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2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 b

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2 January 1964
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MEMORANDUM FOR TEE RECGRD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 2 January 1964.-
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Jchnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

nnd 2.

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3 an

Mr. FitzGerald was present for Items 1
Coionel Steakley was present for Items
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|

4.

m.

‘L. Cuba - vrosmseatsttsottontostitecatio Onerations Burirge
January 1964

The infiltration/exfiltration operations in the January 1964
forecast were approved. Three sapotage operations, numbers 3111,
414, and 417, were approved by the Speciai Group subject to the
concurrence of higher authority. Decision was deferred on a sabotage
operation, ‘number 413, against the petroleum refinery and storage
facilities'near Santiago. Mr. Johnson said that before he could
exercise judgment as to the importance of this operation he must have
an analysis as to what effect the total or partial destruction of
this refinery would have on Cuban petroleum. production and economy
generally.; The Group agreed that such an analysis shoule be prepared _
ard be presented along with this sabotage operation for Special Group
action ac its next meeting. :

a

2. Cuba - Infiltration/Exfiltration Operations During December 1963.

Mr. FitzGerald reviewed the accomplishments during the month of
December. He emphasized ea successful exfiltration activity of a

recently activated ratline. This is .the second time in two months

thet this ratline has successfully exfiltrated agents in danger of
arrest. He also gave a resume of the underwater cemolition opexation .|
{number 3117) which damaged a Cuban FT boat (Soviet-type P-6). Also,
during the same operation self-destroying anti-boat mines were placed

in the harbor entrance to. inhibit pursuit. One of the mines was detected
vesulting in a Cuban goverament directive to all ports to take precaution-
auxy measures. - a


13-09

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1933 ex: cessing
the missicns

t maissance
. er. c A ne regarded
vticularly sensitive, gucn e missions

: nose flown
s in al tituce of planes
other radical variatioas

; two planes in the sam:

', Ge close to Soviet territory;
/ wadle under surveilleace of Sovi

‘| of route,
i

Mr. Johnson listed 14 BOX TCP missions on which State Department
needed further study before approva L would be given. These missions are
as follows: Jane, Paula, Ruby, Cliff, Alf, Eric, Mervin, Frank, Dwight,
Kari, Lioyd, Everett, Hugh, and Caivin. ‘The Soecial Group requested a
coordinated position on these missions as to their necessity aad whether

they can be run without 4 significant or provocative pattern cnange while
under Soviet racar surveillance. This coordinated position is to be |
presented to the Speciai Group at its next meeting. All other missions

‘ta the JRC forecast were approved. "]

Reconnaissance Forecast.

if The: NRO forecast (paper dated 20 Decesber 19633 was epproved as
resented, General Carter gave a resume of the excellence and uniqueness
i the information: obtained in the "T" and "C" series? ]

{ze North Vietnam Working Group. GE

nga Mr. Johnson reported that the Interdepartnental Working Group on
North Vietnam Cperations has about concluded its report. Ali members
of the Special Group agreed that the report should be critically noted
at the highest levels of the Government It shows then be reviewed by
"the Special Group and presented t to" higher author or decision] "

ae . . oe a : 7 Ae ? Lf. hee

Ste. 5 ;

Paul’Ecke

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fated

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Distribution
x. Johnson
‘Mr. Gilpatric
»-Mr. McCone

pe

Br

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10 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: . Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 9 January 1964
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. McCone.

The Attorney General and Mr. FitzGerald were present

for Items 1 and 2.
,

: Colonel Steakley and Mr. Kiefer were present for Item 3,

1, Cuba - Consideration of Sabotage Operations.

. Mr. FitzGerald requested the Special Group to approve a sabotage
operation against the petroleum refinery and storage facilities near
Santiago. The proposal was disapproved.

/ Another sabotage proposal was made by Mr. FitzGerald against a-
sawmill located on the north coast of Oriente Province. The attack
.is to be conducted by a commando team which will place incendiaries
and demolitions at critical locations throughout the installation. — .

. A second target, which may be attacked as security factors permit, is

a large floating. crane which has been anchored in the area and which .

' appears to be used in loading ore from a near-by mine. ' This operational
proposal with its ‘two targets was approved subject to the concurrence of -.

. higher authority. Also, it was the consensus of the Group that the
views of higher authority should be obtained on what ‘is desired generally

‘in the field of sabotage activities in Cuba.

