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104-10107-10183 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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SC-022.64-53

‘Sucmery of Initial Missions
perloa from 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defenss”. _
subjected ‘to eight penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven >
thin a period of only eight deys. It must be remerdered that
5 the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet

Lite

Ls important because it is clea = »recerial that |

ry defeuss bust ness is conducted over JanéTines “and thus. nok
, conclusions may be drawn. from

} these ere indicated as follows: :

i. In spite of the fact that these missions came as 2 surprise,
mone of them went undetected. ‘This is clear evidence that their
r2car coverage extends above 72, ,C00! feat.

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2. By 5 July 1956, the fourth fist %, the USSR was aware

of the purpose of the missions and were taking counter action.
Cne positive action was the standdow of civil flights while the

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mission aircraft was over the USSR, and a second action which is
b2lieved related is the moving of MIG-19 aircraft imto Eest
trmaay and Poland on.7 July 1956. Also HIG-19's were moved
inte Hungary at ahout this time. -
erformance of the Soviet sysvem on the 5 July mission,
indeed curious. While the action evident fraw Comm?
ar an explanation which appears to fit the known Pacts
fered as follows: As a result of the previous missions » the
ts bad concluded the essential facts concerning the nissions,
+, that they were for reconnaissance, that they flew zbove<65,000™~
et, and that a penetration as deep as Moscow wes possible. They.
obadly surmised that the 3 July mission wes headeé for Moscow when
track appeared on a northeasterly heading. “The toss of the * |
Brget whéi it entered Sovies territory wes provably deliberate and) )*
.the red herring" track returning to the west was either a dodge |‘
/Or e-convenience to avoid broadcasting a track for ell the system ,
'td ses that-a_/ "hostile or intruder" wes eoning over Moscow with no
means available to.stop it. This idea is supported by the use.
@ raid number assigned in the region just beyond the point

ve the track had been "lost". In adai tion, the treck was not yo
2oeled “hostile or intruder" when it ves broadcast after it
pessed beyond Moscow. THe. reporting .o? the track when it did |
Rar Was only by Moscow and it has been suggested that other oo \
tions had been instructed not to broadeast the track. ‘Further, + may.
¥ =ay nov be @ coincidence that the height broadcast was almost _ [
cxectly half of the true altitude of the mission aircraft, but-en
the text missions, four.days later, the altitude reporting was ..--- &
\_Sonsisteatly above"50,000 feet. . CS ae

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9 July 1956, in addition to the evident recogition of
ight of the mission flights, tracking was better and
he performance of the werning system was nuch improved.

9+ “he next day, 10 July 1956, ‘the Soviet air defense warning }
SYStSG closed a 3000 mile track with only tyo short periods of . ~
*usion or track loss. Altitude reporting vas over 60,000 feat
2 one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 feet off target.

6. The first cight missions proved that the air defense warning
systen is deployed in dopth. (This was evident fran both the ‘continuity |
OF treck and most foreéefilly fron the ELD date collected. Some 163: ~
Va cepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 ne/s band were
o asd by project ELIUT as follows: TOXEN-1331, WHIFT-37, GAGE-26,
2 -37, Otner 30. These numbers cennot be equated to tn-

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adar sets since the same redar nay be intercepted more than
+ TOKEN sites were Located, including 213 new sites. Some

a1 TOKEN signals were identified out aveileble information
determination of location so that $+ must be con-
ese signals inelude both known and new sites. Because
imitetion of ELINT to the 3000 ne/s band and the Soviet ; !
collocating radars on different frequencies the total

of radars may be expected to be 2t.least double the numbar . to
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SC-02164-58

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. 3102 and track loss seemed to be related to the >
ar Ba TH BURDETS OF Tignters alt tnaovgn the saturation point
azterminsd because of insufficient date.

has not bd

8. The question of radars for height finding, ‘the | capabilities
of TOXEN in this role, the introduction oe ROCK CAKES end later
acvelormients are discussed in enother section. It is believed,

however, that these missions were & catalyst in the imbroduction

cf ROCK CAKEs.

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