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ADDITION HE. “WANTS BRIEFINGS ON INTELLIGENCE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND
| GOORDINATION AND SYSTEM FOR APPROVAL OF MAJOR INTELLIGENCE PROJECTS,

| SENATOR HART ALSO WANTS A BRIEFING ON THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT
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T 604753. EL AB36. PAGE 02-02. SS~*~*~*«**N S98

TORI4519022 JAN 76° =~ *—s LOND 68796

, ADVISED. THAT BRITS. WILL, DO THEIR BEST TO PROVIDE INFORMATION, SENATOR
“MART. WANTS BUT THAT ‘SOME OF THE INFORMATION COULD NOT BE MADE
AVAILABLE, HE IS PROPOSING A JOINT MEETING WITH SIR LEONARD

- HOOPER AND RICHARD SYKES FOR GENERAL DISCUSSIONS ON. THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY AND WITH WR, ROBERT ARMSTRONG AT THE HOME OFFICE ON THE
"|. WORKINGS OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS. ACT. THERE WILL BE CHANGES IN
“THE SCHEDULE AND EMBASSY WILL BE ADVISED. BY MR. TONKIN AT A LATER
DATE, _ a
THERE 1S NO ‘anptcaTtoN IN THE DEPARTMENT TRAFFIC THAT CIA
“HAS BEEN INFORMED ‘BUT WE PRESUME THAT OFFICIALS OF THE AGENCY HAVE
“OR WILL BE CONTACTED BY SENATOR HART OF HIS STAFF ON THE MATTER,
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BRIEFING Ar. 630/237. THE ‘CONTRY. TEAM BRIBE ING WAS sevenu.
= FOR 0930), CARY. ‘MENTIONED ‘HAT THE INTEL: wes: HAD BEEN. |
GIVEN MTATL END" TABATHENT. At PReVioUs: STOPSs AND CONGRESSMAN
-aDDABaD HAD. INDI ATED THAT HE WANTED TO Be ‘SURE AND REMEDY
THAT ON’ THE CANBERRA STOPOVER.. | co
2 CONGRESSMEN ADDABRO,. ROBINSON. ‘AND EDWARDS, ACCOMPANIED
: BY “STAFFERS. SNODGRASS, PRESTON AND GEORGE CARY “ARRIVED: AT HE. |
-. EBASSY AT 8830, WITH CUNNEELY PRESENT, COS GAVE THEN DETAILED
BRIEFING AS OUTLINED BY: HEADQUARTERS, DISCUSSION COVERED THE
NAKE*UP OF THE STATION AND GASES, OUR PRIMARY OBJECTIVES IN

CAUBTRAL TAD THE. OVERALL MANAGEMENT SCHEME useD BY HOS IN MANAGES _
MENT OF STATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES, OUR USE OF LIAISON,
“STRESSING OUR USE OF THEM TO. SUPPLEMENT OUR LIMITED RESOURCES»
OUR INTELLIGENCE CYCLE FROM VALIDATION OF REQUIREMENTS 10
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| oe Tans soaves JAN: 76 _— : CNBR 91033

| -pRODUCTION. OF. INTELLIGENCE) “SPECIFIC. verards 0 OF HOW WE ‘ACCOMP a
Li SH OUR OPS TASKI NG# SPOTTING) ASSESSMENT, DIRECT CONTACT .
WITH TARGETS. AND ‘USE oF LIATSON = STATION BUDGET, ETC,» ACTUAL
“EXAMPLES. WERE ‘USED “WHENEVER POSSIBLE To MKE THE POINTS” |

| FOR ‘EXAMPLE, THE. ‘PDWHI2 CASE WAS USED TO SHOW HOW THE STATION

7 FOCUSES ON AN INDIVIDUALS PRIMARY TARGET, IT WAS A LIvety
SESSIONS WITH CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON AND SNODGRASS *- THE "LIVE.

WIRES! OF THE GROUP. QUESTIONS WERE OF A ROUTINE NATURE
PRIMARILY. RELATED TO. INC IDENT AL OPS DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE,
“CONGRESSMAN ROBINSON NOTED THAT. HE: FELT I RATHER EASY To. IDENTIFY
| THE SENIOR AGENCY OFFICERS: oF A MISSION BECAUSE OF THE WAY THEY
HAPPEN TO. BE ANTERFAGED ADMENI STRATI VELY WITHIN AN EMBASSY

cos RESPONSE WAS. THAT. ‘such TS OFTEN TRUE. BUT THAT STATIONS AND

HOS. MAM GENENT, ARE Focusine. oN. THT SPECIFIC PROBLEM, AND: THAT THE

—WELOH I INCIDENT HAS CERTAINLY ACCELERATED OUR EFFORTS. IN THAT Oo
REGARD, oe fe

fo Be AGL BUT: a FEW “MINUTES OF. THE ENTIRE HOUR. Was

> Pent IN DISCUSSING “STATION: Ps. GEORGE CARY CERTIFIED.

THAT THE GROUP ‘was w WETTING AND. A FEW ‘QUESTIONS AND.

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THE 13TH WITH DEFENSE. ARE, ‘ai 80 DETAILED IN CANBERRA aieae, ow
BECAUSE oF SOME RATHER UNUSUAL ‘DEVELOPMENTS AN FHOBE |
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| BECAUSE OF THE SENSITIVITY. OF ITS CONTENT, — | |
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MEN INDICATED THAT THEY WERE WELL “SATISFIED. WITH WH AT HAD
BEEN CONVERED: COS: STRESSED THAT WE. WERE AVAILABLE TO -
CONTINUE. ON THE: SUBJECT AFTER THE FORMAL AGENDA OF THE Day
was. COMPLETED, BUT THEY. INDICATED THE SUBJECT HAD BEEN.
. ADEQUATELY COVERED. THERE WAS No FURTHER STATION CONTACT
WITH THE CONGRESSMEN DURING THEIR VST. THE STAFFERS
DEP ARTED ON THEIR "VIS ITH. IN. THE EMBASSY CONVA IR ON Sc HEDULE,
AND WILL RETURN DIRECT at SYDNEY BY CONVAIR ON THE 14TH;
. ARRLVING. AT ABOUT 2300. BR. IMPDE T. —_ |


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CNBR 21007

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CITE CANBERRA 24087. OO ee
TO! JAKARTA INFO DIRECTOR, =. |
RYBAT PLMHCONGA CODEL RANDALL AND ADDAgBO
REFS! ‘Ae JAKARTA 35606 (79763)

B. JAKARTA 35661 (1790 §79_)
CANBERRA STATION MUCH APPRECIATES ADVANCED. REPORTING
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- 7 393616 . EL AG2]4 PAGE ee ; — in 791004
7 Oo . -  -TORM4 211412 JAN 76 SKRT. 35674
SE Cr E T 12693592 WN 76 STAFF - A. - ee 7 oe :
CIlTe JAKARTA 35674 oo . | . - | |

TO! DIRECTON,

RYSAT. PLYMCUNGA CODEL ADDABBO

REF: JAKARTA 95 664 ( 4905)

1, AT RECEPTION aT HOME OF CHARGE NIGHT OF. it JANUARY,
— - REPRESENTATIVE ADDABBO MADE POINT OF TELLING COS THAT: STATION |

BRIEFING AS PER REF WAS "DAMN GOOD" AND THAT HE APPRECIATED THE

FR AN K ANS WE RS Ty THE DELEGATIONS QUESTIONS. .

2, MR. SNODGRASS ALS@ VOLUNTERRED THAT THE BRIEF ING-HAD 7

IMPACTED FAVORABLY ON THE DELEGATION AND THAT THEY WERE “SURPRISED
“ano PLEASED TO GET SUCH STRAIGHTFORWARD ANSWERS. TO THEIR QUESTIONS.
ie 4DDEL THAT WHAT OFTEN GAVE HIM TROUBLE WAS STATEMENTS BY a 4

AGENCY UFFICERS THAT THEY HAD GEEN PURSUING SOVIET OFFICIALS FOR. a

TEN YEARS GR MGRE AND HAD NOT YeT RECRUITED ONE. HE. ALLUDED TO

THIS AS THE BUREAUCRATS DREAM, BEING PERPETUALLY. PAID FOR SEEKING
THe HOLY GRAIL WITHOUT “EVER FINDING IT, . COS ‘POINTED, oUt TO MRi

— SNULGRASS That SOVIETS WERE BEING RECRUITED AND THAT THE WORK

|
‘|
|

OF UNE STATION WHICH NIGHT NOT RESULT IN. RECRUTTNENT KOULD BE.

THE VERY Basis ON WHICH ANOTHER STATION Is ABLE. TO MAKE’ A SUCCESSFUL,


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- TORI{Z44442 JAN 76 _okRT $5674

“RECRUITMENT APPROACH, IN COST EFFECTIVENESS TERMS, aLso. POINTED -
QUT THAT THe RECRUITMENT @F A SINGLE SOVIET. COULD AND DOES RESULT’ - =-
IN & MORE ACCURATE APPRAISAL OF THE SOVIET THREAT AND THUS A HORE |
REL 1ST Ic “ALLOCATION OF FUNDS TU MEET IT, MR SND GRASS ADMITTED |
THAT THIS WAS SO BUT ADDED HIS UPINION THAT MORE RATHER THAN. Less.
CONGRESSIONAL CONTACT: WETH CIA FIELD PERSONNEL AS IN JAKARTA
WOULD BE A PLUS FOR THE AGENCY AND GIVE THE CONGRESS A BETTER
FEEL FOR OUX ENDEAVORS AND PROBLEMS,
5, NR CAREY ALSO SAID THAT ON THE BASIS OF HIS “TALKS WITH
MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION IT APPEARED THAT THE BRIEFING HAD oN
DOWN WELL AND THAT THEY FELT They WERE BEING GIVEN AN AGCURATE
ANU INTEREST ING INSIGHT.
4, THUS IT SEEMS THAT STATION DID GET THROUGH’ TO THE DELEGATION
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on ‘CONGRESSHAN. MILFORD. DESIRES: REFERENCED MEETING at ge00
anos WILL ‘EXPECT “CONTACT FOR DETAILS UPON, HIS ARRIVAL.
oa HE 1s VERY EASY TO TALK 10 “AND aM “SURE YOU: WILL, ENJOY
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oN 10 SANUARY > AND. BELIEVE HE WENT AWAY. TOTALLY SATISFIED THAT

HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED. HIS: ‘OBJECTIVES HERE. WE MET WITH

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MINUTES “AND. ALL: MEETINGS. WENT WELL. ALso WORKED THE MEETING IN
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MEETING. ON THE SPECIAL S AND 7 SUBJECT. _ 7
2, INCIDENTAL CONVERSATIONS. HELD WITH WILSON AND DICKINSON;
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PAGE @ "TN 790579

ETA799

TORS1112132 JAN 76 JKRT 356614

SE CRE T 1199372 JAN 76 STAFF

CITE. JAKARTA 35661. Se -

TO: DIRECTOR INFO IMMEDIATE CANBERRA, SYDNEY.

NIACT CANBERRA |

RYBAT PLMHCONGA cope ADDABBO

1, COS SR1EFED REPS ADDABBO, EDWARDS AND ROBINSON AND

MESSERS PRESTON, SNODGRASS AND CARY ON 12 JAN IN COS OFFICE,

ONE HOUR SESSION WAS BASICALLY QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD

CONCERNING TARGETS» OVERALL BUDGET, FIELD PORTION OF BUDGET,

ALLOCATION OF costs TO COMMUNIST. TARGETS. VS INTERNAL TARGETS.

RELATIONSHIP WITH LIAISON, ASSESSMENT OF GOVT, STABILITY AND

INSURGENCY POTENTIAL, MEANS OF ACQUISITION OF SECRET NF oRMa ION»
MOST IMPORTANT REPORTING OVER PAST YEAR, AMOUNT OF COVER WORK

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INDONESIAN REASONS FOR NOT PROVIDING BASES» DIA ROLE iN INDONESIA,

AND CONSTRAINTS OF COS SPENDING, .

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SEEMED NOT TOO DIFFIWSLT TO SATISFY. EXCEPTION WAS. SNODGRASS,

A YOUNG AGGRESSIVE STAFFER WHO OBVIOUSLY WANTED TO DELVE

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“CONGRESSMEN WERE HUNGRY AND WANTED TO GET OFF TO LUNCH).
3, THE DELEGATION IS QUITE DIFFERENT FROM CODEL RANDALL,
‘NONE HAD THE INTENSITY OR INTEREST OF REP MILFORD OR THE TOUGH
POLIVIUAL PERCEPTION.OF REFS WILSON/DICKENSON, NR, GARY WAS GUITE
“HELPFUL IN ORGANIZING THE GROUP AND PROVIDING CLUES TO THESR
‘OUTLOOK, | | ae |
4, OVERALL, BELIEVE DELEGATION WAS SATISFIED THOUGH THEY.
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To: WELLINGTON INFO. ‘pIRECTOR.
. RYSAT. PLMHCONGE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD
REF KELL INGTON 15857, 79752)
1, CoS. WIL TAKE: MATTER UP WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASAP . .
ARRIVAL CANBERRA AND ADVISE, — oo . re

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: CALLING, UNWANTED ATTENTION T0 STATION. FURTHER, STATION ACTIVITIES
AIN INTERNAL OPS FIELD AND FOCUS ON’ “ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION
Ww INDONESIA WILL IF PUBLISHED, CAUSE. US DAMAGE. IN INDONESIA.
ANOTHER PROBLEN IS THAT WE HAVE. PLEDGED. TO LIAISON THAT WE WILL
“PROTECT: 0 OUR: RELATIONSHIP WITH THEN. NEETING WITH YOGA, IF.
" PUBLISHED» WILL BE INTERPRETED BY YOGA AS A BREACH OF FAITH.¥.
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RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF? JAKARTA 235600 (0767873).
i, CONGRESSMEN WILSON AND. DICKINSON BRIEF ED “AT COS RESIDENCE 7
NIGHT 7 JANUARY FOLLOWING A RECEPTION AT CHARGE'S RESIDENCE. THEIR
INTERESTS LAY PRIMARILY IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE APPRECIATION OF SITUA=
TION IN INDONESIA, PARTICULARLY STABILITY OF GOVERNMENT. ann ROLE OF
INDONESIAN MILITARY. THEY ASKED NO QUESTIONS “CONCERNING ORGANI~
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CRITICAL UF YOGA BRIEFING, WHICH THEY HAD ATTENDED: EARLIER IN
“THE DAY AS PER REF, AND FELT THAT YOGA HAD BEEN EVASIVE AND
| GENERALLY UNRESPONSIVE. THEY ASKED COS TO SUM UP WHAT YOGA HAD
SAID, GOS'S ANSWER WAS THAT YOGA HAD APPEALED FOR MILITARY
ASSISTANCE BUT HAD STRESSED THAT THIS WAS ONLY ONE ELEMENT OF
THe TOTAL INDONESIAN’ "NATIONAL RESILIENCE" PLAN, WHICH INCLUDED
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS. A DEFENSE AGAINST. COMMUNIST
ENCROACHMENT, THE CUNGRESSMEN AGREED THAT THIS WAS THE BASIC
MESSAGE, SAID THAT IT COULD HAVE BEEN CONVEYED IN FIVE MINUTES |
| | SECRET

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| 504762 ElASSi PAGE @2. — IN 787635 |
. . tae : : !
TOR?e05592 JAN.76 =.  SKRT «35686

“RATHER THAN ONE HOUR PLUS, | | _
2. THE THO WERE ALSO INTERESTED IN TERRORIST ACTIVITY AND

“WHAT WAS BEING DONE ABOUT IT IN INDONESIA THEY APPEARED HIGHLY
INTERESTED HEN CoS REPORTED THAT THE STATION HAD PENETRATED WHAT
APPEAREL Tu BE AN ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUP WHICH APPARENTLY HAD
- [CONNECTIONS WITH THE JAPANESE RED ARMY, NEITHER HAD EVER HEARD
“OF THE JRA AND WERE INTERESTED IN & SHORT BRIEFING ON IT, BOTH
wane MENTION OF INDONESIA'S CO*SPONSORSHIP OF THE U.N. RESOLUTION
"(CONDEMNING UsSs MILITARY BASES IN GUAM, ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE
DELE GA TION 1s REPRESENTATIVE ANTON IO WONPAT, wi 1S THE REPRESEN- -
TATIVE FROM GUAM, THEY SAID MR, WONPAT HAD AGREED FOR THE SAKE
oF DIPLUMACY NOT TO BRING. UP THIS MATTER DURING THE’ VESIT, Bur
“THAT HE HAD CONFESSED TO SOME DIFFICULTY IN CONTAINING HIMSELF
“IN THIS MATTER,  COS.REPLIED THAT AS A PERSONAL OPINION HE SOMEWHAT .
REGRETTED THAT NR, WONPAT DID NOT EXPRESS HIMSELF ON: THIS ISSUE

_ SINCE WE HAD TAKEN SOME PAINS TU LET OUR INDO NESTAN COUNTERPARTS

KNOW THAT We WERE NOT HAPPY.aT THIS. GRATUITOUS REBUFF IT WAS

> ALSO POINTED OUT THAT STATION. HAD MADE SURE THIS ISSUE WAS BROUGHT - LA |
TO THE ATTENTION OF PRES IDENT SUHARTO, | WHO HAD’ REACTED By INSTRUCTING .

THE INDONESIAN’ UyN. DELEGATION TO SEEK. INSTRUCTIONS FROM JAKARTA os

|
SEC R E T on Oe oe | :


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"ACTION #

T 594762 EIAS51.. Pace @3.=S*=*~<“CS*~sé‘“‘S*S:*S*C*WNSC BOS

TARE 6B 95592 JAN | % 0 . JKRT 35606 ;

BEFORE ACTING ON ANY SUCH Is SUE ahins WE also NOTED THAT.
“PRESIDENT. SUHARTO. HAD BEEN DEEPLY UPSET AT THE INDONESIAN UN.
. DELEGATION VOTE 8N THIS ISSUE. AND HAD. MADE HIS DISPLEAS SURE KNOWN
TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE, .
3, “DURING THE COURSE OF THE YOGA BRIEFING, SEVERAL OF THE
CONGRESSMEN HAD RAISED THE ‘ISSUE OF PUBLIG STUTEMENTS OF” PRESIDENT
Mangos AND "THE KING OF THAILAND" DEM AND IN G THE REMOVAL OF U. Ss.
MILITARY BASES: ‘FROM THEIR COUNTRIES. YOGA HAD RESPONDED. THAT
THESE STATEMENTS WERE FOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONSUMPTION AND. pip
NOT REPRESENT THE TRUE POLITICAL BELIEFS OF THE THAT AND PHILIPPINE .
LEADERSHIP, “AS. YOGA PUT 17, THESE WERE POLITICAL STATEMENTS AND
) NOT STATEMENTS OF POLICY, BOTH CONGRESSMEN FELT THAT THIS ANSWER
REPRESENTED HIGH DEGREE OF POLITICAL NAIVETE SINCE SUCH PUBLIC
STATEMENTS WERE HEADLINED IN THE U.S, AND NATURALLY AFFECTED.

CONGRESS, CONGRESSMAN WILSON COMMENTED THAT IT WAS EXTREMELY
DIFFICULT TU FIGHT FOR MILITARY. ASSISTANCE FOR THESE COUNTRIES ©
WHEN THEY WERE TELLING THE WORLD THAT THEY DIDN'T WANT IT, HE |
ADDED THAT THAT GOES FOR THE GUAM RESOLUTION ALSO, HE ASKED FOR
CoS'S RECOMMENDATIONS ON WHE THER TO KEEP QUIET ON. THIS OR LET

_ HIS FEELINGS BE KNOWN s. cs SUGGESTED THAT HE MIGHT WISH TO.
7 . SECRET

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T 584762 EIASS1 = © PAGE 04 _ ~ IN 787635
TOR$@8O5592 JAN 76 _  SKRT 35606

DISCUSS THIS WITH THE CHARGE, BUT OFFERED AS A PERSONAL OPINION
THAT 17 WOULD DO NO HARM AND MIGHT DO SOME VERY REAL GOOD TOR |
CONGRESSMEN TO LET THEIR FEELINGS BE KNOWN ON THIS SUBJECT. =
COS ADDED THAT HE HAD FREQUENTLY TOLD HIS INDONESIAN COUNTERPARTS
THAT 17 DID NO GOOD FOR ASIAN LEADERS TO SAY PRIVATELY THAT THEY.
“DIDN'T REALLY MEAN WHAT THEY DID SAY puBLIcLY SINCE, THE PUBLIC
STATEMENTS WERE ON THE RECORD AND THE PRIVATE “ONES WERE NOT.
4, THESE GENTLEMEN ARE HARD BITTEN, PROFESSIONAL POLITICIANS.
GENERALLY THEY APPEARED TO FAVOR A CONTINUING ROLE FOR THE UsSy
IN ASIAN AFFAIRS, INCLUDING CONTINUING MILITARY ASSISTANCE. THEY
ARE, HOW EV ER, DEEPLY SUSPICIOUS OF ASIAN LEADERS, THEIR WILL AND
ABILITY TO SURVIVE AGAINST DETERMINED COMMUNIST ‘SUBVERSION: AND.
THEIR PERSONAL INTEGRITY, CONGRESSMAN WILSON RECOUNTED THAT HE.
HAD BEEN PRESENT WHEN SUKARNO ADDRESSED A JOINT SESSION OF THE
| CONGRESS AND WAS HAILED AS A GREAT NATIONALIST LEADER. HE ADDED,
MLOGK AT WHAT THAT (EXPLETIVE DELETED). DID TO UsI" “THEY EXPRESSED
VERY LITTLE GF THEIR UPINIONS CONCERNING. THE AGENCY, ALTHOUGH -
(BOTH SEEMED To ATTEMPT TO ELICIT STATEMENTS FROM COS CRITICAL
OF MR, HELMS. IN THIS, OF COURSE: THEY. WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. BOTH
EXPRESSED ADMIRATION FOR THE “CONDOR “OF MR, COLBY ».
| gee RET


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1 $84762- EIAS51 PAGE 05-05 =  .  ..——sN 787635 |
poe cS ToR 19605592 JAN 76 7 SkRT 35606

5 GENERALLY IT APPEARED THEY WERE SATISFIED WITH THEIR
CONVERSATION WITH COS» ALTHOUGH GENERALLY DISAPPOINTED WITH THE .
RESULTS OF THEIR VIS IT UP To THAT TIME, SINCE THEY’ SAID’ THEY. WAD-
NOT FOUND OUT MUCH FRUM THE INDONESIANS THAT THEY DIDN'T KNOW
“BEFORE. STRONGLY ENDORSE HEADGUARTERS ADVICE To TREAT WITH THESE
GENTLEMEN SEPARATLEY FROM CONGRESSMAN MILFORD» WHOSE INTERESTS
SEEM QUITE DIFFERENT 7 FRoW THEIRS', £2, IMPDET. |

- *Advised of contact with Congressmen. Milford, Wilson and Dickinson to arrange .
briefings, and forwarded a report of the separate 3 hour briefing of Milford on’ |

7 January.

. SECRET

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“= 7b84283  EIAQ0S PAGE OL IN 787573
ee ; _TuRt@80007z2 JAN 760 KT 35600 |

/- §.8 € RE T 0709442 JAN 76 STAFF
CITE JAKARTA 35600 ©
To: DIRECTOR INFO CANSERRA, WELLINGTON,
RYSAT PLMHCONGA | |
REF: A, DIRECTOR 788143
gg, DIRECTOR 788139
C+ DIRECTOR 768390
‘D. DIRECTOR 785722
4, MADE CONTACT WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFoRD SuoRtiy AFTER HIS
_ ARRIVAL AND ARRANGED To BRIEF HIM ON MORNING 7 JANUARY, ALSO
| CONTACTED JONGRESSMEN WILSON AND D/ RKINSON AND LATER MR, TED
LUNGER, AND WILL: BRIEF WILSON AND DICKINSON NIGHT 7 JANUARY,
| 2, MILFORD BRIEFING COMPR/SED THREE FULL HOURS AND GENERALLY
FOLLOWED FORMAT OUTLIVED REF. THIS WAS LIBERALLY INTERSPERSED
WITH THEORETICAL EXAMPLES WHICH WEREVERE CLOSE TO ACTUAL CASES,
, 3, MILFORD WAS SERTURS, ATTENTIVE AND (NTERESTED LISTENER,
| HE WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN CHECKS AND BALANCES, COMMAND
-AND CONTROL» FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY.» AND SECURITY ANU MORALE oF
STATION PERSONNEL, HE DID NOT ASK NUMBERS oF STATION: PERSONNEL,
OVERALL QUDGET, OR OTHER SENSITIVE DETAIL. WE WAS VERY INTERESTED

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T 584283 ELAB94 PAGE a2 . IN 787573

ToRI 802072 JAN 76  JKRT 35608

IN STATION'S LIAISON PROGRAM AND AN EVALUATION OF THE STABILITY
-- AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDONEWIAN GOVERNMENT, -HIS ATTITUDE |
WAS POSITIVE THROUGHOUT AND HE INDICATED THAT HE HAD HIGH. en
ADMIRATION FOR THE AGENCY AND BELLVED THAT NEGATIVE CONGRESSIONAL.
ATTITUDES WERE LARGELY BASED ON IGNORANCE, HE SAID ALSO THAT THE
CONGRESS SO FAR HAD BEEN LUOKING AT THE AGENCY'S "OLD CATS" AND
‘THAT EVEN SOME OF THE "RAVING LIBERALS" WOULD TAKE ANOTHER VIEW
OF THE AGENCY IF THEY ‘TOOK THE TIME TO INFORM THEMSELVES OF THE
MANY POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS MADE BY THE AGENCY, AND PARTICULARLY
‘BY THE poo. HE ‘ALSO EVIDENCED CONSIDERABLE | NTEREST IN ECONOMIC.
INTELLIGENCE, SAYING THAT HE FELT THIS To BE AN IMPORTANT MISSION.
OF THE AGENCY AND NEEDED TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. cos. OUTLINED 4
FEW STATION ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN THIS FIELD THAT SEEMED TO PLEASE
HIM. — : : . re - |
PAGHSE IMMA TA-SEODL-S EO REF BF
eo oe _
& OFF THE RECORD» CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ‘galD HE HAD IN MIND.
PREPARING A MINORITY REPORT AND SPONSORING A BILL WHEREBY A
SINGLE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON AGENCY OVERSIGHT WOULD BE FORMED, THIS
COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE MEMBERSHIP FROM THE ARMED SERVICES, FOREIGN 7
RELATIONS, APPROPRIATIONS, TREASURY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOL OR, AND
” . , pakinces . | |

, SECRET. )_.

/

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T 584283 EIA94 “PAGE BS _ | IN 787573 °

TORIGSOGB7Z JAN 76 7 SKRT 35600-

THE PRESENT SELECT COMMITTEE. UNLIKE OTHER COMMITTEES OF .
CONGRESS; ITS MEETINGS WOULD ALWAYS BE CLOSED AND ONLY OPEN AS

A SPECIFIC VARIATION FROMTHE NORM AND WITH THE APPRUVAL OF THE

; 7 ; 40s - |
SREAKER @F THE HOUSE, ALSO» UNLIKE OTHBS COMMITTEES, COMMITTEE
DOCUMENTS WOULD NOT 8 ACCESSIBLE EXCEPT oN A STRICT BIGOTED

7 courstD Nowr GB

€ BASIS AND MCHD NRLNYE DECLASSIFIED WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE

: . THE
MAJORITY GF THE COMMITTEE, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONNITTEE AND 6a
“SPEAKER GF THE HOUSE. HESADMITTED THAT THIS BILL MIGHT HAVE

: . CE : : . ;
SOME ROUGH GOING IN THE P@@SENT CONGRESS, WE POOH=POOHED THE IDEA

. 44 KO
OF A JOINT COMMITTEE SAEENG THAT IT WOULD HAVEMAO LEGISLATION

wrtaeie AND WOULD THUS SIMPLY BE ANOTHER Dos BITING, AT OUR HEELS,
: . . CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AskeD FOR COS! VIEWS ON THIS |
| “LEGISLATION AS WELL AS ANY RECOMMENDATIONS WHICH GOS WOULD CARE
| TO MAKE @N GR OFF THE RECORD. COS MERELY COMMENTED THAT

CONGRESSMAN MILFORD!S PLANNED LEGISLATION SEEMED EXCELLENT AND

NOTED THAT THE AGENCY WAS NOT ATTEMPTING To AVOID RESPONSIBLE
OVERSIGHT BY THE CONGRES, BUT ADDED THAT A SECRET SERVICE MUST

WAVE Sve SECRETS, AND WITHOUT THIS ESSENTIAL ELENENT We WOULD

BE OUT OF BUSINESS, CoS OFFERED NO RECOMMENDOFRANS ON THE BASIS

THAT THE REQUEST WAS UNEXPECTED AND DID NOT GIVE HIM SUFFICIENT

SECRET

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ACTION #.

1 584283 ° E1A894 PAGE 4 . a IN 787573

TOR: @8G0B7Z JAN 76 © JKRT. 35600

TIME TO THINK THROUGH A RESPONSIBLE RECOMMENDATION,
6. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ALSO’ INQUIRED ABOLT THE EFFECT OF

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT ON STATUN AGTIVITEES. COS

POINTED BUT CERTAIN OBVIOUS SECURITY AND BUREAUCRATIC DIFFICULTIES»
‘BUT pID N@T ELABORATE,

Fe - FOLLOWING STATION BRIEFING, cos ACCOMPANIED CONGRESSMAN

MILDORD. TOGETHER WITH. CPARGE RIVES AND THE ENTIRHDELEGATION, TO

A MEETING WITH GENERAL YOGA IN THE LATTER'S OFFICE. IN THE COURSE
OF THIS MEETING CONGRESSMAN MILFORD ASKED GENEXAL YOGA IFWYOGA ——
FELT HE WAS RECEIVING ADEQUATE INTELLIGENCE ASSISTANCE FROM

UsSs INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND IF HE HAD-ANY CRITICISM OF U.Ss

INTELLIGENCE INTERFERENCE IN. INDONESIAN AFFAIRS, GENERAL YOGA
REPLIED THAT ALTHOUGH HE FELT THE NEED To DEVELOP BAKIN SOMEWHAT
FURTHER, THE PRESENT ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES OF BAKIN ARE
CLOSE TO SUFFICIENT, IN.CERTAIN CASES It 15 POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE
“WITH FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES» BUT THIS WAS ALWAYS DONE WITHOUT

INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS IN EITHER SIDE. YOGA CONTINUED

THAT BAKIN AND CIA COOPERATIE IN CASES OF MUTUAL INTEREST, SUCH
AS THE SOVIETS, THIS 1S A LIMITED COOPERATION DIRECTED TO

A SPECIF3G GOAL, YOGA ADMITTED ALSO THAT HE HAD OTHER LIAISON:
a SECR Er

: . 4
can : . }


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‘ACTION #

T peaz83 TABS PAGE 25 _ EN 787573 |
ae 7 TORIQBOO07Z JAN 76 UKRT 35690
bo YY - | Po -

_ RELATIONSHIPS ETH THE: ‘BRU TISH, THE. AUSTRALIANS, THE JALANESEs
| WEST GERMANS, aD ALL OF THE ASEAN NATIONS, HE SAID SPECIFICALLY
THAT HIS RELATIONSHIPS WITH AIA WERE EXCELLENT. HE DID NOT ADDRESS.
HIMSELF TO ANY INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL - AFFAIRS. a

8. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD HAS AN ACTIVE, VIVACIOUS WIFE NAMED
MARY WHO WASWELL TAgEN CARE OF BY EMBASSY ESCORT FSO EMILY PERREAULT,
SHE EVIDENCED INTEREST IN THE CASINOS, SAILING SHIPS AND SHOPPING
FOR NATIVE HANDICRAFTS, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD IS AN AVID PHOTOGRAPHER
AND ASKED TO BE TAKEN ON A MINI®TOUR OF THE CITY FOR THIS PURPOSE, .
HE WEARS A HEARING AID AND IS SLIGHTLY HARD OF HEARING, AND IT
Is wert SPEAK DISTINCTLY AND DIRECTLY AT HIM. |
9, MILFORD Asko For A NON*CLASSIFIED VERSION OF STATION,
BRIEFING AND OF MEBTING WITH oc To Be SENT TYABENGY AND PSsED_
ON TO HIMs THIS WILL BE A LITTLE DIFFICULT BUT HE INSISTED 1T
HAVE NO CLASSIFICATION SINCE IT WOULD Go INTO THE OFFICIAL RECORD,
wIke PREPARE AND FORWARD SOONEST,

10, GVERALL pELIVE. THIS WAS A PLUSe MILDORD EXPRESSED |

COMPLETE SATISFACTION WITH HIS BRIEF ING AND AGAIN REPEATED

THAT IF @THERS OF THE CONGRESS WOULD ONLY INFORM THEMSELVES. THEY TOO
WORLD BE IMPRESSED,
SECRET

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T 598283 EIA894 PAGE B6=06 IN 787573:

TOR 10800072 JAN 76_ a JKRT 35600 |

7

wit WILL REZORT ecaRATELY ON WILSON/DICKINSON BRIEFING
~~ wen, iT Is COMPLETED LATER TONIGHT, E2, IMPDET,

ae oo) SECRET

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PAGE Oin0, IN 767586.

