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Som

_ Rationallomomatische P Por tel Deutschlands (tational Denceretic Party of Gerrieny) © oo

- . Combined Deutsche Rechtspar tei, Deutsche Reichsparte4,” the arlit off Sozdalistiche
Reichspartei and - the Deutsche Pertei.

In August 1%4 ven Thaden arranged a meeting with other r‘pht-wingers to promote
unification of all nationalist forces. Friedrich Thielen serveé as both front .

man and financial backer. A committee of 10 drafted a constitution which. was

accepted in November 1964 by representatives of the DRP, LF, GL? and the DVNP (Deutsche~ |

National Volkspartei). The DRP officially disolved in L:certer 1965 although the .

NPD had, ‘n-fact, lone been the nationalist party. At the 2] larch 197 mect

of the NPD Fxeeut’ ve Comittee, the more moderato Thielen (forrer Deutsche Partei

waa oustod from the NPD by the more extreme vor Thaden forces (€RP).. There vas

no major rush to leave the MhPD,however. Recent reporting hes indicated that those : :
who did leave the LPD,even including Thielen, are being invited back into the NPD. ‘ ;

vee hoe

aod

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meee ttetie oe ABR aka RR PE

akan chee eee


14-00000

ou ‘Buntestag Blections 1985 i NID's. first Effort 664,187 votes = 2%
ns 2: by “March 1%, cor=unal Slectiars, ‘Schleswic- In nD communities where
ee Folstein. - (ND Hae directive NPD ran candidates,
Reb. to rarticinate, ‘A few-did)° averared 10.5% of vote
. commared with 6% in same.
. towns in 1965,
“3. 13 March 196, Bavarisn Couns! Elections 1.6 % of total Bavarian
: NPD nafor effort ecncentrated vote but: :
ealy in Franconia. Middle Franconia = °.
. Ansbach ~ 5.1%
. Erlangen - 8.2%
Mirnberg- 7.3%

oo, . ; Sewhabach-5 6%
. . . Upper Franconia

: : Bayreuth - 8.2%

we ; Coburg - 5.3%
ee : Kulmbach - 5.38

_ & + 2 village mayors
3.9 % (1.8% in 195
No candidates elected

+

“he 27 March 1966 Hanburg Burgersehaft Slection

56 io July 1966 Northrhein<vestphalia Landtag Electien
No IGD candidates elected none enteral.
6., 16 Catoder 1966 Hamlin Byelection(Commnal Conceil) Bei6 (*65= ) 2 seats
208 na) yotes = 7.9%+
8 Séats in Landtag
Marburg, iesbaden, Barnstadt-
and Glesson =ca 1

Fe/M = 8.4%

“7%, 20 November 19% Bavarian Landtag Slections votes= 7,23
: 15 Seats in Landtag

7.  & Nowenber 19S Hesse Landtaz Slections

8. 23 April 1%7 Sheinland-Falatine 4 Seats, 6.9 % of vete

9. 23 April 19€7 Schleswip-Holsteia 4 Seats, 5.7 % of vote

10. 4 June 1%7 lower Saxony 10 Seats, 7 i of vote

n. L October 1%7 Brexen Burrerschaft 8 Seats, 8.8 % of vote

: 12....28 April 1%E Baden-Wuer ttexberg "12 Seats, %8 I of vote

43, ae Sept 12d Fadecok Oo Sah , A304 vote

14.90000

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+

5

by Charles Lam Markmann

’

Heidelberg
Had he hved Adolf Hitler would have been 83 years
old on April 20. And at was on this April 20 that the
forces responsible for the ouster of Chancellor Willy
Brandt —tor things must be called by their right names
had almost tiushed preparing West Cermany for
her ‘start on the short march back to the past One
hears everywhere TH we only had a strong man
again.” On the fashionable North Sea resort island of
Sylt, Hitter’s turthday was celebrated in the best Na-
tional Socialist style by several dozen Germans, rane
sogtest 15, aad all of them arrested oa
. orn creculated of displayed Nozi sym-
. sseang men were brown shirts and swastika
by eonads; the gurls frumped themselves up in the
‘uwdy Ulue skirts and white middy blouses of the
Bund deutscher Madein (League of German Gitls), the
auailiary of the Hitler fuged. The walls of the room in
which they held their party were decorated with pic-
tures of Hitler and other National Socialist emblems
for which they had scoured Schieswig-Hotstesn. After
they had hstened to records of Hitler’s and other Nazi
leaders’ speeches and of old pariy march music, they
drank a toast ta the Fuhrer.

When they were arrested, ane of the young men
said the party had been planned merely as Ce guter
Gay.” Perhaps se But for millions of other Germans

‘the re-creation of “the Nazi tune” is serious business?
for some, because they want thuse goad old days back,
and tor a tew because they tear the others may very
easily get thew wish when the Federal Republic ot
Germany must at last put its democracy to the test,

aye

* The fearis herghtened by the steady and at times spec-

tacular nse in what ts called dia Hitlerwelle —the Miler
wave, or Hitler boom — which lias hept pace with the
econaonuc crisis. price ievels and unemployment The
number of weiess has doubled since December

It is as much a Hitler and [fatler-associated boom as
a Nazi boom This is not to say that Nazi thinking has

no folluwing i West Gemiany — quite the contrary, .

as the letiers-to-the-editor columns of newspapers

* demonstrate. in Boyaria~ Nurnberg (indeed where
ele), in a Urh-century Franconian castle, a 25-man

“army” of veuths trains regularly, with the same steel
“es that the Weltunacht used tam 19359

helmets and rm!
to 1945, Their leader is a sign-painter named Karl-

Crtartes Lau MARKMANN, Critic. ranstator and journal.
ist, is at work ox abood about the two German ceptabties.

Hers: Hoftmann, whose goals are simple: the destme:-
hoa cf communisat and big capital, the end of paras —
mentary rule, government by an unclected elite. the
anreation of Austaa (which, as the Weimar Consti-
tution makes clear in Article 61, was also the geal of
the int German “republic, and the reunification of
the Federal Republic of Ge
Dermovraltc Repubhe. .

There is a cure ofsome t20,000 regular readers of the
Nenosa? Zeitung, which for two decades hay been
whitewashing the Nagi era, “proving” that the only
won and extermination camps were those
bait eer the wor by German priseaers under Ameri-
can anders, for propaganda purposes (there are even
pictures}: promating a brisk trade in Nazr medals, uni-
menorabtha, as well as
padty conriesses,
ones),

turms weapons and other
books and recordings of speeches
Narratzions or military campaigns (veectortou
and eaxagioy ma tonly subtle antisemitism, There
is no nea tor biatoncy, alter all the Jews were onty the
first and most conspicuous of Nasi tipets Teelve
or so mil: saws murdered by the Germans died

on non: fe
just as painfully — facts tid are aimost daly Vianded

“Res” in letters to new papers, Occaste a tly in des
onsirations, less infrequently in stwasukastibings
and cemetery vandaliza

Bat these things—the Sylt bithdoy party. Hoff-
which ought to be ithea settouasly —
subers when

manvs anny”
the Nasi party’s strength rose dy se
it), the Nutaaagd 2rttisgy the
ans’ avhose windows aid shops aie tilled exclusively
wrth Wehelmnine and especially Nabonal socialist
proms ef the Hitler
preod, fardeeper

Card ma

Harhor tones AG Uaet-

tertum are onty sve
stthing is lar imore wide
and mare “n spectable la West Berba alone there ate
nore han SW cars beansg registrasion phates thar
ater the mondatory “HN ptor Merlint, carry saab fetter
comb ne as Ss. OA, EME RZ betore the varus
nuns. bhese designations ~tor tats Latestatfel
(Elite Guards. Sturwaliennag (Sto Trompe}, Hitler
hegeed, Reetzentracton-liger (concentration camp) =
have not been issued tinely. They are issued by
request. and Karl Koenig, the Socral Democet who

abe

* heads the city’s Ecoaumrcs Department, the issuing

Ouice. explains that ander West German law such re-
quess cannot be retused. (Lam not for one moment
inphang that the hiv should be revised: one does not
fisbr reas. or even bite hatreds, with muzzies.) The

.

gmany and the German:

fame

Baste

a teanrk
‘4 a Ceca

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seer es: ee ere

aetna eeneetiae de ee

OT ee sepa —o eee.

ae

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“of them. hy loschiin C.

l¢ in many other parts of

same hirids of plites are visi
FegstalG Génmany. .

y thousands of pape

There. are. serio

_braphies. of: ‘Euler are eek

Feactionary. Frankfurter Alxe ne , Zewtung, has gone
“well past, 275.00 copies stcalmost $20 apiece — the
“publishers have 25.003 mare ready and waiting in
the warchouse. This book makes much of Eitler’s
“rodernity,” httle cthis parbarities: he was necessary
to his time. The other, whichis much more ovettly an
apologia~1s by Werner Maser, who teaches the Hitler
era at the University of Munich. {t has sold 30,000
copies. It endeavors to create the impression that, had
he not had certain: problems ansing out of misguided
medication in 1933, Higer would have done mare good
(and less harm). ,
In addition there are the big hardrover editions of

In England and in the US there has been a revival of
interest in the Hitler era paralleling the orie in West
Gennany At feast 12 Faghvh land Amisican publish-

ers have capitalized on Cus interest, Here's a sempling
ot theit recent books:

Pictures: Siey Heii!, sn Slustrated history of Germany
trom Bismark to Hitler, by Stefan Lorant (Norton),
more than 70) photographs and s literate text Hitler
Clasesnp (Mpemiltan), interesting because these are
the pictures taken by Hiders frend Hemrich Hoff-
mann, with commentan by contidant and diarist
Henry Picker. .

History: Hitler's Rise ts Power, The Nazi Movement ia
Bavana, 1924-1933, by Ceuttrey Prdhan (ilarper &
Row), In-depth answer to the question, what made
people support Hitler in the early ‘209’ Careful and
scholarly.

Milutary: Hisler’s War Arms, The Establishment of the
“New Onter, by Normoa Rich (Norton) ‘The second
volume of a huge, hugely detailed study dealing with
Hatters loresca policies Tre Sse and Fall of the Luft-
waple. by David Irving (Little, Brown), thy life of Field
Marshall Erhard Miih who was second in command
to Goering and who sur -ved to tell much of thi, to the
author The Adwral’s ty 2 Pact, bv Jean Noh (Double-
day!, centaimng authentic first-hand accounts of
U-boat (Grey Wolves) actions, Battle Over the Reich,
by Altred Price (Cambritce University Press), .on-
tains pictures’ and tevt aboutthe bumbuirg and stroting
of German cities and towas. Part of tre revival be-
cause it is Germany seen as destroyed from the arr.
Hetler's Stratesy, IMO-THT the Baltan Cue, by Maitin
van Creveld (Cambridge Unitersity Press), anew view

_ books about Rudolf Hess; Hitler's deputy

ible. ‘aspect ofthe - at-sd, the last prisunerin S|

ead , Tne-New Rersiie,”

Hitler's speeches (four volumes) and Propaganda Min-,
ister Paul Foseph | Ge sbels” (two volume “four new
ho is:now, .

dau, innumerable radio

and. television programs dealing with-various aspects
Be and: pens trues of the period! arid, most: lately, a fort-
. mughtly: Pr ation, Das) dritte Rew hy planned. 16 cover.
the whole °NS-Zeu” for popitlir. consumption in two

years, and then expire.

The Athes<especially the Americans — for a long
time forbade any mention Whatever of the Hitler
Period. and Wese Germany, once it became a more or
less independent state, continued these bans tor years,
Even mer than other peoples, Germans have the
touchmy neuon that censorship and repression will
eftectively ehatinate ideas and facts; and, ayainst this,
neither the ieft aor the ight has the fantest concept -
ot civil iberues. Thus itis ott torbidden, even though
the German Communist patiy has been legalized
again, te foc ai” or “National Socialist’ party,
Consequentty the old SA and S5 men organtzed the
totally Nak Matoshiemo trates he Parte: Deutschlands,

of Hitler's interest in the Mediterranean and his mila-
tons wrth tay

Rehgion: nean Church Struggle umd the Hoto-
cast (Wave maivecsity Press), a collection ul essays |
that gfew out ot the Fitot International scholars’ Con-
ference in OD.

Refugees: snd Refuge, by A. J. Sherman (University

of Cahtents Press) Aa interesting study of how

Britain chased her policy about retuyees tom the
ory 0933 to 1939 anid why.

t Heydack, by Miroslav Ivanov (Mfac-
millan}. May-Py-play account ot the assassination of
Czech xcupanon bead Reamhard Heydrich and the
Nazi revenge that culmmated in rice Hiller
Juachiin est (Harcourt Brace duvanesacal, the Fry
teansianoa by tichard and Clara Winston ot the bing:
raphy iy sheet nactudes that at Hitler had died
of been billed ot 1955 “fee would hesitate te call hom
aime ob the srestcsd of Geran statesmen.” which may
be why rhe Bown 1s seven cightos over belure we come
to the thtler oc the war years Werner Maser's Mitlhy
legend Mivtvane Rechte (bharper & Row). bnommousty
detatied with sa many tac they obscure the man end
hes works, .

Future: To be pabt shed by Viking in August, already
published im Fretund iSecker & Warburg), The Love:
lest Man ew thy wort, the “inside story of the 30-year
impreoanent of hadolt Hess.” inside because the
author, Eugene K vird, was tarmer commandant of
Spandau Firser. and seems to have won Hess’ confi-
dence Despite u> promises it says very little that has
not already been known or surmised.

— The Editors


Junesi974. os

which, after some initial successes, took cover in the
hardly” inhospitable Christuin Democratic and Chris-
tian Social Unions butchas fece ntly announced, ats |
determination. to “purge itself of! this / taint.” -In
addition in ‘spite ‘ofthe constitutional ban (Article.
18) on any use of civil liberties to endang j

fhons, ‘publishing’ houses, ‘and mail-order book dis:
tributors. No one knows-how many membé sand.
customers the} ‘have “pecause théy operate furtively,
“aa thie: rather” stupid law compels tem (eo da Mut

(Courage). a month ly maga: ine addressing a frankly .

Fascist if not Nazi Prograny to the young jin that state,
has a crrculatian of 10.000 and is regarded by the
Lower Saxon Minister of the Intenor as potentially or
latenly dangerous, * .

Everywhere there is curiosity about those mysteri-
ous 12 years. The teachers who taught then are still
_ teaching, unless superannuated. but very few of them
“dare to teach what they used to teach, or even to tatk
about “the past.’ That is why Dus drifté Rewh was
founded this year: to make money vut‘of that curiosity.
The idea was that ot Hans-Peter Dietze, new its man-
aginy editor, according to his editor-in-chief, Dz.
Christian Zentner, who stakes a pious clan to a de-
sue tu-show his young compatnots how the Third
Reich carne to pass. in order tu prevent its ever hap-
pening again, After four issues, Dr. Zentner is not 50
sure that his publisher, the big Hamburg house of

John fahe Verlag KG, will do much more tnan break -

even, because, he told me, what millions of people are
insutably interested in is nol “the abstracdons” of
Nazism and its history but its Personalities, and in
particular Adolf Hitler. These, he says, are “simple”
people who do not tread bouks but who watch televi-
sion and read magazines, and it was they whunthe set
out to capture — to clarify the past for them,

His magazine is cypensive — about $1.50 a copy. A’
treniendous advertising canipaign, of dubious taste,
resulted in first-issue sales some 150,000 above the
750,000 copies that the editors and publishers eax-
pected. The second issue sold between 336 U0 and
340.000 copies, the third something over 250,610 so
far, and the fourth — which 1s stll on the newsstands —

. More than 200,000. The overwhelming majority of the
purchasers and subscribers, Zentner admits, seems to
include few of those young people he was loukiag tur.
the real circulation 1s among the people old enough to
remember, the Nazis who wats furious letters to the
editor b-:cause he tarnishes their legends. Buth Dietze
and Zentner fold me that the greatest sales of Das
dritte Reich are not in cities but out in the country and
the small towns, in Bavaria and Franconia especially.

One of the reasons for the phenomenal success of a
television program called “Lin Herz und eine Seele”
(‘One Heart and One Soul”) is its enthusiastically en-

ae ere or ee

“cent of t

avs of the sub-men, by name: the Slavs,

joved deragati

the lews, the: Laas. the Levantines A Gefman erage

eet Because ‘ut his Mlggrtimate ‘birth and

“his “lrattorous” " eondarct trom 1935 to 1y45, when he

“Mou, hy against nasi, as well as bis “selling out" ta
is te B

The > An crgatarly altracts 00-05 pers
enanonal sadience, and ofly-an occasional
editonal writer or.conmmentator dares lo see ils popus
lanty for the darger it is. dts “lett-liberal” creator,
Wolfgang Menage. claims ut to be a satire and so recog:
nized because People say its protagonist, Alued Tet-

“the Reds.”

laft, sounds just hhe Frang Josef Stiauss. the head of -

“the CSU: but then in each regional election this year

more of them vote tor the Strausses.,

In mid-March the Bavarian State Radio dnd Televi-
sion breadcase a long interview wath Pitler’s (and
Franklin Roosevelt's: old trend, Erast (Putey Hane
shiwngl, who is new ST “Uhoughin the ead ~througha

rather gruesome practical joke = he felt he had to thee

to the United staves uy 17, and was malerafly as
sisted by Roosevelt, his old Harvard classmate, in
gaining entey Cater he became an adviser on pubicy to
the American forces’). tanistacngl spent hi whole
time on camera telling what fing fcilawes Hither, Govr-
ing, Goebbels, Himivter tad the others really were,
when alt was said and doue~ and masters of their
trades to boet: tine suldiets, genmocs al propainda,
tnd so wester. There Weimar predecessors he belittled
and dismissed as nethings. though he admitted he
had never Gnown much about their aspirations or
their achievements. Movecaver in spite of having, with
his. wite and sister. lavishly and almost single:
mindedly supported Hider from the days before the

1923 Munchen. Pers. © to bis own abrupt departure tar,

the decadent democracy, Hentstacagh insisted that he
had never nought tor a mement that the unenieting
virulent anti-Semittst of hoy fread and beta would
ever amount to anyching serius (same oriay best
friends wee...) os tind has protege woadd ever have
been “stupid enougs te starta war”

The real danger ot a Hatter renascence, in the view
ef Dr. Huge Marx, 3 scholar who surfered under the
original, hes in the combinaden of a temenhe nostal
gia and the mMlennzs! German faith in autnoritaiion
tule as the solution ty all problems Weimar, ater all,
fatled primanty, as bon William B. Shirer and Kart
Dietrich Bracher hove shown, because no one, includ-
ing the Social Demociats who proclaimed it out of
desperation when trey could find neither a Hohen-
zollem nor any cihes voyalty to accept the throne,
wanted a reputiic. Wren the economic crash came
after 1929, the midenzial search for the “strong man*

lost its last restraint.


