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1. REF ‘BEING RELAYED ADDRESSEES IS REPORT 31 oct ANNOUNCEMENT
BY GENERAL PINOCHET DECLARING FREEDOM OF PRESS ‘IN CHILE. SUGGEST
RATHER THAN-REPLAYING EL, MERCURIO ARTICLE TRANSCRIBED IN REF YOU USE

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EviPHASIS ON CONTENTION THAT PRESS COENSORSHIP BHAS NOT EXISTED IN
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EMPHASIZE THESE POINTH: ¥
A. CHILEAN PRESIDENT HAS DECLARED THERE WILL BE NO PRIOR

CENSORSHIP IN CHILE. ¥
B. PINOCHET DECLARED THAT JUNTA IS WAIVING PRIOR CENSORSHIP
OF. PRESS DESPITE FACT THAT STATE OF EMERGENCY CONTINUES IN CHILE. ¥

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GOVERNMENT. BELIEVE ROBERT HOSS, IF HE STILL HAS ACCESS TO LONDON.
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KNOWLEDGE OF CHILE AND AGILITY USE HIS SACKGROUND FOR SPECULATION ON
KINDS OF INFORMATION CORVALAN HAS THAT COULD ENBARRASS SOVIETS. CAN
MENTION SOVIET CLANDESTINE FUNDING ALLENDE'S ELECTIONS, TACTICAL BBS8B
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UNIONS, LONG-RANGE PLANS FOR EVENTUAL PCCH PUTSCH TO overtHesu ALLENDE.
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“WAS ON THAT TYPE OF MISSION. BUT LATER WHEN ASKED WHETHER IT WAS

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ANSWERED» "THERE IS NO CONFIRMATION. IT IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION?

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ATROCITIES AND ARBITRARINESS THERE." ¥
"GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET. CHIEF OF STATE OF CHILEs SAID CHILE

WOULD LIGERATE RELEASE ALL ITS PRISONERS IF THE SOVIET UNION AND.CUBA .

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RYBAT MHSPAWN REDLEG

REF A, DIRECTOR 604965 ) Pyrat

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IS HEADLINED mRy§§1A-HESPONDING-T0-CHILE. ~CaLL- TO_FREE PRISONERS.”

HIGHLIGHTS 4S FOLLOWS:

THE SOVIET UNION 1S PREPARING TO RELEASE A LIMITED
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SOURCES SAID TODAY.

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RUSSIANS, ¥ANT RELEASED IN EXCHANGE FOR THE FREEDOM GIVEN
TO LTS DOAN LETALNEES» THE SOURCES SAID. THERE WAS NO
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STRONG GHJECTIONS OF, SOME GF [7S AY LEACERS. SIKCE OUR ASSETS
WERE ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN FORCING THiS ISSUE THEY ARE NOT IN A
SECUNE POSITION TC TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS CNE ESPECIALLY GIVEN
THE EXTREME UNPOPULARITY | OF THE OVERALL CKILE STORY,
3, WE CAN CONTINUE TO BE ALEAT 10 OPPORTUNITIES FOR SOME
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“story, He NUTED THAT Al EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HAS RECENTLY
VOTED IN NEW AND 19 SOME EXTENT UNTRIED MEMSERSHIP, ALTHOUGH
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PRESENTLY ALL THE MORE CONTROVERSIAL WITHIN Al JN VIE* NEWNESS
COMMITTEE AND NOT LIKELY RECEIVE CONSTRUCTIVE ATTENTION UNTIL
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RYBAT MHSPAUN REDLEG ¥
REF: DIRECTOR BOYES ¥ .

1. GIVEN PERISHABILITY REF IDEAS, REQUEST YOUR COMMENT ON .
FEASIBILITY OF APPROACHES TO DEFLOWFR AND AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AS.
OUTLINED. WELCOME ANY OTHER SUGGESTIONS ON MEANS LIMIT FURTHER
ANTI-8KHERALD PROPAGANDA IN RELATION TO CHILE AND ANTI- JUNTA

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le Or JERNATIONAL CRITICISM OF CHILEAN JINTA AND MORE RECENTLY OF -
AKHERALD HAVE BEEN ORCHESTRATED TO DRAMATIC PROPORTIONS. Ha@S BELIEVES .
EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF GENERAL PINOCHET'S OFFER TO EXCHANGE A
NUMBER OF POLITICAL PRISONERS FOR AN EQUAL NUMBER OF SOVIET AND/OR
CUBAN PRISONERS IS OPPORTUNITY TO BLUNT HOSTILE PROPAGANDA. IF THE
USSR AND CHILE CAN BE LUMPED TOGETHER IN POPULAR MIND AS EACH HAVING wy
POLITICAL PRISONERS: THE SITUATION CAN BE EXPLOITED TO DIVERT SOME OF
ATTENTION FROM JUNTA'S SUPPOSED MISDEEDS TO SOVIET HANDLING OF
POLITICAL PRISONERS. A REPORT FROM A SENSITIVE SOURCE INDICATES THAT
THE SOVIETS AND CUBANS ARE CONCERNED OVER THE PRESSURES THAT COUBLD
DEVELOP FROM THE OFFER. ¥
2. THE EXCHANGE OFFER-HAS ASPECTS THAT WOULD BE ATTRACTIVE TO.
NUMEROUS GROUPS “IN EUROPE @UT THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE REACTIONS
PROBABLY SECAUSE OF CHILE'S EXTREME UNPOPULARITY AND THE LACK OF BOTH
A NEUTRAL. SPONSOR AND SUFFICIENT PUBLICITY. EUROPEAN COMMUNISTS

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OTHER HALF OF THE EXCHANGE. LEFTISTS OF NUMEROUS SHADES, INCLUDING 2°
THE BERTRAND RUSSELL GROUPS SHOULD ALSO FAVOR THE RELEASE OF THESE —

PRISONERS» YET-BE-LESS TROUBLED BY THE DESCONFITURE OF THE SOVIETS
“AND CUBANS. SECOND, THE OFFER TS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR GROUPS LIKE

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL TO BRING DIRECT PRESURE ON THE USSR To RELEASE ”
SOME PROMINENT INTELLECTUAL PRISONERS. FINALLY. THE “OFFER: SHOULD ;
ATTRACT SOME HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT FROM THOSE UHO FAVOR RELEASE OF ALL -
POLITECAL PRISONERS ON PRINCIPLE. IN FACT. PROPERLY DEVELOPED, THE

EXCHANGE IS POTENTIALLY ATTRACTIVE TO ALNOST THE ENTIRE POLITICAL

LUGE ST

SPECTRUM. ¥
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GROUP INTERESTED IN TAKING PRACTICAL STEPS TO GET PRISONERS RELEASED
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PRISONERS {COMMUNIST AND SOCIALIST LEADERS IN CHILE AND IMPORTANT .

INTELLECTUALS IN THE USSR} FROM A BHFASCIST REGIME ON THE ONE BHAND
AND FROM A STALINIST COUNTRY ON THE OTHER HE CAN BECOME SUFFICIENTLY
INTERESTED IN PURSUING THE “EXCHANGE « OBJECTIVE WOULD BE HAVE

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FALTAR SISTEMATICAMENTE A TODAS LAS PROMESAS QUE LES HICIERA A

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DETERMINARA SU ELECCION A LA PRIMERA MAGISTRATURAs Y AL CONFESARLE ;

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MGECAUSE REGINE FEARS REVEALING TO SOVIET PUBLIC HOU INDEPENDENT
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VERSARY- JOHN GOSHKO URITES IN "WASHINGTON POST” oF 6 OCTOBER THAT.

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7 OCTOBER ANNIVERSARY. OF FOUNDING OF STATE BY LARGEST PARADE EVER
STAGED BY EAST GERMAN PEOPLE'S ARMY: "THOUSANDS OF JACK-BOOTED
TROBAOPS MADE STREETS OF EAST BERLIN ECHO TO THUD OF TRADITIONAL

“PRUSSIAN GOOSE STEP-.-SEEMINGLY ENDLESS WAVE OF SOLDIERS IN
RIGIDLY DISCIPLINED RANKS. «HOLDING OF PARADE IN EAST BERLIN
CONSTITUTED DEFIANCE OF FOUR-POWER RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL OF
BERLIN: «+ IN PROTEST: 2 NATO NATIONS WHICH RECOGNIZE EAST GERMANY»

REFUSED TO SEND REPRESENTATIVES TO CELEBRATIONS IN EAST BERLIN« ++
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PRESENT SUCCESS TO GERLIN WALL AND CONTINUED MAINTENANCE OF WALL

ALONG ITS ELO-MILE BORDER WITH WEST GERMANY."¥

3. EGYPT CANCELS ORDER FOR SOVIET PLANES. CAIRO. 29 SEPTEMBER.
WEEKLY NEWSPAPER "AKHBAR AL-YON REPORTS THAT EGYPT HAS DECIDED. TO
CANCEL ITS ORDER. FOR EIGHT RUSSIAN*BUILT TU- 454 JET AIRLINERS» “CITING
"NUMEROUS AND MAJOR DEFECTS” IN AIRCRAFT'S PERFORMANCE THAT
JEOPARDIZE SAFETY OF PASSENGERS. ONE OF PLANES CRASHED IN FLAMES

| DURING TRAINING FLIGHT 10 JULY. KILLING TWO EGYPTIANS AND FOUR SOVIET

CREWMEN- CAACT CAUSE OF: ACCIDENT HAS NOT BEEN ESTABLISHED AND OTHER
PLANES OF THIS TYPE HAVE BEEN GROUNDED. NEWSPAPER SBATD EGYPTIAN

AVIATION ORGANIZATION WOULD FILE CLAIMS WITH THE SOVIET EXPORT FIRAs
MFAVIA"s FOR REIMBURSEMENT OF 427.5 MILLION ALREADY PAID ON THE 642-5

MILLION DEAL-¥
4. NO CUBAN/SOVIET RESPONSE ON SETTING PRISONERS FREE. NEUE

ZUERCHER ZEITUNG CARRIED AFP REPORT FROM SANTIAGO, 24 SEPTENBERs THAT
GENERAL PINOCHET. CHIEF OF CHILGEAN JUNTA» HAD SAID NEITHER CUBA NOR

SOVIET UNION HAD RESPONDED TO CHILEAN CHALLENGE OF O11 SEPTENGER TO

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HUNDREDS OF LETTERS DAILY FROM RELATIVES OF SOVIET PRISONERS» AND
THAT THESE LETTERS WERE BEING FORWARDED TO INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS.
HE ALSO REVEALED, HE WOULD “RECHEIVE DELEGATION FROM BUENOS AIRES OF.”
UKRAINIANS“IN-EXILE WHO WOULD GIVE CHILEAN OFFICIALS INFORMATION ON
SOME FIFTY UKRAINIANS WHO ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS IN USSR- yo :
S. EDITORIAL IN MEXICO ‘CITY INDEPENDENT DAILY. LA PRENSA”
28 SEPTEMBER» ACCUSED KGB OF SPYING AND INTERVENING IN LATIN ANERTCAN
AFFAIRS. COMMENTING ON PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S STATEMENT a
AGAINST CIA ACTIVITIES IN LATIN AMERICA, EDITORIALIST WROTE THAT THE
KGB SHOULD GET OUT OF LATIN ANERICA- ™,..THAT SINISTER RED POLITICAL
ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS COMMITTED SO. MANY. DASTARDLY CRISNES IN OUR
COUNTRY SUCH AS THE ASSASSINATION OF TROTSKY. KGB HAS ESTABLISHED
BOOK PUBLISHERS USED BY THE FASCIST LEFTISTS TO INFILTRATE PARTIES,
MEETINGS AND LITERARY GATHERINGS. KGB USED. THE PRESS AND GROUPS OF
ARTISTS» INTELLECTUALS» WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS TO SING THE PRAISES

OF A RED DICTATORSHIP: e+ THE KGE SHOULD GET OUT WITH ITS THOUSANDS

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MEETING AND SAID HEBATED DEBATE TOOK PLACE Th FIRST SESSION OVER
SEATING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE DELEGATION. “RAINICHI" STORY SAID SOVIETS”
AND RUMANIANS IMMEDIATELY CHALLENGED mQUALIFICATIONS” OF SOUTH
VIETNAMESE AND DEMANDED THAT LATTER BE €XPELLGED FROM CONFERENCE AND.

“THAT PROVISIONAL REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT {PRG} BE SEATED IN THEIR

PLACE. "MAINICHL” SAID THAT ROLL CALL VOTE WAS HELD, AND SOUTH

VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WAS SELECTED "BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITY TO

PARTICIPATE IN THE CONFERENCE. EDITORIAL IN ASAHI" SAID THAT BITTER

CONTROVERSIES WOULD ARISE AT THIS SESSION OF IPU. WHICH HAS MORE THAN

SIXTY NATIONS PARTICIPATING: INCLUDING BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA.

BUT THAT "IT IS.--SIGNIFICANT IN ITSELF ‘THAT PARLIAMENTARIANS OF

WORLD EXCHANGE UNRESERVED OPINIONS ON CURRENT INTERNATIONAL PROBLENS.°¥
2. CAMBODIAN MOSLEMS APPEAL FOR HELP AGAINST COMMUNIST ATROCI-

TIES. PHNOM PENH. @? SEPTEMBER {SAIGON POSTE: “TUO MOSLEM ORGANIZA-

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APPEALED TO ALL ISLAMIC COMMUNITIES TO SEND DELEGATIONS TQ CAMBODIA

FOR FIRSTHAND VIEW OF THE @'INFERNO' CREATED 6Y INDOCHINESE

COMMUNISTS. _ ACCORDING TO THESE ORGANIZATIONS, UHENEVER COMMUNISTS

CAPTURED A VILLAGE. NEN, UOMEN AND CHILDREN OF MOSLEM FAITH WERE

“MARCHED TO A CONCENTRATION CAMP AND THEIR HOMES WERE BURNED TO THE

THE OLD AND WEAK WERE KILLEDS THE HEALTHY WERE FORCED TO
TO HELP DEFEND

GROUND:
GIVE UP THEIR RELIGION AND WORK FOR THE COMMUNISTS.
THEIR RELIGION AND THEIR ADOPTED COUNTRY AGAINST COMMUNIST DEPRE-
DATIONS, KHMER MOSLEMS ORGANIZED A BRIGADE. NOW PART OF THE CAMBODIAN
ARMED FORCES. AND MANY MOSLEMS HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES ON THE BATTLE
FIELD. IN THEIR APPEAL, CAMBODIAN moSLEMS BEGGED FELLOW MBOSLENS
ALL OVER WORLD TO UNITE IN EFFORT TO COMPEL NORTH VIETNAMESE AND-
OTHER INDOCHINESE COMMUNISTS TO CEASE BLOODSHED IN INDOCHINA. my

8 IRAN INCENSED BY NORTH KOREAN GEHAVIOR. TEHRAN, 8-22
SEPTEMGER {TEHRAN JOURNAL AND KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL}: THO OF TEHRAN'S
LEADING NEWSPAPERS CARRIED REPORTS ON HOU NORTH KOREAN ROWDYISM HAD
MARRED ASIAN GAMES, AND CRITICIZED ER CERIO. ONE REPORT CARRIED

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NORTH KOREAN OLYMPIC SILVER MEDALIST BOXER LOST BOUTs NORTH KOREAN
COACHES, MANAGER AND NEWSMEN ATTACKED INDONESIAN REFEREE, THEN
ENGAGED IN BATTLE WITH POLICE AT MOHAMMED REZA SHAH STADIUM. RULES
COMMITTEE UPHELD DECISION ON BOUT, THEN CENSURED NORTH KOREAN
PROTESTERS FOR PUNCHING JUDGES AND BREAKING FURNITURE. SIX TRUCK~
LOADS OF POLICE WERE NEEDED TO RESTORE ORDER. NORTH KOREAN FENCING

AND SOCCER TEAMS REFUSED TO COMPETE AGAINST ISRAELIS, AND GOTH MEN'S

AND WOMEN'S BASKETBALL TEANS ‘REFUSED TO PLAY SOUTH KOREANS. WHEN

NORTH KOREA" S VOLLEYBALi PLAYERS DID CONSENT TO TAKE ON south KOREAN
TEAM, NEWSHEN CONCLUDED NORTH KOREANS HAD AGREED ONLY BECAUSE THERE
YAS TO BE A NET BETWEEN THEM! MOST SENSATIONAL PRESS COVERAGE
CONCERNED NORTH KOREAN WEIGHTLIFTER WHO. STRIPPED OF RIS THREE AWARDS
WHEN DRUG TESTS PROVED POSITIVE, OBJECTED VIOLENTLY AND REFUSED TO

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"|. RECENT PUBLIC LETTER TO CARDINAL RAUL SILVA REQUESTED HIS

JOSIETANCE IN OOTAINING RELEASE OF JURT GRIGOVICVICH PRONING CURRCNTLY

DETAINED IN USSR. LETTER FROM DETAINEE'S WIFE. A CHILEAN CITIZEN

WAVED MARIA ELIANA Es DE PRONING WAS GIVEN PRAOMINENT LOCAL PRESS

COVERAGE SEPT 2b» TEXT OF LETTER WAS WRITTEN IN SOMETIMES IRONICAL
TONE APPEALING TO CADRDINAL'S "NOBLE CHRISTIAN HEART TOWARDS CHILEAN
POLITICAL DETAINEES.” CONTINUING, DETAINEES'S WIFE SAID SHE BELIEVES
AN AUTHORITY SUCH AS THE CARDINAL, "UHO HAS SO MANY TIMES DEFENDED
THE TETAINEES OF THE LEFT." COULD INFLUENCE SOVIET AUTHORITIES TO
RELEASE HER HUSBAND, SAID MARRIED PRONIN IN JANUARY 1968. AND

HLSGAND SINCE AUGUST L9L8 DETAINED IN“UJTA CAMP Soff VING TRIED TO.

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STRENGTH TO HELP THOSE WHO SUFFER." REGARDLESS OF OTHER

CONSIDERATIONS." IN RESPONSE. CARDINAL ASSURED WIFE AND PUBLIC THAT

HE WOULD DO ALL POSSIOLE ON DETAINEE'’S BEHALF. ALTHOUGH HE HAS NO

- RELATIONS WITH USSR AND IS NOT OPTIMISTIC. ¥

"3. COMMENT. PRESS COVERAGE OF LETTER EXCHANGE. AND PERHAPS.
REGUEST ITSELFs IS OBVIOUS CONTINUATION OF PRESS HARASSMENT OF.
CARDINAL FOR HIS CRITICISM OF GOC HUMAN RIGHTS STANCE. AND FOR HIS
SILENCE DURING CHILEAN HUE AND CRY OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN
USSR AND CUBA. IN HIS RESPONSE, CARDINAL SOFTLY REBUKED CRITICS AND
GOC ‘BY STATING, "MOREOVER I BELIEVE IT IS CLEAR TO YOU {EL MERCURIO}
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"REPRESENTATIVE HARRINGTON AS SECgtio

EL MERCURIO CF 146 SEPTEMSE

SEWATOR KENNEDY. EL MERCURIO GUTLINES Gestc

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POLITICAL INTERESTS OF. (SENATOR) KENNEDYS 2
“ANTI eCHILE AN CAMPAIGN WHICH INTEMNATIONAL 79
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AN, ATTEMPT 1 IMPEDE THE ECONOMIC SEVELOOMEN
AND DIRECTLY CONNECTS WITH WORLDemIDE SOVIET

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THE CHILEAN PEOPLE WHILE THE GRANERIES OF THE UNITED STATES “ARE

EMPTIED FOR RUSSIA.”

3, AFTER TOUCHING SEVERAL OTHER BASES, EL MERCURIO CONCLUDES
By DENYING THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN ANY “"YNCONFESSABLE”
INCOME IN [7S HISTORY, EL MERCURIO'S BOOKS WERE SUBVECT To MOST
THOROUGH, AND HOSTILE SCRUTINY DURING THE MARXIST REGIME WITHOUT
ANYONE BEING ABLE TO SPECIFY IRREGULARITEIES, THEREFORE, EL
MERCURIO REVECTS OWITH LEGITIMATE DISDAIN THE IRRESPONSIBLE
CHARGES MADE BY A CLOSE COLLABORATOR OF MR, KENNEDY AND
FEELS AUTHORIZED TO CONJECTURE THAT THE ATTACK 1S THE FRUIT
OF JOURNALISTIC [RRESPONSIAILITY OR OF THE ANIMOSITY OF THE
ADVISORS OF A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE KHO 1S STOPPED SINCE
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OF HIS ACTIONS TO WHICH HS HAS BEEN SUBJECTED IN HIS COUNTRY",

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: PAGE KEADLING "FORD: U.S, MAD NOTHING TO DO WITH FALL OF ALLENDE,”
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"LA TEACENA” GUT NOT IN “EL MERCURIO", oO
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THEIR RIGrTew1G VIEKS, THE CURRENT MANAGEMENT I$ GENUINELY
IGNGRANT OF THE FUNDING THAT TOOK PLACE WHEN FUBRIG-2 WAS RUNNING
THE SHOW, FUBASGe2 WHO SCHEDULED To RETURN 10 CHILE 18 SEPTEMBER,
WAS TOLD COS THs7 NO ONE CURRENTLY aT EL MERCURIO KNOWS OF FUND=
ING, EVEN CURRENT MINISTER OF ECONOMY LENIZ DOES NOT KNOW DETAILS
BUT HA SUSPICIOS £30UT INFUSION OF Gunds THa? TOOK PLACE IN U.P,
ER, WE WILL ATTEMPT TO MONITOR INTERNAL EL MERCURIO REACTION
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INTRODUCING A435VE COVERAGE DESCRIBES THESE DEVELOPMENTS
“as “NEW AND GaOTEeSSoUE EPISODE IN THE ANTI-CHILEAN CAMPAIGN"
AND ATTEMPTS 10 TIE REPRESENTATIVE HARAINGTON CLOSELY TO
SENATOR EDWARD KENNEDY (WHO HAS SINCE THE CQUP BEEN UNDER
STEADY ATTACK HERE FOR HIS CRITICISM GF THE MILITARY [NTER}

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CHAPPAQUIVICK IN A MANNER UNFAVORABLE TO SENATOR KENNEDY.

3, "eb MERCURIO" RESPONSE: HOWEVER, WILL HAVE NET EFFECT
OF RAISING MORE questions HERE THAN IT ANSWERS» THIS INCAEASED
PUBLICITY WILL INCREASE PRESSURE ON AND POSSISLY. SCRUITINY OF
STATION ASSETS JNVGLVED AND MAY AFFECT THOSE NOT DIRECTLY
INVOLVED. ON 13 SEPTEMBER, FUPOCKETe1 WAS QUESTIOND SY
NEWSAEEK REPORTER MERE ABOUT HIS KNOWLEDGE OF FUNDING.
FUPOCKETSS DENIED ALL KNOALEQGE OF ANY FUNSING FAGM FOREIGN

Sources. DETAILS FOL SEPARATE CASLE.

g, RESUEST HSS KEEP STATION UP*TOPDATE ON ANY PLANS OR
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TO! DIRECTOR,

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REFS) A, DIRECTOR 595482
“8, SANTIAGO 30253 (zy 3519/0)
te FOLLOWING STATION AGENTS HERE Coutacren, PERIOD 6916

SEPTEMBER, IN CONNECTION WITH REFERENCE REVELATIONS, “THEIR

COMMENTS AND REACTIONS FOLLOW,
2, FUERMINE*; CONCERNED BUT RELIEVED THAT NO NAMES WERE

MENTIONED, COMMENTED THAT TIMING WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BAD

SINCE IT COINCIDED EXACTLY WITH “EDUARDO FREL'S ARRIVAL IN THE

UsS. AND WE WONDERED WHETHER THIS HAD BEEN DELISERATE,

FUERMINE*2 ASKED WHETHER WE BELIEVED THERE WOULD BE FURTHER

INVESTIGATION OR MEDIA PLAY IN THE U, 5S. REPLIED THAT WE. | 2

DID NOT KNOW BUT WOULD KEEP HIM INFORMED, HE IS TRAVELING To

GERMANY ON 22 SEPTEMBER aT INV ITAT LON OF INTERNATIONAL

COOPERATION INSTITUTE (WEST GERHAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS),

DURING HIS TRIP HE WILL CHECK HIS NUMBERED ACCOUNF FOR THE

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DOES NOT PLAN TO IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER MONTES TNTC CHILE, HE
RETURNING CHILE VIA NEW YORK AND CHICAGO AND PLANS TO MEET
WITH FREI 25 OCTOBER IN NEW YORK. FUERMINE*4 EXPRESSED THE
OPINION THAT THE JUNTA WILL NEITHER RAISE THE MATTER WITH
EMBASSY NOR PURSUE FURTHER SINCE If IS VOT IN THEIR

“INTEREST To D0 So,
2, FUSa Ge ~2 RECEIVED. NEWS CALMLY BUT WAS MOST CONCERNED

“ABOUT IMPLICATIONS OF EFFECTS OF THE REVELATIONS AND EXPRESSED
OPINION THAT SYSTEM IN WASHINGTON SHOULD BE CHANSED

10 GENT SUSH LEAKS. KE WAS RELIEVED THAT EL MURCURIO WAS NOT
MENTIONED 8Y NAME (BUT WE ARE SKEPTICAL THAT IT WELL NOT RE

EASILY IDENTIFIED IN ANY SUBSEQUENT COMMENTARY}, FUBRIG=t
THOUGHT IT QVITE POSSIBLE JUNTA MAY WONDER IF USG STILL NOT IN
SOME WAY SUPPORTING PDC. WHICH OF COURSE JUNTA WOULD FIND
MOST UNACSEPTASLE, . .

4. PUERNINE*®S ALSO TOOK THE NEWS CALMLY ABGUT REVELATION
OF $9,208 ITEM FOR TRAVEL OF PDC LEADERS, wWAILE SHAKING HIS
HEAD ABOUT TRE LEAKING OF SUCH MATTERS, HE BELIEVES THAT THE
REVELATION, UNLESS IT IS MADE MUCH MORE SPECIFIC BY SUBSEQUENT

INVESTIGATIONS aNd PUBLICLIYs, WILL NOT CAUSE HIM a PROBLEM,

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CONS{DERS THE FAILURE TO IDENTIFY THE DELEGATION AS

BEING PDC AND (INCORRECTLY) AS MAKING A TOUA OF LATIN

AMERICAN RATHER THAN EURGPEAN CAPITALS KILL LEAD AWAY FROM
PROPER IDENTIFICATION, SINCE THE FUNDS THAT PASSED TRROUGH HIS
HANDS WERE APPAOXIMATELY $4,922 AT THE THEN LOCAL FREE MARKET
RATE (AS OPPOSED 10 STATION SPENDING RATE), HE FEELS THAT THIS

WELL ALS9 HELP WIDE PROPER IDENTIFICATION EVEN WITHIN THE POC

Lanny

OF THIS FUNDING,
5, FUPOCKET-1 KAS INFORMED OF DISCLOSURE OF $25,200 FOR

PURCHASE OF RADIO STATION ON 8 SEPTEMBER, WAS VISIBLY

DISTURBED UPON HEARING NEWS AND COMMENTED "YOU PEUPLE NEED ;

TO CHANGE YOUR SYSTEM SO THAT SUCH NEWS DOES.

NOT GET OUT." STATED THAT NO ONE WITHIN HIS GROUP

KNEw THAT HE GAVE MONEY ON THE SIDE TO PURCHASE THIS RADIO

STATION AND THAT NO RECORDS WERE MADE OF HIS PART IN THE DEAL,

ME REMARKED THAT THE FORMER OWNER OF YHE STATION JS &

SODTALIST AND UNLIKELY To DISCUSS THE TERMS OF TRE SkLE SINCE _

ILLEGAL MONEY TRANSACTION INVOLVED. FUPOCKETel PROMISED TO KEEP

uS ADVISED OF ANY BLOW-BACK. ,

ON 10 SEPTEMBER? FUBARGAIN=1 SAID THAT GENERAL PINOCHET
SECRET

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TORI 216262 SEP 74 §$bS5 $2293

DiD NOT SEEM VERY UPSET SUT COMMENTED IN FUBARGEL bog"
PRESENCE THAT THE DISCLOSURE "SEEMED TO BE a.oudy THING 10
. DO." FOR THE FIRST TIME JN QUA RELATIONSHIP WIT= FUBLEGAIN@<,
He SHOWED HIS UNHAPPINESS AT WHAT HE FEELS 1S GaieiNG EVIDENCE
OF USG INCOMPREHENSION oF Goc. Salp HE
AND OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WHO HAVE TRAVELED TG ST4"z5
AND ARE: MORE FAMILIAR WITH THE Way USG FINCTIONS ocubo PART {Sule
UNDERSTAND CURRENT Us5.G, ATTITUDES AND ACTIONS. tarp MOST
JUNIOR OFFICERS, HOWEVER, ARE INCREASINGLY UPSE #03
CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY FEEL IS U.S, _
FAILURE TO GE A "GOOO FRIEND" OF CHILE DESPITE Tz IMPORTANT
SACRIFICES THAT WAVE BEE MADE HERE [N THE WORLDS Sant te .
COMMUNIST STRUGGLE. ;

7, ACCORDING TO FUSLRGAINe1, MOST CHILEAN ure iceas VIEW THE
REVELATIONS AND IMEIR TIMING AS A DELIBERATE aTrzec By A.
SECTGR OF U.S.G. (ALGEIT THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH) ;

TO DELIGERATELY DAMAGE JUNTA AND FALSELY CaS? DaLE
ON THEIR INDEPENDENCE 4ND ROLE IN BRINGING DOWN ALENDE. OFFICERS
WAVE ADDED THIS LATEST GLOW To WHAT THEY CONSIDES it BE U.S, Foote

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TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARDS, PROBLEMS OF CHILEAN IMAGE
ABROAD. SUM IS THAT CHILEAN OFFICER CORPS BECCHING
INCREASINGLY BAF FELED aND RESENTFUL ABOUT U.S, ACCORDING 70 THIS
SOURCE, .

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a

- COMFIDENTIAL,

“

MEDIA I ALLENDE'S CHILE

HIGHLIGHTS

2

-- Since President Allende's electoral victory in 1970
propaganda Appakatus has rgunted a coordinated c

a PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE COMM

To: <9 :

7 wethy —
~~

fUNICATIONS for.

Fe oG ety

» the Government
ampArign apainat

the opposition communications media focusing on the prestipious
El Mercurio Newspaper chain and key opposition radios, The long.
- Tange g0al 18 to create conditions that will insure Government
control over the media so that dn emasculated Opposition will operate
intuitively and through self-cenvorship within an approved framework,

-- The opposition radio stations bear the brunt of an array of legal
and illegal devices designed to intimidate them, These devices
include the threat of violence, favoritism in the distribution of
essential Government advertizing revenue, ternporary closures,

and Govérnment-fomented strikes,

-- Chile's national television -- the only country-wide channel -- has
become an important propaganda instrument for the Government,

' But itis being challenged. by a Catholic University

channel which is

attempting to expand its service beyond the Santiago area. . .

-- A major confrontation between the Government and the opposition,
lasting more than a-year, hae taken place at the Papelera, Chile's’
only important private newsprint producer, with the company
Supported by the opposition media Stymying repeated Government

efforts to take over the firm. The paper cémpany
Government Price policies have brought it close to

-- Despite officially-sanctioned harassment, the Oppo
have continued to function, taking advantage of the

claims that
bankruptcy,
sition media
fluid political

situation Currently prevailing in Chile, and have become increasingly
effective in exploiting the Government's #conomic failures and the

growing dissension within the ruling Marxist coalit

-- Nevertheless, the opposition's economic base that

ion,

Sustains its media °

is being slowly undermined as the Government expands its control

Over the Chilean economy, Many opposition media

are reportedly

already in difficult financial straits, The Chilean Communist Party,
seeking to Strengthen its voice in the March 1973 Congressional

elections, has already purchased five beleaguered

radio stations

(one a former Opposition station) in southern Chile. , .

‘  LONFIDENTIA I.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 ii

ore re, oes

14-0000


14-0000

‘CONFIDED TAT,
at

THE ALLENDE PROCESS ~ HOW THE MEDIA ARE TREATED

“Allende's treatment of the Opposition media and his utilization of
the pro-Government media offer revexting insights into the unique
claim that Chile will carry out a Socislict revolution within the frame.

-: WOrk of traditional bourgeois and democratic institutions without
social cost, .

. Any Chilean Government possesses wide Powers thet can be employed
“to contrat and intimidate media Oppsnerte viven sufficient will power and
" ¢ynicism to do’ so, deSpite the fact that reedia frecdoma in Chile are
twice-guarantecd, both in the 1925 constitution and ina statute of
‘constitutional guarantees agreed to by Allerde's Popular Unity coalition
and the Christian Democrats. (PDC) asa condition for PDC Support for
Allende in the congressional run-off eld subsequent to the Presidential
election in September 1970, :

What are some of these powers? Any Chilean executive under
~Provisions of the State Internal Security Lay, may establish emergency
» zones by decree headed by military commanders empowering the State

‘to enforce news censorship and to restrict access to newsprint Supplies,
A law on publicity abuses empowers the sovernment to Petition the
courts to suspend access to news and information. (Laws on the books
that pose potential threats to freedom of radio information.are more
Severe and more frequently utilized. See Section HI, By Radio,) .
Furthermore, through the judicious Parceling out of advertising fron.
State and autonomous State firms any government can discriminate
against opposition media by denying or restricting this key source of
revenue, mc , : , :

Unlike predecessor hovernments which utilized existing laws and
accepted practices to reward political associates and benefit business
partners, the Allende Government has Consistently and frequently
applied these measures to harass, to intirnidate, and to undermine the

‘ morale of political and class Opponents in the media, These tactics .
are applied throughout the country. , :

CONFIDENTIAL
EN IAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 S


14-0000

_ CONFIDI-NTIAL

w

~ A basic organizational technique for the UP coalition has ‘been the

‘establishment of UP cominittees (CUP -- Comité de Unidad Popular) --
“-¢omposed of newsmen who are militant members of parties belonging

to the Government coalition or independent supporters of UP policies --
in newspapers, radios, magazines, and in journalistic bodies, The
CUP's -have been most active at the union level: demanding exorbitant
wage increases, insisting that UP employees be given the right to
express their opinion on editorial pages, disrupting legitimate union
meetings, forming rump unions, and leaking internal company dati to
the leftist press and to the Government. :

* The goal of certain Unidad Popular militants regarding freedom of
the press was most explicitly and revealingly stated by the organizing
committee for a conference of leftist journalists which was held in
Santiago in April 1971, The committee issued the following statement
prior to the conference: ; :

...we believe that we muat fight for true freedom of
the press, which will only be possible when there is
_true economic independence. We maintain that Chile
will have true freedom of the pre6o only when the means

of mass communication are part of the area of social
property, that is, (when they) belong to all Chileans, .
The press, radio, television, and the theater must be
toola at the service of liberation and culture of our
people and not a private business, an ideological
battering ram of the national and foreign minority
(the capitalists) as is presently the case, 7 (under-
lining added) f

Another statement said "the mission of journalists is to support and
defend the People's Government (the UP) together with ali the workers,“
The declaration also underlined the support of UP newsmen for
"Viet-Nam, Cuba, and all the people that are building Socialism,"

and threw a bouquet at Cuba's Prensa Latina‘agency for its “objective”
reporting of the Chilean phenomenon, “Allende himself lent legitimacy

‘to the mission of UP journalists in a speech kicking off the conference

when he stated that "committed" newsmen must act as the “vanguard!
of the revolution by "clevating the political level of the people."
Reiterating a theme expressed on many other occasions, Allende
asserted that his Government would respect freedom of information
while at the same time he lamented his Government's “excessive

tolerance" for the opposition media.

CONFIDENTIAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 6

14-3000

CONFIDENTIAL

A, Presse - an
—— ; 4

In the key Santiago metropolitan area, there are five major
Opposition daily newspapers and one important neutral daily,
La Tercera de la Hora, : : ;

TABLE.2, MAJOR OPPOSITION AND NEUTRAL DAILY NEWSPAPERS

—- Estimated Political
Title °. . Circulation — Orientation

fy

‘El Mercurio 160, 000 Independent, conservative

Las Noticias Ultimaa —120, 000 Part of the Mercurio chain

La. Prensa , 25, 000 Christian Democratic (PDC)

La Segunda i 60,000 Part of the Mercurio chain
La Tribuna , 25,000 National Party (iis) interests

La Tercera de la Hora 190,000 Independent

_ A favorite target of the Gavernment and its propaganda apparatus
has been the conservative, independent daily El ‘4ercurio, dean of the
Chilean press and chief representative of the largest and most influential
newspaper chain in the country, Tarred regularly as "pro-US," and
as a "gringo newspaper written in Spanish" -- potent accusations in
Chile -- El Mercurio has borne the brunt ofjevery conceivable kind of
pressure short of outright seizure, :

On numerous occasions the paper haa been implicated along with
other opposition media in alleged seditious plots carried out in concert
with forciga (i.e., U.S.) interests to overthrow the Government,
Advertisers have been "requested" not ta.do business with the Mercurio
chain, “which has been accused of foreign exchange irregularities by _
tax authorities, by Government supporters on the paper's own staff, and
by Allende himecif at public rallies, Allende, too, periodically reacts’
to critical Mercurio editorials with charges that Chile and the
Presidential office have been "insulted," that the Mercurio chain
indulges in "libertinism unprecedented in Chilean journalistic history,"

CONFIDENTIAL
R-4-73 February 27, 1973 7


14.90000

CONFIDE

and that the chain is “faithful to its tradition of infamy,
Government Propaganda apparatus follows suit,

The

The PDC organ La Prensa and the National Party tabloid
ne
La Tribuna are secondary tarpets for the UP propaga nd: 1 apparatus
ecause their circulation is limited, Pressures sinployed ayainst
these dailies are aimed generally at the political partion Dehind them
in contrast to the Mercurio chain where pressures are intended as a
warning dignal ta the “tree media as an institution,

‘Independent La Tercera receiven diatinct Lrealme nt. The

Gov ernment exerts minimal pressures on the paper in return for
favorable editerial treativient of Atlende policies (see Section VI,
A, The Opposition Media Reaction), This tactic “has paid dividends
for Allende and for Ter rat s owner, Germ: in Pico Cénas. Allende
. 7 obtains favorable publicity im a mune-circulation paper that maintains

1 comparative objectivity in its news columns, thus lending cre dence to

Allende's claims that he will respect traditional Chilean freedonis

while making the transition to Socialism, Freed Crora the need for

the strident partisanship so characteristic of the rest of the presa,
S P E
some

‘ a
: Tercera steadily builds its circulation with a public seeking
As a result Pico, who has been head

reliet from the verbal civil war,
of the Chilean newspaper association, hag defended the Allende
Government's press policies in international forums, The under-
standing with the Government, however, is an uneasy one; Tercera

is not sufficiently malleable for the Socialist Party, the principal y party

in the Government coalition,

! B. Radio

,

' Radio continues to be the most important medium of communication

: in Chile. The latest available figures compiled by the World Radio-TV

_ Handbook give Chile a total of 137 stations, including 29 1n the capital

‘ city, Santiago (See Table 3). The number of receivers is estimated at

H a 3 million,’ or one for every third person, Ina country 2,600 miles long

radio's stratevic importance is understood by both Gavernment and

‘ opposition, The Government has resorted to a variety of devices
designed to intimidate epposition radio stations: requests by Allende
advisers that opposition stations hire designated leftist commentators
threats of violence; favoritism in the diatribution of needed government

advertising revenues; temporary closures; and strikes fomented by
CUP committees.

: ; CONFIDENTIAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 a

ww
ee ee ee oy RE ne Se rn ee nr te OR PE Me mere enema”

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CONFIDENTIAL ~

Station
a \
Radio Agricultura:
Radio Balmaceda |
Radio Cooperativa’
Radio Corparacifa
Radin [2M :

R adiowLuis Recabarrea

Radio Magallanes
Radio Minerfa
Radio Pacifico
Kadio Portales
Radio Santiago

‘’ Radio UTE

TABLE 3, IMPORTANT RADIO STATIONS

Political
Orientation
National Party (PN)
Christian Demuecratic (PDC)
PNC with PN clements
Socialist Party —

Usiversin: ef Chile stitisn
controlled’ by Marxists -

Chilean labor federation (CUT) -
station; Communist-controlled
(See Note No, 10)

Communist Party

Independent with PDC and PN elements,

Radical Party (UP)
Socialist Party

Catholic Church interests
State Technical University station
controNed by Communists

Partial blame for leftist infiltration of Chilean stations mast rest

with “bourgevis" radio owners,

Long before Allende became president

the Chilean businessmen and politicians who owned radio Stations
made ita practice to hire leftiat commentators because they believed
that leftista were superior professionals ‘aad helped to increase
listenership, When the UP came to power it tapped an existing source

of manpower,

In addition, the Government frequentl

y utilized existing regulations

to gain its ends. Radio concessions are granted by a Government

entity (Servicios Electricos) attached to the Interior
same entity can cancel or transfer such concessions,

Nijnistry, The
0 R :
egulations

promulgated during World War II state that "In case of internal
disturbance, catastrophe or war radio stations are subject to the
rules, control, and censorship that the Government may adopt,"
Under this type of emergency regulation, all radio stations were
placed under an obligatory Government network -- not an unusual
Practice for the Allende Government -- when a modified martial |
law was decreed in 21 of Chile's 25 provinces during. the October.

CONFIDENTIAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973

PR res ce me any ee eee ee

9


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—_ oT TELE ILS LE

4

‘. CONFIDENTIAL
wa

”

Novernber 1972 truck drivers otrike (See Note No, 1#j. Another
regulation decrees that stations must interrupt their transmissions
whenever the Interior Minister judges it to be necessary in the
interest of the internal security of the State,” Still another regulation
authorizes the Central Bank to control the importation of equipment
and spare parte for radio,. television, and the presa,

Tho Government moved quickly after the 1970 precidential

“election to obtain control of key stations, The Socialist arty

gained control of Radio Portales, Chile's most populir station,

and purchased Radio Corporacion from EL Mereurio (Portales han

: subsequenily ufipped in poputirity), The Communine Party purchased
Magallenes, an important Santiago atation, The Cornmunist Party
recently also purchased Radio Siméon Bol{var (formerly pro-

; Opposition) in Concepcidntia well ap our other stations in southern

Chile in preparation for the Congressional elections in March 1973),

The rightist National Party daily La Tribuna quoted the former

owner ae oaying that ‘the age of privatelysouned mann media

{in Chile) io over" with only the Government, Blrong econornic

consortiums, and the moat powerful political parties capable of

Bustaining media operations, La Tribuna Says the Corarnunist Party
- ia now the most powerful (single) broadeneter in southern Chile.

. . PNC-oriented Radios Balmaceda and Cooperativa, however, have -

..to date successfully resisted Government enticement) and pressures

~ (see Section VI, A. The Opposition:Media Reaction), Palmaceda --a
radio station which over the years had carned a reputation for objec-
tive newscasts -- has been the number one target of the UP in the
radio field, It haa suffered more temporary closures than any radio
facility. The station was shut down, for’ example, 17 hours in
June 1971 for broadcastiny an alleged "alarmist" report during the
State of Emergency decreed after the dsnassination of Perez Zujavic,
a former interior minister in the Frei Government. At the same
time a UP Station, Portales, received nothing more than an admoni-
tion for transmitting "alarmist" news more acceptable to UP
Propagandists. - During the August-September 1971 period Radio
Balmaceda was shut down on three separate occasions under

Similar pretexts (see Note No. 10), .
a CONFIDENTIAL
ee

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 10 .


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CONFIDENTIAL

In radio as in the press the Government has uscd CUP
committees to formulate exagperated wipe demania, to foment’
strikes, and to form rarnp unions, CUP unions at Radio }
for example, forced the owner to sell out to a cooperative turiner
by employees when waye demands could not be met, The- radio
Station subsequently wan purchased by the Radical Party -- a

member of the UP coalition,

| The principal Government weapon, however, is ito control
over public service advertising, which traditionally has provided —
the bulk of revenues for Chilean radio stations, The Government
has dangled the prospect of advertisernents in réturn for favorable
“news treatment, but the bait hao not been picked up by the major
opposition radios which recognize thit their independence is at
atake, The economic squeeze. makes. the future of Chilean

independent radios appear bleak.

C. Television

Since its inception in Chile in 1962, television has rade great
aridm, but the medium etill lags behind radio, especially, in the oo,
provinces where technical conditions for viewing are poor, Accord- -
ing to the best catimates evuilable, there are 350, 000 sets in
Santiago and a total of 500,000 sets in the country, Chile is ‘served
by the following television channels: 1) A national network with
some 21 oatlets throughout the country; 2) the Catholic, University -
channel in Santiago; 3) a separate Catholic University channel in
Valparafso; and 4) the University of Chilg channel in Santiago,

The Government clearly recognizes television's importance as
a propaganda vehicle, and under the direction af an Allende . :
confidante, newsman Augusto Olivares (Socialist and a suspected
member of the ultra-lefe MIR -- Movement of the Revolutionary
Left), it has transformed Chile's only nationwide television channel
into an outright political instrument of the Government coalition,
Slanted commentaries favoring UP policies, character assassinations
intended to smear political and class opponents, and a steady drum- .
fire of Socialist propaganda in news and cultural programming

became standard fare, oo, ; . :

1
CONFIDENTIAL : |
R-4-73 February 27, 1973 vt . , .

{

14.90000

CONFIDENTIAL

a ee

\ . ;

ifficult under a
ir views in . ‘

At the same tire network authorities made ity
variety of pretexts for opposition Spokesmen to air the
contravention of the State television statme, For ezariple, the
authorities frequently Obliyed all televinion channels “nd radios to
Carry official Staterneénta and denied Opposition spoxessnen equal
time, redorting to the legal fiction that the official atatements were

. : s

transinitted volunta ily,
LY

‘

A popular political chat show "A Tres Bandas, "in which Opposi-~
tion representatives freely debated UP representatives (the only such
show carried nationally), wag cancelled in Auguet 1974 after two
years of Up Agitation ayainse it. The Government delended the Blep
by allesing that the Program had Poor lintenership aed by Pointing to
a ruling ranting all political parties equal time to express their
‘views on twice-weekly 20-minute Slots, The Original chat show
format provided several hours of Open-ended and frequent face-to-
face confrontation, usually embarrassing to the Government,

' The University of Chile station has Consistently aeserted the
Marxist line Since itg inception, but the two remaining Oniversity
Channels have Successfully fought Government control ia date (See
ion University Confrontation and Television Freedoms),

Section yr,
Cuannets, however, Tp national in Scopes

None of the universit,;

D. Magazines and Rook Publishing _
and equipment

‘Early in 1971 the Covernment Purchased the plane

of the PDC-controlled Zig-Zag publishing empire -- one of the most

modern in Latin America, The GOC announchd the purchaee after
Prolonged negotiations, Provoked Originally by the exXCEBEive demands

of a Communist-led union. Under the terms of the accord the
Government Purchased “ig-Zag's plant and Cquipment, the company's
national line of comics, and Several magazines while Ziu-Zag

retained several mA88-Circulation magazines (Ercilla and Vea being

the most irmportant) under a two-year Contract with the Chilean

Treasury, ‘The Zig-Zag infrastructure forrned the basis for the :
newly-established Covernment-owned Quimantu National Publishing . .
Enterprise, The accord with Zig-Zap has been Scrupulously

observed to date,

CONFIDENTIAL,
oe

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 12


14.90000

CONFIDENTIAL

Quimantu quickly beran turning out magazines, comic ‘pooks,
and textbook pushing UP policies. Comic books like Firme
‘were designed for mass consumption and aimed at adults with
low cultural levels, while others like Ramona were aimed at the
teen-age market., Cabrochico, anotherrcomic book, was peared to
pre-teens, The format of some Quimantu products closely resembled
‘competing Zig-Zap products, The weekly Ahora, for example, was.
designed to compete with Ercitla, After eight months Ahora collapsed,
rejected in the market place dy Chileans who were turned off by heavy
handed political propaganda,

E. Films

The Government's film production company, ‘Chile F ilms, became
the UP's principal propaganda arm in the film field. Rival Chilean
Private producers went out of business, squeezed by rising production
costes and discriminatory tan and exchange rate treatment that denied
“them needed equipment and spare parts from abroad. Chile Films
Signed a comprehensive exchange accord in March 1971 with the Cuban
Cinematographic Institute (Z CAIC) (See Section V. Cc, Exchanee of
. Persons, Visitors, and Exchance Acreements).

Chile Films aleo initiated agreements with the experimental film
institute {leftist) at the University of Chile, the film institute at the
Communist-dominated State Technical University (UTE), the Govern.
ment information office, the film department of the Communist-

_ dominated CUT (Central Unica de Trajabadores -- the major labor
organization), the national celevision netwiers, and the University of
Chile television station. The. stated purpose of the accords was to
“develop the new Chilean film industry, "

Its products are intended to clorify the roles of workers, peasants,
and students in the march to Chilean- style Socialism, romanticize the
proletarian role of the Chilean Communist and Socialist Parties, and
attack the "bourgeoisie" and their "imperialist" allies. Despite an
intense publicity buildup, hawever, few films a actually appeared in
the 1970-72 period. Most of the films that were produced appeared to
be pieced together from newsreel film taken Curing the Allende
presidential campaign or from post-election political rallies.

CONFIDENTIAL .

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 13


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iT - - .
| Shareholders were resisting temptation. Govern:
; @rgued that newsprint sroduction was essential ts the State and must

CONFIDENTIAL i
— ‘

The Government's delay in making public the results of June 1972
elections for top posts in the Communist -domisated-GUEtabér
federation also darnaged Government Credibility, Fhe opposition
media scored heavily ina barrage of charges of irregularities and
vote fraud with a public that takes justified price in Clean elections,

B. The Papetera Confrontation
+ EE at rontation

aztones (known as
’rint, became

terms of

The Compa
the Papelera), Chite’s major private producer ¢

a :
another propaganda battleground cast by the opos
"freedom versus Marxist totalitarianism, ".

?4Manufacturera de Pancles Y C
a —

In October 1971, the Government, carrying ort # long-standing
Pledge, announced that CORFO (the Government Devclopment
Corporation) had opened négotiations to buy out the Papelera through
the purchase of ita stock, The oppasition media tz raediately launched
a campaign to warn the public that the free press would be crippted

if newsprint distribution were placed at the merey of Government
Suppliers, At the came time, the opposition me pleaded with
Private shareholders to refuse to sell to the Gov ent. In addition,
a "freedom find" was created enabling private pe Ss to buy up.
Papelera shares to prevent the company from £ 2 into Government
hands, : : . - ; ee

For several months Pro- and anti-Governmers media carried out.
daily an intensive propaganda battle in advertiserser:: + Hews Stories,. . .
and editorials, Both sides resorted to the familizr numbers game: , ,
the pro-Allende media claimed that the Governmers was besieged by

willing shareholders eager to sell out; the oppos A asserted that
= propagandists

_ be controlled by the State; the Opposition said Pasetera raust remain
a ‘ ot —
_' private hands as a4 patriotic duty,

-

: Thwarted to date in its attempt to buy out Pane!
_ the Government has not hesitated to use other mee
‘controls, labor-induced Production Shortages, and strong-arm tactics «+

‘to Prevent the delivery of raw material to the plant. The Government .
Press also circulated rumors that Jorze Alessandri (former President

era shareholders,
tres +-- price

CONFIDENTIAL
a.

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 26
wes re = er .

SRR ER ne eg rere epee reese ane cen e Rn ee ee mee,

14-0000

NPEAL.

of Chile anda leading shareholder and borrd chairman of the- Papelera)
had made a deal with AUende to sive the Government control’ over the”
Papelera to weaken the will of private shareholders and their supporters,
That the Papelera still withstand: these combined pressures-a year |
later is a tribute to a determined defense of the firm by an opposition
Congress, to the loyalty of the bulk of the Papelera cmployees, and to

an aroused and aleried opposition media, - |

ad
1

yelera will continuc and the odds
cquests-for price increases

The battle for control of the P
are not good for the campany, hepeatee
sufficient to absorb cest increases -- forced on the firm in part by
Government economic nolicies «- were net met, and the firm declared
in September 1972 that it could not meet lean payments due to the ;
Inter-American Devetoprnent Dank (IDK). Finally, in December 1972
the Government authorized new price increases averaging 45 per cent,
which were, however, inapplicable to the price of newsprint, The
Papelera gains some breathing space but Government pressures on the
company are certain to continue, The price increase itself may be
viewed a9 a form of pressure,

The battle has spilled over into the balls of the Chilean Congress.
“ats independent status, the PDC sponsored

Partly to protect the Papele
a "three areas" constitutional amendment designed to give Congress

some control over which businesses can be incorporated as social -
‘property by the Government, (The Papelera is one of the firms
appearing on the Government's oripinal fst of 91 firms to be absorbed
‘by the Government as social property.) The a:nendment -- still a
. bitter bone of contention between the Gaverament and the opposition --
would, among other poiats, declare null and void CORFO's atiempted
purchase of Papelera stock in the absenée of Congressional approval.

ision Freedoms

C. University Confrontation and Telev

Growing opposition confidence fed by an election victory at the
University of Chile in April 1972 and by stiffening opposition
attitudes at Santiago's Catholic University had important spill-over
effects in television programming at wo channels run by Catholic
University. Increasing opposition cifectiveness even raised the
possibility that the Marxist-controlled University of Chile channel. for
the first time in its existence might be obliged to inject some
objectivity into its output.

CONFIDENTIAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 27


14.90000

pluralism over

NEIDENTIAL

Dey

Incumbent University of Chile Rector Edgardo Boeninger, an _
independent with Christian Democratic sympathies, gained 51.9 per cent
of the vote for rector in April against three other contenders repree-
sentiny the UP Coalition and leftist epliiter ‘groups, including the
MIR. (An independent-PDC state alco pained control of the previously —
Marxist-controlled Superior Normative Council, The victory wan
billed by the opposition media a6 another victory for democracy and
1 "Marxist tololiterianisine' tn the Proccee ector
Boeninger became a hero of the Opposition media and a ayrntol of
"dernocratic" defiance of Government cfforte to impose its will on
an independent university, The opposition's rallying cry becnrme
“Defend a democratic and pluralist univereity." Translated into
media terms it became “We want a democratic and pluralistic

university TV channel,

Rallying behind that slogan, Opposition supporters at the two
Catholic Universities (Santiago and Valparafoo) bepan to case out a
leftist influence in the news departments of the two univernity
Channels, UP Supporters, however, remain at the technician level
at the Santiago channel and can be expected to create probleme for
Opposition authorities who now Control the channel

their opponents.
are procceding cautiously egainet them,

A more significant indication of UP long-range attitudes toward
television freedoms has been the Government's persistent refusal to
permit university television stations to extend their networks
throughout Chile, In Septernber 1972, President Allende blocred the
Opposition’s most recent attempt to obtain legislative sanction for
such an extension by vetoing eclected items in a PDC-intradeced bill,
The Government claimed that its own bilF -- peading before Congzress
and allowing universities to establish stations only within the
territory in which the seat of each university is located -- would
Create a national network for all recognized universities on an
“equal and non-discriminstory" basis, What the Government did
not say was that the bill if passed would preserve the State Network's
position as the only single channel thaf can be viewed by a national
television audience, Presumably the Government bill also would
Permit the Communist-dominated State Technicat University to
Operate a television station in Santiapo in competition with Santiayo's
Catholic University channél which, according to available public

Opinion surveys, is viewed by approximately 69 per cent of the

Capital's audience.
CONFIDENTIAL

R-4-73 February 27, 1973 238


14.90000

_ Cor

se pene tere ee mee ere een

so eeetemnendenats ine eC

Ercilla
October 5, 1972

A ee A ee ee mi OE een Re eS

astrators Protest President Allende's Veto of Bul Permitting
> University (Santiago) to katend Na Television (Channel 13) Throughout Chile.

ne ee mee A ke eo eee eee

In subsequent developments the Catholic University at Santiago
as nevertheless extended its television service to the Concepcion
yetropotitan area, third most important in Chile, via a television
epeater in Tateahuano, The Government has ordered that the
epeater cease operation as the University lacks a concession under
1953 Law to function in that area, lhe University Jias refused to
ompiy, claiming that the 1970 National Television Act, which —
uthorizes the universities to operate television channels, is the
oversiag statute and that it needs no additional concession to
Pperate in any part of Chile. Meanwhile the repeater is still
g (as of February 15, 1973) while the legal (and political)

anctioning
ebate continues,

CONFIDENTIAL

+4-73 February 27, 1973 29 ‘

A NG ON = SO YT PO pe A arene

eee

poremec sm

14.90000

| for the tragic events.-on and after September 11,

‘fascist counterrevoiution aided and abetted by the [.

“establish the dictatorship of ‘the proletariat by a

_of a-dream” of the-establishment of socialism by

‘complish its goals? Were there internal.and external

{ taken policy choices which, if they had been differ-

| In a three-way race.' What they do not mention is

Ay orld-attention has moved away from Santiago”
since the bloody ‘overthrow of Salvador
Allende last September, dut the questions

that were raised at thar time still need answering.
Where should the primary responsibility. be placed

1973? Was it, as the Left contends, the result of a

forces of imperialism? Was it, as the’ Right asserts,
the only available response to Allende’s attempt to

mixture of guile-and force? Did it mark the “death

democratic means, and was it thereby one more
demonstration tnat Marxism must use force to ac-

political and economic factors which made it im.
possible for Allende's experiment to succced, or.
was the downfall of the Unidad Popular (Popular:
Unity) coalition government the consequence of a
series of Idcologically-influenced analyses and mis-

ent, might have produced another result? A review
of the course uf the Allende ‘government with the
aid’ of the considerable new material that has be-
come available In recent months may help to answer
these questions.

Allende's opponents never tire of pointing out
that he was elected with only 36 percent of the vote

that in the congressional run-off between the two
ee
Mr. Sigmund is Professor of Politics at Princeton
University, Among his published works are Models
of Political Change in Latin America, 1970, and
The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (2nd rev.
ed., 1972). He has visited Chile nine times since
1963, most recently in January 1974 to do research
on a forthcoming book dealing with Chilean politics.

the support of the centrist Christian ODernocratic
Party (PDC) in the run-off in return tor his agree-
ment. to the adoption of a Constitutional Statute of

Ocmocrnic Guarantees protecting freedoms of ex. |.

pression, education and religion, and guaranteeing
the independence of the military from political con-
trol. The text of the statute, which was added to
the Chiléan Constitution shortly after Alicnde’s elec-
tion, reflected the fears of non-Marxlst groups that
the new Marxist President would use the consider-
able power of the Chilean exccutive to undercut and
eventually destroy all opposition to a Marxist take-
over,

Political and Economic Strategy

When he took office, Allende promised that he
would follow a “second model” of Marxism—the
via’ Chitena to socialism, “with meat pies and red
wine.” To prove that this model was “anticipated
by the classics of Marxism,” he quoted from
Friedrich Engeis on the possibility of

«+. peacelul evolution from the old soclety to the
new in countries where the representatives of the

ne

* Altende’s supporters In tha Popular Unity coalltian coneleted of
AIS Gwen Socialist Party (Partido Soc:alsis—PS), (ne Communist
Party (Partido Comunista—PC), tha main body of the Radical Party
(Partido Radcal—PR), the lettist Catholic “Movement of Popular
United Achan" (Movimento ge Accion Popular UAIGa— MAP), and
two ather smaller groups. The largest opposition groups wore Ine
centrist Caristian Oemocranc Party (Partica Democrata Crstiano~—
POC) ord tna’ rignust National Party (Partido Nacondt—PN)}.-

in retrospect, Wt is ironic that tne Critean Senate never acted on e
Constivtonal amendment proposed sarty in 1970 to estadlien a
SOCOM OU POOUIaT eleCLA, WAC would Rave proved tne
President thus elected (probably ine figntwing Candidate, Jorge
Algssengrs) with a clear popular Mangala,

front-running candidates he was elected president
‘by a lopsided majority vote of 135-35. Ha received:

14.90000

"people “have all power and in accord with the consti
tution can do what they desire when they have the
amajority of the nation behind them."

Yet it was precisely the.question cf majority sup-
port that was Aliende’s central problem in his: de-
sign to carry out a peaceful transition te “socialism

with democracy, pluralism and liberty.” The parties -

in his coalition -were in a distinct minority in the

, Congress, and although there was no doubt about the

Jogitimacy of his election by that body, his victory
had only ‘been possible because of the conditional

support of the Christian Democrats. The PDC, it’

should be noted, included both Radomiro Tornic,
the party
gone to Allende’s. house to-conpratulate him the
day after the popular election, clearly inferring his
}future support, and conservatives like Senator Juan
de. Dios Carmona, who had fought within the party
to prevent It from voting for Allende: in the run-off.

In the Immediate aftermath of the election the POC’

was controled by the Toric forces, who claimed
to be In-favor of “communitarian” socialism, nation-
-allzation.of copper, acceieration of agrarian reform,
and reduction of Chile's dependencia on the United

States. One way, then, for Allende to achieve his.

acknowledged goal of majority support for the
transition to socialism would have been to. try to
arrive at an understanding with the Christian .Demo-
crats on the points in his program with which ‘they

were In agreement. This might have provoked the.

secession of some of the rightist members of the
POC, but If an accord had been reached with the
party's leaders, it would tikely have given Allende
a majority in the Congress for at least part of his
program.

Flushed with victory and unwilling to come to
terms with the party which he had termed “the new

‘| face of reaction” during the campaign, Allende chose

an alternative strategy. The next congressional elec-
tions. were not scheduled to take place until March
1973, but the Chilean Constitution provided that in

| the event of a conflict, with the Congress over the
text of a constitutional amendment, the President.
could call a national plebiscite. The strategic course.

adopted by Allende was to attempt to expand popu-
lar support for his coalition and then propose a
constitutional amendment which, in accordance with
the Popular Unity electoral program, would replace
the existing bicameral legislature with a unicameral

4 E! Mareurio (Santiago), Mov. 6, 1970, D. 23.

21970 presidential. candidate, who had ~

t Salvader Allende speaks of his plans for Chile at
‘the 23rd Congress of the Socialist Party, held in
January 1971, three months alter his election as

President of Chile.

—Phote by Santi Visalli for Photosoporters.

house, tobe elected Immediately following the ap-
proval of the amendment. The Congress would be
certain to reject the amendment, but if Allende
had the support of a majority In the country, he
could win the plebiscite and secure control of the
unicameral legislature that would then be estab-
lished, *

Allende’s strategy for the expansion of electoral

" support was an economic one which drew as much

from John Maynard Keynes as It did from Karl Marc.
The Chilean economy, already operating betow
Capacity, had gone into a profound recession as a
result of Allende’s election, The response of Pedro
Vuskovic, Allende's Minister of Economics, was ta
“prime the pump” by adopting a deficit budget, in-
Creasing public expenditures, and redistributing in-

come by'skewing the annual wage readjustment for

the preceding year’s inflation (35 percent in 1970)
in favor of the low-income sector of the population
(the lowest income groups received a 40-percent in-
crease). The utilization of unused industrial ca-
pacity, combined with strict enforcement of price
controls, more stringent collection of taxes, and re-
fusal to devalue the Chilean escudo in relation to
the dollar, were expected to contain possible infta-
tionary pressures which might result. (The Allende
government also had a cushion of nearly’ $400
million in foreign reserves left to it by the Frei
Bovernment as a result of high international prices
for copper, Chile’s principal export.)

The strategy also contained a Marxist elament—

46

14.90000

= [2 ERs

accentuslion of the class strupgic. At tne came ‘te | The takeover of large sectors of Chile's basic

that appeals were made to the pocketheoks of the Induitry and trade, a3 promised in the Popular Unity
lower-class Chileans, there was also to be an effort} program, was thus seen as an essential part of an
to increase their. class consciousness (concienti. | economic and political strategy aimed at achleving
zacién) through BOvernment publications and the | and maintaining power. Combined with a rapid
use of the media to remove the elements of “false acceleration of agrarian reform (again using existing
«| Consciousness” jastined by “bourzeoi3" propayanda. | Iegistation—the 1967 agrarian reform law—but ex:
“Expressing the diametric Opposite of a claim often | ploiting Provisions such as one authorizing the

voiced by his predecessor, Eduardo Frei, Altona | Espropriation of “abandoned or badly-furmed Jand,".

caid ina Press conference just after his installation, | with one percent payment in cash and the rest In
“I am not president of alf Chileans.” And in tis first bonds), the planned takeover meant that even if
“State of the Nation’ message to the Congress he | the etfort to create a unicameral left-dominated
asserted: : “legistature failed, the Allende Rovernmient could
: destroy the economic base of tha “capitalist” oppo-
cition through a series of “Irreversible” taits accom.
plis (hechos consumadosy) which would give the

+++ the People’s Government (Gobierno Popular) fs
Insplred in its policy by a premise that is artificially
denied by some-—the existence of claszes and social
sectors with antagonistic and Opposing interests.*

Allende's economic advisers anticipated an addi.
‘tional source of revenue for the government from
the “exploitative” Profits of the industries that were
to be nationalizeg by the new government. The par-
tially American-owned Copper mines ware ta be
taken over by a Constitutional amendment—toth to
lay to rest any legal doubts about the reversal of
the Frei:;Chiteanization agreements of 1967 and
1969, and because a general consensus in Chile
favored nationalization," Other companies were to
be nationalized after a controlling interest was gained
through the purchase of shares on the open market |-
by the government development agency. The fatter
Course seemed facilitated by the fact that the price
of shares had been depressed since the electicns,
and further economic pressures could be crested
by allowing wage increases but forbidding any rise
in prices. Tne legal adviser to the zovernment,
Eduardo Novoa, also Gutlined other “iegal loopholes”
in existing Chilean law which could be used for
“temporary” takeovers of companies, inciuding
“intervention” because of labor disputes ang “requi-
sition" because of a “breakdown in supply of an
article of prime necessity.”- -

ee
* Salvacor Allende, “The Cniean Way to Sociailgm,” in Paul £.

S'gmuna, €4., Pne tueologies ct tne Geveloping Nations, 2nd sev. ed.,
New York, Proeger, 1972, p. 340. :

4*fral's Chileanization Orogram had tnvolved the Burcnate by tne
Cnitean stete of Controting interest in tne large copocer mines
“| omned by Ime Kennecott Ong Anaconda coinpanies, The agreements

A Chilean Peasant guards the g3te of a farm south

of Santiago which was seized from its Owners on the

pretext that it was “operated unproductively” (mal
; explotada), Se

ret.ning in Chile, earning tne country additional fevenue in tne :

19706 to pay back the loans contracted to finance tne purchases.

* Photo by bopat Conte
47 ;


14-00000

* consumption or had sent out of the country as presit | | of the end of a pun,

table. Allende’s effort to fortray the transition "

ta these, Bebe
en3 untid further riotice, political power comes out
“and Allende repeatedly stated
gifferences with apostles of violence like Ché
| Gutrsara were only “tactical,” because the Chilean
situation required that he observe tegality “for the
tire: Leirig.” Allende himself organized an armed
geronal bedypuard, the so-called GAP (Grupo de
Amiga; Personales), and~we now know—as carly
a Cesember 1971 received reports on the illegal

impartation and distribution of arms to the MIA and
to his bodyguards.*

governmen control of the évonomy and oft ‘
profits that Ihe private sector had used for lusury

remittances to.forcign companies. At the same birne, that his
the fact that the policy remained’ within,the letter,
It not the spirit, of: the law meant that intervention
by the military was unlikely. :

Allende’s constitutionalist and- tepalit: strateny
was not universally accepted within his coalition.
Most of his own Socialist Party-—bepinning with it:
newly elected General Secretary, Senator Cartes

‘Altamirano~-and several other groups further to the
left, such as the MIR (Movimiento do fa lrquierda Yirilg there were thus intermittent hints of revo

!
‘
I!
|
Revolucionaria—Movement of the Revalutis nnary | futienary alternatives, Allende’s basic economic
Left} and the VOP (Yanguardia Orpanitads ae | “uatezy nas “socialist consumerism,” * combined
i

Pueblo—Organized Vanguard of the People), were | with a rapid expansion of state control in industry,
openly doubtful about the wisdom of relying cn elec | tects and agriculture, and his basic political strategy
tions and “bourgeois legality” to achieve power and :

advised preparation for an armed confrontation with
the forces of reaction, which they foresaw as. inevi-

$ tos Pég% Debray, Tha Chilean Revolution: Conversations with
Alinta, aca tte, Random, 1971, po. $2, 77, 91, and 97. Ef Mercurio
Cetare aces Catan) Feb. 18-24, 1974, p. 3, reproduces tre report,
fre 1M tre prequiential palace.

