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198-10009-10099

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

MULTIPLE

02/00/1963
153

CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA

PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN
CUBA - 1962

CUBAN SUBVERSION

SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret

IB

Redact

07/15/1998

Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony
concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in

Cuba, etc.

FEK Kee ed

Department of the Army EO 13528
Bt eciassiy Ci Exclude ©! Exempt
Authority.

[ Refer To : .
Review Date L By. A

v9.1

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22,

Page 1

. a)

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART Il

10.

ll.”

12.
13.
14..

15.

16,

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SUBJECT;

Statement. by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA
before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC

’ Statement by the DirCIA ‘for use.of the staff of the

Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator
Stennis .

SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte

.SecDef testimony before House Appropriations: Cmte

SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte

SecNayv testimony before HASC

Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState

with attached statement by Mr. Martin before
the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject

‘of communist subversion of the hemisphere

SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A.M.)

SecNav testimony before HASC

‘Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell

D. Taylor, ChJCs

Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC.

.SecDef testimony before SASC
.Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC
-SecDef testimony before SASG (Cuba) |

.Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff.of the

Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator

‘Stennis (Cuban. Subversion in LA)

‘Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent
Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on -Govern-
ment Operations - U.S. Senate

Page 2?

DATE:

Undated

7 Jan 63

ll Feb 63

‘12 Feb 63

13 Feb 63.

18 Feb 63

19 Feb 63

"19 Feb 63

19 Feb 63

20 Feb 63

20 Feb 63

21 Feb 63

“21 Feb 63

22 Feb 63

26 Feb 63
(Transmittal

Slip)

13 March 63

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY: - PART II (Cont'd)

NO, SUBJECT: DATE:

17. Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert .& Mar 63
Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4,.5, 6, 8, 9, 10,
11, .12, 13 and 14 included as attachments

18. Study on Cuba as a Base for -------- prepared by Bob Undated
Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara
at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def

19, Memo for Mr, Robt A, Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis 29 Mar 63
Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US
Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano
w/draft of President's message atchd

_ Sub

20. Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm  Undtd
ef Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military
Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8) -

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= AANSMITTAL SLIP |?" 267 rep 6(~
TO: °

; Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance
ROOM NO. BUILDING
3E985 Pentagon
REMARKS:

FROM:
CIA - William A. Tidwell
ROOM NO. BUILDING

EXTENSION

Codell. 6614
FORM NO 7] 44 REPLACES FORM 36-8 GPO : 1957--O~439445 (Cr)
tFEB 55 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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286

J
u

Gs

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE
STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING

SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

OA, ASC Control Me Sy9__ noRET

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25 February 1963
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I..- Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the
daily record of events in Latin America, and reports
from our intelligence, sources within Communist and
other left-extremist elements throughout this hemis-
phere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel
Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Com-~
munists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow
and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis=--and with
increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been
exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and
terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban
support takes" many different forms, but its main thrust
is-in the. supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the
training, and the communications and technical assist-
ance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from
other Latin American countries: | "Come to Cuba; we _
will pay your way, we will train you in underground
organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sab~
otage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you
get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we
will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda sup~
port, send you propaganda materials for your movement,
training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret
communications methods, and perhaps funds and special-
ized demolition equipment. " Castro is not, as far as
we know, promising these ‘other Latin Americans any Cu-
ban weapons or Cuban personnel-~either leaders, ad-
visers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them;
"If you succeed in establishing something effective
by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland,
if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and con-
front regular armed forces, then we may consider more
concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements
in South America has reached this. final stage=--and in —
fact even Castro! 's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had

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to fight a pitched battle with regular military for-
mations which might have required more advanced weap-
ons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns.
In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version
of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustain-
ing revolution wherever it flourishes,

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cu-
ban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part
in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We
know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier,
from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We
know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that
some guerrilla ferces in Peru, for instance, are equipped
with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's pri-
ority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the
recent meeting of Communist front organizations for
Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both
emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in
speeches in January. One of our established sources
of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Vene-
zuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee
agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the pres-
ent situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla
and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed un-
der a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates
activities with the other militant extremist groups in
Venezuela, The result has been the creation of the
Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This or-
ganization is currently trying to publicize its exist-
ence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter
ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate
shootings. These were also designed to dissuade Pres-
ident Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this,
of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized,
The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done
with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has
reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go
out at night in some sections of the capital. But it
is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that

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this level of activity is not the sort of thing that
will bring down the government unless the president
or other high officials are assassinated, The FALN
has not reached a point where it stands up to the

-armed forces, or seizes and holds government build-
ings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla train-
ing to more nationals from Venezuela than from any
other country. Our estimate is that more than 200
Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of
these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and
others were rounded up and given long prison sentences
when they committed themselves prematurely last spring
in a countryside where the rural population strongly
supports the Betancourt administration. One of our
best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela
tells us that at present the unified command has less
than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated
groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II, The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been push-
ing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin
American revolution, with the implication that nothing
more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro ac-
tually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on
July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue
making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera
of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American
continent.." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro
said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to over-
turn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be
in the Sierra Maestra., For the past three months,

Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both
in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Com-
munists which have been repeated to us, have been in-
sisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve
power in Latin America only by force,

.The Cuban effort at present is far more serious
than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that
the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into
such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nic-
aragua and the Dominican Republic during the first

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eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today

the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more
covert, and more deadly. In its professional trade-
‘craft, it shows guidance and training by experienced
Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including
veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propa-
ganda effort, The inflammatory broadcasts from Ha-
vana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of.
public record, It may be worth noting that the postal
and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on
the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda
coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes
into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the
airport or in the post office and destroyed.

. The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla
trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form
of booklets. .There are thousands of copies of the
texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che
Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents
‘have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet,
about two and a half by four inches, called "150 ques~
tions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil
War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba,

) and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with
100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo’s
books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and
mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5.x 8, and in-
cludes drawings on how to place demolition charges as
well as charts for calculating the force of. various
explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's
book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of
Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-
guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla
must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how
to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary
preparations from materials that he can obtain easily
and sometimes even openly at home.’ -They stress that
his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come
from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces
in his homeland.

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IIL. Training

We estimate that: at least 1,000, and perhaps
as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962,
from all the other Latin American countries with =
the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideo-
logical indoctrination. or guerrilla warfare train-
ing or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the
limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Vene-
zuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some
of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed
to let it appear that the trainees had merely at-
tended some conference or celebration and done a
little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as
a year, and may include intensive training in such
things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological
warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to
monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the
main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao.
(Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM
may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great
lengths to conceal the fact that some of these
trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they
stayed, However, we know a great deal about this
travel from our penetrations of the Communist par-
ties, from controlled agents we have been able to
maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and
from cooperative travel control authorities in
Latin American countries, The Cuban Embassy in
Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate
piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes
home, will only show that he has been in Mexico.
We have a record, however, of those who fly on to
Cuba, In other cases, particularly in the case of
travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, ©
the Cubans furnished passports under other names
for travel by way of Curacao,

We derive some of our figures from travel con-
trol points, and another set from the information

we receive from penetration agents of established
reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the

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Latin American governments are also able to maintain
fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to
have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-
checking from lists of names furnished us by several
of our agents who have undergone training, and in
confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in
Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we
come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known
to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962.
We have to make allowance for some who did not re-
ceive guerrilla training, and allowance in the op-
posite direction for those whose names have escaped
our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjust-
ments by the cross-checking information mentioned
above,

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home,
by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using
Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships
as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This
is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in
some cases permits further indoctrination and train-
ing in Bloc countries. ,

Under the circumstances we consider that our
estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees
in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that
the scope and volume of this training is being stepped
up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement.
of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general
guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took
such a four-week course more than a year ago, under
cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned
to his Havana hotel every few days during the course
to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An
Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then
was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great
deal of detail on the type of training. He reports
that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The
Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their Interna-
tional Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into na-
tional units from a particular country, in effect
forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to
the homeland to'lead a "Liberation Army."

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A trainee whe recently returned to Peru after
several months of training in Cuba, said that all
his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and
other similar demolition targets on detailed maps
of Peru. They were also required to fill out :

.lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibil-
ities for subversion of police, methods. for illegal
entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air sup-
ply, possible points of attack against police and
military posts, and similar information necessary

for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in
such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru,
where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either
in action or in being in the hills, there are Cu-
bans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors
or advisors for these forces. These reports are in-
variably second-hand, and we have not been able to
confirm any of them. In Some cases, it has turned
out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas
referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and
was training others, rather than a Cuban national.
However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals
were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya,
Peru, last December, which culminated in several
million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of
the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company.

One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed
invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by
land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature con-
tributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to
crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the
complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that
they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban in-
structors, but found there were none, This came to
light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent,
relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in
the wreckage of. the Varig airliner which crashed in
Peru in November.

IV. Weapons
In general, the Cubans appear to be following

the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision
of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous

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sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare
students and their leaders to obtain their own weap-:
ons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group
of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively
in. the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle
and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His
group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian
guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture
from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Ar-
gentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors
told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because
there was a plentiful source of supply for any de-
termined guerrilla movement in its own homeland.
Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and

-Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have
been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing
to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance.
Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is
reported to us by our agents in these Same groups,

mat .

We have recently again checked with all of our
stations in Latin America to review what evidence we
have of military shipments|from Cuba. In Peru, radio
transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba.
(In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen
last fall that this was unnecessary} ) In 1962, Cuba
furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smug-
gled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees
who were rounded up in the: Huampani-Satipo incident
last March had been issued kits containing a Czech
rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin.
Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla
hardware turned out to have been bought or stelen
locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country.
We do:not have a single case where we are certain
of the Cuban origin. of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons
have not been Sént from Cuba. Latin America has a
long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, in-
numerable isolated landing fields and drop zones,
and inadequate security forces to control all such
channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been
telling guerrilla leaders |that. Cuba will soon send

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them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that’
he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units,
but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making
this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment,

In summary, we have evidence that in principle
Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons
to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have
no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do
so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creat-
ing uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless
to say, this is a matter that we consider of most ser-
ious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that
comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to
Latin American countries,

Vv. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin
America is easy to ascertain and hard to document, Our
evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers
carrying cash. The following are a few examples of
these operations,

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned
from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several
witnesses to have large quantities of US currency
stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suit-
case. There is no law against bringing currency into
Venezuela, so that authorities could not even deter-
mine how much he had brought in, Ojeda later was cap-
tured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Porto-
carrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in Sep-
tember, 1961, when weather forced the plane to over-
fly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was:.found to
be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was
bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla
training camp in the mountains west of Quito and ar-

rested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary
Ecuadorean Youth, The leaders of the group admitted

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having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together
with funds to support their activities. One item
of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected
iast November has given us a specific account of :pro-
cedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weap-
ons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also
have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers
by. which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American
front groups to pay for political and propaganda ac-
tivity. In some countries where the. Cubans still have
diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats show-
ing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing ef front-
group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to
receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked
up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying
to some of those same guerrilla training camps ex-
posed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man
‘admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him
the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla
camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the
communications between the pro-Commanist Peasant Leagues,
which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

‘The principle that guerrillas must be self~sus-
taining has obviously been applied to finances as well,
Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank rob-
beries in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. .The most
Spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima sub-
urb last year which netted almost $100,000, From
the participants, who have been caught, we know that
the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guer-
rillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot
fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals
has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed
to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo
Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank

. in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000
by men wearing FALN armbands,

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations
maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all

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times, with regularly scheduled and special broad-
casts to specific countries as well as general trans-
missions to all Latin America. The general theme

of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example” is
awakening the "people" of Latin America to the op-
portunity for revolutionary action against the "éor-
rupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism"
which allegedly supports them. Within the last two
months there has been an increase in the aggressive-
ness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official .Cuban international service called
“Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda out-
Tet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this sta-
tion broadcasts weekly a total of I87 hours and 50
minutes of propaganda in languages which include
Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and
Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediter-
ranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's. international service was in-
augurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly
since that time and is now Latin America's first in-
ternational broadcaster in terms of program hours.
Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week

Haitian Creole to Haiti - 7 hr
Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min
English to Europe ; - 9 hr 20 min
English to the Western Hemis- - 17 hr 30 min
phere
French to Europe - 9 hr 20 min
French to Canada - 3 hr 20 min
French to Mediterranean - 3-hr 30 min
Por tuguese to Brazil . _~ 7 br
Spanish to Europe - 16 br 55 min
Spanish to the Americas. a 108 hr 30 min

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In addition to the regularly scheduled” inter-
national service, Radio Havana has been Known to -
broadcast special programs in order to take advan-
tage of unique political situations. When serious
disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in
‘late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating froma
self- -styled “clandestine” station which said it was
located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the
overthrow of the Dominican government, The station
went off after about a week, but not before direc-
tion finder bearings and other technical clues in-
dicated that it had been transmitting from Radio
Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities
available to political groups from other Latin Ameri-
can countries so they can beam programs to their home-
lands. These programs, which have the evident intent |
of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are
presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week
schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Re-
public. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua
and Honduras until last September when they were
replaced by a single program with wider targets now
programmed nightly. These special programs are ex-
emplified by the programs transmitted te the Domini-
can Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto"
by Dominican Communists (whe are based in Cuba) on
the recent election of the “demagogic imperialist
agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Re-
public. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist
group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National
Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican

‘university students to demonstrate against the Con-
stituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to

the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one

hour a week transmission in English aimed at US

Negroes, The other program, "The Friendly Voice

‘of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a
' wider audience, Both programs can be heard well in

Florida and also in many parts of southern United

States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are
at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles

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southwest of Havana, At present, no more than four
shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the
past as many as five have been observed on the air
at the same time. These transmitters range in power

- from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to
be heard all over the world. Programs are being
sent from studios to the transmitter site by means —
of microwave relays,

‘VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has ob-
viously been trying to straddle the rift between Mos-
cow and Peiping over global Communist strategy: It
has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping
but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split be-
tween all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--
call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step
back"--~is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin
American countries, Thus Cuba at present not only
Seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival
servants in its Latin American subversion,

Castro's views on what is good for socialism

and revolution in Latin America are more in line with
those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. |
Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are
totally committed to terror and revolution, In spite
of differences over tactics and timing between var-
ious Communist groups, all intend eventually to de-
liver the Latin American countries into the Commu-
nists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conser-
vative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent
on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible
-and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly
increasing. An excellent example of this was. the set-
ting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in
the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose
‘of this institute is to raise the study of the prob-
lems of Latin America, which in their own statements
the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest
possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese

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‘

languages is to be stressed in the institute and
throughout the school] system. A list of subjects

on which this institute intends to publish shows

that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for
Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance pro-
gram in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We
have been reliably informed that posters have been
placed in some Colombian universities referring to
the problems of the "national liberation and work~
ers' movements in Latin American countries" as top=
ics which will be studied by the institute. Re-
sults of these studies will be published in the

near, future in a magazine called America Latina,
intended especially for distribution in Latin: America.
A pamphlet, . apparently to be distributed by the in-
‘Stitute, and entitled Alianza para el. Progreso, will
in the words of its hera. Sy Winmask the economic ex=
pansion of. the. USA" in Latin America. The institute
also’ expects to enter into close. contact with leading
Latin American scientists and academicians, during
°1963,°

One of the most important Communist assets in
Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic
and Cuban missions. These missions are used to fur-
ther..Communist subversive activities even in coun-
tries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions.

The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well,
have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, _Argen=
tina, and Uruguay... ‘The USSR. maintains yelations |
with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba
maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia,
Uruguay, and Chile. ‘The’ Chinese Communists have no
diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba.
That fact aloné would make Cuban missions important
to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries-~
Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,

. Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru~-have no official ties
whatever with any bloc country.

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Com~
munists misuse diplomatic missions and the impor-
tance the Communists attach to them, We have found
that Communist. subversive activities -in Uruguay are
not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity
against the government.: In this case even the Cu-
bans appear to be much more interested in retaining
the good, will of the. government. so that they can con-~
tinue to use ‘the country as a base of operations

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against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplo-
matic missions, however, are active in supporting
local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to re- .
tain enough leverage within the country so as. to
prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a
break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan
government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly
tolerant of the activities of these missions. and

of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of
the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic mis- |
sions in Montevideo--some 70 or so blec personnel.
In addition, couriers and travellers can go back
and forth between this city and the bloc countries
and Cuba at any time.

