157-10014-10005

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Date

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10005
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-05
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES
TO 3:
TITLE ; ‘
DATE : 06/19/75
PAGES : 113 -
SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES
USSR
CIA
FBI -
NOSENKO, YURI
CIA, RELATIONSHIP WITH WC
OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD
DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED

CURRENT STATUS RELEASED WITH DELETIONS

DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS : Box 1
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED -

HW 50955 Docld:32423393 Page 1

wr.

Hearing held before

Senate Select Coumittes to Study Governmental

operations With Reapec

eee ee er seer eet

t to Intelligence Activities

lt

we. Thuraday 6 gn 19 19D ee ann a

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) $44-6000

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TESTIMONY: OF
James Angleton

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WARD S SAUL

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Thursday, June 19, 1975
United States senate,

Select Committee to Study Government.
operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D- Cc.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 pem.,
jin Room S.123, phe Capitol, Senator John G. tower presiding.

Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.
Also present: William Miller, Staff Director: Frederick

A. O. Schwarz, gr., chief counsel; Charles Kirbow and David

Aaron, professional Staff Members.

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Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I underatand that you came
on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating
the Committee.

you will have to be sworn.

Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about
to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but. the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Angleton, I do.

Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Mr. Schwarz. TI would like to first get your name and
address on the record.

Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.

Mr. Schwarz. gust some procedural matters. You have a
right to counsel, you understand that?

Mc. Angleton. Yes, rt understand it.

Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop to ob-
tain counsel you have a right to do that. And if you wish
to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right
to do that, you understand those things also, do you?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.

Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what
period of time?

Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the

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end of December.

Mr. Schwarz. 1974?

Mr. Angleton. 1974.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you the chief of Counterintelligencd
at the CIA for that period?

Mr. Angleton. I was.

Mr. Schwarz. For that entire period of time?

Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.

th Israel! intelligence agencies?
Angleton. That ig correct.

can you briefly state the ¢

ssusiness, oF are we trying to take

Wedmay try to take Up

What we are trying

Schwarz. We are going to the Szule pus ines

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Senator Baker. If I may say 30, 80 that
not. be taken by surprise, there are one/e
Tah Like to discuss. The nature of th@t/material would be
o what you have already discus’ &@ with Rockefeller,
having to with the Oswald situat 2 and other things.

on. Well, to begit with, I went into OSS in

1943, in 1943 freq the infant And then Iwas assigned to an

were put together who

And that included

erewas a training intensive in

to London.

Gagression, the Germans were using a receiver machine cals
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ALO Fast Street, S.£.. Wasmengion, D.C. 20003

HW 50955 Docld: 32473393

break of war, when

prescience to know thate the systems cou d only be one thing,

that it would be operat ive) Mn a time” “ot War.

tend

the counter intelligence

ist of priorities, in

fkhe materlal
in any fashion to the’ Germans would destroy A ilitary
uses. And sm or when the Germans woe in to the
war, they brow
100 percent.

And! Vv
Z messages from the German high command. 1 kn
the Bagi le of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.

So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence

¢ the purpose of playing back German agents to their high

fommand. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the

war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents

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Page 6


west oader aliases, their only point of contact fof/ most
— and money was to our agent under &
And it was Balled the Safe Haven program. /

So Londonswas in-asense a staging aes with full access
to British, or th Méruits of British activity, going back
through their onets NYstory And fies the advance head-
quarters for General pohyan, and Mr. Murphy.

I was then sent wo her inf1943. And I took over the
counter intelligence for X

wffone OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces

lleadquarters.

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Subsequently f became the Ae of OSS Italy. And
I want to say that my wotk then becat @ more broad in terms of
espionage and all the/vother branches of toss. And I re-estab-
lished the countegf XX And I brought the
French back into poxistence, particularly endnan who
originally scafices the code, and who worked ah tt for many
years. And MH ents time it was shifted to one Gad aoe.
I lef’ Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, ‘@nd was

discharged and went into the Agency immediately. AN during

the p he I was in the Agency, of course, I had oN

M ions, long distance operations, and counter intelligence,

some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.
t

410 Forst Street, S.E., Wasmingion, D.c, 20003

And probably the €irst overnight operation that there was

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WARD & PAUL

#10 Foest Street, $.€., Warnsneton, B.C. 20003

Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to ¢

oumanian border and make very primitive snotoaranrif ot the

Sond I was sent back to the Air Force. Afd then I had

code operabions, embassy penetrations, anadd, on.

sense the resuscitation L ve Italian service,

‘ vi
bs Veter of the Interior,

civil war in Greece, and Van of the international

Brigade and in fact the sofdets ee up, when they were

not fighting the war, ingthe post-waig, period, assassinations,
and instability. :
y >
And throughout’ this we had very ciost\supervision from
Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had oe interest

in the vatican, ‘and what was happening in Berlimijbehind the

And ‘che then acting Secretary of State for the¥vatican,

fho is the present Pope. And so there was “fh
Mein,

5

to dofthrough our channels, and General Donovan, with M

the frope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems was
: 2

theycold war. We did not buy the cold war, jit came to us

fad we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the

bs

Be vosseion we began to find that we were not getting the

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then I got into all fields ofylabor, subversion,
. pone a a
rants, and then revolutdon. I was in Greece.
ns at that perfod’ were fairly high level and
ction to Stalin.
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17 i Zeivities be directed in supporting their

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2) Oy during that period was one we sent to . Murphy, and

threugh General Donovan to the President. Tha
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ifs

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of, prevent immigration: And they addressed themselves

5, issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it le

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WARD & PAULUS

410 Forst Street, S.E.. Wrasmengton, b.c. 20003

A

sageria, who

had been Chvefyof the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was

then the Commanding Admiral of the Tu anian Fleet generally

south, where all Lie {ileqal immigrants collected and were

sent down.

And then they ble Irgum, and blew up the British
embassy in Rome, who wy: posite numbers. And the man
with whom we had set uptds the alian intelligence through
the rest of the sradis -- we ha
group, and then Ww the dilemma again as to whether we
turned them ove Jeo the British sathoke ds, and so on.

And we Ajére in a position to make d gions one way or

“Yand eventually we came down o \ Aside of re-
leasing em.

Shad there is so much more of it. fT am try

hread of it.

Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a rehat;
dhip, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons con
with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of

Israeli back in the 1940's?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

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Mr. Schwarz.

we you kept the Israeli account, if that is the rl
P,

jYem was that you

7 ana you had the

problem. And one of my men
the Zionist movement in hh th
a connection to this man /
So,coming vacy/ ad onsntnaton, I
to Colonal Donald
clandestine nig covered the world, on al
clandestine dotivity.

And subsequently t was Chief of Operations\ for Es-

4

Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and la
until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any

relationship -- is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it

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Mr. Angleton. It ig all right. It is as goo
& Mr. Schwarz.

No. That began in 1951

1951 and 1974.

Mr. Angleton. ; ted in 1951. And I was the
/ Fell,
r of Jerusalem, Pete

Kollek, was at the@éther end of the negotiation. He was

stationed in vachleaton. But during the Jewish Agency period.

he was head ofthe intelligence in Turkey, duping the war and

> in common.
Be

whegwas then Director. And he was to be succeeded by Gener i

id ter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the

far that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles retu

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WARD & PAUL

10 Frest Sieeet, 5.E., Warnenaton, b.c. 20003

to thia activity, that we
relationship. And after 4 lot of bureaucratic prob
gave me the account.

Mr.

eed upon between the two services? e

Angleton. In most simplistic,

Paper andop rations ,discussion.

ority was the agree>

Mr. Angleton. Under the authority ofthe Director of

Fi entral Intelligence, and the Prime Minister 6

the other side.

Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of res
of both countries?

Mr. Angleton. The term “resources” is not quite

correct. Everything except their own people. If was giving

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WARD & FauL

up papers and signals, communications intelligence, and

,»the other products of intelligence action.

CIA, and eve
Mr. Mille
as an instrument of

Mr. Angleton.

President or
the Agency.
with Africa,

If you

things cleared 4
obtained veon hf, Hill.

