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88296" ‘Docid:32989624. Page Z-
oF st | @) aa ° 0h ee od


«Mae

, Docld:32589624 Page 3

Mr. a a
- Mr. W. 0. Cregar
- Mr. T. E. Burns

be ON,

G2-116395 duly 25, L975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
©O STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELAIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC}

RE: FURTHER DOCUMENTS PERTAINING 96 .
THE FRI AND DEPARTMENT oF JuStrcE FAN
port nD ; quart, TtON CORTE SS"
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES eon 1S UNCEASBLFLED,

DATE, REY 0 BSh Laan

Reference is made te SSC letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendices, requesting certain decuments and
ether information from the FEI, ~°

Lten number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix B of refer-
enced commutiieabion requested Combittee, Staff decess to all
indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated -
by the Intelligence Division for 1960 to the present.

Attached to this memorandum is a list of all.
retrievable programs, projects, surveys and progedures
anployed in comnedtion with domestic intelvigerice operations
of the PRI which may be of interest to you. There were a
number of other programs, projects, surveys and procedures
employed in connection with foreign counterinteliigence
operations of the ¥BI which are not included. In the event
you. desize information concerning these lather items, which
inelude extremely sensitive matkers, we would be pleased to
diseuss them with SSC Staff Members at FEE Headquarters.

Enclosure

Assoc. Dit. _—_ 1 . The Attorney General

Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv. __

asc Ote TRB: 1ek/lhb |h\y ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG
Comp. Syst. (8) wy . : . ‘A
Ext. Affairs —_ ’ oo ,

Files & Com, __

Gen. Inv.

Ident.

Inspection * ; SEE ‘NOTE PAGE 2 n
Intell. fe

Laboratory

Plan. & Eval. Pun gol :
Spec. Inv, y

Training

" ;
Legal Coun. |e ERCLESURS, a , 2K
duce sey MATLROOMC] TELETYPE UNIT (I (gQ- -- /f 4 oa Ys 7 4 Y ’ GPO S54535

/

Saar Caren afd.

Pa rn ay eee Sr En en


SPR in rg
3 SHOW:

EXSe

4.

6.

t

Tae pededee nae ereneteNer ene recereres

oo Progen CLASS Pic atick
beats pave mos T FES AT
oats ay DES K oN THESE
| CODE MNES /copewords

€DS-
ar 2 eSERRH need
Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

‘Policies and Procedures

NOTE: Ke SECRET

The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List
(PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra,
were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of
available INTD inspection reports and files. —

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPI

Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries ~ Developing

positive intelligerice information regarding personnel in thé
United. States from non-Soviet-bloc countries, .

International Oxganization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside

2 SRE TTY Vee

the Soviet-bloc — Centralized compilation of potentially danger’ .

ous aliens with diplomatic immmity against whom the U. S. State .

Departinent could initiate steps to deport or to lift
diplomatic immunity in the evént of a war emergency.

‘Name €hecks of Aliens ‘Holding Diplomatic -and International.
Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name chécks
conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community
based on information provided to such intelligence organizations
by INS regarding aliens meeting established eriteria.

Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel). U

Anagram ~ Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in] (sy

the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.
(Mr. Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-

tive information such as that regarding (Anagram) and electronic Cs)

surveillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given
to Senators Church and Tower). .

ifr SECRET

-2~-

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page4

5. (Aten - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United states (s)


9.

LO.

aL

; Chinese University and. Graduate School “Thdex ~ tisk of ~~ - wtp

12. [Cokma - Specialized physical surveillance directed. against ,
foreign intelligence officers.)($) THwe FILE E5- 73750 : i

. Oe : é

13. (Gani. ~ Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in the ‘i
United States from Europe through Canadas) ($s) 8

14. Chicoin - Countérintelligence activities to thwart “DRC u
efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country. 1) ye NS i

15. Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York i
University, other than those in authorized prograns, to uncover ee
Soviet illegals. (¢) :

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 5

Further . Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED : ge SECRET
Banpop ~ Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer
of funds through Swiss banks,

a ne

4

aes

of ethnic. Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intélligence assignments. ; —_

Chinese Aliens Entering thé United States ~ Identification

any
©

Chinese Communist Contaets with Scientists in the United States ~
Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
background as foreign counterintelligence assets to. be

targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC) “
personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada.

Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -
Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments,

Chinese aliens in the U.S.

who have attended cotleges or
graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
eonsidered potential candidates for development as U.S.
assets. —

KP SECRET
~3-

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4


ié.
17 2
18.
19.
20.6
22.
23.

24.

25.

21.

Further Rocuments. Pertaining .
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE. CONTINUED: 3 SECRET

Proho —(Program to detect homosexuais who have been compromised :
or recruited by Soviet intelligence.)(S FALE fe S+/4697%

oe

visitors to communist China and Contacts by U. Ss. Residerits ~
With Chinésé Diplomatic Establishments. - Investigations. wt
 Gondiicted regarding certain individuals. meeting éstablished .
exviteria,

at
ent
ee

Visitors to Iron Curtain Comtriés ~ Interviews of ‘sélected
Uy S... tourists to. determine possible contact. by Soviet-bioc
intelligence. 1)

kid - Pechnical penetration of Soviet -establishmerits in the
United - ‘States. (s) Five 10 5-/89362

Cloverleaf - Technical penetration qf new Soviet residential
complex, Riverdale, New York CityXD) Fut 5-2 3/856 |

Sari Survey “ Screening of mail to Selected European cities ;_U

Gus Survey ~ Screening of mail originating in New York, ¢)
New York, destined for specific postal zones.

Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets ~
Racording of Soviet purchases in such areas--intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes.

(Rega. - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.
as aliens during certain years. )($) 65°78074

Csecomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include |
development of sources. against the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico. 9) Free (05-/4 F076
KP SECRET ;
~ 4 =

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

296 Docld:32989624 Page 6


26.

27.

28.

29.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

Hhw.88296 Docld:32989624 Page 7 meeniiinans

vee te GRESTT S as kl greres mENTion ¢

30.

° pev Pore? memo

“a Vie

a aye ITSEL
soeT CLASS # a)

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures
7 6

Sobir ~ [nvestigation GE d¢ertain Soviet-bloc immigrants ana
répatriates in an attempt to identify those previously
reeruited by Soviet-bioc intelligencé.]/(s) 7

NOTE CONTINUED: . fe SECRET

Sodap ~ Review of certain records to identify Soviet
illegals who have applied for documéntation as U.S.
résidents as part of their oferty to establish a bona fide
cover identity. ite ¢5-G6// _

Vietnamese Refugee - Efforts to uncover possible
infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow
to the United States.

(Watkiok - Screening of requests for birth eertificates under
an established criteria to identify such requests which

may have originated with Soviet intelligence }(S)_ eret ae

‘Weéhnical: ‘and Microphone ‘Surveillance : ad Survey of ‘telephone
and microphone installations functioning at certain times. VU.

Gi Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying

Al Fatah members and théir contacts through use of ADP
equipment...) ($)

Cuban Refugee - Detectién of Cuban intelligence agents
who might: tes strate into the U.S. through refugee
channels. (S) 2

Deseco ~ Development of selected contacts to be directed —
against Soviet-bloc officials.

Bast-West Exchange - Provided internal security safeguards
regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite’
nationals. U

4 Coverage - Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission

to the United Nations. U

aRe SECRET

-5- .
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6


Panag POEVOne nd VED Cad bd bu MEM AIG AER by ALTE GE BE
re yErnamenuyy SES RLALL LSS Cb Atak et

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: a ae SECRET

36. Chiprop - Sereening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong
* and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

37. Chiclet - Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
and the PRC.

38, Gacheny - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic
‘ revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets. directed at
uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States /s)

39. Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected
foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify
Soviet illegais 7) (S) Fite es -799%03

40, Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political
intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad fer th gt
information of the. White House. \) Fr ut @U-) Yor Ren

41. Coarpit ~ Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S,
military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S. fi ue
Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents. SOM 96395

42, (@hrenology ~ Efforts to identify Soviet illegals who formerly
resided in a specific foreign country and whose present
whereabouts are unknown)($) Fics 65 - 7s cof

‘3, indefiniée.

6 Docld:32989624 Page 8 _


SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Tutelligence Commu Fity Staff FROM:
ATIN: Central Index

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED
for review but not transmitted, so note.)

x | vocumews | [errerine 7/25[75

+ TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

. IDENTEFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum

. IN RESPONSE TO (List date and item number if in response to formal request, other- 6. CLASSIFICATION OF
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter
u, c, S, TS or
Codeward)

SSG request 5/14/75, Part I, Appendix B, Item lb U

. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)

Information Handling
Intelligence Collection
Operating Procedures

. SUMMARY (see reverse side. before completing this item)

Aecess to all available indices and control files
regarding all programs operated by the Intelligence Division
from 1960 to present.

62-116395

AJD:ihb ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
(4) IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75,

3791 (6-75)

NW 62796 Docld:37929624 Page 9


‘
ee

INSTRUCTIONS

e Type,or print clearly. in ink... . moe

e Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

.

e Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

e "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.

e If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.
SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8.. SUMMARY - enter brief -narrative statement describing
substance of information and. showing relationship to. Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feédbaék or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
@.g., tastrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or-former employee, ete. If actual document or transcript
is: provided,.. that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.

~ oy
, rs . é :
. ‘ ee

NW 88296 Docid:37989624 Page 10


po . :

OPFTONALFORMNO. 10 rt 5010-106 i, .
GSA GEN. REG, NQ a7
UNITER STATES G ERNMENT  ) . Assoc. Dir, st
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams De aD een
} = Memorandum Ls Mel 3. al Mintz ston
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Con San
o  : Mr. W. R. Wannall pate: 7/28/75 Files & Como
. . 1+ Mr. W. 0. Cregar lew
FROM : W. O. Cregar UOA in . mime —
im | | Plen, & val =
SUBJECT: _ SENSTUDY 75 . Trelning,
No : | Eon

a {Director Sec’y __

This memorandum records for the record my effotts
to meet with Mr, Thomas K. Latimer, Special Assi aes) Sto th
Secretary and Deputy Secretary “Of Defense, orf 6/25/75,

On the late afternoon of 7/24/75, Mr, Benson
Buffham, Deputy Director, National Security Agency (NSA),
made available to Liaison Agent Brian Murphy a copy of a
"Top Secret" memorandum dated 4/20/71, written by Louis W.
Tordella, who was the then Deputy Director of NSA. This
Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shamrock, copy of which
is attached, makes reference to a file entitled Shamrock
avaifable in the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Intelligence, United States Army. WA
ee
Pursuant to your instructions on the evening of ee
7/24/75, I personally contacted Mr. Latimer at approximately
8:00 a.m., 7/25/75. In my conversation with Mr. Latimer, I
noted that it was imperative that I see him as soon as
possible regarding the contents of the_Shamrock file,
Mr. Latimer was informed that the Bureau was attempting to
establish the line of authority relative to the Bureau's
procurement of foreign government's cable traffic sent
through international cable companies in the United States.

RECS /, 2. G2 a “a
Mr. Latimer indicated nc he Ll. “ceelind a afea
from Mr. Buffham on the late afternoon of 7/24/75 and was

aware of the Bureau's interest in reviewing certain memoranda
in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer indicated that this was

a matter of interest to the General “consult vith then. ga
of Defense and that he would have to gonsult with vA.

Enclosure } 8B JUL 37 107%
62~116395 TOP SEGRET Mi wna ATA
, WOC:Lhb [lg
tf. (5) n CONTINUED ~ i

i QSURE
| Rey JUL 3.4 1975 i

NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 11


Memorandum to Mr, W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75
62-116395

He advised me he would have somebody from the General Counsel's
office, Department of Defense, promptly contact me regarding
a review of this file by FBI personnel.

Not hearing from Mr. Latimer by the late morning
of 7/25/75, I telephonically contacted his office, He was
not available and I asked his secretary to have him return
my call, Shortly before noon, Mr. Latimer returned my call
and explained that he had discussed my request with
Mr. "Marty" Hoffman (phonetic) of the Department of Defense.
It was Latimer's understanding that Mr. Hoffman had gone to
the White House to discuss my request with Mr. Philip Buchen,
Counsel to the President. Latimer promised that he would
telephonically recontact me as soon as he could establish
contact with Hoffman. I again reiterated to Latimer that it
was imperative the Bureau have access to the Shamrock file
in order that we could advise the Attorney General as to
its contents hoping to clearly: demonstrate that both the
then Attorney General Thomas Clark and, in fact, President
Truman himself were aware of certain information contained
in the Shamrock file. Mr. Latimer said he understood clearly
what was at issue here and that he > would get back to me as
soon as possible,

At 1:50 p.m., 7/25/75, I again called Mr. Latimer's
office and his secretary informed me that Mr. Latimer had
stepped out of his office and that she would give him a
message to call me as soom as he returned. As of 4:00 p.m.,
7/25/75, I had not received a return call from Mr. Latimer.
ACTION :

For information and record purposes.
- - \
h- AK By

Pur

| NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 12


- Johnson's own handwriting is a noté t6 the éffect that he showed the

moms es am oe nema rccree, 9 OT .

ce a fa € r

ECAE

Ms SECRET/LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: SHAMROCK

Mr. Buffham and I had an opportunity this morning to read
the SHAMROCK file in ACSI. Major General Joe! McChristian gave
us permission to view it but once we had read it,after careful con-
sideration he decided that he would not feel free to give NSA either
the file or a duplicate copy without personal permission from SecDef
inasmuch as SecDef had entrusted the file to ACSI] in 1949. All of
us agreed that an approach to the Secretary would be unnecessary
and perhaps would generate too many questions. He did agree
after sealing the file again to limit access to the Secretary of Defense
on demand, the Director or the Deputy Director, NSA, on demand,
Chief of ACSI, and the Chief of the SSO, ACSI. Thos wmtd wheal m

id uf f .

a ry
sve OS

‘
Pa tte te erect ee eth cet ROO RAAF ARACEAE ERA PAC PM TIO AL RRO ORY

The file contained memoranda for record, one prepared after
a meeting in Forrestal's office attended by senior « Officials - from ITT,
Westém Union; and RCA plus” Markg I Teva (then Defense. General
Counsél), Secretary Forrestal, and a representative from the Attorney
General's office. Colonel Carter Clark from ACSI, who was present,
prepared this memorandum. A subsequent meeting was held in Secre-
tary Louis Johnson's office attended by representatives. of the same
“three companies and I believe the Attorney General himself, In Mr,

also-a “digcussed the matter with the Président. > Both memoranda ‘indi-
cated that the ‘companies were informed that the work they were doing
was of very great importance to the U.S. and every effort would be
made to protect knowledge of its existence as well as to protect the
companies in the event of exposure.

The material is filed under TS Control No. 516652- 3~5 in the
SSO ACSI files.

—

a ‘Ly / tn,
LOUIS W. TORDELLA :

mAh 3. A Me BIS oR Director

Pe SECaAeTr
_— boon &
eno


Paved ‘
we “OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION

rf UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT f Assoc, Dir.

\ M. d 1 - Mr. J. Cochran, Jr. De AD ne a
. 1 - Mr. RB. J. Gallagher Asst. Diss
\ emoranaum 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall Admin.

; e! VY 1- Mr. W. O. Cregar comp, Syst. —
ANNALLS DATE: July 24, 1975 Fle & Com —
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan dont. —
GAR i - Mr. A. B. Fuiton Insewcton
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan Laborotory ———
yf 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford ¢ bese! cou.—
r:SENSTUDY 75 i - Mr. F. S. Putman Spee, Ines
1 ~ Mr. J. W. Redfield Training
TFs ot 1- Mr. T. J. McNiff & Telephone Rm. __

Director Sec’y __

My memorandum dated 7/23/75 captioned as above advised
you that this Bureau had received from Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) 190 pages ¢ extracted from a 693-page document prepared by
CIA citing instances wherein CIA believed some of its activities
may have exceeded its legal mandate. Some of the CIA activities
cited in this document include references to Buredauw-operations” of
an extrenely sensitive nature and it was also noted that the Senate
Select Committee has had access to this document. It was recommended
that pertinent pages extracted from the CIA document be routed to
the respective Bureau Division and/or Intelligence Division Section
believed to have an interest in the material contained therein for
the purpose of fully identifying the subject matter and making an
Nb. assessment as to whether any compromise to this Bureau's operation
AY is involved.
~>
a

: This is to advise that the following pages from the docu-
* & ment were furnished to the following Divisions. and/or Sections of
“) the Intelligence Division on the morning of 7/24/75 for the purpose
of review, assessment, and recommendations, if any:

General Investigative Division - Pages 107, 108, 111, 149-151, TA
155, 156, 158-161, 178, 180, ———
181, 296, 298, 301, 353 and 354

Laboratory Division - Pages 65~67, 113, 118, 119, 182, 202, 221,
222, and 234, (pages 238-240 and 248 were
furnished for information purposes as these
pages contained information concerning
techniques used and/or developed by CIA
which may be of interest).

Intelligence Division pect { Ua ok tf te 3 Wr Yd J

Section CI-1
Pages 23, 24, 28, 29, 70, 72, 73, "77, T36, 740~142,
298, 329, 582, 615, and 628,

BS JUL 31 1975
62-116395 con oneeomat
TIM:ekw (12) CONTINUED - OVER

Rul

8A JUL3 1 1975

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 14 4


Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

Section CI~2
Pages 30 and 329

Section CI-3
Pages 26, 59-61, 282, 290, 292, 295, 310, 334, 361-363,
368, 371, 373, 376-379, 384, 385, 458, 468-470, 591-593,

and 615.

Section IS-1
Pages 188, 189, 283, 330

Section IS=-2
Pages 29, 30, 171, 190, 191, 193, 194, 197, 198, 203,

330, and 482,

Section IS-3
Pages 521 and 549

Recipients of above pages were requested to respond to
above request by memorandum captioned as above to reach the
Senstudy Project, Room 4063 JEH by the afternoon of 7/28/75.

ACTION ; None. You will be advised of results of above requested
assessment,

Existence of the 693-page CIA document and the
information contained therein Should be closely
guarded and disciosed only on a neéd—-to-know
BAST

asis.

AA A

-~ 2

88296. Docld:32989624 Page 15 ; |


‘based’ newsmen who, at the.time, had been publishing news articles

‘who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.

‘research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3 other Agency

‘officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director

vof other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span

_of the activity precluded positive identification, [t was observed that through

' to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access

_ NW 88296 Docld:32589624 Page 16

caine Scat a rr
— ‘

>. OJECT MOCHINGRIRE— @

Project Meekingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
between 12 March 1963 and.15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-

based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency
and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.

Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections
were established with the assistance of a telephone company official

Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.

John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of

the Defense Intelligence Agency (Gen, Joseph Carroll), In addition to
Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and

of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector
General (Lyman Kirkpatrick} and the General Counsel, (Mr. Lawrence
Houston). ;

The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
of whom 11] were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number

these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.

Since the termination of Project Moekinevird, those materials related

of two Office of Security professjonals. “ye ‘I, .
CA Mo 375° FIR 0023

ENCLOSOHE

SECRET EYES ONLY

VARHING HOTCE 7
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES |

oun BIT TROAN tNaeVe.y
>


; ae

ent, {,

! . TE:
p He

SUBJECT: Soviet Defector

"A Soviet defector,
‘defected to a representative of this Agency in
‘1964. The responsibility for
his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
: After initial interrogation by
representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
house in. Maryland, . where he
was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a specially constructed "jail'' in a remote
wooded area at ISOLATION. The SR Division was convinced
that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their
contention and he was confined at HS@EATION in an effort
to convince him to "confess."

_This Office together with the Office of General
Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality
of the Agency's position in handling a defector, under
these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms)-by
this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the
Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 Qctober 19, the
responsibility for his further handling was transferred
to the Office of Security under the direction of the Députy
Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.

The Soviet defector - was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr

Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became apparent
| ‘that the Soviet defector was bona fide and he was moved to
more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
’ of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
| fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time. He has proven to be the most

1
a

i

, oo. 7 |  B2 IMPDET
ni . L vr

| CL BY 000988 = Qaga-

| SECRET :
\ se BYES SLY |

INW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 17 _

St ee ee eee oe _ ow ~


)- SECRET
> TES Gil Ps

valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever
had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were
explored.and.have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
of Soviet recruited agents — -in’ several
countries throughout the world. He currently is living
under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
and remarried an, American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,
and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
“while I regret my years of incarceration, I have.
no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."

2 00024
SECRET |
EVES ONLY Oo

| NW 68296 Docid:32989624 Page 18


SECRET
P soy @

SURVEILLANCES | \

- A, -SIBSTA

During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May,,.
and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of
Miss Deborah Fitzgerald, a former staff employee, and
Orlando Toro Nunez, a Cuban national with whom
Miss Fitzgerald had become professionally and emo-
tionally involved. Surveillance was predicated upon
information that Miss Fitzgerald had been seeking from
employees information in Information Processing Division
files, and that employees were visiting a photographic
studio operated by Miss Fitzgerald and Nunez in Fairfax
City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,
one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of Nunez
was aborted because of a door lock problem.

B. PARAGON

Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved
by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of Iden 69
and her associates at various times’ from May to September
1971. Iden 69 » an acknowledged Latin American revolu-
tionary, had long been a source of the WH Division and
had given. information regarding a plot to assassinate
or kidnap Vice-President—Agnew and the BEE. Surveil-
lances included coverage of the activities of Iden 69
during two visits to the United States, technical cover-
age of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives
in New York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.

C. GELOTEXI

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-
ducted of Iden 180 of the Washington Post during
_ : faa .

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 000988.
Vf

PS O002G
~ 4

SECRET.
EYES OuLy

Pa

py

SS a ie


SkGici
e Be @

the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971

and on 3 January 1972.. In addition to physical sur- t
veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
veillance was designed to determine Iden 180 sources

of classified information of interest to the Agency

which had appeared in a number of his columns.

D. MUDHEN

At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con-
ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg
men,’ Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the

' physical surveillance, an observation post was main-

II.

| Docld:32989624 Page 20

tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
Was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
highly classified Agency information appearing in his
syndicated columns.

BE. BUTANE-

At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
to determine his activities and contacts both with
Agency employees and other individuals in regard to
his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-
posing Agency operations.

POLICE SUPPORT

A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,
the Intelligence Division of the Metropotitan Police
Department was provided a communications system to
monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the

‘Washington area. This system consisted of a radio

receiver-and an Agent at the Intelligence Division
Headquarters and several automobiles from an Agency
Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
mitters and manned bytwo Agency employees, as well asia
representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan.
Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was that
the communications over this system were monitored at
the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of
possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-
stallations. . :
Q00nY

2
SEGEET

BE]

EYES SLY


a -  CEGRET
> EVES GLY @

- B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several .
, items of positive audio equipment consisting pri- \

marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone
dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan
Police Department, Fairfax-County,—Virginia, Police
Department, Montgomery—County;—Marytand; Police
Department, New-¥ork—Cits Police Department, and the
sSan-Franeisco;-€attformia, Police Department.

_LII, GENERAL SUPPORT
~ A. -SRPOINTER-

- Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-
cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
Airport in New York City. This operation included not:
only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
tious opening and photographing of selected items of

. Mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
nal security interest which was disseminated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now
in a dormant state pending a decision as to whether
the operation will be continued or abolished.

B. AELADEE

For several years the Office of Security has pro-
vided support to a Russian, defector of
interest to the CI Staff. This support has consisted
of numerous things, including documentation for a change
of identity on three occasions.

'C. REDFACE-—T-

In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-
pied by a former defector working under contract for
the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and

3
VE se
seepey ‘00023
WV -
EVES ONLY An

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 21


SECHE!
ems 4

sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering
a safe within the vauit. The purpose of the opera-
tion was to determine whether the individual had
any unauthorized classified information in his
possession. .

D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS

In January 1971, the Director approved a request
from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
Clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
: . through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of’
, Security operating in
: Falls Church, Virginia. Support
includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
activities af other BNDD employees; (2) Recruitment
: of Chinese or Spanish speaking covert Agents; and (3)
. Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and
Other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reim-.
bursable basis.

E. KITTENS PROJECT

As a result of a request from the Department of
State, approved by the DCI, this office has, since
October 1972, provided protection on a 24-hour basis
to two. sons. of a foreign leader who are attending school
in | the United States. This support includes
the financing of the protection and the detail to the
Department of State of six armed Agents of this office
who are documented as State Department Office of Security
employees. .

F. ~MERRIMAG—

From February 1967 to November 1971, an
Office of Security proprietary, recruited and handled
several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring

SECRET 000%
EYES CRLY

LNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 22 |


PO gee

EVES Gy

dissident groups in the Washington area considered
to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
installations. One of these Agents _so, successfully
penetrated one dissident group that the Agent was turned
‘over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
this period, the Office of Security field offices
were tasked with collecting available intelligence
on dissident groups. All such information was in-
cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside
Government agencies.

io,  F. cANTDERS

Several months ago, at the request of CI Staff,
and with the approval of the DDP and the DCI, this
office arranged to move a sensitive defector out of
a European country via commercial transportation and
gain entry into the United States without leaving
any trace of his true identity.

i 00039

\

5
SECRET

1, . Re
| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 23 EYES iv


os array
) a | By -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: General: Office of Security Survey

*

li May 1973

1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in
_RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security

questions had arisen.

This program, which included upwards ofa

dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current

interest.

2. The principal object of Security's interest through this
informant is a female who was employed in RID for a number of years

until she resigned in 1969,

Her resignation coincided with the initiation

of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
not know whether the employee was aware of this security review at

the time of her resignation.

3. Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance

with a Cuban national.

Reporting by one informant, who was also

being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have

an intelligence interest in the female.

The same informant also sub-

sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among

clerical and secretarial employees of the Agency.

Among these

employees is one girl who works in a biographic section in SB Division.

4, Subsequent to her departure from the Agency, the ex-RID
employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the
Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In this
capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially

those requiring passport photos.

Recently, she and the Cuban sought

to employ Security's informant in this business on a part-time basis.

CTLNT

like

(NW88296 Docid:32989624 Page 24 : :

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_ NW 88756 Docld:32989624 Page 25 _.

5, Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,

but it is inconclusive. e is known to have been a member of anti-
7

Castro organizations J this country. There are alNJJreports that

his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other -
episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.

6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
principal informant.
. a
7. There is conclusive evidence that the Cuban expressed ;
interest in certain 201 files in the Agency, and there are good grounds,
for believing that the RID female employee delivered at least one such

‘file to the Cuban while she was still in RID. There is also evidence

that the female employee in SB Division has continued in frequent
contact with her friend,. the ex-RID employee, and the Cuban. On
one occasion, she served as intermediary for contact instructions
from the Cuban to O/S's principal informant. The informant has no
knowledge, however, of any other requirements that may have been
levied on or satisfied by the SB employee. Neither does he know of

. the extent of contacts by this couple with other Agency employees

except social contacts.

8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for
over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-_
gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed. The FBI, which
was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security,
As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions
it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security
has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-
promising the operation.

9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed, the course of watch-
ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitant action himself that
would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge
of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current
Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues

own


to be quite limited. Neither the Cuban nor his girlfriend have made
any further approaches to Security's informant recently, although he ~

- continues to see the cially. Thus, there is slirMJJheason to believe
that further waiting will produce a break in the case.

10. There are two courses open to the Office of Se¢urity now.
It can attempt to have the Agency employees known to be in contact
with the Cuban transferred to nonsensitive positions. This might
alert the Cuban to our penetration of the operation, particularly
since a plausible reason for transfer would be difficult to develop
for some of the persons involved. Alternatively, Security could
move overtly and charge the Agency employees with violation of the
security regulation requiring reporting of contacts with foreign
nationals. This would, of course, terminate the Office of Security's
_Operation. _
ll, One of these courses of action should be chosen promptly.
The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing ‘
information on CLA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further
delay in moving against her. Moreover, itis possible that the Cuban
has current productive penctrations of RID. Thus, the risk of damage
to the Agency seems clearly to outweigh any. possible gains from
continuing this CI effort.

Te.

i aserebebeing
ee .
need a

| reer |

-NVE88296~Decid:32989624 Page 26 : . wo
Sgr


NW G8296

_ individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--

Lobe h ie isa

willie Huilig cid ies nk UL abi

. co, 9 May 1973

MEMORANCUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management § Services

SUBJECT . 3 ,Press Allegations re Use of Agency
Polygraph. on,

-1.° This memorandum is for your information only
and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
today. ;

2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
American preposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
York Times over the by-line of Iden 181. It was
devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information and directed a sweeping
investigation within the United States Government to
determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
was conducted uncer the direction of Mr. Egil Krogh and
Mr. David Young, Staff Assistants to Mr. John Ehriichman,
Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.

‘3. On the basis of investigations conducted by
State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--
‘one individual in the Department of Defense and three

were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted
me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect

in the Department of Defense.

\-

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ADERISTRATERERAL USE mm

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00065

Decld:32989624 Page 27 ae —


PS Ab TD Tia accanl vai U7

4, I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
in matters involving the national security the Agency had -
detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State
. Security, a polygraph eperator and a polygraph machine for
his use in polvgraphing State Department employees who
were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty.
I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
ation was their total responsibitity. I further informed
him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-
tain his request and that even then it would require the
specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
Mr. Gentile.

S. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
and inquired es to whether the arrangements had been made.
Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the sane
polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an
excellent idea and that he would instruct Defense officials
to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
examination.

6. The four individuals were Iden 182
of the Department of Defense and Iden 183
Iden 184 » and Iden 185 - of
the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The polygraph
examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
| results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
memorandum is attached.
| .
t

7. ° Iden 186 “, a staff writer for The
‘Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1977,
Stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees
suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal

= NW88296—<Docld:32989624_ Pag.

_NW.88296_Docld:32989624 Pag

* fDiandSiRiuisacueat BE Gil
eo . . @

- Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a
Tetter to The Washinaten Post and said that the polygraph.
examinations nad been Concucted by another agency. -Specu-
lation centerec around the Agency, but after a day or so,
press speculation in this regard died away.

8. Iden 186 apparently has never been satisfied
and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.

Bray learned today that Iden 186 plans to use a press
conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
this point further. fir. Bray has been given guidance by

Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible
he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
Department Security officials utilizing an operator and
a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I
do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
iden 186 but I suspect that it is and that this is the
reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was
the source.

baycach y Dire

loward 3. Osborn
Director of Security

Attachment

‘ ASIEN ATA fa ene: preery wa
Adnuisianivt- iaed Gates die ue

. coves

OTe TT


® | @... 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

. SUBJECT , ¢ Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: ''~- Use of CIA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for. FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use
against a common target in the U.S,"

2. Ina follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building.

There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some OTS assistance, was working on new gadgetry for the
surveillance. Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff,
3. The second item: "-- Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
; 4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested

- by State Department was $3,000, 000 but that the Director would

not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in

those instances where some operational activity was involved or

could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicalaction influence
_ activity, etc. Mr. Clarke was not sure of the’ ‘amount of Agency

00079

EET ryES feb yy

Waesikh feo ui qL

i. “a0: .
€anless Pmgetstlic, inssek ote or eves!


funds used.
additional detai

He fdalt that only Colonel White could supply

| He said Senator Russell dP Repre-
sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
asked not to be briefed in detail.

f a . .
bis G hee fark
Johr-G+Richaznds.
Inspector

Attachment

ee | | 00074
SEOPET-EYES GY


9 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Per your instructions

-~

1, Ihave no recollection of specific contacts with the
Elisberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms' instructions
at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment
should be’a matter of record. -~ : , ,

2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
Colby is fully conversant are:

= Clactivity of Dick Ober, DD/D.

[7 * «= WHEBRINEY and MHMUTUAL investments and
accumulation of Government capital.

= -~ Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S.

. {° real estate for FBl and provision of technical °
No.” fA equipments by NSA (MHDOZEN) for use against
(2 [3 a common target inthe U.S,
& .
ar?)
-~ Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer x
Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. A
7 : Mae trip to SEA. C
ai, | |
XN
WV

Clarke

EVES OiiLY . Ke

| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 32


iN

“SUPJZCT t Items-in John Clark

_.

; Docid:32989624 Page 33 . 1

» 54 bne 1973

MEMCRANDUM FOR: Inspector General

to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973

1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
praviously been reported. The first: "-- Use of CIA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equiprnents by MSA (MHTDOZEN) for usé
against a common target in the U.S.'!

2. Ina follow-uo meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
being given to the FEL in cashiers checks for the purpose of
buying an apartment building .
SO There was also
Agency help given in handling the purchase. Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to MSA who, with
some OTS assistance, wa3 working on new gadgetry for the
eurveillance. Mr, Clarke said he thought the only problem -

’ hero was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought

the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. Ray Rocca of the DDO/CI Staff.

‘3, The second item: "+- Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational exvenses

_ of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."

4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money reauested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e., crowd control, politicayaction influence
activity, etc. Mr, Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency

00073

CLL TTS mes

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tae whew

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

. FBI referred to in para 1 is not shown
.in other documents in the Agency. If
and has been kept very close with Mr. Yale,
“Mr. Magnusson, aind possibly Mr. Colby.

"All Files have been purged.

ForN RO« REPLACES FORM 10-101 4
1 auc 54 OL wnice mar BE USED. — . t ”
° .
. .
. .
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.

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NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 34. .
He OBE. MOCK wee sbes Page 4

,

, ” : i
ih .

an

pe 7 "ee ee ——
bd x . -

to . | 0% KAY 1973

> e

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Management and Services
FROM : Director of Finance
SUBJECT -: Special Other Government Agency Activities

1. Project MHDOZEN - Colonel White, Executive Director-
-Comptroller, acting for the Director, authorized the Director

of Finance in a memorandum dated 17 November 1971 to obligate
$2,700,000 for a sensitive domestic FBI operation and to
disperse all or any part thereof in such manner as may be
determined by the receiving agency and relayed to Finance by
the Chief, CI Staff, DDP. This authorization was reaffirmed
by Mr. William Colby 18 April 1972. This Project is still
active. :

2. bPMEDLEY - Rental of office space in New York City
for National Security Agency at the request of Dr. Tordella,
Deputy Director/NSA and approved by Mr. Karamessines,
Deputy Director for Plans.

3. Detailees - The Agency has reimbursable.and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.

4. ' Project TWOFOLD-- Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics ana Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
‘a domestic Agency Security proprietary.

‘Ss. Department of Justice - On 29 April 1971 the

Executive Director-Comptroller authorized a payment of
$858,555.70 to the Department of Justice for negotiated
sensitive services. Details were kept in the Office of the
Deputy Director for Plans.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 006567
‘ i

A
joo
.

Bae STele\rar,

—NW 88296 _Docld:32989624 Page 35 _


ae

: 6 6

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT  : «Special Report

1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
provide information on situations or associations that
might appear to be irregular on the surface.

2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
‘Backsrouna: For many years the Centrai intelligence Agency nas
etailed employees to the immediate office of the White House
- per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate

office of the President such as the Council on International
Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Beard. We have furnished secretarics, clerical
employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable
and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no
Clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a
laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
invitations tor State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
were apparently available to run the White House and most of
our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with
detailees. Levies have been made by this Administration and
others on Defense and State and other Government entities
whose employees have Top Secret clearances.

Professional officers have been and are at the present
time assigned » the National Security Council and we have seven
clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.

| In addition to the above, we have technical specialists
detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
security officers detailed to the Department of State to

\

ry mei E 2 IMPDET Cl By 003935
CONFIDEHTIAL : y 00395

00405

— '
oe ees oe

NW 88296. Docld: 32989624 Page 36 . ; = a “ ——

. i . : _ fer


-protect foreign visgtors. Recently, John ag wes detailed -
to the Secretary o he Treasury along with mr other Agency
employees. We have even, in rare. instances, detailed our
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of. time.

-3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies -
Discussicn: Details to NSC, the Write House, NSA and the
National War College are probably quite cefensible. On the other
hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees
currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and Mr. Peter Petérson having an Agency employee as his
secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce {she also made
@ trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his
present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
a@ hew detail sometime this month. Iden 112 served for —
over ten years as Director of the Office of. Public Safety for
AID. This information has been kept "close to the vest" during
that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability
retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
automatically at the expiration of this leave.

Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
other Government agency has been carefully considered and
approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
involved.

4. Project TWOFOLD I believe the support we are
providing to Project TROSOLD is an activity that should be .-
reported under your guidelines. Since this is an extremely
sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandun.

S$. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities:. In a more
general sense, Contract Personnei Division prepares and executes
contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are
domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided
in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.

6. Arrangements with American Firms: In the interest of
reporting "too much, "I would remind you that Contract Personnel
Division writes "acreements" with domestically based American
firms to provide cover for Agency assets, The actual assign-
ments are overseas. The arrangements, however, are backstopped,
in | the main, in the United States.

oe _— C0106
CONFIDENT L ee!

WW 88256 Docid=33489624 Page 37 . ore a


7. Contractu Relationship - USJPRS: @« Agency
organization, USJPRE, has a contractual assocMation with
approximately 1,500 independent contractors and 45 contract
employees. These individuals are unwitting of the fact that
they really work for CIA in the performance of their domestic
activities. USJPRS (United States Joint Publications Research
Service) is a part of FBIS. They perform a translation service
of unclassified documents for the Government. The independent
contractors work in their own homes and are given assignments

as the need arises. The contract employees are "integrated"

into the Bureau of Standards and are located in Washington, D. C.
They are paid and administered by the Bureau. CIA reimburses

the Bureau. Their basic contracts of employment are prepared

in Contract Personnel Division.

"8, Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is. a record of
External Employment Assistance branch's action on a request
from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or
resigning from the Agency.

Sometime in the spring of 1972, Iden 38 of EEAB
received a call from Hicward Hunt who asked tden 38 1f he had a
retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks.
Iden 38 sent him a resume on Thomas_Amato who retired

‘31 July 1971. Iden 38 did not document his EEAB record

to show the date of this exchange, but Mr. Thomas-Hester (who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
March and May 1972.

All of the above information was reported to the Office
of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.

9. Resume Sent to McCord: Ross Lambert, a contract
employee who retired in September 1971, was a client of the
External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job
after retirement. One of the leads given to Lambert was
James McCord's security business. EEAB sent a resume to
McCord, but Lambert was not hired.

In mid-summer 1972, Mr. Lambert telephoned EEAB from ~
Chicago. (He had a job there with the Halifax Security Co.,
a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had

Ww

CONFIBENTIAL 00107

—NW-88296—Bocld 32989624 Page 38


ee as ~ T = — 7 7 rs aaa |

not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
the D.C. area.) Hegjaid he had been visited@y a Special
Agent of the FBI wh¥told Lambert that his re™ume had been
found among McCord's papers. The Agent wanted to know if
Lambert had any connection with McCord. Lambert explained
how the resume got to McCord. After the Agent left him,
Lambert telephoned EEAB. Mr. Xennedy of OP and Iden 29

OS were notified immediately. ° ~

hae’ ul?
Ang). 1U4hen
; Harry B. Fisher
Director of Personnel

.

ce AL OE 00268

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 39 a ot oo —~

| gi KAY 1973
.

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities Performed by: the
Office of Logistics

&

1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
of Central Intelligence.

2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the

-Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the
Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein
reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-
quest of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief
description of each action involved and then have included the
mame of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-
mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.

3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
initiative of this Office are as follows:

a. A covert procurement proprietary concern, dedi-
cated to the acquisition of firearms, ammunition, and
related police-type equipment, is operated in Baltimore,
Maryland. It was organized in 1969. This proprietary
is operated in order to give the Agency a capability to

‘obtain such materiel without associating the procurement
action with the United States Government. It is legally
_mecessary that the proprietary be licensed by both the
State and Federal jurisdictions. Since it is located in
Maryland, it is appropriately licensed by the Maryland
State Police to buy and sell firearms and ammunition.

EVES. OWLY
SECRET ws 5-229"

SENSIT 1 WE

-MW-88296—Docid:32989624 Page 40


Sensitive <ctivities Performed by th

Logistics

“SUBJECT: “Office of

The Maryland State Police have been briefed on the Agency's
association with this proprietary and have assisted us in
obtaining the appropriate State license. Similarly, a
Federal license has been obtained for the proprietary
through an arrangement with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
and Firearms of the Department of the Treasury. They, too,

have been briefed on the Agency's association with this
proprietary.

b. Under Title 18, Chapter 2512 of.the U. S. Code

- (1968), the sale of electronic intelligence equipment is
prohibited except to Federal agencies, and state and local
Jaw enforcement agencies. In essence, this law makes it
almost impossible to procure electronic intelligence
equipment in a covert manner so that no tie or relationship
to the United States Government is made. In order for the
Agency to covertly obtain such eauipment and hide any
Government interest, the Covert Procurement Staff cf the
Procurement Division. hag relied on an established working
relationship with aU.S. firm. | This firm, a prominent
supplier located in. Maryland, deals in a wide
range of law enforcement, police supplies, and equipment.
The Covert. Procurement Staff has. had a relationship withan officer

“4. in the firm for over 15 years. The officer agreed to

allow us to place orders through his corporation to major
suppliers of this equipment with a billing to 2” Agency national
proprietary.There is an understanding that. if any -inaquiry
is raised by the Department cf Justice, the firm's officer would
immediately call the Chief of the Covert Procurement Staff
who would, through appropriate liaison channels, contact
the Department of Justice, identify the.Agencv's interest
in the procurement action, and clear the officer of any

~responsibilitv.. Cn 10 September 1971, there was an inquiry
about the proprietary _fron_an FBI agent making a routine
investigation of. the officer's books. Through Office of
Security liaison with the Department of Justice and the FBI,

-.the agent was informed that it is an Agency
notional proprietary. This disclosure closed the inquiry
and, since that time, there has been no further inquiry.

Most of the DD/O area divisions from time to time submit
requisitions to us to acquire surveillance equipment. The
majority of the transactions are on behalf of the intelli-
gence service with whom liaison is conducted in various
foreign countries. By agreement between this Office and

- a SAs . _
EVES oly i
| SECKEL +. 002484
; 7 S ay

| WW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 41 : a , . woe


.
%

'
Ss

| SUBJECT: Sensitive <ctivities Performed by tk

following items are pertinent:

‘Colonel White explained that the Technical Services

yO

.Ment that has been involved in the undertaking.

other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel

“request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency

Office of

the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition fer surveil-
Jance equipment unless it has been approved cy the CI
Staff of the DD/O. - ,

Logistics

4; Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the

a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.

Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive project _ .

; Oe » Colonel White did not dis-
Close the purpose of the assistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information
concerning the mission or purpose of Project sub- -
stantive questions concerning the subject should be
addressed te TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
for the FBI_are..revorted below, Specific mention is made,
however, of the Project because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately $1 million, and the complex technical equip-

b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reim-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
amount of $356,900 is for two Westinghouse television
cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which -
Will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
and Services.

c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported
Standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
would either enter into “accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This

Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
Vide a service for, another Government agency when such

EYES OMY ~
SECRET =, 4s OB

-NW'88296" Docld:32989624 Page 42 . ph a
Lo a ~ J


TWRYPEO UWi-lI

SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics

o é

action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities
readily available from another. A typical example of this
procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In
connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and

Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this memorandum..

d. In connection with the disclosures during the sunm-
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
two acts. I directed the Secnritwidéficer from our: West
Coast Procurement Office at the Iden 87 _. .

to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
himself that classified material furnished then by the
Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
7 , His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior

. Security: Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a
letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual
interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-
Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.

This memorandum reports that FBIS regularly
disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation
but that instructions had been issued to cease

- distribution of classified reports. While no
other direct dissenination went to Rand, other
USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
"many" copies of DD/I products to Rand as au-
thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
dum also states that Rand personnel had ~
requested searches and document retrieval from
the CRS facility.

8. In connection with action taken for the Office of
Security, there are three relevant items:

. @. The Printing Services Division, OL," was requested
by the Office of Security to print a book written by
phy, Office of Security. The book was pre-
pared by ety under a Brookings Institution Federal

~~

\e

; ‘he .
Eee Yo 7 7 ‘OO1L3

|_nw.88296. Docld:32989624 Page 43


SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics | .

Executive Fellowship.-- The book is entitled "Where's

What -- Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
formation that may be useful to an investigator. The
book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.
Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made

in September 1968.,...The. title page of the took gives
attribution to Metre, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Ccnfidential,
and it is our understanding that the distribution was mace
to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if
desired, - . Lo

Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested
that the Agency give consideraticn to our publishing, at
LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
was the ‘intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
determined that the LEAA request should not be honored be-
cause the Agency should not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcement material for general and un- -
classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities.

b. On S January 1971, the Director of Security re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven:motor
vehicles for use in connection with a special support
operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
randum of 5 January 1971, that "This support activity has
been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director

‘and has his personal approval." The request was approved.

c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
’ requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in
other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
-by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.

