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157-10014-10081
HEARINGS

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

SSCIA

GOODWIN, RICHARD

07/10/75

61
ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CIA

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT

TRANSCRIPT
UNCLASSIFIED

OPEN IN FULL

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
05/12/98

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Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations with Respect te Tatelligeance Activities

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Thuraday, July 10, 1975
Washington, D.C.

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(Stenotype Tape and Wasts turned over

to the Comntceeg for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Thursday, July 10, 1975

United States Senate,

Select Committee to Study Governmental
Oparations with Respect to
Governmental Activities,

Washington, 0. C.

The Committes met, pursuant to notice, at $:02 o'clock
pem. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (prasiding), Hart of Michigan,
Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and
Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick
A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority
Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan,
David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea.

Professional Staff Membars.

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F7JANANNAT R79.

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The Chairman, We will come back into order.

Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you ara about to give
in this Proceéding will be the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Goodwin. I do.

The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has
been some problem in connection ‘vith your appearance here today
and that there are soma notes that you have that you feel you
need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought
with you. Is that the cage?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they miqht he helpful. Thay
have been in storage for Several years and fY just had no access
to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They wera
notes -- my files and averything have been in storage for
Several years. I've had no access to tham. And they consist
of the files that 1 brought from the White House with me.

The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the
staff and shown certain documents that the staffé believes will
be pertinent to your tastimony?

Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with
the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

The Chairman. And do you bellave that you are prepared

today to give us testimony ralating to Mr, Trujillo or do you

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at

you need to oF oughe to Faview those notes befora

tenants

5 . you give any testimony?

y Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm ef course fully prepared to testiry

§ : to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think |

: | probably in the case of the Dominican Republie, the documents |

a ; 6 : have been adequate. I think there’s a good chance that goina |

x i 9 | through the files may very well add something to my recollection
a | g || of Cuba and Castro.

M4 | 9 | The Chairman, Well I will have this suqgeation to make.

u 10 We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and |

11 | then «= how long will it take you to qet your files and review

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12 | them and coma hack fully prepared to give us your testimony on:

13] the other issues?

WARS & Paw,

14 Mr. Goodwin. ell, 1¢ will take a day or two, ft is

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25) Posaible X will not be able to gat access to them until Monday

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16 i morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello

17 | 4n@ find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine.

18 But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.
19 The Chairman. So that if the Comnittes were to give you |

20 that opportunity, would you than get those files, review then, |

sont tafeebettigesd outte, ccs
TENSE SAE SIUM

2) || 4nd respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the}

first of next week to testify?

22

Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly,

The Chairman. Wa are most anxious to complete the record

410 Fars Street, $.£., Wemnengion, D.C. 20008

and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly

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adconodate' our, fn

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owe

Mr. Goodwin, f

The Chateman.” ai rtones

. 4 With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you
i
aan 8 prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?
oon 6 Mr. Schwarg, I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have
M , 9 a chance to get togather. f thought we were going to have a
8 | chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to
7 9 Speak to you but I do know some of the material, and Perhaps
 o% 10 || ¥e can work on the material.
é ll Refore we do g0, could you state your full name and you:
oi 12 address please? ,
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Washington, B.C.

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4 Mr. Schwarz. And as a macter of course, we teil all of i
}
5 | our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their '

6 | right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop i

9 to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?
8 Mr. Goodwin. f already have too many lawyers.

bas | 9 Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional

m 10 || rights are?
aed
_ 11 Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.
wi 12 Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the
Oc; 13 || Dominican Republic in the winter and eapring of 1961?
- . 14 Mr. Goodwin. I came inte the White House ag Assistant |
ce 15 | Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin
< 16 | American affairs policy statements in the preceeding campaign. |
-*= 17 || I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until! :
ia i| % left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a |
§ 9 | datay basis with President Kennedy and his activities’in Latin
8 20 || Amarica which included what was happening in the Dominican
I . pi] Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepare:
: ge || cables that want to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that
I pz) you are interested in, and I waa with him every day on somethin:
eG é . connected with Latin America.
3

Me. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary j
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material, would you recount for the Committee your understand Jn:
of what the United States government policy toward the Dominic
Republic was in the winter and spring of ‘61 and what actions
were taken to implement that policy.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of th-
policy established by Pragident Eisenhower when he, in
accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decide
to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican .

Republic and the sithation whith you know arose was precipitated

by the attempted assassination of Prasident fetancourt by the

A

President of the Dominican Republic.

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So that from that point on when we cama in, the feeling
wags, firat of all, of course that Trujillo was evan more
at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Proqregs tha:
had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other
relations, that Trujillo's time: dh office was probably,
numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade
which was often in great domestic difficulty had been tha
concept of Amarican support, it strengthened Trujillo agains:
his opposition.

At that point our policy became one of trying to anticlru:
at least, the fall of trujilio. Of course the Castro thing
wags Very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern «!

the President, the ons thing he didn't want was for Trujillo

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to go and a Communist leadar to come in. - So I think the policy

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Pern Ean gare

was to keep up our eaconemia ané diplomatic prassure to hope

that when Trujillo went, howaver he went, whether violently or

Peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would

be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of |

the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keap in
touch with and halp out and keep communications open with |
the potential successor groups, and it wag very hard to

pinpoint.

Hr. Schwarg. What stepa did you take during the period
of tima you were involved, or prior therate, if you know
about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident
groups?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from
policy statements, the usé of USIA, the ude of economic
Pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile

groups principally'in New York and elsewhere. A certain number

pannnesiayq

of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn

of course was one of tha principals, his principal instruction

aap rennennerstpvornen yetmnr me

19 || was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was

20 zealous in thia because ha disliked Trujillo intensely himself

2) and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups.

|
22 And ¥ read through the sort of overall Planning papers, and I |

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think they fairly reflact that range of operations.

None of them wera terribly effactive.

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Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arma,

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1 | what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorization!
j 2 || was provided to transfer arms?
j 4 Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Fisenhower .;
4 Mr. Schwarz. And that was at 4 meating of the Special ‘
5 Group? :
6 Mr. Goodwin. Well, 1 don't know because they didn't let !

