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CO unctasstrieo 0] SP omty [1] CONF“DENTIAL [1 SECRET

ao ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
FROM: “Norbert A. Shepanek eenson
0/SA/DO/0 ; “DATE
2D0109 1542 8 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.}

RECEIVED | FORWARDED

’

'. Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/0

3. Mr. William Wells
DDO
7E26 Has.

fom 610 “EG [] SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL [J [STERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED


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‘ : . DD/O_??. yoy |

8 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: A111 Divisions and Certain Staffs

FROM :. Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/0

SUBJECT — : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

1. Subject book was published in 1974 with 168
deleted items demanded by CIA and involved court
trial and decision. The lawyer for the authors has,
in effect, requested that a review be made of the
168 deleted items to determine which can now be
declassified and removed from the court's injunction,
particularly in view of the official disclosures
since the publication of the book. The Department of
Justice has advised that such a review is in order.

2. Since. the courts decided the 168 deleted
items were properly classifiable and classified in
accordance with the appropriate Executive Order in
effect: at the time of the initial classification,
including Executive Order 11652, the review at this
time must include two points:

(a) Is the item still classified under
Executive Order 11652,

(b) Has the item been placed in the public
domain by official disclosure by the United
States, such as by an official in the Executive
Branch authorized to declassify the item, or by
a report of a Congressional committee, or by.
the courts.

3. Each addressee is requested to appoint a
focal point officer to review each component's
respective items which are held by this office.

This office also has the DDO documentation submitted
in support of deleting each item in 1973. These can

‘be reviewed by each focal point official as necessary.

13-00000

A review will also be needed of those items which
may have been cleared or released by CIA when
reviewing manuscripts submitted by other authors

‘since the publication of the Marchetti book. A

few items will need to be referred by some of the
components to other departments and agencies of
government for their review.

4. Please advise this office of the name of

“your focal point officer by COB 11 April 1977.

e
Fendig

0/SA/DO/0.: SHalpern: (NAShepanekx1542)

Distribution

i DDO

- C/EA

- C/EUR

- C/LA ;
- C/FR : ,
- C/NE

- C/AF

C/SE

- C/DCD

- C/SIA info only
- c/PCSs '" t

- C/CI t tt

- SA/DO/0O

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- SUBJECT: Review of Deletions from Marchetti Book for Declassification -
Request for Documents.

1. In order to review the deletions from the Marchetti book, The
Cult of Intelligence, Mr. Halpern must determine if any official of the
U.S. Government placed any of the classified material in the public
domain in open testimony before a Congressional Committee, The following
material or information is required:

ae

Is there any index to public statements by senior government
officials on the subject of intelligence? Is there any index
to the Pike Committee or Church Committee testimony ?

Mr. Halpern would like to have copies of the open testimony
before a Congressional committee by senior officials of the

CIA;.

NSA,

State Dept,
Dept of Defense,
_ FBI,

which deals with intelligence.

Any open testimony before Congressional committees by senior
U.S. officials dealing with the cutoff of AID during the
Cyprus disturbances. ,

Any testimony (open) concerning American POWs (MIA) in Vietnam
and CIA's method of communication with them.

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Hussein on

Following the disclosure that Jordan’s .

King Hussein had for years taken seeret
payments from the CIA, NEWSWHEK’S

Arnaud de Borchgrave jlo to Amman’

‘last week for an exclusive interview feat :

the King. The result was what Hussein
called “my first and very last words” on
The Washington Post's relation of the
payments and their possible impact on
chances for peace in the Middle Bast.
Some excerpts:

‘DE BORCHGRAVE: How much truth is

there in. the story that appeared in The Wash-
ington Post? :

HUSSEIN: The whole thing is ridicu-
Jous and insulting. But Iam prepared to
answer questions about it, :

Q. Your government spokesman said the ©

story was a combination of “fabrication. and
distortion.” What has been fabricated and
what has been distorted? .
“A. What was fabricated in the story was
everything about funds handed over per-
sonally for private benefit. When friend-
ly Arab countries extend aid, it has been

traditional for the checks to be made out:

to, the Head of State; which then are
deposited ‘in the state hudget accotint.
This is not an uncommon practice. ‘All
assistance received by us is handled in
the same way. What is true is that fora
number of years, we have been offered
security and intelligence assistance
which the government of Jordan accept:
ed gratefully.
As for the story that the CIA paid for,
the protection of my children at school
in America, my request was made to the
State Department which kindly agreed
to ensure their security. Remember that
there have been many extremist plots
against me and ny family and this was a
perfectly nomnal request. If Amy Carter
decided to come to school in’ Jordan,

we would, needless to say, be responsi-

ble for her sectrity and would not be.
sending a bill to the U.S. Government
for an elementary courtesy and ‘security
measure.

Q. How do you feel about President Carter

ordering the arrangement—code-named “No .

Beef’ —stopped? .

A. We had, T promise you, never heard
anything about all this before. H the
reference is to the ‘a ance we have
been receiving for security and intelli-
gence, then I have not been advised
thout its suspension, either officially or
unofficially.

Q. The intelligence Oversight Board set up
in February 1976 reported to President Ford a

few months later that they regarded the pay- -

nents as improper and he did nothing about

't. What do you feel was improper about those
yayments?

' A What is a proper way lo support a
friend and ally is strictly your business.

Newsweel, March 7, 1977

La ae

/The subject never came up before and 1",

was totally unaware that this assistance
to Jordah had come into question last

-year, What is proper in some minds’ is’.

apparently improper i others. As far.
as:‘T am concerned, anything [can get -.
for Jordan: and my pénple is proper.

And five of your Presidents [Eisenhow- °

er, Kennedy,. lohuson, Nixon, Ford{’
thought so, too. fo -

Q. Since you say the assistance was proper |
and just another form of U.S. aid, why; then,
the secrecy‘and method of payment?

A. [f you mean the report that pay-
ments were made directly to the King.

‘and for his [personal] benefit and with

political conditions and obligations, this.

adly coinciden-
e made as the

oloc against us. It was!
\

: Hi iy « IA Mi : » tal that. these ‘attacks v :
: : is : oney ‘peace offensive was picking up steam

and on the very day that Secretary
Vance arrived in Amnon. It is obvious
to me that those who wish to sabotage
the peace process—and help Israel stay
put in the occupied territories—are

even willing to engage in character -

assassination of persons whose dearest
wish is for a just and durable peace.

Q. Who benefits?

‘+ AL Two quarters: One, in your own

country, that has been trying to under-
mine one of your key institutions. en-
gaged in a-worldwide struggle to try to-
neutralize the actions of the KGB in its
efforts to promote Communism. The oth-
er isa powerful group that is not interest-
ed ina settlement and which also-feels it
has'a score to settle with Jordan. Don't

Choice of targets: Jordan’s King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range

is & complete fabrication. The assistance
was designed. only to enhance our in-
telligence and security capabilitics
period. ; co,
' To us, the CIA is a part of the U.S.
Government. We have sought to acquire
know-how, equipmentand new capabili-
ties to defend ourselves in the face of a
worldwide battle, be it hot or cold, which
is still with us. And wherever there is an
‘identity of interests between our bywo'
comntrics, ] will Gontinue to advocate
fruitful and mutual cooperation.

Q. What do you feel was the principal
motivation of those [sources | who contribut-
ed to the Washington Post story? .

A. Yo undermine the credibility au
integrity of those who are able and
willing to contribute to the forces ol
peace: My people know me and 1 know
them and these attacks are futile in

_terms of the Jordanian scence, We are.

stronger than anything that can be lev-

Newsweek, March 7, 1977 _

forget it was the Isracti lobby that
launched the campaign to. block ‘the
Hawk anti-aircraft missile defense sys-
tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby
” failed.

Q. How much af a setback do you feel the
story has been to the peace-with-Israel
campaign?

A. T lervently hope. of course, that it
will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may

have a deleterious effect on or peace
efforts, but T plan to persevere regard-
less of attempts to sabotage a just and
durable peace.

Q. What, for example, do you feel the story

will do to your differences with the PLO and

_ attempts to form a joint delegation for the

.Geneva talks? Is. a joint delegation still a
realistic possibility? .

A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this

week and the whole question of a joint

delegation is still very much in question.

\
The d

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identity of interests between our byo’
countries, 1 will continue to advocate’

13- 00000

His CIA Money

a T he subject never came up before and 1

was totally unaware that this a ance
to Jordan had come into question Tast
year. What is proper in some minds: is
apparently improper in others. As far
as-T am concerned, anything I can gel
for Jordan and my people is proper

And five of your Presidénts [Eisenhow-’
Ford}

‘er, Kennedy,. Johnson, Nixon,
thought so, too, ., -

Q. Since you say the assistance was proper °
and just another form of U.S. aid, why, then,’

the secrecy-and method of payment?

A. [f you mean the report that pav-
meuts were made directly to the King
and ‘for his [personal] benefit and with

political conditions and obligations, this

cled against us. Tewas tcirdly coinciden-
tal that. these ‘attacks ve cre made as the
peace offensive was preking up steam
and on the very das that Secretary
Vance arrived in Amun. It is obvious
to me that those who wish to sabotage
the peace process—and help Israel stay
put in the occupied territories—are
even willing to engage in character
vassination of persons whose dearest
wish is for a just and durable peace.

Q. Who-henefits?
= AL Two quarters: One, in your own
country, that has been trying to under-
mine one of your key institutions .en-
gaged ina worldwide struggle to try to
neutralize the actions of the KGB in its
efforts to promote Communism. The oth-

erisa powerful group that is not interest
edina settlement and which also feels it
has-a score to settle with Jordan, Don't

Alexandra de

Choice of targets: Jordan’s King Hussein taking aim on the shooting range

is a complete fabrication. The assistance
was designed, only to ‘enhance our in-
telligence and security capabiliti is
period. .,
To us, the CIA is a part of the ULS.
Governments We have sought to Megan.
know-how, equipment and new capabili-

ties to defend ourselves in the: face ofa.

worldwide battle. be ithat or cold, which
is still with us. And wherever there is an

fruitful and mutual cooperation.

a. What do you feel was the principal
motivation of those [sources] who contribut-
ed to the Washington: Post story?

A. Pp ‘undermine the credibility’ ari!
integrity of these who are able’ aud.

willing to cc ontribute to ‘the forces it
peace: My people know me and TL kneke
them and these attacks are’ futile in

terms of the Jordanian scene. We are

stronger than anvthing that can be lev

Newsweek; March 7, 1977 |

forget it was the Israeli lobby that
launched the campaign to, block ‘the
Hawk. anti-aircraft missile defense sys-
tem to Jordan. Fortunately, the lobby
failed. :

Q. How much of a setback do you feel the
story has been to the psace-with- Israel
campaign?

A. I fervently hope, of course, that it
will not be a setback. Admittedly, it may

‘have a deleterious effect on our peace

efforts, but T plan to persevere regard-
less of attempts to sabotage a just and
durable peace.

a. What, for example, do you feel the story
will do to your differences with ihe PLO and
attempts to form a joint delegation for the

Geneva talks? Is. a joint delegation still a
realistic possibility?

A. A PLO delegation is in Amman this
week and the-whole. question of a joint
delegation is still very much in question.

/ Was dri

yofocne yee Ree ‘
y ‘ ) T STOR Ok AS
The dialogue (Arter Any’

ed hy the Jorda-
nian civil war'in INTC.

when tae PLO
‘a dat of Amman} has barely
begun. ‘To what degree political action
can be coordinated ian ong us is? some-
thing we will be expiosing aver the next
few mouths. And the x hole Arab. pasi-
tion on this problem + vet to crystallize.

Q. is it your impression that the PLO is now
ready to amend its basic charter and agree to
coexist peacefully with Israel in a West Bank-
Gaza state? |

A. ‘This is the clecision they must face.

But it is equally important to know what
the Esracli position will be. Why should
the PLO take such a step uiilatevally?
There must be a degree of simultane-
itv—tsrael recognizes a West Bank-Gaza
Palestinian state and the Palestinians
recognize Israel.

Q. Is it your intention to negotiate with the
PLO prior to Geneva a new organic link be-
tween a possible Palestinian state on the West
Bank and Jordan proper? :

“A. This has been suggested hy many
leaders in the area as a possible con-
structive development and we certain-
ly plan to explore the possibilities.
But I must caution vou against overopti-
mism. The resumption of the Geneva
conference by itself means nothing and
if it doesn’t produce quick results ..
then zthere will be the danger of a
letdown, of the pendulum swinging
back and the extremists coming to the
fore again.

-Q. How doyou think the latest CIA story will
affect relations between Jordan and the Unit-
ed States?

A. Throughout all these years I have

‘been very proud of the growing strength

of the relationship with our American
friends. We identified with principles
your forefathers held dear. We built

cour relations on the basis of mutual

respect, confidence and faith, and be-
yond that anything I did to cement
relations with the U.S. was based on-a
deep conviction about our common ob-
jectives—stability, peace. and progress
in.the Middle East.

My duty is to develop my country, its
hunian resources, armed forces and secu-
rity and iitelligence services, to face the
tremendous threats that lie ahead. The
road is strewn with mines to sabotage the
peace process. One has just exploded in
Washington. There will be others. But
bear in mind that Jordan is not unique in
receiving such help. Israel falls into the
same category and is a far greater exam-
ple of all kinds of assistance. As far as 1
Jun concerned, these will be ny first and
very last words ou that matter. My per-
sonal pride is a very touchy sebject. And
my main concern is to preserve Jordan in
freedom.

Finally, regarding your media attacks
against a branch of your government, if °
you choose to denude a vital arm that is
there to protect you, that is vour affair,
not Jordan’s.


13-00000
eT SECRET

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

FROM : M. L.. Latta
Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT :. Fairways Corporation

1. Per our ‘telephone conversation ‘today, attorneys
for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168
‘items previously deleted by court order from the book, —
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-
tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in .
this connection.

2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items
(107, 128, 129, 279, on pages 123, 132, 133, -and 403 respec-
tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on
all four items is that they are still classified, since they
describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an
operational support facility located in the U.S., and are
therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)
of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive
Order 11652.

3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby
was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there
are indications that Director Colby may have responded to
the question in a manner which could have been construed as
admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS
files contain other evidence that the matter was considered
to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when .
Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public
disclosure.

WARNING NOTICE —
SENSITIVs INTELLIGENCE SQURCES ; ae
ANDO METHODS INVOLVED SEGRE?

E2 EMPDET
CL BY 026089


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SECRET

4. Per our conversation, CCS has stated in its

response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further

on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may
have been placed in the public domain since the court
order (i. e., since February 1975). :

5. - Please direct your comments to SA/DO/0.. For
your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line
x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject

for the SA/DO/0.
ie

./L. Latta.

SECRET

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Oo UNCLASSIFIED Cy INTERNAL 0. CONFIDENTIAL secret
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET | 7

SUBJECT:  (Optional}

‘FROM:

Acting Chief, Latin America

DATE .
Division 21 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and .
building) _ OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom:

. - “INITIALS to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.) :
. RECEIVED | . oe
" §A/DO/0 . . Oo

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comm 610 “riete"* ] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL [-] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM | -: George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division
SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
REFERENCE . : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the
review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book.

Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a, page ll, Chile ;
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume. 7, Covert Action

‘Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert ‘Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action ;

- Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

“Item 11, page 15, Chile
Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders ©

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select.
Committee Hearings, . Volume 7; Covert Action

Item 89, page 106, Cuba (39

Declassified. 75" Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page. 222, Brazil

Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) 2

' Item. 261, page 338, Panama

Classified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile

Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page. Be, Cuba 129 ff.
Declassified. Senate Select

Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders ©

Item 317, page 468, Chile
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Ttem 318, pages. 469, 470, Chile

Classified. Executive ‘Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
is no record that the intelligence report on which this
item was based has been declassified.

Ttems 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2) ;
There has never been official acknowledgement by. either

the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

Item 338, page 508, Chile ©

’. Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile

1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7; Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil

Problem area. CIA presence. in Brazil and Bolivia has not
been officially acknowledged and is classified information.
Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). However, David Phillip's
book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
Page 209 of | The Night Watch: concerns CIA in Bolivia.

ny

Deas. laccon

George V. Lauder

3 \
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

22 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O

FROM : George V.. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT

REFERENCE : SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are the LA Division comments on the
review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book. .

Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR

Item 3a, page 11, Chile .
Decilassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 3b, page 11, Chile ~e
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Seleet Committee

Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action .

Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate. Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 5, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile .

Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

EZ IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

13-00000

we

“SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana...
Classified. Executive Order . exemption 5 (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20-24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, "166, 171 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action .

Item 89, page 106, Cuba
eclassified. Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil |
CTassified. Executive Order ‘exemption § (B) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama.
assified. Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

Item 292, page 420, Chile .
eclassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page abe, Cuba a

eclassified. Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on age 3 "Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders ;

Item 317, page 468, Chile...
Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile .

CYassified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
is no record that the intelligence report on which this
item was based has been declassified.

Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico |

Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)

There has never been official acknowledgement by either
the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

Item 338, page §08, Chile .

Declassified. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile

1963--1973), pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action
¥ .

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil
Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not

been officially acknowledged and is classified information.

Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). . However, David Phillip's
book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.
Page 209 of the Night. Wate “concerns CIA in Bolivia. ;

/sf Geor

George V. Lauder

SECRET

13-00000

-|* - . Pe . L. .
[1 UNCLASSIFIED =) se ONLY (CONFIDENTIAL (A SECRET

— . ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

EXTENSION

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD | | 9164
c/ccs GH-56 Hqs. 5407 21 APR 1977-

“4 TO: fficer designation, ber, and ,

“Boa fer cesgnamens room number a DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
: : INITIALS ta whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED

HAND CARRY

4 B 4405 Hass
4. Attn: Wm. Phelps

CALL

5.
C/LA
3 C 2019 Has. -
Attn: Wm. Sturbitt

C/NE
6 D 3107 Hgs.
Attn: George Walsh

fi ute ttt
OR RT ET

PL iLL SS BERR] ING

C/CA
3 D 0004 Hgqs.
10. Attn: Susan Watkin

mw

SA/DO/0O
2 D

rom 610 “Eise* [] SECRET [] CONFIDENTIAL [-] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

te SECRET]

21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM : Erich W. Isenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT 2 The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
y Victor Marchetti an ohn D. Marks

REFERENCE . : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs, _
—— fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

oe 1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its.
files and effected coordination with interested components
on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
Results are described below. ,

zZ. It has been determined that the following items
continue to be classified under E.0. 11652, and are exempt
from the E.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
by paragraph citations in brackets:

a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B)(3)] -

b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources ©
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-
firms the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.

c. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.

d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-

tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] AP-Bivieter advises that .
CA S fa
WARNING NOTICE pce £2 IMPDET |
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SO - ; CL BY 026089
AND METHODS INVOLVED S ECR ETI ;

13-00000

SECRET;

-the African American Institute, which published Africa
Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries
in B k

VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
pg- 263. _ However, the Report. gave as its ‘source for

Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should. not be con-
sidered official Government disclosure of. Agency, sponsor-
ship of the Institute. NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
for continued classification and will comment separately.

e. Item 48, page 7la -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
several magazine. publications. [Section 5(B)(2).] NOTE:
CA Staff confirms the need for: continued classification
and will comment separately.

f. Item 48, page 7la -- ENCOUNTER. Classified

' SECRET; describes intelligence ‘sources and methods as

related to several magazine publications. [Section

.5(B).(2)] NOTE: .CA Staff confirms the need for. con-

tinued classification and will comment ‘separately.

g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;

. describes intelligence sources and methods as related:

to.several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)]
NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
cation and will comment separately.

h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of.
operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
tion and will comment separately.

i. Item 51, page. 72 .-- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5@)

(2)] -

j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt.. [Section 5-(B)(2)-]

k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

-2-

SECREI.

13-00000

SECRET]

1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and
methods by identifying an operational support facility.
located in the U.S.. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency:
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but |
there are indications that.the DCI may have responded
to the question in a manner which could have been con-
strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
However, CCS: files contain other evidence that CIA
sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.

m. Item 130, page 133. -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
(NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET ;. describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations “based in Nigeria.
[Section 5(B) (2) ]

n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section

5 (B) (2)]

o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
mercial company. [Section 5(B)(2)]

p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL: CORRESPONDENCE
SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods exposing an operation. which provided cover.
[Section 5(B)(2)]

q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

-3-

SECRET,

13-00000

i - SECRET;

Yo

_ 3. The. following items were heretofore classified SECRET
because they described sources and methods in identifying a
support base located in the United States, but are now con-
sidered to. have been placed in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 --
INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
thé Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
and in the Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.

4. The following items fall into the questionable area
ae as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
. authorized Government officials:

a. Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.

soe = Classified SECRET. because it describes intelligence
sources and methods as related to several newspaper.
publications. . However, CCS files contain a newsclip
from the September and October 1974 edition of the
Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the |
CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement ‘atypical’
of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is
questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
left the Agency long before that, can be considered
as. constituting official Agency disclosure of this ©
information.

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM
WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
intelligence sources and methods and identification of
operations based in England. Forum |
referred to -- but not by name -- in the Senate
Select Committee Final Report, page 199, ‘as follows:
"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] ‘fallout’.
involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two

-4-

SECRET,

13-00000

press services."' It may be argued that although Forum

‘World Features continues to be protected to a degree
by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject
in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
confirm the need for continued classification and will
comment. separately.

one ds )

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

cc: C/AF
C/EUR
: C/LA
a C/NE
C/CA

CONCUR:

Date

22 fon.
Ae

VV FE
Date

Srl 24., 1977

Date ..

“Ze Beth
aty

-5-.

SECRED

13-00000

“TSENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES

SECREY
21 APR-OI7

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM . : Rrich W. Isenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Curt. of intellige ence

REFERENCE : Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,
fy SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
files and effected coordination with interested components
on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
Results are desctibed below.

2. It has been determined that the following ‘items
continue to be classified under H.O. 11652, and are exempt
from the 8.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
by paragraph citations in brackets:

a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of oper-
ations based in Jordan. {Section 5(B)(2), (B) (3) l

b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Seetion 5{B)(2)] NOTH: BUR Division con-
firms the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.

c, Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM. ;
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section §(B)(2}] NOTE: CA Staff confirns
the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.

d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2}] AF-Biviedon—advises that

cr shaff

EZ IMPDET

= cuaraaaet . a a E
WARNING NOTICE CL BY 026089

SECRET;

__ANG METHODS 4NVOLVED


13-00000

SECREL

Whe African American Institute, which published Africa
Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries

in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
pg. 263. However, the Report gave as its source for

the 11st the book The jnvisibie. Government, by Wise and
Ross, pp. 247n-248n. ¢ oh should not be con-
sidered official Government disclosure of Agency sponsor-
ship of the Institute. NOTH: CA Staff confirms the need
for continued classification and will comment separately.

6. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SBCRET;
describes intelligence sources and metho#s as related to
seteral magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
CA Staff confirms the need for continued Classification
and will comment separately,

£. Item 48, page 7la --  BNCOUNTER. Classified
SECRBT; describes intelligence gources and methods 4s
related to several magazine pubBications. [Section
5(B)(2)]. NOTH: CA Staff confirms the need for con-
tinued classification and will comment separately.

g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related
totseveral magazine publications. [Section §(B) (2)]

NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
cation and will comment separately.

h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGHR. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2}] NOTE:
BUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-
tion and will comment separately.

i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
"yee ‘of operations based in Burepe. [Section 5(B)_

2

j. Item 58, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. {Section 5(B)(2)]

k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B) (2)]

-2-

SECRET

13-00000

SECR EL

1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,
133, and 403 respectively -- PAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
Classified SECRET; -dtescrits intelligence sources and
methods by identifying an operational support facility
located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unélear on the point, but
there are indications that the DCI may have responded
to the question in a manner which could have been con-
strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
sponsorship of .Fairways was considered still czassified
as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
Advisor confirms the need for continued elassifieation
and will comment separately.

m, Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
(NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET ; describes intelligence
sources and methods of operatfoms based in Nigeria.
[Section 5(B)(2)]

Item 130, page 133 += SAPART AIR SERVICE LTD.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in Bast Africa. [Section

5(B) (3) ]

o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACB SHIPPING LINES.
Classified SECRET ; describes intelligence sources and
methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com-
mercial company. [Section 5(B){(2)]

p. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRBSPONDENCE
SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
as "a cover company which sold high s¢heool equivalency
diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)"
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
{Section §(B)(2)]

q.- Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;

describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
an operation targeted against Egypt. [Section $(B)(2)}

-3-

-SECREM

13-00000

aa SECRET]

oo 3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
because they desvribed sources and methods in identifying a
support base located in &Rhe United States, but are now con-
‘sidered to have beenpplaced in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129,and 130 --
INTERMOUNTAIN AVIATION, INC. Intermountain Aviation,
Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,
and inthe Report of the Rockefeller Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States, pg. 218.

4. The follgwing items fall into the questionable area
as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
authorized Government officials:

a. Item 49, page 7la -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
sources and methods as related to several newspaper
publications. However, CCS files contain a news¢clip
from the September and October 1974 edition of the
‘Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.

orne, Jr., the YS Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
Benjamin Shute, thén a partner in the prestigious
Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine,.and Moore,
now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the

purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
CIA. [Bross} recently called the arrangement ‘atypical'
of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'." It is
questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute, who
left the Agency long before that, can be considered as
asnconstituting official Agency disclosure of this
information. ;

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM
WORLD FRATURBS. Ciassified SECRET because they describe
intelligence sources and methods and identification of
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to -- but not by name -- In Book I oF the Senate
Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:
"Another example of the damages of [propaganda] “*fallout'
involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
to by over 30 U.S, newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two

-4-

SECRET’


13-00000

_ SECRET

press services." It may be argued that although Forum

World Features continues to be protected to a degrée

by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-

closure t6 newspaper editors, if it in fact took place

and depending on how it was handled, prgced the subject
in the public domain. NOTE: HUR. Division and CA Staff
confirm the. need for continued classification and will

comment separately.

fo, ERICH W, ISENSTEAD
7 ERICH W. ISENSTEAD
ec: C/AF |

C/EUR |

“C/LA

C/NE

C/CA
CONCUR:
Chie?, EUR Division _
Chief, LA Division me
Chief, NE Division <——
a ta Date

SECREW

13-00000
SECRET
22 APR BF

‘MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O_

—F, FROM _  : George V.. Lauder
_ Acting Chief, Latin America Division.
SUBJECT =~: + «The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D.. Marks
REFERENCE :. SA/DDO/O Memorandum dated 8 April 1977

The following are. the LA Division comments on the
review of the 168 court ordered deletions of subject book..

