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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
(Welder.

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President on Cuba at 1100 on —_—_—
19 December 1963

1. Included in the meeting were Acting Secretary of State
Ball, Acting Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, Secretary Cyrus
Vance, Secretary Douglas Dillon, Ambassador Thompson,
General Wheeler, Mr, Donald Wilson, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
Mr. Bromley Smith, Mr. Edwin Martin, Mr. Ted Sorensen,
Mr. John Crimins, Mr, Gordon Chase, Mr. George Ready,
Mr. Bill Moyers, General Carter, Mr. Helms, and Mr. Fitz-
Gerald.

2. The President, after full discussion, postponed any
sizable operations by FitzGerald, primarily to avoid any possible
embarrassment to our OAS negotiations on the Venezuelan arms
cache, We are authorized to continue to put forward proposals
for operations and also to continue preparations for air ops. The
main thrust was to greatly increase political action with Canada,
Britain, Spain, Italy, and others in an effort to promote greater
economic blockade.

3. Mr. Bundy later stated that his analysis of the meeting
was that the President would continue to approve smaller
FitzGerald-type operations even though they would be relatively
unrewarding if they would assist in keeping up the morale of the
troops on shore, of our agents, and otherwise help in keeping the

ball rolling.
i é

-”

Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Acting Director

AEG/OR
OCUMENT


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT : Meeting at the White House 19 December 1963
PRESENT: The President

The State Department: Under Secretary George W.
Ball, Deputy Under Secretary U, Alexis Johnson,
Ambassador at Large Llewellyn Thompson,
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American
Affairs Edwin Martin, Coordinator of Cuban
Affairs John H. Crimmins.

The Defense Department: Deputy Secretary Roswell
Gilpatric, Secretary of the Army Cyrus Vance,

Joint Chiefs of Staff: General Wheeler,
USIA: Deputy Director Donald M, Wilson,
The Treasury Department: Secretary Douglas Dillon,

The White House Staff: Executive Assistant to the
President McGeorge Bundy, Messrs, George Reedy
and Williams Moyers.and Gordon Chase,

CIA: General Marshall 8, Carter, Messrs. Richard
Helms and Desmond FitzGerald.

1, The President arrived at the meeting approximately
five minutes early -- prior to the arrival of several
members of the group including Mr, Bundy. Without a formal
introduction I commenced the scheduled briefing on the Agency
Cuban program at the urging of the President and despite the
activities of the Presidential photographer,

2, The President appeared interested in the number of
agents inside Cuba but made no particular comment concerning
the program until the subject of economic denial was intro-
duced. He asked to be told what additional measures could
be taken to step up the denial program, I said that the


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principal soft spots among free world countries appeared
at the present time to be Canada, the U.K, and Spain, The
President requested a memorandum setting forth specifics
concerning leaks of economically strategic items from these
three countries together with recommendations as to what
could be done to stop these leaks, He requested Under
Secretary Ball to prepare to make demarches to the govern-
ments of these three countries as well as any others
engaged in the Cuba trade contrary to our interests, He
appeared particularly interested in the subject of econo-
mic denial and returned to it several times,

3, After hearing a brief description of our progress
in connection with promoting disaffection among the Cuban
military, the President said that it did not seem to him
that we had gone very far along this line and that one
day those concerned in Cuba matters, including himself,
would have to face the "grand jury" (of domestic public
opinion) to account for our progress in our attempts to
find a solution to the Cuban situation. I pointed out
that the program being presented was, with the exception
of the economic denial item, entirely a covert program and,
if run at full capacity, would tax the capabilities of the
clandestine services -- in other words, that if new and
broader measures against Cuba were to be undertaken, they
would have to be within the overt field.

4, After a brief description of the sabotage and
harassment program the subject of the proposed Matanzas
raid was discussed, After hearing the pros and cons the
President stated that he did not feel that the present time
was a good one to conduct an operation of this magnitude
which carried a less than 50 percent chance of success, He
said that he felt that such an operation, if pinned directly
on the U.5S., might cause the Soviets to move in the wrong
direction with respect to Cuba, i.e, increase their econo-
mic aid or their military presence, Recognizing that a
cessation of raids would have a bad morale effect within
Cuba, he agreed that low risk operations, with admittedly
lower economic and psychological impact, should be con-
ducted, He further stated that planning for such opera-
tions as Matanzas should be continued, General Wheeler —
raised the possibility of air strikes against major targets
by autonomous groups, This was discussed and it was agreed
that in view of the fact that preparations would take at
least three months, these preparations should proceed and
the question re-examined at the time that capabilities have
been perfected,

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5. On the question of autonomous groups the President
asked the cost of these operations (five million dollars),
He also asked the cost of Cuban operations for the current
year (21 or 2 million dollars) and the total Agency budget,

6, The intelligence summary concerning Cuba prepared
by General Carter for the meeting was examined,

7. \Mr,. Bundy then reviewed current U.S. policy vis-a-vis
Cuba. He then went down a check list of possible new courses
of action taken from the Department of State paper prepared
for the December 13 Standing Group meeting, Unilateral
actions presented were:

(1) Air attacks by our autonomous groups. No
further discussion,

(2) Selective relaxation of U.S. controls against
exile groups in Florida, No comment on
Mr, Bundy's generally unfavorable presentation,

(3) Military feints. No comment on generally
unfavorable presentation,

(4) Low-level reconnaissance flights. Comment by
Assistant Secretary Martin concerning the
value of keeping open the franchise for low-
level flights. Acknowledgement of certain
value to the intelligence community. No
decision requested,

(5) Extension of efforts to eliminate free world
shipping from the Cuba trade. No decision
requested,

(6) Presidential declaration concerning U.S.
policy on Cuba designed to stimulate anti-
Castro dissidence in the armed forces,

Mr, Bundy*s comments indicated that there
was room for a stronger statement than that
made by President Kennedy in Miami,

(7) Talks with the Soviets and the Cubans, Not
elaborated and no comment,

(8) Other forms of covert actions. Not specified
or elaborated.

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.

8. In connection with bilateral and multilateral
actions involving the cooperation of the OAS and nations
of the Caribbean, Mr. Bundy stated that the nature and
import of the recently discovered arms cache in Venezuela
constitutes a point of departure for such actions as search
and seizure on the high seas or an OAS-sponsored quarantine
against arms shipments. Mr, Helms then briefly described
the nature of the arms cache and the plans involving those
arms as set forth in captured Venezuelan communist documents,
Mr, Helms showed a map prepared from those documents indi-
cating the manner in which the arms would have been used
to tie up the city of Caracas during the recent election.
Mr, Martin then briefed concerning OAS action with regard
to the arms cache, He said that the committee appointed
by the OAS to investigate had called for additional
evidence from the Venezuelan government which would take
two to three weeks to assemble. He said that he felt that
the OAS report would be out in mid-January although the
question of Cuban defense against the Venezuelan charges
had not yet been resolved. Mr. Bundy referred to the
efforts being made to increase the effectiveness of sur-
veillance of arms smugglers in Central America and referred
to the possibility of an OAS-sponsored search and seizure
on the high seas.

9. Under Secretary Ball stated that the Department of
_— Justice has warned that a number of students, some of more
Sens respectable stripe than the last group which visited Cuba,
were planning to try to visit Cuba during the Christmas
vacation and that there is evidence of larger numbers
planning to do the same thing during the summer. He said
that the Attorney General was bothered by this and had
suggested the relaxation of present rules concerning travel
to Cuba. Mr. Ball said that the Department of State is
tentatively opposed to such relaxation particularly because
of its effect on Latin American countries. The President
strongly concurred with the Department of State position,
He said that he did not propose to change or relax present

regulations.

itzGerald
Chief, Special Affairs Staff

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13 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 13 December - 9:30 a.m.

1. Introduced General Carter but was unable to explain his
responsibilities,

2. Introduced Peer de Silva, The President spoke briefly of
what he expects of the Station and the representatives of the Government
in the Saigon community. G g

3. Reviewed the Checklist. [1 emphasized (a) the dangers of the
hostages in Bolivia, stating however that while 21 lives are extremely
important, nevertheless, we must avoid a policy decision the conse-
quence of which might mean the lives of an undertermined thousands
of people in the future. In fact 1 was saying we must not give the
Communists the upper hand in this argument. I explained the critical
location of the prisoners, and (b) I called the President's attention to
the international oil situation and the deadlock between OPEC and the
international oil companies and the opening that this is affording the
Italians and possibly the French, }

9G .

_ 4, [iXtotea Item C in the notes, stating we felt, from sensitive
sources, Spinelli's observation was incorrect but there was a possibility
of a sufficient withdrawal by the Egyptians to make a favorable demon-
stration of intentions by which we could persuade Fiasal to withhold
military aid to the Royalists for an extended period of several months. ]

NOTE: Carter and de Silva left the room at this time.

5.(4 told the President unZEoubject to Rusk's approval, I intended
to issue a series of articles on the weakness of the Soviet economy,
drainage on their gold supply, over-commitments on foreign aid, etc.
for the political figures who are wavering between leaning on the]

6

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(Soviets or the West, such as Sukarno and certain South American
Countries, so that they will understand they are not leaning on very
much when they lean on the Soviets."]

6. Explained that I had given a complete briefing to General
Eisenhower and conveyed to the President General Eisenhower's
expression of friendship and support.

7. Discussed briefly my talk with Robert Kennedy and urged
the President to send a message to Kennedy but not to see him until
after the first of the year. I asked for the President's approval to
invite Kennedy to accompany me to Saigon.

NOTE: This invitation has been extended but Kennedy

felt it was untimely because of personal family commitments,
responsibilities to Jackie, concern on the part of his wife,
Mrs. Kennedy, and for other reasons.