Mr. udyher. Was it regarded as an obligatic
commitment / from the U.S. to Israel on certain matter
a Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while y
we it as contracting officers and all that, there was
d to writing. And it is a custom of

telligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And

J vere have been very few directors to my knowledge that would

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WARD & PAUL

ALO Feest Street, SE. Warnengian. b.c. 20003

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Sunderstanding.

sign an agreement to some unde

ut their pen to hand to
Loew

standing. It is based on a fiduciary relationship an ommon

ced by events. WE had the arrest of the/nine doctors,

rom in Russia. And obviously

Va didn't go through

eryone to see.

a lot of bit@aucracy, it was there. for,

And it had a dibrect impact on the qyestion of immigration of

(Ses along with it. And

else that

agents, and everyth:
I think that character fydoa operation,

Mr. Miller. How was it /possible for succeeding directors

of the intelligence agency?

agreements were a th

service and the wy

ase the Israeli intelligence

telligence

‘Nery simple. Theysaw the production to

Mr. Angleto

Lf,
begin with. And i met with sirecto’ de the head of

Israeli intelligence. And they met with Apoadors and prime

ministers. yy they were very much involved,

Mr,/ SChwarz. Just one more background guéstion and

#341 turn to the principle subject.

then w

ollowing through on the subject of Israel upy
rture in 1974, is there any connection between

rture and handling of Israel? And if there is,

the connection?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I have said it all to tre

TOP SECRET

commission -- I don't now how wisely. You ean always 9g
different information from different people. But € plis
Sold them, so I would like to give him the benef

on it. But over a period of time Colb

reporting on superiors, until

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a #S
thing where we Had to open the windows ‘and Jet the air in.

And he used ph ases such as, WE must hel ‘ut Henry and a few

position was that it was a political

we were not bound, oF should hot be bound
Nancy on tactical ventures when we had rela
Aaihjich had strategic implications.
But one must rembmer that there are still three

million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship i

410 Fast Street, S.E.. Warmeaaion, D.c. 20003

only place where you do it with high level agencies who wo

for ideology and do not work for money. So it ia unique.

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and ‘axample is 500 Polish intelligence soho ers who were
oi immigrated to Israel. They he about Polish
intelligence” than the Poles. And the S he sg had worked with
the Poles in the:

SS

had the cohesion o£

their own congress pak

Moscow.
ob was to preserve the inte~

loc, because the problem

the return.
And, thefefore, there is a certain Kind of parallelism,

f> oa

you vton/eol, between handling the communications intelligence

f£ it and

(Recess.)

Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the que tren

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movements.

And,
things, and so on, toNte seemed | Weolutely contrary to the
spirit, and what had been soinkion for 22 years.

And during that time wephad obtained, for example, by
way of production, Khrushg ‘ cret speech which prac~

tically created revolutd6ns in Hungary and Poland.

I was just simply reiterating “ee of the immi-

iy

gration. This pen opening the doors a letting the light

in, and breaking/down compartmentation, and bE

Ape the production t ran from everything, such asi
se xt speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran ints
an hard information on nuclear explosives, and dit
into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a cer

tain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports deal-

ing with the Soviet bloc which were unique. And much of this¥

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Lh Ma a SE .

210 First Steeet, S.E., Warmington, O.C. 70002

WARG & PALL

and our own defense budget.
SA tom, our own way of handling it was to give

attrifition, reports, so that if the report wa

And to break down\the fiducfary relationship-- which is

7 as the men I have had were

went back to Tal Aviv; et cetera, ax’small group of men. It
was probably the modt economical operation that has ever been

devised in the ¥5, Government. I don ey think there was more

than 10 peo

I st&sted from the south side with twocSewish men who

es

f .
worke “th me during the war. He sent them over as ordinary

der cover to establish the working hoursyof things,

mi
y,

And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the Serv

da
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But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.

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For example, we had certain political overtones wie’
we were used in an affirmative way under President edsenhower..
anted to make a real attempt to see if there gare ever
And with Alan nivies, his
2 put up a plan

pin Robert B. Anderson, who had/been Assistant

dy emissary from the

6 Israel, which was secret,
black, AS ‘gen Gurion -- and Shaffetz was
the Foreign Minister “- a 6 who was in the Prime Minis-
ter'’s office, and later Mayers,

And we took him wal cone. And Kermit Roosevelt

would take him over tf and this went on back
and forth on men ps, until the Sghglusions were reached
that there wa be any peace. ‘

But those'/ypes of initiatives could, be done without.

ffnich underlay your Leaving the Agency?
Angleton. Yes. We offered me jobs or whats not.
ate these are matters of principle, as far as I am con
VA Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduci

relationship. Were there points along the way where the U.S¥

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interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?
Mr, Angleton. We never got into that,
only had to read the paper every day to see that,

Mr. MIller. But how did they come up ? 7:

counts of.
AY ro level.
Mr.

question.

Mr. Van It was not Unusual. I have had it
% nar
f :
with many €@hiefs of services in 80 fferent countries, so
it is wlan more unusual than a lot e Sothers. The French-
man who’ got the code is closer to me tha’ tthe
oy
Isra@lis are.
Miller. Similar to the relations
. Angleton. I don't jike the word unusval} because to

usual.

Miller. Delete that. If your working relavic ship
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Mr. Angleton. Wh

Senator Mathias. The

WARD & PAUL

had no commitments with Israel

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for a different purpose.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me see if I can make a point on jus

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common sense level.

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HW 50955 DociId: 32423393 Page 24

ys from
ce and Israel?

Senator

hn anindidienen Oise eee :
LOLEA A ote WM. Shara oe

that kind?
Mr. Angleton

days.

WARD & PAUL

lala at ciate aL ete awe a tia mite

tesfified here under oath as to certain matters
(8 the approach that we are going to take now.

Is that clear?

Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask the question generall

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first and then come to the other testimony.

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HY 50955 Docild: 32423393 Page 25

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fexrring to, where the Agency, in me
" LO va
Mr. icCone, had some of the sharpest fo ds probably in the
history of s relationship.
Mr. Schusifz. You mentioned thos@ at lunch, and you might
stéte that to my knowledge the

raised’ the question of their atomic
interests, with one or

two small exceptions, wh

who had heen tea oy

to come back and attend some meé
level.
Mr. Schwartz.
the question/broadly enough.
e Agency take any steps to mak
to a any personnel who had knowled bout atomic
nated.
Yi Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. And specifically with respect t

let's go off the record for a minute.

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(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

Schwarz. To your knowledge was he ever put in con -

Schwarz.

Angleton.

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Schwarz. And did the “three of you then go for dinner

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

uhbeoneaee. At that meeting did you discuss <-

to Israel?

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Mr. Angleton. Yes.

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Mr. Schwarz. What did he say to you?
Mr. Angleton. They prefaced his remarks by

ag not a professional scientist, but he was a

devolved, one sai!

Israelis, and as a follow-u

know-how by sending Dr.

Ss,

Mr. Schwar3

Mr. pe My response to him was, iewas wrong. But

he had not fidentified the scientist.

MrigScharz. When you say it was wrong --

he. Angleton. His statement was wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. So you denied the story that atomic
eéghnology had been transferred to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is.

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does constitute a denial.

Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.

~

terested in fact that, one, he ee Szule <= I am sorry
that I knew Hersh\-~ and that Hersh #o7d him that his source

was the man who ga him the Decenibér 22 article, and whether

he “had been set up

Senator Baker. What. De@ember 22?

Mr. Anglet

Senator Baker. Did they do thatdonce?
Mr. AngYeton, No, because neither disclosed their inde-

pendent soufces to the other.

rar

ify for my

own purposes is that the conversation you just rélated you said
Lf .
volfbrons.

Do I understand you to mean that every material

Ney

of that statement was wrong?
Mr. Angleton. Yes. But I didn't know my motives on

lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the

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acaister: Hersh told him, according t6 Szulc, that
he was sch

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ed of the story, because this wéshis source on the
S

December 2

Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Kirbow.

to Israel?

Be
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Mr. NAGgleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted

(2 iS
a Szulce was .talking about a very\great agent

a

that if in the-Agency. And he was bragging abou
nah had more sources than Hersh had. And then he sad
youilknow Australia?