Item 1, page 11, Chile
Classified. Dept. of State/INR.

. Item 3a, page 11, Chile ; ,
is Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action |. -

Item 3b, page 11, Chile
Declassified. Pages 105, i90 of Senate Select Committee.
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 4, page 12, Chile
Declassified. Page 168, Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 5, page. 12, Chile
oo Declassified. Pages 105, 190 of Senate Select Committee
i Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 11, page 15, Chile

Declassified. Pages 170, 172 Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action and Page 231 Senate
Select Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination
Plots Involving Foreign Leaders

, E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

Item 29, page 49, Guyana
Classified. “Executive Order exemption S (B) 3

Item 46, page 70, lines 20--24, Chile
Declassified. Pages 148, 165, 166, 171 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action -

Item 89, page 106, Cuba ,
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select

‘Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots

Involving Foreign Leaders

Item 201, page 222, Brazil

Classified. “Executive Order exemption 5 (8) 2

Item 261, page 338, Panama
Classified. . Director of Intelligence Operations, ACSI

: Item 292, page 420, Chile

Declassified. Page 205 Senate Select Committee Hearings,
Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 307, page 468, Cuba ; -
Declassified. Footnote 1, page 177, Senate Select
Committee Interim Report on Alleged Assassination Plots
Involving Foreign Leaders

Ttem 317, page 468, Chile

Declassified. Pages 168, 189, 205 of Senate Select
Committee Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 318, pages 469, 470, Chile

Classified. Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). There
is no record that the intelligence report on which this
item was based has been declassified.

Items 322, 323, pages 473, 474, Mexico
Classified. Executive order exemption 5 (B) (2)

There has never been official acknowledgement by either
the Mexican or U.S. Governments of this case.

2
SECRET

13-00000

“SECRET

-Item: 338, page 508, Chile

Declassitied. Appendix A (Covert Action in Chile
1963--1973),.pages 144--209 of Senate Select Committee
Hearings, Volume 7, Covert Action

Item 339, page 509, Bolivia, Brazil

Problem area. CIA presence in Brazil and Bolivia has not
been officially acknowledged and is classified information. ~
Executive Order exemption 5 (B) (2). . However, David Phillip's —

book, The Night Watch, Chapter 8, is titled Brazil, Venezuela.

Page 209 of The Night Watch concerns CIA ‘in Bolivia.

:

f La ot Lda, Loe -

George’ V. Lauder |

3
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET;

9 + APR iT .
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0O
FROM ': Erich W. ISenstead
Chief, Central Cover Staff
SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence —
By Victor Marchetti and John DB. Marks
REFERENCE =: Memo for All Div and Certain Staffs,

fr SA/DO/O, dtd 8 Apr 77, Same Subject

1. Pursuant to Reference request, CCS has reviewed its
files and effected coordination with interested components
on classification of the 26 items given to CCS for review.
Results are described below.

2. #j.QIt has been determined that the following items
continue to be classified under E.O. 11652, and are exempt
from the E.0. General Declassification Schedule, as indicated
by paragraph citations in brackets:

a. Item 24, page 47 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of oper- .
ations based in Jordan. [Section 5(B)(2), (B}(3)] .

b. Item 48, page 7la -- BERLINER VEREIN.
“Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: EUR Division con-
firms the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.

c. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICAN FORUM.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-

' tions. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms
the need for continued classification and will
comment separately. No CCS record.

d. Item 48, page 7la -- AFRICA REPORT.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources
and methods as related to several magazine publica-
tions. [Section 5(B)}(2)] AF Division advises that

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

aes] SECRET!

SECRET,

the African. American Institute, which. published Africa
Report, is included in a list of Agency proprietaries

in Book VI of the Senate Select Committee Final Report,
pg- 263. However, the Report gave as its source for

the list the book The Invisible Government, by Wise and:
Ross, pp. 247n-248n. This citation should not be con-
Sidered official Governinent disclosure of Agency sponsor-
ship of the Institute.’ NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need
for continued classification and will comment separately.

e. Item 48, page 71a -- PREUVES. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related to
several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2}] NOTE:
CA Staff confirms the need for continued classification

and will comment separately.

£. Item 48, page 7la -- ENCOUNTER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods as
related to several magazine publications. [Section

7 5(B)(2)] NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for con-

tinued classification and will comment separately.

g. Item 48, page 7la -- FORUM. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods as related
to several magazine publications. [Section 5(B)(2)]
NOTE: CA Staff confirms the need for continued classifi-
cation and will comment separately.

h. Item 50, page 72 -- AXEL SPRINGER. Classified
SECRET; describes intelligence sources and methods of
operations based in Germany. [Section 5(B)(2)] NOTE:
EUR Division confirms the need for continued classifica-

, tion and will comment separately.

i. Item 51, page 72 -- FODOR and FODOR GUIDES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in Europe. [Section 5(B)

(2)]

j. Item 55, page 80 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]

k. Item 56, page 81 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods of opera-
tions directed against Egypt. [Section 5(B)(2)]


13-00000

SECRET;

1. Items 107, 128, 129, and 279 on pages 123, 132,

133, and 403 respectively -- FAIRWAYS CORPORATION.
_Classified SECRET; describe intelligence sources and

methods by identifying an operational support facility
located in the U.S. [Section 5(B)(2)] According to
CCS files, in April 1975 the DCI was asked by an NBC
reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fairways Corporation
in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but
there are indications that the DCI may have responded
to the question in a manner which could have been con-
strued as admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways.
However, CCS files contain other evidence that CIA
sponsorship of Fairways was considered still classified
as recently as December 1976. NOTE: The DDA/Air
Advisor confirms the need for continued classification
and will comment separately.

m. Item 130, page 133 -- PAN AFRICAN AIRLINES
(NIGERIA) LTD. Classified SECRET; describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations “based in Nigeria.
[Section 5(B) (2)]

n. Item 130, page 133 -- SAFARI AIR SERVICE LTD.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods of operations based in East Africa. [Section

5(B) (2)]

o. Item 226, page 257 -- GRACE SHIPPING LINES.
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods by describing a cover arrangement with a com~-

mercial company. [Section 5(B) (2)]

. Item 278, page 400 -- INTERNATIONAL CORRESPONDENCE
SCHOOLS WORLD LIMITED, INC. Referred to in the manuscript
as "a cover company which sold high school equivalency
diploma courses (advertised on the backs of match books)".
Classified SECRET; describes intelligence sources and
methods exposing an operation which provided cover.
{Section 5(B) (2)]

q. Item 280, page 404 -- RTV. Classified SECRET;
describes intelligence sources and methods which expose
an operation targeted against Egypt.* [Section 5(B)(2)}


SR ET

3. The following items were heretofore classified SECRET
because they described sources and methods in identifying a
support base located in the United States, but are now con- .
Sidered to have been placed in the public domain.

Items 124, 126, and 127 on pages 129 and 130 --
INTERMOUNTAIN " AVIATION?" INC, Intermountain Aviation,
Inc. is named as an Agency proprietary in Book I of
the Senate Select Committee Final Report, pp. 208-9,

‘ and in the Report.of the Rockefeller Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States, pe. 218.

: 4. The. following items fall into the questionable area
' as to whether they have been placed in the public domain by
authorized Government officials:

a. Item 49, page 71a -- ROME DAILY AMERICAN.
Classified SECRET because it describes intelligence
sources and methods as related to several newspaper
publications. However, CCS files contain a newsclip
from the September and October 1974 edition of the .
Columbia Journalism Review which states, "Landon K.
Thorne, Jr., the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA,
Benjamin Shute, then a partner in the prestigious
Wall Street law firm of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore,
now acknowledge that the fourth partner [in the
purchase of the Rome Daily American in 1956] was the
CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrangement ‘atypical'
of what the Agency was doing, 'a bad example'."’ It is
questionable whether the remarks made by Mr. Bross, who
retired from the Agency in’1971, and Mr. Shute, who
left the Agency long before that, can be considered

. as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.

b. Item 54, page 80 and item 236, page 262 -- FORUM
WORLD FEATURES. Classified SECRET because they describe
intelligence sources and methods and identification of
operations based in England. Forum World Features was
referred to -- but not by name -- in Book I of the Senate
' Select Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows:

- . "Another example of the damages of [propaganda] 'fallout'
involved two proprietary news services that the CIA main-
tained in Europe .... the larger of the two was subscribed
to by over 30 U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major dailies aware that the CIA controlled these two


SECRETS

press services. It may be argued that although Forum
World Features continues to be protected to a degree

by deletion of its name in the Senate Report, CIA dis-
closure to newspaper editors, if it in fact took place
and depending on how it was handled, placed the subject
in the public domain. NOTE: EUR Division and CA Staff
confirm the need for continued classification and will.

-comment separately. 1

Lone AL Go stat —

ERICH W. ISENSTEAD

“cc: C/AF
C/EUR
C/LA
C/NE
C/CA
‘CONCUR:
Chief, AF Division a Date
Chief, BUR Division ; Date
lief, ivision Date
Chief, NE Division Date
ref, ta Date


13-00000

[1] UNCLASSIFIED =) {TERNAL [1 CONFIDENTIAL C1 SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET |

SUBJECT: (Optional)
Alyson Ward 6343 | pate
SIA/I (ud 1602 22 April 1977
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | wt
building) COMMENTS (Number each comment! to show from whom

fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.
RECEIVED | FORWARDED )

1.

iN,
C/SIA/T 22 W

9.2, APR 1977

SA/DDO/O
2D0109 Hqs.

scot’ 610 “tose (] SECRET [[] CONFIDENTIAL ([] [NTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

22 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
; External Oversight

VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities

FROM : Robert D. Wiecha
Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from
Mr. Fendig, same subject

1... This office has reviewed the five items concerning
Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has
determined that all items are still not releasable for the
following reasons:

a. Item 182 age (196: According to Mr. Vernon
Weimar, the CIA's liaison contact in the Federal
Bureau.of Investigation, this item is still classified
"SECRET" under Executive Order (£.0.) 11652, Section -
5(B) (2) (intelligence sources and methods).

b. Item 197, page 218: This item is still
classified "SECRET" under E.0O. 11652, Section 5
_(B) (1) (foreign liaison) and (2).

, c. Item-198, page 219: This item is still
classified "TOP SECRET" under E.0. 11652, Section 5

(B) (2).

d. Item 224 age 252: This item is still .
classified "TOP SECRET" under E.0. 11652, Section 5
(B) (2).

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 059748

SECRET

13-00000

e. Item 256 age 329: This item is still
classified “SECRET” under E.0. 11652, Section 5
(B)(1) and (2).

2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be
directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/I, extension 1602.

auch...

13-00000

SECRET

22 April 1977 Ce

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
Rxternal Oversight

VIA : Chief, Staff for International Activities
FROM : Robert D.. Wieche

Chief, SIA/Israeli Branch
SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks
REFERENCE : Memorandum dated 8 April 1977 from

Mr. Fendig, same subject

1. This office has reviewed the five items concerning
Israel which were deleted from subject book, and has
determined that all items are still not releasable for the
following reasons: a,

a. Item 182, page 196: According to Mr. Vernon
Weimar, the CYATs page 106: contact in the Federal —
Bureau of Investigation, this item is still classified
"SECRET" under Executive Order (£.0.) 116582, Section
$(B)(2) (intelligence sources and methods).

b. Item 197 Rees e 218: This item is still
@r £.0.. 11652, Section 5
(B) (1) (foreign Ladson) and (2).

c. Item a os SE This item is still
classifie under #.0. 11652, Section 5
(B} (2). ;

H2 IMPDET
CL BY 059748


13-00000

SECRET

- > 9 TES 256, page 3291 This item ts stili-~ ~~
classified m@ECRET" under £.0. 11652, Section 5§
(B)(1} and (2).

2. Any questions regarding this memorandum should be
directed to Alyson Ward, SIA/T, extension 1602.

Robert D. Wiecha

-2-

SECRET


13-00000

___| , | |
- (C) UNCLASSIFIED (1 Use onty C] CONFIDENTIAL [SECRET

° * . , ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) ; ye : ;
Addendum to LA Division Memorandum dtd 22 April 1977

George V. Lauder In EXTENSION
Acting Chief .
Latin America Division 1039

TO: - (Officer designation, room number, and . DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
] - INITIAL . i .
: FORWARDED to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

SA/DO/O -

se" 610 “smere’* (] SECRET ©) CONFIDENTIAL [[] (RUERNAL §=©=—-[]_ UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET
26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
Dated 22 April 1977

- It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,
INR/OTL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and
item 337 page 509 are still classified.

2. Item 29 page 14, Chile

According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL
lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and
line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry' through line 29 continue
to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee"
through line 24 ending "the covert action programs." has been
declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170,
190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7

Covert Action.

3. Item 10 page 15 Chile

Line 1 through "his nominal superior” and line 2
beginning "Meyer was'' through line 4 continue to be classified
according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through
11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of
Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

4, Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.
Kelly, Director, Intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour
Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.

Lag. loo cen
GeorgA V. Lauder

vy
4

Le Auinine ST GL ORY. ANF... i

SECRET

13-00000

:
in
to
;
t
a
:
i
B
4
¥
iM
B

SECRET .
26 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/0

FROM : George V. Lauder
Acting Chief, Latin America Division

SUBJECT : Addendum to LA Division Memorandum
Dated 22 April 1977.-:

1. It was Mr. William C. Jones at Department of State,
INR/OIL who stated that item 1 page 11, item 34 page 59, and
item 337 page 509 are still classified.

‘2. Item 3/9 page 14, Chile

' According to Mr. David Carpenter, State/INR/OIL
lines 14 through line 17 "So at Kissinger's urging" and ;
line 24 beginning "Ambassador Korry" through line 29 continue
to be classified. Line 17 beginning "the 40 Committee" J
through line 24 ending ''the covert action programs." has been
declassified. The substance can be found on pages 166-170,
190 and 205 of the Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7
Covert Action.

3. Item 10 page 15 Chile

Line 1 through "his “nominal superior" and line 2
beginning "Meyer was" through line 4 continue to be classified
according to Mr. Carpenter, State/INR/OIL. Lines 5 through
11 are declassified and can be found on pages 167-169 of

Senate Select Committee Hearings, Volume 7 Covert Action.

4. Item 261 page 338 was discussed with Mr. Merrill T.
Kelly, Director, intelligence Operations ACSI by Seymour
Young, PCS/LSN. Mr. Kelly stated the item is still classified.

Is/ George V. Lauder,

George V. Lauder

SECRET

13-00000

e .
)unclassirit (INTERNAL [] CONFIDENTIAL ——-([[]_ SECRET

Oo ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)
DATE ,
25 April 1977

OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)

Marchetti-Marks Manuscript

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

’ §A/DO/0O

2. S -

JiltER om

HE

sar 610 “torore’®’ (] SECRET ([] CONFIDENTIAL ([(] [NTERNAL §=©6=«- [7] UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

ca.

bl

timely

eam ges ore a) APR ‘er7
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O 7
FROM: Donald J. Purcell
Chief, Covert Action Staff
SUBJECT: The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence

by Victor. Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE: Memo for All Divisions and Certain Staffs,
from SA/DO/O, 8 April 1977, same subject

Following are Covert Action Staff comments on items
24, 48, 54, 55, 56, 236, and 280, which are among the
passages containing classified information that were de-
leted before publication of the Marchetti-Marks manuscript:

a) Items 24 (p. 47), 55 (p. 80), 56 (p. 81),
and 280 (p. 404) are classified secret, and are
exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2) of
EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and
methods of operation. Specifically, these items
name RTV, Inc. and describe it as a CIA proprietary:
that was used for clandestine operations in a variety
of countries. In addition, items 55 and 56 are
especially sensitive because they describe an opera-
tion in Jordan, exposure of which could be harmful to
United States relations in the Middle East ( Section
5 b 3).

b) Items 54 and 236 (on p. 80 and p. 262) are
classified secret, and are exempt from publication —
under Section 6) (b) (2) of EO 11652, which protects
intelligence sources and methods of operation. These
items name Forum World Features, describe it as a CIA
proprietary that was used for clandestine propaganda
operations, specify that the clandestine operations
were directed especially at the Third World, and further
specify that the man who ran FWF was an experienced
CIA operator. It may be worth noting that the Senate
Select Committee declined to publish the name of this
clandestine proprietary when the Agency advised the
Committee that publication would damage the former
director of Forum World Features, who had entered into
a clandestine relationship with the U.S. Government in
good faith. :

13-00000

prone

Cc
}-
i

€.
r
¢

c) Item 48 (p. 7la) is classified secret, and
is exempt from publication under Section 5 (b) (2)
of EO 11652, which protects intelligence sources and
methods.of operation. This item names African Forun,
Africa Report, Preuves, Encounter, and Forum as
Magazines that received CIA subsidies. In the case
of Preuves, Encounter, and Forum, these magazines were
published by the former Congress for Cultural Freedom.
The Government has not acknowledged covertty subsidizing
CCF or its magazines, although Encounter magazine's
ties to CIA have been the subject of press speculation.
Preuves magazine has been the subject of little or no
press speculation, as far as we know, and it is our
understanding that French laws prohibit covert foreign
subsidies to French publications, which makes it
especially important to protect the former CIA tie to
: that magazine. Exposure of the two Africa magazines
: would be damaging to a number of prominent people and
organizations in this country and in Africa that have
worked for improved social conditions in Africa and for
good relations between this country and Africa, which
would be harmful to this country's relations with Africa.

(Section 5 b 3)

eee tp eee nee

13-00000

|
C1. UNCCASSIFIED =) uPA (1) CONFIDENTIAL [1 secrer

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Richard S.. Sampson EXTENSION
Chief, European Division

0.
OATE 2 5 APR 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE

building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

INITIALS to whom. Draw a fine across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED

rome 610 ER (SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL [J INTERNAL = (7) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight

FROM:. Richard S. Sampson
Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
Review of Deletions i

1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed
the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the
original manuscript because of the Agency position they were
classified information. We can find only one instance in
which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has
placed any of these references in the public domain since
first publication of the book. The specific references are
listed below, together with the grounds. for classification
and the components who have been consulted.

2. References which European Division believes are
still classified and should remain so are:

E.0. 11652

-Name/Cite # /Page _ Exemption Category ' Coordination
Alex Springer (#50, ‘p 72) ; 5 (b) 2 EUR/G
Rome Daily American (#49, .

p 71a) 5 (b) 2 ccS, EUR/Italy
Magazines: Preuves, Forum .

(#48, p 71a) - 5 (b) 2. CA
Encounter (#48, p 7la) _ See note
Forum World Features

(#54, #256, p 80, p 262) 5 (b) 2 CA, EUR/BC

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

13-00000

SECRET

E.0O. 11652
Name/Cite #/Page Exemption Category Coordination ;
LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, :
p 483-4) 5 (b) 3 CA
Bases in Germany (#234, ;
p 262) 5 (b) 3 EUR/G, CCS
Release of. Satellite
photos to British (#62, :
p 86) 5 (b) 2 EUR/BC
Liaison relations |
CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7,
p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437) 5 (b) 2 EUR/BC :
Liaison, others (#196, 225,
333, p 217, 253, 483) 5 (b) 2 AF
MAKARIOS, Base rental
deal (#296, 298, 300
p 425, 426) 5 (b) 1 EUR/CGT
Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,
Italy (#21, 273, p 45, 380) S (b) 3 ' BUR/Italy
Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28, 52,
p 42-45, 48, 77) 5 (b) 2 EUR/G

were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural
®: Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.

ya?
“ch NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds
Ne

RSS

Richard S. mpson

Sei |

25 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight

FROM: Richard S, Sampson
Chief, European Division

SUBJECT: ; Marks-Marchetti Manuscript:
Review of Deletions

1. As requested, the European Division has reviewed
the items pertaining to Europe which were deleted from the
original manuscript because of the Agency position they were
Classified information. We can find only one instance in
which an authorized official of the U.S. Government has
placed any of these references in the public domain since
first publication of the book. The specific references are
listed below, together with the grounds for classification
and the components who have been consulted.

2. References which European Division believes are
‘still classified and should remain so are:

| ; E.O. 11652

Name/Cite #/Page Exemption Category Coordination
Alex Springer (#50, p 72) 5 (b) 2 EUR/G
Rome Daily American (#49,

p 71a) 5 (b) 27 CCS, EUR/Italy ~
Magazines: Preuves, Forum

(#48, p 71a) 5 (b) 2 _ CA
Encounter (#48, p 7la) , See note .
Forum World Features

(#54, #256, p 80, p 262) 5 (b) 2 CA, EUR/BC

E2 IMPDET
CL By 003283

~ SECRET

13-00000

Neme/Cite #/Page

LCPIPIT (#334, 335, 336, |

p 483-4)

Bases in Germany (#234,
p 262)

Release of Satellite
photos to British (#62,
p 86) .

Liaison relations
CANUKUS (#194, 5, 7

ithe dl

E.O. 11652,
Exemption Category

S (b) 3

S (b) 3

S (b) 2

p 215, 6, 8) (#308, p 437): . 5S (b) 2

Liaison, others (#196, 225,

333, p 217, 253, 483)

MAKARIOS, Base rental
deal (#296, 298, 300
p 425, 426)

S (b) 2

5 (b) 1

Political subsidies: SPD, CDU,

Italy (#21, 273,

Willy Brandt (#18 - 20, 28,

p 42-45, 48, 77)

on

C
pomp Ne

“¢

DDO/EUR/FP/FC:William Phelps:kdh

Distribution:
Orig §& 1 - Addressee
1 - C/EUR
1 - E/FP/FC

p 45, 380) 5 (b) 3

52,
5 (b) 2

-2-
SECRET

Coordination

CA

EUR/G, CCS
EUR/BC

EUR/BC

AF

EUR/CGT
EUR/Italy

EUR/G

NOTE: CA Staff advises that information admitting CIA funds
penn were provided to Encounter through the Congress for Cultural
. Freedom has been released under the FOIA and Privacy Act.

RS Serpe
Richard S. mpson

(25 April 77) (x1872)


13-00000

‘CO UNCLASSIFIED = [INTERNAL C1 CONFIDENTIAL [1 SECRET
mS ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

~

SUBJECT: (Optional)

. SE/OSG"
5B4806

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | ae :

building) : OFFICER'S. COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

: F receiveo | roRwanoeD | INITIALS to whom. Drow o line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED

— ;
SA/DO/O
2D0109

rom 610 “Esmee ] SECRET (] CONFIDENTIAL [] INTERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000 9

SECRET
pg APR 1877

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant ‘to DDO for External Oversight

FROM : George T. Kalaris ©
Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT. : The CIA ‘and. ‘the Cult of Intelligence
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Same Subject,
dated 8 April 1977

1. We have reviewed the seven items relating to
SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in.1974
from the Marchetti and Marks' book, The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence, againt official disclosures and have

determined that with one exception, the items are still
properly classified under Executive Order 11652:

A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains
classified SECRET. It describes intelligence ©
‘sources and methods of operations directed
against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from
the General Declassification Schedule of ;
Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

B. Item Nas. 58, 59 and 63 relating to
the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET.
They describe intelligence sources and methods
of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.
They are exempt from the General Declassification

Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption
category 5B(3).

C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the
AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They —
describe intelligence sources and methods of an
operation based in Tokyo directed against the
Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under
cover.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

SECRET E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652

13-00000

_SS=

SECRET

2. The one item excepted is Item No. 57. This item
relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. Marchetti and Marks wrote
in their manuscript: ne oF the CIA's most famous venture
(sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic).

This chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin
appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal

of the actual spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky."' The Penkovski
Papers are mentioned in the Final Report of the Select Committee

to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence
Activities, Book I, page 194, dated 26 April 1976, as follows:

"Another CIA book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was
published in the United States in 196s "for
operational reasons', but actually became commer-
cially viable. The book was prepared and written
by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case
materials. Publication rights to the manuscript
were sold to a publisher through a trust fund
which was established for the purpose. The publisher
was unaware of any U.S. Government interest."

3. In view of this published statement by the Senate
Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public

domain by official disclosure by the United States. It can
no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.

Ll MA |
George T. Kelaris\

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET : 7
og APR WI!

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO. for External Oversight
_ FROM - t George T. Kalaris oe ae
po Chief, Soviet/East. European Division

_[ sussect + The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
ae by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

po REFERENCE. - ? Your Memorandum, Same. Subject,
mo, : dated 8 April 1977

1. We have reviewed the seven items relating. to
SE Division interests of the 168 items deleted in 1974
from the Marchetti and Marks! book, The CIA and the Cult:

determined chat with one exception, the items are still
properly classified under Executive Order 11652:

A. Item No. 53 relating to NTS remains
classified SECRET. It describes intelligence
sources and methods of operations directed
against the Soviet Union. It is exempt from
-the General Declassification Schedule of
Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(3).

B. Item Nos. 58, 59 and 63 relating.to
the Penkovskiy Papers remains classified SECRET.
They describe intelligence sources and methods
of an operation directed against the Soviet Union.
- They are exempt from the General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption
_ category 5B(3).

C. Item Nos. 148 and 149 relating to the”

AEIDOL case remain classified SECRET. They

describe intelligence sources and methods of an

operation based in Tokyo. directed against the

Soviets and also identify Agency personnel under
cover.

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

SECRET E2 IMPDET .
CT. RY A146?

13-00000
Tt ee SECRET

- 2. The one item ‘excepted is Item No. 57. This item
relates to the Penkovskiy Papers. . Marchetti and Marks wrote -
in their manuscript: “One of the CIA's most famous venture -

sic) in book publishing was The Penkovsky Papers (sic). —

his chronicle of spying for the West inside the Kremlin
‘appeared in 1965, and it was allegedly taken from the journal
of the actual ‘Spy, Colonel Oleg Penkovsky." The Pen covakey

; “Another CIA: book, the Penkovskiy Papers, was:
ouch" in the United States in 1965 ° oe
‘ operational reasons', but actually. became commer-
' cially viable. The. book was prepared and written
j; by witting Agency assets who drew on actual case
: / materials. Publication rights to the manuscript
Tors / were sold to a publisher through a trust fund
if which was established for the purpose. The publisher
J! was unaware of any U.S. Government interest. "

3. In view of this published statement by the Senate
Select Committee, Item No. 57 has been placed in the public
‘domain by official disclosuré by the United States. It can
no longer be considered classified under Executive Order 11652.

|

}
Ue Oe
‘ George T. Kalaris\

DDO/SE:JDKenney (x1705 26 April 1977)clh

Distribution:

: Orig § 1 - Addressee » 2 - SE/OSG
i 1 - SE/RAO
1 - SE/CI

SECRET

13-00000

© Fy unevassteio INTERNAL [) CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
a ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Memorandum

EXTENSION

parE A 7
WH April 1977
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and :
building) * - . OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
: Lo . INITIALS fo whom. Draw a line acress.column after each comment.)

SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. P.
Room: 2D 01.09

seeo’ 610 “eathene* [] SECRET ([] CONFIDENTIAL [[] {WTERNAL =. (7) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

a

¢
9
ten!

Chel

- 27 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
ATTENTION : Mr. Philip F. Fendig

FROM : Samuel H. Rickard
Chief of Operations, NE Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence by

Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

1. The following deleted items in subject book have been
oe placed in the public domain as cited below:
a. Item 72, page 97: This item, which was placed in.
1 he public domain in.Harry Rositzke's book, The CIA's Secret
erations, on pages 173 and 174, is a problem area. The author
rae) this book is a former senior CIA officer who allowed the
got wAgency to review his manuscript prior to publication. However,
CIA did not approve the manuscript for publication and, there-
fore, in our view Item 72 remains classified under Executive.
Order 11652 under Exemption 5B (2).

b. Item 152, page 165 and Item 28, page 48: These
two items also fall in a problem area. The following references
to CIA's special relationship with the Shah of Iran imply, but
ent ze do not.specifically state, that such a relationship exists. See
‘Book 1 of the Select Committee to Study Governmental O erations
pant ioe Respect: to o Intelligence Tigence Activities, page 552, and Ray S.
- Cline's book entitled, Secrets, Spies and Scholars; Blueprint
. Sadar OL the Essential CIA, pages 131 and 132. Additionally, though
weer, “Cline, a former senior CIA officer, allowed the Agency to
neues his manuscript prior to publication, CIA did not approve

he manuscript for publication. Therefore, in our view Items
52 and 28 remain classified under Executive Order 11652 under
f Exemption 5B (2). .

as 2. The following items remain classified under Executive
Order 11652:

Item Manuscript Page uxemption
55 80 SB (2)
24 47 5B (2)
56 81 SB (2)

280 404 5B (2)

182° 165 5B (2)

E2 IMPDET
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t
i
H

Item Manuscript Page Exemption
23 46 5B (2}
22 46 5B (2) (3)
73 ; 97 5B (2)
172 189. 5B (2)
74 98 5B (2)
331 482 5B (2) (3)
332 482 5B (2) (3)
160 ; 182 5B (2)
224 ; 252 5B (2)
159 181 an 5B (2) (3)
160 ; 182 5B (2)
161 183 5B (2)
162 184 SB (2)

v . AY
Rast H. Rickard

20 gape
wna]

13-00000

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A) alien 239, page 509 mention

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. yo Hin 339 + ~
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7 peal mn peng
DA Wg dayne als “aE ow
- ae > 4


13-00000

te . INTERNAL
[-) UNCLASSIFIED (J) se omy

(-] CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: (Optional)

[] SECRET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET , .

_ Marchetti/Marks Book
FROM: |
Chief, Africa/Plans

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)

DATE 24 APR 4977

OFFICER'S
INITIALS | to
SA/DO/0

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
whom.
Attn: Mr

. Shepanek

Draw a fine across column after each comment.)

; FORM 610% PREVIOUS

EDITIONS

INTERNAL ~

[] secret ([] CONFIDENTIAL [] se onty

13-00000

a SECRET

2 7 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert Shepanek

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa/Plans

SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book

1. Mr. Sam Halperin has questioned our request
that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground
that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an
official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the
reference to the Congo.

2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo
is reported in an interim report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It
may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification

. of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.

We believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.

Foyy Jr.

ING fone
© SOURCES

E2° IMPDET
CL BY 009904

SECRET

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ue

_#

27 APR O77

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DO/O
ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert Shepanek

t

FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr. ; i
Chief, Africa/Plans mt

|

SUBJECT : Marchetti/Marks Book

a)

1. Mr.. Sam Halperin has questioned our request
that Item 339, page 509 remain classified on the ground
that references to CIA activities in the Congo in an.
official report of the U.S. Senate declassified the
reference to the Congo.

2. The existence of a CIA presence in the Congo

_ is reported in an interim report of. the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975. It
may be argued therefore that to agree.to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire.
We believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5(b)(3) would apply in the case of the Congo.

/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JB
Edward J. Foy, Jr. ais

EZ IMPDET
CL BY 009904 |


13-00000

[1 UNCLASSIFIED “= (—) {TERNAL ) (] CONFIDENTIAL =. [[] SECRET

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: : EXTENSION | NO.

DATE

C/AF/PLS 1326 21 April 1977 |
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | are .
building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

(NITIALS whom. i .
receiven | FORWARDED to whom, Draw a line ocross column after each comment.)

SA/DDO/0O

Attn: Mr. Shepanek _

FORM PREVIOUS

rom 610 “iomere* [] SECRET © ([] CONFIDENTIAL [[] [ATFRNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

oe SECRET)
21 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight

ATTENTION a Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
- SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
RE FE RENCE : SA/DO/O Memo dated 8 April 1977, Same Subject

1. The information which pertains to Africa and which
was deleted by court order from subject book remains
classifiable and classified. The information is national
security information, bears directly on the conduct of our
foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized
disclosure. None of the items of information ordered
deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified
by. any United States Government official authorized to
-declassify national security information.

2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items
are as follows:

Item 29, Page 49 Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 79, Page 100 Exemptions 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Items 283 and 284, Exemption 5(B) (3)

Page 413
Items 286 and 287, Exemptions 5(B) (3)

Page 414
Item, 287a, Page 415 . Exemption 5(B) (3)
Item 288, Page 416 Exemption 5(B)}(1) (2) (3)
Items 290 and 291, Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

Page 417

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS JNVOLVED

SECRET!

13-00000

ce SECRET)

3. The following items, all of which relate to matters
of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified:

Item 41, Page 6fS Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)

Item 42, Page 65a Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 47, Page 71 Exemption: 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 48, Page 7la ' Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 55, Page 80 Exemption 5(B) (2)

Item 130, Page 133. Exemption 5(B) (2)

Item 170, Page 189 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 197, Page 218 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

Item 198, Page 219 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

Page 427 .

Item 301, Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Item 339, Page 509 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
4, Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291

pertain to National Security Council proceedings.

Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security
Council: staff, have been informed by telephone this date
that CIA will refuse the request of the attorney of

Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.

dward ee ; y

SEGRET

13-00000

& 1 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for
External Oversight

ATTENT ION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek
FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence
_ REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Nemo dated 8 April 197, Sane Subject

1. The information. which pertains to Africa and which |

was deleted by court order from subject book remains

' Classifiable and classified. The information is national
security information, bears directly on the conduct of our
foreign affairs and requires protection from unauthorized
disclosure. None of the items of information ordered .
deleted from the book by the courts has been declassified
by any United States Government official.authorized to
-declassify national security information.

; 2. The exemptions which apply to the deleted items
are as follows:

Item 29, Page 49 “Exemptions 5(B) (2) (3)

‘Item 79, Page 100  ~— Exemptions 5(B)(1) (2) (3)
Items 283 and 284, Exemption 5(B) (3)
~ Page 413. a
Items 286 and 287, - ‘Exemptions 5 (B) (3)
~  . Page 414.
Item, 287a, Page 415 Exemption 5(B) (3) |
Item 288, Page 416 Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) °
,
Items 290 and 291, Exemption 5(B)(1)(2)(3) :
Page 417. 7
= 62° IMPDET

CL BY 009904

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WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED


13-00000

we SECRET!

t
1

3. The following items, all of which relate to matters |
of concern to Africa Division, also remain classified: :
Item 41, Page 645 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3) |
Item 42, Page 65a Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 47, Page 71 Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
- Item 48, Page 7la Exemption 5(B) (2)(3)
® Item 55, Page 80 Exemption 5(B)(2)
Item 130, Page 133 Exemption 5(B)(2)
Item 170, Page 189 ' Exemption 5(B) (2) (3)
Item 197, Page 218 ‘Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Item 198, Page 219 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Item 301, Page 427 Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)
Item 339, Page 509. Exemption 5(B) (1) (2) (3)

4. Items 283, 284, 286, 287, 287a, 288, 290 and 291
pertain to National Security Council proceedings.
Mr. William Edmondson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, and Mr. Paul Henze, National Security
Council staff, have been informed by telephone this date
that CIA will refuse the request.of the attorney of
‘Mr. Marchetti and Mr. Marks to declassify these items.

/s/ EDWARD J. FOY, JRe
. Edward J. Foy, Jr.

ae]
i

13-00000


13-00000

THE VIETNAM-CAMBODIA EMERGENCY, 1975
Part V—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of |
Ambassador John Gunther Dean

HEARING |
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON: INVESTIGATION

OF THE ,

COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

MAY 5, 1976

Printed fer the use of the Committee on International Relations

a

- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
73-04 WASHINGTON : 1976


13-00000

672

made on behalf of Cambodia. To insure that the program was tailored to real
requirements, to insure that equipment was received ly personnel trained in
their use and to insure that material provided under MAP hud reasonab'.
expectancy of maintenance support, ites such as force structure, military orgs-
nization, technical assistance and logistics became matters that came under the
purview of the MEDTC. ‘fo have closed our eyes tu these aspects in my view.
would have ignored congressional concerns regarding efficient: management. I
did not.consider these functions a violation of the congressional intent in
banning advisors and these functions coutinued during my tenure. In wiy belie?
the ban would have been violated had personnel been assigned to military units
or activities on an around-the-clock basis and involved thewselves in most of the
watters affecting their units or activity. In prescribing the limits of our assix1-
ance, the views of the GAO report were useful in guiding our judgment.

Question 10. During your tenure as Ambassador, did any U.S, Military Attachés
serve with Khmer military units in the field?

—What regulations did the U.S. Ea:bassy have to govern the activities of
U.S. Military Attaches and the Military Equipment Delivers Team?

—Were any changes in the regulations made after the incident at Kampot
involving Major Lawrence Ondecker in Mareh 1974?

Answer. No U.S, military served with Khmer military units in the field. U_S.
personnel from both the Defense Attache Office and the Office of the Chie!
Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia routinely visited and reported
the military status of Cambodian military units as part of their duties ; however.
U.S. personnel did not remain with units in the manner which U.S. advisors d
in South Vietnam. U.S. personnel were extensively briefed upon arrival regard--
ing the Congressional restrictions azainst advisers ta the Cambodian military.
Yhe Kampot incident oceurred prior to my arrival in Cambodia. Shartiy after
mr arrival in Phnom Penh. T received the instructions in effect and determined
that they were adequate. I did, however. personaily impress unen my nilitars
staff, on several aecasions, the necd to abide serupuleusiy hy these instructions
and to avoid situations which might be interpreted as infringements cf their
prescribed duties.

Qucestian 17, In November 1974, the Washington Post reported and the Ne
fense Department acknowledged that data on potential hembinge targets in
Cambodia was gathered by American reconnaissance fights from Thafland and
passed on fo Cambodian military authorities.

—When da this practice begin?

—Did you know about it, and did rou have a role in it?

—Do rou consider it a violation of the Congreszional ban on American
advisors with Khmer Republic forces?

Answer. It would be inconceivable to me that in a situation as existed in
Cambodia that military information whieh we had would be deliberately withheld
or denied to a country to which we were providing enarmcus military ant
economic assistance. The information we had concerning enemy activities in
Cambodia was a by-product of our own intelNigence collecting effort on com-
munist forees throughout Indochina. This information was provided to Cam-
bodian military authorities but the decision on what ection, if anr, would be
taken was one which the Cambodians made for themselves. The provisiens of
information preceded my arrival and T am not aware exartle when the practice
mary have hegun, I was aware of the practice although I did not play a pivotal
part in the process and did not consider this procedure as violating congressional

: ictions on American advisors.
_aietion 12, Did CIA personnel in Camhodia ever act as advisers to Kbmer
epublic forces in a fashion similar to their activities in Laos (even if on a

smaller scale)?
—Could yon tell us what role China Airlines plared in Cambodia and if it
‘was in any way associated with CIA activities?
—What was the U.S. role in organizing and applying the Khmer “Middle
Range Reconnaissance Patrols” (MERPS) ?

Answer. Haviug served both in Laos and Cambodia, and knowing the CIA
operations in both countries, F can honestly say that the CIA did not act as
advisers to the Khmer Republic forces in a fashion simiiar to their activirie=
in. Laos. China Airlines, under contract to Air America. transported supplies. nei
inchiding. weapons and ammunition, for U.S. agencies in Cambodia. The Middle
Range Reconnaissance Patrols received US. inlitury equipment as part of the
Klunee Armed Forces and also received some intelligence collection training..


13-00000

o "UNCLASSIFIED [oy INTERNAL CO CONFIDENTIAL fk] SECRET

) ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
by Vite Marchetti and John D. Marks

CEA/CA DATE
5D3102, Has 1383 15 April 1977

TO: (Officer designation, ber, and
building) ser cenenenens seems DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
| receveo | FORWARDED | [NITIALS | to whom. Oraw a fine across column after each comment.)

ACEA/OPS

FROM: Robert L. Skidifore

EXTENSION

SA/DO/0O

» fom 610 Ete EK] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIEE

13-00000

re SECRET

16 APR 977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight

FROM : William J. Graver
Chief, East Asia Division
SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks-
ce REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,

Same Subject

East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted
subject book items per Reference request and conclude they
are:

1) still classified under Executive Order
11652,

2) still not in the public domain through
official disclosure; and

3) still not contained in material cleared
by the Publications Review Board.

Wi J Ba); be

Attachment - Detail Listing

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES |
AND METHODS INVOLVED :

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 022438

SECRET

13-00000

Item

SECRET

Attachment

E. 0. 11652 Exemptions for Items in

Manuscript Page No,

os vo od vWD TD VD BE VB BE VB BE VSD VB VS VS 8

47
48
48
54
63
65
65 a ©
65 a
70
71
92
165

470

471
471

ECRET

Exemption

5 B (1) (2)
B (1) (2)

5 B (1)

5 B (2)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B.(2) (3)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B (2)

5 B (2) (3)

5 B (3)

5 B (1)

5 B (1)

5 B (2)

5 B (2)

5 B (2)

13-00000

16 APR 977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight ©

FROM : William J. Graver
. ' Chief, East Asia Division

SUBJECT : The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence,
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum, dated 8 April 1977,
Same Subject

East Asia Division officers have reviewed the deleted
subject book items per Reference request and conclude they
are:

1) still classified under Executive Order
11652,

2) still not in the public domain through
official disclosure; and

3) still not contained in material cleared
by the Publications Review Board.

Wa J Be

Attachment - Detail Listing

WARHING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES Et IMPDET 8
AND METHODS INVOLVED BY 0

SECRET

13-00000

Item

26

27

28
31
38

At

42
43
46
47
or
152
197
319
320

321

Attachment

eee ee

Manuscript Page No.

