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[104-10179-10028, [2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 **esiitiatetbati

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\ KEMORANDOM FOR THE RTCORD , ut - .
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SURJECT: Contact Report on Meeting with AMRUMGL 2°

1, On 5 Yovezter at 1130 hours, <MRCNG-] and -INTECXER were met
at the washington Airoort by undersigned. They were then taken by
taxi to the “ayflover Potel, where a room had been reserved ... for
their use. ifter having lunch at the hcte?, the party sdJournad to
the m, where ACE NGS] was given = stort briefing on rane! sco (9
Castell, the -/T operator who waa schediled to meet AXSTNG-1 at

1h00 urs.

2. At 18€0 hovrs, the under: eat to the lo‘ ty of the hotel
. > where Francisco was waiting wtnliey © Carcial his escort officer,

, 03 (Garcia was instructed to bring Francisco vu? a\ the mon. It was :
: 4 in advance of thia that all srincipals would with draw from >. {
: the room to rive AYRUNC-2 an opportunity to talk with Francisco alone oF °
; Forever, it wes sugrested that! Garcta\¥eturn a half hour before the
: interview was terminated to clear u> any points as to the nature of
Francisco's training, or any aspects that ¢MPUNG-1 right wish to
olerify. The interview with Francisso «as terminated stout 1510
hours, as AYEING.1 statod he would be oleasod to have francisco . '
assigned to hin, All indications were that a happy racport was este- :
blished between the vrincinpals and a camoleto understanding was ~ . ;
reached as to the future role of Francisco ag the «/T operator for : }
the AMYUM ercuo in Cuba, > :

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3. At aporoximtely 1535 hours, |Andy Rogors| put in hie appearance |
at the mon an’ was introduced to AMETNG.) as Mr. Rodrick. Prior to |
this meeting, ““RUNG-l was told that Mr. Rodrick was the coordinator
for operations and wwld lire to dise:ss some of the core snecific |
aspects with hin, orior to hig return to Cuba. [Cecil Cartwright), who df .
had escorted ASNCNG.) Yashington, asked to sift in on this ing 7 .
along with "eters and Rorergpies he felt that MASH sheald be fully - me
informed on watever operstiona] matters were discussed with AMAUNG-1 SO
for rore effective future cooniistion between Headquarters and ¥ASE. . |
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- 0S Rogers\indicated no objections to this and stated he was glad to have ~
sit in at this meeting.

4. In substance, Rorera covered most of the hichlights dealing”
with previcus attests to Suxply the ANTUM group with amas and ammo,
and air-neritine overations currently being clanned. in this
connection, ?°S0NGal was highly pleased to learn that a.~,000 pound

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shipzent had been successfully infiltrated to his group during his absence
and avain urged that wore euch sricments should bo etepped ur in the Suture,
Ho 0} then briefly discussed tho SINS? operaticn and asked {*AUNG-1 if he
ddn’t thank this area fer the Co wa. already "Clown? due to the number of -
people whe alr-ady knew cf his o,eration. (This includes £ other people
besides ANKUM]-1 and A GUNG-1.) AMEUNG-L stated he was not sure, tut would
inve:tigate this upen hie return. However, ke felt that this wags an excel-
lent DZ site and should be uticiized for any sutsncquent airdrop scheduled in. -
the Pinar del Rio province dy [Rogers inferred AVAUNG-1 that his overlaya on .
various LZ"s and £2's had beet rec@ived and were being reviewed by the, operae
ticns peo,le. He corplirented avAUNG-1 on the excellent sork of his carto-
gvrepher and oxpressed the vaew that thease [Z areas would be rut to good use.
Finalsy, he assured avaCNGel that no stone is being left unturned to provide
his grov, with the nosessary rateriel sup,;ort sich is critically nevded and
thut this sup.ort «ill de step ed up as our infiltraticn Capabilities are ine
creased both by air and sea. In parting, he cautioned a’ iUxGel not to tuke
any unnecess «ry chances when he resumed operaticnal activities in Cuba, since
his lesdershiv in the ANYUM group was vital to our overall interests, The
meeting was terminetad about 1720 hours us| Rovers] and Peters took their deo

partlure, or

5. Sore of the more significant hiyblirhts of the conv-rsaticns unteti -
tock place betwe.n AYAUNG=1l and the undersigned prior to his meetings with the
W/T operator (Francisco) and Jie zersl ral aro noted herewith:

a. Eecurity: Castro eg taken stringent acti n in tirhtening up
his internal security a, ainst counterer:voluticnary forces inside
Cuba. The raiitia arr being usea to search heus<:s ror concesled
weapons (ustally by a hlock system), and anyone failing to produce
proper identification ic removed for questicning by the NiFR.
Hence, AMSUNC-1 and his orgsnizati 1 are largely confining thoir
aCtivities te the daylicht hours from C700 to 2000 haurs. He
considers night operaticns © particularly on the st:ects of Havana -
as highly dangerous inasruch as the DJ-N (security orrans) are .
cecnstantly on the alert to stop individuals cn the street to check

their identification dccuments.

b. Documentati:n of A,ents in Cuba: A¥AU'IC-) surgested using an
identiricatin card issued by the Havana University for their
students. Re had a sample copy in his ;ossess:on, wich he cleiza-
was readily accepte? by Castro security. forces as being valid.
Sirdlarty, a driver's Jicense prozerly authenicated along :with a _
health certiricate were considored to ha gocd "cover" docurents Coe
for agents cperating in the Havana arva. A supsly of blank identi- -

ficaticn cards wi:i be turned over to the Staticn by AYAUNC-] fap :

trenerittal to headquart-rse for any sutecquent Accurentation of”

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agente whe can be passed off as students at the Ravana University.
(He suggested preparing cae for tis n/T o;erator (Francisco),

Cperaticnal Expenditures: CQue:ied on this aspect, *3UKG-1 stated
his organizati n-weuld need a rinizum of 50 to 60,N0 pesos a

month to cover their cverall operaticnal expenses. These funds are
being used for safehouse raintenance, travel e>penses, purchase of
vehicles and gascline, ailosaticn of funds to varicus sub- Lo,
divisions of the AMYTM erganizaticn located in varicus provinces of
Cuba, and purchase of food and sup ort of various arents whose :
families may be in dire need of food and medical surrzlies.