7 ToRia72i2va JAN. 76. os CNBR 20980.
S& c RET. 0721002 JAN 16 ‘STAFF a a

CITE CANBERRA 20960.

“Tor DIREGTOR, ~ |

_RYBAT PLMNCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD -

EFL DIRECTOR 787585 |

a ty APPOINTMENTS WITH LIAISON HAVE BEEN TENTATIVELY”
ARRANGED. CONG, MILFORD WILL MEET WITH ‘SOTERN REP
reat SOTERNI44, D/10 AND SQUASH/D=G. _

COS’ AND BONHAM DISCUSSIONS TENTATIVELY set FOR:
0830-1090, “ANTICIPATE: APPROXIMATE 30 MINUTES WEETING WITH
EACH LIAISON. OFFICER, $0 SHOULD. BE COMPLETED IN aNeLE Tae :
FOR’ ‘WILFORD TO REJOIN ‘GROUP FOR AFTERNOON. AQTIVITHES, -C AN

“EXTEND DURATION. oF NEGTINGS. IF we | DESIRES. Ea, JWPDET,. |


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TF 584270  ELABB2 PAG| = J “IN 787572
roRteeagetz JAN 76 a WELL 15837

S Ec RE T 0702402 JAN 76 STAFF a vlS.
CITE WELLINGTON (15837 |
To! CANBERRA INFO DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MILFORD

REFS: As DIRECTOR 787959

B, “DIRECTOR 787555
PLS ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD THAT cos WELLENGTON CAN ARRANGE
45 JANUARY 0802 HOURS BREAKFAST MEETING WITH Nz SECURITY INTELLI
"GENCE SERVICE DIRECTOR, BRIGADIER H, E. GILBERT, AT CONGRESSMAN
"MILF ORD!'S HOTEL. ALTHOUGH EMBASSY WELLINGTON BRIEFINGS ON UPERATION
DEEPFREEZE SCHEDULED FOR MORNING OF 15 JAN. CONGRESSMAN MILFORD MAY
PREFER TO MEET WITH COS AND GRIGADIER GILBERT. AMBASSADOR SELDEN
GONCURS WITH THIS ARRANGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION TO AIRPORT FOR

FLIGHT TO MT. COOK: WILL BE AVAILABLE IMMEDIATELY: AFTER MEETING WITH
GILBERT. PLS “ADVISE CONGRESSMAN MILFORD!S PREFERENCE So COS CAN .

CONFIRM ABOVE ARRANGEMENT WITH BRIGADIER GILBERT, .  E21MPDET

cee SECRET

13-00000

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. - sionaL CentER Use onty , /0 = f
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SECRET. | SO | | Pe
. MESRAGE HANDLING INDICATOR _ pater .TIME GROUP : ome . 7 oo MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER -
STAFF a Ove3uaz DIRECTOR ST  PAPASA

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CONF: ila INFO: “FILE wes, REVIEW STAFF, )
(900, CoM F, S/

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Tor JAKARTA CANBERRA WELLIN TON y

‘Ga -e00

~RYBAT. PLITHCONGA CONGRESSMAN MELFORD yoo
REFS DIRECTOR 787555 |x| a
"CONGRESSMAN MILFORD DOES ‘DESTRE MEETINGS. WITH SENTOR LIATSON
“OFFICIALS REQUEST STATION'S PROCEED TO SCHEDULE MEETINGS WITH
7 LIAISON. £2. InPDET- A oe

_ ¥TRANSMITTED CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S SCHEDULE. .

~ 2 CEA/PMI

DATE: 2 JAN’ 26
“ORIG! Bed. HOUSTON |
UNIT: DCEA

EATS 923. |

| STHEODORE G. SHA oo _ BILL: ‘J. HOUSTON CEA -
. RELEASING OFFICER . eo - COORDINATING orricens. : : “AUTHENTICATING Orricen ot
- _ELASSIFICATION 7 : . “REPRODUCTION BY OTHER “THAN. THE. ISSUING OFFICE 1s PROHIBITED” E

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13-00000

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CLABEIICATION : mn . : -
SECRET 9. .00 . °) a ‘
MESSAGE HANDUNG INDICATOR oo. a dave-rime gaouP . : _ _—
STAFF /J 0. OBB120Z. DIRECTOR oe

~ RYBAT PLMHCONGAY
“REFS: A- DIRECTOR 2as7ze {NOT ‘NEEDED TOKYOR “lel

SECRET © re CL BY:

_ OUTGOIN” | -MESSAGE

com D/OLC, wo: mu Der /Review SH, D Lesher : “i. fate

Pooper, 5 oleas neruan ro PER eert
Orne + of

TO: JAKARTA CANBERRA; WELLINGTON INFO TOKYO. y oe

. B- DIRECTOR’ SELES {NOT NEEDED TOKYO} lesly
be BASED 3 JANUARY DISCUSSION WITH CONGRESSMAN MELFORD» HE
EXPECTS MEETINGS WITH ACTION ADDEES AS FOLLOWS # sy ~

JAKARTA - MORNING ? JANUARY -

CANBERRA - 10 JANUARY.

WELLINGTON ~ EVENING 14 JANUARY ¥-

2. AT 3 JANUARY MEETING: MILFORD REAFFIRMED HE, AS MEMBER HOUSE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (PIKE COMMITTEE}, HAS BEEN MOST |
INTERESTED IN OUTCOME OF COMMITTEE'S INVESTIGATIONS AND IS. CONCERNED |

. ABOUT DIRECTION IN WHICH COMMITTEE HEARINGS HAVE GONE. FYI4 ONLY

MILFORD PLANS FILE SEPARATE VIEWS OR MINORITY REPORT WHEN COMMITTEE
DRAUS UP ITS RECOMMENDATIONS. HE HAS VISITED H@S ON A NUMBER OF |
OCCASIONS AND HAS BEEN BRIEFED BY VARIOUS AGENCY OFFICIALS’ HE’

RECENTLY VISITED SEOUL WHERE HE SPENT DAY IN COS HOSPITAL ROOM JUST

TALKING. MILFORD ANXIOUS SOAK UP AS MUCH KNOWLEDGE AGENCY ACTIVITIES
DATE: . _ .

ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:
+ .
RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS sO AUTHENTICATING OPmcER .
CLASSIFICATION : REPRODUCTION ‘BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE Is PROHIBITED E 2  IMPDET
‘sangs


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288 39 Be :

AS POSSIBLE. TO ASSIST HIM WRITE INORITY’ REPORT. ACCORDENGLYS HE.
“WANTS MEET OUR FOREIGN. LIAISON COUNTERPARTS TO GET FEEL FOR INPORTANCE
THIS SOURCE AND NEED PROTECT IT FROM PUBLIC. DISCLOSURES. “RECOGNIZE.

SHORT NOTECEs’ BUT REQUEST ACTION ADDEES TAKE: “SPECIAL EFFORT ARRANGE
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| 3. FOR UAKARTAR PLS HANDLE MILFORD AND. UELSON/DICKINSON. coN= |
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UELLINGTON, 35 JANUARY... REVISED SCHEDULE, vite ALTER HIS’ DESIRES
THIS CASE. MEETING UITH AEH ON 3 JANUARY AND WILL. FORWARD NEW

' DATE:

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| | FOLLOWING ARE. RESULTS CEA AND OLC cM» ROBERT. CHINE a
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_ "NINETEEN DECENBER MEETING LAID ON IN ORDER THAT.
- “qepnesentatzve ‘MILFORD COULD: BE GIVEN A BRIEFING IN OVERVIEW
TERNS ON WHAT THE cIA STATIONS IN AUSTRALIA. NEW ZEALAND AND
~ EHDONESIA WERE DOING IN. TERMS OF OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS. ye |
| Be  AUSTRALTA® THERE: WAS CIA PRESENCE IN CANBERRAy
“HELBOURNE AND SYDNEY. “THIS REPRESENTATION ‘CONSISTED OF ABOUT |
SIX OFFICERS CHARGED WITH BASIC NISSION OF PURSUMING. SOVIET.
© CHINESE AND. EAST: EUROPEAN TARGETS AVAILABLE. iN AUSTRALIA» at
_ WAS “STRESSED-THAT. THESE DENIED. AREA. TARGETS: WERE PURSUED “0TH
“UNTLATERALLY AND. IN. JOINT OPERATIONS WITH THE: AUSTRALIAN -
LIAISON. SERVICE + THERE WERE 53 SOVIETS IN AUSTRALIA, bb cutser
a HUNGARTANS 22 CZECHS J BULGARIANS. 59. YUGOSLAVS+ a RUMANTANS: |
AND 47 NORTH KOREAN STUDENTS. IT WAS STRESSED: THROUGHOUT
"BRIEFING. THAT PRIMARY. ‘OBUECTIVE IN BOTH’ UNILATERAL AND JOINT
OPERATIONS. WAS THE: RECRULTHENT. OF SOVIETS. CHINESE OR EAST

DATE:
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IN. NEU ZEALAND: THE SCOPE oF OUR, OPERATIONAL PROGRAMS UAS ALSO

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SPECTIVE | OF INDONESIA..FOCUSED oN LEGAL TRAVEL OPERATIONS AGAINST -
CHINA AS WELL AS SCREENING’ OF INTERCEPTED NAIL FROM CHINA TO -
“INDONESIA. . THERE. WAS, ALSO BRIEF DISCUSSION OF NORTH KOREAN “AND.
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-sINDONESIA AS AN-INTELLIGENCE TARGET JIN TERMS: OF HOST COUNTRY |
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TERNS AND. SOME. EXAMPLES WERE CITED OF TYPES oF INTELLIGENCE OBTAINED .
| FROM. CTA. ACTIVITIES: IN INDONESTA. CEA ALSO. FOCUSED BRIEFLYD ON OUR a
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OF AUSTRALIAN. LIAISON SERVICES. "REPRESENTATIVE, NILFORD MADE POINT
“THAT SUCH MEETINGS. wouLD BE USEFUL TO HIN IN CONTEXT OF HIS PIKE.
COMMITTEE DUTIES. BECAUSE HE COULD THEN COMMENT ON, LIAISON SERVICES*
REACTIONS TO CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRIES INTO CIA. REPRESENTATIVE |

MILFORD. was ADVISED THAT IATTEMPTS wouLD BE. ADE: TO ARRANGE MEETINGS.

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; AIRCRAFT. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE MAKING ARRANGEMENTS FOR.
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24 DEC 75. —
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EXTENSION OF. CIAy FOR, COLLECTION OF INFO ON PRC AND USSR. ' POINT -

OUT DO NOT RECRUIT: AUSTRALIANS OR NEU “ZEALANDERS ‘WITHOUT SPECIFIC

APPROVAL OF GOVTS CONCERNED - Ye

E. OPERATIONAL, REPORTING SYSTEM: | STARTING UBT RECRUTTHENT

(OF AGENTs STATION. ‘SHOULD OUTLINE TYPES OF REPORTING REQUIRED” By.
AGENCY FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES I. Ee PRA PART: I “AND a

CONTACT REPORTS. INTEL REPORTS» PERIODIC ASSET REPORTS. PERIODIC .
PROGRESS REPORTS, OPACTS AND. FIELD ‘PERFORMANCE REPORTS: ON LATTER» |
STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED on, FEED BACK FROM ‘MID~ YEAR’ AND FY. “RevEeus:

. WITH DDO. FY BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE “TOUCHED ON. _

oF. CASE HISTORY: IT ESSENTIAL WE NOT ‘IDENTIFY “ANY ACTIVE. .
SOURCES OR LIAISON SERVICES BY° TRUE NANE TO CONGRESSMAN MILFORD: ae
IN VIEW OF THIS uISH POINT OUT H@S HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO. DRAU ;

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Pe THIS VISIT IS SEPARATE FROM TRIP OF PRESTON, SNODGRASS 4.

CALLOWAY AND CARY DISCUSSED IN DIRECTOR 778574.

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| _ 7 494891. EIA755 PAGE #1 | TN 7eaae4

Tors 2005032 Nov 75. sss SOU, .25948-
SEC RE T 2603482 NOV 75° STAFF
tte SEOUL 25948 |
TO1 DIRECTOR. —
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
REF: SEOUL 25761 (73 bere)
1s FOLLOWING: LETTER WAS PREPARED BY GENERAL RICHARD Ge

STILWELL» COMMANDER=IN-CHIEF, UNITED NATIONS COMMAND. AND
FORWARDED TO DOD CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON FOR REVIEW AND PASSAGE TO
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD, THE LETTER WAS PREPARED IN RESPONSE TO
CONGRESSMAN MILFORD'S REQUEST To BOTH GENERAL STILWELL AND LT.
“GENERAL JAMES HOLLINGSWORTH» COMMANDER, I CORPS» CAMP RED cLouDs
FOR LETTERS SIMILAR TO HIS REQUEST OF AMBASSADOR SNEIDER,
GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH PREPARED A LETTER WHICH was REWORKED INTO
THE FOLLOWING LETTER WHICH WAS SENT BY GENERAL STILWELL AS
REFLECTING BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH'S AND HIS OWN VIEWS, THE
LETTER WAS FORWARDED TO WASHINGTON AS AN SSO BACK CHANNEL MESSAGE
AND HAS SINCE BEEN CLEARED BY DOD FOR RELEASE TO CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD, THE TEXT OF THIS LETTER WAS GIVEN TO cos BY GENERAL
7 HOLLINGSWORTH.
: 2. QUOTE " DEAR MR. MILFORD:
| —— SECRET

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7 494891 ELA755 or IN 754484
: “TORI280501Z NOV 75 © ~—.-~—s SEOU. 25948

GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH AND I WERE EXTREMELY PLEASED At THE INTEREST
YOU SHOWED IN THE PROBLEMS WE FACE HERE IN KOREA, 1AM ONLY. SORRY
“THAT OUR SCHEDULES DID NOT PERMIT US TO EXPLORE THE CHALLENGES WE
FACE HERE AND OUR CAPABILITIES TO DEAL WITH THEM IN GREATER. DETAIL.
THIS LETTER INCORPORATES BOTH GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH!S AND MY.
‘VIEWS, |
AS FIELD COMMANDERS, WE ARE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN THE AREA OF
INTELLIGENCE © -AND FOR GOOD REASONS. A COMMANDER HAS A FUNDAMENTAL
INTEREST IN PROTECTING HIS COMMAND AND ASSURING THAT. SHOULD
HOSTILITIES OCCUR, HIS COMBAT RECOURSES ARE EMPLOYED IN THE nost .
EFFECTIVE MANNER POSSIBLE,
ORGANIZATIONALLY, THE. us INTELLIGENCE SETUP IN KOREA . 1S VIABLE, a
THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE. AGENCIES,
I Eas CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIAD, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(DIA), AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY (NSA) WORK EFFECTIVELY IN |
CONCERT WITH OUR” INTELLIGENCE STAFFS AND THOSE COLLECTION ELEMENTS.
WHICH ARE UNDER OUR CONTROL TO PROVIDE AN INTEGRATED: AND
| BFFICIENT FLOW oF. INTELLIGENCE, WE HAVE BEEN MOST IMPRESSED: WITH. (THE.
"DEDICATION AND. PROFESSIONALISM OF. THE INTELLIGENCE, OFFICERS. ASSIGNED.
TO THOSE NAT LONAL AGENCIES: AND He HAVE EQUALLY HIGH. RESPECT FOR our.
oy Ss Ec RET | ye

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SECRET

7.494691 © BLA755 _ PAGE @3 . IN 754484

| TOR 2605042 NOV. 75 __Se00 25948

OWN ‘PEOPLE. THIS TEAM 1S RESPONSIVE AND GIVES US A GREAT DEAL

OF QUALITY INTELLIGENCE.

LIKE ALL COMMANDERS, HOWEVER, WE ARE NOT FULLY SATISFIED WITH ALL:
ASPECTS “OF THE. INTELLIGENCE. EFFORT. THE PRIMARY. NEED 1S, FOR.

RELIABLE WARNING INTELLIGENCE, BECAUSE OF OUR PROXIMITY ‘TO THE.
ENEMY'S AIRFIELDS, AND THE FACT THAT MANY OF OUR TROOPS LIVE WITHIN
THE RANGE FANS OF HIS: EMPLACED WEAPONS SYSTEMS» WE MUST CONSTANTLY Be
ALERT FOR THOSE ANOMALIES IN HIS BEHAVIOR WHICH WOULD. TIP. US. OFF

TO IMPENDING ATTACK. UNFORTUNATELY, RECAUSE OF HIS. READINESS “AND

THE FORWARD DISPOSITION OF HIS FORCES, INCLUDING FORWARD POSITIONING

OF SUPPLIES, WE DO Not HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF ASSURANCE: THAT WE.

WILL HAVE MUCH WARNING. WHILE WE MIGHT HAVE DAYS OR WEEKS» IT TS

MORE PROBABLE THAT NE WOULD HAVE ONLY HOURS. TO PARTIALLY OFFSET THISs

US AND ROK FORCES MAINTAIN A HIGH DEGREE OF ALERT, PREPARED TO

QUICKLY ENGAGE THE FORCES oF THE NORTH SHOULD THEY INITIATE

AN ATTACK. CONCURRENTLY, WE AND THE NATIONAL LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY ARE SEEKING WAYS TO IMPROVE OUR SYSTEMS AND METHODOLOGIES

TO INCREASE OUR ASSURANCE OF TIMELY WARNING.

NATIONALLY MANAGED COLLECTION PROGRAMS GIVE us INVALUABLE |

INTELLIGENCE ON THE DISPOSITIONS OF THE POTENTIAL ENEMY, YET WE
SECRET. | |


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—~? 494091  EIA75s PAGE p4 75

Ton 2605012 Nov 75 _se0U 25948

STILL HAVE SIGNIFICANT GAPS IN OUR HOLDINGS ON THE: “AGTUAL |
LOCATIONS. AND IDENTITIES OF HIS UNITS, HIS COMMAND AND. CONTROL a

| STRUCTURE AND HIS WAR PLANS, IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WHILE: THE,
EXCELLENT TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS IN PHOTOGRAPHY AND. ELECTRONIC
ireeicrne Ey CouPeLy A GREAT DEAL OF INFORMATION ON: THE. ENEMY 'S.
CAPABILITIES, WE ARE STILL LACKING INTELLIGENCE ON HIS INTENTIONS,
UNFORTUNATELY» INTELLIGENCE ON WHAT HE IS THINKING AND PLANNING
WOULD COME LARGELY FROM HUMAN SOURCES, AND GIVEN THE-CLOSED
NATURE OF HIS SOCIETY AND HIS STRICT AND EFFECTIVE SECURITY.
MEASURES, IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO COLLECT THIS KIND OF
INFORMATION, | oe

THE PREPONDERANCE oF REQUIREMENTS FoR HUMAN SOURCE “CLANDESTINE”
INTELLIGENCE FALL WITHIN THE PROPER PURVIEW OF THE CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY: AND. THAT AGENCY I UNIQUELY QUALIFIED ©

TO PERFORM THIS VITAL FUNCTION, AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS. 4 NEED

FOR A CAREFULLY MANAGED). LIMITED MILITARY EFFORT TO FOCUS ow.

STRICTLY MILITARY REQUIREMENTS. A PRIMARY MILITARY TARGET OF THIS
“NATURE 18 THE TUNNEL NETWORK THAT THE NORTH HAS BEEN DETECTED |

_ CONSTRUCTING UNDER THE DMz, THIS 1S ‘A LABOR INTENSIVE EFFORT, AND:
EXPLOITATION OF CLANDESTINE. TECHNIQUES WOULD BELA ‘MEANS oF .

}

oo SECRET


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7494891. ETA755 PAGE 05 So WN 754484
| Tontzoasoi2 NOV 7 : —_ = se0U 25948

DIscoveRING THE TUNNELS BEFORE THEY ARE USED ‘AGAINST us.

IN THE AREA OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE WE HAVE REQUESTED A HIGH,
“ALTITUDE PLATFORN TO BE OPERATED OVER THE SOUTH KOREAN LAND ‘MASS

TO GIVE US A DEEPER AND MORE EFFECTIVE LOOK INTO THE ENEMY'S

ELECTRONIC ENVIRONMENT. THE REQUESTEN SYSTEM INCLUDES A DOWN LINK
CAPABILITY WHICH WOULD GIVE US A NEAR REAL TIME READ OUT OF DATA.

COLLECTED. OUR PROPUSAL HAS RECEIVED STRONG SUPPORT FROM DIA AND
NSA. WE ALSO HAVE HIGH INTEREST IN INSURING THAT WE WILL HAVE DOWN

LINK ACCESS TO NATIONALLY MANAGED OVERHEAD PHOTOGRAPHY SYSTEMS,
WHICH ARE NOT YET OPERATIONAL. — | |

WE ARE AWARE OF THE COSTS INVOLVED IN FIELDING MODERN COLLECTION

SYSTEMS AND THE UPGRADING OF CURRENT ONES, NONETHELESS, GENERAL |
HOLLINGSWORTH AND I SHARE THE VIEW THAT, GIVEN OUR MISSION AND OUR
PROXIMITY TO POTENTIAL BELLIGERENT, WE MUST HAVE THE BEST.

INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE. I AM SURE THAT YOUR TRIP TO KOREA GAVE

YOU A FEEL FOR THE SENSE OF URGENCY THAT WE LIVE WITH HERE,

AND WE HOPE THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE To PROVIDE YOUR COLLEAGUES |

IN THE CONGRESS WITH A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR POSITION. AND HELP
TO INSURE THAT OUR FORCES CONTINUE TO GET THE KIND OF SUPPORT |
NEEDED TO DO THE JOB TO WHICH WE ARE DEDICATED,

SECRET

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TOR? 2805912 NOV 75 SEOU. 25948

SINCERELY YOURS, "UNQUOTE:
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PAGE B1-o1

"IN. 756898
TOR34093492Z NOV 75

SEOU 25761

SECRET 1003222 NOV 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25764

TO DIRECTOR.
RYBAT PLMHCONGA

REF: SEOUL 25732 Gs 73a 037) ;

FOLLOWING 1S TEXT OF STATE 264362 (ROGER CHANNEL)
-AB-NOVEMBER 1975% QUOTE SuBECTs LETTER TO CONGRESSMAN
MILFORD. | REFS SEOUL e531 1. LETTER HAS BEEN FORWARDED

TO MILFORD aS RECOMMENDED, ONLY CHANGE IN TEXT PROPOSED

PARA 5 REFTER WAS DELETION OF FINAL SENTENCE. QW ING TO

SENSITIVITY OF REF ERENCE To "CLANDESTINE OPERATION"

IN: LETTER -
7 LIKELY TO B EC OME PART OF ‘PUBLIC RECORD. UNQUOTES . coe
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ACTION #
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TORI3103452 06775 SEU 25687
. : . fe . . ran 1 .
SECRET 3103142 OCT 75 STAFF engine t
= Lq LC GkLL
CITE SEOUL 25687 AAAS

TO: DIRECTOR. a eet ip
RYBAT PLMHCONGA a
REF: SEOUL 25649 7A4591) * a

1. REGRET DELAY. IN REPORTING FOLLOWUP DISCUSSION

L190 he

WITH CONGRESSMAN MILFORD. HE MET WITH COS FOR APPROXIMATERY
ONE HOUR MORNING OF 28 OCTOBER PRIOR TO DEPARTURE, pcos =
BROUGHT THE CONGRESSMAN TO COS RESIDENCE AND THEN EXCUSED
HIMSELF TO MEET WITH CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN NED@l (SEOUL 25657).
2. AS IT TURNED OUT NOTHING OF PARTICULAR SIGNIFICANCE
DEVELOPED AT THIS MEETING. °R SPROVIDED BOTH AN OPPORTUNITY
‘TO REVIEW VARIOUS POINTS DISCUSSED IN THE PREVIOUS SESSION
WITH COS EMPHASIZING THE AGZFCY COMMAND AND CONTROL
PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN OPERATIONS PLUS THE MANAGEMENT BY
OBJECTIVE AND COST EFFECTIVENESS REVIEW PROCEDURES.
3, COS PERMITTED THE CONGRESSMAN To READ A STERILIZED
_ COPY OF SEOUL 25388 Less THE FINAL PARAGRAPH AND THEN -
DISCUSSED HIS PROPOSAL To TRY To DEVELOP A MINORITY
REPORT AROUND THIS TYPE’ vad $e 2 23 5 Fee REVIEW
S ECRE T

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. t 424247_ ETA337 PAGE 02-02. , IN 728294
Ho ng 88452 OCT 75 _ SEoU 25687

| STUDY AND EXPLAINED WHY DID NoT BELIEVE THIS WAS FEASIBLE.
THE CONGRESSMAN CONCURRED BUT RESTATED HiS DESIRE TO NOW
FOLLOW UP HIS KOREA INQUIRIES AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL AND
SOMEHOW INCORPORATE VARIOUS ASPECTS INTO HIS REPORT. HE cx. -
REINTERATED HIS STRONG DESIRE TO MEET WITH GENERAL WALTERS
COMMENDED MR, SHACKLEY TO THE CONGRESSMAN FOR SPECIFIC. 7
DISCUSSIONS ON-THIS AREA.

4, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS QUITE PLEASED AND APPRECIATIVE

| OF THE DISCUSSIONS HERE AND WOULD LIKE TO BE HELPFUL.

E2, IJMPDET,.
CS COMMENT:*COS forwards a resume of points covered during more than

six hours of off the record discussions with Congressman Dale Milford (Dr Texas) _

| HIS PROBLEM REMAINS ONE OF FOCUS AND STAFF ASSISTANCE,
; on 25 October 1975.

i Bows S¥cD

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7 414529 E1AGa7 = "PAGE OF TN 72459

TORI2804402 OCT 75 — SEOU 25649

SECRET 2003008 oct 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 4 OF 4 a “by. y

TO! DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PL MHCONGA
REF! A, SEOUL 23646 "72, saa)
Be DIRECTOR 759641
“FOLLOWING is A RESUME OF POINTS COVERED DURING
“MORE THAN SIX HOURS OF OFF THE RECORD DISCUSSIONS
WITH CONGRESSMAN DALE MILFORD (D=TEXAS) ON 25 OCTOBER 1975,
BECAUSE OF FEVER COS HAD NOT BEEN RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL AND
DISCUSSIONS WERE THEREFURE HELD AT THE HOSPITAL SITTING
ROOM, | |
1, CONGRESSMAN MILFORD OPENED THE DISCUSSION
| BY REITERATING CONCERNS SURFACED THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON,
IN ADDITION TO HSS REFERENT A ASSESSMENT, HE STATED
THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE FIRST PHASE OF THE COMMITTEE
REPORT WILL STATE THAT:
Ay DUPLICATION OF INTEL MISSIONS RESULTED IN

MULTICHANNEL FORWARDING OF INFORMATION,
B. BUREAUCRATIC INEFFICIENCY RESULTED IN DELAYS
| SECRET

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T 444520 ELAge7” - PAGE 2
| | | Fons 2896003 oct 75

IN | FORWARDING OF INTELLIGENCE,

Ce. NEW LEGISLATION ‘AND NEW PERMANENT, PREFERABLE

JOINT OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE ARE REQUIRED,

2, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT THE COMMITTEE
INQUIRIES ARE POLITICAL IN NATURE AND IN WIS OPINION
THERE IS NO PRETENSE OF OBVECTIVITY. TIME FACTORS ©
DID NoT PERMIT HIM OR OTHER MEMBERS To PERSONALLY
OR SERIOUSLY ADDRESS. THE QUESTIONS INVOLVED SO
THAT FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, MOST MEMBERS WERE "PRISONERS
OF THE COMMITTEE STAFF", HE HAS NOT BEEN HAPPY WITH
THIS SITUATION AND HAD INITIALLY PROPOSED THAT EACH
COMMITTEE MEMBER BE PERMITTED TO PERSONALLY SELECT
ONE STAFF MEMBER FOR ASSIGNMENT TO THE COMMITTEE,

HE HAD LINED UP A TOTAL OF SIX MEMBERS TO BACK THIS

APPROACH, WHEN THE CHAIRMAN AGREED TO LET HIM SELECT
ONE STAFF MEMBER IF HE IN TURN WOULD DROP HIS SPONSORSHIP

; OF THIS PROPOSAL. HE AGREED» BUT SAID THAT HE HAD AS

YET BEEN UNABLE TO IDENTIFY AN APPROPRIATE CANDIDATE.

“HE DISMISSED THE CURRENT COMMITTEE STAFF AS STARRY-EYED.

LIBERALS OUT TO MAKE A NAME FOR THEMSELVES, ; HE [S
. S$ ECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTMEZR THAN
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“IN 724594

—SEQU 25649


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7 414520. EAs? PAGE OS IN 724591
| TOR12804402 OCT 75 - SEou 25649

“OROTIVELY SEEKING A CANDIDATE FoR EMPLOYMENT aS HIS
STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE COMMITTEE, BUT DID NOT APPEAR
SANGUINE THAT HE WOULD CoME UP WITH THE: RIGHT MAN,

3s. COS NOTED THAT DIRECTOR cOLaY WOULD BE |
THOROUGHLY DELIGHTED WITH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
JOINT CONGRESS 10NAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE SINCE HE
WAS NOW O@LIGED TO REPORT TO SIX SEPARATE COMMITTEES,
CoS EVIDENCED SOME SKEPTICISM THAT A JOINT OVERSIGHT
COMMITTEE WOULD BE ESTABLISHED, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS
NOT OPTIMISTIC IN THE SHORT TERM BUT BELIEVED THAT
A JOINT COMMITTEE WILL EVENTUALLY BE ESTABLISHED,
HE SAID THAT RIGHT NOW THE AGENCY IS ESSENTIALLY IN
“AN UNDERDOG POSITION AND 1S GOOD COPY, HOWEVER»
OVER THE LONGER TERM, INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP
SCORES NO POINTS WITH THE FOLKS BACK IN HOMETOWN USA SO
THAT IN TIME CONGRESSMEN WILL NAMEUVER TO AVOID THE
ASSIGNMENT. | |

4, THE REAL PROBLEM AS HE SEES. IT IS TO FORM A

COMMITTEE THAT WOULD HAVE CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES oF
THE HOUSE AND HAVE PROCEDURES THAT WOULD PERMIT EFFECTIVE

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oo 7 _ TOR 2606402 gcT 73  SEQU 25649

OVERSIGHT FUNCTION TO BE EXERCISED AND IN A SECURE |
| MANNER, - THE CONGRESSHAN 1S PUSHING A PROPOSAL THAT.
THE HOUSE. COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP BE COMPOSED OF ONE
MEMBER NOMINATED FROM THE ARMED FORCES COMMITTEE, |

ONE FROM THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, ONE APPOINTED -
(BY THE SPEAKER, WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE COMMITTEE
To BE NOMINATED BY THE SPEAKER WITH CONCURRENCE BY

THE HOUSE MEMBERS, — |

5, THE PRESENT HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE (HSC) IS

TO BE PHASED OUT AS OF 31 JANUARY, THE CONGRESSMAN
| WAS OF TWO MINDS AS TO WETHER THE COMMITTEE'S LIFE
| SHOULD BE EXTENDED, IF TERMINATED ON SCHEDULE, THE
SPOTLIGHT WOULD FADE AWAY BUT THE RESULT WOULD BE
| VARIOUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR "GAD" LEGISLATION, IF
| GONTINUED, THE POLITICALLY INSPTRED MANIPULATION OF
THE COMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE SEEKING SENSATIONAL
HEADLINES, HE SAID THAT HE FRANKLY DID NoT KNOW
WHICH WAS WORSE, |

6, THE CONGRESSMAN'S STATED INTENT» WHICH HE
SHARES WITH CONGRESSMAN DAVID C. TREEN IS TO FILE
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YT 414520 ElA827. - PAGE @5 a, IN 724591. ~
| TOR! 2604402 OCT 75° SEOU 25649

A DISSENTING MINORITY REPORT FOCUSING IN A POSITIVE
MANNER ON THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION RATHER THAN.
THE HISTORICAL ISSUES THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS FOCUSED
IN A NON® OBVECTIVE MANNER, HOWEVER, SINCE DECEMBER
oS FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES NOT A WORKING MONTH) THIS:
“GIVES’HIM ONLY THIRTY DAYS TO PUT TOGETHER A REPORT,
SINCE HE IS A MEMBER OF THREE HOUSE COMMITTEES AND
CHARMAN OF UNE SUB-COMMITTEE WITH NOT EVEN ONE STAFF
ASSISTANT ON THE SELECT COMMITTEE HE IS FINDING IT.
AL Mo ST IMPOSSIBLE To DEVELOP A MINORITY REPORT.
HE TURNED ASIDE THE SUGGESTION THAT FAVORABLE WITNESSES
BE CALLED AS IMPRACTICAL, HE SAID.» FOR EXAMPLE, THAT
| IF HE ASKED GENERAL WALTERS OR PRESTIGIOUS AND |
| KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSONALITIES WITH INTELLIGENCE BACKGROUNDS
T0 APPEAR» THEY WOULD NOT BE PERMITTED TO MAKE AN OBUECTIVE
; AND BALANCED PRESENTATION, THE COMMITTEE'S LINE OF
QUESTIONING WOULD BE CONFINED TO THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF THE
"DEAD CATS" OF TEN TO FIFTEEN YEARS AGO, HE ALSO FORESAW
i NO POSSIBILITY OF MODIFYING THE MAJORITY VIEWS OR THE
| MAJORITY REPORT, HE WAS CLEARLY CONCERNED THAT SAM ADAMS!
| SECRET

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7 414520 ElAG27. PAGE 26-BG oO IN 724591

TORI2804402 OCT 75 — SEOU 25649"
ALLEGATIONS ARE BEING ACCEPTED AS FACT WITHOUT REBUTTAL
PERMITTED, HE WAS PUSHING FOR REBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF ALL
INDIVIDUALS CITED BY ADAMS BUT WAS UNCERTAIN WHETHER HE
“GOULD OBTAIN COMMITTEE AGREEMENT, IF NOT» HE INTENDED To
EMPHASIZE THIS PO{NT IN THE PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT,
7, THE CONGRESSMAN IS TENTATIVELY: CONSIDERING A
MINORITY REPORT THE THRUST OF WHICH WOULD BE THAT HE

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| ToRI2e05022 OCT 75 — SEQU 25649

ge Cc RET zedsaoe uct 75 STAFF

CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 2 0F 4
To! DIRECTOR,

RYBAT PLMHCONGA .

