104-10301-10001 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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CIA Internal Use Only
Access Controlled by DDO

HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~ WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION
1946 - 1965

DDO HP 324

by

Approved:

Davi . ilips ,
Chief, Western Hemisphere Division
Directorate of Operations

December 1973

VoLuME I

Copy No. 1: WH
Copy No. 2: O/DDO -

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-Latin American officers in Panama, and also supplied
material for the US Army Intelligence School to use

in training foreign students on Communism. Nine CIA
officers lectured at a Fort Holabird course for senior
Latin American officers in 1961, capping their presenta-

tion by producing a Soviet defector who spoke on the
267/

Soviet intelligence service.

' AER nro nile terem mpm oy wna we

oe eo eS

CIA maintained a station in Havana throughout
1960 but faced increasing operational difficulties--
some of CIA's own making. Probably the outstanding |
flap was the capture of three TSD technicians, caught
in the act of planting a microphone in the New China
News Agency office. An analysis of this operation,
made when the technicians were released 18 months later,
Showed that they had ignored many of the basic rules
of tradecraft. On the other hand, the Cubans had given
them only perfunctory interrogations -
In 1960 the Havana Station consisted of (Janes
A. Noei, chief of station; Arthur Avignon, deputy;
about six case officers and as many secretaries. Life
was unpleasant; Castro agents shadowed American Em-
bassy personnel, monitored their telephone conversa-

tions, and tried to pump their children about what

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daddy was doing. As relations between the United
States and Cuba deteriorated the station concentrated
on support for the Cuban invasion then being planned,
and on developing stay-behind assets. Frank Belsito
and later Ralph Seehafer were designated as "stay-

behind officers" and regularly reported on a dozen

or sO agents and nets, a few of which survived the

station's closing.*

The break in diplomatic relations with Cuba |
was predictable, and during the fall of 1960 Embassy
dependents were moving themselves and their house-
hold effects back to the United States. Avignon
made a special trip on the Havana-Key West ferry
to take out his personal car, silverware, and a
$1,500 violin. Station files not absolutely essen-
tial were crated and shipped back to Headquarters.
Case officers were working 15-hour days, seven-day
weeks.

When the break came, the Embassy had three
days' notice that it would close on 4 January 1961.

The CIA station had just installed a new incinerator

* One stay-behind agent, AMFOX-1, was still report- .

ing in 1973 but WH Division believed he had been

doubled.
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and managed to burn what files it could not ship to
Key West on the attache aircraft. When they were

not burning papers or smashing technical equipment,
case officers were caching radios or making advance

payments to agents left behind.

| i i i | a

On 4 January station personnel met at the

Embassy, rode in convoy to the ferry, and sailed to

the States. A few, like William J. Murray, had main-
tained houses until the end and lost everything in
269/
them. *
This was the period when Fidel Castro, as yet

unrestrained by his more cautious and practical Soviet

advisors, was busily stirring up trouble in the

Western Hemisphere and popularizing the phrase

"exporting the revolution." A typical target was

Honduras, the poorest and most primitive country in
Central America. CIA's reaction was also typical

of the "nation-building" and "“institution-building"

approach to countering subversion.

When Castro began his propaganda campaign in

* Two years later Congress authorized the Department
of State to reimburse its employees the depreciated
value of furnishings left in Cuba. Payments fell
far short of replacement costs.

i
i
*

a

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pee aa)

7” of assets commencing with a close per-
sonal relationship between the station
| chief and the President of Mexico, high-

level telephone taps, photographic sur-
‘ veillance, unilateral intelligence as-
sets and a broad scale of covert action
an capabilities.

Within a week of the inspector's visit

Frederick W. Cole was relieved as chief of station
| in La Paz, partly because of comments made by Ambas-
sador Ben Stephansky, a former labor attache who had
not worked closely with CIA. Lyle T. Shannon, cos,
Panama City, left WH Division (perhaps coincidentally)
a few months after the Inspector General had described

him thus: |

Se SSS

i
The chief of station is a GS-18 who
has served in many different posts in
| the Agency. He has been in Panama for
about five years. A wide gap in human ‘
relations exists between the chief of
| station and his staff. He is coldly
aloof and is reputed to brook no dif- \
‘ ference of opinion even on questions
| ; of operational procedures. He is a
: ; hard-driving administrator. His tal-
: ents along this line are granted even
by the Ambassador, who bluntly dis-
credits his ability as an intelligence
officer. 275/

