104-10192-10110

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

eon

&

14-00000 |: #
is

waren for fond

‘ TQ. .
: = Chicf£, WH, Division— _ fh 1 xp inoH ing FrQuretD _.
Jeno. - ee Jom quaint Desk
- . _ _ ’ Team nave IHoCING
ct) re Ta a . Sanaa El
ao pre =
" Chict of Station, JNWAVE fre worn {yr _

——————

___ © __ Plans for ODCA Mid-ApriT" Congress __*
ACTON REQUIRED REFECUNCES * ” : . -

"REF: . SNWAVE 0180:°

[son TAR MIS PAWN / AMMOP *

re way be oe Soo 2, The purpose of this dispatch.is to.report the comments
. , : of ANMOP-2 on 30 November regarding the forthcoming Organizacion
; _ oo BDemocrata Cristiana de America (ODCA). Congress. — AMMOP-1 said
- . coo. + that the precise date of ‘the. Congress. 1s yet to. be set though
ate4s still Schedvled for mid-April. .He now feels that he will:
have a copy ‘of. the formal agenda by: the end of December which
is a full month earlier than reported in the reference. While
- AMMOP-1 is. not-a member of the committee preparing the agenda,
“he said ‘that he.is being kept generally informed of: developments
, and that once the agenda is. prepared he shoyld be in a position
to influence avrevision of the agenda in the event that: there
~ are no items concerning Cuba or that the items listed are not
‘satisfactory. -He said that the principal person with whom he
is in-contact on this matter ts Rafael CALDERA and that it
will be through CALDERA that he would hope. to make his influence
felt.. -AMNOP-1. also said that he has been assured by CALDERA
that the Cuban case. will be prominent in the agenda.”

2. We will continue to keep Headquarters informed -of
developments on this end. .

Roger E. MARCHBANE

Distribution:

ZO - WH/COG

cay heat

> +77 eae £75
(ROSS REFERENCE TO OSPAICH SYMBOL AND NUMBER : ale

B- 201-767219 _ UFGA-29068 1 December 1967

‘ oe :
a cusercanes HOS FILE NUMBER
7 ; SECRET © 19-300-10

bor

20 Qe ¢ |
Ow: 9 Plead
Ra. 20


) | cn

Far

Re. MOC (28 Opase
~ GG? Tatnw |

re AOC


14.90000

: Chief, wil Division : _ : . ; : | Noceerns :
Psvpvecr, ° 7 7

_ ff ACTION REQUIRED - ACFCRERCES

“ACTION REQUIRED: None, FYI.

“othe subject matter merits ¢ se aid careful “study by ali Station

and

Chilean Presidential election led many to hope that ‘Christian
Democracy might develop significantly throughout Latin Anerica — +f

' observers to swallow hard, but there was no denying that these -
- concepts had‘ an emotional appeal, This political charisma,

Ce ? ri *
Drrrot Sey eoe De meme
WH/L rin draft)
i i tin dra —
i NT RENEE © 1249) :
OFFICE SYMBOL Serecers SHOMATURL L 5 ‘| ch /
Sm Po Panel
: sans me FT 4 _
es NESPATCH

| _ oo Ltcine ge c a é
“ft A Qh aSetancs ; nd ; PEOCESS iG achOn

SECRET

ps FCT eh RD

hiefs, All Wi Stctions. and Bases a Xanga quero
are . : _ . Etldeat nes is
. . eee | jSsce Queciad CES

JOAN AGE FRM UO

Christian Democrac in Latin America

an Phe following analysis ‘has been prepared in WH Division and
dis transaitted to,all Wii Division Stations and Bases as a review
of the current status of. Ciristian Dendcracy in Latin America ‘and.
an updating o£ Neadquarters' vies on the movement. We believe —

operations. and reports officers whose comments afte solicited.

FYI, this material, in a-shorter and sanitized: form was published
_ din the 3 Match issue of the Current Intelligence Weekly Revicw, —
{will thu3'be widely dicseminated throughout the intelligence :

cosunity., MWowevér, the WOGEAR study could not include much of
the "Conclusions ‘section. since it was interpretative and had

operational overtones, “Thus we've decided to send the full text
herein in book dispatch form, 7 ut

1. .- The decisive wietory of Eduardo Frei in the September 1964

coxpeting with Communism on ideological grounds and offering an-
alternative, democratic route to social and economic progress.
Christian Démocracy"3 advocacy of "Third Force" concepts plus.

’ feequent manifestations of enti-Yankee syndrome caused some

coupled with’ a conmmicuent to, basic social reform and opposition to
Communism, and presented within an ideolozical framework. stressing
the dignity of the hunan person,

attractiveness to the Latin American, particularly the~student and
‘middle class“clements, This dispatch will review the current status
of the CD parties and tho role of organizations -=- ODCA, CLASC,
Party youth and student wings and European CD groups e- which

OISFATCH SVMSCL AND AUMBER™

BOOK DISPATCH 5951

We mUMBER

Joséph DiStefand gb (8 March 1967

WHC.
" COORDINATING

comprised a package of considerable


14-0000

CARRION 7 7 TMOOL ANID SUMDee

Cc UATIONOFS Ob. : ; by
ee OP fo SECRET | OOS DISPATCH 5961

represent key factors in the developzacnt of the Christian Democratic
moverent in Latin dzeriéa. Our major purpose is to. determine, some
two years offer the ‘ei Victory, whether thé gcnerally enthusiastic
‘asgessaent of Christian Democratic prospects engendered by this
highly significant-election was justified. ae

aN
\ .
a Sh CURRENT BALANCE SUEET. OF CERISTIAN DEMOCRACY

2. Parties of Current Sinntficance. . Christian Democratic

- parties .cze genetally agreed to be of current political significance

#. Salvador and Peru,

sca

ate 53a USE PREVIOUS LO&STO, $e CR ET

in ‘Only four Latin American countries -- Chile, Venezuela, El

> ca, the. Chilean.Pppc is the only party with the respon-

' gibility of governing; the solid victory of Frei in the 1964 .
-. presidential election .was followed by an even more impressive:
-., «showing in the’March 1965 congressional election. lowever, the

“party's xéfort program is being implecepted with less than
deliberate speed, no progress has been made in weakening

Marxist leadership domination of the urban labor force, and
“indications are that Frei's moderation will be increasingly
challenged by the left wing of the PDC.

b. The COPEI Party of Venezuela has strong hopes of
Guolicating the victory. of the Chilean Party in 1968 and
appears to have narrowed the gap between itself (22 percent

_of the cicctorate in 1963) and the governing Accion Democratica .
-Party (32 percent). COPEL Secretary General Rafael Caldera, —
“one of the few Latin American CD leaders of international
stature, is expected to be the Party's standard bearer in his
fourth try for the prestdency. — .

ce. In El Salvador, the PDC gamered 29 percent of the
votes in the March 1966 legislative election and one of its
leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte, retained the mayoralty of San
Salvador. In less than six years the PDC has become the
leading opposition party. it has little chance of capturing
the. presidency in 1967, but should be a strong contender by
. 1972, with Notre Dame-educated Mayor Duarte the. likely
candidate. : . a ’

d. The Peruvian PDC formed a coalition with. the Popular
Action (AP) Party in 1963; it currently holds two cabinet
positions. Soe would argue that. the Peruvian CD (with only
4 percent of the votes in 1963) has no real future in compe- .
tition with the dominant AP and.the long-established APRA,
both reformist parties, and thus should not be included in a
Listing of significant CD parties. Some weight is added to
this argucent by the very recent split off of a dissident
fsetion of the PDC into a separate party. However, the
inclusion of the Peruvian party here is based primarily on the
fact that it is the only CD group participating in a coalition
covernzent and thus contributes an element of stability to the

=)

political sceae in Peru.

oo - TUASSIFICA THON

ee |


14.90000

ao

ey -

. Cees PAT Wh atl BTM DOL ANG Oa eee ——
CONTINUATION OF : ,
DISPATCH |. SECRET | soos DISPATCH ‘596

; 3. ‘Parties of E Moderate Potential, "Applying even the most
generous ‘Geiteris t to the judgcueat of. potential, there are not

more than four CD parties -~ in the Dominican Republic, Panama,

~ Brazil.and Guatemgla -- that might develop « as > moderately. important
forces” over the next: ‘five years. : -

ol Be “The Doainican ‘PRSC stands as.a prime exaaple of
- cD irresponsibility’ from the tine Caonabo Javier. took over
wpeee “Patty: leadership in che wake of the Dominican Revolution in

SO “SAprik: 4965, -It has‘ collaborated with the entire spectrum of

OS “Msrxist-Lining partics “and moderation of ita ‘extrema ”

‘ gilitancy in the near future appears unlikely. The PRSC has
-devéloged.a small but talented cadre of leadership, primarily
-frea‘the university Yanks ,- and is buttressed by the strongest
“CLASC affiliate (casc) in the Henisphere. ; :

: “by “The Panemantan PDC ‘was registered some five years
age and. polled dvily“3.1 percent of the votes in 1964. Although —
it centinues a miniscule party, it has madé significant
~Oxgentzatioual strides and its philosophy of. social justice
gives it roots Lacking by most Panamanian parties, which are
“Larcely personalistic or tied to. financial interests. “If the
|_Panen ma CD.succeeds in expanding its middle-class base and
“attracts militants ‘froa.the predominantly negro and mestizo
- . population, it could bécone a force of some importance,

-.¢, While the Brazilian PDC polled a mere 4 percent of
‘thé vote in 1964, the Party has significant strength in three
f-sey states of the Center-South (Parana, Sao Paulo, and
Gusnabsra). Like all other pre-Castelle Branco political
parties, the PDC was unable to campaign under its own banner
in the. presidential and parlimentary elections of late 1966.

' Expandéd political activity will probably be permitted after
the seating ‘of President Costa e Silva in March 1967, but it
is expected. that the number of legally recognized political

‘parties will be limited, It appears likely. that the PDC will

‘have to merge with another party 1f£ 4t is to compete in the
legislative life of the country. If the. PDC joins with a
‘party that has strength outside. the present PDC strongholds,
and the PDC message and mystique seta the. tone for such a new
political entity, the net result could be expanded importance

for Caristian Democracy in Brazil, .

.° The Guaten alan PDC was..only recently recognized as

ily constituted party. This nascent group has good

in the youth and ‘student movement and growth

atial in the ‘fmportant camgpesino sector. Current direction

he party leaves much to be desired; PDC leader Rene. de

- Leoa eppears honest and intelligmt . but he has little organs.
izational flair or charisma, His. leadership is being challenged
by a group of militant "Young Turks” on the left. With more

vigorous leadership and the development of middle echelon

cacres the party could develop significantly.

gd -

omy nn...
rho

4, Partics of Insignificance. The remaining nine Christian
-Dexceratie parties -- in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Uruguay -- show scant ;
ptenise of developing into forces of national importance over the
next five years, Leadership of even modest stature exists only
zoatina (Salvador Allende, Horacio Sualdo) and Bolivia

in Arg

CLASSIFICATION

FORM
aoe
sat

53a USE PAEWCUS FOLTION,


1400000 |

TMP ATOM SY MUCL AML ATMA

|BOOK DISPATCH 5961 -

CURSSEICAT IS

SECRET

CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH _

(Rens “i Natale). These parties appear doomed to the role of
bridesmaids to tad handful of parties that réally count.

II +. PARTY YOUTH WENGS -

5. CD Stroncthin ‘Universities. Ahead: ofP Party’ Strénsth. As
with all political groups din. Latin Anerica, the vast majority of
cD party militants are dram froa the. ranks of student appendages
active in. the local ‘universities, In most countries of the htmi-
sohore, CD. voting’ streAgth on the caspus is much more’ significant
than the: ‘political - strenzth of the. parent party. A few examples.
.. + dllustrate this: point: Panama, the Party: polled 3.1 peréent
“.o£ the vote-in. 1964. (and"probably would poll not more. than 5
percent: todzy), while: Lts University youth got -12.8 percent in the.
January’ 1966 election, -. The Dondinican PRSC received 5.4 percent of
thé Vote. in 1962 (and its present strength could well be lower
: because of internal divisions and ‘leadership conflicts), but its
ssyouth wing on the ¢azpus garnered 40.2 percent of the vote. in
May 19663 I VeneZucla, “COPEL polled 22 percent of the vote in
“16633 its student wing on the campus of the Central University, .
howaver, polled. 40.2 ‘percent of the vote in 1966, These comparitive
figures suggest seae conclusions which are presented ia Paras. 19

acd 20 below.

of 6. Radiealization of Youth Wines. _Sevéxal cp leaders, most
moteably Frei and Caldera, | have expressed considerable concern over
the growing radicalization of party youth wings. That youth groups
of every political stripa assume positions to the left of their
partics is nothing new, but the situation in several CD groups has.
gotten badly out of hand. In several countries only an opaque line
‘divides the positions assumed. by CD youth groups (or important wings)
froa the stance assuned by Maraist youth elements. “In Venezuela, |
_the wing of the COPEL youth headed by Marta Sosa is so "far-out"™
it has earned the sebriquct "the Astronauts." Chilean President

Frei report tedly told a German Christian Democrat that his youth

wing i s in danger of becoming Marxist. In Panama, the dominant
wing of the CD youth has assumed positions at least as radical as
the Communists. And in the Dominican Republic the Social Christian
group in vthe: National University is allied with the Communist

' students.

