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104-10103-10112

Dis. 2025 r A UNDER THE PRESIDENT. JOHN Fe KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

hy & 3 ONLY QUALIFIED
= 3 HEADQUARTERS OESK
6 JUDGE INDEXING

PRIORITY

- ACTION: " “Request Headquarters decision on continuation or
termination of Project. AMTRUNK ,

1, . Attached - herewith is an , operational review of and progress
‘report on the AMTRUNK team: for the period of 4 through 31 March.
Station views on the operation are summarized below.

'2. The AMTRUNK operation has the following disadvantages or weak-
nesses: . .

: y is to|their advantage. It
is believed that if the operation were to develop, control would
diminish rather than increase in the advanced stages of the operation,
Since the need for KUBARK assistance will dectease as operational
successes increase. It is believed that _AMIck uid by
Hesitation “selling out" the operation to any one of the major re-
: ical groups at any at he felt it advantageous to
do so. It is believed that, if he is not already doing so, he is
most likely to collaborate with either the Segundo Frente del Es-
cambray, headed by . Eloy, Gutierrez Menoyo, or the MRP faction headed
by Manuel Ray. In the meantime AMICE/27 will attempt to have his
own way with the operation. He hkelieve pat Sed ee becia
attention because of his ZRM. rade connections, “and.
g Ki

“ea her authori if the iperation of KUBARK handling of the]

AMTRUNKS does not progress td his liking. Since Al TRUNK/1, accbrding
to AMCAPE/1,"masterminded" tHis operation in the fliirst place, ijt may
be assumed that the AMTRUNKS |will withhbpld nothing| from AMTRUNK 1.

SZULC L

" eG G- Vf
. . | “a : se Bate 'k | | gily STATE STATE,
Distribution: i rot », £ 1G os “DATE DISPATCHED
eet : : ape 8 PH?
~ . oe Pe ate lt a el eee det late ieliee -
UFGA-8381

' | HEADQUARTERS FILE NUMBER

RETURN To cA
» Bask kground Use Only
'@ Not Reproduce”

paired

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"+ CQNTINUATION OF Poe ee Piero ono. ao rowan
"DISPATCH om at UFGA - 8381

B. This ‘operation has avery high "tlap potential" if any AMTRUNK

agents are picked up by. ; only will

KUBARK stand to suffer, but ODACID will be tied directly in to the
|. operation, - as may. also QKFLOWAGE, by whom AMTRUNK/1 is employed,

csc rae: TTC BEATA recognized as a possibility, if
not a probability, in’ the event any of the AMTRUNK team fall into
Castro's ‘hands.

C. The security of this operation has certain questionable aspects.
' At least six people were told about the operation in varying degrees
prior to the time the team was safehoused. Two of the age:
AMICE/27 and AMICE/14, did ot! piaiisieclori yd Saolve the
t ait inert

ing information .of an unknown nature from his KUBARK con-
tacts. An undercurrent of friction has recently developed between
_ AMICE/14 and AMTRUNK/3 which manifested itself in a fistfight on
29 March, This was precipitated by AMTRUNK/3 who called AMICE/14 !
the Cuban term for a. homosexual, the ultimate insult to a Cuban. , \
' This in turn gives rise .to the question whether AMICE/14, with a :
_ Possible history of homosexual activity (see UFGA-8411), has made
‘such an approach. to AMTRUNK/3, ;

D. The commitments made to AMICE/27 or which AMICE/27 claims were
- made to him are a matter of concern to the Station. This is an
> area over which future misunderstanding or aggravation might easily
develop.
E. The Phase I landing point appears highly risky. It is within
five miles of a cruise missile site radar, and in an area frequently

patrolled by sea. ; RABEL Nune2
_ | |

Sree ie lack “in the AMTRUNK Operation,
possibility of the two operations crossing or targetting on the same
individual will be present.

3. In examining the strengths of the AMTRUNK operation, the AMTRUNK
group as a whole represents superior agent materiel. (ae ‘of the
‘four have’ been dy aces in training. They appear to have a
number o airiy we placed contacts on the inside whom they ex-
pect to be able to call on for assistance, Although they have

+ been out of ,direct touch with a number of these contacts for periods
ranging ton. to two years, this is frequently..the case in this type
of operation The objective of the operation is worthwhile.

and the advantages and
4 .

. 3
quarters’ decision is to continue with the operation at this time, |
operational plans for Phase I and Phase II will be submitted as ‘

formulated. a

END OF MESSAGE )

PN

om 4 Wy
iw

CLASSIFICATION ‘ PAGE NO.

