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PFIAB
KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN
RECORD

MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBIAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.

12/28/1962
10

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Ww 52879 Docld:32112782 Page 1 ane

. ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
PFIAB

MC CONE, JOHN
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES

MEMORANDUM
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“SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, Lobe

The Board convened at 9:CO0 a.m, on December 27. * Those
present were Dr, Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy ,
Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Cliiford and Messrs. Coyne and Asn,

De. Killian suggested thet Board members read tre draft
report which had been furnished to the Board on the vreceding
day by Mr. McCone, the Directcr of Central Intelligence, setting
forth the results of the all-scource review which the Board had \
requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with
respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months
preceding Cctober 22, 1962, ‘Tne Chairman asked that Boarc members
make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise
. for discussion during this twc-day meeting. Dr. “illian said that
ely he was not sure the DCI's repcrt had the approval of the inteili-

: gence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. MeCone

{ was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it

- vas possible that some of the conclusions anda factual devails

might not have yet received final approval by the agencies whien
contributed to the preparatior of the report (CIA, DIA, State and
NSA). &ecordingly, the Chaimran noted the importance or the
@iscussions which the Board would have on the following day witn
heads of the intelligence agercies. The Chairman also thought
that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board renort
to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.

Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr,
MeGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs
to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelli-
gence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy
assured that the President will understand that the Board is going
into the subject deeply and otjectively, About 10 days ago, the
Chairman related, he had received a telephone cali from Mr, Bundy
who said that he had seen an carly draft of the DCI's report (from
a cenfidential source) and was concerned because the report did not
get to the basic issues, and Mr, Bundy expressed an intention to
taik to Mr. Mcvone about this. Dr, Killian stated that he had an
appointment to see Mr. Bundy Jater in the morning at which time he
would ask Mr, Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of
this meeting. tet a

: ere unable to attend,

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‘oheday stay in Cuba,' “isequally

arous Soviet and Cuban ‘plans “for further activities ‘involving
other countries in this: Hemisphere, “Also ‘we- are; lacking intel- -
ligence on Cuba/Communist China 3iscussions. Hr, Murphy reiterated
his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these’,
indteates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to -
keep our Government informed abot developments in Cuba at the pre-,
sent time and in the future, - Soe, ;

Dr; Killian at. this. point r2ported to. the Board on’ the con-
versation whieh he hadjust-had sith Mr, ‘Bundy. «According to™
-Mr, Bundy, tne President’is fully “aware that the Board 1s: con-
ducting its review of ‘the Cuba situation... The President wants
an objective report ‘froma group ‘oficitizens who have:no axe to
grind, and he is placing ‘great store on this effort of*the Board,
The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about - ::
the prospect that tne Congress will make inquiries -into the Cuba
matter. However, Mr, Bundy feels there is a pare possibility ‘that |”
Congressional investigators will be more nesitent to raise hypo-
thetical questions if they’ learn of the existence “of a study having *
been made by a group such as the Board, It is ir. Bundy's hope
that the Board will cavefully coisider’ the preparation of a sani-
tized version of the report, but if ‘the. Board and the President feel
that this cannot be done’ then-theBoard should try to prepare ‘a ©
report which'could be-used in exacutive session of a Committee of
tne Congress. fe ett mo
Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been
covered in nis discussion with Kir. Bundy. He said tnat Mr. Bundy:
had expressed concern aver the failure of the DCI to accept the
suggestion that there be submitted a move adequate report than the
one vhich the DCI forwarded to tie Board cn December 26. fir, Bundy
noted in stnis connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy
makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to
intelligence handling. oe ;
te ee : My at at . . ~
On- the question of:availability of Special Group records for .
purposes of the Boardésistudy, Mc, “Bundy infermed the, Chairman... :
that certainly the Board ‘should :xamine such records and that ~
they could be obtained, from.Mr, Parrott’ :(Mr, Bundy commented’ that
the Board. is .the only .group whic. can have. this icind.ofyaccess).
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As to the Board's!'study, "Mr, {Bundy*told Dr. Killian -t

the Board should include in its*1evicw discussions with the

Secretaries of State and Defense and:the Chairmen of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff -- Mr, Bundy ‘ind: cating that the Secretary of

Defense has particular reservations about ithe DCI's report,

Another matter mentioned .by. fir, Bundy was his belief? that
the morale of tne intelligence, community as a vihole stands to
suffer in the absence. of a carefully done review and veport
whiten is being expected .from the Board, . wt

. ays Mee : oa ~ : +

With regard to the interim veport which the Board has under.
way, Mr, Bundy informed the Chaiiman tnat the report could he .
delivered to nin or 1¢ could be presented to the Tresident directly,’ '
and ir, Bundy thought 1% important that the Board present it to...
tne President in person,:” Onefotier matter discussed was the Board's
roneern about any Intelligence 1:t-down in the wake of the Cuba ..°
erisis, it being Hr, Bundy's vel .ef that no such let-down is in
prospect if present direétives..aid discussions on the subject have
any effect in Government. "is¥e. oi 7 .

