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104-10118-10427, | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT gra ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

os Organization and activities of the
Deputy Director (Research)

Development Projects Division « Special Projects Branch
a ee ce pectal Srojects Branch

As recommended, the Special Projects Branch of DPD plus the
necessary supporting units have been transferred-to DD/R. -

Technic al Services Division
aaa eewices Mivision

Further study did not commend implementation of the Working
Group's recommendation that all TSD research and development ba
placed under DD/R. The DD/P made a substantial argument in favor
of leaving all of TSD under his control in order to insure close and
intimate relations with the operating units. Further, an argument of
almost overwhelming proportions indicated that the DD/R already had
some very major responsibilities without taking on the diverse and
generally unrelated responsibilities of TSD,

4

Other Research and Development
SEES Ane evelopment

After considerable additional study it was decided to transfer all
ELINT to DD/R, except for the direct command of certain field unitg
which under all circumstances should be left under the station chiefs,
Research and development in suppoxst of NPIC would fall under DD/R

for those very advanced items, but not for current production require-
ments.

-§8.


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Coordination

The ataff of the Assistant for Coordination has continued to work
on the same basis as formerly and continues to be constituted of
assignees from other agencies. There appears to be progress in

. achieving closer inter-agency coordination, but whether this is due

to the work of the Coordination Staff or to the DCI's personal interest
in this subject would be hard to determine,

Princeton Consultants to ONE.
This group has been continued.

National Photographic Interpretation Center

The Executive Director has personally kept under review the work-
load of NPIC. NPIC is recruiting in anticipation of an increased work-
load.

Caliber of Personnel

The new DD/I is cognizant of this problem and is taking steps to
improve the caliber of the personnel.
a.

Merger of ONE and OCI
It has been decided not to merge these offices.
Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda

Too many uncoordinated memoranda are still being circulated.
The practice of asking other departments to prepare memoranda has

not beén adopted.

White House Relations

(This matter was handled orally by the Working Group and con-
sequently the comments will be handled similarly. }


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“SH/~! °

Research on International Communism
rn at vOMMmuniS

The DD/I has established a special staff under an experienced
intelligence officer for this purpose, and this staff ig getting gradually
organized.

Office of Scientific Intelli ence
enc intelligence

OSI is remaining under DD/I, but DD/R will eventually open hig
career service to those who wish to join it.

DD/R's Operational Responsibilities

It has been firmly established that DD/R will operate those pro-
jecta which he develops. We believe that DD/R has implemented some
of the principles in the special annex of the Working Group report,


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Mr}

Organization and Activities of the

Intellizence Communit
oy

National Indications Center - Watch Committee
eet x_Vatch Committe

General Carter, the new Chairman of the Watch Committee, has
mado a thorough review of its activities and NIC operations. Steps
have been taken to sae that NIC is Properly manned with the right
personnel, and the Department.of State is being constantly reminded
of its obligations in this regard. We also believe that the methods of
operations of the Watch Committee have now been aligned in accord-
ance with the objectives of the Working Group.

CIA Relations with the Department of State
partment of State

Sifce the issuance of the. Working Group report, a special team
composed of a senior representative from the Agency and from the
Department of State have etudied-the ‘entire’problem of "cover." They
have Fegched ai agreed formula for.this cover and for correcting some
Qf-thezproblemse-that-attracted the-attention of the Working Group..This
incladesktherRorkigmServicaxe; ignationy *A’new agreement has been
reached on tha handling of State communications. since the production
of the Working Group report the level on which COMINT policy is |

handled in CIA has been raised to that of Asaistant Deputy Director.

State's Counter Communism Office .
mis Otfice

The proposal for the creation of such an office in the Department
of State appears to have come to naught,

State's Operational Center

The State Operational Center also appears to have come to naught.
State at White House Briefings |

The Department of State does not attend the White House briefings.

Receipt of Top Classification Messages
ea Smeaton Messages

Tho DCI has taken up with the White House the necessity for being
included in the dissemination of all top classification messages.

~le


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1c.

11.

12.

3S yeu kr
The or ganization of the DCI/DDCI's office is currently under study.

The Audit Staff is removed from the DD/S area and placed under
the Inspector General.

The Compirolles is removed from the DD/3 area, given greatly
expanded responsibilities, anu will report directly to the DCI/
DDCI's office.

The General Counsel's office is removed from under the DD/S,
will resume responsibility for Congressional relations, and will
report directly to the DCI/DDCI's office.

The Office of Cperations is disbanded. Contact-Division to DD/P
as nucleus for Domestic Division. Foreign Documents Division
to be combined with OCR Library. Foreign Broadcast Information
Division to be independent unit reporting directly to DD/I.

Position of Assistant DD/P for Covert Action abolished.
Assistant DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations created.

Central Support Staff under DD/P created. This will draw together
such support as personnel, logistics and budget and will also take
over technical support from those operating units of TSD which
remain in the DD/P, e. g§-, Secret writing, audio operations, etc.
The Central Support Staff will also absorb the present Operational
Services Staff and certain other activities.

A Special Task Force is created for such operations of a magnitude
that transcends the capabilities of one division.

The International Organizations Division and Covert Action Staff
are combined, putting together our largest activities in this field.

A Domestic Division is created. This will absorb as its nucleus
Contact Division of CO from the DD/I, the Commercial Staff, the
Air Proprietary Branch irom DPD, ultimately the management of
CAT from the DD/S, and those aspects of cover which involve
contacts with the U.S. business community,

A Deputy Director for Research is created. This or ganization will
take over the Office of Scientific Intelligence from the DD/I, Special
Projects ...:m DPD, all research and development from TSD, and
other research and development activities currently located in various
units of the Agency such as the Office of Communications, NPIC, etc.

SEZ RET

. .

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March 29, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on discussions between myself, Carter, Kirkpatrick

Coyne and Schuyler in review of report of the Kirkpatrick
Committee

Following recommendations call for further consideration and

possible modification,

Office of the DCI

1. Page ll - Comptroller gs ae

Terms of Reference of the Financial Policy and Budget
Committee under the Comptroller and the Executive Committee
as provided hereafter must be clarified to provide continuing .
program review by a senior committee as par? of an orderly

| program and budget process. ‘

2. . Offices of Coordination.

Differences between Kirkpatrick and Schuyler position
as outlined in the report and Coyne's position should bs
considered and reconciled. Page 3, Item C, Responsibility for
SIGINT policiea and resulting international arrangements asa
responsibility of this office should be further considered.

3. Public relations directive should be issued on policy of
speech making and public appearances by Agency employees,

- including DCI and the Deputies.

