DARAAN
Iitod-10431-10006 _. | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 2)

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31 January 1975 | : ce

-. MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of Defense
..- James R. Schlesinger

SUBJECT os Analysis of Soviet Policy towards the United States”
Se by an ex-Member of the KGB

de Several weeks ago I talked to Bill 1 Netson, DDO,* - ;
regarding a.more thoughtful: use of. our Soviet KGB Source's know1-
edge of fundamental Soviet Bloc policy.. The information relates. |
to the clandestine programs of the KGB sponsored by the |
..Central Committee in its reorientation in May of 1959 against the
United States as the "main enemy." My sugges tion was to submit a
= ; _ number of your speeches and solicit Source's critique as seen ~
Sn a through the eyes of an ex-KGB officer. Mr..Nelson stated that he
had no objection as long as there. was a description of the _
Source with a statement that his study did not necessarily repre-
sent the views of CIA.. I should add that the FBI and other serv-
ices are on record to the effect that they have never been able
to disprove Source's factual information although they do not
necessarily agree with his hypotheses (see Attachment A).

2. Attachment B sets forth the highlights and chronology of
his professional career in the KGB. This alone does not convey the
true significance of his defection to the Agency in December 1961.
From 1953 until 1961 various circumstances and events led to his
I disafféction with the system and hardened his determination to
i defect should his family be reunited. His concern was for his’

*Bill has taken sick leave for the next nee OE one |
seen this letter. . _—_———

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young. daughter who lived with her grandparents in Russia. In
1961 she was permitted to visit Source and his wife abroad,
and this triggered his defection. Overall, the case is one
where we unwittingly had an agent.in place in the KGB who was —
breaking down Soviet compartmentation of the KGB, both in the
First and in the Second Chief Directorate. His purpose was |

- to obtain information of great value to the West should he
have the opportunity to defect. re

3... By way of special ‘talents, he is ‘essentially an

analyst and historian. - He was frequently called upon by senior
members of the service to study and make recommendations where
there were conflicts over cases affecting more than one depart-
- ment. In-his-drive to gain more. knowledge outside of his par-

’ ticular sphere, he managed on one occasion to be appointed to .

the Inspector General's team which gave him access to the logs

of KGB production indicating the overall .espionage production
’ obtained by the KGB. The investigation was initiated by the
-Politburo who complained of the delay in receiving the product
. derived from espionage, such as British Admiralty, Cables and
Plans, NATO documents, etc. This gave Source freedom to in-
spect the processing of secret information and to trace its
handling from the moment it arrived in Moscow, the translation of
the product and-its preparation for the Politburo. Unfortunately,
the names of agents were not indicated, but it enabled Source,
after his defection, to identify the actual documents which were
identified by Western services on the basis of his description. .
This, in turn, led. to investigative action and important ¢ counter-
intelligence successes in the West.

4. Source has cooperated with some nine intelligence and .
security services under our.aegis. He has imparted first-hand
-knowledge of major covert political programs from the days of
“LENIN to 1961. This knowledge was acquired from reading deeply
into the archives and records of the activities of Soviet intelli-
gence services beginning with the Revolution. Equally important
' was his long tenure in the Higher Counterintelligence School -
where he was able to milk. KGB officers from many departments of
the Service abroad. who were brought back for short. periods of .
retraining. ;

5. Because the Adninistration, the State Department and
the Agency, in part, appear to be firmly entrenched in their
views regarding the policy of Detente, I believe that a prelimi-
nary unofficial reading of these materials by an expert in your
Department might generate an interest in the Source and his views. -

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“This could lead’ te a symposfum “in which he would-be invited ‘ta °°"
. participate and respond to adversary views.’ His reaction to
.. such a proposal is unknown... He has always resisted control in
_ the sense of being an agent of any given country. Further, he

does make demands for classified information and position papers
including the nature of the sources before addressing himself to ©
any particular problem, | Nevertheless, his paper on your speeches

were obtained from him using only unclassified - information. !

6. His production has run. into several ‘thousands of pages a

.of transcripts of interviews including meetings which he had

with other foreign. intelligence and security services. The

‘range of his information is so vast and detailed that we are

hard put to use it as an overlay for interpreting current Soviet
events. We have learned from experience .that if we. give him a.
problem with an adequate data base, he will] computerize and re-

-.arrange his basic information to support his analysis of any new

subject. This approach has been fruitful because in supporting

- his thesis, he often reveals new. information of value.

7. Attachment Cisa sensitive report received from our

Israeli liaison; Attachment D is an assessment regarding ‘the

activities, role, modus operandi and reason for ,
Ambassador DOBRYNIN's success vis-a-vis the United States (which So,
is incomplete wherever an asterisk is indicated) ;_ and... ee!
Attachment E is a rough draft of. his review of the following

- books - SOVIET STRATEGY FOR THE SEVENTIES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SOVIET-POLICY and CONVERGENCE OF COMMUNISM |
AND CAPITALISM - A-SOVIET VIEW - submitted to us during your
tenure in the Agency by Mr. Don Cotter. We intend to follow up -

.on this at some future date. This, and other attachments, are

partly drawn. from a draft manuscript which he has in his posses-
sion. The manuscript runs to over two thousand pages. He guards —
it jealously and is reluctant to publish it at this time. He.
has permitted me to read several chapters, and they are of unique

‘interest because of the classified information (based « on documents )

which he read in Moscow.

8. By way of digression, a bird's eye view is set forth
below of Source's ‘theme.

‘9. The major reorganization (which produced ‘the KGB ©
Department of Disinformation) and the gradual reorientation of the _
KGB and GRU was completed at the end of 1958 when SHELEPIN suc-.  —
ceeded General SEROV as the chairman of the KGB. (General SEROV,.
who worked with KHRUSHCHEV in the Ukraine, was downgraded to head
the GRU). This development climaxed two years of inspection by a

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special committee headed. ‘by: SHELEPIN. ‘who: worked under. the -

Central Committee to investigate activities and policies of the

KGB and GRU. They concluded that the Intelligence Services had
not carried out deStalinization which required that the services -
follow the Leninist concepts of intelligence and its role in

‘ political action. By way of explanation, the OGPU and Cheka were | :

credited under LENIN with having saved the Revolution. This was
accomplished by. suppressing enemies at home, mounting successful - ..
penetration operations into Western governments , the manipulation

*. oF agents of influence and conducting massive disinformation pro--<.. oe

grams by feeding deception tothe West through their intelligence.
services. Under STALIN the services degenerated‘into instruments
of personal. terror to preserve his cult of personality and lost ©

- . Sight .of the overall political, economic, and military obdeck ives”
(of the Soviets. ;

. 10. Before STALIN" Ss “death, there: were “anti-Stalinist ele-

ments who were uncovered and repressed, but their cause to find =

a Leninist solution to post-war problems continued after his. .
death. For example, MALENKOV began serious investigations into .
the KGB and other police organizations by enlisting the talents |
of the Leninist/Marxist Institute. It was his objective to have
the investigation culminate in open revelations regarding the |
crimes of STALIN and the activities of the police state. The

. course which was set would have ultimately led to the trials of |
KHRUSHCHEV and many members in the leadership who were prominent — _

in advancing the Stalinist regime as syncophants and "boot-
lickers."

