ON RECORDS ACT OF 1992,
Oo: : a

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATI
ong z ol ne io

cas oe

124-10168-10040
B

as

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER:  124-10168-10040
RECORD SERIES: HQ oo.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 62-116391-41X

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI

FROM: PAPICH, SAM

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 03/13/1970

PAGES: 85
SUBJECT: CIA ACT, ANTI-CASTRO ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

ORIGINAL Secret NEW
CLASSIFICATION: CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 11/03/1998 UPDATE_DATE: 02/12/2001
STATUS Redact ~
RESTRICTIONS:
JFK Act 6 (1)(A)
JFK Act 6 (1)(B)
JFK Act 6 (1)(C)
COMMENTS: EBF, INC ADMIN PAGES
\ 3

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 1

Ome . wo : x

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See ee OPE SPEED NEAWEES GOVERSAIEN TE
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LECTHOTE?R U! & pror | helease aS mute To
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ro - The Director
CLASS. & EXT.
; REASON-FCIM II,
PROM > SA Sam Papich DATE OF REVIEW
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; ALL INFORMATION coNTAINED ©75° 7772 ow 4 z s/h 22
SUBILCT: pDeL_AaTIONS WITH CTA HEREINIS UNCLASSIFIED woe ey Pec
EXCEPT WHERE SHUWN Soh E, Gaco,/ ETO
OTHERWISE .
Reference is made to my lettors dated Marcel’ 2 and
March 5, 197G, In my letter of March 5, 1970, I- stated "it

HW 50953

is important to oGr

an extensive List
standing that the

snedoued herevith is

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review of Bureau
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can also produce
grievances... It. is my under-
desired thas this lisy be identiticd,.
ef approximately 75 items.

not be considered absolutely conmzle

eated on my personal recollection and a i

rector

To iaske this list more conpiste cud
nece review of thousands
can be supported by Burcau reco
2BLOMS LS UNaNO VG. RNS
on with our evaluation
previously listed, ~

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would esgitate the

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DoclTd:327169180 Page 2?


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“CENTRAL INTELL IGENCE AGENCY Val

eee eee

WASHINGTON, ob. ¢c. 20505

office OF “THE DIRECTOR

ty a bot at oat

K BorweTed RZ we 20 March, 1970 . vs

“€P Isle

.The Honorable.J. Edgar Hoover |
Director

Yederal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C,

Dear Mr. Hoover: . , . en 2 oe 8 of Loe

We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence
collection angendered by your letter of Il March 1970. We warmly
welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implemen.

taTION OL ING 1900 agreciiieue aud tie Coie eiUn ul positive intelligence

which you proposed, I concur alse with your comments that there is
a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and
counterintelligence collection, To be most effective, I agree that it
is essential for this Agency, icgether with your Bureau, to conduct a

ontinuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is
of growing irnportance to the national security and to the United States
Intelligence Cornmunity, Therefore we endorse your proposal for a
reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be
conducted.

}

i With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to ;

. the then Director, Vice Admiral William F, Raborn, Jr., the compe- f
¥tent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an j

( J ,effective and realistic agreement. Iwelcorne your statement that no

‘om

Fmajor problems have been encountered since its adoption.

: I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar
‘importance to the national security, which warrant periodic recxamina-

“tion since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine colt egfion
of positive intelligence. *

Pr
“MAR 20 1970,

nae

Se omemesegmonees wee ot eee

HW 50953 DoclId:32169180 Page 3 . =

QE VITRS

- As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe
that, the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration: _—
ne Tiere we UN" Auato eéverdige! “Audio ¢overage provides timely 7
intelligence of inestimable worth to U.S. officials. for | oe
policy planning, early warning and accurate guidance f
necessary for the improvement: -of operational and collec-~
| tion activity here and abroad. Audio coverage is unique
Dpagigsnt. | production because itis readily. subject to-local cross-.. - cofant atts Seagitge let
checking and evaluation which is far more difficult and
costly to achieve abroad. Further, such coverage is on
targets which affect directly the national interests.

' For several years your Bureau had been recep-
tive to x equirements and leads which resulted in valuable
coverage. The quality of your production proved that

mee Tes ne ote! waa hilidean . a3
your Burcau alone ae cated by capabsitsce onc oupensence

‘On 2 October 19697 two. related requests for audio
coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to
positive intelligence targets, one of whom had KGB connec- ‘
(I refer to the case of Sun eee nd Cheawe
popes.) Your Bureau replied that henceforth the
Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney
General for approval, ;

It is suggested that the question of audio coverage
beireopened between representatives of your Bureau and
this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observa-
tions on this subject. ; ; ; os

I wish to assure you ‘that I believe that this ‘sensitive
= -| type of collection should be implemented under rigid and
stringent controls, This is absolutely necessary in order to
maintain the highest standard of security both in instituting
the coverage and for the exploitation of the product, (An
excellent example of this is demonstrated in your effective
and secure production of BCOPE. )¥$)

- ; SECRET

Oe cere renin sre aman i ee cL TLE REFN RE 8 A RIO SRL SES LSS © OS NE

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 4

ay
oe

| gence tool is mail-coverage.. -Its importance has been,
proven inthe past. I have the impression that it has
been discontinued, and I'would suggest that our represen-
tatives should confer and examine together whether this
asset might be deployed against communications of the
poviet ae oT) New Left, and identified foreign agents. .
)

st

om 1 sy

(3) CIA Technical Services. A. significant expendi-
— oS ture of this Agency's.moncy and personnel has been com~
oo _° .Jmitted to research and development for the improvement

' Joftechnical aids. This Agency has provided-your Bureau

with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and

has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated

ea:

“i. VAlthowéh ‘we v
pe any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the
i _. [technical field including proposals how these assets can be
yo _ \better employed. Your comments will be particularly
view of our mutual interests in implementing

+) oo a,

appreciated in
Operation gsc:

es

(4) Courses in Positive Intelligence Requirements and
Reporting. Since ,the collection and reporting of positive
forcign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your
‘main internal security and counterintelligence responsibili-
ties, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a dis-
advantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting
. processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence,
- At our 1966 conference we offered to institute positive intel-

[jigence training courses, including reports writing and -

n - oe his ceeLoow cbegenihes denies Z.
SECRET |

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 5

“5 (zy “Mail Covéragey” Another much néeded intelli-) «°°:

LEE ae smncee nmin ames meet ne orate

sneer eterna: Seen ben nt MP aa gen consntaeee

- ‘analysis; ‘for FBI personnel, . In ‘soliciting your ‘views on A
, ¢ «mf the desirability. of this type of training,. I wish to reiterate tue
our willingness to provide such instruction. It would be
" designed to expose the needs of the Intelligence Community: °
in depth, thus making the Current Intelligence Reporting

48) * * Séraiinds lars on P OBsociticit Services. Given ‘the’ =
‘growing sophistication a and increased capabilities of hostile
intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI
expexts in this field: meet as required at our respective
Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices,
in order to keep abreast of new developments, modus
operandi, operational tasks, and diverse missions of

te — opposition services. I know that you will agree with me

-- ° thatno opportunities for improvement should be over- ,

Asrhishomight help te pemate the effarts of hostile

‘sexvices who are char ged with undermining the security
of the United States. These sessions should also provide -
‘an opportunity to explore and devise new means to pene~
trate and neutralize these inimical forces.

(6) Live Bloc Sources. The record of our coopera-.
pe . . tion and coordination to exploit live penetrations and defec-
' - tors from Bloc sources proves the success of our mutual

effort. :
' J believe that there is room for substantial improve-
ment in achieving a more uniform and efficient exploitation —
of the positive intelligence potential of certain of these
sensitive sources, ’ I would invite your thoughts on how we
may better coordinate requirements for these sources and
establish a more thorough evaluation of their positive ,
intelligence production before it is given general dissemina-
| ¢ion within the Government. Our review would suggest. that
there are good reasons for consultation to explore the
development of higher quality live sources, for example
feede clerks.

HW 50953  DoclId:327169160 Page 6

List (GIRL) more meaningful to your personnel. :


“ON
1

!
HW 50953

(7) Live Sources in the } Non-Bloc Area.. Sources
such asf{code clerksp@nd diplomats are a fertile field for ~
procurement of much-needed intelligence relating to the

_ jactivities of certain Latin American and Middle Eastern”

“lcountries which are. expanding theit subversive and ©
terrorist activities, -even te the. United States... Ido not.
feel confident that both agencies have adequately exploited
the full potential of this field, and would urge that this

subject be explozed by our respective representatives.

