A AAAAA . -
\q04-10337-10001 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
‘ 0 (W Ctntal intelkyence Agency

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April iT1 2

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.
Chairman ;

Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked me to respond to your letter of
April 6, 1992 requesting certain information regarding CIA
holdings of records related to the assassination of
President Kennedy. We do have a significant number of records
relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy,
although many of these records were originated by the FBI or
by investigating committees of the Congress. We believe that
a significant portion of our records could be released if H.J.
Resolution 454 were enacted into law.

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence
Agency is currently embarking on its own review of
assassination records. I would expect that this review will

result in the public release of a significant body of
information.

To help the committee understand the nature and number of
CIA records pertaining to the assassination, I am enclosing
the answers to the specific questions you raised in your
letter.

aan Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

13-00000

.

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr.

SUBJECT:

Agency Records on the JFK Assassination

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1. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does
the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of
these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000 ¢
pages of such records which include microfilm of CIA's Oswald
file (originally collected in response to the Warren
Commission's inquiry, then added to) as well as records
collected in response to specific requests from the HSCA.
Although these records cover a wide variety of topics, they
principally focus on CIA operations against Cuba and Castro,
Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the USSR, and Oswald's
activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. The vast majority
ef documents pertaining to Oswald were created in response to
specific inquiries from the Warren Commission and HSCA. They
also include a large number of nanie tracea requested by the
HSCA staff, as well as materials relating to the Garrison
investigation, Watergate, Cuban exile activities, and copies
of FBI reports relating to Oswald. Because the HSCA was also
investigating the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King,
Jr., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the
civil rights movement.

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those related to
the HSCA that may be considered relevant to the assassination
of President Kennedy? If so, please describe such records and
the approximate number of pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission

“>and the HSCA (approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The
» CIA has never, however, attempted to locate every document

bearing on every conceivable angle or theory relating to the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. If the Agency

were asked to explore newly advanced theories the search for
\documents could be a rather large undertaking’ involving the
‘review of thousands of additional documents. To conduct any
further search, CIA would require specific guidelines
,describing the kinds of records sought.

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2
originate with the FBI? If so, approximately how many?
go <a wt Bae
We believe that between 40 percent and—-50-pereent of the
records described in questions 1 and 2 originated with the
FBI.

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NS

4. Did any of these records originate with any other
Federal, foreign, state, or local agency? If so, please
describe which agencies and the approximate numbers.

A small number of CIA‘s records pertaining to the
assassination of JFK, probably less than 5%, originated with
the State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. Another small number of records, also less than 5%,
are original HSCA records stating Committee requests to CIA.

5. How many of these records have been reviewed for
release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)? How many
of these records have been released pursuant to such requests?

CIA has released 7,432 pages of records pertaining to the
assassination of JFK, representing 1,969 documents, under the
FOIA. There is no documentation of how many JFK assassination
records CIA has reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many
records would be released under the standards contained in
House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents
that would be released if the Joint Resolution passed because
consideration for protection of classified information and
other sensitive categories of information would be required on
a document by document basis. We would review our holdings
carefully to ensure that the maximum amount of information is
released, consistent with the DCI's responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods and with privacy interests of
individuals involved.

13-00000
Z. 2 HR eb Fe AAT Ee UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DCI History Staff

316 Ames Building
Washington, D.C. 20505
Phone (703) 351-2621

FACSIMILE TRANSMISSION COVER SHEET

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(cover sheet included)

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The Honorable John Conyers, dr.
Chairman

Committee on Government Operations
United States House of Representatives
‘Washington, D.C. 20515 .

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Director has asked.me to respond to your letter of
6 April requesting certain information regarding CIA holdings
of records related to the assassination of President Kennedy.
We do have a significant number of records relating to the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy, although many of
these records were originated by the FBI or by investigating
committees of the Congress. We believe that a significant
portion of our records could be released if H.J. Resolutin 454 ,
were enacted into law. A

I should also point out that the Central Intelligence
Agency is ourrentiy embarking on its own review of
assassination records. I would expect that this review will
result in the public release of a significant body of
information. .

To help the committee understand the nature and number of
CIA records pertaining to the assassination, J am enclosing

the answers to the specific questions you raised in your
letter.

Sincerely,

Stanley M. Moskowitz
Director of Congressional Affairs

Enclosure

yo

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13-00000 win cs iad om

1.. Did the CIA retain possession of records requested by
er developed on behalf of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations? If so, how many pages of such records does
the Agency have in its possession? What is the nature of
these records?

Yes, the CIA retained possession of records requested by
or developed on behalf of the House Select Committea on
Aseassinations (HSCA). The Agency has approximately 300,000
pages of such records which .
(originally collected in response to the Warren Commission's
inquiry, then added to) as well ag recorda collected in
response to specific requests fram the House Seleat Committe
on Agsassinations. Although these records cover a wide
variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA operations A
against Cuba and Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald's sojourn in the
USSR, and Oswald's activities in Mexico City and New Orleans.

They algo include a larga number of names traces requeated by
the HSCA staff, as. well ag materials relating to the Garrison
investigation, Watergate, Cuban exlle activities, and copies
of FBI reports relating toe Oswald. Because the HSCA was also
investigating the assassination of br. Martin Luther King,
Jz., there is also some material on the Black Panthers and the
givil yighta movement. ;

2. Does the CIA have records outside of those relatad to
the House Assassinations Committee that may be considered
relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy? If so,
Please des¢ribe such records and the approximate number of
pages.

The CIA responded to requests from the Warren Commission
and the House Select Committee on Asaassinations —
(approximately 300,000 pages, see above). The CIA haa never,
however, attempted to locate evary document bearing on every
conceivable angle or theory relating to the asaaasination of
President John F, Kennedy. To conduct any further search, CIA
would require specific guidelines of the kinds, of records
sought.

include
mrevets lu
rd

3. Did any of the records described in questions 1 and 2
originate with the Federal Bureau of Investigation? If sa,
approximately how many?

We believe that between 40% and 50% of the records
described in questions i and 2 originated with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.

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4. Did any of these records originate with any other
Federal, foreign, state, or local agency?. If so, please
describe which agencies and‘ the approximate numbers.

A amall number of CIA's JFK assassination records,
probably lesa than 5%, originated with the State Department
and the Immigration and Naturalization Services, Another smail
number of records, also less than 5%, are original HSCA
records stating Committee requests to CIA.

- 5. How many of these recoraés have been reviewed for
release under the Freedom of Information Act? How many of
these records have been released pursuant. to such requests?

CIA hag released 7,432 pages of JFK aasassination
records, representing 1,969 documents, under the Freedom of
Information Act. There is no documentation of how many JFK
assassination records CXA hag reviewed under FOIA.

6. In the estimation of the CIA, approximately how many
records would he released under the standards contained in
House Joint Resolution 454?

It is very difficult to estimate the number of documents
that would be released Lf the Joint Resolution paased. We
would review our holdings carefully to ensure that the maximum
amount of information is released, consistent with the DCI's
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

13-00000
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NEAMLAT cGur WISCONSIN JOHN GEYMOUA CAF ORNIA q e
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LEQNANG WEIEG, STAs DIRECTOR ‘ a .
FRAKKUN C. POLE, MINGAITY GAM DINECTOR AND Cries COUMERL . GOV pepe Oh was

WASHINGTON, DG 20610-6250

April 14, 1992

The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Director CIA HA
Central Intelligence Agency Bee
Washington, D.C. 20505 .

Dear Diractor Gatease

I am please to learn that you will be teatifying before
the Committee on Governmental Affairs on Tuesday, May 12,

1992. The hearing will begin at 9:00 a.m. and be held in Room
342 of tha Dirksen Senate Building. The subject of tha hearing
will be the “Assassination Materlals Disclosure Act of 1992."
The legislation proposes to create an independent review board
to govern and coordinate the release of government information
relevant to the assassination of former President John F.
Kennedy. As required by Commmittee rules, please have 100
copies of your written testimony delivered to the Committee by
close of business, Friday, May §, 1992. While your written
testimony may be as long as you wish, please plan to limit
your spoken testimony to five to seven minutes in length.

Your testimony will be extremely helpful to the Committee
and te the Congresg as it considers this important -
legislation. While you may discuss whatever aspects of the
legislation you desire, particularly how it relates to the
records and resources of your agency, the Committee would
appreciate learning your views on several specific subjects:

What ave the reasons which the Central Intelligence
Agency has records related to the agsassination of

President Kennedy?

What have the methods been to date for the identification
and definition of Central Intelligence Agency records as
material related to the assassination of Prasident

Kennedy?

What steps has the Central Intelligence Agency made to
assess the scope of relevant documents outside of
materials requested by earlier investigative or other
official committees or. commissions, or through the

Freedom of Information Act?

What ig the volume of material which you might recommend
be released to the public without concern for further

postponement?

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The Honorable Robc.: M. “ates
Page 2

‘Would you be opposed to a provision. requesting agencies,
whenever possible, to self-certify materials which may
released without agency objection?

What recommendations can you make with regard to the need
' for interagency working groups to identify thixd-agency

records in agency files, to avoid duplication, and to

assist in the efficient disclosure of information to the

public?

What are the logistical, manpower, and resource concerns
that you have with regard to the review and release of

assassination material?

Thank you for your assistance and consideration. I look
forward to seeing you on May 12th. In the event that you have
any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me. Your
staff has already heen very helpful to the Committee in its
preparation for the hearing. They may also contact Dr. Leonard
Welss, Staff Director, or Steven Kats, Counsel, at

202-224-4751. — :
_ Sincerel

gohn Glenn’
Chairman

JHG/sk

13-00000

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on

S.J. Res. 282:

THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992
Tuesday, May 12, 1992

9:00 a.m. ©
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LIST
ME ORMATION

eke ke *€

Panel _ 1:

The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R~PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

: wx kk &
Panel 2:
The Honorable Robert M. Gates

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ex kk *

Panel 3:
James Lesar ‘
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center
Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

ke ke ke

13-00000

HEARING
before the
SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
on
S.J. Res. 282:
THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992

Tuesday, May 12, 1992
9:00 a.m.
Room 342 Dirksen Senate Office Building

WITNESS LISt?Tt

CRMATION

kt kk *&

Panel 1:
‘The Honorable David L. Boren
United States Senator (D-OK)

The Honorable Arlen Specter
United States Senator (R~PA)

The Honorable Louis Stokes
United States Representative (D-OH)

, * &€ ke
Panel 2:
The Honorable..Robert M.—Gates.-----

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

“The Honorable Williams Sessions
Director .
Federal Bureau of Investigatio

* k kk

Panel 3:
James Lesar — a
President
Assassination Archives and Research Center

Washington, D. C.

Professor Ernest May
Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Professor Athan Theoharis
Department of History
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

k ke &

13-00000

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DB.

OUTLINE OF TESTIMONY ON JFK RESOLUTION

Agreement with Principles of Legislation.

1, Favor disclosure of ag much material on UFK as
is consistent with protection of intelligence

_ Sources and methods.

2, Established own declassification program.
Presumption will be in favor of disclosure.

3. Pledge to cooperate with any reasonable
mechanism to declassify documents.

Describe Nature and Amount of Records,
1, Reasons for having records.

2. Volume of existing material and who it belongs
to. .

3. How we have identified material related to JFK
assassination.

Row Much Material Can be Released? -

1. Give estimate of amount of material to be
released under CIA program or resolution.

2. Deserihe material that could not *be disclosed.

ample of Intelligence Sources and
Methods that w would require withholding,

b. Example of material the release of. which
would invade privacy.

3. Deagerxibe resources--manpower and funds-- to
achieve results. :

Concerns with Resolutiona.

1. Address only Intelligence Community Concerns.
Will defer to DoJ on Constitutional objections.

13-00000

,

7 APR dé $e Les 4?
MPR 22°92 OB: 47

PS

2. CIA or other agencies that originate documents
should conduct initial review of material to
determine whether*it can be réleased. Material
withheld from public release could then be made
available to Review Board.

3. Agencies that originate information should be
allowed to review it for release even if that
information is contained in a document prepared by
another agency or Congress. Suggest interagency
working group to handle coordination issues likely
to arise with disclosure of third agency
documents.

4, Will cooperate with any request by the Board
for additional material that has a reasonable
relationship to the assassination.

5. Would hope that the Board will consult with

DCI before using subpoena power to compel
production of material that involves sensitive

intelligenee sources and methods .

8, Exemptions need to be clarified so as to
engure that deliberative process information and
identities of covert employees are protected,

Conclusion: Pledge to cooperate with whatever

mechanism is established to declassify material. Hope that
this effort will help to dispel myths regarding JFK

assassination.

‘

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“> ° - " ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

OCA 2034-92
. . 1 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

1, On 28 April, the undersigned attended a public
hearing on the proposed Assassination Materials Disclosure _
Act conducted by the House Government Operations Legislation
and National Security Subcommittee. Majority
Committee/Subcommittee Chairman Conyers and Ranking Minority
Member Horton were present for the entire hearing; majority
Subcommittee members English, Neal, Peterson, and Thornton
and minority members Shays and Schiff and full Committee
member Martinez attended at least part of the hearing. The
Committee's Press release, which criticizes the government
and particularly CIA as releasing JFK-related documents “at
a snail's pace", and witness statements are attached.

2. The hearing was well attended by the public and
attracted much media coverage. Eight witnesses testified in
four groups: Congressmen Louis Stokes (assisted by
Robert Blakey, former counsel to the House Select Committee
on Assassinations) and former HPSCI Chairman Lee Hamilton
testified first. The congressmen were followed by the movie
"“JFK"'s director Oliver Stone, who was followed by
Howard Willens, Counsel to the Warren Commission, and
James Johnston, Counsel to the Church Committee. The
session closed with a panel comprised of Ms. Leslie Harris,
Chief Legislative Counsel for the Washington office of the
ACLU; Dr. Herbert Parmet, Professor of History,
Queensborough Community College and Graduate School of the
City University of New York, and Dr. Harold Rellyea,
American National Government Specialist at the Congressional
Research Service.

3. Chairman Conyers advised in his opening remarks
that the Committee wanted to hear from the Executive branch
and thus would hold another hearing session. He noted that
“after much negotiation," the Director of Central
Intelligence would be testifying in mid-May. He further
noted that the Committee also hoped to hear from the
Attorney General, but negotiations with the Justice
Department were still ongoing. Conyers was criticized of
the DoJ at the outset, noting that the Committee had

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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Day

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

received a long, single-spaced letter from Justice detailing
numerous "legalistic" objections to the resolution, which he
characterized as not reflecting a real willingness to work
together to release the documents to the American people.

4. The general tone of the session was strongly in
favor of the resolution and disclosure of the vast majority
of the material. Most witnesses conceded that there might
be some materials that required postponement of disclosure,
but the biasswas clearly toward disclosure. Even
Oliver-Stone, in response to a comment from Congressman
Shays that he (Shays) found it hard to imagine what national
security or privacy issues would persist after 30 years,
conceded that there might be some exceptions, but Stone
thought 98 percent of the material could be released.
Several witnesses, including Corigressman Stokes and Church
Committee counsel, suggested that most national security
information should be released under the resolution, but
that privacy interests posed greater concerns.

Congressman Hamilton warned that the Congress should be
careful that nondisclosure "loopholes" do not "swallow up
the bill," which is why he said that review by an
independent board was so important.

5. Stone's testimony had quite an impact on the
hearing. Several congressman and witnesses credited his
movie "JFK" as "the reason we are all here today."

Chairman Conyers appeared particularly impressed with Stone,
describing his testimony in exchanges with later witnesses
as "persuasive" and "compelling." A few potentially tough
questions were thrown at Stone--did he not over-lionize
Garrison; how much research did he do fer the movie and did
he seek to talk to or obtain information from the government
as part of his research process? However, there was no
aggressive follow-up to Stone's answers. Discerning
observers may have picked up on the fact that Stone's
"research" seemed tailored to and limited by pre-conceived
conspiracy theories. (For example, when asked if he had
talked to President Ford, a member of the Warren Commission
and advocate of disclosure of the JFK documents, Stone
answered no--that it was pretty obvious where Ford stood as
a proponent of the lone gunman theory.)

6. When asked about his personal views, Stone said he
believed that there were two conspiracies. The murder
conspiracy was small and covert--perhaps involving no more
that five to ten people--and was led by the "intelligence
agencies." Stone did not mention CIA by name at this point.

2

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

He mentioned Oswald's alleged ties to naval intelligence,
and also said that a closer look should be taken at an
operation "MONGOOSE" and a Colonel Landsdale. He also
posited a bigger "cover-up" conspiracy after the fact,
spearheaded by President Johnson (who Stone alleged told
Earl Warren he would be responsible for World War III if the
Commission tied the Cubans into a conspiracy). Stone
theorized that a much broader "Establishment", while not
directly involved in the assassination, was not sorry to see
Kennedy go beeause he was an agent of profound change
embarking upon several courses that disturbed that
"Establishment", including pulling out of Vietnam. In
response to a later question about various theories, Stone
called the Mafia theory a "red-herring." Stone said "as you
know, the CIA has always used the Mafia for plausible
deniability" and that it was important to look behind the
Mafia at "who pulls the strings."

7. Other matters of Agency interest discussed include
that both the Warren Commission attorney and particularly
the Church Committee attorney castigated CIA for "lying” to
the Warren Commission. The particular example offered had
to do with "AMLASH." This individual came up in connection
with traces the Agency apparently conducted for the Warren
Commission. CIA purportedly had a relationship with AMLASH
in connection with a’Castro assassination plot, but did not
make this fact known to the Warren Commission. The
witnesses characterized this as pertinent information CIA
consciously withheld from the Warren Commission. Also, when
the final panel engaged in a broader discussion of
government disclosure and FOIA with the; subcommittee, the
ACLU held up the CIA Openness Task Force report as an
example of why FOIA was a "dismal failure* as the mechanism
to "vindicate t public’s right to know." (On 18 March
Conyers rigorously questioned Gary Foster on the task force
report when his subcommittee held a hearing on "Government.
Secrecy After the Cold War.")

8. A major recurring theme was concern that, despite
the need to make the documents publicly available, the
Administration would not support the resolution and it could
be vetoed. Congressman Hamilton stated that, if the
resolution were vetoed, he hoped that at minimum the House
would pass a resolution to release its own records. (Such
an action would be problematic for the Administration,
because much Executive branch information is contained in
House records, and the House also probably considers
documents obtained from Executive agencies as part of its

3

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

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' ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

Subject: House Government Operations Committee Hearing on
H.J. Res. 454 (JFK Materials Resolution)

records.) Most witnesses thought the Congress should try to
avoid a constitutional confrontation with the
Administration, however, and a few practical suggestions to
help work around problems were made. For example, the ACLU
suggested that the Review Board might be modeled after the
Advisory Committee established in connection with the State
Department's preparation of the Foreign Relations of the
United States (FRUS) series, with which CIA's historical
staff is familiar. This body was established by a provision
included in last year's Foreign Relations Authorization Act.

9. In conclusion, the hearing did not get into much
detail on provisions of the resolution. Much time was spent
on general propositions like the fact that the documents
ought to be released and why, and matters tangential to core
issues raised by H.R. 454,

\Wictoria L. Pepper

Assistant General Counsel
Office of Congressional Affairs

4

ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

~STEQNS

POLE 4 May 1992

i
TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE OS dy 'hee-ngenestnanton FILE:

6 Mar 64 Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA

30 Jan 76 CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15
Jan 75 on deleting #s.

6 Mar 64 DD/P transm sheet, re NARA‘ s holding.

Pages Date Description-
= = a
+ 4 :

6 Mar 64 Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
6 Mar 64 Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
31 Oct 5 tate Cable from Moscow to SecState.

Redacted copy of same.
1 Nov 59 Press clipping
2 & 4 Nov Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
2 Nov 59 on Sv Despatch, £r Moscow to Dept
9 Nov 59 « tate Cable, Moscow to SecState
* Redacted copy of same
9 Nov 59 state Cable, Tokyo to SecState
Redacted copy of same
16 Nov 59. Press clipping
26 Nov 59” Press clipping
25 May 60 Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
12 May 60 Attachment to above
12 May 60 FBI report, fr Dallas
25 Oct 60““State (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
Redacted copy of same
3 Nov ‘60 —~DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
Redacted copy of same .
18 Nov 60——~Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany
draft reply to Cumming
undated - ~Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
21 Nov 60 ~ ~Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US

defectors
“ Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
" List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter

18 Nov 60. Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
21 Nov 60 Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above

9 Dec 60 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald
201.

11 Jul 61 Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

26 May 61 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

13 Apr 61—S~DeptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship.
and passport (signed Rusk)

26 Jan 6l-—pState MemCon re Oswald

" Redacted copy of same ;

13 Jul 61 Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several
FBI reports, much of which is illegible

28 Sep 61 Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion
in Oswald 201

13 Oct 61—>-Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering
copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow

7 Dec 61 Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info
on Oswald

13-00000

sqattt®

HES
mare

WW aI Nd wo on

N

20
20

14

14

3 Mar 62
26 Apr 62
7 Sep 62
10 Sep 63
24 Sep 63
10 Sep 63
8 Nov 63
7 Nov 63
25 Oct 63

31 Jan 64

-
”

reser

Note saying Navy message of this date is
missing from CD 692 sent from Archives
Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus
Navy, USMC, and press items

Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas
Redacted pages from above

FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas

FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans
FBI field report on Oswald.from Dallas
(apparently different from above)

Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans
report

Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on
Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for-Cuba stuff

FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material
above

Report, not really contemprary with this file,
entitled: “Information Developed by CIA on
the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..,”
28 Sep--3 Oct 63

Redacted copy of same

13-00000

OCA 2050-92
6 May 1992

MEMORANDUM ror: WY pi rector of Central Intelligence

’ FROM: Stanley M. Moskowitz

Director of Congressional Affairs

SUBJECT: JFK Testimony

1. Attached is a copy of your opening statement for
the 12 May hearing before Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on the JFK Joint Resolution. Because we are
commenting on legislation, Executive Branch guidelines

‘xequire us to submit the testimony in advance to OMB for

Administration clearance. We also intend to provide your
opening statement in advance to the DoJ and FBI. As you
know, Director Sessions will be joining you for a panel

presentation before the Committee.

2. Please let me know whether you have any objections
to release of your statement to OMB, DoJ, and the FBI. The
Committee has requested that an advance copy of your °
statement be provided to them by 8 May. °

Oe fe >

a ~Staiiley M. Moskowitz —

Attachment:
as stated

13-00000

Draft 5/6/92

ECIAL COLLECTIONS
an SE LEASE W FULL

ot Het

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE

12 MAY 1992

13-00000

x

Mr. Chairman, J am here today at your request to provide
my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination
Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of

- documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
_’ F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on

this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
should be made to declassify and make available to the public as
quickly as possible government documents relating to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public
access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that
still linger even 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe
that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that ze CIA Hast fn,

participated the murder of John F. Kennedy. ws & lang
#

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the .
establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
for declassifying as many historical documents as possible
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

13-00000

‘ methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the
Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national .
intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of 30-
year- old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the
Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records fu
focusing on particular events of historical importance, including Fe

?
the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review ~~ Ak
Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of Se,

declassifying the records. JAs-we-speakj- this-Group-has/ already

~N begun its review of the documents related to the assassination of
és. 4, President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that the first group of Re fy
pre ‘these records, : all CIA documents on Lee Harvey 73
wi : Oswald prior to the assassination, has been declassified and
. ‘s transferred to the National Archives for release to the public.
p
LF the 9 oo, |
a, me - As we carry out our program to declassify Kennedy
as assassination documents, we will usé a presumption in favor of
a
/ Se, 7 releasing as many documents as possible. In fact, I recently
P ;

£

“$2. approved new CIA declassification guidelines for our Historical
Review Program whic a presumption in favor of
declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in
making these documents available to the public, and I have
instructed the Historical Review Group.to do so.

be

f apy
raaet

yy
i

13-00000

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to
place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents
related to the assassination of President Kennedy consist of
approximately 250, 009-300 000 pages of material. This includes

cespier = origi nels LG anran Cenmmis sion grok
64 boxes 0 Minformation provide ed to the House Seiec amitittee

on Assassination) robveen 22 preg 17 boxes of ¢
material on Lee Harvey Oswald “
President ICemnmnn doi ok mani ton .

ou might thi

assassination as a result of specific inquiries received from the
Warren Commission or the House Select Co ites 0 Doak Hanhlond
Assassinations, Faere-were some documents that dig exist

the assassination, but they were only brought together in resporise
to investigations of the event. I have prepared a chart that
illustrates this very point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination
pols peld only a small file le gu hee Harvey Oswald that consisted “/-¢Z#
SAY ofa document (tia i na ab obit 8 toca Geek WO.

. a 7 :
“eK “Navy, the FBI, and newspaper olipings—¥ have brought along a

copy of Oswald's file as it existed before the assassination so that
you can see first hand how slender it was at the time. As I have

3

13-00000

\ cat noted, we have declassified the CIA documents j in this file,
éi to the National Archives.’ The records in this .

file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and

his activities }rthe-U-S: after his return in 1961. By contrast, it :

was only after the assassination that CIA ‘Collectaball the rest of. ON
the’material on Aecode 33,000 pages in total: y fe “a

the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% percent of

the documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated

from the State Department or elsewhere, My Stati i is still goi I te
(Worn Comimissum

through the material compiled at the request of the House Select

ssinations, which includes 63 boxes of pap paper ot
cueckom records and one box that Centains 72 reels of microfilm,
ia pant oven y

wrsrerinnld uw
(However) vi we es ate that within the 63 boxes of pape records,
approximately i % ar from the Saleem /

vere 2b otek ee oS na run. _
et ough our holdings do include many documents from
other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of
CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review.
A preliminary soview of these files has provided us some
indications of what they contain. Although the records cover a
wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA activities
concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the Soviet

Commuttéé du.

ot et

4

13-00000

Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City and

New Orleans. They also include a large number of name traces .
on ,

requested by the staff of the House Select Co ttee, as well as
material relating to the Garrison savestigation ube exile

activities? eesies-ef= Bt reports abeatOswa

a
The CIA cannot Simply aet-1q declassify-ox{ release Sener tee x

_ documents unilaterally because of the limits in the Privacy Act
(which protects the names of American citizens against
unauthorized disclosure), the sequestration of many documents by
the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and the fact that
many of the documents belong to agencies other than the CIA.
However, we have already taken the necessary steps to lift the
sequestration, coordinate with other agencies and begin the

process of declassification. Y neecetary, A Will ack

the Nene for a fpecotutionw fi :

oY
yh ; wl 7 privacy concerns or the exposure of intelligence sources and
7 ‘methods. Let me take a moment to give examples of this type of
material. During the investigation by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, I understand that security and
Qe Merwrher

personnel files were requested omyApency Umnployees. These files
contain fitness reports (performance evaluations), medical
evaluations and credit checks on individual CIA officers.


13-00000

CDs Geeta to the question of who killed President

Kennedy;these and other personal documents ultimately ended up
in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not believe that
the benefit to the public of disclosure of this information
outweighs the clear privacy interest of the individuals in keeping
this information confidential. Similar privacy concerns exist with

documents containing derogatory information on particular

individuals where the information is based on gossip or rumor.

Our files also contain names of living individuals who provided

us intelligence information on a promise of confidentiality. We
. Theie viewed, | .

would not disclose)this-informationjin breach of such a promise.

Where we cannot disclose such information ip the public, the

oan

- “Agency will (be-wilting t) make redactions (Substitute generic
>
: ton jor summarize (berinformation in order to ensure tha

the maximum amount of information is released while still
protecting the identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual)’

The effort required to declassify the documents related t
the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
However, it is an important program, and I am personally
committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing
resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the

15%» allocation of 5 EMT time positions to expand the History Staff,

and to form the Historical Review Group that will undertake the

interest.

13-00000

- Lpbing Te Sb te patna senber: pid tp le pebereed’
DB Shae LY éZ, bo Ad iL tte ae . a, y ord
Minter fd
3 #8
Kennedy,I-de-have-certain technical reservations about the font
mechanism established by the joint resolution to achieve this an,

* result. I intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns;
I will defer to the Department of Justice on any additional OP on tine
problems posed by the joint resolution. Me

to the assassination

can be

released to the public} in an outside
body is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to protect
intelligence sources and methods. [fr addition, Lent concerned
that placing responsibility for classification determinations in a
Review Board that has no [partieuldg expertisé in

BAO tA AT aate 3 39 ATS Bot
a

bask
Gir Susenye Jit cbasac ar iss Cl tetitls

assassination materiglis bound to result in delays in releasing the
material. It wiT also result in a duplication of effort since
originating agencies will have to review the decision of the -
‘Executive Director to releasé particular decumes

ocuments be done in

I share your beli f that the review o

an expeditious and efficiert :
the initial review of assassination materials be made by the

13-00000

origtsating agencies and completed within a reasonabie period of
time. ASN have indicated, the CIA has already beg‘in this process.
Documents : aat an agency determines cannot bé released to the
pubhigy ould The nh be reviewed by membersOf the Review Board,
who could operate with a lean staff. Any dispute between an
agency and the Review Board overthe release of a document
could then be resolved by the Président or his designee. This

he initial review of documents is

arrangement would ensure

decisions yfade.to withhold i a 4 tapelib

hn Atriumed townld. bat = t) te“ arhets’,
"Second, I am concerned that th joi # resolution contains no

provision requiring security clearances or secure document

handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

could not e classified informatisa available to the Boar
it took the necessary steps to safeguard that informatio

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not
provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
of CIA information contained in documents originated by
Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review

13-00000

Board without any review by the President or other Executive
Branch agencies. (or e again, this provision conflicts with my .
statutory responsibility tOxgrotect sources and methods; that duty
should not be delegated to an vutside body. I believe that the
joint resolution should provide thatan agency that originated
information found in another's documentshould have the

release of this "third agency" information in a timely fashion

mation materia

th, the joint resolution defines "assassj
broadly to include any records that relate "in Any manner or
ination." I believe we“have already identified
iouS inquiries from

arren Commission and House

degree to the assas
these documents as a reds
investigative bodies, such aSNhe¥
Select Committee on Assassthations. These investigations were
thorough, and any additidnal request3Nor information should bear
some reasonable relationship to the JFK adse
panel of distingyShed historians could be formed to provide

eview Board as to what, if any, additional material

ssination. Perhaps a

advice to the
We reviewed.

Fifth, the joint resolution a 30-day period for

agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive
Director to release informationlsFhig may not provide sufficient
time for meaningful review of what could prove to be large

13-00000

vohumsk of material at one time. {ire € initial review
documents is doné by the Executive Director;tie joint resolution _

should be amended to pr at an agency may request a

reasonable Sion of time to determine whether documents

aay be released,

te Hinally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which outlines the
=, Sounds for postponement ¢ of Puble re release of a document nt ifs

For examplorihere9in no provision for postponing release of

< documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
a S. White such privileges could be waived in the public interest and
are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly

SS related to the JF. K assassination, they would be unavailable under

= process work. It is my hopé that the declassifi¢ation of this
jebesend Beiedmne Ti ey Coaiteel. 4 Lett


13-00000

6 May 1992

weg ay
NOTE FOR: DCI Pe

[o)
icy
FROM: \Neal Wolin, SA/DCI Y, “ <Z
z Y iS
XK .
Attached is the draft JFK testimony, as prepared by oca. “Sh
draft has been coordinated with OGC, the Center for the Study of,
Intelligence. (both Dave Gries and Ken McDonald), and the DO. The
handwritten edits are mine and Dave Gries'. A briefing book with
Q's and A's will be ready by COB Friday. As Stan's cover note

suggests, the testimony must be coordinated with others in the
Executive; OCA's preference is to send it out tomorrow.

&
ft]
Re: JFK Testimony te

Dave and I agree that the section of the draft testimony
commenting on the proposed legislation (pp. 7 et seq.) is too long
and runs the risk of overwhelming the positive message you relay
in the first part of the statement. It seems to me that while you
should lay down your objections to the legislation's scheme
clearly (and even forcefully), you should do so in language that
will leave the impression (which is consistent with the reality)
that (1) you are in agreement with their basic objectivas relating
to the material in question and (2) that you are doing, and will
continue to do, all that you can to accommodate the release of
material consistent with your statutory obligations.

In particular I think it unnecessary to reiterate your
"statutory responsibility to protect sources and methods" more
than a couple of times. Moreover, I think the paragraph on the
definition of “assassination material" (middle of p.9) unnecessary
and potentially counterproductive. One of the impetuses for the
JFK resolution, after all, is the notion (crazy or not) that
previous inquiries were insufficient in scope; this paragraph
feeds right into that criticism. Some of the other "technical"
criticisms (i.e., paragraphs on pp. 9-10) seem important to make
(especially if the basic model of the legislation is adopted) but
might be better included in a post-hearing letter to the committee
or something. Again, otherwise I fear you run the risk of leaving
the perception of trying to nitpick the concept of JFK material
declassification to death.

—

Nak
|, Neal

13-00000

OCA 2149-92
19 May 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: | Director, Center for the Study of
Intelligence
Chief, Administrative Law Division, OGC

FROM: David M. Pearline
; Deputy Director for Legislation, OCA

SUBJECT: Follow-up to DCI's 15 May JFK Testimony

1. We have reviewed a transcript of the Director's
15 May testimony on the JFK Assassination Materials
Resolution to identify those questions with respect to which
CIA committed to provide answers for the record. A copy of
the transcript with relevant portions marked is attached.

2. The following specific questions require follow-up
action:

a. How much material has been destroyed by CIA that we
may never know about? (p. 5)

b. Why was the Oswald file opened at the CIA 14 months
after his defection? (p. 5)

c. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? (p. 5)

d. Was that picture in his [Oswald's] file that was
thought to be him, was that an error? Or was there
something involved in that you can shed some light on?

(p. 5)

e. (W]hat consisted of new information [in the Oswald
file] that the public had not already had in its published
files somewhere? (p. 14)

f. (WJould the establishment of such a panel of
outside experts [by DCI, to review redactions in the absence
of legislation] . . .violate the Privacy Act? (p. 16)

3. I assume CSI, in coordination with appropriate
components, will take the lead on all questions except for
the last. I understand OGC will take the lead on the .
Privacy Act question. (Note: OGC advises that the issue of
why Oswald's file was not opened for 14 months after his
defection is addressed in the Findings and Recommendations
volume of the HSCA Report at pp. 200-202.) I appreciate
your assistance in preparing proposed responses for the
record.

David -M- Péarline —~
Attachment

13-00000

Draft: 14 May 1992

e

STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE

ra SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATION AND __.
_ NATIONAL SECURITY

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS

UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

15 MAY 1992

13-00000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today-at-your-request_to-provide
my views on House Joint Resolution 454, "The Assassination
Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
this important matter, just as I did before your Senate
counterparts last Tuesday.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
should be made to declassify.and make available to the public as
quickly as possible government documents relating to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public

: access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that _
still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe

that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had .
anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the
establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
for declassifying as many historical documents as possible

13-00000

consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the
Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
“declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national.
intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are

10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of
30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the an 1 ioe me
Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records A) 7K
focusing on particular events of historical importance, including

the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review
Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of
declassifying the records.

a Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting
for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents
belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,
. already has begun its review of the documents related to the.
‘assassination of President Kennedy, and I am happy to report that
the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on eo
Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has been | oe se
declassified with quite minimal deletions and transferred to the/ ~ peu
National Archives for release to the public. This is, I ,
acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an earnest
of my commitment immediately to begin review for
- declassification of this material. And; indeed, as I speak, the
reviewers are going through a substantial n ber of, cole | he a ¢ e 14

and | anticipate that many of these will be leisons | gue ye,
w &&

2

13-00000

AS we Catry out our program to declassify Kennedy
assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many as
possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA declassification
guidelines for our Historical Review Program which specifically
direct a presumption in favor of declassification. I believe we can
be very forward leaning in making these documents available to
the public, and I have instructed the Historical Review Group to
take this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making
publicly available these new guidelines for historical review
and declassification. _

In connection with these historical review guidelines, I
have recently commissioned a task force to review Agency
procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). I
have instructed this task force to ensure that our internal
FOIA procedures are consistent with the approach that I have
described for historical declassification. Although the task
force will have to explore the difference between current
documents that often are requested under FOIA and 30-year-
old documents that are placed into the historical review

‘program, my intention is to bring to the FOIA process a much

more positive attitude toward declassification and release of

Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to

q

13-00000

place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents
related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of Che al
approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes
64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the
Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on
Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald
accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
Unfortunately, and for reasons that I do not know, what we are
dealing with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is .
uncatalogued; and is highly disorganized~all of which makes the
review process more difficult. The material contains everything
from the most sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane
news clippings. . . .

: i : Oe nee tae ees

These records include documents that CIA had in its files
before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA _
received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as
well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA ©
prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I

' should emphasize that these records were assembled into the
present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from.
the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on
Assassinations. I have-prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination
CIA held only a small file on Lee Hatvey Oswald that consisted
of 34 documents (amounting to 124 pages), some of which

13-00000

originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and
newspaper clippings. (Although I reported slightly smaller
numbers to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
earlier this week, a subsequent count by my staff revealed

these exact numbers.) Only 11 of these documents originated

within CIA. I brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed
before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender
it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified
the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal deletions and
provided them to the National Archives. The records in this file
dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 and his
activities after his return in 1962. By contrast, it was only after
the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the material on

€

Oswald--some 33,000 pages—~most of which CIA received from - =

other agencies after November 22, 1963.

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination
Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize
that this is but the first installment--an example of our
intentions. All of the assassination-related documents we have
will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfefthéy"
declassified documents to the Archives as they are completed,
rather than waiting until work on the entirety has been
concluded. |

The committee has asked about documents in our possession

generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by

5

a

13-00000

CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,
in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the
documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated
with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staff is still going
through the material compiled at the request -of the Warren
Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
which includes 63 boxes of paper records and one box that
contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms-in part overlap
material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within
the 63 boxes ef paper records, approximately 27% originated with
a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private .
organizations, and foreign and American press.

Mr. Chairman, you have also asked about assassination —
materials that may be held by other Intelligence Community
agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which
I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement
records. The National Security Agency and the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research report,
after a preliminary search, that they have identified a
relatively small amount of material responsive to previous
inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church Committee,
and the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The _
Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into existence
until 1961, has identified no assassination material to date,
and it anticipates that any holdings ‘it might have would be

13-00000

minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy
assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents
from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection
of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to
review, and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for
declassification-is now underway. A preliminary survey of these
files has provided us some indications of what they contain.
Although the-records cover a wide variety of topics, they
principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro,
Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent
activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a
large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House
Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating
to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally
because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names
of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the

' sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents
belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already
taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other
agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If
necessary, in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House of

13-00000

performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the
results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.

While I expect a large amount of material can be
declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be
information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of
reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of
intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give
examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the
House Select:;Committee on Assassinations, I understand that
security and personnel files were requested on a number of
Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports (or
on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of
who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal
documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of
documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of
disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest
of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.
Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing
derogatory information on particular individuals where the
information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain
names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on
a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names
in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such
information to the public; the Agency will make redactions and
summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum

8

13-00000

amount of information is released while still protecting the
identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the
President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence
and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any
information relevant to the assassination, I would appoint a panel
of distinguished Americans from outside of government, perhaps
including distinguished former jurists, to examine whatever
documents wé have redacted or kept classified. They would then
issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to
the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
However, it is an important program, and I am personally
committed to making it work. Even in this time of diminishing

_ Tesources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the

allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff
and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK

_ documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent
to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what
remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is
against this background that, in response to the committee's.
request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism
established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I

a

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intend to address only Intelligence-Community concerns; I will
defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems
posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to
whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released
to the public is inconsistent with my own statutory responsibility
to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concemed that the joint resolution contains no
provision requiring security clearances or secure document
handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not
provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
of CIA information contained in documents originated by

_ Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,

documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
Board without any review by the President or other Executive
Branch agencies. |

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for
agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive
Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for
meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of

material at one time. .

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Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which
outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a
document, makes no provision for postponing release of
documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and,
in fact, are not dikely to arise with respect to factual information
directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be
unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they

might be needed.

These are technical problems that I believe can be solved in
ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing
on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation,
CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the
relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate
fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the -
President to declassify all of this material.

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Statement of Admiral William O. Studeman, USN :

_ Deputy.Director of Central-Intelligence .. . .-.-- -..-/.-. .

~ Before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law

Committee on the Judiciary. —
U.S. House of Representatives

2 Poo fee ge see gg

~ Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide ———
‘our views on House Joint Resolution 454; "The Assassination ~~~

Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of
documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John
F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
this important matter.

Let me begin, as the Director did last week in testifying on
this subject, by emphasizing that I am in complete agreement with

the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts should be

made to declassify and make available to the public as quickly as
possible government documents relating to the assassination of
John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and giving
journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public access to
governmental files will help to resolve questions that still linger
over 28 years after the assassination.. Further, we-believe that -
maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had
anything to do with the murder of President Kennedy.

%

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Even before introduction of this joint resolution, the
Director recognized thé need for greater public accessto CIA _
~~ documents of historical importance. Two months ago,he =

announced the establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be
responsible for declassifying as many historical documents as
possible consistent with the protection of intelligence.sources and... _. ...
methods. This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the -
noon -— oA gency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, willteview for ~~" ~~

_. 1... declassification documents-30-years-old-or-older,-and-national ---—-~- voce

— intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are
10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of
30-year-old documents, the Director has directed the History Staff
in the Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA
records focusing on particular events of historical importance,
including the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical
Review Group will then examine the documents for the purpose
of declassifying the records.