1. MALENKOV was unfortunately -outmaneuverd by the collec-
tive which voted against him on issues, particularly regarding .
Germany. Even in victory, KHRUSHCHEV could not stem the tide
let loose by MALENKOV; therefore, in order to survive, he had
to "steal" the process of de-Stalinization and shape it to his
own ends and the survival of himself and his friends. This led —
eventually to the "secret speech" regarding STALIN's crimes in

‘which he twisted the facts to exonerate himself and his followers.

This led to unrest in the Bloc and the Hungarian Revolution which
forced KHRUSHCHEV and his cohorts to initiate plans and programs -
which represented a return to LENIN.

12. %In May 1959, a secret, six-day series of meetings was

- held for Government bureaucrats possessing a COMINT security

clearance. It was attended by approximately two thousand members
from different parts of the Government. The purpose was to hand
down and explain in Leninist terms the decisions of the

Central Committee relating to the deStalinization of the intelli-
gence services and to set forth policies which would result in
their reorganization and reorientation.

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13. The principal speaker was SHELEPIN who was supported by.
General GRIBANOV of the Second Chief Directorate as well as many
other senior officials of the Government and Services. SHELEPIN ~

_ gave a. broad analysis of the world situation stressing that the

USSR and the USA had reached an atomic stalemate. Accepting this
to be a fact, he stated that all plans for war such as stay--
behind net-workers should be abandoned. . He outlined programs and
reforms for the Intelligence Services which were accomplished
under LENIN and which required the intelligence potential to be
in harness with all other departments. of the Government. He
stressed that each intelligence operation should be designed to
help achieve broad political objectives. Noting that the letter

“"P" (Politika) had been obliterated from OGPU by STALIN, re
SHELEPIN announced the creation of the Department of Disinformation
within the KGB but subject to the contro? and direction of. the. >.

Central.Committee. The Department's task was to use all organs  -
of Government to implement strategic disinformation in accordance
with directives. This was meant to include all channels to the
West; namely, diplomatic, press, military, cultural and economic.

This was in addition to the use of double agents and provocateurs.

14. In discussing the. various objectives, SHELEPIN expounded .
on the wisdom of pursuing peaceful coexistence in the developed

’ countries and wars of national liberation in the underdeveloped —

countries, noting that these courses of action were not contra-
dictory.

15. Shortly thereafter, the central Committee charged the
KGB with the recruitment of two thousand additional S&T staff
officers in order to exploit on a broad basis the opening to the
West. The purpose for this increase was to gain Western technology
as well as to effect the recruitment of agents and agents of in- ,
fluence in the Western scientific world. It should be noted that
one of the more efficient and productive elements of the KGB and
GRU had always been their successful acquisition of scientific
secrets and R&D from the West. SHELEPIN noted that the change
of balance of military power could only be achieved through this

_additional strength of acquiring the technological and strategic

secrets of the West. This would also strike at the USA and hasten
its isolation.

16. According to the Source, he learned in 1961 that the KGB

’ had acquired approximately one thousand new staff officers for

S&T in accordance with the Central Committee directive and that.
about one thousand slots remained to be filled. In 1961 he and
some six hundred KGB officers attended an important lecture given .
by a senior general of the Defense Ministry. The lecture was to
outline the S&T tasks which the KGB would be expected to undertake.

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- . SECRET/SENSITIVE. ~~.

He stressed that the objective of the Soviet and the Bloc was -
‘- not only to achieve parity with the West but to overtake the a
.. United States and swing the bal ance of military. power to the -

Soviets.

_ 17. The general stated that the issk was gourteen’ years
behind the United States in electronic technology but that en

gap would be remedied by coordinated action in the = following -
fields: ae

aA greatly increased espionage effort.
because of the addition of one thousand. staff -
officers to the S&T of the. KGB and the + Academy:
of Sciences;

_ b. Disinformation, i.e., programs to mis-|
lead the United States and the West regarding .
Soviet technology which would lead the Western
scientific community into expensive and time-

wasting blind alleys of R&D;-.

To acquire new technology through:
trade agreements; and. .

d.. To make treaties and | other diplomatic.

’ arrangements by which the Soviets and.Bloc would
acquire information and which would permit Soviet:
scientists to gain access to the United States
scientific community for the purpose of spotting
potentials for the KGB and GRU. Most important,
he said, was that treaties could be used to
block the natural technological growth of the

‘Western powers, in particular, the United States.

18. As noted above, the lecture on shortcomings of Soviet
technology in electronics was delivered in 1961. Attachment F -
is a National Intelligence Bulletin (TOP SECRET UMBRA) dated —
16 July 1974, which has a direct bearing on Source's information
regarding the aforementioned lecture. The National Intelligence
Bulletin begins with the following: oe

"Leading officials of the Soviet electronics
industry have told visiting US experts that the
Soviet Union is four or five years behind the
United States in integrated circuit technology.
The US experts, who tested Soviet equipment. in
’ this field, have confirmed the Soviet judgment.

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Integrated circuits are needed to meet the size, |

weight, power, and reliability of modern military
: equipment as well as the needs of many. civil

electronic. systems.

Admittedly, the question of electronics covers only one phase of ‘the.

question of military power, and we have not been able to pursue this

oe question of technology further, given our ever-shrinking assets.

19. Since my days are numbered here, I do feel an obligation to

‘dispatch these papers for analysis and coment by Y your. expert before
my time runs out. ~ a,

20. As. previously noted, this package represents a unique: dis- i
semination, unofficial in character. It is requested that this © ~:

_ exercise be tightly held and that we consider modalities for the.
- future exploitation and/or discussions of the product. and the Source.

We and our allies regard Source to be the most valuable Soviet
defector since World War II. .

21. At-your convenience I would appreciate a short acknowledge-

"ment of the above and a reaction from your reader. In the event that

these papers do not stimulate any worthwhile interest, I would ap-
preciate their return for the use of my successor. Les
YY .
, Kindest personal regards from,

Sth | Cnylattoonn,
danes-Angté ton :

Attachments: as stated .

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y.5.S.R.
Report Now: = 4-64.44
Subject: | MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Source: Born 1938 In RIGA, has an academic education and Is a
soclologist by profession. He acquired his academic
training In Moscow and Baku. tn 1962 he worked for _
- about six months with the M.V.0. In Baku and efter that; — .”
until 1963, he worked as a lecturer In philosophy In -
Baku. In 1966-1967 he did his doctoral work at the. . ©
University of Moscow. From. 1967 until December 1973
when he left the U.S.S.R., he worked tn Yaroslavi
and in Baku. He was a member of the Sociology Asso-
citation of the U.S.S,R. From 1964 he was an active
. member of the Communtst Party thn Azerbaydzhen and was.
a member of its Central Committee. He was closely 7
assoclated with the First Secretary of the Azerbaydzhanl
Party. He cooperated willingly and made the impression
‘of being a highly Intelligent and educated man with ©... ~
analytical ability, good perception and excel lent memory.

Or

Validity of Information: November 1973

Reliabi tity: 8/2-3 oe


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U.S.S.R.