. (8) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already
a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limi-
tations of manpower raise a serious question as-to whether
both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable
developments. The increasingly close connection between
these forces in the United States and hostile elements
abroad has been well-established by both of our agencies.

I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how
we can best eniplov more. wisely our iinited manpower,
knowing that this problem, which embraces bombings,
hijacking, assassination, and the demeaning of law enforce-
ment officers, is international in scope.

°(9) Relations with Domestic Field Offices and Legal
Attaches. Ido not feel that there are any serious conflicts
in this area but there may be room for improving the quality
of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection,

» |Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic

re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies

to make mutually-agreed adjustments.

!

Mz. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal
judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your
experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our
country. In this spirit, 1 welcome sincerely your observations on the
foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item
which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.

a

Faithfully yours,

: a, l ry . s
: oo _ Richard Helms , a
: ‘Director

- _ SECRET

DoclTd:327169180 Page 7

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secret

- GASES ANDAC~ SLTUATIONS:
INVOLVING CC... LICTS VITT THE
(CEuTR AL wonen se @ AGENCY (cra)

(1) Eocase (rry PORIS ORRCS CA

”
t}
_

.

This “as a sensitive Soviet-espionage eas e.
; which originated in 1943 wnd terminated for the most eae ng
pape TA VSS92 Phe | @ase hed Hany Wide” foreian’ ramifil i
cations and historicaliy has been, and undeuptedly
will be, one of the most inno rtant and involved cases

of Sovict orerations in this country and abroad. We °
did not disseninnte any information of significance
in this case until 1G54. On various ocensions when -
the Lisison Agent has become involved in heated arsu-
ments with CIA officials, they have seen fit to raise
this ease as an outsvanding example of FBI failure to
cooperate with the Agoncy, The position taken by CIA
2s that it Should have been advised regarding the
Soviet operational activity in foreign countries, -
elaining that the Agency would have had the opportunity
to develor more ang Oration of significance, identify
Soviet an its, and pocsibly prepare conditions for
 recru..tneit or daubling ox Soviet operatives. We did
hot disseminate our reports to CIA because of the
‘extreme sensit ‘ivity of the case, We actuaily did not

“permit CIA to handle any investiga tions relating to
\the KOCASE until 1957,

ry

3

In 1657, CIA complained that it coreaey ha

every right to have received the information earli

because many aspects of the MCCASE pertained to CIA. ~
employces and onorations. CIA further argued that it

had been greatly handienpped in effectively carrying out

the’ leads in 1857 because the leads were given to the
, Agency at the same tine that the ease was publicized.
‘The Areney arfucd’thet the failure of the Burezu to
coordinate with CIA those French aspects of the case
permitted the French, rather than the U, S., to play a
| dominating rele in Europe.

7S rerease (ek 2-14 26)

»  femnoe sac (oe oe CRET

| WG) ane -_

oo (Fe fake 2/99 on up ,

Eaot teed

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 6

“How fueh” ‘infosaation ery has” ‘deve’ cloped over
the years concerning our operationel activity in
Mexico City is unknown, However, we shouldear-in . . oS

_ ; | mind ‘that’ former Specii1“Agent Glorge tung] And led i vores ie |
4, many of our oneraticus in i “ico, incwudins hey initere

pmants, and subsequently béean performing services foro"
CIA after Be left the Burenu, We also chould not
forget that Americans operating in Latin American
countrics for one agency are peavily exposed to the -
vahe MESOurees. LEGRES OF, ~INVESTL GRAVE: terete
" “agency. nes Agent. enows “fron. personal experience that i
operating in these areas constitutes a “very small vorlid" :
and the exposuzve to leaks and errors is considerable, 4

(3) THE ABEL L CAS SE

j ; oO ; i

; Althouch CEA has nov raised the point for
‘several years, the preva .iling attitude was, and probably -
still exists, that the FBI did not play At. square with Oo
OTA jn otha Ahal AO | br. not motets cartain that othe . _— oa
Agency was given the pre oper recognition fox its contri-# - az

{puti ious. CIA fcols that the first place, there would
‘not have been any U, 5S, access or availability to the
source in this cuse, Reino Hayhanen, because CIA tock

the full responsibility for moving Hayhanen from France
{to the U. S. in 1857. CIA claims it took the risk and
‘responsibility cf doing this after the Buresu declined
to become involved in any oneration designed to transport
Havhanen te the U.S. It should be noted that Hayhanen
iwas an alecholic and that his first contacts with CIA _ moe
jin Paris raised questions concerning Hayhanen's mental
istability.. ,

After Hayhanen arrived in the U. 8., we.
‘arranged access to.him for a period, the purpose of
which was to obtain a complete story of his intelii-
gence activitics in the U. S. and we were particularly
interested in identifying all of his associates, es-
pecially the man who later was identified as Rudolph
Abel. After a short handling period in the U. S., we
dropped Hayhanen hecause he became @ problem, It vas
an extremcly critical situation because we had not yet
‘identified Abel. CIA < agreed to take the resnonsibility
\for the carrying and safeguarding of Hayhanen but ve

FR |

HW 50953)  DoclId:327169160 Page 9

(8)

Security Agency. xe (bute n (Crd

\

O° geerer

countrics with far better. impressions than in. the
past. In addition, we have learned more about these.

in, COUD itries,. their seryices, and their. securit Y chiefs.

By spending a fey
this. cand of. tree

minutes with them, “Needless ‘to‘say, °
EMER E, hes, 2159, immeasurably helped

rf

T in SOV ur

SPICUAGE G8 ACTIV yity

-In 1965, mnefbuten Internal Security Service JS)
as in ghe process of investigating individuals in >

{HollandpeWno allecediy, had been engaged in Soviet-espionare
 activity..: The (Dute! yanted to have certain,individuais
‘in the U, S. interviewe

d and approached (C14 oO make
anguiry at the, ,Sureau. At that time, our Relations
‘with the (DutchPiced been practically nonexistent because
‘the fbutcH§had “faiied to honestly sieal with us in the
‘case off[Joseph Petersen, & Dutch ficinl who hac been
clandestinely collecting iptelliicence at the National
fpproached us, we told
quid submit their reaues

[the Agencypmheat tI

thyough di Pioustic Channs?s. We subsequontiy tol cia JG
we vould not pants the intervier 78 for the (butch fyve
stuck to our position. (cz A surrendered bu elt that

,we were impairing heir effcerts to gather information
‘concerning Sova etwespionage activities in Surope
Walter G,. Kyvivitsky, Bufile - 100-11146)

COLOREL SOR GROMBACH (PAT. O'REEEY 1)

Colonel dehn Gronbach was a retired U. S,
‘Army officer wo, during World War Ii, established a
private. intelligence network, operating throughout the
world but prinnrily. in Europe, His sources included
any number of European exiles who came to the U. S. °
While he was in business, he was financed by the State
Department, then the Derartment of the Army, and in the
later 1640's and into the 1950's by CIA, Grombach
established contact with the Bureau throuch one of
his subordinates, Pat O'Brien, who periodically called

y-

SECRET

-7<

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 10


*y palationship: sith CIA

a. om @n organization which gas financed by

(9) COMMESSION MN

on. us and furnished infe vmation which Gronbach felt) 7” ue
was of interest (|. us. This Cissemination through — GG
Pat O*Srien continued during the period of Grombach'ts | i

We néver informed CIA. thatiwe oor. cb oe ad

were receiving such information which 21is0 was of oe
‘interest ‘to the Agency,’ It isp soSsible that Gronbach a a
had gi 2 Gata toa CRA but wa do not know, CIA

and Gr aened and the relationship was severed

in an & In the Jast

. 3 ets oy
ve bitterness,

{tie Agencyphad
suceessfu S organization and

allegedly had identified many “OE “the sources, CIA- co, ;
hinted to the Liaison Sgent that it had become BWAre | :
of the relationship between Grombach's organization

and the Bureau, How much CilA really learned about
this:relationship is not known but if its penetrations
were signisicant, the Agency may have developed evidence
to justify a charge that the Hureau hed withheld infor~
mation from CIA, particularly when we were receiving.