SECRET 00428

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 44 . 7


NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 45
™ :

SUBJECT: Sensitive activities Performed by the Office of
-Logistics

6. In connection with the responsibility held by this
Office to obtain, manage, and dispose of safe sites for all

Agency operating components, the following information is
relevant,

a. <A safe site, identified as "Safehouse 562" which
is Iden 88
was made available to General Cushman’ s
office on 23 July 1971. .
The subject safe site was acquired on 15 June 1970
as a replacement for a terminated OL standby safe site
and in keeping with the approved requirement for a com-
plement of five standby safehouses for all Agency use. .
The apartment has one bedroom and is located in an older
high-rise building along Iden 89. The nominal
lessee is Iden 90 a securityv-cleared
attorney With offices located at Iden 91
. - The cover story utilized is that
Iden 90,. > rents the apartment for business conferences,
meetings, and occasional overnight ‘stays by his staff
and/or his out-of-town clients. The original lease term
was for a l-year period, 15 June 1970 to 14 June 1971,
with month-to-month renewals thereafter. As an OL standby
safe site, the apartment has been used by various Agency
components to meet their short-term or crash requirements.
Control of the standby safe site and its security is the
responsibility of this Office. A record is maintained of
each user, component, and date of use; however, no record
is made of those persons being met at the site nor for what
purpose the site is being used (meetings, training, etc.).
Such information is maintained by the operating component
requesting the safe site. Records maintained by this
Office disclose only that the apartment involved was made
available to General Cushman's office on 23 July 1971 in
_ answer to a telephonic request.

b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami
Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National
Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
a meeting place for officers of the Miami Station who were
in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering

EVES Cn LY : i | - _
SECRE!  * : _ _  O0ALe


.

SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics ;

@ . 4]

assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant
operating component on this matter.

7 The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.

. ;

t . —s)

{ — a oe

Le bil

; John F. Blake
Director of Logistics

2 Atts | “
cc: DD/MéS

EYES; ORIN | 00245

-NW.88296 Docld:32989624 Page 46 SECRET : See ee _


PoP . MLA : : : 4
: _ EYES. O#LY
Receiving |
Requesting Date of U.S. Depart:
Office |. Request Item Quantity Unit Cost ment or Agen
ern re nana ae
Os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzer 1 1,350 BNDD
TSD 5/16/72 Transmitters, Radio Beacon 8. 313 BNDD ,
os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzer 1 “1,350 it White House .
. . Communicatic
" Ageng
os . 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers ' 413 1,400 Air Force
0s 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers “10 1,350 ' State
Os 3/23/72 Telephone Analyzers 2 " 1,375 AEC
TSD 11/16/72 Camera Sets , 20 656 EBI
- TSD. 4/17/72 Camera Sets .10 700 TRI
TSD 11/18/71 Actuators, Recorders ~ $80 "488 FBI
TSD 4/19/72  Tessina Cameras . 3 _ 700 - BNDD .-
wu. TSD -- 12/ 7/72 Camera, Video ‘i " 18,045 FBI ‘
ee TSD 10/13/72 Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance, Lo. 4,639. EBI
S " - Equivalent of WL 30691 ; ;
Tsp 3/26/71 Tubes, Image, W L 30691 2 4,607 FBI
p TSD 4/20/73 Cameras, Television 2 18,300 FBI
“VEN INS TOTICE EVES ONLY
. Rw ss2ge'Bigeldsbobdeed Baws ar | QUAD ET


|
| Requesting Date of. .
Office Request
TSD 12/14/72
TSD 10/20/72
TSD 10/13/72
'” TSD 5/26/71
TSD 4/22/71
TSD 4/22/71
TSD 4/22/71
OL 2/25/71
mes) 1/30/71
OL 8/12/70
--‘TSD 1/10/73
TSD 6/28/72
8
bed TSD 7/26/71
ee)
Aw 86296 Docld:32989624 Page 48

EVES. ONLY

Item

Transmitters, Radio
Actuators, Recorder

Tube, Image, Burn-Resistance,
Equivalent of WL 30691"

Tube, Image, WL 30691
Transmitters ‘

Module, Plug-In

Power Supply - UWP-39A
‘Telephone Analyzers
Telephone Analyzers

Cable, Special- Purpose

Ink, Special Formula

Ink, Special Formula

Transmitter, Radio Beacon

EYES ONLY

CUOPl

Quantity

3
25

no YF FP WwW SS

22

5,000 ft.

1 lot

‘1 lot

Unit Cost

313
591

4,639

4,639
1,372
1,247

568
1,350
1,350

42

1,825

3,700

728

‘FBI
FBI

U.S. Forestry

Receiving —
U.S. Depart-

ment or Ageng
BNDD

FBI
FBI |
FBI

oe

FBI

Treasury

Treasury

White House
Communication
Agency

Immigration a
Naturalizatiu
Service

Immigration
Naturalizatio
Service


SUBJECT

THROUGH

OJCS-594-73

it

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency

MAY 1973

Deputy Director for Management and Services’

: Activities which might be considered sensitive

issues.

-

Most Sensitive Projects —

OICS Project Officer
Project Organization, &
Identification Telephone
TYDRY Richard Ober
. CI Staff
Red 1465
EANTA Iden 48
OS
“Red 9298
ORDSTAT John-Hutchings
. ORD
3061

Sensitive Projects

DRUGGS Iden 18

OMS
7792

EYES ON!

a4
SECRET
oes INI, Ih

W 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 49

Vy

Nature
of

Project

A special pro-
ject initiated
by DCI

Machine
index to
security files

Information
storage & re-
trieval of drug
related data
(GRD's project

-OF TEN)

Computer file
of drug data,
oe

Ihave listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
might be considered sensitive issues,

OCS
Reason for

Listing
Type of
data being

collected.

Type of

data in
- index.

Type of
data in
files.

Type of
data in
file,

COZ 43

ere


i ie

N

Ww

~ Sensitive Projects (Continued)

OJCS .
Project

Project Officer
Organization, &

Taentiticad:

“PROFILES-

TSD
362-1922
(sterile)

Telephone

Nature
of
Proiht

Statistical -
analysis of
psychological
data. ;

OJCS.
Reason for
Listing

Source of
data. Con-
tractors are
involved
with project.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern

TILAQ-

SPYDER

DMYREC—

APREGIN

88296 Docld:32989624 Page 50

Rebert-Hehn -

SB
Red 1185/
125]

George
Swegman—

5071

Iden 48

OS
Red 9298

Walter-
Kowalski

CI Staff

Red 9338

ONL

Pattern
analysis of
surveillance

data from
foreign liaison

service

Data on

radio {requen-
cies used for
support of In-
Piece Monitor-
ing-System, a

Nature of
data. Tech-

; niques of

system dis-
cussed with
FBI,

Project
originated by
James McCord.

system to identify

unauthorized
transmitters.

File of auto-
mobile license
numbers.

File of Agency
applicants who
were not
hired,

Nature of
data.

Nature of
data, .

a


— a a ==

‘. :
.

Sensitivity Unknown, but Possiblv a Matter for Concern {Continued)

OICS Project Officer Nature OCS
Project Organization, & of Reason for
Identification Telephone Proje — Listing
o~ Iden 187 . Cooperative Association
. ‘ IsD/DDO program with with the
"Red 1442 . Iden 188 named
: . , ' organization.
&
. - _ , in
- name grouping
techniques.

WBexbe Clues

—
JOHN D, IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support

EVES ONLY = oosaz

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 51


—_ , ee _ St 33289/73

rs | ry 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
.. Office of Communications, Operational
Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies

a .

1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit,
which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
to these activities in monitoring, identification and
DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
Miami area. Arrangements ‘for this support were made
through the DDO's Chief, WH, Miami.

2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/
DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate
a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial
telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.
The circuits carried drug related long-distance calls of
interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
the survey was conducted at the OC Relay Station at Iden 92.
Virginia, where the circuits could be satisfactorily inter-
cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
intercept was instituted, On 30 January 1973, all coverage
was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
complications.

3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
Electronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
for support of specific activities have been made by the
Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of

DOWNGRADED TO SECRET
UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

E2 IMPDET CL BY 061947

. SECRET .
ABE wrim-pecaailg «00240
porte pale -_ AARILE VIA bala, WAH E LS

¥

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 52 a _ |

S. 03289/73

8 May 1973

exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical
assistance and training, and the loan of Agency eauipmenc.
In the past several years, support has been rendered to
sensitive FRI projects &M HAWK, UNION and WUGRAVEL., Support
has been and is presently being given to FBI projects ORKID
and RESE. These projects are described in the attached
sealed envelope. .

4. An operational test of an NSA- developed HF/DF
system was jointly conducted by NSA, Division D/DDO and
OC-SPD personnel in the early part of the summer of 1972.
A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on
the roof of the hotei being used as the receiving/DF site.
A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the
roof. A team member in effect told him that the group
was an advance security segment for the Democratic National
Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests
were completed and the equipment was returned to the
Washington area.

signed Iden 53

Chief, Special Programs Division, OC

satya tt

- se TRP SESRET |
! ewes HANDLE VIA era CARES 00141
Si Gs : . |

d:32989624 Page 53 _— AR

Te


, SENSITIVE
: . ® 9 My 1973

MOHAWK—

-

1

Electronic survey of Iden 63,
This operation was terminated apprOXimately two
months ago. SPD/SEO personnel participated for
two days.

Jden 98 flocding of tha cipher device employed by
the Iden 94 . Embassy on their diplomatic communi-
cation link. SPD/SEO.support terminated two
years ago. . ,

UNION.

!

Electronic surveillance of Iden 64
Washington, D.C. SPD/SEO involved ‘only in pianning
-at this time, (attendance at two meetings).

ORKID-

-ROSE Electronic surveillance of Iden 62
: . SPD/CMT personnel sexrformed an’
electronic search of the Iden 62 _ | area’ and SPD/SEO
personnel conducted a spectrum search/recording
of the spectrum covering -i-to-.6 GHz during the
period 16 to 20 April 1973. Plans call for contin-
ued support by SPD in the future as requested.

WOUGRAVEL

t

Division D operation involving a Ider 95 code clerk.
SEO provided equipment, trained case officer in

use of device and stood by in Iden 97,

Washington, D.C., to back up case officer if neeced.
The operation took place in July 1972.

¥, VW Cs ions car
Dey Uae . .
; jot .
y SENSITIVE . , 00142
andd A °

prong Sten : ; i
gn a fo fr este @Laeclont 1" . " ‘ 7 |
SS AS2989624 Page 54 a

Ininin ci] oeciey party
ta iA ache aselsi


% . . ° F,
6 é

29 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General

SUBJECT :Mr.Colby's Request to Inspector General to
Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
‘ina PP/B Memo to DD/M&S

REFERENCE : D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
. . Subject: Watergate Principals - Direct or
Indirect Involvement :

. 1, The two notes of 13 and 20 January 1972 refer to approval
by the DCI (at that time Mr. Helms) for the expenditure of $30-32K

asked that DDO records be checked.

2. .DDO records show that the funds went to the CI Staff for a
-project called Iden 99, This is a joint operation with the Iden 100
service for the collection of BEET intelligence. The activity is
handled by the Special Intelligence Group of the CI Staff,

*3.. The funds cited in the notes was transferred to Clon
13 January 1972. :It is believed by DDO/MPS and the CI Staff that
the two notes refer to the same appropriated amount,i.., ($30 to 32K
and not to two separate allocations,

PD Lircde

John C. C heed

—NW°88296 Docld:327989624 Page 55

for a sensitive CS project. No further details were given, Mr. Colby

ae aR 001445

SLES)

PAgrTt ; by
EN j . de lline cer cb ayo: oe SU |
Lely lla :


. | MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

,

SUBJECT: _ Watergate Principals - Direct | or Indirect
, ‘Involversent

, 1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
a report of any involvement in any capucity since ] January 1969
*  .. with Messrs. Hunt, McCerd, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.

2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.

. 3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime
during the late 1960's when I was Director, Oliice of Computer
., Services. I cpposed plans fer Technical Division, Office of
' - Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
Iden 101, ‘hed Hines of DD/S2T Cthen ORD)
was the computer individual working with TD and, I think, would
have details.

&. The Krogh centact also was indirect and involved his

request, first through OMB, that CIA fund forcign travel on behalf

of the Cubinct Co:smittee on Internations] Narectics Control. Indi-

vidual phone-discussions are noted in the atteched. The Arpency

“focal points were Iden 32 and Iden 3; f understand a -

Iden 3 has forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of

memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, Iden 3 and Colby are attached

_ also, . - .
20 5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to

all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will

not be available until temorrow.

O\DBE\ CV EHBEe\en ss 2520 (837794 52)
I - D\ESB EAv2 GL)JA ES = /s/ Charles A. Briggs
J- BES cojosk

; \
OUB § 1 - sqg1szece Charles A.’ Briggs
. pIenips 10x: Director of Planning,
Progran uming, end Budgeting
Attachment , ’ , F
As stated \ oe

SECRET ‘=

“NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 56


. : 2 .
. a, eo ; AQ@ereen:
° , 23 May 1773
4 Feb 72 Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud? Krogh-and his deputy,

Walter Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan forcizn
travel in connecticn with their narcotics interests, Jim was
alerting us to their intention to ask us for funds for the
travel. ot ;

% . :
7 Feb 72 Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips fcr 3 individuals--
all in FY 72. Cost prebably SICK. Minnick ready tu make
first trip. Iden 32 is plugecd in. ExDir said GX re Tehran

visit. --
| 7 Feb 72 See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and
| . follow-on memos from Seymour Bolton (21 Jul 72) and Colby
- (2 Aug 72).

12(?) May 72 John Hurley, OMB called, menticning possible Krogh/
Minnick attendance at a Latin American Iden 102
conference on narcotics. He aluo said Jeif Shepherd.
White House, was laying on « ‘aes withIden 32 for
himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Eurepe.

23 Jun 72 Iden 3 commented on Krogh/Minnick interest
: in getting CA activities, including large-scale PH,
, on narcotics front, Iden 3 pushing small-scale PP.
6 Jul 72 Tden 3 called. Notes say only: *Minnick-Hurley film.

We will send.®

-~

2 Aug 72 Iden 3 called re Colby letter (attached). Said travel
. orders ready; need money this. Fif (No record in my
notes as to who wus traveling when, but have faint

and, Iden 73. contacted by Iden 3.
1 Nov 72 Related? Iden 3 ‘call. Again notes are cryptic:

WH/GAO-Grace (Iden 32)-: Survey BNDD problems/
Mexico,* . .

SECRET

Ne 88296 -Docld:32989624 Page 57

) _


On Mr. Colby's copy only:

13 Jan 72 ExDir (Colby) said DCI had approved $30 for sensitive
CS project - no details. .

20 Jan 72 Reminded ExDir re $32K he said DCI OK'd.

a

feo

SFeRFT ORS

| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 58


“HW S8256 Docld:32989624 Page 59
eee

er

° | ; 19 7907

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Jack Bauman

; 1. While on leave visiting Disney World in Florida, I
dropped in to see Jack Bauman who lives in Winterhaven, Florida.
Jack retired from the Agency about five years ago on disability due

- fo a serious heart condition, He was with the Office of Security for
about 20 years prior to his retirement. .

2. During a private conversation Jack told me that he had
been interviewed three or four times by the FBI in connection with .
the McCord-Hunt affair. Iasked him why he had been interviewed,
and he told me that in late 1971 he had béen contacted by Howard
Hunt who suggested that he consider an assignment as Security
Officer for the Republican Party. Jack visited Washington in
January 1972 to discuss the proposed position with Howard Hunt
who apparently was acting on behalf of the Republican Party. Jack ©
furnished a resume to Hunt and discussed the position with him.
Ultimately, he decided not to accept the position because he felt
that his heart condition would not allow him to become involved in
such activity.

3. According to Jack, during the meeting with Mr. Hunt
they discussed some of the requirements of the job. At that time
they discussed a need for both a positive and a counteraudio program
and a need for a good security system both before and during the
"National Convention, Jack indicated that he sincerely believed that
the Republican Party did need a security officer and a good security
- programmer but felt that he could not afford to accept the job even.

though it was a very lucrative offer. Apparently, money was not a
problem.

PITT ssy .
33 wipele ce pia
HIVE TA

Peasy.

* ~“
3
'


4. When Jack declined, he indicated hgh: Hunt asked
for any other rec@#mendations he might have. Whiccording ta Jack
he told Mr, Hunt that most of the people he knew were still in the
Agency, but he did furnish the name of! IDEN-lus who might be
possibly ready to retire from the Agency. .

5. Jack informed me that he assumed that the Bureau
obtained his name due to the resume he furnished Mr. Hunt. He
said that the Bureau had talked to him on three or four occasions
and that he had written up about a 40 page statement concerning
his dealings with Mr. Hunt. When asked about Mr. McCord, Jack
said that he really did not know McCord that well and declined any
knowledge of Mr. McCord's technical capability.

6. ‘Mr. Bauman indicated that he had not been in touch
with Mr. Hunt since the early part of 1972 and knew aothing of
the Watergate operation. He stated that he had gained the impres-
sion from the Bureau interview that the technical devices were being
removed at the time of the arrest and were not being installed as
originally reported. :

7. AU of the above information was volunteered by Mr.
Bauman, and I really did not get involved in any discussion on the
matter other than to comment that I hated to see the Agency's name
connected with such an incident in any way. The above conversation
took place during a 10 or 15 minute period and no other discussion
relating to this incident was held. It is being reported for the record
and for information of the Director of Security. .

7 : - : nd
ct .. so EEE a HE

ee Charles W. Kane

{2 TAtren see
Rimesieeigia) °
Qariyy gis iggqdti - ;
EeHT|AL - 00459
* 7 eae
oA z - - .
PYEg qy3is VW
ree

i - . a a : .
nw 88296 -Docid:32989624 Page 60 . . a
NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 60 0


DD/M&S 73-1509 ©

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT . » : Contacts with Individuals Named in the Watergate Matter

Ly

1. Jam addressing this to you instead of to the Director of Central
Intelligence since I doubt that the information contained herein is of such
Significance to warrant his interest and because it has been on record with
the Agency since July 1972. However, if you feel that the information is of
such interest that it should be forwarded to the Director I shall put it in the
. proper format to do so.

2. My only contact with anyone named in connection with the
Watergate and related matters was through Mr. Jack Bauman a former
Agency employee now retired and living in Winterhaven, Florida. In
December 1971 Mr. Bauman called me from Florida and advised that he
wanted to get in touch with Howard Hunt. He said that he did not have Hunt's
home phone number and that it was probably unlisted but that since Hunt was a
former employee, could I contact Hunt and ask him to give Mr. Bauman a call.
Thad only met Hunt once about 10 years before but | agreed to relay the message.
I-called Howard Hunt at his home and told him that Mr. Bauman did not have his
home phone and requested he call Mr. Bauman. Mr. Hunt thanked me for
relaying the message and said that he would call Mr. Bauman. This seemed of
little consequence to me in December 1971 but in July 1972 Iden 17 of the
Office of Security contacted me in regard to the FBI investigation of the Watergate
situation. At that time linformed Iden 17 ‘of the telephone call from
Mr. Bauman in December 1971. Attached is a copy of a Memorandum for the
Record prepared by Iden 17 as a result of our conversation,

3. In the summer of 1972 I took my family to Disney World in Florida
and took that occasion to drop in to see Jack Bauman. Mr. Bauman told me in
& private conversation that he had been interviewed three or four times by the
FBI in connection with the Watergate affair and he related to me his contact

we of one meen peeps Crapcy : JZ amwaer = OliO1S
AND BidihcuS i v0 eid Gish; Seville

NW 88296 Docihd:32989024 Page 61


(2)

So e @
with Howard Hunt. On 19 July 1972 after my return from Florida I reported
this conversation to the Director of Security and made it a Memorandum for

the Record. This memorandum was sent to Mr. Colby and a copy of the
memorandum is attached.

4, Other than knowing Mr. McCord through his employment with
the Agency and meeting Howard Hunt once in about 1959, I do not know nor
have I had any contact with any individuals named or knowledge of related
matters now receiving attention in the press.

Ae tee
LA Hse a a
‘Charles W. Kane ~
Special Assistant to the ,
Deputy Director
for Management and Services

_ Atts

weg emt SECRET, gga

bast Coed

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 62_


rm 88296 Doce: 32989624 Page 63

: worked for the Central Intelligence Agency. Previously, requests
..

‘how the Bureau obtained his name. He stated that he has‘seen

‘the Chief of Station, Montevideo. The meeting was occasioned

17 July 1972

e

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Charles W.. Kane | oo
Iden 108

“a

1, Last week Special Agent Arnold Parham of the FBI con~
tacted the Acting DD/OS. He asked whether or net the Subjects

of this nature were followed OP by the FBI with an interview of the
subjects,

2. Ibriefed Mr. Colby who is the Agency's focal point on
the ''Watergate'! case and the Acting DD/S of the FBI inquiry.
Mr. Colby suggested that we determine the extent of involvement
and indicated that we advise the Bureau of their employment,

"3. When Agent Parham was again contacted and advised
of the Subjects’ employment with the Agency, he indicated that
the Bureau does not wish to interview them, : Ghinsaty a

"4, he office of the DD/PS will interview Iden 108 in Jb fe -
the same fashion as Mr, True was previously interviewed, a eg

5. Icalled Mr. Kane both et his office and his residence -

‘and learned that he is in Florida and will return to duty on 17 July.

I called Mr. Kane this morning to advise him of the inquiry.
. 6 Mr. Kane stated that he has no firm conclusion as to

Mr. Hunt’ oa only one occasion in 1959. At that time Hunt was

are)


| ‘ . -

| , . by the fact that Mr@fane accompanied a technic bsweep team

. ' " to,the Montevideo station, Mr. Kane stated further that around
Christmas time of 1971 he received a call from Jack Bauman
who wanted to get in touch with Mr. Hunt. Mr. Bauman asked
-Mr, Kane how he could get in touch with him.. Mr. Kane obtained
Mr. Hunt's telephone number tKrough telephone information channels
whereupon he passed the number on to Mr, Bauman. .

7. Mr, Kane stated that he has information that Jack Bauman
has talked to the FBI on several occasions in connection with the
current investigation and that he surmises that the Bureau may
have obtained his name from him.

signed Iden 17

»

Deputy Director of Security

ta’,

—NWE 88296 -Docid:32989624 Page 64 — - Le ath


. a . | SECRET/SENSITIVE

™ \ | . 7 8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH:: Deputy Director for Management and Services

SUBJECT: Involvement in Sensitive Domestic Activities

1. As chief of the DDP Systems Group prior to 1969, I was involved
- in providing data processing support for the following sensitive projects:

%.

: a. Cl Staff- Mr. Richard Ober's program for processing data
_ of U.S. citizens believed to be militants, subversives, terrorists,
etc. .

Ss

u
b. FI Staff and Office of Medical Services program

for recording data on foreign and U.S. physicians from American

Medical Association records.

c. A Systems Group sponsored program of common concern
listing travel of U.S, citizens to and from Communist countries.

2. In the same capacity my staff and I briefed police officers from
New York State and Chicago at the DCI's request (Admiral Rayborn) on
Gata processing techniques related to biographic intelligence (unclassified).

3. As a member of O/PPB, I have been aware of five programs with
possibly sensitive domestic overtones.

a. DDS&T/ORD's contract with the University Iden 103
for "The VIP Health and Behavior Prediction

System."

b. DDS&T/ORD's Project “which involved the collection
of data on dangerous drugs from U.S. firms. I believe Mr. Helms
terminated this program last Fall. 3 yw

‘SECRET/SENSITIVE

~~ NW'88296 Docid:32989624 Page 65 ' ue

WemTRA NTT BLD
CONFI aWowliablb bve

®  1@ey.2973

SLLIECT: Research Project on Rotert Vesco

2. On 16 Gctoter 1972 Hesers. Ereckinridse end Heintzel~en,
in the course of 4 Survey, were trieéfed on activities of the
Atlsntic/Pecific Division of tne Office of Economic aeoorts.: One
project cited was a covery from the Lirectuor, apparently at the re-
quest of Secretsry Shultz, to the effect, "What do we xnow ebout
Vesco," the man then running 10S. Teo of Sli's anal sts uere assigned
to tue project and, werking throwgh tre ucmestic Contact vcarvice, -
spent a day going 0 over tre files of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. There apparently was some contact also with UR Vivision
ef tho Leputy Directorate for Plans and with the Office of Current
Intelligence.

2. The information atove is based on rough notes and obviously
is sketchy. It is cited nos not to suzzest any wrongdoing Lut because
of the current oublicity about Vesco end the protebility of continuing
probes into the subject ty the press end the courts.

Scott D. Preckinr idze
H. Henry Eeinteelaan

eget

NW 682796 Docid:37989624 Page 66


@ 22 Ma 73

’

°

MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
Bill--

Attached are the reports Bill Colby asked to see:

1.. Restless Youth (September 1968), No, 0513/68,
Secret/Sensitive/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 78).

This documént was produced in two versions--one
. with the chapter on radical students in America (pages
hel, + +, + 25-39) which was sent only to the President, Walt Rostow,
: and Cy Vance (former Deputy Secretary of Defense); the .
other version without the references to the American
scene was disseminated to twenty people outside the
Agency. This document without the material on the
US was updated in February 1969 and copies were sent’:
to the Vice President and Dr. Kissinger, A still more
abbreviated edition was sent to the Attorney General
in March 1969.

2. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean (6 August 1989),
~ No, 1839/69, Secret/No Foreign Dissem (Copy 142).

8. Black Radicalism in the Caribbean-~-Another Look
. (12 June 1970), No.. 0517/70, Secret/No Foreign
Dissem (Copy 98).

. - Please note that these are our record copies and should
- be returned.

; Edward W. Proctor
“fel, ¢ my. Deputy Director for Intelligence

Scciments os °
rn oy _ COA7s oh

SECRET /SENSITIVE

pe
NW 88296 _Doeld: S2989624 Page 67 ; ; _ a


NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 68


<ERATE
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM _* o: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Activities Possibly Outside CIA's
Legislative Charter

i, This memorandum responds to your instruction to
report any activities which might be considered outside CIA's
legislative charter.

2, All Office and Staff chiefs in the Intelligence Directorate
have reviewed the past and present activities of their components,
Thave received responses from all of them, and none reported any
activities related to cither the Watergate affair or the break into
the offices of Ellsbereg's psychiatrist. Although contacts with
three of the people allegedly implicated in these incidents were
reported, these contacts were on matters other than the two
improper activities:

Hunt: Col. White, Richard Lehman, and I talked
to Hunt in late 1970 regarding his preparation
of a recommendation in support of the Agency's
nomination of R. Jack Smith for the National
Civil Service League Award.

a Py
£1 PoSEM/ col

Mitchell; While Mr. Mitchell was Attorney General,
an OCI officer was assigned the task of
providing him with daily briefings on
foreign developments,

ea ~y9Q3 fla. Q0469

ied Pn aes

tat LE

fi.
Bee

29OYQT TT

Br pars, An p> = Ka)
ne RO " mt maT 7O%3 Ces iied ty __UIso20 et

_ Gl biSTUg unk mos teey recA
| app Doe fi
| 7 elnfek Haley we)

Gu

a °
we SS ee TG

Ve ou we ee Beret - :
CIA INTER NAL USE ONLY. i


~. Loung: Harry Eisenbeiss and Clarus Rice of CRS
~. .- _. +bad frequent contacts with Young during the

. summer of 1972 in connection with Executive
Order 11652 and the implementing NSC
directive. This involved visits by Young
to CIA to discuss information storage and
retrieval and several meetings of dn inter-
. agency group dealing with the implementation
_ wt “of the Executive Order and directive.

2 66 =

. oe. +). “*+3,-In accordance with my instructions, several Offices reported
-..domestic activities which might appear questionable to outsiders.
. Jour responses are attached. Most of these activities are clearly
. -s within the Agency's charter, but there are a few which could be
- -+. -sviewsed as borderline.

- DCS collects information on foreign students studying
in the US.

- DCS collects information on physicians practicing in
the US who have studied abroad (mostly foreign
nationals),

~ DCS accepts information on possible foreign
involvement in US dissident groups and on the
‘narcotics trade when sources refuse to deal
with the FBI and BNDD directly. ,

-. DCs assesses the suitability and willingness of
US citizens to cooperate with CIA,

- DCS, for six months in late 1972 and early 1973,

was acquiring telephone routing slips on overseas
calls, : ar an . {- *
Information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational
techniques and methods.

- NPIC and COMIREX review satellite imagery
s from NASA programs to identify photography
too "sensitive" for public release,

-2-

- Serger 00287
; CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 70


OTsT LIN DIST NA as Oise

- NPIC has examined domestic coverage for special

purposes such as natural catastrophies and civil
disturbances,

~ OCI, in 1967 and 1968, prepared intelligence
memoranda on possible foreign connections -with
the US anti-war movement and world-wide student
dissidence (including the SDS) at the request of
the White House.

+ CRS is regularly involved with Customs in examining
the contents of motion picture film cans addressed to
the Soviet, and occasionally other forcign, embassiés
to acquire positive foreign intelligence,

-  JfBIS has on occasion supplied linguists to work
directly for another agency, e.g., to the FI to
_ translate Arabic in Washington,

- FRBIS monitors radio press dispatches and reports
covered by copyright. These are circulated within
the Government and stamped "Official Use Only",
This has gone on for three decades without problems,

.« PRBIS has monitored and reported on foreign radio

broadcasts of statements and speeches of US citizens
such.as those by US POWs in Ilanoi, Jane onda,
and Ramsey Clarke.

~ BIS has run the Joint Publication Research Service
under Department of Commerce cover since 1957,
JPRS is a facility for obtaining translations of |
unclassified publications in foreign languages
and contracts with private individuals to do this
work, Most of these individuals are not witting,
of the CIA-JPRS relationship,

Coby. 74) tote
. EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachments

~3- . cy ry .
SomnNaeS a 002.8%
| pec: CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY —


SECREP
“ e INTERNAL USE ONLY

@

‘7 May 1973

! MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence,

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence

1
Director of Current Intelligence

FROM

— * s - : ?
SUBJECT : Activity Related to Donestic Events

1. OCI began following Caribbean black radicalism
in earnest in 1968. The emphasis of our analysis was on
black nationalism as a political force in the Caribbean
and as a threat to the security of the Caribbean states.
Two DDI memoranda were produced on the subject: "Black
Radicalism in the Caribbean" (6 August 1969), and "Black
- Radicalism in the Caribbean-~Anothar Look" (12 June 1970).
‘In each a single paragraph was devotcd to ties with the
US black power movement; the discussion primarily concerned
visits of Stokely Carmichael and other US black power
activists to the Caribbean and other overt contacts.

2. In June 1970, Archer Bush of OCI was asked to
write a momorandum with special attention to links be-
tween black radicalism in the Caribbean and advocates of
black power in the US. The record is not clear where
this request originated, but it came through channels
from the DCI. The paper was to be treated as especially
sensitive and was to include material provided by the
Special Operations group of the CI Staff. The CI Staff

. material was voluminous but did not provide meaningful
evidence of important links between militant blacks in
the US and the Caribbean. This, in fact, was one of
the conclusions of the paper. The memorandum was produced
in typescript form and given to the DCI.

40 rn

Clasifed ty CLI sl SLD?

SECRET. ts
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY,“ % & [A start

NW 60296 Docld:32989624 Page 72

’ e: SECRET ; ,
STA INTERNAL USE ONLY 6

3. For several months in the first half of 1968
the! Caribbean Branch wrote periodic typvescrinot memoranda
on Stokely Carmicnael's travels abroad during a period

‘when he had dropped out of public view. Our recollection
is that the memoranda were for internal CIA use only,
although a copy of one was inadvertently sent to the FBI.

a
|"
Richard Lehman.
Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET
CYA INTERNAL USE ONLY

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 73


NW 68296 Docid:329896.

oe
ot t
: . . . a *
avatana f ao ree a ed

~ . 7 May 1973

’ MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT: DCS Domestic Activity

To the best of my knowledge, pes has not engaged in any
activity outside the CIA charter or that could be construed as
illegal. Some of the functions that we perform under HR 1-13f
(i) of providing operational support within the US to all
elements of CIA and to the USIB-member agencies, however, are
perhaps borderline or could be construed as illegal if mis~
interpreted. For example:

1, Provide personality and assessment data on certain
foreign students and visiting foreign scientists and
officials,

2. Identify foreign students in the US through collection
of foreign student lists from certain universities,

3. Provide personality and assessment data on US citizens
to determine their suitability and willingness to
cooperate with the Agency,

4. Introduce cooperative US businessmen and academicians
to Agency personnel who are in alias but using ciA
eredentials,

5. Collect information on possible foreign involvement.
or penetration of US dissident groups, but only in a
passive manner and only when the source has refused
to pass the information directly to the FBI.

'6, Collect information on the narcotics trade, but again

only in a passive manner when the source has refused to
pass the information directly -to BNDD or the FBI,

; 005.074

w2.upaer cu reesne |

GIG af ~ UPRIOrvins

eis onli


. . _ Cul, f Cutcriwe m

SUBJECT:. DCS Domestic Activity

7%. Collect specific information and supply duplicate or
master keys for foreign hotels,

meres

8. Collect medical information from cooperative contacts
on foreign. leaders who have received medical treatment
or examinations in the US.

95. Obtain computer tape records of physicians practicing
in the US who have studied abroad, Although most were
foreign nationals, some were US, The taped information
included school, present’ business address, date of birth,
and specialty.

10, Acquire routing slips recording the fact of overseas
telephone calls between persons in the US and persons
overseas and telephone calls between two foreign points
routed through US switchboards, This activity lasted
for approximately six months but has ceased,

lh,

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods,

4 | : XQ] ~ Sie ea

i rer \
ZANES R. MURPHY .
Director, Domestic Contact Service

- -
~2- ut
Gras IER PS tae come ene ‘
’

. eeu Lc aE ° 7 . 0048S


December 1967. (We no longer have a copy.) COAG

:

NW-88296-Bocld: s2009624-Pages@———

a . SECRET
- 6 EYES ONLY 6

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM :, Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late spring of 1968 Walt Rostow, then
Special Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs, tasked the DCI with undertaking a survey of
worldwide student dissidence. Confronted-by timult at
campuses like Columbia and mindful of the violence
accompanying student outbursts at Berlin's Free University
and elsewhere, Rostow sought to learn whether youthful
dissidence was interconnected: spawned by the same causes;
financed and hence manipulated by forces or influences
hostil' to the interests of the US and its allies; or likely
to come under inimical sway to the detriment of US interests.

2. The paper was prepared by Paul Corscadden of OCI
with the assistance of the CA and CI Staffs. ‘The DDI,
D/OCI, and Corscadden mat with Rostow to elicit the reasons
for his or the President's concerns and to agree on the
sources to be examined, the research methods to be followed,
etc.

3. Written during the summer of 1968, the most
Sensitive version of Restless Youth comprised two: sections.
The first was a philosophical treatment of student unrest,
its motivation, histor, and tactics. This section drew
heavily on overt literature and FBI reporting on Students
for a Democratic Society and affiliated groups. In a sense,
the survey of dissent energed from a shorter (30 page)
typescript study of SDS and its foreign ties the same
author had done for Mr. Rostow at the DCi's ‘request in

SECRET
EYES ONLY


oo ’ SECRET -
+ ) EYES ONLY r

4. Because of the paucity of information on foreign
student movements, it was necessary to focus on SDS which
then monopolized the field of student action here and
abroad. A second section comprised 19 country chapters--
yanging from Argentina to Yugoslavia--and stood by itself
as a review of foreign student dissidence.

5. Because SDS was a domestic organization, the
full paper Restless Youth, inclucing the essay on world-
wide dissent went only to nine readers. A copy may be

_in the Johnson Library.

6. Following the paper's favorable reception by’
the President and Mr. Rostow, the DCI briefed the NSC
on student dissent. The sensitive version subsequently
was updated and sent to the White House in February 1969.

7. The less sensitive text was disseminated in
September 1968 and then updated and issued again in
March 1969 and August 1970.

fo )

7 \C Coe wf as

Richard Lehman

Director of Current Intelligence

SECRET.
EYES ONLY

C0824
iveetne oot gett


. QOnonganded Hs Stet
Us fief

W2I¢S7 FO 7
ANV-88296-Dochd:32989624 Pag - . ut OO882

A

ae st SECRET UMBRA .
_? EYES ONLY r

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA : Deputy Director for Intelligence
FROM : Director of Current Intelligence
SUBJECT : Activity Related to Domestic Events

1. In late 1967 OCI participated in the preparation
of several short intelligence memoranda dealing with the
foreign connections of US organizations and activists in-
volved in the anti-war movement. The main purpose of
these reports, prepared at the reaucst of the Wnite House,
was to determine wnether any links existed between inter-
national Communist elements or forciqn governments and the
American peace movement. The conclusion reached was that
there was some evidence of ad hoc contacts between. anti-
war activists at home and abroad but no evidence of
direction or formal coordination.

2. In october 1967 President Johnson expressed “'
interest in this subject and ordered a high level inter-
departmental survey. In response to his personal recuest
to the DCI, Mr. Helms asked the CI Staff to collect what-
ever information was available through our own sources and
through liaison with the FBI and to pass it to OCI, which
was directed to prepare a memorandum from the DCI to the
President.

3. A book message requirement was sent to all stations

to report whatever information was on hand relevant to this
subject. * Although agent reports on Conmunist front opera-
tions overseas were ‘of some value, the primary source of
information on the activities of US activists--and that was
quite limited--was sensitive intercepts produced by NSA,
which had been similarly tasked by the White House.

Clowifted vy ye.

P SHCRET UMBRA
. EYES ONLY

santon sched re

2

i


vee

- vo, To aa SECRET UMBRA
"oO oe EYES ONLY

.. <A Gruft memorandum was jointly prepared by
OCIan. CI Staf£.and forwarded to the DCI. He passed
this t;scscript memo, dated 15 November 1967, to the
Presid'-nt personally. The White House copy is ‘now in
the fiews of President Johnson's papers at the library
in Austin. ; ; ,

‘
‘5: Brick follow-up memoranda were prepared and
_teruszued te the White House on Zi December and 17
- Sunue -196€. According to our best recollection, no
furthe _ .tinished intelligence reports on international
connect.ions,.of the peace movement were produced.

il if lew

- _ Richard Lehman
Director of Current Intelligence

6G SECRET UMBRA
EYES ONLY

— 0049-3

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 79


7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: O/DDI

SUBJECT: . Involvement In Domestic Affairs °"'

1. This memorandum responds to the DDI's
request for a listing of any questionable
involvements in domestic affairs. I do not believe
that CRS is doing anything that a reasonable
man could construe as improper.

2. CRS does, of course, have several programs
to acquire still pictures, movies, videotares
and books either privately, secretly or without
acknowledgement that CIA is the actual end user.
CRS is regularly involved with Customs in looking
at the content of film cans addxyessed to the
Russian Fmbassy in Washington. Customs occasionally
also provides access to other film from denied
areas. It may be addressed to private citizens
or organizaticns or other embassies. These efforts
are aimed at acquisition of positive foreign
information,

3. CRS files do not generally bear on U.S.
citizens or organizations. The biographic file-
building criteria specifically excludes U.S.

- nationals unless the person has become of such
major importance in the political life of a foreign
country that the file is essential. (To my knowledge,
only 2 persons so cualify. One is the wife of
the opposition leader of Guvana.and the other,
is Hope Lang. Our Cuban files probably include whee
some persons who are now U.S, citizens but we “eo
have no way to separate them; we have files on
U.S. defectors to Cuba.)

EAs ener te an

~~
4056!
Coes LL AGIMPDET CL py.004058.

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Wh YLSs

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 80


NW 60296 Docld:32989624 Page 01 ; 4 Hp

SUBJECT: Involvement In Domestic Affairs

4, The CIA Library has several informal
snag files intended to aid the librarians in
answering the kinds of questions that they know
they will get on a continuing basis. An
appointnents file is a colle.tion of clippings
on appointed federal officials: who holds what
job when and what is his backaround? The extremist
files are a collection of folders on a variety
of organizaticns and a few people with intricate’
Organizational links. Any sort of extremism
is grist for these particular files. And a few
persons, e.g., Rap Brown and Eldridsae Cleaver,
have cossiers consisting almost exclusively of
clippings from public media. These files are
unclassificd and consist mostly of clippings
from the public press: U.S., foreign, underground,
scholarly.

5. I am not aware of any other kind of
involvement in domestic activities that is not
related to development of techniaues or logistics
or legitimate training of CRS personnel.

foe fo,

/ aa
H. C. EISENBEISS
Director, Central Reference Service

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_ NW 68256 Docid:32989624 Page 32

* :  ) . @. May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR:’ DDI

SUBJECT : Sensitive Activities

1. FBIS has been engaged in no activities related to the ‘Elisberg
and Watergate cases. *

2. FBIS operations occasionally extend to the domestic arena. From
time to time, FBIS linguists are made available to DDO or Office of

Conmunications components for special operations (usually abroad) involving

close-support SIGINT work or translation of audio take. ‘On one occasion
recently DDO, on behalf of the FBI, requested the services of several
FBIS linguists skilled in Arabic to work directly for the FBI on a short-
term project here in Washington. The arrangements were made by Mr. Oberg
of the DDO CI Staff. He said the project was very highly classified and
that FBIS participation was approved by Mr. Colby and the Director. FBIS
participation was.approved by the Director of FBIS after a check with

the ADDI. Other examples of sensitive linguistic support work are help

‘in the handling and resettlement of defectors, the recent assignment of

an employee to the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs to transcribe
recordings in a rare Chinese dialect, and the detailing cf another
Chinese linguist on two occasions to assist in the U.S. military training
of Chinese Nationalist cadets,

3. Within its responsibility for monitoring press agency trans-—
missions for intelligence information, FBIS publishes and distributes
some material which-falls in a "gray" area of copyright protection, libel,
and privacy of international communications. Press services controlled
by national governments and transmitted by radioteletype without
specific addressees, e.g. the Soviet TASS service and the PRC's WCNA,
are monitored by FRIS and the material is disseminated without restric—-
tion. The legality of this has been affirmed by decisions of the
Office of General Counsel. However, we also monitor some in-house,
correspondent-to-headquarters dispatches which are considered private

point-to-point transmissions. FBIS therefore avoids public distribution of

Material monitored from these circuits by labeling them with an "Official
Use Only" caveat. The same caveat is used on material which we monitor
from other press agencies which are protected by international copyright,

e.g. Agence France Presse (AFP), the Middle East News Agency (MENA), and the
Iraqi Nes Agency (INA). This procedure has allowed FBIS to disseminate news

OO RO!2


é
ol
agency material for nearly three decades without problems. Recently,
however, the Office of General Counsel has ruled that an "Official Use
Only" caveat will not bar such material from the general public under
the Freedom of Information Law and we are accordingly looking into
alternative measures, among which are: (1) the purchase of news services
with rights to publish and disseminate; and (2) the classification of
those item$ vital to the government's business which we must continue
to monitor and report. An ultimate decision will be weighed against
the risk of present procedures.
13
4. The routine FBIS monitoring of foreign radio broadcasts often
involves statements or speeches made by U.S. citizens using those radio
facilities. Examples are statements made or allegedly made by American
POW's in Hanoi,- by Jane Fonda in Hanoi and by Ramsey Clark in Vietnan.
At the request of FBI and the Department of Justice, and with the
approval of the CIA Office of General Counsel, we have on occasion sub-
mitted transcripts of such breadcasts to the Department of Justice as
part of that Department's consideration of a possible trial. In such
cases, ve have been required to submit names of FBIS monitors involved,
presumably because of the possibility they might be required as witnesses.
(in one case in 1971, an FBIS staff employee was directed to appear as
_ an expert witness in the court-martial of a Marine enlisted man charged
‘with aiding the enemy in a broadcast from Hanoi.) FBIS views all this
with misgivings. Monitoring of such broadcasts is incidental and we
rue attributiocn of their news to FBIS, and we should not be considered
policemen maintaining surveillance of traveling Americans.

5. FBIS is an overt organization, but one aspect of its operations
is under Department of Commerce cover. The Joint Publications Research
Service (JPRS) was established in 1957 to provide the means through which
great volumes of material from unclassified foreign publications could
be translated by large numbers of independent contractors in the United
States on a piece rate basis. Contractors are not witting of their CIA
employment. This use of cover is an anomaly in FBIS and cont:ains some
risk of embarrassment to the Agency and to Commerce if it becomes public

. knowledge. The surfacing of JPRS was given study in 1969, but after
consideration of all the pros and cons it was decided at the Executive
Director-Comptroller level not to proceed at that time. FBIS is presently
taking a second look.

ge pels
es “NOCHE

Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

SECRET -
Ob brE | o0202
GET .

