[202-10001-10187| | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | -

le wae Date : 08/28/98
Page : 1.
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION |
AGENCY : Jcs
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10187
- RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188
| DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : OSD.
: FROM :
a TO x
TITLE ; MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON. MONGOOSE 6
| SEP 62
- DATE : 09/06/62
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1¢
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
| DATE OOP LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA =:
COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.

NOJOINT STAFF OBJECTION
CoO ee Sr CATION

AW 50955 DocId: 32424918 Page 1


a”

other hand, that particularly because of

WW O95 I : Docld: 32424918 Page 2

overn. ght.

‘bad | The Group then turned to a discussion of dumber 32 ‘Gare

ae

£. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
Cuban exile groups (number 48) 1s impractical, The word was changed
to selected.

e

&. ‘Mr. Martin cautioned that results of n ber 50 (actions to

be undertaken by other Heulephere governments) would aot. be. expected

., Several Carger urged that, in gommetticn vien [number 22 L

in working up other -dé aption men. ||!

Re possible Cuban counter-

measures which had. been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look.

at other possibilities in some detail.

a. General Carter fele that a determination should ‘be made as
to. how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic hartassing actions. a8
He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 .

will not in themselves be especially effective in: yrecking che ‘Cuban

‘rs, Pest Dhow

wabotage). General Carter emphasized the extrene sensitivity o¢ any
Such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-—
thing aoing wrong, particularly if there were obvious actribution ‘to

the U.S. He wenc on to say, however, that it would be possitle ro

accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in

*

the paper. He mencioned specifically the possibility ofproducin


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[failures /by the introduction of biological agents which would appear

LS they could be completely covered up. fe aim citi

oS 4 wey ‘A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which
Poop. cee - :
= _ could be distributed to Cubans should be infilgrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can

to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
“ :

lt was suggested that the matter of attacking and harragsing of
et personnel within Cuba should be considered, Hi

ee

7, The Atcorney General and Mr. Bundy said “that no reprisals against

exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was Suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looke: ~

into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how

much Llatitwde would be allowed the operating elements of the government

within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that ic would not be:

a@ simple matter ro delegate résponsibilities of this kind to any great :

degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum
oo. ee teseanet eh mw A. weet wa med

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HW 30955. Doeld:32424918 Page 3

zo bel of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about |
any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result L.
of local Cuban disaffection or of natural disaster, but. chat we suse |

avoid external activities such astrelease of chemicals, etc., unles¢ coe

f ee

, be-easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinat:


ey

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all
Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed
to selected.

*

Be Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to

Ps

be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected

over: Ce : a [> ; 4 |

General Carter urged that, in connection with

whd be given” more laticude

MN) General Lansdale sh

in working up other déeption possibilities « Bundy felt, on the

other hand, that particularly because of eiie’ possible Cuban counter~
measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look
at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter fele that a determination should be made as
to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in, economic harrassing actions,
He emphasized chat sabotage operations such as those under number 27

i

will net in themselves be especially effective in grecking the Cuban

economy. Pedr h % qh AK\ . | =

“4./ The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32

General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of. any

such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from some-
thing going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to

the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to

8 enti

accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in

*

the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility og


€ a aa ies

ml

Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about

any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result

at .
aor of local Cuban disaffection or o but that we must

. @vold external activities such a

a ‘a :

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: im. :
(0 -~-3. A suggestion was made that suiall explosives or incendiaries which
reed ~
L Ve could be distributed te Cubang should be infiltrated. General Carter

explained that the problem is not ome of such supplies, since they can
, be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatic

to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.
eit

i
i C oe t was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of
wn oly oy

\y"! 6 ét personnel within Cuba should be considered ||

aod

7, The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against

exiles whe undertake active operations on their own are contemplaced.

8, Tt was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked

into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how
much Latitude would be allowed che operating elesients of the government,
within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be
a simple mamter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great

degree.

10. Mr. Bumidy them raised the basic question of the entire spectrum

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