DARAAN
\q04-10332-10074 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | a

*

| _ od
SUMMARY OF AUGUST 1996 REVIEW BOARD ACTIONS ON
SECURITY CLASSIFIED HSCA TESTIMONY OF

JOHN SCELSO
(180-10131-10330)

ar

19; 9, 11, 22 Review 05/1997, "CIA
Employee." —

Protect first four 10/2017, "Operational
words of line 5;. Details."
release rest of line.

52; 11 R_ (see release on
Rae 141)

[5252123 | 21 & 23 R@R

oe a

55; 25. 10/2017 “Describes
technical operation."

56; 4-7 Release line 4; 10/2017, “Describes
, | protect all of line 5; | intelligence operation in
release lines 6 & 7 Mexico City."

10/2017, “Describes
intelligence operation in
Mexico City."

| postpone from 4th
word in line 19
through the third
word in line 21;
release rest of lines

10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."

10/2017 "Describes
individuals."

10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."


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57; 20-23 protect last three
words on line 20;
.. release lines 21-23.

10/2017, “Describes
intelligence operations "
and 4th - 6th words. | "Describes a group of
online il. people."

sia RO

57; 17-19 10/2017 "Describes
technical operation."

10/2017, “Describes
intelligence operation"

Release line 10,
postpone Ist, 2nd,

57; 10-11
ae

57; 24 10/2017, "Describes
intelligence operation"
58; 2-3 Release 2017,
“Describes intelligence
operation."
64; 18-21 &
22
68; 13 Scelso language and
identifier.
83; 14-15 10/2017 “Describes
individual."
83]8.- Po Release date 08/2006;
Crypt."
83; 22-23 Po 10/2017 "Describes |

Release 2017, “No
suitable substitute
language"
Release 2017, “No
suitable substitute
language"


13-00000
a

140; 23 — date 08/2006, |
ee Detail"

Release 2017, "No
suitable substitute

Pop language"

ais [RT
84; 17 10/2017 "No suitable
substitute language."
84; 19 P “ 10/2017 "Describes
; . technical operation."
85; 10 Release date 08/2006.
“crypt” .
85; 19 "crypt"
86; 12 Release date 08/2006.
- "crypt"
86; 15 10/2017. "describes
personnel
87; Scelso language and
date.

Release date 08/2006.
"description."
106; 11 Release date 08/2006.
————

/140;20 20

141; fi41;5-6 |

Release a "CIA
Installation in Western


13-00000

Scelso date. Sub.lang.
"location".

Review 05/1997 "CIA
Employee."

CIA team disk 8\ scel_act.wpd_

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. ; SECRET

27 September 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

FROM: — John F. Pereira
Central Intelligenge Agency

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez. Report

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
once the Board has completed its deliberations on the issues
discussed below.)

a. (8). Issue..._This _memo..is to request. that. the JFK. __-
Board reconsider its decision to release certain information
contained in the HSCA testimony of John Scelso and _in the
Lopez Report. Specifically CIA requests that /the phrases

f "political action program" (pg. 64 ScelIso | Testimony, Pg.

+177, 178 Lopez Report); "Mexican police" (pg. ‘85 :Scelso.

Testimony) ; and "is exposed by Agee in his book" (pg. 141.

Scelso Testimony) f be postponed-from— réléase. We also offer

some~suggéestions for substitute language which we believe

will not detract from the JFK assassination story, yet still
protect the information at issue.

a a en ae re

oo eon 3p SE ees

Ir. Mexican Political Action Program

"We were running, at that time, a vast political action
program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from
its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and
it succeeded. I don't know whether you informed yourself
about the magnitude of our political action program there at
the time -- absolutely enormous"

(Scelso, 64; Lopez, PP. 177, 178)

2. (S) From the early 1950's to the mid-1960's,
Mexico City Station conducted a political action campaign to
minimize leftist influence on and within the Mexican
Government. The campaign utilized student groups, a front
group of progressive businessmen, and Catholic lay group
writers and operatives in political action and media
placement efforts. The Station currently does not have a
political action program designed to influence_Mexican
_ -——" CL, BY 122241307
ae Cl BY 2224 “ITS (ec)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LOC 3-82
LIA 3-82,HUM 4-82

SECRET

13-00000

\. held that because there has been no official confirmation,

. Sek Soe

. . SECRET

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso

Testimony and Lopez Report
politics, nor has it undertaken such activity anytime in the ae
recént past.—Nevertheless,; any public-confirmation—by-the
U.S. Government of those activities would risk an adverse
reaction. Such adverse reaction would impact on current

Mexico City Station operations and be harmful to U.S.
interests. Any ~
DINED end oly CRAG

3. (S) As has-been described to the Board in previous Ae
briefings by the -Menmeat Besa : , Mexicans guard their A ‘
sovereignty carefully. Nothing will infuriate them more

than allegations of CIA meddling in their internal politics.

In fact, earlier this year, the Mexican Government postponed

“a visit to Mexico by the DCI for fear that it might be

perceived (and exploited) by the Mexican media.and political
opposition as the CIA being called in to assist with

handling the problem of the Peoples' Revolutionary Army.

¥

4. (S) The fact that the CIA activity to which the
Mexicans would object occurred more than 30 years ago will drool 0
not lessen the reaction. Release of the Scelso comments |
would risk an adverse reaction from the Mexicans, which Tag, it
would likely include calls for an examination by the Mexican she t
Government of current CIA activities. This could lead to
increased scrutiny of Station operations and personnel and
could jeopardize our unilateral activities. It could also
have a chilling effect on activities conducted jointly with
the Mexican services, who will be reluctant to engage in
programs that could become subject to public scrutiny and
political debate. \

5. (S) Furthermore, the fact that these statements
were made by Scelso amounts to an official confirmation of A)
the underlying facts, making it very difficult for CIA to deopte’
protect the same or similar information from further release | ADLURRO,
in the future. Speculation in books, articles, and other ,
publications, or disclosures by Congress are often perceived
by the public as evidence that that information is in the Four
public domain and therefore is no longer classified. The
CIA has nevertheless been able to legally protect the
information from unauthorized disclosure. The courts have

{i.e. declassification by the appropriate CIA official) the
CIA may continue to protect from release Lhe. .
the information at issue even when there. has been widespread "
public discussion on the issue in questi

6. (S) In this case, should there question raised
as to the classification status of docu Zs on the
political program referred to by Scelso, it would be
difficult to convince a court that such information had not
been declassified because of the release. by the Board.
Scelso was a long-time.CIA employee who was in charge of the
| investigation by the Agency into the assassination of the (shee?

\ a a ae
ty | 2 ET Gud

SECRET ee

AIP

eed

13-00000
. SECRET

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
; Testimony and Lopez Report
f— President; and his testimony was taken under oath, with the
T knowlédge—of-the-Agency;—and—in a classified setting.
Furthermore, the attached letter to Louis Stokes, Chairman
of the Select Committee on Assassination from former Acting
DCI Frank Carlucci also indicates that Scelso was acting as
an official of the CIA. The DCI states that any classified
testimony made by Agency staff before the Committees would
be considered "authorized provision" of the information.
This was to ensure that "all persons respond fully and
truthfully" to the Committee. Carlucci's letter, especially
taken together with the first few pages of Scelso's
testimony, make it clear that Scelso was speaking as an
official of the CIA. New

7. (S) A court would, therefore, probably find that
Scelso's statements were not just merely speculation by a
former Agency employee, but in fact, were official
confirmation of the political action program. Anything
suggesting official confirmation of classified information
would lead a judge to the conclusion that the information at
issue had been declassified by the CIA. This would make it
\ very difficult for CIA to continue to protect this
information from unauthorized disclosure. When confusion
arises as to the classification status of information, it
could lead to complicated legal proceedings and protracted
and unnecessary litigation at great expense to all parties.

IL. Liaison with Mexico

"We did not have any source of Cuban employees. We only had
Mexican police"...We had a whole reporting set up there with
that, two of them, who watched things like that. (Scelso pg.
185).

8. (S) Release by the Board of Scelso's comments about
the Mexican police in conjunction with surveillance coverage
of the Mexico City airport could similarly have a chilling
effect on our current liaison relationship with the Mexicans.
The Station has worked, and continues to work, with liaison
against compatible targets, including tracking the arrival
and departure at the Mexico City airport of targets of |
interest. Although the targets have obviously changed since
the time that Scelso is speaking of, these surveillance
operations are ongoing. The success of these current joint
operations could be threatened by any revelation today of
Mexican cooperation with the CIA in the past.

9. (S) CIA objects to this release on similar grounds
as stated in the prior section - disclosure of the: Scelso
comments would constitute official acknowledgment by CIA of
the assistance provided by Mexican liaison to the Agency.
Such acknowledgment could affect not only current operations

fh nr
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SECRET

13-00000
SECRET

SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso
Testimony and Lopez. Report.
[ “described above, but also result in reluctance by Mexican in
—~liaison to provide similar assistance in-the future.” The ene
Mexican Government would likely be subject to criticism by
groups and individuals opposed on nationalism and
sovereignty grounds to such close cooperation with the U.S.

Government and, even more’ so, with the CIA. The continued
success of CIA cooperation with the Mexicans, whether it be Oy an

with the-Rxesidemi, the intelligence service, or \
depends on the fact that those relationships are, and Wari cur
continue to be, secret. |

DURA

: 10. (S) CIA requests that the Board continue to _ an y
withhold this phrase from release and substitute in "other
sources" or. something similar to this. Omitting the fact
that the airport information was obtained from Mexican
counterparts would probably leave the impression that the
information was obtained unilaterally. Although this still
presents some risk to national security, it does achieve
some level of protection to the Station's equities with

liaison.
IIr. Phillip Agee
| (S) "That is, the variety and number of telephone

taps, surveillance teams, photo operations and other
. technical operations is exposed by Agee in his book. That
exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world by a lot...

(Scelso, pg. 141)

’ 11. (S) CIA objects to the release of the highlighted

i phrase because, for reasons described in Section 1, it

amounts to official CIA confirmation of the existence of a

teltap operation conducted jointly with the Mexicans and

with close collaboration with the President of Mexico. As

this Board is well aware, CIA has consistently requested,

! the protection of liaison involvement in this teltap

: operation. As the Board has agreed with CIA's position on

i this matter, the only issue is whether this statement
reveals what we have agreed meets the criteria for continued

f protection under the JFK Act.

: 12.  (S) For. the Board's convenience, several relevant

pages from Agee's book (Inside the Company: CIA Diary) are

attached. These pages explain in great detail the teltap
operation and the fact that it was conducted jointly between
the CIA and the Mexicans. Although such disclosures by
former employees are disturbing, they do not amount to
official confirmation of the underlying information.

\ Standing by itself, Agee's book can be dismissed by the

\ Agency as speculation, and do not compromise CIA's ability
Scelso's testimony,

to keep the information classified.
however, amounts to official confirmation of Agee's book,

a a ,

4 = .
t atest te es

—— ee ge ce et wee ee TT

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SECRET


13-00000
.¢ ‘ Oo SECRET

- SUBJECT: Reconsideration of Releases in Scelso.
Testimony and Lopez Report
oo and does effect the Agency's ability to protect the.
w-——----- information from—further release. Equally troubling is™ the”
fact that Scelso's testimony could be read to confirm not
only what is accurate in Agee's book, but also what is

inaccurate.