‘ Subject:

THE U.S.S.R. AND CHINA

1. On this subject, Source can report on the opinions of people IIke

-KHALIPOV, ALIYEV, SUKHODEYEV, GVISHYANI (xosycIN's son-in-law), OSIPOV ~~ .

and Polkovnik-General BYCHENKO (FNU) (Commander of the P.V.O. In the ,
BAKU Area). The following is a gist of the main ideas:

The danger of. war with China is not taken seriously in official

circles of thé U.S. S.R. and particularly in military circles.

+ General KHALIPOV said more than once that common interests

outweigh-the differences between the two Communist countries.
The majority in those circles are of the opinion that the
spreading of warnings about war with China is a deliberate

_-plece of dis-information by the Soviet authorities in order

to justify the keeping of a large mobilized force. It was |
often sald that neither China nor the Soviet Union fear an°

attack by the other side. China needs anti-Soviet propaganda. —
for her own Internal purposes and the U.S.S.R., in order to
_ keep miltfons of mobilized soldiers. Be

In those circles it Is thought that war with China Is Impossible
. for. the fol lowing reasons: © °
1) Even given the use of nuclear weapons, It would take a>

tremendous effort to destroy just the military potential.

> of China.- KHALIPOV mentioned a figure: 209 atomic bombs. :

wcleee . :

40

Pt Peon pits ig igs eg ge Sat


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(2) War with Chtna would in fact bea war of mutual attrition
and even In the case of a formal Soviet victory and a
' change-over in Chinese leadership ~ the U.S.S.R. wit! be.
unable to feed the hungry masses of China. According to.
_ GVISHYANI, there are a hundred mit tton hungry people in
. China, and in the U.S.S.R. there ts not enough food for
the popufation. A Soviet victory would thus double the
needs of the Soviet Union tn this respect and would put |
. too great a strain on her economy. .
2, From some conversations maInty with KHALIPOV, Source concluded that —
tha Soviet Union is preparing for war with Western Europe rather than |

with China; here are his. reasons:

a. The substitution of old weapons for new ones takes place first and _
foremost in the western parts of the Soviet Union, and not on the

border with China, except in the VLADIVOSTOK area, and this not be- ,

cause It Is near to China, but, mainly, because It Is near to the

U.S.A.

b.. According to KHALIPOV, tvo or three days will be enough for’ the
: Soviet Army to conquer Western Europe and he elaborated: — :
England has about 920 tanks. and 1500 planes;-
France ~ about 900 tanks and about 1500 planes;
Germany - about 500 tanks and about 1000 planes;
All this put together Is but about a sixth of what the U.S. 5. Re
"ean putin the fleld against the West within 2 or 3 days; and. -
‘until the West decides on counter-measures it will be too late.

od, According | to Source, who bases his opinion on his conversat tons with ‘the o

ain ‘People, not only is the Soviet Union ‘in. no fear of a war with China, but

© even thinks China will foin her in acwar anatnet tha want. _

iii ibiaccoe

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U.S.S.R.

Subject: | ANOROPOV, GRECHKO AND GROMYKO AS MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO |

4. -Many Soviet personalities, close to Government circles, are of the
opinion that ANDROPOV's, GRECHKO'’s and GROMYKO's inclusion In the Polit-
puro should be examined agalnst the backgroun of two tendencies current”
within Soviet ruling circles with regard to U.S. S. R. policy towards China
and. the U. S.A. ;

a. A poltey of detente with China is supported, according to these

personalities, by SUSLOV and SHELEPIN. These two think that the 7 .

Soviet Union should strive for closer relations with China by
adopting: a “ough policy towards the capitalist countries; a
policy of detente with the West weakens the Soviet position Tn

the International Communist Movement and at the same time ‘Strengthens

_ the Ideological attitudes of China.

-b. A pol ley of detente with the West
.. BREZHNEV, KOSYGIN, GROMYKO , GRECHKO, ANDROPOV and particularly.

. "KIRILENKO. + on the other hand. - - support a policy of detente. with

the West fn general and with the U.S.A. In particular. This group
stresses the: need for the nioderntzation of Soviet production pro- —
cesses. After this vital objective is achieved, the U.S.S.R. should
"adopt an even n tougher policy towards the West than in the past.

2. Thus the menbership’ of the three in the Politburo ‘Is designed to.
'-$3¢engthen BREZHNEV's.position.. It should be remembered that these three

- 2 @ personal debt to BREZHNEV: I+ was BREZHNEV who made them what they ©.

FTE Ro it should also be kept In mind that the membership In the ©

“ES

NBT EIT TAT ERIN PONOT II IB GY

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Politburo of the Minister of War, the Head of the K.G.B. and of the Foreign
Minister, has a special significance; It Is an Indication. that BREZHNEV is.

. esout to make most important decisions and needs the ‘support of the Armed

forces, the K.C.B. and of the Foreign Office.

The general opinton In circles of the Intel ligentzia, and particularly in
scientific circles, is that a war against the West is being planned.

fecording to this opinion, BREZHNEV's admisston of these three Ministers .

to the Politburo is a very unusual act In the history of the Soviet Union.
A similar step was “taken only gnce before, when STALIN admitted VOROSHILOV, .
SOLOTOY. and BERIA to the Pol itburo - about two months: before the outbreak Bot
cof war between the. U. Ss S.R. and Germany. ee


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"DEVELOPMENTAL AND RECRUITHENT APPR LOACHES TO AMERICANS ~

THE SOVIET SECURITY THREAT. IN THE DETENTE. PERIOD

a oe The aura of detente in the Soviet ‘and Bloc. ‘relations. dur-
ing the last year and a half, we believe, has created a-favorable __.
climate for: recruitment and penetration in the West. This. paper...”
‘deals with the problems as we see them. There are related counter- =~
' intelligence issues which involve internal security:. the.leakage.*
.-and exchange of economic, scientific and political information; °°
‘the sale of technological information; and the impact of disinfor-...+
-- mation and agents of influence on American policy. -As has been. »,
noted. in our previous forums, since 1961 when KAGO brought us 0 or
- documentary evidence* that. Soviet intelligence had launched ‘a full--*
-..scale penetration effort aga he Slain Enemy," we-have seen'a...
- adv and continuing Soviet effort to effect pe .

— fo. 4 as been clear. to Soviet intel-.. *,
a . -digence, as it has been apparent to Western coun terintet)igence a
that Soviet policy designed to exploit Western technology and,
- hopefully, change the balance of military power has” created new:
, opportunities. for Soviet espionage. - , oss oe

: 2. ‘These new “opportunities may. be characterized. as a plethora
i. ° of. choices: a harvest almost unprecedented since. the New: Economic --..,
t Policy (N.E.P.} period and the 1958 Central Committee. decision to

assign.to the KGB a new vital role in the policy to exploit the. °°).
West “by returning to the principles of LENIN. | Soviet intelligence
now ‘finds more Americans, both official and unofficial: we

a. Anxious to ‘exchange all ‘types of information; oe
b. Willing to ‘discuss virtually any subject;

c. ‘Inclined to believe there is truly a latent and _
potentially viable dissident movement in the USSR which can ©
be influenced if only the American people-to- people concept
could prevail; ;

*Re ferred to.and quoted in Attachment A.