14-0000

SLE CR E-T = a

“COUNTRY West Germany
“pot “Maton ok 5

SUBJECT Intention: ‘of ‘the’ Executive Conini tte ot.

ae

7 Intelligence Information Report

inbecsiaton eteng he Mer cet’ Colsnte ef he Us ted Stree within the meaning
wwomsge teen Tele ld USC Sane 78) wed” We Ae henenee oF veyeletion hen whih in oop
1 Brewer He On ere ented parte Is erehi bed” ‘by, tow,

“bincfonsre ron “xo FOREIGN: DISSEM : 7 PAGE} OF "1 eAGis

toe

‘the Nat donal Democratic. Party toa Urge!
Non-participation of the Party in Baden-
‘ Wuerttenbderg Election = Se

aca Germany, Hamburg (io March 1972) FIELD NO. -BGG-1825 _

source An official West German security service at the Land level,

Analogous information from other West German services should
hot be construed as.confirmation, The Sub-source is an NPD
- official who had access to the information.
:
ls The executive committee of the Wost German National
Democratic Party (NPD) wild mect on 18 Mareh with officials
of the Baden-Wuerttemborg NPP orpanization and attempt to
persuade the Land organization not to contest the 23 April
Land election, The executive committee will point out that
Tf the NPD does not. rua. candidates in this election, the
_ chances’ for the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) to obtain a
majority in the Baden-Wuert temberg election will be enhanced,
This would enable the CDU to retain its Bundesrat majority
‘and improve the chances of defeating the Eastern treaties of
the Social Democratic Party/Free Democratic Party government,

2. The background ‘of the executive committee's desire
to avoid contesting the Raden-Wuerttemberg clection is its
estimate that the NPD would capture only two per cent of the
vote this year compared with 9.4 per cent in the last
election, a result which the executive committee is most
anxious to avoid, ’

3. Field Dissem: Sent to Bonn and Berlin.

—Nod wr

S EC RE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

iclowsifianen) id.ttem roaren)
com v Ter be Le eee (ar Fat Bovaton wa teal pogo

Hamburg-21038
IN 557585

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3 TOS. “S51 a 12543-71

bist i DECEMBER. 1971

country WEST GERMANY:
‘eot ..: NOVEMBER 1971
suwect SUMMARY OF ADOLF VON THADDEN'S

3 DECEMBER SPEECH TO THE NORTH= —-= * .
WEST MINING ASSOCIATION

: Aca GERMANY, HAMBURG (23 NOVEMBER 1971) FIELD NO, EGG-1721
} source AN OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SECURITY SERVICE AT THE LAND
y . LEVEL. ANALGGOUS INFORMATION FRCM OTHER WEST GERMAN

SERVICES SHOCLD NOT BF CONSTRUED AS CONFIRMATION. THE SUB-
SOURCE IS, AN NPD OFFICIAL WHO HAD ACCESS TO A COPY OF THE

DRAFT SPEECH.

1. (FIELD COMMENT: ADOLF VON TH 4 D D EN, FORMER
: NATIONAL CKAIRHAN OF THE WEST GERMAN NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC
PARTY (NPD), HAS -BEEN INVITED TO SPEak TO THE ANNUAL
: GENERAL MEETING CF THE NORTHWEST MINING ASSOCIATION,
7 , SPOKANE, WASEINGTON, ON 3 DECEN DER ON THE TOPIC: A
EUROPEAN'S VIEW OF TEE AMERICAN CURRENCY PRODLEN. SEE
A AMERICAN CONSULATE GENERAL HAMBURG TELEGRAM 767, 10
NOVEMBER 1972. DESPITE VON THADDEN'S RECENT RESIGNATION

FROM HIS NPD POST HE STILL PLANS TO ATTEND THE MEETING AND

° SECRET “*° FOREIGN DISSEN

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YOCs-314712543-71
PAGS 2 OF 5 PAGES ~

To PRESENT ‘THE | SPEECH WHICH as: Suhmanrzip BELOW, )
se VON, ‘7TADDEN BEGINS BY. TRACING ‘THE ATSTORY OF

Onn. UNITED STATES' RELATIONSHIP WITH GERMANY FROM WORLD

Wak’ ‘y ‘TO TH

RESENT, DEVOTING CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO

* THE ‘1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH, HE GIVES CREDIT TO THE
UNITED STATES FOR HELPING. EUROPE BACK ON ITS FEET AFTER

WORLD WAR 1 THROUGH THE MARSHALL PLAN.

BUT POINTS OUT

_ THAT THE NATIONS WHICH WERE HELPED USED THE AID TO BUILD

AN EXPORT BASE WHICH NOW IS CONTRIBUTING TO ANERICA'S

’ FINANCIAL TROUBLES. HE SAYS THAT GERMANY AND OTHER -

COUNTRIES BECAME INFECTED WITH AN "EXPORT HYSTERIA"

, AFTER THE WAR WHICH HAD SHORT ‘TERN BENEFITS FOR WORLD

TRADE; BUT WHICH IN THE LONG RUN DAMAGED THE DOMESTIC

ECONOMIES OF THE EXPORTING COUNTRIES,

°

3. THE 15 AUGUST 1971 SPEECH BY PRESIDENT NIXON IS

COMPARED WITH THE 24 OCTOBER 1929 STOCK MARKET CRASH,

AND VON THADDEN SAYS THAT THE SPEECH WILL HAVE JUST AS

AL SYSTEM AS DID

PROFOUND AN EFFECT ON THE WORLD'S FINANCIAL &

THE CRASK. HE DEPICTS THE

EECH AND THE RESULTING CONTROLS

AS SPELLING THE END OF THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM ESTABLISHED

AT BRETTON-WOODS,

SECRET/No FOREIGN DISSEM

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14.90000

1wCs- -314-/12543-71

PAGE 3 OF S PAGES -

4, aN His: ANALYSIS. oF THE TYPE oF WOLD ECONOMIC . a
SYSTEM wate ‘SHOULD FOLLOW THE CURRENT. AMERICAN CONTROLS
"AND FLOATING OF THE. DOLLAR, VON THADDEN DRAWS HEAVILY FROM

THE 23 SEPTEMBER PRESS CONFERENCE ‘OF FRENCH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU, .
HE SAYS THAT THE DOLLAR CAN NO LONGER BE CONSIDERED THE
SINGLE WORLD CURRENCY.” THE PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY OF EUROPE
MAKES. IT NECESSARY THAT A EUROPEAN RESERVE CURRENCY BE
~ AVATLABLE AS A SECOND WORLD CURRENCY. THIS CANNOT BE
THE ‘BRITISH POUND AS MANY PEOPLE AT ONE TIME WOULD HAVE
' BELIEVED, BUT MUST BE ‘A CURRENCY ACCEPTED BY BOTH FRANCE
AND GERMANY AND ADMINISTERED BY A COMMON GERMAN~FRENCH
BANK SUPPORTED BY GOLD, ALL EUROPEAN STATES WOULD USS
THIS BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY TRANSACTIONS.
.. VON THADDEN VIEWS POMPIDOU'S SPEECH AS A SIGNAL TO THE
+ UNITED STATES THAT THE FRENCH ARE NOT WILLING TO STAY
PERMANENTLY UNDER ECONOMIC PRESSURE FROM WASHINGTON, AND
AS PROVIDING AN OUTLINE OF THE TYPE OF ECONOMIC CRDER
EUROPE SHOULD HAVE IN TEE FUTURE. HE CRITICIZES THE WEST
GERMAN GOVERNMENT FOR NOT TAKING A SIMILAR STAND, SAYING
THAT WHEN IT IS POSSIBLE FOR ONE STATE TO PUT ECONOMIC
‘ PRESSURE ON, OTHER STATES, THE SITUATION CAN LEAD TO

 SECRET/NO F FOREIGN DISSEM

ecerstacacion, dissem fonsrctey : .

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PAGE 2 OFS PAGES

_ (Gracin 2 ~idigrem contrets

POLITICAL AND MILITARY PRESSURES WHICH WOULD BE PROFITABLE |

. 5. VON THADDEX SEES Two ALTERNATIVES IN THE PRESENT
SITUATION, I.E., EITHER A RETURN TO FIRM PARITY WITH A
DEVALUED DOLLAR, OR A CHANGE TO FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES

. at AGREED TO BY THE INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES AND GUARANTEED BY

INDIVIDUAL CURRENCIES. HE BELIEVES THE DOLLAR MUST BE
DEVALUED BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES CANNOT EXPECT EUROPEANS. _
TO CONTINUE TO BUY THE DOLLAR AT A RATE WHICH IS NOT ,
LEGALLY FIXED, WE VIEWS FLEXIBLE EXCHANGE RATES AS
DESIRABLE FOR EUROPE, BLT NOT REALIZABLE AT PRESENT
BECAUSE THIS SYSTEM WOULD EXCLUDE THE "THIRD WORLD"

AND THUS WOULD BE OPPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES.

7 6. SUMMARIZING, VON THADDEN STRESSES THE NECESSITY

| FOR THE FREE WORLD TO REMAIN STRONG AND FOR EACH EUROPEAN

COUNTRY JO RETAIN ITS NATIONAL CHARACTER AND DIGNITY TO

_ PREVENT . DOMINATION BY COMMUNIST AND FAR~LEFT FORCES. HE

CRITICIZES THCSE WRG SAY THAT AMERICA IS NO LONGER NEEDED

aS A COUNTERWEIGHT TO THE USSR, DECLARING THAT THERE 1S

-NO. OTHER COUNTRY WHICH CAN SERVE IN THIS CAPACITY, ESPECIALLY

‘NOT PRESENT DAY WEST GERMANY. HE SAYS THAT THE WEST

:

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-< SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEN | . vs
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5
4
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2
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“GERMAN PEOPLE, THROUGH COMMUNIST INFLUENCE .AND LEADERS:
“WHO ARE FRIENDLY TO CONNUNISM, HAVE LOST THEIR NATIONAL
CHARACTER AND ARE TOO WEAK TO OPPOSE THE USSR. HE ENDS
BY CALLING FOR A CHARACTER RENAISSANCE IN THE FREE WORLD
TO MAKE IT STRONG ENOUGH TO COUNTER COMMUNISM, (HEADQUARTERS
COMMENT: . THE STATEMENT OF VON THADDEN IN SPOKANE MAY
ATTRACT PRESS INTEREST DUE TO THE NOTORIETY HE GAINED IN
RECENT YEARS AS LEADER OF A GERMAN NATIONALIST PARTY

WIDELY DESCRIBED AS NEQ-NAZI. IN FACT, THE PARTY. HAS
DECLINED IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC TO THE POINT WHERE IT

IS THREATENED WITH EXTINCTION, AND VON THADDEN'S RECENT
RESIGNATION FROM THE PARTY CEPRIVES HIM OF ANY POLITICAL
PLATFORM IN WEST GERMANY.)

7. FIELD DISSEN: NONE (SENT BONN).

e

mo 68

SECRET’No FOREIGN DISSEX

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Anteliice orice * Inform: ition Rey sort:

sin Ke pees omnes
el wah bs one Fated es come
yy

Thit) material contosry® * je ehectnn we Noneou! Dolorre of the Unved 5:
of the ckage Lean: rea, TS CSO. See TF) or § 704, Sas ranimanen of ee

on ROU oN Ferwe us pret.b red ky tow,

. xO. EQREIGN, DISSEM
THIS iS AN, TFORUAON. REPORT, Nor HNALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

neronr NO, €§-311/01861- a

i SECRET O .
EO BO, DATE DISTR. Qe sarc 1971

PAGE-1 OF 2 PAGES

- COUNTRY West Germany oo :
DOF March 1972. ; “62, \ D> A by :
v . ‘ . oo . 2 NS y .
SUBJECT ‘Intention of Adolf Von. Thadden  - :
an ’ to Resign As Chairman ‘of the
National Democratic Party -
. Aca” : “Germany, HMambutg (8 March 1971) RUD NO. KGG- 1682 > a -
- SOURCE An ‘official West German Security Service concerned with

Hf
3

right and Teft radical organizations, from sources described |
as NPD officials, who have access to the information.

Similar information received through. other- West German
intelligence chatnels should not be construed as ‘confirmation,

2 “1. In early March 1971 Adolf Von Thaddaden
indicated to close associates including members of the
i Executive Committee of the National Democratic Party of
: : Germany (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands -
: NPD) that he plans to resign as Chairman of the NPD in
: the near future. Von Thadden has not announced the date

i when he plans te resign but close associates believe
: it will he sometime during the period 1 April to i June

— 1971.

; 2. Von Tnhadden's decision lias been prompted by his

2 discouragement over prospects for the NPD, serious financial

: difficulties of the party and by severe internal bickering

i within the NPD Executive Copmit.tee during the past several -.
weeks. Von Thadden is basically more modera te than many
members of the Executive Committee. Among other disagreanents,
Von Thadden has opposed certain aspects of the “Resistance
} Action" - (Aktion Widerstand) in which NPD members have

: recently staged demonstrations which crupted inte violence,
Von Thadden was aiso personally humiliated when his sister
and other relatives asked him not to attend the funeral

of Von Thadden's brother-in-law, the well-known historian
Perey Schram, who died in Goettingen in January 1971,

Me BOO be OF

EGG- 1682

i HAMBURG 19934
+ oy 5


PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
¢3-321/01861-71

° ,

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

: 3. (Source Comment: “Yon Thadden* s resignation
will in alt probnui lity, mean’ the ond of tho NPD a& an
ective political organization, With the possible
Cption. of. the :Bavarian District Chairman of the NPD,
Dr... ‘Siegfried. ‘P:@ eh lmanon, the NPD lacks effective
nd° dynamic leaders .. Pochimann, however. has health

HMeghit- wing groups | coming ‘into sult in a

wht : ike . the Fecent "Aktion Widerstand" may
‘opensity- for violence. After the NPD disin-

: rate ‘most -of* tts former supporters will _probably
“easttheitr ‘votes for one of the three major political

parties in West Germany, . The CDU and CSU stand to gain

most.of these votes.)

4. Field Dissem: None.

Meet Te om ey eae

d

é +

j

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Te watered contoing Wntesmation osctiag the Natucci ewes ef the United Stats withia the’ sian se pean ,
Pend telenoge jens, a tle ve CEN ed be “A Ne Nonemidlon cr revelotion of which in omy - panera !
matner enevthorlied person ri i
NO roRais DISSeM. :. _.. PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES '

t

i

i

NALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

C$ -311/02895-70 ©

“os EGRET . CO . oe REPORT NO.
; Do a DATE DISTR. 3 April 1970--”
.. Country . West Germany Jae Let 0-
| | Mid-Febraary 1970 be
7; ere . .. re:
‘ suajectT analyte ‘of the itest German National «> : 7
‘ Democratic Party's Election Chances sos
“and Cohesiveness

{

| aca Germany (27 February 1970) © FIELO NO, OGAaOS3: -

- gource A medium-level West German government official who follows the
activities of the National Denocratic Party (NPD). from an (NPD.
official who attended the party congress. The report is the ,
NPD official! s -analysis of the party’ 8 situation in the wake
of’ the congress. The information is also passed to an official
West German service, from which similar information should not

be construed as confirmation, . .
;
‘ . ‘ -
1, Adolf von Thaddeon. NPD chairman, remains firmly da
control of the party following the 14-15 February 1970 NPD congress

in Werthein, : i

-

2. Skepticism about. the future of the NPD is increasing among
party leaders. The NPD is definitely planning to wage vigorous cam=-
paigns in al] 1970 Land elections, but there appears to be little
chance. that the party will do even as well in these elections as it
did in the 1969 Bundestag electiozs. when it failed to obcain fiye :

ee 1

‘percent of, the total vote,

3. <At.the congress, several rrominent NPD leaders emphasized

the-need for party unity; these apsceals were well received: by the*

delegates. There are many unresolved questions and problems, how-. '
i ever, which will continue to plague the party. For instance, the
| "national-conservative.” concept, vrich was adopted in the manifesto
j issued by the congress, came under strong attack. One group, which = 3
, includes both older and younger menbers, rejects the concept of the

NPD as 4 conservative party, because they consider. that this term
conveys the idea that the party is an out-of-date and reactionary
political group, On the-other hand, the proponents of the national-- ‘
| conservative concept consider thenselves as upholding “positive .
{ vadues" inthe face of manifestaticas of disintegration. Von Thadden « ©
! is the party's unifying force, tnd one delegate accurately summarized — :
} "Von Thacden, by virtue of the charisma of « !
{
}
t
?
i
i

the situation by saying: :
a

his speeches, succeeded in bridgizg the many cracks in the party,"

4. Field Dissem;- Embassy Bonn, USBER, . .
S EC RE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(dinsom controls)

(elausificetion)

nk: - OGA-953
. ee CATERROR

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of the txoerage lows, Bite 10 USC Sew eli ire the Wonsmiltion of ravetation of wdith la ery temad po aor

monner OA veawhorited peison.ts prohibited ‘ty tcw hen Aimstomasraatalyl
Xo FOREIGN DISSEW “PAGE 1 0F3 “PAGES

Not FINALLY EVAL ATED SNTEIGENCE

WSIS “AN INFOK/AAHON REPCRT.

SECRET ee FEPORT NO. cs-311/08556- -69
, 7 DATE DISTR. N26 Septenber 1988

West Germany
dune 1968, ‘1 September 1969 wo e
test German ‘Ministry of laterior _
| Evaluation of the Prospects of

Banning the National Democratic
Party .

ps ACQS * ‘Gerdiany. a Septeaber 1969) FELD NO. OGA-919°-

SOURCE A mediun-level’ West: ‘German government official who follows -
.  -the activities of the National Democratic Party and who had
te acéess, to thé study during his official duties. The informa- . -
_tion was extracted from the original document and 16 believed -
to be an accurate summary of its highlights. : :

' Summary: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior
prepared a basic study of the -prospects'of banning the West German
National. Democratic Party (NPD). The summary of this study given
below describes the major ‘charges which the government could. bring
against the NPD, the defenses the NPD could be expected to make
against these charges, and the probable political results which
would follow both a successful and an unsuccessful case against the
NPD, According to the source, this study is still considered the -
basic Interior Ministry evaluation of the case against the NPD and
is being studied by senior federal government and state (Land)

officials, | End of Summary,

1, (Field Comment: For several years, West German political
and government leaders have debated seeking a constitutional court
ban on the NPD, On 13 November 1968, Ernst Benda, West German
Interior Minister, advised Chance llor Kurt Georg Kicsinger
that there was sufficient evidence to- warrant bringing a sult against
the NPD. Kiesinger, however, opposed bringing a suit, “and the sub-
ject became embroiled in West German politics. Gn 23 April 1969,
the Federal Cabinet decided not to se€k # court ban of the NPD, at

’ least until after the September elections, This decision. was
prompted by evidence that the NPD was making no membership gains

and apparently was losing popular support. )

Oo Mr aw
KP ROAa

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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14.90000

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Page 2 of 4 Pages”
CS-311/08556-69

. 2. In: June 1968, the West German Interior Ministry prepared
a 50-page study” ‘of the prospects for’ banning the NPD ‘entitled
“Considerations Regarding a Bati of the Nattonal Democratic Party."

. The. study, wag wekl prepared and carcfully written, It is still
_considered the ‘basic Taterior Ministry. paper on the. NPD and is
_ de ing | ptudiéed by senior offictals “of both’ the federal ‘and #tate

governments, -

Tt avoids Biving: a acopinton on. the “prospects of ob=

that: the’ ‘authors’ belicved ‘that the ‘courts
‘government | Oil odie to ban ‘the’ NPD.

"té Sobteie'« a’ ban, against. the’ "NPD, )

‘

3. The study: stimarized ‘the case whieh could: be brought
against the NPD as follows:

a. It could be shown that there was a similarity
between the NPD and the National Socialist German Workers
Party. (NSDAP) which has been outlawed, ‘

m b. It could be argued that the goals, and parts of
_ the party platform, of the NPD are contrary to the prin-
“ciples of a free democratic state, ‘ .

The study concludes that-.a sufficiently strong case could be pre-
sented to prevent the case being thrown out by the courts without

a hearing. .

4. The study lists the following points which the NPD cculd
be expected to use in its defense:

- a. The party could prove that it has given firm png teuc:
(tious to its members. not to engage in rowdy ism. or violencé, 3

b. It could show that a sizeable number of former
NSDAP members have been forced out of the party as part
of the Selbstre ini gun g (self~c leaning) process.

c. It could point out many features of its program
which are in. accord with democratic principles.

d. It could show that its elected representatives
have worked with other parties and have not. disrupted the
Landtage (state diets) and other~ elected bodies in which
they participate.

e. It could point out that other political parties
have many @x-Nazis and ex-communists as members and could
claim that the majority of the 28,000 NPD members are not

. opposed to the concept of the Federal Republic.

f. It would charge that the government's charges were
one-sided, unfairly presented, and out of dste,

g. It would claim that not all of Professor Ernst
Anrich ™“s points were included in the party plat-
form. “(Field Comment: Anrich is a former university ”
professor. from “Darmstadt whose proposals were apparently more
extreme ‘than those ‘incorporated in the'party platform. )

h. It could claim that the increased violence

(Verrohung) of the political climate in West Germany is
the fault of the New Left and not of the NPD.