(Du fits . AOL ner

thn Arenson
wesw cape

Seat yur
bead, “EV ou

pon cette

_QGlerbert Uoover Commission - 19684)

In October, 1954, = task force of the captioned

Commission initiated a survey of CIA's operations under :
the leadershinaf General Mark W, Clark, In vanuary, 1955,
we were advised by 4 representative of th 1@ task force
that Senator Jeseph NeCarthy had furnished the group 2@
list of CIA employees who were censidered subversive.
‘CIA became cognizant of this davelopment and there was :
talk within the Ageney that the Bureau had furnished os
the names to the Senator. When the Liaison Agent was

informally appreached on this, he flatly told the Agency

to officially submit its charges, The Ageney never did.

What information CIA may have had on this matter as it

pertained to the Bureru is not known, Iv is possible that

the Agency's attituce was strictly predicated on a knowledge

that we maintained liaison with the Senator's Committee.
(Relations with CIA, Bufile - 62-80750)

SECRET

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 11

REIGN. COU

a ing the 1956's, we fave our. Legal Attaches © ©
nunerous “te ds g from internm:l security cases in
the U. Be th mn es we @id not see fit to
a she Afency always maintained that
te "internal Security" from "counter-

a lend in Yrance pertaining to a-
Senvrerranced advising C1 ‘not,

at Veast

ncy to handie the lend, In the
last seve: is not believed that there is
any basis - inint since we have regularly been
notifying CIA concerning subjects of cases who travel
abroad. If the Legal Attache is investigating, CiA is
notified in erder to avoid duplicate eftorts, There
have been eaeep tions where we have taken the position

' , that CIA should not be notified beecsuse of the sensitivity
of the natter. How many such exceptions are known to | ‘
CiA cannot be established from our files; hovever, we Sy

]
SHOULG Weise Lu abou Whee b Yate Gin Lsuwed AuiGuneS BiVGSe ot
tigate, they conta many of the same foreign officials
normally contacted “oy Cita. How many of these forcign 4

officials are CIA intormants,or on the Agency payroll,
dis unknown,

(11) BUREAU OPERATIONS IN cuBA

hea,

We operated infermants in Cuba when x doa
ported
in

re Legal Attache's Office in Havana, Inferments r
on Aotave ties of communists and other subversiv
‘tha country. During the period we operated th
informants, we did not coordinate our operationgfwith
CIA, We did not advise the Acency thet we had such
sources Hovever, in 1960, after Castro’. came on the

- _seene, it became infeagib? e to handie certain informants

in a secure manner. Feovroval was granted to turn certain
informants over to CIA, What these informants may have
subsequently told CIA about past Bureau operations is
unknown. This item is being cited in the event CIA had
evidence to cstablish that we had been operation7l in
Cuba and had n coordinated with the Agency pursuant
to Directives; iM tenorandun Donahoe to Belmont, aire 5,

dae 3

2

s
se

we 1960 2 re: "Partido Socialista Popular," 64—200~21 2377
\ “gnd Memorandum Fra abose to Pelnong, Febnyary 3, 1960, re:
* ca 50a oo .
a Nar cisco Tauler :¢ neficto,"[P134 BOS I—4) (Ss) a
_ . ao Ce i 4
; 7 Co ~ SECR _ ne yj
~ . ; ~9- =

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 12

“inte?

‘activities an

oe .O SERED Os

dl
In“ 1959 the U. 8. “Ainbadducor “in"Beanit necused
Attroh i “in UNCOOrG inated covert |
“gatuse

$ I believe
exceeds his : 2
indicated t

the “Leral Attache
tee egedly had told the Ambassador
that-the Legeb Attacter had disseminated “in forita tion tro‘
& source who was a fabricator or a provocator, This-
Situation axvose as a rasuit of the ts Attaches
operation of an informant in[Braci Some of the
informetion that he received Fron he informant w

4

of a derogatory nature and related to a Gr agilian

was ‘being touted 4s a Presidential candidate, CE!
asked for the identity cf the infeymant and we teld

the Agency that the pers ron could not be identified
because he did not wish that his identity be disclosed,
This case is being cited. becnuse_ CIA fae nave evidence
That we nad pean opernticnal mn Brazil Mined not coordi#
nated purcunnt to Directives, anc eed the hatter 4 We.

further aeeravated because of the alleged unrelizbili ty.
of the information, Hemorandum Roach to Belunont,

May 1, 1859, re: "Williaa I. Friedman, Legal Attache,

Rio ds Janeiro," G7 429840) and Glemorancun Roach to
Belmont, may is 1959, re: "Seviet-Satellite Activities -
(Srazi i 38 607 ~48) ) ’

(13) BORDE! DER 2 Govnanes

In June, 1957, our Phocnix Office presented a
problem concerning the Burcau's handling of. informants. ~
on the Hesican border, These informants were operating
side Mexico, The problem was predicated on situaticns
which miriit arise as the result of CIA's endeavors to
Gevelop inforsiants who already were being handled by the
Bureau, It was pointed out that CIA logically could
come in contact with such sources and could make approaches
for recruitment. It was recommended and approved that
in order to protect our coverage in the border area, a
valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would
continue to be utilized even if he were contaced by CIA. |
Our policy was that we would not identify our sources to
the Agei. CV. «' ; ‘ : so - -

SECRET

- 10 ~

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 13

|


_ Shenta he iafasnad econeerning th:

(15)

-As indicated,“he-later bt

‘in Mexico, it could use‘such infor:

" How much CIA learned ‘about oe bérdar- coverdite”

Bureau Agent George Hunr y have been knowledgeable,.
san: performing services for >.
cra, I¢£ CIA learned that we were operating informants
ation ag additional -
evidence of Bureau fai 72 to ceonerate and ceordinate
with the aieney Dursunnt to espe PLVCS.» (Hemorandum
Roach to oe e"Communist Coverage

is not kn6évnac Again, it: SA; pointed out that former’

In Hay, 1987
captioned cass 1 b.

was to hn & meeting 2:
june L6=mLSMYLOS7, A question

the Bureauts double Agenk in the
ee is Sopiet contactPthat he

an uxying the period

s

Sg as to wheth CIA .
ne ® Avant Biraven

to @w. tac asd and [Sit WSs recommender and approve Pat Wwe

not Bdvise CIA.

contact withéGur double aren ~% one point, The Agency .
may have had Turther. conta 2ct thout our knowlecze, The
rye may. have also picked up the contact with the Goviet TS

‘What is important Eh igs that CIA established
<

in (Switz zer land. Fhe ease is being hithlicnted since we

See
cannot. ox joke the possibility that the Agency hag evidence.
to demons 3 that we were onpers -tional (in EuropoPind we

did not coor ‘dinate. With the Agency. (lemornndun Braniran

to Belmont, dune 10, 1957, re; Cosson, " 105—2 25453~1825) Yo)

Ci’ RE QUESTS FOR E REAU LECTURE ON COMMUNISM IN THE U. 8S.

On Septémber 25, 1958, CIA inquired if W.C,
Sullivan could give 2 lecture on the communist movement
in the U.S. It was recommended that Sulliven give the
lecture. Such lectures were being afforded in other parts
of the Government. The Director made the notation "Ye
cannot mane Sullivan avnilablo to this outfit." The
Agency accepted this as an affront and a blatant refusal

SECRET oo

os Sa

¥

HW 50953  DoclId:327169160 Page 14


i . OO . _—

tht ety
“to cooperate.on: ‘a most “aper ta tnt subject of interest a cry
to Bee Te toes a Clenor randum Sullivan -to Bekmont, ce . :
October 1 ‘195s, re; "Request for Lecture on Cormniss
byCIA,") wolfe cet Cot vn S

(16) Grss or

ad of the
Burak Cave
a a CIA cnpieyes. in Moscow, had been
invoived ‘in an * with a Soviet girl. According :
to our source, # allegedly had furnished information
to the Foviet firi. We cheeked with ne State Denartmen
and CIA und we coufirned that Boos had been invoived
an affair and that he had been ree valled, According to
Cié and State Dencytment, there was no indicntion that
mper been involved in any espionnge against the
A gave consideration to requesting the Burenu
ify Lts seuree and thon changed. its mind, Po
Crh has documented this as an instance where  — — i
the Bureau failed to coopers tte by not volunteering the =
source is a matter of conjecture but, it is a ense that :
should be kept in mind, (utile -

