[2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
3/15/201

JFK Assassination System Date:

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: |
RECORD NUMBER: — 124-10325-10318
RECORD SERIES: HQ
AGENCY FILENUMBER:  62-80750-4166 ;
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: = FBI
FROM: BRENNAN
TO: SULLIVAN
TITLE:
DATE: 09/11/1963
PAGES: 12
SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON FILE
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
RESTRICTIONS:  1B;4
CURRENT STATUS: — Redact
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 12/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

vot
HW 42333 DBocld:32313069 Page i

FBI

INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

INC MEMO, SUMMARY

PEG ‘ erry ee
& ee Nas £5 . Ee 3 $3
CY “  GENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY SELi lly
G

9 4 oo 6S
ee DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH J. JMC CONE Ws

. Ty hy ; a . .
Although Mr . {McConey has tdi cated he will not be raising
| 22v problems or issues, the Director may find the following of
assistance: eAnAR TAN CONTALISER Os.

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA

To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is
not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences. Fortu-
nately we have been successful in establishing very effective work-
ine relations with several key figures in the agéticy who have been

ery cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the

‘job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA.
could degenerate into a chaotic state.

With regard to differences with CIA, there were two
situations during the past year which had a significant bearing
on the relations between the two agencies. Approximately a year
ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile
who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency
that he had been trained asa Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had
this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau,
We lodged very vigorous protest (re:{ Alwin Odio Tamayo The
other event which led to a heated conflict arose from information
which we disseminated to the President's Foréign Intelligence
Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic
establishments in this country. On May 15, 1963, McCone informed
Mr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the afore-
_ | mentioned Board should be retracted because the communication

a

included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the
CIA Director. Mr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter
and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it
clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never
retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were

“ predicated on information which had been given to us by two top
CIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone’
writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his
subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular
matter.

STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION
McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He

considers himself not only the head of a particular government
agency but also “the Direcgor of Central Intelligence’ and in

Wale. - | | er Liks —
DECLASSIFY O¥ ZR (wie ba fb7o 0. _

. SBpey
) ENCLOSURE pana!

a —

| a $2333 Docld: 32313069 Page 2

€ :
fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence
being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of
the agency. To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on
intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography
and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used ,
to photograph targets and to intercept communications. Much of
this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U. S.
agencies such as the Air Force.

FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA

During the past year there have been numerous instances
of excéllent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA, Set forth
are some outstanding examples:

INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO

We have furnished CIA information from our
sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled
to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet
leaders. This information has been most valuable
to CIA in following developments particularly the
differences between Red China and Russia.

TOPHAT

Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced
highly valuable information of use to CIA.

(ermal C9)

This is a highly sensitive penetration of
the/Czech Intelligence Service.} His information CSD
has significantlyyassisted CIA”in. obtaining a
current picture of the (Czech intelligence przantzas C5)
tion, ;

| - Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet

BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE

Our sensi tive(Czech source ,(Gimme, is Ost.
scheduled to return tof Czechoslovakia. Arrange- C$ $3
ments have been made to make him available to

CIA.

FEDORA
Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have
furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence
operations abroad. In addition, we have given the
agency data pertaining to the organization and functions
of KGB. . Se!
- 3 - :

wee

eases EE

HW 42333 Docld: 32313069 Page 3


Oo  Q

SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Through our investigations in this country,
we have identified Soviet mail drops in other
areas and we have given this valuable information
to CIA,

CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE
NALS IN THE L’ LATE

Under agreed~to restrictions we have per=
mitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite
visitors in this country for the purpose of
assessing their potential as sources when
they return to their native countries,

CUBAN.“SOURCES
We have afforded CIA the opportunity to

brief Bureau sources before such sources made
trips to Cuba.

SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Both FBI and CIA have had access to
intercepted radio communications being:
utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau
has been far ahead of CIA in identifying
agents mentioned in the communications and
has furnished pertinent information to CIA.

TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA

te The Bureau has been very successful in
identifying Soviet and. Cuban secret writing
techniques. We have made this knowledge
available to CIA,

CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU

HW 42333

TOPHAT

CIA did an excellent job (ot servicing drops C6
in Moscow\in this very sensitive case. This
was done-~dt considerable risk and was productive
for us.

Bocld: 327313069 Page 4


O ane

4 a

DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU

where CIA operated Soviet double agents
outside of the U.S. and then made these
individuals available to the Bureau for
use in the U.S. In this connection it is
also noted that in our development of the
sensiti sources, Fedora (KGB penetration)
and (imag (penetration of

Czech Intelligence (53
sna(cimag CIA furnished va

table assistance.
VLADIMIR VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE CASE

‘Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that
one of its employees had been contacted by
the Soviets. With CIA's cooperation, we
conducted investigation which led to the
ouster of a Soviet official and very favor-
able publicity for the Bureau.

COVERAGE (IN_ MEXICO as

Through surveillances and surreptitious
entry, CIA produced valuable informationnin
our investigation of/Franz Froehlich, a GRU Cs 5
Agent \whom we since have doubled.

/ There have been a number of instances

AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS

. CIA has been most cooperative in making
defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.

COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY

From time to time CIA bas made certain
documents and equipment available to the
Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few
weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory,
at no cost, a portable unit designed for making
radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such
characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.

ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT

Through assistance afforded by CIA, we
gained access to an individual who subsequently
became a valuable informant in the labor rackets

field (NY 3936-C). er aye
oo . Sil “BET
AG tee hes

=

Geant

-5 -

HW 42333 Docld:32313069 Page 5


Oo O
(ZRancu activities C sl |

Information provided by a sensitive CIA
source has been very useful in following the
activities of (French agents in the U. s.C$)

| Posstsus TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO
--‘« JACK EDWARD DUNLAP

who. supplied information to the Soviets and who
committed suicide in July of this year. We
recently received information from our sensitive
source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap
worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information
was furnished to McCone last week. McCone is
particularly concerned about the possibility
that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets
information which led to the compromise of Oleg
Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.

| This is the National Security. Agency employee

PERSONNEL SECURITY

The Dunlap Case has been raising questions
concerning the effectiveness of security within
U.S. agencies. McCone anticipates that Congress
eventually may initiate some inquiry and he
already has been informed that the President's

| serete: Intelligence Advisory Board is looking
into the matter.:-Last week Mr. McCone asked
Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security.
McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning
our careful screening of applicants and our
strong administrative controls including inspec-
: tions. It was emphasized that the Bureau always
resolved security problems in favor of the FBI
rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone
was told that the key to the situation appeared
|ts be tight screening and control procedures and
the willingness to take prompt action.

COVERAGE
IN THE.

e @

up this matter before the President's Foreign

| In the Spring of this year, McCone brought
Intelligence Advisory. Board and he subsequently

OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

HW 42333 Docld: 32313069 Page 6

&

‘on

CO Q

had a discussion with Mr, Belmont. Essentially, te Md
McCone is most interested in technical coverage

-of individuals and installations of non-Soviet Bloc

countries. He has left the impression that in
his opinion such coverage could be expanded in
the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence

‘and more sources. Our coverage in this field

at the present time is quite extensive. With.

regard to CIA, we have the understanding that \
if the agency desires particular technical

coverage, we will give each request the necessary
consideration. :

. (FRENCH \activitigs ( cs)

In the early part of this year, we nitiated,
extensive investigation of the alleged (Frenc
agents in this country on the basis of data fur-
nished to us by. a sensitive CIA source. This
source has informed CIA that (De Gaulle)has (so
embarked on an extensive espidnage program in

the U.S. primarily designed cokhect scientific
data which will enablefFrance)\to hasten its an
development of a nucle TY capability. We have
disseminated the results of our investigation

to CIA and we are continuing the handling of
numerous leads. The information developed by

jus so far, has Bare, to disclose any evidence gs

that. the(French are stealing any. classified
secrets in the U.S.: The(#reneh|

obtaining _yoluminous information available to
the(French ‘through normal contacts between C eB)
Frenchlofficials and their counterparts in the cs
. Ss.

appear to be

- TOPHAT

A CIA agent recently obtained the message
which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in a
drop{in Moscow.| The message included information C$}
concerning Soviet activities in France, Germany
and Austria. We have given this data to CIA, In
addition, McCone was told that Tophat identified

Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that

Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as

June, 1963, The delay in obtaining the communica
tion prevented us from getting into the Dunlap
Case well before the subject committed suicide.

pe

HW 42333 Docld:32313069 Page 7


OO
SEUREL

CIA did not service the drop because our informant
did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently
did not use the signal in order to fully protect
himself. On the other hand, CIA was unable to
service the drop until August because State Depart-
ment adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to
conduct any activity in Moscow. .This position was
taken by State because it felt that any operational
activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. ("s"}

ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV

This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to
the U. 8. under CIA control, feuded with the agency,
“left for England under British Intelligence ¢ontrol

and very recently returned to the U.S. Since his
return, he has met with the Attorney General and
with McCone. He has been extremely critical of

the U.S. position toward Russia. Although a prima
donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely
valuable information for all U.S. agencies including
the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to

, the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact
appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past,
Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director. The
Director has made it very clear that he will not
see Golitzyn. .

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

The subject is a former high-ranking official
of the Polish Security Service who defected in
January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an
embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many
complaints. He has communicated with the President,
the Attorney General and has been in contact with
@ Congressman. He is slated to testify before the
Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near
future. He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over~all
failure to comply with his needs. We have had access
to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of
information. However, we have been most careful not
to become involved in the feud between him and CIA.
We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA
any information received from Goleniewski which
might be of assistance to the agency.

ay a

DEURE

‘RE

ers

a

-8-

HW 42333 Docld:32313069 Page 6


For your information, McCone has found this
Board to be a constant irritant. This Board was
established several years ago by the Eisenhower
administration then continued by President Kennedy.
It is designed to periodically review foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence activities.
The present chairman of the committee is Clark
Clifford and the staff director is J. Patrick Coyne.
Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as
this Board looking into his operations. There is
some indication that his irritation arises from
personal differences with Coyne.

WENNERSTROM CASE

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military
Attache who, a few weeks ago, admitted to his govern-
ment that he had been working for the Soviets.
Wennerstrom was in the U. 8. from 1952 until 1957
and was collaborating with the Russians while he
was here. Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage
report" should be prepared on this case and he
expressed the opinion that this should be the
responsibility of the Bureau. With regard to damage,
he was referring to an evaluation of all information
which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. S&S.

jWe have taken the position that we will not prepare
such a damage report and if one is needed the work
should be done by each interested agency.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"

This is a Bureau investigation predicated on
information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the
KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated
by KGB. We have been endeavoring to identify the .
unknown Seviet agent. We do have a suspect,/John s.C$_)
Barescu} who was born in Russia and who has been working
for CIA for several years. McCone may not mention this
matter but he is very much concerned about the situation.
We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent

- developments.

HW 42333 Docld:32313069 Page 9


