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| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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Sivcra:y of Initial Missions
SUSE OF sneeial i 3s.ons

om 20 June to 10 July 1956 the Soviet Bloc air defense

a period of only eight days. It must be remembered that
the only basis of judging the performance of the Soviet

Eowever, some tentative conclusions may be drewn frost
and these ere indicated as follows:

fact that these missions came as 2 surprise,

This is clear evidence that their

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to elght penetrations of an unprecedented nature, seven

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2, By 5 July 1956, the fourth flight, the USSR was aware a
of the purpose of the missions and were teking counter 2actlon.
One positive action was the standdowa of civil flignts while the
mission airexeft was over the USSR, and & second action waich is
yHelieved xvelated is the moving of MOG-19 aircraft inte East
Garnany and Poland on 7 July 1956. Also MIG-19's were moved.
inte Hungery at about this time. :

3, the performance oP the Soviet system on the 5 July migsior,
gol, was indeed curious. While the action evident fron (COME 2 Y
is not clear an explanation whieh appears to Pit the known facts

is ofrered as Lollows: As a result of the previous missions, the
Soviets had cmcluded the essential facts concerning the missiozus, :
j.e., vnab they were for reconnaissance, that they flew ebove (6,000 4
feet, and that a penetration 2s desp as Moscow wes possible. ihey
procably surmised that the 5 duly mission wes heeded for Moscow when
she track appeered on & northeasterly heeding. 1¢ Loss of the
target Vnen it entered Soviet territory Was provaoly deliberate and
the “red herring" track returning to the wast was either 4 dodge

or a convenience to avoid proadcasting @ track for all the system
+o ses that @ “nostile or intruder” was coming over Moscow with no
means avellable to stop it. This jdea is supported by the use

of 2 reid number assigned in the region gust beyond tas point 40
snore the treck had been ost". In additioz, the track wes not
labeled "nostile or intruder” when it ves proadeast after it

had passed beyond Hoscows The reporting o? the treck when it did
2p0eer Was only by Moscow and it has been suggested thet ovher
stations had been instructed not to proadcast the track. Further, it my
| oF nay not be a coincidence that the heigat prozdcast was almost

| exactly half of the true altitude of the mission eirereft, but on
the next missions, four days later, the altitude reporting wes

i consistently apove 50,000 feet.

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kh. By 9 duly 1956, in addition to the evident -recogaitioz of
the great height of the mission flights, ¢trecking wes better and
in general the performance of the warning systent was much improved.

5, The next day, 10 July 1956, the Soviet air gerense warning
ten closed @ 3000 mile track with only two short periods or
sion or track loss. Altitude reporting was over 60,000 feet ee
: one plot passed 68,800 which was only 100 fees off terget-

6. ‘he first eigat missions proved that the eir defense warming

zo s deployed in depth. This wes evident fran bovn the continuity

of treck end most forcefully from the ELLIT dete collected. Some UhéL
intercepts of Soviet Bloc radars operating in the 3000 me/s band were F
chbainea by project EDIMT as follows: TCKEW-1331, WHIFF-37, GAGE-26,

PATTY CAKE-37, Other 30. These numbers cannot be equated to in- {
dividual radar sets since the same radar ray be intercepted more than |

ae. 618 TOKEN sites were Located, including 213 new sites. Some I 9

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343 additional TOKEN signals were identified but aveilleble information i

dees not permit getermination of Location so that it must be con- I
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cluded that these signals include both known and nev sites. Because !
| of the Limitation of ELINT to the 3000 me /s dand and the Soviet

rectice of eollocating radara on different freauencies the totel \
ex of radars may be expected to be at least double the number \

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T- Confusion and track loss seamed to be related to the 9 ~)
presence of large numbers of fighters although the saturetion point |
has not been Gatermined because of insufficient data.

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8. The question of redars for height finding, the carabdilities
of TOKEN in this role » the introduction of ROCK CAKEs and leter
acevelopments are discussed in another section. it is believed,
however, that these missions were a catalyst in the introduction

of ROCK CAKEs. 99 s

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