A ARAAN
1704-10333-10014 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
- (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
June9,1997 DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR

RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION

Stewart B. Aly | IN THIS DOCUMENT, nel James R. Moore, Jr., U.S.A.
Associate Deputy General Counsel , Information Management Officer,
Office of General Counsel DCSPER (DAPA-ZXD)_.
Department of Defense ' 300 Army Pentagon, Room 2D749
* 1600 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20310-0300

Washington, DC 20301-1600
Re: Proposal fora Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Joseph Califano’ 8 Amy .
Papers under the JFK Act

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
declassify six boxes of Army records from the files of Joseph Califano. The files date.
principally from the period 1962-63, during which Mr. Califano served as Army General
Counsel and as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Army. The records had been
deposited at the National Archives and Records Administration, where they were
recently located. A description of the records, which primarily pertain to US. activities
related to Cuba, is attached hereto. We have identified what appears to us to be

equities of numerous military entities in the Califano papers as well as equities of the .
Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the United States Information

Agency, and others.
Deadlines

Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Boards current sunset date of
September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the
records.’ We have slated the Califano papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997
meeting. The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements fora
prompt and efficient re review of the Califano papers.

‘The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to
September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of
the Review Board. ee nedule rameed belay PPowed extension, we may
be able to revisit the schedule Proposed b below. -

‘Boaro Memecne: John A. Tunheim, Chair » Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall + William L. Joyce » Anna K. Nelson
Execurve Oimecron: David G. Marwell ~


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- Messrs. Aly and Moore

June 9, 1997
Page2

Preliminary Review of Califano Papers

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection;
second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
information in other contexts; and third, the Califano papers contain equities of

_ Numerous military and non-military agencies, which, under the standard referral

process, would be very difficult and time-consuming.” Thus, the logistical problem in
the records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number _
of agencies that will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason,
and for the short time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an
urgent need to make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal
In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an

" alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found

effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of the Califano
papers. We would like to schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23,
1997, where all agencies with equities in the Califano papers be concurrently present for

_ adeclassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own

equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other —
‘agencies for their review. It has béen our own experience that sessions of this sort
greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with

each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because the Califano papers will need to be reviewed by the Board at its August 5-6

" meeting, we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all

agencies with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make

determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Army and the

Ms. Toni Bowie, of the Army Declassification Activity, spent three days
reviewing some of the records and making recommendations for referrals to other
agencies both within and outside of the military. Although Ms. Bowie worked
energetically for three days, it was our sense afterwards that, if we continue at the same
pace, the agencies with equities will likely not be able to complete their reviews before
the August deadline arrives.


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Messrs. Aly and Moore’
June 9, 1997

 Page3

Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will

-take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
; fecords while Army and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military entities to

be present.

, We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
Poe arity trove and leclentty thal cqaltiee an Papers fo haven
opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

I look forward to discussing this issue with you.

cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA

J. Barry Harrelson, CIA
Nina Noring, State

Richard S. Werksman, USIA
William Leary, NSC

‘Carol Keeley, FBI


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e.

JOSEPH CALIFANO PAPERS (6 boxes)

Identified by Steve Tilley at NARA, these 6 boxes of papers, almost exclusively from
1962-63, were either generated by, or addressed to Joseph Califano, who at this time
was Department of the Army General Counsel and Special Assistant to the Secretary of
_ the Army. Most of the documents are short summaries of proposed policy positions, or
letters of transmittal, with voluminous appendices attached. Each of the 6 boxes
‘contains approximately 1500-2000 pages of material.

Representative Topics:

(1)

Q)
‘@

(4)
6)
©)

14)

ICCCA Ginterdepartmental Coordinating C Committee of Cuban Affairs—the
“Cottrell Committee”) meetings on future U.S. policy toward Cuba. These
- documents are generally background papers prepared prior to meetings,
minutes of meetings, or follow-on discussion of action items assigned at
meetings of the ICCCA.

. Contingency plans for Cuban invasion by the US. military in the event of

a Cuban uprising.
Psychological warfare against Cuba.

Diplomatic initiatives intended to increase isolation of Cuba:

Biographies, and evaluations of Cuban exile leaders.

Intelligence reports and estimates on reported events inside Cuba.

Summaries of clandestine paramilitary actions taken against Cuba, and ~
suggestions for possible future actions.

Apparent Equities:

Ninety-five per cent of the documents appear to have multiple-agency equities,
usually 4 to 6 agencies per document. Based upon staff review, it is estimated
that 80% of the documents have State equities, 60% Joint Staff or OSD, 60% NSC,
60% CIA, 15% Army, Navy or Air Force, perhaps 10% DIA, and a small :
percentage of USIA, Justice, Treasury and FBI.

Horne e:\wp-docs\Califano.wpd

File: 4.0.4

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- JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents) _
* Using broad topic guidelines provided previously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
Pentagon has reviewed 40 boxes of records of Joint Chiefs Chairmen Lyman Lemnitzer,
Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for 1962”
and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical

understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
may be relevant to the assassination. -

Topics:

. (1)  ICCCA (Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
meetings regarding future U.S. policy toward Cuba.

(2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
paramilitary operations against Cuba. ,

(3) . Cuban coup planning. ;
(4) Vietnam coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
(5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam). |
(6) US. military strength levels in Vietnam.

Apparent Equities:

Multiple agency equities appear to apply to virtually every document—-usually
State, OSD and/or NSC. The Joint Staff has stated in writing that it is prepared
to expeditiously process these documents for declassification in collaboration
with agencies which have equities, and then accession the declassified
documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
upon receipt of that guidarice, they will commence declassification review.

Home e: \wp-docs\Jointstaff. wpa
File: 4.0.4

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW «+ 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457

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Cc NS HE) OBJECTION TO
June 9, 1997 cy SIFICACA ANO/OR
; R OF Cid INFORMATION
iN THIS DOCUMENT
Stewart F. Aly . Mr. Edmund McBride. - --
Associate Deputty General Counsel - Chief, Information Management
Office of General Counsel Division.
Department of Defense Joint Secretariat
1600 Defense Pentagon Joint Staff ©
Washington, DC 20301-1600 The Pentagon, Room 2B917

Washington, DC 20318-0400

Re: Proposal for a Multi-Agency Declassification Review of Selected Papers of JCS
Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor.and Wheeler, and Selected JCS Central:Files: ::
under the JEK Act .

Gentlemen:

The Assassination Records Review Board would like to make arrangements with you to
; approximately 147 records previously flagged by the Joint Staff from both the
JCS Central Files, and the papers of JCS Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor and Wheeler. The
files date principally from the period 1961-64. The records were flagged during
searches directed by Mr. Edmund McBride (Chief, Information Management Division, -

- Joint Staff) at the request of the ARRB staff. With one exception, ARRB staff feels that .

all records flagged by Mr. McBride's working group are relevant to the historical
understanding or context of the assassination of President Kennedy. A description of
the records, which primarily pertain to U.S. activities related to Cuba, or to Vietnam
policy, is attached hereto. We have identified what appear to us to be equities of
numerous military entities in these papers, cca Cel tthe intelligence
Agency, the State Department, the National Security Council, and others.

Deadlines

_ Due to the volume of the records, and the Review Board’s current sunset date of

September 30, 1997, it is important that we proceed expeditiously in our review of the

- secords.’ We have slated these papers for review by the Board at its August 5-6, 1997 meeting.

'The Review Board is seeking from Congress a one-year, one-time extension to _
September 30, 1998. Congressman Dan Burton is sponsoring a bill to extend the life of

‘ the Review Board. Should the Review Board receive the proposed extension, we may

Board Memaeens: John R. Tunhsim, Chair « Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall +» William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
Executive Dinecron: David G. Marwell


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Messrs. Aly and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page2

The Review Board staff is prepared to assist you in making arrangements for a prompt
and efficient review of these selected papers of Joint Chiefs Lemnitzer, Taylor, and
Wheeler, and the Joint Staff Central Files.?

__ Preliminary Review of Papers of JCS Chairmen and Joint Staff Central Files

The Review Board staff has conducted an initial review of the records and has
tentatively reached the following conclusions: first, the records are very similar in
subject manner to many other records that already are a part of the JFK Collection,
second, although the vast majority of the records technically remain classified, there is
-little remaining sensitivity due to the passage of time and to the release of much of the
information in other contexts; and third, these papers contain equities of numerous ; .

military and non-military agencies, which, under the outa wee VIR,

be very difficult and time-consuming. Thus, the logistical problem in declassifying the
records is not the continued sensitivity of the records, but the number of agencies that
will need to review their own equities in the records. For this reason, and for the short
time-line on which we are now operating, we believe that there is an urgent need to
make acceptable arrangements for the review and referral of records.

Proposal

In order to expedite the process and make it more efficient, we would like to propose an
alternate arrangement for declassification of records that we previously have found
effective. We suggest the holding of a multi-agency concurrent review of these papers
of the three aforementioned JCS Chairmen and the JCS Central Files. We would like to
schedule a single session at our offices, on or before July 23, 1997, where all agencies
with equities in these JCS/Joint Staff papers be concurrently present for a
declassification review. At such a session, agencies would be able to review their own

be able to revisit the schedule proposed below.

"The Joint Staff’s Initial Statement of Compliance to the Review Board, dated
February 6, 1997, identified in detail the process by which these records were located
namely, which files were searched, and who participated in the searches. Mr. Edmund
McBride, Chief of the Joint Staff Information Management Division, indicated in this
statement that the Joint Staff was standing by to expeditiously process these records for
declassification in collaboration with other agencies when the ARRB was ready. ARRB
staff has only recently completed its initial review of these records, which constitute
selectively flagged folders within 40 boxes of JCS and Joint Staff records.

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Messrs. Aly and McBride
June 9, 1997
Page 3

s

equities in the records, declassify them, and simply hand them across the table to other
agencies for their review. It has been our own experience that sessions of this sort
greatly simply the review process by giving agencies the opportunity to speak with
each other and quickly to resolve questions.

Because these papers will need to be reviewed by the Board atts August 5-6 meeting,
we believe that an arrangement such as is proposed above will provide all agencies ©
with a full opportunity to identify their equities in the records and to make
determinations regarding the need for continued classification. If the Joint Staff and the
Department of Defense are agreeable to such an arrangement, the Review Board will
take the responsibility for contacting all non-military agencies with equities in the
records while the Joint Staff and DoD make arrangements for all appropriate military. -
entities to be present.

We are, of course, very willing to consider other ideas or suggestions that you might
have. However, because the clock is ticking, it is important that we promptly develop a
plan that will provide all agencies with equities in these Joint Staff/JCS papers to have
an opportunity to review and declassify their equities.

ing this issue with you.

Attachment

cc: Steven D. Tilley, NARA
J. Barry Harrelson, CIA

Nina Noring, State

William Leary, NSC

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JOINT STAFF PAPERS (147 documents)
Using broad topic guidelines provided reviously by ARRB staff, the Joint Staff at the
Pentagon has reviewed 40 eet records of Joint Chiefs Chairinen tymesy Len,
Maxwell Taylor, and Earle Wheeler for 1961-1964, as well as JCS central files for1962 *
and 1963, and has flagged 147 documents which will enhance the historical ;
understanding of the Kennedy administration, and which some scholars will believe
may be relevant to the assassination.

Topics:

(1) ICCCA (Iinterdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs)
meetings regarding future US. policy toward Cuba.

(2) Special Group (5412 committee) meetings and decisions; and covert
tary operations against Cuba. .

(3). Cubancoup planning. .
(4) ° Vietnam-coup planning, and discussion of Diem and Nhu.
(5) OPLAN 34A (covert actions against North Vietnam).
(6) U.S. military strength levels in Vietnam.
Apparent Equities:

documents to NARA. Currently the Joint Staff is awaiting guidance from ARRB
staff on which of the tabbed folders we desire to have placed in the collection;
upon receipt of that guidance, they will commence declassification review.

Home e:\wp-docs\Jointstaff.wpd
File: 4.0.4


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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW + 2nd Floor » Washington, DC 20630
(202) 724-0088 » Fax: (202) 724-0457 '

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT

TO: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HRG
FROM: — Doug Home, sentient toons
SUBJECT: Declassification Session for Califano Papers and Joint Staft/JCS Records

1. The joint declassification sessian mentioned in our letters to the Army (re: th Joseph
Califano Papers) and to the Joint Secretariat (re: Selected Papers of JCS Chairmen
Lemnitzer, Taylor, and Wheeler, and selected JCS Central Files) of June 9, 1997 is
scheduled to take place during the four-day window Monday, July 21-Thursday, July
24, inclusive. The first session will commence at 9-00 A.M. Monday moming, July 21, at
the ARRB offices in room 207 of the Bicentennial Building, located at 600 E Street, NW

- (at the corner of E Street NW and 6th Street).

2 Our offices are located equidistant from the following three Metro stations:
Archives /Navy Memorial (Yellow Line); Judiciary Square (Red Line); and Gallery Place
(Red Line). Parking Garages are located in the basement of the Bicentennial Building,
and also across the street from us in the basement of the ARKP building, 1

3. Please fax the names, SSNs, and clearance information for CIA attendees to Tracy
’ Shycoff on our staff at fax number (202) 724-0457 prior to close-of-business on
Wednesday, July 16, 1997. Please indicate on your visit request that the period of the
visit is through the end of calendar year 1997, since it is anticipated that our efforts to
expedite declassification of. these documents will take more than one sessionto
‘accomplish. ‘ ; ;

4. Weloak fora to woking compel wit allofour parr nhs mers

\

Boago Memssas; John R. Tunhaim, Chair « Henry F, Graff « Kermit L. Mall « Willlam L. Joyce ¢ Anna K. Nelson
Executive Omecron: Dovid G, Marwoll


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ptt

J

Confidential pve

18 July 1997

Memorandum For: David G Marwell
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

Subject: CIA Reviewers - Clearance Certifications

1. The CIA review team for the joint declassification
session for Califano Papers and Joint Staff/JCS records
scheduled for July 21-24 is composed of the following
individuals:

ees

Charles A. Briggs SSN (161-22-9115 /
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG (262-227-9115 |
Kathleen Puchnick SSN (161-26-1452 /
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG Sd
Richard D. Kovar SSN [194-22-0138 /
IC/DCI/CSI/HRG ne
C Bvléen M: Wukitch ) SSN [178-36-7636 /
s/DO/IMS See
(Mary V. Amoia SSN [579-42-8195 /
IC/DO/IMS wee
William Perkins SSN (082-30-4664 ;
IC/DO/IMS. So

2. The Agency reviewers listed above have the
appropriate clearances to review Joseph Califano's Army
Papers and the selected JCS records and files. Official
certification of the individuals' clearances will follow.
If you have any questions concerning clearances in my

absence, please contact (Barbara Standley, 703-613-1806)

ae
( -

J. Barry Bakrelson-— -—.—-—--”
Project Officer,
CIA JFK Review

CL BY: (611637/
CL REASON: 1-5 (c)
DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: COV 2-82

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108708/87 TUE 17:24 FAX 202 724 0457 ARRB ' ‘gjuor

Assassination Records Review Board
; 600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor « Washington, DC 20530
ff 9 (202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457

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CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
So RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
Via F . ‘INTHIS DOCUMENT
August 5, 1997

To: Mr. J. Barry Harrelson, Central Intelligence Agency HG
FROM: Doug Home, Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: Invitation to Next Declassification Session for Califano Papers and JCS

. 1. Iam writing to notify you that the next working session for joint declassification
review of subject records in accordance with the-standards of the JFK Act is scheduled
for Tuesday, October 7 through Thursday, October 9, inclusive, in the ARRB conference
room in our second floor offices at 600 E Street, N.W.

2. Our goals for this second session are to complete joint review of the JCS papers, and
to open up for review two more boxes in the Califano collection. This session will also
allow selected agencies (which were not able to complete review of documents available
at the first session) an opportunity to catch up.

3. We see a need for representatives of the CIA to continue to attend these sessions
until they are completed.

4, Names and clearances need to be faxed to us only if the CIA attendees for this
October session are different from those clearances passed to ARRB in July. Our point-
of-contact and fax number far clearances is Tracy Shycoff, at (202) 724-0457.

5. For planning purposes, following this October session, our plans are to host one
session per month, of 2 to 3 days duration each time, until the declassification review of
the selected JCS papers and the Califano collection is completed. Agencies which
require more time are welcome to make individual appointments to review these
documents in-between the monthly, group sessions.

Soaap Mamanns: JoAn A, Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall» William L. Joyce » Anna K. Nelson
Exgcurve Dunsevon: David G. Marwell


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Assassination Records Review Board

(202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION 10
DECLASSIFICATION ANDIOR

NEWS RELEASE RELEASE OF CIAINFORMATION
iN THIS DOCUMENT

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT: EILEEN SULLIVAN
NOVEMBER 18, 1997. (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

The Assassination Records Review Board, an independent federal agency overseeing
the identification, review, and release of records related to the assassination of President
John F. Kennedy, today released approximately 1,500 pages of previously classified
military records from 1962-64 that relate to US. policy toward Cuba.

; “These documents further expand the historical record by illustrating the United States
. government's deep interest in developing a policy that would force Castro from power
during the early 1960's,” said Dr. Anna Nelson, a member of the Review Board. “We
now have a new window into the policy options toward Cuba that were being
considered and debated at the highest levels of the military services.”

The mandate of the Review Board is to make the record surrounding the assassination
of President Kennedy as complete as possible. The Board has aggressively sought to
uncover records on U.S. foreign policy that put the assassination into its historical
context.

The Review Board worked cooperatively with representatives from the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) to
locate records stored at NARA that met the definition of being “assassination related.”
The documents are from the fil Pett,

the Secretary of the Army, the files of rome els oO! of Staff Chairmen Lemnitzer, Taylor
and Wheeler, and the central files of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The records have been transferred to NARA for inclusion in the JFK Collection, which is
housed at the NARA facility in College Park, Maryland. These documents are now
available to researchers.

Copies of selected documents are available from the Assassination Records Review
Board, 600 E Street, NW, Second Floor, 1 Washington, DC 20530; telephone number: (202)
724-0088.

~more-

Boano Memsers: John A. Tunheim, Chair + Henry F. Graff « Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce « Anna K. Nelson
Executive Dinecror: T. Jeramy Gunn + Deputy Dinecton: Thomas £. Samotuk

600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530 : a

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The Assassination Records Review Board was 1s established by the JFK Act, which was
signed into law by President George Bush. The five members of the Board were
appointed by President Clinton, confirmed by the U.S. Senate, and swom in on April-

‘11, 1994. The law gives the Review Board the mandate and the authority to identify,

secure, and make available all records related to the assassination of President’
Kennedy. It is the responsibility of the Board to determine which records are to be
made public immediately and which ones will have postponed release dates.

The Review Board consists of the following members:

Honorable John R. Tunheim, Chair; U.S. District Court Judge, District of Minnesota.
Dr. Henry F. Graff; Professor Emeritus of History at Coluinbia University.

Dr. Kermit L. Hall; Dean, College of ‘Humanities, and Professor of History at The Ohio |
State University. .

Dr. William L. Joyce; Associate University Librarian for Rare Books and i Special
Collections at Princeton University.

_ Dr. Anna K. Nelson; Distinguished Adjunct Historian in Residence at The American

University.

-30-


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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW « 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 + Fax: (202) 724-0457

NOVEMBER 18, 1997 ~ , ; (202) 724-0088, EXT. 253

Attached are six selected documents from approximately 1,500 pages of military
‘records that relate to U.S. policy toward Cuba from 1962-64. The records are being ‘-
released today by the Assassination Records Review Board. Sections of the documents

that may be of particular interest to the reader are e marked aby arrows in the margin on

the right side of the relevant Pages. :

List of Selected Documents
1. Excerpts from 198-10004-10020
Note: The Record Information Form (document cover sheet) for the compilation of

documents in this group is dated 3/1/63, but the excerpted documents are from

February 1962.
“Possible Actions To Provoke, Harass, Or Disrupt Cuba”

2. Excerpts from 202-10002-10104
February 7, 1962, March 9, 1962, March 12, 1962, March 13, 1962, April 10, 1962
"Northwoods" documents

3. Excerpts from 202- 10002- 10018.
May 1, 1963
“Courses of Action Related to Cuba"

4. Excerpts from 198-10004-10011

December 11, 1963 .

Memo to Joseph Califano, General Counsel, Secretary of the Army - "Training of
Cuban Refugees in Nicaragua".

5. Excerpts from 202-10002-10010
December 19, 1963
- "Meeting with President on Cuba"

Boanv Memsens: John A. Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff » Kermit L. Hall « William L. Joyce + Anna K. Nelson
Executive Director: 7. Jeremy Guan « Deeuty Dinector: Thomas €. Samoluk .


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+

_ 6.. Excerpts from 202-10002-10117
January 31,1964
“A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba” ”


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oS - «es
. . oo Cuba Selected Documents

. #1 -

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY :. ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10020
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION
MULTIPLE

so ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/01/63 . .
PAGES : 135 \

SUBJECTS : PLANNING AND POLICY, CUBA
". POLICY OBJECTIVES, CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
ACTIONS TO IMPEDE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVES
CARIBBEAN SURVEILLANCE ,
U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BLOCKADE OF CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
‘CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97. :
OPENING CRITERIA : . ,

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 7. Package of proposed -
actions to be used against Cuba, including operations
to apply pressure to the Cuban regime to oust Castro
and potential reaction to US ‘involvement .


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BO [po see

: . Sess ko .
POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO PROVOKE, HARRASS, OR DISRUPT

_-CUBA-

1. Operation SMASHER:

a. Objective: The objective is to disrupt/disable military and_
commercial communications facilities in Cuba, ’ ,

b, Concept: This to be accomplished by the clandestine introduction of
4 "special" vacuum tube into selected communications equipment. The tube,
which is available, is virtually undetectable inasmuch as its effectiveness is
due to the insertion of a chemical compound in the base of the tube. The
chemical, when heated becomes a conductor, when cool a non-conductor,

2. Qperation FREE RIDE: 9... re

ae Objective: The objective is to create unrest and dissension amongst
the Cuban people. : .

b, Concept: This to be accomplished by airdropping valid Pan American
‘or KLM One-way airline tickets good for Passage to Mexico City, Caracas,
‘ete, (none to the U.S.). Tickets could be intermixed with other leaflets
planned to be dropped. The number of tickets dropped could be increased,
The validity of the tickets would have to be restricted to a time period,

3. Operation TURN ABOUT:

a. Objective: The objective is to create indications to Fidel Castro that
his value to the revolutionary cause has diminished to the point where plans are *.
being made for his "removal", . .

°

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of intelligence means the
crecendo increasing until it culminates in Castro's discovery of the mechanism
_ or hardware, m .

Special Handling of this pacer is requested.

Access should be limits to i 7h 1S requiring
the information heroin in o:de: we-anrry out their
official duties. - cna ee

Reproduction cr this doc
Or in pert is prehihg
Pornisstoen or the issutne ez:

ry This dosumont consists of —...__ pages.
Copy # 4... of ___\S copys.

Mh Se


13-00000

4, -Operation DEFECTOR:

Objective: To induce elements or individuals of the Cuban military to
defect with equipment.

b. Concept: “This activity when properly planned and implemented has the
effect of decreasing military capability. In a totalitarian system the immediate
reaction is increased security accompanied by decreased activity. It also
creates havoc in security and intelligence agencies. Could be accomplished -
by intelligence means and promise of rewards. :

5. Operation BREAK-UP: . oo

. Objective: To clandestinely introduce ) corrosive materials to cause
atreralt, vehicle or boat accidents. ; ..

b. Concept: This activity, if possible: should be aimed primarily toward the = Be yt
Soviet-provided aircraft. If properly accompHshed it would degrade confidence
in the equipment, increase supply and maintenance problems and seriously
affect combat capability.

6. Operation COVER-UP:

.a Objective: The objective is to convince the Communist government of
Cuba that Naval Forces ostensibly assigned to the MERCURY project is merely

a cover.

b. Concept: It should not be revealed as to what the cover is--this should
- be left to conjecture. This could tie in with Operation 1 DIRTY TRICK.

“9. Operation DIRTY "TRICK: :

a. Objective: The objective is to provide : irrevocable proof that, should: a
the MERCURY manned orbit flight fail, the fault lies with the Communists
et al Cuba, :

b. Concept: This to.-be accomplished by manufacturing various pieces of
evidence which would prove electronic interference on the part of the. Cubans.

8. Operation FULL-UP:
a. Objective: The objective is to destroy confidence in fuel supplied by the

Soviet Bloc by indicating it is contaminated,

2

ret 5/2


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WReetdiel ©

2

' bilities to create the impression that landings have been made on beaches

b” Concept: This to be accomplished by introducing a known biological 7
agent into jet fuel storage facilities, This agent flourishes in jet fuel and
grows until it consumes all the space inside the tank.

9. O eration PHANTOM:

a. Objective: The objective is to convince the Castro Government that
clandestine penetration and resupply of agents is being regularly conducted.

b. Concept: This to be accomplished by use of BJ, UDT, AND JJ capa- setae

and air drops have been made in other areas.

10. Operation BINGO:
. Objective: The objective is.to, erento. an incident which has, the Appearance ;

‘of m an 1 attack on U.S, facilities (GMO) in Cuba, thus providing the excuse for
- use of U.S, military might to overthrow the current government of Cuba.

