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| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
ne ; a :

28 January 1963

‘ ; MEMOPANDUH FOR Reseed

WELT; Cubs

Tho Executive Comittee met on Friday, January 25th, and
! approved the rew policy as outlined by the Coov‘inator.

Dacisions bearing on covert operations were ceached ss follews:

1. The Special Group will have the responsibility of
continuing review of thé program for infiltration of covert intelli-
pence avents. Progress will be regularly check-d with the Group.
Higher authority wade a particular point of saying that, although
the objective of ‘intensified covert collection’ is approved,
nonethsleas, CIA should not feel it ¢68 under pressure to "yet good
men killed'’ in the ~rocass. In other words, the advantages to ba
gained From intenstited collection must be continually weighed
ageinst the risks. This will be done by the Special Group.

2. The sctorney General expressed great interest in the
extent to which key members of tho Brigade will be brought into
planning and current operations. He thought that they should be
thoroughly consulted on plans for intelligence teans and he indicated
that he will personally keep an eye on progress in this regard.

3. The use of propaganda balloons was disapproved at this
time. It apparently wes not clear as to exactly how far CIA should
go in maintaining its current capability for launching balloons. ,

teivirtctrs

At Mr. Bundy'a suggestion I had a long talk with Cottrell on
Saturday, the 26th. We discussed in particular the method of operation
with the Brigade. I pointed out some of the security aspects that
would have to be watched, but expressed the opinion that a workable
method of operation could be devised eo that the Brigade leaders
could provide motivation and could feel a sense of participation,
without having to bring them so closely into the details of target
areas, dispatch, COmMRO y etc., as to constitute a security hazard.

_ I cited the Agency's experience with the NTS as a possible guideline —
in this regard. Wea agreed that after Mr. PitzGerald returns from
Panama, about the first of February, the three of us should discuss
thie matter further.

TAP

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8 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 8 February 1963

_ PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman,

and Mr. FitzGerald

1. Agent Operations in Cuba

Mr. FitzGerald discussed with the Group the CIA paper of
6 February which recommends a total of five maritime infiltration/
exfiltration operations during the next thirty days.

He emphasized that these black operations are entirely of an
intelligence nature and that they should be viewed only as a
supplement to intelligence coverage accomplished by other means.
In the latter connection, the point was made that information ob-
tained by agents of this type can contribute to the targeting of
aerial reconnaissance sorties and can assist in making the process
of photo interpretation more meaningful, ,

Mr. FitzGerald also emphasized that the teams now proposed
are comprised of only one to three agents. He noted that the agents
available are particularly well motivated, and that those whose
primary motivation was toward action rather than intelligence have
been weeded out.

The consensus of the Group was that while agent operations of
this type cannot be considered as a primary or major source of
intelligence, nonetheless this type of operation is consistent
with U.S. objectives in the Cuba situation and that approval of:
these five should be recommended,

(These missions were approved by higher authority, 9 February

1963)
Subsidy t to , Venezuelan n Newspaper _

= Mr. McCone reported on financial arrangements which have been
made in connection with subsidy of, the Venezuelan newspaper, which

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[vse approved at’ the meeting of 31 January 1963. He said that Agency :

funds on deposit with the Morgan Guaranty, which will serve as i
7 collateral against the bank's loan to the new entrepreneur of this -
newspaper, would draw interest at 4%, while the purchaser will pay |!
the commercial rate of 6%. The Chairman expressed satisfaction i
with this arrangement: .

week Parrott

Distribution
Mr.- Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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: BOW TIE to check on this. It was pointed out that the. BOW TIE

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28 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 28 February 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3

1. [Reconnaissance - DOD Monthly Forecast .
The Group had no objection to the BOW TIE missions as planned.

| Mr. -McCone alluded, however, to. the unexplained military activity
' that is going on in eastern China, and asked about the capability of

program consists of comparatively shallow penetration which would
probably not reach the kind of military target Mr. McCone had in mind.
Accordingly, Colonel Steakley was asked to confer with COMOR to find
out whether requirements exist for deeper penetration in the area,

and if so to bring in an appropriate proposal to the Special -Group.

In connection with project AMOS, Mr. Johnson read a message from
Lord Home to the Secretary of State. Home said that while the RAF
and the Air Ministry will be glad to have the advantage of the.
intelligence resulting from the mission, nonetheless this represents
a departure from the previous pattern of flights in the area.
Additionally, the flight will, according to Home, go closer 'to the
coast than the RAF is allowed to go. He was willing to agree to the
mission, provided it was not viewed as establishing a precedent, and
on the stipulation that Secretary Rusk personally accepts the risk
entailed, Mr. Johnson said that Secretary Rusk is willing to accept
this risk.

The Group approved AMOS, subject to check by Mr. Bundy with
higher authority, and on the understanding that the Group will have
a chance to take a last look at it shortly before the scheduled date
of 19 March, Colonel Steakley was also asked to report to the Group
on the results of the mission. (This mission was later approved by
higher authority.)

In this connection, Mr. McCone commented on the great importance |
of obtaining intelligence on the Soviet low-level SA-3 system. The |
Group agreed that thisis a high-priority requirement, in order to] 7

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: [provide a basis for estimating accurately the chances for successful

ow-Level penetration of the USSR. Mr. McCone will arrange to have
a USIB paper prepared on this subject.

The Group noted the DESOTO destroyer voyage, which will now in-

elude a courtesy call at Djakarta.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that CINCLANT has tried out the
MELON PATCH photography missions, operating under the ten mile re-
striction which was laid on by the Special Group at its meeting of
31 January. It is now apparent to CINCLANT that adequate photography
of the desired areas cannot be obtained at that distance. The Group
agreed that the ten mile restriction should remain in force. In n
coming to this conclusion they made the point that in case of real
need for this type of coastal intelligence, there ‘would be adequate
time to obtain it after an emergency actually was in effect; -and
further, any such information collected now would have to be up-dated
before operations could be mounted based on it. ai

The revised RED DOG missions, to bé flown in C-47's, and the Hl
proposal to fly some BRASS KNOB missions from the Canal Zone, were :
approved.

Colonel Steakley was asked to give the Group a report on the
results obtained from the last mission into the Sea of Okhotsk.

Colonel Steakley told the Group that the JCS will make no
recommendation on low-level coverage of Laos. (ABLE MABEL) until after
the results of the Agency effort explained below.

The Group made a point of saying that although the time is not
now propitious. for covering the COMOR priority targets in Cuba with i
low-level flights, it may well prove desirable to do this on fairly :
short notice. Therefore this matter should be kept under constant
review by operating elements.)

2. ” [Reconnaissance >_CIA Monthly Forecast ;

Mr. McCone told the Group that the weather has suddenly opened ‘
up over North Vietnam and that the mission to cover that area, via :
Laos, which was approved by the Special Group on 17 January, will “|
actually be launched tonight. He said that after this is completed :
the airplane will be ferried to Taiwan in accordance with the dis-
cussion at the meeting of the 25th of February, transiting Laos on
the way. Mr. McCone also reported on the recent successful GROSBEAK

. mission. a _ et

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without specific approval by higher authority. 7]. .. wees eee

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* removal of Soviet troops from Cuba. Mr. Bundy stated that the
' official government position is that available information is in-

6. ‘hite - Proposed Political actich?

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wee ee . we .
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3. fiumovat of Soviet Troops

Mr. McCone said that we still do not know very much about the

sufficient to justify any change in the estimated figures of Soviets |
on the island. He added that no change can be made in these ° figures,

-}

4, Testimony on Cuba

Mr. McCone commented on the difficulties encountered by
officials who are required to testify. before Congressional committees
on the Cuban situation, in light of the propensity of these committees
to question witnesses on statements made by other officials. Mr.
Bundy recognized that this is a problem and said that in an attempt
to alleviate it he has had several documents brought together. These
include a compendium of the President's remarks on the subject; the
DCL's report to the Killian Committee; a report by Assistant Secretary
Martin; and most recently, the CIA-prepared paper on subversion in
the hemisphere. He added that the basic responsibility for co-  .
ordinating public statements rests with the Secretary \ of State.

wT a jr ay |

q.
5. {Italy = ~ ‘Status | Report on Election Operation

The Group noted that this project is progressing, but is still
in its early stages. 7

The Group approved the proposal dated 25 February, subject to

ee by higher authority. (This was later granted.) 7

7. [Asency Operations in Latin America 98

Mr. Gilpatric inquired as to the feasibility of mounting 7
intelligence or other operations against selected military personnel
in Latin America, Mr. McCone said that some of this is being done
but that he will have» it studied further. 7

Tree oe

8. Progress on Cuban Operations

Mr. McCone told the Group that none of the five agent operations
approved by the Group on the 8th of February has been successful.
He noted that there have been a number of aborts due to weather,

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failure of equipment, and failure of rendezvous plans. He said
that efforts are continuing to carry out these operations success-
fully, but indicated some unhappiness with the results to date and
the prospects of success. He alluded particularly to the qualities
of the agent personnel. ,

wth

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric .
Mr. McCone

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14 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ; 7
SUBJECT: Approval of Cuba Papers

All members of the Special Group have now approved the
following memoranda from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

a. “Covert Propaganda to Stimulate Passive Resistance
and Low-Risk, Simple Sabotage," 8 March 1963.

b. "Proposed Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations in
Cuba - 15 March 1963 to 15 April 1963," 11 March 1963.

SMiuparehk

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone


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26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 26 March 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Dr. Scoville, Mr. McMillan, and Colonel Steakley were
. present for Items 1-5.

Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 1.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

1. | Low- Level Reconnaissance, Cuba

i

In connection with the USIB recommendation for resumption of
low-level coverage of Cuba, Mr. Lundahl showed the Group examples
of the additional information that can be obtained from low-level
photography as contrasted with high-level coverage. This had to do

particularly with identification of materiel, spotting of personnel,
etc. .

‘ Mr. McCone emphasized that low-level coverage would give us

. additional information on the numbers of Soviet troops and possibly
on Soviet intentions, and similar subjects, but that it would not
represent a qualitative shift in the body of intelligence available,
It would. not reveal anything that would be of major security interest
to the U.S. and which could not be picked up by high-level coverage.

Mr. McCone ‘also, referred to the progress of certain negotiations
which have been holding up active consideration of low-level photo-
graphy. He said that there are differences of opinion among people
' closest to this situation as to what the effect of resumption of such
i photography actually might be on the negotiations.

Mr. Gilpatric said that Defense is not convinced of the urgency
of this proposition and would not favor it at, this time, unless others
feel that there is an overriding political reason for.undertaking the
project. He said that he would prefer to see this capability reserved
for identifying the type of threat that we might otherwise not be

aware of, or used at a time when there was some political advantage to
be gained by low-level flights. 7

ee eee epee oe SEE See special minutes
aoe or additional item

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_, disapproved by higher authority.)

| Mr. Johnson said that the Secretary of State does not believe i

pa _ wanes coe eee

o 98 WSS ORT TEDW ILE SR EE aa Ve -
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that-there is any foreign policy reason for mounting the operation \
at this time, and in fact the Secretary and other high officials in
the Department feel that from a policy point of view it would be
inadvisable now.

The Group then agreed that the resumption of low-level coverage
would not be recommended at this time, but that it would be kept
under weekly review. ]

46

2. (Reconnaissance Indonesia

The Group noted the intelligence justification for this proposal
and the political objections to it, and the Chairman agreed to discuss |
it with higher authority as an example of a situation where clear-cut
differences of interest exist. He said that if there was any doubt ‘
from that quarter he would have all the principals participate in
further discussion with higher authority. (The proposal was later

98
3. { Peripheral Reconnaissance Operations ‘i

a. Colonel -‘Steakley gave the following brief reports ona
number of peripheral missions:

(1) The ELINT coverage of-the; Sea of Okhotsk produced good
results. He said that this area is now so well covered with
radars that consideration should probably be given as to whether
the rules requiring an abort in case of an AI lock-on should be
relaxed. ; j

(2) The AMOS mission, directed against SA-3's in the
Baltic, did not result in any ELINT take from the radars
associated with the SA-3's. He said that some question now
arises as to whether these weapons are in fact. SA~3's or
perhaps a later generation of the SA-2.

(3) A DESOTO destroyer mission off the Soviet Maritime
Provinces resulted in Soviet instructions to shut down their
radars when the ship approached.

b. The Group approved four missions (UNA, DANIEL, FLOYD and
GEORGE) using new ASD-1 equipment, This includes two in the Baltic
area, one in the Black Sea, and one flying from England to the Black

Sea.'7


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4. ‘(ums Balloons 98 2s
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Dr. Scoville gave the Group details of the operation in the
Sea of Japan, employing balloons against TALL KING radars. He said ‘
that the results indicate that perhaps these radars are not as :
efficient as we had thought , but that further analyeis is _Proceeding.

