A ARAAN
1704-10332-10008 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
{202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457

CIA
O OBy

D CTI
August 23, 1995 Reuss Ficario ANDIOS
HAND DELIVERED Copy prov: ded te
John A. Hartingh IB
Inspector-in-Charge CIP sy F t
JFK Task Force

Federal Bureau of Investigation
10th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. WwW.
Washington, D.C. 20535

RE: Foreign Government Liaison
Dear John:

This morning, Jack Tunheim, Phil Golrick, and I met with Kenneth Duncan and several
State Department representatives regarding how best to implement the JFK Act as to
information obtained from foreign governments through liaison channels. We had a
very constructive discussion of the affirmative role the State Department could play ‘in
encouraging foreign governments, through appropriate diplomatic channels, to agree to
the release of such information pursuant to the JFK Act. The Review Board believes
that Section 10(b)(2) of the JFK ‘Act contemplates that the State Department play:
precisely such a role.

As for now, we will hold i in abeyance requests for evidence on foreign liaison
postpdnements, to which the FBI has not yet responded. This will give us the -
opportunity irtthe near future to work with the State Department and the FBI to.’
establish orderly procedures to persuade the foreign governments in question that it is
in our countries’ mutual interests to release liaison information in assassination records.
Until such procedures are in place, we request that the FBI not make further contact
with foreign law-enforcement or other government officials regarding the release of
liaison information in assassination records.

_ 1 *

Boaro Memecns: John R. Tunheim, Chair - Henry F. Graff - Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce »Anna K. Nelson
Executive Director: David G. Marwell

13-00000

Mr. John A. Hartingh.
August 23, 1995
Page 2

Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any question.

ir Research and Analysis:
and Acting General Counsel _

cc: Kenneth A. Duncan
Department of State


08 os

wa 2 Secret
o
So wi

13 February 1996

Note to: Bob Skwirot,
ARRB Staff
Subject: Liaison related documents.
Reference: Phone call between Ellie and Jeremy,
12 February 1996
Attached are a list and documents (13) which show :

liaison relationships between the CIA and host services.
They illustrate the problem of protecting liaison while
releasing stations. These Documents were acted on by -the.
Board at the January 5 meeting. “a a

\ . : ”

3

Attachments as stated

OFFICIAL USE ONLY WHEN SEPARATED FROM ATTACHMENTS

Secret

vs ; SECRET

-10040: Although the Board continues to protect the
liaison cryptonym in both paragraphs, the text shows Station
cooperation with the Swedish service.

104-10017-10058: Although the liaison cryptonym remains ~~
protected, Paragraph 4 indicates liaison with the Swedish
service.

.104-10018-10089: Board has made a determination to release
“your liaison” in Paragraph 1 in addition to identifying
Stockholm Station.

104-10018-10091: With release of Stations (Stockholm,
Helsinki, Copenhagen, and Oslo), text reveals liaison with ;
the respective local services. ad _

v
ee

104-10017-10036: Although the liaison cryptonym is
protected, the context of the cable clearly shows Station
(if released) has a liaison relationship with the Swedish
service. .

104-10015-10425: The text of this cable from Rome,
responding to a multi-Station message, states that liaison
traces will follow. Once the identification of the Station
is released, the existence of a liaison relationship with
the Italian service in November 1963 is revealed.

104-10015-10420: Cable from Oslo in clear text indicates “no
liaison” traces; therefore, if the identification of the
Station is released, it will acknowledge the liaison
relationship between the Station and the Norwegian service.

104-10015-10159: Paragraph 4 contains information that will
show that Oslo Station had a technical operation directed
against the Cuban target in Norway in November 1963. Also
context of the cable reflects that the following Stations
have a relationship with their local liaisons: Paris, Rome,
\ Madrid, Copenhagen, Oslo, Helsinki, Brussels, the ;
Netherlands, London, and Ottawa.