_b. Concept: This to be accomplished by the use of SNAKES outside the
confines of the Guantanamo Base. .SNAKES simulate’an actual fire-fight and
‘upon hearing such a sound it is-entirely feasible that the immediate reaction
on G'Mo would be that the base is being attacked. This would, with proper
preparation, be followed by a counterattack and with adequate planning the base
at G'Mo could disgorge military force in sufficient number to sustain itself
until other forces, which had been previously alerted, could attack in other .
areas, It is envisaged that a schedule of operations similar to the following

’ would overwhelm the Cuban military and cause its defeat:

(1) Simulated attack on Guantanamo.
(2) Word flashed to the President..
(3) President orders counterattack to include: .
(a) Immediate launch of alerted aircraft whose targets 2 are ‘Cuban airfields.
(b) Immediate launch of counterattack down strategic lines in communi- .
cation in Cuba.
(c) Fleet force standing by on alert would make way toward pre-selected
. targets /landing areas.
(d) Immediate embarkation of airborne troops previously alerted to
pre-selected targets,
(e) Launch of additional combat aircraft to clear drop areas and
further interdict lines of communication.
(£) Ships and aircraft would land/airdrop troops and secure airfields,
road/rail terminals, etc.


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- (g) Resupply and replacement activities.

Properly executed, the above could overthrow the Cuban Government in a
matter of hours, providing the plan is implemented within the next six months.

‘11, Operation GOOD TIMES:

a. Objective: To disillusion: the Cuban population with Castro image by
distribution of fake photographic material.

BES:

b. Concept: Prepare a desired photograph, such ag an obese Castro
with two beauties in any situation desired, ostensibly within a room in the -
Castro residence, lavishly furnished, and a table briming over with the most
delectable Cuban food with an underlying caption (appropriately Cuban) such as _
UMy ration is different.'' Make as many prints as desired on sterile paper and ,
‘then distribute over the countrygide by air drops or agents. Thig should put
even a Commie Dictator in the proper perspective ‘withthe Saderprivileged ”
masses.

= i

cas Pr

12. Operation HEAT IS ON:

/ @e Objective: To create the impression with Castro Government that
certain dyed-in-the-wool Red pilots are planning to defect, thus s causing a
detrimental tightening of security.

b. Concept: It is known that many Cuban refugee pilots are personally
acquainted with many of the present CRAF pilots. Accordingly, by utilizing
all sources available, determine by name those pilots considered to be dedicated
Gastro Reds. Then by use of agents, communications, etc. inject into the
Gastro intelligence system the fact that these pre-designated Reds are planning
to defect for monetary and/or ideological reasons, Security crackdown should
help destroy Castro image and also impose unacceptable restrictions on™
routine training activities. :


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OPERATION: Invisible Bomb

. OBJECTIVE:

1. To create the impression that isolated bombings are taking place
in Cuba thus maximizing harrassment and confysion of the Castro govern-
ment. ‘ ;

RERUNS

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS:

. Be,

2. The Air Force can utilize the operational characteristica of F-101
. or other Century series aircraft to create the impression that anti-Castro
3 . opposition is continuing. The aircraft operational characteristic to be
. exploited is the "sonic-boom,"

seenaye ate

.: ' The "gonic-boom" can ke. employed in. several different ways, such
as an individual boom at selected spots or a Continuous boom and performed |
at either high or low altitudes. It will cause not only apprehension but
varying degrees of malicious damage as well, i.e. break all the windows

on a street in Havana.

4, The "sonic-hoom" effect can be maximized by planning missions _
for execution during the early morning hours when the populace is sleeping.
The Cuban people are generally unfamiliar with this phenomenon, therefore
it is felt that the impact for a time would be most beneficial. :

5. The directional aspects of the sonic-boom" also make it feasible
for use in simulating U.S. Naval gun-fire in the immediate vicinity of the
Cuban land mass,

6. This operation is considered relatively safe and leaves no tangible
evidence. It can be planned and executed with a minimum of effort and
expense. :

Spocial Handling of this payor is requested.
Access sicila be limited to incividuels ‘requiring
the inforustion herein. in order to cerry cut their
official duties.

eproduction cf this document in whole
or in part is prohibited exsept with . ¢ _ sases-
peraission of the issuing office. This document consists of ~-H--- OTS

Auk b . @ Se Copy #,.-L_-. of --sA- mere

ee


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©

Operation "HORN SWOGGLE"
Speration "HORN SWOGGLE!
Ob jective:

1, To crash or force down Cuban MIG aircraft with an all weather
intercept Capability by communications intrusion, ;

Concept of ‘Operations:

a _ 2. Closely monitor MIG air/ground communicatio

of determining frequency and terminology usage for p
operations. -

ns forthe purpose
ractice or real GCI -

3. By use of overr
solid weather conditions, -
Pilot issue instructions: which-tun MIG out of fuel.or-towa
Puerto Rico, Jamaica, a carrier, ete, ‘

Ye

Special Handling of this
Access shnuld ba lLisitad
the inforsntion hescin in <:
offdoini duties.

eproduction of this docvnent in vhole ’

or in part is srchibtted excent vith

permissioa of the issuing offices.

. . n220se
{This documont consists of -£---- Ped

Copy # _f__. of -mS_. copys.

ut 3

13-00000

e

. Operation TRUE BLUE

1. Qbjective: To degrade Castro and his government in the eyes of the
(Cuban people by communications intrusion.

Concept of Operations:

Z By utilizing high powered transmitters in the vicinity of Cuba
(Florida, Inagwa, Jamaica, aboard Naval ship) which have the capability of
overriding commercial Cuban radio and TV stations, periodically degrade
Castro and other government figures in the minds of the Cuban people.

te

“aad

ptt

3. The technique of communications. intrusion could be exploited by pre-
taping or live broadcasts of anti-communist and anti-Castro propaganda at
. station breaks, Castro speeches, etc. This idea envisions the use of a
i Cuban refugee to make such broadcasts and naturally would require close
| monitoring of stations to be worked. Any number of thoughts could be
injected such as:

a. "Cuba Si, Russia No."
b. Communism exploits the masses.
‘¢. Communism is ruthless totalitarianism.
d. Castro and henchment feast off the land while we are rationed.
e. Castro and his reign of terror.
f. Castro is a lunatic and should be put away.
g- Castro is the cause of all our troubles.
h. Rise up against the pig Castro, etc. etc.

4. If approved this operation could become a continuous project, perhaps
under control of USIA. .

Special Kanéling ef this paver is requested.
&ceess should be limited t>
the information herein in c:
official dutios. —

‘production of this dncument ts Yholg
rin part is prohibited o: with
pornission of the issuin.; offise. . this document cousiste of _ fe pages -

ap “OUT US ae
hot A Paar


4,

13-00000
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ;

WASHINGTON 25,D.c. ~

2 February 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Edward G, Lansdale, USAF,
Assistant to the Secretary of Defense .

Subject: Ideas in Support of ‘Project

The enclosed ideas are submitted for your consideration and
’ Possible use in furtherance of the objectives’ of the Cuba -
; Project. T think some of them have promise and should you
desire our group to develop any of them in more detail, we

Will do so.
H. CRAIG

Brigadier General SA

DOD Representativ .

Caribbean Survey Group

6 encls oS

1. Operation Smasher(2Pages) (Ts)
Operation True Blue(1Page) (rs) :
Operation "Horn Swoggle"(1Page Ts)
Operation "No Love Bost" (1Page). (7s)
Possible Actions to Provide, Harrass, or
disrupt (4Pages)( Ts)

- Operation Invisible Bomb: (1Page) (1s)

A UErwn

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT aPPLy

“SPECIAL THAHBLNG- esate _opi9 |


13-00000

v5

saad

Re

AE

¢

Opération "NO LOVE LOST"

l. Objective: ‘To confuse and harrass Castro Cuban Pilots by use of
radio conversations. = =

2. Concept of Operations: Fly Cuban refugee pilot in sterile aircraft

in proximity of Cuba at periodic intervals while communication monitoring
Cuban air/ground frequencies utilized for airdrome control. Cuban refugee
pilot in sterile aircraft would personally know many of the pilots still flying
for Castro. Refugee pilot. would get into argument with Castro pilots over
radio thus distracting confusing, etc. Would be real trouble for Castro _
pilots in actual weather conditions. Argument could go, "I'll get you you .
Red son-of-a~gun, "and call by name if appropriate,

Spscial Hendling
Aesess shon.d ba
the inforuaticn herein in cz
efficial duties.

Recrowuct

This document consists cf - PRRs:

Copy # -f--. of >=...

4

13-00000

. tik

seaakonta

e

I. Operation SMASHER.
1. Objective: Disrupt or disable military and commercial communications |
facilities in Cuba.

2. Technical Requirements:

. a. " Detailed ‘information on both commercial and military communi-
cations facilities and capabilities, to include inside and outside plant
construction, system networks, equipment details (i.e. circuitry, tubes, etc.)
location and type of repeator stations. This information.ia requiredto  _
construct a refined device. ,

b. A vacuum tube modified in such a manner as to cause a short
circuit. This is. possible by inducing silicon carbide (?) into the base of the
tube. When the tube becomes hot the silicon carbide liquifies and becomes
a conductor; whem the tube codls the matter returns to a solid non-conductive
state. Such a device (vacuum tube) is available.

3. Targets:
‘a. Cuban Telephone Company. The company provides local and long

' distance telephone service throughout Cuba and also international telephone

service.

b. Radio Corporation of Cuba Avenida Carlos, The company provides
radiotelephone service to American and European countries. It also provides
radiotelegraph service and includes leased teleprinter channels. In conjunc-
tion with AT&T the company inaugurated over-the-horizon microwave radio
service between Cuba and Florida in 1957. This latter made available two-way
TV channels.

c. Cuban American Telephone and Telegraph Company. Founded by
IT&T and AT&T, providing six (6) submarine cables linking Havana and Key
West. Facility operates in conjunction with microwave link.

d. Commercial Radio and Television Stations.

e. Military Radio and Land-line Facilities. These include point-to~

. point command and administrative systems, air/ground facilities, navigational

aids. Obviously certain commercial facilities provide service to the military
therefore disrupting or disabling commercial facilities will affect military

communications capabilities. Special Handling of this payer is requested.
Access should be lizited to individuals requiring

‘production of this. document in whole the information Lerein in order to carry out their
r in part is prohibited oxcopt with official duties.
peruission “of the issuing office.

"cS. Ht Yt

this document consists of -7—__
Ce TEL Copy # -L--. of Ll econ.


13-00000

oa

¢

_ 4 Concept of Operation:

a. The tube must be introduced clandestinely into appropriate
equipments, .. :

' b. Introduction can be accomplished through the use of known assets
either directly or by contact with an employee of a company who would have
access and who would receive Proper remuneration, .


13-00000

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER
‘RECORDS SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR

se. FROM
TO

TITLE

DATE

Cuba Selected: Documents
. #2 ;

oe

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Jcs :
202-10002-10104
acs FILES 1962
3360 (7 FEB 62)
DOCUMENT INFORMATION a
acs . .
NORTHWOODS
‘00/00/62 ..
197

PAGES
SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS

‘TE OF LAST REVIEW

OPENING CRITERIA -

COMMENTS

U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CURA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATION MONGOOSE :

UPRISINGS IN CUBA _

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA

SOVIET BASE IN CUBA

CARIBBEAN SECURITY

PATROL POSTS

INVASION OF CUBA

JUSTIFICATION FOR-U: 8. MILITARY INTERVENTION

PAPER,. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT Stes
UNCLASSIFIED - |

1c ,
RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
10/07/97 .

: JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code |

Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to Jcs

recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify
US military intervention. : .


13-00000

. re
. - 1
° COPY WO,
w'JOS_1969/303 WWCLASSE SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
February 1962
“ROEE BY THE SECRETARIES
: to the
JOINE CHIEFS OF sTAye «
on
' NorTHWOODS (8)

A report# on the above: subject is submitted for considera-
tion by the Joint Chiefs of State.

FP. J. BIOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

a :
* Not reprodin ed; on file in Joint Seoreteriat

EXCLUDED FROM Gb3

. CB 1969/303 214k

WACLASSIFD


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SPECIAL HANDLING

— | a

APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A
“DRAFT

MEMGARSUM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G, LANSDALE,
Chief of Operabions, Guba Troject

" Subject: Cuba Projeot’
Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
Mgpeciat Projést", dated 27 gan 62
7 As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of.
’ - the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake
ane vole inthe removal of the Commnist regime in Cuba, has
been Gotormined bazed upon the following factors:
%. National Security Policy, determined by the SC during
_ vise outing of G May 2 .
bd. Current intelligence estimates cf the situation in
cuba.’
G. -Sperasions against the Castro regine will be covert,
at leaxs initially.
Gd. Time favors the Castro government.
2. The basis military implications of Castro's Communist

ave as follows:

governme:.': :
a. Zt exposes the Western Headaphere to an increasingly
serLous threat to its seourd ty. This increases our national
vulnexability and defense cose as forces are developed.
or shifted to meet this threat.

be ‘Tt provides the Soviet Union with the most effective
pase they have ever hed for spreading Communism throughout
the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the
possibility that additional Latin American countries will
come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would
demonstrate to the other nations of the ‘world that the United
States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist

control of additional countries would or could result in:

ae : Appendix 1 to

Enclosure A

ee


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aecsee COU LEIVG WOT UH :

.(1) Increased Communist capability: for WLS it

*. other nations of the Western Hemisphere.

(2) Increased communist capability for spreading
Communism throughout Latin America.

(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases,
training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources
of strategic materials necessary to our military
capability.

(4) Ao increased threat to US usage and control
of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage..

3. The urgency of the requirement to remoye the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly
Snereasing capabilities. for attacking other nations of the ..
Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the
hemisphere: This sense of urgency is greatly increased if
courses of. action within the capability of the Communists
are considered: .

a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air

‘bases in Cuba. °

‘b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could
"furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the
’ ’ nuclear warheads.

4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of
Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security requirements of the Westero
Hemisphere, The Department of ‘Defense is prepared to overtly
support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of —
ousting the Communist regime and installing a government
acceptable to the United States. iile the possibility of
Communist Bloc reactions in areas other then in Cuba is
recognized,’ ge 1s belleved that this can be accomplished without
precipitating general war, and without serious effect on
world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:

| ne


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oa wage). SPEOIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
CEE DISTRIBUTION

ro If the impression is created that there is an urgent,
humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the
Uritod States is respording to an appeal for assistance fron
a government - representative of the Cuban people.

b. Z€ 4 48 announced incident to the overt military
action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are
moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding:
free elections, and that they will immediately withdrew as soon?
as the new governnent atvises that they have the capability

to maintain order’ without further assistance from the OAS
nations.

i ®. if the military operation. is conducted as quickly

as peasivle and wath sufficient force co that thé Communist

‘Blos's ability to take effective counter-meaaures in support
or the Castro regine is reduced to a manimun. ;

@. or; 4f the Guban regime commits hostile acts against
VE forces or property. which would serve as an dneident upon
which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable.
pertione cf a, b, and c above apply. ; :

5. The Deayartment of Defense ia also prepared to covertly
provide support to CLA or State, or any US approved popular

movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies, transportation,
personnel and bases.

ae Shien SAS BES A TLE ALOT PR RES a

URCLASSI

:
?
i
&

i

;

3 Appendix 1 to
. Enclosure A

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
LINTTED DISTRIBUTION

@

q


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‘thinned,

a | rs

SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION -

NOTE BY THE SECRETARTES
aa . : to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

on

A repert* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Starr.

ey . soni ntasainegy srnintans Bisa
SBA: 22 4 SEN POOR SILI ES Nitta Te ht MO Om in _ ue

F. J. BLOVIN
M.- J. INQELIDO
Joint Seorstariat

é

i

7

i .

a

. -

4

k

i

=

Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED Fo ops
e EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
. REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE -
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

SE

i

13-00000

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 85, OG,

. Sudject: Justification for US Military Intervention
. . “in Cuba (38) Ao oe

* 1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
Memorandum for the Chief ‘of Operations, Cuba Project, which
’ responds to a\request of that office for brief but precise
description of pretexts which would provide. Justification
' for US military intervention in Cuba.

_ 2. @he Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the ;
proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there
will be similer submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
time-~phased plan. Individual projects can then be
considered on a case-by-case basis.

3. Further, it is assumed that a Bingle agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military
_. and para-military aspects of the basic plan, It is
. recommended that this responsibility. for both overt and
“ +govert military operations be assigned the Joint Chiefs of

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

eps Re

L. Lb, LEMNITZER,
Chairman .
‘Joint’ Chiefs of st

1-Enclosure 0
Memo for Chief of operations, Cuba Project: EXCLUDED. FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM ANTOMATIC
RECRADLEG: DOD DIR 5200. 10
: DOES HOT APPLY

a

eof .

ose rcataapbaen tes Sane Ne ena SBR A Be

13-00000

takes cto

” . mundst goverament increases the probability that one or

| papsthie for tha Sino-Soviet Dies to establish mil

_ defense. costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet
the threat. - :

"they are provided with the opportunity to continue wv

MEMORANDUM FOR THR SRCHRTARY or DEFENBE -
Subseoti Guba

, - . ‘ i
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe’ that

problem sust be solved in the near future.

Bee ho prospect of early success in over

commnist- regime either es a re!

or extsrnal‘political, economic or

Accordingly believe that military:

interven‘ oy
United States will bé required to overthrow the Present
communist regime. .

2. ‘The United States cannot tolerate permment existence ~
of a communist goverment in the Western Hemisphere.
prasent regims in Cuba provides comauniam with a base of
operations for 6: ogpionags sabotage and subversion against
Latin America. ‘he stability of some governments in Latin
America is already threatened by the overt and covert aotions
of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this com -

more other nations in Latin America will become commmist
or commmnist dominated. ‘his will greatly increase the
problems currently facing the United States and the

tion of Amrican States. While considered bnlikely, it is

bases: in. Cuba cimilar to US installations around the too,
periphery. Zatablishment of such bases would increase US

3. Timo favors the Cuban regime ami the coumuniet | bloc.

their subversive efforts in Latin Amrica. Increas: seine
internal security measures by ‘police state methods decrease

EXCLUDED 7 FRow
|. au
macnn, zag; bon Dow anaes °


13-00000

the possibiitty of internal uprisings within Cuba. ‘The
oteady: improvement in military defenses strengthens the. -
resistance vhich must be overcome in the event of US
military intervention an and could lengthen the time required
to secure control of the government anil the island. ‘The
contimuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth créates a
growing moleus for a communist underground after the
elimination of the present government. This creates a
problem for the future whion is } steadily increasing in.

ee

magnitude."s_
- &, tha Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United
States can undertake mili intervention in Cuba without

risk of gonsral var. ‘They also believe that the intervention
oan'be accomplished rapifily encugh ‘to minimize communist
opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces
available would assure rapid essential military control of
Cuba. Continued police action would be requized. :

, 5. In view of the increasing military and subversive ;
_- threat to the United States and. the natidns of the Western

Hemisphere by communist regime in Cuba, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff ree that a national policy of early
mili tion in Cuba

tary
States. They also recommend that such intervention ba
undertaken as goon as posaibie a and Lata ares ly, before the
release of National Guard and Reserve. forces presently
on active ‘duty. “ mae
. Por tha Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Doe

L. L. LEMNITZER
. . Chairman
~ Joint Chiefs of Staff

ET De, EON tin SORE ANAS LLL NIA OAD GAN ARID Bt NN SON EI LE Lael eng A


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“7 SES eee = Vn RULE TOE SEN

HLS)

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STARF URVEY GROSS ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP

to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBA PROJECT (Tg)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Stafr
on this matter by 13 Merch 1962,

tere atuasigete

RU LOSERTEB KES. By

excUDED FROM cps

a

os PRR nay
5
'


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: -_—we vEUnet: “2 OFLU

| TST)

. JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (18)

PNA DE

1. as requested” py chief of operations, Cuba Project;:‘4
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
description of pretextywhich they consider would provid:
justification for Us military intervention 1n Cuba.

_ PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is ‘reoognized that any action which becomes pretext

for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political

decision whioh then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizande has been taken of a suggested scourge of
actiun proposed** by the US Navy relating ‘to generated
instances in’ the Guantanamo area.

ores gna hath ELE OR TILE AE sab

_ 4, Fox additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION .
.5. The suggested coursegof action appended to Enolosure A
are based on the premise that US military intervention will
¥ result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
t place the United States {n the position of suffering justit- eee
HI table “grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations
forum should be favorably,affected by developing the inter-
national image of the Cuban government as fash end irresponsible,
and as en alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere. ;

6. While the foregoing premise oan be utilized at the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as

there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
din Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union.

There is

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of goerations,’
Cuba Project,"‘subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated

5 March 1962, one file in General Craig's office.
“* Memorandumcfor the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
. Chief of Naval Operations, subject: "Inatances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
” on file in General Graig's office.

UNCLASSIFIED

BPS SeR ASRS AV rE


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sophie, Sat set tet SRE A NARLRLE NOLEN NTL LAOS:

SEER ET SPECT TANG NO EAR Ne

AUTUKN
as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
vereaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Burope. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months. :

oa CONCLUSION
---%, The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions-should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated ,- time~phased plan to focus all efforts on the

objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
“+ a, Bnelosure A together with ite attachments should be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project...

_juwee-by This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified

or specified commands.

ec. This paper NOT be forwarded to US gfficers assigned
to NATO activities.

a. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

“Wass

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PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US

(Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. ‘They are’
arranged néither chronologically nor in ascending order.

;

Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are ‘
intended to provide a point of departure for the development M
of a single, integrated, time-phased plen, Suoh a plan would i
permit the evaluation of individual projeots within the context :
of oumlative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably i
to the objective of adequate justification for US military 4
_ intervention in Guba). H
+ Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate i

provocation: as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba

a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary

actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 oc,

could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban

reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the

Cubans of imminent ‘invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout exeoution of the plan will allow a rapid |...
change from exercise té intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2.'A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned E
to take place in and around Guantanano ‘td give genuine
: . y
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. a

+ Inoidents to establish a credible attack (not an
chronological order): ;
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio. £

3

'(2);1and friendly Cubans 4n uniform “over«the-fence"
to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the J # ‘
base. é
(4) Start ricts near the base main gate (friendly :
Cubans). : , ; i
‘

Annex to Appendix
7 to Enolosure A

“et SO

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— UCAS:

(5) Blow up ammnition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn airoraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some “damage to installations.

 (B) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or ‘vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals

for mook-viotima (may be 1ieu of (20)). ,

b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which ‘threaten the base.

0. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A “Remeniber the Maine" incident could be arranged in ©

several forms:

a. We could blow. up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.

b. We-could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere

in the Cuban waters. .We could arrange to cause syoh inoident- cee

in the vioinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of ‘Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes ‘or ships merely invedfigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
was taken; ynder attack. ‘he nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add | credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could

follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent
orew. Casualty liste in Us newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation,
4, we could develop a Commmist Cuban terror campaign in

the Miami area, in other Florida oities and even in Washington.

OLAS

Annex to Appendix

8 to Enolosure A

oe NADAS

tine ee

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The terror campaign could be wl ii BD see seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a@ boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida.(real or simulated). We could foster attempts "

on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.

Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
errest of Cuben agents and the release of prepared documents _ :

substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible ‘goverment.
5. A "Quban-based, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
siminted against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the Mth of June invasion of the Dominican Republic), we
imow that Castro ip backing subversive efforts olandestinely*

against Halt4, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at

present and possible others. Thase efforts oan be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within thelr national air space, “Cuban” B-26 or
c-46 type atroraft could make cane-burning raids at.night, —
Soviet Bloo inowndiaries could be found. This svi Be Soupled |
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republic and “Cuban" ahtpments ° of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach,'””
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional” ‘Provocation. Harasement of oivi2 air, attacks on .
_burface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft:
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions. .
An P-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify- .
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could ,

be produced from US resources in about three months,

Annex to Appendix :
9 . to Enclosure A §

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7. Hijacking attempts against olvil Sir art surface oraft
should appeax to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged. _

8. It 4s possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convinoingly that a Cuban airoraft haa attacked and shot dow
a chartered oivii airliner enroute from the United States to :
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venesuela. The destination would
ve ohosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Guba,

The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persona with a common interest to
support chartering a non-soheduled flight.
"a. an afroraft at Rglin AFB would be painted and -
. numberelas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
airoraft belonging to a OIA proprietary organization in the

Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be

substituted for the actual olvi) alroreft and would be

loaded with the seleoted passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases, The actual registered

airoraft would be converted to a.drones "© © ~”

« Take off times of the drone airoraft and the actual
airoraft will be scheduled to allow a Foniezvous south of
Plorida. From the rendezvous point "the passenger-oarrying
advoraft will descend to minimum altdtude and go directly
into an ‘auxiliary £4014 at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the

. aircraft to its original status, The drone airoraft
meanwhile will oontinue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Guba. the drone will being transmitting on the inter-

. National distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Guban MIG aircraft. ‘The transmission
Will ‘be interrupted by destruction of the airoraft which will
be triggered by radio signal, ‘This will allow ICAO radio

tee Shag eA,

a nota Annex to Appendix

ULES ~~

FFP ABAD Eke DR EDilehd AR Ae ss 00m etc cce


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stations in the Western

ee wronn—
, Ne

11 the US what

has happened to the airoraft instead of the US trying to

"sell" the inoident. .

