1f04-10400-10316 12025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
Jo, SEL SECURIT
’ a : FOR CoO MMITTEES

ll March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. James M. Potts wn ut
; Chief, Africa Division

Mr. Richard S, Sampson Oo Ae 7
Chief, Europe Division

Mr.. Alan D. Wolfe
Chief, Near East Division

Mr. Richard F. Stolz

’ - Chief, Soviet/East European Division
FROM : John D. Walker
0/SA/DO/0
SUBJECT . : Guidelines for Providing Information

to the House Appropriations Committee
Surveys and Investigations Staff -
Concerning Foreign Intelligence and
Security Services

1. Since members of the S&I Staff will be
talking with your Divisions in the near. future,
it may be worthwhile to review the guidelines as
to what may be said concerning relationships with

foreign liaison services. In the broad sense,
liaison services constitute both a source and a
method.

2. We are prepared to discuss the following:

a. The identification and responsibili-
ties of the liaison services.in a particular
area to the extent that we can draw on
sources other than information derived through
the established liaison relationship, i.e.
overt information or information from penetra-
tions which will not endanger the source.

b. In further describing the liaison
services, we can provide information on the.
objectives, key personnel, strength, budget

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SECRET

and methods of operations of services, provided
that, such data will be drawn from open sources
or penetrations and not from details of liaison -
-arrangements with the services themselves.

c. Agency manhours and funds devoted to
liaison with the foreign services.

d. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further
details on such arrangements, including the
scope of funds and equipment provided .to such
foreign services. ;

d. We are prepared to provide general
comments on the degree of operational coopera-
-tion with the Station. If technical support,
for example, provides a useful input, we can
state that the liaison service provides
technical support, using a qualifying adjective
to define, such as excellent, limited, etc.

3. We have no objection to the provision of
foreign intelligence reports based on liaison with

'such services. Source descriptions should be those

used in the disseminated report.

4. We will not make available details on
liaison arrangements, information on sources and

methods of such services which have been obtained

through liaison or jointly controlled sources or:
other information which would reveal Agency sources
and methods or violate the trust on which the

. official liaison relationship is based.

5. The S&I Staff approves close liaison
relationships and believes that these relationships
are cost effective.

John Dt Walker

0/SA/DO/0:JDWalker: kaw (1542)

Distribution
Original - C/AF
1 - C/EUR
1 - C/NE
1 -' C/SE
2 - SA/DO/O

- SECRET


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SO . Guidelines for Providing Information
to Congressional Oversight Committees on
Foreign Intelligence and Security Services

These guidelines’ take into account the fact that
foreign intelligence and security. services, when acting
in connection with the Agency's official liaison with
them, constitute both a source and a method and thus
require the statutory protection accorded any other
intelligence source or method: The guidelines also
recognize that the duly constituted oversight bodies of
the Congress have expressed an interest in such services |
and in the general scope, nature and extent of the Agency's
relationships with them. The purpose of these guidelines
is to provide a formula for dealing with these two

-. sometimes conflicting objectives.

The Agency is prepared to provide, upon specific
request, appropriately classified and sanitized information
to oversight committees on the following aspects of
foreign intelligence and security services:

a. the identification of the governments with
whose services CIA has liaison arrangements; |

b. Agency man hours and funds devoted to
liaison with foreign services;:,

c. In the case of SIGINT liaison, further

details on such arrangements, including the scope of

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funds and equipment provided to such forcign services;
d. Information on the objectives, key personnel,
strength, budget and methods of operation of such services,
provided that such data will be drawn from open sources or
penetrations and not from the details of liaison
arrangements with the services themselves,
e. Where relevant, foreign intelligence reports
based on liaison with such services.

7 . The Agency will not make. available to the oversight
committees the details of liaison arrangements with
foreign services, information on sources and methods of .,
such services obtained through liaison or jointly
controlled sources, or other information which would

reveal Agency sources or methods or violate the trust on
which. these official liaison relationships is necessarily
based. .
In the event of substantial allegations of improper
activities conducted by foreign intelligence or security
-services with which the Agency is presumed to maintain
liaison, every effort will be made to provide all relevant
facts which bear on such allegations. Where this would

' involve departure from the above guidelines, the Director

will be prepared to meet with the Chairman or Vice-Chairman

of the committce to seek a satisfactory resolution of such

problems. ..


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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD |

Mr. Colby, Mitch Rogovin and Mr. Knoche met with
Chairman Otis Pike at 9/30, 7/24 in Chairman Pike's office
to discuss groundrules, etc. for the House Select Committee
on Intelligence,

Mr. Colby left the following material with Pike:

1. 16 June 1975 Letter to the Honorable Elmer B. Staats °
Comptroller General of the United States, Signed by
Mr. Colby. The letter deals with the GAO's audit
of the Central Intelligence Agency. (Attached).

