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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

SSCIA
TWEEDY, BRONSON

10/09/75
92
CIA

ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA, PATRICE

TRANSCRIPT
UNCLASSIFIED

1A, 1B, 1¢

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
09/25/98

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Report of Proceedings

mar: a)
wi Ef

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turns ¢

Wer
to the Committee for destruct:. =

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. F.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000 ©

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WARGO ® PAUL

EXHIBIT

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EXECUTIVE: SESSION

Thursday, October 10, 1975

United States Senate,
Salect Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, ND. Cc.
The Committees mot, pursuant to notica, at 11:25 o'clock

a.m. ir Room 407, The Capitol, thea Honorable Richard Schweiker

’ prasiding.
u

Prasent: Senator Schweiker (prasiding),

Also present: Frederick Raron and Rhett Dawson, Profes-

’ sional Staff Members.

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PROCEEDING

Senator Schweiker. Would..you’ raise your right hand?

Prone {Aree 207) 344-4008

DO you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
| give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so halp you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meating you.

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)

(Discussion off the record.)
Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just receivad the oath
from Senator Schweiker, who has now laft tha room, and you are

‘under no obligation to continue to testify in his absanca, but

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‘ obviously the Committes would appraciate it graatly if you
would continue to testify.
Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's
absence?
Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.
Mr. Baron. You are willing to tustify to tha truth as hsv?
as you can do it?
Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.
Ar. Baron. Are you aware that vou have the riqht to
counsel?
Mr. Tweedy.

‘ir. Saron. You ars appearing here voluntarily without

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“ questions at any point if you wish to conault with counsel?

counsel?
Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Ara you also awara that you may cease answering

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Finally, are: you aware that all of your Consti-

tutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amandment

rights to remain silent?

Mr. Tweedy. I am,
Mr. Baron. All riqht, then.

Let us proceed to reviaw a set of documents which were not

“available to us in your first examination. The attempt here
- today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered
in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few

i main evants in the alleged story of an assassination plot

‘ against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of

these documants.

Let me introduce as Fxhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles
to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert. Guthman on
October 26th, 1960.

(The document referred
to was marked Tweady
Fxhibit No. 1 for

identification.)

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TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY
Mr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous
appearance, did we not?
Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.
May I correct the date? It da August 26th.
Baron. Certainly.
Tweedy. It is rather important.
Baron. It is August 26th,
Tweady. Yes, we did indeed Giscues it the last time.

Baron. After you took another look at this cable

this morning before we went On the record, you made a remark to
‘+ the effect that this cable was a source of euthority as far aa

| you were concerned at the time.

Is that your impression now?
Mr. Twaedy. Yes.

Let me just add to that a bit. Tha cable per se I did not

"! remamber, but £t is perfectly obvious the cable is tha authorit-.

” When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly

implied the only reason the subjact was being raised is because
it had been of national policy laval concern. I do not thin
it could be more clear-cut than that. This was hasically, this
was the formal axpression of that bv the Diractor himself.

T Cannot remember which came first, did I ses this cable
first, or did IT talk to Mr. 3isgal} first. I suspect that }

talked to Mr. Hissell first. It must have been absolutely i:

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Sy asaanme ty
SR ait

the same tima pariod.

This merely confirmed what I think I probably heard from
u Mr. Bissell first.

Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are
| referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the
| purpose of assassination.

Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that
the thrust 6f the American position was that thera was no
solution in the Congo without the fall from powar of Mr. Lumumba,
and no maasure should be overlooked to achiava this -- constitu-

tional. ravolutionary and indused, axecutive action, if you want
to call it that.

Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination?

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Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

But none of these possiblsa measures were excluded, and the
main point was that averybody aqreed that tumumba. had to qo or
We Were in for very serious trouble in the Congo.

Mr. Aaron. You wera referring a moment ago in discussina
this cable from Alle: Dulles to the Fact. that when you first
discussed the possibility ef assassinating Lumumha as one Means
of removirg him from power with Richard Bissell, Bissall rafsrre}
to this cabls.

Mr. Tweedy. No, I would hava saan this cable whan it went

out. tT am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, beceuss I!

Cannot remember the sequence of events. Tt would hava hean 4

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mone [Aree 207) 344-4008

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perfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It
is conceivable that this went out bafore I talked to Bissall,
do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem.

Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents

that ws are about to introduce into the record today, befora

i We begin taking your testimony on the record, are you ‘abla to

Pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with
Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terme of time?

Mr. Baron. Yas.

Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assum --
Baron. Th would have takan place shortly hefora this
Allan Dulles cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly befors, or shortly aftar,
because the next seriss of cablas obviously qet the show, as
it ware, on the road.

May I comment just ganerally on those cables as a group?
Theres are ro surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in
terms of dutail. Much of it, even to this dav, I still do not
remember.

One aspect emerges very clearly for ms, that wa wers very
careful about examining this on ths possihilities of doirad
anything against Lumumba. Pasically, this wholes nariod was a
Series Of exchanges with the filald who wers seaking, as vou car

See from that cable traffic, various maasures that might narfor-

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or achieve the goal, including, indded assassination, but not ,

Means which appeared secure, particularly means which kept the

| by any means limited to- that, that we were in trouble finding
i

“U.S. hand hidden. It is the to and from, and the atmosphere

: of it which is vary familiar to ma) the details of it, much of

i te eVan on reading them, is rather unfamiliar to me. I found

| no surprines in it.

. Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollaction by reviewina

|

| these cables, can you add any graater specificity to the record
about the substance of your conversations with Richard Biassel!
on the possibility of assassinating Lumumba? .

Mr. Twasdy. I think what wa usad to do, as [ remember it.

when it came to tha technical axchanga with the Station on one

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asset varsus another, the possible security weakness of this
man versus the possible strengths of another, 5issel] left this
lergely to me. I do not mean to sav that we did not from time
to time review it. He did not dabate with me on whether(white }
(lami was somebody who was worth dealing with or not, because

‘he had Nelqian connections, for sxample.

Mr. Haron. You are savinad he woule heave laft the operations!
details to you?

Mr. Twesdy. The oparaticnal details of trying to come ur
with some solution that lookud as if itt made Senss, and had a
promise of success. JF do sot racall that we would discuss this

type of a cable in detail. As you can ses, he ralaased quits

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Prone | Av as 707) 344-6008

4 number of tham, because he wanted to remain familiar with

tham.
(Discussion off the‘ record.)
Mr. Daron. Back on the record on thin subject.

.

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of

i datailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand,

\ it was perfectly clear that he remained actively intereated in
it. Tam sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin

‘ O'Dounell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with

that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten uatirealy that Justin

" O'Dornell had over played a role in thin. I am sure when he

fixed on O'Donnell the possibility tct essist the Tie” of Statice

‘he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I

remember it, but hardly.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Rissell

“gaid to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of

assassinating Lumumba about the level at which tha exploration
of this prospect had beer authorized?

Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on
exCept that it was parfactly clear to me that he was quite
co.fide.t that this was -- T am now talking about the elimination
of Lumumba by whatever means. T am rot talking necessarily
about assassination: I want to ba quite clear on thet.

I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levals of

Washington were agreed that Lumumba must qo. T cannot go any

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further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell

said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on

thia or that this had basen discussed with the policy levels
of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to

Me.nor:does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear

that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing

i any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.

Mr. Baron. Off tha record.
(Whereupon, a brief racess was taken.)
Mr. Baron... We are back on the record now.

When we stopped, we ware discussing your account of your

( Meetinas with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinatiny

; Lumumba had arisen among other maans that had been considered

in disposing of Lumumba, Did Richard Bissell aver indicate

| directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the
7 President of the United States for moving forward with an

‘ operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?

‘Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly
never mantioned the Presidant at all.
Mr. Baron. Ry nama?

Mr. Tweedy. Sy nemse, or aven by anv indication. It was

Merely my impression reinforced, cartainly, aithar befors or

after, of this cable of Allan Dulles that this was a nolicy

- level decision, but the extant to which the FExacutive had

» assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.

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It is perfectly obvious that tha Agency felt that it had
the support of tha. Executiva in afforts to eliminate Lumumba.

It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that

“if it aver came down to the point where somebody said, I think

Wwe can do it, and wa decided upon the means, that someone would

| have said, well, bafore we do, obviously thare has to be final

approval. I would not have known where the final approval

| would have come from. I would not expect that. my corresporidance
“with the Chief of Station in Laopoldville would result in the

“assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further refarance.

Mr. Baron. You Were under the imprassion that whatever

steps you Were involved in toward sliminating Lumumba, as you

* put it, were fully authorized at the highest leval of the

- GOVernment?

Mr. Tweedy. Yas, I was.

Mr. Baron. That would include tha Prasidant?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that
question, Mr. Baron. Wher. somabony at my lavel, fairly senior
though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy
leval wants something done, it is varv difficul+* for him to
judge whether the Presidant per ss has hean in contact with the
Agency or that he has done this through his National Security
Advisor, the Secretary of States, Or whoever. There could he
ho way that. I could judga that.

I think i would be quite misleading if I were to try to

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warn a rau

read into it either then or now.
Mr. Baron. Whatever imprassion you had of the axtent of
the authority for. the staps that you were taking to aliminate

Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard

Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.
Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.

\ Mr. Tweedy. Which marely indicated to me that the Agencv

waa confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus

; acting accordingly.

Mr. Raron. Batween this cable on Auqdust 26th which
Allen Dulles dispatched to tha Congo and tha cahle we will now
mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldvilla
On Septembar 19th, marked Fyes Only, Guthman from .Jadwin--

(The document. refarred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 2 for

identification.)

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Mr. Baron. Were there any other mMeatings that you recall

| between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you to

move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation staqe

“in assaasinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. 1 just do not racall
that ever occurred.

Mg. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.

Thia cable indicates --

Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

(Discussion off the racord.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

This cable bagins with your indication to tha Chief of

Station that someone was proceading shortly to the Congo who

i: would announce himself as Sid from-Paris.

First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is
the Chief of Station, is that right?
Mr. Tweedy. Correct.
‘Mr. Baro. Who we agread would be raferred to as the
Chief of Stetion or by hin alias, Hadqmena, and Jadwin is --
Mr. TWeedy. My pseudonym.
Baro:. Nid you hava a first nane in the pseudonvm?
Twasady. Thomas Kk.
Raro:.. Who was Sid from Paris?

Twuedy. TI was trving to think. The idantitv is Sid

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WARD w Pau

FG 200er8

Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.
Mr. Baron. If I reprasent to you that wa have had testimony
Sidney Gott ; By that thia identity stood for himself, does
refresh your recollection?
Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption
that it probably was, but I could not Fraecall, so I find -- in
other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would havea

expected..

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of

tee oe ,
' dispatching ‘Sidney Gottlieb on a miseion to tha Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I hava the most unclear recollection that 1

. TINT ee
- discussed with Mr. Bissell Sidney Sottias” 8 goina *o the
Siiney Gotti izh"s

; Congo. I hava no recollactions of any Conversations IT had

ee

“with Mr.’ Goek iubj himself, although I am quite convinced I had
a RE

them.

In other words, it is inconceivable to mg that he would hav-
gona to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot: recall the
substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imaqi:s
Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was
411 about, the operational preblems involved, so that he, in
turn, could be somewhat sansibls ahout what his own support in:
rule ah tnis miant be.

Whee I say this, it is a reaso.ahble assumption but it is
not direct recollection.

Mr. Baron. “Dons this cable indicate to you that you did

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dispatch ‘S{aney*Gottiteb™ to the Congo on a highly sensitive
mission?
Mr. Twaedy. It does indeed.

When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be

1
more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I

am sure the authority for him going would have come from he

‘rather than me, but we arranged the details.

Mr. Baron. Your comment about ‘the fact that the authority

“ would have flowed from Mr. Bissell diracty is borne out, is it

| not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, axactly.

Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have
both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a
cabls?

Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization

ion matters of aither particular sensitivity or so important that

the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence
on 4 Subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and
send out cables and have it aetually signed off by the DOP.
That was yuite a common practices in the Agency. .