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ANNEX A - ARGENTINA

A participant has given us a detailed account
of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course
given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July

' to December 1962. Instruction included such sub-
jects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, com-
munications, construction of defenses, guerrilla
strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and
open order drill. The trainees practiced with
Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns,
Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a
57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group
reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were
given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean,
and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.

Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that
they had raided a warehouse which had served as head-
quarters for terrorists working with both the Peron-
ists and Communists. According to the police, the
gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into
Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel
of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and
had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds,
weapons, and explosives.

A special. Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay,
_ provides false documentation for Argentines and
Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla train-
ing.

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Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a po-
lice patrol stopped to investigate, they found he
was:carrying a number of rifles. in his. car.

In the last’ week of January, another of the ori-.
ginal batch of trainees'in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues
‘Lima, was arrested by national security police at an
airport. He was carrying-a suitcase full of ammuni-
tion for some of the camps which apparently are still
operating. - Jeronimo Rodriguées‘at first refused to
talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced |
he would tell his whole story. So far, according to
the press, he has revéaled that a woman attorney ‘in.
Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had
bought another farm to continue the Peasant League _
guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for
the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in
his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends
‘to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the
farm, and work it.

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ANNEX B - BRAZIL

Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now
have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement’
in subversion directed against Brazil. These. are the
so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authori-
ties when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial dele-—
gation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro
on’ 27 November.

‘The documents, a letter and attachments from
"Gerardo" to “Petronio,” comprised a report from a Cu-
ban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover
hame, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it
plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by
‘Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to
set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the
framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization.
The report, which relays complaints of some of the
guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear .
that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued
by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cu-
‘ban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.

Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police
official checking on possible clandestine landing fields
in the interior, ran across evidence of the training
camps and arranged to have some of them raided even be-
fore the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up
no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps
happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-
Petronio correspondence, The Varig document provided
the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources
matched their details perfectly, and it has become im-
possible for the. Communists and the. Peasant League to
obtain serious consideration for any claim that the docu-
ments might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their
authenticity.

The Peasant League operation, which was staffed
by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take
guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues
to provide evidence against Cuba, Although the ‘Cubans .
apparently have done their best to avoid all contact
with the ‘guerrilla organization since the exposé, Bra-
Zilian police continue to turn up further ramifications
of the operation, The second-in-command of the Peasant
League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir

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ANNEX C - CHILE

On 28 October 1962, at the height of the mis-
sile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly
in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean
police who searched the apartment found four members
of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6
cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38
fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.

One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had
his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed
with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these,

_ Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares,

. have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence of-
ficers. The Chilean police told the press that the |
group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and
residence, US firms, and local public utilities, This
incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana
broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack
US property and installations wherever possible in ~
Latin America.

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ANNEX D ~- ECUADOR

Well-placed and reliable agents have reported
that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had
given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolution-
ary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare
training. .

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including
three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean para-
troopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp
at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles
west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to
Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez
Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain
Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive
guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January
arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders in-
volved with the guerrilla operation in order to re-
store full Communist control, newspapers reported that
the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists
of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio
Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962,
was reported to have photographs showing him under-
going guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel
Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee
and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians,
was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed
a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by
Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also
Shown. a key which he boasts is the ignition key for
a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon
as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at
least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for
guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees
listed by name.

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ANNEX E -— PERU

The ruling military junta in Peru started in
February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists,
including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indict-

ment, the government charges that the extremists have
attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla
forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in
.San. Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted
in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-—
spaced pages. .The security forces have given us no
“evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is
'ample evidence of Cuban involvement.

The trials center on the activities of the Move-
ment of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organiza-
tion for extremist militants founded by De La Puente

_ Uceda in 1961, De La Puente had just returned from
-Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the.
revolution in Peru with economic and technical help
from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment

' conforms with reports our.agents received at the time
from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of

‘the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched
by the junta early.in January. We believe he is in
Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, .

- which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian
associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.

Although the government did not move against
the Communists and other extremist groups with any.
great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion
goes back. at least as far as March 1962, Peruvian
police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains
into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible
only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously
raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from
which trainees were being sent to the camp. AS a re-
sult, they found complete guerrilla kits including

Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for
dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates,

‘ and two radio transmitters brought in from. Cuba. The
custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact
a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this
incident were released, but have been picked up again
in the January roundup and are to be included in the
mass trials.

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An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba
last fall has provided a detailed account of his
training, lists of other trainees he could identify,
and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans
apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it
is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla war-
fare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint
possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large
map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information
on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to
Subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry
into and travel in Peru, the problems of Setting up
business firms to cover espionage and agent opera-
tions, and information on location of and access to
police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to
good reports from our agents and from Peruvian po-
lice, appear to have reached agreement on 2 plan for
coordinated action. This may be one factor that per-
suaded the junta to move against the. extremists.

- The main guerrilla strength at present is a
force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate
to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla
force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peru-
vian authorities to have received his guerrilla train-
ing in Argentina, If in fact he has 2,000 men, this
figure includes landless peasants and Indians,
largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to
believe that more than a small proportion are trained
and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are
almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are
with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops be-
cause the local police detachments have been unable
to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and
agent reports have established that the guerrillas
are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bo-
livian military and smuggled across the frontier
into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Com-
munist. share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

AS One example of the activities of the co-
ordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the
Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guer-
villas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the
village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima,
and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas
with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three
local banks and retreated to the hills.

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ANNEX F - VENEZUELA

. _ Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban
Subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing.
Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking
Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963,
told various visiting Latin American Communists that

' Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin
America, Venezuela is receiving priority attention
from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt re~
gime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods, ©

It would appear from the meager evidence avail-
able in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists
‘have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban
involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic cam-
paign which is being waged in the country. The wave
of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela
has physically exhausted the handful of competent men
in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or
‘no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban in-
- volvement.

Support from Havana can be inferred, however,
if only from the expert character of. the sabotage
carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was.
discovered that the Communists have begun to use
Shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines.

- Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explo-
sives.

The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Com-
munist Party, which is directly charged with the mis-
sion for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has
been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts
of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with ad-
vanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges,
pipelines and pumping stations, All of these acts
_have been well planned and professionally executed,
There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist
sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and
November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana
to attack all American installations in Venezuela as
a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.

Last November a Venezuelan military court tried
139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto

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Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences,
Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba.
One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time
been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban arny
maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large
sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several
trips there. He was also the recipient of large
quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda,

Venezuelan police early in January raided a
house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Com-
munist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba,
and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reach-
ing Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested
attempting to enter the house. The armed forces
have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be
located on the grounds of the Central University in
Caracas, communicating with another station which they
believe to be in Cuba,

Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader
in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revo-
lutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for
procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When
the man himself was arrested, police jfound a radio
transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.

We have received reports from a reliable source
that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramili-
tary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last
September for assistance. Castro reportedly had prom-
ised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. How-
ever, Castro is reported to have given Martinez
$50,000 instead, and offered to train| some of Martinez’
men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable
to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not
permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was
further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia
Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000
to finance sabotage operations against North American
business installations in Venezuela. | Mrs. Martinez was
visiting in Cuba at the time that she| received these
funds,

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Page 31


INVESTIGATION OF
THE PREPAREDNESS PRCGRAM

INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE
Of The

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

Under The Authority Of
-S. Res. 75
(88th Cong., lst Sess.)
| On
THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

5812 CF)

QATSD(LA) CONTROL NUMBER ~~~.

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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman

John Stennis, Mississippi Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusette
Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia Margeret Chase Smith, Maine

Stuart Symington, Missouri J. Glenn Beall, Maryland

Henry M. Jackson, Washington Barry Goldwater, Arizona

Sem J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina Clifford P. Case, New Jersey

Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Clair Engle, California
Howard W. Cannon, Nevada
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
Stephen M. Young, Ohio
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii
Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman

Stuart Symington, Missouri Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusetts
Henry M. Jackson,..Waghington Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
Strom Thurmond, Carolina Barry Goldwater, Arizona

James T., Kendell, Chief Counsel

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U. S,. Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services,
May , 1963.

Honorable Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. &. Senate

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

There is transmitted herewith en interim report by the
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate
Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.

In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received
testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence,
the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the
Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report
transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military
developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection
with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have
been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry
into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more
subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.

It is necessary that this interim report to the full
Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the
Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security
purposes and will have the report printed and released to the .
public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security
matters have been deleted.

Respectfully,

JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

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CONTENTS

INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

Page
I. Introductory Statement c.vccccerecscscccceveccevsnecesces 1
II. Summary of Major FIndingS .ccccccccerevececcauasesceseses 3
IItI. Situation Prior to Mid-July, LQ 2 se cecevevccnssseencens 7
(aA) Cuban FPOPCOS sacccesesesossccesssososesersesoees 7
(B) Intelligence Activities and Operations.....0.5. 8
‘IV. Situation’ From Mid-July to October 22, 1962... .ssseceeees 10
(A) Buildup im Soviet Forces and Equipment,.....s05. 10
_ (B) Identification of Specific Weapons ..... -
and Equipmentssscssveseseoseseveecvaveresnees 1
(1) SA=2 SATS oc vvenenesccvenccecnseseserens iz
(2) Cruise: Missiles .csseccccresvcccavcecvaae il
(3) MIG-21 Fighters sieseveccevecsscvvcceooss 12
{8} TL-28 (Beagle) Bombers..ssessssecccteses 12
5) Medium Range and Intermediate’... ...:..
Range Missiles, .. 000.00 0 ees ol®
(C) Failure'to Identify Soviet Organized
1 . ‘Combat UDLts .ccccccccccaserseccceserereteeoes 13
(D) “Alleged Photographic Gap..ssccccssenssesevanees 15
(F} Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC..seae0. 16
‘(F) Intelligence Activities and Operations ;
Generally scsserenssceceeecescsectinessccesees 17
V. Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of |
Removal ‘of IL-28 Bomber scssvvsceesvessrencessreseeess el
(A) Intelligence Activities and Operations |
Generally.svocveccerevcccecsuenecsasssessrsce al
(B) Identification of Organized Soviet
‘Combat. Units ssccscncvcccccvcecceerersvesssses al
(c) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers..eessees. 21
VI. Current Military Situation in CUA, cccconcerscvevssvnees ee
- , (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations
Generally.csccccteccccccerrecvessestenssteees Oe
(B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and
“Equipment Now in Cubficscssesesvevecovesveeees 23
(1) Types and Numbers of WeaponS.cessserees 23
(2) Strength ard Capabilities of Forces..., 26
(3) Reports of Concealed Strategic
Weapons in. Cuba..cscrecseecsrevcecves 28
(4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal....s...- 30
{c) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet. _
Presence io CUBA cccccescvssuccesssssieernoes 31
_ (D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion....csss 32
VII, Concluding Statement, vescsrsecovessvessssccevenenscoooge 34

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INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP
I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The dramatic eventa which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are
now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic
and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba end President
Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive
weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.

However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation hee not
subsided, There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still
maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other
underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in
numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports
also abound with respect to the use of Cuba ag a base for subversive, agita-
tional and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.

The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness
Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation inte the entire subject
matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still
continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at
this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments
and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early
1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discus-
sion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included
in a subsequent report. .

Broadly speaking, the term “intelligence commmity" includes the Central
Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections
of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of

State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the
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Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, howéver, ine
somewhat more’ ‘Limited sense; Where the term appears in this report it primarily
refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Foree. Other
agencies are, of course, impliedly included in ‘our use of the term to the
extent that they particlpated in or contributed to any of the activities or
operations discussed,

Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive
bearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen.
Joseph F, Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General
Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear
Admiral Vernon L, Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General
Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief. of Staff for Intelligence, U. 5. Air
Force,

The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written
reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the
Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have
also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Securit,
of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolution-
ery Council.

In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation
and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official
positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent
approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.

Information has‘also been received from individual Senators and Menbers

of the House of Representatives.

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This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from
the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subconmittee. It does, however.
include some information from other sources.

Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any
overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, -:~
based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence
activities during the military buildup have been incorporated, Our general
recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all

activities taking place in Cuba.

II, SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1, While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some
areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems
were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance
characteristics spelled out in @ limited period of time despite adverse weather
and an almost completely closed society.

2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this
capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence
of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those
involved in ‘this mission.

3, While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting
intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several
substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of

the information and data which was accumulated.

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4h, Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence com-
munity to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with
Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence.
judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were.

(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on
October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that
organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our
plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were neces-
sarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous
Cuban defense forces.

(>) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially under-
estimated throughout the crisis, On October 22nd, our intelligence people
estimated that there were §000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that,
at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on
the island.

(ce) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on
October 1lith that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles
had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October lth negative
judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment
as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installcc
were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing
factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to
discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges

and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to

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October lth, The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion
that such charges are unfounded.

6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2
high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 1kth were also closely
inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to
support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from
the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock
or friction between the agencies.

7. To aman the intelligence chiefs atated that it is their opinion
thet all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However ,
they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that
offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They
also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from
penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that,
based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern.about
the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the
Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment
of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports
continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activi-
ties have been noted with reference to @ number of them but it is the view of
the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the
storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage
of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a

substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence

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confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been
withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to detenmine whether or not strategic
missiles are now concealed in Cube. The criticality of this is illustrated by
the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equip-

ment pre-lecated, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could

‘be made operational in a matter of hours.
10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet .

personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving,
according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of hooc
to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelii-

gence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as
"technical reasons,” the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is

unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the
Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate.

There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as
to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree

that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with
the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

12. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate
that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of
hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall,
we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any
real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the
opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban
forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe

opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any

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internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear
that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require
large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the
Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the
United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in
Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive
evidence.

14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring,
aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout
the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous

threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

IIT, SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962 = ‘

A. Cuban Forces

It was estimated by intelligence sources that et the beginning of 1962,
the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve
of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability
of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it
was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training,
they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat
team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units
larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained

primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any

attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500

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Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba,

By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the
acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in
bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG i's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40
propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.

The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially codstal patrol type.
Several of these craft in the sib-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been
received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed
Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.

It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July,
1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba
for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then
the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and
eguipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World
War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether
the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this
time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then ;
constituted.

B. Intelligence Activities and Operations

The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962,
consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnais-
sance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from
refugees, exiles, and other human sources,

For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelli-

gence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of

Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early,1962, two flights

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were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the
number of flights was increased.

Algo, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic
flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters
put not over the Island of Cuba itself.

In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports
were collected and assessed, Included in these reports were many which con-
tained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet
ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the
greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation
of such activities.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the
intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities

‘and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to
Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month.
The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization
of Cuba, However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment
of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the
activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or
strategic weapons were discovered.

The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba
were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that
it might probably be expected that the TL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be

supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.

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IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO ocToBER 22, 1962

A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Bijui pitent

In late July and early August, oui intelligence noted a significant
change in the situation ini Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet
Union became clearly evident, Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger,
increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average
of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped
to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during
the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.

While our intelligence people were aware from this and other informa-
tion that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and
impact was not clear to the intelligence community.

During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile
activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as
scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent
and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confir-
metion of them.

At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships
were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel
being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in
small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known
to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore
eould not be confirmed.

Human. source reports also alleged that the nature and character of
the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that

some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim,

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physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of

fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and
other human source reports suggested that, in cohtrast to the earlier artivals,
the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence com-
munity adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and
trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with
improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include signifi-
cant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized
into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information
brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet 'per-
sonnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.

B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment

1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated
by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention
on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high
altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, estab-
lished positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at
two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from
August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system
can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a
slant range of about 25 miles.

2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation

was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional

‘cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping

missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th

KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile ‘launchers each were identified in Cuba.

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3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air
Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962 » the pre-
sence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture
obtained on September 5, 1962.

4, IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelli-
gence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle)
light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on
September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's
aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was
disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.

5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been
indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed
reports and rumors from human sources about strategic misslle-related activity
in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It
is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile,
which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identi-
fied, still appears large to the untrained observer.

However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced
into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse
the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--
apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a
result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October
14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and
emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range

ballistic missile complex.

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Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many
ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announce-
nent that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evi-
dence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic
missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned
to introduce.

Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range
ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance
missions flown after October 14, Six MRBM sites were located, all of which
had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling
of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated
that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational
pefore being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become
operational by December 15.

The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100
miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles

C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units

As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of
the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwith~-
standing the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophis-
ticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the pre-
sence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25
when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a re-
analysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were,

in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.

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The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people
to be about 5,000 men.

In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba
was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on
October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelli
gence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand.
The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-
up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This
is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate, One
factor in.the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in
October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally
loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and
that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger
ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is pelieved that additional
Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to
doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great
quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.

The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units
in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present
there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our
plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantial-
ly complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading
forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter
is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained,
powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking
power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States
commanders until several days subsequent to October 25,

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In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascer~

tained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our for-
ces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher
price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba -than had been anticipated.

Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of
the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily
armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his
actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from
the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles,

D. Alleged Photographic Gap

There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in
our photo, raphic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5
to Seeudaber 1. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and
have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of
the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be
sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here..

The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted
in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.

On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and
eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central por-
tion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference
to the eastern end of the island.

A flight was planned for September 10th but this‘ was not flown.

On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions,

it was not wholly successful,

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Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights
were flow on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These
flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighte.
as requiring early attention.

Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14, On October
12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2
high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October ik, it flew
the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic
missiles in Cuba.

E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC

There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a con-
flict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Com-
mand (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights.
These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA
and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the func
tion of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that
this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.

These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been
found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any
conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photograph?
coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being
operated by CIA prior to October rhe

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the
two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whor.

the flights should be flown.

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The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of
the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites
in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight whici
was flow on October l4ith was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the
possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it
was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be ecnduct.
ed by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reason-
able and proper.

It is a Pact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the
one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without
explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern, However, after
inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no signifi-

cance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.

‘F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over
Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September.
The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been out-
lined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October bth were flown by the CIA.

After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there
Was @ concentrated effort to determinethe precise nature of the missile buildup
and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the mis
sile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command fle:
a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiat«

until October 23, the day following the President's message.

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During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over
international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using
refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Sub-
committee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, how-
ever, our intelligence did quite well. The MREMs were discovered while they
were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered ina
very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they
were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had
been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were iden-
tified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before
they became operational in a very compressed and limited pericd of time despite
adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost
completely closed society,

The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited
by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis
commencing in mid-September, It is certain that these air defense missiles
had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2
plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and
Major Anderson was killed.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photo-
graphic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence
operations. They ultimately piaced in the hands of the President, his advisors
and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the
presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet
government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part
in the united action of the Organization of American States and world accep-

tanve of the correctness of our position.
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Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only
a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important on
It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period
of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deploy.
ment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and
other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other
SOUrces »

The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have
done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and infor-
mation. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appear:
to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreove:
there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence com-
munity to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had
been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the
most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information. available.
This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the
worst situation which might be established by the accummlation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence
people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports: This was based on
the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as mili-.
tary observers, thelr frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible
among those things which were within their power of observation as to time,
place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest

of the Cuban sources.
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Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets
would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that suc:
a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.
The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent
events. The danger that such pre~conceptions will control the weighing of the
facts as events unfold is evident.

The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc:
judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A
few of these will be mentioned.

The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that
organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba, until pho-
tographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related
fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated
throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.

‘It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate
that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic con-
firmation was obtained on October 1bth. It appears that, on this point, the
analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it
would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba.
In retrospect » it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given
proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile:
complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to
the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile
installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for

the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.

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VY. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS

Ae Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23,
1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted
effort to obtain detailed information poth about the entire island and selected
targets. .

During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Com-
mand flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through Nov-
ember 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air
Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties,

B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Conbat Units

As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th pro-
vided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored
task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distribute:
to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was
thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized
by the Cuban forces. .

C, Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bonbers

To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October
crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic
nissiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment,
and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.

A comprehensive and concentrated serial reconnaissance and fleet obser
vation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equip-
ment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accom-
panied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over
Cuba end Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.

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The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of
the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites
to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it
arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.

As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic mis-
siles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed
by the USSR, However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to
the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible the

despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.

VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA
' ‘A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers
the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of
the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue
on @ regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been
no further attempt to interfere with our serial reconnaissance, The reason
for this one incldent amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights re-
mains a matter for speculation. |

The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources
available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the 111-fated
‘Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveil-
lance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and sur-
face ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic recon-
naissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the
aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that
radar range permits.

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A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might
become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated ru-
mors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related
to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial
fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe
that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.

Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide
temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly ex-
tend their time on station away from bloe nation ports, and to facilitate thei:
operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficieni
depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxa-
tion facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home
for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of
the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods con-
siderably. The use of shore-~based long range communication systems end infor-
mation from surface and shore~based radio and radar nets would greatly facili-
tate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempt
to evade detection. |

B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba

1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was tes~
tified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion
level with the effective modern weapons for such units, Including rifles, ma-
chine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an
organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized

equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.

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They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light
antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of
the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned
above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated,

The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plen-
tiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit
perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar
to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed, Their fire control system is
also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a
large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite
complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive
training, Including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to
replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites
for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites,
are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in
by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are
manned by Soviets is apparently not known.

There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about
30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part
of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment
of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews, As an added feature
of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba,
far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching
sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have
been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and

thus failed to reach Cuba,

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The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-
speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are
each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated
to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but
Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are appar-
ently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expe-
dition.

The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with
almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of
these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motor~-
ized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in
surprisingly large numbers, As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed
to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships
of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy
tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of
almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200
57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field
artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost
100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple laun-
chers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already
in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor
vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.

To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Aruy tactical missiles
The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10

and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles,

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which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST
JOHN, .

According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approxi -
mately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet
fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar
to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios neces-
sary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system,
SA-2 and fighter.

2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces

The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same
level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in
the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.

The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by
their orgenization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to sup-
press an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents
obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help

given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern

, highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United

States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organiza-~
tion which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced
pattalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long
duration.

The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to
consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other

eoastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been

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somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is
not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol
activities.

The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of
about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters,
about 16 propeller-driven tactical bonibers , a considerable quantity of antiair-
eraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters
The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to Imve been
turned over to the Cubans.

The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The
assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics.
The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to. action
against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real
alr cover or air defense capability.

The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intel-
ligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000
are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile
sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting
Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments.
About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which
includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated
7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and. equipment of the Soviet Army contin-
gent in Cuba. |

At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of
the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official

estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some

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4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accu-
racy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present con-
siderably higher estimates ~-some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in
mind the substantial underestimation of last Oetober we can only conclude that
no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles -~knows how many Russian
troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with
the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. ‘The
air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The
coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the
Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary
launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This
gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft.
The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well
coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could -
offer severe opposition to any attack, This opposition would be sufficient
to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any
desired air-borme effort in order to be sure of success, The public evidence
of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combina-
tion of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in
the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.

Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive
weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe
that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States

or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may

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or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack
of conclusive evidence.

It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of
provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and
present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlantic
Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the |
smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery.
light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons,
grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter,
Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced
and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a cen-
trally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace
to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere, The use of Cuba as a
pase for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.

3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the
strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed
in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these
reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all
strategic weapons are withdrawn.

It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to
the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is
grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of
the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a

result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The

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current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on
| the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This
of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 1k,

There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns
in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and con-
cealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It isalso true
that military activity has been osserved in connection with these caves. Our
intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact
utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic
missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with res-
pect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best
be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assump-
tion that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel
were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readi-
ness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of
hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba,
the danger is clear and obvious.

The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already
been discussed.

4, Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel

Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to
5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since: the first
of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons"
the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba

remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that

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there is @ low level of confidence in the criginal estimate. There is also
some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the num-
ber of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected
arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated
their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-
imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we
have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the
matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does
not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction
in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence
that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have
been withdrawn. .

C, Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba
Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence

Taman presents to the Americas is as follows:

1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and
agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity
to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin
America.

2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been
withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduc~
tion of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet
forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.

3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR. .

4, "The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities

based on Cuba.

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5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originat~-
ing from Cuba.

6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict
our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and elec-
tronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States
and the Caribbean.

7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes
launched against the United States from the Soviet Unidn.

8. Advanced Soviet submarine.:bases could be established in Cuban ports
with very little effort.

9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a furthe
reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.

10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin
American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage
techniques. |

ll. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation’:
image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability

to meet and defeat the forces of commmism thousands of miles across the ocean
if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our vexy doorstep.

A consideration of ali these matters serves to emphasize the gravity
of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.

D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion

The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen
to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insur-

)
gents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the

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Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide
evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently
immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper
to the fires of revolt, We can only expect, under present circumstances,
that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the peo-
ple in Cuba, wlll wither and shrink. The communization of the younger ele-
ment creates simultaneously an increasingly militant coummist nation.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary
psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as
a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of free-
dom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces
standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the
Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to

insurgent forces.

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VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public
debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic
weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being
maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The
matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the
real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this
hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and
spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be
sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible.
The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may
be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolu-
tionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may
fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist
goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods .
and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates,
With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent.
The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to
violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuka ae elsewhere it is
conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world commimism for the
purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is
to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them
with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and

moral control of subjugated peoples.

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This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be abhieved
_ elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We
_ must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national
ho ‘self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western
Hemisphere,
The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting
menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever
alert and vigilant to all of ite sinister implications. We must exercise
the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available
resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that
unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised.
The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the
highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that
the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be

eliminated at an early date.

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. . Mrs Califano

: | Co) Corchel\

March 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State

SUBJECT: Miselle Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report
to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

Purauant to dur telephone conversation, the attached draft
has been reviewed and the Department of Defense haa no objection
to it, subject to the following changes:

1, «=6©Page 3, Line &: Change nudiber "25" te a4,"
Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy
records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to > LG" and "25"
to "24," Beason: Accuracy.

3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before
word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic"
pefore “missiles, Reasga: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4, Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert. “by December 6"

before “ite promise" and "42" before "1L-25," Eliminate
the sentence “and, by December 6, the US wae informed that
all bombers (42 in nuraber) had left," and substitute “their
removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by

. along-side:obeérvation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships
carrying them back to the UDSR." Reason: Provide additional
positive detail, particularly with reference to the 1L.«28 remeval
being based upon confirmed observation and aot merely upon
information provided by the USER.

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. Page 43, Line 9: Insert “more vigilant and* bafora
“stronger. Reason: Streagthen prime poine that jacraased
awerenesa of Communist duplicity and potential threats
veguited from exisis, particularly im the OAS.

Joseph A, Califano, Je.
Special Agaistant to the
Secretary of the Army

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 March 1963
UL7,171/P-2 ,

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft
Report to Congress on US’ Participation in the UN
During 1962

TO: General Counsel
Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and
the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3,. line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason:
Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "2i."

Reason: Accuracy.

3, Page. By. Lines 14 and “15: Insert "aor before word

"November" ai, Lines 1 before "2," and. "ballistic" before

"missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail,

4, Page 37, Lines 13 - 15 Insert "by December 6" before
Nits promise” and. "46" before hoy 28 Eliminate the sentence
"and, by December A the US was informed that all bombers (42 in
number) had left, and substitute “their removal being confirmed
by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on
the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR."
Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with
reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed

observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

5. Page He, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before
"stronger. Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased
awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted
from crisis, particularly in the OAS,

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DEPARTMENT .OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 March 1963

Report o vConeress on US "partietpation in the UN
During 1962 _

LOe General Counsel
Department of Defense

Tntelly ence content of subject draft. ait Be reviewed and. _
owing comments. ave submitted:

» Be Change: nutiber “25" to "2h," Reason:
EES Department of the  Meny records.

Bo Pag
‘November a
“nissiles.

insert. "10" ‘before word
"HO." and "pal co" peffore
more accuPate: detail.

Reagon: larity and
Insert "by Decenber 6" before
sit el eabrate the Sentence

ily panblowlerty with
Pr a Lee - based upon confirmed
observation and not cerely. ‘upon information previded by the USSR.

9: Insert “mere vigilant and" before
trengthen ried eae that ancreased,
Ete: 1 +t

from. erisis,. particularly ain the OAS.

JOSEPH F, CARROLL
Bieutenant General, USAF
Director

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 27, 1963

wo »¢ \

de Se

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE Neer
: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Ww

_ Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-.
dent's Report to Congress on United States Participation.in the United
Nations during. 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
me for Department’ eof Defense clearance. I. should appreciate it if
you would read the- report. and return it to me with any comments by
1200 hours ‘on March 29, 1963.

ny. A. Califano, Jr,
Special Assistant to. thé
Secrétary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

coker

Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
‘General Carroll (DIA)

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ae

‘ut


OPTIONAL FORM RO. 10 .
* 5010-104 /

.“ 4JNITED STATES GOVERKNN ENT
te
~ Memorand

. 7 FO

we

- FROM : RPA = William G, Bowdler™ ye

ve ‘SuBjECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report, -
. To Congress on US 5 Participation in UN During 1962,

yao

; UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter... _
‘on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on |
US participation in the. UN.

Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have +

been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about °

- this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with ~

the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through.

. @CA channels, Could you please arrange for this te be done: as quickly . a
mo as Possible @ as the report is now overdue? | be 5 ot

“> ARA/RPA:WGBowdlers 3Jv

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March 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the Presi-
dent's Repart to Congress on United States Participation in the United
Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to
me fer Department of Defense clearance. 1 should appreciate it if
you would read the report aad return it to me with any comments by
1206 hours on March 29, 1963.

Signed ~
Joseph A. Califano,Jr.

deceph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Agalatant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attathmest
Ag Btated

Os

Mr. Yarmelinshy
Mr. MeCitfere
General Garrall (DIA)

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sovisr OFFENSIVE YEAPOIS IN CUBS 4

DRAFT PRESTDESE'S. REEOR 1.962

“Soviet Buildup

on Oetobar 22, President Kennedy announsed to the nation and to the world

. the *seeret, swift and extraordinary buildup” by the Soviet Ynion of offensive
missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States wes taking to

cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the

J 4 '
President the previous Tuesday morning (osteber 16} and, during the week that
followed, serveillance was stepped up, coufiruing avidence evaluated, a course
of aetion decided upon, friendly goverments notified and eonsulted, the
members and uachinery of the Organization of American Sta ates (OsAcS. > brought
7 into the picture, and Ageriean defenses in the Caribbean streng gthened and put
of the alert.
"The President revealed that 2 serious threat against the peace and

seeurit ¥ of the Americas | wag being vocretiy aounted by the Soviet [rion on
.
7 the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-rangs ballistic HLESILeS
“(oraus) -eapable of careying a , nuélear warhead i, 600 naubical niles had been
_ropidly and secretly installed and additional sites not vet connleted Wave
designed ‘for Inverediateurange ballistic nissiles (IRBHs} gapable of

travelling twee as far and thus posing a nuglear threat to rout of the Ea jor
cities of the Western Hemisphere. This ergent transformation of Cuba inte a

oa

strategie base with muelear striking cepaclty const ed an expiics % threat

to the peace and security of ‘the Anorkeas in defianse of the
Treaty yy of Reciprocal hasistance (Rao Back) of 1947, "the traditions of this
nation and hemigphere, ®° and the CGhasier of the United Hations.

action con miradieted the repeated agsurances of Soylet spokesmen, both

{publicly and


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e2Z2e2
publiciy and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain

its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor ‘the world

" coummity, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate esception

and offensive threat represented *y she clandestine Goploymant of strategic
nuclear HeEapons. .

fo meat this threat ‘the United States ves taking immediately the
following s steps: 4) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all
offensive military. : whpmont under shipment to to Cube was being initiated and,

should ofgensive military preparations ontimioy "further action will be

“ gustified;" 2) ‘the Unive States declared that 14 would regard any nuclear

‘ missile Launched frou gube against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by

the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet

“Unions 3) Guantanamo was being reinforceds ‘&) the Couneil of the Organization. .

of fnerican States was being convened to appiy the Rio Treaty in support of.
hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United ations, the

United States wes requesting an enuergency meeting of tee Security couneil.

