157-10005-10236| | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

Date: 10/04/93
Page:1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

a IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10236

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R445

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO:

TITLE :
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/TRANSCRIPT

DATE : 07/08/75
PAGES : 257

SUBJECTS :
» TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
|) EXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLES

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 251-5

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
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WARD & PAUL

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410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

(£5

TOP SECRET

110
Mr. Schwarz. These are minutes of the Special Group which.
you attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on
‘Progress to date with agent -teams and in the general field of
intelligenca, including the Opa-locka interrogation center (and.

| MENbe sel "Sizing

Ssinesinvemss GatiChycenger. He outlined
eer ae

= a ER

various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams
had been infiltrated,"
Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- do

you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?

General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the
passage of pills to parsons to accomplish the assassination of
Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?

General Lansdale. No. As a Matter of fact, we were very
proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been
infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?

General Lansdale. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he Say anything at that Meeting that
you Yecall about the subject of assassinations?

General Lansdale, Nothing.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62
memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to
Higher Authority?

Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebook

TOP SECRET

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SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET | Fi

Program Review by , SENSITIVE
=~ Brig. Gen. E, G. Lansdale,
Chief of Operations ~ 18 January 1962
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE CUBA PROJECT
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR Us
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 1
AS SANITIZED I. OBJECTIVE

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)
ice _\ The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthraw the Communist
V regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the
\ otUnited States can live in peace.

>
) \ Il. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
4 i CONGERS

wee Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban
s

people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute
a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement
established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction to-
wards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The
political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure
of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological
operations to turn the peoples’ resentment increasingly against the regime,
and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for
sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S. -sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook
the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in support-
ing a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against
the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American
countries, Further, the foreigness {Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny
imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the
Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to
defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an
anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement
within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

y The preparation phase must re sult in a political action organization

in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal ;
communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own
action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc. ). It must have
the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this
fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans
are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what
appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of
the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a
{fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both, (A major
goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movemer! ia
; a
y “Ny

v

Excluded from automatic
regrading: DOD Dir. Copy Nd:

al ly. A
§200.10 does not apply L SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET.

This dogur entrrar tains vad


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TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE
H. TV intrusion’

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts .
has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to
attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and
parade demonstrations.

I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility
of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc ship-
ments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated
action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results
(stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962, CLA
is introducing iiZiR as ja corrosive additive, to,Guban locomotive
diesel fuel oil through commercial “Sooke AEE De Waller)

alexeteyeare sRéakgdown. CIA expects to be able

to have at least “agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduc-
tion of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.

1 rat

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan
for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S, help
when their revolt starts making headway, This contingency plan will
permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions,
and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor ina
people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action, Defense
also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments
of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K.- Major elements of the population

ind: CLA are continuing to explore their capabilities
negative to date) for mounting special group operations
in dynamic elements of the population, particularly
operations: through the Church to reach the women and families, and
through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include

. enlistment of. the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration

is to be given to doing this through Latin-American operational contacts. ~
This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can
put it into place. :

L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a
period of a realistic second look at CLA capabilities to mount the required
clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up.
After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be
te create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support
for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate
which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action.
This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of
the Cuba-project's goala. CIA must take yet another hard look at its
potential capabilities, in the light of the following. tasking, to determine
if it cannot make the greater. effort required.

4

A gel? _ SENSITIVE
Qe . TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET.

SENSITIVE

“Ve. TARGET SCHEDULE
2 ARGET SGHEDULE

ba

A, Intelligence
Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CLA),

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made
an effective operation for collection and Processing of intelligence (CIA
with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI). °

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than
Miami area, CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico Be cinecuella,,
etc.) and ona Priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all sutP
source points, 15 February target date,

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets,
with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 Feb-
ruary. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country
sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CLA to submit plan by I February for defection of top Cuban
government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort
must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to
be. worth at least a million U.S. dollars, .This can be the key to our
political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA.
project,-

