DARAAN
‘104-10326-10080 : | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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ACTION: EA/J (299) INFO: DCEA/OPE, EYESONLY, MDSX, ODPD, FILE, C/EA,

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PAGE 001 IN 3620327

96 3620327
260842Z MAR 96 TOKY 24344

ASO

SECRET 260832Z MAR 96 STAFF

CITE TOKYO 24344

TO: IMMEDIATE DIRECTOR.

DCEA/OPE, EA/XO

FOR: LIMIT C/EA/J INFO CHIEF/EA,

‘SLUGS: WNINTEL
EYES ONLY - FOR C/EA/J - OFFICIAL ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF TOKYO

STATION

SUBJECT:

REF: DIRECTOR 700784 96 3598980

TEXT:

1. ACTION REQUIRED: PLEASE INCORPORATE THE FOLLOWING INTO THE
*TALKING POINTS TO BE USED IN THE PRESENTATION TO THE<JFK>
*<ASSASSINATION>RECORDS REVIEW BOARD.

2. AMBASSADOR MONDALE, THE EMBASSY AND THE STATION STRONGLY
OPPOSE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF ANY REFERENCE TO THE EXISTENCE OF A
CIA STATION IN JAPAN. SUCH ACTION COULD HAVE ADVERSE CONSEQUENCES
FOR US-JAPAN RELATIONS AT A TIME WHEN A NUMBER OF DIFFICULT SECURITY
AND ECONOMIC ISSUES REMAIN UNRESOLVED. IT ALSO WOULD RISK REIGNITING
_EARLIER CONTROVERSIES OVER ALLEGED CIA WIRETAPPING OF THE MAN WHO IS
TODAY THE PRIME MINISTER AND OVER PAST CIA FUNDING FOR THE LIBERAL
DEMOCRATIC PARTY. PUBLIC CONFIRMATION WOULD, WITHOUT A DOUBT,
DISRUPT COOPERATION WITH JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICES ON IMPORTANT
COUNTERTERRORIST AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES. BY MAKING THE
STATION THE OBJECT OF GREATER. PUBLIC AND POSSIBLY OFFICIAL SCRUTINY,
IT WOULD LOWER THE CONFIDENCE OF EXISTING AND NEW SOURCES IN OUR
ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR IDENTITY AND SECURITY. ~ :

3. IMPACT ON US-JAPAN RELATIONS: THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT DOES
NOT PUBLICLY ADMIT THAT IT COLLECTS INTELLIGENCE, AND AS A COROLLARY,
DOES NOT ADMIT TO HAVING LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES. TOKYO AVOIDS PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT BECAUSE IT KNOWS THAT
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION IS ANATHEMA TO THE LEFT WING OF THE JAPANESE
POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND ANY ADMISSION WOULD GIVE THE LEFT NEW ~~
OPPORTUNITIES TO ATTACK THE LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY, WHICH WAS THE
RULING PARTY FROM 1955 TO 1993 AND IS TODAY THE PARTY OF THE PRIME
MINISTER AND THE LEADING PARTY WITHIN THE RULING COALITION. ANY

OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION THAT CONTRADICTED EARLIER JAPANESE GOVERNMENT
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MHFNO: 96-3620327 SENSIND: EO ‘ PAGE: 2
DENIALS’ OF CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN WOULD BE USED AS A CLUB BY THE LEFT
TO ATTACK LDP SUPPORT FOR THE US-JAPAN MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY AND THE
PRESENCE OF US FORCES.IN JAPAN. WITH A STATE VISIT BY THE US
PRESIDENT FAST APPROACHING AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS OVER US BASES IN
OKINAWA LIKELY TO CONTINUE INTO 1997, THIS WOULD BE A PARTICULARLY
BAD TIME TO OPEN THE DOOR TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT US ACTIVITIES

AND INTENTIONS IN JAPAN.

4. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF CIA PRESENCE WOULD ALSO REVIVE OLD
CONTROVERSIES THAT HAVE LARGELY RECEDED FROM THE HEADLINES. IN 1995,
THE PRESS MADE A MAJOR ISSUE OF CIA FUNDING FOR THE LDP IN ITS
FORMATIVE YEARS. ANYTHING THAT LENT CREDIBILITY TO THE STORY WOULD
BE A SERIOUS POLITICAL LIABILITY FOR THE LDP. THEN. FOREIGN MINISTER
AND LDP: PRESIDENT KONO YOHEI PERSONALLY ASKED AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT
THE US GOVERNMENT NOT RELEASE DOCUMENTS ON THIS SUBJECT. . KONO
EXPLAINED TO AMBASSADOR MONDALE THAT THE LDP CAN DEAL WITH RUMORS AND
EVEN UNCONFIRMED LEAKS, BUT OFFICIAL CONFIRMATION OF CIA ACTIVITY. IN
JAPAN WOULD BE AN ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AFFAIR, THREATENING TO DAMAGE
BOTH THE CONSERVATIVE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS THE US-JAPAN
SECURITY RELATIONSHIP. KONO EXPLICITLY IMPRESSED ON THE AMBASSADOR
THE NEED FOR THE US GOVERNMENT TO HOLD THE LINE AGAINST DISCLOSURE.

5. IN THE FALL OF 1995, A NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE ALLEGED THAT
THE CIA HAD WIRETAPPED HASHIMOTO. RYUTARO, WHO HAS SINCE BECOME PRIME
_MINISTER. IN RESPONSE TO THE ENSUING PRESS QUERIES, JAPANESE
OFFICIALS OF THE CONCERNED MINISTRY DISMISSED THE STORY AS
IMPLAUSIBLE. IF THE US GOVERNMENT DECLASSIFIES A DOCUMENT THAT
CONFIRMS CIA PRESENCE IN JAPAN, IT.WOULD HAND THE JAPANESE PRESS NEW
OPPORTUNITIES TO REOPEN THE ISSUE OF ALLEGED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE AND
ATTACK THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FRIENDS WITHIN THE JAPANESE
GOVERNMENT . ; :

6. DISRUPTION OF LIAISON RELATIONSHIPS: THE JAPANESE SERVICES
GO TO GREAT LENGTHS TO KEEP THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH US INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES SECRET. ._ IN THE CASE-OF THE MOST IMPORTANT OF THOSE
RELATIONSHIPS, ALL CONTACT COULD BE SEVERED IN THE EVENT OF
DISCLOSURE AND EMBARRASSMENT. SUCH A RUPTURE IN THE RELATIONSHIP
DEFIES EASY REPAIR. THE SOUTH KOREAN AGENCY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
PLANNING, WHICH SERIOUSLY EMBARRASSED JAPANESE LIAISON WHEN IT
KIDNAPPED OPPOSITION POLITICIAN KIM DAE JUNG FROM TOKYO OVER TWO
DECADES AGO, IS STILL TREATED AS A PARIAH TODAY.

_ 7. IMPACT ON CONTINUING OPERATIONS: OUR ONGOING COOPERATION
WITH A JAPANESE LIAISON SERVICE IN PURSUIT OF A MAJOR INTERNATIONAL
TERRORIST GROUP COULD BE TOTALLY DISRUPTED BY DISCLOSURE. EXTREMELY
IMPORTANT US LAW ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE AT STAKE
IN THIS COOPERATIVE ENDEAVOR. THE TERRORIST GROUP IS PROBABLY NOT
AWARE OF THE EXTENT OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR PURSUIT. DISCLOSURE
THAT REMINDED THEM OF THE POSSIBILITY OF US-JAPANESE COOPERATION
AGAINST THEM COULD BE DETRIMENTAL TO OUR ABILITY TO COLLECT
INTELLIGENCE ON THE GROUP.

8. IMPACT ON SOURCES: STATION’S RELATIONSHIP WITH AT LEAST ONE
*SOURCE PREDATES THE<JFK ASSASSINATION.> PUBLICITY ABOUT CIA PRESENCE
AND ACTIVITY, EVEN IN THE PAST, OFTEN CAUSES SOURCES TO WONDER ABOUT
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OUR ABILITY TO PROTECT THEIR SECURITY. OLDER SOURCES, NOT
SURPRISINGLY, SEE EVEN PUBLICITY ABOUT THE PAST AS SOMETHING THAT

COULD FOCUS ATTENTION ON THEM AS INDIVIDUALS.

9. CL REASON: 1.5 (C); DECL ON: X1.

10. FILE: NONE. DECL OADR DRV HUM 4-82.

SND OF MESSAGE : ; SECRET

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