DARAAN
Iitod-10307-10006 ' | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

Byes bee

ceec

Sear. iJ

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTELLIGENCE. COMMUNITY'S REVIEW OF INTELLIGENCE vo,
' ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE CUBAN ARMS BUILD-UP

1h APRIL THROUGH 14 OCTOBER 1962

Task Force W
- Foreign
Intelligence _.
Branch ,


13-00000

a :

x
3
ao

III. WHAT TARGETS WAS THE AGENCY ABLE TO COVER AND WITH WHAT
FREQUENCY AND CONTINUITY? _

The following remarks apply to agent coverage only, that is,
coverage by means of individuals on the island of Cuba, or elsewhere
in the world. Audio devices or telephone taps on Cuban installations
abroad or Cubans living abroad have produced intelligence which has
served operational ends, in other words, information which has pro-
vided critical data used in the spotting, assessment and recruit-
ment of agents. Due to the standard security measures taken in
“arena most official installations, these technical operations have been

able to provide only a limited amount of positive intelligence. In

general, agents have produced information essentially in accordance
with their known access at the time of recruitment. Responsibility
for many of the agents dealt with during the present .reporting period.
was simply assumed by TFW from past efforts against Cuba. In many
instances, these agents had been recruited strictly on an “availa-
bility" basis, and indeed had no particular access. A major effort —
was made at the inception of TFiW to winnow out those persons who
could make no contribution and to redirect those who could. This
process of redirection, which was conducted via time consuming and
generally inefficient S/W channels, resulted in the conversion of ;
a number of heretofore unusable agents into sound, pertinent report-
ing sources. Though, in most instances, TFW operations officers

had never had personal contact with these agents, they succeeded .

in inducing many of them to spot, develop and recruit sub-agents.
This technique succeeded, despite the obstacles involved in

vetting candidates and advising agents via S/W means. In regard

to the recruitment of new agent assets during the reporting period, _
_[FW was able to be guided by specific, priority needs. Accordingly,
the many new assets acquired were chosen because of specific access
‘to target personalities or institutions. The assigned targets and
extent of coverage are indicated below. ,

A. Military

During the reporting period, in the latter half, the Agency's
major effort to obtain intelligence from agent sources, centered
on Cuban military affairs. The reporting obtained covered matters
‘ranging from military policy to detailed OB. Almost every agent
contributed to this effort, with the consequence that the coverage
‘of military matters was wide-spread and continuous. Despite the
fact that 95% of this information was provided via S/W (much of it
‘fron totally untrained sub-sources who had no military experience),
such was the detail and volume of the data, that our agents were
able to give us highly significant information on troop and materiel'
movements, location and nature of military sites, etc. The follow-
ing agents served as the major sources of military ifformation
‘during the reporting period:


13-00000

py

Se STOO hese SR
es

of

1. Cuban (insurance) executive, who had a large and diversified

-net, provided intelligence in late June 1962 which specifically

anticipated the massive Soviet military build-up which ultimately -.....
took place in Cuba. Throughout the build-up itself this agent a
provided an almost continuous stream of OB intelligence on ‘missile;
maritime and air phases of the build-up. He provided the initial
reporting on delivery of TL-28's to the island.

2. <A relative of a former Cuban president whose government |

. connections provided him on several occasions with information on

attitudes of various military factions toward Castro and the
Soviets.’ Agent also provided some detailed missile OB.

G.8. Atized w o established contact with a resistance
ohie? | in Pinar del Rio)during July 1962, provided, in the course _
of sevéral reports}9an inventory of Soviet installations throughout
the province. The maintenance of communication with this agent was
extremely arduous in virtue of his most exposed position.

4. A Havana surgeon) who took special horseback trips to cover

the Soviet installation at Torrens Reformatory.

5. A former lawyer, resident of Santiago provided information
on Cuban armymhitse laying along roads in Santiago area, as well as .
on Soviet troops and materiel movements.

6. <A western diplomat who provided photographs of Soviet~ Ee,
occupied hotels in Havana, Soviet troop and materiel movements in ute
the Havana area. ‘

7. <A Cubana official who provided comprehensive data on state
readiness of Cubana air materiel.