And 1 said, yes, I know Australia.

Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?

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Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.
Do you know sho is bicycling in India?

And Teald, Iam afraid I am not with you.

And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one

ve employees who retired, and is bicyeli

business of:‘this whole evening.
And he Wx he got that from his source,
Now, that } 's name is Sidney gGottlieb. And he was the
head of our technicah, services aepgtment, which means that

there is a cross Plantain our business, And the man who

‘was bugging and performin the hundreds of technical

services, has access, entepfiegeety ta many of our operations.

~

There is one ine pote, in the business where there
is a breakdown of compar Fennoiddee for him to indicate
that he knew Gottlign, and the sours hat had been raised in
my mind, since L/yas talking about a scl ist, plutonium,
atomic energy,#and all these matters, that A goures might
be in our Te¢ghnical Services Division, which, 4g he was, he
would knowsjeverything, or could get into everything.

LY. didn't tell him that.

fin fact, I expressed little or no interest in
other than asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, an

fot that and so on.

Senator Baker. Could I ask you « question at this poi

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—— a)


Prone (Ares 202} 344-4000

m. Angleton. No. That information, sir
XQ

i Senator Baker. I am speaking more of%
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in India. But the Way he went about /

ou think/fthis, and so on --

Senator Baker.

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Mr. Angleton. It gtarted to worry me, because he was

talking plutonium, which’ was scientific. Gottlieb,
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before he went to tHat whole department of his, was transferred

fas,

to Carl Duckett fs that is the ceth Gottlieb left.

rn

Senator Baker. You mean he didn't ‘want to work for
Duckett?
“Mr #Angleton. That is part of it.

nd there are also questions of principlexy™

Wo another

Senator Baker. Is this the same Gottlieb who was

410 Faext Street. S.E., Wwasnengtan, O.C, 20003

charge of processing the photographs that were taken in Dr

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Fielding's office?
Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.
Senator Baker. Do you know of that aitdy
Angleton. No, except --
tor Baker.

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back to co rel.

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to Colby about thesematters? Did yougever get any impression

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Was Her conversation in whiét Szule or Hersh talked
that they were imp\yidng that cophfins their source?
Mr. Angleton. \.The only, tKing that came up is that when
I saw Colby yesterday Vis the first time since
December -- he told me tha\@he had bought a theory of mine on
_Szule, but he did not ee th any misgivings on Hersh. Ne

#3 ach
said that one year v4 he hady-seen Hersh about the submarine

E

article, and that ,had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets
would not have peimitted the operation:\to take place.
And I dif him that he was erronecyd, that to use that
guide was siinply not to understand what vee is all about.
wage Philby was stationed in acho he helped

the PEE ain working on some communications intel

34

cf ‘
jye’s Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt Philby.
a

Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

TOP SECRET


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covered he would have been today Chief of British ineggigence:
In the case of George Blake, who was in the prifish
ecret service, he gave to the Soviets one year inWadvance the

plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love, that is, the

one year in advance, the

save George atene 4/
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the Soviets would or <a
is the objective “oe end 6:

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and destroy the agen

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ae, ~
@duction of Or. Mann's name and so on simply didn
ef :
ser, and something was wrong.

But Dr. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of

TOP SECRET


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‘of an article he wrote, in the

f@bout the bugging situation?

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we Chair was the most s§
Agency. And What it dealt with was ~~

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house or thisf office .

sonar Baker. Off the record.
ie
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a record.) %
‘Angleton. But let me put it this way.

e@ place in which to raise all this stuff.

wanted

Mr. Schwarz. This is Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. ‘This is Szulc.

TOP SECRET


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I arrived.

Mr. Angleton... hat bothers me, that he is
either unwitting, or has a has knowledge and is

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working for an oppo has a source who is mis-

chievously exploitin

ry.

Fig a rough time of saving a ver
Fcen Penthouse for supplying X number. articles.
that is my general feeling.

Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You sayythat he

(dowd have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess~Phi lby.A

relationship through an external source?

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WARD & PAUL

410 Ferat Street, $.E.. wasmengion, O.C. 20003

Mr Angleton. Yes, either witting or unwitting.

Senator Tower.

ehator Tower. That is a possibility? /

y,

the Roumanian .*
and he knows the
and on.
| So, he is dealing™ : people who will be reporting
‘ y
back to their casauer eX ry detailed -- assuming he is
Pe

totally innocent, and given¥his position in Washington,

Did Mr. Szule ever work\

“fi
our people in the field.

2
MiMr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mc. Schwarz. Have you heard that?

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@December, without identifying him, and the
Bing through this business that he had

Bova that was Sidney Gottlieb,

entitled togene free shave.
a I know your successor. And I di me think he

actually mentioned the name. But in this article “ has jus
comef,Out he mentions him with his biographical sketch
Senator Baker. Who was your successor?

Mr. Angleton. Goorge Kalaris.

I had never known him before.

TOP SECRET


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obviously he was talking to me ag somebody di

affected from the Agency, et cetera.I mean that is my“view

Prone (Ares 202} 546-8060

of why he was doing all this.

Whereas my concerns seve quite
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dentist being inv » that dealt with the

hat dealt wien, Chair, that dealt with

bay Se
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7ann o@,

: Angleton. No, I think it

Angleton. My chief words to him was

Ny said, do you
2] realizéfuhat a thing like this implies, and Ne would

s

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Ehé efforts in the Middle East?

410 Firat Steeet. S.£., Wasnneton, 0.C. 20004

Mr. Schwarz, But words like that are as consister

with beingtrue as being false?

TOP SECRET


Mr. Angleton, They were consistent, but they wegen't

stated in that fashion.

They were stated in the fashion that

go back im'to the fact of Mann's association

with me, Mann's

7 aseociation\Mth Philby, all this stuff “

s that, vA

8 Israelis and a regardless of

my actions with the

Ni what the U.S. Government
q _ 9 tells the Britisher the French, or@fhe Canadians, or the
4 ~ 10 Australians, or the \New Zealanders, all of whom have fundament
ss
a 114} ally the basic sntorms ion y ee be a confirmation to the
7 .
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@
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Cc 15 || tions here,
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eer or not, during the

17 | Carly sixties, ¢fissionable material,

long with nuclear

18 }} technology afd technological assistance, ‘was passed to the

Israelis? A,

Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely that
[a3 >
22 | typeof precision. The story that he gave was a venyhlucid,

sGraightforward story without any if's, and's and buf&t

Senator Twoer, Did you deny only in part the ue

of the question that he asked?

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410 Fora Street, $.£., Wasmingion, 0.6. 20003

HW 50955 “Docld: 32423393 Page 40

Angleton. No, I denied his story - és ‘would like to

td
do with vectno

Le I can say is
closely the Nasser, p if

This is a thing that’ has Always concerned us, because

,

in the last war we logt?-- and we . ll do this today, we

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don't know the Wea of this -- lost some of the installatigns
which we had put¥i/n there.

Mr. Schivar . When you say
oY
igleton. The CIA --
; : yu
When ‘he say

Mr. Angleton.The line of sight, electronics --

Senator Baker. YOu are not talking about -~

ALO Frest Street, S.L., Waenengton, O.C. 20003

Nr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intel lig

And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in

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which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in vieéne

er I said, Yes wewe have worked on questions
ot

we have always helped them oug technologically. And I think

And I think Wells will bear me out very Nekeacty on this,

that ithe injection of that could not be magic,

had bee rtold, it would be just another of the Many rumors

And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want on

TOP SECRET


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MS
Israels during the Cuban business ~~ had meét¥on a ship with

am Chief of the British + of who had a back-
ground in the
pared and ay

War. And this is®sll pris, a Was a tremendous pike

5

of Soviet materi ‘they va got much into our media, be-

cause it is directed to #ddle East in Arabic, and which

obviously they knew.

