Vie 104-10306- P16 mE 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

18 June 1964
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

‘SUBJECT: 303 Committee Meeting - 18 June 1964

1." Item I: Autonomous Operations.

This was raised in view of Manuel Ray's request for
- $25, 000 and indications that he is attempting to make a new expedition to
Cuba in a chartered ship. Various courses of possible action with Ray
were, discussed, ranging from.cutting him off altogether to giving him
the money. It developed that Ray is acting inconsistently with the agreement
with him which was that he would operate outside the United States. Therefore
it was decided that we would tell him that he must abide by the agreement,
that he must find.a base of operations outside the United.States and if he does
we will endeavor to secure the release of his ship which is now in Puerto Rico,
and that we will give him financial support.

ao 2. With respect to antime 24 it was pointed out that Artime's
operations are very costly. CIA has put($4.6 ‘million into , this operation
this year - the future bill will be large, but not as great. FitzGerald
reported that Artime ‘planned one hit and run operation a month, but he noted
he would be lucky if he could pull off one every 3 months. Bundy seemed to
feel Artime was more of a threat than an operator and should be maintained
for that purpose and operations discouraged. FitzGerald pointed out this is
not practical. It was agreed to proceed with Artime recognizing that U.S.
or CIA support of him would probably be "blown". Furthermore it was.
suggested that he be cautioned to be'careful and not follow unduly reckless
courses of action.

3. There was a. long discussion on the implications of the CIA
June 10th memorandum reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading
Cuban government leaders. This report was taken most seriously by the group.
It was felt that the purpose of advising us through CIA of these plans was to
put us on notice and therefore we-should not fail to take appropriate precautionary
actions to see that no assassination attempt of which we had knowledge was
carried out. It was decided that appropriate authorities, i.e. Department of
Justice and the FBI,  ~ should be notified and urged to take appropriate action
against the individuals. involved. ;

I took the position that we are overly exercised, that I was
inclined to write the whole thing off as Miami cocktail party talk rather than
definite plans. Had I seen the Memo before it was distributed, I would have
investigated the sources and the credibility of the whole thing before taking
action. However the group were more concerned than I and therefore planning to
discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover.

YAY

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I pointed out that copies of the Memorandum had. been sent
to the Attorney General and the Department of Justice but there had been
no conversation on the subject.

.ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms
steps we should take to establish the
credibility of the report; also communicate
with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also l
should cali the Attorney General personally.

4. Prior to the meeting Mr. Vance asked my opinion of using
the 22 million psyops leaflets which inadvertently had been printed on
U~CS. manufactured white sulphite paper, all as reported in MACV
cable MAC SOG 5050 dated 18 June 1964 (IN 09143). I told Vance that I felt
we should go ahead. It was too bad it had been done this way, but it is one of
‘those things that a person not thoroughly acquainted. with this type of operation

might overlook. He: was in agreement and presumably will instruct the release
of the leaflets. ,

“am/mfb


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LIMITED 5 Sterereurton afectn, mano te SPECAT
EXCLUSIVE STATE FOR SULLIVAN, 0 OSD FOR MCNAMARA an ANTHIS
WHITEHOUSE FOR MCGEORGE BUNDY, CIA FOR MCCONE, CARTER AND
HELMS, JCS FOR GEN TAYLOR, INFO AMEMB SAIGON FOR AMB- LODGE
AND. NES, CINCPAC FOR ADM FELT.
Ae OPLAN 344:

1, IN ORDER TO MEET OPERATIONAL SCHEDULES FOR JUNE AND

JULY PSYOPS LEAFLET DROPS, TWENTY ae ILL ION LEAFLETS Arg

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‘C{ARSIFIED” MESSAGE [TOP SECRET