Stn ye eticnsumarizm” see Paul E. Sigmund, “Two Years
of Bo ar bine," Prgbiems of Communism (Washington, OC),
Tynan Cacemter 1972; pp. 38-52,

soclalisrn as peaceful in character was not azsicte
by the publication of his conversations with fone
revolutionary theorist Régis Debray in early 1971.

A Santiago tally in November 1970 celebrates the first anniversary ot the Allende presidency—in the
foreground, @ picture of Latin revolutionary Ché Guevara.

i ” =Phote by Clous Meyer for Block Pias..

‘ 48 .

Get

wees

meme nen LL

arm

14-0000

when the regime's Pepulurity was at its highest
point,’ but in retrospect it does not appear at all
certain that he would have won—particularly since
by the time that the constitutional Prerequisites for
such 9 vote had been fulfilled, the economic and
political situation would have been much less favor-
able. :

The period after the Municipal elections now ap-
pears to have been crucial for the long-term survival
of the regime. The Right was still in disarray, the
Christian Democrats. had elected a compromise
leadership which was not committed to either of the
“party's wings, and the short-run economic and politi.
Cal indicators were favorable. Yet, instead of taking
action on the economic front to stem the loss of
foreign reserves and to dampen inflationary . pres-
Surcs——and on the political front to prevent the
movement of the Christian Democrats into an alli-
ance with the right-wing opposition Parties—the
regime continued its Previous policies, confidently
assuming that in the fong run "the people” would
support it and ignoring the warnings of “bourgeois”
economists that the loss of foreign reserves, the ex.
“pansion of.demand, and the sharp decline in invest-
ment would produce disastrous consequences in the
folicwing year, : :

Was 3n expansion of the el.ctoral base of the Allende

coalition by an appeal to the material interests and
| the class consciousness of the lower classes. It was
the interaction of the various elements of this politi-
cat and economic strategy that finally produced the
breakdown of Chilean Constitutionalism and the
intervention of the armed forces that the extreme teft
of the Allende coalition had been Predicting all along.

Initial Success Be
ee
At the outset, the new economic policy was
astoundingly successful, although it had within it
the seeds of future disaster. Income redistribution
Stimulated demand, while price controls and an arti- .
ficially low exchange rate kept prices down. As a
Consequence, a mini-boom ensued. By March 1971.
the Sociedad de Fomente Fabrit (Asscciation for the
Development of Manufacturing), representing
Chilean business and industry, admitted that produc.
tion had increased by 6.3’ percent over the figure
‘| of 12 months before, and by May that figure had
reached 13.5 percent. The Institute of Eccnomics
Of the University of Chile tater reported that unem.
ployment In the Santiago area dropped from 8.3
Fercent in December 1970. to 5.2 percent in June
1971 and declined further to an unusually fow 3.8
“percent by the end of the year. The Ccnsumer Price .
| Index stopped climbing entirely in December 1970 : : :
and had only increased by 6 percent by the time | The hardening of the Christian Democratic posi-
of the municipal elections of Aprit'1971—its lowest | tion began in mid-1971. it was accelerated in June
rise in many years. At the same time, salaries and | by the assassination of the former Christian Demo-
Wages increased by 27 percent in reat terms. Cratic Interior Minister, Edmundo Perez Zujovic, by
This wave of economic Prosperity—combined | extremists, at feast one of whom had been released
with the absence of the political repression that from prison by Allende upon his accession to power.
Some rightists had predicted would result from a | A month later in a by-election in Valparalso, the
victory by the Marxists —ted many, particularly in | victorious Christian Democratic candidate received
low Income Groups, to vote for the candidates of the | the support of the’ Right. The tacit alliance with the
Popular Unity coalition in the April municipal elec- | Right led ‘to the secession from the PDC of eight
tons. Allendé's own Socialist Party bettered its elec- deputies and a number of other party leaders to form
torat showing in the 1969 Congressional elections by | the pro-Allende lequierda Cristiana (Christian Left).
nearly 100 percent (a jump from 12 percent to 22 | This was counterbalanced however, by a split in the
percent of the total), and the candidates of all the | other direction within the Allende coalition. Five of
parties supporting Allende received about 50 per. | the seven Radical senators {including two former
Cent of the vote, as compared with the 36 percent | presidential Candidates) and 7 of the 19 deputies
which the President himseif had received only seven | left the Radical Party (PR), and formed the Partido
Months before. Yet, Sratifying as the results were, | de /a Izquierda Radical (Party of the Radical Left—
thé Coalition was still a few votes short of the abso- | PIR) in protest against the Marxist orientation ofa
Ime majority that Allende required to win a plebi- . —
i scita on a constitutional amendment. He was later ? See, #4. Paul M. Sneery,’“Chite: The Question of Foner.”
. Critkized for not Calling the plebiscite at the Ume | Mcntnty Review (new Yoru, Lonaon) Decemzer 1973, Po. VAL.

49 .

Political Polarization


14-00000

Allende in Retrospect,

IPR F policy resolution which the dissidents described
as “completely removed from the characteristic and
distinctive ideology of our parly”-and opposed to
“the interest of the middle social strata” whom the.
_party had always represented." For a time, the PIR

‘| continued to support the Allende government, but

within a year it had entered the ranks of the opposi-
tion,

in July 1971, the Christian Demdcrats had voted
In favor’ of the constitutional amendment national-
izing the copper mines, but from: that point forward,
the pattern was one-of polarization of Chilean politics
_and*Society into two opposing blocks. The Aliende™
forces controficd the executive and pursued an in-
creasingly vigorous ideological purge of those who
were not entirely sympathetic to the government.
The opposition controlled the legislature, and in
October 1971. the Christian Democrats and the
rightist parties attempted to assert legistative con-

| trol over the. expansion of the-public sector by voting
‘in favor of a constitutional amendment limiting the

use of the intervention and requisition procedures
and requiring that all transfers of private enterprises +
to the “social” or mixed sectors be carried out In
accordance with specific legislation adopted by the
Congress. This legislative act, referred to as an
amendment on the “Three “Areas of Property,” be- |
came the focus of a continuing deadlock between |
the President and Congress that lasted - until
Allende’s overthrow in September 1973. .
Alfende's refusal to accept the amendment or to
call a plebiscite to resolve his differences with the
Congress appeared to the congressional opposition
to be a decisive indication of his determination to
bypass the legislature in carrying out the Popular
Unity program, and from the time of the adoption of

the amendment onward, the Christian Democrats -

began to cooperate with the rightist parties in- op-
posing the executive. One method was to impeach
ministers for violation or (more often) nonenforce-
ment of the law. The first of many such impeach-
ments took place in January 1972. Another method
was to present a united electoral front against the
government. Informal cooperation between the
rightist parties and the Christian Democrats led to
striking victories in two by-elections in January 1972,

and a month tater these groups formed the Demo.
cratic Confederation (Confederacian Democratica—
CODE) to prepare joint lists for the 1973 congres-
sional elections. A third area of cooperation was in

© £1 Mercurio, Aug. 8, 1972, p. 37.

50

-eould be expected to get worse with the harvest in

marches and sernonstrations against the government,

the most femcus of which was the March cf Empty
Pots in Decernber 1971, in which thcuzands of
housewives, mostly of middle-class background,
arzing pots to protest food shartazes.
Those shertazes had developed becaute the pre-
dicted ecenemic difficulties resulting from the
.Muskovic peticy began to emerge in late 1971: The
balance-of-payments surplus had been depleted at
such an alarming rate (in 1971 there was a deficit
of $315 million, while in 1970 there had heen a

surplus of $91 million) that in November 1971 the
Allende goverrirnent called a moratorium cn payment |

of its foreign cebts. Chile had already experienced
difficulties in securing loans from the Inter-American
Development Bzenk, the World Bank and the Esport-
import Bans 25 a result of its failure to compensate
the Anacorca ‘and Kennecott copper comzanies
for the naticnatization of their major mines. The
debt moratorium was bound to make it consiceratly
more difficuit for Chile to secure foreign credits,
particularly for the short term:' In December 1371,
the Chilean fovernment finally permitted a partial
devaluation ot the Chilean escudo $o as to Cecrease
the distorticns created by its overvaluation, out tris
created prészure on prices of goods manufactured
with imported components. Shortages of certain focd
items—especizily cooking oil; detergents, suger,

‘toothpaste, and cigarettes—were ascribed by the

government to upper-class hoarding and to increased

‘consumption by fow-income groups; however, the

dislocatidris in the countryside ‘associated with the
very rapid €spansion of the agrarian reform (Aficnde
took over almcst as much land in his first year in
office as Frei rad in six years) clearly had something
to do with the problem as well, and the situstica

early 1972. A 160-cpercent increase in the money
supply'as a resutt of the government's deficit scend-
ing was also tezinning to produce inflationary gres-
sures now that the unused capacity of Chilean indus-
try had been t2zen up by the 1971 expansian. hfs
important, a sharp drop in investment (Allende said
it had declined by 7.7 percent, but oppesition
economists claimed it had fallen by 24.2 percent)
‘meant that the spectacular growth rate achieved in
1971 would be sharply reduced in 1972.

Yet the degree of the incipient crisis was not
ee
80n the inaccuracy of tne term “invisiole Blockade” to devote
the Allende gs-ernrrent’s credit protiems, see Paul E Slgmend,
“The ‘Invisibie Bocesze’ and the Querinice of Allensa,” Fore 67

Altaics (New York), January 1974, pp. 322-40.


14-00000

Workers occupying a plant outside of Saniiega pro-
claim their intention to held it to the desta. The
initials of the Unidad Pecular (Popular Unity) are
painted on the wail by the gate. - ;

~Phote by Moggi Certelloe.

Immediately evident from the figures fer 1971. In- | the Popular Unity coalition was unwilling to accept

dustrial growth had reached 8.3 percent, ezrarian
production (based on plantings before Alignde’s
accession to power) had increased by 5.3 percent,
and unemployment had dropped to record lows. The
Communist Party in-a report to a Popular Unity
“conclave” in early 1972 warned that “very strong
Inflationary pressures could make our situation
acute," but the government tcok i10 action to deal
| with the problem. The continuing:optimism ci zov-
ernment policymakers .at this time was expressed
at a Round Table in Santiago sponsored by the Uni-
versity of Sussex.and the Chilean Planning 0 i
March 1972. In the course of discussion R2
Tomic, the deteated Christian Democratic presisen-
tial candidate, asserted that the Allende government !
had committed a “fatal political error” in failing to

establish an “institutional majority” in the Canzress

through a “far-reaching agreement between saciaiists

inspired by Christianity and those inspire2 by |
Marxism—that is, between the Christian Democrats
and Popular Unity—in the period following the 1370
presidential election.” Allende’s representatives com

51

| scemcd to be no olvtacles in the internal logic of

‘rwinning sufficient strength ta gain controt of the

“menton the “Threo Areas of Property were made in

vith 3 gradual heightening of
the political consciousness of the proletariat, there

the Chilean bourgecis state to prevent the workers’

tegistatureas weit as the executive.”

On the political fant, there were individuals and.
‘groups cn both sins who attempted to stem the
movement toward polarization, which they corzectly
foresave would: lead to the breakdown of Chilean
institutions. Two important efforts to arrive at a com-
promise on the issue of the constitutional amend-

the first part of 1972. in Aprit the Left Radicals, who
had entered the Allende government In January,
carried on tengthy negotiations with the Christian
Demacrats to haramer out a satisfactory agreement
on this issue, only ta have it rejected by the top
Command of the Popular Unity coalition parties. The | -
Left Radicals responded by leaving the government
and joining the opposition, a move Allende described
as “a stab In the back." A secend set of, negotia-
tions in June between the’ head i the Christian
Demoeralic Party and Allenda’s Minister of Justice
broke down when the time limit set by the Christian
Demvocrals expired and the POC l2adjershlp refused
to extend it.

The two sets of negotiations sezm to have col-
lapsed for retuted reasons. In April the left wing of

a compromise which wauld slow down or stop the
forward movement of the government nationalization
program, while in June tne right wing of the
Christian Democrats could point to an impending
by-election ir, mid-July as a reason for discontinuing
discussions. Both cases iltustrated a general prob-
lem posed by the Chilean muitiparty system. Once
poiitical conflict became polarized, the extremes
held the rest of the opposing ccalitions hostage and
prevented what could have been a convergence of
views in the center.

The negotiations were Interspersed with a series
of demonstrations and countercemenstrations by
the government and the opposition which always
stopped just short of open violence. Several ob-
servers, including the American Ambassador to

493. Ann Zammit and Gabriel Palma fos, Te Co.ean Read fo
Socraism, Austin, University cf Teuas Press. 2573, 50. 38, 247.
Tre Communist Party report atoears in Zi Veroure (international
€ononl tan, 31Fep. 6, 1972, p. @.

1t Partco iquersa Radical, Trayectne Postca Get Pra (Political
Pain cf the PiR}, Santiago, 1972, a AL

.

14.90000

Allende in Retrospect a,
OR -
Chile, Nathaniet Davis, remarked on the palt con ‘of
“brinkmanship" that the Chileans exhibited.” Social
and political tensions increased—but &> Jon at
economic deterioration was fot reflected in runaway
Inflation, the Chilean political system seerncd able -

to contain them,

tne

The Turning Poine

The strains in the system only became unman-
agcable in mid-1972, when the lid blew cff the
fragile Chilean economy and tet loose the pressures
that had been building up for at least a year. As the
deficit In government spending rose, particularly
‘| because of its subsidies to the “social area,” its
foreign reserves: dropped nearly to zero, and the
growth of industrial output slowed down. Allende
replaced Economics Minister Vuskovic vail Carlos
Matus and appointed Orlando Millas as Finance
‘Winister, The Matus-Millas team sought to “find
stability at another fevet,” ordering a dractic cur-
rency devaluation, raising prices in the nationalized
sector, and permitting limited agricultural price in-
‘creases. The result was a sharp jump in the cost-of-
living Index, which climbed from 27.5 percent at the
end of June to 99.8 percent at the end of September,
A wage readjustment to compensate for the increase
In the cost of tiving only accelerated the inflation,
s9-that by the end of the year the official consumer
price Index had reached 163 percent (see Table 1).
In September, industrial output began to drop in
absolute terms (/.e., not merely in terms of the rate
.of increase)—-a drop that continued every month
thereafter until the September 1973 coup." Agri-
| cultural production (excluding livestock) aiso ccm-
menced to decline, and mineral productisn regis-
tered precipitous drops, although copper production
rose by 1.3 percent for 1972 owing to the fact that
@ number of new mines came into operation. (On
other elements of the worsening economic situation,
tee Table 2.)

Chile's economic problems were paralleled in the

1972

1973

42 A gecret cable from US Ambassador Nathaniel Davis to the
Beate Cepaciment, published in Jack Anderson's Column in Fre
Wast:ngtun Post (Wasningion, OC) on Marcn 28, 1972, commented
thet “the Chiteans nave a great ability to rus to Ine brink, embrace
each otmer, ang back off.” On the tame pont see Mauric:> Solaun
and Fernando Cepeaa, Allende’s Chie: On the Poutcs of
Brnamanship, Bogcta, Universidad de bes Andes, 1972,

tt Ting Allence government blamed tne drop in progucton on the
October 1972 sirine, Dut this ignored (ne fact that procuct.on ceclines
began betore October.

tI Tie
oa ail aren:
ceqeached, Including, the Minister of interior, who
ns, Charged with abs etting the illegal importation
Gf ares from Cuba in Marsch, (The Allende govern:
recnt claimed that suspect shipments from Cuba-—
“bultus Cubanos"—were “works of art,” but after
September 1973 coup, the government White
ben published an inventory of cver 2,000 pounds
Gf atrr3 sent trorn Cuba In 13 crates which customs

Table ts Monthly Fluctuations in Conzumer Prices

* Percentage of change from ihe same monin of the previous year.
SOURCE:
Statitcs), Santiago; Socevat ce Fomento Fabril. (Association for We
Oeverperent of Manutactuing), Santiago. .

s

syeral ‘additional ministers were

and Industrial Output under Allende

fAonth Consumer Price Indea frwdutriat Output *

Oct, 35.6 —6.0
Nov, 35.3 43
Dec, 349 -03-
Jan, 28.1 : 45
Feb. 228 | -7.3
téarch 20.1 . 6.3
April 20.2 16
Sthay 21.0 13.5
june 21.2 10.7
duly 19.1 6.7
Aug. . 17.4 10.7
Sept. 15.6 25.5
Oct. 16.5 22.6
Nov. 18.8 22.1
Oec, 22.1 19.5
Jan,” 248 18.5 °
Feb. 32.0 119
tAarch 34.0 30.2
April 38.1 12.6
thay 40.0 11.4
dune 40.3 2.5
July 45.9 5.0
Aug. 77.2 . 3.6
Sept. 114.3 —78
Ont 142.9 -77
Nov. 149.9 —-81
Oec. - 163.4 -iMal
Jan, 180.3 —68
Feb. 174.2 . 47
tAarch 183.3 —-28
April 195.5 —-11.3
May 233.5 —-110 i
June 283.4 —148 i
July 323.2 —10.7
Aug. : 303.6 -11.9
Sept. 286.0 _ 229
Oct. 528.4 18.0 .
Now, $28.9 5.1.

seattuto Nacers! oe Estadisticas (Netonal Institute of

14-00000

CRS SSA | ATEN

“Fable 2:

ic product (% change)

Gross don
Investinent change)

Real woses and salaries (% change)
Exports -(§ milion)

Imports ($ million) *

SOURCL: Dematment of fconomica, University of Chile.

had been forbidden to Inspect") The fudiciary
joined in the conflict, protesting the fadure cf the
Ministry of Justice to carry oul court orders, while
Progovernment demonstrators denounced tre viejos
de mierda-—“fitthy old men*—in the Supreme
Court, As it became apparent that there was a0 real
possibility. of resolving their differences, the two
sides turned to the armed forces as impartial arbi-
ters, and the national holidays in: mid-September
1972 were marked ‘by rival efforts’of.the Congress
and the President to ingratiate themseives with the
military.

The political Involvement of the military was
accelerated by the next step in the Chilean tragesy—
the October 1972 strike, Respectively termed the
“employers' lockout” and “the national strike” by
pro. and anti-Allende forces, it began far from
Santiago, in the remote soithern.province of Aysen,
with a strike by small truckers. (Referred ta Dy the
gavernment press as the “truck-owners,” the meni-
bership of the truckers’ gremio—guild—was ainest
entirely composed of owners of one or two trucks

-{wha feared an announced pian to establish a state
trucking agency which would have had pricrity
access to new trucks and spare parts). Tha strike
quickly spread across the nation, as the truckers
were joined by bus and taxi drivers, shapkeepers,
doctors, nurses, dentists, airline pilots, engineers
and part of the peasantry. The Christian Democrass
and the rightist parties supported the strikers, and
the work stoppage dragped on for over 3 mont

resulting in an estimated loss of $150-200 miiton,

in production. Agriculture was particularly hava hx
because the strike, took place in the midst ef the
planting season; indeed, thera is no doubt that ps:t.
‘though not all, of the 25 S-percent drop in the 1973
harvest was the consequence of the Strike. Incustry

"* Socretaris General del Goplerns, Liana B/anco (write Awal,
Santiago, 1973, pp. 103-03.

Some Inigices of the Chilean, 1 Eesnomy, 1970-72 |

" otner grouns. On Ine pertistence of worker “economism,” seo James

1970 a) Ce
37 83 14
86 242 $8.5
13.0 30.0 -9.0
$129 1045 0 - 853 .
1629 1124 1287

“wag mul ag adversely affected, since workers at-
ternpled to keep factories going despite manage-
ments clfarts ta cease production—and the October
strike saw the emergency of “Industrial Belts"
(Cordanes) and “Communal Commands," which
tecmed to embody the.type of spontaneous “popular
power” that leftist theorists had spoken of as the
basis of a yenuine revalutionary class consciousness
to replace the materialistic “economism” that: had
Characterized Chilean workers until this time.”
When se workers seized closed factories, the plants
wre usually "intervened" by the government; so
that an Important result of the October strike wos a
. considerable expansion of the government-controlicd
sector-of industry and trade,

The most important outcome of the strike, how-
ever, was the dircct involvement of the military in
the Aliende cabinet. A condition of the settiement
of the strike was that the military take over key cabi-
net posts. This resulted most notably in the assign-
ment of the Ministry of the Interior to the Com-
mander-in-Chiet of the Army, General Carics Prats,
$0 a#% to assure that the congressional elections’
scheduled for March 1973 would be carried on freely
and impartially.

The involvement of the military ard the prepara-
tions for the March elections brought about a lu
in the escalation of political contlict in Chile. Inevi-

19 The Cordones were more of lets sqoatanenusly organized
Committees uf workers from seized factories which Coordinsted
Producion any dstinubun in a given imdusiesl area. Tag Communal
Commenss (Comanses Comungies) were organized By the Corsonet
to mob-nze the local population In the surrounding area. They
incinded representatives of Ne gn MOA! Committees {juntas ce
velinos), mutrers' groups (centros de macres), price control and
Pstidybon committees (juntas Je adaSie.ruENIO y precos), and

Petras, “Crile: Natonahzatan, Socweconomc Change and Poovlar
Participation,” Stud.es sn Comparative inte nations! Deveiogment
(Beverly Hits, Cal), Sering 197], 00. 2451, alsa available in
james Petras, Ed, Latin Amenca: Fram Desensence ip Revoluton,
New York, Wiley, 1973, Chap. 2. a

14-0000

-tably, however, it also produced political divisions

Rap Pa

in

AU,

_Symptomatic of leltist attacks on Chilean institutions, a Sacre wail goster denounces the country’s
“SSupreme Court as “Protectors of Fascist Sedition.” -

—Photo by von do Onis for fhe New York Times.

of the coxers of government-appointed Supply and
which had hitherta been | Distrituce-. Cornmittees (IAPS) to deat with the
relatively aloof from the process. of polarization. it | dlack-mareat * proe tem led the opposition to charge
was Soon apparent, for instance, that General Prats | politica! s:atupelation of food distribution; nonethe-
was willing to give the government the berefit of | less. tre government SEEMED powerless ta combat
the doubt in nearly every irstance that its decisions | black-mizret: operations.
or actions were challenged. Conversely, the Navy : .
was noticeatly less enthus iastic, and in January | ce mp pe
‘Admiral Ismael Huerta resigned from the cabinet Phe March 1973 Elections .

——

over plans for the initiaticn cf what he took to be |

& food-rationing system. It is now-also known that | The congressional elections in March did not re- |

the first plans for a possibie coup were made by | solve eryvririg. Chile's right-wing parties had hoped

Intermediate-level officers at the end af 1972."* | that food secrtages and econorni¢ difficulties would

Food distribution became a critical issue as d PIOCUCE 2 twvt-thirds Majority against the govern-
|

within the military itself,

black market continued to expand, with much of | ment, ance “ Ment in turn permit the impeachment
Chile's agricuttural production going into illegal | ct the Prannent, but the results, while showing
channels because of the government's refusal to | an anti-government majority of 56 percent, gave
Increase the official prices paid for agricultural pro- | tha Aviencs regime 44 percent—a larger vote than
duce. The result was, in effect, two separate price | most ceservers nad predictcd. The opposition
systems—a subsidized, state-owned distribution | pointed cuc chat the vote of the pro-government
system oriented primarily toward the low-income | forces naz ceciinea trom the 50 percent they had
groups and 4a flourishing black market aimed at registered ir: the 1971 municipal elections, while
middie. and upper-income groups. The expansion | the goverrmen: compared its 44 percent with the
. 25 percess scat Allende had received in 1970.

fact, tha amy proper basis for comparison was he

1ne New Yorn Tames (Now Yorn), Sept. 27, 1973.

ano


14.90000

|
!
\" neighborhood; a Socialist slofun on the cutsi

\ 1969 congressional elections. On that dasis, the
; te'tist parties had suffered a slight toss in votes But
j bad achieved a slight gain in seats. Certain opposi-
* Lonisls later argued that the Left would have suf-
‘tured much greater losses had it not. bean for a
fmyeernment-assisted electoral fraud involving some
790.000-300,000 votes, but the statistics presented
«-*@ support of the argument are unconvincing.”
i While the government's interpretauon ot tne elec-
i tans as proof that it was expanding iis popular sup:
- fet was Nat aecurate, the election results |
‘at at least it had not lost popularity 3s rapidly as
Stewous governments faced with similar esonomic
severses, Despite a wage readjustment ny October;
test wages had declined 7 percent in 1972, and cag:
_ hg intighon continued to consume the wake increase.
n catly 1973, However, the combination cf dis-

-¢nmastory distribution of government-arscuced

: Weds and appeals to class consciousness seemed to

——_—

i Nae teyeat at the Bavestigating Committee of Ine [oe

fea LAwl, feprosuced in Ine Libro Brancy, BS. 22039.
A ee wrere i 1973 omit the 2)-49-24 yea os BUD
ave teen 100 yOuNG 10 vole in 1970. 17e0 ONT Sed

1 et comity the mumber Of “fraudulent” voters estmaied wy the
ont

| apprehensive middle-class homeowners man a watchtower along a se

ated -

curity wall built around thelr Santl-
de of the wall counters with “We Wil Win.”

Photo by Santi Viral) lor Photoreporter®

' have stemmed the erosion of support, at feast amer3
the masses of the 920r, ,

Untartunalely for the government's longer-range
interests, the deliberate accentuation of cizzs
consciousness had an opposite effect on the midate
class, driving: middie<lass areas to organize them-
selves into “Neighborhood Committees” to defend
themselves. It aleo, for the first time, led many (9
arm themselves for a possible confrontation, which
scemed more likely ROW that the sataty valve of an
impending electicn was Ao longer present. A gov
ernment proposal to limit futt wace readjustments
to those making !ec¢ than three times the minimum
wage did nothing to reassure the hostile midcle-
income groups. ;

Before the elections, it had peen rumored that
there might be ancther attempt in March at an
accommadation between the regime and the oppasi-
tion ferces, possibly under the auspices of the
military. Any possible accord of this type was quickly
Prevented by the publication, two day after the
elections, cf a government decree calling for the
initiation in June of a single rational unified schcol
system, which would follow a common curriculum:
including compulsory Courses in socialism and work

a

14-0000

Allende irt

Actrospect

The ens uing “Uproar involved

periods in
the Cathe ©
sitlon to the
of seconds:

ferament and mobilized thousands
vo! students in violent demen:tra-
tions in dearavan Santiago. Stories of fierce argue
ments over the school proposals among the top
Military offcer. (the military had left the cabinet
after the elections) fillered into the national press,
and a Military delegation held a formal meeting
Ministry to express their -of.p03i
Geerzy subsided anty when the gov-
emment anrcunced that tne proposal had been
postponed, peviticg further discussion.

Withia the government, the debate continued on
whether ta “consclidate In order to advance” (the
Communist gition) or to “advance without com-
promise” (th¢ Socialist stance), One Indication of
how the dezzte was resolved was the decision by
the yovernmect 19 use a constitutionally-autharized
“decree of iszitence” allowing: the cabinet to over-
ride the rulirgs of the Controller General of Chile,
Hector Hurreces, who had disallowed the réquisi-
tioning of scere of the factories taken over during
the Octcter 1972 strike. Conflicts also continued
with the judiciery over the exccutive's refusal to
obey court c7cers to return seized properties. On
May 26, the Secrerne Court sent a pudlic Iciter to
the President cerouncing

.. . the iflega! attitude of the administration...
{Its] open ard continual rebellion against judiciat
orders... which signifies a crisis of the rule of law
(and) the imminect breakdown of the juridical struc-
ture of the country.*

The stalemzte between the executive and the
Congress over tre constitutional amendment on the
“Three Areas of Property" was compounded when
the Constitutics:zt Tripunal refused to take jurisdic-
tion over the ciscuted question of whether, in the
absence cf a ¢.ec%scite, the Congress could override
the Presiderit’s item vetoes by a majority or by a
two-thirds vcre.* A second constitutional conflict
along the sam fines developed when the oppasition
majority in Conz7¢ss voted in favor of an amendment
to give farms uncer 40 hectares. (about 100 acres)
in size an acse'.te guarantee ‘against expropriation

3 Udvo Blancs, 9. 215.
10 The term “ie sete” retiects (he fact that the Chilean president,
unlike nis US courtercart, Can velo OF Even Hewrile individual SECUICAS

of proposed iawn.

urch for the first time in formal appo- ,

ans {5 Long eh the ist tributicn ci lard in the,
formed” tector tothe peasanicy elfer a transitional
perits of two years. (Whe poveramerit had once again

$4 sfacphole in the 1967 law to portpone in-
7 the dishibation of evprepriated land by
ual fille, y

‘ation was mening into - 4 new
. The ene efiset that the gov.
ons had mace te hold th foemits refusal to
@ fuil costeotlEving ware increave to the €1
prounds that under
ied partial cost-

they had already r
Of-fratg increases-—led to a bn tyo-und-a-haif
ronin éteixe, which included a ficérs’ march on
and simuitaneous one-day
trikes for and ugainet the government In
By that time, Allende 1045 once more
ready to resort lo military Involverrent In the cabinct
to rete social peace.

Laser Stage—Decline and Fall

ee
On sure: 29, the last act of the Chilean tragedy
revolt by the Secand Armored
Apparcntiy, several army
units hed been in contact with Palsia y Libertad, a
right-wog political ercanization, and had planned to
seize Frevcent Allende at his residence and to
cctucy Ine presidential palace. The revolt was
canceled one day before it was to occur, but when
one of rhe cHicers of the Second Armored Regiment
wat affestes and bela in the Defense Ministry, (he
Regirrent ceciced to tree him and in the process to
seize tee presidential palace as criginaily planned.
General Prats, the Any Commander, used the other
Military erits in Sannazo to put down the revolt in
a few haurs—mast of which were spent in negotia-
nag—Dbut not befcre President
Allends nes gone on the air to urye "the people” to’
lake over aii industries and enterprises as a response
to the uprising of “a small group of rebellious mili-
tary men.” Tne Central Labor Federation also urged
the wirzers to cecupy the factories, and in one day
the numcer cf conmipanics taken over by the govern-
ment rese from 282 to 526. The “Industrial Belts”
that had sprung up at tne time of the October strike
Now achieved new impertance. The spread of “peo
ple’s power (peder pooular) had teen seen by
Allenae 23 a deterrent ta a possible future coup,
but it created many additional problems for the |

. .

56

14-0000

—— ronan pp nye peepee a ees TL ere ee
SE ee een ee tnenerets s poenannn eee Nhe eee ate ld panto nee came,

Aas OO Ree 5 cet

DERE 20 A PO ERP ASR RUE
3A Attempt fo overthrow the government
aod tnilitary intchipence was also aware
sion of arms training by all the govern-
a even the centrist Radicals.” In the
course of their Crackdown, the military fotind arms
cache: in factories In Santtage and Concepcién, and
the kite cf a worker in one such arms raid pro-
voked pretest; from the leftist parties,
paint, the Chilean Communist Party and
ig Church both concluded independently
that the crty solution ta the Impasse in Chile was
attempt at an agreement between the
Allende gi. sernment partics and the Christian Demo.-
rats. Tic Communists initiated a campaign against
Civil war meng. simultaneously with a statement by
the Chitezn hierarchy calling for a renewal of dia-
logue, Peebably in response to these pressures on
both <i tug lengthy discussions took place: on
. : July 31 between UP and PDC representatives. Both
| Workers in hardhats and bearing pitchtorks march | Allende a6 the Christlan Oemacrats agreed on the

, necessity of eaforecment of the Arms Control law, J

in Santiago in support of the Allende administration ‘ ‘ For |
during briet nationwide strikes by pro- and anti. ; bul di feesment continued on the constitutional
Marsist elements in mid-June 1973. ‘ reforninAscede offered ta sien tne arnendment on

: the “Three Areas af Property" in return for a con.
eraendment specifying that the Congress
ceerrida presidential vetoes of constitu.
| goveanment Production declined Sharply after the | tional 2 emerits by a two-thirds vote. He also
i Ukeovers, the opposition gat fresh fust for its C19 | proposed tablishment of joint committees to
; that the expansion of state control of industty W354 work out further apreements, However, the Christian
: tong carried out through extralegal Channels, and | Demnciets éencunced these proposals as “dilatory”
' “perter popular” —as expressed in the worker occu: | ang broke off the nepatiations.

F-1llons—appeared to sonie extent to pose a possibie | A few days before the dialogue was Initiated, the
| "reat of an alternative to the power of the central | truckers kegan another strike, which was to fast
» B%ecrament . from July 26 until the coup on September 11. As in
_ Alter the June 29 revolt, Allende made new effarts. | October, the truckers were joined by the other
"12 “acure military involvement in the BOverUneAL, | promics. Coming at a time when the 12-month
ar ; bt Ais negotiations with the armed forces were | inflation rate, fueled by massive government budget

1 “Msuccesslul."" Instead, they embarked on a pOlicy | doticits and subsidies to the natlonalized Industries

ot wRorous enforcement of the Arms Contrct Law, a} ang agriculture, had reached 323 percent—and In

! Peawure which had been adopted in October 1972 | a situation where inventories had not yet been built
- Bt cnly sporadically enforced thereafter. This ‘aw | up from the October strike—the truckers’ action

shorted any, military or police commanders to! created much maré serious problems for the govern.
«wry Gul arms searcties if there was “a Presumption | ment than the earlier strike. This new crisis once
. «tthe clandestine existence of illegal firearms." | apsin raised the question of military participation
Wha sight wing Patrig y Libertad organization had | in the cabinet, and General Prats persuaded his
fom announced publicly that it was going under. fellow commanders that It was their Patriotic duty

: - to re-enter the cabinet in order to settle the strike.

