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TOP SECRET =; -

cor ree efnpents Sep enna o=

Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for

i
your review. | d
4

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
containing information which bears on the security of

ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto. ‘ : 3
5. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A :

and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, S0, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and

4
4
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= WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

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- ‘Top Secret -

CONTENTS

" VIIL SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962-January 1964)
} : (Conc.)

Deputy Chief of Seventh Department
i : (Jply 1962-January 1964)
KGB Operations
Recruitment of SVENCHANSKIY
Investigation of SLESINGER
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN
GRU Agent SUUBIN
Arrest of BAKGHOORN
Investigation of OSWALD
Dey Residence in USSR
Request to Return to USSR.
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File
The CHEREPANOV Papers
Contents ; fee
NOSENKO's Travel Document
Return to Geneva (January-February 1964)
. . Purpose of Trip
: Visits to KGB Legal Kesidency
/ Availability for Meetings with CIA
x NOSENKO's \Writcen Notes
NOSENKO's Defeccion
4 The Recall Telegram
. Knowledge of Other Seventh Department
‘. Onerations
Operational Activities (July 1962-
January 1964)
KGB Counterintelligence Operations Among
; American Tourists
Inforoation Furnished the KGB by
George BLAKE
KGB Study of American Intelligence
Tourist Operations
NOSENKO's Information
Suumary
Summary and Conclusion

SRD TMT EA

ma why

oO 7 ; Top Secret

PAGE

293
292
292
29)
295
296
298
303
yay
305
307
309
314
315.
316
31?
318
318
319
320
324

326
327

32?
330
331
331

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; ‘Top Secret .

CONTENTS

IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE

Relationship with General GRIBANOV
Communist Party Status

Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures
Awards and Decorations

Sourcing

Ranks

X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMEN

XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

Annex A ~ Statements of Soviet Officials About
NOSENKO

Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text

Index of Personalities

(vii)

335

335
338
342
345
349
350

“ 355

357

361

399

437

TS No. 197124

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~ Top Secret -

(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Ofticials' Statecents About NOSENKO

The portreit of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
cfficialsa' statements about him siuce his defection coin-
cides markedly with NUSLNAO'sS sett-deseripsion. Accerding
to the comments cf Soviet officials, principally intelli-
gence officers most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased sinister, he
served over a decad@ in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome througn the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV,
and in connection witn vperations against Americans ine
occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
responsibility, clcimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
Jargest department in tie sey Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his’ defection
wrought severe damage “for years to come" to the KGB
because of his krowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treacaery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the cecall of
many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in
Annex A.

; Top Secret ss Copy ——

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Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.

+ In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow

: Special Naval School required prior completion of the f
Seventh Class] NOSENKO said that when the war broke out he , i
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he . i t
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned :
to Noscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the \ :

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Moscow Special Naval School (then in HZuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall o. 1943

NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory

School (then in Baku).

vate ae,

After just six months in Baku, without completing the : : 8
Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away frem school and returned to
Moscow.

= were

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran i
away and feught on the front at Tuapse, and

that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku L

i

and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the cquivalent of
Annapolis. He. has retracted both assertions.-

Shetek hee

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i NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the 7
a Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval : - 4

i Preparatory Scnool returned to Leningrad from Baku,.he :

: resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO :

: received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being ' ;
} hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school. :
i

a : :

: Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by >

i a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
‘ : by stating that the wound was self-inflicted, °

4 ane that he actually did accidently shcot him-

5 a sensitive source cj "2 ’
j the effect chat NOSENEO shot nimself to avoid ©
é being sent to the front while attending: a naval ;
| : '. college in 1942,

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Top Secret
(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Comment: (Continued)
After NCSENKO's defection was publicized,
Sovjet tiaval defector ARTAMONOV volurteered
to CIA that he had known the son'of the
Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Mescow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time cf his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhoed heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
are accepted as true.