. Finally, the Pr resident called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate

this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threay to world peace and to -

stable relations between our two nations.”

. U.S. Chjective

This was a difftevlt and dangerous effort on which the United States

had set out, the President coneluded, wt the greatest danger of all would
be to do nothing.” On the military sides, steps ware taken to strengthen

defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces im a posture to

eyoly the quarantine. . The pepartuent of pefens se had order ed all tours of
cuty of We avy and Marine porgonnel extended until further notices the

/Guantanazo ‘naval

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Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in
the Southeastern portion of the United ‘States; and military deployment put
- 5.000 marines and 40 uevel vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a

training ekerclace Follows: cand resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation
of the Comeil of the Organization of American States (deseribed below) the
President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Guba as of

10 Ace on October 2h The Departuent of Defense ordered the interdiction

. of 25 Soviet nerchan vesaclls known to be headed for Guba ; At 8 AcHe on

October 25 ‘the first intereeption of a , Soviet shipg the ol tanker Bucharest, -

” tools place, and. the a was allowsd to proceed. ie of the 25 Soviet vessels
beading for. Cuba ' tuened around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying . wit

vereel occurred s durin the ae affair,’

_ and deception ace”

* e :

was conclusive. the second was to halt gurther shipments and bring about: ee
rapidly and effectively the ronoval. of the offensive weapons, under Uebe — os

supervision, before the guarantine could be lifted. The United States was

prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various ‘formulae but not =
to abandon this goal. | | - _
From the start, both the Organization of American states and the United
"Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were
used to! underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet
Union that elimination. of the offensive weapons Was a purpose to which the |
henigphers was solidly committed. From the start, Loo, & was clear that
- /the United Nations

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the United Hatdons would have a crucial role. It was the forua in which the ~
evidence of Soviet godlt could be nost convincingly exposed to a world-wide
_ audience, world opinion mobiliz ad, ard the world vardict pronounced. It Was,
| also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communis ations. The |
Duited Yatdons served as a site whers U.S and Soviet negotiators could
easily meet. The Secretary-General hineel? supplied an important, Link
between the parties particularly during the first, days when vension was
highest. Thirdly, al thougis Cuba prevented their exploynent, the United Nations Z
. proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable pechanisas for inspection
| . and vyorifieation of diszantling and renoval of the offensive weupons and for
safeguards against their reintrodustion. The United Hations was also prepared
“to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities: “Simul taneously with |
, the President’s speech, therefore, the United States took diplozatic steps to
“© set in motion the political machinery of the 0.4.8. and the U.N.
QeAsSe Action
In Washington the U.S. Representative oa the Council of the Orgeni zation
of American States. (C.0.AcS-) sent 2 ‘note to the Acting Chairman requesting
the immediate eonvesation of. the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation
ynder Article 6 of the Tater-imerican freaty of Reciprocel Assistance (Rio treaty). :
fais article provides for imediate consultation on measures to be taken for the
. ¢ goson defenze and for the maintenance of peace and goourity of the Continent
yhen “the inplolability ef the integrity of the territory ow the sovereignty
cr political independence of any American states should be affeeted by an
aggression hich is not en armed attack or by an cxtrasconth zental conflicts
or hy any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of Azeriea.®
[The O.AS-

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fhe OAS. Couneil met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of state

Dean Rusk sitting as the D.S. Representative deseribed the nature: of the threat
to this hemisphere and the coun. .neesures which the United States considered
At essential for the inter-American systém to teke. He ‘stated thatthe Soviet —
intervention in this hemisphere with: major offensive weapons challenges as
never before the determination oF the Azericen Governments to earry, cut
enispheric commitments solemily assumed in inter-Azerican treaties and

resolut ons for the defense of the peace and security. of the nations of the

honiephere ‘heainst ‘extrd-continental aggression or intervention.® He proposed

: that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ vof Consultation,
“without delay "eal for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba

of all missiles ami other weapons of offensive capability and co. recomiond cos

that the member states of the Organisation of Amcrican States take the

necessary measures to ensure that Cuba doss uct continus to receive additional
‘offensive BEAPCNS ove and if necessary to prevent, the offensive capacity already
acquired by the castro rogixe fron being used to destroy the paace and security

- of the hezisphere.*

_ The Se erstary noted ‘that the United stat tes was oinn) tansously asking
the U.W. Seeurity Council to act in the natter. He observed: “fhe threat °

is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as

‘Ye ere now doing, as a hemisphere. Bub the threat originates from cutside

the henisphere awl it is appropriate that the extra-continental pover which
challenges our inter-American commitments oo. ba dealt with in the foram in
wsleh that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the

SeourLty Council of the United Na ‘dons bs requested to eall upon this menber
[to refrain

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to refrain fron nis aggressive actions agains st us and seek to emorse upon
him its decisions. Heanwhile, without avaliting the outeone of the United
Nations approach, ws must ensure that our hemisphere is sffectively
quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military
pousr in owe midst.* . . .

. Follouing a general discussion of the danger confronting the heaisphere
the Council votad 19 to 6 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instracticas) to
“gonst itute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation {Cs OoAeS. 106 Ge ys
Thon, at the suggestion of the GoSe Representative, the organ of consultation
adjourned for several hours te permit | a pumber’ of del egations to songult their
governments and receive instruetions on the draft resolution presented by the:

tiaited States to deal with the thruat confronting the heal sphere.
| oe The Organ of Consultation reconvened that saze afternoon. Debate centered
on 2 the draft resolution. Ag each representative spoke, it becaze evident that
the nerican republics were solidly united im their determination to resist —
this’ “gost. ‘dangerous’ threat tothe peace and security of the hexispheres... he few
delegations wsre not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions
of the resolution, attributable for the most part to dozestie constitutional .
- considerations, but when the regolution gs 2 whole was put to a vote, the support
was unanimous. In ona of tha historic decisions of the inter-Asarican systea
os the Organ of Consul tation: {1} called for “the immediate dismantling and
withdraval from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive
canability,” and (2) recommended that “the mombor states, in accordance with
Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Resiprosal Asvistence, take
all meesures, individually and sollectively including the use of araad force;
. Junieh thoy

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which they may deem nesessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba gannot
gontinue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related

3

supplies which may threaten the peace’and security of the Continent and to

prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever beconing

an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution

sige ae ote e reempeemne men

also expressed "the. hope that the Security Couneil will, in accordance with

the Resolution introduced by the United Sietes, dispatch United Nations

f

wes observer's to Cuba at the earJiest moment."
Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American

States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant te the recommendations contained

' in the second paragraph of the resolution edopted, President Kennedy issued

the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons

andassociated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard
Time on Oatober 24. The proglamation stated that the Secretary of Defense
*shali take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of srohitited
material to Cuba, enploying the Land, sea and air forces of the United States 7
in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other jmerican
states." the ‘Secretary of Defense vas authorized to designate prohibited or

restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that “any vessel, or craft

which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted ard may be direeted to

4

adentify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of cai

ed

.y to
stop, to Lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to progeed as divested."
Any vessel that refused to comply with diveetions wight be taken into

eustody. In earrying out the order forse was not to.be used except

an ease of failure or refusal to comply with directions or

/reguiations

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regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communiéste with the

vessel or craft, or in self-defense.

In the days imnediately folloving, twalve other American republics offered
assistance in support of the quarantine ‘opsration: Argentina, Dosinican
Republic, Venezusia, Costa Rica, Coloxbia, Ecuador’, EL Salvador, Guatezala,

Raiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval

units, posing the problema of coordination of foreas. Consequently, on Hovenber 5s -_

the Co0.A.S2/0.C- recommended that the contributing mamber states take among

thenselves the technical reasures nacessary to establish an effielent and

“coordinated action. Pursvant to this recommendation, the governzsnts of Argentinas
the Dominican Republic and the United States on Noveaber 9 notified the .
CoboAeSo/OoCe of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine

Fores into which they. vere integrating their respective naval units and placing

officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the _

. Combined: “Quarantine Force. —

Security Counedl. consideration

Simul tanepusly with the call for a meeting of the OoA.5- Councit, Ambas Ambassador

Ad}ad Stevensop in New York raquested the President of the Security Council ==

that month the Soviet Representative we to eall an urgent meeting of the Coueil

“te deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused
?

wy the secret pstablishnont in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

of! “Launching bases and the ‘Anstallation of long-range ballistic missiles capable

of carrying thermonuclear ‘yarboads to wost of North and South juortea.® “the

United statesst he. wrote, mot has incontrovertible evidenes that the 0. S.3.R-
has been installing in cuba a whole series of facilities for Jeunching offensive

nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons theasslve3.
[the establishnent


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The ostablishsent of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, “eonstitutes
a@ grave threat to the peace aud security of this henlsphere and of the whole
vorld,* It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he coneluded,
"to bring about the innediate diswantling and withdrawal of the Soviet
missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba y under the supervision of United
Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which 4s being
pat into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to

confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to

7 the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world.®

_ |. Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution hich ealied for the
- Amnodiate dismantling and withdrawal fron Cuba, of all missiles and other — |
offensive weepors, and hich authorized the sending to Guba of & Ucle observer

Corps, to ; assure. aed report on 2 compliance with the resolutione the resolution

called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of silitery shipsents to Cuba when

the above terns ware complied with and recomaanded that the United States |

and the U.3.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove tho existing threat.”
fhe Security Council held four mootings on October 235 2h, and 25. BY

_ the tins ‘the first mooting opened on the afternoon of Oetober 23, the Soviet

Union and Cuba hed introdueed two parallel letters to the President. of ths -

. Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Couneil

in an attexpt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S.
countermeasures and “aggressive action® against Cubs consti tyted tho real,

threat +o peace in the Caribbean. Vader Rule 37 of the Comncil’s provisional

: vples of procedure, the ouben Representative was invited to perticipate in the

eiseussion of the uatter bsfore the Security Council.
/dsbassador

>. . ©

Ambassador Stevenson’s opening speech put the issue in the porspective
of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionisu. He traced the “vast plan of
plesemeal aggression" and “the basic drive to abolish the world of the
' Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and’ which
had not been altered by the presont Soviet Government. Contrasting the
history of Soviet expansionisu and rejection of the priaeiples of the Charter |
with the United States record of loyal support for the Orgenization and “the
world of the Charter," Azbassador Stevenson rogretted that sone weabers ,
“secued to believe that the cold war is a private war petuoen wo. great, supar

: |. powers." "It is not a private atruggles* he insisted, "it is a : world evil

"war on a contest betueca the pluralistic world and the monolithic world en

contest between the world of the, charter’ ar the world of Communist conforaity.*
the castro rogino,® he pointed, out, thas aided and abatted an invasion of this
. “peakappore" and "hag given the Soviet Union a staging area in a this neaisphere”

. by inviting Yan extra-continontel, anti-dezocratic and cxpansionist pover into
the bosos ‘of the ‘American ‘fanily" ‘and by making itsal? "en accoaplice in the.
communist enterprise of world domination.” ‘The Soviet Union, he continued,
had secretly transforasd Cuba into a forsidable missile and strategie atrbasay
armed with the deadliest, nost Payareaching nmedern nuclear weapons, in an
attempt to put all the Averieas under a “nuclear gun” and to intensify the
"Soviet diplasacy of blackzail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded.
 8Tf the United States and the other nations of ths western Hemispheres should

accept this Rei phase or aggression, ws would be delinquent in our obligations _

to world peaces" Be could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded
dtsal? into sugposing the United States lecked tho nerve and will to use its
pover, and ke voiced the nope that the Soviets would call en end “to this new.
. /phase of

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phase of aggressicn.” He urged the Council to gall for the issediate withdraual

of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.

Asbassador Stevenson then inforaad the Security Council, in in accordance - :

with Article 54 of the Charters that the Council of the 0.A.S. had adopted a

. resolution by 19 affirzative votes (as noted above) calling for the disaentling

and withdrawal of the offensive Weapons recommending that nexber states of the
Oo A.Ss take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the. .
continent, and expressing the hopo that the Security Council will “atspateh UcNe

, observers to Cuba at the earliest moment.*

Aubassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Securliy Couneil
which defined the theses for the debate during the rest of the wack:
(1) The Soviet astion in sending thousands of military technicians to .

its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet borbers capable of delivering |

nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and
preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing
these ‘things through deceit and under tho cloak of secrecy, were in defiance

of the seeurity comsitments of the Organization of American States and in

. ylolation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a nanifest threat

- to this hewisphers and to the whole world.

(2) ‘The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in

gonsonance with the U.N. Caarter and had the unanimous wacking of the

, Organization of American States.

(3) The Seeurkty Council should reuove the threat by calling, as the

yesolution proposed, for the imnediate dismantling and withdrawal froz Cuba

ge al), missiles. and alt offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the
Sosrotary-Goneral to dispatch to Cuba a U.l. observer corps to agsure and
[report in

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report in coxspliance with this ‘resolution; calling for termination of the
‘quarantine upon U.N. certification of such ecmpliance; and urgently wecomending —
that the United States and ithe Soviet Uaion confer promptly om measures to

Pe Tp ere renner eet on arenes creat

remove the existing threat ‘to the security and the peace of the world end
report therein to the Seeurlty Councils - -
| Following Asbassador Stevenson's mresentation, the Cuban and Soviet
Representatives pads their initial Statenents. The Cuban Represoutative,

» Garcla-Inchaustegui, denounced the ravall "ploskede” ag an “act of war?

A ae TORS TIO eh v retnteerggyS ee newt

‘and declared that tho” cuban people bed ansvored the Sarned attack" with
. general mobilization. He asked the Council to eall for the immediate
“withdraval of all trocpsy ships and planes deployed on the approaches to

f
k
4

7
if

Cuban: ‘Shores, and for. the cogsation of all “interventionist” measures. TES:
Cuban, Representative also contended that the United States hed ne right to
ose for Atonantling and dicarnenent and that “logieally, UeHo observers skould

i . .

be sont ta ths U.So bases from which invéders and pirates energe to punish
and harass a small states? He insisted that Cuba ui) not acsept any kind
ad ‘observers in metters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction.