WERE PRINTED ON SIXTEEN POUND US GRADE WHITE SULPHITE
_ PAPER. THIS WAS NECESSITATED DUE’TO UNAVAILABILITY OF
OTHER PAPER SUITABLE FOR IHIGHSPEED LEAFLET PRESS;
2. UNLESS THESE PRINTED LEAFLETS ARE AUTHORIZED FOR
“DISSEMINATION OVER NORTH VIETNAM UNDER SCHEDULED OPLAN
34n° ‘OPERATIONS NUMEROUS PSYOPS OPPORTUNITIES EXPLOITABLE
UNDER PRESENT LIGHT OF THE MOON PERIOD WILL BE MISSED AND
TIMELINESS OF SEVERAL OF THESE LEAFLETS WILL BE LOST.
3, REALIZE SUBJECT OF PLAUSIBLE DENIAL BECOMES INVOLVED
HERE BUT FEEL IN THIS CASE PROBLEM OF POSSIBLE ATTRIBUTION
TO UNITED STATES UST BE JUDGED IN LIGHT OF FOLLOWING CIR-
CUMSTANCES: a
A. PAPER STOCK USED IS STANDARD US MANUFACTURE .OB-
TAINED THROUGH US ARMY QUARTERNASTER SOURCES AND Is |
ASSUMED TO BE AVAILABLE ON WORLD MARKET FOR SALE TO ANY

CONSUMER. MAP SUPPORTED FORCES SUCH AS ARVN OR OTHERS

COULD HAVE -ACCESS TO SAME TYPE PAPER.

oe B. ANY DESIRE TO ATTRIBUTE OP: AN 344 ACTIONS TO us.
COULD. BE MORE READILY SUB STANT IATED BY DRV PRODUCING. AGENT.

PERSONNEL OR MORE CR Tr ICAL ITEMS LOST IN SOME PREVIOUS

__TEAM OPERATIONS, : wee seen eons
'C. PAPER STOCK ITSELF IS NOT ONLY. ATTRIBUTABLE ITEM,

BUT ALSO OFFSET PRINTING | PROCESS EMPLOYED WITH OTHER TYPE
PR INTED MATTER
D4 IN ESSENCE ALL OPLAN 348 ACTIONS ARE DESIGNED -TO
IMPRESS DRV THAT PRESSURE IS BEING APPLIED BY MAJOR POWER.
“USE OF US PAPER AND J*IRECT IND ICAT ION oF us INVOLVEMENT

i

f ; [Tap sEceFT |

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See may . r . yr “
ele e ¢
aa eve . . .

" "CLASSIFIED MESSAGE |

| TOP SECRET | nN prot .
tEND CONTRIBUTE TO THAT BASIC OBJECTIVE, |
E. ONLY CHEMICAL ANALYSIS COULD ASCERTAIN THAT PAPER
USED IS U.S. MANUFACTURED STOCK. | |
Fs IN ANY EVENT, U.S, BLAMED BY DRV FOR ALL OPLAN 34A
ACTIONS THEY CHOOSE TO PUBLICISE AND U.S. IN EACH CASE
COULD CHOOSE TO DENY OR IGNORE ACCUSATIONS. |
4, REQUEST. APPROVAL TO PROCEED WITH DISGEMINAT ION OF PRE-
PARED LEAFLETS AT THIS TIME AND UNTIL SUITABLE FOREIGN
SOURCE PAPER STOCK CaN BE OBTAINED WHICH SHOULD BE WITHIN T¥O WEEKS. |
5. IN ORDER TO MEET. CURRENT JUNE SCHEDULE REQUEST REPLY
"WITHIN, 48 HOURS.
GP oe
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TOP SECRET |

13-00000_. : -

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD =: ‘

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting (5412) - 2 April 1964

1 Briefly reviewed the status of North Viet Nam operations 34A,
All concluded that the results have beén negative and disappointing.
I took the position this was to be expected but that now the period of
organization had past, we might get some better.r results. ee

7 an GR. . 5
ma The CIA IDEALIST- ‘TACKLE | program was s approved except |:
i ; for the North Korean flight. Defense interposed an objection to this . vk
flight on the grounds that they were nearing agreement for the release © zi

|
i of helicopter crews which have been held in North Korean custody.

J Soe

ACTION: This particular flight should be withheld. USIB
and most particularly DIA should be informed in the meeting i

_ On Wednesday, the 8th] .

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a 2. “[Discussed the problem of captains and crews for the SWIFT

_ and. NASTY craft and the necessity of withdrawing the German mercenaries |,
“| and the Swedish captains. This was recognizedas a'must. It was agreed -
that substitution of Chinese Nationalist captains was acceptable on an on

in . . .
i\ interim basis.
. \

\ ’ ACTION: DDP to arrange with Secretary Vance for appro- 7

\ priate actions by the Department of Defense through their

: representatives in Taiwan for the recruitment, movement, Ho
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a a compensation and care of these captains 8]... ae

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{epee a. [eviewes DoD peripheral reconnaissance which was approved
; ‘after extended discussion of capabilities of the new radar in Cambodia.
‘} It was agreed that the field would be instruded to carefully observe ‘
i

’ 7 ' 4 :
“} up by it. If this turned out to be a regular practice by the Cambodians,
: as the matter should be resubmitted for, reconsideration.

