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: az | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

; _ SLGiET ~ ae
eS ‘ 10 October 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD) -————-
SUBJEGT: Meeting with Dr, MIRO Cardona on 6 October

1, Dr, MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the mecting.we had
set at 10:00; again he was driven by his secretary whom he introduced,
As during the first meeting, she remained outside in the car.
mecting lasted until 12:00 noon, ;

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2. First, Dr. MIRO handed me a note-in-longhand listing the
topics discussed with me on § October, These points are? .

a, Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support
should receive their support and be coordinated through the Council.

‘be A propaganda campaign should be waged by the Council -
aimed at: .

(1) Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Key West. ,
(2) Cubans in Miami and other Ue Ss. areas by?
{a) Subsidizing Diario de las Americas.
(b) Contracting for time on radio atations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the "Operacion
Grieta, "*

c, Underground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Courcil for procuring
Cuban pesos to send to the seven-odd resistance
groups in Cuba through reliable channels (such as ©
previously sent through the Italian Embassy).

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the plan for clandestine operations in Cuba,

he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for commando action, part
of them here, part in Cuba. He reiterated that a commando operation
was essential to bolster morale among the anti-Castro elements in Cuba
and in exile as well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken °
Cuban economy and the Communist regime. He said that for this operation
U. S. help would be necessary in providing weapons, ammo, demolitions,
equipment, and funds. He proposed that if this plan was considered to
have merit, that J arrange to have someone meet with his military men
to work out the detaila. After all preparations had been made and
materiel provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,
(NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompson at our nm eting at 15:30 on

& October for transmission. )-

4. Request for Arms, etc, to send to Escambray

Dr.MIRO remarked that over a month ago he had made a request
to Clark for arms for the anti-Castro insurgents in the Escambray, but
to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,
"] ask but never hear an answer." He said that the fighters there should
be supported, Dr. MIRO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and
a means for delivery of the arms, Osvaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the

Escambray group. ;
COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

5. Information on Arma Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought
to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba when the latter came to the
U. S. at the time of President FRONDIZI's visit, He said the Ambassador
would not divulge the source of the information but commented, "You will
know. "'

*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October.

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. MIRO said there was no way to determine the accuracy
of the figures given of planes, guns, etc, received from the Soviet bloc
(and ‘Italy and Canada): but ever. if the figures were exaggerated 100 per
cent, they would still: be impressive, an

. He added that Castro is daily becoming stronger militarily
with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, 000 being trained -
to use them while the economy continues to deteriorate. Perhaps only
half the militia would be effective, But that is sizeable. Thus, he said,
the longer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the
greater will be the task, ‘We must act soon, vigorously and effectively,
to insure victory, Another defeat would be disastrous and would make
Cubans, Latin Americans and others bolieve Castro to be invincible,
Then would core accommodations and even worse, the implanting of
Castro-backed regimes in the hemisphere. And the U..S. would suffer.
worst of all, being discredited for defeat and "guilt of interference, "'
"In the UN no nation would stand beside the U. S,"

6. Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Commando Group and

Establish a Government on Cuban Soil

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro
would never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the sabotage, commando
raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
economy, and that it was inconceivable to establish a government-ir-exile
for nothing would come of it; that the only solution for defeating the
Castro regime was for the Revolutionary Council to ,0 to Cuba and estab-
lish a government on Cuban soil, ask recognition by all friendly countries
and military assistance of its principal ally, the U, S,, and that the U.S.
: be ready to intervene immediately with its Forces, 'This’would all have

. to take place in a matter of 48 hours, otherwise it would fail. I recognize
that this is a bold plan, but boldness is necessary, There will be many
risks, many may be killed, As for myself, I don't care if Idie. Ihave
lost all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner." He reiterated
that all must be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,
everytning must proceed rapidly. First, a commando raid in force to
seize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably near Guantanamo, and imme-
diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclaim a provisional
government, broadcast by radio to all nations an appeal for recognition
(and cables prepared in advance would also be sent out), request U, S,
assistance, and the U. S. should furnish such assistance at once in ade-

quate strength to ensure victory.

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Before such an action is. undertaken, the enemy must be
softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the ~
mass of the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional

* government through propaganda, increased knowledge of the Council
‘and its + unifying ‘efforts, . Sarre

«. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think
that Castro. could be overthrown in any other way. I admitted that :
strong military action appeared necessary. I stated further that
of course his plan would have to be studied at the highest government
levels, He proposed that he might elaborate a plan with his military .
ors,and I suggested that he do this so that it might be examined

and considered.