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here or wa’ it in Israel.
ug? Kirbow. Did you express any concer
sfjabout the use of Dr. Mann's name in this
Mr. Angleton. Not Dr. Mann's name. My ex

flat if you -- I said that article, false as it is,

Tony things injected in it -- 1 will be very frank with®

410 Frost Street, S.€.. Warmington, O.C, 20003

I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story o

TOP SECRET


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these two journalists was so implausable, and fr A

fo Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he ha

abs@lutely a stoney expression, no expression on
roe

hig was something very,. very queer, and theswhole thing

PA
Mr. Szulc,

was insets by him. And that was why I askeg

did he come YS or did you come to him.
Senator >

Mr. Schwarz.

» Did he come to your,

came to us.

Senator Tower. het me ask you.,one specific question,

“we during the late fifties
aN & the CIA made available to the

Israeli Government nay Gal as tee nee and the availability
NS

yes or no,
Did you confirm to 5

subsequent to the Suez W

of one or more aistinof nes nuc

3

Racrentiate or physicists

for the purpose of ggveloping vom Wapons?
Mr. Angleton/ That is completely Tange.

Mr. Aaroné Mr. Angleton, did you con Mitr or deny that

to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. An@deton.

4
statement £7

Ms

Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn’ \eeny,

is that’ correct?

Angleton. It is very difficult for me to res]

And furthermore, in the

TOP SECRET


Israelis in the nuclear field.

Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?

Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive
I don‘ nS ink that they really shed any 14 i
you are tal ng about here,

Xs

Mr. “aardts Do you recall a conve satio

Mr. Schwarz in

said you felt under

Mr. Angleton, ‘ Anow I used that
gon

was a denial. And I think hae, Wells would s

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that there was a denial But wheh I got down

sproblems, And
Ay

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nowith me and

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phrase. There
econd the fact

to a lot of the

other questioning, myAt inking was@to try to lead him around

back into the meeting with Hersh, a lead h
g
source that had t6%do with Sidney Gott

Senator Tower.

im back to this

Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. Whehs

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WwW 50955 Doold:324273393 Page 45


first, I will have to explain we went to the restaufant, he

nvited us to the restaurant, he was insistent ofit. And we

géntire discussion

Bs
ecapitulation by him, in a restaureZicnat was fairly

6 full of sople. Hersh was a person who ,had requested a secret

7 meeting in

WARD & PAUL,

mind. I looked at h

of things.

And so ws got back to Wells‘ ho

anyone out there that you thought this might have bee

setup by a foreign source, or from internally?

Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?

410 Fost Steeet, $.E., wasnimgion, D.C, 20003

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r. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story an

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RW 50955 Doold: 32423393 Page 46

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everything else.
Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this w

mithe Agency until we had this lunch,

t ., —— é 4
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because I en't have access to files <*A
to review a ‘Yet of material, 1£ think One has to review
Szulc's files, % /
Mr. Miller. ‘You spoke ,6f

it as a dossier.

security file. I thinkshe was one of the journalists, the
first one, who made
Pigs, and so on. and I think the\fact that he is foreign-
born, and the aliégations and so Ss, And so the Bureau has
Ps, ‘Ee
a similar filé And many of nen edies are created -- and
and therefore a

routine security check is made,

fe)

Angleton. No.

Schwarz. Past surveillance?

As I say,

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Mr. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the

Szule. Were there files

Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Miller. An@/other America ‘a?

Mr. AngletontY A lot of them. S

=
Senator Baker. Hersh wrote a story# bout -- what did

he say -- 7, files. Was that right or ‘ong?
Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many

never counted them,

How many? A hundred thousa

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:
4
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: 6 CanNyou shed any light on that perf
3 K 7 || life, the AN

of the Watergate,

and we had all of these things,

great deal of this stuff was there,

but it wasn't béfng pro-

Senator Baker.

You have mentioned the Watergate twice,

5 Mr. Angheton,

in the Agency's

mpact that the Watergate investigation had or any

: 8 involvement ofthe Agency in any ofgtie so-called
_ 9
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a a .
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c .
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2) || in yeu break-

in or the preparation for the cové

22 atecmpted cover-up?

Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not,

410 Furst Street, 5.6. Wasningion, D.C, 20003

aa/[Poy that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things

ae newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well. ‘

TOP SECRET

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im. Angleton. I am aware of what was i
eae wart fe
And Paul Nabami recently died who wrote tho etters, and
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popal. relationships

SSS

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Mr. Angleton.
Senator Baker. I be

Mr. Angleton. In anySevent, I can say that Gaynor's

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was a very stubborn meagre he le ~ AGency on conviction,
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Senator Bake In connection with latergate?
Mr. Angleton’, He left much earlier.
Millér. He being McCord?
fry

Angleton. Yes.

416 Ferst Ste@et, 5.6. Wasnengton, ©.C. 20003.

Angleton, He wag not.

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:

HW 50955 Docild:32423393 Page 51

Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent respon

Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very,

"t very wi

At

Doyou know why he went into the Watergate

gp, that wasn

eh

Complex?

Mr. Angléton. Minderstand it, because I would

say it was ideological w = There wasn't any difficulty

in understanding his viéws ona given subject.

of operation.
-
iE. him?

And that surprised

16 Mr. Ang lepon: That is what I read,
7

as
se as a rule -- let me put
'

this way, what
*,

ring everything.

So, instead of using anybody in the clandestin

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, McCord and the group and sent them to that counthy \for
| 8

/ six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great

knowledge of the -~ he knows the counter electronics. An

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pator Baker. He was familiar with the mos

And that is why I can?

aa e

toin“what they have stated

Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away fro
the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing wha
if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.

For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it hav
a file on Lee Harvey Oswald? .

Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more
than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they
have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission
through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.

and then there is a lot of undigested material that was
brought out after the Warren Commission.

Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you
have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. IT know
the time factor, I will try to shorten this.

But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should
not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that

the Commission, in the life of the Commission -~ that these are

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the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact
that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under
the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of
Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future
generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the
door, that it would really mean the investigation would be
pursued.

Senator Baker. John MeCone, as I remember, was
queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of
certain people, including Oawald.

Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.

Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that
time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that
soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in cate~
gorical terms?

Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission
we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko
going under the record, on a question of bona fides.

Senator Baker. Why?

Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.

Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?

Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who
was sent to mutilated the leads. of very high grade Soviets
whom we had acquired prior to that.

Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy

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HW 50955 Docld: 32423393 Page 54

assassination?
Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents,
VaSsALL
Vv ly, the British agents, and many agents in France, a
alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.
Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?
Mx. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that
a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this
Sch ant
interview recently with Shor, I called his executive officer
Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever
alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides
And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too
well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.
And he said, well, I will give it to you.
And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man
whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.
Senator Baker. I am sure he does.
Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was
infact a Soviet agent? 7
Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.
I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too|
. . 4
many leads that were never followed up. There's too much in-
formation that has been developed later. |
For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is |
a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograp

Alonte fig Li tyy
é
of a man called Alexiev, real name Shettov, KGB, with the first

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Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was

the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican

police arrested Castro as & student, they found in hia note~

a

ee

oe

pooks the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.

Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for
Soviet citizens abroad. It is a pible,75 percent KGB stafe.
Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.

Now, we had & double agent after the assassination,
who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the
Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov.
Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on 4 stat
visit. And he pulled an American journilist aside, and totally
out of context, expressed the view that there was a con
spiracy: and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.

The thingwas totally out of context. and he planted
this bug in this fellow’s ear.

WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of
their personnel for six months on working on the assassina-
tion, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business
under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking
‘about petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascer=
tained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.

And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have
been followed up. one is because of Lack of manpower.

never

the general problem in Washington and the government

TOP SECRET

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that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the
intelligence community. of a counter-intelligence nature.

I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in
high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to
whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and
pull the puroau and ourselves and everybody together.

Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memor~
andum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might
be constituded?

10 Mc. Angleton. It would not be 4 pleasant one. I have
11 || submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence —~
12 such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted
a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea
was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and

14

15 || beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as

16 | Vice president he had a rare opportunity the first time these

j7 }} matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's deat

ie || and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the -

counter-intelligence forces.

19

And this

.

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Very, very poor.

Mr. Angleton.