9. It ie poasible to oreate an inoident which will make 4t
appear that Communist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF airoraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 aircraft: will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir .
airoraft for an air defense exarcise in southern Florida, ‘ ‘
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at 2
frequent intervals. Grews would be briefed to remain at :
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry Live ammunition ‘in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs.

b, On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly

tail-end Charley at considerable interval between airoraft.
While near tha Guban Island this pilot would broadcast that

he had been jumped by MIds and was going down. No other $
calls would be made; The pilot would then fly directly . i -
west at extremely low altitude and lafid at a secure base, an — i
Eglin auxiliary. ‘he atroraft would be met by the proper H

people, quickly stored and -given a rev tail number. The Le
Piliot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume bis proper identity and return to his normal Place

of business. ‘The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared.

EPPO RO WE Tee eet

a. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft

would disburse F-12101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
25 to 20 miles off the OGuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as

LTE AAAEREE LS.

¢

they knew. Search ships and aireraft could be dispatched
and parts of atroraft found.

tae

Annex Som Appendix

an Shae

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mccooren 2 WNCLASSiricz

PACTS BRARING ON THE PROBLEM

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously atated*
that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
_aots, against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon’ which to base overt intervention.

2. The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of staff
on 7 March 1962, as follows:

" . . - determination that a credible internal

revolt is impossible of attainment during the next

9-10 months will require a decision by the United states

to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for

" positive US military action." ;

3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.

. fen. SC ELE Meee, + vob Miler Ses x
i ee a tesgnecen e+ cating 44 gtinasGupan ee ENMIPEOUNES IE TPEGINT CHEESE ALICE TLE ON ney
poboiplemsninn so nBeenitasy oc TON HORN ARTES

*

“¥- JOS 19897303 _
** JCS 1969/313

12 : Enclosure B

INGLISSFED

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eee omy ro
Cuba Selected
_ :

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
. IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS :
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002- -10018

RECORDS: SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILE (1963
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : JCS 2304/189

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : JCS
’ FROM : J-5
: : TO : JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

TITLE : COURSES OF ACTION RELATED TO CURA (CASE IT)
DATE : 05/01/63 a
PAGES : 36 ; .,
SUBJECTS : POLICY, CUBA ;

REVOLT IN CUBA

COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
OPLAN 312

OPLAN 316

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
_RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
CE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/23/97
OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 196

3, Box 4. Report to Joint Chiefs.
and Joint Staff disc
Cuba. .

ussing courses Of action toward

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‘COURSES OF acrid

4. Fo discussion, ‘se

Se Segre ce

EINEM NN! Fe tm nL: te

¥ Enclosure to JCS 23 176:
** Attachment to JCS 30/172

*** Attachment to JCS 2304/1168

a - . * .
JCS 2304/2189 -
(Rev: 5/13/63)


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s
>
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4
§
i
a

c Ind ; the viene: of me Joint —
chiefs , of Starr should be forwarded.
Committee ) for conaideratig

a:
* * Enclosuire’ to Jcs 1969/27

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| Semis IN) FPP HOR

‘ - "| APPENDIX .

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION
1. Purnose. This report is in response to a request from
‘the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Start, to consider the desira-
bility ana requirements of a fomented revolt in Cuba. It
includes an examination of engineering an incident or a series
of incidents asa cause for invasion and consideration of
Pertinent comments received from CINCLANT, ©
+ Summary, Study of the desirability and the requirements
of a fomented revolt in Cuba and of the advantages of
enginepring an incident or a series of incidents rather than
trying to generate and coordinate action from inside involving
many Cubans of doubtful Teliability leads to the conclusions
that:
- It is unlikely that en effective Spontaneous revolt
will occur in the near future.
b. Any uprising without US overt. support is likely to
be short-lived because of the improved Cuban/Soviet -
military capabilities presently in Cuba and Castro's.
increasingly efficient internal security’ operations.
c. There appears to be little likelihood that the Castro
communist regime will risk a.direct provocation that
could be used as a pretext for US interverition.
- Unless the United States intervenes: militarily, the
Castro government will become more firmly entrenched and its
efforts and ability to spread international commnian will
increase.
+ The United States. should intervene. militarily in
Cuba and could (a) engineer provocative incidents ostensibly

:
&
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3
2
3
3
‘3
$

semen, MIND

(Rev. 5/13/63)

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perpetrated by the Castro regime to serve as the cause of
{nvasion or (b) foment a. revolt within Cuba which would

' eall for us military intervention,

: f. Engineered provocation Would provide greater ‘advantages
in control, timing, simplicity, and security than would a
fomented revolt. It would be most aarriciit to generate a
widespread effective revolt. However, the staging of @ local

, uprising 48 a contrived incident ‘should not be precluded.

&. The United States should:

(1) Initiate a Coordinated program to créate a pre-
text for US military intervention in cuba.

(2) Im support of the above, undertake a flexibly
phased effort to build Cuban resistance potential, com-
menaing with the: intenstfication oe? intelligence collec-
tion and sabotage in Cuba, and the creation of a frame-
Work for guerrilla activity,

(3) At a propitious time, launch appropriate military
action to remove the Castro communigt- government.

h. Implementation of the above would invoive many
agencies of the United States Government. It would appear
necessary that one governmental organization should. be
Given the primary responsibility for developing Buch a
national plan. The Joint Chiefs of ‘starr should participate
in the development of this national plan. :

i. The broad concepts herein and the views of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff should be forwarded to the Special Group
(5412 Committee) for consideration under the provisions of
NSAM 57. ;

, J. CINCLANT's concept for fomenting a revolt in Cuba
while containing much’ merit, should be re-examined both ©
for its timing and for the large-scale guerrilla activity

it envisages,

—SOR_SReRBT —SENSETEyE “2 Appendix
TOR-GRCREY —SENGTTEVE

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. . Ea .

“ease LAGI

, b. Conduct physical and psychological military harassment oo
of the Cuban regime and covert and clandestine operations as
directed. ,

c. Undertake military action in Cuba in accordance with
contingency plans approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and.
directed by the President. The primary purpose of the US
military intervention would be to assure the overthrow of :
the Castro communist government and to assist in the establish.) § ,

’ ment of a new, non-communist government ‘acceptable to the
United states, .
+ The implementation of any of the suggested courses of
action. in this study would involve many agencies of the United

States Government. It would appear necessary, therefore, that

one single governmental. organization be given the primary

responsibility for developing a national plan.
21.. Beoause of the extensive military operations involved,

the Joint Chiefs of Staff should participate in the development

of this national plan. In addition, for a contrived revoit,

they should be assigned the specific résponsibility for develop-
ing the military and paramilitary aspects of the plan. This
would require the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek a determination
under NSAM 57 when a revolt contrived by-the United States were ©
an operation large enough to warrant control of covert forces

by the Department of Defense and that CINCLANT be designated as

the DOD agent. In this connection, CINCLANT has developed a

specific concept for political and military action in Cuba,

CINCLANT CONCEPT
"22. The .CINCLANT concept provides for inciting a revolt in
; Cuba, fol owed by overt, large-scale US military operations.
The proposed timing of operations permits completion in 15-18
.- months. Supporting operationa by CIA, State, and USIA wil
be required.

— sen secret a 2 12 LPCLASSIED Appendix

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23. Preliminary operations require the introduction by CIA
as soon ag practicable of assets into Cuba for the development
of Antelligence, ‘the organization by State of a Free Cuban
Government (FCG), the development of a propaganda plan by USIA, and
the devdlopment of a suitable cover plan. :
24. Actual operations would commence with the execution by
“ GINCLART of OPLAN 380-63 about 15 January 196%. This plan calls
for infiltrating of UW forces into Cuba for area assessment,
establishing guerrilia bases, developing military units,
establishing escape and evasion nets and conducting subversion. °
On about 15 June 1964, UW forces would be augmented and would
accelerate. subversive operations to create conditions favorable
for establishing a Free Cuban Government on Cuban soil and for
employment of conventional forces.
25. CINCLANT then proposed that on about 15 July mobilization
of forces for US conventional operations would begin. Execution of -
\CINCLANT, OPLAN 312 would commence on 26 July 1964 followed by

DeLay OPLAN’ 316, about 3 Auguot 19€4.-
26. Although the foregoing schedule is approximate, it should

be noted that the Free Cuban Government would be required to
exist at least for 18 days in the face of the Castro government's
/ excellent counterguerrilla ability. this time requirement appears
to be excessive, but it could be shortened. The criteria for
United States recognition of a new government could be met in
this period. The Free Cuban Government could claim it:
, a. ‘Was in actual possession of the governmental machinery.
b. Mas administering it with general acceptance by the
popula‘tion; and,

Zante aR TEER REIR NN IRR NS ESIA 66 LOH rs NETIC NED Atte

¢. Was prepared to honor international obligations:

SSRN eS. 8 OSDIR

(Rev. 5/12/83

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27. The ww forces required for CINCLANT OPLAN 380-63 are
approximately:

(1) Headquarters, Joint - 6 Off 42 EM
Unconventional Warfare Task -
Forse, Atlantic’ (JUWIFA)

Se ce In te one

(2) UW Operating Base - 36 ore 482 EM
(3) Support Units - 15 off 331 —M
(4) Special Forces an 1 Group Headquarter
2 Companies (reir.
+
. (5) Submarines . - 2
(6) APD - 2
(7) SEAL Teams . -~ ° a
(8) Air Commandos - - 150 Personnel
. 20 Alreraft
. , Air Control Teams
(9) CIA Forces - Internal and External
assets as required by
+ CINCLART.

28. CINCLANT does not have UW forces assigned at this time,

, however, a nucleus JUWIFA staff is included within the CINCLANT
staff and has the capability for preparing UW plans for normal
contingencies. Planning or conducting UW operations of the
magnitude envisaged in CINCLANT's concept in this plan is beyond
current capabilities. :

29. At an appropriate time in preliminary operations the

- activation of the JUWIFA as a separate organization and the
assignment to it of full wartime headquarters couplement of

“48 officers, 56 enlisted men, and five civilians would be
required. Approval of any concept in principle or for

Planning purposes, however, would not necessitate the

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activation of a separate headquarters. in this case, OINCLANT
would re-evaluate his staff capabilities and submit appropriate
" Pecommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ,

30. CINCLANT in a related outline concept’ recomended, con-~
cerning the use of Cuban nationals 4n UW ‘operations, that "As
‘practical, the Military Services should initially fom their
Cuban nationals into integral, all Cuban units ...". It 4s
considered that the oreation of a "Cuban Expeditionary Forée" “in
anticipation of its employment in the execution of OPLAN 316. is
a risk which cannot be justifed and should not be undertaken.
There appears to be no reason, however, why Cubans could not be
formed into small teams for use in UW activities. It is estimated
that from two to four hundred carefully selected Cubans could be
used in this role, It would be appropriate for the CIA in a
supporting role to select and train'the individuals forming them

into teams of appropriate size to be made available for Joint use
by CINCLANT or by CIA, as necessary. :

31. For other details of training Cuban nationals, 3ee
ICSN-350-63:;

32. The force levels in CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316 are adequate
to cope with the improved Cuban military capability and the
presence of Soviet troops on the island. :

: 4

33. The experience of the JUWIFA during the Cuban crisis in
October 1962, indicates that the present military supply system
in the conus will be unable: immediately to provide equipment and
supplies an’ the required configuration for projected UW operations
in Cuba. The Army is currently studying prestockage of UW equip-

. ment and will submit proposals for approval and financing.

es

—2eR-SECREF - ~-SEROEEEVE
(Rev. 5/13/63)


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, ; aa. Oe .

; ; | ai

- - FOPTBROREY - senezeryy ll fy

3h The conceptual outline submitted by CINCLANT floes not.
Provide an exact plan in détail ‘for contriving a revolt in

Ouba. However, his general concept would provide ‘for:

a aR

"a. Incremental steps in replacing the present communist
dominated government of Cuba by infiltration, subversion,
unconventional warfare, limited conventional actions and
finally full-scale invasion in that order, if necessary,

b. The capability of U8 to withdraw ‘at any point. in the
Process if unfavorable international reactions or pressures
require it; or if the Cuban people themselves, in a successful
revolt, overthrow the present regiine and form a government
favorable to US interests,

ERS HORE ERNE ick

c. An ambiguous -atmosphere during the critical phases
in its development which would not present the Soviets with
a direct. confrontation of power until events would preclude
timely action on their Part to prevent our intended result
in Cuba. ,

4. Utilization of the OAS Forum ana support without being
dependent upon OAS approval or disapproval for the necessary

Fea rurn esate aieees

intermediate steps leading up to OAS recognition of a Cuban
Government in exile and the final, deci sive military action.

e. Maximum utilization of the Cuban refugee elements
in the US for political and military support without |
depending upon their effectiveness for the ultimate success
of the plan. ,

f. No waldeployment of US forees, affecting the over-all
US military posture, until the final decisive stages of
the plan are ready for execution, thus Feducing maldeployment
time. . .

&. The Most economical use of US resources to accomplish
the defeat of Castro communism. :

na A definite time scale of events culminating in the”
defeat of Castro's communist government and establishing
the groundwork for the installation of a-government compatible
with the aims of the OAS and friendly to the US by 1 October
1964." _

TOR.SECRRT - -ceustasee Ueld BNSIEIEY


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Cuba Selected Documents
vy —
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION = 2 sss
AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10011
RECORDS SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : .
DOCUMENT INFORMATION ,
‘ ORIGINATOR : ARMY
. FROM : R. D. ALBRO
TO : OFFICE, SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ;
TITLE : TRAINING OF CUBAN REFUGEES IN NICARAGUA
DATE: 12/11/63
‘PAGES : 12 ; :
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
, ARTIME, MANUEL
CUBAN BRIGADE
‘KENNEDY, ROBERT
CUBAN EXILE TRAINING IN NICARAGUA —
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION °: UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : OPEN
TE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA : - . Lo
COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Memo regarding

training of Cubans in Nicaragua, recriutment efforts
of Manuel Artime, meeting between Artime and Robert
Kennedy, and Cubans in US Army . .


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ge Report #2870006563, 9 63, Subject:
Séeders visit Nicaragua "eros wart Nicaragua

ert #2870009363, 31 ect 63, Bubject: _.
(0), from USARMA, Bicaragua

*

2. (8) Refaxense tn, Prepared at the request of Your office, advised
suery by UAANAS Mawigon within the bs Eabassy there, revealed no

on: thar Peaah, De McEhail,. 0-30613; YEA Ratived, the foe er

EN eorwny ‘iolved in the’ training of cance”

Bo
Duting the the USARMA, Managua called attention
{genes reports he hed furnished (réferencea 1b, and le above)
an press cousent on the visit of exiled Cuban refugee
nuel ARTIME Buesa, Dr. Carlos PRIO Secarras, Dr. Manuel
iA, De Pla, Dr. Laureano BGTISTA, Dr.
fo MAB SE » and Roberto RODRIGUEZ to
August he USARMA's comment on the
Speculation and runors

newspaper
fa conteming this visit was that he “does

Soy firm information or indicators that orces are

in Nicaragua. ™

OWAGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
HT AUTOMATEALLY DEcLaSsiFIER
BOD DIR szn0.10


13-00000

Colonel, @g ;
. Director of Foreign intelligence

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WARNE NOTICE . 2 Wor AUTOMATICALLY OECtasSiFIE

“ .  BOD otR 5200.18


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AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER :

RECORDS SERIES
SENCY FILE NUMBER

ORIGINATOR :

FROM
TO

TITLE :
DATE :

‘ PAGES
SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS
CURRENT STATUS

E OF LAST REVIEW
IFENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS

Cuba Selected Documents
45

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM.
IDENTIFICATION FORM

Jcs
202-10002-10010
TAYLOR PAPERS

Jcs
EARLE G. WHEELER

MEETING WITH PRESIDE!

12/19/63
3 .

' AGENCY INFORMATION |

NT ON CUBA, 1100 HRS, 19 DEC 1963

POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA

OPERATIONS, CUBA

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

UNCLASSIFIED
OPEN IN FULL

: OPEN

07/31/97

Wheeler, Box 193. Memorandum reporting meeting with

President on Cuba. 1 Document .


13-00000

“ACLUDED FROM 1HTOMATIC REGRADING

+fELIORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBS

19 December 1963

2=CT: Meeting with President.on Cuba, 1100 hra, 19 Dec 1963

1. ‘The following persons were present at the meeting:

. White House: ........

States... ccescecscecs

« The President

Mz. McGeorge Bundy

Mr, Smith
-Mr. Thompson
Mr. Ball
Mr..Johnson ‘
Mtf.. Martin
Mr. Crimmins
x

Mr. Gilpatric

Mr. Vance
General Wheeler
General Carter
Mx. FitzGerald
Mr. Helms

Treacury:............ Mr. Dillen

USIA:....

2. My. FitzGerald briefed the Presiden

_ COvering the following areas:

Mr. Wilson

a. Collection of intelligence,

'b. Propaganda activities.

¢. Economic denial actions.

t on Agency operations

a. Exploitation of Cuban military disaffection.

e. Sabotage and harrassment activities.

f. Support of autonomous anti-Castro groups.

OOM BIR 5200.1. AS" > NOT APPLY

SENSITIVE


13-00000

- 3. a. The President was mést interested in economic denial
‘actions. Ele was informed that talks would be undextaken in the
‘unmediate future with representatives of the Canadian and Britich
governments relative to the supply of spare parts and critical materials |
by Canadian and British firms to Cuba. It waa stated that Spanish firms —
ave likewlse active in this area, a8 well as a number of essentially
ly sby-night firms located in a number of foreign countries. No

- " :putable Amexican firms are engaged in supplying Cuba and, in fact,

have bran helsful in preventing their foreign affiliates from engaging

in this craffic. Apparently, State regards the Canadian, the British

and the Spanish cfforte as being the real trouble spote. The President _
directed that State undertake talks, as appropriate, with the governmenta
vf firma concerned to dissuade them from this practice,

b. Under questioning, Mr. FitzGerald stated that exploitation
of Cuban military digaffectiod is a long term. undertaking. While there.
‘are disaffected Cuban military mén in important poste, they have not,
to date, made any contacts with cach other nor formed any sort of group,
iowever, Mr. FitzGerald considers that any succeasful operation to —
overthrow Castro emanating from within Cuba will have to be supported ©
by the Cuban military Lf it is to have any real likelihood of success.

ec. During the discussion on sabotage and harrassment, the
resident expressed his reluctance to undertake high risk actions at
this time for two reasons:

. (1) Current attempts to set OAS agreement to various
2stions directed against Cuba might be jeopardized; and

(2) The Soviets seem to be watching closely the new
udministration's policies toward Cube, and it might influence unfavorably
the success of our efforts to achieve further reductions, in Soviet military

‘personne}l in Cuba.

4. Mr, Heims briefed on the significance of the arms cache
tiscovered in Venezuela. Mr. Martin briefed upon the activities of
e OAS. survey group now in Venezuela and the results, to dato, of
tueir survey, He stated that the group apparently had accepted that
the arms had been introduced for subversive purposes, but that the.
survey croup was asking of the Venezuclan government further informa-
tion recarding propaganda activities directed against the Vonezuelan
government, ctc. He does not expect that the commission will report


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—Z : . . ey ord ere

eect anette,

to the GAS prior to 10 January 1964, Inthe meantime, our effort

is devcted to ascer taining the maxiraurn that the OAS is prepared

to do as 2 result of the Venezuela affair. They are hopeful that the
CAS will support an increased surveillance system, He thinks it is
too easly to expect a complete break in cconomic.and travel relations
between GAS countries and Cuba.

_ 3. Phere was come discussion of further actions we might
take to increase pressures and harrassments at an appropriate time.
Amony other itemo raentioned were the offect of low level reconnaissance
flighto from time to tizne and the dboirability of executing auch flights
at intervals to maintain the viability of our ‘right’ to do so. While the
President did not express disapprobation, neither did he expresa ‘
=pproval. In fact, no reat decisions were taken at this mecting which
must be regarded, I think, as being an important orientation session. * _

Sigued = Berle G. Wheeler
EARLS G, WHEBLER
Gorcral, United States Army
Chief of Staff _

OFT To

airraan, JCS #!

a cone #5

fof

cue ZF

Director Jt Staff (Atta: SACSA) #¢

Army General Counsel «7

os da & ot Bina
EF ota a rete

. Tote
OL, oy ae ied - 8

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

Cuba Selected Documents
#6

AGENCY

RECORD NUMBER

‘ RECORDS SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER ;

AGENCY INFORMATION

: JCS

202-10002-10117
: JCS CENTRAL FILES 1963
JCSM-77-64

ORIGINATOR

TITLE
DATE
PAGES
SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE

CLASSIFICATION

RESTRICTIONS

CURRENT STATUS :

JATE OF LAST REVIEW :

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS

: A CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

: JCS
FROM :
TO :

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

01/31/64
58 . .
POLICY AND PLANNING, CUBA
COUP IN CUBA

CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

: UNCLASSIFIED
: OPEN IN FULL

OPEN
10/07/97

JCS Central Files 1963, Box 4.

regarding contingency plans in
Cuba. ;

A COUP IN CUBA

Memo for Chairman, JCS

the event of a coup in


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“Sa on ae

TALES ster

.MEMOR ANDUM FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF, ATLANTIC

Subject: A Contingency Plan for a Coup in Cuba (s)

‘1. Transmitted herewith’ iga conceptual proposal, subject as above,
which has been developed jointly by the Department of State, the Depart-. .
ment of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency. .

2. This concept envisions a coup occurring in Cuba which may,

Supported by the United States, achieve US national objectives by the

- elimination of the. communist regime and establishment of a. Cuban
government acceptable to the United States. -

to support a coup in Cuba
the attachment hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff: .
y yt.
WS uopside
MMJ. INGELIDO

Brig Gen, USAF .
Secretary .

RSD

’ GROUP 1- . :
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC —_
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

Attachment

TOP SECRET-SENSPIVE: OP secre PISENSTIVE
Copy 11 of 22 copies, each of } Page, Series A

te corty ont
NEWED
SYSTERAATICALLY pa 1989 ron


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ete Ne
‘DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
" WASHINGTON 28, D.c,

i oo i i nc f
Pot

= eg

e MEMORANDUM FOR HD :SHARMAN,: JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

wr SUBJECT: ~ A Contingéucy Plan for a Coup in Cuba: (s)

Reference:  JESM 809-63, Subject as above, dated October 21,
1963, To

#e

. Enclosed hexsiwith are Shree: copies. of the plan.on the above.

subject which has bei ppared Jointly ona restricted basis by
; arth naj

woos representaHves of i its. Of State arid. Defenae in coordina
i _ Hon wlth ithe: Centraltatetiin Hebey.: The’ which has bi
a revised to reflect génerally ‘ ewe Of the Joint Ghiefs of Staif

contained in referencé, ‘provides'a conceptual basis for US response _ tet
to a Cuban military coup and’has been approved by the Secretaries

of State:and Défenge:and. tiie Director, Gentral Intelligence Agency as

a basis.for: appropriate defailed Planting.” Mr. McGeorge Bundy has _
been advised. of the farégelng and xéquested to,inform the President.

In accordance with the: recommendations contained in paragraph.

8c, page 22 of the plan, it is requested that current CINCLANT plans

' be reyised.as necessary to reflect the. concept of military operations
described.in the plan and. that you advine.me when this has heen accom.

4 ‘plished,
In:abcoxdanceisdthigaiag pane 22.of the plan, .

! . répresentativea of the Central's telligence Agencyin cogrdination with
; representatives. of -the- Departments of Mtate: and-Defense will develop a

plan for the intraduction.of fhe. "Special Team": inta Cuba which will
. subsequently be circulated for-appropriate action.and further detailed
\ Planning by agencies concerned, .
> —*¥ Enclosure A to gcs asou/a0s- ‘\

: . °,** Appendix to Enclosure B to ~ - ; Quca
=... JCS 2304 /205~275 7 Dy Vance

Secretary\of the Army

. 7 EWED —
Pacloeure(5 eye) Byes QN 19-001 1988  — SERISTIVE—

As Stated CLASSIFICE EXCLUDED FROM AUTGHATIC REGRADING

Ae nied tore 0357 ULSI “ vm


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Neen eee wee

RU

1. Problem. To -provide planning guidance for US response to a coup in

A CONTINGENCY PLAN. FOR A COUP IN CUBA

Cuba in’order to assure that US intervention, if undertaken, results in

:
a

replacement of the Communist government with one acceptable to the United
States: ,

2. Ass ions,
a. The leaders of the coup may or may not be aware, Prom previous
contact with CIA, that if they agree to and appear capable of meeting

certain specified conditions (see paragraph 2.d. below), their revolt

will be supported by the US if a US “special team" (see paragraph 3.b.(1)
j below) confirms that the criteria for support have been adequately met. .
: Thus, the coup could be triggered in one of two ways: The leaders » in
| secure radio contact with CIA, implement their plan with US concurrence
‘ , and establish a Provisional Goverrment in full expectation of forthcoming
US support barring a complete and immediate crushing of the uprising; or, ©
less acceptably, the lesders, in the belief that they can meet probable

criteria for US support, initiate the coup without consulting with or

j : ; obtaining the concurrence of the US but establish a Provisional Govern-

| ment, hoping that the US will intervene.

b. If the US had prior knowledge of the coup, up to forty-eight NUE
hours would be ‘required after initiation of the action to introduce into

Cube and receive reports from a "special team" which would obtain in-
formation to assist in making a decision to support the insurgents; if the

US did not have prior knowledge, a longer time would be required. -

SYSTEMATICALLY REVI
This document contains 22 BY JCS ON _ NOTE 900 a
pages.

