124-10185-10214) | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

. . “ «
ly “ya _DAVIDL BOREN, DELANDLIA CHARMAN SECRET
sl * + WILUAM 5. COHEN, MAINE, VICE CHAIRUAN

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SAH KUNN, GEORGIA GRPUH HATCH, UTA
ERNEST F, HOLLINGS, SOUTH CAROUNA FRANK MURKOWSEL ALASKA

BILL BRADLEY, NEW JERSEY ARLEN SPECTER, PEANSYLY:
CALIFORNIA JOHN WARNE!

Sion. Seno Wited States whe

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE -_ :

GEGRGE MCTCHEL, MAINE, EX OFFICIO. ‘
AODERT DOLE, KANSAS, EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, OC 205 10-6475
“GEORGE J, TENET, STAFF OCRECTOR -
JAMES 1. DYSTRA, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR
L BATT SNIDER. GENERAL COUNSEL
KATHLEEN P, MEGHEE, COEF CLEAK ; Fe 990

"90 FEB-20 9:22 PM
SSCI #90-505

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State

- Department of State
‘Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:
- A s
The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual

‘budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S.
counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request
that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ivan
Selin, Undersecretary of. State for Management. Other
witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director William 8.
Sessions, Mr., Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr.
Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for 7
Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center;
and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence. |

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss
with the Committee the results of the Administration's review
of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,
whether recent changes in the threat and operating
environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and
the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,
program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing
will also consider issues identified in testimony from a
group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and. we
will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Selin to address in his written
testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:
(1) To what extent has political change -in the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the
1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security
measures against, that threat? (2) To what extent do other
traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require
greater attention in the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging
threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" |
intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and
terrorists? (4) What new challenges do technological —
advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist
-groups pose in the 1990s? - (5) What are the consequences of
these changing threats for embassy security. prioritieé and.
protection of diplomatic, military, and a

Lose (NG

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"Sry snabert NOW ARSE Som waaeta Vaan ®
eee Se = Wnlted States Denare

7 GELECT COMMITTEE OM INTELLIGENCE
SONG WTO UL, MANE Bt OFROD WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6476

wT #00 courte, ,
cATULON? McONtE CiOl? CLERK February 7, 1990 .
SSCI #90-507

The Honorable William Sessions

Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation -

J. Edgar Hoover Building ;
Washington, D.C. 20535 .

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual -
budget authorization process, will hold a hearing -on U.S.
counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We invite you
to testify at that hearing as FBI Director and as chairman of
the DCI's Advisory Group on Counterintelligence. Other ~— _
witnesses invited to testify are Undersecretary of State Ivan

Selin, Mr, Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner *
Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and .
head of the CYA Counterintelligence Center, and Mr. ch Haver, —

Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with
the Committee the results of the Administration’s review of ~
counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, =
whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment
require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications
for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction,
and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider .°- |
issues identified in testimony. from a group of prominent. “,
citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with -
you further on those matters. os

We would like you to address in your written testimony and
| be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) What are
the results of the Administration's review of counter-
intelligence and security programs to. meet the needs of the
1990s? (2) How will the Administration coordinate national
policy in these areas? (3) What national policy initiatives
are required for the 1990s, i.e., personnel security standards,
actions to deter leaks? (4) To what extent has political
change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their
intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI
; operations and security measures against that threat? (5) To
what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and
Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (6) What are the
emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly"
intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and

ba-He2is— [75

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"and the requirements for CI operations and security measures.

‘are FBI Director William 8, Sessions, Undersecretary of State

Wnited States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, OC 20510-0475

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-S06

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505 ; :

Dear Judge Webster:

- The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual
budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S,
counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
Room SH~219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request
that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ted
Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Bathaway as
Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA
Counterintelligence Center. Other witnesses invited to testify

Ivan Selin, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. | .

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with
the Committee the results of the Administration's review of
counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,
whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment
require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications
for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, ov
and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider at
issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent : [f :
citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with
you further on those matters. —

We would like Mr. Price to address in his written
testimony and be prepared to discuss the -following questions:
(1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s

against that threat? (2) To what extent do other traditional
threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in
the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from
third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as ,
narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (4) What new challenges
do technological’ advances and transfers to criteria countries
and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (5) What are the
consequences of these changing threats for operations and :
security at CIA stations, embassy security priorities, and :
protection of military, diplomatic, and intelligence secrets? °
(6) Are US computer and 4 - PAs y efforts

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4 OWSKL ALASKA
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SSCI #90-508

The Honorable Dick Cheney
Secretary of Defense.

