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HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 1

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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

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HY 50955 Docld: 3242345275 Page 2

do-e

7p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52).

(Draft--9/8/75)
Box 344

The "Executive Action" Capability - _ | : .

Along with the question of authorization for actual assas-"
sination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature
of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element,
the deve lopment of an assassination capability. — |

(a) Introduction

Sometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director

of Plans) instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the

Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish

an "executive action capability" which included research into a
capability to assassinate Foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51;
Harvey. 6/25/75, pp. 36-37.) At some time within the same period,
Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.

Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the "generalized"

capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75,

4

"Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, défined by the

“testimony before the Committee as a project for research into.

developing means for ‘overthrowing foreign political leaders, ineliud-

ing a “capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75,

p. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide

spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign

leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action on the

spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75; p. 32). The Inspector General's Report

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described executive action as a "eeneral stand-by capability.’ to
carry out. assassination when required (1.G., p. 37). The project
was given the code name 'ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.* :

A single agent (asset"), given the cryptonym QI/WIN,
was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project,
‘but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts.
Richard Helms described. QJ/WIN's “capability”:

"TF you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you
had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms,
6/13/75, p. 53). ; ;

Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however , to spot "individuals

-with criminal and underworld connections in Europe -for possible

. multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, Qa /WIN:

reported that a potential asset. in the Middle East was “the leader

of a gambling syndicate" with "an available: pool of assassins"

«~ (CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches). 9 EL

However, Harvey testified that::

"during the entire existence of the ‘entire ZRRIFLE project
oe no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassina-
tion, and no even tentative targeting or target list was
ever drawn." © (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.. 45.) -

Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the

problems and requirements of assassination and developing a stand-

* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs. One was
the executive action assassination capability. The other was:
another program which is not part of the subject matter of this
report: (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section
with general responsibility-for such programs.) ‘This second
Program was genuine, but it was also to provide a.cover. for: any
executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.)

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by assassination capability; more specifically, it involved.

“spotting” potential agents and “researching” assassination.
techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75,
p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized
Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell, |
7/22/75, p. 32). The I.G. Report: of 1967 found "no indication

in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-

QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that “after Harvey took over the

Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (L.G.

pp. 40-41.)*

(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization,

or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project

. There is- general agreement on one fact: at some point. in

early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with.

_ Bundy. The timing of that conversation .and whether "the White |

House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which

i *

_the evidence varied widely.
Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that “the |

and ‘the Inspector | General’ s Report. quoted notes of Harvey's (mo

longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall. any

specific conversation with the “White House". ‘However, his” initial

testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes). and stated

ate

* A discussion of whether. ZR/RIFLE was related. to the actuark

assassination efforts against Castro is found, at Section (d),
infra

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 5

that, while he could have created the capability on his own,, any
-urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later
appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of
the capability .and that the context was a briefing by hin and
not .urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and,
gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he
never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain"
that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met.with CIA officials Sidney
“Gottlieb. the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and
Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, ‘to discuss the feasibility
of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" ;
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those

de.

meetings, Harvey testified that they took place after his:initial

* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-
tations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney
‘Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. llarvey testi-

‘fied as follows: ;

Q: “And is it your judgment that’ that is January 26, 1961 and
is about the subject of Executive Action? ‘

Harvey: Yes, it is.

Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that
‘you have recounted? ,

Harvey: . +... [W]ell, when I first looked at this, 1 thought
this, well, this has got to be '62, but LT am almost cercain
now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the.

_ first discussion that I. had with Dick Bissell in early

' January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were
several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during
the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall

foo. _ of ‘61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver

HW 50955 ° DocId:32423525 Page 6 —

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discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,”
might have transpired in “early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.
52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he ‘agreed with Harvey
about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,

p. LO).

had ~~ °or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassi-
nation with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very
least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had
discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

“~

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-
‘structions to establish an executive action capability:

the first thing I did’... was discuss in theoretical
terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly
the whole subject. of assassination, ‘our possible assets,
Our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-
mental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon
-of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you
assume that it is, is it within our capability within |
the framework of this government to do it ef{fectively.: | -
and properly, securely and discreetly, -(Harvey, 6/25/75,
pp. 37-A, 38). . a hos

"_.- The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb ‘to the

early stages of the executive action project as follows:

Harvey says that: Bissell had already discussed certain
aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney
Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut. in, llarvey .used |
him in developing the Executive Action Capability....
Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this ‘connection

may explain a notation by ‘Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed
Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associa-.
ting the discussion with the Castro operation. (1.G.
Report,“pp. 37-38). ,

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turn-

over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed

‘as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial
‘discussion of: executive action can, at the least, “be dated before
November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to..
refer to January 1961.

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Harvey testified that the “executive action" capability
was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35).
His cryptic handwritten. notes of the January 25/26 meetings: pre-"
served at the CIA, contain phrases which ‘suggest a discussion of .

assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last

resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness", "the

magic button", and "never mention. word assassination". (Harvey,
Ex. 1,-.6/25/75):*
The Inspector General's Report did not mention these

notes, or their dates. ‘However, in describing Richard Bissell's

initial assignment of the “executive action" project to Harvey,

it referred to another set of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed
after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes

quoted Bissell as saying: to Harvey, "The White House had twice

urged me to create such a capability" (L.G:, P. 37). Harvey ‘also!

testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial dis-

- cussion of "executive action" with Bissell ‘(Harvey , 6/25/75, ‘p. 37).

However, the- testimony’ from Bissell and White House aides ‘in the

“Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations ‘is in conflict with Harvey!s

testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given :to

Bissell.

1

* tlarvey's notes also contained a-phrase which suggests his con-

cern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation
from other governments: ‘dangers of RIS (Russian Intellipence
Service) counter-action and monitor if they are blamed." (Harvey,
Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75). ©

HW 50955 Docld:324293525 Page 8

The Following testimony regarding the relationship
between "the White douse" and the executive action capability
was obtained by the Committee:

Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indica*
ted that Bissell mentioned white House urgings to develop an execu-
tive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that
he “particularly remember [ed]” that Bissell said that he received
"more than one" urging from the White House (llarvey, 6/25/75,
pp. 36-37; 7/kL/75, p.-59).. However, he had no direct ‘evidence
that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House."
Wo specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey
(Harvey, 6/25/75, Pp. 31). Moreover, ‘he said that it would have been

y "improper" for him to have asked Bissell who he had talked to and’ |

“grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name - i

dene

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). a -
Bissell: - Bissell specifically vecalied assigning: Barvey
to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 5h). However,

Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in
-the White House. as the origin” of his instruction to. Harvey (Bissell,
6/9/75, p. 51).

During the course of several appearances before the ‘
Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had

been urged by the White House to develop an executive action

capability.

..

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 9

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Agency" (Id. , p. 81). And still later he said: "there is little

In his initial appearances’ before the Committee on June 9 and
11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White

House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged"

‘quotation of Harvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report,

Bissell said, “I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is
wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in his
initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was ‘true that he was
asked by the White House to create a general stand-by, assassination
capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49). |

Based again upon llarvey's missing notes ("White House urging")
and his initial statement that he ‘had no reason to challenge their:
accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy
(Id., 6/9/75, p. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy , for

National Security Affairs, and walt Rostow (Id. P. 51), Deputy

Assistant to President. Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from
‘whom such a request was most likely to have come (Ia. * 53). because

"they were. "the. two members of: the Witte “House staf£ who were closest

to CIA operations." ‘(Id., p. 54):

At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell. said that

the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the.

doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and
possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46).
When Bisse ll returned to the, Committee on july 17 and 22, his

testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier

HY.50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 10 .

appearances, “was that there was no White House urging. for the creation
of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the
"research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established,

First, he was shown the Harvey notes which had been’ preserved

and which, without any ‘mention of the White Hous ,. indicated llarvey
had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. ‘Those’
dates -~ just 5 days after the change of administration -- made

Bissell conclude that-it was “very unlikely that that, assignment .

to {Harvey] was taken as a result of White House urging or consul -
tation” (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). Bissell said that Bundy. did
not have any influence on the performance of his’ Agency duties before
the Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23). Bissell
added that he did not remember meeting ‘with anyone in the new ad-.
ministration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, 7122175,
pi23). _ . 7 7

Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he! was con-

vinced by telephone conversations with Kostow and Bundy that based
upon Rostow's duties. -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with
covert action ~~ he ‘never discussed" executive action with Rostow
(Bissell, 2/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, py 22). |

| “As for Bundy, Bissell’ Ss: final testimony (after telephone con-
tact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy ‘
about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75,
pp. 10- 1; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22). “Bur Bissell confirmed his original °

testimony (6/9/75, pp. ~} that he did not brief Bundy on ‘the

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actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the
CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite
certain” that he would ‘not have expected Bundy to mention the |
executive action capability to the President.- (Bissell, 7/22/75,
p. 35). -Bissell testified: |

Q. Would you think the development of a capability to.

kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient impor--.

tance to bring to the attention of the President? |
Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the.
limited’ scope of activities within that project, I would

not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35).

Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted
"capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination .
operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, Pp. ll). Bissell said that although :
he does not have a specific recollection, he “might have" mentioned
Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of
executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at,
that moment in ‘history’ against whom such a capability’ might possibly
have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51). | |
. Bissell said his’ impression was that ‘Bundy, in addition to ex-
_. pressing no unfavorable reaction to thé project, might have actually

given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28) .
Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy 's reaction

as approval for the executive. action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, D. 30).

Q: la, I. think the testimony of this witness is foing
further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was,
in your view, tantamount ‘to approval? . . :

: Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you, can call -
it approval, or you could say no objection. He (Bundy)

. ore

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-ll-

was briefed on something that was beinp done, as I now
believe, on the initiative of the Agency. Ilis (Bundy 's)
comment is that he made no objection to it. L suspect
that his reaction was somewhat more’ favorable than that
but this is a matter that probably someone listening to
the conversation on which such a person could have had
differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33).

’

Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding’
executive action was. speculative reconstruction from first appearance :
to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell,

7/22/75, -—pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and
specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any
"actual overt steps in use of .the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75,
p. 31). | _ . | |
Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White ilouse urgings
to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly:
confused account of a conversation subsequent to thé initiation of |
“=<. the project in which Bissell. relayed Bundy's reaction to arvey
Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25). :
_ Bissell testified that the development of an executive action
capability Was "undoubtedly" initiated-within the Agency (Bissell.
7/22/75,.p. 22). . He had acknowledged om his first day of testimony

that this’ would not have been unusual:

.it was the normal practice in the Agency and an impor-

tant part of its mission to create various kinds of

capability long before there was any reason to be certain

whether those would be used or where or how or for what

purpose. .The whole ongoing job of ... a secret intelli-
— gence service of recruiting agents is of that character....

‘So it would not be particularly surprising to,me if the «

HW 590955 Doclda:32423525 Page 13

CO

decision to create ... this capability had been taken - :
without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68) 2"
Bundy: — McGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation
with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was dis-
cussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). - Bundy's testimony comports with
Bissell’s on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability,
rather than an assassination. operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy
said that the capability included "killing ‘the individual" ,Bundy,
p. 5).** Bundy's impression was that the CIA was “testing my reaction,’
not “seeking authority" (Bundy; -p.-15) .7 Bundy summarized his testi-
mony by saying:
Lam sure I gave no instruction. But itis only fair to

add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment
either. (Bundy, p. 10) _

Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development ‘of

the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all” (Bundy,

p. 19) because he was satisfied

that this was not ’an operational activity, and would not ~

become such without two conditions: » first; that there

be a desire or.a request or a guidance that there should _

- be planning against some Specific individual; and second,
that there should be a decision to move against the indi-
vidual. (Bundy, p. 7), ; :

~* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he
had requested a CIA officer to go to. the Congo to "make plans and
develop the Capability" for an assassination attempt against Lunumba-
if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55). °

- ~** Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing
about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did-not connect this to the
“conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy -;
Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)

ect oN

HY 50955 _DoclTd:324234525 Page 14

+, on

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Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had
been fulfilled (Bundy, p. 7). .

’ Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sometime in the
early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the
dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the cohversation
about executive. action took place before January 25 -- when‘ Harvey
was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's
directive ~- as "near zero" because the new Administration had: been
in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other
problems, including the Berlin ‘crisis and reorganizing the Hational.
Security staff (Bundy , p. 9). .

Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on. the
executive action project: . . ; _

Chairman; And you have testified that you did- not take
the-matter to the President? ee . i

Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman...
(Bundy, p. 16)

Bundy explained that. the division of responsibility for national

_ security affairs excluded Rostow fron jurisdiction over covert opera-

tions, making | it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project’
like ZRRIFLE. (Bundy, p. ll; Rogtow, p. ll). :
Rostow: Rostow testified. ‘that he was “morally certain" that’

during his etitire ‘tenure in government, he never heard a reference

{Co executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to

act by -the U.S." (Rostow, pp. 10, 13):

‘MW 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 15-

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Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security

affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration, was
borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there was no
evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the |
development of an executive action capability. | Both Goodpaster and
Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. Ll;

Gray, p.. 56.)

y DCT

- Richard Bissell’'said he was "quite certain" that. Allen

(c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project :

Dulles had full knowledge of the executive. action project for two.
reasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at the.
time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the
Agency to work on Cuban operations ;* and second, Bissell “would : !
imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project
(Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms

on Project ZRRIFLE when he became -DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p.:33; llarvey,

. 7/11/75, p. 63)... But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone’
_about the project when McCone took over, as DCI (Bissell, MAITS,:
p. lL). McCone testified that he had’ no knowledge . of such a project

(McCone, p. 43).

William Harvey said it was assumed that the project was:
within the parameters permitted by the DCL. But Harvey testified
that officially advising the DCI of the existence. of the preject

* Harvey' s transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until |
late in 1961.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 16

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was "a bridge we did not Cross" and would not have Crossed until
| “there was either Specific targeting OY a specific Operation or a
RTE 2 . may tf ge oF 7 e
Specific recruitment, - Ularvey, 6/25/75, p. 39). .
- | (d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIEFER was Connected
to Any Actual Assassination PIots : : ~
~ et estual Assassination Plots

The Committee has sought to determine whether the CLA de-

rs,

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> coc faa’.

velopment’ of an executive action capability Was related ‘in any way. to
hen the actual 4Ssassination efforts. One question raised by this

— inquiry is whether the Participants in the assassination Operations

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ation efforts,

(i) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy

_P. 51), However, Bissel] festified that it was “perfectly Plausible

that I would have used examples” (Bissell: 6/11/75, P. 351).- He con-

in such a discussion of a Capability, fj might well have.
used the three names that I just B4ve, because these were '

| : 3 17
HW §0955 Docld:32473525 Page

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attempts (see detailed treatment at Section {(b), supra). There

is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversa-

tion raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in
withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts
against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward.
Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security

affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information’ about.

covert operations at the CIA.

_ (Li) Bisséll's Instruction to Take ‘Over Responsibility
a for Underworld Contact: ‘November 1961

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November
1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over .the contact with

John Roselli. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, Pp. 86;

‘and 6/11/75, p. 19)--which had been used for the initial poison pill

; plot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meeting

on November 15, 1961.(1.G., p. .39), during. the period in which Harvey

was freed from his duties on another Agency staf to take over

direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against ‘the :

_Castro regime. te oe

According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meeting
involved only. the planning and research of a capability rather than’

a targeted: operation against castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13;

t

. Harvey, 7/1E775, .p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose |

of the Roselli contact: had been to assassinate Castro, and that. "it

~~

is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain

HW 50955 Docld:32423575 Page 18

it [the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating
that operation” (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated that

because the assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate

had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs . . . and there
was no authorization to pursue it actively ... . the re-
sponsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that of

taking over an inactive contact." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)

Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over
the contact in case any action should be required and further testi-

fied that it was never required.

-~

The Inspector General's Report stated: "After
Harvey took over the.Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect
of ZRRIFLE." ° (1.G.,-p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a dis-
cussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability,

Bissell advised him of "a then going. operation" involving the’ names |

. - : . oo | :
of Maheu and possibly Roselli’ and Giancana, “which was a part. of the

Agency's effort to develop . . . a capability for executive action."

“CNarvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of

this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approxi-
mately two years or perhaps -18 months ." (larvey , 7/11/75, p. 54) J

Although his "net impression" was that both the
“exploratory project" and the''specific operation” were “fully
authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that
“specific White House authority for this given operation was. implied
or stated". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell: does net recall

telling anyone in the White House that something had been done ‘to

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 19

-18-

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,
6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the
White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November
meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61). | |
oe Although Richard’ Helms was briefed and given
administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE: three
months later, he did not recall that. ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated —
as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).

Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro’ were

related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my.

mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However,

Bissell's testimony leaves more ambi uity: "the contact with the
1ony &

syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the

ZR/RIFLE project’... and ‘they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,

. p. 47). .When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action;

t

“capability . .. for assassination" was “used against Castro",

, Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, ‘6/11/75,

p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15,

-1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the ClA-syndicate assas-

‘ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent. QJ/WIN in Africa
' “QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-

ground who had’ been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive ~'

_ programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 20

:
7

Net

~19-

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN’s function after the advent
of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.
potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was
assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent.
QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his

supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as: the

Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver: worked,

had ordered QJ/WIN'’s mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147,

11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission
afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
1/11/61). (QU/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail
in the ‘discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section _, supra: ]
There are two Factors which may raise a question as
to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop”

an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated.

_First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,

QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter

'- and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of

“ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of

an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver
and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75,
p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

.Nevertheless, there does not: appear to be any firm

‘evidence .of ‘a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate

Lumumba.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 21

KI 48

Agreed to by drafting
. subcommittee on

FINAL “DRAFT

‘Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Daminican dissidents on
May 30, 1961. . ;

| Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and
Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican
dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations
approved or condoned supplying aims to the dissidents. Although there is no
evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain
evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination
plans.

‘Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was
supplied to various dissidents. While United States’ officials knew that the
dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there
is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the -
assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two
Administrations information about the dissidents’ assassination plots
‘had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.

Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States -
officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine’ guns were shipped to
the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well knom _
that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination.
Thereafter ' however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents
was denied, and the guns were never passed. ‘Two days before the assassination,

President Kermedy personally authorized a-cable to the U.S. Consul General -

wee — ee wen

* "The second paragraph under V7A\3c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were
drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been
reviewed by the Subcommittee.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 22

HW 50955

-2-
in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a
matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but
at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissi-
dents“ and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful

in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.

