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(2 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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JOHN A. McCONE

THE SIXTH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

t

By
Bee, Walter Elder
- Edited by Mary .S. McAuliffe, DCI Staff Historian
1987 ‘.
The attached is a draft history CL BY BYE-1
which has not been forwarded for DECL OADR

review outside the DCI History Staff. DERIVED FROM BYE-1

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CHAPTER IV

In the meanwhile, Cuba remained a sore point for both the CIA and
the Kennedys. _ |

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy asked General
Maxwell Taylor to chair a small commission, consisting of Robert
Kennedy, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleign Burke, to investigate,
Highly critical of the piecemeal and acquiescent administrative
decisions which. had accompaned the operation's progress, the Taylor.
report was mild in comparison with the severely critical internal
report prepared by CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick.

Robert Kennedy also produced a personal Bay of Pigs .report. to the
President, which he discussed with McCone in late November 1961. The
Attorney General was especially critical of Richard Bissell, Deputy
Director for Plans, because Bissell had told the President the
operation was likely to succeed, Robert Kennedy was also highly
critical of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for spending only twenty

Minutes studying the planned operation before making its first report

“to the President endorsing the operation.

It is worth noting that McCone was the only official in the

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government privy to all the studies of the Bay of Pigs operation,
including the Taylor report, Robert Kennedy's personal report, the
Kirkpatrick report, and the views of the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board.

“McCone did not dwell on the Bay of Pigs after he took office, but
he did draw several conclusions. Firmly believing the decision to go
ahead was a mistake, he nevertheless thought it an even worse mistake
to dismember the operation once underway, contending that the CIA
should have appealed directly to the President to reverse the
decision to stand down the air strikes. Concluding as well that the
members of the Taylor commission had been too’ closely involved with
the events to have sufficient perspective, he believed the CIA and
JCS had to bear special responsibility for advising the new President
to go ahead, since at that time these were the only two Washington
organizations dealing with international affairs which possessed
complete continuity.

Taking a detached view of the operation, McCone was able to
concentrate on what the Agency could do to avoid similar mistakes in
the future. Leery of large-scale operations involving the Agency's
paramilitary capability, McCone strove, with mixed results, to remove
the CIA from such enterprises. He also stressed the importance of
planning ‘an operation from beginning to end (an attitude which
dominated his approach during the Cuban missile crisis). Finally, he
insisted that the Agency's estimative function be privy to planned

operations, providing early and frequent judgments.

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Cuba, however, remained a subject of considerable concern, In
April 1961, shortly after President Kennedy established the Taylor
Commission, Presidential adviser Walt Rostow speculated that Cuba
might join with the Soviet Union in setting up an offensive air or
missile base. He additionally posed that Cuba might build its
conventional military strength and develop its subversive network to
threaten other Latin American nations from without and within. "Its
ideological contours. are a moral and political offense to us," he
concluded, "and we are committed, by one means or another, to remove
that offense...." .

The Kennedy administration proceeded to address the situation

directly. At a White House meeting which McCone attended in late

‘November 1961, the President announced that General Edward Lansdale,

acting under the direction of the Attorney General, had already begun
to study possible actions to overthrow the Castro regime. These
covert activities, explained Robert Kennedy, included anything
possible to create internal dissension and discredit Castro. . He. then
proposed that, to accomplish this goal, Lansdale head up a committee
made up of representatives of Defense, State, USIA, and CIA, which
would cut across organizational lines. .

McCone decided that the administration and the Agency both seemed
in a state of shock so far as Cuba was concerned. Although skeptical
from the beginning about the Lansdale program's prospects for
success, he nevertheless recognized that the CIA had a special role

and responsibility so far as Cuba was concerned. He himself

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supported the notion of dynamic action, but urged that such action

not be reckless. -Conséquently, he recommended that the Lansdale

group report to the 5412 oversight committee, which was properly

‘qualified to give political guidance and evaluate proposals for

action. In addition, alithough McCone agreed the facilities of all
agencies should be made available for such high-priority operations,
he emphasized that these should remain in place and not be removed to
form a new unit under Lansdale.

‘In this way, MONGOOSE, as it came to be known, was launched.
With the White House's decision to go ahead (keeping the 5412
Committee fully informed), McCone proceeded. to discuss the Lansdale
operation with top Agency officials. Acknowledging that the project
had to be closely held--Lansdale had asked that the CIA's
representative, Richard Helms, report only to the DCI--McCone
nevertheless stated he intended to skip no appropriate echelon of the
Agency, as such a course would deprive him of the advice of other
senior officers. Action would be at the Helms level, and the Agency
would offer Lansdale all necessary support and assistance, but .
without excluding the participation of other Agency members within
the strict security guidelines laia down by the President. Further,
McCone directed the Board of National Estimates and the DD/I to
undertake a continuing evaluation of MONGOOSE, viewing such
precautions as a major step toward overcoming the compartmentation
which had excluded the DD/I from any advance knowledge of the Bay of
Pigs landing. |
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Significantly, McCone insisted on bringing analytical and
estimative functions to bear on Cuban operations from the beginning.
Further, he insisted that truly clandestine actions be small. Most

importantly, he required that careful records be kept of actions and

' conversations, himself setting an example by keeping meticulous

memoranda for the record.

MONGOOSE represented McCone's first working encounter with Robert
Kennedy. The Attorney General, McCone immediately realized, was a
dynamic force with a keen interest in the intelligence community, as
well as a strong influence on the President. McCone became quite
close to him. MONGOOSE also reinforced McCone's awareness of the
extent of the administration's obsession with Cuba. He consequent ly
accepted as a personal charge the administration's desire to
overthrow Castro. He was not, however, about to allow Lansdale or
anyone else dictate the use of CIA sources. Had he detached Agency
resources for Lansdale's use, McCone would have lost control. He
further insisted on the checks and balances of 5412 committee
overview. .

The Special Group (5412 Committee), made up of the Special
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Deputy
Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other appropriate

representatives, had been established in 1955 by National Security

Council Directive 5412/2 to provide interdepartmental coordination of

covert actions. In general, the Group's cognizance extended to any

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covert activity which, because of its impact, could, if exposed,

-reflect on the official position of the United States. Thus, a

sizeable activity aimed solely at intelligence collection through
clandestine methods could come under the Group's scrutiny.
Conversely, small political actions, with little flap potential,
could be undertaken without referring the activity to the Group.

The Kennedys, however, were sufficiently alarmed over the threat
of Communist subversion and covert aggression that, in January 1962,
another special committee, Special Group (Counterinsurgency),
appeared. Largely the brainchild of General Maxwell Taylor, Special
Group (CI) aimed at identifying those areas where an insurgent threat
existed or threatened to emerge, directing the use of appropriate
resources to counter that threat.

