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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10067
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
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ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON
TO :
TITLE ;
DATE : 09/09/75
PAGES : 76
SUBJECTS : CONGO

ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA

OPENING CRITERIA
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CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98 ;

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The Wuitea States &

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

Washington, D.C. 7

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, 8. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C, 20003

(202} 844-6000

SECRET

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TESTIMONY OF

Bronson Tweedy

NUMBER
Tweedy
Tweedy
Tweedy
Tweedy
Tweedy
Tweedy

Tweedy

{The above exhibits were retained by counsel.)

Exhibit
Exhibit
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Exhibit

EXHIBITS

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

Prone {Area 207} $444000

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m.,
in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F.
Mondale presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale (presiding).

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Also present: Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron,

Professional Staff Members.

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Senator Mondale. Bo you swear the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Mr.Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
the right to counsel here today?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here
today without counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

{At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608,
Carroll Arms Hotel.)

tir. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your
Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, includ-
ing your Fifth Amendment rights?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have
the right to cease answering questions at any time and
consult with an attorney? .

Me. Tweedy. Yes. TI gather that was implicit in what
you said in the Senator's office.

Mr. Baron. lt was.

Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence

YT would like to make it clear to you that you are under no

obligation to continue testifying, although the Committee

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would obviously appreciate it if you would.
Are you willing to do so?
Mr. Tweedy. I have no intention of not cooperating.

Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify

Prane (Aree 202) 444-4000

to the truth as best you can?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.

Mr. Baron, Perhaps we should hegin by putting on the
record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading
to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of
the African Division.

TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWERDY
Ne. Tweedy. TI came aborad the Agency in the first of

May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland. t

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returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was
as the Central European Division, I quess, and went through

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a number of different assignments at that time, until May

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of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station co iuemamoaaat

T was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very
Age . oo
briefly to the States, went to [@ERUoa]R Deputy Chief of

Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in

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middle of 1998 ‘and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in
15 -{
EGRET R earty in October 1959, and I took over the

Mar gtaaee,

African Nivision T should think somewhere around between the

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15th and 18th of November 1959.

That brings me up to date.

ALD DK Stones,

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Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chie fof
the African Division? .

Mr. Tweedy. Until September of '63.

Mr. Baron. In that position did you consult frequent
with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?

- Mr. Tweedy. Well, as I was explaining to you as we
were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes.
These consultations would take many, many different forms.

On the Congo, for example, the State Napartment
obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the
U.S. Government and they had a Congolese task force. I
would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would
attend their meetings. They took place almost daily,
sometimes I guess even more than once daily.

Mr. Baron. During what period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thin;
really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the
Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the
task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those mect-
ings were State's meatinas, they weren't CIA meetings, they
weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but
we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the
policy was.

Mr. Raron. If we could focus our attention on the

period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60

and the announce pea ES SR CRET: Lumumba in February of


Mr. Tweedy. WAs that the month of his death?
Mr. Baron. The month the death was announced.

As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his

Prone [Area 207) 344-6600

death and the probable cause of his death, AS far as the U.N
investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps
January 18, 1961.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with
the State Department during that period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of thia is far less
Congo and far more general, as I was mentioning to you as
we strolled, and particularly my talks with Jim Penfield,

whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated.

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Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for
African Affairs, and Penfield and I were colleagues in Vienna
together. He had the minister. Rut we did a great deal cf
talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was
forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot
of things to negotiate with him {aba
ste? msraand he naturally had his views on a jot of the thim:
we wanted to da, and we spent a qreat deal of time arguina

these things out, making arrancements and so on and so forth.

St.

To be frank with you, I have far less recollection abe

seer,

intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that

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particular qroup than 1 did after 19-what, the beginning

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the Kennedy Administration.

Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration
that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were
qeared up.

Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely.

Mr. Raron. Do' you remember: discussions with Livingstone
Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Adminis-
trations?

Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific
discussions with him | really do not recall, no. Later on
Lt remember having a4 couple of meetings along with Mr. Rusk.

mr. Baron. Nid any of those Meetings concern Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. “Mo, Mr ak, T think they exclusively
concerned Portuguese Africa.

Mr. Baron. No you remember having any meetings alone
with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumha?

Mr. Tweedy. T am not sure T have had a meeting with
Herter.

tir. Waron. Did you have any meetings with Secretary
Herter or Douglas Dillon or Livinastone Verchant?

Mr. ‘Pwinedy. Never met Mr. Pilon.

“tr. Baron. About Congolese affaires?

tur, Tweedy. Newer get Nr. Dillon and f do wot recall
having met with Livinastone Merchant on the Conga. T may

have dane so but J really don't recall, T had very Little


Prone {Aras 767) 344-4000

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professional contact with Mr. Merchant, I knew him mostly
slightly socially. .

Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with mr. Satterswate
or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the
sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situa-
tion, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo
was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the
African situations, individual African country situations.

We would spend a great deal of time, their pointa of
view, our point of view, cur perspective, their perspective,
but never as an action matter that I can recall,

Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba
ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?

Mr. Tweedy. Never.

Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period
between Congolese independence and the announced death of
Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the White
House?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example,
President Eisenhower had an African representative the same

N
way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he
was. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes

me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador

and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of

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Sash mate,

UO Forse Greet SE

time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of
Advanced Studies in Princeton.

Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did
you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster
with reference to Congolese affairs.

You are shaking your head and we have to put it on
the record,

Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer is
no. I am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. 1
don't recall ever having: policy discussions with him at all,
nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had
attended only two National Security Council meetings in your
memory and that those two meetings were both long after the
death of Lumumba, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have
because this was well into the Kennedy Administration.
wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.

Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John
MeCone at CIA?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And
McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been
well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following
year.

Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower

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Administration when events in Congo were heatingup, after
Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in
the Stata Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba,
the general attitude toward Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by
saying what was the general assessment of the situation in
the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you
came down to.