TOM a”

—paqgae *

sreprer — - oe _

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eepenetnes = sip cet

‘recruit. Americans, .

d. Convinced that there is a bonanza for. the Ameri gan
businessman in the USSR and that "business" can alter the
“Soviet lifestyle and reduce. governmental, i. -G.5 cP control;

‘e. Believing that the Cold War was a myth created by
America; , woe

vo, g.. Anxious | to atone’ ‘for the "sins" of Vietnan. and
interventionist policies; oh

ge Anxious about. China and nuclear. Weapons;

h. Believing there is more merit to direct USSR- -USA 0 Of
a negotiation if America attempts to negotiate in. tanden with
, its Western allies, or other nations ; Os, a

ai. Ready. to believe: there. are’ many, if not legions, ‘of .
Soviet citizens, particularly the young. "intellectuals," ° <0 ©
who are willing to cooperate with _the West to advance: free-

dom. for the Russians ; . oe ee! :

= 5c Ignorant about: Soviet ideological ‘consistency and
purpose. ; ee aie

3. Addressing ourselves only to ‘manifestations ‘of the ‘Soviet.

security threat outside the U.S., we are concerned that the climate -

for penetration, particularly for the recruitment of Americans, has

become. too permissive. .The attitudes outlined have not only made

America more. vulnerable but have made the counterintelligence. job :
more difficult. Not. only has. Soviet-American contact. increased in:
geometric proportions, but there is also increasing evidence that .
the always relatively loose security check rein on official Ameri- —-
cans has lengthened even more. As. discussed elsewhere,-it is ap-..

“. parent the Soviet-inspired attacks on Western intelligence, when _
. coupled with domestic attacks of whatever origin against American”:
-intelligence and security organs, have had a direct bearing on —

opportunities for Soviet intelligence — to attempt to develop and -

4, In” an attempt to cope with the. problem. ‘of ‘Soviet and Bloc
recruitments and penetrations, we have - since August 1965 -
collected statistics and case data on a government-wide basis of |
recruitment attempts made against American personnel abroad and
foreign employees of the United States Government. Our objective
has been to collect, record, collate and analyze such information .
in order to:. ; _

a. Identify officers and agents of Soviet, Bloc, Cuban |
and Chinese Communist Services; ;

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services by area, | date and modus. operandi 5.

as” “appropriate, ’ information about the. scope ‘and type of pene- ©

b. Identify U.S. Government: employees who are > being ae
targetted by these adversary sgrvices; : oo

c. - Determine. the scope of activity of these adversary

de. Determin the. ‘scope “of targetting against any.
specific U. S. Government agency; ;

‘Help- us “understand the ‘extent of foreign intelligence

- eftocts against the U.S. Government and to obtain other per-
-spectives about. possible disinformation and deception

operations;

Fe “Facilitate management of double agent cases; .
"Furnish. ‘counterintelligence. ‘and operational guidance.

to. our field stations in their efforts to mount. aggressive
operations against the adversarys

che

Provide the Agency and other: U.S. Government agencies, ~

‘tration efforts. being made . against u. Ss. - Government installa-
tions abroad. co ee Sy

5. “Our. evaluated cases*. of a and. recruitment af .

tempts over the last nine years By the ation Bloc, Cuban . and ~

ese Communist services | are’ as “follows? |e as

bob 6 6 bt
©
~

‘
“I
co

*The unit in these and the other statistics in this review is

the single case of penetration or the recruitment incident as es-
. tablished By €Valuation of confirmed reports, unconfirmed or cir-
; cumstantial information, and other specific reporting and informa-
tion.

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re 6.. Over the whole period the penetration and: recruitment SE,
1 . forts have been fairly stably distributed by service as follows: .

Soviet | 588 ‘of the cases
Bloc ys 376
oo

-~ Over the: range ‘Of cases, recruitment and penetration ‘ef ;
“forts nave been directed at U.S. officer personnel in 30%.of the- oe
cases, other staff in 5%,.-communications personnel in 5%, enlisted:
‘Tanks | in- 9%, -local employees in 505 F% others in 22% of the: cases

ooking’ more. ‘particularly at our information on ‘Soviet ;
and associated recruitment and penetration efforts for the Detente |.
-period--the past four years--there is the following distribution |
of adversary service.case effort:

ee. t is clear that. Soviet penetration and: recruitment opera-
‘tions; up to and including the last year, against U.S. Government.
“installations and. representatives abroad have not been materially.
-affected or inhibited by ''Detente." Some representative cases

-since 1968 are cited in Attachment B. The cases have been sani-'::*:
‘tized to protect the: innocent... They are included solély to suggest.
“the range, precision and persistence of the Soviet, Bloc, Cuban and
Chinese ‘Communist penetrations — effort.

ae nd ‘of ‘the problem. ur ‘da a consis s-
‘sentially ‘of information on approaches and pitches voluntarily °
‘reported by American personnel. The 1973 case figures (and those
for 1974, thus far) hold up very well as valid indicators of the °°:
7 persistence of Soviet: and Bloc penetration efforts in spite of, or °
“. because.of, Detente permissiveness. However we acknowledge that
: we have no way yet of judging exactly the impact of Detente on the.
reporting mood of the official Americans who are being targetted.

- *This covers only local employees. outside of Iron Curtain in-

a - gtallations. Local employees in U.S. installations behind the Iron

Po Curtain are regarded as actually or potentially under the control

: of their respective security services and are. therefore not con-
sidered in this calculation.

SECRET

13-00000

'
I~ . os
' sole

H

11. Soviet Bloc modus operandi--the operational ‘techniqués
used against Americans--include ali the known gambit ts and have . .
_ changed little over the past decade: There have been slight tacti- |
_cal shifts both abroad and in the Soviet Bloc to take advantage of -
the "spirit of Detente," for example, but the basic ‘4/0. remains.
what it was. in the 1920's and 1930's. ne

12. “Ta ‘addition ‘to diplomatic. and. official | access to U. Ss.
. officials, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers frequent the places-- .
.. bars, restaurants, clubs and other international, national and _
'. local organizations--that provide them with opportunities to meet’
American personnel or U.S. Government employees. In their recruit:
. ment efforts, Soviet Bloc intelligence officers have utilized the

. theme of peace, friendship, and mutual cooperation and. they have.

Poe offered the bait of exchanging information to develop "common"’

oe -‘interests-and cooperation to obtain information.. They have utilized
' the ploy: of professional advancement or business interests for one --

. or both parties when attempting to gain cooperation or buy. informa-: °
tion to try to remove the stigma of espionage in their development °~:
. negotiations ‘as well as in some recruitment attempts... They con- .. ta

.. tinue. in their efforts to.obtain access to both American and in-;.. ~

_- digenous female employees throughout the world by using: officers. or 7
local indigenous male and female agents to cultivate these target ~

personalities. Recently they have used the language :lesson gambit--
.. even with CIA personnel. Local personnel, ranging from servants to .
oe higher officials, have. been recruited and targetted either to ob- —

, ' tain employment with Americans or to develop personal as well as
official. access to American officials... They have attempted to
recruit foreign local enployees to report about the interests and ~
activities of their American employers.- They employ sex and Ms,

-. financial remuneration as bait, use personal compromise as a threat,.

