| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

157-10011-10078

AGENCY :
RECORD NUMBER :

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO:

TITLE
TESTIMONY OF OSBORN,

DATE :
PAGES :

SUBJECTS :
MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE

DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : P

DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box. 288, Folder 9

HY 50955 Docld: 32203346

Date: 10/06/93
. Page: 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

SSCIA
157-10011-10078

DOCUMENT INFORMATION
UNKNOWN

HOWARD J.
02/17/75
22
COVERED IN TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD
PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
REFERRED

09/29/93

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Page 1

a SS ga ee meg os
Lo _. SSCI Box 288, Folder 9 _. 288-9
TOP SECRET (xcps) <_< auEEECEcEE

Record Number 157-10011-10078 ~

eB MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN THE
TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN
ne UOBORN

February 17, 1975

Background of Mr. Osborn

See the written statement submitted to the Com
Mr. Osborn dated February ll, 1975.

Activities of the Office of Securit Giving Rise to Questions
ee Rise to Questions
1. Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices

In the offices of the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the Executive Director-~
Controller, the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration),
the Director of Security, and the Deputy Director of Security, a
system of telephone taps and microphones has existed. This
system has made it possible to record covertly any telephone con-
versation or office conference taking place in those offices. All CIA
officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully
es aware of its presence md its Capability of being activated on
Portions of the system have been disconnected in recent yea

2. Covert Uses of Listening Devices by the Office of Security

In each instance the installation of listening devices was ‘expressly
approved by the Director of Central Intelligence:

mission by

rs.

a. A conversation which occurred in a motel between Siren Mer eing
and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central tn-
telligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged

vy Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mr.

et otis | ot to divulge sensitive information in a book which he
was then writing;

b. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time
to time;

c. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap
was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to
bea spy of a foreign country;

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ae ' d. BPolygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been
routinely covertly recorded;

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By
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e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert

recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with
others where there was some reason to be concerned about the
loyalty of such employees.

3. Physical Surveillance

Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare
as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under
which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:

a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi-
fied information to unauthorized persons;

° Tease ert o find out if he was getting informmatim from current
employees of the CIA;

Sp RENT POT CFR. PE EI

c. “Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another jegma t9 o determine their
Eten a staff writer

GA

d. <A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her
associates) who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to
assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central
Intelligence. :

4. Watergate Contacts Doe

a. The McCord Letters

b. The Pennington Matter

c. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg
5. Covert Informers Employed by the Agency
a. Within the Agency and Its Contractors

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in-
formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency.
Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone main-
tenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These

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employees are paid additional compensation to act as infomers
and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security

problems which they observe among their fellow employees at
the Agency.

ONAL TRAC TENT AT OO IBN

A few outside employees, i.e., non-employees of the Agency, are
also retained for the same purpose. This would inchide employees
of the telephone company and construction workers engaged in the
construction of Agency buildings. In all instances, however, the
purpose is to maintain security among CIA ermployees and those
working for CIA contractors.

satigatiions 6 of daa is

ee pee

b. Outside the Agency

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for Anderson Security
Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions
of various organizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA

. personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of

@ organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was pro-
vided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular
reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization
monitored.

There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local
police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made

to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate
what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to
solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements.

The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as
recruiters nn college campuses, and its offices around the country.
The field offices were directed at about that time to establish a
clipping service on campus and other newspapers to report on organi-
zations and individuals who might represent threats to CIA personnel
or offices.

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3
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§
2

As a result of the information fed inte the Office of Security relating
to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a
substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and or-

e ganizations.

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6. Mail Intercept Programs in New York and San Francisco
Mail Intercept Prog a en eee eee

7. Cover Operations Using Local Police Cover
Arrangements were made several years ago with Coles D 25
the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department for the issuance 0
badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel.
This involved about 15 sets of identification.

These badges and othez,identification were never used by the CIA. They

Similar arrangemests have been made with other police departments.
Strict orders were issued that the use of identification as local police
officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual cover

eS for surveillance purposes.

8. Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance

Assistance was rendered to many local police departments, including
those of the cities of New York and Chicago, and to the Maryland and
Virginia state police during the period 1965 to1972. He states that this
program was.vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported
by Mr. Helms.

Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment,
and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as
photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives
detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and
covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of — -
intelligence operations.

This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law
Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and
state police departments by the CIA.

9. Break-Ins Without Warrants

& Mr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his
knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving
employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under
investigation for suspected disclosure or classified information.

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10. Counter-Audio Sweeps

At the request of other departments and agencies, including Congres-

sional Committees, the Office of Security conducts "counter-audio

sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hidden
microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.