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“Top Se acret

(PRE-¥.G8) BIGGRAPHY) .-

JOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute :
course was of feur years! duration and that he entered the '
Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years’
duration and that Lecause he failed a state examination he
was graduated later, in 195 5Q; that it was of five years’
duration and he gvaduated In 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of £:ve years’ duration but he failed an examination
which delayed iis graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.307 for report that NOSENKO joined the KG? :
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and the
Gate of NOSLNZO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
whicis ne said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute. '

}
Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953) | ‘

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at {
the Institute of International Relations he entered the

Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post, |

finally successfully “transferring” to the KGB through the ; |

|

|

intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOY.
A sensitive source

that NOSENKO
m, NOSENKO attendad™ his
and tnen served in the RU source

is the sole source also asserting.
served in the RU. According to eeu

Pree

LUO 2 al ite tte a alae ee EY

the Military-Diplomatic Acadeny
Information Department for about a year before securing a
transfer to the KGR through his father's influence, NOZSENKO
denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and

has never claimed service in the RU Information (Rerorts) :
Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
Reports assignments. - '

hast LEE A CTE RTT T BU Ha Hest

“TS No. 197124 7

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... Top Secret

(PRE-4GB BIOGRAPHY )

A sensitive source two ,
SB has croted/KG3 officers
respective Ye aS Stating NOSEXHD joined the- KGB in 1947
or 1949.

The significance of NOSENHO*‘s RU service is the fact
that He claims it launcied his intelligence.career and
served as the means througn which he secured appointment
to the NCB aiter once having bees rejected. The two or more
years he claimed to have servec in the RU represent a
significant period cf his adult life. for which he should
have ro difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval ZU to the KGB is critical to
Getermining the time from which nis claims about KG3 service
can Le judged creditle.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service at his first meetings wich CIA in 1962. After his
19€4 defection, it was the tepic on which he made one of
his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim, tre subject of his Naval RU
Service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
1964, 1965 and 196€. However, throughout these interrcgations,
challenges cf nis assertions abcut his RU service prcempted -
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
Institute or claimed date of enery into the KGB, just as
challenges” cn those latter tepics prompted amended: state-
ments with resrect to his RU service. The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and ccntradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Infermation-19

NOSENYKO. finished the Institute of International Relations
in 1950 and immediately reporte: for duty with the RU.
{He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In
SeptenLer 195¢ he was offered zssignments in Leningrad,
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he weuld take advantage of his father's”

. position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception

unit in Sovetskaya Gavan’ (on the Soviet coast opposite
Sakhalin), where he collected Grder of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in

50

Top Secret. Copy.

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“TS No. 197124

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DEPARTMENT - January 1?62-January 1964}

1. WAS @.VGeaK a
sething.”

nis “he was afraid and gave practi-

id that alféagh he had recruited

AIPPEL was not an agent." The KGb :
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nevertheless hope PPEL would be reassigned to Nos-- Ot .
cow at some future z See p.137 for details of the

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with NOSENKO that they met twice
1963. Sowever, FRIPPEL asserts i
ENKO an Oacessa in February 1962. i
latly Genies. FRIPPEL is known :
ta travel to the Soviet Union :
ard tnere is no apparent reason :
salse claim on this matter. i
@, FRIFPEL, whe :8 now e
a current target of the ge
~ Soviet intelligence service,

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pe eects ot

& sensitive source

Jchannes PREISFREUND

The KGB ccensidered PREISFREUND corpromised to American
Inteiligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 1961] and
thus unsuitable for further use against Americans at the Em-
bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was tole to take
PREIS? REUND with nim when he transferred to the Seventh De-
partment. As the agent spoke only Finnish and Russian, however,
he wes of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
but cid not-use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREULDS asserts that he was no lorger a KG3
agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175)

. and that eithough he saw NOSENKO on his frequent - vet Reva erate
return visits to Moscow, it was only because - of.
NOSENKO sought a cozpanion for wenching and
drinking.

