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ARMY
198-10007-10029

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information’

CIA
C. TRACY BARNES

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

06/25/1953
15

RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret

1A; 1B

Redact

04/03/1998

Califano Papers, Box I, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio
Broadcasting by CIA. ;

AEK Ravise

Department of the Army EO 13526
CADeclassifty [ Exclude Exempt
Authority.

[= Refar To

Review Date 2/2615 By AST Wrg

38
Page 1

a ; Bo SECRET
; Security Information

se . | 25 June 1993

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below) |
SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

‘Lo We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadeast] ;
inp in the cold war mission of CIA. ‘The essential parts of the report .
and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated
15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcast~
ing by CIA". .(Operational information and other sensitive matter con»
tained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be sep~ |
arately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)
_20 The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved
by the} Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

ao Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, 3
country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and
television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their
penetration, where feasible, or.an explanation where it appears
not to be feasible. ,

bo Develoo and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate
personnel and training offices, a plan for the reernitment and
training of officers qualified fer covert broadcasting operations.

co Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a
joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency
and economy, material derived from escapee interropations and other
intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to suppert all UoSe

_propapanda efforts. ; ;

do. Develop. and recommends in collaboration with area divisicns,
an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy

-guidance to. the field.
oe. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland,
'@ project to producé broadcasting devices capable of electronic
intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques

for their useg and to contime research and development of other
unconventional methods of breadeasting suitable to our migsion.

3e Chief of Op: rationa,

; SECRET
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ia

. 3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of
tre attached material with the request that -you cooperate in the carrying

out of the Dn/Pts directive. Particular attention is called to. item 2. ao
ah OVE 6

: he Mr. Co Lloyd Egmr, assisted by Mre. Stanley 1 P. Riciardscny huve
‘ been assigned the résvonsibility for staff coordination of these matters
on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning
and sunnerting broadcasting onerations.

/s/ C. Srag Barnes.
C, TRACY LARK S

. Chicf . -
Political and Psycholorical
Werfare

Attachment

As stated above -
Tistribution. |

nr: fP o 1 : ‘

AQ @ 1]

Cliefs, All Areas = 7 Gao
Cries, Senior Staffs - 1] ea
r/Tr at
PY /¢/OPS. el] ;
PE/CFY = 1 ,
rr /C/PAD ~ 1 7
r/Mr. Femr = 2
Ri «#1

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oo . SECRET
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15 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FCR: CITLF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT : Report Gn The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting ss @ cold
war weapon. It is grouped inte the following sections: - ;

; 1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MLDIUM IN TH COLD LAR.
ft shows in the main that the countrics having the most to fear from
Conminism are doing the Icast to counter its radio propaganda o

2. Seetion 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABTLITIFS, It embraces a
discussion of the techniques available to CTA,

3. Section 3, Pare 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our -
current and vlanned activities arainst them.

4. Section lh, Page l, deals with the principal PROFLEMS peculiar
to covertly direeted broadcasting, and their solution.

So. Section 5S, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of
princivles to govern over-all CTA volicy in its present and future
activities in this field. : ;

(For a detailed statement, of present CIA radio broadcasting

assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953,
entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS C6669.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Rudio Broadeasting.
" from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953,
Se) . a
\ , (The data on broadcasting hours by caintries was ebtained fron
FBID and VOA, that on available reeeivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that -
on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)

‘By Cl,
TS Ohly

t

/s/ Go Lloyd kgner
«LLOYD BCNER
Attachment, as stated. _ — . . an |
PP/CLEsha -

r

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15. May 1953

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

le Radio As «a Medium in the Cold War

a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, prosdesat
te countries outside the Orbit 15395 hours per week of aggressive psych= _
olexical warfare o

bo. The free world ‘responds with 11,018 hours per weeks

&o ‘This gives the. enemy & numerical. advantage of approxinetely
seven to five, In reality, the Communist advantage is.much greater .
because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the
Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own vsoples
for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures
reduee the effectivensss of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as mich,
if not more than, 50 percent. fn illustration. is that the Commmists
devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broad-
casts, There is no jamming of Orbit broadeasts. to the Western worlds nor
any restrictions on listening to them.

