ft ‘+ -
124-10185-10099) - | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

a

®

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Comptroller
| VIA

SUBJECT ‘Agency Surport to the U.S. Scerct Service
| _ (U8SS) fer National Renocratic (20-14 July
j- 1972) and National Republican (21-24 August
: - 1972) Conventions : Hote

es

Acting Geputy Director for Plans

oe

a

; 1. This menorandun is for the information of the Executive
- Director/Cozptroller. ;

2. Authorization for CIA support to the U.
for the Renocratic and Renublican National Conve
‘tained in a mwecorandus of 7 Avril 1272 from Chis
the CCl which was concurred in by the ADLP and appr
“PCI on 10 April 1572 (cepy attached).
. JFK CYB)
. 3. On 13. Arril 13 72 she(cos, 1 WH Namdimet with the dard
USSS representative and ‘ir. “astrovito cf USSS beadquarters to  gete
discuss prelininary : plana ing for (Station wast Gai sinport to the G8)

USS prior ta and during wusicct CoAVSRLLORS » unm oLy Amril Po7?
tho(C/ensess and c/TI/LSN met with “rr. Hastrovito at Usaderartess
V ' arene . , ease :
> ») to [rplesent the prelininary plonning agreed uvon in Hand and

to determine the extent of Headquarters suppert required by the
USSS, ;

4, The basic arreenent cutually concurred in by the USSS
and licadquarters representatives provided that:

ee cy) va, (Station wi/#iast] would conduct naase traces, on
all Cubans of interest to the USSS,

be. CIA Headquarters would conduct name traces on
all other forcizn born persons of interest to the USSS.

ec. CIA would keen the USSS infotr cd of any events
in the Caribkean and Latin American areas that would
haye any bearing ow the USSS protective sission during
the convention periods. This would taclude briefings
on Cuba and Cuban policies toward the United States. and
(On activities of Cuban intellicence oper rations which
could affect the security of the conventions.

tome *

2) 00576


yr WY

(®) S. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffor office

aC) . = co ,
SEONG, (Station W/Miani nas arranaed the rental of a safehcuse
about five minutes fron coaventicn center

a. Coverage of Latin Ancrican exile croups in the

United States would be the resnonsinbility of the FRI
since CIA had ccoased the extensive coverage fornerly -
tarceted against these grouns since it Was now considered .
an internal security function. .

. oe

of \Station wi/‘tiaaill a with the USSS Chief of Comsaunica-

tiofs, Statien persoancl and a ileaduuarters representative, It

Was-agrecd that name traces would te handled by Miani security
PRES

Ficld office courier fron the LESS tower office until the VSss

ostablishec cox ‘munications links frea their connand post in

convention center, at which tine trace requests would be sont

from the connand pest tc uSSS headcuarters and relayed to CIA 150)

Headquarters = Guban nane traces are relayed to\Station wif: fond}

ty the Signal Center and non-Cuban traces are conducted [ty EH/ COS Je)
Leplics to USSS requests on non-Cubans are ceordinated with

(ci/s6.] JPEG)

which will provide a

secure and nearby meeting site for USSS and Agency persennal,

This. safchouse will Le availaule just prior to and during both 9
conventions. A Headquarters orficer will T2Y (to “taniljericr to C

the conventions ana remain until the couventions adjourn to

assist tie Station in providing the support descrived in paragrayh
four above, _—
JFKOYO)
USSS in

7. Station we/iawifis in daily contact with the
Miami, utiljzinc bulier office as\a meeting sitc when necessary. T!
location of(Station #H/iiani pas net been revealed to

1 come ai ed
the USSS. - (Station ( is located sone 1) oetied Fe= ‘buffer office.) | yeeayhé)
co)

1a

Additionally, the(iiiani Security Field Gf£fice}maintains nornal
liaison with the cal USSS sijami unit.

+
v

8. The Staticn understands that no personael will be presen
at the convention hall, that they vill not rrovide any egquinment
unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any otner
facilities other than the Safehouse described in paragraph Six,

an mee
Chain

, ial eke tare : |


r) oo é.., ‘1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

t

-You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,

I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.

' These funds may still be possibly held in a special

account for that use. This is one of the areas where

TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would

have the details as this was handled through the Executive.
Director's office and of course Angleton would have

additional information.

Signed

PeiN-he

Chief
Missions and Programs Staff

(7

E2 IMPDET -CL BY 357737.
EVES Ry os
uy \ COS82

,
+s - oo, . 8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR : Deputy Director for.Operations

SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment
. . to the Agency :

e

1, Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John
Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to
the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was
non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with
‘the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the
- President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the
Agency ¢ on this subject:

a, Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
Helms,

oO b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,
' General Cushman (see atiached telephone conversation),
Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

. ; c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels
were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
the CI Staff to Mr. Fred Fielding for Mr, John Dean.

3, The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since
‘it gives the flaver of White House concern, It took several days to
uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-
_ ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.
‘The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were
coordinated with the DCI. After a few months, interest in this sub-,
ject died down and we did not pursue it further. |
. 1
4, Please relurn the attachments when they have served your
purpose, Vi

\
E2IIMPDET CL BY 0545)?
. . yA
b. | | 2,

CD
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Co

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ne

5. lLalso include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation SRO)
Committee and Staff prepared by|Richard Ober. | The original
meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert “Mardian
and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury andvit is always ~
possible that he might draw in the Agency. : .
JERS)
6. Before appointing[Ober}to the IES Staff as the Agency
representative, I had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-
sided over by Mardian, Iexpressed the view to Director Helms
that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-
perience, Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split

-between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. Ona confidential basis

one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission, This
was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
the Bureau,

A eo. | Jee are) |

; ames Angleton |
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

PTT , . - q
SECRE . gassed
. . st

MEMOPANDUM FOR: Beputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT / >: Counter Intgelligence Staff,
Police Group Activities SONS)

" JeKOY®) JEKON8)

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, (Police Grou: compre) | .
is responsible for Staff coordination within the-Office
of the Deputy Director for Gperations for activities an
roqrans involvin assistancelto foreicn nolice/securi ty ‘eK OIE):
“forces for the nurvose of exnloitins such activities and |~
programs for intellisence DUrvOSeS «

. FROMO) a. -
2. GI pgjn aintains liaison with the Office, cf Public
Safety, Acchey for Tuternational Teveaiomsnt MB/ ATS

JP and its training facility, the International Police Acadeny
9) (IPA). CIA) also administers and suvervises Project

IWEN-IN- and its trainine rromrietary facility ,MEN-172.
ENEN-168 An addition, CI PG coordinates a joint OPS/ATD Tecinteal | Jre eyes)

Services Division, Central reso EMEC pond (TSU/CIA) |
Technical Investiqdations rourse | CI (@Glprovides euidan
(ce) and counse] to the Area PivisioNs in matters vertainine
ue gho(holice/s ecurity functions and activities.| Snecific
yee” details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISON “ITH OPS/ATD

any eae witn OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a
daily basis and consists principally of:

_ A. exchance of information on IPA participants, some
of whom later attend IDEN+172 courses and who are
of interest to Asency cornonents,

B.-arrancine for inclusion of Agency sponsored partici-
pants in IPA/OPS/AID trainine prograns,

C. arra micine for IPA/OPS/ATY briefiacs and tours for 5 PKCD)
foreirn volice/securi ty renresentativies spoasered_
by CIA Area Divisions, ] ee 00537
; . ~~ ‘ 0; wel ¢
ory yee : Racittgpoey cL BY yk rs


L Dd. obtaining biographic and assessment data.on
mo, IPA/OPS/A ID trainces,.

ER. providing general information pertaining to

| police/security orga nizations, activities, equip-
ment, and personalities requested by Agency _

| operating components ,

: F, coordinating the Agency's narticination in t!
| Teciaical Investica tions Course desimned to
faniliaricze the trainees vith the techniaue
; required to nronerly investierate terrorist
activities wherein explosives have been utilized,

obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve. .
abroad, At one time as many as 59 CIA employees
-were covered in Latin America, the Far East: and

Fg

alas

| Sm) Africa. Tris total has heen reduced durin the
C _past several years to 19 servine in Thailana, *
' HH, arranging contact betveen Desk officers and OPS/AIN
sponsored 1 narticina ints. .
~ La nebivn ot |
: * ner,
nv Nl NIL . WADDTTN p 7 eh cM“ :
PROJECT IDEN-171 PROPRIRTARY IDEN-172- de “ IDEN-158
; ns rn . . Sells cates
CEN-172 Training Acades is @ comercial intermrise. Cline
It was incornorated under to laws of the State of “larvland “li!
in 1952 and conducts its: business in the Nis trict of OSE
~Golombia., It is engaged principally in training foreign Consuyi
-(. police/security nersonnel under an overt contract vit ; Seevis
‘) OPS/ATD, ‘and selling police/socuri tv onninment to forsien \e
police/security personnel and orsanications .IDEN- 172 also Nae

provices special training programs and bricfinas to |

foréicn nolice/security nersonnel of interest to Agency

operating divisions, It provides hiosranhic and assessnen
data on trainees to country desks. PecentlyIDEN-172 has

vit acquired thd capability of providing training to foreign

J police/security personnel in VIP protective security

| WS [ for Chiefs of State.

{ “(® CIA personnel under this cover will not he :replaced as Je
such and all will be phased out by June 1974, (49)

-

yee
oy

-aits field stations,

poe

COMMENT

. cifps Goes not maintain direct contact or liaison
with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,
‘at hone or. abroad | When the need arises, such contact is
sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or WEN-17fei.thout
divulging Agdney interest.) OPS/AID has such contaéts
at home and ahroad because of the nature of its activities
(training of forcizn nolice/security personne] at hore
and abrow), and its Public Safety nrocrans around the
world. JOEN-172 has such contacts at here - lecal and
federal level - hecause its nersonnel are nersenally
acquainted with law enforcevent of Sicers througout tie |
United. States. embers of the [DEN-172 staff (not identified).
as CIA) have appeared as auest lecturers at suci federal
institutions as tne U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.

Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Enforcement Division.

JreEWGO)

JPR.OME

3. In. addition to the liaison sentioned in the |
previous paracranh, (the Acency maintains liaison in warying
degrees with forcign police/security organizations through
Tne existence and extent thereof,
hovever, is decision to de nade py the Area livision,
and is not the responsibility of CI/?G. yee ue)

. 4, The CIA station as a member of the Country Tean in
Montevideo, Uruguay, may have had some contact with Jan
Mitrione, vho was murdered by the Tunanaros., Jan litriones,
an experienced and respected law enforcenent officer, was
a bona fide OPS/AIN officer assianed to the AID -nission
in Uruguay, and was never a CIA employee or acent.

JFKUY]

ie]
u“

ACS owen. | AP ECILS)
ete analeton

Chief, tounter Intelligence Staff
'
4
J .
4
Io
°° OOSS9
OTT ; ii

ut
. :
Cha nod vise

a

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program ‘

-1. The MHCHAOS program-is a worldwide program for
clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign
efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic

. U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
-,North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the
Arab fedayeen.

2. .-The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-
ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection
purposes.- Agency efforts dre foreign. Foreign-oriented
activity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel
abroad in connection with their extremist activity
and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile
foreign powers or with forcign extremist groups
have been briefed and debricfed by Headquarters
officers. The bricfing has included appropriate

‘operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist creden-
. tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and
dispatched abroad for PCS assignnents as contract
agents, primarily.sources offered for such use by ,
the FBI. When abroad they collect information re-
e sponsive to MICIL\OS program requirements, as well

as other Agency requirements. They are thus used
primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Con-
munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-
ground and their particular access permits. It

ve yun: _ should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the

oer MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is

: ¢ similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.

'3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
described above. The program.is and has been managed so
as to achieve the Maximum feasible utilization of exist-
ing resources of the Operations Directoraté. No assets

i:

COto2

Sanat

VWihiatiits Titlt, _— yt . “eh ,
SENSITNE RULE seh SOURCES SEIS ST] ee

eee VE
— a : ” SECKE T


SECRET,

6) a CORPORATE COVER

“1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the
placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover
of bona fide U.S, companies abroad and in the U.S. This
process involves the selection of companies; research on
their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts -
with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency; - -
arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the
companics, including letters of understanding; funding of
salavics, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor~
' ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the
cover use, The overall objective is to match tho individual
being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner
that will ensure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro-
tection of the company integrity.

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover
is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in
47 foreign countries and 12 are located in the United States.
' To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel are’ rem
searching and monitoring approximately 250 to < 300 companies
at any given time,

3, To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating
company, and to preserve the Agency’s onerational equity in
the event of exposure. of an individual under cover, it has
been established policy that no more than two individuals
would be furnished cover by the same conpany.- At the present
time this ratio is confined to upproximately 25% of the total
number of companies now being used and efforts are unde
way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one
individual per company.

4, In addition to the primary corporate cover function
described in: paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing
contact with two U.S,. car rental firms and two U,S, .credit
ecard firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being
used by 34 individuals. .

SFE 08


DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-
Stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-
vide cover: for Agency personnel in the United States
and abroad and to provide an attributable source for
Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-
ment of Agency or U.S, Government interest. _ The facilities
comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover,
payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscel-
laneous support such as title to property,‘ funding, etc.;
Gl sole~proprietorships providing status and operational
cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207
non- registered companies providing support for high risk
operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reim-
bursements, and proprictary funding. _

2, 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational
activitics are payrolied by the facilitics, an essential
procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salarics with- .
out documenting the Agency as the souree.. , :

3. The facilities provide a capability for passing
Agency funds]to 30 Agency proprictaries and 97 bona fide
ahaes on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts
Jocated in 36 banks throughout the United States provid
the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

SADT
Vint, al


e covtiontt FORM NO. 10 6 snes
MAY 1962 EDITION

. O54 GER, REG.:NO. 27
{ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 4 Assoc. Dir.

\ M d 1- Mr. J. Cochran, Jr. Der AD Adm, —
. 1l- Mr. R. J. Gallagher ‘Asst. Dies
\ emoran um 1 - Mr. W..R. Wannall Admin, —_—___
. . Ci - Mr. W. 0. Cregarj erm Afters
_DATE:. July 24, 1975 Files & Com. —
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan ldent, —_____
_ 1- Mr. A. B. Fulton acaetien ——
1- Mr. J. G. Deegan Laboratery —___
. 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford Legal Coun. __
1 - Mr. F. S. Putman Hosea ihe
1 -~ Mr. J. W. Redfield _ Tratning

1 -~ Mr. T, Jd. MeNiff Telephans Rew —

"My menorandun dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised
you that this Bureau had: received from Central Intelligence Agency \
(CIA) 190 pages ¢¥ extracted from a 693-page document prepared by)’

=< \

(CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its” activities \
may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities
cited in this document dyieIude references to Bureauoperations of.
-an.extremely. sensitive«nature and it was also noted that the “Senate :
. " Select. ‘Committee has had-access to this document. It was. _KecOttimended |
that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be- routed to,
the respective Bureau Division. and/or Intelligence ~™ Division Section
- believed. to have an interest .in the material contained therein™ for,
“the. -purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and_ making. an~ |
assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation
Vis—involved,

{
{
4

£— ~ This is to advise that the following pages from the ‘aocus
+ 2 ment were furnished to the following Divisions. and/or Sections of
2a the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose
7 Ed, ‘of review, ,assessment, and recommendations, if any:
i

rr General Investigative Division ~ Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, TA
a 155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180,. <—=

oe ° . 181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354
YQ —
fe St Laboratory Division - Pages 65-67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221,
roa’ 222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were
Site; furnished for information purposes as these
ns ; pages contained] information -concerning
techniques used and/or developed by CIA
which may be of. interest). Gd Xb b)
Intelligence Division ~ REC-BE. a ‘2 ——
Section CI-1 ka Lt oN a

Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, “TT, 136, 170-142,

298, 329, 582, 615, and 628, 3 JUL 31 1975

62-116395 eet HE etree 7

TaMsoky (12) CONTINUED - OVER
Ku)

84 JUL3 1 1975


Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

4 -

Section CI-2
Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,
368, 371, 373, (876-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593,

and’ 615.

Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, i97, 198, 203,

330, and. 482,

Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549

a

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75,

ACTION: None. You will be advised of results of above requested
assessment. ;

Existence of the 693-pag “Gta ldocument and the

AL information containe erein shou e closely
6) guarded and disclosed only on a need—-to-khow

asis.

Ar


EProject Mockingbird] a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-

‘based’ newsmen who, at the.time, had been publishing news articles
based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency

|, and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

' ‘Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3, The connections
were established with the assistance of a telephone company official

‘who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr,
“John-Az: McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen, Joseph Carroll), In addition to
Office of Security. personnel directly involved inthe intercepts and ~~
research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency,
‘officials dre on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
of-Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector

| (General- (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General ‘Counsel, (Mr. Law rence
=Héuston).- a ‘ SG

+ (iy

he intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources

of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators

and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number

.of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but‘the short Span
_of the activity precluded positive identification, It was observed that through |
these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination o ‘Project Mockinguird, Jthose materials related
it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access

‘of two Office of Security professjonals.
C23 Wo 395° YTS o0222

ENCLOSURE

WARMING HOGS |
SENSITIVE JHTELURGENCE seuRcés
oun CEE TUNN IAs VE) ‘

-seoRer EYES ONLY

eu

ee SEGRE;
gst, I,

» EVES Wish | 6

SUBJECT: | _ Soviet Detector | ;

-1964. The responsibility -for-s
his-exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought: to this country

After initial interrogation by

|
. {\ \ | . .
Bae “A Soviet defector, | .
| ‘defect to a representative of this Agency in
|

representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-

house in. . Maryland, . - where he

was confined.and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a specially constructed "jail'’ in a remote
wooded area ot] IS0LAFON. | The SR Division was convinced
that he was a Spatched agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable prove their -
contention and he was confined at/ESOLATION n an cffort
to convince him to "confess."