- seek out. personal weaknesses to utilize as operational opportuni-

7 ' ‘ties, make direct recruitment approaches based on compassionate or _
i oe nationalistic grounds , utilize audio and other technical’ mechanisms ,
SR etc. . vot he Se 7 =

13. This summary examination of the ‘recent case’ evidence of |
the essentially unchanged Soviet and Bloc recruitment effort me
against official Americans abroad is not the whole Detente story.. .
There is also a great interest by the Soviets in recruiting U.S. -_

' students abroad. The primary objective of that recruitment effort
as,°° guide the student eventually to obtain employment with the
U.S. Government. Such efforts: are only indicative of the fact that.
the Soviets view their penetration of the U.S. Government, via
students, as a continuing and long-range. program. .,

14. <A recent additional dimension to the problen of Soviet

and Bloc recruitment of Americans has been the access. the Soviets.
-have developed to American businessmen--many of whom are privy to

SECRET

13-00000 —

So egret nmnmnelee rene erties tte papi cig ae

; and the like.

a delegations under their Chamber of Commerce cover, and they are :
-.; applying what appear to be classic assessment techniques. It has.
“*. been our experience to date that they are thinking long-range and.

U.S. Government secrets through defense-related contracts--who~_
travel to the USSR and entertain. Soviet trade delegations in the “.~_

U; a The concern we have previously expressed about the role of _

- General Yevgeniy N. PITOVRANOV and the Soviet intelligence -

: officers in the foreign trade business was well founded and, in. a
fact, we believe was somewhat understated. It is now. evident. that os

PITOVRANOV controls most if not all of the activities going on °

. where American business encounters Soviet trade. officials, in the:

International Trade Center. to be built:in Moscow,. ‘in exhibits in.

the USSR and abroad, in the patents and licensing agreements, in

the supervision of ‘the travel. of trade delegations - (to. the U. Se

41s. Reports which reveal that ‘the KGB is: “active among “american.
businessmen are beginning. to. surface. Not too surprisingly, these -
reports indicate that their. techniques are both subtle. and blatant. °

One of the most blatant approaches to American business: ‘involves
‘Igor ARTEMYEV,-who.is attached to the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

ARTEMYEV claims to be a student in the U.S. to study relationships .

- between U.S. companies and their foreign. subsidiaries and. licensing -

“.: agreements between U.S. and foreign companies... In the course of -- -
~. his research, ARTEMYEV sends detailed questionnaires to U.S. com=..-

"| panies. The questionnaires are the kind required by our Securities

. and Exchange Commission. . While some ‘companies do not respond,.

‘there are those that do. ARTEMYEV also visits various companies to
. talk with officials. ._On.one occasion he replied to a question |

about the: level of classification of the meeting by saying it was:

. "confidential." With that kind of access, who needs to ‘recruit ain’.
.. the. classic sense. a Le _

16. PITOVRANOV's. ‘people are ‘very evident in various trade

are themselves not interested in the cheap shot or quick pitch,

"although these devices are being employed against some American ce
' businessmen who visit Moscow. There are also strong indications —°:

that the Soviets are using recruited agents among the rapidly ex-.

panding demi-monde of fixers, many Russian-speaking, who gain =< .*
“employment as the in-house experts who "know how to deal with the... -

Russians" and who find employment with American firms as guides ©
and advisors accompanying U.S. delegations to HNoscow.

“Attachments

Cnrannm

13-00000

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source’ Ss. : (Subjects)

professional career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the

1945-1946:

1946-1948:

1948-1950:

| Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section |

| (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony an

_. Student at the two- year course, Higher Loe

_ specialized in counterintelligence during -

Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where :

| he remained until July 1945. “At that. tine eo
Subject left the Artillery School before. _
"completion of the course and enrolled. in. a -
" Counterintelligence School.
' Student at the one year course, Military”
Counterintelligence s School, _GUER/"SMERSH, we
Moscow. .

7 Desk officer, Assistant operational Case a

_ security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart- pane

ment. (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign an :
Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. _Head-— 7

quarters in Moscow. ‘During the period 7

November 1947 to September. 1948 Subject held po
‘the title of Referent and his office was” .

Te designated the Fifth (SK). Department of the

Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI _

(Committee for: Information), but his: functions

were “unchanged.

Intelligence School of the KL. Subject .

studied general subjects and the. English oe

language; he was one of 30 students who

the second ‘year of the course.

ae aes a Y oe emate

13-00000

1950-1951:

_s

Desk officer, operation Case Officer, 7

_ supervising SK activities in China,

assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern. Depart-_

ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-.--

September 1951:

November 1951:

‘quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having.

reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949. .
At his request Subject was transferred as

a desk officer to the Anglo- ~American Section,

“Coustterintelligence ‘Departnient of the ‘Fifst)

Directorate, ‘MGB Headquarters in Moscow.

Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational .

Case Officer."

December 19S1:

March 1952:.

The KI, was dissolved and former state security a
elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's

functions continued - the same, but, in, the a

‘reorganization, he was assigned to the cr 7

Section of the American Department of the

Anglo- -American (First) Directorate of the

First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

Subject and an unidentified young colleague

wrote a joint letter through the Central

September 1952:

- meeting, with his friend, with STALIN, :
MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two

officers for their suggestions, “discussed 7

to send him a letter with specific proposals -

Committee of the CPSU to STALIN making -
suggestions for a fundamental reorganization of
Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- = |
intelligence work. . oo

While on vacation in the Georgian SSR

Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour

intelligence matters in detail and asked them 4

13-00000

March 1953:

October 1953:

August 1954:

for necessary reorganizations, together _

‘with the names of recommended chiefs.

In a subsequent letter they recommended.
Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then. in. prison

for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy,

Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy Oe
chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.

~ STALIN met Subject and his. friend a ‘second

time. OGOLTSOV was released £rom prison and -
appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-

rate, with PITOVRANOV as his. deputy. A

Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB

was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence

Department with an Emigre desk and - seven geo-

graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by

OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,.

supervising approximately 15 staff persons.

. When STALIN died and BERIYA. took over control
- of the State Security apparatus). which he. |
“combined with the MVD. into a unified MVD, he.

replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.

' Subject was reassigned as deputy chief’ of ne
Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Departnent of

the Second (new designation for foreign .

Intelligence) Chief Directorate, ‘MVD. » Subject
supervised activities against emigres in a
Austria and Germany. oS
Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in. .
Vienna, “Austria, as an operational case. officer
in the Emigre Operations Group.

Subject was ‘transferred to the British Sub-

"Group of the Anglo- -Anérican- ‘French Group. of the —

KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were (of ao

.counterintelligence nature, i. e. ‘concerned oe

with penetration of foreign intelligence services. .