: 20" 53a . USE PREVIOUS EDITION. ‘| . s 'E C RE Tt ["] CONTINUED 2,


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poe ee 7 oO 31 March 1963
| 1 PROJECT ANTRUNK OPERATIONAL REVIEW |

aed

I. STATUS REPORT ON. TRAINING AND PROCESSING, 4-31 MARCH,
a

. The AMTRUNK Team, consisting of AMICE/27, AMICE/14, AMTRUNK/2,
‘and AMTRUNK/3 were safehoused on 4 March 1963 at Safesite #164
on Plantation Key. Andrew S, PARMERS, KUROAR instructor from
headquarters, was already at the training site when the team
was brought there by the two case officers, Irving N. PEGGINS
and Hobart J. VANDEBORN. PARMERS remained at’ the safesite
until 16 March during which time he conducted training in
clandestine. methods and techniques, This training included
security, cover and compartmentation, clandestine communica-
tions, agent spotting, selection, recruitment and management,
and operational planning and reporting. The training included -
group discussion and participation in a series of ‘appropriate
operational situations, several problems, and daily physical
training. During this two.week period, either PEGGINS or
VANDEBORN visited the safesite every day, spending an average
of two or three hours with the group in operational dis-
cussions and processing. During the week of 18 thru 23 March,
‘both case officers spent a majority of the time with the group,
‘debriefing them in detail on their operational contacts, workin
out operational details of their infiltration, and continuing —
their training on an informal basis. The week of 25 through
30 March was spent in PM-type training with emphasis on compass

-and map reading, including two night problems, and on weapons

: familiarization and firing, During the period under dis-

” cussion the AMTRUNK group were all LCFLUTTERED, were assessed
by the KUROAR assessment team, were given an initial series
of immunizations, were issued clothing, were processed for

_ alias documentation, were processed for disguises, and were
further processed on cover and finance problems. The re-
sults of the LCFLUTTER examinations were sent to headquarters
under cover of UFGA-8111, on 13 March 1963. Based on DIR
26430, no further LCFLUTTER is planned at the present time,

wa Transmitted as attachment ."A" to this dispatch is PARMERS
SN report on his training of the AMTRUNK group, transmitted as
saN attachment "B" are the results of the assessments of the
as _ AMTRUNK group, and transmitted as attachment "C" is the
be 4 training report for the week of 25 March.
=O |
area ; II. AMTRUNK MISSION OBJECTIVE.
B~.y : : ,
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A secondary and subordinate ~
e climate prevailing among the
populace in Havana for organizing resistance elements capable
of either passive or active sabotage. This secondary mission
is .exploratory in nature only, through the first phases of
_ the project. In order to accomplish the foregoing missions,
.the operation has been split into two initial’ phases, which -
' will.be compartmented from each other. qlane One_ involves
- the black infiltration of AMTRUNK/2 and e north coast
of Havana province. These two individuals plan to go into

Havana for a period of approximately two weeks, and then
exfil trate pLack from the same point at which _they infiltrated.

ac] Ss
of. Matanzas. These two individuals will likewise_go into -
Havana for a period of several weeks and then exfiltrate black.

These two phases are’ discussed in detail in following para—

make initial contacts among certain select high level militar
figures in Havana. The following paragraphs discussing these
phases are not designed to be operational plans. Detailed
‘operational plans for each phase will be forwarded as de-
‘veloped. -

II, PHASE I.

A. AMTRUNK Personnel 0%

. ier perress is a(21)year old Cuban who’ is mature for his

years, an n some degree experienced in clandestine opera-
tions. He attended C (Catholic Social) JIniversity in Havana for
_ two years, majoring in Social Studies. Prior to Fidel's

' takeover. A/2 was allied to student elements of the Partido
Autentico which upheld the constitution of 1940. He supported
the revolution against Batista till it became apparent that
Castro had cast his lot for a Communist regime. During his
university years from 1959 to 1961 he was actively engaged
in supporting anti-Castro groups with weapons and materials.
Following the Playa Giron invasiond great many in the Havana
underground were rolled up but A/2 avoided compromise. He

ere this _work through 1961 and rena) TY aibbnube,
Yio Air in icanuary[ 1962, Although A/2_ does not consider
himself an al KUBARK he has been cooperative throughout
vtraining. He.is a pensive individual who displays good
- . judgement. His present attitude ‘towards KUBARK appears to
be one ‘of "wait and see". In the meanwhile, he is con-

“ sciedtiously applying himself in preparation for his mission.

eo

[ana - ’ a

a

Mie nr a ERE Sp oO Ree eA Ti ene MEM He


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re

wit is appealing to his.
fellow team members. He worked under A/2 in the underground
aS an action type, principally engaging in sabotage, His

; underground’ work began while he was in secondary school

when in 1958 he supported the revolution against Batista, .
In late 1960 he sided with the counter-revolutionaries and
began full time anti-Castro activities, After the crack
down following the Bay of Pigs invasion he avoided detection
and continued to engage in underground activities. Finally
when the ituation became hopeless he left Cuba by air for
Miami ih fugust) 1962, While A/3 has performed satisfactorily
in his f eusust ) up to date, his performance falls far short
of. the other three members. A/3 feels KUBARK should onl
function as support for this operation and should nov ee

he operation, Fartunately his

BS]
‘role in this operation. is comparatively minor and he appears

willing to comply with whatever A/2 decides. Nevertheless,
| problems in the future