CL BY 0563956 }
REASON L.5(d)
DECL X5; X5
DRV LIA 3-87

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

w :
104-10015-10225: Paragraph 2 of the cable reflects that Rome
Station had a technical operation in conjunction with the
Italian liaison. Please note: The Board continues to protect

the cryptonyms.

104-10015-10230: Cable reflects that Station had the access
to photograph US passports at the Amsterdam Schipol: Airport.
it can be implied that. that capability is due to a liaison.
relationship with the Dutch service. ;

104~-10015-10255: Cable reflects The Hague Station had a
photo operation in the Netherlands. When reviewed with 104-
10015-10230, it will be clear that the operation refers to

the Schipol Airport operation.

104-10018-10088: Cable clearly shows that both Oslo ad.
Stockholm Stations have a liaison relationship. in their
respective countries if the Stations are released.

as

104-10018-10080: At the bottom of Page 2 of the cable is the
phrase “assume Stockholm still planned ask its liaison to

interrogate.” Release of Station and this phrase clearly
reflects a liaison relationship with the Swedish service.

CL BY 0563956 4
REASON 1.5(d)
DECL X5; X5
DRV LIA 3-87 -

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

From the Desk of‘Linda C. Cipriani ~>

NOTE FOR: J. Barry Harrelson

FROM: (linda C. Cipriani’).

DATE: 04/29/96 04:26:36 PM
SUBJECT: Memo re Mexican Liaiscn (S)

cL By \2224130° 7)
CL REASON 1.5(d)
DECL ON X1
DRV FM LIA 3-82

The following is a draft memo for Jeff. (Bob Caudle’is looking at it now so there may be more changes. Please let me know if there is
anything incorrect here. | have a feeling Jeff will want a meeting with me rather than just the memo. Also, knowing him, he may want
to deal with Tunheim on this directly since he was involved in this. { will let you know.

1. Action: That you advise as per paragraph 7.

2. Background: You will recall that you spoke with
Chairman Tunheim of the JFK Board about the attached cable and
the importance of protecting the phrase ("with _Mexicans*) because
it gives away (iaison involvement in a(tel-tap) operation. At
its 16 April meeting, at which I was present, the Board
reconsidered its initial decision, but determined that the phrase
could be released.

3. It had just come to HRG's attention that this same
cable was released in full by the Board, with no objection by
CIA, in September 1995. CIA probably did not contest this
release bécdtse an excerpt from this cable, containing the phrase
at issue, had been inadvertently released @ven-pxrier-te-that. It
is,. therefore, no longer possible for CIA to argue before the
Board for the protection of this phrase in|the current cable or

to appeal this release to the White House. to he Nahonal Archwes in hug q3

4. CIA is now in somewhat of an embarrassing position
because it has strenuously argued that the release of this phrase
would cause "clear and convincing damage" to the national
security only to find that this phrase has been released with CIA
acquiescence for at least seven months ,with-ne-ostensible damage.
Conceivably, the Board could see this incident as a justification
of their second-guessing our damage assessments, and could give
us a much more difficult time in the future.

SECRET

13-00000

' documents going to the Board to wee msure—ehat—He

SECRET

5. On the other hand, CIA could use this situation as a

way to highlight the problems HRG has had with the JFK review

process - that documents are being reviewed and released to the
National Archives in such quantity and speed that it is difficult
for CIA to-focus on any one document and, more importantly, how
seemingly innocuous information in one document can actually be
quite significant in relation to prior or subsequent releases.
Since September, when this cable was originally released, the
issue of protecting Mexican liaison has become increasingly
important because of other releases on this subject and because
of your appearance before the Board in February.

6. Furthermore, this prior release should not impair our
ability to continue to protect the fact of (Mexican involvement? in
this (€el-tap! operation. Although we ed to the Board ans
ancy aueehe phrase “with; Mexicans'gives that relationship away, *

“does not -~im=facts>. directly do so. In fact, the reason”
ent the Board's insistence that this phrase should be released
was Sho—very fect that—the | cable did N NOT directly state that the

“their arguments to cont inue to protect “the (liaison relationship.