®

In April, 1963, we becam? involved with CIA in
that Agency's efi forts to coll t sensitive information
relating toffrench Go Governmeny Ihteations to conduct

espionage 2: 2. CYA had access to a sensitive
source,

who yas in a@ position to make ~
available freneape cuments, On-Apri},il
‘1863, CIA i orned as that ‘cur Lepfal Attache in Gorigoa’
locally contacted “CIA concerning this matter, CIA Hendea
quarters was highly disturbed because its office in Reris Ts)
had not been cut in on this operation and the Agency wanted

- ; ‘to be informed rerarding the nature and the extent of cur

, disseninatidn of CIA information to our Legal Attache. We

_ . / ~ 12 =

SECRET
coe ed

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 15

_ determi induirices ait
Gari ge ‘ sent fron “Burésauw
Heacquarters, This matter is being highlighted heccuse
it vasa vitally imvortant: oneriiion to CIA and. the Ageney.
LCATIORS that aniox emaiticn had been deaked

‘te veoh authorities IVa havo ‘no evidence or renson td.
beMieve that the Lesal Attache Oftice ever involved itself

2

in eny such leak, Howsaver, we should not, under any cir
> s
id: fact that CIAMMas pene tre Biod

.eumstances, une the
Frencl ,

im [Paris . 2
ypliity of ¢ nes and installing microphones in
Garis Jgisve th ¢ nga on U, S, officials, including their ‘
residences should never be excluded. The information we
hed conve oved to gur Legnl Attache possibly may have been :
acquired by thef{French hrough elondestine coverage, CIA
bly coulda charge us with handling their sensitive
formation in an din ure pAanner by transmitting it to
Gorigyyithout conferring with the Agency.

Tn ennmertion enith nticzed frencif esvionace - i
‘activity in the U. S., CIA has never been sa .tisfied with
the efforts made by the Bureau, The Agconey possibly could
take the position that ve leoked tightiy et the allegations
and Gid not pursue @ me cer which, in nerited
a more aggressive appro.ch, (Bufile ~ )

For some time, CIA has held t osition that
the (French Intelliscence Service (spnesiPls enetrated by _ 7
| . . the FBoviets. fjrhe Arency has pointed out that if th [French]G >
. eve “Gollectins Sensitive information in the U, S., the ;
. : product is ending up inGloscow, In Janusry, 1964, pve
reviewed the status of our investigation of [FrencnMintel}
. ligence activities in the U. 8, . The Director commented
m a "J think this whole thing has been imaginary on
. of CIA which has been played as a.sucker by §@jeee
I would waste no more time on it at least until ail CIA
restrictions are removed," CYA did impose restrictions
by not permitting us to pursue certain loads because it

‘ feared that its sensitive seurce woul. be Jeopardiz sed.
(Bufile ~

p
p
a

¥
f

TO -13 -

ae SECRET

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 16

ne Be Pe te Se ae

. ‘from CIA, We did not obtain ciesrance from CIA for
t+" -" “the inclusion of this information in-our-monogra woh .-
Clearance eee cow. wes not ou ed pecnuse of the
_rrituted becaute

3 S Minét Pholwtion of the cor tend snes
Fe eae a aver made any. protest. .

GUATEMALA Js )

“FE SH POSS ana 1967,” ‘6 were operating informants—..- 8) fr.
“gn Guatonatay JAt the inception of our operational ace
tivity, CIA was not informed. In one case, We finelly
were able to effect the necessary arrangements with CEA

whereby the Buretu would be poaraltted to run the informant
in Guatem aio JG)IN the second instance, we established an
agreement with CIA in October, 1967, tha, we eculid cone

tinue handling an informant in (Quatensia dich She under
gtanding that the Bureau cent, on the ocexsiop of GBcn
vigit, vould cenfer riin Gane local CIA offices pol itical
information collected from the informant. These two cascs a
had all the makings of @ conflict. CLA was under ihe SO
definite immression that we had been running these ; i
informants before ve a fing y coordinated with them,

It ig true that fhe CIA n Guatonal at as much
incensed but no issue tas ra TA Hondauarters and —
therattcr was put to rest. :

concrete evidence tha
we were operating in Guatenals earing in. mind that in
‘@ plegd such oS (Guatemala City $t would not be difficult
for 2 CIA intelligence officer to spot an FSi. Agent in
contact with Ga uavenalan s J6)our potemtias Vulnerability is
that we were operat : nBLle thout coor da Ne

CIA may have develop

| he information emanating from the caption J
sensitive Bureau operation has been disseminated to CIA
and other egencies for several years, | The sensitive 5
source has traveled abrozd numerous times end his trips  — ~ :

-- 15 =

SECRET

HW 50953  DoclId:327169160 Page 17

(26)

ESTABLISHUENT OF BURDAU LIAISON WITH

.

Oger, OO

-

SECURITY SER

WICH (= 1650

VECH INTERNA L

In January, 1960, our Leral Attache, Bonn,
traveled to[Hollan oh) the purpose of exgploring arrangce=-
ments for liaison with appropriate
U. S. Ambassador raised questions,
the ycoars, all relaticns yith the]
been handled through CIA He ind

ButchPutherities, The
s0inting out thet over
Ratenteut thoriticd had

ated that before there

“WAS any change in procedure, it would be nece 2ssary Lor

CIA and FBI to come to same form of an agreement. Allen
Dulles subsequently enpressed dissppointment in that his
Agency ha ad net been contacted by the Bureau prior to

‘exploring the liaison arrangement, We. event ually conte rred
- with CIA and came to an agreement satisfactory to al

parties concerned,

Again, CIA could cite this as an instance where
we “failed to coordinate with the Apency in line with
National. Security Covuneil Nirentives, arendium Br
to Belnont, March 3, 1960, re: "Lagal Atiacne Operata

C

eae See

Norway, i anmark, Sweden, and the Hetherlands GE~1ES

“

In the latter part of 1959 we gave censideration to
establis shing a Leral Attache in Copenhagen,.Deanark, The
purpose of the assignnent was to follow Bureau leads in
Denmark, Nors TDQY, Sweden, and Holland, We did not inform
CIA of our ntentions, (ienorandum Frohbcose to Belmont,

™~

‘January i4, “is 00, re; "Legal Attache Operations, The

Netherlands," S6-18973-113)

BUREAU DISSEMINATION OF COUNTDRINTELLIGENCE
IRVOMATION TO FORRIGN SERVICES 1962

. | By letter dated November 7, 1962, CIA raised
questions concerning the propriety of Burcau dissemination

of aqounterintelligence information to foreign intelligence

services. CiA, at that time, had particular reference to
inforpijtion which our Legal Attache had transmitted to the
GreekPintelligence. Service concerning. KGB operations, CIA

ook the position that pursuant to the coordinating -

~17 -

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 18

“Cami mtr!

~

a + Directive, the Bureau was obligated to coordi fate with _
CIA prior to such dissemination. The par rticular data :
had emannted from cne of our sensitive mas sources
i » we res ided to CIA by stating that the
information was the product of an internal security
operation and did not relate to any operational activaty
abroad, CIA again surrendered, The Agency could axgu
. that it w sponsible for following Soviet matters
‘ with the (Great AP nteiii .sence Service and that we had an
obliga tion of coordinating with the Ba. ne! _ Clemorandum
. Brand ilivan, Noyember 9, 1062 re; YRS a

(27) "THR UVISIBLS GOVERNMENT, "A BOOK AUTHORED BY
DAVIk: WISE AND THOMAS ROSS

. In August, 1963, we received information indi-
cating that Wise and Ross were in the process of gathering 4
material for a “hook pertaining. to activities of U. 8.
imtalts eanag: act ivdtias Rath Rass. and Wise cantactan . \

the Bureau. It was ree onded that liaison or2li y advise ;

~ CiA that these two individuals vere preparing a book cone i
. cerning U. &, intelligen ae agencies. The Director. noted

"Y see no reason doins so,'

~. It is not Knowa if CIA was aware of the contact
with the Bureau. Wise and Ross subsequently published the ;
book which contained extremely derogatery information
concerning CIA, (Cilenorand:m Jones to DeLoach, re: "David
Wise of the “New Yoru Heraid Tribune" and Thomas. Ross of
the "Chicaso Sun Tines") 7 i