The’ Soviet Representative, Anbassador Zoring declared that the United =
states charges usre “a ‘glumsy attept to cover up egeressive actions” in Cubase .
He deseribed the U.S. quarantine es a "new and extrexely dangerces cet of
aggression” and as Sunda sgniged piracye* During this first encounter, while
avoiding direct reference to the prosence of Soviet missiles op boxbers in

Cuba, Asbassedor Zorin declared that accasxticas that the Soviet Union hed
"sot up offensive armazents in Cuba” vere false, and officially confiraed the
statement already nade by the Soviet Union in this connection, “that the Soviet
Coverazent hag not directed and is not directing to Guba any offensive armaments o"

Ee also recalled the statement of Soviet Hinister for Foreign Affairs
. _Hearet Grozyko

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Audrad arcayto an the General Assezbly jest a month previously (Septenber 21, 1962)
that “ony sober-minded nau Imovs that Cuba is not ove building up her foress to
~ gueh a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States coo or cise a.
throat to any state of the Western Bealsphere.®
Anhbaseador Zoran gubaitted to the Security Council a statexent published
by the Soviet covernrent that day uhich addregsed a “serious warming to the .
Gaited States Goverazeat, to advise it that, im carrying owt the measures
emnounesd by President Kemnedy, it is Aeakshing on stself a heavy rosponmibility
: for the fate of the workds® declared that tho Soviet Government wi do
“everything in its pover to frustrate the aggressive desigas of 3.8.
imperialistic eircless” and appealed to all governzents and peoples to raise
their voices in protest against the “aggressive acts” of the Balted States and.
; strongly to conden such acts. He introduced 2 draft resolution conisening
the "actions of tho Goverment of the United States designed to violate the
Charter of the United Metions anc to intensify the threat of war.” Tks Soviet
resolution insisted that the United States “yepeal its decision on the coatrol, |
of ships of other states going touards tho ghores of Cuba,* and ealled spon
‘the United States, Guba, and 0.S.SRo to establish contacts and cuter inte
negotiations for the. purpose of norasiizing the situation and thareby Feaoving a -
the threat of war.”
At the request of the seereutstiv of Ghana the mecting wae adjourned
to the following morning so that representatives night consult with other
delegations outside the Council. , OO
sho Woxt Morning: Qetober 26 me
The nett nora » the Security Comell heard the nopreventative of
Yonesucle, Hro Sosa-Rodriguoz, associate the Latin Anerican nations with the.
action taken by the United States pursuest to the 0.A.Ss posolution, He noted ~


.

wow Lb a

that "4% bas sen proved that the Soviet Union has set up iniCuba rocket bases
that might deliver meleer sissiles to about 1,000 miles distance, ana that,
anparently, it is at preseat sett ting up others for, roskots with @ range of up.
to 2,209 miles.” Thig had created on atmosphere of inscearity and concorn in
tho ecuntries of the American kenisphora vaich felt theaslves directly

' theostened by such Weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Yenozuclan Representative
caphasized, vere no longer dofeasive but offensive, and “thoy are of a magnitude

_ that might be sufficlent to vipe gut any of the sscrioan republics and drog the. |

. world into the holocaust of fF . ° He deseribed the apprehension felt

2 cuban subversive activities, including the

throughout the continent :
“ introdection of agents, ‘propecenta, and weapons to equip guersilla forces in
fesriean republics, jubaseedor SosacRodrigusz recalled the yesolution adopted
by the Organization, oth ioarican States and declared that he vas sposking for the
- entire contineat in asking the Security Council to take measures to step nuclear
me oapons ‘from arriving te Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of
| nuclear ‘Foskets ia cuba ‘@iguantled. -
Sky Petrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by 20
stroteh even of the Soviet imnginalioa could a nuclear mis sile with a range of
(2,200 miles in Guba be called defensive, and roealled agsurencss on this point
by Foreign Minister Geonyno and Prosident Dortieos of Ceba at the Gameral
Ausexbly the previcus month. hile the Soviet Govermzent vere acting their
lie,” he stated, “the orders vere being given, plans qaid and preperations
boing made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who con possitty belicve in
' tho honesty of the Soviet Goverszent’s intentions in these eirewistances?®
The United Kingdea, he concluded, considered that the Ualted States acted
properly by eouing to the Security Council at the first possible mozonte Now
. the Security Couecll mst take imesdiate and urgent steps to restore confidence
/in the Western

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in the Westers Hesisphere by having these offensive missiles dlssantled and
withdrawn. The United Kingdoz fully supported the U.S. resolution before tha
Council. .

fhe Representative of Rumania, Hre ‘palitea. supported the Soviet position.
fko Irish Foreign Minister, Hts Aiken, underlined world concern with tho
geouth of Soviet imtervention in Cubao He appreciated Cuban co aeera ‘with ats
national security, “out it ig a , Por ery feou that to a military puildep of the
kind whieh the Cubsn Goverment now eppesre to have exbarked upoa with the
massive assistarce of the Soviet Uakon.® He. sould not endersten! eywiay the
Soviet Union should have chosen this noasm to establish mew missile and pozker
/ bases on tho island of Cubar® the Foreign Minister believed he perceived sane

Feperrcie igromed in the U.S. statexont to the Security Comeil of October 22 whch |

declared ToS williagnass %29 confer with the Soviet Union on noeswres to
: renove the existing ‘threat to eoeurity of the Hsstern Henlsphere,” and in the
Sovist drat resoli¢ioa wich proposed thet the Yaited States, U.S.SRe and
Cuba eotablich contacts and enter into negotiations.

The Security Goanei peeonversd that evening, soze forty-cight hours
after Presidsat Kemedy°s bistorié specch. The naval quarantine had gone igto

effest at 10:69 AoMe that mornings deabors kmew that if a Soviet ship attexpted —

to run the queranting the result would be serious. ghey ziso kmewu that the
 *Brpesident had indicated that tke quarsntine ls an imnodiate step" which

would be followed by further action? 1f the Soviet missiles were not ronovede

AY thig nesting ‘the Cowell heard statexouts by those mexkers who had not
yot spokeme France, China, Chile, United Arsh Republic, and Ghma.o In
‘ adddtica to expressions of support for the U.S». rosolutios by Franco and China,
the  Bightsgnte of the mesting ware the statexcat of Chile, the United arab

secon

2 Se RR TT LM RR TEEN HOS APN a

Sear ee at Sa RA Ta ele a

= ete a agg enemy eres pen

/Republic-Ghana

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nepeblie-dhana "restraint vogolubic smo? and the first forsal imtecveation of
_ the Secretary-Genaral . Azbassedor Seydour, the Representative of Franco,
noted that “the eppearanca of foreign guelesyr missiles on Cuban soilo.-cannot
bo considered as other than a serious initiative ainzed at, eroating & Bey war
front in a regioa which up to nov has beoa freo from such threats.” He stated
that ths U.S. had denonstrated olearly that 4% is scoking a poacaful solution
in accordance, with the Charter of the Taited Nations and that the solution
_ proposed by the 8.8. ‘wag do trebil ia tho intorest of ‘tho countries coocerned
and “in order to ‘banish once and for alt the dangara with which world peace
ss threatened by tho regant dovelopseats in Gxba." Ankassador Lia, for the
! Republic of Chinas noted ‘that At was particularly disturbing to’ sea Cuba .
\peans? formed, so a result ‘of Sino-Soviet intervention, imto an arzed base for
, cosminist ponstratioa ag ‘the juries, He declared that the measures initiated |
by the TUatted States designed to eal an iunodiate halt to the shipzeat of |
. blitary natorial to Cubs wera jusidtied and supported the U.S- draft :
resolution as 3 reasonable and peaceful, golutica. _
- Spesking for Chile, jebacvodar Schuuiteer extoracd the csowlty messares
ce tie veglonal systes and exprassed sarport for the U.S> arate resolutions
He weleoned the. gauthorization that the U.S. deaft % resoluticn gevo ta the
Secrotery-.donaral to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. opafortenately," hs
said, “the Representative of Cuba yesterday rojeeted this iden. At such a .
decisive nonont as thie, vo balieve Cuba chould trust, tho methods of the United
eviews for putting out the flezeg of conflict and for ensuring PE2eS One
suck mothed could be to GAsure the United Hetions presence im a zone of |
conflict coos Wo make a fervent and heartfelt apneal, to Cuba to accept sach
a procedure.? .
{the United Arab —

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fhe United Arab Repeblic Represaatative, Bre Mahmoud Rind, declared that

“aneeeantmemem sonia er rte apeneninete zone

' bis ecuntry gamot coudone the milateral decision of the United States of
"_pearica to exorcise the quarantine” which ko characterized os costiary to
internaticasl lauiand Likely to imeresse world tension. He recalled that
’ Dre Dorticos had told the denaral, Assezbly thet the weapons cuba hed acquired
. Were "defensive. in natere” and eelled for enormaligation® of rolutions botuson
"Guba aed the United States, Ab the sano tine he reaffirmed U.ieRe policisg.

“against. the spread of ruclear wsapons. He wged ali parties to refrain from

lam peraggeageneenines qeepipanateringemnean ernie: teewnne mp emigteneie me RT AT

veasionaoggrevating action and called for gwegotiaticas. Tho Ghaxian
Representative, Re. Quaison-Saskey, took a sizilar position, stating that ke
. hed ao "incontrovertible: PROOF 0» 928 to the offensive charceter of milltery |

- developzents in Guba? and therefore could mot comdons the quarantine. He alse

eatded for yogotiations to resolve the crisis om the basis of “mateal respect

7 for soveretga Pights.®. Phe U.ARe«Ghans joint draft resolution requested the”
seeretary-Cencral Big promptly confer with the pertics directly concerned om

- “tmieaiate steps te bo taken to roxove the existing threat to world peace, and
to moxgelize the sit uption im the Caribheans" ead ealled on the parties
_ concernsd to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance
to the Seerotary-Gemeral, and “to refrain moanuhile fren any action vhich may A
directly or oe indivestly further aggrave’ ate the siteation.® ho: forma proposed Jb
was thus Lintted toa general appeal for mediation by the SeorotaryGenarale (s.

: toe Baoblo invelvezant in inspsotion asd verification.

OS sank Ppopogal of Qatcbor ok

ht the close of the Ba-tiNZo the SeccotaryConeral revealed thet he had
. fi just addresset’

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just eddzcascd an argent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairasn Khrushchev
which proposed eho voluntary suspemoioz of all amas shipments to Cuba, and
also ths volumtary suspension of the qaawantine measures involving the searching
of shins borad for Cuba." Ghent believed that euch voluntary suspension for a
poried of tuo te thres weeks wowld groctly esse the altestion and give tine to |
the parties to “nest and discuss.® We offered te Snake uysclf available to
all parties for whatever services I may be able te perforn.”

In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Presiler Kurushchov,
the § Seeretaryefensral took tho ‘ceeasion of the Security Cowell meeting to

“ aavess an urgent spposl to tho President ont ester of Guba, dsclaring that

‘3%; ould also contribute grostly te the saze cad if the constructica and
devalopsent of wajor silitery facilities end installations in Gebe would be
 sespended during the poried of zegotiations.” He then appealed to “the parties
) coxserncd” to eater into negotiations imedistely, Seven this night," |
irrespective of other prosedures, vith the firet subject to be discassed being ©
the °acdalities" to achieve his suggestions, Signifieast im U Tkant°s intervention
wore his offer to rake hineal? available to U.S- and Soviet negotiatars “for
vhatover services” he might perform ami the concrete suggestion for Sguspension®
of Soviet ares ghignents ami of the construction and cavelopscat of wajor
military iuotaliaticns in enchange for tho suspension of the ‘qearantine.
the maxt day, President Kennedy*s reply reninded the preyerrmareh
that the threat °uas created by the sserot intredusti.oy of offensive weapons.
tate Cuba, aud the answor Lies in the remeval <«f such HELPORSf fhe Prosident
4 that tho Seerotary.Coperel hedtesds certain suggestions ates invited
sci ierlm ioimery talks te dstersine whether satisfactory arrengerente cen be

—— aed ieadated that Cambassador Stevanson is ready 46 discuss proaptly


o@ 19%

these arrangenents with you." Proeniee Earushehev*s reply wellconed yu fhant’s |

initiative and characterized ‘the situation "as highly dangerous and calling ©
for the immediate intervention by the United Bations.”

When the Security Coaacii cocanvaned Shuveday afterncon for what proved
to bs the last formal mestiag on the Gubsn crisis, ‘hebassador Stevenson
weleezed both the course adopted oy the. Soviet Union the provicus day to
avoid dirset confrontations fia the 2020 of quarantine and the report that

Ere Knrachehor Rad agrecd to the proposals esvenced by the seezotarytonoral .
,Hovarthaless, the situntion remained serious and ‘Asbassador Stevensom set the
“hone im hie opening voasrk by inv! iting the Council to address itself to the

7 realities of the situatica posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power

$ :
ja Cuba.®

Anbaseador Stevenson cautioned the Counsil not to forget that “us are
boro today’s efor one single reason: beeaase the Soviet Unien seeratly

introduced this mmacing offensive militery buildup into the island of Cuba .

while assuring the world that nothiag was further from its thougats.%

Already the Comamists hed attempted te dletort tho record by arguing that

£% was mot the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly —

installing these weapons in Cuba, “but thet it wes the United States which

' eronted this wisis by discovering and ruporting these installations. This

ag the Pirst vine, I sonfess,* the U.S. Representative contimeed, “thet I
| “Rave ever heard 4% said that the crieg is mot the burglary. ut the discovery

of the barglas ‘ 27 He note 2 that sono vepresentatives bao the Gomell say. Yat

they do mot imo whether the Soviet Usior has in fact ‘puilt ig Cuba

Sustallatdonas capable of firing maclear missiles ovar ranges fraa 1,000

2,600 wiles. if further dewbt remaized on this secre the United States would -

Ieeay

fiw prengenai enn one re rs

egg ee DE TLE TBE RL PEE IE PRE LAE I OE ATTY

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2 2) o ; , oo?
| gladly exhibit photographie evidence to prove the truth of the charges.
- Oxe by one Aubassador Stevenson dexolished the arguments that Amzessador |
; Zovin had presented at the first Security Comeil meoting. As for the
“thirtyefive bases in foreign countries” waich the Soviet Represcatative had
mentioned, the fact was that there ware such missiles with the forces of
. only three of our allies << the Quited Kingdos, Italy, and Turkey: <= and that
. these were established by tha devisioa of Reads of Coverrmont in Deceabar 1957
Svhich vas s compelled to suthorize such arrangements by virtue of a priory
‘ Soviet decision to introduce its ov mlesiles eapeble of destroying the .
coantries of Western Europe.” why was it necessary for the Western Healsphore
nations to act with such apeed? The “speed and stealth” of the Sovict
offensive buildup in Cub desonstiated the preneditated attempt by the Sovict
| Union sto confvont this hemisphere with a fait aggamlie® If the United States
_ had not acted” prospthy and pad delayed’its comteraction, “the meclearization
© of Guba would have been quickly completed.” Ho stroosed that the United 7
7 : states had acted promptly to pet inte peouess “tho political machinery which
‘we pray will achieve a salution to this grave orisis.® ‘The one action in (| -
| the ‘Last feu days veich had strengthened the peace waa ‘the Goternination to
stop this further spread of weapons in this hesispheros qhe United States
was now ia ¢he security Counsil, Aebaseador Stevenson noted, because 1k
wished the machinery of the United Nations “to tae over to reduce those .
tensions and to interpose ite? to eliminate this aggressive threat to
peace and to ensure the renoval ‘frou this hemisphere of offensive nuclear
| wesvons and the corresponding lifting of the querantine.*
‘When Zorin again attempted to delude the Counell ebout the facts of
the Soviet offensive buildaip, a drazatic encounter occurred betucen
ST _ Stevenson and

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“Stevenson and Zorin,g which exposed the trath beyond doubt.
STEVEESOW: | Wall, let me gay something to you, Hr. Axbassedors we do
| have the evidence. We have it, end it is clear and incontrovertible. And
let mo say somsthing elses Those wapons must be taken out of Cabs. |
| Next, let me say to you that, if I umderstood you, you said = with a
_ trespass on eredulity that exeels your best ~- that ou position had changed
since I spoke here the other day because af tho pressures ‘of world opinica
gad a najority of the United Bations.. Well, let no aay to Fou» sir: Toa
; are wrong agains “We have had 20 pressure from anyone whatsoever. ve Cane
: here today to indicate our willingness to cisouss U Thant’s proposals - ao BE
; . that is the only change that bas taken plase.
i But let He also say to you, sir, that there has been a changa. You, |
, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union,

pave ‘upset ‘the balanog of ‘power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have:

a ereated this, new! danger - ee not the United States...

Finally, Mr. torin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny
: the existence af these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly |
become defensive weapons. Bat today oe» again, if I heard you correctly a

"you ‘say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist om and

- you say this with ansther fine flood of rhetorical seora. rel vighty sir,

let me ask you one sinple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that
the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and internediate-range
missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do mot wait for the interpretation.

Yes or no?

' ZORINs I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not

wish to answer a question that is put to me an the fashion in which a.

prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply. - .

/ STEVENSON:

ae preemie ae ne AC MON, 8S tar tere emer


See : : : .
aed . oO be :
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: Lo .

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"STEVENSON: You are in the courtrooa of world opinion right now, and
_ you can answer nyas” of "no®, You have dented that they exist -- ard I
want to know whether I have understood you correctly.
— ZORIN: Will you please continue your statenont, sir? You will have

your answer in due course.

se cece eres evened areneeine nena A) Me Speen Te menos gee

Inasmuch ag Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present
conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba.