Conduct black infiltration landing at ‘Punta La Jigjira
(Aus 3785 me?) and establish gontact with t farm manager at
/3's father's) farm in the ek: 3885 III,

Coords 99; 614) .) o§

2. Through contacts of A/3 obtain transportation for A/2

to Guanaba or Havana, . a

3. Although not definite, ‘A/3 may remain at nis Gather’ s
farm \and train assets in maritime reception and clandestine

‘communications, Having completed this he would then be ex-

filtrated at Punta Jijira.

4, A/2 will go to Havana and obtain safehouse and operational
support through his contacts, .

5. A/2 will contact and develop two potential assets with
high level connections within the Rebel Army.

6. A/2 will train support and operational assets in clandes-

tine communications as well as arrange for transportation for
his exfiltration..

oF Exfiltration of A/2 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido
CAMS 8885 II).


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4

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aay .

| j ‘

~

INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

1. The tentative date for, the infiltration of A/2 and 3 at
Punta La Jijira is 18 May 4963. The infiltrees will make
their way to fA73's father's} farm one kilometer from the coast

- and from theré A/2 will be provided with transportation to go

', -to Guanabo or Havana.

dD.

-two men will work their way to rm owned 3 from by

2. The exfiltration of A/3 will occur three days after. his
infiltration. This arrangment, as yet, is not definite.

3. ‘The exfiltration of A/2 is tentatively planned for 31
May 1963 at Punta La Jijira or Puerto Escondido, A/3 feels

. that Puerto Escondido would afford a more secure point for

exfiltration but that a reconnaisance of the area would be
necessary. before final decision is reached. Prearranged
telegram signal would indicate his preference, ‘

4. The above dates fall within a favorable moon phase for
maritime operations, In addition the infil-exfil schedule
will allow for an extra margin beyond the 10 days which A/2
considers the minimun acceptable period of time to make his

contacts...

OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA
SEEN CUBA

/3's
father ‘and Santos SUAREZ] located kilometer) from the “point
of infiltratio -06They will’make cdntact wit he manager of
the farm named (Pédro CRUZ.) (CRUZ)is (35 to 40 )¥ears of age,
is married and has an eleme ary school education. He has

1. Following the successful infiltration of A/2 and s (A/8 24
A

6 (ee record of underground activity. A/3 will depend upon
06(C.

* @§ to @/3's father's) farm, ‘He ds @5-50

RUZ]to make the following contacts in order to obtain
ransportation to Guanabo or Havana:

a ;
; . Goman HERNANDEZ \ whg lives brow kilometers away in
o€ (sierra del Arzobispo) (ERNANDEZ owns ‘a small farm and a
oo tcher shopjJin the area and also owns a truck. He is
v8 [37 to 4 years of age, married with six or seven children,
He was jailed for a brief period in the past for counter-
revolutionary activities.
— 06 eer 4 8
b. If (cruz jis uccessful i getting (HERNANDEZ) truck
he will contact |Augusto MACHIN/who o ates a farm. next
i Fears old, married,

no children, wife's name is (Alicia}o He was the(mayor of >
Santa Crug del Norte)in 1954, He ‘owns a jeep.

av Vabakt Di ne di ae ek NB Na NT


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o6

) .¢. Another contact of A/3 is (Ramon CALZADILLE) age 21,

: ‘Single, 8th grade education. e provided support in
the form of food and safehousing tq underground workers
in the past. Hi sgiome address is (Corojo #1, Cotorro, Joe
Havana. He owns (butcher) shop in the Cotorro) ction
of Havana. Subject will be contacted by A/3 ifhe needs

. to be safehoused in Havana.

2. The following assets would be contacted by A/2 after

arriving in Havana. They will be contacted in the order

listed. Their function will be to provide safehouses and

vehicles for A/2, ;
so . 06,08.

"a. (Eisa Maria NEGRIN, 25Jyears of age, born in Havana.
A/2 first met her when she was a student at the University
of Havana majoring in Social Sciences. Presently she
lives with her aunt in Havana and A/2 has maintained cor-
respondence with her, She has helped previously in
providing .safehousing for the underground. She also has

a car. 06, 06

b. Boge, IGLESIAS Betancourt, age 55) bor inGavana.
He is Grveicie who lives and practices/medicine) in
Havana .obcy IGLESIAS] has helped A/2 in underground activi-
ties previously. ‘He has a brother, two daughters and
a son now residing in the U.S, His daughters live in'

. New Jersey and were last seen by A/2 about six months
ago. Subject was a member of the. Partido Pueblo Cubano
an anti-Batista group, and was a professor of (medicine]ae
at the U iversity,of Havana up. until 1961 en he re-