(Ab the cenelusion of the Ciairmman's account of his discussion
with Mz, Bundy, the Board recess:d-for lunch, , Doe

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by
Hr. Thomas Lawlor, senior, intelligence officer in CIA's Office of.
Current Intelligence (Mr, Ray “Cline, Deputy DCI /Intelligence was.
on vacation leave and not availaoie to be present at this Board —
meeting). Mr, Lawlor explained. chat his own responsibilities in-
cluded tne handling of current iitelligence matters, the selection
and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in.
memoranda for the White House),. and the preparation of internal in-..)
telligence nutes for use at the CITA working level. Mr, Lawlor
pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis ane.
production, not the coliection, of intelligence, His briefing of
the Board includéd,.the following subject matters: “:

: OC oa Lo . . . -
USSR/Chicom rélations:/’Recfiminations between the USSR and
Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute,.
and an cpen break-in, par. relations.is,most likely near
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‘The Chairman asked; theiNCI whether the MONGOOSE-activity:
presented any particular“intelligence, problem inthe’ Cuba: .
situation. Mr. McCone':said‘‘ihat.it had not. He said-that. -
in the MONGOOSE activity! the’ Special’ Group and the Attorney
General had given a-great del offconsideration to the need
for intelligence collection sith: respect to Cuba, but “he
intelligence needed/was primurilysfor"covert ‘action rather
than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity’
contributed to the. over-all’: ntelligence collection effort
on Cuba. fic. MeCone recalled! that there was a hiatus in the‘
collection of intelligence .on-Cuba, after the Bay of Pigs in- +
vasicn,-and when he-vook: off:.ce in’ November 1961 Mr, MeCone
-was surprised to learn*that*no “interrogation of Cuban refugees
was aking places” Thereafter, following discussions with
-. the Presiden’ and the : AttorneyGeneral they got the refugee;.
.., interrogations under, way 2%) aS ed a ne

a
,

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in -.*
intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr.
MeCone said that this took place before his time, but he
assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and ”" -'
other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's :
question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in
store in the wake of the Cubs: crisis, "Mr. McCone said that © =
there was in fact a great danger of such a development followin
what some officials consider was an "Intelligence victory" if
for the United States.” Mr.“TIlcCone, noting that the Soviet
SA-2's remain in Cuba,’ said he-had brought this up forcefully
a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and:the. »
President had agreed to get vord to the USSR that any inter-
ference with our aerial recomnaissance of Cuba would be *.
considered as being most grave -- and Messrs, hicCloy: and
Stevenson have passed this.word. to Kuznetsov. . bir. McCone.
added that while low-level» reconnaissance flights.have been;
suspended, should ‘anyominou:. development ‘occur ,itwill be
: necessary. to obtain; President.ial: approval: of the ‘resumption
‘of. Low-level ‘flights Laks ; reavirhetes Sane

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-* Mr.’ Pace inauired“as.-to’ whether’ there were an °

onthe conduct of. inteiligenc e’ operations with regard™to}Cuba ae
Mr. McCone-said yes, it is ‘desired to follow.a more ‘aggressive:
pattern of, agent“infiltration into. Cuba. . He .would': Like’:to? ‘see
a™3.or°4'month effort: directed! toward the obtaining fof: zn
_intelligence:on#Cubaii(in lieu of ;political warfare," J

- to determine ithe; trendtof :So. .in,Cube.. Th
that:.the ‘Soviets may{ ; t: sT
egyt aU er tins pawl


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"fact take. one step back‘and* wc ‘steps*forward, and hold'on to.
the Cuba real estate "as.a. prope ganda and - insurgency base, '

_as a means of keeping*Castro‘urder-control, or in order to. :

retain a capability for“quick 1 estoration ofa Soviet offensive, +

‘capability. The kindof concerted" intelligence action which <«Fs9
the DCI had in mind: would’ incl de+(1)<penetration'ofvthe:Castr
government regime, (2) ‘the placement of additional agent’ teams “A:

in Cuba, (3) the continuation’ cf efforts to obtain the assistance

:,of British, French andiGerman.1epresentatives in Cuoa, (4). thewss!