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Decep-
tion actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba, Defense,
State and FBI are to collaborate on this. :
uary, CIA to submit operations schedule for
ment within Cuba. This must include localities
essment of sclected Cubans, their infiltra-

» and political platform. One section must
‘ound, "assess its true status and plans to use it,

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S,

Sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility-towards the
~ Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this
we assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed,

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational
assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of loca} governments
or Groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's

_ goals.. Plans for early use of such Capabilities are due by 19 February,

Task 10: CIA to submit Operational schedule for using assets in the
Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals, The

objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such
as workers, farmers) is underscored, Due 19 February,

a / 5
| m ager’ SENSITIVE
aif _- TOP SECRET

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AS NO OBJECTION TO

GIA p/oR
LASSIFICATION AN
DEC OF THIS DOCUM

om 4

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RECEIVED

* JAN 29 1962

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Ab

From: Brig. Gen, Lansdale ql

Noting that you will be away from the country most of the
month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project
for which we should provide, Certain proposals should have
evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to
be made if our Project is to win its goal -- and the bureaucratic
machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.

It is my hope that you will make someone specifically
responsible to speak for your determined course and have the
role of being your "presence" as far as possible. This demands
a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and
reasonably direct access to the President, Perhaps Dick Good-
win could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate
suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated men-
tioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do
not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine
military bureaucrat at heart.

As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won,
Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U,S. agencies to work hard at
it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts
haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might
uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional pro-
gram we are spurring.

It may be a special effort which professional labor operators
can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may
be through ethnic-language groups ;@seaithhas an untapped action
potential, It could be a warming-upof the always lively youth

element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially

, Orr we HE

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gis

Bee

used. It could be with the families s through the Church, with families

TEPARTRENT OF WUSTiCE] R

JUN 6 1962
RECORDS BRANCH

E

sontains «€ pages...

Page 6

of _g copies. Sertes_ 47


TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

: ear "  F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN
“ ) nn)

ACTIVITY PURPOSE CONSIDERATIONS
settee Sollaatiacaet baer EEN NO

Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder
te Soviets. :

This can be an early sabota
Cuba's ability to pay for loc imports.

Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based
outside Cuba, Destruction of transformers,
coolant pumps and towers seems more
feasible than blocking the channel, Effect

can be supported later by denial of (ae)
Spare parts,

ge action on the

2. Sabotage fuel supply. To cripple transportation, Effects of CLA program of lubricating oil
additive is expected on locomotive sgita Jee oie

Much more can be done with fusi
contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel
fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer
real opportunity for more vigorous program,

3. Sabotage communications, To dramatize and encourage the

Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based
spirit of resistance.

outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio
transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S,
broadcasts), Attacks mounted only when
operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave
net should be dealt with when there are suf-
ficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide
with a critical need, in August-September,
a
This should be a concerted attack, as feasible
in July-August, on power plants at Havana, °
Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara,
Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type
requiring detailed planning and Special equip-
ment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba,

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMEN AU)

AS SANITIZED pon oo Ww);
ww TOP SECRET SENSITIVE ate :

4. Sabotage power supply. To increase strain on regime and

bring daily business to a standstill,

by dramatic action all people will
note,

3

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S2FLOGCE PLIOgG Ccéoc AH

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ACTIVITY
)
4. * Caribbean Admission Center,
Opa-Locka, Florida, fully
activated by 15 March 1962.

5. * Periodic intelligence esti-
mates, as required by progress
of operations,

OTHER OPERATIONS
SL NS

e negotiating AGS
‘ppin contaminating
motive lubricants,

INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
ee Ne

7. * Two teams of agents dis-
patched to Cuba,

*%

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED 7
q (at

1-15 March 1962 (cont)

PURPOSE
To collect intelligence required for the
Operations, to identify and earmark in-
telligence assets as refugees arrive,

and to provide security against Com-
munist agent operations,

To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current
estimates can be considered at national
policy levels. :

To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.

16» 31 March 1962

To collect intelligence.