~ Because of high interest in the JFK papers, we are not
waiting for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying
documents belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group
already has begun its review of the documents related to the
assassination of President Kennedy, and the first group of these
records, including all CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald
prior to the assassination, has been declassified with quite ;
minimal deletions and transferred to'the National Archives for
release to the public. This is but a small fraction of what we have,

2

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but it is an indication of our commitment immediately to begin

review for declassification of this material. And;indeed, as I

"speak, the reviewers are going through a substantial number of

documents, and we anticipate that many of these will be released
shortly.

As we carry out our program to declassify. Kennedy
assassination documents, our goal will:be to release as many as

- possible. In fact, the Director recently-approved-new CIA co ee

declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program
which specifically direct a presumption in favor of
declassification. The Director believes that we can be very
forward leaning in making these documents available to the
public, and he has instructed the Historical Review Group to take
this attitude to heart. In this spirit, the Agency is making publicly
available these new guidelines for historical review and
declassification. OS

In connection with these historical review guidelines, the
Director has recently commissioned a task force to review Agency
procedures under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The
mission of this task force is to ensure that our internal FOIA
procedures are consistent with the approach that I have described
for historical declassification. Although the task force will have
to explore the difference between current documents that often are
requested under FOIA and 30-year-old documents that are placed
into the historical review program, our intention is to bring to the

3

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FOIA process a much more positive attitude toward
— _declassification and release of Agency records.

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
- reviewing the JFK papers for declassification, it is important to

related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of
“-* approximately 2,50,000-300;000 pages of material. This _includes* “~~
-— — -..-- .--64-boxes-of copies and-originals.ofinformation-provided-to the --~—.—--~ -
Warren Commission and the House Sélect Committee on
Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald
accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
Unfortunately, what we are dealing with is a mass of material that
is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and is highly disorganized--all of
which makes the review process more difficult. The material .
contains everything from the most sensitive intelligence s« sources
to the most mundane news clippings. —

These records include documents that CIA had in its files
before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA
received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as
well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA

_ prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I
should emphasize that these records were assembled into the
present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from
the Warren Commission or the House-Select Committee on

Assassinations.

place them in some context. CIA's collection of documents. ae

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Prior to President Kennedy's assassination, CIA held only a

~ small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted of 34 documents

(amounting to 124 pages), some of which originated with the FBI,
State Department, the Navy, and newspaper.clippings. Only 11 of
these documents originated within CIA. As I have.already.noted, .. -
we have declassified-the CIA documents in this file with quite
minimal deletions and provided them to the National Archives.

The records in this file dealt-with Oswald's defection to the Soviet
Union in 1959 and his activities after his return in 1962. By
contrast, it was only after the assassination that CIA accumulated

the rest of the material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of
which CIA received from other agencies after November 22,

1963. ; _—— —

There has been some comment on this pre-assassination
Oswald file and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize
that this pre-assassination material is but the first installment of all
the material that we will review--an example of our intentions.

All of the assassination-related documents we have will be
reviewed _for declassification, and we will transfer the declassified
documents to the Archives as they are completed, rather than
waiting until work on the entirety has been concluded.

We have been asked about documents in our possession
generated by other agencies. In fact, much of the material held by
CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,

5

13-00000

gihtis a SRP

in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the
documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated

~ with the State Department or elsewhere. Our staffis still going =»

through the material compiled at the request of the Warren
Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
-which includes.63 boxes-of paper _records-and-one.box that-
contains 73 reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap
material in other parts of the collection: We estimate that within

_ —---. -the 63-boxes of paper records,- -appreximately~ 27% originated: with:

a variety of other U.S. government agencies, private
organizations, and foreign and American press.

We have also been asked about assassination materials that
may be held by other Intelligence Community agencies. The FBI
will describe its holdings separately, which I assume include both
intelligence and law enforcement records. The National Security
Agency and the State Department's. Bureau of Intelligence and
Research report, after a preliminary search, that they have
identified a relatively small amount of material responsive to
previous inquiries by the Warren Commission, the Church
Committee, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations.
The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come into

_._._ existence until 1961, has identified no assassination material to_.

date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might have would be
minimal because its mission at the time of the Kennedy
assassination focused upon foreign order of battle.

13-00000

Although our holdings at CIA do include many documents

from other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection

of CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to
review, and, as I said earlier, this review for declassification is
now underway. A preliminary survey of these files has provided
us some indications of what they contain. Although the records
cover a wide variety of topics, they principally focus on CIA
activities concerning Cuba and Castro, Oswald's defection to the
Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent activities in Mexico City
and New Orleans. They also include a large number of name
traces requested by the staff of the House Select Committee on
Assassinations, as well as material relating to the Garrison
investigation and Cuban exile activities.

CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally
because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names
of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the

- sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee

on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents
belong to agencies other than CIA. However, we have already
taken steps to lift the sequestration, to coordinate with other
agencies, and to begin the process of declassification. If

_ necessary, in the absence of legislation, we will ask the House of

Representatives for a resolution permitting CIA to release the
results of the declassification effort on the sequestered documents.
We hope to work with you, Mr. Chairman, to remove any
obstacles that might arise in releasing the sequestered documents.

7

13-00000

While we expect that a large amount of material can be
declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be

information that cannot be released to the public fora varietyof =

reasons, including privacy concerns or the exposure of

intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give
examples of this type of material.. During the investigation by the .
House Select-Committee on Assassinations, I understand that |

security and personnel files were requested on a number of

Agency employees... These files contain fitness reports (or
performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks
on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of
who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal
documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of
documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of
disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest
of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.
Similar privacy concems exist with documents containing
derogatory information on particular individuals where the
information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain
names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on

-a- promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names

in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such
information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and
summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum
amount of information is released while still protecting the
identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual.

13-00000

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the
President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence
and to provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any
information relevant to the assassination, the Director has stated
that he would appoint a panel of distinguished Americans from
outside of government, perhaps including distinguished former
jurists, to examine whatever documents we have redacted or kept
classified. They would then issue an unclassified public report on
their findings. - me

”-

The effort required to declassify the documents related to
the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
However, it is an important program, and both the Director and I
are personally committed to: making it work. Even in this time of —
diminishing resources within the Intelligence Community, the
Director has allocated 15 full-time positions to expand the History
Staff and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the
JFK documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent

—to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what —

remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is
against this background that, in response to the committee's
request, I cite our few technical reservations about the mechanism
established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I
intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will

13-00000

defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems

- posed by the joint resolution. '

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to
whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released
to the public is inconsistent with the-Director's statutory
responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, we-are concerned that the joint resolution contains
no provision requiring security clearances or secure document
handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

; Third, we are concerned that the joint resolution does not

_ provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release

of CIA information contained in documents originated by
Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
Board without any review by the President or other Executive
Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for
agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive
Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for
meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of

material at one time.

10

13-00000

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which
outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a
document, makes no provision for postponing release of
documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and,
in fact, are not likely to arise with respect to factual information
directly related to the JFK assassination, they would be -
unavailable under the joint resolution in the rare case that they —

might be needed.

These are technical problems that we believe can be solved
in ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents
bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy.

But, again, whatever the future course of this legislation,
CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the
relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate
fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the
President to declassify all of this material.

11

13-00000

a :.
SECRE

Central intelligence Agency

Washingfon. D.C. 20505

OCA 2157-92
22 May 1992

The Honorable John Glenn

Chairman ,

Committee on,Governmental Affairs .__
United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman: ~

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I
made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on
the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to
approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was
declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count
by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total
of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct
numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee
on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee
on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by
Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had
had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or
GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I
answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and
the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State
Department might have requested those files, but I was not
certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate
answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January
1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal
service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy
assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing
their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that
would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC
television special on this issue, which they termed
"detailed and. objective."

cL BY (2196777)
DECL OADR
DRV FM LIA 3-87

13-00000

Sree

The Honorable John Glenn

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain
access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the
Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on
this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of
correcting the public record, I suggest the following
unclassified statement:

In response to a request from the US embassy in
Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file
holdings’on Oswald. They hav@é advised us that

- they had nothing that would add to our knowledge
or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special
on this issue, which they termed "detailed and

objective.*

.I enjoyed the opportunity to testify -before the
Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful.
A similar letter is being sent: to-Ranking Minority

Member Roth.
Sincerely,

tn

Robert M. Gafes .
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

13-00000

ve . SSSCREL_

Central Intelligence Agency

Washingjon.D.C.20505
OCA 2157-92/1
22 May 1992

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member

Committee on‘ Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Roth:

I am writing to correct for the record two statements I
made when I testified before the Committee last Tuesday on
the Assassination Materials Disclosure Act.

I testified that there were 33 documents, amounting to
approximately 110 pages, in the Oswald file that was
declassified and released to the public. A subsequent count
by my staff revealed that the file actually contains a total
of 34 documents, amounting to 124 pages. I gave the correct
numbers when I testified last Friday before the Subcommittee
on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee
on Government Operations.

In addition, I was asked at your hearing by
Senator Cohen whether the State Department or the CIA had
had any contact with any Soviet officials concerning KGB or
GRU files relevant to the Kennedy assassination. I
answered that there had been no contact between the CIA and
the Russian KGB on this matter, and I added that the State
Department might have requested those files, but I was not
certain. At the time, I believed that that was an accurate
answer. I have since discovered, however, that in January
1992 an Agency official did ask the new Russian internal
service (MBRF) for any information related to the Kennedy
assassination. The Russians advised us, after reviewing
their file holdings on Oswald, that they had nothing that
would add to our knowledge or to the 22 November 1991 ABC
television special on this issue, which they termed
"detailed and objective."

CL BY 2196777}
DECL OADR
DRV FM LIA 3-87

13-00000

_

The Honorable William v. Roth, Jr.

To avoid disrupting our continuing efforts to gain
access to the Russian files on Oswald, the fact that the
Agency has had direct contacts with the Russian service on
this topic must remain classified. For the purpose of
correcting the public record, I suggest the following
unclassified statement:

In response to a request from the US. embassy in
‘Moscow, the Russians have reviewed their file
holdings on Oswald. They have advised us that _
they had nothing that would add to our knowledge
or to the 22 November 1991 ABC television special
on this issue, which they termed "detailed and

objective."

I enjoyed the opportunity to testify before the
Committee, and I hope that these corrections prove helpful.
A similar letter is being sent to Chairman Glenn.

Sincerely,

Robert M. Gates
Director of Central Intelligence

cc: Senator Cohen
Senator Boren
Senator Murkowski

13-00000

™
The Honorable John Glenn

The Honorable William V. Roth, Jr.

SUBJECT: Corrections on DCI Testimony before the Committee
on Governmental Affairs

OCA/LEG/SMDunne:me/37916 (21 May 1992) OCA 2157-92

Distribution:
Original ~ Addressees
- DCI
- PpDCcrI
- ExDir
- DDO
- D/OCA
~ D/CSI
- C/DCI History Staff
- ER
- OCA Records
- Leg Subj File
~ SMD Signer File
- SMD Soft File

PRP BPP PPP PPE PE

13-00000,,

:Seiator ae

John Glenn

IMMEDIATE RELEASE: Contact: Jack Sparks (202) 224-5635
May 12, 1992 Leonard Weiss (202) 224-4751

News Release

Statement of Senator John Glenn
Chairman, Senate Governmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on
S. J. Res. 282, "The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act" -
May 12, 1992

The bill before us today, S.J. Res. 282, is the
"Assassination Materials Disclosure Act of 1992." The
legislation was introduced by Senator David Boren and Senator
Arlen Specter. An identical bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives by our colleague, Representative Louis Stokes.

The legislation would require the government to release
records to the American public which are "relevant to the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy." The bill would
establish an independent review board within 90 days of
enactment, and this board would work as quickly as possible to
release the records to the public through the National Archives
and the Government Printing Office.

The bill creates a strong presumption on releasing
documents. The onus will be on those who would withhold

documents to prove to the Review Board and the American people _.

why those documents must be shielded from public scrutiny.

It is also important to stress that the legislation does
not authorize, any official investigation of the assassination.
Its only purpose is to create a process by which the American
public may be given the most complete access to review relevant
records, and make their own observations and assessments. The
Committee's work and the hearing today is likewise limited to
this purpose.

This bill is the result of a climate of suspicion and
distrust that has grown over the years regarding the official
explanation of the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a
climate nurtured by many books, articles, television programs,
and the recent movie "JFK." Disclosure of information is the
only reliable way to maintain the public trust, and dispel
distrust. Those of us who knew President Kennedy personally and
remember where we were when we learned of President Kennedy's
assassination must exercise our responsibility to the next
generation of Americans, whose historical knowledge of the

13-00000 |

4a

assassination of President Kennedy will be significantly
improved by the release of these records.

Ironically, it was President John F. Kennedy who first
required scheduled declassification in the release of Executive
Branch national security information. Declassification schedules
remained in effect until President Reagan eliminated the
requirement in 1981, and President Bush persists in this same
practice. It is likely that more government documents related to
the Kennedy assassination could have been released over the past
12 years if declassification was still a priority. It is also
fair to say that the 1986 amendments to the Freedom of
Information Act, including broad law enforcement exemptions,
have narrowed the release of Kennedy assassination records by
the FBI. ;

The public interest in the history of the assassination
of President Kennedy has been insatiable. In one noted
bibliography, a total of 5,134 books, articles, reports, films,
or television programs were produced on the subject between the
years 1963 and 1979. The Library of Congress has over 250
holdings on the subject. The FBI continues to receive reports,
allegations, and requests for further investigation. Indeed, as
Director Sessions may testify today, the FBI has recently
located and interviewed two of the three "hobos" who were
identified as witnesses of the shooting, as well as seven Dallas
police officers who were not previously interviewed by
government investigators.

The speculation about the assassination of President
Kennedy maybe more cruel than the truth itsélf. It is arguable ©
whether the disclosure of new information will dampen the
speculation, but I hope that the breadth of information made
available will answer many questions and provide many history
lessons.

I view the Committee's mandate as determining whether the
process for review and release of the records is fair and
appropriate; and that exemptions, when needed, must be kept to a>
minimum. The Department of Justice has told the Committee that
it will recommend a presidential veto of the bill as written. I
hope we can find a way to construct a process for release of
assassination related records that will be efficient and
effective, will gain the confidence of the public, and will
address concerns of the Justice Department that are legitimate.

The authors of the bill are to be congratulated for
working quickly to propose an independent and accountable
mechanism to release records related to the assassination.
However, we must carefully consider the parameters of the bill.

I believe that the major issues include:

13-00000

«

:

rf

First, how will agencies and others who hold records
define the universe of “relevant” Kennedy assassination
materials? It is important to be able to go beyond the frame of
reference of previous inquiries of commissions and committees,
but the question must be asked: Where will the search for
documents end?

Second, the definition and search for "relevant
assassination material" also raises important questions of human
resources and costs to organize and make material available to
the Review Board. How much will this cost?

Third, what is the best mechanism to govern the review
and release of records in an independent, accountable, and
credible manner. The tension between management and public
confidence in the process cannot be overlooked. However, it may
be important to simplify the process. The bill proposes a
five-member Review Board, with an Executive Director and staff.
Are we creating a Rube Goldberg machine, or are these layers
necessary?

Fourth, we must ask why the bill, which acts in the name
of openness in government, also exempts the Review Board from
the Government in the Sunshine Act, the Freedom of Information
Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, and judicial review?

Fifth, is the issue of standards for postponement of
disclosure. I strongly believe that the government should
practice disclosure of information as the rule, unless there are
demonstrable reasons for protecting the information. It is
important to emphasize that while hundreds of thousands of pages
of material will be released, the bill contains national
security and privacy exemptions, and withholds personnel and
administrative records relating to past official inquiries.

I personally believe that the agencies and the Congress,
which hold Kennedy assassination records should not wait for the
passage of legislation, and the resolution of all issues in the
bill, before releasing documents. It is my intention to move
legislation through the Committee as quickly as possible, but
regardless it will take time for whatever authority is created
in statute to become assembled, establish procedures, and begin
its work. We will hear today how ready key agencies and
congressional officials are to release their records. If even
some of the material can go out the door without further
adjustments, then let's give the public access now. The review
board or whatever authority is created will certainly have the
opportunity to face the more difficult issues shortly
thereafter.

Today we are fortunate to have several experts and
authorities to discuss these issues. These include the authors
of the legislation, as well as the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and the Director of the Federal Bureau of

-3-

13-00000

. ‘v

Investigation. We are grateful to have our other witnesses as
well. Among them is attorney James Lesar, President of the
Assassination Archives and Research Center. Mr. Lesar's work
represents the track record on public access to Kennedy
assassination material under the Freedom of Information Act. He
will speak to the nature and limitations of current access
arrangements. We also have two prominent twentieth century
historians, Professor Ernest May of Harvard University and
Professor Athan Theoharis from Marquette University. Each
possess extensive experience regarding the federal records of
the intelligence and. federal law enforcement communities. We
welcome all of you to the Committee.

2 armen So. nn oe

-4-

13-00000

on

Te phe os cel coment PRATT

Uk ferent th” Ng

Me as

SUGGESTED AREAS TO TO BE ADDRESSED IN aes ‘LANGUAGE
{IF NOT ADDRESSED IN THE TEXT OF THE RESOLUTION)

1. Initial Review of assassination materials. It
should be made clear that section S of H.J.Res. 454, which
requires that records not provided to the Archivist for
public disclosure be made available to the Review Board
within 60 days of enactment, is not intended to preclude
agencies from conducting their own reviews and making as
much information available as possible before the Review
Board conducts its review of assassination materials.
Suggested clarifying report language: .

The Committee notes that some agencies, such as the -
Central Intelligence Agency, have already begun to
review and release assassination materials. Section
S(a) (2), which requires that all records of an official.
investigation for which an agency is custodian be made
available to the Review Board within 60 days of
enactment of the Joint Resolution, is not intended to
preclude agencies from continuing any reviews that they
have ongoing and transferring documents to the Archives
for public release wherever possible. In, fact the
Committee encourages such reviews to continue inasmuch
as they can provide for more expeditious release of
assasSination materials to the public.

2. . ~ cy
documents. The legislation on its face does not necessarily
provide that the agency or department that originated the
information will have any input into a decision to disclose
the record, or will even be apprised of such a decision
after the fact. Suggested clarifying report language:

The Committee understands that existing regulations
within the Executive Branch require that classified
information originated in one agency may not be
disseminated outside another agency to which it has
been made available without the consent of the
originating agency- The Committee expects that
agencies that are custodians of records will follow
this practice before providing information to the
Archivist under section 5(a)(1) for public release
pursuant to section 4.

Section 5(a) (2) requires agencies that are custodians
of records of official investigations to make such
records available to the Review Board. The Board will
then make a determination of whether the material
qualifies for postponement under the criteria set forth

13-00000 .

~ ae

”

DRAE

in Section 7 and shall inform the custodian of records
and the originating body of the record of its
determination. The Committee expects that the Review
Board also will consult with the agency or department
that originated the information in reaching its
determination as to whether public disclosure of the
material must be postponed to ensure that it is
apprised of relevant sensitivities presented by that
information. For example, the Review Board should
consult with the relevant Executive Branch agency that
provided information incorporated into a Congressional
document before making a decision to release that
document and shall inform the originating agency of a
decision to release that information.

3. toe
. ‘Intelligence agent" is something of a term
of art that, left undefined, might not be construed to
protect information that would reveal the identity of covert
employees of intelligence organizations. Suggested
clarifying report language:

The term ‘intelligence agent" as used in séction

7(a) (1) (A) is intended to permit postponement of
release of information that would reveal the identity
of a domestic or foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence asset, collaborator, foreign
liaison contact, or covert employee of a United States
intelligence organization, where the identity of any of
these currently requires protection.

4. s w +
. <n addition to adding language to section 10(1) (1)
to clarify that requests for additional records must be made
by the Review Board itself, report language should make
clear that the Committee does not intend the Board‘s
discretion in this regard to be unbounded. Suggested report
language: .

Section 10(1)(1) provides that the Review Board may
request “any record" from an Executive agency. The
Committee intends to give the Review Board wide
latitude to determine what additional records may be
held by agencies that are relevant to the assassination
of President Kennedy. Rather than the Committee
attempting to define what records should be requested,
the Committee believes that this judgment is best left
to the Board, which will develop expertise in
assassination-related issues and documents as its work

13-00000 |

oat

«

.

proceeds. However, the Committee does not intend to
vest unfettered discretion in the Review Board to
request any and all records of agencies without regard
to their relationship to the assassination. The
Committee expects that the Board will request only

‘documents that may bear some reasonable relationship to

the assassination, and that the Board will be guided by
the principle that unreasonable risk of exposure of
sensitive intelligence or law enforcement sources or
methods is to be avoided.

13-00000

“oe F. 4 °
SECRET
HPSCI BRIEFING - JFK DECLASSIFICATION 10 April 1996

1. Nature of the records--Oswald 201, Sequestered

- Other records: Minutes of DCI morning meetings; working
files

- Third Agency documents: FBI, SSCI, Presidential libraries
2. Pages released (227,000)

- Percentage of pages redacted; 70 *%
3. Process of declassification

- Former senior officers in HRG review

- Coordination with OGC, DO (DO team detailed to HRG)

4. Standards for review in JFK Assassination Records Collection
Act, 1992

- Records related to the assassination or investigation
into the assassination

- Law provides grounds for postponement of disclosure of
records

-- “Clear and convincing evidence“ must be pre-
sented to the Board

E.g., Identity of agent currently requiring
protection

- Source or method currently utilized

- Foreign government relationship cur-
rently requiring protection ©

5. Board has authority to release records unless it agrees there
is “clear and convincing evidence” to support a postponement

- Board then has to justify on the record each redaction
with which it agrees

- Once a determination is made, Board must publish it in
Federal Register within 14 days

13-00000

gy

- Options available: substitute language e.g., “Northern
European station”

- Also, summary of a record
- Board has access to every document in full
6. Issues raised by Board's decisions:
- Problem: Board has difficulty in linking disclosure of

information that is 30 years old with damage to current
intelligence operations

- Identification of stations e.g., Helsinki /

- Names of former Agency employees who retired under cover

- Board guidelines: Protect person if retired under
cover and now residing overseas, but not if in US

- (Liaison, joint operations in Mexico: /

- Briefing of the Board by Dave _Edgeri, Jeff Smith, Central
Cover, DO desk officers, others

- Problem of accumulative effect of releases--eroding cover,
ability to conduct operations

7. Provision for appeal to the White House if we disagree
with Board's determination

- President has sole authority to require postponement of
a record or information

--President required to advise tHe Board within 30 days
of the Board's determination

-- This is published in the Federal Register
8. Current appeal (now resolved)

- Issues: identification of Agency asset
liaison relationship
identification of station

- Potential appeal: ffokyo station /

9. Additional requests of Board to review other records e.g.,
history of Mexico City station, Intelligence Community Staff
records ‘


13-00000

GET Mn

CSI 1997-552
10 December 1997

NOTE FOR: Director, Center for the Study
of Intelligence
Deputy Director
Office of Congressional Affairs

FROM: John Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

SUBJECT: JFK/Possible Letter from
Congressman Burton to EXDIR

Jeremy Gunn, Executive Director of the JFK Board, told
HRG yesterday that Congressman Dan Burton may well write a
letter to the EXDIR expressing concern about whether CIA
will be able to meet the deadline for declassification of
assassination-related records. Burton chairs the Government
Reform and Oversight Committee which has cognizance over the
JFK Board.

Gunn said that he briefed members of Burton’s staff
last week and told them he was concerned that the Agency may
not have enough resources dedicated to JFK to finish the
review of documents by 1. September 1998. Gunn showed the
staffers the recent exchange of letters between the Board
and the EXDIR on the same issue. According to the staffers,
Burton has a strong personal interest in the release of the
assassination records. The staffers gave Gunn the
impression that Burton’s strong interest will prompt him to
write to the Agency.

During our discussion with Gunn, we reviewed with him
the Agency’s clear commitment to declassifying all
assassination records. We also explained that we have
shifted four additional contractors to the JFK project, and
will shift more if necessary, even at the cost of slowing
down or stopping other declassification efforts.

John Pereira

ADMINISTRATI

AL USE ONLY

/einaletedoIPK

13-00000

{002

202 724 0457 ARRB .
ee te 8T Jee 09:17 FAL 1022022261274 DEC 17°97 17:24 No.003 P.07

DAN BURTON. OUUIA . wen a. Susromes
GENIAMIM A. GRMAN, NEW YORK am, TOM LANTOS, CAFORSMA
1. DES: sboneaR AD . . ONE HUNDRED BETH CONGRESS Seneca Toe
=a Congress of the United States 2
sete ba. YORK x
amore House of Representatives Reeourevertiaton

id w ViRCINCA = - ; CHAKA FANTAH, PENNETLVANOA
tinh €.cou0Eh, tan COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM AND OVERSIGHT Sais comet
Soret gtapeva,aicen 2157 Raveurn House Orrice Buroina pase? & Ove, «ano
STEVE G LATOURETTE OntiO SOHNE. TERRY, MARAACHUSETTS
MARSHALL “MART GANFORD, GOUTH CAROLING . y 44 TURNER, TEZAR
ZOOL Sunny, aw vaaraene Wasuineton, DC 20516-8143 THOMAS 6. ALLEN, MANE
OAck PAPRAA, MEW SERREY .. (ARCADE, FORD, dn, TENNEEBES

December 16, 1997
; CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO

The Honorable George J. Tenet. DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

Director of Central Intelligence RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION’

Central Intelligence Agency SE THIS DOCUMENT

Washington, D.C. 20505 ,

Dear Director Tenet:

{As Chairman of tho Commitice on Government Reform énd Oversight, Lhave a greet interest in
ensuring that the Assassination Records Review Board, which is under the jurisdiction of the Committee,
completes its work by its scheduled termination date of September 30, 1998. Earlier this ycar I introduced
‘HR, 1553, now Public Law 105-25, which extended tho euhorization of the Review Boned for one additional
ycar, until September 30, 1998. This one-year extension of authorization for the Reviow Board was included
in President Clinton "s fiscal year 1998 budget, and received bipartisan support in Congress.

‘consideration of H.R. 1553, 1 stated my firm intention for this to be the final extension of
authorization for the Raview Board. Accordingly, I believe that it is of utmost importance that all fedcral
agencies holding assassination records fully cooperate with the Review Board, in a timely manner, in order
that documents may bo procossed and transferred to the National Archivos, in compliance with the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-526).

oe The Reviow Board has advised ms that while it perceives that the Ceatral Intelligence Agency (CIA)
generally has been cooperative and helpful, the Board novertholess believes that the CIA is not transferring
records to tho Board at a pace consistent with the need to complete the work on time. The Board similarly
has advised that, unless it receives processed records in a more expeditious manner, it is prepared to usc its
legal powers to order a transfor of recards to the Board which would then vole to open the records without
benefit of a pre-review by the CIA. The Board has informed me that it docs not wish to take this sicp, but
date ny Prepared to do so if neoossary to comple its work by is September 30, 1998, termination

T urge you to take all appropriate steps to ensure that the CLA promptly fulfills its obligations under
hl by expen vowing and tafe te ean cr ote Rev Bou

Dan aay
Chairman

DB:jts

13-00000

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

OCA 97-1969
8 January 1998

CIA SPECIAL ©

The Honorable Dan Burton

Chairman .

Committee on Government Reform
and Oversight

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

: . J
Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter of December 16, 1997 in which
you expressed interest in the status of Central Intelligence
Agency’s (CIA) processing of records related to President
John F. Kennedy’s assassination.

You referred to the Assassination Records Review Board’s
concern that CIA may not be processing records at a pace |
sufficient to complete the work on time. I want to assure
you, as I did to the Review: Board’s Executive Director in
the enclosed November 21, 1997 letter, that the Agency is
committed to taking all necessary steps to meet the statutory
deadline of September 30, 1998 for reviewing all of the
Agency’s assassination-related materials. As the Review
Board has noted, we are cooperating fully with the Board
and its staff in this effort.

We share the Review Board’s goal of declassifying
and releasing the relevant records to the fullest extent
possible. As you are aware, it is important that there be
a proper review of all the records so that still sensitive
information that might warrant continued protection can be
identified to the Board. For the past several years a team
of experienced reviewers has been dedicated to the task
of declassifying the assassination records. Recently we
shifted several additional personnel to the team in order to

accelerate the processing of documents and assure the prompt

transfer to the Review Board and ultimately to the National
Archives.

13-00000

The Honorable Dan Burton

I understand the importance that the Congress and the
President have placed on disclosing to the American people
all available information about the assassination. To this
end, we have released more than 200,000 pages of material

' and are working diligently to complete our review of the

remaining records.
If you or your staff require any further information or
would like a briefing on our declassification program, please

have your staff contact: Mr. Jim Meehan, Office of Congressional
Affairs, at (703) 482-8796.

Sincerely,

David W. Carey

Enclosure

13-00000

ey
-

The Honorable Dan Burton

DCI/OCA/Liaison Grp/JPMeehan:dms/37976 (29 Dec 97 INTERIM)
OCA 97-1969 (FN:wdata/action/liaison/burton.doc)
Revised from INTERIM LTR (never sent) to FINAL LTR (6 Jan 97)

Distribution:
Original - The Honorable Dan Burton, HGR&OC
- EXDIR/CIA (Follow-up to SCI-97-536)
- DCI
- DDCI .
- ER (ACTION ITEM: ER 97-5851)
- DCI/OGC
- DCI/CSI
- DDO
DO/IMS
- DA/OIM
- DA/OIM/IRG
- DA/MS
- D/OCA
- AO/OCA :
- OCA Records (ACTION ITEM: A/97-05697)
- JPMeehan Chrono

PREP RPRPRP RRP PHP PEPE
\

WwW

13-00000

Mr. Chairman, I am here today at your request to provide
my views on Senate Joint Resolution 282, "The Assassination
Materials Disclosure Act of 1992," and to describe the nature of

documents held by the CIA that relate to the assassination of John

F, Kennedy. I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak on
this important matter.

Let me begin by stating that I am in complete agreement
with the purpose underlying the joint resolution--that efforts
should be made to declassify and make available to the public as
quickly as possible government documents relating to the
assassination of John F. Kennedy. We hope that opening up and
giving journalists, historians and, most importantly, the public

_ access to governmental files will help to resolve questions that

still linger over 28 years after the assassination. Further, I believe
that maximum disclosure will discredit the theory that CIA had
anything to do with the murder of John F. Kennedy.

Even before introduction of this joint resolution, I
recognized the need for greater public access to CIA documents
of historical importance. Two months ago, I announced the
establishment of a new unit within CIA that will be responsible
for declassifying as many historical documents as possible
consistent with the protection of intelligence sources and

13-00000

methods, This new unit, the Historical Review Group, in the

Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence, will review for
declassification documents 30 years old or older, and national
intelligence estimates on the former Soviet Union that are

10 years old or older. In addition to the systematic review of

30-year-old documents, I have directed the History Staff in the

Center for the Study of Intelligence to assemble CIA records
focusing on.particular events of historical importance, including
the assassination of President Kennedy. The Historical Review
Group will then examine the documents for the purpose of
declassifying the records. |

Because of high interest in the JFK papers, I am not waiting
for legislation or other agencies to start declassifying documents
belonging to CIA. The Historical Review Group, at my direction,
already has begun its review of the documents related to the
assassination of President Kennedy, and I am glad to report that

the first group of these records, including all CIA documents on

Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination, has’been
declassified with quite minimal deletions and is being transferred
to the National Archives for release to the public. This is, I
acknowledge, a small fraction of what we have, but it is an eamest -
of my commitment to begin review for declassification
immediately of this material. And, indeed, as I speak, the
reviewers are going through a substantial number of documents,
and I anticipate that many of these will be released shortly.

13-00000

AS we Carry out our program to declassify Kennedy
assassination documents, our goal will be to release as many
documents as possible. In fact, I recently approved new CIA
declassification guidelines for our Historical Review Program
which specifically direct a presumption in favor of
declassification. I believe we can be very forward leaning in
making these documents available to the public, and I have

instructed the Historical Review Group to take this attitude to ne hie ad fe
heart. | fe dy
. fordelt Bet

To understand the magnitude of the effort involved in
reviewing these documents for declassification, it is important to
place them in some context. The CIA's collection of documents
related to the assassination of President Kennedy consists of
approximately 250,000-300,000 pages of material. This includes
64 boxes of copies and originals of information provided to the
Warren Commission and the House Select Committee on
Assassinations and 17 boxes of material on Lee Harvey Oswald
accumulated after President Kennedy's assassination.
Unfortunately, and for reasons I do not know, what we are dealing
with is a mass of material that is not indexed, is uncatalogued, and
is highly disorganized--all of which makes the review process
more difficult. The material contains everything from the most
sensitive intelligence sources to the most mundane news:
clippings. |

13-00000

These records include documents that CIA had in its files
before the assassination, a large number of records that CIA
received later as routine disseminations from other agencies, as
well as the reports, correspondence, and other papers that CIA
prepared in the course of the assassination investigations. I
should emphasize that these records were assembled into the
present collection as a result of specific inquiries received from
the Warren Commission or the House Select Committee on
Assassinations. I have prepared a chart that illustrates this point.

As you can see, prior to President Kennedy's assassination
CIA held only a small file on Lee Harvey Oswald that consisted
of 33 documents (approximately 110 pages), some of which
originated with the FBI, State Department, the Navy, and
newspaper clippings. Only 11 documents originated with the
CIA. Ihave brought along a copy of Oswald's file as it existed
before the assassination so that you can see first-hand how slender
it was at the time. As I have already noted, we have declassified
the CIA documents in this file with quite minimal ‘deletions, and
we are providing them to the National Archives. The records in
this file dealt with Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union in 1959
and his activities after his return in 1961. By contrast, it was only
after the assassination that CIA accumulated the rest of the
material on Oswald--some 33,000 pages--most of which CIA
received from other agencies after November 22, 1963.

ion

13-00000

You have asked about documents in our possession
generated by other agencies. :In fact, much of the material held by
CIA originated with other agencies or departments. For example,
in the 17 boxes of Oswald records, approximately 40% of the
documents originated with the FBI, and about 20% originated |
from the State Department or elsewhere. Our staffis still going
through the material compiled at the request of the Warren
Commission and the House Select Committee on Assassinations,
which ingles 63 boxes of paper records and one box that
contains 72’reels of microfilm. The microfilms in part overlap
material in other parts of the collection. We estimate that within
the 63 boxes of paper records, approximately 27% of the
documents originated with a variety of other U.S. government
agencies, private organizations, and foreign and American press.

Although our holdings do include many documents from
other agencies, we nonetheless have a substantial collection of
CIA documents that will require a considerable effort to review
and, as I said earlier, at my direction, this review for
declassification is now underway. A preliminary survey of these
files has provided us some indications of what they contain.
Although the records cover a wide variety of topics, they
principally focus on CIA activities concerning Cuba and Castro,
Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, and Oswald's subsequent
activities in Mexico City and New Orleans. They also include a
large number of name traces requested by the staff of the House

13-00000

Select Committee on Assassinations, as well as material relating
to the Garrison investigation and Cuban exile activities.

The CIA cannot release a number of documents unilaterally
because of the limits in the Privacy Act (which protects the names
of American citizens against unauthorized disclosure), the
sequestration of many documents by the House Select Committee
on Assassinations, and the fact that many of the documents
belong to agencies other than the CIA. However, we have already
taken the necessary steps to lift the sequestration, coordinate with
other agencies and begin the process of declassification. If
necessary, I will ask the House for a resolution permitting CIA to
release the results of the declassification effort on the sequestered
documents,

While I expect a large amount of material can be
declassified under our program, I assume that there still will be .
information that cannot be released to the public for a variety of
reasons, including privacy concerms or the exposure of
intelligence sources and methods. Let me take a moment to give
examples of this type of material. During the investigation by the
House Select Committee on Assassinations, I understand that
security and personnel files were requested on a number of
Agency employees. These files contain fitness reports
(performance evaluations), medical evaluations and credit checks
on individual CIA officers. Although irrelevant to the question of
who killed President Kennedy, these and other personal

6

13-00000

documents ultimately ended up in the sequestered collection of
documents. I do not believe that the benefit to the public of
disclosure of this information outweighs the clear privacy interest
of the individuals in keeping this information confidential.
Similar privacy concerns exist with documents containing
derogatory information on particular individuals where the
information is based on gossip or rumor. Our files also contain
names of individuals who provided us intelligence information on

_ a promise of confidentiality. We would not disclose their names

in breach of such a promise. Where we cannot disclose such

. information to the public, the Agency will make redactions and _

summarize the information in order to ensure that the maximum
amount of information is released while still protecting the

identity of an agent or the privacy of an individual,

If legislation is not passed by Congress and signed by the
President regarding the JFK papers, to enhance public confidence
and provide reassurance that CIA has not held back any
information relevant to the assassination, I will appoint a panel of
distinguished Americans from outside of government to examine
whatever documents we have redacted or kept classified. They
would then issue an unclassified public report on their findings.

The effort required to declassify the documents related to
the assassination of President Kennedy will be daunting.
However, it is an important program, and I am personally
committed to making it work. Even in this. time of diminishing

7

C2

poe

13-00000

resources within the Intelligence Community, I have directed the
allocation of 15 full-time positions to expand the History Staff
and to form the Historical Review Group that will review the JFK
documents and other documents of historical interest.

I believe these actions attest to the seriousness of our intent

to get these papers declassified and released, and to open what

remains classified to outside, non-governmental review. It is
against this background that, in response to this Committee's
request, I cite our,technical reservations about the mechanism
established by the joint resolution to achieve this same result. I
intend to address only Intelligence Community concerns; I will
defer to the Department of Justice on any additional problems
posed by the joint resolution.

First, vesting in an outside body the determination as to
whether CIA materials related to the assassination can be released
to the public is inconsistent with my statutory responsibility to
protect intelligence sources and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution contains no |
provision requiring security clearances or secure document
handling by the Assassination Materials Review Board or its staff.

Third, I am concerned that the joint resolution does not
provide the Agency with the opportunity to object to the release
of CIA information contained in documents originated by

13-00000

Congress or the Warren Commission. Under the joint resolution,
documents originated by these entities can be released directly by
the Executive Director of the Assassination Materials Review
Board without any review by the President or other Executive
Branch agencies.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day period for
agencies or departments to appeal decisions by the Executive .
Director to release information may not provide sufficient time for
meaningful review of what could prove to be a large volume of
material at one time,

Fifth and finally, section 6 of the joint resolution, which
outlines the grounds for postponement of public release of a
document, makes no provision for postponing release of
documents that may contain Executive privilege or deliberative
process, attorney-client, or attorney work-product information.
While such privileges could be waived in the public interest and
are not likely to arise with respect to factual information directly
related to the JFK assassination, they would be unavailable under
the joint resolution in the rare case that they might be needed.

he

These are,technical problems that I believe can be solved in
ways that will, in fact, expedite the release of documents bearing
on the assassination of President Kennedy.

13-00000

But, again, whatever the future course of the legislation,
CIA is proceeding even now to review for declassification the
relevant documents under its control. Further, we will cooperate
with any mechanism established by the Congress and the
President to declassify all of this material.

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13-00000

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TIONS

arose Dy 4 May 1992

TABULATION OF PAGES IN THE col ne-assassrentio FILE:

P~)

Pages Date D ription.

6 Mar 64 Note-slip on DECLASSIFIED version held in NARA

30 Jan 76 CIA transmittal sheet, with NARA's query of 15
Jan 75 on deleting #s.

6 Mar 64 DD/P transm sheet, re NARA's holding.

6 Mar 64 Helms Memo to Rankin, describing file contents.
6 Mar 64 Copy of above, with Helms note to Rankin.
31 Oct 5 tate Cable from Moscow to SecState.
" Redacted copy of same.
lL Nov 59 Press clipping
2 & 4 Nov Notes on Oswald & Papich (FBI) query
2 Nov 59 on Sv Despatch, £r Moscow to Dept
9 Nov 59 . tate Cable, Moscow to SecState

* Redacted copy of same
9 Nov 59 metas Cable, Tokyo to SecState
. Redacted copy of same
16 Nov 59 Press clipping
26 Nov 59* Press clipping
25 May 60 Cover Memo fr Dir Hoover, FBI, to Helms
12 May 60 Attachment to above :
12 May 60 FBI report, fr Dallas
25 Oct 60““Sstate (Cumming) to Helm, listing US defectors
' Redacted copy of same
3 Nov ‘60 ~~ DD/P Bissell to State (Cumming)
Redacted copy of same .
18 Nov 60-—~Cover Memo (internal) to DD/P, to accompany
; draft reply to Cumming
undated - ~Handwritten descrip of letter cited above
21 Nov 60 ~ —Cover letter, Bissell to Cumming, on US’
defectors
Declassified version of Oswald info from ff
List of US defectors attached to Bissell letter
18 Nov 60 Memo fr Horton, acting C/CIS, to Bissell
21 Nov 60 Second copy of Bissell letter and list, above

9 Dec 60 2 copies of redacted request to set up Oswald
201.

11 Jul 61 Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept ;

26 May 61 copies of Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept

13 Apr 61 eptState Instruction on Oswald citizenship.

and passport (signed Rusk)

26 Jan 61l~—>State MemCon re Oswald

" Redacted copy of same

13 Jul 61 Cover letter to Helms fr Hoover, plus several
FBI reports, much of which is illegible

28 Sep 61 Short bio of Marina (redacted), for inclusion
in Oswald 201

13 Oct 61—-Fon Sv Despatch, Moscow to Dept, covering
copies of four Oswald letters to Embassy Moscow

7 Dec 61 Form fr INS to DD/P, asking for any derog info
on Oswald

SECRET.