This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and paps

pinpointing the details and Location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aireraft and of
Soviet. misgile basas, complete with launching sites and supporting equiprent,

tay short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible

woapons." When Zorin’s reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet

“ae cn canes nee amen ena npate Regn pen

Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the

Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he

had identified in order to authenticate the evidence. 7
{he proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana,
%Q postpone further work ‘of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was
adopted without ob jection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the
B,5.SoRe to consult with the Secretary-Gensral on his suggestions of the "

previous day. - The Security Couneil thus adjourned but remained “seized"

of the probley while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the
fymal chauber of the Security | Counsil to the informal chanbers of the .

Sgorotary General.

[Weekend Negotiations:

tb oneaelg Ade te

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Weekend liogetiati ons Tae Kennady-Knrushchev tet lers
That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters

between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba
erisis. 0a Oetober 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to Preeident Rennedy.

making certain proposals on the ramoval of offensive weapons from Cuba.
“On Cetcber 27, another isttisr from Khrushchev, which was broadcast befors
- delivery, algo expressed willingness te withdraw the weapons but proposed

to 1ink the queation of Soviet offensive weapong ta Cuba te the unrelated .

: {veue of strategic weapons iz Turkey. the USSR would ragras te remove.

fron Cuba those. weane which ‘you regard & ap offensive msans We agree

to carry thia gut. and made a pledge da the United Nations. Your repre-
"sentative will nade a. declaration bed ‘the effect that the United States .
3 America, “On ptr part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the
fo Soviet State, wl remove ita gimilar meang from Turkey...After that
oe persons “sntrasted by the United Nations: Security Councit may check on
‘the « epot tho ‘fulfilment of the pledga made by either wide.” Of courze, » oe
he added, Bene suthorisation of tae Governmsate of Guba and of Turkey
. weuld be necensary for Gis eabry Late ‘those countries of thene agente. o
_ In addition, Karuehchey proposed that the United States and the USSR
give pledges against invasion of Uuba and turkey respectively: and eodem .
_ pramises to reyapect the sovereignty and ths inviolabi lity of the frontiers
of these countries.
- This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejacted. by the
tiited States. A statement issued by the kiite Howse that dey noted
that eoveral inconsistent and conflicting prepogale had been made by

the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.

2 fhe proposal

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“the propoxal involved the security of * nations ou wtedde the Western
“Hemisphers and.it-wag the Western Hemigphere nations alee that were
the subject of the threat which produced the crigis. ‘The position of
the United States, the statenent read, was that “ag an urgent ‘preliminary
* to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban baa ses mast Zbop3
offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further ehipment of |
offensive weapons to Cuba must cease ~- ali under effective international
= verificatica," As to propodals concerning the security of nations cabelas a
this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and itg allie
had long taken the lead in seeking properly Inspected ars limitation,
Moy on both sides, These efforts cowld continue as soon ag the present seviét- .
- created threat was ended.
Te President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev ef the same day
v4 (ooteber 27) replied to Khrushehev's letter of Getober 26.
. mae r read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of
your proposale which seem generally acceptable as I underatand them are .
as follows: ;
#2, “You would agrea to remove these weapons systems fron Cuba
_ under appropriate U. N. obs ervation and auperviedons’ and undertake,
with suitable safeguardd, to halt the further introduction of such
weapons systans dito Cuba. |
WZ, We, on our part; ‘would agree <= upon establishment of adequate
arraygeusnte through the United Nations to ensure the carrying oyt
and pontinuation of these comituents -- (a) to renave promptly
the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b} to give ageurance
against an invasion of Cuba, and I am ‘eoufident ‘thes other nations
of tbe Wester Hemtophore & ial be prepared ¢ to do iikewdea.

agg wegate Oy rire teh ta Tagless ee
oF wi ma Spe

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Agsuning work cvaned on offensive missile bageg in Cuba and all weapons

systema in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered incpsrable, under.

| effective UN arvangemants, the President vas prepared to have representatives
in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Se cretary-General
for a permanent solution akong the Lines suggested in Chairman Khrashchev’s
- 7 letter of October 26. *. . by .
(On Sunday, October 28 == Chairman, Khruchchev broadcast the text of
. his reply in addition te earlier ineeructiong: vo dlecontinus: further. wrk

- on woapeng coustraction sites be the Soviet Goverament "has given .

8 new “order te alsnantle the arms vhieh you described ag offensive, and
- ro crate and return. them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:
ae regard with respect, and truet the statement you mada in yeur
_ _ Jradeage of October 27, 1962, that there would bea no attack, no invasion -
do te of Ouba, and not only on the part of the Usited States, bet also on » the :

part. of other nationy of the: Western - Hemisphere, as. you gaid in your pang —

ae ‘then the motives which induced sas to vender sselstance of such
‘a kind te Cuba disappear. ; :
"Zt is for thi reason that we instrocted our officers <= thess means
ae I had alraady informed yeu earlier are in the hands. of the Soviet oe
a officers =~ to take appropriate measures to discontinue sonetruction of
. the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle then, and to raturn them to
the Soviet Union. As I had infermsd you an the letter of Octebar 27,
we are prepared to reach agreenont to enable Tnited Nations Representatives
te verify the dismantling of these means.
“Thus ia view of the ageurances you have given and eur instructions on

diemantling, there is every eoudition fey eliminating the present conflict."

/Chairnan

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Chairman Khrugheney sent a copy of this message te U Thant "to enable

you to familiarize yourself with cur positica, which ve regard as exhaustive -
and which “whl help you to discharge your noble. funetiong.” At the sama

time, he informed the Thited States and the United Nations, that in connection
with the negotiations U0 Thant was conducting with representatives ef the USSR,
‘the United States, and ‘Cuba, the Soviet Government vas sunding First Deputy
Foreign Minister ¥. ¥. ‘Kuznetsov te Bow York to help U Thant in his noble
‘efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerevs ci¢uation.® |

President Kennedy replied at once to the breadcest maseage of October 28 7

even before the official text reached him, and weleemed it as "an important

ah pees: eet

. , contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:

“The distinguished efferte of Acting Secretary-General, 0 Tnant
. have greatly facilitated both our tavks. I conzider my letter to
_you of Ostober 27 and your reply ‘of today ae firm undertakings on
the part of both our governments which should be prenptly earriod
out. IX hege that the necessary measures can at. once be taken through
the United Nations as your masage gays, so that the United States
in % burn can. Texove the quarantine msagures now in affect. I have
. already nade arrangements to report all these matters te the
Organization of Ansricaa States, wiove mombera share a deep interest,
ina genuine peace in the Caribbean urea.“ 4 .
"Y agree with you,? the President cencluded, "hat we must devote :
urgent attention to the probiem of disarmament. oJ think we should
give priority te questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear 7

weapons, on earth and in cuter space,and to the great effort for a

. fnuglear test ban.

fete geet
Docld: 324247 3 Pag


= 27 «
i,
nuclear test baz. Bat we ghould also work hard to see £f wider

meauures of disarmament éan be agreed and put inte operation at an
. early dats, the United States Govermasnt will be propered to discuss 7
these questions urgently, gad in a constructive spirit, at Geneva
er elsewhere."
A. U.S. statement iesued the sans day welcomed the Khrashchéy responge

and stated: We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United .

| Natdons | with respect 4 to reciprocal measures to assure tha yoace: a the

“Caribbean area."

7 Weokend Fopotiati ons i Hew Yor
ee Meanthile steps contiaued in 3 New York to reach agreement on practical

means of avoiding confhict at ga and on arrangements to carry out the

Seoretary-Cenoral?s suggsation for stopping work on the offensive bases and -

prong further abipmenty ag conditions. of suspending ‘he quarantine.
The. initial, sm of the Sesvetary-Ceneral was to" avaid an incident: at

“pea. What concerned hiu most, he had written on Oeteber 25 to Chairmen |

. Khrushchev, waz that a confrontation at gon betwoen Soviet ships and Gn}ted:

States vessels rypuld destroy any possibility of the discusatons r have 4

suggested as a prelude toe negotiations on a peaceful 6e etlement.* He

therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be inetructed

_ te stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order tte
“permit digeuesions of the modalities of a possible agreement.” fhe next
: day (October 26), the Secretary-Cenoral addressed a parallel Setter to
Progident Kennedy, ‘informing him of his approach te Chairman Khrushchev
and requesting that ninetrustd ont may be issued the United States’ vessels

ia the Caribbean $0. de overything posedbie to" avoid direct confrontation with

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Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the ‘rigk of an
outward incident.” He expressed the further hope that such eouperation
. could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of...
uhich the quarantine msasures could be called off as goon as possible. |
Premier Nharughchey accepted the proposel and "ordered the magters of
Soviet voessls bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception ' area, ag
you recommand.” President Kennedy weleoned u Thant °s efforts for a.

eaticfactery golutiea and stated that i? the Soviet. Qovermicnt acceptg

and abides by nie request that Soviet ahipe ‘already on thotr ey te Cuba
stay out of the. interception area ‘during the peried of prelininary discussions
, o yon may be: ‘desured that this Goveranent will accept and abide by your |
" request thet our veszels in the Caribbean Yo everything possible to avoid
: “¢arect confrontation, saith Sovket chips in the next few days in- order to
3 -pinintig tho risk of any antoward incidents * at the gana time the Frevident

“underlined . that, this.we an matter of great urgency in view of the fect

that certain Soviet chips were. ‘otal proceeding touard Cuba and the |
interception area, .

- Sergening Shipments,

. Ags the Yhite House’ statement on October 2? made clear, the urgent
preliminary to the concideration of any proposals for a solution wae that

; wori on the Cuban baces stop, the offene! ive weapons be rendered inogarable, -
and further shigwent of veapene to Cuba mest ceage-<all under effective ; o
international verification, After that means must be found to get the .
missiles and other offensive weepens removed and their removal verified and
to inatitute adequate safocuards against their reilntraduction.

 fTha immediate

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“the tmodiate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the .

‘initial phase,’ Wee to work out a gyeten for incoming Shiprente to ensure
that no further affonsive weapons. were being introduced. The tN asked

the Intermational Comaittes of the Red Croae { (z0R6) to § gerve as its agent
in inepecting incoming vessels to make eure that ne more 5 Soviet weapons
were coming in to Cuba. Tho operation would be expected to continue for ;

. ‘about one month and would be entrusted te come thirty inspectors wnieh

| the ICRC vould undertake to recruit, Hr. Poul Ruegeer, former proaident
co of the TORC, arrived in Hew York early in Hovenber. tediseuss with the UN
whether and under what elreumstances the ICRC could widertake this task.

| in releases iseued in Geneva on Novexber 5 and November 13, the TCRC
‘pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with

. the formal agreenent of “the three parties concermed." The stateneat -

ro _ issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "evantual action by the
. TCRC- would be based on previowe congent being given by the three states.

: concemed* and the nethods of contre) ‘would have to be clarified in future .
discusalene. Premier Castro refused to give his eongent to the proposed
schexe, Before final arrangements eculd be made it WBS, in any event,

 pealiged that the system envigaged would no leager be required and that

' the Taited States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely
on other meang, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments
of offensive weapons. | . . :

“Havana talks

The pain obatacle’ to pregregs on establishing the conditions for a.

eottlenent wag the attitude of the Cuban government. - On October 26 U Thant

_farote Prime wintetor

OLN eae getty He

— nee
| HW 50955 DocTd: 3342

IT Ae feet oe ccey


Se _ ry
: oo i ,
wrote Prime Minister Cagtro renewing bic appeal that he (Castre} direct that
_ ™the construction and development of major military facilities and
installations la Guba end especially installations desl gned ¢ $a launch

medium-range aad intermediate-range ballistic missiles, te suspended

sree, Creat inom capmnene ne oe PREG MINE ERE NER LEN ERE

during the poricd ef nagetietions which are now endervay.”

‘Dr. Castro's reply cane the next day and proved to be a hedged accept-

ance. He rejected "the preswytion of the thited States to determine what

action we are entitled ta take within our P country, what kind of arms we.

consider appropriate tor our datende,* Cuba wes prepared to accopt ‘tthe

. compromises that “you, request as afforte in favor of peace 3 provided that — c
1 Bt the sama tn, enile negotiations ave in progress, the United States

coveranent desiats from threats and ageresaive actions against Cuba,

sg renee

_ including naval vleckade of the country." Read Literally, De, Cagtre wag -
| saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending :

the quarantine. At the same time » bis letter contained another note:

nadqmeg neon err errr a

8, Should you consider At weofel to the cause of peace, our government
“would be glad te receive Fou in our country ag Sesretary-General of the - rn:
United Nations, with a: view to direet digcussions on the present. erisia." _ . - of

u Thant réplied eho next day noting that Castro was | prepared to accept.

the suggestion he nad made provided the Uaited states Government “desints :

rom threats. against Cuba including the naval Blockade" while negotiations ~

wore in progress. ‘Ho accepted the invitation to wieit Cuba carly in the

coming week ==. ond to "oving a fow. aides vith Re to leave some of them behind . _ |
to continue our - eonmen etfert to ards 2 scetud solution of the problen.” |
Po focititate his task ‘the United Staves had agreed to ‘guspand its naval

quarantine and ‘eoriel survei lence during. ‘the  Seoretary-Censvall'e visit to. oS

_fBavana.

HW 50955 DocId:32494709 Page 107

~ Fle

et vue : ,

Havana, At thts point » the United Rationg was working on tHe ascumption :

that the vieit to Cuba would be concerned vith yorking out molalities of

Uo. ebcervation and inspection and "reciprocal measures + aseure the

pozce in the Caribbean."

fhe issue was further clouded by Castro’s netatensnt ‘of conditions"

- §esusd in Havana on Octeber 28. "The guarantecs of waich President Komedy

gpsaks against the. invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elinination | ,

also of the naval blockade ;" he declared, "and adoption; - auong others, of

’ ‘the following measares:”

1.

3°

End of the economic blockade and mall measures of commercial

and economic pressure" exercised by the Uaited States against

Cuba

End of wall subversive activities and the organization or support
of imvasionss

End of npdrate attacks" frou bases in the United States and
Puerte Rico; |

End of "violationa of air and naval specs by the ‘United States;
United States withdrawal from the naval bage at Guantanamo and its |

return to Cuba.

Thie statenent of conditions wag ¢learly unacceptable and adunbrated

. 4tg intrans}gent . position that the Cuban authorities would take during the .

Ravana talks. JU Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier Ganeral

Rilkhye and a email mili¢ary staff, flew to Havana on Oeteber 30 and held

“telke with Guban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N.

; eupervicion of removal of the offensive weapons and to digguss the other

acdalities for: carrying out the Kenmedy-Rurushclov agreement of October. 27-28.

/artiroiign store a

HW S095S” Docta:3249e%09 . Page Tbs? (OP 0 Povo eee ot pe

pee te sna RE TEI IE TT I TA CE

; 2326, -
Although general agreensnt was reached that the United Nations showld
participate in cottlemont of the Cuban crisis and the talks vere characterized
. ag "fruitful," the Cuban awthorities balked at all preposals for U.N.

inepeetion of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction.

a snliea mtemeesepmie on raion ome nL SRR Epa ias Ae sete mtn wut

“Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28
gtatement. These demands were ebviouely beyond ‘the scope of the,
Sacretary-General’s purpove ih negotiating with the Cubang, and no agreeuent
was reached. . |
es The Secretarg-Ceneral and his party retumed te © Hew York “tng next day,
uhere, it was understeod; alka betwson the Secretery-Gsneral and Cuban
(Peproventatives + would contines, Premier Castre, hovever, did state that he
would not interfere with. the Soviet removal of the migelles. The missiles
8re. Snot ours, he gad in a radie spsech om Novexber 1 in which he
: 7 “reported on his talks with J Jhant, but he rajected any form of intéraational
dnepecticn on the withdraval ef Soviet waapone. He specifically turned
down a proposal that ‘the: Intemations? Committees of the Red Croas ¢ rere)
‘carry out the inapestion task, He also rejected other forms: of tN tnepect.gn.
On Friday, Noveaber 2, Soviet Firet Deputy Premier Anastal I, Mikoyan
arrived in New York ca his way to Havana and issued a . statement cupporting
Premier Castro's demands ard warmly endorsing the Cuban regina,
 Survyolllance and Dismantling Continued . .
| When U Thant lef Hevana without a mutually satisfactory formula,
| President .Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to.
Cuba and authorized reg gwaption of cloge serial surveillance of ‘the iglend
to dstermine unether diamantling of Sovict ndseile basses was proceeding

ag reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of Nevember 2, the

/President reported

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asa ii ana

AWW 50955 Docld:32424709 | Page 110

eo 33

President. reported in a short gelevision and radio breedcast that the
"Soviet missile bages ars being disnantled, the missil ag are being

‘ erated and the fixed installations at the sites are peing destroyed." The
Preeident said the information was based on acriel photographs and added .

that the Urited States intended to follow closely the completion of this ,

work through various means, fueluding aerial surveillance, until Ran equally
satisfactory international meang of verification is effected." ‘He also
gaid that while the quarantine remained in effect, hs was ‘hopeful that
adequate procedures could be developed for: international inspection of

Cuba~bound ‘eargess.. Fhe Taternationsl Gommittce of the Red Cross could be

i "en appropriate agent" for carrying out tls inspection.

mony Hew Yorke Nogotiabions:  Yord fication end T2685

“Weanuanile 2 talke proceeded in New York between Anbassador Stevenson
and Be, John J. MeCloy for the Taited States and Deruty Foreign Minister _
‘Rusnoteoy, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working owt the details of”
“the schoms for ORC. inspection of laceming shi puents (deseribed above) hace

negotiators gpent the next three weeks in considering suo main iseves.

