle bullets by
snipers while they were armed only with bird shot, etc.,
etc. He said that he had been dissuaded from this course
by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State and
others. -He said he was shocked to read in this morning's
New York Times a story (presumably the Tad Szulc article)
that pretty well covered exactly what his proposals were.
He said he still felt if was a good idea and that he thought
Harriman, Rusk, McNamara, Johnson, and others should
assemble small groups of Latin American Ambassadors and
tell them what he, the President, wanted to tell them. He
thought it was an even better idea if he did it himself. I did
not get the impression that a decision was made in this
regard nor do I think any action will be takenas a result of
this meeting. Unfortunately the discussion centered then
on the security aspects of leaks to the public and the President
expressed in no uncertain terms, with great persuasiveness
and even more emphasis, his unhappiness at his complete
inability to say anything to anyone without its immediately’
being in the papers or getting around town. He made some
very pointed comments reflecting on the integrity of the State
Department and of the Department of Defense in this regard.
He felt. the situation had become extremely serious in the past
two months since he had become President and did not recall |
any such problem when he was meeting periodically with
President Kennedy. He said he was prepared to clean house
wherever necessary to overcome this. Secretary Rusk pointed
out that this had been going on for twenty years and was nothing
new and McNamara agreed. The President thought it was
worse than he had ever seen it before and that in his 22 years
on the Armed Services Committee and around the Hill he had
never been involved in anything like this nor had he ever been

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bothered by reporters once he had made it clear that he
was not the talking kind. No decisions were taken, no
actions directed although both Rusk and McNamara indi-
cated they would immediately take whatever steps were
feasible to improve the situation.

c. The President then reverted to Cuba and said that
he questioned seriously whether these sabotage efforts were
the proper thing for the U. S. to be doing. He thought they
were both hypocritical and ineffectual and while he under-
stood the need for some of them to maintain the morale of
internal dissidents to the Castro regime and to maintain the
morale of Cuban exiles, he thought probably these consider-
ations were outweighed by the hypocrisy of our seeking peace
and talking peace and conducting this sort of activity on the
side. Rusk said that he had never been in favor of this pro-
gram and had the same doubts the President did. McNamara
said that he too had never been in favor of this program and
questioned our participation. I stated that while this program

_ was conducted by the CIA, every action taken had the full

approval of the Special Group on which the Secretary of State
and the Secretary of Defense were adequately represented
and that the program was designed in part for the specific
purpose of generating internal sabotage and dissidents with
a view to creating as many problems as possible for Castro
and with a view to getting an escalation of anti-Castro activi-
ties in Cuba, that over the long run any type of effort such
as this was an irritant to Castro and that such action had
some effect, even though slight, on the Cuban economy. I
said that over the long run you could not expect the Castro
regime to fall from these actions alone but that every little
bit helped, and that we had noticed over the past four months
a considerable increase in sabotage actions generated from
internal Cuban elements over which we exercised no coiitrol.
I said that I could not take exception to the fact that this
policy was a hypocritical one in the light of a peace offensive
although I did not feel we were trying to make peace with
Castro, I also pointed out that sabotage activities in North

CET

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Vietnam likewise had hypocritical aspects. At this point
Mr. McNamara demurred and said North Vietnam was an
entirely different matter but he gave no reasons therefor
and this point was not developed further. General Taylor
noted that in connection with sabotage operations they kept
Castro constantly on the alert and kept his forces heavily
occupied running hither and yon. The President noted that
this was probably true but so little gain in it and generally
seemed disaffected with sabotage efforts. Rusk pointed out
that there was some value in maintaining some pressure of |
this type since to completely desist would eventually lead
Castro to believe that he was immune from retaliation. The

.President then directed that he wanted a complete review

of our Cuban policy and some new, imaginative thinking
developed. I stated that this was presently heavily in train
in all appropriate agencies of the Government, and Rusk and
McNamara nodded their agreement. The President said he
would want to meet as soon as people had drawn up their
proposals. In connection with Cuba the President noted that
he continued to desire the most drastic pressures on our .
Allies to insist upon their cooperation and assistance and
compliance in our economic denial program against Cuba.
He said that Segni and Erhard had both assured him we could
count on the full cooperation of Italy and West Germany to
cease any further Cuban trade. He said he wanted similar
discussions prepared for him whenever he met these leaders
and for our leaders to take the same line in any discussions
they might have.

There was minor discussion as regards the situation

in BES Vietnam with no one indicating any great enthusiasm
or any great surge of hopefulness as to the present situation,
The President stated he was most unhappy to be making a
speech indicating that things were improving and then to have
a USIA spokesman and an Embassy spokesman state in Saigon
that things were falling apart. He said somebody was getting
poor advice as well as poor information and he was inclined
to think it was he. He said that he was new in the job and _
that he had in the past several months based his actions on

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the advice and guidance he had received from his principal
advisers whom he considered professionals and experts ~
in their fields. He said he was beginning to have serious
doubts that his own judgment had been wrong in a number

of cases although he was the first to admit that he had been
wrong in the past throughout his life at various times and
was certainly no more immune than anyone else from
making mistakes. I got the distinct impression that he was
mighty unhappy with some of the actions he has taken as a
result of recommendations from State. I also got the feeling
that from here on out he is much more liable to use his own
intuition and prescience as to what should be done and what
should not be done in the daily operations of his actions in
the foreign policy field.

e. Turning to more pleasant matters, the President
noted that the dinner he had given for the Congressional
Committee leadership had been a complete success and that
he was going to repeat it again on the 23rd and the 30th. He
had received nothing but highly favorable accolades from
the people who had attended and many of them indicated it
was the first time they had ever been in the White House and
certainly the first time they had had an adequate briefing by
the Administration leadership: The President said that he -
had received a phone call saying that he should continue this
and he was certainly going to do so. He had also been
promised that at least in large measure as a result of this
briefing he would have a tax bill reported out by Wednesday.
The President then said we could do a lot better. He told

“Rusk and McNamara that they should take a nap in the after-

noon prior to these two dinners so they would be much
fresher and more alert -- that they had done an A No. 1 job
but not quite up to the caliber that they had put on for the
labor leaders -- in his mind that performance could not have
been better, The President said he had planned for the
briefing to be twenty minutes and that instead it had lasted
an hour. He said that this was entirely too long and that
Mr. McCone alone had spoken for seventeen minutes. He

SENT]

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13-00000 st .
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then said that for the next two dinners he was going to have
only two briefers and the briefing would be scheduled for
fifteen minutes and that twenty minutes was the absolute
maximum he:would sit still for. He said he wanted Mr.
Rusk and Mr. McNamara to work this out together, with
Mr. McNamara covering both the U. S. military and the
Soviet military as covered by Mr. McCone, and Rusk
covering the Soviet economy and the world roundup as
covered by Rusk and McCone at the last hearing. I sub-
sequently checked with Bill Moyer to determine whether.
‘this was a change from the President's instructions to Mr.
McCone or whether it might have been an oversight. Mr.
Moyer stated that the President had given much thought to
this and since Mr. McCone would be away, he had changed
the system to the one just enumerated. This makes abun-
dant sense to me under the circumstances and I considered
any further discussion either with Moyer or the President
inappropriate.

8. The meeting then broke up at 4:15 because the President
had to go out to dedicate a building.

9. The foregoing notes are ina single copy and will be shown
only to the Director upon his return.. Any actions indicated will
be directed by me at the Monday morning meeting. I will send a
very short, sanitized report of this meeting to Mr. McCone by

cable.
| iz -.

Marshall S, Carter
_ Lieutenant General; USA’
Acting Director

Sera]
EYES 2

1, The background as to the purpose of this visit is covered
in my Memorandum for the Record dated | January on my visit to
Independence to see Mr. Truman, ,

2. We departed Kansas City airport in the early afternoon
of 31 December, arriving at the Johnson City airport ghortly before
3:00. This airport was built by President Johnson in his own back
yard and was subsequently turned over to Johnson City as their
airport. We were taken to the Johnson residence and made com-
fortable in the combination office-sitting room just off the dining
room. Coffee was served and ina few moments the President and
Mrs. Johnson joined us. After appropriate welcoming to the ranch,
Mrs. Johnson retired to her household chores.