7 || me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of |
j

8 | some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really
* 9 | know the procedure.
. 10 Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed?
=: 11 ‘Mr. Goodwin. I don’t’ know. [I became aware of the transfer

i7 | effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns were to be given as

18 | Dearborn told me later in conversation after tha assassination

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“4 12] of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the
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c: 13 i transfer of a couple of carbines and .39 pistols. After the |
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c 15 |} came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request
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19 | because theses people felt their own lives were in danger,
20 | especially if they embarked on anything ‘as risky as trying to
fi || kill Trujillo, and thay wanted some self-defense weapons, and

22 | they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a

24 | request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, thev

24 || wanted a machine gun.

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25 Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of People had

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tried and most of tham, they were all dead.

try with a .38,

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It was a very

Tte's not the kind of thing they would want to

And f think also, I mean nobody, I think -- aa I say, we

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Goodwin.

in convarsation.
have known at one time how ha qot them.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know [ei

fthe diplomatic pouch

Mr. Goodwin.

Mr. Schwarz.

far as you know?

Mr. Goodwin.

| had no particular anticipation that this or any other group
6 | would be successful in somathing that nobody had been able to

do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.

Did you know how the arma were passed into

the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?

No, I only know what Dearborn later told ma

I only have this fifteen year old mamory

2 | on my part that he qave tham to them in the consulate.
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guns in the Dominican Republic. ‘a4

I may

There were a lot of

that arms were passed through}

I did not know that, but 1 wouldn't be

surprised, weapons of that size.

Now again, when were the arms passed, as

Wall I don't know. Y don't have the exact --

the message is in here. I think it waa after President

Kennedy took office.

My knowladgs of it was on the basin of the massage --

The Chairman.

Ia thers someone that can halp Mr.

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Goodwin


Ne aR ORY Bing

ECRET

“oe 10
@ with the documents? |
H 2 Mr. Schwara. Let'a mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1,
j 3 || a document consisting -~ dated May 13, 1961 and headed t

4 Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating: ¢
$ “Attached is the spacial briefing paper of CIA covert activities
6 || directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by
7 || Me. Richard Goodwin at the White House,* and attaching a
8 Several page document with that heading and that date.
-. 9 Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and

10] that's where, I guess, I found out about it,

% 3

_. 2l (Tha document referred
ai 12 to was marked Goodwin |
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@.; 13 Exhibit No. 2 for |

< 14 identification.)

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Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the
weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell
that?

Me. Goodwin. Yeah.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which
indicates when the requast for the passage of the arms was
made. . ,

Mr. Goodwin, Yas, it says in late January. Of course
they weran‘'t authdrized until the 12th.

Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after
the Kennady Administration took office.

4r. Goodwin. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice
President Johnson,-- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2,

4 Memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is
marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961,
(The document referred to
was marked Goodwin
Exhibit No. 2 for

idantification.}

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Me. Schware. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin,

this 18 a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject
Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

Would you read into the record the second paragraph?

Mr. Gocdwin. “At one point during tha meeting, the Vice
Prusident asked about the three carbines which the Agency had
turned over to tha dissidents, specifically asked about the
date of dalivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effact
that this was done under the previous Administration, 1.@.,
prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the
Special Group.”

Can you tell me if this his mamo I'm reading? t’'d like
to know,

Me. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom
of the page, do they help you decide whosa memo it is?

Me. Dennine. f believe we wera told by Secretary of State
Rusk that it’s Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what
the U stands for.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an
inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it
would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen.

I thought that I wouldn't have made it. If had no purpose in
making it. And this is --

The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?

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Mr. Goodwin. The delivery ‘of the arms wag not made prior
‘to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to
January 20th.

Senator Schwaiker. Was when, ag&in? Was what date?

Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.

Sanator Schweiker. What year?
Mr. Goodwin. 1961.

Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?

j

Mr. Schware. Somatime subsequent to Jahuary 24th. |
Mr. Goodwin. Wall, now that I look at this, all it says |

was late January. H
The Chairman. This 4s June ist, this is dated June lat,

and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the

meating the Vice President asked about the three carbines

which tha Agency had turned over to the dissidents and

specifically asked ahout the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin

made the statement to tha effect that this was done under

the pravious Administration, i.e., prior to January 25th,

1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group.” ro
Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.

Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading |

that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator,
so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could he
late January. I mean, ft don't really remamber.

Mr, Schwarz. Bue Mr. Goodwin, you know, independant of

TOP SECRET

the document which we marked ag Exhibit 1, tn fact the arms
ware delivered after January 20th.

Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I ~~ my first
knowledge was this decument, the timetable that I requested

which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had hbaen

da ce Someta ete ete te

made in late January. If don't know any more than that. |
Mr. Schwarz. All right. |
Mr. Goodwin. Thie im my source of knowledge. Y may have
learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.
Mr, Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were
you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?
H Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the maetingr.
: Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remamber from the CIA?
, Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -~ I can't be sure who ail was
there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure some-
body like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm
gure you must have a list. |
Mr. Schwarz. tlow I would like you to tastify in answer to }

a series of questions aa to what you ware or ware not told.
Now, Were you told that the arms which had been delivered |

| had been delivered to persons who said at timer that they |

wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more

often that they wanted to use them for assassination pursoses?

Mr. Goodwin. I was given to underatand and told

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specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they

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. 18

wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought
they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns.
tI don't remember any indication that anyone thought that @
carbine or & .38 was adequate to mount an affore of that kind
against Trujillo. Rut they, of course, were interested in
assassinating Trujillo, involved ag they were in a very life
and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered -- B
8 Me. Schwarz. Tha record demonstrates that the Agency was a
9 informed in April, prior to the memorandum that want to you 4
10 | which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to

11 || undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the °° a

. Pa

LP Hi means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the ¥
hz } road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress. fe
c 14 || And that they intended to do it whether or not they received a
Cc 15 the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns; fuse ‘
< 16 to help. q
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7 Now, ware you informed by the Agency oF by anyone else .
1s |! that the dissidents intended to accomplish the sasassination :
§ 19 with the small arms whether of not they got the machines?
é 2 Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other
i “) groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got
: ap | reports of assassinations about to occur almost avery two oF |
: } ee three weeks in the White House. There {8 6 long gap between
: ea} wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -< hut i
° Dt, | at all times, continually, up inte May, there was the very

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insistent request for additional arms that would make the

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plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy,
those arms were denied and -<

Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know
what you wera informed about the intentions of the dissidents.
You didn't answer my quustion. You said you were fraquently
informed about assassination plots all over the world, but
specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you
of were you not informad that the Aqency had been told by the
diseidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination
of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not
they received the machine qunsa?

Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. If
wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that
wouldn't surprise me if they said that. Sy the Agency, you
maan Dearborn, or --

Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency

in this instance?
Me. Schwarz. Thare wera Aqency people in the Republic.

Did you know there ware Agency psople in the Republic?

Mr. Schwarz. In and out?
Mr. Goodwin. They ran soma guns in at one time, as 1

Femember, and they also were engaged in the collection of

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Mr. Goodwin. I knew thay were in and out.

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intelligence about dissident qroups.

ree

Was it your impression that Dearborn was

in charge of the pominican Republic, or the Agency personnel

was in charge of the pominiean Republic?

Mr. Goodwin.

My impression at the time was that the

instructions given to Dearborn ware carried out, and all

inetructions from the Pre

Mr.

Schwarg.

aident went to Dearborn.

Apart from dnatructions from the President.

was it your impression that the Aqency was in charge of the

Dominican Republic or t

Dominican Republic.

Mr.

Goodwin.

My impression wa

of the Nominican Republic, subject

from Washington.’

The Chairman.

Mr.

Goodwin.

relations.

hat Dearborn was in charge of the

to very close supervision

Dearborn was the -~

He was the Consul. We had no formal

The Chairman. fe was the Consul?

Mr.

Goodwin.

Right.

Wasn't that true?

Mr.

Schwarz.

The paper recor

that the Agency, at least from the

that they were in charge.

Mr.

sunt all of our massages &

TOP SECRET

Goodwin.

d makes it look quite hikely

ir point of view, thought

They should have told the Presidant. Wa

o Nearborn.

s that Nearborn was in charag


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Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the
location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in hera somewhere

(Pause) |

in the paper. |
Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question. |
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|
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Mr. Goodwin. I know now.
Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?
Mr. Goodwin. No:-. £ knew, when the issue arose in May

that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the pracisa

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mathod by which they were brought in I never asked about. |

The Chairman. I am having & Little difficulty following. |

We began with your heing told that it was the policy of
the previous Administration to ancourage dissident groups and |

do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down

the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of

nid you know that the machine quns were aent to the
Dominican Republic fERFoudt tha diplomat tepouen?| L

President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these

| dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of

| assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President

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| Now when did you learn that. weapons had been in fact

Trujillo.

President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first

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{ 2 Mr. Goodwin. On the Lith of May when we requested from
j 3 the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in

4 the Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the

5 || Dominican Republic.

17 in January to certain dissident qroups for the purpose of

assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?

6 Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from |
vd | whom?
8 Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for
oe 9 the President. ‘
10 f Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?
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_ 11 Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.
, ;
Ra iP The Chairman; From the CIA, and that briefing paper has
@
@-: 12 | been identified for the record? i"
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c 14 Mr. Goodwin. That is correct. 3
Cc 15 The Chairman. All right. a
< 16 When you found out that these weapons had been transferred | :
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§ x9 | Was it than your understanding that this was Prasident '
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: 2 | Mr. Goodwin. Na.
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22 | the Chairman. Then what did you do when you received |
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and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction


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between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of
2 || personal type side~arms, the salf-defense attendant to any

3 project and the desire for assassination weapona which would |
4 have consisted of machine guns.
6 Our response to thia briefing paper was immediately to
6 try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic
7 || and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks, \

8 instructions to the Consul about the nature of future’ relations |

with dissidents, because the President felt that things

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10 || might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the |

oe 11 Dominican Republic.
a 2 So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I
@.: jz | said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to
a! 14 push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen
= 15 || next. because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than |
< 16 | 4 Communist’. leader. And secondly, that the United States |
s 17 | not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in
ja | the telegram that wags -=° | |
i 9 | The Chairman. All right. ——
5 20 Now whan the President told you that those were his
i 2, | two concerns, what action was then. taken to implement the
: oD, | President's policy?
} 24 ur. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to taka |
: ea and set aside the original instructions from the State
, 26 Department and at the Prasident's instructions, I typed up the :.
| ,

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telegram which is here in my handwriting, which wag to go and

did go, slightly revised to --
Mr. Schwarz. Ail right. Let me mark the one in your
hand as Exhibit 3.
(The document referred to
was marked as Goodwin
Exhibleé No. 3-A for

identification.)

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1 Mr. Schwars. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -~ you
2 | xnow how to do this as wall as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and
3 3-C.

4a Mr. Goodwin. In which f personally added in the courses

6 | ef rewriting --

6 The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators’ hooks

7 | where these documents appear?

8 Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3A?
= 9 Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.
I 16 (Pause)
i o
Li This xerox of my raw, parsonally typewritten draft appears

vi 12 |} on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.
o- : 13 And then paqe 256 is the final. And the same page, 242,
8
c 14 || page 237 and 242.
Cc 16 The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message

ty

16 || that went out?

17 Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

18 |

i 19 | Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

° 2u the Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed? i

} g} Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guass, but they

: ay |) are both my drafts. 1! received a draft from the State Depart- |

gt l ment, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction

ee : 24 || prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden tha State
25

|

Dupartment on my OWN, and adding to it two major points aside |
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the second one was
3 |) must not run the risk of U.8. association with political

from rewording it.

to gay in the final version, "However, we

assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general
policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is

overriding and most prevail in doubtful eituations.*

23
The firet one is on a different matter, and

\
a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State |

Department draft, and it finishes again with -- 4¢ says,

| That was inserted at the inetruction of the President,
!

“Clearly, at the present time We are unabie to transfer arms |
to dissidents. Wa feel that the transfer of arms would serve

ft
very little purpose."

(The document referred to |

was marked Goodwin

{
| Exhibit No, 3-8 for

|
idantification.) |
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The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved
before it was sant by State?

Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.

The Chairman. But you said that tha State Departmant
changed the language.

Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft.
which I changed and redrafted. Now that i# here too, including

a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their

draft.

The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that

Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction

1
you balieved accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy? |
i
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of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.

The Chairman. Tt was shown to the President?

Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Very well.

Then, reading the first paragraph, “The President has now
approved contingency plans discussad during your stay here ;
with one major exception. You are not to requast a pre-
signed request for help from Nominican dissident groups."

Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.