7. Youth Tending to Push Parties Further Left. The great
concern of responsible party leaders is that youth input to the
parties will swell the ranks of the radical wings and push the

‘- parties further left. Soce observers-believe that the CD youth
’ problea has been exaggerated and. that the "hot heads" will mcLlow
- once they participate directly in party life and cope with hard
political reality. While this is*partially true, we would take
issua with this relaxed view. Tha raw. material to be molded is
far different. than {£t was ten years ago; since that time the demand
for revolutionary {even -convylsive) change has mushroomed -- ard
the youth the cry: has. assumed din proportions. The natural
swing process. well no. longer produce the same magic.

8. Reed 4 for treining. Some balieve that the only way of
rresting the the CD youth erift to the left in the foresecable future
cs in massive end intensive youth and political cadre training.
Zsyts in this direction to date (at IFEDEC, several national
li

sical training institutes, ORMEU and various student training

Ly). nea

" ft] et fo

QO by bee

CLASSIFICATION

Yer PREVIGUS EHNA,

14-0000

arta,

y SEAS ERTS ” OSES STSRS aa OA
SECRET - | BOSS BISTATCH $962

CONTINUATION OF
‘ "DISPATCH

_ courses) have been discouraging. In most instances the teachers
share icontical biases with the students with che sesule that
misconccptionas are reinforced and no new horicoas sci opened up.
Frei énd Caldera-have askéd the German Institute far International

-., Solidarity to ineressa its support in the student trsinits fleld,
“but the Germans, walle. recojnizing tha serioua need, have thus far
“ dgelined-to increase their comsituent, To atcocplish anything
. Significant, the Cermsns belive a rassive protran must ba Isunched
‘Gwhich would tax their current resources), aad they wonder whether
‘the:CD youth situation hss been permitted to drift too Long to.

salvage. _

ITI <.TNE IMPACT OF CLASC ON THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC MOVEMENT

. Study points out-that “Organised labor could contribute substantially
_ to. the “development of well-organized CD political parties in the.
‘hemisphere, ‘but it also offers tho best chance for-CD extrenists
to cause ham'to the movezent." Few would argue thst how the CD
movement fares and the imaso it projects depend in not insignificant
mecsure on. the posture assused and progress achieved by CLASC.”

_ .More often than not, the judgement of a mass movement is based on
the worst elenent cexprising it -- and in this Yegard CLASC is
challenged only by the party ‘youth and student wings. As an -
organized lcbor force CLASC has been a dismal failure (with the .
exception of its campesinos -am)} its only impact and sole raison

- dioetra up to this time has becn.as a political action instrument
witha primary appeal to the working classes, It is unlikely that
CLASC, under Maspero leadership, will mellow aa do parties when
they achieve the responsibility of government.

9, CLASC Poses Serious Dancer for. CD Movement. A KUMOX

10. CLASG Ras Maintained Posture of Independence. Despite its
“Christian'’ label, CLASC has consistently maintained that it is not
subservient to the Chriscisn Democratic movement or any menber ;
party. ‘The statement cannot be disputed, for while CLASC is guilty
of most of the seme aberrations as the least responsible of the'CD
parties, it invarlebly comits its follies independently, (often,

- in fact, setting en example that is emulated by the parties). But
while CLASC can defend its claim of independence, it fis also true
that CLASC docs net discourage the belief that it is the chosen .
labor instrument. of the Christian Democratic movement, slthough |
this label has never been formally bestowed. .

11.: Closer Ties Retween CLASC and CD Movement Aspear Likely,
It acpears likely ‘that 2 core organic participation of CLASC in CD
affairs is in the offing.. A Sesinar was held in Montevideo from
11 - 23 April (spensored by the Christian Democratic Formation |
Institute «= IFEDEC) for officials of CLASC who are also officers
of Christisn Dexocratic parties. The Seminar, called for the
specific purpose of erransing closer coordination between the CD
political movenent and the Christian labor movement, resulted in
the signing of the "Carta de Montevideo” on 20 April. Thea Act
calls for formal representation of ODCA in both tha Christian
lebor orgenizatioa.and CD party labor departments. To this end,
a Coorcizating Comittee was formed ~- the Comite Relscionsdor ¥'

Coordinsdor De Orennizactones Laborales ¥ Funcionates te Les

CLASSIFICATION

SRORER

Feline | os

USE P@ENIOUS EDITION,


14-0000

‘Cosritses and ODCA recognition of CLASC as its chosen heaispheric

_ OFA ‘Leadership .hed not ‘been obtained in advance.”

CLASS identiffestioa with the Co political movecnt will likely.
‘-gub off negatively on the CD youth wings. which invariably are further |
. sleft’ than their parent parties .and identify much more closely with ,
tha: tevolutionasy in
It is perhaps signif

a movencnt. : This. initiativa:appeara to have made greatest. progress:
“in-Central America, - - oT . . .

America-(ODCA). Tha current officers of ODCA are:

-eloser attention than we have given it to date if it had substantial

_ homogencity and the cement o

’ qualify wit

“from tke Lat

SECRET Lita BASINS

" CONTINUATION OF
DISPATCH

poe

to request ODCA ssproval of the-creation of this Coordinating

labor instruct, The eventual approval of the ODCA leadership
appears. likely; indedd, dt da doubtful chat the. Act would have
exerjed froa the Montevideo Seminar i£ informal agreement of the

eative CLASG ‘Influence on Perty Youth Wings, Closer

inase and myatiquée CLASC has sovm and propagated,
icant that. CLASC.has intensified its.cfforta - -

since January. to establish youth appendages to“the Christian labox:

a os
ee _ IV < (THE ROLE OF OMCA)
13. OSA Contributes Little Positive Direction, The Latin
American CD paxtics fowned. their.resional organization in
Montevideo in 1949 «= the Organizacion Democrata Cristiana de

‘ President - . 3 Rafael Caldera, Venezuela
Vico, President ‘+ Hector CORNEJO Chavez, Peru -
Vice Presidcat t Rene DE LEON Schlotter, Guatemala
Sceratary General: Tomas REYES Vieuna, Chile

ODCA has consistently assumed an anti-Yankeé posture on a broad
range of key issues (most forcefully on the American intervention
in the Dominican Republic). out :on balance has been less strident
in. its criticism than several of its member partics (notably the
Chilean, Bolivien and Dominican CD's), probably because of -
Caldera's rostraifiing hand. The Organization would merit much

influence on or authority over member parties, or could apply
sanctions egainst national groups. But ODCA amounts to little
fore than a fraternity. Its member parties have little ideological
£ their union appears to be based more
oncty mysticism (which most parties are careful to
h adjeétives like peaceful, democratic and Christian) _
and .m nevative factors (hostility to the U,3., capitalism and the
oligarchics), than on a foundation of Cd doctrine or basic agree~

ment on just what they want.

on revolutl

14. Efforts to Fira Up the OCA Role. We have asked contacts
in European CD circles to prod ODCA to sct criteria for mexbership
and behavior and that the Europeans weigh petitions for support
in American parties and organizations against these
criteria. DCYVOUR officers have argued that while the Europeans
eancot realistically require nascent and ill-trained CD groups in
Latin Accrica to hold to tho sage rigid standards, of political
morality that have evolved in Europe, neither should tha Europeans

CUASSIFICATION
USE PAEV:OUS COrTO™, | .
Ere kee. mad

iY ] Cererciiis!
i

14-0000

Tina Ge ote ferrin

continuation of ¢ [ ee
DISPATCH. | oe SE Cc R ET _ rr BOOK GFSPATCHL 5961
nae a ee

continus toa tolerate end thus ‘abet the, Lerespox iity of the
Latin CD carties because theré ara no standerds Gt wil, ODCA
leader Caldera cppears to tecognize the need for < least soma
basic idcolozical comen ground: among ODCA-menver pirties. But
ro sigacl | success hag been achieved in this direction to date
and we arc eset at all sanguine that.even modest prasress will be
made ia this esdrd-in tha foreseeable future,’ Reporting on the
S@onstess of the “World Christian De =ocratle Unioa (CCU) held in
Lina in April 1966" indicates clearly thes the Latin Acerican :
parcics | “whll- not ssubade without combat to any effort (whether
fnitiaicd by the’ ‘European financial. backers of the Cd movemant
6c by OSCA) that aims at inposing standards and controls that.
will impinge on their conplete freedon of action. .

15. Fornaticn of Central American Regional Grouming. The
Central Amcricaa CD parties act in £1 Salvador in July 1966 to
establish a smaller regional grouping, The Union Resocrata Cristiana
‘de: Controsmcrica (UDCCA). .This-action docs not appear to reflect
anyrele lesent: of pique with ODCA * “(the ‘relations of COPEI and Rafael
4 24 with the Central Ancrican parties appear close and cordial)
bat: rather a desira to establish a émalicr and more cohesive unit
‘that can better address itself to the problemas cama to the ;
ereg and, to a lesser extént, to. the individual CD parties. UDCCA
is ccnorised of five.partics (in Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica and Penola), with the possibility that a sixth party
will be formed in Honduras.

"V = EUROPEAN CD ROLE AND INFLUENCE

16. The: Furovean Christian Democratic Union (CECtU). The
European CD D parties we: were first to establish a ‘a xegional organization,
‘the Nouvelle Equipe Internationales (HEI) in 1947, The NEI never
played a major role in world Christian Democratic affairs. From
the outset the Latina Aner icen parties maintained their closest
ties with individual leaders of the CD movement in earePes. particu-
lerly those involved in financial operations with me sister parties
and CLASC in Latin Auerica, The NEI became progressively less
significant end in reeent years was virtually moribund. But in.
mid+1955 the organization vas revamped and re- -christened as the
European Christian Democratic Union (ECDU). Its nesly elected ~
President, Mariano Rumor, Secretary General of the Italian PDC,
appears intent on making the ECLU a strong organizstion which will
at least catch the Socialist international in stature. _—

17. European: “Pinanctel Sunport to. the: © Parties. The two CD
orge nizations which have coatributed most heavily to the support
of the Latin American CD partics and. related organizstions are the
Institute for International Solidarity (11S) and the International
Soliderity Foundatioa (Fis). Between thea they, will. contribute |
an estimated $500, 000 to $1,C00,000 to the CD par ties and CLASC in
Calendar Year 1967, It was recently reported that the COPEL party.
of Venezucla vill receive $450,000 for the 1963 election from FIS
at the rate of: 3160, 000 per year coumencing in 1965.

The IIS, The Institute for International Solidarity,
cil recently by Dr. Peter Molt (the xew Director is
ierzenrath) ,- is an arm-of the Konrad Acenaucr Foundation

Geraan Christian Democratic Union (CDu). Like its

ae
eaced wu
eer
£ the

Gut

CVeaSS ATION

Pee Sta USE PARNIOWS FONTION: Ss Ec R E T . a

14.90000

(--. dedders are: Dr. Johannes Schauff (President of the FIS,-a

 eontributed only $15,000 froa the CISC International Solidarity
_Yund). FES appears to ba the exclusive European CD channel for

_ of Eurosesn organizational support to the Christian Democratic

controversial area:

“¥e would anpear that the Christi

=e

ia t. eo
Zis's esorating budzet ¢do2s FEvom tha Germs

nN c z set ;

Governaeat, IIS maintain’ several. permsheut represeatatives

- ih Latin \corica aid: supports several. cD activities. dircctly.
* ‘pot .it-also costributes more than fifty percent of the FIS

' budaete cree : 2 oe ;

ob. Tho -Fitwe-Gne.Igtemational Solidarity Fund was ,
spally. Srestcd oa 30 March 1964 to avoid duplication of
ginoncisl. suppors efforts en the part of the Europaan CD
parties, aad ochir Cd-oriented groups in Latin America. The
"nama sv g lates changed’ to the International Solidarity. :
‘Foundation (FIS) to avoid confusion with the solidarity fund
- of CLSC -other organizations. Tho FIS operates a3-an ara
of- the ECDU, with headquarters in Rose, Its most important

Gerzan' nctieasl ,and.close personal friend of Konrad Adenauer),
Naviano Resor, Adolf Herkenrath and August Vaniotendael
_ (Seeretary General of the International Federation of
Caristian Tradé Unions -- CISC).