3. Mr. Murphy briefed the President on our discussions
with Mr. Truman and reported to the President Mr. Truman's
desire to help in any way he could during the coming year. Mr.

‘Murphy followed generally the comments indicated in my previous

memorandum as put forward by Mr. Truman. I thought he gave a
much too favorable report on Mr. Truman's condition and mental

agility. This was understandable to me since Murphy is one of the

junior old cronies of Mr. Truman. The President asked me for

" my reaction and I gave it substantially in accordance with the last

paragraph of my Truman memorandum. I told the President that
I certainly felt Mr. Truman was willing to do anything he could or
was asked to do to assist President Johnson; that my own reaction
was that Mr. Truman was in some respects senile and living 90%

on memories and his past. I stated that I thought there was certainly

nothing wrong with Mr. Truman's mind or alertness but that I felt
some caution should be exercised in just how Mr. Truman's assets
might be utilized. The President made no comment except to note

13-00000

-2-.

wryly that he himself occasionally had problems with his memory
but that he did not think he was yet living with it entirely. The
President then noted that we should have been briefing Mr. Truman
more often and that perhaps had we done so, it would have pre-
vented the type of article he had recently published about the CIA.
The President then stated that he wanted President Hoover,
President Eisenhower, and President Truman briefed monthly on
the international situation as well as on the domestic situation

and what his programs were. (Action: This requires follow-up
with the White House and possibly a discussion between Mr. McCone
and the President since Mr. McCone indicated informally that he
thought once a month was too often and that, in any event, while

CIA can handle the international situation, we should have some
other agency handle the domestic situation. )

4. The President then made a number of statements which
seemed to be in part his philosophy of operations and in others a
repetition of his conversation with Erhard. It was difficult to
separate when he was repeating what he had said to Erhard and
when he was stating a Johnson principle.

5. The President stated that he was much taken with Erhard
and that he thought him a smart, articulate German who was much
more appealing than Adenauer. Erhard apparently attempted to
feel the President out as to his reactions to various statements and
positions taken by deGaulle. The President got the impression that
Erhard was initially trying to play off deGaulle against the President.
Mr. Johnson told Erhard that as far as he, Mr. Johnson, was con-
cerned, he was going to do everything possible to promote a peaceful
world but without in any way relaxing either our guard or our military
strength; he was prepared to walk around the world if necessary to
promote peace when he was convinced that such walking would assist --
on the other hand, he had no intention of making trips just to cultivate
friends and promote the giving away of U. S. resources in an effort
to entice people to join our camp; if they wanted to come in willingly

. with their eyes open, he would welcome them but he felt it was time

for other nations to do some thinking on their own and to make their

13-00000

-3-

own judgments without the need for U. S, persuasion in the form ;
of concrete financial and military aid. Accordingly, the President
intended to stay home and do his own heavy thinking as to just

how he can best promote peace -- if this led to trips, then he

would take trips. If people wanted to come to see him to talk

about peace or other matters, he would be delighted to receive
them but there must be something worthwhile to talk about and
something that will lead in the proper direction. He said that
during his lifetime the United States had been forced to fight two
wars because of Germany and that he was not going to allow any
situation to develop which might lead in that direction again so long
as he was President, He said he would not be a party to any shilly-
shallying in that direction and that Germany must make up its own
mind and see which way they intend to go. If it were going to be
toward deGaulle, then say so. If it were going to be toward the
United States and its concept of a free world, then say so and prove
it by putting more effort into their actions in this regard -- more
effort in the way of more money and more support of United States
policies. He told Erhard that this was the way he felt and there
was no point in Erhard trying to play off deGaulle against President
Johnson nor to try to get Germany in the middle between those two
nations. The President said that Erhard apparently accepted this
frank talk and for the rest of the visit never once mentioned deGaulle.

6. The President then directed that Salinger acquire from
USIA and CIA a roundup of world reaction as to Erhard's visit. He
said that if we did not make any money on that deal, we might just
as well fold-up our tent insofar as influencing foreign visitors was
concerned because he, the President, had really put out and had
really talked turkey to Erhard -- which was the only way he, the
President, knew how to talk. He said that this administration was
being criticized for either having no foreign policy or a poor one
and that he therefore wanted as much publicity as possible on the
highly favorable aspects of the Erhard visit. (I subsequently had
a CIA report prepared and forwarded to Salinger onl January,
pointing out that it was an initial report and that a real reading on
Ambassadorial and Governmental reactions would be coming along

13-00000

-4-

later since it takes more time to acquire these from somewhat
sensitive sources.

7. The President then went on to say that people seem to
have the impression he was going to sit back and try to keep things
on an even keel so as not to disturb the upcoming election. He
said that this was a wrong impression for people to have and that
he intended to do everything he possibly could to ensure maintaining
and augmenting the great forward momentum that President Kennedy
had been developing toward world peace and proper domestic
policies. He said that this was a time for real action and that the
United States must get itself out of this trend of thought that it sits
back and reacts to others' actions rather than creates actions of
its own. He is tired of reacting -- he wants to act and let others
react to him and this is one of the things he intends to think about
during upcoming months. He therefore urges the most imaginative

thinking possible both in and out of Government to see how best his

ends can be attained. He pointed out that this. was not going to be
easy because this was an election year and lots of people would be
looking for ways to attack him and his policies. He said, however,
that he could not sit by and watch this opportunity for promoting
peace and understanding among nations to dissipate simply because
it was an election year in which he would be politically involved. —

8. The President then said that he had been totally dis-
satisfied with what the State Department had proposed he send to
Khrushchev and he had therefore sat down at the desk (pointing) and
had in his own handwriting composed the New Year's message to
Khrushchev. He intended to continue to promote every possibility
for a basis of understanding looking toward peace and again reiterated
that any agreement would never be at the expense of our own security.

9. He then asked me for a briefing of any current situations
that he should be brought up to date on. [ brought him up to date on
Cyprus, on Cuba, and on South Vietnam since he had indicated that
he had read recent Checklists.

13-00000

-5-

10, As to Cuba, he stated his dissatisfaction with our
present policies and actions connected therewith and said that
shortly after his return to Washington, and probably after the
State of the Union message, he wanted a comprehensive review
of the Cuban situation and our policies and he wanted the most
imaginative and forward thinking people put to work on seeing
what else could be done. He did not feel the sabotage efforts
would ever really result in any ultimate goals for U. S, interests
but was prepared to accept some of them if they promote internal
dissidents and assisted the morale of the people we were working
with in Cuba, He stated he was not at all satisfied with the
Governmental actions taken thus far to curtail free world trade
with Cuba, He said he had told Erhard that he could not tolerate
West German trade with Cuba and that Erhard had assured him
that while it was very small, he would put a complete stop to it
as soon as he returned to Germany. The President directed that
thorough preparation be made so that when Pearson visits the
United States, Mr. Johnson can take him on in the same manner
and similar preparations should be made for other free world
countries doing appreciable business with Castro.

ll. There was thena discussion with Staats and Murphy
about some sort of pork barrel program which was to be canceled
and which Hubert Humphrey and Elvis Stahr had taken violent
exception to. Apparently the President had received a vitriolic
letter from Elvis Stahr about this matter because he commented
that he now understood why Stahr had made such an inadequate
Secretary of the Army. The lines of action directed by the
President as to preparation of responses was not a matter for CIA,

12, There was then a discussion as to some sort of adjust-
ment in tax procedures which, by reducing a figure from 15 to 14,
would save some $800 million this year. Neither Mike Forrestal
nor I heard this loud and clear but I think it had to do with adjusting
withholding tax deductions. In any event, no decision was reached
by the President and the conversation was directly with Staats and
not for the rest of the group.