R56 te PLE ALR | TS TT ET ET ET MET TTT BTN TAT ERLE OT ERIE SO TIRING PETE EE PAE Te

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TOP SECRET (XCDS)
COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

2 7 . Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller, David W. Belin,
Chairman

Jonna T, Connor wary

C. Dougias Dillon Pebr . 13, 1975

Erwin N. Griswold

Lane Kirkiand

Lyman L. Lemnitzer

Ronald Reagan

Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

Executive Director

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PILE
FROM: ROBERT OLSEN

SUBJECT: Summary of an Interview of Howard Osborn, conducted on February 10
and 11 in the offices of the Canmission by Mr. Robert B. Olsen

Present throughout the interview, which was conducted from 2:00 pm to approxi-
mately 5:30 pm on February 10 and from 12 noon until 2:45 pm and from 4:45 pm
to approximately 8:00 pm.on February ll, was the attorney for Mr. Osborn,

Jack Debelius.

Mr. Osborn ageared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff. At the
@ outset, Mr. Debelius raised a series of questions:

1. He asked us to supply an outline of the authority of the Commission. He
was handed a copy of the Executive Order creating the Conmission and spelling
out its duties and powers.

2. He asked whether the Commission had subpoena powers,and he was advised that
it did not.

3. He asked whether the Commission had power to grant immmity to witnesses, and
he was advised that the Commission does not have such power.

4. He asked what liaison has been established, or will be established between the ~
Commission and the various Senate and House Committees which will be investi-
gating the CIA and other intelligence activities. He was told that the Com-
mission expects to establish such liaison, but that none of the ground rules
or arrangements have yet been agreed upon.

5. He asked whether Mr. Osborn would have an opportunity to review the transcrint
of any recorded testimony that he may give to the Commission or to the Com
mission staff. He was told that the Commission staff had agreed uoon a policy
of allowing any witness to examine the transcript of his own testimony.

6. He asked whether Mr. Olsen had been cleared for security and whether Mr.
Osborn was free to reveal all levels of classified information in the course
& of the interview. He was advised that such a clearance had been obtained for
Mr. Olsen and that Mr. Osborn was free to answer fully any questions put to
him within the scope of the responsibilities of the Commission.

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Dy NUtOFIty OF

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Mr. Debelius stated that he had carefully reviewed his own situaticn as a
former employee of the Office of Security within the CIA and that he had
concluded that there was no prospect that he would be called as a witness
either by the Commission or by any Congressional or other conmittes. Hence,
he did not feel that there would be any conflict in his representation of
Mr. Osborn under the canons of ethics applicable to the legal profession.

Background of Mr. Osborn

Howard Osborn graduated from the Virginia Polvtechnic Institute in 1940 and
shortly thereafter entered the military service. After World War II he was
briefly with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, and then joimd the Central
Intelligence Agency in late 1947. He served in various assigwments within
the United States and Furove prior to September 1963, including assignment
as Assistant to the Inspector General and positions within the Directorate
of Plans. In September 1963 he was named Deputy Director of Security. At
that time the Director of Securitv was Rob Bannerman. On July 1, 1964, he
was named Director of Security, and he continued in that position until earlv
March 1974 when he applied for disability retirement and went on sick leave.
He was retired on disability on December 31, 1974, having not returmed to
work since going on sick leave .on March 8, 1974. He states that he had no
involvement whatever with Agencv activities after March 8, 1974.

Activities of the Office of Security

The Office of Security provides guards and security personnel to protect the
phvsical facilities of the Agency. It has resoonsibility for overall security
measures for all CIA installations, both in the United States and in foreign
countries.

Counter: Audio Sweeps

At the request of other departments and agencies of the United States Government
it conducts “counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone
taps, hidden microphones, and other irtercepts of audible communications.

In the case of Congressional committees and subcommittees, it conducts such
sweeps of hearings rooms on the occasion of classified presentations bv CIA
personnel. Mr. Osborn further stated that there may have been other occasions
wnen such sweeps were made of Congressional committee rooms, at the committee
request, where classified presentations were to be made. Mr. Osborn does not,
however, specifically recall such other occasions.

. . woe unter.
It also seems to Mr. Osborn that the Office of Security has made similar faudio
sweeps for one or more individual congressmen or senators of their offices in
the Senate or House Office Buildings, but he again has no specific recollection.
The Office of Security also makes such sweeps of the homes of officials of the
CIA with their knowledge.

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ee He knows of no case in which the CIA has made a sweep of any other residences.

It does make sweeps of private firms who have CIA contracts, but always with
the knowledge and consent of the firm.