This Office together with the Office of General

{\icounsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality

of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under

these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong

representations were made to the (Director Mr. Helnsjif[by

this Office, the Office of Generdt Counsel, and the

Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 Qctober 19¢=, the
responsibility for his further handling was transferred
o the Office of Security under the direction of fus Taylor. ]

[Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral/Rufus Taylor

The Soviet defector - Was moved to a comfortable safehouse in|

the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,

ruce Solieg for more than a year. It soon became apparent
i€f defector was bona fide and: he was moved to

[[erice' Sori onditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr
ey

at the Sov

_ more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom

of independent movement. and has continued to cooperate
fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

\ ‘
_B2 IMPDET :
. [cL BY 000988) on022

secrer)” _ v ¥
EVES ONLY | |

CL ee ee toe mee ee o- ._ ~ . -


eR SECRET
op HH cae é

valuable and economical defector. this Agency has ever

had and leads which were ignored’ by the SR Division were
explored.and.have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
of Soviet Tecruited agents §. -in’ several
countries throughout the world. He currently is living
under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
and remarried an. American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,.
and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
“while I regret my years of incarceration, I have.
no. bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

2 ;
SECRET
EYES GNLY

so

sg

SECRET
P EYES OLY

SURVEILLANCES

- A. -SEBSTA

y, During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April- 7 May,.
ifand 9-20 August 1971, fa torer st was conducted of

} Mis¢ Deborah Fitzgerald,f/ a former staff employee, and

Orlafido Toro Nunez, a.Cuban national with whom

Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-
tionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon
information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from

files, and that employees were visiting a photographic

studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,

one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was

made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez

, Was aborted because of a door lock problem.

PARAGOW

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, “approved =
by the DC1, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
and her associates at various times’ from May to September
1971. Iden 69 °, an acknowledged Latin American revolu-
tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and
had given information regarding a plot to assassinate
or kidnap Vice—President—Agnow and the Ber. [ Surveil-
lances] included coverage of the activities of Iden 69.
lances] two visits to the United States, technical cover-
age of debriefings of her by WH Division. representatives
in New. York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
pr ineinded extensive coverage of a commune in: Detroit. /,

“a GELOTEX I

/
i
j
\

NS

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-
ducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during

SECRET ae as Beboee)
.

an ns 00026
BYES OnLy

4
7


EYES et

the vecsnae October, 27 October-10 December 1971

and on 3 January 1972.. In addition to physical sur- \
veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources

of classified information of interest to the Agency

which had appeared in a number of his columns. +}

D. MUDHEN ~ " ; a -

‘At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con- |
ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg |
men," Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
_ £rom 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the
/ physical surveillance, an observation post was main-

_ tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
highly classified Agency information appearing in his -[
.. Syndicated columns.

[By BUTANE-

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
to determine his activities and contacts both with i]
Agency employees and other individuals in regard to |
his proposed book and published magazine. articles ex~
posing Agency operations, 7

> POLICE SUPPORT , + Sr

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions, .
the Intelligence Division of the Metropotitan. Police
Department was provided a communications system to
monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
’ Washingtom area. This system consisted of a radio
receiver-and an Agent at the Intelligence Diyision
Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency
Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as wéll asia |}
representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan. |
Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that
the communications over this system were monitored at if
the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of m
possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in- (}

Stallations. ; :
| : Q00EY

segsey EVES ONLY


III.

\
Ye
a

/+ Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-

SECRET
» ‘se  ¢

B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several .
items of positive audio equipment consisting pri- ‘
marily of clandestine transmitters and. touch-tone
dial recorders were loaned to the Metropotitan

Police Department, Fairfax-County —Virginia, Police
Department, Montgomery—County—Marytand; Police

Department, New-York—CitxRolice Department, and the
San-Franeisco,-Catitforma, Police Department.

GENERAL SUPPORT ee ee
“A. SRPOINTER- |

cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
‘and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
Airport in New York City. This operation included not-
only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
tious opening and photographing of selected items of
mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
nal security interest which was disseminated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now i]:
in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether er
the operation will be continued or abolished. .

For several years the Office of Security has pro- “SD
vided support to Russian, defector of

. e .
interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted Ys
of numerous things, including documentation for a change |!
of identity | - on three occasions. =. |!

os

'C. REDFACE-F-

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu- -
pied by a former defector working under contract for i
the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and


. . SEUHEL ; a
s . EVES my | é$ | wk

Lb. \

7) ‘, “sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering - \
(tb ''- a safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera- =

. , tion was to determine whether the individual had i

' any unauthorized classified information in his Dy)

possession. <<
D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director approved a request
from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of’
Security operating in
: Falls Church, Virginia. Support
includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
yb) medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
hi into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
») viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
- -activities of other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment
of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
In this case, arrangements were made _for all pay and.
other employee benefits to come fromEC1A}on a reim-- |
bursable basis. C7

E. [-KETTENS PROJECT)

: ni) ' AS_a result of a request from the Department of
, ie State,[approved by the DCI] this office has, since
Ka October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis
J . to twa-sons. af a foreign leader who are attending school
in . the United States. This support includes
the financing of the protection and the detail to the:
Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
who are documented as State Department Office of Security
employees. . :

"R, -MBRRIMAG- Co

From February 1967 to November 1971, ~~ an
Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled
several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring

SEoRET = 00089
BSOMY


and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this

“SECRET.
EVES On ,

@issident groups in the Washington area considered
to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
installations, One of these Agents so, successfully
penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
‘over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
this period, the Office of Security field offices
were tasked with collecting available intelligence

on dissident groups. All such information was in-
cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside.
‘Government agencies.

Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff,
office arranged to move a sensitive defector. out of
a European country via commercial transportation and

gain entry into the United States without leaving
any trace of his: true identity.

‘i. 00039

\


mo a ~ _ " . MW May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey

a

1, At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in
RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security
questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a
dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
interest.

2 The principal object of Security's interest through this
informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years
until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation:
of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at
the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance
with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also
being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have
an intelligence interest in the female. The same informant also sub-
sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency. Among these
employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4. Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID
employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the .
Cuban and joined him as partner ina photographic business. In this ye
capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially /
those requiring passport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought
to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

+ m qt ,

— 00059

. .
we: ANT “ _ = cL a
Rae 4 . 4 ee |

3
on

i
:

a a


“i. 8. {The -Office of Security has been running this operation for ~ Soy
oft

ee

5. Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,

, but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-
* Castro organizations this country. There are alM™ ‘reports that

his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other -
episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the

principal informant.
. a

7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed ;
interest in certain 201] files in the Agency, and there are good grounds,
for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such

‘file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence
_ that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent

contact with her friénd,. the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On
one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no.
' knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been
levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of

. the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees

.

except social contacts, ©

a

over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive. proof ofits intelli-  ~ \\
gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which
was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security} i
As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the. actions if
it can take against the Cuban suspect, On the other hand, Security —

has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com- J

promising the ‘operation. J ; A

Qe

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied

_with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures

to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed, the course of watch-
ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge _
of the relationship. between the Cuban and the several other current
Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

rire
wo. .
W met wank,


A!

to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made a
any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he

+» continues to see the cially. Thus, there is sli season to believe
that further waiting will produce a.break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Security now.

It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact
with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might
alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly

since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop

for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could
move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign
nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
_ operation. _

ll, One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing
information on[-CIA's Soviet operations fis too great to warrant further
delay in moving against her. Moreover, it is possible that the Cuban
has current productive penctrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage
to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from
continuing this CI effort.

)

a |

a 09064
: tL!


[

SUBJECT . ¢ ,Press Allegations re Use of Agency

. individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency-~- fr

STs

ivi rtdtecons uot + NL

9 May 1973

MEMGRANCUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management & Services

Polygraph.

2 This memorandum is for your information only
and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
today. a °

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
American preposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. . It was
devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information and directed a sweeping
investigation within the United States Government to
determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
was conducted uncer the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehriichman,
Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs. —

~.0n the basis of investigations conducted by |
“State Security and Defense officials, four individuals-- Ht
‘one individual in the Department of Defense and three j

were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted i
me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency:
and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of 7
Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect - |
in the Department of Defense. a

ry

A ind TRALVE- teabiatal Ist Dal

00065

“Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1571,

. Security, a polygraph eperator and a polygraph machine for

Memorandum is attached.

A Vobintaoiiicl Ud Oe

‘4. «6ST informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
in matters involving the national security the Agency had -
detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State

his use in polygraphing State Department employees who
were recipients of allegaticns concerning their loyalty.

I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
ation was their total responsibility. I further informed
him that this-was the only way we could undertake to enter-
tain his request and that even then it would require the
specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
Mr. Gentile.

5. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
and inquired es to whether the arrangements had been made.
Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same
polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an —
excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials
to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182
of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
Iden 184 » and Iden 185 - of
the Arns Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph
examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering

7. ° Iden 186 “  , a staff writer for The

stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a news briefing that agents of the-Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees
suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

\

t

-RTERAL WE cnLy

o006s

Whitiied: she OL

wes em anevemte ay @ ee: yar "
Dandie RE Ci

: Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation: ‘ina
letter to The Washingten Post and said that the. polygraph.
examinations nad becn Concucted by another agency. -Specu-
lation centeree around the Agency, but after a day or so,
press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied
and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.

Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
this point further. tr. Bray has been given guidance by

Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible
he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
Department Security officials utilizing an operator and

a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I .
do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
investigation was directed.by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
‘Iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the
reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was

the source.

Coypeacl Wok
foward J. Osborn

yh) ‘Director of Security

Attachment

Pan rare dit aure v= TOP ITA "ar YW
ADRISTRATNE iaebtatsiadh Jel " Wy

00067


SB rne-1973

_ MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT ; $ Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
- dated 9 May 1973

1, Two items in the attached memorandum had not ©
/previously been reported. The first: ''~- Use of CIA funds = {\

' and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for. FBI and pro- \
‘vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use 4
against a common target in the U.S." \

2. Ina follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised |
| that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of j
(| buying an apartment building.
. There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
‘CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with ‘
=. some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
)} surveillance. Mr, Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use.of funds, not in the operation. He thought
A“ the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr, Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

«

7 . 3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
“f State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
' of President Lyndon B, Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia." i
; 4, Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
- by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
i not agree to this amount, The Director did supply funds in
| those instances where some operational activity was involved or i
\ could be inverse ise. ; crowd control, politicalaction influence i
\ _ activity, etc. . Clarke was not sure of the'amount of Agency /,

000'70

FOSET TUZA OU
sengl-fye5 cal

funds used. He falt that only Colonel White could supply
additional detai He said Senator Russell a

sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but

Repre-
asked not to be briefed in detail. -

we

| fi

(nw 6 Reland. 7

J ohn-Gi—Richards.

Inspector

Attachment

| 2+ — 000%4
- SERET-EYS GLY

§ May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT '. ? Per your instructions

-

1, Ihave no recollection of specific contacts with the |
Elisberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms’ instructions

‘at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment

should bea matter of record. . ~ -

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
Colby is fully conversant are;

Heal -- Clactivity of Dick Ober, DD/D.

, o> WEEBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and
accumulation of Government capital.

—/
\.

Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U:S.
real estate for FBI and provision of technical °
equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against
a common target inthe U.S,

Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer
Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J.

’ trip to SEA, |
THANO)

| EYES ONLY -_
SEGRET |


et

.

oe a previously been reported, The first: "-- Use of CLA fonds _

’ hero was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought

Mr, Ray Rocea of the DDO/CI Staff. NO

State Department defer Presidential representational expenses \ ;
_ of President Lyndon B, Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia." vow
4. Mr, Clarke said the total amount of money reauested \
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would -
‘not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in \-

5

ine 1973

MEMCRANDUM FOR: Inspector General

3 tems: id John Ctariie)M2morandum
. to the Cirector of Central Intelligence,

dated 9 May 1973,

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had no

and facilities to acquire U. 5. real estate for FRI and pro- “
vision of technical equiprnents by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use \
against a common target in the U.S," ‘ “

2. Ina follow- -up meeting with Mr, Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
being given to the FBlin cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building
~ ‘There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers cheeks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem - -

2 Nn Neen an meme. tema

peer

the only source of additional information on this subject was

'3. Thea second item: '"-- Use of CIA funds to help

those instances where some operational activity was involved or 7
could be inferred, i.e., crowd. control, politicayaction Influence
activity, etc. Mr, Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

000°73

I9 ars uy
eee TN
we te SeehT]

i
CE SOR SOP SY PO Oe Oe

. . . .
=~ agt eo: 2 weede
Cc; PNT? _ Zeit’. C 3 et oe 8 Ge foe

2 ae3 « v

Cn


MEMORANDUM FOR:

. FBI referred to ia para 1 is not shown
-in other documents in the Agency. It
has been kept very close with lr. Yale,

“Mr, Magnusson, atad possibly Mr. Colby.
| °° All Filles. have been purged.

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101

. . 4 ‘
1 AUG sé MHICH HAY BE USED. — ; . _ en ,
. "8
i . : .
. . o: o
t e oe
i) € of
] . e ¢
~ . §
oom,
NS «
“SN
.
oe . ie
\ if °
oan
. @


= ss) .
MEMORANDUM FOR:

of Finance in a ‘memorandun dated 17 November 1971 to obligate | {

. .

Director of Central Intelligence

fst

Deputy Director for Management and Services

VIA. _ H
FROM | . : Director of Finance
SUBJECT - $ Special Other Government Agency Activities ;

1. Project MHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director-
Comptroller, acting tor the Director, authorized the Director

$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to
disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be
determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
the Chief,.CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed
by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still

active.

2. &PMEDDEY - Rental of office space in New York City
for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,
Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,

Deputy Director for Plans.

3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable. and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies,

fy
1

‘ 4. Project TWOFOLD-- Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by

‘a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
: 'S, Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the
Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of

$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated
sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the

Deputy Director for Plans.

| . E2 inpoer J FAA)
GL BY: | 006567,
poo a
SECRET EVES Guy °° 0077

(Trane a ees ee
ee eee =
en \

_ MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT ::~«~Special Report

‘1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
provide information on situations or associations that
might appear to be irregular on the surface.

AY 2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
) ackground: For many years tne Central intelligence Agency nas
etailed e employees to the immediate office of the White House ©
- per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate
office of the President such as the Council on International
Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. We have furnished secretarics, clerical
employees and certain professional. employees on a reimbursable
and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time,’ we have no
Clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a  —
laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
‘invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
were apparently available to run the White House and most of
. Q our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
/ (CIA’is not the only Agency. furnishing the White House with
/ detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and
others on Defense and State and other Government entities
whose employees have Top Secret. clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present
time assigned t the National Security Council and we have seven .
Clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

- ' In addition. to the above, we have technical specialists
detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
security officers detailed to the Department of State to

\-

Bm
ES

Titi
CONFIDENTIAL ® 2 Bro (ons

te
“4

00405

SIDA
protect foreign visi sors, Recently [ John Hag kas detailed -
* to the Secretary o he Treasury along with Air other Agency

employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our:
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of. time.

-3, Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the

National War College are probably quite defensible.» On the other

hand, there may be those who would question Agency enployees

currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs —

and Mr. Peter Petérson having an Agency employee as his
secretary when he was the ‘Secretary of Commerce (she also made

a trip with him to Moscow), She is still with him in his
present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
@ new detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served” for
over ten years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for
AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
that entire period of time. He has been approved: for disability
retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
other Government agency has been carefully considered and
approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
involved.

4. Project TNOFOLD:- I believe the support we are
providing to Project TSOFOLD is an activity that should be.
reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely.
sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.

5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities:. In. a more
_general sense, Contract Personnei Division prepares and executes
contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
domestic activities, We also process Staff Agents who are
domestically assigned, None of these assignments are decided
in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: -In the interest of
reporting "too much,” I would remind you that Contract Personnel
Division writes "agreements" with domestically based American
firms to provide cover. for Agency assets. The actual assign-
ments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped,
in | the main, in the United States.

, _. fos 00206
CONFIDENTIAL =


" mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

oa

‘Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the

| | “gh NaN 1973
) | ee

fo FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

‘THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by. the
Office of Logistics

y*

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed as
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the

Office of Logistics (OL) are such that’in all matters herein o
reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re- :

quest of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief

description of each action involved and then have included the
name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-

Se Facts ‘pertaining to both actions undertaken at the ‘i
initiative of this Office are as follows: :

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-
cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, “and
related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,
Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary 1

_is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to
obtain such materiel without associating the procurement
action with the United States Government. It is legally

. necessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the
State and Federal-jurisdictions. Since it is located in
Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland

, State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

00320

EVES ONLY a:
SECRET | et 3- pi


. (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence. equipment is

‘responsibilityv.. On 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry

“SUBJECT:

supplier located in. Maryland, deals in a wide

. in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to

-.the agent was informed that. it is an Agency

Most: of the DD/O area divisions from lancels time submit

Sensitive
Logistics

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's
association with this proprietary and have assisted us in
obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a
Federal license has been obtained for 'the proprietary
through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too,
have been briefed on the Agency's association with this
proprietary.

stivities Performed by th Office of

‘

b,. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of. the U. S. Code

prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local
law enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it
almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence
equipment in .a covert manner so that no tie or relationship
to the United States Government is made. In order for the
Agency to covertly obtain.such eauipment and hide any
Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff cf the
Procurement Division. has relied on an established working
relationship with a U.S. firm. | This firm, a prominent

range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment.
The Covert. Procurement. Stare has. had a relationship withan officer

allow us to place orders thr ough his corporation to major
suppliers of this equipment with a billing to 28 Agency national
proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any. inquiry

is raised by the Department cf Justice, ‘the firm's officer would
immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff
who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact

the Department of Justice, identify the.Agencv's interest

in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any

about the proprietary £ron_an FBI agent making a routine
investigation of. the officer's books. Through Office of
Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI,

notional propr letary. This disclosure closed the inquiry
and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.

requisitions toe us to acquire [surveillance equipment. The
majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various
foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

EYES eek ae
SECRi » . 00444
3 he


: 7. Contractu@MRelationship - USJPRS: e Agency

organization, USJPR&, has a contractual assocwaution with
approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract
‘employees. These indiviquals are unwitting of the fact that
they really work forj/CIAjin the performance of their domestic

activities. [ -USJPRS (Unite d_States Joint Publications Research’
Service) is a part of FBIS._} They perform a translation service
of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent
contractors work in their cwn homes and are given assignments

as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated"

into the Bureau of Standards and.are located in Washington, D. Cy
They are paid and administered by the Bureau. / CIA reimburses

the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employmen nt are prepared

in Contract Personnel Division.

"8, Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is.a record of
External Employment Assistance branch's action on a request
from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or :
resigning from the Agency. -

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 vf EEAB
received a call from Howard Hunt who asked tden 38 1f he had a
retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks. qf
Iden 38 sent him | a resume onbIhomas_Amataiwho retired uA)
31 July 1971. .Iden38  . did not document his EEAB record 4
to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between °
March and Nay 1972.