13-00000 -

-6-

13. The President then turned to Indonesia and stated that
he was faced with the necessity of making a decision as to whether
or not it was in the national interest to continue aid to Indonesia.
This decision had to be made by him in accordance with the foreign
aid bill just passed. He said he wanted in writing from Secretary
Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and Mr. McCone their recommendations
as to what his decision should be, He also wanted to get reactions
from Senator Russell and several other Congressional leaders. He
quoted a figure of $25 million which was involved. (Action: The .

: wheels are grinding in the Agency to come up with a pro and con and
consequences paper for the Director upon which he may make his
. recommendation to the President. The figures are somewhat con-

fused and the actual amount appears to be in the neighborhood of
$60 million. Mike Forrestal has these figures pretty well tied down

and points out that the Presidential decision does not require any

action on PL 480 funds. )

14, The President then stated that he was totally dissatisfied
with the proposed program for alleviating poverty which apparently
suggested that he ask Congressional authorization for a lump sum
of money which he would administer through some sort of newly-
created poverty administration, He said he wouldn't touch it with _
a ten-foot pole and that if he proposed anything like that on the Hill,
they would laugh him out of court and it would probably bring a
defeat in the Democratic party in the upcoming elections. He would
give absolutely no consideration to anything which could possibly
result in graft or pork barrel activities, Any program for the
relief of poverty must be designed to get right down to the grass
roots out where the poverty actually exists and must be handled by
existing Federal, State, and community organizations which are
geared in this direction. He mentioned specifically the possibility
of utilizing the Bureau of Public Roads and other similar Federal
and State organizations. He said that if roads are to be built, they
should be built into and out of poverty-stricken areas and to pro-
vide access to schools and hospitals and such human needs activities
and not, repeat not, for the improvement of major trunk lines and
highways. He thought perhaps the people who were receiving this

13-00000

-7-

type of aid could be utilized in the construction of these roads
where they would see the results of what they were doing and the
purpose of it. He stated that any attempt to organize a new
administrative entity to handle this matter would not even get

off the ground before the year was out and would merely result

in more Government people on the payroll and more bureaucracy,
He directed an immediate reappraisal of his program for the
relief of poverty and coming up with an entirely different concept
for his approval. Mr. Staats and Mr. Murphy indicated they would
follow through on this.

15. The foregoing covers all pertinent points to the best
of my recollection, I shall write a separate memorandum of the
tour President Johnson gave us of his ranch and with particular
attention to. the fact that he built and paid for every improvement
on the place out of his own pocket, including the runway, the run-
way lights, and the dam across the river.

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Ll January 1904

Paragraphs for message to DCI Tm. Te et OAS Gat 5 g partany t

1, The President has not yor approve approved the 1965 budget
and it is being extremely closely held. Agency requirements
totaled $122 billion and BOB cuts reduced it to $103 billion.
Further cute are quite obviously in the mill, The 'o5 total
request will be less than '64 and expenditures will likewise be
leas than ‘64. There will be departmental reductions in Defense,
3tate, AEC, Agriculture, with increases in HEW and Labor, _
With relation to Gross National Product, the '65 budget will be
the smallest since 1951. This will be the first time in ten years
that there haa been a decrease in personnel, amounting to .
approximately 100. The smallest increase during this period
was 7200 in 1957.

2. Major legislative proposale will be those that are
left over from last session, such as Civil Rights Bill, tax cut,
etc. New programe will include a procedure for attack on poverty,
new program for aid to education below college level, new program
for medicare, preparation for next year's foreign aid biil, etc.

- Najor emphasis on human needs continues,

3. The President wishes to conduct an all-out review of

_ our Cuban policy after returning to W.shington. He particularly

wants 2 more imaginative approach with hard-nosed emphasis on
economic denials through pressures on third countries. This in
line with his statements at recent Cuban meeting at White House.

4, President personally wrote New Year's message to
Khrushchev, released today.

5. Fresident faced with decision on whether or not to
continue $25 million aid program to Indonésia. As you know, this
is primarily civic action, § nte @ study of pros and cons
with recommendations in writing fgom you, Secretary of State, and
others. Also wants reaction from tor Russell and others on
fiill. Will take up when he returns.

6, Salinger will send me tomorrow the memoranda he
wrote on conversations with the Rusalans as to Fresident's intentions.

13-00000

7. President established outstanding rapport with Erhard

-and things are looking up in that area.

8. President greatly concerned over continuing situation
in South Vietnam, ©

3}. President wants General Eisenhower, Mr. Truman,
and Mr, Hoover briefed monthly on international and domestic
affairs. Stated that had President Truman been getting these
regularly, he probably would not have authorized publication of
CIA article. In connection with Truman article, this matter not
argued at Independence,

10, President much interested in foreign reaction to @rhard
talks. We furnished roundup news media reaction to Salinger today.

13-00000

Pp TOP SECRET _ a

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spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record. :

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(OP-2). 12-50


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months.

TGP SEGRET

2 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with Dave Morales » GS-14, Chief of CI Section,
Miami Base, 25 May 1961

1. Morales, who was born in Arizona of Indian and Spanish
parents and is bilingual in Spanish and English, former football
player, arrived in Miami in October 1960 after spending two years

.at the Havana Station. He appears to have done a unique CI job

in organizing ,Within the Frente, the future intelligence service
for the new government of Cuba that the invasion force expected

to install. He also organized two other groups. He did this with
the help of a Chile structor that was supplied by headquarters,
and withimaterials\training) that WH/4/CI Section, Mr. Simmons, |
sent down to hin.

2. The principal group were 39 selected, highly educated
Cubans, who were trained as case officers to form the future ;
intelligence service. They are known as the "AMOTS". After being
trained they were employed by Morales in doing a series of highly
important tasks for the good of the station. These were as
follows: :

a. Penetration of the local anti-Castro organizations.

b. Penetration of the pro-Castro organization in Miami,
the so called 26th of July organization.

c. Preparation of biographical information on all
prominent persons in the Frente.

d. Carding some 200,000 Cubans in the period of three

e. A special section of thé AMOTS monitored all radio
transmissions coming from Cuba. This amounted to eight stations
that were covered on a 24 hour a day basis. ;

n

f. -Screeing of all persons recruited for the grade 8-'4°*
(but this work first started in November 1960, and by that time 300
or 400 men had already gone to camp) This AMOT screening of the
military trainees really amounted to a field check since the
various cases were discussed with Cuban sources of information
present in Miami. :

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13-00000

g. Mail censorship. All mail coming from the military
camp in Guatemala was censored by this group before being released
for transmittal to Cuba.

h. Four of this’ were sent back to Cuba with instructions
to report on CI targets; chiefly the secret service and the police.

a 3. The second group trained by Morales were 100 selected —
Cubans who were given training as future CI officials and civil

government officials. Of the 100 thus trained, 61 were sent to

the camp in Guatemala for training with the brigade. They

accompanied the brigade on the invasion, and of the 61 only two

were lost, nine were caught and the rest got out, due to the

circumstance that most of them were on the steamer Lake Charles

which owing to the developments at the beaches did not land its

troops. These men were given the job of penetrating inland as

fast as possible with the troops and identifgang and seizing records

and documents of the Castro government. Following that they were

to set up the temporary civilian government of Cuba. This group were
J known as the AMFATS. The members of this group were brought back

to Miami where they are now living privately. The third group were

the AMCHEERS, a group of approximately 100 older, nonpolitical

individuals, who received training from Morales as a reserve im

intelligence personnel. Eighty of these had been trained by April

1961 for eventual legal return.

\, Morales stressed. that POA's had been received on members of
all three groups and that the AMOTS received tradecraft training
far in excess of that received by the average Agency staff employee.

5. After the invasion the Frente leaders endeavoya to change
the AMOTS: into a political organization and remove the chief leaders
of the AMOT group. Such a development had been anticipated by the
base and prior to that action all files, the most valuable part of
the AM organization. had been microfilmed (see my interviews with
Simmonsfoa more details. on this protective maneuver). The chief
AMOTS who were thus removed by the Cuban leaders are still organized
under Morales as a shadow intelligence organization.

