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TS#795052
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OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

Vocume III

EvotutTion oF CIA's
Anti-Castro PoLicieés,

1959-January 1961.
(pages 1-203)

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TS#795052 |
DCI-8
December. 1979

Copy 1 of 2

PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

“OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

DCI-8
, Volume III
EVOLUTION OF CIA'S

-ANTI-CASTRO POLICIES,

- 1959-JANUARY 1961 _

‘December 1979

' Jack B. Pfeiffer

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Foreword

This is the third volume of the Official History
of the Bay of Pigs Operation and it focuses on the
problems of establishing a policy for the United
‘States. Government as Fidel Castro and his cohorts
came to power in-Cuba.* The policy decided on by the
US Government in March 1960 called for the displace-
ment of Fidel Castro, and it was by no means a uni-
lateral decision promoted by the Central Intelligence
Agency -- although it is demonstrable that the Agency
was far more perceptive. than the policy making bodies
-in recognizing the threat to the Western Hemisphere
posed by Castro's communist affiliation. Because the
policy makers feared censure by the United Nations
and/or. the Organization of American States, the myth
of “plausible deniability" was the caveat that deter-
mined the CIA would be the principal implementing arm for -

the anti-Castro effort. From inception to termination,

* The preceding volumes were:
I - Air Operations
II - Participation in. the Conduct of Foreign

Policy.

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"deniability" would be the albatross around the necks
of Agency planners; and from D-Day minus 2, aCe
15 April 1961). it became the strangling cord insuring
the failure of the effort at the Bay of Pigs.

This: volume describes the Agency' s organization
designed to accomplish the assigned task; and it

records the interaction between the Agency and other

government components (State and the military in

particular), between the Agency and the White House,
and among various CIA components as the program
evolved. The relationships were sometimes less than

harmonious. Particular attention is focused on the

roles played by both President Eisenhower who author-

ized the anti-Castro program and Vice President Nixon

'who has been charged ‘time and again -- unjustifiably

as the record reveals -- with being the mastermind
behind the operation.
Emphasis also is focused on the drastic change

in the concept of the operation between the spring

' and fall of 1960. From April's plans for the infil-

tration into Cuba of small teams of Agency trained

specialists in communications, sabotage, and para-

military operations to provide training and guidance

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to anti-Castro dissidents, November's plans called for
an amphibious landing with armor and combat air support
to establish a lodgement on Cuba soil from which a
provisional government (approved /and apdtsttes’ by CIA)
could issue its clarion calls for US, UN, or OAS inter-
vention.

Encompassed in this volume are the: records of
the policy level.meetings which considered such items
as funding the operation, possible use of US personnel
in combat roles, the use of US bases for training or
for operations, types of direct action programs (e.g.,
propaganda drops vs sabotage), and the host of other

- problems related to Castro's overthrow. It also makes

. clear that various US corporate interests played an
active (sometimes overactive) role in support of the
anti-Castro efforts of the Government.

This volume also examines official records in
light of the allegations of the Senate Select Commit-
tee's investigations that the assassination plans being
developed by the Mafia were a fundamental part of the

official US Government program to overthrow Fidel

a hae
wot
aa | Castro. There is no basis in fact for this chadbe. .

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Finally, the reader of this volume should gain.

“7 some insights to the character of various of the
principal actors -- Agency and non-Agency -- who were
involved most closely with the Government's anti-Castro -
policy during the period from its inception through
the close of the Eisenhower administration. Not all
of these impressions are flattering; but the author,
‘who was in no way associated with the operation or

. the Directorate of Plans (now Operations) , hopes that
the presentation of. the evidence has been as free from

- bias as possible. |

Again the author wishes to acknowledge the valu-.
able contributions of the other two members of the CIA
History Staff, Mrs. Eulalie Hammond and Mrs. Sharon
Bond, ° to the completion of this volume. Without their
unfailing willingness to perform either the ‘substantive
research or the grimly. mechanical tasks required in
preparing a volume such as this, the task could have
been interminable.

For any errors of. fact or questionable interpreta-

‘tions, the. author alone is responsible.

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Volume III
Contents

Foreword ee ee ee ee ee
Part I. Background . . . . ....+4 646s

A. Watching from the Sidelines

B. Castro Takes Over .... .
Part II Castro Must Go ......42...

A. Organizing for Covert Action

B. Forging the Tool ......

Cc. Cooperation and Challenge .

D. Personnel and Training .. .
Part III Changing Concepts .......
Part IV Presidential Resurgence ....
‘Part V Direct Action Programs .....

A. Propaganda.........

B. Sabotage and other Exercises
Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . .......°
Part VII The Question of Assassinations .
Part VIII ‘Conclusions ..........

Appendixes ©

A. Memorandum for the Director of Central
Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

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Page

iii

17
32
32
80

104

126

143

165

204

204
233

241
277

290

296

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Page

B. A Program of: Covert Action Against
the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 ..... - s .300

C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC:

1) Letter for Allen Dulles from
' Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60 OO
TS (DD/P 0-1436) .........-.- #311
2) Letter for Gordon Gray from To
Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60 ...... 313
' 3). Memorandum for the Special
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,
sub: US Policy toward Cuba .... 318

.D.. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director
(Plans) - Action from,J. D. Esterline,
2 May 60, sub: - Liaison with US
Agencies on JMARC Activities . .... . . 332

E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at. -,
Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961... ..335

F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting
with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959 | oe e © « 337

G. Memorandum for DCI {for Briefing Vice
President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:
What We Are Doing in Cuba ........ 344

Source References

Part I . Background ee ee ee ee ee B47

Part II '. Castro Must.Go .-. ..... . . +. 352

Part III ‘Changing Concepts .:.... . . . 366

Part IV Presidential Resurgence ... .. . 369
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Part V

Part VI |

Part. VII

Part VIII

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Direct Action Programs
Mr. Nixon's Role
Assassination Coe ee

Conclusions ....

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Page
374
- 382
386.

388

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THE BAY OF PIGS OPERATION |

Volume III Evolution of CIA's
Anti-Castro Policies,
1950 = January 1961”
Part I
Background
A. Watching from the Sidelines
Fidel CASTRO RUZ was identified in one of the
earliest reports in Agency files as "one of the young,
“student leaders’ in Cuba, who manages to get himself
involved in many things that do not ‘concern him." 1/
Beginning in 1948, the activities of Fidel Castro came
to be of increasing concern to the Central Intelligence
_ Agency and to the United States Government (USG). By
early 1960 the USG officially adopted a covert action
program designed to remove the Castro government from
control. of the island of Cuba. The policy of the USG
was to be carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency
and would culminate in the operations at the Bahia de
Cochinos from 17-19 April 1962.
Beginning in 1998 and continuing even after the.

United States had formulated its official policy of

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removing Castro from the leadership of the Cuban
Government, the principal questions faced by CIA's
Western Hemisphere Division, by the Department of

State, and by other concerned principals in the United

States were: What is Fidel Castro? By whom is he

controlled? What does he represent? Is he, or is he
not, a Communist? The nature of the Agency's interest
in answers to these questions is reflected in various
of the records for the period beginning in the mid-
1950's when it appeared that the Agency depended in
considerable part on the reporting from the American
Embassy offices in Havana.

‘Commenting on a report entitled "“Antidemocratic
Antecedents and Activities of Fidel Castro" prepared
by President Batista's Military Intelligence Service
(SIM) -- apparently in response. to a request from the
Burd de Represién a las Activadades Communistas (BRAC) *
-- to the Counselor of the American Embassy (Amembassy)
in Havana, Lincoln Vinton Chapin, told the CIA repre-

sentative among other things, that:

* Bureau for the Repression of Communist Activities.

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The SIM report is nothing more than
a summary of allegations and accusations
made. against Fidel Castro during the
period 1948-1950. This summary has
apparently been slanted in an effort to
make Castro a "Rojo," but the result
is a rather poor one. 2/

The Department of State reporter refuted, ona

paragraph by paragraph basis, all of the allegations

which indicated that Castro had been tied in with
Communists, ‘or Communist sympathizers, ever since
his university days; and in forwarding the report to
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, the COS Havana
indicated ‘that he was furnishing the information be-
cause of renewed interest: by the State Department in
Fidel Castro. 3/

| The tenor of State reporting continued in a.
similar vein well into 1957. Charges that Castro
was a Communist could not be substantiated, but State
did note that in his student days, he "was involved
in gangster-type activities." 47 Havana Embassy
reporting also reflected another of ‘the problems: of
continuing concern to the US Intelligence Community --
would Castro have sufficient force to oust Batista,

and were his basic feelings toward the US friendly. 5/

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In the mid-1950's, Havana Station ran seven
approved FI projects, most of which were aimed at
the Cuban ‘Communist Party, the PSP (Partido Socialista
Popular). Agency funds also were used to support
the efforts of an anti-Communist organization engaged
principally in propaganda activities. 6/
Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA's Inspector General,
apparently accompanied US Ambassador Gardner and
his, party toa meeting with President Fulgencio
; Batista in the summer of 1956, a meeting which prompted
the Cuban President to write to the DCI, Allen Dulles,
in praise of the meeting.* 7/ In fact, ‘Agency support
for the peaceful transfer of power from Batista to a
democratically elected successor and amnesty for Castro
and his followers, as well as other anti-Batista dis-
sidents, was proposed in a memorandum from the Inspector

General in November 1957. 8/

‘* David R. McLean, a former member of the IG‘'s In-
spection Staff, attached a cryptic note to the copy.
of Dulles' letter of response to: Batista, which he,
(McLean) included in the file of miscellaneous docu-
ments on the Bay of Pigs, which were inherited by the
present author. McLean suggested that Kirkpatrick
helped organize BRAC, but the present author has not
confirmed this story. .

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In view of subsequent developments, one inter-
esting suggestion made by the Inspector General in
November 1957 was the following:

On the island of Cuba, probably only
a US citizen, in some way known to be
connected with the US Government and
"assumed" to be backed by Washington,

' would. have the ability to act as inter-
mediary between the various opposition
groups in the Batista Government and
work out a possible “cease fire." This
would have to be done covertly, and any

_ results achieved either not ever publicly
announced or certainly not advertised.
until after the election. Any public
attempt to bring peace would be fore-
doomed to failure by each side probably
indicating exorbitant demands and. then
being unable to withdraw from its
announced position.* 9/

Although it may have had no relation to the

’ Kirkpatrick memorandum, on 25 November 1957, less
than a week following the Kirkpatrick memorandum,
William Wieland of the Department of State notified
Adolf Rerle, one of the country's leading experts on
Latin American Affairs and a former member of the
* It is. interesting to speculate whether at this
time Kirkpatrick was thinking of William D. Pawley, .
former US. Ambassador to Brazil and Peru and an
American businessman who operated significant enter-
prises in Cuba,.to negotiate with Batista. Within
a year's time, Pawley, who also stood-high in the

ranks of the Republic Party contributors, was desig-
-nated to undertake such a mission to Cuba.

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State Department, that he was enroute to Cuba, ac-
cording to Berle, “to see whether anything can be
done to bring the Cuban revolt to any kind of an
orderly conclusion." 10/
. Berle, with remarkable prescience, noted:
It is rough going, anti-intervention is

all right up toa point.. But we are re-

sponsible for keeping order in. the hemis-

phere quite aside from the proprieties, and

.a rather bolder policy in that regard.

seems indicated. il/

By early 1958, the Agency had become sufficiently
concerned about the pro-Communist orientation of
Castro's government, and particularly the pro-Castro
proclivities of his two principal deputies, Ernesto
Che Guevara and Raul Castro Ruz, Fidel's brother, that
penetration of the Partido Socialista Popular was a
priority concern of the field. At least two agents
were successfully placed in psp ranks, and. in March
1958, one Agency officer managed to join the Castro
forces in the mountains for a period of two weeks and
to observe their tactics in combat. In June 1958,
Robert D. Wiecha, COB, Santiago de Cuba, got himself
"captured" by Raul Castro's forces in order to be

able to assist 29 US sailors and marines and 15 US

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businessmen who had been kidnapped by Raul Castro.
In both instances, the Agency representatives returned
unharmed; and both reported ‘on the "radical" and anti-_.

American nature of the Castro movement. According

to one source, Wiecha found "definite communist over-

tones" among’ the Raul Castro forces.* 12/ .
Additional documentation of the pro-communist

nature of the Castro organization was reported with

great frequency during 1958 from contacts the Santiago

de Cuba Base had in Oriente Province. Whether Castro's
contingent: was communist oriented or not, others such
as Adolf Berle and his.friends (both in-and out of
State. Department), continued to reflect their concern
about the possible ways to combat ‘the growing strength
of the Castro movement in Cuba. 13/ Berle was most
hopeful that the Castro situation could be remedied

by cooperation among Latin American liberals working

in conjunction with some of the more enlightened Cubans
who haa broken with Castro (for example, Felipe Pazos

and Pepin Bosch) with additional support from the OAS

* The historian for WH Division provided the figures

on US captives shown here, but Hugh Thomas indicates

19 US businessmen and 27 servicemen were captured.

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-- and only minor participation from the US Department
of State. 14/.

At atime when the Agency's fears about the

Castro movement were increasing, a rather different |
proposal was put forward by the Chief of the Para-
military Division, Political and Psychological Staff,

of the Clandestine Service. Rather than trying to

‘whip Castro, Alfred Cox suggested that perhaps the
wisest move for the Agency would be to join Castro.

It waS apparent, according to Cox, that since Batista
was on the way out, we should now try to remedy Castro's

hostile attitude toward the United States because of

©

our efforts to prop up Batista. To accomplish this,
Cox suggested that:

A practical way to protect United
States interests in this matter would
be to make secret contact with Castro,
assure him of the United States sympa-
thy with some of his objectives, and
to offer him support. The individual
chosen to. make the contact should be

of such background that it is clear
~ that he speaks with the authority of

the United States Government.

Obviously, the support must be given
covertly so as not to endanger United
States relations with Batista. The most
effective means of help to Castro would
be ‘arms and ammunition. Air dropping of

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oe

.this equipment might be dangerous from
the security aspect. Allowing a ship-
load of equipment manned by a Cuban
crew to evade our Coast Guard would
probably be.a better method. The most
secure means of help would be giving

the money to Castro, who could then
purchase his own arms. A combination
of arms and money. would probably be

best.* 15/

By late fall of 1958, when it became apparent.
that the Batista regime in Cuba was about to go under,
the Agency in conjunction with the Department of State
supported a plan to have Batista bow out more or less

gracefully and to have the government of the country

taken over, not by the Presidential candidate who had

been elected in the rigged election, but by a junta

pending subsequent free, democratic elections. When

.* Not all Agency reporting out of the Cuban area was

biased against.Castro. One. report in the fall of 1958
indicated that Castro definitely was not a Communist,

citing as a reason for this: "Ninety-five percent of

his followers are good Catholics. Three Catholic

‘priests have joined Fidel Castro and his forces in

the Sierra Maestra, and one has joined Raul Castro

and his troops in the Sierra Cristal. The rebel forces
under the Castros, therefore, have four chaplains,

while the entire Cuban Army does not have a single
chaplain.. (Source comment: The United States should
not be taken in by President Fulgencio Batista's attempt

-to label the revolutionary movement as Communist in-

spired, dominated, or influenced.)" 16/

The source for this evaluation of Castro was, as
one might surmise, a Catholic priest. —

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traveling to Miami with William Snow, an Assistant
“Secretary of State, and Henry Holland, formerly a
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Col. J. C. King,
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, met with William
D. Pawley on 18-19 November 1958 to discuss a plan
which would have Pawley travel to Cuba to meet with
Batista in an attempt to convince him to bow out
gracefully. Pawley was a long-time acquaintance and
friend of Batista from the days when Pawley had been
running the Cubana Airline. “

In return for Batista's support for a friendly
military junta -- nominally to be responsible for his
ouster -- the representatives of the Department of
State and the Agency agreed that Batista should be
provided safety for himself, his friends, and his
close cronies, particularly those whose lives would
be endangered should there ever be a truly violent
overthrow of the government. Batista also was to be
provided protection for his personal assets in Cuba.
Various individuals were identified as possible candi-

. dates. for the junta, and,’ according to King, the

objective was. that various of these members would have -

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sufficient political strength to weaken Castro's sup~
port.

Following the meeting in Miami, Pawley did
undertake the mission to see Batista in Cuba. Arriv-
ing on 8 December in Havana he had a series of pre-
liminary meetings with the Cuban Foreign Minister,
who strongly supported the proposals that Pawley
indicated that he was going to make. Unfortunately,
however, the Foreign Minister told Pawley that it was —
unlikely that: Batista would accept the proposals.

The meeting between Pawley and Batista actually took
place on 11 December 1958 when, according to the re-
port from Havana station: .
Pawley. met with Batista for two hours
this evening. Laid his plan before ©
Batista without pulling any punches.
. B{atista] took it calmly.’ He agreed with

much of Pawley's analysis of situation,

but said he could not take the junta

way out. 17/ so ;

Batista made no promises, and went. through the .
reasons why he couldn't possibly give up the office --
for fear of being called a coward and traitor; that

there would be a blood bath; and that he had both

moral and constitutional obligations. COS Havana
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noted Pawley's evaluation of the meeting as follows:

Batista will not accept plan, and will
make every effort turn government over to
Rivera Aguero [the Batista candidate who
had been named Presidential successor in
a rigged election]. However, unfavorable
developments may produce change of attitude
on part of Bfatista]. 18/

Following Pawley's visit with Batista, the situ-
ation in Cuba deteriorated rapidly and the policies of
the US Government regarding Cuba were ambivalent. A
representative of the Archbishop of. Havana, Father Bez
Chebebe, approached the American Consul in Santiago to
float some proposals for resolving the differences be-
tween the two countries. The priest emphasized that
although a Castro take over was inevitable:

Both Fidel Castro and US interests -

had important stake in sugar crop and

both undoubtedly wish resolve problems

caused by present situation. Also said

that there were matters now mostly minor

on both.sides which have been sources

mutual irritation and misunderstanding

and that these should be eliminated

soonest, so that they would not grow

to affect: future relations, which Father

considers inevitable. 19/

In addition, the representative of the Archbishop of
Havana indicated to the Amconsul that:
He though[t] US Government could
profitably send person of confidence,

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not necessarily an official, to discuss

mutual problems as discreetly as possi-

ble with Fidel. Implied that such would

be well received. 20/

Despite the fact that the communist proclivities
of Fidel Castro and his cohorts had been clearly stated

by Agency personnel in Cuba, on 18 December 1958, COS

Havana cabled Headquarters strongly supporting. the

position that the Archbishop of Havana's representative
had proposed to the American Consulate, saying:

Havana: Station feels proposal merits
serious State/CIA consideration. Opera-
tion this nature could pay big ;future
dividends if fully qualified person could
be found for job and dispatched quickly.
Regardless how. we may feel about Castro-
and his movement, both will be important
political forces for a long time to ‘come.
Perhaps candidate could be found through
National Catholic Welfare Organization. 21/

At about the same. time this, ‘proposal was being
put forward, WH Division had asked the Paramilitary
Division (PMD) to establish 'a small contingency task
force, capable of making air drops into Cuba. Two
representatives of PMD, Lucious L. Rucker and William

G. Redel were sent to Havana -- Rucker to locate and

“survey possible drop zones and Redel to get himself

into position to see if he could locate dissidents who
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were both anti-Castro and anti-Batista. What WH hoped

to accomplish, presumably, was that they could organize

these anti-Batista and anti-Castro dissidents and get
them armed in time so that they could prevent Castro
from taking over the government if Batista should |
suddenly resign or decide to flee the country. 22/
On 31 December 1958, Paramilitary Division reported
to WH Division that a Helio Courier was already in
place in Key West with a backup Helio in Washington;
a sterile C-54 had been requested from Europe; and

the Office of Logistics would have an arms load

* Yigged for a drop by 2 January 1959. 23/

It was not until the last week of December 1958
that President Eisenhower became actively involved in
discussions and decisions affecting US policy toward
Cuba. “His interest was precipitated by a 23 December
1958 Memorandum on Cuba which had been prepared by
the Acting Secretary of State and sent to Eisenhower's
National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, who discussed

the memorandum with Eisenhower and the DCI on 26 Decem-

‘ber. The President apparently indicated that he had

not been fully aware of the positions of State and CIA

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“regarding Castro, and he suggested that meetings of

the Special Group under NSC 5412/2 should be held on

a weekly basis, with Cuba to be a regular subject

‘for discussion.

Gordon Gray and Allen Dulles had some differences
of opinion concerning the advisability of reading other
individuals into the act. Gray suggested that the |
President's Board of Consultants (later the President's
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) be made party to
the discussions,. but Dulles rather strongly suggested
that there was a significant difference between the
discussions which were intended for the Special Group
5412 on Covert Operations, and PFIAB responsibilities
for general problems related to foreign intelligence.
Dulles made ‘the specific point that if the Board of
Consultants was going to get involved in the details ©

of planned covert operations, they were then in a

position of reviewing US foreign policy. The discus-

sion also seems to have verged on the right of Congress
to. attempt to oversee covert operations -- a point

about which Eisenhower expressed himself very strongly,

‘noting that such action by Congress would be an in-

fringement of his prerogative as Commander-in-Chief. 24/
-~ 15 ~

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At 3:40 on the afternoon of 31 December 1958,
there was another high level meeting attended by
Messrs. Herter, Murphy, and Rubottom, Department of
State; Irwin, Department of Defense; Admiral Burke,
the CNO; General Cabell, DDCI; and Gordon Gray at
which the Cuban situation was again discussed. Even.
as the meeting was in progress, Batista was preparing
to flee Cuba; and possible US action, including direct
intervention by US Marines, was among the topics that
were discussed. There also was some suggestion that
the US take the responsibility for naming members to
a junta to succeed Batista, rather than permitting
Fidel Castro and his followers to take over the Cuban
Government. 25/

With some benefit of hindsight, Eisenhower re-
called this period in the following manner:

. During the rush of these last events

in the final days of 1958, the Central

Intelligence Agency suggested for the

first time that a Castro victory might

not be in the best interests of the United

States. (Earlier reports which I had re-

ceived of Castro's possible Communism were

Suspect because they originated with

people who favored Batista.)

“Communists and other extreme radicals

appear to have ‘penetrated the Castro move-+
ment,“ Allen Dulles said. “If Castro

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takes over, they will probably participate
in the government." When I heard this
estimate, I was provoked that such a con-
‘clusion had not been given earlier.
At another point,. the ex-President wrote: ©
Though our intelligence experts backed
and filled for a number of months, events
were gradually driving them to the conclu-
sion that with the coming of Castro, Com-
munism had penetrated this hemisphere. 26/

B. Castro Takes Over :
During the first few weeks of 1959 following

Castro's take over, there was a flurry of activity

as Havana Station attempted to keep track of the

- changes in government. “The Station seemed assured

that it was cognizant of all of Castro's movements ,.
especially on the developing military capabilities.
In fact, when the US Army suggested that the Station
provide support for the Army's covert collection of
‘military intelligence under -commercial cover in Havana,
COS took strong exception to the proposals, emphasizing
the Station's own capabilities in this area. COS was
overruled by Headquarters, however, and General Cabell
assured the Assistant Chief of Staff. for Intelligence

<
of the Army that while he was aware that Havana had

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objected to the Army's proposals, the COS nonetheless
had been “instructed" to coopérate.* 27/

In these early weeks of 1959, US representatives
in. Havana were predicting that Castro would have a
difficult time holding his government together, and
among other things, one report emphasized the proba-
bility that Castro would soon find that he would have
to get along with the United States. 29/ The most ,
likely threat to relations with the United States
was the existence of the naval base at Guantanamo
Bay, but neither CIA nor State Department representa-
tives saw any threat to this installation, and this

belief was supported in early March 1959 by a Special

‘National Intelligence Estimate that, at most, Castro

“sooner or later {is] likely to ask for major increases.

* An interesting side note. to the discussions at this
time was that the Army Attache apparently had planned
to use a negro Lt. Col. who was on -TDY in Havana to do
a study of -the new Castro Army. In a memorandum -to
the Chief} Western Hemisphere Division, and to the
Chief, Foreign Intelligence Staff, Al Cox, Chief,
Paramilitary Division reported -- without ever using
the term “black" --. that General Erskine (Army Special
Forces) believed that‘a “color bar“ did exist in the
Caribbean area and that a better choice than Lt. Col.
Reuben Horner, the black officer in question, could

be made. 28/

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’

in the nominal rent now paid for the Guantanamo Base,
revision of employment practices which appeared to
discriminate against Cuban workers, and perhaps other
changes," 30/
In the early spring of 1959, as Castro made
known that he was planning to visit the United States,
COS Havana revealed ambiguous feelings about the im-
portance of the Castro trip. He noted for Headquarters
information that: |
Washington visit can make or break
Castro. Unless he gets a strong helping
‘hand from the United States, many serious
observers feel his. regime will collapse
within a matter of months. 31/
Pointing to the serious economic difficulties of the
new Cuban Government, cos Havana indicated that
castro’ s popularity was very low among the middle and
upper classes, but at the same time he emphasized that
Castro was "the idol of the masses." 32/ COS Havana‘
did an excellent. job of predicting how Castro would
act when he arrived in the United States, suggesting
that Castro would probably make his pitch, not to. the

heads of the ‘State Department. and to the press, but

‘that he would appeal to the workers, the farmers, the

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students, and the masses in America to support his

revolution. .COS emphasized that ‘Headquarters should

‘make no mistake that the Castro Government, while not

openly avowed Communist, was heavily infiltrated with
Communists and had taken no stand in opposition to
Communist positions, and, moreover, there was little
question about who would eventually control the Cuban
Government. cos did suggest that Headquarters give
serious consideration to planting embarrassing ques-
tions with reporters ‘to stick to Castro while he was
in the US. 33/0 Both the Department of State and COS
Havana were in general agreement about the results of
the Castro. visit. COS Havana summarized one of his
dispatches as follows:

' It would be unwise to assume from the

minor indications to date that Fidel has

undergone a serious change of heart as a

result of his visit to the United States. 34/

In a memorandum to Gordon Gray, President Eisen-
hower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs,
Robert Murphy, Deputy Undersecretary of State noted .
that: |

Despite Castro's apparent simplicity,

sincerity, and eagerness to reassure the
United States public, there is little

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probability that Castro had altered the
essentially radical course of his revolu-
tion. -From his experience here, he has
gained a valuable knowledge of American
. public reaction which may make him a more
difficult man to.deal.with on his return
to Cuba. It would be a serious mistake
to underestimate this man. ‘With all his
appearance of naiveté, unsophistication,
-and ignorance. on many matters, he is clearly
a strong personality and a born leader of
great personal courage and conviction.
While we certainly know him better than
before, Castro remains an enigma; and we
should await his decisions on specific
matters before assuming a more optimistic
view than heretofore about the possibility
of developing a constuctive relationship -
with him and his government. 35/

With the benefit of hindsight, it seems that in
this period shortly following Castro's visit to the
United States the COS Havana may have misjudged a
significant development which surfaced almost imme-

diately after Castro's return to Cuba. Remarking on

‘an apparent rash of anti-Communist statements appear-

ing in the Cuban press, one dispatch speculated that:

These demonstrations obviously welcome,
but possibly most significant aspect is
demonstration once again, enormous power
Castro, who with few words. made anti-
Communism popular position. By same
token he could reverse trend at. any time,
and skeptics speculating that current
stand is sop intended to make it more
difficult for U.S. interests to protest
effectively against stringent agrarian
reform law. 36/

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A follow-up dispatch within two days of that
cited above provided a more accurate insight as to
the depth of the struggle which was,in fact, being
waged within Cuba between the pro- and the anti-
Communist factions. Reporting on comments made by
the Executive Secretary of the Partido Socialista
Popular (PsP) with reference to. the confusion among
party members regarding statements that Castro had
made while he was in the United States, Anibal Escalante
laid it on the line that there was a struggle between
the left and the right; and he emphasized that the
- conservative element was trying to take advantage of
‘remarks which Castro had been forced to make while in
the United States. According to the source reporting
on Escalante's talk, Vice-President Nixon had told
Castro that unless he broke his alliance with the
Communists, the United States would cut off economic
aid to Cuba; and this threat had struck Castro as so
serious that he made some unwise statements. The
source, however, noted that the liberal forces of the
26 July movement in the Directorio Revolucionario (the

DR), were in control of the revolution, and that the

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duty of the PSP was to work toward unity and overcome
the counterrevolutionaries. 37/ |

‘In a Special NIE of 30 June 1959 on The Situation
in the Cartbbean through 1959, the intelligence com-
munity again indicated that the internal situation in
Cuba had not been decided. “The SNIE commented:

The Communists probably do not now.

control Castro, but they are ina posi-

tion to exert influence in his regime, —

and to carry on further organizational

work. 38/

Through the summer aad into. the early fall of
1959, the degree of Castro's commitment to Communism
continued to be a major subject. of discussion within
the intelligence community; and in the weekly reporting
that was begun by COS Havana in early June, this topic
continually occurred. ‘In August 1959, when the Deputy

Chief of Western Hemisphere Division, Rudolph Gomez,

assisted ‘Leo Churn in the preparation of an “Urgent

‘

Report on Cuba" for distribution to members of the

Research Institute of America, Castro's Communist

association was prominently featured. At this time,

> and reflecting the views’ of both Western Hemisphere

Division and the Department of State with whom Gomez

. had coordinated the paper, Fidel Castro was not

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‘considered to be a Communist. His brother Raul Castro,
however, was clearly identified as a hard-core Com-
munist.* 39/— |

The internal problem to which Anibal Escalante
had referred in mid-summer came to a head in mid-
October 1959 when Hubert Matos, a military Leader in
Camaguey Province and formerly a strong supporter of
Castro, broke with Fidel over the increasing number
of leadership positions which were being turned over
to members of the Communist oriented PSP rather than
to members of the 26 July Movement . Matos resigned
as military leader of Camaguey on 19 October 1959 and
was arrested ‘on 20 October. During the months prior
to his trial in December 1959, when he was found guilty
of treason and sentenced to 20 years imprisonment, a

‘

* In view of the trend of recent. years, it is inter-
esting to note that the Chuxn report found reason to
be somewhat critical of the Senate Internal Security
Committee (Sén. Eastland's Committee) for getting in-
volved in matters which were principally of concern
to’ the intelligence community. In this case, the
Senate Committee was criticized specifically for
taking Diaz Lanz, the head of Castro's Air Force who
‘'had defected, and questioning him before turning him
over to the intelligence agencies for initial inter-
rogation.

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number of others who had been prominent anti-Batistianos
also broke with Castro. Among these were Faustino
Perez, Minister for Recovery of Illegally Acquired

| Property; Rufo Lépez-Fresquet, Minister of Finance;
Manuel Ray, Minister of Public Works; and Felipe Pazos,
head of the National Bank who was removed by Castro

and replaced by Che Guevera, whose expertise was in
revolution not in banking. As Theodore Draper has
said, this was the second civil war for Castro. 40/

Coincidental to the internal squabble that led

to Matos's resignation, the Deputy Chief of WH Division,
Rudy Gomez, was in Havana (15-18 October 1959) promot- -
ing. an increase in Station efforts to penetrate the
PSP. In the course of this tour, the qualifications

of the best of the agents who might conduct this pene-
tration were reviewed with COS Havana and Station
personnel. Gomez also pointed out that the anti-Com-
munist efforts in Havana should not be limited to

those who were FI or PP designees, but everyone in

the Station was urged to take advantage of opportunities
to push into the Partido Socialista Popular.” In re-

porting on his visit with COS Havana, Gomez noted that ~

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the Ambassador and other members of the American
Embassy in Havana also were very much interested in
the program being advanced; and, in fact, asked Gomez
if CIA could “send a qualified Communist ‘expert to
Havana to indoctrinate appropriate Embassy officers
on Communist doctrines, particularly on their modus
operandi and how Communists working under ‘cover: could
be recognized." Upon his return Gomez received J. Cc.
King's approval to comply with this request.* 41/
‘Even as Gomez was promising State's representa-—
tives in Havana assistance in understanding Communist
activities, J. C. King, Chief of Western Hemisphere
Division, was going forward to the Director of Central
Intelligence with a memorandum complaining about the
Department of State's failure to provide CIA with a
policy action paper on Cuba -- a paper which, accord-
ing to King, had been promised as early as May 1959,
yet had not been received by the end of October. Nor

was there any indication when such paper might be

* It would appear from this request that both the DDP
and State were remiss in the training of their overseas |
personnel. That the Station had to request Headquarters
for support on such an issue is difficult to imagine.

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expected, despite numerous meetings with Department
representatives. King also was particularly critical

of the fact that Ambassador Bonsal had been called to
Washington on two occasions, but in neither instance

had he called on. the Agency for consultation -—- this
despite the fact that there had been indications from

the Department that such consultations were to be held. 42/

The ambivalence regarding Castrce's relation to

the Communist Party was illustrated by the Deputy

Director of Central Intelligence on 5 November 1959

in testifying at the hearings of’ the Judiciary SubCom-
mittee which was investigating the “Communist Threat |
to the US through the Caribbean." In response to the
question of whether Fidel was a Communist, General C.
P. Cabell stated:

Our information shows that the Cuban
Communists do not consider him a Communist
Party member or even a pro-Communist. On

N the other hand, they are delighted with the
nature of his government, which was.allowed
the Communists opportunity -- free opportun-
ity -- to organize, to propagandize, and
to infiltrate. We know the Communists
consider Castro a representative of the
bourgeoise ... Our conclusion, therefore,
is that Fidel Castro is not a Communist,
however, he certainly is not anti-Communist. 43/

In an attempt to resolve, at least part of the

dilemma a Related Mission Directive was approved on
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6 November 1959 and “would remain in effect until
further notice." The RMD stated in part as follows:

For the moment, CIA operations should

be carried out on the assumption that the
revolutionary government is basically non-
Communist, with legitimate reform goals
that. deserve US respect and support. Cov-
ert operations should support overt efforts
to arrive at a rapprochement with the pres--.
ent government and to eliminate the con-

: _ ditions described above without resorting
to forceful means.

‘If it should be established that the
Cuban government is. Communist-led or Com-
munist-dominated, or if that government
cannot be swayed from adopting measures
which intentionally or unintentionally
accomplish Communist objectives, the
question of direct attacks against Castro
will be re-examined. In planning for such
a contingency, each existing or new asset
should be evaluated in terms of possible
future utility from a paramilitary point
of view, nor will the development or re-
cruitment of assets be precluded merely
because they lack a paramilitary capa-
bility. Under no circumstances would any

"asset be apprised of this -contingency
planning. In fact.any disposition to
undertake violent action should. be promptly
and emphatically discouraged pending a
change in policy at the policy-making
level. -44/

Even as the RMD was being dispatched to the
field, another and more significant program was being
evolved in Headquarters. On 11 December 1959, J. C.

King, Chief, WH Division prepared a themorandum for the

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Director of Central Intelligence, through the Deputy
Director of Plans, forwarding a program having as its
specific objective “The overthrow of Castro within
one year, and his replacement by a junta friendly to
the United States which will call for elections 6
months after assumption of office." To achieve this
objective, Chief, WH/D put forward a program, to in-
clude among other items the following: |

1. Clandestine radio attacks on Cuba,
from liberal Caribbean countries.

2. Intrusion operations against Castro's
{TV and radio, to be mounted from within Cuba.

3. Formation of pro-US opposition groups
to establish by force a controlled area
within Cuba.

Colonel King then went on to suggest that:

Thorough consideration be given to the
elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those
close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul
or his companion Che Guevarra [ste], have
the same mesmeric appeal to the masses.
Many informed people believe that the
disappearance of Fidel would greatly ac-
celerate the fall of the present govern-

‘ ment.* 4S/

* The reader's attention is drawn to Appendix A (see

page 296) which reproduces the original 11 December

1959 J. C. King memorandum to the DCI. In light of

subsequent investigations, hearings, and publicity

regarding the Agency's complicity in assassination
(footnote continued on following page)

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As 1959 drew to a close, a final Special National
Intelligence Estimate, "The Situation in the Caribbean
through 1960," indicated that Castro was in to stay,
despite internal difficulties. The SNIE saw no serious.
threat to Castro's continued rule, and it pointed out’
that if there was direct US intervention, "Most Cubans
including the military, would react violently." 46/ .

| AS 1960 began, General Cabell, the Deputy Direc-

tor of Central Intelligence, held a joint briefing

plots aimed at Fidel Castro and others, pages 2 and 3
of Appendix A show two significant corrections in Allen
Dulles's own handwriting to the text submitted by Col.
King. In paragraph 3d, the phrase “thorough consider-
ation. be given ‘to the elimination of Fidel Castro"
carries Dulles's pencilled correction making the text
read “removal from Cuba" rather than "elimination."

At a later point in the same paragraph the

original text said “many informed people believe that

. the disappearance of Fidel would greatly :accelerate

the fall of the present government". Mr. Dulles has
substituted the word “removal" for the word “disappear-
ance." These significant changes in the text on the
‘original copy of King's memorandum -- which the author
has recovered ~- support the contention that the author.
has made in the Foreword to this Volume that the com-

_. ponent (WH/4) officially charged with the conduct of
the Agency's anti-Castro program was. neither charged
with nor responsible for programs designed to assas-
sinate Castro in the course of the Bay of Pigs Opera-
tion. Colonel King's. memorandum of 11 December 1959,
with the pencilled corrections noted above, was con-
curred in by Richard M.: Bissell and approved by Allen
W. Dulles on 12 December 1959.

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(8 January 1960) on Cuba for the Department of State
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He reviewed the in-
creasing hold that the Communist idealogy and those
affiliated with the Communist Party were exerting

the Castro government. At this time, the DDCI also
discussed the need for increased covert and semi-
covert programs aimed at Castro -- psychological war-

fare, political action, economic action, and para-

‘military action, all of which had been conducted in:

_ some degree during the past year. 47/ This 8 January

1960 briefing can be used to denote the beginning of

the serious anti-Castro programs by Central Intelli-

_gence Agency which would culminate at the Bay of Pigs.

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Part II

Castro Must Go . ‘

A. Organizing for Covert Action (January-March 1960)

The first mention of a formal Agency structure
to’ deal with the matter of Fidel Castro was noted by
Colonel L. K. White, then Deputy Director for Support,
in reporting on the DCI's morning meeting of 8 January
1960. White's diary noted:

There was considerable discussion of

the situation in Cuba, and. the Director

requested Dick Bissell:to organize a

special task force to insure that we were

attacking this situation from all possible

angles. 1/ ,

The instruction was taken to heart, for on 18 Jan-
uary 1960 the WH Division:organized Branch 4 (WH/4) as
an expandable task force to run the ‘proposed Cuban Op-
erations. The initial Table of Organization totaled

. . _ \
40 persons, with 18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station,
and 2 at Santiago: Base. 2/
Named to head the new Branch in Western Hemisphere

Division, was Jacob D. Esterline, recently returned COS,

Caracas, Venezuela, and formerly one of the principals

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in Project PBSUCCESS, the operation which had resulted
in the overthrow of the Communist-dominated government

of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. Esterline was

. the choice of J. C. King, Chief, WH Division; and to

the best of Esterline's recollection, toward the end
of his two year tour in Venezuela he had been queried.
by King about remaining in Venezuela or coming back
to Headquarters to work on the Cuban problem. It was
shortly after his return to the States in. January of
1960 that Esterline became Chief, WH/4. 3/

| In addition to his participation in the Guatemalan
episode and his extensive guerrilla warfare experience _
in World War II with the Oss, Esterline thinks that .
he got the job because J. C. King "had pretty much

confidence in my judgment. "* 4/ The relationship

- between Esterline and J. C. King, Chief, WH Division

and the relationship between. King and Richard Bissell,
‘

Deputy Director for Plans (DDP) during the course of

* The author had heard that Esterline had been directly
selected by the DDP, Richard Bissell, to be the head of
WH/4. Bissell made no mention of this, and it is con-
trary to the story noted above, as told by Esterline.

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the Bay of Pigs Operation has been the subject of
considerable speculation ever since the close out of
the invasion. It seems appropriate that some atten-
tion’ should be devoted to this subject before going
further into detail about the evolution of the covert
plans to oust Castro. One source close to the DDP
at the time.of the anti-Castro activity stated flatly:
A task force was formed under Bissell,

excluding J. C. King, Chief, WH/D, from

having in fact any control whatsoever

over the activity. 5/
‘The WH/D history states:

There was an informal but understood

short cut in the chain of command; basic

decisions were made at the DDP; DCI, or

Presidential level. Although some of

the key personnel were detailed from WH

Division, the Cuban Headquarter's unit

was in another building; and no one pre-

tended that J. C. King was running the

show. Jacob D. Esterline ... was the

Chief of the Cuban Unit, during the

build-up and invasion attempt and took

his orders from the DDP. 6/

" Walter Elder, formerly Special Assistant to Allen
Dulles at the time of the Bay of Pigs Operation has
indicated that there was a deliberate attempt to keep
King on the. outer edges of the anti-Castro activity;
but according to Elder, Col. King always knew what

was going on and was thoroughly involved in the Bay of

aT
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Pigs activity from its inception until its conclu-
sion.* 7/.

Esterline himself declined to comment for the
record on this particular speculation, but indicated

that he was not sure what J..C. King was up to at all

' times. It is clear, however, that Esterline was in

very close contact with Col. King throughout the
course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.**

Additional insights concerning J. C. King's
role in Bay of Pigs Operation have been provided by
Richard D. Drain, who was Chief of Operations for-WH/4,
and by Richard Bissell, the DDP. Drain has stated:

J. C. King never was told, I think for
. understandable reasons, to what extent he

+. Elder. suggested to the author that “they" wanted

King out of the operation because of his strong Re-

publican affiliations. "They" were never identified,
but King was well acquainted with highly placed figures

and. contributors to the Republican Party.

** This will become most apparent in the subsequent
discussion of the relationships between WH/4 and
William D. Pawley. During the author's initial conver-
sation with Esterline about the Bay of Pigs, Esterline
did state, in a manner similar to Elder,’ that J.C.
King was..out of the mainstream of the anti-Castro
effort, because he had known Republican Party
affiliations. 8/ There was no elaboration indicating
the impact of such affiliations on King's role, and
there is nothing in the record to support this allega—
tion.

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was in it, to what extent he was not in
it. Therefore, from time to time, he ~
would protrude ... sometimes, saying that
he was sorry to protrude; and then he.
would retract; and then he would be in;

and then he would be out ... that's as

a person. Then again, his Deputy, Ray
Herbert, would call and say "I just. don't

. understand Cable 18963 IN from Guatemala
_today. Would you come over and explain

to me what that's all about;" and I would
step out of the maelstrom of JMATE ...
they were just working flat out ... and
go over. There would be the old WH types
Going their thing in the old WH way.

- Maybe two cables a week from the stations,

and quite leisurely ... I think what had
happened.to J. C. King was that he had
stayed overlong in.the same job; and he
was "Mr. WH," by Gawd. With the excep-
tion of first Guatemala and then Cuba,

there was very little that ever happened

in Latin America which got to be,. given
our other worldwide responsibilities in
the DDP, a very front priority matter;
and consequently, at Staff meetings, for
example, they would go around and talk’
about the Soviet Union and China and ©
Europe and even Africa. Then, if there
was any time left, J. C. King would have
his time at. bat and report: some relatively
minor thing... Except in the case of
Guatemala there was, as everybody knows
now, a very substantial paramilitary
operation which was run by Richard M.
Bissell in his capacity as Special As-
sistant to the Director for Planning and

“Coordination.

I think that one of the many reasons
--- and I never was able to get much in
the way of history on Guatemala as an aid

, to the study of the Cuban operation ...
‘while the latter was in process ... was

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that this had never set very well with
Jd. C. King. He was divested of the
Guatemalan experience, and particularly
when it turned out to be a success ...
PBSUCCESS was a success, through dumb
luck more than anything else. J.C. ...-
‘couldn't take-any of the bows for it.
All right, that rankled, I am sure. - Now
this one comes along, and rather than ex-
pand WH/4, or whatever. the hell it was,
and leave this JMATE Project within that
.Branch, and build up that Branch -- oh,
no. Once again the same man, Dick Bissell
“-- now, however, DDP instead of SAPC --
becomes the case officer for the thing;
and his assistant, Tracy Barnes, is all
over him. One of J. C. King's few very
good men, Jacob D. Esterline, is pulled
aside and made Chief of the project -..
The old man had a great deal of amour
propre, J. C. King did. He was very vain.
He had all of the area expertise that one
would like to see in a Division Chief,
but he had been at it an awful long time.
It was a very incestuous Division. In
terms of the rotation, it was solely
within WH. There were very few people
in WH who had served outside of the |
“Western Hemisphere, except in Washington.
They were a tight-knit little group, and
here now, for the second time running, one
of their big chances to shine -- there
was a lot of money and all that kind of
stuff -- again had been taken away ...
and it was ... it was tough. 9/

Where Drain implied that J. C. King was cut com-
pletely out of WH/4 activities and operations, Mr.
Bissell had indicated that the situation was somewhat

different. In the course of an oral interview, the

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former DDP responded to questions concerning J. C.
King in the following manner:
Question: I.would like to clarify at

this point J. C. King's relationship .
to the Bay of Pigs project. I have

heard it:on both sides -- that he was
involved and that he was deliberately
end~run.

Mr. Bissell: There.is no doubt in my
mind that that was the case. I was
going to say that both of the things
that you have heard have an element of
truth in them. There was a deliberate
decision fairly early in the game --
I doubt if it was as early as March
'[1960. In fact,] I am pretty sure
that it wasn't, [but] I am reasonably
sure that the decision I speak of was
made by some such date as June [1960]
-- {that] Esterline would take charge
of this. Project and Esterline would
have direct access to. mé. He would.
not be under. the usual requirement of
all the cases going through J. C. King.
Now, as the scope of the scale of this
operation increased, and with the passage
-.of time, Esterline's direct channel to
me came to be more exercised; and there
was frequent interchange between Ester-
‘line and myself that didn't go through
J. C. King in the gense of a command
channel. On the other hand, J. C. ‘
was brought into all the consultations |
and was fully informed from the very
beginning about this operation. His
advice was sought and given, and I
_usually found it very good and followed
it. I remember no specific case where
either J. C. King's specific advice or
general attitude toward the operation
was inconsistent with, or in conflict
with my own.

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Question: Why did you make this decision
‘with regard to Jake, coming directly to
you and not going through King? Was it
just a-matter of great efficiency, or
what precipitated that?

Mr. Bisséll:. I think it was in part on
-the model of the Guatemalan operation,
and in part, I think, a feeling, probably
‘on-my Own part -- in some degree perhaps
on the part of Allen Dulles -- that J.
C. was not effective enough to handle ‘*
this kind of very fast moving, quite
large scale, quite complex, paramilitary
operation.

_ Question: Do you recall any instances ;
where there was a serious conflict be-
tween what Jake wanted to do and what
J. C. King thought should be done?

Mr. Bissell: I don't remember many, if
- any, and I believe that the relation-
ships between Jake and J. C. were pretty
good throughout. 10/

Certainly the’ written record bears out Bissell's.

_ contention that King was fully informed and that the
‘relationship between King and Esterline was, if not

love, at least mutually respectful.*

ay

* The only point of contention between King and Ester-
line that surfaced in the records concerned the degree
to which William Pawley should be involved in affairs
related to the organization of the Cuban exiles. At
one point, Jake suggested to the DDP that all contact

with Pawley be cut.off, but in sending Esterline's

memorandum through channels, J. C. King noted that he
was against cutting Pawley completely off from contact
with WH/4.: In fact, Pawley was ‘in continuous contact
-- even though in disagreement -- with both Jake and
King until: the close out of the operation.

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Another of the questions which must be addressed

in setting the stage of the Bay of Pigs operation is

_.the failure of Richard Helms -- at. that time Chief of

Operations (COPS) for the DDP: -- to become more than

marginally involved in the Cuban project. Oral inter-
views again provided the best explanations, and, con-
sequently, are entered into this record in rather full-
detail. Dick Drain, who became COPS/WH/4, made the
following comments:

Helms was COPS [Chief of Operations].
Either on his own volition, which I sus-
pect or on order -~ which I doubt -- Dick
Helms completely divorced himself from this
thing. I.mean absolutely! The one time
that I heard. from. Helms during this entire

_ project was ... I am sitting down there in
my chair, as COPS of the project, ona
Monday, having spent the entire goddamned
weekend working with the guy who is now
the head. of MI-6 -- Maurice Oldfield,
who was then the MI-6 resident in Washing-
ton -- trying to get an airplane and some
Cubans. out of Montego Bay before the
Brits in Jamaica came back from their
long. weekend ... I am sitting there con-
gratulating myself that the plane is out,
and the Cubans are out, and the British
are back, and it hasn't hit the fan, and
I get a telephone call from Dick Helms's
long time secretary, "Mr. Helms would
like to speak to you." Well, fine ...
well, the whole thing on his part was so.
-.. to me ... incredibly apologetic ....

‘three times he said to me in different
parts of the conversation ... "As you know,
I have nothing to do with this project."
What he did have to do with, ever since

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the Francis Gary Powers thing, he had
been a member of an inter-Agency com-
mittee that met with periodic regularity
to discuss air matters of any sensitivity.
I guess he'd had enough to do with this |
project so that somebody [who] had [been]
reading the cable traffic told him ...
"Well, those nuts down in Quarters Eye
seem to have lost an airplane this week-
end." He was going to the regular com-
mittee meeting that afternoon, so he had _
to ask me the details ... very apologetic-
ally. The third time that he said, "You
know I have nothing to do with this
project," I said, "Well Mr. Helms, I don't
want to be: fatuous about this, but I wish
to Christ that you did have because we
could use your expertise." He said,
“Hahaha ... yes, well thank you very much,"
and that was the end of that. He avoided
the thing like the plague. One of the
reasons may have been that, of course,
life went on; and if Bissell was getting

‘increasingly immersed in this one thing,

somebody had to watch the whole worldwide
store ... which of course Helms was damned
good at. A less attractive suggestion is

_ that Helms figured that there was a high

likelihood that this thing would screw up,
and he didn't want to have the tar baby
around him. I don't know. 11/ ,

Bissell, in responding: to the question about.

Helms' role during the course of the Bay of Pigs, com-

mented as follows:

I think that he [Helms] saw most. all
of the cable traffic and I think he was
pretty well informed as to what was going
on, very well informed; but he was really
out of the line of command on this opera-
tion. There was something of a tacit
agreement between us, that he would be
devoting himself to a lot of the other on

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going, business of the DDP office, be-
cause this was taking a great deal of
my time. .

Question: This was a tacit agreement,

“this wasn't a session in which you
and Helms ...

Bissell: Let me say this was probably

not that explicit. I would make an
observation here, and I don't want

you to infer anything really beyond
what it says, it was not particularly
easy -- I did not find it particular-
ly easy -- to discuss things clearly
and derive a clear understanding with
Dick [Helms] about the division of
labor between us when he was my Deputy. |
I don't imply by this any sense of
conflict or rivalry, but he would go
ahead and handle certain kinds of
matters, and I would go ahead and
handle certain kinds of matters.

‘We saw one another, of course, ‘all the
time. Quite often I would consult him
-about something that I was handling.

I think rather less often he would con-
sult me. I don't mean to imply however
in that any kind of concealment from me
-- I' never had that feeling at all --
but it really was our habit during the,
whole time that we were in those posi-
tions that the division of labor between
us was more tacit than explicit. 12/

Simultaneously with the decision to create a

separate Branch in WH Division to handle the anti-

' Castro activity discussions were begun by both the

Special Group 5412 and on an inter-agency basis as
to the nature of the anti-Castro effort. Among the

many questions raised early in the game was whether

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the US program should be overt or covert, with the
overt implications being the ultimate application

of US military force. to oust Castro. DCI Dulles
emphasized that contingency planning should be under-

taken by the Special Group, without necessarily in-

‘volving either the President or the National Security

Council.

The Department of State was concerned that if
Fidel Castro were deposed, perhaps his successors, Che
Guevara and Raul Castro, would be even worse than
Fidel. As reported in subsequent congressional reve-
lations, concerning CIA's role in assassination plots,
it was during the Special Group Meeting of 13 January

1960 that the Director of Central Intelligence "“empha-

sized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination

of Castro, but rather. actions designed to enable re-
sponsible opposition leaders to get a foothold." 13/

At this same Special Group Meeting, President
Eisenhower's National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray,
predicted with uncanny accuracy the situation which
would ultimately develop as one of the key weaknesses
in the whole concept of the Bay of Pigs Operation.

According to the report on the Special Group Meeting:
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Mr. Gray commented that a problem

would be posed for administration offi-

cials if a decision should be taken to

change our attitude toward Castro, as

outlined earlier in the meeting. He

acknowledged that any such decision

‘must. be kept highly secret, but he

foresaw difficulties which would arise,

for example, during testimony by the

Secretaries of Defense and Treasury”

before Congress, at public gatherings,

etc., if they should have to give an

impression that. the US was not doing ; -

anything about Cuba. 14/

This in.fact, was the “damned if I do, damned if
I don't" position in which Richard Nixon found himself
in the Fall of 1960 and thé position in which the United
States found itself with reference to both the United
Nations ‘and the Organization of the American States
throughout the course of the Bay of Pigs operation as
the myth of “plausible deniability" overruled common
sense, Following the initial Special Group meeting,
there was a flurry of activity séeking some solid
proposals; and in a CIA meeting of 21 January 1960,
C. Tracy Barnes (the Assistant DDP for Action), J. C.
King, Jake Esterline, and Dick Helms among others,
discussed a whole series of issues which would he
basic to the program from this time forward: identi-

fication of the principal Cuban leaders: -- Ramon Barquin,

Justo Carrillo, and Miro Cardona (who would eventually
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head up the principal anti-Castro organization sup-

ported by the Agency) were mentioned; radio propaganda

operating out of either Third country or US areas

was raised; the training program for both communica~

tors and for PM trainers at Fort Randolph in the
zone was discussed; and the possible acquisition

aircraft for support operations and the question

US business as a cover for the operations ‘of the

groups in the United States were all discussed.

Canal
of

of -
exile

The

possible involvement of US businesses to put overt.

pressure. on the US government for the possible imposi-

tion of economic sanctions and as a covert means

of

raising money for the support of Cuban exile organiza-

tions. also surfaced. This initial meeting also recog-

nized the problem of trying to gain the support of

the more liberal Latin American Governments (e.g.,

_that of Betancourt in Venezuela). 15/

Al Cox, one of the senior officers in paramilitary

note:

Stringent security precautions were a

placed on JMARC, including the exclusion
of the PP Staff and other Agency compo-
nents from all cable and dispatch traffic
and from access to correspondence between

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operations was in attendance, and he would subsequently

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the project and the office of the DDP

+». In point of fact, such restrictive
measures were somewhat meaningless inso-
far.as keeping awareness of the project's
activities away from PP/PMG. The A/DDP/P
granted permission to PP/C/PMG to read the
daily project traffic, (with Esterline's
knowledge and permission). Esterline
personally knew the majority of the PP/PMG
senior officers, and in no time he had
drafted six or seven of these, including
the Deputy Chief, PMG, for assignment to
JMARC ... This, of course, was valuable
as’ a built-in penetration of JMARC in

the best FI and CI tradition.* 16/

‘Early in February of 1960, Allen Dulles was
briefed in general terms on the planning that was

\

being initiated by WH. Division, and at the same time

J. C. King told the Director "that the Branch concept

was used [in establishing WH/4] rather than the term
Task Force for greater security and to simplify chan-
nels of command." The Director subsequently explained
to the Special Group. (3 February 1960) some of the
activities that were being undertaken, noting that

within the next week or two, the Group would receive

* The crypt for the WH/4 anti-Castro operation was
initially’ JMARC. Following compromise of this crypt,
the project became JMATE (sometime in the period be-
tween 6-13 December 1960) Throughout this volume
the project will be identified as JMATE, except in
direct quotations.

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‘a paper outlining the Agency's thoughts on the programs,

‘which had been initiated .against the Castro Govern-

ment.* 17/
The proposals of which the DCI had spoken were
discussed in a.DDP review session on ll February 1960

which was attended by Tracy Barnes, Jake Esterline,

Al Cox, Dave Phillips, and Jim Flannery. The focus

was on sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry,** propa-
ganda broadcasts, and funding. Noting that WH Division
had roughly $50,000 available for immediate use, it .
was speculated that the "ultimate magnitude" of the
anti-Castro effort might reach 3 million dollars =-—

an estimate that would, in effect, be some 40 million
short of the eventual cost. It was stated, however,
that funds would easily be obtainable from the Agency

reserve to meet any shortages. At this planning ses-

- sion, the training program for the PM cadre at Fort

‘Randolph in Panama was given minor attention; and

* In addition to the Special Group, which included
a DOD. representative, WH/4 worked directly with other
representatives of DOD regarding current developments
and the possible coordination of activities vis-a-vis
Cuba. 18/-

** "The big sugar sack?"

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here, too, the seéds were planted by Tracy Barnes

for an attitudinal survey of “Cuban society" which

could have (and. should have) caused CIA planners to

re-think the whole anti-Castro effort.* 19/
A very similar briefing, with somewhat more
emphasis on possible paramilitary action, was given

to a high level group from DOD on 12 February 1960; .