8. A merchant in Camaguey who had provided general observa
tional reporting on military activities in his area. .

9. A former wife of a Cuba Airlines pilot. who has contacts
among Cuban Airline pilots from whom she obtained some air OB.

10. A shipping clerk at Cardenas harbor reported sporadically
on activities at the port.

ll. OA construction company employee at Guantanamo Naval Base

“reported on Cuban OB in the. environs of the base.

12. <A public accountant in Havana who is the leader of a
counter-revolutionary group, reported military information acquired
through his group contacts.

13. A Havana bartender who reported considerable quantities
of OB data obtained from his large circle of varied acquaintances
in Havana area,

14, A retired railroad official reported data on raat shipments.

SR

13-00000

SIG STO aed

in Havana where kh certain airijpe) is one of his clients. a
ie Bem mee
16. A pineapple) firm manager in Pinar del Rio recruited:

in July 19 reported on military developments in his area.

17. A Cuban employee of a foreign embassy recruited in July -
1962 in Havana reported some OB information which was obtained
through casual contacts. lo

18. A customs inspector t Jose Marti Airport) in Havana
was.the source of good reporting on Sov/Bloc cargo shipments to
Havana, including military cargos.

19. <A physician in Havana who reported on military movements,

20. <A Cuban Airlines official, with limited access, reported —
Air OB. ;

21. -<A foreign intelligence service staff officer in Havana

15. A nore & ce Havana reported on Rancho Boyeros Airport
|

|

| reported military OB,

22. A second foreign intelligence service staff officer in .
Havana reported military OB. ;

23. A number of maritime assets who have reported on Sov/Bloc
military cargo deliveries to Cuba.

@ ; b. Political. Throughout the reporting period, the Agency was
able to produce Intelligence on Cuban political affairs at the |
| ministerial lovel and above. This intelligence was derived
essentially from sources who had but limited access to persons of
| high rank or in key positions. This type of access placed a premium
on Agent elictation skills and the ability to distinguish between
: rumor and fact, plus an aptitude for remaining afloat in dangerous
waters. The most significant political information was provided — ,
by the following agents: 8

1. An official Gn the Ministry of Economics )who, (in the
capacity of advisor to Ernesto GUEVARA) was able to giean informa-
tion on Cuban political affairs. :

2. A relative of a former Cuban president who through this
connection and his own social position is able to maintain contact
with high-level officials in Cuba. & on

o

3. A Cuban doctor Who gives médical treatment to Cuban
officials and)who is reporting limited intelligence, by direction,
until he is able to develop direct access to. important high-level
VLLL LAL Ss

13-00000

8

on ae 4. A cultural attache of a West European Embassy in Havana who

. picks up information from other diplomats and from Cuban contacts on
political matters. A sub-agent of this asset has also been a source: _
of medium-level political information.

5. A West European Ambassador in Cuba who provides political
information he obtains from foreign and Cuban contacts.
‘ oe | - ae
6. A/fCuban Ambassador in Western Burope) who has been reporting
with utmo: detail and frequency on high-le¥Vel political matters of
an i which he is aware.

7.. The Ambassador to Cuba of & Latin American country who reports
‘political intelligence*obtained through his Cuban and foreign contacts..

8. <A former protege @f Raul CASTRO) who retains contacts with
government leaders and who is a new asset developing his reporting |
capabilities on political matters, — io

9. The Ambassador in Cuba of @ North African country who has
provided high-level political information. os
; 10)

10. A: Cuban . awyer in Santiago whose brother-in-law, (a high- __
ranking official) provided intelligence on GOC/Soviet relations. —

2412, A staff officer of a foreign intelligence service assigned
po a to a cover position)in a Havana Embassy who has produced some
political intelligence responsive to our requirements.