6. Personnel shortages. Morales accomplished all of the
foregoing with the aid of only two girls one a GS-9 analyst. He
tried in vain for more than three months to get a junior case officer
assigned, but in vain. ‘This request was forwarded through Simmons,
the CI Chief in WH/4., Morales tried to get one or both of two JOTs
who were in Miami on TDY, but the JOT office refused to release them
tha on the ground that it would interfere with their training.
Morales feels that these young officers would have learned more in

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13-00000

three months under him than they would learn in three years of formal
training. As a result of being so short handed, Morales had to work
about 14 hours a day, seven days a week. Otherwise, however, he
received excellent support generally, both from Headquarters and the
other sections of Miami Base.

7. As for suggestions for better operation in the future,
Morales made two points. (a) the screening of military trainees

should start at a much earlier point than was done this time; {v)
more adequate number of personnel should be furnished.

4 ft; 5 hia

R. D. Shea

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.

Sn ee ee

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CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION . REGISTRY
SOURCE oo : CIA CONTROL NO.
; MEMO FOR THE RECORD
R. D. SHEA OFF POET REEETIE
. OATE
. : LOGGED BY ~

ATTENTION: This forn will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Centrai Intel-
ligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will cemain attached to the document until such time as it
vis downgraded, destroyed. or transmitted outside of CIA. Acceas ‘to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control
personne! and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive
and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand
columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the
right-hand columns

1 June 1961

Mr .Shaffer

ae
YP

Mr. Dildine

Mr .Ki

8

Mr. Shea

TAH] |

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate
spaces below and transmitted to Centrai Tep Secret Control for record. ‘

DESTROYED DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)

BY (Signature) ~ TO

BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY (Signature) BY (Signature)
a

toner se 20 USE PREVICGUS EDITIONS. TOP SECRET 14aot

(OP-2) 12-59

DATE

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«he ,

5 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD .

SUBJECT: Interview with Clark Simmons, Chief of WH/4's CI Section,
1 June 1961

(This memorandum should be read after Morales interview)

1. Simmons is a dedicated CI type having spent the last 11 years
chiefly on CI matters largely under OTR auspices. He spent two years
in Egypt, 1954 to 1956, setting up and training the Egyptian CI Staff,
apparently starting from scratch. He has been with OTR since then and
came to WH/4 in mid-April 1960. He is about to be transferred to the
WH Division Staff andhis replacement will be Louis Napoli who will
head the new combined FI/CI Section of WH/4. He stressed that the
charter of the new combined section will give CI the right to interfere
in any operation. This will be spelled out explicitly, thus countering
the difficulties that Simmons had in dealing with the PM Section prior
to the invasion. Bob Andrews will stay on for CI matters.and Seehafer
will head the FI part both under Napoli.

2. AMOTS (future Cuban intelligence service trained by Morales
at Miami). This idea started when Anderson of WH Division Staff told
Simmons that he had a.Chilean CI officer who was available for training
Cubans. Drawing on his Egyptian experience, Simmons drew the AMOT plan
and prepared the training materials and sent them to Morales for
execution. It was Morales who subsequently conceived the idea of
training the AMFATS (future o vice) and the AMCHEERS, a reserve
intelligence corps consisting‘ upéiae’? men. These matters are discussed
in detail in my memorandum on Morales. Morales also organized a group
of former Cuban diplomats presently in Miami to have them available
when a new government is set up. Subsequent to the invasion the_AMOTS
have been substantially changed by Cardona. He has replaced the top
AMOTS by political appointees who have no skill in tradecraft. The top
men thus fired had anticipated auch a move, and, in addition to micro-
filming 120,000 cards, they removed all cryptonyms and all memoranda
of conversation between them and Morales with the result that the new
service doesn't know the identity of. the AMOTS who are presently
Cuba. The AMOTS initially numbered 96. The Miami Base now has 18 Ole
22 of them of whom ¢ four are inside Cuba with 14 subsources; A of. at
them producing FI and CI reports. By December 1960 the AMOTS had / (14 (l..
produced 1, 800 intelligence reports and 750 radio monitor reports. b
4
Car bow Tr

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3. In dealing with the Miami Base, Simmons stuck strictly to
the relationship between Headquarters and a foreign station. His
command channel was, of course, via Chief of WH/4 to the Chief of
Miami Base to Morales. ‘He and Morales understood each other .
perfectly and there was no ether obstacle of any sort in their i¢
collaboration. There was no second-guessing or double case offering
in CI matters.

4. Simmons and his section ran a number of CI ops directly
from Headquarters. He referred to the following:

a. A certain lady of easy virtue who had a vast acquaintance
among the top Castro people.

bd. A Greek sailor who for eight years has worked for the
Agency as a penetration in Communist maritime unions in various
countries.

c. A certa r yRPanish intelligence officer, Amshad,

. who has been living in/ ome of the chief of G-2. “Unfortunately,

an expectedgCastro ‘official appointment did not materialize and this
operation has not proved to be of much value.

ad. A former U.S. negro citizen now in the Cuban service.

e. Juan Orta, former chief of Castro's executive office,
now out of office.

5. Simmons gave me the attached copies of four basic documents.
Tab A - WH/4 counterintelligence plan, June 1960

Tab B - Counterintelligence plan for an FRD security service,
late August 1960 J} oe
et. :
Tab C - CI program for future project, 20 April 1961 - rere
eo

Tab D - Counterintelligence assets, 29 April 1961

In addition, Morales gave me a copy a a dispatch summarizing Miami's
CI assets currently in Guba, (Tab E).

6. ‘Relations with PM Section: Simmons' relations with the PM
section seem to have been marked with a considerable amount of friction,
perhaps more than always results fram the resentment operators feel at
the inhibiting influence of the CI man. Thus whenever a PM agent was
lost,.a CI man would analyse the files and draw a damage sheet showing
what the agent knew, etc. Simmons showed me a large file containing
about 50 of such cases. This work was made more difficult because the PM
people kept only very skimpy records. A CI representative, Rothwell,

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abet . 47 Lt AH
also went over all incoming messages from agents to scrutinize for
the use of freedom signals.’ When the absence of such signdlswas
pointed out to PM they would sometimes claim that the agent had b
merely forgotten them. CI was able to stop all cable traffic to { “7
such agents when under suspicion. After a while Rothwell was ae
delegated to be the CI contact with the PM people, and due to his 7 Meas
quiet methods and competence he gained a fair share of their
confidence and the work proceeded more smoothly.
¥i
7. Sinmons and his section prepared a 225-page study~of
Castro's intelligence organization. This document was distributed
generally throughout the U.S. intelligence community, as were also
some extensive studies on Cuban blockwardens. They also issued CS/
CI information reports and Simmons gave a number of briefings to
higher-ups. They were able to identify 14 provocative activities
by the Cuban: services in the U.S., Dakar and Havana. They identified
a U. S. employee of the U.S. Embassy in Havana as a Castro penetration _
agent in 1960. * This document contains the identities of 4g2 Castro G-2
_7 staff officers.
8. From September 1960 to January 1961 Sinmons spent half of
his time working on the case of the three ST ESCALATE members, i.e.,
the audio and development team which was arrested in Cuba and is still
under arrest. If these men had checked in with the CI Branch before

depart e they would ‘haves Varta not.to go. Simmons regards this
matter” of the greatest potential danger to the Agency, e.g., if these
men should be sent to Moscow to be milked.

9. Simmons described the following difficulties he had had:

a. Hissection was not fully staffed until October 1960,
although he went to the greatest lengths to get additional people.
He first had a machine run made for a list of CI personnel having a
“\ knowledge of Spanish. He checked the records of the individuals
thus disclosed. He sent the names thuyselected to the WH/4

_~. personnel. officer who made a great effort, but in no case was he able

\ to get_a man taken off his present job. He feels that the DD/P
should in the ure tell all his senior officers of the importance
_ Of such g project so that the latter will cooperate when their
“i valuable/$e requested. After borrowing Melberg fram covert training
for two TDY trips, Simmons could not face going to Marchand with a
further request, and instead asked Jack Farman in the DCI's office G
help him get Melberg for another trip. The Director of Training
complained of this irregular procedure. If Mr. Bissell had so
informed his. senior officers, Simmons feels that they would have
received-better “Cooperation. The Fesult of lack of personnel was that
they all worked six or seven days a week. Simmons knows of no case
of a directed assignment to the project. As it was he personfally
had to spend 80 per cent of his time on administrative matters with
the result that he could only spend 20 per centof his time on operations. —
His final T/O was four case officers, four analysts, two clerk-typists
and one secretary.