All of the above information | was reported to the Office
of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

9, Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the
External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for ‘a job
after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was’
_James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to.
McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert télephoned EEAB from
Chicago. (He had a.job there with the Halifax Security Co.,
a lead provided by EEAB,. but until this telephone call he had’

\
1

CONFIBENTIAL “00407

=

‘

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
the D.C. area.) 'O:;; he had been visited a Special
Agent of the FBI. wh¥?told: Lambert that his reWume had been

found among McCord's papers. The. Agent wanted to know if
Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained
how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,
‘Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Kennedy of OP and Iden 29

OS were notified immediately.

pled |

—_— e

Tem hull,

Harry B. Fisher .
Director of Personnel

CONFIDENTIAL = 1 gags

rs eens =

7 hoa yer te
ryt
Goth an wide!

eo .

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

1. Information has been reccived from WH Division
which indicates that there was a break-in at Identity 61
on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. ‘The Iden 76 Desk
of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
time.

2. 1 discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
of CI Staff (Red 1751), who advised that the FBI did
have coverage of Identity 61, and (the Agency sup-
ported this operation. He indicated that This tas identified
‘as -Operation WUDCOR and he would be able provide additional
‘details on this if Mr. Colby requests ited

“[s/ Identity 10

Acting. Executive Officer.

—
PONT ATITISY fo
POET -E2 IMPDET +A pete
te SS UTA . CL BY 008246. C02 Ae


Deputy Director for Operations ©

VI a7, LWtorn Sd ”™
MESORANDULE FO;

0}
“SUBIZCT:

WHE\Comments on Jack Anderson Column
REFERENCE: gack Anderson's Washinsvton tHerrv-Co~
' Ronad Colunn of S March 25972; "Chilean
Rreak-ins Reflect untergate"

i. WH Division has reviewed the referenced colunn
(copy <¢ attached) by Jack anderson and fiads that it con-
tains no new infornation, -To toe best knowledge a the
Division, there is no foundation to the allexation that
3%. Howard Hunt wag enyagect on benalf of ITT in preaxing
into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washington and
New York,

: 2. “Any connection between ITT and these break~ins

is purely conjectura a and the colunn tak:
point this our.

ITT Latin

5 care to

, 3. Harold Hendrix, Anierican repsesenta-
f tive, has told us that‘he bad no relationshin with
‘Hunt on this or any ITT matter. Ue had anticipatod
" Penat Anderson sight imvoly such a rolationshin.in bis
j co oluan and had assured us that this Was not true.
y
; j /s/ Identity 81
. , ’ Chief
Western Honisphere Div ision “
v
Attachment: As Stated .
u a
s-apaent h
. . wae cae o.8. fr
ABSA Fay Perens ere

Cia Fristoe, y Fee eed a fe. watt |

bes eurgat Yihy we)

oo
%
we

BY OpRA IE 2

ffOLT


USSa-EPS FORM 191 . .

- 6/0 / y. EqACUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE erence
rn bo me . INCIDENT REPORT Fi-72-398

~ DATE occua.!. Sbueeetis pa asle sors
ot

&~ LOCATION
ARATION

5. RATIRE OF INCIDENT

rue} . hurgla
6. | 47. aodRESS B. ..OME FRINE +04
. . . , : 21-7222.
|. ~ ~ . 7 Br orrce
Hornen Haverro 1705 Handet Street, Springfield ve. 762-17 )5
i

10, OFFICE ASSIGNED WL.-OATE S> _ pte. Koua 43. OAY OF WLEX
Sergeant Stevens’ E. Butler “(3 4 8 & @)
- Ser M, Richardson . My 7 YW T F €)
. 1S, ADGALSS

£ . . 19. ADDRESS ~

| 22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT IGRIEFLY DESCRIBE INCIDENT, CORTINUE ABOVE ITEMS AS HECESSARY IKDICATING ITEM)

At_ aAnproyinately 2 359 hours Monday, May 13, 1972,. Forci¢n Missions Division.

fontrol Center ves sdyised by tu 2D that oa burelom:-had_telon wlece-at—ite
Chancery of Chile,-3735 asnashnget tis Avaria, TL ,sonetine betucen ase
Friday, Hey 13, A912» and on C85 hours this date.

aeeee in . Gnts ser or # ot
: The undersiened was edvised by Mr.
of the Trbassy of Crile, that the.
were ransec}]

a
ted. At this tire the met
Mr. Navarro advises that ne will. contact tha

' i 22. PnSTSS
’
: O Yes

£ miss

Jan {USE EPS FORM 102 + SUPPLEMENT FOS ASSITIONAL DETAILS)

LAST NAME MIDCLE . AOURESS

ee CATE OF BIRTH . RATIGNALS?*

LAST BAME FIRST MIDOLE ACORESS , :
° . .
42) Race sta i WEIGHT jHAIR EYES DATE OF GIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY HO. > pRATIGNALIST

26. ARREST HO. 27. APREST OF FICERANAME ANA BADGE AO.) 2B. OATE OF ARREST 29. no -*

30. INCIOENT STATUS “
ads oren 0. }{ ¢LOseO C. O URFOUNDSO 0.0 CLEARED ay asrtt

31. REPSAT es 32. APPROVING OFFICIAL [SIGIATURE) OATE .
te Leki in rA ye me \ ; ont.”

yy ae ALLOOZ ae Se Qos yi x it, Ly? i Ae A \ Warr a “| <> ———
gi feant Stovens B. Patler Cantein Pote i, Kanttos _ arcs:

33. STATE OCT. OFFICIAL natives DATE: 34. USSS-19 CASE NG.

N/A - ee err [ WA 00374

INUIDENT REFURT - SU i ee Ve StRaS (CASEI he teBE®

i —— Fyie22.— 398
2. ATURE OF INCIDENT ; 7 : La .
Burglary II _ 7 . ‘ : v
3. REPORTED BY: : 4. ADDRESS , y 3. How ioe ~
i , ela 23
: wT eed . . 6. OPER Fer |
Hernan O27) Nevarro 605 Nerlet Street, Snringfield, Va Level Th6

To ADDITIGNAL OCTAILS OF INCIDENT: |

~ oo < aa

The following were previously on the scene: Serzeant Clifton 0. Gil, Badge ; 1,

"¥MAP.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, H.P.D. 04430, also M.P.D.C
Print Cruiser vi 7356

“Ge a“ ot * -

S/A Michael Fe Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Brench), was notified.

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8. SUSPECT AND/OR ARREST £0 PERSONS, ICEATIFY BY HAME, ADDRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY HUMBER, OOB, EYES, ETC.

LAST hAME FIRST |

os : « MIDOLE |
Cth: . ° : :

ACORESS +;
:

SEX |. HEIGHT | WEIGHT KAIR } eves |  OATE OF BIRTH | .o SOCIAL SECURITY NO. RATIONALITY

FIRST \ MIOOLE \ AGORESS

Race | = SEX. | KEIGHT |. WEIGHT | KAR |. eyes |. DATC OF BIRTH | SOCIAL SECURITY HO. RATIGNALESY

9. ARREST PO | 10, ARREST x0, | 11, ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE KO.) 12, DATE 13, Hoe?

\

$4, CURRENT CASE OISPOSTION |

rGSrex J . edefcroseo -| ¢.[exrouxdeo | p.f)ctearco By aRRest |

+18. USSS-1D CASE KO.

.

N/A

\e “00377
13, APPROVED (S25NATURE & TITLED zo. 98°*

; ihe Y\ ioe
Captain Pete li. Manthos

OPEN _ ‘.

16, FINAL CASE DISPOSITION }
AG ot seza Psttyatere) |

17,8
pled tie, 7 fi celles Ah

Sergeant Stevens 4. Butler ‘

18, DATE |

'}05-25~72

|

= rs

'{ 2. MATURE OF IKCIDERT . . : . . U
Burglary II . ;

iq. REPORTEO BY: = * . . "| 4, ADORESS = S. HOWE Frank

z 3+ REPORTED BY . . 127191!

a ; ; 6. OFF sf Fron ek,

lf Tain IPcT ) Navarro x 6OS Henlet erg refiold. Va UE Fe

7 ADDITICNAL OETAILS GF INCIDERT:,

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May w, 1972, Mr. Mavarro contacted Officer
fdriian Roman -Gonsalez ab 1310 L, Street, h.W. and stated the following itens missin st
( Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo 4M/SH Portable Radio, tio (2) Penasenic AN/F*
and one (1) Westinghouse A} ‘/PU/SA Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric Shaver,
one (1) Womens pullover sveater, and an unknowm number of beoks.

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8. ra ARRESTED PERSONS. IDENTIFY BY KAME, AOTRESS, SEX, RACE, SOCIAL SECURITY KUMBDER, DOD, EVES, ETc.

N/A

UXT NAME | . FIRST |

. . . MIDOLE}
oe - . .

|ACORESS |

RACE | SEX | _MEIGHT | WEIGHT |

HAIR } eves | RATIGNALITY

« DATE OF BIRTK { . SOCIAL SECURITY KO.,

.

oLAST KAME FIRST | MIDILE |

. ACDRESS |
(2) ‘ ee, o

RACE | -SEX.| "SOCIAL SECURITY NO. LRATIONALIT :

HEIGHT | .. WEIGHT | -_tves | . DATE OF BlaTH |

$. ARREST PO | 110, ARREST KO. |

12. DATE

41. ARREST OFFICER (RAME & Bass 40.) ‘

13, howe

14, CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION |
-s fo oa _ Look

usSpe j . B.PNtoseD “| éunrodxoeo | DEV CLEARED ey ARREST |

16, FINAL CASE DISPOSITION |

: . _- , . 27,
OPEN an oa 0038

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\ AS, USSSe1D CASE XG,

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17, RC Tepe FF. fer (sienatupel ee . 1S. APPROVED (SPGNATUR me : pao. pat!
~ A flettéy < “Onell: LAF “¢ kU \ aan Wa 387
EL ont Stevens E,-Entle> Captain Pete N. Fanthos Q5-25°-


428. TRANSPORTED CY

CF Cr Ae

Em

3. STREET ADDRESS

LG SS

14. EX. COPIES} 15, . . A ;
cy, 1736 THAISS, Aue “a L/,
18. COMPLAINANT'S OCCUPATION AND HRS Garr 5S. WHEKE EMPLOYED OR SCHOOL ATiE: .

39, DESCRIZE LOCATION OR TYPE OF PheLtiise

> CALE FA IDASS

20. VEHICLE USED - TAS NO. AD STATE

9. LOCATION OF CRIME (Acgcess}

ieee ecb ta ths

O—OWNER
. CODE: C—COmPL. LATS

22, HAE (Lact, First, M.2die)

AVA REO, ge Eri

cope! Res, ADORESS So wn Fr ble PHOME PHONE TL eUS Prine |

RI 7665 Anh Fi 4 \sa/- PAL | FES~, PEE=IF=|

25, IDENTIFY SUSPECTS EY NULISER tactsts Meme, Aedrass, See, Rare, Ase, Hes‘cht, Weisht, Eyes, Hair, Clothing ets.)
IF AKRESIED Gl¥e ARREST KUWSER AMD CHARGE Grit ceccription if arrested)

26. NATURE OF INJURIES AND LOCATION Ot sODY 27. HOSPITALIZED - ViHERE? . . : OADM
b oe

> Feira
4A

29. TREAIED BY, 4
| _ 447]
90. TYPE OF PROPEINY T/KER

32. TRADEMARKS, ay CONVERSATION. or SUSPECT
L7
Wh

. EXACT LOCATION C LOCATION OF PROPERTY 33 VEHECLE FEO ‘f TAG. HO. STATE YCAR AND MARE
Ls Le Fb assy

36. Gd) CO:7ti
; IED F5 st
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PORT IF: HORE SPACE IS HE RECORD VALUE OF LO

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fouts. 6b Ll, 2 5-72 peste C O95, f.
Su/S-~ ZAe Embassy Of Cf he ws evTenedl anid gt. zee

| ofE le Ra sak, ‘dewwar caddie lila ts La hen AL TALS AL FAIS it,

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| v.T. NUMBER DATE G& TIME THIS RELORT 37. DALE/Tie TYPE to. 33. REPROUL Te fet
ISG f SYS-72_ Ba0 _
39. SEFOR FING OFfloze Unty & PADS | 49. STAIUS (che: ; 8 GX UN|TREFERRED 10.‘ | 42, UCR OISFOSIT--

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43, SECOND GEMCz% UNIT & E.. ADSE ho,

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MFIRTHOALITSH PALICE NEDLDTISONT WECLIMATAM 1

Pera
2


~ OGC 73-0930
.25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD » —_

SUBJECT: Identity61 | Break Inon 15 May 1972

~
.

1, On: 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he
had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved

' ina breakin at Identity 61 ‘in Washington, D.C. on

15 May 1972, Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but.
suggested that it would be better to check with Mr. G, Marvin Gentile,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Departenent of State, and

the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from

the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated-

15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest

of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,

and the State Department reply to Santiago, No, 084655, dated

_15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of |

investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.
2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61
between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972, ~
; \

00304

4

Reparted loss at thane consisted of four am [teh dios

and one electric razor. The police investigation identified
some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints

was made. Since the reported loss was under $5, 000 and there
was.no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did
not make an investigation of the incident. The MPD reported
that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified,

t * :
. haa f\ f af’
JOHN K, GREANES
< 7. tant General Cdtnsel

‘ cc: Legislative Counsel
. Inspector General
OGC:JKG:cav
Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
1 -. JKG Signer a Lo
1-Chréno. ~-

re


1. June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mx. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

.

1. Following our recent conversation, I have
‘searched.my memory and Mr. McCone's files for examples -
of activitics which to hostile observers or to somcone
without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
excoeding[ CIA's owes] TFKIV

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
DCI McCone, andes pressure from Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columanists
Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
their sources for classified information which was appear -
ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
to be in the Department of Defense, McCone ordered me
personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Director of DIA,
orally, which I did. TI understand more complete information
on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
what precise actions were taken, what information was gained,
what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result. of a developing relationship with
IDEN-122 _ thelDdEN-123representative in Washington,
and also as a reSult of certain information conveyed by
IDEN-124 » dames Angleton, with the approval of
Dick Nelms, agreed 10 mount a counterespionage operation
against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved
breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

Aman Aeys TIN BoA eran aes

. 7 a
-, ; iy!
Sree eeu d i Lhedswdidy Gu

ae
as

8 Gs 00457

atiiea aes

Tag vst

_ oo, oe i ;
8 soy 7

iid

the: IDEN-126 On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and.
Helms briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally. on the
operation without going into operational details. Later
on.the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.
Actual breaking and’ entering occurred, somewhat later, and
on 15 April 1963, DCI MeCone met with President Kennedy
alone and briefed the President on the details of this
new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised
it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.

On G February 1964 in a briefing of Secrefary of State
Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
reservations about-.the propricty of such an operation.

He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
with McCone on 17 April 1964, 28 May 1964, and 14 June
1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the

- IDEN-95 be iniormed direerly that we knew about their
espionage operations in the United States and ask them
to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
these reservations in the presence of DCI MeCone and
President Jonn F.. Kennedy.- Secretary of Defense. McNamara
was also present, and there is no record that he had
previously been made aware of this operation.

' 4. Although certain activities never got beyond
‘the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
of. such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.

One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
“erops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-

_ilations. Outside. the United States Government. General
“Eisenhower was briefed on such planning A third, which
assumes a new significance today, involved a@ proposal by

Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence

collection effort against foreign installations in this

country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

SN OT are Se RS er

:
‘ ‘ . 2
t Ne mat Wed da

Ww cue wed


. . . 3% a a 7 :
. \ :
‘ ; tiie soda i futaeuedidd

%

ys rete

ee UNka r

3

Wu, exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still: unclear
to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
effect that(CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
eee ately in this country, to greatly increase
the. Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy .jand
' ‘penerally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensi ely and
indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
DCI sicCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.
It is clear that the TBI was opposed to any such: proposal
then, as now, and the plan never went forward,

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI MeCone's office
learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question’
but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964. Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
to DCI MeCone on behalf of American business interests,
offering to insert: some $300,000 to try to secure a
favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
after this approach. ‘IDEN-128 . of IDEN-129

made a similar proposal to MeCone in: connection
with elections in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
the 303 Comaittee, it was decided that the offers of
American business could not be accepted. it being neither
a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
‘forgotten thathe helped to set the precedent of refusing
to accept such collaboration between tte » Agency ' S operations
and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert

ly Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
. MeCone injected/the Agency ,Jand particularly IDEN- 36

gant 2% ye, "
* 3 o . . .

er : Nee

rica meee

hin. cs. _ ‘.


Pasi of ae .
fSebiVesund UL el

Foreign suet ‘for Activities Plann@® to Disrupt —
' or Harass the Republican National Convention a i

SUMMARY: Sa Bt .

There is little new evidence of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to
disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
Dicgo, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic
Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning
‘actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal
to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstra-
tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego
Convention Coalition (SDCC), another domestic group targetting
on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity froin
the North Vietnamese. .The letter is of interest as an indica-
tion of North Vietnamese contact’ with the SDCC; such contact
Will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-reported
plans for broadcasts over public address systems during the
Ponyention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in

aris. - ._ .

DEVELOPNENTS:

....At its recent convention in Cambridgc, Massachusetts,
held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS) adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at
the San Dicgo-Tijuana border during the Republican National
Convention. ‘The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate
with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be
entertained. . oy

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to

the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) in the form of a

letter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the
‘American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the
North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has been

circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,
“expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SsDcc,
and conveys the Committee's "best wishes of militant soli-
darity and friendship." The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC
.. Write often and "send us materials you have.” ;

tee

arab anes

Wee uy bi, : dl: TO ‘ .

. tn eenrens FASTIN Niners anne .,
. Hi9 Tuners! Dagens Wedin Lenant lt

. os . ANTRAL ns COSS5E

: an mintis
Usa GLEE . : . .
@ 7 .) 9 SHAY 872

Foreign Support for. Activities Planned to Disrupt
-—_———or-tiarass the, Republican National Convention

a

SUMMARY:

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
’.to inspire, suprort, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt cr harass the Republican National Convention in
wwetHiami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. <A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vie vnan, who is also a member cf the Secre
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
—--——_-the.Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) ‘has
' @istributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
——“by the Peoples! Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).
The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Republican Convention.

DEVELOTHENTS:

_I-. mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
*. - for Vi Snam, who is also an influential and well-infermed
: staff s.ember of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
- on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion cf the Swedisn
..Committee! S unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

ne The International Confederation for Disarmament and

bk eace, a British- based antiwar organization and one of the

. more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
‘ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
.April-May 1972 issue of its regular internationel pudlic3-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar hed been furnished
iby the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and

_——Aneluded the Tollowing entry:

a

August 21-23 Republican Convention, San Diego.
: Demonstrations org -anized by the San
Diego Convention Coalition, Box 8267,.
San PAeEOs Ca. 92103.

NOTED TON Meee eg
ait . .
1

—
1

1
' eee ea
are ot


5 . The ICDP consent on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
‘in support of some of the dates’listed but does not specificail:

“ee call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.