. de Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in
the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BRC and Canada together
brosdeast 238 hours per week arainst the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries
combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North
America, the: United Kingdom, and ‘the Pacific area

6e In the vest of the world, the balance is drastically in
favor of the Commmiste. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to ali
other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a
mere 26); hours broadcast to all Orbit countrd ies by. non-English speaking
nations of the free world,

£. Of the total of 1,015 vroadeast hours beamed by all the free
world to the Orbit, CIA, throug rh TPTONIC and other quasi-clandestine
stations, breadeasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles
from. Commnis’ dominated APERSo

ge The, greatest disparity in effort is most notiteable- in
Western Furope. France, which receives @9 hours ef broadcasts per week
from the Orbit as-a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy
receives 97 hours from the Orbit but breadcasts only Lh to it, Spain 9h
to 12, Greoce 89 to 9, Turkey 3, to 7. Even relatively aggressive
Yugoslavia receives 19h brcadcast hours from the Orbit against its outout

to the Orbit.of o &9 hours. -
my h. The one-sided

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he The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison
of the breadeast output of the USER alone, without the satellites,
arainst Europes It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for
instance, to 10 hours of broadeasts per week. ‘The combined broadcasts
of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per
weeks France and Turkey who, together, reecive 6, hours per week from
the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR. -

i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the
international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows
that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western
Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it. should in .the radio
propaganda battle with the Orbit. ,

26 Capabilities

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio
broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

ae Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under
cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique rormally
would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and
the use of miltiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly
and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition
and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

i a i a ae

bo. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or
*eaptive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing
a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents
more manageable security and control problems, delivors a Signal in spite
of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on
listeners and presents special problems.in avoiding interference with
‘broadcasts of friendly countries. — :

eH RE RH H

; ¢.o Subsidigation of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Comminist,
religious broadcasts» 2M dk at .

; da. Through covert nenetration and/or support, the manipulation
of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) streng=
thening their antieCommunist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (23 influence
ing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their
domestic services. -

. This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine
operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no

problems concerning
2
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tig

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problens concerning besos ‘and management, ‘end requires relatively
em2ll investrents and @XPense Tt would be advantageous beyond the
_ dumediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist
infiltration, spot forthcoming politcal. changes by observing changes
- dn povernnent prepaganda direetivas, recruit agents with reliable
cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for
dental of the facilities to an enény in the event of hostilities.

We believe at should be the agency's established policy
to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can
be createds A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the |
immensity of this field ‘of potentialities, ‘poth as coneerns the ~~~
countries on the peripheries. of the USSR and Communist China ia -
Europe, the Near East and Far Eastg and in Latin America as welle .
We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area ©
_Divigions, on a country~by-country survey of possibilities in this .
area and that action he taken to achieve penetration wherever this
study indicates it my be foasibles

ne RR RR ane

-  -@e5. Use ‘of purchased or free time through covert channels
on existing radio systems in: friendly COUNTIES ot eS

f. Electronic penetration of enony - proadeasts. y, maples
the "Ghost? . Voice operations of World War Ir. This techn sue is .
discussed in. para. 5ateo(S) below.

ge To exploit the amateur [rast proadcasters, Large
numbers of whom dstist in Russia, * * + A Droject is being Grafted
te explore the possibilities ef this technique.

; hho Broadcasting from . airplanes. Thia has been carried out
‘experimental ly in two areas with digappointing results due primarily
to operational and equipment-limitations which make. for Limited aude ~
‘fence coverage at best. It is, morenver, very ‘costly and-alse pre=
sents ‘special gecurity problems. It is not recommended, except for -
possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used
‘on occasion to similate messages from agents inside: ‘the USSR or sate |
ellites. This ie a desention technique rather ‘han broadcasting: but
shoulds we believe, be explored. . -

3. Targets in n onder of, importance o, with optim of Ade quecy

* YSSReosRadio is the only consistent: medium for. picre~ .
ing the Soviet ‘von curtain. It.is estimated that there are approxi=
‘mately 4,000,000 receiving sete in the USSR, of which 75 to 60 per
cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of
receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of then. readily
, veeeive hong | and medium wave signals. Wot ell of these receivers are

in the hands of
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in the hands of private individual! however} and the’ number of those
having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly ©
deereasing due to Soviet efforts t6,increase group listening by means.
of wired networks. Nevertheless, at would appear that there will be a .
sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three
-Wee bands for som» time to: come. One indication of this is the
fact, that at present the USSR is bréadessting approximately 900 hours
per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own peoples

‘Many of these transmissions are to areas and over Frequencies which lie =

within our transmitting capabilitics.

