187-10014-10227, | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System Date: TIT/2015
Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: — 157-10014-10227
RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILENUMBER:  07-M-132
Document Information
ORIGINATOR: = SSCIA
FROM: DAWSON, R.
~ TO:
TITLE: DIEM
DATE: 06/00/1975
PAGES: 157
SUBJECTS :
CIA
COLBY, WILLIAM
VIETNAM
KENNEDY, JOHN
DIEM, ASSASSINATION
DOCUMENT TYPE: SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified
RESTRICTIONS: = 1B;1C
CURRENT STATUS: ~~ Redact
DATE OF LASTREVIEW: — 05/05/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS: CC Box 133

v9.1

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Date : 08/08/95
Page : 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10227 .
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M~-132 ;

ORIGINATOR
FROM

TO

TITLE
DATE

PAGES
SUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE
CLASSIFICATION
RESTRICTIONS
.CURRENT STATUS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW
' OPENING CRITERIA
COMMENTS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

SSCIA
DAWSON, R.

DIEM
06/00/75

157

VIETNAM

DIEM, ASSASSINATION
COLBY, WILLIAM

CIA

KENNEDY, JOHN

SUMMARY
TOP SECRET
REFERRED
POSTPONED IN FULL
01/20/99

c¢C Box 133

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CATEGORIES:

BicCone Naw

Coloy Hillsman

Xennedy, Jonn F. Tung ea
icNamarra Diem io wg
Lodge *
Act - ay “ a
ket OCCURRENC®: Im a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA Sarticipants

Seing MeCGone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that
aLodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. MecCone commented

hat he believed that we should move cautiusly, that. we should talk seriously to Diem
gand that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic
aview of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach
wbe made toNhu ito seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we

had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared
by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President

asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent

to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some
real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the
Presiden jou. ch-as—the——
instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week. , :

IG Report 1967 (CIA 21-22
PILE: epo 967 (CIA), p.

DATE: Dawson
6/27/15

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F'.
MC CONE, JOHN

DIEM

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

5 Oct. 1963

Feq Ploeg coeos AH

OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when thé telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent

to Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT

@ KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA

“should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE

m felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had preat reser-

& Vations. concerning DIEM and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we

® could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My pre-

“cise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I

_ was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a
good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if DIEM was removed we would have not one
coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might
last. several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be

SOURCE: STAPF:
-Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of
FILE: pp. 62-32

a ee A eS SY cee EE SS Ae Se et ee ch ee seed are eh ne et te me nin ind eee ood

R. DAWSON

DATE:
— 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: more stability if DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him
and hope that some group of generals could run the country better."

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PERSONS/ENTITIES: — paprpy, 256 pares: | CATEGORIES:

RICHARDSON ‘TAYLOR LODGE =< {29 Aug. 1963 DLE ears ae. =
SPERA HARKINS ] 4 AR e
CONEIN TRUEHEART / i

AY oe

MINH WEEDS, Gen. Richard ¢. CARD 1 of.
a Chief of Staff, MAC
CURRENCE:

On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology
of August 1963 coup activities as follows: —
Sea ed Sep eceeveres

"At. O745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact
GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to
GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and com-
menting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and
a» Given strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH

and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a
fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH,

abeqd GTSESPEe PID0ad Gsceos AN

"When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't. )

- SOURCE: I.G STAPF;

- REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12 Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

SESS a ee ace ce ae ee ee ee eo te a

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CATEGORIES:

CCURRENCE:

we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON
advised him of our meeting with GENERAL WEEDE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which
RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view
that. RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying, out a coup. RICHARDSON
expressed a firm dissenting opinion." (12)

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PERSONS / i)

. DATES;
RICHARDSON, John DIEM 25 August 1963
LODGE, Henry Cabot CIA
TRUEHARY, William
HARKINS

do theip Dest to carry out
Successor Pegimes ." (7-8)

Aneto;
rters

IG, REPORT 3

967, Dp. 7-8
Part c

1
32423615 Page 1

WW 50955 DocId

mae |
. PERSO NS/ENTITIES: ; DATES: | CATEGORIES:
HARRIMAN, Averell KENNEDY, John F. ~ ,

HILSMAN, Romer ~° TAYLOR, Maxwell

McCONE, John (Mil. ass't to

MeNAMARA, Robert Pres. )

RUSK, Dean GILPATRIC, Roswell
OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains. the following. description of the events of August 25,
1963, from a book by MARGUERITE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek
traredy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24,
1963, a date made more sipnificant because it was a Saturday. .Washington usually- empties on
sunmer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.

"The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON.
It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER
HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task
foree. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CITA DIRECTOR
JOHN MecCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (con't)

SOURCE: STAFF? Dawson

LG.

REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6

, Fier C DATE: 28.6.75
FILE: —=
PERSONS/ENTIT IEG: : DATES: i CATEGORIES: _ .
(cont) hash fay
HELMS, Richard ; fuby Siet ah
DIEM RPE Met nk
NHU (CARD 2 of 4) a

OCCURRENCE:
SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball mame in New York. PRESIDENT KENNEDY
was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over
and the telegram long on its way. ;

"| the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to
‘unleash! the Vietnamese nilitary, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which
the generals had been talking for so many years. e

"|. the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy
of one war at a time. It-envisaged the generals' making war on their own Rovernment , and
with the implicit blessing of the United States.

"the substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)

A

HW 50955 Docild:324293615 Page 12

PERSQNS/ENTITLES: DATES: | ; CATEGORIES: s

rly

Mp
(CARD 3 of WY)" H

CCURRENCE:

so persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and
cestore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable antici-
sated, DIEM would not. do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS
and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.

it

_» » the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday
2vening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at
jyannis Port.

"The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC . . . had the cable described
0 him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't. )

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: CATEGORIES:
DPiew

Sb be
a AY , wal d ah &4 pt .
eek ae a,

OCCURRENCE:
unportant set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend But he did
Ss é * not feel that h
ought to vete the telegram since . . . it had the ‘approval of the PRESIDENT, ' .

. "In MeCONE's absence, the cable was described
WEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel dispo
che PRESIDENT. (5-6)

» again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS ,
sed to veto something ‘approved by

CARD 4 of 4

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)
NHU °

DIEM

pepe. 243

DATES: CATEGORIES:

24 August 1963

OCCURRENCE:

In. a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, '% oll oe abe’ %
"The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation
in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM
himself may have to go. ‘The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions
apainst BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that: the USG cannot
support a DIEM rewime that includes the NHU's and that "we will give them direct support

in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism; (3) to make statements in
Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids." —

"The telegram includes the following statement: "The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should
urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (eon't.)

SOURCE? 1G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5 STAFF: Dawson

DATE: — 28.6.75
FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

OCCURRENCE? “(con't from card 1)
we Might bring about. DIEM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will under~
stand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this opera—

tion should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take
to achieve our ebjectives.'" (4-5)

CARD 2 of 2

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PEKSUNS/ENTIUPIES :
Thich Tri fuang
Diem

DATES: CATEGORIES:
Aug. 21, 1963 | Diem _Y

CCURRENCE : ae

Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her oWn miybriences, was more a political
\

command post than a holy place. It was the headquarter ‘from which the militant i
Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political way against the Diem regime.
According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of
Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two
of us."
Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen
pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists. (Page 181)

SOURCE: Qur Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, STAFF: Dawson
Harper and Rowe

PILE: DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
[GENERAL T TON THAT DINH, MILITARY 4 4

GOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RD 21 August 1963! DIEM

CORPS

CONEIN Lode, Henry C-
NGO DINH NHU

____ AMBASSADORS NOLTING
OCCURRENCE: "On the night oF the elst of August. GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military gov-
ernor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corns, has established a curfew. If I recall

correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen afte:

that time would be -- shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that
time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of'
NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon.
What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador
LODGE was on his way to take over". -p. 21

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON

AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page i5

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: [ CATEGORIES:

‘Milting, Ambassador
Lodge, Ambassador
Diem .

Thich Tri Quang

Aug. 21, 1963 | Diem a

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins claims that
five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry

».the taids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place
Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam.” Higgins goes
on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this
time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no
intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many
consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem Ta Pesan explosion,
it would be a pansto the United States if they took at e when the new
Ambassador wad“? so ae ea of Vietnam. For the same ne wedges ete was taken not |
to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. ; Swas that Washington
could be blamed for something about whiig (page 183)
€

SOURCE:

DATE:
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTLULES t 7 | pares: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN, CEA officer (Saigon) . , t
DON, General 8/21/63 Diem

Non August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN" [an officer ae the Sore? _
Saigon station) and General DON, the latter asked for US ®. government

assurances of support aasusances—of-support for moves against the DIEM
regime." (3)

1967 I.G. Report, Part C, p3. . RD
FILE? on DATE:  ¢ sno rer

AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 16

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GENERAL. DON

ANBASSADOR NOLTING July 1963

CONEIN

OCCURRENCE: On July I, 1963, CONETN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps
“at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public "meeting and the hotel

was jammed packed. CONEIN states. that:

"Tt was at that time on the 4th of July that I

nad the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when: GENERAL DON t«
me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning. a
ported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or Sth of July, that more indi-

cations.... p. 20.

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

ee ee me ee re a ee eres Se ee ee eect ce et rh an

PERSONS/ENTIP IES:

EN. DUONG VAN MINH
EN. TRAN VAN DON
AJ, GEN. LE VAN KIM
EN, TRAN THIEN KHIEM

DAES:

LO yrs ceeuneed Als
Sh, L1G%,
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OCCURRENCE? “he mitiet CORSA ChE Sie

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STAPF :

R. DAWSON
DATE:

30 June 1975

a an a el em i eee Se ee i a ne

4 hee :

STAPF :

“p fa (hed, SOURCE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, }————" Dawson

pase a i o.

BYTE

e

gars; 6/30/75

AW 50955 DociId:32423615 Page if

7 » DATES:
prea ye Spy ey ws AA Baa

ore PERSON S/HNT J ta KS . 7/63

GEN. MINE

NGO DINH WHU

“OC CURRENCIES

_ ees ee : ~“TSTAR ER: Davson
Hearings, S.S.C.2,, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

page ten. DATE: 6/30/75
BILE:

“SOURCE?

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
aS EO

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the Situation in South Vietnam" the
following quotation appeared: "if —— as is likely -- Diem fails to

carry out truly and promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists,
disorders will probably flare again and the chances of coup or assassina-—
tion attempts against. him become even better. . . We do not think .
the €ommunists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some
combination of his non Onmunist opponents. A non—lommunist Successor
regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but,
given continued Support. from the U. S., could provide reasonably effec-

tive leadership for the Government and the war effort." (1-2) ~
SOURCE:

1967 TT. Rennnt nant anda?

HW S0955 Docid: 32423615 Page 16

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES : _ DATES

:
: a | ee
DIEM . || May 6, 1963 | DIEM Va .
‘HICH TRI QUANG . | ;
OCCURRENCE? Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any

religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic-- having any precedence over the National
Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the
Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made —
possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti-
Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the
excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the Nationa! Vietnamese flag
on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number.

SOURCIS: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,} STAPF:
“T9565 Dawson, R.
FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN
DIEM <~
MADAME, NHU
OCCURRENCE:

CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their
antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be
Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in.
light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish Some mustard at

a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselve:

against. the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or
not poss became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regime.
pp. 42-44. .

SOURCE?

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
PILE:

R. DAWSON

Taster F WATS:

AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 19

PERSONS /ENTTTIES : DATES : CATEGORIES:
TRUEHEART, WILLIAM » | June 1963 DIEM v~

MECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA)

NOLTING, AMBASSADOR

Cad (fr

OCCURRENCE! Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue
was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibilit
for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting
Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Meditterranean vaction at the time.)

. "According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from
Washington, ‘direct,relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States
had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government..,' In despair Trueheart ~
in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures
(police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), t niged States would
be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions , .as* n we, did two months
later. The warning waS a momentous step. It amount edntOy :

OUNCES Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper Bate omar Dawson, R.
Row, 1965 ; pare, July 2, 1975
FILE: - i

CATEGORIES :

PERSONS /ENTIPIES: DATES :
|

OUCURRIAICH {continuation)
the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the
Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics...
perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup"™' (100)

el A
Ty %
ee .

i

SOURCE > Our Viet Nam Niehtware, Higgins, Harper and Row} STAPF:

TATE

HW 50955 Docild:324293615 Page 20

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN "Summer 1963" | DIEM ~~

NHU, NGO DINH

MADAME, NHU

CAN, NGO DINH

OCCURRENCE: coNEIN stated that the attacks in May In Hue followed up by
on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of oe ei betea
by making them become a political entity which they had never been pelo ts ae stat
that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAIB and JSP aon Sem
as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power aa ae er
ment at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME ee e ° ser
the womens’ solidarity movement. DIEM was felt te be out of touch with reality an eis
ting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp.

aE”

SOURCE: START:
Hearings, SSCI,.June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: 7 R. DAWSON |
Se duly 1, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN DIEM a

"middle May .

196 3"

OCCURRENCE? CONEIN said that the DIEM
eould not understand their deing so. He
chance to get out of it and Bet out of it
the 8th of May incident. in HUE by meeting
people who were killed. when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue.

been done, I think that 1d have 6 bet 3 tae on
3 at we wou ve been much better off....This was a tumin int
the political situation...." pp. 41~42 & Pe of

government started the Buddhist antagonism but
gave his personal opinion as that "they had a
very gracefully within the first two weeks after
the demands of paying off the families of those

SOURCE:

TAFE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

mrrm.

R. DAWSON

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 21

PERSONS /ENLTIP IES : DATES t CATEGORIES :

DIEM / | May 8, 1963 | DIEM ~~
MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp. ?)

i
)
1
i
}
;
}

OTT TRE PONT OTS «
OCCURRENCE: "Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation
of the Nue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical commission led by
Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a
man of integrity by the Americans.)' The commission also included the Surgeon General
of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of
witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of ¢ ape deaths on
May 8.

“At the time, nonetheless, Diem' S > regime claimed that plasticepgh

a
d the deaths was
widely ridiculed.

“Unfortunately, no American officials were witness “toh ng intidence. The American con-

—— had son the He of | town put be BViet ita saves gi sbelicyesthe overnnent . 55 gi iprts to place

ade ze ry nA
Oar Viet Naan tne Higgins, Harper and ovarre Dawson, R.
Row, 1965 parE: July 2, 1975
FILE i
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES *

THICH TRI QUANG
NGUTEN VAN BANG (Prevince Chief)
MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV, CHIEF)

May 8, 1963 | DIEM

OCCURRENCE: ‘A

a Nguyen, Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang sy said that "While we
were inside, two loud explosions ‘suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the
sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and- exploding hand grenades.'"" In the confusion Major
Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a
Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged
signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of
these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station.
(95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming
from the Interior Minister which ‘found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal
splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably
made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96)

SOURCE . ‘ STAPF

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins,

Harper and Row, | Dawson, R.
1965 | | pn:
FILE: ; DATE: July 2, 1975

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 22

PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: z
THICH TRE QUANG “1 May 8, 1963 | DIEM /
NCUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief) ° |
MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief) H

OCCURRENCE: According to Higgins on May 8, 1963-on the, ' ddhist birthday Thich Tri
Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government
speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri
Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then
made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. © Thich Tri
Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this
oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen
Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would
not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would
fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy
then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd.
Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94) :

SOURCE: Our Viet Nan Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,} SANE:
1905 : Dawson, R.

FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975

CATEGORIES:

Diem ~~

PERSONS /ENTITIES :

Trich Tri Quang
Diem

OCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of
May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly
the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world. Complaints of
alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant. and his. accomplices in a campaign
of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented
no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.

‘Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and
techniques of governing."

AACE ee wae: wee ee Ey . a.

RW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 23

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
Colby Teo, Uiewh Can 1O/G5 Dien
Conan
“lay

OCCURRENCE:

Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought
of assassination was not aimed at Dien but at Slut and Can, Dien's two
rotuers who were considered the evil influence of the sovernnent. "The
2a of removing Nhu £rom Vietnam was one that was discussed in great detail
ind a great deal of pressure was put on Diem to send fis brother out of
the country." At one point To nade a steeestion that perhaps I could con-
vince him of the desirability of leavine the country for the bencfit of :
iis own, of the country itself, That fT could so over areal areue hin intofs e)
Mhat think is the separable thing from the Actual decision to shoot Dien,
Po think the decision to shoot Dien Was a conscience decision taken by the

renerals which ‘c cae as a very new deve lepmert hiring the coup, but let's

face

if Soe a ie af 4-
SOURCE: wovenmowe Pages '
, Jawson
earines, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Colby DATE:
FILE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DU CATEGORIES:
11/2/63 f = Dien

ni, Heo Dinh
mein
anh

OCCURRENCE:
mein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassina-
on was there a discussion of the killing of Dien. Further, there had never
‘en any discussion at any time about Diem himself being killed by anybodk.

i fact, the generals and many people wanted Diew tea be around but they could
‘t stand Hhu and Madawe Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66.