18, -pLléference in Finction of IIS and FIS. From tho ‘start

of its activities, the Germana and [talions havo contributed
alrost the entire FIS bidger (in 1964, for examplé, Vanistendael

‘exrgenizations] support to the Latin American CD parties, While
the Ifg fs the rich porter in the LIS-FIS. tandem. and could easily
fone che Latin Amerigen parties directly, the FIS channel is
prefecced by the Gesaans and has two major advantages: First,
since TiS is a resional solidarity instrument with representation
(out rot contributions) froa all the European parties, the .
responsibility for support to certain controversial Latin parties
4g watered down and distributed among the European CD's collectively.
Thus a Latin Acveri¢an govermzent’ or party in competition with the
local CD's cannot casily make a formal demarche to the IIS or the
nt. Second, it is casier to obfuscate tha magnitude

ee

German govern

~

movezcne ia Latin Aceriea Lf it is channeled through a qulti-party
orgenization. The Germans have limited 11S funding to, less

as -- support to youth and student formation,
political training institutes and CLASC training institutes.

(See Attachzent A for a detailed flow chart.) -
CONCLUSIONS

49, cots Challente Communist Desination of the Unfversity.
Jt wes noted in Para. S above that almost without exception CD.
atrenzth in the university greatly exseeds the voting strength of
the parent party. The same is true of the Communists, and it ts
a fact that Cescuntst/Christian Democratic strength on the campus
is overwnelsincly deainant throughout the hemisphere. Few would
take fesue with the conclusion that the vast najority of university
youth are attracted to movements projecting an inspirational —
message (the word “inspirational” more accurstely characterizes
the CD movezcat than dses "Ldzological") or an aura of revolutionary
mystique. During the past few years Communist voting losses in
the university have been picked up mainly by the Christian Democrats
we the vote has shifted From one movemcat with a messaze to another.
an Democrata are the only political
Coamunists’ hoaisphorie domination

oe en iia
: rx! CONTINUES t 8

gecus capable of challenging the

of she cannus.


14.90000

SANE RATIOS BATTS

ROOK CLS2ANCH 5561

rerarrrtrar Taseter ny ras

“CONTINUATION OF vo
DISPATCH i SSCRET.

. 20. (CD Strenyth in University Mo Tadieatos agen Party >
Strencth of. 2¢ tial, Frou the foregoing, however, it docs”
~ - not Follew that tue growth of CD strength in the university —
"- presates a corkesponding incressa in CD‘party streagtn. While
-yoting patterns in the university provide valuable insights on
populatioa (particularly youts

4

th) attitudes ond aspirations, these
pattems are inet ¢ reliable bacaueter of either organized party °
atrength- or future potential, inno country of Latin America
{3 thd ‘voting strength of. the @'s or the Comaunists’ acarly -as
‘strong ahong. the pooulation at Large aa 16 d3 on the caapus.. .
Ona -reesen is: that’ the ‘untversity population of. Latia America is .
‘Less than-2 perccat of the total population. The CD. cazpus leader
alzost invariably graduates ‘froa-student;politics to more direct ©
party’ involvescat when He’ leaves the university *- ever 1£ the
party. las no discernable future. It would appear, however, that
tho. néa-university youth (lacking the pscudo-intcllectual pre-
tensions. and the. sclf-bestowed elite label of the university-
traincd) are cuch less inclined to vote and. militate for Christian
Democracy simply.beccuso it hss emotional or inspirational appeal.

‘21. CD Fetlure to Transfom Affinity of Lower Classes Into
Votes. The inadequately ccucgscd and tic lower social classes in
‘Latin Aceriéa ave incvitably motivated by the pragmatism of the

possible; to vote for a party that has limited potential to achieve
national power, simply because it espouses views that hit responsive
chords, is a luxury ho belicves.ha cannot afford. Batter, he
thinks, to vote for the least objectionable of tha: traditional
parties. Christian Democracy remains basically a niddle-class
mover .iic. With few exceptions (Chile, the Dominican Republic and
to a lesser extent Venezuela) it has scant worker or campesino
appeal.” By end large, Christisn Democracy has failed to reach
those on the lower rungs of the social ladder. =

22. Individual Party Fortes Appear Unaffected by CD.
.Promress Elseiiere. Many expected, or at least hoped, that the
Frei victory in Chile would give impetus to the development of
the CD movexent throughout the henisphere. This has not happened,
‘There is no evidence that individual CD parties were either ussisted
or hindered in. their developzent by the Chilean success story. And
yet the vicz persists that the Chiltan victory was a boon to the
movenent's potential and progress, During the past year COPEL .
leader Rafucl Caldera has. broadcast a variation on this theme that
several Eurcpean CD leaders have taken up. They argue that COPEL
must emerge victorious in the 1953 election if the CD movement is
‘to maintain its momentum, for sa ideologically based movement
cannot avoid peaking off, and gradually down, Lf it has only one
sigaificant victery to cite over a period of several years. We
would reject the view -- based ca election results in Argentina,
Coloxbia, LL Salvador, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay -- that
individeal party fortunes will be affected in any significant
measure by the successes or failures of sister parties elsewhere.
What copeavs to emerge from these elections 1s rather solid ,
evidence that the national parties will sink or swim on their |

wm devices, based largely on leadership abilities, the development
tle cehelot cadres, organizational talents, appeal to the
y Gisinherited," and the pragmatism of local issues and
International evénts (with rare exception) count
influence of ODCA and the successful CD parties”

" of mic
Meocd
consicervations.
for liczle, and the
even less.

FX Tescusnmet

fou .
teca = 6530 USC PREVIOUS EOITION, |


14-p9000!

te,
CONTINUATION OF
OISPATCH  -

+ aseecangn

SECRET

SIS Se ene Nees

i Box DISPATCH 5961

23. Growth Potential Exists, But Mach Less Thon Criginally
Antictoated., The Cp movencnt has made. only modest progress the
past two years, . Indications are that the developzent of the
movercnt will be much slower and less extensive than many’ anti«
cipated in the first flush of ‘enthusiasm following che Frei | ;
victory, for it has many problems. to resolve. Chief among these.

“perhaps, 13 CD fatlure to reach the-lower social classes and to
cevelop ‘a significant’ worker base. The chances of CLASC. contrt-
buting positively to correct this failure apoear recote, Another

“poe major problem-is' the. absence ofan ideological comzonnground,

“! - despite :the. lip ‘service paid to the Papal Encyclicals and the .
_ Catholic. soctal philosophers, and the failure to enunciate oinimua

sbéhaviordl. standards that these philosophical root's would impose,

“This deficiency is tke root ‘cause ‘of. two manifestations: First,

' & propensity’ to consort with-Cocaunfst and assorted Marxist groups

. (¢.g., in Coloabta ‘Bolivia, ‘tha Dociiriican. Republic and Panama).

Second, the progr ssive radicalization.of party youth witigs which

threatens to push the parent parties further left. the fact,

xenains, neverthéless, that Christian Demoéracy is the most unified
 Ron-Cemunist movement in Latin: America, It cannot be labeled

| democratic or anti-Communist because of the behavioral aberrations

. O£ several national parties, — : :

24, Need for Eclectic Operational Approach to CD's. The.
renks of those wao viewed Christian Democratic prospects with
&reat cathusiasm. two years ago s- including the European financlal
backers. of tha movencnt «= have ‘dwindled considerably, But those
who have been erLtics ‘of Christian Democracy from the outset (many
of vhom might be described as the “visceral denigrators") have
displayed no:more perception in evaluating CD Prospects. The
head-in-the-gand generalization that Christian Democracy has no |

“future does not stand the challeége of investigation, Neither does
the aesertion that ‘Christian Democracy is the hemispheric wave of
the future. The only valid generalization that might be made on
CD prospects is that all generalizations are false. We would :
subait that the only valid approach ‘to the CD phenomenon is to assess
the movemcat and make operational judgements on & comtry-by=
country basis. There are some countries where the collapse of
the party would be no loss. The. key question is: Can the party
develop as a positive elenent in national political stability?
‘If so, it is incumbent on the Station to develop assets within .
‘the party and to examine the need for operational involvement,
_ Station posture toward the cp movement must be based on the raw
realities of the local situation, case by case,

RUTHERFORD J, LYNER

: Ceasar mation
eouy :

sea) S3a USE PeaNius COMMON,

ARR,
So

14-00000
Tia

“7 et. eontinuation oz... of a rere |
. DISPATCH» - “SECRET... © [ECON DISPATCH. 5961

. Bas Distetbution:

sony each)

ia
ns

Janeiro  . - Lo.
iloxisente a Ct Che [ca oo.
Wa SAREE. a,
Alegre; Wi/Reg istry re

> wee moe . . - . i 7 . .

oO

AED OS EE.

Bo
th ype

0.0
Ct

oO

riarO, Chile . rie
sorota St RS
orszctom : - rr ;

Jose | et re, ee
nto-Doaingo — , re
o . : aris
Gueyeauil oa : Lo
Scn‘Szlvedoer
Gontiuals City —
Port au Peiace ¢ ; 7
Tesucty zelpa : , De ne

map

G

Quin eid

2 9

BBs

faa,
ran

seieo city ee ace
Lontoerey ; - - _ panees

enka ten!

Paraonaribo
Port of Spain
Hontevideo
Caracas —
sentiaze ‘de los Caballeros

Nenagua_

i 3 ; . oe : - r
— a we Premous ramen | ; 8B a a e t anime — | aa |

14-00000
> . |
E
| ,
> EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS 4 7
, : :
3
3
) GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (cou) WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION (weoU)
> . .
: ° KONRAD ADENAUER FOUNDATION : So ' a
so I a
.
.
’ : Political European — Christian Democratic Christian Democratic Internationat Union
, Picthole Leadership Student Christan Organization Union of .
: acemy ‘Academy Institute Democratic _ of of Young Christian
Union Latin America Centra! Europe Democrats
(ECOU) (OOCA) (UCDEC) que)
Institute iq
for
internationat Solidarity Internatronal, Sclidarity .
(IS) Foundation
OIRECTOR (FIS)
Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauft
SOME DUDGETARY SUPPORT
: 5
Support To: Organizational Support To: J

Political Training Institutes Polhtical Parties

Training Institutes of CLASC
(Latin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists)

Youth and Student Training

agnor 367


2 Sateen erm t

oO - © secret

No Forign Disem

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY §$ UMMARY

Special Report

Christian Democracy in

eariee an eaisineneres ern

Secret
N@ 1100

-3 March 1967

No. 0279/67 ;


14-0000

Pa

d
4

ee a er ee

Se rat RH Ene 1 i eet se aaah gry tinut rane nen mp he ore nn yan ga

(PA SOL Oe asa bem em eae AME eae

SECRET

Xo Foreign Sissen

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: IN LATIN AMERICA

“The. decisive. victory of Eduardo Frei in’ the sep-
‘tember :1964 Chilean presidential election led many to
hope that Christian Democracy would develop signifi-.
cantly throughout Latin America, competing with Com-
munism on ideological grounds and ‘offering an alterna=

tive, democratic reute to social and economic progress.

‘No such tren i has yet: developed. The Christian
Democratic movement's appeal is.to students and middle
_ Class, a relatively small percentage of the pepulation
in most Latin American countries, -Its concepts of

. ‘basic social refora and the dignity of the human person
. May. appeal ‘to the workers, but thay still cast their

vote on a pragmatic basis for the least objectionable
of the established parties that have an immediate chance

-of governing.

The movement's progress ‘is likely ‘to be hampered
by its lack of strong leaders and effective labor or-
ganizations to compete against the entrenched posi-
tions of other political movements.

. Current Balance Sheet.

The Christian Democratic
movement is generally agreed to
bé of current political signifi-
cance in only four Latin. American

countries~-Chile, Peru, Venemvela,

and’ El Salvador.

. In. only one of - these--Chile--
is the Christian Democratic Party
(PDC) the governing party. rei's
solid victory in the 1963 presi~
dential election was followed by
an “even more impressive showing
in the March 1965 congressional
election. However, the party's’
reform program has run into d@if-
ficulty in the upper house of
Congress, which is still con-

‘trolled by the opposition; no
. progress has been made in weaken-

ing Marxist domination of the’
urban labor force; and-Frei's

“moderation has been increasingly

challenged by the left. wing of
his own party, which may capture
control in the next two or three
years.