4. Page 6. Reduction of forces consideration should be given
with continuing 3-man management review committez {such as

‘the Kirkpatrick Committee) exploring for the DCI and the DDCI

ways and means of eliminating duplication and consolidating
functions, eliminating unneces sary activities, with the objective
of developing better organization at lesser cost and with

fewer personnel. ;

5. 6.B. Terms of Refersnce for the Executive Director and
the selection of this man should he discussed between McCone
and Carter at an early date.

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-# Il. Office of DD/P

~ 1. Paze 9: Important to move on an Assistant DD/P for
Paramilitary operations and alr Support. There is
coatinuing criticiam of the Ageacy for lack of professionalism
in these activities, most particularly airborne,

Zz. Domestic Division.
aa mestic Miv-sion.

. Care must be exercised and the merger of Contact
Division with tha balance of the Domeatic Division and
also care must be exercised to be sure that the Domestic
Division "gathers up" all fragments of CIAts activities
ae dispersed throughout the United States with the exception
of Security Division, ‘

3. Deputy Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth

Definition of this office must be worked out to avoid
confusion with respect to small British areas such as Hong
Kong, Singapore, British Guiana, ete. The purpose of
this office probab ¥ to handle Commonweaith versus Colonial
Office affairs.

4. CIA/3tate Relations. ‘
aaa melatlons

Review of salary allowances, expense accounts,
living conditions, etc., of CLA agents under State cover
versus Foreign Service Cificerg comparable conditions
should be made and if criticism legitimate, corrective
meéasures:should be taken without impairing abilitgeattets
of SixtiGHto-handle special costly situations which might
bedéne by specific authorization: Also audit and control
of personal expenses of COS must be developed immediately.

my. Ctfice of DD/I
l. Carter and MceCone should agree on selection of a DD/I,
Deputy DD/I and Chief of OCl as initial step in improving personnel
within this office, .

&. Merger of O/NE and OCI should be delayed until new
DD/1 is installed and makes his recommendations, :

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3. National Board of Estimates should be reviewed and
improved where necessary and consideration given to formation
of a special group within O/NE to analyze on a continuiag basis
objectives of Soviet/Sino Bloc, international communism and
their pursuit of their cold war activities and in their efforts to
establish world domination. Note: Thie office previously
existed directly under DD/I but was abandoned a few months
ago,

4. Proper Maison with finance, State Department, and
agreed methods for DCI to brief NsC as provided by law
should be worked out.

5. National Photographic Interpretation Center, Page 19.

Note this requires immediate study, possibly by USIB.
Fear that the work load on the NPIC will overwhelm itandasa
result it will be unable to process vast amount of {information
during months of May through September should be quickly studied
and arrangements made through USIB to disperse read-out to SAC
and Army St. Louis Center if doing so necessary to keep our
processing and read-out on a current basis. This matter
considered of greatest importance,

IV. Elements of DD/R

1. It should be recognized that Deputy Director for
Research is a cover and this‘ office not necessarily confined
to research but should be tad sed with operationed responaibi-
lities. Also most important project under DD/R is OXCART,
therefore DD/R must be restrained from taking on collateral
activities so fast that OXCART will suffer. The DD/R ,
responsibilities will cover all phases of Agency responsibility
and activity in NRO which may or may not include the actual
operation of OXCART. It will include intelligence input into
OXCART and CORONA and SAMOS Planning, irrespective of
where operations rest.

2. Location of OSI should be resolved.

3. Interrelationship between DD/R and DD/P to provide
staff support and particularly the CI production should be
established by directive of Deputy DCI.

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4. With resrect to pate 23, certain operational responsaibi.
Uities should pass from DO/2 to DD/P upon completion of
research and cevelopment; however a study should be made to
determine whether the tmany fully intesrated operational activities
such as OXCART and some fully integrated ELINT operations
should not be permanently under DD/R who Is to have both
Operational and research and development responsibilities,

Considerations of OXCART
re ee AN

i. Responsibility for all phasea of OXCART are to follow
the direct supervision of Sec/Def and DCI by agreement with the
OD, Charyk as AR/Sec.Def., will be executive head of NRO, DD/R
will be his Deputy and by assignment will be responsible for all
phases of OXCART.

2. Details of Operations, as contrasted to R&D, will be
worked out at a later date.

. 3. NSC directive agreed OXCART tasks are responsibility
of Special Group and question of augmentation is a matter for Special
Group, not CIA, to decide. ;

“he 4. DD/R should be charged with the responsibility of
mobilizing and utilizing all necessary resources of DD/I, DD/P and
DD/S and General Counsel in performance of DD/R's assigned respon-~
sibility as Deputy Director NRO and manager of OXCART project.

5. Question of use of Air Force officers versus civilfans
must be decided by higher authority, likewise the question of Operational
responsibility between that of CLA or DD/R or personnel secanded from
the Air Force versus direct Air Force operation must be decided by DCI
and Sec/Def. and the President after careful consideration of all issues
and problems relating to this matter. .

6. Because of imminence of commencement of test
flights immediate careful attention should be given to all aspects of
the cover story ag certain jaformation concerning the plane will
become known when it ig observed in FAA (hat Othey radar

V. National Indications Center Watch Committee
ERE atch Cornmnittee

1, Appointment should ba made next week for General
Carter and myself to visit the NIC and the DIA Centera and
observe the Watch Committee Operations and make a judgment
as to whether this organization is properly set up and
efficiently operating, and to rosolve differences between
Mr. Coyne and USIB,

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‘.

2. White House briefings should continue; a substitute
for Mr. Amory should be arranged until a more adequate
arrangement is provided: Daily briefings of Bundy, Clifton
and Taylor and an occasional briefing of the President by
DCI should suffice.

JOHN A, McCONE
Director


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a
6 April 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Final Report of Working Group on Or ganization
and Activities

1. Ihave the honor to present herewith the final report of the
working group which you established in January to consult with you and
advise on the organization and activities of tha Central Intelligence

aL een

Agency, and of its relationship with other agencies in the intelligence

community. This report reflects the views of the working group and is
divided into two parts. The first part deals primarily with the organiza-
x tion of the Central Intelligence Agency and reflects the unanimoua views
g

of the working group. The second part contains comments and recom-
mendations on areaa dealing with the work of the Central Intelligence
Agency and activities of the intolligence community in which the working
group was either unable to agree or felt that considerably more study
was needed before action was taken.