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 83 Givi

je


rine ra “SEUREL,

. : e

~ , 8 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT TSD Support to Other Agencies

1. Technical Services Division's charter (CSI 1-8) requires
that it provide technical assistance to both CIA operations and
other activities as may be dir ected by the Deputy Director for
Operations.

2. Over the years the chief non-CIA recipients of this
support have been the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department
of State, United States Postal Service, Secret Service, Agency
for International Devclopment, and the White House. \

3. While varying widely among the different recipients, these
services have included training and materials, and in a few in-
stances participation in the fields of audio and visual surveillance,
secrét writing and related communications, personal protection,

, disguise,
concealment devices, electronic beaconry, illicit narcotics detec-~
tion, and counter~sabotage/terrorism.

4. In mostinstances requirements for this support are
received by TSD through higher echelons (Office of the Director
or Deputy Director for Operations). Unless the service involved
is a trivial or continuing one, the request is referred to the
Foreign Intelligence Staff Departmental Coordination Group for
coordination and approval at the appropriate Agency levels.
Approval within TSD by the Chief of Operations or Development
and Engineering and the Chief of TSD or his Deputy alsois re~
quired.

5. The attachment lists the primaty services provided to
the organizations named in Paragraph two.

'h2 IMPDET
CL BY 059098

SECRET 002485

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 84

re . ty a Pe OLUINE

This information deleted because it reveals sensitive operational

techniques and methods,

8, Provision of forged documentation to non-DDO requesters,
whether they be CIA or other Agency requesters, always'requires
approval of non-TSD offices. Support to the military for instance
would be validated by FI Staff/Departmental Coordination Group

t Headquarters or by the COS overseas having responsibility for
coordination of the operation. BNDD requests are coordinated
with DDO/NARCOG. Requests for documentation of Immigration
and Naturalization Service is coordinated via the Alien Affairs
Staff.

9. Authentication items are issued on a loan basis and must
be returned to TSD or accounted for. After any documentation has
been issued, TSD retains photographs and records of such support
until the documentation has been returned to TSD, If the material
is not returned after a reasonable time, the requester is reminded
of the outstanding documentation. i

ar
A “1. i Zz LP,

. reg” :
Attachment ° Sidney Gotuieb”
Distribution: : Chief
“ O& 1 - Addressee,w/att ; Technical Services Division

QOZLS

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 85 Dr


r ATTAc@ent

Department of Defense

Documents, disguise, concealment devices, secret writing,

flaps and seals; counterinsurgency and counter sabotage courses

_ have been furnished to all intelligence elements of the Department
of Defense and certain elements.of the Special Forces, All requests
are coordinated with the FI Departmental Coordination Group at
Headquarters and with the Chief of Stations overseas, In turn
these elements furnished TSD with exemplars of foreign identities
documents, foreign cachets, foreign intelligence secret writing
systems, foreign intelligence concealment devices. Selected
audio requirements have been furnished overseas for CI -type
cases,

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At the request of the FBI we cooperate with the Bureau }
in a few audio surveillance operations against sensitive foreign
targets in the United States.

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs

Beacons, cameras, audio and telephone devices for
overseas operations, identity documents, car-trailing devices,
SRAC, flaps and seals and training of selected personnel
responsible for use thereof has been furnished this Bureau.
All requirements are sent to DDO/NARCOG for coordination
with area divisions and for action by TSD if appropriate.
Requests overseas are coordinated with the COS or his
designee before action by TSD is taken.

Immigrati on and Naturalization

CI analyses of foreign passports and visas, guidance in
developing tamperproof alien registration cards, ‘special
fluorescent stamp inks have been furnished the Service. Requests
are forwarded directly to TSD for coordination within TSD if
technical, with the FI Departmental Coordination Group if oper-
ational, \ i

. H . ‘ ”
Vv FIAT . a ‘ “yg
SECRET oor

_NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 86 . an


NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 87 t whe se 3

Department of State

Technical graphics guidance on developing a new United
States Passport, analyses of foreign passports, car-armoring
and personnel locators (beacons) for Ambassadors have been
supplied the State Department. In addition analyses and
exposure of black letter operations against the United States
abroad are made, All graphics requirements are forwarded
to TSD for further coordination within the Division, The
Department of State furnishes exemplars of foreign passports,
foreign visas andin ie past passports on a priority basis.

Postal Service

The Office of Chief Postal Inspector has had selected
personnel attend basic surveillance photographic courses, has
been furnished foreign postal information and has been the f
recipient of letter bomb analyses, furnished special fluorescent
ink, typewriter analyses. Requirements are coordinated with
the DDO and DDO/EA. The Post Office has furnished TSD
with exemplars of letter bombs and mail insertion capabilities
for CA material destined for foreign countries. We also have
an arrangement with the Post Office to examine and reinsert
a low volume of certain foreign mail arriving in the United States.

Secret Service

Gate passes, security passes, passes for Presidential
campaign, emblems for Presidential vehicles; a secure ID
photo system have been furnished this Service. Blanket approval
for graphics support has been granted to the Deputy Director for
Operations. In each case TSD requests approval from the DDO,

U. S. Agency for International Development

We furnish instructors to a USAID-sponsored Technical
Investigation Course (Counter Terror) at Los Fresnos Border
‘Patrol Academy, Los Fresnos, Texas. Instructors are under
Department of the Army cover and the funding of our participation
is under an approval of a Cl-Police Group project, Courses are
given Spring and Fall each year. Instruction is given at the

yes 0324

Onde


request of CI/PG. ‘trainees represent internal security or
national police from all countries participating in AID Police
assistance programs.

White House

‘Stationery, special memoranda, molds of the Great
Seal have been furnished the Social Secretary. The Deputy
Director for Operations is apprised of these requirements.

Police Respresenting Washington, Arlington, Fairfax and
Alexandria

During the period 1968 -- 1969 a series of classes
reflecting basic and surveillance photography, basic audio,
‘locks and picks, countersabotage and surreptitious entry
were given to selected members from the above mentioned
cities, Overall training was approved by the Director of
Centeral Intelligence and in turn validation was required for
each course from the Director of Security.

@hist OOF SF orst ° C0021
row Sac; |

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 88


dad hia LI Mw 8 ahte v ea
— a

ROUTING AMD RECORD ShiieT

ECT. : ae -—h,
SUBJECT: (Optiencl x) ; ; eo. '

FROM: + EXTENSION NO,

Sidney Gottlieb ~

Chief, TSD _ | x-2831) vate

203 South Building | 8 May 1973
TO: (Gificer designation, room number, and DATE

1
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from wher i
to whom, Draw a line across column after esen comments j

building) OFFICER'S

7 INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED

Attached herewith are addition: i
explanations of TSD support to
other U,S,. Government agencies,

~ GEL? Luge erry f
Gus eled beta Latnd

14,

TI

FORM se eeeous - cinete [TERIAL
hei sazbil Hocld'sias6 iiasensIPapelast! O CONFIDENTIA USE GILY

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.


ATTACHMENT _

; FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

TSD has had a close working relationship with the FBI over
the past few years. The FBI is the only organization that has
been fully briefed on TSD audio techniques and equipment. The
following are situations where TSD equipment and guidance were
involved in operations: ,

(A) Identity 59 - Four masked transmitters were
installed. Two have failed and two remain workable.

(B) Identity 60 - A TSD built masked transmitter
_ was-installed to collect emanations from a crypto~
_ graphic machine. The system continues to function
when samples of the emanations are needed.

(C) Identity 61 - Two transmitters have been
installed and are operating. One is specifically
designed to collect the sounds of typewriting, the
other is a straight audio transmitter to collect con-
versations. A FBI agent is manning the listening
post. A third system is not oper-
ating, probably due to battery expiration. The tape
made from this room was made'by the National
Security Agency before failure.

(D) Identity 62 - TSD furnished equipment and con-
sultation covering Identity 62
First masked switched trans-
mitters were used in two apartments used as tempor--
“ary quarters. Later masked switched transmitters
and microwave transmitters were installed in the
permanent quarters along with mic and wire installa-
tions, entirely furnished by the Bureau. This install- -
ation is not fully operational because the full comple-
ment of personnel have not yet arrived.

_ peas
SECRET coz:

_ NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 90

TO LUI TS

(E) mm | - This is an operation -
participation by National Security Agency. Itis
designed in anticipation of the Identity 64

_ in Washington. The listening post was
obtained by using the Agency covert mechanisms
for procuring the property. New systems are
being designed and produced by using TSD's covert
contractor mechanisms and TSD engineers.

(F) Identity 65 - Ten masked audio devices pur-
chased from TSD were installed in Identity 65

by the FBI. Part of the equipment was install-
ed in November and December 1971, the remaining
equipment was installed 17 - 25 March 1972. Tests
made by a TSD officer from a temporary FBI
listening post on 8 - 9 November 1972, proved that
the target equipment no longer functioned and was
_ believed discovered by the occupants,

(G) TSD has furnished equipment items which constitute
an on-thé-shelf capability to engage in photo and
audio surveillance operations which might not be
known to the Agency. In one case it is known that a
relatively unsophisticated device was used against
a domestic target.

C0Rz2

SEC

»

NW 88256 Docld:32989624 Page 31


- , " £SD/SDB Memo #138-73

8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, TSD
ATTENTION: Executive Officer
SUBJECT: Contacts with Domestic Police Organizations

1. In December 1968, July 1969 and December 1970, SDB
provided basic countersabotage familiarization training for
selected members of the Washington metropolitan area police
departments. The training was given at the Fairfax County
police pistol and rifle range. Authorization for the train-
ing came from DDP and Chief, Office of Security.

2, On occasion during the past few years, under the
auspices of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of
the Devartment of Justice and with the approval of CI Staff
and Office of Security, SDB provided training and familiari-
zation to police officers of saveral domestic police
departments in the uses of the Explosives Residue Detection
Technique and Trace Metals Detection Technique. These tech-
niques had been declassified and are currently available to

e law enforcement community. The National Bomb Data Center
publishes periodic guidance in their uses.

3. In order to augment the SDB mission responsibilities
in.the field of countersabotage and counterterror, SDB offi-
cers have in the past two years visited, under appropriate
covers, the explosives disposal units of the New York City
police department, Dade County (Miami) Florida Dept. and the
Los Angeles Police Dept. Also, in March 1973, two SDB offi-
cers attended the Explosives and Ordnance Disposal Conference
in Sacramento, California, sponsored by LEAA. When the
recent letter bomb menace began in September 1972, our liaison
with the NYCPD bomb squad paid off in that we had complete in- |
formation on letter bomb construction in hours, enabling the: *
Agency to make worldwide dissemination within a day.

ta

/s/_ Identity 120

To
Oran - C/TSD/OPS/F % one
CODEN | ey OBR

_~

NW.88296 Docld: 292 E2Z\IMPDET/CL BY 06222.


ORD- 2328-73
- 9 MAY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
Technology

SUBJECT : Repeated Survey of ORD for Non-
Foreign Intelligence Activities

The 7 May survey has been repeated and refined
with respect to all ORD services or dealings with
other agencies on domestic, non-forcign matters. In
addition, this report covers all our activities deal-
ing with the rescarch and development of intelligence
equipment for foreign use which has been tested in
the United States and might have collected domestic
information. Again, each member of ORD available
today was asked cither directly or through his super-
visor to provide the above requested information,
whether he was directly involved or not. We have
used ail diligence to search our records available
to us during this time period to ensure this is a

complete and factual list.
y, ete
/

Director of Research §& Development

Attachments:
1 - Contacts with Other
Governmént Agencies
2 - Domestic Tests

OLOTE ~ 09228

»


; ~ ae

. CONTACTS WITH Oe: U.S. GOVERNMENT aces Mes WHICH

COULD OR HAVE RESULTED IN USE OF CIA-DEVELOPED
TECHNOLOGY IN ADDRESSING DOMESTIC PROBLEMS

Executive Office of the President

ORD represents DD/S&T on the R&D Sub-Committee
of the Cabinet Committee for International Narcotics
Control that is concerned with research support of
the narcotics control problem.

(Dr. Leonard Laster, OST) (Cianci/LS)

Office of Telecommunications Policy

Technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security information was exchanged with
them,

.

(Noe/TA)

Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD)

Techniques and equipment for navigation and
tracking was discussed with BNDD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) (Van Dewerker/TA)
v . . (Noe/TA) _

Technical information was exchanged relating.
to the development of simple, portable sensor systems
for the detection of concealed bulk narcotics and
narcotic laboratory effluents.

" (Mr. John Gunn and , (Parker/DSP)
- Mr. Bill Butler, BNDD)

Audio tapes were processed to improve their
intelligibility. The source of the tapes was unknown.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) . (Scott/An)
\ ct
ih 00229
SEGRE - ATTACHMENT ‘1

dtheh
| a
|

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 94 __ . <j .

SUBJECT: Con@ts With Other U.S. Govenent Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
. Problems

BNDD (cont'd)

BNDD was given permission in the fall of 1972
to receive proposals from Aerospace, Inc., concerning
a Radar People Detector developed for. ORD.

(Mr. Charles Gaskin, BNDD) ° Identity 125 /LS)

; A prototype bioluminescence sensor was developed
for the detection of narcotics for application in
Southeast Asia. BNDD was given a demonstration of
the instrument.

(Dr. Laster/OST) (Terek/LS)
(Mr. Stan Sobel, BNDD)

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Committee

Continuing contacts were maintained with the
intelligence community regarding technical surveillance
countermeasurs and physical security. This exchange
of information, reports, and equipment has been con-
ducted under the auspices of USIB TSCC and involves
State, FBI, Secret Service, NSA, DIA, Army, AF, and
Navy. . .

‘ (Noe/TA)
(Noyes/PD) ©

’ State Department

| ‘Two contracts for development of countermeasures
| techniques were funded jointly with the State Department.

(Noe/TA)
¥
2 Y
7
Doak
_ 09289
orency
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 95 SEGHE! ~

- SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problens

Atomic Energy Commission (AEC)

Some of the AEC Laboratories, e.g., Savannah
River Laboratory, are supported by CIA to develop
radio nuclide sampling and detection techniques and
devices. These Laboratories have used sampling
techniques developed for CIA to measure COKUS nuclear
plant releases,

(Mr. B, Benson, AEC) (Walker/DSP)

At the request of AEC Security Officer, Mr. Richard
Cowan, the walls of the office of the Chairman of the
AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) were X-rayed, The operation
occurred one evening and was an attempt to resolve some
anomalies created by the use of the non-linear junction
detector.

(Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC) (Noyes/PD)

Law Enforcement Assistance Agency (LEAA)
Reports and information about the ORD-developed
yAdhesive Restraint, Non-Lethal Incapacitation System
were made available to Department of Justice, LEAA in
August 1972. If they developed the systen, it would
be used for civilian crowd and riot control,
(Mr. Les Schubin, LEAA) Identity 125 /LS)

’ Technical surveillance countermeasures and physical
security infcrmation were exchanged with LEAA,.

(Noe/TA)

‘

| - Ubinas - a,

| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 96


SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-

Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
° Problems

Treasury

Dr. Leahy is being detailed to Treasury Department
to assist in formulating their R&D program and organization
in anticipation of the establishment of the new drug
enforcenent administration. The request for his services’
was made by Identity 3, _ the Agency's Narcotics Coordi-
nator. Identity 3 discussed the request and cleared the
detailing through Mr. Colby.

(Leahy/LS)

Customs/Treasury Department

Technical discussions were held with Customs relating
to detecting illicit nighttime aircraft intrusions over
the U.S. -Mexico border.

(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs) lawrence DSP)

Alcohol § Tobacco Tax Div/IRS

. About five years ago, assistance was requested in
domestic search of 'moonshine™ stills using CIA infrared
scanners. This was turned down.

(Lawrence/DSP)

Secret Service

We have had numerous discussions with the Secret
Service regarding navigation and tracking techniques
and equipment.

4

(Van Dewerker/TA)

= 4. 00232


po ~ a eens |

ve SUBJECT: cones With Other U.S. GovAnont Agencies
a Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
. Problems - -

Federal Aviation Agency (FAA)

The results of our research work in the detection
of metals (NOLIR) were. reported to FAA for possible use
in the detection of hijacker weapons.

(MacAnlis/RP)

‘National Institute of Health (NIH)

At the request of ORD, OCS assigned a staff technician
to undertake to write a computer program for the Wisswesser
Line Notation (WLN) chemical notation method. This work was
done in cooperation with NIH.

(Ms. Coniver, NIH) Identity 125 /LS)

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA)

; LS/ORD met frequently with ACDA personnel in order
to structure ORD's BW/CW research programs to support
ACDA needs. 7

w _ Identity 125 /LS)

' Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Technical information relating to detection of
radio nuclides in the environment was exchanged with
them.

(Nr. Charles Weaver, EPA) _ (Walker/DSP)

I 99233
OTA Ee |

. weetl us Soe,
NW 65296 Docld:327989624 Page 98 Coiled. ay


SUBJECT: cones With Other U.S. Goveriiment Agencies
hich Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
. Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic

. Problems

EPA (cont'd).

Technical discussions relating to uSing IR scanning
equipment to detect underground fires in a sanitary land
£il11 have been conducted.

(Mr. Gene James, EPA) (Risinger/DSP)

Federal Bureau of Investigation

At their request, we described Imagery Enhancement
techniques germane to removing distortions from some
photography they had on an alleged bank robber. Request
for specific support in processing the imagery was turned

down.
(Stephan/IPA)
Secret Service
“B
“UTS. Custons
v Mr. C.V. Noyes' total contact with other agencies

in terms of assistance with domestic operations has be2n
in the field of audio surveillance countermeasures, anti-
hijacking, or drugs.

(Mr. Robert Burnell, SS) (Noyes/PD)
(Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI)
(Mr. Martin Pera, Customs)

"- ‘NASA and USDA (Agency association is classified SECRET)

We have an on-going program, Project TAMPER, to
“develop automated systems for exploiting satellite-borne
multispectral sensors for earth resources assessments.

(Mr. William Ruble, USDA) (Galinaitis/IPA)
(Mr, Leonard’ Jaffe, NASA) ; to!
(General Smart) it

an

6 = 0023

_NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 99 Cree ny


ci — — — — ry = SSS ae

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
. . Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems

Proposec. Use of NASA ERTS Satellite (Agency association
would be SECRET)

The Agency is preparing a proposal for an experi-
mental program to aid in estimeting the Soviet wheat
crop. A part of the information would be obtained from
a satellite launched for other announced programs. Ground-
truth data will be collected on North American crops.

(Briglia/PAS)

U.S. Department of Agriculture and Bureau of Narcotics
and Dangerous Drugs

CIA has requested the establishment of a two-acre

plot of opium poppies at a USDA research site in Washington -
state, to be used for tests of photo-recognition of opium

poppies.
(Mr. Quentin Jones, USDA) (Lawrence/DSP)
(Mr. Fred Garfield, BNDD) (Cianci/LS)

Army, Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force, Office of the Inspector Seneral
rmy , Office or rrovost marsnall General

We have exchanged technical surveillance counter-
measures and physical security information with them.

(Noe/TA)

U.S. Arm : .
‘Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Newport Army Ammunition Plant,
oelle Ordnance Nepot

LS/ORD tested environmental samples from testing,
storage and production facilities in the U.S.

\; Identity 129/LS)

7 , 8) 00285

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 100

SUBJECT: con Wes With Other U.S. cove Mncnt Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic
Problems ~

U.S. Army, Edgewood Arsenal

LS/ORD is sharing expenses with EA in field testing
an IR remote detector of CW aerosols.

Identity 125 /LS)

U.S. Navy

BSD/ORD turned over about eight trained dolphins
to the Navy in December 1969, because we discontinued
our dolphin progran.

(Lynch/LS)

U.S. Coast Guard

About six years ago, CIA infrared equipment was
made available for USCG tests to evaluate IR as a means
for night search of life boats.

(then-Lt. James McIntosh, USCG) (Lawrence/DSP)
v ;
Identity 174 Sheriff's Office

ORD conducted polygraph tests on all applicants.

' Polygraph security findings were compared with the
Sheriff's own security findings.

(Sheriff) | ; : Identity 125/LS)

A study was made on con-men techniques and assess-
ment methods in 1967- 68.

. (Sheriff) _— * Identity 125 /LS)

00235
t ws
OrPry
~ orb!
NW 86296 Docld:32969624 Page 101 : -


roy eee ‘ . / ENG ad

a

SUBJECT: Contacts With Other U.S. Government Agencies
Which Could or Have Resulted In Use of CIA-
. Developed Technology in Addressing Domestic.
Problems

‘Chief, San Francisco Police

For security reasons, the Chief was made aware of
a study to evaluate attempts by non-Chiense to penetrate
Chinese social groups. (1967)

(Police Chief) oo . Identity 125/LS)
.
§ MP
i a pT .
one.  00RaY

_ NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 102

cary . : . oe

DOMESTIC TESTS FOR
AGENCY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS

1.'-As a normal part of ORD's efforts in the
research and development of equipment and techniques
for Agency applications in foreign intelligence, we
conduct experiments and tests in the United States.
Clearly, the design and development of our intelli-
gence cquipments can be done more economically and
more securely in this country. Although most of
the tests of our R&D equipments are performed in
Closed laboratories or in secure areas simulating
the foreign environment, some of the tests and experi-
ments, of necessity, reveal domestic information.

2. A review of the surveillance equipment or
techniques which have at some time or other been
exposed to domestic testing is as follows:

a. Laser Probe - About 1967, the laser
probe developed by ORD was tested by TSD in
San Francisco under very closely controlled
conditions. The ORD Project Officer witnessed
portions of the test. Recordings that were
made of laser probe output were carefully
controlled as classified material and it is
believed that the tapes have long since been
destroyed. (Wood/TA)

bs Microwave Intercept System - About
1968, this system was tes‘ed in a light air-
craft near the Naval Ordnance Test Station
in Identity 127:, California. This system is
designed to permit intercept of microwave
telephone communication channels of systems
such as Identity 130 oo » ‘It
works equally well against the Bell Telephone
TD-2, as they are generically the same. Re-
cordings of these telephone intercepts were
carefully controlled and were destroyed several
years ago.

OTAaT:T ATTACHMENT 2
Ciidisink

Oda

NW 60296 Docld:32999624 Page 103


° SUBJECT: von Meic Tests for Agency re Mcn and
. _~ Development Efforts

-¢. Telephone Intrusion Study - The objec-

tive of this current program is to develop a
means-to utilize foreign telephone systems as
@ communication link without the knowledge of
the host system. In order to carry out this
objective, it is necessary to learn the com-
plete supervisory signalling and sequencing
- control system hierarchy for the various foreign
telephone systems. Many of these are patterned
after the U.S. system and, for this reason,
limited monitoring to test the operation of
intercept equipment’ in the United States is
planned. The data to be collected would be
merely the signal tones from which supervisory
codes can be extracted. Message content is
of no interest and will not be recorded. Over-
Seas testing is planned at a subsequent date.
To date, some domestic testing of this concept
has been carried out at the contractor's plant.
No recordings have been made of such data. Ex-
tremely brief tests excercising U.S. and forcign
telephone systems through supervisory tone sig-
nalling have been carried out to verify initial
concepts. The duration of testing was less
than one-half hour.

d.- Other Sensor Testing - Examples of

" engineering development tests of special sensors
within the United States include infrared and
high-altitude photography, forward-looking IR
(FLIR) flights, laser scanners, industrial efflu-
ent sampling for isotopes, and airborne magne-
tometer surveys for metal (rifles and trucks).
In al] these cases, the data output of such
testing has been used for engineering develop-
ment and the content has been restricted to
disseminaticn to those in Government involved
with the engineering design.

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 104

' SUBJECT: Domegkic Tests for Agency Resdrch and
ee Devc@pment Efforts

_

e. Remote Physiological Measurements -
An ORD-developed cryogenic magnetometer is
being tested at a contractor's site for use
as a remote cardiograph (magnetocardiograph).
Some test subjects are witting, but most tests
are on naive subjects (they do not know they
are being tested). The magnetometer is com-
pletely harmless to the subject and the test
results are closely hela.

£. Personality Structure of Defectors
Study - ORD undertook to determine the per-
sonality structure of defectors during the
period 1966-69. The work primarily involved
an analysis of the open literature on known
defectors. An ancillary effort was concerned
with a study of the phenomenon of defection *
itself, i.e., leaving one religion for another,
or changing one set of political beliefs for
another. The work was conducted at Stanford
University. Identity 125/]S5) |

g. Trained Birds - Birds have been trained
and tested in the United States to carry small
intelligence collecting packages such as audio
surveillance devices, small cameras, and cur-
rent measuring devices. Any data collected
from unwitting domestic sources would have been

_ used only for engineering purposes and then
destroyed. ;

h. Communications Link Loading Study - In
the period from I970 through 1972 various means
were used to check out an intercept system designed
to operate against Iden 93 communications links.
Under carefully centrolled conditions, some U. S.
microwave communications were recorded and passed
through the intercept system under test to prove
quality of performance. All intercept material
connected with this was destroyed within a few weeks
of the time of intercept and the material was never
checked for substantive content. NSA participated
and controlled most elements of the U. S. material.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 105 , _

. . ern . a . _
e | Perera 5 @

ORD-2274-73
-7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and
Technology

SUBJECT ° : Survey of ORD for Non-Foreign
Intelligence Activities

At 11 a.m. today, each division and staff chief
or his representative was instructed to query all of
his people and report back by this afternoon whether
or not they had provided any services or dealt with
any other agencies on domestic, non-foreign matters.
The. attached list is an inventory of all items we
were able to uncover. If additional information on
any of these topics is desired, we can provide either

_a verbal or a written report on very short notice.

CLL DY Bocce

Charles E. McGinnis
Scientific Advisor

to
Director of Research §& Development

. Attachment:
As stated

<—*

quan

00244

~

Project TAMPER, an on- going program which may be
politically sensitive.

A proposed OER wheat estimate program vhich’ may be
politically sensitive.

Narcotics--our foreign activities are.well known
in DDS&T.

.

A negative report from the Support Staff,

ORD's NOLIR work was reported to the FAA about
three years ago. No action was taken, to our knowledge...

Robert Scott - Performed intelligibility enhancement vA
of audio tapes for BNDD. Source of tapes unknown.

James M. Stephan - At the request of FBI, we described
Imagery Enhancement Techniques germane to removing
distortions from’ some photography they had on an
alleged bank ‘robber. Request for specific support

in processing the imagery was turned down.

>

CEP ary
Ne era : 00242

NW 88296 Docldi32989624 Page 107 |

) 7 May 197

C. V. NOYES

My total contact with other agencies in terms of assistance
with domestic operations has'been in the field of audio sur-
veillance countermeasures, anti-hijacking, or drugs. Speci-
fically, I participated in TSCC and RED Subcommittee meetings
which included technology exchanges and some equipment ex-
changes on a temporary basis ostensibly for testing or trial.

“I also assisted in x-raying the office walls of the Chairman
of the AEC (then Mr. Schlesinger) at the request of Mr. Richard
Cowan of AEC Security. The operation occurred one evening
(date unknown) and was an attempt to resolve some anomalies
created by the use of the nonlinear junction detector.

Other persons contacted over the years have been:

Mr. Robert Burnett, Secret Service.

7 Mr. Martin Pera, U. S. Customs -

Mr. Marvin Beasley, DASA
Mr. Thomas Allen, FBI

"Major Jack Nelson, OSI/USAF

Major John Langager, ONI/USN
| Mr. Richard Cowan, AEC
| .

| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 108

- SO Thomas P. Noe
: é e

i. Continuing contacts with intelligence community.
regarding technical surveillance countermeasures and
physical security. This is an exchange of information and
reports and has been conducted under the auspices of the

USIB Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Community.

State ot Navy

Aix Force - US Secret Service
_Army , ; NSA .

DIA

FBI

2. .doint funding of two contracts with State Depart-
ment (TRW/LLL). Two electret microphones were furnished
to State Department for test purposes. Joint funding of
one contract with NSA (Sandia). Participation in DNA/DOD
contract (Bureau of Standards).

3. Other DOD and Government contacts for information
collection or exchange only.

ARPA

LEAA/Dept. of Justice

DNA/DOD
~

Office Telecommunications Policy
Office of Army/Provost Marshal General
Army/Military Police Agency, Ft. Gordon
Air Force/Office of the Inspector General
Air Force/Electronic Systems Division

Oren aT . + O9243

Tres . ‘ . .

e . . . Cb

NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 109

| epreestiner ct emer


Wi 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 110

: . - 7 May 1973

LS/ORD CONTACTS WITH DOMESTIC COUNCIL AGENCIES

1. BNDA(Charles Gaskin) was given permission to receive

proposals from Identity 135, concerning a Radar People Detector

developed for ORD. Time: Fall of 1972. Action wes approved by

D/ORD.

2. BSD/ORD turned about eight trained dolphins over to the

Navy. Time: December 1969

3. Developed Adhesive Restraint, Non-lethal Incapacitation System.
Reports and information was made available to Department of Justice, LEAA
in August 1972. If they develoved the system, it would be used for

civilian crowd and riot control.

aaa

3
ar
ak

Ce


; rm ree ~ SE ea eer ee re
| . . * - .
@ 29 "AY 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary, CIA Management
Committee

SUBJECT : Reported .Identity 61 _ Burglary

1. Attached is a report summarizing what we know about the
reported break-in of Identity 61, An investigative report
by an officer of the Executive Protective Service states that the
offices were ransacked and a number of personal items stolen.

2. The attached summary also describes a separate audio
operation conducted against Identity 61 . by the FBI, at the
Agency's behest and with its technical support. This presents a
related question that should be noted. James McCord's’ testimony
indicates that he placed telephone calls to the Identity 75 and Identity

61, - He says he picked the numbers at random, hoping
that if his phone was tapped his attorneys would be able to challenge
the evidence as being tainted, Another witness, John Caulfield,
says McCord called the two named Iden 75 and Iden 61 because he "was sure’!
they "were subjects of national security wiretaps."

3. In fact, there has been a long-standing telephone tap on the
Identity 75 ,» run by the FBI, about which CI Staff believes McCord
knew. It is possible that he also had an inkling of some sort of operation
agéinst Identity 61 *, and assumed that it was also a telephone
tap. One must speculate that he played for double insurance, hoping
that both his telephones and those of the Iden 75 and Iden 61 were tapped, and
that one way or another his case would be dismissed or dropped
because of tainted evidence or to avoid revealing the sensitive
operations, At this point, given the publicity of the Iden 61 break-in,
and the testimony of McCord and Caulfield, the current investigations
may lead to exposure of ihe operations.

>
SI

Alt Leip // fh ete
of Kein Vv. Broe
Inspector General OoGs!

Attachment:
As Stated Above

as oe Sele Se Se
sr . oa

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 111 bee OF,


NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 112 moet

24 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT : Reported Burglary of the Identity 61 -
1. The press reported a burglary of Identity 61 _ 13-14

May 1973. An investigative report by an officer of the Executive
Protective Service states that the offices were ransacked anda
number of personal items were stolen. There were some latent
fingerprints, but no identification was made. The FBI, which states
that the incident was on 15 May, did not investigate because it deter-
mined that it did not have jurisdiction. The Identity 61

registered a formal complaint and American regrets were expressed,
Identity 61 making it clear that they suspected something other than
ordinary robbery. We have no additional information on the subject.
There had been an carlier intelligence operation against the Identity 61
which is described below.

2. On 16 April 1971 the Agency proposed to the FBI the instal-
lation of technical coverage of Identity 61 The opportunily
for such an installation came about when a domestic asset of Foreign
Resources Division reported that he had been asked to submit a bid
for a contract to renovate Identity 61 Upon securing the
contract the asset was willing to augment his work force as appropriate
or install material which would be provided him. The Agency proposed
to turn this asset over to the FBI and to provide technical and logistic
support. The value of such an operation to the intelligence community
was cited.

3. On 23 April 1971 FBI Director John Edgar Hoover turned
down the Agency proposal. That same day CIA Director Richard Helms
sent a letter to Aitorney-General John Mitchell requesting that the FBI
turndown be reversed, citing the importance of the Iden 61 target and
national intelligence needs to collect positive intelligence. On 24 April
the Attorney-General reversed the FBI decision and the Washington
Field Office of the Bureau was instructed to proceed with the operation.

yo

ODGES .

Ta ah wees f teens are
Cre if sy aes

tlt]
eta eee el!

pec fam ince Sane

;
[

a- ‘e


NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 113

4. During the period from 26 April to 18 May all the
technical equipment from the Agency.to the FBI was delivered,
installed and tested. Everything seemed to be working, No Agency
personnel were involved-in any way with actual installation of
equipment in Identity 61 From May to February Agency tech-
nicians helped calibrate, reset and do other repair work on occasions
of equipment failure in the FBI listening post. On no occasion did
they enter Identity 61,

5. The Agency requested that coverage of Identity 61 - be
stopped on 3 February 1972 after FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
advised that he was scheduled shorily to testify in Congress and
might have to advise them that the installation in Identity 61°
was initiated at CIA's request. The operation and equipment, to the
best of the Agency's knowledge, was dormant until 8 December 1972
when the FBI was asked by the Agency to reactivate coverage, The
request at this time was occasioned by the knowledge that a Iden 76
delegation would be arriving in Washington for discussions on
nationalization of foreign holdings, While the FBI was still
in the process of reactivating the equipment, the Department of
State on 20 December 1972 requested the FBI to institute all possible
coverage of Identity 61 and on 22 December 1972 coverage
was partially reinstitutéd with full coverage in effect by 26 December
1972.

6. A review of the take from the operation, weighed against
the risks involved, led the Agency to conclude that the activity was
not worth continuing, On 16 February 1973 CIA requested the FBI
to discontinue the coverage. On 22 February 1973 the FBI advised
that microphone surveillance of Iden 61 was discontinued.

0 Keehanke

John C. Richards

Greet Grates

Gln wt Go: '


a , !

[ Addendum . FY re
ak? We ferred to in JCRichards'! 24 iv 73 memo toIG >
F $,° od a . aragravh 2, re Identity 61™ _Break-in
gre \ l. The Foreign Resdurtes Division assetpvas Identity 77

c ;
ar a who owned the Identity 78 _ .
‘Som .- . :

« The Agency had initially agreed
to reimburse Iden 77 for losses suffered up to $2500, The final
amount of remuneration turned: out to be $4, 828,53. Another FR
asset who worked on this operation was Identity 79 plumber and
elettrician of McLean, Va. He was terminated by FR in January 1972.

2. TSD personnel who entered and worked in the FBI listening
post were: Identity 80, Identity 30 and Identity 45
of TSD and Harold Leith of Division D. GGLSESS
ee 35 ;
Ac ‘
‘
a ;
e Po
. \
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 114 _ a


bass isd hal

eo... °

15 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Break-in at Identity 61

1. Information has been received from WH Division
which indicates that there was a break-in at - Identity 61

on the weekend of 13-14 May 1972. ThelIden76 Desk
of WH Division has no knowledge of Bureau coverage at that
time.

2. I discussed the Iden 76 matter with Iden 66
of CI Staff (Red 1751), who advised that the FBI did
have coverage of Identity 61, _ and the Agency sup-
-ported this operation. He indicated that this was identified
as Operation WUDCOR and he would be able to provide additional
details on this if Mr. Colby requests it.

‘[s/ Identity 10

Acting Executive Officer

ry TATUTTS
qs ae {in
sik

=

st fe |
weed bd nd

-E2 IMPDET ee
CL BY 008246 COGS.


J

ele vee otal

Gin hit
Gms

APOT AEN | ran atrepae * yner ot

03 aurgek Yrbey we) | a

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 116

ME MHORANDUL FOR: Deputy Director for Operations
SUBIZCT: WH -Cossaents on Jack Anderson Column
REPERENCE Jack Anderson's Washineton Merrv-Co~
. Ronnd Column of S March 1578: "Chilean
Rreak-ins Retlect uatergate"

1. WH Division has reviewed the referenced colunn
(copy attached) hy dack anderson and fiadcs that it eon-
tains no new information. -To the best knovisdags at the

ivisi there is foundation to the altesation tha’
Division, there is no foundation to the allegation that
%. Howard Hunt was engaged on bohaif of ITT in breaking
into Chilean diplomatic installations in Washinzton and

New York,

2. <Any connection between ITT and these break-ins
is purely conjectural and the colunn takes care to
point this our.

2 Harold Haendrvix, ITT Latin American repres enta-
Stay has told us that‘ho had no relationsnin with
nant’ on this or . He had anticivoatad
that Anderson 123 rolhationship in bis
coluan and nad is was not true.

As

/s/ Identity 81

. Chiez
Western Henisphere Division

Attachment: As Stated

sil eae

fruc Fic anced Pin. wi wad

‘SRG aan a

USSa-EPS FORM 101 — = = ——

7 6/70 | : .. EacCUTIVE PROTECTIVE SERVICE er
. . rn « SERIAL (CASE) HUWSER
Ie . INCIBENT REPORT 272 =39 B
i 12

y e. CATE cetya ft Pee
& .

&. LOCATION (STREEMIGORES 5) S. KATYRE OF INCIDENT
TARKATION)

Chile if mus lL

6. REPORTED BY: 7. ADDRESS

Fy est ~ neces S-7 ; 3

B. ..OME FRINE

on ~~ 7 . - .

| Hernan Haverro 1705 Hanlet Street, Sorinefield, Vel. 7 SALTS
IO. OFFICE ASSIGNED . V1. OATES 12, HOUR $3. DAY GF WEEX

Sergeant Stevens’ E. Butler
- Sergeant Rilev_ M. Richardson 05-15-72

14. WITNESS . : 15. ADGRESS

1330 hrs.

N/A ie WA

19. ADDRESS

20, ROME F
HE
24. OFFICE Frcs

N/A

18. WITRKESS

m

22. DETAILS OF INCIDENT (BRIEFLY DESCRIGE INCIDENT, CGHTIAUE ABOVE ITEMS AS NECESSARY INDICATING ITEM)

t

- ft Janproximately 13390 hours, Monday, May 23, 2972). Forci¢n Missions Division
Control Center wos sdvised by I PLN C,, 30, that a bonclor: had tskon mlzce atthe
Chancery of Chile, +3735 Uassachis s_Averua, IL, sonatine between 1ANQ hors on
Friday, May 13, 192, and on 0855 date.

Serresnt PR ey
1335 hours in

_Pichordecn ard the pndersicned vere di spetche doat approvinanely
Cruiser # 23.

The undersigned vas _edvised by Mr. Hernan
- of the Tbassy of Crile, that the Ch
were ransacked. Me tis th tine the ret
‘rw Navarro advises

“when detormuuatic

jan

MIOCLE AGURESS

CATE OF BIRTH SOCIAL SECURITY HO. RATICNALLS

LAST NAME FIRST

MIDOLE ACORESS

£2) RACE SEX REIGHT WEIGHT HAIR £YES DATE OF BIATH SOCIAL SECURITY HO. . RATIONALITE
| ,
25. ARREST PO 26. ARREST HO. 27. ARREST OF FICERANAME AND BADGE KO.) 28. OATE GF ARREST [23.0%

39. INCIDENT STATUS

ade oven

C. — UNFOUNDED ©. O CLEARED ay aztis”

31 REPORT fs Grp ke SEI SIGNATS HPE,NOW 27 32. APPROVING OF FACIAL (SIGHATURE) \ DATE
TT Lo aye Ze : \
ca 7 °
bleé CLIK. Fe 7 ker, were (\ itv: LU tomy
Si. ee Sent Stovens E. Putler ote He Ka

33. STATE é pert. OFFICIAL NOTIFIED

. [32. US55-1D CASE NS.
; N/A 8 tC HOUR: , H/A C O3B76

NW 88296 Bocid:32989624 Page 11f


C - : \ , 7 . ° INU] JER EPURT - SUPPLER —_ . 4. SERIAL ICASED ny

‘ . 7 . n :

_ . Fle 2. 200
2. RATURE OF INCIDENT Anatom

Burglary II a ; AN
3. REPORTED BY: . 4. ADORESS , S. ieee ne
1 A
Hernan (9°) HNevarro 605 NemMet Street, Springfield 8 eal in

Fo ADOITIGHAL DETAILS OF INCIGENT: |

_ . we

The following were previcusly on the scene: Sergeant Clifton 0. Gill, Badge. it wy 3
(.P.D.C.,3D, and Officer Michael S. Kurdilla, Badge # 3770, M.P.D.C.,3D, also M.P.D.¢
Print Cruiser # 735. es . . a Ce

S/A Michael F, Murphy, USSS-PID (Foreign Branch), was notified.

»

CAST WAME Y FIRST | ~ MIDOLE, ACORESS |

RACE | SEX |. JBEIGHT | WEIGHT } Rain | eves | . DATE GF BIRTH | « SOCIAL SECURITY NO. NATIONALITY

FIRST \ MIDDLE \

RACE} «SEX, | HEIGHT |. WEIGHT | RAR |. eves | . DATE OF BIRTH | SOCIAL SECURITY HO. RATICNALITY

9. ARREST PO | 10, ARREST KO. } il. ARREST OFFICER (NAME & BADGE HO.) wad . . 13. Hoe?

$4, CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION | . + f-48. USSS+ID CASE KO.
rfgboer j . op{croseo “| c.[exrouxaeo | D.L] CLEARED BY ARREST |

- _ oe : . M/A

16. FINAL CASE DISPOSITION } : .
- a : . . . “00 hes
OPEN ae ae'¢
17, ner ine one seca (StcnaTuRe? | 18. DATE | 13. APPROVES [SISAATURE & TITLED MV)
G3 ? Stet, & Peller Mh -, VOR Wiad

Sorvceant Stevens E. Butler’ 05415~72 Captain Pete N. Manthos
296—Doeld2909604—-Page-T13


(2, MATURE OF INCIDEXT
Burglary II
3, REPORTEO BY: . -_ 4 RDDRESS

«
lerpan GPT) Maver

7 AGOITICHAL DETAILS GF INCIGENT:

At approximately 1600 hours, Tuesday, May 6, 1972, Mr.’HNavarro contacted Officer

Adrian Romen-Soncalez ab 1310 L, Street, H.W. and Stated the following items missi
( Portable Radios), one (1) Sanyo AM/SH Portable Radio, tro (2) Panascnic AM/FM

and one (1) Westinshouse AX, TH/SH Radio. Also taken was one (1) Braun Electric She.
one (1) Womens pullover sweater, and an unknowm number of beoks.

8. SUSPECT-ARD/OR ARRESTED PERSONS, IDENTIFY BY NAME, ACDRESS, SEX, RACE, SCCIAL SECURITY KUMAER, DOB, EYES, ETC, AN
. . * v
Chel NAME | . FIRST « MIDOLE } ADDRESS |

CMEIGHT | WEIGHT | HAIR | EYES | . DATE OF BIRTK { . SOCIAL SECURITY KO.
a

-LAST KAME | First | MIDDLE | AGSRESS |

rm

RACE | -SEX.| REIGHT |. WEIGHT | wan |. eves | . DATE CF BIRTH | SOCIAL SECURITY HO. JRATLONALIT

10, ARREST HO. | ‘te ARREST OFFICER (k AME & BA

S$. ARREST PO | 12. OATE

14. CURRENT CASE DISFOSTION | \

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sytSooen \ B-Pxuosen “| é.[uxrouxoso \ D.E} CLEARED BY ARREST |
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16, FINAL CASE DISPOSITION |

AS, USSS*1D CASE NO. |

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1S. APPROVED (5 A vied

WE MON! ra 4.
Captain Pete H. vanthos

NW 88296. Docld:32989624 Page 119 . .


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25, IDENTIFY SUSPECTS BY NUIMSER
IF ARRESTED Give AMREST RUIMSER AMD CHARGE ni

(inefuta Movia, Address, Seg, Race, Ace, Heveht, Welskt,

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27. HOSPITALIZED - WHERE?

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NW 88296 Dochd:32985624 Page 1271

OGC 73-0930
.25 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Identity 61 Break In on 15 May 1972

1, On 24 May 1973 I telephoned Mr. James Robinson,
General Crime Section, Department of Justice and asked if he
had any information as to criminal prosecution of persons involved
ina breakin at Identity 61 -in Washington, D.C. on
15 May 1972, Mr. Robinson stated he had no knowledge of this but
suggested that it would be beiter to check with Mr. G. Marvin Gentile,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security, Department of State, and
the Secret Service since they had responsibilities for the Executive
Protective Service (EPS). I telephoned Mr. Gentile and he identi-
fied two State Department cables relative to the incident; one from
the embassy in Santiago to the Department, No. 2450, dated-
15 May 1972, Subject: Unauthorized Entry Outlining the Protest
of the Iden 76 Government presented to the American Embassy,
and the State Department reply to Santiago, No. 084655, dated
15 May 1972. Mr. Gentile also identified the EPS report of
investigation and suggested that I get a copy from the Secret Service.
I then called Mr. Tom Kelly at Secret Service and he had his liaison
man deliver me a copy of the EPS report of investigation.