Although the separate Task Force W (TFW) was
not officially established until 8 March 1962, the

planning and execution of the Bay of Pigs operation

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were for all practical purposes conducted indepen-
dently of WH Division and therefore are not covered
in this history. There was an informal but under-

stood shortcut in the chain of command; basic deci-

sions were made at the DDP, DCI, or Presidential

level. Although some of the key personnel were de-
tailed from WH Division, the Cuban Headquarters unit
was in another building and no one pretended that

J. C. King was running the show.

Jacob D. Esterline, a veteran WH Division
officer who later became deputy chief of the divi-
Sion, was chief of the Cuban unit during the buildup
and invasion attempt, and took his orders from the
DDP. When the Cuban unit was made officially autono-
mous as TFW and later as the Special Affairs Staff
(SAS), it was headed first by William K. Harvey and
then by Desmond FitzGerald, Bruce B. Cheever and
John L. Hart, none of whom had previous service in
WH Division. It was not until 1965 that the Cuban
unit really lost its autonomy and again came firmly
under WH Division.

Actual expenditures in FY 1961 illustrate

the disparity between Cuban operations and the

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parent WH Division. In that year total obligations
for Cuban operations were (G41, 498,743) or almost
four times the ($11,003,991) spent in the rest of
Latin America. Except for Cuba 1961 was a repre- :
sentative year, and these were the obligations for

regular stations throughout the hemisphere: :

/ Brazil $1,498,101 Colombia $301,389

' Mexico 1,384,505 Dominican Rep. 261,148

i Venezuela 922,424 Costa Rica 231,351

\ Argentina 802,302 £1 Salvador 222,037

\" ' Chile 646,768 Honduras 103,820
q | Panama 579,310 Nicaragua 92,088
' Uruguay 521,082 Haiti 77,675

j Guatemala 418,778 Paraguay 54,606

' Peru 380,422 West Indies 41,864
Ecuador 336,367 Puerto Rico 24,377

Bolivia | -—- 303,210 | 276/ |

“Until the nearly 1,200 prisoners taken at the

“ Bay of Pigs could be ransomed with shipments of phar-
maceuticals, CIA regularly supported their dependents
in the United States. In the opinion of the General
Counsel, if a dependent had sued, courts would probably

-. ‘have found that Cuban Brigade members were entitled to

the benefits of the Federal Employees' Compensation

Act. Thus by mid-1962 CIA was disbursing $311,500
i ; per month to the dependents, plus bonuses and medical
care for invaders who managed to return. These ex-

penses, however, were paid from special funds outside

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wa 2 eet

SSS ot ESSE

wet

SSSR es

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the WH Division budget.

\_ . Bee ane }
: 7 ae Probably Castro's attempt to export his revo- iy
"We ]

lution reached its peak in 1962. The first Castro-
inspired guerrilla action in Latin America occurred
in March of that year, when Indians in the interior
of Peru attacked the towns of Huampani and Satipo.
A Lima Station penetration agent identified their

leader as Cuban-trained and reported that radios and

; weapons had been smuggled in from Cuba to start the

278/
attack.

At year's end the US Government planned to
assemble for the Organization of American States a
white paper on Cuban subversion in Latin America,
and in February 1963 WH Division chiefs of station
met in Panama to discuss their contributions with -
the DCI. From this meeting came a picture of Castro's
campaign of subversion.
Argentina reported that left-wing Peronists
were an attractive target for Cuba; police had cap-
tured a group of terrorists organized and directed
by John William Cooke, an ex-Peronist then in Cuba.
Bolivia knew of 217 activists trained in Cuba within

nine months and was looking forward to debriefing

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a
I Everyone breathed easier, and the Chief, WH

Division, described the operation as “one of the

most tightly held of our Cuban activities." Two ;

“| years later the hold was not so tight, for on 26 March ‘i.

1965 the New York Times front-paged a reasonably com-
f

plete and accurate account of the great sugar-sabotage

operation under the headline:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY BALKED "
CIA PLOT ON RUSSIAN SUGAR i

United a

3 ten La Sete eaklstt pT’:
ype a TF Re a eT

Press services picked up the story.