: Until November 12 the contral concern ef the negotiators wag to make sure.

| thet the offensive missile gystem had left Cuba and te work out a satige
factory aysten for verification that diemandling and renoval had in fact -
taken place. Associated with thie was ths problea of longer-term safe~
guards ageinst the reintroduction er offensive WOSPSES Fron Rovember’ w
to Hove mber 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problen of removal
of the Sevist TL-26 bombers from Cuba. .
| On vorificatioa, ae vag clear that what the President had terusd .

Pan equally satiefactory international usens of verification" required an

adequate | Gi ‘eye stom ‘of ‘fnepsction to make sure: that: the offensive wsapOns - a

t

fnad in fact


‘ Lo
- | a

had in fact. been renoved, te guard against hiding, and to > provertt
reintroduction of sus h weapons. Various Schenss were ‘considered -
and the USSR made clear its willingness 3 teh have oY verification take place.
Castro ademantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the

UN or under ite auspices for removel of the weapons. US negotiators

peer ne renee a Oe ET MIRAE A a RBar ep mmEE

contimied te maka 1t clear to the Soviet negotlaters thet US aerial
surveillance vould continue so loug as there was no adequate UH syaten of
inspection, When it became elear that Castro would not give nis consent

te UN ingpection or verification of shipments frem his ports, the negotiators

tumed to ‘devising a systen for GS inspection < at sea of outgoing ships

carrying the diexantled miseiles. The 05 ‘pavel vessels would coma “alongeide"
departing Seviet vess els wnieh wowld be loaded in such a way as te enable .
“the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid
prognges was mede in dismantling 2 and toading the rissiles and by November
' the US had counted 2 departing missiles by this procedure, Falling UW .
verification and safeguards, the BS continusd its oun “system of surveillance - Ss
under the” existing OAS vegolution to meke sure that offensive weapons a
were nob reintroduced. . - 7
On Hovenber 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators
--teok up again the question of the venoval of: TL-283 and made it clear
that the United States could not consider Lifting the quarantine anti
the bembera wera withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their
part of the bergein by dismantling and removing the nisalige and were
sging for Lifting of. the quarantine and a U.S. non~irivagion pledge, -
. Tre oS posi Lea was that the bombers ware defined ag offensive

weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of. Octeber r 23 and that they, Cee Bad wee

pore included 20


‘ @ oe

_ were included. ag. such im the Kennedy-Khrue noker exchange of Octover 2728.

The United States made it clear that 1t could uct consider lifting the

quarantine wmtil the Sovists agreed to remove the Ti-28s within a short time.

Partisl Settlement: Nowexber 20 :
on November’ 20, Br. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wtehed
to remove the beubors he would not object. That day an agreenent was reached

betwoen Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the Th-28e would oe withdraw, .

a, & U Thant was notified the game day by anbacoader Stevenven . ead Deputy Foreign

Minister. Kueneteovs ‘Soviet agreement we renove the panbers payed the way

*

‘for the Lifting of the: quarontiti. The partial s settlement had | taken just .

At nis pres 5 conference that evening, President Kennedy snnounced

‘shat he hed that day been informed by Chairman Karushcher that all of the

| meet bombers in Guba, would be withdrawn in shirty days 3, and that these
38 Co a. erved and counted aa they departed. “iesmuch ag this
goes a tong way sowerds reducing the ‘danger wWiieh faced tht hemisphere .
four weeks ago," the Fresidsnt announced , af have this afterncon instructed
the Secretary ef Defense to Lift our naval quarentine." The Presidant |
then recalled the egresnont he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev
October Z7-26, “ineluding the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had
complied with all his pledges > Hea woud remove our naval quarenvine. and —
give assurance against invagion of Cuba." Bridence to date indicated that
‘ali known offencive missile sites had beon diswantled, he stated, and sea
inspection by the navy had confirmed thet the missiles had teen withdrawn.
Bui, ke warned, Hiepor riant part 2" of the agrsemont "remain to be carried

out. The Cuban Government has net yet permitted the United Nations to

\ frerify whether all Ys Bene

HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 112

peek a SRD PPR es CRA auth ise ts pote A a in Sa
‘ ° -
a * , | e
. | @

ag
= 36 =

;
verify whether all offeneive weapons have been remered, and no lasting

Le appear gee oe mre Ma he eee EN
aires re

safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of

offensive weapons back inte Cuba.* the United States, therefore, had no
choice but to pursue ite owa means of checking on military activities in
Cuba. ‘fhe United Stetes, he gaid, will continues ite efforts to achieve . |
tadequate international arrangemate for the task of ingpection and . or
verification ‘of Cube." Later, in reply tc a question, he defined adequate ; (

safeguards a3 "an inspection which would provide Us with agsarances that

there are not in the igland weapong capabis of offensive action ‘againet

United States or neighboring countries and that they wil not be reintroduced, "

Regarding guarantess against invasion, the President gtated that these ;
were contingent on adequate verification and vafeguards for the future. oa

a “AS for our part, 4f all effensive weapons are removed from

Cuba and hope out of the Hemigphers in the future, wider |
adequate verification and safeguards, and if. ‘Cuba is not used _

for the export of aggressive Commins. 2% gurposea, ¢here will be
peace in” the Caribbean. And, as r agta in ‘Septexber, We shell -

noither fnttiat 2. Ror permit aggression in tds hemisphere."

The United Seat vee he stressed, would not abandon the political,

economic,’ aga other efforts to hald subversion from Guba nor its purpoge |

and hogs | Rae & the Cuba people shell soma day be fulldy | free. That thesg |

policies

sig very different from any Intent to Jauneh a military invasion
of? the ieland.”

Tater-Amorican quarentins Porce fomnine ated: Gpstatione

yh

Following the. Lifting of the quarentire, the three governments whose.

- foaval units hed

set Pe Ray eye wee nateita tags Nowe eetin? fof tee ae boa
ria 50955 ‘Page. ne en Cn ace poe de oe


oe
: _ @

naval unite tad paréiedpated in tho intersAmsricsn coabined quarantine
force w= i.e. Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United Statas --
notified the €.0.A.5./0.C. on Wovenbor 30 that the operetions of the
quarantine force had been termineted. Uurley thie pseried, it had not been
necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and
other types of assistance made by ether henigpherie determinatien and
solidarity,

Ag the negotiations botween the United States and the Soviet Trion
in New York progressed, the United States kept the o.0.8.8./0.0. fully a
informed of devélopients.. “the C.0.8.8./0.C. in the meantime withheld
aking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks werg

‘complet ed.

Continued. Negotistions —

The Soviet Government carried oub it3 promize to withdraw the rin28

poubors, and, by December &, the tated States wae informed that all benbers

(he ‘dn ‘nunber) hed left. No progress, hoijever, wad made duping the rest
of the month in achieving the radsquate ingemational arrangersnts fer the

tack of ingpection and. werification in Cuba" that the President had

- mantigned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding.

Dsputy Promisr Mikeyan''s three-hour conversations with ths Pregident on
Novenber 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did act advance
the final golution. The question was turned over again to the delegations
in Hew York. |

By mid-December several important loose ends still remained, . No,

fadequate,

HY 30955 Docld: 32424709 Page 114

a gteeticrmecnre n mereretanee a ry

2

§ Ther near etre ener nene gem

to ptt a ene anne pe I en Fem ecm tet

Ba

Ae

ry oo h a £ :
adequate, U.N,-superviesd arrangements fer verification of removal of

7
|
f
ft
offensive weapons and safeguards ageins} their reintroduction had been . ‘|
achieved, the U. S$. agsurance against invasion or suppor eting an inwasion of
t
k
Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons “were hot i
;
present or reintroduced into Cute and thet Cuba refrained from aggressive’ i
j
i

acts against the Weetern Hemlephers.

Soviet Troops _ . — , - ; ; :
The withdrawal, of Soriet personnel from Cuba vag algo a natter of

deep concern to ths United States, As the President stated at his

press conference ef November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet

combat unite and other Sovies mits wore assoclated with the protection

f. . ;
ef effensive weapons systems and would alee be withdrawn in dus course.

the U.S. position was that removal of the offengive weepons systems made the
! pesaenee ef Seriet traops to defend euch + pons ne longer necessary. | ie
7 “Efforts be secure their removal continued inte 1963,
Security. Council Consideration Coneluded
fhe formula for tenninating Security Council consideration of the

Cuban crisis vas finally agreed between the governments of the United

States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. Tt represented a standstill
‘yather than a final settlement. The tuo governments agreed to send a
joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to
the Security Council for information of its members, The text of the .
letter read:
| "On behalf’ of the covernmente ef tha United States and the
Soviet Union, we desira te express to you our appreciation for

_ your efforts in assisting our governments te avert the serious
threat te the peace uhich recently arose in the Caribbean area.

pprrneeeenee gre tmecene: yong meme remaster, gears neengemeentp nn saeco ly ete

"yhile at has not bsen possible for cur governments to

/resolve all the -

HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 115

— .* ]
: ©

resolve al} the problems that have arigen in eonnection with this
affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding»
reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the
extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it
is not receagary for this item to occupy further the attenticn A
of the Security Council at this tine,

one manera pone nerccemea ate aime eR,

"The Govermments of the Urited States of America and of the
Soviet Union express the hope thet the actions taken to avert the ae
_¢breat of war in commection with this erisis will lead toward the i
adjustment of other differences between them end the general :
- easing of tengions that could cause a further threat of war. ® ,

The sama day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative ef Cuba,
Carlos M.. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he
requested ba ¢rarionitied to Uaited Nations mambors, sxpreesing 2 dissenting

view on the conclusion of the affair, Cuba, the letver declared, "does

_ snob consider as effgetive any agreenont other then one which would include’

consideration of five points or measures, wich ag minimum guarantees to

peace in the Caribbean, our Prim Hinieter Fidel Castro stresses in his
‘declaration of 26 Ogteber, 1962...00 .
As the Security Council concluded ite consideration of the Cuban
iten, the situation remained as follewss

4. ‘The Soviet Union had withdram ite offensive missiles,

ena en ME Ee Merete Men gees cape amma pamenrongentecmtetin, to certs at

°° 4¢8 bombers, and soms of its military personnel. ‘The United

States and participating American Republics had lifted the
-querentina, ~ | . , ;

2, The Cubans had refused to accept eu site inepection and

post-removal verification or te agree on a system of sentinuing ~~ [
safeguards against relntroduction of offensive weapons under _

United Nations auapices.
3, In the abgence of adequate insyection and safeguards, the . ood
United States continued other metheds of surveillance of military ..

. oo  factivities in _
HY 50955 Docld:32434709 Page 116

ee 7 ot 4, @ : i

oe KO »

estivitdes in Cuba in the intereste af hemispheric security.

hk, The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in

Cuba constituted an unacceptable interventisn of foreign

military power in the Western Hemisphers. Efforts contdnuad

with the USSR to chtain their removal og agread,

5S. The United States continued tc be sericusly conserned about
‘Guban subversive efferts directed against other American Republics.

6. The United States position with regard te assurance against

Aneasiion Fomained that stated by the Pres ident on ‘November 20, as J 4

duthined above, | _ i:

Vo With he contlusion of the Now York telke and the Joint GS-TS5R :

-Istter teminating Security Council congideration of the matter,
responsibility: of further action remained with the OAS Organ of

' - Consultation in its hemispheric context,

| Con: Lemente ne of Bila

“Gonehusion: ary Role

aberal, Rap pnais and UN Diplomac

ns

the Cuban affair denorstrated the utility and possibilities for inte

action of the varicue dipleratic and military inetrumente available to the

' United States in a cris vi. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional,

arrangements, and the United Natione syatem marked the handling of the

erisis throughout. Im particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique

demonstration of coordination hetween a regional system and the world

organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the 0,A.5. and the

Usited Nations, deyending on the task to be perfermed and the governments

ai

directly involved, The 0.4.5. systen successfully met the test of

a am ae a

 fworkability by

oe ene eee mere

HW 50955 Docla:32424709 Page 117

workability. by denonstrating comiusively, the solidarity and determination
of the American Republics when their gecurity is endangered. The rapid,
dscisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty
etrengthened the hand of the Usited States in making ats sass before world
opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in

nogetiating with the Soviets.

4
'

“The United Nations played a thres-feld role: as a forum for exposing _
Soviet duplicity and for anlisting diplomatic suppert of the United Staten
position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for
negotiations and, ag an institution willing and abla, on shert notice,
to provide inepection and verification servi cag.

(2) The United States provided an waparalleled forum for presenting
the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to repregentatives of

109 nations and through communications media directly to world public

opinion. Ambaeaador Stevenscn’s gpaeches of Octcber 23 and 25 in the
Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations vO
delegations both inside and eutsida the chamber, prevented incontrevertibie °
evidence in a dramatic and effeetive manner and thus helped in convincing

the world of ths facte. Yn addition, the Waited Nations provided a

forum in ehich the American Republics cowld impress on the world and

on the Secretary-Gensrel their solidarity on thig issue.

(2) the Secretary-Gensval provided an effective point ef contact,
notably in the tease days at the outast ef the erisis and valuable
suggestions for avoiding cirsct eonfrontation, The Secretery-General’s  .—
intervention on the cecond day of Security Couneil debate, in which i
he called for suspension of arn shipments and of construction and
development of military inetallationg im exchange for suspension of

i

sd 5O98S Saw TA 90424909 Page ALG 4 oyu wk ea tee ya yee, cee A EHO, QUATANEINE snip oncners,


a

bq we, & a, = &

the quarantine led te the formula under whieh Seviet ships! stayed away
- fren the interseption area and on that condition the United States agreed |
_ to do everything poasibls to avoid diract confrontation. Khrushchev gave
unprecedented agreement te tha idea of U.N. inspection and verification |

of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was

4
1

ready and capable of organiaing a corps of observers and a eystem of
inspection in rapid order. -
"Both the United Katiens and. the Organization ef American States proved

their utility. and vigor <= and anerged atxonger from the erdgal,

as

‘HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 119

‘SECRET - wap WITH srAceyeTS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

a iia

March 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: ‘Cuba

Ae & follow-up to my rnemorandum to you on February 15,
£963, lam attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in.
tactimeny given by the Degartmuent of Defense te congressional
committees. They continue from the latast dete of each coransitice |
excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed

” Services Gommittee trauseYipts.

Not ali testimeany has heen eercencd for Cuba references
inasmuch ae all trangerigte are got available. ‘Thus the House
Armed Services Gommmittee has been covered up to Fabruary 21,
the DOD Subcommittee of the Neuse Appropriations Committee to.
®ebruarcy 13, and the Senate Armed Services Commities to
February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Genate Appropriations
Gommittee hag not yet begun ite heavings.

| . Aa transezipis become available, I will send the raquested
items to you.