13-00000

“Ses

1 3 Mar 62 Note saying Navy message of this date is
missing from CD 692 sent from Archives

5 26 Apr 62 Collection of Navy Memo to Hoover/FBI plus
Navy, USMC, and press items

9 7 Sep 62 Hoover to Helms, plus report fr SAC/Dallas

2 ” Redacted pages from above

7 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas

3 24 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from New Orleans.

3 10 Sep 63 FBI field report on Oswald from Dallas

(apparently different from above)
2 8 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with page from New Orleans
; report
20 7 Nov 63 Hoover to Helms, with a lot of bio data on

Oswald, plus Fair-Play-for—-Cuba stuff
20 25 Oct 63 FBI to INS, New Orleans, with much of material

above -
5 14 31 Jan 64 Report, not really contemprary with this file,
agart® entitled: “Information Developed by CIA on
, the Activity of ...Oswald in Mexico City..,"
Aon 28 Sep--3 Oct 63
Le 14 " Redacted copy of same

13-00000
ag

_ Theoharis -~ Appendix A

CIA HAS NO OBNECTION
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR _ Va : olan
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT “Mr. DeLodth —_
Mr. Mohr
oo Mr. Wick =
~ ; _Me. Casper —___
; . : Mr. Callahan
June 14, .1966 Mr. Conrad
. ija Mr. Felt
ii a
(4 Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ——
MR, TOLSON: Mr. Tavel
a . Mr. Trotter
Air a Y Tele. Room f
: Justice Fortas returned my call of midday, Miss Holmes ——4_
6/13/66, late last night. I told him that I wanted to see him Miss Gandy
about a matter which he might consider bordered on a violation ES ots
of judicial ethics. He was told that I had been able to discuss ae
AN) tters in confidence with him on several other occasions, i.e.,
thy Jenkins case, boyfriend, and other items which

Mr‘ Hoover had me handle with him, and that I therefore felt that he
wouldn't mind if this matter was brought to his attention.

Ns 6 00 Se 3 fe
Fs The Black case was then brought up and he was told that
although he had disqualified himself, he might not desire to discuss this
matter, Justice Fortas replied that he would be glad to not only discuss .
this matter but any other matter with me on a confidential basis at any time.
He then asked me to have breakfast with him at 7:45 a.m. this morning.

Upon seeing the Justice in his home for breakfast, we

preliminarily engaged in small talk and eventually got down to the meat

of the problem, I gave him a complete rundgwn on the exchange of corres-
pondence that the Director had had with Katzenbach. He,was told specifically
.of Katzenbach's evasive tactics in attempting to defend Bobby Kerthedy.

I then mentioned the Black case and told him that while the Director planned
to furnish the Attorney General specific, honest, hardhitting answers to the
Supreme Court's questions, we nevertheless knew that Katzenbach would
throw our answers out the window and present his own slanted version to

the Supreme Court. Justice Fortas agreed. :

Justice Fortas stated that the entire matter boiled down to a.
continuing fight for the Presidency. He stated that Kennedy was of course
out to capture that segment of voters which in the past had belonged to .
Vice President Humphrey. He mentioned that Kennedy, to a certain extent,
had succeeded in capturing this left-wing group. He added that of course if
facts, as possessed by the FBI, concerning Kennedy's approval of wiretapping
were made known to the general public that it would serve to completely.
destroy Kennedy. .

—s
—

-40

CDD:amr .-
(2) 4" CONTINUED..... OVER

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

Justice Fortas spoke of the Black case. He stated that after
Solicitor General Thurgood MarShall had ineptly and inadequately presented

.the matter of electronic devices to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court

|

had held a confidential meeting among themselves. Although Justice Fortas
and Justice White disqualified themselves, they still attended the meeting.
At the meeting it was decided among the Justices that rather than remand
the Black case to a lower court, the Supreme Court would set itself up as a
tribunal to gather further information concerning the usage of electronic
devices and afterwards make a decision. The Justices, with the exception
of Byron White, felt that if the case was immediately remanded to a lower
court Attorney General Katzenbach would, in order to win the case, pick his
own Judge and thereby attain victory. Justice Fortas stated that some of
the Justices in the Supreme Court were somewhat belligerent in their attitude
towards Kennedy and Katzenbach. He stated these men would not be "pushed

around" regardless of the politics involved.

Justice Fortas stated that the problem at hand was to determine
how the FBI's irrefutable evidence exposing Kennedy and the Department in
‘their clear-cut authorization for usage of microphones could be gotten to the
Supreme Court and to the people. I showed him at this point several memo-
jranda taken from the file, including the New York telephone memorandum
which Kennedy had signed. He stated that there was no doubt in his mind

-|but what the FBI acted in a complete, above-board and honest manner at the

_| Specific urging of Kennedy and the Department. He then stated that he fully

recognized that Katzenbach would only slant any reply the FBI. I gave him in
answer to the * questions posed by the Supreme Court.

After some deliberation, Justice Fortas stated that he thought
{the best thing to'do would be for him to slip in the back door and see the
President. He stated he would tell the President all of the above facts. As
an aside, Justice Fortas asked me if the President had been aware of the
exchange of correspondence pertaining to the Director and the Attorney

|General, I replied that the Director in all fairness and in order to protect

|

the FBI, had definitely advised Watson and the President. The Justice
replied that this was good, however, he felt that the President would want
to know his opinion as a result of seeing it from the Supreme Court.

He then stated that his plan of action would serve to protect
the President and the FBI and could spell "back seat" for Katzenbach and
Kennedy. He mentioned that he would recommend to the President that the
President should immediately call Katzenbach in his office and tell him that

CONTINUED..... OVER

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

he was very greatly concerned about this entire matter and that, in order
for honesty and justice to prevail, an arbitrator should be set up who would
listen to all of the evidence and then furnish a complete report to the
Supreme Court. Justice Fortas added that naturally the arbitrator would

be someone whom the President could trust to furnish the absolute true facts.

He stated the next problem would be to find this particular
man. He said he had in mind somebody like’Ken Royall, former Secretary
of the Army. He asked me what I thought of him. I told him I naturally
had heard Mr. Royal's name, however, Mr. Hoover would have far better
judgment on this matter than I would. He next stated that perhaps someone
like Ross Malone? ‘former President of the American Bar Association, would
be good in this regard. I told him that we had enjoyed very favorable
relations with Mr. Malone. Justice Fortas then mentioned that there was
an immediate past President of the American Bar Association, from the State
of Virginia. I told him he probably was thinking of Lewis Powell. He stated
this was correct. He asked me what I thought of Powell. I told him that
Mr. Powell had generally concurred with Mr. Hoover's beliefs concerning
crime, however, on occasions he had been somewhat naive and a little weak.
Justice Fortas stated that he thought Royal or Malone would be the best man.

Justice Fortas told me that he would take the above action
immediately. He stated he was going to Jacksonville, Florida, today; however,
he would try to talk to the President prior to his departure---if not, he would
discuss this matter with the President Thursday morning, 6/16/66. I told
him that time was growing short inasmuch as the Supreme Court wanted an
answer almost immediately. He stated this was true and that, as a matter
of fact, once the arbitrator was appointed all of his facts would have to be
gathered and furnished to the Supreme Court within two. weeks. He stated

dhe thought this could be done. . °

Justice Fortas told me that he wanted to mention another

j? subject. He stated that he had already taken steps to disqualify himself in

|| the Hoffa case. He mentioned that the Black, Baker and Hoffa cases would
be continuing cases which would go on for many years. He asked me if I
‘knew of any irregularities on the part of Bobby Kennedy in connection with
the Hoffa case. { replied in the affirmative, stating that Kennedy on one _
occasion had specifically asked an FBI representative to place a microphone
on an attorney by the name of Haggerty. I stated this action had been taken
despite the fact that the FBI had not wanted to do this. Justice Fortas replied
that he had felt that such might be the case and that under the circumstances

CONTINUED..... OVER

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

he would sit with the rest of the Supreme Court on the Hoffa case and would
make certain that Kennedy was exposed. He stated that he felt that the
Supreme Court would definitely confirm the decision of the lower court in the
Hoffa case. He mentioned that this opinion had been expressed to him by the
other Justices.

employee by the name of Courtney Evdns. I told him that I did know Evans.
He asked if I knew of Evans' association with Kennedy. I told him that we
were well aware of this relationship. I then briefed Justice Fortas completely
concerning Evans. I told him of the statements made by Edward Bennett
Williams with respect to the fact that Kennedy planned to use Evans as his
“ace in the hole."' I told Justice Fortas that Mr. Hoover had instructed me
| to call Evans in and to show him approximately eight memoranda which had
previously been prepared by Evans. Justice Fortas was advised that Evans
! ! had been told that he had not only prepared but approved such memoranda and
4 that we demanded to know if the facts as he had given them at the time of
| preparation were as true now as they were then. I told Justice Fortas that
| Evans had affirmed the truthfulness of these facts and had sadly indicated,
"Facts are facts and can't be changed." I also told Justice Fortas that we
had specifically asked Evans if Bobby Kennedy had been furnished information
|from microphone coverage in the Black case. The Justice was advised that
Evans had admitted that he had frequently briefed Kennedy in this regard.
The Justice was told that we next inquired of Evans whether or not Kennedy
knew that such information came from microphone coverage and that Evans
jhad replied that there was one specific occasion in which Kennedy specifically
: ‘could have inferred that the information could only have come from microphone
coverage,

| Justice Fortas next, inquired if I had known a former Bureau

Justice Fortas asked if the President knew of Evans’ background.
| I told him that apparently the President did not know this. It was further
mentioned that Evans was currently employed by Katzenbach, obviously at
the urging of Kennedy. Justice Fortas replied that this was-the worst news he
had received since Bobby Kennedy's urging that the Viet Cong be allowed to
sit down at the conference table. He stated that the President should definitely
‘be told of this fact. He then mentioned that several members of the Supreme
Court are well aware of the background of Evans as well as the background of
such characters as Sheridan, Bellino, and other henchmen of Kennedy's.

CONTINUED..... OVER

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

. At this point, I told Justice Fortas of the memoranda in which
the Director in 1963, at the specific request of the President, had furnished
the President concerning Bellino, et al., and that the President had the
following day dismissed these individuals from employment at the White

+ House. I mentioned that Kenny O'Donnel! had immediately advised Bobby
Kennedy, and Bobby Kennedy had had Ed Guthman issue a direct threat to
us in connection with this matter. Justice Fortas stated this was typical
of Kennedy.

Justice Fortas next made reference to the decision handed
dawn by the Supreme Court yesterday in connection with confessions. He
stated that he sincerely hoped that the Director and the personnel of the FBI

J would pay close attention to the conclusion of the statement by Chief Justice
Warren wherein the Chief Justice clearly implied that the FBI was a model
agency for all law enforcement to follow. Justice Fortas told me that he
wanted the Director to know that following Thurgood Marshall's inept and
stupid presentation to the Supreme Court regarding the general matter of
confessions, he, Justice Fortas, had been instrumental in instructing
Thurgood Marshall to specifically return to the Department and ascertain
exactly how the FBI handled the matters of questioning of subjects, arraign-
ment of subjects, confessions, etc. He stated that Marshall therefore, as a
result of such action, had found it necessary to submit such procedures to
the Supreme Court. He stated on this basis, Chief Justice Warren had no
alternative but to pat the FBI on the back.

‘Justice Fortas inquired as to the Director's opinion concerning
Ramsey Clark. I told him that the Director of course had enjoyed a very
favorable friendly relationship with Justice Tom Clark for many years and
that the Director had also enjoyed a fairly favorable relationship with Ramsey
Clark, however, not anywhere near as close as the friendship with his father.
I told ‘the Justice that the Director had received information pointing oui that
despite the fact Ramsey Clark was known as a "Johnson man," he nevertheless
could see no wrong in Bobby Kennedy. Justice Fortas stated that he felt
Ramsey was a good man but young, naive and one that constantly looked down
into the deep waters and could see no wrong in anyone. He stated that Ramsey
Clark was a "dreamer." Justice Fortas then inquired as to whether or not
there are any loyal Johnson supporters in the Department. I stated that the.
Director had mentioned on a number of occasions that perhaps the only one
who could be declared a loyal supporter of the President's was Ed Weisl, Jr.
The Justice expressed no surprise. He stated he thought this to be the case.

CONTINUED..... OVER

15. V ‘ .

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated
once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an “arbitrator.
He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding
this matter.. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to get in .
touch with him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interest should be
protected. He reminded me that the President had great faith in the Director
and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found ourselves in a
position where we could not protect ourselves. He also stated that while the
President had issued specific statements concerning wiretapping and usage of
electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that the FBI had to have the
advantage of such devices in order to adequately handle its responsibilities
both in the security and criminal fields. He stated the President's only concern
had been his opinion that there were too many electronic devices in the political
field. He stated we of course were not guilty of such practices. He stated he
recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the
usage of microphones and electronic devices had been brought about as a result
of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He stated he deeply resented the fact
that Bobby Kennedy had thrown his former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, ,

Internal Revenue) to the wolves in connection with these matters. ,

ae
‘

xv
an
ACTION: (1) Pursuant to the Director's instructions Twill advise Marvi <

Watson today of the background and current employment of
Courtney Evans.

(2) If the Director agrees, I will advise Justice Fortas that
the Director is of the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best.

_man to serve as an "arbitrator."

WM, . > ) RESPECTFULLY,
- _ ) | ( ° BURZ —< -
i —h ;
A. Jj - Fo <8 “yy D. DE LOACH
. / . | YF : ‘ Ne !
6 pod mo ee os

IY Ch foover )

13-00000

2

pec oF THIS ;
4-760 (Rev. 12-14-88) REI . X0Q0GKX

Lo y) . XOUAKK

7 ~ P.0.0.9.0.0.4

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FOIPA DELETED PAGE INFORMATION SHEET

