180-10131-10325) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

JFK Assassination System : Date: 10/19/20
Identification ‘orm :

Agency Inform ition

AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: = 180-10131-10325

RECORD SERIES: SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY

“AGENCY FILENUMBER: 014725

Document Info: mation

ORIGINATOR: HSCA
FROM: TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH .
TO:

TITLE: DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR..

DATE: 06/29/1978
PAGES: 48

SUBJECTS : ;
: CIA, METHODOLOGY

TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TES] IMONY BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ;

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIO ), DEFECTION TO RUSSIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS: 3 ;
CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 03/26/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 5 - .

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Bernard Hugh Tovar

‘TESTIMONY OF:

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‘ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

‘Thursday, June 29, 1978

.U. S. House of Representatives,

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| John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
| Washington, D. C.
| eposition of: -

i — BERNARD HUGH TOVAR

lealies for examination by stiff counsel for the subcommittee,

second and D. Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. Ce, beginning at j

b: :00 o'clock P- m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Publici
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bursuant to notice, in the oj'fices of House Annex II, Room 3370,
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iin and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf |

f the respective parties:

or the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff Counsel
ELIZABETH WOLF
For the Deponent:

(There was-representaticn by counsel)

asm

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Bernard Hugh Tovar.

_ today. You are here voluni:arily today?

Script of a deposition to he made available to a witness and

to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript.

lUr DEGREL 2

TESTIMONY’ OF HUGH TOVAR
Mr. Goldsmith. State your name for the record.

Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is

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Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith,
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Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations.
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I.have ‘been designated by he Committee to take your deposition)
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Mr. Tovar. Yes. * \
Mr. Goldsmith. You hive the right to have counsel present.
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Do you waive that rigkt? ‘

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have vou read a copy of the Committee's

supporting resolution?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have vou had a chance to read Rule Number
4?

Mr. Tovar. I have.

‘Mr. Goldsmith. The Committee rules provide for the tran--

actually be delivered for s:etention by any witness that. gives

the Committee’ a statement. However, by virtue of the arrange-
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ment that the Committee has; worked out with the CIA, the Agency;

has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us,
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The reason for that is because the transcript frequently

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3 that information to be kept in our secure area here. “So I i
@ 4 would “like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of |
5 _ your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you,
6 | will be given a right to review. the. transcript for accuracy, |
: ° make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional !
8. statement ‘ ;
$ | Mr. Tovar. I agree. |
10 | Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you that the court
N | reporter will provide you “vith a transcript and the transcript |
12 will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and 2
-. 13 true record of all the tes:imony that you give here today. |
, e td ! Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that’ correct? |
18 | Mr. Tovar. Yes. |
16 . Mr. Goldsmith.. I had given you earlier a copy of a. letter, .
i7 | dated 23 March 1978 from M:. Carlucei to the Chairman of this :
13 | Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter? :
19 | Mr. Tovar. I have. !
20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it? |
; 21 | Mr. Tovar. I underst.ind it. 7
o 22 | Mr. Goldsmith. ‘hen { think we are ready to proceed to :
ied 13 | the substance of the questioning. What is. your present position
7 14 : with the CIA? |
- 38 Mr. Tovar. I am the chief of the Counterintelligence

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Staff of the Directorate o:} Operations.

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Mr. Goitdsmith. How long have you been working in that |
capacity? | |
Mr. Tovar. Ever since: a year ago April. |
Mr.. Goldsmith. How long have you been working with the :
Agency? |
Mr. Tovar. Thirty: yeers.
Mr. Goldsmith. What vas your assignement prior to becom-
ing Chief of the CI Staff? |
Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where I
was Station Chief in Bangkck and three years before that,

Chief of the Station in Lacs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to assuming your position as Chief

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-of- the CI Staff had you hat. extensive experience in the area of!
counterintelligence? .

Mr. Tovar. No, not perticularly. We don't as a rule
Specialize. We are normally generalists. I do not consider
myself a counterintelligence expert.

Mr. Goldsmith.. Durin¢. the years 1959 to '63 what position, —
did you occupy with the Agency?

Mr. Tovar. In :1959 I was Chief of Station in Kuala: -
Lumpur in Malaysia. .

In 1920, I came back end I was originally Deputy Chief and
then Chief of the Branch ir. Far East. Division which controls |
operations in. the Phillipires, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia,._

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New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964.

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Mr. Goldsmith. Have '70u had a chance to review CIA |
document number 1817 and tie pages that follow it? H

Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these.

They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander.
. Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling us that today is the first;

chance you had to read then?

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Mr. Tovar. I did not read. them this time. They went to
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Mr. Goldsmith. They were prepared by whom?
Mr. Tovar. Jack Friedlander, Chief of Operations. They

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you, to the Committee but { have since read them. i
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were signed by him, not prepared by him. They would have been |
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originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not

sure which. I think Kowaliki almost certainly. ,

1817 was a response by thé Agency to an inguiry by the ©

Mr. Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No.
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Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for
the Agency =) debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors
I believe it is fair to sav by way of summary that the memo
gays that it was not in fact standard operating procedure
during the years 1959 to 153 to debrief such individuals, ‘Is

that correct?

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Mr. Tovar. Insofar a: I understand it. My knowledge is.
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limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this:

period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know what _

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4 the current policy was then.

What I have been told: since by those. who should -know is
that there was no policy as set: forth here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do. you know what the criteria were for

selecting the 117 individuals whose files were reviewed?

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Mr. Tovar. Wo. I think someone mentioned the other day
that the names were incorporated ina memorandum I think ori- |
ginionially by the FBI but’ :: would not certify to that. |

Mr. Goldsmith, Mr. Tovar, since you have no direct | :
knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and,
for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for |
choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions |
pertaining to that document:. .I would like to request that you |
communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the |
Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the |
actual direct. preparation of the document so that I could runs
some time with him.

Mr. Tovar. The document, of course, is over my signature,)
so I stand behind the document. I am responsible for what |
was Said there. If it is .ncorrect then I am incorrect in |
leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand know-|
ledge of the research he did to. arrive at the conclusion here

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which he presented to me and I éndorsed. I am prepared to stand

‘behind it but I will give ‘ou his name. 7
Mr. Goldsmith. I wan: to ask you some questions about thei

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' review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to

‘under the name Thomas Morr:.dian.M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N. While you

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document. CIA no. 1818 indicates that CI Staff has completed a

the USSR between 1959 and ‘63 and since returned to the United
States. Is that correct? '58 to '63?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I wou..d like you to review the statement

read that paragraph, I will. state for the record thst the way.
the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard
operating procedure to deb:-ief such individuals, that of 117
people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed.
Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were
debriefed. |

I have now requested lir. Tovar to read the first summary
which is right next to the name of the first person who was
debriefed. |

Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. When’ did that individual defect?

Mr. Tovar. 1947 is. the :year“he!went to.the-USSR. I
assume ‘that “is the year he defected, if that is the term.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that in fact that individual was not
someone who defected between 1958 and 1963?

