157-10008-10150 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

JFK Assassinatic n System Date: 2/23/201
Identification Form

Agency Inforn ation

AGENCY: SSCIA :
RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10008-10150

RECORD SERIES: MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ed
Document Inf: rmation

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM: JOHNSON, LOCH
TO: SENIOR STAFF

TITLE: SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS R :TRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARY

DATE: 07/21/1975
PAGES: 14

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO
COVERT ACTION AGAINST CL BA
_  LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS
DOCUMENT TYPE:. PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS:  Redact
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: 05/11/1994 ~

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 393-1

vor
NW 47129) DocId:32203658 Page 1


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5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 Decembi:r 1963.

E39
@ Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will
present several options for discussion. including unleashing of Cuban.
exiles and the intensification of the «overt program.

6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1‘ 63.

This memo is mainly important becaise it reveals who in the Admin-
istration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend
the meeting on Cuba held this day inclided: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, —

Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or les Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy,
and Chase.

|

7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 32 December 1963.

For a press conference, Bundy recon mends the following language re-
garding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means
to stop and turn back the spread of Conmunism in this hemisphere."

8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 ,
December 1963.
| peor
This table reveals that the CIA spe nt[$106, 155,774 jon Cuban Opera- pe
@ tions, almost 50 percent of which was spent-on paramilitary action c!

£4847, 815,122); The total covert actior budget (psychological and para-
military warfare) was approximately/$61,000,000|in this four-year period.

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9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.

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The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new Presi-
dent on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which in-
cluded a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans,
and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would
dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding tw> exile groups in particular:
one led by Manuel Artime, the other by ‘fanolo Ray. _Bundy recommends

thatLyndon B. Johns pke "a more vigorous line /toward Cuba/ than
we have in the past." 2.

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“B. Johngon, 9 January 1964.

10. Memo, Bundy to L'

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; Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of
covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamare do not
support the program of sabotage, while ‘McCone and the CIA are for it,
and so are most of the middle-level off tcers dealings with the Castro

. problem.” Bundy concludes: "...in.your position, I would stop sabotage
@ attacks on the ground that they are i111 sgal, ineffective, and damaging

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action up to or including invasion."

18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.

Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charg: of contingency planning for a coup
in Cuba.

19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964. .

This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was
"to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections.
Thus, the continued exile raids were view:d negative since they increased
the noise level. The memo makes it clear that. the exile raids were becoming
completely beyond U.S. control despite CL\ financial support to the groups.

20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.

Chase notes that Castro has executed -hree anti-Castro Cubans and jailed .
two others as CIA agents. CIA admits hav ng a connection with the executed -
Cubans "but that it is completely deniabl:."'

21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1961. Subject: "Plans of Cuban
Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Gove nment Leaders"

‘The CIA was made aware of certain plais to kill Castro. The Agency told
the sources, according to Helms, that "th: United States Government would not,
under any circumstances, condone the plamied actions."" Apparently on 2 March
1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate
Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile tuned down the offer. Similar offers
were make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the
negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shippin;'-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale.
An agreement was finally made to pay the.(‘ameron group $100,000 for killing
Castro, plus .$2,500 for expenses. Julio ‘lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban
exile in New York was to pay much of the lioney, and did pay the $2,500 on
25 April, Though Camerga! “group remaine:| anonymous, it was clear the Mafia
was involved. Camerory @led that his contact was a police officer in the
‘St. Louis (Mo:}-Vice pe

22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. ‘ubject: "Assassination: of Castro."

Referring to the above memo from DDP :o DCI, Chase notes that John
Crimmins feels the matter should be discu: sed at a Special Group meeting.

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"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit
any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, '' notes Chase,
"and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy
agrees with John and with the need to forvard the matter to the Special
Group.

23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, w.th attachment (Des FitzGerald's
"A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations'')

FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and
Chase disapprove of the operations, thoug for different reasons.

24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.

Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more
likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Ciribbean crisis than the overthrow
of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels
and the November election. This memo is ery mich like his 14 May memo
(see Item 19).

25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.

In a reference to Helm's memo on assa;sination (see Item 21), it was
pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in
effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take
preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice
would look into the matter. ;

26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.

McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against
Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 Jime (See Item 21). The Bureau
interviewed many people allegedly invo ved, most of whom denied the existence
a eau did not interv.ew Cameron, since he was out of
the coimtry)}. <The most@uaeeresting findiig was that Lobo had in fact

10 November 1961. Tay

The election past, Chase et al. agrexd that "we can usefully do some

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FitzGerald pishes: for re-institution of CIA-

basic review work on Cfiifa."
directed covert program.

28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 Novembi:r 1964, with JCS attachment
dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE J)ANCE.

A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army ‘to usefgerin varterg)agains
Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Buidy agree that the White House should
"remain aloof from formal consideration of ‘Square Dance' at this stage."

I believe this plan for covert action lis «ven more shocking and unacceptable

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29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently
© a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).

The Bundy memo syggests that LBJ approved various options "short of
war to get rid of thé, Castro regime," including the possible contamination
of sensitive Cuban intports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a
Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating
elements into Cuba.

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30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.
The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA

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(as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere heh
with him at this stage. pre

31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.

Chase reports a plan told to Crimmiis and the CIA about an Artime plot
to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be

"neutralized." - D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed .-
at an upcoming Special Group meeting on shether or not "to cut off Artime's ‘ai
water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation - aa

of the Artime/Cubela plot."

rd 32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA
document. :

Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against —
ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should E
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be authorized to reduce ite commitment i1 the paramilitary field. es
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33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1955. : ; Do
“This memo indicates that not even Actime had his group in control. The '
memo also discusses CIA covert activitie 3 Si British Guiana, such as pene-— P ae
- t¥ating the: PPP and proping up the democ-atic trade unionism. be
34. Memo, Murat Wi (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, :
23 February 1965. ie
Recommends immediate termination of Artime support, ~ “js - ”
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35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965 —
Discussion of who is for maintainin; a covert capability against Cuba se
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be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude
toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out
the Vietnam problem. .

(presently on the shelf) and who is oppo:ed. Chase guessed that CIA would

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MI R7T29- Docld: 32203658 Page &~ *--


36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.

, Chase recommend#phasing out suppoit to Artime. The CIA is consider-
ing diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; tlis is similar to the kinds of tactics on
mentioned in Items 28 and. 29 above and'i:re a manifestation of the moral bie:
bankruptcy of U.S. palicy. Also some tilk here of backing a new exile es.
group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. —_—

Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilit: ry capability, while DoD and State
want the capability maintained.

37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Burdy, 18 June 1965.

This is a summary of U.S. policy tcward Cuba. The ultimate objective ate:
is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary fee
program involving ClA~controlled actions was set aside even before it really
started." ;

38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.

Adm. Raborn recommends reactivatior of a paramilitary effort against
Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNemara, and Cy Vance are against this :
chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us," Bundy
writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's
recommendations said nothing about assassination.

@ 39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.

Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into
ambush and the agents were captured. Th2 President could expect "the noise a
level of Castro's charges of ‘threatened Yankee aggression’ may go up."

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40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967. z
This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans #
who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile 4

talking to them about their activities.

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41, Meino, W.G. Bowdl

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Rostow, 18 De:ember 1967.

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_ The new:CIA’ emph@ia on developiig contacts within Castro's inner
circle. Dave Phillip® was to be in char:e of the new CIA Cuba-pzrogram.
Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for
accommodation or his disillusioned lieut mants want to know where we stand
if they move to dump him."

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