The worry in WAshington about the situation in the
Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression
in Africa that thretened to go up in smoke, up because the
Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because
it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that
those African countries in their early years were at least
vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it
happened there the side effects would have been infinitely
greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.

Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?

Mr. Tweedy. All one culd do was assess those, but it
would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring
country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria
and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid
that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there

was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it

really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.

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This was the concern.

Mr. Baron, Were these political sida effects only

that were being taken into account or were thera also
fears for Americah business interests in the Congo that
were part of the side effects?

Mr. Tweedy. Insofar ag my assessmenta were concerned,

and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall

with the State Department, American business was just not a

great factor.

If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of

course, was Katanga and eventually when Tachombe threatened to

succeed reauiting in tha great dinvalvamuane ef both the its amt

the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that 1? you

put together the Congo without Katanga it was like construct-
ing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.

Mr. Baron. That is because Kutanga is the home of
most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.

Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that
country going.

Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic con-
siderations in back of that but these were political
economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is
whatwas going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor inso-’
far as I recall.

Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political

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Stability in Africa.
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, political stability in Africa. In
4 quick phrase you put your foot right on that.

Mr. Dawson. During the summer of 1960 you mentioned

Prans (Ares 207) $44-4000

@arlier that in the time frame you did not think the
Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with
you but --

Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to Bay this was nothing that
anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern,

Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest
in infiltrating and taking advantago of the situation in the
Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I think £t would be much more accurate

to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet

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intentions with respect to Africa, which r Suspect in those
days like a great many other things about African culture
round the globe were {11 informed at that point, and un-

doubtedly seeking their own policies in Africa just the way this

country was. It was obviously a worry.
Mr. Baron... Was it also Our assumption {f the Soviets

moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?
Me. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have bean

little doube in our minds that that would have been the case,

Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the qeneral perception

at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba

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posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mére threat of
political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets
or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?

Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese mora binding but I
don't think we had any information indicating there was
any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it
was potentially there.

Mr. Baron. And that potential --

Mr. Tweedy. Thia increased one's nervousness about the

situation.

Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African
Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive
orders?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was
through DDD, Dick Bissell and --

Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard
Bissell during this period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. Regularly would be a big word. Not
necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To
say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It
would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but --

Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the
Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook

any major operation.

Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by

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major operation, Major operation per se, iff you are not
talking about just intelligence operations, call for in-
structions and formalization either inside the Agency or out-
side.

Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be
formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the
DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels

than that,

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that
'
was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the
DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instruc-
tions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from
conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and
funnelled down to me.

I didn't always know who talked to whom before I re-
ceived instructions.

Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from
Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that
instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above
the level of DDP?

Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the
basis that he was authorized to give me instructions
and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered

to tell me to do.

XY couldn't run his affairs for him to that

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by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way
it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to
say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to
Allen Dulles first 1 would think is nonsense.

Mr, Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question
Bissell about the source of authority for some covert: action
he was asking you to undertake?

Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if
I felt that it was necagssary to do so.

TI can't recall having done so. He and I used to have
disagreements philosophically on Operations. We were very
good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him
when I thought he didn't make any sense but --

Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical
difference, or is it describable?

Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. 1 think Dick was
by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was
possible, you know, in the Clandestine service, if they put
their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.

Mr. Dawson. Thank you.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the question of
assasgainating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing
came up in the first instance. Iocan't remember how it came

up except undoubtedly we had a conversation,

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Mr. Baron. Do you recall when {t came up?

Mr. Tweédy. No, I don't. ft obviously must have
come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no
way of putting a date to it.

Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or
perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one
discussion or a series of discussions?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discuased it more than
once, I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have
said we probably better be thinking about whether it might
ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which
case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we
could do it or not successfully.

Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him
in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning
exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed
to do anything of this kind. “We were instructed to ask whether
such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of
Station he thinking along those lines as well.

Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move
ahead at least as far as developing the capability to
carry of an assassination if an order should be given?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for

doing that.

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Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you
won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation
with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can
narrow it down a little bit.

Would you assume that it would be after the proclama-
tion of the Congolese independence on June 30, 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes.

Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before
Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on
Septemberl5, 19607

Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes.
didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.

Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the
summer or early fall of ‘60?

Mr, Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?

Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United
Nations force from mid-September until late November and
it was in Late November that he left to go traveling
towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops
at thac point in very early December and from early December
until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in
prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was
flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death
was announced shortly thereafter.

Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it

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waa sometime after September 15th. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. When you aay “after"™ --

Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he
came under, The only thing is X have no recollection that
it would have happened as early as, say, early August or
early September,

Mr. Baron. It was in August or ®arly September that
Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a atruggle for power
between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on. .

Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question,

Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.

Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have
considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody.
If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think
any More precision in the date would neceasarily be productive.

Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would
be that only purpose of the exercise would have been te have
a plan when he was in nobody's custody.

Mr. Baron. That would have been before --

Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense
to me, September, because --

Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.

In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that

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went back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after
he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollec-

tion about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at

that time.

Mone {Area 207) 344-4000

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.
Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would
only make sense to you that --

Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me

Mr. Baron. -- that this initial consideration of the
feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell
and yourself?

Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have

been during the period when he was in effect in power. 1

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should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell
where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassina-
tion of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to

_ an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking
steps to carry out.

Mr. Tweedy. . I cannot recall a conversation with
Bissell wherein effect he said, let's move from A to Bore
to D or something like this. I do not recall that. My
recollection of the whole interval when this was under con-

sideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point

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can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody
would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was
go~able. or anything really very close to it. It was
always my assumption that at the time anything like this should
occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the
problem at probably a very considerable policy level within
the Agency at which somebody would have said something
more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call
or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say
go to it.

Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would
merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far,

Mr. Baron. You didn’t have any action plans for

assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware

Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever
got anywhere.

Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was -done?

Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one
asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of
accers one might ever have had to Lumumpa tor whatever purpose.
Yt was this kind of thing, as best {I recollect.

Mi. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of
gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating

him?

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Mr. Tweedy, I suspect that was the first cable that

ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever

went out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he would

have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were ;
running even though it was purely a-contéhgency.