He states that his Office has never used equioment for counter-audio sweeps for
“positive intelligence."

the sweeps conducted included physical inspection, checking all telephones for taps,
checking desks, walls, ceilings and floors for listening devices or radio
receivers, and may involve such sophisticated measures as counter-laser measures
and the use of a Dodge mobile home equipped with sophisticated equirment capable

of picking up a radio transmission from-nearby premises.

eran tear J WLP ETEE Oe OR ERR ORR CERI

Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices

Mr. Osborn stated that Mr. Helms had authorized for use in his office,

in the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in the office of
the Executive Director-Controller, in the office of the Deputy Director for
Support (now Administration), in the office of the Director of Security, and

in the office of the Deputy Director of Security a system of telephone taps and
secret microphones which made it possible to record covertly any telephone con-
versation or office conference taking place in those offices. The taping system
could be activated with respect to telephones by depressing a button on the tele-
phone in the office or on the telephone at the desk of the secretary in the
adjacent office. The taping system to record office conversations would be acti-
vated by depressing a buttan under the carpet in the vicinity of the desk of the
person occupying that office. All CIA officials in whose offices such equiprent
was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being acti-
vated only by them.

The recorded conversations from all of these offices, except those in the Office
of Security, were recorded in a central ban of recorders located in the base-
ment of the building. Those emanating from the Office of the Director of Security
or Deputy Director of Security were recorded on tvin recorders located down the
hall from those offices.

All recorded telephone and office conversations were transcribed. In some in-
stances the tapes were retained, and in some instances they were erased. It is
not known whether the Agency retains any copies of the typed transcripts. From
time to time, particularly as an official has departed from the CIA, he has
o.dered tapes erased and transcripts destroved.

Mr. Osbom reports that Mr. Colby directed the removal of the recording and tele-
phone taping equipment from his office when he becam Executive Director-
Controller of the Agency and again when he became Director of Central Intelligence.
Mr. Bannerman also had the equipment taken out of his office when he became Deputy
Director for Support (Administration). Apparently all other officials in whose
offices such equipment was installed used it from time to time.

Positive Uses of Counter-Audio Equipment

Mr. Osborn stated that he wishes to clarify his previous testimony that counter-
audio had not been used in a positive sense. What he meant was that it had not
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been used in the positive sense under any of the circumstances referred to
above. There were, however, several situations in which telephone tapes and
covert recording devices were employed by the Office of Security:

l. A conversation which occurred in a motel between suiret nae cee and
Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was
covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the
Purnose of attempting to persuade@ i @ineineraeeniiinot to divulge sensitive
information in a book which he was WILtLng;

2. Intervievs with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;

3. With the approval of Attorney General. Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed
on the telephone of a CIA emplovee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign
country; .

4. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely
covertly recorded;

5. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert
recording devices to record cx«wersations of CIA employees with others
where there was same reason to be concermed about the loyalty of such
employees. In each instance the installation of such listening devices
was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Osborn
recalls only three such instances: ;

a. In 1972-73 such a device was installed in an effort to uncover details
where an old defector was being forced to make kickbacks of his compensa-
tion fram CIA to his CIA case officer;

b. At a date which could not be recalled by Mr. Osborn a device had been
installed to record activity of a female employee of the CIA who had
become closely and intimately associated with persons believed to be
dissidents;

c. In about 1968 or 1969 at the request of Mr. Frank Bartamo of the Depart-
ment of Defense the CIA planted listening devices at the apartment of a
serviceman doing highly sensitive cryptographic work. This was done wit!
the full knowledge of Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI. Mr. Osborm specie
lates that the CIA was called upon to accomplish this task for the De-
partment of Defense because Mr. Sullivan believed that J. Edgar Hoover,
Director of the FBI, would not approve.

Mr. Osborn states that there may have been other instances where such listening
devices were installed within the United States, but he does not recall any
others. He is emphatic to the effect that after President Johnson issued an
Executive Order prohibiting telephone taps without the authority of the Attorney
General, the CIA never to his knowledge covertly tapped a telephone within the
United States except in the one incidence authorized hy Attorney General
aKatzenbach.

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Physical Surveillance

Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country
has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts
that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted
as being limited to the following:

OE LEP BTR p sre eet Poe ces TAFT

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified.
information to unauthorized persons; :

Vélotor Da ela fii to find out if he was getting information from current
employses of the CIA; ,

3. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and anoth
of classified information,and fehl
{ iechingten Post, for the sam@ purpose?
4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the
existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the b
Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the
supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full

knowledge of the FBI.

g
i
Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent |
in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma 5
King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborm reports that

a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel

was also covertly recorded.)

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of phvsical surveillance

in his experience was authorized by the Director of Cen‘iral Intelligence except
that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the
official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that

these also were approved by Mr. Colby as PCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the
effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance,
has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect
to any conversations or commmications, or has ever had a security check performed
on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Ilelrs
in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the “crank mail"
received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that
of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord
had shortlv before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the
Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he
immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

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McCord Letters (continued) ; |

Mr. Helms directed that the lettér should be retained in the file, but that
nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it.
Thereafter a series of letters vere received from Mc. McCord by Paul Gaynor,
then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security.
These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was _
promptly brought to the attention of Mr. Helms. The thrust of these letters
was that the Cammittee to Re-elect the President and high officials within
the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate
break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the
Justice Department and that. he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls
being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the

CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these
letters to the Justice Department.