+O fee oat ating accounts uf those fegotistions aopear in Ercitia :
+ Mest, bo 1017, 1999, op, 7-10, .

“Pew hs 10048, 0.870 Ofica (Santiago), Oct. 22, 1972. By a »  MAllense's ferscnal todyguard had Organized Courses In arms
4 '¥'0 he tom Rad cme to Alinnce’s cosh in tne mast of tne Waning at fos vacaten rouse uetvide of Santiaca. Tne MAPU be fan
TOA Hee Once Hed the sucng susport of thea armed arms-traneng in Oecember 1972, ana ine Radicais dls so in Suty 1973,

i Oe NO O66 Comaned to SGN 1 desoite the Coposition ofthe The armes turces were amare of its al teast oy tne ens of duly.
"howe Cun we the ane, See documents in’ uaso Bence, pp. 43-45, 192-93, 196200.

57

OnE titers

| ~Wide World Photos | stitutions
Could cn

Bre

v ne,

FR Memes ee *

14-0000

Allende in Retrospe ct

Trucks stand idle outside Valparaiso, Chile on Scp-
tember 8, 1973, the 44th day of a paralyzing trans-
portalion strike,

—UPt

On August 9 Allende swore in what. he called a
“national security cabinet,” with General Prats as
Oefense Minister, Air Force Commander César Ruiz
as Minister of Transport (the ministry which would
ceal with the striking truckers), and the heads of
the Navy and of the National Police in other cabinet
posts,

Almost colncident with the entrance. of the mil-
itary Into the cabinet, the naval establishment be-
came Involved in a serious conflict with the left wing
of the Allende coalition. On August 7, the naval
Intelligence arm announced the discovery of a plot
to carry out an enlisted men’s revolt on Aupust 11 in
Valparaiso and Concepciédn. The announcement
accused PS Secretary General Carlos Altamirano,
MAPU leader Oscar Garreton, and Miguel Enriques,

| head of the MIR, of being the “intellectual authors”

of the revolt and demanded the lifting of the con-
gressional immunity of the first two, who sat respec-
tively in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies.
Two days before the September coup, Altamirano
admitted that he had encouraged navymen to resist
their coup-minded (goipista) officers.” .
This attempt to subvert the hierarchy of a service
command from below was combined with maneuvers

99 tt was an imiicatan of the continuing press freedom in Chile that
«easstands in downtown Chile at (nis time conta sea 2 left-wing
publication NesaLned, ‘“Solaers, Disobey Your Oft-cers," 6nd &
magazine of the axtreme Right with tne neagines, “The Rignt.ot
Revelion,” “Reteiion ang its Goals,” ans “Retistance to ihe Tyrant.”

by Allende to replace officers unsympathetic to him.
When Genvral Ruiz resigned “his ‘cabinet post on
Aupust 17 in protest apainzt nis lack of sufficient
power to settle the stris]a, Allende compelled him |
to add that his; departure from the cabinet “im
plicitly” carried with it his retirement as Air Force
Commander. This was correctly seen as an Allende
tactic to remove an officer opposed to him, and it’
mct serious resistance from within the Air Force,
provoking a series of actions which ‘ultimately led
directly to the September 1.1 coup.

On August 20, top Air Force officers met to ‘decide
whether to resist Aliende’s action. ‘By evening, Ruiz’
had persuaded them to accept it on the condition

‘| that: Allende appoint the second-ranking officer,
Genera! Gustavo Leigh, as Air Force Commander and |

name another Air Force general to the cabinet (so
that Allende could not repeai the same maneuver
with Leigh). The next night the wives of high-ranking
military officers, including. those of sia generals,.
gathered in front of General Prats’ house to present
a letter asking for his resignation. V/nen the cemon-
stffion was broken up by police tear gas, it pro-
voked such dissension in the armed forces that ‘on
the following day General Prats decided to resign
both as Defense Minister and Army Commander. He
was joined by two other generals who, with Prats,
had Jed the military forces that had quelied the
tank-regiment revolt in June. :

The resignation of what appeared to be the last |-

defenders ‘of Allende in the army now meant that
all three services were opposed to the President. It
coincided with the adoption on the same day of 3
“sense of the house" (acuerdo) resolution by the
Chamber of Deputies directed at the President and
the military ministers, drawing their attention to
“the serious breakdown of the constitutional and
lepal orcer.” * The resolution criticized the Allende
fovernment for repeatedly bypassing the legislature
through the use of legal loopholes and for refusing
to promulgate the constitutional reforms vco'ed by
the Congress. It accused Allende of ignoring judicial
orders, encouraging ilicgal seizure of property, perse-
cuting opposition labor groups, and supporting
illegal paramititary organizations. In conclusion, it
Stated that the listed actions constituted a “serious
breakdown of the constitutional and legat order of
the Republic” and urged the military ministers to
“put an end to the de facto situations listed above
which violate the Constitution and the law" or be

4* Lire Bianco, pp. 239-42.


14-00000

cuilty of “compromising tie national ond profes.
sional character of the armed forces.”

In its original form, the resolution ha! declared
the Allende government to be illegitimate, but the
acuerdo had later been softens in Order to secure
the support of the Christian Democrats. Yui its effect
was still to give a congrestional green. lint to the.
military, and Allende immediately so interpreted it.

of “promoting a coup d’ttat by askin: the military
forces to’ Make governinental judgacnts ‘Inde
pendently of the authority and dircction ‘of the
President"; he also pointed out that according to
{the Constitution the only: way that the Congress.
. Could decide on the legality of the Presicent’s con-
duct of his office was through. impeachment by a
two-thirds vote.!* ,

The congressional vate was echocd by several
Professional associations. The Medics! Association
called on their “colleague” Allende to resign—a
fequest that was echood by the Federation of Pro-
fessionals (CUPROCH)-~and resignation’ petitions
were circulated in Santiago. The Lawycrs’ Association
Issued a declaration vehich—"“without ‘attributing a
malevolent intention” to the Presicdent—asserted an
: “incompatibility between the institutional framework

and the actions which he feels oblined to'carry out
in hls program." Arguing that Allende “would appear
to be incapacitated (impedido) in the exercise of his
functions as he understands them,” the statement
SugRested that he could be removed from office
under Article 43 of the Constitution, which auttor-
ites the Congress to declare presictential incapacity.”*

|
‘The Coup

‘he Coup

eee

Exactly when the decision to carry out the coup
"was made is Not yet certain, but it evidently was
‘fesched in the days following Pruts* resignation.
j Whe armed forces had Contingency plans for the
; Control of vitat points throughout the country in case
1 Gf any emergency, and it Only required a sipnal to

She crment at mutitary men in at least sq caonet posts, as weil as

een coo v2 a aes

He replied to the motion by accusing the Congress |

within which he Is Supposed to excrcise his office. |

pyres Sys |

pul them into opération, sence the actual seizure of
control required bitte preparation, .

After the resignations of the third week of August,
Allende restructured his cabirict without the top
military commanders but stil retained representa-
lives of the armed forces in ministerial posts. Over

-the opposition of other PS leaders, he appointed as

‘tinister of the Interior his Secialict colleague Carlos
Briones, who was known to Le interested in another
attempt at accommodation with the Christian Demo-
Crats. The president aiso canceled 3 projected trip
to the Conference of Non-Aligned Nations in Algiers.
The: government and the opessition apain staged
rival demonstrations in connection with the third
anniversary of the 1970 presisectial elections..

On the weekend béfore the coup, the Christian:
Democrats called all provincial party leaders to a
mecting at which a proposal was adopted for the
simultaneous resignation of tre Congress and the
President and for. new. elections to resolve tha con-

‘Gen. Carlos Prats, then Commander.inChief of the |
Chilean Army and Minister cf Cefense, leaves the j
President Palace on August 15, 1973, after a

“AY umtenetrelary positions and as Keags:ct tne cniet govern: conference on the transport erisis.

Tete anurans Tre New York Times, Aug. 27, 1973, p. 12. .
Or Mercure (nternarionay Cation), Aug. 26-Seot. 1, 1973, p. 7.

59


14-0000

ne ee

Allende in Retrospect

are nee

recers of the Presidential Palace with his personal bodyguard en

Salvador Allende hurries through the corricc
the: morning of September 1 I, 1973, shortly before takiag his own life during the military coup aétat,

flict between the executive and legislative ranches.
During the same weekend, Allende met with the
leaders of his Popular Unity coalition and cated for
the holding of a plebiscite on his conduct of ofice.
Although this step was reportedly opposed by the
Socialists, Briones’ subsequently asserad that
Allende planned to announce the plebiscite in a
radio address at noon on the day of the cour.”
Meantime, after a stormy session with Aliende on
September 7, the military commanders proceeded-on
Sunday, September 9, to draft the text cf the

pronunciamiento issued on September 11. They did |_

not secure the agieement of the National Police
untl! early'on the morning of the coup itse?f, and
only after the fourth-ranking officer in senixi
taken over the position of police commanzer.
On September 10, Navy units set sail from
Valparaiso for previously scheduled manewers, but
that evening they returned tq port ana by early
morning of the 11th had seized contro! of that city.
Concepcién, the third-ranking city in Chile and a

47 information from the autnor’s cersonal interviews ean Fatrica
Aytwin, Jan. 11, 1974, and Carios Briones, Jan. 14, 1978.

48 Accounts of precour military actives adovar in The Cristea
Science Mon-tor (Boston), Sept. 17, 1973; Ine wai Street arn
(New Yoru), Sept. 25, 1973. Le Monge (Paris), Dec. 19, 3372 ang
Robert Moss, “Chile's Coup ang After,” Encounter (Lonanu, Yarch
1974, pp. 72-60.

—Photo by The Mow York Times.

known center cf leftist activism, was taken over with.
out a hitch, Santiago required a few hours tonger.

' To justify their action, the military. commanders
broadcast a communiqué to the nation. “hile ad-
mitting that the Allende government had initially

come to power by legal means, they announced that

it had. “falten into flagrant illegitimacy” by violating
fundamental rights, by “artificially fomenting the

‘Class struggle,” by refusing to implement the de

cisions of the Congress, the judiciary and the
Controller-General, by causing a critical decline in
agricultural, commercial and ‘industrial. activity In
the country, and by bringing about a state of in-
flation and anarchy which “threaten the internal and
external security of the country. " The coup leaders
concluded: .

These reasons are sufficient in the light of classical
doctrine... to justify our intervention to depose a |
government which is illegitimate, immoral, and ua-
representative of the overwheiming sentiment of the :
nation,”

At 9: 30 a.m., when it was apparent that no one
but the GAP, his personal bodyguard, was ready to}
defend him, Alleride broadcast his {ast message to

F
2° Ubro Bianco, pp. 243-49, : . 1;

: 60

14-00000

SE enor Beepapoanreced

admunistration to justify 4. course states as 3 pre-
requisite “the support of the Majority of the people.”
Allende ‘acted as if he had ‘that support; but even
at the highest point of his popularity in the April
1971 ciections, he never achieved it. Moreover, his
policy of deliberate class polarization, aimed at ex-
panding his electoral base, was more successful in
pitting professional and middle-class groups against
him than iin widening his support among workers,
peasants and low-income groups. :

2) Maraist economists and policymakers have
always placed primary emphasis on Investment and
the expansion of the productive Capacity of the
economy. By contrast, the Allende policymakers |
emphasized increases In consumption and combined
this with a headlong rush to take over industry and
agriculture—a course far removed from the “two
steps forward, one step back” of Lenin. The conse-
-quences of these policies after their deceptive Initiat
SUCCess were massive government deficits, runaway
. inflation, and a neaf-breakdown of the economy,
(The argument that Allende’s economic problems
were the result of a shortage of forelgn credit does
not reall hold water, since they were caused by
policies initiated before the foreinn squeeze ‘and
since, In any event, Allende's regime managed to
Securc enough foreign credits from Latin American,
European, Soviet and Chinese sources to increase
the Chilean foreign debt from $2.6 billion to 43.4
billion in tess than three years. Much of the new
indebtedness was to Western Europe and other Latin
American countries. Surprisingly, Chite’s debt to the
USSR, China and Eastern Europe Incréased only from
$9 million to $40 million between 1970 and:
1973.")
ee

#° Translated fram the transcript of tho tape recording of the speech
Published In Ricerao Boitard, £1 Ultimo Dia oa Artense (The Lact
Day of Allende), Santiago, Eauorial ae Pacifico, 1973, pp. 53-55,

10n Allende’s suiciae, see the. medical report in &% Mercure
(International Edition}, Oct. 29-Nov. 4, 1973, pp. 1 and 7. The
eyewitness testimony of one of tha Presiaznt's personal physicians,
who entered Ine room Immediately inereanter, Is published in Erciita,
dan. 2-8, 1976 pp. 10-13, Allento’s widow nas asserted tat
witnesses told her they nad seen odullet wounds In nis chest and
atemacn. A suppose account by 3 personal bodyguard circulated
in Mexico and elsewhere describing his murder contains numerous
factual errors ang describes events which Could nol Aare taken
Glace Because of Ihe physical design of the duilding. On this and
Many other myths of Lett ang Aignt concerning the overtnrow of
Altende, see Paul £. Sigmuna, “Altemie rrougn the Mytns,”
Wortdvew (New York) April 3974 pp. 16-21.

“! Secretaria, Comite inte-americano de ta Alianza bara el Progreso
(CIAP), Et Estuerzo interna y 1as Necesidades ce Financiamiento
Esterna.para el Desarrolio de Chie (Domestic Etforts ana ine Needs
for External Financing fcr tne Devetopment of Chile), Wasnington, OC,
1974, p. v-9, :

a Sere hast Sete STS VICES

p ople over the single pi . AHtende radio
Station that had not yet been shut down by the
military. He began: — 7 ,

-This is surely the last time that | will be able (to speak
“To you... .. My words are not spoken in bitterness:
but disappointment, In the face of these events |
can only say to the workers, “I am not Going to
resign.” At this historic juncture J will pay with my
life for the loyalty of the people.

Blaming “foreign capital, imperialism, and reaction”
for persuading the armed forces to break with their
tradition, he sald: - et

History will judge them. ... My voice will no longer.
come to you, but it does not matter, You will con-
tinue to hear it; it will always be among you. At the
feast, you will remember me as an honorable man
who was loyal to the revolution,” a ‘

At 11:00 a.m., the coup leaders permitted those
who wished to do so to feave the bullding, and—
except for his personal secretary—all the women,
rlacluding Allende’s pregnant .daughter, teft. The
Military also offered the President and his family
safe conduct out of the country if he would sur-
render. Allende rejected the offer. The Air. Force
then sent in Hawker Hunter bombers, which re-
Peatedly hit the palace with rockets and set fire to
large portions of it. Finally, shortly after 1:30 p.m.,
Allende decided to discontinue. the resistance, and
the members who had been with him left the build-
ing .in singte file, led by the secretary carrying a
-white flag. Allende stayed behind and, sitting on
3 sofa in a reception room on the second floor, put
!wo bullets into his head. The automatic rifle ‘that he
used was a gift from Fidet Castro." : a

eee
Conclusions , :
_
Since the coup, comments In the world press
1 fepresenting widely divergent political postures have
| eted the Chitean case as proof that the hope of
j schieving Marxist socialism through democratic
; Means is a'vain one, Yet most people have failed. to
tote two fundamental errors of the Allende policy,
Pawither of which was essentially related to the
i attempt to establish democratic socialism:
+ (1) As noted at the outset, the very quotation from
HEngels that Allende cited at the beginning of his


14.90000

Allende in) Retrospect
cE
Snecite aspects of the Chilean system also mage
the Allende experiment a particularly difficult one.
He was able to come to power in the first place
because of Chile's deeply-rooted commitment to the
democratic. system and because the Marxist parties
were able to mobilize a part of the proletariat and
the peasantry, and he had at his disposal many
instruments tor state control of-the economy which
had been developed by previous administrations
since the 1930's. However, he: was required to
operate within an institutional system which included
frequent ‘and: staggered elections, proportional. rep-
resentation, and a multiparty system which made
majority rule very difficult.and often gave veto pow:
ers-to the extremes of Right-and Left. The econoiny
had been characterized for nearly a century by 2
chronic tendency to inflation, and successive govern-
ments had consistently ignored agriculture in the
Interest of securing urban electoral support. The

most important systemic constraint of all, of course,

was the existence of a professionalized and insti-
tutionally-loyal military which was unresponsive to
the Ideological blandishments of the Left."

- The immediate causes of the military intervention
are apparent from the preceding account, In the last
part of 1972, the military were drawn into Chilean

politics by both sides and became as polarized as.

the rest of Chilean society—with the overwhelming
majority joining the opposition to Allende. The con-
flict over education in March-April 1973 heignt-
ened that polarization just at the time the military
were’atiempting to extricate themselves from poiiti-
cal Involvement. Then the expansion of arms
searches in mid-1973 revealed the extent to which
Chile was becoming an armed camp on the verge
of civil war, Finally, the efforts to subvert the existing
military hierarchy by a combination of teftist activ
ity among enlisted men and presidential. maneuver-
ing with promotions and retirements provided the
classis scenario for a coup d'état.

One can also relate Allenae's duticulties to the
inherent contradictions in the Marxist theory {9 which
he appeated.. At the same time that he proctained
his faith ina démoctatic, plutatist and libertarian,
transition, to socialism, many ot his Marxist. sup-
porters spoke and acted.on the basis of a belief In
the inevitability of armed confrontation, With his
knewledge, they armed themselves and—-what was
worge—talked incessantly about revolution. The re.
peated Statements of Régis Debray and others that
the observance of the rules of “bourgeois” legality
was only a tactic until the balance of forces had
improved was hardly likely to persuade doubters of
the sincerity of Allende’s commitment to democracy. |
When the importation and distribution of arms was
combined with efforts to reorganize education along
ideological lines, to sUbvert military discipline, and
to rearrange the hierarchy of command, It Is not
altogether surprising that the military finally took
action. : :

A positlve:evaluation of the Allende years would
certainly credit him with a sincere effort to ralse
tog living standards of low-incoma groups and te
involve them: actively in the determination of their
own future. It would likewise stress the continued
existence of freedom of expression for alt points of
ciew in Chile right up to the coup. A more negative
assessment would ask whether the low-income
groups in Chile genuinely benefited from an eco-
nemic poticy. which after the first half of 1972 pro-
duced hyperinflation, a continuous drop in agrl-
Cultural and industrial production, and a reduction
in the real value of wages and salaries. Even more
critically, one could inquire wha has suffered the
most in economic and in human terms as a result of
the breakdown of the Chilean systent—the Marxist
politicians, many of whom were able to escape or
£9 into exile, or the workers, peasants and slum:
dweilers they claimed to represent. who are new
paying the price of the Allende regime's mistakes
in the form of the hardships imposed by sharply |

rn F
reduced consumption and the strictures of dracon-

31 The Socialists atwavs Oolioved that Iney could convert the
military to ther Outionk, Inia is stokingly feveaied 1 Socialist Party
gocuments publisned in the L:D10 Bianco, Bd. 124-30.

ian military rule.


14.90000

!
'
i

‘aims, aithough the Cuban res
_ cadicalisation of party strategy.

Junqualiviea support to ths
:of Czechoslovakia in 1963. V4

SOVIET 4 AINSTy Loraica
15 Auguct 197b .

Kremiin’s Hand

in Aden.’ Ss Chile

by. JAMES THEDERGE

Why did Salvador Allende’s revolutionary gov-
ernment end in a blaodbath deszize Soviet sup-
port and the plaudiis of the werle’s lelt-wing
extremists, who saw In Chile a new poth for
_ Socialism’ 's march to power?

damos Theberge. who is. Director of the Letin

‘Americon Depsrtment of the Gesrgetown Uni-

versity Center tor Strategic ard: International
Studies, shows how Moscow, the Tig brother”,
though eager to explicit this opening in Latia
America to tha full, disagreed with Allende’s
heedlong methods, and while wersing him of the
growing. economic chaos denied him enouga
financial eid.

In 1925, Moscow diszatched EuZocio Navires,
a brilliant Peruvian Commun's arergsnicer, to Chilo
to implament tho “united front” ara “anti-fascist
populzr frent” strategy thar hed rep jlecad tho
ultra-loft strategy of the Cor-irtern. Since that
time the Chilean Coinmunist p27 generally has
followed a strategy of brsad aliianzs and fimited
sign fed lo

The Chilean Communist garty, one of tha most
loyal gro-Soviut partiaa jn Letn ANSI. gave

tig ita fortunes

‘havo shifted through the years <3 a result of
dornestic end intornational daveicomnects, it un-
stintingly supported the tis, sof Soviat
foreign peticy and repeates (.°o2c70"s tnemes of
anti-imapeariaiism and class wariue.

The party, at least price ta the military Inter-
‘vertion of Septenrber, 12973. wes the best organ-
Ised and strongest in Lsiin #merica. Esrwaen
1956 and 1969 it formad on cneesy alliance for
olectoral purposes with the Soc*ci:st Party, its
more militant Marxist rival co the Left. But in
1969 tho Communists dzcic sta mush more
broadly based ailiance of 4g forcas was
Necessary fer the transformatica cf the country
into a socialist state and ney gizved a key role
in tho founding of the Pozuier Unity Front (a
coalition of six leftist partiae) az the end of that
year, Aiter the 1970 electcr2t victory of tha
Popular Unity Front uncer Satvecer AM
Communis:s became tna s-e¢'a mest é

forca within the coalition. It + é for setter
Organised and discialined pe than its
closest rival, the mora idec!<3: sable and

militant Socistist Party.

The ultimate aim of the party did r.ct waver
Tre Commur.ists

throughout tha Aliande period.

“dictatorship of
direction. Their Sucre
Lobarea, mioda this cl
Hores (Santizco, Cdito i
which he deslarad: “Feet tis

Srsiet bloc invasion ~

“Ism to Se octal necessarily requires that the
prolotariat be Converted into the loading class,
into the determining social force”,

Tho Communist strateay. shared by Salvador
Allends and the “mocarate” wing of the Socialist
Party, was to “o-srthrow"™ tha bourgeois state
and constitution, using the legal devica of tha
plebiscits, '% an interview with. Régis Deoray In
1974 Atands aid: "As for the bourgeois state at
(ne present mormnant, wa aro scaking to overrcoma
it. To overterod il” (Régis Debray, The Chilzan
Revolution, Conversaticas with Aliende, New
York, Random Huuse, 1971 9.82), :

Mass seivdilisation, Infiltation of Chitean in-
stitutions and tactical alliances with tha coresie,
tion were 19 be amployad to generats sufficient
popular suger, Congress was to ba repizead bya

“popular assernhly” and tha existing legal system
by “psguler triounals.”” President Alienda’s
pistge to uphold the “Statuta of Guaraniees
(dasignad ta cormmit his government to preserve

Chite’s detmocretic freedams and instituting in

exchange for Congressional suprort) was siunply —

a “tactic2s recersity”’ to qain power, as he ex-

plained fater.

Tne Chitezs Communists and their allies. in’ _

Moscow were uneasy about the id2ological im-
plications of the via Chilena as advocated by
Salvador Allenda (Debray, p.119). The Com-
munist party refused to endorse the via, Chilena
a8 a uniguety Chilean path to socialism, which
impticd (hat it might not necessarily assume the
leading tale after complate power was gained by
tha Popular Uniry coalition, The -Chitcan party
supoorted Mgsece's dictrine of the via peciica,

which accezted {ree eluctions anc popular piural-

ign as a short-tercn tactical device under Chilean
conditions but aimed in the tong run at installing:
a Soviet-styie Communist dictatarship. The vie
eicitea was not 3s “pacifis’ as tha slogan im-
phed: it embraced all forms of class cenflict and
violenca shert of armed insurrection and civil
warin the gracess of establishing the “‘dictator-
ship of tre peeletariat.’

: Misteading Images
The via Chilena proclaimed by Allende scon
aiter his election was widaly misundarstecd in
tha West, The image that was oNicially propa.
Gated was thet of a uniquely Chi'ean path to a
nove tyoe of Manist humanist socialism, where
a hoernes, Ecenom.c plus ad fra
elactions were respected hy ail, Western ibersls
ware led to bébeve that the Allgade Government
was Constructing 3 mew Western-Eurozean type
of demaczuitic cociatism in Chile, This imase
ct tow tha reality of Salvador Allends's
eatunonary ambition to use Cniio’s pluraiist
denosasy ta dsctroy it. Ha seemed to Fave
ndoned the via Chlena tormuta during the ist
nig government. Not oniy cid. ne rarely

you 6!
34


14-0000

arploy it In Nis speeches but the importance of
preserving “cemecacy. Plucaham and fberty™
vers CONSpCUOUSTy Jose. _

Tha government's policy was very much to
Moscow's liking: severe of US invasiments, tha
espousal of the doctrine et “ideulenicai plural
‘ism (ralations A atl status regardiass of
fdaology and intemal setitica! Character), ¢icaer
tolations with the socie'"st camp, and the foster:
Ing of en “anti-imgerislist. (anti-US) front in
Latin America.

Under the Allende cegime, foreign policy was
reoriented, and the prevtcusly close ties with the
Unitod States were tsstaced by strong political,
economic and sciextife ties with the “socialist
Countrias,”” above ail with Cuba anu the USSR.
Tho first tip of tha Fereig
Almoyda, outside ot Latin America was to the
USSA and Exstern Europy, in May-June, 1971,
President Allende visited Moscaw In Decamber,
1972, Strong ideuie band personal ties linked
tho Chilean Com st party feaders with the
Sovlet party luadersyip and Salvador Allende with
Fidel Castro,

President Allende's description of tha USSR
as. Chila’s “big brother” (Aermano mayor) was
no more figure of speech but reflectud tha expect.
ation of hie government that the USSR would be-
come tho most imsertant socialist ally of the
revolution and the main econdimic bulwark of the
tegima, Moscow did, in fact. become the most
Important source af sociatist camp uconamic aid
and ercdits to the Posulsr Unity gevernment,
totalling $629.0 milticn (2756.5 million in short:
term bank credit and $463.5 million in project

-ald ond suppliar crecits) in the 1971-73 pariod®.

Tho USSR authorise4 $2€9.5 milllon ia credits
{$98.5 million in shortre:m credit and $162.0
milion In econamnic a!a) to the Allenda regime,
most of which was névar utilised. This was far
from the massive he!p Attends nesded, But Mos-
Cow was under no illusion that its economic co-
Operntion would decisively influence ‘the
immediate prospects fer radicat social and
economic transformation, altnough it no doubt
helped reduce Chile's dependence on the United
States,

Soviet influence expanded tapidly as a result
of the Chilean Coram t party’ loyalty to the
USSA and tha expansion of Soviet-Chilean
economic, technical, scientific, cultural, and
fisharies cooperation sade passibte by the
victory of the Commua's:-Sociatist regima. But
Moscow became increzsingly alarmed at the
deterioration of the z2ccnomic situation, the
violent clashes of the ulira-latt and the ultra-right,
and the growing organisation of opposition farces,
Particularly after the Posulsr Unixy government
failed in tha March, 1973, elections to obtain the
majority electoral support required to transform
eS
*See Deuso Esterna a> C. Tano V, Departamento de
Créaitos Externos, CORO, Sanvrgs. 1973, for full de-
toils, .

nm tAinister, Clodomiro |

the political and econcenic structure by peacatul,
Corstitutcnal means,

Nevertheless, Mescow wag nei
Vids the massive short-tesn cot,
acta (such 43 foodstuffs) or un
currency Credits -which «tha tes
fnence tho import of food, spate p
machinery 0 aiteviata local shortages
$39.5 milion in short-teriy bank ery dtits 735 NO
Goudt hotpful but pated into insignificsnce belora
the read 9 financa Chila’a imnore requirements,
which, fcr food alana, werd runaing at the rate of
stout $709 million a yoar when tho Allende
teyma collansed. Tha Soviet lgacershig told
Chitsan Communis: and Pogular Unity officials
what the main eort to Improve the beanzmic situ.
ation would have to be trade by the Allerca pote
ernment . Mescow repeatndly stressed that the
Popular Unity government’) must reverso’ tha’
calzmious decling in production and product.
iwity 10 have a chance of Winning over a majazity
Of tho Chileans to the cause ‘of socialism.

eee
Gd convertible
@ needed to
3s. and
oscow’'s

Refusing to give Alienda ‘the hard currency
credits he needed t9 improve his .worsening
chances for survival, Moscow contented itself
with organizing colidarity muetings at tome ond
adroad in the hope ther these cemenstrations
would “reach the ears of the Chilesn pecnic”
(Moscow Radio.13 August 1973), Alte “3's loyal
aby and “big brother” yaa willing to sell Soviet
machinery and equipment ta him—that is. exe
pane Soviet exnorts franced by tongerm credilsa -
—but denied him the short-term hard currency —
credits he desperately needed.

4 combinatien of circunatances — Moscow's
a3stty entanglement in Cuba, economic diificulties
et home, chertages of grain and foreign eachange
——ied the USSR to eschew mossiva short-term
aid to Chile and to counsel a prlicy of salt-help |
to the Allende reqime —~ a theme teneated fre-
-Guently by the Chiteen Communist party leader-
ship when referring to Soviet assistance. In the
final analysis Moscow weiched idly white the via
pesilica was destroyed by the disastrous
ecanomic policies, the circumvention of tha laws,
and the tacit ercouragement of the ultra-lete by
President Atlende and tha Popular Unity govern-
ment,

Moscow pursued a duat Strategy in Chile. At
the level of state-to-stste relations it acted
cautiously, adopted a non-ir erventianist posture,
and encouraged anti-Americanism ang independ.
ence from the United Statas. Since it realised
trat the internal balance of fo:ces did not favour
ime armed struggle, the Pogular Urity leavership
fas ere! to mainiain internal unity, reject the
“prove sailva and adventurous” overtures of the
uitradalt, avoid actions that might nrovake a civil
war or miliary irterveniion, adapta mera rational

conomic pciicy, and consolidzte the initia! gains
of tha revolution.

At the same tima, Moscow did Pathing to re-
strain direct Cuban invelvement in the Chilean
revolution. Protected 6; a friendly, Marxist.
daminated government 2nd its Marxist President,
Cuba wensporicd tarce quantities of Sever and
Crochesiovak-suaplied waapans ta tne nicest lett

. in Chile on the Cutan airiine and merchan: ships, ©


14.90000

Nalsa established a geereita training base and
oordinating centre In Crile, Tha tarce intatiig-
ency tearm in ‘he Cc cribassy in Santiags
ainnd Hints na ie NBeration movement

oa had clone tioa with
end other ruvolutlonary
them, with teaining, .2 arins

oxife Grouns, prov
ond furids for the armed strugyle in Ch. Ja and
other Latin Arnarican cou: tries. .

Revolutionaries Trained: .

Soviet ermy personnel very directly involved
in tha training of woreer sevuiutionaries lor urban
Querritta warfare. This oc
at El Bellotn, near Vatzaraizo, whera tha USSA
had installed a-factsry fcr tho’ manulactura of

| prefabricated huusing. ‘The firm (KPO) employed.

sixteen Russians, four ef whum were cayineers
and technicians: the . re

twelva officers instruc eS 2 herd-core of specially-
selected . worker-revolutviensrias in tha use of
arms, steect fighting. and urean querrilta’ tacties.
The Russiin-built factary vas Kept undir constant
surveiliance by Chile's naval intelligences. On the
morning of 11 Scptemtar 1972, navat intelligence
arrested te Russians and threa days’ later ex-
polled them from ths country*,

This clandestine involvement In training
guerrillas in Chile was an exception to Moscow's
Official line of giving full cunmport to the lagal and
puacelul a ta Sociatizen, Yur tha Sovint leader.
ship oparates on the prin
evontuality cannot be forescen it is botter tc take
advance messures which might “ccntradicat’’ the
official line than to be serry ster, In Chile there
clearty were some adva tages in having some
ormed revolutionaries ut di rect Soviet control:
Moscow veultd-be able to retaif some medsure of
Influence over the ultra-Jefr, particularly import-
ant in the event that this faction was able to seize
power. /s it turned out, Puss “united front’
tactics failed, and the armed strugg'e was aborted
by the Chilean military.

Soviet Industrial Espionage
Soviet Union made every effort to axiract
IM aCvantaze from its tachrical acsist-
ance programma, It as ez 46 technicians to
the naticratised cosper ivtustry to helo rise
productivity, all of whem were engaged in’ in-
dus‘rial escionaga. Thay were far more interssted
in gaining {rst-hand anseiecge ef the advanced
US mining equipment anc mainods of eparation
than in assisting Chilezn <evelogment. Anurés
Zauschquevicn, execunva vick-prasident of tha
copper cornscation, tai¢ me in Dece:ncer 13973
that tha scecialists curing their two-year stay
cant “buted nothing tothe imsrovement cf mining
13 ond wera mai in gathering
ons Of Amaricus wontent, obtaining
Info: mation en mining tathniques and organisa:
tion, and coltecting cata cn costs and procuct-
ivity. °
Moscow was also especially interested in

fisheries and fishery-reisted (oceanographic.

hydrographic and marina biological research)
Assistanca ta Chilo. Fisreries aid gave the
Russiun’s access to Chifzsn ports for its fishing,
Oceanogr: chic and other cascal =n mit

ad during 97273

; aining tasiva were...
‘Soviet army: officers, Af: urking hours, these ~

, avoidaneg of civil war or military con

fe that sincy every -

the Chileans with a Saviet maritima presenca,
The growing presence in Chilgan waters, arcund
the Capa and In cub-Antarct'c waters peovitied 3
cover for cathering imteHigencea and ocsana-

graphic data of use to tha Soviet havy.
The Soviet Union offered to suouly $300

_million in military equigrnent 10 Allentia in 197%,

tut the military refused tho offer and ceticed ta
continue to obtain arms from the United Siotes
and othar Wostern suppliers. The anti-Comrnunist
military wero disturbed by thy deecening
economic and political violence under ths Popular
Unity government, und were anxicus not to
yevanen their military ties with tha United States
‘end Wostern Europe by turming to tne Sovint
Union for arms. M-.scow hed hoped to establish

- gn important precedent for supplying arma to nan.”

