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Date:08/15/92
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AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10018

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TITLE
SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL

DATE : 06/11/75
PAGES :; 135

SUBJECTS :
PTRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93 wrap

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS
SSCI Box 231, Folder 5,. Testimony of Richard Bissell

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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g 1 to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until
g
. 2 after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962.
E 3 Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably
2 4 with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing more
5 capability of assassinations. And you may have discussed
6 | it in the context -of various potential targets! without
9 | deciding on them. Once you decided on a target, or you were
8 going to recommend a target, what was the process of getting
9 clearance?
|
10 Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply because
11 no specific target was ever recommended. And to the best
12 of my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discussed

13 at length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE pro-

WARD & PAUL

14 ject. The issue of obtaining clearance never ‘arose. I

can speculate on how that would have worked if you wish.

15
16 Senator Mondale. No.
“a9 The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions.
18 Mr. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you?
. 19 Mr. Bissell. That is correct.
: 20 Mr. Schwarz. ‘pid you turn over SRRIFLE to him and
: 21 did you tell him about it? |
; 22 Mr. Bissell. I believe I did. And I also believe
7 23 that Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover.
QP: 24 Mr. Schwarz. Do you Know a man called (Gasein O'Sonnel 3
: 25 Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do. i

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Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or /substance to

kill Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility

and to make explanation for so doing.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may

have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter

of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't

remember the date.
Mr .Schwarz.

making plans to go
Mr. Bissell.
Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bissell.

do it. But he also

priate action, and

plished better in other ways.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did you tell him this connection with

see

I think I probably did.

the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?

Did he tell you he wouldn't do it?

Later he told me that he didn't want to

said that he thought it was jan inappro-

that the desired object could be accom-

Who authorized you to tell

Mr.

_o&DEnnedl

to take steps: to move toward assassinating Mr. 'Lumumba?

, Mr. Bissell. Nobody.

Mr. Schwarz.
Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Schwarz.

Did you inform the White House of that?

No.

To

inform the White House

Mr. Bissell.

To

the best of your knowledge, did anybody

of that?

the best of my knowledge, no.

1
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Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassi
Lumumba?
Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinat

told a member of the clandestine service to mak

develop the capability so to do if it were appr
ordered.
Senator Goldwater. Approved by who?

‘Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to h

at the highest level of government.

The Chairman. Where did the idea come from?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember, Mr. Chairm
possibly have been mine.
The Chairman. It could possibly have been
Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was
Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruc
J was my initiative.
Senator Baker. How many others did you pl

as a contingency?

to,.assassinate?

Mr: Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which °

went to the point of instructing that a man be |

Senator Baker. How many were there that d
far? How many murders did you contemplate?

Mr. Biseéll. Well, Senator --

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55
nate Mr.
e him. I

e plans and

oeved and

ave approval

an. It could
yours?
. your initiativ

tion as to

an on, just

_” How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans

prepared.

idn't go that

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quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent

to the Congo in the fall of 1960.
The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which

counsel has referred reads as follows:

"In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE

Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African

Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960:

‘He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong,
but if he is given an assignment, which may be orally wrong
in the eyes of the world,but necessary because his case offi-
cer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he
will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution
without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize
all actions'”".

Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that
applied to such matters at the time?

Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the
range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE.

Could I. say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in

which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency
or a secret service unless it has at least a number of
employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to

carry out orders involving acts of this sort.

The Chairman. That assumes, of course, ithat the

United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders.

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61

meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable?

Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to sugges

t that it was

entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned

were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to

their own countries and the U.S. interests.

Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his

experience?
From my readings in trying to learn more
gence, I gathered the impression that the actio

you have been describing up to and including as

are practiced by every intelligence organization that I have

been studying, is that correct?
Mr. Bissell. That is my impression likewi
Senator Goldwater. Including/:Erganad?
we. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I
it has been used [by Ming. I couldn't give you

cases.

Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB.

about intelli-
ns such as

sassination,

se, Senator.

think =—

specific

Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB -- althoug
man pointed out the other day, I at least canno
any case where the KGB has carried out the assa

a chief of state.

Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that

of those other countries that this ruler would)

of this in every case?

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h as, the Chair

t point to

in the cases

ssination of
have knowledge
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Mb. Bissell. In the case specifically of the Ook. |
I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however,
that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of any one of those
countries would flatly deny that the chief of state had
knowledge of such action.

Senator Goldwater. Thank you.

Senator Baker. Would you deny it?

Mr. Bissell. In our case here?:

Senator Baker. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriate. to do so.
Senator Baker. Have you done so? .
Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to,| because I am
unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by
the U.S. '
Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial?
Mr. Bissell, It is a denial that any has occurred,
at least in the period that I am aware of.

Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to
. 1

indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter?
|

Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context.

There are occasions when I would go a tong way |to protect the

President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrass~

‘
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ment. |

Senator Baker. . The question was, very simply, would

i

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you try to protect the President in such a case as you des-

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eribed,(MI6 or otherwise?

Mr.Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, |Senator.

Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further?
You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a

committee like this, but say another thing publicly, is that

what you mean?

Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean.

The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee?

t
\

Mr. Bissell. No, sir.
The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee?
Mr. Bissell. No, sir.
.Senator Tower. I think that distinction/has tocbe made.
I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself!
The Chairman. Shall we proceed with the questions?
Mr. Schwarz. The remaining topic I have is Trujillo.

It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents.

And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up.

I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would
suggest that. we ask the witness and whatever Senators that
can return to. come back this afternoon on Trujillo.

The Chairman. We have a -Senate order that there will
be no further committee meetings this afternoon.

I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent.

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almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such’ as the

Rcvatantaitan operation, the Bay of Pigs itself is, the earlier

operation that has been discussed in the press (in ¥ugan,

mater gs Rangia : helt A ey care aT yy pe Le Te
Whihehpreswiitedihbn: the oust eigmoiig Se
( SHShE there is an expectation that such operations will involv

military or semimilitary action, and that some [people will los

1
1

their lives in the process.
Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more
precisely of a single person or a group of people who were
targeted, or discussions were held about. targeting ..them, for
what would be an assassination were it not for the legal.
Significance of the. term.
Mr. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in
which that sort of matter was discussed or was |the subject
of planning, other than the ones which have already been
mentioned in testimony.
Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this
point.
But of course that contemplates what we have seen in
the. earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation -—
and I think. this was the history of the Castro/operation --
to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often
moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't
that true?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir.

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AFTERNOON SESSION we

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D)
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.
Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning.

It will be understood that the oath still continues to

apply.

Mr. Schwarz. Before we turn to Trujillo, | two quick

Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that.
Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and
broke it apart you would have no recollection?

Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.

M. Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr.
Helms 'y did’ you brief. him about the Mafia matter?

Met “Bissell. I am reasonably clear that t did not brief |-
him-in’ “the. early stages, that is to say, in 1960. And my
impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on i
until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962.

Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him?.:?

|
“Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally
|

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#Indonesia™

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they might eventually be so used.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon
any recollection? |

Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection.
But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish
between an element of supposition and a dim recollection.

Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter,

There was, as you have already indicated, several discussions

in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very
small groups with representation from State, the White House
and the Agency. And I am clear -- I do recollect that the
plans at that time contemplated the arming of opviously a
relatively small group inside the Dominican Republic, that is,
the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so| people, but
not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion or a major
geurilla activity.

Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am
perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the
discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well
be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his.

Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience
at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident
gréaps within the country? |

Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases;

|
is another casé during the time I was’ in the Agency,

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2 wee Bar 8

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9 : :
8 1 or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember, other cases,

2 but there may have been some, Well, earlier before I was ever

Phone (Area 202) 54
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3 in the Agency, there was [the: cas And there was the
4 reasonably well publicized case (Gf Guatama la. |

5 Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries?

6 Mr. Bissell. I think we have.

9 | Mr. Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly
8 common to supply arms to dissident:.elements in countries all

9 over the world? :

10 Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct.

11 Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an *
12 assassination contemplated or not?

13 Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases

}
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(GGatamailay there was

¢
a
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14 not. In a large scale operation like
15 no intention of any assassination. I think you) would include
16 it under that term.
7 The same is trueliinpieecantof course -- the| possibility
18 that a chief of state would be killed.
. 19 ; The Chairman. But you would distinguish this matter fro
: 20 just supplying of arms to dissidents? [In other words, there
F 21 was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied
i 29 for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassi
: 23 nation of Trujillo or other highly Placed people in this
; 24 Government, correct?
_ 25 Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, Senatoz,

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2
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1 ‘I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would
3 2 say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approva
sn
i 3 process, those involved would probably have given a higher
E 4 probability to such use being made of the weapons than they
5 would in some of the other operations that I have referred to.
6 Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special
” | Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the
8 minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint
9 recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as of

10 the 12th of January?

11 Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as”
12 I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the
13 reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's
14 representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was
15 a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political
16 ties with the dissidents:
1 Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should
18 focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently

. 19 reflecting a discussion of FexonlecetEMDEED . Was §EMDEED the

é 20 code for the overthrow of Trujillo? . |

F 21 Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the -

i 20 project of support to the dissidents.

: 2% Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name(\'E

ss 24 I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed

: 25 "Discussion of Project EMDEED]." Does it appear to be a

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and this record, which is a record we have obtained from

the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree

that on this record it appears that on the item of the pass-

ing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact
used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State
Department uninformed on that item? _

Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way.
It appears -- if I put these two together --

'

Mr. Schwarz. By these two you mean your: cable of March

24 and the cable of May 1 relating to certain matters is
foo a

not to be discussed with the State Department?

Mr. Bissell. Yes. The earlier cable of those refers to

machine guns. . ,

|

Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers? i

I
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Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And

I believe that '~ what ‘eventually passed to the dissidents
were three rifles, not the revolvers. And, therefore, neither

of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissi-

y .

This cable states the conditional willingness at some
time in the future to pass machine guns. That permission
was never granted and they were never passed.

It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't

know whether there was a record that those were ever passed,

or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents. And it would

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