7. Our only recourse is to acknowledge to the Board that
CIA has no basis to bring an appeal to the President since this
cable has already been released in full. , We should, however,
maintain our position that we believe this -information,is
damaging especially in light of releases to National Archives

- and that we never would have acquiesced to the

release in September if we knew then what would be released on
this subject in the ensuing months. Although this message does
not necessarily need to be conveyed by you to Tunheim and could
be handled by John Pereira and David Marwell, given your past
dealings with the Board on this issue, you may prefer to do this.

8. In order to avoid problems like this in the future, HRG
is immediately dedicating several personnel to the task bf
reviewing boxes of documents and determining what our releases
have been‘onm one eaese Wap Sibjects. HRG will also be double

duplicates ‘of >
prior releases are—beimg—-sent. You should be aware, however, .
that. there is only a rudimentary CIA computer index listing o Oral pro)
releases and that it is impossible to do—aceurat’” computer » ;
searches about our releases on specific subjects. Although HRG
personnel are extremely knowledgeable on what has been released,

with over 220,000 CIA documents currently in the collection, it
is suprising that mistakes like this have not happened more

often, Ove no ebwsorluke OSSuraumce ¢ tb COM Vrc pers AQa VN ,

a

ce:

SECRET

13-00000
SECRET

15 October 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assassination Records Review

Board
FROM: John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group
SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
(Australia _

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA once the
Board has completed its deliberations on the issues discussed
below.)

1. (S) Issue: This memorandum will address CIA's position
on the review and declassification of foreign government
information | that appears in the JFK collection. This issue has

Board of\ australian liaison,;documents. The Agency believes it is
important to address this issue at this time because this is the
first instance that this type of foreign liaison document has
been reviewed by the Board and it is possible that such
information will appear again in CIA's collection. This memo
will, therefore, focus on the larger issue of a United States
Government (USG) agency's legal obligations in the dissemination
and declassification of foreign government information but will
also address the specific issue of the ‘six “Australian documents"
(documents: 104- 10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012- 10080, ;
(104- 10012- 10081, 104- -10009- 10222, 104- 10009- 10224).

2. (S) Conclusion: : CIA does not object to the release of the
information in these‘ “six! documents, but is only concerned about
protecting foreign government information. Therefore, the Agency
does not object to the release of the four CIA documents in the
redacted form proposed by the Board. With regards to the two >
Australian letters, the Agency has no authority to unilaterally
‘agree to their release in any form. Pursuant to its legal
obligations, CIA ordinarily seeks the consent of the foreign
government prior to declassifying their information. ‘However,
‘for reasons described herein, it isnot possible to even seek the

- consent of the Australians at this time, nor would it be likely
- that the Australians would give it. Rather than going to the
Australians against its better judgment or requesting the
CL BY: 2224130
CL REASON: 1.5(d)
DECL ON: X5
DRV FM: LIA 3-82
SECRET

13-00000
SECRET

' SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

(Australia >

President to “agree ‘to the unilateral_deciassification of foreign >

jovernment:. information, CIA proposes. ‘that the release of the 2

(haste an, documents. be either Postponed | fora short time or that 2,
a a

Se a ame ry,

a substitution be made.
es a aa

UN ee

3. (U) Legal Authorities: The procedures governing the
declassification and dissemination of foreign government
information are set out in Executive Order 12958, as well as
Director of Central Intelligence Directives (DCIDs). Executive
Order 12958 defines foreign government information as including
(1) information provided by a foreign government, or any element
thereof, with the expectation, expressed or implied, that the
information and/or the source of the information, are to be held
in confidence; or (2) information produced by the United States
pursuant to or as a result of a joint arrangements with a foreign
government, or any element thereof, requiring that the
information, the arrangements, or both, are to be held in
confidence. Id., at §1.1(d)

4. (U) Foreign government information is subject toa
classification determination under E.O. 12958, section. 1.5(c).
When so classified, U.S. government agencies are obligated to
protect that information from unauthorized disclosure. The E.O.
requires. that foreign government information shall either retain
its original classification or be assigned a U.S. classification
that shall ensure a degree of protection at least equivalent to
that required by the entity that furnished the information. Id.,
at 1.7(e). Furthermore, agencies are required to safeguard
foreign government information under standards that provide a
degree of protection at least equivalent to that required by the
originating government. Id., at 4.2(g).