Mr. Baron, I am sorry. I don't think I understood

You say the first cable that went out.

Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman was
ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in
Washington, was via our cable. Iam sure he wasn't back in
the States over anything of this kind.

Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?

Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distincte-
ly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it
was & cable which asked him to be thinking of that.

Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversation
with Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. That was,

Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell

\

send that cable.

Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable 1

wouldhave written and Probably released by him,
Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?

Tweedy. God knows,I don't.

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Mr. Baron, “Or the effect of the language in the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable
would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.

Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the aventuality that we
might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.

Mr. Dawson, I@ that language you think might have
been used or that is how you think it might have been done?

Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the
cable,

Mr. Baron.- Did you send a number of auch cables to
the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a -period
of time. It was not an intansive correspondence as I
remember it.

Mr, Baron. It wouldn't be thenormal practice to
have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject,
would it?

Mr, Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever
had one but I have had very sensitive subjects,operationally
sensitive nubjects that I have dealt with in extensive
cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this
nature whatsoever,

Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to

the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially

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restricted channel?
Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in
various types of restricted channels I am gure you aware.
Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and
closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would
flow to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair statement,

Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included in-
structions to destroy it after reading it?

Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this
such an instruction would have been given?

Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of
Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station
what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he
needed to maintain a record for quick reference Purposes in
the future,

But, he was pexfectly capable of keeping a file
which would be accessable only to him and the station and
if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't
think this would have been a problem for him,but to answer your
guestion I don't know what Hedgman himself did.

Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from

Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?

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Mr. Tweedy. _ It was a serious answer. I can't do
better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn’t argu-
mentative, I guess it started to diacuss, not the pros and
cons of policy,at least I don't recall it did, but “what it
was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply
to an instruction from headquarters.

Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that
he had of gaining access to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall now. I don't recall. I
think ha said it was certainly not beyond the question that
moans cauld either be developed or might arise but I certainly
do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in
the first instance. On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgy.

Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the
Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access
to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this
access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of |
personal access that would be ‘needed?

Mr. Tweedy. Y am sure that must have been covered
at some point,i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.

Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would
this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
have been considered.

Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of --

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finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply
snatch Lumumba from custody,thia was Clearly access to assassin-
ate him, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. That would certainiy be my recollection.
Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even
considered,at least I don't remember it.

Mr. Baron, In your discussions with Richard Bissell
about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to
you that he had had similar discusaions with Justin O'Donnell

Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of uatin o'Donnell’a
role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you
and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten
that qiustin"o"Donrely played any role whatsoever and now
that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it.

I recall it almost in detail.

I remember being told that he had expressed reservations
or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I
think my response to you was if he said that 1 would believe
him but 1 didn’t recall it.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you

Lae

that he had asked<Justin O'Donnell te go to the Congo to

assassinate Lumumba?
Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me
that he was going to ask O'Donnel lato go to the Congo to
vw “

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examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever

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saying, I am going to send O'Doniiell sto the Congo to knock
off Lumumba, not in those words.

Mr. Baron, When you say examine the thing on the ground
you mean he would send 0'Donnell to the Congo to take a
first-hand look at the meana?

Mr. Tweedy. Yee, conceivably I suppose this all’
might have resulted ina climax there but at least my recollec-
tion certainly was never that he told me that I am sending
@'DeRneLL, to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words
but that he, I am sure the Philosophy was that if anything
was done you would want to keep it as separate from the

station as possible and thus a man from the outaide,

It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.

sepa per: .

Mr. Baron. The man from outside?
Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station.
Baron, The CIA station in the Congo?
Tweedy. Right.
Baron. That such a man would be necessary to
out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?
Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would
obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would
protect the security of the station or involvement of the
station.
That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.

Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that QuBonRer

TOP SECRET. --


was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for
assassinating Lumumba rather: than to mount some sort of kid-

napping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put

Bmore three 7202) 344-4000

him in the hands of Cangolese authorities?

Mr. Tweedy. That is certainly my recollection but I
would not want to put too high a value on it. I
just don't recall kidnapping as a factor ia all.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that
lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA
laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumum-
ba? Or they were available for such usa?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD

probably had the capahility or had the agent or whatever ic

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was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I

heard that, yes.

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Mr. Baron. Would this have been under [sianey. Gotelié

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auspices or direction in TSD?
Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would
have been. I don't recall. Was he? I think he was.

Mr. Baron. . Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you
. ove 4a,

directly that (Sidney Gottliehiwas involved in developing

—_

poisons that might be used for assassination?

Pareto 7

Mr. Tweedy. don't recall that at all,

Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about

0 Farag Stewart 6 8

the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons

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come up 48 one means that was being considered and which
the Chief of Station should axplore?

Mr. Tweedy. Iam sure it must have. After all,
there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
him, of course you could,-I suppose, atab him or something
like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency
plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the
involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it
in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right
word, as posaible, I think poison would then stand high on the
list of possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make a
response to you via cable which indicated that he was ex-
ploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible
use of poisoning -- purpose of poisoning him. 2

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I
don’t recall specifically, but that éeffect is what he was
charged to do in the first inatance, examine the possibilicics.

I would be very surprised if Hedgman didn’t come back
and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments
I really don't recall.

Mr. Dawson. When you and Bissell had your conversa-
tions, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he
mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest

authority to undertake.to assassinate Lumumba?

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TOP SECRET

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no. I guess I was under
the impression when he talked to me that -~ I don't know

whether this is fair or not <- I honestly don't know what

Prone {Ares 202} $44-6008

my impression was at the time whether this was something that
Bissell had in effect aucked out of his own thumb as a
contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and
because it was contingency planning I don't think at that
stage I was particularly concerned. But to anawer the
question I just don't know.

Mr. Dawson, You stated earlier you knew Gordon
Gray very well.

Mr. Tweedy. I didn’t say that. I have known Gordon
Gray far better since than I did then, I knew Gordon Gray

very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure 1 ever had a --

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while he was in office -- that I ever had a personal conversa-~
tion with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the
President's Board.