; 2. On 25 May 1973 I received a call from FBI Agent
Ray Mullens on green phone No. 5303 stating that he had received
a telephone call from Mr. James Robinson relative to my inquiry
about prosecution. Mr. Mullens indicated that the FBI Washington
Field Office had recontacted the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
on 24 May and reviewed the report No. 248-424 filed with the 3rd
District, MPD which states that a break in occurred at Identity 61
between 5:00 and 8:00 a.m. on 15 May 1972, |
\

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Reparted loss at thane consisted of four am [i Phaios
and one electric razor. The police investigation identified
some latent fingerprints but no identification of those prints
was made. Since the reported loss was under $5,000 and there
was.no evidence of a crossing of state boundries, the FBI did

not make an investigation of the incident.

The MPD reported

that there had been no prosecution and no suspect was identified.

Mp eco

cc: Legislative Counsel
. Inspector General
OGC:IKGicav
Orig - Subject: Watergate Case
1 - IKG Signer
1-Chréno | ~

-2-

NW 68296, Docld:32989624 Page 122

Z
OHN K, CGRSSSsT

pupae eres:

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1. June 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. William E. Colby

SUBJECT: Special Activities

1. Following our recent conversation, I have
searched my memory and Mr. McCone’s files for examples
of activitics which to hostile observers or to someone
without complete knowledge and with a special kind of
motivation could be interpreted as examples of activities
exceeding CIA's charter.

2. First, as we discussed, on 7 March 1962,
DCI McCone, under pressure from Attorney General Robert
F. Kennedy, agreed to tap the telephones of columnists
Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott in an effort to identify
their sources for classified information which was appcar-
ing in their columns. Because the primary source appeared
to be in the Department of Defense, MceCone ordered me
personally to brief General Joe Carroll, Divector of DIA,
orally, which I did. If understand more complete information |
on this operation is available from the Director of Security.
I, personally, managed to avoid gaining any knowledge of
what precise actions were taken, what information was paincd,
what was done with it, and when the operation was terminated.

3. As a result of a developing relationship with

IDE N-122 thelDEN-123representative in Washington,
and also as a result of certain information conveyed by
IDEN-124 » James Angleton, with the approval of
Dick Helms, agreed 1o mount a counterespionage operation
against the IDEN-95 in Washington. This involved

breaking and entering and the removal of documents from

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NW 68296 Docld:327989624 Page 123


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the: IDEN~-126 | On 18 June 1962, DCI McCone and
Helns briefed Secretary of State Rusk generally.on the
operation without going into operational details. Later
on the same day, President John F. Kennedy was briefed.
Actual breaking and entering occurred, somewhat later, and
on 15 April 1963, DCI McCone met with President Kennedy
alone and briefed the President on the details of this
new phase of the operation. On the same day, the Attorney
General was briefed and he agreed that he would not
mention it to the FBI unless the FBI themselves raised

it with him. On 3 February 1964, DCI McCone met alone
with President Lyndon B. Johnson and briefed him on the
operation. On 4 February McGeorge Bundy was briefed.

On 6 February 1964 in a briefing of Secrefary of State
Rusk on the results of the operation, Rusk expressed
reservations about: the propriety of such an operation.

He raised this same concern in subsequent conversations
with McCone on 17 April 1964. 28 May 1964, and 14 June
1964. On 12 September 1964 Rusk continued to express
grave reservations and repeatedly suggested that the
IDEN-93S be iniormed directly that we knew about their
espionage operations in the United States and ask them

to desist. In a meeting on 28 May 1964 Rusk expressed
these reservations in the presence of DCI MeCone and
President John F.. Kennedy. Secretary of Defense McNamara
was also present, and there is no record that he had
previously been made aware of this operation.

4. Although certain activities never got beyond
‘the planning stage, there are, I believe, three examples
of. such planning which could be subject to misinterpretation.
One involved chemical warfare operations against the rice
‘crops in both Cuba and North Vietnam. A second involved
a paramilitary strike against the Chi-Com nuclear instal-
lations. Outside the United States Government, General
“Eisenhower was briefed on such planning. A third, which
assumes a new Significance today, involved a proposal by
Angleton and Helms for a greatly increased intelligence
collection effort against foreign installations in this
country. This planning also involved a scheme for selected

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exposure of KGB activities and counteractions against the
Soviet intelligence service. The reasons are still unclear
to me as to why the FBI chose to brief the PFIAB to the
effect that CIA was planning to wiretap extensively and
indiscriminately in this country, to greatly increase

the Agency representation in the Moscow Embassy. and
generally to use KGB-type tactics, also extensively and
indiscriminately. This led to a heated exchange between
DCI sicCone and Mr. Belmont of the FBI, one such meeting
taking place in the presence of the Attorney General.

It is clear that the TBI was opposed to any such proposal
then, as now, and the plan never went forward.

5. During the period when Des FitzGerald was in
charge of the Cuban Task Force, DCI MeCone's office
learned, quite by accident, that FitzGerald had secured
the cooperation of several prominent US business firms
in denying economic items to Cuba. There was no question
but that the businessmen were glad to cooperate, but know-
ledge of this operation had to be rather widespread.

6. On 17 April 1964, Mr. Robert B. Anderson came
to DCI MecCone on behalf of American business interests,
offering to insert some $300,000 to try to secure a
favorable result in the elections in Panama. Shortly
after this approach, IDEN-128 of IDEN-129

made a similar proposal to MeCone in connection
with elections ‘in Chile. On 12 May 1964 at a meeting of
the 303 Committee, it was decided that the offers of
American business could not be accepted, it being neither
a secure way nor an honorable way of doing such business.
This declaration of policy at this time bears on the recent
ITT hearings, but I am not surprised that McCone has
‘forgotten thathe helped to set the precedent of refusing
to accept such collaboration between the > Agency! Ss operations
and private business.

7. At the direction of Attorney General Robert
_Kennedy and with the explicit approval of President Kennedy,
McCone injected the Agency, and particularly IDEN- 36

poe -
fat. oe _ ion.
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into the US labor situation, and particularly to try
to ameliorate the quarrel between George Meany-and
Walter Reuther. [DEN-34 steered a very skillful
course in this connection, but the Agency could be.
vulnerable to charges that we went behind Meany'’s back,
or were somehow consorting with Reuther against Meany's
wishes.

8. There are three examples of using Agency
funds which I know to be controversial. One was the
expenditure of money under Project MOSES in securing
the release of Cuban Brigade prisoners. Details of
this operation are best known to Larry Houston, Mike
Miskovsky IDEN-131 » and dames Smith. Second,
as you well know, when Lou Concin received his summons
to report to the Joint General Staff NWeadquarters on
1 Novenber 1963 a large amount of cash went with him.
My impression is that the accounting for this and its
use has never been very frank or complete. Third, at
one of the early Special Group meetings attended by
McCone he took strong exception to proposals to spend
Agency funds to improve the economic viability of West
Berlin, and for an investment program in Mali. His
general position was that such expenditures were not
within the Agency's charter, and that he would allow
such spending only on the direct personal request of
the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense, or
tue White House.

9. I raise these issues of funding because I
remember the Agency's being severely criticized by the
House Appropriations Subcommittee for having spent $3,000
for stamps in connection with a program to buy tractors
to secure the release of prisoners from Cuba.

10. Under the heading of old business, I know that
any one who has worked in the Director's office has worried
about the fact that conversations within the offices and
over the telephones were transcribed. During McCone's

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NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 126

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tenure, there were microphones in his regular office,

his inner office, his dining room, his office in East
Building, and his study at his residence on White Haven
Street. I do not know who would be willing to raise such
an issue, but knowledge of such operations tends to
spread, and certainly the Agency is vulnerable on this
score. .

11. Also under the heading of old business, I
well remember the hue and cry raised, especially by Carl
Kaysen in the White House, when the Agency injected a
contaminating agent in Cuban sugar bound for the Soviet
Union. Shortly after the Cuban missile crisis, there was
a disposition in Washington to reexamine the Bay of Pigs,
and the fact that several Alabama National Air Guard
officers lost their lives in the Bay of Pigs was surfaced
with surprisingly little excitement at the time.

12. During my stint on the 7th floor there was
a special arrangement with the Office of Communications
whereby the Director's office gnined access to non-CIA
traffic. This surfaced briefly at one point shortly after
Admiral Rayborn became DCI. He had visited the Signal
Center and removed a copy of a telegram from the Embassy
in the Dominican Republic for Under Secretary Georve Ball,
Fyes Only. He returned to his office and proceeded to
discuss this telegram with George Ball who was naturally
quite curious as to how Rayborn knew about it, and also as
to how Rayborn had it in his possession before Ball did.
Ben Read in the Secretary of Stace's office and I spent
several weeks putting this one to rest.

13. Finally, DCI McCone, as you and I well know,
operated on a very lofty plane, and I think certain of
his activities could be misunderstood! One example was.
his decision in July of 1964 to have Aristotle Onassis and
Maria Callas flown from Rome to. Athens on Air Force KC 135.
Their arrival in Athens in this airplane attracted the
attention of the local press and in due course Mr. John

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W 88296 Docld:37989624 Page 127


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Hightower, Chicf of the Associated Press Bureau for
Washington, came to see me to ask about the propriety
of this action.

14. ° The use of IDEN-132 aircrait

has been remarkably secure, but DCI MeCone himself
forgot about the cover arrangement and became quite
exercised when he saw Candidate Goldwater land in the
San Francisco airport for the Republican National Con-
vention in 1964 aboard the IDE N-133 with
the -highly visible tail number [pen-i34, This was, I
explained to him carefully, a perfectly legitimate
charter, but he didn't like it.

15. McCone dealt quite extensively with newsmen
in Washington. In fact, they gave him a gift anda
luncheon when he leit Washington, which is perhaps
indicative of the press's relations with him. However,
in the case of the Ross and Wise book, The Invisible

Government, he did try to bring pressure on 2 the publisher
and the authors to change things. They did not change
a comma, and I doubt that this old saw willever sing

again.

. 16. Finally, and this will reflect my Middle
Western Protestant upbringing, McCone's dealings with
the Vatican, including Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul

Vi, would and could raise eyebrows in certain quarters.

17. The above listing is uneven, but I have a
sinking feeling that discipline has broken down, and that
allegations from any quarter which cast these things in

‘the wrong light would receive great publicity and attention,
and no amount of denial would ever set the record straight.
If I may be of any assistance in tracking down further

‘details, I am-of course at your disposal, but I would point

CO4G2

NW 882596 Docld:32989624 Page 128


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out that I was very much in the position of the
enlisted man who knew that the commissioned officers
were aware of these activities and better able to
judge their propriety and possible impact or misinter-
_pretation.

MEd

WALTER ELDER

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NW 882796 Dochd:32989624 Page 129 . A
a .


@ secret sENSITIVE @

SUBJECT: PLMPLODESTAR

Project MPLODESTAR is a Headquarters initiated program
which has as its fundamental objective the long term manipu-
lations of selected agent assets operating against EA Division
difficult targets in the leftist and communist milieu in various
parts of the world. Although targetted overseas these agents are
often exposed to and directed against American radical, leftist,
and communist targets to gain a practical knowledge of the leftwins,
radical, communist world. There is a possibility that an asset

“might become suspect and be accused of being an employee of the
Agency or the Bureau; or it might happen some asset would, for
some reason, become disenchanted with his role and expose his
Agency relationship and his activities, with resultant embar-
rassment. To minimize potential problems, therefore, each

case is cleared with the FBI and throush CI/SO the Bureau is

kept.informed on a regular basis.

SECRET SENSITIVE ° E2 IMPDET
CL BY 0610906

wo

NW_88296_Docld:32989624 Page 130


i
ee

—~— office of the Ambassador's secretary which was

—

muewdbid de

MEMORANDUM

_. SUBJECT: Technical Operation Against IDEN-76 Embassy
in 1971 and 1972 .

.
e .

. ry *
a . . °
.

1. ¢«A technical penetration of the IDEN-76 Embassy in
‘Yashington, D. C. was mounted by the FBI with the support of

| this Agency in April-May 1971. This operation, which used
Agency equipment and technical expertise but was managed

operationally by the FBI, was initiated only after then-
Director Richard Helms had gone over the head of former

FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to obtain the approval of then-

Attorney General John N. Mitchell. The operation was dis-

continued at the Agency's request on 2 February 1972 when it
appeared that Director Hoover intended to testify before
Congress concerning audio installations in the U.S. and
identify this operation as CIA instigated.

2... The operation consisted of the following three
technical devices:

azv~ An AC- powered, masked transmitter and

two’ switches in the. office occupied by the Deputy.
~Chief of Mission. —

ee

~— -

-b. An AC-powered, masked transmitter in-the-—

“oo™

. \i
: Nace ew
Rea web edt 4

NW 88296 Docld:32989624-Rage-t3t———__


Lane ede

.
— . . .. -2- :
“ .
v --

- designed to pick up high quality audio of typing

in the office. It was hoped to break these audio

signals into clear text using advanced computer

techniques developed by Division D. No useful

product, however, Was ever obtained. | ; °
c. A battery-powered, masked transmitter

and switch concealed in the _ door of the

Embassy,- which would supply crytographic information

— .. ° for NSA. (Produced excellenx quality signals

‘antal it became inoperative in early 1972 because of

battery failure.)

3. In December 1972 the Agency requested reactivation of
the operation for a 60-day trial period in spite of the limited
value of intelligence produced previously (22 disseminations
of only moderate interest). Reactivation was requested because
of strong interest in the special IDEN-76 ¢overnment mission
arriving in Washington in late December to conduct high-level

talks. with U.S. State Department officials concerning debt

renegotiation and-other major_items outstanding between -the-—

ease

two-countries. The operation was reinitiated on 21 December

1972 but was discontinued again on 22 February_1973 by Acting

se — {

CTs ess {? \t

SECRE a

Cc
. he
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 132 _ ye


a ae Coody -
_ oo -3- ;
& . @ @ -

Director L. Patrick Gray at this Agency's request. Our request

rary

Was prompted by a decision that the intelligence production of
this operation did not justify ‘the risks involved in continuing
to run it in the sensitive political climate caused by the
mounting disclosures about CIA involvement inLEN-76 This
was especially so because of our ‘reservations about maintaining

proper security for the listening post which, as with other

operational aspects of the case, was under FBI management.

ete oa

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 133 ee


® e
© ‘ @

e. Alias’ Social Security Cards. 171 backstonped
accounts havé been established for Contract personnel
whose relationship with the Agency cannot be revealed
but who are entitled to Social Security coverage.
Following expiration of the contractual relationship,
at an appropriate time the alias and true name accounts
are merged permitting the individual to receive con-
plete bencfits upon reaching the age of eligibility.

£. Alias IRS Tax Accounts. 54 Social Security
numbers have been reesistéred Tor the purpose of open-
ing 54 new bank accounts since 1 July 1972. 87 in-
dividual tax accounts have been established with IRS
on an unwitting basis in 14 cities in the United States.

‘

g. Notional Facilities. 311 notional facilities
(43 corporations; 6Y sole-proprietorships; 207 lawyers
and 61 telephone answering service addresses are main-
tained by CCS in 58 cities in the United States.

h. Alias Signatories on Bank Accounts. 24 aliases
for signatives on 25 proprietary entity and one notion-
al company bank accounts are in use by 9 officers and 1
proprietary-hire as follows:

CCS/llqs - 5 officers (12 aliases) on 8
proprictary entities and l
notional company.

CCS/NY PMC# - 3 officers (9 aliases) on 13
proprictary entities.

. CCS/NY PMC* - 1 proprictary-hire Qa alias)
. . on 3 proprietary entities.

CCS/MD PMC* -—- 1 officer (2 aliases) on 2
proprietary entities.

*Proprietary Management Company

ae

fw
Nd |
ey
Ca

_ 00


_

sensitive nonofficial cover cases under the guise

of normal commercial annuities. Backstopping for -
this arrangement is provided through CCS-procured

bank accounts and Post Office boxes. 19 retirecs

are currently being handled. rt

k. Credit Union Arrangements for Selccted Non-
official Cover Tersonnel, sivicends (interest) carned
on Credit tuion accouitS by individuals under cover
are not reported to the Internal Revenue Service based
| on 50 U.S, Code 403g or Intcrnal Revenue Code Section

6041. .
‘Individuals under cover may borrow money from the
“Credit Union for the purchase of real estate; however,
| the mortgage is recorded in the name of a cleared
lawyer and not the actual lendor (Credit Union).

—

Paragraph 1, deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

| : Poot - 00542

NW 85296 Docid:32985624 Page 135


oO SECRET,

CORPORATE COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) is responsible for the
placement of Agency operational personnel under the cover
of bona fide U.S, companies abroad and in the U.S. This
process involves the selection of companies; research on
their locations and key personnel; clearances; contacts
with companies to solicit cooperation with the Agency;
arrangements for integration of Agency personnel into the
companies, including letters of understanding; funding of
salaries, allowances and expenses; and, continuous monitor-
ing of each integrated case throughout the course of the
cover use, The overall objective is to match the individual
being placed, the company, and the location, in a manner
that will censure achievement of the Agency purpose and pro-
tection of the company integrity.

2. Currently, there are 191 integrees for whom cover
is provided by 140 companies; 179 integrees are located in
4.7 foreign countrics and 12 are located in the United States,
To maintain this placement level, CCS personnel ¢ are re-
searching and monitoring approximately 250 to 300 companies
at any given time,

3. To minimize the adverse consequences to a cooperating
company, and to preserve the Agency’s operational cauity in
the event of exposure of an individual under cover, it has
been established policy that no more than two individuals
would be furnished cover by the same company. At the present
time this ratio is confined to upproximately 25% of the total
number of companies now being used and efforts are under
way to effect further reductions toward the goal of one
individual per company.

4. In addition to the primary corporate cover function
described in-paragraph 1. above, CCS maintains continuing
contact with two U.S, car rental firms and two U.S, .credit
ecard firms for the purpose of obtaining backstopped credit
cards in alias for operational use in the United States and
abroad by Agency personnel. 42 such cards are now being
used by 34 individuals. .

‘ SE Apr EB AN OET <. avs eZ G ar
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 136 Aves a 1OGZs

NW 60296 Docld:32999624 Page 137

~[ ; _—
tan rel. : -
DEVISED FACILITIES COVER

1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains 311 back-
stopped notional facilities which were created to pro-~
vide cover: for Agency personnel in the United States
and abroad and to provide an attributable source for
Agency funds used in operations and requiring conceal-
ment of Agency or U.S, Government interest. The facilities
comprise 43 corporations providing personal status cover,
payrolling and tax attribution sources, and other miscel-
lancous support such as title to property,: funding, etc.;
61 sole-proprietorships providing status and operational
cover, including payrolling and tax attribution; and 207
non-registered companies providing support for high risk
operational requirements, agents abroad, corporate reim-~
bursements, and proprietary funding,

2. 224 Agency personnel engaged in operational
activities are payrolled by the facilities, an essential
procedure permitting the reporting of Agency salarics with-
out documenting the Agency as the source.

3. The facilities provide a capability for passing
Agency funds to 30 Agency proprictaries and 97 bena fide
companies on a continuing basis. 225 bank accounts
located in 36 banks throughout the United States provide
the mechanisms for transmittal of these funds.

Chan TT
Vint il]


- 7 e

PROPRIETARY ENTITY COVER

- 1. Central Cover Staff (CCS) maintains three domestic
proprietary management companies which provide funding and
operational support for 49 Agency entities, including 13
controlled and directed by CCS. :

e

2. The three proprictary management companies are
staffed by 9 cmployees; they furnish assistance in the
commercial, business and investment aspects of on-going
operations, manage the legal and commercial affairs of
entities supporting operations, dnd provide cover and
funding channels for operational activities as required.
Most importantly, professional services are furnished in
a manner responsive to required security standards and
at a cost considerably less than would be charged by
bona fide management firms.

3. The 13 proprietary entities directed by CCS pro-~-
vide cover for ten individuals in the United States and
three overseas, Operationally, the companies provide
commercial funding channels on a world-wide basis and
serve as corporate owners of equipment, inventory and
aircraft and as collection mechanisms for outstanding
notes and loans in order to conceal U.S. Government
affiliation or interest.

pews
OCS 23

ay 74

tree nai rastco ey snl.
LURLG,

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 138


€
a)
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3
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- 7 May 1973

“-MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT: Items for Possible Use in Briefing
the DCI

1. This Memorandun is submitted in order to
identify to you for possible briefing of the
Director activities which in certain contexts could
be construed as delicate or inappropriate.

2. At the request of the Director of Security,
from approximately mid-October 1972 to mid-January
1973 safesite number 585 was made available to the
‘ U.S, Marshal's Service for use as a secure residence
by an Assistant U.S. Attorney who reportedly was
under threat of assassination by organized criminal
elements. ,

3. SB Division over the past three months has
interviewed four sraduate students as prospective
candidates for assignments under American business
cover in the USSR. They were encouraged to locate
cover jobs on their own.

4. For approximately two years the SB Division
has ‘had the cooperation of the Commander of the
Morals Division of the District of Columbia Police
Department in training officers scheduled for
assignment to the USSR and Eastern Europe in how to
conduct themselves if placed under arrest. The
arrangement was made through the Office of Security.

S. Since late 1972 CIA has taken part in seven
FBI training courses at Quantico, Virginia in
response to requests from the FBI. We have shared
with them through lectures and discussions lessons
we have learned which are relevant to their counter-
espionage responsibilities.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059952

a
3

ae 0O0GEA
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 139 we els


6. As a means of sharing more fully our operational
“experience we have invited three TBI officers to be
‘students in our Soviet Operatims Course from 14 to 25

May 1973,

7.:° <A Soviet defector - was
confined at a CIA facility from April 1964 to
September 1967 while efforts were being made to
establish whether he was a bona fide defector.
Although his present attitude toward the Agency is
quite satisfactory, the possibility exists that the
press could cause undesirable publicity | ‘if it were
to uncover the story.

> ayy s

. es eee Ol

David H. Blee
Chicf
- Soviet Bloc Division

im rare) it ys
ote sae i

ot rrr ae
PO tote

NW 88296 Docid:22989624 Page 140


«

MEMOR..wDUM FOR: Mr. Colby 7,

Attached is the material we requested of Dick
Ober: ,

A. Ten Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the ,
Republican National Convention

B. Five Reports, Subj: Foreign Support for
Activities Planned to Disrupt or Harass the
Democratic National Convention

-C. Two Memoranda re Agency support to
Secret Service for Democratic and Republican
Conventions

Ober advises that the only Arnerjcan we reported
on to the IEC is Rennie Davis ag (14 ye (ld May 73 73)

GO Vos DATE ho Beg

ieipeeenaeee"enenenaienenimeamemmrrerarerenmmeeeree TO
FOR NO, re REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG $é@ WHICH MAY DE USED.

mee a

—NW"88296-ocld:32989624-Raget4t———

: | TAC he sty Ww D i “CONFIDES NTIAL SECRET .
OZFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

1. Tape
~fe fie (ATURE

Remarks:

Mr. Broe:

{ .

Dick Ober has been edvised that this package
is being sent to you. Since knowledse of the

existence of this Committee has been strictly
ae . Mirsited, Tie artead thet it he daliverad to ven
| nopened. Although if has an ER number on it,
it has not been sent through that office -- I gave
thern only the day, subject, and originator.

Se

(oz) AA Ae

Conay

FOLO HERE TO FErTURN TO SENDER

FROM: KAIME. ADDRESS ANG PHONE NO.

O/E 5§/MC/Larbara Pindar
UNCLasniein [CONFIDENTIAL

FORM fo. 237 | Use prewGys eciticns

_NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 142


ROUMIG AND RECCAD Stilet i

SUBJECT: (Cptionolj

EXTENSION | NO.

DATE ~ ~

Richard Ober 14 May 1973

JO: (Officer desgaanon, room number, ard
ovild-ag) OFFICER'S
INGTEALS

COMMENTS (Number ecch comment to show frat wore
to whom. Drow o tine across column cfter each commen’.

IDEN-73 |
G/NCI If-  w tapeg * fe. 2 “Attached are:

, oF D..
. i a: t 1 . soit
ay Lf ty i :

i
bo Of, i a |. : :
a A Ce bl AY | shed

° i
: | | | : | 2. Copies of memoranda con- ry
4. “ — corning Agency supmert ce.
“oe | | | | Secret Service (7 Avril ard :
Co a [ | 23 June 1972). . i

OT | ° | | |
! i 1 EYES ONLY .

wv

a ; ;
7. | | | ; :
ee ee eee
: } H aa eens oe nett Seen: ee
rs _— Coss co OT j Deyeey ore egret
. . ! : en conten ne aren ee rennnsn marae amen en a

12.

13.

[-} SECRET
NW 86296 Docld:32989624 Page 143 ;


. . Hho Gi — . 14 Bay 1973
| ® _ :

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff

1. Background: Formed December 1970 to’ produce
fully-evaluated national domestic intelligence studies,
including studies on demonstrations, subversion, extremisn
and terrorism. Membershin: Department of Justice (Chair-
man); Federal Bureau of Investigation; Department of
Defense; Secret Service; National Security Agency; Central
Intelligence Agency; and as necessary representatives of
other Departments or Agencies (following have partici-
pated: Treasury and State). Staff: IES Executive
Director John Dougherty and later Bernard Wells supplied
by Department of Justice with title of Special Assistant
to the Attorney General reporting to the Assistant Attorney
General for Internal Security Robert Mardian and later

William Olson. IPS has received requirements directly
fron and delivered renoris Cirictiy to ighn “ens oF the
White Hiouse. The White House has insisted that the

existence of this Committee be kept secret. Awareness _
of its existence within this Agency has been | limite ed to to
DCT, HnOT Car), C/CE and Tour orficers ot this ofsice.

2. CIA Participation: Contributions on foreisn
aspects (by memorandun with no Agency letterhead or at-
tribution). Contributions occasionally include foreign
intelligence provided by FBI and NSA. The Chief of the
Special Operations Group serves as the Agency representa-
®ve on the Intelligence Fvaluation Committee Staff and
as the alternate to the Agency representative on the.
Comnittee (who is the Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff),

: 3. Special Report: The Unauthorized Disclesure

of Classified Information, November 1971.” This study
‘was initiated in July If Lod by the White House as a con-
| sequence of the President's concern about the release
of the Pentagon Papers by Danicl Elisberg. Both Robert
Mardian and G. Gordon Liddy initially involved in tasking
the IES to produce this evaluation. Drafting done by IES
‘Staff members from Justice and FBI. Only Agency partici-
pation was editorial review.

\

i
i

eee yb

Pye ONY are

SERSTIIVE

; a

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 144 SEORET oo ~

9

”
Z2etMepEr cu ny {2 4F


4, Republican National Convention (21-24 Ausust
1972): At’ the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Dis-
ruptions at the 1972 Republican National Convention, fos
Miami Beach, Florida." The Agency provided from
February through August 1972 periodic contributions for
these estimates concernins foreign support for activi-
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Republican
National Convention {copies attached).

5. Democratic National Convention (10-13 July
1972): At the request of the White House, a series of
estimates was prepared by the IES on "Potential Disrun-
tions at’ the 1972 Democratic National Convention, Miami ° ;
Beach, Florida.'' The Agency provided between March and
July 1972 contributions on foreign support for activi- .
ties planned to disrupt or harass the Democratic
National Convention (copies attached).

Attachments: a/s

a Pay oo.) 6 CO550
belied teak .
aN

we Re ereee vou

YolliVEe =e

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 145 C ayant '


NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 146

Q FGRIGH CISLELG BESS RONOND

PYVAaTS

oe . . SOSTRSELED i . i
- oo GGHINELLEa Losech) ;

TQ @ caereswe

. .

SUBJECT : Foreign Support For Activities Planned to Disrupt oo
co or Harass the Republican National Convention :

1. There are only limited indications thus far of
foreign efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of
activities designed to disrupt or harass the National °
Convention of the Republican Party in San Diego, 21-23
August 1972. ne

2. Some American participants at the Soviet-controlled
‘World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples of
Indochina, held 11-13 February 1972 in Paris/Versailles,
attempted unsuccessfully to include a call for international
demonstrations to take place at the time of the Republican
National Convention. <A representative of the San Diego

* Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the domestic action

groups targetting on the Republican Convention, requested

_the American Delegations' Steering Committee at the World

Assembly to include a specific call for international
support of activities against the Republican convention

in their proposal to the Action Commission of the, World
Assembly. This request, however, was dropped as too
divisive by the Steering Committee, despite initial indica-
tions that the proposal would be taken to the floor of

the Assembly.

3. John LENNON, a British subject, has provided
financial support to Project "YES", which in turn paid

-.the travel expenses to the World Assembly of a representa-

tive of leading antiwar activist Rennie DAVIS. (DAVIS! repre-
sentative is tentatively planning to assist in preparations
for disruptive actions at the San Diego Convention.)

Project "YES" is an adjunct to another LENNO*-supported pro-
ject, the Election Year Strategy Information Center (EYSIC),
of which Rennie DAVIS is a key leader, which was set up to
direct New Left protest activities at the Republican
National Convention. In Paris Rennie DAVIS' representative
to the World Assembly met at least once with officials of
the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam;
it is not known if the Republican National Convention was
discussed. :


my 2 manres
: é 2 Hoga . . Ce
| | _e..
4. The SDCC is planning for foreign support for its
harassment of the Republican convention. A working draft
plan of the SDCC includes proposals for (a) the use of a
Special television network to broadcast video-taped messages
from other countries, including coverage of sympathetic
demonstrations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public -
address systems of live telephone calls from the- Vietnamese

in Paris and from the Communist Chinese and others at the
United Nations. .

.

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id:32989624 Page 147 Nani nicaree ua coarree genaen


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TRAITS pieerry
CONTRGLLED DISSE

- “@ ot eo. 04 NAR 1372

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
oon or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

__Indications.remain limited, thus far, of foreign efforts
to inspire, support or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican
..Party in San Diego, 21-23 August 1972. The concept of coordinated
international support for domestic activities in the United
States was generally endorsed at the recent World Assembly for
Peace and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina; however, the
Conference issued no specific call for international support of
disruptive actions at the American national political conventions.

BACKGROUND: .
At the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace and
Independence of the Peoples of Indochina, held in Versailles
from 10-135 February 1972, there was mention of American plans
for demonstrations at both the Republican and Democratic
National Conventions. The final draft resolution from the
Conference's "Action Commission" contains an appendix submitted
by American delegates whose goal was to secure global coordination
. £or domestic actions in the United States. It calls for inter-
~ national support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and
_ demonstrations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with
| the statement: “This campaign will: lead up to the Democratic
_.._Party.Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Dicgo on August 21, 1972."

‘The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly for the
~——Pedce7~and Independence of the Indochinese People" of 13 February
1972,:drafted by the "Political Commission" states:

"In the United States particularly, the protest against
‘the war is voiced more and more strongly, under various
‘forms, such as draft evasions, desertions, resistance, demon-
Strations which now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
. calls for support to these progressive and antiwar forces in
— _the United States, and asks the governments to grant asylun
to deserters and to support their right to repatriation.
All together, the peoples of the world will efficiently help
to impose on the U.S. Government the restoration of peace,
and independencé and freedom in Vietnan, Laos, and Cambodia.”

MIN Nl Reaapes } -
OOeEe areas a Wea Peas ht) . ! 0 oot
NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 143 n 5


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DEVELOPMENTS: - os

The San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC), one of the
‘domestic action groups targetting on the Republican Con-
‘yention, is planning, in addition to demonstrations, for a
“large exposition in "the campsights (sic) called Expose 72,
which with movies, exhibits, displays will portray the struggles
of people all over the world.'' Plans for activities at
Expose 72 are believed to include (a) the use of a special
television network to broadcast video-taped messages from
other countries, including coverage of sympathetic denon-
strations elsewhere; and (b) broadcasts over public address
systems of live telephone calls.from the Vietnamese in Paris
and from the Communist Chinese dnd others at the United Nations.
In addition, the SDCC has suggested that, in order to “outflank .
NIXON domestically and internationally," international opposition
can be expressed "by obtaining the authority of other countriés
‘and liberation movements to carry their flags in SDCC demon-
strations." .

- 00555

PEM 7 hee « on TATA ITS § . 4,
NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 149 a ; * Of fo aes ph

rez te at apes


a) A. APR.1972

eo Gee bbend

"Foreign iQ: for Activities Piann® to Disrupt
' or Harass the Republican National Convention a

SUMMARY : oo oe _— Do, -

There is little new evidence of foreign plans” or efforts
to inspire, support, or take advantage of actions designed to
disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in San
Diego, 21 to 23. August 1972. The Students for a Democratic
Society, in joining the ranks of domestic groups planning
‘actions at the Republican Convention, has adopted a proposal
to cooperate with Mexican workers and students in a demonstra-
tion in Tijuana, Mexico, during the Convention. The San Diego
Convention Coalition (SDCC}, another domestic group targetting
on the Convention, has received a letter of solidarity froin
the North Vietnamese. The letter is of interest as an indica-
tion of North Vietnamese contact’ with the SDCC; such contact
Will be required for the SDCC to implement its earlier-renorted
pians for broadcasts over public address systems during the’
ponvention of live telephone calls from the Vietnamese in

aris. .

DEVELOPMENTS:

. At its recent convention in Cambridge, Massachusetts,
held 30 March to 2 April 1972, the Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS} adopted a proposal to hold demonstrations at
the San Dicgo-Tijuana border during the Republican National
Convention. The proposal included a call for SDS to cooperate

. with Mexican workers and students in an action to occur during
a fiesta in Tijuana, where Convention delegates will be
entertained.

-

The North Vietnamese have given their endorsement to
the San Diego Convention Coalition (SDCC} in the form of a

Jetter from the Vietnam Committee for Solidarity with the

‘American People (VCSWAP), a quasi-official organ of the
North Vietnamese Government. The letter, which has becn
; Circulated by the SDCC and is dated 27 January 1972,

~ “expresses "great delight" with the formation of the SDCC,
: and conveys the Committee's “best wishes of militant soli-
darity and friendship. " The VCSWAP requests that the SDCC

.. Write often and "send us materials you have."

C rrce>
Oren ey

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hd Toncie. bagae. teh mea eal Penang i

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 150

*


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Me - - : “os e an . - . on * . -.

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
--———or-Harass the. Republican National Convention °

a

SUMMARY: : _ an
oS Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
‘.to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention i
Ww... ,wetiiami, Florida, 21-23 August 1972. A member of the Swedis
Committee for Vietnam, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, hes stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
ee _the.Swedish Committee's wore The British-based Interna-
_ tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
Gistributed a "Spring Orfensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
by the Peoples! Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPIJ).
The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
+ the Republican Convention.

ats 4

Sn

te
> i

a

>

DEVELOTHENTS:

.%- mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Commi
for Vi tnam, who is also an influential and well-infc
staff sember of the Secretariat of th coeckholm Conr
on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion cf the e
.Committee's unusually heavy work load that “things wi
hectic right unti 1 the elections in the U.S."

a

The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace 5 a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to th
-April-Mey 1972 issue of its regular internationel publics
tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
; :by the People's Ucaliticon for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
..._..n¢luded the following entry: ; °

August 21-23 Repubdlican Convention, San Diego.
Le Demonstrations organized by the San
Diego Convention Coalitisn, Box 8267,
San Diego, Ca. 92103.


He

. The ICDP comaentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstration
| “in support of some of the dates'listed but does not specifiea2 ls

Nn +
, call for actions in connection with the Republican Convention.
° A .
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NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 152 ,., ,Soixitnesche eee sn so


. . ot _ _ 14 JUN 1972.
oe Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
-. or Harass the Republican National Convention

SUMMARY: es -

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

to inspire,. support, influence, or exploit actions. designed
to disrupt or harass the Republican National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 21-23 Ausust 1972, is an’ expression of
interest by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to
the Paris Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar
organizations in the United States for demonstrations in
connection with the political conventions of both major
parties.

DEVELOPMENTS:

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese
Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to
contact him again when the visitor returned from an imminent
trip to the United States. The North Vietnamese official
gave the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demonstra-
tions during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
official stated that he was especially interested in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and Republican

. Nagional Conventions.

*

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NW 86296 Dochd:32989624 Page 153 | -*


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‘Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt

or Harass the Republican National Convention .
There are no additional indications of any substantial
foreign plans or efforts to inspire, support, or take advan-
tage of activities designed to disrupt or harass the National
.Convention of the Republican Party in Miami, Florida, 21-24
August 1972. -
t ¢@ : Me .
~ Vy
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po

Ho Foreign Diseem/to Dissem Abraa |
—_ Contralte ed Dissem oe

44

NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 154 pot .


SF pear —
, _ : aU Dlvdths ae
_ . .. 26 JUL 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned | to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention . i
SUMMARY:

Nev indications of foreign plans or efforts to inspire,
support, influence, or exploit activities designed to dis-
rupt or harass the Republican National Convention in Miami,
Florida, 21-24 August 1972, consist of the following: A
Jeader of the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice
(PCFJ) has stated that demonstrations will be organized to
take place at United States and allied military installa-
tions abroad during the period immediately before and during
the Republican Convention. The PCPJ leader also stated that
representatives of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam will

“participate in activities in connection with the Convention.
*fThe Anti-War Union (AWU), a domestic organization which has
been active in planning demonstrations in connection with the
Republican National Convention, has sent a delegation to
Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic Re spub -
lic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Govern-
ment of South Vietnam (PRG). No information is presently
available, however, indicating that actions at the Republican
Convention have been discussed at these meetings.

. . DEVELOPMENTS:
In an early July 1972 meeting with prominent members of

.. foreign antiwar.organizations, a representative of the People's
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), who occupies an impor-
tant position within that organization, discussed the plans
of the PCPJ in connection with the upcoming election campaign
in the United States. The PCPJ representative stated that
during the- period 14-23 August, a "Peoples Campaign Against
Bombing" would be waged in U.S. cities involved in the manu-
facture and shipping of materials for use in Vietnam, and
that similar actions will be organized at United States and
allied military installations abroad. The PCPJ representa-
tiye further stated that "dramatic demonstrations" in protest

. i .

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©£ the bombing in@yctnen are being organi by the "Repub-
dican Party National Convention Coalition" to occur on

21 August 1972. In an apparent reference to the 21 August
actions, the PCPJ leader added that representatives of the
Stockholm Conference on Vietnan will speak on the subject of ~
the alleged American bombing of dikes in North Vietnam. ;
(Comment: We have no.present information concerning plans of
Stockhoim Conference representatives to travel-to the United
States during the Republican National Convention; nor do we
have any additional information concerning plans of Stockholn
Conference representatives’ to participate in activities con-
nected with the Republican Convention. )

The Anti-War Union (ANU), a domestic group engaged in
organizing counter-activities at the Republican National Con-
vention, has sponsored the travel of a delegation of activists
to Paris, France, to meet with officials of the Democratic
Republic of North Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolu-
sationary Government of South Vietnam (PRG). An advance party

+ has already met with DRV and PRG representatives to discuss
the agenda for meetings with the full AWU delegation. Althouch
no information is presently available indicating that actions
at the Republican Convention have been discussed or are sched-
uled to be discussed at meetings between the AWU delegation
and the DRV/PRG officials, it is known that members of the ANU
advance party have asked for advice from the PRG officials
regarding the stance the ANU should take on certain questions
relating to the presidential elections. It is also known
that the DRV officials have questioned the AWU advance party
about the political mood in the United States. One of the
AWU delegation. members has stated that upon their return to
ths United States about 26 ‘July 1972, some of the members

‘will speak at rallies, over the radio, and on television,
to “educate the American people about the consequences of
‘voting for Nixon, and the need to end the war and defeat
Nixon." The delegation member added that the demonstrations
.at-the Republican Convention will be "unique."

e

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Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
ox Harass the Republican National Convention

*
4

SUMMARY: : .
There are no new indications of specific foreign plans or efforts to

inspire, support, influence, or exploit activities designed to disrupt or
harass the Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August
1972. Although meetings have been held recently in Paris, France, between
American antiwar activists and representatives of the Democratic Republic
of North Vietriam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam (PRG), currently available information indicates that the

. DRV/PRG officials made no efforts to encourage or give guidance to the
American participants with respect to the upcoming Republican National
Convention. Private discussions, separate from the meetings with the entire
American délepation, were conducted by both the DRV and the PRG ofiicials;

.at present, we have no information regarding the substance of these private
exchanges. A second group of activists, considered more important than
the first delegation, is scheduled to travel to Paris on or about 1 August 1972
for further consultations with the PRG and DRV representatives.

DEVELOPMENTS:

“Our

In recent meetings in Paris, France, with members of an American
del¥gation sponsored by the Anti-War Union (AWU), representatives of
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the Provisional Revolutionary
Government of South Vietnam (PRG) were very guarded with respect to dis~
cussing activities at the Republican National Convention. Although the Vietnam-
ese repeatedly questioned the Americans concerning the mood of the antiwar
movement in the United States, they made no direct reference to the Repub-
In. lican Convention, except for one instance when PRG Deputy Chief Nguyen
Nan TIEN accused President Nixon of using the private end public sessions
; of the Paris peace talks as "propaganda for the Republican Convention."
. | HEN then urged the Americans to promote and propagandize the Seven
Point Plan offered by the PRG. The Americans, too, for the most part,
refrained from discussing the Convention, other than to estimate that demon~
strators will number about 10,000 at the Convention.

- ereressre:

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Following their meeting on 22 July 1972 with the AWU delegation,
the PRG officials held additional talks with sub-groups of the delegation.
Additionally, at least one of the American participants was invited by
the DRV officials to return for further discussions. At present, there
is no information available concerning the substance of these private
exchanges :

A second, more important delegation of Americans connected with
the Anti-War Union is scheduled to travel to Paris circa 1 August 1972
for further consultation with DRV and PRG representatives. This second
group is scheduled to be led by Rennic DAVIS, founder and leader of the

.AWU. This will be DAVIS! second trip to Paris within recent months for
discussions with DRV and PRG representatives, Upon his return from
his first trip, DAVIS publicly stated that the AWU would demonstrate at
both the Democratic and the Republican Convention, but that the AWU's
chief target would be the Republican Convention.

‘ RESP nae renncns

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NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 158, en its ‘

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“ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
mo _ or Harass the Republican National Convention -

There are no new indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed
to disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Republican Party
in Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

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' Foreign Support’ for Activities Plarined to Disrupt
or Harass the Republican National Convention

‘There are no new indications, as of this date, of
foreign plans or efforts. to inspire, support, or take
_ advantage of activities designed to disrupt or harass
the National Convention of’ ‘thee Republican Party in —
Miami, Florida, 21-24 August 1972.

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_ resolution from the conference's “Action Commission" con- _

in the United States. It calls for international support

Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican

oN,

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Foreign Support for Activities Planned to. Disrupt
Or Harass the Democratic National Convention

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION:

There are no direct indications thus, far of foreign
efforts to inspire, support or take advantage of activities
designed to disrupt or harass the National Convention of
the Democratic Party in Midmi, 10-13 July 1972. The concept
of coordinated international support for domestic activities
jn the United States was generally endorsed at the recent
World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the Peoples
of.Indochina; however, the Conference issued no specific
call for international sunport of disruptive actions at the
American national political conventions.

.

, At. the Soviet-controlled World Assembly for Peace

‘and Independence of the Peoples! of Indochina, held in

Versailles from 10-15 February 1972, there was mention of
American plans for demonstrations at both the Republican
and Democratic National Conventions. The final draft

tains an appendix submitted by American delegates whose
goal was to secure global coordination for domestic actions

to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demonstrations,
from J April to 15 May 1972, and concludes with the state-
ment: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic Party

Party Convention in. San Diego on August 21, 1972."

The final "Resolution of the Paris World Assembly
for the Peace and Independence of the Indochinese People"
of 13 February 1972, drafted by the “Political Commission"
States:

"Yn the United ‘States particularly, the protest
against the war is voiced more and more strongly,

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-. under. various forms, such as draft “Vevasions; i
desertions, resistance, -demonstrations which
now affect even the soldiers. The Assembly
calls for support to. these progressive and -
antiwar forces in the United States, and asks -
the governments to grant asylum to deserters to,
: “7 -*  and to support their right to repatriation. .
meow" "ALL together, the peoples of the world will
Yao cs -ef£iciently help to impose on the U.S. Govern-
Jie 7, Ment the-restoration of peace, independence

ws

ot and freedom in Vietnan', Laos and Cambodia."
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Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt.
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

are *

SUMMARY :

New indications of foreign efforts or plans to inspire,
support, influence, or exploit actions designed to disrupt |
or harass the Democratic National Convention in Miami, 10-15

' July 1972, are limited to a reiteration by a member of the
Secretariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam of a
Statement previously issued by the World Assembly for Peace
and Independence of the Peoples of Indochina. The Assembly's

‘ pronouncement generally endorsed the concept of international
support to a campaign of anti-Vietnam War activities in the
United States leading up to the Democratic and Republican
Conventions, but made no specific call for support of dis-
Truptive actions at the conventions themselves. .
* . . : ‘
DEVELOPMENTS:

In early April 1972 an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam discussed,
in private, the international anti-Vietnam War activities
conducted on 1, 15, and 22 April. The Stockholm Conference
member stated that these actions were part of an international
Campaign in support of domestic American antiwar efforts
during the period 1 April to 15 May 1972, and “will culminate
at the election conventions in July and August."