” . ‘signed. IGLESIAS) es also a close griend of (Elsa NEGRIN) 06
0
c.. Ser io MENDEGS® egabout (0) born in Cienfuegos, a
; ormer (senator (1954) "as well as the former head of the
00 (Railroad system in Cuba.| Subject was originally a member
of the Autentico Party dnd claimed,to be a KUBARK con-
fidante during Castro's takeover .°O(MENDEZ}has an apart-
‘ment and two cars and has previously helped A/2 in under-
ground activities. He has a daughter who works for the
government but is not sympathetic to the regime. The 0
. husband-of this daughter, however, Sen Ot for (Che Guevara]
_ 4/2 has maiptained correspondencg with (MENDEZ.
. ra)

|
t
Q
a] - d. ({sabe1 MENOCOD, fe, about Gs,) born in Havana, single.
‘ an ; Subject is an(English) teacher who runs a small private
, ot of toring] school in nglish}’ n Havana, She was A/2's
. -'7 06(Eriglish teacher].and offered support to the underground.

* @GIMENOCOD) lives by herself, has an automobile and is a

close friend of A/2 and his wife.

i

;

’

BBC RET,


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St - 6 - of
7 tt ; 0G oO ;
Te e. (Gloria BANCTALA] age(23-24, horn in Havana, single,
.4 > mother ‘and father d ceased. 6 e attended_the University
of Havana and Villanova from lisse to 1960] She became
a close griend of A/2 during heir student days in-
Havana.oOShe has no record of underground work. She
~. lives in (ee Beach) during the summer. A/2 felt he
—- might attempt to contact her if she was living at
08 (Guanabo ‘Beach} in order to safehouse A/3 there if necessary

3. The following two operational assets will be contacted by
A/2 after he is safehoused in Havana. Their function will be
to spot Army officers disaffected wae the Castro Regime,

. 9 _ 0
a. (Gorge aus) age Gate 30s early 40S) married. Subject
holdS the rank of (Captain n the Rebel Army but is ‘not
presently on active duty.0He was a friend of Castro's
during the revolution and A/2 claims he,still maintains
some contact with Fidel. He also clai ALS]has been
working in a limited fashion against Fidel and was
originally associated with the MRR and Monte Cristo
groups (VALS) prinacy Satorecs has been trying to or-
ganize his.frie gs within the Rebel Army against Fidel.
A/2 feels (wats) ¢ a very discreet individual who has
not been identified as an anti-Castro organizer bY of
the G-2. A/2 claims to be a close friend of (VALS) and
rusts him completely, 'A/2 saw and talked to (VALS) in
04 962} price to his flying out of PBRUMEN as a refuges§ .

STE PEE

. ts) re)
; ° ose DUARTE Oropesa) age early (40s ,)servea in the
od(u:s. Army}during World War II. Accdrding to A/2,
” _ 06\{DUARTE)was made commander of the [Sth Military District)
y Camilio Cienfhiegos JO8Following the disappearance of
06 Cienfuegos] (DUARTE) gas removed from the post and pre-
sently lives on an Army pension as well as royalties
rom property confiscated by the government. He said
O0¢ (DUARTE )started working against Castro within the MRP
under Manuel RAY. For a timehe was the(military | o¥
secretary of the MRP and became quite involved i
plotting against Fidel.ofA/2 also stated that it was
rumored at the time that UARTE was working for the
RP that he was also a KUBARK agent. Eventually
Ob (buanrn) as placed on a G-2 suspect list, but according
“to A/2 DUARTE) S able to evade detection. Subject
has good connections within the Rebel Army and re-
-volutionary government, A/2 trusts this individual
and has confidence in him as_a potential operational
* -t- . lead in spite of conflicting reports which mention
96 (DUARTE) as an opportunist.

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fo, oe.
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. E. COVER AND COMMUNICATIONS

24

. . ss rm
1° e@, A/2 may also attempt to contact the following
operational asset if he has an opportunity to make.
contact,: . 6 so, ,
a 06
: Gester RODRIGUEZ) age Gate 30s early 40s,] married,
. ‘former member of the Partido Pueblo Cubano. He
-fought with Raul Castro in the Sierra Cristobal Area.
Following the Castro takeover he served as (head of Jo
--one of the military zones within Havana province, .
Eventually ,he was given gesser assignments and A/2
thinks he®is now working fin INRA) in Oriente Province,
' He claims DRIGUEZ)assisted his underground group
. during. 19 by supplying trucks for transporting
weapons and materials. .

1. Cover |

A/2 will. be issued documentation Claiming he is an employee

of a local brewery in Havana. A/3 on the other hand will be
issued documentation as a bus driver within the city of Havana.
‘Both will also be issued drivers licenses and additional

‘items such as immunization certificates, Cuban receipts, etc,

' The two men will also-be outfitted with disguises.