“SIGNED

"David HE. MeGiffert
. Agvlatant to the Sacretary
(Legialative Affaira)

U Attachments
HASC Transcript excerpte
; Dad So, HApgone Transcripts excerote
4 £A6C Tranocript excerpts

SERY » | SECR FT WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

ce:(S/Attachments included) -
Mr. McNaughton, GC Myr. Lennartson, PA
Mg. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst. “Mg. Califano, OSA <————““«
Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)

HY 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 1270

HW 50955 Docld: 32424709 Page 121

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
‘y ROBERT S.°.McNAMARA‘TO.THE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS - 13 March 1963
U. S, SENATE

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted
my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my
views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of
General Dynamics Corporation aS prime contractor for this versatile new
addition to our Defense arsenal.

My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the
Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based
on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an air-
plane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more depend-
able both in training missions and in actual combat.

The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in

aay judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the
Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of. obtaining a
single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:
- The least expensive, time-consuming research and
development effort before production.
- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.

- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type

aircraft.

HW 50955 Doclad: 32424709 Page 122

ily i)

- The greatest use of proven design techniques and

methods.

° - The most understanding of the requirements and
difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and
producing a fighter~type aircraft.

When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first
identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 --
1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by
six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable
without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to
whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or
whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be
continued in order to meet the military requirements.

Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall
of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by
the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
design configurations to the using Agencies involved ~- TAC and the
Navy.

'(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,

and changes can be expected during the development period.

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'(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in
carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed,
and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will
markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability. "'

The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal,

and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both

‘proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to

meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation
with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing pro-
posal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single
design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the
differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied
amore realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to
select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded
that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could
be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military
requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considera-
tions entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part
of the record,

When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed

me to:

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1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military
requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible
cost.
Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in

both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear
forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory
forces:and to. increase théir flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those
weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of
nuclear surprise attack.

At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-
nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the
many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure
that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, pro-
curement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly in-
creased, °

Concur rently with these increases in.our fighting strength we have
attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of
the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy
period of development, their tremendous combat power and their
enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon
systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key

decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.

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In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have com-
monly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when
the program started, and in some instances more, Some of the reasons
for such overruns have been:

1, We have insisted that weapon systems meet pefform-
ance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.

2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost
estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied
many times during the program.

3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what
it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered
that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in
what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract
is awarded,

4, We have too often employed inadequate and
unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting in-
sufficient weight on. .seagoned.experience in:theidesign and :prodiiction
of similar weapons. .

5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and
other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce

cost.

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Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to
attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been.
launched, which should produce savings of at least $3. billion per year by the
end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount
to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed
price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program
definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-péofit organiza-
. tions as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.
At my request the problem of how we select. contractors. has been under
_ study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense
Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's

business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our

current source selection procedures can be improved.

One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that
weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where
this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements.
The advantages of one weapon ‘system over two are obvious. They result in
substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but
throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic! support, ‘midinterrance,
training programs, and operations,

The. disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be

observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a

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rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high.
The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive
spare parts ‘inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change,
the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already
obsolete and practically worthless.

When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was
developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105,
At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the
F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common
missions and require many similar operational capabilities, After consultation

with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became con-
vinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the
Navy and Air Force requirements, Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force
reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common
tactical fighter.

The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new.
I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority

of experts in the Nawy and Air Force said it couldn't be done, As late

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as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air ‘Force had been
working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both
Services that development of a single TX aireratt to fulfill stated
requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.

While this attitude, based ori years of going separate ways,
was understandable, ‘Idid not consider it was a realistic approach,
considering the versatility and. capabilities that could be built into a
modern aircraft because of-advances in technology. ‘Iwas also
convinced that, if we could achieve’ a single tactical fighter, we would
save at least one billion ‘dollars, . in development, production, maintenance
and operating costa. In short, after study and review, I believed: that .
the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both
Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and
economically desirable, I directed that we continue to work toward
this objective. “Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept

myself fully advised of the development of the (FX as it progressed

over the succeeding 14 months.

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Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of
the. matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you
in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision.
On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop ~
a single aircratt for. both the Air For ce. tactical mission and the .
Navy fleet air defense mission. ; From the outset; the emphasis :
was on development ofa weapons system that provided minimum .
divergence between the Navy-and.Air Force versions. My specific
guideline in this regard was! "Changes ‘to the air Force tactical a

' version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall |
be held to a minimum, " ‘This is a recurring theme throughout thei: -
procurement actions which followed. ee

Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were |.

issued in October, 1961, and proposals ‘were submitted by six-firms a

two months thereafter. © — . |

A Source Selection Board was organized with members
appointed by the. Navy-and the Air Force, ‘and they’ we re instructed
to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting

chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Ae ronautical

Systems Division.

HW 50955 Docld:32424709 Page 130.

To assist the Source $élection Board, an Evaluation Group was -
established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force
officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the
detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the: areas
of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management a
strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft
carriers. | |

The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the ‘Source
Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by
appropriate commands within the: Navy'and the Air Force, ‘as well as ;
by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief a
of Naval Operations >» and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and ;
Air Force who made their recommendations to me. o ue

Of the six proposals conside red in December and January, those of
Boeing Company and Gene val Dynamics Corporation were determined by
the Evaluation Group to-be significantly bette r. : But it was recognized
that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it.
would be acceptable. | Although the Boeing design was given. the higher
rating in ope rational capability, ‘and General Dynamics was | given the.
higher rating in the technical area,. the Evaluat jon Group recom-
mended that study contracts -be awarded to both Boeing-and General

Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military

requirements. For éxample, Boeing's proposal had offered the General
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Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable, The senior
Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs
was acceptable without very substantial change.

A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board
which recornmended that further work to achieve a satisfactory
design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that
substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine
was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the
radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting
capsules for ejection seats had to be explored, The Source Selection
Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the
limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be
acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommenda-
tion was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force
Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force
Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsi-
bility for development of the aircraft, | recommended against the selection
of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and

General Dynamics, as suggedted by the Evaluation Group.

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The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for
Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence
of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evalua-
tion Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to-both companies
for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized
that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, 7
would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by
extending the compatition for an additional period “time and dollars are thereby
more apt to be saved than lost in the long run. " It considered that competition
should produce realistic cost estimates, further ‘as surance of the validity |
of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design. .

Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the
Navy and Air Force recommended to ‘me that study eoatracts be. awarded.
to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that: :

a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly
superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up
to stated Service requirements. | | |
b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General

Electric engine (on which ‘the Boeing design had been-based) because of
the low probability of its development in the time required, ‘since not

even a prototype existed at the time.

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c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs
and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design
standpoints.

I approved the recommendations of the-Secretaries of the Navy and
Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost
estimates :

The two. companies submitted new proposals on April 2,, 1962,. and
the second evaluation was conducted in April and\May. The Evaluation
_Group.concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correct-
ing identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy > .
from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability
to remain on station for adequate: periods of time.

-The diffe rence of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged
more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overt:
shadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since
the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor
the General.Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorse-
ments transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and. by him to-the
Secretary of the Navy, recommended in. effect abandonment of the effort to
-achieve a. joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air:Force members of the

Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing: submission. The qualified,

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concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the
over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact,. Admiral Anderson
stated in writing that he had ''no indication that Navy requirements can
indeed be met.'' Therefore, he. was of the opinion that it was premature
to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally
selected,"

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in
view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by
the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and
wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine
courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the
Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting
divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft,
resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined.
Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasiz-
ing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by
reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent
ina joint program. |

At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals
which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy
member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of

the new proposals met the Navy's requirements, The Board also noted that

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the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions
that would be. necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been
determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recom-
mended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and
the Chief of Naval Ope rations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing,
should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design .
definition" phase. The expressed neéd for the continuation of the
definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the
third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.

Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it
appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy require -
ments, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully under-
stood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to.
develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the ‘needs of both the Navy.
and the Air Force.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air
Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from _
which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective
versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and .
the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the
contractors’ cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled.

' Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce. cost by maximizing similarities
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in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use.of common equipments
and structures,

To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary
of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining
fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in
accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962,.
explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any
contract would be awarded. These. were: | |

"l, Satisfaction of both Navy and Air:-Force that a significant
improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the
winning design,

"2. Minimum dive rgence from a common design compatible
with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the
inherent savings of a joint program.

"3, Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for
development and procurement of the complete: TFX ‘weapon ‘system,,.which
costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military
strength by the weapon system," |

These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used
in judging and weighing the two proposals | -- Boeing and General Dynamics.
They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation
Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its
comments and conclusions.

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The two companies submitted their new proposals in September
1962, These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the
Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.

At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general
conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by
theAir Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson,. Chief of
Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully
design and produce this weapon system,

'(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development
design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement,
and changes can be expected during the development period.

“(ay When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft
will markedly improve the. capability of the Tactical Air Command in
carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and -
-when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will. markedly
improve existing fleet air defense capability.'' ‘

The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors.
When I reviewed the report, I could see. why. The question was a very close one.

': In. the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design
as having ''a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge

in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel

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Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics
design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuvera-~
bility at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated

penetration aids system, For deceleration,. it uses dive brakes in ‘the

air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited
deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in fe rry capability,
conventional-weapon carriagé;. loiter capability, and in landing perform-
ance, It has the advantage in low-altitude -maneuve ring capability. For
deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent
deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."

In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher
score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable
from the users' viewpoint.

In the "Production, Management and Cost'! area, General Dynamics
was rated higher than Boeing. ‘In ngcheduling, 4 General Dynamics ‘presented
the better program. It was ‘somewhat more detailed and better time phased,

In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of
maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal
received a slightly higher rating over-all. |

It was clear that beth designs met the first condition prescribed in
Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air
‘Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their
tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the ‘degree to which
‘the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. - You-

will recall that those two conditions were; (1) minimum divergence from a

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common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs.
It should be emphasized that the se two conditions would understandably loom
less important in the eyes of the Source Sele ction Board than operational
capability. These are conditions more properly the conce rn of those
charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are
equally a part of my.determination of what is in the national ‘inte rest.
~ When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint
of minimum dive rgence from a common de sign, Twas immediately struck
by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. | The Report

found. that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very

high degree of identical structure for’ the Navy and Air Force versions. .
On the other hand, the. Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less
than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were
the same. In fact the. Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, .
proposing two diffe rent airplanes froma structures point of view. | ‘The
same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of
identical parts in the General Dynamics design. --a particularly crucial
point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development
process to retain identity ‘of parts, while, on the other hand, small
divergences in the early stages tend to grow.as development proceeds.

In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of
minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral

technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.

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S a

It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role
as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made
about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that
the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could
be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic pur-
pose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two, Two airplanes increase
costs at every stage beginning with development itself.

As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by
Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter,
and fatigue. analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs;
and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions,"

Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required
earlier in the production process, Supply and logistics problems become compli-
cated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the
logistics drea.

These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving
as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates,
common technical manuals, and the. like.

If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects
of saving one billion dollar s would have evaporated. The issue of minimum diver-.

gence is fundamental. ‘The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality.

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lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point
were clear and consistent.

Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed
the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk,
who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Direc-
tor of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, dis-
cussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging
development and production programs, it became clear to me that the
General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach
than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully “acceptable,
There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated
the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in
my mind.

The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers
for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing
touch down. ‘Te date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight
on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on super-
sonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commer-
cial jet transports and cargottype aircraft in which the engines are mounted on
outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter
aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made.

This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline

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and aft of the tail surfaces, The Boeing design uses two engines nestled
in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directiy alongside
the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. ‘The full effect of this hot
gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability
was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in
addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight
testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design
would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early opera-
tional date for the TFX,

In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evalua-
tion Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the
development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this
problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate
in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust
reverser design and development.

Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically
proven and. offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated
military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the
military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must

be weighed against their possible advantages, I want to point out that in

selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply

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thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility: to under-
take this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall
program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.

The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce
more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant-instii-

_ lation with top~mounted inlets, The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that
| Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the
Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air
flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during
high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this
distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately,
and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under
the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.

In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through"
installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a
good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best
trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems.

The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object
damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that
the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not

be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.

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The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater
development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-
through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium
in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat’: ous
resistant applications and where high streés levels in thick plates are not
involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the
fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use
in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises
the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report
further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details,
especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be
quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded
the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel
Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing
companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems
Division, it was net advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject
to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating
to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and
heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that
not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but
additional costs would be incurred. : |

In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing

leading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra
wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing
relatively unusual applications.of an exotic metal.

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These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the

everall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that
this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the
cempetition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen

more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational
features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This

approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped

General Electric engine for its initial submission.

‘Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed
insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems
associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in super-

_ sonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all
susceptible of solution. But my judgment, ‘reinforced by the Fourth
Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact,
complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly
greater development effort te be expanded by Boeing in their solution.

But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than
that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater
complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between
the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser
experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter
aircraft. hia anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the

Boeing proposal.

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I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic. cost estimates in the
Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was
overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously
low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and
production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate

the complexities.of developing the TFX,. This is understandable because

a

Boeing's paSt experience in aircraft development and preduction has been
with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable

to TFX estimating.
I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- .

demonstrably credible understanding of costs ~- Boeing's proposal was
deficient. |
The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They
. attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in
their judgment was more accurate, They also made adjustments for the
General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but

not nearly so much so as Boeing's.

The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical
factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The
application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally

low proposal, Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a. lack

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of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are
subject to substantial errors,

Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group
‘could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing
and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or
less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation
of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which
is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by
the application of statistical factors.

The question has been raised as to why costs are important when
both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts, There
are several reasons,

In a development. contract for a complex new weapon system like the

TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of

change orders.is borne by the government. Consequently, when two pro-
posals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General

Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with
consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred,

Aside from the maiter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of
change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be

carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.

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| It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of .
the contractor and not the government, Nonetheless, if after several years
of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to. be far in excess
of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would
be.in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take
every possible cost saving alternative, These alternatives could have a
serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.

In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force

efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expendi-

‘ture is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that

we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way

we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has
not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of
the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well
as the contractor. —

Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and

development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production

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@ a
program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this pro-
duction program, In the event of very large over-runs on the research
and development contracts,. the price of uthe production program, which
for all practical purposes would be committed to the development con-
“ttactor, would probably be affected.
When we talk about the TEX program, we are talking National Defense.
This aircraft is to be an. important element in our militar y force; it must
: be'ope rational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled, The more
straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well
versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters,
and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designe Y, developer, and pro-
ducer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer
to our needs,
Ihave detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment
‘that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of ob-
taining a satisfactory aircraft.on the desired time schedule and within
the dollars programmed,
Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy

;

Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in

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@ 6
November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently,
coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:

First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid
concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of
the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided.to move ahead with the
development of the TFX aircraft.

Second, our best judgment of the many facters involved let us to
the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award.
Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad
bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts

again before we arrived at a final decision,
¢Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we.decided to
award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.
There remains one more important aspect of this case which I
believe should be thoroughly understood, Fundamentally, we are
dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific

technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment

is what is at issue.
In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are
pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing

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@ ®
contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost
within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation
Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or
. would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board,
using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared
to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational
areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of.
costs, This recommendation, understandably; was seconded by the Navy
-and Air Staffs, since these.officers are most vitally interested in obtaining
the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion,
this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons
systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it
has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.

There is only one way I know to. minimize the compounding of error
that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply
the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation,
but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the
best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises
held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of
military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.

That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition

- is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue

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@ e
through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach
great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements
is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program |
definition phase until I was satisfied that the. military requirements -of
both the Navy and Air Force had been met, That I attach great importance
to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is,
I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the
contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations
.on the task to be achieved..-
-I do not feel that this is a case which presents a-civilian--military
conflict but rather one of placing emphasis ‘where it must be placed.
In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I
considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian
‘advisors as well as-other available evidence, but I had the final
respon sibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my
decision were:
- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs
met stated military requirements and. would provide
significant improvements in combat capabilities of
_the Navy and the Air Force.
- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in
minimum divergence from a common design
compatible with the separate mission of the Navy

and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings
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6  g
and increased dependability inherent in.a joint
‘program.
_- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more
realistic undérstanding of costs.

As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the

decision was mine.

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