Press International doffed its cap to "enterprising

we 1S

i

:
U.S. agents," but added that "White House interven- fe

‘i

' tion foiled the Central Intelligence Agency's Carib- i
283/ HT

eee es ts

bean melodrama." CIA, as usual, had no Comment...
gE Pa Ey a a Tee - st ste

For across- the- board coverage of Cuba in

the early 1960's the Mexico City Station was tops.

Reporting on the Cuban Embassy, the COS said in Feb-

ruary 1963:

... . We intercept their mail, photograph
all the people who go in and out of the
Embassy, cover their telephones completely,
and within a few hours of the conversa-
tions have resumes of all. the phone calls.
We cover their trash, and this has been
found to be useful. And included in the
usefulness was the discovery of a man who
‘was doublecrossing us, who we thought was
a good penetration of the Embassy.

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ia

CIA had seven different microphones in the

Cuban Embassy, one hidden in a leg of the coffee
table in the Ambassador's office. Like most audio

operations, this one produced a lot of chaff, but

it also yielded bits of operational information
showing connections between the Embassy and local
Communists and students. At the airport the station
was getting photographs of all travellers to Cuba,
plus about 300 photos per day of their passports

and documents. y

: 2
[inciudea in the take from the Cuban Embassy

were the serial numbers of weapons bought by Commu-

nists for smuggling into Guatemala, plus the names

and positions of the sellers. Complicating the ex-.

ploitation of this information was the fact that the

weapons had been sold by Mexican officials, and while

the station wanted to stop the smuggling and appre- ~

hend the Communist smugglers it had no desire to

upset sensitive relations with the Mexican Government]
g [Two high-level officers of the Cuban Embassy,

one of them the cultural attache} were recruited CIA

penetrations. The station had sent three agents into

Cuba and was getting reports from them by secret

~

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Se eT
ten Eee ee FL

Saree
Ren seacietliivo Sears

panne

aan =e = = Si ot
[Ne such restraint was applied to Venezuela,
‘1 where Castro-supported terrorism was rampant. On

writing. Meanwhile it was servicing 17 accommoda-
tion addresses for Headquarters and Miami.

In spite of all this, there was little exploi-
table evidence that Cuba was using Mexico as a base
for subversion in the rest of Latin America. Mexico
was the only Latin American nation to maintain diplo-
Matic relations. with Cuba in the face of an OAS reso-

lution intended to isolate the island. Anxious to

retain this bridge to the Western Hemisphere, Castro

had ordered his Embassy to do nothing which might 284)"
284
considered offensive by the Mexican Government.

SIRT TE ae s
co See eee PO Fe St ee

SIT SS ne

2 November 1963, on a tip from a campesino, the
Servicio de Inteligencia de las Fuerzas Armadas

(SIFA) found a cache of more than three tons of

Cuban arms on a beach on the Paraguana Peninsula
in northwest Venezuela. CIA learned about it promptly
through liaison.

Jonathan G. Hanke, a Caracas case:officer,

brought sample weapons to Washington, where CIA was
able to raise the serial numbers and Cuban Army in-

Signia which had been ground off. Richard Helms,

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blocs in the country: Barrientos, supported by the
. ae

campesinos; General Alfredo Ovando Candia, supported

by the army; and the Communists and leftists, sup-

ported by tough mine and factory workers. To have

py Barrientos elected, CIA first had to promote a
" credible election by underwriting the campaigns of

both the selected winner and his token opposition

at the polls.
The real question was whether elections would

be held at all. In 18 months the La Paz Station

spent $585,000, first to persuade the armed forces

to clamp down on the leftists, then to persuade
Barrientos to run, then to convince Ovando he should
not interfere, and finally to promote enough politi-
cal opposition to make the election plausible. In

a genuine tour de force, COS Lawrence M. Sternfield
produced what OAS observers called a democratic and

honest election--and got the results from the elec-

“ont 7 vote 1964 “President “Lyndon B. Johnson
presided at a White House meeting which laid down
general guidelines for CIA action against Cuba.

Others at the meeting included Secretary of State

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Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara,

General: Maxwell Taylor of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, -
Presidential Advisor McGeorge Bundy, DCI John A.