Communist countries in Latin Amesica and furthor
wesken \vashington’s airaacy strained re
vith the Latin American military, Despite th9 Cool.

ness of oficial US-Chitean relations, the United

wtas continuad to mainiain friendiy relations

“with tha Chilean military.

The Kremlin was very much aware of the weak:
ness of the Allende ragims, Mot eniy ws it a
minority government {in 1970, 23% ang, ia 4973,
43%4 cf the olectorata supported the Poaular

- Unity coalition) but the armed forces 2nd cower

ful notional potica were strongly an: i-Communist.
Since the “democratic forces’ faces full
petitical and economic power, Moscow favoured
a Gradual takeover by the Commencts. and |
ovation
zt all costs. Beth the ultra-jefr and citra-right
ecponents of Allenda were attacked reguiay in,
the Soviat prass, But the Movement of the Hevo-
futionary Left (MIR), an ultra-left group thet pur-
sued tha armed path and hosed to cetsat the
opposition forces in a violent cantrontat’an, was
singled out for particularly scathing criticism, te
was charged with “ravolutionary advenicrisa”
oniributing ta political instability ane harming
the prospects of survival of the Poaular Unity
government, 9

From mid-1972 onwards, Moscow realised
that the opposition to tna Aends governinent was
growing and widespread. It was only tne shrewd
-and dilatory personality of Allenda—czilied in
maintaining a balance between the cisruptive
forces within his own governmnent—that hzid to-
eather the cisihtegrating f2tric of sosiety, Thera
was Soviet criticism of the inratidasl economic
menzgament, declining agricul.ural aad industrial
Grodustion, accelerating inflation, and the
worsening balance of payments. .

Soviet obsarvers acvised a slower tane-over
of che economy, nationalising the large firms first
but leaving the smaller and mediuny-sized ‘firms
2isne far tha time Daing. In the fast morins befors
tha military coup they save tise haaderitig on tha
yall and urged a censohdation of tna cocosomic
S2ins already achieved, collaboration with tas
capesition political parties fespecisily the
Christian Oemoctrats), and avoicance of armed

confiict. 4

*Eredty (Santiago), 10-16 October 1973
sntesinas with tha Chilvan mulitary high ¢

14.90000

Collapse of Sociatist ‘Modal’

The Soviet pcticy vis-a-vis 9 empha:
Coors ation in political late, thea ford of
on antiUS trent with Crile, Pera and Co and
siaa Of trade and aid reliiions while ra.
vig fron palemics ang. ir fer in Chile's
internal affairs {mainty th
the Ciitean Communist Party}. Tho Chitean Com.
munists vere given moral and, Maternal support
for widening the besa of support of thy regina,
but it rade no difforenca to the final guteamng,
The weasness cf the Altende regime, its fateful
internal contraci tions, Oficial conalvenos in the
arming end violence uf tha ultra-le!t, the Yéeimar-
typs inflation and tood shortagss, the growing
politicsl polarisation and violence, and thy fate-
ful elienation et the armed forces were the do-
cisive conditions that triggsred the coup d'etat
that fed to Alience’s doventall and replacement by
O militery junta on 11 Septernber, 1973.

and

Moscow was deeply disturbed tut not especl:
ally surprised, TASS acmitted on 20 Ceptembar
1973 thet the “Chilean experiaricn vias bitter and
dramatic,” and Fidel Castro cactared that he was
“vory woset by events in Chily”’ (the new miiitary
junta hed immadiaiely broken off ralstions with
Havana}. Moscow -suverod diplomatic relations
with Sartiago aad whthdrow its amtascacer and
embassy siatt Secause of alleged persecution of
Soviet oMiciasis hy tha Junta, Aline less then a
wes? in powe:, Chila’s naw mii fy Goveroment
begen to teal tha fult blast af Sovint Ainpleasura
and frustration, exprassed in a weil-orch=stratad
and sgusteined propaganda campaign ained at .
isotacing end discrcditing the regime,

Tre Soviet media accused the junta af “per
oocuiIN-y leit-wingers with unparalicled cruelty”
(bloseaw Redio, 13 Sapinnber 1473). There
were resorts in Pravda on 26 Septemiber raat “the
streais of Suntiage were flowing with bice4s” and
tho 6a¢.9 socke ot “tens of thousands of Chilean
democr2:5” Killed. Salvador Allende was altern-
Slively rezarted to have been “murderea in cold

WASHILGTON POST
28 August 1974

Argentine

was “the Persnist workers’
answer lo the enemies of
our class.”

A two-month ziowdown at
the Renault pliant climaxed

blood” cr to have diced a hero's death, resisting -
the rebels to the very ead. Allen's residence
was a @ to have been “wined of the face af
the earth.” The junta was shooting ot women and
children in an attemst ta intimidaty tha feople.
Or. 29 Octover TASS indignantly blared the CIA,
Chilecn “reaction” ang “American monopolies”
fer organising the military coup. And according
to-a Mescew broadcast even Leanid Brezhnoy,
not known for his devotion to Western democ-
facy, expressed horror at the “monstreus, com. _
pletely caen vidiation of a country’s censtitutien,
the uncéremonious flouting of tha democratic |
taditvars of an entire nation,”

The overthrow of the Allende government waa
@ bitter but not entirely unexpected setback for
Moscow's uniied frent tactics in Lotin America,
tnd had adverse reparcussions fer Marxist
parties olsewhora in the Viast, Communists and
Soclalists in France and italy who had earlisr ’
pointed to Chita as a mods! of tha peacctil trans-
itlon to socialism moved to disengage themsalves
from tho Ailenda disus:e: Instead of leading to
socialism, united front tsctics in Chila ushored

“In a period of unparalteted political violence,

ancrmous sutfering for -Chile’s workers and
middie class, and the worst economic crisls in
its history, :

Soviot cosigns for Chile to serve as tho van:
guard of tha anti-US front in Latin Araertca ondad

in a completa fiasco and lef: a deep impressian

on the non-Corimunist political partlas and the
armed forces in the region. I: reminded thom of
the grave risks of entering into an alliance with
totalitarian parties. Dospite protestations ta the
contrary, Marxist governments ara driven in-
exoraly to violate plecges to uphold tha con-
stitution, to destroy the private sactor af the
economy, and ultimately to install a totalitarian
dictaiorship.

rar rn ne cee

Authoritative statements of tha Chilean Comrauntst
Party's position under the Allence tegime can bo found
in Labarea’s Conelan 27 e139 and tuis Corvalan's,
Camino ¢ Victor, {Santiaga. 1971).

NEW YORK TIMES

ho

re spa
Mé anager
Murdered

BUENOS = AIRES—Gun. ©
men kilied the Ihor rota.
tlons manazer of a French.
owned auto plant in Cor.
doba yesterday, and Pos
dent Mana Estéla Peron
Spoke out scainst the recent
“cowardly and mercenary
ossassinations” jn Arsen:
tina,

The extreme leftist Prros.
Ist Armed forces etvined
Tesponsitisite for the . ath
Of IK A Renault offiesi
¢arda Goya, 55, sayin:

Monday with ocser of left
{ist leaders of the auto un-
fon. Workers hailed police
last night on the streets of
Cordoba, * _ .
Mrs. Peran, In her first
speech [rom the patace bal-
cony that her late pusband,
Provident Juan D. Verun of-
ten used” as
doclarsd:
“Many peonle tink thet
because I am a wocnan
cannot rule... but with this

frasile appearcnce | have
committed: myecli.” Her de:
r on of the oalitical
Kathe came ina sail ear.

lier sith, provincial -gaver-
nols,

a rostrum,

ro . 7 and ina . : '
SPARSE AUDIENCE isin 2's deeie
HEARS MRS, PEROW ane event wae marred hy the:
Only a Few Thoreand Atrand corbers'm "4 ie {30 antes

28. Auguse 1974 .
Arawn scares of thousands af!
Governmen's inouatieg, probe
northwest of whe camal,

Her First Public Ralty Earty thi
_ OS ified terre,
;lebor rela
Ry JONATHAN KANDELL  jRene: Car Mianue
Sremial te Tne Nog Yew: facturer~ in Conioba, as hel

27—.drove fi the main plant that.
evntee ef a. bit-,

BUENOS AIRES,
Only a few

A un. has heen int
JOMsts gathered taday ta hear ter workers’ at
Prosdent dab Mirboes co The krilias ¢
Peren, in her nrst pubic eahiv execut re, Ri
Sinve she touk afi yeary old, fou
the Riders got beiwer
Where bet tite buspail Gon, werner and


14-00000

sed an enotmous personal’ were urging Mra. Tenia to hatg!.

oo mevectunaang before here death intial major pon: tol

rt Peron. . [strengthen ber in the

een Gow pow (hat many think face of & meg ctivity
’ cen ute Lama woman, | labor evonomic

ae over heim,
Mrs. Peron, still dressed:
one of the lengthy Diack tocay’s
sea gne has conned since nouncers rer
nesband’y cath, “But Uf crowds were Cmuiltudcnous.”
two arms. and jin one znd at leas: one commentator
I have Peron and-in the spoke of “hundress of tous:
$ ard remorse Eva Peron.” . janes” of feopie on hand, But
OPO pe vane, s her voice cracked’a walk throch the plara com
UNZTESSIEN and > miliary wana enotion asd she shook her finmed that oniv ite street in
t eb arma, recalling gess-front of the & Government!
ny of het ‘speeches are enterded arms, revalingHHif house was filed. The camerast
a heavily faced ‘ain fete: tures weed bv Bva Perdn, 7of the televisio: stations——!!
de and Siugans vic4 bv Gen There nave been rumors infwhin have recently Been |
Ure faust Cires weks that con- *.centiy: brouent under state |
se Peronist§ leaders cortrob—favuseat oon trede
—— unionists and avoided pho.o-”

slize the dielrigultes
of petrateum peoducie,
now, Shell. and Faw su
eries had shared the Int
of oi] produrts with the !
Petroleu:n Company,

Assertion of Lead:

ment to tr

from that of poor tummout, af

felevising an-)
dothat the|

into nun
and meacer

jactent,
a wetepudher

of her spsech to ¢e
claita to lesdership oF
fonist movement, »
been in srowing disarray
General Perin’s death on

“Do not Cudt for a
that Isabel Perdn, his weer,
and discipic, wil

the coup d’

BALTIMORE SUN
28 Auzust 1974

[Forecast | is cloudy for

By GIO eek

Tain de Jancitn Bureau of Tae Sun
Rio de Saneiro—Oppesiien 18°
growing arainst the ¢
lion in office of President I
Bauer of Bolivia, But Ay
ided over whet

n Folance Gertinded i

ers ure
"Gener Langer will ert bis 6 :
tenure fc; . through vlec- ef memoe:

‘ved for neat year os r
grup nutned é

president, Rene B

‘|tlons pros
yor by the ueucl mecha:
transfering power in Ba

Last week, General ¥
celenratcd the t
fourth year in the pres

by dancing in the sire git. ;
© colcbr 2 out, “Were were reports of

the coup deat thal deprerd Cevension within the mili-
Gen. Juan Jose Torres Aage FY.
just 21. eit . Although Pre Bungee
| Even ps be was celebrating, feetived the per a
mi ing speeches part of Ine comunind.cs af th
durability of the Natics. ried services Seris: lass
'Pooulue’ Front--the ci 4's Kyte, it is evident to
‘military coatitien thre here. and from f ports
which he has fcoverred » they the andes
peworful  Eolisian | Siuners
Union ceclaied itself virts. ‘ pulicies.

at war with the resime. And: fy is beleved that the scung-
the Front appsreatly Was Gis ipe onicers are being alien
integrating. i ated increas! Pat
i This week one party he the gent. Speen
coalition, the Nutienshst Bohs. pis eetusal to pron

Y Gpp ure

THE WASHINGTON POST Weduesd’:

TENS
AH

spl Newieskl

Ry Sor
Byey bt Pe
ren bs a Cultuzat Revotuiien

sf ty Wall newsyaoers full
een CO or .

es
“3 eXccuted the unsuccess{ul coup
- agusst his government June 5.

nl, Bamadler |
the late’

iced Over the gresiaent,

iversily

Bolivie’s Banzer:

these officers whe plotted nd

A pemphlet was circulated
ry units ia
produced by
aificers who
iration from
3a Purtugel

* coup against the authori ari-

an’rezime there.

The piuinphict read. in part.
“Baarer’s repression against
his ova institution [the Aemy]
has persuaded those demo-
‘crane officers to fight beside
0% miners, workers
aed students,

Aner the unempted coup of
Jute 3. many ef the oGivers
were vilier jaied or
euile ty Paraguay

a. According 10
Nina, Nuany
se oilicers have been
ag to Bolivia clandes-'

+ mectings™ hang from tre

D. Peron, the A
pulist leader who
foe fenton Jul

urs

pewer wn
Awar meant a
ward serial

Stawly.
af The sevetomne
See 1 .

the defens> of the rev.
o'ution or quee Gen. Juan
CNUNC po
ied jaul-

eo walk past
rirns ty notice.
. behind the pos
people wt

_ One of the organizers of the

graphing the empty stretches '
i
yi was sues} |

Fally assemed U
cessful) consid that: only!
two unions=the light and pow:
ee union and the state petol-
eum workers—were supgesed :
to atlend. But he achnuwiedged>
that “Perdn woul never have
addressed sa snail a crow |
Tae chicf focus of political
finrese in the courtey has been
Cursona, the seond la Rest
city, Last Fe
wing palice coup, Spparently

backed by General Pern, re.

moved the elected left-wing!
Peranist goveraur tron power,

cated controt: of the local
Jaboe federation from lefusis.

Since then, Cérdoda has deen
the scene of repesiei incidents
of polithal vevlence. A fow
dass ago, the Labour? ty dade
vided to remove ideal rovers
tus four the feftssc-controtied
union af Ika-Renani—s con.
ceen with mined Argentine and
French capital — after labor -'
alied a stuke im sup-
Pp r wages.

The clas es with the police
Jast night resuked when offi-
cere reeved ta disiadse hor
leaders from tne uniun head-
ters, .

on

university asiministration

ani student buds. Peronist

Nish ceilings to the Moors.
ers ard columns are = Frotessars say Presi-
ered with posters that dent Maria Extela Peron,

the tsader’s widew and sue
a line
To ease
‘ul the
. This
be S contro
of Ruenos
: Aires—whese eudent body
7 Of ahacs
be far the larsest ins the
countty-—irom the Peronist
Iettws

90.00 wakes it.


14.90000

. versi

and Ru

The university, ga urban

campus with olf =

ganized alone
lines. Lieven separ.
ties. ike separate ¢:
educate iawyers, doctors,
agronomists am! liberal pro-
fessionals

tina's military gov
ernment, many parts of the
Separate curricula. were
shaped to American. models.

When the Peronists re.
turned to power ist May,
young leftist leaders loyal to
Peron were given the unl-
versity as their share of the
hew government. It changed
almost overnight.

Entrance
were abolished aud all high
achool graduates were of.
fered adinission. One year
later, 85. Woo Rew students
had entered and the enroil-
ment had doubled.

“There are su many pco-
ple now, it scems that even
the’ rats from the basement
take exams,” said a fourth.
year philosophy student.

Professors with cunnec-

Gions to the military govern-:

meni-or fore tn compsnits
were ‘dismissed. Fourtcen
were fired from the faculty
of cconumics alone. The uni-
oe off assistance
am? exchanse agreements

ity of California
ic and opened
Tew programs with universi-
ties in Peru, Algcria and

the Unive

. Mexico. -

Courses of study were
changed. Traditional philos-
ophy courses were replaced,
In part, by studies of South
American politicians 2:11
Peron’s tiectrine. In an in-
troductory architecture

examinations .

‘with the Ford Foundation.”

cused al!

ofthe e
and i fulluwed hy a discus
Sion of Ameriean imperial
ismiin Arcentina,

er we had Scomy.
a vear've had L

nEn's book Oi (An

in-

by Paul amuclson, ie
troductor
in the United States and
seme faveign — countricsh
Vhese graphs and
curves te prove that imperi
alism was neceszary. Oh, not

but subtly, you

-y
dean of the economics tac.

ulty, said dusinz an inter.
view. H[e explained that

there is now no single text:

hook for the twovear intra
' ductory course. but rather a
with 2 majority
of Latin Amezican autiars.
well as John May.
s—shows up as

not as the fart word,
The shift from studies de-

Sigaed te
lives for giant compaies to
a more penulist and na
tional outlook, Sbarra Mitre
said. is better exemnliticd
the course ‘ealied
ory of the Union Move.
ment and Labor Relations,"
which replaced a courze on
Personnel management.

It was not educational pol.

iey, however, bul pure poli- .

lies that turned the univer.
Sily duto a left-wing reduubt
defying the Veronist govern.

Ment. A basic university
law, laying down the rules

to Econninies *

t widely used.

idjal theorist, but.

produce execu.’

for Rurnos Afres and the
ert Giese eampuses of the
wnational versity system,
ese
with
sort from non-Peroin
The law embod.
be sic chanics that:
had begun at Buenos Aires.
Mevnwhile, a majority
faction in the | Peronist
yout inovement backed by
wn Ruerrilla sroups
fought the military }
governwent under Peron’s
banner, had made the uni
versiiy here their power
base. Ihey. proclaimed” a
fuvers Program that
smac} sartlly of “Mary. !
nand, in effect, ,
‘challenzed Peron for leader-
ship of his movement.

‘

“Lock, these people are .:-
anythin but Peronists,”
Gen. Verun said last Febru:
ary, when he first beyan try:

ing to separate bls move.
Ment’s youth wing from the’
leaders barn of the guerrilla
Movement who call then.
Selves Montoneros, .
“Before thinking about
setting organized. we've got
it can bo a true
Aand not a sack
full of cats who will srart
Showing their ‘claws pretty
soon." Seren totd leaders of
howins. He asked
them te reorganize them.

., Selves and expel the Mary. :

ists. “That's why this purifi-
cation is nscrsrary,” he said.

The purification Peron
-wanted has heen thwarted,
in parl-by vovernment relue-
tance to drive the whole
youth wing into open revolt
and in part by students

_ from the University of Bue-

nos Aires. Twice, since
April. they have marched
into the streets to protest
the aypyiniment of acw
deans and have furced the
government to-back down, :

.
1

A week oro they took over
10 of the 11 faculties in a
Move te hold ontu the tem.
Pourars. - university rector,

taal Las 2, a professor
‘of pharmacy who is toval to
the Montoncros. And, inside
the facultios, it often seems
as if one is inside Peron’s
“sack of cats.”

At the medical faculty re-
cently, students who stil

“proclaim loyalty to Peron

started playing the Peronist
marching song on a loud-
speaker system. A faction
that stands further to the

left put on the Internatio.

nale, the Communist hymn,
and tuencd up the volume
on their own sound system.
“The Peronists turned up
‘their volume, and So it went;
to ear-shaticring levels.

“Itisn't bad once you zet
above the secund floor.” a
professor of -neurobiolosy
said.

Slowly the university eri-
sis scems (9 be heading for
sume kind of resolution. A
weck azo, President Maria
Estela Peron named a new
Minister of cducation. He is
expected to name a rew
rector, Student street demon.
Strations have been quickly
and sharply put down by po.
lice, The same ‘demonstra:
tons were toi
Jate husband.

There have been some
hints that the government
will try te defuse thé crisis
by unraveling Persnist poli.
tics and the quarrel with the
Mentoneros from university
Paticies. © °
“We're waiting to see who
the new rector will be.” said
a younz professor. “That
should clear up something.
Jn the meantiune, if you're
thinkin: of building a house
in Argentina. get an old ore
chitect.” .

Fated by ber_

+

14-00000

, jj
; be
! Co
| ENCOWNTER, London : my

January 19Th ae
ea ; David Holden!

Mae © Allende’ ee
&t the Myth. Makers ms

oe me

: , AS IT MAY Si=M to say so when the
. | Jotoodshea of the Chilean coup dé:ot ip -

| still 0 keenly mmembered and the generals who
, Made it are ming unplecsuntly high, the. fact

““haemains dat Sclrador Allende diet a lucky

* man In fe he wes a failure. Both his policies |
: and bis country were shattercd Jong before. ths

cod But in death he achieved success beyond his
dreams. InstanUy canonised as the Western
world’s ®newest left-wing martyr, he became

: overnight the most potent political cult-figure

since £1 old friead, Che Guevara,
To some extent, of course, the conrregation

bad already, been prepared fot this-posthumous
" elevation. In the three years of Allénile's admin _
stration’ the “Chilean experiment” and the .

_ “Chilean road to socialism” had become fave

ourite topics of discussion among icf:-wing
groups in Europe, where Chile's supposed
resembiance to Tta’y or France had encourared

the telief that Purope might, for once, foliow in ~
_Latia America’s footsteps instead of the ‘other

way about. Many espiring revolutionanes from
Europe and the United States had actually
joined their Latin American counterparts in
Chile in euch the same spirit as their. dropped-
out contemporaries had hitch-hiked to Nepal

. oping for a glimpse of Paradise in action. By

the time of the September coup the military junta
claimed there were as many as 15,000 foreigners
of all kinds in Chile, actively supportings—some-
times with violence—the “socialist revolution.”

Davo Hope has pravelled in Chile on several
receal assigronents as Chicf Foreign” Corres”
pondent for the “Sunday Times." Among his

feguly contributions to EXCOUNTER are "South
African Wotrhook™ (August 1970), “Day Trip
to Zanzfar™ (September 1972) and “Ethispia~
Forty Years Ou” (February 1973). .

These specially interested groups’ or” indivi.

dash obviously provided a ready ostwork for
international propiganda in the aftermath of
Alleode’s death. But the shocked and, at times,
almost bysterical reactioa to the coup went Yar
beyoad such committed parties to embrace
many of the West's ordinary liberals and social
democrats. For. them, as much as for the self-
styled revolutionaries, it seemed, a bright light
of world-wide bope bad been extinguished in
Santiago; and from Washingtoa to Rome, via
Paris, Boon and Loodon, anguished cries of
“Foul! rent the an.

4

‘Ter ourcRY mf BRITAIN was typkal—and

instantanarnme

> Political Realism oe Revolutionary Romance ‘ wn

+e ee ee

Revolt 7 "Against the Ballot Box” tor which tho

Chilean armed forces could offer no cane
(The Guardian, \2°9/73), as a “Disaster in
Chile” that would “set back the cause of sociale
iarn and democracy everwhere” (New States
ran, 14/9/73); and as “The Death of a Hope”
compasable, even, to the Russian invasion of
Cycchotlovakia that ended Alexander Dubeck's
régime in 1963 (The Observer, 16/9/73), ”

Within 24 hours of the first, bare news of the
coup the General-Secretary of the Rritish Labour

: Party, Mr Ron Hayward, was eriting officially
to one of Allende’s former colleagues to say that

it was dificult to express the sense of horror and
anger felt by the British Labour movement “as

the aspirations of the working people of Chile— *

shared by so many others around the world—
are destroyed at the hands of a few arrogant and
ignorant officers acting at the behest of those

who believe their right to mule is Unchaltenseable” -

(The Times, 13/9/73). Me Leo Murray, Generale
Secretary of the Trades Union Council, expressed
his ‘shock and abhorrence with equal speed and
vigour, And Mrs Judith Hart, speaking as a

.» Member of the Labour Party's National Execue
” tive, ualzashed 3 torrent of assertions so passionate

as to suggest that her mind had come close to

- being overthrown with Allende’s government,
~They ranged from the declaration that “the

democratic will of the people of Chile” had been
defeated by capitalist “collusion” (The Guardian,
17/9;73) to “for Socialists of this generation
Chile is our Spain” and “Thisis the most vicious
fascism we have seen in generations* (The
Guardian, 19/9/73).

| Whea the Labour Party Conference met at
Blackpaol three eveks later these instant re-

actions had hard=ned into established orthodoxy. .
The former Chilean Ambassador in Londoa was -

given 8 standing ovation when he became the

first noa-delegate to address a Party Conference . |

since two Spanish Republicans were allowed to
do so.in the 1930s. Resolutions were then carried
utterly condemnicg the military coup and the
precipitate action of the British Government in
recognising the mijitary juota;, demanding the
recall of the British Ambassador from Santiago
‘aad the withholding from the military régime of
af aid, loans, and codices: and calling on the
Labour Movement to campsign for the restores
tion of demextacy in Chik and to offer financial
end other assistance to the Popular Unity
(Afiende’s) movemecat (The Times, 5/10/73). My
habeas, -

‘ oe

2 AM ILLUSTAATION of tha he’


14-00000

_ ttody, Probably thicy inciuded a happy oh

’ Fumiliar double standards were certinly ie:
* volved. Nobody at th: Labour Party Coaference,

the reawns for this furce reaction wouNS repay
oe of
2 matters

tining. Several of the suest fashions

of We-tero political protest had passat inw |

history or been shadowed by disiilus:
the year or two before Allends’s do "
Viet Nam and Greeee to Biack: Power ead tho
Student Movement. Allende's diarntic ens
supplied a new cause just whea it was wanted,

for examp!s, thought it nocesary to ask why
such a royal welcome should be ofcred to the

representative of a yovernment which had ine,

cluded one of the very few Commucist parties
outside Eastern Europe to approve tue Ruviaa
invasion of Crechoilovakia, A Paviovian ree
ponse to the very dca of “revolution” was. also

* early In evidenco—and made all the more eager,

ft seeored, by the fact that this particular revotue

* tion had been taking place at such a safe distance -

fa such sublimely forcign parts. Too waa
pethaps, a characteristic love of WorMily failure,
too—for it was difflautt to read some af the more
extravagant expressions of grief at Alfnde’a

death without sensing 8 touch of gratification at ©

the ktca that Good had once more succun:bed to
Evil and+ so“delivered another martyr unto
Heavea before he could bd corrupied” by the
practical damnands of iife on Earth. But most of

.all, perhaps, the response secmed to siem from.

Ignorance and wishful thinking—always the two
most powersul sources-of political romanticisa—

which left the facts of life in Allende’s Chilo .

either unknown or ignored and the feld wide

_ open, therefore, to the creation of instant myth

‘Heoce the composite picture, now acxpted

throughout a wide spectrum of Western lderal
and Jeft-wing opinion, of Allende os a yenuine
social democrat of impeccable consttatiunal
propriety who met his end at the hands of a
fascist conspiracy on behalf of a minority “ruling
cass” aided and abetted by the Unitnd States
of Amecricz.

To replace this romantic vision n with something
approaching reality may already be impossible,
for myths undoubtedly possess a life of air ova

* immune to rational challenge. To attempt to do

so also may entail sume risk of abuse, for it

‘geams to be a common assumption nowadays

that anyone who secks a rational caplanation of
a militry coup d'état (unless it happens to
represeat 8 Jeft-wing interest) is nevessanly a
fascist beast,
I sHouLD MAE¢rr PLA, therefore, that I am
concerned here with Aliende’s Chile and not with
what has taken its place. I hold no brief for
military juntas, nor for the siimmary executions,
mass iruprisonments, censorship or whatever that
the Chilean junta may have inspired or tolerated

during its early months of power. Indsed, because |

T happen to know and like Chile as a covatry and
count a number of Chileans among my friends I

feel some personal sadness at the cocaty’s .
present plight. But I feel no surprise nor, tan.

afraid, much more] shock. Military men will be
military men, the world over; and in aay case
Calle was Ieft in such a mess by Allends that
some vindictiveness, alas, was only to be expected
when bo fell.

Nor am I concerned with Chilean might-bave-
beens, I accept that the country predad ground
social refarm and J believe thatit, oo hs ond

23

+ own Politics, His certainly “so accident” that,

. party which has permitted its self-avowed

“have been achieved without violence ty a}
democratic goverment that was ready to work | a.

prapmatically within the con«tituues and with a ,

prOper respect for what the econosus and ;
political fabric of Chile would stand. i
But thatis not the point any more. What lam

conzerned about is how the country came to its.
present pass. And without wichins to speak il of i
the dead, it acems to me neces tary to aay outright :
for the sike of the living that the Chilean coup :
was largely Alicnde’s own fautt and that the myths {
1

’ with which it has been surrour.ced on the Left are

not mercly o falsification of Chicas Listory but .
@ potential danger to the future of Lberal and.
social democratic politics In the Western world |
as well, Indeed, what is most disturbing to me
about the fashionable Western reactions to events

ia Chile is their revelation of the decree to which |”

revolutionary romanticism has combined with ;
left-wing cynicism in recent years to corrupt our :

for example, the British Labour Panty which to
uncritically adopts Allende’s cause is also the

Marxists and utopian socialists to gain factional
positions of unprecedented power.

1 will leave others to pussue that theme, :
however, All I want to do is Lo try to sel some of .
the Chilean record straight—or at any rate,

_ straighter—by looking in some detail at Uree of. :

the main myths that now surround the ead of ~

Alleode and his famous experiment, . . :
i}

-- 1. The American

. Intervention Myth

HIS FOUND its most. virulent expression ia

the equation of Allende’s downlad with that
of Dubcek. Yet in the absence of zeny American
armed assault to compare with the Soviet invasion
of Cyeckoslovakia--let olore the fact that
whereas Dubcek’s Parliament supported him |
against the Russians, a majority of Allende’s

” Congress invited him to resign—theve were oaly :

_ Blereotype suppositions to sustain it

Io general, the American intervention myth
seemed to derive from that. characteristic Latin
_ American and left-wing scapesozt comp'ex which
insists that We Yunguis are resporsible for every-
thing (except, of course, anything good). Gar-
nished with historical fact (Guatemala, the Bay of °

” Pigs, etc.) this is frequenuy transmuted in Latin

American affairs into a plausible anti-American -
smear; and the state of Washington politics ia
1973 was, of course, guaranteed to give such &
(smear extra credence this time. The Mew Stater
man offered a fine example. “The likelihood is
that the trail will lead back to the Peztagon”, it -

" assured its readers, “if a proper investigation can

ever be mounted, Bat in default of this it does
seem possibie to say that Nixonisn ard its allics
were alseady too heavily, _implcated in the

2 Addicts of the ITT conspiracy theory eight Lhe i
to work oul, inadsmtaly, way ‘Ti ia Che was never |
then over by Alience, eved aller Lee potorious.
memezandum became publ propety. Was it,
pehans. because is operations ibere sere musily

jouing mency and Abecde Gd ot wast fo hare its
financial embarrassmcats? OF was it Wat ie krew the
com pany had peco ben as eZoctuive poutical suck to
bea his opponents wid acd be cid cot want toibrow |
& away by kicaing the comtany out? Escher way,
TIT's eppareat imc trom reprisal G5 Boe
_ suggest Wat be took as Chaccage vary acriously, ‘


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“uut‘even if he had, H might ‘not have worked.

To support Casto'e Cuba is Wierd to have
“cost Moscow the equivalent of rbout $1 inidion
n day for many yous To support a similar régune

1

In Chile would probably have cost even mvic, -

There was never tho slightest sign that Mr
“Yserhoev, or anyone cise ja Use Kremlin, was
ready to accept such a burden. :
To cum ug, then, it seems to me that tbe Idea

of an American conspiracy to overthrow Allende
Js both unproven and unnevessuy to eaplain his
downfall 1 am not saying, of cour, that
Washington was not rilieved to see hia £95
although I think some, American officials would
lave prefericd tosce him stumbizoaforsometims

Jonger in the hopo-that: growing disillusionm=nt

. would infect even bis stoutcst supporters and
accordingly diminish , the chances of his being
mado a martyr whea neniesis finally overzook

him. But io gencral the American attitude sccms.

to have boca o predictably cautious ope:

Thou sholt not Mill, but nentat rot sitive >
Offictously to Resp alivé.ace

A realistic Chilean government embarked oa tw

*s0ad to ccialisin” would surely have bargained

for that much, and (on a truly Marxist analy»is *
such as Altuve professed) itshould have expected -

much more—that America would moye:iafor the
KiU as soon as possible. Yet while adopting a

‘deliberately provocative stance, Allence took no |

steps to protect himself against possible American
seprisals, declined to compromiso for the 2ako
of other Westera help, and failed to provide
grounds even for his supposed Marxist fsicnds
to belp him.

It was magnificent, perhaps, Dut it was not
politics, At tho very least, Allende aust be
convicted here of a tack of realism that would
probably bave been fatal to any sijtesman opy-

where,

a . 2. The Ruling Class
. - Conspiracy Myth

pe Ficture of Allence being overthrown

by what has beco variously described as a
“revolt of the privileged,” a series of “bosses*
strikes” or o “coaspiracy o¢ tie taditional ruling
class” contains to many misconceptions that it is
bard to know where to begin to sort them out
One idea, however, secics basic to them all;
that Allende and his Popular Unity coslition
wére somchow the uniquely lesitimate repro-
sentatives pf “the People’s WiLL" That such ao
odd belief should have gained any curreccy
whatever outside purely propagancist circtes isa
( the confusion that surrounds the

mark 0!
. Chilean experience in the minds of many o0n-

* Chileans. To judge from published commeny,

such as those referring to the “defeat of ths
democratic will", some of Allende's sympathisers
abroad seem even to believe that he not merely
enjoyed a massive popular majority of te vote
but was also the first Presitcat of bis country to
do 60. .