A ‘ .

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. | . 14 JUN 1972.
a , Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

_ SUMMARY:

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts
to inspire,. support, influence, or exploit actions. designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972, is an’ expression of
interest by a member.of the North Vietnamese Delegation to
the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar
organizations in the United States for demonstrations in
connection with the political conventions of both major
parties. .
DEVELOPMENTS: .

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese
Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to
contact him again when. the visitor returned from an imminent
trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official
gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
Coalition .for Peace and Justice (PCPS) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-
tions during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
official stated that he was especially interested in plans

for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican
. Najional Conventions.

o

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. ee tees Mages : ery :

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e

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
‘* or Harass the Republican National Convention

There are no additional indications of any substantial
foreign plans or efforts to inspire,- support, or take advan-
tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
. Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, (21-24
August 1972. - . .

No Foreign ‘Dissem/Ho Dissem Abrza:

—_Gontrolted Di soem a

ae - (|. POMERAT preeten
oa 4 CON ERSEE9 bivdaks 96 JUL 72
’ Is

eee

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention ; —

o
?

SUM. AARY': 2

New indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,
‘support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-
rupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,
Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A
leader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
(PCPJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
take place at United States and allied military installa-
tions abroad during the period immediately before and during
the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that
representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will

‘“participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
“The Anti-War Union (AhU), a domestic organization which has
been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the
Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to

’ Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Repub-
lic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently
available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican
Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

. . DEVELOPMENTS:
In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of

. foreign antiwar.organizations, a representative of the People! s

Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-

tant position within that organization, discussed the plans

of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming clection campaign

in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that

during the- period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against

Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities. involved in the manu-

facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and

that similar actions will be organized at United States and

allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-

tive further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

“nites so A) ICaLL i i oa ae C:
Impossible to deternis-

rales tzaperssdte, mt?

| WARRIG GantL
NSHie CUI LIGE RCE SOURCES

Alste O/C tetra eae wen

AMER ATED) paar
ma htie is ote ‘} : a

rEd.le crue

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ma nF r STE ELMER


Toe se 2. GQUFRELIED BES)
. . oe oa adn Luoobs Uwdeil
° ca

“Of the bombing in@rcenen é are being organi by the "“Repub-
‘Lican Party National Convention Coalition" to.occur on

21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August
actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the
Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will speak on the subject of
the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam.
- (Comacnt: We have no.present information concerning plans of
Stockholm Conference representatives to travel:’to the United
States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we
have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholn
Conference representatives to participate in activities con-
nected with the Republican Convention. )

The Anti-War Union (ANU), a domestic group engaged in
organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Con-
vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists
- to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic
Republic "of North Vietnam (DRV} and the Provisional Revolu-

- sptionary Government of South Victnam (PRG). An advance party

* has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss
the agenda for meetings with the full-AWU delegation. Althouch
no inforiation is presently available indicating that actions
at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-
uled to be discussed at meetings between the AWW delegation
and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the AWY
advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials
regarding the stance the ANU should take on certain questions
relating to the presidential elections. It is also known

that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party
about the political mood in the United States. One of the
AWU delegation. members has stated that upon their return to
the United States about 26 July 1972, some of the members
‘will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television,

to "educate the American people about the consequences of
‘voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat
Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations
-at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."

ra MTT 3 at ninpre
rat eae ts:
i ra Vhs al Ul2orh,

- - Ite,
* al bi Naa rane) Artl Aneas ‘
na fe Ral O fos an eri) C: ioutut ABneHD aay 00582


Oo 8g Bug ta72

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY: ; ;
There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to
inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or
harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21- 24 August
1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris., France, between .
. American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic
of North Victriam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Victnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the
. DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the
American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National
Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire
American délegation, were conducted by hoth the DRV and the PRG officials;
_at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private
exchanges. A sccond group of activists, considered more important than
the first delegation, is sclreduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
for further consultations: with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS: _ .
In recent mectings in Paris, France, with members of an American
del8zation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of

the Democratic Republic of Vistnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Victnam (PRG) -were very guarded with respect to dis-
cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-
ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar

my movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-
lican Convention, except for’one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen

Nan TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private and public sessions

., of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."

. TIEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven

Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part, ©
refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon~
strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

00562
.
mtaye, Pore Meiers Saha ent O. (3) a ) reat ns or tests,
AR PuIG wehiG tdi IGE mace WoLEy Uriel ss AUTOOLME ICALLY POAC id GH
CHSITIVE BTEULIECL “clit tS to FON: EISITH jp Bloor areas impossible to o determine


‘ . HA Panerai ne - wl

271 i ebrra |

My: Go. vu ap eS chL .
Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,
the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.
. Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by
the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there

is no information available concerning the substance of these private
exchanges.

”

A second, more important delegation ‘of Americans connected with

the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972

for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second

group is scheduled to be led by Rennie DAVIS, founder and leader of the
.AWU. This will be DAVIS! second trip to Paris within recent months for

discussions with DRV and PRG representatives. Upon his return from

his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at

both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's
_ chief target would be the Republican Convention. .

é Parag aa reese g
sUeE Ti wee Si2 i

an
Vidsilu.

ig Deceit “

Forcign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
. _ or Harass the Republican National Convention

°

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party
in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

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Foreign Support for Activities Planned to. Disrupt
Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

: ; There are no direct indications thus. far of foreign
boo efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities
. designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
the Democratic Party in Miami, 10-13 July 1972. The concept
of coordinated international support for domestic activities
in the United States was generally endorsed at the recent —
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples
. O£.Indochina; however, the Conference issued.no specific _
i +" ++ @all for international support of disruptive actions at the
7S American national political conventions... -,

BACKGROUND :

At. the Soviet- controlled World Assembly for Peace
‘and Independence of the Peoples' of Indochina, held in
Versailles from 10-15 February 1972, there was mention of
American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican
and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft =
_ resolution from the conference's "Action Commission" con- .
tains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose
goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions
‘in the United States. It calls for international support
‘to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations, .
.~ from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-
- ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party
‘Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican -
Party Convention in.San Diego on August 21,°1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly
-£for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"
- of 13 February 1972, drafted by the "Political Commission"
‘ states:

. "In the United ‘States | particularly, the - protest
.. °° @gainst the war is voiced more and more ‘strongly,

ows,

33

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aeceated whee bi:

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Vv

OCSG

L,
Cc


nee Ge

e
.
wee estes te . ane ante

‘) "under. various "forms, such as draft evasions;

desertions, resistance, ‘demonstrations which
now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calis for support to. these progressive and
antiwar forces in the United States, and asks -
the governments to grant asylum to deserters

)° and to support their right to repatriation.

“All together, the peoples of the world will
‘efficiently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-
ment the-restoration of peace, independence
and freedon in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia."

ry . . . . ee
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at v. wt eae?

oo. os * Foreign Support for Activities Pianned to “Disrupt”
, or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY :

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,

support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt
or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-13 °

' July 1972, are limited -to a reiteration by a member of the
Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a
statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace
and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's
‘pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international
support to a campaign of anti-Victnam War activities in the
United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican

. Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-
‘Yuptive actions at the conventions themselves.

. : toe .
an : : : . ~

DEVELOPMENTS :

; In early April 1972 an influential and well- informed
staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,
in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities
conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference
member stated that these actions were part of an international
‘Campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts
during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and "will culminate
at the election conventions in July and August."

The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the
Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was
a-major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement
in-an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's
‘"Action Commission." The appendix called for. international

Support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demon-

. Strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with

. “the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic

Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on ‘August 21, 1972."

te, _ a . . : / . . : \ ;

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.

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
OL ".Harass the Democratic. National Convention \ -

SUM: ARY: :

Indications remain linited of foreign plans or attempts
. to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 10-13°July 1972. A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections. are playing a role in

the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a “Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities

in the United States against the war based on a submission’
by the Peoples' Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Democratic Convention. .

DEVELOPMENTS : 3 ot

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
for Vietnan, who is also an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference
on Vietnam, stated in-a private discussion of the Swedish
Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S." .

; The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April- May 1972 issue of its regular. international publica-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar hdd been furnished
by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCP) and
included the following entry:

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami - Beach,
. : Demonstrations organised by Florida
People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa, ©
Florida 33612,

/
\

Vi

‘

Ay? i minars ; 3: , ry
COS ae LEQ Tegra _ 005 rare

AiR Femeieit BESS: y

‘A mignry nays

Rats tials

aL ete : ’
maar ‘ ) Jo 2 . .-
t . .
AEA : .

_ The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
i. in support of some of the dates listed but docs not specifically

wee : : . . . .
\ ; -call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
| _ co, ot -
| : . ; oT : La,
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00572


7 JUN 1972

. * te . ate et at alae
a TN ates oat atte “. . Yount ° . ' of come tte :

_ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
-or Harass the Democratic National Convention

.
‘

- SUMMARY: | - : ar

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

* to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in

' Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is’an expression of interest
by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris
Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar orgamizations
‘in the United States for demonstrations in’ connection with
the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPNENTS : ,

. In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-
', gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact
him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip
to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave
the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's |
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for denon-
Strations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
boc -official stated that he was especially interested in plans

: _ for actions in connection with the Democratic and National
| Conventions.

MTNALICN migvorse 7
COATED COS) i
t

BFA PARP IO Mesorie. ges


See eens oe STE ot ote mwa ee rete PR She = te teed sete, betas cetera. eet nae

.
~-

~ .

°

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt : “*
or Harass the Democratic National Convention
There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to
disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
Florida, 10-13 July 1972. - .

5



=o
. . . re mat any Rea rt
. . : : QF awe “sy on aborg?

:  Gakiate i fui veye

" | | BAS Coy

into the US labor situation, and particularly to try

to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany-and
Walter Reuther. [ZN-36 steered a very skillful
course in this connection, but the Agency could be
vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany's back,
or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency
funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing

the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of ,

this operation are best known to Larry Houston; Mike .
Miskovsky - IDEN-131 » and Jamés Smith. © Second,
as you well know, when Lou Concin received. his summons
to report to the Joint General Staff Weadquarters on

1 Novenber 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
My impression is that the accounting for this and its
use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
one of the early Special Group meetings attended by

. McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
7 Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
. Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
general position was that such expenditures were not
within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
such spending only on the direct personal request of
the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or
the White House,

oo : 9. I raise these issues of funding because I
"remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading ‘of old business, I know that
any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried
about the fact that conversations within the offices and
over the telephones were _ transcribed. During McCone's.

Apa art gore Ray paca Cha Sie z°
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1
nn irra CO Ty ee

0045

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hore . : 1 i
15h " 3 coy
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, tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,
his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
Street.. I do not know who would be willing to raise such
an issue, but. knowledge. of such operations tends to
spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
score. - .

11. Also under the heading of old business, I
well remember the hue and cry raised, ially by Carl
Kaysen in the White House, when [the lgonoy injected a
contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet.
Union J Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
with surprisingly little excitement at the tine.

12. During my stint on the. 7th floor there was

a special ‘arrangement. with the Office of Communications
whereby the Director's office gained access tofhion = -CIA
-tratfic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
“Adhiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary George Ball,
Fyes Only. . Ile returned to his office and proeeeded to
discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.

. Ben Read in the Secretary of Stace's office and I spent

several wecks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI. McCone, as you and I well know,
operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
his activities could be misunderstood: One example was.
his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens. on Air Force KC 135.
Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John -

‘ .

wergn ney ss pyran Ren pe oN

. . . ma “a . :

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pet Ma a pe ee ue

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t

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:
i a

a
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Hightower, Chief of the Associated Press Bureau for
Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
of this action.

-14. ° The use of '  IDEN-132 aircrait

“has been remarkably secure, but DCI McCone himself

forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in ‘the
San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
vention in 1964 aboard the IDE N-133 : with
the highly visible tail nunber IDEN-134, This was, I
explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
charter, but he didn't like it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift anda
luncheon when he left Washington, which is perhaps
indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible
Government, he did try to bring pressure on the publisher
and the authors to change things. They did not change
a comma , and I doubt that this old saw willoer sing
again.

16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with
the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul
Vi, would and could. raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a
sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
allegations from any quarter which cast these things in
‘the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further
“details, I am'of course at your disposal, but I would point

f
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~ 7,

“\ . . .
out that I was very much in the position of the

enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
were aware of these activities and better able to
judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-

.pretation,

Wellin _-

WALTER ELDER

noe: . . . teu i)
We loti wita U j Caled We ii Uie :
\\,
4 Ban Q . \- an
Wextme ae , . ‘

@ secrer sensitive @

~

_ SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

OS MPLODESTAR | is a Headquarters initiated program

which has as its fundamental objective the long term. manipu-

lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various
parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these: agents are
often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist,
and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwinsg,
radical, communist world. There is.a possibility that an asset
“might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the
Agency or the Bureau; or it night happen some asset would, for
some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his
Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-
rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each

* case is cleared with the FBI and through .CI/SO the Bureau is

kept. informed on a regular basis.

= | "SECRET SENSITIVE = E2 IMPDET
CL BY 061090

. 6. As a means.of sharing more fully our operational
‘,experience we have invited three FBI officers to be
‘students in our Soviet Operatims Course from 14 to 25

May 1973,
f Shing)

a 7. A Soviet defector - was’
“confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to:

September 1967 while efforts were being made to
“establish whether he was a bona fide defector.

Although his present attitude toward the Agency i
quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the
press could cause undesirable publicity ° ‘if it were

to uncover the story. 4

Ce gil Ht . Wer

David H. Blee
Chicf:? ;
Soviet Bloc Division

oé
ON m
oe oe tana

ey

O08R5

MEMOR»iDUM FOR: Mr. Colby re,
ae is the material we requested of # Dich
Ober:

A, Ten Reports, ‘Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the ,
Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Democratic National Convention’

-C, Two Memoranda re Agency support to
Secret Service for Democratic and Republican
Conventions

Ober advises that the only American we reported
on to the IEC is Rennie Davis.p

v4 (lt May 73)
Y, (DATE)
7

0054S |

(47)

FoR’ KO. lol REPLACES FOrM 19-101
3 AUG 54 WHICH MAY DE USEO.

CUAFINEATIAL. [| SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

me ANO ADDRESS

Inspector General

- Remarks: -
oo, Mr. Broe: . - “
. —
[nick Ober\has. been advised that this package s€CU G
is bing sent to you. Since knowledge of the .
existence of this Committee has been strictly
‘ Mriited. Ter artind thet it be delivered to vou

unopened, Although it has an ER number on it,
it has not been sent through that office -- I gave
then only the day, subject, and originator.

FROM: ISAME, ADDRESS ANG PORE NO,

O/ES/MC/Marbara Pindar

eL.b TT CONFIDENTIAL

wh

UNCLA

FORM Ho, Use previous eoitions ' (40)
Ter Zod “se BN a .


-
—

ROUTING AND RECON

SUBJECT: (Cprional}

EXTENSION

[pichara ober

JO: (Officer dessgaoion, room number, ord
ovildng)

11465

{

OFFICER'S

IDEN-73
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SHEET

DATE

COMMENTS (Mumber ecch commen! to show
INITIALS | fo whom, Drow o line ocross column cfter each com~ens,

‘14 May 1973

‘Attached are:

2.

Te on
wae i
aes
Loo
.S oT

per y
orning

‘ound mote an

our

2 ene OARS TR OTS ee ot

fraqny wre

rewues.

Copies of memoranda con-'
corning
Secret Service (7 Avril
235 June 1972).

a gency

SUPNS: we
‘f

.

EYES ONLY

fu . - , “es
a a ath! ory: meee
Thysey ore syrah ee

00548

ets

ard

\

eee eed Pe POOR AS Seal hs OO Mee

4 THe wees
| Co Wiuse

oft

aero eee emo

@ - 14 May 1973

SUBJECT: - Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to: produce
fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
including -studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremisn
and terrorism. Membership: Department of Justice (Chair-_

- man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central
Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of.
other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive
Director John Dougherty. and later Bernard Wells supplied
by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant
to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney

vt General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and. later '
mc Willian. Olson, ITS has received requirements directly
Trom and delivered renerss citectiy tO or fie of the
White liouse. | The White lfouse has “insisted that the
existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness
of its existence within this Agency has been - linited to
HCY, HHO™ Cary 4 C7 CT aad Your orficers ot tits office,

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreign
aspects (by memorandun with no Agency letterhead or at-
tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign
intelligence provided. by FBI and NSA, The Chief of the
Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa-
téve on the Intelligence Fvaluation Committee Staff and
as the alternate to the Agency representative on the .
Committee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff).

: 3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclosure
of Classified Information, November 1971. This study
‘Was initiated in July 197 TI7i by the White House as a con-
sequence of the President's concern about the release
| of the Pentagon Pavers by Danicl Elisberg. Both Robert

| ’ “ Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES
‘Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-
pation was editorial review. — . \ .
i
oi,

Fyne EN oe -
SENSITIVE :
SECRET J)

tf ,
— e 7
Dapper ce ny (24 ys!

Le nee yeep +

4. Republican National Convention (21-24 August
1972): At’ the request of the White Ilouse, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-
ruptions at the 1972 Republican’ National Convention, parti gest
Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from
February through August 1972 periodic contributions for

. these estimates concerning foreign support for activi-

ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican
National Convention (copies attaclicd).

« Democratic National Convention (10-13 July
1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disrup-
tions at’ the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami . i
Beach, Florida." The Agency provided between March and
July 1972 contributions on forcign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

eyes oy 00550
SENGNIVE oh,

OTR BEATE A RineceE ganas . : -
O FORIEH Ged ESL pono. we, :
wVArh

SSRIS DSS
ce | oan @ (23 Fes iv72 .

SUBJECT: Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt _
i or Harass the Republican National Convention

1. There are only limited indications thus far of
foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of
activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23
August 1972. “os
2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
Indochina, held 11-13 February .1972 in Paris/Versailles,
attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international
demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican -
National Convention. <A representative of the San Diego

* Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action
groups targetting on the Republican Conventicn, requested
_the Anerican Delegations! Steering Committee at the World
Assembly to include a specific call for international
support of activitics against the Republican convention
in their proposal to the Action Commission of the. World
Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too
divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indica-
tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of
the Assembly... St

Jot . :
3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided
| financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid
*.the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representa-

tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS' repre-
sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations

- for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.)
Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNOMN-supported pro-
ject, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC),
of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to
direct New Left protest activities at the Republican
National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative
to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
it is not known if the Republican National Convention was
discussed.