HAD TAKEN A CURRENT LOOK AT THE INTEL COMMUNITY IN A
CRITICAL AREA (KOREA) AND FOUND IT ALIVE AND WELL:
AND HAD FOLLOWED THE INTEL FLOW THROUGH THE CYCLE
MALL THE WAY TO THE FORTY COMMITTEE", HE STATED
THAT WHAT HE NEEDED WAS SOME "VEHICLE" TO TIE THIS
ALL TOGETHER FOR PURPOSES OF HIS REPORT. COS NOTED
THAT USIB IN WASHINGTON HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A.
COMPREHENSIVE ALBEIT HIGHLY CLASSIFIED REVIEW AND
ASSESSMENT OF THE KOREAN TARGET IN A EFFORT To
IDENTIFY ANY PROBLEM AREAS AND TO TAKE PROPER
REMEDIAL ACTIONS, COS NOTED THAT HAVING ONLY
RECENTLY ARRIVED HERE HE HAD OF COURSE UNDERTAKEN
A THOROUGH IN@COUNTRY REVIEW IN ORDER To ASSURE
HIMSELF OF THE ADEQUACY OF OUR IN=COUNTRY PROGRAMS,
THE CONGRESSMAN SEIZED ON THESE REVIEWS AS THE POSSIBLE
BASIS OF HIS REPORT, HOWEVER, HE WANTED TO DEAL

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“WITH "UNCLASSIFIED ASPECTS" OF THE REVIEW. (HOW

ONE RECONCILES THIS CANNOT BE SUGGESTED FROM THIS
VANTAGE POINT, IT MERELY EMPHASIZES THE LACK OF
FOCUS. AND THE CONGRESSMAN S DESIRE TO DO SOMETHING
CONSTRUCTIVE, But HIS INABILITY TO FIND A’*HANDLE".)
8, THE CONGRESSMAN COMMENTED THAT THE SECURITY OF
CLASSIFIED MATERIAL IN THE COMMITTEE'S HANDS IS A

“MAJOR PROBLEM, THE HSC RULES STATE CLASSIFIED

MATERIAL MUST NOT BE RELEASED UT THESE RESTRICTIONS
DIRECTLY CONTRAVENE HOUSE REGULATIONS ON THIS POINT

AND WOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED IF CHALLENGED, HOWEVER,

SINCE THE HARRINGTON EPISODE HE DOUBTED THAT THE

-WSC'S SPECIAL RULE WOULD BE CHALLGNGED (ACCORDING TO

THE CURRENT HOUSE RULES ANY MEMBER CAN ASK FOR A
COMPLETE TRANSCRIPT OF ANY CLOSED COMMITTEE HEARING
AND USE IT ALMOST WITH IMPUNITY),

9, COS WAS PREPARED TO PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF
REFERENT B GUIDANCE IF WE SENSED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
WOULD BE RECPTIVE TO THIS LINE OF PRESENTATION, |
GIVEN THE UNORTHODOX MANNER IN WHICH THIS HAD

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“DEVELOPED, AND UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES IT WAS BELIEVED
BEST TO GIVE THE CONGRESSMAN THE OPPORTUNITY To CHART

THE COURSE. IN SO-DOING IT BECAME ABUNDANTLY CLEAR
THAT HIS INTEREST LAY IN THE AGENCY'S ROLE VIS-AeVIS THE

INTEL COMMUNITY IN THE FIELD, HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW

COORDINATION AND CONTROL WAS EXERCISED IN THE FIELD.
COS EXPLAINED THE CHIEF OF STATION'S RESPONSIBILITY
AND AUTHORITY IN THE COORDINATION OF CLANDESTINE
COLLECTION PORGRAMS. IN DISCUSSING COORDINATION OF
MILITARY COLLECTION AGENCIES CoS IN DUE COURSE
SUGGESTED THAT MILITARY REPRESENTATIONS MIGHT
PROFITABLY BE INVITED TO JOIN IN THE DISCUSSION.
TELEPHONE CALLS BROUGHT THE 8TH ARMY Jes CAPTAIN ALBERT
My HUNT» THE DEPUTY J©2 COLONEL ARTHUR W, LONG AND
THE SENIOR NSA REPRESENTATIVE MR, DELMAR C. LANG INTO
THE DISCUSSION, THE COMMAND AND COORDINATION CHANVELS
WERE OUTLINED, AND THE STATION'S ROE WAS ENDORSED BY
THE MILITARY REPS TO ALMOST AN EMBARRASSING DEGREE.
COS EXPLAINED THE DCID'S, AND IN THIS INSTANCE
DCID 5/1, EXPLAINED HOW THE FIELD CLEARANCE,
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ToR12805022 OCT 75 SEOY 25649

REGISTRATION, APPROVAL AND IF NECESSARY, RECLAIMOR
PROCESS WORKS AND SUGGESTED THAT THE CONGRESSMAN
OBTAIN COPIES OF THE DCIDIS UPON HIS RETURN TO
WASHINGTON. NOT SURPRISING, THE CONGRESSMAN HAD
NEVER HEARD OF THE DCID'S, HE NOTED THE SUGGESTION
AND WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY FOLLON UP UPON HIS
" RETURN, ce
40, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS CONCERNED THAT THERE
WAS A DUPLICATION OF EFFORT AND INTENTLY QUESTIONED
“THE MULTICHANNEL NATURE 0F REPORTING WHEN ONLY ONE
DICISION COULD GE TAKEN. COL, LONG» THE DEPUTY.
Je2, WAS PARTICULARLY ELOQUENT IN DEFENSE OF
MULTIPLE REPORTING CHANNELS» POINTING QUT THE
SPEED AND ASSURANCE OF COVERAGE WHEN SUCH WERE
EMPLOYED, HE ADDED THAT PLACING A UNIFYING LAYER

i OF BUREAUCRACY ON TOP WOULD TEND: TO DELAY THE
MORE RAPID TRANSMISSIUN OF INTELLIGENCES TO STIFLE
DISSENTING VIEWSs AND To GREATE A MONSTROUS SIZED
SUPER*AGENCY WHICH MIGHT PROVE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE

TO CONTROL AND REVIEW, THE CONGRESSMAN WAS PARTICULARLY
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T 4145314. E1A838.. PAGE DS IN 72459¢

: TOR 2805022 OCT 75  SEQU 25649

STRUCK WITH THIS LATER POINT WHICH HE CONSIDERED

A PARTICULARLY PERSUASIVE ARGUMENT FOR MULTICHANNEL
REPORTING, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE EVEN ‘MOR E PERSUASIVE
“ON HIS "WILD=EYED" LIBERAL PEERS,

41, GOS’ REVIEWED IN DETAIL AND ESTABLISHNENT OF
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER SYSTEM AS A DEVELOPMENT
WITHIN THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS AND DEVELOPED BY THE
DCL TO FURTHER REFINE. THE COMMUNITY EVALUATION
SYSTEM AS WELL AS TO-ENSURE EVEN MORE EFFECTIVE
COORDINATION AND UNDERSTANDING WITHIN THE COMMUNITY,
IT WAS NOTED THAT THE NIO FOR NORTH ASIA AND THE |
PACIFIC, MRS, EVELYN COLBERT, IS A SENIOR CAREER
STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICER, WHILE COL. LONG'S PREVIOUS

| ASSIGNMENT HAD BEEN AS THE DEPUTY NIO FOR LATIN

AMERICA, IT WAS EXPLAINED THAT THE SYSTEM PERMITS

| THE DCI TO ESTABLISH AN ORDER OF NATIONAL PRIORITIES

AND TO EXAMINE THE PRODUCT OF AN ENTIRE MISSION, AN

IN TELL IGENCE SERVICE, OR A SERVICE COMPONENT TO SEE

| HOW WELL IT IS ADDRESSING THE KEY INTELLIGENCE .
QUESTIONS, THE EVALUATIONS OF THE NIO SYSTEM REPRESENTS

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TORI 2605022 OCT 75 2S 25 EKG

MAJOR ADDITIONAL. STEP IN MANAGEMENT OF THE COMMUNITY,
COS ALSO NOTED THAT PERHAPS AN EVEN MORE IMPORTANT 7
STEP TAKEN BY THE DCI IN EFFECTING COMMUNITY CONTROL
WAS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTER AGENCY RESOURCES
ALLOCATION COMMITTEE (IRAC) WHICH PERMITS THE DCI
. To MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE BUDGETS oF THE
“RESPECTIVE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, THE CONGRESSMAN
MAS QUICK TO PERCEIVE THE USEFULNESS OF IRAC.
‘42, COS REVIEWED THE AGENCY SYSTEM OF
MANAGEMENT BY OBWECTIVE AND THE FIELD INTEL
PROCESS IN SOME DETAIL NOTING THE AUTOMATIC
SIMULTANEOUS RELEASE TO CUSTOMERS IN WASHINGTON.
AS WELL AS THE FIELD, LOCAL CoORDINATION WAS
EXPLAINED AND THE ABSOLUTE INTEGRITY OF STATION'S
/ REPORTING WAS STRESSED, COS STATED THAT HE WAS
UNAWARE OF A SINGLE INCIDENT DURING HIS CAREER
IN WHICH AN AMBASSADOR OR GENERAL OR ANY OFFICER.
HaD PREVENTED THE DISSEMINATION OF A SINGLE. REPORT
| -FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER REASONS, LOCALLY, cos

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ee TOR(2804232 OCT 75 SEOU 25649

“S$ ECRE T 2e03eg2 OCT. 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25649 SECTION 3 0F 4
TO! DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
NOTED: THAT WE DO NoT PRECLUDE REQUESTING THE
AMBASSADOR’ S OR THE. CINCUNC'S OR ANY OTHER SPECIALIST
OPINION OR COMMENTS IN THOSE INSTANCES WHERE: THE SUBJECT
MATTER IS OF A NATURE THAT THEIR COMMENTS WOULD. PLACE
THE INFORMATION IN CONTEXT AND THEREBY MATERTALLY
ADD TO THE VALUE OF THE REPORT, IT WAS NOTED THAT
SUCH COMMENTS ARE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS SUCH IN THE
REPORT AND SUCH REVIEW IS NOT PERMITTED TO DELAY
| LTS TIMELY DISSEMINATION, E.Gy, THE OFFICE OF THE
CINCUNG IS PERMITTED 24 HOURS IN WHICH TO
COMMENT ON CERTAIN MILITARY REPORTS IF THE SUBVECT
MATTER IS OF A MILITARY NATURE AND THE TIMELINESS

| Of THE INFORMATION IS NOT AFFECTED BY A 24-HOUR DELAY,

COS EMPHASIZED THAT NO ONE REPEAT NO ONE IN THE FIELD

CAN PRECLUDE A CHIEF OF STATION FROM EXERCISING HIS

RESPONSIBILITY AND PREROGATIVE TO DISSEMINATE SUCH
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TORI 2804232 OCT 75

INTELLIGENCE AS HE, IN HIS CONSIDERED JUDGMENT,
CONSIDERS WORTHY OF DISSEMINATION INTO THE NATIONAL
LEVEL SYSTEM, .

43, THE costs sesroustin AND AUTHORITY FOR

“COORDINATION OF MILITARY CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS WERE

ALSO REVIEWED IN DETAIL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE DEPUTY
J=2, COLONEL LONG» WHILE DEFENDING THE SERVICES
SEPARATE NEED FOR A COLLECTION CAPABILITY » STRONGLY

ENDORSED THE NEED FOR THE COORDINATION PROCESS UNDER
DCID 5/2, |

14, THE CONGRESSMAN NOTED THAT ONE PROBLEM THAT
HAD BEEN BROUGHT TO THE COMMITTEE'S ATTENTION AND
WHICH HAD SURFACED DURING THE TET OFFENSIVE WAS THAT
FOUR DIFFERENT INTEL ORGANIZATIONS HAD BEEN USING THE
SAME SOURCE IN VIETNAM, COS NOTED THAT IF TRUE
THE INCIDENT WAS THE EXCEPTION NOT THE RULE AND
EXPLAINED THE ROLE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE INTER AGENCY
SOURCE REGISTRY AND HOW IT SERVES THE NEEDS OF THE
ENTIRE COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF FABRICATION WAS

DISCUSSED AND THE COMMUNITY'S USE OF BURN NOTICES

SECRET

SEQU 25649 |

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7444508 ELAB15 = PAGE BS - IN 72 45-64~

| | °° ToRSeeg423z2 ocT 750 i(“Sstt*«S E25

“To IDENTIFY AND NEUTRALIZE SUCH PEOPLE WAS EXPLAINED,
“45, ALTHOUGH.COS HAD PREVIOUSLY BRIEFED THE
CONGRESSMAN PRIOR TO HIS ARRIVAL, SUSLAK DELMAR LANG

BRIEFED THE CONGRESSMAN ON THE STATUS OF COMINT
COVERAGE OF THE NORTH KOREAN TARGET. HE ALSO.
STRESSED THE DESIRABILITY AND COST EFFECTIVENESS

OF THE PROPOSED Us2R DEPLOYMENT, PROPOSED MARKHAM

AND SWAMP COVERAGE AND ADDING A DF CAPABILITY TO THE
AUTOMATED VHF/HF ADVENTURER COLLECTION SITES, LANG
ALSO MADE A STRONG PITCH FOR THE COST EFFECTIVENESS
OF THE THIRD PARTY PROGRAM, AND THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL

FUNDING OF DSA, THE KOREAN COUNTERPART ORGANIZATION,

/ THE CONGRESSMAN AT THIS POINT INTERJECTED THAT HE

SAW NO REASON FOR THE SEPARATION OF NSA AND CIA, COS

ADDRESSED TO THIS AND THE NSA REPRESENTATIVE LATER

/ «STATED HIS VIEWS WHICH WERE GENERALLY IN ACCORD.

COS EXPLAINED NSA TASKING RESPONSIG{LITY AND

FIRST AND THIRD PARTY PROGRAMS NOTING THAT ON THE

SURFACE HE COULD NOT PERCEIVE ANY ADVANTAGES THAT

WOULD ACCRUE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN TERMS OF GREATER.

“SECRET |

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TORI2Ze04232 OCT 75 ==—i(‘(‘(‘é‘ié«S OOO

| EFFICIENCY OF COST EFFECTIVENESS BY COMBINING THE
_ TWO ORGANIZATIONS, INDEED THE UNIQUE. NATURE OF NSA
RESPONSIGILITIES WHICH ARE HIGHLY TECHNICAL AND SOMEWHAT
ESOTERIC ARGUED AGAINST FUNCTIONAL MERGER OF THE TWO
ORGANIZATIONS, IT WAS NOTED THAT THE RESULTANT: SPAN
OF MANAGEMENT CONTROL COULD IN FACT RESULT IN A LESS
“COST EFFECTIVE OPERATION, BOTH COS AND MR. LANG NOTED
THAT PRESENT PROCEDURES PRECLUDE UNDESIRED DURLICATIVE
TASKING AND ENSURED MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE CoMMUNITY EXPLOITATION
IRRESPECTIVE OF WHICH “AGENCY HAD THE LOCAL COMINT |
RESPONSIBILITY, MR. LANG COMMENTED THAT HE HAD WORKED
CLOSELY WITH CIA IN SEVERAL COUNTRIES, AND SAW NEITHER
MAJOR PROBLEMS NOR ANY ADVANTAGES THAT WOULD NECESSARILY
ACCRUE IF THE AGENCIES WERE COMBINED. |
16, DCOS BRIEFED THE AMBASSADOR ON THE EVENING
‘OF 25 OCTOBER ON THE NATURE OF THE CONGRESS MAN'S
INTERESTS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF THE DAY'S
: DISCUSSIONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WOULD BE
HAPPY TO DISCUSS THESE CONCERNS WITH THE CONGRESSMAN
“ON SUNDAY OR MONDAY, THE. AMBASSADOR SAW CONGRESSMAN
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t 414508 ELAG15 PAGE BA > OIN 72456

| _. = J TORI2894232 OCT 75. | SEOY 25649
: —
|

MILFORD THAT NIGHT AT DINNER AND INVITED HIM TO THE
RESIDENCE AT 1402 HOURS ON THE 26TH, “THE CONGRESSMAN
LATER STATED THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WERE QUITE HELPFUL
AND THE AMBASSADOR AGREED To FORWARD A LETTER ON THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF LOCAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT WHI CH
WOULD BE OF ASSISTANCE TO HIS PROPOSED MINORITY REPORT.
17, IN A STATION@ARRANGED ONE HOUR MEETING WITH
LT. GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH ON 26 OCTOBER IN WHICH DcOS
PARTICIPATED» THE CONGRESSMAN RESTATED THE NATURE. OF
HIS CONCERNS IN SEEKING POSITIVE CONTRIBUTIONS TO
; A MINORITY REPORT, HE THEN ASKED GEN. HOLLINGSWORTH
| WHAT INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT HE NEEDED AS A FIELD ARMY
| COMMANDER AND HOW HE WOULD CHARACTERIZE THE SUPPORT
HE WAS CURRENTLY OBTAINING FROM THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY, HOLLINGSWORTH RESPONDED WITH A CRUSTY
BUT IMPASSIONED LECTURE ON THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT TO CIA AND NSAy, HOLLINGSWORTH

we

TOLD THE CONGRESSMAN THAT HE NEEDED MORE TACTICAL

INTELLIGENCE AND HE NEEDED IT IN A TIMELY FASHION,
| WHICH WAS EXACTLY WHAT HE HAD RECENTLY TOLD SECRETARY
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- F 444508 EI AG25 : PAGE (e- : IN 72458
| TORI 2804232 OCT 75 | SEQU 25649

" SCHLESINGER WHO HAD ‘POSED THE SAME QUESTION, . THE
GENERAL STATED THAT HE WANTED MORE NORTH KOREAN TACTICAL,
“PHOTO, AND EVEN ECONOMIC COVERAGE AND HE DEPENDED ON
NSA AND CIA TO GET IT FOR HIM, HE: COMPLETELY
DISCOUNTED US. MILITARY. INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS SAYING
THE ARMY Dip NOT PUT HIGH CALIBER MEN INTO INTELLIGENCE
AND DID NOT DEVELOP. INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS.
HE NOTED THAT HIS SPECTAL ‘FORCES COMMANDER HAD JUST
BEEN TRANSFERRED TO DIA IN AN INTELLIGENCE ASSIGNMENT,
HE SAID HE WAS A GOOD SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER BUT. |
NO INTEL OFFICER, WHEREAS HIS FORMER G-2 HAD BEEN
REASSIGNED TO HONOLULU IN A PERSONNEL SLOT, AND THEN
THE ARMY HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PROVIDE A QUAL IF IED
COLONEL AS A REPLACEMENT, HE SAID THAT IN CONTRAST
C1A AND NSA HAVE CAREER PROFESSIONALS WITH WHOM THE
FIELD COMMANDER CAN WORK, AS HE FORMERLY DID IN
VIETNAM AND AS HE IS NOW DOING IN KOREA, HOLLINGSWORTH
ALSO ADDED KUDOS FOR STATION MILITARY REPORTING
‘NOTING THAT KOREA IS A MILITARY@ORTENTED SOCIETY

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7 4452 ElAeig—S*«*AGE CS : TW 2 585
bo ee _ TOR42804272 OCT 75 SEOU 25649.

| $B CRE T 2803002 UCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25649 FINAL SECTION “OF 4
To! DIRECTOR,
RYBAT PLMHCONGA
AND THAT HE. HAD. FOUND OUR MELE TARY /POLITICAL
REPORTING QUITE HELPFUL, THE GENERAL DECLINED
TO BE SPECIFIC AS TO THE NATURE OF ADDITIONAL
TECHNICAL SUPPORT HE REQUIRED BECAUSE OF |
UNCERTAINTY REGARDING ITS SECURITY CLASSIFICATION,
‘BUT HE VOLUNTEERED 10 PUT HIS REQUIREMENTS AND
COMMENTS IN A LETTER TO THE CONGRESSMAN WHICH HE
WOULD FORWARD VIA STATION CHANNELS AND "THEN LET
| THE PEOPLE BACK HOME WORK OUT THE CLASSIFICATION
| PROBLEM") CONGRESSMAN SAID THAT WOULD BE MOST
HELPFUL AND WOULD REPRESENT A REAL CONTRIBUTION
TO HIS REPORT,
18, IN A SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH DCOS,

THE CONGRESSMAN REQUESTED THE ASSISTANCE OF THE
DDC] BY NAME IN DRAFTING HIS MINORITY REPORT AS
| WELL AS IN REVIEWING THE USI8 STUDY ON KOREA

| “SECRET

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T 414542 E1A819- PAGE WR IN 724585

TOR12804272 OCT 75  SEou 25649

REQUIREMENTS, HE STATED THAT HE PROPOSED TO BASE
HIS REPORT ON THE USIZ AND COS REVIEWS OF THE KOREAN
PROBLEM AND TO INCLUDE EXTRACTS OF THE LETTERS FRON
_THE AMBASSADOR AND GENERAL HOLLINGSWORTH. ALTHOUGH
“STILL UNCERTAIN AS 10 METHODOLOGY, HIS INTENT IS
TO DEVELOP A PUSITIVE REPORT REFLECTING THE HIGH |
DEGREE OF LOCAL COOPERATION THAT HE HAS PERSONALLY
“OBSERVED BUT STRESSED THAT THE REPORT MUST BE
UNCLASSIFIED BECAUSE THE REPORT MUST BE DESIGNED
FOR PRESENTATION ON THE HOUSE FLOOR, HE BELIEVED
THE DDCI WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR ASSISTANCE IN PULLING
| TOGETHER A REPORT OF THIS NATURE,
: 19, THE CONGRESSMAN STATED THAT HE AND REPRESENTATIVE
| DAVID G, TREEN WERE IN THE VANGUARD ON THE NEED FOR A
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AND THEY HAVE THE. SUPPORT
| OF REPRESENTATIVES MCCLARY AND JOHNSON ON THE COMMITTEE.
| -HE SAID THE BIPARTISAN NATURE OF THIS MINORITY, ALBEIT
THREE REPUBLICANS TO ONE DEMOCRAT, WOULD ASSIST ITS
ACCEPTANCE, HE ALSO STATED THAT HE MUST NOW MOVE
RAPIDLY TO RECRUIT HIS OWN STAFF ASSISTANT ON THE
SECRET

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STATION ACTIVITIES DURING HIS VISIT TO SEOUL. ¥ ,
B. “MANAGEMENT BY OBJECTIVE. BELIEVE MUCH OF WHAT |
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STATION STARTS ITS BRIEFING WITH PRESENTATION ON HOW
MANAGEMENT, BY OBJECTIVE FUNCTIONS. SUGGEST STATION OUTLINE
DATE: BY OCT 7S. |

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“REQUIRED BY AGENCY. FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL PURPOSES: T-E-4

PR@ PART I AND 23 CONTACT REPORTS, INTEL REPORTS. PERIODIC

ASSET REPORTS. PERIODIC PROGRESS REPORTS» OPACTS AND FIELD
PERFORMANCE REPORTS. ON LATTER» STRESS SHOULD BE PLACED a
oN ‘Reatess> FROM MID-YEAR AND FY REVIEWS UITH DDO. FY 7 of
BUDGET CYCLE SHOULD ALSO BE TOUCHED ON. ¥

-G. CASE HISTORY. IT ESSENTIAL UE NOT IDENTIFY ANY
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OF THIS WISH POINT OUT Has HAS FOUND IT USEFUL TO DRAW

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MADE IN BRIEFING. IN SUCH CASE-HISTOQRY ONLY IDENTITY OF
AGENT AND POSSIBLE TARGET HAS BEEN ALTERED FOR SOURCE

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2. BRIEFING SHOULD ALSO ZERO IN ON STATION'S COORDINATION ROLE
UNDER DCID'S FOR CLANDESTINE MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPS.
ALSO THINK IT UOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE PART OF. BRIEFING CONCENTRATE _
ON IMMINENCE OF HOSTILITIES INDICATORS WHICH NOW BEING WORKED ON BY .
“AMERICAN INTEL COMMUNITY IN CONSULTATION WITH ROK'S.- THIS NIGHT _
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T 408492 ETA9BA | IN. 722803
| TORI24@6502 OCT 75 «5 (ss SE BU 25645

SECRET 2406202 OCT 75 STAFF
CITE SEOUL 25645
‘TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR,
WLAST DIRECTOR
RYBAT CODEL
REF: A, DIRECTOR 750492
_ Bs DIRECTOR 758427.
1. GODEL MURPHY ARRIVED SEOUL EVENING 23. pcroaer
AT ROKG INVITATION, DUE HOSPLTALIZATION of COS, DcOS .
CONTACTED ‘CONGRESSMAN MILFORD AND OFFERED SEPARATE
BRIEFING IF DESIRED, IN GRIEF CONVERSATION AFTER
COUNTRY TEAM BRIEFING ON MORNING OF 24 acToBER IN.
WHICH DCOS PARTICIPATED, REPRESENTATIVE MILFORD REITERATED
POINTS COVERED IN REFERENT A MESSAGE AND STATED HE KAD.
BEEN CHARGED BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN TO MAKE A
DETAILED STUDY. OF THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS IN THE: FIELD,
HE ADDED THAT HE WOULD Like ‘TO BREAK OFF FROM DELEGATION
SCHEDULE AS OF 0980 OCTOBER 25 TO COMMENCE DISCUSSIONS.
WHILE PARAMETERS OF HI a INTERESTS NOT FULLY COVERED TN
INITIAL CONVERSATION» HE ANTICIPATES DEVoTinG onea/F NOT
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_ SEVERAL DAYS TO DISCUSSION OF FIELD STATION ACTIVITIES.
. 2, REP, LUCIEN NEDZI WAS ALSO CONTACTED WITH OFFER
OF STATION BRIEFING WHICH WAS REYEIVED IN FRIENDLY FASHION. -
REP. NEDZI EXPRESSED ‘APPRECIATION AND. SAID THAT HE WOULD BE. IN TOUCH
LATER. DURING THEIR FIVE DAY Stay. .
3, COS MAY BE RELEASED FROM HOSPITAL MORNING OF 25 OCTOBER,
WHETHER HE 18 OR NOT, Cos PREPARED TO TALK WITH REP, MILFORD GITHER |"
AT HOSPITAL OR AT RESIDENCE WHERE HE WILL NEED 8 CONF INED FOR
‘ONE WEEK RECUPERATION, THIS, OFFER BEING CONVEYED TO CONGRESSMAN, -
AND IF AGREEABLE To HIM, ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE MADE FOR
HIM TO MEET DIRECTLY WITH COS, - | oe
| 4, WOULD APPRECIATE SPECIFIC GUIDANCE BY 9809 LOCAL 25
| STOBER AS REP. MILFORD!S INTERESTS OBVIOUSLY EXTEND TO DETAILED

PROCEDURES AND REQUIREMENTS BEYOND NORMAL SCOPE OF FIELD BRIEFINGS,

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DATE: 23 OCTOBER 1975
ONS: SAMUEL H- RICKARD
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DATE: 33 OCTOBER 24575
ORIG? SAMUEL H. RICKARD
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“DATE: 51 OCTOBER 75

ORIG:
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chieis: s

SUBJECT : The Director's Greeting Card List

1. It is requested that-you provide recommendations as to whom
the Director should send holiday greetings. Please submit vour list
to the SA/ADDO in Room 7E22 by the close of business 1 November 1975.

2. Your list should be prepared on a very selected basis. You
may include the names of chiefs of foreign security and intelligence
services and the names of non-intelligence personnel abroad who are
of special interest or significance to the Agency mission. In most
cases, these names should be those of persons whom the Director has
met here or abroad.

_ 3. After the Director has reviewed the lists of recommended

names, the greeting cards will be prepared and sent to the appropriate
Division or Staff for pouching or mailing.

oy. oot
f - j i /

ed (ie CW ee Aa ae

eter Raudenbush
SA/ADDO

Distribution: .

C/AF . C/SE

‘C/EA % C/CCS

C/EUR ; u C/CI

C/DCD - “y C/OPS

C/DIVD S C/PS

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CVA INTERNAL UST outy

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MEMORANDUM FOR: DDO Division and Staff Chiefs

SUBJECT : DDCI's Greeting Card List

Addressees are requested to prepare a Christmas card list
for the DDCI. It should include, where security permits, al!
significant contacts hosted by him at Headquarters or visited in
the field. Please submit your list to the SA/ADDO by close of
business 10.November 1975.

he TES UE Cb in Pan
Peter enbush
SA/ADDO
Distribution:
C/AF C/SE
C/EA C/CCS
C/EUR C/CI
C/DCD C/OPS
. C/DIVD C/PS
C/FR C/SS
C/LA SA/DDO
C/NE ' SPG/DDO

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 037796

CVA INTERNAL USE ONLY”

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REF A, DIRECTOR 752556
B, DIRECTOR 754586 .
1, AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIM. FOR AN | HOUR AND
FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OcT, IN RESPONSE To
HIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE
OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND: THE FUNCTIONING oF
THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED.» WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL» THE
INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION
AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS. OF THE ..
EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL
FIGURES. 7 oo
2. IN & WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING»
AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING#
A, HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED
WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS
REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY
| SECRET > . 7


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So ToR14 619342 ocr 75) - LOND 664

ten THERE WAS ANY POLITICAL RISK OR 2 SENSITIVITY HE WOULD

“os PROBABLY ALERT THE: AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF
“COORDINATION WITH THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK
CONSIDERABLY |

B, HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAN COORDINAATED ©

WITH THE BRITISH SUCH AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD GE -

CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION |

aL) LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL» COS STATED THAT HE WOULD
7 SEEK AUTHORITY. ‘FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCR

SITUATION,
8, HE ASKED IF. cos WOULD APPROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE

DIRECTLY OR® “THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A

PROGRAM, COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD Go DIRECTLY TO

GNGRAPH AND ° THAT THEY WOULD INSURE | COORDINATION WITH THE FOREIGN a
OFFICE.

‘De. HE ASKED iF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BOTH INTELLIGENCE

| - eOLLECTEON: AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THD
U.K. - AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD « COS REPLIED THAT ACTION

OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, QUT THAT

‘HE IS.NOT SURE AS TO HOW MUCH COORDINATION WAS REGUIRED GN

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“COLLECTION OPERATION, AARON WILL’ UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE. THIS.
POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH: SYKES AND HOOPER
AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER

IN COS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT. ON: PRESENT

PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE

WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS,
COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS, ABLE AND AS
INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN) THAT THIS
MIGHT WORK, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS. HAD NO
KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WITH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO
BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT, THEREFORG,
OF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT. AND® PREVENT MANY |
OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN.

E, IN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, cos CONFIRMED THAT BOTH”

‘THE AMBASSADOR AND THE BRITISH WERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON”

THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN
THE U.K, a | | | | _ oo
3, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE DISCUSSIONS, COS TRIED..10. MAKG _
THE FOLLOWING POINTS! SO os a
Ae THE BRITISH WERE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED GY THE LEAKS AND -
SECRET. |


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pe a Tomaso ocr 7s LOND e635
~ continuina’ pusticrry IN WASHINGTON, ©THE’ PAD BEEN REASSURED:
(7s BY-US THAT WE WOULD PROTECT THE LIAISON RELATIONSHIP AND THE
~ . > “pRopuer, AND=To: DATE THERE HAD BEEN NO DIMINUTION ; a
~~ OF THRE INTELLIGENCE THEY WERE PRPARED TO GIVE uss AARON SAID
- WE WouLD ALSO REASSURE SYKES AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS
THE SENATE COMMITTEE-18 CONCERNED. a
~ By «COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE
| DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT,
THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY
iw > EPFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH
REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE
a “OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD
\ BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OFFER SOME
a © PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,
aaron SAID THAT THE COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS
> PROBLEM, oes _ we
gy 60s REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE aS To \ ya" 2,
~ “WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN’ UP TO AND POINTED GUT THE KIND oF ike"
s ‘DAMAGE THAT GAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE |
SANCTIONS, : COS DUCKED A QUESTION FROM AARON AS TO HOW MUCr a

SECRET


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COVERAGE. ON. AGEE” JAGUAR. Was: ‘PROVIDING FoR us.