8. Mr. Bundy joined in part of these discussions. The President
asked what the Attorney General intended to do, that is, stay on or leave.
I told the President the Attorney General intended to stay on as Attorney
General, but it was not clear to what extent the President wished him to
become involved in the activities outside the area of the Office of the
Attorney General, such as, intelligence work, NSC problems, counter
insurgency matters, etc. I explained to the President that I had told
Bobby he could not bring back the intimacy of relationship with the
President which he had had with his brother because that was a blood
relationship, not an official relationship. A type of relationship which
is seldom found between brothers and never found between officials,
either in business or government.

9. I gave the President a copy of the memorandum on Soviet
Foreign Aid.

JAM:mcm

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6 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 9:45 - 6 December 1963

The first part of the meeting involved a discussion with Rusk,
McNamara, Rostow, William Bundy and McGeorge Bundy concerning
the procedures on MLF.

Rusk requested, and received, approval to brief General
Eisenhower and will arrange to have Amb. Merchant, Admiral Ricketts
and General Goodpastor present at the briefing, Rusk reported that a
group of 'young Republicans" opposed the MLF. ,

Rusk also received approval to brief certain Congressional
leaders in small groups, but to intimate that no government, including
the United States Government, is committed to the MLF program.

[Rusk gave an opticestic report on progress and stated the
most important objectives of the MLF was to give the Germans a sense
of participation in nuclear weapons planning and operations under a
scheme providing adequate control by other Allied nations, including
the United States.7] -

(McNamara stated that Mr. von Hassel had advised him that the
MLF was a ''must'' or else.the Germans would undoubtedly pursue an
independent course in developing their own national nuclear weapons
resources, Rusk indicated that failure to proceed with the MLF might
force a German-French arrangement on nuclear weapons, McNamara
stated there was no military requirement for the MLF but the force
will have a military (?) utility and will permit a reduction in
planned United States national capabilities and hence the cost, which is
considerable, is not really an additional U.S. military cost."]

The President then suggested a briefing of Congressional

(2

leaders, both Democratic and Republican, Senate and House, substantially

along the lines of the NSC briefing of yesterday afternoon. [I brought up
the question of security and pointed out the dangers. The President
asked that I develop a 10 or 15 minute briefing on Soviet strategic
capabilities, Soviet defense and Soviet economy, going just as far as I
possibly could without endangering sources and methods ,7/

ACTION: Discuss with Cline, et al.

7“ Omri
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IS

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(The meeting then continued with the President, McGeorge
Bundy and McCGone, I discussed the foreign aid figures as included
in the 6 December memorandum and the special report on Soviet
Foreign Economics Programs of 25 October, and stated that I
would prepare for the President some special graphics which would
show Soviet foreign, economic and military aid, both extensions and
draw-downs, to non-Communist countries and Cuba,

NOTE: Mr. Rostow raised the question earlier
as to the validity of comparing our aid figures with
USSR's aid figures because the latter did not include
aid to satellites, His position is that since we include
aid to NATO countries, particularly Turkey, Greece,
South Korea, etc., we should examine USSR aid to their
satellites in addition to Cuba, This should be examined.
I do not know whether the figures are available.)

The President reviewed the Checklist and I made the following
comments:

1, E expect the USSR to expand the test ban agreement to cover
underground tests and it was quite possible they would soon make claims
for vast improvements in seismology. I mentioned the recent informa-
tion on the LASER beam.]

78

2. [1 pointed out the seriousness of the Cambodian situation
stating the fact that the Khmer Serei clandestine radio had been located
in Southeast Thailand and that my information was that the Thais were
not inclined to put it out of business because the Cambodians were
broadcasting unfavorably against them]

q
3, fi noted the additional indicators of possible conflict over
Malaysia.

I then explained to the President the source of our information
that the Soviet Intelligence Service, on orders from Moscow, was
attempting to stimulate communications from India to him, Chief Justice
Warren and the Attorney General, urging a full probe into the
assassination of the President. I stated that this report comes from a
very reliable penetration and we evaluate it quite highly.

We then discussed the assignment of Peer de Silva to Saigon,
I stated that the staff had made such recommendation to me, but that
I felt it was only a good move if he was to remove Ambassador Lodge.
He felt that to do this would have political repercussions and would be

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tantamount to a vote of no confidence in the military junta, that it

would indicate President Johnson's support of Diem rather than the
present authorities, Therefore he stated he could not move to remove
Lodge but hoped that Lodge would remove himself and become a
candidate for the Republican nomination for the Presidency and would
be the nominee. (Note: I told the President he wanted things too

easy). I told the President that Lodge would destroy de Silva if he
opposed his assignment or did not like him, or wished to get rid of him,
The President said he would communicate most emphatically with

Lodge in this regard and asked Bundy to write an appropriate communi-.

cation, I told the President this would do no good, that Lodge was
absolutely unconscionable in matters of this kind and he had resorted
to trickery time and time again during the Eisenhower ‘administration
and that he never failed to use the newspapers in order to expose an
individual or block an action. I therefore could only conclude that if he
was going to keep Lodge on that it would be better to stay with David
Smith as Chief of Station, who is a most competent officer but young
and not fully experienced, but this proposal did not meet his request
that the best and most experienced man we can find be, placed on the
job. The President said he would exercise the full power of his
office to keep Lodge in line and felt our responsibilities in South

Vietnam are so great that CIA should have a "four- star man" on the job and

oa

that is what he wanted.