- 47
- 48
- 48
- 54
- 63
» 65
. 65 a

. 70
. 71
. 92
. 165
. 218
. 470

P
P
P
P
P
P
P
p- 65 a
P
P
P
P
P
P
p-. 471
P

SECRET

7), eS, >, >, Sn >, > 2 2,

EB. O. 11652 Exemptions for Items in

Exemption

w

~~~ ~~ ~~ ~~~ ~;~~ -- ~~. - ~~)

(1)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)

(2)
(2)

(2)
(2)
(2)
(3)
(1)
(1)
(2)
(2)
(2)

(2)
(2)

(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)

(3)

13-00000

_o™

ous a | ag APR IF

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney
Office of General Counsel

FROM © > William W. Wells
; Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT :: Review of the 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by. Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

In reply to your oral request, attached is ~
the report of the review of the deleted items which
are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate
components of the DDO reviewed their respective
items for classification and their findings are
contained in the attached report. Specific classi-

' fication and exemption authority for each item
which is still classified is availabie, if needed,
in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.

William ie Wells

William W. Wells

’ Distribution:

Orig G 1 - OGC
- 2 - DDO
2 - SA/DO/0O

E2 IMPDET
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13-00000

27 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations

VIA Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
Special Assistant to the DDO
for External Oversight

FROM | : ‘Samuel Halpern

SUBJECT ~~: + Review of 168 Deleted Items in
; "CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
. by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

(U) 1. This is the réport of the review done by ~
the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items
which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The
remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-
bility of the DDS§&T and DDA were reviewed by those
Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.

_ Responsible components did the necessary inter- and
intraagency coordinations. | ;

(U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted
concerning the completeness of the review, especially
‘as regards those items declassified by "official
public disclosure" as defined. by the courts. While I
am sure that as diligent a search as possible was done
— by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely
complete search is impossible for the following reasons:

(U) a. There is no index of any kind,
let alone having the material in machine form
such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published
hearings and reports of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church
Committee), the six published hearings and
proceedings of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume
Report to the President by the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States
(Rockefeller Commission) ;°

E2 IMPDET
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na i A

Se nr

13-00000

(U) b. There is no comprehensive readily
available record of precisely what information
has been declassified.and released in accordance
with the Freedom of Information Act. and the
Privacy Act; there are separate collections
with a limited capability to retrieve some such
information; .

(U) c. There is no available record of
the information that officials of the Executive
Branch of government, with authority to
declassify information, have said or written
in public either before Congressional
committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,
college symposiums, the general’ lecture
circuit, other public forums, etc.

In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee
that those items which are still classified by the
DDO components have not been deliberately or

‘inadvertently declassified in whole or in part as”

"official public disclosure."

(U) 3. Bearing in mind the above, attachment A
lists those items of the DDO deleted items which have
been declassified by “official public disclosure."
These thirteen complete and parts of four other items
can therefore be released from the court injunction.

(S) 4. Attachment B (seven parts) contains
eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still

classified but about which there may be some possible

question. These are highlighted here so that
cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with
due regard for all legal and policy aspects.

(U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining
items which the DDO components advise are still

classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and
cannot. be released from the court injunction.

Freire (flips
per

Samie lH

SEGRET

13-00000

5
i u-

Item No.
i 3
4.
— s
9 (line 17 thru ninth

10
“11
46

57

89 .

word on line 24)

(last four words of

MSS

p. no,

qd
12

12

line 1 and first 11.

words of line 2;
and lines 5-11)

(line 20 thru first

three words of ‘line’

24) Oo

126

127

15

70

84

106_

130

ATTACHMENT A

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee :

Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190-_

-Church Committee.

Vol. 7, p. 168

Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 190

Church Committee.
Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190

' Church Committee

Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190

Church Committee ,
Vol..7, pp. 160, 170, 172

Church, Committee ;
Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171

Church Committee
Book I, p. 194

Church Committee, |
Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff. ;

Rockefeller Commission Report
218 ,

Church Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church. Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218 ;
Church. Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209


13-00000

No

Item .

292

307

317

338

(line 1, third,
fourth, eighth,
ninth words; and
line 2, first

. three words)

MSS
p. no.

435.

468
508—

509

ATTACHMENT A cont'd

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee
Vol. 7, p. 205

‘Church Committee,

Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff. .

Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205

Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 144-209 ©

CIA presence has been
officially disclosed in
the following only:

a. Congo - Church Committee
report on Alleged Assassina-
tion Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, pp. 13-70.

b. Cambodia - Amb. John
Gunther Dean testimony before
the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations of the

Committee on International
Relations, House of Representa-
tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672

_c¢. Laos - Director Colby,

13 September 1974, in an
address to the Fund for Peace
Conference on CIA and Covert
Actions and in Church
Committee Book I, oP: 120 and
155; Book IV, p.

d. Vietnam - Church Committee.
report on Alleged Assassination
pp. 217-224; Book I, pp. 23 ©
and 120.

e. Philippines - Church
Committee, Book I, p. 23.


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (1)

Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172 MSS pp. ‘no. 46, 48, 165, 189
(U) NE Division has highlighted these items.
(S) Item 22 states in. part "A notable example of such

a ‘special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup
d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was

understandably grateful... Item. 28 lists the Shah among
‘other "world leaders with “shon CIA has developed special.

relationships" as. does Item 152 and a similar statement is
made ‘in Item 179. ;

(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and
Scholars," pp. 131-132, states:

"l.. a covert operation so successful that it
became “widely known all over the world was carried
out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been
driven out of Iran by his left-leaning Premier,
Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the
local Communist (Tudeh) Party and from the Soviet
Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skillful
clandestine services officer who flew to Iran,
hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate
those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian.
military men loyal to the Shah how to take over
the local radio station, and paved the. way for the
Shah's triumphal return."

(U) _ The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly
mentioned ''the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"
as one of CIA's “boldest, most spectacular covert

'. operations."

-(S) There is a vast difference between the classified
deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"
with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a .
statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The
former is still properly classifiable and classified.

green
weuid

13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (2)

Item No. 49 - - MSS p. no. 71a. .

'  (S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Dail
American is still classified SECRET because it describes
intelligence sources and-methods as related to newspaper
publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the
September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia
Journalism Review which states; "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,
the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute, .
then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm
of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the
fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American
in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-
ment ‘atypical’ of what the Agency was doing, ‘a bad
example’'." It is questionable whether the remarks made by

‘Mr. Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute,
who left the Agency long before that, can be considered
'as constituting official _ Agency disclosure of this’ —

information.


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (3)

Item No. 54, 236 | MSS p. no. 80, 262

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World
Features is still classified SECRET because both items

‘describe intelligence. sources and methods and identifies

referred to - but not by name - in Book I of the Church
Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: ‘Another’
example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two
proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in

- Europe... The larger of the two was subscribed to by

over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these

two press services."' While Forum World Features was not
named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be

“protected, it is possible that CJA disclosure to newspaper

editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (4)

Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25) MSS.p. no. 92

(S) Under injunction as classified information is
"For its Tibetan operation of. the early sixties, the
Agency constructed extensive support facilities in ©
Northeast India and brought large numbers of guerrillas |
to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."
Underlining (ine 25, ninth thru twenty-third word).
indicates the questionable part of the item since MSS
page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly

_brought to the United States for special paramilitary.

training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."
This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and

- appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.


13-00000
|

ATTACHMENT B (5).

Item No. 72 ~ MSS p. 97
(U) NE Division has highlighted ‘this. ‘item,

(S) The deleted item is "The CIA. quickly made contact
with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.
Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was.

(U) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret
Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was
winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents
into Tibet to assess the situation and see what could. be
done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the.
offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched
by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama ‘in Lhasa, giving
him a channel of communication with. the West.

"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa to
- avoid capture by the Chinese’ forces in 1959, he was
accompanied on his flight by a CIA-trained radio operator
who. was able to keep Washington posted on his often
hazardous progress."

(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA .
"close relationship": with the Dalai Lama and his being
"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different
from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators
being with the Dalai Lama.. These are two different —
comments with the first being properly classifiable and
classified. ;

lac lated

SEE

§ re 4

Es


13-00000

{ a
i

ATTACHMENT B (6)

Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279 MSS pp. 123, 132,133, 403

(S)} CCS states that all four items which refer to
-Fairways Corporation as a ClA-owned proprietary company
are still classified since they describe intelligence
sources and methods by idéntifying an operational support
facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from
declassification under Section.5 (B) (2) .of the General
Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

(S) According. to CCS files, in April 1975 Director
Colby was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship
of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV
documentary ‘on Agency proprietaries. CCS files are unclear
on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby
may have responded to the question in a manner which
could have been construed as admission of-sponsorship of
Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence
that the matter was considered to be still classified as
recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that. the.
subject be withheld from public disclosure.


13-00000

aa a . _ . out

ATTACHMENT B (7)

Item No. 33900 MSS _p. no. 509

(S)} CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been
officially acknowledged and is still classified because
it involves ‘sources and methods.

David Phillips ‘in his book” The Night Watch,
chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970-
1972" describes his. presence as Chief of Station of CIA
in Brazil. and on page 209 he discusses CIA in Bolivia.

(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence
in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509),
Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presénce
in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of ©
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We
believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo."

_ It is nota question of whether to agree or not
to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church |
Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made
"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the
subject moot. In addition, as Item 339-in Attachment A
shows, four other countries of the Third World are also
mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What
no adverse effect could be expected now. by another public -

' -yeference to CIA presence in the Congo as of the original
, 1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is
difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has
; not changed since the 1975 release of the information by
| the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse
effects there” might be have already occurred.

SECRET.


13-00000

ATTACHMENT C
ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

Item No. MSS _p. no. © “Item No. MSS p. no.

1 11 63. 86.
9 (lines 14-16;- 14 _ 67 92°
: line 24, last _ - 72 (+ 97
~~ two words 73 97
thru line. 29) 74 . 98
; ; 79 - 100
10 (line 1, .. 15 107 123
. first 7 words; ; : 128) 132
line 2, last 2 - . 129 133
words thru ; 130 ° 133
line 4) ; _ 148 155
° 149 - 156
18 - AZ: 152 - 165.
19 43 159 181
20 44 a 160 | 182
21 45 . 161 183
22 . 46 162 184
23 , 46 182 196
24 47 194 215
26 ae ‘47 195 216
27 4B 196 217

28 48. . 197 218

29 49 . . 198 219.

31 54 201 ‘ 222.
34° 59 224 252

.38 63 225 253

41 65 226 257
. 42 65a 234 262
—: 43 , ' 65a 236 . | 262
46 (line 24, 70 256 329

fourth word .- 261 334
thru line 31) 273° 380
| 47 71 278 400
48 Tila -279 403

: 49. 7la 280° 404.
50 72 283 413

51 _ 72 284 — 7° L413

52 77 286 414

: 53 78 287 414
; 54 80. 287a 415
55 80 288 416
: 56 81 290 — 417
58 84 291 417
: 59 85 296 425

62 + 86 298 426

SECRET


13-00000

t 97 . ft

: Item No. - MSS p. no.
300 426 —
308 437
318 469
319 470

: 320 .- 471

: - 321, , 471
322 ; 473.

: «323 474

po - 331 , 482

. 332). . 482

333 a 483
334 483.
335 483
336 : 484
337 507

339 (line 1, first 509 ©
’ two words and
fifth, sixth
and seventh words)


13-00000

27 Ayrch >>

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. John Greaney ;
- Office of General Counsel

FROM : William W. Wells
. Deputy Director for Operations

‘SUBJECT’ _ t’ Review of the 168 Deleted Items in
"CIA and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

; In reply to your oral request, attached is
the. report of the review of the deleted items which
are the responsibility of the DDO. Appropriate
components of the DDO reviewed their respective
items for classification and their findings are

contained in the attached report. Specific classi-
fication and exemption authority for each item
which is still classified is available, if needed,
in each component's response filed with SA/DO/O.

William W. Wells

Distribution:

Orig § 1 --:OGC
“2 - DDO
2 - SA/DO/O

’E2 IMPDET
CL BY. 018630.


13-00000

27 April 1977-

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Operations ©

VIA : Mr. Ralph J. Katrosh
Special Assistant to the DDO
for External Oversight

FROM : ‘Samuel Halpern

SUBJECT _ : Review of 168 Deleted Items in
, "CIA. and the Cult of Intelligence"
by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks

(U) 1. This is the report of the review done by
. the appropriate DDO components of those deleted items
which are the basic responsibility of the DDO. The
remaining deleted items which are the basic responsi-
bility of the DDS&T and DDA were reviewed by those
Directorates which are reporting directly to OGC.
Responsible components did the necessary inter- and .
intraagency coordinations. .

(U) 2. Several points need to be highlighted
concerning the completeness of the review, especially
as regards those items declassified by "official
public disclosure" as defined by the courts. While I
am sure that as diligent a search as possible was. done
by the DDO components, a thorough and absolutely
complete search is impossible for the following reasons:

(U) a. There is no index of any kind,
let alone having the material in machine form
such as in the RSM, to the fifteen published
hearings and reports of the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations .With
Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church
Committee), the six published hearings and

- proceedings of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence (Pike Committee) or the one volume
Report to the President by the Commission on
CIA Activities Within the United States
(Rockefeller Commission) ;

- E2 IMPDET
OT CL BY 018630

13-00000

(U) b. There is no comprehensive readily
available record of precisely what information
has been. declassified and released in accordance _
with the Freedom. of Information Act and the
Privacy Act; there are separate collections
with a limited capability to retrieve some such
information;

(U) c. There is no available record of
the information that officials of the Executive
Branch of government, with authority to ;
declassify information, have said or written
in public either before Congressional
committees, TV talk shows, radio talk shows,
college symposiums, the general lecture
circuit, other public forums, etc.

In view of the above, it is impossible to guarantee
that those items which are still classified by the’

‘DDO components have not been deliberately or

inadvertently. declassified in whole or in part as
"official public disclosure."

(U) 3. Bearing in mind ‘the above, attachment A
lists those items of the DDO deleted items which. have
been declassified by “official public disclosure."

- These thirteen complete and parts of four other items

can therefore be released from the court injunction.

(S 4. Attachment: B (seven parts) contains
eleven deleted items (seven subjects) which are still
classified but about which there may be some possible
question. These are highlighted here so that
cognizance can be taken and final decisions made with
due regard for all legal and policy aspects. .

(U) 5. Attachment C lists all DDO remaining
items which the DDO components advise are still
classified under Executive Order 11652 as amended and
cannot. be released from the court injunction.

fee ius { hips 17.2»
alper

Samuel


13-00000

Item No.

3

9 (line 17 thru ninth
word on line 24)

10 (last four words of
' line 1 and first 11
' words of line 2; .
and lines 5-11)
‘Ll. .
46 (line 20 thru first
- three words of line
24)
57

89

126

127

MSS

p. no.

11
12

12

15

70

84

106

130

ATTACHMENT. A

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee :
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 190

-Church Committee

Vol. 7, p. 168

- Church Committee

Vol. 7, p. 190

Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp..166-170, 190

'” Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 166-170, 190

Church Committee
Vol..7, pp. 160, 170, 172

Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 148, 165, 166, 171

Church Committee
Book I, p. 194.

Church Committee,
Alleged Assassination Plots
pp. 139 ff.

Rockefeller Commission Report
p- 218

Church Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218
Church. Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209

Rockefeller Commission Report
p. 218

Church Committee

Book I, pp. 208-209


13-00000

292

307

‘317

338

Item No.

(line 1, third,-
fourth, eighth,

ninth words;
line 2,sfirst
three words)

and

MSS .

x no.
420

435

- 468

508

509

ATTACHMENT A cont'd

Official Public Disclosure

Church Committee
Vol. 7, Pp. 205

'- Church Committee,

Alleged Assassination Plots

‘pp. 139 ff.

Church Committee -
Vol. 7, pp. 168, 189, 205

Church Committee
Vol. 7, pp. 144-209

CIA presence has been
officially disclosed in

the following only:

a. Congo - Church Committee
report on Alleged Assas‘sina-
tion Plots Involving Foreign
Leaders, pp. 13-70.

b. Cambodia - Amb. John
Gunther Dean testimony before
the Special Subcommittee on
Investigations of the

Committee on International
Relations, House of Representa-
tives, May 5, 1976, p. 672

c. Laos - Director Colby,

13 September 1974, in an
address to the Fund for Peace
Conference on CIA and Covert
Actions and in Church
Committee Book I, pp. .120 and
155; Book IV, p. 68.

d. Vietnam - Church Committee.
report on Alleged Assassination
pp: 217-224; Book I, pp. 23
and 120.

e. Philippines - Church
Committee, Book I, p. 23.


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (1)

Item No. 22, 28, 152, 172 MSS pp. no. 46, 48, 165, 189

(U) NE Division has highlighted these items.

(S) Item 22 states in part "A notable example of such
a 'special relationship' is Iran, where a CIA organized coup.
d'etat restored the Shah to power in 1953. The Shah was
understandably grateful.. Item 28 lists the Shah among
other "world leaders with whom CIA has developed special
relationships" as does Item 152 and a similar statement is
made in Item 179.

(U) Ray S. Cline in his book "Secrets, Spies and
Scholars," pp. 131-152, states:

",.. a covert operation so successful that it
‘became. “widely known all over the world was carried
out in Iran. The Shah, then very young, had been
driven out of Iran by his: left-leaning Premier,
Mohammed Mossadegh, whose support came from the
local Communist (Tudeh). Party and from the Soviet
Union. CIA mounted a modest effort under a skiliful
clandestine. services. officer who flew to Iran,
hired enough street demonstrators to intimidate
those working for Mossadegh, instructed Iranian
military men loyal to the Shah how to take over

“the local radio station, and paved the way for the
Shah's triumphal return,"

_(U) The Church Committee, Book I, p. 111, briefly
mentioned "the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran"
as one of CIA's "boldest, most spectacular covert
operations," .

-(S) There is a vast difference between the classified
deleted items speaking about an active "special relationship"
with the Shah following the overthrow of Mossadegh and a
statement about CIA's role in overthrowing Mossadegh. The
former is still properly classifiable and classified.


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (2)

Item No. 49 To , MSS p. no. 7la

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of the Rome Daily
American is still classified SECRET because it describes
intelligence sources and methods as related to newspaper
publications. CCS files contain a newsclip from the
September and October 1974 edition of the Columbia
Journalism Review which states, "Landon K. Thorne, Jr.,

the CIA's Bross, and a lawyer for CIA, Benjamin Shute,

.then a partner in the prestigious Wall Street law firm

of Cravath, Swaine, and Moore, now acknowledge that the
fourth partner [in the purchase of the Rome Daily American

in 1956] was the CIA. [Bross] recently called the arrange-
ment ‘atypical' of what the Agency was doing, "a bad
example'." It is questionable whether ‘the remarks made by
Mr. Bross,who retired from the Agency in 1971, and Mr. Shute,
who left the Agency long before that, can be Considered

as constituting official Agency disclosure of this
information.

Sierer

Webbed


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (3)

Item No. 54, 236 7 MSS p. no. 80, 262

(S) Reference to CIA sponsorship of Forum World -
Features is still classified SECRET because both items
describe intelligence sources and methods and identifies
operations based in England. Forum-World Features was
referred to - but not by name - in Book IT of the Church
Committee Final Report, page 199, as follows: "Another
example of the damages of 'fallout' involved two

_ proprietary news services that the CIA maintained in

Europe... The larger of the two. was subscribed to by

over thirty U.S. newspapers. In an effort to reduce the
problem of fallout, the CIA made a senior official at the
major U.S. dailies aware that the CIA controlled these

two press services." While Forum World Features was not
named in the Senate report and therefore continues to be -
protected, it is possible that CIA disclosure to newspaper
editors may be considered as "official public disclosure."


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (4)

Item No. 67 (lines 24, 25). - MSS p. no. 92

(S) Under injunction as classified-information is
"For its Tibetan operation of the early sixties, the
Agency constructed extensive support facilities in
Northeast India and brought large numbers of. guerrillas
to a deserted Army base in Colorado for special training."
Underlining (line 25, ninth thru twenty-third word)
indicates the questionable part.of the item since MSS |
page 97, lines 24-26 states "Some Tibetans were quietly
brought to the United States for special paramilitary

“training at Camp Hale in the mountains of Colorado."

This sentence was originally deleted, then reinstated and
appears in boldface type on page 115 in the published book.

mane
Wadi ke


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (5)

Item No. 72° . MSS p. 97
(U) NE Division has highlighted this item.

(S) The deleted item is "The CIA quickly made contact
with the Dalai Lama and a close relationship was established.
Financed and advised by Agency covert operators, he was.

(u) Harry Rositzke, in his book "The CIA's Secret _
Operations" pp. 173-174, states "As the Korean war was
winding down, the CIA began sending intelligence agents
into Tibet to assess the situation and see. what could be.
done to forestall the Chinese takeover that was in the
offing. Tibetan agents equipped with radios were dispatched
by air and made contact with the Dalai Lama in Lhasa, giving
hima channel of communication with the West.

"When the Dalai Lama chose to flee from Lhasa. to
avoid capture by the Chinese forces in 1959, he was

‘accompanied on his flight by a ClIA-trained radio operator

who was able to keep Washington posted on his often
hazardous progress."

(S) The classified deleted item speaks of a CIA
"close relationship" with the Dalai Lama and his being
"financed and advised" by CIA which is quite different

from Rositzke's statement about CIA trained radio operators

being with the Dalai Lama. These are two different
comments with the first being properly classifiable and
classified.

SEGIEY


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (6)

Item No. 107, 128, 129, 279 MSS. pp. 123, 132, 133, 403

(S) CCS states that all four items which refer to
Fairways Corporation as'a ClA-owned proprietary company
are still classified since they describe intelligence
sources and methods by identifying an operational support
facility located in the U.S. and are therefore exempt from
declassification under Section 5 (B) (2) of the General
Declassification Schedule contained in Executive Order 11652.

(S) According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director
Colby. was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship
of Fairways Corporation in connection with a planned TV
documentary on Agency ‘proprietaries. CCS files are unclear
on the point, but there are indications that Director Colby
may have ‘responded to the question in a manner which
could have been construed as admission of sponsorship of
Fairways. In any case, CCS files contain other evidence
that the matter was considered to be still classified as
recently as December 1976, when Director Bush wrote to
the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration
regarding CIA sponsorship of Fairways and asked that the
subject be withheld from public disclosure.


13-00000

ATTACHMENT B (7)

Item No. 339. MSS p. no. 509

(S) CIA presence in Bolivia and Brazil has not been
officially acknowledged and is still classified because
it involves sourcés and methods.

David Phillips in his book .The Night Watch,
chapter 8, pp. 212-235, entitled "Brazil, Venezuela 1970- -

1972" describes his presence as Chief of Station of CIA

in Brazil and-on page 209 he.discusses CIA in Bolivia. —

(S) In regard to the declassification of CIA presence
in the Congo (Attachment A, Item 339, MSS p. no. 509),
Africa Division states "The existence of a CIA presence
in the Congo is reported in an interim report of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence dated 20 November 1975.
It may be argued therefore that to agree to declassification
of the reference to the Congo would have the effect of
singling out the Congo in the Third World as an alleged
target of CIA operations. This would have an adverse
effect on our relations with the government of Zaire. We
believe the item should remain classified and that
exemption 5 (b) (3) would apply in the case of the Congo.'

It is not a question of whether to agree or not
to declassification of reference to the Congo. The Church
Committee report as cited in Attachment A has already made
"official-public disclosure" of the matter, rendering the ©
subject moot. In addition, as Item 339 in Attachment A’
shows, four other countries of the Third World are also’
mentioned, thereby not singling out the Congo alone. What
adverse effect could be expected now by another public
reference to CIA presence in.the Congo as of the original
1974 publication date of the Marchetti/Marks book, is
difficult to comprehend. Since the government of Zaire has
not changed since the 1975 release of the information by
the Church Committee, it would seem that whatever adverse
effects there might be have already occurred.

SECRET


13-00000

ATTACHMENT C

ITEMS STILL CLASSIFIED IN MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

Item. No. MSS p. no. - Item No.  -MSS p. no..

1 11 "63 86

9 (lines 14-16; 14. ; 67 92 -
line 24, last 72 97-
two words 73°. 97
thru line 29) - 74 98:
a 79 100
10 (line 1, 15 : 107 12.3
first 7 words; os 128 132
line 2, last 2 129: ; 133°
words thru co 130.—; 133
line 4) ee 148 — 155
. , ‘149 "156
18 42. 152. 165
19 43 - 159 181
20 44 ; 160 182

21. .4S5 161 183 .
22 46 162 184
23 , 46 182 ; 196
24 47 ; 194 © 215
26 47 195 216
27 ; 48 196 217.
28 -  . 48 197 218
29 Oe 49 ; 198 219

31° 54 201 . 222 —
34 59 224. 252
38 63 225 253

41. 65 226 257
42 65a 234 , 262
43 65a 236 262
46 (line 24, 70 | 256 ' 329
fourth word - - 261 334
thru line 31) ; 273 380
47 71 278. 400
48 —  TWla 279 403
: 49 : 7la - + 280° - 404
i 50 72 283 413
, 51. . 72 284 413
52 77 286. 414
53 78 287 414
54. Ci; 80 287a 415
55 80 288 416
56 81 290 417
58 84 ; 291 417
59. 85 296 425

62 + 86 298 426°


13-00000

Item No. “MSS p. no.

300i 426
308. ae 437
“318 469
319 _ 470
320 | 471
321 ~ 471
322 473
323 474
331 . 482
33200 482
333 . 483
334.0 483
335 483
336 oo 484
337 507°.

339 (line 1, first 509
two words and
fifth, sixth
‘and seventh words)


13-00000

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR; ‘Mr. John.K. Greaney
, Associate General Counsel

FROM - : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT :. DDO Coordination on DDS§T's Review of |

Deletions from The CIA and the Cult
of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

REFERENCE : -DDS§T-5193-76/1-dated 27 May 1977

1. Appropriate Components of the DDO have reviewed
the following items (deletions) listed at Tab C of referent
for coordination with the DDO and concur with the DDS&T
that they are all properly classified in accordance with
E.O. 11652 and should so remain:

Item ; Manuscript Page
» 25 47
159 . 181
160 ; 182
161 7 183
162 184
163 _ 7284
164 - 185
205° oo 234
208 : 235
209 236
295 : 424
297 425
299 ao , 426
301 . 427

2. In Tab D of referent, the DDSET deferred to DDO
or OS the decision on the classification of Item 190, manu-
script page 214, relating to Soviet capabilities to make
intelligible the sounds picked up by audio devices discovered
in the code room of the American Embassy in Moscow. The
appropriate DDO Component finds that this item must remain
classified SECRET since it relates to cryptography and is

exempt. from the General Declassification Schedule of

on ae E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630

weg