8 BCR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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—“NWamn

.
wy

S-E C RE T/NO FORE, .N DISSEM o8-311/08556-69

5. The study states that. it would be very aifficuit to re-
fute these NPD defenscs in court. The government would have to

admit that sfnce carly 1963-there have been very few statenetits
: made “by. NPD leaders, ‘or incide ats Caused by the ‘NPD, which ‘could
‘pe uséd to support the. government! S case, Object ively, it would

have to be admitted that many. ince idénts of violence in which the

NPD ‘has ‘been involved ‘were tnitiated by opponents of the party,

6... The mtudy: predicts” the following, probable results should

its. case. against the’ NPD:

the government win

The NBD: would athe? respect the pronibitton,

a c. NPD and rightist sympathizers would begin a can-
paign for the banning of the new German Communist Party
(DKP) and other leftist groups.

d. A ban of the NPD would be well received in foreign
countries, Lo

7. The study concludes that 1f the government should lose a

case against the NPD, it would be the result of the lack of valid
the following

evidence (Beweiaschwierigke iten + (In such an event,

adverse effects would occur:

' a. The NPD would receive a new impetus and valuable
publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which has had sone
success in. keeping former Nazis out of key positions would

be halted.

ce. Many middle-class persons who sympathize with the
NPD, but who have refrained from open support because of
the stigma of being associated with 4 party which could be
declared illegal, ‘would join the party or become active
supporters.

d. The party would undoubtedly attract more members.
(Field Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be worried
because the party's membership has not increased sigaifi-
cantly during the past 18 months.)

8, Field Dissem: Embassy Bonn, USBER.

S ECR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSE

wee tes: and d*Sontinue ‘to work for. ‘their political beliefs,

Page 3 of 3 Pagosa

on

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14-0000

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. ren eee ge oe ae . : “os
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. as wea. SMCRE T , : [aewete tule es, :

+

_AYD Activities. oe i een oe oa a
actin FUGSINCD + Pa .

REF: EGUT-145 189, ‘dated 9 September. 1969 yhe

We are very, ‘pleased vith the quindity ¢ of the informa.’
tion off the. NPD which has’ beon made’ available through CATERROR, .
It. is particularly useful during this preé- ~election period, but |
we also: apprécinte not -having to wait 6 to 8 weeks for CATAISPER

to. digest the ma terd al ‘and “pass - ‘it on,

fo ee os amen ae omen meee.

4
a
4
e
’

2. After looking over the Reference, we are inclined
to stick with the requirements mentioned in DIRECTOR 39264 for.
items worthy of intel dissemination... In this context Bona
State Department Telegram 12253 dated 17 September quotes
Foreign Minister Brandt as saying that there has been evidence
;that the East Germans, undoubtedly with Sovict approval, had
given financial support to von Thaddcn, While we are inclined
to think that Brandt's comment may be wishful thinking,
evidence ‘of East Gorman financing for the NPD would be of great
intercst and utility. Material not bearing on the requirements”
in DIRECTOR 39284 should be forwarded now to Neadquarters for
review. The NPD, as you know, is a subject of interest beyond
its ‘proportions as a political force, and we are grateful for
the timely opportunity to keep up with the ins and-outs of it.

Aimak 6 co vette
Harriet G, COCOLLATO

@ - COB/Berlin
2 - COS/Germany

Group I + 7
Excluded from Automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

CROSS ALFEREKCE TO OISFATCH SYMESL AND NUMZER

OATE
8-0. SEp-fo¢
125 Scptenbes 1969 >

_EGBS-6522
ay — [ras PIE —— ee

CLASSIFICATION

SECRE T

ORIGINATING

wen ee.

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i : os E/G/R Bee Eo “a Topica sro h 6
; i - COSROINAT ING

: ; - E/REG/Chrono. |---——— rane VT TTS or ;

: ' - C/EUR/R a =r

- C/E/G/R ©

Beri SHAT [Bate ernie ed eee
a - a
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Intelligence Information Report

Neact Setense af a So tad Sestan wise the mooning F we,

TAG mareral enra nt setaceree oe weung the Ne =
. week, te 3 ac se . "Fe one ie whe Pope inc of rece'ston ef wach on ony t tyes TS

a-raR ; . 7 PAGE 1 OF2 PAGES
THIS" is "AN INF ORSRATION. REPORT, NOT Las xX Y Fy ALUATEOD INTEIGENCE

DIRECTORATE OF
PLANS __

REPORT NO. C$ =311/08430-69
~—
mber _

WP a By a

_SECRET oo
ee rr oate piste ( 22 Septe

COUNTRY - , —

West Germany

: ool Early August 1969 |

- -$ussecT” MiScellanéous information’ on ‘the
National Democratic Party

ACQ Germany, Hamburg (15 August 1969) Fao NO, EGG-1444, on
“+, °° SOURCE Member of the Natiénal Democratic Party in Schleswig-Holstein

‘whose reliability has not yet been established. He obtained
the information from two district officials of the Party.

1, According to a ranking official of the Kiel district
of the National Democratic Party (XPD), Karl-Heinz
Knipphals, the chairman of the Kiel district of the
NPD, and Adolf von Thaddeon, the national chairman
of the NPD, are personal enemies, {Source Comment: In
January 1969 Knipphals was elected to be his party district's
candidate for the West German Parliament. Knipphals, a Kiel
lawyer, .is in his early 50's. He was severely wounded during
World War IIT and has only. one arm.)

on 2. Von Thadden is aware of, and unhappy about, the fact
that Knipphals, prior to joining the NPD, participated in
Easter Marches and received unfavorable publicity. Further-
more, voiv.Thadden is. concerned about Knipphals’ strong and ;
ruthless political ambitions, He has referred to Knipphals
as a "second Hitler", and he welcomes and encourages the fact .
that there is strorg opposition to Knipphals even within the -
Kiel district of the party. Von Thadden, for the above .
reasons, would very much like to see Xnipphals remain on the
district level and is anxious to keep him out of the West
German Parliament,

3. The same official. who made the remarks about von .
Thadden and Knipphals. also stated that many wealthy industrial- tod
ists contribute funds to, the NPD anosynously, because they do :
not wish their association or sympathy with the party to : :

s become known. ; 50

4 ‘ at

3 4, The chairman of another NPD district in, Schleswig- hs ar!
32 Holstein stated that, in view of the fact that each new aru i
i , rich
* S-E-C-R-E-T NO FOREIGN DISSEM :

feloss.tcorion) ~ ene id atom cantata)
cas

EGG-1444 _—
CAINFER _

cI 2, FI 3, Wl


14-0000

‘ . “ PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES
“ "  ¢s-311/08430-69

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEN

ote : ; Session of the West Gera nan Parliament is. opened by its: oldest
“the NPD will insure that the: oldest. member - Sees next |

_possibility’, that” an "NPD: ‘Deputy mirht open ‘the Bu
already been ‘considered: by the CDU, See cS-311708te4- Bots"

/. Ls 8). Pield Dissem: None (sent Bona, Berliti) . oo.

SECR ET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

~nNW Rw.
.
_“Neaw.

14.0000

oo At

mS eae

“COUNTRY West Gérmany *_
| January 1969 nr)

SUMUECT. "German Government Evidénce against

Sem PA
-ntelligence Information 1. Sport
bg enriches mation of.chag hard Netiero! Drtenng” of the: Chaired” Safes withia the

moons
ot ng rose tae ton USC. Seen Ni sad 6 the rons woe of revelation of whik ia any
SF cmenten ned parton %e prontond by lew,

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

. RE SSEN Ll :
a THS AS. sy TNEORMATION REPORT. ‘NOT FINALLY EVALUATED TNTEWIGENCE

“RepORT NO. CS LT-3 13 /01123+69

a
"> bate DISTR: 9 July. y 1969 , -

~ SORFINEETIN

the National ’ Democratic Parity (NPD) . \u

acQ Germany, Bonn (26 March 1969) "| IRD NO. EGN-4107

SOURCE An official West German security service. . = wc

. . ; . : .

i a. Vi-pase German-language report, describing the

National Democratic: Party (NPD) and presenting documentary
and testimonial evidence of possibly unconstitutional aspects
of the NPD, has been deposited in the files of the CIA Docu-
ment and Pictorial Services Division, from which copies may
be obtained upon, request. The report is the shorter of two
versions prepared by the Federal Office for the Protection of
the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz). This
shorter version is Said to be complete in substance and is
the version which was made available to West German Cabinet
members in preparation for Cabinet discussion of whether the
NPD should be.banned. The longer, two-volume version has not
been obtained.

2. Appraisal of the leita validity of the evidence
against the NPD was omitted from the report at the order
of the Minister of the Interior, who reserved to himself an.
assessment of the NPD's ‘legality. Also. pages 9 to l3--a
section entitled Chief Features of the Ideology (Grundzuege
der Ideologie)--was omitted from the report at the request

of the Minister of the Interior. (Headquarters Comment:
The evidence in the report appears to be overt and less than
, conclusive. The West German Cabinet decided in the spring
of 1969 not to request a ban of the NPD; substantial doubt
existed as to whether there were sufficient grounds to obtain
‘a legal ban of the NPD, The omissions from the text, referred
‘to in this paragraph,. may reflect realization by the Interior
Ministry of the weakness of the case against the NPD. }
5 4. Field Dissemination: U. S. Embassy Bonn (limited).
3 ‘Distribution of Attachment:
1 CRS/ADD
e CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM
Iclassifcanen) [Tisseca_ come)

(For Field Distribvtion see Snot parogeaph)

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th moteno! contains laformetiod offering the Nattonol Delonte of the United Stotes wi as
anege A fete 18 USC. Sere, 793 ond PRA the fron: Wrontmission oF revelation of ta ony Learcnper paren
fron Srorieed Ges ‘on Ie prowibited by’ kre. nt Petite

_PAGE 1 or 4 PAGES

- 2 -BECRET oO - . REPORT NO. ' ¢s -311/06109 -69
Boo, a pT . __-DATE DISTR: aan July 1989~, _
. . . ‘COUNTRY West rmany eo : .
8 ou” Heat BerkinMtege Germany © Kt |
Me - + go March to Mid-May 1969 _ ey
_ : 7 susiect ‘Status Report oa Protlens, Activities : ; As on
, Tas Fou... and Plans of the West Berlin National \" vt
‘cf "* Democratic Party” * WW

: > | ~ Germany, Berlin: —-~ : ; Co
> neq. (Maréh ~ Mid-May 1969) oe FiIeLO.NO. EGB-24,611 tty
“Intercepted. communications, supplemented by information from a of
member “of the West Berlin National Democratic Party (NPD) with

close contacts among. members of the Berlin NPD Executive Council

and a record of accurate reporting.

SOURCE

: r Summary: The Berlin NPD has been plagued by a split between the
6 wot Berlin City leadership, which is loyal to the Party's national leaders,
; : and the "Loyalists" headed by the Berlin district leaders, who opposed
the dissolution of the Berlin NPD. _ordered by National Party Chairman ;
ro _ Adolf von Thadden in October ° 19683. Court “action led to the thwarting .
<oF ‘of the plan for dissolution, - In an effort to keep the Berlin Party
° Talo - alive, in mid-March von Thadden ordered a cessation of open Party ac-
wf if ' - tivities until after the Septembcr parliamentary elections. Subse-
4 _ quently, von Thadden arranged a- postponement of a scheduled Berlin
| Party convention until October, because of the possibility of a ban
] on the Berlin NPD by. the Allies and the threat of trouble from the Lt
i militant left. At the end of March, Berlin. City NPD Chief Rudolf wot
Kendzia resigned in an effort to” promote party unity in Berlin, but
“he remains active..behind the scenes. Since carly April, the Berlin
_ NPD leadership has followed von Thadden's guidelines. The influence -
et of the Loyalists has been greatly reduced, and in accordance with
von Thadden's instructions party activities have been circumspect,
Both the Berlin and the National leadership are hoping that the NPD
will obtain 25 to 35 Bundestag seats in September, which, they feel,
: will make the party more acceptable to right-wing voters in Berlin
is and enhance NPD chances during .the 1971 Berlin communal electfons.
Berlin is planning to send volunteer workers to campaign for the NPD 1
in West Germany, especially -in North. Rhine-Westphalia, the NPD strong- .

hold. End of Summary. 4 4
s 1, (Field Comment; In October 1968, the West Berlin NPD had 5
a approximately 480 0 dues-paying members, According. to a senior party ° 4!
3 official, more than 100 members have officially dropped their Pi
-_ . / 2
'

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membership and others are dropping out quietly,
menbership was about 300,)

: 2. Following the abortive attempt dy the Natienat Democratic
a Party (NPD) leadership to ferce the BerYin NPD to dissolve itself for
tactical reasons in October 1968, routine party acttvity resdmed al=
most immediately, [Lt was characterized by a split between the leader-
ship. Of ‘the Betlin City (Landesverband) party unit and that of “dis-
trict (Kee isverband) party units, The former are generally loyal to
National Party-Chairman Adolf von Thadden and the national leadership
in Hanover and their broader tactical concepts; while the latter, re=-
ferred to us the “Loyalists” (Satzungstreuc) defend the létver “ot the
to Berlin NPD ‘statutes, The Loyalists initially objected primarily to
Tee “the mechod of the attempted: disSolution, .but the friction with the
“city Executive ‘Commit tee (Landesvorstand) aéaded ‘by’ Rudolf Kendzia
_ led ‘to total. mutual. mistiu disloyat statements to the press, and
efforts. to get. each. other - pelled from ‘the - party: by a party court

Peo a (Senteasgersent) . area . ae
ee a Be at a general membership heettrg in Bor LinsqgizpS.-March. 1969,
‘von’ : Thadderi attempted ‘to. achieve. a truce within the party and ordered

wo root that. there ibe -no “political organizational activity” until after the
rr ra: September 1969 parliamentary elections. At this meeting von Thadden
_ sot ‘approved the scheduling, of a ‘Berlin party convention (L andesparteitag)
chp oe : *-for 26 ‘April 1969, at which: a new and hopefully more stable city
Executive Committee was to be elected, . -

: 4. The 15 March neeting provided an “indieation that the Berlin
NPD may well stick together under. von Thadden's guidance until 1971,
in spite of the friction between city and district leadership. Ai-*
a though the eight “spokesmen ‘Yor the locat leadership, who took the
floor after Kendzia's situation report and von Thadden's icynote
: speech, approved the action of the Berlin NPD districts in opposing
i the self-dissolution of the local party, and no one contradicted them,
: all but 32-of the 140 members‘present then voted for a-resolution con-
: demning District Chiefs Johann Ratzek (Schceneberg) and Philipp
. Goelles (Wilmersdorf), leaders of the Loyalists, for anti-party ac-
tivity. This vote amounted to a vote of confidence in the tactics of
the Berlin -City. leadership, and according to members present was due
solely to von Thadden's presence and influence. In the’ view of these
- members, a ‘meeting without the attendance of representatives of the
~ Hanover headquarters would have led to a no-confidence vote “in the -
Kendzia | leadership. During the meeting, von Thadden also rejected
Kendzia's "Berlin Program," which called for a softer line on East

Germany and on German reunification,

5.. At the 15 March session, left-wing, anti-NPD protestors

: fo _ “"-assaulted a number of NPD members and forced the NPD twice to change
. , its meeting site, This leftist action and the obvious fact that the
militant left has a penetration of the Berlin NPD have had a seri-
ously dampeniag effect on the NPD's willingness to meet in the open,
The party is now tentatively planning to hold future meetings on a
rented excursion boat whose location would not be announced until the

time of the meeting.

, 6. The Berlin NPD has made strenuous efforts to determine which
left-wing organizations made up the task force which tried to disrupt
the 15 March meeting. The Extraparliamentary Opposition (APO) claimed

j 4 the honor, but the NPD investigation showed derinitely that all but a
handful of the protestors were an organized group dispatched by the

Spandau branch of the West Berlin Socialist Unity. Party (SEW) whose

actions are part of a long-range program of ‘harassment by the East

Berlin Socialist Unity Party (SED).

. ‘ 7. -Because of the subsequent possible threats of prohibition
by the Allies (signalled by a letter from Governing Mayor Klaus
Schuetz to the Allies asking that’ the NPD in Berlina be banned) and of
further counter-demonstrations by the militan€ left, on 27 March
‘von Thaddén wrote a letter to the Berlin City leadership asking that

S
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3
2
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S EC R E T/NO FOREIGN DISSE Page 3 of 4 PAGES
C8-311/06103-69

the Berlin party convention be postponed until October 1969, the
‘normal expiration date. of the term of the present city Executive

(¢ The letter, which
was read-at several ‘dintriet mectings, also stipulated that the city
and district organizations weré to restrict themselves to routine
monthly meetings with no- ‘Speeches and no invited guests until next

oe a. In'@ ‘tactical | move to promote \party unity, Party ‘chief ~
: gned.on 28 March, In response to von Thadden's seer
F umit tender ebip: which otherwise remained

“Walter Seézen, a member of ‘the na-
| The. Situation was ticklish because

Lo Or: othe postponéient motion would fail; there was 8. dis-

: TRS nett danger ‘that “this could occur, .At the 10 April meeting, the-
: vo : district leaders grumbled” “but approved the postponement until

‘ : i 11 October. : : . . i

9. On Kendzia!'s resignation, Guenther Mensel, & member of the
Executive Committee, wag selected as, Acting Pz. ty Chief and Speaker
. _ of the Party “Council until-a new ‘Executive Committee is elected in
“fF October, “Ménsel, an attorney, was hesitant about accepting the’ “yoh
ei because of its “possible effect on his practice, and did not commit
noe himself until the 10 April executive meeting, Mensel's age (62) and

stability were the main reasons for his selection, The only other
replacement considered was Guenter Kleinert, also on the Executive
Committee, whom Kendzia did not trust, Mensel's duties are to con-
‘sist of calling and chatring pro-forma monthly Executive Committee
meetings and.of presiding at the party congress next October,

i 10, Kendzia considers his resignation a temporary tactical re-
treat caused by disagreements with the NPD national and Berlin dis-
trict leaders, by von Thadden's public rejection of his “Berlin
Program," loss of business because of unfavorable publicity, and a
3 hit-and-run car accident involving a bicyclist on 27 March, Kendzia
: - promised Mensel to remain active behind the scenes and set up a
* _vacant office in ‘his place of business as party headquarters, with
' : desks for himself and Executive Committee members Frank Schwerdt,
Joachim Rebuschat and Hans Werner Andreas, the de facto heads of the

Berlin NPD.

11. Kendzia and a majority of the NPD leaders hope that the fall
elections will bring some 25 to 35 NPD members into the Bundestag,
This, they feel, will make the party more acceptable to potential
right-wing voters in Berlin and thus enable the NPD to make a showing

_ in che 1971 Berlin communal elections, (Source Comment; The Berlin
NPD's major problem in Berlin is to keep its membership intact and
its machinery functioning until 1971, -Whether Kendzia will hold to
his promise to direct the Berlin NPD from behind the scenes indefi-
nitely, and whether he will emerge as leader ‘in 1971, are open ques-

¥ tions, because Kendzia has shown an interest in the current program
and* policies ‘of the Free Democratic Party (FDP) and particularly in
its “General-Contract" concept, which fits in with his "Berlin

Program." A close friend of Kendzia’ s, (fnu) Nerchert, resigned from

the NPD. to protest..its participation in the presidential election in

Berlin 6n S March and has already made overtures to the FDP.)

4

. 12. Since Keadzia! s resignation and the 10 April executive meet=
. ing, the Berlin City Executive Committee (under Kendzia's behind-the-
. scenes tutelage) has kept the Berlin NPD functioning and loyal to the -
Hanover leadership, Executive Committee members (especially Schwerdt,
Rebuschat and Andreas) have attended annual election meetings in all
12 party:districts. Through their influence, pro-von Thadden or
neutral District Executive Committees have been elected in each case.s

The district officers who led the opposition to the self-dissolution 4
: 3

rd
S EC RE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM 1


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8-911 /06102-69

of the Berlin NPD last fall have been effectively expelled of neu=

; _ tralized., As of. -early May, Loyalist influence had been greatly re-

4 duced. Althoush there “is now no Significant internal opposition

i ‘group, there was a.call pending for formation of an informal “group
representing both the city organization and the distriecs to propose
organizational changes. Routine mofithly district: meetiags with
"guests" from West Germany, whenever possible, are to be continued,

under the watchful eye of the .pro-tem Executive Committee, until ©

co. October. when the party convention of the Berlin NPD will elect

leadership. .