SOURCE: ° TARR?
uo Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975 Dawson

32423615 Page 24

AW 50955 Docla

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ' CATEGORIES:

COLBY, WILLIAM ,

MINH, GENERAL , 1 November 1963} DIEM J
NHUNG

CONETN | ;

Nhu.
OCCURRENCE? COLBY stated that "Apparentiy the decision by several of the generals, the
ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an
officer, a stall armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the
other part of town. He and his brother were put: in an armored personnel carrier with an
officer, a young Vietnamese wno was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, and
they went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at head-
quarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. .That officer, incidentally,
and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently/ when this junta of generals
was overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that.oceasion to shoot him."

po. 16-19.

SOURCE: yo uohe STAMPS R, DAWSON

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19

ATE:

FILE: ae 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES : CATEGORIES:
: | CATEGORIES
DIEM | May 7, 1963 | pray A

THICH TRI QUANG

‘

OCCURRENCE?
OO The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached’Hue on May 7, 1963.
Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister,of Interior,

Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on‘the same date as the circular arrivéd “to the Bud-
dhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not ¥é ‘enforced. "The leaders
of the monks were very pleased,"'said Minister Long. "they Liste ed*to me and told me
that I had given complete satisfaction to their desires ‘Quane was present during this
exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the rangement not to enforce
the regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could
reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according
to lliggins was that Kuang sent aifew monks around to tell the people to haul down the
flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers

actions. "The monks were told to te]1 the population that this was being done as a
SOURCE: Pesala ot Dens oder aid Buddhist Aig: OF) STAPF 3
R.

“Our Viet Nan Nichtmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, , Dawson,

1965 |
PILE: pDATE: July 2, 1975

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 25

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ; DATES: CATEGORIES:
MeCone »
hice DIEM ~~
Kahn H ;

In responge to. % guestion as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate

Mr. Diem and" “®had sent a telegram jn conjunet lo ‘that suggestion, MéCone testified
that he did not think it. was Mr. Diem#"° CASAS that "there was a prog 2sal, one

of a number of proposals, in connection with the difficult political situation that -
existed in. South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination’ Mr. Nhu and. General Kanh.... —

when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down"

(4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations.We

were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basi s of considered judgement
that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final an alysis solve any

problem..", (5).

TAFE s

Gordon Rhea

DATE? 6/27/75

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 26

HW 50955 DoclId: 32423615 Page 27

PEKSONS/ENTIPIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
TEAR BDLLES Mar 16, 1960 MONGOOSE ;
SPECIAL GROUP
DIEM 1~

CCURRENCE:

6 the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans
to ere e bane radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listening audience. 4
VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam... an
commented that. this appears to be_a situation where S. F, training might be in onaer-
DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the u
area to assess the situation on the spot." DULLES also discussed briefly "the possibil y
of assisting the South Vietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin. the north.

STAFF:
KELLEY
DATE:
6/27/75

ad ff Ef hoy

t Pap hey gate

fe fed v ae Brn
el Eee on

bY

Minutes of Special Group eating, March’ 16, 1960.
a oe
, SETy fe

ay

DATES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
FERSONS/ENTITIES

/ CATEGORIES:

Lansdale May 12, 1960 Diem ~
Dulles Special Group
Hare

Irwin

OCCURRENCE;

On May 12, 1960
from President Diem for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr.
"that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use
Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments
could no doubt be made, Mr. Dulles said that “Lansdale could be counted
On to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated

» the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation

Hare said
General

to upset Diem." 4

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975
FILE:

HW 450955 Docld:32423615 Page 23

2 SROONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: i

STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM |

NGO. BINH NHU 1962 " DIEM /
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENT |
OF VIETNAM, COLBY, HARKINS
WESTMORELAND, GENERAL .
OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER ¢
THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and th
MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program was
that of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security with:
hamlets and villages in order S3"the people could deny access of food and taxes to the
VIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspic
of the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including
small sections.” ». 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL. HARKINS ar
it was knowm to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.

CATEGORIES:

SOURCE: STAFY:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein <., R. DAWSON

TILE: DATE: :
Pil. DATE? 39 June 1975
PK | PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORTES:
Maxwell Taylor Special Group Aug -
27 Sept 62 - Mooncoosr™ente
Diem)

OCCURRENCES , ~~ ee
laylor states that the Special Group and the Sencial Group Augmented considered a proposal by
SIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REpublic of Vietnam. This had
seen prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Nefense.

-aylor added that the Special Group aéked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared.

(t was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support

of this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of
rattle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be Flown out

of Saigon , using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese

vir rorce markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists,.piléts documented South Vietnam-
sé citizens. e ¥

*

SOURCE? . ~~ } BOS STR RTT -
——~—=" Maxwell Taylor! saméfiarandum SARE pay

Sept 27, 1862." Gp : Oy
FTLE: ee name 6/20/76

HW 50955 Docla:324273615 Page 29

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air foree pilots, Vietnamese Air

“CONELE

February 1962

PERSONG/ENPTTTES : | CATEGORIES:
t
r

Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. ‘This was not the first
indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th
was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the

different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was Sh

political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the
military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un-
able, at this time, to determine this fact. ‘here was an isolated dissidence within the
military structure. ‘his was reported In February and March of 1962." pp, 16-17.

SOURCE: “ee Sea

Hearings, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Conetri R. DAWSON
VA DATE:

FILE: be 30 June 1975

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 30

IG/ENTITIES: . DATES t | CAREGOH INS :

February 1962 | DIEM 4

|

6CCURRENCE: GONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air

Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first
indication there was something. wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th
was another attempted coup. At that tine, in February, I was asked if I would go to the

different military leaders which I mew and had known in the past, to find out what was iver

political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the
military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was un-
able, at this time, to determine this fact. ‘There was an isolated dissidence within the
military structure. ‘This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.

“PSTAPR:

SOURCE: _
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Coneiri R. DAWSON

\e DATE:
FILE 30 June 1975

ee wre tee ee wee, ree ee merce eee AG he eG eke ce ee ee ce a eee Ae eg nf

HW 50955 Docla:32423615 Page 31

Page 32

32423615

HY 50955 Docld

PERSONS/ENTLTIFS : | DATES: | Raa:
iE oo 1963 DIEM

OCCURRENCE: "Most manifestations of political oppostion," wrote Henderson, "were
vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were
far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime
bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could
be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting
Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's
people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his
professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to
disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165) .¢

SOURCE: — —
toe us oe Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper: STARE: Dawson, R
OW, : ’ *
J > : 4B. DATE: July 2, 1975
FILE: ee

a eee mre ee ee ee nee st ae ae pie i a

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
NGO DINH CAN 1963 - | prem //
MINISTER OF INTERIOR

COnein . |

“OCCURRENCE :

SL CONEIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,....."The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself <
his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aireraft that I:
assigned to me for that day --: while in Hue, they had a very large meting of different
military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met w
the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some
decisions were made, of wich I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night °
the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF ‘THE-INTERIOR told me it. would be impossi:
T wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda. I wanted to see burnt boats. wit’
she candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there we:
an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists. At that time, the Buddhists as an ent?"
was not a political foree and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Budd
came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening 1

SOURCE: . STAPF:
R. DAWSON

te
Hearines, SSCI, June 20, 1975 | Coried a

HW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 33

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
; I

LODGE, leary CABOT 1963 | DEIM~

CONEIN

CCURRENCE: .
oeeuiee "4.1 worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I re-
ceived my instructions from Ambassador LODCE. They were cable instructions, he had a very
good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained tc
you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know wh
was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instruc.
tions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out." p. 23

SOURCE: ES
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON

PILE: | pam:

20 June 1975

» PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN

DATES: | CATEGORIES:
1963 DIEMY- SSS

) . : ( fp fe

CIC) clacte A Met ‘
OCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any
resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25

SOURCE: STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
FILE: . DATE:

Tune 30 FQ76

HW 50955 Docld:32493615 Page 34

PERSONS/ENTEVIES +
Dawson

National Security Council a
State Dent

DATES: | CATEGORIES:

1963 Diem

OCCURRENCE :
Colby stated that the policy of the chain of const wanted a determination
whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry
out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council
to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and

has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an
important question like this (the Diem ceup} would be passed to the ambassador
tohandle. "Now, the other axencies in town would be informed of the policy
directive tha t We macht have additional communication as to the details as

to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through
directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and im-
mediately under the control of the ambassador." Pare 35.

STAPF:

Hearings, SSCT, June 20, 1975, Colby

Dawson
4
PILE: | pam TAIT
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATE DATES: | CATEGORIES:
Special Vorces : 1965 i Rien /
Colby

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that "the Special For€es first arrived in Vietnane worhing for
CTA in this country prosraum of developines villages for their own defense.
"hen Tt gat to be as T remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether
they should be transferred out of CLA into military control, and this was
done during T9603; military took over responsibility for that program and

j 7 - fb pMe “ys ‘ 7¢
LTowill have some more words to say about that at another time." Page 26-29.

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1975, Colby j AAwsSon

HW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 35

PERSONS/ENTITIES! |
BUNDY, MC GEORGE 4 ‘TAYLOR, MAXWELL
BALL, GEORGE

FORRESTAL, MICHAEL

HILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLTING

MC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERT

tae
P

ER Fence oe

GEAR Eee COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference
yoom or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL,
FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. p. 70 COLBY also stated that
generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be
with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney
General would have been there. op. 70-71, ‘The chairman of the meetings downstairs which |
President never attended would have been Me. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come soi
times, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs in
the Cabinet roon, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador NOLTING.
when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam tock a very active role opposing action:
against President DIEM to the extent that he was invited to participate. And ‘his advice we
not accepted. p. 73

“SOURCE: STARE: R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby OATS
Lind
FILE: 1 July 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES! CATEGORIES:

Sunmer’ and
Fall 1963

CONEIN

DIEM a

OCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan. There were several.
facing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likely

chance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no ehance of going back.

because there was going to be a coup. ‘The best thing to do was to monitor arid keep the U.S.
government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and in
the future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this tine, it was getting down

to the critical. element. In October, the generals had to have assurances that I was spealcin:

for the Ambassador. Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was practi-
cally impossible because of the security around the generals, who were already suspect...."
ps 28 : — o 6 Ces

The problem that wa:

HW 50955 Docla:324273615 Page 36

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATS: ; ATEGORIES:
Diem Sumer 1963 Diem \/

SECUR RENCE

-.»-Diem was not conforming. to Western standards of democracy. And this
was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assunp-—
tion that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems .
It was an assumtion with which Ngo Dinh "Diem disagreed on both practical. and philosophical

grounds."

~ SOURCE: ; STARR?
~~~ “Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins, ———" Dawson
Harper & Row, 1965, p. 165
FILE: DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:

Thich Tri. Quang Summer, 1963 Diem va

McNanara

Diem

OCCURRENCE:  Card=I==

Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for concilia~
tion was based on the assumption that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and
such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich
Tri Quang. wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonethe-
less than Diem's head.

“Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personnally
shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly
oxder generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never

publicized. Perhaps he was too ' , So inwardly assured of his innocence was
Diem that he did not of going through the croubee of . Pee, it. He,weuld certainly
(Continued-or-Card2) fac preesed Maaisos Ave. be, Sof fig Embassy, hi °

jul suca straitiy would Scarce; 4 By, Se
SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, \ Aue
Harper and Rowe J

| DATE: July 3, 1975

mrrn.

AW 50955 Docld:324273615 Page 37

PERSONS/ENTIETIES : | DALES + CAL EUUR ite:

CEN, HYUH SS 7/63 DIEM ~

SOURCE: ; STAFF:

“= " Hearings, $.S.C.1.; 6/20/75 , Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson
page ten.

PILE: pars: 6/30/75

Ch

DIEM ~~

GEN,
GEN. NGUYEN ICHANIL
GEN, TON THAT DINH
GEN. DON

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE: mane ,
mo Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, | ~~ "~ Dawson
page LO. wo, DATE:

cee arn 6120775

32423615 Page 38

AW 50955 DocId

PERSONS SENET

DATES: . CATEGOR:

OCCURRENCE:
CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD:

a ~ “STAPPT
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ~~ Dawson —
page ten. DATE; 6/30/75
BILE:
- PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

FOANTTINEER PD OND
CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD:

SOURCE: TAFF: .
~~~" Hearings, S.S.C.I,,' 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPy: Dawson
page il.
“RILE: | PE:
6/30/75

‘32473615 Page 39

HW 50955 Docld

LOD Nee edad nad fd i or

“SOURCE: . ; STARE
w=" Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one , —————" Dawson

Page ll. DATE: 6/30/75

PTI:

CATEGORTES ¢

PERSONS/ENTITINS t

Becet

. abe ve:
ead che
a

4

SOURCE: “Hearings; S.S.c. “Tv; 6/20/75, Conein , EXHIBIT one, SAK
. page LO-l1ll. Dawson

PTLEs DATE:  6/30/7

32423615 Page 40.

HW 50955 Docld

PENSUNS/ENTEVILES : DATES: £
NGO DINE NHU |
CONEIN July 11, 1963 |

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that:
staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he mew of some coup planning going on
the generals. This scared tne generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DIN
NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks." p. 20-21.

SOURCE: STAFF: 2 DANSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE: DATE; 30 dune 19%5
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES; CATEGORIES:
Krulik, Major General Vietor H. Diem

Kennedy, John F.
Mendenhall, Joseph, State
National Security Council

OCCURRENCE:
Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of
the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against. the Viet
Cong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the
effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same
country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reac-
tion to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by go-
ing to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and bat-
talion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e.,

Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew during
that time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital society ey eb ey haven of Viet
Nam's chronicall eritical and bickering intellectu

” 6 ig CaN

SOURCE: joins, STAFF? pawson

DATE « ya Ro anne

Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite |

Harper and Rowe

"On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for

AW 50955 Docld:32473615 Page 41

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
Niu, NGO DIN

CATEGORIES:

DIEM /

ene ee ernie

CONEIN ‘ . August 1963

OCCURRENCE: The coup ...."aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces.

Im talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those
loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines , elements of the Rangers ,
presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the bes
armed trocps available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have
a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NE
who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23

SOURCE: . : STAFF: R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein DATE: 20 June 1975
FILE: —

PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: -

PERSONS /EN| 5 CATEGORIES:
VIBTNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES | | 2
COLBY August 1963 ‘ | DIEM

— arta a]
_ -

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that. "TS part Of the Pressure Oi Che BOVERTENE-In-Che AOE
period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and wit:
Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assis:
ance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the
military who were involved in that, but. CIA is an easy thing to tum off, turn on and off.
The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off, In a simple way, I think t}
has had a certain influence in what they did. I lmow it resulted in the transfer of sever:
units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79

| Ae

“SOURCE : STAFF:

: ‘ R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

PILE: . j Date 1 July 1975

AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 42

pLeaene totW dd be Lait DALES Ss ; CATEGOK Liss:
; |

eMADAME NHU .

SCONEIN August 1963 | DIEM .

in.

on

:
CCURRENCE: "Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the

CONEIN states that: I
Mponzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU
mthat were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the popul:

wtion.” p. 2l

EP aheq CTICZPEE

SOURCE: STAPF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein { R. DAWSON

PILE: | | pare: 31 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: _ CATEGORIES:
COMMODITY IMPORT PROG:
DIEM RAN August 1963

COLBY, WILLIAM

SEP RE i]
NGO DINH NHU » CONEIN wy Pek ae |

QOCUHRENCE: OOLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM
and the government, particularly to remove NCO DINH NHU from the country, to bring about cer-
tain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the perfor-
mance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law
480 aid the suspension of the commodity import.program. And also through various contacts
with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would-stand aside if
the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that,
"Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor gov-
ernment took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war.’ This can only be read as
a green light to the generals. This message was passed through a CIA officer, but his cre-
ditentials were checked by the generals receiving this kind of a message, with the Ambassador

and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so, that there was no question

SOURCE: about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CI”. office
was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge

FILE; Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-12

d consent." R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

#@ PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
o DIEM

® COLBY, WILLTAM August 1963 prem ”
& NOLTING
7 LODGE. Henry Cabot
~————
OCCURRIs ae A
OCCURRENCE? COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors

a from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided
ss Buddists pagadas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddihist dissidence. COLBY stated
N that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying. it in his mind

a and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that
wx country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect
- DIEM's image here in. the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within. the educa-

ted class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.