The only other Christian
Democratic party with a claim to
a role in government is the one |
in Peru. It was brought into a
pre-election coalition by the
dominant Popular Action Party
in 1963 and, although it gained
only four percent of the votes,
it holds two cabinet posts. Its
voting strengrh has been weakened
recently by the defection of a
dissident faction which formed a
separate Popular Christian Party,

SECRET

Page 1

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar 67

14-0000

\

Oo Country with acieve Chistian Democratic cPanty
O “Country nih weak “chain Democratic Pasty .
. 6 Country: without Christian. Democratic Party

. emtied HONoU ee
Le + MOmOU RAS an . ‘
meal , ot _ ok
eu sacvacot*syicanaGua  * aoe a
a. : en

coera dice

BRAZIL

EDUARDO FREI
‘ . - Prosidant of Chile,

. BOLIVIA
lotin America’ ‘3 Christian Democratic loader.

/
. f
PARAGUAY ' wn
a
H
i.
é
fe
. RAFAEL CALDERA
Yeneruolan presidential aspirant and
number-Iwo Latin American Christion Democrat
65880 3-67
Classified material on-reverse. side of page :


14-0000

|. Salvador,

Venezuela's Christian Demo-

Crats (COPEI) have strong hopes

of duplicating the victory of the

Chilean party in 1968 and appear
to. have narrowed -the gap between
their 22 percent of the elector-

. ate in’ 1963 and the governing

Democratic Action's 32 percent.
COPEI Secretary Géneral Rafael
Caldera, one of the few Latin
American CD leaders. of interna-
tional stature, is expected ‘to
be the party's standard: bearer
in his fourth try for the presi-
dency. tle has recently come out
in favor of a politically expe-
dient move to the right, thus
filling the vacuum of the center-

“xight of the Venezuelan political
spectrum and opening new sources

of support.

In El Salvador, the Ppc
garnered 31.2 percent of the
votes in the March 1966 legisla-

“ tive election’ and one of its.

leaders, Jose Napoleon Duarte,
retained the mayoralty of San

In less than six years
the PDC has become the leading
Opposition party. It has little
chance of capturing the presi-
dency in-1967, but should bea

‘strong contender by 1972, with \
-Notre Dame ~ educated Mayor
‘Duarte the likely candidate,

Applying even the most gen-

-@rous criteria to the judgment

of potential, there are not more
than four other Cbd Parties--in
the Dominican Republic, Panama,
Brazil, and Guatemala--that might
develop as moderately important
forces ‘over the. next five years,

The Dominican Revolutionary
Social Christian Party (PRSC),

SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT

Page. 3

SECRET.
No Fer

% Ofesen.

led by Coanabo Javier, has aban-~
doried, atleast for the time being,
the irresponsible policies it °'- .
adopted after the April 1965 re- wo
volt and has moved toward the po- . - ;
litical center. The party -has

made its Opposition to the Bala-
guer..government clear, but has

also indicated that.it intends to

eperate within bounds acceptable

to the President. The PRSC hopes

that this moderate: line will in-
crease its following and enable.

| it to improve on the poor showing

it made in. the 1966 elections.
The party has developed a small
but talented cadre, primarily
from the university ranks,

The Panamanian PDC was reg-
istered some five years ago and
polled only 3.1 percent of the
votes in 1964, Although it con-
tinues a minuscule Party, it has
made significant organizational
strides and its philosophy of
‘social justice gives it roots.
lacked by most Panamanian parties,
which are largely personalistic
or tied to financial interests, | . i
The PDC is currently negotiating
with the mass-based Panamenista
Party of Arnulfo Arias--Panama's
largest--in hopes of forming a
coalition for the May 1968 elec-~ .
tions. The CDs have offered to :
provide the Panamenistas with °
much-needed administrative skills
in return for a share of the as-
sembly seats in the next election,
A long-range goal would be to
acquire support within arias’
Party and inherit his mass fol-
lowing when he passes from the - :
scene, . . : : :

The Brazilian ppc polled
only four percent of the vote in ; :

3 Mar 67

14-90000

_ ideology.

SECRET

No Forutgn Diseem

1962, but the party had signifi-
cant strength in three important
south-céntral states. (Parana,

Sad Paulo, and Guanabara). Like

‘all other Brazilian. parties, it

was abolished during a political —
reorganization under the Castello
Branco administration. Most of:

its meibers then affiliated with.

_ the progovernment_ARENA party |

and ‘campaigned under its banner

in the November 1966 congressional
elections. It is unlikely that
there will be any significant ex-
pansion in the number of politi-
cal parties--the new Brazilian
constitution sets down stringent.

|. Standards that virtually eliminate
“the possibility. of a repetition
of the forner proliferation of

parties. The former PDC has made
no attempt to reconstitute itself,

-but its former members ‘will prob-
‘ably join with. Liké-minded con-

gressmen to pursue policies con-
sistent with Christian Democratic

The Guatemalan PDC was only

“recently recognized as a legally

constituted party. This group,
which is being financed by Cath-~
oOlic sources in Germany and Bel-
gium, has some strength in the
youth and student movement and
Some growth potential among the
campesinos who make up more than
half the population. Current

direction of the Party leaves much’

to bedesired; its leader, Rene de
Leon, appears -honest, but he has
little organizational flair or °
popular appeal. With more vigo-
reus leadership and the develop-
ment of.a middle~echelon cadre, |
the party might develop signifi-
cantly--particularly if the in-
cumbent Revolutionary Party (PR)
administration fails to resolve
basic problems confronting it.

The rémaininy. nine Chris-
tian Democratic partios--in Ar-
gentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, and Uruguay-~show scant
promise of developing into forces.’

‘of national importance over. the

next five years. . Geadership of
even modest stature exists only
in Argentina (Salvador Alende,
Horacio, Sueldo) and Bolivia
(Remo di Natale). :

Party Youth Wings me

As with all political groups

dn Latin America, the vast major-

ity of CD party militants. come
from-student organizations in the
local universities, In most
countries of the hemisphere, Cp.
voting strength on the campus is
much greater than the political
strength of the parent Party.

A few examples illustrate this
point: In Panama, the party
polled 3.1 percent of the national
vote in 1964 (and probably would
poll not more than 5 percent to-
day), but its university youth
got 12.8 percent in the January
1966 campus election and 24.4
percent in January 1967, The
Dominican PPSC received 5.4 per- -
cent of the vote in 1962‘(and its
present strength could well be
lower because of internal divi-
sions and leadership conflicts),-
but its youth wing on the campus
garnered 40.2 percent of the

vote in May 1966. In Venezuela,
COPEI polled 22 percent of the

j-vote in 1963; its student wing on

the campus of Central University,
however, polled 40.2 percent of

the. vote in 1966.

. ’ SECRET
so Page -4 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67

14.90000

ee ee
/ Several CD leaders, most
notably Frei in ‘Chile, and: Caldera -

Jin Venezuela, Nave “€xpressed con-.

‘siderable concern over: the grow-
Ang -radicalization of party youth
wings. In Several countries the
positions assumed by CD youth.
groups (or important wings) are
almost indistinguishable from
those of pro-Communist youth ele-

‘Ments. In Venezuela, the wing

of the COPEI youth. headed by

_ Marta Sosa is ‘so “far out" it

has earned the sobriquet “the

Astronauts." Chilean: President ,

Frei reportedly told a-German |
Christian Democrat that his youth
wing is moving dangerously far
to the left. “In Panama, the

‘dominant wing of the CD youth hag

assumed positions at least as
radical as the Communists. And
in the Dominican Republic the
Social Christian group in the Na-

-tional University, while differ-
entiating itself from the Commu-

‘nist students on certain issues,
has frequently taken a parallel
line, us

. The great concern of respon-
Sible party leaders ig that these
students, as they Progress from
campus to parent party, will swell
the ranks of the radical wings

and push the parties further left.
Other observers, however, expect
the “hotheads” to mellow once
‘they participate directly in
Party life and cope with hard
political, reality. Both views
‘can be defended. Some mellowing
is inevitable, but in the past
ten years the demand for revolu-
tionary (even convulsive) change
has mushroomed--and among the
youth the cry has assumed much
greater proportions.

SECRET

Vo Fordign Diasem

‘
~

"Both German and American
observers have ‘commented that
massive and intensive political.

' training of youth and political -

cadres might arrest “this drift
to the left. Frei and‘Caldera

“have specifically asked the West

German CD party's Institute for. .
International Solidarity to in- _
Crease its support in the student

.training field. However,-the

Germans, who have long been pro- |
ponents of oraanizational programs
in Latin America, appear inclined
to the position in the youth and
student field that party leaders
have permitted the situation to
deteriorate too long for even a_

massive training program to pro-

duce a moderating trend,
The Labor Arm

A major influence in the
development of the Christian
Democratic movement will: be the -
actions and attitudes of its
labor organization, the Latin
American Confederation of Chris-
tian Trade Unionists (CLASC).

So far, as an organized force, it
has been.a dismal failure except
among the campesinos. Its only
impact and sole purpose up to
this time has been as a political
action instrument with primary
appeal to the working classes.

In this role, it has earned a
reputation for independent action
and irresponsibility that has re-
flected negatively-on the whole
movement despite CLASC's vigorous
claims that it is not subservient
to the Christian Democratic po-
litical ledders., ~~ .

In spite of the apparent .
differences between CLASC and

SECRET

Page 5

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar 67

14-00000

a SECRET 9

Ho. Foreign Diasan’

At, a closer and’
«relationship appears.
to be in the offing. Last April,

~ efficials of: CLASC who are also
‘officers of the Christian” Demo-..

cratic parties met in: Montevideo

to arrange closer coordination

between the-two groups... To ac-
complish this goal, they proposed-

that .both the CD party labor de- <

partments ard CLASC be. granted’

“formal representation in the

Christian Democratic Organiza-
tion of America (ODCA), the re-

gional grouping formed. in’ 1949, .

The plan has not yet been.

‘.implemented, but, eventual ODCA

approval appears: likely.. Closer

““. CLASC identification with ‘the CD
. political movement may have an

adverse effect on CD youth
wings, which--being further left
than their parent parties--have

“identified more closely with

CLASC's revolutionary image,
Since the first. of the year, °
CLASC has intensified. its ef-
forts to create: its own youth
groups and appears to have made
some progress, especially in
Central America. ot

The Role’ of ODCA"

In its 17 years of existence,

ODCA has not. evolved beyond a
sort.of fraternity held together

| more by-negative factors such as

hostility to the’US, to capital-

-ism, and to the oligarchies, than

by any basic agreement among it’s
‘members on doctrine or principles.

Moreover, the individual parties

have made very clear that they
will fight .any. effort--whether
initiated by ODCA or by the Eu-
ropean financial backers of the
CD movement--to impose standards

and ‘cantrols that will impinge
on their freedom of action,

_In gencral, ODCA takes a 7
Slightly less hostile line on .-’
US policies than that of its
membér’ parties, This probably
results fromthe influence of
its’ president, Rafael Caldera of
Venezuela, +The organization’ s
two vice presidents are Hector
Cornejo Chavez of Peru and ‘Rene
De Leon of Guatemala, Tomas Reyes
Victina of-Chile is its secretary
general,

Only in Central America has
there been any move toward a
more cohesive unit geared to area
problems, A smaller regional

_ group, the Christian Democratic

Union of Central America, was or-

- ganized last July. .It now has

five member parties, in Guatemaia,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Panama, and a sixth may be

-formed in Honduras,

European Role and Influence |

Although Latin American
Christian Democracy like the Eu-
ropean variety, has its roots in

_ the profoundly humanistic and

democratic ideag of the French
philosopher Jacques Maritain, it
does not contain the European

. fascist concept of the corporate

state. The European reaction to
the growth of Communism in the
1930s had little effect on the
Latin American CDs; consequently
the Americans were moving to the
political left as. the Europeans
were moving to the right.

Not, until 1947 did the newly

_ important and affluent: European

- 7 SECRET:

. Page 6 SPECIAL REPORT. 3 Mar 67

14-0000

Phare

2

EUROPEAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC SOLIDARITY ORGANIZATIONS = -_

GERMAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC UNION icoU}

KONRAD AQENAUER FOUNDATION

.WORLD CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC. UNION (webu)

International Union

European —_. Christian Democratic §=— Christian Democratic

choir Political «= * Student. 2
inno Leadership é tudent . Christian Organization . - Union | : - of -
Academy Academy institute Democratic . of - a of. . Young Christian
, Union _ Latin Amenca Central, Europe Democrats
. . > ~ {ECDU) _ __. _i00a) tUCDEC} . (USOC) |
institute . . . ae Tes
. te ;
Internationat Solidarity International, Solidarity
HS} Foundation
DIRECTOR - (FIS)
Adolf Herkenrath PRESIDENT
Johannes Schauff
SOME BUCGETARY SUPPORT
Support To: Organizational Support Te
Political Training Institutes Political Parties
Training Institutes of CLASC .
__ iLatin American Confederation of Christian Trade Unionists) : oe
— Youth and Student Training
esast aw

-Classitred material on reverse sive of page

ie

¢4


14-0000

 SEGRET

No Foreign Dissem
. 1

CDs ‘attempt, to coordinate inter-.
national’ CD activity through an
organization they: called-the New
International Team (NEI). This.
arganization never, achieved any

_ significance because, European :

influence in- Latin America had

-already been undermined by a basic
' difference in political philosophy
-. and because the Latin Anerican :
Y parties had been maintaining in-

_ dividual relations-with the var-

jous European groups. These ties

were strictly: on vague, ideological.

grounds and for financial ‘reasons.