12. (S) Furthermore, the language used by Scelso is.
clear. The use of the phrase "exposed by Agee in his book"
does not allow for any other interpretation except that
Agee's description of the teltap is accurate. If Scélso had
used other language, such as "has been written about
elsewhere", the existence of the joint teltap operation
would be protected. We request that the Board protect the
phrase as it is and use the above substitute language. Such
substitute language would not alter the story of the JFK
Assassination, yet would still allow for the protection of
the joint operation. :

13.  (S) While the connection between Agee's book and r|
Scelso's testimony may at first seem attenuated, anyone {
‘involved in the review process conducted by this Board will |
know that it is not. Many individuals follow the decisions
of this Board closely, and Agee's writings about the CIA are |
also well known. It is to be expected that those who read
the Scelso report would then turn to > Agee! s book. 4

WA

John F. Pereira

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

From the Desk of:Linda C. Cipriani f

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani
DATE: 09/26/96 12:22:04 PM
SUBJECT: Agee Memo - New draft

Here it is... with Jeremy's improvements. Please read it carefully as | had to rush through this. Some of Jeremy's comments were slight
wording changes so as not to offend "the Board" so you may not notice much change. The biggest substantive change was an my FOIA
section (| have skillfully crafted this section to avoid the use of that four letter word!). Please note there is one more paragraph now
because | did add a bit about Scelso being an “official”. And don't forget to attach to Stokes-DC1 latter which | will fax back to you.

Have fun - and let me know if you need help.

gz

_ AGEEMEMO.DOC

ce:

SECRET

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| SECRET

“23 August 1996

Note For: Fred Wickham, DO
’ Eleanor Neiman, DO
‘Mike Luce,’ DO/Mexico
:Valerie Patterson,’ DO/EA
jChristine Hegeman; DO/EA
‘Linda Cipriani; 6Ocec

From: J. Barry Harrelson, CSI/HRG
Subject: Meeting with ARRB Staff

1. Thursday afternoon I met with Dave Marwell,

Executive Director for the ARRB, and two of his staff,

Jeremy Gunn and Mary McAuliffe. I briefed them on the four
releases in the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony that had
been identified as_potential appeal items, and on the

Agency's concerns} re_ the Australian documents? I requested
_that_ the Board reconsider the release of the statements, on °
{Mexico City political action programs, Scelso's comment on >
JAgee, the reference to the Mexican Police as a source and vs
(Warrenton as site of the Agency' s Record Center ,° a

2. Maxwell agreed to send a “staff recommendation” to
the Board recommending that they delay the release of these
four items to hear additional evidence from the Agency. The
rest of the Lopez Report and Scelso Testimony would be
released on schedule. If the Board accepts the staff's
recommendation, the four items will be addressed at the next _
.. Washington meeting (27 September). If the Board rejects the

staff's recommendation, then we have the option of appealing
to the President. Marwell and Gunn seemed confident that ~~~
the Board would agree to delay the release.

3. ‘Gunn requested that the Agency's additional
evidence on these four items (if provided in writing) be to.
the ARRB staff by 23 September. The Agency can also brie :
the Board members at. the 27 September meeting. As I” a

‘ understand -it; DO/Mexico* (Mike LY Pp will be preparing -
_ evidence’ memos © “oni “political action programs” and “Mexican >
] police” ‘issues and O0GC (Linda C.) will take the ‘lead_on —

{ Agee: T will contact the DA/TRO- (Don Hatch) on the/ Warrenton ’ oe
issue. Bae

4. Concerning{t he > Australian documents,, Marwell agreed
to delay Board action until thé 16 October meeting. The
Agency's proposal on these documents should be sent to the

ARRB staff as soon as possible.

cL By: (611637. * CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1-» ~~ DRV FM: MULTIPLE ~

SECRET

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Centrol Heme - eye

Please. (erred the attached pages as dehermuned —

fellows hiqhliqhted passages a as Cik Sclncthad —
‘ armotnon 4D the. Board, redacted _

Berackeked passages FYI as Bocas upheld delehors |

largest relthop coverage. 5 Bo limes PP: S52, a, 56, 57 7

iS) Oekte re “iQ anodic Redieed Peacd members |

13-00000

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been handled in any different manner?

‘Mr. Scelso. It would have been in the case of dissimina-
tion of information about him, but I do not think that any
operational action would have been taken to apprehend him or
to contact him or to try to force him back to the United
States.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about in terms of -- how would the
dissemination have been treated differently?

Mr. Scelso. Well, it simply means that we would have
disseminated any additional information that we got.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the
Mexico City station for failure to send this information?

Mr. Scelso. No. That was not because we were trying to:
go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of
the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used

to say, in important illegal manipulations of society,

secretly.

We were running, at that time,

~

program in Mexico City) covery

Leftist direction ‘toa middle. of thé
‘ cyl asses cehtel bese . : coe - owe

ssucceédéd.’ I’do not know whether you informed yourself
Se eee ES

¢

ed
about the magnitude of our political action program there at

Vole

the time -- absolutely enormous.

We were trying ta follow the Soviets and all the satel-

lites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of

WOL845,


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a | Mr. Scelo. Yes.
, 2 Now, why did they not report everything they found out?
- j
; ; : Mr. Goldsmith. Answer your own question.
| ‘ Mr. Scelo. The telephone center envoy was manned by
i
- 3 [:pEincipally;Hekxican supervision offfan american JOE Mexican- ake
3 -) American. These people were just inundated with information
= 7 and apparently did not extract this and transmit it back to
: : Washington.
¢ ¥ ( The later contacts with the Cuban Embassy, and so on,
e 4
= ‘G which only were divulged after the assassination. It is an
z : | enormous problem. Mexico had one of the biggest and most -
os #
= os active telephone intercept operations in the whole world
e
z = | and the job of processing this material is just impossible.
: i Mr. Goldsmith. Let's go through this step by step,
E ‘s : although I was not going to do this at this time. I am going
. 's i. to modify the line of inquiry somewhat.
° m4 Do you know how many telephone intercepts there were
: a in the Mexico City station?
z "| Mr. Scelo. How many lines were being tapped?
5 zo | Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, at the Cuban and then at the Soviet.
cme I Mr. Scelo. JI think there are about @0?lines being tapped

ye altogether: That is just the number that sticks in my mind.

a Mr. Goldsmith, Thirty -medning“a" total of thicty from ,|/,
both the Soviet and the Cuban?
Mr. Scelo. And various security suspects.

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a i | Mr. Goldsmith. Would the security suspects to related

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9 3 Mr. Scelo, Some of them were American Communists

= :

a. 4 | living there whom we tapped at the specific request of J.

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' Zz $4 Edgar Hoover.

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a 4 | Mr. Goldsmith. Of those thirty lines how many, at your ole
=
a 74 best estimate, would have been for the Soviet and Cubans?

- | |
s ai Mr. Scelo. However many outside telephone lines they
go i had.
e i
~ id 4 Mr, Goldsmith. You think just about every outside
= ‘ :
Soon | phone? .
F334 | Mr. Scelo. I think they tapped all the outside lines.
>a + .
= d
- 2 ¥ Mr. Goldsmith. How certain of that are you?
= q : .
= 4 a ,
ers y Mr. Scelo. Well, this is just based cn my recollection,
= j :
E 13 ! going back 15 years.
| | |
= 42 4 Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, your earlier comment was
~ 4
“oI | that the telephone surveillance operation in Mexico City
= ia was one of the most extensive in the world?
a ; -
= Fy Mr. Scelo. Yes. And of course, they taped a great
= 20 | deal which they could not exploit. They cculd not later
vo tt i listen to it; they did not have time. They used to listen
ry pan . .
ra 22 to it sort of spottily, you seer and attemst then to exploi
23 what was the most important.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your answer to my earlier question as

to why the information on Oswald was not sent to the

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(Pause)

Mr. Scelo. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have a few questions to ask you on

that. This refers to the envoy operation thhatawas

[joint operation conducted “by ‘the Mexicans and the .aiiericang]

Ole

and I believe this indicates that there were 30 lineg; iin;
fact, connected at one timé, so that your early testimony

was, in all likelihood, accurate.

I am going to have to ask you also to*read the section

marked number 3, Oswald coverage.
Mr. Scelo. What is that report, if I may ask? ;

Mr. Goldsmith. This is taken from the 1977 Inspector

General Report.

Mr. Scelo. I see.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read the section marked Oswald

Coverage through to the end of the paragraph on page 162.

(Pause)

On page 161, the section where it says? “Oswald Cover-

Seer

age. In'mid=62, ifeneve WeRiGan officer 3 in i charge’ Of ‘the™ envoy.”

Nee

envoy “Tistéhing post ror” ‘the “telephone numbers” of: the™ “gSviet ;
Cuban and satellite embassies in anticipation of possible .
coverage, ?. |

The question I have for you is as follows. t would jle

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1-57
= was already in effect, so why would it have been necessary
e + | for[the Mexican officer in chargef)+o ask fene American officer -|
é 2 1 for the telephone numbers? .

3 4 Mr. Scelo. [the Mexicans were.

> at .

é Es 3 things at “that time, not these targets, ~ ; They -were- tapping é
“ F ; | other Mexicans, and so on.3 We had our own unilateral tap -
« __. moe ven

; & 5 L operations |

Z | Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

' * 3 Mr. Scelo. -- on those important targets.

> < 4

Mr. Goldsmith. So, are you saying that prior to 19627:

- . |

= |

= 1; 1 [the liaison operations fwith the Mexicans jfdid not cover the
= +4 4 Soviet, Cuban and satellite embassies?

g \

= oud Mr. Scelo, That is wnat that says. I do not really
Zou, i xrecall. That would have been in mid~62%% That was just

= ts about the time I was coming onboard in the Mexico desk.

5 ts 1 And I do not recall what the previous status was.

I do recall that they certainly did ask --[ aie

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t 15
POE Mr. Goldsmith. It indicates that/ the. liaison operation.
a4 had taps on 30 lines.“ If it was. not“the Sovi.
PTT ee 4 * : : " te —
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£27 i: i satellite embassies, it makes us wonder what it could have
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zs Mr, Scelo. Mexican politicians and security suspects; &
4 : ee
22: Mexican Communist Party people. There were three or four or

TOI §38 .