- Yee the facts ave beyond dispute. Chile was
and had beea for mony years a functiosing
democracy with a constitution which vested
executive power in the President and legislative
power in Congress. Both is theory and ia practice,
po doubt, there were senous weaknesses —OS

revea’:d, for instance, in the inability of previous |
?:

pani lo pres Uwough docial reforms ea +
so wauld have wished.
systems wos the Best |

gove:
ally
But Ly oe.
and gut
aenabied /,

unsuc.:
it at bis Srosst mp in 1970. There was no |

doubt of 4 y of that victory. Hut, |
unfortunately for those who saw It as a URIQUG ;
ado of “the peoy
only Suc a nasroy plurelity in which Altends !
st over 364, .0f the poll. His nearest |
ty a couple of percentaze points tvhind, :
was the cacaidate of tie conservative National -
Pasty, abe members in Congress opposed ,
Allende from the start, Another 23% weat to the ,
third candidate, @ radical reformist from tho
Christian Pemocrat party, many: of whose ,
members In Congess at first gave Allenda the
benefit of the Coudt, oping he sould modify
hit avoved Marxisa in practice to a kind of
reformisin eompatitle ‘with theie own ideas and:
the existing constitution, tty .
In the mid-term Congressional elections of
Merch 1973, the Fopuiar Unity coshinoa raised
¢ of the wore 10 44% (althoush this ima :
ecitimacy” was suspect owing.to opposition ©
allezations of subsiautizs! electoral fraud). But ‘
the appocition panies rctained a large majority :
Io Congress ‘where, by Ut time, most of the
Qristian Demoornts had joined the Nationalists -
in outright anta2zonim te the President, On these
acts it eure plain thet, so far froin representing
“vie Teoole’s Wil", Aliende never, actually ro*
preanid mote than a substantial minority
Interest, Only if “the People” ae identified as
being tho, who vorrd for Altende, while the rest
—the majoray-are selesated to the status of

himself 19 coatest the Presidcacy |

_ “non-peopie™ cid any other interpretation be

wuitainevl Rut thzt, of course, is just what
Is implied by the myth of the “ruling class
conspiracy” ly

Jp niree was a “ruling class” in Chile ht was thas
of the politicians and the surrounding establish: -
meot drawn roo.uy from the narrow upper end of
Chiie’s prossarous middie class. Allende himself
and many of his tinisters and leading supporters |
were as much part of that proup as, were their
politics! opponents. Hut, ironically, ilwas a group
that often suTered Jes than others fram Allence’s

. pocialism because its manbers on both sides,

Ecberally posesced enuugh cash or property to
ceoxploit the black mmcrket at home or slip into
prrecable exile if things got too rouch—in any
case, to.survive (lize Allende himself until his
death) in very reavonable comfort, Rut the people

* who did most to overtbrow Allende were rarely

of this group at afl. With the possible exception
of some naval officers, the armed forces were
very much apart from the establislunent of any
political colour; and even after Allende brought
the service commanders into his government they
yemained eloof from, aod remarkably litte
koown by, thove relztively smal] cided ia Santiago
which were eccustomed to set: the country’s.
political tone, woes :
Indeed, 23 events since the coup état have
shown, Chie’s miliary men—tike their counters :
parts elsewhere —were probably as conie:rptuous -
of the politiciace (acd as igncrent of poulcs) as 8
the politicians were of them. They had stayed
outside politics for nearly 40 years, and if ADends

Areticn nid ik Bad

oa tefore be Enaily wool:

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14-00000

“keepers, ord virtually oli of Chile's ¢

. potators, ry lew chickens, ‘or even a side of tecf,
“et:

could make a good Living on the black t
even if hit ab wares remained sto
white inflation roared plead, The factory worker
who was cntitied to Muy a proportion of his
factory's output at officis al fixed, prices cauta

(and dig) geil that at sis or ten times whet Le hod .

paid as noon av ho bit the factory gic.
miners coud hardly find ready buyers fora -tolza
wuck-load of copper ore.* {!

Thus tho copper-miners were Uirust, in ef
into the suine position as the lorry-men, the >

ibut

professional men and women: they were left .

* more of lew defenceless against the most vicious

inflation tho country had ever experienced.

~ . q ,
Some aroLocits for Allende have maintaised
that the degree of inflation was exage of,

at any rate, little worse (han was'cus!
Ghile and eleewhere in Latin Amcrica. Tuc truth

is ‘that it was far beyond anything nocinalty ~

endured In that continent, As fittle a3 nine
months after Allende came to power, when ft
Lrst visited Chile, the exciudo had already falten

ary in.

from 20 to 40 spainst the U.S. dollar on the free,

of black, market. Eichicen months later, on my
eecond vi-it, the Govermnent’s own figuics put
the rate of inflation at 130% in a year, the noncy

fesue was going up by 10% a month and the.

escudo had fallen to about 350 to the black US,
dollar. By August 1973, the ofiicial inflation rate
was 323% and rising fast, and the ecudo was
worth only 2,000 to the dollar—an effective
devaluation in Jess than three years of 10, GOK!

“Nor is it cuough to attribute these catasrephic
yates to such adventitious er inalicious factors
es—and egsin J refer to published argumenia
falling world copper prices, the normal dif.culties
of maintaining industrial and farm outpet in a
tine of radical political change, of deliberate
American intervention...

On the last of thee three I have alrecidy said
enough, J hope, to shuw that it was (at from
decisive and that it ws,,anyway, largely self
fnvited. Aa to falling copper prices, the fact is
that after a fall im the first year of Allende’s
Government, prices recovered until by the time

- of bis overthrow they were 60% above the Ievel

at the time of his election. Had they not risea
20 steeply he would ulmost certainly have. fallea
sooncr aud probably would not have scoured his

aelative, short-lived success in the mid-term

elections of March 1973. The difficulties of main-
taining output jn a time of change, however, were
real—unfortunately, far more so than Allende
ever scenied to realise,

To take just two examples: copper and milk
Expropriation of the copper mines from their

American owners would, no doubt, have led in -

" Yself to the withdrawal of American technicians

as well as of American management with some
consequent risk of Josing production temporarily,
at Jeast. But this might have been overcome by
the promotion of trained Chilean managers and
technicians, of whom tcre was no shortage.
Alas, for Chile's national income, Allende not

merely nationalised but deliberately politiciged ,

” the mines as well. Jobs for the party boys were
handed out in thousands while trained Chileans
emigrated so that, after three years of Popular
Unity Government, mining manpower end costs
had risen by more than a third while ming

32

} Gr¢rative of
{ expwsted tas

 parmlud a hote ja
> fiz fan Ati

: Guzing milk aed ev

_ base.”

7a the wand erain it tesa it

we ia Pogue Unity |
aries “very

ak Cay.” Vero

a AM leswd
ak the F ret of Clie's
as4 orca way ty CO

Gaming, micht hace been
ware thorifall in Casry pros
of of two while te teething
ius erst. In fect, howrerer, milk
Ata Wo wneons bad exnpiy
ss bettonn of every cium in
Sarge Courerative Casy ia |
sain olk-prosucisy areas of ;

Teinsco, me oft

| Chite, the average daily winter iataze cf milk -
“wee shoul 9 US gallons in 1979. By 1973 it

was downto 7A, Pigs was this surprising.
Anazl from Ov fact thet legal Jand reform had

Lom seeompaniel Ly widespread at$ an.

clerked iMezal Jand teizures to thal ts many
farms were in the bands of people utterly without.

ergeriens, the priv etatlinhed for roulk—es :

for mot other farm products—were -simply
‘ecnpomie nenicir. Prevunably in the huge of

ooiting ball-a-quart cf ie for every chi14 on the;

» cheap, the government darocA that a gallon of |.
milk would fetch Iexs than half the price of one °°

7a. Inevitably, rotedy was interested ia pro-
were slaughtered whealezale
for ted evatly or emy—or driven ert Os
mountains to Arzertina while Alene was |

’ foseed to ecour the werid fur dried milk waports
test, thanks to his p2licy in the eapper mines,
2 no longer had flociga currency.to pay for, |

"Suc pouws were repeated everyshere as the

senaantic pestures of ecifatyled sevolatia were
presesred to facing tie fects of Uife, While overall

_ prediction in both azriculture and industry fell

Crestroutly, Allende cisuitancourly atte to
redistribute the natinnal wealth by givirg Cuile’s |
pooter dussen more money to epend, They were
bis consutuency and they were properly grateful, ‘
fur mzoy of then certzialy had never bed seuch
before. But you can't redistribute what yoo bave
albeady thrcan away; and as output vaniched, |
% Comestic queves aew Joncer, forsign Lebts
piled up, and the budzet deficit exparced Ike a
hydrozen balloon. A yees before the final ewiapse
J asked one of Alience’s chief economic adviners -
what they were going to do to control a sit-ation :
that was already locking critical. He replied, -
sith commendable canZour, that he realy cico’e *
koow, “I know,” he said, “what we ought ta Co—
we should impoce an austerity rézime tnrenrow,

" frecze wares, and ration essential supple. But

bow can we? We would destroy our own poltical -

Precissly. “In the end, rather than do thas they bo
pluozed on down the primrose path of promises j
aod iusions and practicDy destroyed the {|
country. The “ruling class conspiracy” was
the gloss that they acd their supporters pst upon |
(be sezlity of their own miscalculations, '

- i
4
4

3. The My th of the
Constitutional Revolutionary

ERE WE COME to the crut of Aflexte’s
policies and character about which, finally,

14.90000

“at tho other arguments revolve, Was he 6
genuine comtitutionalse? Was he a trust revolu-
tionary? Was he-—could he ever have been-—borh?

Allende hinne, ef coune, adinitted no
doubts. Repeatedly, he insisted that he was o

j Fevolutionary and a Marxist, and (hat he intended

to establish at Teast the precundinens for what
V he told Régiv Debray veut be “total, sclentific
Marust socialism.” Equally repeatedly, he pro-
lalmed his faith that he could achieve this end
by constitutional nicans, throuch the tallot box

J and all it implied. Taat was, after all, to be the

* Aistinctive.“Chilean road to wialign” of which.

‘so many people outside Chile cherished such

high hopes.

But no hindsiyht is required to ace thet ‘boi ” ‘

_theary and practice were riddcd with contra-

' Gictions, Revolutions are born of, or generate,
sectional conflict—a fact of polisic:id life that
Allende acknowledsed every tung he spoke of
“overthrowing what be ca 42 “bourgeois”
state, But a Comnmntic constiiuliun rests upon

- consensuy—a@ basic acopauce of the fact that
the State represents mare Maa ¢ mately sectional
Interest The second permins noun, but the fst
denies it; and there is no way of revonciling the
two.

All Alleade’s practical dificnltics follow sd
from this simple distinction. Taken seviqusly, his
constitutionsism =mrant. that his pregramune

_ could only succecd if a majority would actully

«vote for it Rut, elected as he was with oaly just
over a third of the pppular vote and with o large
majarlty of Congress arainst hin, Aliende had
neither o democratic nur an administratively

+ effective mandate for hic revolution. Indeed, in 8

' parligmentary rether than presidential demo-
cracy, he would probably never have been able to
begin. ‘ :

| Whe was to succeed within his sit-year term of -

office even in opening the door to revolution, let
_ alone establishing it as accomplished fact, he
had to transform his ininority into a majority.
But haw to do it? For, if words nent anything,
Allende's had to mean that he intended to replace
the existing, reformable constitution of Chile
with another that would be, of its Marxist
nature, irreversible. In other words, a system that
was admittedly democratic was to be used: to
build another that would be effectively dictatorial,
This was asking the majority to hang itself from
its own gallows; and, net surprisingly, it declined,

ALLENDe’S ATTEMPTS to overcome this basic

Wogicality in his position were precisely what”

ensured his ultimate downfall. Refusing to
abandon cither his revolutionary rhetonc or his
professed constitutionalism he was forced to rely

sleight-of-hand was often temarkable, as he
sought to outwit the opposition majonty in.
Coogress by exploiting the leuer of the constitue
tion, using every legal loophole to force upon them
: geasures they did not want But in the proves,
inevitably, he destroyed the constitution’s spirit,
so that his opponents became as ruihiess as he

CIndeed, as I discovered foe myself on a visit to
eouthern Chile nine moo:hs ater Au Jo's cchons,
loca} pabve forces there were under speuic instn
Bons not to attempt to mmtore he forms te thea legal
owners. Sor-aiso Kobert Moss's reportin Exquuntra,
Atiende's Crile”, Ausett 397), and Alntalr Horne’s

“Commandant Pepe”, duly 197%.

more and more upon political Masionism. His ‘

_- fenatding the nile of law. He had cut away the

was, At the start he won considerable opposition

support in Congress for needed ghanea The dhe

nalionzination ef the copper mines, land reform, ;
and (he state's takoowr of barca ant major i
Induttrie.—evidence Ut the democuatiz coos |
genus could and woul! work within the existing H
constitution, Bat, at the ead, not a single member -
of the opposition majority would cast a vole ia:
his support, They voted unarimously to conéemn. *
hig “habitual illegalities* and ware even joined

by the Suprene Court in accusing him of dis- :

middle ground of Chitean politics, arecked the
damovrate conensus, ond berotien the reality
of counter-revolution through his own addictios
to revolutionary Mogans. Lom
Equally inevitable was the ecooumic breaks.
down, which came from Allende’s attempts to ~
enlarge -hus popular baso outside the political
institutions. Here his pian was two-fold: to. buy
political support among “ine People” through
mastive Wore increases vad otber ber. dts and at:
Uae game tine to squecie the taidile class into. *

submission, of even Might from te country, :. - aa

throuph wholesale natienalisation of their Inter= *
esta ond the appoinunent of his own men to all.
signiticant civibservive jobs. The to sunply |

~ cancelled exch other out; for while the first part

+ of the plan raiscd vast new expoclstions and i

_ demands, the socoud diminished the counuy’s | .
capacity to meet them, The whusling tpiral of

inflaton foJowed os A necessary result of
Allende's political confusions. :

Tiere BASIC CONTRADICNONS Were compounded |

by the frecmented nature of Allende’s support. |
His Popular Unity coalition was fas fom united,
Iu majority element was Allcode’s own Socialist
Party—a body that bore litte seserndlance |

- beyond its name to most of the democratic

socialist parti¢s of Europe which 0 enthusias
tically e:poused its cause, It was, in fact, a |
revolutionary Marxist party that begaa as & 7
splinter of the more bureaucratic and Stalinist
Chilean Communist perty in the 19303, ond in
recent years had acquired 8 frery “New Lefv'?
wing 2s weil. Several of its leaders, like Senator
Altamirany, and many of its rank and file, cone
stantly uryed Allende to “speed up the revolution” '
without much regard for cansututional niceties,
The smallest clement of the coalition was the °
Christian radicals of various Pertuasions, some —
of whom hoped to offer a bridge to ie centre ©
of Chilean politics by cooperating with the Ic ,
wing of the Christian Democr.ts, but none of |
whan: ever attained positions of real influence, ©
The coalition’s sheet anchor was the Communist
Party which, as business and administration ,
slipped into chaoiw became increasingly im
ponant as a source of discipline aod strategic .

thinking. . . :

T WOULD Have BEN hard enough to drive
J this sroike anyway without either overstepping
the constitutional limits of government or ante
gonising one or other of its elements and thereby
jeopardising the only “democratic” base the
fevolution had. But Allende had also ta contend
with the atl more militant left outside the coalie
tion, lod by the Movement of the Revolutionary
Left (MIR), which insisted on revolution a0w,
and by vioience if nocessary—as, ip MIR's view,
it wos.

Hlese Allende’s professed constitutioaslism was


14-00000

me eee ete ne ome

r

°

tovealed nt,

the Arury to root oul eis para-military groups,
Whea thcy stignatied his Jand-reform pro.
gramme aos “inadequate” and eciced hundreds of
farens at pun-point he rebuked thom in occasional
_bpesches bul did nothing to reverse their actions.®

“When Ucy hijacked lorry-loads of valuable

crime. Whe Left-said this was because the MIR

< Allende dared not act. But the truth, T fear, was

“gnaipufactuscs, to raise funds by selling them: oo |
the black marcet, he rarély tricd to redress tho

- pt} teuly reprecnicd “the People” against whom |

; rt best cquinwonL Ile officially.
sepcted Misit'e violence, yet he nove permiited

° more squalid. For: one thing, the MIR bad close

“friends in the Sodialist Party and in Alende’s

own entourage hom the President did not want
“to offend. For another, as long as their activities
did oot actually split the Popular. Unity coalition,

‘ ft-was oftea convenient to sce them pushing slong

the revolution by unconstitutional means while
Allende denounced them in” his role es a
constitutionalist.

It was not as if Alicnde was unable to deal -

‘with. the MIR when he had to. For example,

whea a Miruia force blockaded the Philips

; television factory In ‘Santiago lin 1973 afier an

unsucces‘ful attempt to hi-jac’ ck a lorry-load ‘of.

, TY ets, they were allowed by the Goverament

to remain usmolested for ten days, although a
police post was just across the road. Yet when

. diplomatic representations were made by the

Dutch chargé d'offaires with the hint that his
country’s Lrsncial eid might have to be recons

sidered if this harassment of a Dutch eaterprize :
continued, the Miristat were hustled away :

* without a shot in aA hours.

es .
A mULAx EQUIVOCATION was evident in Allende’s
adoption of @ personal anned bodyguard—tbe

first in memory to accompany a Chilean President, -

It is true that the extreme. Right in Chile was
quick to threaten. violence as a response to
Allende’s proclaimed ‘revolution, and” Allends

himself always maintained that ke needed pro -

tection. But right-wing para-military groups were

pever as big or as highly organised as those on ©

the Left: and, in any case, the properreaction of a
constituionally-minded President would surely
have been to cal) upon his state security forces to

- protect him, .

Instead, Aliende formed a personal unit,

known as “the Group of Fricnds of the Pro .
sident.” Trained, armed, and party manned by ©

“Cutans, it was led by known revolutionaries,

+ sympathetic to the MIR, ‘including Alleade’s

son-in-law. The existence of such a group at the

very centre of the State was nol merely a prow -

vocation to the established security forces and an
affront to Chitcan tradition, it was also an implied

-Iejection of the principle of constjtuioaal rule,

Doves anour the real depth of Allende’s com
stitutionalisa were raised also by his personal

history and his language, both of which suggested |

Q@ ramante attache

ie wae

Mer ell, a founder and fins presicest of the :

Latin American Soiidarity Org. a, created :
io Mavana in the 19% 5 and dedicated to the i
encoursgement of arned insurrection turoughout j
the continent. He promised to “pai
with blood" in 1970 if Congress ccciined to !
ratify his election as President, and ho repeatedly j

: fried 10 intimidate the opposidon, inside and

outsides Congress, with tbe threat of civil war.
These were vot the actions or the seatimzats of a |

- "man dedicated to constitutional change, except |

asa matter of expediency.

Oa the ‘other hand, it was bard to sce Allende -
as a genuine revolutionary. He never looked !
anything but the complete bourgeois ccnileman, ;
A_boa vivewr, Corid but well-groomed, o snappy

°" dresser, with a twinkling eye fog the ladica and a :

good deal of personal charm, his stroagest -

-, political card was his skill in tactical manocuvre. |
- But as a strategist, a thinker, a man with areal |

messape, he was unconviccing. Towards the end,
as he appeared witb increasing frequency 03 the
presidential balcony in Santiago to” address |
chanting crowds of his supporters with revolue |
tionary platitudes, he seemed to'me to lose all |
contact with reality, to have become an actor is -
love with his revolutionary part rather than a
serious leader who knew where ke was going.

“In nerrosreér, I am inclined to’ think this was

always tho truth of tho matter. with Allcade,

” Basically, he was a political romantic, dealing in *

sensations rather than sense. He enjoyed his hour -

“upon tho stage but-he never properly assessed .

«the forces he was dealing with, either for or :

against him. He raised expectations on his owa

- side without commanding the nicans to satisfy

them, and he encouraged opposisioa on the
other side by his use’of a revolutionary rhetoric
whose threats he also could nog full :
At best he was muddle-headed; and time may
skow that he was deliberately deceitful. Certainly .
he managed to deceive a lot of people, including :
himself. But in the end reality taught its own, hard *
lessons. That you can’t bea dsnocrat and a
Tevolutionary—at least, pot in a socie.y that is
already admittedly democratic. That jou can’t
be anti-American and expect the Americans to
help you. That you can't pose as the people's

_ leader and kick most people in the teech, That

you can't conscript soldicrs into politics and
expect them to remain apolitical. That you can’t
have inflation roaring out of sight end maiatain a
base for social welfare. That, in shozt, the real |
world is not Cloud-cuckoo-land, Down here,
you just can’t bave your cake andeat it

It is sad that such elementary lessons should
have to be taught yet again at such tragic cost in

* Chile. But it is alarceing that so many people

elsewhere should evidently fail to grasp that they
are the lessons, | .
nH

Nome aes

Saaiago |,


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14-0000


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SECRET | 113-47)

14.90000

1

ft an oe
Tub bya tae |

a —
KULTUR 3

Allendes misstag

Den awvenskadebatten dir ensidig. Man hor pacett

Wt dekuaente
tan dear tgs
Chile, Bet ar vik
Tutveeklingenn. wee
aitystar uct

huppen.

Is canneler

~h

he t Chile f
har no acksa
och ckirda fasvism,

— Sabvindor Allomic ovh ““folkres
geringen”” Vnntad Coputar lodklig
enhety emoisdps nwt stead intresse
bsen uremlamis, Man skulle linth-

politisk demobrat? Kaa en social
“resolunon genonifiwas ined hevarad
politek demokan? +

== Polktrontens progam hade
{yea naturtillpangac, fraaist hopparn,
Zr obed takes pordeoformssivtet, ty
forstabgande av de stursta bank:
Och indastabicetagen oh snabl:
chonemiek tibast och Gniondel-
ning av inkemater oh becnogenhe:
fer samt hamp mot iatlationea,

.Koppar viktig

— Keppatn svatar fee upp til fyra
fenitedclar ay fantebs export ech
mellanen femtedet och en tredjedel
av sifantukterss. Under dion fore
fossta varkdskriget: givk gruvorna
Byer i neitcdam ask age, Palutet
ov 19s talet nationitivernies de till
halfien av den bristdeatoke
Ficisegimnen. Staten overt
procenl av“ abterna, Men

Freis
“chifeniwring’' av hopparn visade
sig slutfipen anda med tons for

de smenkiinks tactagen, Kappan
fontitligades genoar ort tillayy till
glundlaged LOD, bedgan om etsdtt:
ning GH de fem aanechanska
hiyierna hanskoits tit hogste satsrevie
sor --— omen Aliemie .och hans
fegering amsy att de inte hade rad
alt berala kontant erating i dollar,
“ee Jondbruket svarac for mindre
dn en fpindedcd av sysehatiningen,

vilket as nudes an ide fests
Isinamenkanska och aodia u-lan-
dhe Plena an antes

fone Allcmle cass demi
hestaikde att alla potdegentomar
osce BO “basnektar Mande tang:
sintenas. fen hasbektar = en bektur
forstiiassg Ronstiesattnad jor).
— Takten ij predrefonmarberct
Uhade under Alleades prosidenitid.
Under hans fiesta ar tvdngsinlistes
fastan fika mycket oad som under
bela den fdtepdemte sevdtiva presi-

demperinden, Alla stung jondegen-,
donmcy uppgass ha fonstatligaty
W974,

hn fulpt av pordreformen sar att
lantaibetarna vepanivciades Ea hlige,
ha anna var jordwhupationcina.
De ubude mo ganger revan under
Allendes forsta ds pamfort raed under
Freis id. Jordsgaina borpe ga til
motangrepp. ‘

— Produktioncn spink — dk
exproprersie gardumns bade inte
Lillrachligt med maskuns, tedshap,
Areatur ovb utside. Den sjunkamde

fillgangen pi isvencdel oh den,

stiyande chlerfragan bois tll fee
seqmingsproblem = awh plisste>
ghingar.

— I herpan genomlonde Alene
en tad atyatder toe at shapa on
Fannie fonteining av fommegenhe-

raat puta
fardom av utvechl
att hernia heiti-
nine tee
varje form av debatt om det som

ansiinder
jakande seme die pao sane lage sen jumtans.,
Andres Kiting. journalit och ferfatta

main avoctt

SUM

Andrea Kiing, journalist oth
forfuntare, aliger att Chile-de-
batten dir ensidig. “Det dir
, hanna keritivs
trum rar fel pa Allendes
tid anoars kan mit inte lara
sig ndgonting™.

avathe boesalfdrer Ovh hamstelng.
Ponningsar sjimk omed 103

- poweol,

+ Under nin vistelse Santiago i
borjan ay 197) var cobart enouret:
heerna i centrum cht par kyarlee
Jangs, beratiar Andies King.

Forlorade stidet

—- De chonomiska problemen
medidede poluinks problem. Allen:
ale Jorlorade medeliisens Mad och

“arbetarchbasens sidd minskade. 1

Longicsssaten behowde Kan mauris
Whos det osar en nddvamdigs
touting foe att hao skulle Kuan
fortsgttas aif pou HUE protean
toh sufte sina degar Han fick tart
44 pracot Makikainpon konptess
 parlamnent — president forlyatie,
Tugen wile ge vik foo den andre.
Altende drevs till dtgarder som inte
var forenliga med demukrativka
Principer och gullande bayar.

— Denaa ulvechling tyder pd att
vane figsok att mot Hertalets vilpe
ity fram en cutrem  palitk
micdiGn fisher fn pomrivcning aw
sonhallet wom bara skulle y
wWemokiinba oktaingun tf
groovy kloopabuik. vate sig a
tcoktonar eller revolutionat,
famkalls ca ubveckling mot cn
svialivtisk eller fascistisk diktatur,
honstaterat Andres Kung.

— Mea ings misstoshiliandea
och nusstag under Allendes tid han
am anJay sun ursdkt fie huppen oh
dot Bhalbud sag) sedan folate. Man
ben ho Ghiks  uppti
Atlenkesy polituk, mea wage sinn
denmkrat maste hanna assky for den
Aus atame nulitaryunlan.

han

Flitig forfattare
Aniys Kung i fadd i Gavle

pee

“ee
oD oe , eat eee
; ~ Fur LER? fay _ peat pnnlptieiNnilinend
FEMEON | meh eee g . ee . L. a! ce ee
. OO Tarr
** een » Ope ta fee She aa A — re ee ee on a
Le ae tee Wark, Wns, 225, —..Lfib--~
Lun a i a ae
ues a | Bote ee weer iene. a ween ;
Persad  efaays ton —
TONRENOSE May Ie nee gage

rn a PAC er spage May 70 Stage

rity MEWS og agg:

Tor Sheec’ se pats STI ome, Stet hago. '- -
wdtsn Bove ~~ a. . a7 tt Want
eI EGEN ot alten aNan tg ACDEES. Cala aTTention
TF NEROY Pee mes Bebe oN Cela ay SPEDISH JOURNALIST,
Tatas tnedes eG "SAS" MT ENTITLED "1a Som Soctacrgn

AND Fr AP agri ce el arny, SEAMS SN SUALLY Gal ANCeD, CONTNG
FAQ WOUNG Saice, Moe iS hot may Pe AEVIEW IN FINGI BM

SSED0S"*CaNGCaue Carle "TIP ACUSTALSOLAUET™, QLNGeownd VISETED

SMESE BEFORE, Soins any acres AVLENCE'S tices ABEL S tHe

SHEITS™ VEGATE on CHILE 45 “ONE*SIDED" AND ANALYSES Bw DETary
ALLENDE'S BOQ gNOMIC Pa.iCles aul tHe INCREASING  ¥ Caiticar FCONORIC
PREELENS UNCER ALLENIE'S Taaez vedas, AND THE CONCOMITANT.

PSLITICML PAO EMS Tat LES biLeNCe fo MEASURES WHION wang | “,

ay
>
.

“INCOMPATIBLE att ZEMOCSa GC PRINCIPLES any EXISTING Lause, Te
é MUNG NOTES Twat wargacssrye CoasS POLITICS, WHETNER REACT OWaRyY
um REvGLUTTONAge, can BRiny about a MOVE AGAINSY & SOCfacier- ree

OR FASlEST Ole rarcee™ gar, TE ADDS, "NO CONDITION O8 MISTARS _

DURING ASSENCE'S TIME Can Ge USED AS EXCUSE F082 tHE coup” ey
rhe 4. ae ess ter
CYNEF TOE NT Pag wee cae

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ACTION UNIT - .
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PERBOM UT NOTIFIED

: SECRET 43UING OFFICE 18 PAO

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TORI2716312 JUN 74 SAGO 29396

“SEC RE T 6745842 JUN 74 STAFF

CITE SANTI] AGO z¢396
TOs DIRECTOR INFO PARIS,

RYBAT HYSage

REFSt a, PARIS 46989( ..) 373442)
B. DIRECTOR 559514
1. STATION COKCURS WITH PARIS ASSESSMENT, TF ALLENDE ACTUALLY

DID WANT TO SURRENDER, JUNTA COULD ONLY SUFFER FROM PUBLICIZING

-- ‘ SECRET

FACT,
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TOL DIRECTOR IFC SauTIaug, putt WIM ee

_RYBAT HYSAGE Wicsi an

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HEF? GIRECTOR. 5595.6
“1, DEFER S&NTIAGS 7E PAAA 5 BUT WE FEEL THERE LITTLE TO 86

cm

“GAINED IN PSYCH TERMS FOR EUROPEAN AUDIENCE To ATTEMPT CLARIFY
WHETHER SLLENDE KILLED anILe FAGHTING UR ATTEMPTING SURRENDER,
YUNTA'S PRESTIGE SG LGW Iy EURUPEAN EYES THaT SUCH HAIR SPLITTING
WOULT NOT MAXE MUCH SIFFERENCE OR COULL ACTUALLY REBOUND .
AGAINST wUWTA SHUULD IT ExEnGE HE DIED WHILE WANTING SURRENDER,

2. SHOULD IT LEVsU2? TaaT FANATICS AROUND ALLENDE REFUSED

ALLOW HIS SUPRENCEA, THE THIS MIGHT EE AnQTHER STORY 9UT THIS

NOT CLEAR FROM REF &NDI ALSQ NOT KNOWN IF GaRCES COULD MAKE

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Se FILES /Sbe00he/3s 221°9387906, E2, IMPDET


14.90000

CASUAC ATION

SECRET

. ) PROCISSING ACTION

[MAEMO FOR INDEXING

_.._Chief of Station, Helsink! es ae wig
Nid, ~ . lon QUALNITO DESK
C/WH Division _—___ (en ese monks

a Ie EOF

Acting Chtef of Station, Santiago ~< ~

t,

“FUOMEN Psych

PTVONE REQUIRE RUTUREWLES rr ee in a a

Ref: HELSINKI 22455

If available, we would appreciate receiving four

copies of Andres Kung's book mentioned in reference. E2 IHPOET.

- 7
fs sat
OP et LE

‘Lestie H: BERRERIAN

%

Distribution:
2 COS Helsinki — 7@ ov FT Po. ol
2° C/WHO :

| RECORD COPY |

ROSS REFLRINGE TO | DISPATCH SYMBOL AND NUMSER Toart ~~ ~~ |

HCSA-28904 — _....3 May ¥978
(uaa LATION HOME NUMEE ny 5k
—_

SeEcREeT


14.90000

givin,

NETHERLANDS

CHILEAN REFUGEES IN NETHERLANDS POINTED OUT AS FUGITIVES

f4itorial by N. van ee age nhaysent Reformatorisch Dagblad,

Dutch, 19 April 1974, p

‘ .The Chilean refugees in the Netherlands seem to be
having adjustment problems. These rather prolonged symptoms.
seem to be caused among other things by the fact that they
still find it hard to accept that the socialist dream of
their Marxist president. is definitely over and that their
country is now being ruled ty a small group of reactionaries
who are trying to keep the people ‘under control through
terrorism, repression,’ and torture. Such problems will take
you quite a ways in the Netherlands and those idealists were
quick to take advantage of it.

Welfare

What is the situation? Most of the approximately
259 refugees with a high school or university education do
not.work. About half of them have been housed at the "Huis
ter Schie” in Gverschie, where they enjoy the sunshine on
the terrace or play volleyball in the yard. Board and
lodging are free and at the end of the week they pick up
another 25 guilders pocket money. In addition they receive
free language instruction, commuter tickets for the bus, and
compensation for each trip they have to take.

Do you get the idea that they are better off than:
many. old people in the Ketherlands? You are probably right,
because the Chilean exiles do not have to live on welfare;
they are being paid from the frozen funds which had been
allocated for development aid to their fatherland, Chile.
So you can see how well our tax money is being spent.

14-0000

Considering that this small proup of pampered exiles
is preaching revolution even here and with a full stomach,
{t may be.useful to point out a few facts. These are facts
which are well known in the Ministry in The Hague: but for
some reason never made it to the Netherlands press.

Facts
The great majority of the refugees are not even
Chilean nationals. They are natives of Bolivia, Brazil, and
Urupuay. They came to Chile as a regult of jlleral and
revolutlonary activities in which they had been involved in
these South and Middle American countries, the ultimate
consequences of which they did not wish to suffer.

They felt at home in Allende's Chile because Allende

‘showed sympathy for their situation. His first action as

president, after his inauguration in November 1970, was to
declare amnesty for all those who “were members of terrorist
underground organizations," those who during the last months
of. his predecessor's regime had been charead with bank
robbery, the armed robbery of self-service stores, the theft
of weapons from military arsenals, kidnapping, and | attempted

murder.
The fact that some of those revolutionaries received

Chilean diplomatic status was due to Allende's policy of
granting residence permits to this type of revolutionaries.

These refugees with a high school or higher level education

seemed to have no adjustment problems in Chile. As a result
they soon found their way to important key positions in the

eovernment.

‘The fugitives didn't ‘suffer any sleepless nights in
Chile either, because they felt protected by a militant
Marxist army, armed to the teeth. Some 10,000 revolutpnaries,
from all points of the compass, were at their disposal.

Definition an :

In the Berner Ta eblatt, a Swiss newspaper which
is known for not exXSEeTatI"Es Dr. Marlo Puelma, from the
University of Freiburg, wrote the following: "The concept

of political refugee . is only of limited value when applied.
to Chile. Whatever ona's attitude toward the military junta

14-0000

may be, One thing is certains the Chilean refugees were not
pursued only because of thelr ideology, their status, or . P
their origin. This is the traditional, humanitarian defini- : |

tion for a refugee. For the most part they aro pcople who,

‘in their own country, could be legally charged with crimeg

which are puntshable under any judicial system. .

These rafugees carried out activities in Chile which
were against the constitution. As a matter of fact, they are
specialists in violence. Thiga in why they sought asylum in
the foreign embassies in Santiago and why there are so many

foreigners among them."