Ay

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An on PS re
ell Welk AD

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4. The SDCC is planning for -foreign support for its
harassment of the Republican convention, - A working draft
plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a
Special television network to broadcast video- ~taped messages
from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic
demonstrations elsewhere; and. (b) broadcasts over public
address systems of live telephone calls from the. Vietnamese
in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the
United Nations.

”

ae

Bem ANT ENE NISRA EE TN MAO EE ZEAE

_tperun DSS

wes

; a . he wal olin, Ia Ay uh henner
. _ .. HE perry Sietatord
wo CONT RULLEU Lidatid

ee Se St

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
mo. or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

___Indications, remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts
to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican

..Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated

international support for domestic activities in the United
States was generally endorsed at the recent lWrorld Assembly for
Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the
Conference issued no specific call for international support of
disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND : a re

At the Soviet-controlied World Assembly for Peace and
Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles
from 10-135 February 1972, there was mention of American plans
for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions. The final draft resolution fram the
Conference's “Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted
by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination

_ for domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-
.' national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and
_ demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with
the statement: “This campaign will: lead up to the Democratic
—__Party.Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Dicgo on August 21, 1972." —

‘The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
‘edée7-and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
1972, drafted by the "Political Commission" states: |

"In the United States particularly, the protest against
‘the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various
‘forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, denon-
—“Strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calls for support to thése progressive and antiwar forces in
_the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylun
to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.
All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help
to impose on the U.S. Governmcnt-the restoration of .peacc,
and independence and freedom in Vietnan, Laos, and Canbdodia."”

it

EDEROUED pese? Oost

WW
PA PROTIAH Pigeediq Miser enoAAN


cs _ T tps
wa GOR noel) Bisdcil

DEVELOPMENTS: _ - _ =

RLIGHY bicstad. nd. Uidoend nuAtAD

oo . .
. .
. . ’
. e .
. . . .

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC) , one of the |

‘domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-
‘vention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a

“large exposition in the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,

which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles

of people all over the world. "Plans for activities at

Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special
television network to broadcast video-taped messages from

other countries, including coverage of sympathetic demon-
strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
Systems of live telephone calls.from the Vietnamese in Paris

and from the Communist Chinese dnd others at the United Nations.
In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to "outflank

NIXON domestically and internationally, " international opposition
can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countries

‘and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demon-

strations."

' . 7 = 00555
APMP TID TD petan
. s "a4 o . ie 4


masewd bid dy

MEMORANDUM -
_- SUBJECT: Technical ‘Operation Against. IDEN- 76 Enbassy

: in 1971 and 1972

. o
. . .
. . .
« . :
a

. 1. A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in

Washington, D. C. was mounted oy the FBI with the support of
cyfin April-May 1971.

This operation, which used. .
agony equipment and technical expertise but was. managed
operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-

Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-
‘Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-

continucd at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it
appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before

Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and

identify this operation as[CIA instigated. {
“2... The operation consisted of the following three

techni cal devices:

. az— An AC- powered, masked” “transmitter and

two: switches | in the. office occupied by the Deputy,
_-~Chief of Mission. — —_

-b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in-the

_,office of the Ambassador's secretary which was


.* .
Le ec erwrtda ly

-2-

- designed to pick up . high quality audio of typing

in the office. It was hoped to break these audio

signals into clear text using advanced computer

techniques developed by Division D. No useful
product, however, was ever obtained, '

c. A battery- powered,” masked transmitter

and switch concealed in the | : door of the
Embassy,- which would supply crytographic information \
for NSA. (Produced excellent quality Signals

‘until it became inoperative in early ,1972 because of
- ot

— battery failure
3, In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of
the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited
value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations
a of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because |
: of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 covernment mission ;

arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level

talks. with U.S. State Department officials ‘concerning debt

enegotiation and—other major i items outstanding betwebn —

—

“two-countries. The 0} operation was reinitiated on 21 December

1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February_1973 by Acting.

CTs Tes 73 |

“SECRET

a

rion an Owe

A Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request

_ WaS prompted by a- decision that the intelligence production of

this operation did not justify ‘the risks involved in continuing

to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the

jiount ing disclosures about |CIA involvement jin LSEN-76 This. -

was: especially so because of our reservations about maintaining

proper security for the listening post which, as with other

operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

— — ooveneeres * -
ee mmeeenemaets
. ee
_ — — —
—_—
—_—
_—
——
— —
— —


: e. Alias’ Social Security Cards, 171 backstonped
; accounts havé been estapfished for contract personnel
A Ab whose relationship with fthe Agency] cannot be revealed
“1 \ but who are entitled to Socia ecurity coverage,
UC — Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts

are merged permitting the individual to receive con-
plete benoLits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

. £. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security
numbers have been repistered Lor the purpose of. open-
ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-
dividual tax accounts ‘have bcen established with IRS
on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.

g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities
(43 corporations; GY sole-proprictorships; 207 lawyers
and 61 telephone. answering service addresses are main-

tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

he Alias Signatories on Bank eS 24 aliases

al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1
proprictary-hire as follows: ;

ccs/igs ~ 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8
proprictary entities and 1

ie). , . notional company.

oe _ OC8/RY PMC* - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13

proprictary entities.

_ CCS/NY PMC# - 1 proprictary-hire ‘e alias)
° . _ on 3 proprietary entities.

cos/uD PMCX - 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2
proprietary entities.

*Proprietary Management Company

-3~

SE rat oa I"!

nic ‘

-

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise.

of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for :
this arrangement is: provided through CCS-procured

bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirecs

are currently being handled. - 4

k. Credit Union Arransements for Selected Non- _
official Cover Vorsonnel, Sividends (interest) earned
on Credit Union accounts by individuals under cover
are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based
| on 50 U,S, Code 403¢ or Internal Revenue Code Section

6041. , ,

| . ‘Individuals under cover may borrow money from the’
; . Credit Union -for the purchase of real estate; however,
_ the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared
lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).

—

Paragraph 1, deleted because it contains sensitive

' ' Agency operational methods and techniques,


~~ 1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
proprietary management companies which provide funding and
operational support for 49 Agency entitics, including 13
controlled and directed by CCS.

e ;

2. .The three proprictary management companies are
staffed by 9 employees; they furnish assistance in the
commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going
operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of
entities supporting operations, dnd provide cover and
funding channels for operational activities as required.
Most importantly, professional services are furnished in
a manner responsive to required security standards and
at a cost considerably less than would be scharged by
bona fide management firms.

3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-
vide cover for ten-individuals in the United States and
three overseas. Operationally, the companies provide
comercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and
serve as corporate owtiers of equipment, inventory and
aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding

‘notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government
affiliation or interest.


L 1973*Safesite number 585 was made available to the
U.S. Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence
“by: an. Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was —

‘elements.

_ - 7 May 1973

“-MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI .

1. This Memorandum is’ submitted in order to
identify to you for possible bricfing of the
Director activities which in, certain contexts could
be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

2. At the request of the Director of Security,
from/approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January

under threat of assassination by organized criminal

3. SB Division over the past three months has
interviewed four zraduate students as prospective
candidates for assignments under American business
cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate
cover jobs on their own.

4. For approximately two years the SB Division
has ‘had the cooperation of the Commander of the
Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police
Department in training officers scheduled for
assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to
conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The
arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

5. Since late 1972[c1Al]has taken part in seven
FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in
response to requests from the FBI. We have shared
with them through lectures and discussions lessons
we have learned which are relevant to their cotnter-
espionage responsibilities.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952

€x

oe OU OO BA

have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS
Program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-

- tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by- product

capability or a concurrent capability for provision of
information responsive to the program's requirements.

This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-
tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-
tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam
Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bloc Division opera-

‘tions and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an

American "Movement" background.or who have known connec-
tions with the American "Movement" are useful as access
agents to obtain. biographic and personality data, to dis-
cern possible vulnerabilities and suscentibilitics, and
to develop operationally exploitable relationships with
recruitment targets of the above prograns. These assets
are of interest to our targets because of their connec-
tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement.
Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been
approxinately 20 important areas of operational interest,
which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:
Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers,

Moxico City, Santiago, Ottawa and long Kong. ~

4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-
tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-
gets of special interest. '

Paragraph a. deleted because it reveals a sensitive
foreign operation. ,

ee ee eee ee

Paragraph b, deleted because it reveals a sensitive
Agency foreign operation. {

Ni TTT V —_

-5. MHCHAOS reporting from abroad relating to the
program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted
in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and -
who appear to have extremist connections, interests or
background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-
ported upon in response to.specific Headquarters require-
ments received from the FBI because such individuals. are
of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the
MHCHAOS program is sent via reStricted channels. It is
not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or.the In-
formation Services Division. The control and retriev-
ability of information obtained, including information
received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-
cial Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI require-
ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled
dissemination chanicls, i.o., by restricted handling cable
traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind
memoranda.. .

8, Information of particular significance, when col-
lected, has been disseminated by special memorandum over
the. signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to
the White fiouse (Dr. kissinger and John Dean), as well as
to the Attorney Ceneral, the Secretary .of State and the
Director of .the FBI.

SENSTIIVE

ne
SECRET 00593

~ : FR 73-183

8 May 1973 .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations *

SUBJECT: ° Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential

REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73- 180, dated 7 May
1973, same subject .

1, The answers to your questions are as follows:
a Question: Do we recruit Americans?
Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be
used as academic supnort assets and access agents.
These Americans are used for spotting and assess-

ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-
ments,

Paragraph 1, b. and 1, c. are deleted
because they contain sensitive agency _

operational methods and techniques.

Bo | E& IMPDET

cL BY: 057223

SE¢ 2, TTS ‘SITiVE 00

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v4
of
whee

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’
wae

“Sh

d. Question: What is the arrangement re,recruiting’
out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?
; y
Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically
requires approval by the, ADDO or DDO for any.
recruitment attempt made in the United States
against an American member of the academic

.

“community or a foreign target attending an American

academic institution. This regulation.is presently in

.the process of revision in that this approval authority

for academic recruitments in the United States is to
be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
for recruitment attempts against American students

outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief

of the appropriate area division, The only prohibitions

_ at the present time are those precluding recruitment
attempts against foreign students here in the United States
on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright,

If you have further questions, please let me know.

signed/IDEN-173

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

COOGLA

cate, Tes poet OETA
an ee 7

haku Cd a 2 fe wie Nat b it

"activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk

. ‘ ae
. ; ¢ aa FOUN DT oe on

en ead

FR 73-180

7 May 1973

a

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations | ;
SUBJECT: | ‘Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1, At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational

that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency.
We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with
our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under
the circumstances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which
FR Division has partic!pated and/or is participating that contain some-
what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed
these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

. JFK OYCR)

a. |The New York Basce|provides a fairly considerable
amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
Chinese. This support was authorized by Mr, Karamessines
and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other

VO,
than the inordinate amount of time spent by(New York Base SECIS)
personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of
money that has been expended in support of these efforts,

b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. ‘The
CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep

; cover;[his cover is the Mullen Corporation, ](This is the cor- ] JFEWIE
oration that employed E, Howard Hunt. }In discussions between
’" NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would
be pulled out and reassigned in the United States.
FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.
: \

E2 IMPDET
cL BY: 057223
. vi.
~ | , 00633
Le a is how ee

Piso INSEE EVE

. "GE rane ree pe Ee
. . Sete ete dine Soba dl . ta
: en ee »
We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
officer attend a university in the. Midwest for at least
a year, working towards an advanced degree until there
has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan
to make no operational use of tiie CIA Officer whatsoever,
f during the period of time that he is attending the’ university.

Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the .
situation and decide the next course of action at that time.

‘Paragraph 1, c, is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

,

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the yee (8)
existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close
yrEOY (sp support in San Francisco. This operation is directed
against [DEN-62, I understand the operation has
been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility
for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction . JFEGDLS )
JE Oe? with SB Division.

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations
in the IDEN- 61 by the FBI, (The equipment was pro- Jey aye)
duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no
CIA personnel have entered the premises, { The operation was |
deactivated and is presently dormant, The mikes, however,
are still in place. If discovered the operation could cause
‘some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is
unlikely the finger would point to CLA.

COi'5
— s™7 .
emurey rmece ey TN 24 2 00G oad
ere mes 2 oe
fr i rs ry ee ‘Ven

se wiv ds
Coa kure nee | ou

SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of

OM

Logistics .
action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
one agency of the Government to’ duplicate facilities |
readily available from another. (A typical example-of this
procedure is purchasing photointérpretation gear for th
“Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC; Tn
“connection with the current reporting requirement, however,

I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be

relevant to the subject of this memorandum.

d. In connection with the disclosures during the sum-
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not, properly
safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
two acts. I directed the Secnritwiéficer from our: West
Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 ..

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy

himself that classified material furnished them by the

CAgency}was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
His report was affirmative. On 25 August 1971, the gontor
Security. Officer assigned to this Office forwarded

letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
information furnished then byfthe Agency.J Of residual

_ interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents

of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to theCExecutive Director-
Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession,)

This memorandum reports that EEBIS regularly

but that instructions had been issued to cease

| ge disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation

distribution of classified reports. While no
other direct dissemination went to Rand, other
USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
"many" copies offDD/I products to Rand] as au-
thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
dum also states that Rand personnel had -
requested searches and document retrieval from
the CRS facility. '

5. In connection with action taken for the Office of

Security, there are three relevant items;

by the Office

;
a. The Printing Services Division, OL,! was requested
£\Security to print a book written by
Office of Security. The book was pre-
hy pnder a Brookings Institution Federal

EVES OMLY sha

SECRETE (00413,


sf"

SUBJECT:

ge

Sensitive
Logistics
)  -@®  @

the/ DD/0,/we will not honor any requisition fer surveil-
dance equipment unless it has been approved cy the CI

Staff of theLDD/O, 450) .

4. Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the

ztivities Performed by th Office of

following items are pertinent:

10)

a. In February 1971, [Colonel L. K. White] the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to-attend a.
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.

‘Colonel White explained that the Technical Services

Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive ject .
So i7ey »[gotones white) dia not dis-
close the purpose of the asSistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
matters. Since the Office of Logistics has. no inrormation
concerning the mission or purpose of Project . sub- -
Stantive questions concerning the subject should be
addressed te TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
for the .FBIl-Are..revorted below, Specific mention is made,
howéver, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap- _
proximately §1 million, and the complex technical. equip-

. ment that has. been involved in the undertaking.

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve rein-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
amount of $56,900 is for two Westinghouse. television
cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which -
will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
and Services. , ot

c. Over the years, thisfAgency] has often supported

other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel

Standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved é)

‘request, supported by a transfer of funds,Cthe AgencyJ

would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting egency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are

legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This

' Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-

Vide a service for, another Government agency when such

EVES OLY yg
SECRET oT, Oorae


SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of

Logistics — . é . ;

Executive Fellowship.-. The book is entitled "Where's

What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
formation that may be useful t6 an investigator. The
book's first printing cf 360 copies: was made in June 1967.
Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made

in September 1968., The. ti tle page of the book cives
attribution tof setae itis Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency] end. the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fellovsht The book is classified Confidential,
and it is our understanding that the distribution was mace
to appropriate,agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
of] Mr. Murphy's| book can be made available for review if
desired. . .

Sometime in 1972, a representative - of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA). requested
that the Agency sive consideration to ovr publishing, at
LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
was the ‘intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
determined that the LEAA request should not -be honored be-
cause{the AgencyJshould not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcement material for general and un- -
Classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities.

b. On S January 1971, the Director of Security re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven:motor
vehicles for use in connection with a special support.
operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
randum of S January 1971, that "This support activity has
been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director

"+ and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has

’ requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
them to local Police Departments, In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued froma ency stocksJand, in
other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
-by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2. .

SECRET _ e0tds

==

SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
-Eogistics ;

6. In connection with the responsibility held by this

Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all
Agency operating components, the following information is

relevant.
a. A safe site, identified as "Safehouse $62" which
is Iden 88 ;
was made available to General Cushman’ Ss
office on 25 July 1971. >

The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970
as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site
and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-
plement of five standby safehouses for all: Agency use.
The apartment has one bedroom.and is located in an older
high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal
lessee is Iden 90 a security-cleared
attorney with offices located at Iden 91
- The cover story utilized is that
Iden 90,. * rents the apartment for business conferences,
_meetings, and occasional overnight ‘stays by his staff
and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term
was for a l-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby
safe site, the apartment has been used by various. Agency
components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.
Control of the standby. safe site and its security is the
responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of
each user, component, and date of use; however, no record
is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what
purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).
Such information is maintained by the operating component
requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this
. Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
; available to General Cushman's office on 25 July 1971 in
\ _ answer to a telephonic request.

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
_ nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami |
Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National \
Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as

a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were

_ an liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

EVES ONLY: =
SECRET 4 : | COAL


SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
; Logistics .

assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant .
operating component on this matter.

7 The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject. tasking given by the Director. -

. . ‘ ; . e .
f cn F
{ 7

- of.
wih. FF Lief.

1 Be “
John F. Blake ~
Director of Logistics
2 Atts _ | o
ce: DD/M&S

EYES, Oty ats
SECRET | |

~~. —- , . oom an a : ws

WTUOLUREL oN

EVES OHLY

| oo _ _ Receiving
Requesting Date of U.S. Depart
Office. Request Item Quantity Unit Cost ment or Agen
OS —S—=s«3/23/72 + ‘Telephone Analyzer - ou 1,350 BNDD
; : :
TSD 5/16/72 Transmitters, Radio Beacon . 8. 313 BNDD .
os ~ 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzer Te _—s | “1,350 cg White House .