The Pentagon

Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Cheney:

' The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual
budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S.
-counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in
Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office: Building. We request

' that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Rich
-Haver, Special Assistant. to the Secretary of Defense for
Intelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify at this
hearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ivan Selin,
Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price,
the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA
Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA
Counterintelligence Center.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss
with the Committee the results of the Administration's review
of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s,
whether recent changes in the threat and operating
environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and
the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation,
program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing
will also consider issues identified in the testimony from a
group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we
will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Haver to address in his written
_ testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions:
(1) What are the results of his review of DoD counter-|
intelligence which you stated was “an early and high
priority" in your letter of May 31, 1989? (2) To what extent
has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the
-requirements for CI operations and security measures against
that threat? (3) To what extent do other traditional
threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention
in the 1990s? (4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s
from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as
well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (5} What new
challenges do technological advances and transfers to
criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s?
(6) What are the consequences of these changing threats ope

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MEAN GANSTON. pesurania * oKKw ; a: tee
Se So B United States Sen cre ne
5 ; SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELUGENCE u | [fs 393
oro roR Aaa eee WASHINGTON, De 20810-4478 é9
GEORGE 2. TENET, STAFF \
wonton
RATHLEEN P, McGHEE, CHIEF CLERK _ February: 7, 1990

ZIG
_X52444


Memornadum to Director, FBI

12, ISSUE: The Committee believes the FBI does not share all

information contain in its files with other members of the

intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would
‘ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.

QUESTION: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single

database for CIA, FBI, and DOD?

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INTD, ASD, CID, and RMD prepare
responses for the questions identified above and submit those
questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business
April 5, 1989 in the format currently in use classified as appro-
riate with a heading for issue, question, summary response, details,
and approval signed by the appropriate Assistant Director or Deputy
Assistant Director and date signed. a,

_ APPROVED: , S¢-fidm. Sono,

. Crim. Inv
Ident.
Director. __. Inepecti

&xec. AD-Adm. _ Intel:
" Exec, AD-Inv. Laborato:
" Exec, ADLES —___ Legal Coun.

Off. of Cang. & A etsy
Off aes ~
of Lia,
intl Affe. “a
_ Rec. Mgmt.
Tech, Servs.
Training ———__.

2. .That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the
preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening
statement and briefing book. Mor ;

Exec. AD-Adm, __ I
Exec. AD-Inv, _- mta

APPROVED: “Adm. Servs, :
. i> Grim. Inv.
lent, :
Director me DHE aint Af

: jaa co
oes ry Tech,
Exec, AD-LES —_ Legal cout, traning = ——t


' + GAMIDL SORE CHLAHONA, CHAIRMAN OG : ‘ : Some
"gb. ce" LIAS. CONDE MANE, Vice CHARON . ;
WHUAM Y. : ae .

a so  *Wnited States te

eoeenr WEST VIRGDIA, EX OFFICIO WASHINGTON, DC 205 10-6475
ROBERT DOLE KANSAS, EX OFFICIO #88-3613

DYKSTRA, CLERK .
RATHLEON P MCGEE, CHIEF October 17, 1988

Honorable William Sessions .
Director

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535 —

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is ;
conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence
| and security programs and capabilities. Included in this
: review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of
sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.

Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers
have been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel.
Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee staff ‘
on any unauthorized transfer of technology and equipment from
the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis. For
the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played
in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission
and Trade Center in. New York.

Sincerely,

“David L. Boren

vVige Chairman

= UST HBIS/ 777

boot — _


ad oe r7
ny a
cn

Exec AD Adm__
Exec AD Inv__
Exec AD LES
Asst.Dir.:
Adm.Servs.__

Crim.Inv.
, ; ‘ : . Ident.__
To ; Mr. Ss. M. ey Date 4/20/88 nsP-__
‘ : : , Intell.
. : Lab,
From ae ‘Legal Couns.__
Oo ; Off.cong &
Oo. ‘ 7 Public Affs.___
ot } Subject 3, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCTI) OLTA__
~~ REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON AND. Rec. Mant. _
‘ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLIA) AND THE Tech. Servs.___
' COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN: Training__

Telephone Rme_
Director's Sec'y

This communication is classified SECRET. - oo

Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.

To set forth results of briefing « of John Eliff,
Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of Congressional
Public. Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr., Unit
Chief Roland 0. L'Aliier, Jr., Intelligence Division, and

OLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) xvepresentation in Berlin.

0 TION: re oe . Cog

- . None, for information only.

]

|

| . Servs, Olt. of Cong.
APPROVED: oan. i & Public Aff

Ident, _______ Ol of kia,

Dirdetor Inspection ———_____ & Intl. Affe!
Exec. AD-Adm, __— Intali. Rec. Mg
Exec. AD-nv. __-. Laboratory. Toon, Se
Exec. AD-LES ___- Lega! Coun. Training

- S. M. McWeeney A \ =
- J. H. Geer - os ; I }
Attn: J. E. Tomlinson ; Mt A
J. K. O'Brien:

“Attn: J. S. Hooks, Jr.. ‘ ; ,
- S. A. Pimentel
- T. E. Crosson
- M. V. Hale

PLN)

PREP FP FR
'

SECRET a,
Classified by: 3642-
Declassify on:

: _ . (CONTINUED = OVER)
|

‘|

Ry

| 1 BEC $2 1968


SECRET

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney :

Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCT)
Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and.
International Affairs (OLIA) and the
Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETATLS:

Mr. Hale opened the session, advising Mr. Eliff that, on
his recent trip to Western Europe to visit certain U. S.
Embassies and establishments, including the U. S. Mission in
West Berlin, where Legal Attaches were desired and needed, he had
conferred with appropriate U. S. military, U. S. Department of
State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in
order to present the FBI's case for representation in .
West Berlin. During these discussions, Mr. Hale was advised that
staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin
concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale, in that
context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding the FBI's
perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a
counterintelligence point of view. -

Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently
visited West Berlin, he was intimately. familiar with the .
intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin
and supported the FBI's presence there. He indicated he was well
aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence
coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in
that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian |
intelligence intelligence components were addressing the threat
to these individuals and this for two reasons.

. The first involved the basic functions of the U. S.
intelligence components in West Berlin, a function he described
as being the collection of positive intelligence as opposed to
counterintelligence, the latter being at best a secondary
requirement. ; ot

u

(CONTINUED ~ OVER)


a

/ , . SECRET

‘Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
International Affairs (OLIA). and the
Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

The second reason for this gap involves the legal
guidelines under which the U. S. military, virtue of their
authority of an occupying power in West Berlin, conducts
_ technical surveillarice and mail openings. Mr. ELiff stated that,

as an occupying power, the U. S. military, much like the FBI
domestically, is the entity which conducts telephone monitorings
o£ criteria country establishments and personnel in the U. 8.
sector of West Berlin. It also opens certain mail of interest
from the East which passes through this sector. However,
whenever there is an overhear of a U. S. national or whenever
there is mention made of a U. S. national in a piece of
correspondence, that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to
any other U. S. intelligence agency. This lack of dissemination
is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. Ss.
Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the
activities of U. S. nationals. As a consequence of this lawsuit,
very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. Ss.
‘ military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to
monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for. minimizing
overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.

The net results of these restrictions is that, according
to Mr. EL1iff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as ~
well as the like potential collection of names of U. S. persons

via mail openings has been lost.

Mr. Eliff advised it was his belief these minimization
restrictions were too stringent and should be amended to allow
for dissemination. He however stated that he thought the issue
should be brought: up after the upcoming elections in that he did
not believe a "lame duck" administration would be interested in

undertaking the issue.
(CONTINUED - OVER)

SECRET
-3-


so,
np . .
q ’

SECRET |

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney

Re: Senate Select Committee on:Intelligence (SSCI)
Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
International Affairs (OLIA) and the
Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblun,
Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice,
had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant with
this U. S. military monitoring issue.

Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBI
presence in West Berlin in that his study of the .
counterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that the
many double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were run
for parochial reasons with no strategic view of
counterintelligence. He stated that even though the U. S.
military services were professional and did coordinate the
turnover of some of their many double agents to the FBI when
these agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believed
the FBI should have input at the outset of these double agent
.cases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamental
counterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with the
principle counterintelligence service, the FBI, at their
pacept on in order to better globally address counterintelligence

ssues, ;

, He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin would
therefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherent
national counterintelligence strategy. .

Mr. EBlif£ concluded by reiterating his support for the
FBI's presence in West Berlin, by indicating that he would be
willing, were we to ask, to indicate his support of this position
to the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. Jeff
Smith, Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also well
versed in counterintelligence issues and a potential strong
supporter of the FBI's cause.

Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff for
his time and indicated that the FBI had designated a new ;
assistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely be
to travel weekly to West Berlin in order to prepare the FBI's
case for a permanent presence there.

SECRET
-4~


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+. .
_AGENCY INSA} AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY {CIA} COMPONENTS |
|

Cc |

PAGE THREE DE H@ DISSSECRET
_it. _ CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE “NATIONAL SECURITY :

fev-wew-vore. ) tHe STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE

| GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE| REGAHUT ACILITY. ACCORDING TO}
-SSCI STAFF. NENBER, NSA HAS. POSED NO “OBJECTIONS 4 AND INTD HAS NO |
| opuectzoNs EITHER. HOWEVER: TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED,

_BY THE SUPERVISOR AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED- UNDER NO

SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

|

!
I.
CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED, AND NO DISCUSSION |~
ie {2

I

$

WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED:

_AS EXCELLENT." ; SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION BE

Dima “a

R

| EXTENDED ro( new YORK CIA FOREIGN RESOURCE DIVISTON arenx_| J
" REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. _ THIS”
"-REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO
‘CONTACT crAver> knnepennenre y. a —— _—

‘.CONGRESS- SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST. IN KNOWING

t
|
'
2} UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE : Lo
-~VIEWS OF FIELD ON ‘UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS § PROBLEMS.- VALUE, ETC-? ! |

‘
'
i)
‘
!
!
1
1
‘

| INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"

sev |

Cys)

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