The two heaviest European
contributors to. the Latin Ameri-
can parties are the Institute for
international Solidarity. (IIS) and

- the International Solidarity

Foundation (FIS). Between them

‘they will contribute an estimated

$800,000 to. $1,000,000 to the
American CD parties and CLASC in
calendar year 1967. In addition,
it was recently reported that

the COPEI party of Venezuela will
receive $480,000 for the 1968
election from FIS.

The. 11S, under the direction
of Adolf Herkenrath, is an arm
of the West German Christian
Democratic Union with the bulk
of its budget coming directly
from the German government. It
maintains several ‘permanent rep-
resentatives in Latin America
and supports youth and student
grouvs, political training insti-

‘tutes, and CLASC organizations.

The FIS, under the leader-
ship of Dr. Johannes Schauff,
Operates as an arm of the European
Christian Democratic Union (ECDU),
successor to the NEI. Since.its

v. \ .

creation'in 1964, Germans and
Italians ‘have contributed almost
its entire budget. FIS appears
to be the exclusive European
channel fer organizational support
to the Latin American parties.

It ‘has’ assumed this responsibility

because it, is,composed of repre-

sentatives,of all the European
parties. Thus the responsibility
for support to certain contro
vergsial Latin parties is watered
down and distributed among the

| European COs collectively. Fur- *

thermore, a Latin American gov-
ernment: or party in’ competition
with the local CDs “cannot formally
protest its funding activities

to the German government.

Outlook

The modest progress made by
the Christian Democratic mqvement
in the past two-and a half years
suggests that its development
will be much slower and less ex~
tensive than many anticipated in
the first flush of enthusiasm
following the Frei victory.

One major problem is its
failure to reach the lower so-
cial élasses.and to develop a
significant worker base. Its
strength in the universities
and its ability to compete with
Communist groups on the campus
create unfounded optimism, The
"inspirational" approach tiat ,
attracts the college student
has no comearable appeal among
the inadequately educated lower
classes. . 7

Neither does a victory for
one party seem likely to have

SECRET

Page 8

SPECIAL REPORT

3 Mar 67

14-0000

ee he SECRET" 05 ee -
Yo : : No. Foreign Dissem ; .
. ' any ‘major effect oa--the fortunes - abilities, organizational talents,
: of another, What’ appears to : and approach to-local issues, In-
- : - . emerge .from CD gains ‘or. losses ~~. | ternational events count for lit-
: ‘in recent elections” isirather . -tle, and the influence of UDCA
' "solid. evidence that the national ‘| and the successful cD parties .for
parties: “will. sink er swim ‘on -the even less, (SECRET NO FOREIGN
basis’ of their own leadership - | BISSEM). © ;
t * *
I
my . _ SECRET ©
Le - ‘Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT 3 Mar 67 .

&

7 Fas yoy. Miori
uP : Mee

Bec wT

ey
valu.

25 wove. Ids ke
Use IGHACTO VALLAG-

at
31 Oct. 1906 Misi, Fla.
Res MDC OOS Loss IAL

30 SEPT. LOGE NeW Jersey
JGNAGIO VALLADARES RODIIGUEE

COMBLOENTLAL

29 dug. 1966 Aisri, Fla.
RE: Mpe SESST

UOnE Dom T TAL

14-00000,

REPOST. COVER SHEET” oa we SO] Lo reecesete Acrion

Te SLE. c. R ne hee wo eceeene
‘teow : . ° . Rrecar No, 4 2 secer oo . ‘
- ; xx oO nGe iuOCaIng Lo
H TE OF UG B97 8 _— hae ae
8A at. 1966 BTED SCPA@ATELY :
John. fe. TARDELL/ VA. wee eee ety eee ienenee we peed Ae
aFecovind ere souect caver i oe
. . g TENS CHSscurmar ion

CATeA AGENCY

1 ‘ .

2 - Santo Domingo - HDC

2 - Saatiago de les Caballe _ Customs

2- Caracas. vo Border Patrol |
2- Guatemala city HES : USCG

Seren dwenTay rata

TYPIC . /
. —_ . iT
SOURCE: AMOT-245 in AMOT reports. as follows: Para. 2: DD-1874 from
Palacio BARBEITE, 10 June 1966, and DD-1988, 6 July, from BARBEITE |
and Angel HERNANDEZ ; paras.. 3 to 7 and source comment 2, DD-1888;
para 3S and source comment 5, DD-1883, 23 June, which included a copy
of the document; para. 9: DD- 1892, 15 July, from HERNANDEZ, DD-1895,
21 July, from a conversation between HERNANDEZ and Jorge MAS, and -
DD- 1902? 3 August; para. 10, DD-1892, para. 11, DD-1874 from Ignacio
VALLADARES; source comment 1: DD-1874 and DD-1890, -8 July, from

Laureano BATISTA.
AMCRUMP-1's true name appears in this report. Information available

in his 201 indicates that he was "suspended" on 25. February 1966,
and there is ne record ef contact since that time. .

, . \ wf bey WSR

| Rn’ nae a ates Tf
| . ; Name’ "BATISTA Falla, Laureano
t

)%

Sex: M*
PPOB: 1 | May 1935, Havana, Cuba.
@ Cit : Cuban

Committee of MDC- at congress 25- 25- =27 Feb. 86, “trip to. Bee
‘on behalf of MDC, June 66. ? :

Group 3: Excluded from
. Automatic’ Downgrading
and Deciassification

¢ -3¢0-lo.

trap

—

TE WWE? Mh - - f copy

tates

14-0000

SECRET. .
Page’ two, of Cover Sheet cS oe | UFG-8873
Name: adi Arnaldo .
- Sex : ul.
a! Dros: 2.

Cit : . Cuban
Oce -or Status: Emigre in. DR.

: Yermerly wi
_ Name: Xfeewanvez Rojo, Angel.

. Nickname 2. Baby, El Baby. — a :
' Sex cr. ‘ oe oe

“Connection with Mpc base.

“:. DPOB: 4 Sept 33 Havana Cuba wae ma “ee
Cit : Cuban
Oce or Status: Emigre in Miamis Second: _in command _of military.
Ndept o : : .
Name: SA eparberte breyre, Placido A.
Sex: M.
DPOB: 19°Nov 38, Batabano, Havana Prov. Cuba.

Cit : Cuban _
\ Occ or Status: _Emigre in ‘Miami. _ _Chf_of military. ‘dept of ef MDC.
poe

‘Name: A feavactos: San Juan, Armando
Sex : M
_s : ;
Cit : - Cuban : - :
Occ or Status: .Emigre. President of MDC in Puerto Rico,

14.90000

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT. 2. ee |
. GPADING OF SCURCE A Completely relate : Lease cohapie Chey fetarte D Mer usualy seratie UY ONat cease (Appia : . &
fowaley, tage vou of man competence ‘: Folatsty sacre! be futged [Apes to! eevee rwhaenly ;

1 Contemed by onan -atecartent ond rolable sources 2, Probarly tue} Posutiy sine. 4 Dourtt 5, Prunably

me _ CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEH

APPS AISAL OF CONTING.
tua” 8 Corect ba weed.

COUNTRY Cuba/Dominican Republic _ REPORT NO.
. : laa, Leet. wa Lor Beatles ‘ . a oT
Suptct Gg Activities. of the MLGy Possibilitpare or rcost § August 1986
- - @f Reactivating a EaSe in the” © 7 re
Dominican RepubYic, Condition-of NO PAGES
_ Boats, Possible Alliances with:
Other Emigre Organizations . REFERENCES

DAILOF 29 May to late July 1966 a
INFO: . ff
oes United States, Miami | UFG-8973

DATE ACQ ep

SEADINGS AQT DIFINT i SEPRASAL OF CONTENT 1S EPStaD ve

fHis 1S VNEWALGATEO wiomear ce sy 424!
SOURCE, : , vo .
A member of a group of Cuban ¢migrés trained in the techniques.
of information collection. This group has provided useful
‘reports since 1961. _

(. Summary; Laureans Satt leader of the Movimiento Democrata Cristiano

Christian pb. ° Bitlety igin, 7, \-werhined to Miami from the
‘lan Democratic Movemcat), 7 +t avan _

Republie on ~vimlenty La:
ore he alles ment. red t, O Oempors t apt me
from the’ Chieg of jlegeuly Gbtalned pled ; Mtamt in late June 19bbe Fests? (Mie,

Be Air Forng, of the Dominte AP an the Comin ienn
the Dor an Vel=Castry wNdertaving.
ee : akings

Ltary aepartment of the mie ™ M2 the APPOVS1
hee iy Y en ily issued a .
z af!

énin
DRE) y and
Cored.

representg tives
. “Presentact on i

in :
tionary Lirsetorate (
Uanees Rave yet been

"WLM aopewen i ‘

(DRE) and the Cuban Representatzun ox =e,
alliances have been made. —_

2. Lauyeano Batista Falla, organization secretary of the National
Executive Comaittee of the MDC, left Miami on 6 June 1966 for . |
|

_ Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic, and returned. to, Miami
“on 26 Junot: On 29 June he met with other. leaders-of the MDC

vto inform them of the resulter of his trip#/’

cence - = EE WORE eee ae re ee : . : . we. - - -:
2 Batista said that during tkaxemm discussions held with Genéral Juan Ry Polen
| erez, Chief of the Air Forces of tha Dominic an Réfudic, he had requested Kxixktuxzenz-

foraounxw i Rochen Mia tha t Folch ate with the MDC ‘oy allowing the MDE 2. maintal

Base Luna leented at Estero: nnn re town of Pepillo ¥tug Salcedo (% natn

W 71-45) Y recordin nent. Batic seh a nduatexkinc,taibemee, 5 .. Geeo ts 19-43,

| mindicated nis wiissangness to cobpasav. weep ee
offered the following assistance, subject to the’ approval of |
President Balaguer, whom Folch said he will consult:

' CONTROLLED DISSEM
‘NO FOREIGN DISSEM

| "CONFIDENTIAL ot
|
i

e-/ DIA ARMY NAVY | AIR NSA_
SO #  USIA ( ) _T&NS (2) USA OO
WHC/SI | 1 E/IB/R::

FI 1
1 WHC/WAVE 1 E/MADR Day j
RE 3 WHC/CA ; re ; OS
cics Jj aoe ven’ .
1 CI/OPS/WH_ 2 WH/PACY(CINCSO) 1

|

i

i

ij RR
-

i

i

1

|

LS IE 2, CI 4, FI 3, CA'1, DO/H 1, Liaison _* a Ar are

14-0000

ee

| known. -' Hernande =

7 OARS “the “meeting zy Batista neported that dis

CONFIDENTIAL ;
CONTROLLED -DISSEH
NO FOREIGN DISSEH .

<2 1: ;

. UPS -8873

ae The use of five falets fac ing Santiago de ‘los Caballeros.
city for a military base. Sie),

-b. Authorization for MDC. personnel to move ineo- and out
ef the Dominican Republic in a Clandestine manner.

¢. Transportation of HDC war materiel from Miami aboard
- Dominiean Air Force planes. .
occasions gga
; Base Luna ‘and on seve rnd cons uy &%
go de los banter
reniuing {a Santlai re ee be the MDC
ARARTNER ELS RARE

. mud wen, Sohat he wad, violted
L. Btn GaULs ta cake tha x
fee Cuban wkpxiiomaaxd
talked “with Arnalso BACM? gs00, per month xkiex ann EXSY

who is. the recipient ee of Rage Luna, Basan, EF

Zepublic for the maintenant h Folehy was

te.the Dominkeas, sepy od als meu tint alth Folch, ‘

‘ d ranges Batiste : . eres

. men ARLES oH, with the La Salle Cole Or nim the

eee Santiag> Ze los Caballeros had made arranipc ee ns ap fase Tana.