Zz. For the record I would note that the working group held its
first session on January 3 and met on 35 different days between that date
and its final session with you on March 28, During its work the group
had approximately 100 briefings. Most of these briefings dealt with the
organization and activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, but also
included a full day spent with the Department of State in addition to several
briefings on State Department activities and ite relations with CIA; approxi-
mately one-half day spent in the Pentagon in addition to other briefings
by the Defense Intelligence Agency; and a full week Spent visiting SAC,
NORAD and other activities in the United States. We were briefed by
the head of every major coraponent in the CIA with the excepticen of three
DD/P 2rea divisions whose briefings had to be excluced becauge of the
pressure of time. However, we feel that having heard from four other
area aivisions the working group had a knowledge of the activities and
problems of these units, In addition to the 106 briefings, the working
group had move than ten executive sessions in which it discussed and
debated at great length its findings and conclusions. Finally, there were

aon oan
ee ee Oh) Ke ~ fetes \
foe : fee pesos SO
on ” — \
( i

1768F


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some 20 mectings with yourself, and with senior Agency officials to
discuss our findings and conclusions. These included at least two
sessions with each of the Deputy Directors and with the Assistant
Director for National Estiraates and the Assistant Director for Cure
rent Intelligence,

3. The attached report does not purport to be complete or ex-
haustive in any respect, but rather it is an aide memoir to recall to
mind our oral discussions and to record some of the reasons and
philosophy behind our recommendations,

Al
Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
cc; DDCI .

Attachment

eet reed [ns oe -
pe lie |
ppl s .
DOVE (6b ofan Keni Lietre aha)
Ad\S=z
po\P

Cp dedi SL

-2-

“9
Ree
wu

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PARTI

This section deals primarily with the organization
of the Central Intelligence Agency and represents

the view of the entire Working Group.

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OFrFICl OF TES DCI
ee

ee te eee tee

Organization of LCs OYfice

tre recoinmend that the organization of the DCI's office be

/
- systematized control of messages both oral and written, anda
clear delineation of the responsibilities of the assistants to the /
DCI In this connection we would urge that a secretariat be 270
oe

| changed in order to provide more effective support to the DCI, a /
_ €reated,- that the head of this secretariat assign {ndividual re+
sponsibilities to each of the personal assistants to the DCI, that J
daily staff meetings be held for a full exchange on the activities
f of the staff, and that all personnel in the Agency be advised as

to how to keep the DCI's staff informed Properly of the activities /

of tha Agency.

Comptroller

We recommend that the Comptroller's office be brought
out from under the DD/S, report directly to the DCI"s office and J
receive full authority for fotal fiscal control of the Agency.

We recommend that the Comptroller be designated Chair-

man of a Financial Policy and Budget Committee composed of i

the appropriate senior officers of the Agency. We believe that


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| a nee 9 ne we ese etee te ee

¥

such a committee should be kept fully and currently informed of
all Agency activities, and in order to be effective should meet

regularly and submit its reports to the DDCI and DCI,

Inspector General

We recommend that the Audit Staff be combined with the

staff of the Inspector General and that the merged staff report to

the DCI’s office.

We belleve that the size of the Inspector General Staff

from their respective components in order to perform more
frequent {nspections of Agency units. We urge ‘inspections af
least anoually of major operations and of field stationa,
General Counsel

We recommend that the General Counsel's staff be
removed from the organization of the Deputy Director (Support)
and report directly to the office of the DCI, Ta such a position
the General Counsel should resume the responsibility for the
direction and guidance of the work of the Legislative Counsel,

which is currently the responsibility of the Inspector General,

\

should ba increased with qualified professional personnel assigned (wy

(e

aa

“

%

vA

e
G

\

t

™,

2

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ne = pee eg ees

Cable Secretariat ‘

We have examined the Cable Secretariat which is currently

* located in the office of the DCI and reports to the Executive Officer, va

We believe it should continue to be in the office of the Director under
the careful supervision of the Executive Director. We are con-

cerned that as it now operates requirements for cables have not |

been adequately coordinated, and cables have been disseminated

too often on the judgment of junior officers. We believe this needs fe

careful study.

Contracts 7
We believe that the Agency is vulnerable on sole-source <
- oe”
contracts for auch activities as TSD and DPD, and that those “7? fh.
ake 7

contracts currently in existence should be reviewed and that all: , he
“ we

such future contracts should be passed on by the DCI's office i we

prior to approval.

Personnel Assignments

We believe that the DDCI and DCI should be the final .
approving authority for all assicnmenta to positions of Chief /
or Deputy Chief of Offices (DD/2 Divisions and Staffs) or of

field stations and bases, both foreign and domestic.


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mae
We believe the DCI's office should also review all asalga- a

ments in the middle management echelon with particular reference

” to insuring the proper language qualifications, operational training

and suitability,

Public Relations

We recommend that the ‘present system of public relations
by the Agency be changed, While we see the necessity for the wit!
DCI to have an assistant in his office handling relations with the
public media, we belleve that every effort should be made to |

minimize the amount of publicity that CIA receiwes,

eee et ee

. We strongly secommend that the Present practice of
giving background briefings to newspapermen cease and that
CIA give information to the press only where CIA has something
which for operational reasons should be released on an unattri-
butable basis, We urge that no public Speeches be given by

Agency officials.

Reduction {n Force
aheeeoan tn vorce

We recommend that the DCI and DDCI insure that the
present reduction in force in the Agency include senior officers,

particularly supergrades who are no longer as effective as they

should be in their assignments,


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Handling of Communications Other Than Cables

We note that under present arrangements communications,

other than cables are handled by the Records Integration Division:

ay
v

) _

of DD/P, which is not always fully cognizant of the interests of

=~

\

non-DD/P parts of the Agency. We recommend that the entire

Sy

system of handling incoming and outgoing communications be
subjected to further study with a view to insuring adequate dis-

semination of all communications, Particularly in DD/I, DD/R

CC aoe

and DD/S, which may have need for Prompt receipt of such

material,

Executive Director
Sane Sirector
Executive Director, inasmuch as we believe this to be primarily

& matter that should be tailored to the personal preferences of

We have not tried to spell out the responsibilities of the |
H
!
the DCI and DDCI and how they wish to Operate their office and ;

the Agency. We urge, however, that Special attention be directed

—_

to the avoidance of a straight vertical line of command; i.e,, all

problems should not have to pase through each of the three officers. :

Executive Committee
=e Vommittee
We recommend the creation of an Executive Committee

to be chaired by the DDCI ang consist of the four Deputies, the


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Comptroller, and the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination and
Intelligence Community Guidance. This Committee, from a
policy standpoint, would review Proposed major projects and
maintain a continuous review of all major activities and make
Bppropriate recommendations thereon to the DCI. This Com-

malttee would replace the present Project Review Committee.


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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE / min lop
DEPUTY DIRECTCR (PLANS) fades 4

' Office of the DD/P
eae OE ne Boi

We commend the decision of the DD/P to abolish the position

of the A/DDP/A, and believe that the restoration of the previous

organization with just the DD/P and COP in the line of command

in the front office will result ina clear delineation of responsibili-

ties and more efficient operations.