Our assets: for exploiting this potential audience,
; reladtng projects still ‘in the Planning Stages | are far from adequate

be ‘Communist China e=<Like tlie USSR, the Communist government
of China relicS heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with
"  @he peovies It utilizes more than. con fational ‘and. regional stations
_. for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and Long wave bat to
' some extent, also, on shortwave o % # He

mh em A ae oe

Be cari Satellites «<The preponderance of CIA broade
casting efforts are cent ered ia area, % % ;

7 de The Free Worl.d.--Hany countries afford opportunities

for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration. of
indigenous broadcasting systems: and use of free or purchased. times * ROE
(See, Parae 20 d.)

bbe Problems ¢ x of * Covert. Broadcasting
as cover oO
: --°- (1) 8 radio transmitter that ean 1 be heard cannot be
fidden. Put another way, there are no known methods. for concealing —
fom téemical monitors the’ geographical : “gource of broadcasts, eithough
the non-technicdl listening public can +e and often is deceivede .
Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable
protieme Autonomoue emigre organizations, which offer the most _
eredible. cover, generate. factionalism ag well as ‘control, security —
and manager: “nt problems. © ese difficulties ‘gould, however, be ~
minimized by positive agency y control through a compartnentel ization
whieh separates the cover organization from program and transmitting

operations and lays dam strict requirements on security, budget
control, and high professional atandarde.7 See Charts Annex IT.

( 2) Religious broadeasting presents few cover heade
aches, but is of doubtful. propagenda Values - — ;
G) The best cover

ep h : tae :

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Oh The: best cover is afforded by covert. penetration
of friendly systems, (a-Western European nation. ‘talking back to > USSEp
€t., a8 discussed in’ 2ode above)s .’

a “(4)” Commercial proadeasting cover presents some. » possi
 palitdes ‘in. the free ‘world but none ‘for hroadeasting to. the Soviet
Orbite-  -”

“Be Bases,

. aay Becauge governnenta object to providing bases for
ageressive psychological. warfare which they do not influence or control,
it is difficult to: find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the —
Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to
plan, build, . and staff ‘and long temre is therefore | important c How-»
. ver, the political Climate of a ‘country can change: abruptly, with |
_ wegulting. uncertainty as to length of tenure. . Munich, for. instance,
which once furnished.an excellent base for a variety of broadéasta —
, targeted t to the Orbits. appears: to be becoming | less and less satisfactory.

a Cover and control problens are ‘elesely’ related to
this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be
less difficult. to obtain than for a deosely organized ONG «

“ay Seaborne transmitters offer mech in nobility but
‘antenna ‘Limitations restrict their effective powere As in the case:
6f the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are: vequired for
maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problen. becomes: the sane
as for land transmitter bases, and.costs in investaent and méintennance
are. considerably higher. than land. based operations, Moreover, the. =.
difficulties of providing ‘eredible cover for a covert seaborne operation
are manifest. While this office wil] contime to study VOA experience
in this field, it. SeeS no Prospect ‘of any: agency use for ite ¢

 £ 3) The OA. presently controls numerous broadcasting
bases and are developing additional bases,. in areas of the world”
sulteble for our purposes. The netessary agreements with host:
countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transporta=
‘ion and. other..logistics. have been provided.. The present: manage=
mont of YOA are symoathetic to sharing these bases’ with . CIAs °.

_ In addition to the’ saving in cost, thie vould furnish us secure.
: Sreas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems,
If the difficult but not ingurmountable problem of cover canbe 7
resclved, ‘gueh, ‘Locations: would be. Adee’ ‘for our: PUPpOBes . « a

“Informatien Support .

-  €)y To supplemerit: available normal news | sources, a:
wosdeasting t to Orbit countries is dependent for program material,

upon: intelligence _

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upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees

and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flew of intercepts
from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, intere
eating, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast rotential resources
‘and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is
far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, Vor,
and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the
Sane or Similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the
same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained
in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only
for all radio but all other Pi activities better and faster. A cleared
consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, pro-
dueed on abundance of exesllent support information and evaluation
data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated,
could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt Fil effort
targeted to the same area,

This complex problem needs a high level decision
by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers —
experienced in both FW and interrogation work with power to devise
an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resovrces.

de fo Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts Yaises
serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that
can be heard above the jamming. ‘Te be sure, some of our breadeasts
get through becauge they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts
in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transe
mission at ell hours.

For future planing purposes, however, these factors
seen clear:

{a} Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and
on the increase.

(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be re=
lated to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on
their interests, Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda
are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

{c) We have no present capsbilities to monitor
their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areag-=
low-powered local jammers.

(2) Prudent planing would, therefore, require that
any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting
transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure
our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.