McCone, DDP Richard Helms and FitzGerald. There was

no question about charging CIA with the following

types of activity:

Bnew»

1. Collection of intelligence.

2. Covert propaganda to encourage
low-risk forms of active and passive
resistance. 5

3. Cooperation with other agencies
in economic denial.

4, Attempts to identify and estab-
lish contact with potential dissident
elements inside Cuba.

5. Indirect economic sabotage.

There was sharp disagreement, however, over
whether CIA should continue infiltrating sabotage
agents into Cuba. McNamara, Taylor and McCone favored
more sabotage raids, but Rusk and Bundy feared that —~
CIA raids might undermine the US "clean hands" pos-
ture in the OAS or give the Soviets an excuse for

delaying turnover of their surface-to-air missile

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(SAM) sites to the Cubans.
Finally Rusk recommended that CIA's raiding
assets be kept in being but not actually used--at

least until the OAS and SAM sites problems could be

clarified. The President accepted this recommenda-

tion. Although CIA did try to keep its sabotage
agents ready, the White House decision spelled the
end of the Agency's. sabotage (though not support and
intelligence-collecting) infiltrations of cuba

Agency-sponsored radio propaganda aimed at
Cuba reached its peak in early 1965 with an actual
expenditure of about $1,500,000 and expansion still
planned. The semi-notional Cuban Freedom Committee
served as cover for Radio Free Cuba, which broad-
cast a total of 77 hours weekly from transmitters
in Miami, Key West, and New. Orleans.

Started in 1961, the Cuban Freedom Committee
retained a public relations firm and spent. $7,000
annually to establish its cover by soliciting bona |
fide public contributions. In its first year these
totalled $5,000, but by 1965 public support. had dwin-
dled to $200. One of the difficulties was that any

widespread US appeal for funds for Rddio Free Cuba

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would perforce have to attack Castro, and might there-
fore be considered domestic propaganda exceeding CIA's
charter. i

Outside the committee, CIA operated a trans-
mitter calling itself Radio Americas and broad-
casting from Swan Island, and bought time for anti-
Cuban broadcasts from three commercial stations.
Programming on these four stations totalled 119
hours weekly in addition to the 77 on Radio Free

307/
Cuba.

Swan Island, roughly a mile and a half long
and three-quarters of a mile wide, lies in the Carib-
bean 125 miles north of the Honduran coast. Both the
United States and Honduras claimed sovereignty over the
island in the 1960's. The US Weather Bureau-had manned
a weather station there Since 1949, and CIA first set
up a covert transmitter in 1954 to support its propa-
ganda against the Arbenz regime in Guatemala. *

Apart from the question of its real impact—in

Cuba and the psychological problems of a. staff living

* Under a 1971 agreement the US relinquished its claim

to sovereignty but retained the right to operate a

weather station.

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in almost total isolation, the Swan Island transmitter

| raised a nightmare of cover complications. Operating
as Radio Americas, it was supposedly under cover of
the Vanguard Service Corporation, an Agency proprie-
| tary which offered no services, and the Gibraltar
Steamship Corporation, another proprietary which
operated no steamships. A Boston millionaire who
= | claimed to-own the island collected rent from the
Vanguard Corporation, which could not afford to argue,
but not fromthe Weather Bureau, which disputed his
claim. Vanguard contracted with Coastal Air of
Miami for one light-aircraft supply flight a week
and with the Logistics Service Corporation of Phila-
delphia, a Philco subsidiary, to maintain the island
facilities and transmitting equipment. All of this
enabled CIA to play tapes and broadcast the commen-
: - 7 “ taries of the three Cuban anfiouncers stationed on ~
' the island, but it did not prevent Radio Habana

from pinpointing the transmitter and calling it a

| CIA \ propaganda mechanism.