Mr. Dawson. That answers my question,

Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation
to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from
any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of
assassginating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall so.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you

that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in

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Leopoldville or that he had:means of dealing directly with
the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through
you?

Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course,
that has the capability, and right, it was never my impressio
that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he
did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he
certainly had the right and capability to go into it.

Mr. Dawson. Can wa go into how the right was able to be
exercised?

Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He
could establish hia own channel to Leopoidville with his own
set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division,
He has the right to do that.

Mr. Baron, It would not be improper for a DDP to send
a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another
country?

Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness.
He obviously had the authority. My relationships with
Bissell were such that I do not believe it.

I never had the impression that he ever had any inten-
tion or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.

Mr. Dawson, Who else other than the DDP or DCI

would have such authority?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

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Mr. Baron, Would the President?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would Probably have to come
to the Agency to find out how to do it. f imagine the Presi-
dent could send &personal representative, I am damn sure he
would}.have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there.

He would make a muck of it if he did.

Mr. Baron, Did you learn at any point that lethal bio-
logical substances were actually in the custody of the Chief
of Station in Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. This was mentioned when I talked to you and
Mr. Widea and my 4newer was that I don’t recall it, but that
it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.

Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent?

Mr. Tweedy. They could have been sent one or two ways,

they would have been sent through the pouch with the

opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out
by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be
done.

Mr. Baron, Do you have any knowledge of a meesenger
from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide
the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry
out the assassination of Lumumba ,if possible, and also pro-
vide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination,

namely, poisonsand medical equipment for administering them?

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Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

Mr, Baron, Let me represent to you that we have
testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that
point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that
& megsenger would arrive in the Congo and would be
someone that he would recognize and thig messenger would give
him instructions that he was to carry out,

Did you ever know of such a cable being. sent to the
Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I should be very surprised if I didn't,
but I certainly have m recollection of it-whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. And the Chief of Station further testified

that shortly after receiving such a cable he received & viait

: Hy
trom Signe: RAG who arrived in _ heopoldville and

made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of
: - “cheradt’,
Station said that he immediately recognized GOestany,as an

officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this
cable referred to.

Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings

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GOEE ey save him instructions that he aaid came from the

headquarters to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and
also, according to the Chief of Station, gave

him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with

which to administer them.

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Were you aware of that chain of events?
Mr. Tweedy. That sounds far more definitive than any-

thing I have any recollection of at all. - ee
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Aa
If I understand what you said was, Gottilerwould have
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left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have

empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their
conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
further recourse or reference to headquarters?

Mr. Baron. That is --

Mr. Tweedy. If that is the case I don't believe it.

Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the testimony that
the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious
to carry out an assassination mission. He didn'it think it was
practical or wise and he probably would have gone back
to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he
was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assass-
ination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision
had been made and that he had authority to move ahead
aithough he doubted ~-

Mr. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go anywhere near
that far. _ .

Mr. Dawson, He checked that authority by] immediately
cabling back to headquarters saying,this guy has made himself

available to me as well as he has delivered something and

has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority

TOP SECRET


in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got
another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying

yes, what he told you is correct.

Prana {Brag 202} 344-6000

Mr. Tweedy. E don't recall that, which surprises
me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't
have been privy to those.

Mr. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson
outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it
were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, if 4t had
said aimply I have seen your messenger and received instruc-
tions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out,
would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had
seen such a cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I can't be at all sure it will refresh

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my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable
was sent, I am not going to gainsay it.
Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which
confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?
Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one be-
fore or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me. This
is the way, this would be the way I should have thought-uany

two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when

a Wanhergton, 2

each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking
about and, of course, you don’t have to use unnecessary words

but beyond the likelihood of this I can't say that de whet

210 Sua Street wt

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Mr. Dawson, This leaves us with one or two alter=
natives,either the Chief of Station who has appeared and

testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly

Prone {Ares 202) $44-4000

reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling
us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were: not
privy to what was going on.

Mr. Tweedy. Or I literally don't recall it. This is my
problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things --

Mr. Dawson. It 1s 15 years ago.

Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this.
had to be reminded of so many things about the things that
T recall the most vividly about all my African experiences

were basically the things I was basically concerned with all

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the time which was putting this division together and the
rest of it.

When it comes to operational detail I start getting
fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking

about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to

bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this

Senge

wasn't the case.
I spent days in a row not even giving Lumumba one

single bloody thought. This is my problem.

LPeamingtin, fe

ut

Mr. Dawson, Let's try to jog your memory on this.

Do you recall any time during that period of any dis-
Tate “1 .
biwhatsoever as a courier?

ALO Barat Atewet


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Mr. Daweon. All right.

Mr. Tweedy. But if he went as a courier, I will bet
I knew it, but I don't recall it.

Mr. Baron. Having heard this satory, would it be your
assumption it is moreilikely to be true than not?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I put it purely this way.

Mr. Baron. Iam asking you for your expert opinion
here as someone experienced.

Mr. Tweedy. Expert opinion.

Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for
promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him
Chief of Station, I assume?

Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His
appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and
I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which,
if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to Lon-
don to discuss an operational matter with me which had
nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good
discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to
headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division
that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station
in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no

exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may

made before I came thay had to be they couldn't wait for

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to get tha word.

Mr. Dawson. Have you ever had any occasion to doubt
his veracity or integrity?

Mr. Tweedy. I have not.

I think when I say yes to your basic queation, it would
be that I would trust hia memory and I certainly trust his
integrity.

Mr. Baron. We don’t question it.

Mr. Tweedy. All of this happened pretty much the way
you gave it to me.

Mr. Baron. That would be your --

Mr. Tweady. The aspect of it I find very difficult to
believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of
these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very
difficult to -- I do not recall and I find difficult to believe
and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was,
reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as
hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did
it.

Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe
such an instruction would have been given?