PE afie

SOURCE: .
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. &9

R. DAWSON
BILE:

29 June 1975
PRRSOUG/ENT TUT ES ¢ PATIOS: | a :
DIEM | Aug. 7, 1963 } DIEM
NOLTING, AMBASSADOR ” !
RICHARDSON, JOHN :
OCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem ‘in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought

the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: ''I do not think Ambassador
Nolting is plotting against me. I do not think Richardson /of the CIA/ is plotting
against me. I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event
the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future. And I

cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle
for its very existence. But some people are crazy--and the world is crazy. Still,

Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young
generals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do

they have--of their own country, let alone the world?" (169)

SOURCE:

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and ine Dawson, R.

Qe


CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: +
“YE, LODGE, AMBASSADOR | Aug. 7, 1963 | DIEM

|  Camd bd2

During an interview by Higgins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "...Diem
sent an aide for document, which:I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent con-
versation with an American official."

a. eyes
OCCURRIENCE :

"Your ambassador, '' Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my
posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists
and the political opposition...1 cannot seem to convinvce the embassy that this is Viet
Nam--not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demoristra-
tions in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong. verywhere...what
would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstratienghe Saigon, toss
a bomb, kills dozens of persons, ‘including some American pre a -would ‘liberal
opinion’ say of me then? ‘Would they believe my govezmienh Ty said that the Viet
Cong were responsible for the killings because only the 3Us mmunists could profit from

GP aHegq CIILTPEE:PIPOCad Cos6Os AH

SSURCE! Our Viet Nam Nightmare

STAFF:
Dawson, R.

, Higgins, Harper and Row,

1965
FILE DATE: July 2, 1975
PERSONS/ENTICIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:

CARD TWO Cad 2 fz
GCCURRENCE: (continuation) :
such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the
Viet Cong...but.whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me--the President of Viet
Nam-- and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable nexje“tame? This is
not child's play; | am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when 1 yotosprotect the
people of this country--including the Americans--by good police wor
the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (67a :

SOURCE + ; : | STAFF:
~ Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, Dawson, R.

1965 i
PTL: ; DAVE: July 2, 1975

OF ahead CTIEZPEE: ploogd

CG60c AH

PERSONS/ENTITIES /fiq1eing, Amb. DATES: CATEGORIES:

_ Affair, Saigon Embassy]

‘Hile tan, Roger, Assistant Secretary of St te]
[frueheart, William] /Mechlin, Director, YSIA 3/ie lez
eter Hen

t

CARD 1 OCCURRENCE: Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America ©
broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was “beginning to affect the war effort."
Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who
was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that
“Qur report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though,
of course, it could ££ riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting frontline
troups.”

"We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, " of the rumor that Bud-
dhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what
Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of
his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA." Mechlin guested to Milting that
perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's co mentree Hdlsman was, after all,
Milting’s boss." Higgins, returning to News ries enoeg thereafter, called Hilsman

(Continued on Card 2) AA a)

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marg¥erite Higgins,

Harper and Rowe

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:. july 3, 1975

DATES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:

CCURRENCE? cara 2
to find out what was the basis for his breadcast. Hilsman conceded that in fact he had
based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches out :

of Saigon. (page 2@& 124-125). Hee Ys
par SeCRE!

Po

SOURCE: oa

FILE: loaner:

PERSONS/ENTILIES : DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Diem 14 August 1963

OCCURRENCE:

In the @urrent Thtelligence Mbmorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Voup Runors in
. South Vietnam” the following quotation appeared: ". . . the coup reports yt
and rumors which have aris sen Since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect
some serious coup plotting s,we have no firm evidence of advaneal planning
by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2).

ha
i=
=)
on
Lé.)
J
o

Ls)

4
=
ww
i)
4
ha
fad
om
-
in
A!
i
=
o

Hm
ua]

DATES?

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES
DIEM 8/21/63 Diem“
Ball, Undersecretary of State
Helms, Richard
Colby, Wm.

OCCURRENCE:

On 21. August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied

Buddhist pagodas throughout: the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial
law, At apresidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants
from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it
was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division
that “on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was
pointed out that there was no indication that DIBM was not in full eontrol."
(2)

wt]

SOURCE:
1967 L.G. Report, Part C RD

PILE: DATE:
Cage

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: |
wae 4 “ , :

DIEM

ma 21 August 1963, the eurrent in
tim ae in South Vietnam Stated that "adqai
ie evidence cn rane eon guiment have been received,
situates dangerous in (3) action, the Buddhist issue e

tional reports of plot-

While there is no
ontinues to make the

PDE GEES PEEL

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:

21 August 1963

LM DIEM

CONEIN
DINH
NGO DINH NHU, .GENERAL DON

See RR ENCE? touring the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16
September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of
the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President.
DIEM and counsellor NHU that. he was thelr savior and requested a ministerial post for himsel!
NHU's reaction was. to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH
realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. ‘The generals would recognize this fact
and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and
that, above all, should have beén thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government.
pp. 12-13 ; :

SOURCE: - STAFF:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975 , Exhibit 1, Conein R. DAWSON

ETT | vente.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Diem

DATES: | _/ CATEGORIES :
August 21, 196 Diem
f

OCCURRENCE: (peed—t
Higgins characterizes the raids enxXakei on the XaLoi and= on
August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy cowa d°Viet Nam. She states
that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration
that Diem had to be opposed.
" raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an
Oriental lan Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks “stormed” into
shortly after midnight. A . of bells, a blood-curdling

scream shattered the spirits serenity. One eye witness professed to see
two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of
death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy.

“When the United Nations in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in of
Znoaths lator
SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins
Harper and Rowe
The snyes tisatovs fathead at (ensth . why had See, | DATE: suly 2, 1975
FILE! preseut darn fee eutue aftas tq los and elsewlays. (g0-&

Se ee ee a a ee a ee ES a ee an Ae, ON NE SE SR HO SN Ec A EN N,N eS

6F 26Pg_ CLOLEPEEPIICT GeoeOos AH

STAFF! pawson

" PERSONS /ENTI I'PIES:

DATES: CATEGORIES:

8/21/63

DIEM
Ball, Undersecretary of State
Helms, Richard

Colby, Win.
OCCURRENCE:

On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied:
Buddhist pagodas. throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial
law. At apresidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants
from the CIA, including.the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it
was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division
that. "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was
pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control."
(2)

er ee wf ot —
‘ fog ot bier.

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C RD

FILE: ¢ DATE:
Cage

6/28/75

og sheg CTSEZFZETPIO0G GcaOoc BH

PERSONS/ENTELIES : l DALES: CATEGORIES :

21 AUG. thru
16 SEPT.

OCCURRENCE:

Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STARE? Dawson
page 12.

PILE: gape. 6/30/75

PERG OS JEN

GENERAL DINH

OCCURRENCE F

STAPEY pawson

“SOURCES
. Hearings, &.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, — ;
page 12. : DATE? 6/30/75

PILE:

PERSONS/ENTLIITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
a
HILLSMAN , Roger (Assistant
Secretary of State for Par
Eastern Affairs)
CIA
CCURRENCE:

8/22/63

ai ie
On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 53334), ete ‘followin Ap,
message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Hqs. ~ .
not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed
at all levels. Hilf{sman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station
pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and
who. real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtain-
ing US@. objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially
assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary
drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency
planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hqs. will comment BB Le

STAPF:
RD

Tg eheq GTOESFEE'PIO0CG GSc60S AH

SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, Part C
PILE:

Cage DATE? 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES?
HILLSMAN, Roger (Assistant
Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs)

CIA

OCCURRENCE:

8/22/63

CARD #2

further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at
Hilvsman's request." (3)
2

STAFF:

RD
6/28/75

ee ee ee ne ee ae ee a ee eR i RE A ES ER, A RF ee Sm, ee

DATE:


fn EY Lee dk cL Lan DA'LIGS ¢
RICHARDSON, John (CIA station 8/22/63
chief in Saigon) :
Saigon Embassy pe
DIEM
OCCURRENC

EB:

On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SATG 0208) Chief of
-station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate
leadership: ". . . Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian
government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution

seems even more improbable than ever béfore. Would appear that we should
have either DIEM or military junta... . View time factor have net coordinated

poe neesans with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject mat~
er. — .

zG aed eloezEZepEdoa—cceoc my
€

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
THILLSMAN, ROGER
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
CONEIN

i

32 or 23 August! DIEM ™

OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August. When he arrived he found that Saigon was +

arme i tn j con the pagodas, there had been many con-
med camp. “During this period of these attacks ion : en ma 7
tacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen 10 ee Gitte aoe orale gone

j doing away with the existing regime, I had talked wi ifferent. g 5 2
rapa oy Aue —- I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 2lith, we received a cable wnleh |
later neen known as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead
that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22

SOURCE:

1 \
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON

DAME _

PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
CONEIN 23 August 1963 | DIEMY
CCURRENCE:

"There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occastc
I met with them, other peeple had also. We had mt with colonels and junior or ricer. te
we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August.
p. 2e.

€G ahegq GCLIESFEEPLOCd GeeOos AW

SOURCE: STAFF:
i } . WSON
Hearings, SSCL, dune 20, 1975, Conein ! R. DA
FILE: DATE: 30 June 1975
PENSONS/ENTIELES : DATES: CATEGORIES:

HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretart
ef State for Political Affairs)
HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans,
RUSK, Dean (Secretary of State)

OCCURRENCE:

Diem

8/24/63

iw

ati‘? i.

On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS attoacdi elke

hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned
out to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to
HELMS' query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained
an implicit. pullout of American forces and Support if the Nhus' were not
ousted. HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared "with Hyannisportl with
the Secretary of State and with Mr. GILPATRICK. (4) ’

of Defense)

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, part C,p.4 RD
FIL® ¢.

Cage

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES :
HILSMAN, Roger (Ass't. Sec.State for
Far Fastern Arf -- FE)
LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN) —

DA'TES: | CATEGORIES:

25 August 1963 ;

CCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN to LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels
(DIR 63854), there appeared the following message:

"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is
dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't
be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5)

FG HPT CLOEZEZEPIOCT GceOoc AH

SOURCE? T.G. REPORT 1967, p. 5
TAer C
FILE: DATE: 38.6.75
PERSONS/ENTITLES : DATES: | CRPRGORTES:
cm 25 Aug, 1963 | Vv
LODGE, Henry Cabot ' DIEM
7

eee il ae 1 i Pages We a

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following iressage appeared:

"FYT CIA not cons sulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared. at. highest
levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek
ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact. text, understand it invites
LODGE final judgment. . . . Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away
bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. ‘Thus
sugeest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same
time as takine, positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we
probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least
interim period... . (7)

STAPF: Dawson

BERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
‘“GHARDSON, Saigon Chief of Station 25 August 1963 | DIEM’

WH, General (SVN)
mM

RA, CIA officer in Saigon
a

ee . ovat te y, | i re “
ium CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:
hat

i 5 > SNERS ted an immediate meeting with
AQIEP OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH reques i

we (an officer of the CIA Saigon Station}. At the meeting KHANH requested assurances that
U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the D.

eal." C7)

Br
Lt
=]
a

SOURCE: I.g. REPORT 1967, p. 7 STAFF: Dawson

fier C.
FILE: DATE: 28.6.75
PLHGUNS/ENT LT LES: DATES: } CATEGORIES:
CIA 26 August 1963 | DIEM +

TAD ORM TF

OCCURRENCE: MW inte

Jn August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Starr Memorandum, No. 60-63 Internal ONE
Vorking Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears:
a NE :

"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment

of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Conmunist
rationalists with sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a group
nicht not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better
‘han the present repiime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist

rationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of
vast years, months, and weeks. ‘Tn such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope
“or the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)


|

y PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
GIELMS, Richard LODGE, Henry Cabo DIEM i/
CARTER, Gen. Marshall KENNEDY, John F. | 26 Aupust 1963
SHU CIA
TEM DEPTEL 243

BELT, ADM. Harry D. (CINCPAC)
& OCCURRENCE:

on

Mn Aucust 26, 1963, HELMS' record. of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other
SLA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI.

=.)

gthe question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam
gsituation that 1t really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DITM himself. Prin-
‘pal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current
WS action in South Vietnam; the faet that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role
of the NHU's; the meaning of the phrase ‘give direct support to military commanders’ in DEPTEL
243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend
failed. ‘The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August. 27 with participants to present
biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)

SOURCE: J.G¢, REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9 STAFF? Dawson

DATE: 8.6.
FILE: . ©

OUlS/ ENUIVTES ;

CTA

RICHARDSO KHTED
CONETN NY? John MINH

"RICHARDSON rey
WN said he


PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: _ CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY, John EF, HARKINS (MAC/V)
HELMS (DD/P) CIA 27 Aug. 1963
COLBY,; Wilitam DEPTEL 243
CARTER sd ~}
LODGE, Henry Cabot wy

hav SO td wok OB

OCCURRENCE: “
On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. ‘The record was taken by
HELMS or by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:

"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and
asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judpment of
LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable was
drafted asking if they still agreed with their coneurrences to DEPTEL 243." (9-10)

£6 shed CTIEZPZE:PIO0d So605 AH

Dawson

SOURCE: SEARE:

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, po. 9-10

DATE: 28.6.75

et DALES +

ott t .
“ppyy. OL CATEGORIES:
DEPLIEL 243 DEPTEL 256 SATEGORTES :
eT Aug. 1963 | = DTEM

KENNEDY, John F.

LODGE, Henry Cabot

HARKINS, John (Commander , MAC/V)
OCCURRENCE:

In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL, 256), on August 27 196
ee >

BI
;

3, the following message appeared:

appraisal of present prospects,
of developing situation, presently favor

to give you all possible su
BiVe you a ; poort in best availabl
that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." “(40). Sut no

-I.G, REPORT 1967, Part C, p. Lo

FILE:

= CATEGORIES:
PEN OUNS ZENE LES t z ae
; a Lise
GEN » DINE | G k
S {
GOUNSELLER NHO

OCCURRENCE:

b tely 3 audacity oO ir orm both President
> 2 1 Y oe \
yin On @pprox i mate y August nad the ° :
: an OUNnSse er Nhu that he Was their savior an requeste a Ministeria
Die d ¢ S } im d ted t i
post for himself.

eG ahegq CTIfZPEE: PIo0G

Se OT. GIONS. pomee a hibit one,
anne (20/75, Conein, Bx
“SOURCHS? Hearings, 5.8.C.1., 6/20/75 ;

—— pages 12-13.

DATES 6/30/75

LL UNS/ENT UY riggs
XICHARDSON, John

Ciba

na CIA cable from By

-+++Unless the

*

i
’

Coe RE Zt a hata be
gon (SATG 0363) that:

&enerals are neutralized before
» We believe they will act and that they have 4 Rood
-«.We all understand that the effort must Suceeed and that
done on our part must be done..." (10)

whatever needs to

I.G. REPORT 1967, Part Cy, p. 10


BZ LRLKSONS/ENTIVIES:
et

. DATES: °S:

gic EXLCUTIVE Covear rte — _ CATEGORIES:
IELMS, Richard fo

SMARKINS 29 Aur. 1963 bm“

CIA

SXENNEDY, John F,
& OCCURRENCE:

oy
At a NATIONAL SECURTTY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE i i
gith @ record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows that EE necting on Vieteam on MEUs 29, 1983,

=
4#The consénsus was that HARKINS sh i
f should confirm to the gfenerals that th
~ * > e
vetter tte nae eeereee the views of the US gevernment. There Was anreonert eee
on was. needed on what ¢ ene . i : ing to do .
ge was inilitariiy Pee he generals were in fact planning to do and whether

At ivi
@RESTDENTIAL approval.” (42) telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for

(Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)

PERSONS/ENTITIES :

DATES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F. BUNDY, McGeorge | “
RUSK, Dean NSC Exec. Com. 28 Aug. 1963 | DIEM!
McNAMARA, Robert LODGE, Henry CaboPB
TAYLOR, Maxwell HARKINS, John

CCURRENCE:

On August 28, 1963, the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, McNAMARA, TAYLOR, and
BUNDY. He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams ;
were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general. message
from the DEPARTMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS. (11)

(This is refleeted in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURTTY COUNCIL. EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (41) .