2. Guide to Central Intelligence Agency Statutes and Law
dated September 1970 (without the Ryan Amendment
on Foreign Intelligence). _@iled in 6D0120)

3, Three Groudrules papers: (Attached) ~s

~-Agreements To Be SoughtBy the DCI With Chairmen » -

of the Select Committees

a eSeerecy Agreement

- =-Guides for Protection of Classified Information
““A nd Documents Furnished i The Select Committee...

4, lt March 1975 1 Letter : from Colby to Senator Church,
(Attached)

Rosemarie R. Hesterberg

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SECRET

Checklist for DCI Discussion with HSC

; oo,
1, . Your intent to be cooperative and forthe aming.

_ 2. Your responsibility to protect S&M. -Will need HSC understanding ~

of particularly sensitive matters;' *"
--names of agents. and sources. —

--names of cooperating American organizations and
contacts to whom v we have pledged confidentiality. —

--material from foreign liaison.
; -+sensitive intelligence. methods and techniques of collection,
3.. will need to. work out segurity groundrules,

--Chairman of USIB Security Committee and CIA Director

of Security available to help work out custodial arrangements,

compartmented clearances, etc.

- , 0 an

4, Importance of secrecy agreements. Your willingness ta ‘gus pend
them to permit testimony by current and ex-employees,

5. will ‘confirm with a letter and an employee bulletin which
can be used by HSC in dealing with Agency witnesses and
interviews. on 7 + ;

nae ‘

Po ay ft

24 July 1975

Classified by
Exempt from genoral
declassification schadute of E.0. 11652

exemption schedu'a 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automaticaty declassified on

SEC RET Data impossible to Determine

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AGREEMENTS TO BE SOUGHT BY THE DCI WITH
CHAIRMEN OF THE SELECT COMMITTEES

Vy ‘lt would be desirable 7; the. per could ‘secure agréement |
. with the Chairmen of the Select Committees; as has been customary
in. other Congressional proceedings regarding sensitive matters, Shats:

' fa) ‘Departments’ and agencies shall have the right”
to request that testimony be givenionly in executive session,
‘that in some instances testimony be’ “off-the-record" and - ’
that certain testimony be heard only by members and in
"some cases, s,only by the Chairman and Vice Chairman.
_ athe! we) Witnesses be. afforded an wn opportunity to review
and. ‘comment on and/or correct the record of their * testimony —
_ Prior to any pupueson of it. - a oe, a. ae
e When que ) stioned about intelligence matters that
-@ome under the purview of another organization, witnesses.
m should be permitted tg state that a response fo the question |
ee a ee _.is not properly within their authority and to respectfully .
_ |, suggest that the appropriate party be called to testify © on
ouch matters. m .

2s tt would ‘also be desirable if the DCI could secure agreement
with the Chairmen of the Select Committees that those agencies
:. furnishing documerits to the committees be-authorized to excise from
- those documents, prior to presentation, the names of their personnel
a “under cover or whose personal safety might be jeopardized as wellas |
mone tae those of other individuals whose safety or ‘individual privacy, may be
- jeopardized by disclosure. ' Also’ excised. should be names of sources,
operations, specific details of technical devices and systems main-
. tained in compartmented channels and names of organizations
cooperating ona highly c confidential basis.

—_—

| 3... In view of their susceptibility to » foreign countermeasures,
it would be desirable if the DCI could obtain agreement. with the .
Chairmen of the Select Committees not to require presentation of details


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of the technology of the technical collection programs... It would also |

" compartmented area.

Hines which will be = Provided.

be desirable if the Select Committees adopted. the use of Compart-

' mented Control Systems to’ protect documents on these programs

‘and cleared only those staff personnel with an absolute need-to-know.
The responsible departments and agencies would be glad to advise. .
and assist in ‘any arrangements the Chairmen would desire in this

eb os to s 0 ee re

Ae Further; it would be aesixtbte if the DCI attempt to -

. secure an agreement with the Chairmen, of the Select. Committees :

*. that they will entertain and consider security principles . and t guide— .