TS No. 197124":

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Top Secret

a (SEVENTH DEPARTBENT - January 1962-dJanuary 1964)

| who was [erroneousiy) considered to ke a CIA officer .
SHAKHOV “maybe” had some contact with MARK in 196¢ or

A but KOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A coun

g intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate,
GOLUBEV, hid once been on a delegation with. SHAKHOV an
had noted “Little details". While SHAKHOY was in the
States, earlier, he had been terminated (as an agent]
KGB officers who ha? submitted a report stating that
liked life in the Unites States, American products,
money. in that KGB report he was Cepicted as "not
and ‘not wanting to work as an agent".

1
NOSENKO stated chat SHZAKHOV had served with the Ministry ‘

of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that Curing that '
service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAXHOV i
was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected ct being t
j

wieb ve dares

an American agent, because he belonaed to the Ministry of j
Foreign Affairs, and “the KGB could do nothing about his ‘
trips abroad'. “There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHCY was a member of the personal staff of

the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB cfficer

pentane ast

Comment: SHAKHOY has served in and visited the United
. States since 1942, when he was assigned to the
Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
tended the 1945 Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions cf the UN General
AssermLiy. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.S. in 19¢3 as a member of the Soviet
Missicn to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROY 1¢en-
tified him as an MVD [KGB) officer whom he us
ce tain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
a sensitive sowrcey mp identified him as "an employee of the
KGB": and KGB defectors PETROV and DERYABIN
have reported that from a photograph, SHAKEOV'S 2 de
_. . aner.s a. face "was familiar". An FBI source, however, seme Ear pedo 8 pes
a ; in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a “pure diplomat” i
and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged ; : a
in no Soviet intelligence activity, until that - i . re
time. .


14-0000

Top Secret

7 - (SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

ROSENKO described the varicus ways he had tésted suspicions
of SHAKHOV im Geneva. He guve SHAKHOV disinformation and then
watched: for an indication that he passed it on to his American
contacts. SHAKHOV gas told to perform countersurveillance
taske. during a meeting ky NOSLNKO with an imaginary agent,
while other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKNCV had

; forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO

‘ revealed to SHAKHOVY the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially rrepared
materials empiaced hid been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
ccnclusion was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion, .
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-~ j
turned to G3 Headquarters fron Geneva.

nd

4
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4
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: Comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHT7 is still
Be "under suspicion", according to @& a sensitive source,

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

man Soviet delegation to the visarmament. Conference and as.-
such he was responsible for the security ard behavior of the
entire delegation. [KGB officers 1.5. MAYOROV and i1.S. i
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left - ; |
|
i
i
!

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94- .
t

Geneva Lefore NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.)
To assist him in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO :
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB

who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never re-

ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates

ia his charge, or what, if any, information his informants

provided him.] i ,

SMR tee re ene latses niet

aie ae 5

NOSENXO has never been precise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he . _
pleased because Ambassador Zorin knew who he was, as did most
of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
. officer, and he could absent himself from conference meetings -
at any time.

nos oe pene’

“TS No. 197124
Ger -

278


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Teo Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

Yu.I. GUK re eS

Implying that their friendship was..of long standing, 1
NOSENZO related in 1962 that he and GUK were together nearly :
every day in Geneva,-where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks. As a conseytence, NOSENKO was granted access tc
the residency and was able to elicit information arcuet sore
of GUK's operations 1: Geneva. He described his "bic. big
friend" GUK as the Bepury Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only “strong officer“ in the residency. :

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
+to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
€Ux. According to several sources (see Annex A’.
because of nis friendsnip with NOSENKC, GU was
Gismisscd frea the KG3

Famed aie

M.S. TSYMBAL

af

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva and , 3
identified hin as Chici of the Illegals Directorate of the 4
KGB First Chicf Directorate. He alluded to having ssoken with 4
him, but placed no particular. emphasis on their reiationsaip. 4
4