In practice, the CIA had always been reluctant to expose its

activities to an interdepartmental body. The Defense Department had

been similarly reluctant to submit its extensive program of
peripheral reconnaissance flights to Special Group review, although,
beginning in June 1961, the group began to consider these flights.
The special Group's influence depended, in the final analysis, on the
attitude of the President and the Special Group chairman, as well as
on the temper of the DCI. Allen Dulles served as an advocate for the
CIA's proposed activities. John McCone took the position that, as
DCI, he was a personal adviser to the President and thus free to
approve or disapprove the CIA's proposals as he saw fit.

The entire Cuban situation was difficult from the outset, and

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McCone was careful to warn the President and Attorney General that he
‘anticipated no quick or easy road to success. [itn le approval Co) i en
Ambassador Alphand,.a close personal friend of McCone, the French —
embassy in Havana had agreed to serve as. the Agency's Cuban eyes and ==
ears, with Philippe de Vosjoli, SDECE's Washington representative, —..=
reporting directly to McCone. De Vosjoli’ reported that at least | ===
ninety percent of all Cubans supported Castro, while McCone added
that of twenty-seven or twenty-eight CIA agents in Cuba, only twelve
presently were in communication. Contact even with these was
infrequent, and an additional team of seven, infiltrated in December,
had been captured (with two featured on a television "confession"
show). |

Nevertheless, at-a Spécial Group meeting in Aprii 1962, McCone
urged a review of our national policy toward Cuba and asked that we
consider more aggressive action, including direct military

intervention. Noting that various intelligence reports suggested

-that Castro was in deep trouble, he questioned whether the military

strength of the Castro government was as large and as effective as
had been understood. In response to objections that such a course
might lose us friends in Latin America, McCone countered that a show
of strength was more likely to win than lose us friends.

Shortly thereafter, McCone learned from the Attorney General that
there was some movement afoot to exchange our prisoners from the Bay
of Pigs for food. (Castro had offered to release the prisoners in
exchange for a large quantity of drugs and medicines). Later, in
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‘early June, McCone suggested forming a committee to negotiate such a
release. Robert Kennedy was generally sympathetic, but did not at
that time request covert support for the project. The subject was
left for.further discussion, with an agreement that it would not be
discussed with anyone in CIA, Defense, or State who was active in
Cuba operations. |

In mid-July, McCone and Robert Kennedy reviewed. the Cuban
situation in considerable. detail. Kennedy thought that, although
considerable intelligence had been acquired, the program's action
phases had been disappointing. Shortly after, McCone had the
opportunity to review MONGOOSE with the President. Since the
beginning of February, McCone reported, nine intelligence collection:
teams (about half the originally-planned number) had been infiltrated
into Cuba and maintained in place, thousands of Cuban refugees had
been systematically interrogated in Florida, and a number of
third-country agents recruited inside Cuba. U-2 overflights were
being.conducted on a regular two-a-month schedule. The operation was
costing the CIA about $1 million per month in direct costs and even
more in indirect support costs. .

Although McCone was skeptical about the aims and operations of
MONGOOSE, he believed the CIA bore a special responsibility to
collect intelligence on Cuba. He therefore told the President that
this collection effort had produced a substantial amount of hard
intelligence on conditions inside Cuba, and a continuation would

provide additional intelligence, possibly revealing opportunities for

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political, guerrilla or insurgent activities designed to overthrow
Castro. McCone added, however, that many individuals felt that more
dynamic actions were called for, including mass landings and military
activity. McCone did not agree. “our intelligence, he said, did not
support this point of view, and any such attempts would face disaster
unless the United States was prepared to commit large military forces
to support them. |

In the meantime, Castro had officially cast his lot with the
Soviet Union, and indications were increasing that the USSR was
Willing to invest substantial amounts of money, not only to keep the
Cuban leader afloat, but to enhance his capability to create mischief
for the United States. After 1 February 1962, our U-2 flights over |
Cuba increased from one to two per month, and intelligence reports
revealed steady Soviet shipments of military as well as economic aid.

On August 4, McCone learned that eleven Soviet ships believed to
be carrying arms were bound for Cuba. McCone asked for further
details. On August 5, he received a breakdown on the ships, and he
directed immediate U-2 coverage (which began: the following day).

According to reports, up to 5,000 Soviet technicians had arrived, in

‘addition to military communications equipment. The preliminary U-2

readout, however, was not very helpful, and another flight was

planned for August 11.

On August 10, McCone met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk,
presidential military adviser General Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy,
Deputy Secrety of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Attorney .
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General. It was during this meeting,. which approved intensifying
MONGOOSE operations, that McCone first shared outside the CIA his
fear that the Soviets might introduce offensive missiles into Cuba.
His statement had little immediate impact. The experts unanimously
and adamant ly agreed that this was beyond the realm of possibility.
McCone's conclusion that the USSR might put offensive missiles
into Cuba was set in motion by the continuing influx of Soviet
military equipment. It was intensified by the arrival of Soviet

personnel, then brought to a head by reports which suggested that the

Soviet Union was preparing to install surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)

there.

Why, asked McCone, would the Soviet Union place SAMs in Cuba? If
the United States were to launch a military attack, the SAMs could be
easily and quickly destroyed. The SAMs were not being put there to
protect Cuban canecutters; therefore, McCone argued, their real
purpose was to blind the United States by deterring further U-2
overflights. This action would then permit the Soviet Union to take
further steps which they could reveal at a time of their own choosing.
McCone then asked himself what he would do if he were in

Khrushchev's shoes. The United States and Soviet Union were balanced

in nuclear weapons and missile delivery systems, but the USSR had a

‘decided edge in intermediate.and medium-range missiles. These

missiles could not, however, reach the United States from Soviet

launch pads. The USSR had not deployed these missiles outside its

borders, presumably because they could be redirected against the

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Soviet Union if they fell into the wrong hands. However, Cuba was
one place where the Soviets could safely put their missiles. As
McCone put it, "IE I were Khrushchev, I'd put offensive missiles in
Cuba. Then I'd bang my shoe on the desk and say to the United
States, 'How do you like looking down the end of a gun barrel for a
change? Now, let's talk about Berlin and any other subject that I
choose, including all your overseas bases.*"

McCone had confidence in the logic of his conviction and was
prepared to alert the top policy levels. He recognized that he
lacked hard evidence, but was convinced that the implications of
putting Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba would be so serious for
American national security interests: that the contingency should be
considered as soon as possible. |

He stood absolutely alone.

At. noon on August 21, he met with Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, Deputy Under Secretary of State Alexis Johnson,’ the
Attorney General, Maxwell Taylor, General Lyman Lemnitzer (Chairman,

Joint Chiefs of Staff), and McGeorge Bundy to review the Cuban

situation. He noted that since their last meeting on Cuba, the CIA

had received intelligence indicating an enormous increase in Soviet
military support to Cuba. Further, there now were indications of
construction work by Soviet personnel, as well as technicians to
handle the newly-delivered Soviet equipment. While the nature of the
construction remained unknown, McCone warned that it could be missile

sites, For, he emphasized, we had to consider the possibility that

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the Soviets would install offensive weapons in Cuba.