Mr. Tweedy. That way I would have said in auch a
matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a-

last word up to the last minute.

abe tte

Not one of these things that GorelicByruns off to the
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Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given his inatruc-
tions and all of which could have been four or five or six
days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it

even then set about his leisure to do te or without further

reference to headquarters that is not the way my organization

has ever run operations.
leat

Mr. Baron. Was it likely at all that (i ogterrss
would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the
Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I should have said quite impossible.

Mr. Baron. Without an instruction from the DDP at

least?

Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible.

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Mr. Baron. Would <pr Gottliebfhave proceeded to the

Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the
DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?
Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid 1 don't quite understand.
, Soho saw
Mr. Baron. If the DCI had given
instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the
Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting
with the DDP?
Mr. Tweedy. I suppose so.
But I don't believe it. I don't believe it ever happened.

To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a

personal private instruction from the DCI, and was ‘inatructed

TOP SECRET


to proceed without reference to anybody else he would pre-
sumably go ahead and do so.

Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this

mone (Area 207) $44-4000

assassination of Lumumba had been Giscussed, this was not such'
a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circum-
vented?

Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the
person with whom the division first discussed the matter on-
tirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen
Dulles. Y am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell dis-
cussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter
which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville
station insofar as 1 was aware, and to this day I don't

believe it ever was.

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Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about
earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together,
it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowl-
edge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that

time that the testimony, the ‘basic testimony we have received
Oeohrvete

about poisons being delivered to the Congo by {Sr. teliebywith

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instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba,

wo.

if possible, would be true testimony?

2 aun

i
Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr.

Baron, is to say I see not the glightest reason and do not

believe that you would have been lied to on this point.

SLO Barat Gerees nF

TOP SECRET.


TOP SECRET 39
But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency

which would really bear on that point whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to the Congo shortly

tereane (Area 207) $44:8000

before the independence of the Congo was declared?

Mr. Tweedy. That was my first visit to the Congo as I
recall, it was two weeks before independence. I made a
long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in
a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flaw from Sambura, I
guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville
and that is thefirst time I ever saw Leopoldville.

Mr. Dawson. De you know whether Mr. Hedgman was

at that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Hedqman I am almost sure was

not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I

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can't remember his name.

Mr. Baron. And you left the Congo before
independence was declared.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was only. there for, 1 suppose f
was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to
end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually
I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected

problem,

Latter fos

Mr. Baron. For the record would you agree with me
that independence was declared about June 30, 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

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40

Mr. Baron. Did you make another trip during which

07) 344-6000

you visited the Congo at some point before the death of

- Lumumba?

Irane {Aree

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgi-
tated finally which must have been as near as the early
part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome
in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi
followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo,
then briefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.

Mr. Baron. And this meeting in November ‘60 in
Rome was a meeting of Aftican --

Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs.

june Tibgirely and these would have been chicfs of stations of

Mr. Baron, And the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. So the Congo Chief of Station would not
normally have been --

Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see
“Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on

Tweedy. No.
Baron. -- tour to Rome and Nairobi?

Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose

os

TOP SECRET@


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41

of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of

our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip

around Africa, which he hardly hud time, he used a device

Panne {Area 207) $44-6006

which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at

a central point to which these people could have ready access
and, therefore, it was easy for people on the north Mediter-
ranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to
Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station
Chiefs to preceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there,
each one two or three days, I suppose.

Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo

attend the meeting in Rome?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not. In other words,

3
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if he saw Rissell he would have merely come to Rome and have
seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in
fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a
man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely
raised the question whether Iledgman was there.

Mr. Baron. What region in the CIA organization chart
would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?

Mr. Tweedy. We change amound there. We had in
those days, we had the North African branch, we had the

ESC Nirican branch, we had af then African branch, which
eae % a aa

included SguthAFrich @Rhodessa, probably syoReuquese Africas
. Re: : ~~ Senso baa Or eel

maybe the Congo in those days. Later on the Congo was sort

TIO Vaear Gere

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Prone [Ares 707) 544-4000

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of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it
fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure.
It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.
We always had aChirenchyWest” Africa, an ENGTIS AE Tepeakingy

a2 aati te F

queat trAfrica.
Socata ane

Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief
of Station in the Congo at that point that he did came to
Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he belives that he also
met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines'
house.

Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr. Karamessines. Tt
would only be because Mr. Karamesaines was host as Chief of
Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any
policy problems with Mr. Karamessines who had absolutely no
jurisdiction over them in those days whateoever.

Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental,
but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and
yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?

Mr, Tweedy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intensity of
activity in che Congo at this point and the intensity of
concern over that activity?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming more

and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and

thus the agency. I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this

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Yee Sella: a

. i
waa the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo |
at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become

a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division

Panne {Ares 202) 3444000

and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the
field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.

Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about
this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and
yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you
were together?

Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things
that we discussed by cable traffic were dinacussed.

The other thing I am sure must have been discussed was
what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese

situation and what the station might be required to do, thus

«
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the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give
the Station.
Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination
of Lumumba or the prospect of ~-
Mx. Tweedy. I would be immensely surprised if it
wasn't discussed but I don't recal! in what context it was
discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn’t discussed.
It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I
assume it was, at that point.
Mr. Baron. The prospect of assassinating Lumumba con-

tinued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that

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Lumumba was actually dead?

Mr. Tweedy. I don’t recall. You probably are much more

knowledgeable on that than I am. I don’t recall when in

Panne [Araa 207) 5444000

effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a
factor. I just don't remember.

Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that
would have the case?

Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it wags atill on
the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was
off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic
between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a
series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed

into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N.

é
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custody.

In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the
attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N.
custody --

Mr. Tweedy. Okay.

Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy
Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the
Director.

(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for

identification. }

TOP SECRET


Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed.
see he sent one specifically to DCI.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

trans [Aloe 207) 484-6000

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Onthe record.

Let's turn back now.

I believe while we were off the record and axamining this
cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that
this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but
rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville; is
that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation

"Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was

«
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a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief
of Station.

Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have
drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.

Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to
the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is
the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high
office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at
worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with
disastrous conseyuences for the prestige of the U.N. and for

the interests of the Free World generally.

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Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an

urgent and prime objective and that under existing condit::
this should be a high priority of our covert action.

Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Mr. Baron. And why would three L'a have been used in
the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure
that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?

Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.

Now, that isn't the normal way to do dt at all. 1
honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.

Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion that
LLL does refer to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.

Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense
of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency anc
State Department? . |

Mr. Tweedy. Ft accords much more with my recollect!
of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situatic
the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obvious!+
W&s aiwayS in the bacxground,

Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his

removal must be an urgent and prime objectiva and that under

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Panne tarts 207) 244-4008

RWAHO R PAUL

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exiating conditions this should be a high priority of out

covert action, close quotes, ~~ is that consistent with the
policy towards Lumumba as you recall it? ,

In other words,that Lumumba's removal was a prime objec-.
tive of the covert actions of the Agency.

Mr. Tweedy. We would have givan our eye teeth to have
Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would
agree with that.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated
September 16, 19606.

(The document referred to was

marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2

for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. This containa references to the fact that

48

“the station ws flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup",
And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N.
troops had interferred with Congolese troops and prevented
them from arresting Lumumba.
Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters :

from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective

custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu
coup where Mobutu took over the government.

In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency
it now reads:

“Station advised two moderate Congolese politician
try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate
Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity
toe organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him
from scene soonest".

WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point,
as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba
was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a
threat in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I don’t really recall but I think the
chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody
might very well result in his early release or his ability sti:
to control matters. I should think that is very probabie.

Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be

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this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was

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protected by the U.N. ==
Mr. Tweedy. © Yes, that is probably true.
Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated
September 20, 1960, which ia sent -- off the record. ¢
(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for
identification.}

(Discussion off the record.)

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Mr. Baron. Back on the record,

Although the top of this cable does not indicate where
the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the
cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking

at the designations that this cable must have been sent from
Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?

Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to Paragraph
7 which saya:

“Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba
reconcilation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny
possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly
as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will
do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt
come out on top".

Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station
in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned
that Lumumba should net be allowed even a-minor role in the
government of the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated

January 19, 1961.

{The document referred to waa
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4

for identification. }

TOP SECRET


1 Mr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to -- '
i

Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville infa

headquarters, information headquarters.

|
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4 f Mr. Baron. 80 that headquarters. would have received :
5 a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Blizabethville ,
6 | to the Station Chief in Leopolaville?
t
2 i Mr. Tweedy. Right.
b Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of thie cable Bays:
9 "Thanks for Patrice. If wa had known he was coming
1 | wa would have baked a snake".
Do you have an independent recollection of this
. cable?
) i vat Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason
: ie of that phrase, which ia another way of saying, a lighthearted
1s ; way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived
1é : in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.
. Mr. Baron, . So this cable does not indicate that there
: was any connection between the CIA and. Lumumba's eventual death,
the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?
: Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? {[ am not quite
: ‘sure I understood that.
: - Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that :
< aad

- ; the CI was knowledgeable ef the actual causes of Lumumba's

death at the point when it occurred?

; i
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In other words, that they were connected to the people


Prone (Aree 202) 344-6008
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WAR & PAUL
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46

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who caused his death?

Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the
queation. Thia means that Lumumba arrived under the Congo-
lese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at
Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't
know very much, didn’t presumably know very much about what
eccurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.

Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.

On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations coz
cluded that. it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba
was actually killed in Kutanga.

I was asking you before whether thia cable would indi-
cate that the United States would have been involved in
bringing about the death of Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely in-
dicates that thia part of the Agency, d.a., Elizabethville
had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate
except these few phrases that he put down here and would imp:
although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a
little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignoran:
Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter.

We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able

to follow the event except after the event.

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TOP SECRET so}

Mr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the

events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?

'
| Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.
|
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Prene {heres 202} 3444000

Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly
i . Re
u Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tyaville a
i ¢
| out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so q
a

, hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there? fi

iH Mc. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely
| an African avent. : C

q Mr. Baron, At what point did you learn of Lumumba's

he

death? ‘ -
‘Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the

world did. No one had a beat on this.

WAPD & Pau
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Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu in-

tended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?
Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am aure the cable
traffic would reflect it if I had. ; :

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do ‘you recall an asset who was -

gent from Europe, where he had been recruited by aap OS
§ Bava

Mr. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of this when I talked

to the Congo in the fall cf 1960?

to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago. q
eo Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the

ie  ) t cryptonym of QJWIN.

Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym

St Fares

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first, by relating to you the testimony of SUBCUMPO' Donnell

I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number

of cryptonyms- when reminded of them.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall Os
there was an asset who had been recruited by aenaes| in |
Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission ,

in November and December of 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that
conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that
my recollection doesn't go any further than that. i

But unlike some of the things If have jbeen reminded

of, I think recalled that asset of fATnolaps lig had been
involved. That is just as about 48 deep as my recollection
goes. .

Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection.

i

who said that he did make use of QUWIN in the Congo as

a kind of “alter ego” of his, a general operative of .-his.
Does that remind you at all of the nature of the

mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?

_Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.

Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase executive ac-
tion?

Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers.

Mr. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you

never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of

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a CIA program or plan.

55

Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington
terma of executive action.

Mr. Baron. Meaning administrative action?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to
develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of
a foreign leader, if required?

. Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project
which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mea:
pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassin-
ations if required? ;

Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had
with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating
Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the
Agency about assassination capabilities?

Mr. Tweedy. Never.

Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with

the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of

assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in

Congo?

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Mr .Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it

56

was my deputy.

Mr. Baron. That would be?

Mr, Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that
sense.

Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that
plan or consideration?

Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he
would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is
all.

Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey?

Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't
seen him in @ long while.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey

was in contact with#frnedas Wivartto develop the standby

capability for carrying out assassinations?
Mr. Tweedy. I don’t know anything about it whatsoever.
Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William
Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?
Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.
Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document now that we will
Mark Fxehibit 5.
(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for

identification.)