SYS BATONS ABEL CTRL FEES

¥
‘

At a much later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these
McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subconmittee of
House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Subcommittee.

The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former
FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His
compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he
has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by
Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him. ae

In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, Emnal
Geiss, was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had
been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies
and departments relating to Watergate matters.)

While Mr. Osborm was on vacation anFBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted
the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named
"Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of
Security. Mr. Kuhn's Aeputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent
Parham to Ermal Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names

of both Penningtons or just one of them. Mr. Geiss instructed Whitaker that
Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired
employee of the CIA, who was not related in any wav to Lee Pennington. Geiss
instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.

Mr. Geiss would have known that James McCord while he was employed in the
Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that
McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really
interested in Lee Pennington. .

Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to this attention in
February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that tire.

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Pennington Matter (continued)

Lee Pennington and a man named Charles Wylie were the only two omfidential
informants who Osborn can think of who were emploveed as such by the Office
of Security during his tenure with that office. (This is in addition to
CIA emplovees and the employees of propriety investigating companies who
have been used as informants.) Mr. Wylie was a journalist and writer who
was paid $10,000 per year, plus certain travel expenses, by the CIA to

act as an informant, but Mr. Osborn has no idea what kind of information
he provided to the Agency in recent years. He does recall that many
years ago Wylie provided information regarding the Vienna, Austria, Youth
Festival and also some information gathered on the trip he made to Japan.
Mr. Osborn states that he has never met Lee Pennington or Charles Wylie,
nor has he ever talked with either of them in person or by telephone.

(Mr. Pennington was apparently terminated as a CIA informant on December 31,
1973.) Mr. Osborn states that he "started action" to terminate Wylie in
about January or February 1974. He thought that Wlie had never provided
anything to the Office of Security and that it was "no time to have a domestic
informant."

Both Pennington ane Wylie had been informants for the Office of Security for
many years. wey had been retained in that capacity even before Mr. Oshorm
became Deputy Director of Security in 1963.

In February 1974 in connection with a search of files in the Office of Security
some indication was turned up that Mr. Osborn had been informed in January 1973
about the fact that Lee Pennington had entered the home and the office of
James McCord at the request of Mrs. McCord on January 22, 1972, to locate and
destroy records which would have revealed a “link" between Mr. McCord and the
CIA. Mr. Osborn denies that he received any such information. The informa-
tion was allegedly given to him by Paul Gaynor, Chief of Security Research, in
the Office of Security.

Mr. Gaynor retired in 1973 at the request of Mr. Osborn, who had been directed
to cut a GS-16 from his staff in a personnel reduction move. He states that
Mr. Gaynor accepted this request gracefully and retired.

Osborn and Gaynor have never discussed with each other the subject of Lee
Pennington or the deception practiced on the FBI in August 1972. Osbom does
not think that Gavnor opened up the subject, but he does believe that Gaynor
has testified before either one of’ the Congressional committees investigating
Watergate or the Special Prosecutor's Office.

After Mr. Gaynor retired, Lou Vasaly of the Office of Security has handled
contacts with Wylie and Pennington.

In January or February 1974 Mr. Osborn sent Sidney Steinbridge of the Office
of Security to New York to terminate Mr. Wylie.

Lee Pennington died in the fall oi 1974 of natural causes. He was in his
middle 70's.

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Watergate Contacts (contineud)

3. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt re Ellsberg Breax-In

Mr. Osborn states that the Office of Securitv had no involvement whatever
with the assistance rendered by the CIA to Mr. Hunt in connection with
the break-in of the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and that he had
no knowledge of that matter prior to the break-in. He is now acquainted
with the White House request made to General Cushman for assistance to
Mr.Hunt in 1971. He is also now familiar with the fact that the CIA
vrovided to Mr. Hunt disguise equipment, false identification pavers,

and a camera , in response to the White House request. He also now knows
that Mr. Hunt arranged for the development of the photographs which he
had apparently taken on the occasion of the break-in at the office of

Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

i

In 1971 Mr. Osborn received a request from Mr. Young at the White House
for the psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. He says that Mr. Young
stated that the White House had been very pleased with the profile which
had been developed by the CIA on Fidel Castro and would like the same
kind of profile on Ellsherg.

Osborn stated that he responded to Young that the CIA personnel had a
areat deal of biographical material on Ellsberg. Young assured Osbom
that the White House would provide material on Ellsberg. Osborn re-
sponded that such a request would have to be approved by the DCT,

Mr. Helms.

PETE RL BOY OVAL IMR ALY LT

Osborn then took the matter to Mr. Helms, who approved the project and
told him to provide the remuested assistance to Young.

Young thereafter sent materials from tire to time to Osborn relating to
Ellsberg. It was Osborm's impression that these materials were very
fragamentary and would not be sufficient to provide a meaningful psycho-
logical profile . Nometheless, the request and the materials were
turned over to the doctors at CIA and a draft of a profile was ultimately
worked up. Mr. Young did not appear to be very well vleased with the
draft.