SOURCE: L.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11 STAFF: Dawson

FILE: DATE:  28.6.75

es LOS BySie DATES: CATEGORIES:
Wey et DATES CATEGORIES

%) INSON, Lyndon B. MeHAMARA 30 tug. 1963 | DrEM

SEIMS BUNDY

CARTER

AOLBY

2 OCCURRENGE: : wie Bory eG PUSS
GH August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER,
aid COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that:

Ko

cy

"BUSK referred to recent cable traffie and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing
ath or what they were planning. McNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether
tHe generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he had re-read the earlier traffic and noted
-mat they never said they did. GEN. CARTER Said he believed that the general's coup. was not
lakely at this Stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before
‘Re attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY Supsested we consider additional contingencies
fore the GROUP. and whether the assumption that NWU is impossible: is well founded." (13)

SQURCE?

iG. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13 STAFF

* Dawson

FILE: DATE: 28.6.75°
nr a a ono np ea yt ema, ft ems eee ces me ve

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
JOHNSON, Lyndon B. TIARKINS

DATES: CATEGORIES:

COLBY CARTER 31 Aug. 1963 DIEM
RUSK HELMS

MCNAMARA

LODGE

OCCURRENCE:

At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August. 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects
that:

"RUSK sugzested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us spenk a a coup
and what. might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA RRS RUG dine tes
quirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE. and HARKT. 7 aos ree oon
that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we mig

to do." (14)

DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS. also participated. )

: STAFF: Dawson
SOURCES 1G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. WA

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

ZPERSONS/ENTIUPIES :

DATES: |
31 Aug. 1963

BOCCURRENCE: 4 Se fogs

oe * oF . ee oe
myAugust 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities,
Oflowing report appears:

ho

vd OE

oa

GENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to mive KHIEM assurances of USG backing.
H@EM showed a reluctance to talk and surgested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KHTEM
oqymented that MINI had called off the planning and was working, on other methods which KHTEM
qBld not describe. KHIPM further stated that the fenerals were not ready as they did not have
w®urh forees under their control. “ HARKINS decided not to sive KHIEM assurances which he had
28n eae to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS re-
orted." (13

SOURCE? T.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13 STAFF: Dawson

FILE: DATE: 28,6.75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
| Fall 1965 bien ~
State Department heCoane :

Defense Pepartment
OCCURRENCE:
Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were haviny almost daily

meetings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense Ne-
partment and so forth, in the basement of the White House and thore was

no aucstion that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these
meetings, these were the meetings at which Mr. McCone and I argued very
strongly .that we should not move against the Diem government we should

continue “to work with it." Pare 36 T


PERSONS/ENTIVPIES : DATES: | CATEGORIES:
CONEIN Fall 1963 | prem eo

CCURRENCE: 1 |
a CONEIN stated that: there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who
were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. ‘The best way I
can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one genera!
would talk, walk. out of the room to go to the "john", two would tell you, don't trust that
one’, and finally the one who had out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he
would say, don't trust those two. p. 31

zo ahead GToeZPZE:PLooed sceos AN

SOURCE: STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
FILE: DATE:
July 1, 1975
ERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
» {
COLEY {
Fall 1963. DIEM /

LODGE, HENRY CABOT |
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL i

SER as PRR ART ish i
HCCURRLNCE? ‘conpy stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political
section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the preposition that the war coul:
not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in
his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, .this which was the public
pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and.
think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUN’
and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT." p. 61

“SOURCE : R. DAWSON

w
br
@PERSONG/ENTITIFS: DATES :

COLBY

DIEM 4

Generel HAR Kms Fall 1963

a

ek ten ee eee

Lo)

RLODGE , H.C +

BNSC

tal

Bo

, ted

BOCCURRENCE: Mp, COLBY“that: "The Defense Department was almost totally in a position th:

Fthe wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well,
that this (DIEM’s continuance in office) is an wroan problem, urban political problem whic:

pshould not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and

€coneral HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62

nm
1a) =

SOURCE: STAFF? oR, Dawson

Fail 1963 DIEM

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby DATE
aye 1 July lL
FILE: | y 19%
PERSONG/ENTITIRG + DATES? CATEGORIES:
“= :Ct=<CSt:tCtStSCS a
NHU ' /
}

LODGE, #1-¢:
COLBY

OCCURRENCE: (COLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious
attempt to persuade DIEM to leave office voluntarily that: "There had certainly been. dis-
cussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, “there was almost no direct
contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact.” P. 66


ZPERSONS/ENTIGIES: DATES: — | CATEGORIES:
a COLBY or ne
: Fall 1963. | DIEM

in ~ .

og

NSC ‘ | |
S spare popanmene .

“BCCUARE “NCE? COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by

«the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTWENT was "one of distas:
2 for President. DIEM." p. 61

F9 aHeq GTaoePee: BI

SOURCE: ~ : P STAPF: Rg, DAWSON

j
Hearings , SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby | ame
PILE: jeanne 1 July 1975

[ots naetateieenr terse tineaclnenetaenticentnnatienetieediemeaienseieanbetetaem teed cs teen teemtneaia needa tune’ dentametamrtanataeeciemimmtonrtramiom iets ean ee

PERGONS/ENTITIES : DATES + CATEGORIES :
COLBY Fall 1963 DIEM

PRESIDENT KENNEDY
GENERAL KRULAK

MR. MENDELHAY
“OCCURRENCE: coLBY stated that: ‘tine’ most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has

been described publicly a number of times, was that at one tim, particularly with the
frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two strong positions, he sent
two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr.
Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about
five days to make an assessment on the spot and they cate back to the camera room, and one
sat on ore end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had b.
to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 20 military chiefs and all that sort of thir
and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing
was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then
. Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political
people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless be~
cause there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the genera:
feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, Idoked at them and
SOURCE Sad, Tf you Tass tethas” yo hb Tha Sane country ? fing die | STAPF:
Hearings . Answer 13 they cid,
caranb®? SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby yy os at ta bleonct R. DAWSON

TATT We Pe ee tag TRAM «


x PERSONS /EN TILES ¢

DATES + CAPEGOR LIES ¢
(Boh, Tonthat
5D.

wn.

Wa, Neo Dink
e

9 OCCURRENCE:
i

Mancin stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double
@ent. Dien or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo T and a Bravo TT that Diem

G Hina would have their ewn conn and so down to Vowstan as if they were
Soapdine and there would immediately be » counter-coup to bring Diem--all
Wstieated by Nhu back to power hy popular acclamation. So on November 1

te lop.m. in the afternoon when troons were moving it was assumed by Dien

Bd Nhu that this was part of Diem's nlan to have a cownter-cemp. Pace 66-66.

ilearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975 STAPP?

SOURCE: Q Rawson
|

PILE DATE? 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ; CATEGORIES:

CONEIN
DINH
GENERAL DON

September 1963 DIEM a

HUAN, Commanding Officer, Military
OCCUR

re
o>

Se . DON promised DINH that he would personnaly speak to the President on DINH's
behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON,
would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. MDINH believed that DON had his personal
interest. at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his
povernment, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM
or NHU to accept. Deadlines were given. DINH was informed that the President would give hii
the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he tho-
ught was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to
lend sympathy to DINH.while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13

Xe,

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein
Trina 2h Taquq7e

CATEGORIES :

DIEM JS

oERSONS/ENTITIES:

CENERAD | MINH .

BER September 1963 |

LODGE, tleant CABOT

DON, GENERAL
EIN

OCCURRENCE: "During the month of September, there was stilt nore talk of coups, and af th

a y i

ne, the n of September, I nad been told by Ambassador GE

eae tee only. “That T was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messages to eG Mt

on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one oecasion. T had met with GENERAL EN and ot

en another occasion. On several occasions, I had mt with GENERAL DON and other ary

leaders." p. 23

DATES:

|

rood Se605

99 abed ST9eePree:

SOURCE;
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

pe ee ee ee ar a ae ee cS ee ae came enc i ee -
ee ee ne

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES |
RICHARDSON, John ——
DIEM r
NU 2 Sept. 1963
CIA
ZOL. TUNG

OCCURRENCE 3 on September 2, 1963, u
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523) ,/the I.G. REPORT provides the following sunmary:

R. DAWSON
DATE:

if

20 June 1975

"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIFM and the NHU's are fully aware
that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of
this encouragement, He judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could
xo forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with
COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a SVN liaison vehicle through which to
conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we. were willing
to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with
TUNG. {NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs) ;

"The Times: of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and finaricine a cour:
and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIFM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widely
alaved by the New York Daily News , the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent

SOURCE: newspapers. STAFF:

Dawson

Ho AIH Ao

Zien SUNS/ENTLY LES:
KENNEDY, John F. DIEM
HELMS NHU
CAaLBY BUNDY

” MADAME NHU

DATES : CATEGORIES:

_ 6 Sept. 1963

"RUSK stressed the Immediate need for direct contact. between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out
the necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-
ggming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.
WSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MALAME NHU but
expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATI seemed to say it was. RUSK
Gmmented that the COUNIRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must. go, to which the PRESIDENT
replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

I.G. REPORT 1967, STAFF:

SOURGE: Part C, p. 16 Dawson


BV LNKSUNS/EN PI LES + DATES : CATEGORIES:

EWNEDY, John F. DIEM VY
FEMS NHU _ 6 Sept. 1963: DIEM

ChBY BUNDY

USK "MADAME, NHU en ng peng

BOCCURRENCE: : Tiny? Ab

tha PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS 4nd COLBY provide the fol-
Owing summary : ,

bo

en

Fesk stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out
He necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth-
qping, meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction.
UBK agreed fo do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but
xbressed some doubt: that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK
dymented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must. go, to which the PRESIDENT
‘eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

STAFF:

SOURCE? I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16 Dawson
PILE: DATE: 98. 6.75
PERSONS/ENTIVIES : DATES! CATEGORINS :

Special. Forees CIA payments

CIA 8 Sept. 1963 a

Tung, Col. te os DAM fe oe

pell, DAvid Pp bp 8 r
7 -

OCCURKRENCIs + ss :
On 8 Septemer 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the
Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being |
paid secretly by CIA. This story was: attributed tO a highly reliable source in oo
Washington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount: of $3 2000, 000
annually, and of payment of $250,000 on 3 September. ‘The ssory was datelined in
Washington and in Manila. David Bell warned in a television interview that the
U.S. Congress might cut pack aid to Vietnam unless: the Diam government changed

its policy.

STAPF: —,

. _— ~ ; Dawson
IG Report 1967 (CIA) , p. 17 DATE:

SOURCE:


69 afeg cT9EZPaE PlacG GG605 BAH

Kr ylgkP BRSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
Ccoviesk, Victor Gen.,|Mendenhall,Jos. A.} 10 Sept. 1963

Counterinsurgency Specialist UN Adviso

Joint Chiefs of Staff__ Bureau Fap Eastern DIEM

Rusk, Dean Sec. of State . ffairs |

MeCone,.loha DCT a ee
“PSO ED RRENCE: Richardson ,John

At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the

following Sore by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963.

General Graetaak reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions were that the

war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won

if current U.S, military and socological programs are continued. Mendenhall, the

State representative who acconpanied €releck, expressed the view that there was

complete breakdown of the Siagon clvilian government in the security situations in

the. provinces had deteriorated. The President asked where the two gentlemen had been

insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August

that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. Mr. MeCone talked from a
t he {ved Richardson recommen sainst any cut in aid.

SOURCE: STAPF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 Dawson
FILE: DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTEETES: DATES: CATECORTES:
Diem .
Richardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon DIEM

10 Sept 1963

~~ OECURRENCE : as —
On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SAIGO760) to

Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers
will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do sa)
unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there — : ,
is breakdown of civil © ‘order or of governmental machinery,or unless war effort
begins to fo backward seriously (despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 August
am inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war
ain military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should

suspend aid ".

SOURCE? STAFF?

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19 , Dawson

On: 10 Septenber 1963, in an interview by Huntley and Bri ey. Hl t taere de,
the charge that the GIA makes its own pol ley. ey ; rinkley. the President denied

Of ahead GT9eTPee PIOOM CoeOs AH

PRRSONS/ENTITINS: DATES: CATEGORIE
aA afHS A ee ° ie GOR TIS +
Kennedy , John F. President
CIA . 10 Sept. 1963 DIEM
OCCURRENCE: as a —— tne

~ SOURCE: :
yy ‘ STAFF:
IG Report. 1967 (CIA), p. 19 .
FILE: 2 DATE: Dawson
i ; 6/27/75
PRRSOWS/ENTITTES | DATES? CATEGORIES +.
Bandy , —_
Colby
HeCone DIEM

MeHamarra
Kormedy, President fa an
. ep ee oaks eee ners vee . je eae . + i
OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council executive meeting on Vietnam,
Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record: Bundy
stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to
eontrol outgoing messages to Saigon. - He emphasized the importance of following the
President's guidance on this delicate problem, in spite of intensly differing views of
what should be done and how, the risk, minimum objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated
that his position was virouously against throwing out this government without secing
an alterpative and that none eppeared to exist. Mr. MeCone commented that the problem
was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one inte power. Bundy
summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations
as to mistakes and iisdeeds of Diem but not be a position where we can not deal with

him further - .

SOURCE’ : : | STAFF:
+ Dawson

10 Sept. 1963) 425, !
Pf

we

Z PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: : CATEGORIES:
®ichardson, John
Heede, General

TIA Station Siagon 11 Sept 1963 . DIEM
5
A OCCURRENCE? “34 @ September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SALGO797) Richardson

weported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page summary cable to answer
™ cable frow the department requesting views. ‘The team was unable to agree even on the
Nirst. three pages of the sunmary. Weedrand Richardson dissented on the basis of the
Sraft summary was. too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country
%n an inadequate basis of data. He said: "In some ways we seem to have reached the
moint in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present
Government, you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority."

ia)

Té

SOURCE: “STAFF!
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20 Dawson
FILES . DATE: 6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES ¢ CATEGORIES:
MceCone “Lodge re
Colby Nou :
Rusk 11 Sept 1963 DIEM

Bundy

OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 meeting of the National SEeurity Council
Executive Conmittee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with MeCone also

being present for the CIA) te following appears: "Rusk. said he believed that we were
not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu, at the same
time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he aaw no alternative. Rusk commented
that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real. leadership’ and become the
real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy
read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu. -

SOU RC STARE?
“IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.

FILE: > pap ; Pawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES = CATEGORIES:

dge, Ambassador Henry Cabot ,
11 Sept 1963
DIEM

jToegd ssegs AL

5 ~ OCCURRENCE : 7
fn a state telegram from Saigon (SAIGK78) Lodge provided the following ref lection on
Bhe situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that

ft is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective
Sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing goverment and the installation
@f another; and (c) that intensive study should be given. by the best brains of the
government to all the details, procedures and variants in conncection with suspension
Of aid.”

i

“al
ha
SOURCE: STAPF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 2h Dawson
PILE: DATE:
6/27/15
PHRSOUS/ENTITTES : CATEGORTES :
MeCone hina
Coloy Hiddsman
Kennedy, John F. Tung ;
MeNamarra Diem ll Sept 63 °

Lodge

OCCURRENCE: tn a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants
being MeCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNemarra pointed. out that
Todgo has little corttact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone conmentod
that he believed that we should, move ‘cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem
and that lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic

view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. MeCone also suggested that. another approach
be made: toNijutto seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we
had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid. (as proposed in a paper prepared
by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President
asked POD and CIA to analyze the Hilisiman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent
to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some
peal contact. with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the
prestdepOUN ROUTE be WELT UTonned OF any ”steps "taker ty vats contpyTER RECT Se
fuatanna teaotwine CTA navment to Col Tung last week. .