° a
TOP SECRET i


ib Sah y

TOP § | |
& } Mr. baron! This is a dispatch from the Chief of }
§ 2 | KUTUBE/D, which I believe is ated |
3 ‘A Mr. Tweedy. That is staff D.
} 4 ! Mr. Baron. In‘ the Foreign Intelligence Diviaion, is
that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

6} 12-10
9 | Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station in)‘uke

and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AP and

Division?

& |

9 I Chief WE.

ic Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African
} .
li

Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?
Mr. BAron. The date is November 2, 1960.

Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.

WARD B® PAUL

Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would hve been Chief of
_ KU2B0?
Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was
Chief of Staff D, in which case ‘he could have, that is
what he would have been then.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the

seoo+

record you have had a chance to review this document and

sara, FC

teri me some things about it I would like to repeat on the

raw

record.

First of all, on this copy of the document there is

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officer'a aignature, and you said to me a moment ago that

you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonym
of William Harvey, is that right?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to --

Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief
of ID at the.time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told
me he was Chief of ID than, I put those two together
and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was
Harvey, I can't gwear to it, but I am virtually sure.

Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollec-
tion of the subject matter that fa discussed in this document?

Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bell
at all.

Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document
do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the
Congo would be, would have been?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo --

Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to
work with O'Dénnell and whoh. O'Donnell Went out there I
guess he was going to look into a number of things for
headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters.

When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't

3

recollect by any emeans what the full auspices of O'Donnell 's "5

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Prone {Area 202} 544-4000

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visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QUWIN
was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going |
to work for him and act as his general assistant.

Mr. Baron. That was the way ‘Mr._0!Donnell.described

it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes
the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of [Mr “Y i

ate

Mr. Tweedy. This I don't think necessarily hae anything
to do with o!pennell! s mission whatsoever. This, I think, is ,
generic mission, seams to indicate that he is going to

muck around with Corsicans. I don’t recall Corsicans, I

know Oysoinet} in the Congo at all.

Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been
written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the
Chief of the African Division?

Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote.
the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather
from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don't
know what the reference is about. But I gather that Dakar is
brought into this activity because they wanted to act ina
support capacity to this headquarters activity.

Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission
in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was con-~
cerned “with?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET si‘ st

Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of

Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without
going through the African Division although keeeping the

African Chief informed?

Prone {ree 207) $44-46008
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P i Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive.
|
6 You can't have one without the othar. To answer your first
a question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred
rT
6 “ that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station i
f
1
9 | without the African Division being informed. This, however, H
ro |

makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African
t Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terma of
headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been

sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate

WAND & PAUL

this with the Division and if the Division had perceived
any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it
before the dispatch went out.

Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems
with this, if it did, and say so. -

Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would

Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?

snoes

Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of

Staff D was.

Parmer at fhe

Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surrepti-

tious entry.

Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals

DVO Voeye Streets

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1 | intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.

Mr. Baron, Would it be surprising to you that QUWIN might.

ss)

have been used in some manner in connection with an assasasina-

tion plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised

‘|
5 by William Harvey without your knowledge? ;
6 | Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and
” t would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn’t occur.
8 h Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a4
9 | moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN
1G | was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.
: : Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly
I hadn‘t heard before. Thie sounds as if he was going to
is have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those
Ls two together but I know nothing about it at all.

Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, “In view of the extreme

|
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sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform
his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.”

De you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that
QUWIN was asked to do?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not.

Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:

“The operation we have in mind is too sensitive

to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets

must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored --

“minimum risk”.

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What would these assets have been used for, what was
the search for assets all about?

Mr. Tweedy. I juat do not know.

Mr. Baron. Let's turn now to a document .that we will
mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which is a maemo
for the PN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI
Division 0.

In thie memo I will direct your attention to the
sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told
to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QUWIN waa
being used for FI/D purposes."

Do you know what FID purposes QJWIN was being used

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:

“QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensi-~
tive operational purpose which has been completed”.

Were you informed by William Harvey that QUWIN's
mission was completed?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall
any aspect of the mission or its completion.

Mr. Baron, Okay.

Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the
Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after re-

ceiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by

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his fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the
Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I do recollect that and you brought it
to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this
& couple of months ago. I do remember the cryptonym and
remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as
& sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought
if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be heipful
and he was recruited on that rather general basis, and when you
discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which
indicated that he landed running and made some rather irrespon-
sible remarks and we commented on them to the station.

My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed
on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a
somewhat useful intelligence source, but Hedgman would
have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember
quite well his dispatch. He had been seen by two or three
members of my Division, including my-deputy. I don't
recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo.
If I did I just don't remember, But I remember he was assessed,
as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on
a general purpose mission.

Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major
assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?

Mr. Tweedy. How major I don‘t know. He was an

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} t asget. Only time would have told how major it would have

. . been. He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety

; of things in the Congo by Hedgman.

Panne thro 202} 544-4000

Mr. Baron. Would one of those thinga for which he was

qualified have bean an assassination mission against Lumumba?

(oa

‘ Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr.

6

a Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was
‘ basically dispatched, asseased and dealt with by the balance
9 i of the Diviaion, not by me personally, Glenn Fields person-

ally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the
Division.

The Division knew nothing about the balance of this
thing.

Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel out-

wart @ eat

side of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known -~
Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.
Mr. Baron . -~- would not have known that the assassina-

tion of Lumumba was being considered?

cece bee bbs Al dah ata ab ICD mae 0d

Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.
Mr. Baron. And --

Mr. Tweedy. 1f they did learn of it I never knew

haela tae ATS tae re tne

that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it
through me or Fields.

Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and

training of this asset to other people in the Division than

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yourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't
being considered at that point for an assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. Iwill put it differently. As far as
I know he was never considered for an assasaination mission
at ali.

He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds
of daring in the PM “ield and began to talk rather lusty when
he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.

Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark
Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is # cable to
the headquarters, marked to Director fromueopoldville dealing
with WIROGUE on an approach. he made to agent QJWIN.