7
o JA _CTION: The field should follow this carefully with MACY v2)

wees UF 0 MORI gi GE _ a

ay A. Rosen of ground rules for U- 2 in North Viet Nam as outlined.

Secretary Vance! s paper \ was '§ approved"7 es

ee a

3 April om Wee

operation of this radar to determine whether the U-2s were being picked
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, ‘in~ 5, |The recommendation to overfly Laos was held in suspension,
; DoD was asked to bring in specific details of the particular 34A operations
; which required such overflights and the probable advantages of continuing
" the operations. by means of overflying L Laos. State held very positive view
against Laotian-overflights:} ~~ :

6. The proposed infiltration and exfiltration operations in Cuba
were approved. Mr. FitzGerald was warned not to cache arms with
- agents felt to be under Castro control. He stated. that this particular
Cache involved money and other things, but no arms, The caching of
. small quantities of arms elsewhere in Cuba was approved.
Memorandum on the operation of autonomous exile groups was noted and no
instructions were given to restrain these operations. The overall question
of future sabotage eperations was discussed. Mr, Bundy agreed to bring
the matter before the President and senior Cabinet officers Promptly. .
S 98 -
7. irae Chilean political action as outlined in the CIA paper of i
April lst was approved, It was pointed. out that since the paper was | i
‘drafted, COS and Ambassador in Santiago had reached an agreement about |
the handling of funds] epee ogre esgp eee
Go
a 8s | Proposed political action in Zanzibar was approved. Mr. . Waller ;
gave a brief account of the results of the favorable negotiations with the
British. Understood thtat implementation of this paper was to be
coordinated with the British in accordance with agreement reached in i
London. ] cee le oe we eee ne eer

OTHER MATTERS:
ae GS Noe 5. okaenmen arene aes Gua \
och, {Statement was made that a. CIA U-2 was. "painted" with radar :
‘on February 24th, ‘implication being that the CIA U- 2g’ in the vicinity of |:
Phnom Penh. . el!

ACTION: I would like to know the facts on this. ] Sy

2. , [Question was raised about need for ‘continuing the 30 mile u

intrusion into Cambodi‘and Laos. Indications were that the photography i

‘had produced no useful. information for MACV. LE
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oe ACTION: This question should be studied and brought '
‘| .up for discussion at meeting on April 9th. I should cable |
f Carter to investigate ily 7 Lf
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. ~ _ , ; -2-

JAM/mfb


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27 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of 5412 Group

_— OF. ee

1. “The e que stion of t the ‘extent of the SAG planes operations in South
Vietnam was discussed against the background of Dr. McMillan's

iletter of of February 26th.

4 .
1) a Overflights of South Vietnam -- O.K.

)
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| : 2. Overfly that part of North Vietnam which is within 30 miles
‘of South Vietnam or of the coast line.. ;

. 3. That part of Laos which is within 30 miles of the South
Vietnamese border.
4, That part of Cambodia which is not more than 30 miles
_ from South Vietnam.

7 ‘ With respect to 4. 7 instructions were to be given that the primary

' purpose of the flights was to survey border activity and the 30 mile shot

i is provided to give range and operational flexibility. I felt in reviewing

J McMillan's proposal that if the SAC planes were to go as far north as the
2lst parallel, then they should go all the way to the China border and the
proposed CIA operation out of Takhli should be abandoned. This raised the
question of whether civilian or military planes and pilots should be over 7
North Vietnam to the extent which could not be explained as being “off

All agreed that the SAC Air Force operations should be either ,
It was }

course",
: ft
I interposed

limited as outlined above or should cover the entire country.
decided to refer the matter to higher authority for decision.
no objection to SAC's overflight of North Vietnam but merely took the ij)
position that if they went as far north as proposed by McMillan, they if

should cover the entire country.) :

2. The program of infiltration and exfiltration of Cuba was approved
with the exception of one operation -- operation #434 -- about which
Mr. Cheever explained that he thought the agents we were resupplying were

under Cuban control and the resupply operation was for the purpose of
deception. It was agreed that the resupply should be confined to money and


: progress.

medicine and that the small amount of arms involved should not be cached.
Otherwise the operation was approved.