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with .
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for. some 4

candidates for recruitment and came across some whos? back-
ground would have made them suitable for the Special [Illegaisi : -
Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head- oF
quarters and ISYMBAL had asked him several times tc transfer i
to the First Chief birectorate and suggested that he might be ; -
assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had

dinner together several times a week, sometines accompanied

by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,

NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency

in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was . :
granted access in 1964. ; :

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14-0000

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Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

NOSENKO's Information |

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business transactions
with a number cf Soviets who-visited his store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned

“another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he

might make some contacts or do something interesting”
while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to

esolve its suspicions’ that SLESINGER was possibly an
agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had

a file on SLESINGER, md a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent

of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to beccme friendly
with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
SLESINGER went to Odessa to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
directed the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who
could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication.
of intelligence activities, the KG2 would have attempted.
to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.

A sensitive source

Bhad reported to the
‘KGB suspected SLESINGER to
plant" and that KGB officer
fi "might be trying to develop
SLE INGER to act as a courier or in some
other agent capacity."
NOSENKO's information was substantially
. correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER, See te te
. reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
Soviet official who exhibited “intimate ... :
knowledge" of his business in New York , ot
city and had asked whether SLESINGER had Cogs
“ever been bothered by the FBI.° ee
298 ee S.No 197124

_ “Copy ——

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‘particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in

Top Secret
(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-1964)

Comment: (Continued)
In 1966 SLESINGFR- reported to the FBI that. .
he was .in touch with a Moscow photographic en cman
shop prcprietor, and he described evidence.
cf KGB interest in him during his visit to
Odessa in 1362. Previous to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been-in
contact with a number of Soviet cfficials

from tac Unites Nations.

NOSENI wag not speerfic in describing how he learned
of SLESINGER, who may represent a First Chief Birectorate
case.

KOTEN's Arrest and the KGB agent Bam

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at cnce, NOSENKO
identified the case as that of Bernard KOTEN, a guide for
Afton Tours in New York City (and hence an employee of
Alexander SVENCHANSKIY, see above) who had heen arrested
on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO ‘said that KOTEN”
was involved with an American agent of the KGB Scientific
and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know the
agent's nane, but from the description he provided he is
believed identical with a KGB S&T

agen identified earlier cn the basis c ay 1962 report
from .a sensitive source.

NOSENKO's Information

KOTEN was a longtime member of the American Communist
Party and a-frequent visitor after the Second World War .
to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
dissident literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
another context that the KGB is wary of foreigners' contects a
with Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
has- frequently inspired such contacts.} Because of these
many suspicious contacts, coth the KGB First and Second te
Directorates had concluded that KOTEN might be a "provocation .
agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks. of the ©
Communist Party in the United States.
295 22h UTS Now 197124

seolebeacas Sabri bwibesbi


atta ose ‘ene aan

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January 1962-January 1964)

NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City. SHUBIN, who nad visited the Soviet
Union twice vefore, visited the Soviet Union in 19538
or 1959, while NOSENKD was serving his first tour of
auty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SHUBIN
was the. target of Seventh bepartment case officer
A.A. VETLITSRIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was’
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
ebserved SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ministry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
very furtively said that they were interested in him,"
from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Sovict Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
having failed carlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
interest in SHUBIN.

‘
a sensitive source

Comment: Earlier, & ‘identified av
agent apparently identical with SHUBIN :
and FBI sources reported SUUBIN's travel
to the USSR in summer 1961 and in

- September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport

between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name. Consequently, he could not then have
been the tourist target of the Seventh
Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a. further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have ae
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because

he claims he was in the American Department.
-at the time. . to,

TS No.. 197124


14-0000

ce oe et

Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPART NP - January 1962-January 19C4)

NOSENKG went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHFRE-
PANOV's disappearance. The alea was covered with very caeep
woods, “vhere a verson could los: himself for life" On the
seventh Gay CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in “nazu,
where he was on his way to the Iran:an border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYLV and several other American Department of £i-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately Lack to Moscow,
interrogating him cn the plane. He immediately confessed
to having given the ducuments to the Americans. Shen asked
why, he said he was “angry at the KGR, very angry", ard
besides, he theugnt ne might ask the Americans for somo
money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
4 November he nad passed the documents to an American tourist
sho was a librarian interested in Russian bocks. He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
hallway in the building of the Ministry of Poreign Affairs,
the building in wi.ich the Ministry of Foreign Trad? was also
houscd.