I have put in there, and I think it is very ¢

gainy substantial information about

10 have

Sem

2

We u.S. such as the infiltration

11

12

14

15 and so on.

t is inclusive Of all the American life,
rly visits to the sottte Union, and so on.

ensitive which was

16 and in partic

17 | Thereare cémmunications intelligence mor

would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems

We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the

TOP SECRET

there.


a common denominator of the military and other agr

none {Aras 202) 444-4008,

ere they do share common information,

ss) Werator Daker. Do you know of any cases#/ though, deal--

netration of a Congressional orsbil
hleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything,
8 because I ca Byoure you that it is endlone thingl have
9 been crc some mf have seen these

t be surprised. And this is

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10 | allegations in the Baber, I wouldns

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11 |) the second time in my Mife, or HG third time, I have ever

12 been here, To come here ‘and“see how this whole set up is is

iF

13 quite a shock,

en cree EERIE

WARD & PAUL

ana @ | {

14 Senator Baker. “a communications intercept,

15 Congressional conversa fone. are youNaware of any methodical

ce,
16 effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a Congressional tele-

17 || phone conversations?

7 6

18 Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- I amBassuming. now
eS USA?
19 that the peophe in NSR are correct, they usually

fe, that the

x &
20 telephone, /tHe formal telephone company traffic appalgently,

J cnoweage of the caller, is quickly shifté

..
x

a
That runs into hundreds of thousands of teléphone

21 without th

p2 microway

Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the

410 Fiett Street, $.€., Wasnemaion, O.C. 20003

Acehetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it

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5 beg n to know much
6 rk YD, scouptes it.

i and transmitted them

10 || mostly related to g

ll to the Soviet Union, and, mdividual files on them, would

12 you confirm that for me?

14 my view correct. And I yi
15 could respond to th would be Dx

now, I think, sé a a consultant there.

WARD ® PALL

ou Tordello, a retired

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HW 50955 Docld: 32423393

:
“and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on thé

@imerican whom they had handled in Washington wh

“discussions and a&guments djs on the subject. We have

Anglo~American Desk, which meant that there was a

Yiows the agent.

tmaasferred to London where the case ee ae

Gand that statement, official statement was put out with-

SE

out any Consultation with the Bureau oxssirselves. So, we

3

8 of Soyleta, and tim
i acigus
all the fallation kind of

are living Inpa dream world here in

is short, it iBedetente, and it £

Oh,
come to detente for Yin

orma Yon through operations and our

in thie Mid-west, he was from the United Nations Ra young
© y JN
fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a =

And they said, we put him to bed.

him. And I am still up there.

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Page 60

:

HY 40955 Dact

cash
‘sls

on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights

Prune (ieee 202) 546-6000

. But he said, I have got to run, and it was about’ five

Rand I asked him if he understood in i 4 what

rked3
12 the reaction to him aniversot wan S
Ehometning I : sll have to negotiate.
o you mean oat

14 And I said, wha &
15 . And he vata Ae wits talk about it next wéek.
LE ana shook hands with him and aes out.

Oks

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13 And he said, that

16 So, Ig

TOP SECRET .

Pmone (Aves 202)

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HW50955 DocT

the Presidential apparatus? “

Mr. Angleton. Never, Sefator®

. xy
stuff in the apewfEE

Senator’Béker .

penetfated the taping capability in the Oval office?

7

Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that

Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?

What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of
Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's
pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?

Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation.

Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that
picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico
was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.

Mc. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, or -~

Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent

believe was actually controlled by the Soviets,

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21m Firat Street, SE, Wasnenaton, O.C, 20003

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Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as
private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any
implication with Oswald.

Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources
the information that the KGB had spent some six months ~~

Mc. Angleton. We. only acquired the hard stuff of six
months and what they did from one man who was very high in the
KGB. .

Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was,
when did you acquire the information?

Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.

Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had
reached its conclusions?

Mr. Angleton. Did you have any auch information during
the life of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. TI think the only thing was the Nosenko -~

Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived
at a very brief time after the assassination as 4 KGB defector

Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as
a planted agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes- They thought he was gent on @

-mission.

Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission.

TOP SECRET


s

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pron oM@y ray?

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WARD & PAUL

210 Fusr Street, SE. Wasnenatan O.€. 26003

Mr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons
you suspected Nosenko was & double agent, or 4 planted agent,
rather, was because he was saying things that were contra~

dictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had

been giving you information before Nosenko came to this

country?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

7
3 Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information
relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality
9
person had given you?
10

Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little

more sense.

12
In December 196) a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected
13 4 alt tnt .
to us. His name is Golitzen. He has never been in service,
14
except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it,
1s ‘
alleging that he had stated there was a plot to assassinate
16
Nixon. He did not make such a statement.
7
Mr. Kirbow. Oo you think this statement should be on

the record?

19
Mc. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after
20
the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.
2} -
Now, his is probably without any question the most major
2°
| defection since World War II as far a8 Soviet intentions,
254
Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned.
24

And the reason, among others, that it was so important was

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Page 65


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he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961,
if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those
many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB
in order to acquire the kind of information which would be mos
valuable to the US, and to our allies.

Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried
to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to
investigative commissions and other things of this sort which
would get into everybody elses's businesa. Among other things
he spent many years in the training schools for people who
came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to
brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this
information.

And among other things, he stated that he gave the
erytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations
throughout the West.

And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their
people after his defection. And as is normal in a case of
this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which
means the whole service would come to 4 standstill. And the
objective would be to review all paper files ad everything that
showed his initials. And you usually would have three
categories of information: you would have information which

he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did

not have knowledge of, and information which you are not

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HW 50959 ~Docld:32493393 Page 6

14°

ceratin about.
Now,

a
Dunlop who was worki

committed suicide,

mately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to,

although he may not

that after his assassination,

the Bureay,

to NSA relating to information

Senator Baker.

Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Miller.

Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Miller.
charged, as you know,

Mr. Angleton.

In any event,
a plastic bag, as I
question of whether

Mr. Schwarz.

of
the 1969 Golitze

when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant
ng in the National Security Agency and

if I am not mistaken we came to approxi-

have had.

from Golitzen.

And it is interesting to note ©
in a search of the quarters,

or whoever did ‘the search, found six of my letters

Did you speak of the assassination?

What did you say?

Did you say Mr. Dunlop?

After his suicide.

t meant suicide.

fhe word is interesting, be

re

recall,

in the attic.

I am sorry.

You used the term assassination.

cause it is
that he was assassinated.

Maybe I was thinking out loud oF something J-

n reports to NSA were in

And there was 4

he passed them before or after.

Now, what we were ON WaS,

you testified earlier ~~

Mr. Angleton.

enormous to the West

t

I was asking you, |

=~]
I just wanted to say colitaén was sO

TOP SECRET

ern world because we immediately moved on


those cases which were perishable, the French, the British,
and ourselves, et.cetera. And we had never had a4 second Chief

Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our

prone (Ares 207) 344-6000

jives, and all SE this out of the blue, and no contact as in

. ov
Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen.

Me. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the

Kennedy assassination?

proves TE a)

Mr. Angleton. Well, this was 4 contact, this was not a
defection. He came to us once for information prior to the
assassination.

And then in Moscow the Soviets ~~ and I am not going
into a lot of names, 2 member of the Second Chief Directorate,
gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the second
Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating .to how they got

and others of our agents, which showed
they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got
it through a on our side.

So the leads rant into the thousands from Govitzén,

and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interro-

gation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in

+s, O.C. 7000)

turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of

veasnemate

that ceme the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess. and

all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some

west Street, SE

other cases, and many cases in France and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Did Oswald show up at that time?

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anda we en aaa . :
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“TOP SECRET

‘
Mr. Angleton. No, not from Golitgen.

But when the assassination took place --

Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. ‘When the Kennedy assassination took place,
colitzbn called me immediately and stated that the modus
operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet
Union required that he go through processing by the 13th
Department of the KGB.

Which is their assassination department?

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department,
which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.
And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to

find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have

had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it

$.0., Wasmimaton, O.C, 20003

310 Fest Sireet,

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wag more Valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army

for future activity.

Of the nature of assassinations?

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or

intelligence, or whatever.
AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military

defectors.