44 IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD ‘evIDENCE. THAT.
THE CONTINUING. PUBLICITY IN.WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING To AFFECT
UR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS, » AARON REPLIED

THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING TO PROVIDE THE.

- CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE
HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER, - HE SPECULATED
THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, “THE CHURCH COMMITTEE |
WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FEGRUARY, THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED
OUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED, &2 -IMPDET

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CONTROL IN FIELD. WE -OFLNED THIS IS TO SOME EXTENT DIRECTION IN

WHICH COORDINATION. HAS TRENDED OVER THE. YEARS BUT LOCAL COMMANDERS
PROBABLY FEEL. HIS CONTROL: UNDERMINED THEREBY. 0.0" i oo

- 4.0 TURHINS TO°EEHERALD OPS. ‘HF. SARROM ‘SAID HE RECALLED fs
FROM WASHIMETOR ERIEF TMG THAT... GERMAH STATION HAD SIZEABLE AL. LOoT-
MENT FOR OFFIC ‘ER ENGAGED. IN? PUL ITICAL * COVERT ACTION ON REGIONAL
Ene =. WE EX ‘PLAINED. THAT. MONIES Tht THES PRO. Se T ALMOST LES = ;

CLUSIVELY FOR SALARY > “ART ‘EX TEN:

HOT MENTIONED BY AANED AND HOT |
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ALONE LINE THAT THESE OULD - PERHAF tE
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SAW VIRTUALLY ALL REPORTING AND. THEREEORE KMEN WHERE - . oo
LOCATED BUT THAT AS RULE WE DID HOT CLEAR WITTH HIM ON “INDIVIDUAL
CONTACTS» MAKING. REFERENCE TO "SOURCES AND METHODS WESTON OF
OWR REGULATION AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS. POINTED nur “THAT ERICH .
SE TREATED SEPARATELY BLT THAT. ADOR AND EMBASSY “CON—
SULATES HAWE NOT HAD INTEREST. If TEVELOPMENTAL CONTAET WITH
YOUNBER POLITICAL, FIGURE = OUT 1De: BONN BREA “OM OTHER HAND
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7 3097258 Elseea. PAGE 24 | IN 716124. —
TOR!1619372 OCT 75 BONN 43389
SECRET 1626552 OCT 75 STAFF JL a
CITE BONN 43369 | My p47
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REF BONN 43381076059 ) a,

1, AMBASSADOR BRIEFED COS AFTERNOON 16 OCT ON HIS HOUR AND
ONESHALF SESSION WITH MR, AARON ON 15 OCT, DISCUSSION COVERED ~
THREE MAIN TOPICS: (A) RISKS AND NEED FOR "FANCY POLITICAL
SOURCES" IN BONN} (B) COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND (C) DEGREE
TO WHICK AMBASSADOR COGNIZANT OF STATION ACTIVITIES,

2. ON POINT OMA. AMBASSADOR STATED THAT MOST STATION
POLITICAL SOURCES WERE OF LONGeSTANDING AND COMMENCED IN THE

EARLY POSTWAR/OCCUPATION ERA, THEY WERE BASED ON PERSONAL’
| FRIENDSHIPS AND UNIQUE CHARACTER OF THE EARLY POSTWAR YEARS
AND WERE IN HIS BELIEF LIKELY TO PROVE IRREPLACEABLE...
. THAT 1S, AMBASSADOR OPINED THAT SIMILAR CLOSE ASSOCIATIONS
i COULD NoT BE ESTABLISHED BY STATION IN TODAY'S POLITICAL
CLIMATE AND IMPLIED THAT HE EXPECTED COVERAGE To GRADUALLY ©

WITHER AWAY, BECAUSE OF THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF THE RELATIONS
SHIPS, AMBASSADOR BELIEVED RISK WAS VERY LOW AND STATED THAT.

SECRET

13-00000

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7 389723 EL A645 . PAGE G2 . IN 746426
a TOR14649372 OCT 75 SONN 43385

TH COVERAGE PROVIDED BY THESE SOURCES WAS OF DEFINITE VAL
Si NC HE INFORMATION WAS NOT OBTAINED BY OFFICIAL EMBASSY

CONTACTS Debt,

REGARDING. PARA eBay. ‘AMBASSADOR CONFIRMED To AARON
THAT. AT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT STATION WAS NO LONGER
INVOLVED IN LARGE*SCALE. COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS AND THAT HE
ASSUMED EXPLANATION PER PARA 4 REF WAS IN ACCORD WITH FACTS,
COS ‘EMPHATICALLY ASSURED THE. AMBASSADOR THAT THERE WERE NO
COVERT ACTION FUNDING OPERATIONS BEING UNDERTAKEN BY THE

STATION» AND THAT WE HAD BEEN MYSTIFIED BY MR. AARON'S
REFERENCE TO THE LARGE BUDGET FOR SUCH ACTIVITIES BUT HAD
CONCLUDED THAT IT MUST APPLY TO SALARY AND EXPENSES OF
HERZFAN2 WITH WHICH AARON SEEMED TO AGREE,

4, WITH RESPECT TO THE AMBASSADOR'S KNOWLEDGE OF SPECIFICS

“OF STATION ACTIVITY, THE AMBASSADOR STATED FIRST THAT HE OF
COURSE "HAD A PRETTY GOOD IDEA" ABOUT THE IDENTITY OF SOME
OF OUR SOURCES BUT HAD NOT BEEN SPECIFICALLY ADVISED OF THE
IDENTITIES OF ANY oF- THEM, HE FOUND THE SITUATIEN ACCEPTABLE.
HOWEVER, FIRST BECAUSE HE HAD BEEN ASSOCIATED WITH COS PER-
Nabaentel FOR THE LAST TWENTY YEARS AND HAD CONFIDENCE THAT

| i" SECRET

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1 389723. EI A6A5 PAGE 03 : _ IN 716124

TOR11619372 OCT 75 BONN 43389

COS WOULD ADVISE HIM OF ANYTHING HE OUGHT TO KNOW. LOOKING
BACK ON THE RECORD OF THE PAST TWENTY-FIVE YEARS, THE .
AMBASSADOR SAID HE CONCLUDES THAT IN FACT THE AMBASSADORS IN.
BONN HAD BEEN KEPT APPROPRIATELY ADVISED AND THE ABSENCE OF
FLAPS WOULD SUBS TANT JATE THE JUDGMENT EXERCISED BY THE RE= |
SPECTIVE STATION CHIEFS OVER THE YEARS.
| 5, MR, AARON DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH THE AMBASSADOR
THE FEASIBILITY OF CHARGING THE AMBASSADOR WITH GREATER DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF THE CLANDESTINE EFFORT, |
_ AMBASSADOR STATED THAT IF IT WERE :SSIGNED TO WIM AS A MISSION
a& WOULD MANIFESTLY HAVE TO DISCHARGE IT AND WOULD AS HE SAW’ tT
aaUSaBlLY Neel A STAFF OF aT LEAST TWO COMPETENT OFFICERS TO.
TARRY OUT THE PRACTICAL STAFF WORK ON HIS BEHALF. MR AARON THEN
| A ISED THE QUESTION OF THE GRITISH SYSTEM ABOUT WHICH THE AMBASSA=
DOR MADE THE PERTINENT OBSERVATION THAT IT WAS A QUESTION FOR THE
70VERNNENT TO DECIDE. IF IT WAS DECIDED TO SUBORDINATE CLAN>

DESTt(ug TELL IGENCE OPESaTIANS <8 THE FIELD DIRECTLY TO THE
PEa0c8: Tay APPROPRIATE 57 \.SEMENT COULD AND WOULD BE MADE.
THE 2-2. 220 isd LaF 7 ytv- Tu2 T4BRESSTON BY MR. AARON THAT. AT

LEAST Pr NUMRER OF 2 Fs Ui: E SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ARE

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PAGE 24-04 IN 716124

BOA S.
= TORI4619372 OCT 75 BONN 43389
Lome. ae Mee, : a

GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION: 70 THE BRITISH SYSTEM -AS-A MEANS OF
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RYBAT PLKMSALL a “ _—
ky AARON MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AT LUNCHEON 15 UCTOSER,
SAID -= WAS STAFF EMPLOYEE UF SENATOR MONSDALE AND: WAS ‘HEAD OF
CELECT COMMITTEE TASK FORCE FORMERLY CALLED WHITE HOUSE TASK
RCE BUT RENAMED COMMAND AND CONTROL TASK FORCE, MRe AARON SAID
~E FELT COMMITTEE WOULD CONCLUDE ITS WORK IN FEBRUARY AS CURRENTLY
SCKEDULED, | |

2. AARON SAID IT HIS OPINION THAT AS CONCERNED WRONGDOINGS
CIA'S RECORD WAS PROBABLY BETTER THAN SOME OF THE OTHER INDEPENDENT
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, HE MENTIONED THE SECURITIES AND EXCRANGE
COMMISSION IN THIS CONTEXT, HE SAID IF WE FELT THAT CIA HAVING
_ DIFFICULT TIME WITH CHURCH COMMITTEE WE SHOULD WAIT AND SEE WMAT
HAPPENS TO FB] WHO WERE "GDING TO HAVE THEIR CLOCKS CLEANED."
SAID FBI HAD GONE 58 YEARS WITHOUT REVISION AND VAST AMOUNT OF
KRONGDOING HAD RESULTED FROM THIS SITUATION,
3. ALSO OF INTEREST, COLONEL SMITH, DEPUTY TO DCSI USAREUR
GENERAL DILLARD, WHO WAS PRESENT DURING AARON'S SESSIONS WITH ARMY
«SE GRET

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“7 388903  E1A896 PAGE 02-02 IN 715761

TOR31615142 OCT 75 “BONN 43369

COMPONENTS, INFORMED US 15 OCTOBER THAT HIS IMPRESSION BASED ON
» TALKS WITH MR, AARON» LATTER WOULD LIKE SEE CIA TAKE QVER POSITIVE
COLLECTION ELEMENT OF THE 65TH. MIG, MR. AARON MADE SIMILAR

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Tos DIRECTOR. *

RYBAT PLKMBALL 2 | | | =
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’ REF A, DIRECTOR 752556

B. DIRECTOR 754586

1, AT DAVID AARON'S REQUEST, COS BRIEFED HIN FOR AN HOUR AND
FIFTEEN MINUTES ON THE AFTERNOON OF 16 OCT, IN RESPONSE TO
MIS QUESTIONS, COS BRIEFED HIM IN GENERAL TERMS ON THE STRUCTURE
OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND THE FUNCTIONING oF
THE JIC. COS ALSO DESCRIBED.» WITHOUT OPERATIONAL DETAIL» THE
INTERFACE WITH THE BRITISH AND THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATION
AND OUR RELATIONSSHIPS WIH THE VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE
EMBASSY. AARON DID NOT ASK FOR FINANCIAL DETAILS OR PERSONNEL
FIGURES, |

2, IN A WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION AFTER THIS BRIEFING.
AARON PURSUED THE FOLLOWING MAIN LINES OF QUESTIONING!

A, HE ASKED IF A RECRUITMENT ATTEMPT COORDINATED
WITH THE BRITISH WOULD BE CLEARED WITH THE AMBASSADOR, COS
REPLIED THAT THIS COULD BE A MATTER OF JUDGMENT, BUT CERTAINLY

SECRET . : .

13-00000

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TOR:2629342 OCT 75 LOND 66194

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PROBABLY ALERT THE AMBASSADOR, COS POINTED OUT THE FACT OF
COORDINATION WITK THE BRITISH AUTHORITIES REDUCED THE RISK
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. B, HE ASKED IF A LARGE SCALE ACTION TYPE PROGRAM COORDINATED
WITH THE BRITISH SUCK AS MIGHT BE INVOLVED IN PORTUGAL WOULD BE
~ CLEARED WITH THE AMEASSADOR, AFTER HE HAD REPHRASED THE QUESTION

TD LEAVE OUT ANY MENTION OF PORTUGAL, COS STATED THAT HE WOULD

SEEK AUTHORITY FROM WASHINGTON TO INFORM THE AMBASSADOR OF ANY SUCH
~ SITUATION, | |

C, HE ASKED IF COS WOULD APFROACH THE FOREIGN OFFICE

~ DIRECTLY OR THROUGH GNGRAPH IN ORDER TO COORDINATE SUCH A
~ PROGRAM. COS REPLED THAT NORMALLY HE WOULD GO DIRECTLY TO
GNGRAPH AND THAT THEY WOULD INSURE COORDINATION WITH THE FORGIGN

~ OFFICE. | oe .

~ , D. HE ASKED JF GNGRAPH HAD TO CLEAR BoTH INTELLIGENCE

| COLLECTION AND ACTION OPERATIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE AND THE
~ U.K, AMBASSADOR IN THE FIELD » COS REPLIED THAT ACTION.

. OPERATIONS HAD TO BE CLEARED WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE, BUT THAT

HE IS NOT SURE AS TO HOw MUCH COORDINATION WAS REQUIRED“ON
SECRET —

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7 389706  ELA620 PAGE 03 : — IN 716149
T0R81619342 OCT 750 ti«w “LOND 66194

COLLECTION OPERATION: AARON WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PURSUE THIS
POINT IN HIS MEETING THIS AFTERNOON WITH SYKES AND HOOPER
AND WE WILL REPORT ANY PLAYBACK WE GET. HE ASKED WHETHER
IN CGS'S JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT ON PRESENT
PROCEDURES FOR THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO REQUIRE PRIOR CLEARANCE
WITH OUR AMBASSADORS OF ALL INTELLIGENCE AND ACTION OPERATIONS.
COS REPLIED THAT IF ALL THE AMBASSADORS WERE AS ABLE AND AS
INFORMED AS THIS ONE AND SOME OTHERS HE HAD KNOWN» THAT THIS
MIGHT WORK, THE PROBLEM WAS THAT MANY AMBASSADORS HAD NO -
KNOWLEDGE OR ACQUAINTANCE WIIH THE INTELLIGENCE FIELD AND NO
BASIS FOR MAKING INFORMED JUDGMENTS, AND THE RESULT,’ THEREFORG,
aF SUCH A RULE MIGHT BE TO SERIOUSLY INHIBIT AND PREVENT. MANY
OPERATIONS THAT SHOULD 3E UNDERTAKEN .

E, iN ANSWER TO ANOTHER QUESTION, COS CONFIRMED THAT BOTW
THE AMBASSADOR AND THE QRITISH wERE PERIODICALLY BRIEFED ON
THE STATUS OF ANY COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS TAKING PLACE IN

wey
oa

“HE CONCLUSION GF 742 DISCUSSIONS» COS TRIED TO MAK&

“OR END TISM WES Lic llvsl? CINGERNED BY THE LEAKS AND

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~ .  TR11619342 OCT 75 * LanD 663s

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CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN. WASHINGTON, THE PAD BEEN REASSURED

PRODUCT, AND TO DATE THERE AD. BEEN NO. DIMENUTION. Se
- OF THHE INTELLIGENCE THEY: WERE. PRPARED TO. GIVE US, AARON SAID

>

E WOULD ALSO REASSURE SYKES ‘AND HOOPER ON THIS POINT AS FAR AS
THE SENATE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED,

~ @, COS POINTED OUT BRITISH INTELLIGENCE ENJOYED AN ENVIABLE

DEGREE OF PROTECTION AS A RESULT OF THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT»

THE ABSENCE OF PARLIAMENTARY INVESTIGATIONS AND THE VERY

- EFFECTIVE COVER PROVIDED BY.THE FOREIGN OFFICE FOR GNGRAPH
REPRESENTATIVES SERVCING OVERSEAS. COS TOLD AARON THAT ONE

~ OF THE USEFUL THINGS THE SENATE COMMITTEE MIGHT DO WOULD
- BE TO CALL FOR NEW LEGISLATION THAT MIGHT OF FER SOME

PROTECTION SIMILAR TO THE KIND THAT THE BRITISH ENJOY,
~ AARON SAID THAT THE. COMMITTEE WAS IN FACT LOOKING INTO THIS
. PROBLEM, a LE,

C, COS REVIEWED THE PUBLIC EVIDENCE AVAILABLE AS TO

~ WHAT PHIL AGEE HAS BEEN UP TO AND POINTED OUT THE KIND OF
~ DAMAGE THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE

SANCTIONS, COS DUCKED ‘A QUESTION “FROM AARON. as TO HOW MUCH
SECRET. .

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“7389706 = E1A20 PAGE 05-05 IN 716119
7 | T0R12619342 OCT 75. «= (ité‘é‘«*CND

~ COVERAGE ON AGEE JAGUAR WAS PROVIDING FOR US.
4, IN CONCLUSION, COS STATED THAT WE HAD EVIDENCE THAT
THE CONTINUING PUBLICITY IN WASHINGTON IS BEGINNING TO AFFECT
QUR ABILITY TO RECRUIT AND MAINTAIN OUR AGENTS, AARON REPLIED
THAT IF SECSTATE KISSINGER HAD BEEN WILLING To PROVIDE .THE
CHURCH COMMITTEE WITH THE INFORMATION THEY REQUESTED THE
“HEARINGS WOULD HAVE BEEN OVER IN SEPTEMBER, HE SPECULATED
THAT THE WAY THINGS WERE NOW GOING, THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
“| WOULD FINISH UP NEXT FESRUARY, THE ENTIRE MEETING WAS CARRIED
(QUT IN A COURTEOUS TONE AND NO CONFRONTATIONS OCCURRED, &2 IMPDET

13-00000 oo, . . ~ ae
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Review Staff: , 75/3149/a
Date 6 October 1975 |
| _ we
at es _ met
TO : CIA Task Force
‘FROM =: The Review Staff, Walter Bilder
SUBJECT : SSC/HSC Request . .
_RECEIVED: Date 3 October Time 1905

etter requests an orientation briefing ~
for-D o is travelling again, this time to
Swit 3 West Germany , and the United Kingdom.”

o

4

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13-00000

ot . : . 1
+s FRANK CHURCH, FOAMG, CHAIRMAN . _
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA,
PHIL? A, HANT, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JA., TEN,
WALTER ff, MONDALE, MINN, BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ,
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHAPLES MCC. MATHIAS, JA, MD.

ponent wonoan ne RICHARD 5: SCHNEIER. FAG “Miriled Blots Denate

WILLUAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWAST, JM., CHIZF COUNSEL, . .
CURTIS R, SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSS1, SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS witH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(pursuant to 5. RES. 2, 54TH CONGRERS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 5, 1975

.

Mr. Seymour Bolten: - .
Assistant to the Director - .
’ Room 6D0120° _ _
Central Intelligence Agency . :
Langley, Virginia .

7 Dear Mr. Bolten:

oe This letter is ‘to request an orientation briefing ‘for _
.a visit to'the Federal Republic: of Germany which a member of .

the Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has been asked to.
take ‘this month. °

Although plans are not yet precise, it is expected “hat
_ he will be in Geneva Sunday, October -12;.in the Federal
Republic of Germany October 13- ~153 and in London October 16
“and 17. : .
: The priniaxy purpose of this ‘travel is to discuss State-.
CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with
_the Aubassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com- ..
. wmanders....As appropriate, past Agency programs may also be
‘reviewed. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador
- U. Alexis: Johnson on the broad issue of the role of the co
7 Department of State in the control of intelligence « activities. . ot

_Stacerely,

s
; Willian G. Miller

copy to. Mr. Hyland, ‘State Department

Sh H! 50 Lt 129

‘ ; _ REVIEW STAFF -

of

WALTER D, ested Ky. CMARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JF., MO,

j- ; ;
ees wo
> Ls FRANN 4 LM, IDAHO, cy AN
. . oof * JOHN G, TqWwEA] TEXAS, Vict, MAN
FWLIP A, HART, wd HOWARD H, DAKER, JR., TENN.
{ ALTER FF, MONDALE, BARAY GOLDWATER, aniz.

RODEAT MORGAN, thc. RICHARD $. SCHWEIKER, PAs . 7? ts oS f Be {
Gawy HART, COLO. Mrutled Diales Henale
VILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
* FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL. SELECT COMMITTEE TO
|. SMOTNE, s
7 vans eee Mansy rt IMORREY CONDE STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT Yo S. RES. 7, ETH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

October 3,,.1975 ; REVIEW starr

Mr. William G. ‘yland - oe

Director - - : ’
"Bureau of Intelligence and Research -

Department of State .

Washington, D. Cc. » 20520

_ Dear Mr. Hyland:

This letter is to request an orientation briefing
for a visit to the Federal Republic of Germany which a
‘member of tne Select Committee staff, David Aaron, has
heen. asked to make this month.

; ‘Although the plans’ are not yet precise, it is expected
that he will be in Geneva Sunday, October 12; in the Federal
. Republic’ of Germany October 13-15; and in London October
16 and 17.. .

The primary’ purpose of this ‘travel is to discuss State-
‘CIA and military intelligence relations in the field with
_ the Ambassadors, Embassy Station officers and military com-
‘manders. As appropriate, past Agency programs may ‘also be
_xeviewed.. In Geneva, Mr. Aaron plans to interview Ambassador |
U. Alexis Johnson on the broad issue of, the role of the
Department of State in the control of intelligence activities.

“sincerely,

‘William G. Miller 9 ~

copy to Mr. Bolten, CIA

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| 419452 SE |
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CITE MONTEVIDEO 21405 SECTION 2 OF 20 oe A /

“TO IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INF 0 DIRECTOR,
NaCT BUENOS AYRES
RYBAT PLVWCADET
1, COS HAD TWO*HOUR SESSION WITH TRUEHART AND AARON LATE-
MORNING 24 ‘SEPTEMBER, GENERAL IMPRESSION 1S THAT BOTH WERE
BUSINESS-LIKE) QUESTIONS WERE INCISIVE AND DESIGNED TO ASCERTAIN
HOW A STATION FUNCTIONS IN AN EMBASSY, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS
THE AMBASSADOR, RATHER THAN HOW MONTEVIDEO STATION 1S FUNCTIONING
“IN URUGUAY, HENCE MANY QUESTIONS WERE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL, MOST
IMPORTANT IMPRESSION WAS THAT FORMER AMBASSADOR TRUEHART (WHOM S
COS HAD MET IN NIGERIA YEARS AGO) FEELS THAT AN AMBASSADOR
“SHOULD BE FAR MORE. KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ALL REPEAT ALL STATION
OPERATIONS IN ORDER TO JUDGE POSSIBLE "FLAP POTENTIAL".
2s COS DID NOT SKGW OD TO VISITORS SINCE THEY DID NOT ASK
TO READ IT BUT INSTEAD READ PORTIONS OF IT TO THEM AND DISCUSSED
IT WITH THE Ns
3, THEY ASKED INITIALLY WHAT THE ANB4SSADORS INJUNCT [ONS
WERE WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITED OP ERAT IONE, cos SAID
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“yMBASSADOR DOES “NOT, ‘WANT “COVERT OPERATIONS OF A POLICTICAL NATURE

PRIOR TO INITIATION OF AN OPERATION. WHAT KIND OF AGENTS

iN® “URUGUAY WITHOUT “HIS PRIOR APPROVAL (NOR DOES HE WANT US TO.
noUNT "ELECTRONIC" OPERATIONS. WITHOUT APPROVAL. COS OPINED THIS
LATTER INJUNCTION MEANT UNILATERAL EFFORTS, AARON ASKED IF WE
WAD oW=8OING PRESS PLACEMENT MEDIA OPERATIONS, COS SAID WE.
DID HAVE. SOME BUT THESE WERE OF ROUTINE NATURE. AARON PURSUED
MATTER, | “ASKED. IF AMBASSADOR WAS FULL Y AWARE OF THIS TO WHICH
cos “RESPONDED THAT HE PRE SUMED $0, COS ADDED ‘HE HAD NOT
SPECIFICALLY COVERED’ “THIS POINT WITH THE AMBASSADOR SINCE.

eos ARRIVAL HE RE ‘LESS. THAN ONE MONTH ACOs

ay “BOTH AARON AND TRUEHART QUESTIONED AT LENGTH WHAT KIND
OF THINGS WE COORDINATE WITH THE AMBASSADOR AND IN WHAT DEPTH

WOULD HE IDENTIFY BY NAME TO THE “AMBASSADOR? COS SAID HE
WOULD BE INCLINED TO REVEAL TO THE AMBASSADOR THE NAME OF
ANY, SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM THE AMBASSADOR WAS
DEALING OFFICIALLY AND INTIMATELY, BUT THIS WOULD IN LARGE
PART DEPEND ON THE AMBASSADORS WISHES HIMSELF. WOULD WE
INFORM THGSROLITICAL SECTION CHIEF OF THE IDENTITY OF ONE OF
QUR AGENTS WHOM THE POLITICAL OFFICER WAS-TRYING TO, DEVELOP?
a SECRET

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T 333576 = EL.Ag22 PAGE 03 - IN 695652

Sree nen ae Toni 242292 SEP 75°00 MONT. 24.403

cos ANSHERED WE WOULD FIRST INSTRUCT THE AGENT. HOW ro HANDLE
MIS ‘OVERT CONTAGT BUT, DEPENDING UPON RELATIONS, MIGHT ALSO
Discuss. THE MATTER FRANKLY WITH POLITICAL OFFICER. WHAT ABOUT
DEFENSE ATTACHE? ANSWERS THE SAME, .

5, THIS LED TO. DISCUSSION OF INTER@AGENCY SOURCE REGISTER,

HAVING wust FINISHED WITH DEFENSE ATTACHE, AMBASSADOR TRUEHART
SAID. ‘DEFATT INDICATED HE HAD MANY SOURCES REGISTERED AND

THEREF ORE WE WERE PROSCR IBED FROM RECUITING THEM. COS POINTED

ouT SOURCE REGISTER 1s FOR COVERT AGENTS ONLY AND SINCE DEFATT

HERE 1S PROCSCRIBED FROM RUNNING COVERT AGENTS, NONE OF HIS

SOURCES ARE IN INTER*AGENCY SURCE REGISTER, COS ADDED THAT

MANY DEFENSE ATTACHES MISCONSTRUE THEIR REGISTERING OF THEIR 4
“AGENTS IN PENTAGON SERIES AS SYNONOMOUS WITH REGISTRATION IN

THE INTERAGENCY SOURCE REGISTER, |

6, TRUEHART ASKED IF WE EXERTED "REAL CONTROL” OVER DEA'S

OPERATIONS AS REQUIRED BY DCID. CoS SAID THAT ON THE CONTRARY

WE EXERTED NO CONTROL OVER DEA NOR ARE WE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO

TRY To DO So WE DO COORDINATE CLOSELY, REGISTER THEIR SOURCES, |
PROVIDE TRACES AND ASSITANCE, ENCOURAGE LIAISON TO COOPERATE FULLY

WITH THEM, ETC. IN ADDITION, WHEN A DEA OPERATIN IS _
SECRET

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TOR!2420292 SEP 75 MONT 21403

BEING MOUNTED TO UNDERTAKE A-DRUG BUY WE ARE REQUIRED To KNOW
ENOUGH ABOUT THE CASE IN ADVANCE TO ADVISE THE AMBASSADOR
AS. TO THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS INVOLVED, IF THERE ARE ANY.

7, TRUENART ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WE WORK WITH LIAISON ON
THE OSOVIET TARGET AND WHETHER WE HAVE TELTAPS, HB WAS ADVISED
“LIAISON SHARES WITH US THE PRODUCT OF THEIR TELTAPS AND THAT
“LIAISON 1S PREPARED TO MOUNT JOINT OPERATIONS WITH US AGAINST
SOVIET TARGET,» THAT WE ARE NOW INTENDING To ‘APPROACH THIS
MATTER WITH LIAISON IN A MORE PLANNED WAY. AARON ASKED
HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION WOULD WE ADVISE AMBASSADOR IN ADVANCE

OF MOUNTING JOINT OPERATION WITH LIAISON TO 8UG RESIDENCEE OF
A SOVIET OFFICIAL, WE SAID PROBALBLY NOT SINCE THERE WOULD BE
NO FLAP POTENTIAL, AARON WANTED To PURSUE THIS BUT STRANGELY
ENOUGH. TRUEHART AGREED FULLY AND EXPLAINED THAT IF SOME ELEMENT
"WENT AWRY THE LIAISON SERVICE WOULD BE THERE TO SET IT RIGHT,

8, AARON. AND TRUEHART SPENT CONSIDERABLE TIME ANALYZING OD

NON@COMMUNIST WORLD COVERT ACTION OBJECTIVE K-2 INVOLVING AGENTS
OF INFLUENCEM, THIS PARAGRAPH WAS READ SEVERAL TIMES TO THEM ON
THETR REQUEXT, THEY..WANTED TO KNOW HOW LONG THE AGENT OF INFLUENCE
PROGRAM HAD BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IN LATIN AMERICA (ANSWER? TWO OR

SECRET .

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“7 355576 ELAD22. "PAGE 05. | IN 695650

Ton re “ToR12420292 SEP 75: ore meee MONT 24493 |

THREE YEARS IN ITS PRESENT FORM THOUGH WE HAVE. “BEEN ‘DOING THIS
RIND OF 7 THING FOR “YEARS, 7 WE STRESSED THAT THIS: PARAGRAPH IN.
Two. PLAGES CONTAINED. THE PHRASE "SUBJECT To POLIcy APPROVAL"

WH ICH MEANT THE AMBASSADOR AND: HASHING TON, WHILE THEY UNDERSOT OOD
THIS, POINT THEY. WANTED TO. KNOW IF WE WOULD COORDINATE: IN ‘ADVANCE
WITH THE AMBASSADOR OR THE -DEF ENSE ATTACHE ON THE RECRUITMENT OF
SENIOR | “URUGUAYAN. GENERAL AS A POSSIBLE AGENT ‘OF INFLUENCE’:
ANSWER | No, Do WE HAVE ANy RECRUITED AGENTS oF _INFLUENCE IN
URUGUAY, ANSWER} NO, ARE HE WORKING ON THIS? ANSWER: YES,

THEN AARON ASKED IF Ir WAS TRUE THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME

WE DID NOT HAVE THE CAPABILITY THROUGH COVERT AGENTS OF
INFLUENCE TO COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVE WHICH PRESUMABLY «

“coud THREATEN PRIORI TY UsSe INTERESTS IN URUGUAY. ANSWER:
TRUE AT THE PRESENT TIME} WE PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO RURN TO
OTHER AGENTS POSSIBLY INCLUDING LIAISON SHOULD 17 BE NECESSARY
IN THE NEAR FUTURE: PRIOR TO OUR ACQUISITION OF AGENTS OF
INFLUENCE, AARON ASKED WHY THAT PARAGRAPH IN OD SPOKE OF
MAINTAINING THE CAPABILITY 0 COUNTER SOVIET INITIATIVES THAT
THREATEN THE STABILITY DF URUGUAY SINCE THERE IS LITTLE UsSe
COMMERCIAL INTEREST IN URUGUAY, HE ANSEWEREED THAT URUGUAY IS

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tI 2420292 SEP 75 MONT 24493

CLEARLY IN THE WESTERN CAMP, VOETES ANT I*COMMUNIST IN
__. FNTERNATIONAL FORUM AND IS CONSIDERED A FIRIEND OF THE U.S,

AKRON ASKED IF SIMILARPROVISIONS WERE WRITTEN INTO THE OD'S OF
bTHER STATIONS-IN LATIN AMERICAs I.E TO COUNTER SOVIET |
INITIATIVES THAT THREATEN INTERNAL STABILITY. WE SAID WE DID NOT

“KNGW, CONTINUING DISEUSS TONS: ON THE MILITARY, TRUEHART
PoSED HYPOTHETICAL CASE ABOUT RECRUITMENT FOR FI PURPOSES OF —
AVPRIVATE SECRETARY TO A MINISTER, WOULD WE COORDINATE THIS —

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T 333589 EL AQ34 | PAGE GES TN 695658
TOR: 2420342 SEP 75 Mont . 21.403
S EC RET 2419452 SEPT 75 STAFF
CITE MONTEVIDEO 21403 FINAL SECTION OF 2
101 IMMEDIATE BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR,

NIACT BUENOS AIRES | —
RECRUITMENT IN ADVANCE WITH THE AMBASSADOR, ANSWER? NO,
TRUEWART THEN POSTULATED CASE WHERE RECRUITED SECRETARY
CONFESSES 10 MINISTER THAT SHE HAD BEEN FURNISHING US WITH
COPIES OF THE MINISTERS CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE. WOULD
THIS NOT HAVE FLAP POTENTIAL HE ASKED? ANSWER? YES,
TRUEHART THEN MUSED THAT AMBASSADOR SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT .
TO KNOW PRIOR TO OUR RECRUITMENT OF THE SECRETARY. HE DID.
NOT SEEM SATISFIED WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT WE ARE THE
OPERATIONAL PROFESSIONALS WHO WOULD JUDGE THE RISK PRIOR TO
RECRUITMENT AND WOULD BE MONITORING THE CASE THROUGHOUT. NE
PRESUME, THEREFORE, BY EXTRAPOLATION TRUEHART WOULD WANT THE

_ AMBASSADOR TO GE THE SUPER-CASE OFFICER MONITORING ALL OUR
OPERATIONS FOR POSSIBLE FLAP POTENTIAL,

9, SOME OF THE EASIER QUESTIONS WERE ALLOCATION OF MAN
POWER (ABQxL TWO OFFICERS NOW ON SOVIET/BLOC TARGET» HOPE
PUSH THIS TO THREE WHILE REMAINING OFFICERS COVER OTHER

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1 333589 = ELAD34 PAGE BE | IN 695658

opJECTIVES), “HOW Is OVER*ALL, BUDGET ARRIVED AT (DIALOGUE
WITH HEADOUARTERS, SYSTEM STILL IN FLUX) AND IS BUDGET
BoVIDED BY OBJECTIVES (YES) WITH SUBORDINATE LINE ITEMS, CALLED
WHAT (PROJECT ACTIVITIES), WAS THERE ANY FLEXIGILITY DURING
THE COURSE OF THE FISCAL YEAR? ANSWER? SOME WITHIN PROJECT

| ACTIVITIES AND OBJECTIVES BUT NOT BETWEEN OBJECTIVES WITHOUT
HEADQUARTERS APPROVAL, Do WE HAVE A REGULAR PROGRAM OF
BRIEF ING REGULAR EMBASSY OFFICERS ON OUR ACTIVITIES SO THEY
UNDER STAND BETTER? ANSWER NOT IN ANY FORMAL SENSE, AARON
IMPLIED THIS MIGHT BE DONE BETTER AT THE WASHINGTON LEVEL.