The group proceeded to consider various courses of action open to
the United States should the Soviets place MRBMs in Cuba. McCone had
a three-part Proposal already in hand, calling for 1) an immediate
aggressive political action program to awaken Latin America and the
Free World; 2) a provocative action against Guantanamo or some other
vital American interest, leading to instant United States
retaliation; and, 3) immediate commitment of sufficient U.S.
military forces. to occupy Cuba, destroy the regime, free the people,
and establish Cuba as a member of the community of American States.
McCone noted that the group was reluctant to consider committing U.S.
military forces, however, both because of the magnitude of the task

the world. : : oe

Reaching no conclusions on any course of action, the group at
length asked McCone to brief the President on the situation. The
‘following day, McCone reported in detail to the President, adding the
personal report of-De.Vosjoli, who had recently visited Cuba. The
President, who appeared quite familiar with the situation, expressed
concern, but agreed with General Taylor and McCone that policy
decisions should wait until the next day, when he would meet with his
principal advisers.

On August 23, therefore, President Kennedy met with Rusk,
McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone to discuss Cuba. The

President requested an analysis of the threat which offensive

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missiles located in Cuba posed to the United States and Latin’

America. He requested as well a- continuing analysis of the numbers

and types of Soviet and Oriental_(.as reported by De Vosjoli) — é
personnel being introduced, the quantities and types of equipment,

their probable uses, and all construction activity in Cuba. In

response to the President's question about our ability to

discriminate between SAM and surface-to-surface missile sites, McCone

said we probably could not differentiate between SAM sites and

350-mile surface-to-surface missiles, but that MRBMs and IRBMS could. ee
be distinguished. "McNamara noted that portable missiles could ‘not -be -
located under. any circumstances. “

The President wondered whether we should make a statement of our
position in advance, outlining the courses of action open to us insu os
the event that the Soviets should install missiles in Cuba. He also oe
asked what we could do against such missile sites. could we take
them out by air action, or would ground action be required? Could
they be destroyed by a substantial guerrilla action? He also asked
what we should do in Cuba if the Soviets decided to precipitate a

crisis in Berlin.

Secretary Rusk received approval for his proposal that the United

‘States inform its NATO allies, particularly Canada, of the growing

seriousness of the situation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however,
strongly opposed his recommendation to remove restrictions on
MONGOOSE operations operating out of Guantanamo. McCone again
proposed his three-part program to combat the current Cuban
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situation. After consideration, the President directed the Defense

Department to prepare céntingency plans for possible military action

against Cuba. He and his advisors agreed, however, that no steps

should be taken until full agreement was reached on a policy aimed at
completely solving the Cuban problem.

| Cuba was our most serious problem, McCone shortly afterward told
Robert Kennedy, adding that, in comparison, he would readily give up
our missile bases in Italy and Turkey. Cuba, he told the Attorney
General, was more important than Berlin. It was the key to Latin
America; and if Castro succeeded, then most of Latin America would.

fall to Soviet influence and domination.

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forty-eight hours should the President's terms not be met,

Sunday morning, October 28, with U-2 overflights continuing and
no evidence of slow-down on the Cuban missile sites, Moscow
broadcast yet another Khrushchev communique--this one announcing
that, in the interest of world peace, the Soviet Union had agreed to
dismantle and return the Cuban missiles under United Nations |
verification. Not waiting for the official text, the President

drafted a quick acceptance. The immediate crisis was over.

Serious problems, however, remained. It hada become clear to
McCone that removing Castro no longer was an objective of American
policy, and he was concerned that, as a result of Soviet military
and economic aid, Castro would be left in a position to create much
mischief. Since no agreement had been reached for on-site
inspection, and the SAM system remained in place to limit aerial
inspection, the DCI and intelligence community would not be able to
verify the removal or check on possible future reintroduction of
Cuban missiles. . Further, the MONGOOSE operation, tasked with
toppling Castro, was in disarray. Lansdale complained he was not
being kept informed of JCS planning and that the CIA's Cuban Task
. Force was acting outside MONGOOSE-channels. At the height of the
missile crisis (on October 26), a high-level meeting on MONGOOSE

agreed to recall intelligence collection teams and discontinue

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sabotage operations while relations between the United States and

“on | November 3, McCone in ormed the , Executive Committee ‘that,
despite indications that the missiles were being dismantled, there
also were signs that the Soviets were taking steps which might
represent a continuing threat to the United States. More IL-28s had
been uncrated; some fourteen Soviet ships were en route to Cuba,
and there were indications that the Soviets were proceeding with

plans to develop a submarine support base at Banes. Stressing the

unprecedented nature of the SAM system deployment and the fact at 7
the system remained in place to provide a shield from aerial J
inspection, McCone emphasized that we did not and could not know the |
exact number of offensive missiles originally placed in Cuba or |
whether all in fact had been removed. Indeed, McCone pointed out,
there remained a distinct possibility that missile complexes could
be hidden from view in Cuba's caves.
The President listened to McCone's warning but appeared more

concerned about the question of past intelligence failures. For by
this time postmortems had begun to surface alleging either a near

intelligence failure or the withholding of vital intelligence

information on the Cuban missile build-up. Deeply concerned, McCone

had already ordered an intensive internal investigation. Now the

_ President himself requested a review of the entire intelligence

community, seeking a judgment as to whether better intelligence and

intelligence evaluation could have forecast Cuban developments ‘more.

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“however, that the United States continue its surveillance and be

prepared to act if a plane were shot down. 9K :
. With the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the completion : |
of Donovan's mission, McCone again pressed for low-level flights
over Cuba--a recommendation supported by the USIB but. opposed by

both McNamara and Rusk because of its possible political

consequences. Noting that the administration could not very well
ignore the views of the DCI and USIB, President Kennedy proposed

three sorties on a trial. basis. But, after considering the pros and |||

cons,. the: President on May 21 decided to postpone a subsequent

low-level mission on the grounds of insufficient urgency. a ~ 4

. Following the missile crisis, Cuban exile groups escalated their

activities, but the Executive Committee. was. ‘unable to come to a firm.
agreement: on how to respond. Similarly, the special Group to
consider Cuban’ sabotage operations met with disagreement and
indecision. ‘It was clear McCone stood virtually alone in his view
that the United States should sustain an aggressive approach towards
Cuba, with the dual aim of getting rid of both the Soviet presence
and. Castro. No senior officials went so far as to propose that the
covert action program be stopped; but the original impetus which
had given birth to the Program had all but disappeared.
American policy towards Cuba, and especially the Agency's role
in supporting this policy, remained ambigious for the rest of

McCone's tenure. Officially, the United States held the Soviet.