JAM/mcm

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3 December 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President at his residence on Sunday, Dec. 1 -
10:00 o'clock - about 30 minutes, No one was in attendance,

1. Reviewed a series of reports. There was no Checklist.

2. (The President asked about news from Venezuela, particularly
concerned about Chenault.) 7
Trae: . 7S
3. [Briefly reviewed a clandestine report from Bonn as a means
of indicating sources to CIA not available to others)

7
4, Reported to the President that the UN Commission to Saigon
felt a bit critical towards the U.S. presence; however we are in some doubt
as to whether they will include such criticism in their public report.7

5. Briefly reviewed the final report on the Alvarado case in
Mexico City.

6. The President then brought up the question of men in government.
Emphasized the need for men, particularly young men, I urged the President
to discuss this matter with the Business Council and with the AFL-CIO group.
He said that meetings would be arranged this coming week,

cory G6

7. fi advised the President that I was to meet with Halaby to

pursue the SST problem.)

8, [I requested the Presidét to instruct Bundy that Memorandums of
Conversation with Heads of State should be distributed to me automatically,
Also that the State Department be instructed to send such Memorandums to
me. The President agreed.

NOTE; This should be followed up by Mr, Cline.
Bundy will apparently discuss this matter later
with the President who agreed that such distri-
bution should be automatic except in very special
circumstances in which he wished distribution
held to his own personal files for reasons of
his own choice. I could take no exception to this
decision?)

9. We should contact Hoover concerning identification of people
sending in ads and letters to the Dallas newspapers,

NOTE: I should call Hoover concerning this.
JAM/mfb (tape) ;

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2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
EYES ONLY--NO DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Discussion with the President, 30 November 1963

Throughout the conversation the President mentioned a
number of very personal problems and asked my help and also
asked that Bundy and I act as a team in trying to help him solve
some of his problems.

l. He indicated that there must be some Cabinet changes,
By inference he made reference to the Attorney General, but not by
direct statement. Apparently he is waiting for the Attorney General
to decide what role, if any, he wishes to play in the Johnson Adminis-

tration.
GSE

2. (He stated that Secretary Celebrezze is very anxious for
ee a judgeship and that he, Johnson, was extremely favorably impressed
—_ with Sargent Shriver and thou ght he would be an excellent Secretary

of H.E.W. This was enthusiastically endorsed by both Bundy and

myself. ]

3. He raised the question of whether Mrs. Kennedy might

be a very able ambassador.
; 98

4, [He was deeply critical of the handling of Ayub. He questioned
whether Ball was the proper man to have gone forward to negotiate
with Ayub. He felt that we needed a new ambassador and he asked for
recommendations, the name of an ambassador who could handle that
Embassy, and more particularly handle Ayub. At this point he asked
that Bundy and I work together in searching out names of individuals
who might be helpful in a number of critical areas. I protested his
criticism of Ball, stating that I felt that Ball had done a very good job
in his mission to Pakistan. The President expressed the highest regard

for Ayub. )

one.

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Cas

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5. {He then turned to a discussion of Latin America. Expressed
criticism of the Alliance for Progress. Stated that Moscoso was not
the man to handle it and he should be replaced and asked who could be
his replacement. He also stated that we had not handled the OAS
positively enough. He was very critical of our ambassador to the OAS,
Acting Ambassador Ward Allen, and asked for recommendations for
a replacement.)

6. Throughout the conversation it appeared that President
Johnson is not going to be satisfied with the organization as it is
now composed and that he will make changes, and at the same time
he does not intend to make changes just for the sake of change nor
does he intend to move in the ''hangers-on of the last 20 years."'
Apparently he has hada vast number of approaches from people who
he termed to be political hacks and said he didn't want any part of
any of them.

JAM:mem

(tape)

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Pe

2 December 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President, 11:00 a.m., November 30th,
in attendance Mr. Bundy, meeting lasted approximately
11/2 hours

1. Reviewed the Checklist. [The President immediately
raised the question of what we were doing about Colonel Chennault.
He expects most serious public reaction and has a feeling that we
are "drifting" on this situation, I assured him we and the Venezuelan
government were doing all that was possible. However, he requested
more positive action on a report on the actions being taken.)

NOTE: Wish a full report from the station for Sunday
morning briefing.

2. No other Checklist items raised any serious questions.

3. The President again raised the question of what we were
going to do in Cuba. Bundy advised that a policy meeting was scheduled
for Monday, time not set, to discuss Cuban policy. I pointed out to
the President the statements of President Kennedy on September 5th,
September 13th, and November 20th, 1962 and then I showed the evidence
that proved absolutely that arms had been imported into Venezuela from
Cuba. I stated that most positive efforts should be made immediately
to secure complete OAS agreement on a course of action which would
involve a series of steps ranging from economic denial through blockade
and even to possible invasion, but that it must be OAS action, otherwise
it would involve confrontation with Khrushchev. I stated that if the
action was a Hemispheric action I didn't see that the USSR could do
much about it. The President agreed but decided to await the policy
meeting on Monday.