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

CONSIDERATIONS

This operation, in response to early recommendation

as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at
utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with

a new building completed and occupied, anc witha

staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February -
and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center,
(CIA responsibility, with Support by Defense, Justice,
State, USIA.) . :

As the operations develop, there will be both increased
inteNigence collection and a need for as current an In-
telligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully.
It is likely that a more informal method of producing an
Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than
now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be
followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence sum-
maries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly
report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA
responsibility, with support of others as required. )

is required to undertake a successful

sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating

lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months
is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking
down, once the contaminant is introduced.

0-298
One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include

personnel who have had resistance training and some past
experience,

Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962


:pIood GcE0c BH

92FCOGEE

6 25edq

ACTIVITY

8. Establish 2 additional third-
country resident agents in
Cuba.

9. By 31 March, have 105 agents
selected and 50 agents trained.

10.* Develop intelligence potential
of Cuban "colonies" in U.S.

ll. * Develop additional interroga-
tion centers in other areas by
31 March 1962,

OTHER OPERATIONS

None,

_ TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont. }
TC TOG (Cont. |

PURPOSE

To collect inte lligence.

To ready agent operations,

To exploit the intelligence possi-
bilities of former residents of
Cuba (including U.S. citizens) now
in the United States.

To collect intelligence in a Latin
atmosphere, at different levels thar
now seem possible in the continental
U.S., to spot additional intelligence
assets and to provide security
against Communist agent operations.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

AS SANITIZED ~ | ae

(4H

~

CONSIDERATIONS

Possible future use in communications and support.

Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose
of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions
controlling these factors. If the recruitment and train-
ing are for resistance activities, ‘the task of recruit-
ment and training will be much less difficult than if
they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes
only.

There are "colonies" in Washington, D.C., and other
U.S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church,
and business interests provoke unusual personal ties
inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential
exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise avail-
able, (FBI support and coordination is basic in this

effort. }

As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate
other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A
center is being activated in Se-Gnyp Negotiations with
local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers,
if possible, in@Wé : as San
Juan, Puerto Rico wlcy are being sur-
responsibility with sup-

port by others as necessary.)

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962,

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

PROPERTY gt
THE WHITE HOUSE Orrin

f La. TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

~ SENSITIVE,

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) . ao

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale>"{_ i" Cais

NO OBJECTION
ECLASSIFCATION AND/OF

EOF THis DOCUMENT =
By &/24 | 44

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase / ¥

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose Ps,

a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems,
necding resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special
Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

Use of U.S. military installations, CIA desires to train | small
groups of Cuban nationals ,oc#veé De in By. dau Koreas sioniaat 5

. gues gical, immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area ;
is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents
who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem
and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S.
Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and
interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure

(in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to
unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination

is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should

be trained on U.S. Government installations.

cote opine 1B

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in
the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use
for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same
policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S, Government
aining and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert

g. ‘Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on

L yinguof '@ and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as
joéated: assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting
to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and itis

. EXCLUDED PROM ANTOUATIC
RECRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

+ SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET bony a ae cone pies. Series
: . PROPERTY OF

. THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

a . ERG Reece Sergey + hfe |

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Gl iAH amet a )
iFICAT & . )

i MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

3 May 1962

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on
Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric,
General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craigs
Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey

1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress
of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said
_the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable
individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The
Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large
number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training
of such Cubans are being looked into.

. 7 It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an ass
to the U. S., which might be used in a number of ways. General
Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this
connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them
useful employment after they are trained is an important and a
difficult one.

ye ae

i 2, Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent
teams and in the general field of intelli nce, including the

i : Opa-locka interrogation center and che geen gidBclandestine interroga-
tion center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said

_that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets

1 : are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources

to. are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has

; , : refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely-
intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been
forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular im-

ortancein-view of Duque's stature.)

arvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude

«programs. The Group asked that a check be made, as

ble§ on how effective these operations were, They also

y,.of the scripts used be made available, The Group

tethate ie ts? worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now
being-done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not
,Perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time. -

- Parrott

ed . cc: General Lansdale
 heabiraye elales “nh of : : aren
PROPERTY OF
. THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

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