: SECRET

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33)

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Mexico City's station's Operations

re

one of the most sensitive of all of the stations at the Agency?

uw

Mr. Sceiso. ° It was then. That is, the variety and

number of telephone taps, surveillance teams, photo oPer ations

wz

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and other technical operations is(exposed by Agee infhis +;

K) That exceeds anyplace else that we had in the world

sa”

by a lot. ‘There is no other station in the world that has

|

that good operations.
Then cand Caracas. frnat got to be real good. Nothing

like it in Europe.

os)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to draw your attention to a’

cable which, unfortunately, I do not have with me. The cable

is referred to in Book 5 of the Senate report, written by

Thomas Karamessinas to the Mexico City station in which he

i

Keproaucea from the holdinga of the Nati
1onal Archive
: 8 HSCA (RG 2

indicated and said the arrest of Sylvia Deran would jeepordize

REPOMT CHS BUELDING, YASUTNGTON, B.C. 20024 (202) 5Sn-2445

On

U.S. freedom of action.

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2 Do -you remember that cable?
e ia:
s Mr. Scelso. Yes. * -
=z
x i Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why it was sent?
¢ i ry
S 201
° i Mr. Scelso. At that time, we were not sure that Oswald .
4 .
ard i
oe i might not have been a Cuban agent, aiid the arrest of a
f27 2
oN foreign consular person was quite a serious matter under

>
aa

international ‘law.

hd
ts

cae wk Mewed Raitt Mee Sebat SSS Skate es Kinwe oo wl

Although Sylvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, I believe,

we
tae

nevertheless, I did not think -- Karamessinas may not have

SE Br BET 101923 |
wWS2:

a BTERET YR Test

Appendix :1

* Alphabetical and numerical listing of CTA employees,
agents and collaborators arid organizations controlled,
financed and thfluenced by the CIA,

ACOSTA VELASCO, JoRGE. Nephew of Ecuadorean President, Jose

' Maria Velasco. Minister’ of the Treasury and Minister of
Government. Informant and Political-action agent of the Quito
Station, : ;

AGENCIA ORBE LATINOAMERICANO, Feature news service serving
most of Latin America, Financed and controlled by the cra through
the Santiago, Chile, station, .

AGRIBUSINESS DEVELOPMENT.INC. (LAAD). Provided cover forcra
Officer Bruce Berckmans, q.v. .

AGUERRONDO, MARIO, Uruguayan Army colonel and former Monte-
video Chief of Police. Close Station liaison collaborator.

AIR AMERICA. CIA-owned airline for paramilitary Operations, mainly
in the Far East, a

ALARCON, ALBERTO, Guayaquil businessman and Liberal Party actiy.
ist. Principal agent for CIA student Operations. in Ecuador, Ctypto-
nym: ECLosg.

ALBORNOZ, ALFREDO. Ecuadorean Minister of Government Gnternal
security), Close collaborator of the Quito Station. —

ALLEN, JOHN. CIA Operations officer at Camp Peary training base,
formerly assigned in the Near Rast,

ALLIANCE FOR ANTI-TOTALITARIAN EDUCATION. Propaganda
mechanism of the Montevideo station, -

ALMEIDA, WILSON, Publisher and editor of Voz Universitaria, @.¥., &
university student newspaper. Propaganda agent for the Quito
station,

commercial delegation to Brazil and Uruguay. Recruited by the cra
in Montevideo before return to Cuba, : .

AMADOR MARQUEZ, ENRIQUE. Labour and Political-action agent of
Guayaquil base. Minister of Economy.

AMAYA QUINTANA, ENRIQUE. Leader of the Peruvian Movement of
the Revolutionary Left (MIR), recruited in Guayaquil as a penetra-
tion agent. Resettled by the cra in Mexico,

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL
EMPLOYEES, The US member of the Public Service International

599

SAN


HEMICAL
ONAL EEDERATION.OF PETROLEUM AND CH!
Taree cues GEES ‘The rxs for this industry set up originally by
Thec1a though GacUS Ol Wackers International Union.

INTERNATIONAL.

ariat ronal wodknes. Used taythe Cia for labour operations. a
eae ONAL EDERATEOLOF WOMEN LAWYERS. Organization .

lice training

: WOKICE &CADEMY. cta-controlled po!
a er a covet kx Washington DC. Formerly the Inter-
a otican Poli Acadeny. founded in Panama by the Panama

mrER ATTONALEOLICESER VICES scHOOL. CIA training school for
1 i

foe in Washiesion. weer commercial cover. :
a eEMATIONAL STUDEXY CONFERENCE (asc). See coonconee)
OF K NIONS OF STUDEN .
ING SECRETARIAT OF RATIONAL u j cose
TRADE SECRETARIATS. A generic deseri
a native trade-saion organizations having as members ne
national unioes worizrs.ia a particular industry. There are 2
ramet have been Seed by the cra for labour operations.
sane = hendquartecs in:Eorope, others in the US but close rela-
i sateined with toc ECF TU in Brussels.
tone a are ORT WORKERS FEDERATION (TF). The
sa inate Gade secreauiat for transport industries. Used by
labowroperstioss. See JOAQUIN (GACK)OTERO.
oo papaya Anoetiean married to Ecuadorean. Quito sora
nee rote mer RACES stn Luis Toroella, q.¥-, and served a8
scriber znd courke fer telephone-tap operation. Cryp!

Sart EXE, Welssquista leader and Quito station penetration
JA ’

en garuno. Socretary-General of the Inter-Americao
JA S

Regioml Later Orgaszation (ORI), 4-V-s in Mexico City. cia
crza,-. Moutexéleo poli commissioner in charge of move
Aen A Nombied oO tiea, Montevideo station liaison.

jones, neRs&. Agent of the Montevideo station used in operation to

break tends: spsicxwol thie Embassy of the United Arab Republic

RAMISGNES, TEQNEHS. Assistant Depuly Director for Plans and
KA

later Depete Diecese for Plans.

612

ULTURAL - |
EEDERATIGMOF PLANTATION, AGRIC -_
AND ALLIED WOSKERS (crraaw). The international trade secret

KAUFMAN, WALT2R 3, Chief of Mexico branch of Western Hemi-

sphere Division,
KINDSCHI, JACK. Cra operations officer in Stockholm using non-
official cover of Washington DC public relations firm Robert Mullen
Co. Assigned to Mexico City with same cover,

KING, COLONEL, J. C. Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the: .

Dp?.

KLADENSKY, OTTO, Quito Oldsmobile dealer and station agent for’
intelligence on the Czech diplomatic mission. Also the cutout to
Reinaldo Varea Donoso, Ecuadorean Vice-President, q.v. Crypto-

- NyM: ECTOSOME Jater DICTOSOME,

LABOR COMMITTEB FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION, Propaganda mech-
anism of tbe Montevideo station,

LADD, RAYMOND, Quito station administrative officer also in charge
of certain operations, .

LADENBURG, ARTHUR. CIA operations officer in Mexico City under

. non-official cover, Later assigned to Santiago, Chile,

LIBIDINAL, Mexico City station postal intercept operation. True
cryptonym and true names of agents unknown. :

LICALLA. One of three observation posts overlooking the Soviet
Embassy in Mexico City. Names of agents forgotten.

LrcoBRa. Cryptonym for operations targeted by Mexico City station
against the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRD) and the
Mexican Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Government,

LicowL~I. Owner of small grocery store near Soviet Embassy, Mexico
City. CIA agent. True nanie forgotten. ied

Licozy-1. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the as. True -

name forgotten.
L1cozyY-3. Double-agent of Mexico City station against the KGB. True
name forgotten,
Licozy-5. Double-asent of the Mexico City station against the KGB.
True name forgotica.
LipENY. Mexico City station unilateral telephone-tapping operation.
Tre cryptonym and true names of agents unknown.
LIEMBRACE. Mexico City station surveillance team. Names of team
members
LIENVOY. Joint telephone-tapping operation between Mexico City
station and Mexican security service. Names of agents un-
known,

LIFIRE, Mexico City station travel control and general investigations
feam. True names unknown.

LILINK, An operation in Mexico City to provide non-official cover for

613

a ta ean


13-00000

nym: LISAMPAN) is still in the ‘interference-complaint¢ itutions in Santa Barbara. Reports on plans for this trip are
stage. immediately to the White House. : ;

Another important operation directed against the Cubans te} The station also has its own unilateral telephone-tapping
sophisticated provocation that won the CIA Intelligence MSy¥aeeee tion which is limited to special cases where the involvement
for Stan Archenhold,{ the case officer who conceived i Bf the Mexicans is thought to be undesirable. Connections for this
operation consisted of a series of letters sent to the Cuban int goperation are made outside the exchanges by telephone company
gence service in. their Mexico City Embassy from a person‘ engineers who work as station agents, as in the case of the bugging
_ purported to be a cla officer trying to help them. The fe ‘ef the Cuban Embassy (LISAMPAN). However this is restricted as
_ purport to implicate Joaquin Ordoqui, a respected, old-g jar as possible in order to avoid damaging relations with the

leader. of the Cuban Communist Party and a high-ranking jyifaq Mexicans in the event of discovery.

tary leader, as a c1a agent, The letters are based on informagy"y Travel control, general investigations and occasional surveil-
‘from Carlos Manuel Pellecer, the Guatemalan exile and peneiig? are the duties ofa six-man team called L1rirg, They obtain
tion agent, who was closely associated with Ordoqui and Marcay: fiight-travel lists from the airport, which are passed daily to the{_
Rodriguez when all three lived in Mexico City during the la, | station and take photographs of passengers to and from com-
1950s. The letters continue to be sent to Cuban intelligence'y, ¢ munist countries and of their passports as they pass through
though Ordoqui was arrested in 1964, and the desired contr @ immigration.
versy and dissension in the Cuban revolutionary leadership Another eight-man surveillance team, known as LIEMBRACE,
followed. ‘ has vehicles (including a Volkswagen photo-van) and radio-

As the cover of Sherry, the chief of the Cuban operations gp, | communications equipment and is mainly concerned with Sovict/
tion, is in the Embassy consular section, he has been able to mey satellite and Cuban targets. It is administered by Jim Anderson, t
several of the Cuban consular officers directly. However, his maj, | ho also controls another eight-man team (i1RICE), similarly
agent for direct assessment of the Cubans is Leander Vourvoulig | equipped, which deals with the Mexican revolutionaries and other

Consul of Greece and President of the Consular Corps. miscellaneous targets.
Postal interception is mainly directed towards the mail.from

. communist countries, but can occasionally be used to

Support Operations pondence from selected Mexican adresse, Set Comes
The support operations must also be detailed. fhe joint oper. As in every station, a variety of agents assists in support tasks
tion for telephone tapping, LIENVOY, is effected In Cooperation § Which they perform in the course of their ordinary jobs. For

@ Mexican author ‘a capacity for about fory processing the immigration papers for station non-official cover
lines. The station provides the equipment, the technical assistane,§ personnel, for example, Judd Austin,t one of the US lawyers in
couriers and transcribers, while the Mexicans make the conn: Goodrich, Dalton, Little and Riquelme (the principal law firm
tions in the exchanges and maintain the listening posts. In adé} Serving American subsidiaries) is used. The Executive Vice-
tion to monitoring the lines of the communist diplomatic mission President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mexico
and those of Mexican revolutionary groups, LIENVOY also coven City, Al Wichtrich,t channels political information to the station
special cases. For years the telephones of ex-President Cardenas that he picks up in his normal work with American and Mexican
and his daughter have been tapped, and recently tapping bs businessmen. For technical support the station has an officer of
started on that of Luis Quintanilla, a Mexican intellectual whos TSD under Embassy cover with a workshop and qualifications
planning a trip to Hanoi with the publisher of the Miami Nea§ audio, flaps and seals, and photography.
and with a fellow of the Center for the Study of Democrat :

532

Y


that they were engaged in political activities. The Chinese had:

fact, been using the NCNA office for propaganda and support,
pro-Chinese revolutionary organizations in Mexico and Ceni@
A 2 Cot

Central American Exiles

Mexico has traditionally been a haven for political exiles from

Central American countries including communists and other

extreme leftists. Several Central American parties, including thy

Guatemalans, maintain liaison sections in Mexico City in orde
to keep lines open to the Soviets, Cubans and others. They
operate semi-clandestinely for the most part in order to avoid
repression from the Mexican government.