‘

28 Page(s) withheld entirely at this location in the file. One or more of the following
~~~ statements, where indicated, explain this deletion.

(1 Deletions were made pursuant to the exemptions indicated below with no segregable material
available for release to you. .

Section 552 Section 552a

C7 (b)(1) O) (bX7)(A) 0) (4X5)

D (x2) DO (x78) DO Gx2)

D (x3) DO wx) D wa)
O wr) Dae)
O xe) D «3
DO wr) aya)

BKOOS O xe) D1 Kxs)

D (x5) =) Owe)

DO (xs) ery

(1 Information pertained only to a third party with no reference to you or the subject of your
request.

0 Information pertained only to a third party. Your name is listed in the title only.

CyDocuments originated with another Government agency(ies). These documents were referred
to that agency(ies) for review and direct response to you. -

Pages contain information furnished by ‘another Government “agency(ies). You will be
advised by the FBI as to the releasability of this information following our consultation
with the other agency(ies).

Page(s) withheld for the following reason(s):

(© For your information:

yy The following number is to be used for reference regarding these pages:

[s- b/s5 — 25 2b

SCHGOOOCIOOCOCOOOOKICK
. X DELETED PAGE(S) X

XOOOKX . X NO DUPLICATION FEE X
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FBI/DOJ

13-00000

>
o

QO Wal \ 19990 4S)

SECURITY Inp-~May La siteee
ee eee 7 oO :
_ Theoharis -- Appendix C ; '

Hareh 16, 1953

L

P-RSOWAL AND CCYPIDENTIAL

NEMORARSIUM 7CR THE ATTORNEY ONN RAL

ECLASSTY1= SRSc)

one nT ie 53 OT,

In connection with a possible unauthorized

leak of official Government information, it is believed
destrable to Institute a technical surveillance of

Jenry Williamtjrunewald, a prominent figure in Washington,

I therefore recomeend that you grant authority
to place a technical surveillance on the residence of

Orunewald, Apartaent 6258, The weatchester, 000 -
carhedre 2 Avemo, N. w., #saahbington, 3. C., telephone:
#00

037008 or any other residence or office space
which he might occupy in the future.

Respectfully, | {
. a
John edgar Soover |
Cirector >
a
RECORDED +9) Gu ~ ge WF

f
?

Sd

WAR 181953 ‘cn =
P?

/ ia J The Attorney General on "February 13, 1953, requested that
*. iw we cover the activities of Grunewald and daned that aS wa
technical surveillance be instituted “on his residence.= ~

This memorandun is being | submitted in wee with the
— Attorney General's suggest on.t “ope (ee/a rh) |

. _ sECvaITY rie Ve

oa os

ee ‘gi.


13-00000

; yee .
Office Memordndum ¢ UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO 8 Mr, Tolson V/A | parz: April 28, 1953
. oe - ” fo Tole
mu L. B. Nichols als, Eerorautton COSTA TED ° Pat
: HERELY I trr1zp en
DAT BY Gosia
susyact: = Hato
TESTIMONY OF HENRY GRUNEWALD tor
KEAN COMMITTEE ole
Tole. Re
Sian
Mies Geo

I saw John E. Tobin, the General Counsel of the Kean
Committee, on Monday evening, April 27th. Tobin pointed out that
on the first day Grunewald testified in Executive session

8 was probably

e point which Tobin
stated caused him the most concern because there was such a reference in

the report of Special Agen’ dated at New York on July 20, 67.
1951, in the investigation on ; ;

Tobin ry tlined this was

pg ee .
4. Tobin stated.that Grunewald had the habit of passing
out ties at Christmas and that as late as 195) Grunewald had sent ties to:
the Director, Clyde Tolson and Guy Hotel. I told Tobin if he was inferring
that because Grunewald sent ties to these three individuals they might have
urnished him the information, that he ought to be pretty cautious because (/f,
knew pretty well what the feeling was. I told him in the first place :
the Director had not seen Grunewald to my certain knowledge for a long
period of time; the Director was not intimate with Grunewald; the Director
has not appreciated the manner in which Gwnewald has thrown the Director's

cc: Mr, Ladd RECORNEN - oY bo-G1bst J47 :
Mr. Rosen INNEYEN . 583 a a ‘¢ .


13-00000

“mame around arid I had my serious doubts whether the Director had ever
seen the ties and I was certain the Director never reviewed the file on
With reference to Mr. Tolson, I told Tobin that Mr. Tolson
was one of the most conscientious individuals in Washington and that
certainly Mr. Tolson would not engage in any such activity. Thirdly,
aie all he had to do was look at the record so far as Hottel was concerned;
at that a few years ago, Hottel was primarily responsible for leading to

. Grunewald's downfall when he was hiding out from the Senate District
Committee.

poo Tobin was making quite a point about how Grunewald
« *. could have gotten the information. I told Tobin categorically I had
reviewed the files on the five individuals he had mentioned and that I
was absolutely certain Grunewald did not get any information from. the
IBureau. I further told him that with reference to the information on
Grunewald was a fairly good i jgator and it would have been

. -
Ve
a

ng

ATe

pu
record; that one of the first things an investigator would do in the investi-

t gation of ,4 lawyer would be to check on his admission to the Bar and
aa e Committee; that anybody could have. gotten this.
“h ether he had any information to the effect that
& ‘assisted Grunewald in the investigation. He stated

I told hit undoubtedly

i s in the Department for many

Nc | years ; in the Department. I asked whether
‘ pbe had any information indicating vas close to McInerney.

— a

13-00000

, The matter boiled down to the fact he was primarily
I concerned about fi I told him the investigative reports on
ent to the Attorney General and Vanech on November 9, 1951;
Congressman King on August 9, 1951; photostatic copies were given to
G-2 on December 26, 1951, and that the Attorney General requested a
summary of our files on February 28th; that a summary memo was

furnish AG under date of February 29th
and He then inquired as to why G-2 would wa ormation.
[x told him I could not answer this, but would endeavor to ascertain the

answer.

I asked him if he had any indication as to when Grunewald
made his investigation, He stated it was shortly after the time when the
committee first started checking on Grunewald, which would be in
November or ‘December, 1951,

I further told Tobin a reputable news source had inquired

regarding (J ana stating he had heard there were a
‘couple of Communists: on the staff and that the evidence was: supposed to
be on the Director's desk. I told him obviously that was not the case
and it would”appear that the newspaper source was merely calling us to
let us know what was being circulated around town, but obviously we

| furnish¢d.’ information; that there was some indication from the source
that had been helping Grunewald and SR =: be in contact
with icInerney. ; ;

‘
°

.I told him he was at liberty to.

do so.

I told him I would check for the reason why G-2 wanted
the information and let him know, which is being done. .

=

13-00000

- ff In my conversation with Tobin, he advised that there was
+ tnforagtion over in the Senate stmilar to that furnished by Grunewald.
= << a8ked hin- where in the Senate d tt cane out of Senator .
i: MoCarran's Office. Inasnuch a toid that a member 0

o. the Ki tttee had told the Senator about

"9 A think tt might be well the next tine I see
4, | to entially tnquire aa to whether she recalled what member of
é the Comatttee furnished then this tnformatton.

I, of course, see no potnt in talking to
any further about this matter,

a
”

-4-<-

13-00000

——_ —- — a

cc Hr. Ladd

—. fir. Rosen
oe : ir, “Malley.
a b ir. Pennington
; wo . oo . . |
we The attorney General t 20 2 LG n, May 13,,1953
se ae, 6s--
abate? & S* PSGRSOMAL AND COMP AL
" Director, FBI Con. vn TAS 7 r 7 ERREOUAL AED COMERS
oe? . _ JUNE . Fe .

RENRY WILLIAM GRUN:AALD

INFORMATION CONCHREING ssrrzep BY |
| mays py Sie )
at

The following information concerning Henry Willian */, H
Grunewald was obtained by a confidential source of known iad
reliability on May 11, 1953.


13-00000

a ene ae

1 The attorney General

to,

.

; Complete details cenzterning the fnlernatioa developed
in connection with tne request or Reputy Atteraey General _Ragers
wlll, of course, be Puraished to hin gpon- ihe ‘complet Lon ut the
lavestigutlon of thess matters. ;

HOTS:

Tnis is a condensed version of infornmuticn received from
the Washington Field Office which has been set forth in as readable
form as possible for the information of the Attorney General.

It is to be noted an attempt nas deen made to furnish tne attorney
Gensral with only pertinent information which appears would be of

interest to aim. a

13-00000

__ Theoharis -- Apendix B _.

; (5) ‘Buresn file 67-322 alec reflecte that, in april 1929 929, the Dureau
eonducted an investigation entitled, “Willian H. Vander Poel, Henry H. Grunewald,
Application for Commission in officer's zeserve Corps.* It le note noted that
Vander Poel had served as an agent of the Boreat of Investigation during ie: werld
War I. At the tine of the investigation, both were sesking to ebtain a ocm-
mission in the United States army. The Bureau's Lavestigation reflested that |
Grunewald was not trastvorthy, pessessed a bad reputation and had been indisted

. for wiolation of the National prohibitien ict, although he wus act convicted

of this offense. This information wes furnished to the Military Inteliigmes .
Bervice ty semorunda te the Departaent dated xay 6, 1929» ant Bepteaber 29, 2979.

nee me ae ——— TT,

!
j

te
v > vio

\

WD

=

V

T. yearly, Seeretary to the President, the Bureau conducted an investigation in:
June and July, 1%40, entitled, “Harry H. Stake Henry william Grunewald,
also know as Henry Gruenwald, Frederish Wilkela be oad Booed Oevatweldy,
Misconduct in offies, Espionage." Mr. Early's wes baped on allegations
ar. cer.
effect that G dus genator Gerald P.
Kye and tha bad told that
Grunewald, on tro ecca yi secretary a ¢ ‘in the oun of
$4000 for Senator Hye. It was alleged that Grimewald had intimated this money
cane from Secretary of War, Harry H. Woodring and that the money was paid in
eonnaction with war Departaent megotiatioms. ‘On dune 25, 1940, the Bure
received a mmorandua from the Military Intelligence Servise reflecting that
wr. Saith ¥. Brookhart mat inrorned that Serviees that he had learned through |
alleged employee of the ‘Prensh-English
Service is 1917-1918 that the sven of Baxi esplomage in Washingten, 8. C., was
Froderieh Kilbele Crusemld, also knom as Neary Willies
.Spartaente, ashingten, B.C. It is aoted that Bepomelé te

residing in the Westchester apartments and during 1937 and 2 Pa he
Grunewald shared offices with Nebonsld and former senater arthur BR. Redinsoa,
din the Munsey Dulléing, Washingtoa, D. ¢. (1) ce .
(1) 65-6165-3

89.2965 227

13-00000

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

At the conclusion of our discussion, the Justice reiterated

’ once again the action he planned to take with the establishment of an "arbitrator."
He stated that I should keep in touch with him on a confidential basis regarding
this matter. He also stated that I should not hesitate in the future to
touch him concerning any problems in which the FBI's interes

‘protected,. He reminded me that the President had great faith
and the FBI and that in many instances we undoubtedly found

position wheré.we could not protect ourselves. He also statéd that while the

President had issued specific statements concerning étapping and usage of

electronic devices, he nevertheless realized that BI had to have the

advantage of such devices in order to adequately Handle its responsibilities

both in the security and criminal fields. He st4ted the President's only concern

had been his opinion that.there were too electronic devices in the political _
field. He stated we of course were Bin of such practices. He stated he

recognized this and he also recognized that the entire hysteria concerning the
usage of microphones and electronic, evices had been brought about as a result
of Bobby Kennedy's brash practices. He’ stated he deeply resented the fact
that Bobby Kennedy had thrown ‘former partner, Sheldon Cohen (Director, ,

Internal Revenue) to the wolves“in cognection with these matters. — va
. . Sf fi} u\ *
ACTION: (1) Purs to the Director's ‘instructions IT will adviee Marvin ¢°
. Watson today of the backgreund and current employment of
Courtne Evans.

(2)- tt the Director agrees, I will vise Justice Fortas that
the Director is-6f the opinion that Ross Malone would probably be the best
man to serve’as an “arbitrator.”

/

ml -RESPECTFU Y,

\

I* CHoover)

13-00000

JOHN EDGAR HOOVER > ; - . teem
WARECTON Se i. Be om
ose . ge of an nd Bs Papen .

cen aot Po. vom
SPP get oo illite Bae
 : iashtepton, Be. “ites Peirpnates
: tm, Oenen
_ Mig 2, 1942 | _— — Ore Comee
. Ott. Deerten
: a <= ke ee
bi 0 Sw
Wols. Gren
MEMORANDUM FOR mH DIRECTOR “Ces Bove
ate, maase ;
With further reference te Henry -usaaie bruno ’ alates
dn whor we are present J am attaching a memorandic. fates Genty

For your eporovel € there ds attached hereto a letter
for the ittorner General'!s Sicneture, to the Secraterr of the
Tre:


13-00000

_ T..c 4uvestigation in this mtter, which was closed July £A20,.
gegtasy that the original allegations were apparently based on surmise and wus pdoton
aie (= end not on any definite knowledge of: the cosplaincnts, “FYyaither the conditions

<° -allered aor any irregulsrity on the part of Grunew:ld Or former Secretary of

*. Yar Woodring were discovered, ‘There was ao evidence developed that Grunenald |
:- was engaged in any activity for the German governaent. The result of the in-
~ Nestigation in semorandua fora were Suratshed to ur. Early oo July 9%, 2940. ay

“. (7) Bureau fils 65-6165 ‘also reflects that in kay, 2941, the Military
. Intelligence Service advised the Burean that information had been received by
one of its informants that Grunenald was the pay-off man for German agents in
the United states and ws also contact man for various American peace and sub-
worsive organisations. Subsequently, the Bureau ascertained that the informant
of the Military Intelligence Service uas and it was
2 AD felt that the Kilitary Intelligence @ was merely resurrecting old in-
as tb formition in view af the fact that the ‘Bureau had previously investigated the
at i een sane allegations mde However, on a May 23, pitts a technical sur=-
5 KAnNe” veillance of Gronevaldws a rised and from June 4, 1941 through August 1,
A 2942, such survatllianse ws maintained on his epartment on the tiestohester
Apartments. “jo definite; information was developed, indicating that Crunesald
had violated any specific Pedsral statute. (2)

(8) Bureau rite 65-6165 reflects ‘that on Septeaber 15,°1942, the Omaha -
office of, the Bureau received a compleint fron the Military Intelligence service
thet Henry tilliam Grunewald bad, on the previous evening, civen $110.00 in
currency to tro privates attached th Service Commnd,
while

wr AC . were drinking at a ber in
b the Fontenelle Hotel in Omaha. The two Privates were then engaged in studying -
(No dntelligence work, and. becouing suspicious of Crunewald's apparent generosity ~
‘*it.; his mo d the matter to the Omaha Office. They Indicated that

approximtely
her purse in order

000 in her purse, money was 0
to furnish currency to Grunewald to pase out to the grou.

;
Grune.ald wat interviewed by two Agente of the Onsha office on

September 15, 1942, regarding the antter and he identified himself as being —
connected with the Alien Property Custodian's offiee in washington, D. 6., by

oY . exhibiting travel authority §5¢, signed by Janes B. Uarkham, of the Alien

. MEE | i: Property Custodians Office in Tashington, De C. Grunewald claimed to receive

ig ee TERY per year es salary fron the alien Property Custodiants Office. He adzitted

5 passing out money promiscuously in the bar and stated that-he gid not ro the .

‘e-- matter reported to his superiors in Washington although be was willing to —

ce" furnish information about the ineident Sone dent ty: ae fle "stated

(1) 65-6165<8 oe a
~(2) 65-5165-225 65-6165 Subd 1, serial 1 ‘to 9 22" toe

a


13-00000
Serial i ais Out. : - 6) |

Subject_HENRY WILLIAM GRUNEWALD

This serial, the original peporandum from the FBI to the
Attorney General dated_.3/1 *_, which was
returned to the Bureau signed by the Attorney General

authorizing FBI to conduct electronic surveil

; lance, has 2 .
. .been permanently removed for retention in the 7
er memorandum
or details and where maintained. ;

i

n

Removed By__ 343 Date 1/21/74

Complete File and Serial Number 65-6165-124

Wai slole SY epeapla

f2-27-39 SpSsa pr

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(carat tome SE a ee i ee ay. ce
i” jeomncn Rogue of Kean Comal ttos’ o Ser Saasy Ws tomnemd

“AY Lee te awe re ete a
Bs ; + .jEnclosed 40 0 eopy of a lettar dated April 7, 3953,
“.. . * .J@hdef Counsel of the Zouse Subcommittee on Administration of the
-  , ‘“@levenne Laws, requesting peruission to faspect the Imaigration anf... -
. a eee eee etre ile arene wate cee mel files relating to Reaxy ¥-
wee dpoaeeel pureas of Suvectigutdone tn Ties Of Sten Property and the
» “[rederel Barvan of Investigation ;

«sage Yuntgretion unt Seturalisation Service Sites ant ‘the Alten
‘Property files have been obtained and will be made available, minus any
“FAI reports, in accordance with policy. es .

Advice would be spprectated ubsther the Bureat bas a pe recone]
11s on Grunewald, and, if 50, wbsthar the Burean would have ary objection
to making it available, minus any investigative reports, for éxamination
a -{tby a Subcomlittee representatives. If ths Bureau has such a file and no °
objection to its examination, please advise ubether the Bureau would pre-

. SST uae fo eee so et

; this ice.


13-00000

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

14 May 1992
Note For: David Pearline, OCA

Subject: Suggested Qs & As for Hearing on JFK Assassination
Documents

(Dave Gries suggests additional Qs and As along the following
lines)

Q. Many of the Oswald documents transferred to the National
Archives earlier this week were said to have been in the
Archives previously . Is this correct ?

Ans. Yes, but most of the documents were originated by
other agencies, and we were not aware of what those agencies
had previously released.

Q. There appears to be little information of interest in the
Oswald file that was released. Is this true ?

Ans. Yes this is essentially accurate. But the objective
in transferring the file was to demonstrate our good faith
commitment to release as many documents related to the
assassination as possible, and as expeditiously as possible

John Pereira
x (76160;

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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’ rtt-rw’ TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-M a ce
a0639 ne ren
11:22 05-15 a SO

BC-TEXT-ASSASS INATIONS-MULTITAKES
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE. GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
- Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination.Materials Disclosure Act
of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
Location: Rayburn Building, Room 2154
, Time: 10 a.m. - —
May 15, 1992
KKKKK
The editor of the report is Steve Ginsburg. Tim Ahmann, Eric
Beech, Peter Ramjug and Paul Schomer also are available to help
you. If you have questions, please call 202-898-8345. For
service problems inside the District of Columbia, call 202-898-

8355; outside D.C., call 1-800- 537- 9755.
RKKKK

KKKKK
This transcript is provided by News Transcripts, Inc. If

questions of content arise, call 682-9050
KKKKK

ROBERT GATES (director, CIA): Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

I'm here to provide my views on House Resolution -454,---

the assassination materials disclosure act of 1992. I very much
appreciate the opportunity to appear before the committee, just
as I did before your colleagues in the Senate last Tuesday.

I can summarize my statement, I think. It is largely
the same as the one I did earlier. Let me just say, as I have
said, that I'm in complete agreement with the effort to
underline the joint resolution, that is, the effort to
declassify and make available to the public as quickly as
possible government documents relating to the assassination of
President Kennedy.

Further, I believe that ‘maximum disclosure will
discredit the theory that CIA had anything to do with his
murder.

I have undertaken a number of efforts at CIA to
accelerate the declassification of historical materials,
creating a new organization to do that. It will be classified,
or review for declassification, all documents over 30 years old,
‘and Soviet estimates up to 10 years ago.

I've asked them to take as their first priority the
review for declassification a review of the documents relating
to, the assassination of President Kennedy. And we have
proceeded with that, without waiting for legislation.

And I've indicated earlier this week, we've
declassified the first set of these records, the pre-
assassination Oswald file. And these have now been transferred
to the National Archives for release.

13-00000

>

. ; It's a small fraction of what we have, but I want to
do it right away as an earnest of our intention to move on, to
declassify these documents and to get them before the public as
quickly as possible.

I've also made publicly available this week the
agency's new guidelines for historical review and
declassification. _

~in—connection-with these guidelines T have recently
commissioned a task force to review agency procedures under the ;
Freedom of Information Act. I've instructed this task force to
ensure that our internal FOIA procedures are consistent with the
approach that I've described for historical declassification._.

Although the task force will have to explore the
difference between current documents and those that are often
requested under FOIA, and 30-year-old documents placed under
historical review programs, my intention is to bring to the FOIA
process a much more positive attitude toward declassification
and the release of government or CIA records. ~~

The chart that: I've brought along with me describes
the nature of CIA's collection of documents, about 250,000 to
300,000 pages of material. And I.don't need I think to go into
any further detail on that.

As I indicated, only. about 11 of the pre-assassination
documents belong to CIA, and we have released those, and as I
did earlier in the week, brought along that file simply to show
how thin it was before that time.

It was only after the assassination that CIA
accumulated most of the documents that it had; 33,000 pages on
Oswald alone.

There has been some comment on the pre-assassination
Oswald file, and how little it contained. I want to reemphasize
that this pre-assassination material is but the first -----
installment-of ali the material we will review; merely an
earnest of our intentions.

. All of the assassination-related documents we have
will be reviewed for declassification, and we will transfer the
declassified documents to the archives as they are completed
without waiting for work on the entirety to be completed.

Mr. Chairman, you have asked about assassination
materials that may be held by other intelligence community
agencies. The FBI will describe its holdings separately, which
I assume include both intelligence and law enforcement records.

The National Security Agency and the State
Department's bureau of intelligence and research report after a
preliminary search that they have identified a relatively small
amount of material responsive to previous inquiries by the
Warren Commission, the Church committee, and the House Select
Committee on Assassinations.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which did not come
into existence until 1961, has identified no assassination
material to date, and it anticipates that any holdings it might
have would be minimal, because its mission at the time of the
assassination focused on foreign military order of battle.

I've indicated in my statement for the record that CIA
cannot release a number of documents unilaterally, because of
limits in the privacy act, which protects the names of Americans
against unauthorized disclosure; the sequestration of many
documents by the House Select Committee on Assassinations; and

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the*fact that many of the documents belong to agencies other
than CIA.

However, we've already taken steps to lift the
sequestration, to coordinate with other agencies, and to begin
the process of declassification.

As I indicated earlier-in the week, if necessary, and

—— in the absence of legislation, I will ask the House or

results. of the declassification effort on the sequestered
documents. And I hope that we can work together, Mr. Chairman,
to remove any obstacles that might arise in releasing the
sequestered documents.

I also have indicated in my statement for the record
that I assume there will be some materials that cannot be
released, for a variety of reasons, including privacy concerns,
or the exposure of intelligence sources and methods.

And let me again-take a moment to give an example of
this type of material. -—-

During the investigation by ‘the House Select Committee
on Assassinations, I understand that a number of security and
personnel files of CIA employees were requested. These files
contained fitness reports, or performance evaluations, medical
evaluations, and credit checks on individual CIA officers.

Although irrelevant’ to the question of who killed
President Kennedy, these and other personal documents ultimately
ended. up—in the sequestered collection of documents. I do not
believe that the benefit to the public of the disclosure of this
information outweighs the clear. privacy interest of the
individuals in keeping it confidential. —

Similar privacy concerns exist with documents
containing derogatory information on particular individuals,
where the information is based on gossip or rumor. bee ee

Our files also contain the names of individuals who ,
provided us intelligence information on a promise of
confidentiality, and we would not release their names in breach
of such a promise. |

Where we cannot disclosure such information to the
public, the agency will make redactions and summarize the
information in order to ensure that the maximum amount of
information is released while still protecting the identity of
an agent, or the privacy of an individual.

As I told your Senate colleagues earlier in the week,
if legislation is “not passed by the Congress and signed by the
president regarding these papers, to enhance public confidence
and to. provide reassurance that CIA has not held back
information relative to the assassination, I would appoint a
panel of distinguished Americans from outside of government,
perhaps including former jurists, to examine whatever documents .
we have redacted or kept classified.

And they would then issue an unclassified report on
their findings.

I believe that these actions attest to the seriousness
of our intent to get these documents declassified and released,
and to open what remains classified to outside nongovernmental
review.

It is against this background that I cite our few
technical reservations about the mechanism established by the
joint resolution to achieve this result.

5

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vO : First, vesting in a body outside--in an outside body
the determination whether CIA materials related to the
assassination can be released to the public is inconsistent with
my own statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods.

Second, I am concerned that the joint resolution
contains no provision requiring security clearances or secure ;

-——decument—handLing-by—the— assassination materials review board or
its staff.

Third, I'm concerned that the Joint resolution does
not provide the agency with the opportunity to object to the
release of CIA information contained. in_documents. originated. by.
the Congress or the Warren Comniission-

Under the joint resolution documents originated by
these entities can be released directly by the executive
director of the assassination materials review board, without
any review by the president or the.executive branch.

Fourth, the joint resolution provision for a 30-day
period for agencies and departments to appeal decisions of the
executive director to release information may not provide
sufficient time for meaningful review of what could prove to be
a large volume of material at one time.

Fifth and finally, Section 6 of the Joint Resolution,
which outlines the grounds for postponement of a public release
of the documents, makes no provision for postponing release of
documents that may contain executive privilege, or deliberative
process, attorney-client or attorney-work product information.
While such privileges could be waived in the public interest,
and in fact are not likely to arise with respect to factual
information directly relating to the assassination, they would
be unavailable in the joint resolution in the rare case they
might be needed. oo

These are technical problems, and I believe they can
be. solved in ways that can expedite the release of documents
bearing on the assassination of President Kennedy. But again,
whatever the future course of this legislation, CIA is
proceeding even now to review for declassification the relevant
documents under its control. And further, we will cooperate
fully with any mechanism established by the Congress and the
president to declassify this material.

That concludes my summary of my statement, Mr.

Chairman.
KKKKK ve
KKKKK
The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing
May 15, 1992
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BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS-1STADD .
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT —

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act
of 1992
-Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992
(First. Add). _
KKKKR

x X X Mr. Chairman.

REP. JOHN CONYERS JR. (D-MI): Thank you very much,
Mr. Gates. We appreciate your statement. And I only have a
couple of observations.

Putting them altogether, I'm interested in how much
material has been destroyed by CIA that we may never know about?
Why"the Lee Oswald file was opened at the CIA-i4-months after
his defection. Was Oswald in fact a Soviet spy? And was that ~
picture in his file that was thought to be him, was that an
‘error? Or was there something involved in that that you can
shed some light on?

ignorant, Mr. Chairman, I I don' t know the answers to any of those

GATES: Well, at the risk of appearing yet tess ff)

questions. But I will take them for the record and respond
quickly to the committee.

REP. ‘CONYERS: Well, thank you so much.

We're here against the background of history and the
fact that this is the murder of the century. A president of the
United States, sitting president. And I thought it was
exemplary of the CIA--I never thought I'd be saying this this
morning, either--to find out that you had permitted your
representatives to discuss the subject, matter with various think
tanks around the city, one of which was included was the
Institute for Policy Studies, whose cofounder is Marcus Raskin.

And I was told that there was a very candid exchange .-
about this subject matter which was the purpose of the meeting.
Some dozen or more of your representatives were meeting with
‘them

And I think that that is a very healthy sign of the
times. I never thought it would happen, so I never thought I'd
say what I am saying today.. But one of the parts of that
discussion was that Oliver Stone, the producer of the movie, has
been parading around the country saying that you will not meet
with him. |

And as a conciliatory member Of this Congress, could I
facilitate such an arrangement so that it would help relieve the
confusions and the disturbances of a lot of people, since he

5

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has, as a result of this movie, become apparently an expert on
this subject?

GATES: Mr. Chairman, I would characterize him as a
self-styled expert on this subject. I am no expert at all. I
think I have moved very far in the direction of releasing these
documents, as you indicated at the outset of the hearing. I
——-think that—the--ageney—has—in-many_ways seta standard in terms
of its willingness to release these documents, and our
determination to do so whether or not there is legislation.
Frankly, I find that the allegations contained in:
the--that I have been told about in the movie; I have not seen
it--are offensive to the agency, and to the American government,
and to a number of people who were in office at that time from
_the President of the United States on down, President Johnson on
down. -
It-is not entirely clear to me what particular purpose
would be served by a meeting between myself and Mr. Stone.

REP. CONYERS: “Can you tell me about the sympathy and
understanding that you may have for the American people's
confusion and differences of view about whether Lee Harvey
Oswald was alone the sole assassin of the president?

GATES: Well, my view, and it's a very personal view,
Mr. Chairman, is that--and I have never made a study of the
assassination; I have not read the many books that have been ~
written about it--but my personal view is that the enormity of
the event and the sense of tragedy that the American people
- felt, and still feel, over that event, is so great that the idea
of a single individual, a single irrational individual,

committing an act of such enormous historical consequence is. wee cere erm

enormously difficult to--for thém €6 accept at face value.

And in many respects, it is similar to the continuing
controversy over the assassination of President Lincoln, as more
than 100 years later we still read books about conspiracies. and
so on in that respect.

And by the same token, and with all due respect to his
memory, there doesn't seem to any similar kind of controversy
about the assassination of President McKinley.

And so I think it is the inability of a lot of people
to accept such an irrational act with such enormous consequences
that has contributed to this. And I think that the--one of the
concerns that grows out of this film is not that people accept

it at face value but rather than particularly young people who

may not read much history and may not read the reviews and may

not read what historians have to say that is critical about the
movie, but come out of it with the sense that there is some fire

in all that smoke; that he may not have it right, but there must
have been some sort of conspiracy.

And I've had, as I indicated to you the other day, I
had a conversation about this with a distinguished United States
Senator who had sent some of his smartest young staff out to see
the fiotey , and they came back and the reaction was not that they
accepted what the movie said, but their concern that their
government had in some way been involved. And frankly it was
that more than anything else that prompted me to decide that it
was imperative to get these documents out and try to dispel the

C

13-00000

suspicions that had been created.
REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much. “Mr. Schiff.

REP. STEVEN SCHIFF (R-NM):: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, Director Gates; I want to thank you for
appearing personally here. I know that you have a heavy
schedule,-and I'm-sure-all-the-members-of the committeé do” *
appreciate that.

I have just a few questions, but I do have a couple of
observations on your statement. The first is, I do not know
personally whether Mr. Oliver Stone who testified before us at
the last hearing is a real expert on the assassination of
President Kennedy, or as you suggested a self-styled expert.

I do know this, though. I do know that it's because
of his movie that members of the Congress of the United States
are discussing this matter publicly with the director of the
CIA. .And I'm quite- positive that his movie has caused all of
that. to happen today, (pnd I personally give him the credit for
that.

Second of all, I note your observation that there is
not a lingering conspiracy theory involving the assassination of
President McKinley. To your knowledge, anywhere in the
government, your. agency or elsewhere, are there any documents or
information which for any reason are not being released with
respect to the assassination of President McKinley?

; GATES: Well, I can't speak to that from direct .
knowledge, Mr. Schiff. But I will say that since it predated
CIA's formation by 47 years, I imagine not.

REP. SCHIFF: Well, you see, I think that's_the .. ----
central point here, is that there is--I'm not sure we'll ever
resolve all the questions about the assassination of President
Kennedy. You are correct that we have not resolved alli the
questions about the assassination of President Lincoln. On.
national TV I saw a program recently suggesting that John Wilkes
Booth did not actually die as suggested, and gave, reasons for

a
: But the difference between the assassination of
President Kennedy and these prior terrible assassinations in our
country's history is, this is the one situation where the
government, for whatever reason, and-for whatever circumstances,
still holds information which it considers to be confidential.

And that's the root of this controversy now, and
that's the root of this hearing, I think. :

And I made a note of items that you as director of the
CIA would consider to be still--to still warrant confidentiality
today. ‘And I made notes of three. If there were more, I
apologize that I missed them. I'm not talking about the
procedures , which you made observations about, and which I think
you'll find the committee willing to discuss with the executive
branch.

But three classifications of records. The first is
personnel records involving, I gather, government agents,
perhaps CIA agents, fitness reports and credit reports, first of
all.

Second of all, the privacy issue because government.

#

13-00000

files often accrue totally unsubstantiated information which can
be fairly characterized as gossip, but which do get into the
files when a total investigation is done; and third, where we've
made a specific promise of confidentiality to a particular

informant.
Before I ask you about ‘those three, can I just ask,

are there any other areas of documents that you_as director of oo wu.

-- the CIA believe should not “be reléaséa in terms « of a generic
category like these?

GATES: No, I would only include in the protection of
sources also the protection of intelligence methods. But I
think you've captured it.

REP. SCHIFF: Let me just go back on each of these
briefly. —_ ;
On protection of personnel records, why would those _
have gotten--I understand what you're talking about. I think we
all do matters where there is internal monitoring of your own -
agents, which I understand is a necessity at times, why would :
those records have gotten into the assassination records on
President Kennedy? Why are they mixed in there, do you know?

GATES: I don't really know, Mr. Schiff. I think, as
I understand it, from the materials that were prepared for me, a
great deal of documents were swept up in the material that is
kept, and as my statement indicates, I don't think I read this
part of it: These files contain everything from the most:
mundane newspaper articles, which are obviously not classified,
or shouldn't be, to the most sensitive intelligence sources.

And so I think it's just a hodgepodge. As I also”

indicated, part of the problem that we have in going through ------------ 7

these documents - -is that they afe not indexed; they are not
catalogued; and they really have no organization to them.

So when I started asking some months ago what was in
the documents, what did we have, it actually took quite some
time even to perform a survey to get some kind of idea of. what
kinds of records were in there.

But I assume that these kinds of- ‘things were just

swept up with a lot of other material.
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The Reuter Transcript Report “”
Assassinations/hearing (first add)
May 15, 1992

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THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act
of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992

(Second Add)
RKKKK —_——

x x x other material. 7 ——
; REP. SCHIFF: Well, let me go on to one of the other
categories, and that is, where the government has given a
promise of confidentiality, the government ought to keep that.
Can't the information be released without revealing the
informant? Because I think it's the information that is desired
here, not necessarily the-identity of who provided it.

GATES: My own view, Mr. Schiff, is that that should
be the case in almost every instance.

REP. SCHIFF: Finally with respect to intelligence
methods, I understand that there's a national security point. ....-..-
there. But we are also talking about 30 years ago,
approximately.

Are our intelligence-gathering methods so unchanged in
30 years that you believe that revealing how agencies gather and
collect and evaluation information would present a national
security risk today if revealed? " .

GATES: Well, first of all, if an intelligence method
is no longer in use, then I think it no. longer--and there's
little prospect of it ever being used again, I see no reason to
protect it. e ;
I think here again, though, that the focus should be
on the information provided by these sources and methods, rather
than the identification of the sources and methods themselves.

The only reason I would seek to protect them is in
‘those instances in which those techniques are still being used,
or we think there is a good chance they will be used again.

With respect to sources, I think that we have a much
longer standing commitment to protect them. But again, I'm
prepared, either under the legislation, through the board that
would be established, or in the absence of legislation, through
an outside panel, to let people who are not in the intelligence
business review any of that material that we had held back to
see that we had justifiable reasons for doing so.

REP. SCHIFF: So your overall position, Director

9

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Gates, is that everything that can be released should be

released?
GATES: Absolutely, Mr. Schiff.
REP. SCHIFF: Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman. ee _ eee
REP. CONYERS: Thank you, Mr. Schiff. “
The chair recognizes Mr. Thornton.
REP. RAY THORNTON (D-AR): Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.

And thank you, Director Gates, for a very forthcoming
and positive testimony before this committee. _I think that it
is important to emphasize that we share an-interest in 7
disclosing all of the information related to the substance of
this without jeopardizing the capacity of your agency to conduct
its business. ___

And in fact, Section 6 of the proposed resolution says
that disclosure to the general public of assassination material
or particular information in assassination material may be
postponed if its release would--and there's a whole list--but
among that list is, if an intelligence source or method which is-
currently utilized or reasonably expected to be utilized by the oe
United States government is involved.
And Director Gates, I believe that you're telling us,

and I want to ask you directly, that if the standards that are

. contained in this resolution were adopted, and the CIA's records
as you have suggested they should be, were released, with those
safeguards, do you believe that any sensitive sources or methods
would be revealed or compromise by the information which is oe
released?.:.----'-

GATES: I think that the provisions that provide for
the protection of sources and methods and that allow us
ultimately the president to have the final say. would provide
adequate safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: The protections in the bill for
intelligence-related information then are sufficient?

GATES: Yes, sir. I've’indicated in my testimony we
would. ask the Congress to consider I think two additional
categories of information. I mentioned executive privilege, or
deliberative process. Attorney-client kinds of information.

Again, we think that there would be very little
information that would be withheld under those circumstances,
but without mentioning it, that recourse would be denied.

The second is, I think it would be useful to pick up.
on the same protection that the Congress has granted in separate
legislation in terms of not revealing the names of covert
employees of U.S. intelligence agencies.

REP. THORNTON: I appreciate ‘those suggestions. But
in summary the release of the CIA records in accordance with the
general outline contained. in this resolution would not damage
any current CIA operations; is that correct?

| 0

13-00000

GATES: .No, sir, not in keeping with those safeguards.

REP. THORNTON: I know, Director Gates, that you've
recently released, as you told us, some materials regarding
Oswald. Can you make a commitment here to promptly release all
of the files about the CIA's operations against Fidel-Castro in

__._the_late_.'50s. and—early- +.60s8?--.—----—. >

GATES: We certainly--the files concerning Operation
Mongoose, AMLash (phonetic), and so on, are included in the
documents that will be reviewed in the--

REP. THORNTON: That was my specific followup question

as to whether those files would be included in the material.

GATES: Yes, Sir.

REP. THORNTON: I want to thank you again for your

-testimony:>—Like you I “have not seen the movie, and that is not
the basis of my concern. The basis of my concern is to make
sure that all of the information that is in government
possession relating to this assassination be released. Because
in addition to the movie, I believe there are some inferences
drawn by the House committee on investigations, and by the
Garrison jury, that while no showing of a government conspiracy;
that there were allusions to the possibility of an external
‘conspiracy, and whatever may have existed needs to be dispelled
by having the light of full disclosure shown upon the events of

that time.
Would you agree with that, sir?
GATES: I agree.with that totally, Mr. Thornton. ~
REP. THORNTON: Thank you. I yield back the balance
of my time.

REP..CONYERS: Thank you very much,. Mr. Thornton.
The chair recognizes Ms. Mink.

REP. PATSY T. MINK (D-HI): Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. I too want to commend the forthright position that
you've taken as the head of the CIA in initiating steps to
release. important documents that will contribute to the better
understanding of the public at large as to what exactly
happened.

I also agree with my colleagues that while the
conclusions and inferences that were part of Oliver Stone's
movie are under question, and perhaps totally negated by your
agency, they are nevertheless, the basis for the renewed
attention and concern as to exactly what happened on that day. -

And therefore, it seems to me appropriate that the
chair of this committee asked you to direct your attention to
the content of that movie, because what we need now is an
informed basis upon which to look at it.

I happen to have seen it, unlike some of my
colleagues. And there are a number of very troublesome
questions that the movie raises, and I am in no position to

I

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evaluate it, aS most of the people in the country. And
therefore, the disclosure of these documents are extremely
important.
Looking at your testimony, Mr. Gates, I notice that
you indicate that some of the documents: which are relevant to
this inquiry cannot be released by the CIA because they are in
fact documents which belong to other agencies.
_--—_. ——-.- —-Would-yeu--comment- on-that-and clarify that particular” ~
statement in your testimony?

GATES: Yes, ma'am. In the course of the post
assassination investigations, a great deal of information was
shared among the agencies. For example, in the 17 boxes of
Oswald records that we have, approximately 40 percent of those
documents originated with the FBI, and were simply made
available for information to CIA.

About 20 percent originated with the State Department
or other agencies, immigration and naturalization and so on.

Under the third~agency rule, it is our_obligation to
leave it to those agencies to declassify their own documents. We
cannot do that, and by the same token, they exercise the same
practice with us.

REP. MINK: Now, would the legislation that we are
considering now make it possible for your agency, as the
custedian of records that you have been given by other agencies,
be included in your own disclosure? Can we make that possible?

GATES: I don't think the legislation would do that,
Mrs. Mink. I-think that it would simply require those other
agencies to undertake the same steps that we are in terms of
reviewing for declassification the documents that they .
originated.-...---
we don' t hold. the record copies of those documents. We
simply have copies of them.

RP MINK Now, in the materials that you have volunteered for
disclosure, with reference to Oswald, how much of the materials
in your possession, therefore, had to be excluded because they
were documents that your agency had been provided by other
governmental agencies?

GATES: Let me answer, and then check with my
colleagues to make sure I got it right, in this very thin file,
of the 34 documents, I think only 11 were originated by CIA. My
impression is that the others had all--belong to other agencies
had all already been declassified. That's correct. :

REP. MINK: So that we have the total file with
reference to Oswald now in the public domain?

GATES: The total file that CIA had in its possession.

REP. MINK: But you just said that all the other
agencies have also already declassified, meaning that they are
part of the public domain, and cannot be obtained, if not
necessarily voluntarily released by those agencies, are now
available public documents?

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GATES: T don't know whether that s the case or not.
only the documents that we had from them have been released as
part of the file we released. They may have other documents
pre-November 22nd, 1963 that we didn't have.

REP. MINK: In other words, in reference to Oswald
everything that you had in your possession, regardless of
whether it belonged to other agencies, ‘bécauSe you found them to
be declassified, have all been released?

GATES: That's my understanding, yes, ma'am.

REP. MINK: Now, there is a:Washington Post article of
May 14th which suggests that the materials that have been
disclosed with reference to Lee Harvey Oswald contain nothing
new. Is that your understanding also of the documents that you
released to the archives?

GATES: As I indicated earlier,.L am certainly no
student of this material. I do not know the answer to that

question.
KREKKK

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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (second add)
May 15, 1992

MORE

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BC-TEXT-ASSASSINATIONS- 3RDADD .
THE REUTER TRANSCRIPT REPORT =~

HOUSE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL
SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
Topic: H.J. Res. 454, Assassination Materials Disclosure Act
of 1992
Witness: CIA Director Robert Gates
May 15, 1992

(Third Add)
KKKKK

x x x that question.

REP. MINK: Does anyone in the room here from your
agency have an answer to that question?

GATES: Some of the documents had not previously been
released, so would have represented new information.

-REP. MINK: Might we know today what exactly were new
items that had not been released previously?

GATES: This is David Grease (phonetic). He is the
director of our center for the study of intelligence.

DAVID GREASE: (director, center for the study of
intelligence): Mrs. Mink, some of these documents had been
previously released. About half of those that are--originated
at the CIA.

Among the documents of other agencies that were in our
files, it's my understanding, but this would have to be
verified, that almost all of them,. if not all of them, had. been
previously released.

REP. MINK: So what consisted of new information that
the public had not already had in its ‘published files somewhere?

GREASE: Yes, I understand. We would have to respond
to you separately from that. I cannot from memory tell you
precisely which documents were new.

I do know that the new ones are not of much
consequence. They do not contain any information that is
particularly enlightening. But we can tell you after the
hearing what those are.

REP. MINK: Can you explain a second, if the CIA had
been alerted by the State Department by a cable dated October
31st, 1959, with respect to Oswald's defection, why the CIA did
not open a file until 14 months alter?

GATES: I don't think we have the faintest idea, Mrs.

4/4

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“Mink.

REP. MINK: There was no policy in effect in 1959 with
reference to persons who publicly announced defection to the
Soviet Union?

GATES: I just- don't know. _

REP. MINK: Has there been any inquiry made within the
agency to determine that 14-month lapse?

GATES: I don't believe so.

GREASE: We did attempt to contact people who might
have been involved at the time, and that largely failed, and in
addition, we gained no information. We don't know.

REP. MINK: Now, I don't know the basis of this
conclusion in the news article, but it indicates that the
materials that were turned over to the National Archives, did
not indicate that they were originals, unexpurgated originals,
as the article says, that the materials turned over had been
altered, revised, in some way by the CIA before they were
released to the archives. Is that a-true statement?

GREASE: It is not correct to say that they were
altered or revised. Our effort was to furnish the file that we
had. That file contained copies of original documents.

Therefore we thought it appropriate to furnish precisely what we
had.

What might be characterized as alterations by some by
us are redactions of the kind of material that Director Gates
has described to you, meaning some numbers, some names, but I
can assure you, nothing of any consequence.

These are Privacy. Act considerations and things of
that nature.

REP. MINK: Mr. Gates, one final question: In your
testimony you indicated that you did not support vesting in an
outside body the determination of whether CIA materials related
to the assassination can be released to the public, and to agree
to that would be inconsistent with your statutory
responsibility. —

I take it, then, that you oppose the provisions in
this bill which call for such vesting in an outside body?

GREASE: Frankly, my own view is that the provisions
that provide that the president can have the final say, normally
I would not shift to the president my burden for protecting
sources and methods. But it seems to me that, given the unique
circumstances of this case, it seems to me that that is one part
of the bill that we could find a way to work around.

REP. MINK: Then is it not somewhat inconsistent in
your testimony in saying that if this bill didn't pass and
didn't become law, you would appoint a panel of distinguished
Americans from outside the government to do the exact same
function for your agency?

[5

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GATES: No, matam, what I would appoint that panel to
do is examine all the redactions that we had made, and to
examine all of the documents that we decided could not be
declassified, and then provide a report to the American people
on whether or not any of those redactions or those withheld
documents had a bearing on the assassination.

They would not make the decision to declassify.

REP. MINK: Now, would the establishment of such a ‘ Q) .
panel of outside experts in effect also under your definition
violate the Privacy Act?

GATES: I don't know the answer to that. I would have { 4.
to have--I would have to have our attorneys look at it.

REP. MINK: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. CONYERS: Thank you very much, Mrs. Mink. You've
touched on some very important areas. °

There are just two related considerations that I'd
like to bring to your attention, Director Gates. One is in the
Freedom of Information Act, where electronic data is a
discretionary matter with the agency, and we would like you to
review the problem with the release of CIA electronic data of
previously released requests. It's a technical point, but I

bring it to your attention for your future consideration.

And finally, with regard to the Castro records, and HEG-
AMLash and Gilverto Lopez (phonetic), it is my hope that you
will elevate those as high. up on your agenda for reconsideration Nor.

for release as soon as appropriate. There are a number of
members in the Congress that have asked me to bring this matter
to your attention as well. .-. ,Y

GATES: I think we can do that, Mr. Chairman. [

REP.-CONYERS: Thank you very much. And on behalf of
the committee, we deeply appreciate your appearance before us

today.
GATES: Thank you, sir.
END GATES TESTIMONY te
KEKKK
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The Reuter Transcript Report
Assassinations/hearing (third and final add)
May 15, 1992
REUTER
LLLEnglish

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 « Fax: (202) 724-0457

January 30, 1998 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLAS SIFICATION ANC/OR
RELEASE OF © we ORMATION
iN THIS COCUME
The Honorable Dan Burton
Chairman
' Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
2185 Rayburn House Office Building
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
* This letter is the Assassination Records Review Board's sixth monthly progress report,
- as required by the Committee on Government Reform and Oversight report on H.R.
Mas 1553 (now P.L. 105-25), that extended the authorization of the Review Board until

September 30, 1998.

At the January 22 closed meeting, the Board processed for public release approximately
3,600 FBI records, 1,000 CIA records, and 350 records from other agencies. The nearly
‘5,000 records processed by the Board is its highest total for a single meetirig.. In
_addition, the Review Board recently released approximately 600 pages of military
records regarding U.S. policy. toward Cuba from 1962-63.- Additional military records
related to U.S. policy toward Cuba in the early 1960's will be ready for public release in
the coming months.

The 710 records that the CIA made available for Review Board action at the January
meeting is the highest monthly number of records released to date. In addition, a total
of 289 HSCA documents with CIA equities were opened in full pursuant to discussions
with the CIA. Although the Review Board believes that the pace must continue to
increase, the momentum is unquestionably in the right direction. The CIA also has
advised us that it has added additional reviewers and indexers, which we believe
should help it process more records during the upcoming months. We now are
conducting weekly meetings with CIA for the purpose of evaluating the pace of the ©
review process. The CIA also has increased its progress in responding to our requests
for additional information and records. The requests that we had identified as priorities
have now been answered either in whole or in part and the CIA has shown an increased

@oanv Memaens: John &. Tunheim, Chair * Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall + William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
Executive Dirnecron: T. Jeremy Guna * Deéeuty Oinector: Thomas E. Samoluk

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The Honorable Dan Burton:
January 30, 1998
Page 2

willingness to respond to follow-up requests more quickly. While there are a
significant number of requests outstanding, the increased responsiveness of the CIA
bodes well for-the completion of these requests in a timely manner.

"Since ou our December report, the Board's FBI team has reviewed an additional 20,000
pages of records from the FBI’s HSCA files. Included in these files are the names of

individuals who have a prominent role in the history surrounding the assassination of
President Kennedy. Although this page count is higher than last month, we have
advised the FBI that the volume must return to earlier levels to ensure that the review is
completed i ina timely manner.

AsI reported i in my January 16, 1998 letter to you, all of the agencies and offices to

' which you addressed letters in December have now contacted us and pledged to

complete their work in a timely: manner. In particular, recent meetings and
communications with the Internal Revenue Service have been fruitful and provide
reason to believe that the IRS will fulfill its obligations under the law.

I would also like to take this opportunity to provide you with an update on the Board’s
federal compliance program. The State Department has submitted a draft final
compliance statement and we expect that its obligations under the JFK Act will be
completed and appropriately documented.by early March. The Joints Chiefs of Staff

has submitted its final compliance statement, and the Board has agreed that its

compliance statement is complete. The Social Security Administration also has
submitted its final compliance statement and has now received notification that its
obligations under the law are fulfilled. We continue to work with the other federal
agencies that have obligations under the JFK Act and the compliance program is
proving to be an effective mechanism to document their progress.

Again, thank you for your continuing interest in the work of the Review Board and the
support that you have provided in working with various federal agencies. Please do
not hesitate to have a member of your staff contact me if you have any comments or
questions. I can be reached at 724-0088, ext 226.


13-00000 se LU 24:03 FAA ZUZ 124 0457 ARRB . @oo2
(Ou

T. Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director and General Counsel
Assassination Records Review Board

- Prepared Statement for
Senate Govemmental Affairs Committee
Hearing on S. 712

March 25, 1998 mee

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee -- | appreciate the opportunity to
testify on S. 712 from the perspective of a person who has labored in the
declassification trenches for the past three and one-half years. Although | serve as the
Executive Director of the Assassination Records Review Board, | wish to emphasize
that I am testifying here today not as a spokesman for the Review Board, but as an
individual who has been involved in day-to-day interactions with numerous Federal
agencies on issues related to declassification. The Review Board members, who were
appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, are Judge John R. Tunheim,
Professor Henry F. Graff, Dean Kermit L. Hall, Dr. William L. Joyce, and Professor
Anna Kasten Nelson. The Board members have provided the American people
unparalleled access to information that has been held secret for more than a third of a
century. The Review Board’s official positions on matters related to declassification will
be set forth in its Final Report to Congress and the President later this year.

| applaud the efforts of Senator Moynihan, Senator Helms, and this Committee .to..-._
reduce govemment sectecy. Orie of the tragic consequences of government secrecy
has been the widely held belief that the goverment has known much more about the
assassination than it has been willing to reveal to the public. Many of the assassination ©
records that we have seen could have been opened to the public years ago without any
harm to the national security. The efforts of this Committee could go a long way to help