NOTE: DD/P and WH should prepare full recommendations
for positive actions which might be taken unilaterally with
the Caribbean states or with the OAS. for my use in the
policy meeting.

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4, I reviewed the report from Mexico City station, 27 November,
advising the number of Soviets in Cuba, indicating that this report which
we thought was quite responsible more or less verified our own current
estimates.

5. Reference the Oswald matter, reviewed with the President
CAS Mexico City 7127 reporting on the interrogation of Alvarado. We
briefly discussed the composition of the Review Board announced by
the President on the 29th. Discussion of the Oswald situation was
inconclusive and no action required.

6. [The President then brought up the question of Pakistan
and I reviewed briefly the intelligence community's feeling of concern
and their view that our Pakistan relationship was of the greatest
importance. Bundy mentioned the forthcoming December meeting
between Ayub and General Taylor. The President made no comment
but seemed to feel that Taylor should remain in the United States
because of serious Defense budget problems. Bundy reviewed the
great number of commitments we have made to Pakistan and that we
would come to their defense if India should use our arms to attack
Pakistan. The President expressed the greatest of confidence in
Ayub and a feeling that we had not been forceful enough with him, had
not given him a feeling of confidence in our motives and that he had
drifted into the thought that we would abandon him in favor of India.
He stated that he wished this corrected in a most positive manner. ]

7. I reviewed our Cuban overflight program advising the
President of the USIB criteria and the extent to which flights were
being carried on,

8. [Reviewed briefly the TACKLE China overilight and stated
these had been stood down since the loss of the last plane but we intended
to resume which the President thought was proper.

ACTION: I wish flight plans to meet COMOR priority n
targets for at least two flights for submission to the
Special Group next Thur sday.9

9. [i advised fe President that the ChiCom-India border flights
had been completed and that we now planned to brief the Indians, Thailand
and very possibly Pakistan. I stated the equipment had been withdrawn
from Takhli.]

Se

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10. [I advised the President that the CORONA mission was up
and would be brought down on Monday. Also suggested that at an

early opportunity I brief him on the CORONA program.)

jl. [Reviewed the Venezuls overflight plan as outlined in
memorandum for the Special Group and President approved.

NOTE: I have communicated this approval to General
Carter and instructed him to proceed. ]

JAM:mcm

(tape)


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29 November 1963

Late developments on the Mexico City investigation of
Oswald's activities

1, Results of the first interrogation of Silvia Duran have been received.
Reveals nothing other than confirmation of Oswald's effort to secure
authority to enter USSR via Havana. His requests were refused,

2. Result of second interrogation of Silvia Duran has not as yet been
received,

3. FBI dispatched a man from Washington to Mexico City at the request
of Ambassador Mann.

4. The Nicaraguan, Alvarado, has been turned over to the Mexican
authorities for questioning, by the CIA station at the specific request
of the FBI.

NOTE: CIA Headquarters refused this turn-over until
FBI request received because F Bilis in control of the
investigation. ;

‘sare Sane wlvarade's story becoming increasingly questionable because ofa

public statement carried by Mexico City radio and press prior to
Alvarado's entering the picture, to the effect that Oswald had
received $5,000 from the Cuban Embassy.

To be used by DCI in meeting with the President at 10:30 on 29 November 1963
with Secty. McNamara and Bundy.

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pe
29 November 1963 » \)
» vi K
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD MN iP
VY

SUBJECT: Meeting at his residence with President Johnson
10:00 a.m. - Thursday - November 28th.
for approximately 30 minutes

1. The President reviewed the Checklist and made the following
comments: v4

a. {Are we doing all possible to keep Venezuelan
authorities informed? I reviewed briefly our penetrations
and our activities ~)

b. What is the real future in South Vietnam? The
President expressed the desire for an objective appraisal
and any recommendations that I might have for modification
of policy, changes of personnel and draw up a rough estimate
of what is the outlook. The President continues to be
concerned over public reaction and Congressional reaction
against our activities in South Vietnam, The President is
obviously opposed to Lodge (his opposition goes back to
conflicts in the Senate). He asked for recommendations as
to who would be a good man and who could run the American
team,

He noted Item b. in the Check list and I pointed out
the press exaggeration and distortion which appeared in the
New York Times. He asked that I personally meet with the
head of the Times in New York, pointing out how such distorted
reports seriously damage the American interests. I stated
that I would do this.