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- I,. Se _y in accepting employment
‘ or assigament with the Select: Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, recognize the
-. Special trust and confidence placed in me to protect classified infor- .
. mation from unauthgrized disclosure. : ;

. I I hereby agree to accept the specific obligations set forth.
. below.as 2 condition precedent of my employment or assignment with.
1 the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect
_ to Intelligence Activities, established by the Senate of the United
_ States, Resolution 21, agreed to on January 27, 1975, hereinafter
_ referred to as the Select Committee, ; . . 7
wei is my » under standing that i in the course of my employment
-or assignment with the Select Committee .I will be given access to
. information from departments. and agencies of the Government which
is classified in accordance with the statidards set forth in Executive
. Order. 11652 of March-8, 1972, as amended. All classified information
. So acquired by me in the course of my employment remains the
property of the United States of America and I further agree to
_ surrender upon demand by the Chairman of the Select Committee
‘or his designee(s) or upon my separation from the Select Committee,
any classified material. which‘thas come into my possession as a : ,
' .xesult of my employment or assignment with the Select Committee.

Thereby agree that the burden is.on me to determine if -
inforrnation is classified and that I will never divulge, publish or
reveal by word, writing, conduct or otherwise any classified
information which has come to my knowledge as a result of my
employment or assignment with the Select Committee without prior
written consent of the Chairman or the President of the Senate or
their duly authorized xepresentative. -


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I hereby agree that any information learned during my
employment or assignment with the Select Committce which is related ~
to intelligence and prepared for publication by me will be. submitted to

. the Chairman or the President of the Senate or their duly authorized
° representative prior to discussing with or showing to any ‘publisher,
. editor or literary agent for the purpose of determining whether said
_ material contains any classified information as defined in Executive
» Order 11652. Lagxee that the Chairmah of the Select Committee,
- President of the Senate or their duly authorized representative has
“the authority to make the final determination as to whether information
vis classified and thus should be deleted from the material submitted.

ae “Yhave been informed of the provisions ‘of 18 U.S.C. 793, 794, .

' 798 and 952; and 50 U;S.C. 783 (b); and-42 U.S.C. 2274; and Executive °
. Order.11652, all of which relate to the protection of classified infor——

. mation, and understand their meaning. rr
Further, 1 I agree to: abide by 5 such rules ‘and procedures as the

-. Select Committee shall instjiute for the protection of classified material.
~~ Lunderstand that any breach of any part of the obligations in this agree-
ment could subject r me to legal. and/ or. 2 administrative action. :

_ I further agree ‘that all the conditions and obligations imposed

‘on ‘me with respect.to the protection of classified information by this
agreement and applicable security regulations apply during my employ-
ment or assignment and continue after that relationship has terminated.

x take the obligations set forth above freely and without any
mental reservations or purpose of evasion. ,

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. WITNESS: oe I

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Date.

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'. “GUIDES FOR PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
‘AND DOCUMENTS FURNISHED THE SELECT COMMITTEES

» Ay

1, Personnel Security Clearances * oS a an oe
a} Background Investigation mo

_ It would be desirable for the Select Committees t to stipulate,
that no staff personnel is to be given access to any classified material,

. 4 _. .. testimony or.information received or generated by the committees. ~~
without prior receipt of a security clearance | based ona full field

7 inve stigation.

. (b) Secrecy Agreement
: It would be desirable for the Select,Committees torequirea =,
signed secrecy agreement of employees or individuals assigned to ,
the committees! staffs. The agreement should include Provisions:
1) That acceptance of committee secrecy regulations
is a. condition precedent of employment or assignment;

2) Recognizing US. Government property rights to
classified information; eae

+ . ,
3) Requiring prioz written consent before divulgence
of olassified information; Ot ae de

‘Ay For recognition that breach of the secrecy rules
and obligations contained in the agreement could subject |
the signer to adrninistrative and/ or * legal action under

- . *

appropriate statutes; ee

5) That there is no time limit on the terms - of the
agreement,


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- 2, Physical and Document Security

The Select Committees should adopt rules to insure : that the
, secrecy of any sensitive information received or generated by it be
-. preserved, These rules should be made known to the individuals. -
- and agencies who will be called. upon to present testimony or foe
- materials. Among. these should be wulgs,An-physical-seourity = ‘and oe
" document security. ; . ce vere

fa) Ph sical Securit _ . = OF a a Sy ;

. tt would be desirable if the Select Committees adopt the following.
rules related to physical security: ae

oy All classified material will be stored i in > safes for
7 safekeeping i in the registry of the Joint Committee on Atomic .

. Energy or similar facility and handled in accordance with _7
“4. the regulations of this registry for classified material.  .. :

2), Twenty - four-hour guard protection, ‘supplemented
. .by anti-intrusion. alarms, should be required on the storage
oe. area. | ; ; a

*.3) Areas selected for use in closed session should Oo
_ be guarded against entry by unauthorized persons.
AY “The committees should z arrange for the conduct of :
” audio countermeasures to preclude the possibility of
.. unauthorized use-of transrnitters and/or recording devices. .
It should be noted that a foreign clandestine transmitter w2s
located in the Rayburn House Office Building on 12 2 February
1973, . ; . we TET

5) At the end of each session of the Select Committees,
the hearing room should be examined by a cleared staff:
. officer who will secure any misplaced « classified material
.. or waste.