_and the agenda for the 17 February 1960. meeting of

the Special Group, again emphasized that the Castro
Government was dependent on sugar revenues for, both
continuation of popular domestic and hemispheric
subversion programs. ** 20/ It was further suggested
to the. Special Group that dissidents within Cuba
might. also be stimulated .to sabotage, with the ulti-
mate result leading to Castro's ouster. 21/ The
recommendation that the DCI made to the Special

Group was as follows:

* This refers to the Lloyd Free Report, which is
discussed: subsequently in this Volume, see pp. 222-226.

** The DOD representatives who were briefed were the
Deputy Secretary, Mr. Douglas; Mr. John Irwin, Assis~

tant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs; General Erskine; and General Lansdale.

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That CIA be authorized to initiate
operational planning, including covert

spotting and assessment of potential

agents, for. eventual sabotage of both

‘Cuban and American-owned sugar mills.

Should this course of action prove. feas—

ible and desirable, the operation would

be designed to deny Castro as much as

possible of the revenues anticipated

from the 1960 sugar crop. 22/

Interestingly enough, although the briefing for
DOD had placed considerable emphasis on paramilitary -
planning, apparently no mention of the subject was
made to the Special Group.

On 17 February 1960 when Allen Dulles presented
the sugar sabotage plan to the Special Group, he em-
phasized that he was not asking for permission to
engage in action, only that he was looking for a
Special Group approval. Mr. Irwin (Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for International Security Affairs)

' noted that he and the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
Mr... Douglas were all for the plan; and the Group agreed
to present the plan to the Secretary of State and to
Gordon Gray so that the latter could get the Presi-
dent's. reaction.

President Eisenhower was less than enthusiastic
about the sugar sabotage plan, reportedly doubting

that the loss of sugar revenues would impact on
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Castro's ability to continue to finance subversive
activities in other Latin America areas. President
Eisenhower also objected to the focus on economic
sabotage, and he would not agree to the plan to

identify assets specifically for sabotage operations

against the sugar industry. Eisenhower was willing

to support a program to identify assets for the sugar -

industry " and other things as well ... including -
even possibly things that might be drastic." In
addition to identifying assets on a broad basis, the
President also requested that a comprehensive covert
action program be prepared by Mr. Dulles. This, it
was suggested, should go to the Special Group; and
if they approved the plans, then the President wanted
to discuss them. In any event, action on the PM pro-

gram would be delayed until Eisenhower returned from |

his upcoming Latin American visit and gave his

specific approval.* 23/ |

* The Minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 17 Feb-
ruary 1960 also noted that

. Mr.:Joseph Scott of State also reported
later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the
same point.
This appears to have been one of the few instances
where Department of State representatives indicated
support for possible direct action programs rather
than political solutions to the Cuban problem.

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Despite the rather positive doubts that the
President had about the sugar sabotage activity, J..
Cc. King charged ahead almost immediately following
the Special Group Meeting of 17 February 1960. On.
18 February, King and Milo Perkins had a detailed
discussion concerning the disruptive effects which |
might result from interference with the. Cuban sugar
operation. Perkins was planning meetings with Am~

bassador Hill and Thomas ("Tommy the Cork") Corcoran,

and King brought to Perkins's attention that Corcoran

had been willing and able to provide valuable assist-

ance to the Agency in the past. Later in the month,

‘Col. King met with Thomas Mann, the. Assistant Secre-

tary for Economic Affairs (subsequently Assistant

. Secretary for American Republic Affairs) who reportedly

was in favor of both reduced sugar quotas and direct
sabotage of Cuban sugar mills. According to King,
Secretary Mann also would support both cut backs in

us oil companies deliveries to Cuba. and actions which
might cut back on us tourist trade with the island. 24/

Col. King also consulted with former Ambassador

‘William Pawley, whom he asked to make arrangements

for the publication of Diario de la Marina in Miami,

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and also “to raise at least a portion of the money,
which would be needed for this operation." In addi-
tion to Pawley, King also contacted Henry Holland in

New York City, suggesting that Holland raise money,
through Cuban exile Justo Carrillo, to help pay for
the propaganda efforts of New York radio station WRUL.
King agreed that Holland could tell prospective donors
that the “money was going to be used on behalf of
non-Batista groups who were going to make a serious
effort to remove Fidel Castro." 25/

In addition to J. c. King's high level con-
tacts, Jake Esterline and -Mr. Dulles had a meeting
with Abbott Washburn, Deputy Director of the US In-
formation Agency who had requested a briefing on the
current state of activities in.Cuba -- Washburn was

concerned lest there be a conflict of interests be-
tween USIA and the CIA's ongoing effort in the area.
Washburn presented ‘the Agency with a copy of some
proposals which the State Department had approved
for implementation by USIA in Cuba. USIA's pitch

. would be that the long-standing friendship between
Cuba and the United States was being endangered by

the infiltration of Communists and Communist ideology

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into Cuba -- at the same time not denying that the
US was sympathetic to the need for a change in Cuba.

The Director and Mr. Esterline agreed that it would

_be advisable for Mr. Washburn, who-was planning to

visit Cuba, to meet Jim Noel, COS Havana, and out-
line the USIA program for Mr. Noel's benefit.* 26/
As the propaganda activities were being pushed
forward, as plans were being made for training Cuban
exiles, and as the possibilities of sabotage, PM
action, and other measures against Castro were being
contemplated,-a cautionary memorandum apparently was

drafted by one of the individuals most closely con-

. cerned with the potential anti-Castro operations.

The memorandum, undated and unsigned, reviewed the

anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in light of what

I

was being planned for Project JMATE: It noted some

of the similarities or differences with respect to

“the removal of Jacobo Arbenz in contrast to the pos-

sibilities of removing Fidel Castro; and in light of

the ultimate tragedy at the Bay of Pigs, some of. the

* One result of the meeting with Washburn was a de-
cision to turn over a planned USIA: anti-Castro car-.
toon effort to CIA.

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key points made in this memorandum are worth repeat-
ing -- even though it is not known who read the piece.
Among other things, for example, the author of the

memorandum stressed "the unique coincidence of favor-

able factors" with reference to Guatemala and suggested

that it was unlikely that any of these would operate
with reference to Project JMATE. ; :
It was noted that the Guatemalan leadership was

“unusually inept"; that: “Communist support for Arbenz

came from the local Communist Party, which was immature,

badly led, and generally weak"; and, that “we had. un-
believable luck." 27/ The memorandum also noted that
there were a number of circumstances which would not
recur during the course of the anti-Castro activity.

Specifically pointing out that where Arbenz was a

. weak leader, Cas‘tro was obviously a strong leader;

that Castillo Armas was a Guatemalan leader of high
character and standing, but no one of similar stature
had surfaced in Cuba to oppose Castro; and that in
Guatemala Arbenz had made no changes in the armed
forces of Guatemala, and when the crisis came, he
could not depend on his army. Castro, on the other

hand had eliminated the Batista influence, and filled

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the key military positions with his own followers

and "introduced a system of intense ideological in-

' doctrination." Furthermore, the unknown author pointed

out that while Moscow.'s interest in Guatemala was
compartatively mild -- the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico
City was the nearest Soviet official available to the .
Arbenz Government -- in Cuba, the heavy economic and
propaganda support from both Moscow and Peiping were
a matter of record. 28/ |

The memorandum closed by pointing to three areas
where the writer claimed that tactical -- not strategic
-~ errors were being made. It stated that the blunt
propaganda attacks on Castro were forging all anti-US
elements in Cuba into a united front and US efforts
should be attempting to drive a wedge between Castro,
as a victim of international Communism, and the Com-
munists both Cuban and foreign. Secondly, it was
pointed out that the propaganda broadcast out of US
commercial radio stations, even if the time were
legitimately being purchased by Cuban exile groups,

would be a "kiss of death" for anyone: who tried to

‘deny US intervention in Cuban affairs. In part re-

lated to the propaganda activities, the planned use

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of US business groups as a cover for the Agency's

support of the Cuban opposition, particularly the

use of US business as a funding mechanism, was also

hazardous in the eyes of the author of the memorandum

under study. If the author was correct in assuming

that this cover would not withstand careful scrutiny,

it would mean that the anti-American contingents would.

have additional ammunition to use against the US.

The memorandum suggested that many of these risks

could be eliminated if propaganda activities were

moved to Third countries and if fund raising activi-

ties were run out of Latin America or Western Europe. 29/ -
Based on the language, the familiarity with the

Guatemaia activity and the nature of the. critique,

it is probable that Tracy Barnes wrote the memorandum

in question. The mémorandum may have been prompted

in part by the increasing attention which the OCB and /

the Cabinet had been giving to fire bomb attacks on

the Cuban cane fields by light aircraft flying out

of the United States. The Agency fully supported Gen-

eral Quesada's effort.to put an end to such flights.* 30/

* Quesada was Director of the Federal Aviation Agency. °

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From 2 March 1960, when the Director briefed
Vice President Nixon on Agency activities in Cuba
and. the state of Cuban affairs, until 17 March 1960,
when President Eisenhower formally approved the cov-
ert anti-Castro plan, CIA personnel most closely
involved in: the anti~Castro effort. were fully immersed
in the efforts to define -- and refine -- a US policy -
which would be acceptable to President Eisenhower.

In the course of this two week period, they were en-
gaged in efforts to satisfy the 5412 Group, the National
Security Council, and themselves that they had developed
‘a viable program which would lead: to the downfall and
‘ouster of Fidel Castro and his principal. cohorts, Che

Guevara and Raul Castro, and the elmimination of

Communism from the island of Cuba and, in effect,

from the Western Hemisphere.

During this period of evolution of national .

policy, WH/4 held its first official meeting asa ‘
. branch on 9 March 1960. J. C. King and Jake Esterline

were in charge of the meeting and outlined the general

nature of the programs that were going to be put into

operation (propaganda activity, PM training, commo

. training) and they emphasized the need for cooperation

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and support from all of the offices that were repre-
sented at. the. meeting, including, among others, the
Office of Training, the Office of Communications,

the Comptroller's Office, the DDS, DPD, the PP Staff,
Personnel (particularly the Military Personnel Divi-
sion), and the Office of Security. At this initial
meeting, Jake Esterline mentioned that Bob Reynolds,
Deputy Chief, WH/4, Dave Phillips, Propaganda Officer,
Phil Toomey, Political and. Psychological. Stategist,
Bob Wedbee, the Economist, and Ed Stanulus, his Plans
and Ops Officer, would be the principals who would

be in contact with other Agency elements which would: -
be called on for support. In addition, Esterline also
noted that liaison channels would be established with
other elements of the US Government, particularly with

the Office of Special Operations of the Department

_of Defense. 31/

It was during the period between 8-17 -March 1960
that the previously mentioned covert anti-Castro pro-
gram which Allen Dulles had agreed (on 17 February
1960) to provide to the Special Group evolved. Among
those in the Agency having a direct hand in preparing

a suitable paper for the Director's presentation, were
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C. Tracy Barnes, Richard Bissell, Dick Helms, Jake

Esterline, J. C. King, and Tom Parrott, among others.
Those who figured most prominently among the Special
Group representatives at this time were Livingston

Merchant, Department of State; John Irwin, Assistant

Secretary -for International Security Affairs, Depart-—

- ment of Defense; Admiral Burke, Chief, Naval Opera- -

tions; and Gordon Gray, the President's National
Security Adviser. Other than the more than a dozen’
memorandums and drafts and other papers related to
the development of the policy paper, perhaps a note

from Richard Helms to C. Tracy Barnes on 8 March 1960

best illustrates the seriousness with which the Agency

approached the task of writing a paper for the Direc-.

tor.. Mr. Helms's note to Mr. Barnes read as follows:

%

Tom Parrott gave me for security late
this afternoon the attached paper for the
5412 Group outlining the proposed covert
action program against Fidel Castro.
After reading it, I asked Tom to. defer
consideration of. Cuba until next week
since I feel that: this document needs re-
drafting whether it is used by the Direc-
tor for an oral briefing or handed to the
designated representatives for their en-
lightenment.

x

I think you will agree with me that
the paper is poorly drafted and needs
considerable pointing up in various

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places. I do not disagree with the listed
recommendations in paragraph 6, but I do
feel that the backup material in paragraphs
2 and 3 needs recasting. For example, the
reference to a “short-wave radio station
patterned after Radio Free Europe", is no
way, in my opinion, to describe what we
have’ in mind. Also the paragraph on covert
economic action is not sufficiently precise
and raises more questions than it answers.
There are other points, but there is no

" sense in belaboring them in this note to
you. -

May I ask that you take this matter in
hand and advise WH how to put it in suit-
able shape for use by the Director with
the 5412 Group next week. 32/

In the paper to which Mr. Helms referred the
problem facing the US was stated rather simply as
follows:

To replace the present Government of
Cuba, headed by Fidel Castro, with one
that will be acceptable to the United
States; and to cause this change to occur
in such a manner that anti-US repercussions
are not induced in Latin America. 33/

- Throughout the discussion of the Agency's role
in the anti-Castro activity, there was a tremendous
concern that there be no “anti-US repercussions,"
not only in Latin America per se, but particularly
among the Latin American representatives in the Or-

ganization of American States and in the United Nations.

The constant quest for plausible deniability would

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become the holiest of grails -- constantly, and ‘un-
successfully, to be sought throughout the course of
the operation by Agency planners.

The proposed paper for the Special Group (the
paper which Mr. Helms found somewhat lacking) empha-
sized those areas highlighted in previous Special

Group sessions -- anti-Castro propaganda, disrup-' _
tions of the Cuban economy, including large scale
Sabotage operations, and the development of instructor
cadres to provide both communications and PM training
cadres to resistance groups already extant in Cuba.
Interesting, too, is the fact that at this. early
stage of US planning mention was made of the offer
‘from the Guatemalan Government of a training site
for the PM cadres, or “action groups" as they were
called. A financial annex included in the proposals
for the Special Group indicated the need for $900,000
for the remainder of FY 1960 and $1.6 million for

FY 1961.* 34/

* Apparently Mr. Helms failed to read the financial

annex carefully enough, for the estimated requirement
for fiscal. 1961 which is shown as $1.6 million, was.
either a typographical error, or a mistake in addition
-- the sum of the parts shown for FY '61 is $1.7 million.
It also was noted that for the remainder of FY '60,

the Agency reserve funds would have to be drawn on to
meet these “non-program requirements."

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. As the paper was being prepared for Special
Group consideration, J. Cc. King, Chief, Western
Hemisphere Division had forwarded a memorandum for
the Director of Central Intelligence, providing him
with additional information for use during the Special
Group discussions; and the transmittal to the DCI
recorded that this paper had been used to brief Mr.
Nixon on 2 March 1960. King's memorandum covered
much the same ground as the paper which went to the

Special Group, but contained considerably more de-

‘tail about the activities of the Castro Government

which were directly aimed at overthrowing the legiti-
mate. governments and replacing them with Communist
oriented governments. Col. King's paper also re-

vealed that both Guatemala and Nicaragua -- the only

,two governments in Latin America which were to throw

their full support behind the Agency's anti-Castro

activity -- had made offers at this time for both

radio time for anti-Castro broadcasts and, also, for
training facilities for anti-Castro groups which the
Agency might wish to sponsor. 35/

Despite President Eisenhower's previous objec-

tions to the over-emphasis on plans to sabotage Cuba's

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sugar industry, King's paper did reflect considerable
emphasis on disruption of that economic sector.
Another. item which Col. King saw fit to include in
his memorandum was the following: |

; We have available, a drug, which, if

placed in Castro's food, would make him

behave in such an irrational manner that

a public appearance could have very damag-

ing results to him.* 36/

Even as the Special Group was planning its ses-
sions on the anti-Castro program, so, too, was the
‘National Security Council being geared up for discus-
sions of the same situation. Again, there wads great
concern over the question of possible loss of prestige
should the US act independently of the international _
organizations. There also was interest in protecting
US business and in the protection of US lives, and

‘the question of viability of the Guantanamo Base was .
of considerable concern to the President's National ~
' Security adviser, Gordon Gray. The policy that Gray
was advised to recommend to the National Security
' Council regarding US bases stated:

_. Take action as necessary, including
military action, to insure the continued

_* For comments on this subject see Part VII of this 7
volume.

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availability to the United States of
bases and base rights in Latin America
that are considered vital to “the secur-
ity of the United States. 37/ ©

An additional aspect of the basic national secur-
ity policy for Latin America which Gordon Gray was
being encouraged’ to promote with the National Security
Council on 10 March 1960 recommended that:

In the event of an imminent or actual
Communist seizure of control from within,
take all feasible measure[s] to thwart it,
including military action if finally re-
quired and appropriate to cope with the
situation.* 38/ .

Following Gordon Gray's briefing of the National
Security Council on 10 March 1960, President. Eisenhower
approved the following rather innocuous actions:

-1, Every effort should be made to in-
‘fluence the other members of the Organiza-
tion of American States to recognize the
dangers involved in the Cuban situation.
and support action with respect to them.

* Mr. Gray also was advised to play both sides of the
street for with reference to the disruptive efforts of
non-Communist groups, the position he was being urged
to promote was the following:

The United States should be prepared, if
required to protect US interests, to take
similar actions against subversion or armed
rebellion by non-Communist elements hostile
‘to US interests.

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2. The responsible Departments and
Agencies should keep current plans to
déal promptly with likely contingencies
which might develop with. respect to Cuba,
especially those involving the safety of
US citizens in the Guantanamo Base.

-3. The developments: with regard to
the situation in Cuba should be reviewed
by the’ Council’ each meeting, for the
immediate future. 39/

Subsequent to the NSC meeting of 10 March 1960, -

‘Gordon Gray informed the President that the Special

Group had set aside a 2-hour session on 14 March “to
discuss the whole range of assets and possibilities

in Cuba." 40/ Prior to the 14 March meeting, Messrs..
Bissell and King received a somewhat strange memorandum
from Allen W. Dulles offering “some suggestions as to
possible added 'starters' for our Cuban paper; use
your own judgment as to adding them." 41/ Among these
starters was Dulles's suggestion that the International

Transport Union somehow be induced to refuse to load

“dangerous" munitions intended for Cuba and then Dulles

made the following rather unusual suggestion: *

* In addition to the International Transport Union,
Dulles also suggested that an attempt be made to in-
duce Cuban laborers to resist unloading explosives
that were sent to Cuba, but as he himself pointed out,
Castro probably would use the Cuban Army should the
dockworkers refuse to do the unloading.

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Stress point that while the dynamism

is running out of the Marxist-Leninist

revolution in Russia, it still remains

in China. This explains ChiCom special

‘interest in supporting the Cuban revolu-

tion and expanding it, with the ultimate

aim of facilitating mass emigration -of

Chinese to the Latin American continent

to meet their over-population problem.

(This may be premature, but there may be

something to it.} 42/

As promised by Gordon Gray, the Special Group
Meeting of 14 March 1960 focused exclusively on the
Cuban problem, and Mr. Dulles presented the members
with the paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan
for Cuba." Much of the ground was already familiar
to the participants, but the memorandum of the meet-
ing reflects a number of items worth review. Even
though Dulles's paper Placed heavy emphasis on the
propaganda needs, even greater emphasis was urged
for covert and overt propaganda activities, not only
through WRUL, the commercial broadcasting operation,
but also through the efforts of USIA's programs for
Latin America -- programs which apparently had been
sharply curtailed in the recent past. The question
of location for the Agency's covert broadcasting

activity was again raised and discussed, the question

being whether it should be somewhere in the Florida

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Keys, in some Caribbean country, or elsewhere.

Somewhat more attention was focused.on the para-
military plans during this discussion than had occurred
before, and Mr. Gray was particularly concerned by the
Agency estimate that: "it appears no large scale para-
military effort (other than wholly overt) will be
feasible in less than 8 months"; and he wondered if  .
a crash program was feasible to speed up the training
program. 4&3/ The questions of economic sanctions, OAS

and individual Latin American country involvement, the

‘choice of the proper Cuban exiles to represent the

government in. exile, and the question of a budget --
the $900,000 for fiscal 1960 and the $1.6-1.7 million
for 1961 were also the subjects of discussion.

One additional subject of disucssion at this
Special Group meeting as recorded by Col. J. C. King
was:

_ What would be the effect on the Cuban

scene ‘if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che

Guevarra[sie] should disappear simultan-

eously. 44/

In the reported context of the discussion it is not

believed that the term "disappear" was a euphemism for

assassination, but rather referred to the ouster of

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Castro's government from political power. The para-
graph which had raised the question then continued:

Admiral Burke said that the only orga-
nized group within Cuba today were[sie] the
Communists, and there was therefore the
danger that they might move into control.
Mr. Dulles felt that this might not be
disadvantageous because it would facilitate
a multilateral action by OAS. Colonel King
said that there were few leaders capable
of taking over so far identified. One pos-—
sibility was Nunez Jiminez, the head of the
Agricultural Reform Program. No other
names were widely enough known to be men-
tioned. *#

Other discussion, notwithstanding, the focus of
Mr. Dulles's recommendations on 14 March 1960 was that
the Central Intelligence Agency should be authorized
to take a number of steps which were specifically re-
lated to the development of the guerrilla capacity of
‘the anti-Castro groups, both within and without Cuba...
The Agency should be responsible for broadening its

contacts with such groups and attempting to unify

‘

* ‘This comment and one made five days earlier (9 March
1960) by J. C. King that “unless Fidel and Raul Castro
and Che Guevara could be eliminated in one package --
which is highly unlikely -- this operation can be a

long drawn-out affair and the present government will
only be overthrown by the use of force" were discussed
(pp. 93, 114-116) in SSC report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Léaders, and it is apparent from
the recollections of the participants in the meetings
that assassination was not the issue in these two
instances.

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them to direct their efforts against Castro. The DCI
proposed that CIA should take the lead in assisting

these groups to develop friendships among various of

_ the Latin American Governments which were skeptical

of Castro and that the Agency should be responsible
for identifying and training -- in facilities in the
United States or elsewhere -- those who would be the
leaders of the Cuban guerrilla warfare groups. At the
conclusion. of the 14 March meeting, it was agreed

that the Agency would revise the paper on the basis

of the discussions and plan to present it to President
Eisenhower later in the week. 45/

As part of the effort to improve the paper on
the proposed anti-Castro operations, the Agency pre-
pared additional backup material which could be cranked
into the version which would eventually go to the
President. On 14 and 15 March, the records reveal
copies of two drafts of such a paper, one of which
was labeled as "revised version, done by [C. Tracy]
Barnes ,. evening 14 Mar," which went into moré detail
on both the political opposition to Castro and on the
propaganda activities that were being mounted against

Castro. These papers also noted that paramilitary

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' activity would “take the longest to become a usable
asset." 46/ The most important difference between
these papers and the covert action plan presented
by Dulles was that the Financial Annex showed a sharp,
upward increase in the anticipated costs for FY ‘61

(-- from $1.6-1.7 million to $3.5 million -- with the
heaviest increment coming in terms of the proposed
paramilitary operation. The sum for PM operations
was revised from an estimated $500,000 in Duliles's
14 March presentation to a total of $1.3 million for
that same year.

From the time Allen Dulles enunciated the covert
action plan (14 March) until President Eisenhower ap-~
proved it (17 March), there was an interesting bit of
bi-play between the National Security Council and the
Special Group 5412. One of the principal concerns of
the National Security Council was the proper US re-
sponse should the Cubans try to intervene or inter-
fere with operations of the Naval base at Guantanamo
Bay, including a possible takeover of the Base. On
16 March 1960, after Gordon Gray had been fully apprised
of the proposed plan for covert action submitted by |

Allen Dulles, Gray was the recipient of a briefing

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note from a member of his own Staff, Samuel E. Belk,
for the planned National Security Council meeting
of 17-March which again focused exclusively on the
situation at Guantanamo Bay. It appears as though
Mr. Belk, even though ‘he was a member of the NSC
Staff was completely in the dark as to the planning
that had already been undertaken with regard to
Castro's ouster. At a time when the President had
already indicated that proposals for economic action
or direct. sabotage of the Cuban sugar industry were
less than what he desired, Mr. Belk, for whatever
reason, suggested again that with the new sugar
legislation, perhaps Castro could be straightened
out. In addition, Belk suggested a plan which was
“unconventional and radical" -- having President
Eisenhower send a message directly to Castro. telling
him that’ he was concerned over the deterioration of ©
relations between the two countries and suggesting
that Castro have private conversations with an emissary
whom the President would personally designate.

Staffer Belk believed that this was a “can't
lose" situation for the US. If Castro refused to

meet with Eisenhower's representative, then he would

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be condemned throughout Latin America. The US on the
other hand would receive the blessings of the OAS and
the UN for its efforts. If Castro did agree to meet
with the President's representative, then relations
between the US: and Cuba probably would be improved. 47/
Mr. Belk' s suggestions apparently never went beyond

Mr. Gray.

At 1430 hours on 17 March 1960, Mr. Dulles pre-
sented his covert action plan to a combined meeting
of the National ‘Security Council and the principals
of the Special Group. In attendance with the Presi-
dent were Vice President Nixon, Secretary Herter, Mr.

Merchant, Mr. Rubottom, Secretary of Treasury Ander-
son, Secretary Irwin, Admiral Burke, Richard Bissell,
Colonel King, Gordon Gray, Major John Eisenhower, and
General A. J. Goodpaster. Based on General Goodpaster's
report on the meeting:

The President said that he knows of no

better plan for dealing with this situa-

tion. The great problem is leakage and

breach of security. Everyone must be pre-

pared to swear that he has not heard of

it. .He said we should limit American

contacts. with the groups involved to. two

or three people, getting Cubans to do

most of what’ must be done ... He under-

‘stood that the effort will be to under-
mine Castro's position and prestige ...

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The President told Mr. Dulles he thought
he [Dulles] should go ahead with the plan
and the operations. He and the other
agencies involved should take account of
all likely Cuban reactions and prepare the
actions that we'would take in response to
these .,. The President said he would
like some groundwork laid with the OAS to
let the Latin American countries know that

‘if the Cubans were to start to attack our
people in Cuba we’ would be obliged to take
action ... ©

The President said that at the next

meeting, he would want to know what is

the sequence of events by which we see _.

the situation developing -- specifically

what actions are we to take. He said

our hand should not show in anything

that is done. In the meantime State

should be working on what we can do in

and out of the OAS ... Essentially,

the job is to get the OAS to support

us. 48/ . .

During the course of this meeting, Secretary of
the Treasury Anderson exhibited great concern over the
welfare of the US firms which had investments in Cuba;
and he was pushing for US intervention to protect
these private property rights. The President, how-
ever, cut him rather short on this. Vice President
Nixon, too, indicated some concern with the American
business interests in.Cuba; and suggested that steps
might be taken to cut off the flow of new capital in-

vestment by US firms in Cuba, terminating private

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businesses already there, and reducing American tour-

ism.* 49/

President Eisenhower's approval of the 17 March
1960. covert action program against the Castro regime
thus set US ‘policy. Briefly restated, the four major

courses of action called for the formation of an anti-

-Communist exile political opposition located outside

of Cuba which would be the focal point for all of the
anti-Castro elements, provision for a powerful propa-
ganda offensive against the island, perfection of a
covert intelligence-in-action network organization
within Cuba, and the development of a paramilitary
force outside Cuba, with the necessary logistical

support for covert military operations on the island.**

* ‘Col. King prepared a memorandum on the same meeting,
but, strangely enough, failed tq include a list of the
participants. The fact that the President, Vice Presi-
dent, and Secretary of State were in attendance could
not be known from King's memo alone. 50/ Not in attend-
ance’ at. this meeting was Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4.
This was one of numerous instances where higher level
personnel ~- in this instance, the DCI, Col. King, and
Bissell -- were the principals in a meeting at which
Esterline would seem to have been an equally legitimate
participant.

** Even as President Eisenhower was approving the anti-
Castro effort a Special National Intelligence Estimate
was in process and would state that Castro was not
"demonstrably under the domination or control of the
international Communist, movement." . {(SNIE 85-60,

22 March 1960, p. 3. S.)

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It is particularly important in light of changes which
were subsequently made in the covert action plan to
note the language of the approved policy with reference.
to’ the paramilitary operation:

Initially, a cadre of leaders will be
recruited after careful screening and
trained as paramilitary instructors. In
a second phase, a number of paramilitary
cadres will be trained at secure locations -
outside of the US so as to be available for
immediate deployment into Cuba to organize,
train, and lead resistance forces recruited
there, both before and after the establish-
ment of one or more active centers of resis-
tance. ,

At no point in this Presidentially-approved plan
for covert action by the Agency is there any hint of
invasion. The paramilitary activity was clearly to
be in the context of guerrilla warfare with leader-
ship and training to the dissident activities inside
Cuba being provided by Cubans trained by United States

technicians.* Finally, with reference to the approved

* Colonel Jack Hawkins (USMC) who was Chief, WH/4/PM
correctly noted in his memorandum: for record of PM
operations for Project JMATE that:

The only approved, written policy
governing paramilitary action against
Cuba is contained in paragraph 2d of
the Policy Paper approved by the Presi-
dent on 17 March 1960." (Emphasis added
by author.) 51/ ‘

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plan, the overall budget for the remainder of FY '60,
and FY '61 of $4.4 million was approved with the
caveat that should there be cost overruns, ‘these could
be drawn up from the Agency's reserve for contingen-

cies.*

* A copy of the approved Program of Covert Action
Against the Castro Regime is given as Appendix B..
(Appendix B, page 300). The reader is also
urged to examine Appendix C, a set of correspondence
between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh
Burke, and Livingston Merchant, the Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs. (Appendix C ,
page 311.) Admiral Burke apparently had become ex-
tremely agitated about the rise of Castro to power

in Cuba; and on 26 February of 1960, he had forwarded
a paper on US action in Cuba, to both Secretary Merchant
and also to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Irwin, in which the
Navy's senior officer took it upon himself to examine
the various options available to the United States to
reassert itself in the Western Hemisphere vis-a-vis

‘the growth of Communist power represented by Castro.

Admiral Burke outlined a series of options that were
available to the United States, such as multilateral
action through the OAS, unilateral overt action by
the US, or covert unilateral action by the US.»

Leaning heavily on both the Monroe Doctrine and
Article 5 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (the Rio de Janeiro Treaty of. 1947) Burke
made a series of recommendations covering the same

ground -- propaganda, organization of the anti-Castro
exiles who were in the US, or direct US military inter-
vention -- which had already been considered at high

levels and were already familiar to both Secretaries

. Merchant.and Irwin. On 10 March 1960, Merchant replied

to Burke's memorandum noting "a marked degree of simi-
larity in the suggestions of the Navy and of our people
here concerning: the need to reverse the trend in Cuba —

and the methods which are best calculated to achieve

(footnote continued on following page)
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With reference to his action of 17 March 1960,

President Eisenhower subsequently wrote:

this result." Merchant then went on to review the
bidding that had already been done, particularly in
the Special Group, on the question of how to handle

_ Castro, emphasizing, of course, that State was very
much concerned that precipitate action against Castro's

government would work, if not immediately, certainly
in the long run, to the detriment of the United States,
particularly in its relations to the other governments
of Latin America.

Whether the. response did not satisfy Admiral
Burke or whether he sincerely believed that the Navy,
more than any other US Agency, should be principally
responsible for setting US policy toward Cuba is not
known. In any event, on. 16 March 1960, he forwarded
another set of proposals for US action in Cuba to both
Gordon Gray,. the Special Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, and to Allen W. Dulles.
Burke's: comments on the transmittal sheets to these ;
two individuals are interesting. To National Security
Adviser Gray he wrote:

‘Dear Gordon: Enclosed is my copy of a
memorandum on U.S. Action in Cuba which
may be of interest to you. Sincerely yours,
Arleigh Burke...

To the Director of Central Intelligence he wrote:

Dear Allen: Enclosed is a memorandum
my Staff prepared containing some sugges-—
tions which might be useful to you in your
work. Naturally, I do not agree with
‘quite all the comments contained in the
memorandum but I know that you will for-

give the impatient young lad for his de-
sire to make sure no opportunity is left
uncovered. Warm regards. Sincerely,
_Arleigh Burke.

Why one.of the recipients was cautioned about "the im-
patient: young lad" and the other was not is something
(footnote continued on following page)

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On March. 17, 1960, less than two weeks
after my return from Puerto Rico, I
ordered the Central Intelligence Agency
to begin to organize the training of
Cuban exiles, mainly in Guatemala, against
the possible future day when they might
return to their homeland... More specific
planning was not possible because the
Cubans. living in exile had made no move
to select from among. their numbers, a

of a mystery. Certainly the proposals by one J. E.
Pond, Jr., reflect at least, Pond's youth and immatur-
ity. For among other things in his memorandum, Mr.

* Pond suggested that the Navy: “Accept Mr. Merchant's

offer in his letter of March 10 to Admiral Burke of
a complete briefing of State Department activities —
vis-a-vis the Cuban situation in an effort to prod
State to move faster." Or, with reference. to action
that the State Department should take, he suggested:

"Brief all individuals and groups of U.S. nationals
‘going to Latin America on the Kommunist [ste] threat

in Cuba for further dissemination to host country
personnel." Two items which had not appeared in other
of the papers related to the evolution of US policy

to oust Castro which were introduced by Mr. Pond,

were that the IADB (Inter-American Defense Board)

' become involved in the anti-Castro effort -- an exceed-

ingly naive suggestion considering that the members

‘of this group were far from unariimous in condemning

the Castro Revolution. And the second unique contri-

bution of this paper which Admiral Burke saw fit to

forward to two very senior members of the Executive
Branch, was the spelling throughout the: paper of
Communist with a "K". These last proposals that Ad-
miral Burke had forwarded to the Director of Central
Intelligence ended up in the files of Chief, Western
Hemisphere Division. The memorandum having been sent
down from Mr. Bissell's office, with the following
notation to Col. King:

Admiral Burke. sent this over to the
Director on the afternoon of 17 March,
and the latter handed [it] to me. I do
not believe it requires a reply,. but
pass it to you for any value it may
have.

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leader whom we could recognize. as the
head of a government in exile.¥* 52/

* In preparing this comment, the former President ap-
parently had to call-on his own memory, on the memory
of. Gen. Goodpaster, and the memory of Gordon Gray.
Based on his own recollections Eisenhower said that
neither his own nor Goodpaster's records contained
anything about the 17 March 1960 meeting. Similarly,
Gordon Gray wrote to Eisenhower: .

_ You may recall that not .so very. long
after I became your Special Assistant, in
a meeting you had with Allen Dulles and

.me you gave instructions that activities
of the so-called "Special Group" should
not be recorded. in.any place except the
files of the Director of the Central In-
telligence Agency. You did not ‘wish that
there be other copies. It’ was for this
‘reason that I did not seek a copy of. the
-* March 17th paper for my files, nor did I
_ make notes at that meeting.

Subsequent: to March 17th, I began to
make memoranda of every meeting on that
particular subject. because I hada hunch .
that. someday these might be important, and
I intended to put them in your hands at the
appropriate time,- understanding, of course,
‘that you might wish to have them destroyed.
Incidentally, there were no carbons or

‘ other copies made of these memoranda. By
not making copies, and by planning to put
the documents in your own hands for .what-
‘ever, disposition you wished to make of
them, I sort of rationalized my violation
of your instructions about not making such
memoranda. I hope I neednot assure you
that it was not my practice to violate
your instructions and this is the only
instance of ‘such that I can recall, 53/

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-B. . Forging the Tool

Following President Eisenhower's approval of
the anti-Castro program which had evolved from the
numerous discussions, meetings, and briefings pre-
viously mentioned, the Agency's leadership then faced
the problem of acting directly to implement the anti-
Castro program. Problems which had been discussed
philosophically prior to this time now had to be put
to the test of practicality. Among the problems of
principal importance during the period from March to
September 1960 were the following:

The establishment of ‘the leadership of WH/4 and
the acquisition of pexsonnel for WH/4 5

Extensive coordination between Agency representa—
tives and representatives of other US Government
Agencies and, at the same time, a “high level of intra-
Agency coordination. | .

. The initiation of a paramilitary training program
for those Cubans who would be directly involved in help-
ing to dispose of the Castro Government:

Attempting to. establish project parameters and
to.give proper consideration to possible changes in

the concept of the program as time passed;

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And, finally, to retain the credibility and
viability of the operation despite numerous wild
haired proposals that were being put forward at vari-
ous ‘times ‘during the months under study -~- proposals
which never should have been offered let alone given
any serious consideration. —

As previously noted, WH/4s was established by. .
Col. King in January of 1960; however, it was not

until 24 March 1960 that Mr. Bissell apparently of-

ficially got around to approving the new Branch, for

‘in a memorandum for the Deputy Director for. Support

(DDS), it was noted:

The SSA-DDS has advised of the DDP's
approval of the creation of a new opera-
tional Branch, the abolishment of an
existing Section, and the creation of a
-new Section within the WH Division Head-
quarters Staffing complement. ,
The 15 new positions required by the Branch would be
more than offset by the decrease in the. DDP complement.

The same memorandum indicated that the Wage and

Salary Division of the Office of Personnel had approved
the various grades that had been proposed and then the

memorandum went on to. state:

The approval limits the usage of the
requested positions to the duration of the

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Cuban crisis; after which all the positions
in ‘the new Branch and Section will be re-
viewed for reclassification purposes. 54/

The question of financing and budget for project
JMATE had already caused concern among those responsible
for the formulation of the anti-Castro policy, and soon
after the President's approval of the project, the
question of budget and finance surfaced. By 24 March |

' 1960, the Deputy Director for Support noted that:
“Jack Earman advised me that the Director had approved
of the paper calling for the release of $900,000 from
the reserve for Project JMARC." 55/ Indeed the Director
had signed such a paper calling for the $900,000 as
"an unprogrammed requirement for which other funds
are not available." 56/

In his memo to the Comptroller concerning the
release of funds from the Agency reserve, the Director
was also careful to point out that it would be the
responsiblity of Chief, WH Division to certify that
the funds had been expended as specified for the
project; that additionally, the DDP or his designee
would have to approve each certification; that the —
only Headquarters file on the budget for the project

would be maintained by WH/Division; and that the

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file would be complete as to the purpose of the expend-

iture, the date, those who were involved as payees,
and any other details; and finally that access to

this financial file would be “limited to persons

_specifically authorized by the Deputy Director (Plans) ."* 57/

In the. first meeting following the Presidential
approval. of the anti-Castro. program, Jake Esterline
callea the members of WH/4 together to announce that
the program had been given the crypt of JMARC; and he -
further pointed out that 1 May 1960 was the target
date for. the beginning of training at Fort Randoiph
in Panama. (This. date was predicated on the assump-
tion of a satisfactory report from the Inspection, Team —
which was to travel to Fort Randolph on 27 March.)
Medical. and security officers were to be assigned to
the training base and the communications Link was to

x

be established with Headquarters. In this early

* Unlike some suggestions that had been forwarded by
the WH/4 Finance Officer, Michael King, the Director's
Memorandum placed budgetary responsibility with the

_ DDP and Chief, WH. Division. Chief, WH/4 was not even

included on the routing. for the Director's Memorandum.
The WH/4 Financial Officer, on the other hand, had
suggested that certain of the responsibilities for
approval: of funding be given to the project Chief,

or the Chief, WH/Division. 58/

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meeting, Esterline emphasized that training at the
Fort Randolph and Fort Sherman areas of Panama was
going to be extremely limited; and since there would
be no training areas in the United States; third
country training activities would need to be estab-
lished. He emphasized again that secrecy was of
paramount importance if the operation was to succeed, .
and stressed that the establishment of a Government-
in-exile was a key point to making the planned opera-
tion credible. Esterline further indicated that such
a government hopefully could be announced by the early
part of April and that the Headquarters for such a
government could be located either in Puerto Rico or
Costa Rica.

Esterline also made an appeal for personnel to
staff both the Panama training activity and Base Two,
the Coral Gables Headquarters which later would be
known as JMWAVE. one interesting point made at this
first meeting was that:

Mr. [Scudder] Georgia reported that

the DDS Offices concerned had nominated

nearly all of the personnel required by

1 and 15 April respectively. Action was

being taken to make all these available

at once.... [and] it was agreed that DDS .
representatives would meet once a week

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to review activities, determine the status
of commitments, and prepare a brief re-
port for Chief, Branch 4. 59/

In another Branch meeting soon after the one

just ‘mentioned, Esterline reemphasized, as he and

others would do throughout the course of the operation,
the’ need for security practices designed to protect
tion. He also indicated the considerable degree of
cooperation which already was being required from
other services. Dave Phillips provided a specific.
example of this, emphasizing that without the close
cooperation of the United States Navy, it would have

been difficult to transport the two radio transmitters

which were going to be installed on ‘Swan Island.

-Moreover, Phillips reported that a crew of Seabees

would be responsible for constructing the facilities
to house the transmitters and the quarters for’ per-

sonnel who would conduct the propaganda effort from

. Swan Island. Because the activities then’ established

on Swan Island were under the control of the Federal
Aviation Administration, om _ Tracy Barnes (the A/DDP/A)
was to meet with the Director of FAA, Gen. Elwood
Quesada, to clear with him the problems that were

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involved in establishing this Agency activity on the
island. 60/ Coordination also had to be effected
with the United States Coast Guard in order that
-there be no interference with maritime activities;
and the Immigration and Naturalization Service was
alerted to the need to facilitate the entry of Cuban
defectors. 61/ .

As attempts were being made to establish the
parameters for the operations against Castro, a most
prescient memorandum was directed to Chief, WH/4
from Paul Oberst, Chief, Covert Action, WH Division.
Oberst apparently had been associated with PBSUCCESS,
the project which resulted in the ouster of the Arbenz
Government in Guatemala in 1954; and recalling some
of the “pitfalls and counter-productive aspects" of
that particular operation, Oberst wrote as follows:

I have the impression that our basic

JMARC plan commits us to a rather firm

timetable. In my judgment, we should

have great flexibility in deciding the

appropriate time for kicking off any

paramilitary operations. Before such
operations are initiated, we should have

firm evidence that our propaganda and

political action operations have irrev-

ocably undermined Castro's prestige,

both in Cuba and abroad. We should not

initiate paramilitary actions until we
are convinced that they will not enable

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Castro to recuperate lost prestige and
rally local and foreign sympathy and sup-
port. .Generally speaking, current area
attitudes toward the Castro regime are
satisfactory from our [CIA] point of view.
However, this could change radically and
rapidly, if there are any premature para-—
military actions. When the time comes
for paramilitary activity, we should make
every effort to conceal any invasion
actions. To avoid or minimize Castro's
counter propaganda, the paramilitary
operations must appear to be an internal : -
uprising by'dissident elements within
Cuba. This, of course, would require
clandestine infiltration of personnel

and. arms before the hostitlities begin.

In my opinion, Castro will inevitably
charge the US with responsibility for
JMARC operations, and many Latin Americans
and other foreign observers will be in-
clined to accept such charges with or
without supporting evidence. Therefore,
what we need is a massive diversionary
effort that will either obscure the fact
of our involvement or make our involvement
palatable. This diversionary tactic might
be accomplished by exploiting unanimous
Latin American revulsion toward the Trujillo
regime ... If it became known, or strongly
suspected, that we were supporting opera-
tions to bring about a transition to demo-
cratic.government in the Dominican Republic,
the waters would be suitably muddied, and
a climate prepared for the Cuban effort.* 62/

* Debatable though Oberst's philosophy regarding the
Dominican Republic might be, serious attention to his
initial comments regarding paramilitary activities
against Castro might have halted -~ or at least seriously
altered -- the operations which would ultimately con-
Clude at the Bahia de Cochinos.. As with other of the
cautionary and restrained: proposals which would be put
forth prior to launching the invasion, little heed
(footnote continued on following page)

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In mid-April of 1960 WH/4 made the first presen-
tation for the DCI since the basic program had been
approved by President Eisenhower in mid-March. In
attendance in addition to the DCI were: Gen. Cabell,
Mr. Helms (C/OPS), Herman Horton (CI Staff), and C.
Tracy Barnes, Mr. Bissell's Deputy. This high level
group was informed that broadcasting activity from -
Swan Island was scheduled to begin on 17 May 1960 and
that very special operations. were being carried out
in order to provide stories for propaganda use. Ac-

cording to Dave Phillips who made the presentation

apparently was paid to Mr. Oberst's proposals.

About the same time that Oberst's memorandum
was going forward, the DDP was calling for WH/4 to
prepare daily progress reports as one way of eliminat-
ing the need for crash-type responses or actions.

In discussing the contents of such reports, it was

indicated that: ,
The Progress Report should generally

not exceed one page in length, and that

we should not hesitate to include it in

items which were not favorable to our

progress, in other words, setbacks or

handicaps. which we might have encountered. 63/

Also, by way of keeping informed about develop-~
ments related to the operation, Chief WH/4 instituted
a series of weekly meetings with the operational ele-
ments of the DDP "for the purpose of insuring opera-
tional coordination similar to that achieved by the
meeting of support elements every Tuesday morning." 64/

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on propaganda, excellent results were being obtained.
The reports on the evolution of the government in
exile and the buildup of the stay-behind network and
on paramilitary activity indicated that much work
still remained to be done to get these activities

off the ground: Further, it was pointed out to the

‘DCI and the DDCI that budget estimates were rapidly

escalating, principally because:

Direct costs of nonexpendable equipment
[were] being charged against the project
which, in fact, was the major cause of the
project's over-obligation. It was the.
opinion of ‘all concerned that such property
should be held on a Memorandum Receipt

- basis without cost to the project, and
that. charges, if any, should be reflected
as direct costs only if property was found
unserviceable or was not returned to com-
munications stock supply after the project
is terminated. The DCI was advised that

- this matter would be discussed with the
Comptroller for resolution. 65/

Most important ‘in’ connection with this briefing,
was the DCI's comment that:
With respect to personnel needs, he
: assured all, no matter whether personnel
were overseas or in the US, he would
arrange to obtain personnel required in
‘support of JMARC. 66/
The meaning of Chief/WH/4's comments to the DCI,

was made quite clear within a few days when Admendment

No. 1 to the project was submitted to the Director

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for approval. The amendment concerned the need for
more money and pointed out that:
Not only has the initial $900,000

already been expended, but it is cur-

rently estimated that an additional

$1.0 million is immediately required to

carry-the activity. through 30 June 1960

--. Note is also made ... of possible

. contingencies amounting to an additional

$1.4 million for which no funds are re-

quested ‘at this: time. 67/

In addition to an early updating for the DCI,
WH/4 also. undertook to educate the Joint Chiefs of
Staff on the Cuban problem very soon after the Eisen-
hower approval of the anti-Castro program. On 8 April
1960, General: Cabell headed a CIA delegation including
Mr. Bissell, Col. King, and Jake Esterline which
briefed a very high level group of Department of
Defense representatives in the JCS conference room
at the Pentagon.* General Cabell made only introduc-

tory remarks, and the bulk of the briefing was con-.

ducted by Mr. Bissell with some assistance from

* Included among the Defense participants were Thomas
Gates, Secretary of Defense; Gen. Twining, Chairman, ©
oCS; Gen. Shoup, Commandant U.S. Marines; Admiral
Burke; CNO; General Erskine, Chief, Special Ops, U.S.
Army;. Gen. White, COS/USAF; and Gen. Woolnough, repre-
senting Cos/army . 68/

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oS. c. King. Apparently Jake Esterline, the man who
had the monkey on his back as project chief sat
quietly by. |
The Suggestion which had been made by Paul
Oberst that the "waters be muddied" by making it
appear that the US was backing the anti-Trujillo
forces in the Dominican Republic was not introduced
during the course of this briefing of the JCS, even
though the Dominican Republic was included as a part
of the overall briefing. What did emerge with refer-
oe | ence to the Dominican Republic was a concensus that
_ if Trujillo were ousted, there was a strong possibility
that Castro might move into the Dominican Republic |
where he probably would be received as a conquering
hero.

_ in the course of the discussion which followed
the briefing, Admiral Burke emerged as the principal
“hawk, * indicating his willingness to move fleet units
into the Port au Prince, Haiti area because the sug-_
gestion had been made that. if Castro went into the
‘Dominican Republic it would only be a few days time
before ‘he also would be welcomed into Haiti. In ad-

dition, Burke made it quite clear that should the

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Cuban government launch an attack on Guantanamo, the
Navy was prepared to defend that base. In Burke's

opinion, the Navy had adequate force available to do

that.* 69/.

Whether a direct result of this briefing of

the JCs or. not, there was’ a noticeable improvement .
in WH/4"s relations with the military services be-
fore the end of April 1960. On 19 April, for example,
$150,000 was to be funneled from the CIA's Director |
of Logistics to the Comptroller, US Army, ostensibly
as a working fund for the 2750th Maintenance Unit,
Fort Randolph, Canal Zone. This money, Of course,

was to be used for necessary construction, renovation,

procurement of material, and hire of native labor as

necessary to improve Fort Randolph as a training site
for the PM insturctor cadre. 71/-
Before the end of April 1960, the Joint Chiefs

‘

of Staff had approved, in principle, the Agency's

ee This briefing for the senior personnel in the Depart-

ment of Defense, would have taken. place in any event;
but it may have been prompted by the reluctance of the
designated DOD liaison officer with WH/4, Capt. Burns
Spore (USN), to do much more than listen to WH/4' s re-
quests for the assignment of DOD personnel to the
project and for real estate for use in the. training
program until. he received a green light from the
SecDef. 70/

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request for overflight photo coverage of the islands

offshore of Cuba. The decision on this matter was

taken up, not only with the Air Force, but also with
J. Lampton Berry of the Department of State.* Al-
though the ‘authorization and plan for these overflights,
presumably by the U-2, antedated the shootdown of
Francis Gary Power's U~2 in the Soviet Union, it was
recorded that:

Ambassador Berry had called to say

that the Department ... had approved the

mission, but insisted that extremely

tight security be exercised throughout

and that Col. Benson (USAF/Operations)

inform Ambassador Berry before each

sortie so that the Department would be

properly prepared to respond to any

emergency. 72/
The first flight, incidentally, ‘was tentatively sched-
uled for the weekend of 30 April ~ 1 May of 1960.**

In April of 1960, in addition to working with

the Army, the Agency representatives also began to

work with the Covert Limited Warfare Committee of

* Berry was a Career Minister and former Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. (AE&P) to Ceylon who
was at this time. assigned to the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research. .

++ Powers was shot down over the USSR on 1 May 1960.

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the Office of Special Operations, Department of De-
fense. One of the particular problems of concern in
this relationship was that of covert sea transporta-

tion which might be necessary to lift anti-Castro

forces back to the. island of. Cuba. Even though all

, the planning about which there is a record at this

time concerned only cadres for guerrilla warfare

training and the infiltration of communications ex-

perts, on 25 April 1960, Savilion Chapman of DDP's

Maritime Branch met with a Captain Thomas (USN) and
a Col. Anderson’ (USMC) who were members of the DOD/CIA
Covert Limited Warfare Stockpiling Committee, and
discussed among other interesting subjects:
The acquisition from the Navy of two
Landing Ship~Tanks (LST) and four Air-
Sea Rescue Craft (AVR), the training of
the Cuban crews for these vessels, and
. the means; of covert transfer of the
vessels from the Navy to the Agency.* 73/
In addition to the requested overhead reconnis-

sance of the Cuban coastline. by the Air Force, the

-* It is rather strange that at this early date in
_ April 1960 discussions were being held concerning

the acquisition of LST's. There had been no discus-

‘sions concerning the movement of a large body of Cuban
troops back into their homeland; and, consequently,

the discussion re LST's seems highly out of place.

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Maritime Branch representatives also discussed beach
gradient problems with the Marine Corps and repre-
sentatives of the Navy's Hydrographic Office. It
was ascertained that much work neéded to be. done in
order to upgrade information suitable for pianning

the use of LST's for beaching and landing of troops

-and vehicles. 74/

In the weeks immediately following Eisenhower's
announcement of the anti-Castro policy, the Department

of State seemed to be operating in a world.of. its own

-~ making elaborate plans for Cuban briefings and the

flow of information on Cuba's internal developments.
On 25 March, for example, Roy Rubottom, Assistant
Secretary of State for American Republic Affairs,
was the originator of an elaborate memorandum which
provided a check list .of current. operations and ten
categories of activity related to developments in.
Cuba. From the tenor of the paper itself, it seems
as though Rubottom was ignorant of the Cuban issues
before the Special Group, of the discussions among
CIA, State, and Department of Defense, and of the
President's approved plan for covert action. Nor

was there any evident awareness of the various overt

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programs with reference to the Cuban problem. 75/
About this same time, Allen Dulles made known to
‘the Special Group his displeasure that the Depart-
ment failed to consult with the Agency prior to
announcing the reappointment of Philip Bonsal as US
Ambassador to Cuba. 16/
The Rubottom plan apparently had some. impact,
for by the end of April 1960, Gordon Gray was calling
on Douglas Dillon, the Undersecretary of State, to
find someone in the Department -- Dillon himself --
‘to be “constantly seized of the Cuban problem and
who would take steps. to assure that all of the activ-
. ities of various groups were in harness and that all
needed decisions were made when needed. "* 77/ Mr.
Gray also specified some of the problems which would
face a Chief of Staff on the Cuban activity, noting:
[Livingston Merchant] has set up two
groups, one under the chairmanship of
Mr. Mallory. In addition, there is the
Special Group, of which Livie is a mem-

ber, and in his absence Ray Hare sits.
Further, there is a special activity

* This, of.course, apparently ignores or disregards
the creation of WH/4 and the responsibilities desig-
nated to the Agency by Gray's boss, President Eisen-
hower.

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proceeding under the chairmanship of Bob
Anderson, with which you may or may not
be familiar. Allen Dulles has a particu-
lar liaison with Bob in this matter.

The Defense Department, of course, has
many interests. 78/

‘The suggestion that Undersecretary Douglas Dillon be

made Chief of Staff responsible for coordinating the

programs with reference to Cuba did not sit well with-

: . / .
the Agency; and after the matter had been surfaced at

‘,

a meeting of the Special Group on 28 April, Chief,

., WH/4 prepared a memorandum stating in part with

reference to Dillon:
The Agency would not look with favor on

this arrangement. Mr. Barnes and the

-Director, therefore, plan to go over to

State on Monday afternoon [2 May 1960]

-and head off this new development. Mr.

Barnes believes that a short paper setting

forth what we are already doing in the

fields. of coordination and liaison should

be adequate to support their point of

view. 79/ ;

Whether resistance to the suggestion that Dillon
become Chief of' Staff for the nation's anti-Castro
program was in itself distasteful to the Agency or
whether it was simply opposition to the idea that State
should take over the direction of a program which
would basically be carried out by the Agency is not

revéaled -in the records... Presumably both elements

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entered into the picture. In any event, Gordon Gray
seemed cavalier in disregarding the creation of WH/4
and the liaison arrangements which had already been
made. (See Appendix D.)* But whatever the explana-
tion, Mr. Dillon did not become Chief of Staff for
the nation's Cuban program.

Although it was not. included on the list of

‘Agencies with which CIA maintained liaison and con-

tacts at this time, mention should be made of the
CIA-FBI contacts concerning Cuba. Technically the
FBI was prohibited. from engaging in intelligence

operations overseas, but in mid-June 1960, Chief,

‘WH/4 revealed that the FBI reportedly had. plans for

installing a stay-behind network ~-- using Mexicans

and Cubans -- to be activated in case diplomatic
relations between the US and Cuba were broken. Chief,
WH/4 suggested that the CI Staff get in touch with

the FBI Liaison Officer, Sam Papich and ask for an
explanation of the Bureau's’ plan. 80/ About the

same time that Chief WH/4 was evincing concern about

FBI activities in Cuba, Chief, WH Division noted in
* Appendix D, page 332.

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a memorandum for the Acting Director of Central In-
telligence that: .
A thorough investigation has been made

of the relations between the Havana Station

and. the Havana Office of the Federal Bureau.

‘of Investigation. It has been concluded

that the operations of the FBI have neither

interferred with nor conflicted with the

Station's operations. 81/

Col’... King's memo also stated the Bureau's long-
time contacts in the Cuban area were a benefit to
both the Bureau and to the Station pointing out that
-€requently the Station was called on to participate
in, or actually undertake, the debriefing of various
individuals who had come into the FBI offices to volun-
teer information. On oceasion, the Bureau had even

_ turned over specific operations to the Station.

Chief, WH Division went even further when,
during the course of one of the weekly interdepart-
mental meetings in State, it was suggested by Mr.