2. Communications

Primary communications will be established through an SW
system. Both men will be given SW instruction and will be
issued accommodation addresses in Miami. This instruction
and these addresses in turn will be passed on to the recruited
.assets in PBRUMEN for use as the operation develops. Pre-
arranged signals will also be devised for use by the team via
. telegram to indicate their progress and confirm their place
and time of exfiltration. Both members will also be given an
OWVL system to provide them with quick instructions in case

of an emergency, Se .

OPERATIONAL AND SECURITY EVALUATION
eee eee a

1. The operational aspects of Phase I portrays a mission which
has considerable potential but also considerable risk, The
area of infiltration is within five miles of a cruise missile
site and its accompanying radar. .In addition boat patrols are
.known to work this portion of the coast at frequent intervals.

/ Once: infiltrated the team will not have to travel far before

heir first contact. However, A/3 is leary of Staying at his
ther's farm/for any length of time and he does not want his

zee father}to know of his presence in Cuba. For this reason the

. problem of what .to do wi'th'A/a=

"farm will not be able to serve as a safehouse, A/2 plans on
leaving the farm the same day lands. This presents the
On approach is to take A/3

PCA SRN aide ‘,

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_ rebuttal to these remarks is that |DUARTE)
* the past and when the chips wer

td Guanabo or Havana and safehouse him. . This, however, may
jeopardize the operation because A/3 lacks the maturity and
patience necessary to stay put while A/2 goes about his busi-
‘ness, He may take advantage of his visit to Havana to under-
take a clandestine assignment on his own, When A/2 and 3
step ashore in Cuba, control will vanish. Fortunately A/2

. -has .a sufficient resource of judgement to go about his busi-

ness competently, Unfortunately A/3 gives no such indication.
For this reason an attempt will be made to steer A/3 towards
developing assets around his father's farm)with maritime
reception capabilities. ca

2. .A/2, on the other hand, appears to have a sufficient -numbe:
of supporting assets tg ovide for his*“safety while in Havana.
However, he has not seskly and UARTE) for over a year, In
addition both men are presently outside of the Cuban Army
organization and this position may dampen their e ctiveness
in recruiting within the Army. ; Station reports 6 DUARTE) con-
flict with A/2's evaluation ofthis man. While there is no
evidence to verify that ANTE is pro-regime, thexe has been
a recent report on him from AMLEO/3 which claims DUsRTE) is an
opportunist who might work for th ha ghes§ bidder 06 4/ "s

Ic S assisted him in

own he continued to aid him
in his underground activities.olThis still leaves a question
mark next to the worth of( DUARTE which unfortunately can only
be resolved by direct contact between him and A/2, There are

. other security implications which should be discussed in this

evaluation, Both A/2 and A/3 cannot be considered truly se-
curity conscious. While safehoused A/2 wrote a letter to a
contact in Miami which was to be transmitted by his case
officer. The letter gave an indication that A/2 was seeking
contacts in Havana and conveyed the impression that a trip
was in the dfing. A/2 has written several other letters
not seen by his C Os which might have given the same impres-
Sion -—ddnon the other hand talked quite 1 is
is on tot

: at he Olning
operation that would take them

R .

first to Miami and chem to Cuba. Once there they would go
to his (father's farm }a d_ begin to make contacts. A/3 also
stated that a man naited (DUARTE) Would be one of their con-
tacts. This loose talk Coupled with A/3's attitude that
KUBARK exists only to serve him makes him a Marginal candi-

_ ,date for this operation, However, if A/3 is exfiltrated
. -three -days after his entry into Cuba, the operation will
'. gain his usefulness and eliminate some of the risk he

presents.

Let manta pee

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seirjunjancniiehieeisc


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| i . _ -~2-

1 3.’ - The above evaluation stresses the operational and security
‘ ' weeknesses in this operation. In contrast to these weaknesses
are the positive considerations of this mission. A/2 has the
: oo intelligence, competence, and confidence to approach and re-
- cruit two assets with the potential for developing anti-regime
' operations. at a high level within the Cuban Army. The results
‘which ‘these anti-regime activities can accomplish is a matter
for conjecture but it appears that they carry potential.
Nevertheless, if the operation continues, it will bear close
watching in terms of security and control for these factors
will jeopardize the operation as well as KUBARK's position
if not properly contained.