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military presence in and Castro's control over Cuba to be
unacceptable. Practically, however, the disposition to take strong -
actions had weakened. Instead, the administration was willing to
accept the removal of the missiles as an adequate foreign policy.
achievement. . |

'McCone never accepted this judgment; he never was comfortable
with the policy resttictions placed on Cuban operations, and he. -
never wavered in his conviction that in order to carry out the tasks
levied on him as DCI, he needed the freedom to carry out intensive. 7
reconnaissance and covert operations. |

Under President Johnson, there were flurries of concern about
Cuba; but, after the missile crisis, the momentum had largely
C.. disappeared. The United States government turned its attention to.-

other issues, and McCone found himself once again fully engaged.

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. and improve relations.

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CHAPTER XVIII

Shortly before the coup began, on 1 November 1963, Diem suddenly
became cooperative.

Lodge and Admiral Harry Felt (CINCPAC) had been at the.

Presidential palace until almost noon. Rather than see_Felt off at

the airport, Diem asked if Lodge would remain. Lodge stayed, and
Diem proceded to tell him that. he could understand President
Kennedy's concerns about: South Vietnam. Lodge should assure the
President that he, Diem, was prepared to take almost any steps the
United States considered appropriate to correct existing problems

Diem's concessions--if that was what they were--came too late.
At about the same time, General Don's aide-de-camp directed Lou
Conein to go at once to the Joint General Staff headquarters. .
Assigned a private telephone, Conein proceeded to provide a
comprehensive, current and coherent account of the coup to the CIA
station in Saigon. The station, in turn, informed Washington.

The first reports reached Washington shortly after midnight. By
mid-morning it was clear the coup was likely to succeed. By this
time, however, both Diem and Nhu were dead, and the President was
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concerned about the circumstances. When the facts became known, he
said, he hoped the new government would be able to state that the
Ngo brothers had either committed suicide or violated their
surrender agreement, rather than been murdered in cold blood.

The President was also concerned that the new government might
be tempted to offer anmesty to the Viet Cong. He consequently was
emphatic that we watch with care the type of political leadership
the military group might install. Warning against the installation
of ultra-liberals or quasi-Communists with a free hand in political
affairs, he remarked that he was more interested in an effective
than a "pretty" government.

As a result, President Kennedy sent William Colby, in the .
capacity of Presidential representative, to Saigon--an assignment
which McCone noted with pleasure as a mark of great confidence in
both Colby and the CIA. |

On November 18, McCone, Rusk, McNamara and Bundy flew to
Honolulu to confer with Lodge and Harkins. McCone later reported
that the formal briefing sessions had gone fairly predictably until
an economist named Silver from AID had discussed the South
vietnamese economy, with its huge deficits and unfavorable balance
of trade. This briefing triggered a lively discussion and the
general conclusion that the Vietnamese economic situation was bleak,
with no apparent solution in sight.

There was other bad news as well. In some areas, the Viet Cong
reportedly had a better strategic hamlet and school system than the
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government. And it was clear to everyone present that the military
situation was far from rosy, although Harkins tried to put it ina
good light. The meeting decided that a major effort should be made
to construct strategic hamlets and to wage anti-guerrilla warfare in
the delta region, but McCone returned more discouraged than ever
about Vietnam and believed McNamara and Bundy shared this |
impression. Lodge, McCone remarked, would emerge from Vietnam
either as a fourteen-foot-tall political giant or as a thoroughly

washed-up government official.

The end of the Diem era marked one kind of transition in
Vietnam; President Kennedy's assassination, on November 22, marked
another. .

The day after the assassination, as official Washington and the
world were trying to come to grips with the shocking news, McCone

told his morning meeting that he knew very little about the new

‘President's personal relationships around Washington or his position

on current issues. In late August, Lyndon Johnson as Vice President
had been opposed to ousting the Diem regime, but McCone had not even
spoken with him since the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange.

McCone then reviewed the CIA memorandum on world reactions to
the President's assassination and ordered that it be disseminated.
He also reviewed the President's Intelligence Checklist and directed
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that it be delivered to the White House as usual. Johnson was
unaware of the checklist, having previously received the Current
Intelligence Bulletin. McCone reported that Johnson had told
McGeorge Bundy to carry on as before, and that the Agency should
therefore continue to move its publications through the usual
channels until directed otherwise.

In other ways, McCone attempted to carry on as before. Before
the morning meeting, he had instructed Walt Elder to telephone
Johnson's secretary to tell her that he would be at the White House
at 9:00 a.m. as usual, to give the President his regular morning
intelligence briefing. This message was relayed as a statement of
fact. The only question was. whether Johnson would be going to his
old office in the Executive Office Building or to the Oval Office.
The word came back that Johnson was: on his way to the White House.

McCone accordingly was at the White House by 9:00 a.m. At 9:15,
President Johnson arrived. |

Johnson opened the conversation by recalling a long background
of association and friendship with McCone. On a number of issues
which had arisen since McCone had become DCI, Johnson said he and
McCone had seen eye to eye. Expressing great respect for the CIA
and complete confidence in McCone as DCI, Johnson said he wanted
McCone to continue in the future doing exactly as he had done in the
past. |

After McCone in -turn expréssed his confidence in the President

and stated his desire to support him in every way, he reviewed some

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‘of the items from the President's checklist, explaining the nature

of the publication. Johnson asked that, for the next few days,

McCone continue to brief him personally every morning and that

senior CIA officials brief the President's staff. Johnson also

directed that any urgent matter of importance be brought to his

personal attention at any hour of the day or night. In this, he
designated no intermediary.

That noon, McCone met with both Johnson and Bundy to relay the
information that Lee Harvey Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet
and Cuban embassies in Mexico City. That evening, McCone reviewed
this information with Secretary Rusk, in addition volunteering the
Agency's assistance in coping with the flood of official visitors
coming to attend the funeral. Rusk agreed to call on him for help.

After informing his November 24 morning meeting that he would
make an effort to dispel the widely-held view that it was somehow
"immoral". for the DCI to be seen openly in his role as a direct
adviser to the President, McCone briefed Johnson for about twenty
minutes in his private residence. The President, McCone suggested,
should receive an early briefing on the Soviet long-range striking
capability, air defense posture, and the condition of the Soviet
economy. McCone also suggested that the President learn about the
CIA's operational programs, adding that the Agency was watching .
Venezuela and Ecuador very closely because of Cuban subversive
activities. |

That afternoon, McCone met with the President, Rusk, Ball,

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—_ ~ . : , _. TOP SECRET
3D McNamara, Bundy and Lodge to discuss the situation in Vietnam...
Lodge reported that the United States was in no way responsible for
the deaths of Diem and Nhu (had they followed his advice, he said, .
they would be alive today) and said he was hopeful about the
future. The change in South Vietnam's government had been an
improvement, and by February or March we would see marked progress.
McCone, concerned lest Lodge's statements leave the President
with the impression that we were on the road to victory, disagreed.
The Agency, he cautioned, had observed a continuing increase in Viet
Cong activities since November 1, including military attacks. It
had also observed a high volume of messages on the Viet Cong
military and political communications networks, which could indicate
preparations for sustained guerrilla attacks. Moreover, the new
“) government's military leaders were having considerable difficulty in
organizing the government's political structure and were receiving
little if any help from civilians, who were staying on the sidelines
in their traidtional role as critics. In consequence, McCone could
not at this time offer an optimistic appraisal of Vietnam's future
prospects.