2. Cuba - Proposed Clandestine Intelligence Operations.

The Department of the Army requested approval for two operations:
- (a) the establishment of a clandestine net using the Second National
-Front of the Escambray, and (b) the infiltration of a radio operator
’ .agent into Cuba. CIA has agreed to provide support for both these.
proposals. The two operations were approved. .

So See special minutes ~
. a for additional item


13-OOOOO attzma trocar takercnt ite ee Se a te tn eee pening

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3. [Revisea January ‘Peripheral Reconnaissance Schedule.

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The JRC paper dated 8 January 1964 was approved as amended.
No change was made in the following BOX TOP missions: Jane, Paula,
Ruby, Eric, Marvin, Frank, Dwight, Lloyd, Karl, Everett, and Hugh.
_ Operations Cliff and Alf were amended resulting in the cancellation
"! of Operation Cliff. Mission Calvin's track was changed permitting
:, it to approach the Latvian coast no closer than 25 nautical miles
rather than 20 miles as originally proposed. ©

; . , :
Mr. McCone raised the question of the increasing number of flights

authorized by the JRC. Colonel Steakley said that the number of sup-
porting flights required for every reconnaissance platform was largely
responsible for the increase. He also pointed out that there is
» currently a review of COMOR requirements for Cuba being prepared to
, determine whether they can be eased in order to permit a considerably.
‘ .., lessened operational schedule -]
96

4. (Benen Report No. 12 on North Vietnam.

‘This report was noted by the Special Groups]

_ S oy
dee Sele

aul Eckel

Distribution
Mr. Johnson — a ; . . ;
Mr. Gilpatric Oo, oo a _
Mr. McCone . :


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31 January 1964 .

HEMORAHDUN FOR THR SPECIAL GROUP
“SUBJECT: | Proposed Cuban Operations for February 1964

Special Group meubers approved by telephone the follouing
infilerstion/exfileration operations proposed for February:
Sunbere 411, 415, 421, 422, 423, 425, 3121, end 3126.

Operations involving sabotage (Numbers 416, 424, 3111, and
3412) were noe considered ty Group aszebera pending en overall
review of Cuban operations, now completed but not yet studied.

Peter Jessup
Distribution .
Mr. Johnson

- Me. Vance .
toro. ite HeComs


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YES ONLY , February wee Vek

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

“SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 13 February 1964

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

General Maxwell D. Taylor, Mr. Thomas A. Mann, and
Mr. Desmond FitzGerald were present for Item 1.

Lt. General Marshall A. Carter was present for
Items 1 and. 2.

1. Cuba - Covert Activities.

A lengthy discussion took place on covert action potential
to weaken the Castro regime. The first part of the discussion
constituted an exchange of opinion of a general nature.

The following points were emphasized: Continued covert
action received support although divergence on the level of
activity was registered. There was a consensus that the present
level of operations was no longer effective in attaining the
basic objective of toppling Castro but harassment might keep
the regime off balance. There was an area of disagreement on
proofs of effectiveness of current and past measures. :

Mr. Bundy summarized the dilemma by noting that the high
risk, dangerous operations are the rewarding ones and the low
noise, innocuous operations prove to be unrewarding.

Mr. Mann emphasized that considerably more hoiwework had
to be completed before the next OAS meeting (presently unscheduled).
Mr. Bundy indicated that a Cabinet level meeting with higher
authority would have to be held eventually to determine how far
the United States was willing to go. Mr. Bundy turned the discussion
to the specific Department of Defense paper.

On Sabotage, Mr. Vance stated that he could speak for
the Secretary of Defense; his attitude had turned to a harder
line.

On Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cust, para-

graph 2.a. was considered work in progress. 0% paragraph 2.b.
the attitude was negative, particularly as to suips of other
than Cuban flag.

SECRET
EVES ONLY

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On Covert Economic Activities, paragraph 3.a. is
part of the present program, Paragraphs 3.b. and c.
are parc of an overall blacklisting problem which remains
to be explored.

On Encouraging Dissidence Among Factions, the

consensus was to intensify these activities.

Actions againse Ciban Subversion in Latin America,
paragraphs 1 and 2: A good look should be taken at this
type of activity and a determination should be made ona
country-by-country and case-by-case basis.