IV. PHASE It
A. AMTRUNK PERSONNEL
. ans

year old PBRUMEN citizen from a wealthy hig family.
His father, now deceased, was a prominent individual in Law
and politics and was at one time a senator. A/27 himself -
graduated from law school in Habana and was a practising
lawyer. In 1959 he became legal adviser to Camilio Cienfuegos.
Following the disappearance of Cienfuegos in October 1959,
4/27 began to engage in counter-revolutionary activities.
In May 1961, at which time he held the position of Under-
Secretary of Public Works, he felt that his underground
‘activities. had come to the attention of the government and
he took refuge along with his wife in the Venezuelan Embassy.
* He was given safe conduct from the Embassy to PBPRIME in late
1961. Subject is intelligent, articulate, and highly moti-
vated. He has some experience in’ counter-revolutionary
activities and has demonstrated an excellent capacity for
learning clandestine techniques. He has a very large ego,
and aristocratic pride, is very sensitive, and is quick to

SS ere re

take offense tent Set bank to state that he has a low opinion.
‘of KUBARK, that he is not 2 ' e) Le deeply re
- sonts2nv implication that he is works wUBARK He
states that he is working for the overthrow of the present

regime in his own country and that he will accept KUBARK aid
and advice but will not accept KUBARK control, His attitude
although not hostile, is frequently critical, and he pre-
sents a difficult handling problem.

.2. - AMICE/14 is a 26 year old Cuban citizen who is also a
7 _ Yaw graduate of the University of Havana, He has been in-
; _ ‘volved much of his adult life in clandestine activities, —
Subject arrived. by small boat in June 1961 in PBPRIME .He
is highly motivated, is intelligent and objective, and has '
».& very highly developed security consciousness, developed
from his counter-revolutionary experiences. From January
to July 1961 he made J ween ti ltration/exfiltration
‘trips to and from Cubg tae, and has an excellent .
‘ B,area. He is easy to work

AGG

a

i

SS.

SP Ripe seen, Ll


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ate / . Tet - 10

to with and has evidenced “hittle of the hostilities or anti-  -
KUBARK feelings shown by AMICE/27 uo

“a . -AMTRUNK/4, Subject is a (49 year old. fisherman from the

; o8(earacnac area who took refuge in PBPRIME in February 1963,

He had previously assisted A/14 in infils and exfils and will
_be used as a maritime guide,

B. TASKS

1. Make preliminary black maritime infiltration by small

boat onto Cinco Leguas Key (AMS Map 4085 III) to contact

_ individuals who. formerly assisted AMICE/14 in infil-exfil
. ‘operations. So, : _ .

- 2. . Through contacts on Cinco Leguas Key, organize a ratline
into the mainland, including making arrangements for trans-

portation into Havana, 7 . ] !

3. Through the mechanism established above, move to Havana
and obtain safehousing and operational support.

4, Make ‘all necessary arrangements for subsequent exfil-.
tration and future infiltrations, —

5. Approach and recruit two key individuals with contacts
among important military figures,
6. Establish internal and external communications.

7.. Exfiltrate from Phase II.
C. INFIL-EXFIL PLANS

ntative] 1 infiltrate AMICE/27, AMICE/14,
INK/4 into the Cinc Leguas Keys area’ on or about

‘23 April, Subjects will take a small boat with silent motor
ER cys area and remain in the area for approximately
' three days, during which time they. will remain black, keap
the boat hidden in the mangroves, and contact individuals
known to them on Cinco Leguas. They will make arrangements
with contacts at that point to re-activate contacts of AMICE/14
on the mainland at Casualidad (Map 4085 III, Grid Square 1747)
and contacts in the town of Marti and Cardenas. Plans will be
yorked om: his time wi t 2.32CON fal

pee t OL |.

nd ( ‘ again go in Cinco Leguas and expect to be
‘passed on through these contacts to Havana, Subjects will
exfiltrate by small boat on or about 26 April and will be met
by the parent craft in open water to the north of Cayo Cruz
del Padre (Map sheet 4085 IV).


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mo _ oo Lo : . | -~ill-

D. OPERATIONAL ASSETS WITHIN CUBA _ . OS _

‘ 1. Cayo Cinco Leguas. This key is used for production of |
charcoal and salt. Residents are reported solidly anti- ;
Communist. A/14 has two contacts here that he used prevjously
for infils and exfils.. One is_'"Tango" (Garcia Lezcano.) 9 06.0

- Tango is a brother of (EuStiquiano Garcia Lezcano (201-307338))"
‘whom-A/14 wanted to use as a guide in this operation, but who
was already being utilized elsewhere\, The other contact is
the owner of ‘the(Salina (salt drying peds)} ra A/14 has not yet
been able to. recall this individual's name ©

2, Finca Casualidad. This area is directly south of Cinco
Leguas,.on the mainland. Key contacts here are (Antonio o¢ °
“Garcia)\(not related to Tango, above) and (Pablo Lopez) both
of whom have small farms in the area, ol

3. Town of Marti. -Contact here is''Pe igo", LNU. Subject is
about 50:years old, is employed bylLINRA}’ and has a jeep which
was used previously by A/14 for operational purposes.

; . a oO , _ 0 .