(3) What techniques

a & »

% O 2
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(3) What techniques are available to meet this requiree
ment? ;

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be

heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a
Jomepoueeed and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering _
unintelligible « signal of substantially higher power from a distant
pointe The greater the power of ovr transmitter the more complicated
the installation and the more exoensive the investment. And the more
diffieult becowes the cover and securlty problems as well as the
political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the
enery is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would
therefore be fighting e losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out!
on & power basis only.

{(b) Jamming evasion turough the device of vary=
ing the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of lay--
ing down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamaing. This —
method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must
assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient
to overcome tue annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination
with appropriate programming techniques and the use of tuo or more
frequencies similtaneously Liis has so far proven to be the most
effective means of jamming avoidance ¢

Such frequency shiftines cannot be accomplished

within the legal. rules laid down for international broadcasting.

These mst, therefore, be "black" broadeasts in the sense that they
can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the fovernnent

of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies
proccrces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to
whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while
fully justified in the ease of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies,
must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friendss

Our proadeasts using this technique have so
far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very lew
pover, This Limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit
target and that only on the periphery. The same vechniques can be
used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. —
fe-aveid interference with friendly nations! broadeasts the base
mast be located in an area which, ‘with the proper antenna adjust-
rents, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly
countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting
‘pass in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts te the USSR, the facility would
have to be engineered sc that its signal wonld not interfere with:
lecal. broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in

between.
(ec) The development ot 4 unconventional broadeasting
techniques for

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techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting
services might well enable us to evercome the handicaps imposed by -
the jamming of our conventional breadcasts to the Soviet orbit and
seize the cold war initiative in the radio ophere It is a field
which has been neglected thus far.

' Sone possibilities in this area are described
in 1 the te Troy” report of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology Vol. 1, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.

no Among then is the "intrusion," or "gide=bana
injeetdon,” ‘technique which wes used successfully by the Russians
‘against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude ..
our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on |
“enemy Home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the |

- Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences. over enemy facilities

or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort —
to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda
broadcasts to Western Burope to the advantage of our friends. ‘The ‘Troy
report observes as to’ the technique itself: od

“This would be an effective and annoying
technique which would be extremely difficult, te counter."

Utilization of this technique appears to. be
within our. _gapabtlities at the moment.. It has been field tested
and is yeady for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations
tan be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved
in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being
explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

. _ Another unconventional technique being devel-~
oped by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing
‘4s the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that
we can transmit an interfering sigaal into an orbit domestic radio. -
sorvice which will cause the listening audience to shift to our
nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference. on his:

our: home program. | .

Other unconventional 1 means of - carrying the .
cold war to the Orbit by means. of clandestine radic might. be cap-
able of invention and development, and the scientific and practical

. potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphiagis must
be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting tech-

. Wiques if the cold war of the air waves is not to-become more one-
sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly devel-
oped and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the pro-~
cess of perfection and those which might be invented mignt even be

: . the means of
=B~

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the means of shitting the whole radio propagandd war balance dn our
favor. They would be indispensablé in the: event . of hot war. We,
therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capaci«:
ties in this direction to the utmost. and proceeding inmediately with
the covert procurenent of bases amet equipment needed fer the task.

. | Bo recapitulate, 4b would. diem desirable for. .
_ CIA to Limit ite present and future conventional, radio broadcasting
acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new: undertakings.
. should provider -

, i “A mascinmam transnitter power of
200,000 watts capable of ‘eccommodating: ©

, - 2 Bult an - jenming evadiion capabili-
' t1esg ani

ee 3 baste in unconvontiond broodeasting
apepiitieee .

& Bases in secure and 1 protected areas:
which permit tiie - use of the jamming evasion teshnique without inter-
ference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is
now being nasle by this office, — , _

Bo Lad Lead Time

. @) (a) Radio| ‘proadeasting gacilitiée cannot be created
_ over night. From the time that plans are finally. approved, it takes
' 12 to 18 months to design, construct. and install & transmitter.”
Prior to such approval time.is required for the planning cycle, negobia~
tion for bases, the staffing problem, eteo

(b) Deep. cover penetration of” existing radio sta~
tdons or ‘eyatens likewise require tine for development. °

(2) All in all; it would be prident, to. estimate that
upwards of two years arc. required from the conception of a project
for broadeasting and its impLehentation. Hence, the planning must
bs long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabil—
ities for targets of opportunity, gach as Stalin's death.

fo and Management, ~

(1) Control by CZA of the substance of broadeast, and
the management of broadcasting cperations should be absolute and through
| efficers directly responsible to agency control. —