Alexis Johnson and Mr, Bundy raised: questions of the consequences

of finding an arms cache or knocking over an infiltration at the time of the

OAS debate on the Venezuelan problem. Arguments were persuasive that

we should go slowly during this period. I read from the February 25th
Cuban checklist of the deterioration of the spirit of the people of Cuba,. the
feeling that we were about to recognize the Castro government.and the apathy
toward further resistance as evidence of the price we are paying for
slow-downs and deferments of action against Cuba. I said that I thought our
Cuban program was incomplete disarray. We had no policy or covert
operations. We now are hesitating on infiltration and exfiltration, our
economic denial program was failing, while Castro is. making significant

3. Gre forcast of NRO activities for March was approved.)

78 °
4. [the « status report on political action in Kenya was 2s approved]

SESS o ee cee pow 2 NTSa re

JAM /mfb

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13-0090,
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THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C. :

February 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY

Attached isa paper which I would like to table for.

discussion at the next meeting of the 5412 group,

ror

Cyrus “| t vance

Attachment

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( : . February 10, 1964
/MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Clandestine and Covert Activities Against Cuba

The objective of the U. S, Government is to overthrow.
the Castro/Communist regime in Cuba, In accomplishing its
objective, the U. S, is not willing to risk nuclear war or, at
this time, substantial deterioration. in its relations with its
Allies, or significant escalation in tensions between this .
country and the Soviets. Thus, any covert U. S. program
should be set at a level that is not likely to incur such risks.
Such a program would appear to be a low-risk, clandestine
program of harassment and sabotage directed against Cuba.
In addition, a program of higher risks ‘seems justified when
it is directed against Cuban subversion of Latin America.

Actions Against Cuba .

1, Sabotage, A low level campaign of sabotage and
tf harassment against Cuba might include such targets as the
( Canete Saw Mill, smaller POL storage plants (such.as the

one at Pilon), the Nazabal warehouse and pier, and ships
(such as barges or Cuban patrol boats). Where possible,
it would. seem desirable to make the raids appear to have
come from within Cuba, Cuban ships outside Cuba can be sabotaged
by discreet means (such as placing sand in gears or sugar in fuel).

2. Harassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba.

a) Initiate a more comprehensive program of
_ overt and covert pressure against Free World firms trading
with Cuba. In this connection, develop.a comprehensive list
of firms doing business with Cuba, check them against known
DOD off-shore and foreign purchase suppliers so that
appropriate retaliation ‘can be applied against those suppliers,

b) Place unactivated incendiary and explosive
devices.in cargoes and on ships bound for.Cuba and subse~ .
quently "'tip’ off" port or shipping offigials so that they will
search and discover the devices with the attendant publicity,

COPY No. 4 ot. & copies


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ia ; 3. Covert Economic Activities,

a) Intensify covert activities directed against
critical commodities destined for Cuba with resort, if
necessary, to. carefully considered and controlled preclu-
sive buying. ; co

b) Make it known discreetly through the press
that we maintain careful records of the companies dealing
with Cuba, suggesting without saying so that these records
constitute a potential "blacklist, "'

c) Form a group of responsible and qualified
Cuban exile businessmen to maintain pressure on firms
trading with Cuba by indicating that such firms will have
no future in a post-Castro Cuba.

4, To the extent possible, encourage dissidence
among different factions in Cuba - Peking, Moscow,
Nationalist -~ by spreading rumors, internal and
external sabotage designed to accomplish this purpose
{such as actions against homes of leaders, etc). |

( Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America

1. Develop a list of vulnerable Cuban agents in Latin
America against whom a concentrated program of bribery,
blackmail and coercion can be instituted,

2. Carefully select key Latin American members of
' the Havana-Peking school and institute a program of kidnapping,
and personal and physical harassment, while attempting to
‘attribute these acts to rivals who support Moscow, Institute
the reverse process as a retaliatory program against Moscow
. supporters, oo

Any of the foregoing activities would be conducted against
a background of U. S, propaganda (black, white and gray) and
political activity designed to increase internal dissension within
Cuba, to support economic isolation of Cuba, to avoid splitting °
with our allies over the Cuban issue and.to reduce, and perhaps
eliminate, Castro subversion of Latin America. In addition,
surveillance activities should be significantly stepped up.

COPY No. 4 of 6 COPIES


