178-10004-10087, 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
° JTK Assassination Svstcm Datt: SIZ 77201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: WILDEROTTE
RECORD NUMBER: — 178-10004-10087 .

RECORD SERIES: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS

AGENCY FILENUMBER: ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: CARL, OFFICE OF THE DD/S&T
TO: BUCHEN, PHILIP

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE: 07/10/1975
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :
CIA
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: — Secret
* RESTRICTIONS: = Consulted
CURRENT STATUS: = Withhold
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 08/06/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Transmittal memo and 15-page report.

}
7

ee ttn PT

v9.1 . .
HY 50955 Doecld:32112749 Page 1

od 10 July 1975
DATE: __ a

Office of the DD/SeT

TO: Mr , Phillip Buchen
178-10004-10087

SUBJECT: Attached Report

. REMARKS:

Phil:

I stressed objectivity and tried to assure
that no persons who were potentially a’ party
to the activities in question had any
opportunity to destroy information or material

which might be related,

My Associate Deputy Director, Dr, Sayre Stevens,
was the prime investigator with technical

advice from *Dr..«'-FomNevison, an MD with an
outstanding research background but hired by

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

vewud
Be GG ct aio oe sancerctcotopenaretionneyaae gba
BES APSE ond AKC Suna Sverre weshcetmarioatrie fn

HW 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 2?

CIA only a couple of years ago and could not
possibly have had any prior knowledge or
involvement. Additionally, I used personnel
from my own staff to assure that compilation of
inventory, etc. was done in presence of people
representing me, who again could have had

no prior involvement.

As I noted earlier, we are continuing our
investigation internally as well as jointly
with DOD. We will keep you informed.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 3

SENSITIVE . SEBRE}

SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI

Project Discovery.

The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the
Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity
requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It
resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated
with the project in response to. the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all
past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the
attention of Agency management. .As a result of the information provided by him
and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project,
it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order. The
three identified the project at.Fort. Detrick as having involved the/development
of BW and possibly CW agents and associated dissemination systems that were

suitable for clandestine use against human targets. They moreover identified letha

Concern about’ these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted.

agents as among those involved in the project.

in a recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD)
that approximately $90,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at |Fort Detrick

"for the maintenance of a BW capability". This statement appeared so important

that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to
questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD -- now the Office of -
Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a small effort had been carried on at
Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW
E2 IMP DET CL 26895

Photocopy
‘ from
Gerald R. Ford Liteary

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 4

De ALA ntl ean e otN te


Photocopy
from ;
Gerald R. Ford Library

detection and did not carry the serious implications of the IG's report. It had

in any event been terminated some years ago. The A/DDS&T was satisfied with this

response. When new and more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort

Detrick activity emerged, however, the words of the IG Survey tended to give it

credibility. Thus, late in April 1975 a search was begun for any records or other

information available on the project. Difficulties were immediately encountered
because the project cryptonym could not be identified. The search for records

of fund transfers to Fort Detrick did ultimately produce information in that

regard, however, and checks by the Office of Security on one of the individuals -

identified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the

MKNAOMI cryptonym. This enabled OTS to recall the proper files from Recards

Center; two MKNAOMI files were retrieved.. Some additional information was also.

produced from the Office of Logistics files. This collection of material largely

confirmed the nature of the project as reported by the informants and identified
q a number of people involved in the activity. Additional cause for concern _
resulted from the association of several of these people with specific. assassinatic
plans as revealed in the IG's report on that activity.

A major concern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition
of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible
Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed
along with the Army's BW stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of
November 1969 and February 1970. An unsigned memo raising the question of the
disposition of Agency materials maintained by Fort Detrick posed the option
of having it stored in a commercial laboratory. It was the impression of those
in OTS who were familiar with the -project that the material had in fact been
destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find

such confirmation, laboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the

y)

HW 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 5

course of that search about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 6 mg of cobra venom
~~ but none of the other materials -- were discovered.

Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the

Ft. Detrick project was needed, all information uncovered was passed to the OCI,

wee

handling Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church
was informed by Rod Hills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under

investigation.

Sources of Information.

This summary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing:
(1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are
limited and contain only a small? number of Agency-originated documents; (2) the
material found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and several].
pieces of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency
employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired
employees indicated by the records as having been more deeply involved at stages
of particular interest. (Included in the latter category are
Tom Karamessines, Cornelius Roosevelt, RayxTreichler, and Nathan Gordon); (4).
information contained in the iG‘s Report on assassination Pianning and (5)
information developed by a DOD investigation initiated as a result of conversa-
tions with the White House about the matter; this information was only recently

received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however.

Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick.

The Agency association with Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations
Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division was apparently responsible for

3

2228 RE Photocopy
SEEN Py from
° Gerald R. Ford Library

HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 6

we)

sp
pare

&

mel

developing special applications for BW agents and toxins. The principal customer
of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Army Special Forces. Its concern
vas both with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for
Special use in paramilitary situations. These applications clearly included
one-on-one Situations in which clandestine delivery was a concern. Both standard
BW agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division.
Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SOD was first
established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about
1948, though no records. going back that far have been found. The Division was

_abotished in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated.

CIA Relationships with SOD.
The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952 through

a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the performance

| of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of the Special
Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick. The animus
for establishing this relationship seems to have been a belief in OTS that the
special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological
materials of all sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which
were appropriate to its function and not otherwise available.. Discussions
indicate that the perception of the requirement for such capabilities was tied to.

. earlier: OSS experience. Initial funding was at the $200,000 a year level which
grew to a high point in FY 1958 of $390,000 and then dwindled to $75,000 a year:
in the late 1960's. Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding

records, total Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is

GEESE, Pty
wide Het from
Gerald R. Ford Library

HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 7

farsa]

estimated to have been somewhat more than $3 million. These funds were
apparently used to generally augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD.
Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way,
but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SOD as part of its
program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied
requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use. Through
the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined.
Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories
of project activity:

a. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal ©

agents in readiness for operational use;

b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated

balance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for

operational readiness;

c. Adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbloinoculator

(a dart device suitable for the clandestine and imperceptible

inoculation with BW/CW agents) to determine compatibility with

various materials and to assure that the microbioinoculator

cannot be identified structurally or easily detected upon a

detailed autopsy; and

d. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet

ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BW/CW.
In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining
a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.

5

. hi
SEG0ET o
Gerald R. Ford Library

HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 6

SECRET

Project Management within CIA.

From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that
was extreme even by CIA standards. Only two or three Agency officers at any
given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. This work was
managed first within the Biology Branch and later in the Chemistry Branch of
TSD. Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers
as to the availability of materials and delivery systems of the type being
developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSD unless initial
approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for.Plans. Even
when this was the case, the Chief of TSD often referred the operations-officer
directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never
informed as to the nature of the discussions. ~ This method of procedure has’ been
confirmed both through interviews and by the IG report on assassination planning.
No written records were kept. . Though some CIA-originated documents have been
found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation
of activities took place. No records on such things as material control, receipt,
delivery, destruction, etc. can be found. No documents relating to any possible
operational use of the material have been found. The files as they exist are quite
different from those normally maintained in the course of a typical CIA R&D
project. As noted above, funding to the project was provided simply on the basis
of augmenting the level of effort established by Army funding. There appears
to have been no relation of funding to specific tasking, nor cam any strict
accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency's behalf be
found. Project officers with whom discussions were held stated that the funding
was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities

6

ee Photocopy
SED BE i fom
Geraid R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Docld: 32112749 Page 9

| EEE

of SOD. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition

on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material

or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed
operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through
the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely
on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions

which will be discussed below.

Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest.

Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an
overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years, available
records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of
lethal materials and delivery systems. The evidence indicates that the Agency
relied upon the use of specific BW agents and toxins being investigated as a
normal part of the Army's BN program. However, directions were given to
investigate such matters as agent stability over varying periods of time, the
Suitability of specific agents for preparation in dry form, the development of
dart coatings, and the preparation of materials in a form suitable for dusting of
clothes, pillows, etc.

Primary Agency interest seemed to. relate to the development of dissemination
equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of
such dissemination ‘devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandesti
use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among
hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of

SOD: attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the air, a cigarette

7
Sebnky
Photocopy
from
Geraid R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 10

case rigged to disseminate an agent when lighted, a fountain pen dart launcher,

“an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent
light starter to activate the light and then release an agent, etc. Available
records do not indicate whether or not all these were developed specifically for
the CIA, though. the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as
falling into such a category. The easy association of this equipment with
specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading,
however. At a meeting in June 1952, at the very outset of the Agency's associa-
tion with SOD when CIA representatives stated they-as yet had no specific re-
quirements, a list of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was
provided. This dissemination list included such things as cigarettes, chewing
gum, cigarette lighters, wrist watches, fountain pens, rings, etc. Presumably
work on these devices was already underway in response: to Army Special Forces
requirements. Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices
and levied requirements for the special preparation of some. .