12. A Cuban manager of an intervened U.S. company who has .
relatives in the PSP and in the government. To date, his reporting

has covered general political developments. é.
ob

Q | librarian and teacher who is a relative of a (former justice)
levees of the “Gini Supreme Court) and who has high-level government contacts,
This agent has been reporting political. personality data and some .
political information. |. 6
og
{

14, A-@uban Ambassador in Western Europe) who hi has reported political
information to which he has access. © :

15. In addition, there are a number of agent penetrations in
Cuban diplomatic establishments overseas who provide a variety of
miscellaneous political information concerning Cuban activities in the
areas concerned. ; . ;

4 iia

oy

13-00000

wee,

Jo. c. Economic. The Agency was able to produce a continuous am
of intelligence from Agent sources on the Cuban sugar, o11 and anount.
portation industries, much of which was in the form-of statistical
summaries. In a number of instances, this intelligence was pro.
vided by agents who had direct access to this information by virtue .
of their jobs.. We also have been able to get continued reporting
on general economic conditions and foreign trade. Among the nost ,
significant agents reporting economic information were: .

1. A Cuban (insurance) salesman, previously noted, who
through his extensive coxtacts and sub-agents has been. able to
provide information on sugar production, (insura e)affairs and
the Cuban banking system. %

ee of 08 — .
-@, An off{cial of the Ministry of E cconomy),( a close associate |
‘of Che GUEVARA , who has proVided useful economié intelligence. ,

3. A-relative of a former Cuban president, previously noted, —
who has provided detailed import-export figures; detailed documentary
reports on petroleum,

“4, @ high-level official of Cubana Airlines who reportedly
provided high-level information on Cubana Airlines, particularly
' financial and materiel affairs. 7

pharmaceutical )firm who travels to Cuba where he has good contacts

0
5. A resigent of Mexico and (director of an Italian-controlled _
in the Minist

of Industry, who has reported economic information,

6. A Dutch businessman who has access to Cuban economic
officials and who has provided useful economic information,

U. Ss. trained Cuban engineer who provided detailed reports .
on(petroleun) industry.

d. Sociological and General Conditions. The Agency has
- provided a st teady and relatively heavy flow of intelligence - :
covering such matters as the state of resistance activities, mood |
of the populace, Living conditions, etc., from agents in nearly
every Cuban province. A survey of agents reporting this type .
of information has not been completed, because almost all of our
agents have reported on this low priority topic from time to time,

4. Within the Terms of the Agency's Mission, What Target '
Was It Unable to Cover and Why? re _

R. Paragraph 3 above sets forth in general the degree to oe 4
which the major Cuban targets were covered during the reporting:

Zh). | 7 a Oo
m a ee wt

praet a oa

13-00000

clearly defined and assiduously pursued by TIW. The. immense
pressure of time must continuously be borne in mind if the attack .
on the Cuban problem is to be granted its. full perspective. Even
before TYW assumed responsibility for collection against Cuba, —.
it was clear that intelligence on Soviet, Satellite and Chinese.

’ Communist Cuban policy and maneuvers | would be formulated and
planned at.the highest level in the respective governments.
Equally clear was the fact that the clandestine search for in~ —
sights into the Cuban policies of these governments would enjoy
only as much success as the clandestine search for any. intelligence |
regarding any policies of these governments. Time restrictions
alone ruled out the hope that adequate coverage of these key
denied area targets could be achieved. As a consequence, every ~
facet of the TFW collection program was geared to the search for.
top priority Cuban intelligence; from sources in the free world
and on the island every agent or agent candidate was evaluated in .
terms of his access to such intelligence. Translated into
espionage terms, this meant that every agent or candidate was
examined sharply to determine whether and how he could help
penetrate the GOC, the Cuban armed forces or the managerial and
policy levels of the Cuban economy. Below is an account of the
success of this effort; it will be seen that most major target.
areas were under direct, specific assault.

“om . period, The key military, political and economic targets were
|

~ | by Potatical,

1. Cuban Communist sects late May a clos relative .

and confidant (of the Chief of the Cuban Communist Party) was
singled out and developed by a Cuban principle agent. he
candidate provided highly valuable information throughout the
summer of 1962. -Though the information was obtained indirectly
by the agent it was but a portion of what he could produce. Thus
the ultimate aim of the operation was to effect the candidate's
direct recruitment, The drive toward this goal continues, and..
though we are optimistic that the 6 months effort thus far in- |
vested will result in the direct recruitment of a high-level

* 29 Communist Party )member, it would be inaccurate to say that as of:

he close of the reporting period, the (Party had been penetrated

ata ‘Significant level. 24

2. GOC Ruling Circle,

(a) .In May 1962 TFW spotted a Cuban legal”
traveller whose brother-in-law has been a member of the GOC™
from its inception. The agent was recruited under specific
instructions.to attempt to induce his relative to report on GOC
policy matters. Though TFW had only 12 hours with the agent