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

I

| 5
ae
|

i

E.0. 11652, exemption category 5B(2).

3. Specific classification and exemption authority for
each item, if. needed, is available from SA/DO/O.

| Oo William W. Wells

\ ; . _ ‘
. O/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution Sc
Original §& 1 - Addressee
; ‘- DDO :
- ADDO:
- Ex Reg
- DDS&T
- SA/DO/O |

SRNR ENE

SECRET

13-00000

DDS&T-5193-76/1

B2 WAL 97.
MEMORANDUM FOR: ‘General Counsel .
ATTENTION .?  John.Greaney
SUBJECT -: Review of Deletions from The CIA and the

Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks

1. The responsible - and knowledgeable components of this
directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from subject
book per your request. The review was made to determine whether
each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the
information in each’ deletion has been. officially released by the
U.S. Government. ;

2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the deleted items reviewed
by this directorate. Tab B is:a list of those items of primary
interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi-
fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C
is a list of those items which we determined are still classified
under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be

released, but we recommend that all of the items in Tab C be

coordinated with other indicated elements. Tab D is a list of
items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and
should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list

of the four items.mentioned above which we believe portions can
now. be released. The portions: in red brackets, remain classified

and should not be released,

3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National

Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-

tions. through our contacts at NSA. We were told that any
coordination must be handled between, the NSA and CIA General
Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with other ele-

ments was attempted.

4, This memorandum completes the DDS§T action on the

‘court ordered: ‘review of the deletions from subject book.

Aoocl f Lillew :

ernest’s J. ZELLMER
7 Associate Deputy Director
*. ; for
Science and. Technology

Attachments:
As. Stated


13-00000

Item

189

DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT

REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T

Page

47
104
104
105
106
107
134
135.
177
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
185
185
185
189
189
189
190
191.
191
"492
193
194
200.
201

202.

' Item

190
191
192
204
205
208
209
245
248
254
258
259
260
267
268
269
275
295°
297
299
301
302
304
306
312
313
324
325
327
328
329

TAB A

235
236

' 268

269
327
331
331
331
337
337
337
394
424
425

(426

‘427
427
430

431

4420
450

- 474

474
475
476
480.

13-00000

91
92
#135

136

158

163
(165°
166

167
188

Manuscript Page

Tab B

ITEMS OF INTEREST. TO THE DDS&T
AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED

SECRET, 5B(2)
SECRET, 5B(2)
SECRET, 5B (2)
SECRET, 5B(2)
SECRET, .5B(3)
SECRET, 5B(2)
SECRET, 5B(2)
SECRET, 5B(3)
CONFIDENTIAL,

CONFIDENTIAL,

TOP SECRET, 5B(2)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

and
and
and

and

and

and

(3)
(3)
(3)
(3)

(3)
(3)

5B(2)

SB(2).

13-00000

laD &

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN

CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD .BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

Item

#25 -

_#& 7)
88
157
159
160
161.
162
163
164

187
189 |

Manuscript Page

47
104
105

DDO
DOD
pop
0S

DDO,
 ppo,
- DDO,

DDO,

DDO |

NSA

~ DOD

DOD

NSA

’ DDO

DDO

- DDO
“pop
' DOD
- DOD

DOD

(DIA)
(DIA)

OC, ERDA
OC, ERDA
OC, ERDA —
OC, ERDA

~ DDO -

(Navy)
(Navy)
and DDO

(SAFSS) .”

(SAFSS)

(SAFSS) , NSC Staff
(SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized’ and portions. released.


13-00000
Tab C
Continued

‘Item, Manuscript Page
259° 331 DOD (SAFSS)
260 331 7 DOD (SAFSS)
267 337 - -pOD (Navy) |
268-0 337, == sé (Navy) |
269 = 337, «DOD (Navy).
#275. 394 OL |
295 ar. DDO |
29725 ppo
299 426 "DDO, NSA a —
301 42700 pDo, OC, NSA
302 s=<“<«~=«CTSC‘(“ NS |
304 a 430° NSA
306° sts«C DOD (Navy)
312 a 2 44200: NSA
313 450 NSA |
‘329. ss 80S*é“‘«‘“‘«‘:*‘UNSC«CSt an
7 *Can be sanitized and portions released.
17 2n :


13-00000

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item

86

170.
171 ©
173.

174

“475—

176
Av
178
190

“-491-

192

324

325

327

328

Manuscript Page

0/DCI
NSA
NSA
NSA ~
NSA
NSA
NSA |
NSA
NSA |

pbO or OS |

State Department
State Department

DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff

‘DOD

DDI and DOD -

"DDI, DOD and NSC Staff.


13-00000

“COE L ‘Tab E

ITEMS SANITIZED. FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE

Item 135, Manuscript page 134

"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred in fioe7
when CIA’ decided to get rid of a technical research {laboratory} »

in the {Boston area."

Item 25, Manuscript page 47

“Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the
th ationalist§} first to run guerrilla attacks against imainland
hina! and then in mote recent years to use Waiwant ‘as a base

' for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist’ Dilots

trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of
the mainland and such covert action programs as propaganda
and disinformation aimed at (China during the Cultural Revol-
ution,?’

- Item 87, Manuscript page 107

"The Agency also had a project to determine where American .
risoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to
[Eommunicate with them} Scale models of the prisons were
constructed from aerial fand satellite photography and from
other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which
prisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.
Some of -the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their
infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending
coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus,
the Agency worked out schemes to use return mail from the.
families to send answers back} Meanwhile, the Technical.

Services Division Of the"

Item 275, Manuscript page 394

new optics for satellite ‘cameras and improvements in ‘over
the horizon' radars? These technical contracts were almost
always drawn up under: the cover of being between the scholar
(or the university) and some government agency other than the
CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were
the most"

SECRET | _.

13-00000

os Be . | Tab €

INTEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN

[ CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS
; Item, Manuscript Page
£9- he - 289 © 47 doo
* 87° | 104 | DOD. (DIA)
88 105 DOD (DIA)
| 157 179° Os
Cine/ Idee = 159? . 181°. DDO, OC, ERDA
. “ 1608 182 / DDO, OC, ERDA-
me 6® 183 ; DDO, OC, ERDA
. wo rel 184 DDO, OC, ERDA
s ‘ 163 | 184 DDO
; a ‘64? 185.0 DDO
172 189: NSA
187 200 DOD (Navy)
189 | a 202. DOD (Navy)
204 233 "NSA and DDO
WED 2089 | 234 bbe
= 208 235 + DDO
LA 236 ppo™.
245 268 ‘DOD “(SAFSS)
248 269" _ DOD (SAFSS)
254 327 pop (SAFSS);, NSC Staff
(258° | 331 DOD (SAFSS)

' *Can be Sanitized and portions released.

13-00000

267° O37
268. 337

2939 gaz

og ct _femcyprs. 297 . 425_

= 299% - 426

306-43

“313 _ 450
329 = — 480

o-

26002 331

269 337
AI75 394.

_ 3018 427°
304 430

31200 442.

Item Manuscript Page
259 331

DOD
DOD

’ DOD

DOD
DOD

DDO
ppo

“ppo,
DDO,
NSA.

NSA

. DOD

NSA

- NSA

NSC

-2e

OL .

Tab C
Continued

(SAFSS)
(SAFSS)
(Navy)
(Navy).
(Navy)

NSA

Oc, NSA
(Navy)

Staff

- *Can be sanitized and portions released.

13-00000

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item

86

170 -

171
173

- 174
4175

- Manuscript Page

104
189
189
190
191
191

193

0/DCI

“NSA |

NSA:
NSA

NSA.

NSA.

NSA

NSA
NSA
DDO or os”

' State Department

State Department

-poD
DDI and DOD ©
' DDI, DOD and NSC Staff.

DOD (ses), and NSC staff

13-00000

t
i

' desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein Vine (which was notfnew),

oe ro Be we ; _ _ . tp

[iussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the BH /
Ft

é

strong and strident propaganda vofce of Radia Cairo. Both parties shared a

Aw

expertise and management skills to put the station in operation. | G
Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special | 7
relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's Link is 7 3
not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,
Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA chief of station, Ray Cline, now the ~ /
‘State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something - h
of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- /
-night drinking boutsfaith the younger Chiang. | tr
Fover the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first Cs
to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then in.more recent . L
years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist h
pilots trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of the mainland $
and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation aimed at l
China during the Cultural Revolution. | . !
In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally 2
conducting al] important meetings, with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was: 2
accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed. 2
But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for z
many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. 2
According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has | Zz
served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal 4 2
‘meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. \ 2

fersonelly with 4
' * }Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu porsonndadjydeis mi11 fons of 2

[Dyer the years, the CIA has provided phteu onsongetpivethe mi} 1tons of
dollars in untraceable, "black bag" funds, -tnerddttionto tha hiadvadecct —_/ Xz

13-00000

| ; the information straight forwardly, thereby, handtcapr'ing the. analysts in making

C "a confident judgment of tha accuracy of the report's content. * 7

. Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive!
large numbers of this type of report every day, many of which do come from &
actual agents. - But by mixing together information supplied by audio surveillance
(which is, by definition, an accuzate account of what was adid) with agent
reports which are sometimes exaggerated or false, the ‘Clandestine Services

~ confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose

function it is to analyse foreign events and indirectly those leaders who make

, decisions based on that intelligence analysts.

In the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and @®
the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddféeces to
carry. out one of the Agency's most imaginative (if ultimately unsuccessful)

Ce intelligence collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level

U.S. government officials were distubed by repprts that Communist China was on
the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system. .
They knew that the threat posed by Chinese ICBM's would play an important part
—_— in the decision, then under consideration, to go ahead with an American anti-
ballistic missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest .
priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzu, the
_ Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.
| The Agency's technical specialists responded by designing a nuclear-
ppwered device which could monitor certain key electronic emissions coming from

the missile site, well over a thousand miles away, and then rely the information

to a CIA listening post. The plan was to emplace the device on a mountain ~

peak called the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than 25,000 feet, in the

a Lee me ema pe cane eee te eye oe

Indian Himalayas from where 1t would have an unobstructed "line-of-sight" to

the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA

Tahorataries. the Clandestine Services took on the resoonsibility for the nost /

13-00000

©)

[aitticute plase of the operation -~ installing the machine on the mountain to

pe

“The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the

Indian government to implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the

CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not

‘only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.
Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry
the device, complete wéth its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it -

into operation. ‘A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered

Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.

Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an experfenced

O

2

aw Pon

wt

CIA case officer. . |
That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian
tn

climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret

CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn

how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top: of Nanda Devi.

Cover for the operation was carefully built by Teaking information in international

. mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an

ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the
technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the

CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements
with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was
clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport

ga

plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were

brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from

where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda

Devt.

eee

Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow line, the

Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking

too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the

A . 6 2 eet A ot A. dn - a a

13-00000

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!

i

; 3
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_ [would do. Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the team reached the base CD

C.

camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by’

a smal} party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the

group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to

tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the

staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. .

The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in’

an effort to restore peace among the climbers. The project was now wel off

. schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition

because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency

operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its
target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures.
well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into

Le . operation. With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news ©

of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging. area.

But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been
ee
sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to. fly over

the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the

device had been knocked over by a snow slide. When the Indian government
was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Delhi
that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headqaters of the sacred —
Sanghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about
religious pollution, not ecological. , |
The CIA reacted by planning another climbof the mountain for the following

year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a ‘new monitoring
system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator. The climbing team,

C led by Bishép, was gathered together again and this time it reached the .
top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was

set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year _[

13-00000

[ before was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devick Zz
c stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical .
. . . ‘
malfunction.

At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the

Coinmunist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved.
A I

SB wa WwW WwW

satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were

presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA. | a ¢

I the fertile imaginations of the E2/S&T experts during the following

—%

years produced many more unique codirction schemes aimed at solving the

ee ee

mysteries of China's strategic missile program, Most eventually proved to be
unworkable, and at least one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.
The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man
C. airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In :
concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into
the denied area where, after performing his espionage missfon, he would ~
assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border. .
Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with
| this scheme, and the projectydied on the drawing boards. . | |
A second system was a device, Tong and tubular like a rocket, that could/ (G2
be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall _
Slowed by a@ parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three

feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from

its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Still

later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most

likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a

foreign and héstile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional

similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine
ct

ratcad carinic miactinne ac tn the evstam'e utilitv and warth. The EYfsat

13-00000

(specialists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however (G4)

oblivious of the dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile . @

installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear :

to a startled radar operator as a-lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear 4
attack. Development of the €ostly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The. | 8
technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device. .—s-_ &

in the southwestern U.S, desert usually resulted in the system burying itself

several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation —

that the davice failed to self-activate and function properly. 7 . . '

fa third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, - Vay
such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which
could be Jaunched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well
over a thousand miles away, al7 the while searing in patterns that would resemble
on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once
over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras

would be turned on to record activities below and relay the information either

. to its laugch site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated

Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the

CIA in research on this “baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in

the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if

and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess it had been on an

Agency~sponsored spying mission. }

The technical difficulties involved in the fair-drop} system and thefmodet ] /6£

airplane Mevice were too great and time consuming for either to be fully . CF
developed by their inventors before improvenents in intelligence satellite |
surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement

for these quest ionably and potentially provocative collection systems before

they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few

more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubious value -- were also being

13-00000

. ierstoma tes

VE ora__the—-Shah 0 nOWe Oya GA : a¥e hah had shown his—gratt ache by

allowing the Agency~to_use Iran as a base for electron and radar surveillance -

of the Soviet Union. The CIA Station chief in Iran usually maintained much -

~ closer contact with the Sha n tha AmerTCan~ambassador. (With the 1973
appointment of formér CIA Director Helms to the past of American ambassador in.
anh haGeEn - 2 on icts BRAR—PPEStTIGOUTyY a ppea ody ,

the case, CIA representatives carried out most of the negotiations with the

Iranis.] However, when Ambassador Armin Meyer was informed of the details of

#, 7 Lamang the Agency had developed a new type of over-the-horizan radar Gtos>

AG
which it wished to install neerthe Soviet dovder | in Iran, As was normally .

Z .

3

4

the proposed agreement, he raised some questions with the CIA station chief that x

blossomed into an inter-agency dispute. At this point Meyer cabled the State

Department for Instructions and advice.
In the way of background, it should be understood that CIA communications

clerks handle nearly all classified cables between American embassies overseas

and Washington -- for both the CIA and the State Department. To have a separate

code roon for each agency in every embassy would be a wasteful procedure, so a-
senior CIA communications expert is regularly assigned to the administrative
part of the State Department in order to oversee CIA’s communicators who work
under State cover. In theory, CIA code clerks are not supposed to read the
messages they send for State, but any code clerk who wants to have a successful
career quickly realized that his promotions depend on the CIA and that he js |
well advised to show the CIA station chief cppies of all important State
messages. The State Department long ago fmplicitly recognized that its most

secret cables are not secure from CIA inspection by setting up special

- communications channels which sppposedly cannot be deciphered by the CIA,

. [Thea in 1968, Ambassador Meyer ran into troubles with the CIA station chief
\ , e7 . 1!

in Teheran, Meyer switched his, communications, with State fin Washington,

: ." ~=6He needed to be able to discuss the 7

G
7
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16

Ut

12
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17
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13-00000

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a

(situation in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were i
‘one step ahead of Ambassador ‘Meyer. - They had figured. out a way to intercept "2
his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each 3
State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy ‘Y
of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Mritten on top of 55
each lintercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be &
kept especially confident because State was unaware thet the CIA had a copy. 7

Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, ( _ $
Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield —_ G
to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even-after these two men met at i ¢

. CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, Hf
‘they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were -. - Ae
unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was SO L
aggravated by this continued resistance thas he personally telephoned Secretary ft
of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing © j
completely to the CIA position. . /

| Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D — Gop

worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain , ‘

South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of F

allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent

r

by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercppt 2
the ‘secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements  ;
were norna1 }procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw :
nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which i
cooperated in good faith. ,
. FI{D's liaison with the South Amerfcan country continued for a long period i
of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over é
unrelated issues, and as-a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship. é
However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could =

Be pestered 7

13-00000

i
i

re
; | Sometime later, Bbb Suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite Go)
ovt

- that the Agency should help the South American country obtain a channel in the

international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive |

operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other

CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and

frether or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to.
be a matter concer.:ing CIA. Only Tater did the executive suite officer learn

ne ES Ee
from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American

country in which liaison would be restored in return for a ‘Comsat channel (which
aah)
_ CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme w¥en

with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office. -
i

Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel; the

country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that

country's secret messages. /

Bob's job with FI/D is by no means one of the dirtiest jobs in the —.

Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who
probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in
a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even Hes
within the U.S. government -- not to mention the deceit he and his colleagues
perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into
liaison agreements with FI/D.

Bob X fs one of these dedinary looking people who mow their Tawn, love:

their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.

an
Fow other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes

similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and f Howard Hunt. Both had long,
relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper- —
middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security
officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt

was an oneratar whn nlaved a leading role in the Bav of Pias and who took part

13-00000

.
C Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced
it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its |
operation against Cuba. ‘The. Presi. ent way have get the original
- policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply.
by approving an attack on Guba, he would set in train Agency
paramilitary etivities against Guatamala.
CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-
ican foreign policys” fhey can subject the country to blackaail
if something goes wrong. For instance, after thy OLA, iphdot. was
shot down and captured by Indonesia in 1958, within rive days
the US government approved the sale for local currency cf 37,000
tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in
small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that
Ce moment, the /oTA was, actively backing-an armed revolution against
the Sukarno regime Jhese would have | peen strange actions indeed
for the US governmat to take if it were not extrenely concerned . 1
about saving the captured pilot.
A somewhat similar incident occurred in 1 Singapore in 1960"
after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city.
: to make sure that a locally recruited agent was trustwor thy. -
When the Agency technician plugged us his polygraph machine ia

a hotel room, ‘he blew out all the fuses in the building.* he

*This was not the only time that the CLA blew major “vsss vier= CIE.

Seas. During the mid+1940s, the Ayency addjed to ite nusemor?
ST \vVSO6O0 0&0 8 ON

wet Kae
_ facilities on Taiwan by building e tmge electronic ime


13-00000

lie detector man, a CIA case officer,. and the local agent were
soon all under arrest. The Singapore government and the 8ritish,
who were in the process of granting Singapore its independence, -
‘were both quite disturbed bythe indident. Negotiations then. |
ensued to secure the men's release. According to Singapore
Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, the (US government offereds3. 3 mile .
lion to get thom out. Lee claimed that he wented ten “tines as -
much and consequently took nothing. In any case, the two CIA
. officials were subsequently freed, the newly installea Secretary
| of State, Dean Rusk, wrote a Hecret letter of apology: ‘to “the
Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in a speech
as an example of the type of activities engaged in bythe CIA.
The State Department then {ssued a routine denial furnished by
the ClA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee’s —
charges. Lee reacted by publicly producing Rusk’s letter of d-
pology, and State was forced to retract its original statement,
although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.
me Y ' As well as embarrassing the US government and meking headlines
around the world, the incident caused the State Department to
revamp its anternal system for naking announcements about in-
telligence matters. . ,
= Blackmail was agin the theme in the mie-1960s when the — | CK)
President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios, quietly informed the .

for
ec

en eee ey ape me ee cee

[installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the -

device was turned on for the first time, it Knocked out a large @77)
part of the island's power. In this case, the local goverment a

ey ae a
“ .

reacted in a much more friendly manner than did Singapore’ Be

13-00000

US gover. nt that he might oust certain intelligence instal- 9,

lations from his island. the CIA had a major interest in the

matter, Ss... it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-

“vice FSIS) listening post there, and_the Pentagon was. also con- i
cerned about the possible loss of its large electronic surveil-

lance facilities. The view in the intelligence community was

that Makarics had to be mollified at practically all costs.
ae aed
Pinally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the

w ily old archbishop, and he received a special payment of about.

$10 million in return for letting the bases remain. The CIA

1G put up half of the money, using the Director’s Contingency Pund

for this unforseen expense. ee eR

In general, the presence of American intelligence facili-+

“ty oe . _

C ties in a foreign coumtry can have an.importent effect on Amer=
ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World.

99

Closely aligned coumtries, such as}England, ‘fermany, Japan,

and Australia, have usually allowed the Unived States to set

TE up electronic spying bases as part of the gencral framework of

cooperation between allies. | But to the less developed countries,

the presence of an American installation is both a threa$ and

an opportunity. The threat comes from domestic opposition fore
ces who look on the base as an example of *neo=coloniciica”
and use it as a weapon against those in powers The opportunity
arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly

for the richt-to install its eavesdropphng equipment~-end te

t rele
¢ keep it in place, as [Archbishop Kakarios] discovered. C7

13

13-00000
be. . .
[. ~ : :
——
i,
iC

io marily intelligence facilities. These are Kagnew in Ethiopia .

I a. ae a Saas :
7 _ and Kenitra in Morocco. [potn host governments have been severely

eriticized by internal forces and neizhboring countries for

The only American military pases in Africa are in fact pri- Got

giving the United States a foothold in their nations, but both

have been handsomely rewarded in terms of receiving American 7 (
military and economic assistance which had added up over the :
| —s-years into the hundreds of millions of doll ars. while compara §

- tively modest amounts of aid would have probably beer ‘supplied,

even ae there had besn no bases, the larce size of the programs od
represented, in effect, a direct payment for the intellirence i
facilities. - 8s SE oy
Ce _ Similarly, from 1956 until thebna of 1969, the US Air dorce t
‘operated a huge base near Peshawar in Pakistan, which was pri- !

Jt marily an intelligence facility. For several years before Prencis —

Gary Powers* abortive flight over the Soviet Union in 1960,

CIA U2 planes used Feshawar as a principal take-off point for
| recomaissance flichts ‘over and along the edzes of the Soviet.
i Uniion. In additicn, Ini latary intellizence set up a vast array
of electronic 13 stening devices there to moniter activities
within the Soviet Union. { From the early days of the Eisenhower
administration, the United States had allied itself nore closely
with Pakistan than with India in those two countries* “traditional
struggle. Lot, at Least some experts on the region believe
i that an important factor in the American “tilt" toward Fakistan,
Co at least until the late 1960s, was the desire to hold on to the

13-00000

° penetration, while clearly fortuitous, are not unique in clandestine operations. t

7

I | ) |

In 1964, it was Tearned that the American embassy in Moscow had been thoroughly 2—

C bugged by the KGB. Scores of Soviet audio devices were found throughout the . 3

building. Counterespionage and security specialists determined that the . 4
equipment had been installed in 1952 when the embassy had been renovated, and =
that the bugs had been operational for roughly twelve years. The damige report G
asserted that during this entire pariod -- at the height of the cold war -- 7

: Soviet thtelligence had probably intercepted every diplomatic cable between 5

Washington and the embassy. [this assessment was based on the discovery of 2

| audio devices in the code room which wosteeeere allowed the Soviets to hear ‘ t

distinctly the sounds being maded by the typewriters and cryptographic equipment.

It was a reasonably easy technological feat -- well within Soviet capabilities --

to.translate such sounds into their true alphabetical meaning. | , oo f
- American suspicions about the Soviet eavesdropping were apparently aroused He

early in 1964 when Soviet leader Khrusbchev made a remark to Ambassador Fay Fey.

Kohler about Khhler's role in béocking the shipment to the Soviet Union of

steel for an important pédpeline. Taken in context, Khrushchav's remark indicated

to Kohler that there was a leak somewhere in American security. Kohler started

a massive investigation, and within a month or two, forty-odd bugs were found

embedded in walls throughout the embassy. Although Kohler would later claim — :