alleviate the suspicion of govemment -- some of it being justifiable suspicion — that has
festered since the assassination of President Kennedy. -

Because my experience comes principally from the field of declassification, ! will
focus my remarks on that area rather than discuss the very important issue of initial
classification.

|. Background

Although the word “unique” is over-used, it can fairly be applied to the work and
accomplishments of the Review Board. The Board was created by Congress in an
effort to release the government's still-secret files related to the assassination of
President Kennedy. tn accordance with the declassification standards articulated in
Section 6 of the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992, 44 U.S.C. § 2107, Pub.L. 102-526 (as amended) (“UFK Act’), the Review Board

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has opened up previously classified records from numerous agencies and departments,
including the CIA, NSA, FBI, the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Justice,
as well as the Military Services, Secret Service, Senate and House Committees, and
the National Security Council.

Under the JFK Act, agencies are required either to open assassination records in
fuil, or'to present to the Review Board proposed redactions and evidence in support of
their proposed redactions. After receiving the agencies’ evidence, the Review Board
deliberates and makes “formal determinations” as to whether the records should be
opened. The Board’s determinations have been overwhelmingly in favor of opening
racords. If an agency disagrees with the formal determination of the Review Board, its
sole recourse is to appeal the Board's decisions to the President. Thus far, only one
agency, the FBI, has appealed Board decisions. (The appeals ultimately Involved
approximately 90 records and four different issues.) After extensive briefings had been
submitted to the President -- with each side arguing why the records should or should -
not be released -- the FBI ultimately withdrew its appeals and negotiated with the
Review Board for resolution of the issues. Without exception, every formal
determination ultimately made by the Review Board has prevailed and records have
been released in accordance with Board decisions. !t has now been almost two years
since an agency has appealed a decision to the President. Thus, the Board’s work has
been a success. Although | do not consider the JFK Act to be the precise model for
future government-wide declassification efforts, it nevertheless has provided valuable _
lessons that may.be of use to you as you consider S: 712. ~ ~

li. The “Four Noble Truths” of Declassification —

In my opinion, any legislation that would attempt to have a significant impact on
the culture of secrecy must do more than articulate worthy goals and establish
bureaucratic entities to reiterate those goals. Effective legislation must address the
significant institutional Impediments to declassification. Any conscientious effort to
change the secrecy system should take Into account what | will call the “Four Noble
Truths” of declassification:

first, an independent entity, not the classifying agency, should be the final
decision maker on declassification; .

second, the independent declassification entity should be informed, committed,
and skeptical;

third, in order for declassification to be successful, there must be internal
institutional incentives to declassify information; and

fourth, the key to successful declassification is nof the articulation of the

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List of Exhibits
Statement of T. Jeremy Gunn

Exhibit A.
Cable to the Mexico City Station from CIA Headquarters, November 27, 1963.

This document was released in full after a Board vote in 1995. The second line of
typed text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) “RYBAT™ and “GPFLOOR.” These crypts
appear in the “slug line” and they are routing and sensitivity Indicators. “GPFLOOR?’ Is
the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in the first line of
the second paragraph of text. CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR could not be
released in the slug line although it could be released in the text of the cable.

Exhibit B.
Letter to the Legal Attaché in Paris from the Director of the FBI, October 12, 1960.

Subject: Lee Harvey Oswald - intemal Security.

This document was one of several records exempted by the FBI because it contained
foreign goverment information. The stamps on the page suggest that the document
was reviewed in 1977 and stamped exempt from declassification. This document was
re-reviewed in 1992 and severely redacted. The Review Board, with the assistance of
the Department of State, approached the Swiss Govemment and requested that it
consent to the release of the information. In December-1995,the document was ~~
released in full after a Board vote and with the concurrence of the Swiss Government.

Exhibit C.
Memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 31,

1964. Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba.

The Review Board located several Top Secret documents related to military

~ contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. This exhibit contains one page from a 58-
page document formerly classified Top Secret--Sensitive. The document was excluded
from automatic declassification and was unavailable to the public in any form. It was
systematically reviewed in October 1989 and the classification was continued. This
document and many similar documents were opened in full at a declassification session
in July 1997 after review by representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CIA, the
National Security Council, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

Exhibit D.
(a) Vietnam danuany-August t 1963, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. 3.

pp. 265-270.

(b) Memorandum for the Record of the Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference on
' Vietnam, May 6, 1963, Honolulu, Hawaii .

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In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara met with military advisers in the
eighth of a series of conferences on Vietnam in Honolulu, Hawaii. Part (a) of this
exhibit Includes all of the material that had been publicly ralieased on the conference
prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign Relations of the
United States) and part (b) includes the title pages of the fli 213-page Flecord [of the]
Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official File that
has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum had been
excluded from automatic regrading and deciassification and could presumably have
remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses fihal fhe document was
systematically reviewed by JCS In May 1989, and the classiication of Top Secret was
continued. The document was opened in full at an ARRIB deciassification session in
July 1997.

Exhibit E.

Monthly Operational Report 1-30 September from the Chief of Station, Mexico City to
Chief KURIOT, October 18, 1963.

The CIA typically is reluctant to release information regarding technical surveillance.

- This document Is a CIA monthly operational report for Mexico City for September 1963, _
a period that includes Lee Harvey Oswald's anrval in the Mexdcan capital. The attached

form discloses that this document was reviewed in 1993 arm d postponed In its entirety. |
It was opened in full in 1995 after.a Board vote - - ao

Exhibit F.
NSA SIGINT product report, November 26, 1963.

The Review Board has had some success in releasing NSA records. This document. .
discloses NSA's Intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy. & was criginaify ursavailable to the public
in any form and was exempt from automatic declassification. This document was

released with sanitizations i by Board vote.

Exhibit G.
Memorandum to McGeorge Bundy from Gordon Chase, Jurse 15, 1964. Subject:

Assassination of Castro.

This document from the files of the National Security Council wes originally classified
“Secret” and was exempted from declassification in 1876. The NSC agreed to release
it in full after discussions with the Review Board in 1998.

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categories of information exempt from release (although the clear articulation of
such categories is important), but the allocation of the burden of proof to the
party that seeks to exempt information from release.

Because these four points are Inextricably interconnected, | will discuss them in
reference to our work and to a series of documents that are attached as exhibits to this
testimony.

During the past four years, | have spent hundreds of hours talking with officials .
from-more than a dozen agencies and reviewing memoranda that argue against the
release of certain types of classifled information. it has been my general impression
that the officials making such arguments are intelligent, conscientious, competent, and
hardworking. (I also have had the general impression that they have sought to be
cooperative with the Review Board and that they have made good-faith efforts to

- comply with the JFK Act.) One nevertheless cannot help but observe a deep-seated,
institutional reluctance to release information — particularly on the part of those
institutions that were created for the purposes of collecting secret information and
preserving secrets.

In order to facilitate declassification, S. 712 requires agencies to articulate their
reasons for initial classifications and for exemptions from declassification. For example,
Section 4(¢)(2)(A) would require the agency to “provide in writing a detailed justification
for [an initial classification] decision.” Similarly, with regard to the 30-year review, _
agencies would “certi[fy] to the President at the end of such 30-year period that
continued protection of the Information from unauthorized disclosure is essential to the
national security of the United States .. . .” (Sect. 4(d)(2)). The talented officials who
are hired by the agencies will be able to provide such explanations and such
justifications. The issue from my perspective is not whether agencies are ablo to .
articulate such justifications, but to what extent their justifications can withstand
scrutiny. Let me provide some examples where initial Justifications for withholding
information did not withstand scrutiny.

Ilustration 1. See Exhibit A. The first illustration is a CIA cable dated November

27, 1963, that has now been released in full, As you can see,.the second line of typed
text includes the crypts (or cryptonyms) “RYBAT” and “GPFLOOR.” These crypts
appear in what is called the “slug line” and they are routing and sensitivity Indicators.
“GPFLOOR’ Is the crypt that refers to Lee Harvey Oswald. This same crypt appears in
the first line of the second paragraph of text. The CIA originally advised that GPFLOOR
could not be released In the slug line afthough it could be released in the text of the
cable. | had several discussions with agency officials as they tried to explain why
GPFLOOR could be released in one place but not in the other. | could not understand
their explanations. At that time | was new to the work and I did not know whether | was
simply not bright enough or experienced enough to understand the explanation being

- offered. | again raised the question in a later meeting with several agency officials that

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covered other topics. Finally, an official said: “I don't see why It can't be released. This
is an issue for COMMO [COMMO i is the Communications Office.) Someone ask
COMMO whether it cares.” COMMO was subsequently asked — and it had no objection
to the release. | now infer that protecting crypts in slug lines was an ingrained agency
habit rather than a considered judgment. The disclosure came only after incessant
questioning by a skeptical interlocutor.

Illustration 2. During the course of our review of records from the Secret Service,
the Board identified for the Secret Service a record It intended to open in full and the
agency objected. The Board then advised that a copy of the record had actually been
published in full in 1964 as an exhibit to the Warren Commission Report. The agency
continued to object, arguing that even a subsequent release of an open document
would again disclose matters that should be kept secret. The Board subsequently
voted to open the record.

iifustration 3. In several FBI documents that were ‘subject to appeal to the
President, the FBI argued that certain types of its electronic surveillance had not
previously been disclosed. In our opposing memoranda, we showed that Director J.
Edgar Hoover, in open testimony to Congress, had effectively disclosed the existence
of the electronic surveillance. Those records are now open.

litustration 4. See Exhibit B. The Review Board was presented with a heavily _
redacted but provocative. document-pertaining to an FBI “intemal Security” Inquiry into
Lee Harvey Oswald in October 1960. The FBI declined to release the Information,
arguing that it contained the equities of a foreign govemment and that the govemment
had refused to release the information. The Review Board, with the assistance of the
Department of State, thereupon approached the Swiss Goverment and requested that
it consent to the release of information about the assistance that the Swiss Federal ~
Police provided to the FBI to, track down Oswald. The Swiss government agreed and
the record is now open in full.

illustration 5. See Exhibit C. The Review Board located several Top Secret
documents related to military contingency planning for a coup in Cuba. Exhibit C
contains one page from a 58-page document from this group that had been “excluded
from automatic downgrading and deciassification." The Review Board staff arranged
for a group of declassiflers from several military and other nationa!l-security entities to
meet at the Review Board offices in a joint-declassification session. The 58 pages of
this document, and many other records from this group, have gone from being
completely closed to completely open.

Illustration 6. See Exhibit D. In May 1963, Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara met with military advisers in the eighth of a series of conferences on
Vietnam. Exhibit D includes all of the materiaf that had been publicly released on the
conference prior to Review Board action (a 6-page summary published in Foreign

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oe ee ee 2

-5-

Relations of the United States, 1961-63 Vol. 3) and the title page of a 213-page Record
[of the] Eighth Secretary of Defense Conference from the Joint Chiefs of Staff Official
File that has now been opened in full. Prior to Review Board action, the memorandum
had been excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification and could
presumably have remained classified forever. A stamp on page 1 discloses that the
document was systematically reviewed by JCS in May 1989 and the classification of
Top Secret was continued, The document was opened in full at a declassification
session in July 1997. _

Illustration 7. See Exhibit E. Like the FBI, the CIA typically is reluctant to
release information regarding technical surveillance. Exhibit E is a monthly operational
report from Mexico City from September 1-30, 1963, a period that includes Oswald's
arrival in the Mexican capital. In 1993, the document was postponed in its entirety. The
Review Board voted to open the record In its entirety.

Hlustration 8. See Exhibit F. The Review Board has also had some success in
releasing NSA records. Exhibit F is dated November 26, 1963, and discloses NSA’s
intercepts of communications related to Cuban military alerts after the assassination. It
was originally unavailable to the public in any form and was exempt from
declassification. After Board action, the important Information has been released.

Iilustration 9. See Exhibit G. Exhibit G is a Natlonal Security Council document -..-------

that pertains to an alleged plot: to assassinate Castro. Although it was originally
classified “Secret” and was deemed to be exempt from declassification, the NSC
agreed to release it in full after discussions with the Board. ’

I trust that these examples show that agencies are initially inclined to protect
information that can and should be released. But the examples also show that, with a
little prodding by an independent entity, agencies can and will participate in a
cooperative spirit to declassify secrets. Under the current regime, outside of the JFK
Act, agencies have little intemal or extemal incentive to take an energetic approach to ~
declassifying records. Agencies do not send the message to agency personnel that a
fast track to career advancement lies with the release of more information than is
absolutely necessary. Agencies have the natural disinclination to release information
that has been painstakingly acquired. Ultimately, secrecy becomes a habit and
declassification is mired in lack of attention and inertia. There is, however, an important
and encouraging message that comes out of the Board's experience: once agencies
come to the understanding that they must declassify records and that there is a
presumption that records should be opened, the agencies will cooperate in good faith
with the requirements established by Congress.

13-00000 cee ah nee nets A ae REMAN TGR SEW De TESS GIPT T
, ig
orcas 9d LU 14:58 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB [2007

Ill. The Mechanics of Declassification

Declassification involves more than appropriate standards for the release of
information. It also calls for the estab&shment of effective mechanisms to move records _.
through the bureaucracy. Once again, the experience of the Review Board provides
valuable lessons that should be of use to this Committee in considering fegisiation. |
would like to draw attention to four important points involving the mechanics of
declassification.

First, the “referral process” is one of the most significant,- government-wide
bottlenecks to the declassification of records. Before an agency can release
information in Its records that was obtained from another agency, it must refer the
record to the agency from which & derived that information. Although this procedure is
a sensible arrangement that promotes the valuable goal of sharing information among
agencies, it becomes a costly and time-consuming obstacle to declassification. Very
frequently, records become trapped in the morass of the referral process.

The Review Board developed essentially three procedures to help expedite the
referral process: (a) establishing joint-deciassification sessions where several agencies
convened at the Review Board offices (or sometimes at another site) and declassified
records; (b) hand-carrying records from one agency to another and having them
declassified on-site; and (c) giving agencies notice that-unless.records-were reviewed
by a certain date, thé Board would simply vote to open the records without receiving the
benefit of their input. In my opinion, any legislation designed to improve the
deciassification process must take info account this referral bottleneck by giving to the
independent, supervising agency, the authority to set enforceable timetables.

The ability to bring agencies together, such as In the joint-declassification
sessions, has important beneficial effects that extend beyond expediting the referral
process. In our experience, agencies tended to lose some of their institutional
inhibitions as they sat at a table with each other and discussed records openly.
‘Surprisingly, agencies typically assumed that another agency would not release
information when the other agency was in fact willing to do so. Frequently, it is the
suspicion that one agency does not want to release information that inhibits other
agencies from releasing Information. Like the COMMO example from Illustration 1
above, the perception of unwillingness to open records is sometimes greater than the
need to keep records closed.

Second, the Review Board profitted from the power, authorized by Congress, to
“direct a Government office to make available to the Review Board . . . additional
information, records, or testimony from individuals, which the Review Board has reason
to believe is required to fulfill its functions and responsibilities . . . .” JFK Act, §
7()(1)(C)(ii).. This power enabled the Review Board to obtain information about the
basis for classifications, the existence of records relevant to completing its mandate,

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and the circumstances surrounding the creation of records. It is important that an
agency with supervisory responsibility over declassification have the authority to obtain
the information It needs to accomplish its work.

Third, as with the referral process, a frequent bottleneck in the deciassification.
process is the final transfer of records from the declassifying agency to the National
Archives. An independent entity responsible for supervising this process should have
the authority and responsibility of guaranteeing that once the declassification process is
complete, the final step of making records available to the public is taken.

’ Fourth, although the start-up process is very time-consuming, it is a necessary
prelude to more efficlent and productive work. The start-up time for the Review Board,
as | understand is also the case for Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel
(ISCAP), required education not only of the Board and staff, but also of the agencies. It
is important that any future planning of an endeavor of this nature take Into account the
initial costs and, importantly, take advantages of the lessons leamed by the Review
Board. The initial cost can be recuperated in the long run.

«

When an independent agency, such as the Review Board, has the authority to

set the agenda (by establishing timetables), sponsor joint declassification sessions,

require the production of evidence, and ensure the prompt transfer of declassified
records from the agencies to the National Archives, declassification can be a success.
I strongly urge this Committee -to take advantage of the momentum created by the JFK
Act and by {SCAP, and create an authority that will be able to bring Independence,
consistency, and energy to the process of making the government more open and

accountable to the people who have paid for it.

WV. Recommendations for Making S. 712 More Effective

With regard to S. 712, | wish to summarize the following recommendations that

‘ have been offered either explicitly or implicitly in the testimony above:

First, the entity responsible for overseeing the declassification process (which, in
the current version of the S. 712, is the National Declassification Center), must be
genuinely independent of the agencies whose records it oversees. The Center should
be staffed by persons who are both sensitive to the genuine secrets of the agencies,
but who also are skeptical and demanding of proof.

Second, the independent entity should have the power to set reasonable
timetables by which an agency must complete the declassitication review (or referral
review). The independent entity should be empowered to release information on its
own authority if agencies do not comply with reasonable timetables. The independent
agency should additionally be empowered to obtain information from the agencies that

Moos

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is essential for completing its work.

Third, the legislation should incorporate a statutory provision that, at a certain
point in time, records will presumptively be opened unless the agencies are able to
articulate specific and persuasive reasons for continued redactions. Although it would
be sensible to provide agencies with the benefit of the doubt regarding declassification
for an initial period (@.g., between 10 and 25 years), once this period has passed the
presumption should shift decisively in favor of releasing the information.

Fourth, agencies should be required to do more than provide mere: “detalled
justifications” (see, 6.g., S. 712 § 4(c)(2)(A)) for classifying and refusing to declassify
records. The written explanations must be more than “justifications,” they must be able
to convince a skeptical reader who has sufficient information to evaluate the merits of
the writing.

Fifth, it would be highly advisable to provide the declassification entity (the
National Declassification Genter), with the authority to make binding requests to

_ agencies to search out records that may have been misplaced or misfiled.

Finally, there is one additional recommendation that | would make that
presumably goes beyond the scope of today’s hearing and so | will raise it only in
passing. | beliave it would be advisable for future Executive Orders to break down the
“sources and methods” exemption, Inasmuch as itis used too casually and it covers a

~ multitude of very distinct issues. To the extent that the Committee Is interested, | would

be willing to submit additional comments at a later point to develop this issue.

a . * x.

| would like once again to thank the Committee for taking seriously the right of
the American people to better understand how their govemment functions. ! would be
pleased to answer your questions.

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STATEMENT OF STEVEN GARFINKEL
DIRECTOR, INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE*
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION

before the

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

UNITED STATES SENATE
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
March 25,1998 Oh HME SIFICATION ANDIOR
OELEASE OF CIA, INFORMATICE

NTHIS DOCUMENT
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: ~

| am very pleased to. appear before you today to report on our progress in implementing
the recently established system for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying
national security information. On April 17, 1995, the President issued Executive Order
12958, entitled “Classified National Security Information.” This Order took effect on
October 14, 1995, only two and one-half years ago. While still in its early stages of .

implementation, the Order clearly attempts to strike an appropriate balance.

*The Information Security Oversight Office, or SOO, is responsible for overseeing Government-wide
implementation of the security programs under Executive Order 12958, “Classified National Security
Information," and Executive Order 12829, "National Industrial Security Program.” [SOO is also
responsible for reporting annually to the President on the status of those programs. Created in 1978,
ISOO became a component of the National Archives and Records Administration in November 1995. In
addition to reporting to the Archivist of the United States, the Director of ISOO receives policy guidance
from the National Security Council.

Among its functions, ISOO: (1) develops implementing directives and instructions; (2) maintains liaison
with all agencies that create or handle classified information; (3) inspects agency programs and reviews
their classified records; (4) receives and responds to public complaints, appeals and suggestions;

(5) collects and reports to the President and Congress relevant statistical data about the security
classification program, including data about its costs; (6) serves as a spokesperson for information about
the security classification program; (7) provides program and administrative support for the Interagency
Security Classification Appeals Panel and the Information Security Policy Advisory Council; and

(8) recommends policy changes to the President through the National Security Council.

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On the one hand, it seeks to reduce the permitted level of secrecy within our
Government, and to make available to the American people hundreds of millions of
pages of historically valuable documents that no longer require protection in the
interest of national security. On the other hand, the Order enables us to safeguard the

_ information that we must in order to protect our nation and our citizens. .
Already, this new system has achieved some rather remarkable results:

e Inthe last two years, the agencies of the executive branch have declassified more

than 400 million pages of permanently valuable government records.

° Of the more than 650 million pages that the executive branch has declassified since

1980, more than 70% of that total took place in the past three years.

e Agencies that never previously contemplated large-scale declassification, like the
Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the National

Reconnaissance Office, now have in place productive declassification units.

e The Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel, a new six member panel!
representing the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Archivist of the United States and the Assistant

to the President for National Security Affairs, has declassified in their entirety more =: -

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than 70% of the documents that have come before it on appeal from agency

decisions to keep those same documents classified.

e Original classification decisions, the actions most akin to new secrets, have

decreased to historic lows.

e Anecdotally, those of us who are exposed to a wide variety of classified information
are noting more and more situations in which information that would have been
routinely classified in the past is now routinely unclassified, without any increased

threat to our national security.
t

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, | can state with total confidence that the
United States Government stands far in the forefront among nations in the manner,
timing and extent to which it makes available to its citizens and the general public its
records of governance, including its formerly classified records. In conversation after
conversation that | have had over the years with foreign government officials, and with *
foreign students, researchers, and joumalists, one visitor after another has expressed
great admiration for the degree of openness offered by our freedom of information laws,
and our security classification system, with its limitations on classification and its

emphasis on declassifying information as soon as it is prudent to do so.

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These indicators of progress do not mean that we have all the answers about our
security classification system or that there aren't ttemendous hurdles to clear. For
example, the implementation of the new system has been uneven among the major —
classifying agencies, and a few are only now just getting started; the costs of
implementing the system at some agencies are higher than we anticipated; and

resource limitations are having a clear impact on agency compliance and oversight. To

_be sure, the standards and goals established within the new Executive Order are

unparalleled. We are not yet certain that every agency, or perhaps any agency, can
achieve them. However, only if the targets are difficult can reaching them be

noteworthy.

| recognize that the focus of today’s hearing is the legislation before the Committee. |
will try to answer any questions you may have conceming the similarities and |
differences between the security classification system that currently exists and the
system that S. 712, as currently drafted, would impose. The Administration has serious
objections to certain provisions of S. 712, particularly as they could impinge upon the
President's authority and flexibility to manage the classification and decliassification
programs. Legislating in this area can be perilous, given the great deference

traditionally given to the President in the areas of national defense and foreign affairs.

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However, the Administration is prepared to work with the Congress to address these
concerns and to establish an effective National Declassification Center. .- The
Administration will identify the revisions that would be required to enable the

Administration to support S. 712.

. s
Aa . 4
Board of Sponsors
(Pe tial List) @ : [ e@

* Sidney Altman
Bruce Ames
* Philip W. Anderson
* Kenneth J. Arrow
* Julius Axelrod
* David Baltimore
* Baruj Benacerraf
* Hans A. Bethe
* J. Michael Bishop
* Konrad Bloch
* Nicolaas Bloembergen
* Norman E, Borlaug
* Owen Chamberlain
Abram Chayes
* Stanley Cohen
* Leon N. Cooper
*E J. Corey
Paul B. Comely
* Johann Deisenhofer
* Renato Dulbecco
John T. Edsall
Paul R. Ehrlich

Carl Kaysen
Chairman

* Donald Glaser

* Sheldon L. Glashéw
Marvin L. Goldberger *

* Joseph L. Goldstein

* Roger C.L. Guillemin

* Herbert A. Hauptman

* Dudley R. Herschbach
Frank von Hippel

* Roald Hoffmann

. John P. Holdren

* David H. Hubel

* Jerome Karle
Nathan Keyfitz

* H. Gobind Khorana

* Arthur Kornberg

* Edwin G. Krebs

* Willis E. Lamb, Jr.

* Leon Lederman

* Wassily W. Leontief

* William N. Lipscomb
Jessica T. Mathews
Matthew S. Meselson
Neal E. Miller

* Franco Modigliani -
Philip Morrison
Stephen S. Morse

* Joseph E. Murray

* Daniel Nathans

* Marshall Nirenberg

* Douglas D. Osheroff

* Amo A. Penzias

* Martin L. Pert
Gerard Piel
Paul Portney
Mark Ptashne
George Rathjens

* Frederick Reines

* Burton Richter

* Richard J. Roberts
Vernon Ruttan
Jeffrey Sachs

* Anthur Schawlow

* J. Robert Schrieffer

*Glenn T. Seaborg

* Phillip A. Sharp

* Herbert A. Simon

* Richard E. Smalicy
Neil Smelser

* Jack Steinberger

* Henry Taube

* James Tobin

* Charles H. Townes
Robert A. Weinberg
Victor F. Weisskopf

* Torsten N. Wiesel
CLS. Wu
Herben F. York

Eric Hall Ameit
Rosemary Chalk
Steve Fetter

* Nobel laureates

FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS

307 Massachusetts Avenue, N.E. E-Mail fas@fas.org
Washington, D.C. 20002 Web http://www. fas.org/
Phone (202) 546-3300 Facsimile (202) 675-1010

Robert M. Adams Ann Druyan Charles C. Price Jeremy J. Stone
Vice-Chairman Secretary Treasurer President
Cl ! a
A HAS NO OBJECTION TO

DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF Cia
tt THIS OCU: Tien NFORMATION

Statement
of
Steven Aftergood

"Director, Project on Government Secrecy

Federation of American Scientists

before the

Committee on Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

Hearing on

S. 712, The Government Secrecy Act

March 25, 1998

National Council Meaibers

*Val L. Fitch Arthur H. Rosenfeld
Robert Socotow

Bums H. Weston

Morton H. Halperin
Linda Gottfredson Daniel Kammen
David Hafemeister Priscilla J. McMillan

ex officio: *Robert M. Solaw. Andrew Sessier

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Introduction

Mr. Chairman, | appreciate the opportunity to address your Committee ori the
subject of government secrecy.

| believe that this subject is as important as any on the Committee's agenda
because it goes directly to the heart of our political system. Government controls on
information define the limits of American democracy. Limits on information mean limits
on informed debate, limits on the ability of citizens to meaningfully communicate with
their representatives, and on their ability to hold elected offi cials accountable.

At the same time, it is self-evident that some degree of secrecy is necessary in
certain matters of national security, including the protection of advanced military —
technologies and the conduct of diplomatic and intelligence activities.

‘A sound government information policy is therefore one that strikes a
responsible and appropriate balance between the imperatives of open, accountable
government and the requirements of national security secrecy.

Such a balance is precisely what has been lacking throughout the modern era of
cold war secrecy, leaving us today with a grotesquely distended secrecy system that
improperly withholds unimaginable quantities of records from public access while often
failing to protect genuine secrets.

My hope is that Congress and this Committee will take steps towards a new
balance that corrects the failings of the past, and will enact a government information
policy that better serves the national interest.

In the following remarks, | will first present several assertions about secrecy - _
policy by way of background, and | will then draw some specific conclusions concerning
the Government Secrecy Act.

BACKGROUND

I would like to emphasize several points that | believe should form the foundation
for congressional deliberation on the future of the government secrecy system.

1. Most Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive.

One might well suppose that public concern about official secrecy is limited to

‘those who are most immediately affected by it, such as journalists and historians, as

well as a smail cadre of advocates and activists. But that is not the case.

Public surveys conducted for the Department of Defense in 1994 and 1996
consistently found that a majority (55%) of Americans believe that “the government

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protects too many documents by classifying them as SECRET and TOP SECRET.”

In other words, concern about excessive government secrecy is not simply’the
province of “special interest” groups; it is shared throughout the general public.
Reducing government secrecy truly is a matter of “public interest.”

Much of this public concern is latent and diffuse, but it crystallizes time and
again around specific issues— the JFK assassination, POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia,
UFQs, Nazi war crimes, human rights violations in Latin America, and so forth.

2. Excessive classification is a fact. But independent review can overcome it.

Even if the majority of Americans believe that government secrecy is excessive,

‘they could conceivably be mistaken. But they-are not mistaken. It is demonstrably true

that government agencies classify too much and fail-to declassify information that no
longer warrants protection.

This problem is illustrated with particular clarity by the fact that agency refusals
to declassify records are frequently overturned— within the executive branch itself— by
the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP), which receives appeals
from members of the public for documents that agencies have refused to declassify

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Roslyn A. Mazer, who was appointed by
President Clinton to chair the ISCAP, reported recently on the latest activities of her
Panel, which includes representatives of the Departments of Justice, State, Defense,
CIA, NSC and the National Archives:

We have taken final votes on appeals for declassification of more than 70
documents on a wide variety of subjects. Of these, we have voted to declassify
more than 70 percent of them in their entirety, while declassifying significant
segments of most of the remainder. This is significant in my view because, in
each instance, we are voting to overturn an agency's decision reached at its
highest level of appeal...

‘Not inconsistently, a majority of those surveyed also favor “a high level of
secrecy” for technology with military applications. “Public Attitudes Towards Security
and Counter-Espionage Matters in 1994 and 1996" by Tom W. Smith, National Opinion
Research Center, prepared for the Department of Defense Personnel Security
Research Center, November 1996. <http:/Avww.fas:org/sgp/othergov/perssur2.htmlI>.

?Remarks by Roslyn A. Mazer, Chair, Interagency Security Classification
Appeals Panel, before the DoD Historical Records Declassification Advisory Panel,
March 6, 1998, emphasis added. <http:/Awww.fas.org/sgp/advisory/iscap0398.htmi>.

2

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The fact that agency classification policies often cannot withstand scrutiny even
within the executive branch points to the root of the problem. The problem is not that
classifiers are dishonest or acting in bad faith; in general, they are doing.a thankless
job the best they can.

The problem rather is the natural and often unconscious tendency of all
bureaucracies to limit the flow of information to outsiders. As Sen. Moynihan observed,
“The problem is that organizations within a culture of secrecy will opt for classifying as
much as possible, and for as long as possible.”* If they go unchecked, agencies will
hoard information beyond all reason, which is how we got to where we are today.

Fortunately, Ms. Mazer’s remarks also revéal a solution to this unavoidable
problem, and that is independent review of agency classification decisions. The record
of the ISCAP demonstrates that unnecessary classification can be reduced or
eliminated when contested classification actions are reviewed by “outsiders” who share
the agency's commitment to national security, but who do not share its Weberian
tendencies toward bureaucratic secrecy.

Only such independent reviewers are capable of separating the national security
wheat from the bureaucratic chaff. | believe that this is a crucial principle which should

‘inform Congressional action in this area.

3. Congress is free to legislate on secrecy policy.

The Justice Department “strongly opposes a statutory framework for the
safeguarding of national security information,” arguing in effect not only that the
President has the authority to set and implement classification policies, but that he has

‘exclusive authority to do so.4

The Committee should recognize that this is a natural and predictable response ,
from the executive branch, which seeks to preserve its prerogatives and to maximize its
own freedom of action. But | believe the Justice Department overstates its case.

3Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
(“Commission Report”), 1997, Chairman's Foreword, page xxxix. Available in
searchable “html” format at <http:/Avww.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/index.html>.

“"Subjecting the protection of national security information to statutorily-required
standards or procedures would raise constitutional concerns to the extent that it would
limit the President's ability to discharge a core constitutional responsibility as he sees
fit.” Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General on the Government Secrecy Act of
1997, September 15, 1997.

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There is no question.that Congress has the right and, | would say, the obligation
to legislate in this area, particularly since the executive branch has failed to manage:
the secrecy system in a way that best serves the national interest. As Harold Relyea of
the Congressional’ Research Service has pointed out:

Pursuant to its constitutional authority “To make Rules for the Government and

Regulation of the land and naval forces” (Article |, Section 8, clause 14), as well
as the “necessary and proper’ clause (Article I, Section 8, clause 18), Congress:
has long established rules, regulations, and procedures of general effect for the

government and the armed services.... These clauses would appear to empower’ .-

Congress with authority to. legislate policy and procedure comparable to that
prescribed by presidential executive order to effect security classification.> —

The right of Congress to enact secrecy-related legislation has also been clearly
recognized by the Supreme Court. Prier to the 1974 amendments to the Freedom of.
Information Act, the Court held in EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973) that Congress had
not intended for the courts to examine the propriety of classification decisions or
procedures. But, as Kate Martin of the Center for National Security Studies has noted,
the Court also found that:

Congress could certainly have provided that the Executive Branch adopt new
procedures or it could have established its own procedures— subject only to __
whatever limitations the Executive privilege may be held toi impose upon such
congressional ordering.®

And of course Congress has enacted legislation dictating classification policy on
numerous occasions, including the statutory classification framework of the Atomic
Energy Act and the National Security Act, in which Congress (not the President)
assigned the Director of Central Intelligence. the responsibility for protecting
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure.

Furthermore, Congress has also successfully enacted statutes requiring ©

5Statement by Harold C. Relyea, Congressional Research Service, before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence hearing on “A Statutory Basis for
Classifying Information,” March 16, 1994, page 48ff.

®410 U.S. at 83 (1973). See Testimony of Kate Martin, Director, Center for
National Security Studies, before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence hearing on “A Statutory Basis for Classifying Information,” March 16, 1994,
page 66ff, for further elaboration of related Court rulings, and her conclusion that “the
only possible constitutional limitation would be that the Congress could not order
disclosure of advice given to the President that would constitute a state secret.”

4

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disclosure of certain classified information, including the JFK Assassination Records,
Collection Act (P.L. 102-526) and legislation concerning the State Department's .
Foreign Relations of the United States series (P.L. 102-138). In addition, Congress has
granted itself the authority to declassify any information in its possession.’

Today, several more bills mandating declassification are pending before
Congress, including: S. 1220, "The. Human Rights Information Act"; S. 1232, a bill to
declassify the private journal of Dr. Glenn Seaborg®; and S. 1379, "The Nazi War
Crimes Disclosure Act.""° Each of these bills was introduced because the public had
no choice but to turn to Congress in order to correct the failings of executive branch
classification and declassification policies. If the Justice Department position were to
be taken at face value, all of these bills— as well as the Freedom of Information Act

: itself— would be unconstitutional, and executive branch officials would have completely
_ unchecked power to withhold whatever information they Chose.

__ Inshort, while the executive branch is entitled to advise Congress to stay out of
national security information policy, Congress must be guided by the larger national
interest and has every right to reject that advice, as it has in the past.

4. The secrecy system is not as bad as it could be.

A statutory secrecy system should be conceived as a means, not an end in itself.
In considering legislative changes to secrecy policy, Congress should aim to fix what
needs fixing, but also to preserve what warrants preserving.

In particular, the Committee should recognize the changes that were
inaugurated with President Clinton’s executive order 12958, and which have already .
produced some impressive results.

Most important, from my point of view, is the order’s automatic declassification
provision (section 3.4) which requires the declassification of most historically valuable

25 year old documents by April 2000. This provision has generated an unprecedented
surge in declassification, reported at nearly 200 million pages in FY 1996 alone."

7See Senate Resolution 400, section 8. |

®<chttp://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1 220.htmI>.

®<http://www.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1232.htmI>.

'°<http:/Avww.fas.org/sgp/congress/s1379.html>.

14996 ISOO Report to the President <http:/Awww.fas.org/sgp/isoo/isoo96.htm|>.
5

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So Congress need not and should not consider classification policy in a vacuum.
It must start with the reality of classification policy as it is today and “first, do no harm.”
Legislative changes to the classification system should begin by affirming what is°
positive in current policy— and then building on it.

THE GOVERNMENT SECRECY ACT OF 1997

The Government Secrecy Act contains a number of important provisions which
are derived from the two-year investigation of the Commission on Protecting and
Reducing Government Secrecy. The Act's two most positive innovations— a “balancing
test” and a National Declassification Center— are also the ones that have elicited the
strongest opposition from the executive branch. | will comment briefly on each of
these, and suggest one other area for Committee consideration.

1. The balancing test and judicial review.

‘Section 4(c)(1) of the Act would require officials to weigh or “balance” the
potential benefit from disclosure against the need for protection in making classification
and declassification decisions, and further dictates that if there is significant doubt
about the need to ‘classify the information, it shall not be classified.

From the perspective of a non-governmental consumer of government
information, this is the Act’s single most important provision.

In the abstract, the idea of “balancing” is unexceptionable and is almost built into
the practice of classification. Executive order 12958 includes a discretionary balancing
test for declassification (sect. 3.2b) as well as a “significant doubt" standard (sect. 1.2b)
for classification. (Interestingly, the CIA promulgated a balancing test during the Carter
Administration which remains in effect today [32 C.F.R. 1902. 13(c)].)

This provision of the Act has drawn agency opposition not because of its
balancing requirement per se, but because it would allow judicial review of agency
balancing decisions under the Freedom of Information Act. The idea that courts would
presume to “second guess” agency classification decisions is profoundly unwelcome to
classifiers, who warn of disastrous consequences if their judgment is questioned.

This warning is self-serving and needs to be taken with large grains of salt.
Similar concerns contributed to President Ford’s decision to veto the 1974 amendments
to the Freedom of Information Act, which allowed judges to determine whether
information had been “properly” classified."? Fortunately, Congress overrode that veto
and it turned out that the opponents’ fears were not realized. ,

'2See President Ford’s veto message at 120 Congressional Record H36243-4.
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To the contrary, judicial review has been a potent factor in making the FOIA as
useful a tool of democracy as it is. Indeed, it has been persuasively argued that the °
courts are not sufficiently diligent in reviewing agency classification decisions."

The CIA has warned of “costly legal challenges that risk second-guessing of

‘DCI/CIA judgments.” This is a considerable exaggeration since in practice, no judge

would reject a sworn affidavit from the DCI that certain information must be withheld.
But at the same time, CIA classification judgments are in need of the checks and
balances that judicial review would provide, particularly when it comes to the invocation
of “sources and methods.” Thus, the Secrecy Commission last year found that:

the sources and methods rationale has become a vehicle for agencies to
automatically keep information secret without engaging in the type of harm
analysis required by executive orders as a prerequisite to keeping other kinds of
information secret. The statutory requirement that sources and methods be
protected thus appears at times to have been applied not in a thoughtful way but
almost by rote.

Federal court judges will never reject a “thoughtful” or even a merely plausible
argument about the need to protect intelligence sources and methods. But the
possibility of judicial review will serve to discourage indefensible “rote” classification.

Dire warnings of the consequences of judicial review of classification have not
been borne out by the last 24 years of judicial review under the FOIA, and there is no
reason to believe that courts would suddenly become reckless now when confronted
with a balancing test.

| would add that any suggestions of a “flood” of lawsuits resulting from this ©
provision are certain to be exaggerated. For the typical FOIA requester, there are huge .
“barriers to entry” to the judicial system. Legal representation is absurdly expensive,
and pro bono assistance is generally available only in cases of considerable national
importance or when victory is all but assured. In the last twenty years | must have filed
hundreds of FOIA requests, but have brought suit under the FOIA only once.

The absence of effective “checks and balances” on executive branch
classification actions has helped to produce today’s bloated and highly arbitrary
classification system. A balancing test that is subject to judicial review is the most

"National Security Information Disclosure Under the FOIA: The Need for
Effective Judicial Enforcement,” Boston College Law Review 25: 611-643 (1 984).

“Commission Report, Chapter mt page 70, emphasis added.
7

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appropriate solution.*®
2. A National Declassification Center ‘

The proposed National Declassification Center is a response to the fragmented

. quality of declassification policy, and to the inadequacy of executive branch oversight,

which the Secrecy Commission described as “the critical missing link.”*

As currently conceived, however, the Center risks becoming an extraneous
bureaucracy that agencies are free to utilize or not, as they wish, and that has little or
no independent authority. In order to fulfill its intended purpose, the Center should be
assigned specific tasks and authorities. For example:

. The Center could be assigned to perform independent review and approval of all
agency declassification guides, so as to ensure their consistency and
compliance with the provisions of the Act and the executive order.

» The Center cotild be assigned to perform or to coordinate the declassification of
all documents involving multiple agency "equities," in order to optimize the
efficiency of the declassification process.

Perhaps most important, the Center could undertake in an expanded form many
of the oversight responsibilities now assigned to the Information Security Oversight
Office (ISOO) and the Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel (ISCAP).

ISOO, under Steven Garfinkel’s leadership, has a profound understanding of the
intricacies and shortcomings of secrecy policy and, in my opinion, has generally
demonstrated good judgment about what is appropriate and achievable and what is not.
But ISOO’s staffing and resource levels are laughably low when compared to its
nominal responsibilities. This disparity between resources and responsibilities sends a —
message throughout the executive branch that “we're not going to take secrecy
oversight seriously.”

SThe characteristic risks and benefits of information disclosure, and the
mechanics of actually balancing them in practice are elucidated by Arvin S. Quist in
Security Classification of Information, Vol. 2: Principles for Classification of Information,
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Inc., Oak Ridge, TN, Report No. K/CG-1077/V2, April
1993, Chaps. 5; 6. Of particular interest, Quist discusses how legal standards for
weighing eviderice that are already part of the judicial process— such as “beyond a —
reasonable doubt,” “clear and convincing evidence,” and “preponderance of the
evidence’-- could be used in balancing and in any subsequent review (pp. 61-69).

‘*Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 42.
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The ISCAP, meanwhile, is doing a fine job, but on a tiny scale. And it is already
operating at full capacity, although its tasks are expected to escalate © sharply j in coming
years. As ISCAP Chair Roslyn Mazer has noted,

When | consider what the next few years may hold for ISCAP, | fear that to a
considerable extent we may become victims of our own successes-- and the
caseloads that these successes may engender. Unfortunately, ISOO [which
also supports the ISCAP] is a very small organization that faces ever-increasing
demands on its resources from the dramatic changes in the classification and
declassification systems now underway.... the onus on the ISCAP’s staffing
structure may very well prove too much to bear.’”

Therefore, one straightforward “fix” that Congress might consider, at least in the
interim, would be to significantly increase the stature and resources available to these
two organizations so as to help fill in the “missing link" of executive branch oversight.

But whether Congress chooses to invigorate the existing oversight entities or to
establish a new National Declassification Center, the goal should be one that has been .
clearly formulated by the Secrecy Commission:

Oversight should be the responsibility of a strong and active organization,
independent of the agencies that classify, perhaps modeled after agency
inspector general offices. To be truly effective, such an organization should also
possess the means to compel agency compliance with established policies...
Equally critical is that such a body have adequate resources, whether through a
budget line item or the reallocation of resources from the principal classifying
agencies."®

3... What About the “Other” Classification System?

" If the Government Secrecy Act became law, we would not just have a statutory
secrecy system— we would have two statutory secrecy systems: one for national
security information and one for atomic energy information, prescribed by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954. This may be too much of a good thing.

The existence of two parallel classification systems has proven to be a
significant obstacle to efficiency in secrecy policy, as numerous records must undergo
separate declassification reviews under each system.

Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above.
*8Commission Report, Chapter 2, page 44.
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Even the high-level executive branch officials who are members of the
Interagency Security Classification Appeals Panel have been flummoxed by the .
difficulties in coordinating the declassification of information controlled under the
Atomic Energy Act. This is particularly absurd because, according to Ms. Mazer,

information that is similar or identical to much of what we have seen designated
as FRD [i.e. classified under the Atomic Energy Act] has been in the public
domain for many years, often as a result of a prior Department of Energy
declassification review. Moreover, there appears to be no system in place to get
this information declassified, even though the Departments involved— Energy,
Defense, and State— acknowledge that it is innocuous. "®

The perpetuation of two distinct classification systems would represent a
significant compromise of the Government Secrecy Act’s' goal of “a more stable and
cost-effective set of policies and a more consistent application of rules and
procedures.”

Therefore, | would suggest that the Committee consider the feasibility of
consolidating both classification systems into one.

CONCLUSION

Although the Cold War has officially been over for several years now, we stil!
face the challenges of adapting the inherited structures of that era to the present day.
Fixing the classification system is foremost among those challenges.

It is only natural that any significant changes to the status quo will be resisted by
the bureaucratic systems that are now in place. But the Committee should have
confidence in the traditional American mechanism of “checks and. balances.”

By installing new checks and balances into a classification system that has long
been allowed to function unilaterally, Congress can induce prudent changes that will
advance the national interest in open and accountable government, while more
efficiently protecting genuine national security information.

"Remarks by Roslyn Mazer, footnote 2 above, emphasis added.

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Congressional Record entry 1 of 100.

“ELR. 1553, 1-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF THE
ASSASSINATION RECORDS REVIEW BOARD

(Page: E876] CIA HAS HO ORJECT
-  DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR ®
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

HON. DAN BURTON iN THIS DOCUMENT

—

in the House of Representatives
THURSDAY, MAY 8, 1997

® Mr. BURTON of Indiana. Mr. Speaker, today I am introducing H.R. 1553, which amends the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992—Public Law 102-526-~-to provide 1
additional year for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. This legislation
would extend the Review Board 's September 30, 1997, termination date.under. current law to.
September 30, 1998. H.R. 1553 authorizes $1.6 million in fiscal year 1998 for this purpose. I am pleased
that the Honorable Henry Waxman, the ranking minority member on the Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight, and the Honorable Louis Stokes, who sponsored the 1992 Act and who chaired
the House Select Committee on Assassinations that was established in 1976, are original cosponsors of
FLR. 1553.

© The purpose of the 1992 legislation was to publicly release records relating to the Kennedy
assassination at the earliest possible date. The Assassination Records Review Board was set up to
review and release the voluminous amounts of information in the Government's possession. The FBI,
‘the Secret Service, the CIA, the Warren Commission, the Rockefeller Commission, the Church
Committee in the Senate, and the House Select Committee on Assassinations have all held
assassination records , and records have also been in the possession of certain State and local
authorities as well as private citizens. When this legislation was considered, nearly 1 million pages of
records compiled by official investigations of the assassination had not been made available to the
public, some 30 years after the tragedy. Congress believed that simply making all relevant information
available to the public was the best way to respond to the continuing high level of interest in the
Kennedy assassination , and was preferable to undertaking a new congressional investigation. The 1992
law requires the Review Board to presume that documents relating to the assassination should be made
public unless there is clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. I believe that the release of this
information is important to ensure accountability in the Government and to clearly demonstrate to
Americans that the Government has nothing to hide. _

® As aresult of the Review Board ‘s efforts, ovcr 10,000 documents have been transferred to the national
archives and Records Administration for inclusion in the JFK collection. At the end of 1996, that

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collection totaled approximately 3.1 million pages and was used extensively by researchers from all over
the United States. The Review Board was in the news last month when it voted to make public the
Abraham Zapruder film of the Kennedy assassination . ;

The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 originally provided a
3-year timetable for the Assassination Records Review Board to complete its work. Unfortunately,
there were lengthy delays in the appointment of Board members, and as a consequence the Review
Board was scheduled to cease operations before it even began its work. As a result, in 1994 Congress
restarted the clock by extending the 1992 law's termination date for 1 year, until September 30, 1996.
The Review Board subsequently exercised its authority to continue operating for 1 additional year, until