Mr. Baron. Do you have a racollection, having seen this
documart, of the fact that you get up 4 special channel using
the YOPROP sensitivity indicator?

e

Mr. Tweady. T did not recall ¥OPROP, but I recall special

channels.

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Mr. Baron. This. would have restricted all traffic from
yoursalf to Chief of Station, ia that. correct?

Mr. Twaedy. Yas. My Deputy would also have access to it
“dn my absence.
Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?

Tweedy. Yas.

Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?

Twasdy. Indead he would.

Baron. Allen Pulles also?

Mr. Twasdy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Why was a anecial communications channel set

- J up in this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Because of tha sensitivity of the subject.

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This, again, was a frequent procedure in the Agancy on sensitive
|. matters. If One was about to mount a seansitive operation, cne
-of the first things normalivy done was to set up special

communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages

could be restricted to what wes raquirad.

Mr. Baron. In this case, the aspecially sensitive subiect t-
which you Were restricting communications access was the elini-
nation of Lumumba by one means or another?

Mr. Tweedy. That. is correct.

“ir. Baron. What was the assidnmant rhacfStaney Motelieny
was to explain to the Chief of Station wher he arrived in the

Couyo?

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WARD & PAUL

Mr. Twaedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume

it wae nat Aarne aererrermmnn—e
' that Sidney Gottliubtwould have discussed with the Chief of
‘t ee _~

| Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of

assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed
his inventory, whatever it miqht be, and the two presumably were

1 trying to coma to some conclusions as to what might have the

: bast chance or the most practical chance of being used.

‘ This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that
] .

. would have been the purpose of the exercise.

. a

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you tha testimony of Sidney”
Gottiiebyapout two conversations that he had at Headquarters
bafore he undartook the mission to the Congo in Ssapteambar of
1960.

First, when ‘or. Gotti Tab) looked at this cable and some
subsequent. cables which we witl discuss today, he said thes
cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took
a trip to the Congo and arrived on Sentember 24th as is indicated
by a subsequent cabla, and: left on October Sth, as is indicated
by another cable.

Ee said before he left the Coneo -- T an sorrv,
before he left for the Congo -- he had ¢ convaraation with you
and Glen Flelds in which you instructed him to take a lathe}
material to the Conge and give it to tha Chie? of Station

with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible

and to instruct the Chis’ of Station in tha technical means hy

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which this lethal material could be administered through
Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.
Mr. QDEETTEE; also tastified that in that conversation you
| indicated to him that thease instructions were being given at
Richard Sissell‘s authority.
Did that conversation take place?
(Discussion off the racord.)
Mr. Twaady. His testimony does not basically refresh my
| memory. Tha only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is
that he had an instruction from ma to tall tha Chiaf of Station
“to use this material and qo ahead and assansinate Lumumba, as

it, i. effsct, that igs all the authority that was necessary.

To be frank, that does not make Sansa. Tha rast of it is

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‘ perfectly feasible. 1 do not recall it in tha detail, but 1

. am not going to deny wha tQSidj said. I think his racollectior

- f ehat I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station anc
‘ gort of gat the show on the road and use the poison and
assassinate Lumumba without any furthar ceremony {is just not f!.-
way it would have happened.
Mr. Raror. Why is that?
Mr. Tweady. For tha simple reason that under ne ecireumstencs
would that instruction hava been given by me without reference.
to higher authority up through the chain of command.
Mr. Baron. When you say reference to hicher authority,

what do you mean?

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WARD & PAUL

Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance
would be Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Gottlies} did testify --

Mr. Tweedy. I understand. |

Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with

him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the

| assignment you were giving to Gottlieh,

Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr .{G6tt ri ab would disagree
on is that thare would be no furthar reference, which hia
statement implies from Laeopoldville before thay took any action

on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this

". matter, and that was navar a matter, to the bast of my recollec-
| tion, that was saver delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words,

' Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, qo ahead

and do it in your own good time without any further referance

“ tO me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence

“ae I read it that way at all.

4r. Baron. No you recall if Mr. Bissell ever want as far
as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the
assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would hs
practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority
for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that
the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances,
authorized to procead to assassinate Lumumba ?

Mr. Tweedv. No, I do not.

TOP SECRET


‘Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way
| or the other? |
Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to ma
«this way.

Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this

poe tee
meeting with (Dr. Gottlieb) into component parts.

You agree now, having heard ‘Dr. Gottlieb‘s, testimony, that
: 1t 1g true that you had asked {Dr. Gottlieb} to go to the Congo?
1 = . ’

Mr. Tweady. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.

sae od

Mr. Baron. It is also trua that you knew that Dr! Gott lier
was to carry a lethal material to the Chiaf of Station in the
Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, T do not disaqrea with him.

wand & Pau

I do not frankly recall thet at this noint, but fT an parfeactly
wadded to accapt what he says.

Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the momant, that you would have
required the Chisf of Station to check back with Headquartars
before he carriad out an assassination mission, would it be
true that vou assigned fro Gort italy the task of instructina
the Chief of Station to assassinete Lumumha on that basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Gr, Sottligs vas the head of the Technical
Services Division, or whatever it was called in those days.

‘4r. Baron. Let me jump in for @&@ moment.

At this point, for about a yaar ania half, he was the

Science Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Tachnical

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Services shortly thereafter.

Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructed

Prone (Aree 207) 344-6000

Covel tebrto aesassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am

‘sure I newer instructed Gottlieb; to assassinate Lumumba. This

ia the way you put it to me.

Mr. Baron. Let. ma correct that.

What I maant to say was, would you have asked FTSETE
to convay the instruction to the Chief of Station that he wes
to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he

| contirnled it with Headquarters?
“rt. qwaedy. My answer to that is almost cartainly not.

‘ That would have bean covared in other correspondance, which |

think is demonstrated by thase cables, to tha Chief of Station

WARD & PAUL

_ direct jfrom me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have
used, neither would ‘ir. Bissell, Mr. {Gott: as the channel

for thi's instruction.

Mr, Baron. Dr. Gott by has also testified that, aside

from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and

instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about «4
mission to essassina-e Lumumba, thet he had one further role

the Congo: he was to sarve as a technical advisor to the
Chisf of Stetion on the feasibility of using these biolesical
substances to carry off the oparation.

nut it, Gottlishj was to satay down there for


of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come

| up with.

i | Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably!
a ,

, with his technical knowledge of the nature of these materials

|

|
i he would be in a position to either comment on or advise the
|

‘ Chief of Station as ha attempted to put together some kind of
| operation. That makas good sense to me.
He would require, basically, a technical advisor.
Mr. Baron. gDr>~GottViabualso testified that the materials
; he took with him were of a fairly short life. Their toxicity
1 | would wane within a matter of wasks.
Given that bit of information to refresh your recollectic:,
" dows that make it more likely that Gottliahy was there, to aid
‘the Chief of Stetion in actually carrying off tha administration
"of these drugs, &S opposed to qiving him qaeneral instructions
"in the use of such lethal substances?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not know really that T can commant on
thet. If the materials would deteriorate fast, tha use of ther,
if possible, [ woule@ stress the latter, would necessarily have
to he exoeditied, but the overwhelming concern of Headquarters
and the field, aqain, demonstrated in this corruspondeance was
our concera that this thing could ba done at all, that it be
done right, sscurely, aud that the U.S. hand should ha
concealed.

If this ware at odds with the life of thease materials,

TOP SECRET


think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is

perfectly clear that we would not have expedited anything at

‘ the risk of doing it unprofessionally.

Mr. Baror. At the point that GotElfap lett for the Congo
) after talking with you, would he have been enpowerad ‘to convey
i to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could
be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out,
concealment of tha U.S. hand and use of these materials befors
i ¢thedr potency waned?

Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would he in no
position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if thev
reached that point in planning, that as of tha last time hs
. was at Ileadquarters that there would probably ba an approval
from Washington.

Mr. Baron. You would axpect, then, the Chief of Station
* would have bsen expected to reconfirm with Headquarters the
fact that he had a go-ahead?

Mr. Tweedy. It would never have occurred to me othsrwise.

Mr. haron. It would ba your testimony that, although you
do not specifically recall your conversa*ion with SErsoee li
you would have made that clear to Bev orev ebs

Mr. Tweedy. I would have thoudht so, yas, hut 7 could sot
comment any further.

Mr. Daron. The reason for that is you do not recall the

conversation?

TOP SECRET


Mr. Tweedy. Not only that; Drv Gottlieb) was as familiar

y

| es I was with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project

‘and what was involved and tha way that. the Agency did its

Prone | Aree 207) $46-6008

’ business, which was things of this kind were not dealt with on

“ sort of an offhand basis.

Mr, Dawson. What is offhand?

‘

Mr. Tweady. The fact that the field and Or “Gottl feb; were
» given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they
» would go about it and when, without further reference to
Neadquarters.
Mr. Dawson. If we are to tia this to the cables, then,
1s there somathing in thea cables predatina Hotei iah's visit to
the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previousl~

Warn @ PauLe

a "beet. authorized by some words in thosa cables?
Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had previously bean
* authorized?

Mr. Dawsen. The authorization of the assassination effor~,
the elimination of Lumumba.

Mr. Tweady. Only in the most general terms. No oparetio:.
had been put forward by the field. In our husiness, thase
things were done by operational planning, at which voint one
came up with an operation that was aqreed upon hy tha Station
and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have beer either
implemented Or not, according to the sav-so from Headquarters.

‘Mr. Dawson. That kind of operattonal Planning is

TOP SECRET


after Mr. Gottliebj arrives in the Congo, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. This, in affect, is that (Indicating). You
can tell by the Chief of Station, there is no further
' reference to Mr. Gottlieb, aa I recall.
Mr. Baron. In this cable traffic?
Mr. Tweedy. In this cable traffic, was looking at all
|| sorts of ways and means of eliminating Lumumba , not rastricted
, to assassination, which coincides exactly with my recollaction
. of the: period betwean when the subject was first broached to the
Station and that rathar indafinablea pariod whan, in effect, it
“was all over, which, I suppose, basically {a the disappearance
of Lumumba.
I think all of this traffic supports my contantion thet
under the instructions he was given, the Chief of Station in
" Leopoldville set about exploring all allays and found none
“crystal clear. There were problems with all of them. Some
looked more promising than others. Individuals who miqht be
used obviously looked more promising than others. Some were
discussed and discarded. We commented on some. And so it
Wait.
Mr. Maron. I think that we should proceed in a moment
to go through these cables with a clos+ eya, ons by one.
One further point inQor..cottlisb!s} tastimony, to be fair
to nim, he said he was under the impression that it was qenere]

Agency procedure that in a mission like this one the Chie’ c!

TOP SECRET


AARD & PAUL

25

Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any

!
| prudent Chiaf of Station would check back to raconfirm his
ii

authorityto go ahead with an assassination oparation, but, DE
Gate febjaaia in his conversation with you he was not told
, that ha should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement
‘ that ha should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded
“with the assassination of Lumumha.
Mr. Twaady. I cannot comment on his statements, beacause
I cannot recall what I said to him, It cartainly is perfectly -
conceivable to me that J could have had this conversation with
him and not mantioned this, that this would be covered in al}
the basic corraspondence that I was having with tha Chief of
Station.
Mr. Harou. So ther it is possibl+# ~-- or {s it nmrobable
‘that in your instructions to Sidney cottitebjahout his mission
to the Congo you might nct have explicitly mentioned tha
requirement that the Chief of Station return to Headquarters
to recunfirm his authority to move ahead with th» assassination.
Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. T am not going
to gay it is nct pessible. T am merely savings thet that is
Lot the way we did business, and on the wiele, Sidney Sottlia
would be as familiar with that as IT would -- nerheps not és >
familier with it, becauBe he was on the technical side where I

was cr th: operational sids and used te thie chain of comma?

thina and the relationship batwaean ths Division and Station

‘TOP SECRET


Chiefs in the field,to a greater extent than ir. Gott feb) would.
The last thing I am doing is impugning his veracity and
his testimony.
Mr. Baron. When you say it is not the way wa do business,
you meant to say it was your understanding in general Agency
I practice that the Chief of Station in a situation like this
i would be expected to chack back with Headquarters?