Sf a house to be cccupled by the MUC mentur’ STN NN Jive neu gage arranges ssid
wants TOT he Housa which {s occupied by the MDC nemerp who

are in charge of Base’ ‘Luna?

S$. Batista. expressed enthusiasm regarding Folch's proposals, and
stressed the necessity of acting immediately, including. sending
‘MDC personnel to the Dominican Republic. He directed Angel -
Hernandez Rojo, second in command of the military department,
to prepare a plan to operate from the Dominican Republic, and
Placido Barbeite Freyre, chief of the military department, to
prepare an estimate of the cost of the plans in-ordaé’ that the
necessary money ean-be obtained.

eet hf cones

azty id @ ton af operational
Al thou th ‘Barbeite asreed with batista f regarding ‘the need tor prepara
plans’ “and an astizste. of the coe 1, wif ER RSRESREN SY LHHCOGK he basically PERK ABASARETS ne
Hatixtx opposed Satista! a advocation of initisting immediate action. He Polt tha na
the implementa tlo: f the plang until Balaguer's reaction Is a
of Barbeite. Ns SRNL LLRANRANANAN RESELL
ended without a solution to the ur cement.

to weeusu wa Qinome: a-

a at ghsckehp SRNL ARCH “The meeti z
vawemwes 2 sere Raenige Cwmuite - .
sension wathinx < exists peewee whth in the
Palnelos amaidux San :

ticularly he tween Arn

MDC in Puerto Files,

2 military

i 3 d. Perez! action with the ar ent that

plane und nett Sanuetmaneu military matters do not really fall RNLARXT RSH

within the scope of respons tbilitties of the a- ssident. cee ee ene
president. - a

Lawove fA tarbelte

a. The military department of the MDC set forth its views in a
‘document dated 29 May. This document included the following
- - pointe: ,

a. Discontent is becoming evident because of the lack of: 4
activity which, in turn, results from the lack of funds.
The sum mentioned is $10,090,5 — y |
Cig fae
b. No change in United States policy pefardiniactlex=
-apainst. (Cuba: fronm=tha-#-¢. is anticipated. A base of
operetions outside of the United States is considered
to be so vitally important that the military department
would be willing to operate an illegal base if the
resources were, made available.
|

Oo the condition of the boats is such that the MDC has no .
/- sea transportation. The beats are described as follows:

of CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO FOREIGN PTSSEM

B


14-0000

: CONFIDENTIAL .
CONTROLLED DISSEM 1.) 5,
“NO FORCIGN DISSEM — ~
-jJ- |

urG-e873

(1) The - CADELLO I ie. ‘docked acroes from Brito! s Boat Yard
at Stock Island, Flarida.6 The boat is in nead of.
repairs on the deck and superstructure, and the instal-
lation: of electronic navigational equipment would be.

aan required to put it in Operational condition. Current

...'. ° Gocking and routine maintenance costs are not being. .
' paid. Efforts’ toymake commercial usé of this boat have
a _ Not. been successful. This boat is considered ideal for

activities which might be undertaken if there were a

base from which to operate, but under the present cir-

cumstances the expense which this boat represents ig

not justifiable. -It is recommended that consideration

be given to selling the CADELLO I if an operational

base is not: established within four. months.

2) “The KYA- oRA? which was donated to the MDC by a nieubér
of the military department, is in drydock at Nuta‘ 8.)
Boat Yard. in Miami. There are leaks in the hull.

-(3) | The LANCHA AzuLeis in need of repairs, as well as trailer.
Repairs on this boat are being given priority, and will
‘proceed as money becomes availiable.

d. Informal discussions have been held with representatives- of :
“the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE, Students? . a
Revolutionary’ Directorate), and there is an "agreement in
“principle” to coordinate future actions. There is no political
commitment. . :

9. In July JorgeMas Canosa, chief of press and propaganda of Representa-
cfion Cuban; en el Exilio (RECE, Cuban Representation in Exile),
‘proposed that the MDC enter into a pact with RECE, and indicated
that some members.of MDC wiit' be offered full-time employment
preparing military plans for the RECE. As of late July. no formal
agreement had been reached. : y military

saumeLl’? is incapable of formating 9Y) aeetude

that Ramon Font Se MUC and gECE “par Ww

. > ho feels atween tne HornandeZ
10, Hernandes, © tion of 4 pact betw tiitary operations.

org the Pormat1o Jans for m > ent of the
sbratepy, favors ration of P e the military 1 okich he currently

ipating in the aeanie reorganization of

wh
pans {0 ee a leas Important post thon than that

Font. from par rtic

‘aid that he :
ane Cin rder to replace Barbe ite in |
MUC in a-eey wepartment ‘orxtne re “4h order” ~
pane - ~maweacte from his present. position to an unimportant

aid position in the department.

eeIn early June Ignacio Valladares Rodriguez?” lexpressed a desire
to participate in action against Cuba with the MDC. Barbeite™
agreed to inform Valladares when an operation isfto be carried
out. Before Valladares left Miami on 6 June for Dover, New
Jersey, he said that within a month he would send a 57mm récoil-

~less rifle, a 50-caliber machine, -gun, and an unstated number of
M-1 and Garand rifles. His address in Dover is Dover Cliff

Apartments, apartment 21.

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED PISSEM
NO FORETGN DTSSEM.

eee away aguas. Rie

x: hen . 7
ea gop Ve, pce cc darPatpe_

14-0000

ov

8,

Field Comments.

6.

oe es tne

UFG-8473

Scurce Comment, At the tise of his departure, Batista told.
the executive ‘committee that he was Going directly to Caracas,
Nenezuela. It was not until after his return that it was
Yearned that he had not gone to Caracas or to Guatemala as

he had planned. He later explained that while he was in
Puerto. Rico he telephoned his relative in Guatemala and was
informed that the latter had "failed in his efforts." or

Field Comment. Presumably ke was referring to.an interview
with. President- Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro which Batista
hac earlier’ said had been arranged by his cousin... (Cf. :
UECHRAIa ae So

~ wh re we aes

Headquarters Comment: In early August 1964, Folch was reported o
ad : Be T T ic; XXBX ? ;
-Rave been in charge of Dominican 3x . Soot area See
i C y ; in the Monte Cris
Hee aE6G Pe peSpn 8te/0e MAS, Another source reported
‘ MeV LIP ULELL“090.-

: aSproximate ly 30 Cuban exiles were taking

that i sptember 1964 > e Lak lt
training at Sitchinp near Punta Presidente(N 19-47, W 71-46) Ace
: eT

BEART Py se Wa ve bee wise ac HEIMU lee. a

The location of the house was not given.

Source Comment. The document, as originally drafted, was
modified because Barbeite felt that the’ tone was too strong.
. Also, the amount of money requested was reduced to $10,000.

Field Comment. An earlier report from the same source
reported that the document was being prepared, and that ; . S
$75,000 would be requested. (Cf. . UFS-8327)9 Goer Bufoy radii)

we + _

The CADELLO I (FL 7579 F), an 83-foot boat, is a former
U.S. Coast Guard patrol boat.: The boat yard referred to
is the Syncrolift Boat Yard on Stock Island which is owned
by Mike Brito. Stock Island is on U.S. Highway 1, between
Key West and Boca Chica. . -

The KYA-ORA, or KIA-ORA, has Florida registration FL 8665 E..

The LANCHA AZUL has been described as a high-speed launch.
(Cf. UFG=-83223,. Besides the CADELLO I, the. MDC has been

reported to own the VICKY I, a blve V-23; the FUNCHIN CHIA
(FL 9256 SC), a 33-foot boat; and BERNARDO IT. -

Font is chief of military operations_of.Comandos L, which
Je

has an alliance with RECE. (C£.\ UFG B423K oe ' Bvafapaen€b

Valladares arrived in Miami on 27 May with weapons which
he gave to the MDC. He offered to Supply ‘weapons to the
MDC and the Association of Veterans of the Bay of Pigs
(Brigade 2506). - . og

CONFIDENTIAL an
CONTROLLED DISSEM Co
“NO FOREIGN DISSEM


by | a

JEL

ba re be level
| na eau :

7 fan be Blaha
» JAC Cex

14.90000

Chief, VD

ef BO. files whi

BECRET

chief of Station, JMVAVE a. ae

ADMIN/TYPIC ae eo .
Station Files on Cuban Countorrovolutionary and Krile Organizations

REVEABNCE: UFGT=16343,.32 Hay ‘1966

1. Wo are returning Voluso VII of the MDC file which you sont
with tho reference ior Headquorters to review as # sanple of a group
ch ere §£ro longer useful to the Station. Headquarters

appreciates your interost in this aspect of yecords improvenont,

considering the neod
until IDENTITY, & KUBARKK employee who is retiring scoop but is nou
engaged in writing historical studies, con visit the Station to

survey those files with others.

; 2, IDENTITY plans to visit SMBAVE for several days about the
end of July to size up and review certais records for writing & -
history of tho Station. Therefore; wa would like the 80 packgrourd
files to be left intact for bis visit. Afterwards & decision will
po made on thoir rotiresent. or other dispesition. .. ’

ng the files is critical wo will authorise

fer your holding thes
h cited above.

3. If space for stort
forwarding thea to Headquarters, but will pre
temporarily to assist with the historical researc

Claude F. GOTTFRIED |

Attachzent:
‘Ll. Identity, u/s/c
2. MDC File, bh/o

Distribution: .
§-COS/JNHAVE, w/att. 1& 2

UPGS-8308
i,j BB eRET

Le

1-WH/RNO, w/att.} _WH/RNO ROBL C. WILSON/pap

1-WH/C/ESEC, w/fatt.1
1-8/C/CA/PP, w/att.1
1-Historical Staff .
c/mH/c/CA/PP | STEPHEN G. CHACONAS

C/WH/C/CA
c/wH/c/M0

for retrieval, but would like to defer a decision’

IDENTITY

Stivcl

SEPANATE COVER ATTACHAENT

TO UyGS-6308
Paul Loob

:

Lo. \


14-0000

“f

a. Loot, : . _ 7 oe
“ a . AO pr —
. os Ono: : oo AO PIS a Ta wiles Csi o
5 7Q FILE NO. eo MESSAGE - rorat comics tor. te
To WILE WO. . .
REPROMK TimW FROCK IBITED

‘ut ao acy. vo seance () - -
 pestaor Osis. _

ADrANce COPY -

oO tsewee o serves EO vous

Teme ger ews See mee ee

SECRET 2109072
“Lima INFO DIR CITE VAVE 0321 7 Ul u
TYPIC a™MOP ' none Ay deg ,

“sREF Aw WAVE wek39790)"
B. DIR 75895 .
ANMOP-1, IDEN, DEPARTING MIAME @22¢ HRS 21 APRIL ON

(es Cia leek 25- -2¢ APRL,

PERUVIAN AIRLINE FLIGHT 55 TO ATTEND REF CONFERENCE.
SECRET ,

- FN @321 0831 75595 avMOP-1- MIAMI @233 HRS 21 PEPUVIAN 65

” «SECRET


14.90000

4
Inctae Ores, Des.
cuasstey yo Fae nO.
H-mUeTO FILE BO.
one ncO eer.
ocsteov: (si.

te arancn

SECR ET 2109172
LIMA INFO DIR-CITE WAVE 2322
_  TYPIC AMMOP .
4, REF WAVE 9321 | (wo 002s) ~
apens ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ, MDC SECRETARY

ad

FOR INTERNATIONAL RE ELATIONS.

s E: CRET oe
CFN 9322 9321 ERNESTO RODRIGUEZ DIAZ MDC
2 SEORET


14.90000

ec

fy
waters a HR - oO. woo _ se .
cuaseee to Ht NO. : ‘quasi ted nest

a 1. We NO. ono
red act. ro eas O
soy One. —_ = ~

: - se P apvance coey oa Hi
ow ¢ @aw corr | O  GanmOond |

we £- : PS Taos.

Wa Dd Of o

actTio®’

seb UK BA IDiso1e:

SDOM INFO DIS CITE vaVe e198 a pee pe

; a boats 7 S80

DYVOUR ARTOP o
be ANCEIE=1 CIDEN) CONTACTED BY DULCE DE LA MAZA
RODRIGUEZ, NIECE CF PRSC LEADER ANTONIO ROSARIO, “HO

TRAVELEL THROUSK JMWAVE AREA. DE LA NAZA HAND CARRIED

LEITER TO AXCEIS=2 ‘DATED 4 APSIL FROM FRANCISCO CORDOVA,
PS’SC CECY OF INTL” AFFAIRS, WRICH REGUESTED AMCRIB~1- ARRANGE
FOS JPURCHASE ail ‘SHIPMENT OF TWO OR THREE USED CARS TO FE
USED FOR PREC PRESIDE: TIAL ELECT I0i: ACTIVITIES In DONREP. .
LETTER WAS ACCUMPANIED WITH £14EF 70R PUR CHASE - “AND

SHLPHENT cc=ts GF iCARS. ;
a ANCS IF = TELEPHOWED RCEANIO EVENING LE APRIL TO > . ,

CCNFIFE LETTee ar D AGREED TO PROVIDE AID IN PROCUF LG cans.