Here, President Johnson observed that he approached the
situation in Vietnam with some misgivings. A great number of
Americans had questioned the United States' role in supporting the
coup, and there were those in Congress who strongly believed we
should get out.of Vietnam. Both of these factors caused him
considerable anxiety. He was not at all sure the United States had

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followed the right. course in upsetting the Diem regime; but now
that it was done, we had to see that we accomplished our objectives.

In addition, Johnson now told them, he had never been happy with
American operations in Vietnam. The dissensions within the American
community there displeased him, and he told Lodge that he wanted the
situation cleaned up. Any official who did not go along with agreed
U.S. policy there should be removed. ; a.

At this point, Bundy remarked that we were searching for a
successor to William Trueheart as Saigon Deputy Chief of Mission.
What was needed was a capable administrator to run the country
team. In response, Johnson repeated that the Ambassador was in
charge and that he, the President, was holding him personally
responsible for the situation.

Vietnam's economy was the subject of particular concern, and-
McNamara now commented that the United States would have to be
generous with its aid, not expecting the South Vietnamese government
to produce miracles. Johnson replied that he supported the concept
of generous aid but wanted it made abundantly clear that he did not
think we had to re-make every Asian after our own image. Too often,
he observed, when the United States became involved in the affairs
of another country, it felt an obligation to reform the country .
along American lines. This, he said, was a mistake. He himself was
anxious to get on with winning the war; he did not want so much
effort devoted to so-called social reforms.

Following this meeting, Bundy issued a statement saying that the

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United States would continue the late President Kennedy's Vietnam
policies as they had been confirmed at a mid-November meeting in
Honolulu. McCone also observed that, for the first time, he had
received an indication of what the Johnson tone would be.

McCone did not brief Johnson on November 25, the day of
President Kennedy's funeral, and at a State Department reception
that evening, the President apologized to McCone for it. Were there
were any developments which required his personal attention?, he
asked. McCone replied that there were not and that: he would call
him if any developed. .

The following day, McCone met with the President for about
twenty minutes. Johnson asked whether all appropriate Agency
> resources were being made available to support the FBI's

investigation of the assassination. He then told McCone with
considerable contempt that certain Justice Department officials had
proposed an independent panel, headed by someone like Thomas E,

- Dewey, to investigate the assassination. Johnson had rejected this
proposal, only to learn that an identical plan would appear as lead
editorial in the Washington Post. Furious at what he believed was a
deliberate leak, he had finally succeeded in killing the editorial

by intervening personally with Katherine Graham... 46.

McCone met again with the President on November : 28 ‘for. about

thirty minutes. After reviewing the checklist, Johnson. questioned | .

him about South Vietnam, Venezuela, Greece, Turkey, Rumania and

Yugoslavia. He asked } McCone to recommend someone as Ambassador to!

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McCone History

CHRONOLOGY

SEGRE eT

Oiawik!


13-00000

10 November 1960

17 April 1961

22 April 1961

4 May 1961

28 June 1961

30 August 1961

7 September 1961

19 September 1961

- 27 September 1961

13 October 1961

_SECKE

‘CHRONOLOGY L

President-elect Kennedy announces that
Allen W. Dulles and J. Edgar Hoover will

continue in their positions.
Landing at the Bay of Pigs

Study group formed (Maxwell Taylor,
Arleigh Burke, Robert Kennedy, Allen Dulles)

“to examine Bay of Pigs operation.

President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory.
Board (PFIAB) reconstituted with James

Killian as chairman.
Taylor named. Military Representative to the _

President and Chairman of the Special Group ©

' (5412).

USSR resumes nuclear’ testing in the atmos-

phere

President Kennedy confers with John McCone

on nucléar issues.

Kennedy asks McCone to become the Director

of Central Intelligence.
_Kennedy announces the appointment of McCone.

McCone becomes consultant; travels to

the Far East until 23 October.


13-00000

* >
-

1 28 October 1961

i

| 21 November 1961

ence 29 November 1961

30 November 1961

| 4 December 1961 ©

"5 December 1961

6 December 1961 |

Ll December 1961

12 December 1961

_30 November 1961

- 1 December 1961

13 December 1961.

15 December 1961 —

SECRET

Dulles and McCone visit Western Europe

until 13 November.

McCone meets with President ana Robert

“Kennedy to Giscuss new program for Cuba.

McCone sworn in by Chief Justice Warren

McCone attends meeting of NSC committee _ ,

on nuclear testing.
. :

“McCone attends first meeting of United -

States Intelligence Board (USIB) as chairman.

‘McCone attends first meeting of Special

Group (5412) as DCI.

McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric

to discuss NSA and national estimates

McCone establishes study group under |

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jz..

“Mrs. McCone dies.

ey

.McCone: meets with President Kennedy alone, |

McCone calls on J, Edgar Hoover.
DDCI becomes CIA representative on USIB.

McCone meets with Phillipe de Vosjoli.

13-00000 CS ee
T : SECKE |

' 27 December 1961 — " General.Cabell announces retirement

effective 31 January 1962.
| 5 January 1962 Schuyler, Coyne added to:-Kirkpatrick

‘study group.

6 January 1962 - McCone attends NSC meeting on Laos. “
8 January 1962 _McCone meets with Joint Chiefs of Staff.
‘12 January 1962 — , Mccone briefs General Eisenhower in Palm.
. ‘Desert.
-15. January 1962 McCone's name submitted to Senate Armed
Services Committee.
16 January 1962 -” ‘President Kennedy issues letter of in-
structions to DCI. .
16 January 1962° ; McCone meets with Ambassador (Atphana]ana_
Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg.
18 January 1962 Confirmation hearings ‘begin
; 18 January 1962 _ DCI attends first meeting of Special Group
(Counter-Insurgency) .
19 January 1962 McCone meets with The Joint Committee on
_ Atomic Energy and the PFIAB.
j | 20 January 1962 McCone briefs President: Truman at Mayflower

Hotel.


13-00000

22 January

28 January

‘31 January

6 February

8 February.

17 February

19 February

19 February:

22 February

28 February’

1962

1962

1962
1962
1962

1962

1962

1962

1962,

1962

CTA.

SECRET

McCone meets with House Sub-Committee

on CIA.

McCone meets with Chiefs of Station from
Western Hemisphere Division in Panama

until 2 February.

Senate confirms McCone by floor vote of

71-12; total vote is 84-15.

4 ; ;
McCone speaks to senior seminar at Foreign

Service Institute.