5. Covert “operations, Cuba

ae Procedures ;

Noting that the shipping sabotage paper of 19 March had
not been considered by the Cottrell committee as a body, the Special
Group asked that such proposals be considered in that way before
submission to the Special Group. In passing the recommendations to
the Special Group it should be indicated what the position of the
various Cottrell members was, just as is done in the case of political
projects coordinated with State and the ambassador. Each member of
the Cottrell committee would see to it that his own agency staffed
the paper in the normal way for submission to the Special Group.

b. Sabotage of Shipping

The substance of the 19 March paper was then considered.
Mr. McCone raised a question as to exactly what the U.S. objective
now is in this and related fields, and questioned in addition whether
we may be trying to manage exile groups too closely...

There was some discussion as totthe actual value of carrying
out the proposed sabotage, that is whether enough damage could be
done to hurt the Castro regime seriously. The consensus of the Group
seemed to be that activity of this kind should not be undertaken if
it could be expected to yield only small gains, but that if its
effect would be really significant then that would be a different
matter.

Considerable doubt was expressed. about the proposal for
sinking and setting fire to ships. None of the members felt that
there was any particular objection to the use of abrasives or other
damaging materials.

The proposal was then remanded for group consideration by
the Cottrell committee. This committee is asked to look at the pro~
posal in relation toeeverything else that is going on or is under
serious consideration, in order to assess its true potentiality.

Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to modify the proposal to the extent

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of considering possible unilateral action as opposed to using an

‘exile group as a cutout. Mr. Bundy will explore-exactly what the

feeling of higher authority is with respect to relations with exile
groups.

Ce. Additional Programs

Mr. Johnson mentioned the activities of the NIS, which has

been broadcasting in Russian to the Soviet troops over. Radio Caribe

in the Dominican Republic. Mr. FitzGerald agreed to add this to the
possibilities listed under radio broadcasting.

Mr. Johnson questioned the extent to which proposition b.,
involving inciting Cubans to commit aggressive acts against Soviet
personnel, is in accord with current objectives.

On the matter of propaganda balloons, most members of the
Group felt that these might be useful in connection with the particular
target mentioned - the May Day concentration which is expected in Havana.
Mr. Johnson had some reservations which he wanted to check out further
in the Department. It was agreed that should State take a favorable
view, then the matter would be presented to higher authority.

As to the request for Defense training facilities, Mr.

_ Gilpatric asked that Mr. FitzGerald discuss the needs with Secretary

Vance. Mr. FitzGerald said that the principal requirement which can-
not be met in CIA facilities is adequate space for weapons training,
Members of the Group recalled that the objection to the use of Defense
facilities at the time it was presented during the MONGOOSE period,
was that this would make it difficult, if not impossible, to deny
official U.S. involvement. Mr. Bundy said that he saw no objection
iff the purpose was to train Cubans for eventual open hostilities, but
thought that in this case the objective might be better achieved by
having them undergo regular U.S. Army training. The other members

agreed.
Thomas ¢ Parrott
Distribution
Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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4 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 4 April 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, Mr.’ Hughes

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for
Items 1 and 2.

Commander Yates was present for Item l.

1. [pon Peripheral Reconnaissance 76 . ,

aa he PS eer

The DOD monthly forecast of peripheral reconnaissance activities
“wag noted. Special note was taken of mission ULCER GULCH, which.all
, members approved. Consideration of YANKEE PASHA was deferred for at "
‘ least a week because of certain points raised hy the Secretary of :
_ State. Mr. Bundy said that he himself would normally have no objection :
: to this operation but that conditions at the moment make it in- :
i , advisable to go ahead at this precise time.

‘Colonel Steakley was asked to brief the Group on the special
navigational safeguards which would be used in the YANKEE PASHA
operation, at a later meeting when Mr. Johnson could be} present.

Commander Yates briefed the Group on certain submarine operations.
Mr. Gilpatric undertook to assure himself: that adequate: procedures
exist for notifying members of the Special Group and other key officials
in the event of an untoward incident » 7

2. “Reconnaissance } Missions, Far East IS
J
eee Mr. McCone briefed the Group on the results of two recent missions.
yr He pointed out that there are now no authorizations ougstanding for
| high- performance reconnaissance in the Far East.

x

The recommendations in the NRO paper for the Special Group, dated

. 4 April, were approved with the exception of 7. b (Laos), which was 1
: . deferred for later consideration, Mr. McCone agreed to mention these
approvals cto higher authority, but it was felt that no further formal

‘| approval was required. ]

Peatelehal


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{ All members of the Group expressed their interest in gétting on

with plans for resuming FALCON missions. It was noted that one of the;
ji principal problems in this area is the question of a base. It was I
* agreed that we should probably approach this from the point of view £
i; Of obtaining a standby agreement with the Indian Government to permit '
“staging in and out of that country. Dr. Scoville said that a message |
‘had gone out to the field on this point last night. The Chairman \
. asked that word be sent to the Ambassador that high-level interest t
‘in this proposition does exist in Washington. ’]

3. (Gratus Report on Italian ‘Elections
CIA's paper. of 1 April was noted. ]

' \
4. [Lewctevel recon’ ssance Cuba .” . '

i The Group took no action on this sub ject J ‘

5. ‘(Govert Subsidy for Kong £2 aa

. . ,
‘
a

)

rao) (At Mr. Hughes' suggestion, it was agreed that CIA should look into |
” the possibilities of a covert Payment to Kong Le.]
: 6. Cuban “Operations

The Group recommended approval of the following papers from the
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs:

a. Sabotage of Shipping, 19 March, as amended by a
memorandum from the Deputy Coordinator, 2 April 1963.

b. Russian Language Broadcasts, 2 April 1963.

c.. Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack
Soviet Troops, 2 April 1963.

Mr. Bundy and Mr. FitzGerald will obtain final approval from

higher authority.
Thomas \ . aya

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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9 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Status of Approvals for Covert Actions, Cuba

1. Propaganda Inciting Cubans to Commit Acts Against Soviet
_. Troops .

Approved by higher authority, on the understanding that.
the propaganda will be non-attributable to the United States.

2. Sabotage of Cuban-Owned Shipping
This. was approved by higher authority. It was noted that

“the suggestion for external explosive charges had been deleted from

the proposal approved by the Special Group last week. (This will
be considered along with other suggestions in an over-all sabotage
paper, in accordance with decisions reached at the special meeting
of 3 April.) ce

3. Soviet. Language Broadcasts

The Radio Liberty proposition has been approved, with the
understanding that there will be no “opening fanfare" in connection
with the inauguration of the program; if a ceremony is unavoidable
it must be played in a low key. The proposal for a Unidad Revolucion-
aria program is disapproved. The suggestion for intrusion on Radio
Moscow broadcasts is disapproved.

4. Leaflet Balloons

This proposal has been disapproved by higher authority.

Thomas fp Parrott

Distribution
' Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SECRET
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12 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 11 April 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. McCone

Dr. Scoville, Colonel Ledford and Colonel Steakley
were present for Items 1 - 3.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 4,

46

1. acommatssane Northern Laos

It was agreed that the proposal for this coverage, which was
contained in the NRO paper of 4 April and which was deferred last
week, should be approved.

Mr. McCone mentioned the difficulties which have arisen with
Sarit, noting particularly that he is unwilling to give permission
|, for the renewed use of Takhli until certain Thai officials return
| to Bangkok from Paris, which will be around the 20th of this month,
Mr. McCone mentioned the possibility of basing the aircraft in the
Philippines or Taiwan, if the Takhli possibility should fall through
completely. ,

The DCI said that if it proves impossible to mount missions
designed to cover the Sino-Indian border, then three will be required
for Laos and North Vietnam, If on the other hand the Sino-Indian
missions are run, then only two additional ones. would be required to
cover Laos and North Vietnam, since some of the area could be covered
in the process of the Sino-Indian coverage.

Mr. Bundy will clear these proposals with higher authority. ]

2. [Coverage of Sino-Indian Border Area 96

wees J

Dr. Scoville reported on the difficulties encountered in ob-
taining Indian approval for staging aircraft through that country,
stressing the fact that the chief of the intelligence service will
not be available in India until the 16th of this month, and no
. decision can be expected before then. He said that the time before
i the onset of the monsoon season is getting short. Dr. Scoville said ©
that efforts are continuing to get staging approval from the Indians,’
as well as approval from the Thais to base in Takh1i.)

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“aircraft, since January 1961.

: was considerably higher. Mr. Bundy asked him to provide for the Group

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3. (Inadvertent Overflights by 2 Reconnaissance Aircraft

Colonel Steakley distributed a. memorandum listing the four
‘inadvertent overflights of Soviet territory by U.S. reconnaissance

He commented that in previous years the rate of such incidents |
|
in the next week or so a recapitulation of such incidents, going back |
to approximately 1949.
{
Colonel Steakley said that both CINCPAC and the Joint Reconnais-
sance Group believe that the incident of 10 April, when an ELINI ;
aircraft flew over one of the Kuriles, appears to represent a violation:
of established procedures and instructions. CINCPAC has asked for |
a full report. “

Mr. McCone questioned the efficacy of the system of advising \
Special Group members of such incidents. Colonel Steakley said that
a procedure has been specified and he undertook to: provide a copy to
‘Mr. Parrott for the information of the Group, He said that he would \
take Special measures _temake sure that these instructions are followed. \

&. ‘Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald expanded orally on the paper of 9 April, giving
a summary of the recent results in the agent infiltration program,
and outlining proposals in this field for the next month, The Group
approved this projection. In response to. a question about the status
of Manolo Ray's people, Mr. FitzGerald said that CIA was in touch with
him from time to time, and that any plan he has to offer for activity
against Cuba will be sympathetically received, but that he has not to
date come up with any such proposal.

The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, dated 11 April,
on the three papers being considered at today's meeting were noted,
The Group requested that these comments be withdrawn and destroyed
for security reasons. With specific reference to the comment that a
proposed sabotage action should not be carried out on the target date
of the 20th or 21st of April, Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that this date
had been set before the status of the Donovan negotiations was known.
He said that of course no activity of this kind would be allowed to
interfere with those negotiations at this stage.

There then ensued a lengthy discussion of the entire question of
sabotage. The Group agreed that the papers before it were responsive
to requests which had been levied on CIA to come up with general and
specific proposals. On the other hand, all members of the Group
recognized that a searching examination must be undertaken in the light

ereney
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i of all pertinent factors, to determine whether we wish to change the
| present policy. It was agreed that in order to provide a firm basis
of for judgment, we must get a clearer picture of capabilities, of the

4 prospects of success, the extent of benefits to be gained from
, . successful operations, the dangers of repercussions and of reprisals,
etc., etc.

With respect to external operations to be mounted by exile groups,
it was agreed that this sort of activity poses a real dilemma.
Particularly in view of the recently-enunciated policy toward exile
raids, it becomes increasingly difficult to disavow plausibly
\ responsibility for such acts. The U.S. is thus placed in the position
4 of either appearing to be ineffective in controlling the exiles or
: of bearing the onus of active involvement in the operations.

Mr. McCone expressed great skepticism about the desirability of
proceeding with sabotage operations, to include training, until an
over-all policy is made clear on steps to be taken to assure the re-
moval of Soviet troops and on the problem of Castro. He also com-
mented on the ineffectiveness of Cuban agents and the fact that they

- would undoubtedly talk if captured. Mr. FitzGerald confirmed the
¢ second point, but felt that these particular Cubans are perhaps more
effective than the usual run.

It’ was decided that. probably Friday, the 19th of April, a pre-
sentation should be made to higher authority at which time all
responsible individuals should have an opportunity to express their
views. A paper will be prepared, outlining: a proposed broad program
for sabotage as well as examples of specific operations; a sense of
the scale of activity which could reasonably be expected and the
benefits from it; an estimate of what could be achieved by the use of
internal assets; possible repercussions; and how such activity would
fit into overall policy. CIA is to coordinate with State in the
preparation of this Paper. cee ee oy onieeieseececpmete eee

aE

5. * (Annexes to Internal Defense Plans
The Colombia annex was noted, Im view of the fact that the
basic IDP for Bolivia had earlier been remanded for revision by the

Special Group (CI), the covert annex for that country was held over
» until the overt plan is considered by the CI Group.)

6. (Roreh Vietnam operationg ©

The monthly report was noted and approved.) - ——

ereney
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18 April 1963

ER. 63-3278

SUBJECT: Minutes. of Meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

The Attorney General, General Taylor, Mr. Murrow, and
Mr. FitzGerald were present for Item l.

1. Cuban Operations

Mr. FitzGerald said that in view of the postponement of the
meeting tentatively set for tomorrow with higher authority, the
proposed sabotage actions for April will be cancelled and two caching
operations, in Pinar del Rio and Matanzas, will be substituted. The
Group approved this.