Mr. Tovar. That is correct. |

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at the next individual under

B,. Joseph Marshall.

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Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. “When did Mr. Marshall defect?

Me. Tovar. It is not clear. He was born in the US in
1897, He said he was employed in Hawaii in 1921. ‘There is no
indication whence he went i:o the USSR.

Mr. Goldsmith. There :.s no indication he defected between
*58 and '63?

Mr. Tovar. No. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945.
Conceivably he might have defected after that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The letter non, Tommaro $-G-0-V-I-0.

Would you please read that section and tell us when this indi-

Mr. Tovar. Again, he went to the USSR with his parents
in the 1930s. No indication when he defected. He left the
USSR in 1960. No way of telling. ,

Mr. Goldsmith. This individual: did not defect between
"58 and '63?

Mr. Tovar. At last we: have no indication he did. one
would assume to the contrary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Lette: "pe, Mary Mackler,.will you please |
vead the first summary and tell us when she defected?

Mr. Tovar. There is ro indication when she defected.
She went to the USSR with rer parents in 1931. Sometime after,!.

married a Soviet. -

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Mr. Goldsmith. Again, no indication she defected between
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2 Mr. Tovar. No. :
3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look at letter "E". Sonia and |
@ 4 | Fréd A-S-I-N-I-A-N, When did they defect? | |
5 | ‘Mr. Tovar. ‘They renounced their US citizenship in 1948.
| So I assume that is the operative year. |
? Mr. Goldsmith. Will -ou look at the letter “F" “now? |
a | Mr. Tovar. Jack Kuraiski. |
9 | Mr. Goldsmith. When did he defect? 7
10} . Mr. Tovar. He recoun2ed his US citizenship in "34 and :
"| departed USSR I assume in 1934. |
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oe 12 Mr. Goldsmith. ‘The point I am trying to make is that the |
-e 13 memo responding to the Comnittee's inquiry makes reference to |
7 | ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and 163, |
‘Si Ttothen proceed. to provide us with ten names. But in fact,
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if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven

of the ten individuals did not defect during that time period.

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* Some of them did return ducing that time period. |
aan Mr. Tovar. And were jebriefed. ; .
20| Mr. Goldsmith. And were debriefed. |
21 | Mr. Tovar. Contacted.
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eo 22 Mr. Goldsmith. Of th: ten, perhaps three or four returned
2 ; 3 during the relevant time p2riod. I asked those questions
24 | Mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response
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given. was not really --

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Mr. Tovar. -- precisely what you wanted?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. :
Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would i
assume that the criteria they applied here as best they could |
was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed ; !
er contacted? In some casus they hit one out of three, in
other cases two out of three. I think they were giving the
best correlation with your criteria that they could. |
Mr. “Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be then|
that the introductory sect:.on should not have ‘stated that these
were people in 1958 and '6:; when in fact they were not. :
Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement;

Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good state-

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Mr. Goldsmith. Here js the letter dated April 6, 1978
which I show. you just for your information to show you what the!
Committee was requesting from the Agency. Jf you will look»

under number two.

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Mr. Tovar. ‘Then this would appear to correlate with thet.
You asked’ to indicate whetter the AGency from '58 to '63 |
interviewed or debriefea fc rmer American defectors. So, the
time they defected is not the’ operative consideration. ;
Mr. Goldsmith. No, it. was not. :
Mr. Tovar. the time of the debriefing --

Mr.. Goldsmith. Yes, that would be the focus.

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Mr. Tovar. So these would be at. least. consistent with thak.

unless there were a specif:.c counterintelligence concern.

2 _ Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, --hat is true. I would like also for |
| purposes of further clarif:.cation, to have you.read the letter
@ 4 dated May 12, 1978 startiny with the second full paragraph.
‘| It is not ‘numbered. |
‘| Mr. Tovar. Yes. |
| Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your background
a purposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event, |
I would appreciate having t:he name of the individual who |
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«| prepared the memo passed al.ong to the Office of the Legislative|
" Counsel. . :
~ 2 Mr. Tovar. Yes sir. |
.. 7 Mr. Goldsmith. The response that was provided to the |
- @ is | ‘Committee indicates that i:he CIA had no standard precedure for
is debriefing. returning US de: ‘ectors. What was the basis for mer
16 policy or actually for the absence of the policy?
| Mr. Tovar. I don! t know. I can speculate only -~- not \
=| having been there and not having any involvement -- 1 don't :
9 | know what mentality of those in charge was at that time.
20 | - Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your specilation be? |
2 | Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with and |
- x») || debriefing, in effect the supervision of: Americans in that ;
-@ sg | category would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rule !
| 7 would not. have had any bas:.c interest or reason to be involved:
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Mr. Goldsmith. Does :he Agency today have a policy of,

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3 ing defectors? |
@ ‘ | Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.
s Mr. Goldsmith. Again. would you Say you relied on the
2 FBI to conduct those interviews?- |
; Mr. Tovar. Yes.
a Mr. Goldsmith. Is thre any coordination between the
Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone
10 | in fact is returning? | |
" Mr. Tovar. On Americin defectors, the type you are speak-
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12 | ing of here? _
oo | Mr. Goldsmith. An American defector who is repatriated.
@ ls ‘Mr. Tovar. I know of no case where they would be - |
7 interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure
" in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of
i7 | a case of returning Americans, Say we learned it from an
i | overseas station and it seeméd of interest, we would probably
19 | refer it directly to the FI by letter.
20 | | I am speculating here because I know of no case in point.
7 Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contact
. 2 | ingthe Bureau and informing them of a returning defector?
-@ 93 Mr. Tovar. Not that °° am aware of.
vs Mr. Goldsmith. You would be the person who would be aware!
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as { of such a procedure?

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Mr. Tovar. Berween tie Soviet-East European Division and | ;
cI Staff we should be awar2 of it. The two were most primarily
concerned with the USSR. © [ think one or the other of us would
inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern: The
Americans, even when they have been naughty boys, having gone

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to USSR and decided to return, we still don't have necessarily

a professional interest in that type of person.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the xesponsibility of the CI Staff

within the CIA?

Mr. Tovar. In a coup..e of sentences it is a little
difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has ‘two
principal areas of activity. We are first of alla staff.

Are you familiar with the : staff as opposed to the division? .

Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not.

DDO?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. .

Mr. Tovar. You know vyenerally how we are organized?