_ Git City. of Cardenas. _Contact is [Pedro Barbi} ‘owner of the

oo te Marino restaurant Subject is a close friend of A/14
who assisted him previously with transportation for maritime .
‘receptions .ob(Barbi) would be used to take A/14 and A/27 to
Havana. Owns a car. ‘

5. City of Matanzas. A-14 has a friend here naned (Carlos; 06
Pedraza who also ssigted A/14 in underground activities in
1961. Subject is(60 years old, married, and is_a forma
oo o8 (ot public works) in e city. Subject has a son (Carlos) ow.
_ in New York City 2 Gearazaywilt be contacted for transpor-
tation to Havana. Owns a~car.

'6,. Varadero. "Pio" Pineiro) Sans a car and was formerly a

. close friend of A/14, “Subject was formerly active in the
underground*4nd might be_used by A/14 in the event he could
. ot use (Barbi or (Pedraza} for obtaining transportation. 06, &
& (@ineird is the brother of the communist |Manolo Pineiro, aka
"Barba Roja",\ but is reported to be anti-communist himself.

7. Havana ob |
a. (Adolfina (Suarez) wore J Subject is single and lives

with her mother. Is friend of AMICE/27 (possibly mis-
;,, tress) and can pPkused as safehouse keeper. Subject is

ob
- ’ + 1) sister of (Rafael (Suarez) More) a \Commandante inthe Navy |
. “who, according to A/27, was at one ‘time(chief of naval
ob operations -) His present assignment or Iocation is

unknown.

wate Tee:

mae ace ai opti sl


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4
| Se remained there 10 days, infiltrating back into
¥
é

GU

a. bk. (Manuel (Gar a)_ Sanchez g Is a ‘close friend of A714

and is uncle of{A/1l4's wifeJ*°Can be used for operational
support, a car, and safehousek oping. Was formerly a Lt.
in Oriente under (Calixto Garcia\?®but no longer in army.

_ A/14 believes he is now an adminstrator of some type of

. industry in Havana, “ol

c. (Maria Josefa (Isalgue) ) Subject is aunt of A/14
and can be used as safehouse keeper. She is single, lives
alone except for ten cats. Does not have a car, Was
formerly a teacher but now has a pension and does not work.

a, . o

a. (Gonzalo (Lopez) dé la Torre.} Subject is a relative of
A/27 and. can be called on for ops support or safehousing..
Subject has a car, is married, no children, is in his
sixties. a

; ae _— ‘ :
7 Bebe. Orozsa)l, To be recruited by “A/14 as his prin-

cipal agent in Havana. Subject and.A/14 previously worked
together in the underground ,06 ozco/was in the Sierra

‘ with Castro and also fought in Camaguey. He resigned from
the army in February, 1959, although he has maintained many
contacts within the army. Was one time active in t o6
Movimiento Democratico Martiano and was-a friend of (Capt.
Bernardo Corrales/who was shot by Castro in Pinar del Rio.
Subject came to PBPRIME in April 1961 with A/14 to obtain

Cuba without his absence having been known i the authori-~
ties. Was responsible for safehousekeeping(Vargas Gomez}
for nearly one month when authorities were searching for
him. Will be used for intel collection and spotting on
defectable army officers, He is also known to A/27, but
not well. A/14 was last in touch with rozco Hy letter

:, about two months ago. ob

Gu Diaz. Subject to be recruited by A/27

as principal agent. Would be used for operational in-
telligence and spotting among disaffected rmy officers,
Would be kept entirely compartmented from(Orozco}o% Guin

is an army Comandante, now managing a large INRA farm
complex outside of Havana. He is known to A/27 and A/14,
‘both of whom believe he can be contacted safely. He is
anti-Communist) and is one of the group of Camilo Cienfuegos
officers contapted by A/27 in early 1961 to join in an
overthrow of.the government. ;

” t :
. Co. tlefemda Tn Cube Gial - 1 Pelee.

she ek
bows LRA BhswyiverMt

14-0000 .. w
vek . oe ' +
: 3 ‘ , a

io g. Target personalities who are suspected of being .dis-
~ ' y affected and on whom A/27 and A/14 will attempt to gather

if ' ‘information in Havana are as follows:
1. Comandante "Macho" Parra
2. Cdte. Oscar Guerra
3. " Jose Pinares .
4. Capt. FNU Lawton
5. "Manuel: Avila
.6,. Cmdte. Rene de los Santos
7... " Pedro Miret
8.. Capt. Juan Nuiry
9. Cmdte. Rafael Suarez More