40, IN DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, WE POINTED
OUR MOST OF OUR TARGETS ARE IN BUENOS AIRES. COULD HE _
RUN AGENTS FROM HERE AGAINST THOSE TARGETS IN ARGENTINA? -
ANSWER? YES, BUT ONLY IF COORDINATED WITH AND APPROVED BY
HOS AND BUENOS AIRES STATION. .CONCERNING MANPOWER, WE SAID
WE “ARE AT PRESENT UNDERTAKING A REVIEW OF BOTH TERRORIST AND
NARCOTICS TARGET TO DECIDE THE EXTENT OF THE PROBLEM AND THEN
THE HANPOWER REQUIRED SO THESE EFFORTS ARE IN A STATE OF FLUX,
WE SAID We WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT BUENOS AIRES MAY NOT) .
HAVE NARCOTICS IN ITS 0D BUT THAT THEY HAVE A VERY FULL PLATE

SECRE 1

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TORI2420342 SEP 75 MONT 21403
oF 0 OTHER THINGS 10 Dd,
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—— NONE. aN URUGUAY, £2) IMPDET, a

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CITE BRASILIA 24723. SECTION 1 OF 2
Tol. IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, NONTEVI DEO ROUTING BUENOS AIRES,
RYBAT PLVWCADET a | .

d+ HAD TWO HOUR SESS1ON WITH AARON AND TRUEHEART | wa :
AFTERNOON 22 SEPT, TRUBHEART AWAY PART OF TIME TO TALK TO. .
OTHERS IN EMBASSY AS AARON WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATION'S
“ACTIVITIES.
2, QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF THOSE INDICATED IN
DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS QUITE A FEW EXTRAS, FOL 1S HIGHLIGHT
OF FIVE AND ONE*HALF HOURS OF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY AND. MONDAY.
3. AARON MosT INTEREST ED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS a
OPERATIONS=+E,G, LINE OF COMMAND FROM HOS AND STATION'S
RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES, HE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN:
PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM
STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HBBS 933. A NUMBER OF
QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS EXERCISED OVER

.

OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL oR ie

ACTIVITIES#@SENTERED AROUND THE 0D, OUR PROJECTS,
FUNDS, AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED TO MEET 7.
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THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS ENUNCUTA TED IN THE 0D. PERIODIC
REPORTS WERE SUBMITTED TO HOS To APPRISE THEM OF WHAT WE
HOPED TO DO WITH REFERENCE TO QUR OD PRIORITIES, AND tuts WAS _
FOLLOWED BY REPORTS ON WHAT HAD ACTUALLY BEEN: AcCOMPLISED AGALST: _
THESE PRIORITIES, A "REPORT Carp" SYSTEM EXISTED WHEREIN « oe
WE WERE GRADED ON THE WORK DONE, - AARON WAS’ INTERESTED IN :

HOW A CASE OFFICER (THIS IS THE TERM HE USED) WORKING ON .
THE HARD TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE WHOSE
TARGETS WERE LESS HARD, AND WHETHER LACK OF ULTIMATE success

(RECRUITMENT OF A SOV, FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE c/0.
THE EXPLANATION WAS THAT THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN- THE
HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE TO RECRUIT RS
RECEIVED A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE C/0 WORKING ON THE
HARD TARGET HAD BEEN IMAGINATIVE, HAD GOTTEN A NUMBER OF
ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT WITH ONE
OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES» AND ALL IN ALL DID HIS
HOMEWORK, WORKED HARD» WAS AGGRESSIVE» BUT WAS. NOT | .
SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET WAS IN FACT NOT RECRUITABLE, |
HE WAS GIVEN A GOOD.GRADE, AARON MUSED WHETHER LACK ne
‘SUCCESS IN RECRUITING A HARD TARET INDIVIDUAL, EVER HELD” oo

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| TORI2315232 SEP Be BAIL, 24728

UP A C/O'S PROMOTION, AND HE WaS TOLD THAT IN ouR EXPERIENCE
THIS WAS NOT So, SO. LONG aS THE OTHER ELEMENTS THAT
EARMARK A GOOD C/O. WERE PRESENT, _

_ 4 THE NOC PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION FOR 0TH
AARON AND TUREHEART,’ THEY WERE NOT INQUIS ITIVE ABOUT NAMES
OR COVER COMPANIES» BUT Dip WANT TO KNOW THE REASON FOR NOCS
(SECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE AGENTS, STAYBEHIND IN CASE
THE STATION HAD TO BE ABANDONED), WHE THER CUTOUTS WERE USED IN-

“ GONTACTING NocS (NOs DIRECT INSIDE C/O CONTACT UNDER

SCRUPULOURS SECURITY CONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY WERE WORTH
THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE AGENTS WERE GIVEN

THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICIENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT IN.
GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS BEING HANDLED). —-

5, AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE

PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF
INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW A cO/O SPENT HyS DAY,
THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW DID’
WE ENSURE THAT C/0S DID NOT TRY TO RECRUIT THE SAME
INDIVIDUAL deCONT.ACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED ADEQUATE
CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO CI, HOW MUCH TIME WAS.

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| -19R32315232 SEP 75 ween TUE

DEVOTED | TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE IT (PENETRATION OF
. ‘Vrarson AND JOINT EFFORT WITH LYATSO Ne TEL ET APS)
ISURVETLLANCE » ET-C,**AGAINST HARD TARGETS), DISCUSSIONS oN.
COVERT ‘ACTION TOOK UP CONSIDERABLE TIME, “DESPITE QS - fo
‘gnifer ING ON THIS: ‘SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE ~~
‘DIFFERENCE BET KEEN A MEDIA OP AND A COVERT POL ACTION OP,
‘HUGH STRESS WAS. “PLACED ON WHETHER WE HAD ANY PLUMBING FOR
 IPOLETICAL ACTION OPS SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED To GET INTO _
SPRATSACTIVETY, LT WAS, EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE ‘NOT SEEN iN |
66k ACTION -IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD NO. PLUMBING AS |
SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE MADE FoR SUCH ACTION,
“THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED To START FROM POINT ZERO
PAGES BRAG Het B23 6” . 7
UNLESS SOME OF THE AGENTS NOW AVAILABLE WERE USABLE, IT WAS
“EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL as
AN AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN NO WAY
RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE ~— *.
CHILEAN VARIETY, | ost ye
6, AAR HAD A FASCINATION FOR TRADESCRAFT, WANTED’ To: a
“KNDM HOW LONG CoS ‘HAD BEEN IN THE BUSINESS AND appRoxinatety |
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HOW MUCH TIME IN TOTAL 0S SPENT IN TRAINING: y ceouLDNtt
HAZARD A GUESS AS TO HOW MUCH TIME SPENT IN’ TRAINING BUT.
SAID. THAT THERE WAS A LONG COURSE ON ENTERING AGENCY », THAT

OVER THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING COVERING ‘AOVARIE TY OF

~ guavects INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTINE® PHOTOGRAPHY»
COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY OF GRIDS, REPORTS
WRITING, ETC. MENTION WAS MADE oF MEDeCAREER ‘COURSE, .
PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS “ATTENDANCE
AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, ETCs)
(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS WRITING COURSE. AND
ASKED FOR PARTICULARS, )- |

9,° ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND
TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE’
DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY, WHETHER cOB HAD AUTHORITY
TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HQS WITH INFO TO
STATION (YES) ON MATTERS WHICH WERE PECULIAR To THE LOCAL
‘SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE. FIRST
SENT TO BRASILIA FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC, PRIOR TO
ONWARD TRASSMHISSION,) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBASSADOR
SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE EMBASSY arp SEE
SECRET

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BRIL. 24723 -

PAGE 06-6
TOR12345232 SEP 75°

"329488

THOSE. REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT To THEM, INTEL ON MAJOR
MTEMS* SUCH. AS. THOSE WHICH HAD: A BEARING ON. GOB POLICIES
WAS*AeVIS THE Us SeeWaS SHOWN TO: THE AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO
SUBMISSION» STATION MADE IT A PRACTIVE TO CHECK INTEL
QUT. WITH CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE EMBASSY PRIOR To
ARANSMISSLON LF. THIS WAS CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL
BY! THE STATION, THERE ARE OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS
REQUIRED TO'LIMIT A REPORT TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY WHEN
SENSITVE: INFO AND/OR A SENSITIVE SOURCE IS INVOLVED...
“THIS HAD NOT HAPPED IN THE COS'S SHORT. TENURE IN. :


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. cite ‘BRASILIA 24723 FINAL. SECTION “OF THO
POS TMMEDTATE DIRECTOR, ‘MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE. auENds AIRES.
aveat PLVWCADET” . _—
BRASILIA, “SUT IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE» senvan REPORTS
CONSIDERED HIGHLY SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN LImtTeD TO THE.
AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE GOVERNOR OF THE CANAL
S§NE/ OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY, SECURITY WAS: THE
GARD INA FACTOR “IN SUCH LIMITING OF DISTRIBUTION. | |
(8, AARON WANTED TO.KNOW WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE OF >
THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER OF THE |
POLITICAL SECTION*=WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITICAL
OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK To THE AGENT ON THE
PROBLEMS THAT WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON HIS _
PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A
CONTROLLED AGENT. IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
(SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO HE WORKED FOR AND ACTED
ACCORDINGE), |
9, AS TO. KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE
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COLLECTION ‘OPERATIONS, THIS WAS DONE AS A MATTER oF COURSE
“put WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS “IN
FACT..SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY AS PART oF HIS AMBASSADOR
“TAL -DUTIES.

2 A) THE LIAISON SERVICES WITH WHOM WE WERE IN TOUCH WERE

“NAMED, INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS, PLUS OUR

UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR CI AND POSITIVE INTEL
Ais BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE K1Qs AND THE

CLALS AND TAILORED ‘REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE SENT PERIODICALLY.

THEY BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A MORE |

SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FOR GETTING REQUIREMENTS: to THE FIELD THAN:
SAY. STATE,

42, VERY LITTLE WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES IN R10

EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT NSA
WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION
TO THE SPORLON PRODUCTS (AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS 1S AN AVID
CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION THAT AGENCIES IN
WASHINGTON CONCERNED WITH THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE
HAPPY WITmRTHE RESULTS.) .

- 43, ON HEARING THAT COS HAD BEEN IN PANAMA, QUESTIONS
. SECRET

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WERE RAISED ON AGREED. ACTIVITIES, THEY WERE BoTH

SURPRISED To FIND OUT THAT THE STATION IN PANAMA HAD TO
AUTHORIZE ALL CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED . IN By
US. ELEMENTS IN THE AREA, INCLUDING GETTING PROJECT INFO

(MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED IN THE AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES: OF
AGENTS TO BE RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, METHOD OF CONTACT,

ETC, . |

14, aes EVINCED GREAT INTEREST IN THE COVER
PROVIDED BY THE EMBASSY, HE WAS TOLD THAT COVER COULD
BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF
OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO OTHER SECTIONS,

THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST SOPERGENT OF THEIR TIME ON THE ACTUAL
WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST aF THA WORK

DAY PLUS A LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH

THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTIME BUT DID THIS OUT OF HIGH MOTIVATION
“AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR OBJECTIVES, ——

15, AARON KNEW OF THE OLD oP AND 0S0 SEPARATIONS OF THE
PaST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED
MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND 080 OFFICERS HAD
A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC TRADECRAFT AND OTHER

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THE 0SO FIELD» AND VICE VERSA.) oo
16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE DISCUSSION.

AARON IS IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST OF THE QUESTIONS, AND.

TOOK COPIOUS NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE 7
“ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP» PROBING,
AND AARON ESPECIALLY HAS A QUIETLY INCISIVE WAY OF GETTING.

AT THINGS, TIS DIFFICULT ‘To TELL WHETHER. THE THO: ARE.
FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NOT. CERTAINLY

(NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS THERE ANY SHOW: oF
GREAT LOVE FOR THE AGENCY. AN OBJECTIVE APPROACH (QD) THE
MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE AN APT DESCRIPTION OF HOM THEY,
WORKED, ;

17, AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE CARED FoR sy wie eheuesy
WHILE IN BRASILIA BUT ON SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED To
HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN. COB AND COS TOOK
AARON OUT TO DINNER AFTER THE BRIEFING SESSION AND HE
SEEMED TO. ENJOY AND APPRECIATE’ THE CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO
AND BUENOS AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND THAT AARON |
48 INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN LOCAL FOODS, 18

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18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY NIGHT» AARON was ASKED BY

THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT NIGHT HAPPEN To THE AGENCY. HE

OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN BODY oF

THE AGENCY, AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF

‘MEMBERS FROM STATE AND OTHER AGENCIES: IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH

MORE CONTROL OVER ITS ACTIVITIES. E2, IMPDET.

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oRYBAT PLVWCADET a | re Seen
REF BUENOS AIRES 34541 (x Gatacs pe a

‘de VISITORS MET WITH AMBASSADOR HILL FOR ONE HOUR AND A AHALF

“EVENING 27 SEP AT HIS ‘RESIDENCE “AND THEN WENT DIRECTLY. to AIRPORT,
AFTER INTRODUCING VISITORS To AMB® cos WITHDREW AND. WAITED. IN’ “ANOTHER:
ROOM, (UPON. DEPARTING COS HEARD ANB ASK VISITORS FOR THEER:
CREDENTIALS.) AMB LATER TOLD COS HE SUGaESTED TO visitors, ‘THAT COS

Be PRESENT DURING. DISCUSSION BuT THEY PRBFERRED TO TALK: WITH HIM.
PRIVATELY, COS WAS CALLED INe HOWEVER, YO PARTICIPATE iN LAST: FEW. .

MINUTES OF DISCUSSION, IN COS PRESENCE, MR. AARON ASKED. ANE
WHETHER HE“THOUGH HE SHOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO SEE ALL INFORMATION:
PRODUCED WITHIN HIS MISSION, TO WHICH AMB REPLIED AFFIRMATIVELY,. ;
_ AARON THEN ASKED AM WHETHER HE IN FACT SAW ALL INFO, AMB REPLIED
“HE DID NOT KNOW, BUT HAD CONFIDENCE IN COs IN THIS REGARD, AARON
THEN ASKED COS WHETHER HE WAS AUTHORIZED to SHOW AMB ALL STATION
REPORTING, . ANSWER! OPERATIONGL REPORTING {DENTIFYING AGENTS OR
"CLANDESTINE METHODS: oF OPERAT]ON COULD NoT BE SHOWN TO ANB WITHOUT
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HOS APPROVAL, OTHER INFO couLD BE SHOWN at “DESCRETION. OF cos,

° SUBY OF ROGERS LETTER RE SHOWING INTEL REPORTS 0 ANB. PRIOR TO
“DISSEMINATION WAS THEN RAISED BY.ANB, ANB SAID WE TOOK POSITION THIS -
“WAS POLICY MATTER WHICH HAD to BE SOLVED IN. WASHINGTON AND HAD SO. =
TINFORMED ROGERS, (COS SAW DRAFT OF LETTER To ROGERS TO. THis eFFecr, a
“AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING AMB. HANDED COS A NEWS ITEM “HAVANA

NERIDIANG 80 IN SPANISH 1-45 JUL 75 PP 5q4, ARTICLE BY CARLOS: mARLA

GUTIERREZ ENTITLED AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HILL SEEN AS.CIA“AGENT IN
ARGENTINA) AND ASKED THAT ARTICLE 8E SHOKN TO VISITORS IN CAR, “aa
_TRUBHEART READ ARTICLE AND. COMMENTED SOMETHING TO. EFFECT THAT.
ARTICLE DID NOT SEEM TO HIM TO BE ANYTHING To BE VERY CONCERNED

ABOUT. MR, ‘AARON DID NOT READ IT, POUCHING COPYs AMA, SUBSE
| QUENTLY TOLD COS ARTICLE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO HIM IN WASHINGTON BY
| “DEPUTY ASSISTANT RYAN.) .

2, ON WAY TO ALRPORT AFTER MEETING WITH AMBs TRUEHEART
MENTIONED ANB'S REQUEST TO SEE THEIR CREDENTIALS, SINCE THEY HAD
NONE» THEY SHOWED THEIR PASSPORTS. (AMB LATER TOLD COS HE HAD
| ASKED To SEE CREDENTIALS SINCE HE WANTED To SEE FOR HIMSELF EXACTLY
WHAT THE LIMITS OF THEIR AUTHORITY WERE.) (CoS INFERRED THAT

VISITORS WERE TAKEN ABACK By AMB''S REQUEST BUT NEETING WITH AMB |
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was: NONETHELESS HARMONIOUS, cane LATER. CONFIRMED Tats. IMPRESSION, y
- Ba AMB TELEPHONED cos: MORNING 28 SEP. AND GAVE. ‘HIGHLIGHTS OF aie
DISCUSSION. WITH VISITORS. FULLER ACCOUNT GtVEN IN WIS. OFF Ice EARLY.
‘MORNING 29 SEP, “AMB CHARACTERIZED. VISITORS AS AINTELLTOENT. AND. Se
BUSINESSLIKE, AMB HAD: IMPRESSION THEY. SATISFIED. WITH visit, 10 BUENOS -
AIRES AND WITH C COOPERATION THEY RECEIVED FROM. EVERYONE. HE
. SPECULATED ‘THAT THEIR REPORT. WOULD BE RET TEN IN “MANNER WHICH SERVES. |
INTERESTS oF CHURCH COMMITTEE. AMB SAID HE TOLD VISITORS HE ‘SATISFIED.
WITH SKHERALD OPERATION IN ARGENTINA. ONLY AREA: WHERE ‘WE. HAD A
—QUARREL WITH BKHERALD ‘TS THAT OF COMMUNI CATIONS: ANB ‘BELIEVES STATE
‘DEPT SHOULD CONTROL ITs OWN COMMUNICATIONS HE HAS: NO OBUECTION. TO
BKHERALD # HAVING ITS OWN COMMO, ALSO. REGARDING HIS. KNOWLEDGE ‘OF
SKHERALD ACTIVITY, AMB SAID HE TOLD VISTTORS THAT BECAUSE oF
TERRORIST PROBLEM HE DID NOT WANT TO KNOW. “ABOUT aKWERALD ACTIVITIES
IN DETAIL AND TRUSTS COS TO TELL HIM WHATEVER HE NEEDS TO KNOW,
_ VISITORS SHOWED GREAT INTEREST IN THIS VIEWPOINT, AMB SAID HE HAD

HAD A PROBLEM WITH ONLY ONE STATION CHIEF HHO NOW DECEASED, WIN
SCOTT, AND WITH ONE FORMER DIRECTOR, RICHARD HELMS. AMB EXPLAINED
THAT. BEFORE HE WENT TO SPAIN AS AMB, DIRECTOR HELMS. HAD TOLD HIM
“SIXTY PERCENT oF “MADRID STATION'S EFFORTS: HERE ‘DIRECTED AGAINST —

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TOR12936272 SEP 75 aa . BUEN. 34519

CUBANS. ONLY LATER pip AME FIND. ouT. ‘BY chance agouT SPORCON:

~ BFFORT. DIRECTED AGAINST NORTH AFRICA, ANB SAID. MRe HELMS: AWARE OF
HIS SENTIMENTS AS IS. GENERAL WALTERS, EVIDENTLY ON BASIS: oF COMMENT.
BY VISITORS, ANB TOLD cos. THAT AMB CRIMMINS: HAD. ‘BEEN CRITICAL OF
BKWERALD, BUT DID NOT: ELABORATE.
4. CURIOUSLY» AARON ASKED peas! SECRETARY FOR DATE EVENING |
26 SEP. ‘ALTHOUGH: a “TURNED: OUT BE PRIMARILY SOCIAL EVENT AND HE
‘bib NOT ATTEMPT eLIcIT INFORMATION FROM SECRETARY, ‘AARON: DID MAKE co
FOLLOWING COMMENTS OF INTEREST! | : a
y (A) HE SAID HE-HAD BEGUN TRIP WITH CERTAIN AMOUNT ANTS
BKHERALD BIAS BUT THIS HAD BEEN, MUTED SOMEWHAT. BY FAVORABLE |
IMPRESSIONS’ HE HAD OBTAINED oF VARIOUS SKHERALD OFFICERS. IN THE
FIELD WITH WHOM HE HAD SPOKEN.
| (B) HE SAID HE THOUGH BUENOS AIRES" EMBASSY POLITICAL:
SECTION WAS "JEALOUS" OF BKHERALD. | . |
0) HE IMPLIED HIS EGO HAD BEEN BRUISED ON TRIP BECAUSE
PEOPLE FREQUENTLY ASSUMED AMBASSADOR TRUEHEART, NOT HEs WAS SENIOR ©
OFFICER, HE SAID HE NEXT PLANS TRIPS TO. EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE,
HEADQUARTERS, THEREFORE, MIGHT. WISH ALERT. FUTURE ‘STATIONS HE WILL
VIsiT OF PECKING ORDER. | —
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“  AGTION NIT

° AGTION . er

F sae “EIA7SG.~~*~“‘“‘i‘é AE: MS!COC~™*S*~*SCS*~™SC*WNS CO

_Teanenisa7# 8 SEP 75 ss _-_ wu 34519
Ba visitors “DeaRTED ‘BUENOS AIRES a7 SEP AT 230 ‘HOURS: oN
SCHEDULE, 7 : | . .
; be - AMB SAID: HE HAD A soon ‘TELEPHONE CONVERSATION. with Re. RICHARD .
_ SAMPSON. IN WASHINGTON, “MENTIONING ESSENTIALLY. SAME POINTS ‘REPORTED a
‘DIRECTOR 744995, 7
My NO FILE. E2. IMPDET.
acer) Comment: xAaron and ‘Trucheart!s 26. September conversations with, cos”
_ and. DCOS, |. ; ;
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“PAGE D1

TOR12523372 SEP. 75 =<“ (BUEN. 34503

oh S BOR eT 2522342 SEP 75 STAFF.
_ GITE BUENOS AIRES 34503 SECTION a 2 | |
To IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO. wonrevi0eo» BRASILIAs + RIO DE JANETROs:
5 RYBAT. PLVWCADET coe
REF DIRECTOR 745626.
1, COS AND DCOS HELD TWO*HOUR- DISCUSSION: WITH. AMBASSADOR”
. WILLIAM TRUEHEART AND MR. DAVID AARON MORNING 25 SEP AND THEN
ATTENDED LUNCHEON AT WHICH CHARGE D'AFFAIRES JOSEPH MONTLLOR,
EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR WAYNE SMITH, AND FBI REP ROBERT
on SCHERRER ALSO PRESENT. EARLIER IN MORNING TTHE TWO VISITORS MET
 BRIVATELY WITH CHARGE MONTLLOR AND IN AFTERNOON TRUEHEART TALKED
| PRIVATELY WITH SMITH, (ARRON, ‘BECAME ILL AND REMAINED IN HOTEL.)
\~ COS AND DCOS ALSO HAD DINNER ALONE: WITH VISITORS EVENING 24 SEP,
| 24 AARON CLEARLY IN CHARGE, (AT LUNCHEON TRUEHEART
: EXPLAINED THAT AARON IS HEAD OF THE COORDINATION AND CONTROL
- | WORKING GROUP, ONE OF FOUR WORKING GROUPS OF CHURCH COMMITTEE,
AND TRUEHEART IS SERVING AS CONSULTANT.) AARON ASKED MOST OF

or :

QUESTIONS. BY NATURE AND TONE*OF SOME OF AARON'S QUESTIONS AND

iw COMMENTS, WE SUSPECT THAT HE HAD PREFORMED NOTIONS WHICH ANTI-=
BKHERALD, (E.G.» ATTITUDE TOWARD SOVIET PROGRAM DISCUSSED BELOW.)

SECRET

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~F 3S7339 ET A706 ——paAGE B2. IN 697814

TOR!2523372 SEP 75 - BUEN 34593

3 IN pI SCUSSING BKHEARALD APPROACH TO SOVIET TARGET, AARON
ASKED IF IT REALLY MADE SENSE. TRY RECRUIT SOVIET IN "OUT OF WAY
“PLACES” WHERE SOVIET, EVEN IF RECRUITED, WOULD NOT LIKELY HAVE ACCESS
(TO INFORMATION OF VALUE TO USG, WE EXPLAINED THAT OUR INTERESTS NOT
| PRIMARILY IN LOCAL SOVIET ACTIVITIES BUT IN INTERNAL SOVIET MATTERS,
POINTED OUT ‘ACCESS SOVIETS HAVE TO THIS INFO ‘EVEN WHILE ABROAD, SAID
SOME. SOVIETS RECRUITED ABROAD SELECTED FoR INTERNAL HANDLING» ALSO
POINTED OUT Cl VALUE OF CERTAIN TYPES INFO PROVIDED BY RECRUITED RIS
“OFFICERS, NONE OF THIS SEEMED IMPRESS AARON, WHO CONTINUED QUESTION
VALUE OF BKHERALD SOVIET OPS IN MANY (BUT UNDEFINED) AREAS, SAID HE
HAD WORKED IN WHITE HOUSE WHERE HE SAW ALL INTEL, FOUND IT HARD
JUSTIFY BKHERALD SOVIET PROGRAM INPUT ON BASIS INTEL PRODUCTION, WE
ARGUED THIS IS ONE PROGRAM WHERE LARGE AMOUNT CASE OFFICER TIME
REQUIRED ON WORLD=WIDE BASIS IN ORDER ACQUIRE THE FEW g00D SOURCES
WHO CAN BE PICKED UP AND WHO ARE PICKED UP, TRUGHEART ASKED FOR
EXAMPLES» AND WE REFERRED. THEM TO HOS FoR DETAILS, -TRUEHEART SAID
IT HIS IMPRESSION THAT BKHERALD NOW IN A SSOVIET PHASEN, WHEREAS IN
EARLIER YEARS IT HAD BEEN IN COVERT ACTION. OR OTHER PHASES, WE SAID
‘SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS BEEN MAJOR TARGETs AND OUR APPROACH: TO THEM HAS .

«BEEN REFINED OVER THE YEARS:


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7 337339 "RIA7@6.=—~*~<“C—*s«<‘< CMEC SSCSCSCSs~<“<;=CS~sé‘S™CSC*N CA

_ Tonuasass7e SEP 75) | _ BUEN 34503
4 KEEN INTEREST WAS SHOWN IN STATION RELATIONS WITH
AMBASSADOR AND DEGREE TO WHICH STATION. ‘ALLOWED AMBASSADOR EXERCISE
CONTROL. OVER PR AT LEAST. HAVE KNOWLEDGE OF, ITS OPERATIONS,
SPECIFICALLY: DEGREE To: WHICH WE- WOULD” COORDINATE RECRUITMENT
“PROPOSAL OF. GOVT OFFICIAL PRIOR TO MAKING PITCH, ANSWERI ANB
WOULD BE INFORMED IF UNUSUAL. SENSITIVITY: OR HIGH. RISK INVOLVED»
WHICH HAS NoT BEEN THE CASE HERE. THUS FAR, ASKED WHO DETERMINES
IF AMB SHOULD BE INFORMED, “ANSHER 1 CoS, ASKED WHETHER AMB HAD
PLACED CERTAIN POTENTIAL RECRUITMENT TARGETS OFF LIMITS. ANSWERS
HE HaD NOT. THEN ASKED WHETHER, IF SUCH INJUCTION EXISTED, WE
WOULD ADHERE TO IT oR TRY TO CIRCUMVENT IT, ANSWER? WE WOULD
ADHERE To IT, ASKED WHE THER AMB SATISFIED WITH WORK OF STATION
AND ITS MISSION, ANSWER! WE BELIEVE-S0, BUT DEFER To AMB (WHO-
WILL RETURN BUENOS AIRES MORNING 26 SEP AND WILL TALK WITH TRUE
HEART, ) | |
(5, BOTH WANTED KNOW HOW STATIONS'S REPORTING REQUIREMENTS ON
LOCAL POLITICAL SCENE WERE GENERATED (1,E,, PRIMARILY BY HS OR
THROUGH DISCUSSION WITH AMB AND OTHER EMBASSY OFFICERS). IT CLEAR
THAT THRUST OF QUESTION WAS To DETERMINE DEGREE TO WHICH STATION
COOPERATED/COORDINATED WITH AMB AND OTHER SENIOR EMBASSY OFFICERS,
| SECRET. |

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7337339 EIA7B6 - PAGE 04 | ) IN 697014"
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TOR12523372 SEP 75 BUEN 34593

ANSWER! WE RECEIVED REPORTING REQUIREMENTS FROM Has ON CONTINUING.