there was no connection between the discovery of the bugs and the investigation x

he ordered after his conversation with Khrushchev, the timing would seen to a,
| indicate otherwise. . . 4
|
- crucial years at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets almost certainly knew 2
every diplomatic secret which was communicated between the American embassy in 2
4 Moscow and Washington, The damage report noted, however, that this Soviet . | tC"
C. knowledge may well have worked to the advantage of the United States at least 2
in one instance in 1953 when the Korean War armistice was being negotiated. At 3

: the time, U.S. bargaining position with the North Koreans was that ff a particular 2


13-00000

DDA 77-2412
28 APR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Halpern

FROM: H.G. Bean
Acting Executive Officer/DDA
SUBJECT: Fairways Corporation
REFERENCE: Attached memorandum from Central Cover Staff

1. With reference to paragraph 4 in the attached memorandum
from Mr. Latta, to the very best of our knowledge the CIA sponsorship
of the Fairways Corporation has not been officially placed in the
public domain. There has been at least one newspaper article relating
to Fairways and, in addition, at least one short television news’
item on the same subject. However, official confirmation of the
allegations of a relationship which was made in these media presentations
has been carefully avoided.

2. There has been official acknowledgement of the fact that
CIA's Office of Training runs a proprietary to provide executive
transportation. Such a statement appeared in the report of the
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. However, here
again there has been no acknowledgement that such an entity was
identical with or related to the Fairways Corporation.

3. The DDA concurs with the position of CCS as expressed in
paragraph 2 of Mr. Latta's memorandum.

Attachment

cc: CCS

ere wee orp:

SECRET uote sos. 229.-


13-00000

SECRET 9 wan 7PARSHS

21 April 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer to the DDA

-_ FROM : M, L. Latta

, Deputy Chief, Plans and Review Group
‘Central. Cover Staff

SUBJECT : Fairways Corporation

1. Per our telephone conversation today, attorneys’
for Victor Marchetti have requested release of the 168
items previously deleted by court order from the book,
The CIA and. the Cult of Intelligence. Fairways Corpora-
tion was referred to CCS by the SA/DO/O for review in
this connection.

2. Fairways Corporation is the subject of four items
(107, 128, 129, 279; on pages 123, 132, 133,. and 403 respec-
tively,) in the original manuscript. The position of CCS on’
all four items is that they are still classified, since they
describe intelligence sources and methods by identifying an
operational support facility located in the U.S., and are
therefore exempt from declassification under Section 5(B) (2)
of the General Declassification Schedule contained in Executive
Order 11652.

3. According to CCS files, in April 1975 Director Colby
was asked by an NBC reporter about CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways in connection with a planned TV documentary on Agency .
proprietaries. CCS files are unclear on the point, but there
: are indications that Director Colby may have responded to
the question in a manner which could have been construed as
admission of CIA sponsorship of Fairways. In any case, CCS
files contain other evidence that the matter was considered
to be still classified as recently as December 1976, when
Director Bush wrote to the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration regarding CIA sponsorship of Fair-
ways and asked that the subject be withheld from public
disclosure.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 026089

WANING NOTICE
SENStA\: INTELLIGENCE SQURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

“xf
ra
|

SECE


13-00000

Po SEER ET

4. Per our convérsation, CCS has stated in its

response to the SA/DO/O that DDA would comment further

on the extent to which CIA sponsorship of Fairways may
have been placed in the public domain since the court
order (i.e., since February 1975).

5. Please direct your comments to SA/DO/O. For

your information, Mr. Halpern, Room 6 D 0120, red line
x9588, is preparing an overall response on the subject

for the SA/DO/O.
JIM

-/L. Latta.

2

SECRET

13-00000

_ | MEMORANDUM FOR: [face

ne Spee

EPs,
Ll or Ee

| ty Matha Pratelall


13-00000

; ° wha we : ) , . . i

- 14 June ‘1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution.

‘FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek —
: ; . * O/SA/DO/O |
SUBJECT” . . : “‘DDSET Request for DDO Coordination on

Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti - “Marks -

1, -In conjunction with the current. review of the dele-
tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should ©
remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached

(see page 3).

. 2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
_- applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive —

. purview of.the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
.. been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the

details.

3. The following itenis should be reviewed by the
components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by

23 June 1977:
~ Item Manuscript Page = Review Responsibility

25 - 47— , EA Division
-159 181° . EA Division and NE Div.
160 182. Lid - ee mw Ut .
161. 183° . : tt " . ou tt:
- 162 _— ; “184 Ww : " nT) mo
‘163 184 . . re eet tt "
164 ° 185 tf 1 a“ Ju
205° - 234 . NE Division —
208 235 LA Division ; ne
209 . 236 LA Division
295 , » 424 oo -EA Division :
297 425 ; EA Division and EUR Div.
299 426 ' - BA Division and EUR Div.
301 ' 427 AF Division —
* 190 214 . SE Division (Office of

Security may be appropriate
“action office for this item)

_E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

4, Where more than one Division is involved, a single
coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
please contact the writer on x1542.

N. A. Shepanek

Attachments
- As Noted Above

0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution .
Original - C/EA/cA™/?*-““"*

- E/FP/FC

- NE/COPS

- C/AF/Plans

_ C/SE/OSG

- TAT FOLAC™ |

- SA/DO/O

J NRE HER
'

SECRET


13-00000

DDS§T-5193-76/1 -_

7 WAY 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Counsel”
ATTENTION. : ‘John Greaney
. SUBJECT : Review of Deletions from The CIA and the

Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti and Marks”

1. The responsible and knowledgeable components of this
directorate have reviewed the appropriate deletions from. subject
book per your request. The review was made to determine whether
each deletion was still classified under EO 11652 or whether the
information in each deletion has been officially released by the |

U.S. Government.

2. Attached, Tab A, is a list of the. deleted items reviewed _
by this directorate. Tab B is a list of those items of primary
interest of this directorate. All of these items remain classi-

‘fied; however, portions of one item, 135, can be released. Tab C

is a list of those items which we determined are still classified
under EO 11652; however, some portions of three items can be
released, but we recommend that all:-of the items in Tab C be.
coordinated with other indicated elements. . Tab D is a list of
items we determined are not of concern to this directorate and
should be referred to other indicated elements. Tab E is a list
of the four items mentioned above which we believe portions can
now be released. The portions in red brackets remain classified
and should not be released. ; .

3. Since many of the deleted items involved the National

Security Agency (NSA), we attempted to coordinate our determina-

tions through our contacts at NSA. . We were told that any
coordination must be handled between the NSA and CIA General
Counsel. As a result, no further coordination with. other ele-.
ments was attempted. ;

4, This memorandum completes the DDS§T action on the
court ordered review of the deletions from subject book.

Aowch f Gillon

ERNEST J. ZELLMER >
Associate Deputy Director
for .

Science and Technology

Attachments:
As Stated se QIN PTE

SECRET 20


13-00000

re _ ce re TAB OA

DELETED ITEMS IN THE MARCHETTI MANUSCRIPT
REVIEWED BY THE DDS&T

-Item Page a Item Page’
25 47 190 214
86 104 191 214
87 - 104 - 192. 215
88 105 204 233
91, 106 205. . 234
“92 ~ + 107 208 235.
135 . 134 - 209 ~ 236
136 135 245 . 268
155 . 177 248. 269
157 .179 254 "327
158 180 - 258 331
159 - 181 259 331
160 182 260 - 331
161 -183 267 337
163 184 268 337
164 185 269 ; 337
165 185 275 394
Ye 166. - 185 . 295 424
, 167 185 297 425
170 ; 189 ; 299 426
171 189 301 427
172 189 302 427
173 190 © 304 430
174° _ 191 306 - 431
175 191 312 442
i 176 192 313 450
: 177 | 193 324 474
178 ; 194 325 474
187 200 327 475
188 201 - 328 476

189 202 - 329. 480

13-00000
Tab B |
ITEMS OF INTEREST TO THE DDS&T
AND REMAIN CLASSIFIED

' Item Manuscript Page

91 - 106 |. SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
92 407 SECRET, 5B(2) and (3) |
2135s: SECRET, SB(2) and (3)
136 BS . SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
155 477 > SECRET, 5B(3)
158 1g0 SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
163 184 "SECRET, 5B(2) and (3)
165 185s SECRET, 5B(3)
166 © 485. . ~~ ‘CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)
- 167 185 CONFIDENTIAL, 5B(2)°

188 ~ 201 ' TOP SECRET, 5B(2)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

13-00000

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS§T AND SHOULD REMAIN
CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS .—

Item -: Manuscript Page
* 25 ; 47 oppo
* 87 — 104° - DOD (DIA)
88 105 -s:pOD. (DIA). .
157 | 179 -. 0s .
159 | isl _ DDO, OC, ERDA
iso 182 DDO, OC, ERDA~
161 183 DDO, OC, ERDA
-162  — -. 184 . DDO; OC, ERDA.
163 . 184 DDO
be | 164 185  DDO|
, 172 . 189 NSA
187 200 DOD (Navy)
189 . 202 DOD (Navy)
204 (233 "NSA and DDO
; | 205 234 DDO
| 208 235 DDO
i 209 2360 DDO
| 245 . 268 DOD (SAFSS)
| 248. 269 DOD. (SAFSS)
| 254 327 DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff

“258 — 331 DOD (SAFSS)

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

13-00000

Tab C
oo: * . Continued
Item - Manuscript Page

259 331 DoD (SAFSS) _
- 260 7 B81 DOD (SAFSS)
267 337 ~ DOD (Navy)
268 337 pop (Navy)
269 337 DOD (Navy)
“8275 304; Oo
295 424 . DDO
297 . 425° DDO
299 426 poo, NSA
301 427 . DDO, OC, NSA
302 4270 NSA
. 304 . 430 NSA
| 306 431 DOD :(Navy)
312 442 NSA
313 aso NSA
329 | 480 NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

-2-

13-00000

‘Tab D

' ITEMS REFERRED TO OTHER COMPONENTS

Item
86
170
171
173

174

175

325
327
328

Manuscript Page
_ 104 |
189
189
190
191
191
192°
193
194
214
214
215
474
474
475

0/DCI
NSA
NSA

NSA

NSA
' NSA -

NSA -

NSA

NSA.
DDO or OS
State Department

State Department

DOD (JCS) and NSC Staff

. DOD.

DDI and DOD ©
DDI, DOD and NSC Staff

13-00000

SECRET tab E

ITEMS SANITIZED FOR POSSIBLE RELEASE

Item 135, Manuscript page 134.

"A somewhat similar sale of a proprietary occurred infiood
when CIA decided to get rid of a technical research laboratory}
in the Boston] area." _ ; . : m

Item 25, Manuscript page 47

"Over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the .
atignalista first to run guerrilla attacks_against fnainland
hingjand then in more recent years to use {faiwanfas a base

for U-2 flights (flown over China by Nationalist pilots

trained in the United States), electronic surveillance of

the mainland and such covert action programs.as propaganda |

and disinformation aimed at China during the Cultural Revol- .

ution’

Item 87, Manuscript page 107

"The Agency also had a project to determine where American
‘prisoners of war were being held in North Vietnam and to
ommunicate with them Scale models of the prisons were
constructed from aerial {and satellite photographyj and from
other intelligence, and studies were made to learn which
(Brisoners had tried or might be willing to try to communicate.
ome of the prisoners, on their own, had earlier used their —
infrequent letters to their families as a means of sending
coded messages relating where they were being held. Thus,

‘the Agency worked out rs back} use return mail from the

families to send answers bac

Meanwhile, the Technical
‘Services Division of the" ;

Item 275, Manuscript page 394

‘Bow optics for satellite cameras and improvements in ‘over
the horizon' radatS} These technical contracts were almost
always drawn up under the cover of being between the. scholar
(or the university) and some government agency other than the
CIA (the Defense Department or some component thereof were
the most"

SECRET -

13-00000

Tab C

ITEMS OF INTEREST TO DDS&T AND SHOULD REMAIN
CLASSIFIED BUT SHOULD BE COORDINATED WITH OTHER ELEMENTS

| Item Manuscript Page |
| * 250 AT - > ppo
: . eT 104 ~ DOD (DIA)
i — BB . 105 DOD “(DIA)_

157 - amg 8S
159 481 * ~~. ~~—sDDO, OC, ERDA.
160 -  1g2- ~ DDO, OC, “ERDA
16lt—<—~iB DDO, OC, ERDA
162. 84 -DDO, OC, ERDA
163 184 oe DDO .
(1640 185 DDO.
172 189° NSA
187 oo (2000 DOD (Navy)
189 202 DOD (Navy)
204 233 "NSA and DDO
| 234  pbo |
208 235 DDO
2092s 286 ppo™s

N :
oO
wm

245... ~.- 268 |. DOD (SAFSS) -

248°. = 269 ~S , DOD (SAFSS)
(327... ‘DOD (SAFSS), NSC Staff

Ny
w
S

258 | 331. ~~ ~—«*DOD (SAFSS)

' *Can be sanitized and. portions released.

13-00000

_ Tab C
Continued
Manuscript Page
- 331 pop (SARSS)
331 pop (SAFSS):

337... |: «pop (Navy) >

337. DOD (Navy).

337 == DOD (Navy)
i.) |
424° °2~«~= oppo

425°. DDO

426° DDO, NSA

427. - DDO, OC, NSA

427  ~———sONSA

430 NSA

431 | DOD (Navy)

4420 - NSA 7

450 | NSA

480. NSC Staff

*Can be sanitized and portions released.

-2-

13-00000

Tab D

ITEMS REFERRED TO. OTHER’ COMPONENTS |

Item ._ Manuscript Page
86 9 °.:104. . O/DEI

17089 NSA
AML 189  NSAS
73 90S
174 yg) NSA
175 192 NSA
9176 NSA
177 aps NSA
178 = =—sti<«iC' NSA
190° 2 —-ppo or os’
191 “214 -. | * State Department °
192 2 21s State Department
3240 _ 7 ee pop (JCS). and NSC Staff
325. AT po
B27 ATS —“ppr and pop»
32800 ATO DDI, DOD and NSC Staff


13-00000 ,

~ CLuwecacsiriep, CTPA, = conFupenriaL DX). SECRET
or _ ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET = —

(+f SUBECT: Optenath a

FROM Norbert A. Shepanek Co | Paes MO
O/SA/DO/ 0 : oa en ory a
200109" re | “14 June. 1977 |

TO: “(Officer designation, room number, and — ve Lo wg ~
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS. (Number each comment to show from whom
a woe INITIALS ‘to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)

'. Ralph J. Katrosh
- SA/DO/O°

3. Mr. | d ; . - : ,
C/EA/CA : Paw vac. Th
_5D3102 Has. 7 j | ; °

nh iVims citeh

e. L. Sedmae

Sm G10 “eee (] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL §(-] (MTERNAL = [7] UNCLASSIFIED.

13-00000

SECRET

if

14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

FROM : Norbert A. Shepanek
0/SA/DO/0O
SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on

Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele-
tions in subject book for possible declassification, the
DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
of the deletions pertinent to your component are attached -
(see page 3).

2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
applied during the review of deletions within the exclusive
_ purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have
been legally placed in the public domain, please provide the
details. ;

3. The following items should be reviewed by the

components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
23 June 1977:
ee

Item Manuscript Page Review Responsibility

25 47 ; EA Division
159 181. EA Division and NE Div.
160 182 ! Ww tt
161 183 uw wT : " wt
162 184 t m 1 tl
163 184 Lhd mW t W
164 185 tt Ww wt tt
205 234 NE Division

208 235 LA Division

209 236 LA Division

295 424 EA Division
297 425 EA Division and EUR Div.
299 426 EA Division and EUR Div.
301 427 AF Division

190 214 SE Division (Office of

Security may be appropriate
action office for this item)

E2 IMPDET CL BY 018630
SECRET

13-00000

SECRET

‘4, Where more than one Division is involved, a single
coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
please contact the writer on x1542.

Attachments
As Noted Above

0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw . (1542)

Distribution .

Original - C/EA/CA

; - E/FP/FC

- NE/COPS
-- C/AF/Plans
C/SE/OSG
- LA/FOIA |
- SA/DO/O

NEB Ee BS
1

SECRET

13-00000
:

i
1
|

'

es t”t*~<CS*~«S SET i
[tussein and the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about the CD 1
strong and strident propaganda voice of Radio Cairo. Both parties shared a a:
desire to counter its anti-American, anti-Hussein line (which was notgnew), 3
owned, New York based proprietary company, named RIV, provided the technical i ¢
ccpertise and managenant skills to put the station in operation] SCG
“Still another example of a country where the CIA enjoys a special i 7
relationship is Nationalist CHina. On Taiwan, however, the CIA's link is” : y}
not with President Chiang Kai-shek but with his son and heir apparent,
-Premier Chiang Ching-Kuo. One former CIA. chief of station, Ray Cline, now the /
State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, became something — of
- of a legend within the Clandestine Services because of his frequent all- . /
night drinking bouts th the younger Chiang. | Do, n
[over the years, the CIA closely collaborated with the Nationalists first Cy
to run guerrilla attacks against mainland China and then fn more recent f
years to use Taiwan as a base for U-2 flights. (flown over China by Nationalist | t
pilots trained in the United States), electronic survetllance of the mainland !
- and such covert action programs as propaganda and disinformation, aimed at t
China during the Cultural Revolution, | t
In South Vietaam, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker insisted on personally z.
conducting al] important meetings with President Thieu; sometimes Bunker was 2
of station
accompanied by the CIA chief, when there was Agency business to be discussed. a
But there has been another CIA officer in Saigon who has known Thieu for z
many years and who has retained access to the Vietnamese President. | 2
According to a former assistant to Ambassador Bunker, this CIA officer has — Zz
served as conduit between Thieu and the American government when a formal \ Z,
, meeting is not desired or when Thieu wishes to float an idea. \ 2

“Personally with \
Over the years, the CIA has provided Thieu personadajyyete millions: of CA) Zz
aun er ce

"black bag" funds, dditten fhe —hunduadenat \g
aes Ke

dollars in untraceable,.


13-00000

; a confident: judgment of the accuracy, of the report’ s content.

wageest ee £2 SEGRE”
' the information straight forwardly, thereby, handicapping the. analysts in making

x.

Some intelligence analysts, both inside and outside the CIA, receive’

Targe numbers of this type of report every day; many of which do come from

(which is, by definition, an accugate account of what was adid) with ‘agent
reports which are: sometimes exaggerated or false, the Clandestine Services
confuses and often misleads those people within the U.S. government whose
function it is to analyze foreign events and indfrectly those leaders. who make

decisions based on that intelligence analysis. —

we

- actual agents. But by mixing together information supplied by: audio surveillance .

[in the mid-1960s, the Far East Division of the Clandestine Services and &®

the experts of the Scientific and Tachnical Directorate combindddféoces to

carry ‘out one of the Agency’ 5 most imaginative (if. ultimately unsuccessful)

intelligence. collection operations ever undertaken. At that time, top-level:

U.S. government officials were distutbed by repprts that Communist China was on.

the verge of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) system...

They knew that. the threat posed by Chinese ICBH's would play an important part

in the decision, then under consideration, to go-ahead with an American anti-

ballistic.missile (ABM) deployment program. As a matter of the highest

priority, the CIA was told to find out what was happening at Shuangch'engtzx, the

‘Chinese missile test site in the far western corner of Inner Mongolia.

The. Agency’ s technical specialists. responded by designing a nuclear-

_ ppwered device which could. monitor ‘certain key electronic emissions coming from

the missile site, well over a thousand miles. away, and then rely the information .

to a CIA listening post: The plan was to emplace the device on a'mountain ;

. peak called. the Nanda Devi, at an altitude of more than: 25,000 feet, in the ©

Indian Himalayas from where it would have an unobstructed "Hine-of-stght to _

the secret test facility. As the device was being perfected in the CIA

Tahoratortes, the Clandestine Services took yk on the resoons ibility for the mos Sfency
=. __ ff

13-00000

.
if

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i
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i
'
i
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i
1

So a 7 =
[difficurt phase of the operation -- installing the machine on the mountain top. (do)

(‘en

The first thing that had to be done was to gain the permission of the

Indian government toa implement the scheme, not a large problem in view of the

CIA's close relations with the Indian intelligence service. The Indians not

‘only agreed but, surprisingly, insisted on full participation in the project.
_ Next, the Agency recruited a group of experienced mountain climbers to carry

the device, complete weth its nuclear powerpack, pp the mountain and put it.

' into operation. A well-known American mountaineer who had previously conquered

Mt. Everest, Barry Bishop, was contacted and convinced to lead the climb.

iw

an +b

~

Overall control of the operation, however, was placed in the hands of an expertenced

CIA case officer. . .

. . That summer, the Agency operator along with the American and Indian .
climbers, and a group of Sherpa porters, were brought together at a secret.
CIA training base in the Rocky Mountains to practice as a team and to learn

how to assemble the monitoring device once they got it to the top of Nanda Devi

Cover for the operation was carefully built by leaking information in international

mountaineering circles that a joint American-Indian expedition was planning an

ascent of one of the more difficult Himalayan peaks. During the winter, the

technicians completed work on the sensor device, and a few months later the

CIA chief of station in Delhi reported that all logistical and cover arrangements

with Indian intelligence had been completed. The monitoring device was

clandestinely flown to a secure staging area in northern India by a transport

ne I

plane from one of the Agency's proprietary airlines. Next, the climbers were

brought together and taken to the camp in the foothills of the Himalayas from

where they and the Sherpas would begin their long, difficult ascent of the Nanda

_ Devi.

‘Things went well at first, but after the expedition passed the snow Vine, the

Indians began to tire and became irascible, claiming that they were backpacking

too much weight. The CIA case officer redistributed the load by convincing the

A . | ~ -. a tA aA A da - a

>

13-00000

[vould do. ‘Progress slowed and, behind schedule, the ‘team reached the base OD

~ camp from where the final ascent to the mountain's summit would be made by

a small party of climbers accompanidd by a few porters. Soon after the

— group had started for the peak, one of the Sherpas returned to base camp to

tell the CIA man, who had remained behind to handle communications with the

staging area, that the Indians were causing trouble at the higher altitudes. -

The case officer immediately set out to reach Bishop and the summit team in
; an effort to restore peace among the-climbers. The project was now webl off
schedule, and any more delays would have endangered the entire expedition
——} because of the onset of bad weather. With some difficulty, the Agency

operator was able to get the team moving again, and it finally reached its

target near the top of the Nanda Devi. Amidst howling winds and at temperatures -

well below zero, the climbers assembled the monitoring device and put it into

ron — operation, With spirits high, the group returned to base camp and the news —

_of the successful installation was sadioed back to the staging area.

But within a few short months, the signals that the sensor had been

sending from the Nanda Devi stopped. The CIA dispatched a plane to fly over

the mountain and photograph the monitoring site. It was learned that the

device had been knocked over by a snow slide. then the Indian government
[ was informed of the development, it complained to the CIA station in Dethi
that the nuclear generator might be polluting the headwaters of the sacred

Ganghes River which flow out of the Himalayas. The Indian concern was about

religious pollution, not ecological.
The CIA reacted by planning another climbfof the mountain for the following

year, both to retrieve the damaged equipment and implace a new monitoring

system -- this one powered by a non-nuclear generator, The climbing team,

Ce. Jed by Bishép, was gathered together again and this time it reached the

top of the mountain with comparatively little difficulty. The new device was
Se eS eee SS

set up, but after an extensive search, the atomic generator from the year [ Rin

ee

13-00000

4.
ad

similar flights to retrieve the data collected and stored by the machine

- a . | bY _ Srerel

before was not-found. Again after only a few weeks, the second sensor devic

stopped working. This time the failure was attributed to a mechanical

4
malfunction.

At this point, the Agency gave up on mountain-top monitoring of the
Communist Chinese missile program, turning to other systems and new, improved |
en

satellites for acquiring the information it was seeking. The Indians were

thanked and compensated for their cooperation. The American climbers were

presented with secret medals by a grateful, but disappointed, CIA. /

. [the fertile imaginations of the G2/S&T experts during the following

years produced many more untque coéIrction schemes aimed at solving the

"mysteries of China's strategic missile program. Most eventually proved to be :

unworkable, and at Teast one entailed a frighteningly high-risk potential.

The silliest of them all, however, called for the creation of a small one-man
airplane that could theoretically be packaged in two large suitcases. In
concept, an agent along with the suitcases would somehow be infiltrated into
the denied area where, after performing his espfonage mission, he would ~
assemble the aircraft and fly to safety over the nearest friendly border.

Even the chief of the Clandestine Services refused to have anything to do with

this scheme, and the projectydted on the drawing boards.

tay ow

ARK

A second system was a device, long and tubular like a rocket, that could (G2

be dropped by a U-2 or another aircraft near the missile test site, its fall
slowed by a parachute so that the device would penetrate only two or three

feet into the ground on impact. Afterwards, the system, andaerial rising from

its top, would activate itself and perform its electronic sensing tasks. Stil]

later, the device would transmit its findings to a listening post, most

likely a circling aircraft. The need for secret air penetration deep into a

foreign and héstile power to deliver the monitoring device and additional A,

we
vaiced carinuc anactinang as ta the evstem's utilitv and worth. The HEYSAat f°

fy
" Sy"
Ae

13-00000

yo eee Ge SECRET

_ spectalists, fascinated by the technical aspects of the project, seemed, however GY)
Cc oblivious of the’ dangers involved in secretly flying near a Chinese missile 2
7 installation and dropping an object in an action that could quite easily appear :
7 to a startled radar operator as a lone bomber engaging in a surprise nuclear © &

attack. Development of the @os$ly system was, therefore, pushed ahead. The
technicians were more concerned with the fact that the test drops of the device é
“in the southwestern U.S. desert usually resulted in the system burying itself
' several feet below the ground surface or so jarring the delicate instrumentation
i | that the device failed to self-activate and function properly. {. '
— [A third system was a model airplane roughly the size of a large bird, WE
4 _ such as a condor, which was powered by a miniature nuclear engine and which |

could be launched from outside China and guided to the missile test site well

over a thousand miles away, all the while soaring in patterns that would resemble.
Co on the air defense radar scopes the flight patterns of a large eagle. Once | 4

over the target, the plane's electronic sensors and tiny television cameras

would be turned’ on to record activities below and relay the information either

to its Tauach site or much more likely a hovering aircraft that had penetrated

Chinese airspace for this purpose. Millions of dollars were expended by the

CIA in research on this "baby U-2" that called for numerous breakthroughs in

' - the state of the technical arts. Its chief advantage was, of course, that if

and when it was shot down there would be no pilot to confess ft had been on an

Agency-sponsored spying mission. } . a
i The technical difficulties involved in the /air-drop]systen and the[node? ] /6£
[atrptane e device were too great and time consuming for either to be fully OF

developedtby their inventors before improvements in intelligence satellite

surveillance programs were achieved, thus negating the justifying requirement
io for these quest ionablz}and potentially provocative collection systems before
they could be put into operation. Other clandestine collection devices -- a few

more sensibly contrived, most, however, of dubfous value -- were also being


13-00000

mee

Pa SORE

C | Agency had become involved in a chain of events which forced
it to intervene militarily in a second country to protect its
' operation against Cuba. The Presijent way have set the original
- policy, but there was no way he could have known that simply
by approving an attack on Cuba, he would. set in train Agency
paramilitary activities against Guatamala,
CIA operations can have another unforseen effect on Amer-

ican foreign policys fhey can subject the country to blackmail

4£ something goes wrong. For instance, after th _ GIA jpilot was.
shot down and captured by Indonesia. in 1958, within tive. days
the US government approved the sale for local currency of 37,000.
tons of American rice and lifted an embargo on $1 million in
small arms and other military equipment. Considering at that
ce monent, the Jota was actively baclcing- an amed revolution against
| the Sukarno regime ohese would have | been strange actions indeed
for the US governmeat to take if it were not extremely concerned
about saving the captured pilot. . .
A somewhat similar incident occurred in Singapore in 1960
| after a CIA lie detector expert was flown specially into the city
| to make ‘sure that a locally recruited agent was trugtwor thy.
| When the Agency technician plugged iu his polygraph machine in
|

a hotel room, he blew out all the fuses in the building .# The

*This was not the only time that the CIA blaw major “sea wver= LPS”
sease During the mid-1940s, the Azency added to its nusesor?
ee TT Om ODDO

a eo
facilities on Laiwan by building a huge electrunic ecg seiye’

Ce SECRET


13-00000

- ya © SEORES
lie de tector wan, a CIA case officer, ana the local agent were
soon all undér arrest. The Si ingapore government and the British,
who ware in the process of. zg ranting Singapore. its independency,
were both quite disturbed by the indident. | Negotiations then
ensued to secure the men's release . According to ‘Singapore a
Prine Minister Lee Kuan Yow, the XS governaent offereds3. 3 mil
lion to get thom out. Lee claimed that he wanted ten tines as
much and consequently + took nothing. In any cas a, the two CLA
officials were ‘subsequently freed, the. newly inst a Secretary
of State, Dean. Rusk, wrote a Hecret letter of apology: to. the
Singapore leader. In 1965, Lee mentioned the affair in 2 speech
as an example of the type of activities engaged in. bythe CIA.
The State Department then issued a routine denial furnished by:
the CIA--State's press office not realizing the truth of Lee’s
charges, Lee LER 2cted ‘by publicl y producing Rus k's letter of b-
pology, and State was forced to. retract its origin nal statement,
although it still maintained that no ransom had ever been offered.
As well as embarrassing the US government and making headlines |
around the world, the incident caused the State Department to
revanp its internal: system for aking announcements about in-
telligence matters. . |
i Black mail was agin the theme in the mid-1960s vhen the — Gi)
ios, quietly informed the

President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makar

ety

[installation for surveillance of the Chinese mainland. When the -
device wae turned on for the first time, it knocked out a large 77)
part of the island's power. In this case, the local government - é

reacted in a much more friendly Manner than did Singapore*s.

Stetn


13-00000

1
_
! .
t

t

t

13

for this unforseen - expense.

cooperation between allies.

yg SEBRET

US pove: leoat that he might oust certain intelligence instal-_ E773

lations: frow his island. ‘fhe CIA had a major interest in the.

matter, so. it operated a Foreign Broadcast Information Ser-

Vice PBIS ’ listening: post there, and. the Pentagon was. also con=

‘cerned about the possible loss of ts large electronic surveil-

lance facilities. fhe view in the intelligence community was -

that Makarics had to be mollified at practically all costs.

Pinally, government negotiators reached a secret deal with the

w ily old archbishop, and Jie received a speckal payment of about

$10 million in. return for letting the bases remain. The CIA

_ put up half cf the money, using the Director's Contingency, Fund

In goneral, the presence of American intelligence. facili+

ties in a foreign country can have an important effect on Amer=

ican policy toward that country, especially in the Tgird World.

~ Closely aligned coun mtries, such as England, lermany, Japans ; C245

and Australia, have usually allowed the Unived States to set

up electronic spying bases as part of the general framework of

But to the less developed countries,

the presence of an Anierican installation is both a threat and

‘an opportunity. — ‘The threat comes from domestic oppo sition for~

ees who ook on the base ag an ‘example of” "neo-colonialisa