Washington DC
20 December 1966

Because of the strategic importance of Mexico to the US, its size
and proximity, and the abundance of enemy activities, the
Mexico City station is the largest in the hemisphere. Altogether
the station has some fifteen operations officers under State
Department cover in the Embassy political section, plus about
twelve more officers under assorted non-official covers outside the
. Embassy. In addition, a sizeable support staff of communications
Officers, technical services, intelligence assistants, records clerks
‘and secretaries bring the overall station personnel total to around

fifty.
Liaison Operations,

Dominating the station operational programme is the LITEMPOt
project which is administered by Winston Scott,t the Chief of
Station in Mexico City since 1956, with the assistance of Annie
Goodpasture,f a case officer who has also been at the station for
some years. This project embraces a complicated series of opera-
tional support programmes to the various Mexican civilian
security forces for the purpose of intelligence exchange, joint

524

‘perations and constant upgrading of Mexican internal intelli-
collection and public security functions,
+ At the top of the L1TEMPo operation is the Mexican President,
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz,} who has worked extremely closely with the
gation since he became Minister of Government in the previous
jnistration of Adolfo Lopez Mateos} (1958-64), Scott had
giso developed a very close working relationship with Lopez
Mateos, and, since Diaz Ordaz became President two years ago,
Scott has been working closely with the current Minister of
Government, Luis Echeverria.{ Thus the LiTEMPO project
focuses at the top on the President and the current Minister of -
Government who will be the second consecutive choice of PR1
faders to pass from internal security to the presidency,

Scott's chummy relationship with Diaz Ordaz none the less has
its problems. In 1964 Fulton Freeman went to Mexico City as
Ambassador to crown a Foreign Service career that had started
in the same Embassy in the 1930s. He is expected to retire after
the 1968 Olympic Games. At the time of his assignment to Mexico
City Freeman’s expectations of meaningful diplomatic relations
with Diaz Ordaz collided with the President’s preference for deal-
ng with Scott, and Freeman was relegated to protocol contacts
with the President while his diplomatic talents focused on the

Foreign Minister. The problem of who would deal with the Presi- _.

dent was confused somewhat by the Ambassador's insistence, not
fong after arrival, on a detailed briefing about the station opera-
tional programme, which Scott refused. Eventually both Scott
and the Ambassador visited the White House, where President
Johnson settled matters according to the wishes of the Agency
and of his friend Diaz Ordaz. Scott continued, of course, to work
with the President and the Ambassador never got the full briefing
he had demanded, Since then the relations between Scott and the
Ambassador have warmed, but the Ambassador forbids any
station operations directed against the Mexican Foreign Ministry.
While Scott frequently meets the President and the Minister of
Government, two non-official cover case officers handle the day-
to-day contact with the chiefs of the security services subordinate
to Echeverria. One of these officers is a former FBI agent who
worked in the legal attaché’s office in the Mexico City Embassy
- the legal attaché is usually the ret office in an American
oe 525


13-09

embassy. The FB! officer had left the FBI to come with the stath 5
but pains have been taken to conceal his c1A employmen

order to avoid the bad blood that would result from the ciate
‘stealing’ of an FBt officer, The two non-official cover officers afg™
the equivalent of an A1p Public Safety mission but in Mexico thi
. function is performed secretly by the station in deference to Mex}.

can nationalist sensitivities - as is the case in Argentina,
the LITEMPO project we are currently providing advice and equip...
ment for a new secret communications network to function be”
tween Diaz Ordaz’s office and principal cities in the rest of thy

country. Other joint operations with the Mexican security seq’.

vices include travel control, telephone tapping and repressiyg
action. > oy

The station also prepares a daily intelligence summary for Diaz
Ordaz with a section on activities of Mexican revolutionary orga.
nizations and communist diplomatic missions and a section oa
international developments based on information from head.
quarters. Other reports, often relating to a single subject, are
passed to Diaz Ordaz, Echeverria and top security officials, These
reports, like the daily round-up, include information from statiog
unilateral penetration agents with due camouflaging to protect the
identity of the sources. The station is much better than are the
Mexican services, and is thus of great assistance to the authoritig
in planning for raids, arrests and other repressive action. we

Liaison between Scott and the Mexican military intelligence
services consists mainly of exchange of information, in order to
keep a foot in the door for future eventualities. The US militay
attachés, moreover, are in constant contact with their Mexicag
military intelligence counterparts and their reports are received
regularly by the station.

Stan Watson,} the Mexico City Deputy Chief of Station, has
been meeting with a South Korean c1a officer. who was recently
sent under diplomatic cover to monitor North Korean sounding
for establishment of missions in Mexico and Central Ameria

Communist Party Operations

The station cp section consists of two case officers, Wat
Thomast and Ben Ramirez} both under Embassy cover, pls

526

ffwo case Officers outside the station under non-official cover: Bob
priscoll,t a retired operations officer now working under con-
a

jract, and Julian Zambianco who was transferred from Guayaquil
40 Mexico City about a year ago. These officers are in charge of
agent and technical penetrations against the revolutionary organi-
zations of importance, The quality of this intelligence is high,
although not as high as it was before 1963. In late 1962 Carlos
Manuel Pellecer,} the station's most important communist party
penetration-agent, broke openly with communism by publishing
a book. He was a leader of the Guatemalan Communist Party
(eo) and had been Minister of Labor in the Arbenz government
during. the 1950s. However, after the Agency-sponsored over-
throw of the Arbenz government Pellecer made his way to Mexico
City where for years he was the station's best source (cryptonym
LINLUCK) on all the revolutionary organizations in Mexico, not
just the Guatemalan exiles. His book, of course, was financed by
the station and distributed by the Agency all over Latin America.
Pellecer is still being used by the Mexico City station as a propa-
ganda agent, as with other former penetration agents who form-
ally break. with communism without revealing their years of work
as spies — Eudocio Ravines,} the well-known Peruvian defector
from communism is a parallel case. Another book by Pellecer,
also financed by the station, has just appeared. This book is a

| continuation of cr exploitation of the Marcos Rodriguez and

Joaquin Ordoqui cases in Cuba, and is aimed at denigration of the
Cuban revolution. .

The station also collects information about communists from
the US living in Mexico. Many of them arrived during the Mc-
Carthy period and some have subsequently become Mexican
citizens. Information about them is mainly of interest to the FBI,
which calls them the American Communist Group in Mexico
City (acGMc). Information collected about them includes that
obtained through the LIENVoY telephone-tapping operation des-
cribed below, oO .

The station also receives copies of reports from FBI penetration
operations against Mexican revolutionary organizations. Mexico
is the only country in Latin America, except Puerto Rico, where
the FB1 continued operations against the local left when the CIA
took over in 1947, The FBI intelligence is of high quality,

527


Soviet/Satelli
Beteite Operations ainst the Soviets with varying degrees of effectiveness and
ability. Several of these agents are suspected of having been
ited by the Soviets for use as double agents against the
jon. Two of the most important of the current access-agents
Katherine Manjarrez, t Secretary of the Foreign Press Associa-
gon, and her husband — both of whom are targeted against the
. Hausman and Robert Steele.t A number of sensitive opera ‘goviet ‘press attaché and the Tass correspondent. Others are
, . poowL-1f and LiovaL-1.f ° ; ;
- p1cowL-I is the owner of a tiny grocery store situated in front
“of the Soviet Embassy where the Soviets buy odds and ends in-
duding their soft drinks - Tsp is studying ways of bugging a
wooden soft-drink case or the bottles themselves, More import-
i all five are owned got, LICOWL-I is involved at.the moment in an operation against
the station. Several years ago films Were made of Soviets con. “| the Embassy zavhoz (administrative officer), who spends consider-
cover naa Eatden, but attempts by Russian lip-readers to dis |) able time chatting with the agent, Because Silnikov, the zavhoz,
cover their conversations were unsuccessful. From one of the Jf hes been on the prowl for a lover — or so he said to LicowL-I -
front OP's, radio contact is maintained with the LIEMBRACR T the station decided to recruit a young Mexican girl as bait: An
surveillance team for Signalling when a particular Soviet Survejl.. | appropriate girl was obtained through BESABER,{ an agent who
lance target leaves the Embassy, his route and other data, Photog js normally targeted against Polish intelligence officers and who
are regularly taken from all the OP's of Soviets and their families | runs a ceramics business specializing in souvenirs. By loitering at
raphe ators to the Embassy, When visitors use vehicles, photo. | y1cowL-I's store the girl attracted Silnikov’s attention, and a
graphs are taken of their licence Plates for tracing. Occasionally hot necking session in a back room at the store led to several
Meee CALLA OF is used for electronic monitoring, since it is} rious afternoon sessions at the girl's apartment nearby -
close to the Embassy, but so far attempts to pick up radiations | obtained especially for this operation. Silnikov’s virility is as-
from Soviet cryptographic equipment have been unsuccess. fonishing both the girl and the station, which is recording and
ies photographing the sessions without the knowledge of the girl,
In addition to the LTEMBRACE surveillance team, several other Although promiscuity among Soviets is not abnormal, relation-
support operations include coverage of the Soviets. Through the ships with local girls are forbidden. Eventually it will be decided
NVOY,operation, Soviet telephones are constantly monitored, whether to try blackmail against Silnikov or to provoke disrup-
fad through the LiriRE travel-control operation Photographs of | tion by sending tapes and photos to the Embassy if the blackmail
travel documents are obtained along with data on arrivals and isrefused. _
departures, Monitoring of Mexican diplomatic communications LIOVAL-If is not as interesting a case but is more important.
reveals requests for Mexican visas by Soviet officials, including The agent is an American who teaches English in Mexico City
the diplomatic couriers. In addition, Ns is also monitoring and is an ardent fisherman. Through fishing he became acquain-
several communications Systems involving ‘burst’ transmissions ted with Pavel Yatskov, the Soviet Consul and a known senior

Thé largest section in the station is that i ietfeatete
¢ Tar Covering Soviet/sas,
optrations. It has four case Officers, three intelligence tsa

. from the UssR to as yet unidentified agents believed to be in | xapofticer~ possibly the Mexico City rezident (KGB chief). Yats-

Mexico ~ possibly Soviet intelligence officers assigned abroad as kov and the agent spend one or two week-ends per month off in
‘illegals’, with false identity and non-official cover. the mountains fishing and have developed a very close friendship.
528 -. 529


13-0000

When Yatskov is transferred back to Moscow -- he has af,
been in Mexico for some years — we shall decide whether to
defect him through LIOVAL-1, Recently Peter Deriabin,t
well-known kGp defector from the 1950s who is now a US Gy
and full-time c1a employee, went to Mexico City to study mt

voluminous reports on Yatskov written by LIOVAL-1. He cas?
cluded that there is a strong possibility that LiovAL~1 has
recruited by Yatskov and is reporting on Paul Dillon, the s
officer in charge of this case, Nevertheless, the operation ¢,
tinues while the counter-intelligence aspects are studied

. . es
, The station double-agent cases against the Soviets, Licozy-j +f pond

Licozy-3} and Licozy-5,{ are all being wound up for
of productivity or problems of control. One of these agen;

Licozy-3, is an American living in Philadelphia who wag re
ctuited by the Soviets while a student in Mexico, but who Teported

the recruitment and worked for the Mexico City Station. Hg
worked for the rar after returning to the US — the Soviet Cane
officer was a UN official at one time — but recently Soviet interest
in him has fallen off and the ¥B1 turned the case back over to the

, Agency for termination. _
Against the Czechs and the Poles many of the same types of

operation are targeted, Access agents, observation posts, tel.
Phone tapping, surveillance and travel control are continuous
although with somewhat less intensity than against the Soviets,
In the Yugoslav Embassy the code clerk has been recruited by the
crAas has one of the Embassy’s secretaries.