(2) The doctrine of. compartnentalization : should be
strictly enforced. No. ones excepting the handful of technicians required

to eperste ;
-9=
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to operate a transmitter, should‘ be allowed near the transmitter
site. The delivery of tapes, ete., should be through a cutout. . Likes

wise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the
operation of the transmitter as well as from ‘any other activities of
the cover organization... If two or more language groups use the seme -

facilities they should be compartmented fron ach other. ® # #
(Soe Para, 4u8.(1)) | |

g Evaluation - me oo
; - GQ) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting —
| (25 February 1953-85 86889) -attention was called to the need for a
continuing evaluation of all radio broadeasting- operations with partic-
ular referencé to coverage am impact, and sources for the essential
information were outlined, = ,

___ , (2) PP/OPS, in ecllaboration with this office, has -
initiated this much-needed underteking, _ ;

he ° Personnel,

(2) There is a shortage of proféssional and. technical
personnel qualified for covert radio broadeasting. A program of

selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any
plans for new radio projects. — cS

+ " (2): A training program in covert. broadcasting techniques
should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe
houses by detail- of qualified instructors from covert training for basic
indoctrination; te be supplemented by area‘instruction by the area desks
and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office. , .

5. Recommendations =

' Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the
. old war we have made certain assumptions ag to. the criteria which
should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting. -

Our théalis is that CIA should use radio Broadcasting in
covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

Be! That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other ©
overt media.°- , : : : ,

_ bo ‘That any contemplated operation follew strict cone
septs for clandestizie operations, including ©. me

ae (1) Positive and direct agency control of both
management and policy. + oO, : se

. ‘.. (2) Strict security requirements ineluding ecome=
partmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.

=10= (3) Maintenance of

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- (3) Maintenance of sufficient sover to permit oo
eredible dental of official connection by U.S. or: host t country govern-
nent. £

&, ‘That no direct brbadcast opereiton be undertaken by
GIA untdl ever; possibility has been exhausted to have the task under-
taken by another country (or countries) through ; ‘penctration, manipula

ton and/or cuntrel aid or covert: -parchase of time on, Andigenous radio
ot faedlities.

Our foremost objective 5 should be to eqlott the :
brosdeastin, syatens of friendly a and neutral countries. This generally
is possible in “te wy

(2). fo stimlate. sur friends. ‘te greater aggressive
effort ia their international broadcasts to the. Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output ef the domestic ser
vices o! friendly and neutral. states in the interests of the: ‘Western
- eanse.

os within this frame. of referencé we made the following
Pecomendatiéns:

a (1) Proceed 448! eiiott the tiga possibilities to.
Be indigenous ratio systeng in- -fedondly and néutral. nations with the
objectives of (a) increasing the smount and effectiveness of their ..
propaganda éfforts against USSR aad the satellites, (b) exposing and
_dihibiting Commun‘st fifth colum activities end & ‘the maintenance.
ef. pro-US. anid pro-Western attitudes. a

mS These missions should be undertelcen in closest
7 collaboratdon with the USIS missions to the en that all that. can be .
decompl ished overtiye a

(2) ndertekce. a recruitment: and training progran to
make availab:. © highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers
preferably with natural. cover to undertake and ‘to support such ndasions.

(33 tn ecoperadon with Staté, develop a positive
pro. eam for information. ‘euppert of all propaganda sotivities Chrough
neximim use of intelligence and defector sources» .

(4). Strengthen and streamline. the machinery for
; policy , guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for. broad
policy only and the field missions to be given the widest. poasible .
latitude in the application of: those policies to local sequirements |.
arid the exploitation of targets a opportunity. A mature staff officer.
‘experienced in'P We should be-dvailable in the miasion to (a) feed
propaganda Mines, (o) expedite Pls ‘Support (ce) coordinate with USIS |

and (a) generally

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and (d). generally backstop the operation. .

. (5) Botablish machinéry for evaluating the ewhetence,
eoverage, impact and management. of radio operations. oo.

5. (6) - Proceed, with thio @evelopnent of capabilities to
electronically imsrude upon: and otherrise exploit the Cosmuniat radio
broadeasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important. BO -

. . hewe these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible
. use. in the ecld war—lot to have them available at the outbreak of .
“hot: war would be a tragic mistake.

seea re eas u&

ote: Reecumendatdons with respect to speeific
‘tardsts haye been transmitted. to the © SEPROPFAStS ,
divisions
: (10) a ‘anal staf? element should be, ereated to
supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting.
‘This’ staff. should be lnstructed to expedite the implementation of
the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CTA
Policy and Progam for the use of this Hedia..

le. “ioyd Ener
“6, Low BGRER

"5 May 1953

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