Doclda: 324275525 Page 23

I. Background
Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic
in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government
supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the
Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States.
Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more
arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States
States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many
Latin Americans.

Increasing American awareness of Trujillo’s brutality:
and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused
U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdi-
cation or downfall.

‘As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration
gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to
Dominican dissidents. (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60).

In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan
for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the
situation deteriorated still further:
.the United States would immédiately take political action to
remove Trujillo from the ‘Dominican Republic as soon .
as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over
with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and
~~ if necessary -~ military support." (Memo. from
Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60;
Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to
Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)

Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize

hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in.Cuba.. Latin

be Nadel

— HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 24 |

American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela,
pressed the United States to take affirmative action against
Prujillo to dispel criticism that the U.S. opposed. dictator-
ships of the left only. A belief that Castro’s road to power
was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the
Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a

Castro~style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)

II. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms

During the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the
Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with
dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's
grasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary
‘evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these
rifles was approved both within the State Department and the

CIA, the rifles were never provided.

A. Dissident Contacts

Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of
dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of
establishing a democratic form of government .* (Farland

affidavit) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican

se

Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-
of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that

* This loosely-organized group, with which contact was es-
tablished, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and
memoranda as “the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.

{ Te aI
(i * i Heel
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¥ . . ”
Roa 5 ce. wee
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HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 25

Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA
Headquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communi-
cations link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/
that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R.7 Rubottom"
(Emphasis in original.) (HOS to Station cable 6/16/60).

Dearborn, agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA
‘confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the
U.S. would "“clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop
effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but would
not "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo
government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic”
(Station to HQS cable.6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed
Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station

cable 6/19/60).

B. The sniper Rifles
During the course ofa cocktail party in the Dominican
Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambas-~-

sador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic
sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on _the request (Farland

affidavit) | He apparently did so after returning to Washington

in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61),

; * As used herein “Headquarters” refers to ileadquarters of the
Ve Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the
Department of State. :

pha, 4

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 26

-4-

Documents indicate that consideration was given within
the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.
At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA
Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly
suggested possible sites for the drops.

(CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held
around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
-of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and
Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.

Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view

regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate
in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were
raised by King, among them:

ve . c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
~ or other devices for the removal of.key Trujillo people
from the scene?" uo .

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to
_that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavity~
On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's
‘signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,
Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that
a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked
Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate

oa

Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins’

-* Neither King nor Rubottom'recalls such a meeting, nor does
either recall any proposal for supplying Sniper, rifles.

(Rubottom affidavit, /King
: iat es
. ti
5s nes

paffidavit.). * Vi

7 .
Yoook
jes dy

4

MW 50955 Doclda:324273525 Page 27

re Pabgil |

he 4 ‘ Tid | gia wt

Ww Gum ediadtle

“presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo
regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided,
since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable,

and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as

close as possible. "Providing the arms as requested would

contribute significantly toward this end."
(CIA memo, 7/1/60)
Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents
in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile* rifles with teles-
copic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.
Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:

"4. Approval for delivery of these arms has
been given by Assistant Secretary of State
Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be

placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest
possible moment." (Id.}

ee Gomez's’ recommendation was concurred in by Richard

Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell,
(1.6. Report, p. 26).

The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with
telescopi¢ sights, together with the statement that they would
be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime
clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were
intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).

On. July 1,-1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA

Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12

telescopicaliy~sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. (‘the

: *"Sterile” rifles are “untraceable” rifles.

(Bissell, 7/22/75,p.69)

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 26

cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to
realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14,
1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against
any further action in the Dominican Republic until after re-
solution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending
against Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed that
sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's
downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to
HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished
to the dissidents. . ,

On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between
a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political
officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost
enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking
of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960,

dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to
them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For
the next several months , consideration centered on providing

200 to 300 guns.

‘II. Summer and Fall of 1960

In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic
relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its
personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and de facto

*

CIA Chief of Station. Consideration was given’ both to providing

a boo. n
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Phy ARS |

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HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 29

arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level
emissaries to persuade trujillo to abdicate. By the end of
the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo
forces, both within and without the country, was approved.

A. Diplomatic Development --
Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel

Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further in-
tensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In
June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan Presi-
dent Betancourt. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo
government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United
States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican
Republic and imposed economic sanctions.

With the severance of diplomatic relations, the Unitéd
States closed its Embassy. -Most American personnel, including
‘the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With
the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became
de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by
both CIA and the State Department. - Although on January 20,
1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic,
Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.

B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only

Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime .

_ Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the

HY 50955 Docld:32423575 Page 30

eo

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved
Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom
that the dissidents were

-.. in ne way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary
activity in the foreseeable future except the
assassination of their principal enemy.”

(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)
It is uncertain what portion of the information provided

by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary

level. Tnrough August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,

his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine,
were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,

aware of Dearborn’s “current projects." (Devine to Dearborn

. : *
letter, 8/15/60)
By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom

as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank

Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While

serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine

reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State
activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that

‘Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman

and other“officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division

(Devine, p.7)

*#pearborn'’s candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960

raised concern with the Department and he was advised that Certain

specific information should more appropriately come through "the
other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn. was

advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least: 19
different recipient offices. . (Id.) . ,

riot

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 31

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By boy it Aa Fle ya} is
Wi Wim vesibn |

ee
‘

Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans .-
under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn
replied in a detailed letter which concluded:

"One further point which I should probably not even
make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will

be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican
Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo
before he leaves this island. If he has his millions
and is a free agent, he will devote his life from
exile to preventing stable government in the D.R., to
overturning democratic governments and establishing
dictatorships: in the Caribbean, and to assassinating
his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank
heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as
being the first necessary step jn the salvation of

my country and I would regard this, in fact, as my
Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will
remember it was necessary to drive a stake through
-his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes.

I believe sudden death would be more humane than

the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought
he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and
lingering illness." (Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)

C. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate
- Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the
diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo
into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican
Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within
and without the ranks of government, was considered. - (Special
Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60)

None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960

Trujillo was still in absolute control,

D. CIA Plans of October 1960

A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3; 1960 entitled .

.

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bs

hl

a ; it ‘ OY y 1
mg PRT) 2m ke ae Ard g
| ke Ld soy tem iy dco

HW 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 32

HW 50955

Se ee ee ne
mir 10 -

Saar Yet meri wey ch ther ed

"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican

besk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans
which "have been developed on a tentative basis which appear
feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with
a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part,

for the following:

“a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols,
together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to
secure cache on the South shore of the island, about
14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo.

"b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an
electronic detonating device with remote control
features, which could be planted by the dissidents in
such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo

henchmen. This might necessitate training and intro-

ducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained
- technician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasis
added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)

E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action

On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and
approved a broad plan of covert support to. anti-Trujillo forces.
The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to both
Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents. The
exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and under-
take anti-~frujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht

ae

for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized

Doclda: 324275525 Page 33

to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not,
of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near
‘future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."

(Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)

IV. January 12., 1961 Special Group Approval of “Limited
Supplies of Small Arms and Other Me Material"

On January 12, 1961, with all members present,” the
Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the
following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:

"Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department

of State that limited supplies of small arms and other
material should be made available for dissidefits in-

‘side the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we
believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that
the plan would call for final transportation into the

country being provided by the dissidents themselves.

; The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)

A. Memoranda Underlying the Special Group Action

On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to
Under. Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sent
through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported
on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United
States for its failure to furnish them with any tangible or

concrete assistance. Further, it reported:

Opposition clements have consistently asked us to supply
them with ‘*hardware®’ of various types. This has included
quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persis-
tently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items
and devices. which they associate with revolutationary
effort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)

* The members of the Special Group were at the time: 1 Livingston
Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon
Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs:

hee John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and’ Allen Dulles,
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

pes

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 34

Py Arist

a al Cs ee SF
~ Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he

approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision

of token yuantities of selected items desired by the dissidents.

Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would

place some “sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident

elements, but stated that there "would be no thought of

toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic)

by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special

Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.

A covering memorandum from Scott to Nerchant, forwarding
Mann’s memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special
Group meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that

. the Svecial Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo”

and that the Secretary of State was informed of that
decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961, (Seott
to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)
other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents: had clearly.
and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to
be used by them in assassination efforts.” “While it is, of
course, possible that such information was passed orally to
some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps

even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no

oo

¥Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper
rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.

4
U

. HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 35


HY

documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which
would establish this to be the case.

On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower
administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that
approval had been given for supplying arms and other material
to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61).
Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the
dissidents were “delighted" about the decision to deliver

"exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)

~

Vv. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961
(the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)

On January 20, 1961, the Kennedy administration took
office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all
except Allen pulles) retired.

Prior to’ the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April
17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These
events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in
which specific assassination plans were discussed, re-
quests by dissidents for explosive “devices, the passage by
U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside
the Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the Dominican.
Republic of machine guns which: had been requested by the.

dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.*

eee ee
*As indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, infra, | permission
to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never
passed,

ct:

50955 Docld:32423525 Page 36

-14-

These events are discussed below under subheading A.

“Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events
‘ possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter.
As used herein, “senior American officials" means individuals

in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.

A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S.
to Dissidents' Assassination Plans

l. Assassination Discussions and Reguests for Explosives
At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York city
on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly
by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot
[to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of
Trujillo.“ (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests
made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:
(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan. and execute
the death of Trujillo.
(b) Cameras and other items that could be used
to fire projectiles.
(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm
of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in
~2 a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.
(a) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a
distance of several miles. (Id.)

Other methods of assassinatiny Trujillo proposed by dissidents

HY 50955 Doecld:324234525 -Page 37

fogiek 4

dpe rr en ] \ ie Me
me OE By na RY Mey WE hh \ . BE
i Sa :

- 15 -

at the Pebruary 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning
Trujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and
attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the
record, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)*

The dissidents' “latest plot", as described in the February
CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful
bomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device,
along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)

On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic
asked for fragmentation grenades “for use during the next week
or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters
on March 14, 1961, ana was followed the next day by an additional
request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid~fire weapons,

and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. MThnis furtner request was also

passed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HOS cable, 3/15/61)
There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to
the dissidents.

The documentary record makes clear that Frank. Devine at

the State Department was also advised of related developments
in a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained

that his spirits were in the doldrums because:
", . « the members of our club are now prepared
“in their minds. to have a picnic but do not have
‘the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have
developed a plan for the picnic,which just. might
work if they could find the proper food. They

* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to
any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the
{ February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the ques~
~ tions raised by the dissidents did not reguire an answer.

4

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 38

ce ee | ee
we Hy bath ee OY

have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly ~
more, and we are not prepared to make them
available. Last week we were asked to furnish
three or four pineapples for.a party in the
near future,but I could remember nothing in my in-
structions that would have allowed me to contri-
bute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't

° tempted. I have rather specific guidelines
to the effect that salad ingredients will be
delivered outside the picnic grounds and will
be brought to the area by another club.
(Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his “picnic” lettér, together with the requests
in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn con~
cluded during his testimony. before the Committee that the
"oineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation
grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients
outside of the Picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to
refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic.
(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27) .
2. The Passaic of Pistols

In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported
that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber: pistols for issue
to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret
no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against
shipment “6f arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor
dinated with State. (HOS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The
Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary

authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had -

received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes” and,

pos
is
ig a bois Ce a SP A es PE el
HW 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 39

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hgs cable,
3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols
and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station

Chief was instructed not .to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station

cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction
Not to Tell Dearborn

Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-
born the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that
the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not
something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79)
Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew
Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,
7/29, p. 33) .

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol
for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-
sideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been
approached by a Dominican contact-who lived in a remote area
and was concerned for the safety of his. family in the event
of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed
* The Inspector General's Report, issued in Connection with
a reviewv~of these events, concludes that:

"There is no indication in the EMDBED operational files

that the pistols were actually pouched. The request

for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-

sequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, pe 60)

Do This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March
24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:

"C. Pouchingi revolvers uand.,ammo*requested TRUI 0462
(in 20040) on-28 March. Do not advise(name Dearborn deleted)
this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

HW 50955 Docld:32423575 Page 40

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a
. * ;
pistol.
Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these

pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA

memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source,
states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to
Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct
contact with the action element of the dissident group. It

should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-

ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether

one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols
eventually came into the hands of the assassins

and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the
assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols
as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never .

considered them in any way connected with the then-current
. i
assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp.38,73)

However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable -
stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.

(Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

“2

*Dearborn 1s clear in his recollection that ne asked Owen to
request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen,
on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three
pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three
pistols. (Qwen, p.72) . om
The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package
& (HOS to Station cables,3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
~~ fied that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped
up" and that he passed it. | .(Dearborn,-7/29,p.30) .

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 41

Wein ee
i how” > Bacekaut |

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the

very cable which was sent in response to a request by the
dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination

effort which had been previously described to Headquarters.

As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,

if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these

weapons to would-be assassins.

3. Passing of the Carbines |
a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA
In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked
for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber Ml
carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by
Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations
— in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
‘in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. |
{Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters

cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to

Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact, wimpy Berry, on April 7,
1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found . .
their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio |
de la Maza. ‘(Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report

pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the

ri wa at td my
‘ : BEAT ay cht

: ey Poy ta ae 3 emt Fe . -
\. carbines were attall.times viewed“as ‘strictly a token show

HY 50955 Docld: 324235275 Page 42

Vhoe wclac |

of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts

“peewee

to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)

c. Failure to Disclose to State Department
Officials in Washington

“ There is no indication that the request or the passage
of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in
Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on
April 5S, Meadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn
not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines
and ammunition were being passed to tae dissidents. This cable
was sent wnile Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that -
upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain
the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-
mented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence

with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station

to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

| Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the
time of his April -6 cable, “that someone in the State De-
partment had been consulted in ‘advance and had approved the

passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

we

Lo
c
ae
c

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 43

a. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use
in Assassination

a er ge ~

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider
pouching an M3 machine gun on ‘February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64;
Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again
in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled
a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns |
specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic
pouch or similar means . The dissidents were said to feel that
delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their
resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61) .

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly
identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connec-
tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to
kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according

ion to Owen's cable:
"4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-
guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in
event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic
job." (Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an
assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or
uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,
Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create
more problems than solutions.” It was Headquarters’ position
that:

'...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action
by.the internal dissidents until opposition group _
and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*,
effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after-'
i math."' (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

*” Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

HY 50955 Docld: 324234525 Page 44

-22-

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared

to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when
they developed a capability to received them, but that security
considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.*
Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington
for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in
the Dominican Republic and

"especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident]

leaders that they be provided with a limited number

of small arms for their own protection (specifi-

cally, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's). (CIA memo

for the record, 4/11/61)

b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved

by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver
Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to
pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a
priority basis for issuance to a small action group. to be used

for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western
‘Hemisphere Division, further provided:

“"B. A determination has been made that the issuance
of this equipment to the action group is desirable
if for no other reason than to assure this important
group's continued cooperation with and confidence in
this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier
commitments to the group. These commitments took

¥* Pais Same cable of March 24, L561, is tne one which advised
that the revolvers and ammunition were > being pouched.

fener y aan
a NES
Wh

HW 50955 Docl#:324235275 Page 45


rarer, Me _ PY fc ‘ luet ets
iE: + wa \ 9a"
Bo et.

the form of advising the group in January
1961 that we would provide limited’ arms
and assistance to them provided they develop
the capability to receive it. Operational
circumstances have prevented this group from
developing the assets capable of receiving
the above equipment through normal clandestine
channels such as air drops or sea infiltra-

- : tion.”

wey Ba

nl ki

FiadBhe #

The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy
Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)

The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and
were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report,
p. 42; Station to Headquarters cables 4/19/61).

On Avril 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued
a memorandum which stated:

"Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets
or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without
his approval.". (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61) .**
The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an

air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching

had been approved.

B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)

On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons,
'. but a month after the generalized approval of the passage —_
of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of -

the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric,

Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.

Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns

never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed
in detail beginning at page ; :

pee

%* Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs
invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual
planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic"
prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)

HY 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 46

HY 50955

which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by

The minutes state that:

"Mr, Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then: summarized
for the benefit of the new members of the Special
Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor -
group during the past year, and also a list of signi-

. ficant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960
and which it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes
of 2/14/61) , ;

In the course of the discussion, the following point, among

others, was made:
"(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a
memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the

subject of what plans can be made for a successor
government to Trujillo." (Id.)

-

The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Domini-
can Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and

Bissell briefed the new members.

What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as

it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to

which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of
the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if
‘the new members of the Special Group were told that the
dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate

ae

Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was .

Docld:32423525 Page 47

12 25~
: AR
hashaw ae

Reed te

advised that the State Department representative in the

Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican
government could not be overthrown without the assassination
(of Trujillo.
Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection

of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unable

to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted
by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102)
_ Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Group
in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the
specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the
February 14 meeting. He does not recail any mention by either’
Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate 'rujilio.
(McNamara affidavit).

dozer

February Memoranda

The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum
on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning pro-

gress to assure an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall.

The memorandum advised that:

“Our representatives in the Dominican Republic
have, at considerable risk to those involved,

established contacts with numerous leaders of the
underground opposition... /and7 . - . the CIA
_,has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery
“to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms
and sabotage equipment.'
This. reference to recent authorization for delivery of
arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing
Soe '. concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961

Wee aan .

pees m

HW 50955 Doold:324273525 Page 48

4 tind exci noi :
Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Triujillo ~
elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and
Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective
positions throughout the transition period. The Committee has
been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or
Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the
intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions

of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly

-

had Knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not
personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper
on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's
National Security Advisor. The paper made note of the out-

a standing Special Group approval for the provision of arms and
| equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents
- - had been. informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such

arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to

receive them.