Gray and Mr. Mallory that the FBI was exceeding its
jurisdiction, and that perhaps this should be brought
before the NSC for consideration. Col. King reported
that he remained non-committal at this time, but did
point out that he thought the jurisdictional issue

should be “soft-pedaled." He did say, however, that

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the memorandum he had prepared on this subject was
being held in the files should questions about this

- particular Bureau activity ever be raised. King
also recommended that the Agency not take the initia-
tive in raising the question. 82/

Neither Col. King, nor anyone else involved in
the anti-Castro operation ever registered a formal
protest against the FBI's activities in the Havana
area. By mid-summer 1960, the relationship became
even closer, particularly as the Agency expanded
activities. at the Forward Operations Base, JMASH
(later JMWAVE) in Miami. ‘In one report concerning
the number of the. Cuban exiles in the Miami area who
were under suspicion of -- or were -- working for
Castro, or who were trying desperately to get sup-
port from one or another US Agency, an FBI agent
made a rather interesting forecast to the CIA repre-
sentative with whom he was exchanging information.
According to the report from Miami, an FBI agent

| told me that his personal opinion was

that it. would be virtually impossible, if

not completely impossible, to bring about

the overthrow of the Castro regime using

Cuban exiles. He thought the only solu-

tion to the problem, and the one that
stood the best chance of success, was to

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go in with the US Marines. He admitted
_that this was only his personal opinion,
but he felt that in view of his experience
and contact with the Cuban exiles, he had
a good point. I could not help agree
with him. 83/

Agent George Davis apparently was extremely

interested in full cooperation with the Agency, quick-

ly accepting the Agency representative's proposal

that they visit the FBI offices once or twice each
week to compare notes; and the CIA field’ representa-
tive, in turn, agreed to pass on to Mr. Davis in the
FBI any information which the Agency might acquire
pertaining to FBI interests. *

* The Forward Operations Base (FOB) opened in May
1960 in Coral Gables, Florida, and it was the second

FOB that had been established since the formation of
WH Division -- the initial base having been set up

during the anti-Arbenz operation in Guatemala in 1953-

1954. In general, the Miami FOB paralleled the organ-
ization of Headquarters with FI, CI, CA, Support, and
PM units. FOB reported directly to the Chief,. WH
Division, not to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4. Ini-
tially the satellite communications center for relaying
commo between Headquartérs and the field -- including
facilities in thé Florida Keys concerning the maritime
operations --.was established; and ultimately the commo
link would connect Headquarters with the operations in
Guatemala and Nicaragua. The cover firm for the base, |
was Clarence A. DePew & Sons, a notional cover:: for

an organization engaged in Classified research.

A series of some 32 reports has been prepared on ~
the FOB, and the reports are available through the
Records Management Officer of WH Division. These

(footnote continued on following page)

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In addition to its concern with the interests
of other government agencies in the Cuban problem,
in mid-summer of 1960 the Agency also was required
to provide intelligence briefings for the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential candidates of the major politi-
cal parties. ‘While the intelligence briefings were
scheduled to consider. the world situation, consider-
able emphasis was being given to both Cuba and the
Dominican Republic. In preparation for Mr. Dulles’
briefing of the Democratic nominee, John F. Kennedy,
on 23 July 1960, WH/4 prepared a detailed Cuban brief-
ing paper touching on the principal aspects of the
exile organization, the propaganda plan, penetration
of Cuba by personnel from communist countries (includ~
ing the Soviet Union, Red China, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
and East Germany), and the play that Castro was making
in the Latin American world for pro-communist sympa-—

thizers. In addition, emphasis also was given to the

reports deal basically with the period between 1962
and 1968; and while there is some feeling that the
story of the Bay of. Pigs operation should go into
extensive detail on the initial operations of the
FOB, this author has chosen not to do so, focusing
instead on only those broad aspects of the problem
relating to the Miami Base. 84/

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planned program for paramilitary training and opera-—

tions under the aegis of CIA. “Insofar as can be

determined, however, there is no indication that in
“his pre-election briefing of the Democratic Presidential

candidates that Mr. Dulles went into any specifics

on the Agency's anti-Castro pians. 85/

As‘mentioned previously, one of the continuing .
problems requiring coordination within the Executive
Branch was the increasing budget demands for Project
JMATE. From an estimate of some $2.5 million of
‘budgeted and reserve funds, which had been made avail-
able for the program by mid-August of 1960, Mr. Bissell.
appeared ata special Group meeting, requesting that
“an additional $10.75 million be released from reserve
funds to meet the ever-increasing needs, particularly
for the paramilitary and propaganda programs. The
decision of the Special Group following Mr. Bissell's
appeal was that: .

| This matter should be laid before the

.appropriate higher authorities and a

presentation would be arranged hopefully

within the next ten days. This was be-

lieved to be wise, not because any. actions

involving major political risks were to

be taken in the near future, but because

the Agency would soon become committed _
to various substantial expenditures which

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should not be undertaken without a reason-
able assurance that the operation was to
go forward. 86/
On 22-23 August of 1960, after discussions with Mr.
Stans and Mr. Macy, the Agency was notified that the

requested $10 million for FY 61 would be made avail-

_able from the Agency Reserve for Contingencies.* 87/

Cc. Cooperation and Challenge

As already mentioned, immediately following
the Eisenhower decision to promote the anti-Castro
program, there was a considerable degree of coopera-
tion between CIA ‘and other of the concerned Agencies

-- the Department of Defense, the Department of State, .

the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and

Naturalization Service, and others. As WH/4 continued

to expand and develop the various programs -- propa-

‘

ganda, covert.action, staybehind networks, and para-
military operations -- there were ever increasing

contacts between CIA and the representatives of other

* One explanation for the sharply increasing demand
for reserve funds may lie in the fact that materiel
was being written off upon issue, rather than upon
consumption -- an aspect of the operation that was
explained to the author by William E. Eisemann,
formerly Chief, Support WH/4. 88/

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government agencies. Perhaps the best way to describe
the period from the summer of 1960 until the early

fall was as a period of cooperation and challenge.

' Cooperation because the needs of the Agency represented

National Policy. Challenge to most if not all of

CIA's proposals -- proposals which concerned the

nature of the propaganda effort, the size and make-up :

. of the exile military force which was being organized,

the location of training sites, the types of technical
materiel (including. aircraft) being requested, and,
most important by the end of this period, the specific

¢

nature of the military operation which was to be

mounted against Fidel Castro.

By early June 1960, the program for paramilitary

training of Cuban exiles was jumped from some 60 to

500 or more trainees -- even. though the actual train

‘ing of the: initial instructor cadre at Fort Randolph

in Panama had not yet begun and the FRD was only in

. i . :
the initial stages of negotiation for PM and commo
“training facilities in Guatemala. It was anticipated

‘that the increased number of PM trainees would be

recruited out of the Miami area, from other Latin

American countries where Cubans had taken up residence,

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and from others who might be recruited inside Cuba.
The emphasis on the PM training at this time was to
be on weapons, demolitions, sabotage, and guerrilla

warfare tactics; and the weapons familiarization was

to be with the M-1 carbine, the Garand and Spring-

field rifles, the Thompson sub-machine gun, and the

-45 Colt automatic pistol. This, of course, was the

weapons mix in the Agency's stockpile of standard
arms packs. 89/

It must be presumed that the call for increases
in the number of PM trainees was related to the con-
tinued importation of Soviet weapons and’ technicians
and the increasing strength of the Communist Party
in Cuba. An NIE written in mid-June 1960 on “The
Situation in Cuba," for example noted that the Castro’
regime was “deeply and increasingly influenced by Conm-
munists .. no longer any prospect of democratic govern-
ment under his [Fidel Castro's] regime." As was past

estimates, this particular NIE was unable to answer

the question of whether Castro himself was a Communist.

The NIE also mentioned that no strong opposition
leader to the Castro regime had emerged, nor did the

opposition at that time “pose a serious threat to

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the regime." One weakness touched on by the National
Estimate concerned the Castro militia which was char-
acterized as "only partially armed, and for the most
part poorly trained ... [and] appears to have little,
if any, effectiveness as an organized combat force.
in conventional operations." For either of the fore-
going reasons, perhaps, an increase in the number. of
PM personnel might (a) assist in bringing a strong
dissident leader to the fore, or (b) develop the
capability to overcome the Castro militia. 90/

The question of an increased number of PM
trainees surfaced in a late August briefing for Presi-
dent Eisenhower, Secretaries Gates, Dillon, and Ander-—
son, and Generals Persons, Lemnitzer, and Goodpaster
by the DCI and Mr. Bissell. After President Eisenhower's
National Security Adviser, Gordon Gray, summarized
developments since the March announcement of the anti-
Castro program, Mr. Dulles provided some specifics
concerning the organization of the FRD and its prin-
cipals, noting that the Headquarters for the FRD had
been established in Mexico City, in lieu of the invi-
tation of. President Ydigoras of Guatemala to permit

the FRD to operate’ from his country. “Mr. Dulles

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.

noted that at this time, it was particularly important
that the US presence in Guatemala not be revealed.’
When the discussion turned to the PM forces, the De-
partment of Defense representative, Mr. Gates, made

it quite clear that he was concerned about the pos-

sibility of US military personnel being involved

directly in the military operations inside Cuba.

Mr. Bissell responded that US military personnel in
third countries would be used only as instructors --
not as cadre leaders for either an invasion ora
guerrilla warfare effort.

Bissell did stress, however, that there was
need for a standby force, .preferably of non-Americans,
with. special training in guerrilla warfare to pro-
vide a leadership complement to the Cubans when “push"
came to’ "shove," a recommeridation that provoked some
differences of opinion during the course of this
briefing for the President when it was suggested

that US officers might be required to direct these

forces. Mr. Dulles proposed withholding this dis-

cussion until the Agency and the JCS could talk the
matter over. Mr. Gray seemed to be determined that

the issue of the force level and make-up be resolved

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at this particular time. According to his own report
_ Of his position at this meeting,

Mr. Gray pointed out that it would be
unwise to mount any kind of an operation
without the determination to see it
through and that. an abortive effort would
be worse than-no effort at all. He there-
fore thought that if this backup force

“was essential to ultimate success, full
consideration should be given to it at
this stage in the planning. Mr. Dulles
again urged that a decision on this be
deferred.* 91/

In support of Mr. Gray and in some contradiction
to Mr. Bissell's view that perhaps the Cuban PM force
would be able to carry off the effort without any out-
side help, the President was reported to have indicated
that _ .

He would go along so long as the Joint
Chiefs, Defense, State, and CIA think we.
have a good chance of being successful. —
He wouldn't care much about this kind of
. cost [the $10 million increase noted |
: earlier]; indeed, he said he would de-
.. fend this kind of action against all
, comers and that if we could be sure of
freeing the Cubans from this incubus, —
$25 million might be a small price to pay.

* In light. of today's relations between the United
States and other of the major world powers with. the
third countries, Gordon Gray displayed -- in the
‘summer of 1960 -- a degree. of foresight with which .
he has never been properly credited. For he noted
at that time that if the US failed to deal firmly
with Cuba, there was an obvious danger that other
. small nations would be encouraged to undertake harass~
ments of the major powers. 92/

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The President concluded the meeting, by
saying that he would like to urge caution

with respect to the danger of making false

moves, with the result of starting some-

thing before we were ready for it.* 93/

One of the most persistent problems which was
to Surface. by: early fall of 1960 concerned the need
for the anti-Castro operation itself, and the bulk
of the questioning came from the Department of State, .
principally from Thomas Mann, who soon was to become
the Assistant Secretary of State for American Repub-

lic Affairs. Mann already had been involved in some

of the prior discussions concerning the anti-Castro

‘activity in his capacity as Assistant Secretary for

* ‘In his temorandum of a meeting with the President
on 17 August 1960, Gordon Gray noted that in discuss-
ing the CIA meeting planned for 18 August, that in
addition to Messrs. Dulles.and Bissell, a third CIA
officer might possibly be in attendance; and he also

noted that the Vicé-President had been invited to at-

tend the briefing. According to Gray's record, how-
ever, neither the Vice-President nor the third CIA

representative were in attendance at the briefing of

18 August. The attendance of the Director and Mr.
Bissell, but with no CIA representative from WH/4,

was further: illustration of Jake Esterline's criticism
that at too many high level ‘briefings, CIA's repre-
sentatives were individuals who, high ranks notwith-
standing, were the furthest from the operation -- yet
they were responsible’ for informing the nation's policy-
makers about the details of the anti-Castro program. g4/

It is also interesting to note that this off-the-

record meeting which was arranged by Gordon Gray lasted

only 23 minutes, and this included at least a short
time for a brief discussion related to Francis Gary -
Powers. 95/

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Economic Affairs. In early September of 1960, Chief,

WH/4 learned from a member of the Department of State
that Mr. Mann was going to ask for a restudy of the
basic concept of IMATE, or, if he did not ask for

that re-evaluation, he would ask for immediate review
and rescheduling of the timetable for the IMATE oper-
ation. At this time and in view of the lack of prog~ -

ress both in developing any great cohesion within

the FRD in organizing the dissidents within Cuba,
_the questions seemed in order. The reaction of Chief,
WH/4 however, was that an attempt should be made to

blunt Mr. Mann's efforts, noting for example:

_ The degree to which we are already com-
mitted in JMARC would pose a monumental
security. problem alone if we were suddenly
instructed to cease and désist from further
activity.,. As of this moment, they. have
well in excess of 200 people .engaged in
air, ground, and communications ‘training
in Guatemala. Additionally, our across-
the-board propaganda activities are being:
stepped up daily. A drastic rescheduling
Of either activity, therefore, could bring
about serious repercussions. 96/ ,

The precise nature of these "serious repercus-
sions" was not spelled out. As time passed, however,
it would be charged that the cessation of the Agency-

sponsored training activities would loose a flood of

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Cubans back into the exile community; and they would
charge that the United States feared to undertake the
task of ousting Fidel jCastro. This, in turn, would
mean that the US would lose face in the eyes of the
Democratic Latin American republics. Jake Esterline
speculated that Mann did not believe that the, Cubans
were willing to support an insurrection against Castro.
A suggestion which was made to counter the possible
Mann proposals was that:

To strengthen our position, therefore,

we are bending every effort to get at

least one supply: airdrop into the target

country, prior to the Assistant Secretary's

return to the United States ... Success-~

ful action in this area should weigh

heavily on Assistant Secretary Mann's

alleged new attitude. 97/

Just how one ~- or even more -~ successful air
drops would in any way influence Mann's opinion about
the receptiveness of the Cuban population to a pos-
sible insurrection effort was not explained. ‘That
there were dissidents on the island was unquestioned,

the problem was the degree of strength and effective-

ness that they might be able to demonstrate. *

* Fortunately for the continuation of Project JMATE,

. the hurry-up air drop to which Jake Esterline referred |

did not set the criteria for the continuation or dis-

‘solution of the project. This air drop was a complete

(footnote continued on following page)
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Mr. Mann would continue to raise questions con-
cerning the feasibility of discontinuing the training
in Guatemala, and ,in on-going meetings with Agency
representatives including the DCI, the DDP, Chief, WH,

as well as Chief, WH/4 and others, Mann continued to:
raise questions about the effect on Project JMATE
should all the American trainers and Cuban trainees
be pulled out of Guatemala immediately. Mann also
questioned the exact timing for Project JMATE. As
he raised such questions, the Assistant Secretary for
Latin American Affairs was informed by CIA that they
would much prefer that the training of the Cuban
exiles take place in US bases, both for purposes of
security and for efficiency. But they also pointed
out that it had been the decision for the Special
Group and the “highest levels" that such training
should take place in third countries, rather than in
the US. Mann persisted, however, suggesting that
the question of maintaining the training base in

-and total. bust, the supplies being dropped to the
guerrillas fell into the hands of Castro's forces;
and the aircraft itself made a forced landing in
Mexico and was not recovered. See Volume I of this
history, Air: Operations.

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Guatemala or removing it to the US should be raised
again with the Special Group. The Agency's repre-
sentatives agreed to this suggestion “with the strict-
est proviso that no move from Guatemala could or
should be made until adequate staging facilities in
the Zone of the Interior have been prepared." 98/

Tracy Barnes put the question of moving the
base from Guatemala to the Zone of the Interior in
a somewhat different context than had been suggested
by Esterline and J.C. King. Barnes recommended con-
sideration be given, among other items, to:

The fact that a move from the present

training sites to the US should not be

made too hurriedly and the importance of

avoiding a decision at a later date that

the training in the US is a bar to opera-

tional use. I realize that this latter

point would be a complete contradiction

of the present theory but, after all,

there is an intervening election; and

political views can shift so that every-

thing possible should be done to avoid

our getting ourselves into the box where

we move to the.US for one reason and then

find that the US move is used against us

to prevent or limit ultimate operations.* 100/

One additional point which was made’ by Jake

Esterline and J. C. King in their conversations with.
Source reference No. 99 not used.

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Secretary Mann was that the sudden pullout of the
training program in Guatemala might very well lead
to the overthrow of President Ydigoras by the pro-
communist elements which were already in evidence
in opposition to the Ydigoras regime. It was indi-
cated that should the troop training be moved from
Guatemala to the United States, 300 Guatemalan troops .
would be trained as a special security force for the
Guatemalan government. 101/

During these discussions in the late fall of
1960, Mann also raised the issue of. economic sanctions
which had been touched on in the early spring. At
this time however, the Agency's representatives be-
lieved that Mann was talking in terms of a one to
three year quarantine period, in an attempt to dis-
rupt the Cuban economy -- a quarantine, however,
which would not interfere with the flow of goods from
the Communist countries. This was a point of some
contention between State and CIA, with the Agency
people convinced that the Soviet Union would make up
any deficiencies that tended to impede seriously the
economy of Castro's Cuba. 102/

In. the context of a possible move of the train-

-ing facilities to the United States, Chief, WH prepared

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a memorandum for the DDP indicating that the need

for training bases to be located in the southern
part of the United States. should include an infantry
training base capable of handling 3,000 men with
range facilities, tactical training areas, an air-
field for training air and ground crews in the utili-
zation of B-26, C-46 and C-54 aircraft, aerial gunnery.
and bomb range facilities, and maritime training and
staging facilities. It was suggested that the air-
field logistical base should be located in southern
Florida, and permission to use Ramey Air Force Base
in Puerto Rico to stage black over-flights’-to Cuba
should be obtained. The maritime facilities would

‘be located on Vieques Island, ‘Puerto Rico and also

‘in southern Florida.

. In a meeting with the Special Group, the Deputy
Director for Central Intelligence put forth the pro-
posals concerning the movement of training bases to
the United States; and although he was supported by
the Department. of Defense representatives -- Mr.
Douglas and Gen. Lansdale -- Livingston Merchant of

the Department of State, normally one of the hard

liners of the Department, seemed to have ambivalent

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feelings at this time about the training program.
Possibly Merchant was succumbing to Mann's arguments

suggesting that the time for military action was so

far down the line that US efforts should be concen-
trated on @conomic sanctions at this time. 103/
Adolf A. Berle, who would become one ‘of the Kennedy

administration'sprincipal advisers on Latin America, -

also Seemed to be swayed by Tom Mann's argument in

favor of economic sanctions, Berle suggesting that

the embargo be expanded to include the shipment of
arms and ammunition both ‘to Cuba and from Cuba to
other parts of Latin America. 104/

Although it has been indicated that the Depart-
ment of Defense would apparently support the Agency
in its. request for the. establishment of training .

facilities in the continental United States, DOD did

- balk at the use of military personnel in third country |

areas in support of Project JMATE. Although Deputy
Secretary of Defense James H. Douglas began to ques-

tion whether his department had actually been committed

to support CIA's anti-Castro effort, it seems clear

that policy approval for the use of Department of

Defense personnel in Project JMATE had been established

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with the approval of the President's comprehensive
program of covert action against Fidel Castro in
March 1960. 105/
| The difficulties encountered with the Department

of Defense .concerning the assignment of Special Force
trainers from the US Army to the Guatemalan training
bases has already been spelled out in considerable
detail in another volume, but even as the Department
of Defense was taking a negative attitude toward the
possible use of DOD personnel in either training or
combat activities, the Agency was proposing the re-

" eruitment of either American or foreign volunteers
to serve as combat troops for Project JMATE. The
Bureau of American Republic Affairs of Department
of State, however, put the quietus on the plan for
obtaining foreign volunteers; but J. Foster Collins,
the Chief of the Covert Action Staff, suggested to
the Deputy Director for Plans that possibly he (the
DDP) could convince Livingston Merchant of the need
to re-examine the Department of State policy. *

* The problem of the Special Force trainers is dis-
cusséd in Volume II of this history, Participation

in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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_ Collins was particularly enthusiastic about the pros-

spects for recruiting Germans, Greeks, and Turks to

serve as volunteers; but in the end, State's view

‘prevailed, and there were no contingents of either

American or foreign volunteers. 106/
During the period of buildup and organization
of WH/4 for the JMATE effort against Castro, the ~

Agency encountered some problems with the US Navy,

but none of these were as serious as the difficulties

encountered with the Department of Defense per se,
the Air Force, or ‘the United, States Army. The exist-
ence of the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay in Cuba presented an unusual situation in view

of the planning that was taking place. Apparently, —
however, there was no disagreement between the Agency

and the Navy that prohibited Guantanamo from being

- used. to mount anti-Castro activities or from being

used as a safe haven area for‘ those who might have

. been detected engaging in sabotage, propaganda, or

other anti-Castro activities. The purpose of such
restrictions, of course, was to prevent the Cubans
from claiming violations of the legal and binding

international agreement between the Unitéd States

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‘and the Government of Cuba over the lease of Guantanamo
Bay. So serious was this issue in fact, that the .
Agency agreed |

_ that. all Cubans participating in over-

flights of Cuba would be told that Guan-

tanamo Naval Base was not to be used as

a safe haven, and that if they landed

there, they would be turned over to the

Cuban authorities. 107/

The - Guantanamo Base also presented a major aif
ficulty for the Department of State. Evidence of this
surfaced in early October ‘of 1960 when it was reported
that during a meeting of the State Working Group on
Cuba a suggestion was put forward that the US try to.
“influence Latin American nations to approve US reten-
tion of the base. One proposal had been made that
this: be done through the Inter-American Defense Board
(TaD8) , where a resolution apparently was “about to be
introduced asking for a definition of the relations
between Cuba and. the USSR, with. the expectation that

\ .
this might force Cuba's resignation from membership
-on the. IADB. According to Col. John F. Mallard, the
Agency's. liaison officer with the State Working Group:

In addition, State desires that the
IADB, make some statement on the impor-
tance of Guantanamo Bay to Latin. American
hemisphere: defense. This statement would,
in effect,. give Latin American approval
to U.S.. retention of this base. 108/

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This frame of reference concerning Guantanamo
Bay led the Executive Officer of WH/4, Ed Stanulis,
to prepare an extremely sharp memorandum for Chief,
Western Hemisphere Division raising some questions
which are as pertinent to CIA today as they were
when they were. raised in 1960. Stanulis wrote as
follows: 7

I realize that this Agency is an
implementing. arm of the Executive Branch
and has no right or privilege in the area
of formulation of U.S. national policy.

- I believe that within this framework we.
who aré part of this’ Agency are permitted
to comment on certain.State Department —
or other Executive Department propositions
that appear, on the basis of our own
personal observations and experience, to

be counter-productive to the best interest
of the United States. I am convinced
that the course of action, described in
paragraph 1 [that the U.S. use the IADB
to win Latin American support for the
U.S. retention of Guantanamo] is in fact
within this category.

It is high time that the U.S. take an
understandable public position in matters
of international agreement, compact, con- |
tract, and treaty. The rights of the U.S. .
to the Guantanamo Bay area have been clear-
ly and.legally described in several docu-
ments which bear the signatures of the
then reigning and cognizant governments
of the United States and Cuba, respectively.
Certainly the assistance of any single or
plural Latin American national:entity (ies)
seems to me to be indicative of an admitted
weakness on the part of the United States

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and its conviction of its legal inter-
national rights.

I suggest that this Agency make known
to the State Department its feelings in
this matter, as described above (if ad-
dressees agree). I realize that consider-
able discussion could be waged in terms
of legally and/or logically presenting
our’case. This memorandum is not intended
to meet these requirements.

One observation that might be included
is the fact that the current Chief of
Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke,
has on at least two occasions in U.S. mass
_INedia of sizable: circulation stated that
the United States would not tolerate any
invasion. of Guantanamo or hostile abroga-
tion of our treaty arrangements to the base.
yo I believe it is significant to note that
no responsible member of the Executive
Branch (including. the President of the
United.States) has contradicted his state-
ments. On the basis’ of this evidence, it
would appear to me that the official overt
position of the United States is crystal
clear and we need not at this time place.
ourselves in a position of indebtedness
or vulnerability with any other Latin
American nation in terms of the Guantan-
amo issue. 109/

By early November 1960 Secretary of State,
Christian Herter, had decided that the matter of
Guantanamo needed to be discussed at a higher level;
and, consequently, he introduced the subject on the
agenda for the National Security Council meeting of.
7 November 1960. The Secretary emphasized the need

for coordination of military and political planning

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Xu

in case of an attack on the naval base. Herter
indicated two extreme possibilities: one, that in

case of an attack, the United States respond with

only sufficient military force to protect the base

13

itself; and another, that the United States decide
that an attack on the base was in fact an act of war

and apply ‘such military power as necessary. Herter

also suggested, of course, that there would be possi-

ble responses between the two extremes, with activities.

in the OAS or the UN possibly having some bearing on

the US response -- the sort of contention that undoubt-

edly must have raised the hackles on Mr. Stanulis

again. The Secretary of State did specify, however,
that the US response to an attack on Guantanamo would

be the result of a decision made by the President of

the United States.

As will be pointed out subsequently, the Cubans
would make charges: about Guantanamo being the center
for anti-Castro activities, and there would be a few
instances where anti-Castro Cubans were able to find
refuge within the confines of the base. Overall,

however, there was a surprising degree of neutrality

.with respect to the naval installation during the

course of the Bay of Pigs operation.

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It is also important to mention at this time
the Agency's relations with the Commander in Chief,
CINCLANT, Admiral Dennison. Before the end of October
1960, the Admiral had made it clear to the Agency's
representatives that he believed it impossible for

him to conduct the affairs of the Atlantic Fleet in

_ the Cuban area properly until he received further -

information. -- specific information -- about the
Agency's planned operations against Castro. When
this report on Dennison was brought to the attention
of the Chief of the Agency War Plans Staff, F. P.
Holcomb, Holcomb assured the Admiral that any request
for information which he cared to lay on the Agency
would be promptly answered. By this time, Dennison

indicated that he had already been in touch with

General Lemnitzer, Chairman of the JCS, and the

expectation was that such briefing on Cuban affairs

by CIA was being laid on. .

| Holcomb, quite truthfully, indicated that

neither he nor the Agency's liaison officer to CINCLANT,
Commander Ray E. Millard, were privy to the planned
operations of WH/4. Once having assured the Admiral

of the willingness of CIA to cooperate and provide

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-him with the necessary information, Holcomb then
noted: “

It was the impression of the CIA
officers present that Admiral Dennison is
a cooperative officer and favorably and
objectively inclined towards CIA, and
that if his needs can be met, he will
undoubtedly follow a positive and helpful
course. 111/
On 2 November 1960, Richard Bissell, Jacob Ester-
line,, and Colonel Jack Hawkins traveled to Norfolk to
Admiral Dennison's headquarters. The CIA representa—
tives received a general briefing by the Navy on con-
tingency plans for Hispaniola and Cuba, and in return,
they briefed the Navy on Project JMATE. Mr. Bissell
gave an overview of the CIA operation, Esterline dis-
cussed the political and propaganda aspects, and
Hawkins talked about the PM program, including the
plan for a 1,500-man invasion force to seize a lodge-
ment on the island of Cuba. Hawkins emphasized that

this last objective could not be met until March or

April of 1961.¥* 112/

* In a telecon with the author.of this history on
15 May 1978, Admiral Dennison indicated that it was
extremely late in the course of the Bay of Pigs oper-
ation before he received any briefing from CIA on the
anti-Castro operation. He made it sound, in fact,
. aS. though he was not briefed until shortly before the
(footnote. continued on following page)

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D. Personnel and Training |

From the time of the official approval of the
anti-Castro policy by President Eisenhower until the
collapse of the effort at the Bay of Pigs the question
of personnel and personnel Management for Project
IMATE was of constant concern. Even though the
Director of Central Intelligence “emphasized the
significance of the Project, by saying that he would
recall Agency personnel from any station in the world
if the individual's abilities were required for the
successful achievement of JMATE objectives," some of
those who were closest to the personnel problem be-
lieved that DCI Dulles failed completely to keep that
promise. 113/ Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 has re-
marked as follows:

It was obvious that as the operation

began to increase in size that the Divi-

sions didn't have the personnel, the

.senior personnel; to staff out the organ-

ization; or if they did have them, they
‘weren't about to release them from the —

LSD (Landing Ship Dock) which was to carry the landing
craft to the area of the Bahia de Cochinos was ready

-to load at the naval base at Vieques for the invasion.

As the text above confirms, however, the Admiral was
read into the act relatively early in the game and
should have had plenty of time to make preparations
for the activities of April 1961.

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things they were doing, because they were
considered indispensable, which was probably
correct. It was on that basis, I think,
that when people like Dick Drain came
‘back home from -- in Dick's case, I think
he came in from Greece -- where he had a
pretty good record -~ but he was not re-
turning to Headguarters to go into an
assignment, and Dick Bissell put him in
the operation with us. Gerry Droller had
been around Headquarters for a long time,
had been quite a bit of a replacement
problem. He was very bright, he was a
German specialist, had a pretty good
political background; and Gerry and Howard
Hunt, for whatever reason, were sort of
-selected, not by us, but they were told
“they were going to be the people who
would handle the political aspects of

the operation. 114/

Esterline also noted that the shortage of compe-
tent, personnel became particularly critical when the
operational concepts began to change and to expand.

He claimed that when serious problems came up none of

the GS-18 case officers were available to make deci-

-sions. 115/.- 7" *

Bill Eisemann, Chief/Support/WH/4, was more
specific in his criticism of the personnel management
for Project JMATE. After emphasizing that Colonel
L. K. White, the Deputy Director for Support (DDS),

did insure that the support elements got the best

people for Project JMATE, “he [White], directed all

Support office heads that if there was a need for any

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senior officer or any position to be filled that they
would £111 it without any hesitation whatsoever." 116/
But, in contrast, Eisemann pointed out:

I can't say that was true on the opera-
tional side of the shop. A Contingency.
Task Force, a program developed by the >
Clandestine Services, was designed to
make available Agency personnel who could
be pulled out of any position that they
were assigned to and moved into any urgent,.

_high priority type of project. JMATE
.Project, was a high priority project; and
the Contingency Task Force concept, in my
opinion, failed at that point because the
Clandestine Services did not provide the

- top quality people we needed for: the posi-

tion to be filled. After JMATE Project ...
the Contingency Task Force was completely
abolished. ._ Many people in the Agency were
designated from the Support and the Opera-
tional side to fill various positions as
they would come up, but it didn't work from
the Clandestine Services side. We had real
' problems, trying to get qualified ... top
qualified people ... to do those jobs. In
my opinion, the Contingency Task Force was
a failure. It was set up and designed so
that.qualified personnel would be completely
immunized and processed and ready to go with
passports at any given time. But you
couldn't get. the people you wanted -- I'm
talking about qualified key professionals
in:the Clandestine Services -- because the
Division heads in the Clandestine Services
would not release those people. 117/

Dick Drain, who became Chief of Operations for
Project JMATE was among the severest of the critics
with reference to the personnel assigned to Project

JMATE. Pointing to his own case; Drain stated:

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I don't mean to be unduly immodest, but

really, I didn't have any qualifications

for this [WH/4] except that I was there

and unemployed -- had no Spanish language
whatsoever, and my entire exposure had been
punching cows in Arizona in 1940. That
doesn't: really bring you up much on Latin
America and latinos, and any of that ...

I had never been on an amphibious operation,
and if that was characteristic of my quali-
fications, it really characterized the whole
damned operation ... about which, it seemed
to me, there was a good deal of well-meaning
hypocrisy. Allen Dulles, always meaning
what he said, would say repeatedly, “now,

I want the very best people assigned to
this project ... there is nothing more
important that we are doing than this; and
I want directed assignments ... I want
people pulled out of tours overseas if
necessary, this thing must be manned."
Everybody would solemnly nod and, then,
much like the case of Vietnam ... humans
being humans ,.. we would tend to get. the
people that the area Division Chiefs ‘found

. "excess" -- which normally meant “found

insufficient." With many notable exceptions,
we did not get the very best people avail-
able. 118/

Although Drain levelled his broadside at all of

the Divisions in the DDP, he was most critical of the

Western Hemisphere Division:

More of this staffing would have come

from WH if there had been more competent

people within WH. WH suffered, in my
opinion, from a surfeit of ex-FBI officers
who had been picked up at the time that

-the Agency took over from the Bureau in

Latin America ... but there were damned

’ few of them that had any particular ex-

perience ... One of the main things
that plagued me was that I could never

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figure. out, because nobody ever made it

clear, where the hell the project stood
vis-a-vis WH ... J.C. King never was
told, I think for understandable reasons,
to what extent he was in it, and to what
extent he was not in it. 119/

As with other of the principals who were involved

in the WH/4 effort, Drain was extremely complimentary
of the Support element assigned to WH/4, stating as

follows:

This is a little ironic, because with
Bissell as the DDP, you would have thought
that if the directed assignment thing
worked anywhere, it should have worked
within the DDP. It worked less well there

_than’it did within the DDS. Red White,

soldierly-like he was, took absolutely
sincerely, what the Director said, when
he said "I want the very best people
assigned to this." So we got Mike King

to run the finance, not some stumblebum

with garters on his sleeve ... the best
finance officer they had. Our logistics
support and Bill Eisemann, they were really
hand picked by Red White ... The DDS or
the DDA, whatever they called it then,
deserved very high marks for being uniquely
the people to put their back into it.

The DDI really wasn't. asked; and that

was too bad, because we could have used, ‘
it seéms to me, some input from the DDI.
Our own intelligence report structure

was not bad. The Chief, FI was a nice

- old guy, Whedbee; and we had some reports
officers who were quite competent in the

DDP sense; but the thing was so compart-
mented from the DDI, in any event, that
the idea of drawing down on DDI talent .
to get in on this, was. not well received.
I had suggested it because I had been

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in the DDI and I knew where the talent
was. For example,. on just such a mundane,
but important thing, as topography and
geography and beach stuff ... Christ, I
well knew from the time that I worked for
Lofty Becker ... that there was in old
ORR ... in the geographic thing ... Jim
[Brammell], ... Otto Guthe ... I mean,

_ they would have been glad to supply
people ... and we didn't ask. So you
can't say: that DDI didn't provide, unless
you understand that they didn't provide
because they really weren't asked.* 120/

Although the Agency's own personnel assignments
have been criticized, the assignment of two of the key
military personnel involved in the JMARC operation
proved to be quite successful. Col. Jack Hawkins,
United States Marine Corps, and Lt. Col. Frank Egan,
United States army, were in charge of the overall PM
activity (Hawkins) and the PM training (Egan) for the
Cuban. exile brigade. Hawkins, who was serving on the

Staff of the Marine School:at Quantico, Virginia at

* Drain's suggestion that.the DDI was left completely
in the cold during the Bay of Pigs operation overstates
the case... As early as January 1959 there is evidence
that Mr. Helms agreed to cut the DDI in on “useful
intelligence to which it would be well for the DD/I to
have access" from State cable traffic on Cuba being
carried over CIA channels. A "massive" study of

Cuban telecommunications facilities prepared by ORR
in the fall of 1960 led Mr. Bissell to send a memo

of commendation for :the Communications. Branch through
the DDI. Obviously the DDI knew something was a-
foot. 120a/_- ;

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_the time that he was assigned to Project JMARC, had

taken part in the battles of Bataan and Corregidor;
had been taken prisoner with the fall of Corregidor;

and escaped from the Japanese prisoner of war camp

at Davao, Mindanao; and joined the Philippine guerrilla

forces, leading raiding parties and harassing attacks
against the Japanese army in the Philippines. After
seven months of such activity, he was evacuated by
submarine from the Philippines in November 1943 and
was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for these
actions. After returning.to the United States for
additional training, in November 1944 Hawkins again
returned to the Pacific area where he was an assistant
operations officer taking part in the assault ‘and
capture of Okinawa. For this service, he received a
Bronze Star Medal. During the Korean conflict, he

was Commanding Officer of the lst Battalion, lst

‘Marines; and he led the Battalion in combat ‘during

the Inchon landing and in subsequent operations in
Korea. For his participation in the Inchon-Seoul op-
eration, Hawkins had received the Silver star Medal
for heroism. From March 1956 to the summer of 1959

when he entered the Naval War College, Hawkins had

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served as liaison officer with the Amphibious Forces
Atlantic in Norfolk, Virginia -- a pertinent assign-
ment for his transfer to Project JMARC.

Lt. Col. Egan's military record showed a well-
trained infantry officer who -haa served overseas in
the European Theater during the course of World War

rf
II; an infantry officer including an infantry train-

.ing officer in much of the period following World

War II; and a staff officer in the Special Warfare
Division of the United States Army in 1958, serving |
with the Director of Plans, in Washington from 1958

to 1960. Immediately prior to his assignment to
Project JMATE, Colonel Egan had been on: the Operations -
and Training Staff of a Joint Support Group, head-
quartered in’ Washington. Egan EOD'd with Project JMATE,

27 June 1960, and Hawkins on 29 August of 1960. 121/

Both officers received high marks from Mr. Bissell

and Jake Esterline, and, particularly from Dick Drain,
who stated:

I thought they [Hawkins and Egan] were
first rate ... I mean first rate, not com-
pared with the jaded World War II memory,
but first rate in terms of officers then
serving in the armed forces of the United
States. The Hawkins selection was an
excellent one. I don't myself, know how

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one could have found a better man. People

have said ... “Well, the son of a bitch
just worked out in the Philippines as a
stay behind ... what did he know?" He

knew a lot. He had written a book on
guerrillas. He was sharp, he was smart,
and honest, and not overly ambitious. I

am sure that he saw this as a way to further
-Ahis career, of course. Military men, I
‘think, tend to maximize that more than
Agency people. But that was not his:
motivation -- or his primary motivation.

He had around him some really first rate
help.... not very high ranking ... but ©
.we didn't need an awful lot of high ranking
‘... we needed some hard workers. Frank
Egan, who went down to do the training,

was the man that I. would have picked. He
was probably the most disputable of the
bunch because he was pretty volatile. He
has been condemned for leading the Cuban
manpower to believe that they were going

to get more support than he had any right
to let them know about. Well, I wasn't
there, but I know damned well that if I

had been, I would have been priming up

the ‘Brigade to do this tough job, not by
‘counseling them as to the difficulty of

ait ... at least, exclusively ... or, giving
them lectures about now you will really
have to do this on your own, because you
are not going to get one iota of assistance
from the armed forces. You don't normally
train a group to conduct an operation. of
this sort by.playing on cheir fears. If,
down there at the end of the line -- first
in Guatemala and then in Nicaragua -- Egan
led them to believe that they were going
to get them more help than he had any right
to let them know, well, I can understand

l why that would have happened.* 122/

* With reference to Colonel Hawkins, Jake Esterline
has noted: : _
(footnote continued on following page)

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(
By way of illustrating some of the problems

encountered in acquiring adequate personnel for the
JMATE operation, on the very day that President
Eisenhower was approving the anti-Castro program, a
memorandum was being sent to the Deputy Director for
Plans from the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
noting that two individuals assigned to the Office

of Training were ‘urgently needed for service in WH/4.
Colonel King reported to the DDP that although Colonel
Matt Baird, Director of Training, was agreeable to
the release of the two individuals to serve as PM

trainers, Baird insisted that the men could not be

I guess that it is only fair to say
that that assignment [Project JMARC] cost
him his general's star, and a good many
other things in terms of his record. 123/

The author of this history attempted to arrange
oral history interviews with Colonels Hawkins and Egan,
but in neither. case would the individuals consent to
such interview. In addition, the author also asked
each man if he would be willing to respond to a series
of written questions, and neither would agree to this.
It was made quite clear to the author that both indi-
viduals harbored considerable résentment about their
relationships and association with the Agency at the
time of the Bay of Pigs. In a similar manner,. Col.
John F. Mallard, United States Marine Corps who was
Liaison Officer between the Agency and the Depart-
ment of Défense, at the time of the Bay of Pigs, also
rejected the author's request for either an oral inter-
view or a response to written questions.

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released until suitable replacements could be found

to take over their tasks in the Office of Training.

' King, therefore, appealed to the Deputy Director for

Plans for their immediate release. 124/

Not only did the Clandestine Service encounter
difficulty in obtaining personnel from within its own
units to serve in WH/4, it also appeared to draw blanks
in terms of Cubans willing to volunteer for the strug-
gle against Castro. In response to a November 1959
memorandum to all WH field. stations and bases asking
that they supply the names of Cubans who would be

willing to work as agents against the Castro Govern-

‘ment, WH/4/FI reported the results of its search,

stating that as of June 1960:

Many of the Agents who were proposed
by other WH Stations for use ‘in Cuba were
either found unacceptable, or did not want
to accept such an assignment.’ Other sta-
tions were unable to come up with any
assets who might gain access to the de-
sired targets in Cuba. 125/

The problem which Col. Baird had raised back in
March concerning replacement for personnel who might

be assigned to Project. WH/4 was not actually resolved

until June of 1960 when:

Colonel White announced that DDS per-
sonnel on full time detail to JMARC

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would be transferred to the project Table
of Organization, effective the beginning
of the first pay period in July 1960.
Employees on detail to the project from
the Clandestine Services offices will not
be transferred since DDP. considers them
temporary assignments with the personnel
returning to their, parent office when the
project is completed. Colonel White
pointed out, that although DDS personnel
would be transferred to the project, there-
by relieving slots in the various DDS ele-
ments, each office head should keep in
mind that his employees will be returning
‘to him, and he should plan accordingly. 126/
Colonel White's comments are quite understandable
in view of the fact that of 104 personnel’ on duty with
JMATE on 7-8 June 1960, only 32 were Clandestine Serv-
ices careerists; and excepting a few with DDI career
designations, the bulk of the personnel were Support :
careerists. By 14 June 1960, Colonel King was appeal-
ing to the DDP for an increment which would bring
total JMATE personnel to 234, including 131 employees
“who were to be in the field. Apparently, however,
the Deputy Director for Plans approved a:total ceiling
of only 158 staff personnel by the end of June 1960;
and.in August of 1960, Chief, WH Division forwarded
a revised staffing. guide, calling for a total of 274
positions and requesting that “as soon after 15 August

as is possible, a total of 40 additional staff: personnel"

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be added to the 158 who were then on duty --. making
a new total of 198.

. Although Mr. Bissell approved the recommended
increment, he nonetheless wrote a memorandum to C.
Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A, suggesting that Barnes and
Dick Helms (surprisingly) take a close look at the
JMATE staffing pattern to see if there were areas of
auplication, particularly between the field bases and
Headquarters. ‘The DDP suggested that in the areas
of FI and PM there might be slots in either the For-
ward Operations Base in Miami or in JMOARSMAN -- the
Panama Training Site -- where possibly the. staffs
could be transferred during slack’ periods to conduct
similar operations in other parts of the JMATE opera~

tion.* 127/

* Lest the reader be confused by the term “Forward
Operations Base," this was the JMWAVE activity in the
Miami area, which continued to operate subsequent to
the Bay of Pigs. At the same time that the Bay of

- Pigs operation was. getting under way, there was con-
siderable emphasis from various individuals in Head-
quarters for establishment of a "Forward Command Post,"
which also might be located in the Miami.area, possibly
in the communications complex. Some even suggested
the possibility of establishing a sub-command post
in a third country. In any event, no Forward Command
Post was established. 128/

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By early November 1960, as the concept of the
operation was shifting from one of guerrilla warfare
and infiltration to invasion, the staffing pattern
for WH/4 was again increased. Mr. Bissell authorizing
a total of 308 positions. Even as he signed the
approval, however, Mr. Bissell noted his reservations,

_ Saying: . |

‘I have signed this request to indicate
my approval, but ‘do. so with a good deal of.
concern. I realize that this is a very
major and top priority activity and I also
realize that the senior officers engaged
in it continue to be heavily overworked.
On the other hand, I am fearful that the
addition of large numbers of personnel will
not in fact reduce the load on those indi-
viduals who are most overworked, but may
instead create additional burdens of
Management without contributing signifi-
cantly to the success of the underlying
activities. I am concerned also that we
may be simply running out of suitable
people in the Agency in cértain categories.
Accordingly, I urge you to re-examine even
the double-starred positions in the staff-
ing guide submitted with your request to
see whether they are all in fact of a high

' order of essentiality.* 129/

* Much of the staffing problem, of course, traces

back to the failure of the DDP to insure early on that
‘only the best people ’be assigned to the WH/4 project.

As. early as August of 1960, it had been indicated

that the DDP might be leaning toward the use of

directed assignments, but nothing ever came of this. 130/

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Even before. Mr. Bissell's memorandum of early
November 1960, indicating the possibility that experts
in certain areas might-no longer be available from
within the Agency, proposals had gone forward request-
ing permission for the use of American contract person-
nel in the maritime operations. Unlike the brouhaha

that was precipitated by the early suggestions for the

use of American volunteers from the ground forces,

the authorization for the use of US contracts in mari-
time activities apparently was granted without much
debate. The statement of the. requirements for the ‘
use of the US contracts indicated that US citizens
would be put under contract to act not only as trainers

for the crews of LCI's, LCU's, LCVP's, and SK's, but

- also, that they would serve in key positions

as LCI captains, LCI diesel engineers, and
. LCU ¢oxwains during training and operations,
where qualified Cubans cannot be obtained.
This would require their entering Cuban
coastal waters and, on occasions, touching
on Cuban beaches, when operations so re-
quire.

It is essential for operations that
these key positions be held by qualified
and dependable men. At this time, it is
not expected that Cuban trainees qualified
for such positions or possessing the
necessary aptitude and character to permit
successful training will be found. If.

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they are located, the use of U.S. contract

’ personnel. will correspondingly be cut down.
Staff personnel will assist in the training
of all crews but will not be used in opera-
tions. 131/

Not only were such contract employees authorized,
but by early November 1960 a cable from Headquarters
to the Forward Operations Base noted: .

In view degree risk involved rendezvous-.

type mission request Case Officer advise

‘all Maritime contract personnel bonus this .

type mission be hereafter $100.00. Bonus

for Cuban territory beach landings or

caching would remain $500.00. 132/

By the early fall of 1960, the question of rota-

_ tion of staff personnel for Project JMATE had become a

serious matter. Many of those who had initially joined
the project had come in on 90-day rotation periods,
and in a cable to Headquarters, Ernie Sparks, the
overall Liaison Officer for Project JMATE for COS
Guatemala, requested that Headquarters approve a ro-
tational’ plan since:
Most personnel adjusted family and

business problems to period they told

they be absent and fact they. on duty

seven days a week as well as being con-

fined. to training areas which lack

‘recréation facilities. 133/

Bill Eisemann, who was Chief of Support for WH/4,
was particularly critical of the 90-day TDY assignments,

saying:

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They [the DDP] would bring a man in,

and then another man would come in to
replace him. It was really a tremendous
task to keep up with. it, because a lot of
these people had. personal problems. In
‘some cases they would cable and request
release from their assignment for personal
reasons. We attempted to satisfy most of
these requests. Herb Juul was the assigned
Personnel. Officer within the project. He
had to constantly keep a check on the loca-
‘tion of our personnel, and when their time
was up for replacement, he would then visit
with the Clandestine Services, and also the
Support components, and give them a list-
ing of the names of potential TDY returnees.
The Support components and Clandestine
Services'then provided names of people who
would be replacements. That was a hell of
a task, now, believe me. When you have a
full time project running 15 months or more,
you have people returning on a 90 day basis,
and constantly being replaced ... you can't
expect the greatest efficiency in opera-

' tions. 134/ |

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Part III

Changing Concepts

It has already been pointed out that the’ initial
planning for paramilitary operations against Castro |
was to be based on extremely small units. Two or
three man units, including a communicator, would be

‘trained and infiltrated (or dropped) into Cuba to work
with a dissident group. ‘one trainer would be the
adviser for the types of guerrilla warfare activities
which the anti-Castro dissidents might undertake safely
and reasonably securely. There had been some signs
of dissatisfaction with this particular type of program
prior to the summer of 1960. By the late summer of
1960 and through the fall there was to be a complete
and radical shift in the concept of the paramilitary

_operations® in which the forces backed by CIA should
engage. In late August-September, there were some
clues that changes in the nature of operations were
being contemplated. During the last week of August
and in the initial week of September 1960, Savilion
Chapman claimed that he and a Col. Evans, Acting

Chief, PMG/DDP, were "briefed by WH/4 planners on the

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approximate number of troops, tanks, and vehicles

for which sea transport would be required." “In that
same period Lt. Col. Frank Egan and Commander Norman
Imler of the WH/4-'staff reported they asked the Mari-
time Branch to draft a memo to the DDP giving infor-
mation on the foreign cargo vessels that would be
required for troop transport, including their owner-
ship, their costs, and on the methods of their acquisi-
tion. 1/

Inasmuch as Egan had been requested for the proj-
ect to become the trainer for the PM forces, it was |
apparent that some changes were contemplated. The
reference to the use of vessels for the transport of
tanks would indicate that something beyond hit-and-run
exercises were being contemplated. Before mid-October,
Lt. Col. Egan and a representative of the Logistics
Branch of WH/4 had spelled out some additional details

for the Maritime Branch of Special Operations. At

that time, according to Mr. Chapman's report, WH/4

was talking about deck loading of 3 LCV's, with 5

armored tanks, 5 2-1/2 ton trucks, one caterpillar
dozer, and two gasoline tank trucks -- hardly type
of equipment which would be required for 2-3 man guer-

villa teams. 2/

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By the first week in November 1960, it had be-
come clear to the most senior planners of the anti-
Castro effort _- Jake Esterline, J. Cc. King, Tracy
Barnes, and Richard Bissell -- that decisions were
going to have to be made about all aspects of the .
paramilitary program. The basic question being
whether a paramilitary program under CIA aegis “should
be launched at Castro, or whether, at this time, such
a program should become a joint operation between the
Department of Defense and the Agency. In the dis-
cussion among Agency personnel, in the discussions
between Agency: personnel and representatives of the
Special Group, and “in. discussions within the meetings

of the Special Group, the whole gammut of options

was being explored. Barnes, apparently deferring to

Bissell, suggested that rather than small team activi-
ties something on the order of 10-20 man teams be

formed and tried out. Barnes was very emphatic that

‘what was needed at this time, was a willingness to:

run some risks --. including the risk of defeat. Barnes
was critical of the Special Group, pointing out that
the apparent belief of the Group was that every opera-

tion had to succeed; .and that if ‘there were “losses,
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failures, or mishaps," the Special Group seemed to
‘want to. cancel everything. This was contrary, com-
pletely, to Barnes' concept of operational activity.
What both Barnes and Bissell supported in terms of
the smaller team activity were that:
The implementation of such teams would
indicate whether the dissident elements

“in Cuba were likely to rally around such

groups, once it had been established that

such groups could provide guidance and

supply for the anti-Castro activities.

These teams also would provide a test

‘of the Castro forces. Could Castro's

militia or his army contain the guerrilla

forces, if such forces were led by cadres

trained by the Agency? Or would the Castro
resistance crumble in the face of effective

dissident elements? 3/

Even as this discussion was going on, it became:
‘clear that the small team concept was going to go by
the board; and when the Agency tried to jump the op-
tion to a 3,000 man force for making a lodgment in

. Cuba in the conventional manner (e.g., amphibious

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assault), the plan was rejected by the Special Group
ina meeting of -3 November 1960. The Department of
Defense supported the Agency, but State objected
and suggested that perhaps the point where covert
7 intervention was possible had passed. Gordon Gray
even went so far as to raise the possibility of a
fake attack on Guantanamo as a means of justifying
overt us intervention. It was at this same meeting
that Mr.. Livingston Merchant of the Department of
State raised the question of whether plans were being
made to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and
Che Guevara -- at which point General Cabell, the
Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency,
pointed out that such activities as assassination
were extremely difficult to manage and that the CIA
had no, capability for such an operation. 4/
Even as the size of the Cuban exile force was.
being debated, Headquarters cabled to Guatemala
(4 November 1960) that the small team concept had
gone by the board and that planning should begin for
_ training a ‘conventional amphibious assault force of
at least 1,500 infantrymen. Outlines sent to the

infantry training base in Guatemala. (JMTRAV), emphasized

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the need to instill an esprit de corps among the
trainees. To do this JMTRAV was urged to provide
for unit separation, competition in the military arts,

and specific identities for the individual units

“through the use of scarfs,. caps, or some other de-

vice. This new training program was to be instigated
in November 1960 and to be completed by the end of
January 1961. 5/ . .

Even as the discussions over the changing con-
cept were going on, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence and the Deputy Director for Plans were scheduled
to brief President-elect John F. Kennedy on 18 Novem-
ber. 6/ The concept to be presented to the President

was that a force of 600 men would be landed by. LST on

Cuban shores and that these men would move inland to

create “a safe area ina mountain fastness. These
men, with possibly another 600 man unit in another
area, and those who‘ joined them from within, would
be resupplied by air drop." 7/ In addition, there
would be new recruits in the pipeline to provide sup>
port for those who had landed. An airstrip in Nica-
ragua would be used to support air operations, and

it was intimated that the US and possibly allied

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governments would recognize that the force lodged in
Cuba and its nominal leadership was the Provisional
Government of Cuba. 8/

One strange and contradictory note which appeared
during WH/4's staff meeting on 15 November to plan
the briefing for the DDP prior to his participation
with the DCI in briefing the President elect was the
following item stating:

Our [CIA's] original. concept is now
seen to be unachievable in the face of
the controls Castro has instituted.
“There will not be the internal unrest

earlier believed possible, nor will the

defenses permit the type strike first

planned. Our second concept (1,500-

3,000 man force to secure a beach with

airstrip) is also. .now seen to be unachiev-

able, except as a joint Agency/DOD action.

Our Guatemala experience demonstrates we

cannot staff nor otherwise timely create

the base and lift needed. 9/

How, if in mid-November 1960 the concept of the
1,500-3,000 man force to secure a beachhead with an

‘airstrip was envisioned by the senior. personnel in
WH/4 as “unachievable" except as a joint CIA/DOD ef-

fort, did it become "achievable" in March 1961 with
only 1,200 men and as an Agency operation? What was

being denied in confidence in mid-November 1960 be-

came the fact of the Zapata Plan and the Bay of Pigs

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Operation in March 1961. Certainly there was no
lessening in the controls that Castro had instituted,

nor in the efficiency of the military forces and

militia that he had at his command by April 1961.+#

One of the principal problems posed by. Project
JMATE -- both before and after the concept changed
in November 1961 -- was whether the training activity
at JMTRAV and JMADD in Guatemala should be, or could
be, continued without reflection upon the position
of the United States Government. Thomas Mann of the
State Department became increasingly concerned about
this situation; and the discussions within the Special
Group and among the concerned Agencies during the
period from the middle of November until the end of
the year, focused very frequently on this question.
Considering the continuingly favorable reception to

Agency activities from Ydigoras Fuentes, Guatemala's

* During interviews with the author of this history,
Messrs. Bissell, Esterline, and Drain had only slight
remembrance of the details of these meetings of 15-16
November 1960 when they ruled out what.would be, in
effect, the invasion plan implemented in April 1961

at Playa Giron -- and at that time it was minus the
joint support of the Department of Defense: This

point was completely overlooked by both ‘the Inspector
General and the Taylor Committee post mortems on the
Bay. of Pigs.

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President, State's concern that the training "places.

too much strain on the government of Guatemala" appear

unrealistic. The Department's real concerns were

with potential criticism from the OAS and the UN.

‘Certainly Ydigoras was ‘not interested in the removal

of those military units which could most. effectively

.

_guarantee his continued reign as President of Guatemala

-- the Cubans in training for both air and ground

_ activities.* 10/

. Even as the Special Group was trying to determine
whether or not the forces in training in Guatemala

should be removed, the Agency proceeded apace with

‘plans for the staffing necessary to put a 600-man

strike force in training. Chief, WH/4 Personnel

estimated that in addition to 14 staffers, there

would be a requirement for 146 military personnel if

such training were to succeed. Well prior to the

-officially agreed-to change in concept, Chief, WH/4

had anticipated a significant increase in funding

* The internal situation,in Guatemala vis a vis the
training operations is discussed in detail in Volume

II of the Official History of the Bay of Pigs Opera-

tion, Participation in the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

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for JMARC requesting of the DDP that: .

With your approval, in the interim
period [as new budget estimates were
being prepared], project funds will be
used as required to meet operational
necessity without strict adherence to
the preliminary estimates of last June
(1960] .* 10a/

Although Mr. Bissell approved the request, he made
this interesting comment:

What is disturbing is that the overrun
reported. in your memorandum seems to have

. eccurred long before you could be feeling

‘any effect of the {planned expansion] in

[PM] plans. 10b/

Contrary to suggestions that the President of
Guatemala was concerned about the Cuban training ac-
tivity, a cable of 22 November 1960 to the Director
from Guatemala indicated that the ground training

' base was undergoing a major reorganization because
permission for the establishment of a tactical train-
ing area at another of the fineas (estates) controlled

‘by Roberto Alejos -- this one near San Jose -- was
being undertaken. Inasmuch as Alejos was Ydigoras's

right hand man and conducted the liaison with the

“> WH/4 representatives for the establishment and operation

* The increased budget being suggested: was on the order
of $42 million compared to $3 million being discussed
in June.