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group that in view of the negative
decision on balloons, he was proposing to dismantle the capability,
which is expensive to keep in being. He said that if it were desired
to start the program up at any time after dismantling, it would take
about three months. A number of members of the Group felt that ina
real crisis balloons could be of considerable value. Accordingly, it
was agreed that balloons and helium should be stockpiled, with the
idea that if a situation should arise in which balloons would be use-
ful, launching could be accomplished by a'U.S. vessel, without worrying.
too much about attribution under those circumstances. In commenting
on his opposition to the earlier proposition, Mr. Murrow said that he
believes that balloons can be useful as a part of an integrated
program.

The Group then turned to discussion of the papers from the Co-
ordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16th, 17th, and 18th. It was
noted that there had not been time for adequate staffing of these papers
and that the principals had not been able to examine them carefully.

In this connection, Mr. McCone said that he wanted the Office of
National Estimates of CIA to review the papers, in light of their
estimative content. It was thus agreed that the papers should be
staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting. Mr.
Johnson suggested that a possible format might be to produce one paper
which would be prefaced by the guidelines currently contained in the

Coordinator's paper of April 18th. This would be followed by a
"summary of sabotage capabilities and the pros and cons of various

types, and then recommendations.

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2.0 (Heconnaissance of Laos © GF

a

: authority. ]

. ~ SECRET ~
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Mr. Bundy and Mr, McCone expressed some doubts as to whether we
are in a position to decide major problems of this type until we
have a clearer picture of what the over-all policy toward Cuba is
likely to be for the next six months to a year and a half. Mr. Bundy
pointed out that the noise level which would be involved in many of
these proposals would be considerably more than it has been to date,
and he felt that we must decide whether we are willing to accept this.
He added that he did not feel that such a development would necessarily
be bad, but it would certainly be different from the low-level
activities prevailing now. He was not sure whether, or to what extent,
it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the
Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy. In this
connection, Mr, Johnson said that he particularly likes the proposals
for supporting internal resistance operations, since these will not
generate a high noise level.

Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that the paper of April 17th, on a
"Maximum Covert Action Program" consists basically of sabotage and
harassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who
may be responsive to our advice but certainly not to our command,

He mentioned some of the difficulties that would flow from supporting
one group and not others. Mr. McCone said that if such groups become
active, it will be obvious that’ they have U.S. support because it is
well known that they do not have adequate assets now. He and Mr,
Bundy agreed that, despite the fact that some Central American govern-
ments might be used as cutouts, the U,S,. would be blamed for their
activities and this must be clearly recognized before embarking on
such a course. They felt additionally that we must be sure that such
a program would contribute to over-all policy objectives. |

Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald referred to the CIA estimate that
time iscrunning in favor of Castro, and Mr. FitzGerald ‘said that
some of these activities are designed to slow down or, possible stop
the trend of events in his favor. .%

eA
It was noted that the program for shipping sabotage, which has
already been approved, is in process of possible implepcat ton It
was agreed that this process should not be interrupte a

A COMOR paper, suggesting that certain targets in Southern Laos
“be included in the proposed missions for Northern Laos, was distributed

‘and no objection was expressed to it. Mr. Bundy noted that he had not

yet had an opportunity to clear the ortiginal proposal wen higher

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25 April 1963 .

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: . Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 25 April 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone,

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present for
Items 1-4. a. t

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1-5.
Mr. Jorgensen was present for Item 3.

Mr. Tweedy was present for Item 6,

1. (Forecast of NRO Activities for May

- This fotecast was noted. ]
- [Reconnaissance of Laos and Vietnam 78

“Mr. McCone referred to a paper prepared by the JCS at the

, request of the Secretary of Defense, outlining a possible schedule

eof reconnaissance missions over Laos and Vietnam, which seemed to
Mr. McCone to be unduly heavy. Mr. Gilpatric explained that the
paper had been drawn up as an annex to a draft contingency plan,

and was responsive to a direct request from the Secretary of Defense
to indicate a sizeable capability for high-level reconnaissance for
intelligence purposes. Mr. Gilpatric added that it is clearly under-
stood that such activity would not represent a "show of force," and
that the latter would requfre low-level activity. Mr. McCone agreed
with this peint and emphasized the unusual sensitivity of any high-
level reconnaissance of denied areas.

Mr. Gilpatric assured the Group that these plans are all of a
contingency nature and that at this point they are by no means

GS

re

3. Propose, "Feint" Operations, GROSBEAK

Mr. Jorgensen summarized the paper of the 22nd of April. He

said that these proposals are frankly regarded as experimental.’

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Mr. Bundy added that there is high-level interest in reviewing this

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) (Cotone1 Steakley said that from the JCS point of view, such
| feints might represent a tactical advantage, in that they could

| divert enemy defenses from actual operations. On the other hand,

the JCS procedures are designed so as not to be provocative in
connection with peripheral and BOW TIE missions. He felt that this
proposal, which is frankly designed to be provocative, could have
the effect of inducing quicker and more intensive reaction to the
JCS flights.

On the understanding that the feint activities would be closely
coordinated with military missions in the area, it was agreed that
the proposed program should be tried for the month of May. At the
end of this period, a report on the results will be made to the
Special Group. ]

4.0 (Low-Level Reconnaissance, Cuba 9G

- The DCL said the USIB unanimously reaffirmed yesterday the
‘priority intelligence requirements for low-level coverage of Cuba.

situation,

Mr. Johnson said that in the view of the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research of the State Department, the Soviets would interpret
a resumption of low-level flights as an indication of the adoption
by the U.S. of a harder line toward Cuba. More significantly,
Ambassador Thompson is very much opposed to such resumption at this
time; he feels that this could result in a reduction in the rate of
.withdrawal of Soviet troops or a Soviet decision to withdraw none at
all in the future, and it might affect Soviet policy in Laos in a.

manner adverse to U.S. interests. The importance of the Harriman. i”

mission with respect to this last proposition was noted. Mr. Johnson
said we should know the results of the Harriman mission in a day or

* two.

It was agreed that the matter would be discussed with higher

authority this afternoons].

5. Proposed ‘New Policy and Program toward Cuba

Mr. McCone opened the discussion of this topic by pointing out
that the overt and multilateral pressures now being applied to Cuba
are useful; on the other hand, while they will slow Castro down they
will not hurt him critically, and the interest of our allies in
maintaining such pressures will almost certainly erode as time passes.
Similarly, any sabotage program can hurt the Castro government, but
not lethally; and in order to be effective at all, it must be done on

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i a continuing basis and cannot be subjected to a stop-and-go treatment,
The DCI went on to say that any such activity is bound to be attributed
to the United States and if we are to carry through with it, we must
be prepared to accept the accompanying noise level. He said that a

- sabotage program will not be entirely beneficial to U.S. interests;
on the minus side, there is the fact that this will complicate the
running of intelligence operations and it could result in Cuban
retaliation, Additionally, Mr. McCone said he is not in favor of
extreme types of sabotage such as complete destruction of crops,
contamination of water supplies, etc. He would prefer open inter-
vention to this kind of thing.

The DCI said that the combination of economic and other
pressures with sabotage activities, might provide a feasible climate
for a successful attempt to fragment the Castro organization. He
foresaw the possibility of such fragmentation leading to assumption
of power by a military dictatorship, which would probably be friendly
to the U.S. In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that we have
a line on certain high-ranking officers who are not entirely sympa-

. thetic to the regime. He pointed out, however, that a major opera-
_ tional obstacle to capitalizing on this situation is the difficulty
( of persuading dndividual Cubans of this type to place their trust
in each other. In addition, we will have to be able to assure them
that the U.S, will be sympathetic to possible successors to the pre-
sent government, even though such people may have been former Castro
supporters.

Mr. FitzGerald touched on the proposed support to selected Cuban
exile groups, for autonomous operations, as being one of the key points
of the possible new program. He made the point that there is no use
in the U.S. trying to deny that it backs such operations, since it
will be accused of this in any case, and the accusations will be
generally believed; further, such a posture is not detrimental to U.S.
interests. Mr. Bundy agreed with this point. He added, however,
that a "scenario" will have to be worked out, clearly indicating who
in. the government should respond to accusations in this field and
what in general they should say.

Mr. Bundy questioned a statement in the paper to the effect that
covert action which might. be used as a pretext for overt military
intervention is ruled out. Mr. McCone and Mr. FitzGerald said that
the purpose of this statement was to indicate that the covert program
is not specifically directed toward the end of providing such a
pretext, but that it is not intended to preclude such a situation if
it should turn out to be desirable at some time in the future.

{ : Mr. FitzGerald then described a number of possible sabotage
. Operations. In this connection, he pointed out that the paper con-
tains a proposal for the placing of limpets, carrying suitable delay
mechanisms, on the outside of Cuban ships so as to explode at sea.

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He noted that Secretary Vance does not particularly like this pro-
position because of the possibility that the explosions would be
attributed to torpedoes. While recognizing the validity of Mr.
Vance's argument, Mr. Gilpatric felt that this risk was acceptable.

The Chairman summed up the preliminary reactions of the Group to
the proposals as follows:.

a. The proposition for dealing with selected exile groups
is a good one, but the method of dealing with them will have to be
more carefully defined. ,

b. There is no objection to limpets, subject to further
technical studies.

‘c. Surface attacks on Cuban ships do not appear particularly

_ attractive, nor do shore-based attacks of a similar nature. ae

d. Externally mounted hit-and-run attacks against land
targets appear worthwhile. The operations in this category which
can be run in May, will be discussed with higher authority. Refineries
and power plants seem to be particularly good targets. Operations
of this kind will be especially valuable if done in conjunction with
other resistance activities.

-e@. Internal resistance should be stimulated, again in
conjunction with related operations.
ART Ca eee oe ee ee

6. Covert Action, Congo en enna

The CIA paper of 19 April was approved with Little discussion.
The Chairman said that hts only concern was whether we are committed
to spending money at this rate forever. Mr. Tweedy said first that
Lf the Adoula government should fall, it would probably be in the’
U.S. interest to support a successor government in a somewhat similar
way and, secondly, he pointed out that there are no firm commitments
made, although of course the recipients do come to expect a subsidy.

Mr. Bundy said he would mention this project to higher authority.

7. Final Status Report, Italian Election Project

Mr. McCone ran over the highlights of the prognostication for
the Italian elections, as summarized in the CIA paper of the 22nd of
April. He noted that virtually all the allocated money will have
been passed by this time. Mr. Bundy said that the CIA forecast is
generally consistent with reports he has had from Italian sources.


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3,

British Guiana

.. Mr. McCone said that representatives of CIA and of MI-6 are
scheduled to meet on the 30th of April and the first of May. They
will consider: an up-to-date assessment of the situation; a proposed
British operational plan; alternative proposals if thispplan proves
not feasible; identification of Indians who might provide alternative
leadership to Jagan; the division of operational responsibility; and
an inventory of operational assets.

The DCI said it is estimated that a continuation of the current
strike would require expenditures on the order of $10,000 a day.
The Group felt: that if this could result in the defeat of Jagan, it
would be well worth it. Accordingly, Mr. McCone undertook to look
into the situation immediately and to assure that support for the
strike is not cut off, pending a broader decision. He said he might
see James Fulton of MI-6, during his forthcoming trip to Europe, to
coordinate views. oo

. SLIT

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

SFAREY wn

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26 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Proposed New Covert Policy and Programs Toward .Cuba

As a follow-up to yesterday's Special Group discussion on the
proposed new covert policy and programs toward Cuba, the following
decisions have been made:

On Item 1. of the summary from the Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs, dated 19 April, additional planning and consultation is
approved. This will include further refinement of the Rules of
Engagement (in this connection, also see the minutes of yesterday's

- meeting); an assessment of the capabilities of specific groups;

and an estimate of the scale and scope of activities which selected
groups could carry out successfully.

Item 2.a. of the above-mentioned paper is approved, To
the extent possible, it is desired that the Special Group be in-
formed in advance of specific proposals under this heading.. It is
recognized that this willin many cases not be feasible.

‘Item 2.b. is disapproved.

Further planning for individual elements of Item 2.c. is
approved, with the understanding that targets will be justified in
terms of their usefulness rather than with regard to the noise level
they might generate. Specific operations will be referred back
through normal channels (i.e., the Special Group in the first instance)
for final approval before execution.

“Item 2.d. is approved.

Thomas \ . Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

EVES Of ny

missions (both contained in papers from the Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs dated 7 May).

There was no objection by the Group to any of the infiltration/
exfiltration operations, This approval includes the seven CIA
operations, the infiltration of a radio operator in support of the
U.S. Army, and approval of rendezvous opportunities which may arise
without adequate time to bring them to the Group. The Group also
noted Mr. Cheever.'s description of a proposed exfiltration to be
carried out by the MRR, with some support by CIA.