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b. Working space was also a great problem. From May
through September 1960 they were working seven or eight in a single
room. .

c.. Dr. Willets, chief of the JOTP refused to releas® two
JOTs whom Morales wanted as assistants in Miami. One of these is
named Ben Ramirez and is very fluent in Spanish.

‘10. For the future Simmons recommends:

a. That an LCFLUITER operator be assigned to each base
permanently, not. withstanding the expense. The need for such a man
(at times can’ ‘be very urgent.

b: There should be one cleared Staff D room containing
all relevant files so that the entire job can be done in one room.
This means all Staff D files involved, all operating cards, personality
and report cards, so that,for instance, a CI analyst can ggthere and
do a complete job in perfect security. The Staff D yield was a
"gold mine", a

ec. If CI section had been told the time and place of the
invasion they could have checked their records on the area and the ©
adjacent areas and have given the brigade recommendations for
document, seizing, etc. in the towns that would be passed through.

ll. Despite, ‘difficulties referred to above, Simmons feel that
‘the results of his section's work were very good, and that one
indication of this is that the upper echelons of the Agency sent him
many matters for handling that were not strictly of a CI nature; for
instance, inquiries from the DCI, from Congress, etc.

l2. In-cases where the CI Section discovered that an agent
communicating by radio was not using hissafety signals, CI would help
the PM or other section to handle that agent in subsequent communica-
tions so that he.would be kept alive. This sometimes required that _
requests by the agent for supplies be complied with, Jn one case LUGLOG.
Simmons was intent on preserving the man so that he could be used at
the end for purposes of deception. The agent requested an air drop
and it was decided to comply. Simmons said that Gen. Cabell disclosed
to the Cuban aircraft a crew that was to make the air drop that the
agent was a double agent. Accordingly the crew did not even go near
the drop, nor did PM Section advise Simmons until four days later that
this had occured. The result was that the man was immediately taken
off the air and Sinmons had indications that he was shot. If Simmons
had been advised earlier of the failure to make the drop, he could
have tried by a suitable message to explain the omission.

L Sfx cm

R. D. Nhe

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.”

JMARC COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN

MISSION
To develop and/or maintain and extend, through agents and other

covert means, intelligence coverage of the organization, versonnel, target

interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of the Cuban Intelligence

and Security Services and the Cuban Communist Party; to similarly develop
intelligence coverage of activities affecting the Caribbean area which are
conducted by the U.5.5.B., by the U.A.R., and by the Chinese Communists or
other pro-CASTRO officials and groups; to protect current and future CI, FI
and CA operations tyrough analysis of their operational plans and through
exanination of new operational proposals; and to coordinate designated C1
matters with the Cl Staff and with staff and geographic comronents of WH
Division. |
REFERENCE

JMARC OPERATIUN ALP LAN
CONCEPT OF OPERATION

it is essential that an aggressive counterintelligesce program be
devised and irplemented to ensure sound operational. security for JMAEC
operations. The wMaRC counterintelligence effort will, therefore, be
directed towards acquiring information concerning the organizations, personnel,
target interests, modus operandi, operations and assets of foreign intelligence
and security services active in the Caribbean area; towards analysing JMAIC
operational proposals and steos in light of what is learned about opposition
intelligence capabilities and activities; and towards containing inimical

activities directed agains: JMARC assets and operations.

SEGHET

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Co vrr re.
eer
Nome ince ft

= 2-

IV, ORGANIZATION

Tho

following versomel ani facilities are required for successful

attainment of JMAKC CI objectives.

be

V. PHASING

Personnel: One senior CI officer; four overations officers;
five analysts (three with a proficiency rating of *high* in
reading Spanish); three clerk typists; one ‘secretary. initially,
two case officers and one analyst should be sent to the JKARC

Forward Operations Base (FOB) to carry out assigned tasks discussed

below, Two analysts (with at least high proficiency rating in

reading Spanish) will be assigned to the task of screening certain
information reports. “Two analysts (one senior) and a clerk tyvist
will form a records unit for the CI Section at Headquarters; two
operations officers and a clerk typist will form an operations
unit for the CI section at Headquarters.

Facilities: The CI section at Headquarters will require working

space for ten personnel and for the following heavy office equip-
ments: eight deske and chairs; eight standard tyvewriters; one

card safes three four-draver safes, Standard office supolies should
be provided, The CI operatiors unit at the FOB will reyulre support

comnensurate to its size.

R. PRSYARATORKY PHASE

1. Principal Ob ectives- To acquire current CI information on opposition

services in Caribbean area through developing counterintelligence

overations and through recording Cx information.

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2. Operational Tasks:
a. The Branch/h/ACI officer wills
(1) Keep “hief, Branch/l informed on CI reyuirements,
ov-ortunities and developments affecting his branch.
(2) Kee FI Deputy, wi Division and Deputy Chief, Cl Staff,
and the latter's appointed staff representatives (Victor
Wallen, Robert Brow, Paul Burke, and Birch O'Neal), inforsed
on CI matters in which they have an agreed interest (see below).
(3) Direct assistany: CI personnel in performance of those jobs
relating to the responsibilities cited below.
(lL) Carry out such other tasks which may be assigned to him by
Chief, Branch/L. |
‘The senior CI officer end individual section officers designated
by hin will acconplish the followings
(1) Familiarize theaselves with selected Branch and CI Steff
redord assets and with designated branch and division
personnel pertinent to their responsibilities in order to
effectively exploit these assets and to coordinate work on
Cl operations with the appropriate persons,
(2) Familiarize themselves with current CI overations affecting
Cuba which are directed by Branch/l, by CI Staff, and/or by
_WH Division with the objective of assuming responsibility
for these. |
(3) Plan, coordinate, initiate and conduct CI operations not
specifically assigned to Paul Burke or Birch O'Neal of CI
Staff. |

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b.

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

ehe

Propare draft CI requirements for F1/D analyste (acconplished) .
in addition, prepare or locate and forward to other Branch/k
officers vertinent cI requiremente and operational guidance
parers pertinent to thees officers' assigned responsibilities.
(To date, I have forwarded ry own study on Utilization of
Exile Groups in Clandestine Oper :tions" to Jerry Droller.)
Prepare an operational summary format for use by operations
officers reviewing cases (accomoli shed).

Prepare. a defector register format cara ( accomplished) and

organize and mintain a register of defectors,

Exploit certain research and overational supvort assets of the
Clandestine Services in order to help all Branch/h sections
‘in the achievement of their objectives, To this end, one
analyst will work on materials controlled by CI Staff,
Examine current operations and/or programs in the PI and

CA fields in order to enaure that CI opportunities are fully
exploited and to identify operational security threats and

to recommend sound courses of action which will prevent or

counter such threats.

‘I Staff components \citead in each instance) will have the following
responsibilities:
(1)

Chief, S.D, Ci Staff: Action resncnsibility for penetration
and double agent operations against Cuban intelligence and
Security Services at hame and abroad (as agreed to by Chief,
4H Uivision and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination wili
be effected with WH/L/CI and all traffic will be released by
wA/l. .

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(2) Deputy Chief, Ici, CI Staffs acti responsibility for
penetration of Cusan Conmunist Party via third countries,
using Cubans as agents (as agreed to by Chief, WH Division
and Deputy Chief, CI Staff). Coordination will be effected
with WH/L/CI and all traffic will be released by sH/h.

