27 December 1963

SC No. 00624/63
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WEEKLY REVIEW.

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AG ENCY

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM TOP SECRET

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This document contains classified information affecting the national
security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage
laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits
its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to

an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial °

to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any
foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated
and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE
information; its security must be maintained in accordance with
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLI-
GENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages
to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

This document MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN
GOVERNMENTS. If marked with specific dissemination
controls in accordance with the provisions of DCID 1/7,
the document must be handled within the framework of
the limitation so imposed.

>

(> TOP.SECRET DINAR (

CONTENTS
(Information as of 1200 EST, 26 December 1963)

THE COMMUNIST WORLD ; Page

SOVIET TRADE | ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST...
Within: ‘a week. after the central committee approved
, Khrushchev’ s plan for the chemical industry, Sovie
‘traders apparently_ -had_their_instructions and were

\x@newing contacts in the industrial West. oe

———
=

a

Lae

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS' AFRICAN TOUR | ae 2
‘While Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have been able to

project an aura of Afro-Asian amity during the ~

first two weeks of their two-month tour, they have
' not scored-comparable successes-in- the political or
>conomic. fields. ne rr et

EAST [ GERMAN REACTION TO RELAXATION OF BERLIN TRAVEL

“The East German people, _While elated over the holi-

vercane -hope_that .they may—be_ permitted to visit
(their relatives in West Berlin and West Germany,
NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY 4
‘Pyongyang haS more widely dispersed its supersonic
feces has acquired relatively sophisticated new

radar, and has-equipped its—IL-28s with an improved
blind bombing and navigational system,

NORTH VIETNAM'S MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT

This 3 military - force, primarily a ground army | with

never theless the most formidable in Southeast Asia,
Its most notable achievement is its highly special-

/ized capability to support and maintain insurgency; |
‘ operations -in_ adjacent countries... (Published. sep-|
\arately. as Special Report SC No. 00624/63B) __

AS IA-AFRICA

ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING
The fhe military regime is beginning to take steps. to.
| ma ke its Counterinsurgency effort more effective,
but the generals _still_seem to have little idea_of

how to rally significant popular support. __

LAOS

Communist forces have moved to erase recent: gains by,

gightist units in central Laos. Neutralist and Pa the't \
Lao representatives_are continuing their—-efforts to
éase tension between the two >_ factions. _ a

27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page i

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. ASIA-AFRICA (continued) Page
FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA __. 7
Armed Forces Minister Messmer's visit. in early. ra)
iar is designed primarily to strengthen French in-
fluence in the wake of Sihanouk's call. for. an-end—
\to- the~ ‘the~US- aid: program. woe
ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT _ g

(Arab “military chiefs” apparently” feél that overt mil-
jitary action against Israel's Jordan River diversion
‘project is not feasible, but sabotage of its facili-

\ties~may be- ‘attempted; ee ee
CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN 9
‘rhe new ‘outbreak of fighting on Cyprus is a reaction

Ito President Makarios' determination to change the
(constitution so as _to limit the role of. the Turkish __
minority. a . a

BREAKUP OF THE FEDERATION OF RHODES TA AND NYASALAND _ .

31 December because its black African population
‘has persistently opposed it as a device to perpet~
‘uate white rule. Its dissolution will end London's
‘hopes for an economically integrated, multiracial
istate and increase the danger of bitter clashes

ibe tween white and black nationalists in its three
erstwhile constituent territories. {(Tubiished sep-

~T

1

AREA NOTE 10
Saudi Arabia

EUROPE

THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS.
vAgréements reached on agricultural policy on 23 De-.
cember are apparently sufficient to discourage De | \
Gaulle from breaking up the community. The agreement
on a position for tne _Kennedy. Round. is—not t necessarily)

favorable 1 to_the_US, ee ee

K-US_FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY .... 0 12
‘The British tish Government has advised shipping circles
Ut to comply with US demands for information relat

ing’ tor rate discrimination | “against US exports.

WEST_GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS _ ee os

\Willy Brandt has again- taken the center “of the. polit-

ical stage with the success of negotiations to open
the Wall for the holiday season. He has been. named

acting chairman” of” the SPN, ee ee

27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page ii

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-EUROPE (continued) Page
AREA NOTES : 14

NATO and Iceland
WESTERN HEMISPHERE

DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA 15
Castro has cautiously continued efforts to reduce
the influence of the Moscow-oriented Cuban Com-
munists, who are said to have banded together to
work clandestinely against him.

DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES __._ 16

The killing of 15 guerrillas by army troops ap-——.
parently removes the insurgent threat but could
provoke dangerous political repercussions. The
head of the provisional government has already re-~

tas Sanaa inna

BRAZIL ._ —_ . i _ 17
‘Appointment of Ney Galvao as finance minister_.. 7

itis the already slight prospect that Brazil's

critical financial problems would be handled ef-— |

féctively. Othér cabinet changes may follow.—.—

AREA NOTE 18
Bolivia
27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page iii

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The Communist World

SOVIET TRADE ACTIVITY IN THE INDUSTRIAL WEST

Within a week after the |
‘central “committee approved 7
Khrushchev" S plan for the chem-
ical industry, Soviet traders
apparently had their instruc-
tilons and budget allocations

and were renewing their activ-
ity in trade circles of the in-
dustrial West.

' Contracts for fertilizer
installations, plastics and syn-
thetic plants, petrochemical
equipment, and mining machinery
are already in various stages of
negotiation. Officials in Bonn
report they have under consider-
ation a proposal by a West Ger-
man consortium to supply the
USSR with $400 million worth of
petrochemical equipment. A
| Soviet mission is negotiating
with the British Imperial Chem-
ical Industry (ICI), which here-
| tofore has supplied the USSR
with technical know-how. ICI

reportedly has offered to de-
liver equipment and processes
for the production of fertiliz-
ers, herbicides, rubber chem-
icals, and plastics, Negotia-
tions also are under way for
large numbers of Japanese chemi-
cal fertilizer plants.