13-00000

oy 1955-1959: oa One of 170 Students. at. _ading the four
. | year internal security- -counterintelligence
course, the KGB Higher, ‘School Juridical
Institute. He presented and successfully
defended his thesis on the subject of SK |
activities among Soviet delegations and
tourist groups traveling abroad. | He re-
ceived his diploma in August 1959. “During 7
his school tour Subject also spent several
weeks in on- the- -job. training as a student
assigned to pertinent elements. of the KGB's
Second . (Internal Counterintelligence) Chief
Directorate, with access to operational files
on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow a
‘who were KGB targets. a cee
September 1959: Subject was assigned as a | Senior Operational
Case officer responsible for NATO. information.
within the Treaty, Organizations Direction, a ag
Information (Reports) Department, First
(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters, a
Moscow. His function was to translate, edit
and summarize information reports obtained by
_ KGB agents | abroad and to disseminate the 7
pertinent information to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, members of the Presidium, “including
KHRUSHCHEV, and, in. the. case of information |
"with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY,. ‘the
- Minister of Defense. At one time, ‘during a |
CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced, about
the delays in translation and processing and
Subject was assigned to study the situation.
Thus he examined registry logs showing, the

titles of agent .information reports, the place —

e.
| acquired, the date received and the date of
dissemination of the finished Russian intelli= -
_ gence reports to the government.” .
Apeil 1366 Subject was tvansferred to the American. ect tien

13-00000

August 1960:

15 December 1961:

28 December 1961:

1962:

‘16 February 1962:
2 July.1962:

9 July 1962:
22 August 1962:

or tne CI Department of the First Chief
Directorate, KGB, to pr.gare for assign-
ment to the KGB residency under Soviet _
Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
the CI officer vorking against foreign
intelligence services. |
Subject was assigned to the KGB residency in a
Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV' (his true |
name was conpronised through . the 1954
defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
with the cover title of Third Secretary.
Subject, with his wife and young daughter
defected to the U. S. ‘Government which ‘granted

them political asylum,

' Subject met Attorney General Robert. ‘KENNEDY

along with Mr. HELMS, ~DDP.°

‘Subject was debriefed by CIA eeicers,

officials from other ‘US Agencies and teams of

| Intelligence Officers. from Free World nations. _

Subject provided much valuable information on

the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,

aims and efforts against the Free World.

' Subject, however, proved to be a ‘difficult.

handling problen, especially as a result of

his personality and his constant demands for —
regular meetings with high-level US officials
such as the President, the Attorney- -General,

the Directors of CIA and ‘the FBI and for a
policy role in the US Intelligence Community.

Subject had another meeting with the - ohn

pe

Attorney- ~General.

‘Subject met again with the Attorney- ~General

and Mr. HELMS. .
Subject had a conversation with Mr. feos.
Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW, -

: Director of USIA.

13-00000

. ——,

- + 418 Nov. 1962:

27 Nov. 1962:

14 December 1962:
21 Feb. 1963. H

Spring 1963:
8 August 1963:
22 August 1963:

23 August 1963:
4 Sept. 1963:

October 1963-
April 1964:

1964/1965:
_ June 1965:
August 1968:

October 1968:

July 1970

—_

An FBI source reported. . hat the KGB was aware |
of Subject"s presence in the U. s. A. and ordered .
all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately
any information which they may obtain regard-
ing Subject. |

Subject met Mr. McCONE, ‘ber, and protested |
treatment by the Agency.

Subject met again with the Del. a
‘Subject and his family left N.Y. c. on -
SS Sylvania for England. .
Subject worked with the British.

Subject returned to the U.S.A.

Subject met the Attorney-General again.

Subject: met: the DCI agsin. ~

. Subject. met the pcr again and stated ‘that he

wanted to become an advisor to the DCT and»

. the Intelligence. Community. on

Subject in contact “with the “Agency nostly an >

the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to

sone’ extent.

| Subject, according to a Dutch official,

visited The. Netherlands. _
Subject interviewed by the Canadians co)

in the N. Y. Cc. area.

Subject in contact with the British regarding

possible publication of his book. _
An FBI source indicated that he had no
current information concerning the KGB

attitude regarding Subject but the source oo

_ stated that if the KGB. knew Subject! s location

it might undertake. to. eliminate hin, 7
Subject was in contact with Agency personnel .

and visited Florida.

13-00000
‘sty?’ March (1972 A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew

’
yay ~ ne

the

that Subject had been sentenced to death —
by the KGB. An article regarding this

sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after

1964, |
April 1972: Subject ¥ was in touch with CIA officials.
September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a ‘copy

of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents _
of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors, -

Members of Anti- Soviet Organizations, Members. of
Punitive Units and ‘Other Criminals under.

Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed
Subject and his wife as ‘under the sentence of

‘death for revealing Soviet State secrets. ee

13-00000

woo: ae =

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) .

professional career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the ._
Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where
“he remained until July 1945. At that time
a | Subject left the Artillery School before
completion of the course and enrolled in a
 Counterintelligence School, .
1945-1946: _, Student at the one year course, ‘Military a
| _ Counterintelligence School, | GUKR/"'SMERSH, no
". Moscow. a
1946-1948: Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case. .
. "Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section pe on
- (otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony = a
_ security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-—
ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign :
Intelligence) Directorate of MGB . Head-—
quarters in Moscow. During the period - 7
November 1947 to‘September . 1948 Subject held
the title of Referent and his office was . -
designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the
Third (Eastern) Directorate of the KI
(Committee for: Information), but his ¢ functions
were unchanged. ;
1948-1950: Student at the two-year course, Higher
Intelligence School of the KI. | Subject _

Studied goncral subjects and the English
z g :

language; he was one of 30 students who .
‘specialized in _counterintelligence during

the second year of the course,

9 B0 3s

13-00000
. r * 1950-3951: me Desk officer, Operation Case Officer,

~ “supervising SK activities in China,
assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern Depart-
ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head-
quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having
reverted from the KI to the MGB in.1949,
September 1951: At his request Subject was transferred as
a desk officer to the Anglo- -American Section,
“Couriterintelligeiice “Department ‘Of. the First
Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
November 1951: Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational
. . - Case Officer." |
December 19S1: The KI, was dissolved and former state security
| a elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's —
functions continued the same, but, in the

reorganization, he was assigned to the cI.)

Section of the American Department of ‘the
- Anglo-American (First) Directorate of the |
First Chief Directorate of the MGB. .
March 1952: Subject and an unidentified young colleague _ oo
wrote a joint letter through the Central
Committee of the CPSU to STALIN ‘making
suggestions for a. fundamental. reorganization of.
Soviet foreign intelligence and counter-
intelligence work.
September 1952: While on vacation in the Georgian SSR
Subject was ordered to Moscow for a. four hour
meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,
MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two.
officers for their suggestions, discussed
intelligence matters in detail and asked them

to send him a letter with specific proposals.

13-00000 |

March 1953:

October 1953:

August 1954:

—

for necessary reorganizations, together

with the names of recommended chiefs. -

In a subsequent letter they recommended
Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSOV, then in prison
for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy
Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.

STALIN met Subject and his friend a second:: _

time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-

rate, with PITOVRANOV as his. deputy. A

Chief Intelligence Directorate of the MGB

was then formed, containing a ‘Counterintelligence
Department with an Emigre desk and - seven geo- |
graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by
OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,.

‘supervising approximately 15. staff persons.
; When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control

of the State Security apparatus, which he

combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he.

replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.