Copy No. __ of __ copies. . . . CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

a > EE

nee, ase Ceatrol ZZE._O88 ¥ JE. ge


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em,
r

cus a - ve _ a WLS |

(1) A pre-arranged call for help from a Provisional Government

set up by the insurrectionists (preferably to the OAS, although US action.

ise
ths

would mt await formal OAS approval), or

AR

(2) A call for help from the insurrectionists after a coup had
started without prior US concurrence, if the us determined that the in-
surgents met generally the criteria for support, or

. (3) Intervention by local Soviet forces.
: d. A coup should meet the following criteria to be supportable,
i , recognizing that specific criteria will depend upon the ‘situation exist- ae
ent at the time: . 7

(1). Have some power base in the Cuban army or militia in order .
to survive.

(2) Be prepared to establish a Provisional Goverment, ‘however
rudimentary, with some sort of public claim to political viebility to
provide an adequate political basis for overt US action (not required if
Soviet troops were clearly fighting Cuban petricts).

(3) Neutralize the top echelon of Cuban leadership.

(4) Seize. and hold a significant piece of territory, preferably
including Flavana, long enough to permit the US plausibly to extend support
and some form of recognition to the Provisional Government .

e. Policy Considerations. For purposes of this paper, US policy af-

fecting US support to a revolt in Cuba is summarized below.
(1) The US does not contemplate either a premeditated full scale
invasion of Cuba (except in the case of Soviet intervention or the re-

introduction of offensive weapons) or the contrivance of a provocation

- WRUSORED TOP HORE Fe

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sin satvt nn sco aan UES

. (2) By the seme token, it is not US policy to encourage un-
organized and uncoordinated mass uprisings since these would be too
easily crushed by indigenous Cuban military forces. ‘The likelihood of
any spontaneous uprising surviving long enough to receive adequate US
aid is small unless it is s part of, or followed immediately by, a
Planned and coordinated revolt led by a significant element of ‘the Cuban
military forces, :

(3) Once a revolt begins, the involvenént, of Soviet forces,
either tactical formations or troops manning air defense installetions nf
would result in inmediate implementation of OPLANS 312 and 316. :
3. Sequence: of Operations. The concept of operations set forth in this
Paper is based on the following general sequence of events:

, a. Upon receipt of word that the dissident leaders have agreed to

and appear capable of meeting the criteria for US support, approval
would be given to commence: the coup at the earliest practicable time.
(In theevent that a coup were initiated without prior US Mnowledge,

the US would proceed as described below but introduction of the special
team into Cuba would probably be delayed and tts task of gathering in-
formation made more difficult. Consequently, it might not be possible

‘for the US to make a decision to support the coup in time to camit

forces needed to sustain it.)
db. Upon receiving word that a coup had been initiated, either on
& pre-arranged tasis with CIA or as a surprise to the US Government, the
US would:
3

WHLISHED TOP SECRET mm

.


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2 RUS

(1) Introduce into Cuba a "special team" to obtain information:
which would assist in making a decision to support the insurgents, This

tean, composed ‘of several persons representing DOD, State, and CIA,- would

ag meke contact with the coup leaders within twenty-four hours of the start

Pes (3

ee

* of the coup if the US had prior knowledge of the plan, probably later if
not. The report ofthe findings should be received by CIA within twenty-

5 Ey

four hours after the team's arrival on the island but this might not be

possible without prior knowledge of the insurgents’ plans. In any event,
American

reliable reports from trained/ observers in Cuba would be of great value

to making a decision to intervene in order that the US would not commit

ce oe)

its prestige to the support of an uprising which might collapse prior to
the point at which US help has become effective enough to sustain and. .
i = "expand it. (The special.team, augmented as appropriate - by CINCLANT,
would remain in Cuba as a liaison element with the Provisional Govern-
ment if the US intervened and would be directed to report immediately
to CINCLANT for operational control at the time the decision was made
to intervene.) - _
(2) Order forces needed to establish an air and sea blockade
of Cuba to take assigned stations in preparation for implementing the
blockade ; commence generating and positioning forces required for the
implementation of CINCLANT OPLANS 312° end 316.
c. A recommendation to intervene, based on a multiple source in-
telligence assessment including the special team's report, would be
. made to the President. This would be the critical. decision because,

once: made, certain actions would ensue inmedi ately and, henceforth,

4

WSR) “TOP SECRET mmm

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ee ——————————_

Uae

the US would be committed to the ultimate success of the coup. These ac-

' tions would include:

(1) The assumption by CINCLANT of command of all military

and para-military operations in Cuba.
(2) Prompt introduction of small groups of personnel::for the

purposes of intelligence, reconnaissance, communications and liaison

‘with the insurgents, and provision of unattributable logistic support

by eirdrop-or submarine. In the event that the us delayed public an-

‘“nouncement of the decision to support the coup, this assistance would

A be provided in such a manner as to minimize public Imowledge of active
. US involvement in Cuba. ‘
: (3) When authorized by the President, direct the special team
: to have the coup leaders proclaim a Provisional Government, if one has :

| , not already been established, and request US and OAS assistance in order

to provide justification for a blockade and consultation within the OAS.

As soon as the request for help is received, the President would announce
publicly that the US will isolate Cuba by means of an air and sea blockade
to become effective at (time, date). The justification for this unilateral,
interim action would be based on Paragraph 3 of Resolution 2 of the Punta
del Esta meeting of Foreign Ministers until such time as the COAS/0C es-
tablished a collective basis for the blockade, as well as to insure that
support for either side is not provided from external sources. Actually,
the announcement would be designed to immobilize the Cuban Navy and Air

Force, encourage indigenous support for the insurgents, and reinforce a

warning to the Soviet Union not to intervene. (See Paragraph J.a. below).


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rt ee

(CLASSIS

(4) Complete positioning of forces for implementation of por-

tions or all of CINCLANT OPLAKS 312 and 316.

a. The US would have the option of replying to a formal ¢all for
help py either publicly announcing immediately ites intention to support
the Provisional Government and initiating overt military operations, or

responding by establishing a blockade without admitting other support

for the coup. In the latter case, the US would, between the time of the

Presidential announcement of the blockade and public ‘announcement of the

other forms of support, employ small groups of intelligence and recon-_
naissance units, thereby providing visible evidence, to, the insurgents

that support is forthcoming and yet providing a facade of non-téitervention
while the US consults with its allies to gain their political support.

At the same time, the US would be generating and positioning forces re-
_Quired for significant overt military operations. Upon publicly announc-
ing US intent to support the Provisional Government, the US would initiate
overt logistical and air support to the insurgents. There is a possibility
that this level of assistance and demonstrated US intent would be suffi-
cient to bring down the Castro. regime, if the coup carried with it a
significant element of the Cuban armed forces. . However, it is probable

that the US would have to introduce conventional forces incrementally as

required to sustain the uprising and should be prepared to and would im-

plement portions or all of CINCLANT OPLANS 312 and 316, as required.
4, Facts Bearing on the Problem.

a. The Situation in Cuba. The Government has an excellent surveii-

lance network, both internally and with respect tothe air and sea

6"

INELESSIE] FOP SECRET omen


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» SECRET _SSECIAL HANDLING -MOFORH-

. ° OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 MRACHSIOBDGLIECTION TO
DECLASSIFIGATION AND/OR
RELEASE GF Clé INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROMEG#S DOCUMENT

Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
; in Cuba (TS) —

1. Reference. is made to memorandum from Chief of Opera-
tions, Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation
MONGOOSE", dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but
precise description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of
Staff consider would provide justification for US military
intervention in Cuba.

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are for-
warded: as a preliminary submission suitable for planning
purposes. It is assumed that there will be similar sub-
missions from other agencies and that these inputs will be
used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. The
individual projects can. then be considered on a case-by-
case basis.

3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions or from other sources, should be
developed to focus ail efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a
logical build-up of incidents to be combined with other
seemingly unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate
objective and create the necessary impression of Cuban
rashness and irresponsibility on a large scale, directed
at other countries as well as the United States. The plan
would also properly integrate and time phase the courses
of action to be pursued. The desired resultant from the
execution of this plan would be to place the United States
in the apparent position of suffering defensible grievances
from a rash and irresponsible government of Cuba and to
develop an international image of a Cuban threat to peace
in the Western Hemisphere. -

4, Time is an important factor in resolution of the
Cuban problem. Therefore, the. plan should be so time-
phased that projects would be operable within the next few

months. .
. ; EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY _

DLING -OFORN-

BP _SECRET=SPECIAL HAN


13-00000 —
oe - Jap-SECRET-OECIAL HANDLING “HOFORN- |

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommeded that primary responsibility
for developing military and para-military aspects of the
plan for both overt and covert military operations be as-
signed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

“A L Meg
4 : : Brig General, USA -

DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group

Enclosure

Pretexts to Justify
Military Intervention
in Cuba

end

WF -SECRET-SPEGHHE HANDLING -NOFORN-


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| Ti SPECIAL HANDLING: NOFORN

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
Subject; -Justifieation for US miitary J Intervention
in Cuba (TS)

1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, for General craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of staff
consider would provide justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba. .

2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
a8 a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.

It is aciumed that there will be similar submissions from
other agencies and that these inputs will be used-as a basis
for developing ‘a time-phased plan. The individual projects
ean then be considered on a case-by-case basis.

. 3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the

attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
‘developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate,
objective which would provide adequate justification for

us military Antervention. Such a plan would enable. a logioal
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
oveate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
countries as well-as the United States. ‘The plan would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. ‘The desired resultant from the execution of
this plan would be to place the United States in the spparent
position of suffering defensible grievanoes from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter- .

national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.

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TOP. SECRET“ SPECIAL Hf t - 7

4, Time is an important factor. in resolution’ of the Cuban

problem, Therefore, the plan should be so taime-phased that
’ projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is. wecomnended that primary responsibility
for developing military and paramilitary aspects of the plan

' for both overt and’ covert military operations be assigned the
. Joint Chiefs of Steff.

Enclosure

Pretexte ¢o: Justify Military Intervention
- 4n Cuba

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"TOP SECRET SPEGHE =

PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agenoles, they are
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably

_ to the objective of adequate justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).

1. Since 1t would seem desirable to use legitimate.
provocation as the basis for Us military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 co,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
reactions, Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the

yo Cubans of imminent invasion would be emphasized. our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a@ rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2. A series of well coordinated Aneidents will be planned
‘to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Inoldents to establish a credible attack (not in

chronological order) :. ,

(1) Staxt rumors (many), Use clandestine radio.

(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.

(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base. .

(4) start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).

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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of tase into base.

Some damage to installations.

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -- napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduot funerals

for mook-viotims (may be lieu of (10)).

b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

ce. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine” ineident could be arranged in

several forms: - : ;

a. We could blow up a us ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba. .

b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to eausé such inoident
in the vicinity of Havana or santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship

“was taken under attack. The nearness. to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
orew. Casualty. lists in US ‘newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation. ; .

4, We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.

4


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The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans

enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
‘Exploding a few plastio bombs in carefully chosen spots, the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared ‘documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A “Ouban-besed, Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 1th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro 1s backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at

present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or
C-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at night.
‘Soviet Bloo incendiaries could be found. ‘This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground ain the
Dominican Repiblic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would

be found, or intercepted, on the beach.

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.

An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban ure, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the seourity risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, -yeasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.

 at8F Fu Le
5 eae 1a. a

ior cones =SechhtewtNe Kora

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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface oraft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
goverrment of Cuba. Concurrently, gemuine defections of Cuban

civil and military air and surface oraft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident whioh will demonstrate
convincingly that a Quban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a. chartered olvil airliner enroute from the ‘United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela, ‘he destination would
be ohosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persona with a common interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.

a. An aircraft at Eglin ARB would be painted and
numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami, area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the seleated passengers, all boarded under

. carefully prepared aliases. ‘The actual registered
airoraft would be converted to a drone. _

b. Take off times of the drone aiveraft and the actual
airoraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
airoraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
4nto an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers. and return the
airoraft to its original status. The drone airoraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being tranemitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
1s under attack by Cuban MIG aircraft. ‘The transmission
will be interrupted: by destruction of the airoraft which will
be triggered by radio signal.. This will allow ICAO radio

MESES VO ABS |

we tad een 2d

6 .

\


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stations 1n the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what

has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to .

"sell" the inoident. ;

9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Comminist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF airoraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.

a. Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 airoraft will be dispatched
4n trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of cuba.
Theix mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
airoraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida,
These airoraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least ‘12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would ‘be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MiGs. ,

b. On one suoh flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
teil-end Charley at considerable interval between etroraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that

Lo he had been jumped by MI@s and was going down. No other
calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly

west at extremely low altitude and land at a seoure -base, an

Eglin auxiliary. The atroraft would be met by the proper

people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. ‘The

pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place

of business. The pilot and airoraft would then have

disappeared. — Lo

¢. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was'
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft:
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etec., at approximately

_ 15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots

returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. Search ships and aireraft eould be dispatched
and parts ef airoraft found.


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9 March 1962 ' "copy oF __copres
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION

REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND . .
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE '
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
‘JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on

GUBA PROJECT (TS)

The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 Merch 1962.

13-00000

JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)

THE PROBLEM

1. As requested* by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
description of pretexty which they consider would provide
Justification for US military intervention 1n Cuba.

; FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. It is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
decision whioh then would lead to military action.

3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of

activn proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated
instances in the Guantanamo area.

4, For additional facts see Enclosure B.

DISCUSSION .

.5. The suggested coursegof action appended to Enclosure A
_ ave based on the premise that US military intervention will
result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
place the United States in the position of suffering justif- .
dable grievences. World opinion, and the United. Nations
forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter-
national image of the Cuban government as fash and irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere.

6, While the foregoing premise oan be utilized at. the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
in Guba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is

* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office. —

*# Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
Chief of Naval Operations, subjeot: "Instances to .
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (T3)", dated 8 March 1962,
on file in General Craig's office. —

2

TOP-“SEGRET=-SPECIAL-HANDLING —NOFORN-


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as yet no bilateral mutual support agreement binding the USSR
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.

CONCLUSION ;

7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions~should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the —
objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.

RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
“or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to Us gfficers assigned
to NATO activities.

a. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

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DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention —
in Cuba (13)

1. The Joint Chiefs of staff have considered the attached
Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise
desoription of pretexts which would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba. .

2. The Joint Chiefa of Staff recommend that the proposed
memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable
for planning purposes, It is assumed that there will be
similar submiseions from other agencies and that these inputs
will be used as a basis for developing a time-phased plan. ,
Individual projects can then be considered on a case-by-case
basis, 0 ee eee D ot :

C 3. Further, 1t is assumed that a single agency will be

: given the primary responsibility for developing military and

/ para-uilitery aspects of the basic plan. It is. recommended —
| ‘that this responsibility for both overt and covert, military

\ Operations be assigned the Joint chiefs of ptaff.

Ye
v

* Memorandum f or Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba
- Project, pubjeot, “Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March
1962, on file in Gen Oraig's office

4 Enolosure A


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MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OFERATIONS, CUBA. PROJEOT
Subject: qustificetign for US Military Intervention
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of. Operations,
Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 Maroh 1962, which requested brief but precise
desoription of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider would provide justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
as 8 preliminary submiseion suitable for planning purposes.
It 18 assumed that there will be similar submissions fron
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
can then be considered on a case-by-case basis. .. 9. = x */ >
. "3. This Plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to foous all efforts on a specific- ultimate
objective which would provide adequate justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan poyld enable a logical
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
oreate the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and .
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
countries as well as the United States. mhe”pian would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. The desired resultant from the exeoution of
. this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-

national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.

Appendix to
5 Enclosure A

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4, Time 4s en important factor in resolution of the Cuban
problem. ‘Therefore, the plan should be so time-phased that
projects would be operable within the next few months.

5. Inasmoh as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility x
for developing military and para-military aspects of the plan ne

cere Ad A
for. both overt. and covert ; military operations be assigned ‘the

Joint Chiefs, of Staff.

messes eee Som m eat


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ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
" PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA

(Note: ‘The courses of action which follow are a preliminary . :
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are :
arranged neither chronologically nor in. ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are ,
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumlative, correlated actions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate justification for US military

. intervention in Cuba), © —

1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to inolude requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban

_ reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convines the
. Cubans of imminent ‘Anvasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid -
change from exeroise to intervention if Cuban response justifies.

2.'A series of- well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo 'éd give genuine.
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.

a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over-the-fence"
to stage attack on base.
(3): Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base. :

(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans).


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(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires,
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.

Some damage to installations. _ .

(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture miiitia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires -~ napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mook-victims (may be lieu of (10)). -

b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.

_ 6. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" inoident could be arranged in
several forms:

&. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and

_ blame Cuba.. . .
. b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. ‘The presence
of Cuban plenes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship
_was taken under attack. fhe nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea. rescue operation covered by US
fighters to “evacuate” remaining members of the non-existent
orew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a. helpful
wave of national indignation.
4, We could develop a Commmist Cuban terror campaign in
thie Miami area, in other’ Florida oities and even in Washington.

Annex to
8 to Enclosure A

“FOP-SEGREE= SPECIE HANDLING HOFER —

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. additional provocation.

‘(The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated), We could foster attempts

“on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots; the
arrest of Ouban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.

5. A “Quban-based, Castro-supported” filibuster could be
simlated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). we
kmow that Castro is backing subversive efforts colandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure, For example, advantage
oan be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to

_ intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-26 or

C-46 type airoraft could make cane-burning raids at. night.
Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republi¢ and "cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach. e

6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
Harassment of civil air, attacks on ~
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MIG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in. obtaining or modify-
ing an airoraft, However, reasonable soples of the ura could
be produced from us resources in about three months.

Annex to Appendix
9 to Enclosure A


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7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
goverrment of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.

8. It 18 possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convinoingly that a Cuban’ etroraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
. Jamaioa, Guatenals, Panama or Venezusla. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a common interest. to
support chartering « non-scheduled flight.
a. An afroraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numberalas an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a OIA proprietary organization in the .
Wiemi area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual oivil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. ‘The actual registered
stnenably woul be sonverved So & drones
. Take off times of the drone airoraft and the actual
-adroraft will be scheduled to allow a _Pendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point ‘she ‘passenger-carrying
airoraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly
into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. ‘The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. when
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
. natlonal distress frequenoy a "MAY pay" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban IG airoraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aireraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio

y Annex to Appendix
10. vo Enclosure A

TOP. 7

———————

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7

stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the US what
has happened to the airoraft’ instead of the US trying to
"gell" the inoident. oo
9. It 4s possible to create an inoident which will make it
appear that Commmist Cuban MiGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack,
. Approximately 4 or 5 Pel0l airoraft: will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
airoraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida. “
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Ouban MiGs.

b. On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between airoraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other
calls would be made. ‘The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a yew tail mumber, The
Pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place

"of business. ‘he pilot and airoraft would then have
disappeared. ,

oc. At precisely the same time that the airoraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, eto., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. ‘The pilots

returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they lmew. Gearon ships end aireraft could be dispatched
and parts ef airoraft found.

Annex to
11 to Enclosure A

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abo

».

ENCLOSURE B
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

- 1, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*
that US unilateral militery intervention in Cuba canbe
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regine commits hostile
acts, against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon’ which to base overt intervention.

2, The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
‘unsuccessful was indlcated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 7 March 1962, as follows:

Ne we determination that a credible internal

revolt is impossible of attainment during the next

9-10 months will require a decision by the United States.

to develop a Cuban "provocation" as justification for

" positive US military action." |
. 3. It’ is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop ‘justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.

-

_ "* JES 19697303
** JCS 1969/313

12 . Enelosure B


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nee wy 3 ~ y 3 aye
'
TOP. SECRET . COPY NO. i
" JCS 1969/3021 SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
12 March 1962
Page 216 .

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
: ‘to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF .
on

NORTHWOODS (8)

& report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. _

FP. J. BLOUIN
M, J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat

* Not reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat

EXCLUDED From
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

‘TOP SECRET

JCS 1969/7321 . 8165


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aN:

* DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY.
OPFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.c.


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Wd, pS Sah a
affort to export subversion “datin Amavies, Great and fhewagh Cube, thore
is agteemont, at the least, that the program embodies grave potential
‘bana foe the Geisreliey athe Hancaphors, Boyead tia, thero ts alse
eeieenl ectmowtegrmans atta svrersian pohtne ix nota iw en,

' sources sf infection 80 wx much of Latin America for two decades 0 or more.

‘Fivally, thera ie evidence that the U. 5. appreciates these reilities, ac
sabtited in the depth of en-guing W. 8. progeeaas tn ail of Latin Amecica,
aimed at blunting the Communist subveratve thrusts inte the continent.
The question ercated by the President's underscoring of the problem is
whether or not our efforts in this area ava adequate o» an to ecops, as to
soordinatjon, and as to intensity. It to the vlew of the Committee that they

ere not. Purthae, it bs the vlew of Bie Gamunittns 7" wpe aimed solely ot,
” tonpeding the flow of wtadents end subversives to and toom Guba will aot, of

themeelves, greatly abate the problem. There mnst be companion efforts

. designed both to degrade the basic expability for Cubsnvbased subversion, as
well as efforts to develop a more effective ros{stance chpacity among the
Latin Amesican states. The sections to follow are designed with these two


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Pires, with reopect to praventing ths export of Communist subversion

by or through Caba, there is s summary of what we aze doing now, and what
we can do in the futuze. . ,

the Lmpect of Coonaaudet eubrersien there io o summary ef our current
programs and 6 listing of specific additional things which we ean do} in other
words, & trestment of the subversive question from two paints of view ~-
therapy 0 rogaede Cubes peepiylnais at regards Latin America at large .

L Programa Now ix Motion. ; &
The following exteting programs ate sll having same adverse afiect -
on the basic cayabllities of the Communiste to organine, train, teach, equip,
underwrite and export enbvezsive strength into Latin America trom Cuba:
&. Rocotnatesance and Surveillance activities, which unite to
| Frovide information and to represent a cantiauing dateivent to subversive
Q) Picket dhip patrol of the Windward Passage.
This action contributes te the rontriction of tlltett Cuban aon
trafic te Hail and Dominican Repubite azen.
. (2) Aircraft patrol fights cut of Guantanamo. a,
These Mighto, augmenting surface surveltiance, keep wateh for
amnsll cxait, Aabing and merchant ablyping opernsing in the Garthhewn owulh
of Cabs; and waters adjacent to and porth of Jematce.

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(3) U.S, Military execution of epeoitie couster-mubversive tasks.
oe, i ; _ Tajo Invatvos action tahon tn eospanse to apectiie needs, as
” daitig the 1968 attoniphs to eabant wivebicteiastaw ae Gouval Ainaited ~
‘These were countered, and probably shorted, by the presente of U. 8, Navy
custoanete petsciing che ental enene of Soca Rien‘ the voquect of the

changes in Guban military capabitision, tose Aighte serve as & reminder of
U8, vighlanoe ond datermduntion, f
(8) Gomsaunioatlons Intelligence,

All of the above are ovpported by and given a scnse.cf
diroution from the guest volume of material provided through the facilities
of the Communications Intdliigenes system.

be Propagands « Radio and Television.

" () tue Vetoe of Aankailon isnt conducts 4-8/3 kaure of short wave
broadcasts te Guba daily. These sstre, in some degreo, to expose to tha
Cuban people the subversive activities of the Castro regime.

(2) Axmad Forces sadio and television bigadenste trum the Guantaname
Naval Base seek daily to combat the spread of Gommuntem by the orientation


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) fein i ite oven Bkophere organiaatons exhibites:
She pear f emits resi anor b herman stato,

cvs rem of Rava recs Hezoee

‘a deimas, si hany Ci ei ef eubrerson ator te wy
“@ Coreen ote tions Aid ot gating Hen tne nd ont of

Uh te clone at Sn aaivitien waleh colate to tha dank of agent
— "en wih. ol poupeanndes corre rectly to dieintah the |
$e aapont subvadeton thie Guha. It tp seencoary.
however, te coidamglite other actions which, ‘While tase divactly welated to.

enbvextion, sti} serve to wasken Cuba sad its Communist disteterelip,
- exud thine $0 elivntuate the problea af ite avurcs. It is for thie reascn that
see te praseated haxen « spectrom of eotions related dixectly to Cubs.

“feast ‘eo abo sy ‘ager, of the requirements of international ,

ted necessary that they be act forth in

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cooporative Latin American state of cucgected

2 EES

of the Gaban people by the Castzo
“ (4) Conduct airborne


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c. liteoubhy Physical ntattigense Gathering Rtforts.
a By venvattetiuabla mene e~ Cubana nod Sted comntry

res tnttng wound canted of eepertaton
@& Movement of Personnel,

teh silanes wd tee peta artongmoents wth
Satin: American matan, coh t0 impede the movement of poston, into end

te he eden tint nendy tants, in conatderahie Guantity, are

Fequitad to condactd subversive training progvam, us} to speak af other
costly factors =« arms, demolitions, fenl, food, propaganda, etc. Specific
actions simed a¢ seducing the Cuban's resources will thus have a direct
effect upon theiy abtlity to putoun thelir program of euhvession, will cauge
Sheen. $> Come pee nn eas eshte Sa i give Oo» Deaciene pee
“prodyative. ldnaietes, oviny Action Wilih centetbatos to bnebllty, worent, -
apprehension and dlavensien bebwaen Rusolan.and Cuban will xeduae
conranpontingly both thely alillty and thelr oppartmity to ditve forward on

a program of edbrovatve tealnag and exycetaicn, ‘The following actions —


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“psnienas, eg dhl vonty of Cuba's atcaseay dnpeits These .
octiane shank emia fl the wey Soom dmvet Sonivuctian ie sabeind»

spenta, tear nacho tanmtacion; bind Jnpers)snnse Gu salty
tated to stand comtbuusily ab gh cost Level aad thus to-edasume oupplion
which could cthaweias be dedicated to. nubretutva training.