- Another Western consortium,
involving US equipment and proc-
esses, is discussing delivery
of a large oil refinery. In
addition, contracts for a wide
vange of other machinery and
equipment will probably soon be
signed. These contracts appar-
ently had been postponed until
the new chemical equipment buy-

Li! eb

ae eo _ ~s

27 Dec 63

ing, program | was- presented to.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

a |

various trade corporations for
next year were approved.

The Soviet need for addi-
tional credit to finance planned
expanded purchases is crucial.
The USSR presumably can generate,
sufficient funds to meet down
payments on sizable orders. !
However, credit arrangements
must be set now to spread out
the heavy crush of payments
which otherwise would fall due
in 1965-66 when equipment con-
tracted for next year will be
delivered... Soviet ability to
increase hard-currency reserves
is not likely to improve in the
near future, Moscow's current
grain imports will reduce its
gold reserves by 25 percent.

If these continue beyond mid- |
1964, the Soviet nard-currency
position will be under further
strain.

|

Despite the bleak foreign |
exchange prospects for the USSR, 1]
Soviet officials appear hopeful
that Western competition for H
Soviet orders will be adequate |
to foster Western governmental
and banking opinion favorable
to more and longer term credit.
Moscow may also hope that a
continuation of its relatively
restrained foreign policy will
be helpful in this context. i
While viewing the USSR as an
acceptable commercial risk, the
banking community has hereto-
fore been unwilling to extend
credits beyond a five-year pe- |
riod because of uncertainty
about future political develop- |
“ments. (SECRET)

t

J

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The Communist World

CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADERS’ AFRICAN TOUR ; ee eee ies
wn “With. -two. weeks of their pro- | continent. Criticism of the >
5 jected two-month tour of Africa USSR was reportedly a recurrent
| completed, Chou En-lai and For- theme in Chou's four lengthy

eign Minister Chen Yi can claim talks with Nasir. Nasir report-

| high marks for their efforts to edly said that Chou talked about

| project an aura of Afro-Asian the USSR the way the Soviets

amity and to identify Peiping used to talk about the US. He |

|with African aspirations. There accused the Soviets of trying

is no evidence, however, that to colonize China, of breaking
igen have scored any comparable political and economic promises,
success in the political or eco- | and of becoming tools of the
nomic fields. US, and he warned that any Afro-

; Asian country which became de-

The joint communiqué issued pendent on Moscow would suffer
/on 21 December at the conclusion the same fate as Peiping.
, Of the Chinese leaders' visit to i

Cairo contains few surprises, In Algeria, Chou sounded a

and reports from Algiers suggest Similar note. He cited China's

that discussions with Ben Bella early support for Algerian rev- |

are following predictable lines. | olutionaries--support which ac-

Thus far the Chinese have at- tually pre-dated that of the USSR.) |

tempted to minimize differences, | He has also undoubtedly scored i fe

play up past contacts, and press Soviet unreliability. The Chi- by
such themes as militant struggle | nese may be pressing the Algerians
against colonialism and "US im- to use some of the $50-million
perialism," _| credit offered in October. This.
offer was made to counter a $100- |

In both Algiers and Cairo, million Soviet credit offered

Chou! s hosts sought to demon- earlier the same month.

strate their nonalignment by

actions designed to play down Sino-Soviet rivalry for

the impact of the Chinese lead- African support also flared at

ers! arrival, Chou was greeted the UN, where Peiping outmaneu-

in Cairo with a 2l-gun salute, vered Moscow on the question of

but Nasir was not on hand. In enlarging the representation in

Algeria, Ben Bella was on hand principal UN organs to accommo-

to greet his guests, but the top- date the African bloc. Soviet |

level delegation he sent to the delegate Fedorenko had attempted |

Soviet Union just before Chou's to make it appear that the Chi- |

arrival is receiving more pub- nese were opposed to the African-

licity than the Chinese guests. sponsored expansion plan because:
they insisted that any change

It has become increasingly in the UN be tied to Peiping's |

apparent that a major objective own admission to the Security |

of the trip has been to undercut Council. The USSR found itself

Soviet influence throughout the holding a suddenly emptied bag, |
LO a 7 _. __ oo - . — at

27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW , Page 2

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~ The Communist World
; “however, when Peiping. loudly _ __..| Such_-secrecy-may-well_be_ prompted \

repudiated Fedorenko's statement by security considerations. Chi+
and . accused the Soviets of using nese officials were apparently

i

the issue as a pretext for op- seriously shaken by the abortive

posing Afro-Asian demands. plot to kill Liu Shao-chi in

Cambodia last spring. The Chi- |

| Chou can be expected to nese envoy in Cairo reportedly

| capitalize on this during next told Nasir of concern for Chou's! |
week's visit to Morocco and in safety and asked that travel
Subsequent stops in Guinea, plans during the Chinese leader's
Ghana, and Mali. No details of visit to the UAR not be made
Chou's itinerary beyond Rabat public. (SECRET NO FOREIGN. DIS-
vhave. -been made_public—by-Peiping.|-SEM) ~~~ 7
\ ee

QU

~~Reaction of East—Germans- —--|-party -headquarters--is_still———
to, the agreement to let West fairly cautious: One party |
Berliners visit relatives in member in Magdeburg said: "The \
East Berlin is hopeful but still reason we don't let our citizens
fairly cautious, judging by re- go to West Germany is that we }
| Ports from local party officials. | are afraid they will defect."
\ But he was promptly silenced by |
\ The party central head- comrades who parroted the party |
quarters, obviously concerned line on "the terror against our |
that the agreement might have GDR citizens in West Germany." (
domestic repercussions, ordered
district officials to submit Public expression of dis- |
immediate reports and detailed satisfaction with harsh travel \
follow-ups on reactions to this and internal controls has been
partial relaxation of travel / recurrent in recent months, {
' curbs imposed in connection reaching a peak prior to the
'|}with the building of the Berlin 20 October parliamentary elec-
Wall. Most of the responses tions.
state that the people are elated
but are publicly voicing hope The people's reaction to
that they may be permitted to the pass agreement with West
visit their relatives in West Berlin points up one of the re-
Berlin and West Germany. Many gime's major problems: how to
East Germans express hope that project an image of itself as a
the present move will be followed | sovereign state and of East Ber-
by other relaxations--a reaction | lin as its capital without in-

0

| probably quite unpalatable to creasing discontent among its

the regime. population, who still risk shoot-
ing if they attempt to escape

Public comment--at least to West Berlin, (SECRET KIMBO) |

Sa nnaeni . |

_ a an od

Sa reported by the various

27 Dec 63 ‘CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 3
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TOP SECRET DINAR |
27 DECEMGER 1963
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The Communist World

NORTH KOREA IMPROVES AIR DEFENSE CAPABILITY

__North Korea has recently —-—-1.

taken several steps which signif-
icantly strengthen its air de-
fenses. MIG-21 (Fishbed) jet
fighters, which were first de-
tected only at Pukchang-ni air-
field, now are being stationed
at other airfields. Pyongyang
has also apparently just acquired
a large number of relatively
sophisticated types of radar
sets. In addition, the North
Korean bomber force, which has
a total of about 100 IL-28
(Beagle) jet light bombers, is
in part now equipped with, and
has been training with, an im-
proved blind bombing and naviga-
tional system,
! .

Testing of and flight train-
ing with the new fighters-~10
to 14 of which were apparently
obtained from the USSR in the
fall of 1962--were first noted
in communications intelligence
in June 1963, Since that time
the MIG-21s have been detected
frequently in flight activity
involving ground controlled in-
tercept exercises,

Beginning in October, MIG~
21s have been noted operating
from Wonsan on the east coast
of North Korea. Their deploy-
ment to this airfield places
supersonic fighters on both the
east and west coasts of North
Korea.

The North Koreans have re-
cently--expanded—their radar

coverage.

_Six_new_types 0 of >]
radar, at least one of which

[
is believed to be exclusively \
of Chinese Communist manufacture, | \
have been detected. For the
present these radars will ap- 1

\

parently supplement rather than :
replace North Korea's original
three types--Kniferest A, SCR-

270, and Token,
The identifiable new types
include Kniferest B, Spoonrest i
A, and a new type of Chinese Com- |
munist origin which is probably | \
a substantial modification of

the SCR-270. Spoonrest A is |
sometimes used as the acquisi-
tion radar for surface-to-air
missile sites, but it is also
used in an early warning role

and is probably intended for that
use in North Korea. Acquisition
of these new radars reflects

North Korea's efforts to extend l
the range of its early warning
detection system. To improve
height-finding capability, Pyong-
yang has also introduced more
sophisticated radars such as
Rockcake and Stonecake.

Another improvement in North
Korea's air capability is the
equipment of about twenty IL-28s
with an improved blind bombing
and navigational radar system des-
ignated Shorewalk. When properly
used, this system permits preci- |

sion navigation and blind bombing
without the use of ground communi-
cations which would betray the di- }
rection of the flight and the tar-|

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

get” designation. ‘(Top “SECRET “DINAR)

__ a —s

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Southeast Asia

ENTHUSIASM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM REGIME FLAGGING

< ae a

—— Communist. guerrilla activ-
ity increased only slightly in
connection with the third anni-
_ versary, on 20 December, of the
Viet Cong's Liberation Front,
despite advance Communist propa-
ganda exhortation for a major
military effort. The Viet Cong
continued to direct attacks and
harassing activities primarily
at strategic hamlets.
| -.

i South Vietnam's new govern-
ment is showing extreme sensi-
tivity to discussion of a "neu-
tralist solution" to its in-
surgency problem. The Communists'
Liberation Front has repeatedly
proposed Such a settlement, and
the idea is gaining new advocates
as a result of Cambodia's call

for an international conference.

week closed down a newspaper

| Saigon' S military rulers last

which was expressing interest in
neutralism, However, editorials
in the vernacular press, even
though attacking neutralism, have
kept the debate in the public eye.
On 20 December, Saigon students--
possibly encouraged by the re-
gime--demonstrated against neu-

| tralism.

On the military front, the
government is beginning to take
some steps to overcome the leth-

| argy that has affected its coun-

; terinsurgency effort since the
coup. A long~range pacification
program has been launched in one
of the most troublesome provinces
in the northern part of the coun-
try, and broad command changes
have been introduced in two prov-
inces south of Saigon where
security has been deteriorating.

In the political field,

\Fhe-government has—named—60——--..__-_

27 Dee 63

‘cles with Premier Tho's provi-

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

‘members of the civilian-advisory >

Council of Notables. Returned
exiles apparently are not rep-
resented, and there is a dearth
of direct provincial represen~
tation. Many appointees, how-
ever, are prominent political,
professional and lay religious
leaders who could provide effec-
tive guidance to the regime if
they are given a chance,

Apathy and disenchantment
over the new government are wide-
spread among such key elements
as middle-grade officers, stu-
dents and politicians. Criti-
cism centers on the lack of
firm direction by the ruling gen-
erals, on repeated reshuffling
of local officials deemed in-
competent, corrupt or close to
the Diem regime, and on the rise
in Viet Cong activity. There
are signs that junta members
themselves are beginning to share
the disillusionment of some cir-

Sional cabinet, which is described
as ineffective and regional in
outlook,

Leading generals nevertheless
seem to have few effective steps
in mind to rally popular support.
Three generals recently complained
to US officials that they were hav-~
ing trouble finding qualified
Vietnamese to fill government posi-
tions and that press criticism
of their efforts was unhelpful.
General "Big" Minh, the chief of
state, has indicated a personal
distaste for a prominent role,
and has asserted that the people
would gradually come to appreciate
the new government as problems
were solved on a province-by

province-basis. (SECRET NO FOR- |

| EIGN  DISSEM/BACKGROUND || USE ONLY) _

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1


GULF OF TONKIN

Road Lo
Track or trail

> Reilroad oo

© STATUTE MILES 100
SS re Crean naneee |

CAMBODIA

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' ‘ Asia-Africa

amontst 3 orces have
: ved to erase recent gains
made by rightist units in cen-
ytral Laos. Pathet Lao troops,
portedly supported by sub-
tantial numbers of North Viet-
mese, on 19 December captured

m Keut and the nearby airfield,
ree days after occupying the

y route junction at Lak Sao.
ght-wing messages have de-
ribed a key rightist parabattal-
n as "completely smashed,"
mmunist units have advanced

uth of Lak Sao toward neutral.
t positions along Route 8-A,

t there have been no indica- ~

a meeting on 20 December in the

Plaine des Jarres, both sides
called for an "early" meeting
between Premier Souvanna and
Prince Souphannouvong. They
also agreed, in principle, that
elements of the coalition govern-
ment should be transferred from
Vientiane to the royal capital
at Luang Prabang, which would be
neutralized and placed under tri-
partite control. Both factions
reiterated their support for
the formation of a mixed police
force in a neutralized Vientiane,

General Phoumi's right-
wing faction, which was not
represented at the meeting,
remains skeptical of Pathet
Lao intentions, Phoumi apparently
believes that an agreement for
the neutralization of Luang
Prabang is unlikely, but he may
join in talks on the subject.

He has indicated, however ,that

the neutralization of Vientiane
‘is contingent on the willingness
of the Pathet Lao to allow free
movement in areas of Laos now
under their control. (TOP SE-

Nhommarath, which is still
ld by rightist forces. In
her areas, there have been
ports of only limited activ-
y, involving scattered skir-
shes and artillery exchanges.

HeH OPOdd oR OND Dee

Meanwhile, neutralist and
thet Lao representatives are
ntinuing their efforts to
gotiate an easing of tensions
between the two factions. At

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

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—_—.

Asia-Africa

FRENCH CABINET MINISTER TO VISIT CAMBODIA

-== Armed Forces=Minister
jerre Messmer's visit to Cam-
festa from 4-7 January is de-
signed primarily to strengthen
rench influence there in the
_wake of Prince Sihanouk's call
‘for an end to the US aid pro-

. gram. Messmer's high-level
ntourage, which includes the
-¢hiefs of the Foreign Ministry's
fadochina and Cultural and Tech-
ical divisions, will probably
; recommend some increases in aid,
but De Gaulle apparently has
no intention of taking on any:

parge new commitments.

French-grant aid to Can-
- ‘pbodia since 1956 has amounted
to only $15 million. Current
assistance is threefold: a
military training mission of at
east 250 men; cultural aid in
_jthe form of a university mission
and 319 teachers in Cambodian
schools; and the maintenance of
{about 40 experts in the fields
of health and public works. In
addition, a number of French
nationals hired by the Cambodian
Government hold positions of
considerable influence in the
inistry of Finance, the Treas-
ry, and the premier's office,
nd are among Prince Sihanouk's
advisers.

Paris has indicated it has
no intention of equaling the
|) aid _program.—Any—incre

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

>

i-military~—aid-probably—wovt
be limited to reconditioned and
obsolete equipment, such as
trucks and light armored vehicles).
Increased cultural and technical
assistance probably would include
further help for the French uni-
versity mission, more teachers,
and 30 or 40 additional technical
experts, especially agricultural-
ists.

The extension of French aid
will be complicated by Cambodia's
claims for compensation for
losses incurred as a result of
the 1958 devaluation of the
French franc. Since 1958 France
has asserted that a large-scale
aid program would be impossi-
ble until there is agreement on
an exchange rate, but a compro-
mise may now be in sight.

Sihanouk has sought French
help in maintaining Cambodia's ©
policy of neutrality, and in
recent talks with the US and the
UK, France has supported his
call for an international con-
ference on Cambodian neutral-
ity, despite US objections. |
Indeed, De Gaulle has consist-—
ently sought to meet Sihanouk
more than half way, and Paris
may now encourage Sihanouk
to press this issue. (CON-
FIDENTIAL) :

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4

ISRAEL'S

JORDAN RIVER
DIVERSION PROJECT

ewes Canal or conduit,
proposed or under construction

N88 enilitarized Zone

ttt ttt ILRI

Sony

Pumping Station
(Under Construction)

tums,

Reservoirs or”
Tunnel / _
F

tant, ISRAEL

SONAR

NEGEV
DESERT

{

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Asia~Africa

ARABS PLAN NO OVERT ACTION AGAINST ISRAELI PROJECT

- TheAtab States *eyidently |
not plan any overt military
(ction against Israel when in
te January or early February
e Israelis begin pumping tests
r their Jordan River diversion
oject, but sabotage of the
roject's facilities may be at-
mpted.

ot The Arab military chiefs
‘|who met in Cairo in mid-December
apparently decided that direct
military attacks are not feasi-
bie - The chiefs reportedly
agreed, however, that the states
ordering on Israel should.
mount independent and uncoor-
inated clandestine operations.

The Arab League Defense
Council, which meets in January,
probably will approve this rec-
ommendation, but its implementa-
ion is another matter. Egyp-
ian, Jordanian, and Lebanese
officials have indicated pri-
vately that their governments
have no intention of taking
aggressive action of any Kind
qeninse the Israeli project.

Nasir, however, told the
Canadian ambassador in early
Seat Sen that he was. worried
that Syria might act unilater-
adly and present the other Arab

;. coming involved in a war with

seek a solution.

‘chief of Israeli military in-
‘telligence, considers there is

states with a dilemma. ‘Damascus
will be under strong pressure
to fulfill its threats against
the Israeli scheme, particularly
in view of the close proximity

of the Syrian border to Israel's
pumping station on Lake Tiberias.|

‘Nasir's wariness about be-

Israel over Jordan waters was
also evident in a speech he

made on 23 December. He empha-
sized that the problem is polit-
ical rather than military in
nature and that the chiefs of
staff cannot solve it. He
called for a summit meeting of
Arab presidents and kings to

Israel, according to the

an outside possibility that
Syria might bomb or shell the
pumping facility's transformer
station. However, the Israelis |
believe the primary threat stems
from former Palestinians now
living in Syria, Jordan or
Lebanon, who might make a dra-
matic effort to sabotage the
project even though they prob-
ably could not cause serious
damage. (SECRET NO FOREIGN
DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONL:

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 8

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13-00000

rd

TOP SECRET DINAR |

, , Asia-Africa

CYPRUS DISPUTE FLARES AGAIN

In the face of these de=—~|
velopments, the Turkish Govern-
ment threatened to exercise its
right under the 1959 agreement
to intervene on Cyprus. Three
Turkish jet fighters flew over
Nicosia on 25 December, and
Turkish naval units appeared off
the island. Part of the 650-man
Turkish garrison on Cyprus left
its barracks to move into one

of the Turkish quarters of the
capital. Part of the 950-man
Greek contingent then moved to
protect Greek areas. The situa-
tion evidently prodded Athens
and London into a more active
role, and Greek, Turkish and
British forces on Cyprus have
been placed under a unified Brit
ish-led command. Britain has an
nounced it is sending 150 ad-
ditional troops.

—=FFpiting between the Gree
and Turkish Cypriot communities,
which. began on 21 December and

s continuing on 26 December
espite efforts to obtain a cease-
ire, is the culmination of a
teady growth of tension on the
sland during the past few weeks.
he new tension followed Presi-
ent Makarios' presentation to
rkish Cypriot leaders of propos-
1s for changing the Cyprus con-
-/stitution. The proposals, which
jessentially involved removing the
guarantees to the Turkish minor-
_\ity that had been written into
-\the Cyprus settlement of 1959,
-\were rejected by the Turkish Gov-
ernment even before the Turkish
. (Cypriots had made their views

known.

Most of the initial fight-
ing appears to have been between:
|Greek Cypriot police and the Turk-
_jish underground, and to have taken
place in the Turkish areas of Nic-

osia.. The situation there de-
teriorated progressively during
ithe week, as the police lost con-
trol to extremist groups of ir-
regulars from both communities.
TA cease-fire, to be supervised

i by the British, had not been ef-

The violence may make lead-
ers of both sides more cautious
in pressing political demands.
Soon after the outbreak, Makarios
told the US ambassador he would
go more slowly in pushing his con-
stitutional revisions. Both eth-
nic groups, however, will be fur-/
ther embittered--particularly
the Turkish community, which
is believed to have suffered
much the heavier casualties.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

4 fective as of the morning of 26
| December. Fighting had also con-
| tinued at the port city of Lar-
naca; the rest of the island was

tense.

t

27 Bec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 9

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r

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‘Asia-Africa
AREA NOTE
~~ ee ~ ~~ ~ ™~.
; Saudi Arabia: ‘Crown Prince were variously reported to have °
——. cl = <i on - ooo SS
¢ Faysal appears to haye weathered {been the new budget, which cuts

j his latest dispute with King
/ Saud without making any conces-
| The details of a new
| arrangement between the two are

sions.

not known, but Faysal is still

firmly in control of the govern-
ment. Royal Guard elements

| which the King ordered to posi-
tions around his palace at the

height of the dispute have now family. Throughout the crisis
been withdrawn,

Saud's attempt to resume per-
sonal control of the government,

| { The dispute centered on
| Sener he relinquished to Faysal

posts to two

funds allotted to the royal
family, and Faysal's refusal
to give cabinet
of Saud's sons.

In blocking Saud's chal- «
lenge, Faysal apparently was
supported by most of the im-
portant members of the royal

the Saudi regular army remained | \
under the orders of the minis-
ter of defense, Prince Sultan,
a Faysal adherent.
servers have reported that the
King's action has actually served

Some ob-

|
||
'

4 \
\
\

\
|

\

“hy

}
‘

\3_vear ago when his health. | to strengthen Faysal's-position. 4
\broke. The immediate issues 7 | (CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM) /

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW
TOP SECRET DINAR

Page

10

13-00000

y . ,

THE TARIFF DISPARITIES ISSUE.

4 “The tariff disparities issue which has plagied preparations for” the Kennedy Round for many’ 4
: “months ‘originates-in the-fact-that-there are substantial: differerices between the EEC rand US ~ .
~ fariffs on individual items, even though over-all tariff: levels are roughly the-same. Because “> ;
) _ the EEC common external, tariff was orrived at by: averaging the tariffs of the member states, ”: i.
| the EEC tariff schedule is characterized by the absence of “peaks and lows"; z.in the’ us schedule,
[ 6n the other hand, the rates vory much more, Gnd some individual tariffs remain very high in ‘
\ comparison with those of the EEC. Accordingly, the EEC and the French in particular have:
‘Yong insisted that a 50=percent cut in tariffs by both the US and the EEC would leave the US -
with substontidl protection on certain items and deprive the EEC of F bargaining power to > effect
their future reduction. Sas :
i

|. Jispe arities issue was ‘believed to have been settled at. the GATT ministerial meeting”

* last May ‘with a formula which provided that tariffs'on industrial. items would i general bes -
“reduced equally and across.the board, except that "special rules™ ‘would apply:"wheré sig-.
- nificant adverse effects on trade would result from disporjties.in tariff levels: In fact’, how- -
“ever, this formula merely shifted the argument to the problem of deterniining what dispari! ties
are’ “significant” or "meaningful in trade terms." Because the’ "special tules" Would mean ‘ins
most cases o smaller tariff reduction by the EEC than by the US, the EEC has attempted to
maximize the area to which these rules would opel while the Us has sought | to minimize their
opplication. - . .

4 * After: lengthy negotiation ,a GATT subcommitt: tee reached a ; considerable measure of
vd agreement last month on a formula which would identify a “significant tariff disparity in
"| the first instance as one in which the high rate is at least 30 percent of value and at least,
- 10 percent above the lower rate. Because this formula would identify some 850 US items as
eligible for "special treatment,“ the subcommittee proposed seven additional qualitative,
teria which would reduce considerably the number of eligible items... The three to which,
‘Us attaches ‘special importance would (1) require t ‘that there be ‘substantial imports of the item
7 concerned from the high tariff country into the low; (2) exclude items where there ore sub-
stantial. imports into the high tariff country: and (@) exclude tems on which the low tariff

ule epproved by the EEC on 23 Deceinber would sub:
. a’: 7/1 formula. A disparity would be identified as one in which the high tariff i is ‘twice
high as the low one, apparently with the additional qualification’ that,. in most cases,
‘!”" would have to be a ten-point percentage spread between the two rates. This formula w
“{ pfovide for special treatment for far more than 850 items, including items of special US
i export interest. The arrangements for qualitative criteria also-seem | to.have been-modified-

NY to the US! disadvantage

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CODE WORD MATERIAL ON REVERSE OF PAGE


- TOP SECRET DINAR

THE COMMON MARKET CRISIS

The Common Market appears to |
averted disaster for the sec—
nd time in less than a year. The
eleventh-—hour agreements reached

‘on agricultural policy on 23 De-
“cember are apparently sufficient

o discourage De Gaulle from carry-
ing out his threat to break up the
ommunity. Moreover, the Germans
and Dutch succeeded in extracting
limited commitments from Paris on
EEC participation in the Kennedy
Round of tariff negotiations. These
agreements donot cover all the out-
standing issues, however, and the
lanner in which they were reached
will leave a residue of bitterness.
Nor is it certain that major US
interests have fared well.

The main agricultural elements
in the "package" deal are the reg-~
ulations concerning intracommunity
trade in beef, rice, and dairy prod-
cts and the rules governing the

ommunity farm fund. Their effect
‘is to open the large West German

rket to farm exports of France,
Italy, and the Netherlands--gen-
erally at a substantial advantage
over the exports of nonmembers, Al-
though approval of these and the
financial regulations is an im-
portant step forward, the key ques-
tet of grain price unification is
still unsettled. Further considera-
tion of the formula proposed by Com~
missioner Mansholt has been delayed
until next year. t

The agreement on a Kennedy
Round position is likewise an ad-
vance for the community, but from
the US view not necessarily favor-

ble. On the long-standing problem
of tariff "disparities," the EEC
adopted a formula which would
exempt from the proposed 50-per-
cent linear reduction in tariffs
a| far larger number of itens than

the US “hoped for.—The EEC positio

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

Europe

on farm products in the trade ne- es

gotiations--although an improvenient
over the initial Mansholt propos- |
als--also leaves much to be desire
from the US view. In general, the |
EEC proposes that, if its levy sys-
tem operates in such a way as to
cause difficulties for the exports
of nonmembers, then the EEC Commis
sion will be called on to propose
"appropriate," but unspecified,
measures. These would not apply
if it is technically impossible to
determine how much protection is
actually involved in the levy sys-
tem.

The general relief within
the community which greeted these
agreements reflects both the :
depth of the crisis and some op-
timism that the Common Market's
unity may have been restored. The
prominent role played by the
EEC's commission in achieving
the compromise has in particu-
lar encouraged those who hope to
strengthen the community's in-
stitutional structure.

In France the conviction
was evidently widespread, how-
ever, that both Bonn and The
Hague were quite prepared to see
the French "leave" the Common Mar-
ket, and in the event of its
breakup, to seek alternative
ties with the Outer Seven. More-
over, while it may prove healthy
that Bonn "stood up" to De Gaulle
in this instance, its motive was |
strongly colored by a desire to pro-
tect its inefficient farmers. Nor
does it augur well for US-EEC re-
lations that the French blame the
US for much of the opposition
they_encountered, —_ (SEGREF_-NO.
FOREIGN DISSEM)

Page 11

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13-00900

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Europe

UK-US FRICTIONS OVER SHIPPING POLICY

jclal circles are incensed over
recent US demands for informa-
tion relating to rate discrim-
jnation against US exports.
The British Government has ad-
vised against compliance on
the grounds that this informa-
tion is commercially confiden-
tial, and that the US cannot
demand what the UK Government
cannot obtain.

Following a recent con-
gressional investigation into
alleged rate discrimination
against American exports, the
US Maritime Commission asked
the North Atlantic Freight Con-
ference to explain the differ-—
‘ehtials on a long list of items,

tting a 20 January deadline
a: compliance under penalty

heavy fines. The US posi-
ti n is that US exporters are
being penalized because outward
rates are higher on the average
than the inward rates.

British and other shipping
lines regard the differentials
s| economically justified. The
tonnage of US exports is much
gre ater than import tonnage,

nd Shipping lines--anxious to
avoid half-loaded or in-ballast
estbound voyages--have tradi-
ionally charged lower rates
or items imported into the US

than for exports from this
(country .

27 Dec 63

j-——_British shippin ‘and offi-

Thus, what are seen as

American efforts to regulate
international shipping lines in
order to improve the unfavorabl
US balance of payments have
caused increasing rancor in
Britain. Before Parliament ad-
journed for its Christmas recess
on 20 December, some Conserva- J
tive MPS called for retaliator
restrictions on US ships arriv-
ing at UK ports. Although the
MPS did not specify what re-
strictions they had in mind,

the government cannot afford

in the present pre-election
period to leave itself open :
to charges that it is not atten-/ .
tive enough to domestic interests.

while hopeful of some compromise
before the 20 January deadline,
is busily lining up international
support. At the recently con-
cluded conference of transport
ministers of 10 European mari-
time nations, Britain proposed
that Japan be invited to join
the united front of European
maritime countries in a general
protest against US shipping
policies, thereby aligning
roughly three quarters of the
world's shipping business against
the US position. Japan agreed

to do so, and the collective
protest was filed with the

State Department on 23 Decem-

ber. (CONFIDENTIAL NO_FOR-
EIGN -DISSEM)

The Douglas-Home compronise|

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 12

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13-00000

od

December

~ TOP SECRET DINAR C

WEST GERMAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

a The he _openini of the Berlin _
Wall during the holiday season

and the death of Social Demo-

cratic Party (SPD) chairman

Erich Ollenhauer have placed

Willy Brandt once again in the
enter of the German political

stage. ;

The agreement to open the
Wall resulted from Brandt's un-
ceasing efforts to ease condi-
tions for Berliners. His will-
the Eas to reach agreement with
he East Zone authorities on
the pass issue is being criticized
y some Christian Democratic
nion (CDU) leaders and by the
DU-oriented press in West Ger-
any. Brandt, however, is bank-
ng on the expectation that most
est Germans, like the Berliners,
ill approve his action. He
has even hinted that there may
be further negotiations with the
East Germans to extend the period
of the passes beyond the 5 Jan-
uary cutoff date. There is also
‘ eculation that both East and
st Germany will find the pass
agreenent a model for agreement
n other issues.

Brandt, who was the most
logical choice, was named acting
chairman of the SPD immediately
fter Ollenhauer's death on 14

> eputy Chairman Her=-
9 ehner has proposed that

27 Dec 63

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

Europe

Brandt's position be formalize:
at a special party convention
next month. Fritz Erler, the
party's foreign and defense
expert, is slated to take
Brandt's place in the hierarchy
as second deputy chairman. As
the SPD leader, Brandt would
stand to be candidate for chan-
cellor in the 1965 general elec-
tions. If current opinion polls
are any indication, the SPD
will give the CDU a strong race
in that contest.

Brandt, however, has not
yet committed himself, since
to accept the SPD chairmanship
might require him to resign as

In so doing he would have to
operate at a distance from his
political bastion.

Whatever Brandt decides,
the SPD is bound to miss the
conciliating influence of Ollen-
hauer, who was able to hold
together the often highly
antagonistic factions of the
party. Brandt, with his ideas
of greater flexibility in
foreign policy, may be expected
to clash more frequently with
Wehner, who--despite his Com-
munist past--has come to rep-
resent the SPD's right wing.

(SECRET -NO-FOREEGN-DISSEM)——————~"

S.

Page 13

TOP SECRET DINAR

mayor of Berlin and move to Bonn.

Jo


| that the alliance should explor

AREA NOTES

NATO: 3.
vial meeting in Paris; which
ended on 1 ecember, avoided

erious discussion of the more
ontentious issues facing the

alliance. There was, for in-
stance, only passing reference
to the matter of nuclear shar-
ing. While NATO's military

posture was generally recognized -

as still inadequate, the Force
Planning exercise--which is
designed to help correct this
situation--was not discussed
at all. The dispute over basi

strategy, the chief stumbling
biock to the exercise, was put
off until after De Gaulle's
press conference.sometime in
January.

All but the French agreed
e

possibilities of negotiating ;
with the Soviets on outstanding
Zast-West issues. The. Germans
as usual, indicated some reser-
vations because of their sensi+

tivity regarding Berlin and Ger-

man reunification. The question
f restricting Western ceestta,

o the Soviet bloc was reserve
for-future consideration. —¢

\CRET_NO-FOREIGN DISSEM)

27 Dec 63

CURRENT ™NTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

TOP SECRET DINAR (—

Europe

Iceland's (near general . .
strike was settled on'21 Decém-
‘Her! when ‘labor—and-manat
agreed to a 25-percent wage in
crease. The li-day work stop-
page was led by Communist-dom-
inated unions seeking, as in

e past, to force the resigna-
t jon of the Conservative - So-
cial Democratic government by

discrediting its economic poli-

Minister Benediktsson's govern-
ment, since the Communists were,
unable to maintain a solid grip
on labor.

r The settlement, however,
will intensify inflationary
pressures and will probably
force Benediktsson to take ex-
tyaordinary measures to maintai
e¢ onomic stability. For polit-

ip reasons he will try to avoid
another currency devaluation, |.
but it is doubtful that the
gi vernment can maintain its
economic stabilization program |-
without resorting—to-this meas- ©
ure... (CONFIDENTIAL ae

Page 14

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DOMESTIC POLITICS IN CUBA

Fidel Castro is continuing his
effort to reduce the influence of

the veteran Communists who were lead-

ers of the Moscow-oriented, pre-rev-
olutionary Communist party of Cuba.
Castro's campaign against then,
launched in a bitter attack in March
1962, subsequently seemed to lose
steam. Recent reports from knowl-
edgeable clandestine sources, how-
ever, indicate that the old liners
are again on the defensive and are
likely to suffer further in govern-
ment shake-ups which may be in the
offing. Castro nevertheless con-
tinues to move slowly in order to
avoid undue disruption within his
regime,

The only major veteran Commu-
nist figure to remain in Castro's
good graces is Carlos Rafael Rod-
riguez, the head of the National
Agrarian Reform Institute. Rod-
riguez' position has actually been
strengthened in recent weeks with
the raising of his job to cabinet
level. He has evidently convinced
Castro of his personal loyalty and
of his ability as an administrator,
It is also possible that Rodriguez
performs a useful and trusted liai-
son role between Castro and Soviet
leaders. He returned to Havana on
22 December after a two-week trip

to the USSR and several Soviet satel-

lites where, according to press ac-
counts, he. was in contact with high-
ranking Communist Party officials.

The old-line Cuban Communists

remain strong, according to a re-

cent clandestine report, in the in-
termediate and lower echelons of
the military and party hierarchies.
Wherever possible, they continue

27 Dec 63

Western Hemisphere

their "sectarian" efforts to secure
positions for their comrades at the
expense of Fidelistas. A clandes-
tine source reported hearing "ru-
mors" in high regime circles late
last month that veteran Communists
have banded together in clandestine
cells to work against Castro.

Che Guevara continues to be the
Cuban leader most openly critical of
the Soviet Union and the most’ insist-
ent on the “necessity" of accelerat-
ing the revolution in Latin America.
Fidel Castro is said to agree with
Guevara's position, but awareness of
Cuba's own self-interest still com-
pels him to be more cautious in pur-
suing policies that could be inter-
preted as anti-Soviet. It neverthe-
less remains a key regime policy to
encourage Communist revolution in
Latin America.

A clandestine source who is a
high-level Cuban diplomat asserts
that Cuban leaders privately recog-
nize that popular discontent with
the regime is widespread. He claims,
however, that they are confident
their unpopularity has reached its
nadir, and that they are beginning
to make up lost ground. They ex-
pect, for instance, that economic
difficulties--a major source of
discontent--will be largely over-
come within three years. The strat-
egy of the government, this source re-
ports, is to hold on untiis the econ-
omy improves and until Cuban subver-
sive efforts elsewhere in Latin
America result in the establishment
of one or more Communist allies in
the hemisphere. Then, the regime
feels, it will be secure. (SECRET NO
FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY)

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 15

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» . Western Hemisphere

‘ DOMINICAN REGIME FACES NEW POLITICAL CHALLENGES

p——~The_kilLinig=of_15 guerrillas | among civilian and militar

y Dominican Army troops on 21 elements. Only the prompt ap-
December apparently removes the pointment of Foreign Minister
jast pocket of insurgents op- Donald Reid to the vacant post
posing the government. However, in the triumvirate appears to
the incident could provoke dan- have helped avert a serious
gerous political repercussions. political crisis for. the moment.
Emilio De Los Santos, head The triumvirate has asked |
of the governing military-in- the cabinet--which was chosen
talled triumvirate, resigned in from and is responsible to six
rotest over what he regarded as minority political. parties--to
ithe brutal and unnecessary kill- resign to permit the appoint-—
ing of the insurgents, includ- ment of a more independent group,| .
ing the president of the pro- This move has promnted strong
Castro 14th of June Political protests from four of the splint
Group. The army commander of parties backing the regime, who
the area in which the incident stand to lose patronage; the
took place insists the deaths outcome is unclear, ,

were the unavoidable result of
a ifire fight. If stories of

-aymed forces "brutality" be- However, the National
‘come widespread, however, they Civic Union, the only sizable
could provoke dangerous hostility party in the government, backs
toward the regime from rank-and- the cabinet reorganization.
file Dominicans, who recall the More important, the key leaders
repressive measures of former of the armed forces are provid-
dictator Trujillo, , ing the triumvirate with their
. support, which could prove cru-
The resignation of De Los cial in a political showdown.

ntos precipitated frantic ma- | (SECRET _NO FOREIGN DISSEM
neuvering-within-the=governnent § [- nl

27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 16

TOP SECRET DINAR

3

TOP SECRET DINAR ©

SfurtherGhianges | in the Bra-
ilian cabinet are expected fol-
lowing the resignation last week
f£ Finance Minister Carvalho
Pinto. A moderate leftist, Ney
alvao, was appointed Pinto's
uccessor, but there remains a
possibility that Leonel Brizola--

who had been actively pushed for
the post by the extreme left--

y eventually receive some min-
idtry. There is widespread be-
lief in the army that War Min-
ister Jair Ribeiro will also be
raéplaced in the near future. As

ne responsible Brazilian com-
entator has remarked, with Gou-
lart “every minister is an in-
erim one."

Ney Galvao's appointment
actually reduces the previously
slight prospect that Brazil's
eritical financial problems would
ibe handled effectively. Galvao's

lifications in the economic

field are weak at best and his rec-
ord as head of the Bank of Brazil

does not command confidence with-
in the business community. Be-
fore taking his new post, he.
served as minister without port-—
fdlio in charge of coordinating
foreign trade policies, a job

he performed without any par-
ticular distinction.

Although his views are
Rs haps Soétiewhat-to—the-right~ of

27 Dec 63

- Goulart's

’ vestors.

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW

Western Hemisphere

falvao can be expected
to toe the adminstration line
faithfully. Moreover, Galvao's
appointment may be a temporary
expedient designed to allay
fears that Brizola would succeed
Pinto. Galvao is a versonal.
friend of Brizola and there is
speculation that Brizola will,
in fact, eventually move into
the Finance Ministry.

The new finance minister
inherits almost insurmountable
economic and financial problems.
Chief among these are a rampant
inflation that may see the cost
of living increase 80 percent
this year, and a staggering
foreign debt involving approxi-
mately $1 billion in payments
due over the next two years.

The severity of the eco-
nomic situation and Goulart's
apparent intention to assume
greater personal direction over
financial policies increase
the possibility of radical meas-
ures that might be detrimental
to foreign creditors and in- .
Goulart reportedly is
considering nationalization of
all public utilities and can-
cellation of mining concessions.

Measures such as these could

lead to further deterioration
of Brazil's economic position.
(SECRET)

«

Page 17

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|


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a Western Hemisphere
AREA NOTE
Bolivia:,The political assure his renomination, and
“competition between Bolivian / | designate his own running mate. >

| Vice-President Juan Lechin and

President Victor Paz Estenssoro If the forthcoming conven-=
is bound to intensify sharply tion repudiates Lechin, he may
as each maneuvers to line up well withdraw from the MNR and

| Support for the presidential establish a "popular front" po-
nomination at next month's con- litical party. He probably
vention of the Nationalist could count on the support of

: Revolutionary Movement (MNR). political groups ranging from
Lechin probably still hopes to leftist extremists to disgruntled
pull an upset by dislodging Paz factions within right-wing parties:
or at least to demonstrate suf- It would seem unlikely, though,
ficient strength to assure him- that these disparate groups could
self of retaining his vice~ coalesce into an organization
presidential post. Paz seems powerful enough to defeat Paz’
certain, however, to be able to well-organized machine in the J
control’ the party" S- ‘convention;~~“I~ elections Set for June. (SECRET) /

* * *
27 Dec 63 CURRENT INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY REVIEW Page 18

TOP SECRET DINAR

1 « . decietenen fees ct awe nme em ee tT eeek cee nee meee ne cient nm de att eammnaicanas sae sarc atelaa Bee Tebabe ce dee ee mates ene oy me Ppa t ne

; ase - JOP SECRET '

. Ld .
pene rn on ee ee erreneepeenanenrrammisommemnraratGnactnage spate 11

TOP SECRET