GE

(We discussed Item 2.f, having to do with the high level of
communications traffic and I stated that this could be considered as an
unfavorable indicator. ,

The President noted without comment report on Israel, USSR,
India military aid and Burma,)

SF
Cc. (The President asked wt the outlook was with Greece. I told

him that we expected that Karamanlis would eventually be restored to
power, The President stated that he had vigorously opposed our7

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withdrawal of assistance to Karamanlis, which he felt had a great deal
to do with his loss of office7

d. [iE pointed out to the President that we could expect some
trouble in Brazil. ]

e. Fhe President asked about the future of Prime Minister Inonu
of Turkey. I stated that we expected that his government would fall.
and that he would lose office soon after his return]

78

f. fi repeated to the President briefly my meeting with President
Macapagal which is covered in a separate memorandum prepared by
Mr. Colby.]

g. fiso I raised the question of the importance of our taking
iniative in the Indonesia matter by working with Macapagal. We might bring
Indonesia round and also straighten out the Malayasia problem. 7

2. The President then turned to Cuba. He asked how effective our
policy was and what was the future of Cuba. He asked how effective the
economic denial program was and how we planned to dispose of Castro,

He said he did not wish any repetition of any fiasco of 1961, but he felt that
the Cuban situation was one that we could not live with and we had to
evolve more aggressive policies. He looks to us for firm recommendations.
In this connection we should prepare a briefing and also we should study
Ear carefully various courses of action.
; 78

3. [ne President then raised the question of the deal between the
Rumanian government and the Ferguson company for the procurement
of a steel mill and asked whether I thought this was a good thing. I
replied affirmatively, stating that in my opinion economic relations with
the satellites would tend to break down the closemess of ties between
the satellites in Moscow and this should be a very definite policy
effort on our part. I noted that Moscow had discouraged the Rumanian
steel mill because it did not fit into their pattern of economic integration
of the satellites and the Soviet Union. The President then stated that he
agreed that we should attempt to pull the satellites away. He then brought
up the question of Tito and asked if I could give him the name of the best
man who could serve as Ambassador to Yugoslavia who would be able to
"win the girl away from Khrushchev." He said that in his opinion this man
should be an experienced, able man, perhaps in his 50's and preferably a
Republican, who could carry the confidence of the Republicans anda
personality who could win Tito's confidence and allegiance. I responded by
stating that I would prepare a list of competent people who I felt could 7

-2-

aye

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g
serve in this capacity and ad, in others. In this connection, the
President stated that he was not satisfied with the Ambassador-elect
to Yugoslavia and had therefore held up the appointment, His request
for help and the suggestion of names in connection with Yugoslavia and
the satellites is along the same line as to who would be a good
representative in South Vietnam, |

4. The President asked concerning our relationships on the Hill.
I said that they were excellent. The only problem was a continual

' harangue for a Joint Committee on Intelligence. I said that I felt that if

Senator Russell would expand his Committee to include Fulbright and
Hickenlooper, and Vinson expand his Committee to include two members
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, that the issue would be put to
rest. The President said he thought this was a good idea and that he would
speak to both Fulbright and Russell about it.

5. LL then reviewed the brochure on the OXCART by giving the
President a broad picture of this development, I explained that surfacing
of it was a problem which had been under consideration by Defense and
CIA which I had discussed with President Kennedy. I said that McNamara
was pressing for a rather early release but that President Kennedy
felt that the timing of the surfacing was of very great importance. I said
that I felt that the timing was even of greater importance now and I had
some reservations about surfacing this vehicle in the first few days of
President Johnson's administration, The President seemed to agree and
suggested that McNamara, Rusk, Bundy and I meet with him on Friday for
a discussion of this problem.)

No arrangements were made as to the time of Friday morning's
briefing,

JAM/mfb (tape)

-3-

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26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with The President - 25 November and 26 November

1, On Monday, November 25th, theré’was no briefing of the President,
although there was a short visit with him at the State reception on Monday
evening. The President then expressed regret that events of the day
prevented a briefing and asked if there was any development requiring his
attention. I replied there was none and would call him if any developments
came to my attention.

2. On Tuesday, the 26th, I briefed the President, reviewing all
items on the Check List and the world reaction summary contained in the
Bulletin, Briefing and discussion on other matters consumed about
15 or 20 minutes. ,

3. The President asked if our entire applicable resources had been
made available to the FBI in connection with their report, which he had
ordered. I replied affirmatively.

NOTE: I should call J. Edgar Hoover concerning this.
(DCI did this at 11:20 on 11/26/63)
2
4, The President asked my appraisal of the situation in Vietnam.
I replied that I was less optimistic than was the report received from
Ambassador Lodge.

5. Mr. Bundy stated the first order of business was to assist
State and assign a Deputy Chief of Mission capable of running the Country
Team and the American official community. Bundy recommended
Mr. Sullivan, Harriman's deputy. The President plans to have a man in
position not later than January first.

6. McCone stated that there remained a number of individuals in
Saigon who continued to be troublemakers and should be removed.
Bundy confirmed this and stated actions were to be taken. No names
were mentioned.

NOTE: Apparently the President's appointment
secretary will bea Mr. Moyts. We
should get to know him.

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7. The President noted with some considerable contempt the
fact that certain people in the Department of Justice had suggested
to him on Saturday that an independent investigation of the President's
assassination should be conducted by a high level group of attorneys
and jurists, probably headed by Governor Dewey. President Johnson
rejected this idea, and then heard that the identical plan was to be
advanced in a lead editorial in the Washington Post. The President
felt this was a deliberate plant and he was exceedingly critical. He
personally intervened, but failed with Mr. Al Friendly and finally
"killed" the editorial with Mrs. Graham.