Schuetz" attenpts ‘to have ‘the XPD banned in Berlin have’

‘ en taken” ‘seriouslys Loval- party activists are preparing’ to-
pport ‘the NPD election campaign in West ‘Germany by sending volun-

workers. “A letter appealing for such help states that ‘the de-

“Cisive’ eleétoral Campaign ‘which will determine whether or not. the

NPD. gets into the Bundestag will be waged in ‘North Rhine-Westphalia,

‘Air -fare and livia: expense subsidies dre being offered to volun-

: teers who are to- distribute leaflets; put up posters and _ring door- |

: bells.. (Field Comment: The ‘NPD made tnroads in North Rhine- :

» Westphalia: “duriag the economic recession of 1965-66, and the NPD a
“national leadership is count ing heavily on salvaging their foothold

in the ‘Bie lefeld-Runr area. +) . .

“14. The main ‘NPD weapons in the national election campaign are’

a, to be pamphlets. describing the party's election platform, One is¢

Lhe, to be distributed beiween 1 and 15 June; a follow-up pamphlet, be- :
~ tween 15 and 30 August; and a third pamphiet on the eve of the elec- .
tion, Each will be printed in 15,000,000 copies. Distribution will

be handled by two firms--Ve Lbringer Company and Erdmann Company.

}

os
oy.

}

i

H

:

- 15. Ruediger Krauss, head of the NPD's: student organization,
the National University League (Nationaler Hochschulbund - NHB), -
has moved from Berlin to Bonn to assume the post of chairman of the

. Bonn City NPD Executive Committee. Von Thadden plans to-.use the
tactic of moving: reliable leaders into critical areas after the 2
elections. For example, he plans to move a Bavarian NPD officer to :
Berlin and assume the chairmanship of the Berlin NPD, In an attempt
to obtain legal recognition for the NHB in Berlin, (fnu) von Hindy,

a Hungarian law student and good friend of Krauss, is to be ap-

: pointed Krauss" successor,

-16, Field Dissem: USBER, DCSI/USCOB (Also sent Bonn),

S EC RE T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

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CAPA

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4
. _ NO FOREIGN O18S5Eu .
weet . ~ wo ele : . ‘Loe
RET mre
civ: fest Germany a
June 1968
West Gereao Wiaistry of Interior a
. Bvalusyttion of the Prospects of:
Baaning the Nstiousl Democratic
- Party
“Germany (1 Septexber 1969) HE.) OGA-BIS “
A mediua-level Went Geruan governracnt off tetal who follows
; the aclivities of the National Dewocretic Party aod who had’
: access to the study during his of ficial duties. The isfor~
mation was extracted yram tae original document and is bte-
lieved to be an accurate gunnery of ita highlights.
guneury: In June 1968, the West German Ministry of the Interior

officials,

Prepared a basic atudy "of the prospects of banuing the fest German
Nacional eaocratic Perty (NPD). The sumnury of this study given
be low describes the major charges which the governseat could bring
against the NPD, the defeusee the NPD could be expected to arke
agsinat these charges, and the probadle politicri results which
weuld follew beth a succeseiul und sn unsuccessiul case against the
MPD, According to the source, thig study ia still conaidered the
hagic Interior Kinistry evaluation of the case agafiast the MPD rod
ja being atudied by senior feceral gevernsent and state (and)

“End of Summary.

1. (ie14 Coament: For neveral yeara, West German political

‘ and goverpucot S ledders | nave debated secklag @ covstitutional court

ban on the NPD. Qu ‘13 Novewsber 1984, Ernst Beada, Fest Geraun
Interior Minister, advised Chancellor Kurt Georg EFiestnueer
that there wag sufzicienot evidence to warrant bringing a suit againet
the NPD, Kiesinger, bhowdver, cpposed bringing a Pore fad the sub-
ject becese ewbrotied in Best German politica. On 23 April 1969,

the Federal Cabinet decided not to acek a court ban of the NPO, at
least until after the September elections. This decision was
prompted by evidence thet the NPD was waking no menbersiip gaias

and: apparently was losing populer support.)

8 BCR EB T/KO YORRIGN DISSNE

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SCAR TYNO FOURIGN DESSES Page 2

2. In June 1968, the Feet Geran Inter lor: Minivery. prepared
n SO-pege study of Che prospec ty Yor bageneg the NPD ‘waticled
"“Considerstious Regarding 9 Ban of the KRasagnal Dvdveratic ‘Party.'
The study. was welh prepsred acd ccrefully written, “It\is stint
a. écansideved the bagic Liberior “Ministry paper on blk NEY aud is. - ms
_. being studied by séntor officials ofboth che federal aad suate. | - | Mort ‘|
soveroments, It ‘avoids | giving. an opintea oa: the prospects ‘of ob *” :
taining a court decision rgsicet the NED, buc trom the ‘éonteat of
- the study, it is: clevr that the authors’ believed’ tothe “courts:
oo would probably reyece A sovernacat proposal” to ba he. NPD.. : . .
7 s Pld. Commdnt:- If the study is stil} ‘considered urrent, -£t ey ad . o
. ; unclear hes how it ite with Benda’s November 196s statcicunt: that there
: Was sudficaent evidence tc abtata 2 ban sgatust ene ~ . There 9:2”
: have been other reports, however, that che evidénce wis pot as ”
Clear-cut as Benda would. have had the Chance Llor’ believe. See, for

example, SGN~3804.)
3. The ‘study yumeartzed the Case which could be brought
aguiast the NPB aa follows: ; an .

\
a. It could be shown that there was a sinilarity
between the NPD sud the National Socialiat Gerann Workers
Party (NSDAP) which has twen out lawed.- :

b. It could be sryued cust the goals, and parte of
the parcy plactorm, of the NPD are cnootrary to the pria-
ciples of a free democratic stare. :

The study concludes that a sufficiently strony case could be pre~
sented to prevent the case being toyrowe cut by*the courts without

o bearing.

4. The study lists che. following potaia which she NPD could
be expected Cc use in its defense:

&, The pavty could prove that ic has given firw Inotrace~
fhe myots Ste misvecs so. bo engage tu pazdviau oF vialeare,
b. Tk could show thet a sizeedle aumber of rormer
NSOAP meabers have been forced out of the party ag part

of the Selbstreintyung (seli-cieaning) process.

ce. At could potnt ous many feacures of its progres
which are in accord with democratic pracciples.

d. It could chow tnat its elected reprosentutives
have worked wath other parties and have uot disrupted the
Lendtage (atate dicts) ned other etected bodies in which
they participate.
7

e. IU sould point out that other political parties
have many ex-Nazis nod ex~communists ras ambers and could
claim chat che mayority of the 28,006 NPD aimbera are uot
opposed to the cuticept of the Federal Republic,

fF. Tt would charge tnat the government’s charyeus were
one-aided, unfeirily preseuted, and out of date.

gy. It would claim that not all of Professor (fou)
Anrich”*s points were iucluded tn tne party plat~
form. (Field Comment: Aprich is appsreatly s rightist
whose proposals — Were gore extrem Chan those incosporsted

in the party piatfors.)
It eoutd claim thac the iocreased violvnce

-" (Vero hun} of the political climate in West Geraany 18
: : : the fault of the New Left end not of the NPD.

t.

S FPR BR PINA FORETGN NISSKy


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S ECR E T/NO FOREIGN DISSEN- Page 3

‘5. The. study gtates tbac ic would be very dixsficult~to re-
fute these Ney déefeases tu court. The governsent vould Bave £o
~ adeit that Since, eerly 1964 there have been very few stateaents
maidc by NPD leaders, or incidents coursed by the HPD, which could
dbevuged to SUGPIE: Be goverament! B CHKE. . Objcetively, tt would . .
-. have to. be -ndmitted’ taat wany tacidents ol violence in which the 4
NPD has been tovoived: were initiated: by oppanc nis cf ube party. —

; 6. ‘The etudy: predicts” the following probable resulee should
the: goverurcnt wie AEs. ‘Case against whe NPD: oe Bone oo, :

_ the app Would probably respect the prontbitiea. ;
re is. ery. WBlikely tont. the NPD would attempt to go uader-
ground as the tllegal Comiunise Perty of Geraoany (XPD). did. - .

Tee “ye “NPD rewibers and ayapathizers would oot change their
‘ . Opinions because of a ban, Wany scuid joie, otter groups
or parties and continis to work for the ir political Beliefs. Le

c. NPD aad rightist sympathizers “would beyin a care
paiga for the baaniag of the new German Coamunist Party:
(DEP) ard other leftist grouge.

a. A ban of tye NPD would be wed received in foreigs
countries.

7. The study conelodeg that Lf the goverosent shoula lose a
ease ayainet the HPD, Lt would be the result of the lack at valid
evidence (Beveisschwiorigkciten). fa such an event, the following

adverse affects vouls occurs

a. The NPD yould receive a wew impetug and valuable
publicity.

b. The policy of Selbstreinigung which hes had some

success ib keeping forner Nozls out of key positieas vould
wo, be halted. -

i . c. Many middle-class persens who sympathize with the

i - wm", but who bave refrained from open sugport beceruse of

_ the utigma of being associdted wich a party which could be

i . declared illegal, wowls join | the Party or becowe active .

yy supporters,

- a. The party would undoubtedly attyvact wore seabers,

i {Ficld Comment: The NPD leadership is known to be soretied
because’ the party’s acabership nas mot increased signifi-
cantly during the past 18 wonths.)

8. Field Dissem: Sabsssy Donn, USBER.

SEC RE T/MO FORKIGI BDISSTY

14-0000

Be Secret
: : ; “> No Foreign Disem

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY s) UMMARY

Special Report

West Germany's National Democrats and the Grand Coalition

Secret

Ne 919

_ 61 May 1968”
. No. 6. 0022768A

14-0000

7 Pe — SECRET ant

” : Gerhany's _far- srighe. National Democratic Party

Democrat a(SPD). lost. heavily. This’ outcome in a_ , '
traditionally liberal and prosperous state appears ;
to stem in part from the dissat isfaction of many :
oO ' Socialists and trade unionists in the SPD with , 7
“ ' their party's cabinet cooperation with the Christian
“Democrats (CDU). Another factor was the discontent .
of farmers. and refugees with the policies of the \
Grand Coalition in Bonn. Concern over student dis-
_ orders contributed to the NPD gains, but this was . \
. not as-decisive as some have supposed... Despite -
these gains, the NPD is unlikely to achieve a :
growth comparable to that of the Nazi Party in the |
early 1930s.

. The outcome in Baden-Wuerttemberg confirmed

; the belief of many Socialists that their cocvera-

‘ : tion with the CDU at both the national and state

‘ level is proving to be unprofitable for the party.

: : As a result, they have alreacy decided at the state

Jevel not to renew cabinet coczeration with the

i CboU in Baden-Wuerttemberg, thus making prospects

: for the Bonn coalition appear less favorable.
Nevertheless, SPD leaders in Bonn remain committed
_to the,.Grand Coalition and sesious instability at

= the federal ievel seems unlikely. Over the long

-run the outcome of this lates= election may have

ee " certain implications nationally, including the ‘

possibility that Bonn leaders Bay be encouraged

4s . to take a more nationalist line

The NPD's Success more than in the last Baden-
as Waerttemberg state election in
The West German state elec- 1854, but 15 percent less than
tions in Baden-Wuerttexberg on in the 1965 federal election.
23 April breught the far-right
; National Democratic Party (NPD) Christian Democratic Union
of, 9,8 percent of the vcte, the (C>z) strength fell slightly to
: most impressive total it has yet 44. percent (1964: 46.2 per- '
: attained in any state. About 71 cent), while the Social Demo-~-
: percent of the voters turned eratic Party (SPB) achieved a
out, approximately three percent vote of only 29.1 percent (1964:
t
SECRET '

Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68


14-0000

SECRET

i964 yee 120 Seats

7 : 1

90630 5 68 . ~ .
37.3 percent). The liberal Free
Democratic Party (FDP), made a
slight gain, winning 14.4 percent
of the vote (1964: 13.1 percent).
Against the background of last
October's Bremen elections, in
which the National Democratic
Party won what was then a record
percentage of 8.9, the Baden-
Wuerttemberg results brought re-
newed cries of aiarm over the
dangers of neo-Nazism in the Fed-
eral Repubiic. More important,
the results also raised doubts
as to the future of a coalition
government by the Christian Dem-
ocrats and Social Democrats, not
only in Baden-Wuerttemberg but
at the-federal government level
as well.

Baden-Wuerttemberg: A Test Case

Baden and Wuerttemberg tra-

ditionally have been strongholds

of liberal, nonsocialist democ-
racy in Germany. In the early
1930s, the Nazi vote in this

area was almost always appreci-

ably lower than elsewhere in
Germany. The hotbeds of Nazism
lay in other regions, for ex-

ample in Franconia, East Prussia,
~ and. Schleswig-Holstein. :

“The economic and social pic-
ture in Baden-Wuerttemberg would
lead to expectations of ‘stability
there. The proportion of the
population. now employed in in-
dustry -is higher than in any
other state. The ecoriomy of the ©
state wag virtually untouched by
the recent West German recession,
during which unemployment never
exceeded one percent. Per. cap-
ita income is. above average.
Protestants and Catholics are
almost evenly balanced in pop-
ulation, while the proportion of
protestants in the Federal Re-
public is slightly higher.

A few observers correctly
forecast the outcome, but the
general expectation was that the
vote for the National Democratic
Party would be lower than in
Bremen. The two major West Ger-
man polling organizations had
predicted in March that the NPD
would receive five percent of the
vote.

Federal-level politicians
had campaigned actively in the
State. Charcellor Kurt Kiesinger,
a popular native son, made a
three-day speaking tour, in which
he sharply attacked "arrogant,
thoughtless, and dangerous na-
tionalism," He stressed this
theme in the Hohenlohe area,
where the NPD later received its
highest vote in the state. Willy
Brandt also appeared to speak for
the Social Democrats.

SECRET
Page 2 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68


1400000,

™. oe, 4
JSECRET -

NPD Representation inv West’ German States

5.8%, 4 eeate)
23 April 67

SCHOESWho.

- LOWER
SANONY

78 (LO sears)
4 June ‘67

NORTH REEENES ‘

NOPSEPHALIA

7.9% (3 seats)
6 Now "66

TEESSE
6.9% (4 seats) .

23 Apni ‘07
RIUNTLAND.

DALNTINATE

SAAR

BADEN. > BAMARIA
WUERTTEMBERG i

PSs Sot
SECRET ot
Page 3° SPECIAL REPORT 31 Hay 68


14-0000

“, :
ae

The participation by | na-..

tional figures reflected a -feél-

ing in-Bonn that this state elec-
tion, the last before the 1969
federal. election, might Anfluence
national politics. Tho ‘analogy
to the. federal scene was pointed

‘up by ‘the existence in Baden-.

Wuerttemberg of a coalition of
Christian Democrats and Social
Democrats, similar to that in-

Bonn.
Reaction to, Student Riots

In looking for explanations

of the NPD gains, German observ-

ers have emphasized the public
reaction ayainst the Easter stu-
dent rioting, and dissatisfaction
with the federal grand coalition.
Conservatives. lean to the former
explanation, while students and
trade unionists stress the latter.
The NPD did not receive less ‘than,
6 percent in any. electoral dis-

trict. This suggests that the .
~sentiment expressed by the vote.

is widespread, and may extend
throughout the FRG.

Reaction to student rioting
probably contributed something,
but this aspect seems to have —
been exaggerated as a factor in
NPD gains. In Heidelberg, the
NPD vote rose to 11.9 percent,
but in three other university
towns, the party's vote fell.
below the state average of 9.8
percent. In industrial Esslingen,
where there had been two stu-
dent riots, the NPD only attained
9 percent. Some voters may have
been influenced by student dem-
onstrations to transfer their
votes from the SPD to the CDU,
whose spokesmen have generally ad-
vocated a stern treatment of
rioters, :

SECRET a

At the ‘same’ time, ‘thé ““néw.
W left". certainly failed to win”
popular support, The Democratic
Left, supported by radical stu-
dents, won only 2. 3 percent in
the state as a whole, while mak-
ing better showings -in certain
university and industrial local-
ities... While the Democratic
Left's state-wide average was bet-
ter’ than the far left had at-
tained in recent elections under
other names, it fell below the
last, low figure gained by the
Communists before they became
illegal: 3.2 percent.

Hostility to the Grand Coalition?

There is dissatisfaction
with the coalition within the-
cou, and it can be. assumed that
some of the party's right wing ;
| voted for the National Democrats.
The Socialists, however, suffered

« | ope greater loss, Left-of-center
‘Socialists often complain that

|
|
|

thc party has compromised its
principles and lost public favor,
There is an undercurrent of feel-
ing in these quarters that the
party has endangered German democ-
racy .by abandoning its long-
time position of opposition and
entering into collaboration with

the CDU.

Although the SPD has pro-~
vided much of the impetus tothe.
grand coalition's economic and
foreign policies, and although
the coalition in Baden-Nuerttem-
berg has generally functioned

i well, dissatisfaction undoubtedly

exists among idealistic members
of the left and among tradition-

} ally class-conscious union: mem-

bers. itiddle class voters of
this persuasion probably turned

SECRET
Page 4 SPECIAL REPORT 31 May 68

44-0000

ee en

.to the Free Denocratié Party,
-which has assumed the role’ of
‘respectable oppésition. “The:

we Pete

Lo ‘SEGRET ° OL,

connection between :this: left-"
liberal criticism and the NPD
gains on. 28 Apri} ‘is not- ~imme~
diately apparent. “ete

Some commentators including

some Socialists ;conclude. that°

many SPD voters defected to the

‘NPD. The respected Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung fudged some
of the election data to support
its argument that workers had
gone over to the NPD, but.a more
careful analysis has shown | that
the NPD did indeed win above-av-
erage support-in some working~
class neighborhoods.

Many. old Socialists and
trade unionists, such as Willi
Bleicher, the powerful boss of
the metalworkers in this state,
are cool to the coalition and.
hostile to intellectuals, and
some of them are repelled by an- -
archic student leftism. Even 30,
most workers -are unlikely under
conditions of full employment ‘to.
cast what they would consider ‘a
neo-Nazi vote; certainly Bleicher
would never favor such ‘action.
SPD electoral losses would seem
to be due less to defection to
the NPD than to the failure of
lower-level SPD functionaries,
apathetic, orevenhostile toward
the coalition, to get out’ the
vote, and to the failure of many
trade union and normally SPD
voters to go to the polls,

In traditionally socialist
Mannheim, only 58 percent of
those entitled to vote turned out,
SPD percentages dropped 14 per-
cent in one district and 13 per-

-cént in another. the percentage"
.of NPD. strength rosé to 12.1, --
_10.9,- and 11.2 in the three city”

districts, but working class -
votes would not be needed to pro-
vide these percentages, espe=

“cially in the facé of -a low SPD

tifFnout. These. votes probably
cama mainly from the CDU, the
FDP, of from those who had not
voted before.

NPD Activity Pays Off

The NPD organization worked

hard during the campaign, con-

ducting more meetings than all
the other parties put together.
The party has overcome its former
inexperience and disunity, and
is developing into a well-oiled
political machine. The organ-
ization Fields speakers and pro-
vides canned speeches and prop-
aganda materials to local groups.
The NPD's heritage is not purely
Nazi. It encompasses more re-
spectable antecedents, such ag
the Deutschnationaler (German
Nationalists) and other conser-
vative elements. In the inter-
ests of avoiding a government
ban, the National Democratic
Party shuns blatantly Nazi
appeals ‘and tactics.

Adolf von Thadden, the na~-
tional leader of the NPD, is a
smooth personality from a Junker
family who denies charges that
he was an active Nazi. He seems
to model himself more on De
Gaulle than on Hitler. The
Baden-Wuerttemberg leader of the
party, Wilhelm Gutmann, is a
former Nazi. During "the good
old days," he was Buergermeister
of Tiengen on the Swiss Lorder,

‘where he .sponsored anti-Semitic

SECRET . .