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Mr. Tovar. You have seen the table of organization of |
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Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

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Mr. Tovar. The main set of components of the Directorate |

is divisions and staffs. “he divisions operate a function overt

the Directorat and we support the Director, we suppor one

another in an advisory capacity and in various ways. So, we
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are not an operating component. “We don't run spies. . We have

vee eee nt ie ee ep

GS o oy) o rh re w
sents ents ae ae re ee ee oe ee en te ee ees a —-. --

Nae”

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a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not ih
the true sense of the term an operating element. |
' So, having said that, the primary field of activity for |
the CI Staff is research and analysis, and then the other, |
what we refer to as operat:.ons coordination. Now, that is sort|
of the term which ‘does not -- research ’and’analysi’. is clear. |
We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not |
scrutinizing people. We acre looking at intelligence operations;
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old and current, primarily things that are not terribly |
current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the: 7
analytic sense. We take o..d cases and look them over to see :
if mistakes were made, to .see ifve can derive lesssons from |
mistakes made in the past. We :publish papers for the Agency's |
community at. Large, all-in the R&A field... 7. 5°

On the! othér:side we sunction in the sense of a true staff,

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We keep our fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas
We monitor what they are doing, not in the sense of being
spooky but we simply read «he correspondence. We are given

normal distribution of mosi: correspondence coming hack from —

overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence

activities abroad. ; oO oo

To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency

on operational activity ac::oss the board. So, we are generally!

aware of the operational patterns of activity that prevail in

various overseas stations. On that basis we are in a position

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to advise the DDO or Directorate as to the level of performance!
the kind of activity conducted, the quality, the proper or

improper degree of emphasis. We maintain an overview on behalf

of DDO.

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3 “Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards
6 counterintelligence threats of a foreign nature?
? | Mr, Tovar. Yes, totally. |
3 Mr. Goldsmith. You would not be concerned at all with
3 counterintelligence threats domestically?
| 7 Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever.
n | Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the
. 12 responsibility of the Bureiiu?
a ag | Mr. Tovar. Absolutely.
e | I1-|_~__tte.-Goldsmith. Now;—l.ee-Harvey Oswald returned from the
i coe,
5 | Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Sovietion Union he worked
“| as a worker ina radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there
a7 was someone concerned about: his being a counterintelligence
a threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you tendin)
19 | questions but: would it. be Yair to say that would be more :
20 | the responsibility of the Iureau rather than the Agency upon {
2 | his actual return? |
ot 2 | Mr. Tovar. Yes, the cuestion whether or not. he was, let — ;
aud 3 | us say, a counterintelliger.ce threat. |
_ . Mr. Goldsmith. KGB acjent? ,
{

Mr. Tovar. That would be a Bureau concern, no question

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2 Mr. Goldsmith. However, would the Agency make any effort |
, a to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet |
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: @ ‘ | Union to the United States?  «* ti. | |
s| Mr. Tovar. You are Speaking of what the Agency might have|
6 | done in '63 or '62? |
;
z . Mr. Goldsmith. ‘62. |
g “Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the
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7 would like to think we woud be interested in what he is doing.;
OW | At the time: I. don't know. I would think, why not. On the |
2 other hand, I couldn't say they would or should be interested. i
7 a) It was not their primary p::ecise prerogative. I think if ‘they
@ ls | could, as I assume they. did, the Bureau would discharge its ;
s| responsibilities. vis-a-vis any American: of questionable )
ts | propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the |
i7 | Bureau. .
a Mr. Goldsmith. “That would be the aspect of Oswald where
7 there was a concern taht he posed | a ‘counterintelligence threat.,
20 | What about the fact that Oswald May have had positive intelli-
21 | gence information that wou..d have been helpful to the Agency?
a 2 | That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau? |
” e %3 : Mr. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been !
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appropriate for the Agency. if the assumed the point you made, :

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to seek an interview with him, I think the appropriate 1
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vehicle for that would have. been the Domestic Contact Division
which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this
memorandum. |

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of the Domestic
Contact Division?

Mr. Tovar. They are -cesponsible for intelligence that
can be checked properly and legally in the United States *..0
normally through American pusinessmen or American persons and
nonofficials who travel ab:-oad and acquire intelligence of
interest. This is not jus: USSR. It could be any other
country. Their primary field of activity is to contact and
debrief on a vluntary basi:, if they so choose to respond,
Americans who return from overseas.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inquiry

concerning the CI's policy as to returning American defectors

was routed to your staff, cr Staff. When the memo was prepared!

by the CI Staff for the Committee, was it done with the thought

of representing the éntire agency or just the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. It is difficult for us to presume to speak for
the entire agency; I thin< on this matter we are. speaking for
the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. That is really the area with which
I was concerned: anyway, Directorate of Operations.

Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of

Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing,

which might be construed a3 having an interest in this type —
,
é

iuUr woeHs

18

of activity, would be the SC Division. On this I think the

Mr. Tovar. In the asecne of a policy, of a guideline, a

|
|
2 |
7 cI staff could be considered as speaking for the Directorate.
wa | a Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Domestic, Contact Division part of
@ ; the CI Staff?
. Mr. Tovar. No, part of the Directorate of Operations. |
| ‘Mr. Goldsmith. The response of the Agency dated April |
| 20, 1978, which appears in CIA Number 1818, indicates. that
to)
| contact seems ‘to be based on opportunity and circumstance. |
. Then it goes on to-say only ten of the 117 persons have had
7 any contact with CIA. Would it be possible for you to go into
‘ more dtail on what is méant. by opportunity and circumstance? ©
i | ;
|

procedure, internal instruction which says you will debrief

Americans who return from having resided in the USSR, in the

"absence of that, this thing is left to chance obviously. I

i
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16 i |
i cannot explain to » you how the names of these 11 ‘passed the desk|
“| of “whoever was in charge at. the time, but assuming they did, ; |
* | my guess, and it is wally only a guess, would be that the
in person who read that, whate:ver document it was, would say, !
20 | “Hmmph! He looks like, he might’ be interesting", and perhaps |
“| would then get in contact with CCD and suggest if they get in !
. @ ° | contact with a person, let us say he is known to “be living in |
~~ ° | New York, suggest that they might want to seek out his Location
aT and if possible interview lim.
ae fi

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‘the assassination of the P:-esident, there has arisen a group of

have reviewed releases made under the Freedom of Information

it. that Oswald received unusuil treatment at the hands of the CIA.

BUr Dpeudti  — os 19

“I think it would be a matter of chance in-the sense that.

the analyst or whoever it vas who reviewed that document, might

react, and yet he or she m.ght not, too, depending on how they

woke up that morning. It :.s sheer whimsy.
Mr. Goldsmith. Let me explain to you why the question
whether or not it was standard operating procedure to debrief

returning defectors is important to the Committee. Since
researchers who have reviewed the Warren Commission Report and

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Act by the CIA and the FBI. '

Having reviewed these materials the argument has been made

One example of this unusual treatment is that there is no
record of Oswald having been debriefed by the CIA upon his
return. For that reason, ve are focusing on this issue. Is
there any way you can give us guidance on how to respond to
that question?

Mr, Tovar. I can't becuase I am sphculating every step
along. the way. I would hesitate to say more than Oswald
simply didn*t connect with whoever happened to be looking --
let us assume his name appeared. Was his namde in the list?

Mr. Goldsmith. Now That is the list of people who were
debriefed. |

Mr. Tovar. One huridr2d seventeen?