Mr. Tweedy. When a Chief of Station was given the authority

" to carry out something entirely on his own initiative, that
‘was inada quite clear -- I'm not talking about this case, I mean
' Ganurally -- this was made quits clear.

Mr. Baro.w. When you ware talking about tha fact that

wero a oauL

“this was not thu way that we generelly did business,” you wer-
not referring to the fact that vou would have made it absolutes!"

‘Si

explicit in any conversation with Cavey ‘not tl lab or anyhody
like him who was undertaking a sansitiva mission that the Chis‘
of Station would be expected to chack back?

Mr. Tweedy. If I had not mantionad this to Sianay Getty:

end he said I did not, I am perfactly prenarad to balieve hin,

it would be because it never occurred to me thet the Chie’ oF

wee ORG

Station would act in any other wav. That is it.

Wastonate

Mr. Dawson. Of course, Nr. Hludqeman also tastifiad thet

it never would have occured to him to have carried this out

st Steet SE

withovt having checked back, an? he did so, of ccurse: the

apne

cables will show that verv clearly, What we ara trying to focus

TOP SECRET


Prone [Ares 202) 344-6008

WARD & PAVE

on is exactly what Mr. Gottliab*convayed to Mr. Hedgeman,
which, of course, you could not testify to.

Mr. Tweedy. I could not.

Mr. Baron. Or what you said to him.

Mr. Tweedy. I think it ia quite possible that I did not

i gay to’Mr. Gottlieb, Sid}. for Heaven's sake, do not have the
. § 4

’ Chief of Station go off assassinating this fellow without
, Feferring back to Headquarters. It would never hava occurred

" ta me to do that. It would have bean, in my view, superfluous.

Mr. Dawson. You ars, of course, aware that Mr. iWiedqarar.

"was aware of this practica in the Agency?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly.
Mr. Dawson. You had sean that happen. He had only beer

Station Chief for a short time; in spite of that, he was still

|| aware of Agency practice?

Mr. Tweedy. T think that it would be perfectly true to
say that any clandestins services officer who had reached a
cartain seniority L field axperience whether he was Chisf o£
Station or not, he! would have sucked this in with his mother's
milk. We ware, if I may say so, a very disciplined ordanizatin
in that reaard.

‘Mtr. Dawson. Specifically as to Mr. Hedqeman, that woul?
apply to him also?

Mr. Tweedy. It would indeed.

Mr. Baron. Let us procesd then to 4 documant ws will mer?

TOP SECRET


7) Prone [Aree 202) 544-4000

.
>
«
ry
«
coy
.
«
3

Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy. to the Chief
of Station for his eyes only on September 22, 1960.
(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 3 for

identification.)

TOP SECRET


ay

“ Ped ¥
ft

“TOP'SECRET

Mr. Tweedy. This is mostly discussion o+ ome aha

Mr. Baron. The man you referred to wasn at this time an

Prone (Aree 207) $44-40090

agunt that was in contact with the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I remamber him very well. I could not possibly
remember his nama. I remember him vary wall; I met him later.

Mr. Baron. lle proved to be a highly effective agant for
the Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Ha was a very good intalliqanca agent, an
excellant intelligence agent, for the simnle reason that ha
was able to make contact with groups and madia in the Congo
which was very difficult for non-Africansk to reach. 'te was, for
¢ year or two, 4 first-class intelliqence source basically:
not an action source, but é@n intslliqance source.

Mr. Barer. When you read the sentence that is at the
beginning of paragraph 3 on tha first page where it says:
“Concur this possibility worth watching, but. 4€ decided support.
cor Ugrnor objectives. Relieve essential such be provided
through third national channal with PRPRIMNF role completely
concealed.”

What are you referring to there?

My. TWeedy. Iam not gur2a; 1 do not ramenber.

recall what the incoming cable said.
oy

am obviously seying i) ebornres Va aE 1 ouess,

wife who was, at least had been,

Gus: } think what I was saying is, if we wanted to use
TOP SECRET.


Scnotrok directly in an assassination attempt, that I would

not dismiss it out of hand.

Prone (Aree 707} 544-4000

Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its ‘security?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "¥GPROP objec-
| tives would refer to an assassination attempt?
| Mr. Tweedy. Yas.

Mr. Baren. That the assassination, discussion of an

assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP

cheannal?

ir. Twaedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. On tha last page of this documant --

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Tweedy. Tha only thing that worries ma about this
** conclusion of mine is this, the more I read it, 2-B is anothar
“ paragraph, which may not have had anything to do with (Sahstnay

** at all and I do not fael, at least I cannot recollect, why

Ty |
aan any rane would almost certainly hava included the (gore
: if coe vere involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to
fh

feel T am talking about. somebody else and not 1G

Mr. Baron. Io will represent 9 vou in other cable traffic,
TIT believe, which we will review as we rocsed here, thers was
discussion of the usa of ano't.~

Mr. Tweady. This’ vee probably the case. T do not think

this refers Ea Bo here I do not think refers to

ee I cannot recall --

TOP SECRET


WARD B® PAI

20001

J Wasne tar Oo

AIG Baty: Street, SE

Mr. Baron. Who?

a :
YQPROP objectives would still refer ‘to exploring possibilities

> to an assassination attempt?

Mr. Tweedy. Yas.

Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with a
4a

| different agent?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Raron. On the last page, paragraph 3, it tells the

_ Chief of Station: "Not intended you construe above comment.s

‘as basically negative. You and colleagua understand wa cannot

read over your shoulder as you plan and agsness opvortunitias.

Our primary coicern must be concealment PRPRIME role unless

outstanding opportunity emerges which makes calculated risk
first class bet. Rwady entertain any serious proposals you
make based our high regard hoth your professional judaments.”

What are you referring to in that paraqraph? What massaqe
ate you convaying to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think if you read the cahle you will
notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his
proposals. These were expvloratoryv nroposals. T wanted --

Mr. Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. You keep coming off with an assassination
mission as if this was always just around the corner. What I
am saying is, we are in a Period hare quite commor in our

business of vary intensive operational planning and axploratior..

TOP SECRET


All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had

commented on it hare; in the end, I say, do not be discourage

i because you do not see the probable channal wa will usa. I

" assume the colleague was Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was
i atill there.
Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had
already cabled that his arrival was imminent?
Mr. Tweedy. I assume that that is the colleaque. I do
; not think he would have talked to anybody else on it. That is
| all it means.
It is, if you like, a techniqua of management.

Mr. Baron. Moving on to a documant that we will mark

WARD & PAUL

i. Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allen W. Bullaes of Saptember
1s 4, 1960 and your pseudonym is also listed as one of tha senders
of the cable to the Chiaf of Station.
(Tha document refarred
to was marked Tweedy
‘Exhibit No. 4 for

idantification.)

TOP SECRET


*

TOP SECRET

Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the firat paragraph, it says:

“We wish give every possihla support in elim{nating Lumumba

Prone {Aree 2027) $44-4000

| from any possibility resuming governmental position or if ha fails
“in Leop* -- maaning Leopoldville -- “setting himself in Stanley-
| ville Or alsewhere °

Firat, for the racord, any time your pseudonym “Jadwin" or
, your name “Tweady" appears in the upper lefthand corner of a
‘cable Or your signature appears on the bottom, you dispatched
y that cable? Is that not riqht?

-Toam raferring gunerally to the cable traffic.

Mr. Tweedy. What it maans ia thia,. Te could maan severe!

thinas, but I parsonally dictated the cahle and diapatchad it

without further referance, or for some reason I constructed the

WARD & PAUL

5
. Cable and had it released by a higher authority, either Mr.

* Bissall or Mr. Dulles. Although thosa were not the only alter-
i natives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in ona
form or another.
I would guess that I dictated the cable and that ‘tr. Dulles «-
and I do not have any idea how this cams about -- Mr. Nulles
wanted to Sse it, and Mr. Hissell suqqeaste? that it ao out
from Mr. Dulles and myself, I just do not know. . What this
Meais is, Dullas and Tweedy were totally aware of the cahle.
Mr. Haron. Meturaing than to the santsnca I citad from

the Cable where vou and Dulles were talking about divine evere

porsible support i: elimtnati.a Lumumba, what meassaqe --

TOP SECRET


RET” ws oe

Mr. Tweedy. *Eliminating Lumumba from any Possibility
a resuming governmental position.” This, if I may say so, raverts
: to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the
U.S. position was that. Mr. Lumumba must be ramoved from a
i Poaition of authority in the Congo and that assassination was
not by any means the Only way by which thia might be accomplished.
Thia, I think, Merely reiterates that it is not a -- being
: a ¢QpRop Cable does not refer Specifically to assassination.
Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase "elimina-
Hl ting Lumumba" in this context contemplate ensassination as
at least ona of the possible Means that midh+ be used?
Mr. Twaady. Tam afraid if 7 mey S&éy $0 you are putting

words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. He has two

wAhO & PAUL

Messagas now from Mr. Dulles. The first One, I think, wag
‘perfectly clear. Sincy then he has had massaqdes from Mr,

Dulles’ subordinates liks myself. This meraly makes it clear
egain that Neadquarters wishes to "give avery possible support
in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming govarnmen*’<:)
position" and I cannot Sé#y More than thet, and T think to sav
that this strasses 4assessi.etion wou)? Ds quits untrue. Rut the
Chief of Stetion in Leopoeldaville was already under instruction
to be consitering this as ons of the vossibilitiss.

Mr, Buron. Assassisetion?

Mr. ‘Tweedy. This doses not chands that.

Mr. Haro... T think thet is Fine.

TOP SECRET


WARD & Pa

| The interesting aspect of that sentence for me is the
rest of the sentence where it makes {¢ clear that not only is
there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position
{ :

; dn Leopoldville, but anywhere else, and it would seam that
NW

|
| assassination would at least have to be One of very faw means

i
| that could insure that fact that Lumumba would not resume a

i position of power anywhere.
Mr. Tweedy. I do not think I can comment any further.
Mr. Baron. Lat us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable
' dispatched from the Chief of Station on September 27th, 1969
for your syaes Only, and this cable beqins with a referance to
{OFT GOtET i 3by
ae |
Tt says he was contacted 26 September. “We on same wavn
length." Ther it continues, “Hance balisva most rapid actior
consistent with security indicated,”

The next paragraph says, “fRasis 2 talks considering
possibilitias:” -- there follows a list of nossibilities from
A to G and paragraph 3 on th: hottom of paqe 2? says, "Plan
Proceed on basis prioritiss as listad ahove, unlass instructed
to co:trary."

(The document refarrad
to was marked Twaedy
Exhihit No. 8 for

idantification.)

TOP SECRET


Mr. Baron. Does that indicate to you that on the list of.

priorities, priority A would have bean considered by the Chief

| of Station to be his top priority?

Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph 2:
2 talks considering possibilities" of dispatching
to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would
| it not? . of
Mr. Baron. Yes. “Recall [ESERIES ron Stanlayville” --
Mr. Tweedy. -- “and have him take refuge with Big
'* Brother” --
Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act as ‘inside man to brush up
datails to razor edga. Also would provide info on food anct

agricultural problem. Guthman recalling /SaNgeronrs| to Leop.”
: :

When Dr. Gottlieb; looked at this cable, he testified that

WARD & PAL.

this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th
lof September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where
* they discussed various operational possibilities of getting ric
of Lumumba. The letter A represented their ton priority pla.
Would you agree with thet interpretation of tha cable?
Me. Tweedy. T would think so.
Mr. Baron. Would you --
Mr. Tweedy. When he says: “Plan proceed on basis prior:
ities as listed above” this again is no* what he was qoing *c
do at the conclusion of this without further reference carr’:

out arn assassination. Ne says, What we see isifin

TOP SECRET


Prone (Asae 202} 344-4000

WARO & PAUL

| best answer to our problem.

Mr. Beron. Does he not indicate in this cable though

! that he would proceed to implement these plans unless he were

instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable

2

i might constitute his requast for a confirmation.