Cen

?--

a wi


13-00000

a

before dispatching him to Cuba, he has attempted to carry out 7

his instructions. By October he had succeeded in eliciting
significant information from the target, and was confident his “4%;
full recruitment was simply a matter of time, One inhibiting

feature affecting the pace of this operation is the fact that

the agent lives in Santiago while his relative, the target, is

a resident of Havana. Unquestion: bly the full recruitment of |.

the target could help fili an important gap in our reporting —

on GOC activities.

So (b) In June 1962 TFW obtained a lead to a
person very closely related to Fidel CASTRO. Throughout the
summer extensive but necessarily circumspent negotiations were
conducted to bring this person to Mexico where full recruitment,

training and briefing would be possible. The negotiations , ‘
culminated in success, The agent was met and trained by Agency I
personnel in September and early October and dispatched to Cuba yt
on 15 October with the specific mission of reporting on the aw

thoughts, plans and activities of the CASTROS and otner leading \\

' GOC figures. Since the target, prior to recruitment did not 3

possess the kind of political awareness which would have led him _
systematically to observe those GOC personalities to whom he

had matural access, the Agency was denied any prime political
intelligence from this source during the reporting period.

-(c) Throughout the summer 1962, TFW
received various reports, the tenor of which were that Ernesto
‘Che! GUEVARA would like to defect from Cuba. Each report proved,
upon closer inquiry, to be groundless, until we learned in late
September that a Mexican industrialist had claimed GUEVARA had
asked him in 1961 for assistance in leaving Cuba. Though many
of the facets of this disclosure tallied with other known data, .
exploitation of this exceedingly important lead was hamstrung by
the inability to aline a qualified agency officer with the widely:
travelling Mexican. This lead illustrates well the frustrations.
involved in pursuing high-level targets within a rigid time
framework, and with a limited number of available personnel.

It also illustrated the need to persist, when the target is of
sufficient importance, in the follow up of "far-out" leads,

-3. Military

(a). In late July TFW recruited a Cuban _ .

legal traveller expressly because @f-his close relationship with .

a member (of the Cuban General Staf 2° Once again only a few hours \
was available in which to train the agent. Nevertheless, during
August, September and October the agent persisted in his efforts

13-00000
—
| Qa ~ ce

13-00000

4 . ve ee

C oe

-to develop the target and was able to provide significant OB -
at the same time. Neither this, nor the other efforts to
penetrate the Cuban military at high-level, however, had met
with full success by the end of the reports period.

of (b) The Cuban lawyer recruited ‘in May 1962.
‘(see paragraph above) developed a second target in September,
_a former member(of the Cuban General Staff)now awaiting reassigne
ment, The agent was instructed to recruit and train this |. ,
military Officer in 5/W. At the end of the reporting period
oo it was not possible to determine the success of this potentially:
“ean excellent operational development.

' (€e) Included in this discussion is the
partially successful recruitment of a Cuban army engineer who |
is stationod in Santiago. The agent cited in (2b above) has —
been in contact with this target, a captain, since July 1962,
but has not succeeded in completing the full recruitment. He
has obtained OB from the captain, but we feel the operation
; will not have reached its full potential until the captain has
| been trained in S/W and is reporting directly to us. .

(dad) Since mid-August the Agency has been
pursuing a lead to the G-3 of the Cuban Army. The basis of this
pursuit was fitted together from innumerable reports, and finally
centered, in early October, on a plan to try to effect the recruit~

3g ‘ment using a letter from a former army and prison comrade, By”
cut-off date, the developmental activity had reached the point
where the only remaining matter was to deliver the letter into
the hands of the Officer.

3. Economic. The Agency has striven to identify key
figures in the Cuban 6conomy and to develop ag$Sess to them as ;
rapidly as possible, wherever the opportunity has arisen. Oil,
Nickle and Sugar Industries have been assigned to us having the |

' highest priority.

(a) ‘Petroleum:© TW recruited and sent to.