and use it aS & weapon arainst those in power. The opportunity

arises out of the fact that the United States will pay dearly

for the right to install its eavesdropping equipment~-and to

keep it in piaco, as [ixehbi shop fiakarioz) Aisdovered. Joa

SECRET


13-00000

“TD unctassiFiep- INTERNAL =] CONFIDENTIAL - [1]. SECRET

JP SUBJECT: (Optional)

1s.

i

‘ed

“ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

“FROM:" ~ EXTENSION
Norbert A. She
0/SA/DO/O ~
' 2D0109 ©
TO: (Officer designation, ‘ro
building) :

panek

1S ¥2 DATE . 7 —_
9564"° 14 June 1977 |

“ COMMENTS ‘(Number each commerit to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line: deross column. after each comment.) ~ :

om number, and

‘RECEIVED _

| Ralph J. Katrosh
SA/DO/O”

3.. Crocky Hoge
' -LA/FOIA .° -
4 “Ho

Norbert Shepanek.
. 0/SA/DO/0. 3

ove To the best of our.
knowledge, :items 208 and
209 ‘have not been made...
public. - -

rom 610 “Erie ] SECRET ©] CONFIDENTIAL [[] INTERNAL =) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

- | SECRET.
14 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution

ae FROM Norbert A. Shepanek ~
mo = . - Q/SA/DO/0 ee
SUBJECT t DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on

Certain Deletions in the Cult of |
Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

1. In conjunction with the current review of the dele-.
tions in subject book for possible declassification, the.
DDS&T has indicated certain items which they believe should
remain classified but has requested DDO coordination. Copies
of the deletions pertinent to your component are: attached
(see page 3).

2. Please review the deletions using the same criteria
applied during the review of deletions within the éxclusive
purview of the DDO. If you find that any of the items have:
been legally placed in the public domain, ‘Please provide the
details.

3. The following items should be reviewed by the

components indicated and response forwarded to the writer by
23 June 1977: ;

Item. - Manuscript Page - Review esponsibility

25 ; AT. , EA Division a
159° 181 | EA Division and NE Div.
160 . . 182 we . t " th
161 183 a a] tt tt Ww
162 184 . wt . t ii) Ww
163 184. . ot sagt tr tt
164 185 . " on ff wt
205 234 — NE Division

208 "235 ' LA Division

209 ; 236 LA Division

295 _ .424 - EA Division
297 425 EA Division and EUR Div.
299 426 ‘BA. Division and EUR Div.
301 427 AF Division ;

* 190 214 SE Division (Office of

; Security may be appropriate
action office for this item)
E2 IMPDET: CL BY 018630

SECRET


13-00000

; :
n.d

“SECRET:

Se 4.. Where more than one Division is involved, a single
oT, coordinated reply may be provided. If there are any questions,
please contact ‘the writer on x1542. oe

(Signed) Norbert A. Shepanek
N, A. Shepanek -

Attachments _
As Noted Above

0/SA/DO/O:NAShepanek:kaw (1542)

Distribution _
Original - C/EA/CA
1 = E/FP/FC
- NE/COPS :
- C/AF/Plans
- C/SE/OSG
- LA/FOIA .
- SA/DO/0

- NPR ERR
t

SECRET


13-00000

ne

Page  azs5 ll SEERET

(‘sitsation. in private with his superiors. But Bob and his cohorts at FI/D were /
one step ahead of Ambassador Meyer. They had figured out a way to intercept Z
his cables and the replies he received from Washington. So shortly after each eS
State message was sent, Bob would appear in the CIA executive suite with a copy Y
of the message for the personal inspection of the Director. Witten on top of s
each tintercepted cable was a warning that the contents of the cable should be @
kept especially confident because State was unaware thet the CIA had a copy. F
Despite Agency knowledge of all of Meyer's instructions and information, $
Meyer and State's director of Iranian Affairs in Washington refused to yield 7
to Agency pressure for a quick settlement. Even after these two men met at ¢
CIA headquarters with the Deputy Director of CIA, Vice Admiral Rufus Taylor, Hf
they still insisted that the Agency's plans for the new installation were Zé
unacceptable to the U.S. government as a whole. CIA Director Helms was so I
aggravated by’ this continued resistance thag he personally telephoned Secretary is

of State Rusk to settle the matter. Rusk promptly ended the dispute by agreeing /
completely to the CIA position. a i

| Bob was also involved in another series of events which started when FI/D Gop!

worked out a liaison arrangement with the codebreaking service of a certain

South American government. This arrangement was ostensibly for the purpose of
allowing the CIA and the other country to cooperate in decoding messages sent

by third countries. However, FI/D tood advantage of the liaison to intercapt

the secret communications of the host South American government. Such arrangements

were nora1} procedure to Bob. The intensely dedicated law and order advocate saw

i

we NO Ww

-.

nothing wrong in practicing this sort of duplicity on an allied government which i

cooperated in good faith.

FI/D's liaison with the South American country continued for a long period

of time until relations between the United States and that nation soured over

unrelated issues, and as a result FI/D was forced to break off the relationship.

However, FI/D did not give up hope that the previous working arrangements could
el nn Selena nase ns baa ceo

Be rested. 7

4

A,
&:
S

13-00000

Pages BBS — greneT |
*y Sonetine later, Bbb suggested to an officer in the CIA's executive suite we GD
—— LE SAT

that the Agency should help. the South American country obtain a channel in the

‘international satellite communications network, Comsat. Always the secretive -

operator, Bob did not explain why the Agency should do this, and the other

CIA man replied that CIA, afterall, was not the American foreign aid program; and
father or not this particular country received a Comsat channel did not seem to

be a matter concer::ing CIA. Only later did the executive suite officer learn

from other sources that FI/D had worked out a deal with the South American  —

7 . . \ a . . .
country in which liaison would be restored in return for a Comsat channel (which
reek! ; ;
CIA would intercept). But Bob could not bring himself to share his scheme sten

. with a fellow Agency employee in the Director's office.
on

Eventually, the South American country received the Comsat channel: the
country restored liaison with FI/D; and CIA again had access to all of that
country's secret messages, , " .

Bob's jab with FI/D is by no means one of the ‘dirtiest jobs in the
Clandestine Services. There are operators in the paramilitary fields who
probably conceive and carry out more distasteful machinations. But Bob is in
a position where, on a regular basis, he misrepresents himself and even lies .
within the U.S. government -- hot to mention the deceit he and his colleagues
perpetrate on friendly foreign governments which in good faith enter into
Tiaison agreements with FI/D. |

Bob X is one of these dedinary looking people who mow their lawn, love
their wives, and do some very nasty things for the CIA.

Tone oe | 7

ten other devoted family men who lived in suburban Washington homes
similar to Bob X's are named James McCord and f Howard Hunt. Both had long,
relatively successful careers with the CIA and rose to roughly the same upper-
middle level of the bureaucracy as Bob X has. McCord was a CIA security
officer, specializing in protecting the Agency's physical facilities. Hunt

was an nneratar whn nlaved a leadina role in the Bav of Pias and who took part

we NO Wy Rh


13-00000

CL UNGLASSIFIED =| [[]_ INTERNAL CO SONFIDENTIAL. [1 SECRET
| ROUTING AND:RECORD SHEET |

SUBJECT: (Optional)

OM: .
E/FP/FC a
4 B 4406 { ‘1872 DATE

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and | ate une Y .
building) OFFICER'S | COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
| recewven | FORWARDED | INITIALS fo whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
. 1. : \
0/SA/DO/0 oo
- Myr. Shepanek

‘ oa oO ase" 7 SECRET — [[] CONFIDENTIAL OO WES «= UNCLASSIFIED


13-00000

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM

SUBJECT

REFERENCE

S-E-C-R-E-T

23 June 1977

0/SA/DO/0

William W. Phelps
EUR/FP/FC

Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti
Book

SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977

European Division concurs that the two items involving

EUR (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain

classified.

elps

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

S-E-C-R-E-T

13-00000

23 June 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/O

FROM : William W. Phelps
EUR/FP/FC

SUBJECT : Coordination of Deletions in Marks-Marchetti
Book

REFERENCE : SA/DO/O Memorandum of 14 June 1977
European Division concurs that the two items involving

EUR, (Item 297, page 425 and Item 299, page 426) should remain

classified.

William W. Phelps

E 2 IMPDET
CL BY 003283

S-E-C-R-E-T

13-00000

(1 UNCLASSIFIED =) INTERNAL [1 CONFIDENTIAL | [[] SECRET
- ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM: EXTENSION

-NE/COPS x 9165 [pate
: 23 June 1977

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and -
building) , OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
: INITIALS. to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)

SA/D0/0
Attn: Mr. Shepanek
TUBE: DX-6

rom 610 Se":[] SECRET [1] CONFIDENTIAL [] INTERNAL =f) UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

4 SECHET

Jw 23 | ig fet, | 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/0O
ATTENTION : Mr. Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM > Joyce R. Herrmann
Chief of Operations, NE Division

SUBJECT  : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination on
‘Certain Deletions in the Cult of
Intelligence by Marchetti - Marks

NE Division has researched the seven DDS&T items cited
in reference and to our knowledge none of the items cited
have been legally placed in the public domain. Therefore,
the items remain classified under Executive Order 11652 as
listed below:

Manuscript
Item Page ' Exemption
159 181 5B (2) (3)
‘160 182 5B. (2) (3)
161 183 5B (2) (3)
162 184 5B (2) (3)
163 184 SB (2) (3)
' 164 185 5B (2) (3)
_ 205 234 5B’ (2) (3)

Retna

ce. R. Herrmann

E2 IMPDET

SECRET CL BY 054979


13-00000

C] UNCLASSIFIED ==] [TERNAL G2, CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTING AND RECORD: SHEET © '

[] sec RET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

1
2D0109 Lb,
. =

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and . DATE ,
building) : COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
. to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED

om 610 “tomers [1] SECRET © [[] CONFIDENTIAL (] ys RNA) =] UNCLASSIFIED


13-00000

“4 SECRET

23 JUN 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for
External Oversight

ATTENTION : Norbert A. Shepanek

FROM : Katharine C. Hart
Acting. Chief, Soviet/East European Division

SUBJECT : Deletions in the The Cult of Intelligence
by Marchetti - Marks

REFERENCE : Your Memorandum, Subject: DDS§&T Request
for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions ae

in the Cult of Intelligence by Marchetti -
Marks, dated 14 June ro

1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division
interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.
This concerns an item from the Marchetti and Marks book,

The Cult of Intelligence. Checking against official disclosures
we have determined the item is still properly classified under
Executive Order 11652.

2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, relating to Soviet
capabilities to. make intelligibie the.sounds picked up by dudio
devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in
Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to
cryptography and is exempt from the General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order 11652, exemption category 5B(2).

Whe ¢Mat

Katharine C. Hart

SECRET E2 IMPDET
CL BY 014652

13-00000

ae | 23 JUN 177

MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Assistant to the DDO for Oo
; External Oversight

ATTENTION : Norbert A. ‘Shepanek oo | !

osFROM 0. ‘Katharine C. Hart - | ee eee
- : Acting Chief, Soviet/East European Division .

SUBJECT : Deletions in rhe The Cult of Intelligence
7 a by Marchetti * Marks . ;

. REFERENCE Your Memorandum ; Subject: DDSET Request
: ' for DDO Coordination on Certain Deletions

a in the Cult of “June 1677 by Marchetti -
; . Marks, date June

1. We have reviewed the item relating to SE Division
interests referred to the DDO for coordination by the DDS&T.
This concerns an item from:éhe Marchetti and Marks book,

- , The Cult of Intelligence. Chegking against official disclosures
' we have determined the. item. is stili properly. classified under ..
"Executive Order 11652.

2. Item No. 190, manuscript page 214, “relating to Soviet
capabilities to make intelligible. the. sounds ° picked up by. audio
‘devices discovered in the code room of the American Embassy in
- Moscow, remains classified SECRET. This item relates to
cryptography and is exempt ‘3g: the. General Declassification
Schedule of Executive Order “oe exemption category 5B(2).

Kh C, Hat |

Katharine C. Hart

SECRET. 82 IMPDET
a oo CL BY 014652.


13-00000

UNCLASSIFIED =») {NTERNAL (C1 CONFIDENTIAL [1 SECRET
oS ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional) DDS&T Request for DDO cule of prtarag putt Certain

by Marchetti-Marks

Chief, Africa Plans

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

0/SA/DO/0
Attn: Mr. Shepane

cm GTO Emee’s (] SecReT =] CONFIDENTIAL §[[] {RTFRNAL = [7]: UNCLASSIFIED


13-00000

SO SECRET

6 JUL 1977
MEMORANDUM FOR: 0/SA/DO/0
Attn: Mr. Shepanek
FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
SUBJECT : DDS&T Request for DDO Coordination

on Certain Deletions in the Cult of
‘Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks

We concur in the DDS§&T's conclusion that Item 301,

page 247 remain classified.

/ Soto

Yo lb

Edward J. Foy, Jr.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

SECRET

13-00000

Py

oe SECRET

2

3 JUL O77
MEMORANDUM FOR: 0O/SA/DO/O
Attn: Mr. Shepanek
FROM : Edward J. Foy, Jr.
Chief, Africa Plans
SUBJECT : DDS&T. Request for DDO Coordination

on Certain Deletions in the Cult of
‘Intelligence by Marchetti-Marks
We concur in the DDS§T's conclusion that Item 301,

page 247 remain classified. 6
' ~e

J{a/ EDWARD J. FOY, JRe
Edward J: Foy, Jr.

E2 IMPDET
‘CL BY 009904

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENSE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED

Hany oe
: gas

virans
i Following is a transcrir.: of Presi-
| dene: Carter's news’ conference in

vecorded by The New-York Times

through th facilities of ABC News:

:

Opening Statement»
Gocd: afternoon everybody. I'd like

“to make a very brief statement as a
_ “progress report to the American people

of some items that are important to
j Bs. ’ ;

We have submitted and the Congress
‘is now considering legislation to give

‘me the authority to reorganize the

‘executive: branch of Government. The
._ Senate Committee under Senator Ribic-
- off has now completed ‘their hearings
“and they'll be marking up the bill
: beginning tomorrow.

The House Committee on Govern-

‘ment Operations unde: Congressman
Jack Brooks has“scheduled hearings to
_ begin on March 1.

‘  $o because of the interest of the
. American people and the Congress and
myself in completing this very crucial
project I think the Congress is moving
with great expedition to give me that
_ authority.

- {. We've also initiated with, directions

:to the members of ‘the Cabinet and
other agency beads a new program to
cut down on the extremely great over-
load of paper work with a requirement
that those who prepare Government
regulations be responsible for the
preparation assigned them. I’ve asked
my Cabinet officers to read the regula-
tions that are forthcoming from their
departments each week until they see
the volume and the complexity of them,
and we hope to eliminate unnecessary
regulations, abbreviate those that are
necessary and express them in a Jan-
Zuage so that we can all understand
them. .

' ve also asked major elements of

our own society, the university profes-.
- sors and the state officials in this last
week to give me their suggestions on
chow the regulations might be improved.
We have done the same thing with
reports required by the Federal Govern-
ment. I hope:to ‘reduce drastically the
number of-reports and the frequency

of these reports and the, complexity. .

of them. .

We will complete the proposed fegis-
lation on creating a new Department
of Energy this week. The proposed
legislation is now on my desk, It will
be submitted to the Congress for action:
the first of next week. And we've con-

sulted very closely with the key leaders’

in the Congress and J believe there’s
going to be a rapid creatina of this
new department.and a heavv emphasis
on the importance of energy questions,
to our people. . : :

We will also present to the American
people. probably at a joint’ scssion of
thé Congress a speech by, me about
April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-
cy which would involve all the com-
plexities of the energy question. It’s
‘something that’s long overdue and it’s
. §0ing to be quite profound in its impact

on the American conscjousness and our .
society, and I hope it will be compre-.
es aT te « . as

cript of t

| Washington yesterday aftcrnoon, as:

I'm not going to, leave of not comment-
ing directly on any specific C.1.A. ac-

’ tivity. But I can tell you that I have

begun a complete analysis which will
be completed within the next week of
all activities by the C.1LA. I’ve received
substantial reports already.

I’ve reviewed the more controversial
revelations that have been publicized

in the last few days, some quite errone- ©

ous, some with some degree of accura-
cy. These same operations have been
reviewed by the Intelligence Oversight
Board, an independent board, and also
by my predecessory, President Ford.
I have not found anything illegal or
improper.

If in future assessments, which will.

come quite early,-I discover such an

. impropriety or an illegality I will not

only take immediate action to correct

_it but also will let the American people

know about it. .

I might say this. This is a very serious
problem of how in a democracy to have
adequate ‘intelligence gathered, as-

, Sessed and used to guarantee the- se-
curity of our country. It’s not part of -

the American nature to do things in
secret. Obviously, historically and still
at this modern time there is a necessity

, to protect sources of information from
other nations. Sometimes other Gov-

ernments cooperate with us fully;
sometimes they don’t.

But I'll try to be sure, and so will
Stan. Turner, who will be the next
director of the intelligence community.
He will try to be sure that every thing
we do is not only proper and legal,
but also compatible with the attitudes

of the American people.

One other point I'd like to make is
this. It can be extremely damaging to
our relationship with other nations, to
the potential security ‘of our country

24 FEB IFIF rue REW YORK TINTS,

he President's News Con

President Carter walking past reporters after news conference at the E:

with labor and management. Bu
whether I'll be successful, I don’t know
I’m just going to have to do my hest

6. Human Rights Abroad

Q. In your letter to Mr. Sakhzrov
you said that the United States would
use its good offices to seek the release
of prisoners of conscience. And you
said that you wanted to continue tc
shape a world responsible to human
aspirations. As you know there are
human rights problems in many. other
countries, And some of them like Iran
or the Philippines we support with
arms, Or we support with American aid.
These are countries where many people
believe we have more leverage than
we might have in the. Soviet Union.
What if anything do you plan to try
to do to help victims of political repres-
sion in these countries?

A. 1 think without my trying to take
credit for it there has been a substan-
tial move toward concern about It.man
tights throughout the world. I think
this has taken place in probably ‘a
dozen or more different cou: “ies,
There's an arou.ing interest in the posi-
tion that our own Government here in
our free country does take. Obviously
there are deprivations of human viyhts
even more brutal than the ones on
which we’ve commented up to now.

In-Uganda the actions there have dis-
gusted the entire civilized world and,
as you know, we have no diplomatic
relationships with Uganda. But h« 2 is
an instance where both Ambassador
Andrew Young and I have expressed
great concern about what is there. The
British are now considering asking the
United Nations to go into Uganda to
assess the horrible murders that ::y-par-
ently are taking place in that country—

13-00000

«

@
ees

|
|
|
|

“) dings. Legislation is in the Con;

ata cu Vvigevos Gnu - OGY Ulivi
going to be a rapid creatina of this
new department and a heavy emphasis
on the importance of energy questions
to our people. . :

We will also present to the American
people. probably at a joint session of
the Congress a speech by me about
April 20, a comprehensive energy poli-
cy which would involve all the com-
plexities of the energy question. It’s

‘something that’s long overdue and it’s
. . Boing to be quite profound in its ‘impact
on the American consciousness and our _

society, and I hope it will be compre-.
hensive enough so that it can be well-
balanced and fair to all. :
1 We are quite concerned about the
Pressures Of inisation. ‘Ihe advisers to
me on economics are trying to assess
all Government programs and private
actions that contribute to inflationary
pressures. When this ‘analysis is done
will use every means that I -have
available to me to express ‘these con-

cerns and possibly corrective actions.

to the American people as ‘well. _ -
: And the last. point ‘is that we will

hava a. samnlata: anelucia underway
aow on deregulation. And the first
question is the deregulation of the air

now. We'll_be—submitting -a- mess
to Congress very shortly on that sub-
ject. We wilt not submit administration
legislation because the Congress has
already moved subst ntially forward in

’ dealing with this important: issue.
And now I'd like to answer questions, .

Mr. Frank Cormier.
Questions and Answers
1. Defense Budget

.*. @. Mr. President, you told the Demo-

‘tratic Platform. Committee that you

thought present defense expenditures ©

could te reduced ‘by: five to seven bil-
lion dollars. Now I think you may have

modified your position somewhat since’

then. Obviously in. your. short time in
office you. didn’t find the opportunity

to make cuts like that in your precedes- .-

sor’s budget. But isn't ‘it also likely
that néxt year's budget for the defense
will exceed this year’s. .

A, Well because of inflationary ‘pres-

sures and because of an impossibility

of assessing the potential threat to our
country from other nations, it’s hard
to predict exactly what the level of
defense spénding will be. In the short
time that we had available to work
on the previous: Administration's budg-
et—about three weeks of hard. work—
we were able to reduce the suggested

expenditures by almost $3 billion, 1°

think about $2.75 billion. -

This was done—and I think Senator
Stennis in his recent public statements:
has confirmed that it has been done
without weakening-our own defense
capability. And the substantial savings

in defense spending that will'still leave ;

us muscle will be in such things as
the Standardization of weapons, ‘long-
range planning, a more businesslike al-

- location of defense contracting, an as-.

sessment: of the defense contracts for
construction or
standing. .

‘. A reassessment of priorities of the

evolution of new weapons which in the
future can become enormously expen-
Sive; a longer assignment of military
personnel to a base before they are
transferred; some emphasis on the cor-
rection of inequities and unfairnesses
in the retirement system. ;

__ These things obviously can’t be dona
in three weeks,
ongoing effort on my part. And I think
the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-

Ministratinn'c firet hideent weltt ot

Be

epair already out-

but they will be an’

’ other natioris. Sometiines~otrier Guv--

ernmtents cooperate with us fully;
sometimes they don't.

But I'll try to be sure, and so will
Stan. Turner, who will be the next
director of the intelligence conimunity.
He will try to be sure that every thing
we do is not only proper and legal,
but also compatible with the attitudes
of the American people.

One other poirit I’'d like to make is
this. It can be extremely damaging to
our relationship with other nations, to
the potential security of our country
even in peacetime, for these kinds of
operations which are legitimate and
proper to be revealed. It makes it hard
for us 10. lay a gruutidauin on wiikic
we might predicate a successful meet-
ing of a threat to us in time of war
if we don’t have some degree of secre- -
cy. .

T’m quite concerned about the num-.
ber of people now who have access
to this kind of ‘information: And I’ve

been working very, closely with the

_ Congressional leaders, yesterday and

taday, to trv to reduce.the overall num-
ber of people who have access to the
sources of information. that. within the
bounds that. 've descrjbed—propriety-
‘and legalit; -and American attitudes to-
ward secre-y—I'l].do the best I can
not ever tc. make a mistake. And I’m
also assuming on a continuing basis
a direct personal reponsibility for the
operation of all the ingelligence agen-
cies in our Government to make sure
that they are meeting these standards.

3, Correcting’ Errors on CLA.

Q. If there has been erroneous infor-

mation, wouldn’t it behoove you to cor- -

rect the record?

A. In some ways we are correcting
the record, but if I began to either dis-
pute or confirm every individual story
that’s written whether correct or er-
roneous on every matter relating.to
the C.LA., then these matters whic
are necessarily secret would no longer
be secret, so I’m.not going to’ comment
on individual items that relate to intel-
ligence, :

4, Difference With Meany

Q. Mr. President, George Meany says
he won’t go along with your idea for
pre-notification on wage and price in-

. creases. And my question really is, how

hard, are you going to press Mr, Meany
to go along and do you have anything
else in mind that you could use in the
way of Government involving itself to
try to control inflation? Ss

A. I announced earlier my firm com:
mitment not to have mandatory. wage
and price Jaws or authority, not to have

“standby. wage and price authority. I've «

not made any proposal to Mr, Meany

or‘any other labor leader nor to any «

Tepresentative of. industry or manufac-
turing. But I. will retain the option in
the future of assessing what we need
to do to control inflation.

I've emphasized always the word
“voluntary.” And to the extent that
I can arrive at a common understand-
ing with industry and labor leaders that
a certain amount of cooperation and
information can. be exchanged before
a major proposal is made. I think that’s

.a legitimate pursuit of mine. I can’t

force it. It’s got,to be voluntary. And
that’s as far as I can go with my an-

. Swer.

5: Wage-Price Guidelines
©. You mean iust directly about wage

. several countries,

there are ‘deprivations of human Fights
even more brutal than the ones on
which we’ve commented up to now.

In-Uganda the actions there have dis-
gusted the entire civilized world and,
as you know, we have no diplomatic
relationships with Uganda. But h« a is
an instance where both Anvbassador
Andrew Young and I have expressed
great concern about what is there. The
British are now considering asking the
United Nations to go into Uganda to
assess the horrible murders that :y-par-
ently are taking place in that country—
the persecution of those. who have
aroused the irc of Mr. Amin.

Vive express. t mv concern abu rte
prisoned posted ar aers ina
Korea, in Cuba. in many countris —-in
rather,—in S uth
America and Pil continue to do so, I
have never had an inclination to single
out the Soviet Union as the only place

. where human rights are’ béing abridged.

We.have, I think, a respofisibility and

-a legal right to.express our disapproval

of violations of human rights, The Hel
sinki AgretmcrA, ¢7 cellad  Rackot:

’ Three Provision, insures. that some of

these human rights shall be preserved.
We are a signatory of the Helsinki
agreement. We are ourselves culpable
in-somo ways for not giving people
adequate rights to move around our
country: or restricting unnecessarily, in
my opinion, visitation to this country
by those who disagree with us political-
ly. .
So I thiuk that we all ought to take
a position in our own country and
among our friends and allies, among
our potential adversaries, that human
rights is something on which we should
bear a major responsibility for leader-
ship. And 1 have made it clear to the
Soviet Union and to others in the East-
ern European community that I'm not
trying to launch a unilateral criticism
of them, that I’m trying to set a stand-
ard in our own country and make my
concerns expressed throughout the
world, not singled out against any par-
ticular country.

Q. Mr. President, the other day. get-
ting back to’ this C.I.A. thing, when
that story broke your Press Secretary,
when he issued what amounted lo a
“no comment” by the White House,
someone asked ‘thim if this story had
broken back during the campaign when. ©

.you were running for Presiden:, v-ould

you have given a similar response? And
he said “well I don’t’ know.” So can
T ask you, what would have beer: you
response? Would it have been the

_same? A. I don’t know.

7. Review of C.I.A. Activities

Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-
ject, you said earlier that you review:
of C.LA. activities had found nothing
illegal or improper and you later said
that these activities are legitimate and
proper. Isn’t that a value judgment that
the American public might like to
share? But how can they if yer refuse
to’ give them any idea of wuat you
have discovered dur'ng this review
about payments, including ones made
in secret?

A. That is a value judgment. It’s made

‘by the independent Intelligence Over-

sight Board, which was established and
appointed by President Ford. This
beard has made itself available to the
Inspector General and to any employce
within the C.LA. or within the defense
intelligence agencies or any other to.
receive-even rumors of improoriety.

13-0000Qsures of imation. Ihe advisers to

me on economics are trying to assess
‘all Govérnment programs_and private

_actions that contribute to inflationary

“lings. Legislation is ‘in the. Congress.

pressures, When this ‘analysis is done
will use every means that I have
available to me to express’ these con-
cerns and possibly. corrective actions...

‘to the American peopile:as-well. . ~

: And the last. point ‘is that ‘we will.

hove (9 romnlate: analucie: indarwav

joy .on deregitation. And the first --

question is the deregulation of the air

“_ now,.We'll_be submitting -a-amessage

to Congress very shortly on that sub-

‘ject. We will not submit administration

legislation because the Congress has
already moved substzntially forward in

: dealing with this important. issue.

‘And now I'd like to answer questions. .
Mr.¥Frank Cormier, |
‘:* Questions and Answers
1, Defense Budget .
. Mr. President, you told the Demo-

“ératic Platform. Committee that you .

se

‘thought present defense expenditures —
could ‘be reduced ‘by: five to seven. bil-
Jion dollars, Now I think you may have

.modified your position somewhat since

then, Obviously in. your. short time in
office you. didn’t find the opportunity

to make cuts like that in your precedes- -

sor’s budget. But isn’t it also likely
that next year’s budget for the defense
will exceed this year’s. .

A, Well because of inflationary ‘pres-
sures ‘and because of an impossibility
-of assessing the potential threat ‘to our
country from other nations, it’s hard
to predict exactly what the level of
idefense spending will be. In the short
time that we had available to work
on the previous Administration’s budg-
et—about three weeks of ‘hard. work—
we were able to reduce the suggested
expenditures by almost $3 billion. I
think about $2.75 billion. - ;

This was done—and I think Senator
Stennis in his recent public statements
has confirmed that it has been done
without weakening our own defense
capability. And the substantial savings
in defense spending that will stili leave °
us muscle will be in such things as
the standardization of weapons, ‘long-
range planning, a more businesslike al-
location of defense contracting, an as-.
sessnient' of the defense contracts for
construction or repair already out-
standing. : .

‘. A reassessment of priorities of the

evolution of new weapons which in the .

future can become enormously expen-
sive; a: longer assignment of military
personnel to a base before they are
transferred; some emphasis on the cor-
rection of inequities and unfairnesses
in the retirement system. ‘

_ These things obviously can't be done
in three weeks, but they will be an
ongoing effort on my part. And I think
the 1979 budget, which will be my Ad-
ministration’s first budget, will show
wee. improvements to a substantial de-
ree. :
Q. Will. next year’s defense budget
actuatly be lower then than the one

’ that you just revised. A. .I can't say

Yet, on

f Q. Do you think dt was proper for:
the C.I.A. to pay off King Hussein and
other foreign leaders? And what steps
are you taking to make yourself more
knowledgeable and more accountable
for what the C.LA. does? .

“S 2. CLA, Accountability

p A. Well, I've adopted a policy which

~

a . meee

iuL us Ww ‘lay a Bivubusuvin Sabi Waialua
we might predicate a successful meet-
ing of a threat to us jn time of war
if we don’t have some degree of secre-
cy. ; ;

I'm quite concerned about the num-.

ber of people now who have access _

to this--kind -ef -informations And I've

been working very; closely with the -

Congressional leaders, yesterday and

i to try to reduce the overall num-
ber le who have access to the
sources of information. that’ within the
bounds.-that T° jbed- i

“and legality ‘and American attitudes to-

ward secret:;—I'l!.do the best I can
not ever tc make a mistake. And I'm
also assuming on a continuing basis
a direct personal reponsibility for the
operation of all! the ingelligence agen-
cies in our Government to make sure
that they are meeting these standards.

_... 8, Correcting’ Errors on C.LA.

Q. If there has been erroneous infor-

mation, wouldn’t it behoove you to cor- -

rect the record?

A. In"some ways we are correcting
the record, but if I began to either dis-