5. (U) Pursuant.to his authority as head of the
intelligence community to protect all classified information from
unauthorized disclosure, the Director of Central Intelligence has
issued Directives (that is, DCIDs) setting out the procedures for
the declassification and dissemination of foreign government
information. Intelligence obtained from another government or
from a combined effort with another government, may not be
released or authorized for release without its consent. DCID 5/6
attachment § C.3. Furthermore, the release of intelligence that
would be contrary to agreements between the U.S. and foreign
countries is expressly prohibited. Id., at § C.5.

6. (U) Finally, the very fact of intelligence cooperation
between the U.S. and specifically named foreign countries and
government components is classified SECRET unless a different
classification is mutually agreed upon. DCID 1/10-1. Such
information may be declassified only with the mutual consent of
the U.S. and the foreign government whose interests are involved.

DCID 1/10-1.

2

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

' SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information
(Australia)

the U.S. ae the foreign government whose interests are involved.
DCID 1/10-

7. (U) National Security Considerations: The importance of.
such coordination with foreign governments prior to the release
of their information cannot be overemphasized. Should CIA, or
for that matter any (USG) agency fail to coordinate where
required, not only would it be a violation of the aforementioned
E.O. and directives, but it would chill relationships it has
developed with foreign services over the years. If such lack of
coordination became known, foreign services would hesitate to
share crucial intelligence information with CIA if they believed
it would be released, in spite of any agreements or U.S. laws to
the contrary, without their consent. Furthermore, the U.S. could
not expect foreign services to safeguard U.S. government
information that it shares with its liaison partners in order to
pursue authorized intelligence and foreign policy objectives.

8. (S) According to its legal obligations described herein,
CIA coordinates the dissemination and/or release of: foreign
government information. Its obligation to do so is similar to
its obligation to coordinate declassification efforts with
another USG agency should the CIA possess any of that agency's
documents. For example, CIA could not declassify and release to
the public FBI information located in CIA files without
coordinating with that agency. Similarly, CIA has no authority
to unilaterally declassify foreign government documents or ,
information in its files.

eee: : strakia:—As—two of the documents‘
lt iss issue here are letters from the Australian service (104-10009-
10224, 104-10012-10080), CIA is legally obligated by E.O. and
agreement with the Australians to seek the consent of the
Australians prior to their release, even in redacted form. The
issue of coordinating with the Australian service is a timely
one. In most cases, CIA would not have an objection to going to
the foreign government and seeking their consent for declas-
sification. However, several events that have occurred in the
last few months depict just how seriously Australia considers any
indication that the U.S. is unable to protect from release their
classified information. Based on the incidents described |

below, it is CIA's position that even asking the Australians ‘for

consent to release would threaten the current relationship.

* Within the last year, a demarche was made by the Australian
government expressing strong concern that U.S. declas-
sification legislation expressly spell out that no information
provided to the USG by the Australian service be declassified
without its permission. A copy of this demarche is provided
for the Board's review. (See attached.) It is worth noting
that this demarche is not_between_intelligence-services—but————

3

SECRET


13-00000
SECRET

‘ SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

‘Australia 5

: ather—between governments ==—it-was—literally—delivered—by—
| the Australian Ambassador to the National Security Council and
i to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia. The manner in which the
Australians treated the demarche demonstrates that the

‘ protection of classified information is receiving top priority

in the Australian government and is not just a concern of

their intelligence community.