“BASIS, AND THESE FORM GOOD DEAL BuT.. NOT ALL OF GUIDANCE WE FOLLOW

ON INTERNAL TARGET, WE ASSURED VISITORS WE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT REPORT}
ING FROM OTHER EMBASSY COMPONENTS AND THEIR NEEDS, “VISITORS PROBED
DEEPLY INTO MANNER IN WHICH STATION COORDINATES ITS REPORTING AND
FORUMS THROUGH WHICH IT RECEIVES THIS GUIDANCE. WE MENTIONED TWICE
WEEKLY POLITICAL MEETING PLUS COUNTRY TEAM MEETING AND FREQUENT .
INFORMAL CHATS WITH AMB AND OTHER OFFICERS, WE ALSO. POINTED TO OUR
PROCESS OF SHOWING REPORTS: PRIOR TO- DISSEMINATION: TO Po” SECTION
AND OTHER INTERESTED COMPONENTS, REGARDING VOLUME oF REPORTS, We
SAID AVERAGE IS OVER 20 PER MONTH, REGARDING DISTRIBUTION OF Has

DISSEMINATED REPORTS, WE SAID AMB RECEIVES ALL REPORTS AND, EXCEPT

FOR EXTREMELY SENSITIVE ITEMS (WHICH ARE RARE), OTHER INTERESTED

OFFICERS DO ALSO, \

6, IN, RESPONSE. THEIR: QUERIES: WE ACKNOWLEDGED PRODUCTIVE
LIAISON RELATIONSHIP. WITH LOCAL INTEL SERVICE (WHICH NOT IDENTIFIED
BY NAME) BUT DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL» SAID COS AND DCOS ONLY STATION

; cL ——
OFFICERS DEKZARED TO LIAISON. ASKED WHETHER WE IN TOUCH WITH

BRITISH INTEL REP, ANSWER! . YES#, BuT THIS NOT SUBSTANTIVE RELATION=

SHIP, THEY WANTED KNOW HOW WE HAD MET HIM. AND WE SAID RELATION-
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| Tas "EIA706— PAGE OS st~<—s~<“Sts«:*«~CS*«*SiN DG
y OS - toRt2523372 sep 75 BUEN 34503
|.” SHIP HAS EXISTED FOR YEARS, AND contact 18 PASSED. FROM ONE PERSON

70 ANOTHER, ' ASKED WHETHER THERE SDECE. REP IN BUENOS AIRES, ANSWER’

| WE NOT. AWARE OF ANY, NO MENTION MADE OF "ANY OTHER LIATSON CONTACTS |
v AND SUBJECT. OF LOCAL POLICE NOTSRATSED, a :
| 7. SUBYECT OF NOCS NOT RAISED. | .
m 8, ASKED WHETHER WE HAD ANY COVERT ACTION PROGRAMS, ANSWER?
- NONE OTHER THAN A FEW CONTACTS UNDER ‘AGENT OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM, WE
- STRESSED INFO COLLECTION ROLE OF THESE AGENTS AND CONTINGENCY NATURE
ve OF CONTACT IN COVERT ACTION CONTEST. - ASKED WHETHER WE RECRUITING
ie NEW AGENTS, ANSWER! WE CONSTANTLY sTRI‘E To UPGRADE CALIBER OF
OUR REPORTING SOURCES AND THEREFORE ARE RECRUITING NEW ONES AND AT
sane Tome WEEDING OUR LESS PRODUCTIVE ONES, WE EXPLAINED HOW ACCESS
i. OF GIVEN AGENT CAN CHANGE FROM ONE TIME Td ANOTHER DUE TO CHANGES
| IN. POLITICAL SCENE,
— 9, FEW QUESTIONS ASKED REGARDING STATION STAFFING, WE
ine EXPLAINED IN RESPONSE QUESTING WHETHER STAFF ING ADEQUATE THAT STATION
! CUT BY OVER 32 PERCENT OVER LAST 18 MONTHS-OR SO» INCLUDING CASE
~ OFFICERS & WE ADMITTED THIS RESULTED IN CUTTING OF SOME LESS
Ie | IMPORTANT CONTACTS BUT NO LET UP IN EFFORTS AGAINST HARD TARGETS,
. WE EXPLAINED FUNCTIONS OF EACH CASE OFFICER AND STRESSED TEAM ~~

SECRET


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7 337339 ETA706.  +~+~+~PAGE O6-06. IN 697044

‘TOR!2523372 SEP 75 BUEN 34593

CONCEPT IN WORKING AGAINST HARD TARGETS. oD OBJECTIVES AND.
PRIORITIES. WERE IDENTIFIED BY OD TNSELF Not PROVIDED, oe |

Seana


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TE S70 ETC R oO PAGE—Ot~ — _ IN 697 0am |

TORI2523012 SEP 75 BUEN 34503

SECRET 2522342 SEP 74 STAFF
CITE BUENOS: AIRES 34503 FINAL SECTION OF 2
‘TO! IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR INFO MONTEVIDEO, BRASILIAy RIO DE JANEIRO.
CRYBAT PLVWCADET | | oO
10, CONSIDERABLE INTEREST SHOWN IN SUBJECT OF TERRORISM, WE
DESCRIBED TWO PRINCIPAL TERRORIST GROUPS ( MONTONEROS AND ERP) AND
STRESSED DIFFICULTIES OF PENETRATING THESE GROUPS, AARON SAID THAT
CHARGE DI AFFAIRES HAD MENTIONED. TO HIM THE CASE OF SOURCE FROM
“ANOTHER AREA WHO“HAD PROVIDED COVERAGE IN THIS AREA, (AMB AWARE
Gf COVERAGE BY PUTENNIS-3 FROM TINE OF HIS FIRST VISIT AND HAD
MENTIONED IT TO MONTLLOR, ) WE EXPLAINED HOM SOURCE SUCH AS THIS’
CAN ESTABLISH GOOD CONTACTS AT HIGHER LEVEL AND PROVIDE GOOD INFO,
WE STRESSED THAT OUR INTEREST WAS IN COLLECTING INFO BEARING ON
SECURITY OF UsS. PERSONNEL AND PROPERTY. AARON ASKED WHETHER WE
WOULD PROVIDE To LIAISON INFO FROM OUR AGENT WHICH WOULD ENABLE
THEM TO CAPTURE TERRORISTS DURING MEETING WITH OUR AGENT, ANSWER:
NO» FOR SEVERSL (OBVIOUS) REASONS, WHICH WE SPELLED OUT.
14. EVENING’ 25 SEP AARON APPEARED TO HAVE RECOVERED FROM
"ILLNESS, WENT SHOPPING WITH TRUEHEART, BECAUSE BUENOS - AIRES
STORES WILL BE CLOSED 26 SEPT AND BECAUSE AARON NOT LEAVING
SECRET |

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O8-O*F |
PAGE @emez— IN 69700@

—TORS2523012 SEP 75 BUEN 34583

> Vas

UNTIL NIGHT 26 SEP AND TRUEHEART NIGHT 27 SEP, WE ANTICIPATE WE ©
WILL HAVE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM, THESE WILL BE COVERED |
IN NEXT CABLE. a

| 42, WISH THANK INFO ADDEES FOR THEIR PROMPT AND USEFUL WRAP-UPS,
B2 IMP DET |

SECRET


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PAGE @1-81 IN 699862

TORI2919572 SEP 75 BRL 24777

A

7 345467. EJASoA

S$ EC RET 2919252 SEPT 75 STAFF
CITE BRASILIA 24777
TO1 BUENOS AIRES INFO DIRECTOR,
_ RYBAT PLYWCADET a ; oo
REF! BUENOS Ines seis 995-04)
- REF PARA 3 SENTENCE "EVIDENTLY ON BASIS OF COMMENT
“BY VISITORS, AMBASSADOR TOLD COS THAT AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS .  — ..
HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF SKHERALD, BUT DID NOT ELABORATE.” Oo
“ORY Ty AMBASSADOR CRIMMINS ON HOME LEAVE AND RICHARD JOHNSON.
—DEMy WAS CHARGE AT TIME OF AARON'S AND TRUEHEART#S VISIT TO
" GRASILIA, IN THE SHORT TIME COS HAS BEEN IN BRASILIA,
CRIMMINS HAS BEEN MORE THAN COOPERATIVE AND APPEARED 0.
"BE MORE APPRECIATIVE OF BKHERALD'S EFFORTS THAN MOST STATE.
OFFICERS, WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF YOU COULD GET
ELABORATION ON HILL'S REMARKS ON LOW KEY BASIS, 2, IMP DET.

es — (SECRET ©.

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- ACTION # -

PAGE a4 Ol Ni

1 sa0e88 Elna
- a : _oniass8208 SEP 5

ge ec R'E 1 “e314008 SEP 75. ‘TAFE, ey
2 “CrTe BRASILIA. 24723. SEC TION. 1 OF 2 Se
(ot. THNEDIATE DIRECTOR, MONTEVIDEO ROUTINE BUENOS AIRES,”
| RYBAT PLVWCADET .
1. HAD Two HOUR SESSION. WITH AARON AND. TRUEHEART
“AFTERNOON: 22. SEPT, -TRUBHEART AWAY PART. OF TIME TO TALK TO’

_ OTHERS IN ENBASSY as AARON. WAS CONCENTRATING ON STATIONS
oe ACTIVITIES.

25. QUESTIONS RAN ALONG LINES OF. THOSE tiprcaTeD in
ae DIRECTOR 744266, PLUS quite A FEW EXTRAS. FOL Is HIGHLIGHT |
oF ‘FIVE AND ONE*HALF HOURS. oF DISCUSSIONS HELD STAURDAY “AND WoNDAY, =
| “3. AARON MOST. INTEREST ED IN HOW STATION RAN ITS ; :
' OPERATIONS <<, G, LINE oF COMMAND FROM HOS: AND STATION'S

RELATIONSHIP WITH BASES, WE WENT OVER OD MINUTELY, THEN:
“PERUSED EXAMPLES OF TELENOTE REQUIREMENTS SENT FROM

STATION TO BASES INCLUDING SUCH AS HaBS eas, NUMBER oF

QUESTIONS WERE RAISED ON HOW CONTROL WAS: EXERCISED OVER

| OUR OPERATIONS, BASICALLY, HE WAS TOLD THAT ALL
-_ ACTIVITIES CENTERED. AROUND THE 0D, OUR PROUECTS,
FUNDS » AND MANPOWER ALLOCATION WERE DESIGNED: to Mee

& E c R & tT


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7 329468. ELADAD PAGE O2

ToRuesigasé SEP: 75
“THE PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS AS. ENUNCULA TED IN THe oD, PERIODIC.
“RePoRTs WERE. ‘SUBMITTED To Has To APP RISE THEN oF F wha WE

WE WERE GR ADED ON THE WORK DONE, AARON WAS: a wtenéefa

HOW A case OFFICER (THIS 1s THE TERM HE USED) WORKING. ON, i
THE HAR D TARGETS WAS GRADED RELATIVE TO ONE: WHOSE”

TARGETS WERE LESS HARD». AND WHETHER Lack OF ULTIMATE ‘success. o
CRECRULTHENT. OF A SOVe “FOR EXAMPLE) WAS HELD AGAINST THE C04
THE EXPLANATION. WAS THAT. THE RECRUITMENT OF SOMEONE IN The -

HARD TARGET AREAS WAS THE™ ULTIMATE TEST, AND FAILURE To RECRUIT a _
RECEIVED. ‘A ZERO SCORE, HOWEVER, IF THE c/o worKine ON. THe |
HARD TARGET Had BEEN IMAGINATIVE HAD GOTTEN A. NUNBER OF
"ACCESS AGENTS, HAD MANAGED TO HAVE DIRECT CONTACT| WI AO Ne :
OR MORE TARGET PERSONALITIES, CAND. ALL: IN ALL, DID als ae _
HOMEWORK» WORKED HARD» WAS. AGGRESSIVE, Bur WAS NOT)

SUCCESSFUL BECAUSE THE TARGET. Was IN FACT NOT. ‘RECRUITA
HE WAS GIVEN. A GOOD. GRADE, AARON. MUSED WHETHER. Lach
‘success IN: RECRUITING A HARD. TARET INDIVIDUAL EVER.


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7 PAGE BS

7 329488 ELAgag, 2

, ToR1 2325252 L SEP 18 __

Pk co's “PROMOTION, AND He Was TOLD THAT IN. our EXPERIENCE
THIS ‘WAS NOT SO» SO. LONG AS. THE OTHER. cLENE ) ,
EARMARK ‘ soo0 C/O WERE PRESENT, - |

oo 4, “THE Noe PROGRAM HAD A CERTAIN FASCINATION. FOR otk
AARON “AND STUREWEART, THEY WERE ‘NOT INQUISIT IVE ABOUT NAMES |

oR covER COMPANIES. BUT. ‘DID WANT TO KNOW. THE REASON FoR ‘Nacs
= ASECURITY FOR HIGHLY SENSITIVE, AGENTS, STAYSEHIND Ww ‘CASE .
oo TWE STATION, HAD 7D BE. ABANDONED)» WHETHER cuTouTs WERE: “USED m
CONTACTING NOcS (NOs DIRECT INSIDE vo CONTACT UNDER -
SCRUPULOURS SECURITY SONDITIONS), WHETHER THEY. WERE WORTH
| “THE MONEY OUTLAY (YES, IF PRODUCTIVE: AGENTS. WERE GIVEN |
‘THEM AND NOCS WERE SUFFICLENTLY EXPERIENCED AND ADEPT - IN
GETTING THE MAXIMUM FROM THE AGENTS. BEING HANDLED) «
5, AARON WAS MOST SPECIFIC IN QUERYING ABOUT THE
— . PERCENTAGE OF TIME SPENT BY STATION IN ACCOMPLISHMENT OF”
INDIVIDUAL OBJECTIVES. HE WANTED TO KNOW HOW .A cov0 SPENT as. DAY,

THE PROCESS HE WENT THROUGH IN CONTACTING AN AGENT, HOW Dr’
WE ENSURE THAT C/0S ‘DID NOT TRY TO. RECRUIT THE SAME

“INDIVIDUAL (CONTACT REPORTS) AND TRACE REQUESTS ALLOWED. ADEQUATE,
CONTROL), WITH REFERENCE TO C1, HOW MUCH TIME WAS
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7 32osee  ElAQaD PAGE 04
ToRI2315232 seP 75 7 ante 24723.

DEVOTED TO THIS AND HOW DID WE MANGAGE It (PENETRATION oF. po
“LLATSON AND JOINT EF FORT WITH LTA SON oT BL ET APS», . -
SURVEILLANCE» ETC, “+ AGAINST HARD. TARGETS) ‘pIscusst oN, e
‘COVERT ACTION. T00K uP CONSIDERABLE. TIME, “pesPite Has.
GRIEFING ON THIS SUBJECT, AARON WANTED TO KNOW THE oo |
DIFF ERENGE SETHEEN A MEDIA-OP AND-A COVERT POL ACTION: Re
MUCH. STRESS. WAS PLACED ON WHETHER, WE HAD ANY. PLUMBING : FOR -
POLITICAL ACTION OPS ‘SHOULD WE BE REQUESTED TO GET NTO .
“THAT ACTIVITY, IT WAS: EXPLAINED THAT WE HAVE NOT BEEN Ww ne
Pol ACTION IN BRAZIL FOR YEARS, THAT WE HAD No PLUMBING as
‘SUCH, AND THAT IF A REQUEST WAS TO BE “MADE | F N SUCH ACTION» |
THE STATION WOULD LIKELY NEED. To START FROM POINT ZERO not
PAGE E-BRISHETI BAI2EE EE .
UNLESS SOME OF. THE AGENTS” NOK watiane USABLE, IT WAS 2
| EXPLAINED THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL MEDIA CAPABILITY AS WELL 8
AN AGENT. OF INFLUENCE PROGRAM BUT THAT THESE IN No WAY .

‘RESEMBLED THE KIND OF COVERT POLITICAL ACTION OF THE ©
CHILEAN VARIETY, — . a |

ba “RARON: HAD A FASCINATION FOR. TRADESCRAFT) WANT
KNOW HOw: Gong CoS HAD: BEEN INTHE BUSINESS. AND APPR

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329488. «= El agde

Tons 2535282 SEP. a

over THE YARS THERE WAS TRAINING covenina a
| SUBVECTS. INCLUDING SECRET WRITING, CLANDESTEA
COMMUNISM, MANAGEMENT: INCLUDING THE STUDY. ti é
WRITING, ETC, MENTION WAS MADE OF MID@CAREER COURSE,
"+ PLUS SENIOUR SEMINARS. AVAILABLE TO OFFIERS, PLUS ATTENDANCE
AT SAFF COLLEGES SUCH AS THAT PROVIDED BY STATE, ARMY, etc.)
“(AARON WAS FASCINATED WITH THE REPORTS. RITING: COURSE: AND
ASKED FOR PARTICULARS, ):

74° ON INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS, BOTH AARON AND
TUREHAEART WERE INTERESTED | IN HOW INTEL REPORTS WERE oe
DISTRIBUTED WITHIN THE EMBASSY WHETHER cos HAD. AUTHORITY
TO SEND AN INTEL REPORT DIRECTLY TO HOS WITH INFO to
i. STATION (YESs ON.MATTERS WHICH WERE PECUL TAR To THE LOCAL
| SCENE BUT THOSE IMPINGING ON: “BROADER GOB MATTERS WERE, FIRST
SENT TO BRASILIA. FOR ADDITIONS, MODIFICATIONS, ETC, PRIOR TO

ONWARD TRANSMISSION.) THEY WERE TOLD THAT THE AMBAS! _ |
SEES ALL REPORTS, THAT OTHER SECTIONS OF THE Embassy BID SEE
SECRET oe


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1329488) EIAC4D PAGE eT IN 694147
- ToRIasi5232 SEP 75 - BRIL. 24723- |

THOSE REPORTS WHICH WERE PERTINENT To THEM. “INTEL ow ‘WAJOR :

“TTEMSeSUCH AS THOSE WHICH HAD A BEARING ON GOB POLICIES =
VIS*AeVIS THE Us SecWas SHOWN TO THE. AMBASSADOR PRIOR TO. _
SUBMISSIONS STATION. WADE IT A PRACT IVE TO CHECK INTEL .
out WITH. CONCERNED SECTIONS WITHIN THE ‘EMBASSY PRIOR. To
TRANSMISSION IF THIS WAS” CONSIDERED NECESSARY AND BENEFICIAL
BY THE STATION, THERE: ‘ARE’ OCCASIONS WHEREIN THE STATION IS
REQUIRED TO LIMIT. A. REPORT 10 THE AnB ASS ADOR “ONLY, WHEN —

SENS ITVE INFO. ‘AND/OR a SENSITIVE SOURCE 1s woLveD.
wis HAD OT HAPPED W THE “c08's sont TENURE IN -


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“TOR 1251508 Laer  BRIL. 24723.
SECRET. ‘2314092 SEPT 75 STAFF |
CITE. BRASILIA. 24723. FINAL ‘SECTION ‘OF THO. rs _
7 Or IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR, wonrevipEd ROUTIN NOS AIRES,
“ RYBAT PLVWCADET | . . . a . 7 a
BRASILIA, But IN PANAMA FOR EXAMPLE, cert N-RERORTS |
: CONS IDERED: HIGHLY. SENSITIVE WERE OFTEN “LimifeD t9 THE
AMBASSADOR, THE CINSCO, AND THE “GOVERNOR oF THE CANAL
ZONE» OR TO THE AMBASSADOR ONLY, “SECURITY was THE oo
CARDINAL FACTOR IN SUCH LEMITING: OF DISTREGUTION,
8. AARON WANTED TO KNOW WHAT. WOULD HAPPEN IF ONE oF
“THE STATION'S AGENTS WAS BEING SEEN BY A MEMBER. OF THE
POLITICAL SECTION*-WOULD WE DISCUSS IT WITH THE POLITIGAL
| OFFICER? (FIRST STEP WOULD BE TO TALK To THE AGENT ON THE
| PROBLEMS THAT WOULD SE ENCOUNTERED BY SUCH ACTION ON His
i PART, THAT THIS NORMALLY DID SUFFICE IF IN FACT HE WAS A”
| CONTROLLED AGENT, IF HIS ACCESS WAS NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SENSITIVE, HE WOULD BE ALLOWED TO SEE THE POLITICAL OFFICER
| SO LONG AS HE REMEMBERED WHO. HE WORKED FOR AND “ACTED ©

| ACCORDINGLY).

9, AS TO. KEEPING THE AMBASSADOR APPRISED ON POSITIVE —
SECRET ne

fo ete St teem Tt

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ACTION UNIT

remeatannentinatoaieal Aci
ACTION # .

T 329420

. ) EIAS74

toR:2315082 SEP Wo “eRIL ge7as

“COLLECTION. “OPERATIONS, THIS Was DONE AS A AT TER OF course
BUT WITHOUT SPECIFIC DETAILS UNLESS THE AMBASSADOR WAS IN.

oF HIS Aibussaoone

‘FACT SEEING AN AGENT OF OURS REGULARLY. AS PA t
TAL DUTIES, Ee oo a
10, THE LIAISON SERVICES. WITH WHOM. WE WERE IN: TOUGH Were
NAMED): INCLUDING OUR JOINT EFFORTS AT TELTAPS. Plus OUR
UNILATERAL PENETRATION EFFORTS FOR Cl AND POSITIVE INTEL & .
an BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE SHOWN THE K10s AND THE a
CIRLS AND TAILORED REQUIREMENTS THAT WERE ‘SENT PERIODICALLY. oe
THEY: BOTH REMARKED THAT THE AGENCY HAS A. MORE: oa ee
| SOPHISTICATED SYSTEM FoR GETTING REQUIREMENTS, TO THE. Frevo THAN a
SAY, STATE,
42. VERY LITTLE. (WAS ASKED ABOUT SPORLON ACTIVITIES. IN RIO.

‘EXCEPT THAT THEY BOTH WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION, THAT NSA 7
"WAS RUNNING THE SHOW. THEY DID ASK ABOUT CUSTOMER REACTION
TO. THE SPORLON PRODUCTS. (AMBASSADOR ‘CRIMMINS Ts AN AVID.
CUSTOMER AND WE WERE OF THE OPINION. THAT AGENCIES. IN |
WASHINGTON CONCERNED wrt THE INTERCEPT PROGRAM WERE g

HAPPY WITH THE RESULTS, »

©4300 ON HEARING THAT cos. aD BEEN IN Pana, QUEST#ONS
oe s € 6 RET

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ACTION # F . op

_tor: 2345082 SEP ce escent oii 24723

WERE RAISED ON AGREED acTIVITIES. THEY’ WERE BOTH

‘SURPRISED To FIND out. THAT THE. ‘STATION IN PANAMA AD to
‘AUTHORIZE ALL, CLANDESTINE COLLECTION ACTIVITIES ENGAGED IW ey
UsSs ‘ELEMENTS: IN THE AREAs INCLUDING ‘GETTING PRovecT INFO
MUCH LIKE THAT REQUIRED: IN. THE. AGENCY WHICH GAVE NAMES” OF

F CONTACT,

AGENTS TO. BE. “RECRUITED, RATE OF PAY, weraoD ¢
ETC. . |
14, oe EVINCED. “GREAT INTEREST IN THE cavER
PROVIDED By THE: EMBASSY, HE WAS TOLD THAT. COVER coup”
| BE IMPROVED UPON, THAT WE DID HAVE A SMALL NUMBER OF.
“OFFICERS WHO WERE ACTUALLY ASSIGNED TO “OTHER. ‘SECTIONS,
| THAT THEY GAVE ALMOST SOPERCENT OF THEIR TINE on THE ACTUAL
WORK OF THAT SECTION, THEN SPENT THE REST oF THR WORK
DAY PLUS A’LARGE DOSE ON NIGHTWORK ON OUR WORK FOR WHICH
| THEY RECEIVED NO OVERTINE BUT DID THIS OuT OF HIGH MOTIVATION»
AND THE DESIRE TO GET AT OUR DBJECTIVES,

15. AARON KNEW oF THE OLD OPC AND 0S0 SEPARATIONS oF THE
. PAST AND PROBED ABOUT HOW THE FINAL AMALGAMATION AFFECTED
MOST PEOPLE. (NOTHING TRAUMATIC, OPC AND 0S0- OFFICERS: HAD
A COMMON DENOMINATOR IN BASIC. TRADECRAFT AND. ‘OTHER . 7

SECRET


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“T 32002e E1KO7a a PAGE [Oa] a BEY

oR: 2315082 SEP 75. Ce _ -oRiL 24728

~ TRAINING. | A ‘e000 OPC. TYPE ‘cbuiD. DO EQUALLY: ‘e000 WORK: IN |
THE 080 FIELD, AND VICE VERSA.) _ | _
16. ABOVE ARE ONLY THE HIGHLIGHTS oF. “THE. DISCUSSION,
1ONS,- AND. asad
| TOOK coP Tous NOTES. BOTH AARON AND TRUEHEART WERE . ames

AARON Is IN CHARGE, HE ASKED MOST. OF THE que

_ ESSENTIALLY LOW-KEY BUT THE QUESTIONS WERE SHARP y ROB Ive,
AND AARON ‘ESPECIALLY HAS a QUIETLY INGIST : GETTING:
an THINGS. ITts DIFFICULT TO. TELL WHETHER
FAVORABLY DISPOSED TOWARD THE AGENCY OR NG

NO ANIMOSITY WAS SHOWN, BUT NEITHER WAS. THORE. ANY SHOW!OF
GREAT LOVE FOR. THE AGENCY, AN OBJECTIVE ‘aseroack AY THE:

MATTER AT HAND APPEARS TO BE aN APT DescAteTION. OF HOW THEY .

“WORKED. : oe a |
417, AARON sn reuignsy enc ‘eaten rien
WHILE: IN: BRASILIA BuT ON: SATURDAY IN RIO AARON SEEMED To.
"HAVE BEEN LEFT ALONE BY THE CONGEN, “COB AND COS TOOK -
AARON out To DINNER AFTER THE BRIEF ING SESSION AND He”
SEEMED TO. Envoy AND.. APPRECTATE THE. CHURRASCO. MONTEVIDEO.
| AND. BUENOS. AIRES MIGHT WISH TO KEEP IN MIND. THAT AARON -

1S INTERESTED IN TRYING THE BETTER KNOWN, Local: Foon
: 8 EcR E r

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: . CABLE SEC DISSEM BY__” PER 0 TOTAL Copies -_____RU. cr Lo
oe. | > RRPROBUETION BY OTHER THAN
: . os | Ss E c R E JT. : . | JSRUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED
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\, ADVANCE GOPY (S8UBD/ALQTIEO. 8
; ACTION UNIT : :

| erm met cere
ACTION #

|. ORS

‘7 329420 E1A971-

TOR:2315082 SEP 75. BRL RATQS

| AWINE LOVER AND. WANTS TO SAMPLE THE BEST.OF-THE LOCAL
PRODUCT. a

18. AT DINNER ON SATURDAY. NIGHT» AARON WAS ASKED BY
THE COS WHAT HE THOUGHT MIGHT HAPPEN TO THE AGENCY. HE
OPINED THAT THE DDO MIGHT BE SPLIT OFF FROM THE MAIN Boby OF

THE © “AGENCY, “AND PUT UNDER AN EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MADE UP OF

MEMBERS FROM STATE. AND. OTHER AGENCIES: IN ORDER: TO ESTABLISH

MORE CONTROL. OVER ‘ITS ACTIVITIES. ° Ba TmeD hoo

-- CS SECRET


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| SECRET

20 August 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, LA Division

SUBJECT : Transmittal of SSC Memo Announcing
the Intention of SSC Staffers: ‘to
Visit Latin America

ae 1. Attached is a xerox of a letter from the
_ SSC Staff Director ‘(Review Staff 75-2399) describing
travel plans to Latin America on the part of SSC
Staffers. This is for your information. You will
be alerted when this. becomes firm and an itinerary
is established.

2. Atso attached is an agreed upon. memo giving
guidelines of such trips. Supplementing this should
be a briefing of the travelling of SSC Staffers
before they go and a notification of the stations
involved as-to what the guidelines are.

John H. Waller

| SA/DDO
Attachment
As stated above
Distribution:
i Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att
! 2 - SA/DDO
E2 IMPDET

CL BY 055636

SECRET

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- SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select Committee and’
-— Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad

. There have been already and there will continue to be ‘nesbers -
of the Senate Select Committee (880) who, wish to travel abroad ‘and 7 _ : 7
, talk to Ue Ss. enbassy and ‘intelligence personnel. It is essential |
that we agree on guidelines to avoid ‘serious diplomatic and security

problens. The following ‘specific guidelines are applicable. -

one o MRS 1 AND STARE OF THE ssc SHOULD NoT PUBLICLY APPEAR 10 BE

Pe ‘ABROAD. FOR THE PURPOSE OF. INVESTIGATING U. s. INTELLIGENCE ;

-agratiattons. —

Most of these. ‘Snstellations, 3 including all. CIA stations abroad,

for example, . ‘are: “under sone form of cover, . or are , maintaining a ow a
piofile. Certainly all have and need varying ; degrees of protection :
from exposure. At one extreme, are U. s. intelligence activities

: bent the- -iron ncartain. 1 These clearly need maxon protection,

e The mere visit of ssc representatives could be noted’ as evidence -

of U. 's. intelligence presence within the country. ‘Even in those
“countries where u. S. intelligence efforts enjoy the chielding and

- . ‘other benefits Elowing from close liaison with the ‘host government,

oo ‘care is required to avoid ‘the ‘potentially grave political repercussions

Ges/y -

13-00000

that could result ‘to U.S. and host country. activities from exposure
4 Be of such ‘Liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the
| United States in: in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public -
exposure of ‘such relationships. “To help waintain the discreet:
: _ nature of the visit, it would be preferable if some reason other
| than SSC business could be given to explain any visits by SSC members
~ a : . and ‘staff. | x deliberate ‘contact should be made with ‘the. local press,

7 _ROr. should comments, on ssc. matters ; be supplied if’ ‘investigating

ay ns officers are contacted vy the press. “Local press publicity pertaining
to, an ssc investigation abroad would in almost all cases be _
: “atstastefot, to the host government.

fe In sum, “except in the case: of especially sensitive areas, discreet

‘afrengenents cr be. made for S8C visits to, certain U. .S. intelligence

Vactivities overseas on.a case by case basis, - and with | senior officers

within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the
“ssc nenber not publicly declaring. himself to be on SSC business
a at the time of. the, visit ox upon his return, and his -proceeding

- ‘on a basis satisfactory ¢ to’ the Ambassador.
THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL | BE IN" CHARGE OF ‘THE
we All arrangements. and contacts will be made by him, and because of his

, knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding. :


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TIX. FIELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL SHOULD BE
“CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS.
It is more fitting that ‘Washington be the place where operational
. ‘details « are conveyed to the ssc. Field intelligence elements will

‘only discuss operations in general terms~-operational priorities,

the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,

. coe ; relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, etc. ; Jn all . :

7 cases, ‘such ‘discussions wild ‘only be ‘conducted in’ “physical

ves.

"surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. . .

Menbers and staff, of the SSC alee refrain from asking to

‘see. ‘texts of or "general notes on intelligence agreements | between
“ the U. 8. and the host government. These ‘are usually considered

: : by the host, ‘government as extremely sensitive, politically and .

ar ‘operationally, and cannot be divulged without ‘the consent of the

“host. government. —

Mmors AND. STAFF OF | THE $SC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT

ae PERSONNEL.

a Foreign agent: personnel frequently are ‘under hostile or local service

i a ot “eerutiny. For. them to be placed in touch with SSC members would be

° gi ‘to run an ‘unacceptable risk. Moreover, - serious damage would be

done to- agent morale and motivation if their identity were to be.

“revealed to Members or staff of the SSC..

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* Vv.

MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES —

WILL BE CONTACTED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES.

Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the SSC.
politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard: that

their relationships with U. S. intelligence activities > the.

. ‘Snformation they pass, ‘and the cooperation. ‘extended. are all. most

7 * “penaittve ma matters. : “Regardless what assurances are > given then,

2 ‘they would ‘find tte atericate and awkward to discuss these. matters — .
oowith m nenbers or "staff of ‘the ‘SSC. The very fact that such matters

: were under investigation could well cause the host Service to -

. "reassess the desirability of a ‘relationship with v. 8. intelligence

activities. . 7

or

Jnusezis AND STAFF OF ‘THE ssc SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN
we TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS .

"In those countries. in which we operate joint technical collection .

: ve sites, ‘the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.

oe Congréssional representatives, especially where there is s public

, - knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. ‘If such

ae va visit ‘is considered essential, a special réquest must be

~ megotiated with the host: country in advance.

13-00000

f
on

\>.

¥
ye,
t

i

"VIX. AN ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS AND

~ ‘STAFE, PRIOR TO DEPARTURE.
; This briefing will be conducted. by the DCI and other representatives: .
‘of the Intelligence Community (cra, NSA, DIA, State, ete.), 2 as

appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the on

- visitor’ with the types of activities conducted | at each Jocatiin, :

a the restraints which dite imposed upon v. s. activities ; in each case |

: and the. considerations which preclude | the discussion of

_ operational details, « names and terms in an overseas” _envixonnent a

Meubers ‘and state of the ssc should bear in. mind at : alt times that
; “they and ‘their activities are matters of ‘great interest to opposition
IntelLigence Services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff

- members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can. hardly _

ne travel, Snconspiciously ‘and will be easily recognized. _


13-00000

eHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN . ~
ae TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

HOWANO H. BAKER, JR., TENN,
~% “MIND. BARRY GOLOWATER, ARIZ.

Ee metre Nn ited Btates Senate ae

WILLIAM G, MILLER, STAPF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL, SELECT COMMITTEE TO

CURTIS Re BMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL ” STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(runsuanr To 5. RES. 21, 96TH CONGRESS)
f WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

August 12, 1975

Mr. Seymour Bolten ;
Assistant to the Director. fe .
Room 6D0120. | Me ;
Central Intelligence Agency a (Nea
Langley, Virginia - , ae

Dear Mr. Bojten:

.. \ This letter is to confirm an oral request by Committee staff
for an orientation briefing for a visit to South America which two
members of the staff, David Aaron and William Trueheart, have been
asked. to make next month.

Although plans are not yet firm, it is expected that they will
be free to travel during the second and third weeks of September.
It is proposed that they visit Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, and

_ Montevideo, If time permits, they might also visit another con-~
; sular post in Brazil L and/or Buenos Aires. . 8 so

‘The primary purpose of this travel is to discuss “State-CIA
relations in the field with Embassy and Station officers. As ap-.
propriate, past Agency programs may also be reviewed.

' Messrs. Aaron and Trueheart are not expected to consult with
officials of the host government and, so far as the Committee is oo
concerned, the latter need not be informed of the visit. ‘

Sincerely yours,

William G. Miller

copy to Mr. Hyland, State Department


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oe VUICYO NG MEQOAUE Lb

|

a: oO SIGNAL CENTER USE ONLY
- aaa con ace roa i bei : . : an Pacu OF PAGES

OMF O o- oO QQ o o a eo 8
CLASSIFICATION © ° . : . + 7 . _ . CO , a. oo. oo. _. j
SECRET Sos TS |

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1 MMLSSAGE HANOUNG INDICATOR . . OaTe-rima arour ’ ona . MEBSAGE REFERENCE wumean |

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|
|

axes: Psfeq -- Barre PER

fo Dem |
TO: PRIORITY LONDON. ~~ —_ ne | |

"REF? STATE 13737, 30 JUNE A975 ¥ 0 re pee
on, "SHENATOR TOWER MEMBER OF SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

r ASC AND VICE CHAIRMAN OF SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE {SSC} INVESTIGAT-

\ , ING CIAy IS TRAVELING IN. EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. ATRI

1 FORCE JET AND wER"AIR FORCE ESCORT. STATE HAS ADVISED THAT SENATOR

o TOWER WILL BE IN LONDON 3-7 JULY WHERE HE WILL CALL ON MINISTER!

oT HEALEY ON 4 JULY AND. CINCUSNAVEUR ER. on 1 Tory, + Oe

| | 2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELING ON ASC BUSINESS, SENATOR TOWER MAY TAKE |
IR THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND BOTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE | . |
| ACTIVITY IN U-K- IF HE REQUESTS “A GENERAL BRIEFING, STABTION i. !
SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING .IN PROVIDING HIN WITH ‘ONE. |
YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF OUR GENERAL INTEL EXCHANGE WITH THE BRITISH
|" BUT SEE NO NEED TO TOUCH ON ANY JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. STATIONS |
| SHOULD NOT OFFER ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR. TOWER AND BRITISH i

SERVICE CONTACTS.¥. . a : -

Pa 3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE. IN THE. EVENT SSC BUSINESS ARISES: |
H@S IS CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ECMSSTABLISH GUIDLINES FOR

DATE:
ORIG: |
UNIT:

EAT:

RLeAS IG GARICEAR LUTHENTECATING GEE 7

REPROOUL TT. wit FeAl. ol gia lycrs

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ITS DEALINGS WITH ITS MEMBERS AND THEIR STAFFS- ALTHOUGH NOT 1

oo

_.

