157-10002-10056 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
; 3 :

Date:09/30/93

AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER :

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION

SSCIA
157-10002-10056

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
TO : THE PRESIDENT
TITLE :
CIA REORGANIZATION
: DATE : 06/10/61
PAGES : 15_
SUBJECTS :

CIA
; COVERT ACTION

PARAMILITARY WARFARE

CUBA

POLICY CONTROL

DOCUMENT TYPE :

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

CLASSIFICATION : S

RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 244
. Folder 7

Page:1

Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED~

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LF, Supevartleng an Seuey

Clandestina activities ahold ba acacsaed pet eniy in the contes
of theiy xeletienghip bo aa apen socloty yet aloe ta the comext of their
relstionabip to United Snaies foroign pasicy.

CiA uperetions haves 104 noon bald effectivery worardinaze to U.S.
fercagn policy. .

: lL. Clandcsting intolligencs aollectian ia, bY charter, {roa from

senate tiepartramne coabrel. This fact axpoees American foreign policy
nen CIA ie Heceverad zearuiting

wa mltile ss of eu be ered ainents wv

sexte ov develuping Sources in w fvisedly count? ye The recert
mhon GEA, withert notice to tha Cengul Genorad,
tried ta satrraye & magmber of tha Spactal Branch ef the Singa pers
Police grovices as ineisuctive exancpla. After ounpllessions cf
Qudicraus commlasdtye incinding an attempt to pubject the recrult to
e lle-dstector tent, it ts pod cut that the rocrest knd leng dincs
infermed bie suparissé of tha CIA approach and wee leading OLA
Imo atrep which, witie SPT. groduced cengiiiezable emharrios-

ment to relations betwaon the US and the Glngny
Ee me

- .
ees! ae Cot ® Sak,

There havs been teovbles of n comparable cart
presser rorrmens eure Sapo Non ree RG mite ee
tania Weert mee Noe Pi CNIUeES ations we

CIA bas said that, in sath exass, neither the Erekogey ner the Dapest-
49 type of operation.

ment in Washington ic nermelly isformed of th
4 tn phost, no ona knows how many potential problems for US foreign
“| policy «~ end how rach potgntiel frictlon with islendiy etatee -- are

d peing created ct this amen? hy CIA clandestine toteliigence epsreiion
i| Surely theca is on argument fox peviniating Sinte te grcide whether the
Sy (| ndvantase ts be goingd by the npsration 12. fxs gho irfocmution derivat
fyorn om agent within the fpecial Branch of tos Singapore Pelier) eut-
woighn the tiek (6. So» exsenorating to lecal govuramert ane sieakioy
ite confidence beta in our gurpeese aod in cer gen3ah, Clarrdeutine
intolligoncs eparations nhoulst plainly be clantod Eoth with tha Dapere:
mort of Sinte and (cave for encectiocal inglantas and gu agreement of

the Beeratary of State) with abe local U.S. Lit CHOOT»

J4

In part and excise as shown,

n & Change | classify to,

(1 With concurrence of

1 Declassity

+

| “DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ss!

FPC/HDR by

_ wey oo A a |
HW 50955 DocId:32261896 Pages 20"

SECRET PS

Ge it bas meant too that the Gtate Denertment, etten apprical ef an
operation only in ite letar atagen, ia under srent prencurs to
endorse the cperetion a8 already mounted becaues of the alleged
evil consequences cf onercletug avete, weal remember Tom
iann’s remezk the day the decision xns mada to go ahaad on Cuba:
"lL would nevar have favored ininintian this cperatian: bet, since it
kas gone ag far ac it has, Ido not think wa ean riek calling it off."
Moreover, 02 & that whan there is increaging pramium en activierm,
States, when it questions CLA cparationa or lnitistlves, casta taalf tn
apriesy, siaey, nogaiive rele. The advoceta cf clandestine actlwities .
seema ‘tough’ and rcalighe! the appensat hee te invoke euth istonoizlos
ea the reputation of the United State, werld public epinfan, "What
do we cay inthe United Motions ?", ote., art osemes bonelessly
idealletic, legaliatia end ‘acde, *

The reqult of ClA's inttiative in covert politics] enerations has boon

to cronte situations which have forced pelicy en the State Department,

Thie woe not the ortsinal idee behind CIA. As Allen Dulisa wrets

in Ne 1947 memorandum ¢o tha Sonate Armed Servises Commiltas,

_ "Tha Central litelligeace Agency should kava nothing to do with policy. ”
Yat, in the ysare since, CIA haa, tn effact, ‘made’ celicy in many
parte of the wo7ld, <A number of powarnmerts etill in power kvow

G that thay have evan been targets ef CLA attempta o& everthraw ~~ not

& Btate of mind calculated to ctimulate friendly feelings teward the

United States. Indoageia, of courea, la a prime cuarople.