(28). COMMIT ACTIVIT DS = AFRICA Co

, i .
, |. In April, 1860, CIA inquirad if the Bureau would
‘give any consideration te acsisting the Agency. toward
developing coverave in Africa. CIA was looking for the ;
services of any Negro informant who might be available,
‘The Agency also inquired about placing a Negro in the.
Communist Party, USA, under a plan which would have as
an eventual objective, the sending of the informant to

secre, re

ett AIM ne me nein a, nee i

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 19

In the” sane month, CLA inguired if the Bureau...
etablish technical surveillance coverage on
who CIA felt was a key figure in the .
scient.fie latelligence data.to.the .
Lligence vorvice ISi0 declined to reinstitute ..
‘CIA considered the matter: important beenuse.
of its relstiot nship to thefiid deast Crisis, 6)

On October 21, 1968, we toid CIA that future
. requests from CIA for technical surveillance coverage -
> should be transmitted by the Agency directly to the
no . Attorney General. :

; CIA has never made any official comment or
protest but it has considered the aforc-mentioned action
by the. Burenu as unfriendly and uncoonerative., The Agency

aS lesked to the Burcnu “as the logical point of contact and
as the only organiantion having the resources and capabilities
of adequately Getermining 4 af. such coverage is even feasible,

FON sey rinne Ave meer wrens.
qawey Beh dh Bel Oe wi tlraitele BAY dA UP a AE

a The Liaison Agent recalls fragnents of oth:
Situaticns or conflicts which occured over the years und .
which resulted _ the voicing«af CIA displeasure or criticism.
The Agent cannot recall the names of the cases which is
necessary to nequise the required data. There was one
instance carly in the 1960's which involved information
recoived from a source of unknown reliability charging
Alien Dulies with having been a communi:t and @ spy while
in Burope, We disseminated the information to several
agencies, Bulles exploded but never ledged a protest.

The Agent also has recollection of instances when
CIA. alleged that its source or informant was compromised by
Bureau revelation ,of CIA information during the course of
interviews conducted by us, Techuically, this would be a
‘violation ‘Of the third agency rule and, if CIA had hard
core facts, we would be vulnerable, pa ticularly if an
important informant was lost, . CIA never made any official
issue or protest. : :

- 24 =

eo SECRET

arr cere inne MRE tea

HW 50953  Docld:32169160 Page 20

yr
'
’
“oy
Lf
o~)
_

cet SECRET

. . . . toe . eo
a ee oe ON Senet Be A te ae et leben
r BURY MAU ERLE

‘ uf ne a Ne ee et rr ers
wes wt vo pe, an Co ates

1, ATTACKS UCAINST BbURPAU CIEXICO CITY AND FRANCE - 1951)

Althoush asment FPenich did not pevin handling Liaison
with Cis. until 1652, it is important to reter to hignly signi-
ficunt differences with CIA which culminated in a sericus
conflict in the Fall of 1953, Our Legal Attaches in
and pexis renorted that CIA representatives were attocking the

7 Bureau, wore endeavoring to piace us in an undavorahte digas,
were ques stioninz our jurisdiction, and were naning sparaging
remarks concerning the Bureau. Seme of this was sumed up by

characterising it as covert hastility within CIA, stemming
largely fron aisgruntled tormer employees of the FBI.

4

In October, 1951, General Walter Beddil Smith, then

Directoy of CIA, asked to meet with the Director and other
Bureau representatives for the purpose of discussing the
existiny differences. General Smith denied that there was any
covert hostilitv against the Buresu and maintainod that there
WAS & gene aj) feeling of respect for is. He admitted that
there nad been isclated instances of friction for which CIA
_must accept its share of responsibility.

It is my recollection. that the Director and other
Buresu officials did meet with Goneral Smith, at which time
guidelines were set forth for maintaining future relations
between the tro agencies, I was not able to find menoOrAangen
of record caverin meeting. : :

2. PROSELYTING GE EGR PASO

bers

¢.

The. Agent clearly recalls that carly in the 1950's

wea encountered difficult with CIA because the Agency allosedly
was recruiting Bureaueemplioyed personnel, We vigorously pro-
tested,and subsequently ihe Agency advised that it would follow

a policy of not having’any contact with a Bureau employee until

the individual had been separated from the Bureau for a pericd

of at lenst thirty days. the Ament could not locate the back-

- ground of this matter in the files reviewed by him. It is pos-

\ Sible that the pertinent information lies in the persennel file

of some former Bureau Atent.

SA SECRET ( Barrereny §
; | a ca (eshte

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 21 .


OM ORE Eee tor
politiconi weyiun whieh 4 :
sailors who had boaen seized by the “Caines
General Eetts disseminat a mor : indieating
of the Committee had agreed that a viow of commitme made.
by the Unitcd States and Chinese offi iciais, that failure to
arvarge reentry Yor the Polish seamen would have an adversa
“ effect on the overeall United States Defector Program, We
emphasized te Gencral Betts that this matter had never been
officially presented | 2efore the Defector Committee. He was
infoxrned that I action was not conducive to mutual cooperation,

8. CYA INTERV

TIE UNITED STATES - DISCUSSION , .
WITH ARLEN I ay

a7, 285 55

_ On September 27, 1955, the Liaisern Agent met with
Allen Dulles, at which tine the CIA Dircetor's attention was i
referved two 8 matter vhseh Aad not yet developed inte a serious ;
situation but if not properly followed could lead to conflicts
betywcen the'tvo agencies. Dulles wag referred to the contacts i
‘of aliens in the Ur states mage by CIA personnel without

Ss)

first obtaining the necessary cl Leavance from the Buresu, The
requirement for such clearance was clear-cut and pursuant to an
established agreement, (62-80755; memorandum Roach to Belmont .
September 28, 1955, "Relations with CIA")

9, CIA APPROACH OF A HATIGNAL ACADEMY DEN GRADUATE (1955)

@® National Academy exaduate to utilize his vervicesMin Guatemzlia,
This approach was made while the graduate was att tending National
Academy clesses, <A protest was made to key CYA officials for) u)
not having ¢ advised us prior ta establishing contact with the

Academy graduate, (fe: ¢ a .

in November, 1955, an incident arcse ‘when A A approached

In December, 1955, we received information i. dicating

that CiA wes in contact ‘eath an indivicuel whom the Bureau was

developing for utilization in « double arent operation, We

learned that CIA representatives had established contact with

E Sand had given him some advice and gfuidance without
eCking with the Buresu, We protested to CIA, :

SECREL

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 22

" 0 . . : - “ . , cad

5 “the rp
* VOUT 1 “We: ha

aye es
eal dah

_. bhecerne involv
tea tha tea: “4
described m

han@ling of

.

On duly

® had been in
Washington, Dp. C. i
CIA employes. We wore
the Agency hag no ind
contacts wilt Cre
it wv as in a: thet
a nan al eoncern
2» protested
Belmont to

beta

£2 Soviet agent Wes being per-
6 +

so thet his activities

mitted to enter the United

could be covered and go that the Bureau would be in a position

to promote a defection, fae Buresu was not in possession of
any information dndaic ing that we had sanetioned the entry
of the subject for. tho purpose described above, The State

WD, iabie te reenall the name cf the CIA
employee involved; inguiry at CIA was negative, We were not
in a2 position to identif
investigation within
up with the identity.

o
rs)
3
ry
oh
3
Q
in
ct
°
Pa
eed.
be
Q
pet
=
i
)
ro
on

nout,the Agency comin
SEP wu)
17.