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i “Mr. Goldsmith. I haven't seen the list of 117 people.

2] Mr. Tovar. What is tis? ;
a | Mr, Goldsmith. ‘That is a list of 350 odd people I was
@ ; | going to ask you about. However, since you don't have knowledge
| of the 117, I am not going to ask -ou about them. |
6 | Mr. Tovar. If Oswald's name was on the list, I can't |
; explain why he might not have been contacted. Maybe he dian’ |
a appear attractive or interesting enough. I don't know what |
: a information might. have been given with these namés on the list,
i : ns :
io such as a memo from the FBI or State Department, whoever had !
nN | originated it, what they said that would have titilated the
1 | analyst who might have seen it that would have elicited a |
.. 2 response on the part of thes analyst who would say “Ah, let us |
@ oi look into this further." !
ist Mr. Goldsmith. ‘In particular, a lot of focus has been
. given to Mr. Robert Edward Webster, who appears in CIA Number
| 1820 who defected approximately the same time that Oswald did
1a | and returned at approximat.2ly the same time that Oswald did and
| who was debried by the CIA for two weeks in Virginia.
20 | Mr. Tovar. I didn't ‘cnow that he was. It doesn't say so
21 | here. |
a 2! Mr. Goldsmith. That joes not indicate the extend of the
i . ;
@ %3 debriefing. That information was obtained independently by
|
|

this Committee.

2
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en -

Mr, Tovar. The name neans nothing to me so I can't -

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enlighten you on it.

| a
2 | - Mr. Goldsmith. ‘Does che CIA have any affiliation with.
3 | ' erganizations in the United States who might be responsible for
: @ : | debriefing someone? |
— 5 | Mr. Tovar. Not that am aware of. |
6 | Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, if anyone is going to be |
7 | debriefed it would be by the Domestic Contact Division? |
8 Mr. Tovar. In the in-:elligence sense. In the sense of |
9 | elucidation of datelligenc:, DCD would do it. A different type
10 of inquiry, personal inves::igation, the office of Security, on
nN | whoever itoworks through, would ‘be the one. a |
WR | : The one we are talkiny about, DCD is the only organization
.. i3 | I know of. I can visualiz: a circumstance under which operating
, e 14 | components might seek out in individual or might have in times
18 past but I can't think of a case in point in my own recollec- :
16 tion. I would say, given ‘he strictures on our operating in
17 | the United States, we would rely upon DCD to do it if they had
a | any positive intelligence connotation. If it were of an
19 : operational nature today, she Foreign Resourees Division might.
20 pursue it. |
1 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.
ae 29 Mr. Tovar. It is the division level of the Directorate.
@ | 3 | It is the division which seeks in the United States to develop
24 | potential intelligence assets for : abroad” I think I had ©
a6 better defer to the other people on that. That is roughly where

}
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several volumes to it -- which relates to an individual. It

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it stands. They certainly would not have interest in debrief- |
ing defectors that I am aware of. .

. Mr. Goldsmith. In anv event, for the purposes of summary,j
there is today no standard operating procedure of interviewing
returning defectors?

i
Mr. Tovar. Right, insofar as I am aware, there is none. |

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard operating procedure

between the Bureau and the CIA which would coordinate any ef fork

to contact returning defect:ors and share information?
g

Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area which I would like

to gt into briefly, would vou define what a 201 file is?

Mr. Tovar, A 201 file is a file or files -- it could be

might pose a dicotony, a 201 file and project file. A project
file might deal with an act:ivity, say collection operations in
Timbucktu, a broad. scale o: activity involving several numbers
of people, there might be several 201 files, A, B, C, who were
associates in that project. The 201 file would be on the
individual himself.

; Mr. Goldsmith. Ti would contain primarily biographic
information?

My, Tovar. No. It would contain a much vaster -- some

of them might contain one sheet of paper with name, rank and

; — i |
‘date of birth. But if the association with him developed and |
. . : - i

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became more extensive, it :night contain a considerable amount
of information. If he became involved with this ope-ation it
might include operational naterial, intelligence operations
as well, all part of the 2)1 complex. .

' The point I am making is that it is an individual file

‘aS opposed to an activity file.
Mr. Goldsmith. If you.wanted to learn about the operation

‘that an individual was involved in, would you go to his 201

file or to his operations file?

Mr. Tovar. I would g..to the 201 file first. There might

not be an operations file. In'fact, in the vast majority of

the 201 cases there are no operational files because there is

no hard and fast rule on wien you open a 201 file or who opens

a 201 file.
If I, for example, am overseas and I become interested in

a person who looks to me to have considerable promise from the

. operational standpoint, sav a local foreign type, I might give

my own local checks, I might examine my own files to see if I
know anything about him. Then I say to headquarters "here is
Joe Doe. He is interestin to me for. these reasons. Will you
please check against. headquarters records and other agencies
ana let me know if you hav: anything of interest on him."

I might not ask for a 201 file. Headquarters might then,
because they thought he wa; interesting, open a 201 file.

Conversely, I might likewise say this looks terribly interest-

7

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ing Please open a 201 file and give me all of the information

_y

2 you can collect on: him." .
3 | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that the fact that someone
j
@ 4 | has a 201 file does not mein at all that the individual was
5 |: involved in any operations of the Agency. If you;wanted toget
}
é| information of an operational nature, would you go both to the
, 201 file and operations file? ) |
3 | ) Mr, Tovar. Assuming -:here was information of an opera~ -
a tional nsture?
10 Mx. Goldsmith. Yes. . ; . :
nde Mr. Tovar.. Yes, indecd we would.
aT Mr. Goldsmith. If soneone is an agent of the CIA -- I |
-. ia | am not referring now to case officers or staff agents -- some- |
is | one is a field agent for the Agency, would that fact be indi- |
1s | cated in the 201 file? |
is Mr. Tovar. Yes.
| Mr. Goldsmith. In the Directorate of Operations someone
e might open up a 201 file on an individual if the person was |
is | of a potential positive intelligence significance? !
20 | Mr. Tovar, Or counte: intelligence, either one. |
2 | : Mr. Goldsmith. — That was going to be my question. The
a 2 CI Staff in particular, when would you have occasion to open a }
-@ 13, | 201 file? |
2 | Mr. Tovar. CI staff would not necessarily be the only one!
|
2 | !
!

to open a.201 file. In the case of a person of CI interest,

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se i integrated in the files of the Directorate or it is in the

ivr oceaci | 25
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lied
a field station might have a counter~-person I described earlier,

and become interested in him because he did have some CI

a

attraction or interest. The station itself or the division wou
open the 201 file. It woud not be us. The CI Staff as a rule
is not involved in that type of thing.

At this stage of the yame since we are not operating and

we are not out soliciting new contacts, we are not working in

-——-$ + ----- a

that sense of the term, we don't to my: knowledge originate 201
files.
Mr. Goldsmith. The C: Staff does not open up 201 files?
Mr. Tovar. There is no reason that we couldn't,
Mr. Goldsmith. As a pratical matter?
Mr. Tovar. As practical matter it does not work that way.