Mr. Osborn surmises that the break-in at the offices of Dr. Fielding

(Elisbera's psychiatrist) was accomplished for the purpose of gathering
more information with which to develop a better psvchological profile.

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HY 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 14

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‘

Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from
among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are
plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, merbers
of the char force, etc. These employees are paid additional compensation to
act as informers and to report to the Office of Security on any rf ‘tential
security problems which they observe among their fellow employees at the Agency.
If an emplovee,. for example, has been convicted of a crime or is thought to be
engaging in any contact which would make him susceptible to blackmail, that
matter is supposed to be reported to the Office of Security. Likevise, if any
employee is observed conducting himself in a suspicious manner, such as request-
ing information from files which do not concern him, that is to be reported.

A few outside emplovees, i.e., non- emplovees of the Agency, are also retained
for the same purpose. This would include employees of the telephone company.
In all instances, however, the purpose is to maintain security among the CIA
emplovees and those working for the CIA.

The only staff employees retained as informers are those who work in the records
office of the Directorate of Operations. Several staff emplovees in that office
were recruited at the reauest of Mr. Thomas Karamessines because of the extremely
high level of sensitivity and the records maintained in that office.

When the CIA Headquarters was constructed in the late 1950's, the Office of
Security recruited various members of the construction work force to maintain
security against the installation of listening devices, telephone taps, or other
penetrations of the premises. PBS eb. CUespsosaa OF 3. im Gaae Saaurh ty :
ettere, tie Ofdier GF Security ongan :

p invest

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for the Anderson Security
Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of various
oraanizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installa-
tions and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for
indications of such threats was provided to Anderson Security Associates, which
in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of
the organization monitored.

Lone ths ‘persorn.d, of compe

Se

Anderson Security Associates was in reality nn by Mr. Ralph True, a CIA Heac-
quarters case officer, who also ran a similar wholly-owned propriet ary company on
the West Coast, General Personnel Investigations, Inc.

The Anderson company has since folded.

whatsoever Of Gither Kedar, Covenant Gr Gls interest, or Involvement: Jl

tive of this categany « eines ‘ok Che Ws
saconnaigemes planes. ipsiing, Conic tt

HY 50955 Docld: 322703046 Page 15

?

reat hk dil ith ccmia eS BPEL TE BOO! LITT Le PT RR

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Surveillance of Dissident Groups and Activity

It has been mentioned above that Mr. Osborn informed us of the activity of the
Anderson Security Associates in maintaining in the Washington, D.C. area a
check on individuals and organizations who would represent potential threats
to CIA personnel or organizations.

There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local police
departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the
‘size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces
would be necessary to cope with them.

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit
or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned
about the safetv of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses and
its offices around the country. Its recruiting office in Ann Arbor, Michigan,
had been bombed at about that time. Mr. Osborn also believes that the field
offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on
campuses and other newspapers to report on organizations and individuals who
might represent threats to CIA personnel or offices.

As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to
organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial
number of files were accumulated on individuals and organizations.

Mail Intercepts

Me. Osborn reports that a mail intercept progrem in New York City began in about
1952 and ended in 1973. He learned of this program when he became Director of-

the Soviet-Russian Division in the Operations Directorate. He states that the
program involved the identification of parties within the United States sending 2nd
receiving mail with persons in the Soviet bloc countries and the identificaticn cf the |
persons in the Soviet bloc sending and receiving such mail. Selected items of :
mail were also opened and photographed, and then resealed ard forwarded. Mr.Osborm
states that he cannot recall any specific use made by the CIA of the information so
obtained. The primary purpose of the program as he understood it was to provide
information to the FBI. He recalls several conferences regarding the program.

It was his position that the three personnel from the Office of Security who
worked on the program were not performing any useful service for the Office of
Security, that it was a drain on the budget of his office, and that the CIA had
no business tampering with the mail in the first place. Mr. Colby, when he was
Executive Director-Controller of the Agency supported Mr. Osborn's position on the
Matter, It was opposed by Mr. Angleton of the Directorate of Operations, who
argued primarily that the information derived from the project was vitally neces-
sary to the FBI. Mr. Helms electad to have the program continue. It was finally
terminated bv Mr. Colby during the time that Mr. Schlesinger was DCI in 1973.

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7

E
g

lr. Osborn also thought that continuation of the program was too risky in the
light of public and Congressional attitude toward the CIA. He thinks that the
program originated while Allen Dulles was DCI and that it was undertaken with
the knowledge and consent of the Postmaster General. However, this is hearsay,
according to Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Osborn is also acquainted with the fact that from 1969 to 1971 the project
Of mail surveillance occurred from time to time in San Francisco. The Office
of Security ade the arrangements with the Post Office Department for this
brogram, but it was carried out by the Far East Division and the Technical
Services of the Directorate of Operations. The Technical Services Division

at that time was headed by Rod M. Kenner, who is now retired and living in
Florida.