“/T_o.erators: To date, both A’PANIC<14 and AYCIZX-} have net
met the requirements for effective coraunica‘ion with us on AXYUK

operat.cns, However, A¥i0NG-1 feels that AVPANICAIS has not been
compromised or turned by the DIZx and once he rets cover his nervous
state, it is possible he can stil] be used. Sirilariy, althcugh -
ANGLEN-1 ds considered to be a co d W/T cjeratar, AYStNGe] fecls
his usefulnoss to hir has been considerably nejatet by the nature
of his assignment at the Naval base end bis recent restrictions
to this base by orders of the Castro regire. In stert, AYRUNGel
feels com-unicaticn is the weabost link in his current cperativna
and that direot com-unicati:ns with the Embassy is growing ine. -!
creasingly hazardous, due to the fact that Embassy perscnnel cre
under closo surveillance by the Castre cecurity forces. For this
reason he feels that Francisco wili fill a sericus wid in this
respect, once he is infiltrated into the AMY! K orjansaticon in

Cuba.

Support for other anti-Castro gro.ps in Cuba: aNaCMe2 stated that

all materiel suport stould do funneled directly te bis orgeniza-
ticn for dietrituticen to other anti-Castro gro-ss in Ceba. In

his view thig would serve as a ccntrol factor in-unifying tke over.
all effort of the varicus spiinter ,roups seeking svet suppcrt in .
Cuba and ould alse entsance the pfestire of the MRE es the spears
head for the FRINTE. He then went cn to acd that he was fully —
aware of our efforts to supsort other groups in Cuba, which he — -
assumed we were operating with on a unilateral basis, (i.e., he
sited Nino Dias in Oriente). AMMUNG-1 felt this was a serious) ~
pistuke, as this unilateral sup,ort would affect the leadership and
directicn new being provided by the MAR throughout Guta. . The .
undersigred told AMalNGel that he arreed on the desirabiiity of .

&@ coordinate d effort on the part of all counter-revoict:o.ary

groups seeking to overthrow Castro using the FRENTE as the rally. —

4ng center. However, tie Guestion of supcort being :étee ted
through one channel namely: his organization in Cundé, was neither
feasible nor practical. The fect that Castro had tightened up
security throughout the various previnces of Cuha, woul? make it
difficult or iupossihle for the A! YUM group tc ship arss and other

equipsent from Havana te the eastern rost Frovinces (ieee, Las

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Villas, Caraguay of Oriente) without jeopardiging both shiprents
and person el. Hence, the need for unilateral action on our
part to sup..y those fighting groups in these provinces. This
explanaticn appeared te satisfy AYEUNG21, however he still insisted
that his organizati n should at least be appraised of any valeriel

support provided other groups in Cuba, He was sasured that wa
would take Lis request under consideraticn.

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f, abDID?Y-1: AMKUNG.1 feels that no useful purzose would be served
in sending his a:stciate to Join forces with him in Havana. He
feels that AFBID0Y-1 shculd continue te r-present the A‘YUK
facticn in the FAD and when the counter-r veluti-r-ry forces aro
Cully prepared to everthrew the Castro reg-re, ab PINtTY-1 will be
: brought into the Pinar del Rio to direct the AY YY forces in this
| province.
| g- Manolo Ray: ALAUNG-1 considers RAY as a tiphly danverous individual
i because of his great amb.ticn to pluy a presinent role in any
| sudsoquent Cuban gov rnzent following the overthrow of the Castro
regise. In his opinion, RY poses a sericua threat to VAHOKA's
Jeadership and the FRD inside Cuba. Ho is attempting to draw a
various dissident groups to hie banners «nd appears to hve support. .-
from the riddle class represented by business intercsts, politiciaks,
and the professicnal class. Should w¥ te persuated to join
| forees with the FRD, AMAUNG.2 thinks he wi:] continue to operate
| on & unilaterai basis while soeking to supercede the FRD with
| his om cryanizaticn in Cuba, .

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h. Tony Varona_and the FRD: Although AMRUNG-1 reccgnizes the neod
to aupport the FRO as a political front for rallying counter-
revolutionary grou;s against the Castro regi-e, he n netheless
feels that the FHENIE and Tony VEiCNA hive Jozt eensiderable face

i in Cuba by inaction and political maneuv-ring. He further pointed
out that he is aware that thousands of doliars tad been poured inte
the FRraTz, but dissident groups in Cuba h-ve s<en no evidence of
any of this money to sup ort their efforts to cverthrow Castro. —
Hence, ccnfidence in the FID is at a relatively low ebb amcnz the
people in Cuba and a new shot in the arm in the form of materiel
and financial support is needed to restcre this confidence... Ac-
conding to “FKUNG-1 vhie eup, ort must be forti.coming soon because
euch peo;¢ as Manolo RaY are taking the initistive and will socn

contrcl the entire counter-revolut.onary movement in Cuba,

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John D. Peters

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