Until the New China News Agency (NCNA) office was closed
last month by the Mexican government, the Soviet/satellite sec.
tion of the station was responsible for following the movements
of the Chinese communists. Telephone intercepts through
LIENVOY and occasional surveillance by the L1RICB team were
directed against them, but the most important intelligence col.
lected against them was from the bugging of their offices. The
audio operation was supported by the Far East Division in head-
quarters, who sent an operations officer and transcribers to
Mexico City. Now that the NCNA offices are closed, the audio
equipment will be removed and the station will continue to

follow up the many leads coming from the bugging operation.

530

gn Operations

Be Cuban operations section consists of two case officers,
pa Sherry and Joe Piccolo, and a secretary under Embassy
: paver and one case officer under non-official cover. An observa-

son post for photographic coverage and radio contact with the
IEMBRACE surveillance team is functioning, as well as LIENVOY

hone monitoring and LiFiRE airport travel control, Through
fo LIFIRB team the station obtains regular clandestine access

4p the Prensa Latina pouch from Havana, and copies of corres-

ence between pL headquarters in Havana and its correspon-
gents throughout the hemisphere are forwarded to the stations

Through the LiTeMPo liaison operation the Mexican immi-
gration service provides special coverage of all travellers to and
fom Havana on the frequent Cubana flights. Each traveller is
photographed and his passport is stamped with arrival or depar-
jure cachets indicating Havana travel. The purpose is to frustrate
the Cuban practice of issuing visas on separate slips of paper in-
gead of in the passport so as to obscure travel. Prior to each
Cubana departure the station is notified of all passengers so that
pame checks can be made, In the case of US citizens, the Mexican
givice obliges by preventing departure when requested by the

ion.

othe most important:current operation targeted against the
Cuban mission is an attempted audio penetration using the tele-
phone system. Telephone company engineers working in the
LIDENY tapping operation will eventually install new wall-boxes
for the Embassy telephones in which sub-miniature transmitters
with switches will have been cast by Tsp. At the moment,
however, the engineers are causing deliberate interference in
Embassy telephones by technical means in the exchange, Each .
time the Embassy calls the telephone company to complain of
interference on the lines, the engineers report back that every-
thing in the exchange is in order. Eventually, as the interference
continues, the engineers will check street connections and finally
arrive to check the instruments in the Embassy. They will find the
wall-boxes ‘defective’ and will replace them with the bugged
boxes cast by Tsp. Right now, however, this operation (crypto-

331

13-00000, . wm ee ka 3

1-185

Mr. Goldsmith. What do you mean, things like this

3

happened all the time?

Mr. Scelso. Planes were held for travellers who woule

otherwise miss them, for Cuban officials, and so on.

ta

tod
a en a ee a

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the Agency ever actually investigate,

this particular matter?

Oo

=r.

Mr. Scelso. It investigated to the extent that there

~~

RUEFORTERS BKULLDING, UASHTIGTON, D.C. 20024 (2027) $54-2305

was nothing heft to investigate. The plane was gone. The

Pr)

man was on it. He had not identified himself before he left. |

is)

x

dle

Py

We had very complete coverage of’ the Mexico City Airport:

Reproduced trom the holdings of the Nation
al Archives
; HSCA (RG 223)

|
|
1 { ee —_
i | and watched the Cuban flights closely, but where it sometimes
2 | happened that an important Cuban official would comé late,
{-
1 i he would go directly to the plane without going through
t
ve i travel controls. |
i . :
se | At that time, the man was gone. There was no picture
4
ts : of him. Nobody looked at his passport. Period.
st tf
a 5 i Mr. Goldsmith. You did not bother to ask any Cuban
2 73 : employees in the Airport about the man?
S y
Ro) i
= 3! e _-We-did_not have source of Cuban
= an Mr Scelso. We not he APY. SO
= 2 | employees.\ We only had\/Mexican police TO
| a | 7
41 Mr. Goldsmith. Were any of them questioned about nim?
oS
aE7 int Mr..Scelso. Yes, this was a.routine thing. We had a
aN i ;
42 whole reporting set.up there with*that,; two of them, who

watched things: liké”this. But the report from :them was that

wd
iy

the man had just gone on the plane and they did not know who

SEVRET 101967,

ALIZASIN ALPORTING COMeaty

nt baa sien bee cnt med Sa etles iene fees Slee!

13-00000

The. hop=z. Report

HscA Summer om“ of Ssvcole aud te ate

Wexice Ci
ee eerie eee,

Wation , andes Ann covers
is so. CIA Coett , ott is ~the—
Archies ex Cit aldiags

teltap COdETEg S & Bo lines

id antic Afar) ef Savest- oCcials
fa. qettend

identiticetien of Cuban oicicls
tog etted


13-00000

Classification: _
(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA—controlled documents.)

744-

was in operation on only four of those days. This .

“Committee has not been able to establish or disprove

the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those

days. when there was no coverage from LIMITED because

the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were

not’ made available for review. That material was

requested but has not been made available. 141/ An

explanation of why this material is missing was

requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated

* that the photographs and logs “may have been destroyed

ee in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the
folders for the destroyed material were reused to
forward more recent photographic material to
Headquarters for retention. "143/ The’ folders which
once contained the production were located at the

ton, NOES

Records Center but,

National Archives"
wat tones nvenives

\

according to the CIA's explanation, the folders
contained production material from 1967.144/ Because
the CIA has not provided the photographic production
and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no

precise determination detailing the effectiveness of
the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made. |

c

Classification: __~ |
roe Se i : — 168.

7

o a ee a
 Cnifiad by daceg ton

SEF = LEE


13-00000 . -.

ore

“oh

eee

esse. of | J

she’

oenewor  eew  E I o

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted
- from ClA—controlléd documents.)

-54-—

surveillance project.189/ - Even though Mr. Scott was
the nominal case officer, the “routine case officer
functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/
An American technician was stationed in the listening
post to maintain the equipment and to protect the

Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's

duties in this operation ranged from meeting with

the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes.

of daily supervision of the operation to handling the

TG,

collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/

Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/

staffed by Mexican . kewwotticarshat/ This listening

erie ne

post covered up to thirty? lines at one time. 195/

b. Analysis ‘and Reporting of Information

Obtained

[ir Herbert’ Manette was responsible for the

) analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet

transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a
daily basis by [Barbara” wané11.f Jes: rare w would

Classification: _- i
ooo gs

nu
wate | os

NOE,

ol

\

NI,

}
NOTRE

WH,

NETS,

ys a a a a a aa la la El

13-00000 -cumenr - Losey rd Aer Air aa ucmmmr aac Aunagy

fi hee

“ee ea QL i .
ope H 23 : fe f ~~ *
Classifica ion Ue Seta

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from ClA—controfled documents.)

RE,

=56-

GER,

It should be noted, though, that an examination of

the project files shows that Americans in contact

“OSTA.

with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely

reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination

SORPAT

to the intelligence community.203/ .

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine

which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban

'

diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic

intercept operation in September and October of 1963.

The monthly operational report of this project for

the month of September lists the following phones

as targets of the operation: 204/

SMITA,

14-42-37 Cuban Embassy
14-92-14 _ Cuban Embassy
25-07-95 Cuban Embassy
14-13-26 Cuban Embassy
15-60-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancéry) ale
15-61-55 Soviet Embassy (C! r) o
15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache) E
15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial’ Office) '
15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)
The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at {
the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September
1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that.
Lteation, EVA AIST eve 5 |
ney ae Classification: ; 2a RE 172 |

aye,
be tae Aiea td Be doh te

CEES amy $a) L&E SEE SEE SESE JE AE

13-00000

etn

Noten ees

Classification: Fe

eran: PP
lise ad. J
(This form is to be used for material extracted

from ClA—<ontrolled documents.)

--71-

in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban
transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on

a weekly basis.293/

(g) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff

produced was much the same as those of the Spanish.

language transcripts described above.294/ Mr.

Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/.

Many of Mr.. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation
“(previously transcribed)" after the meter number
referring to the reel footage location of a
conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this
notation meant that the conversation had already been
transcribed from a.tap on another embassy phone:

"Previously transcribed" means, for instance,

I went to the embassy first and the embassy
number was 605055. Now this number 501264
belonged to the film's office. So consequently
if that particular ‘call went out of the main
building to the films office and it had been
transcribed before, that is exactly what I
would do, put down “previously transcribed".

So there. was no question of doing it twice.298/

bo Cusitled by derivaiion:

18?

SOOT. TETRTPETR,

wr

NITNC,

EEN TOT

aimee nen,

13-00000

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from ClA—controlled documents.) — :

-58-

7

subject to the intercept operation. It should be

noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in

. the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:

14-42-37 The Ambassador's private telephone
25-07-95 The Chancery

14-13-26 The Chancery

25-09-14 The Commercial Office

11-28-47 The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban
operations in Mexico City remembered that there were
taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is
possible that the employee, Mr. PhiTlips, who, ‘Was stationed
in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after
a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/
As the above notes, an examination of the project
files fails to support: Mr. Phillips' memory,

although those files do show that the Consulate

telephone was tapped in 1964.

4. Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from

approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/

Classification: _.

vee ies” 4
| Classified.by derivation:

TOG 174

lev

~

“GE GA GR SER GA

“Ga.

TER, EHP. “UE.

NERS,


13-90000- if” er Pers a mi” - ae Pe
TAR
Classifications: {241 SS :
oar :
i tiie GJS yhde
(This form is to be used for material dass
from ClA—controlled documents.)