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BIGNAL CENTEM BLD ONLY Og - ree
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One Ll G 0 & 6b -G Go -. L é

CLA LU ICATION

SECRET

MESSAGE HANDLING INDICATOR .* DATE-TIME GROUP cre MESSAGHO REFZRENCE NUMBER

: 8] netuento PER

"STAFF : oo.) DIRECTOR ee
CONF: INFO: FILE TIO : a an nex _ DISSEM BYE.

| . See eee eee

o PILES #

FINAL H@S BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT WASHINGTON BE |;

THE PLACE WHERE OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED: .

TO THE SSC. FIELD ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OFS: AND |

ACTIVITIES IN GENERAL .TERMS. I-E-1 OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES. TYPES

OF OPERATIONS. PARTICULAR PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FROM THE LOCAL OPERA-

TIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY AND LOCALI:

MILITARY SERVICES. . IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL MEET APPROPRIATE

SECURITY STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL’ SURROUNDINGS.. H@S IS |

ASKING THE SSC TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEBXTS OF OR

GENERAL NOTES ON INTELLIGENCE “AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE U.S- AND HOST

GOVERNMENTS SINCE THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE. HOST, GOVERNMENTS | i
wt _
AS EXTREMELY SENSITEE, POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY, AND CANNOT

BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT. Ee IMPDET-d

|:
|

baTE: 2 JULY 4975
ORIG: GEORGE B- HOLMES

EXT: 44 . .
nye {TELECOORD} .
SA/DDO - WALLER [MSvASTANCE.
OLC - MILLER 7, Cra) -

eke io BC. COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLARSINICATION "REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS'PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET |
SSEERETO 8. poe Cb BY! g3 2891

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13-00000

1G Te
one ob : sg G | 3
s E o e = : ' DATE -Time GROUP ewe MESSAGE REFERENCE HUMBER
STAFF _ G4175b2 DIRECTOR 713701
CONF: Fe) 3 INFO: FILE, stfad, Z CZ, a7 Wy f 2 4 en OISsEM eM,
ps/Eb 2 De Jo a 0 rerumnro §=PER
sSA/ddo 125, PS/PE enn #

TO: IMMEDIATE BONN: MUNICH. ¥

ANAcT Bonn Wuwiok.

/ LIAISON ¥
| —_—_—— , 0 ws _
REF: MUNICH 30382 [IN &G2LS5E7| ¥

1. AS YOU AWARE. IN ADDITION TO BEING A MEMBER OF THE SENATE
ARNED SERVICES COMMITTEE {ASCH SENATOR TOWER IS VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
“SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE {SSC} INVESTIGATING CIA. SENATOR TOUER IS
TRAVELLING TO EUROPE IN HIS ASC CAPACITY BY U.S. AIR FORCE JET AND
WITH AIR FORCE ESCORT. ‘WE HAVE NOT DETERMINED HIS DETAILED ITINERARY
BUT WILL ADVISE YOU AS APPROPRIATE WHEN WE DO. ¥

2. ALTHOUGH TRAVELLING ON ASC BUSINESS SENATOR TOWER MAY WELL

a

TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK INTO CIA AND OTHER U.S. INTEL SERVICE
ACTIVITY IN THE FRG- SHOULD HE DO SO. THIS ASPECT OF HIS VISIT
SHOULD NOT BE PUBLICIZED. BUT. IF HE REQUESTS A GENERAL BRIEFING,
THE STATION SHOULD BE COOPERATIVE AND FORTHCOMING IN PROVIDING HIM
WITH ONE. YOU MAY COVER THRUST OF . OUR GENERAL LIAISON EXCHANGE. . .
WITH THE BND. OMETTING THE DETAILS INVOLVED WITH OUR INTEL EXCHANGE
AND JOINT OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY: THE STATION SHOULD NOT OFFER TO
ARRANGE CONTACT BETWEEN SENATOR TOWER AND ITS FRG LIAISON CONTACTS.

DATE:

ORIG: —

UNIT: 7. ; ee
EXT: . . . . . . .

RELEASING OFFICER - COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ([SSUING OFFICE 1S PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
SECRET .. coe os ee CL BY:

13-00000

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MEBSAGE MANDLING INDICATOR : . DATE Tie GROUP . ore . MESBAGE RAPERENCE NUMGER
STAFF oe DIRECTOR
. _ ~ ; , O wcex —-—«dDISSEM BY:
_ “CONF: , INFO: FILE . DO nomex: =
WS ad OD sumiro PER
b “penas #

THE COS WILL PROBABLY WISH TO MAKE HINSELF AVAILABLE TO PARTICIPATE
IN ANY BRIEFING SENATOR TOWER MAY REQUEST. ¥ oo,

3. FOR BACKGROUND GUIDANCE», EVENT SSC BUSINESS. ARISES: HaS IS
CURRENTLY WORKING WITH THE SSC TO ESTABLISH GUIDELINES FOR ITS
DEALINGS WITH ITS MENBERS AND THEIR STAFFS. ‘ALTHOUGH NOT FINAL H@S

“BELIEVES IT IS MORE APPROPRIATE THAT ‘WASHINGTON BE THE PLACE WHERE

OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF CIA ACTIVITY BE CONVEYED TO THE SSC. FIELD
ELEMENTS SHOULD ONLY DISCUSS THEIR OPS AND ACTIVITIES: IN GENERAL
TERMS + I.Eea OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES, TYPES, OF OPERATIONS. PARTICULAR
PROBLEMS AS EVOLVE FRON THE LOCAL OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE EMBASSY {CONSULATE} AND LOCAL MILITARY
SERVICES. IN ALL CASES DISCUSSIONS WILL NEET APPROPRIATE SECURITY
STANDARDS IN TERMS OF PHYSICAL SURROUNDINGS . HaS IS ASKING THE SSC
TO REFRAIN FROM ASKING TO SEE THE TEXTS OF OR GENERAL NOTES ON
INTELLIGENCE AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE. U-S. AND HOST GOVERNMENTS SINCE
THESE ARE CONSIDERED BY THE HOST GOVERNMENTS AS EXTREMELY SENSITIVE.
POLITICALLY AND OPERATIONALLY AND CANNOT BE DIVULGED WITHOUT THE

CONSENT OF THE Oe GOVERNMENT. E2 IMPDET.d

DATE: 1, JULY Rane
oric: GALEN pEase/Ga wi peor ag

i

uNIT: E/G/CIL AA Oo ee Niue Me ;

EXT: } y5ea2 i SA {obo tuealler 7
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SLASSIFICATION PU AQULAITIOO. Thou ay tbe ig rs

SEC 2


13-00000 co
Lp UNCLASSIFIED USE ONLY _ C] CONFIDENTIAL [-] SECRET

7 t "ROUTING AND RECORD SHEL :

SUBJECT: (Optional)

C/SS/CAG 3D0004

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

COMMENTS {Number eoch comment to show from whom
fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

OFFICER'S
INITIALS.

By

ONY Abba we,

'" Mr. John Waller Peer.
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SA/ DDO 2B1415

Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff 6 D 0120

rom GTQ HB” [] SECRET © [[] CONFIDENTIAL [] WITRIAL” ~—(] UNCLASSIFIED

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28 July 1975
_ MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
Review Staff
VIA: = —__~-s Mr..: John Waller
co, Special Assistant to the DDO

SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at
Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper
providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing
governments, which is responsive to a question £ from the Senate Select
Committee.

2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive
by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to
today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could
impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the dther dis-
closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our ~
past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military
base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have
broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper-
ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, and
Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about
which the committee Chairman and Co-Chairman might be briefed, if abso-
lutely necessary.

3. In addition to the attachment A summary, we also approve the use
(with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist
the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-
vided to you directly by LA Division.

L 4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information
to the committee. However, should it be necessary to do so, we would

, appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances
of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies
of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional
background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision

of this material to the Select Conmittee.
Gewti/ lot

- conatd Purcell
. Chief, Covert Action Group
Services Staff

Attachments, a/s

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7 . 28 July 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Seymour Bolten
oO a Review Staff
VIA: = —™—«SMMr. John Waller
'- Special Assistant to the DDO
SUBJECT: Summary of Covert Action Operations Targeted at

Right-Wing Governments

1. Pursuant to your request, forwarded as attachment A is a paper
providing examples of covert action operations targeted at right-wing
governments, which is: responsive to a question from the Senate Select
Committee.

. 2. All of the cases in the attached summary are considered sensitive
by the area divisions and some are considered extremely sensitive up to
today. In many ways public disclosure of some of these operations could
impact more severely on our foreign policy interest than the.other dis-
closures on our foreign involvements. For example, a disclosure of our.
past operations in Spain could possibly adversely affect the military.
base negotiations now underway. With this problem in mind, we have
broken the operations into two categories: Category I are those oper ;
ations about which full committee could be briefed, if necessary, an
Category II are those operations considered extremely sensitive about |
which the. committee Chairman and Co- Chairman a might | be briefed, if abso-

3. In addition to ‘the ‘attachment A sumary , we also approve the. use
(with the full committee) of the case summary on our operations to assist
the survival of the Betancourt government in Venezuela, which was pro-
vided: to you directly by LA Division.

4. Obviously, we would prefer to forego providing this information
to the committee. However, should it: be necessary to do so, we would
appreciate being advised promptly regarding the time and circumstances
of any use of this material outside of the Agency.

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5. We are also providing you as attachments B, C and D copies

. of memoranda from EUR, AF and EA Divisions which provides additional

background on division attitudes and caveats concerning the provision
of this material to the Select Committee.

y

/s/ Donald J. Purcell

Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Group
re _ Services Staff

‘Attachments, a/s

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CATEGORY I:

. 1. ETHIOPIA: A project for covert support of the Ethiopian labor
movement was first approved for FY 1965. The purpose of the support

; was to encourage the development of the labor movement as a democratic
i. + force and as one of the few mass representative organizations in Ethiopia.
Lo The project was terminated at the end of FY 1973. The total approved.
budget for this project from its inception in CY 1964 to its termination
in CY 1973 was $291,006. Covert support to the Ethiopian labor movement
was approved by the Special Group on 22 August 1967, on 25 March 1970,
on 26 May 1971, and on 8 May 1972.

2. SOUTH VIETNAM: From 1955 to 1975, a series of projects was F
begun designed to build up grass social institutions as a means of
strengthening the democratic foundations of the country. One of the i

‘most long-lasting of these was aimed at supporting the soundly dem- t
cratic labor movement through the provision of guidance and funds to |
facilitate its growth among the workers and rural village peasants and ‘
tenant farmers. L

3. GUATEMALA: In 1972-73, the Guatemala City Station with access
to the government succeeded in dissuading the President from military
‘action against Belize. .

4. HAITI: As early as 1963, the Special Grow discussed ways and
means of influencing the Duvalier * dictatorship. In 1967, a modest pro- 7
ject was approved for the support of Haitian exile radio broadcasts for -F
the purpose of offsetting "the inflammatory propaganda broadcasts to ,
Haiti from Radio Habana."

5. DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: In 1963, CIA was directly involved in the

successful efforts to prevent the return to the Dominican Republic of

So General Elias Wessin y Wessin and forestall his leadership of a right-'
wing coup designed to prevent the holding of free elections.

6. GERMANY: From 1948 to 1960, CIA exploited an asset in a neo-
Nazi political movement both as a source of intelligence concerning its ~

plans and actions and as a means of covertly sabotaging the movement.
and its European counterparts. —

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CATEGORY II

- SECRET
SENSITIVE

1. SOUTH AFRICA: In 1959, after consultation with the Special
Group, the DCT approved an overall expenditure of $165,000 to a leading
South African political figure designed to encourage the creation of a.
new political party. This party was established in 1960. The objective
was to influence the liberalization of the South African Government by
having a legally constituted party in opposition to apartheid. The

activity was terminated in 1962.

2. SOUTH AFRICA: A project ‘was initiated in 1962 to encourage

. the development of a multiracial trade union organization which opposed .

apartheid. It was funded through a European philanthropic organization.
State Department approval was received in June 1963. A total. of $311,705
was spent on this activity. The project was terminated in 1968. ~

3. KOREA: In 1963, the Special Group: approved a-covert action .
project designed to encourage "emerging civilian government" vis-a-vis
the military leadership following President Rhee's resignation and in
anticipation of forthcoming elections; it proposed to support a group. —s_,
of National. Assembly members. ;

-4, KOREA: The Special Group approved in 1967 a project designed
to support a private, rural self-help organization to encourage more
participation by rural farmers in local and national politics to increase
their influence on the Government of the Republic of Korea; it involved
the creation of agricultural training centers in rural villages, a news-

letter and student rural services. It was terminated in 1970 as a project, —

but the movement has been continued under the auspices of the government.

5. ARGENTINA: Between 1950 and 1955, efforts of the CIA were ©
directed at countering Peron's program to obtain wide support in Latin
America for his Movement of Latin American Trade Unionists (ATLAS) which
was designed as one element of his campaign to expand his influence in ~
the area.. Partially as the result of CIA's efforts, the movement never
caught on and it was abandoned with Peron's ouster from power.

6. BRAZIL: From the early 1960's through the ouster of Goulart
and the assumption of power by the conservative Brazilian military, to
1972, CIA supported a rural cooperative movement in the impoverished
Northeast. This support was provided in spite of strong opposition to
the movement first by the Goulart government and then by Brazilian .
military authorities in that area and in spite of the effect particularly
after 1974 on liaison and diplomatic relations if this support by the USG
were discovered. The project was terminated in 1972.

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7. NICARAGUA: ‘During the period 1962 to 1966, ‘CIA participated
in efforts to interdict moves by General Somoza to purchase arms for
military actions against his neighbors.

— 8. SPAIN: In 1963, the Special Group approved : a program to train
15-20 Spanish democratic labor leaders a year outside of Spain to build’
an effective cadre of Spanish labor leadership. In 1966, the Special
Group approved a modest program designed to strengthen the Christian
Democratic movement in Spain through supportive efforts with youth,
political and labor elements.

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22 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr: John Waller

Special Assistant to DDO

SUBJECT: "Summary of Covert Action Operations

‘Against Right- Wing Governments

_ REFERENCE: _ 'SS/CAG Memorandum of 18 July 1975,

Same Subject.

-” We have reviewed referent memorandum and have the
following comments on those paragraphs which concern ©

. Buropean Division.

13. GERMANY. While this case is somewhat

‘bizarre and does not represent a productive operation,
- we pose no objection to its being presented to the

any

Senate Select. Committee.

- 14. SPAIN. We have no objection to. the

‘presentation of these prograns to the Senate Select

Committee for review although we share concern expressed
by SS/CAG that.a leak of this information would be detri-
mental to the base negotiations,

etgena/eisnies We Wells

William W. Wells
‘Chief, European Division

DDO/DC/E/NW :MFBue11: tj (22 July 78),

_ Distribution:
Orig. §& 1 - Addressee
; 1 - SS/CAG
1 ~ C/EUR
1 - DC/E/NW
1 - E/G
1 - E/IB
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25 JUL 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Covert Action Group, Services Staff

SUBJECT : Covert Action Operations Against Right

Wing Regimes

1. Attached are revisions of the descriptions of the
three covert action operations in Africa, cited in your
memorandum to Mr. John Waller dated 18 July 1975.

2. In the case of Ethiopia, we understand from your
discussions with Mr. Clifton Strathern that the labor project
has not been eliminated from your list but that ‘the Director
will request that. discussion of it be limited to the Chairman

’ and Vice-Chairman only of the Senate Select Committee. The

Director should be informed of the potentially embarrassing
procedural errors in the presentation and review of this
project before the 303 Committee, and the risks of exposure

to two former assets. who have been jailed by the new Ethiopian
regime. ;

3. The Ethiopian labor program was undertaken
without 303 Committee knowledge or approval. Subsequently,
the project was presented to the 303 Committee on 22 August
1967 and Mr. Wait Rostow, then Chairman of the Security Council,

_ asked why it had not been brought before the Committee before.

He was told that for projects costing $20,000 or less, it had
been the DCI's discretion to determine if a given project was
sufficiently politically sensitive to warrant bringing it
before the committee. Mr. Rostow directed that the 303
Committee should examine all political action projects.

Nevertheless, the project was not submitted to the Committee
for review in 1968, 1969 or 1973.

4, In addition to these procedural errors, the arrest
in 1974 and continued detention of two Ethiopian labor leaders
who are former assets under this project, and accusations in

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the Ethiopian press that the trade union organization received
support from the U.S. Government, make any disclosure of CIA
interest in the labor organization potentially dangerous to
our former assets. Neither of the former assets was arrested
because of his CIA connections, and neither of the two assets

_nor the labor organization have been accused of CIA involvement.
An admission now of CIA support to Ethiopian labor. or to the.
two Ethiopian labor leaders in jail could be a sentence of
death for them. .,

5. In the case. of South Africa, CIA support to a leading
‘South African political figure to encourage the creation of a
; new political party remains a very sensitive matter. The
- ee principal agent is still a leading and respected spokesman ;
for the opposition party in South Africa and is a leading member |
of the South African parliament. Exposure of the. operation
could lead to his identification which would be extremely.
damaging to him, to the opposition party and to our govern-
‘ment's relations in South Africa. For these reasons, we believe |.
it would be desirable for the DCI to limit discussion of this
operation to the Chairman ‘and Vice-Chairman of the Select.
Committee only. .
6. The European philanthropic organization which was used.
to fund the development of a multiracial trade union organiza-
tion in. South Africa was the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES),
located in Germany. The South African labor officials and
organizations which received funds from FES were not aware
that the actual origin of the funds was the United States —
Government and presumably do not now know of U.S. Government
or CIA involvement. Aside from exposing a U.S. Government
involvement where none is known to have existed, FES was used —
to support a number. of other covert action operations in Africa
i and elsewhere and exposure of the foundation would have
ramifications other than in South Africa. The Director should
be briefed on FES and its range of activities on behalf of CIA
if he has not already been informed.

ign 9 ‘Strathern

Deputy Chief, Africa Division

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Attachments:
P As Stated Above

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‘21 JUL 1975
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr, John Waller
Special Assistant to the DDO
SUBJECT ; : Covert Action Operations Against .
Right Wing Governments
REFERENCE |. .: Chief, SS/CAG Memorandum, dated

18 July 1975:
Subject: "Summary of Covert Action
Operations Against Right Wing Governments"

_ 1. EA Division is concerned about Reference and its possible
use in briefing the Senate Select Committee. Specifically, our. concern
centers on describing the EA operations contained in the attachment to
Reference as ''were mounted against" "right wing governments",

None of the EA operations -- DNSCOOP, DNSPROUT (both of which

took place in Korea) and TUMIX (which took place in Vietnam) --

were or should be so described as being mounted against the government —
then in power. In fact, just the opposite is true. All of these
operations, while covert in the sense that the U.S. Government hand

was never disclosed, were primarily designed to broaden the base of

the governments in power and enhance its stayability by providing ©
advice and support to "grass root elements" in an attempt to get these
elements to function as a more cohesive organization in seeking

-participation in the governmental process,

2. While all of the operations have been terminated, the
DNSCOOP operation is perhaps the most sensitive of the three, in that
it represented an initial effort by the Agency to establish contact with
opposition elements in South Korea. As noted above, the purpose of
this contact.was not to overthrow the ruling government but rather to
assist the opposition in establishing itself as a more viable force in its
effort to establish a two-party system in South Korea. The Agency today

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maintains contact with the major opposition leaders in South Korea

and this contact is well known to and approved by the U.S. Ambassador
in Korea as well as the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific
Affairs, Department of State.

3. We see no real value to be gained if any of these operations
were to be raised with the Senate Select. Committee.

ce: DC/Operations Staff
C/SS/CAG ,

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“’RSbert DY Brown, irs —
Acting Chief, East Asia Division

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SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

‘There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicly appear to be abroad for
purposes of investigating CIA installations.
CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,

! Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
_ SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But

i even in countries in which we enjoy a good

i liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to ‘be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all

cases be distastefull to a host government.

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In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
questyon Station personnel on specific operational
etail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members 0

host country’s intelligence or security services.
Many services will rind contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

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No matter what assurances are given then,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
staff, and the very fact that such matters
i were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.

. -- Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

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T 126005 ETAL65 PAGE Od IN 620730

TORI3Q15012 JUN 75 LOND 628897

CITE LONDON 628897

—

TO: DIRECTOR,

RYBAT
REF DIRECTOR 712872

1, IN MEETING WITH COS ON 32 JUNE» AMBASSADOR TOLD COS .
THAT HE HAD LUNCH WITH SENATOR MONDALE ON 28 JUNE AND ENGAGED
IN BRIEF GENERAL DISCUSSJON OF INVESTIGATION OF BKHERALD BY
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, AMBASSADOR FOUND SENATOR MONDALE
ENTIRELY REASONABLE IN HIS APPRUACH AND FULLY AWARE OF OILFFICULTY
OF JUDGING EVENTS AND DECISIONS OF EARLY 1968'S BY STANDARDS

ier 1975,

i

2, AMBASSADOR REPORTED THAT SENATOR MONDALE STATED THAT
HE HAD MADE SOME EFFURT TO CONTACT BRITISH ON JUNE 28 WITHOUT
SUCCESS, IN LIGHT OF REF, COS DID NOT ATTEMPT TO CONTACT
SENATOR MONDALE ON 26 JUNE, IN CONVERSATION WITH COS ON 3@ JUNE,

RICHARD SYKES, CHAIRMAN, JIC. REPORTED THAT BRITISH EMBASSY

IN WASHINGTON LAST WEEK FORWARDED REQUEST FROM SENATOR MONDALE

TO MEET WITH BRITISH ON 3a JUNE, SINCE SYKES HAD TO BE IN

PARIS ON 28 JUNE AND HOOPER HAD NOT YET RETURNED FROM HIS ASIAN
SECRET

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TRIP) Usk; EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON WAS ASKED TO 2NFORM MONDALE
THAT THEY WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE AT THAT TIME, THIS IS FOR
YOUR BACKGROUND IN EVENT SENATOR RAISES THE POINT WITH HGS,

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TO: DIRECTOR,
RYBAT
FROM GRAVER
REF DIRECTOR 708791

1e IT WILL GREATLY FACILITATE PLANNING SCHEDULE FOR SENATOR .
MONDALE IF A MORE SPECIFIC ITINERARY GAN BE OBTAINED TOGETHER
WITH SOME. INDICATION UF HOW MUCH TIME THE SENATOR PLANS TO MAKE
AVAILABLE TO US DURING HIS BONN VISITs IN VIEW OF THE UNUSUAL
CIRCUMSTANCE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC THAT GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES ARE
NOT CENTRALLY LOCATED IN ONE PLAGE, PLUS THE SPECIAL NATURE OF
BERLIN» 1 AM GIVING THOUGHT TO HAVING CHIEFS OF BASE BERLIN AND
MUNICH PARTICIPATE BUT AS OF PRESENT TIME WE UNCERTAIN EVEN WHAT
DAY SENATOR WILL ACTUALLY BE IN BONN,

2, WE ALSO PERPLEXED BY PARA 6 REF RE“ SIMILAR INDEPENDENT
CONTACT WITH THE BND" SINCE, AS HOS AWARE, THE BND JS LOCATED
IN MUNICH, WE ARE EQUALLY PUZZLED BY THE COMMENT IN PARA 7
ABOUT "SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY! WHICH SEEMS TO SUGGEST
RESURGENCE OF LONGSTANDING MISCONCEPTION THAT WESTPORT IS A

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T 121989 ETA815 PAGE d2eve IN 619528

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PHYSICAL FACILITY HOUSING AND PROCESSING DEFECTORS, THERE
. IS NO WESTPORT FACILITY AS SUCH, JUST A FEW SAFE APARTMENTS
JN FRANKFURT» AND J PLAN TQ @RIEF THE SENATOR ON WESTPORT
ACTIVITIES aS PART OF THE BONN PRESENTATION, IF THE SENATOR
PLANS TO VISIT ANY OTHER LUCATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN
ADDITION TU BONN WE URGENTLY REQUEST EARLY ADVICE THEREOF,
$, ASSUME SENATOR HAS BEEN BRIEFED IN GENERAL TERMS AT LEAST
ON AGENCY PROCEDURES FOR TRACING AND CLEARING OPERATIONAL SOURCES,
REPORTING ON THEIR ACTIVITIES» AND AGENCY FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING
PROCEDURES» KUT WOULD PLAN USE THESE PROCEDURES AS FRAMEWORK
IN DESCRIBING EXERCISE OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN THE FIELD,
IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING GENERALIZED DESCRIPTION OF MAYOR AREAS
OF STATION OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY. . .
4, WILL GREATLY APPRECIATE ETA UF SENATOR AND PARTY BONN
| ‘AS SOON AS THIS. CAN POSSIBLY BE PROCURED, G2 IMPDET,

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REF A, DIRECTOR 708794
B, STATE 146723 DTD 21 vune (WE*
D> 6, STATE 150884 DTD 26 wune (HO-™
/ 24.) We NOTE CHANGES IN SENATOR MONDALE TRIP.

2, REFS 8 & C INDICATE MONDALE ARRIVING =eRexeSEn 28 JUNE
DEPARTING. 297H, TRAVELLING NORWAY THEN RETURNING TO WASHINGTON
VIA LONDON ON 7 JULY. NO MENTION OF OTHER MEMBERS OF PARTY
EXCEPT MRS, MONDALE, REALIZE INFO MAY BE COVER FOR TRIP, BUT
WOULD LIKE CLARIFICATION, DOES SENATOR EXPECT BRIEFINGS
"LONDON ON 28TH VICE 30 JUNE AND 4 JULY?”

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B- LONDON b2b15 JIN b13590] ¥
AS YET WE HAVE NOT HEARD FURTHER ON THE MONDALE VISIT
NOR HAS EUR DIVISION HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO BRIEF ANY OF THE

Tt)

MENBERS OF THE CODEL- IN ANSUER TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS,

( WE HAVE ALREADY FORWARDED TO LONDON BY SEPARATE CHANNEL THE CLEAR-
ANCE STATUS OF THE PARTY. WE HAVE QUERIED ABOUT THE SENATOR'S ~_
KNOWLEDGE OF THE AGEE CASE. BUT KNOW OF NO’ SPECIAL BRIEFING GIVEN
HIM. WE PRESUME HE HAS READ THE NEWSPAPERS. SHOULD THE SUBJECT .
ARISE. WE ARE PREPARED TO ANSWER HIS QUESTIONS FORTHRIGHTLY.

RATHER THAN DISCUSSING SPECIFIC COVERT ACTION PROJECTS AND DIVULGING
SOURCE NAMES. YOU SHOULD COVER THE GENERAL IDEAS BEHIND COVERT
ACTION ACTIVITIES, THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH THEY WERE DEVELOPED _
AND WHY THEY WERE TERMINATED. E24 INPDET «A

o

, DATE: 2S JUNE 1975S so :
ORIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS , :
UNIT: C/EUR _ ijl
EXT: 1412 Sd

WILLIAM We WELLS, - JOHN WALLER. SA/DDO

RELEASING OFFICER . . . COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER
CLASSIFICATION | REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED E 2 IMPDET
| : , oN CL BY:


13-00000

L771 MFG, 2/75 | : : _ j
j . fi

“

CABLE SEC DISSEM of vn TOTAL COPIES _ RUN ‘Ry
SECRET.

PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED. ;

DYAN D/SLOTTED T

RODUCTION BY OTHER THAN
UING OPFICE IS PROKIBITED

IN 616067

7 112809 ELAsse | PAGE O14
. TO RI24416222 YUN 75 LOND 62704

S EC RE T 2444512 JUN 75 STAFF

CITE LONDON 62702 wo

TOs DIRECTOR,

RYBAT | | . 9 ne

REF A, DIRECTOR 708794 w
>. B, LONDON 62615 ¢ ¥13590) = ~
A 1, [RE PARA 5 REF Ay RICHARD SYKES» CHAIRMAN, JIC, |

INFORMED COS AT LUNCH 24 JUNE ‘THAT AS RESULT OF REQUEST FROM

SENATOR MONDALE VIA MURRAY SIMONS+ SYKES AND SIR LEONARD
C HOOPER ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO MEET WITH SENATOR MON DALE. .
ON 1 JULY TO DISCUSS BOTH HOW POLICY CONTRO-IS EXERCISED OVER
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND HOW BRITISH OFFICIAL -
“SECRETS ACT WORKS,
2, SYKES MADE IT-CLEAR THAT HE AND HOOPER WERE THE .
ONLY ONES AUTHORIZED TO DEAL WITH SENATOR MONDALE AND THAT
“SENATOR MONDALE WILL NOT BE MEETING WITH GNGRAPH OR JAGUAR
REPS, . 7
3, WOULD APPRECIATE REPLY To GUIDANCE REQUEST IN REF a.

E2. IMPDET

ee . . BU ROR ET

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Review Staff: 75/1009

24 June 1975 -

' MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Senator Gary Hart's Request to Talk
. to QUWIN While Traveling in Europe

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary
Hart's request to talk to a former agent while the senator

-is traveling in Europe.

The agent is QUWIN. . He was first approached in 1958
through the head of the Luxembourg intelligence service.
At first he was used mainly to spot potential agents in
various European countries. Later he became the major |
asset under ZRRIFLE. In this capacity he made.a brief

..visit to the Congo, but took no actions. -

- On the weekend of 7 June 1975, members of the Senate
Select Committee staff spent many hours at Headquarters
reading files, including QJWIN and ZRRIFLE, among others.
QJWIN's true name contract is in the file which they read.
So is a street and post office address as of 1964, the
time when we ended our contract with this agent. We have

not contacted him since.

We have heard that David ‘Aaron of the ‘Senate Select
Committee staff telephoned QJWIN. This report remains |

unconfirmed. We have protested to Bill. Miller. eck

It is difficult to imagine how a U.S.- “senator could

“talk to a former agent without arousing the interest of

the local intelligence service (probably Luxembourg) and

‘of. the host government who might wonder about the propriety
of investigations being conducted on their territory and

, involving one of their citizens.

“In any ‘event, an approach of this nature “would be

of i interest to the Department of State, and the senator

might wish to consult with the Department before proceeding.
4
Me, Flee
Walter: Elder. - a —
CB: 907789...
| (E2 IMPDET

| SECRET.


13-00000

SECRET —

Talking Points For Use With Senator Gary Hart On His s Proposed

Contact With Qi WYN

Senatorial contact with a former CIA agent would run the
risk of his exposure to his local government and the press.

. Because of his former activities and relationships he

might be subjected to reprisals from abroad, possible
prosecution for espionage at home from his local govern-

-ment and harassment from the media.

‘Active as well as former CIA agents abroad would have
-further cause to believe that the American intelligence

service is incapable of protecting its informants from dis-
closure. Contacting an agent. under the insecure conditions
involved would violate the Agency's promise to this former

informant to protect the confidentiality of the relationship. ~

Foreign intelligence services with which the CIA is in

‘ liaison would find this approach highly unprofessional

and risky. It is bound to raise further questions about
the dangers of continued confidential cooperation with»
the CIA. ;

It is possible that the local government involved might

'. lodge a formal protest to the-US mission protesting the —
-unusual procedure of a Senate investigating committee .—
‘interrogating its nationals in violation of its sovereignty |

without requesting formal permission.

6/24/75

SECRET.

he nen tell


13-00000

20 June 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR; Director of Central Intelligence -

This is for your information concerning Senator Gary |
Hart's request to talk to a former agent ¢ of ours while
traveling in Europe.

You should know that we “have -been told that the
Senate Select Committee staff has already been in touch.

with this agent by telephone. We do not know how they — oo
learned his true name or his whereabouts. We have already

advised David Aaron of the Senate Select Committee staff
of a potential problem.araa in connection with such a
proposed. meeating.. The agent in. question is, of ‘course, |.