With regard to the two sabotage missions, Mr. Cheever said that
he thought the chances were excellent of carrying them out successfully.
He said, however, that the critical problem would arise the following
morning, when sea and air interception might well take place. He
emphasized that under the circumstances that could be expected in the
aftermath of such sabotage, the Cubans might well disregard any
territorial limits in the course of hot pursuit of the saboteurs.
He added, in answer to questions, that there is no doubt that Cubans
would recognize these operations as being externally mounted, and
that. the agents would certainly talk if captured.

Mr. Cheever mentioned three possible operational plans which might
minimize the danger of capture by Castro forces, but emphasized that
these were by no means operationally well-designed nor was he re-
commending them, and further that they did not come within any exist-
ing policy approvals.

The feeling of the Group was that the damage that could be done
to the Cuban economy by successful execution of either of these
missions was not sufficient to outweigh the disadvantages. The Group
recognized that the responsible CIA operators feel themselves under
obligation to continue to develop suitable proposals, and they thought
that CIA should be encouraged to keep on doing this. The difficulty
of maintaining agent morale in the face of continued inaction was
recognized. Mr. Cheever was commended for his frank and explicit
outlining of the pros and cons.

4. Cuba --NTS Broadcasts

Mr. McCone and Mr. Cheever’ said that CIA does not object to the
’ Department of State's proposal to subsidize NTS broadcasts from the
Dominican Republic, addressed to Soviet troops in Cuba. They pointed
out that this concurrence is subject to the caveats that the Agency
will be unable to accept responsibility for monitoring and control of

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at BRET
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the content of the broadcasts, and that contact with the NTS will
have to be made through its headquarters in Frankfurt, rather than
directly with the U.S. representative of the NTIS. With these under-
en the _Proposal was approvery- eee eee,

5. [Political Action Bolivia

,

| The CIA paper of 3 April 1963 on the above subject was approved. / 7

6.) (air Proprietary, East Africa 96 f

i The ‘CIA paper of 3 May 1963" on 1 the above Subject | was es approved]

7. Intelligence < on Cuba _

Mr. McCone said that he is concerned about gaps in U.S. intelli-

gence on Cuba. He said that this leads him to favor resumption of

low-level reconnaissance. The other members of the Group felt that

under existing circumstances, this type of reconnaissance will not

meet the needs that Mr. McCone perceives. Mr. Johnson suggested
that penetrations of the Cuban Government would be more productive
in trying to assess Castro's possible intentions.

ht

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution

Mr. Johnson |
Mr. Gilpatric.
Mr. McCone

Ye

ME sai ce a rattan caren mene ct ess reeeameneansed Eames sanannanseicee

9 May 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 9 May 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone
Dr. Scoville was present for Items 1] and 2.
Captain Dankworth was present for Item 1.

Mr. Cheever was present for Items 3 and 4.

id. ' (Peripheral Reconnaissance

2° The Group approved operation YANKEE PASHA, which had been

originally presented at the meeting of 4 April and deferred at that
time, with the understanding that the aircraft would not approach . Mh
the Soviet coast closer than 15 miles.‘] om

2. 2. [nconnatssance of the Sino- India Border 93

6 With particular reference to an incoming’ message from Ambassador

Pi Galbraith, the Group noted, that the Indians had refused, to grant

' staging rights in India or to allow refueling over that country. In

light of this, all “members of the Group felt that plans for these va

missions shouldbe shelved for the time being. Mr. McCone noted that’

the’ ‘aircraft. now at Takhli will, ‘therefore, depart’ before the th of if
May; the date’ on which SEATO exercises begin.” ~ .

s

v4

The’ Group specified’ that in conveying “the decision to the”
Indians it should be made perfectly clear that the standdown is due
to their own view of the urgency of such Coverage, not to any re-
luétance on our part’.

(The point was made that in the meeting of the CI Group, just
concluded, an allegedly improved road network south of Tchepone, in
Laos, had been mentioned. The CI. Group. had felt that harder intelli- —
gence should be obtained on this network. Dr. Scoville undertook to
make sure that this target is highlighted in planning for additional
high- performance coverage of Laos. I -

3. ‘Cuba - “Proposed Agent. Operations

Mr. Cheever outlined in some detail the infiltration/exfiltration
operations proposed for 15 May to 15 June, and the two possible sabotage

Tmo

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eet: een
an ace

o June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 6 Jure 1963

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Jehnson, Mr. Gilpatric ({trems |-7), and
Mr. McCone a,

Colonel Steakley was present for’Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Lundahl was present for Item 2.

Mr. George Miller was present for Item 5,

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item ?.

Mr. Karamessines was present for items S and 9,

opt re

A GB rn a _ : moon a

1. (pop Reconnaissance

wev> With respect to the two PAYSTATION missions which were deferred

last week, the Group decided‘that the l2-mile proposal should be a
scrapped and that the 30-mile one should be flown for ELLENT only.)
m . . \

78 | - .

i

| [Reconnaissance of Cuba
a

oa Mr. Lundahl showed the Group sample pictures from the two PEG
[, LEG missions of 5 June.

Mr. McCone said that before making any recommendation as to
further missions of this kind, he wished to have the USIB consider
the matter. In the meantime CIA and DIA are analyzing the results.

Mr. Lundahl and Colonel Steakley raised the question of the
advisability of including some color film in future missions, The 7
Group felt this kind of thing should be left to the best judgment of

the operators. ]
98

3. (Far Base Reconnaissance

{
L {
7 So, . i
Mr. McCone reported that two out of the existing four authoriza- if
tions for high-performance reconnaissance of China have been exhausted. -!

It was agreed that the "bank" should be restored to the original four. ;
a . |

: ‘It was noted chat no further requirements now exist. for this type © 4;

: of reconnaissance of Laos, but there are some targets remaining in ‘
1) North Vietnam,

| et nang]


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98°

ssance of the Middle East

: Mr. McCone reported that the British will probably not approve a

the request. to.use an.-RAF base-on Cyprus for high-performance '

/ coverage oi Middle East areas. He said that the feasibilicy of
' wsing Wheslus is being explored and that a new recomaencation will
‘ko be forthcoming to the he Groups] . an

dg | |

ler briefed the Group on ELINT projects OARAGE ' (Cuba) and
an). No objection was voiced to either proposal. ] 4

Mr. Mil
+ MOONBEAM (Ja

o.° Channels to Castro

The Group discussed various possibilities of establishing channels
of communication to Castro. All members of the Group agreed that this
is a usefu! endeavor. Mr. Bundy caurioned that of course Castro
should ‘not be made privy te any official U.S. positions, while Mr.
McCone emphasized the necessity of keeping any such approach entirely
secret so far as the public is concerted, It was ‘agreed that pro-
posals of tnis kind which are particularly unusual, would be discussed
with the Special Group in advance.

i. Cuba Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of infiltration/
exfiltration operations during May, and on proposals for the coming
month. The latter | were “approved, . ,

ieee foe a

(leat, Assessment of Results of Election 1 Operation |

Mr. Karaimessines discussed with the Group the results of the
* recent Parliamentary elections in Italy, and the effect of the
election project, so far as can be ascertained. He elaborated on
the CIA paper of 4 June.]

9. »fisats Proposed Aid to PSI Autonomists . A
i Mr. Karamessines briefed the CG; roup further on the preposal to

‘ give aid to Nenni and his autonomisc group of the PSI, as autiined in

oT !

the CLA paper of 1 June. , a

Yone

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-

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oN

: The Group agreed to recoumend approval of this project to
~ higher authority. Mr. Bundy will take this up on Monday, June LOth.
‘He suggested chat in the meantime all aecessary preliminary alerting
\be accomplished, so that Nenni can be informed in the even: of

A;

Loe

. favorable action, defore the meeting of the PSI Central Conmittee
‘on June 12th.7

4

ee Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

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Plea ied eae

20 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 20 June 1963

PRESENT: ‘Mr. Bundy, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Hughes.

*

Colonel King was present for Item 3.
Mr. Colby was present for Item 4.
‘Mr. Critchfield was present for Item 6,

ty eth Ee ee oe ne eee i ae “y

oo ee
1. [Reconnaissance of Southeast Asia

Mr. McCone’ reported that all high-performance missions

“ scheduled for this area had been held up during the past week,

due to bad | weather]

2. Sabotage Program, Cuba

In connection with the new Cuba sabotage program approved
yesterday, Mr. McCone suggested that CIA make a report to the Special
Group every two weeks. The Group agreed. with this procedure. They
felt that such a report need not be in written form nor very elaborate,
and that it should consist of a briefing on activities during the
preceding period and those planned for the next one. Mr. Bundy
commented that keeping the Group informed in this way constitutes
protection to the operators, since all agencies concerned are thereby
given a continuing feeling of just what is going on.

_,7-* | The CIA paper of 17 June was approved. Mr. McCone said he has
‘some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for

Duvalier, but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order
to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel King,
in support of the paper's recommendations, said that in his opinion
we have no feasible alternatives but to cooperate with Bosch in.
attempting to‘unseat Duvalier, and that if this is not done we are !
likely to end up with a.far worse situation. ;

Mr. Hughes told the Group that the State Department shares the-
reservation about the quality of alternatives, but it also recognizes
the necessity of taking some action. He said.the Department is
principally worried about the possibility that the U.S. hand in any
such operation might be revealed.)

pe

13-00000 ,

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| : Goosen, King” cautioned that we'will not be ina position to

, ’ know how many useful exiles can be recruited until we give it a
fe try. Mr. _McCone and Colonel King said that probably the most pro-
mising way in which the desired objective can be obtained is
/ eventually to accomplish “the defection of “significant elements of
aa the Ary, the Palace Guard, eres]

|
|

“by Monthly Report ‘on a North’ “Vietnam Operations

Mr. Colby gave a report on results of operations during the past
month, and those phanned for the immediate future. :

of “Special Ana fink a) se

4 (Domes)
. 1g. fe
6. [iraq - Soviet Materiel Objectives and Related Problems | 7

ae The Group approved the recommendations contained in CIA's paper

re “ The Group approved the State-CIA proposal to hold the Congo i

. paramilitary project, originally approved on 29 November 1962, in |
t
|

/ of the 19th of. June.
i
Mr. McCone pointed out that this sort of action could conceivably; |
' lead into considerably broader activities, and emphasized that the j
dl ' proposal immediately at hand is carefully limited. ‘The Group agreed f
i ' /: that approval of these recommendations does not imply any sort of is
| commitment to additional actions. ] ot
| ns
i

'
ty

. 7. [zians for Immediate Future GE
/ ““ Mr. Bundy asked Mr. McCone to act as Chairman of the Special
Group next week, if he wishes to have a meeting. During the time
that the Presidential party is away, DOD peripheral flights, ;
, particularly in the European area, should be carefully screened. } :

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone :


13-00000 Een Meee en an eee

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that the U.S. government stands behind previously-expressed commit~

ments to ensure that India does not use its own. increased military
‘strength to mount an attack on Pakistan.

| It was agreed that State and Defense should draft a paper for

i higher authority, outlining this proposed approach to the Pakistan

government, with a CIA representative participating in the drafting
of the paper to the extent necessary to assure that the intelligence

ee Parrott
Distribution
Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric
-Mr. McCone

Von

interests and the views of the Special Group are adequately reflected.

13-00000 o ;
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27 June 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 27 June 1963
PRESENT: Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, and Mr. Gilpatric.

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 5.

ne 2 cle nt eee es Tag wecege ee 7 oF 9g
1l., ‘[pritish Suggestion Regarding Reconnaissance Flights

The Group reviewed the message received from the British

Foreign Office through the British Embassy, suggesting that during

the period of the Harriman-Hailsham visit to Moscow reconnaissance

flights be suspended, as well as the suggested draft reply pre-
't sented by Mr. Johnson. The Group approved the language of the
: reply, the gist of which was that while appreciating the UK sug-
gestion, we do not find.it possible to agree to suspend all such ae
i. flights. We believe that most of them have virtually no risk, and va
that to cancel all of them would break a routine long familiar to 1
-. the Soviets; we might then find it difficult to resume. However, i
i; we undertake to screen with particular care all flights scheduled
', during the period of this visit, so as to reduce selectively to a
minimum those which might be regarded by the Soviets as sensitive.

i In. the course of the discussion of these messages, the members

|: of the Group agreed that probably the British motive in making the :
i suggestion is to provide a political gesture that would be apparent i
‘} to the Soviets. From this point of view, the. pattern of DOD . F
: peripheral flights was examined and the conclusions were that: | ,
(a) Particularly sensitive flights are gcheduled sporadically. j
Therefore, no isolated definite pattern in any one area that would

be noticed by the Soviets if cancelled and that would provide

political impact on Soviet leaders, can be identified. (b) A world-
wide stand-down during the. period of the visit could accomplish this
purpose, but would be undesirable for the reasons set forth in Mr.
Johnson's draft. (c) Peripheral flights in particularly sensitive

areas (i.e., Baltic Sea, Black Sea and the Sea of Okhotsk) are

subject to Soviet reaction in the form of identification intercept

by fighters. However, it is believed that these have become sufficiently
routine so they are not brought to the attention of high levels of]

4 . os vy

OF “See special minutes
, for additional items.
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the Soviet government. (d) In the case of the Sea of Okhotsk,

owever, no flights will be scheduled during the visit. Baltic .
flights will be very carefully reviewed. Black Sea flights should of
not require cancellation, In general, all flights around the Soviet
periphery will be subject to special review during this period.