Sardis

nara.

~ 177 7

tert oh.

Q: Had the information concerning Oswald‘’s visit
to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet
- one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa,
if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would
his case prior to the assassination have been
handied in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemina- -
tion of information about him, but I do not
think that any opérational action would have

. taken to apprehend him or to contact him or
Ps to try to force him back to the United ‘States.

Q: ...how would the dissemination have been
treated differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have dis-
seminated any additional information that we
got. 657/

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or

not this additional information about Oswald was reported

TED.

to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief

of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station

UEP,

was ever criticized for this failure to report in the

face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters.

WEEN,

He said:

Ko. That was not because we were trying to go
easy on them, it is simply because it is in the
nature of the business. What you are trying to
do is engage, as I used to say, in important il-
Tegal manipulations of society, secretly.

action, program in an Mexico.Cityj to try to ;
i swing Mexico around from its Leftist” direction »
to a middle of the road directionsand: it.

{tiea 3f were running, at that time, a vast/poli-
tica

ae

Classification: “00 aa wf
ie VIA bee alt


13-00G00- - °°. 1 ee

.

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted
from ClA—controlled documents.)

— - 178 - oe
Be a I do not know whether formed yourself about
we, ; the magnitude of our/political action program at.
: ; ; the time--absolutely enormous. ;
We were trying ‘to follow the Soviets and
all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same
time, the main thrust of the Station's effort
was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and
satellite people. 658/
Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's |
handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination
can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when

he was asked how he would characterize that handling:

“At the very best, it is not professional, at the. best.“ 59/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning
Oswald After the Assassination .
A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph

of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the Station clearly dis-
associated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453
from Oswatd after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is
clear that some people still considered it possible for 7
some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. Tn Octo-
ber, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Win-

ston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the

“it Was sending

Mexico City Station cabled Neer ea UE 9

Classification: u ive ‘
as soon as possible “copies of only visitor “to 9,3

Par a’ .
: {

Classified by derivation:

a a aa

Ue

ORR SFT,

TNO,

SUT,

13-00000

SECRET hk Wee

pO
From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani -

we

NOTE FOR: John F. Pereira
J. Barry Harrelson
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Fredrick C. Wickham @ 00
eeuemae
Johnny L Goins.@ 00

Fred Crawford @o oo
FROM: Linda C. Cipriani ?
DATE: 04)24/96 12:15:25 PM
SUBJECT: Interview with John W. (S}
CL By 22 9704130 , )
CL Reasoii 1. 5(c}
DECL On X14
ORV FM Hum 4-82

Attached is an MFR summarizing my meeting with Mr. Whitten. On a more personal note, Mr. Whitten is an extremely
charming and interesting gentleman. The meeting with him went much better than [ had hoped, but it was also rather emotionally
distressing for both Jeremy and {. Mr. Whitten broke dawn several times during the meeting and was obviously feeling very scared.
Although Jeremy is sure that the Board will do the right thing here, we both agreed that Mr. Whitten is without doubt someone who
should be protected even if it means going to the President.

&

WHITTMFR.DOC

cc:

SECRET

13-00000
1

SECRET

17 May 1996

- MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
‘Jeremy Gunn, General ‘Counsel of the JFK Revi oard, and I spoke
' with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in/Vienna). Gunn
conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents and
‘his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
‘help the Board .in any way he could and even offered to come to
'the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. Although
Whitten had in general a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
‘anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
: about 1900. (S)

2. . Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry
‘with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
' betrayed. His obvious physical problems add_to this feeling of
being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on

‘his left side and has great difficulty walking. On a map, he
pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
-serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA
‘become known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out

ithe headquarters.of the PKK, the ANgECHIst party and = bar where 7
‘many Middle Easterners wi uld congregate He-then -pointed—ou
sé places to us. when we went

Oo his apartment. He made it
clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any.
‘attack. (S)

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for

almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
completely different life. now in {Vienna/ He. and his wife have
_ lived in Wienna) approximately 25 years. He is a member of

arious musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
¢@Vienna}Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music

. (his Specialty is Johann Stra He has received many medals
-for his work in the arts jin ‘Vienna which we saw when we went to
‘his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worried about the fact that
he committed perjury en applying for/Austrian? residency by
stating he worked forthe State Department! He believes this

CL BY: (2224130 ;
CL REASO c
DECL ON: Xl

DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

13-00000

LY SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S) |

could subject him to criminal penalties in/Austria./ He stated on
several occasions, should his affiliation bédédéme known, he would
have to leave jAustria. On other occasions, he stated that he
would turn himsélf in to the (Viennese authorities and offer his
services as a consultant to the pdélice or intelligence service.
He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
believed were his options should his name be released by the
Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of
action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
I had assured him that CIA was doing everything. to protect him
and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
Board. He. clearly looked upon Gunn and I as his allies in this
process and. even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would

' turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree

, to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he

’ could to them. The Board will make its decision in it's next

/ meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be necessary for

; anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that

, should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing
Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on

‘which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

(Linda C. Cipriani {

-DCI/OGC7ED ;

2
. SECRET

13-00000

1

’ .

SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

DCI/OGC/LD/LCipriani:/76124 (17 May 96)
Distribution:
Original - Original

1 - Registry
1 - Lit File

3
SECRET

13-00000

Pod

« . SECRET

24 April 1996

_ MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (Ss)

1. On 22 April 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,
Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of the JFK Revi ard, and I spoke
with Mr. John Whitten at the U.S. embassy in/Vienna/ Gunn.

' conducted the interview by showing Whitten ‘various documents and
his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was eager to
‘help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
‘useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. jMthough
Whitten had in general’a good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
‘anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
‘After the interview, Mr.. Whitten took us to his apartment and
‘then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten
‘about 1900. (S) . :

2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about. the
release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry |
with CIA and, the. Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and
betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this feeling of
being vulnerable.  =Physically he is, not well; he is paralyzed on

..s. his left. side..and.-has-great-..difficulty~ walking «On-a~map;~ heer
* pointed out his apartment and indicated what. he. .believed to be.
‘serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA |
‘become known, Within a block of a" paxtment, he ointed out
.the hea quarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a ‘bar where
many Middle Easterners would congregate,” He then pointer

‘these places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
- ‘clear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
‘attack. (S)- . To

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
‘almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
‘complete different life now in)-Vienna? He and his wife have
lived in Vienna? approximately 25 years. He is a member of
various musiGal and art societies. He sings in a prominent
Vienna?Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music +
(his “specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals ~
for his work in the arts/in Vienna jwhich we saw when we went t
his apartment. (S)

. 4. Mr. Whitten is also greatly worrie out the fact that
he committed perjury whe plying for /Austrian/residency by
stating he worked for)}the State Department,» He’ believes this

CL BY: an
. - CL REASON: 1.5(c)°. 3"
a DECL ON: X1 ~ 7°
; DRV FM: HUM 4-82

SECRET

@cces es

13-00000

- Board, although he
‘action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
. Matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
. anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)  ..

” 7 SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S).

_ could subject him to criminal penalties infaustria j He stated on

' geveral occasions, should. his affiliation become known, he would
_ have to leave{Austria} On othe asions, he stated that he

would turn himself in’ to the’Viennese/authorities and offer his
services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
believed were his options should his name be released by the
fad not decided on a particular course of

5. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him ;
and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and(_/as his allies in this

‘process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to

us, We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
turn out well. (S)

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn

about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
a

‘believed that it was more than likely t

t the Board would agree
to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he

‘could to them. The Board will make its decision in (it's) next

meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be nécessary for

.anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
... should. the -Board--make.the-reprehensible decision. of--releasing
.Whitten's name, that we could.not imagine a stronger case on .

which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

' Qpinda C. Cipriani).
OGC/LD

SECRET

13-00000

| Jeremy Gunn, General Counsel of t

SECRET

24 April 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

1. On 22 April: 1996, from approximately 1000 to 1600,

e JFK Revi Board, and I spoke
with Mr..John Whitten at the U.S. embassy inj Vienna}.. Gunn .
conducted the interview by showing Whitten various documents an

- his prior testimony before the HSCA. Mr. Whitten was éager to

_ help the Board in any way he could and even offered to come to
the US if need be. Gunn concluded that it would probably not be
‘useful to take Whitten's deposition at a later date. though
Whitten had in general a. good memory, Gunn felt he did not add
anything of significance to his prior testimony before the HSCA.
. After the interview, Mr. Whitten took us to his apartment and
-then later to a restaurant with his wife. We left Mr. Whitten

‘about 1900. (S) -

2. Mr. Whitten was extremely worried and upset about the
release of his name and on several occasions in the interview was
on the verge of tears. Although I was expecting him to be angry

‘with CIA and the Board, instead, he clearly felt hurt and j
betrayed. His obvious physical problems add to this ‘feeling of
being vulnerable. Physically he is not well; he is paralyzed on
his left side and has. great. difficulty walking: On-a map, he
pointed out his apartment and indicated what he believed to be
serious threats to his safety should his affiliation with CIA

ih e known. Within a block of his apartment, he pointed out
the headquarters of the PKK, the Anarchist party and a bar where)
many Middle Easterners would congregate,/” He then pointed out
“thése places to us when we went to his apartment. He made it
Ghear that there was no way he could defend himself from any
-attack. (S . -

3. Mr. Whitten also stated that he has been retired for
‘almost as long as he worked for the CIA, and that he has a
completely different life now in/Vienna He and his wife have
lived iniVienna) approximately 25 years. He is a member of
various musical and art societies. He sings in a prominent
{ Vienna}Men's Choir. He has published various articles on music
‘(his specialty is Johann Strauss). He has received many medals
‘for his work in the arts} in Vienna) which we saw when we went to
his apartment. (S)

4. Mr. Whitten is also Jing for tacsten about the fact that

fhe committed perjury applying for Austrian) residency by
stating he worked forlthe State Department? e believes this

CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1

DRV FM: HUM 4-82 _

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Interview with John Whitten (S)

could subject him to criminal penalties in fAustria} He stated on
several occasio ould his affiliation bécome known, he would
have to leave jAustria}. On other.occasions, he stated that he
would turn himself in to the {Viennese} authorities and offer his
services as a consultant to the police or intelligence service.
He obviously was extremely distraught and was voicing what he
believed were his options should his name be released by the

Board, although he had not decided on a particular course of

action. On the other hand, Mr. Whitten was adamant that no
matter what happens he would never betray the CIA by telling
anyone about his work as an intelligence officer. (S)

S. By the end of the evening, Mr. Whitten stated that he
felt much better about the state of events. On several occasions,
I had assured him that CIA was doing everything to protect him
and Gunn had stated he would argue for his protection to the
Board. He clearly looked upon Gunn and(/as his allies in this
process and even stated that he had a "wonderful" day talking to
us. We left him, I believe, feeling happy and confident all would
turn out well. (S)_. ;

6. After our meeting with Whitten, I spoke with Gunn
about how this issue would be handled by the Board. Gunn
believed that it was more than likely that the Board would agree
to protect him and that he would make the strongest argument he

7 could to them. The Board will make its decision in (it's) next

meeting in mid-May. Gunn did not think it would be nécessary for
anyone from CIA to come down to that meeting. We agreed that
should the Board make the reprehensible decision of releasing ---
Whitten's name, that we could not imagine a stronger case on

_ which to bring an appeal to the President. (S)

' {pinda Cc. Cipriani .
CI/OGC/LD

2
SECRET


13-00000
SECRET

20 November 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Eleanor Neiman —

{ Sue A. Burggraf 7?