On the last paragraph of the paper, it was decided ~
that these efforts constitute work in progress with the
exception of shipping surveillance which is under active
study by the Departmenc of Defense. A paper on this
problem Will be ready next week. It was understood that
this was an expression of members’ opinion on types of -
action but that specific operational proposals would be
submitted to the Special Group as heretofore.

Mr. Bundy then asked Mr. Mann to prepare papers covering
the major issues of Caribbean surveillance, the blacklisting
of firms trading with Havana, covert actions, and types of
retaliation. .

Review Programs

‘On the review programs for Japan, France, Tibet, Taiwan,
and China, it was agreed that the papers as prepared were the
most useful way to present the material ‘to members. Mr. Vance
indicated he had a number of questions in depth but that he would
not take the time at this meeting. Mr. McCone then directed that
the area specialists would be made available at Mr. Vance's con-
venience to answer any questions he might have. Mr. Bundy
concluded that since a time factor was not involved, formal approval %
. of these papers could be made at a future meeting. Mr. Johnson
remarked that State had already registered its approves

peter Jessut |

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

: “ma “7

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24 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Special Group Meeting, 20 February 1964

PRESENT: . Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

{Ete “proposed Covert Funding of the Somali Parliamentary
Elections" was s approved by the Special Group. .

The previously considered review program papers on France,
B Japan Tibet, Taiwan, - and China also were _approved.

The minutes of the. Special Group meeting of 13 February 1964
were modified at the request of Mr. Vance in the following context:
In paragraph one under "Cuba - Covert Activities," subheading
Sabotage, the phrase "he fully supported the paper under discussion"
has been substituted for "his attitude had turned to a harder line."

Peter Jessup

Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance ©

SS Mr.“ McCone -

See Special Minutes
for additional item

Vorb

13-OO0 OO Qatari aa ake fn al SRST wm tiem ie Se eee

28 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Specia! Group, 27 February 1964
t

PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone. :

Mr. Bruce Cheever was also present for Item 1.

1... Cuba

The Special Group approved the following infiltration/exfiltration
and/or caching and resupply operations: Numbers 411, 3121, 415, 422,
431, 3120, 432, 423, 416, 433, 434, and 3122, with the proviso that
in regard to Number 434, a double agent operation, ‘the cache would

contain money and medicine but no weapons.in case the Cubans decide
to terminate the operation and publicize the cache.

The four sabotage missions, specifically Numbers 414, 3111, 424,
and 3119, were again placed in abeyance pending eventual resolution .
by higher authority of the entire problem of higher noise level
operations.

GF. Co oe 7 Te

2. [Rema
_ ‘The Political Action. Operation on Kenya was approved without
discussion.
Py aA \, mc?
Un oes if
Peter Joosk)
Distribution
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance

Mr. McCone

Please see special minute

for addicional iteus.
[oe


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3 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
| SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Group, 2 April 1964
PRESENT: | Mr. Bundy, Mr.. Johnson, Mr. Vance, and Mr. McCone.

Mr. Desmond FitzGerald was present for Items 1 and 2.
Mr. John Waller was present for Item 3.
Colonel Ralph D. Steakley. was present for Item 4.

on Cuba ~ Proposed Operations during April 1964.

a In discussing the proposed Cuban operations for the month of
noting, the following conclusions were reached: The five infiltra-

---tion/exfiltration operations were approved as were the five caching
operations, However, the five sabotage proposals were tabled.

- Referring to the paper entitled, "Status of Sabotage and Raiding
“Capability against Cuba," Mr. FitzGerald emphasized the. economic and

” morale aspects of maintaining this potential and the influences of
deterioration when it remains in stand-by status.. Mr. Bundy then
stated that the time was overdue for submitting to higher authority
the entire question of covert operations against Cuba. The problem
of autonomous exile groups and their potential for conducting oper-

os ations on their own and the momentum of these groups even if support

should be cut off was also discussed. It was clear that the groups |
headed by Artime and Ray’ constitute a considerable threat.

Mr. Bundy indicated that next week he would call a meeting with
higher authority and the Secretariés of Defense and State. Mr.
‘FitzGerald would outline the current status of operations against

; . Cuba, and it was hoped that definite policy lines could be determined
:., for future covert activity against Castro.

. oot a ee GS os _ . _ a

- 2, Caine - Support for: Chilean Presidential Elections of
. September 1964. ;

_ The paper, "Support for Chilean Presidential Elections," was
approved. Mr. FitzGerald announced that a solution to the slight.
difference of opinion between Ambassador Cole and the CAS in Santiago

Please see special minute
for additional items.