JAM/TMLee/mfb

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wee damn teen ata  ne eens .

"SEP 22 "98 1:46PM Cc

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25 November 1963
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: South Vietnam Situation

ATTENDANCE: The President, Secretaries Rusk, McNamara, Ball,
Mesere. Bundy and McCone, Ambassador Lodge
Now 1uS - 38 Exac OFrcce Bide .
Se ee el

1. Ambassador Lodge reported that the change in government
had been an improvement, that he was hopeful over the outlook, that
he expected a speedup of the war, he thought by February or March
we would see marked progress. Lodge stated that we were not
involved in the coup, though we put pressurea on the South Vietnamese
government to change its course and those pressures, most
particularly on indications of withdrawal by 1965, encouraged the
coup. Lodge stated that there were indications that North Vietnam
might be interested in arrangements which would be of a nature
satisfactory tous. He did not elaborate. He that that everybody
was vary happy after the coup and showed some pictures of the
crowds in Saigon. He mentioned that Gen. Don would be here and
that those talking with him should influence him to put on all the
pressure he could. He spoke most highly of the Papal delegate and
hie intention to see the Pope on Wednesday. He carried with him a
letter from the Papal Delegate and also from the Bishop of Saigon,
apparently praising the actiona in upsetting the Diem government.
Lodge said he saw dangers of an anti-Christian move and this was
his purpose in seeing the Pope. He made a point that Bishop Thuc
had engaged in serious persecutions involving the imprisonment of
a great many people, including three Catholic priests. He also made
the point that Can, Diem's brother, also engaged in a variety of
activities of persecution and the execution of individuals and that
Can had, on his own premises, a burial ground for his victims.
Lodge said that we were in no way reaponsible for the death of Diem
and Nhu, that had they followed hia advice, they would be alive
today. He said that he saved Can from assassination and that
Bishop Thue was out of Saigon under orders from the Papal
delegate. (Note: I question whether the Papal. delegate can order
a Bishop out of a country.) The tone of Ambassador Lodge's
statements were optimistic, hopeful, and left the President with |
the impression that we are on the road to victory.

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|

At this point McCone stated that our estimate of the situation /
was somewhat more serious. We had noted a continuing increase

in Viet Cong activity since the first of November as evidenced by

a larger number of Viet Cong attacks. We also noticed with
considerable concern a high level of message volume on the Viet Cong
military and political networks and this might quite possibly reflect
preparationa for further sustained guerrilla pressures. Furthermore
I stated that the military were having considerable trouble in
completing the political organization of the government and were
receiving litle if any help from civilian leadership. Indeed it seemed
to us that the competent civilians were staying on the sidelines and
continuing their traditional role of critics rather than turning ‘in and
being helpful. I concluded by stating that we could not at this point

or time give a particularly optimietic appraisal of the future.

The President then stated that he approached the situation with
some misgivings. He noted that a great many people throughout the
country questioned our course of action in supporting the overthrow
of the Diem regime. He also noted that strong voices in the Congress
felt we should get out of Vietnam. Both of these facts give the
President considerable concern. He stated that he was not at all aure that
we took the right course in upsetting the Diem regime but this was a
decision that he did not have to make as it was a fait accompli. He
said now that it was done, we have to see that our objectives were
accomplished. (Note: The inferences were that, left to his own
devices, he would not have supported the courseg of action which led
to the coup.)

The Preaident then stated he hag never been happy with our
operations in Vietnam. He said there had bean serious dissension
and divisions within the American community and he told the
Ambassador that he was in total charge and he wanted the situation
cleaned up. He wanted no more divisions of opinion, no more
bickering and any person that did not conform to policy should be
removed. At this point Mr. Bundy stated that we were searching for
a replacement for Truehart and what we wanted wae a capable
administrator who could run the Country Team. The President again
repeated hia insistence that the Ambagsador waa the Number One man and
he, the President, waa holding the Ambassador personally responsible.

‘
Secretary McNamara stated that he had examined the economle
situation and that he felt we must give generously of economic aid
and must not ask the South Vietnamese government to do the impoasible
at this particular time.

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The President then said that he supported thie, but at the aame
time he wanted to make it abundantly clear that he did not think we had
to reform every Aaian into our own image. He said that he felt all
too often when we engaged in the affairs of a foreign muntry we
wanted to immediately transform that country into our image and this,
in his opinion, was a mistake. He was anxious to getdong, win the war -
he didn't want as much effort placed on so-called social reforms.

Note: I received in thia meeting the first ''President Johneon tone"
for action as contrasted with the Kennedy tone''. Johnson definitely
feels that we place too much emphasis on social reforms; he has very
little tolerance with our spending so much time being ''do-gooders";
and he has no tolerance whatsoever with bickering and quarreling of
the type that haa gone on in South Vietnam.

The meeting was followed by a statement to the press which waa
given out by Bundy to the effect that we would pursue the policies
agreed to in Honolulu adopted by the late President Kennedy. A
picture was taken of the President with Lodge, McNamara, Rusk and
Ball.