wee ee ee -— wre: re en ce ce
vn eT eererenaaesreae eae - st reso — coats

_ “Nevertheless in early 1965 Congressman Roman . J
C

. Pucinski (D-I11.), a member of the Cuban Freedom

4

i
i
\
\

Committee executive board, was pressing CIA to saturate j/

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iif the Cuban airwaves and smuggle or airdrop transistor
radios into Cuba to expand the audience. Inside the
Agency FitzGerald politely rejected the. congressional
advice but pointed out that WH Division already was ot

planning the University of the Air,* which would of

broadcast college-level courses to divide the loyalty
of Cuban students. /
Another congressional critic was Senator 7
Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.), perennial sponsor of bills :
to create a CIA Watchdog Committee and author of a i
January 1964 Saturday Evening Post article entitled :
"The CIA Is Getting Out Of Hand." In April 1965
FitzGerald and Seymour Bolten of WH Division met
with the Senator to discuss the Christian Democratic

social and political programs of the Catholic Church

in Latin America. After this meeting McCarthy, a

‘devout Catholic, coo tempered his assess-
310 :

- ment of the Agency. i nay usta eee ated
| iL nig EE TS Ee EE be a ETS 6 eB td into
US relations with Cuba entered a new phase

| after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 when Agency

wea ee ae ea + apeies -he
Pee ana ~ ae cee i ees Soe See TENE ee

* This project was abandoned following press expo- b:
sure of CIA's relations with American universities

and student groups. ey
ST a +

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facilities provided the Kennedy administration with
positive information on. the buildup of Soviet mis-

sile capability on the island. This episode is docu-

-mented elsewhere and is outside the scope of this

present paper.

One of FitzGerald's major successes against
Cuba was in the field of economic warfare--called
the MHVIPER program in CIA. After a hurricane
ripped through the island in 1964, Castro's econo- |
mists and publicists began a campaign to persuade
free-world sugar brokers that the Cuban sugar crop

had been badly damaged and exports would be low.

‘The object, of course, was.to drive up sugar prices

on the world market, on which Castro depended for
hard currency to finance imports.

At first the campaign worked and sugar prices
did skyrocket. But FitzGerald was not convinced,
and sent Natalie Scott’ to London to study economic
reports from the British Embassy in Havana. Partly
on the basis of her research, the US. Government's

sugar-crop forecasters concluded that despite the

_ hurricane Cuba would harvest more sugar than ever.

FitzGerald arranged to have a. Department of

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State official leak this general conclusion to the

New York Times. Sugar prices dipped, but rallied

when Castro indignantly denied the Times story.

The Department then officially announced the US Govern-
ment estimate that there would be no shortage of

Cuban sugar. As it turned out, the US estimate was
right.

After the official announcement world sugar
prices dropped several cents per pound, and this
time they stayed down. At a time when fluctuations
of one cent a pound meant millions of dollars to
the Cuban economy, publication of the essentially
correct estimate upset Castro's attempts to manipu-
late the narket

Late in the summer of 1964. the DDI told Fitz-
Gerald that the Department of State was inquiring
informally about the possibility of setting up a
CIA channel for plausibly deniable clandestine con-
tacts with Cuba. FitzGerald replied:

It seems to me that the establishment

of a continuous two-way conversation with

Fidel Castro at a time when we- have noth-

ing to convey to him would be a serious

mistake.... It may: be that Secretary Rusk

feels that the present establishment of
conversations with Fidel Castro should

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be considered in order to make sure that

we will have the ability to speak to him
when or if the time comes. On this score

I do not feel there is any reason for worry.
There are a number of ways in which we can
communicate to Fidel. Castro virtually at a
moment’s notice. 312/

ae caren

art of CIA's economic warfare against Cuba
involved an elaborate scheme to Supply tampered pet-
' roleum additives through an Agency mechanism in An-
twerp. This was planned as subtle sabotage; after ‘
being mixed with Soviet petroleum the additives would :
Surely but imperceptibly incapacitate Cuban machinery.
; Unfortunately, the doctored additives proved anything
but subtle and the Cubans promptly discovered they
were unusable.
Also a failure was an attempt by Francis S.
Sherry and William C. Boner, Jr., of the Cuban Oper-
ations Group (WH/COG) to persuade Detroit automobile
executives to produce spare parts: deliberately de-
Signed to break down. Sherry and Boner went to De-
“— troit in early March 1965 and explained to manufac-
turing vice presidents that the defective parts
could be:sent to Cuba through third-country suppliers.
But. the automobile executives refused to cooperate;

they feared that their companies' reputations would

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be ruined ifthe doctored parts accidentally got in-
314

,.to the wrong channels.

| BN

In the wake of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs ine “,

vasion of 1961 and the active years of 1962-1964,
anti-Castro operations began to diminish in .1965.
Operations continued but at a slower pace. John L.
Hart had the title of Deputy Chief, WH Division, for
Cuba (DCWHD/C), and operated a large base in Miami
with virtual autonomy. A chain of safehouses,
training sites and boat-moorages stretched through
the Florida keys to Key West. From these CIA

. launched maritime operations which regularly placed
and retrieved agents from the Cuban coast, but whose
intelligence product often did not justify the
effort.