The Staffs

We studied at some length the staffs in the DD/P. We con-
sidered a possible merger ofthe FI, Cl and CA staffs. We also
studied proposals for divesting the staffs of all operational responsi-
bilities, We beliave that while both are desirable objectives, neither

<.
are practicable under present circumstances. We therefore urge
that the FJ, Cland CA Staff functions be drawn closer together
under the Chief of Operations and that these organizations insofar
as practical act in the classical sense as staffs for the DD/P. We
further believe that the Operational Services Staff, the Central Staff,
and the residual of the Cover and Commercial Staff, after the changes
recommended below are completed, be transferred to the Central

Support Staff which is proposed,


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a en

fee ee erm came eseae

oe eee

ce ef meee ene oe

/

Merger of Covert Action Staff and International Organizations Division

The DD/P haa advised us of hia desire to merge the Covert
Action Stalf with the International Crganizations Division. White
this ia contrary to the trend of divesting staffs of operational duties,
we nevertheless do not observe any major reasona against sucha
merger and believe that it should be tried out in accordance with

the DD/P's wishes. |

Central Support Staff
We recommend that the DD/P draw together into a Central

Support Staff control of personnel and other support matters cur-
. 4
rently decentralized to the divisions and staffs in order to locate

these functions directly under him.

Special Task Force Cperations

We recommend the creation of an organizational entity to
be known as "Special Task Force Operations* reporting directly
to the DD/P, which shali be activated and deactivated upon need,
and which shall be the command inechanis:n for handling such
projects as the Cuban operation which demands the creation of an

organization from Agency-wide assets,


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RRR

Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations

We recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be
known as Paramilitary and sir Support Operations, under the
direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert
paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk
of this new organization be located at c 10 dw where it will have
facilities for organization and training. Such a move will also relieve

the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the

individual to head this organization be drawn from military service

and be a senior Colonel or a Brigadier General with wartime para-
military experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of .
. 4

the DPD in its present form, we recommend that the Air Support

Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.

Domestic Division - an
a Son

We endorse the-proposal to create a Domestic Division. We
strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact
Division of OO, which is to be transferred from the DD/I to the DD/P,
as the nucleus for field work in the United States. We also believe
that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the
Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial.

Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve


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- SECRET

contacts with domestic organizations in the United States such as
business and foundationa. This would involve the transfer to this--.

Domestic Division of the Air. Proprietaries Branch of DPD, and of

the responsibility for the management of CAT from the DD/S, and

of managing Fairways ‘Corporation, In consolidating CAT and Fair- |
waya into the Air Propritaries Branch we wish to draw attention
to the neces sity of having the right man to head this branch. |

We would also urge that a complete review be made of the ©
Agency's present and future requirements for air proprietaries and
that a statement of the requirements be provided the Air Proprictaries
Branch indicating exactly what may ba needed in all parts of the world.

With the création of the Domestic Division we urge that the DD/P |

examine. the requirements levied. by DD/P components on the Office
of Security for operational support and if possible > reassign these
requirements to the Domestic Division in order to relieve the Office |
of Security for its more important responsibilities in regard to the

security of CLA,

Operational Aids Unit

The DD/P should have a new unit charged with the following

functions:

-10-

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a. Residual TSD activities not transferred to DD/R.

b. Preparation of "operational characteristics" for new
or improved equipment desired to be developed by DD/R.

c. Close contact with DD/R activities involving develop-
ment of iteme for DD/P.

d. The condact of rigorous field tests of these itema
before they are released to divisions for operational use.

We recommend that all of the research and development responsi-
bilities currently in TSD be transferred to DD/R. Remaining units
in TSD should be transferred to the new DD/P division recommended
above; e.g., Audio Support less Research and Dévelopment, Photo-
graphic Support less R & D, Special Assistance, Intelligence,
Personnel, Authentication, and Graphic Arts Reproduction. We
note, however, that DD/P himself would prefer to retain under his
own responsibility the R & D function as it pertaina to specific items
to be used by individual agents (audio devices, incendiary itema, etc. ).
Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European .
Division
We recommend the creation in the Western European

Division of a second Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affaira.

We suggest that this Deputy Chief have ae hie line responsibilities


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LN SS

all matters involving (_ y . ;
| 7]. Further, this officer should
have full control authority over. C
yg
. ; . . e
and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I,should

keep this officer advised on‘a daily basis C > Ly

Wear Plans
Because of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's

relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War

Plans Croup receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it

should remain organizationally as a part of the Central Support Staff

of the DD/P. ‘

Police Pro g rams

. We are convinced that United States Government support to
the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the

United Statea and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its

_work,. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes

this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should

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Fe CA pr renee
*
.

give it greater support than it has previously received, We recom-~
mend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation
2s is necessary, and that Project | C 2 c

7] be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.

Liaison with Department of State

We urge that the DD/P centralize liaison with the Department
of State and maintain careful records of all discussions betiveen the
Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every
area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in n the
Department t but that under the present system there is no organized

method for keeping the central management of thé DD/P informed

of what takes place at these meetings.

Advice to State on Black Propaganda

a.

We recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will
insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department
of State,” Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately
informed of black propaganda activities which otherwise might be
misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign
power, We have in mind our discussions with the Department which
heard expressed concern that ‘the Department was unaware of certain

black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and conse-

quently was led astray,

-I]3-

harets Srebre
rent thy

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re a a ee Oe at

CIA Personnel Under State Cover
We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of
State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We. believe

in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the

'_DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants —

and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department

allowances.

WLegitimate" LC oe -lcover

We recommend that the Agency more and more place people
under L osx ma cover by the’ Megitimate" method of recruiting |
individuals, having them [_ ; oF J

and be t Ov

J : and ioliow through a

‘nermal L og Jeareer, CIA should obviously keep £

ot J] advised concerning these individuals, work with C

of a on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial,
and covertly train them. By. this method such individuals will be
under true C. o¢ 4 cover and will not only be unknown to

other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in Cc

oF J.

-~14.


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et ae one

sent ae tea

Latin American Operations

We urge that the Agency give high priority to supporting

the expansion of activities of Latin America, and i insure that the ©
proper level of competence is assigned to these important posts.
American Friends of the Middle Eaat

| We recommend that the Project for support of the organization
known as s the American Friends of the Middle East, which is cur-
rently being run by the NE Division, be transferred to the 10 Division
inasmuch as it now transcends NE Division area responsibilities and
has activities in Africa, or, if it is determined that AFME activities

. : , . a
are not worth the Agency's support, that the project be abolished.