_ The arrangements with the Po.t Office Department were made by Jack Turton of
the Office of Security. Mr. Osborn has only the vaguest knowledge of the pur
Pose of this project and could offer no further light than that it involved
some checking on the stamping and postmarking of mail from the Peoples Republic
Of China. The project was orally okayed by Mr. Helms. Mr. Osborn has no knowl-
edge of any other mail undercover projects in New Orleans or elsewhere.

Cover Cperations Using Local Police Cover

‘ir. Osborn stated that arrangements were made several ye. rs ago withiemmen nim th
of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department for the issuance of badges ard
other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. It is Mr. Oskorn's
recollection that this involved about 15 sets of identification.

aaa hide

security personnel in conducting a physical surveillance of (/@eae Echiaptl./
seems that Lgwevememelived in a residential community and his*home was™
a cul-de-sac. is

made it extremely difficult to cruise by his hare or station a
security car anywhere near his home without attracting the attention of other
residents in the neighborhood. Security personnel who may have been sitting ina
car within several blocks of the [URIRIS@eietresidence would have attracted the curio-
sity of the residents and the operatfGn wotild be threatened if such residents
approached the car and asked what the occupants were doing there and if they vere
given straight-forward answers. According to Mr. Osborn, it was highly desirable
that the security personnel be able to respond to such inquiries by saying that
they were police performing official duties. Most citizens, he savs, would accept
that as sufficient, whereas their curiosity would be even further aroused if the
sccurlty personnel identified themselves as being with the CTA,

-. Osborn states that he had issued strict orders that the use of identification
local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual
ver for surveillance purposes.

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HW 50955 Docld: 32203346 Page i7

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te. Osborn seems to recall that the Office of Security had similar arrangements
with the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, and he thinks that
there were instances in which such cover was actually used, but he does not
recall specific cases. He also states that it is possible that CIA field offices
would have used similar cover of local police departments, but he has no knowledge
of such instances.

“ATURE PEE 70 ROAR

Wire Taps

Me. Osborn states that he has no acquaintance with the wire tans made of the
office and hove phones of two syndicated columists in Washington in 1962 and
1963, which wire taps are revealed in the file as having been authorized bv
Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (The file reveals continuation of activity
with respect to the surveillance of these columists into the period of when
Mr. Osborn was in the Office of Security as its Deputy Director. The file does

not, however, show any indication of actual avareness on the part of Mr. Osborn
that telephone tapping was involved. On the contrary, there are indications
in the file that these telephone taps were discontinued immediately prior to
Mr. Bannerman becoming the Director of Security in 1963, at which time Mr.Osborm
also became the Deputy Director of Security.)

Taining of State and Local Police and Other Assistance

Mr. Osboim states that assistance was rendered to many local police departments,
including those of the cities of New yOrk and Chicago, and to the Marvland and
Virginia state police during the period 1965 to 1972. He states that this
program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mr. Helms.

Pssistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and tha
declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as photo analysis,
surveillance techniqu:s, metals detection, exmnlosives detection, locks and picks,
hidden microphones, telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up,
handling, and organization of intelligence operaticns.

this program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement
Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments
by the CIA. ;

Mr. Osborn feels verv strongly that the program of cooperating with and assisting
police departments in improving their capability to fight crime was proper and
that its termination is a serious disservice to the American people. Referring
to the prohibition on CIA "police and law enforcement functions" in the National
Security Act of 1947, Mr. Osborn is of the coinion that the CIA in sharing its
information and technical developments with state and local police departments
was not exercising any police or law enforcement function.

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The Huston Plan

Mc. Osborn states emphatically that the Office of Security had no knowledge
whatever in developing or assisting in the so-called "Huston Plan," relating
to domestic security operations. He states that he had never heard of it until
it hit the papers at the time of the Watergate investigation. All relation-
ships with the Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligunce unit was handled for the CIA
by Mr. Helms and Mr. Ober.

BET OS Fe RAST ATH aE BE HRD SRE

Ella Milas eA Bie cae

The Nosenko Affair

Nosenko was a KGB agent who defected to the United States in Switzerland in the
early 1960's. His interrogation was handled under the supervision of the SR
Division of the Directorate of Operations, especially by David Murphy and Peter
Bagli-y of the SR Division.

Mr. Osborn states that he repeatedly protested the treatment of Nosenko. After
more than two years of solitaixry confinement in a special facility for which the
Office of Security provided all security measures, Mr. Bruce Solie of the Security
Office finally arranged for the release of Nesenko and gradually increased his
privileges and freedan.

Me. Osborn states that Nosenko has proved to be the most valuable defector in
the entire history of the CIA. He has been responsible for identifying nine
Soviet agents, including a major in the Pentagon.