' possible obtaining of-useful ir telligence from the attorney, —:
Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) vossibly,

_ the obtaining of usefullinform.tion from the captain of the oe
“african, Pilot whe {had ia’ 3-hour'italk-with Castro and who ace
yesterday.asked.to 's U a intelligence officer,’ -

. Se BETES A Pay BET a
. Mr, Pace asked whether Mr, NMcCone would favor the use of ¢))’
Guantanamo Naval Base as a base “for launching intelligence .and
related operations against Cubr. Mr, -McCone said that he would.
not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo py,
for intelligence operations Cas tro would obtain UN and other support. gyi
for Cuba's demands for U,S. evacuation of the Naval Base, — a oie

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Answering General: Doolittle 's question, the DCI stated that’ ae

-U-2 overflights of: Cuba were: gcing: at the rate of two a day, re--
sulting in coverage of: all: tarpets once a week and in coverage of
some important targets’ (e.g., liarbors) more often. Mr. MceCone said
that COMOR and USIB. list..the ;tirgets and that he then establishes -,
flight schedules, |: nN ee T 2B eS”

BBE ee, Sra :

: Going back to the subject:.f. Guantanamo, Mr, .Pace asked wheth
the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return’ that=
-would be obtained if intelligence operations were’ conducted’ from. ©
‘the Base -- Mr. Pace.adding thit.he thought such a study'should be ™
made before:a final .policy:dec:.sion was reached, ., Mr.:McCone said.
that he had. not. madesuch, atstudy.*™He, added: that in -August the. :
"operators" “in: CTA had}'proposeci to the ‘MONGOOSE. Group, that Guan-.,
tanamo Base beso used ;}but:th:.s"was#opposed at' the policy level,
Mr, MeCone said-that ih iwould:notiber opposed to..a restudy of. the
proposal"at this: time<i¢2In, ansvergtoyDr.-Killian’s, inquiry, Mr

a: thatYwevare®* conducting’ SIGINT’ operations#at%¥
icl-«noted ; that’ NSA had ,oF

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we Mr. Murphy’ asked, the-DCI: to state: the*meaning of, :MONGOOSE:
“RB pLUS", Mr, MeCone explained” shat ‘in the MONGOOSE Group it

was originally conceived ‘that Piase I would be one of gathering’

intelligence on the possibiliti2s for the organization and supply ates:
_ of resistance groups within Cuba,’ but’ this effort was "only fairly, >. peasy
successful" because: Castro has. 3ome. 100,000’ informers’ in place -in-

Cuba and exercises 4internal-sec arity controls through a system o

ration cards, and therefore, CI4 did not get as many teams’ into-

Cuba as had been hoped. On Augist 10,-Phase II was reached with:

MONGOOSE planning. for, (a) .violeat actions .(b) a relatively high.
- Leyel of actions, or: "B-PLUS",“and lesser act-cns, or "B MINUS",

Mr; McCone said that he“ had not been prepared to endorse proposed:

"RB pLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military packing, = ‘:\\: “

because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with «>

MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, .the MONGOOSE effort became diverted

by considerations of Soviet tivities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated,

’ a a “. :

In answer to a question fron Mr. Muxphy “as to who chairs’ the a \
MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not now «LR )
whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorrey, General was now serving as. ll [es
Chairman. we “ matin WS ot hea

‘ ge

With reference to the abserce of photographic evidence of Soviet —

offensive missile deployment p:ior to October 14 photography, Mr.
McCone said that if one locks <t photography of Cuba obtained on
September 5 it is possible ‘to. spot evidence of activity at the San
Cristobal MRBM site, but this <ctivity could have been that of
agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile
activity. Dr, Killian noted tie Board's concern that Soviet cam-
ouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. MeCone expressed his
own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage
methods, Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a
certain margin for error, Mr. licCone noted that it is nevertheless
impossible for us to say that ye know all that is going on in the j
_USSR with respect to missile activity, In response to Dr, Killian's."
comment that public discussion: ,seem.to indicate that U. S. missile ..:
capabilities are superior.'to,.those of. the USSR, the DCI considered:«-.:
that any such conelusion is‘erroneous and dangerous and could lead.
to a complacency which. might: well result in curtailment of.the.U. S,
»missile program. by’ an economy-ninded Congress.»; Mr. MeCone,.added i>;,
ject Committees of the-Congress he “”"
‘ S.,imissile. superiority,

20 Dp, Kill Lanjwondered*whether.the.:President ,* the Secretary. of
‘Defense ,, and -thegCongressiunde: "stand \the danger: of conclusions that

gno thing 185. aus: Gitticuntabe, seen! “tM: Me Cone;said: that;

undoubtedlystheresiss Mtowardgheavysdep : “oh :
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