-~15-

we net eee epee ev mene ney sean aed enna agg mente pee gnereeeneneecene,

Prire
aed

on

©

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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF TRE -
SPUTY DIRSCTOR (INTELLIGENCE) wy

Office of the DD/I

We have carefully reviewed the organization and activities
of the DD/I's immediate office and believe that with the addition
of a full thme deputy he will be able to assert the degree of
influence on the management of ‘the units under him required for
sound operations, At present his three office assistants provide
good atatt work in this review, but we did observe that a con-
siderable amount of the intelligence produced in the DD/I area
is reviewed at no higher a level than office chief, if that.

‘ We recommend that the DD/I establish in his office a

focal point through which all intelligence, processed or unevalusted,

going to the White House must flow. If for reasons of urgency a
report is sent to the White House prior to evaluation, we recom-
mend that a special notice to the effect that it is unevaluated be
attached to the report and that an evaluation follow the report at

the earliest possible moment.

Board of National Estimates

The Office of National Estimates should be strengthened by
the addition of one top-level foreign affairs expert to the Board of
Estimates, and if obtainable a top-level scientist and a top-levol

economist. We also believe that the Board would benefit by the

. -1

aA, oh vm:

RET

<<

we

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addition of an individual experieaced in business in the international

field, provided one of sufficient caliber could be found who would

be willing to spend two.or three years on the Board of Estimates.

Control of Estimates
We urge that the DCI utilize the USIB to control the

echeduling and to limit the number of National Estimates.

Office of Operations

We recommend that the Office of Operations be abolished,
that the Contact Division be transferred to DD/P to be the nucleus
of the Domestic Division, ; NG

‘The DD/I has advised us that with the transfer of Contact
Division, Office of Operations, to the DD/P, he is considering
closer integration of the Foreign Documents Division and the
Foreign Broadcast Information Division. These units have a lot
in common: both process unclassified information, both have
considerable language capability. We believe such an integration
should be considered, On the other hand, the Assistant Director
for Central Reference believes very strongly that the Foreign
Documents Division should be assigned to OCR. He advances as
reasons; that the procurement of foreign documents are arranged
by OCR; that the dissemination of the FDD product is handled by

OCR; that OCR through its relationa with the Library of Congress

<1

SeCheT

14-0000 oe, co ; . OLGUILS
. . . , H
. and other agencies is in a good position to assist in coordinating
the exploitation of foreign documents. We urge that the DD/I
integrate FDD and FBID into the most compatible area of the —

DD/I organization,

_ . 7 ae ae r .

Support of Cenis AX ee”.
Support for the Center for International Studies (CENIS) 2
at MIT is currently being handled by the DD/P.. If such eupport, . {

is worth continuing, and we question this, we recommend that

it be transferred to the DD/I's office.

-~ 18 -

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ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (SUPPORT)

Security Office

We recommond that the burden on the Security Office for
support of the DD/P be reviewed (see DD/P section). Ia the
meantime, we believe that a careful look at the Security Office
is necessary to insure that the volume of work it {s carrying
is not in any way feopardizing {ta primary responsibility of

“insuring that every‘possible measure is takea to keep the Agency
“gecure, |

We recommend that all security clearantes be centralized
undsr the Office of Security; ¢.g., clearances that are issued
by DPD, OCI, NPIC, and other Agency components, While we
would leave the policy of granting clearances with the appropriate
officials, we believe that the Office of Security should maiatain
a centralized index for special clearances and do all of the

processing of these clearances.

Audit Staff
We recommend that the Inspection and Audit Staff check
regularly on activities in the LockiBad plant which are of vital

concern to the Agency.


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-—~

D2D Support

We recommend that the DD/S be given the responsibility for

-support to all projects under the control of DD/R, providing of

course the neccasary security safeguarda, and that in the future

no parallel support mechanism be developed in the Agency.

Automatic Data Processing

We believe the Automatic Data Processing Staff can

properly remain under the DD/S inaemuch as this is a support

machanism, although wa strongly recommend that the DD/S

iu consultation with other deputies concerned direct this staff

to aggressively pursue the objective of automation in the Agency
in such a way as to insure the ultimate compatability of auto~

matic data processing aystems throughout the intelligence

a.

cormmunity.-


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'
|
!
:

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE.
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (RESEARCH)
The Office of the Deputy Director (Research) having already
been created, we now make the following recommendations as to

those units which should be included under this Deputy.

Development Projects Divigion - Special Projects Branch

We recommend that the Special Projects Branch of DPD
plue the necessary Supporting elements, including those projects
supporting the Department of Defense in advance reconnaissance

programs, be placed under DD/R.

Technical Services Division
Set ces vivision

.We recommend that all TSD research and development

be placed under DD/R. _ *

Other Research and Development

We recommend that the extent to which research and
development for SIGINT collection equipment, including agents!
SIGINT equipment, air-borne collection, etc., should be transferred
to DD/R, be left as a matter for negotiation and agreement between
DD/I and the Director of Communications.

We recommend all research and development in support of

NPIC be transferred to DD/R.


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rs earner ete ence entnce

yee

<

PART Ul

This section contains comments and recommendations on areas
of the work of the Central Intelligence Agency and activities of the
intelligence community in which the working group was either unable
to agree, or felt that considerably more study waa needed before
action is taken. These views are presented herewith so that they

may assist and guide those who may be asked to pursue these matters

further.


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Coordination

We note your intention to abolish the present office of the
Assistant for Coordination end to create in its stead an Assistant
to DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.
With the exception of Mir. Coyne, we are fully in accord. We set
forth below our concept of the principal functions of this Assistant.

a. He should be the DCI's principal advisor on coordina-
tion matters within the community and his personal representative
in dealing on ‘such matters with top officials of the community.

b. When so directed he should represent the DCI in
negotiations and discussions on intelligence mattérs with appropriate
officials of foreign governments.

c. He should be responsible for development of Comint
and Elint policy insofar as thie is an Agency function. |

d. He should keep continually under review the general
extent and direction of the intelligence efforta of the community to
insure that such efforts fully and effectively support national policy,
submitting reports and recommendations te DCI as appropriate.

e. He should correspondingly maintain a continuing
review of activities and efforts of the Agency to insure that they
remain fully and effectively coordinated with the activities and

efforts of other members of the community.


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nee ant enn ee A RA EES A NE I TE Ee Se

<a ee

We do not consider it practicable at this time to suggest the

number or qualificaticas of supporting staff officers for this

Assistant. We feel, however, that he will need a group of such
officers and that they should be of particularly high caliber and
broad experience. The functions we visualize for this office are
highly important for the community and for CIA, They have not
been adequately handled in the past. The Assistant should be given
whatever staff the full development of his role may later require.