‘

Now. when the Soviet Government turned over to the US
all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald
stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating

processing by Department 13. Then after the assassination

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-that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and

Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow.
And in my view he would have never come back on the scene
HE RE PANU
because they brought this Cheraponov thing in to have the locud
shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to
Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would
be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct
means of counteracting and mutilating the Jeads and the
importance of Golitzen's defection.

But the tourist gave the documents to the American
Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on
giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be
appropriate.

Mr Schwarz. These are not the official documents deal-
ing with Oswald but the documents that ‘the man tried to pass
in Switzerland?

Mr. Angleton. The Second Chief Directorate, he took all
of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them
to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.

So there is the assassination. Cheraponov allegedly
was chased to the turkish border and shot. And in my view
this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in
Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time
tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6,

at a-time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning

TOP SECRET


TOP SECRET

then he reappears in the early 1960's ag a member of the
Second Chief Directorate,

That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only

Prone (Aces 202} $44-46000

from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.

And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have
seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and
tells us he wants to defect.

Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was

inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.

So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career
so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing

he tells us is that while he was in_the Second Chief

4
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Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went
ever his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that
it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down
to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.

Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald

was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and:

therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff
of this sort.

And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetra~
tions, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging

of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had

nen nd

AIG Frest Street. SLE. Wasmenaton, O.C, 20003

something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And

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HW 50955 Docld: 32425393

g
oer
in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in

contact with Nesenko, which may have meant the assassination
of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one
where Logically you would bring them in and have two bodies,

1

at
one from the First Chiéf Directorate, that is, Golitzé

n, the
CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the
system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance

against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were

certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And

as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have
answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they ha
to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the

2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of

1959, presided over by Shelepin and atténded by many members

of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet

Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence
oparations has a political objective. And this is a part of
the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him
unwittingly chronologically through his career, he : omits

all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test
things, where their damage report would not show that colitzdn
had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and
breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no
evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.

Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he

TOP SECRET


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Prone {Area 202} $44-6000

WARO & PAUL

S10 First Street, $.£.. Wasminatan, O.C, 20003

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looked wrong to you?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided
to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot?

Mr. Angdeton. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenkao ~~

Mr. Angleton co1itsdn -- from colitzdn -~- information

. . Z zs
that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13,
which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assasgina~
tions, to interview miléitary defectors. And -we had observed
that when the Russians transferred documents concerning
)

Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such
debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of
itis that there was a man who was handling George Blake from
London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he
returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin.
But he was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the
Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then
he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.

Mr. Schwarz. And-what was his connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department
13, and was head of Department 13 at a time ~- I mean, he had

a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of

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Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that
the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination

department. The Soviets have always had an assassination

department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the

organization. People from the outside kno very tittle about

what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And
they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who ‘in
turn report to the Politboro. And therefore it is an entirely

sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action,

whether it be sabotage ~~ an illegal sabotage or what, an
illegal directorace which is independent of the rest of the
KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and
infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of
course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders
in West Germany.

x

Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes

more significant the absence of any reference to oswald necaued

you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, of

did you recount it because there js a more direct connection
with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. This ig related to what I told Mr. Duiles,
I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the =
life of the commission, and instead there should be a statement
that .we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to

,
us during the given period, these are our conclusions. And

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then to spell out in detail Department 13 and ite organization
~- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden
of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's
head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on
the entire story. ;

Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of
Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your,
mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the
documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US.
And you have recounted the strange nature of the information.
provided by Nosenko.

Mr. Angleton. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions
about each one of these jtems. As to the Nosenko information,
you stated that that information was suppressed from the
Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the
right word because, x will be very honest with you, I was told
the other day that the information was given classified, and
it was given to Helms or somebody, OF Mr. McCone, who passed.
it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I
haven't seen it.

Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment ago that it was
suppressed?

Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. When

TOP SECRET


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I was sitting in the position as to where that information
would go, I was opposed to it. And my pffictal position was

that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never

went.

And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of
dae ee

stuff. And Mr. Rocha, who was the point of record of the

Agency’s dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that
his

Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying. Now,

Actually it was

role was not one of the executive nature.
simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other

things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to

handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in

exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the
Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining
to the Warren Commission. He is a tidy individual. And in
fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the

Commission's business, and he is the one that had done all the

digging for the Commission, and so on, on a whole series of

matters that I am not familiar with.

But my point to you -- and this is very difficult to

explain -- is that the question of Nosenko created a very

great division in the Life of all counterintelligence as to

bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing with

double identification agents, there is always dispute.

But let me just Line up the order of battle here. Our

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Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man
was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted
the fact that the man was a provocation.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing
false information?

Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.

I said he was false. My man gaid he was false. And
isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and
analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And colitgen,
who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in
Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that
because of the enormity of his defection they would send a
provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.

So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who
knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.

Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is

no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector

General went into all this -- he is today the NIO dealing in

Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet

Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named
\

Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley,

and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now
in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through

these other people who have been dispersed. But the record

will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individnals

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TOP SECRET

was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.

Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?

Now, is it your current understanding that what was
provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration
brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided
with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you
have recounted that he was providing false information?

Me. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commiasion was
ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Golitadn
or Nosenko.

Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was
suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no,
it is your understanding now -~

Mr. Angleton. well, the word suppression isn't the right

word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed

by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --

Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to
the usefulness of the material?

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the
Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which-fas to give it
prominence and have it come out as an official part of the
record and documents and articles, and so on.

Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the

information was provided?

Mc. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in

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public.

Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the
Commission?

Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.

Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time
that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it
was false information?

Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in
spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made a
presentation of it.

Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings,
certain experts thought that it was false?

Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from
Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the
documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put
it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not
include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that
information provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. TI don't think so. But all
I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect
the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents,
secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their
agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history,

the way they falsified the official record, they had it with

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the Italians in 1923, Consatatinople, and cases on diplomatic
issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And 1.
there is no way of testing them, the security is such that
they can't be tested.

So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to
state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him
the following questions.

Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes
there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission
was fooled?

Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I

pee la

didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he
was running over there all the time, and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no
reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known
that as a matter of everyday business that they did in fact
run every defector through Department 13?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you
see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to ~~ I used to
see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an advisor officially
to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for
him. And I regarded him as a very personal friend. And I am
Executor of his papers, among other things.

But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him

guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the

TOP SECRET


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FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and ao on, so that he would
be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director,
that were no longer germain to his position on the matter.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and
Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I don’t know the full ‘FBI story. I know
there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the bes
men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt
Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt
Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in
the US, one of the analyzts. And he was in the Washington
Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is

basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources -- that Burt

Turner was handling the Oswald org related matters at the time

the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was
some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had

not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the informa-
tion on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that
there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he
confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit,
or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was
responsible for the death of the President. And he was pretty
forceful about his position. And as a result, this was
expunged or something to that effect. And that is the reason

he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in

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Headquarters,

And then he retired. And I think his retirement had
something to do with this fact.

But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands
of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service
seizing on-‘facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then
going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send
it to Texas.

What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their
system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly
ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And
we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the
controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned
automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there
would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an
operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to
do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him.
There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that.
There would be tetal encapsulation of that individual until
it was ceratin beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent
back as an agent.

Mr. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up,
as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the
views of a number of people. And you said that one person

had changed his mind or recanted subsequently. And you made

a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's

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What was that report?

Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this -- and it was
much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the
inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of
our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word
inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko
matter and see if there is anything there that he should know,
because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole
question of bona fides, and it bothered him, hecause I had

brought him in touch with Golitzen, and he was fully aware of

all my activities, and travels and so on.

And so this person who was chosen began to interview
everybody and reopen the whole thing. I mean, there were 21
safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen
and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed
out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has
happened, of “27 years of experience of myself and my two

colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases

Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean
Rockefeller?

Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, Rockefeller.

There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence
officer in our busienss should know before he even begins to

get his feet wet.

TOP SECRET


Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing

all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergisti

and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which

Prone (Ares 202) 544-6000

we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought

I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians

into take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of
every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize
how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to
this elemental stage of being able to be launched.

That wag sort of a preparatory business. And they

figured it out and they gaid it would take 22 man years, we

meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11

man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and

WARD & PAUL

Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all

this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring

+
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people back and forth and all the rest gf it. And I nver chos
Ay

anybody in that job as a rule who had “either been in the FBI

or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence.