FROM:
SUBJECT: Per _our telecon, here is a copy of the cable that came in on Friday
i from | Vienna)

REFERENCE:

* Document displayed with Header, Body, ‘and Footer zones"
Print this cable

[- Edit cable Categorize cable
CATEGORIES:

ROUTE SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
ROUTE COMMENTS:

SECRET 1716482 NOV 95 STAFF

t
i CITE VIENNA 28456

|
| TO: DIRECTOR.
LIMIT CHIEF/OCC INFO OCC/OSG, CHIEF/PCS, C/EUR/SA, EUR/LGL,

FOR:

7 OGC/OSD, OGC/OFLD
; | SLUGS: WNINTEL _ cee
(or TT ee nse ce er etm
SUBJECT: RESPONSE FOR JFK ASSASSINATION RECORDS COLLECTION ACT
95 2040015 ?

Pes “DIRECTOR 493642
B. DIRECTOR 493658 95 2040060 /

TEXT:
1. ACTION REQUIRED: NONE, FYI. oe os
\

a ON 14 NOVEMBER 1995, C/O. NOBLEHORSE DELIVERED REF TEAR LINE -
“INFORMATION AS REQUESTED. REF IDEN THEN ASKED FOR TIME TO FORMULATE
‘HIS THOUGHTS AND SUBMIT THEM ON PAPER. ALTHOUGH NOBLEHORSE '

if EXPLAINED THAT WE WOULD PREFER HE PASS THE RESPONSE DIRECTLY TO C/O, i
/} HE WAS APPARENTLY SO ANGERED OVER THE CONTENTS OF REF, THAT HE LATER
TRIED TO CONTACT BERT MILLS DIRECTLY AND WITHOUT SUCCESS. ON 15 i)

\

2.

i]
: NOVEMBER, REF IDEN PROVIDED THE FOLLOWING RESPONSE IN WRITING, WHICH
( IS BEING POUCHED TO HQS VIA TM 902-825: ae
we OO ve _
We Nev a4, 1995 os

ae

: TO [BERT 41 MILLS}

SECRET

13-00000

\

SECRET

I OBJECT VIOLENTLY TO THE REVELATION OF MY NAME REGARDLESS OF
THE LAW. HERE ARE SOME REASONS:

i. __I EMIGRATED To ‘AUSTRIA . TWICE, FIRST IN 1971 AND AGAIN IN 1983?
{BOTH TIMES/I HAD TO FILL OUT_AND. SWEAR_TO_LENGTHY FORMS ABOUT MY
“BACKGROUND._JI USED MY RETIRED STATE COVER BOTH TIMES, THEREBY »
COMMITTING | PERJURY TWICE UNDER_AUSTRIAN LAW. "MY OLD FRIENDS” IN HIGH
—PLACES: ‘WHO MIGHT HAVE “BEEN _ABLE TO PROTECT ME HAVE ALL RETIRED OR,
EVEN MORE, DIED. ; AUSTRIAN JUSTICE IS NOTORIOUSLY IMMUTABLE. DO YOU

WANT ME TO GO TO JAIL?

2... LIVING SINCE _RETIREMENT: IN AUSTRIA FROM 1971 TO 1980 AND FROM \
(1983 TO THE PRESENT, I HAVE ACHIEVED HIGH POSITIONS IN VIENNA'S \
MUSICAL BODIES, BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE JOHANN STRAUSS _ SOCIETY AND ?}
\ VICE PRESIDENT OF T VIENNA MEN'S SINGING SOCIETY, AND/I AM ~
PERSONALLY KNOWN TO/ SEVERAL RECENT AUSTRIAN PRESIDENTS / MANY
REPORTERS AND RADIO FIGURES. I SUFFERED A DISABLING STROKE IN
DECEMBER 1993 AND MY WIFE AND I, BOTH 75, CAN CONTINUE TO EXIST HERE
BECAUSE OUR 2000 SQ. FT. APARTMENT IS WITHIN WALKING DISTANCE OF 2
POST OFFICES, SEVERAL SMALL SUPER MARKETS, MY FAMILY PHYSICIAN, OUR
DENTIST, MY UROLOGIST, AND AN EYE DOCTOR AND OPTICIAN. WE ARE
WITHIN WHEEL CHAIR DISTANCE OF THE CONCERT HALLS AND THE OPERA.
WHERE CAN YOU DUPLICATE THIS FOR ME?

/DURING_MY_ ACTIVE CAREER IN VIENNA AROUND 1959 Tr INTERROGATED AND _‘\

/BRoxe AN INTELLIGENCE SWINDLER WHO HAD BEEN A NAZI ASSASSIN.” I aan)
;PROMISED HIM SECRECY IF HE CONFESSED, BUT THE US ARMY PUT OUT A

/ "BURN NOTICE“ ON HIM, FORCING HIM TO MOVE TO GERMANY. I AM SURE a
“—WO@ULD_LOVE_TO_FIND_ME_AND..SHOOT_ME... -

4. [| VIENNA/IS 5 FULL OF ISLAMIC TERRORISTS. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL
ASSASSINATIONS, EVEN OF A CITY COUNCILMAN, BY THEM IN RECENT YEARS.
UNDER( AUSTRIAN} LAW, I, AS A FOREIGNER, CANNOT EVEN GET A PISTOL

LICENSE. YOU MUST KNOW ABOUT THE KIDNAPPING AND KILLING OF OUR
COLLEAGUES AROUND THE WORLD.

4. I HAVE TWICE TESTIFIED BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES ABOUT
THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. THEIR FULL REPORTS SIMPLY CALLED ME THE
"DESK OFFICER" AND THAT HAS SEEMED TO SATISFY EVERYONE. NEEDLESS TO
SAY, IF YOU DO EXPOSE MY NAME, I WILL NOT EVER TALK TO ANY
JOURNALISTS OR SO-CALLED HISTORIANS.

5. IF MY NAME IS EXPOSED, I WILL OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO LEAVE VIENNA,
WITH THE WHOLE HOUSE FULL OF FURNITURE, PICTURES, LIBRARY, CLOTHING,
ETC. WHICH I PACKED AND PAID TO HAVE MOVED OVER HERE IN 1983.
BECAUSE OF MY STROKE, I WILL BE UNABLE TO DO ANY PACKING AND THE
MOVE WILL BE VERY EXPENSIVE. WHERE CAN I RESETTLE IN A 2000 SQ FT.
APT. SO CONVENIENTLY LOCATED.

6. MY WIFE AND I LOVE LIVING HERE FOR MANY REASONS, AND LEAVING
WOULD BE A CRUEL AND NEEDLESS FATE.

7. j%II REGARD THIS LAW AS DISHONORABLE AND UNWORTHY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA. IF YOU DECIDE AGAINST ME, I WANT TO APPEAR
BEFORE THE BOARD AND EVEN THE PRESIDENT, WHOM I HAPPEN TO ADMIRE. I
WILL PAY MY OWN WAY BACK TO DO SO. I SERVED IN WWII AND NEVER
SPARED MYSELF; IN THE OUTFIT I WORKED HARD, WAS FEARLESS IN DEALING
WITH MY SUPERIORS (CORD MEYER AND DICK HELMS CAN TESTIFY TO THAT)
AND MY ADVERSARIES. I WOULDN'T EVEN THINK OF THREATENING TO EXPOSE
THINGS TO PRESSURE YOU. I WILL BE EMPLOYING AN ATTORNEY OR TWO,
FAMILIAR WITH OUR AFFAIRS, TO REPRESENT ME. I WILL NOT DENY, THAT I
CONSIDER YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE IMPLEMENTING THIS LAW TO BE ENGAGING
IN DISHONORABLE CONDUCT, UNWORTHY OF OUR GOVERNMENT SERVICE.

SECRET

13-00000 |

‘IS TRUE.

‘SECRET

8. £IN THE LATE 1960'S WHILE SERVING IN VIENNA UNDER TOM | pan
KARAMISSINIS; I WAS” ORDERED BY HQ TO REVEAL—TO-AUSTRIAN-MILITAR :

LLIGENCE THAT A LOW-RANKING AUSTRIAN DIPLOMAT SERVING AS THEIR
INFORMANT IN BUDAPEST HAD ALSO BEEN RECRUITED BY US AND WAS REPORTI
NG TO US. .I REFUSED TO CARRY OUT THIS ORDER AND OFFERED MY
RESIGNATION. TO ME, IT WAS DISHONORABLE TO BETRAY A YOUNG AGENT WHO
HAD ACCEPTED OUR RECRUITMENT AND PUT FAITH IN OUR PROMISE OF

- SECRECY. TO MY MIND AN AGENCY WITHOUT PRINCIPLES CANNOT SURVIVE AND

INDEED SHOULD NOT SURVIVE. TOM KARAMISSINIS, PERHAPS ONE OF THE
LAST HONORABLE MEN TO SERVE WITH US IN HIGH POSITION, FIRED A STRONG
BLE BACK AND THE SHAMEFUL ORDER WAS RETRACTED.

9. I HAVE INVESTED ABOUT $50,000 IN MY APARTMENT, IN KEY MONEY AND

IMPROVEMENTS. I LEAVE, I WILL LOSE ALL OR MOST OF THIS. OUR
LAST MOVE TO aie COST ME ABOUT $15,000 IN SEA FREIGHT AND
INSURANCE. NEVER GET ON MY KNEES AND ASK TO BE MADE WHOLE IF

YOU EXPOSE ME, BOT I MAY REPORT TO THE COURTS. I AM A RETIRED
MEMBER OF THE VIRGINIA BAR.

10. LET ME REGALE YOU WITH AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THE HISTORIANS

MINDLESS DRIVE TO KNOW EVERYTHING CAN LEAD TO A PROUD COUNTRY'
DISGRACING ITSELF. DURING WWII WHEN WE WERE INTERROGATINGROERNAN
POW'S, WE PROMISED ~WOULD-EVER-LEARN—THEY-HAD—"SPILLEI
IR-GUTS; *— ALL BELIEVED WE WERE BEING HONEST. BUT ALMOST

(25 YEARS AFTER WWII THE BRITISH DECLASSIFIED ALL THE ADI(K) REPORTS

(THAT'S WHAT THEY WERE CALLED, AND EVEN THE “ROOM CONVERSATIONS,”
TRANSCRIPTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS POWS HAD IN THEIR ROOMS, EVEN

- INCLUDING THE EXTREMELY VALUABLE SPEECHES MADE BY HIGH-RANKING
-LUFTWAFFE OFFICERS TO THEIR HIGH-RANKING FELLOW POW'S AT

"COCKFOSTERS" MANSION. NEWCOMERS WERE VISITED BY THE OLD HANDS FOR
A MONTH TO MAKE SURE THEY WEREN'T STOOL PIGEONS, BEFORE THEY WERE
GIVEN THE PRIVILEGE OF ADDRESSING THEIR FELLOW OFFICERS ON SOME
IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR. THE EXCELLENT BRITISH MIKES

ALL UP.