Page 5

SPECIAL REPORT

31 May 68

14.90000

activities in “1938. He refused
to permit the raising of white
flags when the Allied forces ar-
rived in 1945. Despite his past,
he’ won 15,000 votes in Karlsruhe.
In one commune in ‘the northern
end“of the staté, ‘the NPD gained -

/an absolute majority with 55 per-
cent of the vote; this was. the:

home Of an NPD candidate named.
Valentin ‘Goetz, who had been :;
voted out ‘as Buergermeister . two
years before. Le

The NPD won its greatest
relative successes in three
northern districts: Oehringen
(14.8 percent), Crailsheim (14.5
percent), and Tauberbischofsheim
(14.3 percent). The first two of
these districts ‘are largely prot-—
estant; the latter is predomi-
nantly Catholic. This northern

.area, and especially its Hohen-

lohe section, is ‘filled with dis-
satisfied small farmers, who. now
face Common Market - competition

ADOLF VON THAODEN

SECRET
SPECIAL REPORT

Page 6

: SECRET : , 4

and who have recently suffered
the’ loss of a- state subsidy ‘on
milk. Rural dissatisfaction pro-
vides opportunities for the NPD,
but ‘this is not a promising base

_ for a mass movement, .particularly

sifice the farm population in. the

“Federal Republic has dropped in

the last ten years from 20 per-
cent to 1l percent. Another im-
portant voting factor in this.

' northern area is the relatively

high proportion of refugees, who
were probably aroused by recent
Statements by Willy Brandt about
the Oder-Neisse line and by ‘the
failure of the CbU to react more
forcefully against Brandt.

As was the case in the
early 1930s, overwhelmingly
Catholic areas, where the Church
influences its members politi-
cally, had the lowest right ex-
tremist vote. One overwhelm-
ingly Protestant district,
Freudenstadt, also produced a

WILHELM GUTMANN ;

31 May 68

14-0000

AMOS Patna

aoe

eae a a

low. NPD vote. A postelection

_ poll of 1967 voters’ in Bromen
,. Showed. that, ‘UALike the | Hitler |
' movement, ‘the. National: Democrats ~

go not -yet attract ‘many women
and youth.- More than two ‘thirds

~. of the voters ‘for the. party, .

Were males, and the strongest. .
participation was in the 45 to

.60 age bracket.

FDP Gains and Losses

The FDP profited from its
position in the opposition. Ralf
Dahrendorf, a séciologist from
the University of. Konstanz with
an international reputation, has
recently entered the party and
has assumed a leading role, in-
fluencing the FOP in a loftward
direction and attracting left-
liberal support. In the Stuttgart
district where he was a candidate,
the party vote rose by 6 percent.
On the other hand, the new pat-
tern is not acceptable to many
old members of this tradition-
ally business-oriented party, who
looking askance at Dahrendorf's
readiness to debate and discuss
with Rudi Dutschke and other rad-
ical students, ‘Two of the three
districts with heaviest NPD gains
also showed heavy FDP losses, as
eid some other former FDP areas
of strength.

Perspectives on the Vote

The over-all picture appears
te be that while both the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Frea Demo-
erats lost to the NPD, they gained
at the expense ef the Socialists.
The Socialists suffered from :
apathy and incurred some loss to
both the NPD and Democratic Left.
The NPD probably garnered some

SECRET

new and uncommitted votes. It.

is fortunate for the “SPD leaders
dn Bonn-that the annual party
congress came before- the ‘Baden-
Wierttemberg election. It is
hardly likely that the congress
would now defeat a motion with-
holding. endorsement of the coali-
tion, as it did by a four-vote
Margin:in March, Assuming the
SPD remains faithful to the

Bonn coalition now, the prospects
are for further erosion of its
Strength and for greater diffi-
culties within its ranks.

Meanwhile, the NPD probably
will continue to grow in in=-
fluence. ‘It now is probably
stronger in some other areas
than in Baden-Wuerttemberg. A
change from proportional rep-
resentation to single-member... ..
constituencies, which might have

o Tauber:
(Mannheim bischulsheim
Baden-

Wuerttemberg — Heltelbers

Ochringen
Cralfsheia

Heilbronn.

eKarlsruhe

Plorsheint
art ITTGART

“Enslingen
“Tuchingen

Ereudenstadt :
reudensta oo. Utne

oFreiburg

Consta
Tiengen, e oOnstang

90671 5.68

SECRET

Page 7

SPECIAL REPORT

31 May 68


,, not seem to be warranted.

ye

_ sexyed: to block NPD growth, has
> now ‘become even“ less acceptable
than before’ to the SPD, which.-

would have lost three-fifths of
its eels ayeten seats

: A ban of- the. NPD en
unlikely unless’ the party com- |
mits some flagrant violation of
_ accepted rules, A Bonn press of-
| fice spokesman has stated that
‘the government will. seek a po-
‘litical debate with the NPD, and
‘not a-ban. On present form, the
NPD may get 40 seats in the 1969
Bundestag elections. An attempt
to'set a higher minimum per-
centage of votes (present mini-

mum: five percent) for Bundestag.

representation would arouse. .
violent FPD opposition, and does
not seem to be under serious con-
sideration at the moment. It
would violate German traditton,
and might produce a reaction in
favor of the NPN, enabling it

to overstep even the new margin.

Although. the growth of
the NPD is disturbing, alarm does
In the
‘early 1930s, Germany suffered
from depression and high unem-
ployment, and had bitter memories
of a recent inflation which wiped
out savings. Powerful elements
in the government and society/
including President von Ninden-
berg, the army, the courts, and
heavy industry, were highly re-
actionary and either cool or hos~
tile to republican democracy-~as
were the professors and students.
Racism was rampant and more or
less respectable, and unwilling-
ness to accept defeat in World
War I provided endless opportu-

ry

“ manifestations..

- velopment.

bot “SECRET . os

-nities for deriagoguery. All

these conditions are: now vir-
tually absent. “The defeat in
1945, and subsequent disclosures,
work to discredit. any real Nazi.
Moreover, the
fact that .no other ‘state will
elect a-newW assembly before the
1969 federal elections may help
to prevent a real bandwagon de-~
It must be emphasized
that the NPD is still a small
party, if no longer a mere splin-
ter group.

The Coalition Problem

German observers tend to be
more worried about the effect of
the NPD showing on foreign opin-
ion than about the increase in
NPD strength itself, and their
greatest concern is over the pros-
pects for the grand coalition,
resulting from the SPD losses.

A Baden-Wuerttemberg SPD conven-
tion voted on 18 May against con-
tinuing the coalition in Stuttgart,
and the old state SPD leaders
resigned. This would seem to

make the prospects for the Bonn
coalition less favorable.

At the same time, the FDP
appears not to be in a mood to
return to a coalition in either
Bonn or Stuttgart. Dahrendorf
has suggested that there might be
a CDU minority government in the
State. State CDU leaders may,
however, prefer to call new elec-
tions if a coalition cannot Be
formed. In this evént, they
would appeal for an absolute ma-
jority from the voters. If they
got it and if the NPD vote de-
clined, this would be encouraging,
but new elections might also have
a less favorable outcome.

SECRET

Page 8

SPECIAL REPORT _

31 May 68

&
5

a

3969 ‘€éderal election:
. thé pattern'of the 28-:
‘April éleétion,- the same ‘problems
i -in-Born, With this .
‘a breakdown of .the vote,

' the-FDP ‘and the. SPD together can- ~

not form ‘a majority, and /a-re-
fusal “6n_the part of both of
them to join the CDU means that
‘the latter cannot organize a ma-"
‘jority government either--unless'
the CDU invites NPD'collabora-.
tion, which it. is far from ready
to. do. .

A collapse of the grand
‘coalition in Bonn either before
-or after 1969 and a return by:
the SPD to opposition positions
would signify more than a passing
cabinet crisis. In the past,
parties ‘tended to harden into
intransigence, committed to par-
ticular ideological and material
interests, and undblé to reach
pragmatic compromises with each
other. In recent years, West
German politicidns have tried ‘to
break with this tradition and
to work o. the consensus prin-.
ciple. A failure of these ef- _
forts would have serious “imp li- .
- cations. If--as does not Séem-
likely at present--the three” °
Major parties were unable to
form a majority government, this
might lead to severe instability
and the discrediting of par-
liamenctary government.

Bonn and Weimar
Many misleading analogies
have been drawn .between the Bonn
and Weimar republics. One Weimar
precedent may help, however, to

* SECRETD. .

explain why some observers view -

the coalition problem seriously.
In March 1930, another grand
coalition with SPD participation
collapsed over the ‘question of

.Cuts in unemployment insurance,

leading to ‘the formation of a
conservative majority government
under Heinrich Bruening.. Bruening
was later replaced by the reac~-
tionary Franz von Papen, who in
turn was followed first by a wire-.
pulling general, Kurt von Schlei-
cher, and ‘then by Adolf Hitler.

The worst aspect of the SPD with-

' drawal was that it made the par-

liament ineffective and power-
less,

Once minority government was
embarked on, supported by presi-
dential prérogatives, there wags
no effective test for legitimacy

‘except the will of Hindenburg by

then susceptible and old. The

Nazis ultimately came to power,

not by a majority vote, but through
the paralysis and impotence of the
constitutional system and through
intrigues in the presidential
palace on the part of those, espea-
cially Papen and Schleicher, who
thought they could “use” Nazi

“mass support.

In contrast to the 30s,
the presidential powers now are
far weaker,* and aside from all
the other factors inhibiting a
recurrence, the Weimar precedent
itself must influence SPD leaders
in Bonn. They are completely
dommitted personally to the pres~
ent coalition. A decision to
go into opposition is unlikely
under Brandt and Wehner.

*The absence vf executive emergency powers is not of course without dangers. In a bitter parliamentary deadlock, an
illegal assumption of power, perhaps by extragovernmental elements, might be the only way out.

ee SECRET

Page 9

_ SPECIAL REPORT

31 May 68

14-0000

SECREF

~ Another possibility might
be a ‘left-wing’ withdrawal .from
the SPD, although the leadership
for a dissident. faction has yet

te" emerge. This_might provide
“a healthy outlet ‘for “criticism

of the system without’ a turn to

“minority rule. Unlike the early

1930s, virtually all West Ger-
man politicians now would do their
best to maintain a functioning :
constitutional system. Real. .
dangers will probably not arise
unless, as in‘the late Weimar
period, the government finds it-
self confronted with economic

or political problems which seem
to defy compromise settlement or
Yational solution:

Immediate Prospects

Assuming that’ the Bonn co-
alition lasts until the 1969
elections, its leading members
may still modify their policies
somewhat in the light of the
Baden-Wuerttemberg experience.
The adverse vote of the refugees
in the recent election could act
as a brake on the policy of de-
tente with Czechoslovakia and
Poland, although there is ne sign
ef this as yet. Chancellor Kie-
singer has attributed NPD gains
partly to “years of agitation -
against our own history and against
healthy self-confidance,"” which
suggests that he may try to sound
amore nationalistic note. To

the extent to which. the results
continue to be attributed to
student activities, this will

‘Strengthen the demand for firm-

ness. Even before the election,
Brandt sent a telegram to SPD
state headquarters, advising that
speakers should react “completely

-| hard" against student demonstra-

tions.

Although the antistudent re-
action does not seem to have been
as important a factor as some have

‘believed it to be, constant vio-

lence and provocation on the part
of the students, accompanied by
constant press attention, could
lead to severe official or unof-
ficial counteraction. This, in
turn, could bring more scrious
student violence, verhaps with
the support of other elements.

Some matters of student con-
cern have appeal for others. Thus
students and many trade unionists
Oppose emergency laws, and this
question is again being agitated.
Because of the Nazi experience,
there is widespread aversion among
left-of-center elements to the
use of force in the name of “or-
der," however great the provoca-
tion. But also because of the
Nazi experience, a really Large
increase in NPD votes does not
seem likely in the 1969 election,
or in an earlier new election in
Baden-Wuerttemberg, should that
come to pass. (CONFIDENTIAL)

SECRET
Page 10 SPECIAL REPORT . 31 May 68


14.90000

—
1
)
.
eta YATE OnE Ae eS CTO EDR hat NETE TNR ENE ano en PA vorie@riege Lie ment Ee anne

ARON I SO eR TN me am a tree me ne MPL ERAN ANN Le nh Pe

Secret

AOE I NGO Een S Lag MEAT Mb ASD EMS EY COMET bm

8 Sess

oe

wey

14-0000 .
sea

1, “Tata stag Siactlons 185 |e NOta first Ettorg 684,137 votes 728
2. 13 March ISS, examined Llectlows,s Schlerts- Ta lt ocesvilthas wane :

Ris dlyastive : ALY ray. exnitdatoy . :
svecspal 20,58 of vote’ ,
Quimared sith 6 in cote

‘ . Lowzs da 1354

"Bolstein, AN
“aot to parttetpata, 4 tes did)

pout. 2s VW Marcy 1S, Reverie Crtical Bloe tions 1.6 $ et total Bavartea
. ae MO nafot effort echowatrated “ cvete tke : :
ae enly_in Franzonte, . . Migele Pysseonts 3 “a. .
7 _ r ee : . dosh = 5,14
a SM , LEplangea <3, 2s
; oo . . Rumberg= 7.
. Sovintach- 5 of
: : Uppas Frassoala
“oe Sayrouth” - ait a
_ - 3° x
; Rershee’ = 5,86
\, $3732 village & zoe

3.9 % O88 33 ia 185

Ay 27 March 13S fasburg Barrarschatt shrotten
ma ¢uxiiistes alestod

$, 10 July 13S Yorthrheftn-Nestphalta Laniteg Slestioa
No ND euiditates elegted nose. ontarcd,
6. 6 Ostebar 16 Hanlin Syslactloa (Cesc: sal Conctl)  @, as C8525) @ seats
mae en) yates = 705+
s thats in lemitag
. . dorburg, Vleshetan, Passat
Lo . : ‘ and Cleasen zea 10%
0 t/t = $8
ct %, 20 Nowexbor 1¥6 Bavarian fanitag Elesticas —~ votas? 7, ib
. Loy an 15 Seata ta Landisg

7 6 fovetyar, 1966 Resco Tacdtag BYsotions

2,0 2) Ape i) 1587. Rhetniand-Palatina &Sests, 6.9 Sef vita
23 AeA] WRT Schicavtyiolatetn +  & Seats, 5.7 $ of rote
Wd. 4 Sons 17 lover Saxony 10 Sears, 7S «? vote a
S Soats, 3.3 ger wote .

Od. 1 Ceteber L287 Brennen Burgerachalt

. a . ; . . .
12,0 e 8-Kjr ril 38S Baden-Buertteaheurg am 12 Sa249, 903 % of voto

: 3 . ‘
. -
: . ie . SOG .
> 1 . . . ’ 7 ve
eat
: oe ve


14-0000

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Sa

DIRECTORATE OF |
INTELLIGENCE

The National Democratic Party in West Germany

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

-_ Secret
Ho . Ne 310
\9 June 1987y

a

SC No. 00773/67B


14.90000

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° SECRET

“THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY: IN WEST GEREANY | ,

The poor ‘showing of the ultranatilonalistic.
National Democratic Party (NPD): in recent elections
in several Wast German states cléarly disproves the
party's claim of providing an acceptable alternative

to the policies and programs of the country's maior
parties. The NPD's failure to, maintain the momentum

suggested by the successes scored in two state -
elections last fall.is directly attributable both

to its own well-publicized interhal dissension ani

to voter preference for the Christian Democrats and
Socialists deriving from the image of vigor, and* -
decisiveness imparted by their “grand coalition*®

under Chancellor Kiesinger.

Barring some serious

reversal in the fortunes of the Kiesinger government--
which ig unlikely--it is doubtful: that the NPD will
be any more successful than cther fringe groups have
been in seeking to rally latent riyght-radical senti-
ment in Germany and revive it as a dynamic political

ferce.

Election Setbacks

The NPD has claimed wide
attention both in Germany and
abroad and led many observers
to conclude that it was a force
to be reckoned with, “Within two
and a half years of its founding
in November 1964, the party
elected representatives to the
legislatures in five of West
Germany's ten states (11 counting
West Berlin). In elections this
April the party was expected to
obtain close to 10 percent of
the vote in Rhineland~Palatinate
and 12 to 15 percent in Schleswig-
Holstein but actually won only
four seats in each parliament
with 6.9 and 5.8 percent of the

|
|
|
|
|

4

base bastion" of Lower Saxony,

the NPD's performance was simi-
larly unimpressive--7 rercent

of the vote and 10 Lanégtag seats...

Emphasis by party leaders
on their success in gaining rep-
resentation in all the states
where the party has comzeted
during the past year has not
masked their disappointment that
the NPD's momentum of growth has
leveled off. The partys failure
to make a good showing in
Schleswig-Holstein ang Lower
Saxony--areas considered particu-
larly susceptible to nationalist
appeals--is especially damaging,
and raises fundamental doubt
about the party's future pros-

vote respectively. In the 4 June -pects.
@élection in the party's "home
SECRET

Page 1 SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun 67


mY SECRET. 2. “

.. : NPD Representation in West German States

2

5.82 (4 seas)
MOM PSIG. J

PREMEN

are

LOWER ~
” SANONY

Inte,

MOR TE RHINE

WESTPHALIA

7.9% (8 seats)

6.9% (4 sents)
HINELAND,

A PatsnSare oO .

* SAAR

7.4% (15 seats)

- BADEN.

WUERTTEMBERG

_ BAVARLA

40840 6 67

SECRET

14.90000

SECRET

: Origins: and Early Successes -

Férmed from ‘the remnants of..
the-definct German Reich - ‘Party
(DRP)--one of a number -of ultra-
nationalistic. splinter groups

_.which have détted the political

landbcape of postwar Germany=-the
NPD. quickly established a polit-
ical apparatus capable of func-~
tioning throughout the country.
The new party soon distinguished ©
itself by its relative success

in attracting the support of other
ultranationalistic-elements and a
variety of political:malcontents.
Earlier:attemets by other groups
to unite disparate nationalists
invariably had foundered on -per-
sonal rivalries and tactical.dis-
agreements. Some were. no more
than platforms tor self~expres-
sion by leaders: advocating a
particular set of extremist no-
tions. Even the most successful,
the Socialist Reich Party (SRP),
which at its high water mark
ebtained 1l percent of the vote
in the. Lower Saxony Landtag elec-
tions in/1951, was unable to
establish effective working rela-
tions with vival rightist groups
before itiwas outlawed by the
West German supreme court in
1952.

paring its first year, the
NPD encountered many of the prob-
lems experienced by its predeces-
sors. The party was unable to put
on an effective campaign for the
September 1965 national elections
and obtained only 2 percent of
the votes--short of the 5-percent
minimum required for representa-
tion in the Bundestag. In local

ot SECRET
Page 3 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67

|
4

elections in’ Bavaria and Schleswig=
Holstein in March 1966, however, |
the .NPD showed that -it could com-
mand pockets of strength. In the
Bavarian cities of Nuremberg and |
| Bayreuth, it received between 7
and 10 percent of the vote and
elected representatives to the lo-
Cal governing councils. These
gains were facilitated by concen-
trating the party's efforts in
selected areas such as the Protes-
tant centers of Middle and Upper
“Franconia in heavily Catholic
Bavaria,

The first clear demonstra-
tion that the NPD could attract
more than the ultranationalist
vote came two weeks later in ~~
Hamburg, where the party nearly
doubled its vote as compared with
the Bundestag election the year
before. Although the NPD failed
to elect any deputies, the Chris-
tian Democrats and the Socialists
were concerned about its ability
to secure even 3.9 percent of
the vote. The threat to the tra-
ditional third party, the conserva-
tive Free Democrats (FDP) became
apparent. The FDP fell a third
below its 1965 vote and lost 4 of
its 12 seats in the Hamburg city

4. council. Profiting from a decline
‘in the economy which was already

under way and the increasing pub-
lic disenchantment with the lead-
ership of then Chancellor Erhard
in Bonn, the NPD accelerated both
its organizational effort and its
public relations campaign.