(3) Victor Wallen, Operations Division, CI Staff: Responsibility

. for comoiling recerds and studies on Cuban Intelligence and

_ Security Services. To this end, Victor Wallen wills

(a) Prepare and mad ntain a briefing notebook on Cuban
- Intelligence and Security Services (accomplished).

(v) Prepare a guide for screening Wi/l/Revorts personality
cerds and other record assets in order to identify sus-
pect persons aiding or abetting Cuban clandestine acti-
vities (accomplished). —

(c) Prepare lists of suspect persons and maintain these
‘ists on a current basis for exploitation by all Branch/l
sections and other Agency components with operational
interest. (Initial lists have been orepared in 1} books).

(d) Prepare or assemble CI rejuirements, as requested, which
pertain to the maintenance of (Zi nctebooks om the Cuban
services, (initial requirenents have ben drawn up for

_ Ernie Sparks use.)

(lk) Deouty Chief, CL/ICG: Pesvonsi bility for compiling records
and studies om Cuban Commnist rarty. To this end, question. -

naires have been orenared for Agency officers assigned the
task of interrozating persons knowledgeable of Cuban Communist

Party persocnel and activities,


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a } Lit; &
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(5) ‘WA/PI will prepare studies of CASIO subversive activities

abroad.

8, DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE
. 1, Principal Objectives To advance our knowledge of opposition services
end to dewlop a security service for the Cuoan Government in exile,
2. Operational Taskss
a. Wi/UCIs During this second phase, wH/k/CL personnel wills
| (1) Screen everational correspondence and eable traffic for leads
to CI operations against the Cuban Intelligence and Security
Services and the Cuban Communi st Party and forward pertinent
leada and CI informatim to ap -ropriate CI Staff component
and/or authorised security officers of agencies of U.S.
intelligence coumuni ty. | |
(2) In coordination with Political Acti Section of Wi/l, outline
an organisation for a security intelligence service for the
Cuvan Government-in-Exile and list its functions in detail.
(3) Continue and/or complete all tasks cited in Phase I.
(h) Staff the FOB with two operations officers and one analyst
to verform those functions necessary to the initiation and
conduct of secure CI o-erations and cl poytection activities,
b. Cl Staff: The sia, Ira, and OPS/WH, as indicated, will earry out
the following acti ities:
(1) Revise the notebook on Cuban intelligence and Security S-rvicea
as required (OPS /#t) .
(2) Prevare organizati nal studies and blacklists of Cuban Intelli-
gence and S curity Scrvicespersonrel, and black lists of

person g.; an or abetting Cuban clandestine activity, in
Ch cET

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three categories of sensitivity for use by the Agency, by

| dealgnated members of the United States intelligence community,
and by authorized components ef the Cuban Government-in-Exile,.
(ors/ai)

(3) Revise lists of suspect persons as required. (OPS/#H)

(lL) Prepare special studies om Cuban Intelligence and Security
Services and m the Cuban Comaunist Party and other groups and
organizations active in the Caribbean area, as required. (07S/wH)

c. WH/FI will continue studies of CASTRO subversive activities abroad,

VI. COORDINATION
Coordination on CI operations and on operational ‘support activities
which davolve WI/FI, CI Staff and Wi/k/CI will be effected by sentor CI
officer of 1/1, Communications on these matters will be by telephone
and/or persmnal mectings. CI aspects of Vi /l/FT and CA operations will be
discussed by appropriate section officers and the smior CI officer or ths
latter's designates, .

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COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PLAN FOR AN FRD SECURITY SERVICE
TAB B

I. HISSION

To select, assess, organize, train on-the-job and support FRD
personnel for a security service capable of protecting the FRD,

its personnel, installations, secrets and activities fran sabotage,
subversion and espionage.

TI. QaEERENCES

A. Project Operational Plan

B. Project Political Action Plan

C. Project Counterintelligence Plan

dD Project Counterintelligence Budget for Fiscal Year 1941
lll. OF OPERATI: .

It is essential that the Agency create an aggressive service for
FRD-Project activities. Since there is no certainty that the leaders
of the FRD will achieve and hold responsible positions in a new
Govermment of Cuba, and since there is an everpresent threat that
political or operational flaps may destroy the FRD as an effective
Project instrument, it is essential that the Agency's role in creating
an FRD security service be carried out under cover of the BENDER-CARR
group. It is also essential that the leaders as well as rank and file
menbers of the FRD pay more than lip service to the requirements of

an effective security apparatus, even though these requirements dictate
a a need for major changes in the modus operandi of individual members.
To this end the BENDER-CARR group must direct the FRD to accept, in
return for its support, controls and limitations vhich must be imposed
by the security service if operational security is to be achieved.

’ The Agenay's objectives in establishing and supporting a security
service for the FRD arei

A. To protect its operational interests in the FRD} and

Be To acquire counterintelligence information through participation
in FRD operational security activities.

The security service of the FRD will have as its objectives:
A. <Sereening all personnel holding significant FRD positions;

B. Screening new adherents to the FRD;

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C. Maintaining pertinent file information on FRD personnel}

D. Maintaining physical seourity of FRD installations;

E. Staffing FRD debriefing centers;

F. forcing personnel security regulations;

G. Indootrinating FRD nenbers on personal security;

H, Monitoring malcontents} and

I. Acquiring both positive and counterintelligence information.

To build a security service for the FRD capable of attaining Agency
and FRD objectives, it is necessary for the Agenay:

A. To supervise the selection, assessment and training of
eight candidates;

B. To identify and select secure office sites in Miami, New York,
Washington and Mexico City, and to procure a secure eafehouse
training site in Miami; .

C. To create an organization which can fulfil) essigned security
funotions.

D. To supervise the training of thirty-two additional candidates
to staff the organization;

E. To support the organization through the BENDER-CARR group by
' providing, sanitised record data, special training, financial
backing,: and, at need, operational facilities; and

F. To supervise through the BENDER-CARR group the organization's
day- activities.

To implenent the plan for an FRD security service, BENLEH-CARR repre-
sentatives in Mexico City, Miami, Washington and New York will be
briefed on the plan for an FRD security service. The Chief, FRD/Intel-
ligence and Security Subcommittee, will be directed by BENDER to salect
seven officers to be processed for jobs with the service. Processing
will include medical examination, polygraph, and psychological assesment
of the candidates. They will later be briefed on the objectives and
functions of the security service by a representative of the BENLER-CARR
group. They will be trained on-the-job by a Chilean ex-police officer
who will be recomended to the FRI by the BENLER-CARR group. The
training will cover subjects pertinent to the service's day~to~day

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security responsibilities as spelled out in the organizational plen.
The FRU security components 4n Mexico City, Washington and New York
will be initially assigned one officer each from the first group of
eight candidates. The remaining five candidates will. be assigned to

. Miami. Of those candidates subsequently trained for the security

service, two additional men will be assigned to Washington; six to
New York; six to Mexico City; and eighteen to Miami.

OFGANIZATION

The organisational structure of the FRD security service and of the
Agency's related support structure are outlined in Attachment "A";
the facilities and personnel required to staff and support these
structures are discussed below:

A. Facilities

l. Seourity office sites in Mexico City, Miami, Washington
and New York. (These will be selected by the Office of
Security; the Office of Security will identify these
sites to the BENDER-CARR group, which in turn will direct
their use by appropriate FRD components. )

2. A training site will be selected in Miami by the Office of
Security and identified to the BENDER-CARR group, which
in turn will recomend it to the Chief, FRD/Intelligence
and Security Subconmittes. ;

3. One four—drawer safe will be acquired by the Office of
Security for use in each office site in the above-named
cities. ; ,

4 Appropriate office supplies will be assenbled by the FAD
component in each site.

BS Foreien Personne)

1. <A Chilean police officer has been selected and recruited
as training officer for the security service. The bENDER-
CARR group will recommend him to the FRD for this job as an
‘individual who, in its experience, is best suited for the ©
job, and as one who is most acceptable to the BENVER-CARA
organization.

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ay

whe

2. The BENDER-CARR group will direct Chief, FRD/Intelligence

.. and Security Subcomittee, to immediately select seven
officers for processing and training prior to assignment
-in the FRD security service. later, thirty-two additional
officers will be selected for processing and training.