There was a proposal made in the State Papartmant version '
has baen discussed that the dissident groups, that in case!

managed to take over the governmant and there was some

of fighting that they should request halp from Venazuela,

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Columbia, a few of our allies an@é therefore we ought to prepare
them in advance for such & request. The President thought that
putting such a4 document in their hands would amount to @
declaration of war and wanted it struck.

The Chairman. All right.

Than the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that
you continue to work" -- wall, before we go on with the second
paragraph, in the first paragraph you 84y, “rhe President has
now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here

10 with one major axception.*
Now, what were those contingency plans that had been

12 discussed?

Bi Mr. Goodwin. Thay have tham here, I believe. I think --

wARe & FAL

contingency plans, it discusses here. “tha paramount interest

i
1 of the United States ie to assure that Castro-Communist

14 this is a very thick document, whare you have a series of
5
6

\ elements not take over.” It says Trujillo is weak, and then it,
a is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the
19 weakness of the Prujillo regime, and it goes into the covert
ou | activities. which, I think probably ~~ is that your principal
“y | interest at this tims?
| o The Chairman. Yes.
Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that gets forth all the

og || covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States,

B10 8 ost Srrset, SE, Wearmonaton. Oc 20003

not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform prod.S.

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25


26

Aissidenta that if they succeed on their ow and form an
acceptable government we will be giad to come in and help then
and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing -~

The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency

4
5 ‘plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?
6 Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that
” he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.
tape Sb 8 The Chairman. But if he were “assassinated, it would have
a 9 prasumably been the result of an action by a dissident’ group
er 10 |} €° overthrow his regime?
r Mr. Goodwin. Yes.
~. 1]
wr 12 The Chairman. All right.
|

Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message ~~ the President's

n
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c 14 message to Mr. Dearborn, “We consider it essential that you
i 18 continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among disai-~
ss 16 dent groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable.
~ 17 | However, wa must not run the risk of U.S. association with
16 political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general
3 19 policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is
3 24 overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations.”
2} | How that language, it has been suggested by some mambers
i op i of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoldina
* ,
' at any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the
© 4 24 United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved
. 25 | in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, “nowaver
|

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1 || we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political

g | assassination, gince the U.S. as a matter of general policy
z cannot condone assassination. This last principle ia over-
I riding and must prevail in doubtful situations.*
Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves iS

to the interpretation that your primary concarn was that the

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because

|
7 United States should not qet caught?
8
= 9 1 think, to ma, the plain meaning of the words and as 1
- 10 understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S.
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| Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?
ce 14
c 1b In that same vein, if % could interrupt for just a second,
<< 16 ds it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had
ia
already been dispatched?

Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.

j 10! ‘Senator Baker. T'm not talking ahout how many, Fritz.

3 ve | Guns had been dispatched.

al Mr. Schwarz. Mut this talegram refuses the passage of

ann .

: ve | four machine guns.

} on! Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am
] i vs just saying that guns had been dispatchad,

; Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this teleqram?

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Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination,

two days before the assasaination.

Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched.

Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over

to the dissidents.

Senator Raker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite
gure -~ or there's no indication that the quns were actually
used in thse assassination, although they may have been in the
back swat. Ta that about the way it atacka up?

The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine
guns.

Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has
said wa thought the signals for assassination afforts for
machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead
with the material in hand.

Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their
own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.

Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important,
because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassinatio:
against &@ heavily armed <-

Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards ina
heavily armed car.

Also, if I might add, Senator --

The Chairman. Just to understand what you hava said,

as the author of this instruction and having conferred about

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it and having ahown it to President Kennedy, are you teatifying
that it was your understanding that the meaning of that
sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr.

Dearborn 4 prohibition against involving the United States

i in an assassination attempt on tha life of Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my firat draft, I did it
in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase
about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the
President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul:
because I used‘ the vary word disclosure, you can see here, and
I crossed it out, in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you
changed it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, {t's not very qramnatical, it's
embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't raad the hand-
writing on the xerox.

“Nowever we also must not™ -- something -- “permit any
danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political
assassination or intervention in the fominican Republic,”
it says or intervention. All that was atruck.

Senator Baker. That sounds ilkse exactly what the Chairman.
asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please
don't get caught.

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why fT changed it,

Sgnator, to read “Howsver, we must not run risks of U.58.

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association with political asgassination gince the U.8., as a
matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination.”
Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it te

be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this

document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to ma like

the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught

the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.

Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this
time.

Senator Baker. Nor waa I, at that time.

I need reassurance, and I think the record doas, that the
coincidance of that this cable, this wirs, going out, gay two
days before the assassination, ‘ after quns in fact had been
dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under
the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.

This witness says i¢ does not. There {s no avidence to
the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need
to pursue the issue any further.

Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Sanator --

Senator Bakar. And it also, as Smothers points out, that
there was another communication saying destroy anything you'va

got, all those communications except this cabla.

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Mr. Aaron. ‘That is standard practices. That is the standan!

practice for covert operations.

Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines

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and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent
to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking
offica. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. 1 haven't
geen any indication of tha date of that transfer. I do know
that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns,
because he told ma he was not aware of it, until we finally
requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of
our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at
Which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred.
r etill don't know tha date of that transfer.

And then 4¢ was the basis of that briefing paper, which
obviously the Dominican Republic was not tha first matter on

President Kennedy's agenda when he came into offica, on the

BARD ® PAL

basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sant.
this telegram.
The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call
off any further involvement by the United States government in
i an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo. |
Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United |
States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to
slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The Presidant was

not that.anxious to see@ Trujillo thrown out.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, t'm sorry.

ALD F erst Gaveet, BE. teauronaton. OC. 20001

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Senator Tower. That doasn't totally answer the question. |
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The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony,

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that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had bean
transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had
expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. Correct.

Tha Chairman. So there was 4 connection, the connection
being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished
weapons to a group that had communicated ite interest, if not
its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.

So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the
Massage was meant to call this off, this involvement. What
axactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.

Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.

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The Chairman. But at the same time, you ware saying, don’

transfer the machine guns, Were you not?

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Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what
we were saying is --
The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?
Mr. Goodwins We were saving that we didn’t want to do
i anything that would involve us further, the United States

| further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.

Senator Raker. The distinction is --

Seunator Tower. Well, it saya hare in number J}, it says,

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position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn
from this ia that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead
and have the other guys on, because their position would be to
assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is: sayina,
let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support
for what they are doing.

Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our suppert for what they .
were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency
paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office

‘

we wanted to be our man, that ia corract. And so wa were going |

to support and try to retain’ relations and say we would support,

| which is not a difficult thing to do, aa you know, any droup

that might take offica and be moderate and pro-tnited States.

| that was all we wore interested in, was having a pro-American

government.

Senator Schweiker. Wall, there are two other references
here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, “In case of assassination or
overthrow” -~- obviously you still had a reference thare, whether
initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the
planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we
feel the transfer of arms would serva very little purpose and
exposa tha United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure —
in participation in an easassination attempt," and that is
scratched out, and says “assassination attempt,” meaning that

thers was ‘== to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate

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since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

So what interpretation? I mean, thie is rift here with

assassination propositions, and the fact that you have “ultimate
disclosure,” fear of ultimate disclosure of participation,
Mauant that cortainly there was something already afoot, that
ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this
pass through.

Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did,
it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away,.
but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there
ware many groups, a continual flew of groups, of information,

i that there were various groups planning to assassinate

Trujillo.

WARD & PHL

Senator Schweiker. Wall, if that's what it meant, then
why did you delete it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --

Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why
in fact did you delete those four words, “ultimate disclosure
; of participation?”

Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell ma what page you're reading

from?

Senator Schweiker. Page 3.

The very words that you interpret one way ware in fact

deleted, which shows to mu that you maant them another way, or
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Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --
Senator Schweiker. So that you disquise that.
Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they

were words that were going to give exactly the impression you

were afraid of being found out and what we didn’t want wag any
association with the assassination attempts, so the reference
to disclosure was struck and thea words association were
inserted.

Senator Schweiker. Mut you still call off -- you still
left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms
would serve very little purpose and expose the United States
to great danger of association with assasaination attempts.
That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had
other language, that says “ultimate Aisclosure of participation

which impliss to ma you were concerned about other things you

are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, ws |
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were doing and things that had already been programmed and ar
operation that you Were 458 much concerned about those baind --
or you wouldn't have changed the language to atill gay the sane,
thing with that one distinction ahout somathinn else being
afoot. 1 don't --

Mr, Goodwin. Well, T changed it, T believe, Senator -- | |

mean it's hard to bea hald responsible for languace that was |

rajectad because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one

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4

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of disclosure, the problem was wa did not want to be associated
with assassination. That's why I struck it out.

Sanator Schwaiker. You changed the language, but the first
part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, wa feal the
transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and axpose
the United States. So while you changed the language, you had
the same condition there that you were not qoing to supply thos
arma.

Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --

Sanator Schweiker. Mut why were you not concerned about
the othar language, becauge ~-

Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other lanquane

| was that, well, wa were worried about being found out, whan in

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fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be

involved. So I struck the implication.

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| our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have '
been any closer to this plot would have been to bacome one of
the dissident group. They told him evervthing thay did, down

+ to and including when the car was coming down the road. And

we knew that, didn't we?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to
us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his

| dnetructions was to keep in very close contact with these

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and if they told him everything they ware planning to do. Rut
it's a long jump between saying you're going out and wail
Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.

But I was not aware, as ft can remember, that he had any
kind of detailed information.

Mr. Smothers. His massages back to CIA, in fact, convey
thosu datails, don’t they?

Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these ~~
none of tham that --~

Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that
the dissidenta intended to use tha small arma, carbines and

pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended

to use the weepons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in

precisely the way ha was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know
that befora you wrote the telagram, or not?

Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I’m rasponding to is 4
request that says we can’t do it unless wa have the machina
guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. Wa area
saying, don't give them machina quns.

Later on they said to Dearborn, fF mean he did tall me
that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, wa'll
do it, whether or not we get tha machina guns. T mean, that
might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying,
well, you might as wull giva it to them anyway since they're

going to do it. Tf don't know why anyone would take on

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Trujillo with a .38. f wouldn't have thought that, if I thought
about it.
President Kannedy went to Paria a week or two later. When
the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by

surprise, so that Nearborn had detailed knowledge of when it

1
was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President ~~ he called
an emergency masting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent

to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announce?!

by Pierre Salinger.

11 | make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in

10 But this instruction, the Prasident told me he wanted to
|

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12 | assassinations.

|

1o 4 Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the racord shows -~ I think

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16) Administration, they decided to supply arms eo this dissident

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16 | group and assist in the assassination of Mr. frujillo. Then,

|

17 | as thase documents show, at some point very near to the time

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7

" that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was
t sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with
i this.
Why didn't wa also say stop it, tall thase people not
to procesd further, in light of the fact that they may have
thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to

z4 | assassinate Trujillo had our biessing? In other words, thare

BLE eens Greet, BE. Teacnengron, D.C. 20003

ah | is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should have

TOP SECRET


WMA ERS

WASD & Pau

4

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430 Fartt Stomet, 8 . Wavhengiam, OC. POOCE

suggested -=
2 Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to
3 j| inform dissidents of U.S, support for their position.”
4 i Senator Mondale. In other words, if I ware one of those
5 | dissidents and I qot that from tha United States pursuant to
6 | this earlier agreaament, I would feel ancouraged to believe that
? | T had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, ana|
8 | that wo weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our govern-
9 ment wag not really neutral, that it encouraged them.
10 Tt fa true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it
is true, apparently that what you understood was that they
2) Wanted the machine guns for assasaination and they wanted the
4 Other weapons for personal defanse, but there was still, it
| would seem to me, reason for tham to beliava that they had our
Bupport.
Why didn't we say or communicate to tham we want you to
stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you

to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more

There was a similar talegram sent just before Diem was

assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and
yt appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're
I
| worrled about human life, if wa're worried about correcting 4

policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion,

TOP SECRET


Smee

to

the way to really disassociate it is to @ay atop, and that is
really what I don't understand.
Mr. Goodwin. Wall, lat me say, Senator, first of all,
that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's
| minds. There ‘is no doubt that we hoped that frujillo would. he
| overthrown, Not only was their no doubt, but there was a
unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it

be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hopa that it

?

might happen. And that occurred aver before wa took office and

we were in full agraament with it.