Our research is primarily -‘ocused upon established cases, cases

that may:even be dead, terminated, or dormant, or even current

in certain cases, but as a .¥ule not very many | 201 file is

opened by someone else. We: may examine those files and review
them. We do review other ictivities. But the 201 file would
be in existence. They ’.whould not be created by ourselves.

In former days when C:: Staff files were segregated from
therest of the Directorate it might have been different. I
don't: know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

Mr. Tovar. Say prior to 1974, 1957. Today our foles are

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| Process of being integrate. We have been working on this.

three years to make sure, when you go to the central files and

research a name, if there .s something in the CI Staff reposi-

un

This is one of our major f:.nal exercises in the past two or

tory that will turn up when you are making a check of the

*| index.
7 | ‘Mr. Goldsmith. Will nost 201 files be open as a result of;
8

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information coming into headquarters from the field, one of
i
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_§ | the field stations?
10 1 Mr. Tovar. Yes, the vast majority. In years before when |
ny they has such programs as MH Chaos, I assumed they opened 201 |
12 | files of their own. —

Mr. Goldsmith. What :.s that?.

|
| |
: : | :
| Mr. Tovar. MH Chaos-program? —— - remem er rnrnnns wea o

. . . 4

. ; aaa

| Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, will you indicate what that
i)

i
16 program is?

:

7 | “Mr. Tovar. I frankly would rather not becuase I don't :

13 | know the precise definition of the program. It was a program |

19 | which. has been described ir. the press as domestic surveillance.

39 Whether that is the correct: proper designation, I don't know. |

21 | Our CI Staff does not normi:lly Open a 201 file. We don't have !

_ 22 | occasion to. 2

ao . . : mf

ed | %3 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands” |
24 | for? |

mies

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—_ ; i
Mr. Tovar. Counter I:telligence/Special Investigative
. ‘ 7 i

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‘on the subject, but I have been given to understand that was one

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ivr OVLLALI | 27
| |
Group, I think it is. Invastigative or investigations, I don't!

know which.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is that group still in existence today?
Mr. Tovar. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. When iid it go out of existence?

\
|
Mr. Tovar. I don't k10w exactly. Before my time. I :
think it ended in '73, '74,,'75. I am not sure. _ |
Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo. know what the function of that |
group was? | . |

Mr. Tovar. Only in a very vague sort of way. I have hear

8

‘ about it, it was the inves:igative group in the CI Staff that

investigated whatever the 7I Staff did in those days. I can't

‘they did but I would be hesitant to make a general definition

of their function.

1
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speak to that with any first hand knowledge... I know some things
|
Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo: know whether the function of that
. i
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group was to investigate Ayency employees who were suspected

of having been penetrated?

Mr. Tovar. © I think, because I have seen nothing in writing

{

of their functions in the sontext of their responsibilities |
that was included. But I oam no authority on the subject. !
Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether CI/SIG would have |

; ‘

occasion to open a 201 fil?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate. I don't know,’

‘
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Mr. Goldsmith. What vould your speculation be?

|
2 | | ae 7
Mr. Tovar. I would speculate in the days when they were
: functioning they probably did. You have a very unauthoriative
- ) | ‘ | witness on that subject. |
>| Mr. Goldsmith. What is the relationship if any between
| ;
6 | the Office of Security and the CI Staff?
a Mr. Tovar. We have basically different functions. The
S| Office of Security is unde:: the Directorate of Administration
: and is responsible for the personnel and physical security of
ie | the entire division.: It.focuses on personnel security and
ul physical security.
12 | The CI staff as I described it, is an element of DDO
t ; ;
-. 17'| concernea with research and analysis and ‘operation and coordi-
._ :-I-wations “The relation between us and the Office of Security is i
is simply that between us and another fraternal element of the
| Agency which has responsib:.lity which sometimes comes close
17 | together.
i Mr. Goldsmith. Does che Office of Security maintain
9 | files which contain information of a derogatory nature on
t .
20 | individuals, not necessari'::y limited to Agency employees?
af Mr. Tovar. To my knowledge they don't. My assumption is
e@ 22 ii Ihave never seen what ..s in their files -- my assumption is
at 33 that they have files only on Agency personnel. I. cannot
2 | visualize circumstances under which they would maintain infor-
a

25 % mation on people who are not in the Agency or who had not been

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Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

‘Security may be different today from what it was in 1959 with

HUF S2UREI a9
applicates for employment and then left.
Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Office of Security interested in

Maintaining information so that if in the future an individual

was being considered for employment in some capacity with the

Agency the Secuirty Office: would have that information on
him?
Mr, Tovar. I cannot visualize that heppening today.
Mr. Goldsmith. I wou!.d like to ask you to read CIA 0786,

which is a document that this Committee obtained from the

Mr. Tovar. That sort of suggests they maintained such =|
information then. I still cannot visualize there doing it
today.

Myr. Goldsmith. | Do you think the function of the Office of

regard to maintaining such files?
Mr. Tovar. The funct:.on, I would use the term function,

I would say the policy of -c:he Office as far as the way the

office operates today. I «don't know what they do intrinsically.
I cannot visualize their maintaining that kind of current .-.°

records today. Maybe this is historic, it was in the files

since 1969. With the injunction against destroying files,
the files remained.
If it was John Q. Doe appearing today in a similar context

I would not visualize the Office of Security maintaining this

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kind of document.

‘Mr. Goldsmith. To whom would. this document go today?

Mr.. Tovar. ‘You mean from the State Department?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, a State Department document. Which
is indicating that an American citizen is giving information,
intelligence information t> a: foreign country, to whom in the
CIA would that document go?

Mr. Tovar. I am not sure it would come to the CIA at all
because the CIA does not -have responsibility for that type of
person. I think it would jo to the FBI,

“Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the individual is overseas?

Mr. Tovar. Yes. He is an American..- ‘Again, this is
speculation. I don't know what moves the person who releases
cables to the Moscow Embassy today. He might decide or some~
body here in State Securit; might decide that CIA should see
this. In.that event, it pcobably would go to the Office of
Security as a matter of information...

Mr. Goldsmith. Would information contained in this type
of telegram normally lead -o the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. I would tiink not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Tovar. There is nothing that suggests here this
is going to be of continuing interest to the CIA, This is -

1959. Let us say in 1962 ‘che man came back and another message!

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or was of interest and so wn and maybe there are reasons for

debriefing, I can visualize a 201 being opened if the matter

-were of apparent continuiny interest. I can see no reason why

a 201 would be opened in this case.
Mr. Goldsmith. What :.£ this telegram was followed by a
aable indicating that the adividual haa decided to defect?
Mr. Tovar. What do you mean? He is applying for Soviet

citizenship, so he is defec:ting here?