Surveillance of Justice Douglas

7
i
;
|

Me. Osborn has no knowledge of the alleged surveillance of Justice Douglas
(referred to in an article in The Washington Post on February 3, 1975, page D-11).

Contact with The White House

Mr. Oshorn states that he was not involved and has no information regarding anv
request from the White House for files relating to the coup in which Premier Dien
was overthrown in Vietnam, or regarding the Bay of Pics operation in Cuba. The
CIA versonnel who would have been involved in such matters were Willian Nelson,
Deputy Director of Orerations, on the Bay of Pigs matter; and George Carver, then
Svoecial Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam affairs, with respect to the Diem coup.

The only other contact of any nature. with the White Howe recalled by Mr. Osborn
was one which he seems to remember occurring in about 1963 when the Office of
Security was congulted by the Secret Service with respect to counter-audio measures
to protect against buaging and wire taps i: the White House. He thinks this
occurred during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.

Unauthorized Break-Ins

tr. Osbor states that the onlv break-ins which have occured to his knowledge
ay sccuritv personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former
employees, or CIA contact agents who were uncer investigation for suspected
disclosure of classifica information. (Details are in the files provided to the
Conmission,)

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General

e
ON RK BOT RS fe CORTESE

e
k
a

Mr. Osborn states categorically that the Office of Security has never to his
knowledge: .

=- conducted any audio surveillance, telephone taps, physical surveillance
or personal investigation of any member of Congress or public official;

-- maintained any file for political or other inproper purpose of anv such
congressmen or public official;

|

i

i
~~ pulled any file for examination for purpose of checking up on anv such 3

membex of Conress or public official. ‘

Mr. Osborn states that he does not recall any instance during his career with
the CIA to which any particular activity of the Agency was examined in the
specific light of Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947; i.e., he
Gora not recall any assessment of a proposed or ongoing activity from the
si dpoint of whether it was improper as a “police®, “law enforcement”, or
“internal security" function.

Iroression

Mc. Osborn impresses the interviewer as being honest, intelligent, and dedicated
to the interests of the United States and its people. His memory appeared to be
in error in some details, but considering the wide range of the interview and
the time period involved, coupled with the wide breadth on responsibilities and
the number of personnel under his .supervision in the Office of Security, this
is to be expected.

There is one area in which the interviewer was doubtful concerning the complete
candor of Mr. Osborn. That was the area of his knowledge conceming the
Pennington matter.

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HY 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 20

Led SW SAITS
(Le -

STATEMENT

Mr. Vice-President, Governor Reagan, distinguished

members of this Commission. I am here willingly at your

|
:

invitetion; I shall answer all of your questions fully and
eandidly.

My federal service has extended over a 32 year period, 27
of these years were spent with the Central Intelligence Agency.
I am proud of my service with the C.I.f., and I am proud of the
thousands of dedicated men and women with whom I worked in the
C.I.A. I retired from the C.I.A. on December 31, 1974, after
having been on sick leave from March 8, 1974, until the date
of my retirement. My last ten years of active service with the
C.I.A. were spent as the Director of Security. I was responsible

to the Director C.I.A. and to other senior C.I.A. officials for

personnel security and for the security and protection of classified
information, data and installations, both in the United States and
abroad. During my tenure as Director of Security, I served
successively under Mr. John A. McCone, Admiral William Raborn,
Mr. Richard Helms, Mr. James R. Schlesinger and Mr. William F.
Colby.

I am aware of allegations given recent prominence by the
news media that C.I.A. conducted improper activities in the
United States. Since my departure from active status in March,
1974, I have had no access to Agency files or records with which
to verify or refute such charges. I can assure the members of

this Commission my full cooperation but it is possible that my

recollection of dates and details may be imprecise or unclear

without access to particular files and records of the C.I.A. To

ath r

HW 50955 DociId: 32203046 Page 21

the best of my knowledge and belief, all.of the actions and
eetivities in which ~ participated, or which I rected are
recorded and documented in C.1T.A. files.

At all times, while serving as Director of Security I oS

acted with the knowledge and approval and at the instruction

of the Director of C.I.A., and in many, if not most instances,
with the knowledge and approval of other senior Agency offic sais”
in the chain of command. I should like to emphasize that Secu wity
in the Agency is a service and support function and its activisies
are not self-generated. Among other services, the Office of
Security provided guidance and assistance to employees with
personal problems; it provided support to other Agency component =
upon authorized request and performed tasks and special inquiri.:
assigned to it by the Director of C.I.A. The Director of Cras
was empowered and directed by the National Security Act of 1gt7
to "protect intelligence sources and methods" By virtue of and

extension of that authority, those actions and activities within

my purview were designed to prevent potential penetration of che
Agency by hostile intelligence services, afford protection to”
the Agency's domestic installations and to determine the sources
of unauthorized disclosure of classified and sensitive intelligenss" ==
information to public media.
While I am not now privy to precise statistical data,
I believe the United States Government Agencies involved in
intelligence activities can document the fact that the number”
of hostile foreign intelligence representatives in our countr.
has increased significantly in the last ten years. One of |

their prime targets is the United States Intelligence Communit by.