Roe SARIO [NFCRISE Agr TEI TRAT HE EXPECTED RECEIVE RONT-

NAT 108 AS PSES [ENTIAL CANE IDATE OF PRSC AT PARTY ASSEXELY .

oi 17 APRIL Aus STATED rE “OULD SELECT CESAR ESTRELLA AS HIS.
RUS SK ING MATE. FosAaR 10 ALSO, INDICATED HE EXPECTED SOME -

“ELECTORAL euPFOr T FRc UNSPECIFIED NUMPER OF APJ HEEBERS.

sec ET 5 et

dog EN REY Taper PP cer or crnecrsbtnie oo a

e
y

anes

a


~~ yt
t
lle pace 2
! <n :

i ‘CF 19a ANCRIB-1 DULCE DE LA PAZA RODRIGUEZ PRSC ANTONIO ROSARIO

rome Oe gee cee en,

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

JHWAVE AMCRIP=1 4 FRANCISCO CORDOVA FREC “1 FRSC DOMREP sane
“lott =a PRSC 17 CESAR ESTRELLA Ara . |

PT

}

i

NWN
.
'
|

| | ’


14-0000

!
4 ee
\ +
ye
che 4
» ft ?
4, ‘,
te 2
7 r

Bovance COPY

| pyvouR ator fa mo a
| REF: WAVE 0194 G79 Y )
me}

NTE,
OF
SBC

apa RS COVE ARTOIS OED ONE

: IDEN JESUS wniguLo cLEt
‘DEMOCRATA CRISTIANO

SECRET

CRIST LANG CUBA Ss ic ;

BT

BHEN

. _U reeves. :

CFNs 3195 194 sesus ANGULO CLEMENTE HOVIMLENT

— “geen dcuer 10N: PROM IBITED

Tire = pie

SECRETARY oF rovinieNto we

eat

acs

0 -DENOCRATA


he X aN { a
ore Pre Ose Nuassieteo message 17
ceasotey To FIle Ad. —-

RA FO Ce we,
eree oo) oer. 10 posure Oo
vestooy Clare,

Torat copiers (aa

eae

fy as:

C) RID Copy
as =
Mic.

Jaovance copy

Qo toeves Cacorres Dace

M+
“"“S"E CRE 1416542
DIR INFO LIA QUIT CITE WAVE 0167

TYPIC AMMoP -
REFs WAVE o132 ( add Rut ye
AMCRIB-1 RECEIVED AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND

WILL DEPART 9245 HOURS 14 APRIL FoR LIMA. HE NSTRUCTED

MONITOR ALL EVENTS For DESRIEFING ON RETURN,

SECR ET KE MaAET RI Pde ewe Fo ~ .
ATTEMOASCE enn CMe init BOSAL!

CFNt 9167 9132 AVCRIB-1 9245 14 LIMA
BT

SECRET

NNNN


1400000

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED.

! i “ew rE i- 1a1orad. Dott ont S ; a ee . ee :

Sf). b . pir iro Lima uit CITE WAVE 68 oe ou, oo
TYPIC AMMOP = oe . Viva te. Yb626

REFs WAVE 0167 (w ee # a SO

. IDEN: “JULIO MONCAGATTA- SO a 7

SECRET. :
CFNr 9168 9167 JULIO MONCAGATTA SECRET

BT

SARS ACER EES RN BREN, SORE QR EIMEEY SO BETTE EN om oy DES URNRERAEN E T

NNNN-

WET cw tet mame net,


1400000 ,

"TSE ORE T 1416542 7

- ; DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE ais?
° : TYPIC “AMMOP .
| > REFS WAVE sao f 9 gud We . .
: ‘AMGRIB- 1 RECEIVED. AIR TICKET THRU IDEN EFFORTS AND

WILL DEPART 245. ‘HOURS 14 APRIL FOR Lima. neglisteucteo
po” _ MONITOR ALL EVENTS FOR DESRIEF ING’ ON RETURN.

' SECRET ..« KE PRETRI Bra Fite Pow
iy Bo : PETS WERE — yguap Cait end DEM *

CFNe 167 @132 ANCRIB-1 245 14 LIMA
"BT

EV Ob yy ane

Paral

PER IAY tase a at ten

SECRET

Pos

NNN


14-0000

:
2

POS gt stamtastone

i Ove On 7a
4

cuaserre™ 10 rie woe
A av ‘ta: eit 0.

ead ao wer. to-eaance (J |
. oesiaoy Oine. :

‘BORE i 1410242 —

DIR INFO LIMA QUIT CITE AVE 2168 eens
Lei eeentrera.)

TYPIC. AmMoP
REF: WAVE 0167 (0 SLi. AS

IDENs JULIO “‘MONCAGATTA

SECR ET
CFN: 0168 @167 JULIO MONCAGATTA > “SECRET
BT

NNNN


14-0000

| Chief of Station, Santiago

DISPATCH |

_ Chiefy, WH

a
oP
=
—

Chief. of Station guwave ¢
mucT: AMMOP/Operational :

Ht © AMMOP Circular Letter to Identity A Leaders and Org anizations
. ASTRON REQUIRED - REFERENCES

AR: FYI
REF: WAVE 9784

: ‘1. -As indicated.in reference, the ANMO> organization on
1S March 1966 sent a circular letter based on Fidel Castro's
13 March speech to Identity A individuals and organizations.
The. letter, which was signed and composed by AMMOP/1 and which)
was accompanied by transcripts of the speech, condemned Castro's
attack on Chilean President Eduardo Frei; requested ‘support for
. Frei's position; and asked the recipients to join the struggle
maintained by the Cuban people to overthrow Fidel Castro and
prepare for the freedom of Cuba from Communism.

2. The youth wing of the ANMOP firoup, headed by ANCRIB/1,
mailed a letter to its Identity A youth contacts. based on the
13 and 20 March speeches by Fidel Castro along the lines cited
above. Included in this letter were the strong anti-Castro
, statements made by Identity B. Copies of both letters dre for-
warded. under separate. cover, a .

, 3. According to AMMOP/1, his letter was retlayed by FUSEE
and was the basis for an article ina pares newspaper by

Identity C. vo .
Do Nevin ile RE ak

lip G. =LMAR

Attachments: a
A. Identities - u/se. tie
B. Cys of Ltrs - u/se.

Distribution:
“3 - WH/C w/atts :

Santia 4 ve itts —_ Da F
32 CRA att a ts — 76.6 a

*Please furnish HOS Fi

Boa _ ; - 3 hea Bae 18
“Chase serene 7. — | pesmaten $1680 Bow - Ton ART RE
UFGA-28893 31 March 66
GASSFGATON SP SE RE MOE a
SECRET « | .

meee mae

SETAE 2a Pot I tee ue PR  RUROY ee ce  ee ReE ee e cae

o
Sy oe
a . . ‘
. “ SECRET ‘
To witle
'U/se att JA to | |
UFGA-24893
IDENTITIES; A, Christian Democratic Party
B. Alfredo Lorca
C. Jorge Roman
GALLE
Ercleees tro automate
toner yey 4g
Cet vee ae
SECRET yn
£3 Guey
S “lo. a 4

+e ety Q


. Cad
SEAS JOS 0 Vala Gia ioe”
1 2 | "ada
Marzo 15 de 19660. QDR NDS
Phe awe NAN
WO Lae TRMIISIUE STARA A BA a ok

Estimaco demdédcratacristiano:

cepia literal del discurso pronuncia-

el

Después de leer una
t en la escalinata de la Universidad de La Habana,

do por Castro,
pasaco 13 de marzo, me considero obligado con el Gobierno, el Par-
taco Demécrata Cristiano y el pueblo chileno, que fueron innoble-
mente atacados por Castro durante el transcurso de su alocuci6n, a
expresar mi opini6n con relacian a dicha ofensa.

Digo obligadc, porque el hecho de ser demécratacristiano
cubano, integrante de esa gran comunidad de seres humanos que un

ifa se dieron a la tarea de realizar una revoluci6én en libertad y
gue lamentablemente vieron tronchadas sus aspiraciones al compro-
bar que las mismas eran ahogaéas por la sangre vertida en los pa-
redones de fusilamientos por hérces como Porfirio Ramirez, Presi-
Gente de la FEU de la provincia de Las Villas en Cuba y el Dr. Hum
bexrto Sori Marfn, Comandante éel Sjéreito Rebelde y autor de la
Ley de Reforma Agraria: debe servirme de experiencia para
ar lo que pienso decir a través de estas lineas. Digo obli-
porque en igual forma que nosotros hemos pedido en milti-

Po]

ples oportunidades, colaboracidn y solidaridad con nuestra lucha,
solicitud que lamentablemente no ha sido respondida por algunos,
alegando unas veces desconocinients y otras imputdndonos incom-
prensiss con el "proceso revolucionario" que se est4 llevando a

cabo on Cuba, no queremos que an esta oportunidad en qua son los
NDS

eros Chilenos los que necesitan Ge nuestra solidaridad, va~

yamos a encontrar a alguien que por desconocimiento, no se decida
X respaldar péblicanente al Gobierno, Partido y pueblo-de Chile
cfvica y valiente adoptada frente a las ofensas ex-

entre las cuales trans-

uw

das por “Castro durante su discurso,

cribimos las siguientes: "A decir verdad, siempre he cceido que
Frei es un representante de la burguesfa chilena, que su gobier-
no es un gobierno de la burguesfa. Jam&s he creido que Frei vaya

a Racer ninguna revoluci6én".... posteriormente, al referirse a

los Sucesos provocados por los comunistas en la mina de cobre del”
Saivasor donde murieron varias sersonas dijo: "Frei es un reaccio
Marie Fr

ari rei ha cemostrado con este hecho, no ser un individuo de
mano ‘irme, sind un individuo (‘cobarde, que abusa del poder,......


14-0000

o's . + ‘ . vo , 27 a = . - web
a

we ‘ : to ae ce “ . ; :
# te Freilha démostrado ser un mentiroso. Frei ha demostrado ser tun pe~ |
os litiq:ero vulgar que para justificar su saAguinario gesto, trata {
.*. de culpar a°la Tri-Continental. Frei se desenmasgeata. Frei demues- - iz

eb... fa, Fa al ‘pueblo.de Chile y al mundo qué tipo de revolucign es la

aa of . ue va a hacer,.qué tipo de gobierno es ‘el que.va a llevar adelan-
7 “7° t@. Es decir, no una revolucién sin Sangre, sin6.una pol{tica de’.