\
e On two recent but separate occasions the Australian service |

passed to CIA information indicating that there would be
| assassination attempts on two non-U.S. citizens. CIA |
' requested that it pass this information on to the targets, but |;
the Australians refused. They argued that the information was |
not specific enough and would endanger a source. The |
Australians stated that if they believed the information was |
useful, they would pass it themselves. The Australians were |

concerned that CIA had even asked to pass on this information,
and questioned what they perceived as CIA's willingness to
share their information with third parties. Finally, they

; stated that the easiest way to protect their information was

i simply not to pass it to CIA anymore.

e Just this month, a senior official of the Australian service
approached the CIA with accusations that a former Agency

| i employee allegedly may have disclosed their. classified

information. The Australians believe that this disclosure

{ may be related to the loss of all agent reporting sources

| in a country of particular interest to them. The DDCI

promised the head of the Australian service to launch an

investigation into the matter.

* The Australian service recently expressed grave concern to CIA
about a book published by an American USG official which

| alludes to a relationship between the CIA arid the Australian

service. Even though this book was not an official CIA

acknowledgment of a liaison relationship, to the Australians,
this incident called into question the CIA's ability to protect |
that relationship.

10. (S) Under the circumstances, it would be an affront to ,;
the Australians: to be asked for their consent in light of the
above events which have all occurred in the last year. The t
Australians would not only be extremely upset with CIA, but would |
certainly deny their consent. Should the Australians deny their
consent, CIA would have no authority to agree to the release of

r | the information and would be obligated to-do all it could to
Prevent disclosure. It_is_crucial_not—only—to_CIA!s_mission_but_

LL. ft te to See _ a

chaPrs ; _ eee

4

SECRET

13-00000
SECRET

‘ SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

Qustralia |
m

(7 aiso-to-the-conduct~ of _US~ foreign —~ relations that thé usG is seen | |
as abiding by its agreements with foreign services as. well as its \

{j own laws on the release of information. :

' 11. (S) Finally, the importance of maintaining good :
' relations with the Australians cannot be overemphasized. As a :
result of our valuable relationship with our Australian liaison ‘
| counterparts, the USG receives a large volume of finished if
; intelligence. Due to our shrinking resources, much of this i
‘ information would not be available to U.S. policy makers were it i
not provided by the Australians. Additionally, we work together
' with the Australians around the world on joint collection !

- activities that cover the full spectrum of USG intelligence i
j priorities. Finally, there are several critical collection i
it

]

!

t

efforts vital to the USG where we do not have the entrée to
. collect intelligence independently. In these cases, we rely

; entirely on the continued good will of the Australian services to
provide us with the assistance necessary to meet U.S.
policymakers' needs. . 7

| 12. (S) In light of all the above, CIA submits the be
; following two proposals for the Board's consideration. First, {
the Board could postpone these two documents from release for a |
short period (we propose 10 months) at which time CIA can
reassess its relationship with the Australians. It is possible |
that the relationship with CIA and Australia could change so that:
it would be possible to seek their consent for release in full. |
However, should we seek the consent of the Australians at a
future date and the Australians object to the release of the ;
i | documents, we would ask that the Board seriously consider any ;
- negative reaction from the Australians in its deliberations and
| abide by their desires. A second option would be for CIA to.
coordinate with the JFK Staff a substitution or some sort of | |
This ,
:
1
}

4 summary of the Australian documents for immediate release.
summary would hide the fact that the letter came from the
Australian service, but would reveal what the subject of the

letter was. This would avoid the problem of having to go the
Australians to seek their consent, which we would have to do even,

| in the case of redactions. 7

| 13. (U) Should the Board reject these proposals, CIA is \ \

agreeable solution. We strongly believe, however, that any
approach which suggests that the U.S. Government may ignore its
obligations and commitments to foreign governments would
seriously undermine the vigorous and healthy diplomatic as well
as intelligence relationships that we currently enjoy.