McCone meets with Senate Sub-Committee on |

-

Richard Bissell resigns as Deputy Director fir
Plans; succeeded by Richard Helms,

ph: Ser

‘Deputy Director (Research established as

new directorate with Herbert A. ‘Scoville,

Jr. as head,

McCone meets with Board of Inquiry chaired.

. : : : 3s .
by Judge Prettyman to study implication of |

Powers' case,

McCone meets with Major General Marshall

S. Carter.

Kennedy receives first briefing by

Arthur C.: Lundahl

q!

vw


wpe SECRET

7 March 1962 : McCone presents Carter to President
| Kennedy; Carter named DDCI on 9 March.
~ . , : : tar
30 March 1962 Robert Amory, Sr. resigns as Deputy Director/
| Intelligence. . .
| ; : ; . .
“— 1 April 1962 Office of General Counsel, Office of

| : ‘Legislative Counsel, and Office of Comp-
troller moved to Office of the DCI; John

‘Bros named Comptroller.

- 10 April 1962 _ Kirkpatrick named to new position as

Executive Director.
|| (23 April 1962 Ray S. Cline named DD/I

| a) May 1962 8 ; Jack Earman becomes Inspector ‘General;

Walter Elder named as Executive Assistant

-to the DCI.

|| 15 May 1962. DCI attends meeting of National Security “
Council with Congressional leaders on
fo _— - ' American role in Laos.

-3 June 1962 McCone travels to Far East until 17 June; “
+ . . . .c . . \ . . . . .
develops basis position paper-on situation

| , , ; in, Southeast Asia.

| 4 gune 1962 | Albert D. Wheelon, Jr, named Assistant

Director/Scientific Intelligence.

neds
1;

CRO S
WUE


ve SECRET

; 29 June 1962 . McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget
[ to review the projected intelligence community
| : . ; budget.
10 July 1962 ' McCone meets with Frank G. Wisner on

Oo latter's. future.

| ‘12 July 1962 McCone discusses consultant status with

Allen W. Dulles.
; ok
20 July 1962 _ President Kennedy briefed in detail on
; information derived from Anatole Golitsen.
mi 27 July 1962 i - McCone becomes immersed in nuclear testing
| oo ; Sc a - issue “and the role of intelligence in the

event of a treaty banning nuclear testing _

| - in the atmosphere.

28. July 1962 co McCone meets with [Prince Souvanna Phouma  -
| eS (o£ Laos,] |

10 August 1962 ‘At Cuban meeting, McCone makes first

Lo. oo SO explicit statement outside Agency on the —

possibility of offensive missiles-in Cuba.

a be ; .
10 August 1962 — : Najeeb Halaky proposes covert development. -

| oe of super-sonic transport.

“21 August 1962. McCone warns senior government officials

about offensive missiles in Cuba.

13-00000

i:
|

21 August 1962

22 August 1962

23 August 1962

29 August 1962

7,10,13,16 and |
19 September 1962

24 September 1962 .
27 September 1962

4 October 1962

9 October 1962

10.October 1962

SEUREL

McCone attends meeting to discuss inten- ~

sified operations against North Vietnam.

McCone advises President Kennedy about
possibility of offensive missiles in Cuba;
also on 23 August with senior advisers

present.

McCone leaves Washington until 24 Sept.

“MeCone marries Mrs. Paul Piggott in

Seattle; SAMs in Cuba photographed,

McCone sends cables reiterating his concern.

about missiles in Cuba.

| McCone meets with Robert Kennedy on

‘ransoming brigade prisoners in Cuba..

McCone meets with President /Ayub of. . Do

‘Pakistanj/in New. York. ~

McCone urges Special Group to direct U-2.

coverage of Cuba.

sy
.

Special Group approves U-2 coverage.

President Kennedy briefed on IL-28 crates;

Kennedy orders limitations on dissemination

of information about offensive weapons,

13-00000

. OCUNELI

[ . "12 October 1962 . SAC takes over U-2 overflights of Cuba.

| 14 October 1962 u-2 overflies San Cristobal MRBM site.

| . 15 October 1962 NPIC identifies MRBMs

16 October 1962 McCone notified; returns from Seattle.
“se 17 October 1962 ‘ McCone develops position paper on Cuba.

_ 18 October 1962 - IRBM sites identified.
: 18 October 1962 , ‘NSC Executive Committee divides into two.

“study groups to consider "fast" and "slow"

courses of action.

19 October 1962 . Special National Intelligence Estimate: a
| a, ok - concludes that USSR would not risk general .

[ _ oe, ' . war over Cuba.

19 October 1962 : McCone develops position on measures beyond -

a blockade.

| 20 October 1962 Chinese Communists attack India -
21 October 1962 -  MeCone briefs Vice-President Johnson on
ij _ Cuba, a - :
| 21 October 1962 Briefers go to London, Paris, Bonn, Ottawa.
| 22 October 1962 — _ Meeting with Congressional leadership just ”

prior to President Kennedy's speech.

23 October 1962 President Kennedy signs blockade proclama~_

tion.

wo
a
Si
rv
ee


13-00000

af 7

24 October

27 October
28 October

29 October

2 November

5 November

“9 November

17 December 1962

1962

1962

1962

1962

1962

1962.
ve
14 Novenber 1962,
a Novenber 1982

(20 November 1962_

4 December 1962

SECRET |

Soviet ships near Cuba stop or turn.

Messages from USSR show willingness to

avoid confrontation.

McCone orders post-mortem on handling of

intelligence.

f

SB,

Cuban refugee reports on missiles in cave

5 ; ;
President Kennedy requests review of

intelligence handling.

McCone meets-with Rusk to protest nibbling

away at approvéd operational. programs.
PPIAB requests post-mortem on intelligence

handling.

Kennedy and Eisenhower meet at McCone's

residence.

Kennedy announces lifting of the blockade.

McCone meets with Gilpatric to discuss

Air Force view of NRO.

Kennedy approves concept of covert support

to Congo government.

cecheT

13-00000

FY

27 December 1962

z

‘

2 January 1963

3 January 1963

10

10.

“17

21

27

30.

January

January

January
January
January

January

1963

1963.

1963

1963.

1963

1963

10

SLUKEL
Report on intelligence community's handling

of intelligence relating to Cuban missile

,crisis completed for PFIAB.
NPIC moves into Building 213.

McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric

to discuss A-11,SWITCHBACK, policy towards

Cuba.

. : Nos .
Special Group reviews reconniassance over

' Cuba, .

‘McGeorge Bundy discusses DOD-CIA friction;
raises Kennedy's concern over Chinese

Communist nuclear potential.

£8

McCone meets with/Italian Prime Minister
Fanfanil. :

"Meeting with President Kennedy on surfacing

A-l1l.

McCone meets with Chiefs of Station in

Panama until 29 January.