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2 approved

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ad been reached and that attribution of U.S. support would be

indicated that this was operationally feasible.

oo . | a 4%

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3. ‘Gantivar - Proposed Political Action

— The paper on Proposed Political Action in Zanzibar was
approved. ‘Mr. Waller gave a short briefing on the operational |
.climace which emphasized the cooperative attitude of the British
services and the growing likelihood that Jomg Kenyatta could be
persuaded to support the West more actively. ]

- JRC Month} Reconnaissance Forecast.

na Monthly Reconnaissance Forecast for April 1964 was

pororst 53 : cn . ee

. Distribution

- Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
:Mr. McCone

ferred but there should be no evidence of proof. Mr. FitzGerald —

| 23
a [Bye 2656- eal
: _ 28 .APR 1964

frie,

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: — - Overflight of Cuba on 1 May ©

1. Although it may, in fact, have little substance, the thought occurs ._-
that if Castro is seriously considering a "shoot-down" of a U- 2, from a
‘@ propaganda standpoint he could not select a better time than 1 May,
the traditional Communist holiday, and more significantly the Fourth |
‘Anniversary of the "infamous" Francis Gary Powers incident.

2. From a psychological viewpoint, identification of a new U-2
shoot-down with that incident on May Day four years ‘ago might have
considerable appeal to Fidel and might. conceivably influence his judg-.
ment.in reaching a determination. to take such action.

3. Recognizing that this association is rather tenuous, it might |
‘still be worth considering a stand-down of U-2 overflights on that one.
day. This would not seriously impair our intelligence effort and it |
would deprive Castro of the opportunity to exploit this rather unique
‘circumstance should he have any inclination to do so. 0 KF oo

JAMES A. CUNNINGHAM, JR.
' Deputy Assistant Director
(Special Activities)

" SECR Ei T


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1 May 1964

EEMORANDUM POR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the Special Croup, 30 April 1964

General Carter
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. Hughes, Mr. Vance,/and Mr. McCone,.

“Colonel J. C. King and Assistant Secretary of State Mann
were present for Item 1.

Mr. Bruce Cheever and Mr. Theodore Shackley were present
for Item 2. Assistant Secretary Mann was also present
for Item 2. ;

1. FE Chilean Situation qb : ‘

: yy, \

i PT a, During. a 35-minute discussion of the 4 September Chilean

> “election, Assiscant Secretary of State Mann and Colonel J.C. King

. ’ outlined some of the problems and prospects for the Frei candidacy.

: ;, Colonel King, who had recently returned from Santiago, outlined some ;

of the covert efforts planned or underway which included financial ;

support to Frei, Italian CDU assistance, emphasis on the woman's vote,

' Cactholic'‘and labor union assistance, fragmentizing the opposition
Socialist party, distribution of propaganda, and possible assistance
from long-standing United States industrial interests.

! b. Some of the obstacles faced by the democratic forces were

/ underscored: the strong Chilean anti-clerical tradition, the unimpeded
rise in the cost of living, the formidable. outside. support being afforded
Allende, the political apathy of the military and the third man candidacy
of Duran,

i i, c. The Special Group decided: (a) that contact should be made with .

' Ambassador Cole to urge his return fc. a visit in the coming weeks,

4 (b) that talks with American business interests should proceed to deter-

: mine the amount and method of their support, and (c) It was further decided

» that higher authority would be apprised of the closeness and importance of

' this Chilean election and that the Group itself would continue to review
the problem in the coming ead ;

‘ Loe — .
Som epe ee ° : SET) Ca eer popes wee Fl

RE SPORE SO ee oe we eng poe

2. The Current Cuban Operational Climate and the Proposed Operations
for May 1964.

a. A 25-minute briefing was provided on Cuban operations by the Chief
of CAS, Miami, Mr. -Theodore Shackley. He gave a thorough summary of the
policy framework in which programs have been established and provided detuil
on the cechniques used to accomplish these missions. He enuwerated successes

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achieved to date and indicated the types of difficulty encountered.

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The briefing was well received and members expressed the opinion

that the session had been extremely useful.

b. The Special Group approved the proposed. infiltration/

exfiltration operations into Cuba during May 1964.

vee a aa ea 9G"

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ficant number.

b. As cthe minutes were going to press on 1 May, the Secretary of
the Special Group was informed by telephone that Stace Department apreement i
was obtained with the following proviso: That an intensive and high
priority effort on training of South Vietnam Nationals be undertaken as
rapidly as possible "for future maritime operations." 7 _ .