JAM (tape) /mfo

References: 1. IN-66988, 23 Nov 63
2. SC No. 11709/63, 18 Nov 63
Subj: The Military Situation in South Vietnam

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GELLADBPBOPBRBAA PAA AEA EAE CLL LAULELECULLOOONLLLL LLCO POLLO COC CCLCULOOLOLUO LLL COOL ll
' TOP SECRET(DINAR Jy5 |
— CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 9 O**4 4 Wee

on . a wv, k, (reb- Mork
uth. ak ae i 23 November 1963 a
—_ a cet ff. ; ; Y
. Cou Rhine }
Pepte gusts DAILY BRIEF a Ho!

i ee
ew oul *South Vietnam: The accelerated tempo of Viet

; “v Cong activity in the post-coup period continues.
Use, te

. _- previous week's record high of 233, the number is
wd still about 50 percent above normal for this year.
J “~~. The attacks continue to be ona small-scale. They
Gust porecutlere targeted primarily against strategic hamlets
yj “SB Apewe and outposts, with government paramilitary forces
Yj ——~ bearing the brunt.
Mew — 24
Yj Continuing(high message volumes on) Viet Cong

é pad § military and political networks may reflect prepara- |\'*
- _ tions,for sustained guerrilla pressures.
doce! 01h i) Coe
Anup The Saigon government apparently is proceeding —_ Gey

_ with a purge of military officers holding high mili- ; _

tg tary, intelligence, and provincial posts under Diem. =
al On 22 November it announced the suspension of 31 dot on
chant officers. Some of these are under arrest. The : “se ite
urges may be partly in response to the demands of of ae

—

student and Buddhist groups seeking revenge against
~~ prominent figures who sided with Diem during the
Buddhist crisis. (TOP SECRET(DINAR)

94

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26 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson ~ Sunday,
November 24th at 10:00 a.m

I briefed President Johnson at his residence at 10:00 a.m
Briefing consumed approximately 20 minutes. Reviewed the
Checklist and I made the following points: g

: l. I explained the space event. [Soviet ships are in place
which would indicate a long range ICBM test. However, the ranges
are not up, the area is not cleared and therefore the possibility is
that a planned ICBM or Lunar shot has been deferred. “7

2. I statedI felt the President shoyld, atan early opportunity,
receive a briefing on Soviet long range Seeman capability, their
current air defense capability and the status of the Soviet economy.

3. I referred briefly to our estimate of the Cuban situation,
the condition of their economy and our operational plans against
Cuba.

4. I stated that we are watching Venezuela and Ecuador with

great care. I gave the President a copy of the November 24th Summary
of World Reaction to President Kennedy's Assassination.

JAM:mcm

Vane

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fa

25 November 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with President Johnson, November 23rd,
about 9:15 a.m. The conversation lasted approxi-
mately 15 minutes.

1. The President entered Mr. Bundy's office alone and
no one was present during the conversation.

2. The President opened the conversation by recalling a
long background of association and friendship with me personally,
his respect for the Agency, the fact that on a number of issues
that had arisen since I took office as DCI he and I had seen eye
to eye, he had complete confidence in me and expressed the wish
that I continue in the future exactly as I have in the past.

3. I confirmed my confidence in him, my desire to help and
support ‘him in every way and my willingness to continue in the
future as I have in recent months. :

4. The President then asked of any world developments. I
reviewed details of the Checklist with him and explained the institution
of the "President's Checklist" with which he was not familiar. I
stated that we would continue the publication of the Checklist in the
future as we had in the past.

5. It was agreed that for the next few days I would brief the
President in the morning personally and that senior staff officers
would brief the President's staff each morning as I have in the past.
The President asked that any matters of urgent importance be brought
to his attention at any time, day or night. He designated no inter-
mediary.


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6. At 12:30 I went to the President's office in the Executive
Office Building to tell him of the information received from Mexico
City. In attendance was Mr. Bundy. Following this I had a brief
exchange with President Eisenhower who was visiting with President
Johnson at the time.

7. This evening I called Secretary Rusk and reviewed with
him the information received from Mexico City, most particularly
the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban Embassy by
Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald. I
explained to Rusk the information that we had transmitted to the
FBI and to the authorities in Dallas. Rusk had not known of these
developments prior to my communication with him.

8. I offered the assistance on the part of Mrs. McCone and
me personally and also the Agency in connection with the appropriate
handling of official visitors arriving from all over the world who
might overwhelm the State Department's capacity. Rusk appreciated
this offer and said he would call on me. He further said that there
may be visitors we would like to meet with and, if so, he would make
appropriate arrangements. He indicated that he intended to avoid
having all incoming visitors appear as guests of the United States.
Each had their own embassy to take care of them, however, he
thought there might be some obligations in which I could be helpful.
He said that following the Arlington service on Monday afternoon
he would hold a reception in the Department which would be in the
form of some kind of a buffet and this would be the extent of any
planned activities. He thought it was quite probable that the President
would meet with several Heads of States at various times on Tuesday
and Wednesday.

JAM:mcm
(tape)