2. (= Forecast G6 ; "

‘The NRO-monthly forecast for July was approved. ]

r
3.' (Use of Chinese Pilots in Southeast Asia 7@

he NRO paper of 25 June, proposing the substitution of Chinese 4

Nationalist pilots for Americans for the high-performance coverage |

“of North Vietnam and Laos, was discussed.

Mr.-Johnson said that the State Department's view is that if
Chinese Nationalist missions out of Taiwan are so scheduled as to
cross over the border into North Vietnam from time to time, they have -.
no real objection (on the understanding that the cover story would i
be that the pilot had strayed off course.) On the other hand, the I:
Department is unable to concur in any deep penetration into the :
southern part of North Vietnam, or into Laos, The latter country is
considered particularly sensitive in this respect.

In. light of the State position, the Group agreed to proceed as

- at present with the modifications suggested by Mr. Johnson.7

4. [Spain - Labor Program 9
a The CIA. _paper of 21 June was approved as presented.)

al

5. ‘Guba - Infiltration/Exftleration Operations

Mr. FitzGerald briefed the Group on the results of the previous
month's ‘operations,

Mr. McCone called particular attention to the continuing buildup
of fast patrol boats in the Cuban inventory, and said that in light
of this we must begin to draw contingency plans for alternate methods
of delivery of agents and supplies against the eventuality that the
patrol boats may become too great a hazard. He suggested the possi-
bility of such means.of delivery as submarines.


13-00000

4

Mr. McCone went on to say that continuing reports are now being
received, alleging the existence of various exotic items of materiel
in Cuba. No one report appears to stand up, but he has directed
that all such reports for the past ninety days be examined in total
context, so as to see whether on this basis any possible pattern
might emerge. Mr. McCone added that he personally feels very uneasy
about the situation in Cuba.

Meu? anaet

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone


1 of egw ce”

:
‘

ad

‘PRESENT:

oN a a

ll July 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 11 July 1963

Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Mr. Johnson, *xxftkipetricj;andk
Mr. William Bundy and Mr. McCone

Colonel Steakley was present for Item 1.

Mr. R. Jack Smith was present: for Item 2.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.
Mr..Colby was present for Items 4 and 5.

.

5 a noe areata G6 5 ee a

1. '|feeripheral Reconnaissance

yf

2 The Group approved the agreement reached last week between

State and the JRC on the handling of certain possibly sensitive
operations during July. Specifically, REX 1 and 2 were approved
with the understanding that. the nearest point to the Kuriles would
be 15 miles. instead of 14, at the northern end of the track. URBAN

-and RAY were approved, in light of the fact that overt flight plans
will be filed.

. It was noted that the Chiefs had already deferred operations
YANKEE PASHA, VERNE and THOMAS at least until after completion of
the Harriman mission, .

Of the three new missions presented by JRC, RED DOG /HAWKEYE and
the special photographic operation in European Turkey were approved

as presented. Mission RAINHAT-Track 2 was approved with the stipula-
_tion that the nearest point to the target country will be 12 miles

rather than 10.

The British note concerning proposed reconnaissance of the

-Soviet Northern Fleet (British name, Operation BARGOLD) was discussed.
Colonel Steakley stated that the standard British restrictions on such
operations are that no aircraft will approach closer than a quarter of
a mile or will go under 500 feet, but he said that we have been‘unable

to determine whether the current restrictions, mentioned in the ;
British note, are more stringent than this. He told the Group that
U.S. rules provide for no harassing action and for no flights below

2000 feet (this height limit being primarily because of flight safety,
in view of the expected presence of British aircraft at a lower level).

The Group felt there is no objection to overflying Soviet vesséls
under these conditions, despite the apparent British ban on this for

their own aircraft.

TTT = 7 ne NET PS OE ETS. 2 ETT TA I

13-0900

96 !

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f

2 (State will inform the British Minister that we Propose to pro- 4
‘ceed in this manner: ] y

a a cee _

2. “Cuba -. “Status. “of. “Soviet “Personnel. and Materiel

Mr. McCone reminded the Group that he had asked for a review of
intelligence reports on the situation inside Cuba over a 90-day
period, so as to see whether any possible pattern might emerge. He
said this review is just now being completed, it having involved
examination of 30,000 to 40,000 separate reports. He expects a draft
to be availablie to him by Monday or Tuesday. This will. probably take
the form of an Agency memorandum, but DIA will be asked to review it.

The Chairman said that the Cuban situation will be of great
importance in connection with Governor Harriman's negotiations;
accordingly, he asked that an informal reading on the results of
this review be made available as soon as possible, before a formal -
paper is fully completed. .

Mr, Smith then. summarized CIA's latest views on the status of
Soviet personnel and equipment. He said that there is insufficient
evidence on which to base any change in the current estimate of
12,000 to 13,000 Soviet troops. He said that it appears the Soviets |
are now engaged in training Cubans for eventual transfer of Soviet
‘equipment to them. No combat equipment has been seen leaving Cuba,
since last fall.

Mr. Smith added that the equipment which was seen leaving on
6 July appears on close examination by photo interpreters to be
communications and generator vans, rather than missile guidance
equipment.
g

_Mr. McCone said that the (Japanese. ‘Ambassador to Cuba has ex-
pressed his conviction that some offensive Soviet missiles still
remain in Cuba. CIA and State will debrief. the Ambassador on this
point today.

3. Cuba ~ Agent Operations

Mr. FitzGerald told the Group about two additional infiltration/
exfiltration operations which were carried out in the last days of
June, after his last report. He then mentioned highlights of proposals
for the next month. These proposals, as presented in the Coordinator's
paper of 9 July, were approved,

mc EE A et te a ne RR RE

13-00000

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5. Tibet - Status Report GL

Mr. McGeorge Bundy said that by the 26th of July the Harriman
negotiations in Moscow might have reached a crucial stage; he asked
how flexible are the sabotage operations planned for that day (as
explained by Mr. FitzGerald to the Standing Group on Tuesday). He
said he was not suggesting that any change in the basic guidance for
sabotage operations is indicated, but it is evident that in times
of particular sensitivity all potentially provocative activities
should be subject to review.

In this connection, Mr. FitzGerald said that because of light
factors these operations could not be run any later than July 28th,
in this month's moon period. He pointed out that if it should appear
that it would be advisable for political reasons to postpone the
operations until the August dark-of-the-moon period, then as much
advance notice as possible should be given the agents,iin order not
to damage their morale unduly. It was agreed that by. the time of
next week's Special Group meeting it should be possible to make some
kind of judgment about the possible progress of the Harriman talks, —
and that a decision could be made at that time whether or not to
postpone these particular operations.

4, Vietnam - Monthly Status Report

Mr. Colby outlined the results of the past month's agent operations.
In summary, he said that he believes the covert propaganda activities
are beginning to catch on, but that so far there is not a great deal
of tangible result to report in the sabotage field.

Mr. Colby expanded briefly on the paper of the 8th of ‘July, on
the status of projected Tibetan agent operations. He emphasized that
the trainees will be sent back to India in the very near future, and
that discussions will then take place jointly with the Indians as to
details of overland infiltration into Tibet. Planning for aix drops
of agents is being deferred until sufficient operational intelligence
can be built up to permit reasonable decisions.) _ EEK

—_ S

(6. Guatemala.- Covert Annex (Revised) to Internal Defense Plan q

This annex was noted by the Group. Particular attention was
called to the agreed assessment that the Arevalo threat no longer exists.

ett

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson : . Loe
Mr. Gilpatric ; ;

Mr. McCone

13- 0 OIE SAPO Erma 7ex1 ROW Nasa LAER semmrmmere mms rnceeeeee omer Se =

bmg ate te

18 July 1963

_ MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 July 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Colonel King was present. for Item 2.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 3.
Mr. Sheldon was present for Item 4.

1. [fecsiaissace BH

aa Mr. McCone reported that during the last week no high-performance
-- missions were flown in the Far East, due to bad weather. ]

2. [fais - Political Action GE 7

: Mr. McCone and Colonel King reported that the following changes
. have taken place in the Haitian picture since the Special Group 7
| approved, on June 20th, the proposal to reach a covert understanding is
with President Bosch on the use of Haitian exiles in the Dominican ody
Republic. The developments are: '

a. It has been demonstrated that these exiles are of
very little use, because of insecurity, lack of cohesive purpose or
of adequate leadership, etc.

; b, President Bosch has now decided that he is unwilling :
1+ to allow such an exile force to use his country as a base forymilitary |
' .operations against Duvalier. . :

c. Duvalier's own capabilities have improved greatly, due

to such things as: the widespread purge of potentially-dissident Army
' officers; clearance of the border areas; and, most recently, the ,
elimination of the Barbot brothers. .' an

,., ° > Colonel King said that everyone concerned with the project
agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other. However,’:
in light of the factors mentioned above, operating elements have con- ©
cluded that the existing plan is unworkable, and that it is best to
switch to a different kind of operation. This would include in the ;;
first instance, training of selected exiles in intelligence collection,’
in communications, and in cross-border operations. Such training 7 |

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13-00000! ticiassianr

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'

7 presented, in the light. of the changed conditions. ns).

: ‘objectives would be to establish a clandestine organization capable

aes

feould be given at a base in the Continental U.S. or in Puerto Rico;
Support and facilities may be required from DOD. The long-range 4)

of gathering intelligence and eventually building up and arming an
effective opposition in Haiti; to establish friendly relations with,

and if necessary, support individuals capable of playing a constructive |
role in a future Haitian government; to encourage and support indi-
viduals and organizations who are both anti-Duvalier and anti- ~Communist ;
and to attempt to spread dissension among Duvalier advisers and to
subvert some of them.

Colonel King emphasized that the $200,000 already approved would
cover the training activities, but that it is impossible to estimate
now how much the subversion operations might require, if suitable
opportunities should be identified.

The Group agreed to recommend this new course of action to higher
authority.

(There was no objection by higher authority to the program as

ie. , . 2
3. “Cuba = . Sabotag e erations

Mr. .FitzGerald was asked to reschedule tentatively for the
middle of August the special operations planned for the 26th of July,
in light of the negotiations going on in Moscow. Mr. Bundy cautioned
that it is entirely possible that by the middle of August the negoti-
ating. process might have gone into another phase which would make it
necessary to cancel the operation ¢ once more.

4. f techriteat tn Installations - Pakistan GE

The Group considered the CIA paper of 17 July, with attachments,
which outlined the difficulties which have been encountered recently
in getting the Pakistani government to go along with expansion of our
special intelligence facilities in that country. Mr. McCone emphasized .
his feeling and that of the USIB as a whole, that any wasting of this i
asset would represent a very serious loss to the intelligence community. —

After some discussion the Group agreed that the best method of ;
approach is to make it entirely clear in presenting the proposed three- ;
year MAP program to Pakistan authorities that the maintenance and {
expansion of U.S. intelligence facilities at Peshawar is an essential '
part of the bargain. It can also be reaffirmed to Ayub at that time’)

ye

ye

15 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 15 August 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr, Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone,

Mr. FitzGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 1,
2 and 5.C.

Dr. Whelan, Colonel Ledford, and Mr. Cunningham were present
for Items 3 and 4.

1. ‘A Non-Violent Program to Inhibit Free World and Neutral Tzade
with Cuba ;

The operational proposal dated 12 August, was approved by the
Special Group, with the two changes in wording made by the State
Department. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that to make this operation -
convincing, a “big bang" on a Cuban ship will be carried out before
the operation is implemented. He further pointed out that in paragraph
2.a. of the paper, the reference to "real ... sabotage" applied to
Cuban shipping only. Item 2.c. in the operational proposal was thought
to be of low priority and is to be placed at the bottom of the list.

2. Cuba - Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups

Mr. FitzGerald recommended that the paper dated 13 August be
submitted at this time for discussion only rather than decision by the
Special Group. This recommendation was made because the members of
the Group had not been given sufficient time to study the proposal.
The paper had been presented in hasty fashion because CIA had received
reports that the exile group in question was beginning to scatter and
prepare for an operational program not influenced by CIA.