Col. Delsany, SDECE, admits charges of KGB

penetrations and French espionage against

US Oe RERBET program.
WAAL

ee

ye

re SECRET

31 January 1963 - McCone attends meeting with Kennedy to

| , discuss European problems.

1 February 1963 - McCone develops basic position paper on
oO ' Europe.
6 February 1963 ' Public statement by DCI on Cuba before

‘Stennis sub-committee; DOD public briefing.

&
‘10 February 1963 McCone travels to Paris and London until,

i7 February.

28 February 1963 MeCone talks with Bundy on lack of ‘policy|

| . towards (Cuba and ‘Problems in the. Middle. Bast.

4 March 1963 — - Meeting with President Kennedy on Cuban.

reconnaissance gap.

11 March 1963 - ‘Meeting with President Kennedy on the
bo Middle East with special reference to

Yemen. }
| 13 March 1963 McCone meets with the President and then
the NSC to discuss Latin America and

| . policy towards Cuba.

i 13 March 1963 McCone and :Gilpatric sign new NRO agreement.

po | seckEr

13-00000

i
|

' 4

21 March 1963

bo
ui.

March 1963

26 March 1963

29 March 1963

9 April 1963

11 April 1963

1l April 1963

15 - 17

April 1963—

OEUNEL

McCone meets with Brockway McMillan, new

Director/NRO.

Meeting with President Kennedy to discuss
special Agency operation aimed at exposing

the KGB.

‘Meeting with Dean Rusk to discuss the

Middle East with special reference to

a :

Israel's nuclear potential.

Executive Committee meeting on raids. by

Cuban exiles,

McCone meets with Stewart Alsop for general.

background ‘briefing,

McCone. develops basic position paper on

responsibility for reconnaissance over

denied areas,

Special Group discusses sabotage operations —

against Cuba,

oe

. . a . aan
President.Kennedy, the Attorney~General, and

the Secretary of State briefed on:svezial 7%}

at

| - 2
operation against {French intelligence/

“SERRET

service..


13-00000

t

|

SEUKEI

20 April 1963 . At NSC meeting on Laos, President Kennedy

' .

requests study of increased pressures

against North Vietnam.

ya

23 April 1963 — Clark Clifford’ succeeds Killian as Chairman,
PFIAB. |
25 April 1963 President approves low-level reconnaissance

,flights over Cuba.

25 April 1963. . Scoville submits resignation as DD/R

effective 14 June 1963

26 April 1963 - -McCone travels to Paris, Rome, and

Frankfurt until 8 May.

7 May 1963 - Penkovsky put'on trial in Moscow,
9 May 1963 NSC meeting on US support for India,
13-14 May 1963 McCone meee with Rusk to discuss support hoe

ferfionalng

14 May 1963 . McCone meets with Clark Clifford.

15 May 1963 " McCone meets with President Kennedy to

discuss Penkovsky

SECRET

13-00000 -

|
|

»

1

18 May 1963

21 May 1963

3 June 1963

14 June

19 June

21. June

2i June

25 June

7 June 1963

1963

1963

1963

1963

1963

SELKEL oe '

McCone develops position paper on Haiti.

.

McCone attends three meetings with President

Kennedy; low-level reconnaissance over Cuba;

_ high-yield, large megatonnage nuclear weapons;

Haiti.

McCone develops position paper for dis-

cussion with Gilpatric on ‘Air Force push

to take over: all reconnaissance,
McCone presents his view of the world in

speech to National War College.

McCone ‘meets with Rusk to discuss relations “

with France.

McCone attends three meetings with President

Kennedy; the Profumo case; Laos; Cuba.

McCone ategnds meeting with President Kennedy

on Betctsn! Guiana}

McCone meets with Rusk to discuss covert

program on Cuba.

McCone develops position paper on the: role.

of intelligence in a nuclear test ban treaty.

Voge

13-00000

-

2% June 1963

1 July 1963

9 July 1963

10 July 1963 —

21 July 1963.

23 July 1963 |

30. July 1963

23 duly 1963

5 August 1963

SEUNLI

McCone notes Roy Tod's’ paper on an inventory

of intelligence community assets.

DCI's Scientific Advisory Board established
under Dr. Kinzel.

‘y

President Kennedy briefed on mosaic of {Israel}

“gas bomb in Yemen, and findings of the

Purcell Panel on reconnaissance satellites.

McCone writes McNamara on need to review

intelligence community programs.

 McCone meets with Rusk to discuss DeGaulle.

McCone attends meeting with President Kennedy

‘to hear John J. McCloy report on the

“Middle East.

Sgt. Dunlap‘commits suicide. ,

McCone attends meeting with President

Kennedy on Laos,

DD/R re-constituted as DD/Science and

Technology with Wheelon as head.

15
~ scCRET

13-00000
|

5, August 1963

16 August 1953

21 August 1963

24 August 1963

26 August 1963 -

‘31 August 1963 —

2 September 1963

4 September 1963

9 September 1963

VLUIALI

Nuclear test ban treaty signed in Moscow.

McCone presents position on test ban
treaty to Stennis sub-committee,
McCone attends meeting with President _a
Kennedy to discuss actions by Diem govern-
ment against the puddhests.

*

Department of State Telegram 243 sent to vy

Saigon.

Saigon station officers in contact with

Generals Khiem and ‘Minh.,

A

:
é
Pr pew 1 a

7 A-Sae. a peg nals
a Peeve ge At Ae

ur
i

pred >

ortttyet

John Richardson cables his view that there will

be | no coup.

McCone reviews two papers on Diem government;

one by William Colby; one by George Carver.

»
‘

McConé meets with McNamara and Rusk to discuss
terms of reference for review of intelligence

community programs.

John Bross appointed Deputy to the DCI for

National Intelligence Programs Evaluation,

setber

13-00000 , sLUNECI
T. -10 September 1963 : McCone develops position paper for meetings /
| with President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy on

Vietnam.

ll September 1963 Huntington D. Sheldon cables his views from Vv

_ Saigon; ‘McCone asks Agency experts to answer

: six basic questions on Vietnam.

16 September 1963 Ambassador Lodge requests Lansdale as re-

placement for Richardson,

19 September 1963 McCone writes Lodge about COs Saigon.

| ' 19 September 1963 Colby briefs Special Group on re-vamping

Agency operations in the Far East.

20 September 1963 -McCone briefs McGeorge Bundy on. plans to re-

organize Saigon station and a covert program: —

| - _ aimed at the KGB. |

20 September 1963 _ McCone develops basic position. paper on

National Reconnaissance Program.

‘24 September 1963 McCone deyelops basic position paper on v

Agency role in Vietnam,

a BRET

13-00000

[ _3 October 1963

|

.5 October 1963

4 October 1963

9 October 1963

| a6 October 1963

| _ 17 October 1963

| 1 November 1963

. 25 October 1963

OLUNEI

McCone asks John Richardson to return to

Washington on temporary duty; Dave Smith
ng ;

acting COS Saigon.