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C605 BH

PERSOUS/ENTITIES: DARES: NOEGORTES +
Faiberstan, David, an
wecCone, Jehn, DCL 15 Sept. 1963

agen Station

a

Cf

OCCURRENCE:

i

ePee- PL

1 15 September 1963, Halberstarn stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence
eoncy favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members
of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their
Bhief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence

Wathering.
“J
tee.
SOURCE : eee ST AF i: nme,
' TG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 2 Dawson
“P v7 )p 3 DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richardson, John
Diem

DATES :

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

a ae pte ws

16 Sept 1963
- OCCURRENCE: re
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to
Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain
ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He :
cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long —
as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with .
respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly
tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious
and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders
willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully
explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure /
Diem, within context of persuading. him to take steps needed. These measures. would be i
more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)" :

SOURCE: par ?
IG Report: 1967 (CIA) p. 2h i
Nawsoan \

n

GL a6eg GI9LSEEE*PIIOG GG6é0c AH

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
Richardson, John a
Diem .

16 Sept 1963 DIEM

OCCURRENCE:
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to
Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain
ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He
cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long
as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with
respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly
tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious
and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders
willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully
explore and perhaps carefully experiment. with graduated measures designed to pressure’
Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures. would be
more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives. )"

"SOURCE: ' a
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 a
EAUEt pate:
CVT /9TE

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

. CATEGORIES:
Smith, David.R.

DATES:

CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 196 “
Richardson, John Lodge ; Sept 17, 1963 paEM
Dunn, Mike

ae Pee hee tga

OCCURRENCE: TT : TOADS

in 2 memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September17i4 1963. he“Peporte 4 Loa

(Mik sonnel with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson
e had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson’. (On one

occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do_you think that. Da
: . i . Dave. Smith can run the
a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?! qarions *or

SOURCE: STAFF:
IG Report. 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Dawson
PILES DATE:

6/27/75

;

4
é

a

94 98g CI9CePZE Plocd ceeos BH

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

Smith, David R.

CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963 Sept 17, 1963 DIEM
Richardson, John Lodge ;

Dunn, Mike Saigon Station

- OCCURRENCE: 7 Ta

In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September.17;. 1963, he reported
"Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson
(Mike Dunn) had told Conein that lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one
occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can. run the stations for

a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?! ™

SOURCE: a STAPF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24 Dawson
FILE DATE:
G/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean
McCone, John

Lodge, Henry Cabot

Richardson, John

OCCURRENCE:

Sept 19, 1963 DIEM

in a personal letter from MeCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk
that you proposed thet Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). JI wish
to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet. your
desires. Personnel, including the ‘station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would
not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to
abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced
We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead
us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a
replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may
occur even before you receive this letter....."

SOURCE:
.IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

ETT He

Dawson 1

BL She CIIESPSEPIOOG SGE0S AW

PERGOUS/ENUTT LES: DAVES: CATEGORIES?

Tadve, Hoary Cabot
Kennedy, John. F. Sept. 19, 1963

On September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stuted to the President
that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the present government In

the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as
an interim measure pending. such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all. for :
substantative changes. "

SOURCE: — : STAFF?

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25
6/25/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES : ; DATES: CATEGORIES:
Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean
MeCone, John Saivon STatdon Sept 19, 1963 DIEM
Lodge, Henry Cabot boots or a eB :
Richardson, John ; ee ee oe :

OCCURRENCE: : ee

In a personal letter from McCone to Ledge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk
that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish
to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your
desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would

not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to
abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced
wae We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could Jead |
“us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a
replacement regime which would be better. ‘This is not however to say that a coup may
occur even before you receive this letter....." :

—— OURS an Starr;

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 Dawson

_ PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES + CATEGUR Ib?

MeCone
CTA Subcommittee on House Armed Services
Sept. 23, 196

On September 23, 1963, the iicCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services.
He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of
ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then

current regime that was capable of running the government.

Qf shea GI9LSPEE*PIOOG GG60S AH

SOURCE: STAFF?
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25 Dawson
FILE: DATE:
6/25/75

DATES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:
NHU _ TT
DINH October 1963 DIEM we

COLONEL TUNG

CONEIN
CCURRENCE: DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to rres ent

DIEM. He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times
brilliant mind, was used to the peneral's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convineed President
DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders. to be
a counter-coup force. ~DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne com-
e of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops

panies on a bootless operation outsid
would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional

government. p. 13

“SOURCE: : STAFF:
[Se DAWSON ;

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein |
Wer DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN October 1963 DIEM <<

OCCURRENCE CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying o S ane
bassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were
planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught
with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic
and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the en-
couragerent or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of dis-
couraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or
remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41

6£ abhed CLIESETEPIOCG Coos AH

SOURCE: STAPT:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON

; DATE:

FILE: ~~ duly 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
DINH

MINH Early October DIEM ou —

DON 1963

COLONEL CO, Dinh's Deputy

OCCURRENCE? Woon the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, the
coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It is
evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH dur-
ing the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromised

him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed any sign
of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a

day including. CO, his deputy. p. 13

. STARE :
SOURCE: R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CATEGORIES:
CONEIN
pra

COLBY, WILLIAM October, 196

OCCURRENCE: coLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONBIN) received a call on October 30
(1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially

sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the de-
cision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home
at one point, etc."

og ahegq GCTILZFEE:PLOCd Co6O0S AH

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-12 =" _R, DAWSON

FILE: at 29 June 1975 —

ne ae i a eS ee ee co a ee Oe eS RN ee ee OR SY ce ny sp Fer: nS Sen Sn es endo ‘ee sin i.e ere cm, es ey ape es mw eno end one ee ae

~— PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
. Oct. 2, 1963

Conein - ; P

Gen. Don - . BIEN

Gen. Duong Van Minh
Gen. Ton That Dinh
Neo Dinh Nhu

an i Gcé0o AH

|
|
I

tl
8 OCCURRENCE =

a

ar

ch.

=

i=.)

a=!

a
it~

Raga

i="

i

CONTINUED ON NEXT
CARD
STAFF: Dawson
. DATE: 6/30/75
™ FILE: DATE: 6/30/75
Se :
PERSONS/ENTITTIES:
“u
OCCURRENCE:
3 are

Boi LNELAS Ob Of$:) tha | °
SOURCE: STAPF:

a

PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
AMBASSADOR LODGE Loft ;
conte 10/3/63 DIEMY™

GEN. DUONG VAN MINH

_ ne
i

OCCURRENCE:

28 aheg SYIESHCE PLO ec6os AW

SOURCE:

STAFF: Dawson

Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, p.4

PILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
McNamarra
Lodge
MeCone Oct 3 = 4,1963 DIEM v
Richardson Fon pe
Smith :

oll £ON EOS Do
re | 3 I ‘ints i
OCCURRENCE: Sere as ea wy
On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to’ McCone stating that "I... agree with what

I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think
of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA
cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the’ following report appeared:"...,.it is clear that

Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 ~ 20 hours...". Ina
comment in the IG report it is noted that. Richardson's departure was based on a head~
quarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon
Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."

SOURCE? STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26 DATE: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTIT IES :
233

LODGE
CATEGORIES:
MCNAMARRA.
TAYLOR
DIEM ¥
ite fe eres} Sek ON Fa gp
_ OCCURRENCE: SER M :
wo NG Pte i

pow

On ? October 1963 in a
instruction that
cnn nat the

States cable to Saigon (

Ambassador should continu

: Stated as a fourth

DEPTEL5 344° was
his policy of "eooL correctness "toward

é

€9 s6eq GTI9LZFTE'PIOOG GCEe6os BLL

SOURCE;

nan

IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30

PERSONS/ERTITIES: DATES:

MeNomarva.

Lodge . f

MaCone Oct 3 - 4,1963 DIEM

Richardson a. goeg ft wt :

Sudth Pf k (8, 4
pf é \ :

i
i
; Be}

OCCURRENCE : » po wad ra —_
On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to MeCone stating that "I... agree with what
Y understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but IT also think
of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA
cable from Saigon, (SATG1397) the following report. appeared:"..,.it is clear that

Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". Ina
comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a head-
quarters request. that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon
Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."

~~ SOURCE: } STARE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26 . DATE:

Dawson.

$8 ahed CT9EZFZEPLOCG Coéos AW

PERSOUS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
SODGE
Dept. of State ;

MCNAMARRA 5 Oct 1963

‘TAYEOR Popes

~ OC CURIE ONCE

On 5 “October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon CORPTERSAN Ite was stated as a fourth
instruction that the Avrbassador should continue his poliey of "cool. correctness"toward
GPN. so

SOURCE: STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30 DATE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES? CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY , | JOWN F.
LODGE, HENRY CABOT DIEM
WHITEHOUSE

October 5,
1963 a

OCCURRENCE: —
In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears:
..Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give
any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with
closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with
possible alternative leadership as it appears...."

Annee — es ——— ewe ene te se ee rae

SOURCE: - STARR?
1G Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30. | . Dawson


t no initiative should be taken to ee?
sent covert effort with ve

1 contacts with

ce abea cioccradtpioed GGb0e AH
m
Q
fs
®
5
5
ct
8

SOURCE: -
IG Report: 1967 (CIA) p, TAPES

cee er ee en en ee ee ie a ne me ed ine ne ee eee

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
Kennedy, John F.
Colby, Wiliiam
Coumodity Tisport Program Oet. 5, 1963 DIEM
McCone

I OCCURRENCE: —~S~C~C=<“<—<“—sS*S*S*=*=‘“‘“s~S*~*~*~*:~™S Tr —
On. 5 Oetober there was a Presidential weeting. on Vietnam, ‘The only CIA participant was
MeCone. He provided the following record. ‘The meeting was held to discuss matters that
became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the
opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with
the conmodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create
an économie crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more
cooperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning
of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at
large of a more serious nature. It was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful
political movements, had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined.

SOURCE? , SUREF:
TH Ranart 1Q67 (CTA) o. 27 Dawton


99 ahead GI9EZPceiPlood sceos AH

PERSONS VP TT LES t DATES: . CATEGORIES:
SMUTH, DAVID ; 7
‘onin ‘ Oet 5, 1963 DIEM
i OLGE
iTNH

CRCUARENCET :
Tn a CEA cable from Saigon (SATGIY47) of 5 October 1963, DAVE, SMITH, the Act Ing Chief of
Station cabled thit he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Fase et
LODGE and DCN TRUEHART. SMITH reported that he had recommended eal :
that: “we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignation plo 2 sine ae
the other two alternatives mean either a blood baka in Saigon or . protracted strugg.
which can rip the Arty and the country asunder.

~ SOURCE: ~ ~ STAFF?
~~ _ Dawson
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.28 DATE:
FILE: 6/27/75

on, “pre cnich ee see th et ae a Se i ee a a Ae eS ne ea ee ec ma a

ee er ee ee ee ee ee ee en

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
Nhu, Ngo Dinh Conein
CAn, Ngo Dinh Lodge
Diem

Minh, General

OCCURRENCE: Tos

On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIGI445) it was stated that the
meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a
statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future.
He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances
that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the
accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassinationof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo
Dinh ein keeping President Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon by various
military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the
coup and loyalist military units.

Oct 5, 1963 |

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28 Dawson

FILE:


SPERSONS/ENTITIES:

BODGE, HENRY CABOT
‘RENNEDY, JOHN F.
RENNEDY, ROBERT F..
BIEM, MC CONE, JOHN:
i=]

PUCCURRENCE? vc CONE recalled a meeting with =. President KENNEDY and Attorney General _
“ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was
M'rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said,
mfohn, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised
a the position you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it...7(1) This dis-
éussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go

use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of mes-
gages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways.
CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called ~— CABOT LODGE was called by DIEMts
Sffice and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do
it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup
was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy." .

SOURCE: SPAR:

Hearings; SSCI, June 6, 1975, MeCone , pp. 63-64 R. DAWSON

FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
KAHN No LODGE, TRUHART, WM. | -
Sn eA ° , 5-7 Oct. 1963

NGO DINH KAHN

SMITH, DAVID .
COLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE, JOHN

dey! be

OCCURRENCE? CoLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable, From Sango Oe ase.

ber 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourse/ves sepeeueres te Saiaon or a pre-
i j 90d

ination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a And. the response on

‘ try asunder."
tracted struggle which could rip the army 6nd fhe vows: "WC CONE directs that you withdraw

63 whieh COLBY wrote for MC CONE as follows :
6 Octo tion to Ambassador concerning anne pian Ta ane eeganeering as ve
in a position to actively condone such course
Cant sponsibility, therefore COLBY explained that this Beene eae eysein dra tere Dl St
eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY state i Fe ea a eas sent on eee 7

tinue.
> s NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to con a
amen response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was anne as directed, mean
jing that the Anbassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation.

TARE:

ee R. DAWSON

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp- 12-17

FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975

ee sheq CIQESPEEPLOOG Co60S AH

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:

MCCONE ~ .
TODGE

SMYTH Oct 6, 1963 DIEM

In a CTA eable to Saigon (DIR7366lof 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs
that you withdraw reconmendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan)
under MCCONE instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course
of action and thereby’ engaging our responsibility therefore."

~~ SOURCE: ~ STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28 Dawson
FILE: DATE:
~~ 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: CATEGORIES:
TRUEHART ,
LODGE
MCCONE ;
SMITH Oct 7, 1963 DIEM

~ OCCURRENCE:
In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon
responded (SATG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DORA
TRUEHART was also present. when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal
reconmendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART. Ambassador
LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion.”

SOURCE: " STAPF:
. IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29 Dawson |
PILE: DATE:

6/2015

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
BUNDY COLBY iY
JOHNSON 1o[3/ 63 DIEM :

KILPATRICK SPECIAL GROUP
MCCONE

OCCURRENCE:
On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there
was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S. was maintaining
a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to. the fact 3
that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCCONE also referred iL
to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that"for
Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent
a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running
counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of
station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)

68 aheq GTI9ESPee:PLIOG _GE60S AW

aoe De

——
poo

seer ahd is

SOURCE:

i
Minutes. of Special Group Meeting. Oct..17, voll y

Kelley
FILE: DATE: 6/28/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
Tung, Col. Smith, David Oct 8, 1963
Phillips, Rusus, AID Acting Chief of Station DIEM
Colby, William Aisvoad after 10/5/63 _
Richardson, John “Jocko"Aid to Diem Regime
OCCURRENCES LSSnosT a

On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflacts In a conment that the U.S.
government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had alraady been cut
quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith
told us that the public armouncenent of the aid reduction was a signal to the
general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that
the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals: on, but if so, that
intention did not find its way into the record. The nearest thing to it is in the
record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. ‘The President asked
Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recemnended and he suggested
“eutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much ,
enthusiasm as an indication of virgouous of American position. W “In. general,
aid cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in
hnis-reeéminpdevever pianied; p-heveverleoled—-un)en_by.the-T8. mga Aeteats : it. is.
clear Cee eee vietnamese considered the official confirmation of a Othe ss a clear
token of their support of coup planning.

DTT Re. iG Report 1967 (CIA), Dp. 17-18 DATE «

Dawson

06 ahead CToczPze:Plo0d Gc60S AH

___-PERSONS/ENTT?rgs; Pn |" 627/75
KENNEDY, JOHN F, paves: — e-
RICHARDSON, JOHN an

Oct. 9, 1963 DIEM 1.

bli "I know that
c Servant , has led to

independent

ral Intelligence

he Director of
Cent
onal Security Counc

PERSONS/ENTITIFS: DATES: CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT a
COLBY, WILLIAM Oct 9, 1963 pr /
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

TAM _erenn

OCCURRENCE: 2 a :
In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228)
which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish
to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart
a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if
it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular
support to win war and improving working relationships.with U.S." The cable urges
that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that

's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional
general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been
cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."

SOURCE: STAFF:

Nawenn

T6 BHed GTILSPTEPTOOG GEs0S AN

PERSONS/ENLITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F,
RICHARDSON, JOHN Oct. 9, 1963 DIEM

OCCURRENCE: $a

Cn October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that
the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to
surmises but I can assure you flatly that. the CIA has not carried out independent ;
activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence
operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under

my instructions."