There was some discussion of the effects of using a British
island for launching these operations and as to the desirability of
striking Cuban shipping on the high seas. Decision on this operation
was deferred until the next meeting.

. eo

See special minutes
for additional items

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3. [Beteneive Armament for GROSBEAK Aircraft

The Special Group approved the paper of 11 August as presented, :
'. subject to confirmation that the sidewinder heat-seeker missile, already

compromised, would not lead to a security problem should a GROSBEAK
\ Plane be lost.

4. [onospeax Overflight of Laos G8
: The proposal was approved to overfly Laos in order to fulfill |
+ COMOR requirements for radar order of battle information in support
of current and future missions. 7

5. [Miscellaneous Items G g
A. Mr. McCone briefly described the current status of Radio
'. Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RadLib). He stated that he hoped
/ there would be no change in the State Department policy with respect to
: the radios because of the extensive commitments, international agree-
ments, and political implications in RFE and RadLib. Mr. McCone :
indicated that there appeared to be a feeling in some quarters of the :
Department of State that, because the U.S, may be entering a period of :
"detente" with the Soviet Union, efforts should be made to reduce the i
causes of tension and conflict, Since the two radios are major
!, igritants to the Soviets, CIA should, therefore, modify or reduce .
"some of these activities. The Special Group opined that this was not
the time to change U.S. policy with respect to RFE and RadLib, Mr,
Johnson said he would look into this further. —

\
‘
1
’
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|
i

7 B. The matter of the Soviet attempt to establish a consolidated
\ headquarters at Lietzenburger Strasse in West Berlin, was raised by !
. Mr. McCone, He opposed such a development forthe following reasons: \
i a The formation of such a headquarters would lay the

groundwork for future Soviet claims to an equal footing with the
U. 5. in West Berlin.

(2) Its establishment would severely handicap CIA operations
against the USSR target in West Berlin,

(3) Such a center would improve on the USSR's- ability to :
concentrate its operations against Western targets. a

7 os (4) It would in effect increase Soviet prestige in West |
mop Berlin. 7 . in

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i (ur. Bundy stated he was aware of the problem and believed that

the British who had been reluctant to support. the position of the y

U.S. and the French, now concurred that-a refusal to the Soviets . \

‘ ghould be made, This concerted action, it was believed by: the Group,

. | would succeed in preventing the Soviets from establishing such a .
| eonsolidated headquarters.

C, Mr. FitzGerald reported that recent discussions held with ;
Artime have indicated that he is somewhat disgusted with Luis Somoza i
who has not behaved sensibly, but that he does have respect for his
brother, General Anastasio Somoza, with whom he can deal more rationally, °
Artime will make greater use of Costa Rica in order to decrease his
operational commitments in Nicaragua and increase his Security!) ;

de eel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr, McCone


13-00000 (°° at

8 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 August 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Item 1.
Mr. Herbert was present for Item 2.
Mr. Baird was present for Item 3.

1. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

_ Of the 13 Cuban operations approved by the Special Group, 2 are.: to be
externally-mounted sabotage operations which will be subject to ;
possible reconsideration up-to 12 August 1963, The other 11 operations
approved are designed to meet the need for expanded intelligence

‘collection activities and to develop viable internal resistance
organizations. :

‘Mr. FitzGerald made a special report o. Luis Somoza's conversa-

tions with exile leaders. Somoza wants the Cuban exiles to begin

' aggressive harassment operations against Castro and indicated that
the Nicaraguan government was willing to give them a base as well as
‘support, including military aid. Somoza intimated that this may result
in Castro's launching an offensive against Nicarague. If this occurs,
Somoza would expect U.S. protection and possibly intervention, Mr.
FitzGerald further stated that Manuel Artime, leader of the Movement
for Revolutionary Recovery, would be in the U.S., at which time all
aspects of his program would be examined. In.order to avoid unfavor-
able complications. with Somoza, two operational changes will be
suggested:

a.  Artime should concentrate on getting resistance started
inside Cuba and de-emphasize armed attack and external sabotage.

b. Artime should shift the main weight of his operations to
; . Costa Rica. There. should be no break, of course, between Artime
é and Somoza. ,

SERS as RY PETER LS ERTS sabes aed Cor re eer TC mee

In.this connection Mr. Johnson raised the Costa Rican Foreign
Minister's question regarding Artime, It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald
would work out the language of the reply with Mr. Cottrell, giving as

ae es SRSAANV Fl atatan HEEL

: . See special minutes
5 ; ; - for additional items

A CES OMLY

13-00000 —

Lf

organized by Pawley, would not be desirable.

much. encouragement to Costa Rica's support of Artime as possible
without showing his activities.

create a situation which might: ultimately require U.S.

General Carter mentioned the eagerness of William D. Pawley to
implement an operational plan against Cuba, purportedly designed to

intervention.

The consensus of the Special Group was that an independent operation

Efforts should be made

to bring him into CIA's current operational thinking.

from Guatemala.

Mr. FitzGerald also reported that the Attorney General had sent

Mr. Harry Ruiz Williams to the Agency to present a plan which turned
out to.be a series of 4,2 mortar attacks on the Cuban coast mounted

It was agreed that such attacks, in addition to being

impractical logistically, would also tend to give substance to the

"Somoza plan"

During fiscal 1963, CIA sent over 2000 students to 1275 courses at 166
government and educational institutions.

2. | Ere - Covert t Action”

an oral report on CIA's counterinsurgency training and courses.
Baird emphasized that ever

and therefore should be discouraged.

58

‘The CIA paper of 2 August was approved. ]

3. [aa Training Activities

Matthew Baird, Director of CIA's Training Activities, made

Mr.

of training.

GE

Mr.

since the establishment of the Office of
Training in January 1951, CIA has concentrated on the covert aspects
It has not duplicated in any way courses offered by the
Department of Defense, the Foreign Service Institute or universities.

In addition, during the same

year, CIA trained 4214 students in 432 runnings of 64 different courses, \.
all directly or indirectly relating to counterinsurgency. :

Mr. Baird said that strong emphasis has always been placed on

The e

resistance operations and guerrilla and paramilitary activities.
methodof instruction in CIA is based on case studies of current ©
CIA trained, during fiscal 1963, 150 junior officers (with

operations.

a drop out of less than four per cent) and gave instruction to 174

foreign personnel in counterinsurgency, or directly related fields. r

Mr. Bundy raised the question as to how CIA courses were inspected.

General Carter replied by pointing out that these courses are con-

tinuously inspected b; the Inspector General, 5
Consultants, and the Deputy Director, Plans, who heads up the clandestine

services.)

the President's Board of

13-00000 ffennen

4

The consensus was that Central Intelligence was meeting its

counterinsurgency training obligations and that because of the covert,

character of the training, an inspection team external to CIA was
probably not desirable.

Goue Phe

Paul Eckel

Distribution
‘Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
General Carter


13-00090.

-

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, 7 oe
i

29 August 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 29 August 1963

PRESENT::. Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1’and 2.
‘Mr. Cheever was present for Item 3._

we

1. [ionth1y Reconnaissance Forecasts 98
a. NRO

“ The NRO forecast for September was approved as presented,

with one exception. This had to do with the second Laos/North Vietnam,

flight, which had been requested in order to "replenish the bank."

Mr. Johnson asked that he be briefed on the results of previous

reconnaissance in this area so that he could weigh the value of the

product against the political risk involved.

It was noted that this procedure will not delay operations,
since one approval remains outstanding for Laos/North Vietnam.

b. DOD

. The DOD September forecast was approved with the exception
of the proposed trip of the USS THOMASON, Mr. Johnson objected to
the proposal to transit the Kita Uruppu Suida Passage. He said that
the Department.is in. favor of continuing to exercise our rights of: 7
free navigation in the Sea of Okhotsk; but the projected voyage of .
the hydrographic ship REHOBOTH satisfies this requirement. Further, i ae
U.S. merchant shipping does transit the Passage. In view of these ; ae
considerations, he did not believe it desirable at this time to send « wa
a U.S. warship on this route, The Group concurred with Mr. Johnson's

position.

General Carter said that in view of certain other indications

‘recently received, YANKEE PASHA is considered by the intelligence

community to be even more urgent than before.

Mr. Johnson raised a question about the mission of the USS
STATEN ISLAND in the Chukchi Sea, asking whether the objective could
not be met by staying 15 miles from shore rather than 12. Colonel’)

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13-00000

(Steakley explained that the mission of the ship is to obtain informa-
tion on hydrographic "stations" located 12 miles out and that the
restriction suggested would not enable the vessel to accomplish this.
Mr. Johnson then concurred.

; Colonel Steakley. briefed the Group on certain sensitive
reconnaissance operations.

Colonel Steakley gave a brief summary of the deployment of
MIG fighters in the China coastal areas. He said that as of now there
are no MIG-21's in the area, the MIG complement consisting of 17's
and 19's. He saw no need to revise any of the projected BOW TIE
missions because of these fighters. ]

2. [Negotiations for Indian Base G e

The Group noted the report from New Delhi that the Indian
': Intelligence Service finds itself unable to give assurances to the
’ Prime Minister about the security of personnel. on the projected
: temporary base at Char Batia, and that approval for use of this base
' has, therefore, been withheld.

- Mr. Gilpatric and General Carter pointed out that the DIA is
anxious to have the Sino-Indian border area covered, because this has a
not been done since January. General Carter said that he had intended iA
to have the USIB reassess the priority of this requirement at its ‘

+} meeting yesterday, but that other matters had made it impossible to
bring it up. ,

sy The Group felt that this should be discussed with USIB next week.

' They agreed, however, that in the absence of a really persuasive case
for the priority of the requirement, it would be inadvisable to attempt
to run the operation once more out of Takhli without Indian assistance.
They felt that other things being equal, it would be preferable to
revert to the original proposal of having a permanent Indian base

available in December. ")

ooct re ha - oe

3. Cuba
a. The Group then turned to consideration of the paper from

the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 12 August 1963, “Support of

Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups."' In answer to questions, Mr. Cheever

said that the project for support of Commandos L would be useful but

not essential, He felt that the economic damage which this group might

inflict would probably be comparatively minor. On the other hand there

would be some psychological advantages to be gained, and also such
operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy.


13-00000

<lare lst Ge
Seb Ae) -
. EYES ONLY
-3-

In view of the personal interest expressed by Mr. McCone ©
in the project when it was tabled at the meeting of 15 August, it was
agreed that no decision should be made until after the DCI's return.

b. Mr. Cheever briefed the Group on the successful disposal of
the contaminated sugar which has been in Puerto Rico.

c. Mr. Cheever discussed the "After Action Report" on the two
sabotage operations conducted the middle of August. Mr. Johnson
commented on the amount of materiel that had been left behind at the
site of one of these operations, and asked whether it is possible that
the Cuban agents did this deliberately, in order to involve the United
States. Mr. Cheever acknowledged this possibility, but felt that it
had simply been a question of "green troops" behaving in this manner

their first time under fire.

The Chairman asked that an estimate be prepared, assessing
Castro's probable reaction to this sabotage, He also asked Mr. Cheever
to see that the Attorney General is briefed on the results of the’
operations. ae ok

<bean oe sme a Gf eee sours

4, ‘(Gosta Rice - Re-establishment of Institute for Political Education
The CIA paper of 26 August was approved as presented. 7
(GRosBEak Armament GO - -

es an , h make it clear

, o the Chinese
GROSBEAK aircraft
verification that
al can, therefore, ]

nA anes

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
General Carter


—_ wt ial “~~
mura nat i
EVES GNLY

5 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 5 September 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. Colby was present for Items 3-5.

1. Cuba - ent Operations

. Mr. FitzGerald commented on several reports from inside Cuba,

' which indicate that the morale of the people was raised considerably
as a result of the Santa Lucia and Casilda sabotage operations, He
cautioned that some of these reports might be somewhat overdrawn,

but it appears certain that the sabotage did have a beneficial effect
in this way. . .

He then discussed with the Group the general philosophy of these
operations, and plans for the future within the capabilities of the
available agents. Among other things, he pointed out that there is
a limited number of targets on or near the coast and that the most
attractive ones are, at the same time, the most difficult to attack;*°~
the available teams are not yet ready for assignments of this difficulty.

- On the other hand, smaller and more vulnerable targets are being: ‘selected.

Te is Proposed to hit a lumber mill in September.

Mr. FitzGerald went on to say, in connection with the scope and
pace of these operations, that it would not be desirable to knock out
all available targets in the near future, even if it were possible
to do so. This is because this type of attack is designed to stimulate
, -Yesistance inside Cuba, apart from whatever intrinsic value it might
The Group agreed with the approach. They felt that the reaction _
‘to the two missions in August was most satisfactory and that it is
essential to keep this sort of thing up, selecting a limited number of

_ worthwhile targets. Mr. Bundy commented particularly on the silence

that had been maintained by the agents, which has resulted in the
noise level being of a different character than might have been ex-
pected otherwise. Mr. FitzGerald was authorized to proceed with a
relatively soft target, such as a lumber mill.