Cuba in January a-.yound\U. rained engineer. In Way) it eported
he had obtained a position in the (Institute of Petroleun Too .
lowly himself to be of major value, we have steadily guided him 24 =|
in an enterprise aimed at recruitment of the(chieg of the petroleum)
industry. The families of the two man had bée@n close friends.
‘The effort involves many imponderables and must be carried out via.

S/W. Still, the major aim is deemed worthy of the investment,
Meanwhile the agent has been able to provide intelligence of
increasing value. .

13-00000

.. . (b) Nickle Industry: The seat of this
important industry unfortunately Is in two small towns in Oriente
province. Lightly populated areas which are of strategic importance
always pose rugged operational obstacles. The nickle towns are
no exception. Numerous well-meaning persons in the U.S. have
attempted to help us obtain access to this critical target. Yet
not until late September was the Agency able to turn up (by. |
virtue of a Now Orleans recruitment) a source of viable leads
to key personnel. By cut~off date, however, we had not been able
to bring any lead to function. Most promising is a lead to the
(technical supervisor of the Nickle complex.

°

{c) Sugar: Two former high-level penetrations
of the Sugar Industry. defected to the U.S. soon after the inception
of TFW. Throughout the summer it was not possible to identify :
a suitable candidate to replace them. A New York source in early
October succeeded in placing us in touch with the (chief sugaro re
technician)in Cuba. This “operation should be full. productive

by Christi s 1962, —

2Iry res Se

13-00000

voy
La

To illustrate the results of this opecational data, we have
recently been preparing the recruitment in place or defection of
one of the principal officers of the Cuban Foreign Service in
Europe. We have been able to develop the proposals through an

already defected diplomat and the effectiveness of his approach

and a reading on the diplomats reactions can be provided to us
independently by three other agents in close contact with him as

well as through a technical surveillance operation.

G. Liaison

r¢] .

The most fruitfu  \4aison relative to the Cuban target has
been conducted with Guropean)and a few of the(Latin American)/¢ ~
services. Specifically, tn llowing ;services,have veen [tne most
cooperative, and helpful:, ritish ‘Outch) Tench, , (Spanis by,

Italian) Greek, ) Norweziaiys (Deatak) (rede German (Mor; can) @rg ntinian)
ruguay 1€ (Canda any and(‘Chi tean):

sorte of thene services are working closely with the Task Force
both in Washington and Miami, cutting corners on procedure,

. protocol and actually exceeding their own official instructions.

This has been particularly true after the announcement of. the
President on 22 October 1982. The degree of this effort is se
remarkable and runs. all the way from full cooperation to an

‘outstanding exertion of personal conmitment, resourcefulness, and

imagination to find ways to help our effort.

To cite only’ a few of the current||FI operations developed,
through liaison services, the Gpanis sepvice has,given us(4 24
resident agents, (including\2 diplomats)%4 The (French) service has
provided us with one (resident di Loma, yho communicates: directly
with us (by W/T)24 Thdl Manish and Mutchy)iSérvices, have given us
control of eo tdae assets calling at Cuban rts), and they have |
also participated in join perations using (legal travellers) 24 —
In addition to mounting,operations against Cuba, several (European) (0
services have provided(secure diplomatic courier )services for the
transmittal of our owhagents' communications) and for the infil-— 24
tration of S/W and W/T and. other materials )to our agents inside
Cuba. Services in bigtundand Gotland) fava. been particularly
helpuf] in the devélopment of an operation to deny Cuba @ccess) 24
to a (urgently needed solvent for petroleum product date
it appears that efforts to make this roduct mod e) to

_ the Cubans has been successful,

{O-
In general, the West European) services have been cooperative

installations in their own territory.\|ofatin American)services,
have been most helpful in developing operations against Cuban |,
targets in, their own countries, apparently because of the (Latini0
Americans')increasing concern with the threat. of Cuban subversion
on their territory. .

in assisting us to mount operations against Cuba ican)eervic

wna

2s

13-00000

«

oe

_ V. | SIGNIFICANT CHANGES, EITHER POSITIVE OR NEGATIVE, IN
‘THE AGENCY'S COVERAGE CAPABILITY, WHICH TOOX PLACE DURING THE

PERIOD.