Dr. MIRO declared that he was convinced that this-Communist

: dagger in the side of the States could only be eradicated by éuch action,

that the U.S. is and will be blamed for all anti-Castro propaganda,
sabotage, etc, and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention’
in Cuba, but that if the U. S. goes to the aid of a friendly revblutionary
tegime established in the country and helps it defeat the Soviet-backed
Communist regime, all friendly governments will applaud,

. "I have no personal political ambitions, " declared MIRO.
ny merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the
anti-Castro.elements inside and outside of Cuba, If the team isn't con-
sidered effective, then change the pitcher. But I believe the Council must
establish itself on Cuban soil, and soon, _ Time is against us.""'The Punta
del Este agreement will backfire against the U, S, if Castro is allowed
to remain in Cuba. Ina year, after the politicos of the countries re-
ceiving U. S. aid have gotten their hands on U. S. gold, they will say,
‘Thanks to Castro, we got this.' And they will spend it as in the past
with no benefits to the social and economic welfare of the people, "

. 7. Views about the Judges and Lawyers
|

: Iqueried Dr, MIRO as to his views relative to the judges and
lawyers and their future status, He said he hoped that they could all
reunite and that they could be given assistance as in the past. He de-
clared that Dr, ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was
doing nothing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council
and MIRO and VARONA, Dr, MIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister

' in the early days of the Caetro government, had named ALABAU to the -

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8 Members of the Revolutionary Council

. Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Councit on”
10 October, I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-
posed to add. He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate

30 de Noviembre
MRR ;
Accion Democratica. _ : \
20 de Mayo .
AAA Independiente
MDG

Montecristi

He said he had invited to join:

_
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

He would also like te have the Workers, Students, and the
Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, etc.) come into the Council. He be-
lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate
should be excluded, but that all ether groups should be brought together
under the Council,

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine
and military, should be coordinated by members of the Council, but that
the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO).

9. Probable Argentine Rupture of Relations with Cuba

Dr, MIRO declared that he believed imminent the Argentine
rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to
Cuba (Juho AMOEDO) was ordered to return to Havana (he had been
vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VLLLANUEVA, a
Secretary of the Argentine Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night

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' from.a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO
to go to Buenos Aires to arouse anti-Castro sentiment of the people, |
Le . -inasmuch as some Argentine action against Cuba appeared imminent. |
te (FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRO a letter.) MIRO says;
: "Of course, I cannot go. Ihave the Consejo meeting on the 10th, .
Furthermore, Iam going to New York.on October 11th or 12th for the
SIP (Socieded Interameriicana de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted
12 minutes to adaress the meeting. " .

10, MIRO to attend Homage to LACERDA (Brazilian whe
Precipitated QUADROS' resignation) on October 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (after
11 and 12 October SIP meeting) until October 15th to attend the homage
for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brazil, MIRO
probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark

of his location.

I commented that I would probably remain in Washington next
week in view of his plans, but that I might go to New York City to meet
with him; if go, 1 would get in touch with him and arrange a meeting
time and place through Clark,

11. Propaganda Commission

I asked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization
and structure of the Propaganda Commission, He stated that it is out-
side the Consejo and not under his direct control, although the Council
accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CABTRILLO’ had resigned
as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERO to handle
it. He’ claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda.

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Juatice or PRIO
being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Government

Ilasked Dr, MIRO if he believed that there were many anti-
Castro Cubans (both in and out of Cuba) who favored PRIO, or the head
of the Supreme Court to. be the provisional president if a government were
to be established on Cuban soil.- Dr, MIRO declared that the revolution
is a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former
regime. The people in Cuba would resist any such possibility. He de-

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nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and its efforts to unify
the anti-Castro elements, He said that the people should be given an

opportunity to elect their chief of state after Castro's overthrow and
reestablishment of order in the island. | ;

13. Offices-of Council {Consejo Revolucionario)

When questioned about his business and private telephones,
MIRO eaid, "The business phone is algo in my house. I have no office
except in my house, but that phone is always busy (JEfferaon 2-4680),
So use the other phone (JEfferson 4-2751) when you wigh to call me. "

"I need to have a small office somewhere away from my home
because all the activities there are driving my wife crazy. I want to : .
find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation = eee
merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and one for meetings. oO
of the Council, etc, The FRD had a place but at that place.also was the
press, the refugee center, etc, It would not be satisfactory. The FRD
is now practically dead. It was the forerunner of the Consejo.as the
unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance, " ;

14; MIRO's Views on. Coordinating the Activities of Other Exile
Groups :

After Dr. MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groups outside the
Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-
stood that some of these elements were unwilling to function under the-
Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he consider that an
Activity Committee might be organized with a delegate from each of
these groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Consejo.
This would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with
the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied
that this would merely set up another Consejo outside of and parallel to
the existing Consejo, I did not pursue this further, not having enough
background of these organizations to be able to discuss the matter
effectively, |

15, Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 October

Before my departure from Miami for Washington on 7 October,
I telephoned to Dr, MIRO froin the airport, He appreciated the call and
asked if 1 had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

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the ALABAU Lawyers’ group in proclaiming Julio CARCERAN (one

of the chief justices in exile) as "President of Cuba at War."' He ex
pressed his indignation at thie unilateral "political" move by ALABAU
and his adherents: “among the exiled lawyers and judges. He added his
best wishes to me and reminded me that he would probably go to New
York on October llth or 12th for the SIP (Sociedad Interamericana de
Prensa) meeting. 1 replied that 1 would appreciate if he would contact

. Clark after his arrival to give his location in New York City, and that

Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if
this seemed desirable. 1 suggested that in future phone conversations.
I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleasure that this would
be a good Procedure. I wished him Godspeed and he replied likewise
tome. — . -

16, Comment
During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish
myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing
up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals,
Ilistened, asked various ,uestions, and he talked at length.

In future meetings, after Ihave gained further background and

’ Rave more policy guidance, I shall be able to discuss with him specific

issues and endeavor to reach agreements or compromises, as may be
required,

Clo, cp
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