(2) Diminish Cubes financial vesouxces.

‘@) Consider introduction. af counterfolt currency in
large quantities, $ distert the Cuban Aannetel posture, and to
19) vende angs tan eo de, r tai Neetween. and

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ry Programs maw ta beings
_ a emtaag hn yrogeen wes au newt proget U  tcesary

shots fi thirweh wd, taken all sagethin. they have cestalaly mit fortttied
sar allie $e thn polutstnce sebvertinn can be sald to be unter Sit consset.
* ‘Wo aitteany Mtr. ,
. Moited Mine milan devas are sow panictyiing in bees

ste anette smgtanig th ly of putsen te engne ad at .
dren wubvagalee ssttvtty. 2 thane, tha principal are: a
Q) Saunterineuegency, astlaeudwarsion sad physhntogical aperstions
trainiig through the sundium of military miasions and mobile training teams.
(2) Provision of equipment and matestell on shoet notice for use
in the face of nubvervion o¢ subversive threats. |
Q) ‘The conduct af emergency truining programs tn mob and slot

{4} Provision of femal cuuntertneurgensy edneation for Latin
Amatican néfivase dnd galisted mon In Tilted States Servier gahoota and
" "{5) Proviaton of civée action tridning and ssststance.
(s Anciiary miliary efferta ened at etengthening te ait
_ of Titta anita endian to Yontet eorepatans
 @ Gated Oates pevsin of matnene ppt

assistance for Latin American novel gad ats units.


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@ Officer exchange programs.
ts) Language training for Latin American military students.
@ fornia Ars Ravy and Alr Foree Defense Contsrences.

‘The United Staten military te embarked on # program aimed at ms
the Latin American militesy aware of the realities of Gontmunism and
Gomsauntat eoversian. This includes

gy: ‘Fenuatation into Spon het yetatng of 80,000 ente of the
eerics of ten paraphlete entitied, “Demecracy versus Communism. "
 @ evelopment of an aadio/visunl film strip based on she
"Demouracy versus Communism pamphtets for the illiterate Latin American
eni{eted men. One Hundred and eighty of these films and records have been
sent to CINGARIS for further distribution te the Latin American services.

42) Thivteenshundved copies af the USTA pamphlet "Tactices y
Pireativas Contr fa Fanse Gommusdote: sro bing pevoured for detetvtion
among the beds Assaylenn military,

&. Te PoliticosEconomic Effort (to he supplied by State).
e. The Propagenda Effort {to be ouppliod by USLA).
d. ‘The Intelligence and Non-ath sibutable Efforte(to be supplied by CLA).
An tn the ease of Sectiin It, the programe cutltaed below are within
oti . Howaver, as tiey exose the

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_ “whieh provides for slititeral exshaage af infutmation and sculillatere!

sarticipation tn an slesting aystexss anch cvvatey to he reapenatble for

system ond yootdn suite eshnnge of nteligngsbetwoce mbeertber

zations, ; he
@ Contiins tha tnprovemmnt of US commnnisations lu Letts

. America, nt high priority, to coutsthute to the effactivensss of the alerting.

oyster,
bh Multinations’ Guusterianus gency Farce.
Paper Sh aly of orang om OA Goerinegnny

subversion. Cutts 8 peopeatty sade ut de thos, would exhibit the selous :
determination af the awa te suppent vigorously an. sxtleubearaion program.

ce. Training aud Osientation. .
Provide tov a greaGy expanded cut-of-country training and
orfantation program fos kay segments of cach Lada American country's


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SD car danibeadainht hits Ai ertnieeth ete CPE REE gia te niente I tt Te
aoe re ’ Mo

a Eulisted and affieer military perscunel to be achoaled tn
Panama and/ex the United Stats, .
Soe Potiee psmspah tbe athoilnd ts Phin at te Rated nto,
@ Newspaper parsannel to be ucheched within the United States.
«) Nurses (mute snd fesnale} to bo traiand in the Salted Staten.
(8) Civitan nshnaian tbe enka in tt itn ening

a wh hr fh pt sed ang vig tatleg pinged.
the United Sintee, ts aot fust to echanee the abill and efiftntion devel of thé

people tavolved but, even mora, te axpone the Latiua te UG taffeense, ¥e show
: oe a, .
them. eur country, to poxeunds them by close agcactatian that cus view ta

correct, and thus to effffen thats resalve to comber pulvorstan tn any Gorm.
4. Troup Information Program .

_ Rapand greatly tbo current Latin Amartoan trogp information
program in andes to edueste the Latin Ameniean sprvieansent (tod thais
stutinn enutecrpaien) we Sh ecbrenstre Gnu Bay Gee.

a. News and Pyopagands

@) Underwrite, as necessary, and condubt an tuformation
program within exch country tn Latin Amextos using those themed:

-(e) An exgapition of incte on tulvrarstve tenting, movement of


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{4} Facts on the decreess in living ctnodards within Cuba since
the rise of Castro.

fo) Paes on tennew sad sepeenston Se Goh.

- a: Develip i: Py eh a

Maicy Latin Atmasiean popees, oven the antlecommunist ones,
are infitreted by eameanstet agente ant mgay Of hnty calmmlite, pnout-
rendare end Unotypars ae hough with eqmenuntet minbey, Cleeulation

of tase payee ie ately tated Wy low petons and maderetiten by

tx news contr inset envey th tut th Lata wha Me the Amesica:
believes what he rade. | _ if

. 4
7

(3) Mintelinits Auti-Communiet Mteratere .
Books snd pamphicts, ta lange uumobare, expasing the ‘woality
of communism abould he printid tn Spandub and Portuguese ond disteibuted
£ Tver tra fo be rte by

We shoot nonelarita nnd iteaden acetetionteysosy program tn

each country of Latin Aumgxica, dstving for 0 ronitatlg “Enteral Defense Plan"

, for avery country and uxying Letin dmatioan countries to ask tor counter-
tnouxgency teafiing assistance, fox military, partmiiitary and police forces.

Beyond thie we shanld ate mpecifie exyisels wean developing civie action

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. @ Instigate and stage solocted tersoriat incidents in Latin
American countrios, designed to implicate Cuatro.
* (a) Avtange tor exchins of SotketeGunch pein bo bo “discovered”
in sclected Latin Amoristn countrias, ontanalidy axagghed i from Coba. |
TV. Sonclusion.
Mt 1s the bellef af the Camuttice that the setious outltied tn the
_ precoding sections sonspaise a acriae of stops which in some areas will stem
; ‘and th othons attach the pingram of Oxtnshened Yoni Spapratin tn Spin,
America. Kach individeal netion embodies seme element of usefsiness tn
itself, and any combination of sections may generate correspongingly favorable
regults. There i no profound sdlationshlp which demands the semblaiag of
siny epecitic cet of notions. | . .
It ln Fecammended, therefore, that an carly selection be mundo of those
ations Listed above whase execution fo compatihie with sntional obligations
wad dedications in other avons and which are within U,8, capabiifiine, and
_ th ay bo yuk eutey tte silet stnoe the longer thn snbrannirabtueneee

in thie Hemisphere ate permitted iy mature, the more dittinult will be thads

ultimate elimingtion, -

. And Saslly, revogsining the diverse nabaie af jha Geld Wer astéstibes
invelved, it is strongly recommended that a single point in the Government
be dentgated an aantgnd reepoctiity for eperviaing cancion of te


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Vee NBs Gua te

While we generally concur with the paper prepared by the
Department of State, we do not believe that the proposals contained
therein present a sufficiently wide spectrum of options or activities

to impede and stop Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.
Specifically, we recommend the following additional actions:

q1) . Measures to attrit Cuban resources:
- 2) Purchase the defection of personnel,
aircraft, ships, . boats and other valuable items.
(b) Conduct non-attributable actions against
petroleum resources, upon which much of Cuba's economy depends.
These actions -should extend all the way from direct destruction to

sabotage through chemical and bacterial contamination of carriers

' and storage,

(c) By means of intelligence indications (aircraft

. flights, agents, clear radio transmission, beach jumpers) cause Cuban

military forces to stand continually at high alert level and thus.. to

consume supplies which could otherwise be dedicated to subversive

‘training.

(d) Consider introduction of counterfeit currency

in large quantities, to distort the Cuban financial posture, dnd to

undermine confidence.

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‘ this financial investment

(2) The designation of a single point in the Govern-

’ ment to be held responsible for supervising the execution of the total

program,
(3) An intensified and broadened news and propaganda

program, including the following:

(a) Underwrite, as necessary, and conduct
an-information program within each country in Latin America using
these themes: wont lee. meee nme .

1. An exposition of acts on subversive
training, movement of subversives and general subversive programs.
2. Objectives of the Communists within
each country. .
3. Communist methods of operation.
4, Facts on the decrease in living standards
within Cuba since the rise of Castro.
5.’ Facts on terror and repression in Cuba.

(b) Develop a Pro-American Anti-Communist Press

“Many Latin American papers, even the anti-
communist ones, are infiltrated by communist agents and many of their
columnists, proof-readers and linotypers are bought with communist
money. Circulation of these papers is artificially inflated by low prices
and underwritten by communist funds. The United States must match

ews control in order to convey the truth


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adi.

ae

ghss

the United States.

. education level of the people involved but, even more, to expose the

to the Latin who, like the American, believes what he reads:
(c) Distribute Anti-Communist Literature

Books and pamphlets, in large numbers,

exposing the reality of communism should be printed in Spanish and

Portuguese and distributed through inexpensive commercial sale.

(4) Greatly expanded training and orientation in the -
United States for key segments of each Latin American country's
population, such as: ; .
(a) Enlisted as well as officer military personnel
to be schooled in Panama and/or the United States. > *
(b) Police personnel to be schooled in Panama
or in the United States. ,

(c) Newspaper personnel to be schooled within

(4) Nurses (male and female).to be trained in the
Unifed States. 7

(e) Civilian technicians to be trained in United
States training achools.

The thrust of such an expanded training program,

taking place in the United States, is not just to enhance-the skill and

Latins to US influence, to show them our country, fo persuade them by

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close association that our view is correct, and thus to stiffen their

resolve to combat subversion in any form.


{tin Stare enboilide grave potential tamrds for
——— Beyond Yikes, there i

“es exhibak ‘gn the depth of gimptne 0.2, programs in all —
of Latin Aniyioe, aimed at blunting the Commmnist subversive .
thrusts inty-the continent. :
The eugetion oreated by the President's undersvoring
of the padtilen 1s whether or not our efforts in this area
are adequate : ~~ a8 t6 Baope, ag te ooordination, ana ae te
intensity. .2b'ts the view. of thts Comittse that they are
nob. Furthain, A619 the viewof the Gamittes that steps 7
aimed soledy. Bt dnpeiting the Pee of stidents aid dubverstyey
¢o and oie wi. neti, of (iemmelvée,s greatiy anate the
problem. gére umatj de ctimpeuti efforts deatened both. te
degrade thi Ghote capability fay Cubsn-based subversion, as
jell ae otter te ‘deverep a wie -effeotive resistause
capacity auido the Latin saseripan states, The sections to
follow are designed with these tro requirements in mind,
First, ¥

nist subvermdbn by or through Pita, there 18 4 summary of
wat wo exe (aka now, nod wna we cen do in the future.

Lin respect to preventing the export of Comm- ©


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Seoerid, With respect to esuisting the Latin Aueyican
nations te weaist the impact 6f Coommist subversion, there —
io 8 sumixy of cur current programs and A listing of
specifies: editions. things which we om de) in other words,
B treatment @f the subversive question fron ¢we points of

view ~ therapy ap regerds Cubs peepiy lancta as regards Latin |
Amerioa et args. ;

TZ. Measures ts

whe felloning existing programs are ali having eous
edveres ethigh on thi hania abpibttitten of the Ogmmuriate

) Makes chip pehrgd of tho: Wanduase Pasunge.
his ection celytbubes to the restristien

ot Ftesn Given ope ehtrin Mate wat Deiter
4B) Assesede petrol adhe oot of coantenmn. _
i: Shene Plighte, mignenting aurface vurveiliance,
Keep: waten for mail? spite, fishing and merchants
sniping ‘epereting An the Onrthbean south of Oxbe,
and Waters tAgncent téan ana noveh of Jamaica.


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Tete dnvelves ection taken iu response to
specific necks, as tiring the 1962 sttampts to expert
Cuban vevolutiosartes te Central Aserica. These
were ooustered, and probably aborted, by the prevense
GF UA, lary Gostugers potveliing the constal areas
| OF Cente Rien ot the veqmet of the goverment of
_ text ooumtzy. :

: (4) Overtisgh. :
0 seocent staves $m Coban wiiitexy sqpubsistteny,
ese Flights serve'te s rounder of UAE. vigtinee
Bit Gobermtunittan,

| (5) Comamisatiqns Intelligate.

AI af the shove ere supported by ond strum
jevertas provid taeeup toe meeiitiaee of ta
 Somemicntions Inbeltigense syaten.
Propaganda ~ Radi end Television.

. (1) the Votse of America nov conducts 2-3/5 boure
“(6f hort-ueve trontsante to Gia daly. ‘Shepe serve,
vin some degree, te expose to the Cuban people the

(2) sued Feros radio ant televiaten tromfeants
fom the Gumatenmig Bevel Buse seek Gatty to combi


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(1), Ziduination ef Cubs from Hemisphere organi-
witttens exhibits the penalty for conductive subversive
eativitty in her neighboring.states.

(2) ¥.3.-Sovget talks regarding removal of Soviet
equibet forces from Guba are productive in thet they
cobtimme the pressure on the USSR end the Cubans, —
008 inep Ge mubjook. OF subversion vefore the wirlt.

Xp'is clear tint tebe ootivittes witah relate to
the dentaS of agent movenesis and the suppressiian of putge~
ganda enive Gtrectly to diminish the Commist capability
to export: subversion fzen Guba. Et 3s necessary, however,
bo contadpiate other actleiii itch, While less dtrectly
related bp wubversion, still serve to weaken Cube and tte
Comming itotatorshtp, and tims te oliminate the problen
at tts sgyrce. Xe 4s for this reason that there ts ;
presented herein 4: Gpestnm of sotions related directly
to Cuba, . ‘While tt ty alear that sous actions Iisted mny .
exceed the hortnens of feasthtlity, in terme ef sooye, viger,
or the retaiivenents of tutermtionsl rélations, 2t is never
theless fineidered necessmxy thay they be eet forth in thetr
_ sabtrety, $e onder that, the Brestdent may contenplate the


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te Iatratey Peclagtenltettons.
{42} Create probit Dor the Camtro vegime ond.
9) Sti sulvereive regain ty om intensified payeha-
hot! Angin effort euphintnine the hardships ont
i es » Gals eniiired ty the Conpentnos while
subvercivg tntnees axe given Jyrered trentemn
(2) Yublieing the eosttast between Living eon
sto of Ct tte et ov of at
“{9) mason entetay the nomnt oF oA Uwesd-
gust time tattevet $9 Pula, and intenity exhests
LO “ge the daprotation 2 suffertig brought on the

OR A) centunt atebeien televiaten troatennts asm
44 the Gabon penne and Latin dmentoms stutenke tn ‘

lone on the matuie ‘abit seope of adbwenaive tainting
Gindusted in Cuba aid methods of exportation.
A. Movenant: of Perporae. oo

" Smengh miilktinbwial and Misterel political
poemomette with 2ahin snericon stater, eek to .
tipede the mpuinetit Sf persone into and out of Cuts,
_ {20 Co be cxymnted br Sento.)

og

ae. oi te eer ns


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6. Dininish the Hysical ant Esoncms Capability
of Castwo Cube to Train ani Expart Subvereives.

Te 1s evident that veaty fonts, in considerable _
quentity, are requived to conduct a subversive training
progr, not te apank bf pther costiy factors + army
demolttions, uci, food, progagunda, ete. Specific
actions aimed xt rederiig the Gubens' resourses will
tiem-have o divest effeit upon thety ability te pursua
thety uegtum of exiweysiion, wit! cow then to torn

to thety om tnternel payblime ahd will give the Raeions
vous 'ap to the wistem‘Or porting 2 yrogrem which te


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| (a) Atkrtt Catan senourean.

: (a) Furchasie the defection af persone, ete

“ qgafty ships, boats and ether valuable items,

_ (>) Coniuet aea-ettripatable actions agatnet
petwslens resources, upen which much of Cuba's
eoontny Cepeda. ‘these actions show extend ell
the uny from divest dertrustion te sabotage

” thvongh cheatin eat Sesturtel contamination of
(e) ty aan oe tutettigmi tatieastone

cnuse Cuban ailttery fevees to stant continually

"eb @ high alert level und thas ‘te eonmens suppites

110). sate enna Semen tn teisentet to movers .

“ (3) Dintvich Cube finansial ressurees.

a Oe ee tn lavge

LO —_ eeamnk i, W'iarert the Satan finawatad prewe,
ae ant te nahi oak onde:

Stace the Bratton are anctttone = sesne Boater


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Sfp aepentsing tho Yegreas shdch are naw fn progress
it 42 nosensary 0 reflect that, extensive though they are,
many have net yet sccelevated to their full thrust ant, taken
all together, they have oertuinly sob fortified eur elltes to -

the point where suiversion can be gaid to be under full oembrel.
a. US Mtittany neterts. : , ;

. United States military forces are now partici ,
setting tn a tend saobion of miiksnay and exkos-eaitinay
fungiiens in Latin Anewlen, all of uhtch contribute to
etueigthening the abfiity of the ommtries to expase
tant put dem exbveredys eotivity. Te these, the
neteetved aves .

a

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- (2) couetxsursinay, exttnaitwession and 7ay~
chilogton) gperationy treining,’ thrown the medtan
of pilitery sitestons end mobile treining tomes.

AG) Yeoristen of eghigmant and materiel on chert
notice for wie tn the fies of subversion or subversive
tonnes. ,

GG) Ree conde 6 eerasney toeizing ogres ia
mob and viet contre, .

{8) Peoetaian of feted combertsmurgenay otuek-
tton for Latin dmertoan officers end enlisted men in
United States Seaview behets amt sondentes.

AS) Provision of efute action training and
assistance.

"(6) Amaitiney witttasy cerorte atued at streigthen-
ing the ability of Latin American countries to resist

Lo a (2) Satted Stétes provision of mintenence

vimeapert and Suctatanoe Say Latin American sare)

(b) Berioer exetange yuesrem.

rs (a) Language fietning for Latin Auertcan

waiatary students, —

= Intecnatidont xy, mavy and Ate Farce

B. fe) Couperatins mapping operations.

“S0H) exedp sntormstiifins . .

: ‘The United Stptes military is embarked on a
pevgron aimed at making the Latin American military
mere of the retlittes-ef Comumisn ané Comuntst
eubterstion. This AneRinens


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. " (q)-Qvensistéen inte Spanish and printing of
'-$0,000 sets of the series of ten pamphlets
. entitled, » “Denoomiey versus Conmmisn”.
: (o): Devesynent of en antto/visun fim strip
_Mased on the "Denacecy vermus Ccmumian” Pamphlets
-/ Chechamived and elghty ef these films sat records
“tove been send bo WINERIES cur further distribution
i ae sats ada saraons
, (oe) Mrdetecnsintired copies of the USEA pamphies
‘ eotdoes y Dovettien Contes Ia Yaron Sommnntsti"
“awe being pobourcdl ‘fer distritution anmg the
“ketth Amartcan nttitery.
b. te Roltoo-tombe Betas (to be euyplted Wy
"* State).
othe Foopaguata Eevert (to be mupited by WHA).
4.: the Intelligence gai Non-attributable Efforts
es ‘be sapped by OFA),
2. Bepgrenp Waton lay Be Znttinted.
fufn the case of Segtiim TI, the the programs outlined
bela are seithin ressanitte technical end pructiest soupetense.
However, 2 they ovtes the deuplete spectrum of actions, it~.
te vesleaaf that jer tiy'be foend smmttahte, on politions
or other gitupdss 7
2, Sarveiliances -
GS matched a GEBBiboan ane ant constel surveti
lugiee /peegvam witch WppYides fer mittisterel exchenge
of feforantion and milttlaterel pertisiyatton tn an


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43) Couttinn te taprorencat of US comooations
an Jatin America, ot high priedity, te contribute
tothe effectivences af the alerting systen.

b. Multinational Cousterinsumgency Force.

‘Bibtoxe the romsibitiity oF organizing en ORS
Counbérineurgemy Erigete for explaynent throughout
Latte ‘darter: to omiat the effects of subversion.
Such & proposst, mie #4 this time, would exhibit the
seriesis determination of the U.S, te support vigorously
an anti-cubversion program,
©, Spates and Orientation.

Provide for a greatly expented out-of-country
touting ant orientation peegrem for kay seguents of
each fintin American eoitey‘s population such ast

2) Bontsted and @fticer miittery persommel te de
' , sebijoled an Youu sntfar the United states. ,
42) Pontos persentidt to be soheeted tn Fanmes or

; (s) anti snctatom tn be irene 8 Ute
Shites teaming sotaaiis. .

{fe tot of shen pte tetnng eee,
taki pance ia the ntted Stebex,.ta not just te en.
hangg the skill ani edusmtion level of the people tuvebved
but, ‘even mows, to exping the Latins to US influence,

‘or ijow tien Gur veut, te yeanusde then Uy close -
congeinkton thet our view is correct, and thi to stiffen
thaty receive te oustat Sibresmten fm any fom.


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@, ‘froop Informstign Progrest
tmoclon ncroeam (cer strton enterprise)
to the sutwomatee dangly they fees.

tne aa Prenat .

(2) Vademurtte, tig, mecemmmry, and comet an

{iferention yeoman nitintn each county sn Latin

Kiterton using these: §

3. (a) dn eayesitiim of feote on mivveretve totthm

ON ding, woirement of’ gubversives, and general sub-.

: (b) Gbjeotives of the Commuists within cach

a (o) Counintes metheda of eperatiag.
(4)-Fects onthe decrease tn Ltving standards
. “ydtnin Guba since the Five of Cacteo. :
S (e) Pacts on turzor saa repression tn Cube.
“3qa) Develop & Prowimertean Jsh’-Comamist Press
Many Latin American papers, even the anti-
opmamist ones, axe infiltrated by commmist agente
and many of thetr colmamtists, proaf-readers and
Mnotypare sre bought with commaist money. Civcu-
Antton of these papiy te avtitieelty inflated by tow

United Stites must witeh this fiumcts} Saveetment in
swe control tn érder''to cowpey the tgnth to the ;
“Miftin who, If the Simertoan, Helteves what he ren .


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fet

, , Frevel conteels A b-
. Re Ue should strive for an O48 euberge on travel 7
|
i

g. agrove Our Combertusurgeney Programs .
“We should accelerate and brenden counberinuurgenay
progeigws in each ofuntay of Latin Amerton, detwing
for ; gealistia “tntermal Defense Plan” fay every ecustzy
ont usging Latin Anavioan camivies to ask for US cqunter-


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hl


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ceve-of Sidid-beset Cmmauist subversion tn latin Auavten,
Zeqh indtvidin? sotien enbodies some eletant of usefulness
in Atself, ‘and any seubination pf actions snelid/ generate

coppuspuntitiyly favorable semulte. Shere 19 no profound ver

lntLenship ‘which dusante the combining of any specific sot |
of satienss -
goomen, therefore, that en early selection
be made of those nations Lixted’ shove those exeoution ts
compatibig with nabional ¢ seat end dediostions in |
gli wad that they Ve gut qulokiy inte effect sinse
Longa) he subversive influences th the Hemisphere are ;
. ~~
- mnte 7 -


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7.
e

Subject:

Date:

A
| a | — | USAF __
vey OO NSC —
ONI HEDGES
OSD | a Se 7

_ Joint Staff


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IX.A.3.d+- General Pressures to Create a Contingency

In order to accomplish the overthrow or reorientation of the Cuban
regime without harming the United States image and vith minimm distortion
of bilateral US-USSR relationships, thare must be careful coordination and
phasing of our future actions and demeanor. There mist be a plan capable

‘. of getting us from where we are now to where ve vant to go, by gradually
increasing pressures until the objective is achieved. These pressures
should be designed to create opportunities ‘and contingent tuations
for further exploitation, along the way. | ee
The optimm orchestration of such # Cuban yrogram mist obviously be oO
developed as the future unfolds. But in onder to provide overall. guidiince
‘ee; within this Government, a plan tracing the mainstreams of effort is required.
This plan is divided into eight headings with a gradually increasing level
of effort described under each of these headings. The progress through
the various phases 1s visualized as taking place in « coordinated but not
a necessarily symmetrical manner. In other vords, we may be in the most
. vigorous phase of propaganda while not yet having reached the final. phase
a“ with regerd to subversion but nonetheless the decision to proceed to the
respective phase ‘in either category would t be coordinated ae .part of an

. overall govermmental orchestration.
A-program scenario capable of producing a decisive chanes or
oe exploitable contingency over an 18-month period follove.
US Posture - ~ Initially the US image should be that of ‘willingness
to ao all that is necessary to keep Cast=o's military threat nil end his

subversive threat to the Western Hemisphere at en acceptably low ie
It should be characterized as one during which the USG, .having been .