' a subject of interest to. the local intelligence service
and we doubt that the host government or the intelligence

Review Staff: 75/868

service would agree. that a United States senator, especially a

a member of the Senate Select Committee, may appropriately
conduct -guch. investigations | within its territory without .
clearance ‘to do. SO. :

‘In any event, an ‘approach o£ this ‘nature would be’ .

of interest and indeed. of concern to the Department of

State and the senator. night. be well advised to consult,

. with then. before. proceeding. -

For your information, the agent referred to is
1981. . ;
ff
Walter Elder |

a ae
oe

7

een Me DDT BBs 007789
oreo re 2 IMPDBP

oo and we » have not been in touch with him since “aoe - 7

13-00000

i Vo 3
MEMORANDUM FOR: DC / ~ a a

Ting pre

| wee unt ene

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4. Lana —tRt | gaghs

FORM NO. idl REPLACES FORM . (47
UG 54 3 wich MAY. BE usep. : . oo so

13-00000

C a ¢ PRa PssED DOD
SE CAGES SHOWN.

| a | | WERE, pp ena S

wri THE WEAvy

BRACKETS, |

‘SUBJECT: GUIDELINES FOR MEMBERS OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE AND |

‘THEIR STAFFS WHILE TRAVELING ABROAD

There have been already and there will continue to be members ae

| ef the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who wish to travel abroad and -

talk to U. s. enbassy and “intelligence personnel. ‘It is essential

' that we agree on guidelines to avoid serious diplomatic and security.

problems. The following specific guidelines are 2 applicable.

I. MEMBERS AND. STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT PUBLICLY APPEAR TO BE ,
| ABROAD FOR THE PURPOSE OF INVESTIGATING U.S. INTELLIGENCE . |
INSTALLATIONS. | —
Most of these installations, including all CIA stations ‘abroad,
‘for example, are under some form of cover, or are naintaining
a low profile. ‘Certainly all have and ‘need varying degrees of
protection from exposure. At one extreme axe U.S. intelligence
activities behind the iron curtain. These clearly need maximum 7
protection. Ther nere visit of ‘SSC representatives could be .
noted as evidence of U.S. _ intelligence presence within the
country. Even in those countries where U. S. intelligence :
efforts enjoy the shielding and other benefits flowing from
close Liaison with the host government, care is ‘required | to -

avoid the potentially grave political repercussions ‘that |

2 Ture — Jodest- Vevs7on | shear pavatiny :

preneces choy ° DoD.

13-00000

; could result to U.S. and host country activities from exposure
of such 1istson. f Severax foreign governments or entities thereof -
now willing to cooperate privately with the U.S. in intelligence
‘agreement s-exchanges naintain strong/neutral or anti-U.S. foreign
policies; continuation of such agreenents-exchanges is. therefore
‘dependent upon avoidance of their public disclosure. ‘In many we
cases termination of such agreements would result in ‘the loss
“of -unique strategic intelligence, and alternate collection -
methods are - either not available or are prohibitively expensive.
‘To help maintain the discreet nature of, the visit, it would be
preferable if some reason other than ssc business could be _
given to explain any visits by SSC menbers and staff. No
Po , “> deliberate contact should be made with the local press; nor
should comments on SSC matters be supplied if investigating
officers are contacted by the press. Local press publicity _
_pertaining to an SSC investigation abroad would in almost all .
cases be distasteful to the host government.
“In sum, except in the case of especially sensitive areas,
discreet arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S.

intelligence activities overseas on a case by case basis, and with

senior officers within the covering embassies. Such visits are
- contingent upon the -SSC member not publicly declaring himself
to be on SSC business at the time of the visit or upon his

‘return, and his proceeding on a basis satisfactory to the Ambassador.

13-00000

to. oF

II, ‘THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE -
OF THE VISIT...
All arrangements and contacts will be made by him, and because

of his knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

of L. FIELD DISCUSSIONS 1 WITH Uv. 3. INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL, | SHOULD BE
: ay Va - CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. | 7 . |
a oe It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational -.
' details are conveyed to the 58C. Field intelligence elements) a
 yild only discuss operations in general terms—operational
priorities, the kinds of operations conducted, . the operational :
ho. . , : ‘environment, relationships with the Embassy and defense attaches, 7
‘ete. In all cases, such discussions will only be conducted in
physical surroundings which meet appropriate security standards. :
Members and staff of the ssc should refrain from asking to. =
- see texts of or general notes on ‘intelligence agreements between
_ the U.S. and the host government. These are usually considered _
by the host government as extremely sensitive, politically and ©.

operationally, and cannot be divulged without ‘the consent of |

the host government.
IV. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT PERSONNEL.
Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local

service scrutiny. For them to be placed in touch with Ssc - members

13-00000

Vv. .

LS.

sould be to run an unacceptable risk. ‘Moreover, serious

damage would be done to agent norale and motivation if their

identity were . to be revealed: to Members or staff of the ssc,

MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY SERVICES

WILL B IN EXCEPTION ..

_ Many foreign intelligence services will find contact with the:
.. SSC politically difficult and will avoid it. They further regard

- that their relationships with Uv. S. intelligence activities, the ©

information they pass, and the cooperation extended are all most

sensitive matters. Regardless what assurances are given . then, _
they would find it difficult and avikivard to discuss these matters
with members or staff of the SSC. The very fact: that. such matters

were under investigation could well cause the host service to

“reassess the desirability of a relationship with U.S. intelligence |

VI.

activities.

MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN TECHNICAL |
INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS .

In those countries in which we operate joint technical collection

‘ sites, the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S.

Congressional representatives, especially where there is public

knowledge of the Congressional investigating interests. If such

13-00000

-- a visit is considered essential, a special request must ‘be

negotiated with the’ host country in advance.

Senate Select Committee principals and staff should --

_ understand the distinction between U.S. intelligence .

installations abroad and joint U.S.-foreign intelligence

. installations or foreign intelligence installations supported

"by the U.S. intelligence community. Access to the former

| Vit.

is at the discretion of the U.S. Ambassador; access to the

‘latter two is at the discretion of the foreign government
_ involved. J a

AN. ORIENTATION BRIEFING WILL BE PROVIDED ALL MEMBERS: AND: STAFF,
PRIOR TO- DEPARTURE.
‘This briefing will be » conducted by the DCI and other representar.

tives of the Intelligence Community (CIA, NSA, DIA, State, etc.),-

as appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize

the visitor with the types of activities conducted at each

- | location, the restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities

in each case and the considerations which preclude the discussion .

‘of operational details, names and terms in an overseas environment.

Members and staff of the SSC should bear “in mind at all tines that.

they and their. activities are matters of great interest to opposition

intélligence services, as well as to the press. Committee and staff

members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly

travel inconspiciously and will be easily recognized.

13-00000

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J 721 MEQ. 2/78. re ae 8 oe es oo ;
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“ PERGON/UNIT NOTIFIED

REPRODUCTION @Y OTHER THA;
ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHUNITRI!

ACTION UNIT

ACTION #

Y i05767—ETAaes IN 613590"
| | _Tenvaniyetz MUN 75 LOND 62615

ne ee EE

8 E. . R &T 2047482 JUN. % stare ed
are: ‘LONDON. e2is a |

Tor DIRECTOR), -

~ REF A, DIRECTOR 707518

By DIRECTOR 708793 oo
“44 THANK YOU FOR ADVICE REGARDING SENATOR HONDALEYS
PROPOSED VISIT) AND. AMBASSADOR “AND! MINISTER HAVE ‘BOTH BEEN
ALERTED, | a oo -
| 2. IN RESPONSE. 10 PARA 6 REF Ay cos: PLANS TO. BRIEF SENATOR
| MONDALE ON STRUCTURE OF THE BRITISH INTELLIGENCE. COMMUNI Ty a |
AND “THE NATURE OF. our INTERFACE WITH 17 WITH PARTICULAR STRESS =
“ON THE GROUND RULES. GOVERNING “OUR RELATIONSHIP. os wee, ALSO. ue oe
“COVER THE STATION'S ORGANIZATION, PRIORITIES, AND THE GENERAL |
| KINDS OF “OPERATIONS BEING RUN, 7 Would: 86 WELPFUL 10 HAVE co od
“ANSWERS TOA NUMBER OF SPECIFIC QUESTIONS THAT OCCUR TO'USs

“Ay. WHAT CLEARANCES. DO: SENATOR MONDALE AND WIS THO. STAFF
. av : co:
ASSISTANTS covet a TO WHAT. EXTENT HAS. THE. SENATOR BEEN INFORMED

|
ee
ABOUT AGEE CASE, ~ AND IN WHAT De TALL. SHOULD THIS, CASE. BE ‘COVERED oo |

WITH HIM AND His THO. “ASSIS TANCTS 7 to WHAT. ‘EXTENT. ‘SHOULD

$ EC: R & T To wer,

13-00000

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. ISSUING OFFICE Is PROHIB

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ACTION UNIT

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“7405747 ~«ETA@OS~*~<“—*“‘“‘*éAE «Ce SS”*~“‘“COCOC*#*;*;*;*;*;*#‘*CN #643804

TORI 2ag9rt uN 75 Lan 62635.

~gpeciFic 6 CA PROJECTS. BE DESCRIBED, “ASSUME THERE 18 NOT. QBVECT IONS
10 POINTING ‘OUT THE DANAGE DONE BY LEAKAGE IN WASHINGTON TO.
“TOWANKBIT, AS A WAY OF. DRAMATIZING THE NEED FOR ‘SECURITY IN THE 2
COURSE OF THE SENATE [NVESTIGATION, Dy IF. THE STATION |
1s TO BE RESPONSBIGLE: FOR THE SENATOR'S HOTEL AND TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS, |
WE WOULD. APPRECIATE, BEING. So. INFORMED, BQ IMPDET. |

as

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13-00000

“= QUTGOING,~MESSAGE

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, s E C R E T o. OUP : cre MESSAGE REFERENCE NUMBER
STAFF 1837332 TRECTOR 208? h
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c[Peleca, elo. Lx , ‘®) ‘cs 0 nerurnto PER
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cla] le? 2 ’ 1 FES >
TO: LONDON. VIENNA. SONN., PARIS INFO OSLO. HELSINKI. ¥ av
ret nr nen - :

RYBATY | a |
we ae

REF: DIRECTOR 207518 {NOT NEEDED OSLO. HELSINKI} 4

L. {REF CONCERNED VISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE TO EUROPE IN EARLY
JULY ON SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION ACTIVITIES-} ¥

2. SENATOR MONDALE'S ITINERARY IS NOT YET FIRM. NOW APPEARS
HE WILL ARRIVE LONDON ON 30 JUNE FOR TWO-DAY STAY THEN PROCEED
OSLO AND HELSINKI FOR VISITS NOT CONNECTED WITH SENATE SELECT
COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES. CURRENT PLANS BRING HIM TO VIENNA 7 JULY FOR
TWO-DAY STAY THEN TO PARIS {4 DAY? AND BONN £2 DAYS}. NO DECISION

Ree Cee TRO

YET AS TO WHICH CITY WILL BE VISITED ESSER VIENNA.

3- MR. DAVID AARON ADVISES THAT SENATOR WISHES THE DISCUSSIONS.
TO BE GENERIC IN NATURE. HE WANTS TO KNOW THE STATIONS’ PRIORITIES
AND THE GENERAL KINDS OF OPERATIONS BEING RUN. BUT HE IS NOT SEEKING

_ SPECIFICS. ¥

Y.. MR.» AARON STATES THERE WILL BE No PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT
OF SELECT COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS, AND IT IS NOT YET CLEAR WHETHER

“THE SENATOR'S PARTY WILL BE TRAVELING BY AIR FORCE OR COMMERCIAL

DATE:
ORIG:
UNIT:
EXT:

RELEASING OFFICER . ° COOROINATING OFFICERS . , . AUTHENTICATING orricen
CLassinicaTion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED = E 2 IMPDET
_ CL BY:

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CLASSIFICATION

SECRET .
MESSAGE HANOUNG INDICATOR OATE-TIME GROUP _ coe . MESSAGE neranence NUMBER
STAFF — So , : DIRECTOR ,
; ae : : O  woex DISSEM BY:
CONF: INFO: FILE DO no moss :
Ao anh, Dame ren
i] IP FILES. #
7 AIRCRAFT-¥

i 5+ FOR LONDON. MR. AARON HAS BEEN IN TOUCH WITH MURRAY
SYMONDS BUT NOT THROUGH CIA ARRANGENENT-- SENATOR MONDALE HAS
ASKED FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE {AND PROBABLY MI-b}
_ ON THE BRITISH OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT AND HOU THE BRITISH COMMAND
SS AND, CONTROL AUTHORITIES RUN WITHIN THE BRITISH SERVICE. WE ARE
NOT ASKED FOR ANY ASSISTANCE IN THIS AFFAIR.¥
b- FOR BONN. SENATOR MONDALE PLANS A SIMILAR INDEPENDENT

GERMAY ENBASSY AD THE BD xf)
CONTACT WITH THE te

7. IN A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE TRIP, MR- AARON SAID THAT IN
VIENNA THE SENATOR WOULD WISH TO DISCUSS EAST/UEST RELATIONS AND
HOW THESE AFFECT THE OPERATIONAL PICTURE IN THAT CITY- IN BONN
THE SENATOR WILL WISH TO LOOK INTO. COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS AND

MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN SEEING THE WESTPORT FACILITY- IN PARIS
THE SENATOR WILL EXPECT TO REVIEW THE STATION'S VARIED PROGRAM. ¥
es B. WE NOTED THE SENATOR'S INVESTIGATION MAY STILL BE SUBJECT.

TO HIGHER LEVEL EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT DIRECTION OF WHICH WE HAVE NOT

YET BEEN INFORMED. £2, IMPDET.dA ~ oT
. pate: 17 JUNE 1975. Pe ——
orIG: WILLIAM W. WELLS  E- -H. KNOCHE Libesevs
UNIT: C/EUR ih.
EXT: 101
‘L luul (ll!
fy, - Ww. “2
UICLIAM W- WELLS4 C/EUR sous’ Oa SALZDDO
CLASSIFICATION REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE 1S promisiTeD — 2 IMPDET

‘ cL BY:
cor fe PF tT ; ;

13-00000

ee SECRET

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE AND- PLACE: 17 June 1975 1000 - 1100
Room 2E-45

SUBJECT: Conversation by Mr. John Waller, SA/DDO with
Mr. David Aaron, member of Senator Mondale's
staff, with Regard to the Senator's Proposed
Trip to Europe

1. According to Mr. Aaron the Senator and Mr. Aaron's itinerary,
while not yet fixed, will be along the following lines:

a. 30 June - 1 July: London
b. Monday, 7 June: Vienna, for one day

c. Paris and Bonn. Although the order has not yet been
determined, the Bonn stop would be two days and the
Paris stop, one day.

In the period between London and Vienna, the party intends to visit
Oslo and Helsinki.. The purpose of this part of the trip, however,
has nothing to do with the SSC and the party does not want or need
Station contact.

2. Mr. Aaron agrees that in discussions with Stations, the
party should not get into specific operational cases. They want to
discuss "more generic" subjects: operational priorities, relations
with the Embassy, problems, scope of liaison, operating conditions,
—t etc. Their basic interests are related to “command and control".
It had occurred to Aaron that Vienna would be a good example of a \
Station which concentrates on "East - West" operations (read third
country, Sov and Sov Bloc operations}. He recognized London was a
liaison station. Mondale, however, was anxious to talk to Cord Meyer. |

E2 IMPDET

SECRET | . Et By 085636

13-00000

a  SERRET

Paris, he felt, would provide some understanding of "third world"
operations. Bonn, he felt, would be a good example of the inter-
relations of a CIA Station with the Military and the Foreign Service.

3. Mr. Aaron stated that he had already sought out Mr. Simon
of the British Embassy, requesting that contacts be arranged in
London with the appropriate Foreign Office or Intelligence Offices
in order to discuss the British experiences in "command and control”.
Aaron is also interested in how the British Official Secrets Act
works. He had heard that it was proving inadequate. Mr. Aaron
stated that Simon had not been enthusiastic about the idea but
promised to look into it. Aaron felt that it had been better to
work directly with Simon, whom he claimed to know,than to involve
the Agency's go-between.

4. Mr. Aaron intended to make a similar approach to the German
Embassy. : ;

5. Mr. Waller commented that such approaches to foreign
- governments would make our liaison services uneasy and could
adversely affect their willingness to cooperate. To this reason,
we did not favor involving foreign governments -- at whatever
level or wherever in the bureaucracy. Moreover, contacts with -
foreign governments increased the likelihood that the true purpose
of the Senator's trip could leak to the press. Mr. Waller mentioned
that he would want to bring this to the attention of others.

6. Mr. Aaron agreed that the Senator, through press conferences
or otherwise, would not make public the fact that his trip was
connected with Select Committee investigations.

7. Mr. Aaron said that he and the Senator were in touch with
Mr. Hyland of the State Department with regard to this trip. He
also sugges ted that they might get in touch with military intelligence
services in Washington and in the field. He made specific reference
to "Naval Intelligence".

8. Mr. Aaron stressed the fact that the itinerary was still
tentative and subject to change.

SEGRET

13-00000

oe SECRET

-3-

9. At one point, Mr. Aaron asked if CIA had any aircraft
in Europe which could be put at Senator Mondale's disposal.
Mr. Waller replied negatively.

10. Mr. Aaron felt that it was unlikely that Mr. Bader
would be a member of the Senator's party.

Distribution:
1 - Mr. Knoche
1 - Mr. Wells
1 - Miss Page
1 - Mr. Leader

SECRET

13-00000

i
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|
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CABLE SEC DISSEM avd PER TOTAL cored — i
PERSON/UNIT NOTIFIED__ : Pam
-E COPY ISSUED/SLOTTED py é/
. ACTION unit
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Ogun | .

action # | Ole Se. “lor <= —

T 892461 E1A462 PAGE 21

TORS1699212 JUN 75

SEC RE T 1668532 JUN 75 STAFF

CITE VIENNA 26877
TOs DIRECTOR.
RyYBAT

REF’ DIRECTOR 797518

IN 696574
VIEN 26877

Nye

1e ALTHOUGH WE WOULD GENERALLY PLAN BRIEF SENATOR MONDALE

ON STATIONS POSITION WITHIN EMBASSY, PRIMARY TARGETS...

ORGANJZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND DEPLOYMENT FOR OPERATIONS, CAN OF

COURSE ADJUST TO SUIT HIS REQUIREMENTS, WHICH HOPEFULLY WILL

COME INTO CLEARER FOCUS AFTER HOS BRIEFING MENTIONED PARA 8 REF,

3. NO FILE, E2 IMPDET.

SECRET

2. IF POSSIBLE, WOULD APPRECIATE CONFIRMATION THAT STAFF
AIDE, MR, WILLIAM BADER (PARA 2 REF) IS IDENTICAL WITH PERSON OF |
SAEM NAME WHO WAS FORD FOUNDATION REPRESENTAT:VE IN PARIS LATE
SIXTIES AND AT THAT TIME WAS NAVAL RESERVE LIEUTENNANT COMMANDER,

13-00000

ng

TOE PRIORITY LONDONs VIENNA, BONN PARIS. 7

-RYBAT 4 yo oe mos | - ne

“suasects THE vISIT OF SENATOR MONDALE OF MINNESOTA TO EUROPE

70 EXAMINE, ‘AGENCY, COMMAND AND. CONTROL IN THE FIELD- " SENATO

“GATING CIA ACTIVITIES. MR. “WILLIAM BADER: A SECOND STAFF MEMBER.
; HAY ALSO ACCOMPANY THE SENATOR. ¥ |

wUILUVIIN NWIRDDIAUE

aa We Cs a
Pt anu ua om 8 aE es
OMF o “Oo OG Oo oO G oo. a oy
. cuassmcarion ce, 7 . . 3l- ;
SECRET - nar
4 SRA 0 MANOLINS INGIeATOR . . _ DATE-Timg GROUP < org Loe MEBBAGH REFAREHCE NUMOER - . .
STAFF oo, L4Lb51Z Dy ECTOR a a 707524

D weez - DISSEM BY: 28
CONF: a/mgi G INFO: FILE bez, ‘Diez, bao, esheF, OAL, o mo wean

_ ofPlan, poole, tlalo ' “efoPs, eleswha rerumre . PER

CfASIEER, - . A vey S Le

| AT THE END OF THE: MONTH. = ee oe
— THE SENATORIAL PARTY. WISHES. To VISIT CIA FIELD STATIONS:

MONDALE. WILL WISH | TO TALK. 70 You } ABOUT. How STATIONS OPERATE AND
THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STATION AND THE: EMBASSY. PRESUMABLY

: THE “SENATOR WILL ALSO UISH TO EXAMINE OUR O8 COUNTRY TEAM RELATIONS. so

2. SENATOR NONDALE ‘WILL BE TRAVELING WITH HIS PERSONAL
AIDE. MR. “DAVID AARON, WHO IS THE DIRECTOR OF THE TASK FORCE .
ON COMMAND. AND CONTROL OF THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTI~

~REequesl. OF ages
3. HEADQUARTERS WILL “SUGCESPHTO SENATOR MONDALE THAT HE USE

OTHER REASONS: THAN THE ‘SENATE. SELECT COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION FOR - |
ET :

HiS TRAVEL: IN HIS. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE PRESS: WE DO NOT KNOW, -
A. ,

HOWEVER, IF HE WILL AGREE-¥ |. . ee eT
“pare: |

ORIG: »

UNIT:

EXT:

. puceanina OFFICER : . coonoinanina ornicans : aurmerncanns OPPcan .

cussemearon «= REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED £ 2 — IMPDET

SECRET , oe | oe, CL BY: 93,2866

13-00000

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* DIRECTOR —

‘wou «OISSEM BY: -

NO iNONX

nao.

‘aerunnto PER

You: ‘SHOULD ADVISE THE “AMBASSADOR OF: THE SENATOR'S” me

INTENTIONS To VISIT HIS MISSION AND. THE PURPOSE OF THE vISIT~ _ .
LEASE. ASK THE AMBASSADOR “To RESTRICT: HIS. ‘CORRESPONDENCE TO. “WASHINGTON .~

BouT THIS TRIP TO, EITHER CIA. CHANNELS oR THE ROGER. CHANNEL - ad

© LATER: RESTRICTIONS MAY BE FORTHCOMING. DEPENDING ON ‘HOU. SENATOR
7 MONDALE DECIDES TO HANDLE HIS PUBLIC STATEMENTS. -
oe 5. THE CODEL' S TENTATIVE ITINERARY IS AS FOLLOWS: DEPART

30 JUNE VIA COMMERCTAL AIRCRAFT > ARRIVING | LONDON L SULYs 2 aULy -

“WIENNAS 3-4 JULY ~ - BONN’ 5-6 “guLy. - “PARIS 33 28 JULY - “LONDONS”

a) SULY = RETURN, TO THE U. si

che. REQUEST EACH COs ADVISE: HEADQUARTERS OF HIS P PLANS FOR

BRIEFING. EvSENATOR. ¥ oo As
| FOR BONN... SUGGEST you ‘CONSTDER A VISIT 10 UESTPORT. vo

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be HEADQUARTERS WILL OFFER A BRIEFING TO SENATOR MONDALE

ano HIS PARTY AT HEADQUARTERS PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE. E2, IMPDETA
“Gf MoRE specific qui Dance ON oPgestione! discussions 7d
Fallow. / EB +Hs KNOCHE 5

_ BATE: 13 “JUNE 1975
ORG: HTLLTAM We hes
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RALSASING OFMcER .

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COORDINATING OFFICERS : a a AUTHENTICATING LJ

chagsincanion REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHISITED £ 2 IMPDET
. . . « . .
: , ; - CL BY:

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13-00000

C-
»

a

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff

should not publicly appear to be abroad for
urposes of investigating CIA installations.

CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive... In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.

SEORET

13-00000

ee

In sum, except in the case of very’ sensitive

areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis. .

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
uestion Station personnel on Specific operational
detail. It is more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files}. There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

host country's sntetiigence or security services.
any services will find contact with tne SSC

politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

SECRET

13-00000
ee | BEURE

No matter what assurances are given them,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
: staff, and the very fact that such matters
! were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
: perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

rome
Stowe

13-00000

—

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
Wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important:

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicly appear to be abroad for
purposes of investigating CIA installations.
CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under

some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.

13-00000

|
t

ee eee i ineee n

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
quest yon Station personnel on specific operational
etail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations
finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There
is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs should
not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if. they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

host country's intelligence or security services.
Many services will Find contact with the SSC
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass us and the sort of -
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

13-00000

No matter what assurances are given them,

they would find it difficult and awkward to

discuss these matters with the SSC or its

staff, and the very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed.to access by Congressional representatives.

13-00000

cy

“ ce : 7 a - —_ _ . slabs

SUBJECT:. Guidelines for Members. of the Select Committee and
Their Staffs While Traveling Abroad © e

There have been already and there will continue to be: members

‘of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) wha wish to travel. abroad and’

.

talk to U.S. embassy. and Antelligence personnel... It is essential that

we agree On. guidelines: to avoid s serious. diplomatic and security. problems.

‘The following. specific guldelines a are applicable: :

I. MEMBERS AND'STAF F OF THE. ssc. SHOULD PUBLICLY APPEAR :
ro BE ABROAD FOR SOME: PURPOSE OTHER THAN. THE °
“INVESTIGATION OF U. S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS,

ee:

‘Most of these. installations, including all CIA stations abroad, for

~ "sc example} a are under, some. form of cover, or are maintaining a low

Profile. . Certainly 3 all have and need.varying degrees of. protection .

from exposure vat. one extreme are U.S. intelligence activities.

behind the iron - cctatn. These « clearly need maximum protection.
The ‘mere visit of SSC. representatives. could be noted as evidence

, of U.S: intelligence presence within the country. - Even in those
countries where U.S. intelligence efforts enjoy the shielding and
other beriefits flowing from close liaison with the host government,

care.is required to avoid the potentially grave political repercussions

13-00000

rie

“ae

that could result to U.S.. and host country activities from exposure

of such liaison. Many countries that wish to cooperate with the

' United States in intelligence endeavors simply cannot afford public _

exposure of such relationships. Some reason other than $ SSC business
should be given to > explain any visits by SSG members and staff to
help maintain ihe discreet nature of the visit. No deliberate: contact
should. be made with the: tocal press, ‘nor should comments. on 1 SSC
matters be. supplied if: investigating officers are: contacted by y the :
presa. Local press publicity pertaining to.an ssc investigation abrond.
would in almost all cases be distasteful to the host government, ‘ : 7 |
; In sum, ‘except in. the. case-of especially sensitive areas, discreet

arrangements can be made for SSC visits to certain U.S. intelligence :

activities overseas ‘on a case. by.case basis, and with senior officers

within the covering embassies. Such visits are contingent upon the’
ssc nlember 1 not. “Publicly. declaring: himself to be on ssc. business.

at the | time of the visit or upon his return, an and his procéeding ona

7 basis satisfactory to the Ambassador:

THE AMBASSADOR AT THE EMBASSY VISITED WILL BE IN CHARGE

OF THE VISIT.

All arrangements and contacts. will be made by him, and because of his

_ knowledge of local situations, his advice will be binding.

13-00000

Mm. FLELD DISCUSSIONS WITH U.S, INTELLIGENCE PERSONNEL
SHOULD BE CONDUCTED ONLY IN GENERAL TERMS. :
It is more fitting that Washington be the place where operational
; details are conveyed to the SSC. Field intelligence elements will.
only discuss operations in general terms _ operational priorities, .
the kinds of operations conducted, the operational environment,
relationships with the Embassy and. defense attaches, etc. ‘In all
cases, such discussions will only. be conducted.in physical surroundings.”
which meet appropriate security standards. |
Members and statt of the SSC should refrain from asking to
‘see texts of, or general notes on intelligence agreements between the
U.S.. and the host government. These are usually considered by the
host government as extremely sensitive, politically and operationally,

and cannot be divulged without the consent of the: host government. -

IV.. MEMBERS AND STAFF OF THE SSC WILL NOT INTERVIEW AGENT

PERSONNEL,

! _ . Foreign agent personnel frequently are under hostile or local service

° scrutiny. For them to be placed ‘in touch with SSC members would be

13-00000

to run an unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage. would be
done to agent morale and-motivation if their identity were to. be -

revealed to Members or staff of the SSC. _ . -

Vv. MEMBERS OF HOST COUNTRY INTELLIGENCE OR SECURITY. 2 |
. SERVICES W WILL BE.CONTACTED ONLY my EXCEPTIONAL CASES: 3
Many foreign intelligence » services. s will, find contact with the ssc
7 politically difficult and. will avoid : it.. “They further regard that their -
relationships with U. s. intelligence activities, the information. they. -
pase, and the cooperation extended are all most sensitive matters! ~
‘Regardless. what assurances are given them, they: would find it -

; difficult and awkward to discuss these matters with members or

staff of the ssc. 7 ‘The: very fact that such matters were

‘the host: ‘service to: reassess: s the , desirability of 2 a. fe

relationship with U.S S.. ‘intelligence activities. i

[EMBERS AND'STAFF OF THE SSC SHOULD NOT VISIT FOREIGN

TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS.

* In those countries in which we operate joint. technical collection sites,
the host would be firmly opposed to access by U.S. Congressional .
repre sentatives, especially where there is public knowledge of the

Congressional investigating interests. If such a visit is considered

13-00000

Sd

essential,.a special request must be negotiated with the host country

. in advance.

-. VIL AN. ORIENTATION BRIEF ING, WILL BE PROVIDED. ALL MEMBERS

' AND STAFF, PRIOR. TO DEPARTURE,

This briefing will be conducted by the. DCL: and other representatives -
of the Intelligence: Community (CIA: NSA. DIA, State, etc. }y as cate

appropriate. ‘The purpose of this briefing is to familiarize the _

visitor with the. types of ‘aétivities conducted -at each location, the
_ restraints which are imposed upon U.S. activities in each case and ,

‘the considerations which preclude the discussion of operational details,

names and terms in an overseas environment..

“Members and staff: of the ssc. should bear j in mind at all times that

: they. and their activities: are ‘matters af: great interest to opposition

intelligence services, as well as to the-press. “Committee and staff. o .
members, particularly those who are publicly prominent, can hardly

travel inconspiciously and. will be easily recognized.

13-00000

|
| «

i

wae a

°

SUBJECT: Guidelines for Members of the Select
Committee and Their Staffs While
Traveling Abroad

There have been already and there will continue to
be members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) who
wish to travel abroad and be in conversation with our
Stations. It is important that we agree on guidelines
to avoid serious security problems from arising. The
following specific guidelines are considered important :

-- Members of the SSC and members of its staff
should not publicl ear to be abroad for
urposes of investi ath CIA installations.

CIA Stations abroad, all of which are under
some form of cover, have and need varying
degrees of protection from exposure. At
one extreme are Stations behind the iron
curtain or in other particularly sensitive
areas which need maximum protection. At
the other extreme are Stations which enjoy
close liaison with the host government and
are thus less sensitive. In the first case,
Stations existing under strict cover conditions
in sensitive environments, the very presence of
SSC members could be highly provocative by
flaunting the fact of CIA's presence. But >
even in countries in which we enjoy a good
liaison with the host country's security
service, there remains a need to be discreet.
Many countries whose services want to be
cooperative with CIA cannot afford public or
parliamentary exposure of the relationship.
Local press publicity pertaining to an SSC
investigation abroad would in almost all
cases be distastefull to a host government.

SECRET

13-00000

|

In sum, except in the case of very sensitive
areas, discreet arrangements can be arranged

for SSC visits to CIA's overseas stations and
with senior officers within the covering Embassy
provided the SSC member does not publicly declare
himself to be on SSC business and maintains his
Station contacts on a discreet basis.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

uestion Station personnel on specific operational
detail. It 1s more fitting that Washington be the
place where operational details are conveyed to
the SSC. It is at Headquarters where the guide-
lines are best understood, where the most complete
and authentic records are kept (many Stations

finding themselves in dangerous crisis situations,
have periodically destroyed their files). There

‘is no reason, however, that Station Chiefs. should

not discuss operations in general terms -- opera-
tional priorities, the kinds of operations, the
operational environment, relationships with the
Embassy, the service attaches, etc.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not
interview agent personnel. Foreign agent
personnel frequently are under hostile or
local service scrutiny. For them to be placed
in touch with SSC members would be to run an
unacceptable risk. Moreover, serious damage
could be done to agent morale and motivation
if they were to think their role had been
revealed to members of Congress.

Members of the SSC and their staff should not

in most cases be in contact with members of

host country's intelligence or security services.
Many services will Tint contact with the ssc
politically difficult and will avoid it. They
further regard that their relationships with CIA,

the information they pass us and the sort of
cooperation extended as a most sensitive matter.

SEGRET

13-00000

2
m
re
“4

~

|
| wow Par *
t
;

No matter what assurances are given then,
they would find it difficult and awkward to
discuss these matters with the SSC or its
staff, and the very fact that such matters
were under investigation could well cause
them to reassess the desirability of a
relationship with CIA or other U.S.
intelligence agencies. Exceptions can
perhaps be made in special cases.

-- Members of the SSC and their staff should
not visit foreign technical intelligence
installations. Again there may be exceptions
to this which can be arranged, but in most
countries in which we operate .joint technical
collection sites, the host service would be
opposed to access by Congressional representatives.

SECRET