Mr. Twaedy. I disagree. I think these various possibili-

’ ties still need further exploration is what he was suggesting

, to Headquarters. he concentrate onthat.ia the best possible use

nN

“
+ of Sfhotretitehion this including further operational inteliigance

On the situation which might lraad to an adreemant that. we woul
use this man, and then all these Othars, but it doas not-in anv
Sense, as far aga I am concerned, it is not in anv sanse the
Chief of Station saying, if A looks terribly aood T shall just
go ahead and finish the job without further reference. Not at
all.

Mr, Baron. I do not understand how you.can read the phras-
“unless instructed to the contrary” in that. way.

Mr. Twaudy. Because there are other possibilities here.
l am sorry, but I am afraid lookina at it fifteen years later -
in the subject that you are andaged in, TI think you would loak
at it entirely differantly than 1 would, working on a day-to-day
matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothina

in this cable which seys that thay heave ths answer te

Naro:z.. Does peragraph A indicate thas OBResanaag) ¥o8

TOP SECRET —s_—sit


Want a PAUL

take refuge with Big Brother, Meaning move into

Mr.’ Twaady. I think probably this would be -- I am trying

| entourage?
|
!

“to think how this was.

06
Was this possibly retegary

Mr. Baron. I do. not know the operational detaila.

Mr. Tweedy. Hie did have some access to Lumumba's entour-

{ages which was the reason we were so interested.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that thia cable is suggesting

t vt
| that (§ Ss) be recalled to Leonoldvills so that he might

. career ae anaes
- move into 4Lumumba's entourage?
: Od
Mr. Twaady. Absolutely.
Mr. Baron. Whare it says he “would thus act as insides mete

‘to brush up details to razor edge," would you assume that. refars
to exploring the means by which Lumumba might be poisonad?

ur. Tweedy. I think that is quite # possibility. 1 cannc:
specifically say yus. I suspect he was our best potential source
for operational intelligence, if you Like, on this.

Than hs says "Also would provide info on food and agricni-
tural problems.” I have a vaque recollection at thin point the!
he was raporting rather importantly On aspects of food anc
agriculture which wes a major nolitical factor within tha Cor.
then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that.

Ithink it is that this woul? ba a byproduct of this, th.«'

we woul] aat more good ranorting on the subieact.

TOP SECRET


Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence literally instead
of an oblique reference to getting access to Lumumba's food hy
which he might be poisoned?

Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which is a
cable from the Chief of Station on September 30th to Jadwin,

| which ia yourself --

8 (The document referred

lt Exhibit No. 6 for

identification.)

|
9 | to was marked Tweady

ill

WAR & eA

TOP SECRET


Mr. Baron. in which the Chief of Station says: “No

really airtight op possible with assets now available. Must

Prone (Aree 2707) 344-6008

chooses batween cancelling op or accepting calculated risks
ef varying degrees."
‘

EEE ee assat available. View necessity act
immadiately, if -at all, urge Headquarters authorize exploratory
conversations to datermine it| a Rehwilling take role as
active agent or cut-out this op.”

Firat, would you read the sentence or the phrase “view

’ necessity act immediately, {f at all” to refer to the fact

- Sena : .
that at this point “ottlieb had informed tha Chia’ of Station

i

that ths lethal material was of 4 Limited life?

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot really commant on that. That is

waARD & rae

ecurtainly a perfectly reasonable explanation for that remark,

: but as I do not know exactly where Lumumba sat on that particu-
lar moment when this cabla waa sent, it miqht hava something
to do with his availability or somathine elae, I just do not.

know.

Certeimuly your first point is 4 possibility. Tt aquali

makeS Cleer, of course, thet althouch EMO Oke s] Ne! Daan 2ss
in an operational intelligence support role, he at this point

het never been cut in on plans. Of course, Chie’ of Station

did not knew whether he would be willing te qo atong with thas:

“tr. Haron. The Chief of Station here ia considering

TOP SECRET


approach to | SENosEsar? first on a hypothetical basis --

I
| Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
'
|

OY
Mr. Baron. It is clear here, is it not, that | SERSeaO ee}

" is baing viewed as a potential assassination asset?
u

mone [Aree 202) $44-4008

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 7 a cable on 30
| September 1960 signed by Glen Fields to the Chief of Station,
\ again in the {oPROP channel,
| (The document referred
to was marked Twaedy

Fxhtihit No, 7 for

idanti*ication.)

TOP SECRET


WARD a rau

oe" te ae

SECRET

“TOP

Mr. Baron. Prasumably, it is responding to the cable that

We just looked at, and in this Cable, Glen Fields says, "You

4
are. authorized have exploratory talks wien EET co

assas6 his attitude toward possible active agent or cut-out
role.”

Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you before

Bending this authorization to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Not necassarily. f might have been out of

. town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, “You.are
i authorized have exploratory talks" -and “Agree with you initia}

}; Aiscussions shoulda ba on hypothetical basis.” And, of

course, at that point, we would expact a raport from tha field

, On how it want. He wag taking it one Step further. He micht
“not have cleared that with ma if I were away. He might also

- have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissell,

Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectly

: Proper in your eyas for Glen Fields to have issued this cable

without consulting you?

‘ir. Tweedy. Certainly. Tt is quite possible, too, ther
he eVen told “Mr. tissal] what he was plarnnirea to do. T Cannot
tell you Specifically. This is all thyt this cable authorizes.
I find it antirsly within his delequted rasponsibilitias.

Mr. Maron. Would it have bea Standard srocedura for
Glew Plelds, in your absence, to M4ution to Richard Sissel! «he

fact that such authorization to be sant to the Chiaf of Statio.:

TOP SECRET


on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?

Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?

Prone (Ares 202) $44-4000

Mr. Baron. Would it have bean standard procedure for

’ Flelds to check with Rissall in your absence before he sent such

i a cable? |

Mr. Tweady. No. Field's understanding of his authorities
; and his relationships with tha DDP on such matters were exactl
‘ the same as mine. We would have sean eye to aye with him.
If I had sant the cabla, undoubtedly I would have lat
‘Mr. Bissell know that I was planning to carry this thing thet
much clossr. Ths reason for thet {s that wa wera qatting clos-

to informing a third party the+ this was in the wind. Therefor-.

WARD BPA

bufore wa actually took this step, IT think something like
this,a third party baind{Snomegnn
Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, wa will introduce a cabl@ on
‘October 7th, 1969, from the Chiat of Statin to Jadwin, which
is yourself.
(The document raferre?
to was marked Twaady
Exhibit No. 9 for

identification.)

TOP SECRET


1

Mr. Baron. This cable begins with a reference to sidney}
; GOttlieh, and he: : "Departed Leop for PBPRIME 5 |October, view
expiration data his materials. However, laft cartain items of
° continuing usefulnass. Guthman plans continue try implement
op.”
Do you have any independent recollection of receiving

7 | this cable?

& Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see

9 something that clearly occurred, and to me I read, it's
|

'  , terribly hard at this stage. to say, of course I remember. It a1}
reads parfectly familiar to me now.. To say quite specifically
T recall receiving the cable will perhans qo a little heyond

my memory.

WARD @ aU,

Mr. Baron. Based upon having read thia cable at that
time, which you assume you did, is that corruct?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. You would have known that Gitaey Gottlien® had
laft the Congo on October Sth and that the Chief of Station

Planned to co.tinue to try to implemant the operation. |

Mr. Tweady. Which msans that he would continues his

axploratory onerationel work to see if he could coma to some

ware

solutior..

dr. Beron. You would read thet santeance still to apniy

BLO Hast Sermon, SE

to an exoloratory phase, a phasa in which the Chief of Static:.

Was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as

TOP SECRET


Prone (Ares 207) 5444000

opposed to moving to implementing?
Mr. Twwedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything
else.

Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one

“than, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent

f was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?

“Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indead. That also coincides with my
best recollection which is not. all that damn good. It is
parfactly obvious that | GREE wee naver raquested to
assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody

having besn asked to do this.

Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, «as

e
outlined in the pravious sxhibit.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

fir. Dawson. Why is it obvious that Frenoreerotra

asked to assassinete Lumumba in light of the santence in this

OF
fiffeywas never

cable that reads, “Although did not pick up ball," -- reaferrins
to the fact that /Gehotinot did not necessarily pick up the
bell on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chie’
of Station, the Chief of Stetion nevertheless believad “he
Prepared take any role necessary within limits security acce
plish objective.”
Does thet not indicate Or TE wag at least view!

a8 S$OMcO.e VhO WAS prenared to undertake an assassination “i:

if he should he tasked with it?

TOP SECRET


Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time
. a
is the Chiaf of Station's best assessment of what theyscnoceas
reaction would be if tha thing was formally put to him so
bluntly that ha understood ontirely what it was all about.
i do not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic
indicates that it aver got so far that we did that, and I think,
t
my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on nether ERE)
would agree to do it. I think probably in “limits security

accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor.

Cannot really racall anymora.

‘Nr. Dawson. Off tha record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers
, back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he
was --

Mr. Twaedy. Implied to by Fields.

Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the pravious cabic

of the 30th.
Mr. Tweedy. Richt.

Mr. Heron. As Fxhibit 9, we will introduce a cable siqne.'

Bas
Tweedy to the Chisf of Station in the yoOrRor channal,.

(The document referred

ALO bas Some SE

to waa marksd Tweedy

Exhibit ‘lo. 9 for

TOP SECRET


identificationi}:---

os

~

10

1

WAGED & PAUL

1s
yo [i
ad ji
4
16°
17
1 Pa
z .
é . at
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4
:
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i
2
3
u

TOP SECRET


WARD & OAR

Mr. Baron. It bagins, "Had good discussion your colleague

7 October. Comments follow:" ‘

am
"A. Be ‘assured did not expact YOPROP " objectives

‘ be reached in short period and understand current situation

« fully warranted return your colleague.”

And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were

i considering dispatching a third country national operator and

{a senior casa officer from the CIA who would "run thia op and

; Outeide agent full time under your direction.”

Doas this cable refer to tha fact that you debriefed

' Sidnay Gottlieb?

——

‘Mr. Tweedy. Loam sure it doas. That is what it must be,

Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that

ithe Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would

be disappointed in the fact that ha did not pull off an

‘ assassination mission in such a short period of tima?

Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that.

All 1 was saying to a vary professional collaaque was that we
hed no illusio::s about the fact that tha plenninad operation

of this would be very difficult, at bast, and would taka time
and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immadiate

aot

prospects, wera such that there was no alternative for Sicnarg

ws

Gottlieb to raturn. That is all I was saying.

But to say what T was trving to exprass to him was the

TOP SECRET


WARD & PAUL

49
fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba was not.
assasainated at this point is just not the level of intercourse

} that I had with a very professional Chief of Station. That is

i

tall.
|
|

Mr. Baron. Doas not the paragraph A here indicate that

| the objective of the mission that was discussed dn the YQPROP
. ~

f|
|
I we a

« fact that qGottliLebyhad gone to the Congo with materials that
|

| were Only going to ba lethal for a short pariod of time?

channe] was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the

Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.
Mr. Baron. In other words, what I am trying to explore

‘with you is your characterization of thia entire Stage of the

‘ S operation as one of planning and exploration when we know that

, pn en . .
Gottlieb took materialm to the Congo which would only be lsthel

for a short period of timu and presumably was prapared to move.
' from exploration to implamentation?

Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of tha Station focusing on
the problem for the first time, as a result of Haadquartars’
request, they had come up with 4 plan that they thoudht was
exceadingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not
surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the matzrials there to tar=
advantage of such, if you likes, an unlikely avent. But this
would not chande tha normal sequence of svents, which would b+
that the Station would axplora, kaen Headduartears informec,

Headquarters woul) commant, it would than be a cresando of

TOP SECRET


agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final’
request for approval or either approval or no approval. This
would not have changed.

Mr. Baron.
the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality,
ware you not contemplating at that time that the operation
might wall move from the exploration phase to the implementation

nn,

phase just as soon as Gottlieb jand Hedgeman determined that it
was feasible?

Mr. Tweedy. I think IF would put it quite differently.

vu T think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not

- being in a position to wxploit, if wa reached the point where

+ we all agreed that the thing was possible.

If they had merely gone over and said we think wa can ‘to
te, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that
- i would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.

Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of
Station to cable back for confirmation, but i* was cartainly
within your contemplation at the time that when Gott liad went
to the Congo, wher the Chief of Station cabled for confirme-
tion, you woul’) probably give him a go ahea:’ to assassinate
Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. .I did not say that at all.

Mr. Baro... Tf the operation wers feasible?

Mr. Tweedy. 1 did not. say that at all. It would not have

TOP SECRET


Prone [Aree 207) 346-4000

WAR &® PAUL

- OC 2OOu6

1 been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of my

, Agency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy

levels of the government, would have dona if it had come to the

Point where somebody said, wa can do it, do you want us to do
“it.

Mr. Baron. You would’ have referrad that to Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. He would have referred it?

Mr. Tweedy. He would have referrad it according to his

“lights. That was not my business. We was his own level of

authority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at my
leval. T only assume that this would haves been discussed at
the highast level, certainly at the Agancy. T assume that the
decision would have had to have bean made hy Allen Oulles and
who else he wished to consult in Washington.

These are pure assumotions on my part. Under no circum-
Stances would I have given the go ahead.

Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.

Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line.
I realize we are going very closely over this qround. We woul!
not be dcing it if it weren't important in trying to qet you to
clarify for the record exactly what shade of maaning you wast
to attach here.

Would it ba fair te say that wher you dispatched

to the Cornao you expected to hear back --

TOP SECRET


Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue
between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.

Mr. Baron. You were hoping?

Mr. Tweedy. Gottliebjassisting the Chief of Station in
his explorations.

Mr. Baron. In view of tha entire policy of the Agency at

that time, as indicated in the cables of Dullas and the cables
from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that

| GoverLeb} and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means
; VRE §

of carrying out an acsassination mission and then inform you of

jy 1% that.

| Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to commant on the hope. I do

:y ‘| not know what my frame of mind was on that.

The purpose of the exercise was to sea whether this was

+s il possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of

&

. policy in carrying out the exploratjian which was antirely 4
_ professional Matter. If the exploration had reached a point
where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan
which wa thought made some sensa, at that point hiahar authorit~
would have to taka the ball and run with it and let us know
what they concludad.
Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any
authority highar than yourself?
Mr. Twaady. It would start with me in my chain of comman.

Lt would not be concernad with the Mational Security Advisor

TOP SECRET


warn a rau

to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my
mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters

had been broachad to the fleld by Mr. Dulles, that the thing

i was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's

arena.

What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his
authorities ware from higher authority I cannot tell you.

Mr. Dawson. That would havea been @ matter that would havs
bean between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, in that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, {it would have been
betwaen Mr. Dulles and the outside world, tha Fxacutive.

Mr. Dawsor.. Tha chain of comman! would have bean, you
would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expacts'
or would have asked what Mr. Dulles’ view wera?

Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, We Weru also an Aqency that was

very flexible. Tt am not saying “Yr. Nulles might not have talked

to me about this, that was bacause Mr. Pissell was not

immsadiatealy available, or somathing of this kind.

Wheat I am saving is at the working level, the oparatione:
level, the Divisionel and tha Stetion lavel, we had come up
with « plan which mad» profassional sense to us which we felt
sound sanoudh so that we would praesent it to our masters, we
would have dons so and the resultant instruction te the fiel'
would heve dapemled on their reaction as far as | was concerse

within the Aqancy. As far as “Ar. Dulles was concernsad, } caninc"

TOP SECRET


is
.
s

you.

In other words, tha degreaa to which he thought he would

Prone [Mee 2027} $44-4000

have to refer furthar to Washington on, I have no idea.
Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry
F out an assassination; it was the job of Rissall and those above
him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you ware concerned?
Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concernad, that is the way it
sterted.
Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollec-
' tion that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, wa do not hevs
‘a shot at this, or we do, and wa could do it this way, and hin
saying one thing or another? You hava no recollection aither
‘way?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic 1 did.

)
Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.

Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. Whan I say he raad
every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is ha
had full access to these cables and anything he had not read oc:
had anv reason to bslicve he had not read, I would have kept bin
GQouerelly briefed on thse progress of tha planning. “lIaturelly,
he would have been interested. He woule not haves followed it

: .

in detail.

Mr. Dawson. Would My. Dulles have hal any access to thes

Not routinely. I think he would have expect sl

TOP SECRET


WARD & PAUL

Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this.

He did not want any more paper floating around in those days.
Mr. Dulles was in evan another building. Now, We were all down
at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr.

Dulles was on E Street. It doasn't make any difference. The

th Cbs
| number of papers on this XQPROP thing would have been restricted

j to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would hava
! expadted to be bothered with the operational detaile, What he
‘would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on plannina

the alimination of Lumumba by whatever maana.

Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information
would have besn given to Mr. Mulles -- for instance, what I'm
thinking was, were there staff meatings at which you attended
with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles’ praseaace concerning what was
happening ganerally on a routine quarterly or weakly basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have sean Mr. Dulles by a:
large svery day.

Mr. Tawsou. They would not. review mretings on a weakly or
routine besis?

Mr. TWeedv. He hat his own sta‘’f maoting avery morning,
Mr. Oulles did. These were attended by his Daputyv Directors, o°
which ‘ir. Bissell was one.

L used to See Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meating once
a week which all Chisfs of Division attendad. “Nothing like

this would be discussed at those. had my own private mautiseds

TOP SECRET


WARD © Pau

with him on these matters whenever it Seemed nacessary by one

or the other of us.

Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1969,

i .
which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference toa

senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that
a reference to the fact:that Bissell was considering dispatching
Justin O'Donnell?

Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that

' te who it is.

Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked by
Bissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of
Lumumba would fit here?

Mr. Tweedy. Sure.

Mr. Baron. The third country national refarrsd to in this

» cable and in other cables as someone you are considering

dispatching to the Congo to halp with the operation, would that

‘be QJWIN or WIROGUR?

Mr. Twuedy. As I told you before, definitely not WDROGUF.
Presumably this other fellow, whose identity and what ha wes is
very, very unclear to Me.

Mr. Baron. The agent that was rua by Phy;

Mr. Tweedy. Yas. This would have beer the man that would
have worked with Justin 9'Mounell if it had all happaned.

‘xr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will ranrasenut to you that

QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Ponnell.

TOP SECRET


WARD & eeu

Mr. Tweedy. We read that that time, which is my only

i recollection of it. That is the person I am sure.

! Mr. Baron. Let me correct mysalf here.

I will ruprasent to you that. QUWIN was the agent that was
: recruited by Tho lass iverg and sent vy ENR *> the Congo for
| usa by O'Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station.
Is that consistent with your recollection?
Mr. Tweely. No, it is not consistent with my recollection.
It is cartainly consistant with what I read the last time I saw
! you, which I have no reason to dispute. IT just cannot remamber
the bliqhter at all.
Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 10, let us introduce a cable of
October 15th, 1960, which is not sent in the ¥Yoprop channel.
It is marked nronr ie cat in the space whars sensitivity
dudicators are usually placed.
(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 10 for

identification.)


wAmD & PAUL

Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of

: Station on suggastions A, B and C for various covert operations.
. ve
In paragraph C, there is a reference toffEROAK.

Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the

“ CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba.

Is that consistent with your intereptation of the cable?

Mr. Baron. It is indeed.

Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: “Only direct

| action we can now stand behind is to support immobolizing or

Oe .

: arresting EBROAK, dasirable as more definitiva action night he.

* Any action taken would havea to be antiraly Congolese.”

Now, you signed this cable, but it was sot sant in the
special senaitivity channel) that dealt with Gottllab's mission
to the Congé*

Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into
the record as Fxhibit 11 another cable which you siqned on
october 15, 1960 which was sent in the YOPROP channel to the
Chief of Station.

(The documant referred tc
was marked Twealy Fxhibit

So. ll for inentiticetic:.

TOP SECRET


Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: “You
2 | will note from cable through normal channel currently being

any

3 i transmitted" then it continues “on YQPROP suggestions. You
\ .

i

, wild Propet receive more along these lines aa stumbling
i bloc [fiaoax represents increasingly apparent all studying

| Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously

Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-

| Pecones number ona consideration.”
I
i

| awful English.

Mr. Baron. The cabla continues --

Mr. Twaedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked
‘to said thare is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba

‘ stays in a position of powar or influance there. That is whet

WARD @ PAu

, that Means.
Mr. Baron. The cable'continues: "“Raisa above so you not
* confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains
for specific purpose you discussed with cclleague and also
remains highest priority."

Now, dows this pair of cables indicate that at this point

Oc 2000"

despite the indication in the first cable that we lookad at thet
“direct action would be limited to entirely Congolase action"
the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters

involved in this onearatio: was that exploration of an assassinrc-

210 Porst Street, § fo Wathingtinn

tion mission remained tha highest priority for tha Chief of

gi Station?

TOP SECRET


WARD @ PAUL

410 Feat Street. > fF, Warmington, 1 20003

ERTIES TE
: :

Mr. Tweedy. I think thet is accurate.
We had come to the end of the road, at least- temporarily
on the YQPROP aspect and for the tima being we were in no

position to approve anything but: what was discussed in the
0?

NQPLAP’ cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo

from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search
for maans to take care of the YQPROP Planning aspects.

Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose
you discussed with colleague --

Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with (Gottlieb; I am

gure.

Mr. Baron. It than says: This purpose remains highest

| | priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station

+ i that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be

assassinated?

Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station

‘was that he should retain exploration of possible means of
' assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continues

“to suek means to do this, not to do it.

Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made

yourself claar, as far as you W4re concarnsd, you were still

“asking him to explore and not implemant at this point?

Mr. Tweedy. Nothing alss but.

Mr. Baron. Who would have had accass to or received

‘distribution of the first cabl» we looked at which travelled i:

TOP SECRET


WARD & Pau

S10 Farss Street, 5 ©. Wrasrengton, OC. 20003

Mr. Tweedy. It would have basn restricted, but not as
restricted as the other.

Mr. Baron. Would somebody at the Embassy conceivably
| have been cut in on cable traffic in the channel that dealt with,
(are operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Could be, certainly. —__ oy

Mr.. Baron. In other words, the purpose of sending -a

. #econd cable on the same day which dealt with action against

Lumumba was: what?

Mr. Tweedy. The simple reason I think -- I say I think,

| because I cannot tell you so -- as I said a few minutes ago,

, obviously you'd come tamporarily to the and of the line on
YOPROP, Measures taken to shore upf{; ETT position in ths

|| congo, {#abutul would have served to support the general objactive,

I ot containing Lumumba by whatever means. It is all part of the

, same purpose. —
Once again referring to the original cable from Mr. Pullas
which said all means, in effect, ani I think the reason I'm
putting this in tha open channel, the onen channal is still --
Mr. Baron. Simply tha ordinary channel usad batween
yourself --
Mr. Tweedy. Still a restricted channel. RIBAT is a
restricted thing, in any evant. This could have bean discussed

with the Ambassador or the Embassy, if any aspect of it seemed

TOP SECRET


WARD &@ Pau

2 Wasnengtian 16. 20001

410 Fey Street,

the Congo to handls the

e@ppropriate by the Chief of Station.

Mr. Baron. by contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have
been sean by the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Tha Fmbassy would not have been shown this

cable anyway. Wea do not show the traffic to the Embassy; we
discussed it. 02

Mr. Baron. It would have been propr for the fiipiar cable
to be conveyed in some manner?

Mr. Tweedy. ‘To ba discussed.

Mr. Baron. Between the Chief of Station and perhaps the
Ambassador?

Mr. Tweedy. Discussed; only orally.

Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YOPROP cable clearly would
have been restricted to the Chiaf of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I have no reason to believe that the YOPROP

business was discussed with the’ Ambassador, I do not

beliuve it was, although Mr. Dulles, in his original cable, sai?

"he could, if he wanted to.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as the final exhibit for

| the moment Exhibit 12, a cable of October 17, 1960 going to

* Jadwin from the Chief of Station.

In this cable, the Chief of Station 1s responding to your

* suqgestion that a senior cass officer might be dispatched to

Tdprop Operation. He says it is an

excellent idea. Is that a fair interpratation?