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7 . : | or ernie
st .
tle 0 extrenely reasonable despite Castro's intransigence, is waiting for signs
" of more favorable change in Cuba.
Later the US image showld change to one in which the US is being
"Led" by the majority of the OAS into OAS initiated and sponscred Tm
‘a . pressures against Cuba. These would consist of” measures less than those
certain to overthrow Castro but going beyond the earlier measures, in
’ . the expectation that resulting internal pressures might eliminate Castro
tial provide an occasion for decisive ection. Pressures would be applied
oe n, 4m such fashion ax to represent both a carzct to the Cuban people to get
rid of Castro regime end a stick toward the present regime. still later
the US stance should becom: publicly, "at last" to join the OAS mjority =~.
in seeking vigorous pressures ‘on the Castro”regime_without yet irrevocably
ee

committing US prestige to decisive action. ; 2 oe
Finally, if and when the orchestration and circumstances have ,

brought the us position to such a point that decisive action is possible,
and if earlier pressures have not eliminated Castro or do not give nromise
eo of eliminating, “Stee decisive action might be considered. This need not
be an invasion by US forces and could be re-imposition of total blockade
or a disarming airstrike, dependent on the circumstances. .
OAS Action - --The USG will need to devote major attention to the
strengthening of the solidarity of the OAS as a source of regional
_ Opposition to the Castro regime. These efforts should go forward openly

. @long several lines, quite pert from the covert effort to organize the
majority on specific issues. This effort to achieve. solidarity should
consist of frequent briefings of the OAS nations through all appropriate

._’ channele, Consultative Meetings of Foreign Ministers of the OAS, efforte

to set up an OAS military organization ‘with occasional commitment of troops


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oa 0 gt

"for training, and all other feasible developments of regional themes, such
as intensive efforts to build up the counterinsurgency capabilities of the
region. -It is very necessary, in view of the general LA situation to
; contame all measures necessary to isolate Castro.
"| Initial OAS ection should be the enlargement of the bases for the
invocation of the Rio Treaty. | qhis broadening should be against the con-
timed presence of Soviet troops (unless negotiations with the USSR iniicste__
that this aspect should be deferred) and/or against Castro's continued
subversive activity. Concomitantly, the recent study of the. Special
Consultative Committee on Security should be given wide publicity and ,
the US should press for implementation of its recommendations. Do
‘The OAS, in the near future, probably after publication of the results
of the foregoing study and enlargement of the basis for invoking the Rio
Treaty to include subversion, should again formally warn Cuba against

promotion of any more subversive activities. ‘The OAS should formally
state that should Cuban subversive activities rise above some (unspecified)
level, a "new condition" would exist which would justify decisive action
_-— against Cuba. All episodes of subversion or sabotage which could be
attributed to Castro should be highly publicized. The majority OAS support
_ should be organized to neutralize the Brazilian co-existence thens. .

2’ Bitatered epprosches and economic quid pro qios should be used to win
Brazil to the U.S. view within OAS.
Still later, at an appropriate time, the OAS should make an official
finding, from its studies initiated earlier, that the Castro regime has
continued, despite warnings, to conduct aggressive and subversive actions

—_ in Latin America. A summary publication of subversive activities or


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See

nee

vy oc O
{ ; Gist enn :

. . t.
"white Paper should be promigated through ‘the OAS. Later a “new condition”

should be found formally to exist, following which the US would state
that the earlier US-USSR mods vivendi regarding’ Cuba. has ¢ come to an end.
Following the above, - an OAS vote should call for the remaining TA natidas—— ~~
to sever diplomatic relations with Cuba and for all menbers to restrict
their nationals from travel to ‘Cube. Castro should be officially labeled
as a major threat to the hemisphere and to the objective of the Alliance
for Progress, ;
The QAS might then declare that Castro's subversive activity constitutes

* warlike activity and proclaim @ prohibition against eny warlike activity

being conducted by Cuba within an ocean and lend area around the entire IA
continental and Caribbean area. Intervention of aircraft and ships
carrying arms, subversive egents, propaganda materials, ete. could be

orized, | ony > ' , a

Still leter at an appropriate time the OAS should vote, under the
Rio Pact, to punish Castro's aggression. This action could take the
form of a resolution for all wenbers to take such action including the
use of force es individually considered appropriate or to endorse any
specific decisive action to which the nenbers had agreed.

‘The USG should brief its Allies on the views of the OAS and warn that
the situation may get worse. Later, as 6 result of “OAB" insistence" the
Free World should be urged to extend or re-affirm trade exbargos to all
items except food stuffs, medicines, and medical supplies; to: apply shipping

; restrictions; NATO should be persuaded to include Cuba on the Vist of

countries to which shipment of COCOM ist (strategic) items is prohibited;

free world industrial nations should be dissuaded from shipping to Cuba


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-¢ . .
erucial spare parts and equipment which are not on the COCOM list.

' Union has no intention of removing any additional militery personnel,

, fashion as to be clearly visible to the Cuban people; vhile avoiding

Eee

Still later the US should increase the vigor with which she seeks,’
through. briefings, ‘pressures, etc., to increase the effectiveness of all
economic measures and should seek to persuade all non-bloc nations to
limit their airline services-to Cuba and to withhold transit rights to
Soviet aircraft serving Cuba. At an eppropriate point in the orchestration,
food stuffs should be added to the prohibited trade list, vith US using ~---—__

—
its influence to extend this embargo throughout the Free World.

The ultimate extension of economic actions, would be the application
of @ blockade to Cuba. This could be © phased weapon consisting of a,
Dlockade on POL, with the prospect of total blockade to follow.

Surveillance over Cuba -~ Until it becomes apparent that the Soviet

aerial surveillance should be limited to appropriate high altitude
‘coverage with low level surveillance avoided oxceyt for thoroughly
suspicious indications.

Later, at a suitable point in the orchestration, occasional low
altitule surveillance of "suspicious" areas should be undertaken in such

AA. defenses. : -
sti21 later, sustebly timed, the United staton/oAs should initiate
very. frequent low altitude surveillance. This should be increased in
intensity to the point at which our aircraft vould literally seek out
AA defense sites in search of provocative acts or, in the absence or
Cuban reaction, to deflate Castro's image. — :
In any decisive action at the end of the road, surveillance should

be at saturation levels.

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ctese anemone

- Regions Surveillance ~- The OAS or the Caribbean nations should take
the initiative in organizing, as a part of a Caribbean security arrange-
went, a-curface ship and serial surveillance of the coastal and offshore
_waters of the Caribbean nations. These patrols should be progressively
moved out from the shores of the nations being protected into the Caribbean
approaches to Cuba, tying in with an OAS proclaimed zone in which movement

_ of subversive agents, materials, forces, or arms is prohibited. Toward the

. ” "end of the crescendo, they should operate close to the shores of Cube. °

"there should be increasing surveillance end control of land boundaries.
: There should be improved systematic exchange of intelligence on sub: verpive. .

/  estavity, wen
Propaganda -- There should be established sotsteny a redio station

(Radio Free Cuba) » Probably in Florida, using covert fonds, with

regularly scheduled Cuban broadcasts available to all Cuben political
=~ @roups. Its content should be the middle cotvexse between VOA and
. Radio Swan. aa ;
Initially, through public statements, VOA, etc., maintain the
theme of the U.S. “watchful. wilting" for change in ‘the Castro regime.
a Maintain the currently enbanced VOL wave facility beamed G5 Uttar High-
5. °° ight positive results in Latin America of the Alliance for Progress. We a
_ should warn Cube unofficially through the suggested Radio Free Cuba of the
consequences of continued ‘subversion and of Castro's present track. Still
later, prior to any decisive action, if taken, this theme should go out
officially over VOA and in announcements of public officials.
Initiate and organize clandestine newspapers and leaflet operations.

Infiltrate Cuban exile publications. Play up, on all media, the threat

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‘of Castro to the regines of the Western Hemisphere and the objectives

of Alliance for Progress. Remind the Cuban people that Castro came to
power on-a pledge to provide political freedom. Remind them of the social
goals he held up while he destroyed that freedom. Contrast their present
economic chaos with those economic goals of land and housing reform. .

Remind them that he -preached nationalism while delivering their country
to the Soviet military occupation. Point out how each shift of goal vas
eecompanied by the destruction of earlier ones. Ask vhat Castro ‘has left
to offer. Conclude thet only the mitual fear of retribution among
huis elite remains to hold then in pover. Use slogans euch as " 64"
‘(Liberty in '6h), ete a
Still later initiate through public broadcast, training in the
, rudiments of seditions activity.
St4ll later urge the many small yevolutionary-cells to make contact

sa

with neighboring groups. Warn end threaten the Castro regime through
‘ all media; exhort the people to orgenize to-join enlerged resistance groups;
_ seek to build up resistance heroes. [ndeavor to deflate Castro through
__--—* these bewadcasts. Stress the freedom-of the Cuban people, post-Castro, to
- _choose their ow political and social structure.
Bo Subversion -- There should be’ an.initial ‘period of no increase in
~ subversive efforts by the U.8.4 until the bilateral phase of the Cuban
affair is completed and it is clear that the Soviet Union
no additional military personnel. _
° After that time minimal covert contacts should be established within

Cuba for the distribution of newspapers and leaflets. Minimal acts of
* - defiance and sabotage should be initiated.. For example, exhort groups


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Soe

ragyencaes
eerie)

* of 3 or 4 friends, without establishing external. rebel affiliation, to”

mane L'64, ete., on walls or. to cafit isolated acte of sabotage. The -

GS

. Purpose. would be to establish rebel connotation and to generate leadership.

This would lead to the establishment of rudimentary c&llular training

in seditious activity. Minimal supply of critical items shoulda be initiated
to subversive groups within Cuba on a case-by-case basis. Potential leaders .
should be identified. Contingency planning, covert and unilateral, should
continue. The number of Cuban exiles ‘teken into the United States Armed
Forces for training and formation of reserve units should be significantly
dncreased. A esmiler program for "freedom fighters for Cuba” should be
undertaken for volunteers from other LA nations. At a leter point in the
crescendo, departures from the Cuban armed forces in organized units should —
‘be encouraged. All covert effort should be exerted toward conrdinating

the cells, pockets, and groups ‘restating Castro, inside and outside Cuba.
Thig would bea transition period from sporadic acts in isolation into
organized subversion. Fuel and: food suppliés: chowla be sabotaged. An

"organized supply system should te put into effect vith large numbers of

fishing craft situated around the island to make both scheduled supply.

of deliveries and deliveries of opportunity. As various. groups are identi-
fied in revolt, they should be worked into the supply system. New LA end
Cuban fighters training outside.Cuba, should be introduced in the seme. way

into these organized movements within Cuba. There should be frequent.

ieaks of planed UB invasion and appropriate denials to frustrate the
suspicious Castro. Fleet and air "training" dembnstrations should be
scheduled off Cuba. At the ame time it should be made clear to rebel

leaders that an externally launched invasion is not to be expected until

@ revolution has come from within, with external logistic assistance.


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"Et" showla De emphasized to the rei.cl leaders that the U.S. does not expect
_ the clock to be turned back with regard to social conditions. |
" gtaa2 iater a complete orchestretion should be wover together,

coming to @ crescendo through the optimal exploitation of all the mn-
strearis discussed in the categories above. Propaganda should reach the
maximum denunciation of the regime, exhorting to revolt, holding up the
prospect of peace and a better life should the Cuban people join their
-Yesistance leaders. Subversion should be stepped up by introduction of
aul aveilable externally trained vesisterce fighters, provision of maximm
logistic cupport, ete. st the ep roprdct z : vime, if this resistance noyement
needs the essistance of external forces there should be an OAS structured
air strike, related to an appropriete Castro mis-step, to disarm Cuban .

offensive end defensive power and to destroy all POL storage. Thies atteck

should be coordinated with all-out sabote ze.

An invasion force should be kept in readiness for use, if re-
quired to save the resistance, once the all-out internal resistence
efforts has been initiated.

Criteria ~-- The pressures discussed in all categories above should

. be appropriately coordinated. The period of moderation should end after
one or two months when it fe apparent that no further Soviet nilitery
personnel are to be removed. Moderate pressures shoulda then commence,
lasting for a period of two to:three months, until some episode of
escalation by Castro or other appropriate event, makes further pressures
feasible. If such an event is not forthcoming, OAS major insistance should
lead to escalation of pressures. After enother skort period, egain pre-
ferable triggered by an approprinte Ccstro episode or alternatively vy a

. majority OAS vote’ still more vigorous pressures should be initiated.


13-00000

1.

; ° If Castro hes initiated a suitable -r-like act, such as firing
ve on surveillance aircraft, pressures should be escalated to the maximum
oh immediately rather than gradually. -_


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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS .
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. oe nercy acrer to
Op-613C/sg
Ser 000950P61

a MAR T1963

| ; oo Seen —oongraces to CONF upon removal of ‘enclosares

MEMO DUM FOR MR, J, A. CALIFANO, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO TH
_ SECRETARY OF THE ARNY —

Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuban
Affairs: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion (U) .

Ref: (a) Your Memo No, 13 of 28 FEB 1963

Enol: (2) through (8) Proposed actions (18)

‘1. As requested by: reference (a), specific. and direct: ‘getions: md
designed to resolve problems of Cuban subversion are sub- .
mitted herewith as enclosures (1) through (8).

cack ee

WF AWE poe
Pini Ha Da

‘

|

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
- BOD DIB 620010 DOES MOT APPLY

: Reproduction of this decument fn zi
: or in part Is f-onbited
PAGE NO__1__oF__1_PAGES except with permissic. of the ;

copy NO._1._OF_10__cOPIES Wsultg eee or higher aut


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aon |
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ent !
28 G
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K,

. PROPOSED ACTIONS WHICH MIGHT
sO BE-TAKEN UNILATERALLY BY THE US,
, BILATERALLY, OR THROUGH THE OAS, TO
IMPEDE THE MOVEMENT OF SUBVERSIVE
TRAINEES TO AND FROM CUBA

Institute effective Procedures to insure that U.S, citizens
do not travel to and from Cuba (unflateral U.S. action).

Continue U.S. restriction against U.S, airline service
to Cuba. (This is important to avoid giving other air~ -

}. lines an excuse to reestablish air service) (unilateral

U.S. action). .

Thoroughly examine Latin American constitutions and laws .

to determine the legal. capability or impediment to.control

a travel “i their citizens to and from Cubs. (unilateral
oS. action), . :

Arrange ‘for adverse publicity on individuals who are . .
known to have undergone subversive training in Cuba (uni-

‘lateral U.S. action).

sSpread rumors of epidemics in Cuba Canilateral U.S. action).
Sabotege aircraft proceeding to and from Cuba (unilateral
U.S, action), ; .

Increase U.S. efforts to establish identity of all Latin
eeriosas travelling to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S.
‘action), . ; ; .

Encourage Latin American countries to pass new legislation,
or enforce existing legislation, restricting the travel
of their citizens to and from Cuba (unilateral U.S. action),

Persuade Latin American goveraments to prevent re-entry:
to their country of persons Suspected to have been :
trained in subversion in Cuba (unilateral U.S. action).

Persuade LA countries to tighten border security measures
by appropriate authority (unilateral U.S. action), Supply
equipment and POL for patrol and surveillance, See
enclosure (6), ; .

Cubana’s Britannia aircraft are in disrepair (2 or 3 of 5
are operational), Under existing agreements, Cuba must
ue : EXCLUTED FRO AUTOMATIC DAVRGRADING

Of this document in - . . . oon or S20 Does WOT APPLY,

= | hola or. in part is prohibited - oo i ;
“foo Bing offs or prt _Encosune (/) to cno Surjtena 000 £5 07%) Weel oe

tenes eet ce

thority. se


13-00000

seék Mexican concurrence in using new equipment (IL-18)

on the Havana—Mexico City route, We should persuade

Mexico to refuse the new aircraft on grounds of safety, :
facilities, or other reasons. We should also encourage = =
Great Britain or other sources to cut off spare parts
(unilateral U.S, action),

L. Encourage hemd spheric countries to deny unscheduled
traffic stops: to Cubana airlines (unilateral U.S. action).

M. Persuade friendly governments in LA and elsewhere to.
harass ships and aircraft traveling to Cuba with admini- ~
strative delays (minute examination of air worthiness
setione customs, documents, ete. ) (unilateral U. 25e
action), .

N. Seek arrangement whereby other Latin ‘Amexican countries +. -- ..-
would cooperate with Mexican efforts to-deny travel their ,
nationals to and from Cuba via Mexico (see Mexico City

Tel 2221) (bilateral U. S. action).


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aie to predict { the. Suture, lt: LQ,

. The dlecussion of the factors conditioning U. a, polley ta
the realm of the clandestine and covert may ecem elementary and
somewhat philosophical; however, these factors provide the general
parameters within which future actions can be considered. Any.
attempt to determine the proportionate influence of any particular

“conditioner would be speculative,
(2 MAJOR conperignuNG FACTORS

, eu describes onal ce few of the elements which must bé considered

in the process of making valid and conclusive determinations:

TMS, a : a
It is moet dealrable to detazmine tha Ui 8.”
objective in precise terme. _ When the objective te clarified and


13-00000

understood, actions can be developed to achieve that oljeative. The
extent of the U. S. cormmitment; se. reflected by the determination

- of the objective, is an important factor in the determination of the
. commitment of U. 8, yeequrces and has great algnificance in the

“ander the situation currently sbtatning in Cuba probably envisages

: gn ultimate U. 8. Pooaeeeantn sures here can

F in advance of U. 8. policy, anid (4) devalop- .

‘Bera Seen nn nce oon

some intriguing gimmickexy.

Obviously, thie dictoymination of U. 8, objectives is
beyond the realm of the clandestine and. covert and cannot be con-

. sidered in the context of Cubs atone. Serious judgments must be

made in relation to the broad world environment. Actions against
Cae ny be detrimental fo. o. alms by caning intensified socerity

7 7
A goad “rule of Cammnb” with reepect to clandestine

or covert nations te fat tha risks entailed are in direct proportion
ta thé necfalness of the operations.

cP Attest ibutlon ‘and Denisbiltty : ye
U. 8 Lenderitig will cbvays be concamed with
bra


13-00000

‘tatrative or security preceutions'o
ton itself) and reasqnabic safeguards to inraie tat the prost of
Lm 8. implication cannot ba developed, -

In this connettion there is a mandatery requirement ;
- for unanimity of dcalal ou‘the part of U. 5. officials. This unanimity
muist obtain despite the raagnitude, yecetotemens ov accuracy of the
-Cagt¥o/ Communist proph bie penssombeongert ty 8,

‘setire operations

shou peed oe ato 6 roto 8.

scat eon iy ciara senaluve postion e
the wu 8 is ina ‘ pmiere sensitive

cetngeavaban

SEEN og EMA NE REE ON AI, Neel ten tite


13-00000

OO Serre i Sa een Le a ee

greater credibility to the accusations of the Castro or Sino/Soviet
Bloc and alert our enemies to the possibility that the U. 5, may
tadartake- actions of a less conventional nature,

a “Vea, cake

. It may be desizable to undertake actions which
achieve Little press caverage (visibility or noise level), I¢ ig
difficult to determine with any accuracy beforehand the extent of
the publicity to be achieved. The Castro Regime generally can
-cantrol the timing and magnitude of public release. The world .
preas for the most part is not subject to WU. & control exgapt as”
‘the U. 8. may achieve success through counter -propagenda,

tnesenating’ or , iano canto mont acceptable;: A .°

atically increased nolae level may be acceptable when accomphiled

by significant (headline) overt items which serve to distract the -
attention of the sable. . of.

There is @ natural reluctance to undertake
clandestine or covert actlona which result in the death or serious
injury to innocent Cubans. Meaningful actions will certainly .
cause harm to certain elements, but eome of the destructive actions
which could be undertaken may be counterproductive in that they
strike at the wrong fargets. Unfortunately, it is difficult to achieve |
the desired degree of selectivity.in uncontrolled operations, imple- .
mmonted. ia secrecy,

aa - hy ereattoniot fobs” eLothing unit iadksl stingiagse
and the subotage of etorage or distribution facilities undoubtedly may
“hurt the sconomy but those committed to the Castro Regime may ;
suffer relatively little. Such actions may do little but weaken an
inane or apathetic populace while increasing the internal security |
me em.


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+ emma y *
‘ :

. judgmé
many of the proposals for actions directed ageinst Cuba. When
. _ the judgments of various individuals differ, the resulting U. 8.

ti pauper mi icsane iy artardpe periennt-oryasen renee

mitment and subsequent disclosure would not be desirable since

“state which theoretically could be brought to its knees ine rela~

dvely short pesiod of time through the npplication of
weapons,

These could canject the. U. S. to adverse criticiam on moral
rounds oF cxtend the parameters of warfare to new dinyiaslons.

4; Besguttest ond Exile Politics: - °

‘The recruiting problem deserves consideration

in any paper considering clandestine and covert actions. Obviously,

the recrultment of a sole individual involves a system of screening |

which theoretically must not be compromised efther in the process

of sorting Or during the subsequent utilisation and post-atilisetion
Theéxe ie « marked tendency for Cubans to talk, to brag,

or to infer participation in secret operations. - Individuals personally ;

and scores of exile organtentions are quick to capitalize on the real

covert activities.. There is & constant flow of proposals for action
and requests for assictan¢e or officiel recognition. Some individuals

. and organizations merely dasire to publicise their affiliations with
Goverament.

some member of the U. 8.

5

13-00000

of the proposals for action submitted by individuals and groupe.

“ally can be sisasured in terme of thelr assimilation and ecoiiotn!
‘gatcens {n tha U;°8.: ‘Sapertence has shown that internal |

’

It is not feasible te investigate in details all .

are not datialed with a elngle robuil. but make their offers to ine
dividuals in CIA, the Departments of State, Defense and Justice
or with members.cf Congress, the press, and other nonegovgrne
montal individuels or agencies, A specific action or proposal -
may have had merit at one point, but from a security

the persistence of the propascr may have negated the potential
eer eeperccn Cond have compronaaed an otherwiee

groups, the most apparent solution which is suggested frequeitly ae
envisages the recruitment of Cubans who have no political affiiia
tions. While this may be pasaible, experience has: od. Shas
it is not probable. Those Cubans in the U. 8. who have absoe:
with U, S. parsonnel and those who speak English are generally |
marked. Those whose language capabilities and economic stature
combine to mit their social mobility are more likely to turn.to,
accept and become involved in the socfal, polltical or cultural
elolsters of Gubans inthe U.S.

There are additional political and psychological
problems in seeking recruits from among Cubans who have fled -
and generally desire to yemain united with familits and friends,
Their motivation to participate in activities against Castro gener

iets may resent external Guban lesderahip, As the exile eroupe | .
compete for political prestige and material support, ao do the ©
representatives of the internal reaistance groups.

The probleme of exiles attempting to detirniine =

, the extent of U. s. commitment and associated secutity, im licat

are discussed eloewhere in this paper.


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ac ae

econ BM adaytindey caters oR pees te oy
ER RT

_Orviously, the suscnacted smevetion of walle S
Be cosa pervert stn plcanhrupebeinrr ar yinm eng

days. There is no standby reservoir of multlegarpose agents, The

operations themselves call for split second timing and are subject both

paticle, compromiee tf internal contacts, actions of anti+Castro
SFPD S.. or othey world evant).

Dog ing stone ee comme yn noon oo
a Mote oftective operations can be undertaken when

Lty to nla Le ceoutect dota” Troan ensued senile

tunity to plas in greatest detail, From a practical itis

extremely difficult to maintain individual or group motivation and aggres-

aiveness whan operations are delayed, aborted, canelied or subjected to -

continual modification.

’

3. ASSETS

In considering U. 8. asaects for covert and clandestine operations
ageinat Cave. Ane re ran” bristly in an historical context, the
situation whith faces the U. &.

. frie. Sartre's neous of pore, U. 6. edtuets tn the held
etlarts in Trove immediate problem areas of the world. At the time
Castro assemed central in Cube, there was much open controversy on the
quastion of Castro's subservience to communism, but generally it was
assumed that the change of government in Guba was in the Well-known

Latin tradition, Later, Noa eeetca. eee a eral ns arernment
was not. juat @ change in personalities, but a revol:

governmental system. At this point, cay tn 1966, plane ware developed
to asaist the people of Guba in overthrowing their government. This plan


13-00000

SPRL IE BEARER ITAL RS EUR SA ee ge

cullmtanted ta the abortive Bay of Pigs Operation in lato April 1961.
idente and potential sestotwace groupe to capoee teansehves act be

af this tacts ponders

; During toa six month period which followed the eents-of Apt
2961, ec Scnae rat ns position to copoce ieult farther £9 to any

7° pap arienrelpinipherin pores ety
the Cuban security osierations of oi eng ma soe of

ss ivenenysevealed at tof pele eaet fa he tree aren
Agente one Saald nat be spared for con-

e During
first nine months af 194%, the emphasis was placed on intelligenca
aaa ne

avea.

_ sigehone aadestacen fering the apring and ponsuce ef tha .

wet maa Gin of immed aer th mines ies osinse

‘The cole af the Department of Defence ti casdenting iid covert
areas has been the subject of much controversy both within the Depart-
ment of Defense and within the Central Intelliganes Agency. .