SOURCE: : STAPF:

TG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 Payson
FILE: DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. wy
MINH, GENERAL Oct 10, 1963 DIEM
DON, GENERAL | OSE 9, 196D

— COLBY, WILLIAM

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's “history of the Vietnamese
generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances. were to
be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
or deny economic and military assistance to a new fein if it appeared capable
of increasing effectiveness in military effort. ee

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33


ZG aheg” CIOLZEZE!PTIO0qa Gce0s AN”

PERSOUS/ENT LPLES + DATES: . CATEGORIES:
Lobe, HERRY CAROL a ne
COLBY, WILLIAM Oct 9, 1963 DIEM

KENNEDY, JOHN F,

bp peal}

~~ OeCURRENEE: a tt

In a CTA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Anbassador (DIR7H228)
which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish

to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave thelmpression that U.S. would thwart

a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if
it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular
support. to win war and inproving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges

that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that
MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional
general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been
cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense." ;

SOURCE: oo STAFF:
iG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 Dawson
PILE: ; * DATE:
: oo, 6/27/15

PERSONS/ENTLIVIES: DATES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. ~~
MINH, GENERAL Cet 10, 1963
DON, GENERAL Oct. 9,1963
COLBY, WILLIAM

OCCURRENCE.”

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese
generals coup" it is noted that the fmbassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
wore authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
high prospect of success. ' While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
not wish to leave the timpression that the U.S. would thwart a change of governinent
or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable
of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

SOURCE: “TSTARFS
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33 DAWSON


E PasroouNoy Bat ee bi
retheoviws baa

S\MBASSADOR LODGE
acEN. MINH
SEN. DON

e6 seg st9czrze' propa

STAFF? Dawson

Pane S,

DATE? 6/30/75

ae ek ii i’ soni yy hi ee me ne ge me

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:

(ODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MINH, GENERAL : ct 10, Ey DIEM
JON, GENERAL Oct. 951963

SOLBY, WILLIAM
OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's “history of the Vietnamese
generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate
contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact
were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to
be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the
matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a
high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do
not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government
or. deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable
of increasing effectiveness in military effort...." a

SOURCE: — STAFF:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33 , DAWSON
FILE: = DATE: 6/27/75

ee a ee ne Aa SAD RE A SN HEC Ae mp

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
MCCONE .

DATES: CATEGORIES:

Oct 10,1963 DIEM

CCURRENCE?: -
A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that
“we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively
would be an improvement over DIEM. ‘Therefore it. has been our counsel to proceed

cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something
of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on

the sidelines."

£6 a6eq GTILTFSE:PLICM GCG60S AW

SOURCE: | STAFF:
IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33 Dawson
FILE: DATE:
6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

Senate Foreign Relations Comnittee
_MCCONE Cet 10,1963 DIEM

OCCURRENCE:
A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that
‘we. have nob seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively
would be an dinprovement over DIEM. Therefore it: has been our counsel to proceed
cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something
of a eivil war, and the Conmunists would come out the victor merely by sitting on

the sidelines."

SOURCE: STAPF:
IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33 Dawson

8 4

PILE: oa
6/27/15


605 AH

PERSONS/ENTIPLES: DAEES 3 CATEGORIES:
Scour eee BATES oR EEGOR LE 3
GENERAL DON
Fore 4228 Oat 23,1963 DIEM
acObGH, HENRY CAROL a ;
= ete p a
we og, ae a
& OCCURRENCE : rr ma -

In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Satgon stations, nyistory’ of ‘the Vietnamese Generals
Booup", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the
Generals had decided to try to ‘stage a coup within a week follcwing 26 October. CONTIN
gunder instructions passed the substance of DIR7'228 to DON. DON promised he would scek
permission of the coup conmittee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Aybassador's

ecyes only.

SOURCE: ~ STAFF

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33 DATE: Dawson
FILE: ——
—_— 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ; CATEGORIES:

Lt. Col. PHAM NGOC THAO

OCCURRENCE:

Dawson

SOURCE: Hearings; > Ss woeGel., June 20, [I97>, Conéin, Exnibit 1; STAFF:
- PAQe 7,

RTT Ts | name.

AL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: : CATEGORIES:

DIEM a

60g

ONEIN
AMBASSADOR LODGE

ISON

OCCURRENCE:

96 sheq CLg9eZPeei pro

SOURCE:. earings, $.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One

Page &, )
. DATE: 6/30
FILE: (30/5
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
NEIN
NERAL DON
R74228 Oct 23,1963

IDGE, HENRY CABOT _ a

OCCURRENCE:

7
a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "Hi story of ‘the Vietnamese Generals
up", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the
nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week follewing 26 October. CONE IN
der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek

mmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's
es only.

f

'

SOURCE: T STAFF: ;

E PERSONS/ENTIV LES ¢ WALEED 4S GM LLU based

al ee | .
SON Oct. 23, '63 | DIEM

OCCURRENCE :

plaed

£6 sheq CLlyeZPee

SOURCE:

Hearings, 5,8.C.1.

6/30/75

DATES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Oct. 235 63 |

ood
»ONEIN
. HUAN

CCURRENCE:

Hearings, 8.8.C.1I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, f 6 STAPF! Dawson

PILE: DATE: — 6/30/75

oc BH

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
Sen. MINH , 10/18/63 DIEM &~

Don .
SEN. HARKINS

a

= ONEIN
8 OCCURRENCE:
ic

tat

nh

~~

an

=|

a

[=

mn

‘io

[=]

SOURCE: STAPF:

Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One Dawson

o. aes 9
Pa oA Qo dap, DATE?

FILE: ~ 6/30/75

SOURCE: . : 7 : TAPP
SOURCE? Hearings, 8.8.C.., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPF? dawson

pages 13-14,
PILES: mine. 6/30/75

E: PERSONS/ENTITIES: | CATEGORIES:

SCone in i DIEM
SHvan

[Gen. Harkins .
gimbassador Lodge

5

a.

J OCCURRENCE:
4 .

i]

i

ho

a

oh.

=)

an

i]

a

et

7

Ao:

\o

SOURCE: earings, S.5.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,

Po gee toh,

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LAM NGOC HUAN
AMBASSADOR LODGE

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

Oct. 16, '63

OCCURRENCE:

o Pe eye

ante

SOURCE: ;

mer

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN
_MC NAMARA 12 October 1963 | DIEM x

NCU YEN QUANG © |
PHAM NGOC THAO .

OCCURRENCE? when CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p.
5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, i.e. :
NGU YEN’ and THAO. But did not. explain the reference to MC NAMARA, ps 29

ee

Gite

OOT aHeq GTILSPEEPIIPG Co6OS AH

SOURCE: STAPF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
FILE: . DATE:

—_vuly 1, 1975

ee te Fare i ie ss A OL SF SD MY, sh eee eae ey eee en pee sg A, Ashe, tes neh ts‘ nen mei

LTES: CATEGORIES:
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
DIEM

I
AMBASSADOR LODGE
SECRETARY MACNAMARA

OCCURRENCE:

Hearings 5 S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,

"BIOOG Gcé6o0s AW

Tor abeq cagcePee

cee .

= PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: _ sa.

" CONEIN ! : CATEGORIES:
DON

OCCURRENCE:

Ayla erase yf & ae
Coup Comme Low
MoW Owe :

CON'T ON NEXT

CARD
SOURCE: _ SEAPF? Dawson
nearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein,
. Exhibi O moc an TF M3 a
PILE: ibit One. pee 7 . DATE: 6/30/75

SRST A en Ope ee eee

OCCURRENCE:

DATES: CATEGORIES:

- PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONTINUATION OF
LAST CARD:

CONARpON NEXT

SOURCE:

OLAPR ;

x babes Adee x aa a obk ae BAP ok bat RAD dk GRA AG ow
m x a

=I

i—|

yo

aa

a

oS “

4 OCCURRENCE:
4 CONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS:
“

ho

fe

i

Ga

n

i

an

ao]

au

a

7

i

o.

ha

SOURC

FILE: DATE:

PERSONS/ENTEIVIES : DAWES ¢
von 10/24/63
BZ ONEIN =
SEN. HARKINS °

OCCURRENCE: «

£0T aHeq ClgesPree: Plopa

SOURCE; © Hearings,
| PAQES A 5

Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

FILE:

ee re ee ee ee A ee rm me me rm pe ae cn Se en ee eine ee el eh a, —

ff ERR gre ee EE ee pe eid a co Oe ke ey wie ren reer rein mers ees we ne mee

DATES: i CATEGORIES:

"ERSONS/ENTITIES ;
JODGE, HENRY CABOT
TARKINS

3UNDY, MC GEORGE
JENERAL DON

JONSIN

JCCURRENCE: In a cable marked “eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October
24, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S.
government and DIEM. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU ;
attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKIN:
zan stand back from any non-essential involvement, It seems wise to maintain close control
over meetings between DON and CONEIN." p. 33

October 24, 1963! DIEM +~

OURCE: STAFF:
jlearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON

P FENSUNS/ENELELES : DATES: CATEGORIES:

* BUNDY CONEIN A a

=JOHNSON Oct. 24, 1963 DIEM
SKILPATRICK SPECIAL GROUP —
MCCONE

i=]

CCURRENCEs
Fon October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting “expressed his fear that
wthe top U.S, diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved
min conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN
Suse fullness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult
Bto deny. " The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS. emphasizing
"a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment
tof DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONELN
“meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns
to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken.

FOT she

SOURCE: STAPF ANS 7
— EP Ab dE pepo ay: tl y
Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct ak a Ne 4 ke ley ic
PILE EEE el onres)) wiblts f
6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: * CATEGORIES:

PDDGE

s3UNDY DIEM

ON, GENERAL :

SONEIN

OCCURRENCE:

na UIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY:it was noted that: "CAS has
2en punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each
~eting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance
xplicitly..."

SOURCE: : “STAFF,
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 DAWSON
FILE: DATE:

6/27/75


Got eheg CTgcereeplocd coseoc AN

PR RSONS/ENUIVYLES: DATES CATEGORIES:
LODGE ~~ as
HARKINS .
BUNDY Oct 24, 1963
COMSIN
NHU {

OCCURRENCES ; mee COTES
In an eyes. only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY ‘the Following
message appears: ..there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's

epproaches to one ..feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back
from any nonessential involvement..,it seems wise to maintain close control over
meetings between DON and’ CONEIN."

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 DATE: DAWSON
FILE: . ae
6/27/75

ee Se ie a ai a ik ae nie et eee vee Sele ne ares cee erie ee Se me re me tet pen ere ee co et eee ee ae eee ne ame ee Aa ae :

ne pee, eee ag ce a le a lm A Pe ence "sem, int Se ry ote SR. mm

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORTES :
BRENT 24 Oct 1963 DIEM
CONEIN °
CRITIC

JGS headquarters

QECURAEMME? the IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is
well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: ‘In
future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you

should ‘slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.! As a consequence, the firse cabled reports

from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at
headquarters."

STAFF:

R. DAWSON
DATE:

SOURCE?

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42

morro

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
g HANSEN, “BURMAU OF BUDGET ~ ee
SEXECUPIVE DIRECIOR OF CIA Get 24, 1963 DIEM
LODGE
RICHARDSON

OCCURRENCE: ~ “
“On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and
NKENNITH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at ,
Nhis initial meeting with LODGE, The memorandum for the récord prepared by the Executive
MDirector, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1, CIA was improperly dealing
@with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the
giill tribes; g. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GYN and the Buddist. and was
#eaught by surprise; 4, RICHARDSON had a. palatial mansion and entertained government
® officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its
Sow initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or
Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE fhat he thought LODGE's charges were
erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had
been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the
Ambassador.,_and had been carried out with eood judenent and with a high quality of
performaiZRCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting withSHGiik, LODGE hadnot
yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. ‘This took place a few days later.
(this appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in 1G areau of the Budget

for findikEout what Lodges thinking _was at this time.
Fer Rear POET (ELA) De a )

proe

£

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: : CATEGORIES:

DON, GENERAL

HARKINS, GENERAL _

_ CONEIN, Oct. 24, 1963 DIEM
OCCURRENCE: ~ -

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON
reported he had been informed bv Gehtrel HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart
any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were
available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. ‘The second meeting
DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON
to outline its substance, which he did. ;

SOURCE: ’ STAFF:
: IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35 ; Dawson
PILE: ° ; DATE:

K/97/7E

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: CATEGORIES:

Oct 24, 1963

OCCURRENCE: AS am
——— PS ta ad seer Oy

#In an eyes only cable f. ENS, INDY

2 meseape, appears: D e rom CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following
: .. there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's

~ appenas es to CONBIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back

Fi om any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control ove

a meetings between DON and CONEIN." .

=
a
sed
SOURCE: :
pee STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p.
PILE: ( )p. 35 DATE: DAWSON
pee ee 6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
HANSEN, “AUREAU OF BUDGET
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA Oct. 24 ; 1963 DIEM 4
LODGE . an ee ar ee oe
RICHARDSON :

OCCURRENCE:
On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and
KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at »
his initial meeting with LODGE. ‘The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive i
Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing id
with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the i
hill. tribes; 2. CIA had tnadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was |
eaught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government
officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its i
own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or :
Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were
erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CLA had ddone in Vietnam had i
been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the |
ed a with good judement ang 3 lity of
performawwehCEHANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting withehGir, LODGE hadnot

vet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later.
ee ee” nn vinta Ab had in the Pirean of the Budget |


80T SHeI CTIOLSPZEPIIOG So605 AH

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
DON, GENERAL t
HARKINS, GENERAL Y oo -
CONEIN,

Oct. 24, 1963 | DIEM

hf. y
yoy tae

OCCURRENCE:

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals
Coup", it 1s noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON
reported he had been informed 4 Gehereal HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart

any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were
available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting .
DON said the coup conmittee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized -DON

to outline its substance, which he did.

SOURCE: STAFF:

IG Report. 1967 (CIA),p. 35 ; Dawson
FILE: DATE:
6/27/75

a RE Ee ee ce eee me a ES tt eA yp ee my ce ee ne en ee ce ge ces cn eS SS SE See SY ce me: ce

DATES: CATEGORIES:

/ 7

DIM RE RE
Q CHRP A

. 24, 1963

In a @IA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY.it was noted that: "CAS’ has
been punctilious in carrying out my instructions, I have personally approved each .
meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance -
explicitly..." i

SOURCE: TARE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35 "DAWSON

me ey —

E PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:

CATEGORIES:
ONCCONE NHU ae
‘KENNEDY, JOHN F. Oct.25, 1963 DIEM
“TODGE |
PIEM . !

CCURRENCE?: ie _ oa °
an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with’ the only participant from
TA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose
the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to
Seoup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in
Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government _
wrior to the return of LODGE for corsultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. :
in sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control. and
™herefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making
fand could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional
‘nanner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak
rship; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war-might be lost during
p OU Say Peet a Ont as Lurrs “Vv si wating Seuph-yiekn
be injected™Imto the government and exercise e Anes”
important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool] correct attitude; (9) ;
we elthgy shave to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggres BATEEPS to remove them ©
and it“Isnot clear that the succeeding government would be much ba =

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36

aa

Feeepro
£6 efeP

a)

Vet 27 Oe Vo

——_

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:

CATEGORIES:
MCCONE NHU _

KENNEDY, JOHN FP. ; Oet.25, 1963 DIEM

LODGE

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: a a y cd —
tober 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participan

orn being recon MCCONE's notes. show that the President stated that the purpose f
of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect x
coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy
Sout Vietnam es he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the governmen
prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in cotati.
Tn sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control an
therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in " malig
and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-pro essiona ak
manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would pret “ we
leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war:might be tos pring
pertodagtyponitical confusion; (7) civilians ca nine oy Haeinen-cond-not——
be injected into the government and exercise effective control;

garnet’ discuss (9)
; i it ‘ licy of "cool| correct attitude; (9

inportant political issues with DIEM because of the po : )

we eltingy nave to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive ,Skeps to. remove them

Gé60s AW

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
“DON, GENERAL -

SLODGE,° AMBASSADOR

eCONEIN Oct. 28, 1963 prem’
=

3

i OCCURRENCE:

athe October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals
SCoup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was. speaking, for bher Ambassador.