The stage was then set for
the party's breakthrough in the
Hesse and Bavaria state elections

14-0000

. legislature for the
its history. © By underlining the

SECRET . \

last fallin which it won 7.9 and
7.4-percent of the vote and
elected 8 and .15 deputies respec>

tively. | “In: Bavaria the NPD

emerged as the on nty small party.
in ‘the Landtag, ‘causing the -FDP
to lose its: representation un the
“first, time’ in

weakness of ‘the FoP, the-election
outcome contributed to, the forma-
tion of the grand cealition gov-

ernment in Bonn by the Christian

Democrats and the Socialists.

For the major parties, the-
NPD's successes had disturbing
implications. In contrast to its
various predecessors, the NPD
appeared capable of mobilizing
urban as well as ruzal support
and of altering the general trend
long evident in most West German
elections toward a two-party
system. In Hesse, the combined
vote of the Christian Democrats

and Socialists was a lower per-
‘centage of the totel vote than in

the previous election four years
earlier. Still more significantly,
however, Hesse and Bavaria pro-
vided further evidence cf the
NeD's ability to attract "pro-
test" votes from various dis-
affected lower-middle-class ele-
ments including small businessmen
and farmers unhappy with their
lot in. present-day Germany.

Basic Characterist and

Sources of Surp

In spite of its direct
lineage from the old German
Reich Party, the NPD has tried
to dispel the impression among

“_,

the general public that it is the
spiritual heir of Hitler's Na- |

tional Socialists. The party has
sought acceptance as a. legitinate

“political party and insists- that

it intends to function within the
established democratic order. .
Party Spokesmen maintain that it
differs 1rom the established par~
ties primarily in its allegedly

‘superior devotion to the national

interest, which they accuse the
governing parties in Bonn of
having failed to protect. ‘The
NPD says it offers the voter a
genuine choice between bankrupt
policies of the major parties and
a- return to national morality.

As much as some NPD support-
ers might wish to play down the
party's Nazi associations, how-
ever, it has been clearly estab-
lished that the leadership con-
sists of a nucleus of former
Nazis,who nave been active in
neo-Nazi parties throughout the
postwar years. According to
police reports, some 2,000 of
the estimated 25,000 members cf
the NPD belonged to the Nazi party
before 1933. This ratio is roughly
eight times that for the public
as a whole, The party has lost
libel suits in which it has chal-
lenged charges of neo-Nazism.

The German Interior Ministry

notes the parallels in political
outlook and philosophy between

the NPD and the Nazis, and main-
tains that the party's activities
“approach” unconstitutionality.

In the words of one former party
member, the NPD is made up of
people "who have forgotten nothing
and learned nothing” from Germany's

past.

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The Bonn goveriment is gen-
erally reluctant, however, to ban
the NPD, believing that it would
be imprudent to drive the ultra-
rightists Mnderground... 1, Tf the
NPD weré to ‘score impressive new.
successes in future elections,
chowever, the resulting concern
in the major parties might’ prompt
a reconsideration of this policy.
Interior Minister Luecke favors
banning the party as soon as
."enough evidence can be obtained
to assuré successful court action.
It is also possible that new °=--
NPD gains would motivate the
established parties to make pro-
posed changes in the electoral

_law that would make it more dif-

ficult for the NPD to obtain

. Bundestag representation.

Although the NPD pregram is
strongly reminiscent of Hitlerian
National Socialism, the party's
electoral supporters in Hesse
and Bavaria also include persons
“tions or any particular suscepti-
bility to Nazism per se. It has
managed to attract impulsive
youngsters, as well as political |
malcontents of all ages. . Its
membership includes individuals
from a broad range of occupations.
The NPD's special appeal among
the lower-middle-class, and par-
ticularly among the small business-
men and farmers is reinforced by
the economic squeeze these groups
are experiencing as a result of
gevernment economy measures. In
Hesse and Bavaria, the party did
especially well in areas noted
for traditional German nationalism

.and in areas which are predomi-

nantly Protestant. Many NPD ad-

‘herents are expellees from the

territories lost at. the end of
World Nar II.

, The makeup of the formal.
NPD membership is not radically
different in age or occupation —
group from a.cross section of the
general public. However, there
are certain characteristics of
NPD supporters which set them
apart from supporters of the
three major parties. The NPD
tends to attract a somewhat larger
number of older persons as well
as young adults, and the number
of lower middle class members,
including pensioners, is dis-
proportionately large. Formal
membership among students, how-
ever, is very small and only 350
of a total of 244,000 university
students are on the party rolls..

There is no evidence that
the NPD receives significant
financial support from German
industrialists. It is, however,
able to operate in the black.

The sound state of its finances
is in part a result of its prac-
tice of charging admission to its
rallies. This serves the double
function of making the rank and
file feel that they have a stake
in the party and of making it
necessary for its opponents to
pay for the right to heckle., The
party also derives considerable
sums from membership dues, sub-
scriptions to party publications,
and donations from members and
sympathizers.

SECRET
Page 5 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67

14.90000

dden at Second NPD Congress

Tha

: Party leader Von

June 1966

at Karlsruhe,

ion

acharacteristic cross sect

NPD audience

68627 667 CIA

i

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4

Sh

14-0000

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Rumors of clandestine fi-
nancial support from thé, Commu-

“nists or from sympathizers among

Nazi emigrants. to: Latin America = :
ave mot been sontiried.”

‘Despite NPD claims: of wide~-

‘spread sympathy in. the West German

carmed forces, ‘there is no evidence
‘of this.’ German security offi- .
cials estimate that no more than

2 percent of armed forces members
are card-carrying NPD members.
‘Since.the NPD is -a-legal political
organization, military leaders

are constrained from openly in-
fluencing members of the armed
forces to oppose it.

Many Germans are probably
reluctant openly to admit their
support for an organization like
the NPD. It is significant, how-
ever, that only 6 percent of
respondents to a national opinion
poll in January 1967 indicated a
preference for the NPD,

Leadership Problems’ -

The most notable single
handicap confronting the NPD is
the weakness of its leadership.
None of its leaders possesses any
great talent or stature. Cer-~
tainly no individual with Hitler's
demagogic genius has yet ap~
peared. ‘The absence of strong
leadership in what has been called
a "fuehrer-oriented party" has
left it divided and weakened by
factionalism. This was clearly
demonstrated in March 1967 wher.

‘then party chairman Fritz Thieien

and Deputy Chairman Adolf von
Thadden engaged in a public feud
which further damaged the party's

reputation. An outgrowth of long-
standing personal antagonism, the
dispute was triggered by Thielen's
resistance to Von Thadden's at-
tempted take-over as party chair~
man in Lower Saxony. Thielen
claimed that Von Thadden's elec-
tion to the state chairmanship
had been illegal and would hurt
the party's reputation. The par-
ty’s federal executive, however,
turned the tables on Thielen and
not only voted to reinstate Von -
Thadden but also to drop Thielen
from the national chairmanship and
expel him from the party. Thielen
clung to the helm under a temporary
court order until finally throwing
in the sponge in early May with

an announcement of his formation
of a new, rival part,, the Na-
tional Peoples Party (NVP).

More of an archconservative
than a neo-Nazi, Thielen was never
more than a figurehead. Real au-
thority and leadership--as well as
ideological gquidance--was provided
by Von Thadden. Von Thadden is.

a 45-year-old native of Pomerania,
a member of a prominent and aris-
tocratic Prussian family, a number
of whose members were prominent

in the anti-Nazi resistance. Al-
though Von Thadden applied for
Nazi party membership he appar-
ently was never formally admitted.
An ardent nationalist, Von Thadden
aspires to become a German De
Gaulle rather than a re-creator of
the German Reich.

Other leaders of some promi-
nence include Otto Hess, party
propaganda chief, and Waldemar
Schuetz, editor of the NPD's

SECRET
Page 7 SPECIAL REPORT 9 Jun 67

14-00000

Nazis.

3 0 SECRET

official weekly, ‘Deutsche
Nachrichten, Both were active

Thielen's departure: clears
the way for Von ThaddeA formally
to take over leadership of the

NPD. It is doubtful that Thiclen
.has the personal force or follow-.

ing to organize a party with
significant strength. The impact
of the new party on the NPD will
probably be small since the bulk
of the NPD membership appears to
prefer the leadership and ideology
of the Von Thadden’ group. On

the other hand, the strengthening
of extremist tendencies within the
NPD siqnaled by the triumph of
Von Thadden may hurt the party's
interests in the long run. The
result is also likely to assist

those actively seeking a formal

government crackdown on the party.

Program

In addition to its leadership
difficulties, another failing of
the NPD is its inability as yet to
offer a clear, positive program
relevant to existing problems.
Xenophobic and opportunistic, the
NPD feeds upon nostalyia for an
Older German nationalism, discon-
tent with the existing social or-
der, and Germany's international
standing and frustration over the
fact that reunification remains
as distant a prospect as ever.

Its stated objectives are ill de-
fined, when not deliberately am=
biguous, and are sometimes incon-
sistent. Its electoral approach
is generally: negative and destruc-
tively critical rather than af-
firmative. Its principal targets

-~

include foreign intérests and cul-

‘ture which undermina old values _
and "de-Germanize the fatherland."

It attacks the renunciation by
those in power’of what the NPD
regards as justified German ob-
jectives. It deplores what it’
considers the miseducation and
corruption of youth, “crime in the
streets,” foreign aid, and the

competition of foreign workers.

The NPD demands an end to
German dependence on the US and
calls for the revival of German
national consciousness. [Tt at-
tempts to draw a parallel between
West German - US relations and
those between the East German
regime and the USSR, In order to
tree Germany from Foreign domina-

‘tion, NPD spokesmen maintain,

American "occupation" forces must
go, although not before the with-
drawal of Russian troops, which
the NPD would have occur simultane-
ously with that of US troops.
Germany must again become master
of its Own fate, party leaders in-
sist, and the “lie” of war guilt
and war crimes trials must be
ended and a new German general
staff created. A key demand is
that the reunification of Germany
cannot be limited to uniting West
and East Germany but must include
the lands beyond the Oder-Neisse
border now held by Poland. Al-
though it does not advocate the
use of force to achieve this ob-
jective, the party holds out hope
that recovery will be possible by
@ Machiavellian deal of some sert.
NPD spokesmen at present renounce
a national nuclear capability for
Germany.

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Page 8 SFECIAL REFORT 9 Jun 67

14-00000 ,

1

VON tas um aberrane eta

j
:
i.
:

ry

SECRET

The’ party ‘puts forth slogans ©

"proclaiming "Germany for the Ger-

mans" and "Europe for the Euro-
peans." Indeed, ‘the NPD favors

a united Europe somewhat ‘along the
lines advocated by De Gaulle,
Europe, it holds, should be’ com-
pletely independent of the us,

and possess its’ own nuclear deter-
rent. It should be built ona
Franco-German alliance that smaller
European countries sooner or later
would have te join. The NPD would
welcome the decay of NATO as sig-
naling the end of sterile policies
which do not serve Germany's real

interests.

In seeking to gain the broad-
est popular acceptance, the party
avoids affirming the more extreme
aspects of Nazi ideology. There:
is, for example, no obvious anti-
Semitism in the party program -
and Jews technically could become
party members. The private atti-
tudes of the leadership, however,
are said to resemble traditional

‘Nazi anti-Semitism closely. The

NPD makes vague references, more-

- over, to the importance of "biood

ties," rejects evidence relating
to the Nazi extermination policy,
makes derogatory references to
the Jews in the party press, and
denounces aid to Israel.

In recent campaigning in
Lower Saxony, NPD spokesmen
shifted tactics somewhat by no
longer stressing issues obviously
associated with the Nazi period
such as war guilt and reparations.-
Instead, they sought to exploit
current grievances including
the economic recession, unemploy-
ment, lack of progress on reuni-

'

| fication, and. what they called

the unreliability of NATO.

Future Prospects

The NPD's failure to main-
tain -the momentum of last fail's
successes in this year's state
elections in Schleswig-Holstein,-
Rhineland- -Palatinate, and Lower
Saxeny is a serious blow to the
party's hopes. The squabble
among the leadership apparently
reinforced the feeling among un-
committed elements that casting
a protest vote for the NPD was
not worthwhile under present cir-
cumstances. The widespread dis~
content among farmers over gov-
ernment economy measures did not
result in a significant shift of
votes to the NPD. Moreover,
there has been a strony resur-
gence of general ‘confidence in
the Bonn government. Although
the NPD benefited lust Fall from
the popular dissatisfaction with
the Erhard government, the grand
coalition headed by CDU Chancellor
Kiesinger has displayed vigor and
decisiveness which has been re-
warded at the polls.

Even if the NPD were to fol-
low its forerunners intn oblivion
it-would not mark the end of right-
ist extremism, A portion of the
German electorate will remain re-
ceptive to this kind of appeal.
In the absence of, a party such as
the NPD, right-wing voters tend
to give their support to one of
the insignificant splinter par-
ties, or to one of the more con-
servative established parties,
such as the FDP, when they vote
at all. :

SECRET 1

Page 9 SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun, 67


14-0000

It is possible--although in-
creasingly- unlikely--that. the NPD
could turn’ out €o. resemble other
parties of a national~conserva-

-tive stamp.. Despite the radical

views of some of thoir menbers ,
such groups have. “managed., to, Op--
erate without’ Subversive- mani- . .-
festations., ‘The ‘German Party (DP),
for example, which had been rep-

resented in several North German

state legislatures and in the
Bundestag conducted itself_in a.
responsible fashion. .-

The NPD at present draws a
good deal of this traditional
right-wing vote from the old Refu-
gce Purty, the DP, and small con-
servative regional parties such
as the Bavarian Party. The total
extremist vote,’ ‘however, has in-
creased very little since the
establishment of the NPD. Es-

timates of the extent of hard-core -

ultranationalist sentiment in
Germany vary between 5 and 15 per-
cent of the electorate. Under
present conditions this does not
constitute a threat to German dem-
ocratic institutions and is not

SECRET

greater than the degree of ex-
tremist sentiment in-other West-
ern, European countries.

Gutlook

‘Assuming. the .NPD’ survives
the current period of internal...
Strife, its potential for further
growth beyond its present 6- to
8-percent range appears to be
limited under conditions now pre-
vailing in West Germany. The NPD
is still capable of Capitalizing
on circumstances which might pre-
sent themselves as a result of a
protracted economic recession or
major political blunders which
would discredit the present gov-
ernment leadership. The outcome
of recent state elections, how-
ever, tends to confirm that the
overwhelming majority of German
voters continues to prefer the
moderate ,-albett increasingly

.independent and nationalist, pol-

icies of the major parties and
the government, and rejects the
radical alternatives advocated
by the NPD. (SECRET)

SECRET

Page 10

SPECIAL REPORT

9 Jun 67

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14-0000

1 Tale material contains information efecting the Rane pnal Defense af the United Mates within the mesning of the Esplonace Laws, Title
: . a USE Sece 76) ond 96, the Crensmivwe of revelativa of which f any manner to an wneuthoruat recon ts Prohibited | ‘be tow.

SECRE T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CONTROL EE D-DISSE

“f Scountay West Germany : he repoRTNO. —-—-CS- DD-312/ 00003-67

suwter’ ‘BEV ‘Progran : to Monitor and Counter DATE DISTR. 3 JAN 1967 owe

the Activitics of the National - ; :
- Desiocratic Party NO. PAGES 3. , :

Tyo. > Repgiences |

'

nw so . . . + i
DATE OF : - |

INFO: = + 23 November 1966 rn . : t

PLACE & et i

FIELD REPORT. NO. ‘

oe DATE ACO. German; "Bonn (2s: November. 1966

THiS 1S UNEVALUATEO tnroRwatlon SOURCE GRADINGS ARE OFFINITIVE APPRAISAL OF CONTENT tS FENTATIVE,

A qualified American. ‘official from a senior official of the
West Gorman Federal Office for tho Protection of the Con- :
stitution (BfV).. This official is responsible for monttoring. :
the” activities ‘of right radical organizations throughout : :
Wost Germany. The information is probably true.

» SOURCE

lM. _(Summary: The West German Federal Office for the Protection
- of the Constitution (BfV) and its regional affiliates
: " (LEV) have undertaken @ program to monitor and counter
_ - .the activities of the National Democratic Party (NPD).
whe Included in this program are efforts to penetrate the NPD
at all its levels, to monitor its membership end finances,
; and to counter its influence, )

at

!

re ved. Report For a number of ‘years. the. BiV has been engaged in
penctrating and monitoring the activities of right radical
organizations. Since the establishment of the NPD in, LMS RYO!
1964,the BfV has made a concerted effort to penetrate it
at both the national and regional levels. This effort has
resulted in the recruitment of about 60 sources with access
_to the NPD organizations at_all levels. In several cases
. the BfV or LfV have been able ‘to recruit local NPD county .
: “ chairmen and in six [Cacnder have access to the minutes and :
. . - files of the Land organizations, The BfV has also penetrated i
the.national headquarters of the NPD in Hannover. .

3. Through its penetration of the national organization, the
BfV has been able to obtain and photograph the entire mem-
bership rolls, which currently contain about 20,000 names,
The national list has been augmented by additional member~
ship applications obtained via ponotrations of the 2. i f

“5 . Land organizations. The BfV is currently in the process 5
‘4 of tracing all of these membership applications against 4!
3 the master Nazi Party menbership files at the American 3
. . 2°
; - 1:
SECRET . ; Gow |

NO ‘FOREIGN DISSEM /Continued/ | tryimees™

EGN-3098
CAVATA-1

"SEB, CI 2, FI 4, EUR 9, DO/H 1.

14-00000

wah hah DISSEN - : :
..Page 2 €$03--212/00003-67
controlled, Beriin Pocumant. enter. Although this tracing
activity han,not boon conpletod and-is bhnidicapped by lack
of personnel at the Berlin Docunient Center, the BL¥ estinetos
its current file on the NPD 1s far more accurate than the
Coo files at the NPD headquarters, Because of its acerss to
‘ Se ’ the Berlin Dociiment; Center, the BY will. éventually.. have
‘ , a better estimate of the numker of NPD members who are-
former Nazi Party menabers than does. the NPD. itself.

The: ‘Biv! ‘Ys also making a céncerted ‘effort to obtain ‘docu-

ment’ ‘efforts ‘to do this are. directed. at spotting and recruite

ing: clerical ‘help who ‘workin’ NPD officés and-have access

to filés. ‘ Information. in‘the ‘BIV's possession to date,
‘which. ineludes considérable documentary. evidence regarding

-——.. finanées; tndicates that the party is not receiving any

‘substantial’ ‘financial. .ossistance from abroad. . The principal .

an sources of funds are a6 follows; — .

jas . The monthly DM 3.7 _ membership dues. For ‘the
“20, 000 members, this amounts’ to DM 60,000 per month
or DM. 720,000 a yoar.

b, Subscription fees for publications.

ig

~“@, Single donations from financially well-to-do
members and supporters.

° . d. Admission fees for political rallies, The Bf¥
has registered, since May 1966 when the NPD began its
campaign in Bavaria, a total of more than 2p00 polit-
ical rallies in Bavaria. Although at times more than
ss - one. third. of. thuse attending -such rallies were
; - estimated to be opposed to the NPD, everyone attending
the rally paid an admission fee. The BLV estimates
that the NPD has heen able through the above sources
of income to collect from DM 3,000,000 to DM 4,000,000.
The LFV are watching this funding quite closely,
particularly for evidence of financing from Communist
countries, Thus far they have been unable to sub-
stantiaté the existence of any such support. Although
thero inno firm evidence of actual financiel support
of the NPD trom Communist sources, the BfY¥ is aware
of an intereat'on the part of the Eastern intellizeace
services to penetrate the NPD and monitor its activities,

i

& At the instigation oi Fredeval Minister of interior Luecke,
the BfV has undertaken to establish a confidential ell-party
committec consisting of mempers of the Social Democratic
Party (SPD), Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Trade Union Movement (DGB)
to counter the NPD in Rheinland-Pfalz prior to the upcoming
elections’ in spring 1467. All of the parties have agreed
to participate and this activity is moving ahead. Recently
at a two-day conference chaired by. the BLV in’a village
on the Mosel River, it was decided not only to counteract

: NPD. propaganda during the election campaign, but also to
‘ undertake orientation lectures for all officials in the.
Rheinland=Pfalz and other local governments who have shown
NPD leanings. These courses will be launched as soon as
the campaign gets underway. A similar propaganda and
ofientation activity-is also being planned for the elections
‘jn Schleswig-Holstein.in 1967.