And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business

~- I had men who stayed with me for ll years, Rocca was with
me for 31 years, even though they went into operational situa-
tions abroad and returned, and so on.

And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and

Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany J

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Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Ermine?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon
Stewart -- and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine
executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the
really top-notch men.

'But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce
in terms ~- so he would talk to people and get their views
and so on.

When I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division,
who was then stationed in Paris -- and this is only hearsay,
I never read the report -- the former Chief of the Soviet
Division stated, when I look back it, perhaps I have given
too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yea
or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past

pin enela ee
that this man was an agent provocateur.

Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the
handling of the matter with the Warren Commission?

Me, Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this
may be something. TI don't think I have evern seen the review
-~ in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in
the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the
idea that it was just the ciy state that had this view. This
was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had

dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of

all is Golitzén himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew

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everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 yeara of his life.

Mr. Schwarz. Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr.
Harvey in touch with the Israeli's during the Cuban business.
And we have had a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, 30 we
are moderately well aware of his activities.

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry.

Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy is and we have had a
fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done.
What was the connection between him and the Israeli's during
the Cuban business?

Mr. Angleton. [f will put it very briefly --

Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?

Mr. Schwarz. The witness used the expression Cuban
business. I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the

Shad ;
Cuban business, and second, was is the connection between Mr.
Harvey and the Israeli¢s on this matter?

Mr. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the
importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to
Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking
over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the
Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me,
not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of
differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both

the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being

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planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and
it was foredoomed.

Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami?

Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything,
and so on, there was no cover or second investigation or
anything.

So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I
decided that since we were very close friends that I would
try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown
to everybody. And I went to the Israeli's. And I had them
assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well.

He was born in Bulgaria. He can speak Russian and the Balkan
countriest languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet
intelligence. He was a young officer in the days I am speak-
ing of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he
was ~- and the communications were from him in a one time
pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to
me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence

or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course,
Dick Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. McCone?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone
would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested.

What I am trying to say is, he knew.

Mr. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was DDP --

TOP SECRET


Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into
this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and

SO on.

Prone {Area 202) 544-6000

And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio

going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a

radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is,
I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and to Havana and then put it
someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and. such a place
and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call
some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust

the whole setup.

So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly.

This individual established his cover. They only had two or

WARD & PAUL

three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a
Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go.
And he would spot one of the waiters or a headwater who was
Jewish and it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are
from the Israeli Embassy, and pretty soon one thing led to
another, and his production was without question the greatest
production there was.

Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on]
that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey

together secretly with this individual, the only person I put

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in touch was an Israeli, in this context. So later on the

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WARD & PAUL

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with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what

the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with
all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the
rest, a Little thing involving one man waa not a thing that
you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about.
Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was
he someone you knew?
Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called
him the other day, his mother died.
Mr. Schwarz. I heard that.
Did you know anything about his use of underworld
figures in connection with
Mr. Angleton. I know the allegations.
Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that?
Mr. Angleton. I only know one incident.
Mr. Schwarz. Okay.
Mr. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a
surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer
_ of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in .
Thee 2
Te co, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the
Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich
at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had
surveiled the Mafia all the way from California to National

Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who

was the physical description of Bill to a tee“ And they

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what to do.

Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?

Mc. Angleton. I think it was.

Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill
Harvey?

Mc. Angleton. Bill Harvey.

So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And
I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone
and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to
do anything until they hear from you.

And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on
this and I will be back in touch.

And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how

he had gone over from California and followed him in this

thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.

Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey
went to Rome?

Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was, I think
quite a long time before.

So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on
this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection
with the Mafia and all that, but I @id know him well enough
to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing

happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public

opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left

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410 Esest Street, 8.0. Warmington, D.C. 27000)

the FBI.

So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill

around?

And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.

And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble.
Would you please tell me where I can locate him.

And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert‘'s. And I called
Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. And I turned the
phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the
record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera.

And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear
the discussion. It was something about, I will see you
tomorrow.

And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people
to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.

And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what
Anderson and everybody else has stated.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge
did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in
Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down
there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard?

Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.

Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire
contact with the Israeli‘'s?

Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

TOP SECRET


Senator Tower. We will take a recess for
minutes while we go up and vote.

(A short recess was taken)

Prone [Area 202) 344-6000

“SOMACOis Worderes
Schwarz.

Schwarz. I don't have anything more.

this gall

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‘Me. Angleton. False.

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Senator Tower. That it totally false?

Mr. Angleton. That is totally false.

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to work with Dimona scientists.”

Mr. Angleton. False. I will

’ British-born physicist, now an

with special and esotertte ties to the CIA."
Mr. Angleton. iio" na Srecstses is false.
Senator Tower:

cover that one ,£g60, I assume.

fy.

“Persons cose to Angdeton have Av this account in
recent yon Reflecting Angleton™gitown position, howeve

they haveidenied assertions from other sou
team Wy fissinoable material -- plutonimum

the LSivaelies from United States stocks."

Angleton.

f

Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that

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second paragraph, is where all the questions are raises
Really, the CIA would be hard put to transfer

fissionable materials without the knowledge “wr Atomic

J Energy Commission, would it not?

SiN Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure a, hat the CIA ~~

ally know what the word i means anymore.

There is SO,much use of the atomic éiergy - We have atomic

battery 77

fee ciesigiible materials, I think the

reference here is t at, couvafibe converted to weapons.
Mr. Angleton. I 3 tt categorically ~~ in my whole

ver involved fissionable material

peculations regarding leakages

control ovgreyany stocks of fissionable,

aterials except through the knowledge oO

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nitepy
y want to simply state that there was 4 problem in thepagency
once where you have, Sayr somebody simply approach you aged

state, I have access to fissionable materials, and there fo

if it is a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question

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how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where
allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to
ou the stuff? The purpose then was to penetrate, 9
rate. And I wonder if there wasn't a questignh/at one
» to what we do about it, and what the daagers would
be Lf we Ube the diplomatic pouch, and therefare thousands of

questions. it did happen in the Far pat. And it was a

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false case, Ny pdential case. But it Avs happen. There was
an offer to on eo fissionable’material or something.
,
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knowledge, or an interestaof thdZcra in any shape or form

But my point is, mo never béen initiative to my

wanting any fissionable
Senator Tower.
Mr. Aaron. aT i te Mc. Szule said that "In
effect Mr. ;
Mr. Mann's name,

commit suicide

Mr. “Le I don't think I said ityfto him. But in

the naciie ny mind -- after I left you -- waghwhat I think
hi ‘S
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I a -- and maybe I didn't tell you, maybegl told Colby,
A ys.

someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in

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we had the report or not I don't know. So I ama little

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monfused as to that statement. Because I don't think?the

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Mann and Philby, et cetera.

ad one other segment of his

fer recounting the story of the

ve could conf Many.
one, the timefrant Beas wrong, that itgiias not the early ‘60's, |

reg,

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Late ‘So's after the Sueziwar, and number two,

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Re was concerned there was Yisoesss by the

Yee:
Aaron. Did you make those two corrections

Angleton. I don't understand what you are s@ying.
Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?

Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying

TOP SECRET


Senator Tower. He is reading -- actually what
a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to b

that you did not agree with his story, that you d&

Prone {Mraz 202) $44-6000

eSnfirm the validity of it.
.» Angleton. That part is correct. ie not follow

“last part you are reading.

running
Mr.
that is

Mr.

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koe page 40, from line 8,
"Mr. Angleton O14 me that essential this information was

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correct," t a¢ is absolutely false.

And frover made any such statement¥that I could confirm
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Mr. Aaron. I think that covers it.

Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or more

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were available to the US Government", that is totally fa

TOP SECRET


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Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.

Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance,

. quite different matter.

Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assié

Tear field whatever?

Senator tater.

terms of intellige
Mr. aw 4 No, it wasn't a qu@stion of my admitting,
# -

I told him ene it was well-known that Sane whole field of

ay

ELINT and Any things, that we have worked
vacaer ll
Senator Tower. But not specifically,
i
fh... and nuclear weapon development?

Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.