One- development peculiarly associated. with the CIA was the “microbioinoculator
which was an extremely small dart device which could be fired through clothing to
penetrate the skin so as to inoculate him with an agent. of some sort without the
target's perception of being hit. An added fillip to this development was the
requirement that no indications of the use of such a device be discernable in
the course of autopsy. A large amount of Agency attention was given to the
problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Much of the equipment delivered to. the
Agency and some of the testing undertaken by it involved a dart delivery system

carrying dog incapacitants, and an antidote used subsequently to restore the dog

8
SebEET “Photocopy
from

Geraid R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Doeld:32112749 Page 11

to normal activity. Though most of the dart launchers used in these develop-
ments were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the development of a
smal] hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs.

Clearly a lot of work was done on human incapacitation. OTS apparently
received continuing requests for safe, effective and rapidly acting, incapacitat-
ing devices. Much work was done in trying to use the dart system for such
purposes, but real success was never actually achieved. Since larger amounts
of appropriate agent are required to incapacitate a human than to kin] him, no
scheme was developed for introducing sufficient amounts. through the use of darts.
Attempts were made to solve this problem increasing the area of the darts
available for coating and for making a dart which would dissolve in tissue
which could thereby introduce more material into the system. Work on this pro-
ject was underway when the association with SOD ended and Edgewood Arsenal
endeavored to complete the project using unexpended Fort Detrick funds. Success
Was not achieved, however. One reason for the preoccupation of those involved in
the project with the incapacitant problem may well. have been the substantially
greater difficulty of solving it when compared to developing lethal mechanisms.

Substantial work was also done for the Agency in the development of spoilants
for. agricultural products, biological materials for the ‘contamination of petroleum
stores, and agents for use in the destruction of electronics, optical systems,
structural materials, etc. At times in the history of the project, requirements

for such materials as these were apparently very high on the Agency's list.

ey an a Photocopy
Sebhe : ton

Gerald R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 12

SEGRET
Shellfish Toxin.

By the late 1960's, a stockpile of some 15 to 20 different BN agents and
toxins was maintained on a regular basis by SOD for possible Agency use. The
supply included such agents as food poisons, infectious viruses, lethal botulinum
toxin, paralytic shellfish toxin, snake (krait) venon, Microsporeum gypseum which
produces severe skin disease, etc. Varying amounts of these materials ranging
from 100 grams to 100 milligrams were maintained.

As noted above, with the Presidential Order requiring the destruction of
Army BW and toxin stockpiles, the question was raised as to the disposition of
Agency materials. Though specific accounting for each agent on the list: is not
on hand, DOD indicates that, with the likely exception of. the shellfish toxin,
all of these materials were in fact destroyed by SOD personnel.

The shellfish. toxin -- along with 8 milligrams of cobra venom -- was found
by David Boston, currently Chief of the Chemistry Branch, in Vault B10. in the
basement of South Building which houses OTS. This vault is a lightly used
laboratory area and historically associated with the Biology and Chemistry

“Branches of OTS. It has been regularly used for the storage of dangerous materials
of various types. In past years, the combination to the vault had been available .
only to the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Branch and their secretary.
More recently, the combination had been given to other members of the Chemistry

_ Branch as well. With the discovery of the material on 20 May, however, the
combination was changed and is now available only to the Chief of the Chemistry
Branch, his secretary, and OTS security officers. Qn 13 June the vault was put

under 24-hour guard.

Photocopy
IRE 3, 6E> es Th

Re Ee) from
a Geraid R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 13

SECRET

The freezer in which the toxin was found is located under one of the.
work benches in the laboratory. The Fort Detrick material was the only thing
in the freezer and was in two one-gallon cans along with several smaller con-
tainers. There were no labels on the gallon cans, but on top of each was a
folded piece of paper with pertinent information about the contents. This
information provided the types and amounts of material and the date on which
it was put into storage. The shellfish toxin was, according to this information,
put into the freezer in February 1970, and the cobra venom, in February 1961.

The shellfish toxin was packaged in several different forms including two
individual doses in tablet form. .

The discovery of the material was a result of repeated attempts by Boston
to determine what disposition had been made of Agency BY materials held by Fort
Detrick. In making one more check on this, he called Nate Gordon, a former Chief
of the Chemistry Branch, who retired in September 1972, and asked him if- he knew
what the disposition had been. Gordon stated that he thought that perhaps some
of the shellfish toxin might not have been destroyed and was in storage in OTS.
In following up on this lead, Boston found the material in the freezer.