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of the Guatemalan training bases, the contradiction.

in positions between State and the Agency was obvious. 11/
As the Special Group discussions were going on,

Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 was in Guatemala taking’

a first-hand look at the air and ground training bases.

As noted in another volume, Esterline went strongly

on record in support of the Office of Logistics en-

gineer who had been responsible for the reconstruc-

tion of the airstrip at Retalhuleu. Jake noted that

even though there had been a sizable cost overrun,

the task had been performed on time under the most

adverse weather conditions; and, consequently, sug-

gestions from Headquarters that there had been gross

inefficiency were unwarranted and unfounded.* Ester-

line's review of the situation at JMTRAV, the ground

training base, indicated that the situation there was

considerably more difficult than what he had encountered

at the air training base. He noted, for example, that

there was a severe lack of qualified senior trainers,

stating:

* For details.‘on construction of the airfield at
Retalhuleu, see Office of Logistics, Engineering Staff,
RECD, Agency Engineering Activity, 1947-1966, Vol. I,
63-67; Vol. II, 132-193. DDS/HS OL-11, Feb 72. Ss.

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. While a few of these men [from the
Domestic Operations Base in.Miami] impress
me as being good. types,. for the most. part
I found them to be too immature and lack-
ing in experience to qualify for the job
at hand. In any event, they are not in
my judgment worth the $1,000 per month
which we have to pay them. I would like
most of them to be GS-4, 5, and 6 students
that [sic] we trained at Fort Benning in
1951-52. Under’no circumstances would I
consider putting these people into Cuba
with the Cubans.

In closing his report on the visit to Guatemala,

Esterline presented the following critical observations
of the situation as he saw it. Reflecting on the

mission and on the resources available, he wrote:

I also reviewed the problem in the
light of the many gaps in policy approval
for. JMARC,. all of which complicate project
planning. By the time I arrived back at
Headquarters, I had fairly well convinced
myself that it is unrealistic for the

_project or the Agency to try to "go it

alone" in opening up another major base
in a third country to train from 1,500 to
3,000 Cubans for a major invasion effort.
I discussed my thinking with Col. Hawkins
at length, and found that-he shared my
view. As a result of this discussion, we
re-evaluated our capability and presented
you [the DDP] with the recommendation that
we limit ourselves to preparing a force
of 600 maximum to be used in the manner
we outlined to you on 16 November. I
still feel this recommendation is quite
valid given the limitation on real estate

‘that we are presently working under. If

it turns out that we can acquire policy
approval for the real estate in the interior,

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I would then agree that, with limited

additional help from DOD, we could train

a maximum of 1,200 and commit them along

the line outlined during the.16 November

meeting. Even our present scope of op-

erations, however, continues to be en-'

dangered by the gambit that Mr. Mann and

Mr. Merchant are engaged with in the

[State] “Working Group." I cannot empha-

size this too strongly: if we are re-

quired to.evacuate Guatemala for reasons

of high policy or because of the situation,

the project will be seriously damaged unless

we have immediately available real estate

where these people can be put to work. 13/.

Some relief would be provided for the ground
training: program with the opening up of Alejos finea
near San Jose, but the adequacy of the training facil-
ities for the ground forces would continue to plague
JMARC through the course of the project. - Moreover,
even though the discussions concerning plausible
deniability reached near fever pitch during the. dis-
cussions. of November 1960, at no point did the.
Special Grotip of presidential consultants ever step

‘\ :

' forward with a firm recommendation that the United
States assume responsibility and so admit. The most
persistent advocate of this position: was Thomas Mann,
of the Department of State, and why his proposals

were never pushed more seriously is one of the unresolved
t . . .

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questions concerning the Bay of Pigs Operation.*
Esterline's visit to the bases in Guatemala
was almost immediately reflected in the correspondence
between the field and Headquarters, with specific
emphasis being placed on the assignment to the ground
training base, JMTRAV, of senior training officers.
Similarly it was stressed that there was a priority
need to secure Special Force trainers from. the Army,
on an ASAP basis. Requirements for materiel jumped,
particularly in the number of personal weapons which
would be required for added numbers of troops in
training. With the acquisition of the additional
training. site in Guatemala from Roberto Alejos, re-
quests immediately came forward for trucks and jeeps
to transport troops to these training areas. The.
* There also is evidence that at least one of the
principal Agency planners, C. Tracy Barnes, contrib-
uted to the November confusion. At one point, when
serious consideration was being given to the possi-
bility of increasing significantly the training activ-
ity that might be done in Nicaragua, Barnes introduced
what amounted to moral objections to the association
-- or to strengthening the association -- with the
Somoza Government. Barnes emphasized that this would
go down hard with the more liberal elements in Latin
America. 14/ This argument, of course, was very much

in line with the position being advanced by the Depart’
ment of State -- Thomas Mann excepted.

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field was aware that the increasing number of trainees

would create problems, but at the same time, there

. were indications that the trainers were hopeful that

the infiltration teams that had been developed could

be held intact. 15/

Just as there was confusion within the Headquarters

‘area over the nature of the program, so, too, was:con-
cern reflected in the field's messages to Headquarters.

“A cable of 28 November 1960 from COS Guatemala to

Headquarters requested:
Recent cable traffic suggests. major

changes in near future and COS feels it

would be of great assistance to have

complete story to assist in dealing with

Alejos and Ydigoras. 16/

Even as COS Guatemala was requesting information,
the situation in Washington remained in a state of
flux. On 29 November, Col. King made a specific at-
tempt to obtain positive guidance through the office
of the Deputy Director for Plans. Chief, WH/D, out-
lined his understanding of the paramilitary planning
as follows:

(a) On or about 1 February 1961, land by

amphibious means a guerrilla force of about

600. trained Cubans to establish a perimeter

defense and resistance center in a selected
-area of Cuba.

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(b). Continue present operations of in-
filtrating small paramilitary teams to
organize, train, and lead resistance
forces and report intelligence informa-
‘tion. |

(c) Follow up this effort by providing

‘ air logistical support to the 600-man
guerrilla force in Cuba and all additional
guerrilla elements who join to collaborate
with this force. 17/

Having outlined his understanding of the planning,
Col.. King then went on: - ,

‘The following major questions must now
be resolved by the Special Group or referred
_ to the President for decision before pro-
ceeding further to implement the paramili-
tary aspect of this program as described
above:

a. Does either the Department of
State or the Department of Defense view
the proposed paramilitary concept as

_ not in consonance with policy or for
any other reason open to question? If
so, why and what alternatives are pro-
posed; what course of action is ap-
proved? .

b. If there is agreement as to the
paramilitary concept,. then is there
agreement that training shall ‘continue
in Guatemala?

c. If continuance in Guatemala is
disapproved, will DOD air-lift the.
present trainees at once from Guatemala
to Saipan for training and provide
‘similar air-lift for up to 300 additional

"men as they are recruited? . The entire
group would later be returned toa stag-
ing area in Nicaragua for the amphibious
operation.

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(da) Will the DOD also provide the
following:

(1) Thirty-eight Special Force
officers and enlisted men to be used
as instructors in Guatemala or in
Saipan, or both.

(2) One reactivated LST.

(3) Supplementation of logistic

' resupply air-lift to resistance after
1 February. (As detailed an estimate.
as can be made will be forwarded to
DOD if the paramilitary concept is
approved. ) 18/

Col. King then closed this memorandum to Mr.
Bissell by noting that if the paramilitary concept
was approved, certain policy approvals would be re-

' quired. These were listed as follows:

a. To use one Florida base, .such: as _
Opalocka, for air supply missions in sup-
port of guerrilla forces in the ‘target
country.

“b. °To use a small number of American’
civilian contract personnel in air and |
‘maritime operations. (No such personnel
are to be used in ground operations.)

c. To mount air strikes against Cuban
air and other military targets. 19/

. Whatever else can be said, it is clear that by
the end of November 1960, the original concept of the
Agency's anti-Castro effort as one focussing on the

‘use of small teams infiltrating Cuba and working with

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the dissident elements located within the country had

' gone by the board. What was now to be undertaken was

an amphibious assault in strength -- the strength as

yet to be determined -- with the concomitant require-—

ment for heavy ‘air support for resupply and possibly
for military support as well. Indicative of the con-
fusion which surrounded this period when the concept
was changing were Jake Esterline's remarks shortly
following the collapse of the Bay of Pigs when he
testified before the Taylor Committee. It appears

as though Esterline had been informed -- incorrectly
as it turned out -- that in his testimony of 1 May
1961 Lt. Col. Frank Egan had indicated to the commit-

tee that the strike force concept has been in being

‘since his EOD in June 1960.*

In rebutting what he thought Egan's testimony

had been, Esterline reported:

My recollection is that Lt. Col: Egan \
came to us about June 1960 and that he

* Egan had actually testified. that following the
Guatemalan revolt he had been sent down to organize
the brigade, and he stated that the number of Cuban
trainees had been on the order of 420 on 20 November
1960 and had risen to nearly 600 by the first week
of December. 20/

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arrived with certain ideas which he carried
from the Pentagon on how best to tackle the
Cuban problem. This, however, did not con-

“stitute JMATE policy. I am sure you [Col.

Jack Hawkins] -- or more particularly, mem-

_bers of your staff -- will find that we had
‘no approved philosophy of the operation

within the Project until well in[to] Sep-
tember. The training program which Rocky
Farnsworth conducted in Panama was directed
solely toward training an instructor cadre .
in small unit or “guerrilla type" opera-
tions. This cadre, when it arrived in
Guatemala, in. addition to working on build-
ing the camp with Carl Jenkins, continued
to train the first recruits in the same
kind of training they had received.

Another example of my positivenéss
that we were not, at Project level, think-
ing of the strike operation is the first
conversation that we held in my office in
Barton Hall when I referred to the fact
that the PM staff had been talking about

. the development of a strike operation, but

that I, myself, was not convinced of it at
the time and that I preferred to put small
teams into existing units at the appropri-
ate time. As I recall, you [Col. Jack
Hawkins] had an open mind at that point;
although without positive study of Cuba
you leaned to the concept I outlined... It
was at a. somewhat later date, therefore
(probably before the first of October),
that we talked .again,and you [Col. Jack

Hawkins] stated your conviction that Castro

could not be overthrown without a major
or catalytic effort being made against
him. After deliberation, I came to the
same ‘conclusion, and we then began to
think.in terms of expanding the force

to the strength of a reinforced battalion,
more or less.

The foregoing is important only be-

' cause General Taylor is going into very

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fine points in his analysis: of government
policy. It is incumbent upon us, there-
fore, to get the record straight in this
manner, and, although Lt. Col. Egan may
have had in his own mind the idea of a
strike opération -- and I believe he came
to us with some idea on hitting the Isle
of Pines -- this nevertheless was not
approved Project or Agency policy until
quite a few months later. In point of
fact, as I look back over that period, I
am sure during that period I found myself
drifting along, devoting myself merely to
creating basic capabilities in a variety
of fields. without any clear-cut idea of
what national policy would permit us to
do.* 21/

Richard Bissell who was the Deputy Director for

Plans at the time of the Bay of Pigs operation has a

* In a discussion with the author of this history in
the fall of 1975, Esterline introduced another thought

‘about the change in concept to wit:

That the small team concept had been planned to
be put into operation early in November of 1960, and
Esterline seems to believe that this would have been
feasible. ‘dowever, the Presidential election of that
year made the Eisenhower administration extremely
cautious about anything: that might have an impact on
the outcome of the election; and, consequently, such
delays as were incurred gave added time for the build-
up of Castro's internal forces. By the time that the
election was over, it had become apparent. that the
small team concept was no longer viable. Esterline,
in fact, suggested that the emphasis for the buildup
in the brigade forces came from the White House. But

even though Gordon Gray -- in various meetings of the
Special Group during the period from November to the
end of the Eisenhower administration -- did support

the idea of increasing the size of the force, there
is no evidence to indicate that pressure to do this
came from the White House. 22/

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rather more positive recollection of the change in
concept, having noted:

That.decision as to the character of |
the operation was rather gradually modi-
fied during the late autumn [of 1960],
and it's very difficult, even for someone
who.was close to those developments, to
put a finger on the exact moment when a
clear decision was made, or the circum-
stances, or, really, the people who niade
it. It was a decision rather forced by
-circumstances. 23/  —

When discussing the situation in October of 1975,
however, Bissell volunteered the following observations
about the change in concept for the operation. He said:

One of the clearest impressions I have
of the whole planning period and of this
change in concept was that by November
({1960] ... and I don't think Esterline
bought this view either as completely or
as soon as I did ... I [also] remember
the feeling that I was well ahead of
King ... in my ‘belief that we had to place
nearly exclusive reliance for the initial
phase on whatever force it was possible
to land.. So, I also remember very clearly

-~ and I think as early as November -- where
I think there were probably under 500 people
'in the brigade in training -- I remember

repeatedly saying to Hawkins and Esterline
that if we are really going to have to
place this heavy reliance on a landing
force, this is an all together prepos-
_terously inadequate number ... I remember
being told that people did not see how it
would be. feasible to get up to the size I
was talking about in the time period; but
secondly ... I have a ‘clear recollection
that he [Jack Hawkins} had a lesser sense.

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of urgency at that point about a buildup
in numbers than I did. .I felt that I

‘was consistently .urging upon Hawkins the

necessity of a larger buildup than the
plans then contemplated, and I. also re-
member, at. a later stage in a somewhat
similar fashion, urging upon Beerli, the
necessity of a significantly larger air
arm than his plans contemplated ....I
think that Hawkins likewise felt that he
had to rely on what the recruiting
mechanism would turn up, which wasn't
really his direct operation, and that |
he wasn't at all sure that he could get
the sort of numbers that I was talking
about.. But I do remember an awareness
of what seemed to me to be the inadequacy

-of our resources in the light of an altered

concept of the operation. 24/

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Part IV:

. Presidential Resurgence

The previous section of this volume has examined
the activities that occurred during the period from
the early fall through November of 1960, with the
shift away from what was to be exclusively a guerrilla
warfare type operation to a new concept emphasizing
amphibious invasion. During this period most of the
discussion and the decisions, aside from those within
CIA, were at the level of the special Group. The

principals involved from the Department of State were

at the Under Secretary/Assistant Secretary level at

the highest, and at the Agency, both the Director of

Central Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Plans
were involved. On 29. November 1960 the level of in-
volvement of the US Government escalated sharply with
the sudden resurgence of interest on the part of
President Dwight David Eisenhower. In contrast to

the period from July 1960 through the Presidential

election of early November -- when, as noted earlier,

_ there was, at most, minimal attention to the develop-

ing anti~Castro program at the White House level --

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suddenly the President emerged as one of the principal
decision makers in the period prior to the take-over
by the Kennedy administration.

- When asked for an explanation of this sudden
resurgence, Jake Esterline, then Chief, WH/4 stated:

I.can't explain it ... but I will say.
this, it probably had a political basis.
They [the Republican administration]
realized that they had lost, and they
realized that they were going to have to
brief a new administration along with the
British on the things that had been going
on. I suspect that they didn't want to
‘brief on something that would emerge that
they hadn‘t been giving anything other

-than their full support. I am guessing,
but I would think that was a pretty good
guess. 1/

on 29 November of 1960, the President had a meet=

; ing which included Messrs. Dillon and Merchant of State;

Gates and Douglas of Defense; Gray and Goodpaster of
his own Staff; and Dulles and Bissell of CIA. In his
report on the session with the President, Mr: Bissell,
the DDP mentioned among other things the following two
points of particular interest:
The President made it clear he wanted

all done that could be done with all

possible urgency and nothing less on the

part of any department, ... and the Presi-

dent led a discussion as to how best. to

organize the total US effort against the
target. There was some feeling that an

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overall coordinating executive might be
desirable, but it was left that the
Director would make Mr. Barnes available
to work closely with a State Department
- officer to be designated. It was also

-felt desirable to use Mr. Pawley's
services, initially in connection with

' Argentina's possible covert assistance. 2/

The points of view attributed to the President
at this time by Mr. Bissell reflect very. closely the
position of William D. Pawley who had met with the
President immediately prior to the President's ses-
sion with State, DOD, and the Agency's representatives.
According to Livingston Merchant, who had a long
session with Mr. Pawley.on the day prior to Pawley's
meeting with President Eisenhower:

Mr. Pawley said. that two things are
necessary, and I inferred that these would
constitute his [{Pawley's] principal recom-

_ mendations to the President.

(Ll) The President should appoint a
single experienced individual (he said he
was personally qualified and would be
available for the job if asked) to. conduct

the entire covert operation. In this con-
nection, he cited the role which he had
played in the Guatemala case.

(2) We should recruit several thousand
good young Cubans in Florida and give them
basic training. This could be done in five
or six weeks, rather than months, according
to him. He was extremely impatient at the
thought of moving any Cubans who may now be
in Central America, expressing himself

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forcefully as being sure their host would
object.

-I asked if he was proposing overt in-
tervention by US armed forces. He said
absolutely not. The essence of his plan
would be to land in Cuba, presumably in
the next month or two, a force of 600
trained Cubans, following up this land-
ing with additional Cuban elements and
then installing a government in the bridge-
head which would call on us for financial
and logistics support. He mentioned a
number of names which were unfamiliar to
me of Cubans who he said are politically
unblemished in Cuba, neither pinks nor
reactionary rightists.* 3/

On 30 November 1960, a Special Group meeting was

held at which time Gordon Gray:

*. Considering that discussions within the Agency and
within the Special Group had only recently arrived at
the figure of 600 men for an invasion brigade, plus
the fact that this brigade would establish a bridge-
head from which a provisional government opposed to
Castro might be announced, .one might speculate on the
source of Pawley's information. Jake Esterline has
tended to denigrate the role played by Pawley during
the course of the Bay of Pigs operation; but, nonethe-
less, throughout the course of the operation Jake was
charged with maintaining close liaison with Pawley.
JMATE records indicate not only the numerous. face-to-
face meetings between Pawley and Esterline during the
course of the operation, but also reflect an amazing
number of telephone conversations between the two
during the life of the operation. In terms of the
operatiorial plan per se, Esterline appeared to be
most cagy in handling this subject during the dis-
cussions with Pawley. The recorded conversations
focus on the potential leadership for the FRD -~ with
Pawley's "best" leadership choices usually being far
to the right.

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Solicited the Group's assistance in -
arriving. at a concensus [{ste] of views
_as..to what exactly had been decided as a
result of the. high level meeting [the
meeting with the President] of the day

before. 4/ a

According to the memorandum on the meeting,
there was agreement that the US would deny its partic-

ipation in any training activities in Guatemala, that

. there would:continue to be a prohibition on the train-
ing of Cubans in the United States, and that evacua-

tion plans. should be kept in readiness in case the

Cubans in training in Guatemala had to be evacuated
-- the plan to evacuate was not clear as to whether
the Cubans would be taken into Florida as ordinary

refugees or whether ‘the evacuation would call for

‘transporting the troops to our Saipan training base.

“The problem that apparently created the greatest
difficulty at this Special Group meeting was the Presi-

dent's suggestion that a single individual should be

placed in charge of. the: anti-Castro program. The

Special Group decided that there should be two indi-.

viduals with principal responsibilities -- one to

handle the overt and the other to handle the covert
activities. After reviewing a list of potential

candidates: |

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It was finally decided that, taking all
things into consideration, including the
aspect of quick availability, Ambassador |
Willauer would probably be the best choice.
On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr.
Barnes. It was recognized that these
nominees would have to be checked’ with
Mr. Gray's associates. 5/
When Mr. Mann suggested that Ambassador Willauer
‘might also assume responsibility for contacts with the
FRD, Mr. Dulles rejected this out of hand, emphasizing
that this liaison must be done covertly, and that it
- must be done by. the Agency. There apparently was
unanimous agreement that Mr. Pawley not be given any
official status with the US Government, but no one
objected to Pawley's plans to visit Argentine Presi-
dent Frondizi in his capacity as a private US citizen. 33/
Following the President's suggestion of 29 Novem-
ber, Acting Secretary of State Douglas Dillon forwarded
a memorandum for President Eisenhower on 2 December
1960 recommending that, because of the differences
.
in responsibilities, two senior officials, rather
than one, be charged with managing the anti-Castro
‘program. Dillon suggested that Ambassador Whiting
Willauer be named as a Special Deputy to Assistant

Secretary for American Republic Affairs, Thomas Mann,

to.act as the officer responsible for the US Government's

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overt position vis-a-vis Cuba, and with the responsi-.
bility of coordinating the covert activities of the
Agency into that US position. On the covert side
Dillon followed the DCL's suggestion that, C. Tracy

Barnes should be appointed "to devote full time to

the direction of the Agency's program with: respect

to Cuba, and to concert! with Amb. Willauer." 6/
Dillon's memorandum then went on to recommend
that the members of the Special Group -- Dulles,
Gray, Douglas, and Merchant -- should continue to
exercise general supervision over the covert opera-

tion and to provide the Agency with general guidance

in the operation, and -- now at the tag end of the
Eisenhower administration -~ went on to say that the

Group

should continue and intensify its general
supervision of the covert-operation ...
{and] maintain close and regular liaison
with Secretary Anderson of Treasury or
‘his designated representative ... [and]
should meet, together with the member's
individual principals, with you from

time to time as it deemed necessary or as
you desire. 7/

In response to this recommendation, the Presi-
dent wrote:
I approve of the suggestions regarding
the reorganization of the government's

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program with respect to that country
{(Cuba], except that I think Mr. Willauer
should have a position directly subordi-
nate to the Secretary of State for so
long as Cuba remains a critical problem
in our foreign relations. There should
be no doubt as to the authority of the
Special Assistant to the State Department
(Mr. Willauer) to. subordinate covert and
overt activities, nor as to his responsi-
bility for conveying policy guidance to
the operating agencies. In their broad
outline, these policies will, of course,
be subject to the approval of higher
authority. 8/

An interesting aspect of the Eisenhower memoran-

dum is that he elevated the position to be assigned

to Mr. Willauer from that of being a Special Deputy

to Assistant Secretary Mann, the Assistant Secretary

for American Republic Affairs, to that of being direct-

ly subordinate to the Secretary of State. When Thomas

A. Parrott who acted as secretary for the Special

Group meeting. transmitted a copy ‘of the draft of puiies' popes
Aes ve rk © eg gelato :

menorati it to racy Barnes, Parrott had been made

aware of the possibility that Eisenhower was in favor

of raising the position of Willaver. In an aside

to Barnes in his transmittal note, Parrott indicated

that even if Eisenhower did want Willauer made

directly responsible to the Secretary of State, in

fact: “He (Willauer] will be instructed that he

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darn well works for Mann anyway, regardless of the
title."* 9/

Even as the negotiations just mentioned were

“underway, by early. December 1960 the Agency's posi-

tion on the nature of the PM action decidedly hardened.
On 8 December at a meeting of the Special Group,
Colonels Hawkins and Egan proposed a military program |

which combined the use of infiltrated small paramili-

tary teams as a test to see if. the dissident elements

would rally round and, also recommend a training

program for a force of 600- -750 men possessing extremely
heavy fire power for amphibious assault. Prior to

an amphibious invasion, however, it was agreed that
there would be sorties into Cuban air space but the
precise nature and number of these was disputable,
ranging from possibly 100 a month for a three month
period beginning on 15 January 1961 -- and including
some B-26 sorties to bomb and strafe military targets

-- to an undefined minimum of sorties for a three

week period to’ soften up the opposition. |

* The Agency apparently thought that it had a pretty
good handle on Willauer because of his long. term associ-

ation as Executive Vice- President, President, and Vice-
Chairman of the Board of Civil Air Transport (CAT).

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in the course of these discussions of grouna
and air operations there were some interesting contra-
dications among Agency spokesmen aS to what was needed
or what was wanted. Tracy Barnes seemed to have a
great deal more to say than was warranted by his
knowledge and apparent understanding of the planned
action. In one discussion with Secretary Douglas,
when Barnes was pushing for the use of an increased
number of troops, he stated that the number of anti-
Castro dissidents who might rally round the invaders
would be no different if the size of the invading force
were 600 men or 3,000 men. A rationale such as that
and Barnes's comment to Gen. Lansdale when he for-
warded one proposal --
Please recognize that this proposal is
a draft and is off the top of the head.
without any detailed knowledge of possible
applicable regs and procedures -~
help make understandable the consternation within the
ranks of the Department of Defense concerning the
Agency's understanding of which end was up.* 10/
+ There was also an ongoing discussion during this time
_ period regarding the assignment of US Army Special Force
trainers to the Guatemala bases. This is discussed in

detail in Volume II.of this history, Participation in
the Conduct of Foretgn Poltey.

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In one of the longer and more detailed papers
being prepared toward the close of the Eisenhower
_ administration, the State Department drafted the polit-
ical action recommendations and suggested collective
action through the Organization of American States
to effect the ouster of Castro. Failing in that,
State then outlined a unilateral political action
program for the United States. The paramilitary and
covert action segments of this paper were prepared
by the CIA. Neither the State nor the CIA paper
introduced ideas that had not been thoroughly dis-_
cussed. These recommendations were made just as if
the Secretary of State, the Special Group, and the
President had approved, or would approve, the courses
of action that were being outlined. This. being the
case, it was: suggested that the concurrence of the
president-elect should be sought for the proposed
program. In the best of all possible worlds one
could hardly find fault with this optimistic approach
-~- in the pragmatic world it is difficult to under~-
stand that anyone would go on record with the expec-

tation that such recommendations might be followed

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across changing political and administrative lines.* 11/
With WH/4 in the throes of revising the anti-

Castro program on the basis of the increased efficiency

‘of the Castro military forces, an SNIE, Prospects for

the Castro Regime, was issued, belaboring the obvious
-~- that Castro was firmly in control of Cuba. The
SNIE also proceeded to make the following observation
about Castro's military forces:

The militia's overall combat efficiency

is low; many units are still on a part |
-time training basis.. However, there appears
to be emerging a nucleus of well organized,
well equipped, and well ‘trained units loyal
to Castro and strongly Communist~influenced;
we believe that within the next 12. months
or so, these units will develop into a
reasonably effective security force. 13/

The estimate continued, noting that the Cuban Army
was still disrupted and “combat effectiveness of the
Air Force is virtually:nil." 9/ . The concept for
Project IMATE, however, had shifted from small unit

uN

guerrilla warfare to invasion because of evidence of

* President Eisenhower wrote that on 6 December 1960,

“Senator Kennedy“ came to the White House for a brief-
ing and that among the subjects. discussed was Cuba,

this being one of-the first three items that Kennedy
wished to talk about and that: "He [JFK] had previous-.
ly been briefed by Allen Dulles a number of times and

had some familiarity with the details." 12/

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increased: efficiency of Castro's forces and it would
appear that the operators and the estimators were
not making evaluations from the same intelligence
information.

Despite his promotion early in the month, it
was not until 23 December 1960 that Ambassador Willauer
called a meeting with the Agency's principals to ex-
plain both his role and some of the problems that he
anticipated the President wanted him to handle. Ap-
parently it was an inauspicious beginning, for accord-
ing to a memorandum of the meeting: .

Mr. Willauer stated that his role, as

explained to him by Secretary Herter, was

to be that of the chairman and major

shareholder of a corporate board with Mr.

Tracy Barnes, the executive director for

operations and minority shareholder. Col.

King asked for clarification on this point,

noting that Mr. Esterline is the director

for operations for CIA with the chain of

command going from the Director to Bissell

to Col. King to Mr. Esterline. Mr. Barnes

is a coordinator with, the other interested

agencies. Mr. Willauer agreed that this

was the case, noting that he had used the

term operations in the looser sense of

overall coordination. 14/

Once having had the pecking order set straight, |
Ambassador Willauer then proceeded to a discussion

of various problem areas, indicating his very strong

bias in favor of Agency ‘positions as opposed to

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positions being taken by the Department of State.

For example, Willauer noted that there was a. strong
aversion to attempts to set a firm date for D-Day,

with the opponents basing their arguments on the

fact that the oas would be sure to get in on the act
and, moreover, that military planning should be deferred

until it could be determined if the economic sanctions

would work to Castro's disadvantage. On the question

of economic ‘sanctions Willauer pointed out: to the

people in State that since the Soviet Union was so

- strongly committed to support the Castro government,

economic sanctions would have little or no impact on
Castro's position. Willauer also argued that there
was going to be revolutionary activity in Cuba,
whether the US had a hand in it or not; and he empha-

sized that, in any event, the US would be blamed for

it.

Both Jake Esterline and Col. Jack Hawkins pointed
out that another reason for firming up the D-Day date
concerned the logistics of the troop movement ; and .
both urged as early a date as possible because of

the already mentioned improvement in the military

capability, equipment, and training of Castro's

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forces. Esterline also emphasized that most of the
arguments urging delay: of PM planning, particularly
concexn re the OAS, had been debated with State for
months, and the time had come for direct action.
The WH/4 representatives also stressed that the
period of training for many of the Cubans had been
extended and re~extended, and that to hold them be-
yond 1 March 1961 increased the problem of maintain-
ing high morale among the troops. Esterline took
the position that the Cubans the Agency was training
knew that the US had the force to throw Castro out
any time that it ‘so desired, but the months and months
of.training was indicative, to them at least, that
the US was not really interested in the welfare of
the anti-Castro Cubans. |
During the 23 December 1960 meeting, Willauer's
expertise and familiarity with air operations led
-him to ask almost immediately “why the project is

‘so thin in the air'." Willauer was told that the
rules of the game were that only Cuban air crews

could be used, and this was the reason for the Agency's

efforts to obtain permission to use contract American

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crews for both:

tions were the
Concerning the

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resupply. and combat.* The air opera-
subject of considerable discussion.
possibility of launching air strikes

before the invading force landed,

Willauer objected, pointing out that this would give

the OAS ample time to get involved in the act. Wil-

lauer then raised the question of whether all of the

tactical bombing could be done on D-Day. The answer

to that from Col. Hawkins was

no," but Hawkins said

that it could be done on D-2, if permission were given

for dawn airstrikes to take out Castro's air force

and military targets, with additional sorties during

the course of D-1 and follow-up raids on D-Day prior

to the landings. Moreover, Hawkins pointed out that

. if an attempt were made to withhold the airstrikes

until D-Day, the Castro. air force would have an op-

portunity to attack the ships which would be. carrying

the invasion troops. «

In a similar manner, a strong case was made for

the use of the

Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua air base to

* Hawkins wanted “pilots who can work over key targets
without tearing up installations we will later need."

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launch strikes against Cuba. Apparently there was

some discussion of limiting use of this base to only

two or three days -- at least some of the State De-
partment people pushed this idea -- but WH/4 pointed
out that it was inconceivable in view of the nature

of the planned air operations, that the air support

‘operation could be in and out of Nicaragua in this

period. It was pointed out to Willauer that efforts
had been made to get permission to use US bases, or
other closer bases to Cuba than Nicaragua, but with-
out success. Willauer, himself was positive that no
US bases would be made available for the strike
against Castro. .

One other interesting aspect of this initial -
meeting with Willauer, concerned the transition be-
tween the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.

Willauer stressed that the ground rule at. the Depart-

‘ment of State was that the Kennedy people could not

be sought out to discuss specific problems unless
they initiated requests for information, and it was
Willauer's opinion:

. That the only practical way to get de-

cisions.on the project before 20 January
would be to have the Director [the DCI],

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whose position re the new administration

is different than Mr. Herter's, to go to

Mr. Kennedy in person and seek to get him

committed. It would be very difficult

for State people to’try to approach Mr.

Kennedy via Mr. Rusk and Mr. Bowles. 15/

During the 21 December 1960 meeting of the
Special Group, Allen Dulles briefed the attendees on
a meeting that he had participated in the previous:
day in New York, with a group of American business-
men. The meeting had been called by Henry Holland,
who was one of the principal fund: raisers for the
FRD, and in attendance at this meeting were the Vice
President for Latin America of Standard Oil of New
Jersey, the Chairman of the Cuban-American Sugar
Company, the President of the American Sugar Domino

Refining Company , the President of the American &

Foreign Power. Company, the Chairman of the Freeport

Sulphur Company, and representatives from Texaco,
International Telephone and. Telegraph, and other
American companies with business interests in Cuba.
The tenor of the conversation was that it was time
for the US to get off of dead center and take some
direct action against Castro.

Suggestions were made. to sabotage the sugar .

crop -- the question being whether to burn the cane

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fields or ruin the refineries; to interrupt the
electric power supply; and to put an embargo on food,.
drugs, and spare parts for machinery. Dulles opposed
the embargo. on food and @rugs, but the feeling of

the business group was that it was time to get tough

and, hopefully, the blame for an embargo would be

laid on Castro. Another interesting suggestion volun-

teered was that the US Navy should blow up a ship in

Levisa Bay in order to force the shutdown of the

nickel plant at Nicaro which formerly had been owned

and operated by the US Government. 16/ In his usual
cautious manner, Gordon Gray suggested that the
Special Group not authorize any action until he had
cleared the matter with his "associate." |

This group of businessmen also indicated that

‘they were going to undertake the publication of

specific papers on issues and programs related to
‘

the post-Castro Cuba, which would be designed to

-help us policy planners. Mr; Dulles, of course,

emphasized that policy. planning was not his respon-

sibility; this was the responsibility of the Depart-

ment of State. He did comment that “what he was

interested in was getting rid of Castro as quickly

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as possible and in this field he had direct responsi-
bility and would welcome any ideas or suggestions on
how this might be achieved." 17/

The high-level business group which Dulles met
with. was also extremely concerned about the possible

orientation of any anti-Castro government in exile,

particularly that it should not be left-oriented.

Michael Haider, Standard of Jersey's Vice President

‘for Latin America, for example, forwarded a.memorandum

to Col. J. Cc. King in early January 1961 identifying
as members of an extreme leftist group which had
formed in Miami to oppose Castro, Manolo Ray, Aureliano
Sanchez Arango, Rufo Lépez Fresquet, and Dr. Raul
Chibas among others. Mr. Haider worried that unless
more positive steps were taken to force ‘the conserva-
tive Cuban exiles into a cohesive organization, that
any post-Castro government would automatically be in
the hands of the leftists. * 18/

In addition to strong positive suggestions from
US businessmen, Brigadier General Lansdale, Office of
* Haider was consistent at any rate -- "leftists"

with Fidel or “Fidelistas sin Fidel" were held to be
equally bad for US business interests.

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Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
also had some suggestions which he made. to Mr. Bissell
about the conduct of the Agency's anti-Castro program.
For whatever reason, in late December 1960 Lansdale

forwarded to Bissell a number of suggestions which

. had been presented to him by an Army reservist who

had put in two weeks of active duty with OSO at Lans-
dale's direction researching Cuban political objectives.
Inasmuch as the Agency had devoted many months to

the study of this subject, ‘and all other aspects of

‘the anti-Castro effort, it appears a rather gratuitous

insult that Lansdale would have forwarded this kind

of paper to Bissell. 19/ What response, if any,

‘Bissell made to this memorandum is not known.

The Special Group held its last meeting of 1960

-on 29 December, and there were, in addition to the

standing problem of the use of US air bases to sup-
port the operation against Cuba, the questions of

the use of a Nicaraguan air base, the political organ-
ization of the Cuban exiles, and considerable discus—
sion about the possibility of initiating action against
Trujillo in the Dominican Republic. “Te was emphasized

that Mr. Pawley was strongly in favor of intervention

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in the Dominican Republic, even suggesting that an
overt operation against Trujillo be mounted concur-
rently. with ‘the Cuban operation. The members (of the
Special Group, however, were unwilling to buy this
particular plan of action; but they did | Support Mr.
Bissell’ s. ‘proposals for some limited covert action
operations aimed at the Trujillo. regime.

James: H. Douglas, Deputy Secretary of Defense

questioned the feasibility of “expanding the initial

beachhead into a full-scale takeover of the Cuban

Government"; but Mr. Bissell. pointed out that such
a project was unrealistic unless "One or all of the
following situations develops: (a) overt support,
(b) a major revolutionary uprising, (c) massive. use
of air support." 20/° The Group was apparently in

agreement that the Agency should make every effort

to insure that no abortive small-scale insurrections

be attempted to overthrow Castro. 21/

In view of the fact that the US would break ©
diplomatic relations with Cuba. on 3 January 1961,
the minutes of the Special Group meeting of 29 Decem-
ber 1960 present an interesting historical problem.

In summarizing Livingston Merchant's report of his

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meeting with President Eisenhower, on 28 December,
the minutes of the Special Group Meeting of 29 De-
‘cember read as follows:

The latter [President Eisenhower] made
two points: (a) it would be desirable to
obtain the cooperation and support of indi-
vidual Latin American Governments, (b) it
would be desirable, if possible, for. US to
break relations with Cuba, in concert with
other countries some time before January
20th. 22/ ;

In contrast to the suggestion that the US break
realtions with Cuba, prior to the inauguration of
Kennedy, General Goodpaster's record of the Merchant-
Eisenhower meeting of 28 December reported that:

He, [President Eisenhower] thought,
however, that [Presidents] Frondizi,
Prado, and others should take diplomatic
initiative to get Latin American countries
to take a position that they would like
to remove Castro from power, but, lacking
the means to do so, would like the US to
take the lead. The President said it was
Clear to him that Latin Americans must be
brought to see the necessity of action.
He was inclined to think that it might
be time to recognize the anti-Castro
front as the Cuban Government. He added
that he would like to see a definite
move taken in this matter before January
20th, and said that the State Department
should be thinking of some definite
action that could be brought about be-
fore that time. 23/

"Thinking of some definite action" differs consider-
‘ably from the suggestion that the President thought
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it would be "desirable" to break relations with Cuba
prior to 20 January of 1961.

At the Special Group meeting of 29 December 1960,
it also was suggested by Mr. Merchant that the Group's
membership for discussions on Cuba be expanded to in-
clude Ambassador Willauer, Assistant Secretary Thomas
Mann, and Cc. Tracy Barnes. 24/ As already has been
noted, in his retrospective view of the Bay of Pigs
operation Jake Esterline was quite forceful in his
opinion that the Agency's representatives at such
high level meetings should have been someone like
either himself or Col. Jack Hawkins who were the most
knowledgeable about the status of the operation and,
indeed, the whole operational plan.*

* It is the considered opinion of the author of this

.  . history that Esterline had a valid criticism. A re-
view of the records of the Bay of Pigs Operation, indi-
cates that one of the most voluminous correspondents
was C. Tracy Barnes, that a great deal of the written N
material is repititious ad nauseam, and that Barnes
belabored issues which were common knowledge to the
principals in WH/4. Illustrative of this, for example,
was a 28 December 1960 memorandum which Barnes wrote |
to Jake Esterline. It began as follows: “It has been
a little while since we have had an internal DDP hoe
down on your project. In the meantime, a number of
important points have been raised." 25/

The memorandum then proceeded to run through all

of the issues which, by this time, were common knowledge
(footnote continued on following. page)

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On 2 January 1961 Fidel Castro notified the

United States Government that it would. have to cut

its Embassy staff in Havana to eleven persons. On

3 January 1961, President Eisenhower held a meeting

at the White House to discuss the Cuban situation.

In addition to the President, and the Secretaries .

of State, Defense, and Treasury, the participants
“included the members of the Special Group, plus
General Goodpaster, Mr. Bissell, Thomas Mann, and
Tracy Barnes. “Among principal questions, of course,
were if and when the United States should break off
a@iplomatic relations with Cuba; and after some initial
hesitation, before the day was over the United States
did break relations officially with the Cuban Govern-
ment. *¥ |

to those who were even marginally involved in planning

the anti-Castro operation and contributed nothing in
‘particular to understanding of any of them.

- Similarly, Barnes' memorandum for the DCL in prep-
aration for a 3 January policy meeting, rehashed the
same information that Barnes had presented to Chief,
WH/4, just a few days before. 26/ Barnes appears to
have suffered a severe case of verbal diarrhea.

* Before the firm decision was made to break diplomatic
relations, there was great concern within the Agency
that the COS, a communicator, and a PM officer, and
‘possibly a fourth individual be retained as members of
the Staff. 21/

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The other subject of conversation was whether

there now was cause or reason for direct US inter-

vention in Cuba, and the decision was that no such

action should be taken unless the Cuban Government
took aggressive action against US citizens in Cuba
or damaged official US property (e.g., Guantanamo) .

In the course of the discussion about the status of

Agency planning for anti~-Castro activities, the

question was raised about increasing the number of

trainees. This was ruled out pending the suitability
of training sites to handle additional numbers.
Training sites in the US still were denied, in part,
again, because of the fear of compromising the US
position in the Organization of American States or
in the United. Nations. |

The high level White. House meeting also agreed
that it would be useful to brief members of the new

administration, particularly the Secretary of State,

“but “no definite schedule was agreed upon but the

concensus {sic} of the meeting was that appropriate
briefings should be considered for the near future." 28/
In the few days following the 3 January decision |

to break relations with the Castro Government, the

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Agency retained control of US communications out of

‘Havana -- the Ambassador deciding that he preferred

to relieve the female Department of State communica-
tions officer and retain the services of her male
counterpart from the Agency. During this hectic
period, the communications officer was instructed
to pack up as much gear as possible and destroy that
which remained. Even if all the gear were not destroyed,
CIA's Director of Communications indicated "there
would not be any extreme compromise." In any event,
however, the last message from Havana Station -- on
7 January 1961 at 16382 -- stated
This last msg from HAVA Station. All
files and crypto material destroyed ...
on evening 6 Jan [1961] Swiss amb placed
"Carta de Proteccion" notices on emb doors
minimizing possibility takeover of bldg
by GOC.* 29/
' Even as the ‘debate over the breaking of diplomatic
relations was taking place within the Eisenhower ad-
ministration, Col. Jack Hawkins addressed a memorandum

to Jake Esterline, Chief, WH/4 which provided an ex-

cellent summary of the policy decisions which needed

* Authorization for complete shutdown. had been set
for 03002 on'7 January 1961. 30/

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to be made if strike operations were to be conducted
against the Castro government. In the course of his
eight page memorandum, Hawkins reiterated the need

for resolution of the problem that had particularly

‘bothered the Special Group -- that.was whether the

Kennedy administration was interested in following
through on the plans that had been made. Assuming
that the Kennedy administration did intend to follow
through on the program which had been initiated,
Hawkins suggested that considering the rapid build

up-of Castro's military forces the strike operations

be conducted not later than 1 March 1961. The ques-

tion of air strikes was basic to Hawkins's planning
-- on this he was quite firm. In discussing the
general question of air operations Hawkins said:

It is axiomatic in amphibious operations
that control of air and sea in ‘the objec-—:
tive area is absolutely required. The
Cuban Air Force and naval vessels capable
of opposing our landing must be knocked
out or neutralized before our amphibious
shipping makes its final run in to the
beach. If this is not done, we will be
courting disaster.

Then, by specific recommendations, Hawkins urged
the following:
1. That the air preparation commence
not later than dawn on D minus 1 Day.

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2. That any move, to curtail the number
_ of aircraft to be employed from those
available be firmly resisted.

3. That the operation be abandoned if
policy does not. provide for use of adequate
‘tactical air support.

In order to insure the success of both the air

strike and the air drop operations which would pro-

' vide the logistical support for. the troops holding

the lodgment on Cuban soil, Hawkins urged, as he had
in the past, authorization for the use of contract
American pilots, the use of the airfield at Puerto
Cabezas as an advance strike base, and the use of air
bases in. the United states for the launching of
logistical flight operations .* 3l1/

'. Much the same ground indicated in Hawkins memo-
randum was rehashed in preparing Mr. Barnes and the

DCI for a Special Group meeting of 5 January 1961.

* .There'is no indication that Hawkins ever changed
his, attitude about the need for the. introduction of

some ‘us pilots into both the-strike and logstics

air operations, even though his much quoted cable of
13 April 1961 from Puerto Cabezas repeated the high

_ praise. for the B-26 pilots. who were about to under-

take the D-2 air strike. See Volume I of the Official
History of the. Bay of Pigs Operation, Air Operations,
Part III, A for discussion of the Hawkins cable in
the context of the air operations.

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Somewhat more. emphasis than Hawkins had given to it.
was placed: on the political organization and the
needs for structuring the exile political group to
conform accurately to the sentiments of those Cubans
who did oppose Castro. Otherwise, much of the same
focus was to be given to the questions regarding air
bases, the -size of the invasion force, and the number
of trainees who could be accommodated in the’ camps,
and other of the problems that had already been dis-

cussed time and time again. 32/ Similarly, in dis-

cussions prior to the 12 January 1961 meeting of

the Special Group, much of this same ground continued
to be replowed without any positive resolution by
the Special Group members. 33/ . |

During the course of the frequent sessions of
the Special Group in the final weeks of the Eisenhower
administration, the Director of Central Intelligence

also was required to make a presentation before the

CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee

on 6 January of 1961. Among other things, the record
of this meeting stated as follows: .
Mr. Dulles then gave a fairly detailed

picture of CIA action with respect to Cuba,
mentioning the two-pronged program of

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propaganda including radio and publica-
tions and the paramilitary effort. Again
he pointed out that this is an expensive
program running to approximately $28
million. Mr. Dulles discussed the radio
effort and paramilitary effort in some
detail, indicating the numbers of Cubans
being trained and the supply efforts and
the bases. 34/

Because of the subsequent charges which would
be made by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and
others writing on the Bay of Pigs, it is important
to emphasize that among other CIA personnel attend-
ing this briefing was Robert Amory, Jr., the Deputy
Director for Intelligence, who, according to Schlesinger
and some of the later “experts, " was supposed to be
in almost total ignorance of any planning for an

operation such as took place at the Bay of Pigs.*

* Other Agency personnel in attendance at this brief-
ing were General Cabell, DDCI; Colonel L. K. White,
Deputy Director for Support; Richard Helms, Chief of
Operations for DDP; Emmett Echols, Director of Personnel,
and John Warner, Legislative Counsel. It also should

be noted that Mr. William A. Tidwell, Jr. of Amory's
office was appointed in January 1961 to be Chief of

the Office of Operations in Miami. 35/ Organizationally
at this time, the Office of Operations was under the
Deputy Director for Intelligence. In view of -the
efforts being made in the Miami area to recruit Cubans
for training in the exile Brigade, it is inconceivable
that Tidwell and the Deputy Director for Intelligence |
were not fully aware of the plans that were being made
to unseat Castro until after the invasion had collapsed
at Playa Giron..

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On 10 January 1961, President Eisenhower got
involved in a meeting concerning the planned opera-
tions against Castro. On that day the New York Times
broke a story about the training of the Cuban troops .
in Guatemala. As the ex-President himself wrote:

On the morning of January 10 [1961],

the New York Times carried an article,

with a map, describing . the training of

anti-Castro- forces in Guatemala ... It

told most of the story. I decided that

we should say nothing at all about this>

article... Believing that my. successor

‘might want’ some day:to assist the refugee

‘forces to move into*Cuba, I considered

that we were limited in what we could

say about them. 36/ ,

Whether a meeting had been planned prior to the
appearance of the New York Times article is not known,
but the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did call

on the administration to send a representative up to
the Hill on 12 January 1961, in order to provide fur-
ther explanation of the Times article. Of the two
‘candidates being considered to appear before the Senate,
' Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for American
Republic Affairs, or DCI Dulles, it was decided to
send Mr. Dulles to appear before the Senate Committee.
However, President. Eisenhower
raised certain questions as to the right
of a Committee to ask questions on foreign

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policy affecting the security of the
United States. He [Eisenhower] commented
that when this is demanded as a right you
.are “sunk," and wondered how much right

'. have they got, inasmuch as the Constitu-
tion says that it is the responsibility
of the Chief Executive. 37/ _

The culmination of the Special Group discussions,

which had taken place with increasing frequency between

‘ mid-November 1960 and mid- ~January 1961, was the report

of the Joint Planning Committee issued by Willauer on

18 January 1961. The conclusions were predictable --

there were decisions that needed to be made, but these

could not be made until the new administration became
fully aware of the extent of the anti-Castro programs
that had been evolving. As Willauer himself said in
his final memo: .

In the absence of these decisions, or
at least most of them, there is a grave .
danger that the December 6 plan (updated)
may have to be abandoned, -as an effective
means of overthrowing Castro without more
overt support, and that the only practical
course of action for the physical overthrow
of Castro, will be either: (1) open U.S.
war with Cuba, or (2) a.seven-month overt
training by the.U.S. on United States soil
of a Cuban-Latin American invasion force,
which will be planned to strike with at
least overt U.S. logistical support.* 38/

* Willauer probably meant to refer to the 8 December

1960 plan. See pp. 173 ff.

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Perhaps best illustrative of the merry-go-round
which the Special Group had been riding for at least
two months was Willauer's closing statement:

In our discussions we weighed without
coming to a conclusion the advantages of
a rapid, effective action by direct war
in terms of getting matters over with
without a long buildup of world opinion
vs. the inevitability of such a build up
under any seven month program. 38/

Having reviewed the meetings during the last
few weeks of the Eisenhower administration, it is
interesting to review the comments of some of those

- who were principally involved, as they looked back
on that period. One of the most. immediate responses
was found in Fidel Castro's virtuoso performance for
the Cuban television audience on 23 April 1961 when

‘he explained the invasion to them. Among other things,
Castro claimed: an

-That on certain occasions, we have also
been in. danger of direct aggression. This
danger always has been lurking about us
and.at certain times has gathered consider-
able support in the minds of ‘leading circles
of the United States. One of those moments
when this type of direct aggression was
very near was at the end of December [1960]
and the beginning of [January 1961], and
that is to say, during the last days of the
Eisenhower administration. 40/.

}

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So concerned was Castro at this time that he put his

armed forces in. a state of alert for a two week period,
_ covering the transitfon from the Eisenhower to the
Kennedy administration. 41/

The other. principal protagonist at this time,.
remembered it ina somewhat different manner. The
former us President wrote of this period in the fol-
lowing manner :

. . Covert training of exiles for any pos-
j sible future operations against Castro
: - was going forward. Units were growing
L, steadily in strength and efficiency
' against the time when actual tactical
} planning could. be undertaken. In Decem-
ber [1960], I suggested to the State
Department that the time might be pro-
pitious for organizing a "front" against
Castro among the refugees, with ‘the.
United States recognizing the leader
and his associates as the legal govern-
ment of Cuba, with the priviso, however,
‘that the exiles themselves would volun-
tarily select from their own number an
acceptable “head of government." I
added that if they could do so at once,
I'd like to see recognition accorded
i promptly -- if possible, before January

So, to the incoming administration,
we left units of Cuban refugees busily
training and preparing hopefully for a
{ ; return to their native land. Because
: they had as yet been unable to find the
leader they wanted -- a national leader
to be both anti-Castro and ‘anti-Batista
~- it was impossible to make specific

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plans for a military invasion, However,

their hatred of Castro, their patriotism,
and their readiness to sacrifice for the

restoration and freedom in Cuba could not
be doubted. 42/

In the statement just quoted, Eisenhower's empha-

sis was on the fact. that during his administration

all that took place was a training program -- that
there was no specific plan for the invasion of Cuba.
This was re-emphasized in an interview that he held
on 10 September 1965 when he said: “There was no

tactical or operational plan even discussed" when he

turned the presidency over to John F.. Kennedy. 43/

According to this same interview:

_ The retiring President stressed that
there, had been no decision as to how the
' Cuban forces would be used, if-at all.
Eisenhower had made no commitments that
might bind the new President in dealing
with the Castro problem. In fact, the
armed. refugee group was still so small
and relatively unprepared that. it could ©
easily have been disbanded if the incom-
ing administration considered its exis-
tence unnecessary. |

And, more specifically,

- Eisenhower felt that Kennedy shared his
judgment that the new administration need
not rush a decision regarding the Cubans.
“At no time did I put béfore anybody any-:
thing: that could be called a plan (to invade
Cuba)," declares the former President. He
emphasizes that there was “no mandate, no

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commitment by me, or by anyone in my admin-

istration,” and he doubts that Kennedy felt

“he was frozen to any position by me." 44/

Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National
Security Adviser, also supported his former boss when
queried about the Eisenhower role in the Bay of Pigs
activity, stressing that the emphasis during Eisen-—
hower's administration was on training the Cuban ex-
iles and providing then with equipment. Like the
former President, Gray, too, said that there was "no
military plan". 7

The definition of a military plan, however,

seems to have focused on an actual site for the land-

ing; and in this sense, Gray certainly was telling

' the truth because no such choice had been made at the

time that’ Eisenhower left office. In his own words,
Gray stated:

There wasn't any military plan formu-
* lated by the time the Eisenhower admini-
- stration went out. Of course, the Presi-
dent was fully aware of and conversant
with the decision to train and arm indi-
viduals. And the concept was one that
was sort of changing in the Eisenhower
Administration. First we were thinking
in terms of the old infiltration of small
groups. Then they were thinking of the
possibility of landing of people, unit
sized groups. And no decisions had been
' reached at that time. It was only that

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there was’training. That was clearly

authorized, and it was clearly contemplated

that there would be or could be a military

action. But it simply was not true that

Kennedy inherited a plan that he couldn't

change. As a matter of fact, the planning

that was done in his administration was

changed. The Bay of Pigs was not the first

landing point. That was changed. But none

of that, no planning process in the Eisen-

hower administration had got to the point

of discussing what would be the landing

point. 45/ : mo

What both Gray and Eisenhower conveniently. ig-
nored, as has been pointed out in the preceding dis-
cussion, was the major change that was made in the
concept in November of 1960. What was to have been
an infiltration of numerous small teams of communi-
cators and PM trainers became an amphibious invasion
plan calling for a major enlargement of the exile
Brigade and an air operations plan which would be
critical to both the Brigade's landing and its ability
to be sustained once ashore in. Cuba. What was yet

. ‘
undecided as Eisenhower was succeeded by Kennedy were
the issues which. the Special Group had argued through-
out the weeks from mid-November into January -- the
number of troops that should be. or could be trained,
)

the facilities that would be available for training

sites (possibly in third countries or in the United

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States), the possible commitment of the United States
personnel (as "volunteers" or contracts), and possible

overt US intervention to remove Fidel Castro.* 46/

~
‘

* Despite the availability of documentary records
and autobiographical information about President
Eisenhower's role in the anti-Castro program, it is
interesting to the historian that the subject of the
Bay of Pigs apparently was banned as a topic in oral
history interviews conducted with Eisenhower and.
various of his senior subordinates who were close to
the operation. Included among this group, in addition
to. Eisenhower himself, were James H. Douglas, Jr.
(DOD), Thomas Mann (State), Gen. David Shoup (USMC),
Thomas S. Gates, Jr. (DOD), and Livingston Merchant
(State) . . .

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CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by

CIA Htstory Staff

— -TS#795052 .
Copy l of 2

OFFICIAL HISTORY
OF THE
BAY OF PIGS OPERATION

‘VOLUME ITI
Evotutton oF CIA's
Aur1-CastRo POLICIES; |

1951-January 1961
(pages 204-388)

TOP. SECRET.
TS#795052
DCI-8
“December 1979
Copy 1 of 2°

PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUMENT
DO NOT DESTROY

13-00000 ; -

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Volume Tit
Contents

(pp. 204-388)

Page
Part V——- Direct Action Programs ...... . 204
A. Propaganda eZ

B. Sabotage and other Exercises . + 233
Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role. ......... 242
Part VII The Question of Assassinations . . . 277

Part VIII Conclusions .........4.4.4.. 290

Appendixes

A. Memorandum for the Director of Central
Intelligence from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59 . 296.

B. A Program of Covert Action Against
the Castro Regime, 16 Mar 60 ....-. . . 300

_C. CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC: ;

1) Letter for Allen Dulles from
-Arleigh Burke, 17 Mar 60

TS (DD/P 0-1436) ...... +... #311
2) Letter for Gordon Gray from. ;
Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60... .. - 313

3) Memorandum for the Special
Assistant to the President:
for National Security Affairs
from Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60, |
sub: US Policy toward Cuba ... . 318

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Page

D. Memorandum for Assistant Deputy Director
(Plans) - Action from J. D. Esterline,
2 May .60, sub: Liaision with US
Agencies on JMARC Activities ...... . 332

E. Attack on Petroleum Refinery at
Santiago de Cuba, 13-14 March 1961 . . . . 335

F. Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum on Meeting
with Fidel Castro, 19 April 1959...... 337

 G. Memorandum for DCI [for Briefing Vice

President Nixon], 29 Feb 60, sub:
_ What We Are Doing in Cuba ......'. . 344

*

Source References
Part I Background... - - +--+ +--+ ++ + 347
Part II Castro.Must Go .......... . 352

Part III . Changing Concepts .... Le - « 366.