DGE replied in the affirmative. ' DON told the Ambas dof "thatf the “U:S. government
gshould not interfer with or try to stimulate a cov 4 The: assador agreed with DON.
rs oboe oi re

ay
7
a
SOURCE: STAPF:
oo, DAWSON
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37 DATE:
FILE: 6/27/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
DON, GENERAL 28 October 1963] DIEM t-——~
LODGE, HENRY CABO?
CONEIN ;

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey

_ to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup arid that CONEIN was to stay home and await fur-
ther orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE ,. who
was preparing to retum home on the 31st of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON

that LODGE not change his plans as it. might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was
going on. p. 48,

SOURCE:

. STAFF:
5 | = R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, Jume 20, 1975, Conein

PILE: DATE +

4 caso NS/ENTITIES :
STILWELL, GENERAL RICHARD
SCONEIN

GENERAL DON .
SLODGE, HENRY: CABOT

DATES? ; CATEGORIES :

Latter part of DIEM
Qctober 1963

‘pro

SCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured
chat CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the
#U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Wash-
gington made made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive militar.
backeround should take over from him. When Washington. then sent a message to Ambassador
BLODGE and reconmended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN'’s, GENERAL
SSTILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't wan!
penybody else. pp. 31=32

SOURCE: STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein R. DAWSON
DATE:
FILE: July 1, 1975
PERSONS/ENTINTIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:
DON, GENERAL
“pDUk, AMPASSATOR
SONEIN Get. 28, 1963 : DIEM
OCCURRENCE: ° a a

he October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals
coup! " notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador.
ADGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Anbassador ‘that! the uls: government
should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup (ihe, Ambassador P agreed with DON.

i ‘ J ’

SOURCE: ~~ | STAPF: ~
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37 name PAWSON


one tne VAwRD t CATEGORIES:
ADN, GENERAL

GONEIN Oct 28, 1963 DIEM

MPCCE, HENRY CABOT — ;

a ey i ee

2 OCCURRENCE?

j

a _ Se oes a .
$h an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals

@oup" it is noted that: CONEIN met with Genral DON for the last time before the

@pup was launched. DON confirmed he had talked with
fr CONBIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 Oct
pans. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until
notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have
Uegan, ,but when pressed on his previous commitment ‘to
advance, DON said that possiblythe hours. would onl
advarice. DON said that nothing would be happening, wi
if there was a good reason for the arbassador to chan
the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his

the Ambassador who had vouched

ober to coordinate final

30 October -- until further

the plans before the coup

make them available, 48 hours

y be made available 4 hours tn

thin the next 48 hours ‘and that,

ge his planned 31 October departure,
own decision.

SOURCE: STAFFS
IG Report 1967 (CTA) P. 37 DAWSON
PILE: DATE:
-a---------- eee 2 72


Proed Geeos BH

ETT shea GagEee Pee.

"PERSONS /ENTITIES: _ DATES j CATEGORIES:

CONTIN GEN. DO CAO TRI : a

GEN, NGUYEN KHANH Oct. 28 5 163 ; ‘ rom, PREREE

GEN, DOW . “ ie: : i TARE ye, 1
AMBAS. LODGE a ty bm B a

L a A nell

OCCURRLwws.

petite it

CON'T ON NEX'
CARD

ae
acer

SOURCE:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CCURRENCE:
i

CON'T FROM LAST
CARD

SOURCE? p. $, Cont,

aoa an nae a

“So60S AH

proog

FIT sbeg.--§T9eePree’

oR CONS /ENTITIES.

OCCURRENCE :

fee teen ae

CONT. FROM LAST
CARD

pe erent ee AE AT OR

CATEGORIES:

STAFF:

DATE:

ce en ee ee te ee Se ee

C605 BH

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: ; CATEGORIES:
Fink . i “
Rhine, CAPT Conein 11/2/63
im

ra . a
aha, eo Dinh
bam, Coed

id

% OCCURRENCE:
Fam was returning with Diew and Nhu and an aide of Diow to the headaunarters
In an armored personnel carrier when tlinh in a separate column in radio com-
munications with Lam's celunn found out that Diem and “Nhu had been taken.
onein states that Hlinh with his aide, crossed the column, halted it and
ghungs stepped into the armored car and upon orders From Minh Uhens Lilled
Bhem. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Meadeuarters
and later on-in the afternoon they were later removed From the Ceneral Staff
Neadanarters toe Clinique St. Paul.

SOURCE? Hearines, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975 STAFF: Hawson
DATE? TIL/ 7S
FILE:
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
1 November 1963} DIEM

OONEIN

OCCURRENCE? Oy or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were

communications: between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact
with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was trans-
piring. CONSIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera
did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They d
not. want any American participation within the coup. p. 50


CATESOHLES :

GG60S5 BH

. 2400 hours
RAN THIEN KHIEM Nov. 1, '64 DIEM a
TNH
RAN VAN DON
a)

i wewJHHENCH

i yee RABNOE t

Ga

n

ran

on

ri

ot

=

in

=

~

nm

“SOURCE Ce pe pee STARS
===" Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, CoE? dawson

Exhibit One, page 21. DATE:

FILE: 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENIT'PLES: DANES: CATEGORIES:

Diem UL

Nov. 1, ‘6
2400 hours

| ns oc aenenree

BENCH

TAD Pe. . Ss" APR:

pOUNE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, STARS Dawson
Exhibit One, page 21.

gave: 6/30/75

PEN OVEO/ BN iT Lists DALES ¢ CATEGORIES

11/4/63
2140 hours —_

NHU

~ OCCURRENCH:

5
ri
oe

LIT aheg CI9EePee PLOOO GoeO0s BH

SOURCE: — ; a STAPF:

— Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, ~ Dawson
Exhibit One, page 19.

BILE: : DATE:

_ eee Se LTE

PERSON IS/ENT ITT : DAYES:

11/1/63
2400 hours

“OCCURENCE: ~ ~

2
%

ha oh tha 7
bey
~ SOURCE” ae — ~ — [TSTAPF?
~ Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Dawson

et Exhibit One, page 21,
SLL:

TAM

MINH 11/1/63
AMBASSADOR LODGE
1925 hours

SOCUNRENCEE

~ SOURCE: j
~~" Hearings, 5.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit. One,
page 16. - DATE: boy bre,

LO pre

ST BARGES

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: . DATES:

11/1/63
2140 hours

i
|
i

pom
co

WEST RRENTE:

at
pa)

SOURCE: ~ TSPAPPr
Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Dawson
Exhibit One, Page 19.

Bocld:324233615 Page 116

AW 50955

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ae a PHONAUNADIO
QEN
(/ SOSH
: aT Te
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_ VES | ee . cee ene DUNO

Page 119

324235615

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T/TT OHL DOON NEXADN JuepTsezg 9oT
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POMEL TL,

Aj
HW 50955 DoclIa

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES:
-_ ee 11/1/63
DUONG VAN MINH . 1545 hoursy
TRAN VAN MINH . *
TRAN THIEN KHIEL be

he

ven id

Nae

DEC

, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit 1

, Hearings, S.S.C.I.
PILE: page 16.

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENPITIES :

GEN. NGUYEN KHANH L

5h a, aaqegarh & as
wea albiyimed S)s

Doe — STAFF: .
SOURCE: Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one pani Dawson

- page 16.
. pane: 6/30/75

32423615 Page 120

HW 50955 Docld

Nov. 1, '63

Lite Yothey dane ded tn ¢ WALES & CAPEUGORTES

13230 hours DIEM“

OCCURRENCE? ——_

page 1h.

PILE:

ate ee ee ee

fearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

DATE:

PERSONS/E

“STARE TG

Dawson

P/s0MS

COL. Le QUANG TUNG 11/1/63

~ SOURCE? Hee

PILE:

1400 hours DIEM j

tay Le a ee ee ne
ng <3 pet Lant3 etugnd GOO ETO Games
. 4 >
tts wey rr er are seg Yee ee
ao egpes ovine Savoie fhe stleces.,

Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exnibit one, | SL ABIES”
pase rh,

DATE:

DATES + CATEGORIES:

Diem

6/30/75

AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 121

LOU AS 7 NEL. Lab t DATES : j CATEGORIES:

eee ao vu j e,

COLBY Noverber 1, 1968 DIEM

LODGE, H.C « :
“OCSTREENCE. When DIEM CALI LODGE CUYSCtly preceding cedt B Is Ceatin, COLBY states “tnat tne
Sees nee he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was

i i La ille ir: loyalty to the constitution, th
ing to require his officers to have filled their:oaths of t : ,
Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position
President." p. 67

— AR
SOURCE: STAPF:

i :
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby | | pare: ‘1 July 1975

R. DAWSON

Se ee my a Sy Se ee A He en‘ ee

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
a EN EEE

DATES: CATEGORIES:
CONEIN wz
DON, GENERAL 1 Nov 1963 DIEM

STATION (sateen)
JGS headquarters

OCCURRENCE? On November 1, 1963,:."CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the
conmand post throughout the Struggle. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION
by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONEIN was. told by GENERAL DON that’ DON had
tried unsuccessfully to reach CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that
CONBIN's: telephone was out of order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line
open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate con-

tact with the coup principals ,the STATION was able to report almost minute-—by-minute progres:

of the coup."

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42

PILE:

R. DAWSON
DATE: 29 June 1975

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Baye 122

PERSONS/ENTITIES +

DATES: CATEGORIES:

CONEIN
COLBY, WILLIAM 1 November
DIEM 1963

MIHN, GENERAL

CCURRENCE:

that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible

on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted.
that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance

to look at the bodies but tured it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assass-
ination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between Presi-
dent DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very
strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early
stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that
he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to
veceive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten
out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city.
SOURCE: KIN was not in attendance. STAPF:

R. DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.
FILE:

DATE: 29 June 1975

_ PERSONS/ENTITIES: . DATES:
CONEIN
CRITIC 1 Nov 1963
JGS headquarters
STATION

OCCURRENCE: the IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at
JGS headquarters is well known in official cireles", and bolsters that notoriety by the
following statement: “The first cable (on the coup) was: received at headquarters at 0117
hours, .(November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159.

At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the
STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the
day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters
cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in ‘its CRITIC
cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages,
seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at
headquarters ."

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42

STAFF:

R. DAWSON
DATE:
FILE:

29 June 1975

Docld:32423615 Page 123

BW 50955

VALS t CATEGORIES:
CONEIN 1 November 1963 DIEM «

CCURRENCE:

==" When the generals took ie i :
let grily the embassy Lee tnt over the PIT which controlled the communications, they

; The telephone terminals had bee tak
coup and instead of lea “IN! i - ad been disconcen
Pe ving CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

PILS: R. DAWSON

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ; DATES: CATEGORIES:

i
_t J
COLBY, WILLIAM J November 1963 | DIEM
Nhu }

OCCURRENCE: conpy stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of Pres-
ident. DIEM and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in
ine United States government and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern.

in retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encoura;
ing and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is
very clear that the United States through itsoverall policy was in support of that overthr:
and, of course, I think it is fair to say that im launching a violent overthrow of a re-
@ime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we:
killed in the process." pp. 19-20

\
a
a
oh

SOURCE:

R. DAWSON
Hearines, SSCI, Jume 20, 1975, Colby, po. 19-20

wo nm

TY AINE « SY Teas IAT

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 124

PERSOUS/ENPTLTES + DATES: CATEGORIES :

GENERAL DINH DIEM
el. AUG. thru
16 SEPT. 163

a as Sa

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE: | STAFF? Dawson

Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
age 12. TE:
vine: Pa? DATE? 6/30/75

nee ee ene cent eee a me ee een me ee er ene ee de nee ne Sneed eee in eee me Se ge eg ened ~

CATEGORIES:

DATES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
1 November 1943 DIEM

CONEIN

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain .

shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a
certain time in order to alert American personnel who might. be living around the area to
wateh out or stay under cover, because theyxwotld find 105's in the center of the city.

There were no American casualities during this coup. ‘The Vietnamese suffered about. 100
dead. p. 51-52 7

SOURCE: R. DAWSON

Bocld:324233615 Page 1235

AW 50955

Presi / aye La LES ¢

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE: sine

Se bestia, $.8.C.1.,; 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ————" Dawson
age ,
cere, . DATE:
PILE: "6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES :
GEN. DINH 31 August. "63 DIEM e———~

{
COUNSELLER NHU

OCCURRENCE:

Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audaeity to inform both President
Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial
post for himself.

7 SOURCE: Hearings, $.8.C, I., 6/20/75, © Conein, Exhibit one, STARE? pawson

pages le-13.
FILE: : DATR : 6/30/75

Docld:32423615 Page 126

HW 50955

DIEM
GEN. MINH

OCCUR TEN

CON'T, ON
NEXT CARD
coud

ae

SOURCE? son

Hearings, S.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
pages 11-12,

PILE: DATE: 6/30/75

foghnce Shag Oe nee eee are eae ee ee ee rm a ef ere

PERSONS/ENTIVIFS: | DATES: CATEGORIES:

—
f

ger t

NMC

on ty.

v
ae

7
a

At

Coa
Occ

SOURCE:

P, 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED

FILE:

32423615 Page 127

Bocld

AW 50955

PERSOUS/ENTIPTES :

COL. KHANGY

CATEGORIES:

CON'T ON
NEXT CARD

“rr Dock

SOURCE:
“~~ Hearings, SiS.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,
page 12.

PILE: . = 6/30/75

Epa RANE

. PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES : CATEGORTES:

me Loko ed
Avon te

GS

cop undes kha

Page 12, con't,

32473615 Page 126

HW 50955 Docld

CAPEGORLES :

PERSONS ENTLY LES 3

DISH © .
MINE
DON

~~ OCCURRENCE :

ha

| ; “SPAKE: Dawson
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, —

page 13. DAVE: 6/30/75

32433615 Page 129

Docld

AW 50955

PURQUMD SEAN ULL bio j deren) t CALE Ios

OCCURRENCE

SOURCE? Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, STAPF! pawson
pages 13-14,

—— - spac, 6/30/75

I PLS: DATE:

DAES CATEGORIES:
NGO DINH NaU 11/1/63 DIEMU-—
GEN. DON
GEN, DINH

SOURCE? ten ; ~ PT SPARE T
oe Hearings, 8.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, | ~~" Dawson

page 13.
PTLE: ; . nape: 6/30/75

32423615 Page 130

HW 50955 DocId

CEN. DON a
CONETN : Nov. 1, '63
AMBASSADOR LODGE

2CCURR ENCE:

whe

rite da

“CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: ; ~ oO SARE
a Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, ———— Dawson
PAA A, DATE:
ce ~ , 6/30/7
1 pe RSONS/¥ INTITI Tis: : ‘DATES: : CATE CORTES :

“ONT FROM LAST CARD

scare —_—— : START

32423615 Page 131

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FSULETL apvu Juroq sea Jaojyo uves+,, *opqnerg SULATAL SEA OY ZuUYy pres word
"dnOD OZ JO UOOULOTJL OY. UO DSpoy o2 wWoTy WOLY Ope PTV. Lv syuNoDdoa YOTUA
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*SATYOOaELVO >SaLVG OMT TINTON OOM T

PERSONS/ENTITIFS:
HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,

DATES

CATEGORIES:

30 Oct. 1963 |

OCCURRENCE? On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the
same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063): "........do not think we have the
power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has. made it clear many times that this is
a Vietnamese affair...... I believe we should continue our present position of keeping
hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has
been anaylzing forces for some time and it is thelr estimate that the generals have
probably figured their chances pretty closely....... It. does not: seem sensible to have
the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of govern-
ment....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last
moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be
passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them....If we were convinced that the coup
was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has read
~ SOURCE: UhIS and does not caric START:

R. Dawson
CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39 DATE: ;
ILE: ——" 29 June 1975
PERSONS/ENTITLES:
: CATES :
FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander <ASECORTES:

CONEIN DIEMt-"

OCCURRENCE:
—————= CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vi ;
landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 438 etnam anc

SOURCE:

Héardngs,“SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein STAFF:

FILE: DATE:

Taster 7 pee teiod

Doclda:32423615 Page 134

BW 50955

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE
BUNDY

DATES: CATEGORIES:

prem //

30 Oct 1963

OCCURRENCE? On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following
cable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction. Will
earry out to best of my ability."

SOURCE: ;
a STAPF? R. DAWSON
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40

FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975

en at or om a na et ae ce A ae i i ey seers ee ae Sens ioe, ae es cep mee sey eek yh en nd ae, he ea OU ae me ee

PERSONS /ENTITIES: DATES;
TODGE

30 Oct 1963

quotation appeared: "....We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power
to delay or discourage. coup. ..We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your
message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authorities
will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side.... " ( the IG Report here
states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House re-
peats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inference
ean probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it
was. undoubtedly emanating from the White House.)