"| |" Sangre sin-revoluci6n; sangre sin revoluci6n, esa es la polftica

: Ce Frei,.sangré.sin revolucién, ese es el gobierno de Frei, sangre

‘sin revolucién, esa es la polftica de la Alianza -para el -Progreso*.

i : : : oo ;
j ; _ Después de estas expresiones, no podemos menos que salirle = j
edd cee, al ‘paso a Castro y a la camarilla qué desgobierna hoy a Cuba, e ©
: instar y pedir mayor colaboracién ‘con los patriotas que hoy ofren-
; “Gan sus vidas por liberar a Cuba, a fin de evitar no solo la con-
: tinuada masacre de cubanos que se lleva a cabo en la Isla, -sino
; ; tambien. ponerle’ fin a todos estos incidentes bochorhosos para la
ie : historia, en los que aparece un cubano, ofendiéndo publicamente
ante el. mundo_a.un Presidente, a un Partido y’a un pueblo que a
contrario sensus de lo que 61 esta haciendo en Cuba, sf est4 rea-
lizando una revoluci6én en libertad, s{ ha defendido en todo momen
to el sano nacionalismo, s{ se ha puesto de frente cuantas veces
las circunstancias lo han requerido a los’ oligarcas y explotado-
res. : : 2 :

Para’ terminar, s6lo me queda reiterarle, que en nombre de
la solidaridad que une a todos los dem6cratacristianos, exprese
pablicamente, su deséo de colaborar con la lucha que mantiene el

‘pueblo cubano por derrocar al castrocomunismo y poder realizar en
Cuba, una verdadera revolucién en libertad, asf como su xespaldo
ala actitud asumida por el Gobierno, el Partido Demécrata Cris-

tiano y el pueblo chileno-en los actuales momentos,

SMe ee tes ene me Rhee ae eg Baad Say

oe : ' Pendiente de su_atencién y respuesta y dejando constancia
‘@e mi mayor consideracién, quedo suyo “

be

i - Corddalmente,

: . X
or . . So : . : Sil
ro. : ot . ODS) oj
i a)
| Ernesto ‘Rodriguez

; 7 ; . Sec. de Relaciones/T ternacionales del
a " : MDC Cuba


14.99000

thwnte a

TRESS ore ado oO nee une ea HY

. AS

i

:
PUVERTUS: 222 seauraca lst 14M be cus. no - - 7 | .
1732 We. Tun Sty ,
wad, FUL U. ‘. A - . + Miami, “Marzo 17 de 1966

\
'
L
Pye
{

Estimaco cozipafiero: . .
La JDC de Cuba, fiel al pensamiento de nuestro Apostol
Jos6 Mastf{ que.dice:“ver en silencio un -crimen es cometerlo”, no
ha queziéo marginarse del dato que Castro quicre hacerle a la
_ Revolucign en Libertad, que estd realizando el Presidente Eduar-
‘Go Frei, su Gobierno y el Partido Demécrata Cristiano de Chile. |
Consciente de que es posible que no te hayan llegado
muchas galas informaciones relacionadas con los innobles ata-
ques pfblicos de Castro a Frei y su Gobierno, ‘calificdndo al Pre
sidencte de “representante de la burguesf{a chilena", "reaccionario’
“mimado del imperialismo yanqui y guardian de sus intereses en
Chile".....etc. Hemos. querido comunicarte, no s6lo los ataques de
Castro a Frei, sino una de las muchas respuestas que se le’ han.
Gado & castro. Nos referimos a la que en dias pasadds hiciera el
“Diputsce Dem6crata-Cristiano Chileno, Alfredo Lorea y que a con~
tinuaciSa sranseribimos “Realmente, Fidel Castro es un caso dig-
mo de andlisis. Hace pocos dias atr&s, segGén expresaron @iputa-
é€os que estuvieron en Cuba, Castro dijo que Frei era un gran Pre-
sidente. agregd que si el hubiera estado en Chile, habrf{a hecho
lo mismo cue Frei, :
Pero ahora, porque se le ha tocade la epidermis ‘dela
Tri-Ceontinental, Frei se transforma en un Castro Cualquiera,.
Yo-estuve en Cuba -afiacdi6é Lorca- en 1959 cuando Castro
subi6é si poder,-En esa ocasi6n le pregunté al ver a tantos hom--
armados, si pensaba reorganizar al ejército. Y 61 me contes-
t6, con ese modo tan tropical: “chico, armas para qué cuando se.
tiene al pueblo", |
7 Sin embargo, -afladi6. Lorea- en los siete afos gue Fidel
ene al pueblo detras de 61, anda mds armhado que un militar en

ty
4
0
un
a]

i
plena guerra. En Chile, todos los Presidentes que yo recuerdo, los
Co , V2;
Ccta dal manana, . . rs Semocrata- Cristiana

14-0000

Wy tee xe

Moet cage

?
i
i
i

integrs, puro y extremadamente justo",

. .. *2 . : :
; . oo “et . °
radi cates, el Sr. Thsiter,. el St. Alessandri, ci ‘propio Sr. Froi,
hea rvecsrrido todo el pais sin gendarme, ni pistoleros a sueldo
como dius que ugilica Castro. —_

--6-

- No se puede dacir que Frei sea un cobarde, un “ment iroso -
Youn 6Gspota como Fidel Castro afirma - anadié Lorca- . En cambio
1 ests resguarcacs por metralletas y no pucde dormir, ni se le”
conoée zomicilio rijo porque los hijos de logs muertos en ol pare-

-@6n le Suscan. Adends ~puntualiz6 Lorca- vale la pena, destacar que

nadie sc ha-ido de Chile. En cambio, es ptiblico y notcrio que mas
ee 206 G20 personas han huido del paraiso fidelista. Y ma atrevo. ,
a pen2:r que si Fidel Castro diera libertad a quienes quieren irs

.8e de Coda, se quedarfa-solo con sus barbas y su hermano: Radl,

Camilo Cienfuegés ya no ést4. Dicen que se cayé de un avién.
‘Pinalmente, Lorea recordé el caso del que fuera Presiden-

te ‘ee 06 tribunales populares de Cuba, Sorf Marf{n."Es un. hombre *
decf{a Castro de 61. “Estoy

porgue

sSegure cze nOnea condenarfa‘a quien no mereciera la pena de muer-

‘

te". Si. obstante una mafana amaneci6 de mal genio.y el Sr. Sort
Marin convirti$ en un agente de la Central de Inteligencia de
los Es722dos Unidos. Resultado: hizo fusilar a ese hombre puro,

{Integrs y justo."

Estas palabras, expuestas por el Diputado D.c. Alfredo
Lorca, sefalando algunas de las muchas contradicciones de Castro,
ratizigea una vez mis lo que la JDC de Cuba a través de sus di- —
2, le ha venido diciendo a toda la juventud demécrutacris~
ae América y que hoy, con m4s fuerza y moral’ que niinca nos
pedirte en nombre de la solidaridad que nos une, que ex-=
blicamente tu respaldo a la Revolucién en Libertad que
lizando el Pueblo, Gobierno y Partido Demécrata Cristia
ale as{ como tu golaboracién a la lucha que mantiene el

riger.t
tiana
permite
pongas
viene +

Consciente de que nuestra. solicitud sera escuchada por
tf, y Seguros de que nos dar4s a conocer la atencion que has de
_Prestazle, quedo a tu entera disposicién

oa om an!

AD Cpe pee Oe
ipo a7 ae

ot _ Jesas Angulo
; _ Presidente de la JDC de Cuba

a

14-00000

f

iwoeae Cy ees Dono : . RB }
_ CLASSIFIED Me JSAGE : TOTS. COP LES 3

CLASSIFY TO FIRE Ne.
ReREP TO PERE NOL
gare ain) ocr. to ozasce (J
cestooy (J sic.

Aovance Copy

— Oscars Diroree Chive
ial varia, eae, walenoe, cnlo4, Fueihwr, ciloa, ahez

Te . ~ 7
. 7 J, 2” Co
= ice =“ ae
SECRET 0422502 ( Aeiey Ame a, C hala

DIR INFO LIMA QUITO CITE: WAVE 9231 CINGHURST ACTING) CL

TYPIC ANMOP

REF A DIR 75895 #

B WAVE sosa(¥ 517° 7G
ANCRIB-1 ADVISED BY IDEN A THAT REF A LIMA CONFERENCE

Wa .82790

te
SCHEDULED FOR 23-26 APRIL, PRECEDED BY YOUTH SEMINAR 15-22 APRIL.

2. AMCRIB-1 HOPES OBTAIN TICKET THRU EFFORTS OF IDEN Bo
IF NOT SUCCESSFUL, STATION PLANS FINANCE AMCRIB-1 TRIP TO ;
ATTEND ROTH MEETINGS UNLESS ADVISED CONTRARY. é
3, AMMOP INVITED IDEN C, 201-749991, FORMER WAVE ASSET
WORKING IN QUITO, ATTEND REF CONFERENCE AS MEMBER AMMOP DELE-
GATION. IF IDEN C ATTENDS, WILL PAY OWN WAY,
4. PLS NOTE AMCRIB-1@ OF REF B SHOULD BE AMCRIB~1.

SECRET *asenen SHEesTIAN DEMOCRATIC OCNGKESS Scnzoied Usain
~14 ™MakKCH

CFN @031 15895 523.4 AMCRIB~1 A A 23=26 APRIL 15-22 APRIL AMCRI3-1

B NOT SUCCESSFUL AMCRIB-1 AMMOP C 281-749991 AMMOP C AMNCRIB-19

B AMCRIB-1 near
SECitE

BT

14-0000

-weREP TO FILE WO,

~ |

woerr Oves Ono wey
{ CLASSIFIED MESSAGE”

CLASSIFY TO FILE NO.
[26 SECRET TREES

PERSON UNIT ROTIFITO

ere avo) eer. 10 sosuce O
oestioy Oaie.

AOVANCE COPY .
vs! RD COPY CD issees Charerres O)ruseo

SECRET 242232 . . RO

DIP INFO LIMA QUIT CITE WAVE 0032 ecg NN tats. 99798

TYPIC 4MMOP \

REF WAVE 923 I(ta/ ¥ 7720)
IDEN A. UTUOC
IDEN B. JULIO MONEAGATTA, JUDCA SECY. GEN.
ENC, JOSE M. ILLAN

SECRET

CFN 9832 O231 A UIJDOC B JULIO MONEAGATTA JUDCA SECY GEN ¢

JOSE M ILLAN

8T

14-00000 ' 1 . Po . Nm re we -
i i . ° a
ane
4
4 -
‘ 7 ; . — . -
. —— = =.
% REPORT COVER SHEET “SECRET OP vy erceessing scr ion
‘ ‘ : } . ; . . ;
. qrese Noe aa a “Teaver sneer
: WACKED FOR INCERIEG -
: “leat oF Sacroet -— NO ISTEXING ACQUIRED
. 1 | 15_ February 1966 . ors Cata mePORTED SUP ARATELY
. 1y : veoute? aa meen wees ae _ ——
- a i . . . des DISSEMINATION .
‘alt ' “[souace “caver remem wanes Cee rt a
T TLON
ik -AVOT- 245 . ect OISSEMINATLO
\. Io FIELO DISTRIBUTION |.
he ~ERTRAS AGENCY
fp. -
il | 2.- Caracas | — .
| | 2-Lima . ae + ue
be 2 - Santiago Ms Tt .USCG
i 1. 2) - Bogota . : -
i, ; SUPPLEWENTAL DATA Sout foo
i ae .
Hi Jt .
iL, TYPIC Le
{ x .
7 | SOURCE: anor- 245. in DD-1768, 11 February 1966. Field Comment 2
yoyo. |p was received from AMCRIB-10, "orally, on 14 February.
| |. RID: No Index
Vd : .
1 y: .
i :
He i .
Pt . .
1 af —
J Group 1: Excluded from
' ' Automatic Downgrading:
and Declassification ’
ye i .
| |
hed
- J 4
ohr,
fe |
M4 |
|
Wy SSS AWG7 Eee ;
They ' : ERTTHONS
i ‘ r
yad '
1°
4
vf ;
i
i i
toa i
|


1400000

’ COUNTRY
yore

SUBJECT

' DATE: ACO.

4
‘
be
i
Hl

“GRADING OF SOURCE: A: Comencey,revigtis 8: Umut reliable.

. to soi

‘wources).

1. 84 to 27 February 1966 "ROPAGES 0D.

, REFERENCES
care OF Barly February 1966 ,
PLACE & .. United States, Miani _ UFG-7960

rhe

Field Comments;

1.

4 2.

res of doubitul honesty or <aeily. regardless 41 mar ceinpetence).

SALOF CONTENT: 1: Condemed ty other indapennart ara reviapie sources. Piytably true” 2:-Poisibly true. & Dowtttud Probably: ”
aa & Cannot be judged, ” 5 - a :

Cuba

Christian Desocratic Hovemont
to Hold Congress in Hiani,

(7_to 14 Febru

“THIS WS UNEVALUATED INPORMaTION SOURCE GRADIN

_A member of a group of Cuban emigres-trained in the techniques
of information collection.
reports since 1961.

"- whe Moviniento Democrata Cristiano (UDC, ‘Christian Democratic:
a Movement) in Miami will hold a congress from 24 to 37
“a 1966.
| ~-enile, Colombia, and Germany will attend the congress,

2. “The HDC is preparing to hold elections for positions en the
executive comnittes. : . .

_-invitations had been extended to delegations From these

. from Peru, which only acknowledged receipt of the invitation,

a

FIELD-INFORMAZION REPORT...”
Gi Feiete peer'e, © G& Not ususty rovoble, E: NM petiage—. (Apotied
fF; Rehazoy cannot be judged Apphed to uatestes o Favtheientty

"+ CONPIDENTIAL «__

REPORT NO, 0 PR eA

DATE CF REPORT 15. February 1966

1965:

OR ARE DEFINITIVE, APPAAIBAL OF CONTENT 18 TENTATIVE.

The group has provided useful

February —
Delegations of Christian Democrats fron Venezugla, Peru,

‘The Bighth ‘National Congress of the MDC was held in Miami
from 19 to 21 February 1965. Delegations from Puerto Rico .
‘and Mexico attended. ' (Cf, CSDB-312,/007 90-65) :
Another: source, who is a member of the MDC,’ reported that . 7

countries, but that no replies have been received, except

CONFIDENTIAL
CONTROLLED DISSEH‘
HO DISSEM ABROAD


