124-10276-10400 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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OgTIONAL FORM NO, 10 4 5010-108 .
t AY 1962 EDITION .
GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27-
. : : Assoc. Dir.

; UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 6s Dep. AD Adm. —

ok SECRETASCOPEL1 - Mr. J. B. Adams oe
, Memorandum & 1 - Mr, W. R. Wannall — Adnis.

1- Mr. W. Cregar Comp. Syst,

2

. Ext. Affairs
Sir, We R. Wannaliweelel DATE: 7/15/75 fee
. 1.- Mr. F. S. Putman Ment.
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om — ; Sits 1 -Mr. W. A. Branigan md&tetyAre
FROM +B. 8. partnansp SIN 1 - Mr. L. Fl Schwartz tsteoter
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SUREOMAENSTUDY 75 0 HITWIN 1s UN" LiSSEFIED ETCE"T Teining
ES SET OLE Tolophone Rm, —

Hr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/26/75, captioned "Senstudy 45s

: OtrectorsSec'y
Reference is made to memorandum W. O. Cregar to DE scr
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SYNOPSIS: | Len mex db, =e

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize nity yy

(s) information in FBI files concerning [Israeli intelligence col- Ls)

lection capabilities|in the United States, James J. Anyleton,
former Chief, Countérintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence,»
Agency (CIA), advised the FBI on 5/26/75 that he appeared before,
the Senate Seléct Committee (SSC) and in response to questions?
advised SSC_he only had secondhand and fragmentary information /.. .-
concerning (Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collec ion)
in the United States, including {nuclear information) He advised
the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly
2 be directed to the FBI. (Sensitive technical source coverage by
"| the FBI of the &smacines SSyeaVyers mpOn=EDEeaeesr between
February, 1969, and October, 1972, developed information showing
that Angleton, during this period in his official capacity at
CIA, had frequent personal liaison contacts with the ERVASSS
isERe 1, Israeli Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives 1
the exchange of extremely sensitive information, Currently the
|FBI has no pending investigation involving Israeli intelligence
collection capabilities in the United States. The most current
information in FBI files concernins this matter involved the’
investigation based on CIA information dated 11/14/68 concerning
the establishment at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C,, of
an Israeli: technical intelligence network, Also under investi-
sation durinz this period at New York City was an IIS attempt to.
penetrate United Nations and official Arab estabtishents mel the

use of live sources, FBI files 3 uiet cay ota dd ti
periodically have operated in the Uist &y staf Loita Bees ia

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Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

ACTION:

None. For information.

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Memorandum to Mr, W. R, Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

DETAILS:

According to referenced memorandum, James Angleton,
former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, CIA, advised the
FBI on 6/26/75 that he had recently testified under oath without

_ counsel before three Senators and staff members of the Senate
~ Select Committee (SSC). He was questioned concerning his knowl- is)
edge of {Israeli capabilities to conduct.intelligence collection)
in the United States, including (nuclear information, Angleton
stated he avoided any direct answers, advising that any knowledge
he might have would be secondhand and fragmentary. He informed
the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly
be directed to the FBI,

Senstive technical source coverage by the FBI of the era
Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., between February, 1969, and aM
October, 1972, determined that Angleton, in his official capacity
at CIA, had frequent personal liaison contacts with Israeli
Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives at the Embassy of
Israel, Washington, D. C., involving the exchange of extremely
sensitive information, This special relationship was confirmed
by Angleton and other CIA officials during a meeting with an FBI
representative on 4/3/69. At this meeting CIA representatives
stated that this liaison with IIS_was known by the White House
and the U, 8, State Department. (S) | JERK OY)

At the present time the FBI has no pending investigation
- involving Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the
United States, Cs) L

The most current information in FBI files concerning
this matter involved the investigation based on CIA information
dated 11/14/68 concerning the establishment at the Embassy of
Israel, Washington, D. C., of an Israeli technical intellicence
network directed by Avraham Hermoni, Scientific Counselor. Hermoni,
prior to his assignment as Scientific Counselor in Washington,

we D. C., was involved in the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The
activities and contacts of Hermoni and colleagues at the Embassy
were investigated through 1972, The investigations of these
individuals were discontinued as no specific information was.
developed to indicate that they had acted unlawfully or outside

the scope of their official duties, (§) ore ()(8)
CONTINUED - OVER
SECRET /SCOPE
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secrEt/Scors](S) -

Memorandum to Mr, W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

(

During the period of these investigations it was
determined that Embassy of Israel officials recruited U. &.
scientists for employment in Israel, and extensive liaison was
established with individuals within U. 8. scientific, political,
academic and industrial communities. As an example, Hermoni
developed close contact with Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, Director
of Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo,
Pennsylvania, a firm which processes uranium 235 for nuclear
reactors, (§

. The basis of the discontinuation of the sensitive 1.
technical source coverage on the Israeli Embassy in 1972 was 5 RKC
aU, S. State Department directive. (5)

During this period it was also determined that the
IIS was attempting to penetrate the United Nations (UN) and
Arab diplomatic establishments in New York.City, An informant
of the New York Office, who previously engaged in intelligence
activities in the Middle East for the Israelis between 1955 and
1960 while working at the UN, was recontacted by Israeli intel-
ligence in August, 1968, while visiting Israel. This informant
had access at the UN to extremely sensitive information from the
office of the Secretary General, Israeli intelligence had
directed him to obtain and furnish, through a mail drop in
Belgium, interoffice communications between the Secretary General
of the UN and his undersecretaries, and information regarding
the Middle East, particularly relating to Arab matters, (s)

In May, 1968, another informant of the New York Office,
who previously resided in the Middle East and was active in the
Egyptian intelligence service, addressed a personal letter to
General Dayan of Israel in which he expressed his opinion the
Israelis should force the Egyptians to surrender and sign a peace
treaty. Informant was subsequently contacted in New York City by
an Israeli intelligence agent who furnished his name as "Michael"
who showed informant a copy of his letter to Dayan, "Michael"
subsequently “recruited" informant and furnished him a mail drop
in Italy, "Michael" instructed informant to obtain employment at
an Arab diplomatic establishment in New York City in order to (S

CONTINUED - OVER

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oO SECRET SCoPE] (S)_

Memorandum to Mr, W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy, 75.

furnish Israeli intelligence information on Arab moves in the
Middle East crisis. During a meet in October, 1969,. "Michael"
was surveilled to the Israeli Consulate where he met Paul Koren,
IIS representative, The informant subsequently received
instructions that in the event of an emergency he should call

a specific telephone number and ask for "Paul." This telephone
number was identified as being a private line located at the
Israeli Consulate. (§

Neither of the above-described operations is currently
active at New York. (§

Korem, during his assignment at the Israeli Consulate
in New York, initiated liaison contact with the New York Office
of the FBI. ©)

FBIHQ currently has liaison with Menachem Navoth, IIS
representative at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D, C,
During July, 1956, through December, 1956, while attending
American University, Washington, D, C., and employed part time
as a guard at the Embassy of Israel, Navoth was engaged in intel-
ligence activities in the United States, Navoth met with an FBI
double agent who was an employee of the U. S. State Department
on several occasions and paid the double agent,$250.00 for
cooperating with the Israelis, Gs)

New York currently has liaison with the Israeli Consulate |S)

FBI files also reflect that IIS representatives have
periodically conducted operations in the United States similar

to those described herein since 1948, (S)

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