157-10002-10001

| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

ot

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Box 133

TITLE :

“RESTRICTIONS :
“2” CURRENT. STATUS + P
‘DATE OF LAST: REVIEW :

i i
foo, ge Date:08/15/92
", tho _ Page:1

JFK ASSASSINAT ON. SYSTEM ;

bes . .
BBENTIFICATION PORM _. .

AGENCY INFORMATION

SSCIA
157-10002-10001

: 06/00/75
: 491

: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

T
REFERRED
09/28/93

Index Cards - June 1975 and July 1975

HY 50955 Daocld: 3272761641

[R] ~ ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Page 1

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PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES :/~
Telns, Richard Castro”
Leyland Bus Co. Mongoose

QCCURRENCE? “Sielms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to
get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no
limitations were placed on the means. In fact, T never yecall having been told by

anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26)  €The

above statements refer to Mongoose.) Ilelms testified that "the pressure was very
intense and IT remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several

“very nutty schemes." (26) elms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pip:

and then lag dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and

1962, The Cuban Hissile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. After-

wards interest tapered off, although Ilelms recalled cfforts in 1963 involving
“economic warfare” such as turning of f oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries
including an attempt to stop the aay DY. thebeyland.’ Bus Company in-Spala sey buses te

Cullis —“SAURCE: ; STAFF:
(27) ————= Helms 6/13/75 — Rhea
FILE: DATE:

6/28/75

‘

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PERSONS/ENTITIES: CATEGORIES:

(continuation)

Cad 3d

OCCURRENCE: Carp 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results
(stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing
"lubzol,"' a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil ;through Commerciate:;
Suppliers: tn Redken A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba-
Varsdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least
create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve

CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative
actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate

to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks
are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum
notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through
the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo
‘notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:

FILE:

DATE:

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TRSTSECE pLo0gG Ccé0oc AH

PERSONS/ENTITIES : DATES: | CATEGORIES:
weeny . | Special Group Augmented
LANSDALE, iecoeyp © ] . | MONGOQSE
“== | Mar 13) 1962 | LUBAL
Y,]-
a Cari / 2
OCCURRENCE:

The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate
planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line. was
submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk.
Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the
CIA, (‘'Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills

as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are
inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort
will be made to attempt such control.'’) (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Cpa-Locka,
Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued freee iaiiratsomepiggetsny help in con-
taminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for
March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop
additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented FFT /
from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation
13.March 1962 (00206-00213) He

adi Genova
wel 1, 1975

7


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emer DATES: CATEGORIES:
TRUS McNAMARA SS
SPECIAL Grp. | August 10-11 CASTRO /
1962

FaCubar Geille Jou aa Yous. Gt
fat the term assassinate’ was used in the discussion of Ke M.
in “Cuba and it visibly upset_\.M. LASH, who preferred the term viel imenate (8s).
DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place
at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his gheceere after the SPECIAL GROUP
(AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's* the | pchni ue of assassination
could be used against CASTRO. AE E

STAFF: Baron

SOURCE: 4G REPORT, 1967

FIL": DATE: 7/2/75


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TOP SECRET

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

August 14-23

: ETAMSOM| cables CIA headquarters that “have no inten-
tion give 7AM, LASH/ physical elimination mission as requirement but recognized

this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (85).
CIA headquarters replied tosWELEEASONSby cable on_18 August: "Strongly
concur that no physical. elimination-misSions be given JAM. LASH/."" (85).

(enghoris eel

SOURCE:

IG REPORT, 1967

’ FILE:

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Page 8

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CATEGORIES:

Edwards
King
Bannerman

OCCURRENCE:

ennai,

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to
Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had
to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy"! to. project. O'Connell was embarassed.

Castro

(Tr. 36, 99-100).- No one but KING, notggerey or fhioikeonive

knew (100)

Q

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SOURCE: STAFF:
Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75 John Bayly
FILE: DATE:

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Page 10_

32781841

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CIA HAS NO
JECLASSICATE aero

RELEASE OF THIS DOcuIES
Ko 23/2 oN

CATEGORIES:

DATES:

w Ly [6 >|
Nov. 21, 1962> (Special Group Augmented
ae Operation Mongoose
Cuba

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

— KIRK PA TRICK
William Harvey DUP ~
Gen, Lansdale Mr. Halpern
Walter Elder CHEEVER,
DCI “—
CCURRENCE:
———=-==" With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov.
1962 Harvey states: 'The statement that. Operation Mongoose had had no information on-
this operation since early October was patently false. ‘Specific references made to the
pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale’s memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he
used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to
a telephonic. conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever
which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu.
I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his
conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum.
During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief
discussion of the COBRA andfAMikOMiiyteams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's
recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which
—agunCE Would logically have Ted to the discussions at the Timp spAPT:
—————" of the Matahambre operation." _——
pul Wallach

DATH:
— July 1, 1975

Mepgrandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)
- se Lee a t . - aa by

ib
BA ONE