TOP SECRET


Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 12 for

identification.)

.
ry
a
i+)
r
«
g

TOP SECRET


Prone [Av ee 202) 34446008

Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station then makes a suggestion
j tn the fourth paragraph for equipment that might be provided if
I such a casa officer ware to be sent. He ssays, "If case officer
J
‘|
ti

sent, recommend Headquarters pouch soonest high powered foreign

| make rifle with telescopic sight and silencer. Hunting good

| here when lights right. However as hunting rifles now forbidden.

jj would keep rifle in office pending opening of hunting season.”
Would you take that to be a racommendation by the Chief

“of Station, if a case officer was sent to the Congo to concen-

Oke
“strate on tha YQPROP operation, he should be provided with the

: kind of Weapon that would be suited for a aniper shot at
Lumumba ?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Not necessarily to be fired by the
case officer, obviously not, but at least used in the operatio.:.
Mr. Baron. This reference to the hunting season can be
’ taken as a reference obliquely to the fact that Lumumba was in
UN custody and that there would not be, in affect, "open
Season” or. him until he showed his face outside of UN custor’y.
Would that be a fair interpretation?
Mr. Tweedy. I would not have interpreted it quite the
Bame way. 1 would have interpreted it this way, which was if
it, as a rasult of Ileadquartarg suggestion that a rifle bs
providad to the Station, the Station would coms up with an
Operational plan involving the uss of the rif€te which Headaue: t-r5%

would approve, and that thus, in affact, tha opsaration was o:

TOP SECRET


Prone (Aree 202) $44-4000

by a rifle,that would be the opening of the hunting season.

In other words, the Point where they knew, how it could be used

\ and Headquarters had approved its use.

Mr. Baron. I have one othar genaral quastion before wa

i tak break t £ G "s
ea eak, and that is, returning to sianey ottiieb!
! account of his conversation with Richard Bissell about -making

‘| Preparations for carrying off an assassination against an
i aot EY

) African foreign leader if it were required, Gottlieb said in
i ies

that context that he had higher authority for such an operation.

" Gottlieb. also said that he clearly interprated Bissell to maar:
that Bissell had Presidential authority for such an operation?
Did you have any knowledga of such a conversation between
dottlieh ‘and Bissell from any source?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that Gottliab‘and I avar
discussed highar authority and approval. 1 do not say that it
did not occur. re Gottlie’, said that he had this impression
in talking to Bissell, I cannot say no, but I cannot comment
on it further.

Mr. Baron. For the moment, we have no further questions

and we will take a break now and pick un eqein befora the full

Committes and Executive Session this afturroon.

Thank you very much for your patience in qoing through these

documants ona by ona. It has been extranaly heloful to us.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the heeringa concluded.)

TOP SECRET


stipe Retetenre #4 ons
AR SES Ae 282)
e LEOPOLD FILLE
tas DHRECTOR

} OPEvatumag

—_— a a RS

~4 LUO? cc

* W7887
NPRIOAITY

= ae?

@.: DEST Ob CAAUS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY SO COMMUNIST TARRY:
oF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR VILE PRESTIGE Ue fr:
un AND FOR THE INTSRESTS OF THE FREE AR WORLD GENERALLY,
CONSEQUENTLY ‘VE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT
AND PRDAE OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDX2 SXISTING CONDITIONS T7US
BROULD BS A HIGH PRIOAITY UF GUA COVERT ACTION,

2, HENCE SE
LZ0P 0772 AND LZOP N74S AND DLR 46115 INCLUDING SVEN MOEE AUGRL.SIe
ACTION IF IT CAM REMADICGVERT, WE RVALIZE THAT TAAGETA Le

opProa FUNITT MAL PRNSZNT TIEMSILVES TC TOU AND Lt ADDITION TO
; Vista
@e-« MEAS FH OLS A UTHOMIZAD, NE FURTHER AGTUCRIZS EXEYN OD:
ve ea crv i Arey Qeereass
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FAGE 2
Infy aprerer

'P TO A TOTAL C¥ 9100, 000 YO CARRY OVT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS CF

vost OPPORTUNITY TO CONot us nin. AVVO”

3. TO THS SXTINT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DOISiR= TO 3a CONSULSED,
OU SHOULD 623% iis GONCUARZNCE. LF IN ANT PAATICULAR CASE Hi
O83 MOT WISH TO BZ CONSULT2D YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY
T PRALLT RIETERRAL HERE.
he deta MAM YSIAGS AS CLAN UMA ANU APPKUY.Y AT LUM PENT

£VSL ODALID,

ar 2q704)3
(i nt
res(cul 35
CABLE SECASTARLIAT: LAMIT MISTuinuTion
. M2, HELMS.

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St¥ van’ yi

Gil

sy avearmatiw ae averroe4d
On

x T Ast atm bi Carian Qerices
' 33082

qi mQeerc ed

mEPRCOUC TION AY OTHER THAN THE SSUINO CHPICE 1S PRCrUAITIO.


¥$ “8445 - ‘
« 19 September 1960

'2 § LEOFOLDVILLE

@.. CIFECTOR

CON far

ar
ROUTINE /* pee
tei tas .

tad

PhiONTY

mA FaUenows

=

“O08  DoP. She 2

=

Aprhan “Tana 77
OPERATIO*aL
UAMECIATE =
}

“
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sa

is (PRITY) LEOP into Crt Ga

OMet
EYES ONLY GUTHMAN FROM JADWIN
rt
RYBAT YOPRUP
Mw
l. IDEN PROCEEDING BRAZZAVILLE SHORTLY AND SHOULD ARRIVE
APPROX 27 SEPT. HE WILL MAKE HIS WAY LEOP SOONEST THEREAFTER — Nie
CALL YOU AT CFFICE ON ARRIVAL. WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS “SID Fic.
err - BRIEF COVER DISCUSSION WILL THEN BE HELD LN WHICH "SIN"
SUGGESTS MEETING YOU-AT OFFICE AND YOUQGVILEL RESPOND by aAriyi re
AND SETTING THE TIME. HOWEVER THE ACTUAL MEETING wtb. TAKE PLA:
ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN TIME MENTIONED IN THIS CONVERS a rIAN AND IN
FRONT MAIN ENTRANCE NEW STANLEY HOTEL. "SID" WILL CARRY UNROL LL}
COPY OF "PARIS MATCH" IN LEFT HAND.
2 IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE IDEN SOONEST FOSSiBLE AFTER He
PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY LOENTLIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HLS A:

MENT TO YOU. HOWEVER HIS ETA NOT FIRM AND You SHOULD NOT BE

CONCERNED BY SOME DELAY.

CONEDIMATING OF FTChag

@ GCthaabin dg ovrricea SECRET _| AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITEC.


ehoury

Dot oe
OPERATIONAL
IMMEDIATE

mT VEE Tae Thee
Into Cn 2:2
PAGE TWO

3. ACKNOWLEDGE ABOVE SOONEST, WITH ANY REVISIONS YOU
WISH MAKE IN ABOVE PROCEDURES. CONTINUE USE YQPROP INDICATOR
ALL. TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO
YOURSELF.

END OF MESSAGE

bel _ ccd,
DD/ COCEDIMATING OFPICTES Clar &
CEbdabing oerices SECRET AUTAEMTICATING OPFICES

@ REPROOUCTION.| BY OTHER THT ISSUING OFFICE.18 PROHIBITED. Copy °.

rated -

.

: Tay se ier LS
oD Oe eEweed y 455:
te) CJAR

‘ 27445 .
te 19 September 1960

r LEOPOLDVILELE

we CLRECTOR
he CfAF prineity
ae hoe, sfe 2 | Orteationay feet :

tM MEDIATE

Po) fy, rors 4G
Ye fre
/ Jé ‘ Wyhegs be

CHE Gm 0) Eee

{PRITY) LEOP

regse a
RYBAT YQFROP

RE DIA Jiye4 jour GIYY SF

IDEN SIDNEY BRAUN.

END CF MESSAGE

cooeoin ating orercees

DD/P
eerssasing orricts SECRET avintnt

ern neem eee eS Dee a ee Em ew RRM TE


a Se cee
C/AF
1 22 Sa ptcmber 1Sh3
@ wero. :

wae VIKEC TDA

PRiery

ree
+ meee “Great Fantane

(PRITY) LEOp cre ove
“T23 ONLY GUTHWAAN
RYMAT rdyxop
RE LEOP 0025 (iN 18989)
af VERY WELCOME,
A. RE 2A. CONCUR MAXIMUM use |&E TORE OR COLL. Kh
S SL. MUS1 RERMALN UNWITTING FOR TIME BEING ALTNOUGH Pil urh
You “WiLL BE i 4% MORT ACTIVE ROLE.
*
HAS APPARENTLY MAINTAINED SPLENDED COVER, MUST RE
BEA MINATION HIS BACKGROUND WILL REVEAL HE RESID
(imams ONE LES ON RaERUME]RASSPORT AND voz Raxco mmm ;
RZ 2%. CONCUR THIS PCSSIBILITY WO2TH WATCHING BUT iF
DECLDED SUPPORT FOR TOPROP OBJZCTIVES, BELILVE ESSENTIAL. 51

3E PACYIC : (Gin TU3BD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH PORQUE WOOL:

COMPI.LTZLY CONCRAL=D, ‘A IMACRIE FOU CONCUR OUR DELIEY SUBJECTS
. ny
SSOGuVUAITT LiZ=Ly 324 POOR AND LEAKS WOULD ALMOST CERKTALNLY

Se owen za WHS

a

aviwM Atte ea OPPICL OS

coo
CT
wh


@.. Omrcise

TONS,

NEO

PAGL TWO

TCRIGITHAN WE, DUT TRACES INDICATE AE ECT AN GINS: PRS Conncvie

TUVS OUR COMMENTS ALONG LINES B ABOVE.

5 9. RA 2D. UNDX2STAND STATION HAS HAD REASONS QUEST

aaehy
Bate LAM R2EPCRTING RELLABILITY AND WE MUST ASSUM = (YEREUNS

CONN=:CTIONS COMMENTS AS AROV m.

t EB. Ke 2h. FROM TRACES HERE ASSUME SUAIECT MAY Ae cree $f’
*
ARM SUPPORTEA \YUSU. NOTEZ PREVIOUS CZECH COMNECTIONS.

iG YOUR FURTHER EXPLORATION CNA CA Ah

PSA ES PED ANT POSSIDLZ CNA SOLUTION. YSUS SHOULL

Wow |
’
t

PROVIDE MAAIMUM CREDIFILS

UBIEC1 LYOP oco? Luc ELLY ih
MCS T RISKY VEHIC
su 2A wls

—

‘VERESTEL TOUR CONTINUIAG...

RAB
COOEDINATING OPFFicery fist

~~ SZCREiT ] AUTNEMTICaATINGO OFritet


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Inryo PAGE THREE 7 Cite Gia wees %
assseanean(Ghorres AS GENUINE THIRD NATIONAL ASSET ON GhOUND 2 Ch.
WHATEVER ROLE THIS OP YOU MIGHT CONSIDER 300M. SOMEWHAT COlGi nt §
YOUR RECANT RIEPOAT HE MISUNDERSTOOD OR DISOSTYED INSTRUC TIO.

HUT ND APPARENT INCREASING ACCEMSE TO Sik
MILLizu CLF spear} JAGEASST. Wit ARE CONSIDESAING A TURD NATICNA!.
EUS UUT CORPZETAA VALLAX LE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL DILL AND WILL Aleve ;
SHORTLY.
NOT INTINDED YOU CONSTRUE ASOVE COMMENTS AS DASITCALILY
ZOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANMOT READ OVE ‘5
AM Aa
MUST DE CONCZALMWUENT PBPRIME AOLE, UNLIGS OUIEBTANVING Urruis::
IME2GA3 WHICH MANES CALCULATED EIST FISST CLASS SET. READ
ENTEATAIN ANY SXRIOUS PROFOSALS TOU MAILE SASED OUR INGN At
ZOTH YOU PR PF ESSIOWAL JUVGGIAAINO.
if i por MESSAGE
v gis

/ rhipeedy we

m/AY / : CEORSCMMATING OF Ftcsen welt
9 DELTAS Am Grercae pm T ’ AITOAMU CATING OFFICT?
ny | n ' .

er enero
AEVOARIUATINUARY PAV TUA RS VEIT ELON NF EIR (OC PO HIOITEY,


eee es ome

ee ao ee

PROKY

OPERATIONAL | ae
MET IALE
t CT TZ

morgane
| er Rere Ee)

26 Tanenw

cole Ore

025?!

02521

FV RCM ASCHAM AND JADWIN

RE: LEOP 0002 (LN 173384) *

1, APPRECIATE EXCELLENT REPORTING YOUR REFERENCY

AND COMMENDE RAVEHIS ALERT ROLE. WE AWloH GIVE EVE Y

POSURLE SUPSORT MUS GMATING LUMUMBA FROM ALY POSSLEILI OY

“Nee . my

HESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR HE FAILS OI LEOP.

SETTING HIMSELF IN SFANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

é. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF NEFARIOUS PLOTTING Gitans,
GUINEA, UAL. TO ANSTORE LUMUMBA, GREATLY DISTURBED AT
REFERENCE TO MCROCTO AND PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AS MEMSE? -
YOU SUGULOT ANY ACTION WE CAN PROM.

mae
wrt

OQCACID OR TAKE OTHERWISE TO HWELP DETACH THEM FROM LUMUAINA

“yy

conesimatina opyi1eres


» LECPO LINVILLE

. 4
@icic: : A CUTINE |

ae a a ee ee ee

. «6
FRicale '

t

ane ad
rab ate |

ee ee

fete Mew edice

(N&O
DISTURBED AT PUSSIBILITY THATS?
CONTAOL OF WIS FORCES DUE POSSIBLE HIGHER PAY DEING OF FEREL
SOURCES HOSTILE TO US AS SUGGESTED PARA 4 TOUR REF FERENCE.
SITUATION IM ORDER AND CAN ANYTHING FUHTHER DE DONE

ABOUT THIS THROUGH UN OR COVERTLY THROUGH},

4, AGREE POSITICN CUTLRIED LAST SENTENC? REPRE RENCz

——

Duce WE ASSUME is FULLY ENDORSED BY AMBASIAUURK,

5. AT YOUR DISCRETION, SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH
)

AMBASSADOR.
ENO CF MESSAGE

CIS COMMENT: EHiOERO. Ee ayl 2) reported of. 23 Settember that Pierce
Matcts, Gabriel Yormae, and Antnine Giznenga of the PSA were mounting

a coup agauinet Mobutu and the Council of Cormmmissiunecs

roe
\ yal
1 .
Wo ste 24 1005

.* say f
SAA
‘my rStrs MATIN mr rirees

e@ . acl n a
Gbtsasingd ovricer yy | SECRET i ae ai CATIB

* REPROCUCT BY Ores Trane decd ISSUING Sr FICE iG FROHICLTS


rronyas
bbatavel

Seen er 1915

C lA 'N 18Qfa
LECP 4226

rn 2>5 Cote

abrnin
ry eM) Aw pe raNTAcT «oa PHAAS way ns CAYe YlAne
CLAM IM CONTACT 5 SALUBAS Wo LE SAYS ANXIOUS

PRIORITY

Laven BOF PROGRAM IF PROPER INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.
c HECTOR GEORGES MASS!IANGA RECENTLY TOLD UUACID OFF ISLE

ue

SMOVCOUTHMAN HE TN CONTACT SMALL GROUP CNA TROCPS WO WOULD
SARTISIEP ATE CF RECEIVE FINANCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT. GUTRAAN WI THEE
Med ARAANGEO HAVE ODACIO GFFILEX Ini eoouce MASS LANGA

THIS COULS BE PUSH THROUGH ANOTHER

nia WM TOLO BETTELMEIM ME IN act

wes rN Gee UF ty IRASAVLES, Lie
“0 GF COMMISSIONERS, BOLIKANGO AND CAPTAIN, asecol Rhye an

4 TM CONTACT GELS! Nt, FRE ke o OR OTHER GROLPS WILLING TRALI

ALO Alta VES TROOPS LOCATED. K LTONA AREA. SAIO HIS GROUP WANTS

. ?
Meow THEM LEOP IN ABOUT & DAYS TO TRY TAKE OVER CITY. PLAN NOT

GLE ANO GOUST KASAVUGU AGREES. BUT MIGHT Get CAPTAIN

FOALIE
INVULYED REF OP, O78 - .
G.. SLIGHT chance(potree MIGHT TRY THROULn SUBLET

LEoP C209. CIN: “or
3. “PLAY PROCEED:

N-BASIS-PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS

INSTRUCTED. bicy ‘CONTRARY


“PRIORITY

wll 1c,

SLED. 2b

procreerao

\

PUNT ONS

¢


Cept 24 . REC'G CALE SEE1.

fo an PRIORITY

re 22 \9I5 po
C Lh ‘ | In 1E565
. ae

“tO cE coP gach

yy a Q1hby (OUT 74465)
\, INFN PL© CONTACTED 25 SEPTEMBER. wE CN SAM WAVE

Ply MAGT VAP IO AT TION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED,

[SERING POSSIBILITIRS:

WOULD THUS ACT AL aS | Co CMAN, TO Ritimae
Mam are ey

ALSO WOULD PROVIDE INFO OM Fong AnD
SUL TURAL zm. GUTHMAN RECALL Chie a] 10 LEUP.
é. Syeuect LEGP 9981 TIN 16685 —) SAID HE PLANNED ACT

Witt" © DAYS. CATE PASSED AND “NO ACTION BUT ITF PRICE RIGHT Mich:

GOT STW ON ROAD.
WHO UNWITTING GUTHHAN POLITICAL

COMTACT VISITED STATION. 26. SERTENCER, EXPRESSED VitwW NEED TAC

IMMEOTATE ACTIGH, © SAI" HAS: Me S Malt SOUAD weio WANT INTER VE

ACHIEVE POSITIVE SETTLEMENT.

NEED CUT-OUT SUCH AS RouTont REALIZE PREFERACLE. USE THIRD NAT ten ob


DIRECTOR

LEOPCLOVILLE ;
C/ar {CR HIS, af Chy NOTIFIED 1940 20 SEP)

Oop, .3/C 2 . CPERATIONAL IMEDIATE
IN 20057
Dia = it Leo?
EYES CNLY JACWIN FRCM GUTHMAN ee
RYBAT YOPROP SEP 22 1915
, CIA

REF: DIR £3994 (OUT 74837 7”

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL:
MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED 1545
GF VARYING DEGREES.

2. PE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE f§ci
AVAILABLE. vitw NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY,
AUTHORIZE €*PLCRATORY CONVERSATIONS TO CETCRM IBC
WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD
APPSCACH CH HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. ANO NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE
APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL
CBSECTIVE OF TO HIM IN ORDER OOTAIN FULL nail HIS POTENTIAL.
ALTMOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC COTAILS | Se

" BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED iF HE: LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE
, _ 2)

_ APPARENT. ss fae 0%
3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED Possi8iL 1 TY Qfhor ie 7

‘

PARTICIPATIGC’. BELIEVE, HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW

POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO a REPORTING ad

'
°


ee

* ‘DIRECTOR ;
LEOPCLOVILLE

‘ C/aF (CR HOSE, AF Civ NOTIFIED igo 20 SEP)

@ cop,.s/C 2 .

CPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 2005]
oR who a crt LEOP P25."

EYES CNLY JACWIN FRCM GUTHMAN Ke rats
RYBAT YOFROP SiP 22. 1915

; ) | CIA
REF: DIR £3994 (OUT 74837 )

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAIL) LE
MUST CHOOSE SE TWEEN CANCELING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RIS<S =m
GF VAHYING DEGREES.

2. Af PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE QM cco: asses
AVAILABLE. vtiw NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, TF AT ALL, URGE HS
AUTHORIZE E*PLCRATORY CONVERSATIONS TO CETERMing if QQ
WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD

APPOOACH CH HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE
APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL

CBSECTIVE OF TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL.

ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC COTAILS GMB Paks is ce,
| ;
BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE:LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP Ane

. - _— es os

_ APPARENT,
3... FEAR MIGHT “HAVE “OyERSTATED. POSSIBILITY gee YILE
PARTICIPATICY, BELIEVE, HE UNSUITED ROLE AT: PRESENT TIME, VIEW

POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING a

|
@

OPERATIONAL IMMUULATI

IN 2203) /
LECP 5442

“WNwO Catt
}
4, NEW POSSIBILITY EXISTS VIEW 29 SEPTEM3ER GUTHMAN

r
(Gisce 1 TALKS. AL THOUGH [BE ISLE 1 PREVIOUSLY FAVORED SUBUECT
REF OP, NOW BELIEVES HISS>ANGOLAN GROUP WOULU BE SUPPRESSED 11!

CONGO ANDO REPLACED 8Y GUINEAN SUPPORTED GROUP IF SUBU’ECT EVER

REGAINS ASCENUANCY. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTIC?.
THEREFORE PRCPOSE cxPcone [EI Sus 1 THINKING SOCNEST TO SEE tu
TAR =E WItLLites GO AND CETERMINE HIS ASSETS. assem no QR Psu: 5

“MOOT ING POSITIVE, COLES HOS CONSIDER HIM BE TRUE THIRD COUikt

U2
NATIONAL FROM POINT VIEW SECURITY OF 07? 1FGQLISLE ) REACTS

FAVCRABLE, SCLIEVE THIS OF FERS MEANS ACHIEVE OUJECTIVE EARLY
PAR wi Th (GenononaE IN SO.FAR AS ACCESS ANO SECURITY CONCERNE::
5. RE PARA IF REF: -AS OF NOW DO NOT HAVE CNOUGH INFO
EVALUATE POTENTIAL OF CNA. ~
5. view IMMINENT [(Genunev ai AND [GA SLE powCETINGS, of.
QUEST HCS REPLY OPIM VIA EQUERRY LINK. |
_ END OF MESSAGE


* LECPOLEVILLE

oimECTO?

CiM +s
or" (/

CPLRATIONAL

i IAM E DIATE

ace v2 Wh
Gi
. Cité or
QRee”
Py |
QYES GAY CUTMA CS COMENT:® URGED HOS AUTHORIZE CxPLURATE

TALKS TO DETERMINE IF SCHOTROFFE WwiLuli

ia
RYLAT YORE?
- * ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT CR CUT-OUT.

RE LLOP fee2 (10 20887)

1.) VOU ARE AUT:GRIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS arerenerc TO ASSESs

HIS ATTiTLCE TOWARD PCGSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE. AGREE witht yOu

INITEAL DISCUSS ICAS TrCOULD BE Ctl HYPOTHETICAL BASIS. O
Cc. UT UKE APPL FROA HERE THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILSL Gar SR \
ot TE

@*". wi STILL HAYS SOME WORRY ALCUT PSPRIME STAY TOGETIGR WITH CLESTIC.

O wif hl. GCOLVER WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ACSESDENT bis

ATZITUL AS VELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACHES THAT BAY DERGE. LE WOULD GE Te.

A'S STATUS Gu) SITUATION WOULE ALLO FOR MODERATE HASTE.
3. 1 AGSEICE MORE DETAILS WE ARE RELUCTANT cexsiogn (Ry tste Ge.

WACREAS nf HAS ELEN LOG TIME CONTACT ARD IN HIS SPECIFIC FIELD IE 1S tN
HOST RESPECTS AN ALENT WE WOULD STILL HAVE BASIC CUESTIONS AS TO CONTROL AD
SECURITY. wo 00 AGREE YOU SHOULD. EXPLORE HIS i WITH QUESTIGHS HORE
COLIQUE THAN TIREST. vF YOU FEEL WE ARE VRONG a OS ASEESSEMT or
ADVISE AFTER NEXT TALKS WITH Hot,” -,
POL APPRECIATE revze YOUR FFFFAAGHK TO rROoLEis, | Gud of MEME.

/-COUTOTHUATING OPetceas.