. Mr, Coyne does not concur in this recommendation. He die.
agrees with (a) the proposed organizational placement and title of
the recommended office, ‘because this would perpetuate the present
ineffective arrangement of the Coordination Office now in existence
and would not provide the recommended office with the stature required
to assist the DCI in fulfilling his heavy responsibilities throughout
the Intelligence Community; (b) the limitations in the functional
concepts of the office, as outlined above. Further, he does not con-
cur in this recommendation because it doss not distinguish sufficiently
the internal CIA operating functions of the DDCI from the community-
wide functions which the recommended office must perform if the

DCI is to execute effectively his principal mission as assigned in

the President's Directive of January 16, 1962. Mr. Coyne believes


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that if the office is established along the lines recommended above,
it will be incapable of effectively assisting the DCI in performing
his principal Presidentially-assigned responsibilities of (a)

coordinating and effectively guiding the total U. S. foreign intelli-

" gence effort; (b) establishing necessary policies and procedures to

assure adequate coordination of foreign intelligence activities at all
levels; (c) maintaining a continuing review, with the heads of the
Departments and Agencies concerned, of the programs and activities

of all U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence activities; and

’ (d) assuring efficiency and effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable

duplication in the total foreign intelligence effort. Mr. Coyne will
4

submit his recommendations on this subject at a later date. :!

Princeton Consultants to ONE
‘Mr. Coyne recommends that.this group be disbanded based on
advice from principal concerned officers of the Agency that the group
makee no contribution to the intelligence estimating effort. The other

members feel that on balance the group should be continued.

National Photographic Interpretation Center

We are concerned about the capability of NPIC to handle what

may be a greatly increased volume of work in coming months. We

~25-

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recommend that as a matter of priority the USIB have this matter
reviewed and insure that any increased flow of raw material does
not result in slowing down the prompt and complete processing'so

urgently required.

Caliber of Personnel
We believe that the DD/I should devote some considerable:
effort to improving the caliber of personnel in his offices. Although
we did not make a study in depth, we believe that there is a serious
_ problem in this regard in OCI and that steps should be taken under
the new management of OCI to improve the caliber of supervisory

personnel and thus improve the morale of that office.

Merger of ONE and oc!

We studied at some length the feasibility of merging the Office
of National Estimates with the Office of Current Intelligence. We
found the Office of Current Intelligence eager for a merger, the
Office of National Estimates strongly opposed. The DD/I was inclined
to favor it, but foresees certain personnel difficulties. We do not
believe that such a merger would be wise unless it was well esta-

blished that the result would be the creation of better national estimates

and current intelligence dailies and weeklies. The DD/I feels that


14-0000

he should be given at least sixty days to explore this proposal and
to prepare hia recommendations. We concur,

Mr. Coyne does not agree with the above paragraph and in lieu
thereof recommends that the ONE and OCI be merged now. He

believes that such merger will result in improved intelligence

products to support the national policy makers. !

Preparation and Dissemination of Memoranda

We have noted considerable unhappiness in the Department of

State because ONE and OCI have established the practice of distri-

buting throughout the community, and to the White House, uncoordinated
memoranda on intelligence matters. These memoranda are prepared
as “think pieces", but the Department of Siate feels that they often
seem to influence policy at high levels. We think the Department

of State has a point, and we urge‘that such memoranda be carefully
restricted to circulation within the Agency unless or until they have
been coordinated across-the-board,

‘We also urge that the DCI adopt the practice of asking other

“agencies to prepare such memoranda if the subjects fall within the

purview of their responsibilities; e. g-, the Department of State on
strictly political matters. We believe that, at a minimum, when

CIA is asked for a memorandum that inquiries should be made of

-

14-0000

other departments to determine whether such a memorandum hasn't

already been prepared or might be in the process of preparation,

White House Relations

We are concerned about Agency relationships with the White
House insofar as handling of intelligence matters is concerned. We
would like the opportunity to discuss this with you orally before

framing recommendations.

Research on International Communism
OT MUI ST

We are concerned about the reported inadequacy of research
done on International Communism. At the present time some is
done in the DD/I area in both OCI and ONE, some is done in the DD/P
area in the International Communism Division of the Counter Intelli-
gence Staff, and some is done in the State Department in the Special

«.
Studies Group of INR. The DD/I expressed himself as believing
this was sufficiently covered. The Chief, CI Staff believea it is
insufficiently covered, Representatives of the Department of State |
urged that greater expertise be brought to bear on the subject.
Inasmuch as it will fall squarely on the shoulders of the DCIif not
enough is being done, we urge that the matter be reviewed by the DCI
at an early date to satisfy himself that all necessary research in this

field 1a ‘being accomplished.

- 28 «

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Office of Scientific Intelligence

On the new chart we have shown OSI as a division under DD/R
since we understand this to be‘ your desire. We feel, however, that
OSI in its major activities is more closely linked to DD/I than ta

DD/R and therefore more properly belengs under DD/I, DD/I himself

‘strongly supporte this view and urges that he retain OSI. We believe

that if this is approved, scientists in OSI should be members of DD/R's

career service, subject to transfer between OSI and units of DD/R as

might be agreed between the deputy directors concerned.

DD/R's Operational Responsibilities

We have some concern relative to your intention to have DD/R
carry into the operational phase his responsibility for certain major
projects involving complex and coordinated operations which are
highly sensitive and where a mis;step could have serious national
or international repercussions. DD/R's key people will be mostly
scientists, technological experts or leaders in specialized develop-
ment fields, Such individuals on the average have no professional
intelligence operating experience and little background or interest
in detailed operational problems requiring thorough inter-agency

coordination, painstaking and tedious follow-up actions and careful

attention to security details. DD/P, on the other hand, has a number

°


14-0000 -

of top-flight people who for some years have dealt almost exclusively
with just such problerns,

We recognize all the difficulty, in the course of a project of this
type, of shifting responsibility from one deputy to the other; and we
realize that development must also lap over into the operational
phase. We suggest having as a general rule (but granting that excep-
tions will arise) that when operation begins the responsibility for the

operations should be the DD/P's, but that DD/R should retain his
responsibility for seeing that the equipment he haa developed continues

to function properly. There is here attached a specially classified

annex, “e


“

ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

National Indications Center - ‘Vatch Committee
sational maications Center - w/atcn Gommittes

We have examined quite carefully the National Indications
Center, ita organization, its capacity to support fully the Watch
Committee, and its relations with other departments and agencies,
We note that opinions within the community concerning NIC and its

functions vary widely ~~ from the feeling that it should be abolished,

or combined with DIA indications center -= to the belief that it is

entirely satisfactory in its present situation. We do not fully sub-
scribe to either of these views, ‘
The functions of the Watch Committee, and NIC, with their

terms of reference, were developed prior to the time when DIA was

created, Now DIA has developed‘a strong capability to provide both

early warning and indications of approaching crises to the community.
Its capacity in thia regard will develop even further in the months
ahead,

We are aware that USIB is now considering the Fitch Committee
Report. But we doubt that few if any members of that Committee
were intimately aware of the full capacity of DIA and of its future
plans. We note that General Carroll was reluctant to be drawn into

the Committee's deliberations,


14-0000

We recommend, therefore, that except as noted below, NIC
operations be allowed to continue as they are for the next three or
four months, At that time we recommend a thorough review of the
Watch Committee and NIC operations, particularly in the light of
DIA's capabilities and activities, with a view to redefining the

responsibilities and functions of NIC as may then appear desirable.