Part IV Presidential Resurgence Dee ee 369
Part V Direct Action Programs eee ee ee) 6374
Part VI Mr. Nixon's Role . Loe we .o - 382
Part VII Assassination .......... + 386

Part VIII Conclusions ............. 388

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t
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Part V

Direct Action Programs

A. Propaganda

The desire of WH Division to undertake the propa-
-ganda operation against the government of Fidel Castro,
antedated the formation of Branch 4 in the Division by
more than two months; for on 27 October 1959 in a Memo~
‘yandum to the Director of Central Intelligence, J. C.
King proposed:

That CIA undertake clandestine propa-

ganda. operations targeted at Cuba. These

operations would employ primarily: radio

broadcasts and other means of propaganda,

and at informing the Cuban masses of the

truth. 1/

Col. King's memorandum pointed out that repre-
sentatives of various of the Cuban opposition gxoups
organized in the United States had requested Agency

_ assistance to. set up propaganda operations directed
against the. Cuban mainland, and, in addition, he also
indicated that he and the Director of Communications,

Gen. McClelland, had his people studying the best,

methods for carrying out such propaganda broadcasts.

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King's initial memorandum. contained no information
about potential locations of transmitters, personnel
security, inter-agency coordination or costs.

Almost ‘immediately following the ‘memorandum from

col. King to the Director, the > subject of propaganda

directed against the Castro government | was introduced

to discussions in the Special Group. Following the
first such meeting at which the subject came up seri-
ously, the DCI requested that WH Division provide

“

more specifics on such matters as requirements for

real estate, recommendations for someone to be in

charge of the propaganda operations, the equipment

that would be required, and how the broadcasting might

be controlled. By mid-November, following additional
discussions both within the Agency and by the Special
Group, WH Division proposed that the broadcasts origi-
nate from the Yucatan Peninsula under the guidance

of Manuel Benitez, and “from Costa Rica under the Monte
Cristi Group, headed by Col. Ramon Barquin. ‘The pre-
sumption was that the Yucatan operation would be self-
sufficient, but that the Costa Rican operation. would
be CIA funded, supported, and directly under Agency

control. ' The estimated costs that were mentioned in

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mid-November 1959 were roughly $80,000 each for the
operations in Costa Rica and Yucatan, plus an addi-
tional $12,000 for intrusion broadcasts which would
originate within Cuba. 2/

Before the end of November, the plans to utilize
the Yucatan peninsula had been abandoned because it
was feared that the President of Mexico would not.
give his approval for such an activity; and by the
early part of December, President Figueres of Costa
Rica had made it clear that he: dia not want the propa-
ganda operation to be set up in Costa Rica. Conse="
quently, there was considerable discussion about the
‘possibility of getting permission from President
Betancourt of Venezuela to agree to permit. the broad-
casts from his country. Some members of the Special
Group also suggested the possibility that the anti-
Castro broadcasts might be originated from other of
the Latin American countries, a project which Mr.
Dulles discouraged because of the lack of suitable
‘broadcast facilities that would be available in coun-.
tries outside of the immediate Caribbean area. Some-
where along the line C. Tracy Barnes, the ADDP/A and

Mr. Bissell's right hand man, came up with the

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suggestion that broadcasts against Castro could be
originated from continental United States. How Barnes
came by this proposal is not known, for no such
activity was ever given the slightest sanction. 3/

By early February of 1960, however, an equivo-
cal agreement apparently had been reached with Presi-
dent Betancourt, for a memorandum from WH Division
indicated that:

One pilot [anti-Castro] tape has been

made and has been played, for the benefit

of President Betancourt Of Venezuela. He

has agreed not to interfere if we initiate

broadcasts from available transmitters in

‘Venezuela. 4/7.

Even though thought had been given to the establish-
ment of a special transmitting facility for the Frente
Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), or whoever would

run the ° ahti-Castro ‘broadcasts, Betancourt had made

it clear that he would not permit the establishment

(of special new. transmitting facilities in. his country.

On or: “about 17 March 1960, the same date that

President Eisenhower approved the formal anti-Castro

program for the US Government, JMATE had prepared its

propaganda program which, after outlining: various

‘phases of the activity, stated:

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It is planned to concentrate all capa-
bilities available to the U.S. Government
on the [Cuban] target. In addition, it
will be necessary for CIA to create such
unilateral, FRD, and third country opera-
tions as may be feasible and useful. All
‘facets of psychological operations will
be exploited through mass media means,
including: radio, television, motion
pictures, press.and publications, books,
leaflets, posters, handbills, and rumors.
The major emphasis will be placed on gray
materials. Liaison will be conducted as
necessary with other U.S. Government
agencies. Black operations will be care-
fully coordinated within CIA prior to im-
plementation. All direct dealings with
members of the FRD willbe under unofficial
cover. 5/ ‘

The outline of the propaganda program made it
clear that funding of the propaganda operation was
going to be a major problem, and it was also clear
that CIA was going to be responsible for a consider-
able portion of this. But even as the propaganda
program was being formulated, Col. J. C. King was in
New York working with Henry Holland to approach a
number of American businessmen whose companies had
interests in Cuba . Their objective was to raise funds
to support the FRD propaganda operations which might
be operated through Station WRUL in New York, a sta-:
tion that was directed by Mr. Walter Lemon who worked

closely, with the CIA. Lemon, in fact, was ready to

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mount radio program operations almost immediately
pending receipt of material and guidance from the
Agency.* 6/ _

With reference to King's approach to Mr. John
Loeb, of Loeb, Rhodes & Company, the businessman
stated that he would contribute his personal funds
to the anti-Castro propaganda effort; and. in addition, |
he would approach the directors or heads of other

companies that were also involved in Cuba -- individ-
we

‘uals whom he thought were well enough off to make
‘personal’ contributions. With reference to contribu-

tions of this nature:

It was decided that personal contri-
butions were most advisable because they
. would ‘not require action and approval by
' Boards of Directors, and therefore could
be most easily concealed. . The sum dis-
' cussed was $50,000. 7/

The plan for private funding of WRUL was in

trouble from the start. As early as April 1960, Chief

# Among those that Col. King met with on 15 March

. 1960, were Mr. John Loeb of Loeb, Rhodes & Company,

Mr. Lapham of Banker's Trust Company,. and the president

of the Freeport Sulphur Company, Mr. Wright.

** Other companies, including American and Foreign
Power Co. and: the Freeport Sulphur Co., made donations

in the company names and the Agency notified the Com-

missioner of Internal Revenue about the donations so
that they could be treated as corporate tax deductions.

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WH/4 had requested Chief, .WHD's permission to obligate
JMATE funds for support of the station; but Chief,

WHD refused, indicating that private money would be
available. In October 1960 a similar proposal. was
made and rejected for the same reasons. By: December
1960, however, payment from JMATE funds was authorized
because private funds were unavailable. 7b/

In terms of the broadcast facilities that were

to be established under the propaganda program, CIA

was to create and control both short and medium wave

shipborne radio broadcasting operations, and to investi-
gate the feasibility of an airborne radio transmitter
capable of black broadcasts into Cuba:* Aside from

the broadcast operations, there were a number of ad-
ditional programs calling for printing facilities for

the production of propaganda materials and secure .

‘* Whe airborne medium wave transmitter apparently

was ruled out early in the planning stages because

it was “a terribly expensive operation." Based on
DPD's. estimates, Phillips figured that three flights
per week to six selected Cuban cities -- among others,
Havana, Santiago and Cienfuegos -- over a two month

. period would show operating costs in excess of $83,000,

plus an additional $0,000 for transmitting equipment
on a C-54, and a cost of ($250, 000 if the C-54 were
lost. 7c/

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editorial offices so. that..the propaganda materials
could be prepared. 8/

It was shortly after the formulation of the
propaganda program that David A. Phillips became
Chief of the WH/4 Propaganda Activity. Phillips
had done propaganda work for the Agency at the time
of the Guatemalan activity, but subsequently retired |
and had been in private business in Havana. Accord-
ing to his own: story, he had intended to stay in
private business; but in the course of Castro's rise
to power, he was. recontacted by Agency personnel and
persuaded to take on the. job of running the Agency' s
propaganda campaign against Castro.*

According to one interviewer: _

In the Guatemalan campaign, Phillips
had worked with a handful of completely
controlled Latin American propaganda
writers, and had been able to‘develop a
single credible propaganda line. Now,
however, he had to work under Washington
orders, to offer radio broadcasting time

to all’ the major and competing Cuban
exile groups. Much of the Phillips'

* For Phillips' own story. of his employment and his
re-employment by the Agency, see his book The Night

Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977).

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effort went into overcoming the idea that
CIA financed radio programs should become

a forum for the varying views of rival
exile splinter factions. Phillips was
principally in Washington ... [but] there
were frequent trips to Miami and New York,
and Phillips himself coordinated CIA covert
broadcasting with Henry Loomis, Director
of USIA's Voice of America. 9/

All indications are that Phillips had an excellent
staff which was highly motivated and certainly extremely
busy during the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation.*
The key point in Dave Phillips's propaganda opera-
tion was to be the 50,000 watt radio transmitter located
_on the larger of the two Swan Islands -- this so called
“larger" island being roughly 1 3/4 miles long by 1 1/4
miles wide. US possessions, the Swan Islands are located
roughly 100 miles NE of Honduras in the Caribbean Sea.
Already located on the island was a Federal Aviation radio
beacon, and a Department of Commerce weather station. In
April 1960,\the cover story.which was devised for the
* Among those who worked in Phillips's Political and
Psychological Section in WH/4, were William Kent, John
Isaminger, Phillip A. Toomey, Earnest I.Harrison, Paul
Oberst, and Michael J. Maney. 10/ Illustrative of the
desire to placate the various exile factions was the
proposal by the Forward Operations Base to give the
spokesmen of the factions air time on WRUL on a rotating
basis to present the position of the particular group.
FOB was to assume responsibility for WRUL programming
on 1 December 1960, and was of the opinion that such

programming would “have desired effect on creating
semblance [of] united anti Castro opposition." 10a/

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operation of the two radio transmitters (one 50,000
watts. and the other 7,500 watts) was that the Navy
was going to purchase scientific signal time from the

Gibralter Steamship Company, an Agency proprietary,

- which was nominally the operator of a commercial

radio station then being established.

The loading of the transmitters, the unloading,
the construction of the facilities to house the trans-
mitters, and the installation of the transmitters
was done by the Navy Seabees under the direction of
Alfred Cromartie of CIA's Office of Logistics. James
Burwell, a logisitcs officer who was thoroughly in-
volved in the JMATE operation, reported that the con-
struction activity at Swan Island required the move-—
ment of 180,000 pounds of equipment from the Washing-
ton Depot, aboard Agency trucks for delivery to Norfolk

and the reloading aboard two LST's. In addition to

“locating the transmitters and constructing the facili-

ties for housing the transmitters, a crude landing
field also was cleared. The total time involved was
approximately 20 days, and the cost was something under

$225,000.

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The first test signals from Swan Island were
sent on 17 May 1960, and from that time until the
close out of the Bay of Pigs Operation, the station
was one of the two or three. principal voices. aimed
at Castro's government. 11/ Shortly after the initi-
ation of the broadcast from Swan, a true tempest in

teapot was brewed over the question of whether or not

‘export licences were going to be required for goods

moving from the mainland to support operations at

Swan Island.. Involved in this brouhaha were the

Department of Commerce, . the US Customs Service, and

numerous Agency components -- Cover Staff, Commercial

Division, the Office of Logistics, and the Office of

Security. Bill Bisemann,, WH/4's Chief of Support,

had his hands full! Comnion sense ultimately prevailed

and the question of export licences was dropped. 12/
‘Even before Swan went into operation, there

was some question within the government as to whether

the CIA or the United States Information Agency should

be principally responsible for propaganda broadcasts

directed at Cuba. Within a few weeks following the

' beginning of operations at Swan, this question was

resolved in a meeting in Senator Mundt's office which

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. included representatives from the Agency, ‘Mr. Abbot
Washburn, the Director of the United States Informa-
_ tion Agency, and various of Mr. Washburn' s senior
people. The meeting made clear that the Agency was
‘doing medium wave broadcasting directly into Cuba.
‘Although it was ‘not specified at the meeting in
Mundt's office, CIA also was supporting station WRUL,
which had made a direct application on its own initia-
tive for funding such broadcasts ~~ even though the
Agency was behind such broadcasting and such. financ-
ing. ay
The Navy, however, got goosey about the cover |
story which was being presented. pespite a strong
effort on the part of senior Agency representatives
to convince Rear Admiral S. B. Frankel -- who was
designated as the Chief representative of the Office
' of Naval Intelligence by Admiral Fauste, then Director
of ONI -- the Navy declined further involvement in

supporting the cover story.* The hassle with the

* The thrust of the Agency's 27 April 1960 briefing
for Adm. Frankel was that.the USN was already so heavily
involved in the project that it. would do them more harm
than. good to withdraw. Information on this meeting
with the Navy and other information pertaining to the
development’ of the Swan Island facility is contained in’
the sources listed under Reference 14/.

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Navy was successfully resolved when the Agency found

that. through its own resources it would be able to

‘provide for resupply of all of the Island's needs,

including transportation of personnel between JMWAVE

in Florida and Swan Island without undue difficulty.
The problem of security of the island -- particu-

larly the fear that perhaps Castro would send saboteurs

to the island -- was never put to any real test. In

fact, what might have been the only serious security

incident was most successfully resolved by Robert

‘Overjord, the Security Officer for the island and

the Députy Chief of Base. The incident took place
in July 1960 when a group of 14 Honduran students
landed to assert a claim to sovereignty of the Swan —
Islands by the Republic of Honduras, and it was re-
ported as follows:

A potentially. dangerous situation was
averted by the tactful handling of the
‘group by Mr..Overjord who persuaded them
‘to leave their armament of 13 pistols and
three submachine guns aboard their boat
and conducted them on a tour of the island.
The group leader indicated that he wanted
to take a census of the population, and.
‘was furnished with pertinent information,
with no divulgénce of Agency interest in
Radio Swan or its personnel, Upon comple-
tion of the census, the group was permitted
to raise the Honduran flag, was given lunch

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and refreshments, and: ‘departed shortly

thereafter. The: good judgment and dis-

cretion of Mr. Overjord are felt to be
. directly responsible for avoidance of

what could have been a serious incident

involving loss of lives, or injury to.

Agency and other island personnel.* 15/

The question of the exact nature of the broad-
casts from Swan was the subject of much discussion,
both prior to the opening of the station and subse-
quent to its first broadcast. The Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, for example, called Jake
Esterline, Chief, Project JMATE to report on conver-
sation that he (General Cabell) had with "a person
of considerable importance who. was very familiar
with Cuba," concerning the nature of the propaganda .
which should be aimed at the Cuban population. Cabell
stated that according to this important person, if
tapes of Castro's radio broadcasts could be acquired

and then patched together for rebroadcasting to the.

Cuban population for hours on end, the effect would

be “to bore the people horribly with Castro, but would

* The island. was manned by 24 people, all but nine
of whom were CIA personnel. ‘The nine were unwitting
technicians of the Philco Corporation.

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also pointedly reveal the. inconsistencies of his
statements." Following receipt of this call from

the Deputy Director, Esterline passed the word on to
Dave Phillips with the comment that he thought perhaps
such broadcasts might be used as filler during the
intervals when Swan was not doing its regular broad-
casts.* 16/ | .

By early August 1960, however, the official
policy for the Swan propaganda broadcasts aimed at
Cuba, was: to be “the Revolution Betrayed." This
theme was formalized by the Department of State; and
at the direction of the Secretary of State, copies of
a 105 page document addressed to this theme were pre-
sented to members of the National security Council,
to members of the Inter-Americah ‘Peace Committee, and

to US Embassies in the Latin American countries.

* COS Havana forwarded another suggestion for a pos-
sible propaganda attack on Castro based on a May 1960
issue of Confidential magazine, which apparently car-
ried an article called “An American Mother's: Terrifying
Story -- Fidel Castro Raped my Teenage Daughter." It
was COS Havana‘s ‘suggestion that wide publicity be
given to this article in the Spanish language, pre-
sumably including broadcasts from Radio Swan. 17/
Available records do not indicate whether this sug-
gestion was adopted.

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‘Instructions were that the Embassies could furnish

copies-of the document to the foreign ministers and

to other high officials in their respective countries.

Additionally, the NATO Council also received.a copy
of this document; and it was the hope of the Depart-
ment of State that the document would have some im-
pact on the upcoming meeting of the foreign ministers
of the Western Hemisphere countries, which was to be-
gin 16 August 1960 in San Jose, Costa Rica. According

to one interview of WH/4's propaganda chief, Dave

. Phillips, the theme of the Revolution Betrayed

Hammered across the idea that Castro
had. double-crossed the Cuban people by
abandoning the programs and promises »
that originally won him support: None
of CIA's propaganda, spoken or printed,
ever urged the populace to rise up against
Castro. This appeal, suicidal before the
invasion, would be used when, and if, a
Provisional Government obtained a lodge-
ment on the island. 18/-

According to Phillips's interviewer:

Friendly third country diplomats in
Havana monitored CIA's principal broad-
casts and confirmed that the signals were
loud and clear. To verify its audience
the Swan Island radio offered simple gifts
(ball point pens were a favorite). to any
listener who would write to the station.
Considering the police controls inside
Cuba, listeners' letters were an act of
defiance to the regime. There was a

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a flood of letters including, during
freak radio propagation periods, re-
quests for..ball point pens from New
Zealand.* 19/

Another evidence of the success of the Swan broadcasts

_was related to the Director of Central Intelligence by

Col. King, Chief, WH Division, who pointed out that WH
had a copy of a letter from a Cuban listener who, in
the form of a letter bitterly attacking Swan, made it
clear that the Swan broadcasts were coming in loud and
clear. 21/ ™.

- Before the end of the summer of 1960, Swan was
on the air on both short-wave and medium-wave for a
total of 10 hours a day, in addition to which they
also began to utilize programs that had been prepared
by the FRD. One: problem which would plague Radio Swan
-~ as well as other elements of Project JMARC -- was
the shortage of Spanish language capability. Among
* %It appears that perhaps baseball cards also were
going to be offered as an inducement to get listeners
to indicate that they had picked up Swan's broadcast. -
A propaganda note from WH/4 for 9 August 1960, for
example, reported: "M[aney] spoke to Ken Harris,
Special Acquisitions. He has contacted a company
making baseball cards who claim ‘this most unusual

order ever received.' Will get cards, but curious
what was wrong with bubble gum." 20/

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other evidence of the need to have someone with Spanish
language capability immediately available at Radio
Swan, were the following: A machine-run of Agency
employees failed to surface anyone with sufficient
Spanish language to undertake an announcer's job;
inability to exploit the fatal shooting of a Venezue-
lan child by a pro-Castro goon, could not be turned

to US advantage; and by mid-November 1960 WH Division
was requesting that a requirement be laid on to the

Department of Defense for a serviceman with native

_ fluency in Spanish who could be used as an announcer

at Radio Swan.*

* In the instance of the death of the Venezuelan
child, the pro-Castro Cuban press was able to get the
story out before it could be broadcast from Radio Swan.
The pro-Castro press claimed that the death had been .
caused by a counter-revolutionary. (Sources for the
foregoing discussion related to the lack of Spanish -
language capability are listed in reference 22/.)

‘The lack of Spanish language capability was felt
throughout the project, not only in the propaganda ef-
fort. As late as January 1961, for example, the train-
ing facility in the Canal Zone was pushing Headquarters
for the services for a two week period of an Air Force
sergeant who was fluent in Spanish. The training base
wanted the sergeant to assist in briefing and debrief-
ing an infiltration team. The request was denied, how-
ever, because there was a greater need for the man's
services as an instructor at the air training base in
Guatemala.. 22a/ In another instance, a request from
COB Miami for promotion of a clerical from GS-4 to
GS-5 was based on the fact that “her services as a

' translator have been of the greatest importance to the

Base since her arrival." 22b/
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Despite the handicap imposed by the lack of
Spanish language capability at the Station, Radio
Swan was the most effective of the propaganda activi-
ties supported by the agency; and with Station WRUL,
New York, these Agency-sponsored radio broadcasts
were the most effective means of providing the general
Cuban population with anti-Castro ammunition. Addi-
tionally radio propaganda -- via both short and medium
wave transmitters -- was: to play an important role

. immediately following the landing of the anti-Castro
forces on Cuban soil. 23/ .

Aside from radio broadcasts, other media activi-
ties in which WH/4 PP engaged were the. hewspaper Avance
in Exile and the magazine Bohemta Libre. Both of these

“were published in Miami by the exile groups, and at
one time Bohemia Libre was reputedly the most widely
circulated Spanish language. weekly in the world. Al-
though barred in Cuba, selected items from both publi-

. cations -were broadcast by Swan or WRUL. 23a/

One of the strangest of all activities in which
WH/4 PP. engaged was a public opinion survey conducted

“by the Lloyd Free organization to assess the attitudes

of the Cuban people toward the Castro regime. If WH/4's

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planners expected that the survey would show a strong
core of internal opposition to the Castro government,
they were to be sadly disappointed. Working with "a
competent ‘Cuban research organization" Free's report
was based on a series of a thousand interviews with a
cross section of the urban population of Cuba “both in”
Havana and in other cities, towns, and villages through-
out the island." Among the findings of the Free survey,
the following comments were included in the summary
report of mid-August of 1960:"

The great majority of Cubans surveyed
felt that both they personally and their
“country were very much better off than

during the days of Batista. fhe prevail-
tng mood was one of hope and optimism.

Attesting the apparently genuine en-
thusiasm of the great majority for the
‘Revolution, the Castro Government and its
program were the replies when the sample
was asked about the worst aspects of life
in Cuba today. Despite the fact that *
this question was designed to illicit un-
favorable comments, a very sizable major-
tty named.as the worst aspects of the
present situation items which implied
sympathy or support for the present regime.
At the top of the list (mentioned by one-
third of all respondents) was regret or

- apprehension over the fact that there is
opposition to the Revolution and to the
Revolutionary regime; jand] that there
are misguided counter-revolutionaries and
reactionaries.

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Even in describing the worst aspects
of the present situation, only 30% of all
respondents mentioned items which could
be construed as.criticisms, explicit or
implicit, of the Castro regime. Only a
few such subjects received significant
mention, with each being referred to by
only a small minority of total respondents:
e.g. the danger of or’ trend toward Com-
munism (7%); criticism of the Revolution's
program (7%); economic. difficulties (7%);
unemployment (6%); confusion and disorgan-
ization (5%).

In view of the overwhelming popularity

of the Revolutionary program, it is patently

‘clear that ertticisms of Castro's program,

as such, will fall very “largely on barren,

tf not counter- productive ground.
The only positive statements that appeared in the Free
report, insofar as the objectives of WH/4 were con-
cerned, were to the effect that successful attack on
the Castro Government should be made in terms of the
inability of the government to meet the projects it
had outlined because of "the unwise and unrealistic
means it is employing in the execution of its program";

. ON

and “the Revolution and its program are being perverted

through the insidious influence of the Communists."*
* The information concerning the Free report, is

contained in source reference 24/.

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. It is interesting to record the reaction within
the Agency to the Free report:

. C/JMARC lamented the fact that the
Lloyd Free report evidently has gotten
‘into: the. hands of the Cuban Government
and will probably be. used with devastating
effect at some point during the meeting
[the upcoming OAS Conference scheduled
for San Jose, Costa Rica]. He told ADDP/A

‘that he felt the Department of State. would
have to. be prepared to sacrifice Mr. Free's.
report on the proverbial “alter of gold."
The point was made strongly to ADDP/A
that the Free report, in fact, is not at
all valid other than for a. limited
"sample" of the City of, Habana. ADDP/A
agreed, but said he didnot think ‘State
should be made aware of the fact CIA
actually paid for the report. He further
indicated that he was still endeavoring ~
to find out how the report -- copy of which
CIA never receivéd in full -- got out. of
control. * 25/

The substance of the Free Report appeared in the
New York Times and also in a Peter Edson column which
was reported to be syndicated in 600 newspapers. In
passing this information on to the DDP, Chief, WH/4

suggested that “the survey, in the opinion of WH/4

* Chief, WH/4 apparently misread the significance
of the Free report: because, as the report points out,
‘the most’'serious ‘opposition was, in fact, in. the
Havana area, which included the heaviest sampling of
opposition ‘sentiment.

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Prop, will be used in Cuban propaganda" --. something

of an understatement!* 26/ _

* Logic would seem-to indicate that if WH/4's princi-
pals could not subscribe to the results of Free survey' s
that WH/4/PP might have been tasked to. make a serious
study of the impact which Castro's propaganda and his
achievements were having on the will of the Cuban public
to. resist outside interference. In an interview with
the author of this history, Dave Phillips stated that
Enno Hobbing had provided the editorial guidance for
WH/4's propaganda efforts; but that to his (Phillips' s)
knowledge, no study: ever was conducted of the Castro
propaganda effort. In retrospect, Phillips indicated
that this probably was an oversight. 27/

On the subject of surveys of. questionable value
during the Bay. of Pigs Operation, mention should be
made of a contract JMATE negotiated with Klein and
Saks

to initiate a survey of Cuba's present
(May 1960]. economic position that will
also contain an outline of proposals that
would sound [ste] as a platform for a suc-
cessor government to the Castro regime.
The cost, which will be borne by JMARC,
will be about $20,000. This is merely the
first phase of the projected comprehensive
economic program.

Why, with CIA's in-house economic talent (in the
Economic Research Area of the Office of Research and
Reports) and the surfeit of government economists fa-
miliar with Latin America, WH/4 thought it necessary
to negotiate’ an. outside contract for a study such as
indicated is truly incomprehensible! That the Klein
and Saks contract was not. blocked at the DDP or DCI
level is equally: incomprehensible. The. company's
‘“Preliminary Outline of Economic and Financial Govern-
ment Platform to Serve the Interests of the People of
Cuba and to be Compatible with the Interest of the
Hemisphere and ‘the Free’ World of Which Cuba is a Part"
-- which was presented in typescript -- was 15 pages
of platitudes about the best of all possible worlds. 28/

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WH/4 PP also became involved in the propaganda
activity that was intended to offset the planned
visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Cuba in the summer of
1960. In an Eyes Only memorandum to the Director of
Central Intelligence, Col. J. C. King informed Allen
Dulles that it had been learned that Khrushchev had ©
accepted an invitation from the Government of Cuba
to visit that country. Working with Havana Station,
a two-pronged program was being developed with the
intention of either forcing the cancellation of the
trip or indicating the opposition of the Cuban people
to Communism. Havana Station was to be responsible |
for organizing church opposition to the visit, and

' WH/4 and other elements of WH Division would be re-
sponsible for instigating rumors throughout Latin
America that an assassination attempt would be made
on Khrushchev's life if he appeared in Cuba.

. One of the WH/4's contacts suggested that leaf-
lets should be prepared depicting the crucifix upside
down, to signify the Soviet treatment of religion,
and that. these leaflets should be distributed widely |
through Cuba. 29/ There is no indication that this

particular leaflet was ever devised, but in at least

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one instance, the Hammer and Sickle was used to form
the ‘'T‘' in the word fraidor..on a sticker that was

being prepared for propaganda use. 30/ In anticipa-

' tion of the possible visit, 10,000 stickers of an

anti-Khrushchev, ‘anti-Soviet nature were forwarded |

from Headquarters to Havana Station. The legend

on one of these was "Ciba, Yes; Russia, No; Khrushchev,

w

No; and a second item showed a prisoner behind bars
formed by the stripes of the Cuban flag with the words
Sin Palabras .-- “Without words."* 33/_

Despite these advanced preparations, no oppor-
tunity was presented to utilize the propaganda stickers.*+
Although both Castro and Khrushchev were in attendance:
at the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations in
New York, 19-28 September 1960, and even though Castro
flew out of New York in an Aeroflot jet, the Khrushchev

visit did not materialize at this time. ***

* See following two pages for copies.

** ‘More’ detailed information on propaganda leaflets
and the dissemination of such materials by air drop is
given in Volume I of this history, Atr Operations.

*** Khrushchev flew from New York directly to Moscow

‘at the close of the UN session. On 22 October 1960 in

the course of an interview in Moscow with a Cuban
journalist Khrushchev did state that he wanted to visit
Cuba and its people as soon as possible. 3la/

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If not particularly successful in projects other
than Radio Swan, WH/4/PP cannot be charged with lack
of imagination. Among other projects, it was proposed
that the Office of Medical Services’ psychiatric study
of Fidel Castro be surfaced because the profile was
not particularly flattering to the Cuban leader; and
the Castro image also would have suffered if a dis-
orienting drug could have been placed in Castro's .
food. These proposals were similar in intent to
others aimed at the Castro "image" as revealed in the
Senate Select Committee investigation of. CIA plots
against ‘the Cuban leader.

In light of a rumor that had been picked up to
the effect that the Cubans reportedly were painting
some of their British Sea Fury aircraft with the
American flag ~- said planes to be used in a provoca-
tion action to discredit the United States -- WH/4
investigated the possibility of doctoring some photos
of the Sea Furies with the flag being painted on in

order to forestall any such: provocations by the Cubans.

. Unfortunately, however, the Agency art shop pointed

out that it would be technically infeasible to attempt

to make such fake photos. “With the idea in mind of a

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propaganda campaign aimed at terrorizing Castro's

militia (and apparently at ‘the request of Col. Jack

-Hawkins, Chief, WH/4/PM), WH/4/PP gave some thought

to preparing a purported secret order to Castro's
militia to establish an "elite suicide squad" which
would fight on even after the defeat of the other
troops. The gentleman who would later become infamous
in connection with the Watergate activity, E. Howard
Hunt, and Dave Phillips assessed the possibility of
sending a white painted “Flight of truth" airplane
on a trip to several of the Latin American countries,
bringing -- in a “Billy Graham type operation" -- the
message of Castro's betrayal of the Cuban Revolution.

But this esoteric plan, too, never got beyond the

/ planning stage. 32/

None of the foregoing proposals however, were
in the same league with the propaganda plan that came

to be known as “the Dripping Cuban." The WH/4 Propa-

ganda Notes for 19 August 1960 stated:

P({hillips] dispatched cable on Special
Operation to HAVA. (Cuban jumping ship in
Bosphorous) . .33/

In fact, the cable that Dave Phillips had orig-

inated was addressed not only to Havana, but also to

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Istanbul, Ankara, and to the Forward Operations Base
in Miami. Remembering that Dave Phillips himself
was something of an actor, as well as a newspaperman,
it is believed worthwhile to repeat this cable in its
entirety. The cable read as follows:

1. FYI: HOS IS CONSIDERING THE FOLLOW-
ING OPERATION: SHORTLY AFTER A RUSSIAN
BOAT HOMEWARD. BOUND FROM CUBA PASSES THROUGH
BOSPHOROUS A DRIPPING CUBAN CLIMBS ASHORE
IN TURKEY. HE CLAIMS TO BE POLITICAL
PRISONER ARRESTED BY CUBANS IN HAVANA BUT
SENT TO RUSSIA FOR IMPRISONMENT. CUBAN
SUBJECT WILL CONTACT LOCAL LATIN AMERICAN
CONSULS AND ISTANBUL PRESS FOR EXPLOITATION,
THEN RETURN LATIN’ AMERICA. AFTER BRIEF
BUT DRAMATIC EXPOSURE TO PRESS AN "ATTEMPT"
WILL BE MADE ON SUBJECT'S LIFE. FOR THIS
REASON HE WILL GO UNDERGROUND SO "THEY"
WILL NOT LIQUIDATE HIM.

2. FOR HAVA: REQUEST STATION RECRUIT
SUBJECT. OBVIOUSLY HE MUST .BE SUPERB
ACTOR WHO CAN CONVINCINGLY MAINTAIN ROLE
IN SPITE OF SKILLFUL PROBING BY DUBIOUS
NEWSMEN. HE MUST HAVE MEMORY CAPABLE. OF
RETAINING THOUSANDS OF "DETAILS" ABOUT HIS
ARREST AND FORCED JOURNEY. HE MUST BE
KNOWN IN HAVANA SO AS TO BE MISSED WHEN
HE IS “ARRESTED." AN ARTICULATE STUDENT
TYPE WOULD BE DESIRABLE. SWIMMING ABILITY
DESIRABLE BUT NOT ESSENTIAL.

.3. SUGGEST THAT IN RECRUITMENT, STATION
STATE THERE GOOD REASON TO BELIEVE CUBAN
PRISONERS REALLY ARE BEING SENT RUSSIA,

BUT THAT THIS CANNOT BE PROVED. THUS SUB-
JECT'S PARTICIPATION IN THIS PLAY-ACTING
WILL BE JUSTIFIABLE DRAMATIZATION OF
SOVIET. CONTROL IN CUBA. STATION ALSO
AUTHORIZED PROMISE FINANCIAL BACKING, LATER

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RETURN TO CUBA WITH FIGHTING GROUP, PER-
MISSION WEEKEND © WITH ALL THE WORKS IN
PARIS, ETC.

4. “IN RECRUITMENT,. IT SHOULD BE
STRESSED TO SUBJECT THAT SUCCESS THIS
OPERATION AND STATUS HIS POSITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LIMELIGHT DEPENDS ENTIRELY
ON SECURITY. HIS FAMILY AND FRIENDS MUST .
REALLY BELIEVE HE HAS BEEN ARRESTED (AND
STATION MUST ASSIST IN SPREADING WORD OF

\ HIS ARREST FOR SPECIFIC OFFENSE SO THAT
FACTS WILL JIBE IN SUBSEQUENT INVESTIGA-
TIONS. ).

-5. ADVISE SOONEST WHEN YOUR MAN IS
SELECTED. HIS BRIEFING WILL BE IN PBPRIME.
_ HOPE HE:MAY BE RECRUITED IN TIME EXFILTRATE
AMPAN BOAT DEPARTING HAVA END OF THIS MONTH.

6. FOR ANKA, ISTA: APPRECIATE YOUR
CABLED ASSESSMENT POSSIBLE EXTENT .COOP-
ERATION LOCAL SERVICE AND NEWSPAPER ASSETS.
SUGGEST HOWEVER NOT (REPEAT NOT) CONTACT
NON-KUBARKERS UNTIL HEADQUARTERS CAN FOR-
WARD OPERATIONAL PLAN. 34/

A memorandum on the outgoing cable quoted above

went to Chief, .WH/4 from Rudy Gomez, the Deputy Chief

x

of WH Division on 24 August 1960. Gomez's memorandum
' read as follows: ,

The DCI, General Cabell, and Mr. Helms
discussed this cable on 24 August [1960]
and concluded that since Fidel Castro is
definitely identifying himself. more and
more with the Russians, it is not worth
the candle to launch an operation such
as that one proposed in subject cable.

Mr. Helms said that we may discreetly try
to find a body for’ this operation, provid-
ing we ‘play it very carefully and do not

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let the body in on what we definitely
have in mind; also, that any further
cables which go out on this proposed
operation are to be signed off by him.

Examined in retrospect, it would appear that Mr. Helms

had good reason to be nervous about the proposal!* 35/

B. Sabotage and other Exercises**
Where WH/4/PP was successful in putting Radio

Swan into operation. and in supporting Station WRUL in

* This proposal provided another of the very few in-
' stances where Mr. Helms' name surfaced in relation to
a Bay of Pigs related problem.

** Because so many of the sabotage activities of the
Cuban dissidents were uncoordinated, uncontrolled, and
did nothing to impede the extension of Castro's control
or lessén his support, the author has tried only to
illustrate something of the scope of those sabotage
operations: over which the WH or WH/4 could exercise a
degree of control. In responding to the Taylor Com-
mittee's requést for an assessment of the effectiveness
of its sabotage program, the best that WHD could say was:

There are numerous acts of sabotage re-
ported from all provinces of Cuba. ‘These
acts included the burning of cane fields,
damaging of power and communication lines
and sugar mills, burning of schools and
commercial buildings and damaging of petro-
leum and sugar refinery [ste]. It is ex-
tremely difficult to verify just what
sabotage damage were [sic] the result of
our team's [ste] activities; however, they
have claimed the burning of cane fields,

_the firing of commercial stores, [high]
tension lines, and the damage to the oil
refinery at Santiago de Cuba was the re-
sult of a raider operation by one of our
(footnote continued on following page).

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its broadcasts into Cuba, Project JMATE could claim
no similarly successful or continuing program of
sabotage and disruption. In fact, one of the earliest
and most thoroughly discussed sabotage programs against
Cuba -- disruption of the Cuban petroleum industry --
was a complete and total bust. Being suggested even
before President Eisenhower's authorization of the
anti-Castro program, attempts to sabotage and inter-
fere with the operation of Cuba's petroleum refineries
continued until well into the middle 60's -- with at
least one of the sabotage "experts" displaying the
same notable lack of success, but excess of foolish-
ness, that characterized his. activities during Project —

external action groups. In addition,

we feel that a great deal of the. other

sabotage were [ste] the results [sic]

of the demolitions we supplied to the

various teams and other action groups

in Cuba with which we were in contact.

Approximately 10-15,000 lbs. of the

over 100,000 lbs. of material [ste] .

placed in the hands of internal assets

were demolitions supplies for sabotage

action. 35a/ —
The attack on the Santiago refinery was led by Rip
Robertson, but his exciting cable about the action
greatly overemphasized the damage; and the plant op-

erations were quickly restored to normal. At the
time, however, the DCI reported it to the Special

‘Group (Chester Bowles, Roswell Gilpatrick, and

McGeorge Bundy) as a "successful" operation. 35b/
Robertson's cable is shown as Appendix E (p. 335).

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JMATE. It is a story worth recording here, because
of. the extremely close and. continuing relationship
between one of the major US.oil companies operating
a refinery in Cuba, Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey (SONJ), and WH Division.

As early as 9 March ‘1960, the minutes ofa
Special Group meeting reflect conversations that
both Allen Dulles and Gordon Gray had concerning the
problems being faced by the major petroleum companies
operating in Cuba -- SONJ, Texaco, and Shell -- and
particularly the need for “discreet means of inter-
company: consultation" in order to avoid possible
anti-trust prosecution. In a discussion of planned

para-military operations against Cuba, it was report-

ed that on 14 July 1960, Chief, Western Hemisphere

Division was approached “by the Standard Oil Company. .

4

‘He {(Chief, WH/D] indicated that it appeared that

Standard will be willing to: cooperate, perhaps even
carry the ball, on certain selected [sabotage] targets.

DD/P gave authority | to push this contact immediately."* 36/

* Paramilitary Operation Plan I, indicated that among
the specific sabotage targets to be considered for at-
tack in the period between 1 and 30 September 1960,
were petroleum targets. 37/

—

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By August of 1960, WH/D had approved a program of
“subtle sabotage paying off, without resorting to
the more risky and sensational type of sabotage."
Unfortunately, however, there was a communications
gap between the operations people and the intelli-
gence analysts most familiar with. the world petroleum
industry and a number of demonstrably unworkable --
though subtle -- sabotage efforts came to naught.*
The Cuban petroleum industry also was looked
to as an. économic-political target as well as a
sabotage target. When the US refineries operating
in Cuba refused Castro's order to process Soviet
crude oil, WH/4 began to think in terms of disrupting
the flow of this crude to Cuba by pressuring Onassis
and other independent shipping operators to refuse

to carry the Soviet oil. It was predicted that such

* The Agency's real petroleum expertise and knowledge-
ability --~ both technically and economically -- ona
worldwide basis was in the Fuels and Power Branch
(later the Fuel's Branch) of the Office of Research
and Reports (later the Office of Economic Research) .
Aside from the constant irritation of having to work
half in*the dark in response to WH/D or WH/4, ORR/F&P
was constantly having to correct errors, to make
apologies, or mend fences with the major US petroleum
companies as a result of the lack of coordination be-
tween DDP and DDI components.

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a plan would force the USSR (then facing a shortage
of tanker bottoms in the world market) to. transport
its ow crude to Cuba and. to "provide technicians

and make modifications in existing refineries to

process their crude." This, in turn, was supposed

to alienate Venezuela and Mexico, normally among
Cuba's crude suppliers .* 39/,

In addition to ‘petroleum refineries as targets
for sabotage, plans: were also, made to disrupt the

Cuban microwave system. unlike the plans: to disrupt

the Cuban petroleum industry -- which would directly

. involve properties of the international. oil companies

~~ the sabotage program for the. microwave networks,
as late as February of 1961, specifically stated that
attacks should be limited to the Cuban operated net
with “hands ‘off RCA‘and Dumont systems, which are to

remain intact:for later consideration.":40/ Also

* In fact, the Cuban refinery technicians themselves
did an excellent job of adapting the plants to the

‘use of Soviet crude. The former manager of the
' Standard Oil refinery commented to this effect after

reviewing thé all source intelligence materials avail-
able on the plant. He was pleased -—- at least in
one sense -- to note that Standard's training program

“has apparently been quite successful!

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prohibited were attacks under Agency sponsorship on

Soviet and Soviet-bloc targets located in Cuba. J. C.
King protested that attacks on Soviet and Soviet-bloc
targets by resistance forces not controlled by the
Agency were far less efficient than such attacks
would be if they were mounted through Agency efforts. 41/
In addition to planning for sabotage, WH Divi-
sion's anti-Castro activity also included extensive
plans for the formation of goon squads throughout
much of Latin America in an attempt to counter the
pro-Castro elements of the various nations. This
goon squad program also was of considerable interest

to the Deputy Director for Plans, Mr. Bissell. Be-

. cause of its. areawide nature, the activities of the

goon squads were run out of WH/D rather than out of
WH/4. Among the operations which WH claimed credit ‘
for were the following: The disruption in Mexico

City of about 400 Castro sympathizers gathered to
celebrate the 26th of July movement through the use

of stink bombs set off in the ‘meeting place; in Lima,
Peru a counter demonstration against some 200 Castro
sympathizers also gathered to. celebrate the 26th of

July movement; and in San Jose, Costa Rica, "A meeting

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of the Amigos de Cuba was broken up by an agent at
the Station, who sprayed the. two principal speakers,
prominent Costa Rican leftists with ‘Who, Me?'."* 42/

Among other assets which Chief, WH/D chose to
mention in the same context with the goon squads were
the Secretary to the President of one Latin American
country: .

Who can promote action of any of the
National Security Forces.

In another country, an.

Agency member integrated. into the

' Public Safety Program serving as an

Advisor to the President on Security
matters is in a position to’ recommend
police action to the President.** 43/

In what may have been a ploy intended principally

to obtain a vessel for use in infil-exfil operations,

* “Who, Me?" was an obnoxious scent.

** In light of subsequent investigations of CIA Activ-
ities by the Senate Select Committee in the mid 1970's,
it is interesting that the reference to the “Action
Squads" described above also included with reference

to the Dominican Republic an agent:

_ In contact with a group of dissidents
capable of violent action, including assas-
sination. This group has killed a number
of: agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia
Militar (SIM), Dominican Secret Police. 45/

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rather than in direct action programs against Cuba,
representatives of the Special Projects Group, Counter-
intelligence made a pitch to Chief, JMATE to acquire
a vessel which.-- for its acquisition, operational |
maintenance, crew, including incentive bonus would
run roughly $200,000 for a 6-month period ~- could
also be used in deception operations against Castro.
In responding to this suggestion from the Special
Projects Group, Col. Jack Hawkins quickly put the
quietus on this request, noting that it was doubtful
that the Cubans had either enough sophisticated radar
or commo gear so that they would react to “the false
radar presentation, deceptive communications traffic,
noise makers ,, signals, smoke, explosions, etc." Con-
sequently Hawkins concluded:
In view of the high cost involved,
and the other factors mentioned above,
I do not concur in the acquisition of

this craft for deception purposes as
proposed in the reference. 46/

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Part VI

- Mr. Nixon's Role

Like so many other aspects of the Bay of Pigs
story a great deal’has been said about the role that
Richard. M. Nixon played in the operation during the
course of his Vice Presidency, but woefully: little
solid evidence has ever appeared to verify either
the pros or cons on the subject. Because of the
continuing vepetition of many of these stories, a
careful search was undertaken of the voluminous CIA
records of the operation in order to recover those
items pertaining to Nixon' S participation directly
or inditectly -- through his aides, assistants, or
correspondence -- in the Bay of Pigs operation.

During the course of his unofficial visit to

the United States in the spring of 1959, Fidel Castro

accepted the invitation of the Vice President of the

United States to meet with Mx. Nixon in his official
office in the Capitol for: an informal discussion.
Nixon has stated that the meeting was arranged at the

request of the Secretary of State Herter, who suggested

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that. the administration might profit if one of its
leaders could gain additional inside information about
what made Castro tick.

Nixon has said that he had a 3 1/2 hour meeting
with Castro on 19 April 1959 and that as a result of
the meeting, he prepared a 4-page secret memorandum
‘and sent copies to Président Eisenhower, Secretary
Herter and to Allen Dulles.* 1/ In part at least,

Mr. Nixon's version of the meeting with Castro was

made public as early as November 1964 in an article

he wrote for the Reader's Digest, and - these views

were repeated in somewhat more detail in his recent
memoirs, RN. The thrust of the meeting was that Nixon
was emphasizing the need for castro to establish a
democratic form of government as he (Nixon) understood

it, with Castro on the other hand emphasizing that the

* In his Reader's Digest article of November 1964 Nixon
indicated that copies of the memorandum went to the
three individuals as noted in the text above, however,
in his recent Memoirs, RN, Nixon states that a copy

also went to John Foster Dulles. John Foster Dulles

was technically Secretary of State until 22 April 1959,
on which. date he was succeeded by Christian Herter.

At the time of the meeting between Nixon and Castro,
however, Mr. Herter had been acting in Mr. Dulles'
place. Dulles‘'s death occurred 24 May 1959.

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type of government he believed in was that which was |
expressed most vocally by the people. Nixon's most
widely known remark about Castro as a result of that
meeting was his statement that: "Castro is incredibly
naive about communism, or is under communist discipline."
Reportedly Castro was not particularly enchanted with

the meeting either, for according to a member of his

“party when Castro. emerged from the meeting he “was”

angry. He swore and added, ‘This man has spent the
whole time scolding me'."* 2s

Subsequent to his meeting with Castro in April
of 1959, Agency records do not reflect any particular
interest on the part of the Vice President in Cuban
activities until the end of January 1960. On 27 Janu-
ary, and again on 23 February, Col. J. C. King, Chief,
Western Hemi sphere Division, briefed Gen. Robert Cushman,

Mr. Nixon's Aide, at the Vice President's Office...

“Cushman. made it. clear that the Vice President was

* It was only after making a direct request to Mr.

Nixon that a copy of the memorandum was obtained.

No copies were found in the files of. CIA, State, or

the Eisenhower Library. The copy obtained was from

Mr. Nixon's personal files. The memorandun was, in

fact, classified CONFIDENTIAL rather than SECRET.

A copy of the memorandum is attached as. Appendix F . 2a/

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{

interested in supporting anti-Castro groups both within
and outside of Cuba, including goon squads or other
direct action groups to match against the pro-Castro
groups in Cuba.

‘Among the other subjects discussed with General
Cushman on 23 February 1960 were propaganda attacks on
the Castro government and the possibilities of economic
sanctions similar to those which had been suggested
by former Assistant Secretary of State Henry Holland,

* : .
whose views on the need for economic sanctions had

‘not only been discussed with Agency representatives,

but also had been forwarded to the Vice President's
office.

Another facet of the Agency's anti-Castro ef-
forts which were of some interest to the Vice-Presi-
dent were CIA's relations with the Department of State,
which obviously was not one of the Vice President's
favorite organizations; but Col. King made it quite
clear that all of CIA's actions were undertaken only
after policy’ approval. 3/ After it was pointed out
to Gen. ‘Cushman that the Department. of State's knowl-
edgeability about Agency operations was ona strict

"need-to-know" basis, even for the Ambassador in Cuba,

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Cushman then showed Col. King some derogatory informa-
tion that the FBI had provided the Vice President
about both Ambassador Bonsal and William Wieland of
the Bureau of American Republic Affairs. Col. King's
memorandum provided no details about the nature of
this information, but the probability is that both
were accussed of being too tolerant of Castro and
communists. 4/

During one of these meetings in the early part
of 1960, Gen. Cushman- noted that the Vice President
had suggested that possibly the Agency would want to

consult with, or acquire the services of, Col. Edward

Lansdale, a member of Gen. Erskine's Special Operations:

Staff in the Department of Defense. Lansdale's activ-
ities in helping to quell the Huk rebellion in the
Philippines, apparently were well known to Nixon. 5/
On 2 March 1960, the Director of Central Intel-
ligence gave Vice President Nixon a detailed briefing

on "What We are Doing in Cuba:" The 7-page briefing

‘paper which had been given to the Director provided

information on Castro's pro-communist proclivities,

on the whole range of the anti-Castro propaganda ef-

fort which was being supported by Agency financing,

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‘and went into. details concerning attempts to rally
anti-Castro support, not only in the other Latin Ameri-
can nations, but in the Near and Far East and in Africa.
Details were given on the preparations being made for
resistance activities including the acquisition of
training bases in third countries, and both Ydigoras
Fuentes, President of Guatemala, and President Luis |
‘Somoza of Nicaragua were noted as having made offers
of support for this country's anti~Castro activities.
Plans for economic warfare against Castro were
also outlined for the Vice President. Delaying de-
liveries of necessary spare parts for the sugar indus-
try, tightening credit by oil companies to restrict
delivery of the essential petroleum products, and
possible restriction in ‘sugar quotas were mentioned
as under study. One other. item which was mentioned
in this briefing for Vice President Nixon was the
fact that the Agency had "a drug, which if placed in
Castro's food, would make him behave in such an irra-
tional manner that a public appearance could have very
damaging results to him." 6/ It’ should be emphasized
that at the date of this briefing (2 March 1960), the

United States did not yet. have an official anti-Castro

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policy -- that would not come until 17 March of 1960.

!
/ .

Subsequent to that announced policy, the author has
found no other references: to drugs or other types of
attack. which were being considered upon Castro's
person, or the persons of any of the other Cuban
leaders, as a part of the Agency's official program. *
There is some question as to whether it was the.
Director of Central Intelligence himself, or whether
it was Mr. Bissell, or, perhaps, whether it was Col.
King who actually briefed the Vice President on
2 March 1960. A stamp on the copy of the original
Memorandum for the Director reads: “Noted by DCI
28 March 1960." This copy was sent to the DCI through
the DDP and carries Mr. Bissell's initials. The car-
bon of the memorandum does not’ show this stamp and
the presumption is that it was the Director who did

‘

the briefing. A third version of the memorandum is

_-eren—ae ‘N

* See Part VII of this Volume of the History of the
Bay of Pigs Operation for clarification of the defini-~
tion of the Agency's official: policy regarding the
anti-Castro program, as contrasted to the unofficial
program. The author assumes that regardless of reader's
biases regarding the former Vice President, that the
fact that he heard about this drug in the course of a
briefing will not be construed to.make him a member of
a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other of the
Cuban leaders.

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dated 8 March 1960 and was revised to read:
For the Director's use at the NSC 5412
Representatives Meeting which will. con-
sider the Cuban covert action program
paper. (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon’ S
briefing.)
This would seem to imply that perhaps the DCI did in
_ fact do the briefing. While the briefer may: not be
: positively identified, there is no question however,
‘that the Vice President did receive a detailed brief-
ing on the Agency's plan for action against Castro
prior to the time of Eisenhower's formal proclamation. *
In addition to the meeting of 2 March when Mr.
Nixon was briefed on the Agency's concerns about Cuba,
the Vice President was also a participant in the
10. March 1960 meeting of the ‘National Security Council
when President Eisenhower emphasized that Cuba was a
danger, that he wanted contingency plans drawn up, and
that he wanted Cuba to be a subject for review at all

future National Security Council Meetings. Mr. Nixon

attended the 17 March 1960 conference when the President

* See Appendix G for copies of the first page of each
of the three memorandums on the briefing of the Vice
President on 2 March 1960. (For Appendix G see p. 344).

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“ gave a formal "go" to the Covert Action Plan of the
Agency which had been agreed to by the 5412 Group.
Mr. Nixon's only reported comments during this meet-
ing concerned the cutting off of new capital to Cuba,
the pulling out of private american firms, and the
possibilities of reducing tourism to stop the flow
of American dollars into Cuba. 7/
Perhaps one.of the reasons why Vice President
Nixon has been attributed with playing a major role
in the Bay of Pigs activity has to do with the re-_
lationship between Nixon's office and Mr. William D.
Pawley, former US Ambassador to Peru and Brazil and
a us businessman with extensive investments in Cuba
and interests in various other parts of Latin America.
Pawley also was a principal contributor to the Repub-
lican party, particularly to Mr. Nixon's cause. Ap-
parently hopeful of an appointment as Assistant Secre-_
tary of State for Latin American affairs -< assuming
a Republican party victory in the 1960 presidential
election -- Pawley was a widely known conservative.
In the spring of 1960, shortly following Presi-
dent Eisenhower's decision to promote the anti-Castro .

program, Pawley's contacts with the Agency (particularly

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with WHD) and with Nixon's office became increasingly
frequent and apparently quite close. On 21 March 1960,
four days after formal approval of the anti-Castro
program, Jake Esterline met with Pawley to plan a
meeting to be held in Pawley's Miami residence which
would include the DCI, col. King, Gen. Cushman, and
Walter J. Donnelly, Vice President of United States |
Steel and former ambassador to Venezuela as well as

Mr. Pawley. Of the session with Pawley, Chief, WH/4

t,

wrote:.

Details and the agenda were not dis-
cussed other than to say the principal
emphasis would be on reviewing what work
could be done throughout the hemisphere
and public opinion on the pending opera-
tion against Castro. Mr. Pawley was told
that the time had arrived for careful coor-
dination of all activities; that permission
had been granted for an all-out operation;
a government in exile will be formed post.
haste; that the acceptable non-Batista .
groups will be put into contact. with each
other almost immediately; and that Mr.
Pawley's contact, Rubio Padilla, will
figure prominently in this effort ... It

. was carefully explained to Mr. Pawley that.
any action involving exiles now should be
most carefully coordinated with Chief,
WHD and Chief, Branch'4 to avoid any flaps.* 8/

* Esterline also mentioned in his memorandum that
Pawley had provided some information on the Dominican
Republic which he asked Esterline not to pass beyond
CIA until’ he, Pawley, had the opportunity to give the
information directly to Vice President Nixon. .

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The meeting mentioned in the foregoing para-
graph was convened in Pawley's Miami residence on
‘1 April 1960, and the Agency's representatives briefed,
among other things, on the problems being faced by
_ the Cubans in exile who. were trying to form a govern-
ment. There was considerable discussion as to who
should be the nominal leaders of this government in
exile, with Pawley pushing in particular for Dr. Rubio
Padilla and the agency's representatives suggesting
Dr. Antonio Varona. For the benefit of the Vice
President's representative, it was stressed that none—
of the Latin American countries seemed particularly
anxious to provide a-base of operations’ for the
government in exile. The group was informed by the
Director of Central Intelligence and by Col. King
that, in addition to US Government financing, arrange-
ments were being made to have private confidential
sources help defray the costs of the Cuban government
in exile. Col. King pointed out’ that over and above
a bond issue | |
’ which will be floated in the name of the
government in exile with Mr. Pawley's
help, that donations are being made by

private citizens and corporations. He
indicated that confidential arrangements

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‘have. already been .made with the Bureau
of Internal Revenue ‘to permit individuals
Or corporate entities making donations to
claim these donations as contributions to
' the US Government for‘tax purposes. He
cautioned that this arrangement was being
‘limited to a very small group. 9/

The question also was raised about the relation~

ship of the anti-Castro program to the Organization of

American States. Mr. Pawley suggested that rather than

lean toward the OAS, better use should be made of the

US Military Mission in the Latin American countries,
especially having them pass the word on about the dangers

of the Castro Government to one and all in the Western

Hemisphere. Other items of importance that were dis-
cussed by the group were the planned propaganda program
and “the present pathetic effort on the part of the

Catholic Church to face up to the Communist plot in.

Cuba."

This meeting demonstrated that from the very

_ outset of the formalization of a US anti-Castro policy *

Mr. Nixon was being fully informed of the plans that

were underway to accomplish the US objectives, and

that certain private American citizens were closely

involved in the planning. Within a very short time

after the April meeting at Pawleys residence, however,

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senior Agency personnel + notably C. Tracy Barnes,
the ADDP/A -- began to question the Agency's rela-
tionship with Mr. William Pawley, particularly as
 pawley's support for Rubio Padilla was apparently
intended to establish a group of. Pawley supported
Cubans in exile in opposition to the FRD, the Agency's
supported exile group. Barnes's concern was that .
if the US continued to support the extremely conserv-
ative element represented by Rawley's group, it
would be charged that any anti-Castro action under-
taken by the us would be “on the basis of protecting
economic royalists." | .
| What Barnes stressed to Mr. Bissell, the DDP,
was the need for the US to decide whether or not it
wished to be charged with supporting reactionary
movements in Latin America, not only in Cuba, but
in the rest of the Central’ American and Caribbean.
; ‘
areas as well. ‘Once having made up its own mind,
Barnes suggested that CIA's’ position be worked out
with State “and thereafter take it to Mr. Nixon,
giving him at that time, a thorough and complete

briefing so that there can be no doubt: in his mind

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as to where we stand, and what we propose to do."* 10/
“When Rubio Padilla and the FRD failed to get
together, Pawley informed Chief, Western Hemisphere
Division that he was withdrawing from support of the
Agency's anti-Castro operation; and Pawley told col.
King that he intended to make his views regarding the
FRD known to Vice President Nixon. In addition,
Pawley also had a meeting with President Eisenhower

on 12 or 13 May 1960 at which time he stated his
opinions with regard to the Dominican Republic and
probably with reference to Cuba. In view of Pawley's
‘recalcitrance to continue to work on the funding of
the FRD, the DDP, ADDP/A, Chief WH/D, Chief WH/4 and

. others, discussed the pros and cons of cutting off

the communications channel between Pawley and the
Rubio groups into Cuba -- a channel which was pro- |
vided by the Agency's communications facility.