There are papers hare which talk about the avent of a coup

on)

; of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out

Now
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of the country. Assassination waa always a possibility, but

WARD & PAUL

, & coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole
range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that
Trujillo was going to be ovarthrown one way or another and
not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassi-

| nation because -- in fact, 1¢ would sesm at that time to he tha

” most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and

: protected, ordinarily. Thay knew morse about fit than we did.

. And whan that happened, which we favored that happened,

becausa wa falt that the eatablishment of a democratic raqime

‘in the Dominican Republic was gomething not only baneficial to.

the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we'ra

ALO Borate Srsoet 3.0 . Meareneenn, OC 20003

h
i talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life,
t

TOP SECRET


7ANnAADN

2
4

WAS & Pave

SIR C wat Seems ST. Hemungion, 9.0. 2000)

i history that we may be supporting the overthrow,- including

the business?

the man wae not only a Pascist, but he was @ murderer. He used
to have @ freezer room in the back of his house where he would
take people and show tham the bodies of enemies.

But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real
concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we
wanted to be associated with the new government.

Senator Mondule. If understand, but the arqument is made
with respect to that last telaqram that it was a fig leaf

teleqram deaigned to cover our tracks should assassination occur

' @nd you arque, and I think Persuasively, that you intended much

mora than that, you intended to make it Clear that we wers not

nd Supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going

If that was our intent, and I take it that 1¢ was, why

we didn‘t wa go one step further and say please communicate to

|
|
to be used. |

. = these dissidents who have @Very reason to believe from past

assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I

* BUPpOss, Claarer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's
74 their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted
+ to. Tt was not going to be us that dealt with him in.this

4 : fashion.

TOP SECRET


Senator Mondale. Yeah, but sea, if we were completely
neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate
Trujillo that's their buainass. I agree with it, that's none
of our business.

But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like
being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day

before the job is done and not talling anyhody. It seems to
ma you should say, boys, I'm out and I don’t want you to do it.

The Chairman. I"ve changed my mind.

Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.

Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that’s

been described to uz where peopla ware beyond control and you

RARE & PAWL

couldn't communicate with them after the forces had heen set

in motion.

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Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, — don't know that ther

4

aver was any statement that those guna that were authorized on

7

January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequant, for
, | the purposes of assassination or otherwise.
Mr. Schwarz. Well,.there’ were :scores of those;
i and whether they reached you.or not 4s a4 separate and important
question, but thera are four or five axamples of communication
| to the Agency, and I think passad on to the State Department,
" and that those guns were to be used for an assaasination effort

‘whether or not the machine guns were obtained.

B10 6 wet Severs, SE. ewNerane D.C. 200048

Senator Mondale. Well, you sae, that could be important.

|

TOP SECRET


Gen alroadeont’ tev Urea rice sey a re
COREG RU RA Lee 3 de teenie

»

43

1 | because if your understanding was as you have just described
2 || then the telegram makes more genge. But if in fact we were
3 || implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --
The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I
think it's vary important to understand this matter, to look
at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He
was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having
received the inatruction, the following -- now this is at Tah
J, book 2 of 2, the second J.
It saya -- first of ail, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

2
3

The Chairman. It says: “One, I believe we can hold pro-Unite™
States dissidents, although with soma grumbling on the basis
set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tall
tham you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr.

Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

peana®

“two, following our observations for Department and CAS
considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States’ friends
| to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations aqainst us
' and the best we can do is sae there ia no proof."

Senator Raker. To see thera is no proof.
The Chairman. "The greatest danger point ia Thomas Stockar’
He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold

| several days and has told several persons disaidants obtained

B10 9 wat Yreet, SE. Remmnaten OC POOOE

thease items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I have

|
|
|
|
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|
|
|
|

TOP SECRET


Sn
“TOP SECRET

informed him this cannot be true or 1 would know and when he

requested ma supply arms through him for dissidents, T told

Beene (Arte TOP) 344-4008

him it was impossible. He ‘is greater danger because of
personal ambitearment against CAS, a matter of which CAS head-
| quarters is fully informed.”
| Than he goes on to say that *gince local CAS is now to
engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting,
recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three
9 CIA officers. If simnering assassination plot should materiziie
an they would be in danger and might ba picked up for trujillo-
11 | evee questioning. This ie easily avoidable by quick transfer
|

Py now. Thase three have enqaged in fully authorized activity

which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public

AND & POE

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position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage

n

and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR,

4

foster Laftist activities.”

7

Now there’s a vote On.

1 read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a
4 different message than the one you say you intanded to send.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paraqraph, to ma, Senator,

410 Corer Street eT. wotinetnn. o.6 20003

instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear.

He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms

\

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’ paraqraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of |

TOP SECRET |


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TOP'S

to the dissideanta, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course,
had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know
wheather or not he could supply arms.

So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure,
quite clear, in what way ha misinterpreted the telegram.

The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he
has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms.
That's clear enough. Rut if you go down to B == are you with
Ma now?

Mr. Goodwin. Yas.

The Chairman. “Since local CAS" <= I guass that should
be chief of Station -- “Since local Chief of Station, then” --
and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- “Since local Chief
of Station is now to eangaqe mainly in intelligence collection
and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican

Rapublic of three CIA officers. If simharing assassination plot

| should materialize” -- now that in itself, if I may digress a

moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion aasassination might

i be imminent. For he says “If simmering assassination plot

should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked

up for Trujillo-typse quastioning. This is easily avoidable by
i quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling
‘ that an assassination might ba imminent, otharwise, why transfar:

‘tham. “These three have engaged in fully authorized activities

|
i
which, if uncovared, could put the United Status in bad public

TOP SECRET


prone (ares 707) s4s-600@ ©” {51

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ALG Foret Btoeed, SE, Mrs einn. DBE 200ns

position."

Now: © would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn
anticipated at least the real possibility of assasaination
attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommend ina
that those CIA officers that had been connacted with having
supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic
right away.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, Tf would agree with a good part of nat.
Senator, although 1 think that there wets assassination plots :

simmering in the Pominican Republic and now, and of course this

in fact took place. And I think he was concernad that the

\

up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of
guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had
been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill then.

And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in

t

1

|

assassination would he unsuccesaful, that Trujillo would pick :
'

the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing.

I think, in the telegram that was sant to him that danies the
possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there
might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of
Dyarborn's, because if the assassination wan successful, thera
was no need to get the CIA out.