Mr. Angleton. No.

Prone (Ares 202) $44-6609

“Let me just state my own feeling about some; this.

sources

to Israeli ifiéelligence. Well, I knew 7 t away that that

with some people,

was a lie. I s&{d, after 22 years' wo

they would have bed “ns me out E vee at 3 in the morning.

In other words, in 2 never known them to withhold

WARD & Pau

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410 First Sister, S.C, Watnengion, O.C. 20003

Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instan

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HW 50955 Docld:32423353

aarower. In your

SER ENG

4 secrets?

Mr. Angleton. } an to that?
ye Would you Like to > a
“>

‘Senator Tower. We can go off the record.

ZUR ase seu OLN)

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that
perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we
will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.

Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the FBI matter in
the meantime.

I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate
it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as an expert
on. And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy
assassination.

As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassi-
nation Golitadn' on his own initiative communicated with you
and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who

had a military background to be processed in Department 13?

~ Page 100

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Mr. Angleton. Interrogated, OX processed:

Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of
this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through
this process, and that therefore at least that he might have
been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that
right? .

Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying
to say. His English is such that it igs very di€ficult.

Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years
later -- my recollection is that you gaid it was in 1967 or
1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of
employment of their top operators in the investigation of the
Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind
negate the implication of the. original colitgdn call or that
they were involved?

Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that
man is a man who is also a Suspect of Nosenko.

Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?

Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are
treading on, Golitzen gave us informatian regarding the
penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an
identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking
about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work.
And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and

the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we

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advise that you send it to the Army.

And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was
the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent
FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X"
was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept
that. And in 1967 a Soviet ~~ on whom we had a dossier on thi
thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore
we knew who he was, and ail the rest of it “= with an unknown
coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years
of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he
alleged -- and he was a- noe, temporary duty in Washington

here -- and he established contact with the first Mrg. Helms.

- And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated

that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefectio
or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was
the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went
into the whole background, that this man was one of the
highest grade illegals that they. had ever had, and he was in
our Agency.

So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because
he was one of the two interrogating officers. And ~ can't
talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his
competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.

So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know

about George Blake?

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And then his response was, he says, we thi he is dead.
‘ Ss
‘Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special
L

Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose
mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore
from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was
the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of
Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen
for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came
from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fatherd
and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.

So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is
dead.

Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from
Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to
the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of
Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in
the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and

gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the

nme.
exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been

é
7

simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TOC.
So we handled him for six or seven weeks.
And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation
was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have
/

access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what

cryptonym that we wanted him to work up -- and this would

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what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew?
agents in the West could be under our control as a result of
Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?

And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of
almost getting from our man those four or five- crytonyms,
which would have told them what they wanted to know, because
there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn’t
know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.

So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was
Sort of medium low level stufE£, you couldn't call it chicken
feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he
said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity,
because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American
Department of the KGB,

And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the
Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he “—
there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to
acquire all the information Possible on the whereabouts of
Golitzen and Nosenko. And Iwas actually in Wisconsin. And
I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any
proposal put up by that individual that. would expose -- and I
use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- donte.

A week later is when he got to “Moscow and he sent a cable

to tell us that he can give them word on everything on

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44

Gollitzen.

Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and
with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a
part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the

build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of

the fact that for six months the Place was immobilized for thi
investigation, of all the high level all over the works, 1s
the way he put dt.

Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russiang
treat a returned defector, ahd the way we treat them. And
in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every
interrogated when he teturned from Russia? .

Mr. Angleton. I don't know -~ I Probably would know, but

I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall

within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a
military man who defected. So I don't know’ the answer to that
Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?
Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.
Senator Mathias. Or at-any time?
Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.
Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?
Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.
Senator Mathias. But you think the PBI did?
Mr. Angleton. That -is. just my sensation that they did.

Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.

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be RPA Biss

This is the very last question. You referred to filea
that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the
Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to
pursue that in a personal way.

About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he
came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of
Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of

record?

ae Embassy, then my answer would. be yes.
Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came wa

person witiish im, whose name I don't remember.

contacts, if the

Senat Gn’ Tower. Excuse me. You are talkin
Alon visiting members here on the Hill?

sSenator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to g

dossier might


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At this point my question is on purely a an

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réup which is

Mr. Ang letoh..
Senator wae 3,6
Mr. Angleton. ‘ey are not living in a very ideal world

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in the Agency. We can . process the hard material.

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Senator Mathias. Hee is a hypothetical question,

Qthetical. Let's say our mission,

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instead of visiting Moscow, vitsits Rome or Paris or someplace,
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where it is very easy,“for you tQ:operate. And there were

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meetings with Russidns who were kio

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thing which would get

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Mr. Ang@éton. No. I imagine the ws MI-5, though,
Me &
ee Russians in London, would Poss through liaison

to us, Ge there was something suspicious, would, Pass through
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a report on the meeting. And we have examples ere Czech

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that you have not then identified. We know what they

Or some of the stuff which was passed,

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you would be Bkied in the file, whic
thick, of that soviet activity in My US. And there would be
the fact that he was
“he did this or that.
Senator Mathias.
file,

3
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Mr. Angleton. That#is right

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the Cofigress who would be contacted and notified, and so on.
And fiythink Mc. Hoover's practice was that he would Te@arn
thijéugh his own sources that a person who

y .
going to have lunch with a Congressman or

yand he would pick up the money -- or this

S10 Fest Street, SE. Wainingion,

And I think this is the way he handled it

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following, and there would be a notification that M
notified, et cetera. He called me once when eno
ugh time factor for him to send a letter fie. He said,
doing something at such and such an(Nour, you should
know that, this man is a homosexual, or aofen and so on. And
it may hav Sbeen useful to change the Saree in a hurry. But

¢
Bureau. Whe’ Mr. Hoover intervened

elther a question of time or a

number of things, thei

mine once sia@id, that you don't get news

- Mathias. That is all, Mr.

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Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to
to rehabilitate the Agency .in particular in ae a

gence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating.

awhat things in particular would you do?

fe
ia place, and if you go

to purgatory, my Vitew is, the “ the fires, the better.
So my view is, let Re come ft. And let people take the
consequences. I am notga veyfeves that an agency can have
two fathers. And I don't’ 5 feve in inferlors reporting on

their superiors by directives, And I don't believe that the

Agency below the Direétor has ‘tO, be responsive to two

gpd” Colby what it might be. But to throw the bur
-Fector to respond to 4 question on Chile, gives him
is always in that dual position. And gomething doesn't

to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, eve

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here are so Skemain to everything in thig Zountry relating to

the world balanddyot power and what ene” Soviets will strike
oy
at, and what the rode of detente ish’ That ia what I-am trying
; By

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to get at. The Executive -- inggther words, the intelligence

community has never realy hada day of peace in a way. When
any e/

Hoover passed away, and omer aboard, everyone in the

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situation. It has never been normal before. Mr. Hoover never

a

,
intelligence communit ae we can normalize this

attended an Agency: Heeting. Mr. H@aver never permitted one

of his representatives to go beyond this jurisdiciton question.

and he wants to reestablish }

I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the¥o,

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relates to, not Minter fw but the intelli-

gence community. And now I ams tre gly opposed to professionals

being Directors.

of the idea of two

have to be confirmed and whatnot. And

the busine'ss.
$ ot

ggreter Baker. What do you think of the Roc
Commission reports?

Mr. Angleton. I don‘t see anything wrong with it

Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?

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Mr. Angleton. I really don't know thia area, So TI am

not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen

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in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile ane the

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mentativel uthing.

Mr. Nireton. All the cases sgl sues in the
hands of the rong people, and our fiies in the hands of the
wrong people, would have very geisive political impact upon
our elections. Tha is wnat Mean, to be very frank about it

Senator Baker. Ruowgwould that happen?

Ae

Mr. Angleton. Bige are all kinds of information which,
AN
if it falls into gfe wren nanas Or should they want to use

it for their ow@u ulterior Otives, would be absolutely
damaging.
Senatgy/ Tower. in other weds, this information could

be vd V politicians as a polit tesa football?
hy

4&7 angleton. Precisely. But a%man who would do it

subject to the call of the Chair.)

'

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