September 30, 1997. Because the review process proved to be more complex and time-consuming than
anticipated, the President included in his fiscal year 1998 budget a request for a 1-year extension of the
Review Board 's authorization.

I support the Assassination Records Review Board 's request for a 1-year extension of its authorization
so that it can complete its mission in a professional and thorough manner. I have always believed very
strongly that Congress should not indefinitely continue funding for Federal entities that were clearly
intended to be temporary in nature. The Review Board has informed me that it is confident that it will
be able to finish its work and complete its final report if Congress will extend its life for 1 additional
year, until September 30, 1998.

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13-00000 .

»
. *

TESTIMONY OF ATHAN G. THEOHARIS

PROFESSOR OF HISTORY
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN

on
S.J. Res. 282
"The Assassination Materials Disclosure Act"

Before the

SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

MAY 12, 1992

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Startaid OF aAcHan G. TH*eCHAPIS

I am a professor of history at Marquette University, specializing
in U.s. intelligence and surveillance policy, and have published extensively
on matters relating to the history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). As a consultant in 1975 to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Activities (the so-called Church Committee), I researcned classified and
nonclassified records deposited at the Truman, Hiserhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson presidential libraries and since 1978 have filed numerous Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA) requests for FBI records.

I welcome this opportunity to testify on S.J. Res. 282, the Assassination
Materials Disclosure Act of 1992, and the question it raises: Should Congress
create a special Review Board and authorize it to release or postpone the
release of relevant Government records?

There are precedents for legislating procedures governing the release
of "Government records relevant to the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy," most notably the Freedom of Information Act of 1965, as amended
in 197+, mandating the release of and stipulating the exemptions for withholdings
agency records. The congressional response to the so-cailed Nixon-sampson
agreement of 1974 offers a further precedent. Rejecting former President
Richard Nixon's claimed right to retain exclusive control over the records
pertaining to his presidency, including the right to destroy the sc-called
Oval Office tapes, Congress rescinded this agreement, created the 3rownell
Commission, and enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978. Presidential
records were public records, and not a president's personal property,
Congress affirmed when defining the criteria to govern the disposition
and release of all presidential records.

As in the case of the Nixon presidential records, there exists
widespread public suspicion «bout the Government's disposition of the
Kennedy assassination records stemming from the beliefs that federal
officials (1) have not made available all Government assassination
records (even to the Warren Commission, Church Committee, House Assassination
Committee) and (2) have heavily redacted the records released under FCIA
in order to cover up sinister conspiracies. S.J. Res. 282 effectively
addresses these concerns first by creating an impartial body, the proposed
Executive Director and Review Board, with the authority tp review and
if necessary subpoena all relevant records and then by establishing the
criterion of full disclosure except in cases where "clear and convincing
justification exists for postponing" the release of specified documents.

There is reason to believe that all relevant Government records
pertaining to the Kennedy assassination have not been released and cannot
be precisely identified by persons outside the executive branci:. It might
not be the case that all such records were filed under specific names
and programs (Oswald, Ruby, Ferrie, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Warren
Commission), The federal intelligence agencies, for example, had in the.

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recent past instituted separate records procedures to safeguard their

most sensitive documents. CIA files, for one, are compartmentalized to
limit access on the "need to know" principle. As one result, when responding
in 1975 to the Church Committee inquiry into the Agency's drug testing
program, CIA officials ac¢vised that the relevant program file had been
destroyed in 1973. In 1978, however, CIA officials admitted to having
discovered among the Agency's financial records extant documents which
provided additional information about the scope of this program. During

the Iran-contra hearings of 1987, moreover, CIA officials, at times,
distinguished between official and informal records while NSC official
Oliver -North admitted to having employed a "do not log" procedure to ensure
that his communications to his superior, John Poindexter, were not indexed
in the NSC's central records system. Although the FBI maintains a central
records system, FBI officials dating from 1940 had authorized a series

of special records procedures to ensure that sensitive records were not
serialized or filed in the Bureau's central records system or that sensitive
information cculd be withheld if a FBI report was circulated outside the
Bureau. These included: the Do Not File procedure for memos requesting

and authorizing "black beg jobs;" blue/pink/informal memos for "administrative"
matters in which case, was "to be destroyed after action is taken and not
sent to files section;" JUNE Mail for reported information received from
“sources illegal in nature" or from "moat secretive" sources such as
"Governors, secretaries to high officials who may be discussing such
officials and their attitude;" and administrative pages/cover letters

for reporting "facts and information " which could "cause embarrassment

to the Bureau, if distribut -d." Do Not File and blue/pink/informal memos
were to be maintained in “office files" of senior FBI officials (and were
to be destroyed every six months), JUNE Mail was to be maintained "under
lock and key" in FBI field offices or in the Special File Room at FP™
headquarters, while administrative pages/cover letters were to be detached
whenever the report to which they were appended was "distributed to any
agency outside the Bureau."

S.J. Res. 282 addresses the inability of requestors to identify all
relevant Kennedy assas.ination records and how and where they might have
been filed. Executive agencies are mandated to make available to the Review
Board “all asscssination materials" even if “uncertain if a record is
assassination material" and the Executive Director is authorized to
“inquire as to the existence of further records" and then recommend that
the Review Board “subpoenas such records in the event of denial." Properly
placing the burden of ensuring the accessioning of all Kennedy assassination
materials on agency officials who are most knowledgable about their agency's
records practices, S.J. Res. 282 further enables the Executive Director
and staff to identify additional records learned through a close reading

_of cross references in the "available" documents.

Section 6, moreover, addresses the companion obstacle to full disclosure,
the discretion which the FOIA allows federal agency officials to withhold
categories of information when releasing FOIA-requeated documents. Particularly

”

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during the 1980s agency officials have withheld information clearly

relevant to an understanding of the relationship of the agencies to
individuals identified directly or‘indirectly with the Kennedy assassination.
Administrative and legislative changes encouraged such non-disclosure--notably
President Ronald Reagan's 1982 classification order, legislation of 1984
totally exempting CIA "operational" files from disclosure, and legislation
of 1986 authorizing the FBI to withhold and deny the existence of FBI
informant files. Section 6 dovetails FOIA's exemptive provisions but,

at the same time, introduces a stricter non-disclosure standard to require
release unless "the threat to the military defense, intelligence operations
or conduct of foreign relations of the United States posed by its disclosure
is of auch gravity that it outweighs any public intereat in ite disclosure."

My skepticism about agency practices in withholding documents, moreover,
ia based on my experiences as a frequent user of the FOIA. I recognize
that this is not the proper forum for reviewing how federal agencies have
processed FOIA requests but think the following examples shed light on
whether the FOIA, and its provisions accepting agency discretion, can be
expected to ensure full and reasonable disclosure.

In 1980, I filed an FOIA request for the Official and Confidential
File of former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and in 1983 received approximately
6,000 heavily redacted pages of this 17,700 page file. Exercising my right
to appeal these withholdings, z eventually (in 1985) received approxdunately
2,000 additional documents. Granted the right of a second appeal, at this
time I offered a detailed foldsr by folder challenge, arguing that much
of the withhelu information was already in the public domain and further
that since the former FBI director had maintained in his office derogatory
informati.a on presidents, members of Congress, and other prominent
personalities the question of what use had been made of this information
required its release. These arguments proved somewhat convincing and in
1989 the FEI released approximately 15,000 pages including information
formerly redacted in the earlier processed releases. :

The enclosed Fortas document (see Appendix A) was one of the documents
released to me in 1989, but withheld entirely both in 1983 and 1985.
When withholding this document (and five others pertaining to the same
matter), the FBI had originally claimed that its release, would reveal
FBI sources and methods and violate personal privacy rights. Yet, Fortas
had not been acting as a FBI Criminal Informant or Security Informant
when concerting with FBI Assistant Director Cartha Deioach in 1966 and
the withheld information records Fortas's willingness to service the
political and bureaucratic interests of President Lyndon Johnson and
FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

This example, because the FBI had evaluated the same document three
times, offers insights into the criteria employed to deny the release
of records. And while the agency ultimately decided to disclose, this

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he

decision indirectly supports S.J. Res. 282's “clear and convincing"
standard. For, my original 1980 request and receipt in 1983 of the

heavily redacted Hoover file had become known to U.S. News and World

Report which devoted its 1984 issue of December 1903 to summarizing

the contents of the released Hoover file. The resulting publicity heightened
public and media interest in the heavily redacted Hoover file. By 1989,

if not 1985, FBI officiala were no longer williug to risk FOIA litigation
challenging their claimed interpretation of the FOIA's exemptive provisions.

My second example bears indirectly on how the FBI would process a
FOIA request for still-unreleased wiretap records first diclosed by the
House Assassination Committee. The House report had disclosed that FBI
wiretap intercepts recorded critical comments of organized crime leaders,
notably Carlos Marcello, regarding the Kennedys. Did the Mafia put a
"contract" out on John Kennedy? Did FBI officials purposefully withhold
this information from the Justice Department and the Secret Service in
1963 and ther from the Warren Commission in 19647 The answers to these
questions would require the release of the wiretap transcripts as. well
as other FBI memos recording how tne FBI dealt with these transcripts.
My experience involving how the FSI has processed my requests for other
FBI wiretaps suggests that any FOIA-released Kennedy documents will be
s« redacted as to preclude answers to these questions. In describing one
of my FBI wiretap requests, let me also outline for the Committee the
considerably broader "records universe" sought by scholars and which
cistinguish our approach from those of journalists, congressional staff,
and lawyers.

This case of FBI wiretapping involved Henry Grunewsld, a Washington,

D.C.-based investigator with close ties to New York insurance-executive --.-.-

Henry Marsh, isolationist Republican congressmen, former New Dealer Thomas
Corcoran, and +ashington bureaucrats. FBI officials were keenly interested
in Grunewale'. activities, confirmed by the inclusion in Hoover's office

file of two folders containing the transcripts of two FBI wiretaps of
Grunewald in 1941 and 1945. As in the case of the Fortas document, these

two folders had originally been withheld in entirety on sources and methods
and personal privacy grounds. The released 1941 wiretap transcript-
particularly interested me as I had learned from documents contained in
former FBI Assistant Director D. Milton Ladd's still extant office file

that Grunewald, as other conservative critics of the Roosevelt Administration,
became the subject of FBI "espionage" investigative interest during the

early 1940s. The Ladd file, however, did not resolve whether this 1941
wiretap had been known or authorized by the Attorney General or the White
House. Accordingly, 1 filed a further FOIA request for the FBI's headquarters
files on Grunewald. The released, redacted records confirmed the Roosevelt
Administration's interest in Grunewald's activities in 1940 but (see Appendix
B): either because of redactions or the Justice and Treasury Departaents®
failure to have processed a3 yet documents which they originated the

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-5-
wiretap authorization question cannot be resolved.

The heavily redacted Grunewald filee further disclosed that Grunewald
became the subject in 1953 of a third FBI wiretap. In 1952, a House ;
Committee held public hearings on the subject of influence peddling that
centered on Grunewald's activities, among others. Thin inquiry proved
embarrassing to the Truman Administration and was exploited by the Republicans
during the 1952 presidential and congressional campaigns. In 1953, the
new Republican-controlled House revisited this issue. Particularly interested
in Grunewald, the so-called Kean Committee sought assistance from the
Justice Department. The heavily redacted records (see Appendix C), however,
preclude answers to the questions as to why concurrent with this congressional
inquiry Attorney General Herbert Brownell had requested and authorized
this wiretap and whether the Justice Department's assistance to the Committee
included information learned from this wiretap. (I have only appended a
summary of one FBI report to the Attorney General, based on this wiretap.

The released transcripts of this 1553 wiretap, in contrast to those released

to me involving the 1941 and 1945 taps, were héavily redacted--the FBI
withheld on personal privacy grounds the names and intercepted conversations
of Grunewald's telephone partners, rendering the released transcripts
virtually incomprehensible and of minimal research value.)

I have gone into detail om the Fortas anc Grunewald matters as I
think they offer insights into the processing of FOIA requests, an
issue central to these hearings. It has been my experience that the
“culture of the intelligence agencies encourages agency officials to
interpret the FOIA exemptive provisions broadly but also that more senior
agency officials will release even embarrassing information in those
instances when their decisions are potentially subject to critical scrutiny.
The Review Board procedure promotes this needed accountai. lity. At the
same time, the Bo:.rd's independence can undercut public suspicions that
claimed national security or privacy justifications are a mask to preclude
full disclosure. Surely now, thirty years after President Kennedy's
assassination and with the end of the Cold War, we should be able to
assure the public that relevant Kennedy assassination records are neither
secreted nor withheld for bureaucratic reasons.

While I douSt that the rlease of the Kennedy assassination records
will conclusively resolve the question "who killed Kennedy,'' I am convinced
that the procedures outlined in S.J. Res. 282 will undercut suspicions that
records documenting a government conspiracy are being purposefully withheld.
Release of the Kenncdy assassination records, moreover, will service other
significant research interests of the scholarly community. let me conclude
by briefly list some of these non-assassination-related questions: (1) the
liaison relationship between the FBI and the CIA before and after the
assassination; (2) the liaison relationship between the FBI and the Secret

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°

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Service and the background to the FBI's revised delimitation agreement

of 1964 with the Secret Service; (3) the politics of presidential commissions
(the purpose for creation, the level‘of agency cooperation, and the
responses of federal agencies, Congress, the White House, and the public

to the Warren Commission's findings); (4) the paradox of the FBI's apparent
disinterest in Oswald (Soviet defector and Fair Play for Cuba Committee
activist) in contrast to the intensity of FBI interest in more respectable
national leaders (Eleanor Rossevelt,. Adlai Stevenson, Joseph Alsop, Ernest
Hemingway, even John Kennedy); and (5) the FBI's and the CIA's relationships
with and uses of informants and sources recruited to provide foreign
intelligence, counterintelligence, criminal, and "subversive activities"
information.

Cis, HAS NO CBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF SENATOR DAVID L. BOREN
BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
ON THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992
oe ee a

May 12, 1992

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I very much appreciate the
opportunity to appear before this Committee to discuss with you
Senate Joint Resolution 282, the Assassination Materials

Disclosure Act of 1992.

The purpose of this legislation is to provide for a

‘comprehensive process ultimately leading to the release of all

materials held by the United States Government regarding the

assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Congressman Louis

‘Stokes, the distinguished former Chairman of the House Select

Committee on Assassinations, has introduced identical legislation
7 . a

in the House of Representatives. I am particularly pleased, Mr.

Chairman, to have you as an original cosponsor of this

legislation.

We have had at least four substantial federal government
investigations into the Kennedy assassination: the first
conducted by the Warren Commission appointed by President Johnson
in 1963; the second, by the President’s Commission on CIA

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te

Activities -- the Rockefeller commission _- in 1975; the third by
the Senate Select Committee:to Study Governmental Operations with
Respect to Intelligence -- the Church Committee -- in 1975 and
1976 as part of its investigation of CIA assassination plots
against foreign leaders; and finally, the extensive investigation

of -the House Assassinations Committee in 1978 and 1979.

Each of these investigations, particularly the Warren
Commission and House Assassinations Committee investigation,
produced long, detailed public reports concerning the Kennedy
assassination.. In addition, literally hundreds of books and

articles have been written on the subject.
Yet still, almost 30 years later, the questions remain.

The recent release of the controversial film "JFK". has raised
them anew, suggesting that answers may well lie in the
assassination records and other materials that remain sealed by
our Government. Even prior to the release of “JFK," in fact,
there were diligent efforts made by researchers as well as

concerned legislators to open these files for public review.

Mr. Chairman, I do not know what all of these files contain.
Specifically, I do not know whether they contain information that
would call into question or undermine the findings of the previous

investigations or not.

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+
But it seems to me the time has come to open these files to
the public and let them speak for themselves. Let historians and
journalists and the people read them, and draw the appropriate

conclusions.

“As a general principle, the Intelligence Community should
make available its records after the passage of a reasonable
amount of time when current sources and methods would no longer be
compromised. The American people have a right to assure
themselves to the greatest degree possible of the accuracy of the
historical record of our government. The timely release of all
documents of historic value and importance helps to assure that
even the most secret programs of our government will be operated

in accordance with basic American values. Current intelligence

‘operations will be even more carefully conducted when it is

recognized that they will be scrutinized by the public during the

‘

lifetime of many of those who administered the programs.

This is not to say that all of the files should simply be
pulled from the vaults, turned upside down and dumped onto
Pennsylvania Avenue for general consumption. Careful review is
required to ensure responsible public policy and fundamental
fairness. Even after almost thirty years, there remain
governmental interests, as well as individual privacy interests,
that we must consider. But these concerns must not stand in the
way of disclosure unless they are shown in a given case to be
especially compelling.

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What this Resolution proposes is a comprehensive, government-
wide review of the Kennedy assassination records conducted under

the auspices of an impartial, independent board.

It may be useful to state precisely what these records are.
First, they encompass all of the records of the FBI, the CIA,
Secret Service, military intelligence, and other Executive branch
agencies which may pertain to the Kennedy assassination. They
also include the records of the Warren commission, the Rockefeller
commission, the Church committee, and the House Select Committee
on Assassinations. Many of these records are now stored under
seal at the National Archives, while many others remain in agency

files. The Rockefeller Commission files were claimed by President

Ford as part of his personal papers and then deeded by him to the

Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. There may be

other relevant records at the Kennedy and Johnson presidential

libraries. These presidential library records are administered by

the National Archives, and thus we envision that they would be
subject to this Joint Resolution. °

I can report to you briefly on the status of one group of
these records -- the Church committee files, which are now in the
custody of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. All of
the Church committee files are housed in some 500 boxes in a
single small room at the National Archives. There is a
rudimentary index, but it is not always sufficiently descriptive,

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and a file-by-file review is probably necessary. My staff has
examined some of these files, and we believe the process of
separating out J.F.K. assassination materials -- once that term is
more precisely defined (as I will discuss in a moment) -- will not
prove especially cumbersome or time-consuming. The Kennedy =. _.
assassination investigation was only a small component of the

Church committee’s work and the investigation conducted concerned
only the role of the intelligence community in investigating the
assassination; it did not seek to determine who killed President
Kennedy. In addition, many of the Church records are in fact

copies of records originated by other agencies. However, the

Church staff did interview numerous witnesses, both inside and
outside of government, and the transcripts and notes of those
interviews, among other materials originated by the Church

committee, are -an important part of the J.F.K. files. .----..--.----- —--~---

Although many government records on the J.F.K. assassination
have previously been released by the Archives and as a result of
Freedom of Information Act litigation, a great deal remains
shielded from public view. Approximately twenty boxes of the
internal files generated by. the Warren Commission are still
sealed. Experts estimate that a much greater volume of FBI and
CIA files remain sealed. Many pages of documents that have been
released have been so extensively redacted that their
informational value is minimal. The extensive files of the House
Assassinations Committee, some 848 boxes of materials on both the
Kennedy and King assassinations, currently are sealed until the

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year 2029.

To date, these records have been withheld from the public due
to a variety of concerns: the fear of damaging foreign relations
and military defense,.-the--concern for disclosing the identities of
confidential sources or informants, and the desire to protect the
privacy of individuals. While these concerns may yet retain some
validity in a very few isolated cases, it seems to me that with
the passage of time, there should remain very few objections to
full disclosure. I believe it is time to review these records,
not in terms of the old assumptions, but rather in light of the
need for openness and to encourage confidence in the Government.
We need to assure ourselves of the facts, that there is not
information lurking somewhere in the Government that would shed
new light-on what remains perhaps the most heinous and enigmatic

crime of this century.

The Joint Resolution would make it much harder to justify the

continued shielding of a document from public view. It would also

w
create a process by which many records could be promptly released.

Any arguments made for withholding any document or portions of it

must be weighed against the strong public interest in disclosure.
The resolution establishes this kind of balancing test -- with a

strong presumption in favor of disclosure.

In addition, to address the, problem of heavily redacted and
therefore meaningless documents, the Joint Resolution borrows a

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page from the Classified Information Procedures Act, the law that
covers the handling of secret information in criminal trials.
Under that law, federal judges have discretion to permit
introduction in evidence of summaries or substitutes in place of
classified information. The Joint Resolution provides for

creation of such summaries or substitutes where appropriate, so

“that the public can learn essential facts about the Kennedy

assassination from a document even where references to private
matters or crucial national security secrets would render the

document itself mostly unreleasable at present.

In all cases, the Joint Resolution requires that the
presumption be in favor of release. All records will be released
unless there is clear and convincing evidence that postponing

release is essential to a vital interest.

Now let me briefly discuss the process established by the
Joint Resolution for applying these disclosure standards.

The Joint Resolution creates a five-member panel called the
Assassination Material Review Board. The members of this Review .
Board would be distinguished private citizens outside of

government who have had no prior involvement with previous

inquiries into the Kennedy assassination. This Review Board,

aided by an executive director and staff, would play the central
role in the release of the assassination materials. The Board
would be required to complete its work within two years of its

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first meeting, although it is certainly expected that it could be
completed much more quickly. The point is to proceed

expeditiously, while still doing a careful job.

We faced a difficult choice in deciding who should appoint
the Review Board, and I am aware your Committee is looking at
other alternatives. I am certainly amenable to this, but let me
give you some idea of why we came out as we did. Given the
allegations of government cover-up and the potential for perceived
conflict of interest, allowing the President or Congress to
appoint the Board did not seem appropriate. We settled instead on
the special three-judge federal court division that appoints

independent counsels for criminal investigations.

The Justice-Department;--in-an-April 27,°1992, letter to°--—7-7 77 OTT
Chairman Glenn, worries that "it is not clear" that our approach
to appointing the Review Board is constitutional. In addition,
some may feel that a judicial panel is ill-suited to make
appointments for this task. The judges themselves, who have very
small staffs and.other concerns, might well prefer to avoid this
assignment. In short, we recognized that this approach would
raise possible constitutional objections, as well as practical
ones, but, on balance, we felt the appointment authority should
rest with an impartial source without no interest or stake in the
outcome. I believe a strong argument can be made that the
appointment process is constitutional under the principles
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654

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(1988), which upheld the power of the same court division to
appoint independent counsels ‘to investigate executive branch

misconduct.

If the Committee nevertheless concludes that this approach is
undesirable, I would offer two alternatives for consideration,
conceding that both are also susceptible to possible
constitutional objection. The first would be for the President
and the leadership of the House and Senate each to appoint a given
number of Board members. Each body has interests in, and
responsibility for, certain of the records at issue. I would not
make these appointments subject to Senate confirmation, since
they are not policy positions, and confirmation would only delay
the task at hand. A second alternative would be the approach
suggested by the ACLU: adopt some variant of the formula used
last year by Congress in establishing the Advisory Committee on
Historical Diplomatic Documentation in the State Department,
namely to have the President appoint based on specific criteria,
i.e. background in particular disciplines, with most of the
members coming from lists submitted by designated professional

associations. -

Once the Review Board, however it is appointed, is
constituted, it would appoint an executive director, and the first
step in the process would be to make available to the Executive
Director all Government assassination materials. Where the
Executive Director suspects that the agencies have failed to

-~9-

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submit some of the relevant records, he or she has authority to
question the agencies and to use the subpoena power of the Review

Board to obtain any additional records.

The Executive Director, assisted by employees of the Review
Board and, if deemed necessary, detailed from elsewhere in the
Government, would undertake the initial screening of these
records. If the Executive Director concluded that a particular
record was appropriate for release, the record would automatically
be released, unless the record implicated personal privacy or the
Executive agency or congressional committee with responsibility
for that record filed an appeal with the Review Board. In this
Manner, many records could be promptly released without formal

Review Board deliberations.

If the Executive Director determined that a particular record
was not appropriate for release under present circumstances or
that the record implicated personal privacy concerns, he or she
would automatically be required to refer that decision to the

Review Board.
The Executive Director would also be permitted to refer
particularly difficult decisions, or decisions requiring further

investigation, to the Review Board.

In deciding on appeals and-referrals from the Executive
Director, the Review Board would have authority to conduct

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hearings and subpoena records and witnesses.

The Review Board would have final say as to the release or
non-release of all materials, except that in the case of Executive
branch materials, the President would have the authority to
supersede the Board’s determination and postpone release. But
each time the President did so, he would be required to explain
his reasons, both in a notice to the public and to the Congress.
Decisions by the Review Board itself to postpone release of
records would also have to be explained to the public and

Congress.

Finally, under the Joint Resolution, no item would remain
permanently sealed. The Review Board, before finishing its work,
would designate as to every item still withheld a specified time
or a specified occurrence following which the item could be
released. The files would then be transferred to the Archives,
where the Archivist would have a continuing duty to reconsider
them for release under the standards set by the Joint Resolution.

a
Materials released by the Archivist or the Review Board would

be available in the Archives for public review and copying.

Our Joint Resolution makes clear that an Executive branch
agency or congressional committee retains its existing powers
under.the law to release a particular record even if the Joint
Resolution does not require it to do so, and that the members of

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the public can continue to use the Freedom of Information Act to

X.

request from the agencies documents related to the assassination.

Mr. Chairman, this Resolution may appear complicated, but the
matter of disclosure is itself complicated. It cannot be
accomplished arbitrarily or summarily. The process established by
the Resolution, in my view, is logical and takes account of all
the interests and equities in the disclosure of these documents.
In the end, I think it will result in all of the pertinent
information pertaining to the assassination of President Kennedy
being made public in a prompt and orderly way, and, in doing so,

will help restore confidence among the public in our Government.

Since the Joint Resolution was introduced, comments have been
received from the Justice Department as well as others suggesting

the need for change.

With regard to the reaction of the Justice Department, I must
say I found it very unfortunate that the Department chose to take
what I found to be an extreme, hard-line position in opposing many
of the key provisions of the Resolution. Rather than showing the
flexibility needed in this unique circumstance to deal |
cooperatively with the Congress on a matter that is a serious
concern for many Americans, the Justice Department chose to

reassert familiar claims of Executive privilege and all of the

other reasons asserted over the years to block the release of

government information.

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The whole point of this legislation was to create new
criteria and new procedures to maximize the release of information
hitherto withheld by the Government. The old laws and old.
procedures have been tried for the last 30 years, and have not
produced the type of disclosure needed to restore the confidence

of the American people.

It seems to me that just this once, where the public policy
interest in full disclosure of these records is so apparent, the
Justice Department could dispense with its usual "to-the-last-man"
defense of Executive branch prerogatives, and help us deal with

solving the problem.

I feel obliged to take special note of one point in the _
Justice Department letter, and that is their claim that the
Executive branch must have not only increased safeguards over its
own material -- but also have the ability to veto release of any
congressionally-created assassination record. This strikes. me as

®
preposterous, particularly coming from a department that is
ostensibly so concerned to preserve a separation of powers. If

Congress wants to release information it has developed, the

President should not be able to stand in the way.

Hopefully, the Committee will yet be able to obtain executive
branch cooperation and move forward with this process. The public
expects action on this matter, as the many letters, postcards, and

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telephone calls to congressional offices demonstrate.

x
ry

Having said this, there are, in fact, several points raised
by the Justice Department's letter, and by private citizens in
touch with me, which I believe merit further:consideration by the

Committee.

‘.. Perhaps the most important matter involves setting the.
boundaries of “assassination material." The Joint Resolution
defines “assassination material" as "a record that relates in any
manner or degree to the assassination of President John F.

Kennedy.... But given the wide range of theories that have

developed as to who killed President Kennedy and why, many types

of records arguably relate in some manner to the assassination.
What: records regarding, for example, Cuba, Vietnan,: and’ organized rs

crime should be covered? This matter requires careful

consideration.

The Justice Department urges a substantial narrowing of the
definition of “assassination material," apparently to only those
records that on their face directly concern the assassination. I
am concerned that this formulation may be too narrow. There is
widespread public suspicion that some sort of conspiracy led to
the murder of President Kennedy. If we go out of our way to avoid
records that might shed light on activities linked to such an |
alleged conspiracy, we make little progress toward assuring the
public that it has the full story. If we err on the side of

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inclusiveness, and as a result learn a bit more about the
operations of our government and our foreign policy in the early
1960's, I think we will benefit. My only concern would be that
the search becomes so broad that it delays action of the release
of documents clearly germane to the assassination. But where
records have already been segregated, such as the executive branch
materials obtained by the House Assassinations Committee, full

review is probably appropriate.

I do, however, suggest that the Committee, either in the
Joint Resolution itself or in report language, set more precise
parameters defining "assassination material," or else direct the
Review Board to do so promptly after it is established.
Otherwise, we may end with widely varying interpretations by the
various records agencies and committees as to what documents

should be forwarded to the Review Board executive director.

2. As the Justice Department’s letter to Chairman Glenn
noted, the Joint Resolution, as drafted, would give an agency or
committee control over release of a record it originated even if
that record contained information obtained from another agency or
committee. I agree that this provision should be changed to give
agencies authority over release of their own information. .
However, the change suggested in the Justice Department letter may
not by itself do the trick, because a record, for example a
lengthy congressional report, may contain both information

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+

.

developed by the body that created the record and information
originated by a- ‘xecutive agency. Instead of letting either of
these two “oric zing bodies" have veto power over the release of
an entire document, we should work out language that give an
agency or committee control over release of that portion of a

document for which it was responsible even if other information in

the document was originated elsewhere.

3. On reflection, I think it would be best to amend the
Joint Resolution to make the records of the Review Board itself
subject to the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act, and
to make the Board’s proceedings subject to the Sunshine Act and
the Administrative Procedures Act. A law mandating increased
government openness should not itself establish an exception from
general standards for accountability. I still’ strongly believe,
however, that we should avoid subjecting the Board to extensive
court litigation over the release of the J.F.K. files themselves
either under the standards set by the Joint Resolution or under

the Freedom of Information Act.

4. Section 11(a) should probably be amended to make clear
that the Joint Resolution’s provisions take precedence not only

over other laws, but also over executive orders and regulations.

5. A sentence might be added to Section 8(f) to ensure that
the public is clearly informed when summaries or substitutes are
released instead of actual records or information: “Any such

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summary or substitution shall be clearly labeled as such when

released to the public." :

6. The Joint Resolution should probably be amended to
recognize the records of the Rockefeller commission as a component
of this effort. The Archives would be the appropriate custodian
of Rockefeller commission materials for purposes of the Joint

Resolution.

I thank the Committee for this opportunity to express my

views on this measure.

-17-

Statement for the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,
May 12, 1992
CIA HAS NG CRJECTION TO .
. DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR s,
Ernest R. May = RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
.  iNTHIS DOCUMENT ~~~

It is an honor to be invited to ‘testify on this bill. —

I am.a professor af history. at Harvard University, where I
teach both in the history department and in the John F. Ken-
nedy School of Government. : While I have done research on

the history of intelligence agencies and have served in
Washington from time to time as a consultant, I do not speak .
as an expert on the matter before the committee. My com
ments are merely those of a historian looking at legislation
designed to unearth historical source material.

The bill now under consideration seeks to clear doubts
about President Kermedy’s murder. The Warren Comission had
the same aim. Its make-up was supposed to reassure the pub--
lic. It failed. The Commission reported in 1964. Almost

_within months, books challenging its ‘findings hit best—
seller lists. |
7 Over time, other theories multiplied. Now, it takes
whole books just to list books about the murder. Some of
these books picture the CIA or FBI as plotters. This is not
new. A number appeared in the 1970s. Recently, this par-
ticular set-of theories has found new life. Two books of
this genre reached best-seller lists in the spring of 1992,

and Oliver Stone’s filn, "EK," became a box office hit.

13-00000

we owe Om Pear ans ee at BOON AO deat PED se ° waver”.

The bill now under consideration would open records so
that the public can be reassured that these theories are
fantasies. The stated aim is to "contritwte to the trust of
the people in their government." | ;

’ ™o achieve this, the bill proposes to create a five—
person Review Board. As reassurance against a cover-up in
behalf of the President or Congress, the District of Colum-

-bia Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals would appoint the
Board. (The Supreme Court presumably is thought too
partisan; besides, it night bring to mind Chief Justice War-
ren.) ; |

The bill says that members of the Board are to be "dis-—
tinguished and impartial." Otherwise, it demands only that
they not be currently in government ‘employ and that they

‘never have been involved in any investigation of the Kennedy
murder. ; .

The Board and its Executive Director would have wide
povers. They would look at all materials relating to the
murder. re they suspect any agency of withholding material,
they would have a right to conduct a hunt. The bill gives .
the Board power to subpoena records and persons, to take
testimony under oath, to grant immunity to witmesses, and to

punish defiance.

13-00000
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The Board’s decisions are to be final unless the Presi~ —
dent himself intervenes to insist that some piece of in~
formation not be -released. The bill giving the Board its .
powers is to "take precedence over any other law, judicial
decision ..., or common law doctrine" that wight be in con- —
flict. |

My comments on this bill are mostly cautionary. I
question whether any legislation can achieve all that this
pill seeks to achieve. I question giving to a court-
appointed Review Board such broad responsibllities and
powers. I believe that a Review Board differently ‘selected,
with a more limited mandate, could do a better job.

“The first cautionary point concerns the aim of clearing
doubts about the Kennedy murder. Even if every bit of
relevant documentation becomes public, it will not yield a
story that all Americans will accept. Why should it?
Though we now know just about everything about the Pearl

_ Harbor attack, nev conspiracy theories continue to be woven.
One of the latest has Winston Churchill as the villain!

Despite more than a century of research, new theories
still appear about conspirators helping John Wilkes Booth
kill Lincoln. The chances are that the same will always be

true for Oswald and Kennedy. © After another decade or so,

13-00000

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2aead Ws ORY Adie Ete OV ws

however, Kennedy’s murder will probably become, like Lin-
coln’s, more an interest of buffs than of the public at

diaxge-.

es VU:

The chances of clearing away all doubts are lessened by

the fact that every bit of relevant documentation will not
be released. his bill itself speaks of protecting secret
agents and intelligence sources and methods. It speaks also
of privacy rights. CIA and FBI reports and National
Security Agency intercepts contain much material that, by
these criteria,- would have to remain secret.

In fact, still more material may be kept from the pub-
lic. This bill refers only to protecting the privacy of
living persons. If the Review Board yields to human feel-
ings, it may extend protection to families and friends.
Suppose, for example, that it sees raw FBI files recording
old accusations against some Cuban-Anerican. Even if the

person is dead, anyone ever connected with: that person could

suffer should the accusations become public. If the Review

Board suspects that the accusations were malicious and
false, will it not choose to leave the files secret?

Also, it has to be assumed that some files will torn
oat to have been lost or destroyed. The proposed Review
Board would thus have to confess ‘not only that it chose to

13-00000

leave some material under wraps but that other material was

. simply missing.. Would spinners of conspiracy. theories take

the Board’s word? Would they not instead accuse it of col-
Luding in concealment of "smoking guns"?

The Review Board would meanwhile. be under pressure not
to let privacy rights or other considerations inhibit
release of documents. Investigative reporters, writers, and
docudrama producers would hamer at it. So would scholars,
including many interested in subjects other than the Kennedy
marder. So would others with axes to grind.

Some ‘material sought might have only a remote rela-
tionship to the mrder. The clamor would be no less fero-
cious. How much of the central files. of the FBI and CIA
would have. to be opened, for example,.to persuade disciples

of Mark North or Mark Lane or Oliver Stone that neither FBI

nor CIA officers participated in a morder plot?

The Review Board. would surely be urged to pursue data
on the possible involvement of right-wing extremists. Oob-

vious items would include not: only FBI files but aiso tax

' yeturns. Imagine the scope of possible documentation if, in

feixrness, the Review Board also sought data on financial ©

transactions by individuals associated with Vice President

Lyndon Johnson!

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I’ forecast, in other words, that'new evidence will not
dispel conspiracy theories. At most, it will curb some of
‘the more adventurous theorizing.

I also forecast that, if release of the evidence is
managed as this-bill proposes, one of two results will. fol-
low.

If the Review Board yields to outside pressures, it
will conduct a fishing expedition. Much embarrassing and

possibly harmful information will be made public. Alterne-

tively, the Review Board ‘will resist pressure. It will -
define its mandate narrowly. It will be prudent in what it’
reveals. It will then ‘be accused of a "whitewash." The
latter result could make matters worse rather than better.
Suspicion could be fed, not eallayed. - .

There may, however, be better means of doing what needs

doing. ‘The current bill would have the Rqview Board and its

Executive Director examine ali materials to ‘be released.

They would be charged with ferreting out ‘undisclosed nateri-

goog

al, and they would have effective responsibility for decid-

ing what would and would not be released.
An: alternative would be @ bill simply enjoining holders
of records to identify and locate materials that, in the

language of the current bill, "relates in any manner or de-

13-00000

grea" to the murder-of President Kennedy. The injunction
| would apply to all congressional committees and all exvecu-—

’ tive agencies, including the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Ser-
vice, and the National Archives. The bill could direct __
these record-holders to make the materials public. It could
specify that the only materials to be held back would be
those itemized in the current bill -_ agents, intelligence
sources and methods, etc.

Where legislative writ does not run or is disputable, a
statute could urge voluntary action. “ghe current bill asks
such cooperation from state and local agencies and foreign
governments. A statute that sought to svoid constitutional
disputes conld ask the same of the President regarding
records of the ‘White House. and Executive office.

This alternative hill could require or request public
reports describing materials withheld from release —- their
, characteristics and quantities, the genexal reasons for non-

disclosure, and plans for eventual release. .

| A Review Board could -be created with a limited — and
more workable -— mandate.

Its first duty could be to review record-holders’
guidelines. These might well differ from agency to agency.
Procedures for searching National Security Agency files of

13-00000

communications intercepts might not be the same as those for

searching the much less voluminous files of CIA stations and

headquarters divisions. The Board could try, however, to

ensure comparative uniformity in the diligence of searches.
The Board could try also to ensure comparative

‘uniformity in definitions of what is to be withheld. It

might urge, for exemple, that the intelligence sources and

methods criterion apply only to sources and methods in cur-
rent use, not just to amy ever used.

. The Board’s second duty could be to scan materials that

_ record-holders proposed actually to withhold. The Board

might question record-holders’ decisions. If so, it could

ask that the agency or committee think again. rf dif-
ferences continued, the Board could appeal to the President
or, for “Congressional documents, to the President of the
Senate « or the Speaker of the House.

In a final public report, the Board could describe any
still umresolved differences. While the description would
be in generalities, the issues vould become publicly known.
The broad purpose of the Board’s report would be to validate:
the record-holders’ non-disclosure decisions.

Such a Review Board could be selected by comparatively
traditional methods. Nominations could be asked of the

13-00000

ae ee Pe ee 2 dade Oe wl

‘American Bar Association, the American Historical Associa-
tion, the american Political Science Association, or kindred
bedies.. Appointments could be made by the President, with

_ advice and consent of the Senate.

Uniess the quantity of material withheld. proved to be
mich larger than I would expect, the Review Board could be
kept small. It conid probably manage with minimal staff..

I believe that this alternative statute would ac-
complish all that can be accomplished. It would Leave the

_ onus for release or non-release of records on those already

familiar with these records. Committees of Congress would
make rules for their files. The President, the heads of de-
partments; the Directors of Central intelligence and the

M012

FBI, and the archivist of the United states would make rules

for theirs.

This alternative statute would limit the powers and

_ responsibilities to be thrust on an untried and potentially

vulnerable Review Board. It would create a Board with the

assignment only of checking the coherence and consistency of

. oriteriza:' for aisclesure and non-disclosure.

Since the invitation to testify included questions

reaching beyond the current bill, I take the opportunity to |

respond to that concerning general declassification

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10

policies. I believe the procedure just outlined could be’
applied much more widely. A statute could declere that all
government records more than thirty years oid would become
public unless the originating agency showed specific cause
for continued non-disclosure. A Board or Commission ap~ .
pointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate could have euthority to review all such naterials and
to question or appeal the non-disclosure. This approximates
practice in the United Kingdom.
. In conclusion, X repeat a verning ageinst expecting any
| legislation to create consensus and thereby "contribute to .
the trust o£ the people in their government." Inventors of
conspiracy. theories will alwaya be more ingenious than as-
semblers of evidence. The imediate result of releasing
records will be, moreover, to provide grist for the .
theorists’ milis. Even if everything were released tomor~
row, it would take at least a decade for researchers to sort
the newly released materials. In the meantime, conspiracy
builders would be picking out those bits and pices of evi-
Gence that suited them. In the long run, release of docu-
ments will get us closer to truth; but, as Keynes observed,
thet. long rom. probably stretches beyond any of our

lifetimes.

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4 '
4 6
a! o

TESTIMONY OF-JAMES H. LESAR
PRESIDENT

ASSASSINATION ARCHIVES AND RESEARCH CENTER

ON
S.J. RES. 282

"THE ASSASSINATION MATERIALS DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1992"
BEFORE
THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

. May 12, 1992

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¢)

000

dy

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

I am honored to have this opportunity to testify before you

on the legislation to require the government to release its records

pertaining to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I
appear on behalf of the Assassination Archives and Research Center
("the AARC"), of which I am President. The AARC is a private, non-
profit organization which collects, preserves and disseminates
information and materials on political assassinations. The AARC
is funded by membership dues and donations from the public. I am
an attorney specializing in Freedom of Information Act litigation,
and have litigated well over 100 such lawsuits. Over the past
twenty years I have represented nearly all of the major authors and
researchers who have litigated their Freedom of Information Act
requests for records pertaining to the assassination of President
Kennedy. To date, I have handled over fifty such lawsuits.

I have carefully studied the proposed legislation. I have
also read the letter which you received from the Department of
Justice. I have heard that the Administration pay seek to achieve
its goals, particularly that of using more restrictive standards
for release of Executive Branch records, by issuing an executive
order rather than awaiting action by Congress. In my mind the only
thing worse than seeing the Justice Department's wishes granted in
legislation would be to see them set forth in a stand-alone
executive order which goes unchallenged by Congress. . Legislation

is needed to bring each branch of government which holds records

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Pe)

3

on to the same playing field, and to create a process which is
accountable, independent and credible. Incorporating the Justice
Department's restrictive standards in an executive order would
duplicate the devastating damage to the ideal ‘of full disclosure
which occurred when the Reagan Administration successfully
sabotaged the 1974 amendments to Exemption 1. by drastically
altering the standards for classifying information in the interests
of national security.

The difficulty which researchers have had gaining access to
Kennedy assassination materials amply demonstrates the need to
alter the standards employed by the FOIA and the current executive
order on national security classification. If you support release
of the Kennedy assassination records, you cannot favor the Justice
Department's recipe of simply mixing one part political will to
three parts of existing standards and stir. You must substantially
liberalize the existing standards and make it stick.

A few illustrations from my practice will- show the
inadequacies of the FOIA and the enormous frustration which accrues
to those who attempt to use it to obtain infermation about the
Kennedy assassination. These examples reveal a pattern of delay,
costly litigation, and untrue representations by the government.
Cases brought in the 1980's also show that massive withholding of
information, with little significant information being released.

Case 1: In 1969 Harold Weisberg, a leading Warren Commission
critic, made a simple request to the FBI. He wanted to see the

results of the spectrographic. tests which had been conducted on

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bullet(s), bullet fragments and items of evidence allegedly struck
by bullets during the assassination of President Kennedy. Denied
access by the FBI and the Attorney General, in 1970 he brought
suit. A four-year legal battle ensued. First, the district court,
relying on the Justice Department's representation that it was not
in the national interest to release the results of these scientific
tests, denied his request. A court of Appeals panel reversed, but
the dissenting judge wrote a scathing opinion in which he referred
to FOIA requesters as "rummaging writers" and characterized
Weisberg as "some party off the street." Stating that the FOIA
"forfend(ed) against" Weisberg's proposed further inquiry into the
Kennedy assassination, he concluded his dissent with a Latin phrase
in capital letters, "REQUIESCAT IN PACE." "Rest in Peace." But
the case did not rest in peace. The Justice Department sought a
rehearing before the full court, which was granted. On rehearing
en banc, the full court ruled that the files of the FBI were exempt
from the FOIA's disclosure requirements. That case set a precedent

so bad that when Congress first amended the FOIA in 1974, it

‘specifically overturned the Weisberg case, requiring that the FBI

and other law enforcement agencies demonstrate that allegedly
exempt records fall within one or more of six enumerated harms.
In 1975, when the new amendments took effect, Weisberg again
brought suit on his request for the spectrographic analyses, this
time adding a request for neutron activation testing on the same
evidentiary items. This new phase of the battle lasted eight years

and involved three trips to the’ Court of Appeals. Ultimately,

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Weisberg obtained important records on these scientific tests,
including records that the FBI had first said did not exist, then
claimed were missing or destroyed. Other records were never
located or were meaningless. From the date of the first request,
the legal battles lasted fourteen years. .

"case 2: In 1980 another requester asked the CIA to release
all of the records it had made available to the House Select
Committee on Assassinations. The CIA refused and the requester
brought suit. In court the CIA stated that there were
approximately 300,000 pages of records responsive to the request.

I spent the first three years of this lawsuit litigating four

‘threshold issues raised by the Government. Had-my client lost any

one of these four threshold issues, the CIA would not have had to.
release a single page from its 300,000 page collection.

By 1984 the CIA had begun to release a trickle of documents.
Although the .cIA told the court that it had assigned seven people
to work on the request, it processed the documents at an incredibly
slow pace. When it became evident that it would take the CIA
several decades to process all of the documents, the requester had
no choice but to drastically limit the scope of his request. Thus,
he entered into a stipulation which restricted his request to some
of the subjects discussed ‘in the report of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations and its supporting volumes. Although
the CIA's job of reviewing documents was reduced by more than one-
half, it took several more years for it to complete processing of

the remaining documents. Moreover, the CIA continued to withhold

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virtually everything. Only a few thousand pages were released, and
most of them consisted of newspaper clippings, records that
previously had been released, or documents that were heavily
redacted.

Case 3: In 1976, Dr. Paul Hoch requested two batches of CIA
documents which had remained to be processed after the CIA had made
its initial releases of Kennedy assassination documents. Many of
the records responsive to this request related to the 1966-1969
investigation and trial of Clay Shaw by New Orleans District
Attorney Jim Garrison, who charged that Shaw, David Ferrie and
others had plotted to kill the President. The CIA repeatedly. told
Hoch that his request was being processed and that if he would only
be patient the documents would be released in "a few months," "in
six to eight weeks," "in the near future." Indeed,. Hoch received
such assurances on no less than 11 different occasions over a six-
year period.. After having been strung-out for six years, Hoch
retained counsel and filed suit. After the suit was filed,
evidence was developed. which indicated that all the CIA had done >
over the previous six years was to number the gocuments. It had
numbered several documents one month, a few more another month, a
couple more the next month. Then, in one month, it engaged in a
veritable orgy of numeration, numbering, as I recall, nearly a
hundred documents that month. . .

A few months.after Hoch filed his complaint in district court,:
the CIA produced 808 pages. It also continued to withhold a

considerable volume of materials, mostly on grounds of national