Chief, WH Division got the group to agree that
the communications channel should be continued because
* Mr. Barnes's thoughts probably were transmitted to
Director Dulles for in a meeting of the Special Group

on 19 May 1960,-the DCI categorized the Cubans sup-
ported by Pawley as “unreconstructed reactionaries." 10a/

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it did provide a window to the activities of the Pawley
group. Moreover, the Pawley group had a duplicate

channel into Cuba and would not necessarily have been

_ restricted by denial of the Agency channel. A restric-—

tion was placed on the transmittal of communications

which would be prejudicial to CIA operations in Cuba;

but it was agreed that Pawley should be advised of

the cancellation of such messages by Chief, Western
Hemisphere Division. The monitoring of such cable
traffic, however, was to be the responsibility of
Chief, WH/4, Jake Esterline.

Because of Pawley's close ties to the Eisenhower
administration, the Deputy Director for Plans agreed
that the discussion regarding Pawley should ‘be brought

to the attention of the Director of Central Intelli-

gence and that Mr. Dulles should be urged to bring

this matter before both President Eisenhower and Vice

President Nixon. 11/ By the first week of June 1960,
however, Jake. Esterline apparently had reached the
end of his tether, for in a Memorandum to the DDP,
he wrote:

It is our firm conviction, based on

months of discussion, that Mr. Pawley's
views on the Cuban situation are highly

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personal and rigid. These views in our
opinion are inimical to the best interest
of the United States. Mr. Pawley has re-
fused to budge from his position and has —
continued. to seek official endorsement of
his views at the high levels of the govern-
ment. The flagrant disregard for security
reflected in Havana cable 4820 dated
4 June 1960 requires Chief, JMARC to
recommend that all contact with the Rubio-
Pawley group be immediately and finally
severed. If such action is not taken,
no guarantee can be made for the security
of the JMARC operation. In point of fact,
the information in the foregoing message
indicates that security already has been
damaged severely. 12/ |

:,

Among other things, the Havana cable which had

aroused Chief, WH/4 stated that the following infor-

mation was being circulated in anti-Castro circles in

US Government now backing Rubio group
and no other group. Group has entre to
Veep. For a time Pawley was - having
trouble with an Agency or Agencies who
wanted [to] back another junta, but after
Pawley offered. [to] withdraw completely,
he was talked out of doing so, and given
assurance his group only would be backed,
{and this] resulted resignation person
backing other group. 13/

Headquarters prepared a priority cable ‘to be

sent to both Havana and to the Forward Operations
Base, which had also picked up the disinformation

being spread by the anti-FRD group. The text of the

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cable read in part as follows:

You have been authoritatively advised
that US Government is not (repeat not)
backing Rubio group.and that it has no
intention of ever doing so. It complete
fabrication that Pawley was given US
Government assurance that only his group
would be backed. No resignations of any
kind occurred, nor are any foreseen.
Mention Veep in such context and on this
particular level sheer foolhardiness and
can only reflect most adversely on those
Cubans who guilty misrepresentation of
facts and severest indiscretions. 14/

The cable apparently wag never forwarded to
either Havana or to Miami, presumably because of op- -
position from Col. J. C. King who had noted and ini-
tialed on his ‘copy of the Memorandum from Jake Ester-~

line recommending that all contact with the Rubio-

’ Pawley group be “immediately and finally severed"

the following: "I do not concur with severing of

all contacts."* 15/

* As will be noted subsequently, whether it was
political expediency or conviction that Pawley could
“actually do some good, the relationship among Pawley,
Chief, WH Division, and Chief, WH/4 continued through-
out the course of the Bay of Pigs Operation. If any~
thing in fact, the relationship between Pawley and
Jake Esterline appears to have become mutually sup-
portive, particularly as the operation drew to its
unsuccessful conclusion. ,

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On 20 June 1960 at the request of General
Cushman, Jake Esterline joined him for. lunch, the
purpose being to provide the General with sufficient
information on the state of the anti-Castro program

so that he could bring the Vice President up to date

from the time of the Miami meeting that had taken

place at William Pawley's house.* Among the points
covered were the developments related to the organ-
ization of the FRD and the, fact that Mr.° William
; ~ om
Pawley's candidate, Senor ‘Rubio, had decided not to
join the Frente. According to Esterline's memorandum:
‘Dr. Rubio's failure to join the Frente,
however, has not held up progress in form-
ing the junta, and/or the other important
aspects of the operation.
General Cushman was told that the Frente's headquarters
were to be established in Mexico, and it was on this
occasion that Esterline introduced General Cushman to

E. Howard Hunt, who was going to move to Mexico with

the Frente.**

* The meeting of 21 March 1960.

** Insofar as can be determined, this probably was
the first occasion on which Richard Nixon heard. the
name of E. Howard Hunt.

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‘Chief, WH/4 also touched on the programs that
were being beamed out of Swan Island, on the prepara-
tion being made for training paramilitary types, base
communications, planned paramilitary activities, the
choice of a Third Country's staging area, and that the
operation was still scheduled to begin during the
month of November 1960. Gen. Cushman noted that the
Vice President requested this information in order to
prepare for an upcoming NSC meeting at which he would
be a senior official. The vice President's aide also
asked if there were any particular problems with re-
lation to the operation that. Chief, WH/4 wished to.
have brought to the attention of the Vice President.
Esterline reported that the only problems that had
occurred concerned political differences among the
exiles, but that for the moment all factions seemed
to be quiescent. Chief, WH/4 also indicated to Gen.
Cushman “that much had yet to be done vis-a-vis other
‘countries in the hemisphere to ensure that JMARC
would have adequate support at the eleventh hour."* 16/

On 22 June 1960, General Cabell ~~ Acting DCI
at the time -~ briefed a special meeting of the National

Security Council on the Cuban situation. The Vice

* Except for Guatemala and Nicaragua, such support
would never be forthcoming. ;

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oO President presided and the meeting was attended by
the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, the
Director of the Office of Civil & Defense Mobiliza-
tion, the Acting Attorney General, a representative
_ of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and,
among others, Messrs. Bissell, King, Esterline, and
McMahan of the Central Intelligence Agency.* 17/
A great deal of the briefing was devoted to the
FRD and its leadership ~- their policies, their back-
ground, and the internal difficulties and bickering.
The propaganda picture also was discussed, with partic-
ular emphasis again on radio broadcasts from Swan
Island. Gen. Cabell stated that the paramilitary
plan was to develop a force of 500 men who would be
divided into 25 20-man teams. The teams would go
into Cuba to organize and to train indigenous dissident ,
groups. Cabell emphasized that the implementation

of the paramilitary program depended on the existence

* Knight McMahan was on the Staff of the Deputy
Director for Intelligence -- that component of the
Central Intelligence Agency which, according to some
of the “authorities" on the Bay of Pigs, was presum-
ably uninformed and unaware of the Agency's anti-
Castro program. .

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‘of viable dissident forces which “have not emerged
in strength."

The ADCI also mentioned the plans to create an
anti-Castro air force, but his comments about this
air force (even at this time) were very much in error.
According to General Cabell:

Some trained Cuban fliers are currently
available and we hope soon to have access

to additional numbers. "Sterile" aircraft

for their use have been mothballed by the

Department of Defense and earmarked for

CIA use. These craft can be made ‘available

in a matter of hours. 18/

As reported in an earlier volume of this history, nei-
ther the aircraft nor trained Cuban pilots would be
available for missions against Castro's Cuba until
late in the fall of 1960.*

In the NSC briefing, Cabell also made some inter-
esting comments about the resistance that might be
encountered in an attempt to oust Castro, emphasizing
that intelligence reports had indicated that Cuba >
Might organize “a ‘foreign legion' comprised of highly
trained: regular military personnel, drawn from Com-

munist nations, mainly the eastern satellites. Should

this eventuality occur it would seriously affect the

* See Volume I of the Official History of the Bay of
Pigs Operation, Air Operations.

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‘probable success of any purely clandestine paramili-
tary operations." Cabell then introduced a suggestion
which would be heard right up to the time that the
invasion fleet was being boardea -- that “volunteers"
be acquired for the anti-Castro forces, such volunteers
to be drawn from US Special Forces.* 18a/ | |
As the presiding officer at the special National
Security Council meeting, Vice President Nixon raised
a number of questions with the Department of State
representatives concerning support that the Organiza-
tion of American States would likely give to this
country's anti-Castro efforts; and he also posed a_
series of questions concerning the economic pressures
that the United States might put on Cuba. The. ques-
‘tions concerned sugar, oil, and tariffs in particular;
and the Vice President urged that "strong, positive
action [be taken] to avoid becoming labeled “Uncle

Sucker." 19/— ‘

* Wo such volunteers were permitted in the case of

the ground forces, but in the last two days of the

Bay of Pigs Operation such volunteers were accepted

for combat. air operations. See Volume I of this
“History, Atr Operations.

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On 1 July 1960, Jake Esterline received an inter-
esting telephone call from General Cushman, contain-
ing two messages from the Vice President. First, Mr.
Nixon was interested to know if there were any obsta-..
-cles that the Agency was encountering vis-a-vis other
agencies in support of JMATE; and if there were, the
Vice President indicated that he personally would
help to resolve such problems. The second request

was a bit more sticky. Gen. Cushman said

that the Vice President™has commissioned

him to. keep Mr. William Pawley happy and,

in connection with-this, he has also been

instructed to keep Mr. Pawley briefed on

how things are moving. General Cushman

said he realized that this is much against

our desire, as concerns Mr. Pawley, but

the fact remains that he [Pawley] is.a

“big fat political cat" and, as such, the

Vice President cannot completely - ignore
him. 20/ .

Esterline allowed that he understood the General's
problem and. suggested that with a few hours advance
warning the Agency would provide the Vice President,
or the General, with such briefing materials as nec-
essary for any given meeting with Mr. Pawley -~- after
first clearing the paper with the appropriate agency
officials and within the security regulations that

applied to Mr. Pawley. Esterline indicated in his

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‘memorandum that he. immediately informed the Deputy

Director for Plans, and the Assistant Deputy Director
for Plans, Mr. Bissell and Mr. Barnes, respectively,
about the call from General Cushman.*

ve

Jake Esterline apparently took the Vice Presi-

dent's offer to help CIA with difficulties it might

‘have with other agencies to heart. In a memorandum

from C. Tracy Barnes, concerning a.more effective

commercial cover for Radio Swan, it appears, from:

Barnes's response, that Esterline must have suggested

that the services of Vice President Nixon be engaged

to resolve a difficulty between the Agency and the

_ FCC over the use of commercial advertising to make

* The following interesting comments also appeared
in Esterline's memorandum on the conversation with
General Cushman:
This information {regarding Cushman's
telephone call] could not be given to Col.
King, as he had just departed on a three-~-
day trip.. This memorandum will be avail-
able -to Col. King, however, upon his re-
turn. Wednesday, 6 July. ;

Contrary to the opinions of ‘many who have. sug-
gested that Col. J. C. King was read out of the anti-
Castro operation, this memorandum would indicate that,
in fact, extreme care was being taken to make sure
that J. C. King was read into the act.

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Swan appear more legitimate. Barnes, however, took
exception and recommended that the US Government
should consider overt sponsorship of the Swan broad-
casts.* 21/

It was also in July 1960 that Vice President
Nixon's office, principally through the person of
General Cushman, first indicated an interest in the
activities of one Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. Garcia
was a Cuban exile who claimed to have extensive back-

. %,
ing both within the Cuban community in Miami and

‘among dissidents inside Cuba. At one point he claimed

that he could raise a force of 2,000 men in the Miami
area and 10,000 men inside of Cuba -- if he were given
proper financial support for training and equipping

these men. Garcia's name first came before the Agency

in mid-June 1960 following a meeting he had with a

Cuban exile who was an Agency contact. During this

* Whether the FCC was chastened by Mr. Nixon or whether
a determination was made concerning the increased use

of commercial advertising for Radio Swan is left in
doubt. But Barnes's suggestion of official, USG par-
ticipation in Swan was rejected. A note from Ester-
line on the official routing slip from Barnes for-

‘warding this memorandum read: “I believe Mr. Bissell

reversed this position?" To this query King noted
“Yes" on the buck slip.

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initial meeting Garcia claimed that he had large
stores of military equipment in Spain, that he had
additional promises of assistance from General Franco,

and that he had contacts in the White House who had

given him the "go ahead" for an invasion of Cuba!

Word of Garcia apparently got to the FBI, to
General Cabell, and apparently to the Office of Vice
President Nixon. In any event, on 9 July 1960 Jake
Esterline met with Mr. Marshall Diggs, a Washington |

; *
lawyer and Garcia's sponsor, where he was told of

Garcia's grandiose plans to overthrow Castro. In a

follow-up meeting in Diggs's office on 11 July, Mr.
Phillip Toomey, WH/4/Prop met with Garcia, Cameron
Pulley, and two reputed underwater demolitions ex--
perts. Garcia went into his act about how his force
could overthrow the Castro Government, assuming that
he could get some financial assistance for training
and equipping the troops. Mr. Pulley proceeded to
tell Mr. Toomey that Garcia's project was part of a
program that was being promoted by former Senator
Owen Brewster ‘for the entire Caribbean area -- appar-
ently a program designed tu eliminate all the bad

guys. Following another meeting on 13 July and after

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listening to Garcia denounce the FRD leaders as
Communists -- as well as. being unimpressed by his
credentials -~- on 15 July 1960, Marshall Diggs was
informed that the Agency had no interest in support-
ing Mr. Garcia. On 20 July 1960, Chief, JMATE met
with General Cushman to tell him that a full study
had been made of the representatives of Seffor Garcia;
and as a result, the DCI probably would get in touch
with Mr. Diggs and/or Senator Brewster and explain to
them "the wisdom of their desi'sting from pushing Garcia
as an outstanding Cuban military leader."

The subject dragged on, however; and at one
point Mr. Pulley, who with Mr. Diggs and ex-Senator
Brewster, was a strong supporter of Mr. Nixon, indi-
cated that the administration's policies with regard
to Cuba might hurt the Vice President in’the upcoming

election. Moreover Pulley also is reported to have.
indicated that a congressional investigation. of the
anti-Castro plan was possible. The Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence was advised on 26 September that
because of Garcia’ s threats to expose everything he
had learned ‘about possible Agency involvement in the

anti-Castro effort, including the Cuban exile

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organization in the United States, that the time had
come for Diggs and Pulley to be asked “to forego
their efforts on behalf of Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga."
This recommendation was approved by General c. P.
Cabell on 13 October 1960.* 22/

Insofar as the available records show, the con-

tacts between Vice President Nixon's office, and the

* More nonsense from Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga would
surface again in the summer of 1961 following Castro's
offer to free the Bay of Pigs” ‘prisoners in return for
US tractors when Garcia bounced up with another pro-

posal for the planned escape of the prisoners -- pro-
viding, of course, that he be given a bundle of bucks.

In fact, the hand of Garcia reached from beyond
the grave to touch on the BOP operation. On 2 August
1976, almost a year after Garcia's death, the Washing-
ton Star carried a.UPI dispatch saying that Rep. Thomas
N. Downing (D., Va.) had affidavits claiming that:

In return for support of the invasion
{of Cuba] from Mario G. Kohly, a popular
right-wing leader who was exiled from
Cuba, then Vice President ‘Nixon agreed
in October 1960.to order the CIA to
arrest the leftist leaders and turn

them over to-Kohly for "elimination"
after Premier Fidel Castro was thrown
out of office. |

The affidavits reportedly came from a former CIA con-
tract agent and Mario G. Kohly, Jr., son of the would-be
invasion leader. These materials were supposed. to have
some bearing on House of Representatives's investigation
of the assassination of President Kennedy; but there is —
no indication that they were given any credence. 23/

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Central Intelligence Agency -- except for the Garcia
case -- for all practical purposes ended by August

1960.*

The only other significant involvement between
the Vice President and the Central Intelligence Agency,
prior to the change of administration on 20 January
1961, concerned a briefing of the Democratic candidates
for President and Vice President of the United States,
prior to the 1960 election. | On 23 July 1960, follow-

ing the Democratic convention, Allen Dulles briefed

Sen.. John Kennedy, and on 28 July Senator Lyndon

‘Johnson. In his memorandum to President Eisenhower,

who had directed that Dulles give these briefings,
the DCI reported that in the two hour period for each
briefing he had covered US relations with the Soviet

Union, developments in the Berlin situation, in the

* Whether this reflects the concentration of the Vice
President's activities on the upcoming November elec- —
tion, whether the principal contacts came to be main-
tained between Col. J. C. King and Nixon's office --
with the consequent reference memoranda being included
in J. C. King's files, which have disappeared from the
sight of God and man -- or whether, in fact, this is
an accurate reflection of the limited contacts, the
author cannot confirm. His inclination is to believe
that the contacts probably were as limited as described -
above. , . -

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Congo, and in Cuba. Kennedy was briefed again on

19 September 1960, and again the briefing touched

_. on relations with the Soviet Union and on the trouble

spots in the world, including Cuba. The White House
was informed of this briefing prior to the event; and
subsequent to the briefing of Kennedy, Mr. Dulles
reported on the meeting to both Jerry Morgan of the
White House Staff and also to Brigadier Genéral Andrew
Goodpaster, Staff Secretary to the President. 24/
; a
The exact nature of the briefings that Dulles
gave to Kennedy on Cuba is of particular historical
importance in terms of the election of 1960. In the
last of the famous TV debates between candidates Nixon ~
and Kennedy, Mr. Kennedy, in the course of condemning
the Castro regime and suggesting that the United States
take stronger action against Castro, made the statement
that:
We must attempt to strengthen the non-
Batista democratic anti-Castro forces in
exile, and in Cuba itself, who offer
eventual hope of overthrowing Castro. Thus
far, these fighters for freedom have had
virtually no support from our Government. 25/

Based on his knowledge and interest in supporting

the anti-Castro program that had been authorized by

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President Eisenhower in March 1960, Nixon was put in
a Catch-22 situation; for as he said:

President Eisenhower had instructed
Allen Dulles, head of the CIA, to brief
the Democratic candidate on all opera-
tions, including Top Secret operations.

I knew that Kennedy had already received
two briefings from Dulles. I immediately
had a member of my staff call the White
House on the security line to ask if
these briefings covered Cuba. A member
of the White House Staff indicated they
had. (Several months after the election,
Allen: Dulles was to state that his: brief-
ing of Kennedy ‘had included Cuba but not
the training program fof, Cuban exiles.)
At the time of the debate, however, and
after checking with the White House, I
had to proceed with the assumption that
Kennedy had been briefed on the secret
program.

I was faced with the heads-he-wins,

tails-I-lose proposition. If in the TV

. debate I were to reveal the existence of
the training program and point out that I
had been one of its strongest advocates, I
would pull the rug out from under Kennedy's
position. But if I did so, the project
would be doomed, and also the lives of the
brave men, both inside and outside of Cuba,
who were receiving training and assistance.

I had only one choice: to protect the
security of the program, I had to oppose
Kennedy on his position of advocating that
the United States openly aid anti-Castro
forces inside and outside Cuba. 26/

It is interesting to observe that Nixon became

more philosophical about the impact of the final TV

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debate with regard to the outcome of the 1960 elec-
tion as time passed. In 1964 he would write "Most
observers agree that our positions on the Cuban

issue could well have been the decisive factor [in

‘the’ outcome of the election]." But in his recent

memoirs he expressed doubt that any single factor
in such a close election could really have changed
the outcome. * 27/ |

Following the TV debate+in which Kennedy had
raised the issue of assistance for Cuba, Nixon quickly
lashed back at Kennedy. The result of the introduc-

tion of the Cuban issue into the late stages of the

* In an interesting conversation with Fawn M. Brodie
who is writing a Nixon biography, the author of this
history, in response to Brodie's concern about the
fact that Nixon knowingly lied to the American public,
emphasized that plausible deniability was of real con-
cern at the time. of the TV debate. He also emphasized
the Catch-22 aspect of the situation as explained by
Nixon. The author also suggested to Mrs. Brodie that
it seemed equally valid to infer that perhaps Kennedy
had been leaked detailed information about the anti-
Castro program and that he used this device to put
Nixon in a corner during the TV debate. Arthur Schles-
inger, of course, claimed that the Kennedy comments

“ “were no more than a rhetorical flourish. Neither

Kennedy nor his staff knew about the secret Cuban Army
in Guatemala." 28/

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election campaign, struck sensitive nerves within
the Agency; and on 26 October 1960, General Cabell
met with Gordon Gray, President Eisenhower's National
Security Adviser, indicating that the discussion and
debate about Cuban issues were touching on

areas which, in the end, might be damaging to the
nation's interest. On 27 October at the Special
Group meeting, Mr. Gray reported that he had talked
to “certain Nixon people in the White House" in an
attempt to enlist their support to bring such dis- -
cussions to an end. 29/

It was not until.18 November 1960 that Presi-
dent-elect John F. Kennedy was fully briefed by Direc-
tor of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, and the
Deputy Director for Plans, Richard Bissell, on the
extent of the anti-Castro activities being planned
by the United States Government. 30/ Mr. Nixon's
misconception of the extent of the briefing that
Kennedy had received in the pre-election period was
not finally clarified however, until 20 March 1962
when Allen Dulles addressed a memorandum to John A.
McCone, his successor as Director of Central Intelli-

gence, stating as follows:
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I have read the portions of Mr.
Nixon's book with regard to the intel-
ligence briefings which he understood
Senator Kennedy had been given by me
with respect to Cuba during the campaign.
I have also seen the White House state-
ment issued today on this subject.

There has been here, I believe, an
honest misunderstanding. This was
probably due to the nature of the mes-—
.Sage Mr. Nixon writes he received as to
these briefings. The Cuban situation
was, of course, dealt with in the .
briefings I gave to Senator: Kennedy.
The last briefing I gave him was over a
month before the debate,in which the
issue arose. ,

My briefings were intelligence brief-

ings on the world situation. They did

not cover our own Government's plans or

programs for action -- overt or covert. 31/
As previously noted, however, by 1964, if not earlier,
Mr. Nixon had accepted the fact that he had made an
error in assuming that Kennedy. had received a more
detailed briefing than in fact he truly had.

By way of concluding this segment on Richard

x

Nixon's involvement in the Bay of Pigs activity, it

should be clear that by no stretch of the imagination

was Nixon "the architect of the Bay of Pigs."* 32/

* A statement made to DCI Stansfield Turner by Fawn
Brodie who attributed it to Tom Braden, an old CIA man,
in.a TV documentary on the CIA made by the Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation. .

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It is equally clear that Mr. Nixon, principally
through his aide, General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,
was fully read into the plans that were being
developed by the Central Intelligence Agency for
the ouster of Fidel Castro. This interest was
especially strong in the period from the winter of
1960 through the late summer of 1960. It also
should be apparent to the reader that while some
of the Vice President's interést -- particularly
in his insistence on placating William Pawley,
especially in giving undue attention to Pawley's
concerns that the Agency-sponsored Cuban~exile
organization was being taken over by the pro-Com-
munist groups -- was politically motivated, his
basic concern was the fear of the establishment
of a communist government in the Western Hemis-
phere. Certainly his constant interest and offers
to provide help for the Agency in its relations

to other branches of the US Government fall into
the latter, rather than the former, category. The

unanswerable question, of course, is whether Cuban

Communism would play such a large role in international

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affairs in 1979, particularly in the third world
countries, if Richard Nixon had been elected Presi-

dent in 1960.* |

‘

* Indicative of the more forceful role that Nixon
would have had the US play was the comment that he
reportedly made to William Pawley several weeks be-
fore the 1960 election, when Nixon indicated that he
favored breaking relations. with Cuba -- at that time |
-- recognizing a Government-in-exile, and then assist-
ing that: Government in its efforts to oust Castro. .33/

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Part VII

The Question of Assassinations

In his testimony before the Senate Select Com-
mittee to Study Governmental Operations, Intelligence
Activities, Richard M. Bissell, formerly CIA's Deputy
Director for Plans, testified fully and completely
to the role that he, Sheffield Edwards, and William
Harvey played in negotiations with Robert Maheu and
Mafia figures John Rosselli and Momo Salvatore Giancana
on plans for the assassination of Fidel Castro. In
addition to the. individuals just named, it also appears.
highly probable that Allen Dulles, the Director of
Central Intelligence (ana possibly both Presidents

Eisenhower and Kennedy) was aware that Castro was an
assassination. target. Unfortunately the Senate Com--
mittee Report -and the media. coverage of the investi-
gation of the Central Intelligence Agency's partici-
pation in assassination plots made it appear that the
Mafia involvement was a fundamental paxt of the Agency's
response to President Eisenhower's March 1960 authori-
zation for CIA to be principally responsible for the

ouster of Fidel Castro. In fact, the activities of

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Messrs. Bissell, Edwards, and Harvey, with Maheu and

the Mafia remained strictly compartmented and isolated
from the officially authorized Project JMARC -- the
Project which came to be known as the Bay of Pigs
operation. Bissell himself stated:

I don't remember. I have no recollec-
tion that [there was] any specific other
plot against Castro during this period
when the Bay of Pigs operation was in
preparation. I do remember my own feel-
ing that the Mafia plot had a very modest
chance for success, and that it was not
something to be depended*.on in any way.

I don't remember others. 1/

Bissell also told the author of this history that:

Shef [Col. Sheffield Edwards, Director,
Office of Security] would occasionally let
me know what was going on [vis-a-vis the
Mafia]. In effect, he and his immediate
subordinate were case officers for that
activity; and I don't think anybody else
{was] involved. I think probably Tracy
[Barnés] may have known about it, but I
don't think anybody else involved with the
Bay of Pigs operation knew anything about
it, whatever. My recollection is that it
never went to the Special Group, and that
is the view of [McGeorge] Bundy.* 2/

* Interestingly enough, at the same time that Col.
‘Edwards was concerned about the elimination of Castro,

CIA's Deputy Director for Support, Col. L. K. White,

noted:

. Shef Edwards and I met with General
Cabell and Jack Earman [on 22 March 1961]
to point out to them that we were not
(footnote continued on following page)

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Jacob D. Esterline, who was Chief, WH/4, the
component of Western Hemisphere Division specifically
created to run the anti-Castro project, disclaimed
either responsibility or knowledgeability about the
Mafia connection.* 4/ Richard D. Drain, who became

Chief of Operations for WH/4 was more voluble on the
‘subject of the assassination attempts which were re-
ported by the Senate Select Committee . In an inter-
view which touched, among other things on the planned
assassination of Castro by the Mafia-types Drain com-

_ mented:

furnishing. the Director the personal
protection which. we should be furnish-
ing in these critical times, particu-
larly with regard to the dangers inherent
in the Cuban situation. General Cabell
agreed to talk with the Director about
this, and to try to obtain his approval
to increasé Mr. Tighe's force to six
people. 3/ —

* Esterline claimed that on one occasion as Chief,
WH/4 he refused. to grant Col. J. C. King, Chief, WH
Division, a blank check when King refused to tell
Jake the purpose for which the check was intended.
Esterline reported that King nonetheless got a FAN
number from the Office of Finance and that the money
was used to pay the Mafia-types. It was subsequent
to the Bay of Pigs operation when he found owt about
this, and Esterline told the author of this history
that he expressed his strong opposition to the fund-
ing of such activities to J. C. King. 5/

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I've been giving you lessons here about
[how] a COPS should know a little about
everything ... Well, I promise you, until
it. came out in 1975, this allegation, at
least, that Shef Edwards and Mr. Maheu
were working with the Mafia to assassinate
Castro, concurrent. with the Bay of Pigs
Operation, that is the first time I ever
heard about it. Ever! ... My thought, when
I saw this, was Jesus Christ, I must have
been a little over-compartmented, because
we had spent a considerable amount of
nervous energy figuring out how are we
going to get a shot at the old son-of-a-
bitch concurrent with the landing. If
anybody with whom I participated in
planning for that ... something that we
never had figured out how to do, because
so many of our agents went down just prior
to the invasion. If anybody that was in-
volved in that ever spoke a word about any
other exercise going on to get Castro, I
never heard it; and-my initial reaction
when all this came out, during this last
year was ... well ... why did they give
me the idiot treatment? . Then it occurred
to me that maybe there was very good reason
for me not to know. You don't need to
know ... compartmentation ... even from
COPS is not unheard of ...

Well, mind: you, I am not saying what
I've just said in any kind of pique; and
I certainly don't want to leave you -- or
this tape recorder -- with the impression
that had I known about this, I would have
been opposed... I must say, I don't think
I would have enjoyed the instrument very
much -- whereas we put out an awful lot
of bullshit to the Cubans about the res-
toration of democracy and all that. Those
Cubans, that were working with us were not,
I submit, working for the re-establishment

of the Mafia as a controlling factor in

Havana. I had a helluva lot rather, in

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contemplating the assassination of Castro,
contemplated in the way that we were con-
templating it -- that is, can we get a
‘Rip Robertson close to him? Can we get

a really hairy Cuban -- I. mean a gutsy
Cuban -- to be infiltrated with this one
thing in mind? We surveyed all of our
agent material to see who could take a
shot at him, but the assassination of
that charismatic guy, coincidental -with
the invasion, would have been a highly
desirable thing. Whether the instrument
to be picked should have included the.
Mafia, I think I might have questioned at
the time. It was part of my job ... to
ask, “Now wait a minute ... What are we
doing here? ....If this comes out ...
what will we look like?™. Not only to our-
selves, which is important, but'to the
Cubans." 6/

In light of Drain's comments about the desira-
bility of having the good guys in the white hats elim- -
inate Castro, rather than the Mafia guys in the black
hats, a specific attempt was made to see what the
official records revealed about such plans. Although

XN

far from satisfactory or complete, there is evidence

4

to indicate that the white-hatted guys would have had

no objection -~- as reported by Mr. Drain -- if a suc-

cessful assassination attempt could have been made.

Contrary to General Cabell's reported put down of

Assistant Secretary of State Livingston Merchant for

' Merchant's query about the possibilities of taking

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“direct positive action" against the Castro brothers
and Che Guevara, WH/4 : records reveal interest, and
possibly Limited, direct participation, in a number
of such activities. *

~ For the most part, however, the various pieces
of evidence that seemed ‘to implicate WH/4 in assas-
sination plots against Castro or other of the Cuban
leaders. proved to be cold trails. The peripatetic
Howard Hunt claimed, even prior to the Senate inves-
tigations, that after a visit to Havana in the spring
of 1960, he prepared a report recommending among other
things that the Agency should:

Assassinate Castro before or coincident
with the invasion (a task. for Cuban patri-
ots) ... Barnes and Bissell read my report
--. and said it would weigh in the final
planning ... So far as I have been able
to determine no coherent plan was ever
developed within CIA to assassinate

‘
* As the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence,
Cabell. pointed out to Mr. Merchant that such action
was highly dangerous both in conception and execution,
and, further, he indicated that it was beyond the
Agency's capability. 7/ The Senate Select Committee
chased its tail at some length over the interpretation
of the ‘term “direct positive action," as used by
Merchant. Only someone (even a Senator) who consist-
ently engaged and in omphaloskepsis would have a ;
problem understanding the meaning to ‘be anything other
‘than assassination.

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Castro, but it was the heart's desire of
many exile groups.* 8/

In another instance, it appeared possible that an
agent named Rivero, a Cuban exile, might have been in
training to make an assassination attempt because it was
reported that he

was taken to the Warrington [ste], Virginia
firing range. where he was checked out in
the use of the Special .38 Airweight semi-
hammerless pistol; British Welrod pistol,
single shot, a 9mm parabellum with silencer;
carbine with folding stock; and a 7.65mm
British Welrod with silencer. He is to be
also checked out this week in the use of a
sporting rifle with telescopic lens attach-
ment. oo, ;

It was revealed subsequently that upon his reinfiltration
into Havana, Rivero had two principal sabotage missions --
one against the Esso; refinery and the other aimed at the
Havana Electric Company. 9/

In mid-July 1960, theré reportedly was an internal ©
Cuban attempt on Castro's life, an attempt in which neither
WH/4 nor the Mafia played a part. A cable from Santiago

N

de: Cuba reported:.

* Hunt alleged that when he asked Barnes about the status
of his recommendation he was told that it was “in the hands
of a special group." Jake Esterline and Jim Flannery
(Executive Officer of the DDP at the time of the Bay of
Pigs) both disclaimed knowledge of any memorandum prepared
by Hunt. A search of WH/4 records failed to surface any
such report.

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‘On 15 July 1960, the Cuban Government un-
covered a plot to kill Prime Minister Fidel
Castro Ruz on 26 July 1960 during his visit
to Mina del Frio, an army camp in the Sierra
Maestra mountains, between Bayamo and Manza-
nillo in Oriente Province. Three captains
‘and approximately 100 soldiers had been ar-
rested and more arrests are expected. 10/

In addition to Richard Bissell and Dick Drain, Jake

Esterline the Chief of Project JMATE was also very emphatic

. in denying that assassination of Castro or the Cuban lead-

ers waS a part of the JMATE Program. In response to a
question of whether various of the special arms that were
being forwarded to the PM training sites were intended for

use against the Cuban leadership, Esterline responded:

No, I think it [silenced weapons in par-
ticular] is for hit and run operations, where
they could do their maximum damage and get
out without necessarily alerting people ...

I know of no -- within JMARC as I knew it --

I know of no attempt, no plans that were made
to assassinate. As a matter of fact, the
constant battle with Cubans during those

years ‘was to tell them that we weren't

going to get involved in any assassination,
that if there was going to be an overthrow,

it was going to be, obviously, a bloody op-
eration; but no Cubans were going to be ©

Sent in there, to "make an assassination attempt."
It was. going to be a ground-roots revolution.* 11/

Some contradictory evidence, however, indicates

that WH/4, if not principally responsible, was certainly

* It is known that at least one assassination plot
against Castro and his advisers -- an attack by four men
using US rifle-grenades -~ was proposed by anti-Castro
Cubans to COS Havana, but the COS gave the originator of
the plan “no encouragement whatsoever." lla/

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aware of some sort of planned assassination activity.
One of the principals of WH/4 recorded that on 24 Feb-
ruary 1961 he:

_ Asked Ed [Stanulis], Dave P{hillips],

{Ed] Hinkle, [Bob] Moore, and Jake [Ester-

‘Line] why not proceed with Operation

“AMHINT to set up a program of assassina-

tion. 12/

Although the author of that remark was Chief of
Operations for Project JMATE, he was unaware, as re-
ported earlier in this chapter, of the Mafia connection;

el
but he had indicated that one of his hopes was that
the invasion might lead to the death of Castro.* In
response to a specific question about the AMHINT pro-
gram, all he could say was: -
I said that I was not failing to give

some attention to the business of assas-+

sination. Now, here on the 24th of Feb-'

ruary, when I asked Ed, Dave Phillips,

Hinkle, Moore, and Jake “why not proceed

with Operation AMHINT to set up a program

of assassination," either none of those

bastards knew anything about Sheffield

Edwards and Maheu in the Mafia ... or

some of them did, and didn't see fit to

say “Drain, take your AMHINT and stuff
- it. We've got this thing pretty well

* See pp. 279-281.

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‘covered." What I would love now [is] to
see an outline of AMHINT.* 13/

_ A few days after the reference to the AMHINT assas—
sination program, WH/4 Propaganda Notes contained the
following statement: “I [saminger] phoned following line
to Wilkinson from Swan: ... attempted assassination of
Guevara"; and Chief.Operations WH/4 made a cryptic note:
“CI and D watch Gueverra [ste] assassination attempt." 15/
When asked about the possibility that WH/4 was directly in-
volved in an attempt to assassinate Che Guevara, the former
Chief of Operations for the prBject wrote: |

My only memory of this is that we did not
plan a Che assassination, but must have gotten
intelligence that an attempt on him had been
tried, planned, discovered or speculated
on. 16/ . .

If one can assume that the statement "Ci and D watch
Gueverra [sic] assassination attempt" translates as "Counter-

Intelligence and Division D watch Guevara assassination

.* The author of this history has unsuccessfully tried to
track down this particular project. AMHINT was related
to the work of the Directorio: Revolucionario Estudiantil
(DRE), an anti-Castro organization inside Cuba. The only
evidence that has been found which might have been related
to an assassination attempt concerned an AMHINT request
of 14 January 1961 for “Silenciadores Rifles de marilla
telescopica." (A request for rifles with silencers and
telescopic sights.) This might have had to do with a DRE
plan to assassinate the Soviet Ambassador to Cuba rather
than a plan to kill Castro. When the FOB in Miami heard -
about the plan against the Soviet official they “immedi-°
' ately sent ... [word] to AMHINT-1 forbidding planned

‘atentado' [assassination] ." 14/
. — )

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attempt" then the comment from Chief of Operations appears

eminently sensible, for Counter-Intelligence and Division
D (which was responsible for intercept traffic) would be
the two most likely sources to pick up information should
an attempt be made on Guevara's life -- particularly since
such an item probably would not be reported overtly in the
Cuban press or radio. -
. One ‘final item which was surfaced during the course
of research concerning the possibility that WH/4 had >
actually included an assassination program as part of its

operational planning concerns a carbon copy identified

only as "Must Go List." The single sheet of unknown prov-

enance lists and identifies in the following order eleven —

individuals: ‘

Che Guevara - Minister of Industries

Raul Castro Ruz —- Chief of Cuban Armed
Forces, and wife, Vilma Espin de Castro

Blas Roca - International Communist leader
and Secretary General of Communist Party

Ramiro Valdez Menendez - Minister of

; Interior (G-2) :

Carlos Olivares - Deputy Foreign Minister

Carlos ‘Raphael Rodriguez - Communist leader,
editor of newspaper HOY

Lazaro Pena - Communist leader - labor
movement

Abelardo Colome. - Deputy in G-2

Captain Rogélio Acevedo - Chief of Militia

Anibal Escalante ~ Communist leader

Armendo Hart Davalos - Minister of Education,
and wife, Haydee Santamaria de Hart

Pencilled in on the bottom of the paper is a note:
"List forwarded E. L. by C/WH/4 in Nov [1960]."* When
* A copy of the list follows p. 287. The list should
read Armando, rather. than gpmende Hart.

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asked if he could identify the "Must Go List" the
former Chief of WH/4 stated: ~

Weil, I know all these people ... Some
of them I know personally, like Armando
Hart ... I entertained Hart in my home a
number of times ... the miserable bastard.
I have never seen that list in my life,
but this is the whole top gang at that
time. Now many of them were later elimi-
nated from the power structure by Castro,
and by Raul Castro ... They got rid of
Olivares, and Roca was pushed aside ...
Armando Hart was also half nuts at this
point, and he still is. I guess he is
still fairly prominent,,but he is not
really in the power structure. Abelardo
Colome ~-- I don't even know who he is.

I wish to help you, but I don't know. 17/

The former Chief of Operations for WH/4, in re-
sponse to the question of whether the "Must Go List"
meant anything to him, replied as follows:

No! Huh! “List forwarded E. L. by
Chief WH/4" ... Eddie Lansdale ... E. L.
would be Eddie Lansdale. Chief, WH/4
was Jacob D. Esterline. In November, I
was. there ... No “Big Daddy.“ Well,
whether this "Must Go“ is in terms of
the assassination, or in terms ... [of]
nobody, none of these people must be
allowed to have a role in the new govern-

ment. I guess “Must Go" came to pass
eventually in the case of number one on |
this list, Che Guevara. Raul ... I myself,
contemplating the future government, thought
it might be interesting to try to keep
Raul in, with Fidel out. Capture what
magic there was in the name of Castro,
but do it with that little homosexual,
instead of with Fidel, the real man. I

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don't even know the rest of these guys --
_ Hart, Escalante, etc. 18/

By way of summarizing, it would appear that CIA's
official anti-Castro program as reflected in Project
JMATE did not include assassination as an integral
part of its operational planning, but would not have
been averse to eliminating Castro or other of the.
Cuban leaders if the opportunity had been afforded.
Based on records, however, WH/4's principals were in
no way privy to, or participants in, the Mafia assas-

ination planning at the time of the Bay of Pigs.

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Part VIIL .

_ Conclusions

This volume has traced the history of the CIA's
official anti-Castro program from its inception in
1959 through the end of the Eisenhower administration
in January of 1961. It emphasized that in the initial
period when Castro's revolution was taking place, the
Agency, reflecting the policies of the US Government,
was caught betwixt and between -- to move with Castro
or to move against Castro. Shortly following his take-
over, it became cleax that Castro had little or no in-—
tention -- nor apparently concern -- for establishing
cordial relations with the “Colossus of the North."

Instead, he turned to the Soviet Union and its allies

x

for military, technical, and economic assistance. It
- became clear that a new philosophy was being intro-.
duced into the Caribbean basin and‘that this philosophy
was directly contrary to the interests of the United
States Government and to the governments of many of
the Latin American nations, whether democratically

governed or governed by dictatorships of the right.

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As Castro's threats -became more serious, and

as increasing pressures were put on legitimate eco-
nomic interests’ of the United States in Cuba, pressures
within the United States Government led to a decision

that Castro must go. . With great concern about the

impact any overt, anti-Castro activities by the

United States Government would have on the United -
Nations and on the Organization of American States,

it was decided that a covert plan of action would be
adopted. This was the officially sanctioned program
approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March of 1960.
It broadly outlined the political, economic, propaganda,
and paramilitary programs which would be implemented

in an attempt to oust Fidel Castro. CIA was j}to be

the principal action agent for the bulk of the program.

Once the official US position was announced,

CIA made organizational plans to carry out the policy.
A separate Task’ Force within the Western Hemisphere
Division was established under the leadership of Jacob
D. Esterline, on whose shoulder Col. J. C. King, Chief,
. Western Hemisphere Division perched and peered. Initial
concepts of the Central Intelligence Agency called

for a propaganda program to be run out of a radio

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station based on Swan Island and by Agency financed
radio operations out of Station WRUL in New York City.
Strong support was to be provided for anti-Castro
publications launched in the area of Miami. Para-
military programs initially called for the training
of cadres of communicators and paramilitary instructors
who would go into Cuba and provide leadership and .
training for the numerous dissident elements that
reportedly were ready to move against Castro.

™"
‘as the summer of 1960

Unfortunately, however,
drew to a close, it became apparent that Castro's
military strength and training programs were sharply ..
improving.and that the initial plan to infiltrate
small teams to organize the dissidents no longer was
feasible. Consequently, the concept changed to one
of.a landing in force, the acquisition ofa defensible

base in Cuba from which a Provisional Government might

call for assistance from the United States Government
if the invaders themselves could not arouse sufficient
support to force the overthrow of Castro.

This volume emphasized that following his decision

in March 1960 that there should be an anti-Castro pro-

gram, President Eisenhower remained quiescent on the

= 292 -

! a TOP SECRET

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question of developments of the anti-Castro program
until late in the fall, following the election of 1960
and the defeat of Mr. Nixon. At that tiime Mr. Eisen-
hower reinjected himself into the program and stimulated
action to the point where some of CIA's planners hoped
that -- in addition to the propaganda program which was

already underway -~ paramilitary operations might be

‘initiated. Apparently this was feared by Castro,

too, for in his famous TV broadcast on the Bay of Pigs
he said: ,

. When our country was in danger of
direct aggression and mobilized itself,
it waited for the [Kennedy] presidential
inauguration thinking that this man
[Kennedy] would do something different,
because all in all, we didn't understand
why a man who assumed the administration
of the United States would want to bear
the guilt of someone else's mistakes.* l/

This was not to be, however, for aside from considerable
emphasis on the propaganda activity, there was only

limited support for sabotage activities prior to the

* Raul Roa, Castro's Foreign Minister charged that

-.in the Eisenhower administration Vice President Nixon

and General C. P. Cabell, ADCI, were two of the most
vigorous proponents of direct action, with Cabell
proposing air and naval protection for the invasion
and, if necessary, use of US marines to hold the
beachhead. 2/ ;

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end of Eisenhower's administration. There was con-
siderable concern over the necessary formalities of
diplomacy in order that the United States not be in-
volved in investigations by either the UN or the OAS
for its anti-Castro program.

Because it has been so widely publicized that
ex-Vice President Richard Nixon was one of the prin-
cipals in planning the Bay of Pigs Operation, this
volume has attempted to put the role that Nixon

played into the proper context®. It was the role of

an interested senior officer in the Executive Branch, |

and by no stretch of the imagination could Nixon's
role be construed to have had a major impact on the
development of operational planning by the Central
Intelligence Agency in its anti-Castro effort.

. Similarly, because of the sensationalism which
surrounded the Senate Select Committee's report on
Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders,
including Fidel Castro and the implications that the Mafia
plot was a part of the authorized planning for the Bay.

of Pigs Operation, thorough examination of the evidence

was undertaken to determine if this allegation was sup-

‘portable. It was not. ‘The Mafia operation was run

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aside from, apart from, and independent of the formal
anti-Castro program which was undertaken by CIA. At
most, four or five senior officials -- Allen Dulles,
Richard Bissell, Shef Edwards, Bill Harvey, and pos-
sibly, Tracy Barnes -- probably were knowledgeable
about the Mafia connection and Mr. Maheu.

In terms of Project JMATE itself, the .few bits

eee?

of information which indicate the possibility of as-
sassination attempts against the Cuban leadership also
fail to demonstrate any respongibility for their ini-~
tiation on the part of WH/4. ‘If anything, the evidence
would indicate. that WH/4's position was one of watchful
waiting and wishful thinking that dissident Cubans
would themselves eliminate the Castros and Che Guevara.

‘The possibility, of course, that Agency-supplied weapons
might be involved in such an attempt ‘cannot be ruled
out. 3/ |

Obviously it would be foolish to contend that

those principally responsible for developing CIA's

' anti-Castro program would have objectéd to the assas-
sination of Fidel Castro. On the other hand, this |
was not one of the basic concepts nor intentions of |

the official program of the Central Intelligence Agency.:

= 295 -

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k

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Appendix A

Memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence

from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59

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fo whom. raw a fine across column ‘after each comment.)

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Li Becentomer 1

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TEMORANLO #OR: Director of Central Intelits

VIA: Deywty Director (Plans)
GUBSECT: Cuben Problems.

This menorsadun = requests aporoval by the Diracttor oc? the xeccruen-
C2tions cowtatned in paragraph 3.

-

i. Nstimate of the Situation.

a. A Getatorshin of the far LePt ls nov astablisnmad. Tt
is’ not only unfriendly to the United Stctea in oral eriticisa, but

has ta: sen acticn against Aneris an properties, both industrial and
agricultural, which, ii perubtbted to stead, will encmurage siailac

acti ons azainst U.S. noldiags in other Latin American countriss.
% ’

b. Wedo and must expect 3 wajor increase in the scale nd

effectiraness of Cuban aid and parti elpation in revolutionary .
achiors against other countries o? Latin A wnerica now Crisndly to
the United States. Tn addition to Vaose hat ‘have already been
tergets - Micarsima, Paneme, the Damwitican Resubliic ond Haiti,
recon’ Entei cgence indicates 2 Girect interest by Cestre in ..

Coloweia and P. . Betancourt's positior in Venemele would he
gravely weakened by Caatro succeshas, and 1% is believed crly a
quaustion of tine before an allience would be eatadLi shed betreen
the poverful Commmist Party of Venemtela and the Castros. —

Ce Rapid naticralization of the banks 3 industisy and commerce
is reportedly contemplated. If this occurs, the stials group in
control vill have 2t its disposition several hndred willion dollars
froa the sale of the sugar crop early is 1960. Part of these 2nnds
may ba sed to further their revolutiorery onjactives against other

nounbrle 28 sof the Caribbean and South América. ;

a

ad. Castro naa lost the sw aggort or the wover class acd most of

nijale class, | Tie » prebai) ¥ still bas a sufficient following fron

cae ml
the nasuas to maintain control util Yurther iproads can be mada in
Bis vomilar support t ead the uppoaition nots effectively unifisd.

& _Propagsnda sekion toa reduce nis f follovicz, wails easential,
in ies212 will probably rot be eongh to dislodge Win. His eusroacking

strane isola on Cuba will be broken only oy violent netion.

£. it is ay versonsl coinion taet if Castro is sucesss2ul in
consciidating his position and remaining in power for two mors years,

—2a7

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juta
fiomtss aver uwsswaption oY office.

lusting damage may occur to the United States' alrsudy weskenad
position of leadership in Latin Americs.

&. U.S. Objective.
= overtharoy of Castro within cre year, and his repiscerent dy a

friendy to the United States which will call tor elections six

Prd

3e Recoumended Action:

wt
cries

ck
a

& Clandestine radio attacks trom Caribrean countries ov

Aiberal group, working closely with us and ‘using Cuban netionels for

broadcasting.

Dd. nerusioa overations agsinst Castro's {V7 and radio, to
be mounted from within Cuba

c. She encouragement of proJ-S. cpposition gromps, exc}uding
Bytiste anl Mesferrer supporters, to establisn by fords 2 contreiied
area within Cuda. This would have the following advantages:

(1) It wousd cermit che establismmeat of a radio stetion,
long yave, woich would reach wll of tha acations in Cuba.

Since it would be on Cuban soil, the problans o2. Joint

tions with other covatries would be elimina tad.

(2} A controlled area would ve a walltying point for
the growing opoosition to Cautro in the same senner that tt
25th of July movement in the hills of Oriente became the

vallying point of ueny who turned against Batista.

(3) ret would be a mesns of t2 esting the strength a nd. Libre
or th» opposition, and separating the men trom the boys. ,

(4) The reportedly Large fe Pregemented 2 ecents of the
constitutional Cuben Aray would neve a > lace | to go.

(5) A sizeable guerrilla moverenat within Cuda would
eurtall Castro's plans for revoictionary action against
cthar countries. : ..
. iy et amelie
ad. Whorough consideration 2 elimination tor Pidel
Castro. Hone of those chase to Tidal, w such as his brother Rent

298

13-00000

er his cameenion Che Guevarra, haye the se
tne masses. Many informed people believe ah tna diss
of Side would greatly accelerate the 2sli oF the presect Govermrent.

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299

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Appendix B
‘A Program of Covert Action
Against the Castro Regime

16 Mar 60

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t.
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This document is our basic policy
paper. It was approved by the
President at a meeting in the

White House on 17 March 1960.

™
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Pues Pi y
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QCARIT
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Stee ete A me ata mee a core

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16 March 1960.

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME |

l. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring.
about the’ replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true
interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner
as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of
accomplishing this end will be to.induce, support, and so far as possible direct
action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort
that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. | —
Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be
provoked by circumstances beyond controi of the U.S. before the covert action
program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it
out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U. S. to
act in a-crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of
action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing
. and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared
as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped
that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape or
a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition
groups with which the Central Intelligence Agency is already in contact.

The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the

Eyes Gay
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SS A SRS SAE SR A EL Oo

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> NBS OMY
SECRET

Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan,
and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political
alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet
for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various
opposition activities; and provide cover for other compartmented CrIA
controlled operations. (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of
popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means ‘for
mass commiunication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda
offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition.

The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short

wave gray. broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island.

‘The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supple-

mented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by
private Cuban groups and by the clandestine distribution of written
material inside the country. (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert
intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be respon-
sive to the orders and directions of the “exile opposition. Such a,
network must have effective communication ard be selectively manned,

to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization caa

probably be created within 60 days. Its role will be to provide hard

YEO avy 302
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‘the Island. Initially’a cadre of leaders will be recruited after care-

ful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. Ina second

mN

intelligence, to arrange for the illegal infiltration and exfiltration
of individuals, ‘to assist in the internal distribution of illegal
propaganda, and to plan and organize for the defection of key individuals |
and groups as directed.
| d. Preparations. have already been made for the development of
an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms

for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on

phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations
outside of the U.S. ‘so as to be available for immediate deployment into
Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both
before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of
resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of
six months and probably closer to eight. “In the meanwhile, a limited
air capability for resupply and tor infiltration and exfiltration already
exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when
the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this.
with a.small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial
operation in another country.

3. Leadershio: It is important to avoid distracting and deévisive rivalry

among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the


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EYES QULY °
SERED

opposition. Accordingly, every effort wili be made.to have an eminent,
non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence
of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various
personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract,
control, and lead the several forces.. As the possibility of an overthrow of
_ Castro becomes. more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S.
support focused upon him, and his build up undertaken,

4, Cover: All actions undertaken by CIA in support and on behalf of

1

‘the opposition council will, of course, be explained as activities of that entity
{insofar as the actions become publicly lmown at all). . The CIA will, nowever,
_ have to nave direct contacts with a certain number of Cubans and, to protect
these, will make use of a carefully screened group of U.S. businessmen with
a stated interest in Cuban affairs.and-desire to support the opposition, They
will act as a funding mechanism and channel for guidance and support to the

irectorate of the opposition under controlled conditions. CLA personnel will
be documented as representatives of this group. In order to strengthen the
cover it is hoped that substantial funds can be raised from private sources to
| Swpport the opposition. $100, 000 has already been pledged from U.S. sources.
At an appropriate time 2 bond issue will be floated by the council (as an
obligation on a future Cuban government) to raise an additional $2, 906, 000.

5, Budget: Itis anticipated that approximately $4,400,006 of CLA funds

wil be vequired for the above program, On the assumption that it wiil not .

CVlO ANI
RIES BNL. so,

“Ooranrs.

13-00000

pasty
SECRET

reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated
requirements for FY-1960 funds is $900, 000 with the balance of $3, 500, 000
‘required in FY-1961. | The distribution of costs between fiscal years could,
of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforeseen contingencies
which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C) |

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized
to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for
this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5. from the Agency's Reserve for

contingencies.

ay
ra

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) : Aa0
ee

rin
eas
ts Yd
Cr
cn

uy
T

ma
oo
se]
re

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION

.l. CIA is already in close touch with three reputable opposition groups
(the Montecristi, Autentico Party and the National Democratic Front). These
_all meet the fundamental criteria conditional to accepiance, i.e. -they are
for the revolution as originally conceived --many being former 26th of July
members--and are not identified with either Batista or Trujillo, They are
- anti-Castro because of his failure to live up to the original 26th of July
platform and his apparent willingness to sell out to Communist domination
and possible ultimate enslavement. - These groups, therefore, fit perfectly
the planned opposition slogan of "Restore the Revolution". foes
| 2. An opposition Council or Junta will be formed within 30 days from
representatives of these groups augmented possibly by ‘representatives of
. other groups. ‘It is probably premature to have a fixed platform for the Council
“but the Caracas Manifesto of 20 July 1958 contains a number of exploitable
points. Two of the CIA group leaders were signers of the Manifesto. The
following points are suggested as a few possibilities:
a. The Castro regime is the new dictatorship of Cuba subject
‘to strong Sino-Soviet influence.
|
b, Cuba is entitled to an honest, democratic government based

on free elections. There is no hope of this as long as Castro throttles

. t
the rights of legitimate political parties and the freedom of expression.

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EVES ONLY
SECRET
set

c. Arealistic agrarian reform program providing for individual

ownership of the land must be put into effect.

d. Individual freedoms must be restored and collectivism in
commerce and education must be eliminated.
e. Sino -Soviet influence in the affairs of Cuba must be eliminated.
A special research group of Cubans with American support is planned to refine
and expand these planks and to produce propaganda materials based on the above

platform for use by and on behalf of the opposition Council.

™.

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i:

™, ™; Tab B

. PROPAGANDA

re Articulation and transmission of opposition views has already begun.
. Private opposition broadcasts (i.e. purchase of commercial time by private
individuals) have occurred in Miami (mediurn wave) and arrangements have
been made with Station WRUL for additional broadcasts from Massachusetts
(short wave) and Florida (broadcast band), Presidents Betancourt and Ydigoras
‘have also agreed to the use of commercial stations for short wave broadcasts
from Caracas and Guatemala City. CIA has furnished support to these efforts
through encouragement, negotiating help and providing some broadcast
material,

2. As the m2jor voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at
least one “gray" U. S. -controlled station, This will probably be on Swan Island
and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial
power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these wu be
transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience
and as the overation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan

Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate cove rage of all
parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. Such an additional facility
might be installed on a U.S. base in the Bahamas or temporary use might be
made of a shipborne station if it is desired to avoid "gray" broadcasting from

- Florida.

arin iene Meat keene cee eS

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. - ~ s , , ~\
EYES CMLY “
SECRET

3. Newspapers are also being supported and further support is planned
for the future. Avance, @ leading Cuban daily {Zayas' paper), has been
confiscated as has =1 Mundo, another Cuban daily. Diario dela Marina,
one of the bemisphere's outstanding conservative dailies published in Havana,
is having difficulty and may have to close soon. Arrangements have already
been made to print Avance weekly in the U.S. for introduction into Cuba
‘clandestinely and mailing throughout the hemisphere on a regular basis. As
other leading newspapers are expropriated, publication of "exile" editions
will be considered. ; . ™%,

4, Inside Cuba, a ClA-controled action group is producing and distributing
anti-Castro and anti-Communist publications regularly, CJA is in contact with
groups outside Cuba who will be assisted in producing similar materials for
clandestine introduction into Cuba.