. The World Assembly for Peace and Independence of the
Peoples of Indochina, of which the Stockholm Conference was
a.major organizer, had earlier enunciated a similar statement
in an appendix to the final draft resolution of the Assembly's

"Action Commission." The appendix called for international
support to six weeks of domestic antiwar actions and demon-
strations, from 1 April to 15 May 1972, and concluded with

““the statement: "This campaign will lead up to the Democratic
Party Convention at Miami on July 9, 1972, and the Republican
Party Convention in San Diego on August 21, 1972."

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to ; . 83 WAY 1972

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
-or Harass the Democratic, National Convention

SUMMARY :

Indications remain limited of foreign plans or attempts
to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in
Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972. A member of the Swedish
Committee for Vietnan, who is also a member of the Secre-
tariat of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, has stated
that the U.S. National Elections are playing a role in
the Swedish Committee's work. The British-based Interna-
tional Confederation for Disarmament and Peace (ICDP) has
distributed a "Spring Offensive Calendar" of activities
in the United States against the war based on a submission
by the Peoples! Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ).

The calendar includes actions planned in connection with
the Democratic Convention.

DEVELOPMENTS: .

In mid-April 1972, a member of the Swedish Committee
for Vietnan, who is also an influential and well-informed
staff member of the Secretariat of the Steckholm Conference
on Vietnam, stated in a private discussion of the Swedish
Committee's unusually heavy work load that "things will be
hectic right until the elections in the U.S."

The International Confederation for Disarmament and
Peace, a British-based antiwar organization and one of the
more prominent member organizations of the Stockholm Con-
ference, has attached a "Spring Offensive Calendar" to the
April- May 1972 issue of its regular. international publica-
tion Vietnam International. The calendar had been furnished
by the People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and
included the following entry:

.

July 9 - 12 Democratic Convention, Miami Beach.
. ; Demonstrations organised by Florida
People's Coalition, Box 17521, Tampa,
Florida 33612.

3 "Naty bad mars i . Lye
| Godel cen OOS7i
NW 88296 Docld:32980624 Page 164 NS PERE BRST CO ECE foaeng

a]

The ICDP commentary on the PCPJ calendar urges demonstrations
in support of some of the dates listed but does not specifically

. -call for actions in connection with the Democratic Convention.
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IW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 165. 1) FORTIN STL pie pecan


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7 JUN 1972

ny

=< Pott ee . . a ns ' eee : : *

a hae oe ae

_ Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
-or Harass the Democratic National Convention

.

SUMMARY: 7 an

The only new indication of foreign plans or efforts

- to inspire, support, influence, or exploit actions designed
to disrupt or harass the Democratic National Convention in

' Miami, Florida, 10-13 July 1972, is an expression of interest
by a member of the North Vietnamese Delegation to the Paris
Peace Talks in the plans of the major antiwar organizations
:in the United States for demonstrations in connection with
the political conventions of both major parties.

DEVELOPNENTS: tos

In mid-May 1972, a member of the North Vietnamese Dele-
gation to the Paris Peace Talks invited a visitor to contact
him again when the visitor returned from an imminent trip
to the United States. The North Vietnamese official gave
the visitor the New York City addresses of the People's .
Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and the National
Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), and asked the visitor to
inquire at their offices regarding their plans for demon-
strations during the coming summer. The North Vietnamese
~official stated that he was especially interested in plans
for actions in connection with the Democratic and National
Conventions.

.

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ide et

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a

Foreign Support for Activities Planned to Disrupt
or Harass the Democratic National Convention

There are no additional indications, as of this date, of foreign plans
or efforts to inspire, support, or take advantage of activities designed to

disrupt or harass the National Convention of the Democratic Party in Miami,
Florida, 10-13 July 1972. :

.

| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 167

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ue 231572 c

HEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director/Conptroller

VIA s Acting Deputy Director for Plans .
SUBJECT : Agency Surrort to the ULS. Secret Service
(USSS) fer National Penocratic (20-14. july
$72) and National Republican (21-24 August
1972) Conventions
2. This memorandum is for the information of the Executive
Director/Cozmptroller. .

2. Authorisation for CIA suppor rt to the U.S. Secret Service
for the Democratic and Fenublican Mationnl Canventions is can-

nve

tained in a menorandusa of 7 Anril 1272 fron Chie? c

mh

4

sok Staff to
the CCl whica was concurred in hy the ADLUP and avcproved by the
PCL on 10 April 1372 (copy attached).
. 3. On i3 Arril 1972 the COS, Wifttland met with the iari
USSS representative and tir. “astrovito ef USSS beadgquarters to
discuss prelininary nlanning for Station Wii/tiani sunport to the
USSS prior to and duvina cunicet Conventions, mmo oL7 Awral boys
the C/unfess and C/TI/LSN met with “yr. Hastrovito at leadauarters
ta inplencat the prelininary plennine agreed uyon in ‘Hani and
to determine the extent of headquarters suppert reauired by the

USSS.

&, The basic aereenent tutually concurred in by the USSS
and licadquarters representatives provided that:

Na. Station Wi/Hianml vould conduct name “traces on
ali Cubans of interest to the USSS,

b. CIA! teadquarters would conduct name traces on .
all other foreiz “i born persons of interest to the USSS.

c. CIA would keen the USSS informed of any events
in the Caribbean and Latin American areas that weuld
have any bearing ow the USSS protective mission curing
the convention perieds. This would iaclude priefinc
on Cubs and Cuban policies teward the United States. and
On activities of Cuban intelliceace operations 3 which
could affect the security of the conventions.

tt

uv
x

ea

8 00826


6 a ©
d. Coverage of Latin Anerican exile croups in the
United States would be the responsibility of the FRI

Since CIA had coased the extensive coverace fornerly °
targeted against these yrouns Since it was now considered ;
an internal security sunction, .
¢
 §. On 27 April 1972 a meeting was held at a buffor office
of Station wh/‘iiani with the | USSS Chief of Comsunica-

tions, Station versoanci a Headquar ers representative, It
wWas.agreed that name traccs would he raneied by Piani security
Field office courier from the LESS toninfer office until the ESS

established communications links fron their command post in
convention center, at which time trace requests would be son

mt

from the command post to USSS headcuarteors and relayed to CIA
Neadquarters. Cuban nage traces are relayed to Station wif iami

t : ;
by the Signal Center and non~-Cuban traces are conducted by &H/COS,

Replics to USSS requests on noneCubans are coordinated with
Ci/so.

. ani has arranned the rental of a safeheuse
about five minute on convention center which will provide a
secure and nearby meetinz site for USSS and Agency perscunel,
This safchouse wili be avaitaile just prior to and during both
conventions. A a adquarters officer will Tay to “dani cricr to
until the conventions adjeurn to

assis t the Station in providing the sepport descrived in paragraga
four above

G6. Station WH/"!

os

7. Station "E/Miasi is in daily contact with the YESS in
Miani, utilizine buifer office as a Beetine site when necessary. rie
Jocatsion of Station #H/itiani ras net been revealed to
the USSS. - (Station is located some distance frc= buffer office.)
Additionally, the Miani Sccurity Field Gifice maintains nornal
liaison with the local USSS ¢iiami unit.

; 8. The Station understands that no personnel will be present
at the convention hall, that they will not trevide any eguirment
unique to the Agency, nor will it provide the use of any otner
facilities other than tne safehouse described in paragraph six.

we

COARNT : 7
Cfo |


) é.., 1973

SUBJECT: Request for Information on Sensitive Activities

“You will recall that in Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972,
I believe, Agency funds were made available to the FBI.
' These funds may still be possibly held in a special
account for that use. This is one of the areas where
TSD has been very much involved. Chuck Briggs would
have the details as this was handled through the Executive.
Director's office and of course Angleton would have

additional information.

Signed

TeiN-hi

Chief
Missions and Programs Staff

Gy

E2 INPDET -CL BY 357737
eyes GY Po
bE Varad Sy 00SE2

SECREN

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 171

6

b.
“+ _ . 8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR : | Deputy Director for Operations :
SUBJECT : Areas of Possible Embarrassment

e

to the Agency

1, Sometime in the spring or early summer of 1971, Mr. John
Dean levied the requirement on the Agency for information relating to
the Investors Overseas Service (IOS). The original request was
non-specific but it gradually emerged that Dean was concerned with
the possible adverse publicity that might develop regarding the
President's nephew, who was employed by IOS.

2. There were multiple channels from the White House to the
Agency on this subject:

a. Presumably Haldeman and/or Ehrlichman to Director
Helms.

b. Someone (unnamed) in the White House to the DDCI,
General Cushman (sce attached telephone conversation),
Note that Ehrlichman is mentioned, and

c. John Dean to the CI Staff. These various channels
were sorted out in time and six reports were passed by
the Cl Staff to Mr, Fred Fielding for Mr, John Dean,

3. The telephone call of General Cushman's is of interest since
“it gives the flaver of White House concern. It took several days to
uncover the fact that the White House interest centered on the involve-
_ ment of the President's nephew with IOS and possible adverse publicity.
‘The reports submitted to Dean's office were routine in nature and were
coordinated with the DCI, After a few months, interest in this sub-,
ject died down and we did not pursue it further, :
. .
4, Please return the attachments when they have served your

purpose, Vs
E@iMPDET CL BY 0545)?
YT Anrep “os “ar
| ol | a4 00583

‘ \ “
, NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 172 oA


" ~.* Ts a are i OF ee ™
..

5. LIalso include a short note on the Intelligence Evaluation
Committee and Staff prepared by Richard Ober, The original
meetings were held in the office of John Dean at the White House
and the principal sparkplug for this group activity was the then
Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, Robert Mardian
and then later his assistant, William Olsen. It is noted that Mr.
Mardian is now appearing before the Grand Jury andit is always
possible that he might draw in the Agency.

nr

6. Before appointing Ober to the IES Staff as the Agency
representative, ] had attended various inter-agency meetings pre-
sided over by Mardian. l expressed the view to Director Helms
that Mardian would require very careful handling due to his inex-
perience, Furthermore, Mardian was deeply involved in the split
between Bill Sullivan and Mr. Hoover. Ona confidential basis
one or two senior FBI officials stated that Sullivan was secretly
passing files to Mardian without Mr. Hoover's permission. This
was one of the important reasons why Sullivan was dismissed from
the Bureau.

fecal Cot: oe
James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachments (5)

cenit on,
SEGRET =} gases

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 173 oe


MEMOPANDUM FOR: Beputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Counter Intelligence Staff,
Police Groun Activitics

1. Counter Intelligence Staff, Police Greun (CI/?G)
is resnonsible for Staff coordination within the Office
of the Deputy Pirector for Gperations for activities and
nroqrans involvin® assistance to forsicn nolice/security
forces for the nurvose of exnloitins such activities and
programs for intellisence nurnvoses

2. CI/?PG ma Lintains liaison with the Office cf Public
Safoty, Arency for International “eveionvanat CoPS/400}
and its training facilitv, the International Police Acddeny
(IP\). CI/PG alse adninisters and sumeryises Project
IDEN-171- and its trainine nromrictarvy facility OEN-172.
KISN-168 in addition, CI/PG coorcinates a Joint | OPS/ATD Tec%
Services Division, Contral Intellizesnce Asoncy €
Techaical Investications Course. e1/2 provides sulcance
and counsel to the Area Divisions in matters nertaining
to nolice/security functions and activities. Snecific
details of these functions are as follows:

LIAISON WITH OPS/ATD

CI/PG liaison with OPS/AID and IPA is conducted on a
daily basis and consists principally of:
A. exchange of information on IPA participants, some
of whom later attend IDEN-172 courses and who are
of interest to Agency cornonents,
B. arrancing for inclusion of Asency snonsored partici-
pants in IPA/OPS/AIS trainins prograns,

ines GQ tours far
Ntativies sponsored

Jos COSY?

SEED wliasa lone BRITO Le Metco IORI

C. arrancine for TDA/OPS/ATIVY Brie li
foreien nolice/security renrese
by CIA Area Divisions,

. det many
oom Bese Recta ther Et cL BY ek | 4

NW 85296 Docid:32909624 Page 174 ear tit


NW 60296 Dochd:32909624 Page 1/75 NOWEE:

Dd. obtaining hiogranhic and assessment data.on
PA/OPS/AID trainces,,.

E. providing general information pertaining to
police/security organizations, activities, equip-
ment, and personalities requested by Agency .
ope ratin © components

g tne Agency's narticination in the
nvestications Course desiuned to
the trainees vith the technicmue
nronerly investicate terrorist
wnerein explosives have been utilized,
G. obtaining OPS/AID cover for CIA personnel to serve .
abroad. At one time as many as 59 CIA employees
were covered in Latin America, the Far East and
Africa, Tris total as heen reguced durine the
past several years to 19 servine in Thailana, *

H. arranging contact between Desk officers and OPS/AIN
sponsored narticivants. .
ut wa at

PROJECT IDEN-171_ - PROPRIETARY IDEN-172— decane an os

Set patic-

MEN-172 Training \cade>y is a comtercial inter>rise. Clips
It was incornorated under tie laws of the State of “arvland i010!
in 1952 and conducts its business in the Mistrict of OSE
Colombie. It is engaged principally in training forcign COASHLT
police/securi ty nersonnel under an overt contract with Seevis
OPS/AUD, “and selling nolice/sscuri ty enuinment to forsion

police/securi ty personnel and orea ations IDEN-172 also
provices special training nrograns. and briecfinas to
foréien police/security versonnel of interest to Agency
operating divisions. It provides hiosranhic and assessment
data on trainees to country desks. PecentlyIDEN-172 has
acquired the capability of providing training to foreign
policc/security personnel in VIP protective security

for Chiefs of State.

* CIA personnel under this cover will not he replaced as
sucn and all will be vhased out by June 1974,

COMMENT . ~

CI/PG does not naintain direct contact or liaison
with any law enforcement organization, local or federal,
at home or abroad. When the need arises, such contact is
sometimes made on our behalf by OPS/AID or [DEM-172without
divulgins Ag Gncy interest. OGPS/AID has such contacts
at home and abroad because of the nature of its activities
(trainina of foreisn nolice/security porsonnel] at hore
and abrows), and its Public Safety nroctrans around the
world. IDEN-172 has such contacts at hore - lecal and
federal level - hecause its nersonnel are nersenally
acquaintec with law enforcerent officers throug out tne
United States. Mombers of the IDEN-172 staff (not identified)
as CIA} have appeared as suest lecturers at suci federal
institutions as the U.S. Park Police, IPA, the U.S.
Secret Service, and the U.S. Treasury Inforcement Division.

3. In. addition to the liaison mentioned in the
previous paracrann, the Asency maintains liaison in varying
degrees with foreign police/securityv organizations throug!
its field stations. The existence and extent theraof,
hovever, is a decision to se nade by the Area Division,
and is not the responsibility of CI/?G,

4, The CIA station as a menber a the Country Team in
Montevideo, Uruguay, snay nave had se contact with Dan
Mitrione, ho vas murde red by the mu ataros Dan Mitrione,
an experienced and respected law enforcenent officer, was
a bona fide OPS/AIN officer assianed to the AID mission
in Urusuay, and was never a CIA emmloyee or accent,

ffi C2 Crome
James snsleton

Chief, tounter Intelligence Staff

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 176


SENS HIVE

es | ® . CE

SUBJECT: The MHCHAOS Program — | ;

1. The MHCHAOS program is a worldwide program for
clandestine collection abroad of information on foreign
efforts to support/encourage/exploit/manipulate domestic

. U.S. extremism, especially by Cuba, Communist China,
-. North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Korea and the
Arab fedayeen. :

2. -The MHCHAOS program has not and is not conduct-
ing efforts domestically for internal domestic collection
purposes, Agency efforts are foreign. Foreign-oriented
activity in the United States has been of two types:

a. Selected FBI domestic sources who travel
abroad in connection with their extremist activity
and/or affiliations to make contact with hostile
foreign powers or with forcign extremist groups
have been briefed and debriefed by Headquarters
officers. The briefing has included appropriate
operational guidance, including defensive advice.

b. Americans with existing extremist creden-
tials have been assessed, recruited, tested and
dispatched abroad for PCS assignments as contract
agents, primarily sources offered for such use by
the FBI. When abroad they collect information re-
sponsive to MICHAOS program requirements, as well
as other Agency requirements. They are thus used
primarily for targeting against Cubans, Chinese Con-
munists, the North Vietnamese, etc., as their back-
ground and their particular access permits. It
— should be noted that the MPTROIKA aspect of the

ar MPLODESTAR project of the East Asia Division is
: ¢ Similar to the MHCHAOS PROGRAM.

'3. As indicated earlier, MHCHAOS is a foreign pro-
gram, conducted overseas, except for the limited activity
described above. The program is and has been managed so
as to achieve the maximum feasible utilization of exist-
ing resources of the Operations Directorate. No assets

q 1

re A EET.
Waitin PRICE
SENSITIVE PEELLLDE Sch SOURCES
ANU PHL CPA EIYOU¥YED

wave

SENSITIVE re =
- SECRET v1

NW 88296 Docld:32589624 Page 177 iyo


_ ww 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 178

have been recuited and run exclusively for the MHCHAOS
program. Instead, emphasis has been placed on the exploi-
" tation of new and old Agency assets who have a by-product
capability or a concurrent capability for provision of
information responsive to the program's requirements.

This has involved the provision of custom-tailored collec-
tion requirements and operational guidance. This collec-
tion program is viewed as an integral part of the recruit-
ment and collection programs of China Operations, Vietnam
Operations, Cuban Operations, Soviet Bioc Division opera-
‘tions and Korean Branch operations. Agents who have an
American "Movement" background.or who have known connec-
tions with the American "ovement" are useful as access
agents to obtain biosraphic and personality data, to dis-
cern possible vulnerabilities and susceptibilitics, and

to develop operationally exploitable relationships with
recruitment targets of the above programs. These assets
are of interest to our targets because of their connec-
tions with and/or knowledge of the American "Movement."
Over the course of the MHCHAOS program, there have been
approximately 20 important areas of operational interest,
which at the present time have been reduced to about ten:
Paris, Stockholm, Brussels, Dar Es Salaam, Conakry, Algiers, .
Mexico City, Santiago, Ottawa and Hong Kong.

4. The MICHAOS program also utilizes audio opera-
tions, two of which have been implemented to cover tar-
gets of special interest.

Paragraph a, deleted because it reveals a sensitive
foreign operation.

en ee ee ee

“

Paragraph b, deleted because it reveals a sensitive
Agency foreign operation,

SENSITIVE

Sa, 9) roa
aa Ss Sot


_

5. MHCHAOCS reporting from abroad relating to the
program originates in two ways: Individuals who are noted
in contact with Cubans, the Chinese Communists, etc., and
who appear to have extremist connections, interests or
background are reported upon. Other individuals are re-
ported upon in response to. specific Headquarters require-
ments received from the FBI because such individuals. are
of active investigatory security interest to the FBI.

6. All cable and dispatch traffic related to the
MHCHAOS program is sent via reStricted channels. It is
not processed by either the Cable Secretariat or the In-
formation Services Division. The control and retricv-
ability of information obtained, including information
received from the FBI, is the responsibility of the Spe-
cial Operations Group.

7. Information responsive to specific FBI require-
ments is disseminated to the FBI via special controlled
dissemination channels, i.e., by restricted handling cable
traffic or via special pouch and specially numbered blind
memoranda.

8. Information of particular significance, when col-
lected, has becn disseminated by special memorandum over
the signature of the Director of Central Intelligence to
the White House (Dr. Kissinger and John Dean), as well as
to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and the
Director of the FBI.

NW 88296 Docid:32389624 Page 179


MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations °

CORTISMALCIT INS
| La

et ian Vas i ig

- FR 73-183

8 May 1973 |

BY

Foreign Resources Division Operational

SUBJECT:
Activities with Possible Flap Potential
REFERENCE: FR Memorandum, 73- 180, dated 7 Mey

1973, same subject .

1, The answers to your questions are as follows:

a. Question: Do we recruit Americans?

Answer: Yes, we recruit Americans to be
used as academic supnort assets and access agents,
These Americans are used for spotting and assess-
ment purposes only and do not perform any recruit-
ments.

Paragraph 1, b, andl. c. are deleted
because they contain sensitive agency ,

operational methods and techniques,

E2 IMPDET

CL BY: 057223

_ NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 180

CGE

re

Late

d. Question: What is the arrangement re. recruiting
out of colleges? Any clearances or prohibitions?
Answer: As of now CSI 50-10 specifically
requires approval by the, ADDO or DDO for any
recruitment attempt made in the United States
against an American member of the academic
“community or a foreign target attending an American
academic institution. This regulation-is presently in
the process of revision in that this approval authority
for academic recruitments in the United States is to
be delegated to Chief, FR. The approval authority
for recruitment attempts against American students
outside the United States is to be delegated to the Chief
of the appropriate area division. The only prohibitions
at the present time are those precluding recruitment
attempts against foreign students here in the United States
on grants from Ford Foundation, Rockefeller or Fulbright.

2, If you have further questions, please let me know,

signed/IDEN-173

Acting Chief
Foreign Resources Division

gg
[<r aa wth ped ened
eo ba Mou was ape “at ein dV be

_ NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 181


, a ea ad uy: wae
i S2 Tp re
| a Re rvee

RT /35 Biss TP Py 7 eer

’ FR 73-180

7 May 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations ©
SUBJECT: Foreign Resources Division Operational
Activities with Possible Flap Potential

1, At thr risk of stating the obvious, almost all of the operational
activities carried on by FR Division in the United States run the risk
that unauthorized disclosure could create embarrassment to the Agency,
We have accepted this as a condition precedent and have proceeded with
our operational activities in the most professional manner possible under
the circumistances. There are certain rather unusual activities in which
FR Division has participated and/or is participating that contain some-
what greater possibility for embarrassment if discovered. I have listed
these below, not necessarily in order of embarrassment potential:

a. The New York Base provides a fairly considerable
amount of support to Dr. Kissinger in his contacts with the
Chinese, This support was authorized by Mr. Karamessines
and Mr. Helms. Thus far there has been no problem other
than the inordinate amount of time spent by New York Base
personnel, not to mention the fairly sizeable amount of
money that has been expended in support of these efforts,

b. A CIA Officer is to be assigned to FR Division. The
CIA Officer is presently assigned overseas under deep
cover; his cover is the Mullen Corporation. This is the cor-
poration that employed E. Howard Hunt. In discussions between
‘ NOCAD and the ADDO, it was decided that the Officer would
be pulled out and reassigned in the United States.
FR Division was directed to accept this officer for assignment.
\

E2 IMPDET
CL BY: 057223

CUS tists
eJlatisidrdiia F i erer: VSPPEVE

_ NW 88796 Docld:32989624 Page 182


NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 183 © -* "+"

We have concluded that the best solution is to have this
officer attend a university in the Midwest for at least

a year, working towards an advanced degree until there
has been time for the situation to clarify itself. We plan

to make no operational use of the CIA Officer whatsoever,
during the period of time that he is attending the’ university.
Upon completion of his year's study, we will review the .
situation and decide the next course of action at that time.

Paragraph l, c, is deleted because it contains sensitive

Agency operational methods and techniques.

d. FR Division has been briefed in general on the
existence of an audio operation done by the FBI but with close
TSD support in San Francisco, This operation is directed
against [DEN-62, I understand the operation has
been exceptionally well done. However, the responsibility
for this activity has come from Chief, TSD in conjunction .
with SB Division,

e. Three microphones were planted in various locations
in the IDEN- 61 by the FBI. The equipment was pro-
duced by CIA and the overall operation was joint, although no

CIA personnel have entercd the premises. The operation was _

deactivated and is presently dormant. The mikes, however,
are stillin place. If discovered the operation could cause
‘some embarrassment to the American Government, but it is
unlikely the finger would point to CLA.

. - .
: ~ a re ereia
epee TAN EN ETI ET a &
noe oa Sof wey, .
ne ub

nt ae
Qe

ca » fe tau wena

Arn

3
Awd


1d:32989624 Page 184

Coordination

A. Internal

In developing its cadre of general. support assets.
and access agents, the FR Division maintains close contact
with the Domestic Contact Service of the Directorate for
Intelligence, using their assets wherever and whenever
possible to support FR's operational activities. To a
more ‘limited degree, FR Basés maintain contacts with Office
of Security and Office of Personnel field representatives,
pursuing the occasional leads surfaced by: these officers
and using their entre to specific individuals who can
provide access to targets of operational interest.

B. External .

FR officers in the field maintain coordination with |
their FBI countérparts. There is limited cooperation
with Bureau offices on internal security cases involving
Soviet and Bloc officials and the local FBI offices are
of- occasional help in operations involving other nationals.
The local field offices of the FBI are made aware of the
presence of FR officers in their jurisdictions and have on
occasion provided backstopping on cases. where there was.
some flap potential.

Coordination with the FBI of FR Division's agent
recruitment activity is governed by an agreement between
the Agency and the FBI dated 7 Fébruary 1966.

The Bases also have contact with local Immigration
and Naturalization Service offices although. these contacts
are less frequent and less important than the contacts

with “the FBI offices.

SECRET

OND

PN


if / SENATOR GARY W. HART 1

(L- Bufile 62-116395

. 1 ~ Mr. Wannall (detached)
July 16, 1975
ra 1 =- Mr. Mintz (detached)
- 4 1 - Mr. Hotis (detached)
Mr. Daly (detached)
1~- Mr. Cregar (detached)
1 - Mr. Farrington (detached)
Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney

General dated May 28, 1975, and signed-py Senator Frank
Church and Senator John C. Tower. (i fe

. - wy Sy . ( ‘

A review of the central files of -the FBI revealed
that a file pertaining to your application for employment
with the Department of Justice and a file which lists you as
the victim in a case involving the Congressional Assassination
Statute are maintained by this Bureau.

Enclosed herewith are pertinent documents from the
Departmontal Applicant file. Certain data in this file is
exempt from public disclosure pursuant to the provisions of
Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(2), (b) (5), and
(b) (7) (C) and (D). As I am sure you are aware, these exemptions
allow for the withholding of information related solely to the
internal personnel rules and practices of an agency; inter-
agency or intra-agency documents not available through discovery
proceedings during Litigation; information which would constitute
an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of another
individual; and information which would disclose the identity
of a confidential source.

The other file pertains to an investigation concerning
a threat against your life. Although your name is carried in
the title throughout the file as the "victim," only a minimal
amount of information refers to you. The file indicates that
the Denver Police Department received information that a
particular individual was in Denver to kill you if you were
elected as United States Senator from Colorado on November 5,
1974; that the polls indicated you would be elected; that you
and your Denver Office were aware of this threat; that the
Denver Police Department afforded protection for you until you
departed Denver the morning of November 6, 1974, for vacation
in Mexico; and that an Agent of this Bureau attempted to see
you to display a photograph of the suspect, but was advised
by your assistant that the Denver Police Department had

1 - The Attorney Ceneral

2-~ The Deputy Attorney General vA y uf Loo
Attn: Susan M. Hauser ORL 4
Attn: K. William O'Connor NOT RECO Roa

SEE NOTE on Pace Shut 19 2/6
jdvicdj (14 Le
APES 2 maet erase Lp é, Le SE

ETT

oe

a a “AS Pe ieg
“530 eee 23 SPB. ae ml fre

1d:32989624 Page 185.


Senator Gary W. Hart

displayed the photograph to you and you did not recognize the
suspect. For your information this is no longer an active
investigation as the unknown subject was not identified and
the original allegation was not corroborated. Other than the
reasonably segregable portion of the references to you as set
forth above, this file is exempt from disclosure under the
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act, Title 5,

a ne Code, Section 552 (b) (2), (b) (5) and tb) (7) (C)
an D).

Also, our records contain two decuments from the
United States Department of Justice concerning you which have
been referred to the Attorney General.

T£ you wish to have any of the material reconsidered, i
it would be appropriate to discuss this matter with the
Attorney General. '

Enclosures (12)

NOTE: Sea Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter dated
7/16/75, captioned, "Request For information in FBI Files by
Senators Gary Hart, Walter BD. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,
Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRWsmlh. '

. Senator Hart is subject of favorable Department
Applicant file 77~93050. He is the victim of a civil rights
case under the "Congressional Assassination Statute,"

Bufile 44-62521. Airtel from Denver dated 3/3/75, sets forth
info that Carbon County, Wyoming is in the process of filing
First Degree Murder charges against Thomas Eugene Creech
{Suspect of Bufile 44-62521) in connection with the murder
of Ridgley Stewart McKenzie. Ascertained 6/11/75 from
Supervisor John Brockton, Denver, case closed for reasons
cited in’ instant letter, The 58 pages being furnished to
Senator Hart are located in Bufile. 77-93050.


the following records pertaining to you. It is noted that you A

NN a July 16, 1975
Tae ite 1 ~ Ur, Wannall (detached)
- Me. Mintz (detached)
fir. Hotia (detached)
Mr. Daly (detached)
lr. Cregar (dotached)
Mr. Parrington (detached)

SENATOR WALTER F. MONDALE

ft Fat et fot fet
pid

i —
4

-

Reference is made to the letter to the Attorney General
signed by Senator Frank Church-and Senator John Tower dated
May 28, 1975. ~ meant

: ~,
” t ‘oy ‘

ee ee ‘
& review of the central flies of the FBI revealed

have not boon the subject of an FBI investigation; however, a ae
correspondence file pertaining to you has bean maintained since 1964.~

Also, our records contain three investigative files .
in which you are shown to haye keen the victim of an attemptcd
extortion. Copies of excised documents from two of these files
are enclosed. ‘The third file, comprised of one hundred and eighty
three documents, includes six extortion lettors which you or nan
one of your assistants furnished tha PPI. In this’ regard, your ar
office was advised of the final disposition of this matter by ,
the FBI on February 16, 1971. Although some of the documents from
this file aro subject to disclosure, they are not being included
since you would be aware of the contents of this data,

t

Additional information concerning you which is
contained in our central records is exempt From disclosure as
provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b){1),
(ob) (2), (b) (5), (2) (6), (b) (7) (Cc) and (Dp). These exemptions
protect, respectively matters that are specifically authorized
unier criteria established by an Executive Order to be kept
secret in the interest of national defense foreign policy;
information relating to the internal persongeY/rut b) dea 4p
practicas of this Bureau; inter-agency or intra~-aghe RECORGED
merrorandums or letters which would not be available neSngRPES
discovery proceedings during Litigation; informati€& .iyR ay 1976
personnel File the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; “hrfermatiesm=
the disclosure of which vould constitute an unwarranted invasion
of privacy of third partics; and the identity of and information
furnished by sources pursuant to ar assurance of confidentiality.

ARIGINAL FILED IN

a
Ll ~ Tae~Attorney General : on
2- ApEn POPERR af “hie AK SEner a? 1j- Bufile 62-116395

ry
=

ttn oy"3 Ky Wi tam OtConnor am:dal (14) CONTINUED OVER

| NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 187


» .
Sevfator Walter I. Mondale

Z£ you wish to have any of the material reconsidered,
it would be appropriate to discusd this matter with the Attorney
Goneral,

Our records also revoaled a classified document fron
the Department of State pertaining to you. We have reforred
this docuwent to them with the request that they communicate
with you directly.

Bnelesures (39)

NOTE: fea Director, FBI, to the Attorney General memorandum
dated 7/16/75, captioned, "REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN FRI oO
FILES BY SENATORS GARY HART, WALTER B. HUDDLESTON, CHARLES .
HeC MATHTAS, WALTER P, HONDALE AND ROBERT MORGAN, MEMDERE OF
THE U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTER ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES."
DRWmth

ot Senator Mondale is the subject of Bufile 94~-$0482 and
is shown as a viotim in Bufiles 9-44396; 5~52508; 9~-54758,
fhe original of excised documents released to the Senator are
in Bufiles 1~11800-2375; 9-52508—-1;2; 9-54750- 1;2;3; 61-3176-
4490; 62~89475-592; 62~LO02Z30—1; 92-0-3355; 94-G0489-13;374;
57677782 92107117127133147253163172193207213;22;100-435175-42;
200-454565-463; (105~25263~1047; L246; 1418; 1LO5-74565-2757 76s)
157-4-33-A-Washington Post and Times Herald 5-24-61; 157-7-6-43-25.
Sea memorandum Mr, MeDarmott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/3/75,
and 6/19/75 regarding classified material pertaining to Senator
Mondale exempted from disclosure. Also see Mr. MeRermott to
Mx. Wannall memorandum dated 6/16/75 captioned "Congressman
Donald W. Riegle“ regarding classification review of Bufile
(i05-229897. Serials 81_p.6; 114; 117 p. 216; 113; 140 ep 2487
143 of Bufile 405-229907) Rotor to Senator Mondale.

By letter dated 5/14/75, CIA furnished 23 FRI documents
concerning Senator Mondale which they had surfaced in a review
of their Files in connection with a FOIA request from Senator
Mondale to Mr. Colby, Director of CIA. SA T. U, Bresson
advised CIA by telephone of our pending request for information.

ty letter dated 7/14/75 to Department of State reference
(fos-198989-8}as referred to them for action.

©

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 188


i ‘ 1 7" : ” ee 7 _ _ . i : . - ney a oe .
Fe gs 2, _ OT 1 - Mr. Farrington. (detached)
‘ Fo .° 2 = Mr. Wannall (detached)
~ ,1 = Mr. Mintz (detached)
1 -' Mr. Hotis- (detached): .-
1 - Mr. Daly (dejtached)
- Jaly. 16, 3975

= fo nen . .. | . , i: - Mr. Cregar (detached)
} Baron ROBERT MORGAN | Co.
x Se bby? ee

: ie made to the letter to the

_ Attorney Genazal tad Hay 28; 1975+ sigeed by
' Senators Prank Church ang John G - Tower.

og SEE aT
reve 0. records pertain. te you a.
which we are authorized to release. Other information - .
concerning you ts eteupt, from diavlosure pureuant
to Title 5, United States Code, Saation 5$2 {b) (2), .
and (b} (7) ic) and (b}). ‘These. exemptions allow the .
withholding of material which relates solely to the -
internal boraonnel xules and practices of an agency:
exeupts information thea disclosure of which would vo
constitute an unwarranted invasion’ of  poreonel privac privacy -.
of third parties; and exempts information which would
discloses the identity of a confidential source, and -
_informstion fornished under circumstances of . .
confidentiality. oO

, Other Gocunente in our central . records
- Feveal that while in the official capacities of .
Attoxney General for North Carolina and Jadge for —
Harnett County, North Carolina, you were one of the
subjects in three Civil Rights investigations
conducted in 1956, 1971], and 1973. You were advisod
‘of the 1956 and 1973 investigations. The 1971 -
investigation was veferreda to the Criminal Division,
Department of Justice, for adjudication. to ‘oniy. -

omaman rm 3 7S 6 ep oj om >

° rafexrences concerni Zou per
Civil Rights aint in 29746) an. catovtion letter: .
received by you 31970 threatening Governor Robert

Seott; and tZformation xegarding your resignation
from the Office of the Attorney General of
Horth Carolina ‘to run for the United States Senate;

1- he Attorney General. my, iy ? a
2 = The Daputy Attorne General . . (pet
Attn: Susan M. deuser NOT RECORDEE”

q ; . :
| «Atent KR. William fe) ‘Connor 46 WAR 49 1976 7
1+ “ Bufile 62-116395 ; . cmos
pe ae: :mlh (14) ; . _.. SEE NOTE PAGE TWO ——

NW 88296 Docla: sguene Page 189 - ; Co, Le .


Senator Robert. Margan

“-R€-you wish to have any of the material.
‘reconsidered it would be appropriate to discusa this
mattex with the Ateouney General.

Snclosuxes (13) res

NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter
‘dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in —
. ‘FBI files by Seriators Gary Hart, Walter.D. Huddleston,
. Charles McC. Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and -Robert
Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate Select Committee
“on Intelligence’ Activities." DRW: mlh-

‘Morgan, is subject “of Bufiles. 44- 13052, 44- 50587,
- 44- 57418 and 94-68460. He is also mentioned in eleven :
other files. These files contain no derogatory information,
and our relations with the Senator have been cordial.

; ~2-
NW 88296 Docid:32389624 Page 190 ;


16,
1 -~ Me. Vannall (Detached)

1 = Me. Mintz (Detached)

1 - Mr. Dotis (Detached)

Ll +lir. Daly (Detached) \
Ll Mr. Cregar (Detached) “\?
SEBEQR VALLE D. PUDDLUSTON 1 - Pr. Farrington ™~

July L975

t

ee Detached,
| es a )
') Reference is-rade to the Upteer to the
q ixttorney General dated Nay 28, 1975; siqned by Fenators ‘,
‘\ Frank Church and John Tl. Tower. \
K A review of the central files ef the BI
fr vevealed the enclosed records pertaining to you. Those ol

portions which have been deleted are] the remainder of the
files ara euerpt from disclosure pursuant to the provisions \
of the Preccom of Information Act, Title 5, United States
Coie, Sockion 552 (b} (2), (6) {5}, and (6) (7} (Cc), (P} and (F). \

Subsection (b})(2} exerets docurents which relate \
solely toe the internal rules an¢ practices of our agency. XN
Subsection (b) (5) exempts inter-agency and intra-aqency x"
reroranda the disclosnre of which would have a dotrimental nN

effect upon the developoent of policy, quidance and admini-
Strative direction. Subeections (6) (7) (Cc), (©) and (®)
allow withholding information the disclosure of vhieh
would constitute an unvarranted invasion of personal
privacy of those individuals interviewed or nontionad
duxing the course of an investication; roveal the identity
of and information furnished by confidential seurces; and
divulge investicative techniques and procedures.

\

ORIGINAL FIRED By

Z£ you wish to have any of the matorial
reconsidered, it vould be apprepriate toa discuss this
ratter with the Mtetorney Ceneral.

Inclosuras (13}
i - The attorney General

2~ The Deputy Attorney General eet
Nttention: K. William o'Connor n [fl i =
Attention: Suson iM. Mauser ir “ ~ .

FIOT RECORDED

46 MAR 19 i376

Feel

Gj Bufile 62-116395

Fee Note Page 2.

bi MARS op9)

NW 88296 Docid:32983624 Page 151

cman


-. ‘s, @

Senator Walter B. Huddleston

NOTE: See Director, FRI, to the Attorney General memorandum
dated 7/16/75, captioned, “Request for Information in FBI Files
By Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles McC. Mathias,
Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members of the U. S. Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence Activities." DRW:zmih.

Senator Huddieston is identical with subject of
Bufiles 166-5980, 94+-67291, and 94-1-676~-300. Huddleston
was contacted by Bureau liaison to offer any assistance
to the newly elected Senator, which is standard Bureau policy.
Huddleston's Executive Assistant called the Congressional
Service Office on 1/9/75, and requested a speaker from the
PBI to address the Kentucky Chamber of Commorce Convention.
Speaker granted. Huddleston was alleged to have taken a
bribe of $15,000 while he was a State Senator in Kentucky.
Several persons approached him to find out if they could
establish a bank charter. His supposed reply was that this
could be accomplished for a certain amount of money. The
bank charter was eventually established and one of the
individuais who originally approached hin, hand-carried the of
$15,900 in cash to him at his office. On 9/5/73, the
. Department advised the FBI that it desired no more invest-
he igation in this case at that time. Senator Huddleston was
never interviewed regarding this matter. Excised documents
taken from 94-67291—3,2,1; 94-1-676-300; and 166-5980-9,7,5,4,

and 1.

88296 Docid:32989624 Page 192

sf

weet

- Wannall (detached)
. Mintz. (detached)
Hotis (detached)
Daly (detached) ©
Cregar (detached)

RR RRE

ed de

© yay THPORMATION CORTALES o _—
wai TS UQLASSTFIED RIGS GeO i
WHERE SHORE SLHSRWL SEs: ik ke B.

Caaf

=
ia

y 16, 1975

i

SENATOR CHARLES Mec. ACTA, 3 aR.

. x review of the central files of the PBI has been
conducted to locate records pe to you in accordance
with the letter to the Attorney General dated May 28, 297%,
signed by Senators Prank Chureh and John G. Tower.

. enclosed is one copy each of 52 documents from our
files. -The deletions which have been made were based on | the.

ty Jor
feo

noe se U7,
SSIRED
CLASSIFY

. Freedom of Taformation Act.

SY
ON:

AAditional information concerning g you which is a
contained in our central records is exempt from disclosure as

4 provided by Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b) ah.
‘5B (2), () (5). tb) 2) (€) and (b)(7)(D). ‘These exemptions
=  gilew withhelding of information classified pursuant to -
Executive Ordex; information related solely to the internal
rules and practices of this agency: information within the ©
-Ramoranca not available through
a 2 during litigation: information the
Siaclogure of which could constitute an unwarranted invasion
of the personal privacy of a third party; and the identity
of ang information furnished by individuals under cireun-
- stances of confidentiality.

CLA
,

a Ne

yo

Also. our records contain two documents from the
United States Dapartment of Justice concerning you which have
been referred to the Attorney General,

x¢€ you wish to have any of the material reconsidered
Enclosures (32)

1- Attorney General
2 = The Deputy Attorney General _

bat 163 1S

Attention: Susan M.. Hauser
Attention: K. William O'Connor NOT RECORDED
G)- susie 62-116395 - . 46 MAR 19 976
rar (14) © ; . Lo .

; | al |
61 MARQ 3 976.

WNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 193 \

oy bites

ORIGINAL FILED my |.
ee

it would be appropriate to diacuse this matter with the Attorney

\

—

Farrington (detached)

x

i


y

. NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 194 Copa te Tbe

©

SENATOR CHARLES MC CURDY MATHIAS = "3.4

1, $ ; .
NOTE: See Director, FBI, to the Attorney General letter
dated 7/16/75, captioned, "Request for Information in FBI
Files by Senators Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Charles
McCurdy Mathias, Walter F. Mondale and Robert Morgan, Members
of the U. 5S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities,"
DRW:mlh. Mathias is the subject of the following Bufiles:
945767 "Victim, Extortion” (3 serials); 9-47912 “Victim,
Extortion" (4 serials); 94-49643 "Victim, Extortion-Racial
Matters" (5 serials); 9-53432 “Victim, Extortion” (3 serials);
56-5105 "Possible Violation of Title 18, USC 602 and 603, |
Election Laws” (3 serials); 89-2560 "Possible Victim, Congres-
sional Assassination" (5 serials); and 94-54474 *R-Maryland*
(13 serials). He is being furnished excised copies of the
following references: 9-53432; 9~45767; 9-47912:. 56-5105;
94-—-54474; 62-96529-268; 5-0-1861; 7-16021-6; 47-52807-2;
62-116270-7: 65-74060-765;3; 94-1-32555-1L48; 174-3-6723; 94=
37990-1011; 100-443916—278; 89~2560; 64-29833-345-188; 65-
74060-589, 1168, and 1276. U. S. Secret Service documents
are being given per Robert Goff on 6/26/75, with "No objection
from USSS," 9/49543-1 and 4, UL. Miller, CIA Legal Office,
contacted SA D. R. Williams 7/15/75 concernino{FRI LiMs
(dated 12/13/67 re Kerekes, “IS-HU"; 2/6/69 re Bubnov, "IS-R";
2/18/70 re Soviet Diplomatic activities, "IS~R"; 4/17/70
re Romanian Diplomatic Activities in the United States, "Is-
Romania"; and 6/8/72 re Peoples Republic of China Mission)
maintained in their filesy] they are in general terms referring
to documents in CIA response to Senator Hathias. He was
advised our review will cover these documents. Mathias is also
identified in the following references which are being denied:
73-15725-5, 100-429998-82 p.6, (05~-36731-429, 134-22930-15,7 G
100~434886-54 , (T05-18784-754, 105-124338-120, 105~229897-77 ”
ep.136, 105~-10828-1970, 89-2560, 65-74060-1205 p.49, and
95~45505-24. Justice Bepartment documents contained in 56~
5105-1 and 62-115695~4 are being referred. Per addendum to
memo from lir. McDernott to Mr. Wannall dated 6/19/75
the (b)(1) exemption is being utilized.


OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 :
9, JULY 1573 ED'TION
"GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
‘ "ED STATES “oon

Memorandum

TO Depyty Attorney General ,
i¥liam O'Connor
rector Kelley
FROM
Dougta Marvin

Attached is a

ro

with the Senate Select Committee.

Please provide ‘your comments to me by

11:00 a.m. on Thursday,

° t
} Attachment f

"Dep. AD
Dep. AD
Asst. Dis.:
Admin.