~ Communicaticy

Asorg

°

ETT00.

os . . - 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers : ‘ 43 1,400 _ Air Force
os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers... "10 | 1,350 ‘'State |
. 0S . 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers . - 2 - 944375 ane
TSD -—S»s«- 11/16/72 Camera Sets _ 7 29 656 EBT
TSD_ 4/17/72 Camera Sets | -10 700 ~~ ERE
TSD «11/18/71. Actuators, Recorders = SO | ° 488 FBI
". Tsp —s«4/49/72 ‘Tessina Cameras, | 3 700 BND |
ae: TSD -"  12/ 7/72 Camera, Video oe "1 - 18,045 FBI e . |
- RSD. 10/13/72. Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, 1.) 4,639 EBE ws
a z . Equivalent of WL 30691 . . : .
TSD 3/26/71 Tubes, Image, WL 30691 - 2 ‘4,607 FBI .
TSD . 4/20/73 . Cameras, Television )

Nw
we
fe)
~
Ww
Lo)
So
ie? |
w
a)

WANS COfICE
SENG EL Ua UT, SOURCES
Able he ens Vive vin

EVES ONLY

GUA RET


“ONLY

. _ oo. Receiving
1 Requesting Date of- . , — ; U.S. Depart-
Offic Request Item _-° Quantity Unit Cost ment or Agent
TSD - 12/14/72 Transmitters, Radio . 3 313 BNDD
TSD - 10/20/72 Actuators, Recorder =. 25 591 FBI ct
TSD 10/13/72 Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, | 1 © 4,639 - FBI So
. Equivalent of WL 30691" , :
‘” TSD 5/26/71 Tube, Image, WL 30691 2 4,639 FBI e
TSD 4/22/71 ‘Transmitters’ 3 1,372 | FBI
-TSD | 4/22/71 Module, Plug-In 4 1,247 ‘FBI
. TSD -: 4/22/71 Power Supply - UWP-39A 1 - * 568 FBI
OL 2/25/71 Telephone Analyzers "2 1,350 Treasury
“OS 1/30/71 Telephone Analyzers . 22 1,350 Treasury
OL 8/12/70 Cable, Special-Purpose .
. Electrical 5,000 ft. - ~42 White House
_ . . oe ; Communication
_ - ; ., . ; Agency
_. “2. tsp ”—-1/10/73sInk, Special Formula > = ~~ «1. Lot 1,825 nmi Mttion a
Ot | oo, - ; ‘ss Naturalizatio
TR, ; m ' ; i Service
TSD 6/28/72 Ink, Special Formula -1 lot 3,700 Immigration 1
Naturalizatio
oo) Service -
an) . .
bao TSD 7/26/71 Transmitter, Radio Beacon 1 _ 728 U.S. Forestry
“ha : .
ee) a red “7 a.
EVES OWILY |
af CUD 4


TE EAO Loses ver
@.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services.
SUBJECT : Activities which might be considered sensitive
issues, os

' Ihave listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
might be considered sensitive issues.

Le a , “

Most Sensitive Projects a ~ a °
OJCS ' Project Officer Nature — ' OCS

Project . Organization, & of Reason for
Identification Telephone Project. Listing
(Lever) Richard Ober A special pro- Type of
, ; CI Staff ject initiated data being
Red 1465 by DCI . _ eollected.
£_sance | Iden 48 | Machine Ss ype of
. OS" index to _ data in
“Red 9298 security files - index,
(erpsrat) Ct JohrHutchings ] Information | Type of
7 ORD : storage & re- data in
3061. trieval of drug files.

related data

' (ORD's project

Sensitive Projects ©

Tprvces) Iden 18 | Computer file Type of
OMS of drug data, . datain
71792 . ‘ x . file, \

EVES ONLY
SECRET


"+ Sensitive Projects, (Continued)

_ OCS . Project Officer Nature
- . Project & Organization, & of é
Kn of Identifica@: Telephone _ Proi

A s\ nt) _ mo Oo

4 W Li - PROFLIGES- Fokn—Winnte Statistical -

\\ - TSD - analysis of

: . 362-1922 © psychological
(sterile) . data, .
r . . ‘

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

TILAQ- RoebertHahn - Pattern |
: . : SB uo analysis of
Red 1185/ surveillance
1251 data from
re foreign liaison
. ; oo , , service
SPYDER George Data on
; . ; Swegman— ' vadio {requen-
Os ’ cies used for
5071 support of In—-
- Plece-Monitor- -

ing-System,.a

system to identify

unauthorized
transmitters. .
DM¥REC— —_—Iden 48 “File of auto-
- Os mobile license
Red 9298 numbers.
'  #PREGIN Watter- File of Agency
; Kowalski applicants who
CI Staff were not
Red 9338 hired.

: niques of

| ns
SECRET |".

OJCS,
Reason for
List ing

Source of
data. Con-
tractors are
involved
with project,

Nature of
data, Tech-

system dis-
cussed with
FBI.

Project
originated by
James McCord.

Nature of
data.

Nature of
data, —

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued

OgcSs . Project Officer. Nature . OFCS
Project & Organization, & of Reason for
Identification Telephone Project — Listing
on ’ ‘Iden 187 : Cooperative Association
‘ ISD/DDO program with with the
ot “Red 1442 . Iden 188. named
. ; : . ' organization.
t
. -o. . an
: name grouping
techniques.

b° sua . .
' JOHN D, IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support

‘00497

)


<n é
= 29 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT. :Mr.Colby's Request to Inspector General to
. Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
. ‘ina PP/B Memo to DD/M&S
REFERENCE H

: D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or

: - (Xb) , Indirect Involvement —

\ . SS
The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K
for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr, Colby

asked that DDO records be checked.

Zz. .DDO records “show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
-project called [den 99. This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
service for the collection of ELEVT intelligence. The activity is .
handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff,

*3, The funds cited in the notes was transferred to Cl on
13 January 1972. :It is believed by DDO/MPS and the Cl Staff that

the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,i., , $30 to 32K
and not to two separate allocations,

iC Pecdarde)

John C; Richards


. |. MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUEJECT: _ Watergate Principals ~- Direct or Indirect
‘ Involverse ent :

1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
a report of any involvement in any capacity since J January 1969
| (*  .. with Messrs. Hunt, McCerd, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

-

fj . - 2. 1 have } had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

3. My McCord contact was indirect and ocurred sometime
. @uring ‘the late 1960's when I was. Director, Ojfice of Computer -
., Services. . I epposed plans for Technical Division, Office of
| Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
Iden 101. : Ted Hines of OD/S2T (then ORD)
was the computer individual working awith TD and, I think, would
have details.

4. The Krogh centact also was indirect and involved his | os
request, first throush OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf |
of the Cubinet Co:smittee on Internationa] Narcetics Control. Indi- |
, vidual phone discussions are noted in the atteched. The Agency
“focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; f tnderstand ;
Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of
_ Memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached
“also, —— : :

§. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to
all OPPB employees. One oificer who was attending a funeral will
not be available until tomorrow,

O\DbR\ CYS HBEe\E ss 1330, (5371252) = . ye
J - DAESB EAve OU]A LIT /s/ Charles A. Briggs a p\
- yew ET coh : — (Ne
ous gi - saqusveoe Charles A.’ Briggs
plemipayor: Director of Planning, -
rogramming, end udgeting ©
Attachment
As stated

ve SECRET


° . @. A Pooment
, , ; ; 23M: uy 1723
4 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud* Krogh-and his deputy,

Walter’ Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreinn
travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was
alerting us to their intention to ask us for junds for the
‘ travel, 7 .

& 1 :
7 Feb 72. Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3 5 trips icr 3 individuuls--
all in FY 72. Cost probably $1¢K. Linnick ready tu make
first trip. Iden 32 is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran

, Visit. --

7 Feb. 72 See attached memo from Beil Krogh, Jr, to Bill Colby and

_ follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (2 Jul 72) and Colby
| . (2 Aug 72).

12(?) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, mentioning possible Krogh/
Minnick attendance at-a LatiA American Iden 102
conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd.
White House, was laying on a hese with Iden 32 for
himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Eurepe.

23 Jun 72 Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest
in getting CA activitics, ‘including large-scale Ph
on narcotics front, Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.
6 Jul 72 Iden 3 called. Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film.

We will send, a

“

2 Aug 72 Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel
. orders ready; need money this .Fif (No record in my
notes as to who wus traveling when, but have faint
recolicction of its being to Mexico City). Sam Hines
and, Iden 73. contacted by Iden 3.

. | ; oe,
1 Nov 72 Related? Iden 3 ‘call. Agein notes are cryptic:

WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32):: Survey BNDD problems/
Mexico," .

SECREI


On Mr. Colby's copy only?

1B Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approv ed $30x for sensitive” a7

id
i

CS project - no ‘details.

_20 Jan 72 Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

t


19 Jul Qo

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: ‘Conversation winf Jack peo] TRL

i .

Y) 1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I .
. Pesos ed in to ned(7ack Baumanjwho lives in Winterhaven, Florida.:
Gack etired fromthe Agency)about five years ago on disability dve
- to a“Serious heart condition. He was-with the Office of Security for
about 20 years prior to his retirement, :

2. During a private conversa ationJackstold me that he had
bee fyinterviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with .
wv the( i MeCord- Hung affair, I asked him why he. had’ been interviewed,
a: and he told me that in late 1971 he had been contacted by Howard
Hunt who suggested that he consider an_assignment as Security
Officer for the Republican Party. (yack\visited Washington in
January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt
who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. (Jack?
furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.
Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt

that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
such activity. ' oe, .

3. According toldack? during the meeting with. Mr. Hunt
they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time
they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program

VA ah and a need for a good security system both before and during the

" National Convention, { Jack}indicated that he sincerely believed that
7 _ ; the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security
| - programmer but felt that he could not.afford to accept the job even.

though it was a very lucrative offer, Apparently, money was nota
hoo problem.

Ne rot wt )

se

i a aa. dei. - al i Fa
: 1

‘Rate Prac
BEPIRER TI
a4} PGGhy alte des

“on sano Ox. “Des

wees ~~. weer eee .

* (Glas bs wasgiss, ifsc ny ba ersni/
es


i). 7: "
4, wherbig eDacctined, he indicated thaw Mr. Hunt asked

~ for any other recijmendations he might have. Wiccording tofjack]

he told Mr. Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the

Ggenc but he did furnish the name of JEN- -lu8 who might be
possibly ready to retire from chetagency}

. 5. (Jaciinformed « ime that he assumed that the’ Bureau

, ND obtained his name due to the resume he furnished. Mr. Hunt. He

Abe “said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions
and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning
his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. MeCord (Jack)
said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any
knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.

6. ‘Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch
with Mr, Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew aothing of
. the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-
, sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being

es sna Bd | ae

removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as
originally reported, :
7. ALL of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
(Bauman,) and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the
“matter other than to comment that I hated to sec theCAgency'g name
connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation
took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record
_ and for information of the Director of Security.


al soa . : ; ws
7 _ | op aass za-1609°)) :

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT ; 1: Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

h) 1. lam addressing this to you instead of to the{ Director of Central

. Intelligence ince I doubt that the information contained herein is of such
i you Significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with
4 . thd Agency)since July 1972. However, if you.feel.that the information is of
such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the
. proper format to do so.

_

h) 2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the
; \ M) “Watergate and related matters was throug Mir. Jack Bauman a former
A Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida, } In

J December 197 Mr. Bauman}called me from Florida and advised that he
wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's
home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a
former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give(Mr. Baumapla call.
Thad only met Hunt once about 10 ycars before but [ agreed to relay the message.
I-called Howard Hunt at his home and told hi naMr. Baumanjdid not have his
home phone and requested he calf Mr. Bauman Mr. Hunt thanked me for
relaying the message and said that he would call/Mr. Baumap/ This seemed of
little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the
Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate
Situation. At that time I informed Iden 17 ‘of the telephone call from
Mr. Baumanjin December 1971. Attached is a Copy of-a’Memorandum for the
Record prepared by, Iden 17 4s a result of our conversation.

a private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the
FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

n) _ 8. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
we and took that occasion to drop in to seq Jack Bauman) Mr. Baumatold me in

6

WARES? Lone . | ~.~.f 12
Hig ccs] oma ey QEOD ET [es
AND bigilicuS is LY9 cisd td we


(2)

rn rr

with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for

the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the
memorandum | ‘is attached.

Other than knowing Mr. McCord throuzh his employment with
Athe Ageneylend meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, Ido not know nor

K (Kp _ have Lhad any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
6 cl matters now receiving attention in the press.

tS Lee
4 Aine TF Cah
Charles’ W. Kane °

Special Assistant to the.
Deputy Director
for Management and Services

Pa

.  Atts

megeny SECREL =o.


17 July 1972

6

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, . - on,

Pood °

SUBJECT:] Charles W. ae Ti FEOA)
, ‘Fden 108

_*

1, Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con-

Lt e) ; tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or net the Subjects

. + worked fod the Central Iatelligence Agency.) Previously, requests
of this nature were followed uP by the FBIWith aa interview of the

subjects. -

. 2. I briefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on

the ''Watergate"' case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.

Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement

and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment.

"3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advis wed NO

of the Subjects’. employment with| the Agency,| he indicated that
the Bureau does not wish to interview them, | ‘

4, The office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in Jhe a
the same fashion as Mr, True was previously interviewed.

5. I called/Mr. Kang)both at his office and his residence °
‘and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.
I caile Mr. Kane)this morning to advise him of tae inquiry.

“Bho by (te. Keng stated that he has no firm conclusion as to
\

how the Bureau obtdined his name. He stated that he has‘seen
Mr. Hunt on only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was
.the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

a
SnD

by the fact tra

to, the fact thal co

Christmas time of, ©: h Mee Kane]

to get in touch with Mr.: Hunt.

“Kane/how he could get in touch with him.,
Hunt's telephone number tHrough telephone information channels

wheseupon ‘he passed the number on to, Mr, Bauman)

e ccompanied a technic
Mr. Kant] stated furt

sweep team
ther that around
call (an ees Bauman

[Mr Kane stated that he has information that{(Jack 5 Be sumep>
on several occasions in connection with the
“current savestigation and that he surmises
have obtained his name from him.

has anealee
that the Bureau may

signed Iden 17

Deputy Director of Security

enews wena

' SECRET/SENSITIVE

._ e

8 May 1973

aN . ay ; . .
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1, As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved
- in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

ite |

WO b, FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program .
(\ for recording data on foreign and U.S. phy sicians from American
Medical Association records...

nee

of U.S. citizens believed to.be militants, subversives, terrorists;

a. Ci Staff - Mr. Richard Ober's. program for processing data” iy .
ica

.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
listing travel of U.S. citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from. “~
_New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on v7
. “@ata processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with
possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103

for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction
System." :

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project “which involved the collection
‘of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms
" terminated this program last Fall.

“SECRET /SENSITIVE S

a

S

| CONFIDE. TIal f-2

e

Mp

Oy

MEAORANDUY FOR THE RECORD
| .

SLiJiCT: Research Project on Rotert Vesco
- ; “ a

2. On 15 Gctoter 1974] Hesers) treckinridse end Heintreleen)

in the course of a Survey, were triéfed on activitiss of the :

Atlsntic/Pacific Division of tne. Office of Econemic aesorts.: One
project cited was a overy from the Lirectur, apgarently at the re-

quest of Secretary Shultz, to the effect, "hat do we Know ebout
.Vesco," tke man then remning 19S, Two of OLK's anal, sts uare arsigned
to tLe project and, working through tre. ucmestic Contact vervice, |

“spent a dey going over tre Piles of the Securities and Exchange
‘Commission. There apnarently was sone. contact also with UR Division

of the Leputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current
Intelligence.

2. The information atove is based on rough notes and obviously
is sketchy. It is cited nox not to sucgest eny wrongdoing tut because
of the current outlicity about Vesco end the probebility of continuing
probes into the subject ty the press end the courts.

Scott D. Preckinridge

sfteyyh Ges titi

.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

Bil--

' Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1.. Restless Youth (September 1968), No. 0813/68,
Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This document was produced in two versions--one
. with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
re, + «+. + 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
‘ and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the ~~
other version without the references to the American
scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the
Agency, This document without the material on the
US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent’:
to the Vice President and Dr., Kissinger. A still more
abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1969),
‘No, 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142),

8. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean--Ancther Look
. (12 June 1970), No.. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
Dissem (Copy 98).

\

Please note that these are our record copies and should.
eee een ener ineeinan oa aA a ah ES

- be returned. . .
Lash! ao

“ Edward W. Proctor
_ Deputy Director for Intelligence

the

SECRET /SENSITIVE

¢ I-A
“/! MOXY,

Attachments



| ee > CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY
re

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM Jf oy Deputy Director for Intelligence ;
SUBJECT : Activities Possibly wesaicta
Legislative Chartier

inh) ee .
coe 1, This memorandum responds to your instruction to — =
aa report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's. ,
: legislative charter, ©
. { .

2, All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate
have reviewed the past and present activities of their components.
I have received responses from all of them, and none reported any
activitics related to cither the Watergate affair or the break into
the offices of Elisberg's psychiatrist, Although contacts with
three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were
reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two
improper activities:

Hunt: . Col, White, Richard Lehman, and I talked
to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation |
of a recommendation in support of the Agency's
nomination of R, Jack Smith for the National
Civil Service League Award,

WL, Geiseliyrel

Mitchell; While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,
an OCI officer was assigned the task of
providing him with daily briefings on
foreign developments.

pret ila: = fists v9, Aoi h. 094.

on sil OH es: Ke
APERAUET Ean psy rees yong | [ers Ue
* Gh FS TU ork Tas fo Preocwadl - : 7 . 2 . 7

GEO shir ae)

bile
be a

.
Dit

et
ns

- . ee er

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY.

. directive.

.

DCS collects information on foreign students studying

in the US.

pcs collects information on physicians practicing in
the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign

nationals).

DCS accepts information on possible foreign
involvement in -US dissident groups and on the
‘narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal
with. the FBI and BNDD directly.

DCS assesses the suitability and willingness of
US citizens to cooperate with CIA.

DCS,. for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,

was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
ae Jt.
Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods,

calls,

NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery
; from NASA programs to identify photography |
too "sensitive" for public release,

CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

.. hour responses are attached.

-2-

if,

Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS
-had frequent contacts with Young during the

‘ summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
a Order 11652 and the implementing NSC

‘ This involved visits by Young
to CIA to discuss information storage and
retrieval and several meetings of an inter-
, 2eency group dealing with the implementation
“of the Executive Order and directive.

eee ee By In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported |
"1. domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders. r

Most of these activities are clearly

- Within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be

- viewed as borderline.


Aa PR ITErRy s)

r 6
NPIC. has examined domestic coverage for special

purposes such as natural éalastrophies and. civil
disturbances,

OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
memoranda on possible foreign connections -with
the US anti-war movement and world-wide student
dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of
the White House.

CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining AH
the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to "
the Soviet, and occasionally other forcign, embassies . ,
to acquire positive foreign intelligence,

FBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work
directly for another agency, ¢.g., to the FI3I to
_ translate Arabic in Washington,

FBIS monitors.radio press dispatches and reports
covered by copyright. These are circulated within
the Government and stamped "Official Use Only".

This has gone on for three decades without problems,

FBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio

- kroadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens
such.as those by US POWs in Hanoi, Jane Fonda,
and Ramsey Clarke.

FBIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
under Department:of Commerce cover since 1957,
JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of |
unclassified publications in foreign languages

and contracts with private individuals to do this
work, Most of these individuals are not witting.

of the CIA-JPRS relationship,

Chea idyll 2: a
EDWARD W, PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence |

Attachments
~3- - toa
: SSMGUAIED v4 0078"
CIA INTERNAL USI ONLY —_


SECRET
e INTERNAL USE ONLY

‘7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence,”

VIA ; Deputy Director for Intelligonce

t
FROM : Director of Current Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on
black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean
and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean statas.
{wo-DDI memoranda ware produced on the subject: "Black
| Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black
i Radicalism in the Caribbean--Another Look" (12 June 1970).
“In each a single paragraph was devoted to ties with the
US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned
« Visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black. power
activists to the Caribbean and other. overt contacts. —

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to

write a memorandum with special attention to links be-

tween black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of

' black power in the US. The record is not clear where

‘ this request originated, but it came through channels

| from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially

' sensitive and was to include material provided by the .

' Spacial Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff °

“ material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful

' evidence of important links between militant blacks in
the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of

the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced
in typescript form and given to the DCI.

%~
%

SECRET.


' SECRET <a
STA INTERNAL USE ONLY 6

. 3, For several months in the first half of 1968
the! Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typescript memoranda
|
|

on Stokely Carmichael's travels abroad during a period Ms
‘when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection
/ ds that the memoranda were for internal CIA use ‘only,

' although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

. a,
, Richard Lehman.’
Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

0028

Cc rh han ce Lr |
. . . “3

Uw Vateal J Vecewe nabs

7 May 1973

’ MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

2 o . y

sim To the best of my knowledge, DCS has not engaged in any

-activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as
|) gllegal., Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
(1) of providing operational support within the US to all ,
elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are
perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis-

interpreted. For example:

1. Provide personality and assessment data on certain
foreign students and ‘visiting foreign scientists and

officials.

2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection
of foroign student lists from certain universities.

3, Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens
to determine their suitability and willingness to
cooperate with the Agency.

4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians
to Agency personnel who are in alias but using CIA

credentials,

- 7 - + & Collect information on possible foreign involvement. -
\ or penetration of US dissident groups, but only ina
passive manner and only when the souree has refused
-to pass the information directly to the FBI.

“6, Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again
only in a passive manner when the source has refused to
pass the information directly -to BNDD or the FBI,

—004.8.4

NPEOITING

mts sete
SE SG} friseliee

Luv. wWE PCS me

SUBJECT: ‘pes Domestic Activity

yO

%. Collect specific ‘information. and supply duplicate or
. master keys for foreign hotels,

Collect. medical information from cooperative contacts
on foreign leaders who have received medical treatment
or examinations in the US.

Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
in the US who have studied abroad. Although most were
foreign nationals, some were US The taped information
included school, present’ business address, date of birth,
and Specialty.

Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas
telephone calls between persons in the US and persons
overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points
routed through US switchboards, This activity lasted
for approximately six months but has ceased,

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational -

techniques and methods.

pe NJ Sil; fle

. . mF lee
! ot SANMES R. MURPHY . 7
_ to Director’, Domestic Contact Service

1 “8 ° ‘ . .

2a il

Gens tA IS Sel te eemey ee

(VALET RSL | ~~ 00485


' December 1967. (We no longer iu copy.) | CO1S2

_ " SECRET ;
. . . ry EYES ONLY @

7 May 1973.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA ; Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM 2, Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT :

Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then an
Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of
worldwide student dissidence. Confronted. by timult at
campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence
accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Pree University
and clsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes;
financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences
hostil‘ to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely
to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.

; 2. The paper was prepared by /Paul Coracaddef] of octI
with the assistance the CA and CI Staffs. The DDI,
D/OCI, and corscadcen Inst with Rostow to elicit. the reasons
for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the
sources to be examined, the research methods to be folt owed,
etc.

3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most
Sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two- sections.
The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,
its. motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew
heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,
the survey of dissent emerged from a shorter (30 page)
typescript study of) SDS and its foreign ties the same
author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCi's irequest in

Caaawas ty SSS LES
soko i earns

EYES ONLY


~ on student diseont. The sensi [be

2 ‘i SECRET .
so e EYES ONLY )

4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign
student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which
then monopolized the field of student action here and
abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
ranging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself
as a@ review of foreign student dissidence.

‘5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the

‘full paper Restless Youth, including the essay on world-

wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be

_in the Johnson Library.

the President and Mr. Rostow, e DCI ]briefed the NSC
rsion subsequently
was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

6. Following phe paper's [tbe exper reception by’

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in
September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
March 1969 and August 1970.

iC ( Po Wf.
Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET
EYES ONLY

00223

b Oo : ee

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
. - O£F£ice of Communications, Operational
Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

D ; |
ww, 1. Prior to 1969 thelOC CONINT intercept unit,J-

which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
to these activities in monitoring, identification and
DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
Miami area. _Arrangements’for this_support were made

through the @D0's C1) Chief, WH, Miami}
In late September 1972, NSA, through Division(D/ ~

ppod requested that the Special Programs. Division initiate
“a hearability survey ot certain HF long- distance commercial

telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.

The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
interest.to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92.
Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
intercept was instituted, On 30 January 1973, all coverage
was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
complications.

3, The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal

technical liaison with operating components of the FBI

for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
for support of, specific activities have been made by the
Division€p/DDO} Support has been providéd in the form of

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET.
“UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL By{o61947)

| SECRET auile 00240
TiAl LE ¥IA Geil, bit Hy

S. 03289/73

system was jointly conducted by NSA

b 7 a ge

exchanges of technical information on techniques,. technical
assistance and training, and the loan of(AgencyJequipnen:.
In the past several years, support has been rendered to
MGHAMSK, UNION and WUGRAVEL. Support
ORKID

sensitive FRI projects.
has been and is presently being given to FBI projects
and R@SE. These projects are described in the attached

sealed envelope.

4. An-.operational test of an NSA-developed HE

'Ppivision D/DDQ and
OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.
A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
environment in Saigon... Receiving antennas were placed on
the roof of the hotei being used as the receiving/DF site.
A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the - |
roof. A team member in effect told him that the group j
was an advance security segment for the Democratic National
Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests
were completed and the equipment was returned to the
Washington area.

- signed Iden. 53

Chief, Special Prograns Division, OC

Att.

saya t:

— TR Set MT
bi DLE NA eS Galil ELS: — GO442

- ‘

SENSITIVE

) | . 9 ,, 1973

Electronic survey of Iden 63, so i:
This operation was terminated approximately two
months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for
two days.

Jen 98 flooding of the cipher device employed by
the Iden 94. Embassy on their diplomatic communi- |
cation.link. SPD/SEO.support terminated two
years ago. . '

Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved only in planning
sat this time, (attendance at two meetings).

- Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
e SPD/CHT personnel serformed an’

electronic search of the Iden 62 _.. ared” and SPD/SEO
personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording
of the spectrum covering -to-.6 GHz: during the

period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin~
ued support by SPD in the future as requested.

Division D operation involving ‘a Ider 95 code clerk,
SEO provided ecuipment, trained case officer in
use of device and stood by in Iden 97, a
Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if needed.
The operation: took place in July 1972.

ert pHEAEMIE@ wee CeOET '
ih oct Bits Wl .

pase liddnsoke oy J

SENSITIVE

. EGUEGEE™

as SECRET UMBRA '
 ) BYES ONLY . C)

~
~

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director for Intelligence

VIA :
FROM : Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT _' 4 Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late 1967Coct participated in the preparation s
of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the ,
foreign connections of US orcanizations and activists in-
\\ volved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of
C these reports, prepared at the request of the Wnite House,
was to determine whether any links existed between inter-
national Communist elements or foreign governments and the
‘American peace movement. the conclusion reached was that
there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between. anti-
war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of
direction or formal coordination. :

2, In October 1967 President Johnson expressed
A )\ interest in this subject and ordered a high level: inter-
\ departmental survey. In response to his personal request
OY to the DCI, Mir. Helms asked the( CI Staff to collect whats
‘ever information was available through our own sources ‘and
~ thirough liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which
was dixected. to prepare a Memorandum from the ber to the
President ,. ;

3. La book message requirement was sent to all stations
to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this
subject._} Although agent reports on Communist front opera-
tions overseas were of some value, the primary source of
information on the activities of US activists--and that was
quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,
which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

" erry ars it
Clacifed by corey yt
Feeagt I wn Feneral He date rot van ach fed it ‘
dott O. BS o nod
MG ; . P SECRET UMB wanCy at

- f BYES ONLY

Fs WISI FO

ora

ae wo @ He SECRET UMBRA
-- oo EYES ONLY

. yn Se A Orutt memorandum was jointly prepared by
OCI ane. CI: Staff\and forwarded to the€DCL2- He passed
\h this t;coscript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the
. (| Presid nt personally. The White House copy is ‘now in
the fizus of Presicent Johnson's papers at the library
in Austin. oe .

‘
‘5: Brief follow-up memoranda were prepared and
terwsieed te the White House on Zi December and 170
- Sanuez : 196@. According to our best recollection, no
furthe _ finished intelligence reports on intexnational
connec:.ions,.of the peace movement were produced.

Ne : | . il { / lo

oe, ’ Richard Lehman . ;
_ Director of Current Intelligence

362 SECRET UNBRA
oO RYES ONLY

| 0029-3


“only 2 persons so qualify. One is the wife of

have no way to separate them; we have files on

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

. . oy

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

‘1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's
request for a listing of any questionable .
involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe
that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable
man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs
to acquire still pictures, movies, videotares
and books. either privately, secretly or without
acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user.
CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking
at the content of film cans addressed to the
Russian Fmbassy in Washington. Customs occasionally
also provides access to other film from denicd
areas. It may be eddressed to private citizens
or organizations or other embassies. These efforts
are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign
information.

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S.
citizens or organizations. The biographic file-
building criteria specifically excludes U.S.
nationals unless the person has become of such
major importance in the political life of a foreign
country that the file is. essential. (To my knowledge,

the opposition leader of Guvana.and the other.
is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include
some persons who are now U.S. citizens but we

U.S. defectors to. Cuba. )

asuiu]

\O
ened gh Eade IMPDET CU BY.0 — 120

004 a

Zé

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

4. The CIA Library has several informal
snag files intended to aid the librarians in.
answering the kinds of questions that they know
they will get on a continuing basis, An —
appointnents file is a colle tion of clippings
on appointed federal officials: who holds what
job when and what is his backaround? The extremist
files are a collection of folders on a variety
of organizations and a few people with intricate’
Organizational links. Any sort of extremism
is grist for these particular files. Anda few
persons, c.g., Rap Brown and Eldridae Cleaver,
have cGossiers consisting almost exclusively of
Clippings from-public media. These files are
unclassified and consist nostly of clippings
from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground,
scholarly. ‘

5. I am not aware of any other kind of
involvement in domestic activities that is not
related to development of techniaues or logistics
or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

foe f. fo.
/ ( fo, eee . BA i
H. C. EISENBEISS .
UAV Director, Central Reference Service y

n
mv

OQ

~_


ae r . 6 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:’ DDI

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities

TFELYB)

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the ‘Ellsberg
and Watergate cases. * .

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From
time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of
Conmunications componeats for special operations (usually abroad) involving
close-support. SIGINT work or translation of audio take. ‘On one occasion .
recently DDO, on behalf of the FBL, requested the services of several
FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-
term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg
of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and
that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS
participation was.approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with
the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support .work are help
‘in the handling and resectlement of defectors, the recent assignment of
an employee to the. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transeribe
recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing of another
Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training
of Chinese Nationalist cadets.

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-

missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes

some material which’falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel,

and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled

by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without .

specific addressees, c.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's CNA,

are monitored by FAIS and the material is disseminated without restrie—

tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the

Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,

correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private

point-to-poiat transmissions, FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of

material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official

Use Only" caveat. The sane caveat is used on material which we monitor

from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright,

e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the
\ Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news


© @

[sy material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently,
however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use
Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under
the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into
alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services
with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of
those items vital to the government's business which we must continue

to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weigned against
the risk of present procedures. —

‘

4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often
involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio
facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American
Pow's in Hanoi, by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnan.
‘At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the
approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-
jmitted trauscripts of such broadcasts to the Department of Justice as
jpart of that Department's consideration of a possible trial, In such
jcases, ve have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,
|presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.
(In one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as
an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine. enlisted-man charged
with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all- this
with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we
‘}rue attribution. of their news to FSIS, and. we should not be considered

policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations
is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research
Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which
great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could
be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United
States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of’ their CIA
employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and contains some
risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public
knowledge, The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after
consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive

Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently |
taking a sccond look,

fcneds
Ev H. Licoe a

Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

~2-

SECRET

RUAL 00203
CEI

@

= 8 May 1973

\

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology
SUBJECT . : TSD Support to Other Agencies
1. Technical Services Division's chartgr (CSI 1-8) requires

that it provide technical assistance to both}CIA operations and
other activities as may be dir ected by the Deputy. Director for

“Operations. J

2, Over the years the(,chief non-CIA yecipients. of this
support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department
of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency
for International Development, and the White House.

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these
services have included training and materials, and in a few in-
stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,
secret writing and related ‘communications, personal protection,

; disguise,
concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-
tion, and counter~sabotage/terrorism.

. 4. In most instances requirements for this support are
received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.
Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development
and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy alsois re-~
quired.

5. The attachment lists the primary services 5 provided to
the organizations named in Paragraph two.

“ CK ‘82 IMPDET
OY [| CL BY 059098

SECRET %. (00845


}

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods,

Kok, Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,

whether they bd. GIA or other Agency requesters, always‘requires
approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance
would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group
Xt Headquarters or by theCOS loverseas having responsibility for
coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated
with DDO/NARCOG Requests for documentation of Immigration
and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
‘be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
until the documentation has been returned to TSD, If the material
is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
of the outstanding documentation.
: {; : ; . Sf

. L477 - (o gle
AMA Loe

. . . Be te. ooh.
Attachment . * Sidney Gottlieb |
Distribution: a Chief
O& 1+ Addressee, w/att Technical Services Division

COZiS

re CEPDET ae


} arrac (ent .

Department of Defense

iv

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,
flaps and sealsy counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses

. have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
of Defense and certain elements. of the Special Forces, All requests
are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at
Headquarters and with the(Chief of Stations)overseas. In turn
these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. (Selected , oo.
audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type -
cases.

Federal: Bureau of Investi gation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau |
in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive forcign ;
targets in the United States. -

| Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

a bs) Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for
le? overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
KW . SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel

/) responsiblé for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.

All requirements are sent to. DDO/NARCOG/for coordination
with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
Requests overseas are coordinated with th€:COS)or his
designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigration and Naturalization

(er analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
developing tamperproof alien registration cards, ‘special
fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service) Requests
are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-
ational, ~ . f i

: . Poo

SECRET © nay


x

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United
States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring

and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been

supplied the State Department, In addition analyses and
exposure of black letter operations against the United States
abroad are made, All graphics requirements are forwarded
to TSD for further coordination within the Division, The
Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
foreign visas andin the past passports on a priority basis.

' Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
been furnished foreign postal information and has been the
recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
ink, typewriter analyses, Requirements are coordinated with
thesDDO and DDO/EA,) The Post Office has furnished TSD

with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities

for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have
an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert

a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID

(

photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval

for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the'DDO.

U.S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border,
‘Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under

Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
is under an approval of a Cl-Police Group project. Courses are

given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

rT Sa oP : 9)
. t
a)

rT»
Ont

X


request of ct/?G) Yrainees represent internal security or
national police from all countries participating in AID Police
assistance programs.

White House
‘Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great
Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary, The Deputy

Director for Operations is apprised of these xequireme nts.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlincton, Fairfax and
Alexandria

During the period 1968 - 1969 a series of classes
reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,
‘locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry
were given to selected members from the above mentioned
cities. Overall training was approved by thel Director of
Genteral Intelligencejand in turn validation was required for
each course from the Director of Security. -


SEO UILY
sf f

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE

, SUBIECT: (Optional . ; ® 4 ous . |
NO, . : |
{

5

i

FROM: + EXTENSION
Sidney Gottlieb . -
Chief, TSD © '

203 South Buildin

YO: (Officer dasignotion, room number, ond
building)

DATE

x-2831 8 May 1973

OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number éach comment to show from wtem

| seceved | ronwatoeo | INITIALS to whom, Draw o lina across column offer escn comment) j

Attached herewith are addition: i
explanations of TSD support to
other U.S. Government agencies,

ERNE EAN et 18 ue a ee

. Qe Ey TTA gry

Sed Pe Pe “yd
nie aed ee) Catad

O9RZ90

~
w
——_——
Be
= -
“4
'
acs
:
.

for USE OP Ev: se : he ree TE at een
sor GTO SES CJ secret «=O conriventiak =) WS. 0 C) uncLassiriza

ATTACHMENT |

= FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close: working relationship with the FBI over
the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has
been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The
following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
involved in operations: ,

(A)

(B)

Idéntity 59. ' - Four masked transmitters were
installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.

Identity 60  - A TSD built masked transmitter

_ wWas-installed to collect emanations from a crypto-

ae (09)

(D)

. graphic machine. The system continues to function

when samples of the emanations are needed.

Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been
installed and are operating. One is specifically
designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the
other is a straight audio transmitter to collect con-
versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening

‘ post. A third system _ is not oper-

ating, probably due to battery expiration, The tape.
made from this room was made‘by the Nationa
Security Agency before failure. . '

Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and con-
sultation covering Identity 62

First masked switched trans-
mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor--

“ary quarters, Later masked switched transmitters

and microwave transmitters were installed in the
permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-
tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install-
ation is not fully operational because the full comple-
ment of personnel have not yet arrived.

- poo,
SECRET doz


he

(E) | - This is an operation -
participation by National Security Agency. Itis
_ designed in anticipation of the Identity 64

, in Washington. The listening post was

obtained by usinglthe Agency coverf.mechanisms |
for procuring the property. New systems are
being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.

(F) Identity 65 . - Ten masked audio devices pur-
chased fram TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install.
ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
equipment was installed 17.- 25 March 1972. Tests
made by a TSD officer from a temporary. FBI
listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that
the target equipment no longer functioned and was
_ believed discovered by the occupants,

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute
an on-thé-shelf capability to engage in photo and ,
audio surveillance operations which might not be
known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a
relatively unsophisticated device was used against
a domestic target.

