1§7-10011-10093 ; | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

Date: 10/06/93
Page:1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
@ IDENTIFICATION FORM
@ _ AGENCY INFORMATION :

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10093

RECORDS SERIES@:) i
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES, N. *
TO : FILE

TITLE :

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J.

DATE : 03/05/75
PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :
| PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT °
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 294, Folder 15

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED ie a tess cee ee

HY 50955 Docld:32203361 Page i

SECRET _F-

During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton
of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton,
In the early 1960's the relationship between the two agencies was probably
the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both
agencies seened to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and
jurisdiction of the other.

Relationships. Between 1965 and 1970

During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in
the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to
become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of
the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate
the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and
conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed
Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced

aon ee SE ERT ee TT r

that strong counter-me es were necessary. For example, Papich tried _
eee cor the Memmi of & Gop-level Somiet official

eS @ CIA agent. This was to be a joint CIA-FRI eperation,but fit was slageed :
, down by Hoover. Murther, a pmeposed joint operation MSEC
Clectromic conamge of suspected Sovigriactivitieg: S\

sear

During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the pro-
grams and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted.
Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was
coming to an end. . Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to
keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite
letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the

area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some

of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States.
While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he
did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to
Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the
relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich
brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts
was generally rejected.and accompanied by a critical remark.

While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude,
Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich con-
fided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring
of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effec-
tively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his
responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his
letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970.

+ | SECRET
eo |

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SECRET - 10 -
EFfO2TS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI

Eiforts by Papich

Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels
of the CIA and FBI. This was merely Hoover's Style. Papich was able
to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done
with tloover's approval.

Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest

to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover.

for such interest and action. When any CIA promoted projects were ap-

proved, the responsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there

would not be anv invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements. -
For instance, tne CIA through the Domestic Operations Division (now the 1B

Foreign Resources Division) was always” looking for foreigners in the

[ae BN ‘also That al ahem :

perations Division could recruit without con-
flicting with the Bureau, Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover
recommending approval, but Hoover indicated that.hg was concerned with

he oe jurisdiction eG Was en) cad tance eae Seu 8 | Qa

P b fin the United Sta they scuid Lanedtacniy contact the FBI pan. ‘He=
4 “ruling on individeat ‘ond furmmish Papich with al infomation ebtaimed
* Seem that ¢ individeal which perteimed to imtemal. aiMiafvs, arches, ‘the
x Sadividuad “wast So bo made available go the PBI if he pesscssed substan-
tial intomation within the PL's jursdietian. ts § poresaaait ingest
dm @ Mewor cadet.  ageresran ddl ih caine Te dated |
ib sree : a well” and much valuable in’
‘ormation Was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover. Perhaps more
importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed.
However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that
if it flapped, Hoover could immediately kill the project.

Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to
give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was
doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not
come about until about the time that Papich retired.

Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of
time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the
various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working
level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI.

= sae emer eeemnepey “mn

Panich reiterated the fact that he had a very good working relationship
with Jim Angleton. He fecls that this relationship was probably respon- f
sible for the FaI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abs], Apparently a Soviet
agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI was contacted
] concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do
with it. Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained
® led to Able's arrest and conviction.

SECRET ~
By

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SECRET -12-

The following grey areas were delineated by Papich;:

1. The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United
States for use by the CIA overseas or whether this should be left
to the CIA. .

PAchivities with séspect eo: deGsctor ‘aid Spon oae Lg ” e i as

United States. (AE preseat the FBI generally Tees © ea ae

Snacking as long as the Ml is given access to the ma within a
the at baie aeve boon

Peeasomable tine, On cceastion the bone fides of devteetons
od by GEA and the PBI.) | —

MENPCWSE TO moniter the mmy defectors press
: Papich feels thet these.

4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for
CIA operations overseas,

5. The handling of agents Suspected by CIA to be Communist agents over-
@ seas who travel to the United States.

6. Inadequate communication between the two agencies in resolving
bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies.

7. See the subheadings below.

Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut
delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to

time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in
particular areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following

a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA.

Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we

ask Kelley for this type of information.

Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear-
cut. For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the

United States. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining
factor of jurisdiction is a Strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't
be.) : ; .

Espionage Matters

Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate

any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case
a where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable

evidence of espionage existed, even if the Suspect was an employee of the
@ CIA. In some instances, the CIA might cone to the FBI with information /

HY 50955 Docld: 322703861 Page 4 _

Ober's Operation: (continued)
a CONTINUE) ©

had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such acti-
vity on a massive scale. However, Papich did receive a continuing
Supply of information from Ober. Most.of this information related
to the relationshin between domestic end foreign groups. Inciden-
tally, information pertinent to internal security may have been
Picked up and passed’on to the CIA, Papich is also aware that some
of Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United States
a5 well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels ended
and he or she returned to the States. This information was also
passed on to Papich, Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI
would provide CIA with an introduction to a Sympathetic student in
a dissident group,

RMERRIEWNC: loffice of seeunto(S

Projec

Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups |
by the Office of Security. He feels that if such a project had been
extensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a large
Washington Field Office and was very interested in the dissident
groups and constantly monitoring then. Papich couid not recall an
incident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was
turned over to the FBI. He did recall Occasions when Ober'ts group
turned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseas
and no longer wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only a
small amount of.information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI
from the Office of Security.

WE)
per
air

Papich states that during this entire period of-the dissidents, the atmos-

phere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what the

More Militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings,
and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were
screaming for action to bring this unrest to an 2nd. It was a difficult
time for all Federal agencies,

Criminal Cases
a MESES

Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law en-
forcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there was
not Some cooperation between the [FBI and CIA in criminal cases. For
instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information
connecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S. Angleton would
contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's

_source of information to assist the FBI. A good example of this led to

the arrest and conviction of a New York City official during the Lindsay
Administration.

SECRET

HY 50955 Docld:322033861 Page 5

)


SECRET ~ 17 -

Penetration of Embassies in the United States

Papich ba

sarge oe of ave Cla Seerorts to obtain positive os

t tes, euithough
occasion attempt to reeruit Embassy pexsemnel, for activities
0 che. pie eal Menorendin of Undsrstandine.of Reb. 7

man a to gain positive in-

S)

Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns i
to obtain information on Americans. » ;

&

Information Obtained From Tax Returns

PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United
States presently obtain great amounts of information through new techno-
logical developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the
leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to pene- -
trate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate
is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business
unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is

"If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me
alone.'' He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United
States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is.an essential factor. He be-
lieves that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director |
of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.

Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have
nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups
were directed by the Commmist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These
differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich
retired.

Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3

man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto,
California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport

with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective. In

fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover.
Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.

JNR/var

Cc: D.Belin SECRET
Senior Counsels

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HY 450955 Docld: 322703361 Page 6