\ willing to work with the Board to reach another mutually

14. (S) With regard to the remaining four documents (104-
10012-10078, 104-10012-10079, 104-10012-10081, 104-10009-10222,
Sat 2 i dbtce id hte eaetacgsonmnee Otho

C = nae

5

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

‘ SUBJECT: Foreign Government Information

Australia
government. As such, CIA consents to the release of these

documents with the redactions proposed by the Board.

15. (S) Proposal for Future Coordination: With regards to

any other foreign government information that may exist in the
files, CIA proposes that it approach its liaison services to
request their consent in the release of their information when it
would be appropriate to do so. Although recent events with
Australia make it impossible for CIA to approach them at this
time, this may not be so with other services. In cases were CIA
believes, because of the nature of the relationship, that it
would not be possible to request the consent of the service, CIA
proposes that the documents either be postponed from release or
that CIA and Board's staff coordinate a summary.

Attachment

6

SECRET

13-00000

Attached is a copy of the Australian Demarche on U.S. legislation on declassification.

This was given to the U.S. Ambassador to Australia, Ambassador Perkins by Philip

Flood, then Director of the Office of National Assessments (ONA), in September 1995.

This demarche was also given to Sandy Berger at the National Security Council by

Australian Ambassador to the United States Don Russell on 4 August 1995.

re,

13-00000

( OO AUSTRALIAN COMMENTS ON

BXECUTIVE ORDER 12958 —
CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

The Australlan government wishes to register Its concern over the 17 April Exccutive
Order on Classified Natlonal-Security Informuation.and the apparent omission of any
explicit provision to protect foreign-sourced information or documentatlon from
automatic declassificatlon once it is over 25 years old,

The Australian government understands and supports the democratic principles and

commitment to open government which underpin the Exeoutive Order. We too are
improving access to government information, but are maintaining provisions to
protect fore!gn-sourced Information —tneluding U.S, information. .

We do not agree that these principles can be applied by one foreign zovernmetit to the
information or documentation of-another government without prior consultation and
‘clearance. Australlan-sourced information was and continues to be passed to the U.S,
government on the understanding that it will be protected. We adopt precisely the
same approach to information that tho U.S, shares with us.

Omission of such consultation would, in the cyes of the Australian government, not
be in keeping with the 1962 U.S.-Australla General Security: of Information
agreement or the many other bilateral and multilateral intelligence co- operation und
information sharing agresments.

The failure to protect ‘sensitive Austrailan-sourced information about, for example,
our intelligence operations, could have ramifications for our relations with regional
countries and compromise Intelligence sources and methods (upon which the U.S.
depends in part).

Australian concems could be addressed if provision for clearance with originators of
~ foreign-sourced material was embodled in the Information Securlty Oversight Office
c Implementation directive to U.S. agencies.

.— such an approach should not impede or delay the declasslfication process —
Australia is not seeking this, Por example, categorics of sensitivity for Australia -
could be identified. A reasonable ime Limit could be put on Australian response
time after which the U.S. could be free to declassify (we have @ similar
urrangement with the U.K.).


13-00000

SECRET ——
Central Intelligence Agency

a >

28 January 1997

Mr. David G. Marwell

Executive Director

Assassination Records
Review Board

600 E Street, NW

Washington, DC 20530

Dear David:

This is to acknowledge your letter of 3 January 1997 to the
Director of Central Intelligence concerning the Assassination
Records Review Board's recent formal determinations with respect
to CIA Records.

The appropriate Agency components have again reviewed the
documents that the Board has decided to release either totally or
with some information. postponed. While the Agency does not plan
to appeal to the President for additional postponements at this
time, we ask that the Board reconsider its decisions with respect
to six documents. These documents contain information relating to
foreign government provided data, foreign liaison relationships,
and intelligence sources--information. that we believe merits
protection under current standards set by the Board. A,list. of
these, six documents, together with Agency comments concérning
them, “is enclosed.

We plan no further action on these documents pending
discussion with your staff and review by the Board.

‘47 John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

Enclosure.

UNCLASSIFIED WHEN
SEPARATED FROM ENCLOSURE

13-00000

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

(We request that this enclosure be returned to CIA once the
Review Board has completed its deliberations on the issues
discussed below.)