The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders
had informed CIA of “their plan of action which they felt could
be implemented if they were provided with arms. for 300 men,
explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various

witnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300

men would, standing alone, indicate a "non~targeted"- use foF the

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 49

HW 50955

arms .(i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as
opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell,
7/29, p.80),

Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:
"... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the
time of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these
dissident groups were, and had for a long time,
been hoping they could accomplish the assassination
of Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests since
some seven or eignt months earlier was a perfectly
clear indication of that, so that fact was not new
knowledge." (Bissell 7/22, p».102)

When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that
the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell
replied:

"I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not
remember what considerations moved ine. TI don't
know whether it was because this was common
knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to
include it, or as you are implying, there was

an element of concealment here. I would be very
surprised if 1t were the latter, in this case."
(Bissell, 7/22, p.101)

In response to questions concerning the lack-of information
in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to
which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents,
Bissell stated:

" . .. I would say that the Agency's failure,
if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to’state
in writing that the plans of the dissidents
..would include assassination attempts.”
(Bissell, 7/22, p.99)
Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the

assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Tryjillo

Docld: 32473575 Page 50

HY 50955

Pe 2B ak A

Eras
wat et sree” OD

and the internal opposition, “which will

liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts

Brace amet

i
\
i
end either with the

or with a complete

roll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fear
was expressed that existing schedules for the delivery of
weapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficientlv
timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be
given to caching the requested arms and other materials.
(Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)

‘hus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior
members of the new administration, and in view of the "for
higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably
President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special
Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to
opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was
no modification or recision of the “inherited” Special Group
approval and. it would seem fair, therefore, to regard the

approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new

administration.

During March and early April 1961, operational levels”
within both the CIA and the State Department learned:of in-
creasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate
Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was

passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,

Docld: 32473575 Page 51

except Allen Dulles.” Similarly, there is no evidence that
the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching
of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed

. , Ke
to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.

VI. April 17, 1961" ~ May 31, 1961

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts
were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican
Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassina~_
tion attenpt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo
were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were
prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would
result from Trujillo's death,

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but
permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and
the guns never left the Consulate.

Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a
contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.

Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received
a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy.

The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of associ-~-
ation with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter

~2

of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable

* Gopies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable
describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment
of his mistress were apparently sent to the office. a
of the Director of Central Intelligence. ,

** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols
were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles
apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving
passage of the carbines: or pouching ‘0f the machine guns.

{ dob

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 52

HW 50955

further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of
material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of
U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing
the Trujillo government. ‘The cable also reconfirmed the
decision not to pass the machine guns.

A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccess-~
ful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort

By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had
/oOveration was a failed/. As a result, there developed a general
realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the
Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further —
consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and
the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/1],
p.113) A cable from leadquarters to the Station, on April 17,
1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns
not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April
19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. ‘The earlier ad-
monition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody
until further notice was repeated in a second cable from lead-
quarters, sent April 20, 1961. ‘This decision was said to have
been “based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assas-
sination ‘iow bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions
in Caribbean area." (HQs. to Station cable, 4/20/61)

The dissidents continued to press for the release of the

machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters

Snoeelies

,
LOK PS ey ye ee lege [tt
WP OROH RE bb pe ed le

Docld:32423525 Page 53

HW 50955

in cables from Dearborn and Owen, (Station to HOS cables
4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised IHeadquarters that
Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was
going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.
Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three
carbines .passed from the American Consulate, together with
whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated |
that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the
dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the
United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with
the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, .
Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61). The following day, April 27,
1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with
the dissidents, “We doubt statement U.S. government not now
prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from
attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that

an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and
testified that efforts. to carry out the instructions were
unsuccessful. In effect, tne dissidents informed him that

this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit

oy

the convenience of the U.S. government. , ,

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

Doclda: 324275525 Page 54°

HW 50955

j a ¢
‘On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that

the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt

was’ going to take place during the first week of May. The

action group was reported to have in-its possession three carbines,
four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although
they reportedly still wanted thé machine guns, Dearborn advised
Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they
had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS
cable, 4/30/61) ; - ~

Dearborn's cable set. forth the argument of the action
group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to
some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance
of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic re-
lationship. The cable concluded: .

‘Owing to far-reaching political implications
involved in release or non release of re-

quested items, Headquarters may wish discuss fore-
going with State Department.” (Id.)

B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns

In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authori-

zing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent

to Allen Dulles, with Bissell’s recommendation for. its dispatch,

provided:

"Since it appears that opposition group has
committed itself to action with or without

‘
4

poy
ey :
1k Nat

Doclda: 324275525 Page 55

HW 50955

- 33-

additional support, coupled with fact ref.

C items [the carbines] already made available

to them for personal defense; station authori-

zed pass ref. A items (the machine guns] to

opposition member for their additional pro-

tection on their proposed endeavor.” (Draft of HOS
- to Station cable, 5/2/61). : .

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-
zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns
as:

at

- - . having made already a considerable
investment in this dissident group and its
plans that we might as well make the addi-_
tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief
of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted
as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning
covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph
Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force
on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert
informed Berle that a local yroup in_the Dominican Republic
wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms:for that purpose.
The memorandum continued:

"On cross examination it developed that the

real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they
-Wanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wanted

to know what the policy should be.

"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo

and that this was the general sentiment. But ;
we did not wish to have any thing to do with any «
assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert

said he felt the same way." (Berle, Meno of
Conversation, 5/3/61)

Doclda: 324275525 Page 56

Copies of Berle’s memorandum were sent to Wymber ly Coerr,;
the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,
and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily
contact with each other since.August of 1960, had been advised.
of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact,
Herbert, alony with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed
cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

c. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 16, 1961

On the day following the Berle-ilerbert meeting, the
Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

"The DCI referred to recent reports of a new
anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if
one of these is going to work or- not, and asked
what is the status of contingency planning should

the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point
is covered in the Cuba paper which will be’ discussed

a . at a high level in the very near future." (Special
: Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes
makés subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed
speculative. It is not known. to what extent and in what detail
Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports” of a new anti-Trujillo
plot. Certainly, the most recent ‘report of such a plot was
Deaxborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination
attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.

‘On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the

situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

7

_—

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 57

HY 50955

minutes:

" Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the
internal dissidents were pressing for the
release to them of certain small arms now in
U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He

- inquired whether the feeling of the

Group remained that these arms should not be
passed. The members showed no inclinatjon to
take a contrary position at this time.”
(Emphasis supplied). (Special Group Minutes,

5/18/61)

D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns

On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department,
attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgent
request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable
advised that the assassination attempt was scheduled for the
night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were
$0 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the
possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed
to Dearborn that if the effort failed,due to U.S. refusal to
supply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held responsible
and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had
informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations

in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization

could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn

to State cable, 5/16/61)

2

A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent
the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment.’ It instructed him

* Phere was no meeting of the Special Group at. which the Domini-
can Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. ‘The language
attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the
Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the

guestion of passing these arms must have been raised prior to
the May 18 Group jreeting.,, perhaps | at the: May: 4, 1961 meeting.

Rea

Docld: 3242735275 Page 58

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary
instructions which clearly indicated they had béén cleared in
advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was
approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
. Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request ina
memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be
advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of
the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was
last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the
weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA £rom CIA, 5/16/61)
Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day,
advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be
negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.*. Herbert's
attention was directed-to the January 12, 1961 Special Group
— limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the
° Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert
was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,
to the attention of. his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.
(Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --
Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,
the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was

considered and it was:

“Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would
prepare promptly both emergency and long- . a
range plans for anti-communist intervention

{ 'in the event of crises in Haiti or the

5 a —_
By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that
the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the
fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State

‘cable, 5/27/61)

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 59

zo
oe
ee

eum

Dominican Republic. Moted the President's -
view that the United States should not
initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before
we knew what government would succeed him,
and that any action ayainst Trujillo should
be multilateral." (Record of Actions bv
National Security Council, 5/5/61)
- ' (Approved by the President, 5/16/61)

Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was
recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these
contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washing-
ton at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.

While in Washington, Dearborn met with State
Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur
Schlesinger of the white House staff. When testifying before

ao the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of
his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his
general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican
Republic was discussed. He did not recall..any discussion with
- Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had
been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought.
(Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the
White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin had been
reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican
Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)

HY 50955 Docld:32423575 Page 60

HW 50955

‘On May ll, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft” .
document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly
aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted
that means of stepping up the covert program were considered
in separate: papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961)
Tnis Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used as a
basis for portions of the “Dominican Republic -~ Contingency
Paper” discussed below.

fwo documents entitled, “Program of Covert Action for the
Dominican Republic" were provided: to the Committee staff from
State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the
covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May ll, 1961
memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to
deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating
it was attached to “Dominican Republic -- Contingency," dated
§/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very
Similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within
the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not
recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310).

Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which
Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered
points including the following:
ey, The USG should not lend itself to direct

political assassination.

"2. US moral posture can ill afford further -

tarnishing in the eyes of the world.

“Docld: 32423525 Page 61

"3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying
the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then
turning over only the final execution to
(unskilled) local triggermen.
"4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action
capability. Should we entrust ourselves and
our reputation to this extent in the absence
thereof? F
"7. Can we afford a prece@ent which may convince
the world that our diplomatic pouches are used
to, deliver assassination weapons?” (Document
from State Department files bearing No. 313)
The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the
likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately
“ be revealed.
On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sentto
Under Secretary. Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Pro-
grams Authorized With Respect to the~Dominican. Republic". ‘That
document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert
assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommen-_
dation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group
review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested
agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document

from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)

a

During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was

'
'
td PRL kL

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 62

prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter
*
circulated within the State Department. This document,
entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic” |
reported:
"CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station
in Ciudad Trujillo; a very limited supply of
weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent
requestsfrom the internal opposition leaders for
personal defense weapons attendant to their
projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three
(3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with
accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure
means to the opposition. The recipients have
repeatedly requested additional armed support."
This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to
anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been
passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.
The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above
oo quoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize"
is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee that
he circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandum
because the information concerning passage of the arms was new.
- to him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49)
Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require
Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated
that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and
a small number. of grenades currently in the direct custody of
the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing
these weapons to the internal opposition “for their use in «
\. * See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy

of Goodwin memorandum.

i
'

4

a

4

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 63

C3

Quine “1
ow

i
personal defense “attendant t to their projected efforts to re-
move Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memo-~
randum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage
of these weapons. (Id.)-

~ .On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another
memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and

Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received

by Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an under-

lying document which began:

"Recent reports indicate that the internal

Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly
determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and
their plans in this regard are well advanced."

The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable -
ie for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements.
~ seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment

recommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidents

that if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their own

- responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government

‘they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance

from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents

from State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286).

FP. “Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961
A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting
urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard «

Goodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin,

the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17,

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 64

~42-

and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as
expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that
the United States should not initiate the overthrow. of Trujillo
before knowing what government would succeed him. (Depart-
ment to Dearborn, 5/17/61)

Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that
for over a year State Department representatives in the

Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort

to overthrow frujillo and had assisted the dissidents in
numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It
was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United
an States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited
further guidance from State.
SO In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State
Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a
conflict between ‘two objectives: _
"{1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo

regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents
and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

"(2) To disassociate US from any obvious inter-

? vention in Dominican Republic and even more so
from any political assassination which might
occur.”

HY 50955 Docld: 324235275 Page 65

It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that
“former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter.”
(State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 ~ not sent)
This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary
Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it “too negative"
and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present
tomorrow morning.” (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)
A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:
"Following up on our discussion of the Dominican
Republic at yesterday's meétiny of the Special
Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which
we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul
General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the
guidance he will be receiving on the recently
approved contingency plans."
Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not,
however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic.
a If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning
the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is
not known what the discussion involved or what decisions,
if any, were made.
Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to
the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testi-
‘fied that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate
to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United
States:.
". . . didn't want to do anything that: would
involve us further, the United States further,

in any effort to assassinate Trujillo."
(Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)

i

i

SE Dis Eo

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 66

At the same time,Goodwin's draft raised the issue of
further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents
and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available
to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.

It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by
Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces
of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the
new government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2)
to avoid any action which might further involve the United
States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose
is clearly evident in the cable which advised:

- « we must not run risk of U.S. association
with political assassination, since U.S. as matter
of general policy cannot condone assassination.

This last principal 1s: overriding and must prevail
in doubtful situation." (Emphasis -added)

kk Kk kk

“Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S.
Support for their position."

According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in
the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy.
(Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23).

With. respect to the four machine guns which were in the
Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by. the
dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable
to transfer these arms to the dissidents: Dearborn was
instructed to:

"Yell them that this is because of our suspicion
that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 67

fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would
serve very little purpose and expose the United
States to great danger of association with
assasSination attempt.”
The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President
Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept.

to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

Vit. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:
A. Trujillo Assassinated
Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed
and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The
assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the
action yroup to American representatives in the Dominican Republic
and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and
the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The
a assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to
whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy
information as is available indicates that one or more of the
carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60~61). This evidence indicate
however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by
handguns and shoteuns. (I.G. Report, p.61)
-B. Gables to Washington
After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul
General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According
to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable
as a change in U.S. policy concerning support. for assassinations.
(Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).
ee ee

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 68


~46

He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

"l..we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate

‘Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want
anything to pin this on us, because we aren't
doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing
it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)
Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had
always been his personal belief; tha& the U.S. should not be
involved in an assassination and that if an assassination
occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn
7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the
cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly. on
the questionof supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the
May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter
.and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
its prior. position; of offering material support to the dissi-
dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such supnort.
Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already
associated with assassination. If we are to at least
cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in

assassination preparation must be withdrawn."
(Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

HY 50955 Docld: 324235275 Page 69

bij ~47-

iy t

Pio
at :

Immediately following the assassination, all CIA
personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the
country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was
back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station
in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning
contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to
destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dear-

born. {HOS to Station cable, 5/31/61.

C. Immediate Post-Assassination Period

The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick
to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated,
and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to
' President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary,
Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the
assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news
aon in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified
that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most con-
cerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris
and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his
- father's death from the press secretary to the President of the
U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk,

32, 33.)

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 70

SCHNEIDER REPORT

Reviewed and Agreed to by
Drafting Subcommittee on
August 27, 1975


SCHNEIDER REPORT

Page
I. Summary 1 Me
Il. The President's Initial General Instruction 6 —
and Background .
A. September 15 White House Meeting 6
B. Background: Tracks I and II ° | 8
C.. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15
ILI. CIA's Implementation of Track II 7 _
A. Evolution of CIA Strategy V7
1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach V7
2. Military Solution , 18 _.
e:
‘B. The Chile Task Force ; 19 .
C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency 20
Relations
D. The False Flag Base 26
E. Chief of Station 27 :
: Iv. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup ‘29 F
. pote
A. The Chilean Conspirators 29
: ' B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30
C. October 15 Decision oe 34 i.
D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36
E. The Killing of General Schneider 39 ‘
F. Post October-22 Events : 4} eo
V.  CIA/White House Communication During Track IT 43 :
' , , ; 46502 yee ee ororTD io
A.. September wom aye pail : pee:
; pe Th eo
B. October 1 46 Phe
C. December ; ; 34

i D. Did Track LI End? 54

\ HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 72

““ SCHNELDER REPORT

I. Summary |

"On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality
in Chile's Presidential election.* Since no candidate had received a

majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that yo

a joint session of its Congress ‘decide between. the first and second place
finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-

forma. The Congress had-always selected the candidate who received

highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session

was October 24, 1970.

On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director

Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to

the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a

direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent

Allende’s accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this .action
without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without
informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in

en general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to
power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40
Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever

approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to re-

port, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.

Dr, Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in
Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made
up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident
Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making

‘his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero,
candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge Alessandri
Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won
__ 36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second with 35. 3% of the vote. _
“Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a'total of 3 mil- "yf
lion votes cast in the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei
Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean

( 3 law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves. ;

HW 50955 Docld:324235575 Page 73

in practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assis-

tant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its
activities. na
Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts

with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those

Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of

strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both be-

fore and after a coup.
One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators
in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief

of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional

a
process. be followed. As a. result of his strong constitutional stand, P
the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the _
coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General
Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap :
an him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, :
: by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively sup- _

- . porting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again un-

successfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine

guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed

on October 19! That same day General Schneider was mortally

wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted :
kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspira- ;
oa - &
tors other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier Sey *
; weet eS ath i
a . : He BOK:
in the day. to, ; a
| =
See uses —_ : .

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page ?4

rt aa as

A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers,
both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and

to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had
contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of con-
spiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out

the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were assoc-

iates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by

: Fy
the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General cane
Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo

Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the

military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being

the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General Ps
Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile pa
for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of
tos office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in
contact throughout the coup plotting. k.

The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all
of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:

1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible
way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from

coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.

2. All of the known coup plets developed within the Chilean mili-
tary entailéd the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.

3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean
i : : . ee
pians for a coup after it became known that the: first step would be to i.
‘ - . rs Sa

kidnap General Schneider.

HW 50955 Docld:324235275 Page 75

wo -4-

,
. 1

4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19,
the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge
of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition be
to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.

5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted

- by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General
Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abor-

tive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those

supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court
which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had

been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of

the killing.* . , er
h,
6.° While there is no question that the CIA received a direct - ‘
. . - L
instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment ,
. a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about
4
whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the
: coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict
is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the
other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House _
; stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on
October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig. agreed~- .
that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA: i
. f
coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testi~ ?
; . '
fied that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and }
; Sr bee
an on
a
*

The Committee has not been able-to determine whether or nct

the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of. the
i three supplied by the CIA.

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 76

thus authorized by the White House.”

This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable
to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves un-
answered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting
pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup
activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/

Haig view)-

* .

The basic issue is whether or not the CiA~informed.the White House of

its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized.

No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step~by-

step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on.the White
House to-object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed

unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persua-
sive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA

did -not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer wea-
pons to the’Chileans; in fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas
Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer,

but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the

Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to
Karamessines'’-subordinates that he would approve their decision to do

so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually «

were sent. wT :

s.

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 77?

On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for ; Se
National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, ; —__
and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was
Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting re-

flect both its tenor and the President's instructions:

l in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
worth spending

not concerned risks involved

no involvement of Embassy

$10,000,000 available, more if necessary
full-time job--best men we have :

game plan oo

make the economy scream

48 hours for plan of action

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled
coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:

.. (the) impression...that the President came down
very hard that he wanted something done, and he
didn't much care how and that he was prepared to '
‘make money available....This was a pretty all- -
inclusive order....If I ever carried a marshall's , ni
baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it. : . —
was that day.* (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11)

* Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with
President Nixon may have been triggered by.the presence of Augustin
Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washing-
ton. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of
Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast
with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversa-
tion was the political situation in Chile.and the plight of El Mercurio / :
and other anti-Allende forces. ° : ‘According to Mr. Helms:

-F recall that prior to this meeting (with the President)
the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington. and | wget
I had been.asked to go and talk-to him at one of the |/., :
hotels here, this having been arranged through Don _
Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have — © '
this impression that the President called this meeting -
where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards'

: presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall

4 about what Edwards was saying about conditions in
Chile and what was happening there.

(Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)

st

“a
y.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 78

However, none ‘of ' the CIA officers believed that assassination was within

3 the guidelines Helms had been given.

ws

A Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte

- blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton

that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende ey

from assuming office, include physical elimination? : bie
be

Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I be-
came Director, I had already made up my mind that we
weren't going to have any of that business when I was
Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and
I think they will tell you this.

The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting

at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he re-

lated to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instruc-
tions:

2. The Director told the group that President

Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile

was unacceptable to the United States. The Presi- re
dent asked the Agency to prevent Allende from com- :
ing to power or to unseat him. The President ;

authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. , posmanee
Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission

without coordination with the Departments of State

er Defense.

(Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970) '

bee Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with
‘ 1 . . A * *

President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms. Although

Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as

precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that: i

- ...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting
was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent
Allende from.being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

RK

x

The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard
testimony, -are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon
authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a
military coup d’etat in Chile. There is not, -however, agreement .

about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--

and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week. between o
October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This
matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider
ee ‘killing.

HY 50955 Doecld:324234525 Page 79

. ae ~B~

y

‘ ooo . .
“It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms)

to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or
to take the initiative in preventing Allende from
taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12)

Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion

on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters ©

to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:

3.. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende as-
sumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has
been discarded. Military solution is objective.

(Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)

Rick
B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA
only, to work toward a military solution to problem.
As part of authority we were expltcitly told that

40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were

not to be told of this.Track Two nor involved in any
matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240,. 21 September. 1970):

B. Background: Tracks I and If

United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile

did not begin with President Nixon's September’ 15 instruction to the

; «
CIA. For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda.

At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of

the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be

done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile.

At that time,Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will

k

Allende.

~2

Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action
programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in
1970, this was in response to the perceived. threat of Salvadore
Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.

_. (Colby testimony, July 14, 1975, p, 5) «

Seth


*

On March 25,

1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recom-
mending that "spoiling" operations~-propaganda and other activities--
be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent’ an election victory
by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was”
authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. on
June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a
two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review.
The first. phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende ,
campaign. The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort
in Congress to persuade certain: shifts in voting on 24 October 1970."
Phase II was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to
vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 elec-
“tion. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the
bs _ anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador
Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4
election. _ . 7
The 40 Committee met. twice between the time Allende received a plural-—
ity of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his”
instruction to Director Helms on September 15** at both ‘these meetings the |
question of U.S. involvement in-a military ‘coup against Allende was raised.
Kissinger stressed che: importance. of these meetings when he ‘testified be-
fore the Select Committee: 7 a , - . : Oe _ i
Wis aad other references to 40 Committee discussions: and actions ‘regard-
ing Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the
CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our.Covert Action Involvement
in the September, 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated Octobér 9, 1970.
On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council
documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Goverrf-

“Ment to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the
i, Committee received, 46. poguments from the. -Whites House relating to Chile cover-

ing the period Sept bint
xxSee Page 9a.

HY 50955 Docid: 32423525 Page 61

-~ 9a -

*kFollowing the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate.of Intelli-
gence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of
an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment,
dated September 7, 1970, stated:

Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:

1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile.
There would, however, be tangible economic ‘losses.

2. The world military balance of power would not be sig-
nificantly altered by an Allende government.

3. An Allende victory would, however, create consider-
able political and psychological costs: '

a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by
the challenge that an Allende government .
‘would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions
that it would create in other countries.

We do not see, however, ‘any’ likely | threat
to the peace of the region.

b. An Allende victory would represent. a defin-
ite psychological set-back to the U.S. and
a definite psychological advance for the
: Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/ . :
ae - * * "Situation Following the Chilean Presidential a
‘ Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, : ‘

y 7 September 1970)

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 82

.| A ~10-

eee) ;
L think ‘the meeting of September 15th has to be
seen in the context of two previous meetings of
—_ _ the 40 Committee on September 8th and September

oot aes 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look

oi

at the pros and cons and the problems and pros- ae
pects of a Chilean military coup to be organized ere":
with United States assistance. —_——
: (Kissinger testimony, p. 5)
According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September —
8, the following was discussed:
.--all concerned realized that previous plans for , : isis,
a Phase II would’ have to be drastically redrawn.... , Ge.
The DCI made the point, however, that congressional ine

action against Allende was not likely to succeed
and that once Allende was in office the Chilean ,
opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse ;
rapidly. While not advocating a specific course

of action, the Director further observed that a
military golpe against Allende would have very
little chance of success unless ‘undertaken soon.
Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported
this view....At the close of the...meeting the
Chairman directed the Embassy to: prepare:a "cold-
blooded assessment" of:

._' 1) the pros and cons and problems and pros- ee |
pects involved should a Chilean military
coup be organized now with U.S. assistance,
and | ;

~~

2) the pros and cons and problems and pros-
pects involved in organizing an effective (i.
future Chilean opposition to Allende. : : , '

(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our
Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970

- ; : ’ Chilean Presidential’ Election, 9 October 1970)

Ambassador Korry y responded to the 40 Committée's request for a

"cold-blooded assessment" on _ September 12. He stated that "We [the

‘mbassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat

a2

not, Move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation

“_. | of national. chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to

say that "Our own military people fare]. unanimous in rejecting possi- ”

Th oD eR goss

fees

aed Gas pe i
Laid Nate Si SA nore BY

N

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 -Page 83

| i
bility of meaningful: military intervention in political situation."
He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this ‘cold-blooded

assessment’. is that opportunities for further significant USG action

nn”

with the Chiléan military are nonexistent. (Memorandum/Ambassador's
Response to Request for, Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean

Situation, 12 September 1970)

The. CIA's ‘response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's

-assistant. for Latin American affairs. on the NSC staff, summarized the-

CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military ac

tion is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize

power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memo-
‘randum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday-~September 14,

September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to: discuss these reports and . i
what: action was to be taken:

Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared
” review of political and military options in the
Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy’ hog
and Station's “cold-blooded assessment." The Com- i ew
mittee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg" at Ro, bev
‘gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the , ;
Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to .
_leave Frei constitutionally free-to run in a second oe ros
election for the presidency. a i, owe

ae

RSS cad
* Pacey

HW 50955 Docld:3242352

7

5 Page g4


-1l-

' Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President
“Frei ‘to see if he would be willing to commit himself to
re ‘this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was
vee approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or
his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed :
that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the Agency re
to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover. ... ;
(CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our

Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970
- Chilean Presidential Election, -? October 1970)

Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President
Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts

*
to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks. Track

eget

I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, in~
cluding the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as
well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were

designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his

assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track

*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House
ee officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order
} to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials in- i
quiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities.
Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of nom
Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Under-~
secretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for
Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau:

- of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cliné, “and the Deputy Chief of Mission
in Santiago Harry W. Shiaudeman. Thus far the Committee has received
written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline.
All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge’ of the Track II
activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a ;
general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from !
former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee :
staff membeys, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware 3

' .of Track II. ; : ; ~~

HY 50955 Docld: 324234525 Page 65

encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In‘his testimony by
ag

‘
before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks ha

’ ; I and II:
...There was work by all of the agencies to try to
prevent Allende from being seated, and there was
work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track
I to encourage the military to move against Allende
...the difference between the September 15th meet—
ing and what was being done in general within the
government was that President Nixon was encouraging
&@ more direct role for the CIA in actually organiz-
ing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p.- 13)

Tracks I and II did, in fact, move togefher in the month after
September 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally
excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and paneener
broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other
"appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to inten-

a sify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their

willingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of
g P 8 ¥

. power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to
run for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related .
to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presiden-
tial Election, 9 October 1970) ,
In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary 7
Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated .that in order :
to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would L
- Ok

HY 50955 Doeld:3242935275 Page 86

- on -13.

_ co = to, \
a fo. \

. : oN
vcs have to, be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."

(Korry to

Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying,

Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which Track a
I and Track II were merging, that is. to say, that individuals on Track an
I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on

Track ir." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21)

Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and

October 24 support Kissinger'’s view that the line separating Track I

and Track LI often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador was
authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if
Allende were seated, the military could exp@ct no further military
‘assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his own
recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that
‘all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome
of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador

Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary

“in this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that —
he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating

the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should

Allende assume office.

- Frei should know that not a nut-er bolt will be
allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once
Allende comes to power we shall do all within
our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to ;
utmost deprivation and, poverty, a policy designed ‘
for a long time to come to accelerate the hard 7
features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, t
for Frei to believe that there will be much of :
“Zn alternative to utter misery, such as seeing
Chile muddle through, would be strictly illusory. . i

n

The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and.the Chilean
military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions
and of instructions to, the field. Helms' notes: from the September a —
15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation .
i, "make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primary
feud topic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger,
Helms and Karamessines.

€

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 87 , , ce

~14-

war ose

- Ce in ers
of State U.*Alexis Johnson:

2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly
the Chilean’ military through the channels available
to you that if a successful effort is made to block :
Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the re
cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean -
MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed

MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any steps

the military should take should result in civil dis-

~ order, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver
support and material that might be immediately re-
quired. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)

The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by

oe
ar

instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track
II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in
mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's

direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and

support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals ame
in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track LI
, matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons

of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the

ae

CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA
contact with. the White House on Track Li matters, testified on his

understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador

' Korry were excluded from Track II:

That was not a decision that we made. But the
best [I can do is suggest that there was concern ;
about two things. Number one, that there might b
be serious objections lodged, for example, by b
the State Department particularly if Track 2 >
were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. i
“And the only other thing I can contribute to that ;
is that it was felt that the security of the
activity would be better protected if knowledge : -
of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122) ca
pone

HY.50955 Docld:32423525 Page 388

-lL5~

wee Y asi

‘ASOn one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in

Track II is unanimous: - they all said they thought Track II was unlikely he

to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the

top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible,
that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At
the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential

order, and they tried to execute that order.

A few excerpts from the testimony follow:

Richard Helms, CIA Director -

-..my heart sank over this meeting, because...the
possibility of bringing off somefhing like this
seemed to me at that-time to be just as remote as
anything could be. In practical terms, the Army
was constitutionalist....And when you look here at
the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking . parser
you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost

inconceivable....

} What I came away from the meeting with
the distinct impression that we were being
asked to do almost the impossible and trying
to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... ce
(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)

David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -

..-it is my feeling that the odds are unaccept-
able, it is something that is not going to work,

- . “and we are going to be burned if we get into it
...what are the chances of pulling off a coup ,
successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from
assuming the presidency?...we never even got to
two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)

..I assure you that those people that I
_was in touch with at the Agency just about univers~
ally said, my God, why are we given this assignment?
(Phillips testimony, p. 53)

James Flannery, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -

ae

There was just no question that we had to make
. this effort, no matter what the odds were. And
i I think that most people felt that the odds were
M, just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20)

at ree

were

HYW50955 Doeld:32423525 Page 89

-16-

\

Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's
difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the Septem-
ber 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively
certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough."
(Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing
out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized

and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something,

there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

wo

ed

phe Reo aha Sd

HW 50955 Docld:3242739575 Page 90

SS Se OE
ade


-Li-.

~~ IIL. ACTAYS ‘Implementation of Track II

_

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent
Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. —
. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction
to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup

d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military

circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place
without active U.S. encouragement and support.

There was much talk among Chilean officers about
the possibility of some kind of coup...but this
was not the kind of talk that wa being backed by,
you know, serious organizational planning.
' (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende
victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its
activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.
On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-
tion of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been

discarded. Military solution is objective.
(Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted, to enlist President Frei in promoting
a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency
decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a !
successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)
Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the

Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had

been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 91

HY 50955

—su>-

with this message on\September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)
' Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:
. o
So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a
-sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully
non-violent military coup....This was abandoned
when the military were reluctant to push Frei
publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant
_ to leave on his own. in the absence of pressure
aa from the military....There was left as the only
chance of success a straight military coup.
(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)
At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:
Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor
Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario
in which either has to play an active role now
appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower
echelon officers (e.g., Valenzueha) can of course
be made. This involves promoting Army split.
(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)
2. Military Solution
President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party
convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended
all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18
memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October,
it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be
found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-
ship: of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, consti-
tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,
September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly
unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented

by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence

of organization and. enthusiasm among those officers who were interested

in a coup.

Docld: 32423525 Page 92

|

-ay-

“a. Collect’ intelligence on coup-minded officers;

: Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation,

and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to

Eyl

give a pretext for a coup; *(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)
c. Inform those coup-minded officers-that the U.S. Govern-
’ ment would give them full support in a coup short of direct

U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)

-B. The Chile Task Force

Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special
task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it.
The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Direc-

tor for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency’s most

experienced and skilled operators. were detailed to the task force.

*\ cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused
on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:

1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification
that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It
therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will prob-
ably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism...You may —
wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for

- . their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel.
that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along
Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state....B)Economic
situation collapsing:....C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist
countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to
Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then
empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of .
terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes j
from Allende on this.) i

2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes i
at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare t
intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify .
coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With Lower u
appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel’ report 4 :
which could even be planted during raids planned: "by. ‘Carabineros. 3 ee

=——_

-
i
ee

§
3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plot; i.t!% er
ters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to:prosper. ~

(Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)

es

HY 50955 Docld:324234525 Page 93


_ A ~L0-

‘David'A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned-

' back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the

Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head
of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the
task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-
sibility for Chile. The ‘task force had a special communications channel to
Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.
(November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the
significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and
Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involwed with the task force des-

cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines

has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the

heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-

‘ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Kara-

messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the
Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was

“as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testi-

‘mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone

through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I. mean it was just
constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the
White House." (roe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA?Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the

Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army At-

tache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the, Chilean ‘military

ae

HY 50955

Docld: 324735275 Page 94

"of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting in-

telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support
for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military,
the senior military which we had not maintained and did not
have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-
tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to ;
enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to. pro- —_—
cure intelligence.

(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested mes-
sage for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago

through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General

Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy ~
Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy
Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,
a 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of fie:
the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized —
- . transmission of a message directing the Army Attache: . .

-..-to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,

his deputy, in contacting and advising~the principal mili-
tary figures who might play a decisive role in any move which
might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At- 7
tache of this message, or give them any indication of its
portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in
accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
I wish**and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion -
with the CAS chief.

a 4d
vening of October —

nN : TOR,
are ; Pan ON ba wa oh
* General Bennett returned to7the,U ited States on the “e
ing Director in Bennett's absence.
be

10, 1970. General Philpott was)

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 95

~22-

* be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 3 380
to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache,
the secret CIA communications channel was used.

_ Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-
tially the Army Attache would be used only to “obtain or procure” in-
telligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, i
p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did —__
in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to
the Attache’s testimony, he received day-to-day instructions -from the
Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages
ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to
take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army
Attache to these Generals. |

~ "General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track IL
and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did Ee
he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. - —

- Generali Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything

connected with Track If after his initial meeting with General Cushman

on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)
U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970

was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

west oes

<3 b..

* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about -
this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled,signing Boat
an authorization such as that contained in the’ first. paragraph of por
Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall. chet authorizations and °
instructions in paragraphs tworand ae a —

on

i ar
oe *

( | ae

HW 50955 Docld:324235275 Page 96

iyi
i
i

mae

i

7
testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on

"a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be

helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."

(Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls: no mention of Track II as such,
the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message.
of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities:

connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting

on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean

generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military
coup, Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.
The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to

“Mr. Broe ‘to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert

that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized: ;

FYI: . Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has

been réscinded. This action does not repeat not.imply

change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary,
‘a it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can

formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa- al
tion develops as we anticipate. Request up. date on situa-. on
De, ' tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters ae
934, 21 October 1970) &
Roth testified that this DIA project ended.on October 23 when he bi
.. Pio
‘followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on I
_ . . \ Le
Chilean figures to Mr.-Broe at CIA. , Philpott also instructed him that te
. i ts
*s.
. _ . . . : Fai
' * Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this hoo
‘message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re- ‘ ee
_: ‘sponse from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Reth, fe
Vol. II, p. ) . aa
. . md power

HW 50955 Docld: 3242394525 Page 97

“any further action on the subject would henceforth be thé responsibility

of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,

p. 8)*

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described °
by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is
that I was informed that there was concern at the highest :
U.S. Governmental level over the: possible election of Allende,
that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with —
the identities of ‘key Chilean personalities that would be help-
ful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature ‘of
the instructions or the channels through which they came.

.Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a
project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had
the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

* Roth’s chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe
be queried 6n two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert
‘and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-
cate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi.

~_ fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would
be by CIA channels. {Roth, Pe 41)

HY 50955 Doeeld:32423525 Page 93

Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department
‘that the highest level of government usually indicated the
President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. 1 would assume that.

‘The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
Genérals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among
these documents. is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's

purported signature. (Undated message. ca..14 October 1970) General

Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be-his but doubted that
it was and hé could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott,
‘pe ) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762)

and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General

Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett’ testified he did. not
authorize these messages:

It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military
assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I : :
had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the i, oo, .
approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert a j
action of this magnitude. This message would not have been _
signed by me. . (Bennett testimony, p. 21) ‘ ;

-According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to : ' wre ~
issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi- :
. . --- an ; : : Boy
‘mony, p. 84) . . _ i nee
‘The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-
ing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A
DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel 0. Graham, the.

present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents

for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth

testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on m=
care ny i. ‘ ‘y. yt . -
‘om. the. files: ‘(Rot
ns ;
rs Kk

his activities are missing:

%

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 99

‘CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting |
messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a

message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly .— a
forceful in this regard:

-+-I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central
Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an
“individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in what-
ever department, which was not. faithfully, directly, promptly
and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his
duly authorized representative.
(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

We may have played tricks overseas, but it - stopped at the

water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or.

among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

We could not remain in business for a day...if- this had been
the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at
ali before we would have been found out, a single instance
of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken
place would havé put-us out of business.

(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's ' ; \

wf
v

role or that he authorized. any messages to be sent to the Army Attache,

oo
5 _ Kissinger testimony, p. 22) re
The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between ‘the 4 . er
- . ; . ror,
_ Statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are if
. four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals oa
Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their «
. ; ; . ee
general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be — a po

contrary to. their sworn testimony: Second, General Bennett-was not aware
of Track IT but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to: ”

the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony

*”

but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to

; '  . keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and,

4

after ‘receiving initial, author ty;from_ General. Philpott, co-opted.and ordered

vari

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 100

chk
ithe “Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department

of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to

the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, —_
and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized —_
the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or

highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff

directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-

formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr.

Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

‘
|
q

In order to minimize the risks of makin& contact with the dissident

Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a

"False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as peer
nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts

ms “with Chilean military officers.” Given the Limitations of the Station's

ao resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of |
"False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a

chance." One. of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer

so that “any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363,

September 27, 1970) _

et od

*The- use of."False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips,
"an unusual practice," either by the CIA or, ray, eign. intelligence boa 8,
services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47~48) ' i ,

Some ewe cee

is

ous}

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 101

-27- : :

The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported
separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago
who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the
Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and —
not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of

Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and

the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers.
The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

I had left no doubt in the minds-ef my colleagues
and superiors that I did not consider any kind of
intervention in those constitutional processes
desirable....And one of ‘the reasons certainly for my
last recall.(to Washington) was-to be read-the riot
act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very
intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at
that time that the Agency was not too interested in
continuously being told by me that certain proposals

which had been made could not be executed, or would

be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) ;
testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10) Oe ee eb

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed.
The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report .
should not .contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on

action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters

wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself. ;

HW 50955 ‘Docld: 32423525 Page 102

Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his

claim to have dissented:

Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceed- Ki
ingly narrow and available options are quite
limited and relatively simple.

(Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)

a Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism.
It is essential that we not become victims of our
own propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)

Urge you do not convey impression that Station has
sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering
coup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2) —

spent

é

Mi :
Say:

|

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 103

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.” Following the
"Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the
support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as. being
the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Ro
Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile,” July
15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting. centered was General Camilo

Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was og

in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral

pane
Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director

General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of

, the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command,

a Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, m

1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales,

aK
were in contact with Viaux as well.

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-
tizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as
an abortive coup. —

ae.
py ee eee
sf sor * ;
?

*kThe record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers
is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General
Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7}. On October 12
Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One
cable from Santiago indicates that Admirai Tirado may have been a member

of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970),
At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux. abe.

mm a ge

Although a distinction can be made between theiV faux and Valenzuela groups,
as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony: before the Committee, the
. principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led-by active duty
. , military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The
record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three
Schneider kidnap attempts.

HY 50955 Doclda:32423525 Page 104

aeTey

Se a vat . ; i :
y. Le

sey Ta A on
mrt

There was considerable communication among the various plotting

$i oe

sine T

~,

elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
-..I might add here that it seemed that a good
dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers
were privy to what was going on in addition to
President Frei and they were all talking to one
another exchanging views and trying to ‘see how
best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted
an to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
B. Contacts Prior to October 15
The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within
the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-
Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),
but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the
Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,
Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the
Constitution.” (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-
ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,
constitutional-~oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)
Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General.
Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the
idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the
second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S.
; *
Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.
(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in

earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General

("Station's priority contact”) an an Air Force.

?

General of the pro-coup
Nhe oe onare
Lees t

*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be

prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra~ «
cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-
tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 105

e

ae

*
(Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)

Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander

of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solu-

tion and is willing’ to support it in any manner short of outright —_
military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta

informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean

Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy

in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was

Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he
aK

would ultimately pass three submachine gunseon October 22. At this

meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues . é

were
—
trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate ,
Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send
him out of the country. They had even stud-
ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the
main barrier to all plans for the military
aaa to take over the government to prevent an
Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)
; . a
* according to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5
and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part
the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. ee
. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970) os

**T0 his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was
affiliated with General Canales. (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable
sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request
for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert
believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in
league with-Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18) At another point
in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy
Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force ‘General over here." |
(Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine
the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously
stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with o —
General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.

HW 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 106

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page i107

to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's
resistance to coup plans and stated:

»».-This would make it more important than
ever to remove him and to bring this new
state of events...anything we or Station
can do to effect removal of Schneider? We
- know this rhetorical question, but wish
inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
(Hqs. 628, 8 October)

‘During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success

looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:
President Frei and the highest levels of the
armed forces unable to pull themselves together
to block Allende. The Chilean mflitary's tradi-
tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to
tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's’
firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,
the lack of leadership within the government and
military are working against.a military takeover.
: (Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning
chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not
dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: Station has arrived at Viaux-
solution by process of elimination.” (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three
days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention
on General -Viaux who" now appears to be the -only military leader willing
to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If-Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak
indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him
as "a General without an army.” (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the
first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as: the’best hope for-

cere ye po
carrying out.the CIA's Track II mandate. at f

a ee 0 ober es “

eee f

i 1

Fig earns Me gen Rew
a a See ra


A “39-

++ "4
. \
ac “ot et TN

Although. Colonel. Wimert was ins structed not to involve himself with
as Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he
served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military
Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several —
hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. “(Santiago
4765 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that

a “mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive” and Viaux

should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner
to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if
it materializes.” (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base” was to contact Viaux,

and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that

task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the
"False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand . oS
for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency
was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
a refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."

(Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-
quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000
in life insurance to. Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of
U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over ‘Schneider

by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement -in early :

hours which»will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join p.

Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that ; _
. Me er
same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within vile i| er

eis

the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup.” (Santiago 527,

Le ee

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 108


tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)
“At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its
other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was
to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:
Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing
coup activity from other military quarters,
specifically, an Army General (name deleted),
Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion and
Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.
: (Task Force Log, 14 October)
C. October 15 Decision
To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-
tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had ifidicated he would deal with
the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen-
erals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*
On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According
. to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines “provided a run-
down on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail,
the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."
(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October
- 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de~fuse the Viaux coup plot,

at least temporarily:"

* The. reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable
from Santiago to Headquarters:

We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-
tempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other re~- :
porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this me
weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October) cee

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental
in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile, Task Force Logr

Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met
{ : with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

cated a
wl

;

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 109

~35-

\_-It'was decided by those present that the Agency
. “must get- a message to Viaux warning him against
mn . any precipitate action. In essence the message
should state: “We have reviewed your plans and
based on your information and ours, we come to
the conclusion that your plans for a coup at
this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may re-
duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve
your assets. We will stay in touch. The time
will come when you with all your other friends
can do something. You will continue to have .
~ our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conver-~ ‘
sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr.
Kissinger'’s note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,

after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching

-

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.'"'*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende

oo be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to

~! generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-
ing every appropriate resource.

3. After the most careful consideration it was

. determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out

. by him alone with the forces now at his disposal

Oe would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive
to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that

“CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against
‘precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo~
ber)

The message was supplemented by orders to “continue to: encourage him
(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:

"There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado,.

Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

*
Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not
4 . in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)
_ that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-
ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

iE
Ex

OS ee

»

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 110

By -36-

aie
J

De Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "“de~fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's
father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not
matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in ‘any case.
(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False
Flagger” and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was in-
formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-—
tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."
(Santiago 568, 19 October) An “emergency channel" of communication
with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 November 970+ Page 21) -

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter

; *
for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.

As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

Coup possibilities afforded by the active
duty military group led by General Valenzuela
and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more
promising than the capabilities of the Viaux
group. These military officers had the abil-
ity and resources to act providing they de~
cided to move and organized themselves ac-
cordingly.
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from
the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
this direction.
On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. Ve

Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,

*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to, "3 if
persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15; ‘ny td
The Station reported that the meeting turned outi to be a "complete fiasgo. |
Schneider refused to listen to General Canales’ eloquent presentation of
Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement

stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)

Page 111

i


-37~
; ‘ a LS . n

pn

. three “45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy

. captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified

by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to ays
use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief __
of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns

for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were

- intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.

The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy

Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing
suggests that the guns were not involved.

The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-
matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was a

puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them

ppsseasnnassee:
but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops
with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will
— try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters
854, 18 October) The first.instaliment was delivered to the Army Lt.
Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and con-
sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally. for Viaux ot .
* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--
rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to
provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades “
originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of a
this action: at :
“Station plans give six tear gas grenades to nw i
Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces ALY |
officers (deletion) instead of having False a !
Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group. ~ . tt . a
Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with . \yv at!
active duty officers. Also False Flagger “ od
leaving evening 18 October, and will not be f
{ replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence. Ww

~~ . important that Wimert credibility with Armed
Forces officers be strengthened.
(Santiago 562, 18 October)

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 112 Oe

General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared

to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18

a
we.

November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General
Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military
dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown

to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave-Chile, Admiral Tirado would

head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the

kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
but not directly involved. He has been sent to
Vina to stay with prominent physftian. Will be
seen in public places during 19 and 20 October

to demonstrate fact that above operation not his fF
doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at .
“end of week. Military will not admit involve-
ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be 4, 7
blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October) |
The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider
oon left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official.car, and. his police guard ,
. . i
failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that an- :
- . other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)
Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price
; agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors,"
* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time 7
the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently undetstood r
that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated: j
aan ; _
Q. Were you told any of the details of how ces a
the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out? Moa pes
Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be F

at some sort of a banquet which the General - ‘ nel
(Schneider) would be attending.
(Sarno testimony, p. 37)

vam

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 113 Foe nrar men enes storia ¢

~39-

sy

ta

‘but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the

corset
=

Pel

: money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task ,
Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also

. failed and the Task Force concluded
~ Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having
considerable difficulty executing even the first
step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup
succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider
In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert
delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt.

Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago. *

*al though Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not
a) clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel
; was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the
ae weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the. Valenzuela group:

be

.

-The only assistance requested by Valenzuela
to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion
through Schneider's abduction was several sub-
machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades
and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
_ $50,000 for. expenses (which was_to be passed upon
demand.
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 November 1970, p. 22)

|

-Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas
cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen-
zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason
-~why they still wanted the weapons was because
there were two days remaining before the Congress
decided the Presidential election andthe Valen- |
zuela group maintained some hope they could still
carry out their plans. aa
(CIA Briefing Paper, "special Mandate from the | o
President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975) _—

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 114

en ye TN en, aa -40-

oe a wt ace AA

4° At about: am ‘that day the group that intended to kidnap General

oo f
H
:

Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the

findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider

Dyes
aget®

killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there.
Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his
way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew

his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand

guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found
that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the, killing.

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said
"at litary Mission sources claim General Schaeider machine gunned on

way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease

guns."' (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously

been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station
was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered
several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed

Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000

if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating

that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-

zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters: eerie

a Shag TA

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the
shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
conspiracy. The.Court also found that this same group had participated
in the October’ 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

culminating in. the death of General Schneider. He received a 20~year
prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which re-~
sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-
( spiring to cause a military coup. Also. convicted on the Latter charge
se were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three
“ years in exile.

t
,
:

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot FE
poms
i

Tee sR ee,

HW 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 115

-41-

“Station unaware if assassination was prée-
meditated or whether it constituted bungled
abduction attempt. In any case, it important
to bear in mind that move against Schneider
was conceived by and executed at behest of : : sO
senior Armed Forces officers. We know that ye
General Valenzuela was involved. We also
near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt.
Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved.
We have reason for believeing that General
Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,
but cannot prove or disprove that execution
or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
elements linked with Viaux. Important factor
to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not
retired officers or extreme rightests, set
Schneider up for execution or abduction....
All we can say is that attempt against Schneider
is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity
to prevent Allende'’s election if they are willing
to follow Valenzuela's scenario...

(Santiago 598, 22 October)

"

T. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in. a declara- ,
tion of martial law, the appointment of Generali Prats to succeed Schneider
as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief

of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile Bt
. pe.

Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

- . With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional
runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack
on General Schneider has produced developments which
.closely follow Valenzuela’s plan....Consequently the a
plotters' positions have been. enhanced.
(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II: -

It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,
and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a
~successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a
point where a military solution is at least open to _
them. (Task Force Logs 24: October) ;

;

he

Lite oot

SS hae ee
Sea

HW 50955 Docld:324273525 Page 116 ; _ “


ee " -42-

4

lee an rf

s A Moy f om % nae A a
it cAlthough it was not. immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's
a

prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of
an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of te
constitutionalism" was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 . —
Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider

died the next day.

\

J T ae

my

En al : aan eae ANS TD eh a BR EE a

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 117

The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General
Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials. ,

Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White ee
House .stood downCIA efforts to promote a military coup d’etat in Chile.
Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor
authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of

General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.

By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and
after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.

The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but

it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the

CIA in. the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger. testi-

fied that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the abduction

of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he

and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not

know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction. e
CIA officials, especially Thomas ‘Karamessines, stated that there was

close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White

- House. Katamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to ho
ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony,
page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments.
(ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between
Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between
Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines'
daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General antral roa

meen Em CNS oo i
took place-~but does not establish with “ey ‘that the topic, was ae

ne id ‘fi y hers

Ne

HW "50955 ‘pocld: 32493525 Page iis

447

Set AY
The? calendaralso suggests that Karamessines and Kissinger
met on three other occasions and so might have had the opportunity to

discuss Track II.

Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Committee differs
from Karamessines in two respects: He. believed Track TL was "turned off"
on October 15; and, after that date,he was informed neither of the coup
plans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons to then.

He said that Track II was
in the nature of a probe and not in the nature of
a plan,...no plan for a coup was ever submitted to
the White House. So my recollection of events,
this was a request by President Nixon for Track II
which led to two or three meetings which then on
October 15th led to being turned off by the White
House, after which Track II was dead as far as my
office was concerned, and we never received another
report on the subject. (Kissinger testimony, p. 15)

voor

KKK

In my mind Track II was finished on October 15th
and I never received any further CIA information
after October 15th on the basis of any records that :
I have been able to find. (Ibid., p. 59) ;

General Haig's testimony generally coincided with Kissinger's
recollection:

I left (the October 15th meeting) with the distinct
impression that there was nothing that could be _
done in this covert area that offered promise or
-hope for-success. I had the distinct impression
that was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion, and that in
effect these things--and I wasn't even really
familiar with what these two groups were to do .and
how they were to do it, but they were to cease and
desist. (Haig testimony, pp. 26-27)

RK

~My recollection would be that we had no hope for a
viable, covert plan of action. That is the impres=-
sion I got. (Ibid., p. 29)

The following pages present the Committee's record of communication

ae

between the White House and the CIA from September. 18 through December 2:


- Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As

Helms’ notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a , ker
plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA . —
records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in
the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con-

cern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was

viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation
that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar pone
confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-
man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review

aon his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings

of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the

an

meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet
privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances
- save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, - the Committee has no
evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting
actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa-
tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been ‘able to find none

at

for other meetings may provide some:-support for the argument that no

3 YE a women

other such private meetings occurred.
September 22 i

ry
a

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind wo hter a fio Se
( ge GS pats P)

Ke meeting called to discuss Track I. The two Re} | pgscet tian te "actions,

especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to

rd 50955 Docta: 32423525 Page 120 Bete ne

Kissinger told Karamessines that “our

ray . : .

andling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect
and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for
the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

October 5

“A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a
report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
--Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta-~named in a cable ‘of September 30.
(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,

5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed suchaa meeting had taken place,
although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony,
pp. 69-70} His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40
Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger

_ chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

?

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe
Pp

evening 9 October, or morning 10 October.” (Santiago 472, 6 October
1970) “In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one
- “with scant chance of ‘success which will vitiate any further more seri-
ous action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered
action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)
Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan,

supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of

an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)

pore oe :

makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kigsinger testimony, p. 24) al t|
. . . 4

etorad + «eg t
foNahoa: - Koa
; AG «G : thee

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 121

ne at we)
Stee


-47-

. SY he 7
Similarly; Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the

CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:

My perception at that period was that if they - , as
had a coup they would come...back to us before : Mies”
triggering it...at no time during the period
did they, in fact, tell us...that they had a
coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed,
they generally told us the opposite.

{Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26) :

As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meet-

ing on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms:

and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes.of that meeting,
CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed.

However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State De-

partment's ‘Assistant Secretary for Latin. American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger
stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent panos

Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:

j o- . Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a: post-Allende
_ . , position such as proposed in NSSM 97. It was agreed that. * :
ae an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr.. ¢. | }
a Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait : '

9 accompli and higher authority had no intention of conced-

ing before the: 24th; on the contrary, “he wanted no stone
left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the
Meeting of the, 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October
1970): — .

October 8 . oe wee
Karamessines met for lunch with Cenéral Haig. (Karamessines calendar).
In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that ‘the CIA was in touch»
with two differenct groups of military ‘plotters. He believed there must’ |
have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going

contacts.

~

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 122

It seems to me, although the records don't re-
Flect it, that there was a meeting in September,
a very brief one, in which I must-have been

told that there was a specific program going
underway. That probably would have been by
Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines
there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12):

Octobér 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General
Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number
of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly
very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all."

(Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.

His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

I do know, and I know that from looking at the
} record this morning, that Karamessines made a
pout telephone call to me in which he gave a progress | !
report. I recali that. It was in effect a nega-
tive progress report, that they were’ just not com-
ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

‘Sapa Eater eee ee

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 . Page 123

piv:


substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his
role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger: oy

I am quite confident that, given my own concep-
tion of my role at that time, that I would have
conveyed that information to Henry,...
- (Haig testimony, p. 13)
: ARK .

Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.
Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of
latitude did you have concerning what you would
pass on to Dr. Kissinger? :

General Haig. At that time I would consider I
had no degree of latitude, other than to convey
to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)

A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from General
Bennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers and
convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington
has authorized you to offer material support short of armed interven-
tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to :
prevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters to

Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in

this case “high authority" would have been-Kissinger or the President,

for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization.

Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at

least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)
Howevef; Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th

cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on

i
1
r
pores aa
the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the : M 2
ro . -- : “ —

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 124

-49-

the! 15th_(sée below) to have discussed the results of the

meeting .on

October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any

such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14
The 40 Committee met to discuss, among. other topics, Chile. In ad- |
dition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David
Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by.

Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman ‘of the CIA, Charles

“Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and. Ambassador Korry, who had returned to
Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation. .

According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines

to give a rundown on the latest devélopments and present situation in Chile. -

Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does-not presently exist."
He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual. seem-
‘ ' ingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful-
one were slight." Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines' assessment
. i I 2
; and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would : ER:
be voted into office on October 24th.” Kissinger then observed that :
"there. presently appeared. to be little the U.S. can do to influence the
Chilean situation one way or another.” Other participants at the meet-. "Be.
‘ing concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the

“40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)

LL ‘

HY 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 125

- 494 ~-

October 15

. Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-

cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines

gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in.
Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that’ Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to Launch a
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions

from an unsuccessful coup. .The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5. It was decided by those present that’ the
Agency must get-a message to Viaux warning him
against any precipitate action. In essence our
“message was to state: "We have reviewed your
plans, and based on your information and ours,
we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
they may reduce your capabilities for the future.
Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.
The time will come when'you with all your other
| friends can do something. ‘You will continue to
_f have our support."