After hearing trip report by McNamara and Vv

Taylor, President Kennedy states publicly

that war in Vietnam can be won by the end

of 1965; McCone takes pessimistic view.

McCone meets with John. Richardson,

President Kennedy answers two questions at

- press conference about Richardsm and. the —

Agency.

Far East Division develops basic paper on

re-organization of Saigon station.

McCone discusses role of.Air Force and national

intelligence assets with Gilpatric.

McCone develops position paper for meeting W~
with President Kennedy on coup plotting in .

Vietnam.

Diem government overthrown by Vietnamese /

generals,

18 |
SECRET ~ :


13-00000 OEUNCLI
[ , 3 November 1963 - President Kennedy orders Colby to go to Saigon

| as Presidential emissary.

| 12 November 1963 icCone, Helms meet with President Kennedy

for basic discussion of Cuba; President is

shown Cuban rifle captured in Venezuela, -

18 November 1963 McCone attends conference in Honolulu on “a

Vietnam until 21 November,
4 , , .

| 18 November 1963 Executive Director -and Comptroller functions

merged under Kirkpatrick.

| 22 November 1963. '. President Kennedy assassinated in Dallas,
| - 23 November 1963 McCone meets with President Johnson alone.
; 24 November 1963 McCone meets with President Johnson and Lodge W—

| : on .Vietnam,

| ~~ 28° November 1963 McCone’ meets with President Johnson who asks

So that McCone play an active role aS a policy.

advisor. |
29 November 1963: McCone attends meeting with President Johnson

| ; _ ; on A-ll.

| | OO 19
SEURET

13-00000

To ce — SECRET |

.

_ 5” December 1963 : President Johnson holds first NSC meeting;

McCone presents intelligence briefing.

6 December 1963. - McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss
COS, Saigon; Peer de Silva named; Johnson

sends message to Lodge.

7 December 1963 McCone meets with President Johnson to discuss.

~changing the image of the DCI and CIA.

12 December 1963 _ McCone meets with the Bureau of the Budget

-to review the Agency's covert action program.

13 December 1963 -McCone meets with McNamara and Gilpatric to
discuss the need for economy in intelligence

“operations.
13 December 1963 McCone meets with Rusk and Harriman who approve
concept of releasing information on. Soviet

economy.

16 December 1963 McCone visits Saigon to install de Silva - v.

until 20 December.

21-December 1963. ‘McCone presents his views on Vietnam to V

President Johnson.

Pry
—


13-00000°— “ QLUINLI
i December 1963 . McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ
Ranch; Johnson reiterates hig views on

McCone'’s policy role.

31 Dacember 1963 McCone meets with Genéral Eisenhower in
Pasadena and again on 2 January 1964 to discuss

President Johnson's budget plans.

i 4 January 1964 McCone meets with President Johnson at LBJ
a . .
Ranch to review meetings with General

Eisenhower.
7 January 1964 McCone attends meeting to hear General |
| . So Krulak discuss proposals for: intensified

operations against North Vietnam.

9 January 1964. =~ +=‘ Thomas Dale of The New York Times publishes

article on Soviet economy with attribution

| : _— to CIA; other newsmen briefed.

9 January 1964 . McCone attends meetings. with President

*

Johnson on Panama.
| - 13 January 1964 oO McCone develops position paper on how plan to

release information on Soviet economy was

| . mis-handled, .°

po | other

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+

“14 January 1964 McCone attends meetings on Robert Kennedy's.
| . . trip to meet Sukarno.
14 January 1964 Cyrus Vance succeeds Roswell Gilpatric

effective 28 January.

18 January 1964 McCone travels to Paris, London, Rome, Madrid,
- Bonn - until 1 February. |
‘ . | :
7 February 1964. McCone attends meetings on Cuban fishing ~

boats and Guantanamo water supply. —

| il February 1964 ; -McCone develops position paper on reconnais—
Te a sance after Air Force deployment to fly

| So - -Us2s out of Clark Field.

28 February 1964 McCone develops position paper. in preparation

| _ mo _ for trip to Vietnam.

| . 28 February 1964 McCone attends meeting with President

Johnson jon surfacing A-ll.

t Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
| Affairs.

|

i. 4 March 1964 USIB re-organized,

i
~ 4 March 1964 _ William Bundy succeeds Roger Hilsman as

gether Oo

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,
4-5 March 1964

6 March 1964

L7 March 1964

1 April 1964 _

2 April 1964

(7 April 1964

22 April 1964
29 April 1964.

2 May 1964

SEUKE|
McCone meets with General Eisenhower who

discusses relations with de Gaulle.

McCone travels to Vietnam until 13 March;
McCone dissents on McNamara's trip report;
reports policy disagreement separately wv

to President Johnson.
NSC meeting on Vietnam. v

McCone develops basic position paper. on NRE

for use with Baker panel of PFIAB,

At evening seminar, McCone develops position —

paper on operations against North Vietnam.

McGeorge Bundy develops position paper on.
Covert Program Against Cuba for use in .

meeting with President Johnson.

McCone talks to McGeorge Bundy about lack of

direct briefings of the President by the DCI.

McCone talks to President Johnson about ‘lack

of direct access.

NSC meeting on Cuban overflights.

SECRE

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May 1964

6 May 1964

14

16

18

- 24

25

May 1964
‘May. 1964

“May 1964

‘May 1964

May 1964

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- bombing North Vietnam, ff:

SEUKEL

“MeCone sets forth position on "The

Invisible Government,”

McCone attends meeting with President Johnson
on Cuba and Laos; remains for Tuesday lunch .
meeting with the President, McNamara, Taylor |

and Bundy.

McCone attends meeting with President Johnson

4

' to consider General Khanh's statements about

war footing and march north. /

‘McNamara's report on trip to Vietnam discusses |

y

McCone. gives President Johnson Agency estimate .

on action against North Vietnam, /

“At meeting on Laos and Vietnam, Rusk raises

question of when does the United States |

commit troops, A

Meetings all day with President Johnson on

Southeast Asia. v

‘William Bundy paper on Courses of Action on

Southeast Asia.

i Denn
SECRET

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7" 38 May 1964

4,5,6,7 June

6 June 1964

11 June 1964.

11 dune 1964

‘15 June 1964

17 June 1964.

30 June 1964

oCUNEI
McCone goes to Honolulu for meeting on

Vietnam until 3 June.

McCone attends meetings with President Johnson

on Laos with the President asking, "What comes

next?"

McGeorge Bundy and Michael Forrestal raise
with McCone the possibility of an Agency

program along pre-SWITCHBACK lines.

McCone develops position paper on Southeast.

Asia. v

McCone writes McGeorge Bundy about PFIAB

report on NRP,

McCone meets with President Johnson to suggest
that McCone leave his post; President asks

‘that he remain until after the election.

a

McCone develops position paper on NRP.

McCone issues guidance for developing re-

quirements for reconnaissance satellites.

25
Seunel