See special minutes
for additional items

__ SECRET
EYES ONLY.

Trina es cemerrersemen se cteemsenepen

13-0000 0 emnemenn sept

i
i
{
1

wed

There were some questions as to the feasibility of having some-
what larger teams, but Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that that is not
practicable now. Mr. Bundy suggested that special attention be given
to electric power installations to the extent that adequate assets
are available for that purpose.’ He also noted that the two August
operations had been carried out in a professional and sophisticated
manner, which leads naturally to the accusation of Agency sponsorship.
He urged that to the extent possible attempts be made to vary the ,
method, for example by launching the attack from the shore side rather
than from the sea, as Mr. FitzGerald had previously said will be the
case with the lumber mill. Mr. Bundy felt that in this way the "CIA
signature" might be blurred.

_ The Group then discussed the paper prepared by the Board of
National Estimates, on possible Castro reaction to sabotage opera-
tions. No issue was taken with the conclusions of this paper, but
there was some discussion as to how the Soviets would react to any
requests made of them by Castro to assist him in combatting sabotage.
In this connection, Mr. McCone called attention to the increasing
currents of tension between the USSR and Cuba.

Mr.-FitzGerald then summarised the results of last month's

Anfiltration/exfiltration operations and those proposed for next

month.

2. Guba ~ Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Group

The Group then turned to further discussion of the paper from
the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13, on the subject of — :
Comandos Le :

In response to objections stated at earlier meetings to the use
of a British base, Mr. FitzGerald said that it would be feasible to
take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of
the keys very near Cuba, This would considerably reduce the dangers
of hot pursuit.

Mr. Johnson said that purely apart from the British problem,
whether or not such a change in location would alleviate it, he does
not feel that the type of activity proposed accomplishes the agreed
objective of reaching internal resistance elements.

The Chairman, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone all felt that support
of this group in the manner outlined, should be considered as action
additional to that designed to contact the resistance. Further, they
felt that it would be perfectly feasible, and in fact necessary, to
avoid any involvement with the British in this matter. It was finally

suit f

EYES qn

wart nreseeeres

- Mr. Johnson.

general nature and asked whether this could be accomplished if larger

'- diction of Route 7 in Laos by a thousand-man force of Meos, in early
.. August. He pointed out that the success achieved could be attributed

EY ES GRLY
-3-
decided that Mr. Bundy would discuss the proposal with higher authority,

noting the reservations expressed by Mr. Johnson, In the event of
favorable reaction by higher authority, Mr. Bundy will talk further to

rena ieee aye a enon oa rape oe ree eT

Mr. McCone said that he would like to see more activity of this

‘numbers of Cuban personnel were obtained. Mr. FitzGerald replied that
the problem is not numbers, but the degree of training and competence.
In this connection, he noted that the Artime group should be ready ¢ to
goin November, 000 es
3. 3. {[lnteraiceton a Operations . Along Route 7 98

Mr. Colby briefed the Group in detail on the successful inter- \

qo petite sep ce meget eres te

to adequate operational’ intelligence, security, size of the group, and

. the support of the Parus.7] i

4 . GE

4, [hort Vietnam Status Report Number 7

me Mr. Colby touched on the highlights of agent activity in North
Vietnam during August, and on plans for similar activity during the

—_ coming month, 7

5u | Qperations in Denied Areas of the Far East GE

a Mr, Colby said that: a review has been made of experience with
-,', agent operations in the denied areas of the Far East, including North
- Korea, China, Tibet and North Vietnam. He said that as a result of

this review, serious doubts have arisen as to the results that can be ©:

"expected from’ small teams, either in intelligence or in action, He

said that he proposes to discuss with the DCI in the near future, "
’ certain changes in the method of operation.in such areas. This might /
take the form of concentrating on developing a spirit of resistance
rather than on a search for resistance elements or on carrying out
minor sabotage. It might also involve much larger groups of people.
In this. connection, he pointed to the success (of the thousand-man

operation against Route *)


4% te

“ ‘use of South Vietnamese nationals for activities of this nature in _ i!
North Vietnam, is to be discussed next week with the Joint Chiefs. |
_ Mr. McCone suggested that the Chiefs should be briefed by Mr.. Colby. 7

Mr. » Gilpatric noted that the Wheeler report ’ recommending the

!

{

Thomas A. Parrott

Distribution
Mr. Johnson :
.” Mr. Gilpatric «©
_ Mr. McCone

ar
H

13-00000.

rn ae _ SECRET oF 4.0
Me BYES ONLY 7
24 October 1963
os

MEXORANDUM FOR RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 24 October 1963
PRESERT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone

Mr. Heime was also prasent.
| Mx. MesGerald and Mr. Cheever were present for Items 2-5.

1. (Gost States Evaluation Board 1 (use) 96 |

Mr. Helas reported that the USEB wes established in 1950 by a
Netionsl Security Council Intelligence Directive. The Board wae re-
quired to perfora certain functions in connection with 0.5. cover —
; and deception programs. Mesbership on the Board wae limited to the
i Service Departments, FHI, CIA, JCS, and the Department of State.

According to Mr. Heluws the USEB has not met in recent years.

_ However, it was agreed by the Special Group that ite functions had
considerable significance end should be continued. Since USEB was
originally organised only to deal in the military sphere, it was re-
commended by Mr. Helos chet a new directive be written and coordinated, | 5
which would encospase all national deception programs, and be sub- | \ aé >
misted co the Special Group for epproval. It was also determined \s =
that the new home would eps to the 1al. Group. the fers

2. cuba © at 01 ¢ botase rations _ a wee sD

_ The proposed sabotage operations for Noveaber through January
was noted by the Group. The operation plan against petroleum storage
facilities in Niquero was deleted and an operation egaiast a sawmill
located et Canete in Northarn Oriente Province, was substituted. Specific
operational propos@le for Noveuber will be submitced to the Special Group
_ fet approval at che next mecting.

3. Guba - Proposal for Air Strikes Ageinst Cuban Targets

‘This cperetional proposal was deferred by the Special Group
pending au estimate to deteraine the Cuban reaction to an air strike
oo the Santiago refinery, and specifically what effect it might have.
en the 0.8. reconnaissance operation. CIA will prepare the estinate.

See cial minu
for additional ites

ae
SEK Vv
FY ed Uivlt


13-00000 *

Ne ee ar, ree

‘SECHET _

EYES ONLY
4, bol lo a s for 58 rt o°
Autonomous Ant i-Castro Croups ,

Mr. FitsGarald informed the Group that CIA ie dropping ite
earlier proposal te support Consndos L, due to the crackdown on
exile raids by various U. &. and British government agencies. He
recomended that a plan of "selective relaxation" ba adopted, designed
to relex current stringent controls on selected anti-Castro groups in
order to avoid all raide being charged to CIA. ,

The suggestion is that the “selective relaxation" be accoaplished

by authorising CIA to tell appropriate U.5. enforcement agente that

eertein activities are of interest to CIA and should not be molested.

‘CIA would not actually gat Lavolved but would singly screen chese

groups to permit some freedos of movement on the part of the better
ones. Thié would be without the knowledge of the groups. —

Me. Johneca caised che question of difficulties of controlling
exile groupe should eny group succeed in engaging in activities not
te the liking of the U.8. Governsent. ‘This possibility was admitted,

Mc. FicsGerald cited the Manolo Bay group aa one group which a
“selective relexation™ would assist. Thia autononcus group is re-
ceiving financial and limited logistic assistance fron CIA, and desires

te mount en infiltration operation from Florida. He has good cone

 peetions in Cubs and should be urged to proceed. Mr. Bundy steted he

was not enthusiastic about Bay operating frow U.S. texritery. Mr.
Bundy steted he would discuss thie propesesi with higher autbority.

‘Se ~ Jnfileratic e

ue, FitsGexald reported chet one of the aualil boats used in the
21 Cctober infilerstion operation reached Mexico aud is in the hands —
of local authorities, friendly to us;. There were three persons on
beard, one dead, ons injured, and the other all right. ;

The fete of the second eneil boat fe unknown. ‘The mother ship

weich escorted the two emall boats was attached, but evaded its

attackers and escaped. There ia a possibility that soua teas or beat
crew senbero may heve been captured and if so, a “show trial" may be

expected.
hoa TOE “TITY Se GE en Ty - ole

6. | Proposal. to ° fore. ond. Suppert a Political Action Comittee on
- Beligious Freedom in the UssB

This projecs was not approved as proposed. It was agreed that

the concept wea ecund but there should be further. exploration as to] i

Pe

13-00000 sisi

ao

SECRET ~
EYES ONLY,

ej3Za

(gether private capital could not be used instead of governsent funds. |
The project was referred back to CIA with the euggestion to explore

: whether the World Council of Churches or the Nationel Counctl of

i!

Protestants and Jews might be interested in obtaining end conertbuttag g
_ funds for carrying out the eine eet forth in the paper) :

- (om 7s

This cperation vas sppreved although . thea” “‘Spectal Group sexdera

' agreed chat until after the elections there should be no new effort ? ,

PITT greg par on eget

8. Yiesnan = Coup Plotting —

Mr. MeConus expressed hie fear that the top U.&. diplomecic aad
wuilicary officiale in Gaigon are becoming too invelved in conversations
between General bon and Consin. Such involvement could destroy
Conein's usefulness and involve Ambassedor Lodge end General Harkins
fa operations difficult to deny.

The Syectel Croup authorised the eonding of 9 coordinated massage
te Lodge acd Harkins euphasising (4) the setting vp of a sore secure
systea of contacts vith General Don and other Vietnancse atilitery;

(>) che preperation of an E-baasy assesement of General Don's status,
the group he represents aud future plane; (c) the tightening of contrel
ever tha. Doa/Consia mpetings.

Special Grovp meubers agreed that they shovld firm up their policy
thinking with respect co Vietnam befere Anbassador Lodge returns to
Washiogton, and then heer what Mr. Hodes has co say on what couress
_ of action should ‘be taken.

te initiate operations! activity among the Greek en)

(Signed)
Paul Eckel
Distribution
Me, Johnecs:
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. HeCone

Oras cow
, pas afd
ITO AME

13-00000" .-: 9 Pee

- oft aed

Bovis Sg a
as Hy an
OR

athe

EYES ONLY

6 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Special Group,
5 November 1963 : ;

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.
The Attorney General, Mr. Helms, Mr. Cheever, Dr. Wheelon,

“and Colonel Steakley were present for Items land 2. The
_. Attorney General and Mr. Helms were present for Item 3.

“1, ‘Cuba - Sabotage Operation in Southeast Pinar (No. 3105).

Mr. Helms briefed the Group on the background of the mission and
on'events leading up to the infiltration attempted on 21-22 October.
On the basis of available information, the best estimate is that Castro's

_ Security forces penetrated the reception committee and laid a trap which
' resulted in the capture of some personnel.

The subsequent press coverage of this affair renders the further

- operational use of the mother ships REX and LIDA to be undesirable in

awe

the immediate future,

2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations

Mr. Cheever presented a low-key sabotage operation, No. 3111, against
a warehouse and pier on the north coast of Cuba. This activity is to be
carried out by a small commando team which will land on the pier and the

. warehouse.

Mention was made by Mr. Cheever of some problems with British patrols
which have unwittingly exposed some of CIA's operations, Mr. Bundy stated
that he would mention this to the British Ambassador and CIA would follow
up on a service-to-service level in order to prevent further unnecessary
incidents.

.In addition, the Special Group tentatively approved two other operations. :

These are No. 3112, a sabotage operation against a sawmill located in northern

Oriente Province and No. 3115, the infiltration of a radio operator to provide

. communications for a ratline.

Mr. Bundy has placed the above three operations on a "fail safe" basis

° pending concurrence in each case by higher authority.

See_special minutes
for additional items


13-00009.. a . et ous

a - eves ANY

-2-

3. Cuba. - Peace Feelers

Mr. Bundy stated that is has come to the attention of the White
House that Castro would like to have a talk designed to bring about
some kind of "arrangement" with the U.S. To hear what Castro has to
say and to know on what basis he might wish to negotiate would be of
some use to the U.S. Mr. Bundy suggested that for this initial talk
Mr. William Attwood, currently on the staff of Mr. Stevenson at the
United Nations, might be a likely candidate since Mr. Attwood has been
in touch with Mr. Carlos Lechuga Hevia, the Cuban Ambassador to the
United Nations. Also, Attwood has a fairly friendly relationship with
Castro based on previous acquaintance.