This experience guggtats thet the present sysiaim by which CIA notifies
State of a prolected covert operation is tnaceqemte to preiset US
trtereate, There mort be seme means by which Stete can bea infozmod
ef such cocrationa a¢ an early enough etaga ta affect the conception

ond preliminary planning ¢€ the eperatinn, Ctherwise CLA will con-~
tinve to confremt Oiske with propesitiona having potential imapnce on
foreign posicy but as toe late a point to subject that impact te reascn.
alle contrch,

2 k we

ete SED IES ecnarr ners eae. RE arn eal
o With concurrence of

& _ Ne 3 or i. aoa Peclassify Ol In part a excise si
ss JECET: Eo iais Seavert | ) jdoneuell
FPC/HDR by < | t eLL AGS

Sia pl oo : Rite o Le an
EW 50955" “Doe 139981896 Page| 3

SEL E

preaa rea adh
Gri anally the age of eapta “Departenand cove; lor
norncnaa was supposed to be eteletly limited aad tempgrary.
mien -Corren-Jeckaon report stated fn 1943, "The CAA shovla = ff
Uinta Pepartrient cover a9 4 olmplo answer te al’ tts problena;
wrocesl to daveles ie own ovteide cwver anf eventually in
uraugh increaged efficiency of its oveggeas persennrl, ff
mper ita dimands upon the Siate Lppartment.” hang
ly inerveaaod ite requisitioda low official cover.

i wolede CLA haa we
phere arn gevernl x

ona why CLA nag abag@ened lta original jatentign
f{ develozing eytter erkvate caver. (fie easier to arrange covet
Rovourn Seis; itis sive; 4 ig Fraie': ax, it fecilitates chs
Reaves erity of operations 82 GK er 14 of comounications; it ingures &
% auple. 3 it the allect is te further the

Pleaganter ise fox the CIA
GIA encroachmant on the tvaditionalfyunctiong af Stato.

: BT cy.
ae Sing OS Bo

He Ley oF nee bogus to mova into arens = Pratithont EOPOr oa
accu pied by State, Tho CLA mon doing overt interzal eee Sal Tee ew
epty sber these in the Embhacoy's political socttoolipmloee NOCLA ba
eon cought to rmonopelina contact with carted Rene cllaica Ryerodjatt-
Hes, among thera the Pranident of tha National Aenerstly, x

ne top Deo of [tha rama tnbasay, a fect wal) mown locelly; anit

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Del he Se 3 Wy etatn elaas’n (1 Change] ctasalfy 1 .cencze

| So : Gi With concurrence of a=
7 il : 4 PA Creer (1 Deslassity-S- part a Kes ¢. -ag shown
| FPC|/HDR Te pth ie.

tes Pass Sets eee "oe

eS adil ‘a3 eas rinses ;
HW ‘ROOS5 Docld: ‘39981896 — Page 4


CR ,
at EPA
* gle gee = Class’n ARTME, Ch MENT OF STATE
tal

qj
th eonourrence o ranee| Classify tg,

Che

ermB gletion fer Berrien, R ig presoing t have CLA
poeple given the rash of Couneeliig,, Balers State kesne contrel of
pose an more of its pragumed overtess prrgennsl, and befsre GAS

ae EY g
over the lecnl CAS atetlou naminally promised in eS Dizectiy

cf Gancery 19, (961, and {b} to review ths current cas a ation «tht
anpye toa steady redaction ef CAB personel. = ,

=P Faramilitar es I gather, ia regerded tn soma quarters
asa purely technic WoNOT, eagily detachable trem pelicy aod there.
foro a proper functica of the Depasiment of Defense, Yot there ia
almest ao CIA Cuncebon mews pecullerly dependant on the pollaicead
coatexs than pasamilifncy warlors.

& These are arvoral soizons fer this. Fer one thing, a naramisitacy
optyation ie lo ta otturs @ layge end alizribetalia eperetion and thareb;,

ag suggested above, ciavkes with the preaupreritions of eur epen
sockety. (These congsideratiens nead net sepiy, hewavery, to tha
tvoiniag ef, cay, the Bouth Vietonmede in quarrilla tacties er ts the
exeport of alrosdy ozlgting querriila activities,} For ancther, ian
moral and political price af direct paremilitery Asilure is acute for
va. Communtats, when they stimulate paramilitary activity,
doing what the world exsects froma thems when we de lk, we aoraar
to keftray ous cwn prefeesed princinics and therefers canecs aftord te
éorpoand delipqortncy by defeat, Merenver, a9 tro reqent Alssrian
epleeds chewad, enca we convince the werld that we ere ceommitiod to a
paramilitery endecyer, we will bo blamed foe sii eovie ef hbisan., And,
ng the recent tractera-dJee-prlzcuera exiecde showed, when we do ind
mon to poasihle deoth, wa etnact Ughtly waite them aff and clogs tho
booke, Ths Cermrauntets, on ths other haw, hava no ecremice about
Uequideting a losing shears, ;

eesti Rear iv eae BRS
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