Mr. Goldsmith. You a:te correct. I withdraw the question.

Mr. Tovar.. I think basically my point is that it is a
fact that a 201 need not be: opened up on this type -- this is
a casual piece of informat:.on. If one could eliminate the
name Lee Harvey Oswald, wh:.ch raises flages, it is John Doe
and there is nothing in th:.s -- someone might say what an SOB
this is but there is nothing to indicate anything but an
unfortunate incidental event, I would say today, “why bother:.
We have enought to do without opening 201 files on péople of
that nature." The encyclopedic approach is not one that we
try to appiy.

Bear in mind, I am do:ng a lot of speculating here. I
perhaps shouldn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. You really aren't aware of what the
procedure would be in 1959 for dealing with a telegram like

this?.

Mr, Tovar. No. I woild still say today I would not expe

7 on

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NW 48331 Docra:4

that kind of document to be retained in Agency files anywhere.

Mr. Tovar.

citizens?

concerned with Americans o:' counterintelligence interest. If
an overseas station is informed by somebody that an American

is contacting the Soviets and is apparently engaged in what

2277210 Page 34

1UPr SeENE!

You know, inter-departmentiil correspondence is firing paper in
all directions all the time on an informational basis. That
. does not mean it is retained.

Mr, Goldsmith. With ‘regard to
your testimony is moreorle:s speculation but you are saying
that today you don't think that this type of document would be

retained and have any spec:.al significance?

I don't think so.

trying to visualize circumstances under which it could be

is nothing of immediate counterintelligence interest. I don’t

know who would retain it o:: why.

Mr. Goldsmith. _For the purpose of clarification, if the

Mr. Tovar. You are asking is it?
' Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

. Mr. Tovar, Primarily yes, but not solely. We are

looks like espionage, we would become interested. That is

TAD GLeDErT

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this document, after 1959

I am scratching my head:

retained. There is nothing of interest to the Agency. There .

(CI asked that of the CIA, by that I mean the counterintelligen
aspect of the CIA concerned primarily with a foreign counter-

intelligence threat, in otehr words, foreign nationais, foreign

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espionage I.am talking abou:. —
Mr. Goldsmith. I understand,
Mr. Tovar. You realise of course with the sensitivity | ;
of Americans investigation:; of Americans we have to be an we |
|

are extremely careful in making the determination as to when a

person is of counterintell:.gence interest. . We have very strict!

rules and regulations on the consideration of investigations,
considerations retaining information, the rights ofa person.
The criteria are very stringent. they are under esecutive
order and Attorney General guidelines. We don't approach this
casually at all. It is proscribed activity. |

"Mr. Goldsmith. Both is to Americans?

Mr. Tovar... Prima:ily Americans. The Attorney General

is not concerned essential:.y with non-US persons. Our focus od

sensitivity is on US persons who are US citizens or residents,
aliens or US entities, organizations, which are primarily
‘American in composition:

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you focus outside the-borders
of the United States? |

Mr. Tovar. yes. Ins:.de USviis FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before: when you made reference to a
station overseas, you becane aware of an American who might
be involved in espionage for another country, you were refer-
ring to an American who wa: living abroad, is that correct?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, or t::aveling abroad.

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\

| |
} Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA. Number 788 |
~ 2 | which is the field personality file request form that was used -
a to open Oswald's 201 file. In the middle of the page there is
” ) . 4 | box which states -the term ‘Other identification". I£ someone |
— 5 wrote the number or letter "AG" down, what does that stand for?!
‘| | Mr. Tovar. I have no idea. What are they referring |
a to here? I cannot think o7 anything. : | |
7 Mr. Goldsmith. The form also indicates that Oswald's |
a file was restricted. Do you know of any reason. why Oswald's
10 | file would have been restr:.cted? |
ni . Mr. Tovar. Where is chat? . |
12 Mr. Goldsmith. Here. | |
oe 13 Mr. Tovar, No, I don't know. I don't know what criteria |
. @ id | they would have used at thit time or even. today for that matter,
is | to open a restricted file. Bear in mind, there is a lot of
y
16 | latitude given to the individual who opened these things. He
17 | ‘could be a very. junior ana!.yst who for reasons of his own
a decided he would do it this way. Supervision would not neces-
19 | sarily get down there very closely behind him. |
20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the inter-agency source
21 | register is?
= 2 | Mr. Tovar. yes.
0 %3 | Mr. Goldsmith. What :..s that?
xu | Mr. Tovar. As I unde:-stand it, it is a register maintainet
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interest in a person. Let us take, for example, you are eel

interdsted in Mr. Smith. et us say you check Mr. Smith with

the CIA and with the other agencies and in so doing you wish’

. i
da

to have him recorded under the ISR, Inter Agency Source
Registry, the entry of his name in the ISR will normally flag

for the Army Intelligence and you are in Germany and you become
prior interest on the part of somebody in the government, in

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I don't know what this symbol is but they put two asterisks .
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8 this case you are in the A:-my.
9
10 which indicates to anybody else who’ checks that name later the
nl us Army has.a prior interest in that person. |
7 Mr. Goldsmith. What J:ind of interest would that be?
i3 : Mr, Tovar. Intelligence interest to me, potential
| |

intelligence interest. Again, the ISR may have ramifications

that I am not aware of. In my experience the ISR has been the

i
4

_ place we go to check, say, a new or potentially new source to
— ;
i see if there is ny other p:-eviously established government

|

. Military rely upon this ve:-y heavily because we coordinate the ile

interest in the person which means keep your hands off. The

clandestine intelligence operations.

‘Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ISR index be checked prior to
opening up a 201 file as a matter of routine?

Mr. Tovar. 'It has been so many years since I have done

‘this. The way we have become mechanized today I would assume

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that a normal file check through the central files of the

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Directorate would include or would turn up anything that was |
in the ISR. I am just not sure. how it works. |
Mr. Goldsmith. If. someone were an agent of another
intelligence organization vould that be indicated in the 201

|
file? , 7 |

. ‘ .
ot wet
~~

-. = Sree mes

6 Mr. Tovar. If it were: an agent, agent of another service,
; that would be inthe ISR:only if it: had been of interest to |
8 "another agency which said "Put Joh Doe's name in the ISR and |
9 | indicate he is a US Army intelligence source," at the very |
10 | least a person of interest to the US Army Intelligence Agency.
VY rt would not be there if the Army had not put it in. So you |
32 | might not know. , |
. i3 Again, I think aimed ane any agent ‘of the military would rely
 d (4 upon the ISx, I would thin}: almost certainly would be entered |
is ! in the ISr, because they want to maintain control of ity to- |
16 make sure nobody else gets in the way arnd interferes - with their
17 operations. :
' | |
13 | Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone were an agent it would in |
19 | all ‘Likelihood be indicated: in the ISR and assuming the ISR |
20 is checked by a CI person prior to opening up the file, he woul
21 | take note of that ‘fact? |
= 22 | Mr. Tovar, Say that again. Some of this is pretty fuzzy |
; ® 33 to me. I don't want to mislead you by extrapolating from my :
_ 24 | - Own ignorance. !
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ac of

an

Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of another °:

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intelligence service, that fact would be noted in the ISR?