The initial, significant change effected by the Agency to
increase and improve its Cuban intelligence coverage capability
was to establish a Cuban Task Force at Headquarters and to
staff it with experienced intelligence officers. These officers
‘were selected from other operating Divisions within the Agency.
Many of them spoke Spanish and all of them have had extensive
experience in various intelligence assignments both at Headquarters
and in the Field. This newly created Task Force was charged with
the responsibility to direct, advise, support, and/or coordinate
‘all phases of the Agency's intelligence operations directed
‘against Cuba. a :

At the same time, the Task Force Field Station in Miami was

strengthened considerably with increased numbers of experienced
staff officers and facilities for mounting intelligence operations
against the Cuban target. This concentration of experienced
personnel into the Cuban Task Force, both at Headquarters and at
the Miami Field Station, was a positive and significant effort to
increase the Agency's intelligence coverage capability in order
to satisfactorily fulfill the priority requirements and tasks
which had been levied on the Agency as a result of the Communist. -
takeover in Cuba. . . .

{

To further improve our -coverace—capability,: the Agency comnunica~
tions office set up a special facility in Miami to (intercept
electronically internal communications) within Cuba, These (inter-24
‘cepted communications )are processed in Miami and then forwarded
directly to Headquarters, Miami Field Station,(and to NSA for ection *4
and/or further dissemination) The (wsi disseminates to the other
members of the intelligence comnunity"the information that has been
intercepted and processed by this special Agency communication _
facility. This facility cooperates and coordinates its operations. -
closely with(NSAland is used 6y NSA) to assist in the (interception) ZY
of (internal communications) in Cuba. *% - ma _

In addition to setting up within the Agency an organization
whose primary mission is concerned with all phases of intelligence
operations directed against Cuba, all other operating Divisions
within the Agency wére directed to give top priority attention to
the development of intelligence operations against Cuba. This. has
resulted in the diversion of certain assets who had the requisite’
access to Cuban targets as well as the experience or capability.

13-00000

The response of the various Agency components, both by Head-
quarters Desks and by the Field Stations, has been most satis-
factory and has aided the Task Force considerably in the perform-.
ance of its assigned mission. Within the Task Force, selected’ -
officers have been designated to assist, advise, and coordinate .
on all phases of Cuban intelligence operations with the various
geographic division desks. This arrangement has provided for a
continued, increased coverage capability of the Cuban target by
insuring a regular review of. current, developmental, and planned —
intelligence operations of all available Agency intelligence
assets which could be directed against Cuba.

The above points are ones that reflect significant changes

which have taken place during this period. In addition, it

should be pointed out that there has been an intensification

and concentration: of all operational techniques applicable to

the particular type and character of the Cuban target. . There

has been a substantial increase in the recruitment and training.

of agent assets. There has been an extensive increase in the
establishment and use of clandestine communications methods and
channels. The use of SW, one way voice radio, and WT as. methods

of communicating with agents inside Cuba has been greatly expandéd.
And ‘singe certain (Western Nationg“stil1 maintain Embassies in -
Havana, €ourier)channels for the delivery @f letters and packages)24 —
by the(diplomatic pouch have. been developed and are being usad'

_. extensively.:4The above points are discussed elsewhere in this |

_ paper but they are mentioned here briefly in the context of being
closely related to significant changes in the Agency's intelligence
capability. ,

GIpy

13-00000

VI. WHAT SUPPORT FOR COLLECTION FACILITIES-WAS REQUIRED

" FROM OTHER AGENCIES? HOW WAS IT SECURED FROM THEM? WAS IT TIMELY -
_AND EFFECTIVE? WHAT, IF ANYTHING, WAS LACKING?

The conduct of intelligence collection operations often
has depended on timely and effective support from other U.S. governe
ment agencies. Several government agencies provided support to
intelligence operations directed against the Cuban target on both a
regular and a standby basis. In fact, each and every request for
policy approved support was granted and carried out rapidly and
effectively. For example, the Department of State has expedited the
issuance of visas on selected cases at our request as well as granting
visa waivers to individuals of operational interest to the Agency.
In addition, Foreign Service personnel interview, debrief, and attempt

‘to establish the bona-fides of potential intelligence assets who

voluntarily contact a U.S. Embassy or Consulate. This. is often done
alone and some times in collaboration with an agency officer prior
to introducing the agency officer for further development and ex-
ploitation as the case may require. These types of support are
provided regularly by the Department of State and contribute consid~
erably to the effectiveness of many complex intelligence operations.