(SEE Fi Cite 0 > 7
oe a if, - gee Caitee eT | O41 sagtmauricatino oericer

ae OTHER THAN. Wee ISSUING OFFICE 1S PROMS, | ats a


OIFECTOR

LEGPOLE. .ce
c/a RECO Cache SECT,
oo/P, s/c 2 PRICAQITY

tN 2447)

PRITY DIR ve

EYES ONLY UGADWIN FROM GUTHMAN®
r

RY2AT YOPRUP

PEF: OR a5 (QUT 757900 ) ee

1. icem Ore g1hb3Z (out 78S.
5 OCT, VIEW CxXPIRATION CATE HIS MATERIALS.
TTEMS OF CONTINUINS USEFULKESS. GUTHYAN PLANS

IM“_LEMOENT OP.

1

2. Com CTEO LAPLORATORY CONVERSATION WIT guepcepmcmecmmmeraig. ©

PEF. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, ere ES TES

SOLUTION RECOMENDED BY HOS. ALTHOUGH DIO 'i2T PICr UP ALL,

SG ore. ust

BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS S

ACCOPPLISH OBJECTIVE.

3. IF HOS BELIEVES PRP RIME STAY OR LOCATICA
WIFE PERMANENT BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY
PPOVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY HATICNAL.  PECRUL INET
SUCH ASSET LOCALLY NOT FEASIBLE VIEW SECURITY FROLGLM aND LIVI TCU
PUM2ER POTENTIAL ASSETS, OMLY OTHER POSSIPLE ASSET HERD IS

1. 'GurtH4an DOUBTS + CAPABLE SUCH ACTION, ALSO |


ry Quays

LOEP To

40ViSe.

r
at
rc
mn
»
wr
ri

END CF MESSAGE

Hi Bre

"5 © WAENT: PL YLS ONLY APPEARS TO GE IMPROPERLY USTG. IN 3P
Pf aSl ADVISE “HE FILLO TO COMPLY WITH RESULATION 90--”.

ee ATM EIED GUTPAAN TO HAVE EXPLORATORY TAL ry ai th
7) SESS IS AT TETUDL TOWARD POSSIBLC ACTIVE AGENT We soe ROL

fag
> aAsrt

4


~LCPOLDVILLE

@ OUPECTCe
“hy oes

Prioety

fart e eater eT)

Ima Ale

oe
{7RITT) LEOr Ree crt om NA
whe

ft
RYRAT YOPROP

HYXS UNLY GUTHMAN
SOODUCOK

HAD GOOD DISCUSSION TOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT. COMMENTS

FOLLOY
De ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT forRor ONsEOTIVES Be
EOD AND UNDERSTAND CURILENT SiITUAG LU 8

ROACadES WA SHORT
FULLY WAARANTEU BETURN YOUR COLLMAGUE.

CE

Bw OR BORE ACTIVE HOLE,
C. MZANWHILE WE CONSIDEURG DISPATCIUNG FPiURD MATIC
OPXTAATOR YHOO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN DUN ASSESGED iy

CU OVXR PVAIOD TO SEE WHETHER WE MIGHT PLAT ACTIVE OK

rama rmwating OF FICHE

Qivirssine orricie SECRET

VERDE STA BY OTHE THAN THR ISSN ESI 1 MR NEP, op ee ee
a . a en yo Posty: “e . TO Eras Gl .
yee : ° eka

} AUTMEMIICANING Offic ae


baicgersaae -
BEGET My.
sep 2 195

eos

PAGL TAO

+ OT OLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. le TUU CONULUUS ti:

EEF Clea:

SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY EXTRA LOAD THIS VLACK

UN TOU, W OULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY SENIOR CAS? OFFICER KU

TRIDE AGENT FULL TIME CNDFK (TOUK LIRECTICN.

iid ANT CASE THIRD NATIONAL WOULD NOT Hi NETTING PRIGR vlorn re

POs Vn ANU WOULD CS TENSIBLY ph UCHR G Le PERFORM

GrnMAL OFS MOLE. WILT. ADVISE Pee eEesSs om Tis Luan.

MEN DIONED AKRAIVAL YOUR PARC AME More ¢

Ler erersesten sn
LUANDA WEEMEND. WARMLY sux PCAT THIS -no ANT C1 Hea SPOKMT

LEAVE YOU CAN SCROUNGE. DONOT WAIT TILL YOU TOO TIRED Ta

SEN=SIIT FACH IT.

imp OF MESEACE

a

coy

f
/ Awtek,,
Lf ATS J ovsresrine opricgna

SIatAse am OPPs EE { Sj . DECEZT AGIAEMMCATIMG OFFICHT
Nn re NS |S
PEPROCUCTION BY OTHER THAN IHD ISSUING OFPICE 13 SSCHIBTTO

irre INC ce srernbseerersih hare

TERE uted =e Slee i A


15 Octohed 1944

@ LICPCLOYLLLE

ree ren
arenentee2

6 CPER ST yeeag

| ' | L tea whOIATS

LAT

RE AL V.ZCP Ici (IN 25261)
3B. LEGP cict UN 25967)
Cc. LEOP 0672 (IN 23052)

WOULD APPRICIATE YOUR VIEWS FOLLOWING:

A. FURMA pe

YPRALTORIAN GUAKD BY GIVLNG EXTHA TAT

PERHAPS 25-50 PERCENT MORE THAN NOW BEING RECZIVED TO CORFS

ce MN UP TO 206. DO ROT FEEL THAT BATLOAA-
ART

HCOL GROUP CAN BE USED FOR THIS. RAISE QUESTION WhHiels

sc
LOYALTT IN

LISTED MEN COULD BE SO HELD FOR LONG. SUGGEST THis

Z57 HANDLED BY GIYING FUNDS rofiipLar 4 YOR HIM TO GIVE TO

; ° : oe o\
FTE PURPORT THIS TO USE(QF Lat 4 TO KEEP (BS) SPINE STA Stir

ENO.

~
=

3. AMMUNITICM: WHAT RESZAVES AMMUNITION 1ODE HELD UM

PRB CON TAL VOULD BE RICUIRED. ASSUME 10,000 ROUNES FOX

SMALL AMMLS MIGHT Sur PICE. wh MOULD REQUIRE INYO CALIBRE ANL

ys
val


wi FAGE TWO cist Oe
TYVE WEAPCIS INVOLYED. PCSSIYLE METHODS DELIVIRNY ARS FOR

& Sx PLANE TO TRANSPORT FROM ADJACINT TERRITORY, Cl PESSIDLY

FROM MATADI BY PLANE OR TRUCK. ALTZIANATIYZ WOULD 3E GIVE
cal. vagy
MCNEY wr rE TS TO GIVE TOfjapiy LAT 7 FCR HIM TO PURCILASE

np AMD HAND ovon Tolapgigenyae, 0 |

mK
r ) c BBe -IN VIEW OUR DISTRUST SUBJECT ALF A exeLoufGh Lu.

KNOWLEDGE CF AND ACCESS (TO FETICHEURSTO SETZAsUNE
cHzt EAs pRoax SPIRITUAL SUPPORT MICHT B33, SERIOUS

BLOW TO HM. ONLT DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NCW CTAKS 2z27IND is Ta

SUPPORT iMMOBILIZING OR aanzsTin PBA. DESIRABLE AS MORSE

wee INLTTY E (ACTION MIGHT Ba. AMY ACTION TALS NOULYD AAV E TOS es

eee we

ZNTiRZLY CONCOLISE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD HRELCOME YOUR VIEWS #OCK
OUR 2EVIZTW CN ANY WAY THLS COULD PCSSISLT Se ACCOMPLIS:E:.:

\ ZND OF MESSACZ

5 Tt 7

AF — shed , Cave atiM@ OFFictes
v . : —_———___———---,
_ wT ;
Pe ee ee pos : avintm TCAs OF

RIP ECAAK. DOM A OTe? DAM Det ISSUING Abece 3 PROHIPITED,


Glas
ced
1S Dctoner 194Y

ce

Liao ca Vl dg

Ou

_

=
yao yd

- ee
(PRITT) Lior

aan
RYBAT YOPROP
ad

Cate Gat

ZYES ONLY GUTHMAN
GH NORMAL CHAVINEL

YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROU

Fur
DBR PARA ON EPROP TYPE SUGGESTIC!
7

CURBINTLY DELING TAAKSMITTS
fOU WILE PROBABLY WECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINZS AS STUMBi.i?.
KFMTS INCH ZASINGL YT APPARENT ALLL ATUDTING ©

3SLCORM tS Os

ONE CUNSIDEHA TION. YOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS VE:
\
; Mey H1S WEEK AMD BE CONGO THEY CAMA UP WiTH Tt

TMOLNG ANT

= 50 YOU NOT CORT US:.D ut AKY APPARENT DU

CIFIC PUNPOSS TOU DiSce

SAND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. ih LAIR CHIOR, 2

RFACTICN TO POSSIBLE DIRZCTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE:


'
a)
women. -4

bevsatiece |

poe eee eh

\s' . . A .
An ‘ ! recer

er

eyp 2 VS Ch ona p>

Gi

.

PAGE TS CIE O1n

ere)

SOONE5ST TO CONCZMNYTIUALE ENTLRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORK''4,

ON THLRD NATIONAL MENTIONZD THAT REF, DUT WONDER WHITHER Y° U

THINK EARLY ARAQAIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE GENSE. SEEMS 1h

aA dawn geen pms ee owen reste pee ee as pease wane
BVOWD OTMIN COMMIT Tas T TOO HEAVY T GiVS NECrssnaY VNU.

YQFPROK. ADVIA®,

oe

()
COMMANDO TIRE GROUP FOR aupucTionfytoax, AVTHER VIA ASSZ.UL

are .

HAV 2 iidsCuUsse S00 DSLAM WITH BET TRLHUIM with POSSIST LS 1

OM HOUSE UP CLLEF FROM BIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, PROM

OPTS ANOTHER DAEAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENSILY. PICKED G)'

aN
or GiEeNy RONA TACOPS MIGHT ALSO 2E CONSIDEREL. REQUEST LUC"

rrtrs.
ATT oS

EM OF MESSAGE

pam artiwy Deerceesn


.SIPLCTOR
LEOPOLOVILLE

Cyar

O1R

EYES CNLY CATASIN FRO SUT PMAN
fy
RYBAT YAPRCP
Boe: A. GIR gthas2 (CUT 783%)

8. ula feasg (crt 81336) °

“

\
1. | TeMGR AS NOT OREN AELE PENETRATC ENTOURAGE

'
ml esA MOT Roe te SELE PeUVIOC Cen fs

el ge es PAO ey AL yluM4enT COMIOR CASE OFF hoe SHANG TE
CPS CATELLENT GDEAL AL THOUIH MAINTATHING PRIGRITY INTEREL SY
CP, anel CEVCTE Sel y LIMITEO AMOUNT TIVE, WIEW MULTIPLE TPS
COMMITMENTS. cE UAT ION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN ptiAT:

“GCES ELIZ 19 CCTCBER. IF CA E OFFICER AVAILAELE, GUTHMAN OSL

CAS
DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIELE TO ASSISTING AND OFRECTING fis

EFFORTS.
3. LERIWSLY OOUST POZSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STC. ..
CONCUR WP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOnN QUT ViEW CNA
" VATCHING HOUSE, DOVOT HE WILL TRY THIS. 1 NEAR FUTURE. CELI:
POSSIBLE TO MOUNT CAT4ANDO, PER REF 2, BUT ASSUME HSS WOULT) ‘WANT

7 mo
~ THIS COME BY THIRD HAT IONALASSET.
LOLS CASE OFFICE SUNT, RECUHFEND HGS POUCH SOONEST bIoH

teowe

[eo secne to.


4> ;
he
PAGE 2 wp 2% 1915 PRIORITi
CLA IN 2593;
. LEC gl.

CITE

POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCER
HUNTING GOCD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLI
NOW FORBIDOEN, WOULD KZEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF
HUNTING SEASCN,

ENO OF MESSAGE

C/3 CO4ENT: "SL QESTED ETA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYFL ChOUW Ie:

ABAXTION (SUeJ).