Mr. Coyne disagrees and recommends that the NIC be abolished

now, and that the DIA be assigned the national: strategic warning

function and that its personnel complement be enlarged to include
representation from appropriate members of USIB. Mr. Coyne
points to reasons outlined in his memorandum to the DCI dated
February 5, 1962.

We do believe that the National Indications Center should be
properly manned and should receive both the high caliber of pere-
sonnel at the proper grade and the number of personnel to perform
its function promptly and efficiently. In this connection the Depart-
ment of State has no representatives at NIC at present and the DCI
should ask the Secretary to remedy this situation immediately.

We would suggest a change in the present method of preparing
the Watch Committee report. If NIC is adequately manned, we see

no reason why it should not draft, 24 hours in advance, the weekly

- 32-6

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sehtr

_ Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera- -

tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it

could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and dis seminated.
Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspect

of all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe that

substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled

out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNiEs rather than

being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is some-
times the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of.
views of the intelligence community. If there are differing minority
views on the part of one or more agencies, including CIA, these

should be spelled out in appropriate footustes.

CIA Relations with the Department of State

ao.

. We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State.

’ Several matters of concern in this area are mentioned in the section

on the DD/P, We would note that "covering" for the Agency poses

certain problema for the Department in its relations with the Congress.
These include such items that attract Congressional interest as: .
the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political

section; the designation of CIA officers asL 2%); the CIA role in

-~ 33 -

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handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend
close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and
that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro- |
priate Congressional committees on these matters. |
We are particularly concerned that the c 2 ¢ 2 designa-
tions of CIA personnel C 24 J, particularly c ae are go

revealing, We recommend that the Agency arrange with State to

- Cb -  « 24 . aq designations.

The Department of State indicated concern about the level in
CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also. noted that |
on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CIA on
Comint policy matters. This factor is one. of the reasons why we

recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant —

_ to the DCI for Coordination and Intelligence Community Guidance.

State's Counter Communism Office
ee One Vitice

We reviewed with some interest the proposed creation in the
office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the

Department of State of a strategy group for combatting communism. .

While the full scope of its function is as yet unclear, wa believe that -

CIA should follow the developments in thia office closely as its

activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.


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State's Overational Center
We reviewed with some interest the embryonic operational
center which the Department of State is developing. We found that

this is an interesting development and would obviously have bearing

‘on the intelligence community,

State at White House Briefings

We recommend that in accordance with the present practice of
a representative of the Defense Intelligence Agency attending the
briefings of the White House staff by CIA, that a representative of

the Department of State also be invited to attend these meetings.

a

Receipt of Top Classification Messages

We recommend that the DCI take up directly with the President
the preblem of receiving all Pertinent measagea dealing with foreign
affairs which might have any bearing on intelligence estimates or
reports, or on covert operations, We have particularly in mind
such communications as between the President and Khrushchev, etc.
We believe that it is important for the DCI to see such messages in
order to give proper guidance to the intelligence and operational

activities of the Agency.


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4

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 3, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr, Lyman B, Kirkpatrick
Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency

In the course of our discussions aS members of Mr, McCone'gs
Working Group on Intelligence and in our March 28 meeting with
Messrs, McCone and Carter, fr indicateg that I did not concur
in the "Coordination" Section of the draft report which we
discussed with the pcr and the DDcr,

In line with the foregoing, it would be appreciateg ir
you would;

1) Amend the Second sentence of the Section to reaq:
"With the exception of Mr, Coyne, we are fully in accord,”

- 2) Add at the end of the Section a new Paragraph
' reading ag follows:

"Mr, Coyne does not concur in this recommenda
tion. He disagrees with (a) the Proposed
organizational Placement and title of the recommended

of (a) coordinating and effectively Guiding the total
U. S. foreign intelligence effort; (b) establishing
necessary Policies and Procedures: to assure adequate
coordination of foreign intelligence activities at
all levels; (c} maintaining a continuing review,


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w

"with the heads of the Departments and Agencies
concerned, of the programs and activities of all

U. S. agencies engaged in foreign intelligence
activities; and (da) assuring efficiency and
effectiveness, and avoiding undesirable duplication
in the total foreign intelligence effort, e
Coyne will submit his recommendations on this
subject at a later date,"

I would appreciate receiving a copy of the revised report
of the Working Group at your earliest convenience,

 $ PIL

J. Patrick Coyne

14-0000

f-.

y
4 oS
\

, anetednan ahem

uo

| a

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: After Action Report on the Findings |

of the Working Group

This is with reference to the memorandum of 6 April
1962 which presented you with the final report of the Working
Group which you established in January to consult and advise
on the organization and activities of the Central Intelligence
Agency. This report indicates the action which has been
taken on the findings of the Working Group, and if no action
has been taken the reasons therefor. The comments here
are in the same order as they appeared in the report of the
Working Group.

(ligne) Lo son B, Mistouciciek

Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director

‘Attachment

cc: DpCcI
LBK:jre: Retyped gmk (23 Oct. 62)

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee w/att
1 ~ DDCI w/att

1- Exec. Dir. w/att

Lan

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1983. ee Ord
" GIARISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM: © 2? Cctober 1962 AAS .
: me oo _ a Of DT

14-00000 . . —_—aT-s
. . : CT:

Metis y
Re ee ed

Operational Aids Unit
oa es Vnit

This recommendation was rendered inapplicable in view ‘of the
decision not to transfer TSD to DD/R.

Deputy Chief for British Commonwealth Affairs, Western European
Division

As recommended, this position has been created and is now
occupied by Mr. John Caswell; A review will shortly bs made to
determine the degree of control that this unit has over Liaison, |

War Plans

As recommended, the DDCI is giving full support to the War
Plans Group, and is assisted in this effort by the Executive Director.

Police Programs

a : As recommended, CIA is giving the police program greater
4 support. An Agency Officer heads the police program in AID, and
: _he has been provided an Executive Officer by the Agency. Project
. (ENDOMORPH)will be transferred to the GI Staff. .

. Liaison with the Department of State -
ber tment of state

The DD/P has centralized the control of liaison with the Depart-
ment of State and careful records are now maintained of all discussions.