COR


~ _ [. 8D/SDB, Meno save-73.J

‘8 May 1973
- .
"MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
ATTENTION: Executive officer
SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations _

i... In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB
provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County
police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train-
ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

_ 2. On occasion during the past few years, under the
auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
the Department of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff
and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-
zation. to police officers of several domestic police
departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection
Technique and Trace Hetals Detection Technique. These tech-
niques had been declassified and are currently available to

e law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center
publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities .
in.the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate
covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City
police department, Dade County (Hiami) Florida Dept. and the
Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973,-two SDB offi-
cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
in Sacramento,. California, sponsored by LEAA, When the
recent Letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison
with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in-
formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the: “
Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day. ,

/s/_ Hdentity 120 ”

cout c/tsp/ors/s a)
{ Oo2e.
i : \ vhs fee

EQVIMPUET/CL BY. 96233)


E

ORD- 2328-73 —
9 MAY 1973

7 ae

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and.
; Technology

SUBJECT He Repeated Survey of ORD for Non- \
Foreign Intelligence Activities )}

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined —
with respect to alllORD servicesSor dealings with
other agencies on domestic, non-forcign matters. In
addition, this report covers all our activities deal-
ing with the rescarch and development of intelligence
equipment for foreign use which has been tested in
the United States and might have collected domestic
information. Again, each member of{-ORDS available
today was asked cither directly or through his super-
visor to provide the above requested information,
whether he was directly involved or not. We have
used all diligence to search our records available

to us during this time period to ensure this is a
complete and factual list.

ae yb Vie
Lee

Director of Research § Development

Attachments:
-l - Contacts with Other
Governmént Agencies’

2 - Domestic Tests

reyares


&

COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEYELOPED i
TECHNOLUGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

.
ae CONTACTS WITH O:: U.S. GOVERNMENT acess WHICH

Executive Office of the President.

{\\ b .ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee
AX of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
Oo . ‘ Control that is concerned with research support of
the narcotics control problem.

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)

|

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security information was exchanged with
them.

(Noe/TA)
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) _

Techniques and equipment for navigation and
tracking was discussed with BNDD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA)
an ae . (Noe/TA)
Technical information was exchanged relating:
to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
narcotic laboratory effluents.

" (Mr. John Gunn ands- ‘.- (Parker/DSP)
’ Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD) . ae

Audio tapes were processed to improve their
intelligibility. The source of the ‘tapes was unknown,

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ; (Scott/An)
YN , ' .
. 7 . 0022
SEG al + ATTACHMENT 1

“SECRET

ae ; SUBJECT: Con@ts With Other U.S. Govc@y ent Agencies

ay Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of. CIA-
/\ \\y ‘Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
(\ . Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning
a Radar People Detector developed for. ORD.}

” 8. t BNDD was given'permission in the fall of 1972

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ° Identity 125 /LS)

A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
for the detection of narcotics for application in
Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of
the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST) : (erek/1s)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD) . _

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with the
intelligence community regarding technical surveillance
countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange
of information, reports, and cquipment has been con-
ducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves
State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and
Navy. : oy .

 (Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD) °

’ State Department

‘Two contracts for development. of countermeasures
techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA) ,

SECREE ok

XM

* SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology. in Addressing Domestic
. Problems

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah
River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop
radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
devices. These Laboratories have used sampling - if}
techniques developed for CIA to measure CONUS nuckear//
~ plant releases, .

(Mr. B. Benson, AEC) - (Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard
Cowan, the walls of the. office of the Chairman of the ;
AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed. The operation
occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some
anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction
detector. ,

(Mr.. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes /PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA) _-

Reports and information about the ORD- developed
Adhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System
were made available. to Department of Justice, LEAA in '
| August 1972. If they developed the system, it would |
| be used for civilian crowd and riot control. _

Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)

’ Technical surveillance countermeasures’ and physical —

security infcrmation were exchanged with LEAA.

(Noe/TA)


eo 6

, . SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
4 b Which Could or Have Resulted In Use off CIA-

WP Lo Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

a Problems

Treasury

OO Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department
to @¥sist in formulating their R&D program and organization
/ in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug

)

_ enforcenent administration, J The request for his services”
was made by Identity3, | the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-
- nator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the
‘detailing through Mr. Colby.

\
Cx

(Leahy/LS)

Custons /Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating
to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
the U.S.-Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) (Lawrence /DSP)

Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Div/TRS

Z| ¥ Cavout five years ago, assistance was requested in
ee ‘domestic search of “moonshine” stills using CIA infrared

Dy scanners. This was turned down. J

C'

' - Sectet Service

(Lavrence/DsP)

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret
' : Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
and equipment.

4
(Van Dewerker/TA)

00232


SUBJECT: a With Other U.S. cov@ncnt Agencies
Which-Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

‘Problems -

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

The results of our research work in the detection
of metals (NOLIR) were.reported to FAA for possible use
in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

SD

nC

At the request “ofl ORT, OCs assigned a staff technician
to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser
Line Notation. (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was

done jin cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH) | Identity 125 /LS)

Arms Control and Disarmanent Agency (ACNA)

; S/ORDInet frequently with ACDA personnel in order
to s ructure (QRD's}BW/CW research programs to support
ACDA needs. ’

‘Identity 125 /LS)

’ Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

Technical information relating to detection of
radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with

then.

(Mr. Charles Weaver, EPA) === = ~———s (Wa ker /DSP)

)
00233
TOME : :
Cate b. ty .


“49

. 1
BU oatn

SUBJECT: contMes With Other U.S. cove Ment Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of (CIA-
Developed| Technology 4 in Addressing Domestic
Problems

EPA (cont'd)

. Technical discussions relating to using IR scanning
equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land
fill have been conducted.,.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement
techniques germane to removing distortions from some
photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request
for specific Support. in processing the imagery was turned

own.

- (Stephan/IPA)

Secret Service
FRI. t~<“‘;O:*:; ~
“YTS. Customs so

Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies
in terms of assistance with domestic operations has be2n
in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-

hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
’ (Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

"NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)
We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to

‘develop automated systems for exploiting satellite- -borne
multispectral sensors for earth Tesources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA) ; (Galinaitis/1PA)
(Mr. Leonard’ Jaffe, NASA) m oo
(General Smart) i

6 2 00234


®

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
. Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems . ; ;

Erepeses. Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
would be SECRET)

Che Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-
- mental program to aid in estimating the Soviet wheat
crop, A part of the information would be obtained from
a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-
truth data will be collected on North American crops. 7.

(Briglia/PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics
an aAnecerous rugs

-CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre
<plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington
~ state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium

Poppies.

(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD) , (Cianci/LS)

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Orfice of the Inspector General
Army, ( al

rrice of rrovost Marsnal General

We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-
measures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

penny S. Arm , ,
oc ay Rocky Nountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,

joelle Ordnance Depot
oy LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,
storage and Production facilities in the U. S.

\ Identity 124LS)

7 ~  QQ235


4

Sd

-

. SUBJECT: con Wes With Other U.S. cove Oncnt Agencies

Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
° . Problems "

ULS. Army, Edgewood Arsenal . . r

(_us/orp)is sharing expenses with EA in field testing
an IR remote detector of CW aerosols,’

Identity 125 /L,S)

U.S. Navy

ssp/orpJewrnea over “about eight trained dolphins
to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
our dolphin Program.

~~ Cynch/1s)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years azo[ CIA infrared. equipment Was.
made available for USCG Sts to evaluate IR as a means -

.for night search of life boats.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) tawreceo/0se)".

Identity 174 ‘Sheriff's Office
(corp conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.
Polygraph security findings were compared with the
Sheriff's own security findings. |
(Sheriff) ; oo : = Identity 125 /LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
ment methods in 1967- 68,

. (Sheriff) a \ tdentity 125/18)


SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.
Problems

‘Chief, San Francisco Police

; For security: reasons, the Chief was made aware of
@ Study to evaluate attempts by non- ~Chiense to penetrate
(1967)

Chinese social groups.

(Police Chief)

Identity 125/LS)

4° 00Ra7


NU oo DOMESTIC TESTS FOR . .
ye AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

, 1.'.AS a normal part of ORD's efforts in the
research and development of equipment and techniques
for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we
conduct experiments and ‘tests in the United States.
Clearly,.the design and development of our intelli-
. gence equipments can be done more economically and
more securely in this country. Although most of
the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in
closed laboratories or in secure arcas simulating
the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-.
ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

.. @. A review of the surveillance equipment or
techniques which have at some time or other: been
exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. tkLaser Probe - About 1967, the laser
probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in
San Francisco under very closely controlled
conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed
portions of the test. Recordings. that were
-made of laser probe output were carefully
;controlled as. classified material and it is

“ believed that the tanes have long since been
destroyed. (Wood/TA) :

bs Microwave: Intercept System - About

1968, this system vas tes:ed in a light air-
craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station . ‘
in Identity 127:, California. This system is
designed to permit intercept of microwave
telephone communication channels of systems
Such as Identity 130 oe - (It
works equally well against the Bell Telephone
TD-2, as they are generically the same. Re-
cordings of these telephone intercepts were
carefully controlled and were destroyed several
years ago. _

eran: ATTACHMENT 2.
CebstS iste d ‘ .

09238


SUBJECT: von Ceic Tests for Agency reMerch and
-~ Development Efforts a

- -€. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-.
tive of this current program is to develop a
means-to utilize foreign telephone systems as
a communication link without the knowledge of
the host system. In order to carry out this
objective, it is necessary to learn the com-
plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
control system hierarchy for the various foreign
telephone systems. Many of these are patterned
after the U.S. system and, for this reason,
limited monitoring to test the operation of
intercept equipment’ in the United States is
Planned. ‘The data to be collected would be.
merely the signal tones from which supervisory
codes can be extracted. Message content is
of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-
seas testing is planned at a subsequent date.
To date, some domestic testing of this concept
has been carried out at the contractor's plant.
No recordings have been made of such data. Ex-
tremely brief tests exercising U.S. and forcign
telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-
nalling have been carried out to verify initial
concepts. The duration of testing was less
than one-half hour.

d.. Other Sensor Testing - Examples of

' engineering development tests of special sensors
Within the United States include infrared and

high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR
(FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial efflu-
ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-
tometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).

In al] these cases, the data output of such

.testing has been used for engineering develop- -

ment and the content has been restricted to
dissemination to those in Government involved
with the engineering design.


SUBJECT: Domegkic Tests for Agency Resdirch and
Devd@pment Efforts :

’ e. Remote Physiological Measurements -
An ORD-developéd cryogenic magnetometer is
being tested at a contractor's site for use
as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph),
Some test subjects are witting, but most tests
are on naive subjects (they do not know they
are being tested). The magnetometer is com-
pletely harmless to the subject and the test
results are closely held.

£. Personality Structure of Defectors
Study - ORD undertook to determine the per-
sonality structure of defectors during the
period 1966-69. The work primarily involved
an analysis of the open literature on known
defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned
with. a study of the phenomenon of defection
itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another,
or changing one set of political beliefs for
another. The work was conducted at Stanford
University. Identity 125/LS) —

g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained
and tested in the United States to carry small
intelligence collecting packages such as audio
surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-
rent measuring devices. Any data collected
from unwitting domestic sources would have been

', used only for engineering purposes and then
' destroyed. .

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In.
the period from IS70 through 1972 various means
were used to check out an intercept system designed ||
to operate against Iden 93 communications links, :
Under carefully centrolled conditions, some U. S.
microwave communications were recorded and passed
through the intercept system under test to prove
quality of performance. All intercept material
connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks
of the time of intercept and the material was never
checked for substantive content. NSA participated
and controlled most elements of the U. S. material;--~|:

onnts

. _ ; ,
. ‘ .
. - e GU aes . .
* " G q
;
-~ . .
i ‘ . ‘

-7 May 1973

see? . : | [or-2274-73)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
oo Technology

SUBJECT’ os Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
or his representative was instructed to query all of
his people and report back by this afternoon whether
or not they had provided any services or dealt with
any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
‘The. attached list is an inventory of all items we
were able to uncover. If additional information on
any of these topics is desired, we can provide either

. @ verbal or a written report on very short notice.
iN Ch. ED ines

Ca E. McGinnis:
Director of Research & Developnent
‘ Attachment: —

Scientific Advisor
As stated

SPITS

ot a aah

CLASSIE(ER Z it
cx

ttt seatey

. Sept | a Pe

(Gales nigos ate, hteest cate or events


ro

“

-~

Cpt TAMPER, an on- going program which may be

politically sensitive. ]

A proposed OER wheat estimate program which may be
politically sensitive.

(isregties som foreign activities are. yell known
45° n DDS&T._} .

A negative report from the Support Staff.

[oes NOLIR “york was ‘reported to the FAA about |
| three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledgeuc

Robert Scott - Performed sntetiighbsaiey enhancement VY
of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described
Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to renoving
distortions from’ some photography they had on an
alleged bank ‘robber.. Request for specific support

in processing the imagery was turned down. —

>

7 May 197

C. V. NOYES

7)

. My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance
¢
with domestic operations has’ been in the field of audio sur-

veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-

fically, I participated in TSCC and R&D Subcommittee meetings
“which included technology..exchanges and some equipment ex-
changes on a temporary -basis ostensibly for testing or trial.
“I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman
of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard
Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening
(date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.
Other persons contacted over the years have been:
Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service
Mr. Martin Pera, U. Ss. Customs -
Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI
_Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF
Major John Langager, ONI/USN
Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC : . !

ibm —' ) egeag’

ERE prove

ae ms _ Thomas P. Noe
: 5/7/73

a. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.

. ' xegarding technical surveillance countermeasures and
\ physical security. (This is an exchange of information and
reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.)

State . 0 Navy

Air Force [- - US Secret Service
“Army NSA

DIA |

FBI

2. _ Joint funding of two contracts with State Depart-
ment (PRM/LLL) . Two electret microphones were furnished
to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of
one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD
contract (Bureau of Standards). ,

_ 3. Other DOD and Governnent contacts for information
collection or exchange only. |
ARPA :
LEAA/Dept. of Justice
DNA/DOD
Office Telecommunications Policy
Office of Army/Provost ‘Marshal General
Army /Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon

Air Force/Office of the Inspector General

Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

Pr ae . . 00R43
SG at : . : ; . .


.

T May 1973

LS/ORD COMPACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

‘) ven. 1. BNDA(Charles Gask cin) was given permission to recéive 7
© proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Reder People Detector |
developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action wes approved by

D/ORD. ;

\ 2. BSP/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the
| Navy. Time: December 1969

a

aa 3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation ‘System.
Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA
in August 1972. If they developed the system, it would be used for
civilian crowd and riot control.

CREASES
wun mf

cae z
err rn

@ 7 ay r 9 ny 973
- seed

MEMORAND UM FOR: Executive Secretary{ CIA-Management
. Committee

| ;

| . t ; : -

| SUBJECT : Reported Identity 61 _ Burglary
| .

|

1, Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the
reported break-in of Identity 61, An investigative report
by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the
offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.:

y 2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio |
operation conducted against Identity 61 by the FBI, at the
| p § . vbY
N\OE  Kgency's} s 's] behest and with its technical support. This presents a

elated’ question that should be noted. James McCord's' testimony
indicates that he placed telephone calls to the. Identity 75 and Identity
61. - He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping
that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge
the evidence as being tainted. Another witness, John Caulfield,
says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure!"
they "were subjects of national security wiretaps. '"'

, Ak 3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the
. XD Identity 75 , ran by the FBI, about which{ CI Staftelieves McCord
W knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation
agéinst Identity 61 +, and assumed that it was also a telephone
tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping
that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and
that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped
because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive
operations. At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
may lead to exposure of the operations. :
. >

Pha

Ailey J VA

filliam V. Broe

Inspector General OC3SSi—
caret AEE,
Attachment: roa gs itt
As. Stated Above Cot oe 7 Fakes :
. Bootes Tee “2. OF ie
Miveee creed eLenteseneget 400
. rc ay al
ITT EN ere ty Cet be ee i. Tog at
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(eaters Lapaseibin, ttyeed Cote oe execs
~ ep


. 24 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT 4 Repoitea Burglary of the Identity 61 -

1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 _ 13-14
May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive
Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked anda
number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent
fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states
that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction, The Identity 61
registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed,
Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than

ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.
There had been an carlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61
which is described below,

- 0 2. On 16 April 197 aa Agency) roposed to the FBI the instal-
ion of technical covera ity 61 The opportunity
for such an installation came Sabot when a domestic asset of Foreign
Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid
for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the
contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate
or install material which would be provided him. {The Agency proposed
to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic
K 4 support. ' The value of such an operation to the intelligence community
‘) \ b was cited.

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned
down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms
sent a letter to Altorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI
turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. . On 24 April
the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington ,
Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation

sere ARO! one
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a nnn
CRAOTT  eteranpresl at eens SAAS shee eee
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QE

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the
technical equipment from the Agency .to the FBI was delivered,
installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working. No Agency
personnel were involved-in any way with actual installation of
equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-
nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions

of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did

they enter Identity 61,

5, The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 - be
stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J, Edgar Hoover
advised that. he was scheduled shortly to testify in Congress and
might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°
was initiated af/CIA's)request. The operation and equipment, to the
best of the Agenty's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972
when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage. The
request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76
delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on
nationalization of foreign holdings, While the FBI was still
in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of
State on 20 December 1972 requested the F BI to institute all possible.
coverage of Identity 61 - and on 22 December 1972 coverage
was partially reinstitutéd with full coverage in effect by. 26 December
1972,

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against |
the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was
not worth continuing. On 16 February 197% CL requested the FBI
to discontinue the coverage, On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised
that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued,

John C. "Ric onde

00288


s* ae
AK Oe CO Tee
5° ~ wn . ; ; : Sheet ae .
| ddendum ”
Lk? We Bddvendum | 2:2: to in | ICRichards! za v 73 memo to ‘Ic ,
r 6," us agraph 2,. re Identity 6 Break-in
go” \ 1. The “F oreign Ressurees Division aeentfwas _ Identity 17

(And . a

Ns 2 who owned the Identity 78 . - -
[2a‘* - oe

—. ) a _« The Agency had initially agreed =

Ua to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500, The final

\\ {| amount of remuneration turned: out to be $4,828.53. Another FR

\ asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and
elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972,

2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening i

post were: ‘Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45 |

of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D. Go 263 i

Wud
a 3.- -
x

Shes

4

Coordination
A. Internal . co
In developing its cadre of general. support assets”
and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact
with the{ Domestic Contact Service|of the Directorate for
Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever
possible to support FR's ‘operational activities, To a
more ‘limited degree, FR Basés maintain contacts with Office
of Security and Office of Personnel field representdtives,
pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by’ these officers
and using their entre to specific individuals who can
provide access to targets of operational interest.
B: External
FR officers in the field maintain coordination with -
their FBI counterparts. There is limited cooperation
with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are
of- occasional help in operations involving other nationals,
The local field offices of the FBI are. made aware of the
presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on.
occasion provided backstopping on cases. where there was,
some flap potential.
. Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent
recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between
the Agency and the. FBI dated 7 Fébruary 1966.
The Bases also have contact with local Immigration
and Naturalization Service offices although. these contacts
are less frequent and less important than the contacts

with “the FBI offices.

SECRET

ONG 83