:. Subject was reassigned as deputy chief of the

_ Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of

the Second (new designation for foreign
Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject |
supervised activities against emigres in :
Austria and Germany. - _

Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
Vienna, Austria, as an operational case. officer
in the Emigre Operations Group.

Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
Group of the Anglo- ~American- French Group of the

KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a

“ counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned. -

with penetration of foreign intelligence. services.

13-00000

"1955-1959: “Tone oz 170 Students at ting the four
year internal security- counterintelligence
course, the KGB Higher, School Juridical
Institute. He presented and successfully
defended his thesis on the subject of SK
activities among Soviet delegetions and
tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
ceived his diploma in August 1959, During
his school tour Subject also spent several”
weeks in on-the-job training asa student
assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
Second (Internal Counterintelligence). Chief
Directorate, with access to operational files ©.
on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
who were KGB targets. . ao

September 1959: Subject was assigned as a Senior Operational

“Case. Officer responsible for NATO information

within the Treaty Organizations Direction,
| Information (Reports) Department, First. .
(Foreign) Chief, Directorate, KGB Headquarters,
Moscow. His function was to: translate, edit —_
and summarize information reports, obtained by
_ KGB agents: abroad and to disseminate. the
pertinent ‘information to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, members of the Presidiun, including
KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information
with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the _
Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
the delays in translation and processing and
Subject was assigned to study the situation.
Thus he examined registry logs showing the
- titles of agent information reports, the place
acquired, the date received and the date of
dissemination of the finished Russian intelli:
gence reports t the government.”

avit 32848: ay,
ADYAL Louu. ouULY

‘Se

- YR. @.. - owt Le rer en
G THe AMETLCah section

oI
a
Ha]
a
| ate Y
a
tal
ro
h
ff

ct was tyr:

oy

13-00000 ; pee cee be eee nee eee

“Directorate, XGB, ‘to piv. Fe for assign-

ment to the KGB residency under Soviet

Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as

the CI officer working against foreign

. intelligence services,

August 1960: Subject was assigned t to the KGB ‘residency in —-

Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true |
name was compromised through the 1954
defection of Petr DERYABIN in- Vienna), - and
with the cover title of Third Secretary.

15 December 1961: Subject, with his wife and young daughter
defected to the U. S. Government which 1 granted

them political asylun,

28 December 1961: Subject met Attorney General Robert ‘KENNEDY
‘ along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.” ; .
1962: . Subject. was’ debriefed. by CIA ceticer,
officials from other US Agencies and teams of
- Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. |
Subject provided much valuable information on
the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations,
aims and efforts against the Free World. . -
Subject, however, proved to. bea difficult
handling problem, especially as a result of
his personality and his constant demands for
regular meetings with high-level US officials
such as the President, the Attorney-General,
| the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with ‘the
Attorney-General. ; .
2 July 1962: Subject met again with the sone tei
and Mr. HELMS. a
9 July 1962: Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of thé
White House Staff and Mr. Edward R.. MURROW,

Director of USIA.

-18 Nov. 1962:° . OOS An FBI source reported “yt the KGB was aware
. ‘ . : . ee

of Subject’ s presence in ‘the U.S.A. and ordered |

13-00000

all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately
any information which they may obtain regard-
; ing Subject. oo
27 Nov. 1962: Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested

treatment by the Agency. _

14 December 1962: Subject met again with the pcr.»
21 Feb. 1963 : Subject and his family left N.Y.c. on
| SS Sylvania for England. - 7 |
Spring 1963: | Subject worked with the British.
8 August 1963: Subject | returned to the U. S:A.
22 August 1963: Subject met the ‘Attorney- ~General again.
23 August 1963: Subject met the DCI again. © re
4 Sept: 1963: Subject met: the DCI again and stated ‘that he

wanted to become an advisor to the DCI and

. the Intelligence. Community.
a

October 1963- - -
April 1964: Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in
| the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative to. 7
some extent. _
1964/1965: . Subject, according toa Dutch official,
| visited The Netherlands. 7 .
June 1965: Subject interviewed by the Canadians RCMP)
din the N.Y.C. area. | oo
August 1968: Subject in contact with the British regarding
possible publication of his book.
October 1968: An FBI source indicated that -he had no
| . current information concerning the KGB
attitude regarding Subject but the source 7
stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
it might undertake to eliminate him.

July 1970 _ Subject was in contact with Agency personnel |

and visited Florida.

y “ same ewer me me header Ore Pree

13-00000

that Subject had been sentenced to death |
by the KGB. An article regarding this
sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after
1964. |
April 1972: | “Subject was in touch with CIA officials. |
September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy

of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
of Foreign Intelligence Services, Defectors,
Members of Anti-Soviet Organizations, Members of.
Punitive Units and Other Criminals under - | -
Search Warrants. In this List the KGB listed
Subject and his wife as under the sentence of =~

death for revealing Soviet State secrets.

13-00000

The following are highlights of the chronology of Source's (Subject's) .

professional career:

September 1944: Subject was mobilized and sent to the >

1945-1946: ©

1946-1948:

1948-1950:

Frunze Artillery School in Odessa where

he remained until July 1945. At that time _

Subject left the Artillery School before

oi,
completion of the course and enrolled ina.

: Counterintelligence School.

Student: at the one year course, Military

Counterintelligence School, _ SUKR/"SMERSH," t.

" Moscow.
Desk officer, Assistant Operational Case
| Officer, assigned to the Eastern Section
(otdeleniye) of the SK (Soviet Colony es

. security of Soviet officials abroad) Depart-

ment (otdel) of the First Chief (Foreign
Intelligence) Directorate of MGB. “Head- 7
quarters in Moscow. During the period |
November, 1947 to September . 1948 Subject held ;
the title of Referent and his office was 7
designated the Fifth (SK) Department of the:
Third (Eastern) Directorate of the XI
(Committee for: Information), but his” functions
were unchanged.

Student at the two-year course, Higher

Intelligence School of the KL. - meee

studied gencral subjects and the English

.

language; he was one of 30 students who ,
specialized in counterintelligence during

the second year of the course.

-.. 0203


13-00000

1950-1951:

Desk officer, Operation” *. Case Officer,
supervising SK activities” ‘in China,
assigned to ‘the SK Section, Eastern Depart-

ment, First Directorate of the MGB Head--

‘quarters in Moscow, the SK functions having

September 1951:

November 1951:

December 1951:

reverted from the KI to the MGB in 1949.
At his request Subject was transferred as

a desk officer to the Anglo-American Section,

“Counterintelligerice Department of. the First.

Directorate, MGB Headquarters in Moscow.
Subject was promoted to "Senior Operational -

Case Officer."

The KI, was dissolved and former state security a

elements were returned to the MGB. Subject's.
functions continued the same, but, in the

reorganization, he was assigned to the cI-

Section of the American Department of the 9

Anglo-American (First) ‘Directorate. of the.

First Chief Directorate of the MGB.

March 1952:

Subject and an unidentified young colleague:

_ wrote a joint letter through the Central

September 1952:

Committee of the CPSU to STALIN ‘making |
suggestions for a fundamental. reorganization of.
Soviet foreign intelligence and counter- a

intelligence work. —

While on vacation in the Georgian SSR

Subject was ordered to Moscow for a four hour

meeting, with his friend, with STALIN,

MALENKOV, and BERIYA. STALIN thanked the two

officers for their suggestions, discussed

intelligence matters in detail and asked them

to send him a letter with specific proposals.