By letter dated November 8, 1955, we strongly. pro~

‘tested to CIA bcecexuse representatives of that Agency had inter-

viewed an alien in the United States without firs st obtaining
clearance from the Buresu. It should be noted that there was
a well-established afi cement. whereby it was incumbent upon
CIA to first check with the Bureeu before interviewing any

i United States, (Letter to CIA November &, 1956,

Oo SECRET

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 23

othe

Cla employee without conduc ting

ade |
t that a CIA cawleyoe allegedly

Sli. Meese


' a. ,
en aren)

sity eS
assocition - ; ;
En December po weft ote

shit nt Goiumbis Unive
had been in contact becuse of his

Lesiened:

with
eowethe
Ag SS, Rh,
ean unc
that the writer
interested in aocn

: : eng that
£ the United States, When ame
returned to the Unite we. pounitred CréA to intesviow.
‘the subject because of -t : forets é, intelligence inter--

» ests, We subsenuently intery : Cx at which tine he.
infoxmed Us that he bad been 4 vutioned oF "CIA not to furnish
iucormation to the Bureau, CIA denied that any such

wae mode, Che: Bosse Patyiek Hamner js

19. CIA REQUES ICERNING A HYGH-SPEED CA
1957

The San Francisco Office furnished information
indicati that CIA had requested a firm in California to furs

yds Lira Agency Suluria tien be
‘pertaining to e-hi
the om cee WEG ¥ev

CEA we

SOULE BAL LURGLEA LuGuas ae

tHespeed efmere manufactured by the cen
ved becau ve wanted to be certain that

Gur jurigdiction, We did not. develop

had overstepved its jurisdiction, The Director

& notation, "O.K., but it does seem to me we give CIA

viee authority to explore such a field, H"

Be liso ane to Boardman April 16, 1957, "Flow of

soviets and Satellites throush

On May 28, 1957, CIA advised that one of its repr
sentatives. in the field had interviewed the cépticned GEE
alien who had 2 tO cooperate with the Agency aeter he
returned to « CIA conducted this interview vwithout >
first obtainine clearances from the Bureau. Such clearance Was
necessary pursuant to an estnblis shed 2¢ ecment. ~A vi
rast wag made to the Agency. (Re:

sot secret

HW 50953 . Docld:327169180 Page 24

n duly, ots
Gotonbie offieiais whe w
invitation CiA was t
[Cox On biang| beecnuss 32 ]
rossily insulted

anbasancon's chauitfour on

If we so desire
accusing CIA of trying to
considered undesirable in
Cfemorandun Je o
of Colombaen
by CIA) CR).

22,

REQUEST F

Teen LATIONS = ?

Ha PVT
PALEY

YORE

On Novenber 15,
tacted by the local CIA re
formed if the Burenu coul
premises of the Council o

United Nations Delegatior

across the street from 2 Cee

that his visit

received fron Allen Dulles
the possi baLity of thao
convers att ens and discuss

-It should be noted thet t
_Welleknown pergonalities,
States Governuent, Uv)
Pursuant to ins

on November 18, 1957, tha
by CIA in that such a sen

the field level rather ‘tha
(Henorandum Roach to
on Foreign Rela tions")

 geeRER

CIA requested a tour

Beimont Novenber ig,

yc

ron COLOMBIAN INTELLIGENCE

for several:
ere corning to this country under CIA
that no tours wow be eiven to the

12 past a[Colombianbtfabassador had ;
eau aiter \

we had @¥rested the
White Glave Traffic Act che arge. (®)
d, we could give consideration to
impose upon us individusls whom we
light of the forenging.
Noach to. Belnont {Reps osentatives
Servicef- Request Tor Bureau Tour

S)
FOREIGH (a)

SURVEY OF COUNCIL ON i
_Ciy 1257 i
: : j

1857, Reel New York Office was con~
presentative who desired to be ine i
a ‘coneuet R security survey ct the i
n Foreign Relaticns which were located. '
occupied by th oviet -

The CIA representative indicate’

to our offiee was pursuant to instructions

& Whoggliezedly was concerned about
vietsWYstablishing coverage of

ions which might be held at the Council,
he Council included as members many

including officials of the United

tructions, Allen Dulles was informed
t we did not like the arproach used
sitive matter had been taken up at
an through Bureau Headquarters,
1957, re "Council ~

SECREL

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 25

ed

O

scientist then visiting in tHe
We followed developments through | fs 5
Q The, Agency was duliy aware-of. the. .
portly knew that we were in contact with
q
N

a ‘Se received: ‘information fron ==)

‘States mi eee) LOCe
and wa. hept. cia. adv:
thon ana parti

VW

Q bee
&
:

@
3

elived information indicating that
loyee, esteolighed contact with
eveloping information concerning “(S)
protest wag mide to CIA for not
rests with us, bearing in mond

mel
sibly could have jeopardised

prone coordi natir
that the action take
a2 Burenu ons aration,

ted February 10, no) we directed a.
protest ta Cra ting that Arency with inte wing the
subject rene ten, without first ob: the S

sfrance Loin the Bureau, (Re: wy

cesary c

25, iSONSTION CF FRY. EMPLOYEE

e@ received information indicating
hed represented herself as being

arrange an interview with

le ntcrnations Ll Association of.

2 ave a signed.statement

ved @ phone call from a
Ee Igon checking with
eniled that she had made
to Belmont April 25,

Miss: rc
Ci4é, we were informe
“such representati
°1958, "Unknown Sub njec

26,

; By letter dated May 12, 1958, the Bureau protested

to CIA for interviewing an alien in the Detroit area without

first obtaining the necessary clearance from the Bureau. 7
(ten chen sary pursuant to established agrecment.
Rey :

SECREL

~ 8 -

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 26

et

- June 1 153 ad Scheral Beinhard” 7 ~~
voor Gehlert eae: hond. of the : intelligenc OLE resell ey ee
becanG avare of this in¥Ptation an Amency coprosent@tive
informed our Lesal Attusc! Lb ag not desired that the
LeEgav Visit with [G tos” our Legat was inetructed by the Bureau
to accept the invtta tio regardless oi the CIA position,
* We could evealuste the CIA position in this natter as
being uncooperative, Ciomorandum Raach to Belinont June 17,
1858, "Relations with CIA")
Si. CTA Ni
In June, ‘ we 4hecd the question concerning
crAts failure dheze to an agrcement relating to CIA's G
recruitment of Chinese fe aa i he United States for over
qaag Griellirenta néer the agreement, CFA wns
not to approact without first checking with(S)
us. 4 situat Linois indicating thet CIA
allerediy Kn yecruiting an alien and
even toon 99t checking with us Vie
expressed tter to CIA June 12, 1958
CM orAanc : tune @, 196s, ‘Reoradesent S)
of[ ch nese Aliens in the United States for Overseas
Intellicene @ Onorationns's
32, CIA OFFICIAL's CRAITICISN OF “MASTERS OF DCE?"
Qur Legal Atta he, Tokvo, obtained a copy of ar
randum sent to an official-in curl Embassy in Tokyo by &@ a,
Chief of the CIA Office in Japan, | In his communication S)
elittled the value of "Masters of Deceit’ as an anticommunist
weapon in foreign countries. He claimed that the book nertained
only to the Communist Party, USA, which he characterized as a
small, ineffective, £ tion-ridden organization. He svated
that ‘ 2 author of the book was not an intellectual but rather
@ policeman, Ciemorandum Roach to Belmont dune 12 and 24, 1955,
"Masters of Deceit.")
“ 7 \ 7 a - i?
: SECRET
Me oS ot ~ 10 -

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 27


Scand volunteer oy
°&@ gource by CIA e

cin BURP Gs What actually happened at the United States Embass

Snape ena:

pn

LESURE

hy, WORE GAILY.,. v,
date

vind

ing some lagormation ‘to.
the Ageney, In 24, 1953, we told CIA
that in the cnse of EB A, Wwe eit that the * Agency should
have notified us at an earhicer date in order that we could
have considered coreneen for internel seguFity purrs

oh By,
at the outset. (le: /IndonesianLActivities - j10 On 25474 YS)
incl

L GOLRNYEYUSEI, AK ADR BINRICH SCHULZE ale

ne ae ARE N

Tha carhdaat

and furnishea axtre
ss of this case include -
cerning CLA coopers tion,

Service,
veiveble

In June, 1988, we developed informatio indicating
that CIA: May nave opened a letter in itzerlandpWhich had
been addressed to the Director by an idividual who had
identified hi fF asfor. Heinrich Schutze ae weiger further
indicated that he might be connected with “the (B BE ntelligence —
Service. The hotber addvesseod to. the he the FB cen olsced
.in ag envelone tury ended up in the pees of
thefUnited State ‘ dox t tS, bsequentily
recived @ copy of the. particuls omuunieation from Cis, — .
and the contents were such at ¢t time that no action was

m <7?