4. [hetton 29 - OPLAN 34-A GS

3. (Recruitment of Chinat Personnel for Maritime Operations of 34-A.

- requested that the matter

Action 29, OPLAN 34-a, proposed by DOD was disapproved,] .

IS

5.) [Honthty Forecasts

a. The NRO Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved.

Distribution
4x. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone

b. The JRC Monthly Forecast for May 1964 was approved]

se ested
ae

a. On the proposal to recruit Chinat  personnél for maritime operations
of 34-A, Mr. Vance and Mr. McCone were in favor and felt that enactment of

;. the maritime program was long overdue. It was noted that the Ambassador
had already registered approval. State, however,
' be held in abeyance until the return from Ottawa on 1 May of Alexis Johnson |
and Secretary of State Rusk. Mr. Hughes felt that the introduction of
additional Chinese Nationalists into this theatre was not in accordance
with existing policy. Mr. Bundy was of the opinion that the proposed
temporary introduction of 64 persons for sea operations was not e@ signi-

oven) i ene
. ee
i
Pa04 THK COGRDEINATOR GF CUSAN AYFAIRS
|

SUBJECT: Standby Copability fer the Launching of
Propegenda Leaflet Balloons

1. Tho purpese ef this sencrandus ie to present fer
- your ceasiderstion and epprovel, 6 propomal te undify the
: current status ef the CIA propaganda bellecs lnuaching
| capability, If approved, CIA prepeses to conse the rentel
| of helina end tacks, which will mean that if utiligstion of
i «the enpsbility is desired, either Department of Defease
will have te provide the heltus or it will have te be
. cemercialiy procured at the time. These alternates are

In the fall of 1962 the CIA as pert of
the MONGOUEE progres, ee approved ty the Special Group

| | Gugnentes), developed a covert capability for the leunchtas
| capability consisted of properly outfitted merchant

| | veawel, ostensibly chartered and operated by Cuban exiles.

| sy Beecember 1908 sad in the early sonths of 1963, several
proposals were ande by the CLA to utilize thia espability


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2

but ench time they were tabled for further consideration.
In April 1963 a specific propoasl to leunch propagence
balloons on May Bay 1963 was eubsitted to the Special Group
and on 9 April 1963, the propamal ens disapproved by higher
suthority (cee Mencrandun for Henbers of the Special Croup
from ir. Thomas Parrott, dated 9 April 1963). In view of
the prevailing situation, the CIA proposed to diamatic the

eupability ae tt wos expensive to mnintain aud ite security

was sure to detericrate. However, at the 19 April 1969

meeting ef the Speciel Group, several noubera of the Group
felt thet in a eriaia euch « capability might be useful and
2t we egreed the CIA would stockpile the bsalleoas, helius
and other equipment and be prepared to aunt operations ae
required utilining 0.8, Navy er other vegsels and creve,

to he provided by the Dopnrtaent of Defenme. (See Minutes

ef 18 April 1963 Meeting of the Special Group.) In eccerd-

‘ence with thie directive, the CIA haw stored the required
eqnipwent end ham been keeping helium on bend en # rental
beats. |

3. Tre anmavel expense for snintaining thie capability
on a otandby basi hes besa spprexinately [$20,000 ]or whieh
[918,600/nee beun for the reatel of heliws teake and con-
pressor. A review of the capability leads the CIA to tke

Sant.


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conciusion that the eapebility can be aninteined st an
neceptable degree of rendiness without heving the heliva
tenks on hand, In the event utilization ie desired, the
Departzent of Befeass would be able te provide the heliua
ae well as the launehing vessele and crows or if necessary,
helium could be commercially precured within the tiae
factor necossnsy te ready the other camponents ef the
eyetes, The CIA therefore propesca te tersizate ite
current arrocgexents for the rental of the heliun tanks

4. 1t 1m requested that approval ve grasted for the
CIA to proceed, ac outlined in poregraph 2 above, with the
teruination of rental contrects for helium tanks and con-
presser, — .

1 3-00006

ia!

re: <1)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BECORD

At the request of Mr. McCone, the paper on the covert action

‘program in Italy for FY-1965 was deferred until he had time to study
pit: more corehully _ 4k

2.°  NSAM 303

NSAM 303 was circulated and the new designation for the Special
ate reel 2 sec ENS SN

‘Group 5412, the 303 Committee, was noted.