Advice to State on Black Propaganda

The Chief, CA Staff, is now charged with advising State, and
other departments where appropriate, of any black Propaganda activi-
ties that might be misinterpreted by the U.S. Government if they were

-presumed to be legitimately the statement of another government. .

CLA Personnel Under State Cover
EE tat Cover
The DD/P is making a thorough review of State cover directed

toward insuring that CIA personnel are not out of line in their various
allowances with their State Department colleagues.

14-0000

Ra uisiedh

aetna teat ens ee

Assistant to DD/P for Paramilitary and Air Support Operations ‘
We recommend the creation of an office in the DD/P to be
known as Paramilitary and /ir Support Operations, under the
direction of an Assistant DD/P, to develop the capability for covert
paramilitary and air support operations. We suggest that the bulk
of this new organization be located at Isolation where it will have
facilities for organization and training. Sucha move will also relieve
the burden on the headquarters building. We recommend that the
individual to head this organization be drawn from military service
and be a senior Colonel ora Brigadier General with wartime para-
military experience. Having in mind the total disestablishment of
the DPD i in its Present form, we recommend that the Air Support

Branch of DPD be transferred to the new Paramilitary Office of DD/P.

Domestic Division - a.

We endorse the proposal to create a Domestic Division, We |
strongly urge that the new Domestic Division utilize the Contact
Division of OO, which is to be transferred. from the DD/I to the DvP,
as the nucleus for field worl in the United States. We also believe
that this Domestic Division should take over those functions of the
Cover and Commercial Staff presently carried out by the Commercial.

Group, plus all those activities of the Cover Division which involve


14-0000 : Wiaste ities

| all matters involving liaison with the Britieh or with Canadian) ,

| Australian and New Zealand intelligence ‘services except matters)

o “concerned with, Sigint and Comsee, Further, this officer should

have full control authority o over fiaison exchange of information 3

ee)

7 : with ‘the British and the above mentioned Commonwealth services, /

eet ee

and all other components of the Agency, including the DD/I,should

keep this officer advised ona daily basis ‘of liaison relations ¥ with a

\ the Britiah services!

War Plans

Because of the vital importance of war plans to the Agency's 8
relations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, we recommend that the War
‘Plane Group receive direct support from the DDCI, even though it

should remain organizationally as apart of the Central Support Staff

ofthe DD/P. *

a

Police Prog rams
WwW ¢ are convinced that United States Government support to
the police in friendly nations can provide great benefits to the
United States and that some of these benefits will assist CIA in its
_work,. The President has recently indicated to AID that he wishes

«

this program to receive strong support. We believe that CIA should

14-0000 wouasi tie 3

give it greater support than it has previously received. We recom- _
mend that the police group in the CI Staff receive such augmentation

as is necessary, and that Project ENDOMORPH (police training

om
a

‘school)’be transferred from the NE Division to the CI Staff.

1
|
|
|
|
|
| Liaison swith Department of state . | — 7
We urge that the DD/ P centralize liaison with the Department.
| of State and maintain careful records of all discussions between the |
Agency and State Department officials. We note that nearly every.
area division chief has a weekly meeting with his counterpart in the
Department but that under the present system there is no organized
’ method for keeping the central management of the DD/P informed
an ‘of what takes place at these meetings, . .

coe a Advice to State on Black Propacanda
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We recommend that the DD/P develop procedures which will
insure that other appropriate agencies of the government (Department
of State,” Defense, White House and USIA) are kept appropriately
informed of black propaganda activities which otherwisé might be
misunderstood and believed to be legitimately the views of a foreign
power. We have in mind our discussions with the Department which
heard expressed concern that ‘the Department was unaware of certain :

black propaganda activities relating to Communist China and conse-

quently was led astray,

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CIA Personnel Under State Cover
We recommend that CIA personnel under the Department of

State cover make greater efforts to truly live their cover. We believe
in this connection that the DCI should receive assurances from the

: DD/P, after proper study, that CIA allowances for rents, servants
and entertainment are in line with comparable State Department |
allowances. |
"Legitimate" Foreign Service! Cover
. We recommend that the Agency more and more place people
under F Foreign | Service cover by the’ “Legitimate” method of recruiting
individuals, having them take and j pass the Foreifa Service. exams |
and be gommissioned in the F oreign Service and follow through a

‘normal ‘Foreign Service/career, CIA should obviously keep the ?

Department jadvised concerning these individuals, work with the y

\ Department) on their assignments which will be mutually beneficial,

" and covertly train them. By this method such individuals will be

under true: Foreign Service’cover and will not only be unknown to
other intelligence services, but also to their colleagues in'the

\ Foreign Service, /

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_ Watch Committee report, circulate it to all agencies for considera- —

tion prior to discussion at the Watch Committee meeting when it

could be decided upon in final form and reproduced and disseminated. ,
_ Related to the Watch Committee -- but also an important aspect

of all coordinated intelligence community reports -- we believe that

substantive disagreements should be encouraged and even spelled

‘out in Watch Committee reports; that NIEs and SNIEs rather than

being suppressed or covered by watered down language as is ‘some-
times the case today, in all cases should reflect the consensus of
views of the intelligence community. lf there are differing minority
views on the part of one or more agencies, including CLA, these .

Bhould be spelled out in appropriate footnotes.

CIA Relations with the ¢ Department of State

_ We examined the relations of CIA with the Department of State.

, Several matters of c concern in this area are mentioned in the section

on the DD/P. We would note that "covering" for the Agency poséa

certain problema for the Department in its relations with the Congress. °
These include such items that attract Congressional interest as: |
the number of officers in each Embassy, particularly the political

section; the designation of CIA offi icera as(FSRa; the CIA role in

~ 33 ~

SECRET

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SLUR
handling State communications, etc. In these areas we recommend

close liaison be maintained with State on Congressional matters and

that whenever possible State be given a helping hand with the appro-

priate Congressional committees on. these matters.

We are particularly concerned that the Foreign Service designa-

tions of CIA personnel funder § State | cover’ » particularly ESR, are 20

: revealing. We recommend that the Ageney arrange with State to.

vee

“cover CIA personnel equally with FSS and FSOsde signations,

The Department of State indicated concern about the level in

CIA on which Comint policy matters are handled, and also noted that |

on occasions there appears to be lack of coordination within CLA on

Comint policy matters. This factor is one of the reasons why we

recommend raising the level of Sigint policy matters to the Assistant

_ to the DCI for Coordination and Tptelligence Community Guidance. .-

State's Counter Communism Office -

' We reviewed. with some interest the proposed creation in the

' office of the Deputy Under Secretary 3 for Political Affairs of the

Department of State ofa strategy group for combatting communism.

While the full scope of its function i is as yet unclear, we believe that

CIA should follow the developments in thie office closely aa its

activities will have considerable bearing on the work of the Agency.

. - 34 -

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