-regquived by the Burcau, We asked CIA for particulars. leading

to the alleced opening of the Letter which had been. addressed

to the Director. CIA claimed that it had not opened the

letter, We tere confidentially informed by an Arency repre-
sentative that the (Ambauvsadorphad opened the letter and then
referved the matter to CYA, ‘ne contents were such thut inves~-
tigative action of an extensive nature was required by CIA

is semcthing. we may never know. [Ciichal Golenicwski - 65-65192

SECRET

~ll-

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 26

,
1
5
t
'


a

~ &
Sei
:
roe te ey pet % “4 a v
35, * eet
» . aot . . A . *s

By letter dated June “26

58, we oiced our concert
rerardink Cra ‘sca bhaced: darter view Sean vom a)

was con adering for overseas reeruitment, CIs denice that

ch alien bad boon, wOw Our, inves t: it ic
e anatine- m-CkA, (Res
. Bie eas ee PAE SD,
oa —_ THs, CIN requestéd the Bureau fom.
_ permigs to folay a’recording of a telephona een Tee

ohn of dJordanpe? tha

ad throucn ourfsenusitive coverage

Vashineton, Dp, Cc. On dune 5, 16538,
« Ee nversation between Mabnoud

and the Egvptieg Air ttache Tf)

Lied that PounaanpPwnas wosleine

“yen ly. CTA developed

! fas a key figure in a

plot, the objective bf which was to overthrow

obtained by tik? Gureau pr Mu
recordingphad been deve

fo the MFPvntian Fmbassy
we had obtained the con
Rousan of the Jordanian: Em
The conversation gtrong ty |
closely with the 3
information indict

evolutionary
Vt Meet

i :
Rousenptionicad any tuph LC ‘
he wes stpongly supy , ropta: op of field ‘als she
Gordan rianPGovernnen on ¥ at he was on the
gecieie ial

(Spot and that he nce
jactivity. CTA asked. Fhe Epcording | to be
was the only way [Kine

‘played to the Kings
Hassel] could be convi

On July 18, 1958, a CIA of ficis
the Bureau posi thye ly would. not avant pormis toppiavying
of the recording) We maintained that if we ¢ ed such
permission, out other (Coverage of. a sensitive nate ure peoule

be seriously imperiled @) >)

On July 23, 1958, Allen Dulles asked if the Bureau
would reconsider its position in view of the critical situation
in[the Middle Fast ) Pursuant to instructions, CYA was ther
tol@ that in vier™ef the position in which the Bureau had been
placed, we neceded to Bulles' request. CIA was further told
that we were seriously considering: the termination of all of
eur technical surveillancespaiecause we aid not intend to be
placed in such a position ‘in the future

advised that

On July 22, 1958, Dulles told the Liaison Ament
that he was very much disturbed over the Director's reaction
He stated that he was not interested in- holding | a pistol to

So SECRET ==

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 29

Daddy ts Nene nnd: he “guvther indiggted that ha was “deFihor~"
satains whether -or not the feccardinFehould She used, ee ek ee
recomm rendad that the Liniwses the matter for phe
ve" pirrotal taf boritittinn yep tt fa t67Be Used | by rCh
The Director's notat . is in the~fire
“and Ata) Useless ta whst ’ “y
ear of any dota

OE ate

The strong mowe took in resis
dissemination of such se tive ww Porsa tion | to foreis
~ _governn fully 1 ch .to Belmont, 0 1 |
“dated: 2, 1SHs, ssion to[Pla me
Survod

a Yechnic

Linnee Recording te King Huss ton Jordan’ HS) 4

#5

Ad on! RONM vr
ICAW Gf SYER ENT

Yn 1958,
enstged in. a pracran ‘ :
‘activity in Hexice We became: ‘con
vas “to involve deporta eee of uncda

-ecommiinbsts ves eds ng | in

ine ludine :
plonenta tian of Bru

PRO ei Vo Oh Stee aca
to the United. it Was engaged in any
operation : Amotican communists. :
In September, mt the Mexican Government :

had embarked on
Americ ins were ord ere i
Agency's ray (, in

involved (XH) UW):

: program and certain
We cheened with CrlAé and the . ‘
ime ed that his Agency was net °

: The Liais 207
strictly confidential bas
been in contact with certs xiean officials concern :
possible anticommunist ectivities., The Ambassador had consulted
with the lecal CIA chief and had asked for a list of Americans
-who could he cons heered as being devortable, ne Cia officer
reportedly furnished a Mist of eer ee ap ames. MEMO ~
randum Reach to “elmont, epten 1985, Lenal Attache/s
Office, Mexico City, Relations with Dnmbassy and C13 U)

Subsequent ty was informed on a
erican Ambassador had

; : (
ng :

= we
5 4

Ie pea
~~] +
“

ty 4

38.

We xpress

ed our. displensure to cra itkseptenber

1958 hecaus 2 of he Agency's suthorized. investigation in
the United States of eters: nian tigen whoowas here in 4
nce a .

tion with an excha ELAM, rh Romanian#indicated ta a
fneriean friend that he was intereatrd in stiying in the “ty

States, but wes not roady for actual defection because of U\

SECRET

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 30

“to! noLizy" the Pagoda. * A To ‘bby “dated Sépte mbor 16, 1959, ‘was
oa. 4 Alsorsont.to-§ ish etioy s tolt “thet the Bare: ‘ati hos
vo dis cappointe od boca he had failed to make any objection

chad’ ‘not alostod “Ws -conedrnitig: the’ impending’
Bureau, (Memorandum Frohbose to Bolmont,
‘Allen Dulles: ). America's Global - ober loci,
true! Hearn ine, ceptenber, 1S59"s< and Memeorandum, Frohbo Se. to”
Beluont, September 4, 659, "Allen Dulles") 9

45. ACTIVITIES OF COMPAOTS DIVISS 3 DIVESITON OF CTA - 1956 SC)

13
‘te ‘the dtticlo nd.

attack against ¢)
a jAugus

We received infomation in September, dese, that

as as es

. the Conta Lon of CYA had held interviews with American
business
the businessmen and visiting ovietsWSIcrA reportedly was inter-

ested in developing positive ovictgplas in informationgkbut it
1c

so happened thag,yone of ¢t! SovietsPWas involved in af double

agent operat ighf®he ing handied by ¢ Burgeau. The Buretu already

had notified CIA of our interest in the (oviet,] By Mths. ne

Geter September 29, 1959, “we voiced our objection to the m&iner
no wi doh CTA hag yondied this, (he @ a9, Bureau

WNPISHE TISLER BEFORE ‘THE

nan ACTIVITSE C LICUA) = 1659
: On November 6, 1959, information was received

indicating that HCUA was inte srested in obtaining Colonel Frantisek

Tisler, a Caech defector, to testify before the Committee, CUA
advised us that it had contacted the State Bopartment who, in
turn, head conferred with C1lA, Allen Dulles allegedly informed
HCUA that Tisler was agreeable to appearing before the Commitice

and that he would be made available pursuant to certain security |

instructions,

The Director asked whether or not CIA had authority ~

to make a defector availcble to a coneressional committee without

first checking with other pntercsted agencies. The Girector was
informed that CIA did not have such authority because a National
Security Council directive made it very clear that this not
be done without processing the matter through the Inter-:
Defector Committee, In this particular case the aforementioned
Comnittee had not called a mecting, but the chairman, a CIA
official, had made certain phone calls, . A Bureau representative
was contacted by ‘phone on November 6, 1959, but et that time we
had not formulated a position. Allen Dulles allegedly contacted
the chairman of the mmittee and was told that the Committee
had no ebjection to Tisler available,

SECRET.

Boo . oe : -17 - : “

HW 50953 . DoclId:327169160 Page 31

3 “the Beston area, which dealt with meetings between

tas

P" One Novenber “135.1959, CIA representatives: were (oe

informed that: oppesed ttocaking. the defector. availdah 4

to HCUA.. On late we were told that CIA was infor .

pete HIOUA. Etowas re - peidtom rand that apon roconsidera a
7) Gt’ did-not feel Tisler could-be made available. “4

“dirted Nexvenber’ 14, “2959; the-develepei st
reviewed and it was recommended that —
Deteecor Committee meeting we stronely

ono in the handline of the HCUA request.

iments in
‘at.the next
protest CIA's
(Bureau file

47, CRYTIC

“ ee.