The Chairman. . But there 4s somathing more, really. If
the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing,

always on the mind of Naarhorn, why doas he raspond to this

TOP SECRET


2 Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had

3 | relayed to him that thay're going to try to make the attempt

3 | anyway, with or without the machine guns. Ile thought the attemp
H

4 might be abortive, and if so, he thoudht that all Americans or

1 {| instruction by saying, get these men out now?
t
|
'

|
people that worked for him or with him would be in dangar.

The Chairman. Then -you would have to aqres with ma, |
wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had
}

| evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt
was imminent.
Mr. Goodwin. 2 think that's clear. Yer, T think it was.
The Chairman. And ha took this sufficiently serious to

recommend getting the threa CIA aqents out without further

WARS & Fae

delay?
Mr. Goodwin. f think that’s right. That's absolutely

ltrua, because I think he believed that there was a serious

76%

attempt in the offing, as'indeed there was, and he was absolute!)

, tight and he was doing his job well. |
I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of
| the telegram, is that I gat in the office with President |
t Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he
, | wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which ft

did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, bacause he cannot

testify to that matter, 80 it's not a quastion of reading the

£10 @ mest Seeaet SE. Harhington, OC. 20002

text so much as deciding whether or net t'm telling the truth

TOP SECRET

#


about that instruction.
Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --
Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.
Mr. Schwarz. We hava to explore whether somathing went
| wrong in the communication procass. and I want to put some
information in front of you and then see if you can help us
| explain what, if anything, want wrong.
Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.
Now Exhibit 2-A ia a cable dated March 20th from the Agency
10 | in the nominican Republic to the Aqancy {n Washington. And

1) |} reading -in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which «= it

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.t deseribes a plot.
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4 five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1599 rounds
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ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use

In Paragraph 4, it says the following: °To do, thay need

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quiet waapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently
(

{ the assassination.
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| told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the

\
Row again, wate you told -~- now, in Exhibit 1, you were |
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| carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense
" weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.
vet Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says. |
Me. Schwarz. . Right. I understand that. |

Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that

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i the weapons had been passed for parsonal dafense purposes, do
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TOP SECRET


you think that is consistent, © is candid, in light of the
fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons ware

going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.

Set

Mr. Goodwin. Well, thera are several communications

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regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously

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Mr. Schwarz. Thay are.

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paren
ors

Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand, ;
a carbine or pistol 4s hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would
regard that as saying IT am going to strangle him. And if

you're going to have a fire Cight with machine quns, IT mean

in other words, it swama to ma that somebody is interpretting

what they say, or they might have had five or six different

"

WARS @ CHE

plans.
The request that came to the White Housa, finally, was

i very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are

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needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. f mean,
i however you read this, thsy do say they need additional weapons
to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President
i
tat that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about
the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that,

{he had wstablished or any directions that he had given, immediately

‘ said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting

ALO Fert Srreet. $C. Mra wtiengtor, OC. 20003

| involved in assassinations. Thay can do what thay want, but

we are not going to get involved. |

TOP SECRET


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Senator Mondale. In othar words, the Presidant was
advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we
were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of
it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that,
and that is what you thought you had dona?

Nr. Goodwin. Tf would phrase it a little bit differently,
Senator, which is to say 1t would say there were people who
wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns
and hia response was probably like, ycu mean some idiot gave

them guns? 1 said, yes. He said -- this {fs a paraphrase <-

you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or Prasident Kennedy,

. 1 maan, ha said, well, let’s make it clear. And if you compars .
i my draft with the State Department draft, I was overridina, as
r they point out, bacduse their draft says, we're trying to cet
this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have
, to send his message instead. They would rather blame ma, of

‘ course, than the President.

It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear

that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condons

assassination. {ft does not say cannot condone baling caught at

‘assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And! did’

“ ¢hat bacauss he told ma to do that.

The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kannedy

. policy a8 ona of getting the sovernmant no further involve?

because there had been a past involvemant? tle knew that ane

TOP SECRET


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you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished
dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating

Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram

1 Was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kannedy Administration

wanted no furthsr involvement in this -~
Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the Prasident

found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that

' pracesdad his coming into office that a couple of carbines and

pistols had been transferred in order to mount 4 major assault

on @ governmant that had lasted for thirty ysars, and it seemed

y at that point like «4 formidable threat to Trujillo.

le wanted to make it absolutely clear whan he found out

i ¢hat anybody who wantad to assassinata Trujillo in the Nominican

; Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the

i no more Weapons and -this is why he said wa do not want to

. condone assasSination oF be associated with it. And that’s why
i

i
United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out |
t
'

" t wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

Senator Towar. Well, may T ask you, then, what you

-dnterpratted the meaning of tha first sentence in number 3,

“continua te inform dissident elementa of U.S. support for

|, their position?”

'
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4
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|

|
Me. Goodwin. They were ~~ their position was that, what {

they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and raplacet

|

by a moderate govarnmant. Wa supported that position, as did \
i]

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TOP SECRET


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210 Past See AE | Waneneton, 8 2000)

the other mambers of the Organization of American States, and
a
| ve wanted to make it very clear that we did support that

| position, and we wished tham well in their efforts to establish

\
y that position and if they did we would recoqnize their govern-

‘ment and sand them assistance, which we did.
As a matter of fact, we took much qreater efforta to
| got rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the
assassination than anything that preceaded it, ineluding brinaing
, the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad
.Trujille at the direction of tha Secratary of Defense. Instead
of carbines and pistols, wa brought in destroyers, aircraft |

carriers and Marine battalions so that thay would know what

the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they cot

" out.

If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that
‘the countries of South America are full of quns sent thare
| by the American government to be used to kill thousands of
' people over the last several decades, and with the lcne

“exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armiss

go: from on top -- of courses you'rs well-acquainted with that --

sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal

zy i struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo
ei ‘happened to be the head of State, which is a practical

; | dtatinetton, but you’ could hardly make a moral one.

Sanator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could t aak a quastion in
TOP SECRET

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that respect?

The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that,
although that is a philosophical argument.

Senator Raker. Are you talling us, Mr. Goodwin, that
assassination, not of heads of stata, but assassination of
lesser figuras was a common, ordinary occurrance in South
America at the beheat of America or with American support?