“Mr. Tovar. Another U3 intelligence service?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. A US milizary intelligence service only, yes,
the military intelligence service would normally be registered
in the ISR. Other than th military, the FBI. intelligence
assets would not be regist:2red in the Isr to my knowledge,

_ Mr. Goldsmith. “ But tie military tends to make that list-
ing?

Mr. Tovar. In my. experience the miltiary has been the
primary element involved in the use and the exploitation of the
ISR. Let me interpose ano'-her point here, I am not an expert

in these procedures and I iam way out of touch. You live most.

of your life overseas, you don’t do these things-back-at-—--———

headquarters. These procedures may be quite different in

actuality. I am groping through my memory to see how they were’

dealt with on an active basis.

A fellow like Bill Donnelly might enlighten you much more

than I could about the ISR.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I think you can tell

i am not pressing you for <letail on it.

Mr. Tovar. I would 1: ke to help you. I am prepared to

‘specualte as I have been doing on things that are somewhat =~
oeyond my direct experience: and direct responsibility. There

is a limit.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, :.£ someone checking IS-R notes that

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an individual isa military ‘intelligence agent would the fact
of that agency status be nated and a 201 file opened on that
individual?

Mr. Tovar. I am not sure. I would think it would be.
Again, I .am speculating. [ think almost certainly if I were
doing a file check on a person whose name came from one of the
field stations ana it turned up the fact he was already -
“registered in the ISR,.if a person is of interest let us say,
to the US Army Intelligenc:, that would automatically sort of
proscribe further attempts on my part to go in and get involved
I think a notation would b: made in the 201 file. _ : |

Mr. Goldsmith. AS a practical matter ‘that would be a good
reason for making. the nota :ion?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does che CIA regularly use the ISR?

Mr. Tovar. We maintain it as I understand it.

- Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone is an agent of. the CIA,
would that fact be noted in the ISR?
Mr. Tovar. No, I don't believe it would. again, you
can check on that to make certain, Donelly I think can help

Much better on it. I cannot visualize all our sensitive source

being registered there.

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Mr. Goldsmith: Do yoa know how internal memoranda prepare
: ; an

by James Angleton when he ‘vas head of the CI:Staff, how interna]

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2277210 Page 40 | TRAD QEPOTT

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paperwork relating to the JFK assassination was prepared and

subsequently stored?

3 - Mr. Tovar. No, I really don't. I have no idea. I have
” ry 4 seen no documents on that subject. I have seen nothing either
5

originated or approved or signed by him. You realize that any

current-job. Until ‘you poeple became interested, we were not

dealing with them on a dai..y basis.

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i files on this subject are dead files. I am just doing my
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—14-]| -Staf£;-what-would-happen-to~your personal papers?

9 Mrs Goldsmith. What happens to the personal files of an
ld individual such as Angletons or even yourself after leaving the
oY CI staff? | :
12 Mr. Tovar. After lea‘ring the staff or leaving the Agency?

{ .

@ . i3- | _ Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take the first after leaving the cr
i
|

'Mr. Tovar. The personal file, official file on the person

i
“| in the Agency is retained by the Office of Personnel.

a Mr. Goldsmith. That vould givern your personal |. file, |

| your personal papers. Wha: about internal memos, soft copy |

19 | type files, what would happen to them? .

20 | Mr. Tovar. Having been only one element of the organiza |

| tion during my career, it is hard to say. : _ |

a 2 | Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about personnel file.
@ 3 | -I am talking about soft copy, working files that an individual
2 | may maintain. - |

26 . | ‘Mr. Tovar. You mean che files he himself as an individual,

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maintained?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

_ Mr. Tovar. Most individuals don't maintain: personal. files, |

I don't think. I would say, for example, anything I write,

I dictate a memorandum and I send it to anybody you want to

name, in a sense that is my work, I have done it but I don't
keep a personal file on that. That goes into my office file.
It is part of the office cironological file which is maintained
by my secretary. Let us say multiply that by-500,000 over.a
period of years the foles jrow. At the time I leave I am -
incidental in a sense. I just happen to be the person in the -
job at the time. The files will still be there.

There is a normal retirement and destruction under normal

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conditions, retirement and destruction program which eliminates

the accumulation of excessive useless material. i

Mr. Goldsmith. Most »aperwork would go in this office _

chrono file? >

Mr. Tovar. Yes, anything of significance would go in the
office chrono file. Anyth:.ng I write to the Directorate of
Operations, DDO, CI, it is normally part of the chrono files.
If I want it, it is there. It is my own file in the sense that:
when r am on the job I have total | access to. it. If Ir left
the job and wanted to ‘Look at it six months later, it is “still
in the fole and I would as}: somebody who took my place could I

see what I wrote. I would not take it with me.

iUPr OCLAZ! on

meant that everything is filed in a chronological order?
Mr. Tovar. Not necessarily. Here you ought to consult
my secretary. There might be a subject breakdown. Ordinarily

hte front office, we don't main-ain a lot of files. There is

no point: in it. Let us say something I signed off on, here
is a case in point, memos that are signed on my behalf or
that I might have signed, if I were there that day, I would
not maintain that in my front office as a rule. That would
probably be maintained by che office of origination. I think
if I signed it my secretar; would certainly maintain a log of .
things that had gone throujh me for signature. But I don't
think, I could be wrong on this, I don't think as a rule she
would maintain a routine im2morandum just because I happened to
sign it because I sign. so many things on.that staff. I sign
off on a host.of things which are not really ny creation. I
am representing the staff as a whole.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo: know when Mr. Angleton left the CI

Staff?

Mr. Tovar. Yes. I an not certain of the precise date.

position of Chief, Counterintelligence?
Mr. Goldsmith. Yes,

Mr. Tovar. I-believe he may have retmained in the office

for several. months after tiat before he finally retired.

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nv 48331 pocta:$2277210 Page 43 THe QEPRET

Mr. Goldsmith. If it is an office chrono file does that —

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NW 48331 pocta:52277210 Page 44 THD OCrorTy

there were probably all kinds of drafts, scratchings and sort

iUr DLUALI 12

Mr. Goldsmith. Do yo1 know whether, after Mr. Angleton
left the cI Staff, any typ2 of followup was done by that staff
on the Nosenko issue? . |

Mr. Tovar. Followup ‘vork?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. For example, one of the issues, the
key issue. with regard to M:. Nosenko was his bona fides.

Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed. - 7 i . |

Mr. Goldmsith. After Mr. Angleton left was any additional

analytical work done on thit issue?
Mr. Tovar. A very de-:ailed study was done by my predecessb
, |
George Kalaris. A very thorough analysis was made of. the whens 7

Nosenko question.
Mr. Goldsmith. Are you referring to the Hart Report?
Mr. Tovar. Yes.
Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the Hart report was any type °

followup work or analytica:. work done after Mr. Angleton's

wee DL ee

departure?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know. for certain. The Hart Report is

a thick piece of paper. In the preparation of that report

of preliminary jobs. All shat I know would be in the context 7
of:that report. All I know would be same representations in
response to the Director's inquiry or your inquiry or someone

else's inquiry as to what happened, what did it say, what does

it mean, that type of thiny, but really correlary efforts.

ivr? Hela a 43

Mr. Goldsmith: Think for a moment on the Nosenko issue.

ne

a | As Chief of the CI Staff, if it were demonstrated to you very

Clearly that the story given ‘by Mr:-.Nosenko on Lee Harvey

as

dictions, it was in many ways simply incredible, what impact
would that have on the Agency's assessment of Mr. Nosenko as
being a bona fide rather than a dispatched defector?

‘Mr. Tovar. Well, it is difficult to answer: You are

|

|

a . . |
@ 4 | Oswald was full of contradictions and in addition to contra- |
|

| |

posing a question in a nar:cow sense. You are focusing on one

|

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nip ce se ee a

oO

point, Nosenko vis-a-vis Oswald and contradictions that may
emerge there. I would answer by saying that again I am not an |

expert on Nosenko. I don':: profegs to have a full grasp of

I would say that ques:ion alone would not be enough to

satisfy me that the inquiry had been made carefully. “There is:

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his bona fides or anything related to it. |
|

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much more to it than what Josenko had to say about Oswald.
There are more aspects. about the bona fides issue, more than ar
a

could give you today. |
t

; .

Mr. Goldsmith. I hav2 read the Hart Report. ; i

. '

. : ]

i

Mr. Tovar. He tried =o deal with the whole consideration,

Cry — —
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the whole Oswald, the handling, the methodology. He did not
go into every jot and tittle of the issue.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fast, the Hart Report did not mention

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\ Oswald issue is untrue, cainot be believed, would that have any)

| impact on the Agency's ass2ssment of him as a bona fied?
Mr. Tovar. The first reaction would be I would be deeply

| distressed and.concerned, [ would want to know more about it.

You have to exptrapolate from me to the Agency. Other people

further and convinced ever;thody, the point you made is valid,
then you would have --

|
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have views on this other tian myself. If you carried this thing
|
|
Mr. Goldsmith. We ar2 talking hypothetically now. Let
,

us go beyond you. If it were demonstrated to the Director of

|
the Central intelligence Ayency that the story given by Nosenko

. . |
on Oswald -- I am not talking about any of the other information
he gave, but on Oswald -- simply cannot be believed because,

A, part of it is incredibl:, B, it is full. of contradictions,

what effect do you think tiat would have on the Agency's

assessment of him as a bona fide defector?

Mr. Tovar. I literally don't know, I am not sure what
the comparative weight of chat point would be when considered’
against the backdrop of th: full Nosenko question,

Mr. Goldsmith. “As Chief of the CI Staff, you would
personally be troubled by chat?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, I think I would be troubled by it. I
would be troubled. I would be troubled that our current

assessment is wrong. That would trouble me.

mn

Again, I would say, loo, if this is a serious proposition

j ur ay a Pr i | 45

you are making, let us say you adduced a number of analysts

i
| |
2 who examined this thing thoroughly and were in a position of
3 | Making that kind of judgment, I would say, "I want to have
; e 4 | these analysts talk to my analysts because I am not in a posi-
§ | tion to make that kind of judgment." |
6 Mr. Goldsmith. First of all, I am not making the statement
? | ‘that Nosenko's story on Oswald is inaccurate in any way. |
a | Secondly, even if the’ story is inaccurate, I don't want:
t
$ to suggest that because of that anyone on this Committee has |
10 any feeling that that means Nosenko is not bona fide. My |
nN | question is really very linited. A, if it were demonstrated |
: : . . i]
12 | that the story on Oswald is inaccurate, what impact would that |
_ 13 have on your overall assessment? |
e ty Mr. Tovar. You mean demonstrably inaccurate? |
1s Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. | |
16 | Mr. Tovar. It would have to be examined. It would have |
7 | to be examined the full panoply: of the whole Oswald issue. :
12 _Tswould say weiwill get this team of analysts and we will
19 | fight it out. We are talking about hypothesis. !
20 | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I would prefer to stay away from the
31 ! term "fighting it out" because there is no one here who is in |
- 29 the posture of making a fighting isstie out of it. ° |
hd “4 i I no longer have any questions. I.will have questions to 1 |
14 | ask whoever on your staff participated in the preparation of . |
25 the memo that we discused earlier.

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Normally whenever a witness has an opportunity to testify
before the Committee at a iearing, the Committee gives him five
minutes at the end to make a statement. This is not a hearing.
However, if you would like ‘to make a statement for the record,
‘feel free to do so. If no:, you will be given a chance to
verify the record for accuracy. .

Mr. Tovar. Since I have no position to present and no
point to make it is probably improper to make a statement.

The only think I would reiterate is that I have been sort of

speculating here in many respects. Bear in mind there is an

area here where I have a purview that is perhaps. valid. We

: i :
2 are talking about a lot of things which are way beyond my |
; 43 | immediate experience and certainly my current responsibility.

, e 14 I would say, take some of my speculation with a grain of J
Ht
1s | salt, because I don't mean to be dogMatic on these things. |
16 | The procedure for handling the 201 file, there are some GS-7

7 | girls down the line who could tell you much more about the 201
ail files than I would ever be able to compile for you. ‘They are |

19 | the ones you really should talk to.

30 | Things like the ISR, = know the ISR-in a limited framework|
z1 | from the standpoint of a guy overseas who is dealing frequently!
- 22 | with the military and registers military sources in the ISR. |
-@ 13 | and checks the ISR either on behalf of the military or to see’ |
34 ! if they have. already regis::ered prior interest, and so on. There
35 I may. be other aspects of the thing that you should ge more -- :

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| professional advice on. |
oo

I think your question: have been reasonable, I have found

no objection to try to mee: you more than halfway on it.
Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Thank you very much.
(Whereupon, at 3:20 P.m., the deposition was concluded.)

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NW 48331 pocrachaarrai9 Page 49 THe QFARCT

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by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition

48 .
| _
“CERTIFICAT:3 OF NOTARY PUBLIC
2 I, Alfred Joseph LaFr.ince, the officer before whom the
3 foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the |
7 e “| witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition |
5 was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was |
6 | taken by me in stenotype to the best of my .ability and there-- |
7 after reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said |
: deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said. |
9 | witness; that I am neither. counsel for, related to, nor employed
\

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11 | was taken; and further that: I am not a relative or employee :
; {

2 | of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, H
3

nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the
action.

Notary Public in and for the

t
16 District of Columbia
17 My Commission expires Novernber 14, 1980.. |
- 4 ; i
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