HY 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 22

—-3-

huy investigation and review of C.1.A., or any othe element

of thet community should be made within that context.

"BE ORT RA EZ 9a PNR

After many years of service in the security field, I

can fully understand the extreme sense of frustration among
the United States Government officials regarding unauthorized

disclosure of classified information. It is devastating to

read the contents of a highly classified document disseminated

in the intelligence community and then a day or two later, to

RET SELEY” Bs sag

read the same information ad literatum in the press. I believe
most firmly in freedom of the press, but I believe also that
there should be a sense of responsibility accompanying such
freedom; that sense of responsibility seems often tobe buried
or absent in the publication of classified information which

could endanger our national security.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Commission
and to assist it in acquiring facts relevant to its investigation.
In the course of developing such facts, I am hopeful the Commission
will look at the possible consequences of the Agency's failure to
act even if the Commission should find fault with individual
conclusions or judgments made by Agency officials.

I shall endeavor to answer all of your questions and I
shall put aside my citizen's schield against self-incrimination.
That decision is based on my desire to assist the Commission to
the full extent of my ability and for the equally cogent reason
that I do not believe that any action I performed was unlawful

or in derogation of my duties to the United States Government.

a f a : .
. Len ee ‘ tC SS Iona. ce:
“ “ HOWARD J. OSBORN

HY 50955 Docld: 32203846 Page 23

-4.

5.

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d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been
routinely covertly recorded;

e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert
recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with
others where there was some reason to be concerned about the
loyalty of such employees.

. Phys ical Surveillance

Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare
as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under

-which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:

a. ClA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classi-
fied information to unauthorized persons;

b. Mictorghs [ameHetti¥ to find out if he was getting informatim from current
employees of the CIA;

c.  faePanderson= PS Hitter! and another legman to determine their

Rene eS Po “
sources of classified information, and Michwel@ettner,, a staff writer

for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;

d. A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her
associates) who reported to the CLA the existence of a plot to
assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central
Intelligence. ,

Watergate Contacts eee

ae The McCord Letters

b. The Pennington Matter , -

<. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg

Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

a. Within the Agency and Its Contractors

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential in-
formers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency.
Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone main-
tenance mzn, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These

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HW 50955 DociId:32203046 Page 24

,

A
é
&
x
\
B
5


‘TOP SECRET -~ 5 =

Physical Surveillance

Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country
has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts
that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted
as being limited to the following:

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified
information to unauthorized persons;

2 AiropoueMaeenSee to find out if he was getting information from current
employees of the CIA; ,

Pies.hitten and another legman to determine their sources
of classifietimformation,and Miiehael=Gestier, a staff writer for the

Washington Post, for the same purpose;

Eee ee
3. Jacks Ander sony

4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the
existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the
Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the
supervision of Mx. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full
knowledge of the FBI.

Also included in this surveillance wads some of the contacts of this agent
in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma
King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborn reports that
a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel
was also covertly recorded.) ,

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of phvsical surveillance

in his experience was authorized by the Director of Cen‘xal Intelligence except
that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the
official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that

these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the
effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance,
has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect
to any conversations or commumications, or has ever had a security check performed
on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Helms
in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail"
received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that
of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord
had shortlv before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the
Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he
immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

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HW 50955 Docld:32203046 Page 25

LES TE OP OE Sv" PRLS BLE INTEGERS CITES


McCord Letters (continued)

Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that
nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it.
Thereafter a series of letters were received from Mc. McCord by Paul Gaynor,
then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security.
These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was
Promptly brought to the attention of Mr, Helms. The thrust of these letters
was that the Cammittee to Re-elect the President and high officials within
the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate
break-in. Mr. Helms dirécted that these letters not be referred t® the
Justice Department and that he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls
being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the

CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these
letters to the Justice Department.

8 STOR SENET MOE OO EES

Sy

i.

At a mich later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these
McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcommittee of
House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Sudcommittee.

2. The Pennington Matter: For many vears a man named Lee Pennington, a former
FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His
compensation from the CLA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he
has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by
Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.

In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, aoe:
GEES was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had
been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies
-and departments’ relating to Watergate matters.)

While Mr. Osborm was on vacation anFBI agent named Armold Parham contacted

the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named
"Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of
Security. Mr. Kuhn's eputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent
Parham to ExangilgGeiiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names

of both Penningtons or just one of them. «MEHEGéifes7instructed Whitaker that
Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired
employee of the CIA, who was not related in any wav to Lee Pennington. <GSieery
instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.

‘RIGSHSswould have known that James McCord while he was employed in the
Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that
McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really
interested in Lee Pennington.

Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to his attention in
February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.

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HW 50955 Docld:32203846 Page 26