13-00000 |

March 1953:

October 1953:

August 1954:

em

for necessary reorganizations, together

with the names of recommended chiefs.

In a subsequent letter they. recommended
Sergey Ivanovich OGOLTSoV, then in prison
for "political crimes," and Yevgeniy
Petrovich PITOVRANOV, then chief or deputy
chief of the MGB in the Uzbekistan SSR.

" STALIN met Subject and his. friend a second <

time. OGOLTSOV was released from prison and
appointed Chief of the First Chief Directo-
rate, with PITOVRANOV as his. deputy. A.

Chief Intelligence Directorate of: the’ MGB -

was then formed, containing a Counterintelligence

Department with an Emigre desk and . seven geo- .

. ‘graphical desks. Subject. was appointed by.
. OGOLTSOV as chief of the American. Desk,

supervising approximately 15. staff persons.

; When STALIN died and BERIYA took over control
| of the State Security apparatus, which. he

combined with the MVD into a unified MVD, he.

replaced OGOLTSOV with one of his own appointees.

' Subject was reassigned as deputy chief. of the

Russian Emigre Desk of the CI Department of

the Second (new designation for foreign. . .
Intelligence) Chief Directorate, MVD. Subject
supervised activities against emigres ‘in
Austria and Germany. .

Subject was assigned to the MVD residency in
Vienna, Austria, as an operational case. officer |
in the Emigre Operations Group. .

Subject was transferred to the British Sub-
Group of the Anglo-American- French Group of the

KGB residency in Vienna. His duties were of a

-counterintelligence nature, i.e. concerned -

with penetration of foreign intelligence services.

13-00000

. "1955-1959: - One of 170 Students at: os ‘ing the four
year internal security- _éounterintelligence
course, the KGB Higher, School Juridical
Institute. He presented and successfully
defended his thesis on the subject of SK.

_ activities among Soviet delegations and |
tourist groups traveling abroad. He re-
ceived his diploma in August 1959. During
his school tour Subject also spent several

_ weeks in on-the-job training asa student
assigned to pertinent elements of the KGB's
Second (internal Counterintelligence) Chief

‘Directorate, with access to operational files
on foreign diplomatic personnel in Moscow
‘who were KGB targets, _ or

September 1959: Subject was assigned asa a Senior Operational pee

Case officer responsible for. NATO information

within the Treaty Organizations Direction, _
. Information (Reports) Department, First .
(Foreign) Chief, Directorate... XGB. Headquarters,
Moscow. His function was to translate, edit ce ant
and. summarize information reports obtained by
a Se : KGB agents abroad and; to disseminate the |
| | _ pertinent information to the Central Committee
of the CPSU, members of the Presidiun, including ;
-KHRUSHCHEV, and, in the case of information _ .
with military aspects, to MALINOVSKIY, the
Minister of Defense. At one time, during a
CP cell meeting, criticism was voiced about
the delays in translation and processing and
Subject was assigned to study the situation.
Thus he examined registry logs showing the

titles of agent .information reports, the place.

e
acquired, the date received and the date of
dissemination of the finished Russian intelli-
gence reports to the government, -

April 1866 Subject was transferred to the American Section

13-00000
. . ; OL the Cl Department of the First Chief
a . ‘ foe _,

“ : “ * Directorate, XGB, to pie, ure for assign-

Pd

ment to the KGB residency under Soviet
Embassy cover in Helsinki, Finland, as
the Cl officer working against foreign
intelligence services. .
August 1960: Subject was assigned to the KGB ‘residency in
Helsinki, under the name KLIMOV (his true
name was compromised through the 1954 |
defection of Petr DERYABIN in Vienna), and
with the cover title of Third Secretary.
15 December 1961:. Subject, with his wife and young daughter
defected to the U. S. Government which granted

then political asylum.

28 December 1961: ‘ Subject: met | Attorney General Robert KENNEDY
. along with Mr. HELMS, DDP.:
1962: . | Subject was debriefed by CIA “Officers, —
. officials from other US Agencies and teams of
- Intelligence Officers from Free World nations. .
Subject provided mich valuable information on
‘the KGB, its organization, personnel, operations, |
aims and efforts against the: Free World. _ -
Subject, however, proved tobe a aveticult me
handling problem, especially asa result of
his personality and his constant demands for
regular meetings with high-level US officials ©
such as the President, the Attorney-General,
the Directors of CIA and the FBI and for a
policy role in the US Intelligence Community.
16 February 1962: Subject had another meeting with the es
_ Attorney-General. ; .
2 July 1962: Subject met again with the Attorney-General
and Mr. HELMS. -
9 July 1962: Subject had a conversation with Mr. HELMS.
22 August 1962: Subject had interview with Mr. SORENSON of the
White House Staff and Mr. Edward R. MURROW,

Director of USIA.

13-00000

* .

15 Nov.

27 Nov. 1962:

1962:

14 December 1962:

21 Feb. 1963

Spring 1963:
8 August 1963:
22 August 1963:

23 August 1963:
4 Sept.

_ October 1963-

Aprii 1964:

1964/1965:
June 1965:

- August 1968:

October 1968:

July 1970

1963:

. the Intelligence Community.

in the N. Y.C.

om

,An FBI source reported __it the KGB was aware
of Subject! s presence in the U.S.A. and ordered
all Soviet 1s personnel to report immediately .
any information which they may obtain regard-
ing Subject. |

Subject met Mr. McCONE, DCI, and protested

treatment by the Agency.

Subject met again with the DCI.

‘Subject and his family left N.Y.C. on

SS Sylvania for England.
Subject worked with the British.

Subject returned to the U.S.A.

“Subject met the Attorney- -General again.
Subject: met the DCI again. oe

— Subject met the DCI again and stated. ‘that he

wanted to. becone an advisor to the DCI and

Subject in contact with the Agency mostly in are

the N.Y.C. area. Subject was cooperative | to

sone" extent. -

| Subject, according to a Dutch official,

visited The Netherlands. 7

Subject. interviewed by the Canadians (RCMP)
area. . -

Subject in contact with the British regarding
possible publication of his book..: |
An FBI source indicated that he had no

current information concerning the KGB

attitude regarding Subject but the source ~
stated that if the KGB knew Subject's location
it might undertake to eliminate him. .
Subject was in contact with Agency personnel _

and visited Florida.

13-00000
+e 8 * "March 19725 A KGB defector, LYALIN, reported that he knew
oN

» » as
tthe

that Subject had been sentenced to death
by the KGB. An article regarding this

sentence appeared in The Chekist sometime after

1964. | |
April 1972: Subject was in touch with CIA officials.
September 1972 A KGB defector, OGANESYAN, provided a copy

of the 1969 KGB Alphabetical List of Agents
of Foreign Intelligence Services, ‘Defectors,
Members of Anti- Soviet Organizations, Members of

Punitive Units and Other Criminals under.
Search Warrants. In ‘this List the KGB listed.
Subject and his wife as under the sentence of -

‘death for revealing Soviet State secrets. |