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1 engendered ees oe

on a dade

with come inborn §


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jn-the past, tue nilltsary has played an easeniiet role in threa

wee SE amen and materiel. From the flecal stand-
| paint, the Department tbe an previa Put epenar wt
- selatively great flexibility.

deepen raat Peonourene im manpower of the DeD (with miiltary

and Hnguistic ekilis, ovareeas experience, physical cone

aitioning and personal dedication and aggreasivendus) provides a
participation in clandestine and


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ca sis with tpned ene are aap onion ad etn
ton miggions. DoD stocks of arms, teed ehip fot savteh or eattee

There te a gendral mivenderstanding conzerning the use of
Army Special Forces units, Navy SEAL teams, Alz Force Jungle Jim
. .egententions or Marine Corps epecial units in covert‘and clandeitine -
. Operations. While it is entirely possible and feasible to convert

tion of a restetance in Cubs in support of a
ton thezve. . -

_ “it

It be encential to an understanding of the problem to.reallse
that since Late 1961, all U. S. intelligence estimates have indicated
that there ia little kelihoed of an internally sparked Cuban resistance
__ £9 bead any slgntGeanse. ‘Aedrding to GIA Gate Le ite possiblity
ef getting advance 1s

-of any uprising this information
ateo reaching officials ef the Castro Regime. It is also estimated that
theze in Uttie likelihood that any resistance groupe would be able to .
“hold out" In any organized form for more than a week or two. Castro
personally is quite aware of the potential of a guerrilla resistance and

rtionate foteas to ensure that

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Soe ee Oe a ec Oro ee Oe RD

There has been a lack of useful intelligence on Cuba. This
has caused the U. 5. oath 0. poutsupending lnek of gxaphacia.cn.

opr phereeeger of oonteat opacatianat inbottigenes are ctoded: The
’ petority for ale operational type e intelligence has been relegated

mo getiviion, Normally different methods of operation are employed
. t physical pexetionsl

"We ahaa ue peiaaca out that dhe tack of bablaghen
used as « crutch in not prescing for more clandestine operations
antions. This view can be justified, but no commander conimite
forces on the battlefield ever knows all he wants to know: hie

; ny. Somewhere in between lies the anewer. Therd must be on

‘This portion of the paper is designad to indicate in general
terms the latitude of clandastine and covert actions based upon past
srr eaty We. cation tn Gates creat, This abedd nos be where

- "Clandestine and covert activities prior te sind diiting the Bay
of Pige operstion can be characterised as bald and far reaching. The

fatare orientation of U. &, activity in this field is conditioned largely
by the failure of that operation. Clandestine and covert actions since
April 1961 can be summarized ac being cautious, intermittent, and low
level. The current attention directed towards “things Cuban" plates
even mote stringent fequizcenente on U. s. activities tn the clandestine
and covert envirénment.


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Following are examples of the types of activities which could
be undertaken. This is not an exhaustive list, wet te presgated to
: “x tlataets. the. types of aetiety which might be eansldared.’
a Interrogation of refugeas.
2) Ceunterintelligence in U. 5,

(3) Legal travellers, |
eR ‘At. ‘clanayton taptigens agentes
- is) "pds end onvad eurvetllance..

6} 9 Commanicéitions surveillance. ?

(7) ternal sources (wiaro Cutie sepres
‘sented officially or quasl-officielly or where refugees and
‘travellers can be reached).

(8) Intelligence provided by third countries.

(9) = Defectors (inside or outside Cuba). Itis —

: important to note that the security mechanism in Cuba renders
defectors relatively inaceensible. The

, who might defect if there was eny reason to believe they could
leave Cuba. Those-who have sought asylum in other embasaics
in Havana have been yefused eait vices for auch prdlonged periods
that thefts information, when finally releasad, ts practically aseless,

— (0) Penetrations (inside or outatde Guba), Extreme


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Behe ta om se that tesco. legebes ames

Aan af el

@) Printed moeterial (mail, airdrop, or packed
. with other material destined for Cuba). Atrérop (s severely
“ Ygnited by Cubs's aly defence capability

milftary
nature, rumors and “plants" of information, ote,

~

; - (4) Inaide Cuba to instigate demonstrations,
establish a resistance net, or to take a particular action.

- : @). atnraal to instigati demonstrations against
eieewhere (educators, - fariete, labor leaders, women, yeuth, —
‘ ‘entertainers, religious and cultural groups, ste.) NOTE: Many
above-actions can can be aecomplished overtly.
4. Eeqnemie Actions .
a Sabotage af agricultares: power, industry,
internal or exiarial trans port, communteations, + adentadefretion,

. . t
u a al


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remaining
‘althongh wely minor, fy exitical to Cube and provides
the U. 5, with a incrative tatget.

(3) «= Gounterfaiting. . Because Cube has oncextially
a barter market -and mass dlstefbution is is diffiecit, this may not
" Ropespent © asatdl sctivity. Thare aré cther yery far-reaching
_ ‘znuat be conalared setters. a eelatively saaager..; i
* and shovt Hved getn,

©. Sabotage and Herrassing Actions
re

i) "astorage of teadare nomen, chess and

y installations. ‘Grconamic sabotage included tn para
graph d above).
. {2) Actions designed to withdraw people from
harvest or to overwork military elements, (To include actions
from tumors to mijor military oxerdises).

@) Radio of television intrusion or Jamming,

. Bribing, cmbsrraseings bachoasiling ascass~
_ Anathaiy cveneity and kidotping leaders —
8) Attack, seisure, eeateh or barrasement end
abotage of als and oncel ix trafic.
6} Attach, tninidation and harrassment of Cutan
Fepwescntatives abroad.

f.

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PAF est ra
SSR ee RE ge:

say of hen nat provecntins canbe devel ia provoese
tive acts.

2 ot .
A discussion of fature options should be related specifically —
te nea slot ed ahold conser etre indicated tn

ia ta

me, ‘ly be adviaclyss  tatiteg 6
actions sake alone in order to (a) demonstrate and

waned y
but-to the Cubans, the Latin Americana and many other new-born states,
Castes ta on ee “David" and the only Latin whe has oni pe

Au tha econaaie cltuntion in Guba becomes inoze intolerable,

_ the U. &. may expect greater dissensian and more manifestations of
outhranks of, }

extremely difficult for the U. 5. to support euch
destine or covert manner for more than a few days. Such eupport could
serve to alert Cubs to U. &. intentions.


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port vo vital to bis tenure and so necessaxy to prévent & Counter coup
from thove deriving strength from the heavy SineGoviet economic ;
ontantation sf the present segins.

Seite ae 8. emeenecl ca 200 aah artesian
targete in Cuba. Sach on action could serve to help Castro consolidate
internally and to aextously embarrass the U, 8; internatighslly.

8. . SUMMARY

' The U. 8. finds itself in an uncomfortable position of waiting
_ for the breaks in Gubs and not knowing precisely when or how the
breaks will occur, As time goes on the changes for en internally
- fnspived revolt become increasingly more remote, Barring a major
“political echism in. which major elements of the security forces are
eplit, there ia litte promise of an internally sparked revolt of cuf-
ficient magniteds to permit the U. S. to muster malitisteral representa-
wel. Hon af. euppest and intervene on behalf of this resistence. .

: Accoséiag t authoritative sources, the.U, 8. will recéive Mitte
or not advance notices of such en uprising and according to intelligence
eatimates there ie little likelihood of such an uprising curviving for
mere than a few days, Aled, it has been indicated that there is little
Ubelthood of such a resistance could gain control of radio station

request outside assistinge. {it is recognized, however, that this
probally wesld be one of he principle sis of any euch eston gree


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nomad 0 NA ELITE TEI ED SORA ANIIS ARID 0H enpete

se eee nena cece aan eet a
wo. .

Go lug asthe SinosSovet los conimss to exbeidine Cuba,
situation

. Castro has cautiously avoided provocative actions of sufficient
magnitude to incur the wholesale wrath of the U, 8. oF to provide &
jaridical basis far overt intervéition. To Castwo's Uking, U.S. options
have been narrowed to U. S. instigated open conflict economic pressures
or t0-& timéeconsuming and # frestrating mltilatera epesack wilistog
the OAS mechantars, ao

befoveliand,
Salome in repent of nt vert money witb ted ly ove
deipoeal ot ths tim tn eaettalisn et at ite

- From the standpoint af the Cuban Regime, there appears to be
‘ Shetle Likelihood that any clandestine actions will be taken directly
against the U. S. However, the recent aircraft attacks or warnings

_ ageingt U. S. boate indicates the possibility of encontrofied action on
_ the part of individuals of the Castro Regime.

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wy m4

ATLONL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

“(repared - for the Meating of ___» February 1963, 4 P.M.)

~?
FROM: Coordinztor of Cuba Affairs oy
SUBJECT: Psychological Program in Support of U.S. Policy on Cuba

\ .
Objectives . . :

Tha basic program adopted by the Executive Committee on January
25, 1963 sets forth major objectives for our policy toward cuba. It als
commits us to "be prepared to increase the political, economic, psycho~
dogical and military pressures, as appropriate oppor tunities present :
themselves or ‘can be created," .
This memorandum outlines a program that will meet the paychologica:

.

xequirements of our overall policy. -

Role of Psychological Ope yations

A successful psychological campaign cannot be viewed solely as a .
propaganda exercise or an informational program, It should cover action:
and statements--all thet is ‘said or done solely or primarily for paycho:
logical effect. This definition sets off psychological activities from
those actions undertaken primarily for their direct value--whether in tl

_ Elelds of intelligence, military, political, or economic action.

One of the tasks of psychological operations is to-exploi. other
a-vvities to maximum advantage, or to seek to minimize any nc :ative as:

pects of such activities, In designing and carrying out action program

directed at Gaba it sha} be the task of the Coordinator and his Group

LS GOS

ara


13-00000

to balance possibly conflicting interests and to determine which, in any
given circumstance, shall have priority.
Strategy and’ Tactics
we aust keep in mind constantly the relationship between what happens —
"in Cuba. and the overall struggle between ourselves and the Coamunis ts.
We should seek to insure that the Cuban situation will develop in a way
that will:

a) lead to the collapse or overthrow of the Castro regime;

. by demonstrate to the Cyban people and tothe world at large that

Communism ie not a solution for the problems of a developing
country; . .

ec). discredit ‘Castro ‘and his associates and their methods of opera-
tion throughout the Americas; .

d) insure that the burden imposed by Cuba on the Soviet Union and.
the satellites ‘adds substantially to the mounting evidence that
efforts to export communist revolution are unsuccessful and ex-
cassively costly. | .

Our focus should always be on the first of these objectives--the
end of the communist regime in Cuba. But pending achievement of tats,
wa’ cca rove toward the other objectives. And they, after all, are of
major importanca to our overall strategic purposes.

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a

-3-

Wa have the possibility of insuring that so long as Cuba remains

Communist it will serve as an open, bleeding wound that will weaken the

Communist cause generally, This strategic concept is one which the
Communists have tried to use against us.
Our tactical approach should be designed to fit this overall concept.

it calls for the utilization of every available weapon in our aresenai

_. and engagement, day-in and day~out, in a oulti-faceted struggle at all

levels. ; ;
Our initial ain should be to wéaken steadily the capability, con~
fidence and will of the enemy (inside and outside Cuba) and, correspond .
ingly, to ‘strengthen our sida. We need not, indeed ought not, stake every~
thing on one great effort. Nor should we concentrate on simply building —
up our forces and husbanding them "until the right time comas" for a final
showdown.,. 7 |

Instead, our effort should be directed toward achieving an unbroken
series of. small successes, encompassing gains on the part of anti-Castro

elements and failures on~the part of the regime ‘itself. Our aim should

. be that the end of each day'would see the position and prospects. of the

Castro regime and little worse than they had been at sunrise.

i”) factory breakdown because of a shortage of spare parts or sabotage, -
an inczease in absenteeisn, lengthened queues at the food stores, failure

to getia field planted--whether because of neglect or lack of seed, a.

FS Bae


13-00000

SeRSRSE

resort to terrorist methods egainst the populace, an unexplained fire, |
exeation of suspicion in a minor but key official, the sudden appearance
of antiregime slogans on walls, a " defection from the armad forcess-these
and similar things, whether major or minor, and over and over again on
a mounting scale, will have a cumulative impact, In the long mm, they
can be equivalent to a major victory.

The important thing is to keep-the pressure on, to never give the
‘regime a respite, to see that the series of small defeats and setbacks

ia unbroken and unendLige "our purpose is to create a sipuation in which

the regime and its supporters steadily lose hope and Heart, in which they
coma to “accept the certainty of eventual defeat,

Meanwhile, repercussions would be felt throughout the Communist
world. Assistance to tho regime would increasingly be regarded as a
"rat hole" operation. The “exemple of Cuba" would become the reverse of
7 - expectations; fidelismo would become a term of opprobrium,

* gm short, the goal is to bring about the elimination of the Castro
regime without resort to direct and massive foreé, We cannot rule our
the possibility that soma reliance on force may become necessary to. insu
finsl victory for anti-Castro forces. But the greater and more effec-

_tivs ie the effort herein outlined, the more we ere likely to insure thai

over Zorce requixements will te minimal, ©

See

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Specific programs to carry. out this kind of approach to the Ojban
probiem are submitted in Annexes A and B. : |
: 4 : f

fudiences and Targets
: . The psychological program should be directed at the following primary

audiences or target groups: ;
1) the Cuba people ° Our goal should be to encourage dissatisfaction
with the present. and hope for the future once Castroism is eli-

It should be made clear that the next chapter of Cuba's

i

i

i

miominated.

| But they should know that
: <

‘history must be written by the Cubans.

‘Blak

| they will have friendly aupport from others. -
| 2). the Castro regime. Our goal should be to create dissension, doubi
\ Oo : : .
: and hopelessness inside the ruling clique.
| 3) Latin America. In ‘programs ‘directed at the peoples and govern-
34 ments of the hemisphere, our goal should be to weaken the influ- ~
|
!
I
i
!

ence of the Cuban regima and its propaganda, to encourage solid-

: arity within the OAS family, ‘to counter Cuban influence in key
groups (youth, labor, intellectuals), to encourage actions that
counteract Cuban programs of subversion and insurrection.

si 4) the Soviet Union and other Communist states. To picture Cuba

as a steady drein on already limited resources, to insure that i

is such a drain, to encourage the Soviets to limit and eventual]

- eliminate their involvemant in Cuba,


13-00000

5) Gther countries. To insure understanding of what is involved
ia the Cuban situation, to use Cuba to disprove that conmunism
provides useful answers to the needs of developing countries,
to expose. the continuing danger of communist efforts to export

‘ . ‘revolution, . , , ,

6) the Home Base. To provide the: American people and the Congress
with the full facts of the Cuban situation within: the limits of
legitimate security considerations,

Sssets ’

The psychological program toward Cuba should utilize the full range
of che Gcvernment’s capabilities for action and information, These in-
| luda, emong others; a) public statements by the President and other
, officials; , , — *
b) “{nformational assets ‘such as the public affairs anc
Congressional relations agencies of State,
Defense and other agencies; ,
‘¢) the Government's research and analysis facilities;
d) oversees information programs in all media,
especially the facilities of the U.S. Information
Agency; . .
e): the diplomatic mechanism for both formal end
“dnformal contacts;

£) capabilities for unattributed programs of Action

and information. ;


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Ae

Coordination arid Guidance
tn carrying out the kind of many-sided offensive described herein,

it will ba necessary to provide for coordinating various programs. We

5

" gust oe sure that what we do in one area reinforces what we do elsewhere,

It will be necessary to provide careful end regular policy guidance to
those responsible for action. This task is assigned to the Coordinator
for Cuban Affairs. He should establish the necessary machinery on an
inter~departmental basis.

. .
U.S. Posture toward Cuba : . ;

Tae picture we should seek to create fs one of a confident and de-
cisive United States moving forward in cooperation with its other ftitends,
dealing with the Cuben situation but not exclusively preoccupied with
Cestro, We should not appear to be in doubt or confusion, We should take
note of developments in Cuba promptly and react to them quickly, Our
answer to claima, charges or attacks should be swift. Our machinery must
be geared“ to permit answers to Castro ‘and his henchmen dmmedi ately and

effectively. If he makes a speech ‘tonight, our reply should be on the

airwaves tomorrow at the latest.

Cur approach should not be defensive. We should not confine ourselve
to cuswaring Castro’ but as much as possible force him onto the defensive.
We should insure that he is required to go tha answering, the explaining,

the disagreeing es much as possible.

Attachments: Annex A - Guidelines for Attributable Programs .
Annex B - Guidelines for Unattributable Programs;i8 i : 2253

as TAP Tae dn SS


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erases.
ZSREIX A
Guidelines for Attributable Programs

Ouyrrent Recuirements

1. There should 53 a statement, prefercbly by the President, ex- .
sleining overall U.S. policy teward tha Cuban question. It would provide
clarification of where we stand on Cuba and how we hope to see the future"
sevelop. It would provide the basis for statements, private and public,
for all other officials concerned. It would inform the Cubans how we re-
gard their future; ‘eet Latin Americans how we see tha problem and our
view of their role; underline’ to the Soviet bloc our determination to
oppose communism in this hemisphere; further clarify for our own peopje
the seriousness of the problem and our determination to support the cause .
of freedom in Cuba with all feasible means,

The Coordinator should arrange for preparation 0 of such a statement
and submit a draft. 6 the White House. ; ~ .

2. It is our policy to seek elimination, or at least material re-
Guction, of tha Soviet military presence in Cuba. Efforts now underway

. to achieve this end should be given a reasonable chance, If they fail

to produce the desired result within a reasonable time, we should be pre- .
pared to move forward along other lihes. The Coordinator should develop
& prozvam to mast this contingency. Meanwhile, the continuing presence

of Sovie= forces should be descrited as ‘an. exacerbating influence in

East-West relations and a symbol of forsign domination and control in Cuba. |

ae

wees S00 Eran.

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_ 4. The Coordinator.should a:sange for up-to-date surveys of the

-2-

. 3. Clarificatioa of our position on “non-invasion" would be desira-

“pha. This could be covered in 1 above. It should be.clear that wa do not
xegazd invasion of Cuba by the United States as a desirable or useful |
coursa. But the possibility of such action in given circumstances cennot
bs eliminated, The door should be left open for any action that we and
our allies in the hemisphere may regard ag necessary in the future to
counter aggressive moves by the Cuban regime. , .

4. We need to have clearly in mind our. position regarding 4 possi-

_ bie internal revolt. This, too, could ba covered in 1 sbove. We should
evoid statements for the present which could reasonably be expected to
encouraze in open revolt, We should avoid for the present enything that
could be read as a firm pledge to coma to the eid of anyone who moves

| against Castro. We should make clesr, however, that we are prepared to
support and cooperate with any elements. who succeed in ending ‘communist

dominance in Cuba and who are committed to establishing in Cuba a free

and democratic government responsive to. the degtres of its own people.

5. We should exploit by available means all evidence of internal
discontent and opposition, Defections from the Cuban regime should be

exploited extensively and quickly as soon as security considerations are

mat.

followinz:

meee

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ae) progrens now underway in the psychological field;
b) U.S. capabilities in this field with a view to exposing any
obvious remediable gaps in our resources for conducting a signi~ .
Zicant psychological effort against Cuba;
- ¢) Castxo's propaganda machine--how does it work? how mich effort
_ goes into it? how can wa weaken id . .
d) major lines of the Cuban propaganda offensive--favorite themes»
techniques, principal targets, etc.; .
@) current position of Gastro and hig regime in Latin America--
main areas of influence, by country and by groups. ;
£) the past record on leaflet drops~~how effective, adventeges of
_plane vs, balloon drops, comparison of delivery by other means,
possibilities of such a program being used to ‘attack us in the

GN or among the Cuban people.

tnemes for Information Programs
Information media should exploit the following thames to the max- -

imum extent practicable. Hard data supporting these themes should be  ~
spotted on a day-to-day basis and used, Commentaries and discussions

shsvld be tzilored to take ‘full advantage of these attitudes.

(20 Cabana audiences)
1. ‘Castroiem is doomed; it is on the slippery slope to oblivion.

5 =


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3.

4.

5.

~q-

Cuba is an unwilling i:strumeat of Soviet ‘policy, subject to
the whims and moads of a foreign power.

Moscow will use Cuba es it sees fit end for its own purposes,
giving help and withdrawing it to suit’ the Kremlin's desires.
Cestro has isolated his country from its traditional friends, a
from the hemisphere in which its roota of Bistorys culture,
religion, and well-being are. sunk.

Communism has failed to solve the problems. of Cuba--has lowered 7

,

rather than raised its standard of ‘living.

r

The Cuban revolution has been perverted and betz‘ayed,

Ereedon, independence and diversity are the "wave of the future." -
Latin American audiences) .

Use the above as appropriate.

Cestro and the Russians are using Cuba as a base for subversion,
espionage and sabotage against neighboring states.

. Castroisn promises bicodshed, terror and economic stagnation.

The Hemisphere’ & most promising course is vigorous efforts to 2?
achieve the goals of the Alliance for Progress. . ‘
Soviet and Bloc audiences) — ;

The above as appropriete,


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2. Cuda rivresents a steady dcain on already limited Soviet and
bloe resources; every shipment to Cuba means things do not appear
on Soviet shelves, 7 ‘ | .
3. Cestro really supzorts the Chinese, not Moscow; he is using
a . “soviet help to promote Castroism not Moscow! s policy.
tr2 above lists do not: pretend to be exhaustive. They are but thea.
beginning of a catalog of themes we can exploit in our information and:

-propasenda offensive,

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.

ABNSX B

It is the judgement of the Coordinator taat this annéx covering - ;
intelligence end covert actions should be submitted separately after the i
Executive Comaittea reaches a conclusion on, the overall psychological

‘ program and the attributable activities set forth in Annex A.
ry . * Hf

| |
at af : :
Ge ¢ t “" - . |

PR,

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DARE

& é

E . Toy , . . . ;
DATE OF DOCUMENT [NUMOER OF COPIES [COPY NUMDERIS)
zeta || name |

LOCAL Ts CONTROL NUMBER (if eppficable) x iL , jo
al

S 00
ORESSEE!

MUMBER ANG DESCRIPTION OF INCLOSURES TO DOCUMENT (indicate addition and/or deletion of inclosurca with dates)

Annex A (5 pgs) and Annex B (1 pg)

: DISTRIBUTION DATA . GATE OF CISTRIGUTION
COPY WO. AODRESSEE (Print oF type) | copy wo. | ADDRESSEE {Print or type)

INTRA-OFFICE ROUTING DATA

FOR: ._ [action [_] information
crac

e
&
v
a
5
a
5
a

S OF ALL PERSONS HAKOLING ATTACHEQ. DOCUMENT OR WHO HAVE BEEN INFORMED OF ITS CONTENT WILL BE LISTED BELOW
[NAME Chin ore) om

(92)

©
3
2
i
{THT
9
i
3

. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES -


13-00000

SUBJECT: ‘Future Cuban Leadership

INTRODUCTION

Following is a proposal for the creation of an imaginary

Cuban leader. This proposal is presented primarily to fill gaps
existing in the present policy study. It will become obvious that
this proposal can be utilized int conjunction with current programs
as well as many of those programs proposed for the future. It
may be necessary to address this proposal or a similar proposal
separately and in advance of the policy study; however, in pe
event no pressing requirement exists, itis suggested that

_ proposal be considered in conjunction with the policy study end
handled on a closely held basis.

REASON FOR PROPOSAL

. Following are listed a number of indications that the leader-
ship question will be addressed in the near future:

a. With the termination of U.S. support to the Cuban
Revolutionary Council (CRC) a vacuum has been created. Various -
exile groups in the U.S. and elsewhere will be vying for recognition
and support in an attempt to fill this void.

b. There has. been constant pressure on the U.S,

_ and on other Latin American countries to recognize a government

in exile. This proposal could serve to lessen or eliminate much
of this political and psychological pressure.

¢. This proposal could serve to reduce the bickering
among exile groups and may serve to resolve some of the problems
of Cuban exile unification.

ass... EXCLUDED FROM
Gasitive DOD DIR 5200.

AUTOMATIC REGRADING
10 DOES NOT APPLY © -

13-00000

a. The proposal could emphasize the development of
a native "David" in opposition to Castro, the Cuban "Goliath." This
could serve the U.S. image by making Castro the "Goliath" rather
than the "David"' who opposes the "North American Giant. "

e. This proposal could serve to prevent the U.S, from
making premature commitments to a leader or a particular exile group
and could be used as a device to test exile response.

f. This proposal could retain for the U.S. the ability
to control future selections of leaders or groups (timing and political
ideologies). -
g. This proposal could permit the U.S. ona progres-
sive basis to influence the idealogies of the resistance and thus to
influence the platform of a future Cuban Government. ’

'h, The publicity aasociated with the prolonged existence
ofa resistance in Cuba can serve to delay the furtherance of. the de
facto recognition of the present Cuban Regime.

OBJECTIVE

. To create an imaginary leader or image of resistance in Cuba.
This image would serve as a focal point for resistance directed | against
Castro by Cubans or Latin Americans.