(U) The Central Intelligence Agency requests that the
Assassination Records Review Board reconsider its determination
on the six documents listed below: :

(U) 1. 104-10012-10080 and 104-10009-10224
(substitute--language for a foreign country document) .

(S) The foreign government in question has expressed
strong-.concern about USG and CIA‘s inability to keep secrets,
and current relationships are very tense. If we are required to
release the date and/or narrow the geographic choices too
closely, the foreign government will be able to identify the
document as theirs. Because this document is scheduled for
another review in July 1997, we request that the ARRB reconsider
the inclusion of the date of the document and designation of the
‘country of origin as “Pacific Rim Country”, and accept our
originally submitted wording.

(U) 2. 104-10051-10106 (release of location)

(S) We request reconsideration of the release of the
location identified in the last three words in the eleventh line,
paragraph eight. This CIA base currently is undeclared to the

host government.

\
(U) 3. 104-10055-10072 and 104~-10054-10007 (foreign
government activity/VTiaison) .

(S) Regarding the release of the reference to the passport
camera.on page 3, it is not the USG's position to confirm that a
foreign government undertakes such activity. In addition this is
an on-going operation. Further, releasing the words in question
would establish a strong inference that the two Agency officers
were permitted by foreign officials to inspect the camera, thus

i ae

. CL BY: \OT85904™"
DECL ON: Xl
CL REASON: 1.5(c)

DV FM: «AHB 70-9 MULTIPLE

1 *

13-00000

SECRET

tending to confirm the liaison relationship. We request that the
last seven words of line four, paragraph “h*, be replaced with
substitute wording such as “the public security facilities”.

(U) 4. 104-10004-10213 (source)

(S) We request that the ARRB reconsider releasing the word
“agent” in this context (page 32); suggested substitute,
“contact.” Nielson was not a paid agent of the REDSKIN project
and does not appear to have worked for the Agency in any other
capacity. To describe him as a CIA agent could cause danger
either to him or his family, especially if they are still in
Russia. .

te

13-00000

SECRET

Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457

September 5, 1997

BY COURIER

Mr. John Pereira

Director

Historical Review Group

Center for the Study of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Re: Request to CIA to contact liaison channels regarding LIENVOY intercepts of
Oswald telephone calls in Mexico City

Some time ago the Review Board requested informally that CIA contact its liaison
channels in Mexico City for information related to Lee Harvey Oswald. During your
recent visit here we discussed with you the feasibility of your making such contacts. I
am writing in response to your request that we memorialize our request and provide

' some background information.

The Review Board believes that all reasonable steps should be taken to account for all
telephonic intercepts of Oswald during his visit to Mexico City in September-October

1963. There is evidence that CIA intercepted some telephone calls through an operation
named LIENVOY fonducted jointly with components.of the Mexican government.) We_ |
. . > . Toe . Y liaison
felophoric e, specifica lly the actual recordings of Oswald’s telephone calls to the
“Soviet Embassy during the period of September ‘through October 3, 1963.

The Review Board previously has sought information from the Mexican Government
through appropriate diplomatic channels. For reasons that are obvious to those
familiar with Mexico City issues, the Review Board could not raise with Mexican
officials:nor with the U.S. State Department the possible existence of additional tape
recordings that might be in the hands of certain officials. Thus, at the behest of the
Review Board, the Department of State requested that the Mexican federal government

and local government agencies conduct general searches of their files for records
related to the assassination of President Kennedy. The Mexican government responded

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Boaro Memeens: John R. Tunheim, Chair » Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce * Anna K. Nelson
7 Executive Director: David G. Marwell


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Mr. John Pereira
September 5, 1997
Page 2

by sending copies of the same documentation and correspondence. that the GOM had
made available to the Warren Commission in 1964.