. 6. After the decision to de- fuse the Viaux coup i
Pe plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc- :
> ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in

Chile, working ‘Clandestinely and securely to main=
tain the capability for Agency operations against

Allende in the future.

a 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger’ s note

- “that the Agency should continue “keeping the pres-

: : sure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now,
after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and
into’the future until such time-as new marching
orders are given. Mr..Karamessines stated that
ithe Agency would comply.
(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. .
Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
October 1970)

HW 50955 Docld: 32493525 Page 126

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Kissinger in “his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA

1
1

en

memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat

.

a

more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) oe

Le

He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your

assets."
Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as
recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA

issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the

October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the
meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maxi-
mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-5@) The October 16th order

indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous

day, and stated:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup. ft would be much prefer-
able to have this transpire prior to 24 October

but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
beyond this date....

x

é

4. There is great and continuing interest in the
activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al
and we wish them optimum good fortune.

: (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off
the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them.” (Kissinger
testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

The conclusions of that meeting were that we had. ba
better not do anything rather than something that my
Was not going to succeed....My general feeling i
was, I left that meeting with the impression that ;
there was nothing authorized.”
(Haig testimony, p. 13) fs
| cca

HW 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 127

51
oy yah
te 4 wey \ in “

ws eh

{4 October -10-October +22’ (approximate)

Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with

ata

”

the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting

B

took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89)
According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress
all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential

; *
that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted." As

they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside

to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)
October io
Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that
the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan, . ae
beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Com-
mittee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the
i Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason
pee than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to

the White House...." (Karamessines testimony, p. 72)

And as I say, if for no other reason we would have.
wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the
White House as soon as possible, and it would be my
best estimate now that that is precisely what we
° , did. (p. 72)

In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig
for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then,

Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela

2

“Te the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that
would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were
not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting.
Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars |
of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might ‘pinpoint the
date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. - Those calen-

¢ dars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have

, been subpoenaed.

Sk P

HW 50955 Docld: 32423525 “Page 126

mer
yee o

4s

plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haig
had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor

df{d he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela-plan. "This

is all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiar
with this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that
aré described in here." (Haig testimony, pP- 38-39)

Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of

the Valenzuela plan. He said he “was informed of nothing after October

; ay bs

15th...."" (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according
to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines
or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ebid., p. 53) He indicated
that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and Bat
tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was no
further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs

(the CIA's), none of the information from the l6th on was familiar to me."
(Ibid., p. 62)

Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States io
was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved
the abduction of General Schneider:

- Senator Hart of Colorado. I-am-not sure that
the record clearly shows you answer to the direct
question of whether you knew or did not know that
we were negotiating with military officers with
regard to a plot that did involve the abduction

of General Schneider.

Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know.
(Kissinger testimony, p. 86)

i
Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction bee
plans before the fact. #
a

a

emer be

HY 50955 Docld:32493525 Page 129 . mms

3 you” aware during that period of time
BOF “the plans to kidnap General Schneider?

General Haig. I was aware after. the fact....

Q. But you were never informed prior to his .
attempted abduction? —

General Haig. I don't believe I was at all.

October 20

A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever

events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on kK

j
interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to ~
queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines
testified that the references to "high leveds" in the .cable of, the 20th
meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain
that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan —
for the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the
morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger
interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He’ felt it indicated .
that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When re

news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed
he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, ‘What is this
all about?!" (Kissifiger transcript, p. 68)-:
October 22
Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar)

General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as

“a great sHock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him
about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either

was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to.
7 Tey

Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had“ told him! (aig testi-, ;

{ mony, p. 36) : . 7 i . : : _ oy

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 130

C. December

December 2

A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated
that Helms had given a recapitulation om Track II to Attorney General
Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten
note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)."
(Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which
was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities
during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and
the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA
Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18

ee

November 1970)
In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiv-
ing the report, although he. doubted that he would have read such an

“after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find

.it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I,

dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by a number of. aspects of

the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report

of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of

December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger

testimony, pp. 71, 74)
Dp. Did Track II End?.

The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or

-_
er
Be
{

er

not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indi- t.

cated that ‘Track LI was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on

October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presi- Kar

dential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress ."*

mmr oy prs

oer ge oe —

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 131

’

‘b
#

Shel Commit tee’ ee not “have this new “marching order" in its possession.
However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed
that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely
tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change . —

of government in Chile. Karamessines’ testimony was most explicit:

Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that
were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact

in 1973. I do not have any question about that -?
in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26) f
kek ,

=

Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there
a specific order ending it?

Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned,

Track II was really never ended. What we were

told to do in effect was, well, Rllende is now

President. So Track II, which sought to prevent

him from becoming President, was technically out,

it was done. But what we were told to do was to

continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what ; —

we could to contribute to the eventual achieve-

ment of the objectives and purposes of Track II.

That being the case, I don't think it is proper i

to say that Track II was ended.
(Ibid. ,- pp. : 128-129)

is!

When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never
ended, Kissinger testified: -

The Chairman. Would you take issue with that,
with the (Karamessines) testimony? ~

| ese
An

sf. a . i

Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear
that...after October i5th that there was no
separate channel by the CIA to the White House
and that all actions with respect to Chile were
taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was
no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to v
‘or contact with military people, no plots which }
I am familiar with, and all the covert operations . r
in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress |
‘were directed towards maintaining the democratic re.
opposition for the 1976 election. And that was :
the exclusive thrust, and if there was: any further, a.
contact with military plotting, it was: “totally” . {-
unauthorized and this is the first that I have
i heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)

Le ee at ee tee ©

ee ae Te sera
Bes PSS ee, So eS
HW 50955 DBocld:32423525 Page 132

(Draft--9/8/75)

A. Summary

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother,
Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese
generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee
indicates that the United States Government offered encourage- .
ment for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the
assassinations, Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have
been a spontaneous. act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by
anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the
custody of che leaders of the coup.

On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") out-
lined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and
another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being
considered for changing the government in the near future. |

7 Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William
Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief
“of Station, who recommended that “we do not set ourselves
irrevocably against. the assassination. plot, since the other two
alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted
struggle which would rip the Army- and the country asunder" (CIA
cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being
informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated
“[wle cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or
supporting assassination", and the second directed that the

recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position

t . ,

~ actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 133

_ our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63);
CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).

B. _ The Abortive Coup of August 1963

On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue
fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing
nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide
Buddhist protest and.a sharp loss of popular confidence in the

. : *
Drem regime.

On May 13, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Wolting
met with Diem and outlined steps.wnich the United States desired
him to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapture
public confidence. These steps included admitting. responsibility
for the Hue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming

aa religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) On
June 3, Madame Nhu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly
accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents;
Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-
associate ‘the United Etates from any repressive measures against
the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308).. Shortly
thereafter, Madame Uhu commented on the self-immolation of Quang

* Senator Gravel Ddition, the Péntagon Papers, The Defense Depart-
ment History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, pp. 297-
208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon
Papers). Fonuer Public Affairs Officer of the U.S.: Embassy in.
Saigon, John Mecklin),in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate
Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965,
(hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the“vul-
nerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this

period noting that itt “offered a classic opportunity for a Communist
Sleeper ploy." :

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 134

Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to
furnish mustard for the monks’ barbecue. On June 12,. Trueheart
told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the worid and
again warned that the United States would break with his govern-
ment if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers,
p. 208.) | |
Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the

Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought
down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the
United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering
.pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before

attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)

By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had
~~ agreed on the necessity for a coup. * *. .
| In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting,
Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to

the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview

* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved
in the coup ,

"for many years. Some of them I had known back even in
World War II. Some of them.were in powerful positions,
and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis,
not as-a government official." (Conein, p. 17.)

** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:

"The majority of the officers, including General Minh,

. desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from,
the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to
Ngo-Dinh Nhu and.Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention.

Sweet The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo

Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed.”” (Conein After-Action Report,
p. 10.)

HY 50955 Doclda:32423525 Page 135

-4-
with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted
that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory

and asked for harmony and support of the government.

Shortly after midnight on August, 21, 1963, Whu ordered forces
loyal .to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks
and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured
and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise
and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's

K .

promises to Nolting. ° (Pentagon Papers, p.21U)

On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable
(peptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Ilenry Cabot Lodge.
The teleyram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and under Secretary of State
Averell Harriman, and was approved by President xennedy. (Pentagon
Papers, p.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take
“prompt dramatic actions" to redress the: grievances of the
Buddhists.

"We must at same time also tell key military leaders

that US would find it impossible to continue support

GV (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically
unless above steps are taken immediately which we
recognize requires removal of the Mhu'ts from the scene.
We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's
but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept
the obvious implication that we can no ‘longer support
Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders
we will give them direct support in any interim period

of breakdown central government mechanism... . con-
currently with above, Ambassador and country teams should
urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and
make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's
replacement if this should become necessary ... ."

a

( ar ry “
* Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur
when no American Ambassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few

Says before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein,
p. . .

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 136

-5-

In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson
reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge , True-
heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They
accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and
would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (1.G.,
C, pp. 7-8) but believed: that Diem would refuse to remove his
brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America
in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids
‘and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation
that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South
Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 912) .* -Later on that
same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers
Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,
respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,
but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial

- action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action,
win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized
Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United
States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,
but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-
rized to suspend United States aid at his disctetion.(Deptel 272,

8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:
¥in a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broad@ast
* nad “complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating
“the possibility of the generals’ effort achieving surprise."
Lodge further warned that. "the US must not appear publicly in
the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends"
(Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63). .

HY 50955 Doclda:32423525 Page 137

-6-

“I have approved all the messages you are receiving from
others today, and I emphasize that everything in these
messages has my full support. We will do all that we can
to help you conclude this operations successfully ... .
Until the very moment of the. go signal for the operation
by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to
change course and reverse previous instructions. While

_ fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of
such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is
more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I
would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such

. change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this
operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63).

In a reply cable, Lodge stated:
“L. I fully understand that you have the right and
responsibility to change course at any time. Of course
I will always respect that right.
2. fo be successful, this operation must be essentially
a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of. its own. Should
this happen you may not be able to control it, l.e.,. the
“co signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge
to President, 8/30/63)
A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:
-_ "This particular coup is finished . . .. Generals did
not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of
forces ... . ‘there is little doubt that GNV. (South

Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have con-
siderable detail ....” ASAIG 0499, 8/31/63)

Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later
relations between the United States representatives and the -

generals.: Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength

of American support, grew in confidence.

C. The November 1963 ‘Coup |
American ‘dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became
increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell,
i * ina television interview,. stated that Congress might cut aid

to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 138

~J-

(Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to deter-
mine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the
regime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with White
House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the
“Senate condeming the South Vietnamese Government for its
repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an
end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were
curtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215).

In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem
were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated
increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American
policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's-actions,
recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting
to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the

a first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and
General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon

. Papers, p. 215.) ¢

On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington
and presented their findings to the National Security Council.
Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing
favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political
turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This
pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000
American troops by the end of the year; ending support for the
forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's

Soe policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 139

-~8-

against a coup, but sugyested that alternative leadership should be

identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly
approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-]16)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a
coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American
“support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of
action, one of which was the assassination of sten's brothers,
Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saiyon to Director, 10/5/63).
The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on
October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that “we do not set
ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a
protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

"“(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
a approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other.
: hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every
such threat of which we might receive even partial know-
ledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.
We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this
matter opens door too easily for probes of our position
re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently
believe best-approach is hands _off, However, «we naturally
interested in intelligence on any such plan.

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon
by various military units and direct confrontation between military
units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

**x Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted
this cable for McCone. Colby testified:

"Q; So you were on notice as of that date that the Director
personally opposed any involvement by the.CIA in an assas-
sination?

* "Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 140

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and
the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was
to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was
going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but
to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the
United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,
p. 62). MeCone testified:

"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-
pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning
Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all
the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to
encourage more support throughout the country. My precise
words to the President, and I remember them very clearly,
was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball
team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether
he was a good pitcher or not.. By that I was ‘saying that,
if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we
would have a succession of coups and political disorder
in Vietnam and it might: last several years and indeed

it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go
‘or use our influences not to". . He left the meeting believing
that tthe President, agreed with his “hands off" recommendation

(McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:

"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to

ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone
instructions, aS we cannot be in position actively con-
doning such course of action and thereby engaging our oo
responsibility therefore” (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

"Aetion taken as Girected. In addition, since DCM
‘“Trueheart was also present when original recommendation .
was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's
{ . instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador
7 Lodge conmented that he shares MeCone" s opinion. (Saigon
to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 141

-~10-

Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals ,*
testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the
assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20
(Conein, p. 35). -Conein testified (but did not so indicate in
his detailed After-Actiou Report) that he then told General Don
that the United States opposed assassination, and that the
General responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk
about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).

The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his
ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3)
informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending
aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda
raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under
Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217).

On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did
not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American
“requests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219).

On October 28... Conein met with-General Don, who had

received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United

States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup

* Conein described his role as follows:

"My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and

the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who
‘were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals who

were planning the coup, to get as much information so ~

that our government would not be caught with their pants
Le down" (Conein, pp. 38-39).

HW O50955 0 Docld:32423525 Page 142

-ll-

available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place,
and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the
United States on October 31. (1.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers,
p. 219.)

“ On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was
powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely

in Vietnamese hands. General-Harkins disagreed and cabled his
opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers,

p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed
White House concern and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclu-
sion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup”
(Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that
same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with

the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it

would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolve-
ment and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers,

p. 220.) .

Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved
in the coup began‘to deploy around-Saigon. “The Embassy was
given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV
cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to
Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint
General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters
(Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given

to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 143

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to those killed in the coup (Conein, 6/20, p. 72).*

Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during
most of the coup (I.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the
Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed
him and. Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15).
The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30 p.m.
the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the
resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired
about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the
United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern
for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).

According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and
Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be
bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him
and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in
on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh
offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later,
telling him that if he refused he would be “blasted off of the

_ earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched
on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report,
pp. 17-18.) |

At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General

* CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup
leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). On October 29,
Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated”.
(Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63).
Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe
in his house.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 144

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Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to -
surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport.
Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally
and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According
to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace
at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-
Action Report, p. 24).

At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to
be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined
‘to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage
United States interests (Conein, p. 57). —

The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.*

; * Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel
from the palace and.fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He
opined that an informant must have identified them and called the

' General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23)
Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace

' the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at
the church at 8:00 on the morning. of November 2. Ten minutes
later-they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army
vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told
Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein
doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives ina
church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report: states
that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown.
reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem
and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their
backs (1.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and
Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint
General Staff headquarters.

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 145 ene

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None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or

indirect involvement of the United States.*

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge
notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders
for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation
(Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged
with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the
morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked: Conein to procure an
aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting
Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not
be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,
since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified
that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country
that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in

any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail-
able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country

of asylum (Conein, p. 54)._

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 146

SE mm re ne ees ee em Nt Meee ete | teenie: eee “aie fe. coven genonematndntasin

wn Hy

ee TABLE OF CONTENTS

IV. Findings and Conclusions .

~ A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves .

Ll.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. . .35
The United States Should Not Engage

HW 50955 Docld:32423525

Officials of the United States
Government Initiated Plots to
Assassinate Fidel Castro an
Patrice Lumumba

No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As
A Result of Assassination Plots
Initiated by Officials of the
United States ....... .
American Officials Encouraged or

Were Privy to. Coup Plots Which
Resulted in the Death of Trujtt io.

Diem, and Schneider

The Plots Occurred in a Cold War

‘Atmosphere Perceived to be o

Crisis Proportions .

American Officials Had Exaggerated
Notions About Their Ability to
Control the Actions: of Coup Leaders

CIA Officials Made Use of Known Under-

world Figures in Assassination
Efforts ....... 0... ,

in Assassination .

a. Distinction Between Targeted

_Assassinations Instigated by
the United States and Support
For Dissidents Seeking to

Overthrow Local Governments.

b. The Setting In Which the Assas-

sination Plots Occurred Explains,

But Does Not Justify Them

Page 147

3A

iii

7
ar ats
a
aS

— Co rt a, FUN CRORE

. ty é

Ptwide i

(a) Agency. Officials Failed On
Several Occasions to Reveal

The Plots To Their Superiors
Or To Do So With Sufficient

Detail and Clarity oboe ee, 27

- Castro 2... 27

Trujillo... 2. 34

Schneider... .... Soe ee ek 36

Feat

‘doe:

Lae

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials

Gave Vague Instructions to Sub-
ordinates and Failed to Make sufficiently

Clear That Assassination Should Be ‘

Excluded From Consideration. ... . . 37
Schneider .. 7. 1.) cy:
Lumumba...) . 8g
‘Castro a 39

6. Practices Current at the Time in Which
the Assassination Plots Occurred Were

Revealed by the Record to Create the
sae Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and
irresponsibility in the Very Aréas Where
Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most
Necessary 2. 0 DD st—“ststSCSti‘i‘ CS 46

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending
. &7

the Doctrine of Plausible Denial ~
wa IE OF FP dausioie Denial

(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" .

and "Euphemism™ . > 7 C«wSsSCsstSSS*~SC . 43
(e) The Danger of Generalized Instructions. 49
(da) The Danger of "Floating Authorization". 50

“4 (e) The Problems Connected With Creating

New Covert Capabilities ,

50

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 148

Approved, Drafting Subcommittee,
10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open
to possible reconsideration)

IV. Findings and Conclusions
In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and
conclusions, the Committee. has been guided by the following
standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to
the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.
1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is
not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather
to draw upon the éxperiences of the past to better propose
‘guidance for the future. |
2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching: conclusions
because of the amount of time that has passed since the events
reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and
many other key figures to speak for themselves, ‘the conflicting
and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems
ae in assessing the weight to be given 'to particular documents |
and testimony.
3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons
involved in the events under examination while at the same
- time respofiding to a need to understand the’ facts in sufficient
detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.
With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at

the following findings and conclusions.

ae

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 149

Nee

vatit, # fl

A. Findings Concerning the Plots. Themselves

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated.
waticiars of the Vnited states Government Initiated

Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba

The Committee finds that officials of the United States
Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate
Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.

The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in-the latter half
of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quick-
ly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be
used for the assassination.