Because CHEREPANOV he.) eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts wnich had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting. CEERUPANOV under full,.round-the-clocx,
surveillance. CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the XGn
that if ne had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the government and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then

would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.

sensitive sources,
Comment: Other sources, including PT Ee Pe een
. have also reported various aspects of the
CHERNPANOV incident.
NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the

CHEREPANOV cae, however, are not material to
(41, ses =. His claim that he was Deputy Chief of the

Seventh Department at the time.

TS: No. 197124.

ePY Ag.

due,

eae

2 shat a


14-00000 .-

ae Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTNENT - January 2962-January 1964}

The Recall Telegr3: . .
HNOSEEKO's Information

Cn 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB
Legal Residency once during the morning before he ret with
Cr\ and again that evening after 13900; there were at those
times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
were again no such messaacs for him. Later in the mornings
of 4 February, however, ufter attending a session of the
Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
found that a telegram fron KGB Headquarters had arrived,
instructing him to return to Mcscow immediately to partici-
pate in the FGB conference on tourism. After relating the
substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
forth in CIA custody.

Comment: Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's
asserticn regarding the existence of the recall
telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
there were ercipiered cormunications Fron Moscow
to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
later, Lut there was none from 1815 on 3
February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
after NOSENKO was in custody of CIA.

Top Secret ~

piiieoewe!

3k


14-0000

Top Secret

(SEVENTIL PREPARTHENT ~ January 1662-January 1964)

Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Teiegram

NCSENKO maintained throughout sis interrogations
in 1964 anc 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
it prompted iis defecticn, In October 1356, hovever, while

—+e

being quest:oned again, NOSENSO stated that there hal bee:

no telegram reculling him to Moscow E£ro- Geneva, end he !

signed the following statement: i
i

"On 46 February 1964, I told ny CIA certact
in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in i aae)
Noscow had Leen received in the KGE Residency in . |
Geneva recalling mo immediately to Moscow, 1 said
at the time that this telegram said that I was
recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGS
activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I
maintained this story as fact throuchout subsecuent
interviews and interrogations by American authcrities
in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.

No telegram was received in Geneva. i admit that
the stor:; was a lie. I myself invent:d this teie-
gram in order to hasten my Cefection. I was rervcus
and afraid that :y contacts with American Intelli-
gence might be noticed."

errr nent sent ee

Knowleége of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to, CIA in Geneva in 1°64
(see p.319) included brief reference to thirteen cther KGB : r,
Operations conducted, ayainst what NOSENKO descriked as
tourists during the 1962-1563 period. Yer reasons cited
in the descrintion of these operations in Annex B, these
opcrations are not material to tOSENKO's claim to service
an 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British
Commenvealti Section or as Deputy Chief cf the Seventh
Department.

dM TE te +

a ‘ } ‘ - t 4g

“TS No..1971242
1 Gepy Ae.


1490000 +

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‘% eee

ian

FAS PANNE SONAL OTE OE AITAIIE SELENA RMR ER te ERAN ISA ad ACA AOE et Heder Ayeneerrneen a eee

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Biel coer anrsbeg a ar

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Top Secret

(SEVENTH CRPARTHENT - Jaruary 1952-January 1964)