(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7

for identification.) -

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Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we dis-

66

cussed two montha ago and this happens all the time.

Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QIWIN's
report that"WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to par-
ticipate in intel net and be member" .--1 am sorry -- “member
‘execution squad'*,

Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this aa a result
of your having previously brought it to my attention and I
recall it, it was a typical example of an agent or as#et

full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brinf and he was

_certainly put back on the track very early on.

But in this business do not confuse axecution Bquad
with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or any-
thing else. It had nothing to do with that.

Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you would
assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to
the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination
coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made
to QUWIN was probably not a part of that mission.

Mr. Tweedy. it was quite specifically not a part of
that miasion. There was a chapter of accidents. You have
seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times be-
fore, two people who are periphically involved in the same
thing and run into each. er and one smelis something on the

other.

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Mr. Baron. Again, why are you ge sure that this would

67

not have been connected in any way to the assassination
mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I thought I made that clear because
this man went out up to a point through what I would call
the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving
training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing
to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been
handled that way.

Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr.
Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake
recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination
mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He
could have been but Hedgman would also have been required
and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him.
That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for
which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally
in the PM field.

Mr. Baron. Bid this report create a flap at headquarters
at the time when the cable was sent?

Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly

Mr. Tweedy. Jt is not.

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Mr. Baron. -- example of free wheeling by an operative?

68

Mr. Tweedy. It ig the sort of thing that can happen.

What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem.

© (Atee 202) 944-4060

The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.

Pees

Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo
RR ede ‘

Bye meee ;
with Sidney _GottllLeb?:

Mr. Tweedy. Have I ever discussed events in the

ease teen:

Congo with {Sidney Gottiten?

i ' whee
I can only assume I must have seen Sidv during this

period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions.
; wo gem

In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney-Gottey-
; ; ai onan acon

. Yr seyon the Congo it would have been at that time,
Mr. Baron. Why would that be so?

wtwe
Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney Cottlieb would have had

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no interest in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. So you'mean if there had been any dis-
cussions between yourself and Sidney Gort liee it probably
would have --

Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.

Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological sub-
stances in his laboratory? ;

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because
1 think that would have been Siarey7saevHieb "Fp business as

what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest pre-

sumably would have been was there anything in his inventory

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that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.
Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory
conversation with him on that subject?
Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if. I didn't.
Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then 1
followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that

probably the first conversation would undoubtely have been
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held between Dick Bissell and§sidney Ggttiieby but this is mercly -

_

what I would suspect was the way it occurred.

I don't say that that is the way it occurred. fut
¢“aehe seu .

than that no conversation with iSidney Gottlieb on the Con-
cad

all.

Mr. Baron. T am at the end of my questions on specific
facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leadina
dp to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow
subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want
to say that I appreciate tremendously and know ‘that the
Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony
here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one
narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and un-
pleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.

1 wonder if you have any facts that you would like to ant

to the record that you think are necessary to put our dis-

cussion today into context? i
J

Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest. .recollection about

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my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo --
let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S.

involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen

1608 (Bee 207) 5444000

an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which

~

clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking
about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.

Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at
that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme sense of urgency, .
the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting
the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. “What the
Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately
with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly
State, the White House. I must say the Fxecutive Department
was very much working as a team during these days. AGain for-
get Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And
I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off in-
to left field or that I didn’t know the way the White Mouse was
thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking
about things, and the National Security was thinking about
things, and 1 have no reason to believe they ever felt that tne
didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. Tt was an extras
ordinarily close thina.

I remember Mennen Williams trying to forma

Congo club. When LI retired from the African Division I was

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given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one,

which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather

* 1 Ares 297} $44.6000

typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I
personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely
right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been
& total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed,

and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is

Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty
well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it

a chance to move the way it has.

There are going to be ups and downs with the things
but that ds the way it is. I feel very stronaly about it.

Does that somewhat answer your queation,
does that help?

Mr. Baron.] simply wanted to give you a chance.

Mr. Tweedy. 1 felt that very strongly and no other assiqn-
ment that. I have ever had was this kind of government team
and cooperation ever teally required. because we weren't
engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.

Mr. Baron. 1s this government team efforts that you are
talking about one that was primarily put together to carry
out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the
latter part of the 60's, ‘62, ‘63.

Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over what-

ever activity the United States Government felt it needed

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to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as
purely policy questions of what the Ambasaddor to the U.N.
might say to the Secretary General of tha U.N.or what the
President might want to Bay conceivably I suppose to the
Chief of the Belgium state on such matters. Everything
certainly didn't just involve what CIA waa going to be
involved in. It was the whole policy ball of wax with res-
pect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which
the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.

Mr. Baron. Did this high dagree of organization and
intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba
or had it gotten rolling?

Mr. Tweedy. I think --

Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?

Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government waa thoroughly
seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating
Congo that started in the earliest days of independence
and continued and, of course, when the Tachombe-Kutanga
thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N.
was there, then, of course, that was it.

Tn other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S.
concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read
them in the press just continued and continued, but one thin:
was perfectly clear, was that the U.S, was quite determined

‘

to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than

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the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings.
He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was
worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but
he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he
waa continually goosing his staff to do just that , but

in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by
ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer,

Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the
Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and
analysis in the intelligence community yenerally and there may
be other members of the Committee staff that would ike to call
upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long
experience in Agency activities.

But I want to thank you now for your complete coopera-
tion and the tremendous amount of information that you have
provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you any-
thing I can do to help the Committee in other areas I
will be glad to do it and if I dun't think 1 can help be-
Cause I don’t think I know enough about the subject I wilh ius
Say 80, Gtherwine 0 am not afraid tc. put in, two Dits in.

Mr. Baron. As far a8 your two bits goes, we would
be interested in your two bits worth on pOricy recommendations
in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change

or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make,

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and we will take that up at some point in the future. But

4

you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy :
level in the Agency and wa like to take advantage of that.

That is all, thank you.

Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)