6, Staff Personnel,

1. HENDER-CARR representatives will deal directly with Chief,
FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee, in all matters
pertaining to the security service.

2. Project CI officers will provide through BENDER-CARR
representatives all advice, guidance and support to the
‘security service and its chief,

Ve FHASING
A. Preparatory Phase (25 suust ~ 15 September):
1. Primary Obiective: .

To. implement the plan for the security service by selecting,
assessing and training an initial cadre of eight officers,
including chief of the proposed service.

2. Operational Taskat

a. Advise BENDER-CARR representatives in Mexico City, Miami,
Washingto. and New York, by dispatch where appropriate,
before 26 August, of the Agenay's plan ami objectives
regarding an FRD security service.

b, Advise Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subccamittee,
through BENDER, to select seven officers to participate
with him in processing and training for assigrment to

the FRD security service.

c. Procure from each candidate a complete PHS, a certification
of health dated this year, and three letters of recommendation
from as many FRD sponsors.

d. Arrange for polygraph exanination of candidates through
the Project security office.

®. Procure through the Project security office an appropriate
training site in the Miami area vhich will accommodate a
minimm of eight trainees and an instructor.

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f. Assign trainer to Miami after BENDER gets concurrence
of Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security Subcommittee.

g-. Arrange for Project CI officer in Miani to brief trainer
on his assignment.

h. Quarter trainer in training site.
4. Advise FRD representative to purchase minimm office
_ supplies from list to be provided ty the Project CI
officer.

J. Provide trainer with a curriculus and a training schedule
which encompass on-the-job application of techniques and
skills.

-_—- k. Diacuss with Chief, FRD/Intelligenoe and Security Sub-
committee, the organization and fimotions of the proposed
security service,

1. Initiate training of eight candidates (including Chief
of the service) end processing of others.

Me Get signed secrecy agreezent and loyalty cath fron
each student.

n. Identify and assess (for recruitment) potential agent.
candidates as Agenay-controlled sources.

B. ‘Pevaloment Phasat (16 ~ 30 September)
1. Primary Objective:

To build the seourity service in a way which will enatle it
to perform its assigned functions.

2. Qperational Tasks:
a. Assign trainees to FRD components in the oities named above.
be Complete processing of remaining candidates.

c. Procure secure office sites in the cities named above
or check the sites previously selected.

dad. Initiate training of remaining candidates.

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e. Activate a records center in Miami and provide it
with sanitized record data.

f. Forward physical security plan and physical security
regulations to Chief, FRD/Intelligence and Security
Subcommittee, through BENDER,

g. Forward operational security regulations for security

service to Chief, through BENDER,

h. Forward administrative procedures (involving communica-
tions among FRD elements, document controls, etc.) to
Chief, through BENDER,

4. Give remaining trainees their security service assignments.

j. Recruit candidates selected in Preparatory Phase.

C. Action Phase (30 Septanber on):

Dd.

2s

1. Eximary Objective:
To identify and contain rabid CASTROITES, Cuban Communists,
menbders of the Cuban Seourlty Services, and Orbit espionage
‘and sabotage personnel.
Qperational Tasks!
a. Move the seourity apparatus into Cuba with the FRD.
be Provide FRD security service with black lists and
record data pertinent to the above objective.
ce. Monitor FRD security activities through the BENDER-CARR
Broupe.
Consolidation Phase:
1. Primary Objective:
To direct the FRO security service in its efforts to maintain
public security and to contain foreign services activities.
Operational Tasks

20

a. Request existing security units in the country to stay

on the job and to protect arm supplies, record assets,
and security force facilities.

13-00000 ~

-7-

be Continue to funnel sanitized arrest lists effecting
CASTRO security personnel to the FRD.

ce. Monitor FRD security service activities in Cuba.
VI. COORDINATION
The above plan will be coordinated vith the Political Action,
FI, and Support Sections of the Project.

VII SUPPORT
See SUPPORT ANNEXES,

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2

. Taare bu f
a ron FUTUR. an

(pant | TABC |

20 apetl 1961

PEMORANIXM FOR; Chief, u/s
SUBJECT == CL.: Program for JUTE Project

sys. {t ie anticipated that ether —
for double egent operations will oe identified.
States; their exploitation will be coordinated with
Federal Berean of Investigation. ol,
te 4, To support sad direct the AMOT Intelligence and Security
- -", - Servies in Miend in the fulfilloent of egrees: upoh objectives.

@. . Fo suppert end direct && AMT effiecers and egeats now in -
.. + . Gade, im the collection ef intelligence pertinent to Project
(-* \. gqeeds, end in the fulfillazemt ef such other covert action
- sesigureats which may be deered within their competence. —

f,. To int rodues ‘Into Cuda wiileterally-ecoatrolled counter-
intelligence agents. .

_ &- Fo intenaify the Phofect'a Communist Party penetration
eregran,

fk. “Te inerease counteriatelligence operations rum {ate Cubs H
fa conjunction with liaison services of friendly countries.

L.° To counter the espfoncys, subversive and aaictage operations :
' ddracted by the Castro services against other States within :

. the Wastarn Bevlsphare.. Tile to be done in conmfunction with
_' the services of these countries with which we malatain
TLatison, ; |
|

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Asettt:
ae

a.

>.

AMOT Security Sarvice: The AMT complex fe cace =. of 97
| BOF stall a @lerical personnel, 3& AHFASTS (security~

eounterintalligence teams) lecated im the Miami ares, and
63 AMCHEERS (senior Ceban citizens drewm froa banking,
eeamereial and ranching cireles in Cuba), also located in

in dgunay-comt rolled Coomunist Party penetration agent

located in Hevane.

im Aginty cont roTied agent vith eecese to leftist and
Communist eireles in the Western Healapbere, now in ew
Bork City.

in aqeet. esndidate vith aecess to engineering circles fa
Raevena, vhe will be available for essigumeat in Cuda fa
June of this year. .

ths aertty of chen ere Army ef lerey had bedteste

- @wlllingneze to dafect in place end help the opposition forces

When the strike cams; ‘Although the rebellion was crushed before
is eould advance rey for ths 30 individuals to fwlfill

‘(Der-3), three captainge heve thdicated willingness to cooperate.

The Infantry commander agreed to try to take th: base and the
nearby cadet school. Assusing that be had thet ezpabllity, it
way be further assunad thet be could recruit agents and inforzants
at these bases.

* Other pessible assets of this type Smelude the chiefs of the Fourth

end Fifth IMRA Zones im Pinar del] Rie and the Chief of Police in

| Santa Clera, Las Villes Province.

Te eddit{on we have on bend a list of potential defeetors who heve
shows dieillusionment with CASTRO, and who hewe been approsched
but who Reve mot yet declared themselves, It is possible thet the
turn c2Z events pay hove helettened thetr diegiltusloncent; ney be
Worth trying tc reervit thec at this time.

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PrGtless asl lLertiutione:
eee ee

»b.

a.

AMOT-EUBALE mere teren sr The Agency must. recoguire the
possitliity of stra feclings because of the fallure of
the imvastom, It is believed that the Agency representative
im Miami will be able, because of his excellent personal
Felationship with the Chief of the AMOT service, to maintain
a satisfactory working relationship.