On April ll, 1

Company Caracas, Venezuelan

® reld a coi ny erset thon ye tbe
Enbassy in Caracas.

o compli ¥

: EB Reicco
che Bureau that he reeentliy
fficial of the Uls. |
Lt ‘ ) MEER took excent
i leary statements mide by foncerning the Direc
and the FBI. SP stated that the Director should have retired
five years ago for the good.of a11 concerned, A protest was made
April 20, 19650. Vora nd unm Frohbos 32 to Relmont,

wt SDS

Anse te TO {5 taararoerye ee nn eee SOLER PORTIS, 11 - : soe i
eapee ey ? os iia

TA Are . i
F ADVOCATING. i

Posi Lior
: sce .

on Fouuds tion, -eered iutormation
ts ey made hy : ee a ten ‘
ailesedly advocated recernit thon of Red ,

yoiuint

cone myrwoge Staten
CIA official.
China.

This: matt called to the attention of Allen ; 4
‘Dulles and on Anril 2 ; Dulles informed the Linison Agent
that he Read canducted . uiry, had review wed a tape recording
of & ey talk, and was satisfied that @had not made the
4

statement attributed tol
The above is, be ing cited in the event we desire ty
dispute the pos taker 1 by Dulles, If the evidence clenriv
established that £ MP had made such a statement, we could woe
the information vo ort a position that we would have fern
varvanted in being most circumspect with (Memorandum.
Frohbose to Belmont, April 21, 1960, :

LLAT MICN OF MICRGPHONES ON U.S,
BY CTA

49.

ALLUGID INSTA

my ane a .
* ; A State bopartment representative informed the tarcan
: that a microphone had bec found in the U.O. Minbassy, Mester ' 1iss
, that it had been planted by CIA; and that Allen Dulles allerett's
_ — SECRET :
oo, -~ i184
. : - en er ns ana) D8 meen oer

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 32

. : 4 . a . a 2 ms ; en
sa .

oO SECRET

7:
‘

‘had imadintained® that “VF CTA UV:
to know. what owas

S to operate @ffoetively, it Had”
coing of, im US. : stablishments . The implication

y yas Left that CIA was covering aetivities of other U.S. agencics
“os throush sechities} ‘Enstad data Inquiries: developed in rfou
“tion indicatiig that CLA’ had installed | a microphone #n the a
-in 1952 atthe. requcst of a Rte Department official, The.
-¢ pesecuritysdn State Pepa tia thine .e rontacted™ in amr-erfort
pin this fown ip 2 more specdric mnnmer, We were told Dy
“that their records: did not’ an any anv i
the mic crophone, ‘
meee ee pce uahbly, a ‘Letter was’
. Attaches instruct zag | them to be on the “to
instalintions vback : DULESU Of vations, Gionorandws
L'Allicr to ; ‘installation of Microphones
on U.e. Deon ines ;
50.
Saudienting that the
; subject of a Bu
tigetion, “had pla Tork City.
ben OFA-rogrec gubdcot TS
-to orient him se that fleet. would be derived
throurch wh piper pubbieig a ‘told that -the CIA vopre
senlocivQ® in Now Yorl Cityi@ind been instructed by his headauarte
to tell the°subjeeu that he would not be prosecuted by the US.
Governnont. We complained to CIA sti vossing that the: Agency
hed no power or authority to promise the subject immunity. ly)
(Memorandum L'ALiier ta Belmont, September 36, 1660, ae
ss, a CIA gmployce, obtagned A
position as a secreta in the Orfice off tho ee
i to the United HaAtions, jPrior to receiving tit
} sureau. Ths Lh 3 gont aubsceduently len
! iforme ge the that she was Lonvins
ineuivreg if che could recommend somebody
| the nane of another CIA employee, hiss
The Liaison Agent informed CIA that the Agency was
out of line by not first ¢ ing with the Bureau pefore recon-
“mending iggthes 8, thet the Burcau was intere
in developing intelifsrence information which might be useful
to the U.5, Governnenty and that, in this instance, CTA was
° Olsteuct ini opernt ions by Not appronriately coordinating with
. wenn,  Clongrandun L'Allior to Belmont, October 31, 1966,
: >A) SECRET
° - 19 -

HW 50953 Docld:327169160 Page 33

|

Lc aeaeet ed

r —— = angel

nee SECRET a.

contacted.
Bene clear:
RPoafd document.
4 wes SOG tlie, ‘ om
3 fk reaue eted one. .of His
ne dure to preven ito oa recurrence

elmont, reh SO, Leal,

© °° Allen Dulles:
. . For use of
oe NO. mown
-tivi
cahondina

such

Lge tte: a
53s, oPY IN Tf

1, MONATE .

‘In duly, 1961
proofs of the book “Ep;
A review of these proofs
| portrayed our counteresn
light. Since CIA w
/ owhiech he might perform,
fo turned out that CIA had not bee
the book. We were told that st

,

icaro Office received walley
S.,'' written by Pawel Monat.
ed several references which
cnpabilitie s in an unfavorable
for Monat and for any writing
ey was discussed with CIA, 1t
following the preparation of
would be taken to protect
bs ‘gan InFomest, Phe publishers had indicnted té6 CIA that, they
would coopernte on cha Se a some changes were made,
the book still cane out with some indermation which was not

enti J favorable to (Pawel Monat, Bureau file
105-40510

~

54. CONSLICT, WITS LEGAL ATTACH 1961 | w)
;

es

yeceived information

city wes planning. to
Intelligence, ‘The Lega
that the Agence. was mot invalved., Cn October 12,
same CIA of fis ree Changed las position and admitted
been involved to a certain extent. The Liaison Agent objected ~
to these tactics, ity anportant to hin to know the facts

so he could be guided a rdingiyv. (Hemorandunf’L'Allie: to
Sullivan, October 16, Ve 61 “Eczcchoslovaiian Histomatic

’ “~ F
Activities|}- Mex ico HSS)

55, CIA TRCHNICAL SUPUEILLANCH ACTIVITY IN THE

Cn October 6
in

haregesment of its personnel by a

1 Attache was told by thegglocn L CIA office
: the

the

FA had

ok

a
u
pa

When he defected in Decembe ot y
furnished int vmeation concerning alleged penetration of American
intelligence. Iuguiries and review conducted by CIA within, the
Agency surcested thet va CIA intelligence officer, ©

“SS was a logienl suspect. We conferred with CIA and on
‘ 162, we advised the Agency that we would take over the inves
: gation. Ab. \ : ET .
: — — SECR .
-~ 290 -

CET OPT TE we et ee

HW 50953  Docld:327169160 Page 34

nee.

1661, our Legal Attache, xico eo
leating that thegzech Babe vesyRin tha
reat imag

3st


Ld and we then: learned in’
Le: y plnaned ta mate, a veerniin
S$ taken. up with CYA headquarters and
& Of: vide discrepancy: in the -

LNT ons. CM

Sonmtet

OO. Epetrucdtions %
 Bicw. York City Mthat CIA
-iipreach, . $HE matter ws
 aQopretest- was wade beca
“pepor ts: “we veceived on. Cia

Sullivan, Aprilk, 18, .1066,_

_ . _ ain Seneenber ,. LOGG, pan . 5
that: sof PBI docu cs hac - Senator Byrd
‘CIA. The” matter was digeussed, w a bir ector af Ci
7 Ageney subce Leaipion
that ene-
a name chee!
who

/ aiid

ou
wield oin question,
snd ling nema chec
in contact with
instituted a name
employee named

CIA and in this
Section. He adm
the cuff basis"

Tt heomy yvorsliention that ano
were sui equently fizved aeiged to ra

+ 1966, "he ak of

tor Robert Cc. Byrd")

UL DOUPLE AGENT st HRY u)

protested to CLA in connectig
nua interest in afchemis;

Brennan te
Concerning

6&. Al LEGGED COMPROUT
t

In}
With a matter
connected with¢

HOLS

Ve were utilizin we Chon G AS Chowbie agen’ an onerat
directed ageinst 3 j “head estaulis a velation
shiv with the fun YuUPrros ie) ivaing

Mi

that oa CEA “otfic 2a

withou e" Lidon mo mised our relationship wit the
binonist “disc Lne the ter with the president of the

irm, Veloach, March 15, 196

intelligence vel:
e

pent et

oyandunm Brennan to

Lor

Yi

In July, 1967, we protested to CIA in a case where

the Agency allegedly had failed te report to us concerning a
conmunication whic a an Cuban. exile, residing in the United St
had received from the Cuban Intell
oT Communication hae tnatras

SERRE

yo

HW 50953 . Docld:327169160 Page 35

nba

genee Service, 9 The: particula
ved the exile to initiate preperations

_&

i
ne eee 61