DEVELOPMENT

An imaginary name of a resistance leader could be developed
utilizing a popular name from Cuban history, a name associated with
resistance in Cuba or a newly devised:name. The name selected

‘should typify a person who is friendly to the Cuban people, is anti-

communist, is willing to fight against the Regime, and is little-but
tough, There is no requirement for a detailed staff study in order

Snsitivze

13-00000

. . te
> a

. ere $B? SERET sonsstsv0
¢ . .?

to determine this name. "The Little Bull," "The Little Worm,"

"The Friendly Worm," ''The Fighting Friend," "The Tough Peasant,"
or any such name which is acceptable and meaningful in Spanish

could suffice, Over a period of several months the name could be
too "“droppéd" or leaked through U.S. officialdom, in diplomatic channels,
in intelligence channels or within the Cuban exile community. Specific
acts against the Regime could be credited to this individual or mem-
bers of his group. Communications could be arranged between this
individual and his subordinates to be picked up either by Castro's
censors or by. radio intercept in Cuba or in the U.S. |

After a period of time, all unexplained incidents and actions
for which credit has not been seized by some other exile group would
automatically be ascribed to our imaginary friend. At some point in
time it could be leaked that the U.S. is, in fact, supporting this
imaginary person. Similarly, other Latin American countries may,
without inducement, publicly follow the U.S. pattern.

During the course of this operation it is quite possible that the -
Castro Regime could indicate that the activities of this individual were
terminated, that the individual was captured, that he was being pur-
sued, or that he was an imaginary faker or fraud. Such action would
only serve to further publicize the actions of the individual and so long
as resistance in general continued the fame of our "Cuban Kilroy"

’ would spread. Humorous antics could be credited to our imaginary

friend and rumors of his exploits of bravery (ala Zoro) could be
circulated. .

At some point in time it may be wise to indicate what this
individual stands for. (It will become obvious that he is opposed to
the Regime in Cuba.) It could be possible to indicate little-by-little
his political platform in very general terms -~ realizing that the
mistique and the "generalness" connected with his operation is, in
fact, the power behind the operation. Ultimately, Cubans and others
may demand that he proclaim his complete political views or even
that he present himself physically. Since this is not desirable,

3

13-00000

: arrangements could be made to have selected individuals meet
ok with his appointed representative. His instructions and words
“ could be relayed to the public by many means,

As his political platform becomes more apparent within
as . the exile groups, it may be possible to determine those willing to
a follow his leadership (to gain Cuban independence under his terms)
or those who are unwilling to accept his leadership. The lines of
controversy among exiles can.be drawn more clearly. Undesirable -
leaders and exile groups can be eliminated from the competition
through his disavowals. :

Eventually, a member of the resistance in Cuba may gain
sufficient stature to assume or to be given the title of this imaginary
leader. This, of course, will depend in large measure on individual
leadership ability and the ability to "fill the boots" of this anti-Castro
image. .

While this scheme is replete with gimmickery, ite imple-
mentation could be undertaken in a relatively short period of time.
Sensitivity of this scheme is such that the knowledge should be held
on the tightest basis and if implemented, those proposing should
not be informed. In the event the scheme is compromised, (unless
knowledge is widespread) there is little need for plausible deniability;
however, once used and compromised the scheme can hardly be .
reinstated. A major advantage is that this image can be created
over a long period of time or developed rapidly. without a political
ox economic commitment on the part of. the U.S. There may be a
point at which the U.S. could no longer disavow collaboration with
this imaginary person, This point,. however, is so distant that
during any point in the intervening period it would be possible for
the U.S, to disengage easily without suffering embarrassment or
loss of prestige.

SBe-SEaREF eo


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CONCLUSION -

Based on a consideration of factors indicated above, it
appears that the U.S. should immediately undertake to implement
this proposal, determining at 30 to 60 day future intervals what

‘additional action should be taken to improve, reduce, or change

the image during the subsequent 30 or 60 day period.

. Patchell
Lt Colonel, -USA

Spucrsgle Geta


13-00000
reper teenie

* : we

2] 7

awn,

From: Lt. Colonel Patchell

Subject: Poychological Operations Group

Following is a brief "run-down" of meeting on psychological
operations at State, 21 May 1962. The mectings are normally held
ench Monday at 1430, Attendees include: Bob Smith or Kermit Brown
(USIA); Seymous Bolton (CIA); Colonel Wade Robert (DOD); ‘Harvey;
Summ (Cuba Deck Officer - State); Bob Hurwitch, Dick:Phillips (Public ‘
Affairs Advisor of Martin's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs - State)
and Leon Curtis (Bureau of Intelligence and Research - State).

¢

Subjects discussed included: yg
: (1) Priorities of work « Cuba, Weatern Hamlaphore, U.S.
~ in that order.
—_ (2) Publication of document on conditions in Cuban Univer-

sities received from Cuban exile group (DRE) - CIA to check authenticity
and whether document is outdated. -

(3) Radio SWAN - CIA studying proposed changes.

(4) USIA reported three commentaries. pa out on Cuban
Independence Day. . ;

(5) On the Axmstrong Circle Theater, USIA states this
"hung up" for $15,000 cost of translation. It was decided in meeting to
push on to get it translated - and in the meanwhile to get Miro Cardona's
apecch into wide circulation. ~

. (6) State suggested that speeches in Cuba (Rodrigues, Castro,
and others) within past week indicated moves away from collectivization

- to free enterprise and mentioned antipathy of people to idea and name of
cooperatives. USIA to push on this and to prepare releases on it.

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(7 CIA to declaseify the Soviet nickel contract with Cuba ,
which exposes Soviet colonialism + for wide distribution in Latin America
thrtugh Embssetes and USIA and for use by CIA in Cuba.

; . . (8). CLA wants more stuff in the vein of ridicule, satire,
mh ‘humor. =.t0 get away from invective and hit the regime: aod individuals -
‘low key atuff to develop ridicule.

(9) CIA to find out from refugees what appeals best, what
they read, what they Listen to, etc.

(10) USIA and GIA to play up the March USIA survey which
showe Castro's popularity in Latim America on the decline.

(1)) On 26th of July, State suggested.cave be used to avoid
discussing 26th of July movement as Commy - to clearly differentiate
between original 26th of July movement and its prbiciples - and the be-
trayal. CIA requested State's guidance on policy and State's help on
providing material. State provided the attached and indicated that its use
4s within policy (Ihave noted some particularly hard hitting spiiff - « if used
properl

(12) A number of important events and dates in June and July
were discussed to include Caribbean Games, ‘Peace Festival, Khrushchev
Rocket statement, and Castro's "Cordillera of the Andes” statement.
USIA and CIA to prepare information on these.

: (13) State asked CLA to prepare a catalogue of admission of
failures of the Castro Regime, a list of production promises, and a report
of bloc people in key positions, Ali were asked to bring ideas into next
week's meeting to. be used to exploit 26th of July to our advantage.

(14) This office will be placed on distribution: ‘of minutes of
the meetings.

13-00000

22 ;
‘iS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 23, D.C.

1 June 1962

SENSIIE

os . MEMORANDU! M FOR GENERAL LANSDALE

From: Lt. Cal. Patchell

7 Subject: Psychological Operations Grgp.

Meeting held at 1430 hours on 28 May 62 with Mr. Hurwitch
and Mr. Simm of State, Bolton of CIA, Smith of USIA, and myself
attending. “Following } isa summary « of subjects, discus a:

: (1) CEA asked State to provide'a clarification of porsébalities
and groups to be supported - this came up in connection with a dis-
cussion of crc and newspaper stories on its change in laadprehip.

(2) The Armstrong Ctrele Theater movie has ised okayed
for Spanish language publication and distribution.

. (3) On the "Eyewitness to History" program of 25 May 62 -
because of the type of movie - USIA to look at carefully and deter-
mine whether useful for replay (I will be invited to attend).

(4) CIA using theme for farmers not to produce ~ okayed.

(5) On declassification of Cuba - Soviet trade agreement ~
CIA has ‘been unable to obtain, bat should produce soon. ©

(6) CIA GIA“guidance now being prepared for. payeh’ wae. £ to Met -
priorities as follows: -(a) Cuba, (b) Latin America; '(o} rest of world.
Draft copies will be brought to next meeting for informal review.

(7) On the DRE publication White Book on University Probleme
in Cuba" - 2,000 copies each are being printed-in Chile in English,
French, and Spanish. CIA to take action to make available in summary
form for Latin newspapers and student publications. m ;

(83) On the CRC publication “Guba Nueva" - presently going

only to exile commiunity. CIA ta look into getting it into Latin America
and Cuba - money appears té be no problem,

SENSILVE

Er are 7


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(9) State suggested exploitation by USIA and CIA of items 7
appearing in the FBIS daily summary, (Housing end labor -- made
arrangemente 6 put us on distribution.)

vor :i(0) GIA brought up the. unhappy impact of Moscosp's:epeach
infotring that Cabs should be forgotten arid nip Mensee dat ea otk

the Alliance For Progress. State indicated that a correction was being
made to show that Moscoso was misquoted, :

ay State suggested that Castro's 11 April speech (which was
not released until May) had many exploitable points -- corruption =
failure to suggest unity - labor -- State sent to CIA for research people
to work on. ;

|” (2) tein ‘appeasiiig in Cubsin paper concerning people who
“transgrese the’ nora" being sent to training camp WSIA to'take. -
action,

(13) CLA after looking at symbols etc. has about Gedided ‘that
the "worm" {a ‘preferable to the “fish” and that it haa beet popularised
by Castro and we should take advantage of it. Both CIA and USIA will
develop furthex the worm idea. Lt. Col. Patchell suggested relating
it to such expressions ae "the worm will turn" « if applicable in Cuba
and associating it will biblical quotations such as "Their worm shall
not die, and their fire shall not be quenched" -- Isa 6624 or “As a moth
doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood, 6o the sadness of a man
consumeth the heart" - Prov. 25.20. USIA to take action.

COMMENT:

- In the two: ‘previcus meetings I have developed sufficient rapport
so that I can Bow-get:actions taken without too.much: ‘question, Thies .
next meeting I propose to introduce a system ‘of suspense dates so that.
' the "we are looking into" or "we are considering" are replaced by —
"we will meet the suspense" ~- this may be difficult at first, but feel
it can be managed, .


13-00000 a | _ Ce ents matt
| ra)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 28, D. G.

6 June 1962

‘MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE -
From L&, Colonel Patchell
Subject: Paychological Operations Group

__ Meeting held 1430-1450 on 4 June 1962. Attended by Mr.
Hurwitch, Mr. Phillips, - Summ, and Mr, Curtis (State),
Mr. Bolton (CIA), Mr. Smith (USIA), and myself. Following is
& summery of discussion items: co

(1) USIA will provide advance notice of TY programe
scheduled re Cuba. ,

: /
Bo, (2) Free Cuban Group (DRE) has arranged for strong
‘; representation at African International Student Meeting in Canada
- 27-28 June. They will curface ¢oples of report on student conditions
“~~ je in Cuba. They asked for no advance publicity - then big follow up"
i = ~ State and CIA coordinating to include preparation of releases
i to U.S. prese, : .

i (3) CIA has looked at CRCta mailing liste for various types
A of info, to include the publication "Cuba Nueva, " They find lists
oo: most elaborate, .complete and well organized for each purpose,

as — [ . lose of rights by workers in Cuba, USIA provided exmple ciples of
. : their daily wire output and of weekly mail output for me to lock at in ;
’ ae greater detail, (I will report sepi rately on this.) , . ;

a ; (5) Much exploitable info in Castro's speech on housing ~-
7 corruption, unavailability etc. USIA and CIA to exploit. ;

ee . (6) CIA reported that the Latin American edition of Time
. A Magasine was in English -- that Time Magazine in spanish was @ :
& - Latin publication (Bogota) using same format, but not useful for purpose
- of exploiting Blas Roca story.

v
i:

Sesh


13-00000

. (1) Reports of hunger strikes etc. at Iele of Pines prison
to be played up by USIA. (Berne‘s cable 527).

wendy - (8), Copige of onrtoon books and other
_ “requested by Lt: *Gol.:Patchell.

: - (9) USIA requested to provide info on the public opinion
poll conducted and schedules for future polls.

Seymour Bolton privately asked me to inform you that subject to
any comment from you, he was using the approach on psy war that
the means of delivery would not be tied to attribution. Aone ke
might be more convenient to work completely through the CRC, he

believed that we‘should reserve flexibility by organizing the “pipelisies™ 7
_ and then putting ‘stuif in from CRC, . or other Cuban organizations, as © * -

well as tuff created by the U.5., with or without signatures or attri-
bution. He feele that such control would best insure that we Gent in

. just what wae needed and no more or no less. i

‘ y 4

at


13-00000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

. 12 June 1962 ©

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE “7(_
F HANSD
From: Lt. Col. Patchel {.\/

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held 1430-1600 on 11 June 1962. _Attended by Mr. ,
Hurwitch, Mr. Summ, and Mr. Wells (substituting for Mr. Curtis
from R&I-State); Mr. Bolton (CIA); Mr. Smith (USIA); and Lt. Col.
Patchell. Following is a summary of discussion items.

(1) CLA has translated and declassified Soviet-Cuban

. Trade Agreement and passed to Mr. Hurwitch for publication and
use. - . '

. ‘
‘ ‘

(2) Lt. Col. Patchell pointed out that the Cuban increase |
of delegates to 330 to Helsinki Eighth World Youth and Student Festival
"for reasons of an imperative nature" should be acted upon and full
use made of report on student conditions which will be surfaced at the
Canadian regional meeting. Bolton assured me that action was being
taken. NOTE: After the meeting Bolton said the same group of
people were working on both and that "extensive" work was being done

on Helsinki, I asked him to be sure it was on Cubans in Helsinki --
not just Helsinki,

(3) USLA agreed to look at clippings on Cuba with view

4 to broader distribution in Latin America -- as requested by Lt. Col.
a Patchell. ; .

- (4) CIA will present a document next week on guidance. >
‘with respect to Cuba. wud wrt, Zo we 428 7

(5) State (Mr. Summ) indicated a Cuban report indicated
: that Havana was going back to horse-drawn trolleys because of motor
transport shortages. Mr. Wells added that previously horse-drawn

transport was not permitted in Havana. All to look into this for possible
exploitation. .

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(6) Lt. Col. Patchell brought up comparison between
Hitler's speech after the wisuccessful Beer Hall Pustch and Castro's
"History Will Absolve Me Speech" following his abortive attempt.
CIA will look into this -- both for research and whether suitable for
propaganda purposes.

(7) Since the title "Doctor" adds some respect to Castro's
name -- all agencies will push toward referring to him primarily as |

the Prime Minister or secondarily as Fidel Castro. < Wek accadins ‘i y.4.
ee epee og
t

ee

f (8) A USIA report indicated that Cuba had increased its
radio propaganda output by 60% over the past few months. USIA .
stated that FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) has added
Cuba to the list of Bloc Countries, which -- subjects Cuba to periodic
research and analysis reports and broadcast trends. (See FBIS Report,
"Operational Developments in Foreign Broadcasting" Number 355,
dated 6 June 1962.) ‘

(9) CLA reported additional people had been placed in
their research department to make content analyses on Cuba.

(10) State has received two articles from New Delhi written.
by an Indian reporter who visited Cuba in the early months of 1959 and
recently revisited Cuba.. These reports are good for the before’ and
"after" content and will be publicized. State asked USIA to look for
others who visited in the early days of the Castro Regime -- who might
be encouraged on a selective basis to return and make a comparison.

s . .
auyOr® » +11) State indicated that Cuba had presented a series of
complaints against U.S. actions at Guantanamo and it looked as though |
Cuba was building up a case against the U.S, for future use in the U.N.

‘or world opinion medias. State has asked Navy to provide similar . Cs U!
information for use by State and will present information to the group Oy a *’,
*f i itation. Wh

or possible exploitation. . wre,

ms , (12) USIA unable to report on Miro Cardona'’s spéech in .
Costa Rica. CIA reported that it had been carried in papers in Costa
Rica and had been broadcast by the Voice of America and several Miami
Spanish language stations. : of

ote~rt

. (13) State suggested the next meeting be held’at USIA for HMeerD
the purpose of briefing the group on the functioning of USIA -- in ¢ rae a
handling a select number of items. ; ~~ Je

2 td a

13-00000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 23, D.C.

18 June 1962

From: 4. Gol. Patehell

Subject: Payehslogictl Operations Grow,

The meting held 1430-1600 on 18 June was attended by Me.
Hurwitch, Mx. ‘Bart. Welle, Mr. Gumm, and Mr. Phillipe (State), :
Mr. Boltan (CIA), Mr Dob Amish (TEIAD, and Lt. Col Patchell,

i ‘GIA dlvtciated coptes of a student booklet (Eaglish and
French versions attached). Thirty~-thousand copies were printed

by & Latin American student organization, : and prinstsfiy Zor Latin
audiences. The bodklets will be used.on tour.of Latins in Afri -
and were distributed throughout Latis America and at internstipnel
youth and student meetings in Quebec and Helsinki. Some copite
will be matfiled into Cuba.:

(2.) GIA presented draft guidelines for overseas posts re
Cuba. The group made some minor changes. The guidelines are Pana aesey
Gers July. Fol USE

<3.) State will put out a slmatlar cleculat to tts porte, and UGIA
will consider doing:the same, .

(4.) Howidap report of overects statiine on actions: ue
within 7 days after 26 July. They are to cable significant ‘actions
immediately.

(S.). Hurwiteh distributed copies of a drat cable intended te
exploit Cardenas incident (copy attached).

(6.) Lt. Col, Patchell asked full exploitation of Mexioaa
defector -- suggesting appearance before OAS Committee, . trip
. \
SPECTAL-HANBSLING This document contains pages.
: Gopy No... % of _ copies. septen_—

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=
at

” WEBB. :

SUOBME -A0.3

Saturday evening and four times Sunday over VOA. -

(7.) The Group was informed that Mr. Grant (St. Louie
PostDispatch), Tad Ssule, anda number of dther xewsmen
‘were attempting to get into Havana fax the 26 July celebration.
Depending on the individual situation, these people will be

__ (8.) State will obtain copies of seporte from the British, .
Italian, Weat.German and other Allied Embassies in Havana

for distribution to members of this group.

_ (95) CLA aaked to‘have Cuban Embasay representatives in
other Latin American states confronted, with. Castro promises
and agkedfor comment for publidation: +=. refusals and no com-

mente" to be publieized. ‘
: ) ‘Sth reported that Gardetiiie: fnctdent

-@l.). USIA provided film on Carpenter flight for use on -
at Guantanamo. . : i . wad


13-00000

WASHINGTON 238, D.C.

26 June 1962 .

“Feds” ars Gal : Putchell.
Subject: " Psychological Operations Group

Meeting held at 1430 on 25 June 1962 was attended by Mr. Hurwitch
(State), Mr. Robert Follestad (substituting for Harvey Summ-State),
Bob Smith (USIA), John Tilton (substituting for Seymour Bolten-CIA),
and Lt. Gol. Patchell. Following. items Glecusced: -

a State to seek: anfi-Castro ; press clpeings ‘from other Latin

- American countries for replay.

b. USIA is distributing confidential memorandum, ‘/The Impact
of Castro on Mexican Public Opinion and Some Indications of Attitudes
Toward the U.S. and the USSR" (LA-3, Feb 62). This report, although
dated Feb 62, ie just now coming out - it reportedly shows a significant
decrease of Castro popularity in Mexico.

c. CIA was asked whether the reports of Cuban communist
interference with other Latin communist parties could be exploited.

d. Decided to direct propaganda into Cuba which is designed to
destroy the image of Cuban success throughout the hemisphere. Also to
direct propaganda designed te stress that Cuba is being “ased", by the USSR.

e. State pointed out. the value of President’s:trip to Mexico this |
week end to point up US-Mexico solidarity. (Noted that Hurwitch withdrew.
considerably from hie initial position - + Cuba not mentioned asa point of
solidarity).

£. CIA is tranolating Theodore Draper's book into Spanish for

" dissemination ao a paper-back in Latin America.

g. Decided to play back into Cuba administrative "goofs'' by
Cubans on transportation arrangements for youth of other Latin countries

. to celebrations. (Some left penniless and etranddd in Caribbean).

: _ ue oe t oe Be ee
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_ SENORE

"ky The Cultural people in State are seized with problem of
Jamaican Games. I suggested other athletes for free Cuba or other

mss : personalities. +> That we should at least make an inventory to sce
o what'we have available. I¢ noted that Cubans are “out to win't oo
Rate What is now being aecomplaed ie not quod muvagh. ,

ero CIA working with Navy on s dclasotfteation of USSR-Cubs
Trade Agreement.

13-00000

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
sO WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

3 July Oe pen

From: .Lt. Col. Patchell

SEB von or a

‘Subject: Psychological Operations Group

_Meeting held fram.1100.to. 1300.on 3 July-1962 with the
following in attendance: Bob Smith (WSIA), Seymour Bolten (CIA),
Bob-Hurwitch, Bob Fallestad, Al-Carter, and Bart Wells (State)
and Lt. Col. Patchell. Following are. highlights. of.discussion.

‘a. State is. providing. copies of report from: ‘Britiah
“Ambassador. to Cuba MARCHAND. Report.made after:absence $5 9
3.months from his post in Cuba. Compe ttrcaf) TA hw. y

Qocdtews

b, State has received letters explaining dothils of
Cardenas incident.- passed to CIA and USIA for action.

: c. CIA to obtain: more information on outbreak in ALCANO
which is being suppressed by:Cuba.

d, CIA provided copies. of study on. promises and failures
of Castro regime.- it has been.distributed to CIA stations overseas.
State and.USIA to look at-with view to providing copies. to international
organizations and State and USIA representatives overseas. Coy « at 6 ashade,

e. In-yiew of uncertainty expressed. in messages from.
‘Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and JAR about stability of
Cuban. economy and attempts ‘to collect.funds to assist Cuba - CIA
to play on theme of Cuba as poor inyestment.etc.. behind iron curtain.

£. Defector who was formerly, Cuban.economic attache in
Moscow being debriefed. - he was-held for 16. months -in Argentine
Embassy in Havana and for-thie reagon much of his information is
dated, CIA to expedite his. assessment.

- g. On Cuban economic defector from Mexico - still being
interrogated and assessed with view to looking at: his. ability to stand

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up to cross~-examination under OAS, State stressed need to

+ expedite in order. to gain impact. CIA can provide no estimate
of time when assessment will. be completed. In Miami, his Press
‘conference indicated Gastro. control.of the Mexican provincial police.

-h.. On question-of intervention Mexican papers stating

this is Mexican victory on ‘Cuban issue - this is being replayed by
U.S. papers - leaves a poor.impression, State said this is-being
discussed with President and will.be covered by: Lincoln White at
‘Press. conference.today. CIA and USIA agreed that more should be
-done. - State could not answer. on ‘Cuban talks - unknown how deeply —
/Cuba was covered and. whether the question of diversion of U.S.
good or movement of people were discussed. ‘Any hint of Mexican
- victory will be ‘demoralizing to people in-Cuba.- ‘exile community -
and Latin America in general.

i, Following the meeting Mr. Hurwitch indicated that
State and CIA representatives would meet. with CAB officials con-
cerning.PAA flights to.Havana.

a
ae

P


13-00000

be cok ate —
— HH

“UL July: 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL LANSDALE
. From: Lt. Col. Patchell

Subject: Psychological Operations Group

. Following is brief of meeting held from 1430-1530 on-9 July 62
with the following in attendance: Robert Hurwitch, Harvey Summ,
, Juan Gurrell, and Al Carter (State), ‘Bob Smith (USIA), Jolin Tilton
” (CIA) and Lt. Col. Patchell. -

Swiss. article. A Swiss. publication has a very fine article in
detail on Cuba - by Swiss reporter who spent several months in
Cuba - USIA to replay. | ; . ? 7

Clipping service. ‘Good immediate reaction to clipping service
being provided. . —— -:

. 26th of July. Group.agreed to "jack up" machinery for informa -
tion on activities. and L. A. reaction to 26th of July. -

. GRC Political Platform. State provided members with copies
of a CRC political platform lattached) Little publicity has.been
‘attached to document. CIA will check to see if it is a document
for internal or external distribution. (Note: Following the meeting,
I asked Mr. Hurwitch:to.coneider this in connection with his guide-
lines paper, depending upon. its validity and usefuluers. He stated
he believed the two were in consonance, -but would check: )

Cuban Protests. “Discussion of Cuban protests. Believed that
the publication of. protests may be leading up to justification for
receipt of defensive weapons. (Note: This fits.in with Mr. Bill
Harvey's earlier remarks on the same general subject. ) State. is
responding to ‘protests. and queries in low key.

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Copy No. copies. Series___.


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Fed

British Newsman. Will meet with State representatives. at
1430 on ll July. Others invited: Thig individual was formerly
_ & Communist, :

' Chinese Opium Technicians. On report of Chinese techni-
cians to assist Cubans in opium ‘growing. Lt. Col. Patchellisug-
gested CIA get declassified and publicized as. quickly as possible.

Overall Evaluation. All to take a look at orientation of group -
its purpose, missions, methods of carrying out tasks to see what

changes are required for period starting 1 August 1962, or after
new NIE is published.

Note: From the time that I Joined the group on 21 May,. the
group's orientation has changed from a general Latin American
psychological operations g: ‘oup. to one focused on Cuba. My own
personal objective is now to get the output extended beyond Latin
America - into NATO, the uHcommitted areas, eastern Europe,

. . a 4

Japan, etc. ‘

2

ras . Visit of James B; Donovan” Following the meeting, Mr.

Hurwitch gave me the attached memorandum of conversation with
. Mr. Donovan. erence tae :

Copy tet Wr Nanas  ptyer