5. Two prominent Cubans are on lecture tours in Latin America. They
will be followed by others of equal calibre. The mission of these men will be

_ to gain hemisphere support for the opposition to Castro. Controlled Western
Hemisphere assets (press,. radio, television) will support this mission as
will selected American journalists who will be briefed prior to Latin American

travel.

13-00000.

. Z - r > ER any y ; “Tab Cc

FINANCIAL ANNEX -

I. Political Action oO , ' FY-1960 : FY-1961
Support of Opposition Elements ;
and other Group Activities 150, 000 800, 000
I. ‘Propaganda
Radio Operations and Programming
(including establishment of trans -
mitters)- ; - 400, 000 . 700, 000

Press and Publications — m, 100, 000 500, 000

fi, Paramilitary

In-Exfiltration Maritime and Air

Support Material and Training 200, 000 1, 300, 000°
IV. Intelligence Collection 50, 000 200, 000
Totals , * 900, 000 3,500, 000

‘X

*These figures are based on the assumption that major action will not
occur until FY-1961. Uf by reason of policy decisions or other contingencies
over which the Agency cannot exercise control, the action program should be

accelerated, additional funds will be required.

~ ata

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Appendix C-1

CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC:*.
1) Letter for Allen. Dulles

from Arleigh Burke,
17 Mar 60

13-00000

“J UNCLASSIFIED Ld see "Gy
. ROUTING AMD GEC:

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Ltr from Admnirai Sueks - . ;

‘DD/P . So oe
: da Macecn 1664

DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
ustdieg) INIT13i5 4 t wron,

1, Admiirat Burke sent this
over to the Director on the
aiterngon of 17 March and tha
latter handed to me. Ido nat
Delieve it requires a reoly
but pass it to yau for any
value it may have.

pod fe

: 4 “RM Bjr.
Wath, 42 ABj

5. i.
t : . i
bles A iic CB | Sos

joanne nnn InTIRSIDEEENIE HY SunenERanER eres

4. , :

n : i

i

3.

Eo
Fr a i
fy “4 -
WH Obes Feb
v7 ;

; .
QFRICER S 2 COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
‘Draw @ Hine vcror column alter each comment.)


13-00000

CO Okt

17 March 19690
PERSONAL - TOP SECRET

Dear Allen:
: . . : \.

Enclosed is a memorandum my staff pre-
pared containing some suggestions which might be
‘useful to you in your work. Naturally, I do not
agree with quite all the comments contained in the
memorandum, but I know-that you will forgive
the impatient young lad for his desire to make sure
no opportunity is left uncovered.

Warm recards.

n

Sincerely,
The Honor able

iliyt BURKE |
Allen Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

Enclosure

312

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Appendix C-2
CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC:

2) Letter for Gordon Gray from
Arleigh Burke, 16 Mar 60

Ww
wr
Ww

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Dear Gordon:

Encloseé is a convy of 2
momoranduma on U.S. -action in
Cuba which may be of interest
to you. ,

Sin cerely yours,

bh.

ARLEIGH BURKE

The Honorabie

Gordon Gray

Special Ascistant to.the President
for National Security Affairs

The White House ,

Enclosure

314

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very out : : . - . Op4Ao3D/ivr
os ae a : L6 Ve: 950
rl 9
Lieu.
“sy. fons
‘4 yO ot

«*
eA
ie)

1, ‘Whe recomacndciiens comiained in the wper on "U.S. Actions in Cuba" were
oMied oripinally to provide the brozd outline for a carefully laic out
Pe for causim, the Castro reise to be replaced by a friendly povernment .

Jt was interded that “tate would lo ically control and coordina nie allapects
provide the guidance as.to the specific actions uired of the other

teents of the government, The paper was not suterereted in this manner

wee Nio received it and the search appears row to be for specific actions
which can be wed.to accomplisn the end desired

9

ie
my
aa

‘
et
a

2 The tol loins are offered as possible s pecific actions which can be taken

in stvport of ow position on Cuba — You wmifht desire to have 00 inject
these jiccs ints the KOC scétine, 16 Zarch,

a. Tach - Chairman, or the Chief of the U.S. Nelretion, attempt to have

@ Gcleyation other than U.S. introduce 4 motion for the board to consider the
gap in henispheric cefense resulting from the Cuban oituetion or for the

Board to rocommend th wat tk ne OAS study the influence of Kommunisn in Cuba...

asseroial ~ Oil companies aro not being paid by Cuba, State could
oil coz zpanies to point out to the governments who produce the
ets. an tieir cconomies of the loss of the Cuban uarket.

Ce Schocls and “ar Colleces ~ ‘The Services could include in courses for
foreizn officers the cfiect on hemisphere defense of the establishner it of a
Soumnist Gictatorship in Cuba,

‘a. Commercial ~ Do iatin Anericans. hold stock in the expropriated properties
in Guba? If SO, State could regucst the companies concerned to include in
‘their dividend maiiangs, information pointing out the effect on the companies
_e@arninis andthe stock holders' cividends of expropriation of property without
conpens sation and, for the oil companies, » non-payment for oil celivered,

e. State in conjunction with CIA, pudlish a weekly or bi-xeekly: letter
Gocanenting the ctions: of the Castro Covernment for the previous period.
Incliced would be:

ag o: hun

re ) Lous norights.
(2) Kormenist tronds ané actions,
(3) Dictator

tato isl and undemocratic act tions.

315

Soave 2 nt? Leanies = Pa:e 1 of 3 copies

i/

13-00000

sloxntie posts.
an. AGr Force for surther distribution to units or
atin ccericans,

st

Castro repiso.
for the U.S. position.

te,

Alert Latin Avericans as to the sommunist agpocts,.

ané Gistribute speech material su
adc tresses, Ha terial snoulc cover

forwards tie aspects of present Cuban tovernment,
throat of Xomnunisn in Cunha to henispheric cefense.
Gre

ne cietatorial. aspects of the Cuban reine. on

the Cuban regise's actions against the basic numan rights,
the strategic impor tunce of tre Cuantanemo Naval base.
ire) 7

Oued tH
Ne er ae et

The logic of the firmness of the treaties by which we hold |
Cuantanano aré the forsal comiitnent of the Castro regine on taking power
to honor Cuba's international cozm:.itments,

(
(

3

Distribute this saterial to the Services and to their Leazues and
Aéssociaticns for raxinuz use in oublic ssecctics.

Ce. 28GB - have Uersral Skaer, as Director of the Staff, IéDB, inject
into the month wly intéllijzence briefinss at the IADB inforzation on the latest
Soviet Bloc actions and the pro:ress of International Komsunism in Cuba.

h, State, in conjunction with CU: and the Service intelligence arencies
hold special briefings oce cach month on the general situztion in Cuba with
specia 1 emphasis on the Kozmunistic aspects for the following:

(1) U.S. officials of the OAS and UN. ’

(2) U.S. person anel of the Staff of the IALB.

(3) ors 15. personnel in Washington having duties involving
close contact with 4atin ieevioans.

iw]
ro,
i
Q
1 a
fs
| ol
¢.
$e

i, All Services provice spscial briefings on a one-tine basis alone “ne
dine of nm, above ior officers and enlisted nersomicl of units proceeding t
Caribsean or South Averican ports

J. Navy endcaver to have a good resorter or author prepare a story con=
taining the lewy's vicows on Cuantanazo for publication in 3 national magazine
With “ide circulation in Latin Averica,.

7 tac
TOP SrCx

ae

316 7

13-00000

we

wee

ets pany
auii Sut. teed

. ecept °.

rw Merchant's ofier in his lett
serho us & conplete briefir

letter of\-aren 10
of State » wartzer: wt. activitics
situstion in an effort to prod State to nove Taster.

S and, croups of
‘reat in Cub.

U.S. Nations:
sa Yor Furt!

als goin, to
wr dissoningtion to

F

Vory. respectfully,

J.B, POUD, Jk.

317

ace 3 of 3 pares

TOP SenRTe

13-00000

: _ Appendix C~3

ae
_CNO Correspondence with Department of State
and NSC:

3) Memorandum for the Special
. Assistant to the President
.for National Security Affairs
from. Haydn Williams, 16 Mar 60,
sub: US. Policy toward Cuba

13-00000

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C,

whe 16 1960

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

MEMORANDUM “FOR THE SPECLAL (SSISTALS TO THE PRESIDENT
: POR NATIONAL SECURITY AP? AIRS

SUBJECT: _ ‘U.S. Policy toward Cuba

Esclosed 1s en exchance of letters on tha above

“gubject betusen Admiral Burke and Under Sceretary Marchent, both .

of whom have suthorized that I malls the correspondence available
to you for whatever help it may be in connection with the dis-

cussion of this subject at tho Council nesting this coming

Thursday . ;
| Vo se for )
\
, me) assistant Secretary
2 Excls

8

318

a,

13-00000

SECRET

27 USS tenn

LO FPwe we

Deor Arleighs

XY vas cosh intercoted fn your psroonal letter of Februcry 25,
1960, on Cvba exd ths Caribtessn eituation, {a vaich 1 noted a norked
desres of stallarity in the suggestions of the Navy ond of cur poople
hess cencerning the eecd to reverne tha trond tn Cea ead ths eathods
vaich ara best calculated to echicve this result.

As you ore écubtleso avare from ths bricfing ch Dick Retottea
rad I gave ths Joint Chlefs of Steff oa Jenucry J,. “1960, es ot of tha
eources of action swygasted In tte sored es kocdsd ®Roccemsndations
for U. S. Actions In Cuba,™ “rich you trancaltted with yoer letter,
wore initioted seas tics ago and ere constently being {ntensiffed. To
recapitulate, cer om thinking oa ths Cruden aftentica aa it relates
to Cocomlea cad cor nn cecurity interests bao beca 79 follovas

” The racic eijectiva of Iutersaticnal Cccaunfsm-- -
in the” lexcdfate Keturc--fo tha consolldatica of a radical,
rat i-Acoricen Revolution fricadly to the USSR In Cra nad the

- utill{ention of Cuda.as a bass to proncte slnilne revoluticcaory
coveronts In thes Cartbbsan. The cinfmsa epdestive of the
Comxvaigts, if they oro unable toe cealew omugoing, is
to aeio the United Stctes my as high price co peosible for
thz aliaination of the undspirable features of the Cehon
Revolution. In particular, the Cosmmists stent to gin by
proveling us into arsed intervention, or otherviss tating
interventionist actions fm violation of cur comafte=sts fa
a ezensr which could be cada to appros os if tho Uaited States

reacted ths ezx3 Way on the Soviota did in Hungary ond other
eatallites.

b. Unless

Adalfral ArleicaA Berks,
Chief of Haval Operatic,
 Departzcat of the Havy.

SECRET

NREE) rile COPY _ 319 a J 1240 vile |

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princinle thet eoaittica to Coatete polfsics

Scher

~2-

>. Unloso we vere indefinitely to occupy Cuba nilitorily,
hs only solut{ca to ths Cubsn problea {is necessarily the

‘eccagents of a Cudoa lenderahip willing to end caopcble of

ecvesaiag ths countsy olong lass ecceptable to the Cedan
gsople end along Linco consistent vith bosie U.S. policy ,
tAth meapent to Letin Anerica. This will teus tics. On the
exg hae, fC fa Covottul thet ary Cider Govenm=nt rich re~
exited fren U.S. cored eg other overt intesvertien could

leag ovrvive cut withdratal. Or the other, dcopite car om
long=dtendiag edogivings comcrning Coatso, it fo en inescep
Cole Fatt teat hs cme fnto gover with overeheleing cuppect

sok ealy fn Creda bet elocctere In the hoaicphsr, scoluding .
§a thio Cutcy. Although that ovpport hos lonely evcporate’
ta the Urited Stateo~-ond, to a lesser extent, in coapeasible
Ofraics 4m the othes Latia Accricsn Republi faz—Cestso end,
sortieultriy, his sofoma poogrea ctiil enjay very con fidszable-
arose fn his coutey. Cxbmo, oven tose dloilicsicacd with

Oe aed

Costco, Fave yet to find cn alterrative lectsrchfp rhagch thay

Belficve told esteslly cory cut tha refara cmowres tAlca

Polio opinion sth1l dcomis. Gppsaitioa clencrto tainted
Tith colich=atfon with the Extlate gogins ose stél2 political
toncdeptoble end covid not osteblich a ctable gavegnocat.
Grcostdon groups that might be aveeztabla to Crborms are
begfentng to organise cove effectively but, ct best, ft will

Be contho befesa thay ore ready for vigcco ction.

GO. Tha pricecy ebsective of U. S$. polley cheuld be the
cseolesetioa of the orcatica af cn effective, potriotic aovo-
cont fifendly to the United States within Ccta and cong
Cha eles to counter Cubsio curvent toon’, The Livot Cesk
fs to coguze, froegest cs wa ota eble to do op, u Glicate fn
ohea vespensible mid Sriently Cub)ess vould fied 2t wrth
waile to egpose Cestco policies taich hsly the Coacexats ext
vtameias good U.S..Oban roleticns. Ca ths poolitiva aids,
vo chouid exi age teksng sotions orl etking otetencnts tick
tesid caccugngs cuth elecents to exgeics care offectively

end to expect cor euppost end COlicbosctica fn thsfic offerte
tO acticvus political ac4 coonmais poogicas fos Ccta hy tetzirg

® iffereat road than the sroad Cxebm sesicsio. At the

SS beisfins, we gave ca iileation of th covert cotivities
crfomray torr this end, cs toll a cn Iadiccttion of ths
extestive excitefibuted effert waich ino boca etemcy for
ove? a ycar to idextify end exeaa to pxbhfa epiaica
ost ths henfophers the Cemmeuist espects of tho Coton pocbica,
€5 ths nog-tive site, cag polfeiecs ave cdc by the

{3


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SECRET

«

-3-

{neresse fairly zooidly Lf & Ao clear to Crbens thet Cectro
Kicsely ig ceapensible for political ond ecocenic dateriora
t1en ef the country. Hower, the consolidatsea of tho:
caposttion will be slowed doa ff Cestro cm Scsescd by
wroppdey ths fleg of patrictian owt antiesstica cho Rin-
eelf fa Seether ccavinting the Cuban ceogie Unt tha Uaited
Stctea has aggseroive écaigns on tha Cetin n-ticn ca a hole
Od thas the United Stateo motaor then Costsots policies is
teopeasible for Cebata difficultics, Ye 25%, thorcfore, -
exosofoc the grostcest eare tant we do aot umedcccthy
tecasfommn ths developing disontiafeaticn of tas Cclon poople
with Cestco into a sight botesm ths United Stated ed Gta,
‘foe 29 eslferespcsting Croan could thea afford to cesport wa
against his eva couctsy.

4. bilo wa balfows thet {ntendAnceiem astlicn thanioh
fo O53 ondfar com cecaccio cation by the United Stotca fa
doferss: of ite rigkta acy play cn Acpoticnt role at the
Trepee tina, wo crust ast ict these posalbilizics come 3
© lose sigh? ef the critical fect thet mo soluticn will be

.posoSdle until em cltemetéve lenieranip is rectly to move in.

2% ths cppliortios of collective oF unlicteral prccoercs
Mould Balsg the Contre Government down before ea cosepteble
Leotoechtip fo gecty to tets over, tis poctobihitio eye efvil
wor of 0 tetemcver by evca cose Conmmistia elemcto. Bithor
would beirg us oleser to comed intesvention. Tau, vile vo
ems going chec4 fn the process of influcnsing the hos Ancri~

ma RepSilcs to ace the Coomalst and other expats of the

Cyan sitextion a9 we Co ext preparing the ground for pooginic .
istes-Acorlom censidecetion of. the Coten predlen, wo Sntend
ts cemtrol the tintag of aay such meting fmofes 29 petDie
% ecoinside with tae dovalepmsct of sm alterentiva lowisre
cafip. xt fa eles the irtentica of ths Scniniotact ica to
rropoas to ths Congrees thes ths President ba given dfecro.
GScnary muthority to elter sygar quotes In ths exticcal
fatecost end ws hove develesed ond ars sxthirg feta afoot
ection plen to ehtain the release of tha hits Sot
fron sextola ether cereale comitemts vhleh beo$e eur

G ity to take actlon. ia tha escacate fficld tom this could
cottituts to Cofcgansdiag ovr Interest ec te the cocticn

. ef Caxtitions fewsahls to o lotorchlp exposed te Exstie ts

poileles, .
Vote

321.

13-00000 —

! gcccist te atl thess eattccs, a ecot Espouten® olecast f5 tics.
ize th noodet gor Ceding to scatice eked ths dctoricrahtcn of thete
molitisel cad ccencaia 13%0 $a cua ts Costrola axceteco, Ansludirg his

-  Cannsothens wht Intesantionsl Cocoméica. Tics is nected Lor ea Altern
Rive lesdisoh4a to esesps ead to commiss cifestively foe action, Tim
t3 alco reedod furthes to omoties Latin Acoricen cpinica te th Gagera
of ia oitustica oni fot Lotta Amicon Gcvocmmate te oo arom
reco to the point of view thot the Cxora citeation $9 a matter of
commen conecrm, not just a U.S.-Cootse qeooeel, Ue mrs vaing all
eveilodle restlivics to atks this tic2 o3 clost ca puasibie, DA cer
experiome Sa other dixficult situcticzs fn the Hear Enst end Cexisal
Snctica indfoate that foicdiata semiita cre not ty bo expected, Kitt
tine, we ara gsfiag to hove, vo hellove, to axertige restraint frou
cxing setiors valek, while tafisating our am great sense of Ccomccen
Ga usyendy, vould esteally retard the process ef Ghange vhich ve of]
desire, | Oo

I chovlé point ect also thet, rakle estion in the O23 et ths right
tine my bo dacircbls a3 e means of exouraging ta alternative Cutea
icadavehip, wa would prebchiy here-do contend vith Seviets In the
Vakted Betiens. Yt to cloost certain thot tas Ceouns will try to |
exicipate or counter exy U. I. approach to the O4S by going dircatly
to tha Gaited Hations, Furthecoere, ecturl "forcenent netien® hy
tho G&S would predobly be beougit up before the Gaited Hatieno unéor
aetials 53 of the (2 Charter even Lf ve angqued tat any sction teken
hy ths GS corstituted ealy *recosmendstiens" to governments. Thic
veinferacs our wlew that action In the OiS—-uhich cen be taken uextor
fAe Caster by coavoking a acting ef Fortign Htatstare, ss vell 03
exfer the Rio Treaty ani the Caraess Renoluticnmchould prieertly be
vicved a9 2 mses of otrengthening Cuben copositien to Cestzols
pollofes at the right acorst sathsr then 29 6 coos of quarvatining
Cia cad walting to see what boppens. Te would ot present bs sone
. - tant difffoult to bring a case against. Cuta undes the Careees Reoslin

thon since the Intest Spectol National Intelligence Retiente-—which
ws have asked te be sevicwste-dres not Lind the Coban Geovermncat te
be omumlst-donimted at prevent. TL our orm Potéeate ses wot
yet Chotactinte the case, ft would be diffionlt in a shert ties ts
pormanis less wall-indered cgovetrments that the Politics! snoti¢e.
tleas? ef Cr>a are unter Intematioml Commmiot ccatsol
Gata lea, ;

AS yuu ete Exare, cor basie asticacl policy (oon sont
CSowd intesvasticn as 2 loot reser’ to bs pee <a ro con eset
thea all elge failo. Uo veuld bo gt selucter: to oohe es esate
im OU recommendation to the Prestde:t util Sioa MY ben a
seccensble sharse fcr alk othe eskision to te toctct,

Thartt.-yes
° eg

322

13-00000

he

iecnk you again for ocr nding ce a cory of your occemoaten. Aa ys
kasy, the To is “bespirg ths Cwon problen miss constent ocrutizz,

having dicosoad (& fa com detall at its Jowasy U, escting cad mata

ids coraing., At the Lhest of tne eectings, the Scuretary of State
seviived ths sollcy toverd Cuta Uiteh hed been eppcoved by ths Preaidest, ©
ead the concensus of this ssonligts nceting tao thet this polfcy fs”

ecsentieity correct. Yo maticipate te?, at Mature ceotings of tho ESC,

tisge will be further dfacussleas caacerning Cuba te deteraing tisthos
thece should be o rociffcetion of policy tears that country, Ia view

| ef the fest that tedcyls EX nacting indicated cavtiausd egzcecont ca

the validity og thea poiley dliccugsed In Jonucey, ft wuld empcar
wrtesessary Co develop now policy documsntction ct thts ties, capootolly

‘cs the prepocais in your Easy execcendca cloacly patalis] policics. vdick

era alswady untamay. Should you, e¢ your coliecgess on ths Jofnt Chiefs, -
acSirc.o furtiss _peiering ca cur ettions and epecaticonal plans to corzy
GA ths policy, I chad ba gore: thea glzd te exregeo it.

Dinceraly,

...s LSwingoten %. Raertheact
Uaéer Leoretacy for Political Affairs


13-00000

26 FEB 1969

I em bscomine incres
ltions in tke Caribbean. Tsu

eke,

s
s
presen. Sz

Sincly censerncd over cctericra

ting con=

cepecisily concerned over tre

itustion in Ceba, in whose security the Xevy io dircetly
interested oy reason of island's stretezic location with

et.
pt)

roeniaa Tansl, the loczt

Hoysl ivsee Cuba eypon:

untcr the Cosination of imbernz

conbinee wicheeled end a es.nurist
besone = roclity,

oes Stetcs vould fe prosontcd.

state in Cuba world serve ts a. pase of

. Spread of covsnaiistic influence in the

as its ain the

iSne

ated or 85
& direct threat to koe 3 sco

Sie ipan
Adcitica

Sicnal Cesmuni

pene.
we,

. Because of ny concern, I <2 tsking the lib

southern United States =

end

tion there of the Guan
to be in the process of fat
Shove tris tera

ins

ome qovermient*

ity. of tro tint bod
communist contro] led
Soervtions for the further
Vestern _tenisphere having
Aascletion of the United States from Latin Americas

exty of sending you

the attsched paper a9 indicative of current Heavy thintcins in this
mebttor, — naaely trai positive auction to revérse the present tread

should be initistcd to the er
neted and 2a
Action teken new in tha case of Cuba will] a

mi that the ca:

coucunist threat is clisi-
etavle, ir tondly goverment es stoblis ned in Cubase
aiso facilitate ard proce

vide 2 fousation for exy sintler actions which may be necessary to
prevent the sprezd of comunisn in Latin America end to stabilize

other srecs where anrest is Sppesring «

am also sending a ‘copy of this letter ari the enclosure to

dack Treins
Sincerely,
AZLZISH BURKS
The Honoredie Livingston 7 > ber hank

Enclosures Paper on } U.S. Acticn ia Cup2
Copy to: Mrs Je Be Ircin I, (osn/tsz) w/fenclesire
f
; ft

a 324

13-00000

lh. Ghe Castro Uiewsent in Guba is a vehicic by which iaternational cow:unisa
opomcrs to Se a fosthold.in the ucstern Hosischere., Lf tie present

: 2211 soon be too late for tie United Siates to sten ,
> Sovict dneursion ints this henisphere, This situation, in its many i
rauLlfiections, proesonts an imsediate threat to the security of tix United

=

Slates ard to tint of ovr important nctzhbors in North and South Azerica,

oNMIMA

2. what action can be taken to prevent the cotablichzent of a comsuaist (<7
State in Cube aad to restore a stable, friencly ,overnzent?

LACKEEOTD
—

Ps ws _ . . : nae . Pn: -
9, “She wu. oS. has nyver renconee? the Youree Ooctrine. This was reeffirced

by Ceerctary of Stato Dulles in his addrass to the Kation on July 12, 1954,
Ga internaticnel Comconisz in Custecnela. In thet address, wr. Dulles
stated;

*

rs intcrnatiorcsl coizmmism has teen probing kere

stin:; places in tho Auertcas, It finally chose

Guatenzla as a spot which it coxld turn into an official base
fron ywnich to breed subversion which would extend to other
Axericen Repunlics.”

“Sor several yoe
one there for re

ford
ov

‘ "Tis intrusion of Soviet cespotism was, of course, a direct

- challern:e to our Monroe Doctrine, the first and most funda-

mental of our forei,n policies,“

iss united States is bound by treaties which comait it to seek scttle-
ment of henispharic-disputes by neaceful means, bat which also provice for
action in the event of aggression cither from outside the hemisphere or
within, Article 5 of the Inter-Acerican Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,
Sijned at iio de Janeiro, 1947, requires each contracting party to send
to the Security Council of the UN complete inforaation "concerning the
activities uncertaken ... for the purpose of saintaining Inter—Amrican

pecce and security."

Article 6 of this treaty states:

"If the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the

ignty or political indevendence of any Arerican State sto.ll
ec Ly an amression which is not an gesed attack ... or

h

hor Pact or citvation that night endancer the xeace of
f:icrica, the Yrgun of Consultation shall xect in.ediately in


13-00000

mote
4 Rake a
Qt

order to avroc of .., the measures chich stoule be taken for the
corsen Cefcnse asc for tle mainteiasce of the peace a: secarity
2 tte Contiacnt,"

. fhe Ycclaration a do opted by the Tents Iater-sécerican Conference at

Caracas, Voucaucla, ch. 1954, states:

th -

WOhet the Coziratioa or control of the political institution

of any @zcricaa State by the faternati mal corsumist movement,
extendis: to this hemisphere the vcliticel syste=x of an extra-
continental raver, wouls constitute a threat t o tze sovereignty

anc political indepontence of the Avsriccn States, endangering

the peace of Avcrica, and woule call for the ceeting of consultation
to consider the adoption of approprizte action ia accordance with
existing treaties."

a 5

fhe 26th of July tovenant succeeded in cicpleciny Batista on 1 Jan 1959.
Since that tine the Czstro rezice has followed ‘sncreasingly tre classic
stroteny for establishing a coz.unk ; stzte, the concnunist time table is

ielinceted im Acerican cubossy Tavana Picpstcn «0, 903 dated 29 Lecexber
1956. ‘the rothless elisination ef the opposition, ssuspiion of dictatorial
mowerc, Suspension of elections, the "Late Averica" campaign, the studicd
breaistomm of ihe cconesy and confiscztion of preverty, the initiation of
rolatio:s ami trade with the Soviet inion, ite forbidding: oF anti-communist
activity and the brealwowmn and reconstitution of the Arecd Services and
police cre ali % ypicst cor. coum st mareuvers,

the rafority of the Cubans are not yet cosuitted to the acceptance of
conzunism nor are they avare of the trend of the Revolution in this direction.
The lencr classes, horever, continue to five full support to Castro and the
Revolution,

It has not yet been vroved that Castro hinsely is a cosmmist, Hovever,
Sore of his srincipal dcouties as well as other leacers are believed to te
co:ununists, Ia my case, individvals susceptitle to comcuaist influence are
. Occupyire key positions in the .overmcent as «¢11 as in ali isportant organ-
salions an¢ trece unions. Two develoments ere noticeable, Comsunists
are bei::, appointed oxcaly and are. heins elected (in trade unions) to wy
‘positions, ‘iddcn communists in ihe 26th of July Hoverent ara taking
positions in sseming oosposition to the open communists,

At present the Cuban Aried forces are.

Gisorgenized arai apparently capable
only of guerrilla warfare, Intellizence resorts indicate that the Sovict

Bloc may be suoclying technicians to assist in training: the new forces anc
supzlying ars to the now governuent. There is no present indication thet

tie £511 of the Castro Goveracent is iminent. If it should fall, hovever

the governzent would roct protaoly emerge 25 a conmmist povernment because

ee t4

Page 2

376

13-00000

bo. CHL?

OD, .95 a. bean eib.inated and thers appear to ie no leaders of
stater nud when anti-Castro/eatiCosuumist peoples coulé rally.
Show’ Cast ooo agcassinated, sot action Wile: would provaaly
reselt would ge tne safety of f ericans in Cura, Finally, in the

worst ¢ Roilit, of Cirost  peeort for Cuba by tho Sovict
alec, ihe extent of an opin xutual sceurity egreecont, caunot te

Giere

4. ‘Source bosic courses

4, Lultiliteral sci aon. - thrown she UAE. -

B. ‘ivilateral wert Action bythe vu. S.

; it

Unilateral éction + by the gS.

sys : “ = >
AML sursidiary cetiows, such as economic pressure and wore) suae ton,

wilh accist in achicviny the objective Should also be taken in. addition

Taree ga

TAH LE
“CS aio. + bdine Ulare

The machinery exists in the daclerstion and smecsonts of ‘the usS

for the U.S. to rewuest convocation of the Organ of Conszliz! ion of the

Gis With subsequent investigation of the government in Cuba, anc, if
aparoval of tro menaber states is obtained, intcrvern.ion to prevent a _

Conusenist takc~over.

(1) fevanta, Fer}

» (a) Tt woulc be in consonance wi ith our nationzl policy and
our treaty comcitcents under the OAS.
. ‘
(b) It. woul strenrthen the JAS and would reassur ure te Free
“orld and the Latin Acerican States of U.S. weliingncee to live up to
comdtnents. .

(2) bisadvanrases:

_ |. (a) Uncertainty of support for Os action by oth ner Latin
Acerican States,

(b) Lelay in 045 action could result in a Comzumist controlled
front covernzent being a "fait accompli" in Cube.

(ec) Could result in the entire proble= endizg in the Security

Page 3

aang

13-00000

.Y ass

Coweti of the Un where tre povict unioa

B
fe
4
oO
fag
°
e

OCH TOM a cl S ‘2

the U.S. has tie eapebl lity to ceize Cuba by direct: nilitary
wctien, anc after a comolidation perisd, cause the establishrcat of a

as

=.

viendly, nom-comsnnist ovement.

(a) It would be in consonance with the tonroe Doctrine,
“wnich is st ee 5, policy with respect to the Sestern Uemisphere,
ané world solve the problex. .
(b) It would serve notice to the sorle that the U.S. will
t ablishrent of a commumist or communist "front" rezgin

(c) It wold re-omphacise to the world thet the U.S. will not
hesitate to acct when ite security i6 itestake.

(d). Ié woulé dispel any illusions by the world at lerze tiat
the U.S. is unmiDis;,, anu vucble to act ao catter what the provocation.
Iv sould also procably stop the “baiting of the 0.5." in which soxe ainor
powers throuchout the vorld indulce.

(2) Uisadverta‘es:

(a) It wovld violate owr GAS comitacnts to seek settlezent
by peaceful means.

(b) It wuld lead to charges of aggression against the U.S.,
both in the OAS and in the United lations, with the resulting possivility
of UF and C15 action azainst ise 3. S. ;

(c) It would prove tint the U.S. is not willing to abide by
its treaties if §. S. intorests dictate othersise,

(d) It conkd isolate tho U.S. fron the other Anerican States,
(e) Tt would violste the principle of non-intervention,

% ACTION UF Pie US.

The U.S. wuld ‘assist rebel groups covertly to. overthrom the

i
ct and rewestablisa o friencly gevernournt, Concurrently,
‘take all possible acasures to alert al fricadly nations and the. -
5, yeople and branches of the U.S. covernzens to ike danger of the threat

Page 4

328

inester ta dicevedit Cube and bring ¢ rld opinion to tre side of ine U.S,

{aj} So S..akid not be charged with aguression,

(z) TL carrise out successfully, bree Vorlé acd Latin Anerican
opinion wouls Lo faverablc iv tue 4. S.
{2} Yisaévanta, 253 .
{2} here is no certainty of success, ‘
(&) She effort cist well cone too latc,
Ta cons ring the above courses of action, the basi

2a
cannot and must not pomsit within the
vomisiker: t este Aat of Bay Covernss: at Cconinated oy the
Tatecaatious : Gun. Gnerefore, ii other courses of
4

_ ection Fail, tue Geo. 4 au the face of adverse world opiation,
-take unilatoral cetioa +0 prev exok

2
Cy «4
a
ee
er

nt OCCUrxrsce,

Until tae Sitwtion resenes the stare. where direct enileteral ection
by the U.S, is tis only ccancg 2cft, it apgcars thet a combination of those
rarts of courses of ccticn A ard C which heve a fair Chesce of success
should be followed ia srder to utilize the prim: advaniage givea uncer A,
i.e., the cocscration anc ,osd will of thse other Averican States,

COOL SICS

5. The follow! im, conclusions ore reacikod:;

a. The cstablisicecnt of a.coma nemist governsent , or a “front"™ goverment
followias cowmmist precepts, ia Cuba would be a dizoct threat to the -
scecurity of the 3, 5. ans ele ender: eer hedispheric security.

bE The U.S. sh ald initia te
ae

positive actio on to @lininate the threat
before a Om amdst or “froa" yo

vernaint in Cuca is a "fait accomli."
ce, Althonh the revolution still has iss support of the aasses, the
resultin, :overucest ia Cuda is following the path of Aer ne

connanics,. Althewt th ey are bs tote yet aware of the tread tuvard conmmunisn,
Castro has the personal ioyaity of the asses,

dq, accricaa holcin s are being coafiscated, - auericas lives ray te
encangeréed if stable, responsible goverascal is not ensured,

e. The wonros Soctrine is siill basic U.S. policy with respect to the
Sestern venisphero,

Page 5 ae -

SECKE ?

t

13-00000

. tee
ee Orreenrl

- rHececure exisis saior tie Ueccluretion of Caracas t
ay the oo ueaincst a Tomsunist threat to fomispueric security.

we The i. 5, showld proceed. te cocuent the exteat of infiltration of
gsvzunist2 inin key positions in Cuba and the extont of extra—lestern
woieriers commurist sunport of the present Cubana regire,

hk. Tre Vl. should initiste a canmainn to asprise 211 U, S. agencies,
the 2, 5S. public, and the other Arerican States of the threat in order to
gain Sucsort Yor any Luture action that czy be taken,

~ - a wore . ee sya a val 3
i, Tne UW. 5. shevld sovertly snpnort the Cuban opecesition.

a. tne H. 5., aftor having gatocd the reanired suprort, should vresont
sic ense before the O° in arder that goint action oy the uembers of tie
ois say br taken to elininete the com unist inrest awl establish a friendly,
staklc Tovercent in Cuna, sO

Kk. The U. S., as a lest resert, shovic iake unilateral nilitary action

to elisinete the threst, :

Ese
}

6, To accurmlish the above, the followin: plen of action is recomended:

a Tmnediately Gccurent the commerist tize teble ‘anc the comaunist
take-over in Cuba,
b. Use all rosourees and cedia te wake the U.S. and the other Anerican
States aware of the threat, The following should be utilized to accomplish
this: ; fae

(1) Intellilerce briefings of:

(a) U.S. Sovernrent officials.
Ab) Hewspaper represent atives and editors.

{c) U.S. businesszen operating abroad and soinr abroad.

~
ie
et
el

hé ILPB nezbers and latin Americana Ciplormatic persomel
and military attaches,

(ec) The Catholic Church (possibly throug the Ap postolic Pelerate).

sO (f) Church groups operating in Latin Aserica.

(g) Latin Aucrican officials visiting the U.S. aad ¥. S..

Paze 6
330

ns ‘a sr dte

ORAS

13-00000

ry
i

2) ueriemtation of radio breadeasis and mvs regorts, bota rorern=

wet wo orivats,

por

(2) She ci. SO. infernstion Sarvice.

fy AML country tess.

ce. Covertly sigsort . : : et aae groon trusted
: : anaes riendly coverazont,

7
wiseasS £5 S37,

te

evacuate 2, G, Netionale
ere they are endangered,

s tee Pons
d, Zs perres

aA

bss

should the

" at ef swe Pan ees.

‘ys ane ioree to safspuard and
whe
wot

situation deteriorate to the point ©

CG. On Sunsort Is baen galed, ust, in conjuacti mowith other
meicers of ths 23, convecniisa of the Org.n of Co asalt ation of the as
cam€er the Pars:s of the Declarct ton re) t

.

(1) See: %83 action to call on Cuta to nace hersell wer 0:5
ausak ices "in orcer to sreserw the reveiution for the people auc prevent
sommaisct take-over,* and;

. {2) Sect WA acbiou-to ictervene by force > in the event the ebove
d 7

a3

oint group is Zor:ed to acconpiic the alove, keep
, force the Latin Arerican |
9 the Kenisphere and to counter

Fa
G
e
e
B
a
Qa
Ar f
6A
c
My
¢
io]

HM) gu

ae |

x fo
ay

a a
h
i

2 hat
ss

re
cf
iv)

accusations af Ee S. . ie erialicn,

e.in the event tims does aot permit coxplction of ths above, or as a
last | resort, be prepared to take unilateral ailitary action to establish
a non-commants t gove rn-x: 2% in Cuba,

Pasta?

my . . Aas

13-00000

Appendix D
a
Memorandum. for Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) -

Action from J. D. Esterline, 2 May 60


13-00000

EYES ONLY

SECRET
\ _
COPY
2 May 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Deputy Director (Plans) - Action
SUBJECT : Liaison with United States" Agencies on JMARC Activities

1. This memorandum contains information for the Assistant Deputy Director
(Plans) - ‘Action.

2. The attached chart on liaison with other agencies of the United States'
- Government on JMARC activities is restricted to those contacts that are made
on a regular basis, such as the weekly policy meeting with the Department of
State, and to offices which, we must’ contagt ‘quite frequently to solicit their
support, such as the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

3. As you know, infrequent contacts are made at various other levels of
the Executive Branch including:

‘a. Brigadier General Cushman, Vice President Nixon's military
assistant. :

b. NSC 5412 Representatives.

'. ¢. Certain United States' Senators and Representatives, particularly
' Senator George Smathers of Florida.

4. In the early stages of JMARC we had-almost daily contact with Rear
Admiral S$. B. Renkin, USN, who was the action officer on the movement of two
radio transmitters and construction of the broadcasting facility on Swan Island.

5. Through Raymond Millard (Mallard?], the Agency is in close touch with
CINCLANT at Norfolk. Robert Reynolds, Deputy Chief, WH/4, has briefed selected
senior officers on JMARC 4. Mr. Reynolds is the designated CIA alternate for

the CINCLANT force under provisions of the Contingency Operations Plan for
Cuba..

J. D. ESTERLINE
Chief, WH/4

Attachment:
Chart mentioned in paragraph 2:

ao . SECRET’

EYES ONLY 339

13-00000, . “

SECRET

| . EYES ONLY | . COPY
OFFICE | ; NATURE OF DISCUSSION . . CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY
STATE DEPARTMENT
Office Inter-American Affairs (ARA) “Policy Col. J. C.. King _ Weekly
(Mr. Rubottom) . ; ,
Cuba Working Group (State, USIA) ~~ Overt Programs ; Robert Whedbee Daily
(Chaired by Ambassador Mallory) ; oe _
Consular & Security Affairs Passports for Aliens — Me. Pennington (08) As required
(Mr. John Haynes) , ; :
Office of Intelligence & Research "Talent" Matters - | _. E, A. Stanulis — As required
(Ambassador J. Lampton Berry) ‘ ‘
. : By - - .
Inter~departmental Defector Committee Cuban "Defectors" Robert Whedbee As required
© Latin America. Task Force Program Coordination Paul E. Oberst Weekly
Ww (Chaired by John Hill (ARA) ; ,
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT
Office of Special Operations Defense Support /—E, A, Stanulis . As. required
(Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN) - Robert Young (CC)
Office of Special Operations ; Briefing J. D. Esterline Weekly
- (Capt. Burns B. Spore, USN) ; _
Collateral Support Section, . Cover Robert Young (CC) As Required
Office of Naval Intelligence ,
(Cdr. Frank Day, USN)
Operations Branch, Collection Cover - Robert Young (CC) As required
Division, ACSI (Army) | ,
(Col. Stewart McKinney)
. SECRET ;
Continued

EYES ONLY

13-00000

‘ COPY
SECRET .
. SO . - EYES ONLY
| OFFICE | NATURE OF DISCUSSION © CIA REPRESENTATIVE FREQUENCY
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY ~ |
Director, Voice of America _ Coordination . | “David A. Phillips weekly.
(Henry Loomis) ; , :
IMMIGRATION. AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE -
Office of the Director Us S. Entry of Cubans - Mr. Pennington (0S) As required

(Mr, Hennessey)

o

HEE

SECRET

EYES ONLY

13-00000

Appendix E

Attack on Petroleum Refinery at
Santiago de Cuba
*
13-14 March 1961

13-00000

PRIM t MAR 7% 09202 61

Aes ee

BELL 15 | af

ee ie

—

nao
-

A as '
Do/r, COP, ADDP/A, WH 3, OC GH Bei «rE Y | - OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
IN| 3307 i

"1M@ BELL KOLA WAVE

SFOULOW. 3 RECEIVED: FRQM BARBAR:. . 47 1466982. NRA 1¥sseez

May netted

MSGUMAGER KO. CroItK
RED I300E5R MARCH Es

APT HS xe

of

NO . cc VER ba

Ete? i
eae SLA

t

aa

Sans

Se a

a fsct Beets


13-00000

_ Chagsizize .eashex F;
ay ed

y

ANCE AT
1 Be CALISRES AUD PO MILIMETER ENGAGED US PLUS PLENTY SHALL

wes ~@

vAT AIT DUT RESTARTED IN FEW MINUTES, AT HAPSOR ENTR

wees,

when ene “tle aa seer ee sae eens fee eee _. *

ee a

£10 ON STRONG SEARCHLIGHT. LEFT SEARCHLIGHT POLRTING a _
OWN INTO. WATER AND SILENCED 20 MILLIME

Sh Lond
ad

‘ETER BUT. 51S FOLLOWEO  -


13-00000

Appendix F

”™

Richard M. Nixon's Memorandum —

on Meeting with Fidel Castro,

19 April 1959

13-00000

RICHARD NIXON

LA CASA PACIFICA
SAN CLEMENTE, CALIFORNIA

July 27, 1979

JZ. a. 0 ~
I am enclosing b-AX summary

of. my conversation with -.Fidel Castro
‘in 1959, as. you requested in your
letter of July 19th.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Dr. Jack B. Pfeiffer
CIA Historian ‘
Washington, D.C. 20505

enclosure, 4 pages”

13-00000

COPY _ COPY COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

April 19, 1959

Summary of conversation between The Vice President and
Fidel Castro: ;

When Castro. arrived for the conference he seemed
somewhat nervous and tense. He apparently felt that he had
not done. as well on “Meet. the Press“ as he had hoped. He
was particularly concerned about whether he might have irri-
tated Senator Smathers for the comments he made with regard
to him. I reassured him at the beginning of the conversa-—
tion that "Meet the Press" was one of. the most difficult pro-
grams a public official could.go on and that he had done ex-
tremely well -- particularly having in mind the fact that he

“had the courage to go-on in EngLish rather than to speak

through a translator.

The subjects we discussed ‘were no different from
those on which he had made public statements on several
other occasions. A brief summary, however, might be of in-
terest, particularly in view of the comments I made with re-
gare to the positions he took. .

I suggested at the outset that while I understood some
reasonable time might elapse before it would be feasible to
have elections it would nevertheless be much better from his
viewpoint if he were not to state so categorically that it
would be as long as four years before elections would be held.

I urged him to state his position as being in favor of having

-elections at the earliest possible date and that four years
. wotld be the maximum amount of-time that would elapse before

elections were scheduled. He went into considerable detail
as he had in public with regard to the reasons for not holid-
ing elections, emphasizing particularly that "the people did
not want elections because the elections in the past had pro-
duced bad government."

He used the same argument that he was simply reflect-
ing the will of the people in justifying the executions of war
criminals andhis overruling the acquittal of Batista's avia-
tors. In fact he seemed to be obsessed with the idea that
it was his responsibility to carry out the will of the people

COPY . COPY . COPY

33a

13-00000

COPY copy COPY
-2-

whatever it might appear to be at a particular time. It
was also apparent that as far as his visit to the United
States was concerned his primary interest was "not to get

' a change in the sugar quota or to get a government loan
but to win support for his policies from American public
opinion."

It was this almost slavish subservience to prevail-
ing majority opinion -- the voice of the mob -- rather than
his naive attitude toward Communism and his obvious lack of

} understanding of even the most elementary economic principles
which concerned me most in evaluating what kind of a leader
he might eventually turn out to be. : That is the reason why
I spent as much time as I could trying to emphasize that he
had the great gift of leadership, but that it was the respon-
sibility of a leader not always.to follow public opinion
but to help to direct it in the proper channels -- not to
give the people what they think they want at a time of emo-
tional stress but to make them want what they ought to have.
I pointed at that it might be very possible that the people
of Cuba were completely disillusioned as far as elections
and representative government were concerned but that this
placed an even greater responsibility on him to see that”
elections were held at the very earliest date, and thereby
‘to restore the faith of the people in democratic processes.
Otherwise, the inevitable result would be the same dictator-
ship against which he and his followers had fought so gal-
lantly. I-.used the same argument with regard to freedom of
the press, the right to a fair trial before an impartial
court, judge and jury, and ‘on other issues which came up
during the course of the conversation. In every instance he

justified his departure from democratic principles on the

‘ ground that he was following the will of the people. I, in
my turn, tried to impress upon him the fact that while we be-
lieve in majority rule that even a majority can be tyrannous and
that there are certain individual rights which a majority
‘should never have the power to destroy.

I frankly doubt that I made too much impression
upon him butte did listen and appeared to be somewhat recep-
tive. I tried to cast my appeal to him primarily in terms
of how this place in history would be affected by the courage
and statesmanship he displayed at this time. I emphasized that
the easy thing tod was to follow the mob, but that the right -

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thing in the long-run would be better for the people and,

-of course, better for him as well. As I have already in-
dicatedle was incredibly naive with regard to the Communist
threat md ppeared to have no fear whatever that the Commu-
nists might eventually come to power in Cuba. He said that

' during the course of the revolution there had been occasions
when the Communists overplayed their hand and “my people put them
in their place." He implied that this would be the situation
in the future in the event that the Communists tried to come
to power. As a matter of fact, in his attitude toward Com-
‘munism, both nternally and from an international standpoint,
he sounded almost éxactly like Sukarno had sounded to me
when I visited Indonesia in 1953, In our discussions of
Communism I again tried to cast the arguments in terms of
his own self-interest and to point out that the revolution
which he had led might be turned against him and the Cuban
people unless he kept control ofthe situation and made sure
that the Communists did not get into the positions of power

. and influence. On this score I feel I made very little im-
pression, if any.

Speaking to him from a personal standpoint I urged

him at the earliest possible moment to bring good strong -
men. into his government and to delegate responsibilities to
‘them in the economic and other areas where he presently was
making many decisions. I tried to point out that unless he
did thishe would have a workload which would be so great that
he could not provide the leadership and the vision that the
Cuban people needed for the great issues, I put as much em-
phasis as possible on the need for him to delegate responsi-
bility, but again whether I got across was doubtful.

It was apparent that while he paid lip service to
such institutions as freedom of speech, press and religion
his primary concern was with developing programs for economic
progress. He said over and over that a man who worked in
the sugar cane fields for three months a year and starved
the rest of the year wanted a job, something to eat, a house
and some clothing and didn't care a whit about whether he had
freedom along with it. I of course tried to emphasize that
here again as a leader of his people, he should try to de-
velop support for policies which could assure economic pro-
gress with freedom rather than without it.

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He indicated that it was very foolish for the
United Sates to furnish arms to Cuba or any other Carib-

‘bean country. He said “anybody knows that our countries

are not going to be able to play any part in the defense
of this hemisphere in the event a world war breaks out,
The arms governments get in this hemisphere are only used

‘to suppress people as Batista used his arms to fight the

revolution. It would be far better if the money that you
give to Latin American countries for arms be provided for
capital investment." I will have to admit that as far as
his basic argument was concerned here I found little that I
could disagree with!

We had a rather extended discussion of. how Cuba could.
get the investment capital it needed for economic progress.
He insisted that what Cuba primarily needed and what he
wanted was’ not private capital but government capital. He
gave me some rather confused arguments as to why plants that
were licensed and/or owned and operated by the government
would serve the best interests of Cuba better than privately
owned enterprises. I told him quite bluntly that his best
hope as far as the United States was concerned was not in
getting more government capital but in attracting private:
capital. I explained that government capital was limited be-

‘cause of themany demands upon it and the budget problems we:
- presently confronted. I pointed out that private capital on

the other hand was expansible and that he would be serving
the interests of Cuba far better by adopting policies which
would attract it, I pointed out that there was competition
for capital throughout the Americas and the world and that

it would not go to.a country where there was any considerable
fear that policies might be adopted which would discriminate
against private enterprise. At this point he, at considerable
length, tried to explain why he had said and done some of

the things which had appeared to be anti-private enterprise up
to this time. Here again on this point I doubt if I made too
much of an impression.

He explained his agrarian reform program in consider-
able detail justifying it primarily on the. ground that Cuba
needed more people who were able to buy the goods protuded
within the country and that it would’make no sense to pro-
duce more in factories unless the amount of money in the hands

_of consumers was increased.

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He rather bitterly assailed the United States press
for what he called their unfair reporting of the revolution
after he came to power. I, of course, tried to explain
that speaking from some personal experience, it was neces-
sary to expect and to learn to take criticism both fair and
unfair. I would not be surprised if his sensitivity with

riticism) regard to @Bkxsism might eventually lead him to take some
. - rather drastic steps toward curtailing freedom of the press
in the future.

He also spoke rather frankly about what he felt was
avery disturbing attitude on the part of the American press
and the American people generally. His argument went along
this line: “yours is a great country -- the richest, the

greatest, the most powerful in the world. Your people, there-
fore, should be proud and confident and happy. But every-
place I go you seem to be afraid -- afraid of Communisn,
‘afraid that if Cuba has land reform it will grow a little
rice and the market for your rice will be reduced — afraid
that if Latin America becomes more industrialized American
factories will not he able to sell as much abroad as they
have previously. You in America should not be talking so
much about your fear of what the Communists may do in Cuba
or in some other country in Latin America, Asia or Africa -—-
you should be talking more about your own strength and the
reasons why your system is superior to Communism or any
other kind of dictatorship."

; In my turn of course I tried to explain that we wel-
. comed. the industrialization and development of Latin America,

that one of our best customers was Canada, for example,
which was highly industrialized and that as economic conditions

improved in any country this was not only good for that coun-
try but good for us as well. TI also tried to put our atti-
tude toward Communism in context by pointing out that Commu-
nism was something more than just an idea but that its agents
were dangerously effective in their ability to grasp power
and to set updictatorships. I also emphasized, however,
that we realized that being against Communism was not enough
-- that it was even more important that we make it by our
actions, by what we say and what we do abroad that we con-
vince people every place that we want to help them achieve
economic progress in a climate of freedom.

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_ Several other subjects were discussed but none
that I: think are worthmting at this point. Significantly
enough, he did not raise any questions about the sugar
quota nor did he engage in any specific discussions with |
regard toeconomic assistance. His primary concern seemed
to be to convince me that he was sincere, that he was not a

_ Communist and that his policies had the support of the great

Majority of the Cuban people.

My: own appraisal of him as a man is somewhat mixed.
The one fact we can be sure of ts that he has those inde-
finable qualities which make him a leader of men. Whatever
we may think of him he is going to be a great factor in the

' development of Cuba and’ “very possibly in Latin American

affairs. generally._ He seems: to be sincere, He is either
incredibly naive about Communism or under Communist discip-
line -- my guess is the former, and as I have already im-
plied his ideas as to how to run a government or an economy
are less developed | than those of almost any world figure I
have met in fifty countries.

But because he has the power to lead to which I have
referred, welave no dcioice but at least to try to orient him
in the right direction.

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“RHR

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Appendix G.
-
Memorandum for DCI

{for Briefing Vice President Nixon],

29 Feb 60.

13-00000

taken or planned against Cuba are:

t. ep3ry | q. pent
| py nebo

29 February 1960
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba.

1. This memorandum is for information only, and is for the Director's

‘use at meeting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence
Some highlights of recent intelligence which justify the actions being
- Rapid build-up of events waich snateate slide toward Commmnist orbit

' and intensified efforts implement internal programs ‘towards esteblishnent
Communist dictatorship. Public feeling emong middle and upper class
Cubans and students has reached new nigh on Comminist : issue and numenous
station contacts: ‘ranging from left to right have declared that situation
cannot be tolerated, and that they are. now convinced Communists control

"Guba. :
b. The Chief of Cuban intelligence activities in Mexico is on a trip

. through Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of
a pro-Castro revolutionary. movement in each country aimed at: the. over-
throw of existing government. Cuban Embassies serve as cover.
@. Considerable intelligence has been received of Cuban attempts to
establish an operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia
with ult imate goal of overthrowing the Colombian government.
da. French intelligence reports "Che" Guevara is talking of including

Martinique and Guadeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him.

344 >

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— 29 February 1960
NENORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)
SUBJECT: . What we ave doing in Cuba.

1. Thia memorentm is for information only, end is for the Director's
use ab meting with the Vice President on 2 March 1960.

2. Intelligence

“Soo highlights of recent intelligence which justify the sctions being
taken or planned against Cuba are:

fg. Rapid bulla-up of events which indicate elids toward Commniat orkit

end intensified efforts implement internal progrems towards esteblishuent
vines Comintst dictatorship. Public feeling snong miQale and upper: clasa

Cubeas ana studenta has reached new high on Commmist issue snd mmercus

station contacts ranging free left to right have declared that situation —

coonot be tolerated, end that they are now convinced Commnisate control

Cube. 7 |

b. The Chief of Cuben intelligence ectivities in Hexico is on a trip

through Central Azerica to initiate ectivities for the entablishment of

a pro-Castro revolutionary movesent in each countay aimed st the over

throw of existing goverment, Cuben Exbessies serve as cover.

c. Considertble intelligence has been recetvea of Cuben attenpta to

eatablish en operational relationship with guerrilla groups in Colombia

vith ultimate goal of overthrowing the Colesbian government.

- @. French intelligence reporta "Che" Guevara is talicing of including
Martinique and Cusdeloupe in a Caribbean Federation headed by him. ©

345

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8 March 1960

MEMORANDUM FCR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director (7lans)

‘SUBJECT: What we are doing in Cuba. —

1. This ‘nemorandum is. for information only, and is for the Director's
use at the RSC 5412 Representatives Heeting waich will consider the Cuba |
covert action program paper. - (This paper was used for Mr. Nixon's briefing. )

2 Intelligence
Some hignlishts of recent. intelligence which justify tha actions being
taken or plenned against Cuba are:

Be Rapid build-up of events. which indicate slide toward Communist orbit

i

and intensified efforts Implenent internal programs towards establishment
‘Conmunist dictatorship. Public feeling anong middle and uopsr clasa
Cubans and students’ hes reached new high on Communist issue and numerous
stztion contacts ranging from left to right ave declared that situation
cannot bo tolerated, and that they are now convinced Communists control
Cuba. |
. be The Chict of Guban intelligence actAvit ies in Mexico is ‘ona trip a

Pa
through, Central America to initiate activities for the establishment of 7

Fj
<
‘

@ pro-Castro revol: tionary. movenent in exch country aimed at the over
throw of existing government. Cuban Embavaies serve as cover.
&- Consideraole intellizence has been received of Cuban attempts to

- estabiish an operational relationship with guerrilla ‘groups in Colombia
with ultimate goal of overt: vowing the Colombian government.
d. French intelligence. reports "hs" Guevara is talking ot including

Hartiniqua: and Guadelouge tn a Caribbean Fedsration headed by him.


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*

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Source References*

Volume III

Part I
- Background

A. Watching from the Sidelines

State, Amembassy Havana: Memo from V. Lansing .
Collins, 17 Nov 48, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. C.

Memo for Chief, WHD from COS Havana, 20 Dec 55,
sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. S. (HKH-A-2261)

Ibid. -

State, Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army?]. Attache,
14 Oct 57, sub: Fidel Castro Ruz. (Memo No. 185.)
Ss. ; .

State, Memo from Vinton Chapin, 19 Jun 57, sub:
Biographic Information Concerning Fidel Castro
_ Ruz. (Memo No. 869). C.

David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division,
1946-65, Vol. I, 191-192 (DDO/HP 324, 2 Dec 73).
3.

Letter to General His Excellency Fulgencio Batista
y Zavdivar from Allen W. Dulles, 7 Jul 56. (ER~-8-
4007/a) . .