Ext. Affa

Gen. Inv.
Ident.

Training
“| Telephone

| euapsunl?

ud fas

Bf 4 Oe" Bocid:32989624 Page 195

Comp. Syst.

Files & Com,

Inspection ____

Spec. Inv.

Director Sec'y __ |

[Kevot eater nb Girton

July 17.

pout

DATE: July 16,

oa.

a eee eee

ae

6 o- (to F957

>

— Wr. Cdrrr
1-17-73 gd,
Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1975

| Raee Bi]

"62-6 395% 414

® AUG 5 1975


296 Docid:32989624 Page 196
a 5 a eae cn

, | | orf
AUL 26 scanteon 6 CONTA TNE

: HEREIN TS UNCLASSIFIED
PROPOSED PROCEDURE paraye\t| 00... ByS¥ SKz pwede

The Committee will request those documents to which it
wishes access.

The Department will furnish access to those matters
requested to: -

(a) the members of the Committee where it is deter-
mined by the Attorney General that the matters
are peculiarly sensitive; ;

(b) in all other cases, the appropriately -cleared
staff will have access to the materials.

The Committee staff shall select those documents which
it deems pertinent to the Committee's inquiry and
necessary for the examination of witnesses or the
eStablishment of certain facts during the course of
the inquiry.

These documents may be reviewed and studied in Room 4171
of the Hoover Building and such notes may be taken as
deemed appropriate by the staff.

The notes.will be left in the secure room of the Hoover
Building during the study.

Upon completion of the study, the staff can prepare a
summary of the information which it considers appropriate

for Committee use.

The summary will be checked with senior Bureau executives ;

to ensure the protection of national security matters,

confidential sources of information and interests of

[2- ee


individuals in privacy. ‘Thereafter, the summary may

be removed to the Committee's office and all the
staff notes will be destroyed. The original documents
may be veferred to as extensively as necessary to

check the summary.

(8) The Committee staff shall designate those documents that

‘it wishes to make copies of for transfer to the
Committee's offices. Before the copies of the docu-
ments are taken to the Committee's é£fices, appropri-
ate excisions of the documents will be made. If an
agreement cannot be reached at the staff level with

respect to the appropriate excisions, the matter shall

be taken to-the Attorney General and the Committee.


OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 . 5010-106 a

MAY 1962 EDITION »

GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27 a

UNITED STATES GO . Assoc. Dir.

m Dep. AD,Adm.
Memorandum / ine ae
Comp. Sy, —
to +: MR, CALLAHAN pate: 1/24/75. aie: >
. L , 4 Ident m
4 eROM J. /B. ADAMS | inspection
. Ao yo Laboratory .
{ Ye Plan. & Eval.
sugjecT:/ REQUEST BY VARIOUS SENATORS ON Ay . vee
C SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO REVIEW Gal

THEIR FBI FILES yt Upiohige Re. —

At the meeting between Mr. Kelley and the Attorney
General, along with their respective staffs on 7/21/75, the Attorney
General determined that there should be broad disclosure of material
in the files of those Senators on the Senate Select Committee requesting
access to same and that in the main the Bureau should only restrict
access to revelation of live informants or information which would {
reveal the identity of live informants. In addition, he indicated that vi
in his review of the file on Senator Hart he noted certain derogator t
information on relatives which he felt Senator Hart should not see. |)
Also, there may be criminal investigations against one of the SenaforS
of such a nature that revelation should be restricted.

It was agreed that Deputy Assistant Attorney General .
O'Connor and I should review the files in order to determine problem _
areas and Mr. O'Connor would consult Wi gudee Tyler as,needed. “ty?

Files have been reviewed and there is general agréement
that almost all of the information can be revealed with certain limited
excisions taking care of problem areas, Mr. O'Connor-advised=on=cues
7/24/75 that he has been in touch with the Committee and they will make
arrangements to come to my office and review their fifes AUGm> pPesence
along with Mr. O'Connor. Senator Goldwater has addgelebis BIS aLoatn®
list and Mr. McDermott has been advised in order to insuré
material is accumulated. .

ACTION: / px 1.f { ee ffd-

None. Information only.

Sr
1 - Mr. McDermott } Soe " A
<a a
4
ye

JBA:am,
(3) faa

. fj .
1975
8 A AUG 3 cia 2989624 Page 198 j

OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 my 5010=106 q
MAY 1962 EDITION .
GSA GEN, REG. NO. 27
G s Assoc. Dir.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT se08: Di
Dep. AD inv. .
M emoranduyy : onal
Comp. Syst. ——
9 J . MR, CALLAHA pars: 7/29/75 File & Com:
ra
\

Vows Gen. Inv
~ pe ni ie ae
Flom : H, N, BASSETT we ae ele weg

ao ho oratory —.—
oy fi Legal Coun. ——

Plan, & Eval,
SENSTUDY 75 ar oa ‘ Spec. Inv. —_—_

Training

SUBJECT: {

al Telaphone Rm. —

Director See’y _.

In compliance with instructions of Mr. J. B, Adams
as relayed through SA S, F, Phillips, there are attached hereto
Field Inspector's Manual #763 and Headquarters Inspector's Manual
#225 for turn over to the Senate Select Committee, These manuals
are currently charged to SA F, B, Griffith and should be removed
from his property record,

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1, That this memorandum be routed to the Intelligence
Division to turn over the manuals to Senate Select Committee
representatives,

2. That it also be routed to the Administrative Division f )
for removal of the manuals from SA Griffith's pr Le ty 4 ic’ Se H q

REESE,
wi Enclosures 2 AUG 5 1s
us
y 1- Mr, Adams ¢
“ 1- Mr. Walsh
1- Mr, Wannall
$ 1-Mr. Cregar Z0
FBG:wmj
di, wy

ie)
whe Ah 5 4. ge. 499

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE S$ b .

WASHINGTON, D. C, 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC 75-2675
28 July 1975

Yoni on ad
es

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc “Coordinating

. Group
SUBJECT : Select Committee Requests
Attached for your information are four requests, two of Yp
which are levied on the Central Intelligence Agency, one on af

the Department of Defense and one on the Internal-Revenue Servicas™
The Central Intelligence Agency requests are dated July 22 and 25.

The request to the Department of Defense is July 22, and the

Internal Revenue Service request is dated July 9.

™ | : , | 4 ba “les 2 9 3 HM
LLovicth Mancih © AUG 5 1975

* Harriett D. Mowitt,,

Executive Secretar PE SSS seen
Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

on Congressional Review

Attachments: a/s ~ a

90\2 cn a
ee yg 62 - (0039S
mE juve
x to. ,
8 4 AUG5 1975

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page; "200


he

+ OTISS, PIKE @ 7
Fnisy District, New York uo
. v . x

COMMITTER:

WAYS AND MEANS . _ Congress of the Ginitesy States + OFFICE MANAGER

NW 88296 Doc{l:32989624 Page 201 _

Washington, D..C. 20505

25 RAYSURN House Orrice BulLoInc
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20315
AREA Cope 202
~ ¢ TeLcprone: 225-3825
MRS, BETTY ORR

Woause of Representatives 203 Wesy Mam Srnec
7 . RiverHeag, New Yor« . 11903

| Washington, BC, 20515 5° ‘Feversione; 727-2932

sa .

mee Sully 22, 1975

Mr. William E. Colby eg peg, hee
Director. . , “

RO ad
Central Intelligence Agency ee ae
aes oe

Dear Mr. Colby: . .

. As Chairman of the House Select, Committee on
Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee s.

_ be furnished with copies of all documents and materials

provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern-
mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

I would like to make a priority request for

all documents and materials related to budgetary authority
-and procedures, all budget information for the past 15

years, and any General Counsel's opinions of the authority,
mandate, or charter of the Central Intelligence Agency.
Until such time as the materials can be delivered to the
Committee, I request that arrangements be made for the
Committee staff to review them at the Agency.

oy Your cooperation in this matter is very much
‘appreciated. , ; oo

Sincerely, -

' Otis G. Pike
Chairman

ENCLOSURE, ”

_ :

* . “ . . an Soyo
Pears enugen, fOANO, CHAIRALAN © .
DOHA Ds sows, TEXAS, VICE CHATNMAN

@ put

ta. WANT, Maca, TOWANDd 1, NaAKaM, Jat, TEIN, D | | Vi, “Bias _3
Sag §. MONOALK, MINN, TANHY COLOWAT iN, AIC. with ww Le = es we ae XY
FER 1, HUDOLESTON, KY, CHARLES MCC, PATIIAS, Jit, MD, LY
Mae PeOuo'wN, ii moos RICHAKD S. BCHVRIMEIT, PAs ,
HARTY, COLO, . ert Be iz CS Service L Dy Vale Cab &
2 WILLIAM G, MOLLER, STAFF DInECTOR Coote PI RSETLES Bebe vay Le (- -

po LO mo, Sot GELICT COMMITTER TO : an
Rol tre et st J et | SSTUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH . yy

i are an ce TE tee te RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ° Ar ~14

: ws . wae wee )

rursvany tos. RAS. Mt, HTH CONCRESS)

ft

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

vouly 25, 1975

“Mr. Valter Elder, Poe
” Central Intelligence Agency
iangley, Vixginia

Dear, Walt: 2

, - Whis is to confiim - our tetdpnone conversation of suay 25; “2975, | . _
tn which I conveyed to you the requests of the Senate Select Committee “ 2
~ for fou. and complete information on the, following fophes: ° mo

os Any “‘pinaneiig by owA,. “@irect or indixect, of vu. a Sat
- owned, including proprietaries, domestic or foreign sO
we +» media, including but not Limited to books; articles, a —

“y publishing houses, @ilns, TV PrOBrens, scholarly” : ee
Journal. 8, magazines: and news. services Le

Be - “Pu and cont ete information, ‘airect or ‘ndirect - we
_CTA use of United States citizens who are news- So
‘paper men, journalists, movie, f¥ or any other .. Pane
* ‘persons. -comected: with the media’ in any way. Ree
“Fell and complete intonation on the direct or ine
* Girect involvement of the CYA with U.6. citizens who
were connected directly with “religious groups, including
“churches and missionaries, with activities or “relation-

hips in a foreign countries. — ke Se

ies oe Tp ee

* Sincerely, oo coe nae ae oS
BM

William G.


ny

a + = a ¥ ce . ” - . . . ’ . a et . . a . ’ .

i vow we : mo - ne = :

Moe w . a - so + . .

foe r-4 « a . . 5 . 3A25 Ravountt House Orrice turteteet
f ve. . a aye You . . : . oy . Po ol 7 Waotaneron, D.C, 20318

e “hog yee c . ’ . : 7 Lo AnraA Cove 202,

tay . oo . ~ ‘ - + ‘ : . Telernons, 225-3026
we. sunirrees o , re wee wi ; . . MRS. bry onA
? ; ws AND mee . ; Congress of the Ghirttety tates . . OFFICE banaern
a | , Botise of Representatives ggg buRTMIET Orr
Rivenued<p, New York
 _ Hashinglor, AE. 20515 retention mia

 “Suly 22,-1975-
The Honorable James R. Schlesinger
Secretary of Defense . .

The Pentagon
‘Washington, D. Cc,

Dear Mr. Schlesinger:

7 As Chairman of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence, I am hereby requesting that the Committee
‘be furnished with copies of all documents and materials
provided to the Senate Select Committee to Study Govern- |
“<2. “mental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,
p . in relation to the National Security Agency, the Defense
‘Intelligence Agency, and Armed Services intelligence
_ components, — : ~ ; :

coe TI would like to make a priority request for all
documents and materials related to budgetary authority and
procedures for the past 15 years, and any General Counsel's
opinions of the authorities, mandates, or charters of the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence. Agency, .
or Armed Services intelligence components. Until such time
as these materials can be delivered to the Committee, TI
yequest that. arrangements he made for members of the Com-
mittee staff to review them at the respective agencies,

. Your cooperation in this matter is very much _
appreciated. mo re

. “Sincercly,
nn ae
_ ie An *. as

tis Pike ean on
Chairman ‘109 GS

Lyd

. Gale 37s
, oe ENCLOSE |

IW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 203. . . ney te
WWW cass Uocifiodsadbed Mage fUs0


im, eeeeibenieniael

- ‘ cr rr La
. “ .
Pritngy a. tant, MICH. HOWARD H, HAKEN, St, THY a . . .
WALT. MoNGALE, Ait, DAPRY COLOWATEN, ANZ, . 2 . . . .
ve WALTEM ©, UODLES TOM, KY. es oe Sieamen a 'e * . . _

HONTRT HONGAN, BCs R . BORER, a _ f r
|g Senin, eto, Anilea Blates Beneke
fm ‘ WILLIAM G. MILLER, GTAFF DIRECTOR “ . . : ~ : ; .
: FREDERICK A. ©. SCHWARZ, JR. CHILE COUNSEL, . aan * SELECT COMMITTEE TO" °-

CURTIS fe BMOTHERS, MINOHITY COUNSEL STUDY, GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH

RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

. ao - 6 - ‘o. *  (runsvanr YO 5S, RES, 2, soTH CONGRESS) . .
MDE u 5 ae WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510 :

; bi

peice JAA% ‘

: a t

z - an eo rr nr ceri oe raed

; pan | “o}20/0 8 Pome L a “guly 9, 1975

“Mr.’ Thomas V. Glynn

Assistant to the Commissioner ‘9 2"

Internal Ravenue Service ~ a ee

Washington, D.C. 20224 . re a tN ee
Dear Tom: _ ne ee

. . | We would appreciate your advising the Select
Committee of ‘the following regarding possible IRS
participation in or furnishing information to the Intelli-
“gence Evaluation Committee: 1) whether the IRS had a
' xepresentative on the IEC and, if so, who; 2) if there
' was such a representative, what duties he’ had; 3) what
information, if any, IRS furnished to IEC. -We request
that the IRS identify for inspection and copying by the
Select Committee staff all documents relating to or- .
constituting information furnished by IRS either ’
‘directly to IEC or furnished to persons in the Treasury
- Department or elsewhere which was ultimately provided to
. 'ZEC. , - a ; . on

; The Committee has reason to believe that at a
March 26, 1971, meeting of the IEC, Mr. Eugene fT. Rossides,
then Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Treasury,

. Enforcement and Operations Division, was introduced to the

.. TEC as the person responsible for, inter alia, intelligence
. gathering by IRS, and that he would be called upon to make
".. , Contributions from that source to the Committee's work.

- Essentially, the Committee requests that the IRS
come forward with all information it has regarding direct
Or indirect IRS participation in the. work of the IEC.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page‘204- * a we ee


~ 7 eS eS . —_————s = =
A "ye at . toe on .
an. roe ga eon te wt \ _ et eta, . te ,
. : aan . wae . . ;
‘ an! * . . ' : . mo,
: ne . : ot . .
A : .

Joe" > Me, ghomas V. Glynn ee
. ‘Page two - oo, Soos ss July 9, 1975 2)

a

. . Mr. Arthur Jefferson of the Select Committee
staff is the individual primarily concerned with the
“investigation of IEC and will be in touch with you soon
xegarding the development of the requested information.
' Sincerel roe 2
é te ay / , 7
: Arthur W. Harrigan, Jr.
i
a ~

.

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 205


‘ 1 -Mr. Adams-~Encs.

1 - Mr. Mintz-Encs.

1-Mr. CregarEncs.
1 - Mr. Wannall-Encs.

The Attorney General July 21, 1975

1 - Mr. Hotis-Encs.
Director, FBI 1 - Mr. Daly-Encs.

O :

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT re
COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL veg ey Emer ae
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO .
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES -yol2 Joo. SP rami

During the executive session of captioned Committes
on July 16, 1975, members of that Committee requested that they be
furnished answers to the following questions:

() How are files established on Congressmen?

(2) How long are such files maintained?

(3) Who has access to the Congressional files and
"official and confidential files?? \)

N
Attached for your approval and forwarding toto
Committee is an original of a memorandum in response te the above- }
mentioned questions. A copy of this memorandum is enclosed for mK x
S
a

your records.

av
~~ mr : QR: “& ONS
ee fad er OE - on
Enclosures {2) la2 a LL Hh ON
pula mene - ‘
§2~-116305 .
- @ AUG 5 1975 _
1 - The Deputy Attorney General Zoom, eee \\ (NO
Attention: K. William O'Connor IN x +.
| Asses. Dir, Special Coungel for We
aaa Intelligence Coordination INN >
“usn.. NOTE: The attachment to the enclosed letterhead memorandum entitled
cone. Sree — "NEB Information-Gathering Practices with Respect to Members of Congress”
Filse& com, _-, WAS Prepared in conjunction with the appearance of the Attorney General and _,
pens Inv. he Director before the Subcommittee on Civil Rights and Constitutional Rights - a
Inspection A OL the House Judiciary Committee. This statement is responsive to questions :
venaay (1) and (2). Question (3) was answered in coordination with Files and Communi.
Plan. & Eval. “oo Division. LA
Spec. Inv. —_ §
Training t
egal Coun, a Ae a ay
Teloshene Rm. = pat who “4 é nik oR ORY
Di age x HG BAT QFEM \eLETyPE UNIT (_] "ho asses
NW.88296 Docld:22989624 Page 206 |

1 -Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 -Mr. Mintz
1 -Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Hotis

duly 23, 1975
1 -Mr. Daly

UNITED STATES SGUATE SELECT COMLETTAL
£OQ STUDY COVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPOCT FO DVERLAICONCE ACTIVITIES {S5C}

Earring the appearance ofore the SSC on Liay 16, 1975,
the following questions were asked by raembers of that Subcommitice:

(2) How are files established on Congressmen?

(2) How font ave such files maintained?

(3) Who has access to the Congressional files and
“official and confidential Hies''?

Attachad is a response in questions ane and two and,
in part, question three. With regard te that portion of question three
concernins access to the official and confidential files, be adviced that
those files are maintained in the Special Tile Room of the Federal Eurcad
of Investigation, Files and Coramunications Division. Access to these
files is strictly limited and thoce only having a necessity for aceoss may
veview these files. A log is maintained as to who has access to the
oficial and contidential files.

vA Enelos we

a 62116395
| 39 serve l&
f be, RE
i 1 - Fhe Attorney General sp eT A Weg
| ne walt Joo. Skane” ie

Agsoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. _
Dep. AD Inv.

Asst. Dir:

Admin,
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affoirs —.

Fils & Com. Q [-
wi ath

ston KA ve
Laboratory __. PVD: dk: (9)

Plan. & Eval. —

Spec. Inv.

Training

it |
Legal Coun. ___ "’ “

Telephone Rm. __ -

Director Sec'y__. +-«s-«sMAPL ROOMC_) TELETYPE uNIT(_] GPO 984-545
NW 88296 Docid:329896024 Page 207 a


aay Pair SCE NTNCOID et cn sere 2 Wen OE nn ee eee Ee re et ne rae

nr nce nee

PO USSS DEE TV: Wee ny Lar nnns

“9 88 st Y _ / Va _
_ Nw 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 703  - / G 3 A) ad Oo La

’ FBI INFORMATION-GATHERING PRACTICES
’ WITH RESPECT TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

There is a total of more than 6,500,000 files at
FBI Headquarters. Most of these contain information gathered
during investigation of matters--including some 100 types of
criminal, security, and applicant-employee cases--assigned to
the FBI by laws of Congress, directives of the President, and
orders of the Attorney General. : :

The remainder of these more than 6,500,000 files
include: .

(1) Personnel files regarding FBI applicants and
employees;

(2) General files regarding FBI contacts and
Gealings with a variety of individuals and
organizations concerning matters that do
not require or involve FBI investigation; and

; (3) Administrative-type files, such as those of a
policy nature, those containing statistical
reports, those detailing FBI cocperative
services, and the like. .

An unknown, but extremely small, percentage of
these more ‘than 6,500,000 FBI files contain information
regarding present or former Congressmen and Senators which
mays have been accumulated prior to, during, or after their
tenure in Congress.

‘WHAT FBI FILES CONTAIN ON CONGRESSMEN:

FBI Files contain substantially the same types of
information regarding Senators and Congressmen as is contained
in them about other citizens. Basically this information falls
into the following categories:

Violations of Law

(1) Allegations that Congressmen or Senators have
violated Federal laws within the FBI's jurisdiction. ~—

ENCLOSURE y ‘ )


Ro -@ é
i . Oo .
i .

“The FBI investigates such allegations whether they
relate to Members of Congress or any other person, The
results of these investigations are furnished to United States
Attorneys and/or other prosecutive officials of the Department
of Justice. The investigation may establish (a) that the
Congressman or Senator has, in fact, violated a Federal law,
(b) that a Federal law has been violated, but that the involve-
ment of the Congressman or Senator in that violation cannot be
established, (c) that a Federal law has been violated, but
that the Congressman or Senator clearly had no involvement
in its violation, or (d) that no violation of Federal law
was committed.

Included among such allegations invclving Congress-
men and Senators have been the following types of violations
within the FBI's jurisdiction: Bank Fraud and Embezzlement;
Conflict of Interest; Conspiracy to Obstruct Justice; Election
Laws; Fraud Against the Government; and Interstate Transporta-
tion in Aid of Racketeering,

TS RE RTE Sei Sr ae Rie A sae I ee

(2) Violations of Federal laws within the FBI's
' jurisdiction involving Congressmen and Senators as victims.

The results of FBI investigations of such violations
are furnished to United States Attorneys and/or other prosecu-
tive officials of the Department of Justice. In many instances,
the original complaint in these cases is received from the law~
maker~victim himself; however, if the information originates
elsewhere, the FBI promptly notifies the Congressman or, Senator

_involved of the threat which has been made. In addition; other
law enforcement agencies which have a legitimate interest in
f 7 these cases are notified of the threat.

: ; “Violations of the Congressional Assassination, Kid-
naping and Assault Statute, Bomb Threats, and Extortion are
among the crimes within the FBI's jurisdiction which have

E involved lawmakers as victims.

(3) Allegations that members of the staffs of
Congressmen or Senators have violated Federal laws within the
FBI's jurisdiction, or that these staff members have been
victims of such violations.

The PBI investigates such allegations and furnishes
the results to United States Attorneys and/or other prosacutive
officials of the Department of Justice. Where appropriate, the

Congressman or Senator involved is also advised of the investi-
gation.

NWEO296 Docld:32989624: Page 209


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Tao ae

7 7 ry | é

Congressmen and Senators may be interviewed by the
FBI in these cases involving Congressional aides--just as they
may be interviewed in connection with other types of FBI
investigations~-and both the fact of, and the results of,
such interviews are noted in the file reflecting the FBI
investigation.

(4) Allegations that Senators cr Congressmen have
viclated laws within the jurisdiction of other investigative
agencies.

These allegations are brought to the attention of
the agency concerned--Federal, state, or local. Such allega-
tions are not investigated by the FBI. However, the coopera-
tive services of the FBI Laboratory, Identification Division,
and National Crime Information Center are available to other
law enforcement a4 agencies in the investigation of these, as
well as other, crimes.

Applicant Investigations

(5) Present and former Congressmen and Senators
often are considered for positions in the Executive or
Judicial Branches of the Federal Government which require:
that the FBI conduct a thorough background investigation
of them. .

Dependent upon the nature of the position involved,
the results of these investigations are furnished to the White
House, the Department of Justice, and/or other appropriate
Government agencies.

" (6) Congressmen and Senators often are interviewed
in the course of applicant-type investigations regarding
other persons who are being considered for Executive or

Judicial positions--as well as during applicant-type investi-~

gations conducted by the FBI (at the request of the Committee
chairman involved) concerning staff members of a limited
number of House and Senate Committees. Both the fact of, and
the results of, the interview of the Congressman or Senator
are noted in the file reflecting the FBI's investigation.

Security Cases

(7) Either prior to, during, or subsequent to their
tenure in Congress, there may be files pertaining to security-
type matters which relate to members of the House and Senate,

or Congressmen may be identified in FBI files as actual or
intended victims of acts by subjects of security-type cases.

-3-

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 710

ae


. >
"4 seo . eo - Pan
. 4 ry

The Statutes covering such matters are Title 18, Section 2383
‘(Rebellion and Insurrection), Title 18, Section 2384 (Seditious
Conspiracy), and Title 18, Section 2385 (Smith Act -

Advocating overthrow of Government by force).

Se he nee eR le aN AL ata OA CA Pe EN Ae erred a
.

Oral oF Weitten Contact

(8) An unknown number of FBI files contain copies
of correspondence between the FBI and Congressmen and Senators
concerning a wide variety of matters which include bills
pending in, or passed by, Congress; personnel matters; the
Bureau's cooperative services; and FBI policies, procedures,
and investigations. Many of these letters from Congressmen
and Senators have been prompted by inquiries which these
lawmakers have received from constituents or other interested
citizens.

The FBI's files also contain memoranda regarding ,
telephone calls and personal contacts the FBI has had with
Congressmen and Senators regarding the above-cited variety
of matters, -

[at nereeereeaiehbmeleend weitebone we ESSE

‘Miscellaneous Tnformation About Congressmen

(9) An unknown number of FBI files contain informa-
tion reflecting favorably or unfavorably upon the. character,
integrity, and loyalty of Senators and Congressmen-~which
information does not require investigative action at the time
received on the part of the FBI or other law enforcement

- agencies. It consists of:

a a ode

(a) -Information contained in unsolicited letters
received by the FBI from persons and organi-
zations representing a variety of backgrounds,
viewpoints, and walks of life.

{(b) Information volunteered orally to FBI Agents by
the same broad range of individuals and organi-
zations as cited directly above.

{c) Newspaper clippings, as well as data from
magazines and other news dissemination media.

(d) Miscellaneous information received from FBI con-
fidential informants and/or other sensitive sources.

FN Renna eaelle tate abc Rae fie Ste sia kin badtnciatttin enn Rie 4

NW 86296 Docid:32989624 Page 2711

Po we @

Fingerprints of Congressmen

(10) The files of.the Identification Division
contain the fihgerprints of an unknown number of Senators
and Congressmen. Some of these relate to their having been
arrested for violations of Federal, state, or local laws.
Others are noncriminal in origin and largely pertain to
their having served in the Armed Forces or having been appli-
cants for various positions. These fingerprint cards have
been submitted to the FBI by Federal agencies, as well as-by
iocal, county, and state criminal justice agencies, throughout
the United States.

Fingerprint records are maintained by the FBI's
Identification Division, and they are kept entirely separate
and apart from all other files and records of the FBI.

ct phe a eaeeio ampey ee tne MR See et em X=

HOW INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN REACHES FBI FILES:

There are two basic types of information regarding —
Congressmen and Senators in FBI files:

investigations involving the Congressman or Senator as either
a subject or a victim. This includes information of
pertinence to the case which the lawmaker himself has
furnished to the FBI.

t . *

(2) Unsolicited information,

:
l
| (1) Information which the FBI has solicited during
i
r

fhere are many sources of the unsolicited information
that is included in FBI files: ,
. 4

a as

(a) It is volunteered by citizens who are being
interviewed during investigations of matters

having no relationship to any of our Nation's
lawmakers.

(b) It is volunteered in communications sent to the
FBI by individuals and organizations.

(c) It is included in news articles and other reports
publicly disseminated by our Nation's news media
which come to the FBI's attention. ;

(dq) It is received from FBI confidential informants
and, very infrequentiy, from telephone taps not
directed at a Congressman which have been
installed with authority of a Federal Court
and/or authority of the Attorney General.

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~5-

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NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 212 oe ee ; a ]


7

ce eet nance ttatcnete
.

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am eenie a Aaah nate The Maiti emda he be ak a ohh en as

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S é

(e) In the case of information contained on finger-

print cards, it is sent to the FBI's Identifica~_

tion Division by authorized contributors,
including criminal justice agencies throughout
the United States.

‘HOW AND WHERE INFORMATION ABOUT CONGRESSMEN IS MAINTAINED:

Information regarding Congressmen and Senators is
included in the official FBI files--totaling more than
6,500,000 in number-~-that are maintained by the Files and
Communications Division on an upper floor of the J. Edgar

Hoover FBI Building.

The area where these files are maintained is staffed
and supervised 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to assure
continuous security. .

General Index

The essential key to the effective use of these FBI
files is the Bureau's General Index which consists of 58
million index cards and which is located on a different floor
from the files themselves in the J.: Edgar Hoover FBI: Building.
To determine what files (if any at all) contain information
regarding an individual Senator or Congressman, it is
necessary to search the name of that lawmaker in the General
Index. ,

The General Index is staffed and supervised 24 hours

‘a Way, 7 days a week, to assure continuous security.

Rules Governing Use of Files
; These official FBI files are available only to FBI
personnel-~and they are available on a."need<-to~know" basis
only.

The Files and Communications Division maintains a

“record of files that have been charged out by Headquarters

personnel. Such files must be returned to the Files and
Communications Division as soon as possible; and during the
period that a file is charged out, it cannot be left even
momentarily in an unlocked room. If retained overnight,
the file must be kept in a locked cabinet inside a lockéd
room.

NW 88296 Dochd:32969624 Page #13


at heniencadenB unapmabtem duh nas hams nae ET ee

Pee Orn SO OO RE STee DeSean 7 SreWe wn WP tat. RWMDET CES Ver 8 -viSaae Sennen STOne eran

ee a ee tee rath ne AMR, eamlaiimafnteaattalM Daa 2 Lye nthe AREA Tah td AERC KAS

_ NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 214

The charge-out record is temporary in nature and
is. destroyed five days after the file has been returned to
the Files and Communications Division.

WHY THE FBI RETAINS INFORMATION REGARDING CONGRESSMEN:

The information regarding Congressmen and Senators
that is maintained in FBI files can be divided into three
major categories: ;

(1) The results of investigations (criminal-,
security~, and applicant-type) involving a Congressman or
Senator as a subject or victim;

(2) Information regarding a Congressman or Senator--
in addition to that gathered during investigation(s) of the
lawmaker involved-~-which the FBI has disseminated to other
Federal agencies (such as to the Internal Revenue Service if, for
example, the information involves a tax-related matter) and/or to
state and local law enforcement agencies (such as the police
department covering the lawmaker's home community if, for example,
the information involves an alleged threat against the lawmaker's
house or other property); and :

*(3) Other information that. the FBI receives from,
or receives about, a Congressman or Senator that is included
in the FBI's filess-without having been either investigated

or disseminated by the FBI.

The reasons this information is retained in FBI
files can be explained in legal and administrative terms,
as well as in practical terms.

Legal and Administrative Reasons

All investigative files and other records of the
FBI involving Congressmen.or Senators are within a class
of records which-~under the FBI Records Retention Plan
developed in 1969 by the National Archives and Records
Service of the General Services Administration--are con-
sidered of enduring archival value to ensure their preser~
vation.

This FBI Records Retention Plan was prepared under

the authority contained in the Federal Records Act of 1950,
which is contained in Title 44 cf the United States Code. °

- F=-


{ a . -_'* s
moe ” @ .
.

i

j

| Included among the FBI records to be retained

{ under the Records Retention Plan formulated by the National
Archives and Racords Service are those which would have
historical value and would document policies,: procedures,
functions, legislative and budget matters, and the like--

| and reports of investigations of both civil and criminai
activities, including "crimes involving, and other records,
{ concerning, the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the

| United States, members of and delegates elected to the
Congresses of the United States, cabinet heads, judges and
i other officials appointed by the President."

j .

In «stablishing the FBI Records Retention Plan,
| the National Archives and Records Service noted, "Ordinarily
the records of a Federal agency that are worthy of permanent
retention amount to a rather small percentage of the total
volume of records generated. Many of the records produced '
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, however, relate to
a number of controversial if not important aspects of the
history of the United States, particularly to the role of
the Federal Government in its relation to its citizens.
To be sure, mauy years will pass before these records can
be made available to the public for historical and other
serious research, Nevertheless, the archival value of these
records will not decrease nor will interest in them dissipate."

BD ee, me Bia Feet aml elemental oat eee

In addition, the FBI is also required by the
Federal Records Act to make records containing adequate and
proper documentation of its administration and operations
which, among other things, are designed to furnish informa-
tion necessary to protect the legal and financial interest

of the Government and of persons directly affected by FBI
activities.

SD at ome eS ce

Practival Reasons for Retaining Information

Logic, reason, and lessons learned from more than
six decades 0! law enforcement experience dictate that the
FBI should maintain records of investigations it has conducted
(category #1 cited at the top of page 7) and records of

information it has disseminated to other agencies {category #2
on page 7). .

Such records enable the FBI to answer questions. or
chailenges (including those arising in judicial or administra-
tive proceedinzs) invoiving investigations FBI Agents have
conducted and;or information the FBI has disseminated to other

hin EFS EE EY SS OE SYS AAR ETT a SL LST ROR AD CF 2 NSS OEY CA SAS

NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page #15


” a . ‘
. .
we
mo. - .
. . > . .

agencies. Such records also endble the FBI to furnish additional
: copies of investigative reports or other information that has

4 been disseminated-~should additional copies be needed by the
original recipients or by other official agencies. Furthermore,
the information contained in these files often proves of
assistance in future investigations. '

Less obvious may be the reasons why the FBI retains
the third category of information about Congressmen and
Senators (data that has neither been investigated nor
disseminated by the FBI) cited on page 7.

If such information is of an administrative nature--
that is, if the information indicates the [awmaker is interested
in a specific FBI investigation, a specific area of the FBI's
jurisdiction, or specific PRI policies, practices and procedures~-~
it is filed for:

Te eA a a meena a A AN Witane ance tmin

{1l) the information and advice of FBI employees in
connection with future contacts or correspondence with that
Congressman or Senator;

(2) consideration"of FBI personnel in connection
with possible future changes in FBI policies, practices, and
procedures.

te Sie alte gaa

If the information is of a personal nature~-that is,
if it reflects upon the loyalty, character, or integrity of a
. lawmaker-~it is included in FBI files for the following reasons:

(1) The information may prove of value when a
. present or former Congressman or Senator is considered for
a position in the Executive or Judicial Branch of Government
which requires that the FBI conduct a background investiga-
tion of him.

(2) The information could prove of value in
solving future crimes committed against the Congressman or
Senator--or against members of that lawmaker's family.

(A person who berates and defames a lawmaker would be a
“ logical suspect if that lawmaker--or another Congressman
or Senator whose views coincide with his--becomes the
target of actual or threatened violence.)

eB aAn Nt it Simreaay ee cet

ate cdeneRaiamacte >

(3) The information could aid the FBI in solving
crimes committed against other persons. (For example, the
handwriting, typewriting, stationery, and/or distinctive

et Ant A

a

} NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 216 oe ; -


= aoeeart se Sa eeateet tether ap ART GATED at, me meer nt Garena ta ae

swantereiireivers saben’ nthe Abin tt Anan ss Seinen eer tr etignn e =

ies naehiae EN a OT we ae

phraseology in a letter defaming a Congressman could assist

the FBI in linking the writer of that letter to a subsequent
extortion note or written bomb threat that,does not involve

any member of Congress.)

(4) The information frequently provides valuable.
insight into the character, stability, and reliability of
the person who has furnished it to the FBI. Thereby, it is
of value and assistance to the FBI in future contacts with,’
contacts by, or inquiries regarding, this individual.

(5) The information provides a useful administra~
tive check on the performance of FBI field offices--
particularly with regard to the important consideration of
whether they are being fully responsive to the public needs.
Supervisory personnel regularly review complaints or
allegations received from the public to insure that the

appropriate action was taken--if, in fact, action was called
for. .

WHAT ITS REQUIRED TO DESTROY FILE INFORMATION:

Barring a new law of Congress and/or receipt of a
revised FBI Records Retention Plan from the National Archives
and Records Service, the FBI cannot unilaterally undertake

the destruction of information regarding Congressmen and
Senators in its files,

s

- 190 -

W 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 217


5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION |
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee
LTR LHM Memo Report dated 1-21-75
us. S nate Select. Committee to study overnmen

Caption 4f Document: Operations With Respect to rat

Activities. Concerning 3 questions asked by that
Subcommittee,

EBI

Originating Office:
Delivered by:

Received by:

Title:
Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FB!

Sa a cmc ner En Ft Ht we

rg -_ YUU
encrosune 2 - (| le 2%57~ U7]

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 718


NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 219

SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE BEFORE COMPLETING.

Intelligence Community Staff FROM: ‘
Central Index
PET

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED
for review but not transmitted, so note.)

fgg [svcuwen [[errerime | [inwenview[ [resto | [omer | 2/28/75

+ TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

- IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)

Memorandum ond encl@sura

. TN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other- . CLASSIFICATION OF
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter

SSC oral request on 7/16/75

Codeword)

u

. KEY words (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are
used underline for emphasis)

Gperating proceivres

. SUMMARY (See reverse side before completing this item)

PBL infernuation-gathering practives with respect
to mesbera of Congress

62-116395

FMB: fmk
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIATSON TO CENTRAL, COMMUINTTY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

3791 (6-75)


OE E?'DW’?~SCS~*~*~*~S

ig ioe oF

INSTRUCTIONS

e Type or print clearly in ink.
® Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
e Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required,

e "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information. :

e If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY ~ enter brief narrative statement -describing,
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.

re : @ : @

NW 88296 Docld?32989624 Page 220


_ ‘WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff 7 _ _ . DCI/ Ic 75- 2613
7 pe , 29 July 1975

at. 0, y ISN
MORANDUM FOR: --Member's.of the. USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating
é ; ' Group .

. _ ; moe |S 7
SUBJECT: : Security Clearances ieee : OR COTATNED

NAN
S . an or reeate : wes ALAILY

Attached i's an updated listing of staff personnel certified
¢ by the Staff Dir ector/Senate Select Committee as meeting the
requirements of Executive Order 10450 for access to classified
information up to and including TOP SECRET, Some of these a)

No
>_< individuals have been certified as meeting the requirements of a

DCID 1/14 and have been provided the appropriate briefing.

we . ., .
; . John.M. Clarke r
~ ° Associate Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Commaymity HE

“Attachment | , us "gp Ud. Ll - Le rie

LO GE |
| ial, ie | =

g- ih 639s — |
(e a be Uf oe 7 |

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 1 ‘Page 221 re _ Oo!


Staff Members of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities who have received a security
investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation within the past five years and are certified as
meeting requirements of EO 10450 for access to classified information up to and including TOP SECRET.

’. Name

| . Aaron, David wae
' @..,5 William -

‘Bayly, John

Banoff, ‘Barbara bee i Sue

Barkey, Howard rr ae

Baton,. Frederick”. ,

| Benz, Charity 1.

Betts, Richard K. os

Birdsell, "Wayne » a
:.iB Ps rasieta, Susan vO
Bouschard, Samuel" .
‘Bris sett, Belva —_
. Brooks, ‘Nancy’ a
*Brown, C. Harold a

‘ Brown, Maxine’. .

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 222» .

Cc ompartmented

oo ee
ar ad

4 eo ae, if

Clearance

; a Designated Briefed. .

(SI, TK, B)
B 4/15

B, ant.
BB/19. os:
. B6/26

BL oo
B7/14:,
SSB 6/10,”
' B 6/10

B 5/23°

-B6/26.." |

BO6/2. 0°

a: 5/23. Yous

IC STAFF VERIFICATION OF CLEARANCES

Date and '

‘ Place of Birth - , Security No. -'-
* genie
asp.
| 1226-44.
12-20-45.
So 26-17.
yaaa |
7023-46.
 B+15-47
11 52-06
° | 1a 23-51
_ 3212-24

6-23-41

2-14-40

646-38 |

8-8-28 -

Ti.
NJ. -

“DC
‘Cal.:
“Mo. |

Conn. .

NY

pa
Ohio
Maine

Ok. ,

Ky

. Ohio’

. Ida..

Social

- 550-44-7971,

45-30-3377: T

| 57860-2308

» 861-68-9123

| - 490-01-6758

o  aapa-szen, 00

| 053-38-7410' .
*-916-38-2619.

“. §7g203-1841 ”-
256-92-0841
007-18-3292
440-4456374 °
: 313-38-6773 | _
+6 27834-3428

>: 568+40-3123°..-

29. YUL 1975"


Compartmented So, Oo - - 29. JUL t975 |
' a we - Clearance me Dateand. .- Social: 9° 9. 7"
Name poet _ _— ' Designated Briefed - Place of Birth - Security No.
; CE _(SL TK, By . ; “
‘Bushong, David aa wo RE BTA 10-47 (2) Ohio’ 9)  © 289-40-1203 So

Carpenter, - Maxgaret,

ren _ 8-27-44" 2 Cale §55-62-6129

: Carter, Barry - - B 4/24 2 wa, “12-14-42 _ “Cal, 7 no 567-56-8854 -

@. cic, ieabe re fp ie rs) A=18-46, 0 WE) 390-46~2235, .

; Culbreth, Elizabeth | CE a ae 7B 7/2: i 6-23-42'. . NGC we '240~64~9040.. :

Davis Lynn : ; _BANTR9E- 96648 PR, 042-36-9155 : TF Badge -. |
OB 6/26 - - 2° 949452. (R Minn.’ -°""., 47160-1688 ~ a

, Dawson, Thomas, - are a we te
7! Dawson, Rhett. 2 008 7 os BSg/19 12- 9-43, Ti. OT 38163494329

“DeMarco, James. re: bia 312-43 ~ W.Va. | 286-36-9097

Dennin, Joseph Francis, _ $B 6/239 or 1629-88 SONY 4, 56762-5353

f
fo DeOres, ‘Mary | - -B 6/26 3s, w, 6+13-47,. Ohio 287-42-6258 te,

 Mecsive, Joieph 3 EL nor _ a eB 6726 | Doo 222-45 . Del. si. 28-8430
. Dick, Jamies oe /B 6/26. ° s+ 7425-47 Mase. |. 029-36-6745
ve Dillon; Molly - . . aan SE ye 27 8 6/10. 4-16-51 Vac. | 150-38-4588
“Doolittle, Patricia. : . et ao oy Te 7 on os ; g-12-43" * NC - ; oe 213-242-6360 .
° Dwyer, Daniel | ° 7 me os * pana” - 8-24-52 * : Mas.” 023-44-8792 _ . | a
r ‘Enuff, John. a 7 ra _ B.5/23 630441 DG. -345-34-2468 - - . _

. Epstein, Michael Taylor RL oy MB-6/26, 0 7", 3410-37) Mass. (026-428-6318

| wR?  SAPRoseoia Bags 223° : fo oo - \ oe "8-30-46 DC ee 215446~2988 en

"Name

Fenn, Peter

Ford, Harold

Ow eeermalawemememme tines meteni wale a nO ee nates earcwRnN  o ©
. : *

_ NW 88296 Doctd:32989§24 Page 224

Gitenstein, Mark Henry’
‘ ant, Bruce

, award
‘Harrigan, Arthur
Hatry, Audrey Helen

Inderfurth, Mark K

. Iverson, ‘Portia « '

Jefferson, Arthur M.:

. Johnson, Dérothy

‘ Johnson, ‘Loch

@vre%05 ,» Anne

.Kayden, Jeffrey |
Kelley, Robert, -

Kieves, Lawrence

7 Kirbow, Charles

‘Kirchheimer, Joseph ¢ _

Compartmented -
Clearance

Designated Briefed
Te, (SI, TK, B)

BA/24 |.
LB 6/260":

¥ &

*

“B.5/28 . a ~
nan B7/2 00

sana
BSNS
Se
pa eee
“TB 6/267

'B 4/29 a
3B 5/28
BT/l4
= B 5/19 -
B 5/19" os
“B'A/24 es

Date and .
Place of Birth

ace 12-47 -
23-23-21,
327- 46 ,
6 16-16.
)11,27-50
"3e1 badd
"6210-23
9-29-46 -
10-22-50:
3216-44 |
" '-8-25
aoe
“11-6-46
* 3-22-51 7°
. 10-29-40

1-42.48

* 10-2-22 _

63-17%

“Cal

NY

> The.

Ma, .

ala.
"Neb.

Germany 2
ONY
Ma.

t
NC

W.Va.

N. Zealand ”

Ma.

NYS

Ind.

Ga.

Social

Security No.

" ) 213-50-1123 |
a 550- 16-4630.
"20-60-8767 "|
_507-20-1311-"
—-296- 50-4113"

141- 34- 1031

26014-8691"
245-74-5617.
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OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 é . >
JULY 1973 EDITION «!
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6 ps
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Og Sa
TO : Clarence M. Kelley, Director DATE: July 16, 1975
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Mono tg

FROM : / Edward H. Levi Ee aes ee an \r1S:' .
Attorney General ] nt . - :

SUBJECT, United statesdenate Select Committee to Study Governmental
¢ Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.