8463 .
CS01 8014/2087-w

14-9p000
b

“egtcuiney

brates

Franciaen heeft
anuckendigd tly.
@ negera zulien
em gefoullleerd

“hel spoor tw ko.

fden op coettan-
3 Mf maanden,
fen| zonder pare
hetltrattatr near
“montage ts su-
Herling san ver-
laringen,

i

' te jain belond,
thetere verhou-

acu het*

AD islechtas dat

in partif- steer,
Bresintevs onte
dere |communis~
dee init tical feos
Rooen  vriend.
Roefnenié ver-
an mening over
miiltalre Lend-
téermanneuyres
‘a het: Ruasische

Het} Amert-
no buftentandse
fag ekpeurtver-
urd erarhtens
dochteronder-
grote) Amert-
drieken, auto's

Cubs. Deze
waarsrhijnitjk

et

2 de organisatie
en tegen Cuhu!
mbargo

1 eerOD Oe ey nore:

-

V.S.-economie. _

- Toopt terug

WASHINGTON — De Amerinaanse
we Nest dondeniag heaend Ee-
460 Gat de nationale ecurumie Veol
rch tig. PCunKelopen, da het ecp.
Rwart van dit jaar, dan was
Seoacht Prigzen Stegen tevendien
Met mover dan tien Procent,
“Urt brute natinale
Wandente in het errste &
On taur-perventage van 3.0 Vit ts da
eerste keer ninds 1970 dat het brute
TAMA produkt (a Seonivderd en
betas de scherpote duling In 16
De ver: odering van het bruv fn.
fale prouuat met 3,6 Dioeerit
Verseleaen worden met een ochs
Van tussen de my A precetit, goa
ie door de re DR Wak geclasn. din
het laatsie kwartaal Van tiet vorig
J8ar nam het brute Rationale produxt
loc niet 1.6 procent.

- MINISTERS KRLUIGEN HUISARREST |

~ Ethiopische leger wit :
. scherpe verwijten

ETHIOPISGN LEGER

ADDIS ARYBA — Premler Enial-
kachew Malkwcoea van Ethiopié heeft
donderdarc MeaArodeemaakt dat do Ie.
den van de regecing die elnd februurt
door de sind&rachten gedwongen
werd af te inven. huisarrest hebben
egen;

iswhe radio heeft
oop ¢en bijeens
A®eba van rond 2.000

+ De pres
kemst ont-

Makko:
komss ta 3
Officteren
mier sou ns
boden sun on
hem hadden
Gedwongen pa,
er niet anme.
ters went an: con .

Het leger verwik de ministers dat
ai} het laid in xa ecosomishe chaos
hebben pear cick op onweltige
wijze verrijkt bedden ea na hun af.
treden hedren xamrengezworen om
Verdecidheid w Rasica

PLANNEN

Makonnen £2? 2 v2 bijeenkomst
een uitewenee vier

dat het leger
t te grijpen als
~Y& teZen de minis-

van de tuch?
land in de m
zullen komen
huisarrest v
ters beken2

Liberaal

Kennedy aan
het weoerd

hem de vraag werd pesteld waarom
een arme Ethlopiér die ren brocd
heeft gestolen, onmiddellije de ge.
vangers Ingaat, terwifl de ex-minis-
Ners die ernstige. misdaden zoucen
hebben begaan, niet voor de recht.
bank worden gedaagd en naar on-
eehindent! op straat rondiopen.
Makennen zei dat er cen commissie
's benvemd die een onderzork net

Insteen naar het eedrag van de
Voormalge ministers,

POLITIE

In de stad Asmora heeft de Palitle
bekenceemsakt dat 2if geen restine-
Werk meer zal Verrichten, omdat
Cle tar ota)

& Shibeshi, nfet ts ingewil-
orts hebben de 1.200 spuor-
Wermannen die woensdag In Making
tijn eeeaan, de vrachtauto's tegennge-
houden die goederen van Asmara
Buar de haverstad Nassawa zouden

brengen.
Arbetdsonrust
in Canada

OTTAWA — De posterijen, het
oammeiele luchiverxeer en het
schrepvaartverkeer op de St.-Law-
rence mv in Canada zijn vertarnd
door een staking die het land dage-
lijks enkele milioenen dollars «oat
De arbe:taonmust duurt nu al meer
dan een week en zal volzens de Ca-
Radese pariementaire oppos:tie de
Livlatie,
Procent bwiraag:. bevonteren. |

Door wrhie stakingen is ie
aile wetkantoren in

kevelge van
Lolw ane

e mewnentee! jaarliixs 10
helft

Brslui a
tebtastan

Chileense luchtelingen |
nd oachtinen od anpaeel
problemen te hebben,
tangdurige Ve
Mermeer  veroorsaakt * tp worden
doordat 2t) het Tog osteeda solet
kunnen verkroppen dat de socdaline
flache droom van de Marsisthehe
President definitter vaorbl ls en dat
hun dand nv Beheert wordt duor
een Rlelae arocp teactionulren die
met terreur, onderdrukking en fal-
terlngen Probeect het vot onder deo
dulm te houden, Met to'n tange vole
sin hom Je cen heel cind in Ne.
deriand en dit hadden deze Idealls-
ten al gauw in de Baten,

VERZORGING

Want wat-is het Reval?) Werken o

doen de meeste van de onKe Vere 250
viuchtelingen van middelhane en
unlveritatr niveau niet, Ongevece:
de helft van hen is ondergebracht an
het .Muis ter Sehie= in Overschle,
waar rlj op het lerras genicten van
de zon of vollesbal apeten in de
fuln. Kost en inwoning sijn qrails
en’asn het einde van de Week van.

gen «lf ook nog eens Vilfeutwintle [

fulden zakgeld. Daarbll krligen aj
ROK grath taalcursussen, fen eit.
tenkaart voor de Mis en en vergoe-
ding voor elke rely die ei) moeten

maken,
o_O

Door
N. van Niauwenhuysen

U vindt dat aij hes beter hebben
als menig Nederlands bejaorde?
Waarschijatijk hebt ou Relik. wang
de Chilcense  hailingen hehoeven
niet van de distand te leven: yf)
worden namelijk gefinancierd door
de gebtukheerde Relden voor ont.
Mihheliagehuln gan hun vadertaned
Chil, Zo stet uo maar hoe goed ony
belaiageetd words bestead

Dase dit tv de watten Kelegde
Rroepje bailingen selty bier nog wet
voile maag de revolutie predikt is
het miiase bo muttig enize feiten te
focmen. Feiten die op het Ministerice
in Den Haase welbcekend aijn, maar
om de een of andere reten nooit de
Pers in Nedertand halen.

: FEITEN
De viuchtelingen hebbeu voor hes

OVergrote deel niet ceas de Chi.
teense nationaliteit. 2 gin afkom.


14-0000

} .
- Me OF
; fof
: .


14-00000

GEA 2. DA. Arner teaurize
senotar Felward Keanealy be

de
BRAVO ver
neerden van se Ad

rereorebeg tat

Shen het georkil
fuscen Halli on lavie over de
togenaninad: gone BO leo guides) van
Tibat ve ert. Reunedy oo nveride
het geen fuende reden dat ce cae
fening nlet kon wonten. afvelast san
dat ae al verscheddene maandet, te-
Voren in voorberetding waren fener
hy Amerik senator be
rdug: na cen besvex van rte
Ujdens hetwelk hij bespre-
) vuerde met onidet ineer pre
sitet Tito, naar de Sov ;
Aeargerciad. Hij i .
Wtruk” te etn

rt het Zutdslavis

vefeningen

lijh halfrond
—_

ver Cuba

en donder- |

sn vniniaten
" Hrond in
yenadigd op
golgend jaar

PA van Het wes-
Hexteo-stad twee
gar had sich niet
suw iy de prul-

Aijk veker van
yigde Staten i
zn in verle-
qvragen  amtrent
bijeenkomst te
snkainst wordt
node organisutle
in op vrijdag In

EMBARGO

Afue waarmee de
Rhomst hebben af-
gy over Cuba Ke-
hts economische
Maneden, Niettemin
wememers dat het
Fguitaat van de
Raiington fs, dat de
Feld tijken te zijn

erika en de La-
eden gebleven te

B vs_s afschaffing
mmeringen maat

Minister Kis-.

nalaten te yoorkamen dat de invecr
ult Letfijns-Amerika nog meer, tes
beperkingen . onderhevig wordt ge-

vmasnl

AY werknemers acharste anal
2 owanrep het
went vecrsecht de Canadese ps
te boveetien, De werkremers Ww
fen osteljen, maar de ey
te onderhandelen wetist ie
dereen weer aan bet werk is
139 loatsen op de St-Lawriye tte
vler, die voor alle acheepvaartversee?
gergen tussen Montreal en tert
2ijn alleen week In staking amie
een enmiddeliske lomaverheg
gen van 27000 tot dH.000 aT
jaar. De regering heeft hen Wo
dollar geboden over cen perusie VRo
drie jaar en sockt momentecl naar
mogelijkheden um de kasisen te
dwingen het werk te hervatten.

Ook het luchthaven persaneet erst
loonsverhoging van fund de SOW fol-
Jar. De acht greetate Jaehthavens van
het land hebben de afseloyn werk
op halve kracht erkt, Ven
dreigt cen staking van de yverkoern

ders.

Trak krijg

| parlement

RAGDAD — Irak krijgt voor het

 eerst scdert de revulutie vin Lt eet

volksvertegenwoordiging., Het presi:
diom van het ..progréssleve nationale
front” heeft hlertoe bestoater ia
donderdag bekendgemaakt, Wanacer
de volksvertegenwoordiging ‘er kent
en of die tot stand zal komen voor al
gemeno verklecingen, ts nog nict be
sloten, In Bagdad staat een xtmot
gebauw voor cen nationale vérgatc-
ring maar het {3 nog nooit gedre
De soctaliatischa Baas-partij

ode
cummunisien werken samen in Ret
Drogressieve nutionate front. |

GOUDPRODURTIE ACHTERUIT
Grote onrust onder

mi jnwerkers

in Z.-Afrika

JOMANNESHURG — In de afgelopen weken Is moord en doodstag’ in de
Zuldalrikaunse goudmlinen onder de zwarte mijawerkers tot cen rorgbarvade
omvang Uligegrocid, Ve Jongste balans van Dlordige stamtwisten tussen gast-
arbelders ult Lesotho en de Xhoaa’s in-de goudmiia Carletonviile, bY Johanoes-

burg, luldt; en doden en drie en zureig gewonden, :

De meeste slachteffers waren grue
welijx verminkt, Slatpplastsen wer-
den vernie!a, met ine overgatien
en in) brand gestexen, Viuchtende
mijnwerkers zijn volgens ouggetusgrn
duodgeschoten, .

Tienduizend Baatho's hebben sinds
rj hun we in Zuide

in de
naar hun veilige becyachtige vader-
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In het Chill van Abeade vechden

1Y sich shuly omdat ARewe dearip -

toonde vour han gedras. Son eerste
daad als president, teen Bi Ut no-
vember 1970 geinstalies’ was, be-
sond namelifk ult hee stiendigen
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als men weet dad de nsecing van
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gerleht wae om Juist: wereaifaver-
cunningen te geven saz dt type

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FUOMECN PSYCH
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TG "a nen Pu PUBLISHED ~S90K ON CHILE BY SWEDISH JOURNALISTS

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SWEDISH-LANGUAGE DAILY "HUFVUDSTADSBLADET™, KUNG-*WHO VISI
CHILE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER ALLENDE'S TIME~-LABELS THE
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ALLENDE'S ECONOMIC POLICIES AND THE INCREASINGLY CRITICAL ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS UNDER ALLENDE'S THAEE YEARS» AND THE CONCOMITANT
POLITICAL PROBLEMS THAT LED ALLENDE TO MEASURES WHICH WERE
"INCOMPATIBLE WITH DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND EXISTING LAMS",

KUNG NOTES THAT “AGGRESSI{VE CLASS POLITICS, WHETHER REACTIONARY

OR REVOLUTIJONARY, CAN BRING ABOUT A HOVE AGAINST A SOCTALIST

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CLYE HAMBURG 24795 (SWARZCHILD ACTING)

TO: DIRECTOR INFO BONN, SONN BASE, SANTIAGI~
FUOMEN PSYCH CASPECIAL
REF: DIRECTOR 549262
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AND REACTIONS

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HOV 1 1973

MICROK 1LMED

TEREST AS FOLLOW-UP To REF

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CUBA AND CHILE ERUPTED INTO A BATTLE OF

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INSISTED THAT LATE PRESIDENT SALVADO

SAID 'CASTROISH" MUST TAKE A LARGE PART OF THE BLAME +] HEAD *

AST NIGHT. DISRUPTING A LATE SESSION OF THE
IGHT OF THE DISTURBANCE: CUBAN FOREIGN

THE CHILEAN REPRESENTATIVE A sony? OF AU

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MITTED AND REGRETTED AN OFFICIAL FIGURE OF SS\ DEATHS IN CONNECTION

SPECTED HUMAN LUFEs

WHILE ‘Li CUGAs FIDEL CAST

WATCHING OF EXECUTIONS BEFGRE THE FIRING SQUAd YALL 4 TO WHICH HE

EVEN INVITED SOME OF THE DIPLOMATS+--'

y. "AT THAT POINT ROA ROSE FROM HIS SEAT AND DASHED DOUN THE
AISLE TOWARD THE ROSTRUIMs SHOUTING "FAG"
INSULTS AT GAZANs IM SPANISH. OTHER CUBANS FOLLOWED HIM. NICARAGUAN
SEATED It FRONT NEAR ROSTRUN» ROSE TO BLOCK THE CUBANS-

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DELEGATION»
OTHER LATINS FLOCKED TO FRONT OF THE HALL-

SAID A CULAN SHOWED HE WAS CARRYING A PISTOL IN A CONFRONTATION WITH

PARAGUAYAN AMBASSADOR FRANCISCO BARREIRO+ «+»
S. " U-tie GUARDS SUARMED 10 JHE ROSTRUA AND THE CUBANS DISPERSED.

ROA RESUMED HIS SEAT LATER. FIVE LATIN ANERTICANS CANE TO me ROSTRUM

LATER T0 CALL THE CUBANS "GANGSTERS’ AND CHALLENGED THE RIZUT oF A

DICTATORSHIP TO CRITICIZE THEIR GOVERNMENTS -
"HAS ONCE AGATH SUNK TO HIS USUAL LEVEL OF GUTTER

U.S» ANBASSADOR JOHN A-

SCALI SAID ROA
VULGARITY---THE OUTNODED VITUPERATION OF AN EARLIER ERA."

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PRIORITY GRASILTIAs HEXECO CITY» CARACAS MONTEVIDEO» TOKYO.

TO:

THE HAGUE’ ROME. CONN. HANQURGs PARIS. LCPIPLT, LONDON QERN TFS

SANTIAGO. 0
 RYDAT FUONEN FUSRACLE co \\

J. SINCE CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER'S APPEARANCE BEFORE UNGA HAS
RECCLVED LIMITED PRESS PLAY. BELIEVE .FOLLOUING MAY DE USEFUL TO
ADDRESSCES FOR BRIEFING LOCAL GOVERNMENT. HEDIA AND OTHER CONTACTS 7
WHO MAY GE INTERESTED IN CHILEAN SITUATION. MATERIAL IS LARGELY a
OVCRT, THEREFORE NO OBJECTION TO ETS USE BY PRESS ASSETS SO LONG

AS STORY ROT PAS sed OR USED VEROATIN. a ; , \
a ON FT OCTOBER CHILEAN FOREIGN MINISTER VICE - ADMIRAL TSNAEL

ce

HUERTA APPEARED FOR ONE AUD ONE~ HALF HOUR PRESENTATION BEFORE -UNGA
TO EXPLAIN CFACTS WHICH ~ORLIGED ARMED. FORCES AND POLICE TO TAKE

CCHTECL OF THE GOVERNMENT and TO ESTADLISH A REGING OF NATIONAL :
; . . i
RESTORATION, AND TO CHARGE THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD GECONE VICTIM :

OF A "HOST FALSE. MOST MALEVOLENT. MOST VICIOUS AND VER

\: can “ey,
ORCHESTRATED CAMPAIGN.” .
ye
3. HUERTA'S SPEECH STRESSED THAT nue pin REGINE HAD
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BEEN STEERING COUNTRY It DIRECTION OF A TOTAL ITARTAH TAKEOVER
TUSTIGATED AND SUPPORTED LARGELY GY CUBAS THAT CUBA INTERVENED IN
CHILEAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS WHILE SECRETLY INFILTRATING ARMSs
INSTRUCTORS AND PERSONNEL FOR PARAMILITARY GROUPS! INTENDED TO BECONE
A "PARALLELTARNY TO OPPOSE ARMED FORCES’ THAT CHILEAN MILITARY ACTED
ONLY AFTER FAILURE OF ALL OTHER EFFORTS BY PARLIANENTs JUDICIARY s
PROFESSIONALS AND WORKERS TO BLOCK DRIFT TOUARD CIVIL WAR “AND CHAOSs
HE STRESSED THAT HIS GOVT IS NOT POLITICALLY ANGITIOUS AND ITS GOAL -
IS TO SET CHILE BACK ON ITS HISTORIC PATHS AFTER GOAL ACHIEVED» "WE
WILL NOT HESITATE TO RETURN TO OUR BARRACKS AND TO OUR SHIPS.”

4G. HUERTA ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ALLENDE REGIME, THE FIRST ELECTED |
MARXIST GOVT IN WESTERN HEMISPEHEREs HAD AROUSED ENTHUSIASN IN
MANY, BUT "IT IS ONE THING, GENTLEMEN, TO EVALUATE A FOREIGN
EXPERIENCE FROM. AFAR. SEATED IN COMFORTABLE ARNCHAIRS OR IN DISCUSSION
AROUND A WELL-SERVED TABLE. IT IS QUITE ANOTHER TO LIVE IT." HE DE-
TAILED A HISTORY OF EVENTS OF LAST THREE YEARS, POINTING ouT THAT
DESPITE AGREENENTS BY ALLENDE REGINE. LATTER NOVED TO UNDERMINE
EXISTING JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL MACHINERY OF COUNTRY». ATTEMPTING DO

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OF ART AND SOE DISGUISED AS GIFTS FROM FIDEL CASTRO.

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WAS HARASSED, THERE WERE TLLEGAL INDUSTRIAL AND AGRARIAN TAKEOVERS 4

FOREIGN AGENTS. SENT PRINCIPALLY BY CUBA, HAD SECRETLY BROUGHT
ENOUGH UEAPGNS TO CHILE TO EQUIP 20,000 MEN. HE DECLARED THAT
SOVIET-NADE STDEARMS, MACHINE GUNS, ANTITAUNK GUNS ROCKET LAUNCHERS 5
CAHHONS AND EXPLOSIVES HAD SEEN SHIPPED IN -- SOME PACKED AS WORKS

5. AT ONE POINT, TO SUPPORT CLAIM OF CUBAN INVOLVE NENT. HUERTA
READ TEXT OF 29 JULY 1972 HAND- URITTEN LETTER FRON CASTRO ADDRESSED
TO "DEAR SALYADOR.7 LETTER ASSURED ALLENDE THAT CHILEAN UORKING
CLASS HAD 6EEN FOREUARNED AND WAS "READY FOR ACTION" IF HIS REGINE
WERE THREATENED. HUERTA SAID THAT LETTER CLEARLY DENONSTRATED -
CUBA'S INTERVENTION IN CHILEAN POLITICS AND HER SUPPORT OF THE

"ILLEGAL METHODS” OF THE ALLENDE REGINE-
be IN VITRIOLIC REPLY TO HUERTA, CUBAN FOREIGN NINISTER RAUL
ROA CALLED HUERTA "TRAITOROUS EX-NINISTER OF ALLENDE AND SERGEANT OF

GOEBBLES." SIMILAR LIES AND DISTORTIONS OF FACT CAN BE FOUND IN

DATE:
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ON TO GIVE SUBSTANCE TO HUERTA'S CHARGES BY ADMITTING THAT CUBAN
CUNS HAD IN FACT BEEN SENT InTO CHILE BUT THAT THEY HAD BEEN SENT

LETTER TO ALLENDE WHICH HUERTA HAD PRODUCED’ ROA SAID THAT THE ?
LETTER WAS NO SECRET.
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PROPOSE USE REFS FOR FUOHEN. PLEASE ADVISE CONCUSSENCE AND

3.

CAVEATS +
2. FILE: 4S-124-S2. £2, INPDET+d

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TO: IMMEDIATE ARGENTINA, LA PAZ. GRASILIAy BOGOTA, SAN JOSEs
SANTO DOMINGO, QUITO. MIAMI, GUATEMALA CITY, GEORGETOWN, PORT AU

PRINCEs TEGUCIGALPA. KINGGSTON, MEXICO CITYs MANAGUA PANAMA CITY>
ASUNCION, LIMA, SAN SALVADOR, PORT AU SPAIN, MBONTEVIDEO, CARACAS

INFO PRIORITY SANTIAGO. ¢

BOOUK CABLE

FUOMEN cugmaty 4¢ Con? Evuacgs .
1- FOLLOWING IS FOR YOUR BACKGROUND AND FOR PASSING LOCA

. AUTHORITIES AS YOU SEE FIT:

2. FOUR-MAN MILITARY JUNTA THAT REVOLTED. AGAINST MARXIST RE-

GIME OF SALVADOR ALLENDE ON LL SEPTEMBER HAS GAINED FULL CONTROL OF ©

THE COUNTRY WITH EXCEPTION OF POCKETS OF RESISTANCE IN CAPITAL- ON

L2 SEPT THERE WAS FIBGHTING IN DOWNTOWN SANTIAGO BETWEEN TBSROOPS AND

SNIPERS HOLED UP IN GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS AND IN INDUSTRIAL AREAS WHERE

i

ALLENDE SUPPORTERS WERE BARRICADED IN FACTORIES. SPORADIC FIRING AND |
ANB NIGHT

EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD THROUGHOUT DAY, BUT STRICT CURFEW KEPT OBSERVERS |

|

{

|

FROM WITNESSING ACTION. CURFEW EXTENDED TO NOON 13 SEPT.

3. AUTHORITIES ESTIMATED DEATH TOLL TO BE OVER 250 MILITARY

DATE: id
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3. JUNTA~ CONTROLLED RADIO STATIONS AND ONE TV ) STATION

OPERATING- PUBLIC UTILITIES ARE FUNCTIONING NORMALLY NEUSPAPERS

PLANNED RESBUNE LIMITED EDITIONS 23 SEPT BUT ARE SUSJECT To CENSOR=

ye JUNTA ANNOUNCED THAT PRESIDENT ALLENDE COMMITTED SUICIDE

“IN LA NONEDA AND TROOPS ENTERING THE BUILDING FOUND HIS BODY IN A

| DINING ROOM.

S. JUNTA TV PROGRAM SHOZED LARGE QUANTITIES OF SOVIET MADE

“AUTOMATIC WEAPONS COLLECTED at La NMONEDA AND AT ALLENDE RESIDENCE

ON TOMAS MORO STREET AFTER FIGHTING.

! DATE:

b. JUNTA PRESIDED “OVER SY GEN. AUGUSTO PINOCHET CARNY}+ AN
YNTELLIGENT. PROFESSTONAL OFFICER WITH NO KNOWN POLITICAL TIES3
‘ADMIRAL JOSE MERINO {NAVY} 4 ‘UHS IS INCLBINED TOWARDS NATIONAL PARTY
“CCONSTERVATIVE}5 GEN GUSTAVO LEIGH {AIR FORCE}. A STRONG LEADER
uHo FORMER SUPPORTER, "RADICAL PASTY AND KNOUN TO DISLIKE CHRISTIAN

‘DEMOCRATBS$ AND GENBERAL CESAR MENDOZA, {CARABINERO CHIEF} WHO HAS
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CLOSE TIES TO MILITARY AND APPARENTLY HELPED PLAN COUP.
. 7. JUNTA NAMED FOLLOUZIG CABINET 12 SEPT! |
| ATWISTER OF THTERIOR - MAU GEN OSCAR BONGILLA CARMY?.
WHO SERVED AS PRESIDENT FREI'S SENIOR MILITAGRY AIDE FOR
‘TWO YEARS.
MINISTER OF FGREIGN RELATIONS - REAR ADMIRAL ISMAEL
HUERTA {NAVY}, HIGHLY RESPECTED IN NAVY AND ONE OF
INTELLECTUAL LEADERS OF CouP. |
MINISTER OF ECONOMY - MAJ GEN ROLANDO GONZALEZ CARTY}.
REPORTED TO BE A U-P- SUPPORTER ADOUT 1972.
MINISTER’ OF EDUCATION - JOSE NAVARRO TOBARy A
CIVILIAN BIOLOGY AND-BOTANY PROFESSOR OF UNKNOWN POLITICS-
MINISTER OF JUSTICE - GONZALO PRIETO GANDARAs CIVILIAN
LAUyYER. 7 7
MINISTER OF DEFENSE - VICE ADM. PATRICIO CARVAJAL»
FORMERLY CHIEF OF HATIONAL DEFENSE BSTAFF. REPORTED
INVOLVED IN ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES AS EARLY AS 14973-
MINISTER OF PUELIC UORKS AND TRANSPORTATION - BRIG

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FORCE}. AGRICULTURAL AND CIVIL ENGINEER.
NINISTER OF LABOR - GEN MARIO MACKAY {CARAGINEROSY

ANTI-U.P- OFFICER NAMED IN JULY AS COMMANDER IN CONCEP

CION.
NINISTER ‘OF PUBLIC HEALTH ~ COL ALBERTO SPOERER {AIR

FORCE}. FORMER CIVILIAN SURGEAON DESCRIBED AS HARD

WORKER.
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WHO WAS SCHEDULDED TO BE RETIRED BY ALLENDE IN AUGUST»

CLOSE TO MILITARY-
MINISTER OF HOUSING - BRIG GEN ARTURO VIVERO> HARD-

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| UNDERSECRETARY, OF INTERIOR = LTW COL ENRIQUE NONTERO
{AIR FORCE} FORMER LEGAL OFFICER IN AIR FORCE. a
RINISTER OF LAHDE AND COLONIZATION - GEN DIEGO PARRA
RETIPES CARABINERO OFFICER, ON WHOM LITTLE IS KNOWN.
-WINISTER OF FINANCE - REAR ADM LORENZO ORTUZARs
LITTLE XNOUN OFFICER. , 7

&. JUNTA HAS BROKEN RELATIBONS YITH CUBA AND WILL PROBABLY BBB
QREAK WITH OTHER SOVIET BLOC STATES. IT WILL PROBADLY ENDEAVOR 8
STRENGTHEN TRADETIGNALLY FRIENDLY TIES WITH U.S. AND SEEK AID AND:

DEBT RELIEF FOR INTERIM.

9. JUNTA WILL PROBADLY DECLARE COMMUNIST, SOCIALIST. AND SMALL.
LEFTIST PARTIES Suca AS MIR ILLEGAL AND DISSOLVE CUT LAGOR CONFEDERA-
TION. THEY DO Nor PLAN WORK WITH POLITICAL PARTIES ‘BUaT MAY CONSULT
WITH THEM. THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IS EXPECTED To EXPRESS
SUPPORT FOR THE JUNTA AS IS THE OTHER MAJOR OPPOSITION POLITICAL ;
GROUP, NATIONAL PARTY. STRIGKING TRUCKERS AND PROFESSIONAL GUILDS

HAVE EXPRESSED. SATISFACTION WITH COUP AND CALLED OFF STRIKE. -

10. FILE: 3£5-124-S2. E @. IMPDET.A
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IIDIVEDUALS WHO ARE OPEN TO PERSUASION AND
BKHERALD SHOULD CNGAGE IN GENERAL

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FUOMEN rae CaSPECTAL
1s cHIC'S IMAGE AS REFLECTED IN WEST GERMAN MEDIA COMMEN@

TARIES HAS REACHED ALL=TIME LOW AND EVEN CONSERVATIVELY INCLINED

“NO LONGER BOTHER TO TELL "THE OTHER SIDE."
RUMP TRE OF ANTI@CHILEAN

OUTLETS SY aND LARGEs
EASTERI Fbo10 STATIONS MAINTAIN RELENTLESS i)
PROPAGANSA AND THEPE NO APPARENT DEARTH OF INFO TO SUSTAIN

RATHER EFFECTIVE DENIGRATION CAMPAIGNe

— 2, 1m SPITE OF DISMAL AUSPICES TO TURN TIDE, (UNLESS JUNTA
. . pEcibes TO SHOK SOME DECENT REGARD FOR OPINIONS OF MANKIND) » WE
CAN STILL PROMOTE FAIRER UNDERSTANDING OF IMPERATIVES OF CHILEAN
; SITUATION TO WHICH JUNTA APPARENTLY FEELS IMPELLED TO RESPOND.
1 TOWARD THAT END. RECUIRE SOME TYPE OF OBNECTIVE spoRn sy OF
= PECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND OF PREDICTABLE TRENDS. — :
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REFS! A; SANTIAGO 24477

8, DIRECTOR 391223
1. IN VIEW OF THE POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS Rer a {NFO IF UT

WERE SURFACED GR IF IT CAPE TO THE ATTENTION OF THE U.P,

GOVERNMENT, “STATION RECOMMENDS AGAINST FUOMEN ExPL OI TATION

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(TOS DIRECTOR, PARIS, HELS{iK!, BONN; TOKYO, LONION,

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REF? “DIRECTOR 499469 -7°

1, WISH To ‘OFFER FoLLoaTaoeusuesteD CHANGES IN REF

WHICH GASED ON LATEST INFS AVATLABLE LOCALLY. PARA 31

".,.CENTRAL BANK DEVALUED tHE EXCULG FON IMPGRTS/EXPORTS BY
SLIGHTLY OVER 420 PERCENT Iw an EFFUAT T9 CURS IM?Q8T DEMAND,
ENCGUAAGE EXPCRTS ANU EASE PHESSURES,..H .OTsER PRICE RISES
GROUSHT INFLATION FOR THE Year ™) 5¢6 PERCENT..." (FOR DIRECTOR:
WHILE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES SY BUT EMBASSY AND IMF IN NOVEMBER
PLACES INFLATION FOR THE Keaa at PRUDABLY JESTNEEN F350 AND see
PERCENT. ThE END@GF="HEXYEAH FIGURE OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICAL me
INSTITUTE WAS Soe.t SES SANTIACS EMBASSY TELEGRAM e173 =
OF 12 SJAKUARY,) ,

2. PARA & LAST SENTENCE SHuULD READ "THE MASSIVE 3,5
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_ RYBAT FUOMEN
Lb. FOLLOWING SUNNARY OF POLITICAL AND ECCNONEC SITUATION IN

CHILE AT BEGINNING OF 1974 NAY BE USEFUL FOR ORAL BRIEFINGS OF LOCAL

STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION.
2. THE OUTLOOK FOR CHILE IS CAUTIOUSLY oPTINISTIC.

MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAS AVOIDED MAJOR INTERNAL CONFLICTS \

NOVED AGGRESSIVELY TO "REORGANICE GOVERNMENT AGELCTES NOR Leilf
EFFICIENTLY, TO CREATE, AN APOLITICAL CIVIL SERVICES AND TO connect
THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE
SOCIALISM. ITS ECONOMIC PROGRAMS, ALTHOUGH AUSTERE. ARE SOUND AND
OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION FOR RECOVERY AND GROY UTH OF THE CHILEAN
ECoNOTiY. THE STRICT SECURITY NEASURES ADOPTED sy THE JUNTA HAVE
BEEN SUCCESSFUL. IN PREVENTING ANY LARGE-SCALE, VIOLENCE OR TERRORISH
AND ARE LIKELY TO 8E CONTINUED FOR THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE.

3. THE JUNTA MOVED @UICKLY AFTER THE cou? OF 32 SEPTENSER TO

RENOVE PRICE CONTROLS ON ALL GUT 30 BASIC conte 3ITIES. UHILE THE

DATE:

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FOR THE YEAR-
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3
PROGRAN PROPOSED. BY AN IMF TEAT WHICH VISITED CHILE IN LATE LV?A-
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BE SONECUHAT OVER-OPTINISTICs ESPECIALLY SINCE THE WORLD-UIDE ENERGY
CRISIS UILL SOON FORCE CHILE TC RAISE FUEL PRICES. THUS EXACCER-
BATING THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING INFLATION. ADHERENCE TO THE IMF
“PROPOSAL HAS. HOWEVER. IMPROVED CHILE'S CCREDIT RATING, AS HAS THE
SIGNING OF A BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE WHITED STATES ON CHILE'S
Li7i-1972 DEBT. CHILE IS THUS IN A RELATIVELY GOOD POSITION FOR
THE OPENING OF THE PARIS CLUB TALKS IN FEBRUARY. THE NASSIVE $4
BILLION DOLLAR FOREIGH DEBT» HOUEVERs WILL CAUSE CHILE BALANCE OF

BALANCE-OF~PAYMENTS PROBLEMS FOR Sone TINE.

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7. -COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE THAN SO%

OVER. LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AND. PRODUCTION WILL PROBAGLY REACH A RECORD
250,000 TONS IN 197% DESPITE SPORADIC SHORTAGES OF SPARE PARTS AND “
SERVICEABLE VEHICLES. FARM OUTPUT HOWEVER, IS NOT EXPECTED TO
RECOVER FULLY UNTIL THE 1424/75 HARVEST SO THAT AGRICULTURAL
INPORTS, PARTICULARLY GRAIN. WELL CONTINUE TO BE A DRAIN ON CHILE'S

FOREIGN RESERVES a

&. THE JUNTA HAS DEMONSTRATED GOOD FAITH IN THE TREATHENT OF

FOREIGN EQUITY AND HAS LINED UP SUFFICIENT FORELGH CREDITS TO
ENAOLE IT TO PURCHASE CAPITAL GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT .PAY- °°
NENTS GAP.’ THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO UNDERTAKEN TO SETTLE OUT
STANDING COMPENSATION CLAIMS ENANATING FROM ALLENDE NATIONALTZA~
TIONS, STATING THAT IT WILL EIVHER RETURN INTERVENED FIRNS TO THE
PRIVATE SECTOR» OR AS Iii THE CASE OF LARGE COPPER MINES. ADEQUATELY
COMPENSATE PREVIOUS OUNERS. FORMER PKIVATE BANKS WILL ALSO BE
RETURNED TO THEIR FORMER OUNERS. BUT PRODAULY UITH SONE FORMULA
INVOLVING WORKER PARTICIPATION IN DAK MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE ALSO
STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEUED INVESTOR CONFILENCEs AND PRIVATE

DATE; .