6. The BfV has persuaded the DGB to set up an action group

5 almed at organizing the Labor movement into countering the 5

‘ ; 4 . 4
1? SECRET 2

=. NO FOREIGN DISSEM 1

CONTROLLED DISSEM /Continued/

mentary. evidence on tae NPD‘s sources of incone, The recruite


14-0000

rere Ae td Hace

5
4
3.
2
t]

- ee ee

vy ~SSBCRET Ff,
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CONTROLLED DISSEM

Page 3 ; CSNB-312/00003-67

influence of the. NPD. The BfV is assisting the DGB in.
working out methods for the infiltration of workers into
NPD organizations to report and counteract their influence

. within factories and workers councils, . The Biv has also
established contact ‘with the German Industrial Institute

in Cologne, which. is.'sponsored by the German equivalent of
the U-S. National- AsSociation of Manufacturers. The Bf¥
used as an argument with‘ the industrialists the fact that.

. inéreasing. influence of the NPD in Gernan industry would

have. a, negative. effect pon foreign trade.” .

7 The BEV: undertook a,survey ‘ot the election resiilts at ‘the

village and county level -in. Land Hesse. This. survey showed

that the NPD had substantial success in: areas containing

.Gernan military. installations. It was further determined
: "that - -the * “NPD! had ‘considerable appeal amang non-commissioned
, professional soldiers who feel. they have failed to find

acceptance in the postwar German society. This negative

attitude has’ been less among Bundeswehr officers and draftees

than among, non-commissioned officers, who feel themselves under-

- paid and ‘lacking in social acceptance. The Bf£V¥ has contacted
.the sécurity organizations of the Bundeswehr to under .
take a‘program of orientation to counter the influence of

.. the NPD within the Bundeswehr.

Headquarters Comment: CS-311/16288-66 from qa different
source reported that the President of the West German
Association of Military Reservists had stated that a
large percentage of older reserve officers and non-
commissioned officers had voted for the NPD in the Land
Hesse election.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM .
CONTROLLED DISSE!

-~NWaw

oe me oe

14.90000

Anlage 1.

Steilenbdesetzung des Bunce esparteivyorstandes der XPD
| (Stand: 2.10.1966)

.e Parteivorsitz zender
nS

fo, THTeEEN Priedtich (pric) ged. 25.9.16 in Bremen,
. “‘wohnhatt: Bremen-ochdnebecs, Srauteichen 19
+. Beruf: Betonfabrikant

. Frithere Organisationszureheri,
 Grundungsmi ty zea der CDU, ~
Mitglied der Bremer Burgerschaften,

, 1957 Mitglied und spdter nandesvorsitzender ‘der

L "Deutschen Partei" (DP) in Bremen. fos

“" NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

sKeits : .

L. Stelivertreter:

. GUTMANN, Wilhel ged. 9.6.1900 in Basel,
; wohnhaft: nar srune, Kaiserallee 30
- Beruf: Angestellter

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Baden-wirttemberg
der NPD

Friihere Orranisationssu
"Gesamtdeutsche Parte."

SEP HIS),

, _ ehem. Funktionir des sBundesverbandes enen, Internierter=-

und Entnezifizierungsgeschadigter" (BIB).

NSDAP: 1.3.1932
1933 Biirgermeister in Tiengen

von THADDEN, Adolf, geb. 7.7.1921 in Trieglaff,

wohnhart: Benthe, Larchenwes 6

Beruf: Chefredaxteur

Friihere OrganisationszugehéricKkeit

49 hitglied der Deutschen secnt 3-partei" (DRP),
Mitglied des Deutschen Bundestages in der Fraktion
"Nationale Rechte",

. .

1950 Mitgl. u. Punktionir der "Deutachen Reichspartei"(DRP),

1955=1959 Mitglied des niedersichsischen Landtagea.
NSDAP: 129.1939

WINTER, Franz Florian, geb. 23.3.1923 in Amberg,
wohnhaft: fegernsee, Bahnhofstr. 11

Beruf: Metzgermeister u. Fachredakteur

1. Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Bayern der NPD
Frithere Or anisationszu ehorisxeit:

CSU-Mitglied u. Mitglied der vandesleitung
-GDP-Mitglied u. Mitglied des Vorstandes des Landesaus-
schusses und des Kreisverbandea

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied


' te .

14-0000 i aetna eras oo xe a
" EEA EE VMS TORR a WER 9 Reeth 2
~ - Ea oe adel as te
H 1 . . Ved BN tery
a
Fy

H

1

WER, Otto. Theodor, ged. 31.5. 1906 in Paris,
wennhart: Brenen-Vegesacx, Gerhard-Rohlfe-Str. 61,
Beruf: .Kaurnmann

Vorsitzender des Landesverbandeg Bregen der NPD.

pkeit:

.. rrihene Orpanicationszugehsri
re . mo, "Deutsche rartel' Di
io : . Mitglied, der Bremer Burgerschaft

NSDAP: 1.8. 1951

| HESS, Otto ‘ged. 19.12.1903 in “Rossdorf,
wonmnaft: bBissendorf, weidendamn,

Beruf: Oberregierungsrat a.D. (Jurist), Kaufnoann,

Paps Frihnere Orveat.-ationssugencrigkeits |.

ot i Matglied u. cundtionar aer “Deutschen Reichspartei" (DRP),
aes ae ; NSDAP: 1.6.1930

: Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,

i 1938 Referent-im 3erichts- und R echtsamt der -

: obersten SA-Fihruns, SA-Obersturmbannfihrer.

AMNKER Dr. ‘Karl geb. 22.9:1913 in Theesen,
Mee east Bielefeld, Paderborner Weg 24 a
Beruf: Rechtsanwalt und Novar

Vorsitzender des Landesvervandes Nordrhein-Westf.d.NPD

Frihere Organisationszugenirigkeit: keine
NADAP: 1.5.1933

Wie Raed oak

SCHUTZ, Malsemar, geb. 9.22.1913 in Dausenau,
: . wohnnait: Gottingen, Felix-Klein-Str. 4
3 “ Beruf: Schriftleiter u. Verlagsinhaber

Friuhere Organisationszusenirigkeits

NSDAP: 1.11.1936,

: 19°9 Hintritt in die HJ,

: : 1934 Adjutant des Gau-Pressechefs,

: 1957 sreiswart u. Gaureferent "Kraft durch
‘ Freudc" (KaP),
! : 1938-1939 Junker der Ordengburg Vogelsang,
: : /  ° anschlieSend Beaurtragter der NSDAP in Gau Hessen,
: SS-Hauptsturmftihrer der Waffen-SS

iol. a , SCHNEIMER, Horst-Glinther, geb. 11.2,1913 in Essen,
: . i wonnnatt: hamburg-Grob-riottbek, Hochrad 7,

. Beruf: keedereibesitzer

Vorsitzender des iandesverbandes Hamburg der Ned

i Frihere Orgarisationszugehdrigkeit: keine

, NSDAP: 1.4.1932 .

‘ : SS-Hauptsturmfiinrer und Adjutant

: : Legationsrat im Auswirtigen Amt :


14-00900 ,

- Yockats. 6, r
i 24.35.2909 in
‘ : WOrnnALSS Aavoaneth, Vt aCenannsse. $
os yr Berud: Recntsaneals unc Notas ‘
‘ : Frohere Oren. :
i Mitwvised aer ” 7% rarcea ve) und
' Mitgiied ages nieiersachsithen Landtages -
I . + so
i NODAME nicht M.tgirea i
i i
H !
/ OV, Partewvarsthand:
; a) grantee Mitvliecers: .
! i
i BUAND EG, Anneliese, geo. 7.10.07 in Hargarten/Lothsringon
; wonnhatt: Heraterc, onzianstr. 7
; Feunere Crean. nt onnucenorigne. ts
; Dirp-Mityiaed und runxtionar
: NGODAP: nacht Mitglied
i
H .
: LAUGH, Feber, geb. 20.11.1640 in Lénnhorst,
: wohnhalt: hunnover, Auf dem Larchenberge 15,
H Beruf: Gtudent
i Fruhere Organinationszuzehorickeit: keine
i tHGnAL: nicht Mitglied

; MAL os TORN, Eo 1, ceb. 26.9,19CA in Kaufbeuren,
: Wohnnatt: Grobeaitingen, Bahnhorstr. 45

Beruf: Aaufwann

sxeits:

Fruhere Organisationszugehtri
-Mitgliea und Funktionar

: NSDAP? 1.8.1950 ,
1934 Gauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)

1936 Leiter der Gauschulungoburg Gau Schwaben
1937 Reichsschulungsleiter is Amt ftir Technik,Munchen.

ged. 8.11.1911 in Coesfeld,

i PRINZ wu SALM, Karl
fo, wohnhart: reitocheid ti.Disseld., Kahlenbergweg 7
: ’ Beruf: Kaufmann/Oberst a.D. .
Frihere Organinationszucehorigxeit: keine

NODAP: nacht Mitglied

ov

re eee -nge

OE aE™ ore copes


14-0009,

NOES 2 FE TE EIT ET I ET I I
: s ee ° Pe OR SPIER RST OREN
a : er PER TORY AS CCNY YT NAT A
' a . oR SB” SOE Gr EET 2 ty

a

fs ca

Gertraals geb..16.2.3937 in Prettin, .
wehmnarts bunedurse Tnider Techt 1 : .
Beruf: Hauufrau

Peohere Orsan natonseucendrigkei ts . ;
; Vranderin und pe.teria aes Deurscnen Kinderschutz-
: . _ bandes" Oldendursg :

tRE-Mitglied und Funktionar

NSDAP: 1.9.1938 . Loe

Senetige

: ‘a a
ay.2,1606 in Saarbrucken,

sev. Lhaced2
7

e
a

varg, Agel
oe

‘ wombaftr osareracken, Endircher Weg 23

be Beruf: Versacherungseay Soann . ,

: Vorcitzender aes, Lancesverbandes Saarland der NPD
Fruhere Orranvratronszucencraghes’ nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1,.6.1935

26.10.1914 in Osthofen,
Mainzer Str. 20

MA 7, Fritz, seb.
Wohtnalt:; Qatnoren,
‘ Heruf: winzer/weinhandier

Rheinland-Pfal: der NPD

“Vorsitzender des LV

Frunere Orranyuatronszucenses

ne-Mitgiied una Pubsationar

. SDAP: 1.3.1933
_ S§-Sturmbannfubrer

zxeit:

FAEBENDER, Hernrseny ged. 24.5.1899 in Solingen,
verg 4

wohnhart: Notnenburg/Fulda, Oberer Haus
Beruf: Kaufmann

; Landesverbandes Hessen der NPD

Yor aiteender tes

gurehorigkeit:
“Tatronaren-Volkspartei” (DNVP)
des hessischen Landtages,

: Frubere Orvani.satior
: THIS Mitglied der "veutsc
' 1946 FDP=Mitglied und Mitglied
- 1949 Mitglied des Bundestages,
1955 Ubertritt sur "Deutschen Partei" (DP) u. Mitglied
der Fraktion der DP in Deutschen Bundestag.

: KSDAP: 21.10.1931
Austritt erfolgte ia November 1932

oo KUHNE, Dr. jur. Lothar, ged- 2,1.1908 in Steinbach/Thir.,

. . YohnhaTt: Hannover, Im Moore 12,
; Beruf: Kechtsanwalt,
: Vorsitzender des Landesverbandes Niedersachsen der NPD

. NSDAP; 1.1°7.1931
\ ; 193é Reichssicherheitshauptant ; :
. . 19 Referent in der tparteramtlichen Priifungskonmis-
sion" ia Stab deg Stellvertreters dea Fubhrero,

\ 1937 Buro des potschafters vou Ribbentrop, :
. so-Unteroturmfubrer

14-0000

LOBDEN, KarieErnst, ed. 666.1927 in Nagslau/Senhl.,
wohnhalt: cchieswig, nolonnehweg 31, | .
Beruf: Bicker und Jugendpfleger .

“ .. Vorsatzender des Landesverbandes Schleswig-Holatein der NPD

‘Friihere Organisationszugehirigke ts ,
*  obPshatgased und runctionar, : ;
DRP-Hitglied und Funktiondr auf Kreisebene.

NSDAP: nicht Mitglied

!
|

V. Amter_ im Priisidium:
onsabteilung: Adolf v. THADDEN (0.Stellvertreter)

sath

Organi
Finangabterlung: Otto Theodor BAOUWSR (s.Prasidium) —

Rechtsabteilung: Frits WINKELMANN (s.Prasidium)
Propaganda- u.Schulungsabteiiung? Otto HESS (s.Praisidium)

Presseabtcilung: Waldemar SCHUTZ (s. Priisidium) -- ----.

Heferat 3.b.V.: Fritz WINKELMANN (9.Prdsidium)

Re oe aah won na

2

: VWI. Referenten in Parteivorstand:

f AuGenpolitix:

|) von THADDEN, Adolf (a. Stellvertreter)
2 . Innenpolitik:

: : HEURMANNDURVEN, Benno, ged. 20.35.1916 in Altdtting,
‘ ' wohnhatt: Munchen, Heckenstaller Str. 178,

: Beruf: senatsrat
H Mitglied des geschiftsfiinrendea Vorstandes des Landes-
: verbandes Bayern der NPD,

Vorsatgender des Bezirksverbandes Oberbayern der NPD.

> Friihere Organisationszugehdrigseit: nicht bekannt

NSDAP: 1.1.1938
————" HJ-Mitglied seit 1933

Agrarpolitik:

' RUDOLPH, Heinz, geb. 7.6.1922 in Elberberg,
wohnhatt: alein-Ilde 5, ‘
bert; Burgermeister, Dipl.Laniwirt, Hauptmann d.R.

fo Referent fiir Agrarfragen in LY Niedersachsen der NPD,
cs Redner aur Landesebene im LV Niedersachsen der NPD,
: 1. Vorsitsender 1m Kreisverband Hildesheim der NPD.

Fruhere Organioationszugehoriskeits:,
: veritglie

NSDAP: 1.9.1940

14-0000

He wm andere 6 tes

ST ON ENT MPSA

Wirtachafts-—

rR crn,
na SA TRAE EE Eee ey Rae I Yasar

Finans- ung Steuerpolitik:

- PAGBENDER, Heinrich (s. Parteivorstand)

Vorkehfupolitiks::

SCHWEIMER; Horst-Giinther

(S. Praésidium)

Jugendfrapen: -

LOBEL, xarl-Ernst (9. Parteivorstand)

Sozinlvoclitixs ©

Kurt, seb. 7.6.1915 in Rippien,

KNUP PRY
wonnnaits Neuenhuus, Jahnstr. 2,

Beruf: Elkektromonteur -

Geschaftsfinrer und Kassenleiter im Kreiaverband

Grafschatt Bentheim der NPD

Pruhere Orfanisationszuyendrizkeits:
Da¥-Hitglied und runktionar

NSDAP

.Prauen- u

<a aetna raettemattettananae se OLA, -

WINKELVOSS, Gertraud

1.5.19350

nd Familienfracen:

(s. Parteivorstand)

Kulturpolitik:

DEM

Wwormmnait:
Berut;:.
2. stellv. Vorsituenaer im LV Nordrhein-Weatf. a.NPD
Lundesreaner deo LV Wordrhein-Westralen der NPD

Dr. Dietrich, geb. 19.4.1924 in Duisburg,
JuLsours-meiderich, Haferacker 13
Ocerstudienrat ‘

.

Friunere Organ .sationgsugendriskeit: nicht bekannt

NOVARs

nicnt ratglied

Vertriebenentraren:

GUTMANN, Wilhelm (3. Stellvertreter)

Arbeitskreis Bundeswehr:

'

“NSDAP:

ged. 4.7.1934 in cattau,

NI?TSCHE, Dieter,
-wohnhaft: Oldenburg, (z.%. Putlos)

Beruf: Hauptmann der Bundeswehr
NPD-Stadtrat im Stadtparlament Oldenburg

Friuhnere Orranisationszugehorigkeit:
AROh— Hitelied ;

nicht Mitglied

atte Eee

Ah ths aieittae mnateteieaamaywenas aieetaamenraitborta

a ore.

fewer heme MOB bee eee NY Shen be

FE are


gd

LEI cota

VII. Sonatzre funktionen ig Parteivoratand

Leiter der Abteilung Kasse:

‘SCHUTZ, Waldemar (0. Présidium)

“SGHIMMEHOHK, Dr. Heins, geb. 22.1.1911 4

Leiter der Hevigionsabteilun

. wonnnalt? liannover, nXaimundstr.
Beruf: Versicherungs-Kaurmann

pros: eh tS
DiAP-Mitglieu und Funktionar

Oreunigaticnss
Aeu una runxtionar.

ra

HEDAP: 1.6.1950

sS-Obersturnbannfuhrer -

bunaegveuchartsruhrers:

GCHAAKS, Martin, ged. 16.9.192 in Oels/Schles.
aonnnalt: roré~knsen,

Berufsiiauptmann a.Bw. a.D.

Yriinere Orfanisationszugehorigkeit:

MGDARs 1.5.1932

rehorigkeits

ve

* in der Finanzabta lung:

Charlottenstr.

n Chemnitz,

an ae

wee

Somer Re we ae samen

wr ryer vem eg

14-0000

fee tbe de

wee ee

aoe ee

j wes Verlaes

Geoebliscnurter . a:

Nosutsond pacurichten™ .

Gubil.

OCHUYZ, vinlaeu.c, geo. J.10.1915 in Dausenau,
wonnnalts; uottinjen, Felix-niein-str. 4
gerul's penriftieiter und Verlagsinhaber

Frineré Organisations suyenorigkeit:
DKP - Mityilea und yunktronur

NSUaPs 1.17.1936,
Wy29 Lintritt in die itd,
Wig wu gutunt deg Gau-Pressechefs,
1927 PFeiswart una yaureferent "Kraft durch
: freuue" (dF),
1998 - 19,4 Junker der Ordensourg Vogelsang,
angcnlieyeng beaulrtragter der NoODaP im Gau Hessen,

wee

Jo-Hauptutucmiunrer aeg Walfen-ss.

von THAUDEN, aaolf, geb. 77.1921 in ‘triegiaff,

Wohnnalts wunbne, vparcnenweg 6

Beruf: Uhelredacteur

Feudhere Orrunisaticnsgucenoripkoits

949 Matgiaea Ger "“veutachen Kecnts-partei" (DRP),
fiatglied aes veutychen Bundestages in der Fraktion

"sitionule Kxecnate",
1YSO bitgiied unu punktionir der "Deutschen Reichs-

partei" (oxre), : -
1yb5 - 1954 Mitglied: aes niedersachsischen Landtages.

NSDaP: 1.9.34999

HSS, Otto, geo. 14.12.1408 in iossaorr,
wohnmnal bt: Bisbendort, Yeiaendann,
Berul: Oberregierungsrut a.v. (Jurist), Kaufmann, .

Frihere Orgunisintiong4zupehoripxeits
Mitsl. uy Funktionar der “peutscnon Reichspartei" (DRP)

NSDAP: 1.08.1926
Kreisleiter, Gauinspekteur, Gauredner,
1998 efferent im Berichts—- und Rechtsamt der

obersten: sa-Puhrung,
SA-Odersturmbannifihrer.

Hal - vORR, sail, geb. 26.9.1908 in Kaufbeuren,
Womnnalt Grobuitingen, Bahnhofstr. 45
veruf; Kaufmann — :

rruhere Organisationszugentrigkeits '
Ute = mitgllea und tunktionar

NSVAP: 1.8.1990

1934 Uauwart "Kraft durch Freude" (KdF)

1926 Leiter der Gouschulungsburg Gau Schwaben

1997 veicugascnulungsleiter im Amt fiir Technik,
Ihiinchen .