WN .
Sx The United States Senate Sélect Committee to Study
Se Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Acti-
— NG vities (the "Church Committee") has recently requested
> certain information regarding the functions of the Attorney
INN General with respect to the supervision of and policy-making
g for internal security and intelligence activities. I would 3
appreciate it if you would prepare by July—25, 1975 the full- X=
NS est possible response to the following questions: f
re 1. What standards and procedures has the
NG Attorney General adopted for the collec- WY
RNG tion, analysis, use, and dissemination of -
ee organized crime intelligence?
yO 2. To what extent have communications between
dre the White House and the FBI or other agencies
x under the jurisdiction of the Attorney General
Y bypassed the Attorney General? To what extent

should such communications be channeled throug
the Attorney General?

a

2XseefrttoleHale, Ding wd | -
Mlose ilo us 7 e
ioe Reescpt co bps %

| U §
\ iho fe ManinStot.- nf Le VC2- LAG 3 ¥s a bY
Sere Pe LIA feu ob The3hrm eek frp :
Wr PIEDRA Gve)) 037

Pe Te errr eal
~

2X teckowt Yo Py Dob sie i aA ie Z 1975

MULL LS 7 \yy-
wafeener ie P Se

1975 Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-110

LNW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 229 . ”


f Assoc. Dir. .
f Dep.-A.D.-Adm, .. h

Dep-A.D-Inv, 2. f
Asst. Dir: i
§ Admin, . ..
§ Comp. Syst.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS. SECTION

:

Ext. Atha --]

eves ; fles & Com, .}

. 7 aA Ly “ ane f
' §RBO7 AT CODED LB pays | fuente
a ra [ene # Inspection s

10216 PM NITEL JULY 39, 1975 Wome TYPE {infaliu HEL

1 Laboratory —.. f

12. { Plan. & Eval, |

DIRECTOR  (62-116395) — ple | s —|

< Ths TAPORNOIT ON OCH PP [ Teainieg E

(62-2854) MREIN 9S UNCLASSIST ED | Legal Cons. fi

: ware Vola OO 2S PA. targlazg| Tlemere Be
NSTUDY . we) 9 BUDED JILY 3 lt, 1975 e ETE ae ola g macs

RE BUREAU NITEL TO ATLANTA, JULY 25, 1975.

IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST SET FORTH, EXTENSIVE FILE REVIEW
AND RELATED ADMINISTRATIVE PROCIDURE WILL ENTAD. TINE WHICH
WILL NOT ALLOW ATLANTA TO MEET THE JULY 31, 1975, DEADLINE.

ATLANTA ANTICIPATES RECOVERY AND XEROXING OF MATERIAL
REQUESTED AND SUBMISSION OF AIRTEL TRANSMITTING Same BY THE- | \/A°
QLOSE OF BUSINESS, JILY 31, 1975, WHICH SHOULD REACH TIE,
BUREAU BY AUGUST 2, 1975.
END .
PLS HOLD FOR ONE MORE

a

bp 2-1E398 -

awe Sc1a:4980624 Page 230 ee


SUT eraseneren'anaesnemsane qe ane eae SnD EER een orton

é eee a Oar ME OF INVESe. 4 a

he ute TIONS SEO ane bar
& “ Dep.-A.D.-Adm._,
a y it tsar
. A

Dep.-A.D.-Inv._.

Five & Com 1

: Asst, Dir: !

NR GG4 SF CODE Pe Aisne a |

“gon ast - it et 2 Gan, ie in

1246 PM URGENT 7/14/75 MCC> Pe ee |
10 RECTOR

|
|
FROM SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)  4P x 2 i
\ 4
INTELLIGENCE DIVISION - MR. W,)O2) CREGAR
— lag Pr Rugs
UNITED STATES SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OP aie Shnon as
resi r Sec'y — }
Vn RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IS EXAMINING NMEASURES ~~~
\; DERECTED AGAINST THE) SLACK PANTHER PARTY (BPP) IN. THE LATE
\psos | AND EARLY 1876S IN SAN FRANCISCO = OAKLAND, LOS ANGELES

AND SAN | DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, BY THE RIELD OFFICES “OF THE FEN ee os

—|

RE BUREAU NITEL wuLy 9, 1975, (Sacjachu fy Cu

FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF ALL LOCAL POCICE—DEPAREMENTS AND
PERSONNEL CONTACTED BY THE SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION RELATIVE To
THIS COINTELPRO: .

IN NOVEMBER 1968, UNKNOWN OFFICERS OF THE SAN FRaNCISco
POLICE DEPARTMENT WERE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO GIVE WILFRED ¢ ,) ee
HOLIDAY, ALSO KNOWN AS CAPTAIN CRUTCH, SPECIAL PRIVILEGES AT |
CITY PRISON, SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER DECEMBER 2, 1968, Dp
ENTITLED “COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE

GROUP, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE (BLACK PANTHER PARTY), BUFILE t#@-448996,
y

fy BN st G2 eb ra — He

-,

AT5 4202 ae
GRATE CONTAINED
HEREIN, JS UNCLASSIEIED SOP aol Jope> nae
DAT i /Z.3 8 PE. =

a

Nive ae 8 a: Mr aa24 Page 231


PAGE TWO SF 62-6887

IN JANUARY 1969, UNKNOWN POLICE OFFICERS, BERKELEY POLICE
DEPARTMENT, WERE ADVISED THAT RICHARD AND SAM NAPIER WERE
MEMBERS OF THE BPP. THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO THE
BERKELEY POLICE DEPARTMENT AFTER AN ARMORED CAR WAS HELD UP AND
A GUARD MURDERED AND THE GETAWAY CAR WAS FOUND TO BE REGISTERED
10 RICHARD NAPIER, SEE SAN FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU
JANUARY 13, 1969, ENTITLED "COINTELPRO, BLACK NATIONALIST = HATE
GROUPS (BLACK PANTHER PARTY).

“IN EARLY 1969, AN UNKNOWN OFFICER, SHERIFF*S OFFICE,
ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA, AT OAKLAND, WAS ADVISED OF THE USE
BY A FILM COMPANY (MGM) OF BLACK PANTHERS AS "PROPS" EN THEIR
FILMING OF BERKELEY RIOT SCENES, THE SHERIFF'S OFFICE IN TURN
FURNISHED THIS INFORMATION TO THE BERKELEY PRESS. SEE SAN
FRANCISCO LETTER TO THE BUREAU MARCH 19, 1969, ENTITLED
“COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM, BLACK NATIONALIST ~ HATE GROUP,
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE, BLACK PANTHER PARTY.”

IN APRIL 1969, INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED THAT THE BPP WAS
PLANNING A MEETING BETWEEN SOME OF THEIR LEADERS AND SOME OF THE
PEOPLE WHO HAD LEFT THE PARTY IN AN EFFORT TO GET THEW BACK
TOGETHER, THIS INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO RICHARDYWAGNER,

So 5

NW 60296 Docid:32989624 Page 232


-  ® qe

. “

PAGE THREE SF 62-6887

OAKLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT, ON APRIL 18, 1969, WHO, IN TURN,
APPARENTLY FED THE INFORMATION TO THE BLACK PANTHER RENEGADES
WHO CONSTRUED THIS APPARENTLY AS A "SET UP" AND DID NOT ATTEND,
THIS INCIDENT IS RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO SERIAL 157-601-201.
ON SEPTEMBER 26, 1969, SERGEANT stan erie, oatsano POLICE
DEPARTMENT, INTELLIGENCE UNIT, WAS"ADVISED THAT INFORMATION
HAS BEEN RECEIVED THAT THOMAS JOLLY, A BPP MEMBER, WAS PLANNING
TO CONTACT PROBATION OFFICER IN OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, TO we
REPRESENT HIMSELF AS THE UNCLE OF BELVA NEWSON, ANOTHER BPP
MEMBER WHO HAD BEEN ARRESTED, JOLLY, WHO IS NOT NEWSON'S UNCLE,
“PLANNED TO ARRANGE FOR HER RELEASE TO THEM, THIS MATTER TS
RECORDED IN SAN FRANCISCO FILE 157-601-356.
SAN FRANCISCO FILE DOES NOT REFLECT MEDIA PERSONNEL
WERE CONTAC [N RELATION TO THIS PROGRAM, ee
ek sarwonn aslbeens, LAST KNOWN BY SAN FRANCISCO 10 BE x

CN enter mr mak

ASSISTANT LEGAT, TOYKYO, WAS NAMED COORDINATOR OF THE COINTELPRO -

BPP ON Arm. 5 3908: / HE CASE WAS REASSIGNED APRIL 18, 1968,

10 FORMER lef WILLIAMVCOHENDET WHO PRESENTLY RESIDES AT 1557 BALBOA
eamnetace ne SERIES et REPS a yrKgoe ee “eet

WAY, BURLINGAME, CALIFORNIA 94910, THIS MATTER WAS REASSIGNED

TO SA LEO S\/BRENNEISENMAY 16, 1969, THE MATTER WAS CLOSED ON
MAY 1, 1971. Nabe

le .
PES—MAKE—READ-LAST-PARAGRAPH-2.ND—LENE-—3RD-WORD- READ—TOKYO—-REPT-TOKYO

NW 68296 Docld:32989624 Page 233


\ a
L \
au .

PAGE FOUR SF 62-6887

THIS MATTER WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA ALBERT PC/CLARK
FROM APRIL 3, 1968 TO MAY 9, 1979. CLARK PRESENTLY RESIDES
66 ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94939, COINTELPRO - BPP
| ELM AVENUE, LARKSPUR, CALIFORNIA 94
WAS SUPERVISED BY FORMER SA DAVID Ej/TODD FROM FEBRUARY 9, 1979
een maiitonionves gn F
TO MAY 1, 1971, TODD RESIDES AT 2¢ COZZOLINO DRIVE, MILLBRAZE,
CALIFORNIA 94930. .

| Te ee

ee

| END
— RERFWAUTXX-WAE TAME NUTE—ON-SRD-PAGE-2-g DXX-2-y-2ND—TOL
k .

ALAS-T~LINE—~LAST-29.4-—
WORD-READ—MELEBRAEREPT-MILLBRAE—

NW 65296 Dochd:32909624 Page 234


Assoc. Dir. f
Dep.-A.D.-Adm__

i Comp. Syst.
4 xt. Affairg
Files & Com. __

NR@IS BS CODED

S:G3PM NITEL JULY 24, 1975 Inspectio
; Intell. wien

f , § Laboratory [/E

/ y j Plan. & Eval, __

| Spee. Inv.
Training

eine

A
jn DIRECTOR 62-116395

Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. .,
Director See’y __

OSTON 66+4177

INTD, (SA W. 0, CREGAR)

@)
Cotustivy, 1975, . mn (UDELL
e a (|

> \e
>

ON JULY 24, 1975, JOHN F. KEHOE, JR», (FORMER 5a) 5212s By
COMMISSIONER OF PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., NL 2B
ADVISED THAT on JULY 23, 1975, HE HAD RECEIVED A TELEPHONE 5
CALL FROM PAUTS WALLACH, WHO STATED HE WAS, A STAFF MEMBER
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE7ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES. WALLACH GAVE HIS TELEPHONE NUMBER AS
202-224-1700. WALLACH ASKED KEHOE IF HE WAS A FORMER SPECIAL

AGENT OF FBI AND KEHOE REPLIED IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, WALLACH
THEN INQUIRED WHETHER KEHOE HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE OR OTHER COVERT INTELLIGENCE

GATHERING ACTIVITIES IN NEW YORK CITY IN Ay 62-MVISYS.

= a J ‘
KEHOE TOLD WALLACH THAT HE HAD per dy SA ASSIGNED TO

er
eee

wi - :
-2GHE NEW YORK OFFICE IN 1946 AND 1947, WALLACH STATED

=

Moe

a)
ca YOU DIDN’ T GO BACK THERE TO DO SOME JOB DURING THE 6g°S

‘y
‘

\ !

NW 68296 Dochd:32589624 Page 235


A

-. e : @e@

* PAGE Two BS 66-4177 °
ASKED IF KEHOE KNEW OF ANY OTHER SA'S NAMED KEHOE WHO
WERE ASSIGNED TO NEW YORK OFFICE DURING THE 1960°S AND
WHO WERE NOW RETIRED. KEHOE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE,
AT WHICH TIME WALLACH CONCLUDED THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION.
_ THE ABOVE IS FOR INFORMATION OF FBIHQ.

END

W 68296 Dochd:32989624 Page 236


OPTIONAL FORM NO, 10 a 5010-106 e - .

“May"7962 ECITION

GSA GEN, REG. NO, 27 a Assoc. Dit.
UNITED STATES G RNMENT

Dep. AD Adm. —

1- Mr. N,. BP. Callahan Dep. AD inv.
Memorandum 1 = ir, J, B. Adams ma
2 - Mr. Jd. A. Mintz Comp. Syst. ——
Ext. Affairs
TO : Me. W. R. Wannall DATE: 7/11/75 be wa
} 1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall or
“ yo 1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan ay
yon 7 iW. OO. Cregaly 1- Mr. RL. cer age x
: _ 1 —+Mr. W. O. Cregar
J o oN ~ & se cae —
' SUBJECTS SENST

s Invs
t pec.
UDY 15 Training
ot gutitnca nanan : Telephone Rm. —
, Director Sec’y

This memorandum recommends that the Director raise the
question of privacy and source protection with Senators of the
Senate Select Committee (SSC) on the occasion of his anticipated
meeting in Executive Session with the SSC tentatively scheduled
for the week of 7/14/75.

By letter dated 7/9/75, Senators Frank Church and
John Tower of SSC requested the Attorney General and the
Director to appear before the Committee in Executive Session
during the week of 7/14/75. The purpose of this meeting is to
discuss the matter of concern to Mr. Kelley and steps which
might be taken to expedite the response to requests for documents2
essential to the Committee inquiry.

The Senstudy staff of the Intelligence Division is
preparing for the Director's use copies of each of the written”
requests received from SSC annotated with the dates of ou
response to each request; the date it was delivered to the
Department; and the date it was delivered to the SSC staff.

There remains, however, a serious problem precipitated
by three recent written requests of the SSC dated 6/30/75 (received
by the Bureau on 7/7/75); 7/1/75 (received by the Bureau on
7/8/75); and 7/8/75 (received by the FBI on 7/9/75). All three
of these requests appear,in part, to disregard the privacy of
certain individuals or requests the identity of sources mu

cooperating with the FBI. &y b2 Ahh 57

Enclosure NQ CONTINUED = OVER
yr. ~ . ,
woC:emg/dsh Bmmnfimmtiomtislss— -
(9) 6 Serr tien
mee an eer
< ae <9) \

ats eee Boe ae ete

we, my al

pane nay

ww sbobllB Ga-s38h a4 Page 237

= N - .
° . @
4

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY '75

In this regard, in an exchange of letters dated
3/11 and 12/75, William Colby in his role as the Director
of Central Intelligence, wrote to Senator Church stating .
that "I am particularly appreciative of your recognition
that certain sensitive aspects of our intelligence activities
must receive special consideration and treatment by the Select
Committee in the course of your work. As we discussed, such
matters as the identities of our sensitive sources. ... «
should be protected not only from exposure, but indeed from
the risk of exposure. -We should also work together to protect
certain other information which, if improperly disclosed,
might impair the privacy rights of the individuals."

By letter dated 3/12/75, Senator Church stated as
follows, "It is the Committee's understanding that the members
of the Committee and designated staff will have access to any
or all information which the Committee deems necessary for its
inquiry. We recognize, however, that the Committee inquiry
may touch on sensitive areas, such as the identities of CIA
personnel, sources, or cooperating organizations whose
disclosure could place persons in actual jeopardy. In the
event that the Committee inquiry touches on such sensitive
areas, which matters we have already discussed in our meeting
of February 27, we should discuss jointly, and as you suggested
quickly, what procedures might be followed should the Committee
decide it requires more information in these specific areas."

The 6/30/75 SSC letter requests among other things,
a list of all police departments and personnel contacted
relative to a particular COINTELPRO operation; a list of all
media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and
the media affiliation.

The 7/1/75 SSC letter requests a list of all persons
outside the FBI (including, but not limited to, employees!
relatives, friendly media personnel, members of clergy,
federal, state and local law enforcement and other officials)
contacted in relation to four persons who were subjects of

CONTINUED ~ OVER

ew 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 235


aca

. @ o . .

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY '75

COINTELPRO opérations. This same letter also notes that one
Morris Starsky, one of the four persons referred to above,
was made known to the FBI during a conference on 6/12/75, as
@ person who would be the subject of a case study by the SSC,
This is not so. Inquiry was made of those Bureau supervisors
who attended the conference and a review of the memorandum
written following the conference was made. Neither the
memorandum nor the recollection of Bureau supervisors attending
the conferencé indicates the name Morris Starsky was mentioned
by SSC staff personnel.

The 7/8/75 SSC letter requests among other things:
(1) all memoranda and other materials which relate to a meeting
between the President and Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph,
Whitney Young, Mrs. Dorothy Haight, James Farmer and Jack
Greenberg on 11/19/64; (2) a copy of a November, 1964, telegram
from Dr, Martin Luther King, Jr., to Director Hoover and all
notes, memoranda, and any other materials reflecting the
disposition of, or actions taken as a result of the receipt
of, said telegram; (3) all memoranda and other materials which
relate to a meeting between the President and Dr. King on
2/9/65; (4) all other materials which relate to the transfer of
former Special Agent Robert C,. Nichols to the Oklahoma Office of
the FBI in June, 1969; (5) all forms and attachments including
forms entitled "Performance Rating Guide For Investigative
Personnel," from 1959 until retirement for former Special
Agents Robert C, Nichols and Alan Sentinella,

OBSERVATION :

It would appear the above-cited requests do, in fact,
violate the privacy of individuals and possibly place in jeopardy
the identity of persons who cooperated with the FBI. Consistent
with the agreement in the exchange of letters between Colby and
Church dated 3/11 and 12/75, it is believed the Director should
raise these questions with the SSC and attempt to get relief
from the requirement of revealing the names of FBI sources or
violating the privacy of individuals. Certainly the request for .
information on former Special Agents Nichols and Sentinella goes
to the heart of the privacy issue and appears to be a blatant
disregard for their privacy.

ACTION CONTINUED - OVER

NW 86296 Dochd:32589624 Page 239


Memorandum to Mr, W. RB, Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY '75

ACTION:

If approved, the attached letter to the Attorney
General will be sent advising him of the Director's intention
to raise these issues with the SSC on the occasion of his
appearance with the Attorney General during the week of
7/14/75.

Wy ar

Que

| NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page #40 .

~~

TO

FROM

SUBJECT:

: The Attorney General

NW 88296. Wocld:32989624

.

-prTlgnaL ror NO. 10
MAY 1662 EDITIQN
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-116

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Memorandum

DATE: July 15, 1975

+ Director, FBI

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIE&S :

By letter dated July 9, 1975, Senators Frank Church
and John Tower requested our appearance in Executive Session
before the Senate Select Committee to discuss matters of
concern to me and steps which might be taken to expedite
responses to requests for documents essential to the
Committee's inquiry.

It is my intention to/raise the question of privacy

Committee dated June 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which are
in the possession of Mr. O'Gonnor, the Committee appears to
disregard the rights of cerfain individuals' privacy, going
so far as to ask for copies of the annual performance ratings
of certain former Special/Agents of the FBI,

it is my intextion to request the Committee to
relieve the FBI from the obligation of violating the
privacy rights .of indjwiduals or placing in jeopardy
the identities of cooperating sources of this Bureau,

1 - The Deputy Attérney General
Attention: William O'Connor
pecial Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

of\' Me
oth Zs
F 9 aM Raseee | ry
: eo
wih 19 ee a
Bay sis
es

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
Page 241


The Attorney General 15, 1975

i : 1 - Mr, W. 8,
Director, FBI llimere
1 = Mr. R, Ie

U. S. SENATE SELaCT coumrrrm: 1 - Me. W.

ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By letter dated July 9, 1975, Aenators Frank Church
and dohn Tower requested our appsaranc¢ in Executive Session
before the Senate Select Comittee to/diseuss matters of
concern to me and steps which might Ae taken to expedite
responses to requests for documents’ essential to the
Committee's inquiry.

It is my intention to /raise the question of privacy
as well as the protection of sgurces at this forthcoming
mecting. In the most recent vequests of the Senate Select
Comnittee dated dune 30 and July 8, 1975, copies of which ave
in the possession of Mr. O'Qonnor, the Committee appears to
disregard the rights of cevtain individuals! privacy, going
so far as to ask for copicss of the annual performance ratings
of certain former Special/ Agents of the FBE,

relieve the FBI from tHe obligation of violating the
privacy rights of individuals or placing in jeopardy

the identities of c erating sources of this wy Ge

£t is my intepwtion to request the Committee to a

1 ~ The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K./ William O'Connor U
' y Special Counsel for

Vv Intelligence Coordination

Dep. AD Adm. — ‘ . *

mesure een yi oN \
tin \\ \ fe
Ext, Atoire _ NOTE: a * A .
Files & Cone — _ ‘See W. 0. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall memorandum
he dated 7/11/75, captioned "SENSTUDY '75," prepared by

Inspection woc : eng/dsh .

Intell, ( uh

aboratory —_—.

fan. & Eval, i S
pec. Inv,
raining Vv —
at Coun, —___— g
lephone Rm. — ‘
etorSec'y MAIL ROOM(L_] TELETYPE unIT (LJ

882965 Docid:32989624 Page 242

GPO 955.546


4-812 (Rev, 12-11-73) é

Date of Mail _ 6/14/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL IDY 75

Removed By

File Number _. Ss 62. -116395-463

Permanent Serial Charge Out

iy
woth Gee
qos Oh al
_ pacrge 2 wld
paTs_l

ZOAUG 41975

boJ/ FBI


Assoc. Din WW if
Dep-A.D-Adu.—
} Dep-A.D-Inv.— jf
} Asst. Dir: B:
4 Admin. FE
# Comp. Syst. —— bh
4 xt. Affaira —— f
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv. .....——
Ident. . 0.0 t
Inspection ..—— f

pean ge me RTT

Lu Ck ayer wat 8 S SCCTION
bite. om |

‘ . AUS 1 GETS
‘ é f
i) Ded os, ‘|
> sae oui .! i: “he . 4
x , ye fee a = 4 Laboratory ...

- Pldn. & Eval. ‘
4 Spec Inv. .... f
¢ Sratning ...-—.f
4 Legal Coun. ..—.. ff
Telephone Rm. ... |
‘ Director See’y —..

NR_961 SF CODE °
19:56 AM URGENT 6/16/75 MCC
70 DIRECTOR (62-1 16395)

“FROM SAN VRANCTSCO (62-6887)

| ATE a ORBEAR, INTD
Ly
( SENSTUDY 75, oe

RE SACRAMENTO “Tegtes stow ogre

he Sist Sdeias4b8o624 Page 244 - |


24

paneccreremeceneattn es
Assoc. Dir. -———~ |

Dep-A.D.~-Adm.—

Dep-- -A.D-Inv.—— \

Asst. Dir.: :

Admin. -.--—-——"" \
Comp. Syst. —— |

a ee 2

- NR 615 WF CODED Any, pxt, Affairs —)

oe Files & Gom — |
\ ga PM NITEL JUNE 16, 1975 WWC ee Go
Mo: DIRECTOR, FBI (62=116395) ne UME
4 Leboratty ———
} FROM: SACS WFO (62=19744) (P)

plon. & Eval. —%
Spee. Inv. —-—"
Yraining ———"
Legal Coun. -——-— |
Telephone ae -
Director ey

W e 0 e CREGAR .

| REFERENCE BUREAU TELETYPE DATED JUNE 13, 1975. \

BASED ON INFORMATION CONTAINED IN REFERENCED TELETYPE
, WFO IS UNABLE TO_LOCATE ANY INFORMAT

N REGARDING ELECTRONIC
. . 4
SURVEILLANCE OF DR. MARTIN LUTHERAKING , JR. DURING PERIOD

INDICATED IN REFERENCED . COMMUNICATION.

ay

END. a
| ; , bn
NYAS
z RE Ue chin
Q a8 A a
rege MG

plele- “e8. ne
See od

64 Aue4 1970.

NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 245


Admin. .———-
tl? UE STICATION Comp. Syst. ——
wie ee meryings ( Txt. Affairs —~
CABYS SECTION Files & Com. ——
Gen. Inv. -—--——

emenegesesnsernilartesit hist SORES TETES
. Assoe. Dir, ————
@ @ rm Dep-A.D- Adm —
. 4 Dep-A.D-Inv.——
Le P Asst. Dir:
2 PAV nh we
ul NR‘6G1 SC CODE 1 ORS Tnspection —
: ai Leen Sntell, ere
19:30 aM URGENT 6416/15 VS vel Pe BE eee Bea
Plan. & Bval.
_ Inv. =
TO . DIRECTOR ¢69~116395) Toaiaing
; oo ” fi Legal Coun.
J Telephone Rm.
Director Sec’y —

“Wh. Le

S/23 JEM

_ SEHSTUDY 75.

al
“ae BUREAU TEL TO DETROIT, JUNE 13, 1975.

: REVIEW OF SACRAMENTO INDICES REFLECTS NO INFO RE ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE » APRIL 23924, 1964, SENATOR HOTEL, SACRAMENTO, CALIF «
SACRAMENTO DIVISION ESTABLISHED 1967. ca

FOR INFO SAN FRANCISCO, RETEL STATED IN CONNECTION wit SENATE

SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST, FOLLOWING DATA REQUESTED BY RETURN TELETYPE

ATTN: INTD - W. 0. CREGAR: Vr
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANSE INDICES AT FBIHQ DO NOT inDICATE ‘OVER a

HEARS ON KNOWN TECHNICAL INSTALLATIONS ON MARTIN LUTHER /KING ’ IRs
FOR ABOVE DATE AND LOCATION.

1 -
SAW FRANCISCO REVIEY ELSURE INDICES AND FURNISH FB IHa FIRST DATE
XING OVERHEARD ON ABOVE TECHNICAL INSTALLATION. IF HE WAS NOT iG 0
HEARD, SO ADVISE. gp l Qu i We 8 39 a
END
_ VES FRIHG CLR cost ey: ? We 80 1975 |
cane ue af Ape ald sea TNR Sea
me ‘ ‘j1p}00 oes BRE we
| URE
84 AUG4 1975 =

, NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 246 Somme


4.312 (Rev. 12-11-78) @ @

Date of Mail 6/16/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority. | m5

Subject JUNE MAIL op 75

Removed By 7OAUG 41975

File Number ______—<¥62-116395-459

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/ FBI

NW 88296 Dochd:32969024 Page #47

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
(@ “RAY 1962 EDITION
¥ . GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Assoc. Dire —__
Dep. AD Adm. _
ep. AD Inv. __
Memorandum core
Admin,
Comp. Syst.
TO DATE: Ext. Affairs —_
j Mr. Clev : July 21, 1975 Files & Com.
Gen, Inv.
~ ent. Z
PROM; Fi arniogf
} : : R. Jd. McCa Pe Intell
" Laboratory
Plan. & Eva
y, SUBJECT: UNITED STATES SENATE,SELECT.COMMETTEE = Tetning. ZS
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH Legal Coun
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ce eae ect

Director Sec’y __

—

| Reference is made to the Attorney General's letter, bhay
| July 16, 1975, captioned as above, requesting information : fi
| relating to the collection, analysis, use, and dissemination

of organized crime intelligence,

On June 25, 1974, the Director testified before
the FBI Oversight Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary -
Committee that the Bureau has "no statutory authority to
collect intelligence per se" but that it operates under the
general umbrella of 28 U.S.C. 533 (3), which authorizes the
Attorney General to appoint officials "to conduct...investiga-
tions regarding official matters...as may be directed by the
Attorney General." A listing of any directives issued by
the Department or the Attorney General with respect to organized
crime should be available in the office of the Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division, Department of Justice.

With respect to the FBI, all our investigations in
the organized crime field are aimed os one ultimate objective:
prosecttion.

ol
gy labios vb l Aaa
During the course of our i sti ion of individual
hoodlums and the various criminal syndicates operating through-

out the United States, we naturally acquire considerable data
regarding the structure of the organized underworld, the
identities of its principal leaders, the extent of its in-
fluence, its primary sources of income, its payoffs to corrupt
officials, and the operations of its vast communteattons—retworks.

Mr. Wannall

Mr. S. F. Phillips
Mr. Cleveland

Mr. McCarthy

Mr. McHale

9 AUG 4 sly

et fet fet et pa
Prag

«
JEM: bkh ge
(6). 3° nv oe ;

Rnseahbio Berd osoez4 Page 248

Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland

Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities

Most of this information is obtained from paid
informants, from other law enforcement officers, from alert
citizens, and from court-approved electronic surveillances
installed under the provisions of Title III of the Omnibus
‘Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968.

None of it, however, is intelligence for intelligence's
sake. The experience of the FBI over the years has shown that
criminal syndicates exist for the sole purpose of conducting
illegal operations and that anyone belonging to them may
reasonably be presumed to be engaged in one or more of these
activities. Therefore, our investigations of the organized
underworid are not aimed at developing general nonspecific
data but at establishing which criminal violations its members
are engaged in and then proving these violations in a court
of law.

Obviously, not every case opened, every lead followed,
or every bit of information received is going to wind up in
Federal court. On the contrary, much of this material relates
to offenses outside the investigative jurisdiction of the
FBI. When such is the case, we immediately disseminate the
inférmation.” to the appropriate Federal, state, or local agency.
As a result, information uncovered by the FBI during the past
five years alone has enabied the recipient agencies to make
more than 17,000 organized crime arrests; confiscate over
$151,000,000 worth of illicit drugs and narcotics, $9,000,000
worth of cash, property, weapons, and wagering paraphernalia,
and- $6,000,000 worth of counterfeit bills; and assess tax
liens against $19,000,000 worth of property arising out of
Federal gambling cases.

in addition, a considerable portion of the organized
crime intelligence information developed by the FBI is for-
warded to the various Federal Strike Forces coordinating
racket investigations throughout the country and to the
Criminal Division of the Department, which has entered this
information in its computerized data bank called “Racketéer
Profile.*

Don

NW 88296 Docid:32989624 Page #49


Memorandum to Mr. Cleveland

Re: United States Senate Select Committee
To Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities

RECOMMENDATION:

' That, upon approval, this memorandum be routed to
Supervisor 8. F. Phillips, of the Intelligence Division,
‘who is coordinating the Bureau's reply to the Attorney

General's inquiry.
wre tt “a

AL

-3-

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 250 |


4-812 (Rev. 12-11-78) 6 é

Date of Mail 7/28/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

6 wi?
<3
See File 66-2554-7530 for authority. a cr IN Fok

tA

10
Abt INFORM AsStF

mes
mw loo

Subject JUNE MAIL gs 75

Removed By AUG 41975 |

File Number ____62-116395-457

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/ FBI

NW 85296 Dochd:32989024 Page 231 |


« e

URGENT ‘

1- . Mi
1- Aral ai EDERAL BURCAU OF R/BRATR,
_ 1 -.Mr. Cregar OMMUNICATIONS SECTION
5 ; i - Mr. Hotis
K - Mr. Daly ; M
j | hen OM
T E
: RE BUREAU TELEPHONE CALL TO LOUISVILLE, 9/24/75.
\
THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE HAS REQUESTED THAT
SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE STANLEY S._ CZARNECKI OF THE
LOUISVILLE OFFICE BE MADE AVAILABLE FOR INTERVIEW CON-
CERNING HiS KNOWLEDGE OF THE BUREAU'S INVESTIGATION OF
KEY ACTIVISTS - NEW LEFT, THIS WILL BE A STAFF merenE 694 :
ee CONDUCTED BY STAFF MEMBER JOHN SMITH. SMITH REQUESTED > —s
@ é oe THAT THE INTERVIEW TAKE PLACE IN LOUISVILLE ON FRIDAY,
oa
Se EQ 9/26/75, IF POSSIBLE.
wa
be ae SAC CZARNECKI SHOULD TELEPHONICALLY CONTACT LEGAL
wae
cea wre ccm ee a vk 9
-— HE3B9S-
J BRIEFED CONCERNING THE INTER zr x
o ee
e APPROPRIATE | M THE INTELLIGENCE al |
r ber 1. 1975
Agece. Dir. é Personnel File - . Stanley S. Czarnecki ees EEE eee,
ben pmb’ NOTE: John Smith, Senate Select Committee staff member, requested the
nl interview of SAC Czarnecki concerning the Bureau's investigation of Key
Comp, Srats — Activists - NéwWELeft:: ;This communication will serve as approval for the

waiver of the ekistingtémployee agreement signed hy SAC Czarnecki,
ferenced telephone call alerted SAC Czarnecki.

dent. we .
tnepecilon . in t 7 ji L- te . p
Intell. * :
Laboratory . ( . f f'-
” Plan. & Evol. - ( re .
Spec. Inv. _f’ ’ daly

FE Tat Re Sec” =p ose B, jee UNIT
iW BE age 25.

Files & Com. __

AS i~

¥ “p 4


ED ER EERE ON

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 ”
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPR (41 CFR 108—11.8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Ml} Memorandum

Nee
» : Mr. J. B. Adams

Ext. Affairs

WZ, 7-24-75 Files & Com.

Gen. Inv.
dente

Ins pe
Inkg
Laborator
Legal nonhl ae
Plon. & aie

Spec. Inv.

Troining

cae ee ' Telephone Rm. —

Pursuant to a request from SA Thomas J. MecNiff Director Secty
SA Daly of this Division contacted Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special
Counsel for Intelligence Coordination for the Department, on 7-22-75
concerning the current policy regarding excisions which may econanty Le
be made on documents being furnished to the Senate Select Committee
for their review in Bureau space and the policy concerning notes being

8 taken during the Committee staffers review of such materials.

E

Shaheen stated that there is no agreement currently in

B operation concerning excisions, however, he felt that excisions should VY)
be properly restricted to the protection of sources, sensitive techniques
nN a

mons E

Aly THPORATION COUTAT NED

ev RTSIN £5

i
BAY

an or methods concerning sensitive ongoing operations. He noted that this

et} is in general conformity. with the proposed agreement concerning this matter
3 ki which was being reviewed at the White House. Regarding the question

4 d raised concerning the taking of notes, Shahe®n indicated that the proposed

ey new agreement allowed for the taking of notes on these documents which

notes may be taken to the Senate Select Committee offices. In fact,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, K. William O'Connor, who
was present during this discussion pointed out it was the intent of the
aforementioned proposed agreement that “screened documents” may be
removed by the Committee staff members to the Senate Select Committee
offices. With this in mind, Shaheen stated we should allow the staff =L5
members to take notes and remove same to their tees (prtucl, wl Ace Aen ae

Lele fe)

mt
wh abt

SA McNiff was orally advised of the wits of thigye & 1978

conversation. Aa.
eon patti ea
RECOMMENDATION: \ WP)
4 n ‘P

For information.

Oo A
; yy LY oo
1 - Mr. Wannall (| a”
1 -Mr. Cregar \ py
1 - Mr. Mintz Hf Run _o

1 - Mr. Hotis eS)

1-Mr. Daly
DN igh (7)
we #3 hoeld:32980624 BELL ah, Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

~
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 $010-106
AY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
Assoc. Dir.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT e208: Di
M, d SECRET Dep. AD lav.
1 - Mr. W.R, Wannall Asst, Dir:
emoranaum 1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford #"
Ext. Affairs —_
TO oo: Mr, WR. vannaiis / DATE: July 29, 1975 Filer & Com —
dent.
( } ‘ if 1 - Mr. W.O. Cregar sr)
\/FROM =: J.W. Redfield pe 1 - Mr. W.A, Branigan iat —
\ } aay _ 1 ” Mr. JW. Redfield Legal Conn
7? : , ; Ta 1 _ Mr. J.F.. McGuire Plan. & Eval.
i. ». Spec. Inv.
SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75 \ Spee In

wm Telephone Rm. —_
Deena ode
. Director Sec’y __

PURPOSE:

To comment on items extracted from a 693-page (y fs
document prepared by CIA citing certain instances wherein | A
CIA believes its activities may have exceeded its legal

mandate,

BACKGROUND:

Memorandum W.O. Cregar to Mr. W.R. Wannall, dated
7/24/75, captioned as above, described the above-mentioned.
CIA document and requested a review of certain items
mentioned therein in order to fully identify the subject
matter thereof and to assess whether same may involve any '
compromise of FBI counterintelligence operations.

CIA item captioned "Antlers," relates tha CIA
arranged to move a sensitive defector out of a European
country by commercial transportation and gained entry into a
the U.S. without leaving any trace of the defector's true
identity. FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information
concerning the word "Antiers,'" in the context described by
CIA. More than likely, "Antlers" is a CIA in-house code word
used for the handling of a valuable and sensitive defector
source, While we have no information relative to "Antiers,”
it is noted that we do have access currently to two CIA
defector sources respectively code named TORTIS and TUMBLE,
both of whom were Romanian Intelligence Service (RIS) officers
whose whereabouts have been carefully concealed as both of
these defectors are targets of the RIS. Specifically, the RIS .
has indicated a desire to kidnap and/or kill the two defectors
mentioned herein, It is possible the CIA item referred to as
"Antlers" may relate to either TORTIS or TUMBLE. It is firmly £5
believed that public disclosure of the CIA ite ntapas 77,7 4A.
beyond that described in the attachment to W.0o” Gregari.s << ¢*.
memorandum of 7/24/75, could adversely affect the safety and’ Sx
security of TORTIS or TUMBLE, if in fact, either oneBisaihes ,
defector described in the CIA item. Lege e 978

62~116395 SECRET Sas

JFM:bew Classified by 2721 CONTINUED - OVER - AN
(7) \e Exempt from GDS, Categories 2, 3 and 4

Date of Declassification Indefinite

ennai

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Givi cAbG DocilQTkps0624 Page 254


SECRET

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY 75
62~-116395

CIA item described as Project WESTPOINTER apparently
invoived the examination of mail to the U.S. from Mainland
China during certain specific months of 1969, 1970 and 1971.
CIA indicated that Project WESTPOINTER was similar to Project
SRPOINTER, FBIHQ COMMENT: Our files contain no information
concerning Project WESTPOINTER. Memorandum from Acting
Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, dated 4/1/75,
captioned “Jane Fonda v. L. Patrick Gray, et al.; Civil Action
No. 73-2442-MML (C.D. Cal.)," describes a CIA covert operation
known as SRPOINTER which involved examination of mail to and
from the Soviet Union which was discontinued in 2/73,
Apparently, CIA had examined certain mail addressed to Jane
Fonda in connection with its SRPOINTER activity. While we
were not aware of CIA's Project WESTPOINTER, it is noted that
this Bureau did periodically examine mail coming from the
People's Republic of China (PRC) and Hong Kong to the U.S.
and mail from the U.S. to the PRC and Hong Kong during the
period 1956-1966, This activity, which was permanently dis-
continued 1/24/66, was carried under the code names CHIPROP
and CHICLET. Public disclosure of the CIA item referred to
above as Project WESTPOINTER might lead to a more detailed
public examination of this Bureau's periodic control of mail
in the CHIPROP and CHICLET operations.

ACTION:
For information in connection with Senstudy 75,

as K AE ao

eur

SECRET
-~2-

NW 85296 Docid:32989624 Page #55


DCI/IC-75-0126
23 July 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of the USIB Ad Hoc
; _ Coordinating Group

SUBJECT: Key Word’ ter Central Indexing
: oO me

Dene hy -75~ \

. * ~~, “
Future key wor ding 6finformation furnished to-the

' Community Central Index should include names of Agencies.
These will be helpful in identifying information in the
material which relates to another Agency's activities.

\
¥
YL
ae | | 7D
{ | | Deda hewn >
; Harriett Mowitt

Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

=

| oo eu
pegs Yo -l/ bP 9S 14
® aus ts |
ne

/

aa ae
J jet
LY"

wi AnbUG ra dMBso Page 256


Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspect?
Intell.
Laboratory —_—
Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm. —

nf ee

. .8 8
~~ 8 " Me. J. B. Adams

Me: H. N. Bassett
-~ Me. J. A. Mintz
(L - Me. J. B. Hotis)

The Attorney General Joly 22, 1975

1 - Me. W. R. Wannall

Divector, FBI 1 - Mr. W. 0. Cregar
pos O 1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

Nt Be
ft

TITED STATES SENATE. SELECT CONMITTEE ao ©
OW INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (Sscy ~~ o RK =
acne arenes sete, 5

x c :
8 fox
®

Reference is made to a letter from the SSC dated

May 14, 1975, with attached appendices A thru D requesting YO
certain documents and other information from the FBI. a *

Attached for your approval and forwarding to Ve. V8
SSC is the original of a memorandum which responds in part :~ .

3 Xi to one of the requests contained in above SSC letter. KG
“ey ; } ~ .
Bm A copy of the memorandum is being furnished for as
RE rit - your records. nM
Bt! av
Xs Ay _ 2S.
Na 8;  Enelosures (2) ae Sot:
Rosy) 62-116395
8 oe. a
1 ~ The Deputy Attorney General wy rr
Attention: K,. William O'Gomnor ~~ af
Special Counsel for ly oa -/ f foo} at
Intelligence Coordination -—--—— — gg >
\,
C' aprztnp [hb 2 AUG -& [ui wd
(11) lamest: emma ETO s
a ; > ‘|
Assoc. Dir. —__. 4
Dep. AD Adm. — 4 p
pene Bins \7 7 ae yw oY von
ine — 9. BNI CLOSURE Ny
Ext. Affairs __ f  ~) * . } :
Files & Com. aw

Cx ih « 4P?

ry ;
y \ A h ( AK
ROOM ELETYPE UNIT (__} GPO : 1975 © - 569-920 ‘

fd:3. #4 Page #5f


EE = aa — + ——

- vin @ B. Adams

~ Mr. H. N. Bassett
~ Me. J. A. Mintz

(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

62-116395 Jaly 22, 1975
1 - Me, W. 0. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Thomas

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE To
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WETH
RESPECT FO LYTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

t
ay
%

NO et Re

‘RE: FURTHER nocuMmiTs PreTaTme
TO THE FBI AND DEPARTMENT oF oie 5
JUSTICE Deana

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 4 “Sly. S

Reference is made to letter, with attached
appendices, dated May 14, 1975, to the Attorney General
from the Chairman of captioned Committee, requesting certain
documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI).

Appendix B, Item I, Mumber 5 of referenced
appendices requested this Bureau to provide Committee Staff
access to annual inspection reports and related surveys for
the past ten years with respect to the following PBI field
offices: Vew York City; Chicago; San Francisco; Les Angeles;
San Diego: Sacramento; Springfield, Illinois; Buffaloe;
Atlanta; and Columbia, South Carolina; “umber 6 requested

-_ this Bureau to provide the annual inspection reports and
7s velated surveys for the past ten years pertaining to the FDI
Intelligence Division.

Agsoc. Dir,

CA hen St a conference held on May 30, 1975, betveen
Asst Dire Messrs. John T, ELLI£f and Mark Gitenstein of the Senate
Com. san, S@LEct Committee; Mr. K. William O'Cennor of the Pepartment
Est. AMfois of Justice; and Messrs. William 9. Cregar and Elmer 1.

'~ Larson of the FBI, it was agreed, in response to above request,
that this Bureau vould make available to appropriate personnel
of the SSC State, for review at FRING, copies of the roperts

Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory

Plan, & Eval. _ JPT: thb

Spec. Inv. 0 are

Training (10) Le 3 (‘Cs
ah

Legal Coun,

yy
Telephone Rm, —

/ ¢

. ee Z
Direetor Sec'y_. © MAIL ROOML__] TELETYPE UNIT[[_] Iy i aa ~ Moo a
NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 258 LOSURE, g 2 -/ / .


Ra: Further Documents Pertaining to
the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procadurasg

of the tywo inspections conducted of the Domestic Intelligence
Division, PBI Headquarters, during 1971, and of the
inspection of the San Franeisco Field Office o€ the FBI
during Oetober, 1970.

Pertinent documents, believed responsive to abova
agyreoment, ate now ready for review at FBI Headquarters by
apprepriate persormel of the SSC Staff. You will note that
portions of the San Francisco inspection report which relate
solely to investigations of criminal matters, with no
security ramifications, have been eliminated from the report.
Should the S5¢ deem such material pertinent te its mandate,
however, it can be made available for review by the SSC Staff,
wpon weitten request,

1 - The Attorney General

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 259


ee at

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C, 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

gs em epor eq 1-22-75
Oe. Seni e S deleat ‘Comnlit ise 0 ant y Governm Opér—

Caption of Document: ations. Re: Further Documents Portain-

* ing to the FBI and Dept. of Justice. Policies and Pro-

cedures, 5-14-75 request Appendix B, ItemI, #5.

Originating Ara
hi-fi
Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI
SA hE OT RO TN NTO RERNN al gE TS OM om wee oe

Delivered by:

Received by:

arnk\e
ponte SD, 16
nuh ai 38 ics By S
wi wee
ps at

ENCLOSURE (22, pee g IS

NW 50296 Docid:32909624 Page 260


e : BF: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE
; Sad CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE BEFORE COMPLETING.