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security or because disclosure allegedly would identify
intelligence sources and methods. The district court upheld all
of the CIA's exemption claims save one. This one was an 11l-page
memorandum which the CIA swore must be withheld in its entirety
under Exemption 5's deliberative process privilege. The judge
ordered this anonymous, undated memorandum disclosed. Then things
got really interesting. The CIA moved the judge to reconsider his
order on this memorandum, asserting that it had claimed, albeit
obscurely, that this document was also withheld in its entirety
under Exemptions 1 and 3 in order to protect national security and
intelligence sources and methods. But before the court could act
on the motion for reconsideration, the CIA rushed to court with a
new revelation: the eleven-page memo, which dealt with the

CIA/Mafia plots to kill Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro, matters

‘exposed by the Church Committee in 1975, had been released nearly

in full almost a decade earlier, by the CIA itself.
Case 4: In 1969, Harold Weisberg made a request for FBI
records on the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. J.

Edgar Hoover himself ordered that no response be made to this

‘request. In 1975, when the amended FOIA became effective, Weisberg

submitted a new request for King assassination records. He
specifically included a request for crime scene photographs. After
he filed suit, the FBI claimed that it did not have any crime scene
photographs. This statement was false. Ultimately, the FBI
released more than 150 crime scene photographs to Weisberg.

During the same case, Weisberg picked up indications that an

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FBI supervisor named Long had kept a tickler on the King
assassination. A tickler is a file containing extra copies of
documents kept at hand so it can be immediately retrieved. The
FBI first denied that such a tickler file had been kept. Then it
Claimed that it could not locate it. After a long period of
resistance, the Justice Department finally located the Long tickler
exactly where Weisberg had suggested they look for it. When
finally located, most of the file had been gutted.

Weisberg's suit for the King assassination documents lasted
15 years. He obtained approximately 60,000 pages. If the same
suit were filed today, I believe that he would get about one-fourth
of what he obtained in the late 1970's and early 1980's.

These stories that I have related are unusual only because the
requesters actually went to court to fight the CIA and FBI. Most
requesters cannot afford the time or the money of litigating their
FOIA requests. against these agencies. You might be tempted to
conclude from the absence of litigation that the FOIA is working
just fine. The opposite is true. The FOIA has been severely
damaged by the 1984 amendments eliminating access to CIA
operational files and by the 1986 amendments to Exemption 7, which
applies to law enforcement records, as well as by a string of
decisions in the Supreme court and the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia which have greatly expanded
the amount of material which can be withheld from the public.

Let me add that while it is important to have obtained the

public pledges from CIA Director Gates and FBI Director Sessions

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9
which you heard today, if you support release of the records, you

must also ensure that you have the support of other agencies,

. including the Department of Defense, the Treasury Department, the

State Department, and such divisions as the Secret Service and the
National Security Agency.

I wish to caution that while I think that this legislation
will result in greatly enriching our fund of knowledge about the
Kennedy assassination and the official investigations of it, at
least if modified along the lines I suggest in the attachment to
this statement, I do not believe that there is likely to be any
"smoking gun," which will “solve the case." Rather, . this
legislation must be defended on the ground that the American people
have a right to the fullest possible disclosure so they can make
of it what they will. It will take much time to read, analyze, and _
understand the information released. Whether it will lead to the
resolution of any controversies which beset this subject remains
to be seen, but it is a course which cannot be avoided. The
American people want to know the details of their history, however
painful and puzzling it may be, and that is their right.

The proposed legislation has both strengths and weaknesses.
I am attaching to this statement a detailed discussion of the joint
resolution which includes a number of recommendations for changes.
To briefly summarize, the major provisions of the bill include: a
definition of "assassination materials," the composition of the
Review Board, and the standards for the postponement of the release

of information. |The standards for postponement are critical

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10

because they determine the. amount of material which may be
withheld. |

Before discussing the limitations on the term “assassination
material" as related to the assassination of President John F.
Kennedy, I note that this section excludes records on the
assassinations of Senator Robert F. Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. The House Select Committee on Assassinations ("HSCA")
conducted an extensive investigation on Dr. King's assassination
and concluded that his murder probably involved a conspiracy.
Public belief that Dr. King was killed as a result of a conspiracy
and that this crime remains unsolved is widespread. The alleged
assassin, James Earl Ray, denies that he shot Dr. King. Unless the
importance of historical issues is to be determined by whether a
movie has been made about them, there is no justification for
excluding the King assassination records from this legislation.

The assassination of Senator Robert F. Kennedy is equally the
subject of profound controversy. Recently, a group of
distinguished citizens have submitted a lengthy petition to the Los
Angeles County Grand Jury to investigate evidence that the Los
Angeles Police Department engaged in “willful and corrupt
misconduct" in its investigation of Senator Kennedy's
assassination. In support of these charges, the group submitted

more than 800 pages of exhibits, mainly derived from the Los

Angeles Police Department's own files, which document its charges:

that L.A.P.D. destroyed crucial items of evidence, ignored material

evidentiary leads, cannot account’ for important missing evidence,

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11
engaged in a cover-up of its failures, and failed to conduct a
thorough investigation of the crime. The records of federal
agencies and congressional committees relevant to Senator Kennedy's
assassination should also be included in this legislation.

The term Nassassination material" is broadly defined, but it
falls short of ensuring that scholars will have all of the
documents which they need in order to properly study the subject.
It should include policy documents which provide the context of
decisions in the Kennedy Administration which may shed light on
the assassination. It should include, as it presently does, all
documents obtained or created by any previous official
investigation. It should include materials on those persons who
have figured in previous official investigations: state, Federal
or local. Because no one can predict in advance where new avenues
of study may lead, or what they may produce, the definition should
be flexible enough to provide scholars with those materials
reasonable calculated to shed light on the assassination or its
investigations. Finally, it should also include information
records on agency operations and functions which may be relevant
to the study of the assassination.

The current provision defining assassination materials
contains an exemption for “personnel matters oor other
administrative affairs of a congressional committee, the Warren
Commission, or any entity within the Executive Branch of
Government." I strongly oppose this exclusion. The Warren

Commission records on this subject have been publicly available

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12

through the National Archives for many years and should not now be
made secret. The work of prior commissions and committees isa
perfectly legitimate subject, but it has been the subject of some
secrecy which has impeded the public's right to know. In
particular, the staff of the House Assassinations Committee, with
the exception of its General Counsel and Staff Director, G. Robert
Blakey, pledged an oath of secrecy about their work. Blakey has
published a commercial book about the committee's work, and is
quite public and outspoken about it. Because of the secrecy oath,
others who are quite knowledgeable about the Committee's work have
been silenced. The public has been denied their views and their
information. In this regard, I would urge the insertion of an
additional provision in this legislation which would rescind any
secrecy oaths taken by the staffs of any previous congressional or
executive branch commission or committee.

This provision would also be used to prohibit release of
information regarding a very troubling incident in which the House
Select Committee discovered that its most sensitive files on the
Kennedy assassination had been rifled by a CIA liaison officer
assigned to assist the committee. According to published accounts
in the Washington Post, this officer, Regis fT. Blahut,
surreptitiously entered the safe reserved for physical evidence of
President Kennedy's assassination, including autopsy photos, X-
rays, and other articles, including the so-called "magic bullet"
that wounded both Kennedy and Texas Governor John Connally.

According to the Post, Blahut was given several polygraph

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examinations. He was asked whether he did it, and according to one
source, he flunked that. He was asked whether anyone had ordered
him to do it, and he is said to have flunked that question too.
Materials regarding incidents of this kind should be fully
available to the public.

A second problem with this legislation is that is proposes to
exclude from the Review Board anyone who has had "previous
involvement with the investigation or inquiry relating to the
assassination of President John F. Kennedy." I believe this is too
broad and should be limited to involvement in prior "official"
investigations. Having a panel of Kennedy assassination agnostics
might have some idealistic allure, but the public is unlikely to
be persuaded that the government intends to disclose all pertinent
materials if the panel does not include experienced and
knowledgeable Kennedy researchers.

A third and critically important area that needs refinement
is the standards for postponement of disclosure. Particularly
significant is the need to narrow the definition of the term
“intelligence source" and the term “intelligence method."
Virtually all information an intelligence agency document can be
withheld under these terms. "Intelligence source" must be defined
to make clear that it does not include dead sources who have been
the subject of widespread publicity that is tantamount to official
acknowledgement, .and sources who are willing to have their:
identities disclosed, and sources who cannot reasonably be expected

to suffer death or serious bodily harm if their identities are

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disclosed. Similar restrictions must be put on the term
"confidential source." With respect to intelligence methods, it

must be made clear that this term does not include outmoded
methods, methods which are known to the public or methods’ which may
be commonly deduced. Nor should it include methods that are known
to other hostile intelligence services.

New legislation is needed. Half measures will not do. If
this legislation does succeed in substantially clearing the air,
it does not convince the public that nothing of critical importance
to our understanding has been withheld but for the very best. of
reasons, then public cynicism about government will continue to
increase.

I ask that additional comments be placed in the record.

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ANALYSIS AND COMMENTS

on S. J. Res. 282

Sec. 3. Definitions

(2) “Assassination material" is broadly defined but still may
fall far short of the documents which scholars need in order to
properly study the Kennedy assassination. In essence, the present
definition limits "assassination materials" to those records which
have figured in previous inquiries by Congressional committees or
Executive Branch agencies or commissions. Since these entities may
not have asked for all of the relevant records, and may in fact not
have asked for records on some relevant subject areas, the

definition of "assassination material" needs further refinement.

. It should be modified to indicate that "assassination material"

includes any material which any member of the Assassination
Materials Review Board ("AMRB") or any individual seeking release
under the Freedom of Information Act ("the FOTA"), can plausibly
contend may shed light on the assassination or any of its
investigations.

The definition also contains two explicit exclusions. The
first of these excludes material to the extent that it pertains "to
personnel matters oor other administrative affairs of a
congressional committee, the Warren Commission, or any entity

within the Executive Branch of “the Government. . . . " This

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language could be used to prohibit release of materials pertaining
to Regis Blahut, the CIA employee suspected of tampering with
autopsy materials pertaining to the Kennedy assassination.

The second exclusion relates to the autopsy materials donated
by the Kennedy family to the National Archives. This assumes that
the autopsy materials were those of the Kennedy family to give to
the Archives. This legitimizes a bad precedent. The autopsy
materials ought to be subject to public, not private, control. The
remedy for abuse of autopsy materials should be a newly created
right of legal action by family members rather than denial or
public access.

Sec. 5. Assassination Materials Review Board

(b) Court of Appeals division shall appoint "5 distinguished

and impartial private citizens, none of whom are presently

employees of any branch of the Government and none of whom shall

have had any previous involvement with any investigation or inquiry
relating to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, to
serve as members of the Review Board."

Query: Is this language designed tq exclude private
citizens who have written or spoken critically of the official
investigations of President Kennedy's assassinations? Or only
those persons who participated in official investigations or
inquiries? If it excludes the former, then it will be difficult
to find individuals who are sufficiently knowledgeable about.
Kennedy assassination matters to make the judgments called for by

the Joint Resolution (i.e., defining what materials are related to

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the assassination and whether the public interest in disclosure
outweigh other concerns). Additionally, without such persons on
the Review Board, it may be difficult to persuade the public that
all pertinent materials will be disclosed, thus undercutting the
objective of restoring trust in government. A committee of
distinguished citizens who know nothing about the subject is not

likely to inspire trust.

Sec. 6. Grounds for Postponement of Disclosure

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may be postponed if its
release would (A) reveal "an intelligence asset."

This must be qualified. It should only apply to living,
covert intelligence agents. Furthermore, if material in the public
domain identifies or suggests the identity of an intelligence
agent, the presumption should be that such material shall be
disclosed unless the agency which employed the agent can show by
clear and convincing evidence that serious damage to the agent can
reasonably be expected to result from disclosure.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure may he postponed if its
release would (B) reveal "an intelligence source or method which
is currently utilized, or reasonably expected to be utilized, by
the United States Government. . . ."

‘This provision also must be modified. The first problem is
that there is no limiting definition of “intelligence source of:
method." Under this proviso, it would be possible to withhold such

"intelligence sources" as newspapers, libraries, law enforcement

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4
agencies, etc., as well as. the personnel affiliated with them.
Research in a public library is an “intelligence method, " and it,
too, is no doubt currently utilized. A fortiori would this
definition include the surveillance techniques employed at the
Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City.

The "intelligence source" definition should be limited to
living sources in circumstances where disclosure could reasonably
be expected to result in actual serious personal damage to the
source. Where disclosure of the identity of the source will not
cause serious actual damage to the current national defense or
foreign policy interests of the United States or where the identity
of the source has become publicly known or is likely to have become
Known to any hostile or formerly hostile foreign power or an agency
thereof, it should be released.

"Intelligence methods" must also be modified so that it
applies only to methods that are unknown to the public. or to
foreign intelligence agencies.

Subsection 1 states that disclosure maybe postponed if its
release would (C) reveal “any other matter currently relating to
the military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign
relations of the United States; and the threat to the military
defense or conduct of foreign relations of the Unites States posed
by its disclosure is of such gravity that it outweigh any public
interest in its disclosure.

The chief problem with this provision is that there is no

standard for what constitutes a’ “public interest" of sufficient

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5
moment to outweigh any of the putative threats. Is the general
interest in the fullest possible disclosure a public interest which
may be considered, or must a showing of public interest in the
substantive content of the material at issue be shown?

Subsection 2 provides that invasion of the privacy of a living
person is a grounds for postponement of disclosure "if that
invasion of privacy is so substantial that it outweigh any public
interest in its disclosure."

This exemption contains a phrase stating that it applies
"whether the person is identified in the material or not." This
phrase should be stricken. With this phrase included this
provision is significantly less liberal than current FOIA exemption

6, which covers only those invasions which result from the actual

production of the materials themselves. Additionally, some content... -

needs to be given to the invasion of privacy concept. One
limitation would be that it must cause an actual as opposed to a
theoretical invasion of privacy. A second that it relates only to
intimate personal matters the disclosure of which would be likely
to have profound adverse impact on an individual.

Subsection 3 states that disclosure may be postponed if its
release would constitute "a substantial and unjustified violation
of an understanding of confidentiality between a Government agent
and a witness or a foreign government. .. ."

This provision needs to be amended to include only those
promises of confidentiality--either to a witness or a foreign

government--made in writing. _ Among the reasons for this are the

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fact that (1) if the promise of confidentiality is not required to
have been made in writing, then there is seldom any effective means
to counter the agency's claim of confidentiality and the agency
wins by default; and (2) the agency's claim of confidentiality
frequently reflects not the desire of the witness but its own
desire for secrecy.

This provision needs to be amended to make it clear that it
does not authorize withholding of the identify of, or information
provided by, a deceased witness. Secondly, there should also be
some time limitation on any understanding of confidentiality made
with a foreign government. And perhaps there should be a
requirement that the foreign government officially object to each
such disclosure in writing. .

Additionally, it should be made clear, either in the text or
in the legislative history, that it is not a “substantial and
unjustified violation of a promise of confidentiality to disclose
information supplied by a witness if the identity of the witness
can be concealed. .

Section 8. Determinations by the Review Board

Subsection (g) provides that any decision of the AMRB that a
record is not assassination material or that disclosure should be
postponed "shall not be subject to judicial review."

Why not? Likely to pose less of a burden and expense than
litigation under the FOIA.

Subsection (h) (2) provides that the President may certify that

material "qualifies for postponement of disclosure pursuant to

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*

7
section 6, in which case release of the material shall be
postponed, and this decision shall not be subject to judicial
review."

There is no limitation on the duration of postponement by the
President. Suggest that the maximum period of time be that portion
of the President's term which remains.

Section 11. Rules of Construction

Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the Joint Resolution
shall be construed to eliminate any right to file requests with any
Executive agency other than the Review Board or seek judicial
review of the decisions of such agencies under the FOIA.

One problem here is that transferring all agency records to
the Review Board may mean that they are no longer “agency records"
within the meaning of the FOIA." |

A second problem is that this provision eliminates the AMBR
from FOIA coverage. This sets a bad precedent and sets up
circumstances of highest irony in which an agency whose overriding
mission is openness will itself operate in secrecy.

A provision should be added here stating that in any FOIA
action involving assassination materials the court is to apply the
standards for postponement set forth in the Assassination Materials
Disclosure Act in lieu of the exemptions provided in the FOTIA.

Additional Notes

It may be a good idea to expressly mention the Rockefeller

Commission as subject to the Act.

*

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«

*

CIA HAS NO OBIECTION 79
. DECLASS IFICATIO’
fudge John R. Tunheim ° N AND/OR
Judge J RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
f

Chairman
Assassination Records Review Boari!’ THIS DOCUMENT

Prepared Testimony In Support of
FLR. 1553,
To amend the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
to extend the authorization of the Assassination Records Review Board
until September 30, 1998.

Before the
N ational Security, International Affairs and Criminal Justice Subcommittee,
; House Government Reform and Oversight Committee

June 4, 1997

I. Introduction

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the
opportunity to testify on behalf of the Assassination Records Review Board in support
of H.R. 1553, which would extend the authorization of the Review Board for one final
year. The Board acknowledges that all of the issues surrounding the assassination of
President Kennedy will likely never be fully resolved, however, this additional time
‘will allow us to complete our work, including the review and public release of critical
FBI and CIA ¢ecords, submit a comprehensive and complete final report to the
Congress and the President, and make available to the American public.as much
information as possible on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

I would also like to take this opportunity to thank Chairman Burton for introducing
HLR. 1553, and Congressmen Waxman and Stokes for cosponsoring this bill. These
Members have exhibited an admirable bipartisan spirit and an understanding that we
as a government, and as a nation, must bring closure to a sad chapter of our history,
and that we must seize this opportunity to do it now. In addition, we would like to
express our appreciation to Chairman Hastert for chairing this hearing today. It
provides an opportunity to explain what the Review Board has accomplished to date
and discuss how we could finish our work in Fiscal Year 1998, if given the opportunity.

Please allow me to introduce the other members of the Review Board with whom I have
had the professional honor and personal pleasure to work: Dr. Henry F. Graff,

_ Professor Emeritus of History, Columbia University; Dr. Kermit L. Hall, Dean, College

of Humanities, and Professor of History and Law, The Ohio State University; Dr.
William L. Joyce, Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and Special Collections,
Princeton University; and Dr. Anna K. Nelson, Distinguished Adjunct Historian in

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_ Residence, The American University. We have been honored to engage in this

important effort to make the history of the Kennedy assassination available to the
American public and I am pleased to be here today to testify before this Subcommittee
and answer any of your questions.

I would also like to describe briefly the professional staff that we are fortunate to have
hired. The Executive Director is Dr. David G.: Marwell, a professional historian who
gained vast experience dealing with large numbers of important historical documents .
with the Office of Special Investigations at the Department of Justice and later as the
Director of the Berlin Document Center. He leads a staff of 28 full-time employees, who
have varied backgrounds as historians, lawyers, analysts, investigators, and
administrators. The members of the staff have approached their unique task with
seriousness of purpose, creativity, professionalism, and competence, and have assisted
us in shedding new light on the assassination through the release of thousands of
Federal Government records, and the acquisition of records in private hands and local
governments that were not previously-available to the American public-: ‘I believe’ that. -:
we assembled exactly the typé: ‘Of professional and diversified staff that Congress °°
envisioned would be necessary to accomplish this difficult assignment.

I. Accomplishments to Date

As I know you are aware, the Review Board was created by The President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (JFK Act) as an independent
Federal agency to oversee the identification and release of records related to the
assassination of President Kennedy. I know that certain members of this subcommittee
played a role in crafting and passing the JFK Act—a unique piece of legislation
designed to remove doubt and speculation about the content of government records
related to the assassination of President Kennedy. As a result of these lingering
suspicions, Congress determined that an independent board was the most effective and
efficient vehicle to make all assassination records available to the public.

The Review Board has accomplished much since we began releasing previously secret
records in June of 1995. The Board has acted to transfer more than 14,000 documents to
the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection (JFK Collection) at the
National Archives and Records Administration. We would not have been successful in
our efforts without the significant assistance of the National Archives. The JFK
Collection currently totals approximately 3.7 million pages and is used extensively by
researchers from all over the United States.

By the end of Fiscal Year 1997, the Review boat will have reviewed and processed .
nearly all.of the assassination records that have been identified by the more than 30
different government offices believed to be in possession of relevant records, with the

important exception of the FBI and the CIA. I will elaborate on the status of records
held by these two agencies later. The overwhelming majority of previously redacted -
information will have been made public by the Review Board.

Before discussing what we will accomplish with one final year, I would like to highlight
for the Members of the Subcommittee some of the important records that the Board has
made public. They include:

* Thousands of CIA documents on Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of
President Kennedy that made.up the CIA’s Oswald File and detail the agency’s
investigative activities following the assassination; _

* Thousands of once-secret records from the investigation by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, chaired-by- Gongressman: Stokes, including the:
controversial Staff Report on Oswald‘s trip'té Mexico City; «°~":

# Thousands of records from the FBI's core and related assassination files that
document the FBI's interest in Oswald from 1959-63, after he had defected to the
Soviet Union, three years before the assassination; and.

* The extensive FBI files on its investigation of the assassination.

The important work in which the Review Board has been engaged can be best and most
graphically demonstrated by showing you the “before” and “after” versions of one of
the pre-assassiniation FBI documents to which I just referred and that the Board has
released to the public. Prior to the Review Board’s review, this FBI document (JFK
Collection Record Number: 124-10023-10236, Attachment Number 1) was available to
the public as you see it on the left. As you can see, it is heavily redacted. The only
information that was not secret was the date of the memorandum, “October 12, 1960,”
that it was to the “Director, FBI,” from “Legat, Paris” (the FBI representative in Paris),
that the subject was “Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security,” and that it had to do with

a “Paris letter 9/27/60.” The rest of the text was blacked out. Obviously, this version
of the document left room for a great deal of speculation among historians and
researchers regarding what was underneath the black ink on this document with the
provocative subject title.

The Review Board aggressively pursued the release of the redacted information in this
document and several others that relate to the FBI's interest in Oswald before the
assassination. After protracted negotiations with the FBI, an initial FBI appeal to the
White House in an effort to keep the document secret, and a direct appeal to the Swiss


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government, we were able to release the information. The unredacted memorandum
shows that the Swiss Federal Police had been enlisted by the FBI to try to locate Oswald
and to determine whether or not he had enrolled at a school in Switzerland. Now the.
public is able to see the document in full and judge its importance. In its redacted state,
the document could have meant anything that a researcher’s imaginationand -.
speculation could invent. In its released form, it must be analyzed for what it says.

One of the most important, most difficult, and most time-consuming responsibilities of
the Review Board is to identify and locate additional records-that are relevant to the
assassination. This is a task that to some degree must logically come later in the
process, after the Review Board has gained a full understanding of the records that have
already been identified. Although the Review Board has made a significant number of
requests for additional records and information, some of which I would like to outline,

much remains to be done before tt canbe be confident that it has completed. this. eek ste tke

responsibility. feconamer ibis

I would like to highlight some of our efforts to identify and locate additional.
assassination records. Some examples:

* Medical Records Inquiry. The Review Board has several ongoing efforts to
identify and locate assassination records involving medical issues. As with any
homicide, the medical records are among the most important pieces of evidence.
As part of its attempt to ensure that the medical records are as complete as_ .
possible, the Review Board staff has deposed the principal pathologists involved

' in President Kennedy's autopsy, as well as other individuals who had
knowledge of the autopsy and related photographic records.

Review Board has continued its efforts to locate additional FBI assassination
records by making several requests for records and information. The FBI has
assisted in this effort by giving the Review Board members access to requested
files. The JFK Task Force at the FBI has, on the whole, been extremely -
cooperative and helpful to the Board and has provided the requested
information.

Review Board has initiated a number of requests to the CIA for additional
information and records.: The Review Board expects that these requests will be’
promptly and fully satisfied during the upcoming year.

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Information. Time consuming and careful r review ‘of Secret Service activities by
the Review Board produced a series of requests for additional recordsand = *
information that, in turn, led to the identification of additional relevant
assassination records. For example, in response to the Review Board's first eight
requests for additional information, the Secret Service has submitted more than
1,500 pages of material.

Department of Defense (including it its many components and the oe
services) (collectively “DOD”), identified few assassination records on its own
initiative. DOD has nevertheless been cooperative with the efforts of the Review
Board to locate assassination records. When such records have been located,
DOD has been willing to release the records with few redactions.

Additional work would be required in‘ourlast year to.ensure that all.*: 242 t= er
assassination records in the military‘archives have been made a part of the TION
Collection. Fortunately, the diligent efforts of the ARRB staff have set the stage
for accomplishing this task.

V. Release of Private and Local Records

In addition to the release of records in the Federal Government's vast files,and
consistent with the Board’s mandate to make the historical record of the assassination as
complete as possible, we have been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant
assassination-related records in the possession of private citizens and Ic
governments, including:

* The original personal papers of Warren Commission Chief Counsel J. Lee Rankin
that give further insight into the operations of the Commission;

* Copies of the official records of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison’s
investigation of the assassination;

* The original papers of New Orleans attorney Edward Wegmann, from his work
as a member of the legal team that successfully defended Clay Shaw in 1969
against a charge of conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

* Copies of records from the Metropolitan Crime Commission of New Orleans,
including records on District Attorney Garrison's investigation and prosecution .
of Clay Shaw and records regarding New Orleans organized crime figures;

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ean et cater nnn penton eee

* Long-lost films taken in Dallas on November 22, 1963, that the public had never
seen and that shed new light on the events of that day; and
. : , a
* Private collections of records from individuals including Warren Commission
attorney Wesley Liebler, author David Lifton, FBI Special Agent Hosty, Attorney
Frank Ragano, as well as others.

Iam also pleased to announce today that the Review Board has just acquired the
original personal papers of Clay Shaw, the late New Orleans businessman who is the
only person ever tried in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Shaw
was acquitted by a jury in 1969 after being charged as part of District Attorney
Garrison’s investigation. The Shaw papers will surely add another dimension to this
particular chapter of the assassination story.

All of these records will enrich the historical record of the assassination for future

generations of Americans.. te these Toco are Ppoesoed and described by se HAL a ive

National Archives, they will’be available for résearch. - .
VL The Need For Additional Ti

Despite our best efforts and significant accomplishments, some of which I have
outlined, the Review Board will not be able to complete its work within the original
three-year timetable set by Congress for the following reasons:

* First, the authors of the original legislation believed that our task would take
three years. That estimate was based on the best available information at the -
time, but the legislation established an unprecedented process. There was no
way of knowing the problems of scale and complexity that the Board would
encounter, nor was there any way to factor in the comprehensive approach we
have taken in fulfilling our ‘mandate.

* Second, the Board was not appointed until 18 months after the legislation was
signed into law. As a result, without the guidance of the Board, Federal agencies
initially defined for themselves the universe of records that should be processed
under The Act and to speculate about the kind of evidence that would be needed
to sustain the redaction of assassination-related information. Once the Board
was in place, agencies needed to redo a considerable amount of work. In fact,
many agencies have yet to complete their review and the Board is still seeking
their compliance.

Third, our enabling legislation imposed several restrictions on the manner in
which the Board could operate. Unlike other temporary agencies, the Board

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~ #

could not hire or detail experienced federal employees, but rather had to hire
new employees who had to undergo background investigations and be cleared at
the Top Secret level. Locating and renovating space that was suitable forthe ”
storage of classified materials was required. As a result, the Board could not
begin an effective review of records until the third quarter of our first year.

We are pleased and proud that the Review Board and staff have been able to overcome -
these obstacles, and that we have developed an efficient and effective process for the
review of records. All involved in this process want to see that the job is done, and do
not want to cease now with a reasonable conclusion in sight. We want to finish the job
we began, and with one additional year we can.

VIL The Job Ahead
The additional. year of operations will permit the Review Board to finish its task by

completing several major areas of our:work: Please be-assured that these are:
identifiable projects that ara‘critical to erisuring that the JFK Collection isas complete as.

~ possible, that relevant Federal agencies have been held accountable, and that all that we
have done is documented in our final report. The Board would focus in our final year
on the following:

*

CIA Sequestered Collection. The Review Board has completed its review of the
Oswald “201 file,” the file created and maintained by the CIA on Oswald and the
assassination. .The Review Board is now faced with the task of reviewing the
agency’s “Sequestered Collection,” the large collection of files that was
assembled by the CIA in response to requests made by the House Select
Committee on Assassinations, chaired by Congressman Stokes, in the late 1970's.
These records find their relevance to the assassination defined in part by the
course of the HSCA investigation. The Sequestered Collection originally
consisted of 63 boxes of CIA- and HSCA-originated records as well as 72 reels of ©
microfilm. Unfortunately, these records are in a confused order, poorly
described, and are replete with duplicates. Some of these records are clearly of
great significance, some are of only marginal interest, and the relevance of others
cannot be identified.

FBI] Sequestered Collection. The FBI divides its assassination records into two
general categories. The first is the “Core and Related Files,” consisting of nearly
600,000 pages of files collected in the course of the massive FBI investigation into
the assassination. The Review Board will complete its review of this significant
collection by the end of FY 1997. The second, which the FBI refers toasits
“HSCA records,” is a large collection of records that were identified as being of
interest to the HSCA and which remain to be reviewed by the Board. Like the


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CIA’s Sequestered Collection, this voluminous body of records (approximately
280,000 pages) ranges widely in relevance to the assassination.

‘Additional time will allow the | Board to o finish its. work with several ag agencies,
including the Secret Service, the National Security Agency, and Congressional
Committees, including the Senate Intelligence Committee. -

Search for Additional Records. With one more year of operations, the Board's
search for additional records held by Federal agencies, private individuals, and
local governments would be concluded with greater confidence. Some of these
records have been identified, but not yet acquired by the Board.

* Federal Agency Compliance. In November 1996, the Review Board initiated a
compliance program to ensure that Federal agencies have fully cooperated with
the Board in discharging its responsibility of assuring Congress andthe |! -
American public that the goals of the JEK Acthave been‘accomplished to the ° +
greatest possible extent. The requests to document compliance with the JFK Act
were sent to 27 U.S. government agencies and departments to confirm that the
U.S. government has identified, located, and released all records relating to the
assassination of President Kennedy. The agencies’ statements of compliance will
be included in the Review Board’s final report to the Congress. The one-year
extension will ensure that the compliance program is completed and fully
documented in the final report.

It is important for the Review Board to complete these major projects. The Board
believes that the completion of the task outlined above, the inclusion of these important
records in the JFK Collection, and the documentation of Federal agency compliance as
part of the final report will mark an appropriate point at which to conclude the Board’s
work. We are confident that all that remains for the Board can be accomplished in an

_ additional year.

It is clear to the members of the Review Board that there is much work to be done. The -
review of the remaining CIA and FBI records is a cumbersome and complicated task.
However, the Board and staff have the benefit of our experience to date that sets the
stage for an efficient and effective review of the remaining records. I would like to
briefly describe our early experiences reviewing records and how the past two years set
a firm foundation for the future and would work to our advantage in our last year.

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- Our review of records in the early months was slowed by the complexities of the issues

‘raised in the records. The unprecedented new standards of the JFK Act, which go far

beyond those established under the Freedom of Information Act, requiredatime- *
consuming early phase.

At first, the review process proceeded slowly and the agencies were afforded ample
opportunity to present their evidence. Over time, the Review Board began to
standardize its interpretation of the relevant section of the JFK Act and the issues raised
in the various documents. Now that the Review Board and the agencies are familiar
with the rigorous demands of the JFK Act, the process has accelerated. Ina
progressively increasing number of cases, records that initially contained proposed
postponements can be released through a “consent” process. In this consent process,
the ARRB staff notifies an agency that its proposed postponements are not likely to be
approved by the Review Board and the agency thereupon voluntarily consents to the
release of the information.

in our review of the FBI's “Core and Related Files” divdthe CIA’s“Oswald 201 File,” °° Te

the records that have been the focus of our attention to date, we subjected every
requested redaction to a rigorous test: did the evidence of the harm that would result
from the release of the information outweigh the public interest in the information?

In considering our review of the CIA and FBI “Sequestered Collections,” the Board
recognized that it needed to develop a different approach, one that would take into
account the varied degree of relevance of individual records to the assassination. Only -
in this way could the Board ensure that it would appropriately expend its resources in
its last year. As a first step, the Board carefully analyzed each collection in order to
determine what priority should be assigned to the category of records. In addition, the
Board developed a set of guidelines for the review of these records which recognized
that some categories of records did not require the intensivé word-by-word review that
had been the rule for the core collections that have been the subject of the Board’s
attention to date. The development of these guidelines began with the August 6, 1996
Board public hearing and culminated in their adoption at the October 16, 1996 Board
meeting. The ARRB staff will distinguish between records whose relevance to the
assassination is clear and those not believed to be relevant (or “NBR”). Applying these
new standards will permit the ARRB staff to identify and review the most significant
remaining records in order of priority.

These detailed guidelines will reduce the loss of valuable Review Board and ARRB staff
time expended to review, on a word-by-word basis, those documents thathavea __
remote relationship, at best, to the Kennedy assassination. Those documents that are

identified as relevant to the assassination will continue to be reviewed word-by-word.

These standards of relevance are designed to ensure that the greatest number of true

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~

assassination records is properly identified, reviewed, and made public in the JFK
Collection at the National Archives.

’
The fruits of our labor from the first three y years would be realized in our last year, one
in which we would be reviewing some of the most difficult records, and potentially
most important records, but with the benefit of our invaluable experience. Iam happy .
to report that we have received assurances from the FBI and CIA that they will work
with us in a final year to make sure that the necessary resources are applied so that our
task can be completed.

IX. Conclusion

In making our recommendation for a one-year extension, we, the members of the
Review Board, are fully cognizant of the difficulties inherent in extending a temporary
commission. We are aware of the concern that temporary bodies may havea self- :
preserving and self-perpetuating instinct, and want to-assure’you in the clearest arid ** e
most unambiguous manner that our recominiéridation’is motivated strictly by our désite’ 2°" 2°" 9
to complete the job. My colleagues and'I were appointed as private citizens and have

many competing claims on our time and energy. It is our collective conviction that the

additional time is necessary and our sincerest commitment that we will complete our

task by the end of Fiscal Year 1998, if given the means.

I would like to note that, as you may be aware, the Administration is supportive of the
one-year extension for the Review Board and has submitted an FY 1998 budget
amendment to allow us to complete our work, close out our operation, and submit our
final report.

‘Since the Review Board began this effort three years ago, we have witnessed the
widespread and passionate interest that the American public has in the assassination of
President Kennedy. We have received thousands of letters, telephone calls, faxes and
e-mail messages from individuals who care deeply about our history. They come from
all walks of life, from all over the country, and are of all ages. Their interest is of
varying degrees and they do not all agree on what happened in Dallas on November 22,
1963. However, they do agree that the public has the right to see the files on ithe -
assassination.

I believe that what the Review Board is all about can be summed up ina letter we
received from a man from California just last week. The author is not a professional
historian, not a student working on a paper for a history class, but simply a private
citizen interested in learning about this tragic historical event. He wrote the following:

“In my humble opinion, it appears that the ARRB is having a healing effect

10

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upon the American public, who may be coming to realize that there may be
closure in sight (in our lifetimes) with regard to the JEK assassination.”
These words capture why the Review Board was created by the Congress and why w we
hope that the Review Board will have the additional year to complete our task.

The Assassination Records Review Board was conceived as a means of eliminating
uncertainty and speculation about the contents of government files relating to the
assassination of President Kennedy. We, the members of the Board, believe that a
premature termination of the Review Board would surely generate intensified doubts
within the general public about the commitment of Congress to release all information
that relates to the assassination of President Kennedy, as well as renewed speculation
about the conduct of our government and its institutions and personnel. If appropriate
closure is not reached now, the identical issues will likely have to be addressed again in
the future—at even greater cost. The additional year that we: recommend. will allow for
a confident conclusion of this important task:#!:": of thos mrysoriert RS

’ Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the members of the
Assassination Records Review Board, I thank you for allowing us this opportunity to
discuss our work and our future. We urge you to favorably report H.R. 1553. I would
be happy to answer any questions that the members of the Subcommittee may have for
me. The Board and staff stand ready to provide the Subcommittee with any additional
information that may be required. Thank you.

11

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i
\ \ wa ,
ee
Copyright 1997 Federal Information Systems Corporation
Federal News Service
JUNE 4, 1997, WEDNESDAY ;
CIA HAS NG CBJECTION TO ,
SECTION: IN THE NEWS DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR %,.
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION’
LENGTH: 12335 words iN THIS DOCUMENT

HEADLINE: HEARING OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM AND
OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE |

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATIONS RECORDS REVIEW BOARD REAUTHORIZATION
CHAIRED BY REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS HASTERT (R-IL)
2154 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

WASHINGTON, DC

BODY:

REP. HASTERT: The Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs and

- Criminal Justice will come to order. This hearing will focus on a very

important piece of legislation, HR 1553, the John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. This bill was introduced by Chairman
Dan Burton on May 8, 1997 and included in original cosponsors ranking minority
member Henry Waxman and Congressman Louis Stokes, our first witness for today,
also who chaired the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

In 1992, 30 years after the assassination, nearly one million pages of records
compiled by official investigations still had been not-made public. Congress
decided to set up a process for reviewing and releasing to the public the

records surrounding the Kennedy assassination. The result was that on October
26, 1992, President Bush signed into law Public Law 102-526, the President John

F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

The original act provided a three-year timetable for the review board to

complete its work. Unfortunately, extensive delays in the appointment of board
members delayed the review board's work from the very beginning. In 1994, the
Congress extended the 1992 law's termination date for one year, until September
30th, 1996. The review board subsequently exercised its authority into the

statute to continue operating for one additional year.

The review process has proved to be more complex and time- consuming than

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anticipated. And although we believe that Congress should not indefinitely
continue funding federal entities that were intended to be temporary, Chairman
Burton and this subcommittee support the request for a one-year extension of the
board's reauthorization. I believe that by releasing these documents to the

public we serve an important public right to know and advance the cause of total
accountability to the people of this country.

At this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr.

Barrett.

REP. THOMAS M. BARRETT (D-WD): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm honored to
welcome

my esteemed colleague, Representative Louis Stokes, to testify before this
subcommittee. We are fortunate to be able to draw on your experience in this
area.

Over 30 years ago this country was shocked by the assassination of President
Kennedy in a way that it had not been shocked since the bombing of Pearl Harbor
or the bombing or Hiroshima. Yet today we are still prying papers out of the
government about that assassination.

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PAGE 17
Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

The legislation that created the Assassination Review Board broke new ground by
establishing the principle that there should be a presumption of public access

to government information. That legislation was necessary because

administration after administration had failed to release documents. That

should not be. The Assassination Review Board has released millions of pages

that could have otherwise remained locked in government file drawers. We are
here today to extend the authorization of this board because the process of

making government information public has been more complex and time-consuming
than anticipated. I am not criticizing the work of the board or the dedication

of its members. I am, however, critical of the fact that we are still fighting

with our government to allow public access to government documents.

Congress has passed laws and resolutions reiterating the principles of public

access that were laid down when this country was founded. Administration after
administration has worked to thwart that access. I applaud President Clinton

for his efforts to declassify xdocuments, but we need to do much more.

I hope that every employee at the Office of Management and Budget, and every
agency in the government will pay attention to what this board has accomplished.
It is the refusal to allow public access that breeds suspicion of the

government. It is the thwarting of public access that causes the public to

mistrust government officials. If we are to turn the tide of mistrust and

suspicion, it will be done by opening the doors of access. Today is one step in

that process, but there is much more work to be done.

Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: Are there any other members wishing to make an opening statement?
If not, our first witness this morning is fellow Congressman Lou Stokes, who
served as the chairman of the House Select Committee on Assassinations from 1976
to 1979, and is a cosponsor of this important bill.

And, Mr. Stokes, we want to say welcome, and thank you for your fine work in
this area. And please proceed with your opening statement.

REP. LOUIS STOKES (D-OH): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Barrett, Mr.
Turner, Mr. LaTourette.

Mr. Chairman, I'd like to submit my written testimony for the record, and if I

may, I'd like to just summarize my testimony. ,

REP. HASTERT: Without objection.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

It seems, Mr. Chairman, it was not as long as it is, but actually it's been 20

years; it was in 1977 when I was appointed as chairman of the House Select
Committee on Assassinations. We were authorized at that time and directed to
complete an investigation surrounding the assassination and the death of
President John F. Kennedy. We completed, as you've already stated, our _

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1

‘t

investigation in 1979. And on March 28th of that year, we filed our final

report. In addition to it, 12 volumes of evidentiary material, printed by the
Government Printing Office, was made available to the American public. In
addition to this, we conducted 18 days of public hearings and an additional two
days of public policy hearings.

Prior to the committee running out of both time and money, we had released
everything that we had the time and resources to release. All of our other

. records were placed in the National Archives, under a House of Representatives

rule which existed at that time, Rule 36, requiring such unpublished records
routinely to be sealed for 30 to 50 years. The records of our committee
relative to this investigation consisted of 935 boxes, which we turned over to

. the National Archives. Then, over the years, a considerable public debate about

these records has ensued, including accusations that these records, if released,
would contain evidence of a government cover-up, or complicity of government

agencies in the assassination of President Kennedy.

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PAGE 18
Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

A great deal of this was fueled in 1992 by a movie entitled "JFK." That movie
contained many distortions of the facts and circumstances surrounding the death
of our president. As a result of that movie, my office was deluged with

thousands of letters and telegrams by Americans calling for the release of these
sealed files.

As a member of Congress, and a former chairman of that committee, I deemed it
important not to have the good work of our committee impugned by such baseless
accusations. Our committee had attempted to conduct its investigation into the
assassination of the president, and to present the results of that investigation

to the Congress and to the American people in a thorough and dignified manner in
keeping with the memory of this great president.

Consequently, in 1992, I introduced, and the House and Senate passed, PL
102-526, a bill entitled The President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992. That law created the Assassination Records Review

Board, which mandated and authorized that board to identify, secure, and make
available all records related to the assassination of President Kennedy. It was

our intention, Mr. Chairman, that everything that could be released from every
agency, every court record, anywhere they existed — that those records be
released to the American people.

Under the law, the board had until October 1, 1996, to fulfill its mandate, plus

an additional year, at the board's discretion.

We were very fortunate to have a very distinguished panel appointed. This panel
was appointed by President Clinton 18 months after the law was enacted here by
the Congress — a considerable delay in the appointment of this panel. But we
were very fortunate to have persons suchi as Chairman Tunheim, Dr. Henry Graff,
Dr. Kermit Hall, Dr. William Joyce, Dr. Anna Nelson, and an outstanding
executive director, David Marwell. :

Under this panel, they have now released more than 10,000 Previously secret
government documents.

They have released a report, which I would urge all the members of the committee
to read, if they have an opportunity, because I think you will see the extensive
amount of work in which they have been involved.

They now need one additional final year in order to complete their work. Their
work during this period of time will be primarily to secure the release of
documents from the CIA and the FBI. Those are the two main agencies left from
which they still have a considerable number of documents to be released.

Mr. Chairman, in closing I think that it's important that we complete this work

in an orderly manner with full and complete disclosure to the American people,
that they will feel that they know everything that their government knows about

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r ‘

the assassination of their president. And I would urge the support and passage
of this legislation sponsored by Chairman Burton, of which I am one of the

‘original co-sponsors.

I'd be pleased to answer any questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Chairman — or, Mr. Stokes. And I really appreciate
the work that you've done here. I have just two brief questions. Actually,

three. Do you believe that the Ford Review Board is up and running smoothly
now?

REP. STOKES: Absolutely. In spite of the delay of 18 months they have done just
a yeoman's amount of work. It's just been almost incomparable to realize how
much they have done. And to their credit, they feel that if given just this one
additional year that they will complete the work.

REP. HASTERT: And do you believe that this process is consistent with the goals
of your original legislation in 1992?

REP. STOKES: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.

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REP. HASTERT: And then you are confident, as you said before, that the review
board can finish its task by September 30th, 1998.

REP. STOKES: I am just very confident that - in projecting the fact that they

can do this work with one year. And when they say themselves as they will say
to you when they appear, this'll be one final year.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much, and thank you for your testimony.

REP. STOKES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: The gentleman from Wisconsin.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have a lot of questions, either. I just want to compliment 5 you,
Congressman Stokes, for the fine job that you have done.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. BARRETT: And just one question. Do you think in the unfortunate and
hopefully unlikely scenario that there are future assassinations in the future

that this was a good way to approach this problem, the panel that you served? ©
Do you think that you have accomplished what you intended to accomplish?
REP. STOKES: Mr. Barrett, at the time that we undertook this panel and Congress
passed the act to create this panel, 85 percent of the American people believed
that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald had participated in the assassination
of President Kennedy. A national poll had told us that. There were boundless
rumors and myths. People were writing numerous books and things of that sort.
And as a consequence of it, I think that putting this panel together and
permitting this type of investigation I think was very helpful. I think it

allayed many of the rumors and myths that grew up and abounded around the