. pute or confirm every individual story:

that’s written whether correct or er-
roneous on every. matter relating. to
the CLA. then ‘these matters which
‘are necessarily secret would no longer
be secret, so I’m.not going to comment
on individual items that relate to intel-
ligence. ~ :

- 4, Difference With Meany

" . Q. Mr. President, George Meany says

he won't go along with your idea for
pre-notification on wage and price in-
creases. And my question really is, how
hard. are you going to press Mr. Meany
to go along and do you have anything
else in mind that you could use in the
way of Government involving itself to
try to control inflation? :

_ A, I announced earlier my firm com-
mitment not to have mandatory wage
and price laws or authority, not to have

-standby wage and price authority. I've

not made any proposal to’ Mr. Meany

or‘any other labor leader nor to any -

representative of. industry or manufac-
turing. But I. will retain the option in
the future of assessing what we need
to do to control inflation. .
I've emphasized always the word
“voluntary.” And to the extent that
1 can arrive at a common understand-
ing with industry and labor leaders that
a certain amount of cooperation and
information can be exchanged before
a major proposal is made. I think that’s

_a légitimate pursuit of mine. I can’t |

force it. It’s got.to be voluntary: And
that’s as far as I can go with my an-
swer.

5s Wage-Price Gluidelines

Q. You mean just directly about wage
and price “guidelines” which might be
voluntary. How js that for an idea?

A. Well I think rigid. guidelines are
a mistake. If we said, for instance, that
no price increase or no wage increase
could exceed 6 percent this would be

too restrictive. It would be contrary

to my own philosophy of Government

: and I think that because of the diversi-

ty of our society and the fact that it
is a free enterprise system, you've got
to have some flexibility.

But I'd prefer to deal with these
problems that arise on’ increasing
prices on an individual bases and I also

prefer, of course, to work harmoniously _

’ Three Provision, insures: that ‘some ‘of
__.these-humaa-rights-shallsBe preserved.

prisoned ptcue ou SPic aers A fad
Korea, in Cuba, in many countris in
several countries, rather,—in $ uth
America anid I'll continue to do so. T
have never iad an inclination to single
out the Soviet Union as the only place

- where -huntan rights ‘are being. abridged.
"  ‘We-have, I'think, a ‘resporisibility and ~ |
_- a legal right to.express our disapprovat

- of viotdtions of human rights. The He

sinki Agreemira, 77 Ree

We are a signatory of: the Helsinki

agreement. We are ourselves culpable- -

in some ways for not giving people
adequate rights to move around our
country: or restricting unnecessarily, in
my opinion, visitation to this country
by those who disagree with us political-
]

y- .

So I think that we all ought to take
a position in our own countr’ and
among our friends and allies, among
our potential adversaries, that human
rights is something on which we should
bear a major responsibility for leader-
ship. And I have made it clear to the
‘Soviet Union and to others in the East-
ern European community that I’m not
trying to launch a unilateral criticism
of them, that I’m trying to set a stand-
ard in our own country and make my
concerns expressed throughout the
world, not singled out against any par-
ticular country.

Q. Mr. President, the other day, get-
ting back to’ this C.LA. thing, when
that story broke your Press Secretary,
when ‘he issued what amounted to a
“no comment” by the White House,
someone asked him if this story had
broken back during the campaign when
you were running for Presiden:, vould
you have given a similar response? And
he said “well I don’t‘ know.” So can
I ask you, what would have beer, your
response? Would it .have been the
same? A. I don’t know.

7. Review of C.1.A. Activities
Q. Mr. President, on that same sub-

ject, you said earlier that you review”

of C.LA. activities had found nothing
illegal or improper and you later said
that these activities are legitimate and
proper. Isn't that a value judgment that
the American public might like to
share? But how can they if you refuse
to’ give them any idea of waat you
have discovered during this review
about payments, including ones made
in secret?

A. That is a value judgment, it’s made

by the independent Intelligence Over--

sight Board, which was established and
appointed by President Ford. This
beard has made itself available to the
Inspector General and to any employce
within the C.ILA. or within the defense
intelligence agencies or any other to
receive even rumors of impropriety.

. They have assessed these opcrations.

They made their inquiries in the past,
which is in accordance with an execu-

. tive order issued by President Ford to

the Attorney General of the United
States and also to the President.

Y have read that correspond.are. }t’s
quite voluminous and J think that il’s
accurate to say that Senator Inouye’s
committee in the Senate and tne appro-
priate committees in ihe House have
also received this injormation in the
past.

I have talked to Senator Inouye and
he confirms what I've just told you.
And I think he would also conirm that

pune

4
“Wl

13-00000

iN

HURSDAY, FEBRUARY 24, 1977

The New York Times/Teresa Zabala
chtive Office Buiding in Washington

.the impropriety or the illegality does
ot exist on any ongoing C.LA. opera-
‘ion. .

8. Problems With Congress

Q. Mr. President, Charles Kirbo, your
friend Charles Kirbo seenis to feel that
‘you're going to be having a continuing
problem with.the Congress and that

to the people in order to get results.
s this true? ;

A. I think if you read the whole
statement that Mr. Kirbo made, which
is just a private citizen’s opinion, he
would say that every President has had
* arguments and debates and disagree-
» ments. with the Congress. And I think

“ that’s inevitable in our system of Gov--

“ernment. That's part of the checks and
~ balances that’s very precious to us.all.

" : IT have found up té now a growing.

sense of cooperation with the Congress.
' J think last week when I was asked
‘roughly the same question. that the
- troubles were perhaps underestimated
by the news media. I think now per-
“haps the troubles with the Congress
are overestimated. I have frequent
meetings wilh the Congressional] lead-
ers both Democratic. and Republican.
= And I think that the progress of the
legislation that ‘we consider to be cru-
cial which seemed to be moving very

Z slowly’ in the past is now speeding up -
: ave

So I don’t believe that we'll
‘nearly the problems with the Congress
. that has been the case in recent ‘years.
, And I have to‘say in summary that
- Iam very pleased with my relationship
owith the Congress now.

“9, The Election Process
» Q. Mr. President, in view of your
" assignment to Vice President Mondale
» regarding the election laws, could you
ygive us your view, sir, on the direct

s program - will
voluntary: conservation, yet the public’s.

you'll have to go over Congress’s head -

n

ference on F oreign ¢ and Domestic Matters’

But I will work with Congress on
the deregulation: of natural-gas as a
part .of an overall energy policy. By.
April 20 I think we'll be’ prepared to
present to you, the news media, and
the people and the Congress more
specific proposals involving’ direct
legislation proposals that will answer
your question more fully.

12. Energy Program Sacrifices.

Q. Mr, President,, we've been told that
the. central thrust: of your new energy
involve sacrifice and

always reading stories in.the paper of
how the major oil companies are with-
holding natural gas. So I'd like to ask
how are you going to expect the public
to make ‘sacrifices when there’s such
widespread public suspicion about the
role of the oil companies in the energy
crisis. ©

A. I think the comprehensive nature
of the proposal that takes in all these
very disparate and sometimes ‘conflict-
ing elements at one time and a long-

Tange projection of our needs and a

tangible demonstration to. the Ameri:

‘can people, to the extent that I’m able

to put it forward, that there will he
direct ultimate benefits to them will

-be the elements that will cause them’

to make those sacrifices. At the same
time, I want to increase the surety that
we have that the reserve supply data
given to us by the oil companies and
others are accurate.

We are now conducting some admit-
tedly. superficial studies by Secretacy
Ceci! Andrus in Interior and also they'll
be followed up by more detailed studies
under Dr. Schlesinger, to see whether
or not the reserve supplies are ade-
quate and whether or not the oll com-
panies are giving us accilrate data. I
think it’s obvious to all of us that there
are some instances where natural gas
is withheld from the market. That's
‘understandable. If I was running an’
oi] company I would reserve the right
to release or to reserve some supplies
of natural gas.

With the emergency’ legislation that
the Congress did pass, I think in about
a week of assessment during the frigid
part of the winter—it’s still very cold—

we were given some authority to buy .

extra gas at a very high price. This
is obviously a transcient. circumstance.

But I believe the American people
will be willing to make, the sacrifices
required, if they are convinced that fu-
ture reports will be accurate, that sup-
plies will not be withheld from the mar-
ket and if we can let the oil companies
know in a predictable way what, our

‘policy will be two months or two years

or-20 years in the future—within the
bounds of human reason—then I think
they'll be much less likely ta withhold

. supplies of oif and natural. gas from

the market just hoping that they'll get
some bonanza iricreased price in the

future if the policies do change.

14. Rise in Gasoline Tax

Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-
fices that you say your upcoming ener-
gy program is going to demand, Is it
likely that one of those sacrifices. is
going to come in the form ofa largely
increased Federal gasoline tax? -

A. I don’t know how to answer vour

fe pl 9 96 fete}

was a waste. You also promised td ott i
the waste out of the defense budget.
When would you expect to stop
production of the B-1 as opposed to
research and’development on the B-1?
A. I think I cut out about more than {
$200 million from the B-l program: “ine |
the budget just submitted to the Con-.
gress, I “have -serious questions about
whether or not the B-1 ought to be
in the future the center of our airborna
defense capability.
“have several more months before: |
T have to make a decision on that mate::
ter and the National Security Council

- which combines, as you know, State,::

Treasury, Defense and other elements,
of the Government, working very closez: :
ly with me, is now making a complete :
reassessment of the need for the 'B-
bomber. 4 nr coe
_ I don’t know whether we will decide:
to go on with it or not. And I don’t}
know whether we'll expedite produce
tion of it or not, at this time. rT
Part of the factor to be assesstd is.
the attitude of the Soviet Union. If-wee
can have a general lessening of tension,.
a demonstrated commitment on ‘their
part toward disarmament, it would cer-.
tainly make it less likely that we woulé
go ahead with the B-1. nites
But'l can’t answer that question unitiP
T complete my own study, and I thinks
that would have to be terminated. by"
the end of May. ily vow

18. Campaign Financing Law.

Q. Mr. President, T was a little unclear,
about what you're going to propose:
in the campaign finance law. Are you

saying that you will propose to have"

tf Congressional elections publicly
hanced? A. That's my preference, yes.
*Q. Is that what. you will propose ta
Congress? A. The Vice President is'nOy,
doing a study on a complete election
law package. And I'd like to reserve’
my own judgment until T see what his
report ig to me. But that’s my own.
inclination. It’s a position that I took:
during the campaign and so far,I ‘have.
no reason to change my mind.

19, Foreign Policy Turntable

Q. You gave us a kind of a timetable”
for your domestic program in your pre-
‘liminary statement. I wonder if “you
-have a similar timetable of what you
hope to achieve in foreign policy be-
tween now and the end of the year,

‘such as Middle East peace, Cyprus,, the.

treaty with Panama. 7 :
A. Of course I can’t answer. that

*, question specifically because I. don't

know what cooperation we will -get
from other nations and I don’t. know,
what the inclination of those nations.
in disputed regions of the world want
to do toward one another. :

_ Secretary Cyrus Vance has just. nes
turned from what I consider to bea
very successful trip to the Middle. East.,
He not only probed with the heads. oft
those Governments and their Cabinet.
members their own positions, both pubs
lic and private on -the controversial,
issues that have so far prevented-ra

“peace in the Middle East. He also had

a chance to compare their positions
on issues—which ones they found ta.
‘be in harmony, which,ones there was

13-00000

| And I have to‘say in Summary that

Tam very pleased with my relationship «.

| with the Congress now.

- 9, The Election Process

/ Q. Mr. President, in view of your
assignment to Vice President Mondale
regarding the election laws, could you,
_give us your view, sir, on the direct
election ‘of a President versus the Elec-
.toral College. And also do’ you think
“that the public financing should be ex-
tended to Congress as weil as the Presi-

; dency? ; 7 : :
A. There are three basic questions
} that come up. In the first place, I do
«favor at least an automatic ‘vote by
presidential electors once the general
‘election is completed. 1 think the Elec-
i-toral Colllege, for instance, should: be
eliminated. Whether the ratio among
i.states of votes ought to be changed
kT'm not prepared to comment on now.
poe dee cs tng Ha eINg Of Congres-
| sional elections by public funds—it has
i proved to be successful, I believe, in

ithe Presidential election, I strongly

' favor that, yes. And the other element
‘of the overall package would be a sim-
ple way. for American people. who are
| citizens and 18 years old to register
to vole. And I am committed to that

-graciously consented to ‘take «on this
| joverall election process responsibility.
“Those three will be basic elements of

‘the proposals.

t 10, Relations With Cuba
i: Q. Mr. President, are you, prepared

: to jift the trade embargo ‘against Cuba

-as one Step toward normalizing rela- .

. tions? to. .
.) AT think any substantial -move in
‘igur Yelationship with Cuba would have

.to await further discussions with them.

“indirectly, and, also some tangible evi-

‘dence on our part that they are willing,

. to restore basic human rights in Cuba,
: involving the number of prisoners who
‘gre being held, their attitude toward
overseas adventures such as the’ one
‘|n Angola, and other matters. So Ican’t
i gay. what might come in the future.
'” Ym willing, though, to discuss these
" mattess with the Cuban leaders, At this
: fime we have mo direct relationships
: vith them, political. But through inter-
‘nediaries comments are being ex-

: bhanged back and forth. Most of my. -

-tomments are in public statements like
‘ this, but we do have messages coming
* back from people who visit Guba.

rh : ;
'* 11. Defense Savings Goal’

; Q. In answer to an earlier ‘question,
| Mr, President, you said that you could-
wt: say whether nezt year’s’ defense

| tudget will be lower or higher than

‘this year’s. But as I understood your

tegardiess of the overall level of spend-
ing. Do you still hold with that figure?
le 'that still your goal and a commit-
nent? :
A, Yes. The analyses that I’ve made
‘if the defense budget so far—which
is you know has been limited to about’
month’s study just part-time—indi-
late that that’s a goal that will be

feached.

|{ 12. Natural Gas Deregulation

|, Q.-Mr. President, in letters to the
‘zovernors of Oklahoma, Texas and
! fouisiana last October, you said uncon-
jitionally that you would work with
Congress to deregulate new - natural
tas. And 1 wondered ‘if you: planned

lo keep that promise, and if so how
eee 101 me bn OF 7 7

proposition and the Vice President has ~

' tarlier postion, you did want to.achieve ©
a five to seven billion ‘dollar savings -

Tae Ab to peed UU CHanBgeEr ”
‘14. Rise in Gasoline Tax

_ Q. Another question, sir, on the sacri-
fices that you say your upcoming ener-
gy program is going to demand, Is it
likely that one of those sacrifices is

oing to come in the form of a largely
increased Federal gasoline tax?

A. L don’t know how to answer your |

questions about specifics of the propos-
al. I want to make this clear. The pur-
pose of .the energy policy evolution
is not to cause sacrifice or hardship
among the American people.Unless I
can demonstrate that in balance the
temporary sacrifices ina certain area

are far overcome by immediate and ul-

timate benefits then nobody's going to

buy it.
- And T believe that we've. now got.

such a horrible conglomeratton ‘of cari-
fusion in the energy field that nobddy

knowe whatle. goine to -happen. gent.

So I think that the sacrifices ‘w
far overcome by: |
American people-*#ill be easily -able to
discern-for themsel.s.

15. U.S. Ro!:: on Canada
Q. You said that. 'n spite of the fact
that the. Canadian “eople would have
to determine their future for them-
selves, particularly in regard to the
separatism issue in Quebec that .you

had: confidence that the issue would .

be straightened out relatively peaceful-
ly. Do you really think that there is
little concern in this country about the
‘future of a unified Canada and is there
anything really: that we can do about
it? .- . :

“A. There's a great deal of concern
in this. country about the future of

_ Canada ‘and I have complete confi-

dence, as I said ih an interview with
the Canadian news media in the sound

’ judgment of the Canadian people.

I'm familiar—and even more famillar

“today than I was two days ago after

Prime Minister Trudeau's visit—with
the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
tion of some of the French Canadians
to have an independent status from the
rest of Canadian Provinces.

I don’t know what’s going to be the

ultimate outcome. But.I believe that™

we are so Closely tied together with
Canada on a mutually berieficial basis,
sharing -problems, sharing. opportuni-

ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur--

ing companies that have joint owner-
ship, our exchange of ‘energy sources,

‘our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-.

way, the Great Lakes as far as water
pollution is concerned, the bringing of

_ Alaskan oil and natural gas down to

us that we have got to have a continu-

- ing relationship with Canada.

My own personal preference would
be that the commonwealth stay as it
is and that there not be a separate
Quebec province> But that’s a decision
for the Canadians to make and I would
certainly ‘make no private or public
move to try to determine the outcome
of that great debate.

16. Keeping Campaign Promises
Q. Mr. President, you've had a month

- now to enjoy the view from the Oval
’ Office. Do you think you'll be able to
.. keep fully all-the campaign promises
“you made?

A. As you know, we have issued what

" [believe is the complete book of my

campaign. promises, which is, I pre-.
sume, being made available to all of

-. you. My determination is to keep all

‘those promises.
Obviously if circumstances should
‘change I would have to reserve the

1 Aen nalnne manaln

‘be
by: the. benefits that the.

cee very SULLESSIUL TITY TOTAE MIGUIC Lasts

He not only probed with the heads. oft
those Governments and their Cabinet
members their own positions, both pube
lic and private on the controversial,
issues that have so far prevented as

‘peace in the Middle East. He also had

a chance to compare their positions
on’ issues—which ones they found tq.
be in harmony, which, ones there was
still a dispute. eer
“We also invited the leaders of. alk
those nations to meet with me. ‘They
fave ali accepted ta YT will be rceting
with the heads of the nations in dispute.
in the Middle East, all of them, before
the end of ‘May. The first visit of one
of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin.I
believe, March 12. And he will be fol-
lowed by the leaders from Egypt, fram

- Jordan and from Syria, from Saudia

Arabia-and I look forward to meating
with them. : : watts

At that point I hove 1. will have.a
very:-elear picture: of: wnat ivic the
American Government ought to-play.

The.same thing applies to the situa:
tion that exists between ourselves.and
Turkey, ourselves and Greece, -our-
selves and Cyprus onefire

We can’t impose our will on other
people. But if they honestly want to
seek a solution, we are perfectly -will-

ing to offer our good offices as a coun: :

try with influence and interest to help |
them resolve their own differences. But °
it’s got to be done primarily by those ,

countries involved. .

We have begun again, and within

the last week, our discussions on the

extremely good negotiators and I: hope
that we will have success there: Thera-s,

‘no way that I can say at this point
- what degree of progress we have made,

‘Its just beginning.

So throughout the areas of high diss
- pute, including South Africa and others
that I don’t have time to mention we're.

probing as best we can to discern soma
Possibility of resolution of those ten-
sion areas. ; _—
We are meeting today, in fact-all
this week with the British, to try to
get a renewed proposal to make con-
cerning the question surrounding Rho-.
desia. And then, of course, we'll still
have left Nambia and_ ultimately -ma-
jority rule question in South Africa.
But I've only been in office a month.
I don’t claim to know all the easy ans
swers. And these questions.that have
are not going to be easy to solve.: But
we'te going to do the best we can opens
ly and forcefully offering. our . good
services, not trying to impose our-will
on other people. wae
Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Carter Errs on Rabin.

And U.S.-Uganda Ties

WASHINGTON, Feb, 23 (AP)—Presi-
dent Carter made two errors in. his
news conference today, which .the
White House staff later corrected. :

Mr. Carter used a wrong dale. for
the forthcoming visit to the United
States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin
of Israel. The President said that he
thought the visit would take place
March 12. a

The White House later corrected that
to say “the proposed visit is tentatively
planned for March 7 and 8.” _

The White House also corrected the
President’s statement that the United
States doeg not have diplomatic rela:
tions with Uganda. voy

“This is not strictly accurate,"’.. the

- Panama Canal Treaty. We have two-

1 310Q00Q ungress a3 Weil as ule rive
mcy? Lo .
A. There are three basic questions
iat come wp, In the first place, I do
wot at least an automatic *vote by
residential electors once the general
ection is completed. I think the Etec-

yral Colllege, for instance, should: be _

iminated. Whether the ratio among
cates of votes ought to be changed
m not prepared.to comnrent on now.
eo ta Oo tad WIN Ge LOngres-
onal! elections by public funds—it has
roved to be successful, I believe, in

1e Presidential election.. I strongly ~

tvor that, yes. And the other element
* the overall package would be a sim-
le way.for American people. who are
tizens and 18 years old to register
» vote. And I am committed to that

-oposition and the Vice President has ©

raciously consented to ‘take ‘on this
verall election process responsibility.
hose three will be basic elements of
le proposals. ‘i.

"10, Relations With Cuba

Q. Mr. President, are you. prepared
» ift the trade embargo ‘against Cuba

s one step toward normalizing rela- |

ons? . .
A,;1 think any substantial.move in
ar Telationship with Cuba would ‘have

» await further discussions with them.

directly, and also some tangible evi-
ance on our part that they are willing
» restore basic humah rights in Cuba,
volving the number of prisoners who
‘e being held, their attitude toward
verseas adventures such as the one
Angola, and other matters, So I can’t
iy. what might come in the future.
Ym willing, though, to discuss these
attezs with the Cuban leaders. At this
me we have no direct relationships
ith them, political. But through inter-
ediarics comments are being ex-
ianged back and forth. Most of my
»mments are in public statements like
iis, but we do have messages coming
ick from people who visit Guba.

11. Defense Savings Goal.
Q. In answer to an earlier ‘question,
r. President, you said that you could-
t. say whether next year’s defense
jdget will be lower or higher than
ds year's. But as I understood your
irlier postion, you did want to achieve

five to seven billion ‘dollar savings -

‘gardiess of the overall level of spend-
g. Do you still ‘hold with that figure?
that still your goal and a commit-
ent? :
A. Yes. The analyses that I've made
' the defense budget so far—which
3 you know has been limited to about:
month’s study just part-time—indi-
tte that that’s a goal that will be
‘ached. : .

12. Natural Gas Deregulation

Q. Mr. President, in letters to the
wernors of Oklahoma, Texas and
yuisiana last October, you said uncon-
tionally that you would work with
ongress to deregulate new natural
as. And I wondered ‘if you planned

1 keep that promise, and if so how

du will go about it?

A. I don’t know how I’ll go:‘about
. | do try to keep my promises, The
sition that I have taken, and the
sition. that the governors of Oklaho-
a and Texas took at governors con-
‘rences to which I was referring, was
ve deregulation of natural gas for a
mited period. of time, four to five
2ars, to see how it works out, leaving
<isting contracts in effect.

\

And I believe that we've np
_ such’a horrible conglomeration ie
inobédy °°

is not to cause sacrifice or hardship
among the American people.Uniess I
can demonstrate thdt in balance the
temporary sacrifices in ‘a certain area

. are far overcome by immediate and ul-

timate benefits then nobody's going to
buy it. .

fusion in the energy field th:
knowe sshatic. gaine to —hey
So I think that the sacrifices
far overcome bj

i 1p
discern-for themsels:

15. U.S. Rol: on Canada
Q. You said that. in spite of the fact
that the. Canadian seople would have
to determine their future for them-
selves, particuJarly in regard to the
separatism issue in Quebec that -you

had‘ confidence that the issue would .

be straightened out relatively peaceful-
ly. Do you really think ‘that there is
little concern in this country about the

‘future of a unified Canada and is there
anything really: that we can do about
te :

A. There's a great deal of concern
in ‘this: country about the future of

_ Canada and I have complete confi-
dence, as I said in an interview with.

the Cariadian news media in the sound

' judgment of the Canadian people.

I'm familiar—and even more familiar

“today than-I was two days ago after

Prime Minister Trudeau's visit—with
the problems in Quebec and the inclina-
tion of some of the French Canadians
to have an independent status from the
rest of Canadian Provinces,

I don’t know what’s going to be the

ultimate outcome. But.I believe that”

we are So closely tied together with
Canada on a mutually beneficial basis,

. sharing problems, sharing- opportuni-
' ties, sharing trade, sharing manufactur-

ing companies that have joint owner-
ship, our exchange of ‘energy sources,
‘our sharing of the St. Lawrence Sea-
way, the Great Lakes as far as water
pollution is concerned, the bringing of

. Alaskan oil and natural gas down to

us that we have got to have a continu-

‘ing relationship with Canada,

My own personal preference would
be that the commonwealth stay as it
is and that there not be a separate
Quebec province? But that’s a decision
for the Canadians to make and I would
certainly make no private or public
move to try to determine the outconie
of that great debate.

16. Keeping Campaign Promises
Q. Mr. President, you've had a month
now to enjoy the view from the Oval

’ Office. Do you think you'll be able to
- keep fully all. the campaign promises
“you made?

A. As you know, we have issued: what
I believe is the complete book of my

. campaign promises, which is, I pre-~

sume, being made available to all of

-. you. My determination is to keep all

those promises. _

Obviously if circumstances should
change I would have to reserve the
right to go back to the American people

. and say “now that circumstances have

changed. this a better approach to that

particular problem.” But I will do-my _

utmost to keep all the campaign prom-
ises that I made to the American peo-

ple.
17. Production of B-1

" Q. Mr. President, you said at various
times during the campaign that the B-1

st

be ©
y:-the. benefits that .the
n -peopleacill-be-easily-ablé to. ~

liave an accepted sod Twill be erecting
with the heads of the nations in dispute.
in the Middle East, all of them, before
the end of May. The first visit of one
of those leaders will be Mr. Rabin»
believe, March 12. And he, will be fol
lowed by the leaders from Egypt, from
dJofdan “and from ‘Syria, from Saudia.--~;
‘Arabia-and I.look forward to 'meating
with'them. - et wacte  |
' hat point I hone: I. will have.
ar picturesa® wnat iuie 2
‘American: Gavernment. ought to..play.
The.same thing -applies.to the-situas ...
tion that’ exists between ourselves,.and
Turkey, ourselves. and Greece, -our-
selves-and Cyprus. eo be
We can’t impose our will on other .
people. But if they honestly want to |
seek a solution, we are perfectly -will-
ing to offer our good offices as a couns ;
try with influence and interest to help :
them resolve their own differences. Bug '
it's got to be done primarily by those |
countries involved. yt
We have begun again, and within ; ’
the last Week, our discussions on ,the . ’

- Panama Canal Treaty. We have two:

extremely good negotiators and I- hope -

_ that we will have success there: There's,

no way that I can say at this point i

’ what degree of progress we have made, -

‘Hig just beginning. ch
So throughout the areas of high dis:
pute, including South Africa and others ,
that I don’t have time to mention we're |
probing as best we can to.discern some *
possibility of resolution of those ten-!
sion areas. . oy
We are meeting today, in fact: all i:
this week with the British, to try to
get a renewed proposal to make con-:
cerning the question surrounding Rho-,‘
desia, And then, of course, we'll still
have left Nambia and ultimately -ma- °
jority rule question in South Africa...
But I've only been in office a month, ;
JT don’t claim to know all the ‘easy aris .
swers. And these questions that have
are not going to be easy to solve. But
we'te going to do the best we can opene
ly and forcefully offering. our , good
Services, not trying to impose our-will
on other people. oka,
Q. Thank you, Mr. President.

Carter Errs on Rabin:
And U.S.-Uganda Ties |

WASHINGTON, Feb. 23 (AP)—Presi-
dent Carter made two errors in. his.
news oonference today, which the:
White House staff later corrected... ...

Mr. Carter used a wrong dalte. for”
the forthcoming visit to the United. -
States of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, -
of Israel. The President said that he.
thought the visit would take placa!
March: 12. : Ts

‘The White House later corrected that, |
to say “‘the proposed visit is tentatively ;
planned for March 7 and 8.” eae

The White House also corrected the
President's statement that the- United.)
States does not have diplomatic rela- ::.
tions with Uganda. toed

“This is mot strictly accurate,".. the ..
correction said, explaining: ‘, is

“While the: United States has with-.
drawn its mission from Uganda ancl,,
has no direct diplomatic representation
there, United States affairs in -the
Republic of Uganda are carried out-:
through the West’ German embassy and.”
the Republic of Uganda has an aperat- ..
ing embassy and charge d’affaires-in .
Washington.” :


13-00000

‘tional security. Although the. CIA’s : The federal government ‘had previ.’ :

‘attempted to prove the need for sec- :

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‘WASHINGTON POST b wm

CIA Admits - 5 ea oa
Working to. - 7 | Qu { ‘Cth
Raise Sub w qh Moe

_By Timothy S. Robinson
Washington Post Staff Writer . .
The Central Intelligence Agency t For example, Gesell was forced to -
has finally acknowledged publicly {ssue a secret opinion in the case last?
‘ October that even the: attorneys in-'
“ *
that it was “involved” in the Glomar volved still have not been able to
Explorer's attempts to raise a sunken - read. The opinion was issued in that |
Russian submarine from the Pacific secret fashion upon direct orders of
Ocean floor,” . ' the U.S. Court of Appeals, which in- :
The terse ‘acknowledgement ¢ came in _ Structed Gesell to accept secret affi- ;
filed the US. ‘davits from high-level government of. *
a court document filed in. the i ficials concerning the case. :
Court of Appeals -by the Justice De-' — pubtic aftidavits filed at the time by |
partment two’ weeks ago. The docu- former President. Ford’s top national |
ment asked that a suit against ‘the ' security adviser, Lt. Gen. Brent Scow- :
CIA by a private group concerning | croft, said disclosures of the CIA in- :
volvement or other details about the
the Glomar's financing be sent back project ‘might prompt. other nations ,
to.a lower court for further hearings. ~ offended by the project to Fetaliate :
The filing marks an abrupt change — against the United States. . ; ij
from the previous position taken by | -géoweroft ‘said’ ‘that retaliation { j
the Justice Department in the 18 inight take the: form of “strong ‘meas- i
month-old case that the mere acknowl-! ures” that might “endanger US mili.
edgement of the CIA’s involvement in | tary and diplomatic personnel and |
the project would be harmful to na-’ businessmen overseas.” .

operation of the project has been re- i ously acknowled ged only that the ship |

' ported in numerous publications, the | \/.. -part: of a 1969 classified .U.S. gov- |

agency has been adamant in its re- ernment “
project “to accomplish cer- |
fusal to say publicly whether ‘those re | tain secret tasks in furtherance of na- |

Ports were true, 20 tional, security: objectives. 7 _
The case brought by the nonprofit pe = - . ai
Military Audit Project, which moni- ; a
tors spending by the defense and in- ‘
telligence establishments, has in- :
volved an unprecedented amount: of -
secret court: proceedings as the CIA .

recy to U.S. District Court Judge Ger- :
hard A. Gesell. The suit seeks the fi- :
nancial details of the Glomar project. ;

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