,
“ ”

TO: Intelligence Community Staff FROM:
ATIN: Central Index

FEE

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (check appropriate term. If a document was made available 2. DATE PROVIDED

for review but not transmitted, so note.)

RL vocoment | —[omerine [[vwrervien| [testimony [[orwes | 7/29/75

FOR REVIEW

+ TO WHOM PROVIDED (check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)

« IDENTIFICATION (provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer,
interviewee, testifier and subject)

Henoranduin

. IN RESPONSE TO (list date and item number if in response to formal request, other- . CLASSIFICATION OF
wise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.) INFORMATION (enter
u, ¢, S, TS or

S30 Letter 5/14/75, Appendix 8, Teen 7, £5 Codewor®)

. KEY WORDS (enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not Listed are
used underline for emphasis)

Qberating procedures

. SUMMARY (See reverse side before completing this item)

Made available to appropriate personnel of the SSC

Staff, for ravlew at FRIRQ, coples of the reports of

the two inspections aenducted of the Domastic Intelligence
DMvision, PBL Readgsarters, during 1971, and of the
inspection of the San Franciace Field Office of the PBE
during Ontobex, LO7O

62+116395

PMR: fic
(4) ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX
IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75

TREAT AS WELUOW

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE
3791 (6.75)

ENCLOSURE (9 [Ze 3 Z5

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 261


INSTRUCTIONS

® Type or print clearly in ink.
e Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
e Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required,

e "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the
information.

e If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to
HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a
copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing
substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community
matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests
should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be
noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here,
e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether
interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript
is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional
pages may be attached if necessary.

~, ~ oy ‘
‘~ ‘
cs

NW 88296 Docid:37989624 Page 262


i ‘ ™ ‘ ” . " Assoc. Dir.
” My / 6 VEDERAL £5 64 é aYtSTIGATION é Dep- AD- dma —
. y COMMUNICATICNS SECTION Doped

done
Admin.

‘ ll oy 1 Or, ae Gasp. Syst.
i ° t. irs
006 SE CODED . < xt. Attia =

Gen, Inv.

4:50 PM NITEL 7/21/75 SLA TELETYPE f Wdent.
. : : Inspretio pi

Tnietl. (OK,

Lavoratory {
\ \ Plan. & Eval, __
, Spec Inv.
t , Troining 2.
\ ; Legal Coun.
Teleghone Rm. _

T1973. 0 | | -!
y DAL
FORMER EMPLOYEES LEROY W. SHEETS NO LONGER MAINTAINS RESIDE
AY MARYSVILLE, ‘WASHINGTON, JHE-HAS PURCHASED AN AIRSTREAM TRAILER \
1
AND ON JUNE 10, 1975), HE AND HIS WIFE LERT THE AREA FOR AN | NK
EXTENDED FOUR-NONTHS CROSSCOUNTRY TRIP, PRIOR TO LEAVING, sHeeTs “jy 4h ll
ADVISED SRA JOHN Es. CONNOR, EVERETT, WASHINGTON, THAT HE WOULD BE oy | :
,
\,

TRAVELING CONT 1NUOUSLY QNTIL MID-OCTOBER, 1975, WHEN HE WOULD RETURN) af

At
{ y
TO THE MARYSVILLE, wasHiNneToN AREA. CURRENT LOCATION OF SHEETS IS Kon

eo

UNKNOWN. . . a . iy
. J
SHEETS 1s BELIEVED TO STILL HAVE A MARRIED STEPDAUGHTER, “NAME
UNKNOWN, IN THE MARYSVILLE, WASHINGTON AREA. SHE MAY HAVE. ‘AN
ITINERARY FOR. SHEETS THAT COULD. LOCATE HIM FOR A POSSIBLE INTERVIEW.
IF BUREAU DESIRES HER CONTACTED, A REVIEW OF PERSONNEL FILE OF |

SHEETS AT HEADQUARTERS SHOULD PROVIDE HER NAME AND ADDRESS.

END Reg |
=e Lo- Mt 3 m2
ge a) ih ly
a :
rE b
ag cl yi“ an cara ae eo
eb Sapo ue
DAM.

idee (bh4ctd-38889624 Page 263

~ 8 s

1 - ir. d. B. Adans

CODE TELETYPE HITEL
3 ~~ Mr, Jd ° A, Mintz
TO SACS ere ANGELES JULY 30, 1975
SAN DIEGO °
a SAN FRANCISCO . (1 - Mr. Hotis)

Mr, E, W. Waish
My. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. 0. Cregar
Mr. S. F. Phillips

FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
REBUTEL MAY 2, 1975.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC) STAFF MEMBER LESTER SEIDEL
HAS FURNISHED THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR INTERVIEWS
IN YOUN OFFICE: SAN DIEGO 7-30-75 SAS EARL M. PETERSEN,
LAWRENCE F, WIRICK; LOS ANGELES §-5~75 WALLACE E. WARD, RICHARD
A. BLOESER, 8-7~75 ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROBERT E. GEBHARDT; SAN
FRANCISCO 8-11-75 LEO S, DREWNEISEN, 8/11-12/75 SAC CHARLES W.
‘ BATES. PURPOSE OF INTERVIEW IS TO BE COINTELPRO AND BUREAU ~~
>’ INVESTIGATION OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. ADDITIONALLY SAC

Pitt

~~

He Bee

co

WEES wS

a

. cae wos
seta oy
Fuge

S0PY RETAINED IW
PERSONNEL RECORDS’ vari

Bl

BATES WILL BE INTERVIEWED CONCERNING KNOWLEDGE OF "ROUSTON PLAN”
at Y SSC STAFF MEMBER LOCiI ‘JOUNSON,

CINE I HAVE WAIVED YOUR EMPLOYINENT AGREEMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF

ay THESE INTERVIEWS. EACH SHOULD NOTE THAT HE HAS THE RIGHT TO

COUNSEL; HOWEVER, TOE ERI IS UNABLE TO PROVIDE PRIVATE COUNSEL.

{HERE ARE CERTAIN PRIVILEGED ARBAS CONCERNING WHICH SAS WOULD ]/ £ Hd!

Me OD adm Riese fo w foils Eh oe.

Dep. AD Inv. —

sst. Dir: ’

“nie PVD/SFP:njervic © AUG 4 1975
Comp. Sy (1.0) v2 ‘SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

Fie kcow ee Pee Se
Gen. Inv. _

went: TEDERAL BURLAU Oh iVESTIGATION . are io
el COMMUNICATIONS SECTION | Q,/

Laboratory : a - P ,
Plon. & Eval. — . ” a
nas 01975": yp” (7 wre,
Spec: JUL 3 wr Af ae C

Legal Coun. ey ee vag Ae] eur Ay
Telephone Rm. se
goiekis Direcror See? "E _ = [fui an TELETYPE UNIT ca (! :
24

GPO 7 O° fo9-02¢
Page 264 C5 o


, NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 265

PAGE TWO 62-116395

NOT BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER QUESTIONS. AREAS CONCERN INFORMATION
WHICH MIGHT DIVULGE IDENTITIES OF FBI SOURCES; INFORMATION
RELATING TO SENSITIVE METHODS AND TECHNIQUES; INFORMATION WHICH
MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT ONGOING FDI INVESTIGATIONS; AND INFORMA~
TION WHICH ORIGINATED WITH OTHER AGENCIES, INCLUDING FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES.

SAN FRANCISCO NOTE RELEASE ALSO APPLIES TO FORMER SAS
ALBERT P. CLARK AND WILLIAM A, COHENDET WHO, ALONG WITT OTHER
EX-SAS ON WEST COAST, MAY ALSO BE INTERVIEWED, CLARK AND COHENDET
HAVE ALREADY RECEIVED FOREGOING ADVICE REGARDING PRIVATE COUNSEL
AND PRIVILEGED AREAS AND HAVE ASKED FOR CONSULTATION ASSISTANCE
WHICH BUREAU IS APPROVING AS BELOW.

NORMALLY, FBIHQ WOULD SUPPLY REPRESENTATIVE TO BE ON-THE-
SCENE FOR CONSULTATION PURPOSES. HOWEVER, DISTANCE AND TIME
SCOPE MAKES THIS NOT FEASIBLE IN THIS INSTANCE,

{TUE RANKING FBI OFFICIAL IN EACH OFFICE WILL SERVE FoR
CONSULTATION PURPOSES. IN HIS ABSENCE, AN SAC IN LOS ANGELES OR
ASAC IN SAN DIEGO AND SAN FRANCISCO MAY SO SERVE. PURPOSE OF
CONSULTANT, WHO WILL NOT BE PRESENT AT INTERVIEW BUT AVAILABLE
NEARBY, WILL BE TO SUPPLY ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT PERSON BEING

~-2-


\

\ NW 68296 Docid:32969624 Page 266 -~3-

PAGE THREE 62~116395

INTERVIEWED IS ASKED QUESTIONS IN ONE OF THE PRIVILEGED AREAS
OR QUESTIONS OUTSIDE THE SPECIFIED PARAMETERS OF THE INTERVIEW
(COINTELPRO/BLACK PANTHER PARTY). SHOULD QUESTIONS ARISE WHICH
CONSULTANT REPRESENTATIVE CANNOT HANDLE, SUGGEST IMMEDIATE
TELEPHONE CALL TO LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION.

SHOULD ADDITIONAL FORMER SAS CONTACT YOUR OFFICE FOR ASSISTANCE,

COORDINATE WITH THEN WAIVER FROM EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT THROUGH
LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION AND FURNISH CONSULTATION SERVICES AS
REQUESTED.

" ‘NOTE THAN RANKING OFFICIAL SERVING IN CONSULTANT
POSITION DOES NOT REPRESENT THE PARTICULAR EMPLOYEE AS PRIVATE
COUNSEL. —

NOTE:

The referenced 5/2/75 teletype apprised all offices of
our cooperation with the SSC and furnished general background re
Bureau'’s servicing of its requests. Because of time element
relating te the first interview to take place in San Diego 7/30/75,
we are telephoning necessary instructions to that office. We
previcusly by teletype 7/9/75 advised current and former employees
on West Coast of SSC's intentions regarding these interviews. We
also previously released SAC Bates for purpose of interview re
Cointelpro/BPP and are now extending release to inchde interview
re "Houston Plan,” as requested by SSC Staff Member Johnson 7/25/75.

Former SAs Clark and Cohendet previously given necessary
advice by Legal Counsel Division as indicated above and offer
made for consultation services which they requested,


OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

MAY 1962 EDITION

GSA FPMR (41 CFR) TO1—11.6 es
ic.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT figs AD kde

Dep. AD Inv. —_

Asst. Dir.:
iva Memorandum ro
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs ——
MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 6/9/75 Files & Com, —
. |

Gen. Inv.
ee

Trai ning .

FROM . N, BASSETT

‘Gd. id - we.
SENSTUDY 75 >
ee

In response to a Senate Select Committee request for
guidelines utilized by the Inspection Division, memorandum

H. N, Bassett to W. R. Wannall dated 6/2/7 B, captioned as above,

noted there would be no objection to a review of the Handbooks

for Headquarters and field office inspections by Commitiee Staff
members provided the review was conducted in FBI space with an

Inspection Division representative present,

SUBJECT:

Telephone Rm. ——
Director Sec’y —__

On 7/8/75 Mr. Mark Gitenstein of the Select Committee Staff
reviewed the FBIHQ Inspection Manual in the presence of SA _
Fred B, Griffith, Mr. Gitenstein was specifically advised these
Manuals are used solely as guidelines for the Inspection Staff and
are not binding on anyone but staff members, They cannot be used
to document any deficiencies noted during an inspection. He was told
such action would have to be based on applicable provisions in either
& the Manual of Instructions or the Manual of Rules and Regulations, v

“et

During the review it was noted Mr. Gitenstein made notes regarding’.
the following Sections: a

<

ANT, TMP STON CONTA THO

OLS UNCLASSTVLED

28 fe/eloa BY.

1, Section 2 (Recording the Inspection Findings), pages 5 and 6
which deal with the assembly and distribution of inspection reports and
work papers.

MOLISE

2. Section 4 (Specific Division naar pages 4 and 5 which are
concerned with surveys and audits. EG

Kes

a

on
3. Section 8 (Inspector's Summaries), pages 1, 2 and 4 wikich seas

with the summary for the Director, the letter to the ee a
the Director and personnel write-ups,

boyea
peer 0)

6
Mr. Gitenstein stated he would return ata later date to neve 19.975
field manual, ee

ACTION: None. . . . for information. DQ / »
ACTION Lf S$

1- Messrs. Adams, Wannall, Cregar ( ue eum 4
ie ‘
Bu wy U. LS, Savings Bonds Regularly WB rol Savings Plan

5} 2gg9624


¥FMDR/E

{GE TIPSEMATION COUTALNEO

t
SUBJECT:

LEE.

bail

PZ:

u iS WICLASSIPLED
BY

eres

usa rele/o

ater

° is 1- Mr. Daly

Ident.
t Inspection
: Leg: Counseh fh — i “ig a
y * a

Bie
o-biactel: 3.

Perel FORM NO, 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 10%—13.6 q  ) A
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT s A ah “iy

veda

Memorandum ep

conn an
Ext. Mate —

: Mr. J. B. Adams pate: 7~%=75 Files & Com. —

Gen. inv.

SENSTUDY 75

* a ’ land& Eval, —
pa Spec. Inv.
4 Training :
Telephone Rm. —
Director Sec’y —~
*

By memorandum, 6-18-75, you were advised the
Department was considering preparing summaries of existing mat if it

of the so-called "Ki er 17" wiretaps to be furnished the Senate
Select Committéé (SSC). The Department was awaiting our approval
of this mode of response to the Committee. The referenced memorandum
recommended we advise the Department that we agreed on the preparation ay
of the summaries with the provision that we be allowed to review same

prior to the Department seeking Court approval for making them availab

to the Senate Select Committee, This recommendation was approved. y

Michael Shaheen, Deputy Special Counsel for intelligence”
Coordination in the Department, inquired of Special Agent Paul V. Daly
as to when the aforementioned summaries would be completed. He was
informed it was the Bureau's understanding the Department would prepare
the summaries. Mr. Shaheen, after consulting with K, William O'Connor,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, stated it was the Department's
desire that the Bureau prepare the summaries. He advised the Departmental
attorneys concerned with the litigation arising from these wiretaps will
review the summaries and seek Court approval prior to furnishing to the

Committee. REC-2 (om AY Co. isu - MY

RECOMMENDATION: 1é JUL 181975 i
Intelligence Division with the assistance of Legal Counsel——=
prepare the necessary summaries for forwarding to the Committee,

2

oo
f

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1- Mr. Mintz

1 - Mr. Hotis

1- Mr. Peterson

VD:kis (8) ;
Me py Us U.S, Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan \\
age 2


aes @ | @ - ee

CODE CABLEGRAM URGENT Pau
| ' 1-Legal Counsel Office .
(Atin: Mr. Daly), 1/23/75
7 TO LEGAT LONDON 1-Foreign Liaison. ,
. l-Mr. Cregar _,,” a
FROM DIRECTOR FBI 1-Mr. Helgeson

O senate spLxcr commrres
MARK GITENSTEIN, SENIOR STAFF MEMBER, SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE, WHICH IS CURRENTLY EXAMINING PRO-
CEDURES OF U.S. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, HAS ADVISED THAT

IST AND SUBVERSIVE INVESTIGATIONS. GITENSTEIN IS LEAVING

& THE COMMITTEE HAS EXPRESSED AN INTEREST IN HOW OTHER
~o

5] ‘ COUNTRIES HANDLE THEIR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS;
BSG:

o> “ THAT IS, THOSE INVESTIGATIONS ANALOGOUS TO OUR EXTREM-
a

yD.

FOR LONDON AUGUST SIX NEXT AND HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO
MEET WITH APPROPRIATE BRITISH OFFICIALS ANY TIME AUGUST

. #MDbR/ 6
tof Bo

ELEVEN OR TWELVE NEXT FOR A GENERAL BRIEFING IF THIS IS

x,

POSSIBLE, HE HAS NO OBJECTION TO LEGAT SITTING IN ON SUCH

BRIEFING.
yw GITENSTEIN'S REQUEST HAS BEEN DISCUSSED WITH/JOHN
; ©
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. — HER:enm
heeds (6) FEMCRAL BUREAU Ch iwesTieTion SEE NOTE PAGE TWO
Adin yn COMMUNICATIONS SECTION Ree agp aa g
Comp. Syst. —— [
Fn Com — duL a 91975 2 lv iK /. (e. OG t / ‘y- f
Inepccton Teeny CA x06! Am ~— er "
ell 19 JUL 31 1975
ere oan
gal Coun. —_ ;

Plan. & Eval. —
Spec. Inv. —___.
Training

/ wp cert AY
Telephone Rm. — OOM mm TELETYPE UNIT

° R
nF EAA ead Page 269 So


. © @ ,

CABLEGRAM TO LONDON
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

[PARKER, COUNSELOR, MI-5, WASHINGTON, WHO SUGGESTS
YOU CONTACT MI-5 LIAISON TO DETERMINE HOW THIS SHOULD
BE HANDLED, BUREAU SUGGESTS THAT IN ADDITION YOU. a
CONTACT SCOTLAND YARD IF YOU FEEL IT APPROPRIATE. |(S)

HANDLE AND SUCAB ARRANGEMENTS, ATTENTION:
HELGESON, INTD.

NOTE: Gitenstein made the above oral request to Inspector
Helgeson during a meeting 7/25/75. This is being
coordinated with Supervisor Paul Daly with the Office
of Legal Counsel.

cf

Nw 88296 Docid:32989624 Page 270

Be
PTIONAL FORM NO. 10
may 1962 EDIT! i

2 EDITION:
GSA FPMR (41 CER) 10T=913.8

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT Pagers ae
\ i Dep. AD Inv. L
w Asst. Dir:
<i Memorandum oa
Ext, Affaire _s
TO =: Mr. J. B. Adams ; DATE: 7/18/75 Gon be
c Iecnion aie
Intell. ex Vb
FROM : a oratory t
Legal comedif eee DE !)
Plan. & Eval. Le4f
Spee. Inv.
suBjecy\“gENATE-SELECT-COMMITTEE Tein
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Director Sosy —

ACCESS TO WITNESSES ’

At 11:40 a.m. on July 18, 1975, K. William O’Comnor,
Special Counsel in the Deputy Attorney General’s Office, telephonically
advised me that his negotiations with the Committee concerning more
restrictive limitations on Committee access to witnesses were not
successful. He said that the Department has determined that the
procedure in effect previously whereby the FBI Director would receive
a request for the availability of FRI personnel for interview and would
determine whether such personnel should be released from applicable
secrecy agreements would be reinstituted. —_——_
ee
Iasked Mr. O’Connor whether this meant that the Department
no longer regarded all requests for interview of present or former employees
as "demand" situations requiring the specific authorization of the Department
as if a subpoena had been issued. Mr. O’Connor said that the Department
[rake not consider such requests in that manner and that the FBI should

Su

FNOR| 6
Bi

ALY USPORMATION ORES!

make all determinations necessary for the appearance of witnesses for
interview.

IX

REC-36
RECOMMENDATION: FX-108 yo WEBI ie,
° 4) C7 et fs

For information. We will continue to discuss requests for
interview with individuals named by the Committge.in their requests,
and authorize waivers of the secrecy agreements on: ove a case- “ase-by-case
basis. W yuL 31 1975 -

1 - Mr. Wannall A. iat nee es
1M. Gress oH Ce ‘a

lofe

a Soe

Pact

MRUIT GS UCLA IEE
a bs

DA

1- Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

Ae ey
(6) *

| em 5 tAug Panes Jy on the Payroll Savings Pl
eo coezsoian EIQ HS Siting Bons Replat on tbe Pyrat Stings Plow


ato

/
N a y
~~
na €
NS my \
ROE
“mer
“. ° &
a
“or
Nae ~
we
Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. —
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:

Admin,
Comp. Syst. —.
Ext. Affairs

Files & Com. _
Gen, Inv, —___
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Evol. _
Spec. Inv.

Training

Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.

| ai Awies298 Bocid Pease Pag Page 272

1- Mr. Mintz aot
1 - Mr. Wannall °-

1 - Mr. W.0O. Cregar’
(Attn: S.F. Phillips)

@

CODE TELETYPE NITEL
1 - Mr. Deegan
1 - Mr. Nugen

nt
JULY 25, 1975

w -* re. oe AN
: wake CA Neo Y Seo flol
FROM DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395) i

C(seustupy *75>>BUDED: 7/31/ 15.7 “ TEL Hepes:

f

FBIHQ IS PRESENTLY COMPILING PERTINENT DOCUMENTS PERTAIN,
ING TO CAPTIONED MATTER AT THE REQUEST OF THE UNITED states ‘
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH.
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC). :

INCLUDED IN THE SSC'S REQUEST IS ONE CONCERNING ALL MEMO
RANDA AND ANY OTHER MATERIALS INDICATING OR REFLECTING THE
INCEPTION OF (A) ALL HEADQUARTERS FILES AND (B) ALL ATLANTA ~
DIVISION FILES CONCERNING MARTIN LUTHER KING AND ORGANIZATIONAL
FILE CAPTIONED "COMINFIL OF SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE," (SCLC), TOGETHER WITH THE BASIS AND AUTHORITY FOR
OPENING SUCH FILES. g

SSC STAFF PERSONNEL HAVE ADVISED THE ABOVE REQUEST REFEES

NOT ONLY TO COMMUNICATIONS WHICH INITIATED ACTIVE INVESTIGA-Q

TION OF KING AND THE SCLC, BUT SHO D carey), ae Re yp is
WHETHER THEY BE OFFICE nn EGET, OR ofan Ath hits 8 (I

een oe ae Sal ide Sow wo o well wo
ES ake Daas
PE cy We
{WAP BE Wey
VEELIPE fm Xe
TELETYPE UNIT Pe me a


PAGE TVO

WEWSPAPER CLIPPINGS) WHICH FORMED THE BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING
THESE FILES PRIOR TO THE TIME ACTIVE INVESTIGATION WAS
INITIATED.

ATLANTA DIVISION PROMPTLY REVIEW ABOVE MATTERS AND
FURNISH FBIHQ WITH THREE CLEAR XEROKES OF ITEMS WHICH ARE
RESPONSIVE TO THE SSC'S REQUEST. THESE ITEMS SHOULD BE
XEROXED AS THEY APPEAR IN YOUR FILES, ANY EXCISIONS OF
DATA APPEARING THEREIN WILL BE HANDLED BY PBIHQ PRIOR TO
THE TIME THESE MATERIALS ARE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE SSC.

IT WILL NOT BE NECESSARY TO FURIISH HEADQUARTERS WITH
COPIES OF ANY INSTRUCTIONS RELATIVE TO INSTITUTING ACTIVE
INVESTIGATION IN THESE CASES WHICH EMANATED FROM FBIHQ.
WHERE SUCH IS THE CASE A SIMPLE STATEMENT TO THAT EFFECT
SHOULD BE MADE AND THE DATE AND CAPTION OF THE HEADQUARTERS
COMMUNICATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED.

EXPEDITE AND SUBMIT BY COVER AIRTEL IN ABOVE CAPTION
BY CLOSE OF BUSINESS 7/31/75.

NOTE:

Teletype being directed to the AT Division to obtain
information which is responsive to a request by the Senate
Select Committee. Bureau deadline deemed necessary in view
of request by this Committee.

| NW 68296 Docid:32969624 Page 273


OPTIONAL FORM NO~10 ®
MAY 1962 EDITION!
GSA FPAR (41 CFR) 101—11.6
UNITED STATES . ; 3 pen AD pdms
/ Dep. AD inv,
Asst. 'Dir.:
Admin,
Memorandum
Comp. Syst. __
iq Ext. Affairs ___
TO : Mr. jJ. B. Adams pate: 7-18-75 Files & Com, —

Gen. Inv.

Ident.
Inspection

FROM : Legal Counsef IN ia ‘Vert
ger
sunject;/SENSTUDY 75 Ee
Telephone Rm. _

Director See’y

Attached is a memorandum from K. William O'Connor,
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice,
dated 7-18-75 requesting our observations concerning the type of access
certain Members of the Senate Select Committee would have to FBI
files concerning those Senators. This memorandum was received at
11:14a,m,, 7-18-75, and we were requested to furnish our response
no later than 1 p.m. on 7-18-75,

After consultation with Assistant Directors-Deputy |
Associate Directors Adams and Jenkins, Mr. O'Connor was telephonically “/
advised by SA Paul V. Daly that it was this Bureau's position that AO.
Option 3 with certain modifications would be this Bureau's choice. ae
Option 3, with modifications would read, "The file is assembled and the
Senator given access to it, with certain portions or papers withheld
and the Senator is orally advised of the reasons for withholding of the

P- 27 embhe

documents."
& app
a RECOMMENDATION: . sor, om LEE
BoB ern agc2i / fed = tf, Ce oF 2 I MU

zm 0R IG

ATT, IMPOREATTON CONTAINS
£
3

For information. Ye

te a!

3 Enclosure fh we
“2 1- Mr, Adams - Enclosure atp-108 sf inl aca
eS 1 - Mr. Wannall - Enclosure S ja
= 1- Mr. Mintz- Enclosure ° JUL 31 1975 |
+ a 1.Mr. Cregar - Enclosure maces comeeman

1- Mr. Farrington - Enclosure fi ue

1 - Mr. Hotis - Enclosure pa?

1- Mr. Daly - Enclosure sll

/7?
PVD: his (9) (

at aH

84 A 1875 Buy U. 5. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
NW 88296-Bocld:32989624 Page 27


A TG asa A Pile 2 eS TE AE

*

=
= ere

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, &.C. 20530

JUL 18 1975
TC: See Distribution eid MOR 16
' / tenets aan er z ore vee
FROM: K. William O'Connor aa One DS
Special Counsel for Intelligence i,
Coordination :

SUBJECT: Congressional Access to Personal Files Maintained
by the FBI

’

Certain members of the Senate Select Committee have requested
access to their personal files. The preferred mode of access is the
subject of pending consideration by the Attorney General. As you
know, under the mandate of the Senate Select Committee, access to
the personal file of a member of the Senate Select Committee may be
had without any consideration of Freedom of Information Act issues.

The Atromey General has considered several options, and has
asked that you consider them and indicate hereon your view; he has
asked that these views be delivered to me not later than 1:00 p.m.,
this afterncon so that he may promptly consider them. ‘The options
considered are not exclusive. If you have any suggestions other
than the options indicated, please attach it to your response.
Responses should be delivered to me in Room 4213, Main Justice,
by the time indicated. Thank you for your cooperation.

OPTIONS

Option 1: Departmental staff examine the documents in the file and
delete any references to sensitive sources or ongoing criminal inves-~
tigation; thereafter, the file is made accessible to the Senator under
controlled circumstances at the Department of Justice.

Approved _______ Disapproved
Comment:
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tion 2: Same as Option 1, except that a xerox of the. documents as
excised is delivered to the Senator.

Approved Disapproved

Comment:

Option 3: The file is assembled and the Senator given access to it,
with certain,papers withheld and the Senator is orally advised of
the reasons for withholding of the documents.

Approved Disapproved

Comment :

porte sor

Option 4: The Senator is furnished his entire individual file
without any excisions or deletions, for review at the Department
of Justice. .

Approved Disapproved

Comment:

Distribution:

Deputy Attorney General

Solicitor General

Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Mr. Thornburg, Criminal Division

Mr. Pottinger, CRD

Mr. Scalia, OLC

Mr, Uhlmann, OLA

NW 88296 Dochd:32969624 Page #76


Mav 1962 EDINON / ;
GSA FPAR (41 CFR) 101=11.8 } vv
UNITEB STATES , f ‘Den AD AAS
aa Der, sip
‘~~ Memorandum ‘a

Comp. Syst, —_

Ext. Affairs —_ i

76 : Mr. J. B. Adams pate: 6/27/75 Files & Com —
"  —
FROM : Legal Counsel fi —— |
RSC omy
St Gin re a
SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON Li Spec: tow
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Telephone Rm. —
iractor Sec’y —__

ALLEGATION BY JopN/aErtrF CONCERNING
in! TERFERENCE WITH COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION

At 5:14 p.m., on 6/27/75, K. William O'Connor, Special
Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, advised me that he had received
a call from John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee complaining of
what he described as an attempt to interfezewith the Committee's investi-
gation by supplying information to the press that the Committee had been
furnished material which it had declined to use or to inquire into because
of its sensitive nature. O'Connor said that Elliff claimed that a journalist
who is friendly with the Committee had advised the Committee that he had
information from a Justice Department official that the Committee had been __/
furnished information originating in the FBI that Communist funds were io
used to financé Martin Luther King; that King had been related to the CP, USA¥’
and that the Senate Select Committee had treated this matter as a "hot potato"
and that the information also indicdted that "King laughed all the way to the
bank, "'

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O'Connor said that Elliff protested the apparent disclosures
by the Justice Department b9 the press and claimed that it appeared an
effort was being made to interferewith the Committee's work. O'Connor
told ENliff he had no knowledge of anyone in the Justice Department furnishing
any such information to the press and further, he told him that he did not
believe that information concerning CP funding of King had been furnished

to the Committee. st AOL geet® G2 -//6s7e- Me)

O'Connor said that he did not believe that att AB Aa furnished
such information to the news media but he wanted wastesbezaware-eof Elliff's ,
complaint. O'Connor said that it is possible that during interviews conducted |
by staff of the Committee, they have received statements indicating that |
Communist funds were used by King, but he does not believe that any docu-
mentation of that has been furnished to the Committee as yet.

1 CONE
RECOMMENDATION: For information. yea ff (ye
® %& %I-Mr. Moore

Moore

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NW 88296 Dochd:32989624 Page 278

ADDENDUM ” INTELLIGENCE DIVISION SFP:lhb 7/2/75

INID has received no report .or has any information
concerning the alleged leak referred to in this memorandum,

Concerning t2 the allegation in this memorandum
that information originated with the FBI that communist
funds were used to finance Martin Luther King, Jr., and that
King had been "related" to the CPUSA, the following is noted. f
We have never had any information that communist funds, .
literally, were used to finance King. We did have reliable
reports that King was helped in a financial way, particularly
as to advice regarding fund raising, by a close advisor,
Stanley David Levison, who was a secret member of the CPUSA.,
However, none of our reports are known to have claimed that
"communist funds’ were financing King. King was-never known
to have been a member of the CPUSA. It is true that he had
a number of close associates such as Levison who at the time
were either current or past CPUSA members.

INID is unable to pinpoint the report that "King
laughed all the way to the bank.”

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. og
"OY, 2- m4 A. Mintz
’ 1“ Mr. J. B. Hotis)
L-~ Mr. W. R. Wannall
1- Mr. W. O. Cregar
il - Mr. Tf. EH. Burns
he Athorney Ceneral July 25, 1975

Diregtor, FBI

a)
UNLEED STATES SENATE SELECT COTIITTER »
ON INTEILIGRUCE ACTIVITIES {S8c) ~N

By letter dated Nay 14, 1975, with attached appendices,
the SSC requested cortain documents and other information
from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the
Comittee is the original of a memorandum with an ue
enclosure which is in response to one of the Committec's V4
requests.
a

2 . . A
A copy of this memorandum with its enclosure is
being furnished for your records.

Mnelosures (4) ST
62-116395 adlZ
- 5
: oy. t >)
1 - The Deputy Attorney General ;
Att tention: KR. Williaa O'Connor poe 7 NS
Special Counsel for rn re 4H 4
Intelligence Coordination or “\
TEB:lek/thb|h|p ore, aye |
(9) aan _— Fd OTE a
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Assoc. Dir. , / 2 : ~
Dep. AD Adm. — a . (\ a7
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Admin,

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Intell 28
Laboratory -

Gen. Inv.

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Spec. Inv. ‘ {

Training a \
Legal Coun, 7 A

Inspedtion
Telephone Rm.
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Déctd:t8 pecta:étesz4 Page 279s~ 7)

i


- J. A. Mintz
(l - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
~ Mr. W. R. Wannall
Mr. W. 0. Cregar

- Mr. T. E. Burns

Be ON
'

42-116 355 doly 25, 1975

GiIGHD STATES SHUATH SEEECT CONMTPTER
@O STUDY GOVERNLENTAL OPERATIONS
WIS RESPECT TO TITELBIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC}

RE: PHURTOER DOCUMINITS PERTAINING TC

\ THE FBI SUD DEPARTMENT oF gueTrcen He pre
a weer ane nea SERA ay
POLICIES AUD PROCEDURES my

er

yoo

Reference is made to S8C letter dated May 14, 1975,
with attached appendicas, requesting certain documents and
other information from the Fer,

Item number 1. b., of Part I, Appendix & of refor-
enced comunication requested Committee Staff access to all
indices and control files pertaining to all programs operated
by the Intelligence Division For 1940 to the present.

Attached to this memorandum is a List of all
retrievable programs, projects, surveys and procedures
employed in connection with domestic intelligence operations
of the PBI which may be of interest to you. There were a
muther of other programs z projects, surveys and procerfures
emploved in connection with foreign counterintelligence
operations o£ the FRI which are not included. In the event
you desire informetion concerning these latter items, which
include extremely sensitive matters, we would be pleased to
discuss then with 66C Staff Membors at FRE Headquarters.

BuclLosure

|
, Agee. Di. 1. The Attorney General
fu Dep. AD Adm. —

f Dep. AD Inv. __

“a0 TER:lek/Ihb |h\y) ORIGINAL AND ONE COPY TO AG c
“ {8)

Admin, ®
Comp. Syst. __ 8) WN
Ext, Affairs
Files & Com,
Gen, Inv.
ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Leboratory

vs
fon. & Eval. — aro
Plan. va pun a y

_ Spec. Inv.

SEE NOTE PAGE 2 7

Training

ngay OUTS.
i ‘ nee Sey

Fclephone Rm.

res sec'y MAILROOMC—] ‘TELETYPEUNIT (7 DL
68296 36 Docid: 32989624 Page 230


Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBE and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

-
f

NOTE: ROP SECRET

| The Programs, Projects, Surveys and Procedures List
(PPSPL), enclosed, and the Counterintelligence PPSPL, infra,
were generated by SA Thomas E. Burns, Jr. from a review of
available INTD inspection reports and files.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PPSPL

1. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries - Developing
positive intelligence information regarding personnel in the
United States from non-Soviet—-bloc countries.

2. International Organization - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside
the Soviet-blicc - Centralized compilation of potentially danger-
ous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom the U. S. State
Department could initiate steps to deport or to lift
diplomatic immunity in the event of a war emergency.

3. Mame Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International
Organization Visas - FBI maintaining results of name checks
conducted by various members of U. S. intelligence community

- «based on information provided to such intelligence organizations
by INS regarding aliens meeting established criteria.

4. Special Support Group (Use of non-Agent surveillance personnel).
5. Alen - Uncovering of Soviet illegals entering the United States.

6. Anagram - Penetration of foreign diplomatic establishments in
the United States for procurement of cryptographic materials.
oo Buchen, Counsel to the President, has advised that sensi-
information such as that regarding Anagram and electronic
eillances is to be handled in an oral briefing to be given
enators Church and Tower).

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 3

10.

ii.

12.

13.

14.

15.

NOTE CONTINUED: ate SECRET

q
“ya

t
*

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

Banpop ~ Identification of Soviet illegals through the transfer .
of funds through Swiss banks. {

Chinese Aliens Entering the United States ~- Identification
of ethnic Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments.

Chinese Communist Contacts with Scientists in the United States -
Development of selected scientists of ethnic Chinese
background as foreign counterintelligence assets to be
targeted against People's Republic of China (PRC)
personnel and establishments in the U.S. and Canada,

Chinese Entering the United States Claiming Citizenship -
Identification of Chinese legally entering the U.S. with
intelligence assignments,

Chinese University and Graduate School Index ~ List of
Chinese aliens in the U.S. who have attended colleges or
graduate schools on the Chinese mainland and who are
considered potential candidates for development as U.S.
assets.

Ccokma ~ Specialized physical surveillance directed against
foreign intelligence officers.

Canil - Identification of Soviet illegals arriving in tle
United States from Europe through Canada.

Chicoin - Counterintelligence activities to thwart
efforts of Chinese intelligence in this country.

Forest - Screening of records of foreign students at New York
University, other than those in authorized programs, to uncover

Soviet illegals.
Ye SECRET

~ 3

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 4

32589624 Page 702


Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: Tp SECRET

16. Proho - Program to detect homosexuals who have been compromised
or recruited by Soviet intelligence,

17. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U. S. Residents
with Chinese Diplomatic Establishments ~ Investigations
conducted regarding certain individuals meeting established
criteria. . ®

18. Visitors to Iron Curtain Countries ~ Interviews of selected
U. S. tourists to determine possible contact by Soviet—bLloc
intelligence,

19, Orkid - Technical penetration of Seviet establishments in the
l - United States,

20. Cloverleaf - Technical penetration of new Soviet residential
complex, Riverdale, New York City.

21. Sam Survey - Screening of mail to selected European cities.

22. Gus Survey — Screening of mail originating in New York,
New York, destined for specific postal zones.

23. Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets -
Recording of Soviet purchases in such areas-~intelligence
and counterintelligence purposes.

24. Rega - Identification of Soviet illegals entering the U.S.
as aliens during certain years.

25. Secomex - Expanded Mexican border coverage to include
development of sources against the Soviet Embassy in

Mexico. :
nye SECRET
-~Ai~

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 5

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

31.

32,

33.

34.

35,

£96 Docld:32389624 Page 284 ro

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOPE CONTINUED: ye SECRET

Sobir ~ Investigation of certain Soviet-bloc immigrants and
repatriates in an attempt to identify those previously
recruited by Soviet-bloc intelligence,

Socap - Review of certain records to identify Soviet
illegais who have applied for documentation as U.S.
residents as part of their effort to establish a bona fide
cover identity.

Vietnamese Refugee ~ Efforts to uncover possible
infiltration of North Vietnamese agents in the refugee flow
to the United States. .

Walklok - Screening of requests for birth certificates under
an established criteria to identify such requests which
may have originated with Soviet intelligence.

Technical and Microphone Surveillance - Survey of telephone
and microphone installations funetioning at certain times.

Al Fatah Automatic Data Processing Project - means of identifying
Al Fatah members and their contacts through use of ADP
equipment.

Cuban Refugea - Detection of Cuban intelligence agents
who might infiltrate into the U.S. through refugee
channels,

Deseco - Development of selected contacts to be directed
against Soviet-bloc officials.

East-West Exchange ~ Provided internal security safeguards
regarding admission to the U.S. of Soviet and satellite
nationals.

4 Coverage ~ Screening of mail destined for the Soviet Mission
to the United Nations, :
tye SECRET

~5-
NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 6


36.

37.

38.

39.

40.

41.

42.

Further Documents Pertaining
to the FBI and Department of Justice

Policies and Procedures

NOTE CONTINUED: 3B SECRET

Chiprop - Screening of mail to the United States from Hong Kong
and the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Chiclet ~ Screening of mail from the United States to Hong Kong
and the PRC,

Alchemy - "notional" Pro-Marxist - Leninist - Maoist domestic
revolutionary organization staffed by Bureau assets directed at
uncovering PRC intelligence activities in the United States.

Geology - Verification of individuals entering selected
foreign countries claiming U.S. citizenship--to identify
Soviet illegals.

Hilev - Collection of high level foreign political
intelligence by FBI Legal Attaches abroad for the
information of the White House,

Oarbit - Checking of U.S. Post Office Boxes utilized by U.S.
military personnel in the vicinity of selected U.S.
Military bases--to uncover possible Soviet agents.

Phrenology - Efforts to identify Soviet illegais who formerly
resided in a specific foreign country and whose present
whereabouts are unknown.

Classified by 6283, XGDS 1, 2 and 3, Indefinite,

Dee SECRET

32589624 Page 285


5.

10,

il.

12.

Her DE. |Fon oost8

Seer mite - ; ee - PY DK we y

vate

NW 88296 Docld:32989624 Page 286 nein

PROGRAMS, PROJECTS, SURVEYS, and PROCEDURES

Administrative Index (Adex) - List of individuals who posed:
a realistic direct, and current dangar to the national
security of the United States.

Agitator Index ~ List of individuals who have demonstrated
by their actions that they have a propensity for fomenting
racial discord.

Anerican Rapatriate - Specific procedure toe be followed
concerning United States (U.S.) citizens who wore issued
Swiss protection passports to return to the U.S, From
Cuba, . .

Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File ~ Covers
black extremists who have propensity for violence or who could
be considered logical suspects in various crimes in which
Bureau might have an interest,

Black Student Groups on College Campuses ~ Disereat preliminary
inguiries, Limited to established sources, on black student
organigations and their leaders,

Bocov - Communist coverage along the Mexican border.
Characterization -~ Deseriptive statements concerning
certain organizations which have been subject to
investigation,

Cointalpro - Counterintelligence programs directed against
domestic subversive activities,

Communist Influence in Black Extremist Groups ~ Periodic
reports relative to communist influence in biack extremist groups.

Communist Influence in Racial Matters ~ Periodic reports
relative to communist influence in racial matters.

Computerized Telephone Number File - Computerized programing
of telephone numbers utilized by extremists and
revolutionaries and other individuals suspected of
involvement in interstate gambling activities.

Emorgency Detention ~ Provided for apprehension and detention
of persons considered potentially injurious to the national
defense and public safety of the U.S. in time of national
omengency «

wy


13. Extremist. Informant - Development of sources to provide
intelligence and evidentiary information concerning extremist
individuals and organizations.

14, Gherto Informant - Rovalopront of individuals living or working
in Ghotto areas who can furnish information with particular
onohasis on situations which may ¢ereate civil unrest.

215. Intensification of Investigation ‘of Weatherman and Other
Similar Yerrorist Grouos - Use of full resources of FBI and
use of innovative matheds to achieve a more comprehensive
coverage of such groups. .

16, Key Activist ~ Invastigation of individuals who were oxtremoly
active and vocal in their statements denounting the U,s.
and calling for civil disobedience and other forms of
wiiawful and disruptive acts.

17. Key Extremist ~ Provided intensified coverage of selected
extremists who were known to be activa and who had
praviously evidenced the potential for fomenting violence
or revolutionary activitics.

18, Docation of Non-Fugitive Weatherman Moambors - Intensified
efforts to locate non<fugitive Weatherman members.

19. New Left Extromist ~- False Identity - Attempt to provide
effective dissemination of voluminous data concerning
false idontities used by Weatherman porsonnel and other
Mew Loft extromists,

20, Wow Left Movement - Finances ~ Periodic information meade
available to the USDJ and the tihite House regarding inconc
source of various revolutionary groups.

21. How Left Movement ~ Publications - Coverage of Publications being
circulated by New Left Movement.

22. Potential for Racial Violence ~ Survey of localities having
potential for racial violence based on current social conditions.

23. Potential for Violence and Civil Unrest ~- Periodic assessment
o£ potential for violence and civil unrest throughout the
U.S. with emphasis on situations involving racial factors,

24, Prisacts - Extremist, revolutionary, terrorist, and
subversive activities in penal institutions.

a - ~ .
NW 88250 Docldt3 2085004 Paoe yet NESE mewn


26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

32.

33.

4 ¢

Presab - Protection of Strategic Air Command and inter-
continental ballistic missile bases of the U.S. Air Force.

Revolutionary Activities ~ Violence - Periodic reports
appraising potential dangerousness of the various
revolutionary groups,

Sceurity Index — Lint of individuals who were believed to be
dangerous to the internal security of the U.S. during
times of enorgency.

Seenrity Informant - Development of sources to provide intelli-
gence and evidentiary information concerning security matters.

Security of Spocial Agent Personnel ~- Communication to all offices
dated September 17, 1973, alerting field to information that
revolutionary and extremist activists and organizations have
instituted a program of collecting intelligence data against law
enforcement personnel and agencies. Et directed field to

advise FBI Headquarters if information developed that such organ-
izations and individuals are actively ongaged in confrontation
and harassment of FDI personnel.

Spectar - (Special Varget for Informant Pevelopment) ~
Development of quality informants to penetrate revolutionary
underground,

Stop Index Program on Administrative Index Subjects ~

Placing Adex Category 1 individuals in the "stop index"
operated by the Computer Systers Division in order to promptiy
Getermine inguiries received from local police concerning such
subjects.

Underground Wewspapers « Collection of conies of various
revolutionary newspapers,

Venceromos Brigade ~ Individuals subjected to background
investigation with view toward determining possible Adex
inclusion and analysis to determine whether or not subject \
could be targeted against hostile intelligence agencies,

Weatherman Fugitive (Neatherfug) Investigations ~ Efforts to
locate Weatherfugs,

Weatherman Automobile Hot Sheet + Commilation of Weatherman
vehicles for use by surveillance personnel,