assassination of our president.

However, I don't think that it put to bed everything. We uncovered many things.
For instance, we pointed up many of the things that the Warren Commission had
not done properly. And we were able to destroy many of the myths, such as the
umbrella man theory and things of that sort. But we couldn't put everything to
bed. We had begun that investigation 15 years after the assassination of the
president. I think had we been given this type of investigation immediately

after it had occurred, it would have been a different result. But many of the
witnesses had died. Evidence had disappeared. As you can see now, there were
materials which we were not able to get even within that two-year period before
we went out of existence. ;

And so as a consequence of it, I think we did an outstanding job. No one has

ever been able to refute any of the work that we did. No one has been able thus
far to say anything was ever covered up from the American people. And so to
that degree, I think that it performed a good service for the American people.

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REP. HASTERT: Okay, thank you very much.

The gentleman from Ohio.

REP. STEVEN LATOURETTE (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I
want to

thank you for having this hearing today and for also expediting the markup on

1553, and give praise to the co- sponsors, our chairman, Mr. Burton, Mr. Waxman,
and also to Congressman Stokes.

The editorial comment I would make is I'm always amazed each succeeding day that
I serve in Congress at the rich history that a number of our colleagues have,

and to now have our fine colleague from Ohio, Congressman Stokes from Cleveland,
here and talk about his previous work on the House Select Committee on
Assassinations. Although many members in the House remember his service, I would
venture to say there are a number of people back home that don't know all of the
things.that you've done during your many years of service to this Congress and

this country.

Just as an example, the other day I found out — and I don't know if you're a

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

lawyer or not, Mr. Chairman, but I found out that Congressman Stokes — well,
you're lucky you're not a lawyer, but I am, and I'm proud to be a lawyer.

I found out that Congressman Stokes was responsible for a ruling called Terry
versus Ohio, and you might have heard of a "Terry Frisk and Search," and I
didn't know that till the other day, that Congressman Stokes had a hand in that,
and so, again, we find Congressman Stokes showing up again, sharing his
expertise with the country.

Lou, the one question I would have, deals with, in both your written testimony,
and then also your observations to Congressman Baird's question. You talked
about the "JFK" movie, and all of the rumors and innuendoes and the public
polls. And you still run into people — as I'm sure — I still run into people

that aren't convinced that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone on that November day in
Dallas.

And part of it has to do, I think, with, after your commission met, and now the
legislation in '92, and a little delay in getting everybody in place in the

review board. Do you think it was necessary, after you've reviewed the
documents in this case, that we waited, as a government, 34 years to make these
documents available? Was there something impinging upon the national security
that you found or discovered that made it necessary for the government to wait
34 full years before releasing this information, and hopefully dispelling some

of those rumors? ,
REP. STOKES: Thank you very much, Mr. LaTourette, firstly for your nice remarks.
But it's a good question, because not many people realize that this was not --
when we sealed these records for the period 30 to 50 years, this was not done
because of anything relative to this particular investigation. That was a House
rule in existence at that time, that applied to any committee that, when it
completed its work and filed its final report, if they had documents which had
not been released publicly, under that House rule, they had to be sealed for 30
to 50 years. The same applied to the other part of that investigation which we
conducted, which was to investigate the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King
Jr., which was a companion part of our investigation. So that applied to that
one also.

But as a result of it, in compliance with the House rule, it just sort of sat

there until things were stirred up by that "JFK" movie and it sort of brought
things to the head.

REP. LATOURETTE: Okay. The principles behind your '92 legislation, the
Assassination Records Collection Act - obviously, now we collect records
differently than we did before. A lot of them are electronically stored. Do

you think that we can use that act as a vehicle, should another tragedy - God
forbid we should ever have such another tragedy in this country, but should

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another tragedy such as this occur, could we use the lessons learned in the
model of this review board to prevent the significant time lag between the date
of event and the eventual release of documents for public review?
REP. STOKES: I would hope, Mr. LaTourette, that we have learned some lessons.
Firstly, here in the Congress we'd no longer have such a rule in effect, and
that will help us, I think, tremendously.
But also, I think, by the agencies now working with a review panel of this s sort
and realizing that many of the type of documents which they will cite to you in
their testimony -- for instance, there's a very interesting document that they
will talk about, where the whole page, with the exception of just the date and
the name of a country -- everything was redacted. And under their work, that
whole page has been released, and everyone can read that.
What you do by that is that you're to allay all the suspicion as to what really

. has been redacted and people can really see. And then you can't have the kind
of rumors and myths that grow up around it.

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

And I think and hope that in the event of such an occurrence in the future —

which all of us hope would never occur -- that our agencies will realize that

this has been a good example of how we could allay some of the fears and

suspicions that the American people have around the manner in which we conduct
this type of thing.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you very much, Congressman Stokes, for your expertise —
REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. LATOURETTE: — and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you.

And at this time I recognize the gentleman from Texas.

REP. JIM TURNER (D-TX): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And all I would add is to also compliment you, Mr. Stokes, for your many years
of work on this effort. I too stand somewhat in awe at the number of years of
service and your contributions to this body.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. TURNER: And I know the Congress and the American people are grateful for
the years of service you’ ve provided not only on this issue, but on many other
issues to which you've contributed.

And I also want to thank those who've served on this panel, because I'm sure it

is a time-consuming endeavor to carry out this task.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you, Mr. Turner.

Thank you, Mr. Stokes.

REP. STOKES: Thank you.

REP. HASTERT: The second panel, come forward, please.

Our distinguished second panel includes four witnesses: Mr. John Tunheim, the
chair of the Assassination Records Review Board; Mr. Steven Tilley, the chief of
the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection at the National Archives.
We also have Mr. Max Holland, the author and contributing editor of the Wilson
Quarterly; and Mr. Bruce Hitchcock, an historian and teacher at Noblesville High
School in Indiana, our distinguished chairman's home state.

And I also would say that, at this time, Mr. Burton would have wanted to be here
to make a few comments. He is not here yet. We may entertain that at any time.
So, if you gentlemen would please stand, and -- (witnesses are sworn in). Thank
you. Let the record show that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.

And we start with you, Mr. Tunheim.

JOHN TUNHEIM (Chair, Assassination Records Review Board): Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I, too, would like to submit my written testimony for the record and

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just give a brief summary to members of the subcommittee today.

I'd like to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to testify today in

favor of House bill 1553. And I'd also like to note our thanks to Congressman
Stokes for his leadership on this issue and his guidance in the important effort

to release the records relating to the tragic assassination of President
Kennedy.

The review board is confident that the additional time requested and provided by
Congressman Burton's bill will allow us to complete our work and submit a truly |
complete final report to the Congress, to the president and to the American
public. I'd like to thank Chairman Burton for introducing the bill and
Congressman Waxman and Stokes for co-sponsoring the bill that is before the |
subcommittee today. And I also appreciate, Mr. Chairman, your role in chairing
this hearing today and assisting in this effort.
One of the other members of the review board is present with us today -- I'd

like to introduce her -- Dr. Anna Nelson, who is the distinguished adjunct

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

historian in residence at the American University and is seated in the row
directly behind me. Dr. David Marwell, the executive director of the review
board, is also here, as are a number of staff members who are very professional
and very dedicated and have done their work for us very well.

The review board, Mr. Chairman, began releasing records in July of 1995,
pursuant to the act passed by Congress. And thus far, the board has acted
specifically to transfer more than 14,000 documents to the JFK collection at the
National Archives. That collection, as Mr. Tilley will tell the subcommittee
shortly, now contains more than 3.7 million pages’ worth of material.

I'd like to show one brief and rather dramatic example of the work that the
review board is doing. Congressman Stokes mentioned this issue in his
testimony. This involves one particular record. This is the "before" version,

the record that was available to the public up until several years ago. You
probably cannot see it from here, but it is a document that was sent from the
FBI's representative in Paris to Director Hoover on October 12, 1960. That is
indicated at the top of the memorandum. The subject, as indicated, is Lee
Harvey Oswald: Internal Security. And then it says Re: Paris Letter 9-27- 60.
And the remainder of the entire document is blacked out. And not surprisingly,
a document like this dated three years prior to the assassination of President
Kennedy, a document sent to J. Edgar Hoover attracted a great deal of interest
among researchers who saw it because everything was blacked out underneath. The —
speculation that individuals had about this was great.

Well, the board aggressively pursued the release of this information, initially
ordering its release. The FBI appealed that decision to the president.
Subsequently we worked out with them, including an aggressive effort to contact
Swiss authorities who were the subject of this particular document. I met
personally with the Swiss ambassador to the United States to ask for his
assistance in obtaining Swiss approval to release it.

And here is the record that is now released to the American public at the
National Archives. All of the material is released. And what it indicates was

the FBI was interested in whether Oswald was indeed attending a college in
Switzerland during that period of time. And the document tells about the
investigation that Swiss authorities did to determine whether Oswald was,
indeed, enrolled. He was someone who the FBI was following because of his
interest in defecting to the Soviet Union. That's a good example of the type of
work that the review board is doing: pursuing individual releases of information
that has long been redacted from the public.

The board has worked closely with federal agencies. The vast majority of the
records are at the CIA and the FBI. We have completed the review of the core
collections in both of those agencies and significant numbers of materials have

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been released.

The board has also been aggressive in identifying and acquiring significant
assassination-related records that have been in the hands of private citizens

and local governments. Just a couple of examples: _

The papers of J. Lee Rankin, who was the chief counsel to the Warren Commission,
have now been released through the efforts of the review board. Virtually all

of the records of the prosecution in New Orleans of Clay Shaw was also released.
And I'm announcing for the first time today that the review board has just
acquired the original personal papers of Clay Shaw. He was the individual
prosecuted in New Orleans in 1969, the only individual prosecuted for the
assassination of President Kennedy. That will add another dimension to this
story. This is an example of his diary, which the board has just obtained, and
will be released as soon as we can process the materials. It's very

interesting. It's his diary from the day that he was arrested, on March Ist,

1967 and his feelings about Oswald on that particular day.

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

Despite the best estimate, Mr. Chairman, that this job could be done in three
years, we cannot finish our work by the end of this fiscal year. We're

confident that in the additional year we will be able to get through the

records, which will largely involve the sequestered collections at the CIA and

at the FBI — records sequestered by the House Select Committee on
Assassinations. I'd be happy to answer any questions, Mr. Chairman, that you
and the members have.
REP. HASTERT: Thank you. We'll hold all the questions until the end of the
testimony.

MR. TUNHEIM: Very well.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tilley?

STEVEN TILLEY (Chief, Access and Freedom of Information Staff, National Archives
and Records Administration): Mr. Chairman, I am Steven Tilley, and I'm the chief
of the Access and Freedom of Information Staff at the National Archives and
Records Administration. And I wish to thank you for the opportunity to testify
today on behalf -- for the National Archives in support of HR 1553.

I'm appearing today in my capacity of NARA's chief of the President John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Collection. In that role, lam charged with
implementing NARA's responsibilities under the act, and I serve as NARA's
liaison to the Assassination Records Review Board. And it's my understanding
that my written statement will be made part of the record, therefore, I'll be

brief in my remarks.

Mr. Chairman, this month marks the 20th anniversary of the closing of the office
of the Watergate Special Prosecution Force. I oversaw the closing of that

office and supervised the transfer of those records to the National Archives.
Most of my career at the National Archives since then has been involved with
working with sensitive records. And in 1993, I became the chief of the JFK
Collection, and I've served in that capacity ever since.

When the review board members were confirmed by the Senate in April of 1994, my

staff and I began to work with the board, and later with the board staff, to

provide information on the records in the JFK Collection, the development and
use of NARA's data base, our contacts and discussions with other agencies ~
involved in searches for assassination records, and the existence of

assassination records in the custody of private repositories or individuals.

The review board and NARA have maintained an excellent working relationship
through the.three years of the board's existence, and I'd like to think that

this close relationship has in some way contributed to the success of the review
board.

NARA enthusiastically supports passage of HR 1553 to extend the review board's
authorization.

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The board needs the time designated in this bill to complete its important work
in making available as complete a historical record as possible concerning the
assassination of President Kennedy.

I would like to briefly offer for your consideration some statistics and facts

to demonstrate the success of the board. The JFK Assassination Records
Collection has grown to more than 1,600 cubic feet of records, or approximately
3.75 million pages from more than 30 different government offices. These
numbers are a testament to the work of the board in obtaining the cooperation of
the entire federal government as well as private donors in this important task.
For the information of the committee, Mr. Chairman, I've attached to my
testimony a copy of the register of the collection, which lists the major groups
of federal records and private papers along with a supplemental listing of FBI
records.

Not only has the collection increased dramatically in size; the significance

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

of the records in the collection cannot be underestimated. In addition to the
records of numerous executive branch agencies and offices, the records of
relevant congressional committees, related court cases, and records donated by
private entities are also available in the collection.

This rich documentation is searchable electronically, giving researchers the
ability to seek out documents concerning a topic, person or event, or even
individual documents, not only at NARA's College Park facility but from their
own personal computer through the Internet.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, public demand for these records is the ultimate evidence
of the value of this collection. Reference requests have risen in number every
year since the collection opened with new records in August of 1993. This year
we have already received over 600 written inquiries, an increase of over 30
percent from this period of time last year. The number of inquiries on our
computer Web site is also steadily increasing. Since March 1996, when the
assassination records database was made available through the Internet, it has
been accessed over 100,000 times by the public.

Due to the exceptional work of the Assassination Records Review Board, great
progress has been made on making available as complete a record as possible in
the history of the assassination of John Kennedy. Without the focus, integrity
and expertise of the review board, the collection would not have the size,
quality or public demand witnessed today.

However, there is still much to do. NARA supports passage of HR 1553 so this ©
important work can be completed.

_ That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I'll be glad to answer any

questions.

REP. HASTERT: Thank the gentleman.
Mr. Holland?

MAX HOLLAND (Author, contributing editor of Wilson Quarterly): Thank you, Mr
Chairman. I'd like to make a brief statement summarizing my testimony.

Nearly 75 years after President Lincoln's assassination, a chemist-turned-author
named Otto Eisenschiml provoked a national furor with his 1937 book, "Why Was
Lincoln Murdered?” Eisenschim claimed one of the most important events in
American history was still a mystery. And Eisenschiml claimed to have uncovered
the truth: President Lincoln was the victim of a conspiracy organized by his
secretary of war, Edwin Stanton, who was allegedly opposed to the president's
program for a charitable post-war reconstruction of the South.

When pressed, Otto Eisenschiml openly admitted that he had no evidence to
support his case. At the same time, it was precisely the documentary record

that enabled critics to prove that Eisenschiml's book was just another in a long

line of lunatic theories about the first assassination of an American president.

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'

Here lies, I submit, the long-term importance of the work being carried out by

the AARB. The meaning of the raw data being unearthed by the review board will
probably not be appreciated any time soon by the generations sentient when
President Kennedy was murdered in Dallas, but if these generations cannot come
to terms with history as it happened in their lifetimes, then at the very least,

they have an obligation to hand over, insofar as possible, a complete and
thorough documentary record. Citizens will need that record to rebut the Otto
Eisenschimls of the next century, not that there is any dearth of them now.

I strongly support without qualification extension of the review board for
another year and full funding of its operations. Bringing its work to an abrupt
end would not only diminish the investment of time and resources already made;
in all likelihood, it would throw the whole initiative into chaos. Not least of

all, gutting the effort now would surely create ineradicable suspicion about the
federal government's intentions in the first place. I'd like to spend the

balance of my time describing the three areas where I thank the review board

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

had made its greatest contributions. The first has to do with the Warren
Commission. The review board's labors have resulted in many new documents that
I believe will eventually remove the stigma that has been attached to the
commission, which is probably the most unfairly reviled and/or ridiculed entity ©
ever created by the federal government.
These records paint a sobering portrait of our federal government during a very
traumatic time. It's not the idealized versions depicted in civics text books
nor the demonized version featured on talk radio. It's the real federal
government: imperfect, plodding, riven by ambition, distrust, rivalries,
compartmentalized by secrecy, working at cross-purposes or in ignorance,
simultaneously guided by the most banal bureaucratic instincts and the most
elevated national concerns. Somehow, through all of that, it does struggle and
manage to do the right thing.
Besides the Warren Commission, I think the work of the review board has made a
very substantial contribution towards understanding the operations of the
intelligence community. The assassination necessarily caused what could only be
termed a mobilization of the U.S. intelligence community's far-flung resources.
The government had to determine that weekend who was responsible and whether the
assassin or assassins had any co-conspirators either foreign or domestic. ©
Consequently the records being released now constitute a gold mine of
information about domestic and foreign intelligence operations at the midpoint
of the cold war. These records not only shed new light on what the government
knew 34 years ago; the release is an object lesson in why they were kept secret
for all those years. They do not contradict the federal government's official
conclusion at stated in the Warren report. Rather, the documents were kept

secret because they disclosed or tended to disclose ongoing intelligence sources
and methods.
With the release of these documents, the intelligence community's record in the
wake of the assassination can finally be assessed with some fairness and
thoroughness. The fact is that the information provided by the FBI, CIA and
other agencies was instrumental to preventing the United States government from
overreacting when the circumstantial public evidence was highly suggestive of a
link between Lee Harvey Oswald and a foreign power.
The last area in which the review board has made a -- perhaps its greatest
contribution has to do with whole issue of secrecy and disclosure. The balance
between secrecy and disclosure has always been in favor of secrecy, especially
since World War II, controlled by laws highly deferential to the equities of the
interested government agencies. The five citizens who serve on the review board
decided that if their mandate was to have any meaning it was imperative to
pierce this veil. They had to get at categories that had been classified here

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before, including information derived from intelligence sources and methods.
While some historians have been critical of the resources devoted to this
particular effort, I like to believe that a breakthrough had to be achieved
somewhere, and in fact, the records pertaining to President Kennedy's
assassination make an excellent demonstration project of what can now be
released. The lines drawn by the review board should prove helpful as the
government undertakes to declassify the vast body of records generated during
the Cold War. ;

Finally, I'd like to say the entire history of the federal government's efforts

in the wake of the assassination, including the experience of the review board,
serves as a cautionary tale. Perhaps it will enable the government to strike a
better balance between secrecy and disclosure in the future, for there exists no
better example of the heavy wages of doubt, suspicion and public cynicism:
exacted by secrecy than the Kennedy assassination experience.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

REP. HASTERT: I thank the gentleman.

And now, Mr. Hitchcock, I'd like to welcome you especially. A gentleman from
Ohio asked me a little while ago if I was an attorney. Indeed, I was not an
attorney, I happened to be a history teacher for 16 years before I ever got into
politics. So it's certainly a noble trade, and happy that you're here. I know

the chairman wanted to introduce you personally, but he couldn't make it this
afternoon.

You have contributed students, I understand, a clerk for this commission, and
have been involved in it at a very high degree. So we welcome you and listen to
your testimony.

BRUCE HITCHCOCK (Teacher, Noblesville High School, Indiana): Thank you, Mr
Chairman. And I, too, would ask that my written statement be entered into the
record and I will briefly summarize.

REP. HASTERT: Without objection, all written statements will be entered into the
record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Thank you.

My name is Bruce Hitchcock and I am a teacher at Noblesville High School located
in Noblesville, Indiana, which is a community approximately 20 miles north of
Indianapolis. I am currently completing my 28th year in secondary education.
My teaching assignment has primarily been in the areas of United States history,
American government, and international relations.

And I want to express my appreciation to the committee for affording me the
honor and privilege of being here today and permitting me to make some brief
remarks concerning an issue about which I have very strong convictions not only
as a citizen, but as an educator.

In the spring of 1994, I assigned my Honors United States history class a

project studying the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. This project
culminated in the students placing the Warren Commission Report on trial. Half
of the class represented the prosecution and half the class defended the Warren
Commission Report. The class became quite interested in, and many would say
obsessed with this subject. The project resulted in a trial which became quite
intense and divisive, so much so that the class had to have a party at the end

of the semester to rekindle friendships. They became so fascinated with the
subject of the assassination that they requested an opportunity to travel to
Washington, DC during the summer following their graduation to do additional
research.

From that modest class assignment developed an internship opportunity with the
JFK Assassination Records Review Board. To date, four student groups from

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

believe the government did conceal, continues to conceal, and will continue to
conceal the truth. If the review board is permitted time to complete its work,

it will assist in defusing the last two charges. We cannot prevent the

speculation that someone did conceal the truth. But the argument that a
cover-up continues, and will continue, can at least be defused, or discouraged.
What has been lost cannot be replaced. However, what still exists can be made
public. We should have access, and our students should have access to the
information and documents still in existence. This is an opportunity for the
United States government to provide a credible response to public interest. The
review board established by the Congress, is actually a group of citizens

telling the government what to do, and what to release. An opportunity exists,
in this era of skepticism, to restore some credibility and trust in the

government.

In his recent book, “The Approaching Fury," author Stephen B. Oates quotes John
Furling as saying, "Events by themselves are unimportant. It is the perception
of events that is crucial."

Perhaps in 1997, the most important aspect concerning the assassination of
President Kennedy, is the perception, shared by many, of a conspiracy involving
individuals and agencies of the United States government. Do we not owe our
young people the opportunity to form the most accurate perception possible? Do
we not owe them the chance to see as much of the truth intact as can be
assembled?

It seems to me that we owe this generation, and all succeeding generations, the
opportunity to question, to study, and to form opinions on the basis of
information they can view independently, without solely relying on the opinions
of others. Oftentimes, while I'm in the classroom, I observe students who have
opinions, but little to substantiate them. Congress has a chance before it in

some small way — or maybe in some large way -- to at least provide them with
more information, so that they may have their turn in determining what the JFK
assassination means.

We have been affected by this event. For 34 years we have been affected. The 56
students from Noblesville High School have, as have countless others, been
affected by the events of November 22nd, 1963.

The study of this event has the public interest. It is an event to which the

public and students can relate. It touches people.

As an aside, last week an article was published in the Indianapolis Star. I have

a copy with me today. Regarding our school's ongoing JFK assassination project.
Within a day of its publication I received phone calls from a gentleman offering
500 pages of documents for our use. And from a former teacher calling me with

_ information regarding some scholarship opportunities. I also received a call

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from ABC News Nightline. And yesterday before leaving Noblesville High School
received a call from Atlanta, Georgia offering information.

The subject of the call from Nightline was seeking information as to what
Noblesville High School students were doing with regard to the study of the
assassination. Together I think these calls reflect continued local and national
interest in continuing the probe into what happened in Dallas. Congress has the
opportunity to lay the facts before the American public and permit a more
reasoned, rational and fact-based account and discussion of the assassination.

I would hope that the committee would take into consideration the fact that the
review board had a one-year delay before truly becoming operational, that it is
making a one-time request for an extension, that the review board has been on
task and on budget, that the review board has conducted its business in a
professional and non-partisan manner, and in 1992, when the act was passed by
this Congress and signed by President Bush, the enormity of the task was not

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Noblesville High School have interned with the review board, with the fifth
scheduled for the week of June 16th of this year. When this group completes its
work, a total of 56 of our students will have participated in this unique and
truly educational opportunity.

I might add that except for the first group, succeeding student groups have
studied, researched and prepared for their internship on their own time, outside
normal class meetings. The most recent group to participate did so over spring
break. The fact that students wanted to spend their vacation working with
government records reflects the interest that the JFK assassination has for
students.

In my 28 years of teaching, I have never had a topic create as much interest as
the assassination of President Kennedy. It is a mystery, and it provides an
excellent research opportunity, as well as a chance for students to be actively
involved in learning.

Since November 22nd, 1963, there have been many who have believed, and still

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997 -

and could not be fully appreciated.

An opportunity exists to complete a task which I believe is overwhelmingly
supported by the American public, and it is important that this mission and
mandate authorized by Congress be completed. I would like to end with just a
couple of quotes, one from former Senator Bob Dole, who said in a different
context, this is not about only who we are. It is about have we made a

difference. This is a chance to make a difference. And as former President
Reagan often said, if not us, who, and if not now, when?

After 34 years it is time to let the public know the facts that remain. To do

less would be a tragedy and a travesty. As an educator I believe that our most
important task is to provide our young people the most complete story of who we
are and why we are who we are. We have an opportunity to work towards the
accomplishment of that goal. It is an opportunity, I believe, we cannot afford

to miss. .

In his last speech in Fort Worth on November 22nd, 1963, President Kennedy said,
we would like to live as we once lived, but history will not permit it. History

can only be served by permitting the public to see the evidence.

Mr. Chairman, as a further aside, if I might just have a few seconds. Reflective

of our students’ interest in this event, I have my honors government classes
perform a project for the model Congress. One of the students this year — they
could write a bill on whatever subject they wished, and one student who worked
with the review board last year introduced House concurrent resolution 1 in
support of the review board, and concludes, after all the whereas's, the

Congress of the United States firmly supports the assassination records review
board in all endeavors leading to the collection, review and release of the
documents regarding the assassination of President Kennedy and supports the
extension of the life of the ARRB for an additional fiscal year.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: We thank the gentleman and thank the panel. Now, I recognize the
gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Barrett.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Hitchcock, can you give us the name of that student so we can
make him or her an honorary co-sponsor? Might as well get the name in the
record.

MR. HITCHCOCK: Abigail Meyer, M-e-y-e-r.

REP. BARRETT: Judge Tunheim, you mentioned that you were releasing some
materials from Clay Shaw's diary and perhaps other things. Is there any
information in here that you find particularly interesting?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Barrett, I've not had a chance to go through it. We've just
gotten these materials in the last week through some aggressive efforts on our

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staff. The page that I cited to you is interesting in that he made the notation

in there and it's a portion of it in his own handwriting that it was perhaps
unfortunate that he had never met Oswald because then he might have possibly
been a tiny footnote in history, an ironic statement given the role that he

played in the trial.

We've not had a chance to analyze it thoroughly yet. It does contain his
reactions to events as they were going on around him during the course of the
prosecution and certainly supports his view that he was not involved whatsoever
in the assassination, which ultimately was the view of the jury that acquitted
him.

REP. BARRETT: For my benefit, as a person who has not been immersed in this
issue at all. You just mentioned it took some aggressive work from your staff to
get this released. Can you tell me what that entailed, where it was, why it was
so difficult to get this information?

MR. TUNHEIM: Certainly. Part of this, this is an investigation into where

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

records are. The bulk of our work has been with federal agencies that hold
assassination records. But we've also, at the direction of Congress in the bill

that was passed, entertained a search for records wherever they might be.
Records that are in private hands are not records that we can subpoena and take
from people, so we have to find where they are.

Staff members go out, talk to people, encourage them to donate those records to
the American public, to the National Archives. That was done in this case. We
received a tip that an individual had records that were left over from Mr. Shaw,
and staff went and talked to the person, spent time with the person, encouraged
them to share those records with the American public, and that's how it was
developed.

REP. BARRETT: How do you determine which assassination records you can disclose
now and which just have to wait?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, there's a standard that's set up by the act. There's first of

all a presumption that all records should be public. That presumption has
governed what the board has done throughout the process. But then there's a
standard where the board has to weigh the public interest in a particular record
or information with the potential harm that might be caused by release of the
material.

The standards that we look at are, are there national security interests such as
disclosure of an intelligence agent whose name hasn't been disclosed and whether
that person perhaps may be in some danger if that name was released publicly.
Does it disclose a method of protecting the president that is not generally

known today, so therefore it might be a threat to the president. Are there

personal privacy considerations that are involved.

I will tell you that when all is said and done, a very, very tiny percentage of |
information gets redacted under the standards that we are applying, and the
process of going through the records has led the board to arrive at a number of
policy decisions which the agencies by and large are now following in their own
review of records, and therefore decisions that we had to make two years ago now
we don't have to make because the agency is following the advice of the board
made on earlier records.

REP. BARRETT: As long as there are some records that are not being released, do
you think that we will inevitably face criticism from some people in the

American public that there is still some sort of cover-up? I make reference to

Mr. Holland's comments about a book being written 75 years after President
Lincoln's assassination.

Will the time ever come, do you think, when all records will be released?

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MR. TUNHEIM: I think it will, Mr. Barrett. The board is releasing every record.
The question is whether certain information on these records gets redacted or
not. For every redaction we are attaching a specific release date. Some of the
dates are five years in the future. The law that was passed which established
the review board provided that all records that are redacted, all information
redacted will be released in 2017 unless whoever is president at that time makes
a specifics determination that the record cannot be released because of some
continuing national security concern. ,

So we expect that virtually all of the information by 2017 will be released but

a very high percentage, in the 99.999 range is being released right now.

REP. BARRETT: Mr. Tilley, in your written statement you indicate that the
collections currently consist of 3.75 million pages. What's your estimate of how
many more records need to be reviewed?

MR. TILLEY: Well, it's hard to say because there is still a good deal of

material that's being reviewed by agencies at this time. But we have located

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

some records at the National Archives that are still under review, such as the
Secretary of Army's records dealing with Operation Mongoose, the campaign to

‘destabilize the Cuban government in the period after the Bay of Pigs.

Other records have been located at other agencies. I received a call from the
Customs Bureau today and they will be turning over their assassination records
to me hopefully this afternoon. After this hearing is over I'll be picking up’

the records they've located.

So it's tough to say how much is still out there but I think there's still going

to be another considerable amount of material, probably will be added to the
collection before this process is finished.

REP. BARRETT: Millions of pages?

MR. TILLEY: Oh, no. I would say probably, if we had another half a million
pages, that might be the extent of it. But what's interesting and fascinating

about this process is that we continue to turn up records where we did not know
there were records before. As agencies are aware of this effort, they have come
to the board. And the board is responsible for a lot of this by their aggressive
work with federal agencies. But I don't see us ever doubling the collection

again, but I think we will add a significant amount of material in the weeks and
years ahead.

REP. BARRETT: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

REP. HASTERT: Mr. Tunheim, I have just a very short question. You mentioned the
movie that came out, JFK, and Mr. Oliver Stone's work in there. Did Mr. Stone

~ ever have any questions of your work at all, or did he do research?

MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. Stone has been very supportive of the work of the review board.
He testified before the Congress when this bill was passed initially,

encouraging broad release of the records. He sent a representative to one of our
public hearings who testified and spoke very favorably about the work of the
board. So he's been strongly supportive and we've appreciated that support.

REP. HASTERT: Why have you waited to this point in the process to begin
reviewing the CIA and FBI records?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we've been reviewing CIA records and FBI records from the
very beginning, Mr. Chairman. The volume of records in those agencies is really
significant. We have completed the entire review of the core collections of

those agencies and those are numbers, between the two agencies, it's more than a
million pages of records.

What we are doing right now are delving into what's called the sequestered
collection in both of these agencies. Within the CIA these are records that the
House Select Committee on Assassinations asked to be sequestered, taken away
from their files and kept in a secure place for future review. The House Select
Committee did not have time to review these records carefully. Some of them are

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highly relevant to the assassination, others are not. Within the CIA there are
about 62 boxes of material and 72 reels of microfilm.

In the FBI in the same kind of sequestered collection is about 280,000 pages of
records. Those records are the focus of the review board's work over the next
year, if we get the extension.

REP. HASTERT: Let me ask the same question I asked the previous panel. Do you

think that you can finish your work by the end of the fiscal year 1998?

MR. TILLEY: Mr. Chairman, I'm confident that the board can complete its work. |
Members of the review board are confident. We will make every effort to ensure
that it gets done. In fact, we intend to provide to your staff a timeline which

sets out our anticipation of how we will review these records over the next

year.

We have set up a review process that we're working on right now that's moving
quickly and we are confident that the work can be done. We were set up to bea
temporary board and no one on the board wishes this effort to take a long

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

time. We need to get the information to the American public.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you very much. Mr. Hitchcock, I want to ask you, bringing
students into the real realm of research and learning in that respect, how
important is it that records like this be made available to the public so that

folks like yourself can have the availability for students?

MR. HITCHCOCK: I think, Mr. Chairman, it is extremely important for not only
teachers of history and historians but also for future students and future
generations. One of the things so special about our relationship with the review
board has not only been an opportunity for students to travel to Washington, and
they pay their own way and they do their own research on their on time. But it
has helped change opinions in many cases by students about not only the
assassination but about government, politics, agencies and people who work for
the government.

I cannot overstate the importance this has had for the 43 thus far, and soon to

be 56, students from Noblesville High School who have had this research
opportunity, that have been able actually to see, handle original documents, to
work with documents, to see firsthand the evidence that exists. To have that
opportunity is something that no teacher, no classroom, no film, no laser disk,

nothing in the classroom can simulate such interest and focus as this trip to

Washington DC, the review of documents, the working with people that we've had »
the opportunity to be with at the review board on a firsthand basis.

It is just something that cannot be duplicated, or as I said, simulated in any
classroom anywhere in the country. It's just been a fantastic opportunity and
will provide students in the future with a place to go to find those records, to
look at the records, to look at the documents, and be at least assured that as
much as is available and is in existence can now be made available to them as
ordinary citizens of this country, whether they be students at a university,
students at a high school, or in their just curiosity and interest as American
citizens. ;

I don't think it can be overstated the impact that this will have in helping

bridge that gap of skepticism, if this is the correct way to say it, that

exists. I just cannot imagine what the many conspiracy theorists out there would
think if the review board has to finish its stay without completing its work.

REP. HASTERT: Thank you. The gentleman from Ohio.

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And Mr. Chairman, I would begin by indicating that my earlier query about your
legal training was not meant to be an affront, and I should have recognized that
your learned demeanor was that of a --

REP. HASTERT: Not at all.

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REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Howe, I don't have a question but I'm glad you told the
story of Otto Eisenschiml because somewhere in the back of my mind I remember a
book or movie called the Lincoln conspiracy and I was certain that Secretary
Stanton had something to do with the demise of our sixteenth president, so I'm
glad you brought that up. .

Mr. Tunheim, I do want to ask you a follow-up question to what we were talking
to Congressmen Stokes about and I was fascinated by the document that you held
up. When I was in the prosecution business and we had a public records law in
Ohio which was new on the books, we found that law enforcement agencies always
wanted to take a big black magic marker and redact everything. It was my view
that that led to more conjecture, rumor, suspicion than not, and I think this
document that you brought forward, knowing that it came from the Swiss federal
police, that would give, I think, some cause to believe that Mr. Oswald had some
Swiss bank account and was squirreling away money from foreign nationals as part
of a conspiracy.

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

When you un-redact it, if that's really a word, you find out like so many other
people he apparently registered for the Albert Schweitzer College for the fall
semester of 1960 and didn’t show up. Nothing sinister or unusual in that at all.
The question I have is, when you were testifying you indicated that the FBI
originally appealed the decision to not—or to withdraw the redaction of this
particular document. You also indicated that the vast majority of documents that
you have left to review during this renewal period are located at the CIA and
the FBI in the sequestered section, I assume.

Are you any unusual difficulties with either of those agencies in terms of
cooperation as you attempt to get to a public release of what should be
appropriately publicly released?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, Mr. LaTourette, the answer — the question i is, no, we're not
receiving any degree of difficulty with those agencies right now. They are
committed to this process. They are supportive of the effort to keep the process
going for one additional year.

The CIA has not appealed decisions that the review board has made. We've got a
good working relationship with the people within that agency who are doing their
work. The FBI appealed a significant number of our decisions, but now all of
those appeals have been withdrawn. And we've got a working relationship with
the FBI that I think has been constructive and professional and is working quite
well.

The FBI initially opposed release of the document that I held up and appealed

the decision because they had contacted, in a general way, the Swiss federal
police and asked whether this record could be released, and the answer was no.
Our follow-up through the ambassador is showing what really this document was
all about, led to some wiser approach to the particular issue. And sometimes it
takes additional work like that to accomplish the release of important

materials.

REP. LATOURETTE: And the last question I would have is Congressman Stokes
expressed the view that perhaps the fine work of this review board -- should
another review board setting be required in the future to review another ;
situation similar to this, that you may be breaking down some of the barriers in
terms of suspicions that the intelligence community may have about do we need
to, you know, stick to the script and have a page that has all black magic

marker on it? Do you find that the lessons learned in this review board will be
instructive to us as we move forward and think of ways of dealing with the
release of documents in the future?

MR. TUNHEIM: I think that's a very good question. And we have found through
this effort, being the first group, an independent group outside of an agency,

to have this degree of control over the declassification process. The process

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at first was rough and difficult and fraught with suspicion. That has changed.
There's been a sea change as these agencies have realized that release of this
information is not going to harm our national security, that perhaps it's time
simply to trust the American people with access to important information about
their government. And I think everyone has learned important lessons from this —
process. It's a process that, while time- consuming, has worked very well for
this set of records.

REP. LATOURETTE: And in that regard and in that vein, have you at the review
board put together sort of an instruction or an operating manual to be left
behind for future such endeavors?

MR. TUNHEIM: Well, we certainly will. We have — virtually all of our work has
been computerized so that we have an extensive record of exactly how we've
approached all these issues. We do intend, in our final report, to make
recommendations on how this effort can be extended in the future to other areas
if the Congress so wishes.

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PAGE 33
Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997 .

REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you for answering my questions. Thank you for your fine
work. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
REP. : Thank you. I had a couple of questions. I read your testimony as I was
listening to the other two. I'm sorry I was late. I wanted to ask Mr. Holland;

were there credible historians who at this point were still questioning the
assassination in the Warren Commission and the information that came out before
this commission existed, before these documents came out?

MR. HOLLAND: Basically, most historians have stayed away from it because they
regard it as a tar baby. So there are actually surprisingly few. By

historians, you mean professors at universities. Surprisingly few have written
about it, because they just see it as a morass, and how are you going to

possibly figure out what happened? So my answer would be -- and, you know,
credible is in the eye of the beholder.

But there's actually remarkably few, and that's one of my arguments is that you
have to — it is time to insert it back into history. It did happen during the

Cold War, and that exerted a tremendous influence over what the government did.
Right after the assassination, it was a precipitating element of the formation

of the Warren Commission that the Cold War was ongoing, and they worried about
~ to be frank, they worried about congressional committees holding hearings and
disclosure of sources and methods, such as the fact that Oswald had gone to
Mexico City and been observed by photographic surveillance, and how was that
going to be handled by a congressional committee? So I do believe it has to be
inserted into-historical context. That's probably been the element that's been
missing all this time.

REP. : So you believe one of the elements of this commission is it'll bring out

of pulp -- pop culture -- pulp culture was a bad choice of words -- pop culture

and in more mainstream because more documents are there, less questions. It can
now be analyzed. And also, you seem to hint that we'll gain as much, not
necessarily that there's a lot of new information on the assassination, but that

we're going to learn a lot about how our government worked and a lot of the
interrelationships, and that may be, in fact, more use to the historians than

any questions they had remaining about the assassination.

MR. HOLLAND: I think -- my own particular view is that besides, you know, being
an investigation of three crimes — the murder of President Kennedy, the assault

on Governor Connally and the murder of Officer Tippett (sp), and then the murder
of Oswald, so four crimes -- the Warren Commission is a fantastic lens to view

the operation of the government circa 1963-64, because they had an overriding
mandate.

But yet they were going up against agencies such as the FBI and CIA with

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entrenched interests, and especially Hoover's FBI was sort of a wonder to

behold. You dealt with it very gingerly. So it's a great - and the FBI had

not been second-guessed since Hoover became director. This was the first time.
And you can't underestimate what that meant in terms of the difficulties it

posed for the commission. Now, I maintain they still came to the right

conclusion, but the fact is that they had a lot of trouble with the FBI.

REP. : One of the questions here is it took so many years to get to this point.

In looking at what future commissions might do, how much of that, do you think,
can be overcome? In other words, how much of this was the Hoover FBI, say, and
how much of this is institutional that in the first 10 years you'd have so many

‘agents active in the field, ongoing operations, in the first 20 years there's

still some — can we accelerate the process?

What have we learned from this as to -- obviously this is one that particularly
anybody in the '60s era was a defining event, so it's an extraordinary
assassination. But what have we learned for investigations in the future? Do

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

you believe the CIA and FBI will release information sooner? And if so,
presumably they'll still be redacted, which still could lead to Oliver Stone
movies and Lincoln conspiracy books and all sorts of things.

MR. HOLLAND: Mr. Chairman, I think that the fact that these records are 30 years
old has helped in obtaining their release. It's not information about the
assassination per se that agencies have objected to releasing. It's more who
said what to who, who's an intelligence agent and who's an informant for the
FBI, those kinds of issues. And there will still be institutional reluctance to
release any of that information.

I hope that through this process we can demonstrate to the public and to these
agencies that this information can be released to the public, that the public

can be trusted with information like this. There will still be a need for

secrecy to a certain extent, but certainly not with the broad brush/black pen

approach of the past.

REP. : We first learned -- I was elected in '94, and our first experience in

this committee was with Waco, where we had similar questions and still had some
information that wasn't able to be released. We're certainly having that

ongoing debate with the administration right now, because it gets far beyond the
initial investigation. In the course of Travelgate we discovered the data bank.
And, of course, with the data bank you discover the code, and then you find out
that the code leads to this. Pretty soon you're off into other investigations.

That's going to be an ongoing problem. Do you believe, in the end, that this

_ will have silenced most critics?

MR. HOLLAND: In my view, Mr. Chairman, it will silence some. It will perhaps
provoke others.

We're many years after an event that was investigated in a different era. There
were many mistakes made at the time that cannot be corrected at this stage in
time. But I think when the review board is done with its work, one thing we
should be able to prove to the American people is that the federal government is
no longer keeping secrets from them relative to the Kennedy assassination. I
think that will be a very significant development.

Whether all the questions will be resolved or not, that's a question for
historians in the future who will review these materials and will make their
determinations. This is like a gigantic puzzle with a lot of pieces missing.

We are putting some of those pieces in, small pieces and large pieces. But
there's a lot of pieces of the puzzle that will never be found. |

REP. : I want to ask one last question, and that's options of dealing with
acquiring the Zapruder film. Is that going to be a cost additional to what
you're requesting? Do you have options on how to pay for that? What's the

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status of that?

MR. HOLLAND: Well, the Zapruder film, as the chairman is aware, the review board
designated that as an assassination record about a month or so ago. We felt

that that decision was determined by the Congress in the passage of the JFK
Records Collection Act when it said that all records in the possession of the
National Archives are assassination records and should be included in this
collection. ,

Recognizing the potential cost of a film like this, we did set forth a 16-month
period before the taking would take place, so that the Congress could address

this issue and make appropriate determinations that the Congress wished to make
those determinations. The board did feel that that decision had been made for it
by the Congress in the earlier act and that it is the most significant piece of
evidence of one of the most significant crimes in our nation's history. So,
therefore, the original has an intrinsic value, and it should belong forever to

the American public.

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Federal News Service, JUNE 4, 1997

We are hopeful that the Zapruder family will agree eventually to donate that
film to the American public. We have no assurances of that at this point. But
we did set the time frame far out in the future so that the Congress can review
this issue and make its own determinations if it so wishes. REP. : Do you have
any additional questions? With that, I thank you all for —
REP. LATOURETTE: Mr. Chairman, if I could beg your indulgence and just ask one
more question, if I may.
Mr. Tunheim, if I might, my previous question about difficulty with the CIA and
FBI. Sometimes I don't make things broad enough. And I guess my query would be,
it's been brought to my attention that perhaps there's been some difficulty in
obtaining records from the other body. Is there any agency within the federal
government that you're having difficulty in terms of cooperation that would
impede your ability to complete your work in a timely fashion, as envisioned by
this legislation?
MR. TUNHEIM: Mr. LaTourette, I have not seen any evidence currently that anyone
is deliberately stonewalling us, so that when we go away, they will put the
records back into the files. We had some significant problems early in the
process, just really because agencies didn't understand what this was all about
and didn't understand what the law really provided for. So it took some time.
It's taken some time, for example, with the Secret Service to get them to the
point of realizing their obligations under the act. They do now, and they've
been very cooperative and easy to work with. But this has been a learning
process for all of the agencies, and I feel at the current time there are no
impediments among any of the agency partners that we're.dealing with to
completing the review of the records on a timely basis. -
REP. LATOURETTE: Thank you. I thank the chair for your indulgence.
REP. : I thank you all for your testimony and appreciate your coming today. For
procedural purposes, I'll now close this hearing -- the hearing is adjourned --
and open a subcommittee markup on HR 1553, markup of the John F. Kennedy Record
Review Board Reauthorization Act. The hearing is now open.
If there are no opening statements, the subcommittee will now proceed to the
consideration of the bill as amended. Without objection, the first reading of

- the bill is dispensed with and the bill will be considered for amendment at any
point. Do any members wish to be recognized to offer an amendment? Hearing
none, the question is on favorable reporting of the bill, HR 1553, the John F.
Kennedy Assassination Records Review Board Reauthorization Act. All those in
favor say “Aye."
MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. It goes
fast. The question now comes, will the subcommittee report the bill to the full

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"4

4

mae,

4

committee? All those in favor, say "Aye." MEMBERS: Aye.
REP. : Opposed, "No." In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it. The bill
moves forward to the full committee. There is no other business before the

subcommittee. We now stand adjourned. Thank you all for your hard work.

~END~