Meanwhile CIA ran a dwindling number of

on-island intelligence agents, including some
' handled in cooperation with the US Navy base at
— ~~ Guantanamo, where hundreds of Cubans still worked = ~— => >
-by day and returned to Castroland at night. As .
the Cuban General Directorate of Intelligence (DGI)
i improved and expanded under Soviet tutelage, CIA

agent networks were rolled up and even singleton

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agents dropped out of contact. Typical was Radio
Habana's 12 May 1965 announcement that '31 counter-
revolutionaries, members of a CIA espionage network"
had been arrested. Of the 14 actually named in the
broadcast, WH Division identified six who had worked
with Juan Bautista Perez Luis (AMTAUP-10), chief
gardener at the naval base and principal agent for
CIA. Although he had been debriefed in Miami in Jan-.
uary, Perez' location and status were not known in

316/
May.

Bs, ak a hin Ee

PTO

bably the most successful political oper-

ation in WH Division's history was the Chilean elec-

tion of 4 September 1964 in which Eduardo Frei of
the Christian Democratic Party decisively defeated
Salvador Allende, Marxist leader of a Communist- ’
dominated coalition.* Drawing on covert mechanisms
established by Santiago Station years earlier, plus

new procedures and assets developed for the election, ys

the campaign to assure Frei's victory cost CIA about

$2,600,000. Its success kept Allende at bay until

1970, when no such intervention by CIA was authorized.

* For a full description, see "The Chilean Election
Operation of 1964, a Case History, 1961-1964." ‘
CSHP-1. —

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that FitzGerald had won the President's confidence
in several meetings. Freeman, who had been in Mexico

only a few months, apparently simmered down after his |.
318/ -
talk with the assistant_secretary copes ER

= see Ss Pathe eee Se ee

sar mae

The Mexico City Station devoted a major part
-of its time to running or supporting operations

| against Cuba; 47 percent of its cable traffic con-

cerned Cuban operations. Mexico was the only Latin

American country maintaining diplomatic relations

| ~ with Castro and had the only direct air link to Ha-
vana. WH Division assigned top priority to recruit-

| 7 ing agents in place in Cuba, and Mexico City Station
not only ran its own operations but supported the
tentative plans of other stations.

| The variety and volume of technical operations
created a heavy workload managing safehouses, listen-

| 7 - ing posts, and vehicles. - For photography. alone the

Station had six base houses commanding the entrances

to target embassies, two mobile photosurveillance

] trucks, and three agents trained in photosurveillance
7 on foot.: It was such projects that provided informa-

i _ tion on the visits of Lee Harvey Oswald, President

J Kennedy's assassin, to the Cuban and Soviet Embassies

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319/

in Mexico.

CIA's clandestine information on Oswald, in-
cluding a photograph showing him in front of the
Soviet Embassy, was turned over to the FBI, which
promised to safeguard Agency sources and methods,
Instead, the Bureau showed the photograph to Oswald's
mother in Dallas and told her it was a CIA photo.
The mother gave the press a garbled story about the
photo, the FBI gave the press the correct story,
and eventually CIA's clandestine information became
part of the voluminous Warren Commission report on
the Kennedy assassination. In the process Mexico
City Station had to abandon its photosurveillance

320/
base houses, which had been thorough ly blown.

— a = na errr ns tel ae
Fe a ee eR ve

= In the early 1960's WH I Division “built an ex-
tensive political polling mechanism around the Insti-
tute for the Comparative Study of Political Systems,
a proprietary whose project cryptonym was JMTUBA,
From 1962 ‘to 1966 the institute conducted 20 polls

in nine Latin American countries. Their cost cannot
be computed because many of the expenses were charged
to other projects. .

In FY 1965, for example, political polls in

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