The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued
until 1965.. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars,
exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not
advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving under-

ban world figures reached the stage of producing poison pills,
establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba,
procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one’
witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. .In the
1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode
from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement
‘to Cubans whose ‘intent to assassinate Castro was known, and

provided the means for carrying out the assassination.

ae

es

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 150

phe ay ~3-
Jie BR
wh hey

g
oi

° 2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assas-
_Sination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United

States

The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba

were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that

the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death
at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assas-

sinate Castro failed.

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to
Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo,
Diem, and Schneider . ,
American officials clearly desired the overthrow of
Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissi-
dents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols
“7 and rifles. .
. American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese
generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and.a CIA official in
Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun.
‘However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested
by officials of the United States.
The record reveals that the United States officials
offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted
_ the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire
or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that

=

the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 151

~3A-

POEMS re ; TT pre omy
71 en
hag Lisa f

As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of
a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In
the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in
varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in
the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the
contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President
‘Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the
United States’ Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White
House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap
General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed,
although the possibility of his death should have been recognized ©

as a.forseeable risk of his kidnapping.

4, The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmos here Perceived
mL _ to be of Crisis Proportions

The Committee. fully appreciates the importance of
evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context
‘within which they_occurred. In the preface to this report, we
described the perception, generally shared within the United
States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country
faced a monolithic enemy.in Communism. That, attitude helps
explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed,
although it. does not justify them. Those involved. neverthe-
less appeared to believe they were advancing the best inter-

ests of their country.

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 152

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About
‘Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

Running throughout the cases considered in this report
was. the expectation of American officials that they could
control the actions of dissident groups which they were support-
ing in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United
States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated
by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam.
Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he
was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated
that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay

or discourage, a coup." The coup took place three days later.

Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA
_ headquarters. requested operatives in the Dominican Republic
to tell the dissidents to “turn off" the assassination attempt,
. because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the
aftermath." “The dissidents replied that. the assassination

was their. affair and that it could: not be turned off to suit

the convenience of the United States Government.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 153

-5-

6. CIA Officiais Made Use of Known Underworld Figures

in Assassination Efforts
Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated
with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the
assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were
relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and
contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.
Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used
by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the
development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign
national with a criminal. background was used to "spot" other
members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA
for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need
should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal back-
a grounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a
volatile political situation in the Congo.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. The United. States Should Not..Engage. in Assassination’.

We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool
of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the
use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with
extensive-.experience in covert operations, we find that assas-

sination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 154

In addition to considerations, there were several
‘practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign
leaders. These ‘reasons are discussed in the section of
this report recommending a Statute making assassination

a crime.

a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations
Instigated by the United States and Support

for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local
Governments
Two of the five principal cases investigated
by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders
(Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American
officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider)
ae invoived killings in the course of coup attempts by local
| dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to
which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the
coups and the degree to which United States officials
- motivated’ the coups. | oo
The. Committee concludes that targeted’ assassinations

instigated by the United States must be prohibited.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 155

Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination.
The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises
questions concerning the propriety of United States involve-
ment in coups, particularly in those where the assassination
of.a foreign leader is a likely prospect.
This country was created by violent revolt against a
regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers.
(the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign
“countries. Given that history, we should not today rule
out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants.
But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious
questions: for example, whether the national interest of
the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such
support should be overt rather. than covert; what tactics
a should be used; and how such actions should be authorized
and controlled by the coordinate branches of government .
The Committee, believes that its recommendation on ‘the question
of covert.actions--in support of coups must await the Committee's
final report which will be issued after a full review of

covert action in general.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 156—

b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots

Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them

‘The Cold War setting in which the assassination
plots took place does not change our view that assassination
is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and
practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal
defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justifi-
ed the assassination plots:

-First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by
imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied,
Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then
only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Castro's
assassination had been planned by the CIA long before that
crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible
course of action during the crisis.

Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United
States should justify its actions by the standards of totali-
tarians. _Our standards must be higher, and this difference is

. what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our
democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining

the very virtues we are defending.

ae

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 157

Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee
graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to.
tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very
ideals we must defend.

“The first was written in 1954 by a special committee form-
ed to advise the President on covert activities. . The United
States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than
[those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from
hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing
American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."*

Although those proposals did not involve assassinations,
“the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified,
indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots

were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)

* The full text of the passage is as follows:

. another important requirement is an aggressive
covert psychological, political, and paramilitary

' organization far more effective, more unique, and,
if necessary, more ruthless than that. employed by the
enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the
way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplish-
ment of this mission. - _—_

The second consideration, it is now clear that we
are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective
is world domination by whatever means at whatever
cost. There are no rules in such a game, Hitherto
acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If
the U. S. is to survive, long standing American con-
cepts of American fair play must be reconsidered.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 158

We do not think that traditional American notions of
fdir play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries.
It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt

tactics “more ruthless than the enemy".

A second document which represents an attitude which we
_ find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when
the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The

chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a_particular agent -- -

WLIROGUE -- because

He is indeed aware of the precepts of right
and wrong, but if he is given an assignment
_which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the
- world, but necessary because his case officer
ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, —e
and he will dutifully undertake appropriate
action for its execution without pangs of con-
science. In a word, he can rationalize all
actions. (Memo dated / /60; Bissell Tr.,
6/11/75, p. ) - ;

The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the

\
. t
ideals of our nation. \

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld
Figures for Their Criminal Talents
We conclude that agencies of the United States must not
use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying

out their operations. In addition.to the corrosive effect

*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and
other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals
as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons
known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their
expertise in carrying out criminal acts.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 159 .

upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involves
the following dangers:

: a, The use of underworld figures for "dirty business"
gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid
prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the
figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used
their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution. . The CIA
also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against .
QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.

db. The use of persons experienced in criminal tech- o
niques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood
_that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are neces- mer
sarily given broad discretion, But the risk of improper
activities is increased when persons of criminal background

are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take

advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.

*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is \
graphically demonstrated by the. fact. that Attorney General Robert ©
Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fight-
ing organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating
with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had.
made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.

In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the
operation had involved assassination, he did, according to
a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld o
figures should not be used before checking with him first,
but failed to direct that they must never be so used.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 160.

~ 12 -

c. ‘There is the danger that the United States Govern-
ment will’ beconie an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and
, that criminal figures will take advantage. of their associa-
tion with the government to advance their own projects and
interests. -

d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting

persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the
laws of our society forbid. . _
The use of underworld figures by the United States Govern-

ment for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable

to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context

five decades ago: , ss

Our government is the potent, the omnipresent
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example. Crime is con-
tagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it in- |
_vites every man to become a law unto himself.
To declare that in the administration of the
criminal law the end justifies the means --
‘to declare that the Government may commit
crimes in order to secure the conviction of’
the private criminal -- would bring terrible
retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine
this Court should resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S; 439, 485 (1927)

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- 13 -

C.. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authori-

zation and Control

In the introduction to this report, we set forth in

on

summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the
assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion

elaborates and explains those conclusions.

The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for

the assassination activities from two perspectives. First,

‘the Committee examined wh ther officials in 1 policymaking ;  -

positions authorized or were aware of the assassination

activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the aad
officials responsible for the operational details of the

plots perceived that assassination had the approval of

their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that

their superiors would not disapprove.

‘No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes
discussed in this report were authorized at the highest

levels of the government. |. But the record leaves serious

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 162°

-14-

doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by
the Administrations. Even if the plots were not expressly
authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel

ae

believed they were acting improperly.

“1. The Command and Control System for Assassina-

tions Was Such That the Plots Could Have

Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization 7

As emphasized throughout this report, we are
unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility
for the assassination plots. Even after our long investiga-
tion, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive _
state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible
denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were
in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization
which made it possible for assassination efforts to have
been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government
without express authority from officials outside of those
agencies.
| ‘Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have
been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government

without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was

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explicit authorization from the highest level. The command
and control system revealed by the record made it possible for
the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without
express authorization by officials outside the Agency.
The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates
the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise
level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While
there is no evidence that -the “plausible denial" system has
succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases. considered
in this report, the possibility that: a system exists which
might permit those responsible. for authorizing major operations
to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government
requires that public officials be held accountable for their
‘decisions.
2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were
Authorized _
a. Diem
We find that neither the President nor any other
official in the United States Government authorized the assas-
-sination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top
State Department officials did know, however, that the death
of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup

leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup

leaders were considering assassination was brought to the

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 164.

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attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States
would have no part in.such activity, and this information
was relayed to the coup leaders. . |
b. Schneider

We find that neither the President nor any other
official in the United States Government authorized the assas-
sination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the
White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnap-
ping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.

_ Trujillo
The Presidents: and other senior officials in
’ the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow
of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain ‘that end.
The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-.

American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended
to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents’
intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of
the government responsible for formulating policy is less
clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961
senior American officials, including the President, learned
that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that
they desired machine guns for that purpose. Thd Special Group

disapproved passage of those weapons’ and the President himself,

in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 165

Be wi
United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone
assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded,
the United States would support the plotters.
d. Lumumba ,

The chain of events revealed by the documents and
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.

It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.
The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"
Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC
and Special. Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo,
Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority",
and the delivery of. poison to the Congo can be read to support
an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
— the assassination of Lumumba. |
| Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President
to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,
as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization
7 which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record
of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of
others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's
national security. advisors. The fact that both the Chief of
‘Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was
Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

HW 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 166

-L7A-

WbS t
yb CONDE SS
cat Lod

this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings
with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of
Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles’ statements
about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed
that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,
but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when
this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and
DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the pilot to assassinate
‘Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that
President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination

effort against Lumumsa because of the lack of absolute certainty

in the evidence.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 167

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Sn - 4 -18-
Cy Sage bd a eereras res)

e. Castro
‘There was no evidence from which the Committee

could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson,
their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the
assassination of Castro. |

We find that the effort against Castro was clearly autho-

rized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether
Allen Dulles knew about ‘the plots, although Bissell and
Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility
of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew
about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and
attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find
no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred
during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified- that

' he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never
expressly authorized by. anyone to assassinate Castro.

The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization
for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion
that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents
Eisenhower: and Kennedy after the assassination had been plan- .

. ned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion

are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 168

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First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a
matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles
went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action

“which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than
Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of
plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third,
it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand
from a “circumlocutious'’ description that assassination was
being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the
Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents. who are not
able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent
with Bissell’s other testimony that "formal and explicit”
approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary

an to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men

closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

* If the evidence‘concerning President Eisenhower's order
to assassinate Lumumba is. correct, it should be weighed against
Bissell's testimony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the
Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would
‘imply that President-Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba
example indicates that the President would discuss such matters
openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be |
approached.privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's
testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
teld Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have
told anyone elsé of _that fact. _Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the.
Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential autho- |
rization for assassination by Bissell; who in turn assumed he
was told by Dulles. a , ,

Fooat

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 169

wid ish Bb
PY BE ae &

am BO OX: eae a ¥.
GE ei ie ‘
Be ; ~20-

Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under
which they served never asked them to consider assassination.
There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson

knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his

Presidency.

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Opera-

tions Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permis-

sible Course of Action
The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination
‘ attempts testified that they had believed that their activities
had been fully authorized.*

In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation,

Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection
of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and
Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have
flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in
the Agency.

In the case of the assassination effort against Castro,
Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the
operation involving underworld figures had been authorized
by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been

se

initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the

* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the «
AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since
they had clear orders from their immediate superiors.

ree,

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 170 ~

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plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level
within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal
knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times,
exact words, or channels through which such authority may
have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard
Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized _
"from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the
plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms
testified that although he had never discussed assassination
with his superiors, he believed: |

tt

that in these actions we were taking against
Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba,

.that they were what we had been asked to do. ... In
other words we had been asked to. get rid of Castro.
and . . . there were no limitations put on the means,

and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines

that we understood to be in play at this particular

time. . .

The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency
officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have
been within the parameters of permissible action, but Adminis-

_ tration officials-(including McCone)~responsible for formulat-
‘ing policy were not aware.of the effort and did not authorize
it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning
overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that
were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible

for carrying out those orders.

The various Presidents and their senior advisors

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 171

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strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the
accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence

of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those
foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example,
President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming
power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's
baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day."
Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort
against Cuba as "a combat situation", and Attorney General
Kennedy emphasized that “a solution to the Cuban problem
today carries top priority". Helms testified that the
pressure to "get rid of [Castro and the Castro regime]"' was
intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ‘ordered to.
“get off your ass about Cuba".

It is possible that there was a failure of communica-
“tion. between policymakers and the agency personnel who were
experienced in ‘secret, and often Violent, action. Although
policymakers testified that assassination was not intended
by such words as “get rid of Castro", some of their sub-
ordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that
assassination was desired and that they should proceed with-
out troubVing their superiors. .

The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations

appropriately observed:

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 172

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The point is that of frequent resort to synechdoche --
the mention of a part when the whole is to be under-
stood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated
references to phrases such as “disposing of Castro",
which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assas--
‘sinating him, when it is intended that. it be read in
the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro
regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking
vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is
clear that what they have specifically in mind is
killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking

may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or
may not have said what they actually meant, they should
“not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted
differently than was intended.

Differing perceptions between ‘superiors and their sub-
ordinates were graphically illustrated in the’ Castro context. *
MeCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as
follows:

Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in
oy terms such as “dispose of Castro", "remove Castro",
af "knock off Castro", ete., and this meant the overthrow
- of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing
a of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the
: above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the
record, ete., and, as.stated, all. refer to a change in
the Cuban government.

* "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history.
~- When Thomas A'Béckett was proving to be an annoyance, as
Castro, the King said, ‘who will rid me of this turbulent
‘priest?'. He didn’t say, ‘go out and murder him’. He said,
‘who’ will rid me of this man', and let it go at that.

Jf,
“Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.

“Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations
and the centuries?

"Mr. Helms: I’ think it’does, sir.

"Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind OF
thing which might be said, which might be taken by the

vm
C

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 173

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Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator,
gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpret-
ing them as conveying authority for assassination.

Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit
authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of
Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe
the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as pro-
viding authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified,

‘the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende

from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove
the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my
mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when

I was Director.”

Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected

to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis

that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from

“the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified
that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval"

would be required for assassination; and McManus testified

director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to
_ go forward?

“Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I
realize that one sort of grows up in.tradition of the time
and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult
to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I
just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to =
keep those things out of the oval office.

HY 50955 DocId:32423525 Page 174

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that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of
the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing
assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted
from their different backgrounds and training. Neither
Bissell (an academician wnose Agency career for the six years
before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor
McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work)
were experienced in covert operations .*

The perception of certain Agency officials that assas-

sination was within the range of permissible activity was

reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions
against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level

and by the failure ‘of the successive administrations. to make
‘clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is

*~ one of the subjects considered in the next section.

* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In
the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were
Administration officials with no covert operation experience,
construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while
other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret

'. them. ”

os

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 175

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4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials
In 1» Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors
In The Agency And In The Administration Was. Due To:

(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The
Operations To Their Superiors; and

(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Frecise Orders

Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make

Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of
Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions
Sanctioned by the Administrations.

While we cannot find that officials responsible for
making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassina~
-tion attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case) ,
Agency operatives at- least through the level of DDP neverthe-
less perceived assassination to have been permissible: This
failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity
“> -of assassination. The Committee finds ‘that the failure of
Agency officials to inform their superiors | was reprehensible,
and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected
to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee
further finds that Administration officials failed to be
sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and

that theix attitude toward the possibility of assassination

was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities

r

oe

that they did authorize.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 176

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CE BRRPA ANET ap

te
af Sen
sy

S . (a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal
The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient
Detail and Clarity

_Several of the cases considered in this report raise
questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently
informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the
‘Agency about their activities.

Castro
The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors
of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly
troubling.
Richard Bissell testified that he and Sheffield Edwards
told Allen Dulles only “circumlocutiously" and only after
- the project had begun about the operation which used members
of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP,
Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the opera-
‘tion with John MeCone or any officials outside the CIA. The
two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards
and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the
operation with McCone or any Government official above. the
level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about |
the operation, and that’ Dulles never briefed him on its
existence, On the basis of the testimony and documentary

evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain. whether Dulles

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 177

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was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld
operation, and virtually certain that it continued into
McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge
or approval.

“on the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity
to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against.
Castro, he either failed to inform them or misled them.

Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and
Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld
figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then
only after contact had been made with the underworld and a

price had been offered for Castro's death.

Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue
of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or
a Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under
Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had no
duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Adminis -
tration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have
: circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy
.about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was
inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible

_for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they

might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 176

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himself had not been straight~-forwardly told about the operation.*
The failure to either inform those officials or to make -
certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly
reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions
on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to
do’ so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Adminis-
tration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development
of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action.
But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt
was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board
of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the |

Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did

‘not inform .the Commission of the assassination operation. As

chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations

and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in

the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban.

operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not
tell them that the~CIA had undertaken-an effort to assassinate

Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the

* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles
understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for
Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further,
even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the
Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell
"guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had.
been planned and was being attempted". ;

HW 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 179

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effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and Presi-
dent Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert
action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the
assassination operation that was underway.

The failures to make forthright disclosures to policy-
makers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP.
Helms": failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation
when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were
sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses
are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was
told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had
terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who
had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had
not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney

‘General that the operation was still active when he learned
that the Attorney General had been’ misled. Helms did not
inform MeCone of the plot until August 1962, and did so then
in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated
before MeCone became Director. ‘Helms' denial that AM/LASH:
had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to
Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified,
"not truthful". | |

When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro pilots,
‘he apparently described the activities that had occurred during

ae

prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH ‘opera-

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 160

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tion which. had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to
inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise
question was not asked. |

Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the
assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration
officials because he had assumed that the project had been
previously authorized, and that the aggressive character of
the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime
made assassination permissible even in the absence of an
express instruction. He added that he had never been convinced
that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told
McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go
anyplace". :

Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about

aa the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, ‘many of: them
were reasons why he should have sought express authority.

“As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order
of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by
intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency ;' had emphasized
on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse
than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented
required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be sub-
mitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration

was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about

‘Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have ™

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 181

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undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and
equivocal permission.

‘William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt
using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that
he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the
Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been
fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was
uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because
he believed that it was Helms", not his, duty to inform higher

authorities.

Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions
on which it was incumbent on ‘Harvey to have disclosed the
assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch
of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey
reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special Group
Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known that
‘covert. operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both
by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular.

operations be submitted in “nauseating detail". Yet Harvey

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 162

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did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group
Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was
explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor,
and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April
1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the
’ August 1962 meeting and McGone voiced his disapproval.
The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not
having informed those responsible for formulating policy
about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading,
and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as
too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while
others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey
testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the
underworld opération in April 1962, because it was not
sufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it in
August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate
it. On: other occasions, officials thought disclosure was
someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was
up to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helms —
_remarked that Harvey “kept Phase II pretty much in his back

‘pocket".

Paaiti

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 1863

ons

ef ~34-

The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to
inform policymakers of the assassination effort against
Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that
it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a
sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how
grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the
- operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to
accurately inform his superiors.
Trujillo |
In the Trujillo case there were several instances in
which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient
information, or were not informed in a-timely fashion.
‘At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a
plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups
and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring
down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo
-himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group
‘authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and
other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions.
At this time; the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating
the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department
at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCL.

Yet the memorandum supplied to. Under Secretary Merchant, which

ae

a

HW 50955 Doeld:32423525 Page 184

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was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group
agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention
assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of -"sabotage potential"
and stated that there “would be no thought of toppling the
[governmerit] by any such minor. measure [as the supplying of
small arms]."” |
On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum
_on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew
that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo,- but his
memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that
the dissidents’: "plan of action" included arms for 300 men.
Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a
non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.
The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA head-
“7. quarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently
: “unaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of the
.machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA. |
The State Department official from whom the CIA sought
permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross |
examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was
assassination. ‘The CIA official then agreed the United States

should have nothing to do with assassination plots “anywhere,

a

anytime", even though the previous day he and Bisséll had signed
a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for

use in connection with a planned assassination. - -

cos
\

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 165

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Schneider

The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were
contrary to those of the Administration. [It is clear that Presi-
dent-Nixon desired to prevent Allende -from.assuming office, even
if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile.- Nor
did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (includ- -
ing as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have
been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed

.is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given
an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of suc-
cess, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics.
The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after Octo-
ber 15 there is some doubt.

The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-
October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one
hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least. one White
“House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of
General Schneider en October 22. However, the absence of any sub-
stantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such
memoranda describing contacts with the White House between Septem-

ber 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communi-—

“cation on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful super-

vision on the part of the White House.

HW 50955 DoclId:324273525 Page 186

-37-

The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a
view that action which the Committee believes called for
top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as
permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis
of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming
power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to
military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers
without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of
the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action
of the junior officers. But it. necessarily establishes that
there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the
passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude
within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax.
‘Further, this case demonstratedthe problems inherent in giving

aa - an agency a “blank. check" to engage in covert operations
without specifying which actions: are and: are not permissible,
and without adequately supervising and monitoring these

activities once begun. -

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague
Instructions to Subordinates and Failed-to Make Sufficiently

Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.

While-we cannot find that high Administration officials
expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have

_ noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived

HW 50955 Docld:32423595 Page 187°

~38-

assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials
were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their
activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving
vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassina-
tion. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued
until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued
by Director Helms.

Schneider

As explained above, there is no evidence that assassina-
tion was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presi-
dential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The
Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte.
blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case
may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of
General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing
an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably
‘short time. Apart from the question of whether any inter-
vention was justified under the circumstances of this case,
the committee believes that the Executive in any event should —

have defined the limits of permissible action.

Lumumba

Weare unable to make a finding that President
Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination
effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute

certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 188

-39-

strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and
NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings,
led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The
minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of"
Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity
for straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out any
activity that might contribute to “getting rid of" Lumumba.
The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an
atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy
Administration officials. to discredit and overthrow the Castro
regime. Richard Helms recalled that:
"T remember vividly [that the pressure] was very
intense. And therefore, when you go into the record,
you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty
schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure.
fon “And we were quite frustrated."
Bissell recalled that:
"During that entire period, the administration was
extremely sensitive. about the defeat that had, been
afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of
Pigs,. and were pursuing every possible means of
getting rid of Castro."
Another. witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in
the Fall of 1961 Bissell was
“chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by
both ‘the President and the Attorney General. for, as he
put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about”

getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime."

General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 1869

-4Q-

Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have

been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara

confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time
of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter"...

Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved

contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation |
which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary

onslaught that had the approval of the highest government
officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney
General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Aug-
“mented that “a solution to the Cuban problem today carried

top priority. .. no time, money, effort--or manpower is

to be spared."* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved
propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a

a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that
were considered by the top policymakers included incapacita-

'. ting sugat workers during harvest season by the use of
chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging
merchandise in third countries--even those allied with
the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming

insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging

ma

* The Attorney General himself took a personal interest
in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba,
“on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits
and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles
active in the covert war against the Castro government.

-”

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 190

-41-

of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit
‘and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines,
and harbors.

Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might
well. have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials
that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to
overthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting in
November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether

any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action"
against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied
that such a capability did not exist, but might well have
‘left the meeting with the impression that assassination was
not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which

was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed

ao at inducing “open revolt and overthrow of the Communist
: regime", and included in the final phase an "attack on the
. cadre of the regime, including key leaders”. The proposal
stated that "this shouldbe a ‘Special Target" operation
Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential

tt

against police. Several minutes from Special Group
meetings contain language such as. "possible removal of
Castro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposal
was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was
not ruled out. .

On several occasions, the subject of assassination was q

HW 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 191

~42-

discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials.
While those officials never consented to actual assassina-
tion efforts, they.also failed to indicate that assassination
was impermissible as a matter of principle.

In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA
project described as the development of a capability to
assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection ‘and, according to
Bissell, may. have been more affirmative. Although Bissell
stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy 's
remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then
underway, the fact that he believed that the development
of an assassination capability had been approved by the White
House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have
contributed to the general perception that assassination was
not prohibited. |

Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General

” Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate
Castro. prior to the Bay. of Pigs. According to the CIA

officials present at ‘the briefing, the Attorney General

* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President,
had an obligation to tell. the President of such a grave.
Matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability
to assassinate. His failure to do.so was a serious error:

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 192

-43-

indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation

on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no
evidence that the Attorney General told the CEA that it must
not-engage in assassination plots.

At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August
1962, well after the assassination efforts were ‘underway ,
Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of
whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored,
and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning
the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans. for the
assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified
that he had immediately made it clear that assassination
was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony

. and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that
Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had
objected to the use of assassination, or whethex he-was only

concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any

* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy,
learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld.
figures in.an operation against Cuba. The documentary record
further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that
the operation had involved assassination efforts until May

of 1962, and that the operation was then described-to him

- as having--been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence
that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the
operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it

had not infact been terminated. While it is curious that
the Attorney General would not have inquired further into

the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam -
Gianeana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that
he did.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 193

~44-

“event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order
banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.

One of the. programs forwarded to General Lansdale by
the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled
“Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba
offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders.
“Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that
persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assas-
sination might be permissible.

While the ambivalence of Administration officials does
not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or
justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it dis-
played an insufficient concern about assassination which
may have contributed to the perception that assassination
was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's
general objectives.

With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by
the Special Group. Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose,
precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring
prior permission for the details of other proposed covert
operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assas-
sination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order
in 1972. “In light of the number of times in which the
subject of assassination arose, Administration officials

were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity. -

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 194

~45-

The Committee notes that many of the occasions on
which CIA officials should have informed their superiors
of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did
so ina misleading manner, were also occasions on which
Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced
the perceszion that assassination was permissible.

For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an
executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that
an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy

failed to rule out -assassination as a tactic.

In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told
about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of .Pigs,
an ‘but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney
: General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.
When a senior: administration official raiged the question

of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group

meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed,

but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should

also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had ex-

hibited strong aversion to assassination.

<2

HY 50955 Docld: 32423525 Page 195

HY 50955

WN 3 ~46-
6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assas-
Fc te I EE LE DE ASS AST

sination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to
Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness’,, and Irresponsibility

in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was
Most Necessary.

Various witnesses described elements of the system
within which the assassination plots were conceived. The
Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the
most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels
of Government with the least clarity. We find this dis-
turbing, and view the following concepts as particularly
dangerous :

(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial"
beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of
the United States from other countries to an effort to
shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsi-
bility for certain operations.

(2) The use of circumlocution | or euphemism to describe
serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings
ought to be made clear. —

(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert
action programs is. sufficient to justify specific actions

such as assassination or the passage of weapons.

Docld: 32423525 Page 196

DEAR

a TM
en

-4jJ-

(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to
be granted, by one director or one administration could be
presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming
the authority with successor officials.

~ (5) .The creation of capabilities without careful
review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that
such capabilities might be used without further authoriza-
tion. .

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine
of Plausible Denial” 7

The original concept of plausible denial envisioned
implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal
American involvement if the actions were exposed. The
doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It |
was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of

actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed,
The Committee's inquiry into assassination ‘and the public
disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the
United States resorted to cloak and “dagger tactics, its hand
was ultimately exposed. In addition, the likelihood of
reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers

, believe that their decisions will never be revealed.

Whatéver can be said in defense of the original pur-
pose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends. to conceal

U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of

ay
\

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 197

the Government is absurd. Any theory which, aS a matter

of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of

the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an

abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic

government.

(b) The Darigers oF Using "Circumlocution" and
‘Euphemism" | os ,
According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible

denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of cir-
cumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and

'- other senior officials.

Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity.

On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be
shielded: from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if
the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes
that senior officials must be told enough, by. way of double
talk, to grasp the subject. AS a consequence, the theory
fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the
risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should des-
eribe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank
language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand
no less. .

Euphemism may actually have been preferred-~-not because

a

HW 50955  Doclda:32423525 Page 198

-49-

of plausible denial--but because the persons involved

could not bring themselves to state in plain language what
they intended to do and may. have, in.some instances; assumed,
“rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not
want the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate,
murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak
or hear. They describe acts which should not even be pro-
posed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business

by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty
business being done.

(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of
general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende
from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs

ae responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases
the danger that subordinates may take steps which would
have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed.

A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally

use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for
embarrassing activities.

In either event, we find that the gap between the
general policy objectives and the specific actions under-

taken to achieve them was far too wide.

It is important that policymakers review the manner in

HW 50955 Doecld:32423525 Page 199

-50-

which their directives are implemented, particularly when
the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from
public scrutiny.
(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"
One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William
Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of under-
world figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion
that the project had already been approved by McCone's
predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was
unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more
advanced stage.
Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo
case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration
were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961,
ae at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.
| The idea that authority might continue from one adminis-
. tration or director to the next and that there is no duty
to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible
decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ.
New officials should be given the opportunity to review

significant programs.

(e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert
‘Capabilities

The development of a new capability raises numerous
problems. Having a capability. to engage in certain covert “*

‘

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 200

-51-

activity increases the probability that it will occur,
since the capability represents a tool that is available
for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a
capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use
without need for obtaining explicit authorization.

Of course, an assassination capability should never

have been created in the first place.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 201

Approved by

Drafting .
, ; Subcommittee
otis uo oo 10/8/75
Se ; . (with possible reservation
“iy VV. RECOMMENDATIONS as to language of statute)

During our long investigation of. assassination, a number of vital issues’
came into sharp focus.”

Above all, stood the question of: assassination. Our recommendations on

other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and_

am

‘our final report.’ But we need no more information to convince us that a‘flat
ban against assassination should be written into law. . ~
We condemn assassination. and reject it as an instrument of American

policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making it a crime to assas~

. sinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons
set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute mak-- -
ing it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to_

do so.

. : . ed

A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassina-

tion. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by
the Administration.
President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to
deal with the assassination issue, stated: .
I am opposed to political assassination. This administration
has. not and will not use such means. as instruments of national

policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly
Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. -24, p. 611.

The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced
it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society,
most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President
Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we
would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4) |

The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically

that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:

HW 50955 Docld:32493525 Page 202

With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I
just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it
7 very clear ‘to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)

Colby's predecéssor, Helms, although himself involved ‘in an- earlier plot,

‘said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and

we '

practical reasons:

As a result of my experiences through the years, when I be- '
came Director I had made up my mind that this: option...of
killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want
to happen on my watch. ‘My reasons for this were these:

There are not: only méral reasons but there-are also
', some other rather practical reasons. . -

It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep any-
thing like that secret.... Somebody. would go to a Con-
gressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, what~-
ever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alterna-
tive, it seems to me, in our society. ;

Then there is another consideration...if you are going
to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader,
then who is going to take his place! running that country,
and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice
when it is over than you were before? And I can give you TI :
think a very solid example of this which happened ‘in Vietnam
when President Diem was eliminated ‘from the scene. We then
had a revolving door of prime ministers: after that for quite.
some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government
at a time in its history when it should have been strong was
nothing but a caretaker government....In other
words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of
the United States, ;

...there is no sense in my sitting here with all the ex-
perience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my
feelings this day. It isn 't because I have lost my cool,
or because I have lost my-guts, it simply is because I don' ‘
think it is a viable option in the United States of America * chose
days. °

Chairman Church. Doesn't it also. follow, Mr. Uelmns -- I
— . agree with what you have said fully ~--but doesn't it
also follow on’ the practical side, apart from the moral side,
that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do,
they do very grave political damage to the United States in
the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians

NW 50955 Duca: 32425925 _ Page 207 — ~ ri


~ 3

involved themselves in

ing it concealed. Sincé we do like

Since. these secret

revelation will then do serious injury

reputation of the United States, ,
Would you agree with that?

Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.

prerogative to do so,

gative as weil,
invite with this kind -of action,

Mr. Helms.
Similarly,

because:

I didn't think it was

B.

said:

It has recently again been al
engages in assassination.
the case, and Agency policy has long

leged

political assassinations,
their system they at least have a better. prospect

John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations

Proper from the Standpoint of the U.S.
Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p. 15)

CIA Directives Bannin Assassination. “In 1972 and 1973, Helms and‘
ee ene Assassination ;

then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination.

As you are well aware,

but under :
of keep-- '

a free soctety and
S are going to come out’ in

due course, the
to the good name and

we

if we were to reserve to our-
inate foreign leaders,
ign governments who assume -

we .may in-

it is their prero~_

and that is another danger that we at least
wouldn't you agree? -

Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)

4

In his order, Helms

in the press that CIA
this is nor

*been clear on this issue.

To underline it, however,

I direct that no such activity or

operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our

personnel. ... (Memorandum,

Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)

Colby, in one of a, series of. orders in Augus

own review of prior "questionable activity," issued

t 1973 arising out of the Agency's

an order. which stated:”

CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or

Suggest to others that assassination be
to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)

HY 50955 Docldi32423525 Page 204

employed, (Memorandum, Colby

S

-4e-

C. The need. for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, these |
CIA ‘directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change,
and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a tempt~
ation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do
all that we can do to prevent their happening again, Laws express our society's.
values; they deter those who might’ be tempted and stiffen the will of those who |
want to resist. |

The statute we recommend, which is printed as am appendix to this report,
makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction: of the United a
States 1) té ‘conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a |
foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to assas~
_sinate a foreign ‘official.

Present law makes it a/crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign
official or foreign official guest while such.a person is in the United States. .

18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 117. However, there is no law which makes it ‘a crime
to assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official
‘while such official-is outside the United States. Our proposed Statute. is thus |
designed to close this gap in the law.

Subsection (a). of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed
within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the
United States. Subsection (b) is necessary to eliminate the loophoie which would
otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. ,
Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or |
to kill a foreign official outside the United States.

Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee

of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 205 ©

-5-

’ government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation.
to thewWJ.s. government: In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies °

W

within the United States, applies to "any other person, whether or not a + United

States citizen. Noneitizens who conspire within the United States to assassi~

“nate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction. of U.S. law.  sub-:
sections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply
to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or.

hot they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United States

of persons who are not U.S. citizens or-who do not hold a “position as a officer
or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such-
conduct takes place. 7 4

The term "foreign official” is defined in subjection (d) (2). The defini-
tion makes it clear ‘that the offense may be committed even though the official :
belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governaental
“political party. Our investigation -- as well as the reality of international |

, !
politics -- has shown ‘that. officials in such organizations are potential ‘targets
for assassination.*/ . . :

.The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such ‘persons because of their
official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus,
for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is
not politically motivated would not be. punishable under this statute.

‘The definition of official in section (4) (2) also provides that such per-

son must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the

United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have

*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the
time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no
official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.

HY 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 206 ~ : ee

~6-"

not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of

the War’ Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear ‘that, absent a decla-

,

ration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant :to the,

War Powers Resolution, the killing of. foreign officials is a criminal offense.

finsert discussion of paramilitary aspect/

kK KKK

In the course of our hearings. some witnesses, while strongly condemning

assassination, asked. whether, as a matter of theory, assassination should absolutely
be ruled out ina time ‘of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was woe
cited as’ an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not,

of that character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to ae
act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities

under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared,; the

Constitution “is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza~Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,

160 (1963).

Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented
power based on the need to preserve the nation:

-.-my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of

my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by

every indispensable means, that government -- that

nation -~ of which that Constitution was the organic law.

Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the
Constitution? By general,law life and limb must be pro- ‘
tected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life;

but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt °
that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become

lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of

the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation

«+e. The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X,
pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).

‘*/Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis’ ~~. the Cuban missile
crisis -- assassination was not even considered.

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Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional
‘ powers, it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional: system that these
powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power -
. of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a. President pur- j
suant to his limited inherent powers and in appatent conflict with the law
must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the ac-

tion truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to

the life of the Nation. °

As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary ‘actions to the Congress
for ratification: "In full view of .his great responsibility he has, so far,
done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment,
perform yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special -Session, July 4,

1861).

HW 50955 Docld:32423525 Page 208° ~~ ; -

Appr game by Drafting \,
Subcommittee on 9/9/75."

Pa

EPILOGUE

oe

‘We ‘4g not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the

given’.

4
4

‘aerican character. They do not reflect the ideals which have

e of this country and of. the world hope for a better; fuller, |.

We regard the assassination plots as aberrations -
Bee a Ee oO . an
; ce en adent . . re :
¥;:We must not adopt. the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important

Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that

“men free. But each time we do.so, each time the means we use-.are-wrong,

¥

our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.’

Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in:

