DARAAN .
Ii104-10332-10076 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 . lL .
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' 13 December 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

SUBJECT: (U) Identity of Human Sources

(We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA
once the Review Board has completed its deliberations. on the
issues discussed below.)

1. (U) Issue. The purpose of this memorandum is to
"relate CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the
release of the true names of human sources of intelligence
which appear in the JFK Collection and to present a proposal
on how this problem could be addressed. )

I. Factual Background

2. (U) In general, CIA “sources” are foreign
nationals, recruited and living in a foreign country, who
provide information to the U.S. Government under a promise
of confidentiality. Their act of passing information to the
U.S. is generally against the national interest of their own
country and would be considered espionage, which is a.
capital offense in most countries. Just as in this country
when a spy is caught, should a CIA source be discovered, it
would be “headline news," even 30 years after the fact. The
Review Board will recall that when former National Security
Agency employee Robert Lipka was arrested approximately a
year ago for espionage he allegedly committed 30 years
earlier, this received a lot of attention in the United
States. Lipka is currently awaiting trial. in the U.S. for
his alleged espionage activities.

3. (U) This month, the Review Board will be
considering approximately 50-60 true names of human sources
, for release. These particular sources range from encrypted

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assets to one-time contacts. It is our understanding that
additional source names appear throughout the JFK Collection
and will be reviewed in the future. It is important,
therefore, that the Review Board and CIA agree ona

‘consistent method of dealing with source names appearing in

the JFK Collection at this time so as not to. impede the
future review of documents. .

4. (C) The Review Board has recently developed a
policy for releasing the true names of covert CIA employees.
Although there are. many similarities between covert
employees and sources, there is an important difference that
should be reflected in the way the Review Board looks at
this issue. With CIA covert employees who are mentioned in
this collection, it has been possible in some instances to

go to them and seek their permission to reveal their names.

Some of these former employees have even been made available
for interviews and depositions. With most sources, it is
not possible to do this. First, CIA has dropped contact
with some of these sources and may not be able to locate
them. Attempting to find these individuals would create
some risk of creating suspicions that they were or are
associated with this Agency or the U.S. Government. If CIA
were unable to locate a particular source, there would still
be some risk in releasing his name. Just because CIA cannot

‘locate him, does not mean that he. is not alive and:-well-

known in his own community. Even if we were able to locate
a source without risk to his safety, it is probable that he
would not want to be visited by the CIA again after so many
years. More than likely, sources do not now want their past
association revealed when they have undoubtedly moved on in

' their lives to-do other things. Some may be in political or

private enterprise positions where CIA affiliation would
damage them professionally and/or harm them and their
families personally.

5. (U) Another important distinction that needs to be
taken into account is the difference between CIA and Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) “sources.” Perhaps the most

significant difference is that many FBI sources provide |
information with the understanding that the information and
the source will be publicly revealed. FBI sources are often
used in criminal prosecutions as witnesses. CIA, on the
other hand, promises secrecy and confidentiality to its
sources. CIA sources rarely appear at public trials. [In-
fact, not only is the identity of CIA sources protected from
public acknowledgment, but also it is closely held within
the Agency itself. Another difference is the fact that a

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foreign’ national cooperating with CIA is usually committing
a unique violation of his own country’s laws-~espionage. ‘IE

- one gets caught committing espionage, the punishment in many

countries is for a capital offense. On the other hand, a
foreigner who cooperates with the FBI is not usually
committing espionage. Cooperation may be with the full

‘knowledge of his government--such as cooperation in a

criminal investigation. Therefore, the risks for
cooperation with the FBI are not usually as great as
cooperation with CIA.’ In addition, the FBI has greater
means for protecting individuals who provide information to
it, for example, the. witness protection program, which CIA
does not have. .

II. Legal Considerations

6. (U) Although Section ll{a) of the JFK Act provides
that when the Act requires release of information, it takes
precedence over all other laws that would otherwise prohibit
the true names of sources. CIA believes that it is
important for the Review Board to consider the laws, which
have been growing and developing over the years, to protect
classified information because they clearly reflect a larger
U.S. Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

7. (U) By Executive Order (E.O.)and statute, the
President and Congress have made the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) responsible for protecting intelligence
sources. In his Directive of 22 January 1946 which
established the Central Intelligence Group, President Truman
made the DCI responsible. for protecting sources. With the
establishment of the CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this
responsibility. The National Security Act of 1947, Section
103 (d) (3), codified at 50 U.S.C. §403(3)(c) (5), requires the _
DCI to protect intelligence sources from unauthorized

‘disclosure. In addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to
ensure that risks to the United States and those involved in

the collection of intelligence through human sources are
minimized.

8. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
with or for CIA has been of particular concern to U.S.
lawmakers since the establishment of the Agency. For
example, with Section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act. of
1949, 50 U.S.C. 1949 §403g, Congress specifically exempted
the CIA from the provisions of any law requiring the
publication or disclosure of the organization, functions,
names, titles, salaries or numbers of personnel employed by
the Agency. Although the purpose of this law is to protect

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employees of the CIA, and not assets or contacts, it .
indicates Congress‘ intent from early on to protect those

working covertly for the U.S. Government... -

9. {U) In 1980, Congress passed the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,

trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving

or potentially involving classified information. Working
with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
successfully protected intelligence sources from public
release even in criminal trials where there are heightened
(i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring disclosure to
the defendant of all.government information relevant to the
défense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte hearings in
which the judge can rule on questions of admissibility and
relevancy of classified information, including the identity
of human sources who may have information pertaining to the
defense, before it is introduced either to the defendant or
Gefense counsel, or in open court. In some cases involving
CIA, the judge has ordered that CIA information be turned
over to the defense, but only in some unclassified form such
as in a summary. In other cases, judges have reviewed the
Classified information and ruled that the harm to national
security outweighs the defendant‘s legal rights to the
information. In still other cases, the defense was never
notified that CIA even had information bearing on the case
as the judge ruled that the mere fact that CIA possessed
this information was classified and outweighed any rights
the defendant had. .Moreover, under CIPA, the Attorney
General has the authority to drop a prosecution in those
cases where the risk to national security is too great.

10 (U) In 1982, Congress acted to protect human
intelligence sources by passing the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982, 50 U.S.C. §421 which criminalizes
the revelation of a source’s identity. This Act subjects
anyone who reveals information that identifies a covert
agent to prosecution with up to 10 years in prison and
$50,000 in fines. A covert agent includes: (a) a U.S.
citizen whose intelligence relationship | with the U.S.
Government is classified and is acting abroad as an agent,
informant or source of operational assistance to an
intelligence agency; and (b) an individual, other than a
U.S. citizen whose past or present intelligence relationship
to the U.S. is classified information and who .is a present —
or former agent or: informant of, or is of operational

_ assistance to, an intelligence agency.

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11. (U) These statutes are just a few examples ofa
larger government policy to protect human sources from
public disclosure. There has also developed over the years

-a significant amount of case law which further implements
this policy. For example, in Sims y. CIA, 10 S.Ct. 1981

(1985), the Supreme Court. held that pursuant to the National
Security Act, the DCI had the authority to protect from
release to Freedom of Information Act requesters the
identities of individuals conducting research on projects
financed by CIA. The Supreme Court further stated that the
DCI’s authority to protect sources was broad, and was not
limited to only those individuals who were guaranteed
confidentiality.

12. (U) Most recently, President Clinton signed an

Executive Order on classified national security information

which came into effect in October 1995. Although it
requires that agencies make greater declassification efforts
than the prior Executive Order, Executive Order 12958
affords human sources extra protection from its
declassification provisions. .Under E.0. 12958, information

that is over 25 years old and has historical value must be

declassified within five years. owever, information
revealing the identity of a-human source may continue to be
protected.

13. (U):' The above federal statutes and case law show
a long-standing practice of protecting human sources who

provide intelligence’ information to the U.S. Government. In

carrying out its statutory obligations, the Review Board
should give serious weight to this policy and afford the
protection of human sources the highest priority.

III. Operational Considerations

14. (U) As the Review Board is well aware, in order
for CIA officers to effectively collect intelligence around
the world, they cannot acknowledge publicly that they work
for CIA and, conversely, CIA cannot acknowledge a particular

“individual's affiliation with it. This is true even more so

with sources. In addition to the risk to a source’s
personal safety, discovery of a CIA source would also reveal

‘any operations he was conducting and CIA case officers with

whom he was meeting or might even cast suspicion on the

* (U) The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. §552 is another
example of a federal statute that allows for the protection of human
sources. Although the FOIA generally mandates release of government
documents, exemption b(3) allows for withholding: from release
information that is exempted from disclosure by statute. The National
Security Act has been held’ by the Supreme Court to be such a withholding
statute. Sims v. CIA, 105 S.ct. 1981 (1985). ;

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affiliation of innocent family and friends. This is no less

_true with a source who -no longer works for. the Agency. A

source's. prior affiliation.with CIA is normally still
classified in order to protect him, his former contacts at
CIA, the CIA facilities at which he may have been meeting
with case officers, the cover mechanisms employed to protect
his affiliation with CIA, and the operations which he
conducted.

15. (U) The public disclosure of an individual’s
affiliation with CIA could and, in fact, has threatened the
safety and lives of not only the source, but also their
families, colleagues, officials of foreign governments and
other foreign nationals with whom they have had contact.

The Review Board will certainly recall the Proenza case

{since this was released by the Board in August 1995) in
which a number of Cuban officials were falsely believed to
be CIA agents. They were arrested, convicted and spent
years in prison for their alleged treasonous activities and
their professional and personal lives were ruined. The
threat of violence to those who are in fact associated with

CIA is even more real. These individuals live and work in

foreign countries, many of which have a local population
hostile to the United States and especially CIA. If one
should doubt the risks that those affiliated with CIA face,
one only has to recall that, in 1992, two CIA employees were
murdered while waiting to turn into CIA Headquarters in.
Virginia. If this type of attack is possible right at the
CIA’s front gate, it is not hard to imagine the personal
risks that those working with the CIA abroad face. Clearly,
the-risk is that much greater for those who are sources:
for example, as a result of Aldrich Ames’ disclosures to
the KGB, 10 Soviets who were covert assets of the CIA were
executed.

16. (U) Incidents: such as these clearly demonstrate
that the policy of protecting association with the CIA is an

‘important one. Individuals associated with CIA have been —
and will continue to be subjected to threats, reprisals and

physical injuries from foréign intelligence services,
terrorist groups, and other persons or organizations hostile
to CIA or the U.S. Government. Individuals choose to .._
undertake these risks for many different reasons, but it is.
with the condition that the CIA will protect their ,
cooperation with the U.S. Government.

Iv. ‘Proposal
‘17. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is

important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
sources in the JFK Collection.. The Agency proposes that in

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most .cases a substitution for the true name be used. In
prior releases of these same documents, the Review Board >
agreed to redact the true name and substitute “source.” If
the Review Board is: concerned about tracking particular
sources throughout the records, a particular identifying

_ substitution can be used for an individual source throughout

{for example, “Mexican source 1”).

18. (S) Among the names that are currently being
considered for release by the Review Board, the following
are some that the CIA proposes be treated in this manner:

e True name of LIRING/3, an encrypted asset of the
CIA{and unilateral penetration of. the Cuban |
‘Embassy. His wife also worked at the Embassy ,and
he was “apparently suspected as being CIA though it
was never proven. LIRING/3 at some point
disappeared and we have no way of knowing what his
_current situation is.

° True name of SETHRGTD (3 the ai lateral
(penetration of ‘the Nicaraguan Service./ The Review
Board will recall that it has already been fully

briefed on ERTHYROID/3 and had agreed to the

protection of the fact {that he was a unilateral)

) {Enthony Cc: M. Devere (4041901210022) was [is] a
(member of the. British Service jAs Such, he was

Tis] “a \diaison Jsource. Th This raises concerns about

protection of our, liaison) relationships.

Moreover, Mr. Devere’ s\|identity constitutes

-* forei “government:-inftorn don*’\which, as the

Board has already been informed, the CIA does not.

“have the authority to release.

19. (S) Another type of name that similarly should be’
protected from release is the new identity provided toa |
defector. Although defectors do not face some of the
dangers that “assets” overseas face, they are still given
new identities for their protection because there is some
risk to their personal safety even in the U.S. For example,
in this collection the identity of Golitsyn appears in
documents being reviewed this month.’ Since the time of his
defection,..Golitsyn has utilized successive identities;
because they /have been unofficially disclosed, that have not

7 (S) Golitsyn‘ s identity had to be changed again. However, there is a

risk that revealing this former identity could lead to the
identification of Golitsyn’s current identity.

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been officially released and that are closely held within
the Agency. This is done for his own protection and that of.
his family even though they live in the United States. CIA
cannot, at this time, agree to the official release of
Golitsyn’s assumed new identities or for that matter of any
defectors that appear to date:in the collection.

20. (S) CIA has noted that-in some cases a source is
identified by only a first name or a code name. Where CIA
has been unable to identify any information about that
individual or there is no other source revealing information
that has been revealed in the JFK Collection, it would he ,
possible to release that name. For example, in a few
documents, the name “Tota” appears. To date, CIA has been
unable to determine who this person is and there does not
appear to be any further source revealing information in the
collection. It is probably that “Tota” is just a code name
or a street name known to his colleagues. As “Tota” is a
common name, such a release would not threaten the
particular individual or his family, and as the person can
not be identified it would not seriously undermine the U.S.

Government policy to protect intelligence sources.

21. (U) The Agency recognizes that some names may be
particularly important to the JFK story. In such cases, the
CIA is willing to work with the Review Board to come to the
appropriate resolution. CIA proposes that it conduct a
record search for information on that individual. It may be
that in these cases, if the person is deceased and has no
living family, that the Review Board and the CIA can agree
that the value of revealing the true name outweighs the need
to protect that source from disclosure.

22. (U) %&It is our hope that the CIA and the Review
Board can work out a mutually agreeable policy regarding the
identity of human sources that will not undermine the
important policy of protecting those who work covertly for
the U.S. Government. As usual, my staff and I are available
to discuss this matter with you.

MS Leo .
\John F. Pereira
Chief, Historical Review Group

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a

DCI/CSI/J.Pereira: apd/x31805 (13 Dec 96)
G:/CSIFO/SHARED/Pereira.doc

Distribution:

Original - Addressee
- CSI/HRP Chrono
- D/CSI
C/CSI/HRG
- Barry Harrrelson, CSI/HRP
- (linda: ‘Cipiriani,

PRPRPRPP
‘

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"Fe
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aon
oe CIA HAS KO OBJECTION TO
MEMORANDUM DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
. IN THIS DOCUMENT
September 25, 1998
To: Laura Denk
Executive Director
co: Bob Skwirot
, CIA Team Leader .
From: Michelle Combs

Associate Director for Research and Review

Subject: No Evidence of Contact Between Lee Harvey Oswald and the CIA’s Office of
Operations

One of the e enigmas that has surrounded Lee Harvey Oswald’s defection and re-defection is the
question of-whether the CIA’s Office of Operations (later the Domestic Contacts Division)
interviewed or took note of Oswald either before his trip or upon-his return from the Soviet
Union. The available evidence is somewhat contradictory. The CIA has long claimed that
Oswald was never a source, asset, or employee of the CIA. Yet, a November 25, 1963
memorandum discusses the recollections of a CIA staff officer that the Agency considered

_interviewing Oswald. Further, another former CIA officer, Donald E. Deneselya, has stated that

he recalls reading an OQ debriefing report in the summer of 1962 from a former Marine re-
defector who had worked at the Minsk Radio Factory. The Review Board could not corroborate
the recollections of the two former CIA officers with additional records or information.

In an effort to clarify the mystery, the Review Board searched for records that might confirm or
deny any contact between Oswald and the CIA before or after his time in the Soviet Union. In
the early 1960's, the Office of Operations (OO) was.a part of the Directorate of Intelligence.

This office, which interviews American citizens who might have come into contact with
information or individuals of intelligence interest overseas, later became the Domestic Contacts
Division (DCD) of the Directorate of Operations. - This office nommally only contacts individuals -
after receiving questions or requirements from intelligence community customers looking for
particular types of information.

’ The Review Board staff examined OO records and operational histories to gain an understanding

of OO practices in the late 1950's and early 1960's. The Review Board staff could find no
evidence of contact between Oswald and OO either before or after his time in the Soviet Union.
Had Oswald departed for his trip to.the Soviet Union through New York City, as did most
travelers, he possibly might have come to the attention of OO. The Review Board. staff did not
locate any reference or record to Oswald’s departure from New Orleans via freighter that
predates the assassination. The Review Board staff also could not locate any.information to

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document an OO interest in Oswald upon his return from the Soviet Union. While OO was
interested in interviewing tourists to the Soviet Union for general information in the 1950's, by
1962 only travelers with special access, knowledge, or skills were of intelligence interest. OO
had no specific policy covering contacts with returning defectors although a local field office
could initiate a contact if justified by a particular situation. According to the records located,
OO only made contact with three of twenty-three defectors in the 1954-1962 time period. No
records or reporting showing any OO contact with Oswald could be located. The Office of .
Operations did interview re-defector Robert Edward Webster in June 1962 on his work at the —

Plastics Institute of Leningrad.

While a DCD “A” file on Oswald does exist in the CIA’s sequestered collection, most of the .

documents in the file are from the mid-1970's, none predate the assassination, and the file
appears to have been created as DCD personnel attempted to locate any evidence of contacts —
with Oswald in response to various congressional investigative bodies. This file has been
processed for inclusion in the JFK Collection at the National Archives. ;

File 4 4. 50 0 (Wrap Up Memos)

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9 October 1997

Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn
Executive Director
Assassination Records Review Board

From: J. Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Officer

CIA/CSI/HRG
Subject: October 14 Meeting - Source Names
Reference: “A” Name List of Sources

(CIA requests that this memorandum and its attachments
be returned once the Review Board has completed its
deliberation on the names discussed below.)

1. Manuel Calvillo, an unwitting source of (Alfonso /
‘Wichtrich _ (see below)/, Calvillo became a figure in the JFK
story, whén Elena Garro de Paz identified him as the person
who sequestered her in a hotel after she protested at the
Cuban Embassy. Because of this link to stories related to
Oswald's visit to Mexico City, Calvillo is considered a JFK
assassination figure. His name and all assassination-x: related.
information have been released in collection. } However, his ?
\erypt when Iinked to his true name has been deleted. “The
* CIA requests that his crypt not be released when associated
¢with the true name in order to protect Wichtrich and other ~_
_ involved with the LIHUFF project. The linkage of Calvillo's <
“true name with his crypt could lead to his association with | :
~ and identification of Wichtrich and his assistant. LO

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2. CIA concurs with the release of the following name
in the specific documents cited:

Miguel Nazar-Haro in documents 104-10052-10058
and 104-10014-10016.

‘Because of the relationship of this individual with the CIA,
futuré documéfts containing his name must be reviewed on a
case-by-case basis; there may be situations in which the
Agency will request that the name be protected.

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3. Phillipe “Thyyraud- “De Vosjoli: eee a

Former head of the French Service in Washington
(1951-63), De Vosjoli retired and became a CIA/FBI asset. As
a USG asset, he had contact with German and Canadian 7
Intelligence Services in the mid-1960s and early 1970s. He :
became a naturalized US citizen c.1971. Apparently his case if
was not handled in normal defector channels as the fs
responsible component has no records of De Vosjoli. His 201 a
file shows that his last substantive contact with the Agency yy
was in 1972 and was initiated by him from Florida. Although ff
De Vosjoli has publicly acknowledged his unilateral 7

relationship with the Agency during his tour in Washington, js
it is not clear if the extent of his activities following |
his defection is widely known. Official confirmation of his ‘ij

“defection” could potentially affect the Agency's foreign Le

_—
Maison relationships |. __. er

4. The CIA requests that the three names discussed _
below from the A List be protected. ) All are, or were,

covert “assets of the Agency: The Agency has a Moral; and ~
possibly a legal, obligation to protect their identities. \ \
As a basic tenet of the covert relationship, the Agency

agreed to protect the fact of their relationships with the \
USG; and they, in turn, promised to keep those relationships \
secret. To our knowledge, the individuals have honored this \\
basic contractual commitment. The Agency believes that the
possible harm to the individuals, their families and/or V4
associates, and the potential for damage to sensitive
intelligence operations, outweigh the contribution the a
release of these three names would make to public
understanding of the assassination. The Agency is
particularly concerned about the erosion of the principle of
protecting the identity of sources and the potential L,
chilling effect on future agent operations and recruitment. ii
The Agency is further concerned about the possibility of //
liability to the individuals and their families for failure J/

eiaded ra oe _ — we ae
A. Franklin sthony GavGia Welore a
WU SELL Se ae
i The Agency acknowledges” that Wheelock is a key figure

/ tn the Alavarado story, and it has released all information
(including his crypt) except for his name. It is not known:
if Wheelock is still alive. However, he had five children
who may still be living in Nicaragua and are probably
unaware of their father's Agency relationship. The release
of his name could have negative repercussions for Wheelock
and his family. Nicaragua is a small, provincial place, and
Wheelock's patronymic name is a prominent one in the
country. Revelation of his name and his relationship with
CIA would be quickly disseminated within Nicaragua, and his
family members would be easily identified. Such

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ff identification could result in anything from public oS
f humiliation to dangerous retaliation by the thriving leftist a
i Sandinistas. In either case, disclosure would undercut the ff
\ Agency's ability to recruit sources in small countries such //
SH Nicaragua. ro Spee a Eng ena ~ an

——-~B;> Jose Marie Mankel. 7 ee

PO Coto

Mr. Mankel is a central figure in the Agency project SY
named ZRRIFLE. The Agency has released his crypt and al-
most all the information related to the project. Mankel's

| relationship with the Agency commenced in November 1960 and i
i ended in February 1964. Our files do not reflect any contact |
[i since that time. It is presumed that, if Mankel is still 4
| alive, he is living in Luxembourg. VA

Mankel had numerous acquaintances in European criminal vA
circles, and, on behalf of Agency/ZRRIFLE interests, he
sought out individuals from this element. Acknowledgment 1
| that Mankel worked for the USG/CIA could result in personal i
\ harm to him, his family, and associates. In addition, his |
\ 201 file, which is in the JFK collection, contains a number iF
| of references to his support of the Bureau of Narcotics and if
Dangerous Drugs. Given the potential compromise of ;

|
individuals and operations totally unrelated to the JFK fi
| story, the Agency requests that Mankel's true name continue I
\ to be protected. Coordination with DEA may also be required /;
in this case. Mankel's 201 File is available for review in LE
AN the CIA secure area. : OY
aa “(Alfonso RudoTpa’ WIChEriCh. TO re
_— ann 7 ene —
(or ——~ A WWII intelligence officer, Wichtrich worked with the \

if Agency in Panama during 1947-49 and in Mexico City from \
4 1954-70 in various capacities (Station contact, field agent,
i and contract agent). A prominent businessman, he was general
manager of the Royal Crown Cola Company in Mexico and later
I was executive vice president of the American Chamber of

| Commerce in Mexico. During the JFK time frame, he was

| primary agent on a CA project (LIHUFF), initially set up to /
i] support a conservative front organization. He later became I
|; the sole focus of the project. In that role he also served |
as the cut-out for an unwitting individual, Manuel Calvillo if
{see above). Wichtrich's only link to the JFK story appears fi
| to be his relationship with Calvillo. A review of his files i
| (OP, 201, C, Production) by the ARRB staff did not identify i

TR.
oe

\\ any other connection to the JFK story. A selection of if
\\. Gocument s from his file are attached. y

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Given Wichtrich's high profile, the release of his name
could impact both past and future intelligence operations
and directly affect Mr. Wichtrich and his family. His son
had contact with the Panama City Station'in 1979; we are
trying to determine the extent of that relationship. In this
case, the Agency believes that the potential for harm
clearly outweighs the contribution the release of
Wichtrich's name would make to the JFK assassination story.

J. Barry Harrelson

Attachments: As stated

SECRET

