oe -“RETURNTO CIA
a a Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

a 1a@february 1977
MEMORANDUM | '
SUBJECT: Nestor Antonio MORENO Lopez (AMICE-27) (201-312091)

1. MORENO was born on 25 August 1921 in Havana, Cuba.
His: father was a Cuban Senator (1940-44) and the Cuban Minister
of Public Works (1944). MORENO became a lawyer and continued
to live in comfortable circumstances. He became involved in
the arti-BATISTA movement, apparently in the late 1950's, and
ultimately in the 26th of July Movement. After the revolution,
one of his clients was Camilo CIENFUEGOS. In Miami after
defection, he was associated with the JURE.

2. MORENO's specific activities in the anti-BATISTA

movement were not reported and apparently were unexceptional.

- A point worth noting about his activities before defection is

his acquaintance with Tad SZULC, at least by 1959, and with
Jorge VOLSKY. MORENO's background as a lawyer did not prepare

him for active revolutionary involvement. When he defected in

' April 1961, therefore, he associated with anti-CASTRO exiles,

particularly VOLSKY, but did not become actively involved.
He was assessed in 1963 as being unfriendly to CIA.

3. About February 1963 MORENO. and Enrique- CAYADO Ribera
‘reportedly collaborated in the formulation of an operational
plan to overthrow the Castro government. They discussed it
with Jorge VOLSKY, who then passed it to Tad SZULC. VOLSKY
and SZULC apparently conspired to have the plan presented to
the "political authorities" (Robert HURWITCH and the KENNEDY

Administration) in Washington in order to by-pass the dis-


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trusted "operational authorities" (the CIA). (VOLSKY
originally took full credit for the pian, called "Leonardo
Plan," which eventually became known as the AMTRUNK Operation.)

4. The Leonardo Plan was well thought-out and caught the
fancy of the KENNEDY Administration. HURWITCH bought it to
the CIA with the blessings of the Department of State. Thus,
from the very beginning, SZULC, VOLSKY, and MORENO, each of
whom had outside interests. to some degree in conflict with
AMTRUNK, were involved in AMTRUNK policy and planning meetings.
Moreover, all three were to some degree antipathetic to the
Agency for various reasons and were difficult or impossible
to control.

5. MORENO's indiscretions were a serious problem that
limited his effectiveness as a direct participant in the AMTRUNK

Operation by arousing the concern of other participants. While

the Station attempted to cut out VOLSKY and SZULC after, the

initial policy discussions in Washington, VOLSKY always remained
involved to some degree and kept SZULC fully informed. Under
the circumstances, the censure of MORENO for talking to SZULC
was just an attempt to plug one of many leaks. The fact is

that MORENO, SZULC, and VOLSKY believed they had an inside

track in Washington because of their contacts there and all
three disliked following Agency instructions that conflicted
with their own diverse interests. However, because JMWAVE
Station and AMICE-14 (Miguel A. DIAZ Isalgue) objected to
MORENO's continued involvement in the AMTRUNK Operation after

learning of his free talk with SZULC and others, the Station

oS ScGRET ey.

terminated MORENO's involvement sin the sensitive aspects
of AMTRUNK in November 1963. | |

6. Since MORENO was one of the original authors of
_ AMTRUNK and already disliked the Agency, one can imagine his
feelings at that juncture. He sulked, refused at first to
take a position on the Rebel Army Radio Program, and caused
problems in general. By January 1964 MORENO was actually
interferring in the AMTRUNK Operation (by giving demoralizing,
conflicting information to AMTRUNK-9, for example) and
attempting to debrief returnees on behalf of VOLSKY and SZULC.
MORENO was fired, therefore, by RABEL on Station instructions,
from the Rebel Army Radio Program in February 1964 and termin-
ated by the Station as of 5 March. .

7. Shortly after his termination, MORENO, using VOLSKY
as an intermediary, approached Mr. G. Harvey SUMM with a
proposal similar to the Leonardo Plan. The COS met with SUMM
on 1 April 1964 and advised him how to put off MORENO.

8. In August or September 1964, MORENO left Miami and
took a position as a Spanish-language professor in South
Carolina.

CONCLUSION:

MORENO. apparently’ was a sincere anti-CASTRO revolutionary,
but his dislike for and distrust of the Agency, which was
undoubtedly stimulated by SZULC and VOLKSY, made his involve-
ment in AMTRUNK a lia&bility to the security of the operation.

It appears that MORENO, like many Cubans of the upper middle


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class, had little sense of security. It is obvious that he

trusted SZULC and VOLSKY far beyond what normal prudence

would dictate. He probably was not a CASTRO agent, but he
did help leak operational details and general plans to

people who helped to spread the information more widely and

who, themselves, were not trustworthy.

oo |
LAD/JFK Tas Force 1977(Marty Miller}: rp

Copy filed: 201+312091