3.0 (Gort Vietnam — a 7 GE Troe —_ -- . - ~

a. The DOD paper dated 19 May 1964 entitled "North Vietnam
Operations" was discussed at some length.

b. Each annex of the paper was noted. In Annex A, Physical
Destruction Target List, the members concurred in Mr. Vance's recom-
mendation to accept all targets with the exceptions of “1, 5, and 7.
Target 5 was brackered with Nos. 14 and 15 in Annex B and is subject
to the same treatment indicated below.

c. In Annex B, Psychological Operations, the listed targets
were approved except that Nos. 14 and 15 were to be examined further
by DOD and CLA on the operational. level. Mr. McCone stated that’in
regard to the Mo tribesmen (No. 14) this had been a CIA operation for

some months and should be continued to be handled in the same way. He

further felt that tribal operations of this type should be done covertly.

ard.to Annex C, Intelligence Operations, the targets
aoproved and the Committee agreed to Mr. Vance's veto -

, See Special Minute

oe for Additional Item

EvES ONY

This minute also notes the celephonic approval obtained from all
rompers on 30 May for a single cmergency exfiltration operation in and
out of Cuba scheduled for early June.

¥

Jess
7 \
Distribution

lr. Johnson

Mr. Vance

Mr. McCone


cites

SECRET
EVES (ay

22 June 1964_

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of the Meeting of the 303 Committee, 18 June 1964
PRESENT: Mr. Bundy, Mr. McCone, Mr. Vance, Mr. Johnson.

Mr. Mann and Mr. FitzGerald were also present.

“ A general discussion was held on problems arising from increased
activities on the part of organized Cuban emigre groups, independent
adventurers, purported plots to assassinate Castro and the general edginess
and instability on the island. |

None of those present appeared to feel that it was either realistic or
practical to sever connections with or to withdraw support from the two.
principal emigre organizations, those of Artime and Ray.

The recent escapades and overall capabilities of Manolo Ray were
deplored but it was agreed first: that steps should be taken to get the Puerto
Rican authorities to release his ship; second: that he should be promptly
advised in accordance with the stated policy established by the late President
to cease forthwith all activities from the United States Mainland and find _
himself a new base of operations; third: no monies would be forthcoming,
specifically a requested $25,000, until point two above has been accomplished.
No help was to be offered in finding Ray a new Caribbean base. Mr. Mann
was particularly interested that Ray not be encouraged to transfer to the
Dominican Republic because of the fragility of the regime.

The next subject discussed was the recent visit of Major Oliva to both
the Attorney General and Assistant Secretary Mann. It was pointed out that
Oliva is both a zealot and a man of integrity and that his only interest in life

‘is leading a return to his homeland. Any attempts to put Oliva into business

would be expensive and undesirable at this time. It was decided that
Mr. Bundy would ask the Attorney General if he would be willing to dampen

‘Oliva's ardor:

The activities of Artime from Nicaragua were discussed next. Alexis
Johnson pointed out that Artime raids could conceivably provoke Castro into

utilizing Cuban SAM sites; he said this possibility should not be discounted.

But it was also pointed out that Artime's recent sugar mill raid succeeded
in leading Castro to mobilize many persons involved in important sugar
harvesting and thus constituted a successful economic warfare byproduct.


It was estimated that Artime's schedule of. one operation per month was
overly optimistic; one every three months was about all Artime could
accomplish. ‘The decision was to drive home to Artime that his greatest
value was not in hazardous hit-and-run actions but in his survival as a
continuing psychological threat in being,

Mr. FitzGerald, in discussing the current situation in Cuba, stated that
he believed the regime was in considerable difficulty. There has been a
large increase in the number of executions and mass arrests. He also cited
the fact that an entire CIA Pinar del Rio net has been rolled up by Castro's
security forces and the key man executed. The sugar and crop prospects —
were not good, the world price having dropped. Some of the members were
surprised at this picture and stated it did not seem to conform to the daily
bulletins. Mr. McCone said that he would ask for a SNIE on the current
situation in Castro Cuba.

A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld
to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical
of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further.
Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on
notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity
of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy
would call'the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law
enforcement. a

Peter Jessup

Distribution:
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Vance
Mr. McCone