In the Group discussion which followed it was thought inadvisable
. to allow Mr. Attwood, while on the UN staff, to get in touch with Castro.
The suggestion was made that he might be removed from his official UN
status and then go to Cuba for the ostensible purpose of writing an
article for Look magazine. In this way it might be learned how badly
Castro might want a detente with the United States.

It was suggested by Mr. Helms that it might be profitable to
“war game’ this problem and look at it from all possible angles before.
making any contacts.

A further suggestion was made by Mr. Bundy that Dr. Rene Vallejo
Ortiz, Castro's aide and personal physician, might be flown to Mexico
with Castro's proposals and discuss them with the U.S. Ambassador in
Mexico City.

The Attorney General emphasized that as a prelude to all this the
U.S. must require some fundamental steps such as the end of subversion
in Latin America and removing the Soviet troops in Cuba before any serious
discussion can take place about.a detente.

Mr. McCone stated that it might be possible to use again Mr.
_James Donovan who is known to have excellent relationships with Dr. Vallejo.
Vallejo might be flown to the UN for such talks or better still Donovan
could go to Cuba.

It was decided by the Special Group members not to try to reach a
firm decision at this time but to study the problem for several days and

attack it again.
(fu Shh

Gu Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone


13-00000;*

6 November 1963

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

At a special meeting of the Special Group on 5 November,
it tentatively approved, subject to higher authority concurrence,
three Cuban operations scheduled for implementation on 8, 10, and
13 November. On 6 November higher authority disapproved all

. Cuban operations scheduled to be run into Cuba before 12 November.

The two operations dated 8 and 10 November are therefore disapproved.

| Distribution |

Mr. Johnson’ —
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

;
;
'
t
i
'
i

13-00000
|

12 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

A meeting was held this morning with higher authority on the
above subject. Present were: Mr. Rusk, Mr. McNamara, Mr. Robert
Kennedy, Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr.
Vance, General Taylor, Mr. Heins, Mr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cheever, and
Mr. Shackley.

Mr. McCone gave a brief summary of recent developments inside ~

‘Cuba. He stated that the military is generally loyal to Castro. -:°

There have been some disorders but not very extensive. Castro's ._
internal security forces appear to be well organized. He has devel-
oped a system of informers which is becoming increasingly effective.
The economic situation is deteriorating largely because of the
enforcement of economic sanctions, and Hurricane "Flora" although

its damage was not as great as originally thought. The Soviets
appear to be continuing the gradual withdrawal of personnel from Cuba
although recently 1,000-2;000 troops have come in. There now seems

to bea kind of "Soviet MAAG" program concerned mainly with training

Cubans in all types of military activity including the handling of
missiles, There has been some removal of the more sophisticated types
of electronic equipment. Some new tanks have arrived in Cuba, esti-
mates run from 25 to 50. Ss

Mr. FitzGerald reported on Cuban operations under six main
headings: (a) Covert Collection, (b) Propaganda, (c) Economic Denial,
(d) Disaffections in the Military, (e) Sabotage and Harassment, and
(£) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups.

. (a) Covert Collection. Mr. FitzGerald pointed out that
inside Cuba CIA has three kinds of agent activities: (1) "singleton"
(2) collection nets, and (3) agents involved in "black net": operations.

® While there is encouraging improvement in the geographical spread of

these agents, there is still, understandably, a fairly heavy concentra-
tion of agents in the Havana area.

A question was raised as to how many agents in.all of

these activities have been lost. Mr. FitzGerald said that in the

neighborhood of 25 had been either captured or killed in the past year.

EVES ORLY

13-00000

The reasons for these casualty figures are the increasing effectiveness

of Castro's internal security forces and discovery brought about when

agents try to obtain food. No matter how good the documentation, an
outsider in a community is viewed with suspicion.

(b) Propaganda. The activities of CIA in this field are
the mailing of leaflets and.radio broadcasts. Some 30-40,000 leaflets
per month have been mailed and during a day there are 32 hours of
programs emanating from seven different stations. It is believed that
there is a very excellent listening public. The programs appeal to

people in a wide variety of jobs and professions. There is some jamming

but it is spasmodic and generally confined to Havana.

(c) Economic Denial. Mr. FitzGerald reported that the U.S.
economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy.

‘Mention was made that the economic denial program would be more effec-

tive if the Canadians were willing to cooperate. Up to now they have
not gone along with U.S. efforts, and they are supplying many items
essential to Cuban economy. The UK and Spain are continuing to deal
in certain types of goods required by the Cubans. Commodities going
into Cuba in 1962 from the free world. reached $101 million. While this

represents less than in 1961 the amount is still too high.

(d) Disaffections in the Military. While the military is

loyal to Castro as has been noted there are indications that: some leaders
would like to break with the regime but lack courage and opportunity.

Mr. FitzGerald commended a CIA-DIA task force which prepared a report
covering some 150 Cuban military leaders. Out of this figure there are
some 45 which look interesting from CIA's operational viewpoint. Mr.-
FitzGerald reported that CIA is in touch with three persons who are in
the military or who have highly placed contacts. in such circles. The
aim is to use these three individuals to establish contact with military
personnel inside Cuba. The principal aim is to get military leaders who

-have become disenchanted with the Castro regime to dare to talk and plot

Castro's downfall with each other.

(e) Sabotage and Harassment. Mr. FitzGerald ment ioned four
successful sabotage operations against a power plant, oil storage’
facilities, a sawmill, and an underwater demolition operation against a

. floating crane in one of Cuba's harbors. It is believed that the publi-

cation of these successful sabotage activities in the Cuban press has
tended to raise appreciably the morale of the people. Also, such
sabotage continues to keep pressure on the Castro regime and adds to the
growing economic problems facing the country.

(£) Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups. The question

was asked from-where would the autonomous groups operate. Mr. FitzGerald
replied that they would operate from outside U.S. territory. He mentioned


13-00000

two bases of the Artime group, one in Costa Rica and the other in

Nicaragua. Also. it was hoped that the autonomous group under Manolo Ray
would soon get itself established in a working base, possibly Costa Rica.
Mr. FitzGerald said that much could be accomplished by these autonomous
groups once they become operational.

A question was asked as to what decisions remain to be made. Mr.
FitzGerald replied that we were looking for a reaffirmation of the program
as presented, including sabotage and harassment. When asked what was
planned in sabotage for the immediate future, he said that destruction

-operations should be carried out against a large oil refinery and storage
‘facilities, a large electric plant, sugar refineries, railroad bridges,

harbor facilities, and underwater demolition of docks and ships. The
question was also raised as to whether an air strike would be effective —
on some of these principal targets. The consensus was that CIA should
proceed with its planning for this type of activity: looking toward ~
January.

The State Department raised questions with respect to sabotage
activities in Cuba. The thought was advanced that there may be a
relationship between such hit and run attacks on Cuba and the delay of
American convoys en route to Berlin. A further question was posed as
to the over-all importance to the United States of sabotage operations,
especially since it is so difficult to keep. them from being directly

‘attributable to the U.S. It was thought that the hit and run type effort

might in fact invoke loss of support inside Cuba and may even result in
bringing more Soviet troops back into Cuba. Somehow the U.S. must pin
responsibility for these activities on:Castro. The U.S. in fact must be
ready to retaliate when it can be fairly well established that Castro is
attempting with arms, money and men to foment Communist uprisings in any
Latin American country.

The consensus was that since CIA's sabotage operation is in the
main low cost and since it does worry the Castro regime, denies him some
essential commodities, stimulates. some sabotage inside Cuba and tends to
improve the morale of the Cubans who would like to see Castro removed,
CIA should proceed with those operations planned for the coming week end
(November 15 through 17).

The view was expressed that CIA, in connection with the Department
of Defense, should concentrate on attempting to catch Castro red-handed
delivering arms to Communist groups in Latin American countries.. It-was
determined that during-the next 90 days from this date an attempt would
be made by means of air patrols and surface ships to identify ships
carrying arms for Castro to Latin American countries. It was hoped that .
a ship with Cuban arms could be picked up. Conversations are to be :


13-00000 . .
: oa y
te ee ae : i
Ev ES men Vv Jobe
initiated by the Secretary of the Navy with CIA to map out a three-month
operation against Cuban shipping. It was also determined that the
Colombian and Venezuelan governments should be asked to join with the
U.S. in developing a joint patrol designed to identify ships. carrying
weapons from Cuba destined for revolutionary groups in Latin Anerican

countries.
hide


13-0000. «ss Fo a nee BS
- . Lot a i :

15 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 14 November 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

General Taylor and Dr. MacMillan were present for Item 1.
Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 2 and 3.

ae Oo Lona ice os - . GS oe Te Sa
1. ff S. Support of Foreign Paramilitary Forces ;

, “ General Taylor proposed that an ad hoc group be formed consisting
‘of a representative from CIA, Department of State, and Department of

; Defense to review U.S. programs involving support of foreign paramili-
Qn tary forces. The countries given in the following list have internal

/" security problems and all have received U.S. support for paramilitary

/| organizations:
: Bolivia | Iran
pie Brazil Iraq
a * Colombia Cambodia
Ecuador Thailand
Venezuela Laos
i Peru Indonesia ~
i Guatemala Pakistan

The Special Group approved General Taylor's recommendation.

7 Mr. Bundy suggested that the agencies concerned make recommendations

r for membership on the ad hoc committee to the Secretary of the Special
Group. This committee will arrange for reviewing programs in the

df above-mentioned countries and prepare briefings, reports, and recom-
a mendations for. Special ‘Group action. "7] _ ce ee

2. Cuba - vedi fication of Revised Schedule of Proposed Infiltration/
.. Exfiltration Operations for the Month of November 1963.

_ Approval was granted by the Special Group for the following:

Operation No. 31111: The exfiltration of a previously-
infiltrated agent.

Operation No. 3711: The exfiltration of two members of
-— an existing resistance net.

See special minutes

.for additional. items


x

13-00000..

Wet e s
mreaoere

-2-

A sea rendezvous with Cuban fishermen
for the purpose of establishing a

Operation No. 31110:
ratline into Cuba.

An exfiltration operation to be
accomplished by members of the

Operation No. 31112:
, DRE using MRR-owned vessels.

3. Cuba - CIA Request for Department. of Defense Support of Autonomous
. ene pee ae 7 ne ray

Operations.

Operation approved.
4. || Laos - Review of the Total CIA Program. .
The paper on the above subject was noted by the Special Group.) ; |

[give - Status Report. Ig
oe The paper on Tibetan operations was submitted by Mr. McCone to the
Special Group for information. Since the paper was concerned with . fH
collecting intelligence no Special Group action was required. 7
; / i

10. IE as

6. (Benen Vietnam _-. Monthly Report. No.
This report was noted ‘by the Special Group). as

Se

7 | : . . - Va mall

Distribution .
Mr. Johnson

Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone

tee
nae

iu Fee te huled

1300000. ye om ne

t “eceuber 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 6 December 1963
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

Also present were Mr. Helms and Mr. Cheever.

Cuban Operations.

Mr. Cheever briefed the Special Group on Cuban operations proposed for
December, Approvals were granted for the following: —

Operation No. 3121: The infiltration of agents for the purpose of
establishing a base on an off-shore key for a ratline.

, Operation No. 3113: The infiltration of a team, including a radio
operator, designed to establish operational contacts with Cuban
' military personalities.

Operation No. 3114: The infiltration of an agent into and exfil-
tration of agents out of an existing internal net. :

Operation No. 3122: The placing of a 3,000-pound cache of arms,
ammunition, and demolitions in support of an existing internal
resistance organization.

Operation No. 3123: The infiltration of a team to further develop
an existing ratline. .

_ Operation No. 3117: An underwater demolition operation designed to
sink or damage a Kronstadt or other Cuban patrol vessels while in

anchorage.

Operation No. 3124: The placing of a 100-150 pound cache of radios
and weapons on-the northern coast.-of Cuba.

Operation No. 3126: The infiltration and subsequent exfiltration of
a team which will attempt to establish contacts for the development
of a ratline. , :

The two sabotage operations, No. 3125, against a sugar central, and

No. 3116, against the transformer yard of an electric power plant, were
deferred by the Group for further discussion at its next meeting.

bfediglel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Mr. McCone


13-00000 OT

5 December 1963

CE
[he
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP :

SUBJECT: Cuban Operations

Special Group mawbers approved hy telephone on 5 Decemb
the following: “

a. Operation No. 3711, the éxfiltration of three aenbers
of an existing resistance net.

b. Operation No. 3118, the infiltration of a five-man
team for the purpose of sabotaging a railway bridge.

c. Operation No. 31110, the establishment of a ratline
inte Cuban ports.

(Signes, -

Paul Eckel

Distribution
i Mr. Johnaon
Mr. Gilpatric

og Mr. McCone
Yen