14-0000

cea

Tey.bscd aa ;
neferatsleiter der faup?treunandstelle Ost, ‘ver? in - fF

H
t .
- : - noe ged- '22.1.1911 in Cheanitz, -
: never, uuindstr. 1
: co Serat: Versbouurungjsaacloaan : . “

: Teo. bend .

: gS-Qoers turabannfunrer

‘ . Droog, Ory HanseRernhard,geo. 10.32.1903

: in rrotzig/Poumern.

: inkel, Am Osterholz 55

t . ,

1 Tessor o.Wv.

- : -o. : einer Privatachule
: unisutionss. i:
: baed und fan
: ist .

i wiudelter der aslay (Gau Ostpreugen)

: Lotabben-.oisleiter, : .

£ i mllenbuiru.rer. ‘

: /  Orientslcher Yroftessor der tua tswissenscharten I.

. Redton uer alnertus-Universitat in Konigsberg.

10.7906 in Bresiau,
nha, armoldstr. 24

estar: 1.4. 1952

UUrt-Baa vannstatt, sPreuergasgse 45
anwalt

vr, ged. €2.10.1950 in Greifswald,


b.11 Tay in Hamburg,
kampffallee 162

SEETSEN, Walter, gev-
wonntiaies, Bremen, Kuleu
Beruf: Kaufmann .

upehorigkeit:

: Fruhiere Orcanisitions
>. ‘Sarvs Natglied una Funktionar ~ os
. - - DRP - Mitglied und Funktionar a Sth,
" RSDAPRs 1.41950 eS .

, gebs 25.95.1916 in Bremen,
eck, Hrauteichen 19 ‘ -

THIELEN, Friedricna
wonnnalt: bremen-sehnone
beruf: beton-favrikunt
- Brdnere Oreiniuatione 2uy
Grunduncegnitys.ea der UMU » .
Mitglied aer premor: Burgersuchaften,

1957 Matglied und spaiter Landesvorsitzender der
-"“" speuatychen Partei" (LP) in Bremen

‘eonoripkeits

i

i
;
H UoSDaAP: nicat Mitglied
i :
i BAGIWER, Otto Theotur, ged. 91.59.1906 in Paris,
‘ WORRMATt? Brenen-Veyeouch, Gerhard-Rohlfa-str. 61
: Peruf; xaufmann
! Frunere Orranigationsauyendrigkeit:
: "yeutscne carter” (s')
j Mitgiled ser gremer Birgerschaften.
i UsoaP: 1.6.9951
; — .
j
i
i
i
i
i
4
i -
: ;

SR ne erate net atummneismabe ant ae

eee , tet Bae are oe

SRT BT ine rs

ee eK ESE eR metres Re AEE SEAS ATS eens
rs i TRE PION


14-0000

A 7 ABOSCH, HEIR. The mensce of the miracle: Germany froa Biter
. te te Adesauer. : London, Gollet'sy 1962. 27 Tp. 20259. 4683. 1963,
* DD259. ATES = CLA” ;

See! of ARNTZ,. sti " Germany ina nutehéll.. 28 ea., rev. and enl.
oN ine 2b ©- Bonn, “Press and Inforsdtion Office of the Federal Goverment
; aye ~- OF Germany, 1960. 116p. DD'3.A8 1960 DIK.. oo,

" REoRSoR, Joan Robe. Hesi var ains; the plans for the
“thousand year Reich. Rock Island, I11., Augustana College
Library, 1962.: 1595p. - (azgustens library publicaticns, > 36.30)

Dpe56. 52 BST at DIC.

-BITHELL, JETHRO, ed. Germany, a a ‘companion to Geran studies.
5th ed., rev. and enl. London, Methuen, 1955. 578p.
ipa. B56 1955 DLC; DD61.B61955 CIA.

od BOSSENBROCK, WILLIAM JOHN. ‘The German mind. Detroit, Wayne
State University Press, 1961. 6p. DOT6. BOTT DE.

BRANT, STEFAN, poeud. Bast German rising. "London, : Themes and
Hudson, 1955. 202p. PD261. 4 BT3 DLC; DD261.4.B355 CIA.

ALAN LOUIS CHARLES. Hitler; a study in tyranny. Rev.
ed. Hew York, Harper, 1960. 776p. UDD247.H5B85 DIC;
DD2KT.H5BS5 1960 CLA. :

CLAY, LUCIUS DU BIGWON. Decision in Germany. Garden City,
‘H. Y¥., Doubleday, 1950. 522p. DD25T 053° DIL; ,
DD257.C6 . CIA. ‘ ‘

COLLIER, DAVID S., and KURT GLASER., eds. | Berlin and the future
of Eastern Burope. Chicago, Pemery, 19 1963. 251p. (Foundation
for Foreign Affaire series, 00.7) DR8.5.C6 DIL;

843.7 «CIA. - ;

¥

FOR OFFICIAL USE OLY

14-0000

ee we -

_ Germany. and ‘treedin; a peréciiax: Appratoal. |
A University Presa, 1955. li7p. (The -
Harvard P University, 1958) ‘DD259. 2.66%

‘

a a iaertaad  saandnaii.
. BUTS. CT ‘Be.

WWIDSON, - ‘The |
of tlie’ “qmericen’ ‘occupation. “Landon, - we ‘Cape, 1959s
/BD25T-D33 Due DD2STsD33E5 cla.

‘pintio; iwi. “Gériiany ana’ world politica’ in the ‘twentieth:
eentiiry. Hew my ork, ‘Maopt, 1959. ‘lap. _ DD232.D413 DLC;

~ DD232.D5 -
7 DICKINSON, ROBERT ERIC, Germany; & general and regional
so . geography. 2a ed. London, Methuen; New York, Dutton, 1961.

we TSP __.DDA3-D5_ DIC; _ DDY3.D5 1961 cla.
"PIC baa 1953 ed. only.

ew « MARSHALL, . Germany; a modern history. Ann Arbor, University
- of Michigan Press, 1961. 467p. DDe9.D5 DIC; DDOY.D5 CIA.

DONKER,. JOERN. Report from Berlin. Blocsiington, Indi
University Press, 1961.. 284p.  DD881.D633 DIC; *nD861.D62
CIA. -
; ‘Translation fron the Swedish.

DORNEERG, joan, Schizophrenic Germany. New York, Macmillan,
1961. 302p. DD259.2.D6 DIC; DD2e59.2.D6 CIA.

| LL, ALLEN WELSH. Germany's underground. New York, Macmillan,
1947. 207p. Dp256.D8 Dic; ¥11638.D8 CIA.

A simple, clear account of the opposition to Hitler during the
war.

EPSTEIN, FRITZ THEODCR, Germany and the United States: basic-
patterns of conflict and understanding. Lawrence, Kansas, 1959.
284-3lhp.  £183.8.G3R6 DIC.

"Reprinted from Issues and Conflicts, University of Kansas Prese,
3T4p. 1959."

2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


14.90000 .
deetems at

FOR OrriczAt, USE ont _

Ge" " prjierity: tiireiin Gompetitioa.. ‘te York,
: 58. 2600p. HC206.5+57313 _ ‘DIC. re
lstory’ of the Weimar Republic. Canbriage,

ty Pres, 1962-, '0D237.9913: ‘DIL.

ern (rermaia History (it (i9ex
rids. Hew York, Bareourt,

-- thive
fuente ei
GERALD. . Getmany’ ‘between two

“Brace,” ‘1962. _ 2396p. --DD259.4.778 CIA.

: . oe GERMANY (rmeut: REPUBLIC). CONSTITUTION, 1963. ‘he basic lev of
: oo -- ~.) the Federal Republic of Germany; amendments as of 31 December
Lo Ce 3962, ‘Rew York, German Information Center, 1961.°
Sb a . . JHGITLASAS 196 GIA.)
ee a o OOEREITE,. WALTER, . Bietory. ‘of :the German general ataf?,, 16FT-19b5e
. New York, Pracger, 1953, - 508p. DD1O1.G614 1953 DIC3; “e

| a ; , _ DD1O1.061 195385. CIA. .
. —_™. Ge LAY. Teka ; The Feandeag + of the Federal. Repabla of (ror oniae (sk) -
GOTTLIEB, MANUEL.

The German peace settlement and the Berlin
crisis. New York, Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1960. 275p.
DD257.068 DIC; -DD257.G68 ° CIA.

» BRIT. ‘FOREIGN OFFICE. Selected documents on Germany and
the quéstion of Berlin, 1944-1961. London, HMSO, 1961. 4683p.
(Ita Germanys ly61, no.2. Gt. Brit. Parliament. Papers by
coamand, cmd » 1552) DD257.4.G75 1961 “DIC.

GROSSER, ALFRED. The colossus again; Western Germany from defeat
to. rearmament. Hew York, Praeger, 1955. 2k9p. DD257 -G7413

‘DIC; «DD257.GTES «CIA.
HEIDENHEIMER, ARNOLD J. The governments of Germany. New York,
Crowell, 1961. 22hp. JN3971.A59H4 DIC; JN3971.a58H4 CIA. - -

HELLER, DEANE, and DAVID HELLER. The Berlin Wall. New York,
Walker, -1962, 2462p.  DD861.H39 DLC; DDSBL.Bb2 CIA.

EERTZ, FRIEDRICH OTTO. Development of the German public mind;
a social history of German political sentiments, aspirations,

and ideas. London, Allen & Unwin, 1957. 524p.

_ * Bp. Hkh = DIC. . . ,
|-- RD EE, JOR JULIUS, and JOHANNES LEES. The Nuremberg trial;

a history of Kazi Germany. “New York, World Pub. Co., 1962.

3968p. K1836.1.63H61b5 “CIA.

_3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


14-00000

EIM. <The ai é ‘éronti the story of. oat poitiea
he New York, Praeger, 1954. 3277p. BOe%6 53-8563
832. SHOES” CTA :

‘ inoxaciuy, ‘AMO. oe Litatory of nodera comany. “ew 1 York, Ae ‘nope, .
1959s  DOLT5-H62 | DIL.

Vel: the Refomation. :

HOLBROOK, SABRA, -. Capital ‘without a country: The challenge of
Berlin. ew York, Coward-MeCann, 1961, :

“HOU, ALISTAIR, - _-Return to’ pover; a report on the new Germany.
New York, Praeger, 1956. 45p. DD259.4.H65 1956 DIL;

DD259.4.H8 19 CLA.

HUEBENER, THEODORE. The schools of West Germany; a‘ study of

German elementary and secondary ‘schools. Mew York, New York
rn University Presa, 1962. 181p. -1A721.02.58 DIC; -
: LAT21.82.88 cIA.

INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHY AND HUMANISTIC STUDIES,
Jhe Third Reich; a study published under the auspices of the
International Council for Fhilosophy and Eumanistic Studies
‘ and with the assistance of UNESCO. New York, Praeger, 1955.
910p. DD256.5.158 1955a DIC; DD256.5.15 CIA.

. JARMAN, THOMAS LECKIE. The rise and fall of Nazi Germany. New
York, New York University Press, 1956. 3688p. DD256.5.33 1956
° . ‘DIC; DD256. 5.33 CIA. . .

JOHNSON, UWE. Speculations about Jakob. New York, Grove, 1962. ;
A novel reflecting life during the laat decades in Germany.

KITZINGER, WE W. German electoral politics, a study of the 1957
campaign. (xford, Clarendon Press, 1960. 365p.  JW3971.A95K5

DIC; JNG971.A956 1957.K7 CIA.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14-00000 ore re

‘FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

‘\s *. KOCHAN, KXONEL;“ . the struggle for Germany, 1914-1945. plating,
— University Press; Ctilcago, Aldine Pub. ° Coo, 1963. 150p. °
BD2NO.KOT Dic; ‘DA3-K7 CIA.

ys ‘mind: “of Gemnany} - ‘the. educatian of ‘a nation. -
ribner, 1960... 370p. _ DDT6 X59 DL; “DDT6.K59 CIA.

~ The German idea of ‘freedom; history of a *
political tradition. Boston, Beacon Press, 1957. Supe |
DD112.K62 DIC.

LAQUEUR, WALTER-ZB'SV, ~ Young Germany; a history of the Gérman
‘ . so youth movement.’ London, Routledge & Paul, 1962. 253p.
oo. 2 m9. 13 DIRS " BRT99- G513 cla

- EEDDELL HART, BASIL HEARY. ‘The German generalo talk. New York, 9
Morrow, 1948. 308p. DIST. 55 igia DLs DIST-IS lA.

2 LOEWENSTEIN, Prince HUBERTUS,. aad “YOLKMAR VON ZUEELSDORFF. RATO
and the defense of the West. New York, Praeger, 1962. 383p.
UAGK6.3-I8E5 CIA.

-. ... |. . 4 OWEB, ROBERT HARRY. Toward understanding Germany. Chicago,
, ta. . University of Caicago Press, 1954. 396p. HNb45.168 DLC;
“ENANS.L6 (CIA.

y .

J ‘A MCINNIS, "EDGAR, RICKARD HISCOCKS, and ROBERT SPENCER. The shaping
of postwar Germany. London, Dent, 1960. 195p. DD257.N35 1960a
DIC; nDe257. 595 1960 CTA.

. NCCLELLAW, GRANT S., » ed. The two Germanies. Kew York, Wiison,
1959. 18hp. (the Reference -shelf, v-31y no.)
DD25/.M27 = DIL}. Bbe5T- M2 OCIA.
MANDER, JOHN. j#§ Berlin, hostage for the West. Baltimore, Penguin
Books, 1962. 124p. (A Penguin special, 8209) DD&81.M27
‘DiC; =Dpe81.M2 CIA. . -

ROGER, and HEINRICH FRAENKEL. Goering. New York, Simon
& Schuster, 1962.. Skdp. DOQNT.G67M3_ = DIC; «= DDKT.G67M2 CLA

MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. The German catastrophe; reflections and
recollections. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 5950. 121p.
DD256.5-M42 DIC; DD256.5.M¥E5 CIA.

Translation from the German.

1 . 5

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14-0000

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

an wah, HANS Song ‘Voi, and: WOLFGANG -METZNER, ods.

Frankfiirt a.M., A. Netsnez, ig eo. .
- DD259.M372 «CIA.

we areal “Joan. Core ~ Our Stake in Germany. Washingtoa, Washington

College Press, “1961. 6p. DD259.2.Mb2 DIC.

- MEAL, FRED WARKER. -War and peace and Germany. . Rew York, W. We

Morton, 1962. 166p: DD257.25-38 DIC; =DD257-2-MS CIA.

NESSELRODE, FRANZ VON. . Germany's other half; a journalist's
~ appraieal of East Germany. - London, New York, Abelart-Schunan, —
1963. | -20TD. © ‘pp26l. N85 DIC; DD261.2.N% CIA.

PASSANT, ERNEST JAMES, Short. history of Germany 1815-1945. °
London, Hew York, Cambridge University Press, 1959. 255p.
DD232.P35 DLC} _ 083 DD2j2.P2 CIA. ‘

PINHEY, “EDWARD Le “ Federalism, wureaucracy and party politics ‘da
Western Germany. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press,

1963. 268p. <JN3OTL.ATTPS DIA.

i PSON, KOPPEL SHUB. Modern Germany, ita history and civilization.

New York, Macmilian, 1954. 637p- DD203.P5 19th DLC;
DD203.P5 1954 = Cla.

A useful survey, particularly of the intellectusl background.

PLISCHKE, ELMER. Contemporary government of Gersany. Soston,
Houghton Mifflin, 1961. 2h3p. JH39T1.ASP95 DIC
JH397L-A5PT = CIA.

POLLOCK, JAMES KERR, and others. Germany in pover an4 eclipse; the
background of German development. New York, Van Hostrand, 1952.
66lp. DDa&Q.P6h DIC; DDE9.P6 CIA.

POUNDS, FORMAN JOHN GREVILLS. Divided Germany end Berlin.
Princeton, Ke J., Ven Nostrand, 1962, 129. DD257.25.P6 DIC;
DD257.25.P7 CIA.

PRITTIE, Hon. TERENCE CORNELIUS FARMER. Germany divided. Boston,
Little, Brown, 1960. 360p. DD257.P72 1961 Dic;

DD257.PT CIA.

DLC bas English ed.

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14-0000

oo.

‘ 4 ° ran

FOR OFPICIAL USE. ORLY

: Aximiannt, Di, .KURT FRANK. Germany: 2000 years, Rev. od. New York,

sF. Ungar’ Pub. Co., 1961. ays: - -BBOD. R36 1961 . DIC;
~BDBYs R36 19615 7 ;

 ROBSOR, . CHARLES B., ed. Pérlia--pivot 0 ‘of German destiny, Chapel

“Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1960. 233p.
- BDGELBI553~ Ble "DD881,R62 ° CLA.

* nowireia, HANS; “the Gérmsn opposition to Hitler, an appraisal.

2d rev.‘ed. Chicago, Regue 1962. 166p. (Foundation for
foreign affairs series, 0.6). “DD256.3-R6 1962 DLL}

_¥2836.R84 1962° IAs.

« SHIRER, WILLIAM LAVRESGR, . ‘the rise end fall of the third petehs
a biatory of Nati Germany. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960.

“lekSp. —DD256.5.848 . DIL; D256. 5-655 CIA
This is issued also as a peperback ed. “

SNTTH, BRUCE LANRES R. The governance of Berlin. Hew York, Cainegte
- Endowment for International Peace, 1959. 171-230p. (International
conciliation, 10.525)  JX1907.A8 no.525 DIC..

SuYDER, LOUIS LEO, Basic” history of modem Germany. Princeton,
N. J.,. Yan Nostrand, 1957. 192p. DD175.658 DIC;
DD175.858 CIA.

SPEIER, BANS. German rearmement and atunic war; the views of
. German military and political leaders. Evanston, I1i., Rov,
Peterson, 1957+ 272p. UAT10,856 DLC; UAT1O.8S7 CIA.

SPEIER, HANS, . and W. PHILLIPS DAVISON, eds. Weet German leadership
end foreigs = policy. Evanston, Ill, Ke Rov, Peterson, 1957. 323p.

-DD259.4.86 Dies; DdD259.457 CIA.

STAHL, WALTER, ed. Tne politica of postwar Germany. New York,
Praeger for Atlantic-Bruecke, 1963. 4%&p. DpD259.4.88 DIC;

DD259.4. 872 CIA.

STERH, FRITZ RICHARD. Cultural despair and the politics of

discontent; a study of the rise of the "Cermanic” ideology.
Berkeley, University ‘of California Press, 1961. 367p.
DD76.872 1961 DIL.

T

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%

:

Atal Jom PERCIVALE. - The course of. German hisscxys a survey
* oe . of the developditot of Gormany since 1815. New York, coward-NeCann,
hoe : 1946, - 230p- DD203. TS 1946 re. 83 .

GETERS, TATE HAREHS. Me nev Germany and the old Naxts. Sew York,: .
' Random House, ‘1961, 286p. DD259.2.T% DLCs; DD2S.2.53 CIA i

HAYER, CHARLES WHEELER. The unquiet Gemans. Hew York, Farper,
1957. 275p." DD5T.THS DIC.

EOMOED. .-: Germany in the twentieth century; a political
and cultural history of the Weimar Republic aud the Hirt Reich.
Hew York, Praeger, 1956. 2658p. DD232.V413 1956 is; ;
DD232.V5E5 CIA.
VIERECK, PETER RORERT EDWIN, © Metapolitics, the roots of the gact
minds New York, Capricorn Books, 1961. 36h4p.. (A Capricorn
Book, CAPA5) — DD253.¥5 1961 DIL. :
-. WHEELER-BESNETT, JOHN WHEELER,- The nemesis of power. Lonmin,
Hew York, Macmillan, 1953. 82. DD2N0.W5 DIC; Iaw.w56
CIA.
Revised ed. 1963

/ WORLRABE, RAYMOND A., and WERNER KRUSCH. The land and ps-gie of
Germany. Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1957. 1168p. DDIT.s6 DIC.

‘POR OFFICIAL USE OHLY