10. Capt. Fernando Fernandez Superville ©
11. Capt. FNU Guerra Matos ,
to . 12. Capt. Sandy Olivares
yo . ; . li, -* Jose Fernandez Alvarez

through JMWAVE RI and

In a majority of cases

to indicate the subjects
In the case of Jose Pinares however,

\ e is completely loyal to the regime,

This information was passed on to A/27 and A/14, RI files

AMICE/27 and. AMICE/14 will live black during their entire Stay
‘in Cuba. They will be equipped with alias documentation and
with disguises. Both of them have Previously lived in the
Havana area and know the city well. They will be trained in
Secret Writing (SW) and will Plan to train at least two and
‘possible ‘three agents in Havana. in SW, prior to their own
\exfiltration, In addition, it is Planned to train A/27 and
»A/14 in OWVL,. At the time of infiltration, exfiltration plans
‘will have been laid on with the agents. In the event that a
Change in time or location of exfiltration becomes necessary,

- an OWVL message could be sent to the agents. Any urgent and
immediate message which might have to be sent by the agents
-during their short Stay in Havana would be on a prearranged
Open code system by commercial telegram. Such a System will
be worked out to cover several possible contingencies. In-
ternal communications of whatever net is organized by A/27
and A/14 will be a ranged by courier, cut-out, live and dead
drops, — . ; a

g e
the training personnel who have been in
close contact with these individuals that both agents are

secutaelcnltaiate et, ot

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Vv.

aa, According poor following principle, which he

~ m4 -

highly - ‘motivated and strongly anti-communist, this point “will
remain basically unresolved since it is almost certain that
A/27 would retuse a second LCFLUTTER. sxamsna tion if asked.

Although “he says “that “he aid aot eiae any details
of the operation, he does admit to having discussed it in

._ very general terms with two individuals whom he named at

- the time of the. LCFLUTTER test. One of these oe
7rinGutserremieneze and one, 2 fracnd of vargas. Gomez..

Tied oe same Ususpre 6s v0. Leet Ce 2 0

3.° AMICE/27 has not seen his contacts in the army for the .
past two years. Although it is difficult: to assess how well
he knows various persons in the military about whom he speaks,
‘lit is the case officer's opinion that few of these contacts
might be considered really close. .AMICE/14 has been out of
direct touch with his operational contacts since July ‘1961.

4s The infiltration into Cayo Cinco Leguas is dependent
upen having a good guide in the boat. At this time, Phase
‘Il is awaiting the recruitment of AMTRUNK/4 as guide.

5. Control over AMICE/27 and AMICE/14 is ‘basically lacking.
Some control can be exerted through the implied threat of .
‘withholding support to the operation. Control however will
remain tenuous at best and A/27. will continue to be a dit-
ficult handling problem.

6. On the. positive side of ‘the ledger is the calibre of the
-agents, both of whom are well educated, astute, and “ine ope
motivated. Both asents have expe ce in Cclandes i oper
jong. aperticularly A/14 who has “nade” a number of 5
clandestine entries and exits and has many operational con-
tacts. To date both have performed in a superior manner in _
training. — .

FUTURE PLANS .

Duringthe week of 1 through 6 April, the team will receive
maritime instruction, During the week 8 through 13 April,
they will receive SW training, possibly OWVL training, dis-
guise training, and further operational planning sessions.

on

"COMMITMENTS

a_commitment from ODYOKE . was enunciated during his


14-0000

democratic principles; ODYOKE does not-desire to impose a

government of its own choice upon Cuba".. A/27 has made a
. big point of discussing this “commitment”, It is apparent
. that he intensely dislikes (or fears?) Batista and his
{followers. It is also apparent that in his mind he links
oe / Batista and KUBARK, and fears that KUBARK would back Batis-

pe ip: : / tianos ina post- -Castro government.

; {

whe ( government which is anti-Communist and which operates on ~
et
toi

YS,
o/s

_
ae
a
~~

y} 3. Another commitment which AMICE/27 claims to have discussed

| in ZRMETAL is that ODYOKE should give “official recognition"
‘ to members of a conspiracy which culminates in a successful
' coup d'etat, following the coup, in order that. these individual:
i will not be treated as political criminals by a future regime,
This means recognition of an individual's participation in
‘;the conspiracy, not a promise of recognition of a specific
/ government formed by the conspirators themselves.

_ 4, ‘Discussion of the above "commitments" has been pressed
‘several times by A/27. PEGGINS has not agreed to any of these

commitments with A/27. However, A/27 feels that the com-

mitments have already been made by ODYOKE in ZRMETAL. PEGGINS

has told A/27 that he will report these "commitments" back

to ODYOKE to determine if, in fact, ODYOKE considers them as

commitments. ;

hrough PEGGINS has

en ei A ag eet” ee

while on the mission,..jhei LJ PBPRIME..
assisted for_a “reasonable ‘amount a tine financial
PEGGING declined to state what that time would be or hoW much
financial assistance would be involved.

6. One further negative commitment has been discussed between

. ‘mitment will be made at this time to support any internal
\) \ group organized by the AMTRUNKS with weapons or explosives
\ *\-land that this extends specifically to no promise to support
Wy | ettye sabotage with demolitions. jee

\ | PEGGINS and A/27. PEGGINS has stated to A/27 that no com-_