Tks neal Us aaTINESES LDN agente son As place in Cube in
e agents now in place in Cuba in
the event theit positions becomes wntensdle..

rational Clixete. The Agemcy sust antie!fpate the develop-
= of 08 TrereasLagly unfavorable operational clincte
inside Coda tm view of the {ucreased security acasures being
tuplenented by the Castro sarvices,

Conprond sed a Assets Inaide Cuba. The Agency wuet asoune
: par essets in Caba heve probably been

eoupropised by Castro eeeurity counter measures takun at the
tine of the iuvasics. Bach ef these aspete or net must be
. wsefulnege


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<lo TesiassteteD 1) [TERNAL 2) CONFIDENTIAL (secret

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Chief, Task Force W

10 July 1962

: TO: (Officer designation, room number, ond | are
| building) COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
| seceeo | ronwannen | to whom. Oraw a line across column after each comment.)
FORWARDED

"Deputy oagyeeer
(Plans)

Elder for DCI

Party

ceil
BY, HAND

eT

aecngrading and
__ e2nassification

‘tse GTO “stete* (J SecRET —[] CONFIDENTIAL) Usegwty = C)_ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

ae en - yy:
cod Vy
4
bce cick ; .
| GE ; £6 (L2-#TEL |

10 July 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Deputy. Director. (Plans)
SUBJECT: Juana (Juanita) CASTRO Ruz

“1. ACTION: None, This memorandum is for your informa-
tion,

2. In connection with Task Force W efforts to split the
Cuban leadership, some time ago we targeted Juana Castro Ruz,
half-sister of Fidel and: Raul Castro Ruz. A number of reports
have been. received indicating that Juana Castro Ruz opposed
the strong communist nature of the Cuban regime and was
prepared, at least to some extent, to cooperate with anti-
regime elements, In May 1962 we reestablished contact with and
recruited Mrs. Virginia Leitao De Cunha, Cuban born wife of
the Brazilian ambassador to the USSR and a long time: personal
friend of Juana Castro Ruz.

3, .On 11 June 1962, on our instructions, Madame De Cunha
proceeded to Havana where she maintained frequent contact
with Juana Castro Ruz and other prominent Cuban leaders until
1 July 1962, She discussed. the current regime quite frankly
with Juana Castro Ruz and, according to Madame De Cunha, she
obtained Juana's agreement to provide intelligence on the .
Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban
communist regime, short of engaging in activity which might
result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel.
According to.Madame De Cunha, Juana has agreed to proceed to
Mexico or the United States in this connection and return to
Cuba after discussions with “the Americans”

4- We are making the necessary arrangements with
Madame De Cunha to have Juana Castro Ruz proceed to Mexico as
soon as possible in order that we may attempt a direct re-
cruitment, You will be kept advised of any future develop-

ments of importance in this case.
Li Minu/ia eal

WILLIAM K, HARVEY
C/TFW


13-00000

ICICKNAL

- * Ly UNCLASSIFIED =O gee“owyh, 72°03 (Bg CDAFIDENTIAL

~  T SUBJECT: {Optional).

NO.

Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
1317 Barton Hell 10 January 1962

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and ; :
building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

203 Admin. Building y Ae OmF fo DOCT- W2fir

INITIALS
a ye
bee,

ets, G10 Emre’ (2 ‘conFioenriat * “ET BS

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a7 al - R-O17
Dofs-6a- 6173

ata

ti

Executive Roecisiry

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Support)

10 Jamery 1962

SUBJECT 7 s Project IMATE
REFERENCES 1: @. Beecmendation approved by the President,

h dageet 96h, oeerte Covert action
Progrem Agains

bd. CAGID Bemoranduz to DCI, Subjects Action
_ with respect to the Agency Reserve for
Contingency held by the Burean ef the
Budget, approved by DCI 19 October 1961

1. The references eited establiahed the current STs
activity and cbteined funde in the enount of $5.36 xtllions

Se eperate the project dering the peried 1 duly ~ 3h

2. As set forth in paragreph four ef reference "b* it
is intended that the financial and andit requiransmte of this

. prejest be regularized to the extent possible consistent with
operational reqrirencente.

3. In the Project authority, reference "a", on k august
1961, and in subsequent discussions, the President approved —
covert operations incleding the funding of various persons,
groups, or activities, Cuban and non-Cuban, which, in eur
opinion, may be able to advance the over-all objectives of
FATE, These individuals, groups, and activities are and
will be many and varied. In many instances we will be able
to exercise little or no control over the finde, materiel,
arms, or equipment given such entities nor receive any suitable

accounting from then.

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.

‘ : aN
fy ~ 1‘ AG

mw
7
t
es

4. I have, therefore, authorized the Deputy Director (Plans)
to pass to such persons, groups and activities, such JMATO monies,
eateries ms and sic pai as in his opinion may be necessary

» groups and activities, fhe Deputy Director
(pian i tuthevized Fired to delegate this authority to the Co@P/piP, the
Cilef, Western Healsphere Division, the Chief, wifi, and Chief,
SMMAVE, as he may desire.

5. Pands advanced in accordance with thie authority shall te |
accounted for in accordance with normal Agency requirements except,
that, with respect to activities not controlled or administered
by the Agency, euch as those described in paragraph 3 above, .
certifications by the person passing funde to the activity may be

as final accomting when approved by an official designated

ebore. Such certifications ahall etate the amount passed, date, and
general purpose of the payment, and that further accounting is not
practical.

6 During the Project development, writing of sub-projects

"88 get forth in paragraph four of reference *b" will be deferred.

In liew, thereof, the project will provide you with copies ef

reference *a* which will be supplemented by more formal docanen-

tation when specific projects evolve as determined by the Deputy

Director (Plans). With the exception of the activities cited

fn paragraphs three and four abeve, activities whieh in the opinion
ef the Deputy Director (Plans) lend themselves to regularization
seated, sn uusteetive plans or fisesl annexee ill be eo oon
7 : aon o-

7. This authority does net amend regulstery sutheritices
in respect te adxinistretive matters covering Agency personnel.

SIGNED

dCHR A. MC CONE
Tirector

concurs
sf
omptroller

Z¢ 62 G
wc ; jsh poo. : \ av
CC: Dict por?
Dip
DLS ares
' Comptroller bam ee
Cfaudit staff LA Ff

13-00000

Tee / —
PROCESSING

PRO. ACCOM.
POSED | ACTION

"NO -NCEYING REQUIRED

ONLY QUALIFIES

y WEATCLARTERS GESK
WAN 1 DGE INGERING

ACC ester
SQW EEL

Cperational/d-aTi/ac7 -
Action Required: For infornation and fi les

1. Following is a brief straary of J.AVe/AUG:SK current assets in the
Target Area (CiuBa)s

|
|
|
a. &{CT=33 Subject is a source of operational intelligence in Havana,
he are naintaining contact via Sie Subject had a k/T set, cached it
and no longer kas access to it. ALtY.-1 has been instructed to deliver
another one to him,
bd pate Subject is a source of operaticnal intelligence in Criente
. rove %. n@ are in contact with Subject via a cutout at the Guantanano
Nav: Base. ; ]

Ce AMLTH106, 107 and 106: These three Subjects are sisters. They provide
7Cie3y with ope-ational intelligence in fabana.

de. Rolando “ANGUATT Julias Subject is an AT sub source in Pinar del Rio,
Subject is carrently reorganising his arsets -n that Province.

e. Jove ‘envel FuOUNA'L2Z Quintanas Subject is an ANCT eub scurce in the Port

of ise, SSS

f. Violeta NACIAS ig an MCT live drop in Rabana and is still active.
Ge Norberto \“ARTINEZ ig an AXCT sub source and is active in Habena and
Pinar del Rio Provinces,

2. SWAV4/KUD:SE current snd futare plans are to continue to support and] E
direct the existing assets it has in Cuba as outlined in psragraph 1 above, Moreover.
plans are now in motion for the followings

&

a, Exfiltrate, either legally or black, MASGUART end MARTINEZ for further

" training and return to the target ares
DATE TYPED OATE OSPATCHED |

Distributions :
3~ aD

_ DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMBER

UFGke 1539
HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

192523

_ ORIGINATING ~

ae The detection, Adenti fication and ‘neatrali getica of bootie intelligence’

FrOviae sec rity checks on ager.ts, potential agent 6 and acsots, and

-Ge Provide, with the security section of Base ISUTE, security checks en CDYCKS J
covert ralationettn with Gite and ban erratisations. In adiition t.e TUD% Sect:
will continse to develop = ay paratus to be used as on (Ment corps which wan 3e 64s
in the rollup of Vastro end Comm aiat acert CAF rt of the post-Castro f

pevarmrant, fats, AMO 28, © Facts and ar be the main source for tf