TAFF

R. DAWSON

CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39

FILE: ° DATE: 29 June 1975

ae eee me nme AP em Se me Se ne hc ee hae a me ty SU ky MR ce a RS a A em ee A Se Se eT ERE RS SS fe SH ec sn a

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 135

PERSOUS/ENTEITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

SMTDH, DAVID MCCONE

HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS > Oct.
TRURIARD, WILLIAM COLBY

KENNEDY, ROBERE

KENNEDY, JOHN FP.

~~ OCCURRENCE:
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY.
tn attendance. ‘The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was supfested
that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, 'TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a
committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE. countered with the view that 8MITH should
not be tnvolved in such a policy making. function, although he would be in a position to

provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions

in the operations field. ‘The President stated that if the forces In Saigon were not
elearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General
felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view
that even a successful coup would ereate a period of interregmum, confusion which might
only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

STAFF:

DATE: Pawson

FILE: om 6427/15

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

HARKINS , DON ve peg ES
MINH KENNEDY, JOHN F. yes, 7 DIEM

LODGE Oct 30, 1963-J4 * te
BUNDY a oe

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that
.chariées of action with or without our approval now so sighificant that we should
coeent ly consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to
eoup group can still have decisive effect. on itsdecision. ... We must have assurance
balance of forees clearly favorable...CONEIN should express to DON that we do not find
presently reveal plans. to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some
corroborative evidence ef men or others directly involved.. “highest authority desires
it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in alt coup
contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team.

SRK | STAFF?
IG Report. 1957 (CIA) p. 39 Dawson

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 136

Lee 6 DALES:

LODGE, AMBASSADOR CATEGORIES:

DIEM
NHU . Oct. 29, 1963

OCCURNENTE: 3
de! ‘ To i

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAT 7 peg ,
+ & G2040) of 29 0 if A oead myit bee y
TIA 7 pf etober, sent’ thr : +t
hat 2 coub attenpt by ty on the seemingly inminent coup: "In cusmeny we. ald peo
che USG can prevent y the ganerals group is imminent...and that no posit’ would appear
re a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU eer Hveaction by
a owe novugn ere

wave no requests to date by the
; : he generals for materi
mticipate that such requests may be fortheoning Or Simancial support, we mist

mit ;

SOURCE:

IG Report. 1967 (CIA) p. 38 STAFF:

PILE: Dawson
DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
DIEM . 29, 1963 DIEM
NHU

OCCURRENCE onze er
; A ig ol ey pa .
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent™through eyes only” channels of:

CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly inminent coup: ‘Tn summary, it would appear
that a coup attempt by the ganerals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by
the USG can prevent a.coup attempt short of. informing DIEM and NHU.. .Althoughthere

have no requests to date by the generals for materials or finaneial support, we must

anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38
Dawson

PTI:

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 137

10/28/63

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:

GEN. DON ;
AMBASSADOR LODGE

CONEIN

OCCURRENCE:

STAFF:
Dawson

TE:
——— 6/30/75

him i yt Ne ie A

SOURCE:

Hearings, 8.8.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One,
ie tn oH on po ee

FILE:

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
SMITH, DAVID MCCONE
HARKINS, GENERAL HELMS
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM COLBY
KENNEDY, ROBERT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

OCCURRENCE:
In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY
in attendance. “The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested
that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a
committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should
not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to
provide technical advise to HARKINS. and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions
in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not
clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General
felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The CCI stated his view
that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might
only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Bocld:324233615 Page 136

AW 50955

| PERSONS/ENTITUES DATES: CAREGORTES:

GEN. BON
GEN. DO CAO TRI
NGUYEN KHANH

OECURRENCE:

GQu't.
NEAT
CARD

CONTINUATION OF LAS? CARD, p. lil.

STAFF:

SOURCE:

PILE:

32423615 Page 139

HW 50955 Docld

“PERSONS/ENTIPIES:

CONEIN GEN. DUONG VAN MINH
GEN, TRAN VAN DON

CATEGORIES:

TRAN THIEN KH ITEM

sess RAN VA u can ie
OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUED ON NES?
CARD

ee I tte perm a

SOURCE: STAFF?

_—— Hearings , * Si. I.; 6/26/75 , Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson
p AD gv on a

FILE: _ 6/30/75

CCURRENCE ;:

pete ab” sma  2
CONT. FROM LAST
CARD

SOURCE: p

PILE:

32423615 Page 140

=

HW 50955 DocId

PERSONS/ENTITLES: . ‘DAPES:

11/2/63
TLCE PRESIDENT THO | 0310 hours —_—-

CATE: GORTRS

OCCURRENCE ——

SOURCE: — ; : eee STAPF? _

Hearings, S.8.C.1., 5/20/95, Conein, oo

Dawson
Exhibit One, Page 22,

PILE: DATE? — 6/30/75

Docld:32423615 Page 141

BW 50955

pew Vins WIL Liss t
ee he

2
MINH

NHUNG

* CONEIN sta
tc MINH for the first tim.
not guarantee full honors, if and durin
another. DIEM stated that he would ord

that this took place at about 7:50, November 2, 1963.

. Stage, there were four armored cars and

ted that around 6:30 or 6-4
DIEM asked MINH for full honors and

DATES: CATEGORIES:
Novenber 1963 VTEM i acs

0 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked

MINH replied that he could
& the tim that Vietanese were still killing one

er the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls
CONEIN stated as follows: "At this
113's an escort of military police proceeded inme-

f headquarters toward GAT LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with
the general staff headquarters toward. the back of the go

TPS, went out the back road from

If course and took a different road
from the armored cars that went down Cong Le." p, 52-53

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
PILE:

PISRSONS/ENT IP TES :

MINH -

DATE: July 1, 1975
DALES: CATEGORIES:
11/2/63
2420 hours DIEM ~~
Odza(?)

OCCURRENCE:

pOURCE: Hearings, 5.5.C.1.,

Exhibit One, page 2

PILE 2 |

6/20/75, Conein, STAPP? Dawson
3.

| pave: 6/30/75

Doclda:32423615 Page 142

BW 50955

FEHSUNS/ENTLULES : DATES: | CATEGORIES:
er a. } a

Non, General |

Conein 11/2/63 | Dien”

OCCURRENCE:

Conein stated at the tine they were
wony on the capitulation of Dac,
im the press.) pace 74,

“going. to bring the press in For the cere-
Hon said" get the hell ont we are brineine
. coos ae

rr tn

SOURCE:

. . STAFF :
rr aos SSc 7 7 y 5 ;
Nearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975 Dawson
PILE: | parE: P/US7S
PERSONS/ENTIVIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

LAM, DUONG NGOC

oobectcea

oom her >, 63

NHU
XUAN
ke

GENERAL MAI HUU

= io? Fe '
OCCURRENCE? XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took”
off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted,
and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan, DIEM and NHI
were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the ¢olum LAM, who was a little
fat guy who wore a mustache and used te command the civil guard and not the individual who

later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical pro-
tection. p. 59-60

SOURCE: STAFF? 3, DAWSON
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

HW 50955 Docld: 3242735615 Page 143

PERSONS/ENUT'PIES : DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Conein

Lodge, ic. 11/2/65

Nien Po a

~~ ECURRENCE: ; ——
Conch staten he kept contact with the junta "untal the day that the i. &,
officially recoanized the South Vietnamese sovernment. There were several
countries that recognized, and T was acting as ‘the liaison officer for the
anbassador to the junta durinue this period for approximately ten days or
Cwe weelks,

[

SOURCE? Hearings, Sse Conein, June 20, 1875 STARR: Dawson
i
PILE: pe 1 DATE: T/AVLTS
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: | CATEGORIES:
Tuan  Conein . T1/2/63 | Dien
Mh

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that another, officer who had worked with Conein was apparently
executed ahout that same time as Diem and Mhu were. Tuan had been head of

the Special Forces and had worked very closely with Diem and Nbu and Concin and
was executed by the Generals’ that morning. Page 27-28,

SOURCE: . STAFF:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby ; Dawson
PILES | ATE:

7/1/75

Doclda:32423615 Page 144

BW 50955

sa ace eitegee = arent pene emery rare i aoe cn nm gemrneertcemenenm nest ersnmrns gree en a eer ee

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: CATEGORIES:

i .
11/2/63 Dieu
fink un

‘ra, so ana .

Trane th |
“OCCURRENCE:

Sonein explained that althoush it was baffling as to why Ddenm left the palace
te pa to the church in Cholon, and although he did not lmow exactly now they
rat out the general assumption was that there were secret tunnels.in the palace
which was the former Governer General's Palace called Gailong Palace. The
cunnel took them under amd tirouwsh the palace and the half block to Caty Hall.
Jad =

ase 63-04,

1975

Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20,

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:

Bane, Chijor PPL naa . a
mane R ; . Ler te
Phen, Neoc Conein

Tan Min

OCCURRENCE:

Rane was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had licft.
Conoin asked Bang (whom Conein had met in Hanoi in 1949 what his orders were. _.
Bane stated the orders soing through the palace was that we were not tn Eire
unless we were £ired upon and that they had not been Found at that tim
The expectation was and everybody assumed, that Minh and Yhu were at the
palace

Pawson

SRE anny , SSCA , Connin , G sof 57

32423615 Page 145

AW 50955 Docld

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CUNT ON NERY DAES:
nn CARD —
c= 11/2/63
Ey 0310 heurs

_ LIST OF OFFICERS Ustorels
PARTICIPATING IW
THE COUP: =

an

CON'T on NEXT
CARD

f wwe Ba

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75
Exhibit One, page 22,

>

CATEGORIES:

DIEM +

PERSONS/ENTITIES : . DAWES:

NGUYEN CAO KY.

CATEGORTES

DIEM

Ic

OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:

OCCURRENCE:
-_ ~~ 1 LIST
LAST CARO CONT.

oo in AT arg ct
fo Coben: e

patie Tos

SOURCE: , j
Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein,

po ae

HW 50955” DoclTd:32473615 Page 146

atl

DIEM
ay PES

SEE

OCCURRENCE: Lisp OF OFFICERS PARPICIPAT CONTINUATION FROM

a LAST ae (Oc.

SOU REE ~ STARE:

. —

DATE:

AW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page i147

PERSONS /ENT LT Tics 2

CATEGORIES +

ore”

11/2/63
1330 hours

OCCURRENCE T

bo (Fh feo moet Ps Rye Fa OQ fbn hes 3oy rho
“SOURCE: ~ —_ _—- ; / —_ ~ | STAPF: ;
ee fearings, S.S,C.1,, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Dawson
Pages 2k - 25, . DATE:
PILE: “_ 6/30/75
PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:
DIEM TTT
DON, GENERAL .
MINH, GENERAL 2 Nov 1963 DIEM *
CONEIN
JGS headquarters

OCCURRENCE? “pecording to one of CONEIN’s reports, DIEM called GENERAL DON at 0650 hours
e November and offered to surrender unconditionally. GENERAL MINH immediately ordered all

telephones removed from rooms in their JGS command post area. This cut off all communicatio
with the outside except. for radios under MINH's control.

, ee R. DAWSON

Docld:32423615 Page 1436

BW 50955

PLES: ; mE TES t ; CATEGORIES:

Nov. 2, '63
1130 hours

NHO

wCCURRENCE: — ~

SOURCE:

— rene | STAPF:
-=—"" Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, —

— Dawson

Exhibit one, page 24, DATE:
PILE: | =" 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTIVTES :

CATEGORIES:

11/2/63 /S
1330 hours DIEM

“NCE?

OCCURR

SOURCE: STAFF:

“Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Dawson
sete page 25. .
PYLE? PDATE:

Pope te

32423615 Page 149

=

Docid

HW 50955

PESSONS/ENTTTIES : DATES:
11/2/63
AMBASSADOR LODGE 1000 hours

CATEGORIES :

piEM

© OCCURRENCE:

===" Hearings, $.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit One, page 24.

DATE:

Dawson

6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTIT IES :

GEN. MAT HUU XUAN 11/2/63

NHU

CATECORIRS:

ren”

SOURCE: :

"=" Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein,
Exhibit one, page 24.

PILE:

DATE:

SRNR y Dawson”

6/30/75

HW 50955 Docld:32423615 Page 150

PERSONS/ENTILIES: DATES: CATEGORIES:

va 11/2/63
NHU . 1000 hours

OCCURRENCE:

eee ee L
SOURCE? Hearings, $.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein STAPF: Dawson

Exhibit One, page 24,
PILE: nate: 6/30/75

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTIETES : DAMES ¢

NHU ; 1000 hours DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

raat \.
SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein STARE? Dawson

Exhibit One, page 24,
PILE: DATE: 6/30/75

HW 30955 Docld:32423615 Page 151

PER SOUSG/ENT UP ERS ¢ Die

CATRGORTES :

Vice President THO 11/2/63 aA
0420 hours DIEM

OCCURRENCE: 7 — a
Geiee IS. eaeaes EOGAVLOH E95 frie bilwisted

6/20/75, Conein, oe Dawson

Hearings, 5.5.0 2 ;
23. pare: 6/30/75

et,
Exhibit One, page

MELT EES | “St
11/2/63
1000 hours DIEM U—~

OCCURRENCES 7 eee

| acon Dawcan

Hearings, $.8.C.1., 6/20/75, Conein, | SEAR: —_

Docld:32423615 Page 152

HW 450955

PERSONS/ENTITIES: DATES:
DON
CONEIN 2 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM”

OCCURRENCE? On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to pay
the families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional
1,750,000 pilasters. One bundle of 250,000 pilasters was overlooked and was found later in
CONEIN's safe, ‘(The IG<Report goes on to note as follows: "The passing of these funds is
obviously a very sensitive matter.")

SOURCE: AE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 40-41 R. DAWSON
FILE: DATE: 29 June 1975

ee i, RN CE SOUT Sra te Ses re ee iF ‘in Sl, poem ne rte eye te nee ee

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PERSONS/ENTIVIES : . DATES: | CATEGORIES:
Pel shld wk Machetes “ene vee

KEANU i Jan. 1964 3 DIEM LY

MAJOR DANG SY

:

QCCURRIENCE :

At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime th
coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's,.fii
deaths had been .caused-by American-supplied grenades a
use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the convictiggyby}thedmilitary court was that the 8
deaths were caused by these concussion grenades “\H fins argues in her book that this
conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessmeng Of the MKIII grenade which found that
at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have suffi-
cient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors,
and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Iiiggins also
states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter

e8ded that of the
Oxecutor insisted that the
ype known as MKIII whose

eX
cS

one way or another. The trial was Clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)
SOURCE: [ START:
Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,! Dawson, R.
1965 ; |

PILE: , — July 2, 1975

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J tows DANY LY iat DATES + CATEGORTES:
Thich Tri Quang Spring, 1965 Diem «_/
McNamara :
Diem

CCURRENCE?

Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "Thich
Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the
greatest mistake we made was_when we gave Thich Tri Quang at the U. S.
Embassy." (from September through November 1963) Page 103

SOURCE? Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, STAFF: Dawson

Harper and Rowe

FILE: ; DATE? Suly 3, 1975

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Colby, Wm. E. fearsoa, D.
Breckinridge

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge actually put to
response to a March 1967 Drew Pearson
was involved with eriminal syndicates
of discussions caused by the Pearson e
offiee were directed to put together r
assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and

VALLOo: CATEGORIES:
Diem

3 (67 IX-Ci2-5
Castro

gether the I.G. Reports and he did so in

colum to the effect that the agency
toassassinaté Castro. As a result
olum, staff members in the I.G.'s
eports on CIA involvement in the
Diem (50).

DATE: 6/28/75

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PERSONS/ENTITIES:
IG REPORT
CONEIN
SPERA
DON, GENERAL
DIEM

DATES: CATEGORIES:

DIEM,

31 May 1967

OCCURRENCE: In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: "To recap:
(a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried

_ out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup gener-
als, but only as approved and under instructions. (¢) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the
generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) CONEIN furnished, GENERAL DON about
$65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. (e) CIA had
no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them." .

~ SOURCE:
oo R. DAWSON
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44

—" 29 June 1975

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f ubuoke t/a LS: DATES + H
COLBY

¢

OCCURRIENCIE:
Yoreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various tir
the degree: to woniech he is going to do one thing or the other. ‘The U.S. eannot control it.
The U. S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, vernaps influence hin,
but the control, that is....when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why t:
are limits to your degree of authority over them.'" p. 76

“SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

a STAFF: ~
R. DAWSON
FILE: DATE: 1 July 1975

ee ee Se ye cee ee em ca ee

COLBY stated in response to the difficulty far the United States once it ha:
sougnt to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the

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