Operetional Activities ~ July 1962-January 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to havine served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Lepartment during this period, NOSENKO
Gescribes KGB invelvement in the recruitment of SVMNCHANSKIY,
the arrests of KCTEN and SARGHOORN, and the investigations
cf SLESINGER, OSWALD, and cf former KG officer CHEREPANOV,
his discovery that SHUBI!) was a GRU agent, and his assignment
to Geneva. Even if HCSENNO learned cf the operations as
he Gescribed and they were as he describe@ (there are substan- ‘y
tial reasons why they might have been cenducted by KGS :
elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
with respect to NOSENKO's oun description of Seventh Deparc<-
ment cperations. ‘They do net accurately characterize, as
NOSEN“O claims, KGB counterirntelligence operations against iy
tourists, and thus do net substantiate his Seventn Department 4 1
service, NOSENKO'S explanaticns for his assignment to .
Geneva in 1964 are no more plausible than for his earlier : ‘3
assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
not a lieutenant colonel as the temporezy duty authorization
indicated, but a captain, a rank incongruous with a Deputy
Chief of Department and one en which he presumably would
have been Fromoted as he as

KGB Counterintelligence Operations : . .
“Arong American Tourists : l
1962-1963 :

_ Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
‘Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed te Teen et eo ade
awareness of what the KGR posture was with respect to .

So TS Now. 197124
: Top Secret . oo. Copy 7

ophenntoe:

tisk Se iy REN RE POR a hats

14-0000 yO tee

a . - Top Secret

{OTESR ASPLCTS OF NOSFuNO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

4 mir eported «—
optained from
various KGB “colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBNNOV
was expelled frcem the KGB as a consequerce of NOSENKC's .
cefection, it was’ rumored that GRIRANOV was to Le fired f
hecause he whad Been: NCSUNNO's friend and patron, that
GRIBANOV was held resronsible for the defection of his
protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO" Ss assionrent to ut
Geneva in 1964 despite xu.

incligible, that GRTBM
father, that LOSENKO had Loon a depaty to a Department. Chi
‘ a<spice his junior rank bLiocause of GRIBANOV's influence, a
; and that GRIDANOV was dismissed from the KGA and Party i \
Lecause he willfully withheld information about NCSLNZXO's 3
precuring women for parties which he and the General arzvarged. 7

crethe deta 5a

iMinter cee

5 ce iithe 2
De aia ne

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964 ,

A

Imnediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to . *
refer to this special and personal relationship, which ‘
: touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB’ service.
Under interrogation, hewever, NOSENKO could not sustain
this claim. The extent NOSENKO'’s statements were retracted
! or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
H other evidence, is scen from the following examples excerpted
! from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
j the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be giver . i
i (Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness . a
3 reports); KOSENKO and GRISANOV carroused together with women
: provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalied only two
i occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);

4 recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 37) together with NOSENKO
i (Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in-SMITH recruit-
t

1

ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
1961 at which the latter learned that French Ambassador
DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted. NOSENKO accompanied

3360 es .. -


14.00000 of ns

exe
PME RRL:
,

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCE GR 7XO'S SCNA FIDES
CONCH EET EG FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he Served for a decade in the XGB in
succeysively senior positions of authority from which he .
Gerived extensive raowledge of the scope, character, and. A
results of “G8 operations against Arericans in the Soviet
qi

Unien in the period 1353-1923. To substantiate his clain,
he provides an impressive array of information-ahout ¥GB
rsonnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
that it Las been contirmed, :S presumptive evidence of his
Lona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
2rg, have generally corroborated NOSEMNKO's

av
3
t

claims. HAecorcing ts some ci these sources, NOSENKO was

« Senior KGS offiecr who oecuried a series of sensitive
positions, «ho enjcyed consizerable authority ard trust
despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the
greatest loss ever suffered Ly Soviet Intelligence", ss

petalyzed tie work of G7 163 GRU Meee (ETE TATED |
5 ROTI Risener! Vasher eee Ba. Se akies

ex

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
bicgraphy relevant to his claimed KG3 service with known “4

§ facts. and reasonabie surmise. The examination reflects

eect tied Site hates

the test to which his accounts were put: whether his

accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known

fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has

from occupying the KGB positions he ciaims to have held.

In short, is he what he says he is, according to his: o«n

accounts? ; , Co we

ADS Lelia

LMT Fleet

TS No. 197124:
\ Copy 10 . .