IN RECENT YEARS, AT LEAST ONE LUFTWAFFE VETERAN ASSOCIATION,
THAT OF J.G.2, THE RICHTHOFEN GESCHWADER, SENT PEOPLE TO LONDON TO
GET COPIES OF THE INTERROGATION REPORTS OF THEIR PILOTS: . THEY DID
IT CHRONOLOGICALLY AND WERE SO SHOCKED AT THE VAST AMOUNT OF VITAL
DATA REVEALED BY THEIR BUDDIES THAT, IN ACUTE REVULSION, THEY
STOPPED LOOKING. I ASSUMED THEN THAT "EVERYONE" HAD "TALKED," WHICH

il. I AM 75 YEARS OLD PARTLY PARALYZED ON MY LEFT SIDE FROM A
STROKE IN DEC. 1993. I WAS NEARLY FULLY REHABILITATED WHEN, IN MAY
1994, I WAS HIT BY CONSTANT MUSCLE SPASMS ALL UP AND DOWN MY LEFT .
SIDE. THIS RATHER RARE CONDITION, BASICALLY A SUDDEN SUPER-HUMAN
TIGHTENING OF ALL THE MUSCLES, WITH AFTER EFFECTS LASTING UNTIL THE
NEXT SPASM, HAVE MADE IT INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT FOR ME TO STAND UP,
WALK, OR EVEN SIT UP FOR VERY LONG. IN A FEW DAYS, WHEN ALL THE
MANY MEDICINES ARE HERE, WILL BEGIN A. 20-WEEK HOMEOPATHIC CURE FOR
THE SPASMS UNDER DR. SCHRAMM, A LEADING SPECIALIST HERE. I CAN'T
VERY WELL LEAVE FOR 20 WEEKS. .

YOU WILL BE CONTACTED MOMENTARILY BY ONE. OF MY ATTORNEYS. I

_WILL ALSO BE IN TOUCH WITH MY CONGRESSMAN AND SENATORS.

WITH BITTER RESOLVE,
(SIGNED - REF B IDEN)

3. REF IDEN HAD ALSO ATTEMPTED TO. PUT THE ABOVE INTO

"CABALESE," BUT BECAME TOO TIRED TO FINISH IT. NONETHELESS, REF
IDEN ALSO REQUESTED THAT THE CONTENTS OF THIS MESSAGE ALSO BE PASSED:

. SECRET


13-Q0000 .

a

SECRET

1. SAW SUBJ IN HIS APT NOV 14. CORDIAL

2. REASONS: SUBJ HAS EMIGRATED PRIVATELY TO; AUSTRIA TWICE, 1971 }

JAND 1983, USING RETIRED STATE COVER ON SWORN AUSTRIAN FORMS ‘cHUs 7

a
i_se

COMMITTING PERJURY TWICE BY AUSTRIAN LAW: ~ HIGH OFFICIAL HERE WHO
COVERED FOR HIM Now" DEAD. “WOULD FACE © “SCANDAL TRIAL, JAIL, AND
DEPORTATION.

3. SUBJ PROMINENT IN LOCAL MUSIC CIRCLES, RADIO, TV, AND POLITICS
AND MILITARY, GREAT SCANDAL POTENTIAL. —

‘4. SUBJ INVESTED 50 THOUSAND DOLLARS IN APT AND WOULD LOSE IT IND

HURRIED DEPARTURE, PLUS EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFECTS TO Z1, AND OWN
FARES. : ;

5. SUBJ NOW 75 HAD CRIPPLING STROKE DEC. 93. WIFE ALSO 75 ABLE TO
CARRY ON BECAUSE STORES, DENTIST, DOCTOR, UROLOGIST OF SUBJ, POST
OFFICE ALL IN WALKING DISTANCE OF APT. CANNOT DUPLICATE THIS IN 21.

6. SUBJ WOULD BE ENDANGERED BY ISLAMIC GROUPS HERE WHO HAVE
ASSASSINATED SEVERAL INCL ONE CITY COUNCILMAN. EMBASSY GETS
HREATENING PHONE CALLS. /AS FOREIGNER SUBJ DENIED AUSTRIAN PISTOL
{ PERMIT. SUBJ ALSO ENDANGERED BY FORMER NAZI ASSASSIN AND INTEL SWI
{| NDLER HE INTERROGATED AND BROKE 25 YEARS AGO, PROMISING HIM SECRECY; °
(BUT US ARMY PUT OUT BURN NOTICE, FORCING_NAZT TO MOVE TO GERMANY. ;
7. SUBJ HAS TESTIFIED FULLY BEFORE HOUSE AND SENATE COMMITTEES,
TERMED "DESK OFFICER," OWN ROLE MINOR. ALTHO PUT IN CHARGE OF
AGENCY INVESTIGATION BY HELMS THEN DDO, HIS WORK WAS SABOTAGED BY
ANGLETON WHO WITHHELD HUNDREDS OF BEST FBI REPORTS AND CONFERRED
DAILY WITH FBI WITHOUT PRESENCE OF SUBJ, ALL IN FLAGRANT VIOLATION
OF HELMS ORDERS.

8. SUBJ AVERS HE WILL NEVER THREATEN TO EXPOSE AGENCY. EVEN IF
SURFACED WILL DENY EVERYTHING. .

4. FILE: 785-120-034.
CL BY: 2618711
cL REASON: | “1.5 (C)

DECL ON: Xl
DRV FROM: HUM 4-82.

END OF MESSAGE SECRET

cc:

SECRET

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EXPENSE OF MOVING EFFEcTs To 24, AND OWN FAR Ls.

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DENY. EVERY THING

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-

Subj: Gn Scelso testimony

Date: Octl2 TueSun 19961995 18:46 EDT

From. 74030.3022@CompuServe.comM

A-From: 74030.3022@CompuServe.COM (ed dolan)
To. dickkovar@aolcom (Dick Kovar)

Dick, this is what Chuck Briggs requested.

Date: 06-Oct-96 02:36 EDT
From: (The name of this person is unimportant]
Subj: Ex-ClA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire

Ex-CIA Agent Adds Fuel to Kennedy Assassination Fire
By Michael Dorman
(c) 1996, Newsday

The chief CIA investigator of President John F. Kennedy's assassination has
testified that another high CIA official - noted for seeking conspiracies -
disobeyed orders in repeatediy conferring with the Warren Commission shortly
after the murder. The witness also said a colleague once told him that the CIA
official, the late

James Angleton, “has ties to the Mafia

Almost 33 years after the assassination, the identity of the witness, who held
various top-secret CIA jobs, ts considered so sensitive that federal authorities
insist on withholding his true name. He is known only by the alias “John
Scelso.”

While Scelso testified before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in
1978, his 192-page testimony was kept secret until now. It has just been sent to
the National Archives by the Assassination Records Review Board, a federal -
agency that screens assassination documents and makes public those that do not
endanger national security.

sceiso's testimony, which criticized operations of the CIA, FBI, Secret Service
and other agencies, likely will renew debates, especially among conspiracy
theorists, on the assassination and how it was investigated.

when Kennedy was assassinated on Nov. 22, 1963, Scelso was chief of aClA

13-00000

v

38/8/1996 Amarica Online: Dick Kovar Page 1

branch

responsible for operations in Mexico and Central America. Richard Helms, the CIA
chief of clandestine services and later the agency's director, placed Scelso in
charge of the assassination investigation. Angleton, a counterintelligence
official with close ties to FB! Director J. Edgar Hoover, “immediately went

Into action to do all the investigating,” Scelso testified, criticizing the

move sharply.

“Helms called a meeting at which Angleton and a lot of others were present and
told everybody that | was in charge and that no one should have any

conversations with anyone about the Kennedy case without my being present -
which was violated from the word ‘go’ by Angleton, who dealt with the FBI and
the Warren Commission and (warren Cornmission member and former CiA Director
Allen) Dulles himself, .. Angleton ignored Helms’ orders. | tried to get Helms

to make him obey and Heims said, You go tell him. ”

Angleton, who died in 1987, spent much of his career searching for conspiracies
- believing that there was a Communist mole in the CiA - and was presumed by
other CiA officers to have tried to press a conspiracy theory on the warren
Commission. The commission found no evidence of a conspiracy. Angleton.was
fired

in 1975, Years later, a mole was found - Aldrich Ames - but he had entered the |
CIA after Angleton's dismissal.

At one point in the 1978 House testimony, committee attorney Michael Goldsmith
asked, “Do you have any reason to belfeve that Angleton might have had ties to
organized crime?”

“Yes,” replied Scelso, who is now retired and lives abroad, government sources
Sald, He said the Justice Department once asked the CIA to determine the true.
names of people holding numbered bank accounts in Panama because the Mafia was
hiding Las Vegas “skim” money there. “We were in an excellent position to do
this and toid them so - whereupon Angleton vetoed it and said, ‘That is the
bureau's (FBI's) business.’ " Sceiso said he discussed the situation with

another CIA officer. “And he smiled a foxy smile and said, “Well, that’s

Angleton’s excuse. The real reason 1s that Angleton himself has ties to the

Mafia and he would not

want to doubie-cross them.’ ”

On another subject, Scelso gave Kennedy conspiracy theorists a slight plece of

13-00000
so 10/8/1996 America Online: Dick Kovar Page 2

*

ammunition. A Soviet defector, Yuri Nosenko, was known to have told
investigators. that Lee Harvey Oswald - fdentified by the Warren Commission as
Kennedy's assassin - was not a Soviet agent. But Scelso said: “| later heard
that Nosenko was discovered to have been dissembling, not being on the level.
That information was imparted to me by CIA officers.” —

Based on the information CiA headquarters had on Oswald before the assassination
- chiefiv that he nad been in the Marine Corps and defected to the Soviet Union,
then returned - Scelso said he saw no reason to pay him special heed. “Oswald
just seemed ta me to be a small-potatoes defector,” he said..But he conceded

that significant information about Oswald - known to CIA agents in Mexico City,
for exampie - had not reached headquarters before the assassinatton.

It dealt chiefly with Oswald's visits to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in
Mexico City and his attempts to obtain a Cuban visa two months before the.
assassination. Scelso said the information failed to reach Washington because of
Simple overwork and bureaucratic delays in the Mexico City office. He revealed
that all the outside telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban embassies were
tapped by American agents and that calls Oswald made to them were recorded.
After Oswald was arrested, Sceiso revealed, agents compared audiotapes made
while he was in custody with the wiretaps and determined that he was the same
man who had visited the embassies,

Distribution:

Z

To: j. dolan > 174030,3022) Dickford Cohn > [76226, 1572]

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