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4 17467 ; Oo owenss #-

FOREIGN INVESTMENT IM CHILE 15 E“PECTED TO Rou SUGSTANTIALLY SURING
1974.
4 INTERNALLY> THE ELIMINATION OF PRIZE CONTROLS AND AbJUST-_
MENT OF EXCHANGE RATE HAS PRACTICALLY ELINIUATED THE ONCE FLOURISH-
ING OLACK MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. HOUEYER's THE
BURDEN OF AUSTERITY Of CHILEAN CONSUMERS HAZ ZEEN HEAVY. DESPITE
HEALTHY INCREASES .IN UAGES AND FENEVED CONFIDENCE BY BUSINESSMEN,
VORKING CLASS CONSUMERS FIND IT DIFFICULT 70 AFFORD THE BAREST 3
NECESSITIES» AND WORKING CLASS LABOR IS TAKING A WAIT AND SEE
ATTITUDE» THERE IS+ HOUEVER, #29 ORGANIZED FESIETANCE TO THE JUNTA

OR ITS PROGRAMS. SOME POLITIC/L FACTIONSs PARTICULARLY THE

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY {PDC} ARE GRUMELING. BUT THIS wget
FACTION IS LARGELY DUE TO GOVERMENT EFFORTS TO SET UP NEU NOH
POLITICAL-PARTY MECHANISMS FOR EACHING THE PUBLIC.

10. GOVERNMENT "RECESSING” OF CONGRESS AND ALL POLITICAL:

PARTIES HAS CREATED A POLITICAL YACUUN IN CHILE. THE GOVERISENT »
WITCH HOLDS THE POLITICAL PARTIES LARGELY RESFONSIGLE FOR CHILE'S
CURRENT PLIGHT» IS TRYING TO FILL THIS VOID EY AN INTENSE USE OF:

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499469 Oocmi  #

_ CIVILIAN ADVISERS TO ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES. THIS

PHENONENON IS NOST APPARENT IN THE AREAS OF ECONOMIC POLICY AND IN
SUCH TECHNICAL FIELDS AS PUBLIC HEALTH AND HOUSING. THE LIPORTANCE
OF THE GROUP OF ECONOMIC ADVISERS HEADED OY RAUL SAEZ. FOR EXAMPLE

IS weit KNOWN» THE MINISTRY OF HEALTH HAS AH ADVISORY BOARD

DOONINATED BY THE MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, WHILE THE NINISTRY OF
HOUSING' S BOARD Is LARGELY CONTROLLED BY THE ORGANIZATION REPRESENT

ING PRIVATE ‘CONSTRUCTION FIRNS- SIMILARLY» ALNOST EVERY HINISTRY:

AND NANY AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES. HAVE PERMANENT CIVILIAN ADVISORY
BOARDS COMPOSED OF REPRESENTATIVES OF GROUPS WHOSE WELFARE IS

AFFECTED BY THE AGENCY'S ACTIVITIES.
“ybe IN ADDITION TO THESE CIVILIAN ADVISORY BOARDS. THERE ARE A

LARGE NUMBER OF "STUDY COMMISSIONS" THROUGH UHICH CIVILTANS CAN

EXERT THEIR INFLUENCE- BEST KNOUN OF THESE IS THE GROUP te INTER@

NATIONAL LAWYERS WHICH IS DRAFTING A HEU CONSTITUTION, SUT THERE
ARE OTHER GROUPS WORKING ON A NEU MINING CODE. STUDYING THE EDUCA~
TIONAL SEYSTEN, COLLECTING INFORNATION ON OU; MEDTMPLOYMENT 4 URITING A
STATUTE FOR YORKER PARTICIPATION IN QUSINESS ENTERPRISES» AND

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be LYING INTO A DOZEN OTHER TOPICS:
12. ALTHOUGH SOME CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS: HOLD INFLUENTIAL GOVERN-

KENT POSITIONS, MOST CIVILIAN ADVISERS ARE EITHER CONSERVATIVE OR .
APOLITICAL- LACK OF MORE UIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION BY CHRISTIAN
DENOCRATS MAY CREATE PROGLENS FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE FUTURE,
“ESPECIALLY SINCE ORGANIZATIONS REPRESENTING WORKERS 1 CANPESTNOS-

AND POBLADORES {WHICH FORMERLY SUPPORTED EITHER THE CHRISTIAN
PEMOCRATIC PARTY {PDC} OR THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT} ARE 50 FAR
INADEQUATELY REPRESENTED ON ADVISORY COUNCILS- THE GOVERNMENT HAS
ESTABLISHED UNITS ADDRESSED TO YOUTHS YOMEN GUILDS AND NEIGHEOR-
HOOD CIVIC GROUPS IN THE SECRETARIAT GENERAL OF GOVERNMENT 9 AND
HOPES THAT THESE BILL SERVE AS VEHICLES FOR GOVERNNENT-TO-PEOPLE

COMMUNICATION.
33. THE JUNTA LEADERS VIEW WITH DISTRUST ALL PDC EFFORTS TO

WIN NEU POLITICAL ADHERENTS FROM THE WORKING CLASSES UNICH FORNERLY
SUPPORTED ALLENDE'S UP COALITION AND REPORTEDLY BELIEVE THAT THE
PDC IS NOT RESPECTING THE POLITICAL RECESS- THE JUNTA IS
PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE POSSIGILITY THAT THE ppoc'S LEFT UING

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THAT PERU MAY ATTACK CHILE SOME TIME PRIOR TO LIPT THE 100TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR BETUEEN CHILE AND PERU: IN ORDER TO REGAIN
Sone OF THE TERRITORY Lost IN THAT WAR. THE CHILEANS ARE WORRIED BY
THE SOVIET SALE of ARS TO PERU AND FEAR THAT THE USSR HAY BE TRY-|
ING TO CREATE ANOTHER UNSTASLETMIDDLE EAST Type” OF CLIMATE IN
LATIN ANERICA- ;

us. THE JUNTA IS aLso CONCERNED BY COMMUNIST EFFORTS TO CREATE

INTERNAL DISCONTENT ana TO Mount AN INTERNAL RESISTANCE HOVENENT -

THE JUNTA EXPECTS THAT THE FORUER UP PARTIES» LED BY THE COMMUNISTS

WILL SET UP A UNIFIED FRONT FOR CAUSING CIVILIAN DISTURBANCES AND
POLITICAL DISCONTENT» AND YILL TRY 70 HANIPULATE THE PDC INTO
OPPOSING THE JUNTA GOVERNHENT. THO FRONTS FoR CHILEAN RESISTANCE
ARE BEING ORGANIZED IN ARGENTINA AnD SEVERAL ARE BEING SET UP IN
EUROPE. 7
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REORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT AND IN EtLISTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
SITS PROGRAMS. PROSPECTS FOR ECOHOMIC RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT ARE
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FUOMEN CASPECIAL CAFECET jo
REF? HAMBURG 23881 [IN 056923] ae
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D . —_
1. FOLLOWING ANALYSIS OF CHILEAN. ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OF x
SS RAE COMONTC SITUATION AND OF RISK

FACTORS INVOLVED IN MAKING INVESTMENTS IN CHILE PREPARED FOR PASSAGE
cE SES TENTS IN CHILE
TO HERMES BANK PER REF PARA 1 REQUEST. ©

A. THE RULING JUNTA IN CHILE I3 MOVING AGGRESSIVELY To
REBUILD THE ECONOMY BY ADOPTING A HARSH AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND IN-
STITUTING POLICIES DESIGNED To RETURN CHILE TO A MARKET ECONONY.
_ 8. SANTIAGO MOVED QUICKLY AFTER THE Coup TO REMOVE PRICE.

CONTROLS ON ALL BUT 30 BASIC ConmopIties, WHILE THE CENTRAL BANK

EFFECTIVELY DEVALUED THE ESCUDO BY SOME bO% IN.AN EFFORT TO CURB
IMPORT DEMAND AND EASE PRESSURES ON SANTIAGO'S MEAGER FOREIGN EX-
CHANGE RESERVHES. AS A RESULT, CHILE'S cos? OF LIVING JUMPED 88%
IN OCTOBER. BRINGING INFLATION TO NEARLY 450% FOR THE FIRST TEN MONTHS
OF THE YEAR- ANTICIPATED PRICE RISES DURING THE REST OF 1973 IS Ex-
PECTED TO PUSH INFLATION TO SonE 750% FOR THE YEAR.

C. THE ELIMINATION OF PRICE CONTROLS AND ADJUSTMENT OF

OATE:

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MARKETS IN COMMODITIES AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE. WHILE EXCHANGE RATES

CHANGED AND PRICES ROSE. THE GROYTH IN THE MONEY SUPPLY HAS BEEN
SHARPLY CURTAILED, CAUSING A RELATIVE SCARCITY OF LOCAL CURRENCY AND
A LIQUIDITY CRUNCH FOR BUSINESSMEN. Oo

“L7-De “THE BURDEN ON CONSUMERS HAS BEEN HEAVY. DESPITE A
HEALTHY INCREASE IN THE MINIMUM UAGE, WORKING CLASS CONSUMERS ARE

FINDING It INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT TO AFFORD THE OAREST NECESSITIES. ©

AUSTERITY HAS BEEN EXACERBATED IN ANY CASES BY DISMISSALS OF

RELATIVELY UNPRODUCTIVE AND POLITICALLY SUSPECT EMPLOYEES HIRED

UNDER THE ALLENDE REGIME. AN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION PROGRAM HAS

BEEN ANNOUNCED AND AN EXTENSIVE PUBLIC VORKS PROGRAM IS UNDER CON-
SIDERATION- .

E. THE JUNTA IS ATTEMPTING TO ENLIST PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR
THE AUSTERITY PROGRAM AND BUSINESS IS SHOWING RENEUED CONFIDENCE.
CONSUMERS AND LABOR. HOUEVER, ARE TAKING A UAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE. NO
ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE JUNTA.OR ITS PROGRAMS HAS MATERIALIZED»
EVEN THOUGH SOME POLITICAL FACTIONS ARE GRUMBLING AND PREDICTING .

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FAILURE FOR THE JUNTA.
F. CHILE STILL FACES LARGE BALANCE-OF- PAYMENTS DEFICITS

Oate-tws ome - ena WORE nas ogee Come EERE

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IN BOTH 1973 AND 1974 EVEN IF DEBT- REPAYMENTS ARE RESCHEDULED IN BOTH

YEARS. UITH A MASSIVE ey BILLION FOREIGN DEBT HANGING OVER SANTIAGO'S

HEAD, IT VILL AT LEAST BE SEVERAL YEARS BEFORE CHILE'S BALANCE-OF-
PAYMENTS POSITION IMPROVES SIGNIFICANTLY. _
G- HOWEVER, COPPER PRODUCTION HAS ALREADY INCREASED MORE

“THAN 50% ABOVE LAST YEAR'S LEVEL AS A RESULT OF A 49% LENGTHENING OF

THE WORK WEEK AND IMPROVED MINE MANAGEMENT. PRODUCTION WILL PROBABLY

REACH A RECORD 750,000 _TONS NEXT YEAR DESPITE CONTINUING SHORTAGES OF

. SPARE PARTS AND SERVICE ABLE VEHICLES.
H. AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS CONTINUE ‘To BE THE LARGEST DRATN

ON FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND THE RECOVERY OF. DOMESTIC PRODUCTION Is A

PRIORITY OBJECTIVE OF THE JUNTA. FARM OUTPUT, HOWEVER, Is NoT EX-

PECTED TO FULLY RECOVER UNTIL THE 1974/75 HARVEST SINCE HOST CROPS
ALREADY ARE PLANTED AND ARE WELL INTO THEIR GROWING SEASONS. THUS,

CHILE WILL CONTINUE To IMPORT GRAIN IN LARGE QUANTITIES DURING 1974.
I. ALTHOUGH THE PROBLEMS oF ADEQUATE SHORT RUN SUPPLIES

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OF RAU MATERIALS AND SPARE PARTS nust BE SOLVED To sSoosT PRODUCTION

QUICKLY, LONG RUN GROUTH WILL DEPEND HEAVILY ON CHILE'S ABILITY TO

ATTRACT ADEQUATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT: ' ATTRACTION OF SUBSTANTIAL NEW--

RY ASTLITY A DEMONSTRATE GCoD

INVESTMENT VILL DEPEND ON THE JUNTA?
MIME ABILITY TO INSTILL DRE -

FAITH IN THE TREATNENT oF FOREIGN EQUITY AS.

CONFIDENCE IN CHILE'S PROSPECTS FoR STABLE RECOVERY AND GROUTH. A

CRITICAL FIRST STEP Is TIMELY SETTLEMENT OF OUTSTANDING COMPENSBATION

|
|
THE JUNTA HAS |

AS IN THE CASE OF THE LARGE COPPER MINES, ADEQUATELY .

SECTOR ‘ORs.
SOME 40 FIRMS ARE ALREADY IN THE

COMPENSATE THE PREVIOUS OUNERS.

PROCESS OF REVERSION.
Je THUS FAR THE JUNTA HAS SUCCEEDED IN LINING UP SUF-

FICIENT FOREIGN CREDITS TO. ENABLE IT TO PURCHASE ESSENTIAL CAPITAL

GOODS AND FINANCE THE CURRENT PAYMENTS GAP. IN pT TTONs THERE ARE

STRONG INDICATIONS OF RENEWED INVESTOR CONFICENE. AND PRIVATE FOR-
EIGN INVESTMENT IN CHILE IS EXPECTED TO GROW DRAMATICALLY DURING THE

Ts re .

NEXT le MONTHS.

DATE;
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‘Ks THE ECONOHIC OUTLOOK FOR CHIBLE IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTI-.
MISTIC AS THE JUNTA TAKES STEPS TO CORRECT THE EXCESSES OF NEARLY
THREE YEARS OF DECAPITALIZATION UNDER STATE SOCIALISM. THE PROGRAMSs

THOUGH AUSTEREs ARE ECONOMICALLY SOUND AND OFFER A FIRM FOUNDATION
FOR RECOVERY AND GROUTH OF THE CHILEAN ECONOMY. THE MAJOR POLICY
CONFLICTS WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT APPEAR TO BE OVER THE DEGREE AND
TIMING OF SPECIFIC MEASURES RATHER THAN PROBLEMS OF BASIC POLICY
ORIENTATION. |

L. THE EMERGING DOMINANCE OF RAUL’ SAEZ AS SENLOR ECONOMIC
ADVISOR IS PROBABLY FOR THE BEST SINCE THE JUNTA'S. AUSTERITY PROGRAM
MUST BE TEMPERED IF POLITICAL-AS WELL AS ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND
STABILITY IS TO BE ACHIEVED. MEANUHILE. CHILE IS PREPARING TO
SETTLE OUTSTANDING COMPENSATION ISSUES AND COMPLETE @ILATERAL NE-
GOTIATIONS ON 1971/72 DEBT SERVICE IN ACCORD WITH THE 1972 PARIS
CLUS AGREEMENTS. TIMELY RESOLUTION OF THESE ISSUES WILL GO FAR

IN IMPROVING INVESTOR AND CREDITOR CONFI@DENCE IN CHILE-
3 2. FOLLOWING QUESTIONS SUGGESTED TO ELICIT HERNES' VIEWS
ON CHILE'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AS REQUESTED PARA 3 REF.

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VESTHENT FROM. GERMAN AND OTHER WEST. EUROPEAN SOURCES: 15 EXPECTED To

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7 OFFICIAL GERMAN CREDITS TO BE EXTENDED TO CHILE DURING NEXT 12 HONTHS?
WHAT TYPES OF CREDITS WOULD THESE BE. I.E. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

RELIEF, DEVELOPNENT ASSISTANCE, TIED AND UNTIED TRADE CREDITS?
DO BANK OFFICIALS SEE THE WIDESPREAD ADVERSE PUBLIC |
i

© REACTION IN EURCPE TO THE NEW CHILEAN GOVERNMENT AS: SIGNIFICANTLY

"AFFECTING FUTURE INVESTMENT AND AID DECISIONS FOR CHILE?

3.

BE OF INTEREST.
£2, IMPDET«d

4y. FILE? 15-L2b-S2.

SREF ATTACHED-

4Y DECEMBER 1473

‘ORIG: JEANNE LINTON; SMB
+ UNIT: C/WH/bB/SA ne |
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PRIORITY CARACAS 4 LA PAZ1 QUITOr BOGOTA: NONTEYTDEG s BRASILING

NEXICO GIs “BUENOS AIRES 4 “GUATEHALA CITts SAN SALVADOR’

ct

HAWAGUA®
aYOAT FUOUVEN
REF? DIRECTOR-4Sd04L ; ;

FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUONEN ORIEF LUGS. STIPU~
CHILEAN CITLZEN RESIDING

1.
LATION NO FURTHER EXPLOLTATION. SOURCE:

TH LIMA.

as sue JECT: n98 SIBLE SUPPORT. BY | TIN ANERT XTCAN COMMUATST

PARTIES FOR fk RESISTANCE IN CHILE.

IT WAS SGUINSICATED IN AN EARLIER ORIEFTUG

3+ BACKGROUND:
{RIF} THAT SOVIET CONNUNIST PARTY OF PERU {PCP/SOVIET} INTENDED TO

SERVE AS A RECEPTION POINT FOR GUERRILLA FIGHTERS FROM OTHER
COUNTRIES WHO WOULD ENTER CHILE FROM PERU TO JOIN ANY RESISTANCE

MOVEMENT IN CHILE.
CP/SOVIET

WY. THE FIRST WORD OF CHLLEAT CGUP WAS RECEIVED BY PC
. che
FROM CHILEAN EMBASS’ IN LIMA. CENTRAL COMMITTEE canes “Ad ENERGENCY
MOETUNG WHEN IT APPEARED THAT EVENTS Tl CHILE DERE corn AGAINST
Cas . . £
Waits: . bate boot _— .
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F | twaleeeFye yy"

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| ALLENIE REGIME.  UHILE WAITING FOR INSTRUCTIONS FROM HOSCOUs CENTRAL i
. CONNLTTEE DECIDED TAKE CERTAIN NEASURES SUCH AS SENDING SIX oo oe
OEGAETEERS INTO CHILE. THESE ORGANTZERS JERE MENGERS OF PERUVIAN . i
CONNLSIST YOUTH) WHO USED PASSPORTS OBTAINED EARLIER FROM CHILEAN i
ENSASSY IN CASE OF SUCH AN EMERGENCY. PASSPORTS WERE LEGITINATEs -

SUT DATA IN THEM, INCLUDING NANES. VERE FALSE. THE PERUVIANS NERE
TO CROSS INTO CHILE AT THE TACNAZARICA BORDER POINT AND WERE TO. BE
xceonPanTED BY A NUNBER OF GOLIVIANS AND ORAZILIANS. 7
5. ON LG SEPTENBER. THO UNIDENTIFIED NEN WHO YERE LATIN
AMERICANS BUT NOT ‘PERUVIANS BROUGHT TO PCP/SOVIET REAI QUARTERS - ;
TUSTRUCTIONS FROM THE COUMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION {CPSU}.
TASTAUCTIONS WERE DELIVERED TQ NEMHERS OF. PCP/SOVIET CENTRAL

CONNITTEE AND IMMEDIATELY DISCUSSED BY PARTY LEADERS INCLUDING

un

£ DEL PRADO CHAVEZ {PCP/SOVIET SEC GEM}. FELIX ARIAS SCHREIBER

. ee COeSOUTET POLITICAL COIMISS TON NEMBERFs GUILLERNO HERRERA

ONTES EOS CALSO MENBER OF PCP/SOVIET POLITICAL COMMISSION}. AND

a ne QF THE Td CCURTERS DELIVERING THE THSTRUCTIONS * 39 WHO USED — vs)

THE ALIAS "FIGUEROA. FOLLOWING DISCUSSION, THESE PARTY LEADERS

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INITIAL

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SETR COUNTERPA ARTS IM THE: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE {PCCH?.
yesvauctrons TO PCP/SOVIET NENGERS BERE TO ARRANGE For LODGING FOR

WEUSERS OF OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES UHO VERE ARRIVING

GH LIMA, TO OBTATI HAPS OF CHILE, FALSE DOCUNENTATION, ETC.
SECOND STAGE OF SUPPORT To CHILE YAS TO SEGIN DURING WEEK

he

5 a3 SEPTENBER UHEYN COMMUNISTS AND OTHERS VERE To ARRXIVE FROM
, : Couey? ts) i
JEMEZUELAy PANAMA, COLOMBIA. CUBA AND OTHER ro ALL WERE TO BE :

LODGED IN LIMA» AUDs LATER. GIVEM FALSE DOCUMENTS AMD TRANSPORTATION

TO CHILEAN BORDER. THEIR PRINCIPAL TASK Ii CHILE WAS TO ASSIST

Til REORGANIZATION OF PCCH FOLLOWING COUP D'ETAT, AS KELL AS IN PRO-

DUCTION OF CLAIDESTINE PROPAGANDA. THEY ALSO WERE To STUDY POSSI-
tL ery OF ALDING TH AGURTING CONCERTED ARMED RESISTANCE TO MILITARY

REGINEs PRINCIPALLY THROUGH URBAI GUERRILLA WARFARE. THERE YAS NO

WEED TO SEND ARMS: SINCE THERE STILL ENOUGH WEAPONS UIDPEN IN CHILE

To HAKE “SucH RISK UNHECES ISARY :

a 2 cenmTeaL, AUD SOUTH AMERICAN COMMUNESTS WERE TO MEET IN CIMA

9H 2S SEPTENBER, TO CONSIDER SENDLNG PERSONS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE

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AN 44 SEPT. JUAN CAHPOS

GUERGELLA GROUPS THERE

PAVTOMAL RABOR ORGANIZATION cater MECH BEG

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ATION OF TRADE UNIONS {UFTUS, WHO IS DN LIMA FOR ILO MEETING, HELD

PRESS COUFERENCE OM 14 SEPTENGER DURING WHICH HE CALLED ON ALL WORLD

TRADE UAITON ORGANIZATIONS TO HOUNT PUBLIC OPINION CRUSADE AGAINST

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L. IN GENERAL TERMS “BUSTHESSES. LEGALLY. NATIO:NALIZED.SUCH_AS_ |
“COPPER. COMPANTESs BANKS AND ITT HAVE GECOME GOVERNMENT PROPERTY AND

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THCLUDING NOST DONESTIC MANUE ACTURLES FIRMS. WAY DE RETURNED TO

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RETURNED. IT SHOULD bE NOTED, HOMEYER, THAT TO CUR KNOULEDGE NO

LIST EXISTS WHICH SPECIFICALLY LDENTIFIES WHICH BUSINESSES OR
PROPERTIES FALL. ENTO-DHICH CATEGORY. WE HAVE HO FURTHER DETAILS
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CUtupee ss os a TOR: 2414592 SEP 72 WN 28675
SB anne
S$ E.c RE + 24i4r$2 SEP 73 STAFF
CITE BONN 26475
TO: PRIORITY DISECTOR INFO MEXICO CITY. CARACAS. BRASILIA. PARIS,
LONDON. ,
RYBAT CAGER FUOMEN
REF: a. DIRECTOR #58535 0 Cyst pore Zo; yet
. DIRECTOR 455615
c. BONN 26832 [LD O35 SU)

1, PARA 3B AES 3 STATES PROPERTIES IN © SOCIAL: AREA® KHICH
HAVE BECOME QucTE LEGAL UNGQUOTE PROPERTY OF GOVT WILL NOT 35
RETURNED OWNERS, SEF C REQUESTED IDENTIFICATION OF SPECITic
PROPERTIES INVOLVED. NOT CLEAR FROM SEF 3 WHETHER EXPROPRIATED
AND REQUISITIONED PROPERTIES CONSIDERED QUCTE LEGAL. UNQUOTS
PROPERTIES OF GOVT SUBJECT TO PROVISIONS PARA 39 REF a. IN a)
OTHER WORDS. WHAT IF ANY FIRMS TN SOCIAL AREA HAVE NO? SecoNe ~ “As

LEGAL PROPERITY S* GOVERNMENT AND WHAT FIRMS
OVER OR INTERVENED WITHOUT BECOMING LEGAL FROFERTY CE GOVERN}
MENT.

2. PLS CLARIFY AND IF POSSIBLE PROVIDE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

OF FIRMS INVOLVED,
SECRET (S~ 424-352.

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REFS: A. BONOAN ebua2 IN 3544! Il

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ECOUONY.s.
THROUGH PURCHASES»

SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DURING ALLENDE REGIME.

: ; .
EXPROPRIATIONS, REQUISITIONS. -AND INTERVENTIONS oF PRIVATE SECTOR

ENTERPRISES, THE GOC BY MID-2979 HAD CONTROL OVER ot PRODUCTION OF

- GOODS AMD SERVICES ACCOUNTING FOR ALMOST HALF oF CHILE" S$ GDP. COM-
PARED TO AN ESTIMATED 20% AT am] END OF THE FRET ADMINESTRATION IN
a ——

1470+
e a.

SINCE TAKING OFFICE, ALLENDE GOVT HAD TAKEN OVER AT

LEAST 400 FIRMS. THE EXECUTIVE. HAD SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS ON VARTOUS

occastons BILLS THAT WOULD AUTHORIZE INCREASES IN, SCOPE AND RANGE
OF. gout ~CONTROLLED SECTOR: BUT THERE HAD BEEN NO AGREEMENT ON WHAT

SECOTOR'S AIAITS SHOULD BE. ALLENDE GOVT. THEREFORE 2H Te

DATE: .
ORIG: a : a
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RYEAT FUOMEN

2. FOLLOWING INFO CLEARED FOR ORAL FUOMEN BRIEFINGS,
STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXPLOITATION: SOURCE: MEXICAN JOURNALIST
WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN LEFTIST CIRCLES. , : .

ae SUBJECT: ° REMARKS BY CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFE CER IN MEXICO
AFTER THE 12 SEPTEMBER COUP D'ETAT IN CHILE.

-3. SHORTLY AFTER THE COUP DETAT IN CHILE, A CUBAN ENBASSY:
OFFICER WHO IS ALSO A NENBER: OF THE: CUBAN DIRECTORATE OF: INTELLIGENCE |
{DGI} IN NEXICO SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVT WAS IMPRESSED GYITH THE
600d ORGANIZATION OF CHILEAN MILITARY'S SUCCESSFUL OVERRTHROW OF THE
ALLENDE REGINE ON 23, SEPTEMBER. an ; :

y. HE SAID THE CUBAN GOVT, AND CUBAN ENBASSY IN SANTIAGO WERE.
HOT SURPRISED. HOWEVER, THAT Afi ATTEMPT. “AGAINST THE ALLENDE GOVT WAS
MADE GBECAUSE THEY HAD LONG PERCEIVED THAT ALLENDE, UNILE i, GOOD
MARXIST+ LACKED SUFFICIENT AGGRESSIVENESS TOURED ars” EREIAES.

5. HE SAID aioe CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTEAGD HAD > PL EPARED

TOOKCHA ATiEd OF CEO AUTEN ane OFmcee

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RYBAT: FUONEN ;
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IN LIMA.
2. sugsect: CmeeTING IN LIMA OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBBVERSIVE

pace ee

“GRGANTZATTONS TO_NAKE PLANS TO SEI SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE. .
3 “On OR “ABOUT 22 SEPTEMBER A MEETING IS TO. BE HELD IN LIMA St
OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH ANGERTC AN SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS FOR THE
PURPOSE OF HAKING PLANS TO SEND MILITANTS TO CHILE TO ORGANIZE
GUERRILLA GROUPS AND TO HELP CHILEAN COMMUNISTS.

4. THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY OF PERU IS DISCUSSING THE:

| POSSTeILITy OF SENDING GROUPS ‘TO CHILE TO FIGHT. ALONGSIDE ANY _

CHILEANS WHO ARE ‘STILL OFFERING RESISTANCE TO THE NEU RILETARY. JUNTAS

JOIN RESISTANCE FORCES BIN CHILE.

DATE:

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TORI2116112 SEP 73 MEX! 25263

“SE CRE T.2118202 SEP 73 STAFF
CITE MEXICO CITY 25263 .
TO1 PRIORITY DIRECTOR,

RYBAT FUOMEN

REF DIRECTOR 457868

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PARTICIPATION AT MEETING.
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PLEASE ADVISE CONCURRENCE

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LONDON,
vest CAGEA FUQMEN

| REF: DIRECTOR 456615 _ , .
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. |
SOURCE? CHILEAN BUSTUCSSHAN :

STIPULATION NO FURTHER EXE PUITA TION.
ULTH GOOD CONTACTS IN MILITARY JUNTA GOVERNNENT.

2. SUBJECT: ~Feanina audi : een Beaks No. :
a+. ON LS SEPTENGER GENERAL SERGIO NUNO. MINISTE® VICE PRESIDENT

OF CHILEAN DEVELOPHST CORPORATION {CORPO}, GUTLINED NILITARY JUNTA'S |
ECONOMIC PLANS AS FOLLOWS ,

. As ALL OF FIRNS AND COMPANIES UHICH HAVE CEEN EITHER TAKEN

OVER OR INTERVENED SUT WHICH ARE NOT LEGALLY OUNED BY GOVERNMENT, i

WILL 8E RETURNED TO THEIR ORIGINAL OUNERSS
. : :
B. THOSE PROPERTIES IN "SOCIAL AREA" LHICH HAVE BECOME ,

LEGAL PROPERTY OF GOVT VILL MOT BE RETUSNED To FREVTOUS OUNE RS. UNO

SAID HE BELIEVES THAT A GIVEN PERCENTAGE -CF OUNERSHIP CF THESE

ear c

PROPERTIES, PERHAPS AS MUCH AS NO oR SO%_ SHOULE €2 SHEE AVAILABLE

TO THE WORKERS, AND REMAINING FERCER TAS af SEU D BO SOLD AS SHARES

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uw ACCORDING TO HUN. PERSONNEL IN CHAZCE OF THESE INDUSTRIES
HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED 70 BEGIN UORLENG AZ SOON AS POSSTSLE. THEY
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TO HELP THEN.

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PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY, FOR COUT AT'S ECOG

NUNO, AND CORFO WILL UORK VERY CLOSELY WITH TiDUSTRIAL PEVELG
SOCIETY {SOFOFAY, WHICH HAS APPOINTED EUGENIO HELREVANUS AS WSOFOFA

COORDINATOR WITH CORFO.
Bb. FILE: 2L5-4e4-S2. Ee. IMNPDET-A

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CITE SANTIAGO 26529 ,

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rh CONCUR USE OF SANTIAGO 26499 (HCS 9836) FOR

ee 2)

| PUDMEN, No SPECTALCAVEATS, | (W030 7?

Z+ PREFER NOT USE SANTIAGO 26512 (HCS 9839) “BECAUSE
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SECRE t 1719592 SEP 73 INTEL HCS-9839

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SENSITIVE INTELLIGE, NCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED.
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IN 031722
PAGE} OF 3 PAGES

NSC/'$ ;
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SINS SS
OPERATIONS
Clouitied by Recorded Rpertieg Officer, Bxempt from » earl Deatonsifteati

of Automatic Dextasstiielat!

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CITE TDFIR ~314/07571-73

DIST 17 SEPTEMBER 1973

COUNTRY:

Dory 73: a
SUBVECTI PL 0 FRET, FORMER PRES iDEnr’ OF CHILE

THE = CHRIST oan DENDGRATIC Paaty TO LEAVE Ca

“ACO ot Gutee, SANT IAGO (6 SEPTEMBER 1973) FIELD NO, WCS~9830.
“SOURCE! aN INFLUENTIAL MEMBER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ‘PARTY
. MMOSE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY PLaces Wim IN THE
CENTER OF THE PARTY'S IpEqLoGrcaL SPECTRUM. HE HaS
GOOD Access TO BOTH THE RIGHT= AND LeF Towing SECTORS
OF THE BDC, MUCH oF HIS PREVIOUS REPORTING Has gEEN
CONFIRMED 3Y SUBSEQUENT EVENTS anp SOURCES,

1. ON 15 SePreuger 1973 FORMER PREeSIDEyr EDUARDO FRE],
A LEADER OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PDC), TaLD orHER
PDC LEADERS That HE CONSIDERED IT WISEST For HIM 70 Leave
CHILE IN THE NEAR FUTURE AND. FOR MIM tq REMAIN ABROAD UNTIL THE

DIRECTIONS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT BECOME CLEARER AND THE SECURITY
SECRET i


14-0000

SECRET so Foreien oissen .
° (olaastpteation) idisserm controtey " : .

IN 0.5.222
- ; , TORR =3}u Q7E70°:

. WARNING NOTICE : a .
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED PAGE ? OF * PAGES

‘Situation BECOMES MORE STAgLyzeED,

2: ISOURCE COMMENTS MOST OF THE PDC LEADERS ARE CONCERNED
ABOUT THEIR PERSONAL SAFETY SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT THEY age
TARGETS FOR ASSASSINATION BY LEFTIST EXTREMISTS AND THAT THEY

_ MAY BECOME THE POLITICAL TARGETS OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT.
THEY ARE CONCERNED PARTICULARLY ABOUT THE GoVEAVNENT?S OFFERING

“OF IMPORTANT PosTS TO RISHTISTS SUCH AS ORLANDO SAENZ, TuE

PRESIDENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT SocrETY (Sorora). WHO
HAS BEEN NAMED AS ECONOMIC ADVISOR To THE MINISTRY OF FORE:GN

RELATIONS) aNp LEON VIL AR ION, HEAD OF THE TRUCK OWNERS

FEDERATION, WHO WAS OFFERED THE POST OF MINISTER OF PuaLT¢

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