Memo ino addressee) from Lyman B. Kirkpatick,

* 19 Nov 57, sub: How to Bring P2ace in Cuba. S.

Ibid.
Beatrice B. Berle and Travis B. Jacobs (eds),

Navigating the Rapids, 1918- 1971, (N.Y., 1973),
p- 681. U.- .

Unless otherwise specified. all sources are SECRET.

Copies or notes of all sources cited are filed under
HS/CSG 2632. .

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12. MR [no author], 27 Jan 61, sub: WHD Reporting
on the Cuban Revolution and the Rise of Fidel
Castro to Power, p. 6. 5S.

McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, op. ctt.,
I, 213-216. 8S.

Hugh Thomas, Cuba, The Pursuit of Freedom (N.Y.
1971), pp. 1000-1001. U.

13. Berle and Jacobs, op. cit., pp. 685-686.
Following CS reports (S):

3,345,281, 13 Feb 58
3,345,282, 13 Feb 58
3,347,126, 4 Mar 58
3,351,466, 15 Apr-68
3,354,755, 12° May 58
3,367,468, 21 Aug 58
3,373,470, 10 Oct 58

‘qa. . Berle and Jacobs, op. eit., pp. 685-686.

15. Memo for Chief, PP Staff from Alfred T. Cox,
25 Aug 58, sub: US Course of Action in Cuba. S&S.

16. DCS 3/376, 032, 30 Oct 58, sub: Fidel Castro
. Ruz and Forces Strongly Catholic, Non-Communist.
Ss. ;

17. MR from J. C. King, 20 Nov 58, sub: Cuba - Dis-
cussion of. Pawley Proposal. S.

Cables to Director from Havana: 9 D--~- 5° - ™™tr™ —
0661 (IN 35522); 11 Dec 58, HAVA 006
Ss.

oe f Gf
18. Cable to Director from Havana, 11 De
0668 (IN 36486). S. |

19. State, Incoming Telegram from Amconsul Santiago
; de Cuba, No. 341, 15 Dec 58. S.

20. Ibid.

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13-00000 |

21.

22.
23.

“24,

25.

26.

27.

TOP SECRET

Cable to Director from COS Havana, 18 Dec 58,

HAVA 0704 (CHECK NO. 453). S.

Alfred T. Cox, Paramilitary Activities at.the Staff
Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dee 61, II, 374-375 (CSHP 183,
Mar 70) . Ss.

Memo. for Bob Dahlgren from Alfred T. Cox and Col.
C. H. Heinlen, 31 Dec 58, sub: Support Arrange-
ments. S. :

Memo for the President from Acting Secretary [of
State], 23 Dec 58, sub: Cuba. TS: [no number].
(Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records,
1952-61, “Cuba" folder, Box 27(?).) .

(Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from:
Thomas A. Parrott?], 7 Jah 59. S.

[Minutes of] Special Group Meeting on Cuba [from
Thomas.A. Parrott?], 7 Jan 59. S.

Handwritten notes on Department of State Meeting
on Cuba [by Gordon: Gray?], 31 Dec 59. (Dwight D.

‘Eisenhower Library: Gordon Gray Records, “Cuba"

folder, Box 27.) .U._

-. Dwight D. Eisénhower, Waging Peace (N.Y., 1965),
. pp. 521, 524. UL

B. Castro Takes Over

Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Jan 59, DIR 07542
(OUT 60805). S.

Cable to Director from Havana, 15 Jan 59, HAVA 0900

(IN 47617). S:

Memo for Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
(Army) from C. P. Cabell, 6 Feb 59,: sub: Proposed
US Army . Operation’ Against the.New Cuban Armed
Forces. (ER 11-409a.) 5S.

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13-00000

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34,

35.

- 36.

37.

38.

39.

TOP SECRET >

Memo for Chief WHD from Alfred T. Cox, 30 Jan 59,
sub: Research Project on Castro Movement. S.

Cable to Director from Havana, 3 Feb 59, MSGNR
0984 (CKNR 747). S. ,

Memo for Mr. Braddock from [Army] Attache, 16 Feb
59, sub: Situation Report, Memo No. 412. S&S.

Board of National Estimates, Threats to the
Stability of the U.S. Military Facilities Posi-
tion in the Caribbean Area and Brazil, SNIE 100-
3-59, 10 Mar 59, p. 1. S.

Cable to Director from Havana, 9 Apr 59, MSGNR
1191 (CKNR 004). S.-

Ibid.

Ibid., 13 Apr 59, MSGNR 2000 (CKNR 017); 15 Apr 59,
MSGNR 2016 (CKNR 039). S.-

Dispatch to Director from Havana, 15 May 59, HAVA |
2161. S.

“Memo for Gordon Gray from Robert Murphy, 1 May 59,

sub: Forwarding Tentative Evaluation of Castro
Visit. C.

“Dispatch to Director from cos Havana, 26 May 59,

HAVA 2197.

HKH-1964, 4 Jun 59, sub: Comments of Cuban Com-
munist Leader on Castro's Trip to US. C.

Theodore: Draper, Castro's Revolution (N.Y. 1962),

pp. 48-57. U.

Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the
Caribbean through 1959, SNIE 80-59, 30 Jun 59. S.

Memo ‘for DCI from Rudolph Gomez, 4 Aug 59, sub:
Mr. Leo Cherne. 6S.

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13-00000 .

40.
41.

42.

~ 43.

44.

as.

46.

47.

TOP SECRET

Dispatches: To Director from Havana, 5.Jun 59,
HAVA 2233, 5 Jun 59; To COS Havana from DIR,
9 Jun 59, DIR 30041. Ss.

Draper, op. ett., pp. 61-62, 65-69.
Thomas, op. ctt., pp. 1234-1271.

Memo for Col. King from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Oct
59, sub: Visit of Mr. R. E. Gomez to Havana,
Cuba, 15-18 Oct 59. S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:
Discussions between the Department and Chief,
WHD on Cuba. S.

US Senate, 86th Congress, lst Session, Judiciary
Sub-Committee Hearings on’ “Communist Threat to
the US through the Caribbean," Part III Testimony

‘of Gen. C. P. Cabell, pp. 162-163. U..

Dispatch for COS Habana and COB Santiago de Cuba
from Chief, WHD, 18 Dec 59, sub: RMD -- Cuba,
HKBW[?] 3214. TS (No number). os ;

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 11 Dec 59, sub:
Cuban Problems. S&S. (DD/P 4-9871.)

Board of National Estimates, The Situation in the
Caribbean through 1960, SNIE 80/1-~-59, 29 Dec 59,
pp. 1, 4, 7, 13. 5S. a ;

Office Memo to Doris from Pauline, 11 Jan 60, .

‘sub: General Cabell's Briefing qf JCS-State,

8 Jan 60. S. ;

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10.

Ll.

by

TOP SECRET

Source References’:

Part II

Castro Must Go

A. Organizing for Covert Action, Jan-Mar 60

L. K. White, Diary Wotes, 8 Jan 60. S.

CIA Inspector General's Survey of the Bay of Pigs
Operation, Oct 61, p. 5. TS 173040. (Hereinafter
cited as I. G. Survey.)

Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by

‘Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, p. 2.*

Ibid., pp. 3-4.°

Memo for James E. Flannery, 12 Dec 73, sub: Review
of [{E. Howard] Hunt's Book [Give Us This Day]. S.

David R. McLean, Western Hemisphere Division, 1946-
1965, II, 242-243. (DDO HP 324, Dec 73.). S.

Conversation between Walter Elder and Jack B.
Pfeiffer, 14 Jun 74. U. ce

MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 3 Oct 73, sub: Brief
Conversation with Jake Esterline. C.

Oral History Ihterview: Richard Drain by Jack B.

Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Tape 1, pp. 6-8.

Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack
B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 1, pp. 2-3.

Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape l,
pp. 15-16.

This and all other Oral History Interviews conducted
Jack B. Pfeiffer are UNCLASSIFIED.

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12. Oral History Interview: Richard Bissell by Jack
B. Pfeiffer, 17.0ct 75, Tape 1, pp. 5-6.

Proposed ‘Agenda [for the] Special Group Meeting,
12 Jan 60. S.

13. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, sub:
' Minutes ‘of Special Group Meeting, 13 Jan 60. S.

US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activi-
ties, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders,:20 Nov 75, p. 93. (94th Congress, Ist
Session, Report No. 94-465.) U. (Hereinafter SSC.)

14. MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 13 Jan 60, oP. ett.

15. Memo for DDP from C. Tragy Barnes, 21 Jan 60, sub:
; Cuba. Ss.

16. Alfrea T. Cox, Paramtlitary Ground Activities at
the Staff Level, 15 Sep 55 - 31 Dee 61, II, 384-
- _ 385 (DDO HP 183, Mar 60). S&S.

17. MR from J. D. Esterline, 2 Feb 60, sub: Meeting
with the DCI. S. :

{MR from Thomas A. Parrott] 3 Feb 60, sub: Minutes
of Special Group Meeting - Cuba. 5S. .

18. MR from J.-C. King, 26 Jun 60, sub: Meeting with
DOD: representative on Cuba.- S.

MR from E. Scott, 3 Feb 60, sub: Meeting, 3 Feb
vo [60], 0900 hours - 1015 hours. S. ;

Memo for the DDS from Bruce Cheever, 4 Feb 60,
sub: Request for Special Allowance for CIA Rep-
resentative. to CINCLANT. S.

19. [MR from Jim Flannery?], 11 Feb 60, sub: A/DDP/P
Review of Status of Plans for Cuban Operations. S.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 12 Feb 60, sub: Briefing .
of Deputy Secretary of Defense on Cuba. S.

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13-00000

‘20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

TOP SECRET

Memo to.Designated Representatives Under NSC ©
5412/2 [from Thomas A. Parrott?] [15-16 Feb 60?],
sub: Covert Action Operations Against Fidel ‘

. Castro. S.-

Memo to Designated Representatives under NSC 5412/2
{15-16 Feb 60?], op. ett.

Ibid.

{MR from Thomas A. Parrott?] Minutes of Spectal
Group Meeting - Cuba, 17 Feb 60. S.

Memo of Meeting with the President [on 17 Feb 60]
from Gordon Gray, 19 Feb 60. TS 189337-1.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversa-

tion with J: C. King, 110@ hours, 18 Feb 60. §&.

MR from J. C. King, 25 Feb 60, sub: Meeting with
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, Mr. Thomas
Mann on Cuba. S.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 18 Feb 60, sub: Conversa-
tion with J. C. King, 1100 hours, 18 Feb 60. S.

MR from J. D. .Esterline, 19 Feb 60, sub: Meeting
with the DCI on Cuba. S.

Memorandum [no author, no date, presumed written
between 24-25 Feb 60], sub: Covert Action Against
Cuba. S&. ;

‘Ibid.

Ibid.

Minutes of OCB Meetings: 2 Mar 60;'9 Mar 60. S.
(Dwight.D. Eisenhower Library Files of the Office
of the Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs, Gordon Gray (A67-64), Box 67.)

MR [from E. A. Stanulis?], 9 Mar 60, sub: First
Meeting of Branch. 4 Task Force. S.

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32. Note to Mr. Barnes from Richard Helms, 8 Mar 60,
sub: [Revision of 8 Mar 60. paper for 5412 Group].
S. | :

33. [Memo] to Designated Representatives Under NSC
5412/2 [from T: A. Parrott, 8 Mar 60], sub:
Covert: Action. Operations Against Fidel. Castro.
S. ;

‘34... Ibid.

35. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 8 Mar 60, sub:
' What We Are Doing in Cuba. S.

36. Ibid.

‘37. Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from-Samuel E. Belk,
.. 9 Mar 60; sub: . Cuba. (TS 189337-2). (Dwight
D. Eisenhower Library. -ChLean-Up Files, Box 6
[Cuba] -)

- Briefing Note for NSC Meeting of 19 Mar 60, from
S. E. Belk, 9 Mar 60, sub: Cuba. S. (Dwight
D. Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 6
[Cuba] .) .

38. Memo for Mr. Gray from Samuel E. Belk, 9 Mar 60,
op. ett. ,

39. Memo for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., 15 Mar 60,
sub: .U. S. Policy Toward Cuba... TS (no number).
. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. Gordon Gray .
Records, 1952-61, “Cuba". Box [27?].)

40. .Memo of Meeting with the President on 12 Mar 60
from Gordon Gray. TS (no number). (Dwight D.
Eisenhower Library. Clean-Up Files, Box 7,'1960,

- Meetings with the President. Vol. I.)

41. Memo for Mr. Bissell. and Col. J. C. King, from
‘Allen W. Dulles, 14 Mar 60, sub: = ["Starters"
for Our Cuban Paper]. S.

42. Ibid.

- 355 -

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13-00000

43.

ay,

45.

46.

47.

48.

49.

.50.

51.

52.

53.

TOP SECRET

MR from J. C. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: Special Group
Meeting, 14 Mar 60. 5S. ; ;

Memo to Designated Representatives Under NSC 5412/2
(14 Mar 60], sub: Covert Action Operations Against
Fidel Castro. S. . ;

MR from J.-C. King, 15 -Mar 60, sub: Special Group
Meeting, 14 Mar 60. S.

Ibid.

Two draft papers on the Clandestine Service's .
anti-Castro efforts, 14 and 15 Mar 60. {15 Mar,
6 pp. plus Financial Annex; 14 Mar 60, 5 pp.,
no Financial Annex.)  S.

Memo for Mr. [Gordon] Gray from S. E. Belk, 16 Mar
60, sub: Cuba (Briefing Note for NSC Mtg 17 Mar
60). S.

Memo of Confererice with the President, 2:30 p.m.,
17 Mar 60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. TS
(no number). (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, White
House Office, Clean-Up Files, Gordon Gray, et al,
1953- 61, Box 40[{?].)

Ibid. —

{Memo from] J. C. King, 21 Mar 60, sub: Policy
Meeting on General Covert Action Plan for Cuba,
17 Mar 60. §S. -

MR from Col. Jack Hawkins, 5 May 61,.sub: Record
of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Govern-
ment of Cuba (CSHP 105). S.

Eisenhower, Dwight D., Waging Peace (New York,
1965), p. 533. U.

Letter to William Colby from Gordon Gray, 3 Dec
74, sub: ‘Letter to Dr. Don Wilson. (ER 74-6355/4).
U. . .

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TOP SECRET

B. Forging the Tool
54. Memo-for DDS from John E. O'Gara, 24 Mar 60, sub:
‘Establishment of a New Branch and Section within
Headquarters WH Division. S&S.
55. L. K. White, Diary Notes, 24 Mar 60. S.

56. Memo for Comptroller, CIA from Allen W. Dulles,
24 Mar 60, sub: Project JMARC. S.

57. Ibid.

58. Memo for J.-D. Esterline from M. J. King, 18 Mar
60, sub: Branch 4. Financial Support. S.

Memo for Ed Stanulis from,Mike King, 22 Mar 60,
sub: Per Diem for Domestic Base. S.

59. MR - No. 2 [no author], 25 Mar 60, sub: _JMARC.
Ss.

60. MR - No. 3 [no author], 31 Mar 60. S.
61. Ibid.

Savilion H. Chapman, The Cuban Invasion: Maritime
Aspects, 1961, p. 7. {(CSHP-.86, Nov 66.) S.

62. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from P. E. Oberst, 31 Mar 60,
_ sub: JMARC ~- Timing and Tactics. S.

63. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R[obert] Reynolds,
4 Apr 60, sub: Daily Progress Reports. S. ‘

64. Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 15 Apr 60,
sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report for 14 Apr 60.
S. ;

65. MR from Eleanor, 27 Apr 60, sub: DCI Briefing
[by] WH/4, 14 Apr 60: S.

66. Ibid.-

- 357 -

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13-00000 .

67.

68.

69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

. 76.

77.

78.

TOP SECRET

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 26 Apr 60, sub:
Project JMARC, Amendment No. 1. S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub:
Briefing of the JCS on Cuba and the Dominican
Republic. S..

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 6 Apr 60, sub:
Briefing of JCS on Operations in Cuba. S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub:
Briefing of JCS on Cuba and the Dominican
Republic. S.

MR from E. A. Stanulis, 10 Mar 60, sub: Meeting
with Capt. Burns Spore, USN. S&S.

Memo for Director of Logigtics from William E.
Eisemann, 19 Apr 60, sub: ° Funding of JMARC-3.

Memo of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 27 Apr

°60, sub: Aerial Coverage of Cuba and the Off-

Shore Islands. S._
Chapman, fhe Cuban Invasion, op. cit., p. 8.
Ibid., pp. 8-9.

Memo for the Secretary [of State] from R. R.
Rubottom, Jr., 25 Mar 60, sub: Coordination of

Activities Relating to Cuba.. C. (Dwight D-~.

Eisenhower Library, Gordon Gray, Records 1952-61,
Box 29, Folder: “Cuba".):

‘Minutes of Special Group Meeting of 23 Mar 60

from T. A. Parrott, 24 Mar 60. S.

Memo for Honorable Douglas Dillon from Gordon
“Gray, 29 Apr 60, sub: Personal and Confidential.

U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library. ‘Gordon Gray
Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder: "“Cuba“.)

Ibid. |

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13-00000

79.

80.

81.

82.
83.

84.

85.

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Minutes, of Special Group Meeting of 28 Apr 60
from T. A. _ Parrott {29 Apr 60?]. Ss.

Memo for E. Stanulis from J.D. Esterline, 30 Apr
60, sub: Review of Coordination with other
Agencies. S.

Memo for Chief, JMARC/CI from Jacob D. Esterline,
14 Jun 60, sub: Bureau Stay-Behind Activity. - S.

Memo for Acting Director of Central Intelligence
from J. C. King, 23 Jun 60, sub: Operational
Activities of the FBI in Cuba. S.

MR from J. C. King, 30 Jun 60, sub: FBI Intelli-
gence Operations in Cuba and Mexico. S.

Dispatch to Chief WHD frow. COB JMASH, 30 Aug 60,
sub: Forwarding of Memorandum (UFGA-113) . Ss.

Official Routing Slip for Bill Byrne from Don
[Ewing], 6 Mar 69, sub: [Review of papers on
JMWAVEJ. S. :

Memo for the President through the Secretary of

State from Allen W. Dulles, 9 Jul 60, sub: [Brief-
ing of Presidential Candidates] -[ER-62-1750]. Ss.

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Clean-Up Files

(Gordon Gray, et al), Box 64, Actions by the
“President, Miscellaneous Action Notes, 18 Jul 60,
“Telegrams to Sen. John F. Kennedy and Sen.

Lyndon B. Johnson.“ U.

Memo for Mr. C. T. Barnes from John H. Dyer,
20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing Material. C.

Memo for Mr. C. T.-Barnes from E. A. Stanulis,
21 Jul 60, sub: Cuban | Briefing Paper. S.

Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, —
3 Aug 60, sub: (Briefing of JFK, 23 Jul 60,
and LBJ, 28 Jul 60). ER-60-6067. S.

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‘TOP SECRET

* 86. [Minutes of] Special Group Meeting [from T. A.
Parrott], 11 Aug 60. S.

“Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 12 Jul 60, sub:
Project JMARC, Amendment No. 2. S.

Memo for George H. Reingruber (P) from J. C.
King, 19 Jul 60, sub: Instructions for the
Obligation and Expenditure of JMARC Funds. S.-~

Memo for the DCI, from J. C. King, 19 Aug 60,
sub: .JMARC, Amendment No. 3. Ss.

87. [Memo for] Mr. Bissell from T. A. ‘p{arrott],
23 Aug 60, sub: [Release of $10 million from
the Agency Reserve for Project JMARC]. Ss.

88. Oral History Interview: William E. Eisemann by
Jack B. Pfeiffer, 14 Nov 75, Tape 3,, pp. 33-34.

C. Cooperation and Challenge

89. Cables to: MASH and RAND from Director, 6 Jun 60,
DIR 33225 (OUT 82950); MASH from Director, 22 Jul
60, DIR 41283 (OUT 99274); OARSMAN, GUATEMALA,
PANAMA, 4 Aug 60, DIR 43756 (out 54882). Ss.

90. NIE. g5- 2-60, The Situation in Cuba, 14 Jun 60,
pp. 1, 5-6. -S/NOFOR .

91. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60
from Gordon Gray, 22 Aug 60. TS 208101. (Dwight
'D. Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project
cxeans Ue Records of Gordon Gray, et al, 1953-1961,
Box 40.).

92. Special Group Papers, 15 Apr 60 - 31 Dec 62,
Vol. I, 30 Jun 60. 6S.

93. Memo of Meeting with the President on 18 Aug 60,
op. ett.

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13-00000

94.

95.

96.

“97.

98.

99.

100.

101.

102.

TOP SECRET

Memo of Meeting with the President, 17 Apr 60

_ from Gordon Gray. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library,

White House Office, Project “Clean-Up Records of

- Gordon Gray et al, 1953-61," Box 7, 1960 Meetings

with the President, Vol. II, 22 Aug 60. TS
(no number).

The President's. Appointments, 1960 (Dwight D. Eisen-
hower Library, A 70-29/1.) U.

Memo for DDP from J. D. Esterline, 7 Sep 60, sub:
Attitude of Asst. Secretary of State for Latin

America, ‘Thomas Mann, on JMARC . Ss.

Ibid.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Re-
view of Cuban Situation fgr Asst. Sec. State for
L. Aes Thomas Mann. S&S.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub:
Observation on Briefing of Asst. Sec. State, Thomas
Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operations on 20 Oct 60.
S. : .

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Meet-
ing with DCI and Asst. SecState for L.A., Thomas
Mann, on Cuba. S.

Not used.

Memo. for DDP/EMB from C. Tracy Barnes, 31 Oct 60,

sub: Attached Paper for Special Group.

MR. ftom Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: ‘
Meeting with DCI and SecState for L.A., Thomas
Mann, on Cuba... S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 Oct 60, sub: Review
of Cuban Situation for Asst. SecState for L. A.,
Thomas Mann. S. . .

Memo: for DCI from J. C. King, 21 Oct 60, sub:
Observations on Briefing of Asst. SecState,

Thomas Mann, re JMARC/Guatemala Operation on
20 Oct 60. Si. .

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13-00000

103.

104.

“105.

106.

107.
108.

109.

110.7

111.

112.

TOP SECRET

Memo for DDP from J..C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub:
JMARC U. S. Base Requirements... S.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub:
Meeting’ with DDCI. Ss.

MR from J. C. King, 7 Nov 60, sub: Dinner with
Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 10 Sep 60, sub: Meeting
with James A. Douglas, "9 Sep 60. S.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from E. A. Stanulis, 12 Sep
60, sub: Policy Approval for the Use of DOD
Personnel in Project JMARC. S.

Memo for DDP from J. Foster Collins, 15 Sep 60,
sub: Foreign Volunteerswfor JMARC. .,

Memo for Chief, WH Division from Alfred T. Cox,
12 Oct 60, sub: Recruitment of American Volun-
teers. Ss.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 Sep 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-16 Sep 60. S&S.

Memo for Chief, WHD .from E. A. Stanulis, 5 Oct 60,
sub: Guantanamo Bay. S..

- Ibid.

Briefing Note for NSC Mtg, 7 Nov 60 from CAH
{Christian A. Herter], 4 Nov 60, sub: U. S.
Policy Toward China. S.

Memo for DCI from F: P. Holcomb, 28 Oct 60, sub:
Concern Expressed by Admiral Dennison, CINCLANT.

MR from J. Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this
date. at HQ CIC Atlantic and Supreme. Commander,
Atlantic on Project JMARC. SS. .

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D. Personnel and Training

“113. Memo for DDP from Jacob.D. Esterline, 14 Apr 60,
sub: JMARC Daily Progress Report. S. ;

114. Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape l,
pp. 3-4.

115. MR from Jack “B. Pfeiffer, 26 Oct 73, sub: Brief
conversation with Jake Esterline. ic

116. Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. cit., Tape l,
: p. 2.

117. . Tbid., Tape 1, pp. 2-3.

118. Drain- Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape l,
Pe 5.)

119. Ibid., Tape 1, pp. 6-7.
'120. Ibid., Tape i, pp. 9-10.

120a. Memo for Executive Officer, ‘DCI from. ‘Richard Helms,
19 Jan 50, sub: Dissemination of Intelligence to
DD/I. (ER 11-552). S.
David Coffin, Development of Ecnomic Intelligence
in the Office of Research and Reports, 1950-1967,
II, 44-45. (DDI/OER 2, Oct 74.) s.

-121. Military biographic sheets on Hawkins and Egan.
U.

JMARC Daily Progress Reports, 27 Jan and 29 Aug 60.
Ss.

122. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. eit., Tape 1,
_pp- 10-11.

123. ‘Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ectt., Tape l,
/- p. S. .

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124. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 17 Mar 60, sub:
: Personnel Assignments to Branch 4, WH Division.
sS.

125. WH Field Memo. No. 12-60 to Chief: All WH Field

Stations and Bases, from Oliver G. Galbond (P)
19 Feb 60, sub: -Agent Candidates for Possible
Use in Cuba. S. ,

Book Dispatch No. 1881 to All WH Field Stations
and Bases from Chief, WHD,. 22 Apr 60, sub: Re-.
cruitment of Cuban Nationals. S&S. .

R and R to WH/FI from WH/4/FI, 12 Sep 60 forward-,
ing FI activity reports for.months of Mar through.
‘Aug 60. S.

126. DDS Chrono Files: Minutes of DDS Staff Meetings,
20 Apr, 18 May, and 29 June 60. S.

127. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Jun 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report for 7 and 8 Jun 60.
Ss. ; ;

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 14 Jun 60, sub:
Staffing Guide for JMARC. S&S.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub:
Personnel Requirements for WH/4 - JMARC. S.

Memo. for A/DDP/A from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
'25 Aug 60, sub: .Personnel Requirements for
WH/4.° (DDP-O-4402.) 5S.

. (128. MR from John F.’ Mallard, 6 Sep 60, sub: Meeting
with Mr. Tracy Barnes. S.

129. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from.Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
5 Nov 60, sub: Personnel Requirements for WH/4-
JMARC. (DDP-0-5858.) S. ;

130, JMARC Daily Progress Reports - Support, 19 Aug 60.
S.

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131.

132.

133.

134.

4

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Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 19 Oct 60, sub:

“Use of US Contract Personnel for JMARC Maritime

Operations. S.

Cable to JMASH:from Director, 9 Nov 60, DIR 10738
(ouT 90611). S.-

Cable to Director from MADD, 1 Nov'60, MADD 8452.
(IN 36407). S.

Eisemann-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape l,
p. 7.

it

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Source References

Part III
' Changing Concepts

1. Savilion H. Chapman, The Cuban Invasion -- Maritime
Aspects, 1961, pp. 11-12. (CSHP 86, Nov 66.) S.

2. Ibid., p. 13.

3. Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
2 Nov.60, sub: [Memorandum on Project JMARC]. S.

' Memo for DDP/EMB from Frangis W. Barkley, 2 Nov: 60,
sub: WH/4 Paper. for SubmiSsion to Special Group on
3 Nov 60. S. ;

4. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 3 Nov 60, sub: Meeting
with DDCI. Ss.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from T. A. Parrott],
3 Nov 60. S. -

5. Cable ‘to Guat. from Director, &4& Nov 60, DIR 09972
(OUT 88974). ;

Cable to Director from MADD, 5 Nov 60, MADD 0487
(IN 38552)... S. .

Memo for Chief, TRAV from Jack Hawkins, 7 Nov 60,
sub: Organization and Training of Strike Force. S.-

6. Memo for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft
Cuban Operational Briefing {for] PresidentrElect. S.

MR from Jack Hawkins, 2 Nov 60, sub: Briefing this
date at Hq. CIC Atlantic and Supreme Allied Com-
‘mander, Atlantic. Ss.

MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC
' Meeting with’DDP. S.

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13-00000

10a.

‘0b.

li.

_ 12.

13.
14.

15.

16.

TOP SECRET

MR from Richard D. Drain, 16 Nov 60, sub: JMARC

Meeting with DDP. 6S.

Ibid.
Ibid.

Memo for General Maxwell Taylor from Allen W. Dulles,
1 Jun 61, sub: [Briefing of President- Elect, John
F. Kennedy, 18 Nov 60]. Ss.

Memo for DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 69, sub:
Points re Cuba from Discussion at Special Group Meet-
ing, Saturday, 19 Nov 60. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meetings [from T. A. Parrott],
16 Nov, 19 Nov, and 23 Nov, 60. S.

Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 26 Oct 60, sub: JMARC
Budget. {DD/P. .0-5866). 5S. :

Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
7 Nov 60, sub: JMARC Budget. - (DD/P 0-5866). S.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 Support from Herbert B. Juul,
22 Nov 60, sub: Staffing Requirements for 600 Man
Strike Force Training.

Cable to Director from Guatemala, 22 Nov 60, GUAT
584 (IN 46427). S. |

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Nov 60,

sub: Major Problems Confronting. Operation JMARC. S&S.
. . N

Ibid.

Memo for DDP from Cc. Tracy Barnes, 18 Nov 60, op. eit.

Cables to Director from JMTRAV: 23 Nov 60, .TRAV 0141
(IN 46775); 25 Now 60, TRAV 0148 (IN 47383). .S.

Cable to Director from Guatemala, 28 Nov 60, GUAT
605 (IN 48628). 5S. L

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18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24,

TOP SECRET

Memo .for DDP from J. C. King, 29 Nov 60, sub: Para-
military Policy re Cuba. 5S.

Ibid.
Ibid.

Taylor Committee Reports, MR's of PM Study Group
Meetings, 7th Meeting, 1 May 1961, p. 3. S. .

Memo for Chief, WH/4 PM from Jacob D. Esterline, |
2 May 61, sub: Straightening Out Dates of Strike
Force Concept for the Taylor Committee. S.

Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 3, p. 39.

Oral History Interview for the John F. Kennedy
Library: Richard Bissell by Joseph E. O'Connor,

25 Apr 67, pp. 3-4. U.

Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75.

ps!

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Source References

‘Part IV
Presidential Resurgence

1. Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
Jack B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75, Tape 1, pp. 13-14.

2. MR from Richara@’D. Drain, 29 Nov 60, sub: JMARC.
Meeting with DDP. S.

3. Memo of Conversation with William D. Pawley from
_ Livingston, T. Merchant, 28 Nov 60. S.

4. Minutes of Special Group Méeting [from Thomas A.
Parrott], 30 Nov 60. s.

Ibid.

2: a. - Lbid., E Pec:iéo.Ts

6. -Memo for [Allen W. Dulles] from Livingston T.
Merchant, 10 -Dec 60, sub: Proposal to the President
and President's Reply. TS (no number).

7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9, CAE aera a per’ Ae OPEL A Poem (pel ente | Doe bc, Aul--

leenabede a peeps,
Jo, Vernke § Spread hey, nals] prove Theme, A bee], SDVee Go, S.
Memo for DDP/EMB from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 Dec 60,
sub: Four JMARC Problems for 8 December Meeting of
Special Group. S. : ;

Memo for Gen. Lansdale. from-C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60,
sub: [Problems for Special Group Meeting of 8 Dec 60].

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Dec 60, sub:
. Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S.

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13-00000

ll.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.
20.
21.

22.

TOP SECRET

_MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 8 Dec 60, sub: Minutes

of Special Group Meeting, 8 Dec 60. S.

Memo for Tracy Barnes from Joseph W. Scott, 8 Dec
60, sub: [A Suggested Program for Cuba]. TS (no
number). —

‘ Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York, 1965),

pp- 603, 712. “Ue

SNIE 85-3-60, 8 Dec 60, Prospects for the Castro
Regime. S/NOFORN.

MR from Michael F. Taylor, 23 Dec 60, sub: Meeting
with Ambassador Wilhauer [ste]. Ss.
Ibid,

*

Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A.
Parrott], 22 Dec 60. S.

MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: Meeting
arranged by Henry Holland, 21 Dec 60.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A.
Parrott],'22 Dec 60. S..

MR from R. E. Whedbee, 22 Dec 60, sub: “Meeting
arranged by Henry Holland,, 21 Dec 60.

{Memo] for Attention of Col. J. C. King from Mike
Haider, rec'd 10 Jan 61, sub: [Anti-Castro Leftists].
U . . . . .

Memo for Mr. Richard Bissell from BG Lansdale,
28 Dec 60, sub: Cuba. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting {from Thomas A.
Parrott], 29 Dec 60. 5S.

Ibid.

Ibid.

- 370 -

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13-00000

23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

TOP SECRET

Memo of Conference with the President, 29 Dec 60,
from A. .J. Goodpaster, 6 Jan 61. S. (Dwight D.
Eisenhower tibrary, DDE Clean-Up Files, Box 51 -
Cuba.)

Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 Dec 60,

Op. ett.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 28 Dec 60,

“sub: [Cuba]. S.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 2 Jan 61, sub:

_ Material for Policy Meeting on Cuba, 3 Jan 61. S.

Memo for Mr. Frank Devine from J. D. Esterline,

3 Jan 61, sub: Personnel for US Embassy in Havana.
Ss. :

Cable to Havana from. BELL, 3 Jan 61, BELL 0174

(OUT 5669). 5S. ;

MR from C. Tracy Barnes,‘'3 Jan 61, sub: Outline
of 3 Jan 1961 [White House] Meeting. S.

L. K. White, Diary Notes, 3 Jan 61. Ss.

Cable to BELL from Havana, 7 Jan 61, HAVA 7405
(IN 1184). Ss.

Cable to Havana from Director, 7 Jan 61, DIR 19746

(OUT 60701). S. ‘

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 4 Jan 61,

sub: Policy Decisions Required for Conduct of
Strike Operations Against ‘Government of Cuba. S.

MR from R. D. Drain, 4 Jan 1960 [ste], sub:
Meeting with A/DDP/A. Ss.

Memo for DCI from C. Tracy Barnes, 5 Jan 61, sub:
Material for the 5 Jan Special Group Meeting. S.

Memo for. ADDP/A from J. D. Esterline, 9 Jan 61,
sub: Material for the 12 Jan [61] Special Group
Meeting. S. :

- 371 -

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13-00000

34.

35.

36.

37..

38.

‘39.

40.

41.
42.

43.

AG,

45.

‘TOP SECRET

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.
Parrott, 12 Jan 61]. S.

MR from John S. Warner, 9 Jan 61, sub: DCI Appear-
ance before. CIA Subcommittee on House Appropriations
Committee, 6 Jan 61. (TS 174817).

Daily Progress ‘Reports, WH/4/Support: June 1960 -
March 1961: ‘28 Déc 60, . 30 Dec 60, 3 Jan 61. S.

_ Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. ett., p. 614. U.

MR from J. C. King, 1L Jan 61, sub: Meeting to
Discuss Proposed Release to the Press re NWYf Story
of 10 Jan 61- on _ Training of Guerrillas in Guatemala.
Ss.

Memo for Under Secretary Merchant. from Ambassador
Willauer, 18 Jan 61, sub: The Suggested Program

for Cuba Contained in the Memorandum to You dated

6 Dec 60. S.

Minutes of Special Group Meeting [from Thomas A.
Parrott], 19 Jan 61. S.

Memo for Under Secretary Merchant from Ambassador
Willauer,.18 Jan 61, op. cit.

Playa Giron: Derrota. det Imperitaltsmo (Habana:
Ediciones R, 1961), I, 405... U.

Ibid., 436.

Eisenhower, Waging Peace, op. ctt., pp. 613-614.
Newsday, 10 sep 65, p. 50. U: |

Ibid., pp. 50-51. |

Interview with Gordon Gray by Paul D. Hopper,

19 Jul 67, Columbia University Oral History Project,

Part 7, pp. 274- -277. U. (Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library copy.)

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13-00000

TOP SECRET

46. The following Oral History Interview filed in the
; Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:

OH~14 Dwight D. Eisenhower, 28 Jul 64.

OH-57 | Thomas C. Mann, 23 Feb 68.

OH-117 Livingston Merchant -- Part I, 4 May 67;
: Part 2, 13 May 68. : :
OH-183 Thomas S. Gates, Jr., 3 Aug 67.

OH~206 Gen. David M. Shoup, 29 Aug 72.

OH-288 James H. Douglas, 23 Oct. 72.

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Source References

Part V
Direct Action Programs

_A. Propaganda

1. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 27 Oct 59, sub:
Propaganda Operations in _the Caribbean.

2. Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 Oct 59 [from
T. A. Parrott).

Memo for A/DDP/A from Sherman Hoar, 29 Oct 59, sub:
DCI Comments on Cuban Proposal.

Memo for DCI from J.C. King, 3 Nov 59, sub: Opera- .
tion Against the Regime of Fidel Castro. ;

Memo for: Acting Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell,
Jr., 16 Nov 59, sub: Anti-Castro Broadcast Opera-
tions.

Memo for DCI from R. E. Gomez , 17 Nov 59, sub:
Anti-Castro Broadcast Operations.

3. Minutes of Special Group Meetings {from T. A. Parrott]:
18 Nov 59; 9 Dec 59.

Memo for. Chief, WHD from C. Tracy Barnes, 20 Jan 60,
sub: Cuba (DD/P-0-308).

4. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Feb 60, sub: Report.
on WHD Plans and Activities Concerning Cuba, etc.

5. _JMARC Propaganda Program [Maxch 1960]. Ss.’

6. MR‘'s from J. €. King, 15 Mar 60, sub: [Meetings
with Messrs. Lemon, Loeb, Lapham, and Wright].

7. Ibid.

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Tb.

7c.

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MR from J. C. King; 9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur
Co. Contribution to Support of Anti-Castro Radio
Program.

Memo for Mr. Lawrence R. Houston from J. C. King,
9 May 60, sub: Freeport Sulphur Co.

MR from J. C. King, 9 Aug 60, sub: Contribution
to Cuban Broadcasting Program.

; Ltr to Hon. Dana Latham, Commissioner of Internal
“Revenue, 10 Aug 60 from John S. Warner. ;

Memo for Col. King from R. E. Gomez, 19 Aug 60,
sub: Telecon with Henry Holland, 19 Aug 60.

Memo for ‘Chief, WHD from q. D. Esterline, 25 Oct 60,
sub: WRUL Radio Effort. —

Cable to Director from MASH, 19 Nov 60, MASH 1744
(IN 45083).

Cable to JMASH from Director, 23 Nov 60, DIR 13132 |
(OUT 95725). - Se

‘Request for Payment of Confidential Funds to JMARC/

Finance from D. Phillips, 21 Nov 60.

Memo for JMARC/Finance from C/WH/4/Prop, 23 Nov 60,
sub: WRUL Monthly Payments.

‘

Cable to JMWAVE. from BELL, 27 Dec 60, BELL 0022
(OUT 5074). °

Memo for Chief, WHD from David A. Phillips, 25 Jan
61, sub: Approval for Continuing Payments from JMATE
Funds for WRUL Radio Program.

Memo for Chief, Ops Branch, DPD/DDP from Chester H.
Vincent, .29 Apr 60, sub: JMARC Progress Report

(DPD 3505-60).

Memo for DPD/AS from.D. A. Phillips, 25 May 60, sub:
Medium Wave Broadcasts from Aircraft (DPD-4426-60).

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10."

10a.
ll.

12.

13.

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Memo for DDP from D. A. Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub:
Estimates for Aircraft Broadcasts to Cuba.

JMARC Propaganda program, op. cit.

MR from David’ R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Interview
with David A. Phillips.

Ibid.

Cable for Director from JMASH, 22 Nov 60, MASH 1805.
(IN 46419). -

Memo for C. T. Barnes from E. A. Stanulis, 21 Jul 61,
sub: Cuban Briefing Papers.

[Memo for] Mrs. Geraldine S. DePuy, Director,
Operations Division and John P. Hebrew, Director,
Investigation Staff, Bureau ‘of Foreign Commerce,
Dept. of Commerce from R..W. Lindsay, Intelligence
Division, Investigation Staff, Bureau of Foreign’
Commerce, Dept. of Commerce, 20 May 60, sub: Swan
Islands (FC-2040; 2-37).

Ltr. for Harold W. Reeves, Collector of Customs,
Tampa, Fla. from Geraldine S. DePuy, 25 May 60,

‘FC-2650-FLB.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from Chief, WH/4 Support,
27 May 60, sub: Shipment of Supplies and Equip-
ment to Swan. Island.

MR from [R. S. Kraus?], 27 May 60, sub: JMHOPE.
MR from David A.-Phillips, 27 Jun 60, sub: Briefing

of Senator Mundt on CIA Radio Operations against
Cuba. .

- . Minutes of Special: Group Meeting [from T. A.

14.

Parrott], 12 May 60.

Memo for Chief, WHD from William E. Eisemann,
27 Jun 60, sub: Administrative Plan for the
JMARC/4 Phase of Project JMARC.

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Phillips, David A., fhe Night Wateh (New. York:
Atheneum, 1977), pp. 90-91. U.

MR from Richard R. Bennett, 22 Apr 60, sub:
Proposed Implementation Plan for Cover Plan for
' JMARC/4.

"Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Apr 60,
; ‘sub: JMARC ‘Daily Progress Report 22, 23, 24,
ye 28 Apr 60.

R and R Sheet for E. Stanulis from David A. Phillips,
_.5 May 60, sub: Annex A, Operational Plan for JMARC/4 .

Memo. of Conversation from E. A. Stanulis, 28 Apr 60,
_sub: Cover for JMARC. ,

‘Burwell, James, Logisttes*.Support for Operations
in Cuba, March 1960-October 1961, DDS/HS OL-7,
Apr 71.

15. - [Memo from} WH/Security for Cuban History [May 61],
~ sub: ' [Security ‘of Swan Island] .

16. Memo for Mr. David Phillips from J. D. Esterline,
29 Mar 60, sub: Random Notes of 29 Mar [60] which
Require Attention.

17. Cable to Director from Havana, 30 Mar 60, MSGNR
3940 (CKNR 208).

Cable to Havana from Director, 9 Mar 60, MSGNR .
18435 (CKNR 098).

‘18. MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, sub: Inter-
view with David A. Phillips.

Memos for the NSC from James S. Lay, Jr., sub:
U.S. Policy Toward Cuba: 20 Jul and 5 Aug 60.

oUO. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library: Gray, Gordon:
Records, 1952-61, Box 27, , Folder “Cuba - ")

[Dept. of State, ARAI, Progress Report on Cuba,
22 Jul 60. Cc. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:

Gray, Gordon: Records, 1952-61, Box 27, Folder
“Cuba. "y) ;

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19.

20.

2r.

22.

22a.

' 22b.

23.

23a.

24.

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MR from David R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. eit.
WH/4 Prop Notes for 9 Aug 60.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 1 Sep 60, sub:
Radio Swan.

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 2 Aug 60, sub:
Radio Swan. (DD/P 0-4013).

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 30 Aug 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report for 25-29 August 1960.

WH/4 Prop Notes for 23 Sep 60.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 27 Sep 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report for 23-26 Sep 60.

_ —.

Memo for Mobilization and Military Personnel Divi-
Sion from J. C. King, 19 Nov 60, sub: Request for
Personnel from Department of Defense.

Cables. to BELL from RAND: 7 Jan 61, RAND 0172
(IN 1158); 10 Jan 61, RAND 0179 (1360). —

Dispatch to Chief, WHD from COB, JMWAVE, 20 Mar 61,

sub: Request for Promotion/Fitness Report.

{Memo from] c. T. Barnes, 15 Mar 61, sub: Propaganda

Effort.

x

MR from David.R. McLean, 27 Jul 72, op. cit.

Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 6 May 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report, 28 Apr-5 May 60.

WH/4/Prop Notes for .20 Oct 60, 21 Oct 60.

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60, sub:
Conversation with ADDP/A.

Free, Lloyd A., "A Summary Report on Attitudes
of the Cuban People toward the Castro Regime"

' [August 1960]. (ER 60-5982).

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25. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Aug 60; op. cit.

26. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, -12 Aug 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report for 10 and 11 Aug 60.

27. Interview of David A. Phillips by Jack B. Pfeiffer,
11 Mar 75.

28. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 24 May 60,
sub: JMARC Progress Report for 12-19 May 60.

Klein and Saks,.. “Preliminary Outline of Economic
and Financial Government Platform, etc," 17 Jun 60.
U.

29. Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 5 Jul 60, sub:
Operational Exploitation of Khrushchev Visit to
Cuba. (ER 60- ~5254)". ™
WH/4 Prop Notes for 5 July 1960, 6 Jul 60..

30. Memo for. DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 23 Aug 60,
- sub: JMARC Progress: Report for 19-22 Aug 60.

31. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 13 Sep 60,
' sub: JMARC Progress Report for 8 and 9 Sep 60.

3la. Information on Khrushchev destinations from John
Zabotto, OCR/USSR Div/Pol-Mil Br., 23 Aug 78. U.

32. Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 9 Aug 60,
‘sub: . JMARC Progress Report for 8 Aug 60. ©

WH/4 Prop Notes for: 21 Oct 60; 1, 2, and 1 Nov
60; and 1 Dec 60.

Memo for DCI from J: C. King, 29 Feb 60, sub: What
We Are Doing in Cuba. ; ,

Cable to JMASH from Director, 2 Dec 60, DIR 14634
(OUT 98992).

Senate Select Committee, Alleged Assassination Plots
Involing Foreign Leaders (94th Cong, lst Sess, Rpt
No. 94-465), 20 Nov 75, p. 72. U. .

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33.

34.

35.

35a.

35b.

36.

37.

38.

39.

TOP SECRET

WH/4 Prop Notes for 19 Aug 60, 22 Aug 60.

Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara, JMASH from
Director, 19 Aug 60, DIR 46287 (OUT 60198).

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from R. E. Gomez, 24 Aug 60,
sub: Outgoing Cable to Havana, Istanbul, Ankara,
and MASH, OUT 60198 of 19 Aug 60.

B. Sabotage and Other Exercises

[Information Requested for Green Study], Job 63-289,
Box 1, Folder 9.

‘MR {from T.A. Parrott], 16 Mar 61, sub: ‘special
Group Meeting - Cuba.

MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 9 Mar 60, sub: Minutes
of Special Group Meeting, 9 Mar 60.. .

Ibid., Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 14 Jul 60.

MR from J. D. Esterline, 15 Jul 60, sub: Paramilitary

‘Meeting with DDP.

Transmittal Slip to Chief, WH/D from [Chief] WH/4/PM,
21 Jul 60, ‘sub: Paramilitary Op Plan 1.

Routing and Record Sheet to WH/FI from WH/4/FI,
12 Sep 60,.sub: Monthly Reports of FI Activity,

March-August 1960 (See Aug 60).

MR from [WH/4/PM?] 30 Nov 60, sub: Operation to
Subtle Sabotage Oil and Kerosene in Storage [in
Cuba]j. ‘

Cable to BELL from WAVE, 31 Jan 61, WAVE 3322
(IN 3361). |

Cable to Paris from Director, 23 Jun 60, DIR 36353
(OUT 89214).

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40. MR [from J. C. King?], 29 Nov 60, sub: Sabotage
' [of] Cuban Television Services. TS (no number).

, Cable to .JMWAVE from BELL, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1924
. ‘ (OUT 9992).

Cable to. JMWAVE. from Director, 24 Feb 61, BELL 1929
(ouT 5001). ©

41. Memo for DDP from J. C. King, 1 Nov 60, sub:
' Request for Approval for Sabotage attacks against
Soviet and Soviet Bloc Targets in Cuba.

42: Memo for DDP from J. Cc. King, 18 Nov 60, sub:
* Development of Action Squads by WHD.

Memo for Chief, WHD from Richard M. Bissell, Jr.,
10 Nov 60, sub: Goon Squads. ;

43. Memo for DDP from J. C..King, 18 Nov 60, op. cit.

44, Memo for Chief, JMARC from John D. Corbett, 12 Sep 60,
° sub: Approval of Special Operations.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from J. Hawkins, 14 Sep 60,
sub: - Special Operations.

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Source References

_ Part VI
Mr. Nixon's Role in the BOP Operation

Richard M. Nixon, “Cuba, Castro,. and John F. Kennedy,"
Reader's Digest, Nov 64, pp. 283-286. U. .

‘Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of: Richard Nixon

(N.¥., 1978), pp. 202-203. U.

Theodore Draper, Castro's Revolution (N. Y., 1962),

pp. 62-63. U.

Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. ctt.
: *

Nixon, RW, op: ett., p. 202.

Rufo Lopez-Fresquet,,” My Fourteen Months with Castro
(Cleveland, 1966), p. 107. U.

MR from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 18 Jul 79, sub: Telecon
with Bob Zunzer re writing letter to Richard Nixon.
U.

Letter to Richard M. Nixon from Jack B. Pfeiffer,
19 Jul 79. U.

Memo for Jim Pittman from Jack B. Pfeiffer, 5 Mar 79,
sub: Memo of Meeting with Fidel Castro on 19 Apr 59

(ER 79-7295). U.

MR's from J..C. King: 27 Jan 60, sub: Meeting in
Vice President's Office on Cuba; 27 Jan 60, Meeting
with Mr. Henry Holland on Cuba; 25 Feb 60, sub:
Meeting with General Cushman, Aide to the Vice
President.

Ibid., 25 Feb 60.

Ibid., 27 Jan 60.

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6. .Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 29. Feb 60, sub: What
We Are Doing in Cuba.

7. Minutes of the 436th Meeting of the NSC [from Gordon
Gray], 10-Mar 60. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library:
Gordon Gray, Box 79-NSC, Minutes and Agenda 1960. -)
TS (no number).

Memo: of Conference with the President [on] 17 Mar
60 from A. J. Goodpaster, 18 Mar 60. TS (no number) .

8. MR from J. D. Esterline, 30 Mar 60, sub: Contact
- with Mr. William Pawley in Miami, 21 Mar 60.

“an,

9. MR from J. D. Esterline, 8 Apr 60, sub: Review of
the. Cuban. Operation and Examination of Possibilities
for Hemispheric Support for Liberal Governments
(DDP 0-1956).°

10. Memo for. DDP from C. Tracy Barnes, 17 May 60, sub:
‘ ; : Project JMARC. a

10a. [Minutes of] special Group Meetings - Cuba. [from
Thomas A. Parrott], 19 May 60.

11. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 20 May 70, sub: Review
of Swan Island Operation and [William D. Pawley's]
‘Apparent Unilateral Decision to Work with Cuban
Exiles Independent of CIA.

12: Memo for DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60,
sub: Rubio-Pawley Group.

13. cables to. Director: from Havana, 4 Jun 60, HAVA
4820 (IN 48003); from MASH, 9 Jun 60, MASH 0041
(IN 49533).

14. Official Routing Slip to C/WHD from Gerard Droller
{4 Jun 60].

a

15. Memo to DDP from Jacob D. Esterline, 7 Jun 60, sub:
Rubio-Pawley Group.

-16. MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 11 Jul 60, sub: Lunch
{on 20 Jun 60] with General Cushman, Vice-Presidential
Aide.

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17.

18.

18a.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

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{Minutes of] Special Meeting of the NSC on 22 Jun
60 [from' James S. Lay, Jr.]. (Dwight D. Eisenhower
Library: Gordon Gray: Records, 1952-61, "Cuba"
folder.) TS (no number).

Routing and Record Sheet. for Chief, WHD from Chief,

WH/4, 21 Jun 60, sub: Copy of NSC Briefing Paper
sent General Cabell on 20 June.

Ibid.

Memo for Assistant to the President for. National
Security Affairs from Jacob D. Esterline, 25 Jun 60,
sub: Notes on Policy Discussion which Followed the
CIA Briefing of the NSC on Cuba, 22 Jun 60.

Memo for Mr. Jacob D. Esterline from James S. Lay,
Jr., 29 Jun 60, sub: Esterline memo of 25 Jun 60.

[Notes on Policy Discussion at Special NSC Meeting
of 22 Jun 60). .

MR from Jacob D. Esterline, 1 Jul 60, sub: Tele-
phone Conversation with General Cushman.

Memo for Chief, WH/4 from C. Tracy Barnes, 7 Jul 60,
sub: Swan Island Broadcasts.

Memo for DCI from Rudolph E. Gomez, 26 Sep 60, sub:
Mario Garcia Kohly Antiga. (ER 60-7645).

Memo for DCI from J. C. King, 18 Jul 60, sub:
Contacts with Mario Garcia Kohly .

MR from. J. D. Esterline, 20 Jul 60, sub: Briefing
of General Cushman. oo .

_WH/4 Prop Notes Jun 60 - Jul 61: 18, 19, 20, 21,

26, 29 Jul; 1 Aug; and 11, 17 Oct 60.

MR's from. Robert W. Andrews, 23 and 26 Sep and 4 Oct.
0, sub: William Jackson Powell.

. ta
Memo for Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. from Allen W. Dulles,
17 Jun 61, sub: Marshall Diggs Proposals on Behalf
of Garcia Kohly. ,

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. Washington Star, 2 Aug 76. U.z

24. Memo for the President from Allen W. Dulles, 3 Aug 60,
{sub:. Intelligence Briefing for Democratic’ Candidates,
July 1960]. (ER 60-6067). U.

Memo for the Record from Allen W. Dulles, 21 Sep 60,
‘{sub: Briefing of Sen. John F: Kennedy on 19 Sep 60].

25. New York Times, 21 Oct 60. U.

7 26. Nixon, "Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy , " op. cit.,
pp. 286-288. U.

Nixon, RN, op. ctt., pp. 220-221. U.
27. Nixon, “Cuba, Castro, and John F. Kennedy," op. cit.,
p. 288. .

Nixon, RN, op. cit., p. 221.

28.. MR from Jack: B. Pfeiffer, 1 Mar 78, sub: Meeting .
with Mrs. Fawn M. Brodie. U. |

Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., A Thousand Days (New .
York, 1965), p. 225. U.

29. New York Times,- 23 Oct 60. U.

MR from Thomas A. Parrott, 27 Oct 60, sub: State-
ments by Presidential Candidates.

30. Schlesinger, -op. eit., p. 164. U.

Memo. for C/CA from WH/4, 15 Nov 60, sub: Draft
Cuban Operational Briefing: President Elect.

31. Memo for the Honorable John A. McCone from Allen
W. Dulles; 20 Mar 62, sub: [Intelligence Briefing
of President-elect Kennedy] . - U. .

32. Letter to Admiral Stansfield. Turner from Fawn M.
Brodie, 4 Jan 78. U.

33. .MR [from WH/4], 15 Nov 60, sub: [Transcript of

Tape of] Telephone Conversation between C/JMARC
and William D. Pawley on 14 Nov 60.

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Source References

Part VII
Assassination

Oral History Interview: Richard M. Bisssell, Jr.
by Jack B. Pfeiffer, 17 Oct 75, Tape 2, p. 18.

Ibid., p. 17.

LK. White, Diary Notes, 22 Mar 61.

Oral History Interview: Jacob D. Esterline by
- Jack. B. Pfeiffer, 10-11 Nov 75. (Untaped conver-
_ sation.)

Ibid.

Oral History Interview: . Richard D. Drain by Jack B..
Pfeiffer, 8 Jan 76, Pemaeiy: pp. 19-21.

MR [from Thomas A. Parrott], 3 Nov 60, sub: Minutes
of Special Group Meeting, 3 Nov 60.

Hunt, Howard, Give Us This Day (New Rochelle, N.Y.,
Arlington House, 1973), pp. 38-39. U.

Daily Log - [WH/4] PM Section, 18 Jul 60; 14 Oct 60.

(No author], Key to Map of Potential Paramilitary
Assets, [no date, but ‘after 6 Aug 60].

Cable to Director from SACU [Santiago, Cuba], 18 Jul
60, MSGNR 609 (CKNR 170).

Esterline-Pfeiffer OH Interview, er a 3) Sd
pp. 16-17. ,

Cable for Director from Havana, 9 Dec 60, HAVA 7133
(IN 14488). — , -

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12.° Richard D. Drain, Personal Notes.

13. ‘prain-Pfeiffer. OH Interview, op. ett., Tape 3,
p. 60.

14. Job 63-605/58, Folders 1, 2, 3: AMHINT-Operations, .
19-132-16/1-3. ;

Cable to BELL from IMHAVE, 24 Feb 61, WAVE 3931
“€IN 0915).

15. WH/4 Prop Notes for 27 Feb 61, 28 Feb 61.
Richard ‘OD. Drain, Personal Notes, 28 Feb 61.

16. Letter to Jack B. Pfeiffer from R[ichard] D. D[rain],
24 Jan 76. ;

Letter to Richard D. Drain from Jack B. Pfeiffer,
' 22 Jan 76. ,

17. Esterline- Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. eit., Tape 1,
“pp. 15-16.

“Must Go List"

18. Drain-Pfeiffer OH Interview, op. ett., Tape 1,
p. 21. .

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_ Source References

Part VIII

Conclusions

Playa Giron: Derrota del Impertalismo (Habana:

Ediciones R, 1961), I, 436. U. -

Maurice Halperin, The Rise and Decline of Fidel
Castro (Berkley, 1972), p. 89. U.

Playa Giron: Derrota, op. cit., III, 387. U.

Oral History Interview: Richard D. Drain by Jack

_B. Pfeiffer,.8 Jan 76, Tape 1, p.

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