Another U.S. government agency which has given invaluable
support to the Agency's intelligence collection operations is the. FBI.
The FBI has provided biographic data, investigative reports, and
operational leads to individuals of known or potential operational '
interest. This support has been maintained on a regular and continuing
basis. Close liaison relations between the FBI and this agency are
maintained at Headquarters and at various Field Stations. This close
liaison has resulted-in a better understanding of the needs and

. requirements of each Agency in the successful accomplishments of :

their separate responsibilities as well as providing a rapid channel
for providing support and assistance when requested.

- The U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service has facil
itated the entry into the U.S. of persons of operational interest —
to the Agency; and has provided guidance and support for cases which
involve unusual alien residence and/or naturalization proceedings.
Liaison with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service is
particularly close and harmonious at the Miami Field installation.
where the bulk of the cases involving persons of operational interest
to us originates.

Reports provided on a regular basis by the National Security |
Agency have been a source of operational leads which have been followed

13-00000

Sih)

ant

up sor’ the development of collection assets. The disseminations by
the(N.S. ASalso serve as an effective means of checking selected
information and rep ey that has been provided by other sources of
information. Th 4) also collaborates in theydissemination of _.
certain information een the CIA (communication facility) in Miami, an.
Agency,unit engaged in the (electro nic interception and processing ¢ of
Cuban (I (internal Communications) _ 24 24

Liaison with the aforementioned U. S. government agencies
is maintained . on «x continuing and regular basis both at the Headquarters
level in Washington, D.C. and. at appropriate field installations by
designated Agency components. It has been our pleasurable experience
that these agencies, in addition to others such as the Department of
Agriculture where specific operations required guidance in their par~
ticular fields of competence, have provided timely, effective, and |
professional support and guidance, in support of policy approved

_intelligence collection operations as required in the national interest.

Without such support, the task of.intelligence collection would have

been in many instances much more. difficult and, in many cases, impossible

i a , nee ; Of

13-00000 {

z . - een : - So
nn ner a aes sete as .

VII. AGENT SUMMARIES

The scope and nature of the Agency's Foreign Intelli-

gence operations is most clearly seen in the character, personal
ambition and caprice of the human material present, namely the
agents involved. The following sketches of the individual agents | -
_ engaged in these operations have been compiled in recognition of

the vital ingredient which these human beings bring to an apprecia-

tion of the Agency's FI operations. It will be noted that a
‘majority of the agents work, or have been worked, out of Miami,

‘the city which has been the center of anti-Castro Cubans, the

major pool of potential agents, since 1959.

Other gfeorraphical areas are represented in mathematical
sequence, in fact according to the number of Cuban exiles in
residence at a given place. This same mathematical order applies
with reference to the jobs these agents hold. Thus, if a Cuban

- fas a function, the performance of which is important in sustain-
ing the island, hence important to the Cuban Regime, the Agency
‘has sought the services of this man as its agent.>,For this reason,
several agents are in the employ of the (airlines \and of (merchant zl
i. ‘marine shipping\businesses. So too, with diplomacy. Every foreign
| “diplomat now acéredited to the Regime in Havana has been examined
|
j

by the Agency asa prospective agent. Forty percent of these diplo-~
mats were approached. Of this number about one half took our bait
-and have accepted assignments which range from marginal involvement
in "intelligence" (e.g., using their diplomatic immunity to. carry
our materials), to active participation in our operations.

Finally, one type of Cuban who played an influential, 3
though limited, role during the past six months was the defector
; (who is not mentioned elsewhere in this paper). The defector is
; the official who for one reason or another cannot remain in or be
! persuaded to:remain in place and report on his job. Owing to the
nature of this particular person, it is difficult to draw hard
‘lines between those who genuinely reject their Government and those
who merely quit in self-interest, but during the past six months,
i the Agency tapped in on the defections of aLout ten Cubans of
| _ eonsequence, prvfiting from their information in all cases and
| _ from their psychological exploitation when circumstance would permit, .
!