Mr. Goodwin. No, L am talking about that we supply arms
toe revolutionary groups or to armed groupe which we did in
say Dolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile

we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with

| the knowledge that our assistance would he used in internal

atruggies.

i don't have to use the word assassinations.

Senator Baker. Sut how about for internal struggles, then,
as opposed to assassination?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struqgle in the
Dominican Republic.

The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction,

because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is

a difference between first deqras murder and manslauqhter.

t
| Theres is supposed to connote 4 certain differance in moral

+ connotations, and undertaking delibarate action that is

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targetted against a particular parson with the intantion of

i murdering that person ia normally reqardad under our crimina)

TOP SECRET


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laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore
definted as murder'in the first degree. Soa there mast ba some
gradation there.

Mr. Goodwin. Wall, there are gradations, althouch I do
think that many of the activities against, say, someone like
Allende or others are equally tarqetted in Latin American
countries and not just general conflict or the killing of
particular &=- Mexicans, ‘of'course, traditionally go out and
shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurqents, but
not necessarily with our guns.

The Chairman. But in any avent you're not testifying hare

'
to your certain knowledge the United States government partictpas

'
ted in an assassination attempt or asaisting in an assassina-
|

tion attampt’ --
Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that
' subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acte.
In any eVent, I do want to return to this.

This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to

«

{
y | yours.

| Nr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took, place,

|

_ | President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we

, | looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President
a :

Johnson was interasted in finding out what had happened and you

| had a teview of this, and discussed in that review that the

weapons had bean passed, the small arms and the machine guna |

TOP SECRET


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o 1 hadn‘t been passed and the assassination occurred. |
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H 2 Now, after that review, were any Steps taken to make, a8
} 3 & matter of more general, govarnmental policy, the policy which
4 is expressed in the telegram you drafted at Prasident Kennedy ‘+

instruction?

Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman, Do you have any more questiona?

Mr,

Schwarz. I don’t hava any more quastions.

The

Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you

can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enliqhten-

| mant? :

RABD & PAVE

nt Mr. Goodwin. On tha assassination?
i

The Chairman.

On the assassination.
yo Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through
all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have
something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do

think this is pretty complete.

; yes The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again gsarly next

; pos | Weeks on the Cuban phase of your testimony,

i wa Mr. Goodwin. And Ruvalliar.

: be | The Chairman, Me. Dennin, thay've bean ur all niqhe,

i oy woutd lika to ask two quastions. |

@ i Pa Mr. Dannin. Well, whan you said thera were no more |

. 24, | quentions, I just ralsad thy possibility and you discussad it |
'
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TOP SECRET

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about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington
when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held
after the assassination befors ha came back, at which the
whole matter was discussed, initially with Vics President
Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last ons, with President
Kannedy.

Mr. Goodwin. That's riqht. We had, of course, a serias
of emergencies. Wa had an emergency mesting, and cabled the
Prasident who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind
was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who wan the son of Trujillo,
from taking over, and we didn't know whare he was, at first,

it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at

least {ndicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it

: wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found ha

was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to

detain him, but it was too late. Ry the time wa found out, he

| had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to

Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe’ thare was some affort mada to
bluff him off by sending messages to ths plane in flight,
diverting it to somy American airport, but he didn't do that.
and he landad and took over. And I think the principal aim of

our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle,

’ Hector -- and I forget tha othar fellow's name ~- out of there
“$0 that the kind of moderats governmant that we wanted could

| be installed.

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various inducements like ha could taka his money out, it was

discussed that if ha would leave peaceably, but what finally

Prgee (Aree 202) 34646008

happened was when McNamara moved tha fleet in over the horizon

And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make |
|
i
i

j and an Air Force Ganeral bombed the palace, that was the and,
ha got on his boat and left.
The Chairman. Air Force Gauneral?
Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Foreea General.
tle decided that was an easier target than the Amertcan
flost.
The Chairman. Was tha bombing done at our inatruction?
Mr, Goodwin. No, I don't buliave so. Tf was trying to

Temembur that, but I don't balieVa ‘it was. As T remember,

RARO & POE

it was quite a surprise to us that this fallow had takan the
initiative. The moving of the fleat was intendad as sort of
a threat that if they didn't gst out we might come in and get
them. Thera was no, however, no, at that point, no country
| attempted to do that, just to scara them, And the fleet was
actually chesred in the Dominican Republic, a very rare
occasion.

But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make

. Parriagen OC 2000)

| himself dictator and two of his own officers arrwestad him. They
ali hed been trained in American military achools.

Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to

BLOF was Seow SE

the teleqram We had Nearborn'a raaction. «© Wa will read into

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ra SERS geen eC
SOs pe et to

SUR THinaioripes i stn
Som Mace eat eg TAR:

STL MTR ela
SMUT ae

the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in
response to tha telegram ‘Mr. Goodwin drafted.

Assume -- reference BB, that's the telegram, “Final word
on present policy in which KUBARK" == that's CIA -- “work here
must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that’ raference, are for
practical purposes retraat from previous policy. Howaver,

| Headquarters aware extent to which ODYOKE" that is, the United

States ~-“already associated with PER -- that ian the
assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try ‘cover
up tracks' KUBARK parsonnel directly involved tn cen
preparations must be withdrawn now.”

I don't know if that marita comment or not. [t just

happens to be how it was interpratted by CIA.

WARD & PHU

Mr. Goodwin. I think it‘'a accurate and it also raflects |

Dearborn's own disappointment that --

|

Mr. Schwarz. CIA.

Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable.

The Chairman. Any further quastions?

Senator Tower?

Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothars. Mr. Chairman, ft'd rather wait t11] the return
H of the witness,

The Chairman. Yas.

810 Forwt Grreet. 3 €,. Wasmogion, OC 70007

Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opnortunity to

meet with the staff ao that the pertinent documents that will


up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be
reviewed. Wa're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We
want you to be fully aware of whatever documantation we have
go you can help eniighten us of your understanding of the
policy at the time.

Me. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and a
then duplicate it.

Mr, Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the
ataff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony
Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and

getting tha thinga out, I think it will be safer Wednesday,

5

that's not too inconvenient.

RAS & PAUL

a)

The Chairman. Wednesday?

A

ALL right. Thank you very much.
(whereupon,. at 6135 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed,

to reconvene at .8:30 o'clock a.m., Priday, July ll, 1975.)

Bt Earns Street, SE _ Wawmogien, 0.0. 2000)

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