Though hard to understand, such material could in fact be stored for so long
without anyone being aware of it. The laboratory is no longer used for the type
of work for which it was originally built and had become a disordered storage
facility. There have been no requirements for use of the freezer in the inter- °
vening years and. it is indeed possible that no. occasion arose to. investigate the

contents of the freezer. There have been no reported functioning difficulties

with the freezer during this entire period.

1

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Litrary

HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 14

After finding the shelifish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was
taken. A large number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were
found. These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, including
the drug project, the development of harassment materials for crowd control or
meeting disruption, crop contamination programs, etc. Small amounts of several
other Jethal preparations were found. Two of these are known to have been
obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick. Nothing is known about three.
others. Aiso found were a number of L-Pills issued to agents, and formerly to U-2
pilots, for suicide purposes in the event of capture.

Boston contended that he had no recollection of the shellfish toxin having
been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. On 30 June, dis-
cussions were held with Dr. Gordon in an interview at which Boston was also presen
Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been called back from Fort Detrick and
stored in the laboratory on the basis of his own decision which resulted from -
conversations with Boston. It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of
isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have
it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of TSD, was told of this
decision or the fact that the material had been delivered by Fort Detrick. As
Gordon recalled, this took place prior to -his being told by the Chief of TSD to
inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the material on the inventory list should
take place. Boston who was present during this discussion took.no issue with
Gordon's account. Neither could recall precisely how the material was delivered
to OTS, but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by

someone from Fort Detrick.

Photocopy

Rp. from
SEGRE: Gerald R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 15

Gordon was certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same
toxin as that listed on the inventory. There is, however, a discrepancy between
the amount in storage as calculated from the labels and the amount shown on the
inventory. Since the material in storage is in several different forms and
complete reliance is placed upon labeling, however, no real discrepancy may
actually exist.

Discussions with Karamessines have established that he and Helms were
aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that
the Agency stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, im accordance with
Presidential Directives, the CIA should get completely out of the BW business.

The explanation given by Gordon as to how the shellfish toxin came to be
in Agency storage is fully consistent with other available information. He
stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it
was simply transferred from one freezer to another and in his view was continually
under adequate control. He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent
to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972. Boston has
given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that.

After the discovery of the material, OTS was told to investigate ways in
which they could safely dispose of it with full documentation. Edgewood Arsenal.
was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for
disposal on 11 June 1975. The disposal was to be witnessed by a representative
from the IG's office. On the day prior to the scheduled delivery, these arrange-
ments were cancelled, however, because the DD/S&T wished to consider further
ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later

13

SEGRET “on

Gerald R. Ford Library

HY 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 16

SECRET
misinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Boston
was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material for the CIA,
it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not con-
sistent with the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposal

of the material have taken place, and it remains under guard in the OTS vault.

Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material.

There is no record associating the project with actual operations. Dis-
cussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with
darts loaded with: dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use in .
S.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or cropsspoilants may
have been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning have
been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being
investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitating
or assassinating Castro. For example, botulinum pills were reportedly provided
in February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pills”
were made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery of
some in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960 -
involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatment
of cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files. Consideration was given to the
' administration of shellfish toxin with a pin device in late 1960. Both the
toxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick. The diving
suit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus
which would produce madura foot, a serious, non-spécific, skin disease. Work

14

Segre] Photocopy

from
Gerald R. Ford Litrary

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page i7

on fungal agents generally compatible with such an approach was underway at Fort
Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent was prepared at
Agency direction in a form suitable for application to clothing, pillow cases,
and so on. Tuberculosis germs with which the breathing apparatus of the suit were
to be contaminated were available at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency
stocks. Finally, the general presence of BW agents or toxins in all of these
plans suggests the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick.
_ None of the interviews. undertaken in the course of this investigation provide
information about specific.support to operations which may have involved
assassination. Roosevelt, who.was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that
discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the
details and was skeptical as to. the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler,
Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received
requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible
with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during: its investigation
of assassination attempts. ‘Treichler may constitute a connection. between the
MKNAOMT project and the assassination plots involving Castro. “He was the officer
responsible for MKNAOMI during this period. The records show his giving direction
in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those
mentioned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG's report indicates that
he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro”
"schemes, no suggestion can be found that-any of these materials or devices was

ever considered for use for lethal purposes.

Photocopy

from
SEERET Gerald R. Ford Library

HW 50955 Docld:32112749 Page 18