The basis for our interest in your contacting appropriate Mexican officials is found in
CIA document 104-10004-10199, which was reviewed by the Board on September 19,
1995. On page 5 of this document (not including the cover sheet) information that the
Board agreed to protect, due to the sensitivity of sources and methods involved,

{suggests that the Mexican security forces may have had their own copy of the October 1 “}
intercept on Lee Harvey Oswald. It is unclear whether this statement refers to the
transcript or to an actual tape containing the phone call. Nevertheless, it provides
enough evidence to warrant additional inquiries on this matter.

For your reference we are enclosing copies of the reference documents as well as copies _
of the correspondence between the DOS and the Mexican government:

We would appreciate your contacting appropriate officials to determine what i
fesponse to this request by November 14, 1997. We are fully aware of the sensitivity of
is type of request and do not wish to take any action that would compromiselexisting,}

intelligence operations) If necessary, we would be pleased to discuss with you. ways in
which we might further elaborate on this request, including person-to-person
discussions with appropriate officials either herelor in Mexico.

Thank you for your continued assistance and cooperation.

Sincerely yours, 7 \

T. Jeremy Gunn /

General Counsel and Associate Director
for.Research and Analysis

ce: J. Barry Harrelson, HRG. _

Enclosures

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‘ -_
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. CL BY{6T1637_|
CL REASOW: Section 1.5 C
DECL ON: X1
orv FRM: COV 2-87
15 January 1998
MEMORANDUM FOR: John Pereira @ DCI °
Fred Wickham @ DO
Lee Strickland @ DA
FROM: J. Barry Harrelson
JFK Project Officer
OFFICE: CSI/HRG
SUBJECT: ARRB 22 January Meeting -- Agenda
REFERENCE:

1. The following items are on the ARRB meeting agenda for 22 January 1998:

(S) A. Reconsideration of the (State Cover.) The ARRB staff has advised that briefings by senior CIA and{o alg
not required. However, the Agency‘and Staté\are welcome to make a presentation if it will add to the information being presented in the
“evidence memorandum”. The evidence memorandum must be at. ARRB no later than Tuesday 20 January. Mr. Gunn has suggested
we may want to have individuals standing by for questions. The current plan is for Lee SUaEREaT Sad me to be available at 600 E. St.
NW.. to answer any questions. -

{AlUO) © B,. Office of Personnel Files i in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recominend to the Board that
personnel files:he, deglared NBR (Not Believed Relevant) and their release postponed until 2017. The Agency position is that the privacy
of each individual clearly outweighs the public interest, most of the information in these files has no relevance to the assassination story,
and any related information exist elsewhere in the collection. At ARRB staff request HAP is preparing five OP files for review by Board
members. .The ARRB-staff will prepare a memorandum for public release describing the files; their memo will be coordinated with the
Agency prior to release.

(AIOU)-_ C. Non-related files/documents in the Sequestered Collection (Microfilm). The ARRB staff will recommend that the files a
and documents (approximately 35,000 pages) designated non-related by C1A during the 1994 review of the microfilm be declared NBR

"and released in 2017. !f the.recommendation is accepted by the Board, the ARRB staff will prepare an unclassified description of the
records for public release. This too will be coordinated with the Agency prior to release.

DB: Other possible items:

(AIUD) i. ARRB Request # CIA 1--- The ARRB staff may request that the DO documents at issue in this request be
declared Assassination Records to be released in full or sanitized form.

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(S) it. Crypt LINCUCR) -- ARRB staff did not find our evidence m memo on this crypt persuasive. They are expected to
recommend that teBoardr Board reaffirm its decision to release.

(AIUO) iii. 1967 1G report on "Castro Assassination Plots” -- ARRB has requested that an updated version be released to NARA by
the end of January. Any disagreements between the Agency and ARRB staff may be added to the agenda. HRP and
DO reviewers are currently re-reviewing the report.

(U) 2. If you have any questions about any of these items please call me.
ce: (Eileen Wukitch}@ DO
; Becky Rant @ DA

(nda Ciprianij@ DCI
Sent on 15 January 1998 at 05:24:34 PM

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