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_ (») Document Security’

oa

6) Areas should be designated in which classified
material can be reviewed. These areas should be secure
against access by unauthorized personnel, Material should
not be removed from these areas for the sake of conveniente _
except when necessary for the work of the committees.and

- ” sHould.not-be-teansported ovérnight to the office or residence,
” of personnel of the committees. De

-) Committees should select and identify a single

o location and specific personnel authorized to sign acknow-~
ce ledgement of receipt of clas sified materials provided to
the committees. a . oe ments ae - ar ao

: feat,
le 7 -

2) A sy stem of document control should be established

- a : to permit control of glassified documents to provide for
oo! accountability. oo er ee ot ue

ee . . ee aot he _ woe TP

* 3) ‘Duplication of documents should be controlled so

as to require a record of the document. xeproduced, the

- subject to the same controls: as the original.

, the destruction of classified waste,

'. mwumber of copies reproduced and the custodian or receiving

personnel. Reproduced classified documents should be

4) Appropriate arrangements should be. made for.

mas >
‘eo

+.B) Transcripts. The committees Should give ©
consideration to the necessity of providing appropriate _ =

. security in the transcription of testimony by committee cet

transcribers. The committees may desire to charge each
agency presenting testimony with this responsibility. In
some, if not all cases, this might include escort of
materials to the place of transcription, the securing of

* carbons, waste and notes and the return of the transcribed .

testimony to the committee for safekeeping in accordance a

. with comimittce rules,

CRE ROE Oe tee

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"need to know" in order to build, perfect, operate.or handle the.

6) Early agreement should be reached on the
‘disposition of classified materials such as storage
_ under seal in the National Archives. The question of
access should be determined by. the President of the

‘Senate or. the Speaker of the House. es oa a

3. _ Gompartmented Information. a ia ,

ae

‘There i is. some’ ‘extremely: sensitive information i in: nthe intelligence
‘community which is disseminated only to those who have a very strict

“' material produced by extremely sensitive’ foreign “intelligence collection

“programs... The sensitivity of these programs rests upon the vulner-
” ability to countermeasures which a foreign government could easily
’ Justitute. if.details. of the means of collection. became known. Thus,

even individuals cleared for Top Secret information do not have access -

. ‘to compartmented information unless they ere required to have such
'.. knowledge in.the performance of their duties. This information is

handled in Compartmented Control Systems. It would be desirable -

-if the Chairmen would adopt the Compartmented Control Systems on

these extremely sensitive collection efforts and clear only those

* staff personnel with an absolute "need to know” about such systems,

:- and that documents related to such systems: be handled in a compart-_

Ae, Securit Officer

mented fashion by the Select Committee. The responsible departments

_ and agencies would be glad to advise and assist in any arrangements.

the. Chairmen would desire in this compartmented area.

. or”
ge BS

; “Te would be desirable if the committees appointed a security
officer with the responsibility of discharging the security rules adopted’
by the committee and of serving as a point of contact with the depart-
ments and agencies of interest to the committee. It would also be .
desirable if the committee rules required each agency of interest to
identify a single point of contact to facilitate provisions of security
support required by the committee, mo


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{~ ENTRNC WTEELICENCE AcE

{asHINGTON, D.C. 20505

a6 um age

Honorable Elmer B. ‘Staats’ Doe
Cornptroller Generai of the United States oo os, cot, .
_ General Accounting Office CO : Te

' 441 G Sireet . oo ea 0 ot
Washington, D. oc. © 20548 = a ge

Dear Mr. Sieats: ;
eo. My attention has been directed toa a letict om Mr. Keller, General
_. Accounting Office, to the Honorable William Proxmire dated May 10, 1974, .
.. which was > placed i in the Congressional Record. by Senator Proxmire on ese eb a
a February 11, 1975.- The-letter deals with the intelligence community and <2.)
-"r.- reviews the General Accounting Office's" right to audit and obtain information ne
_— from the Central Intelligence Agency. Le a Es a

* Yrasmuch as Mr. Keller has treated a a subject basic to this Agency" s
capabllite to carry out work mandated by Congress, I believe it would serve’
_' 2usefal purpose to review some of the background concerning the use of

2 confidentia} funds and their relationship to the audit of CIA over the ‘Years.

cleus Mr. Keller notes in his letterthat there are "a fairly substantial number
“.. of instances where expenditures are accounted for solely upon a cerfification .
. . by the head of the department or establishment involved." The need is clear
! dm the case of this Agency. The necessity to safeguard certain truly vital
' foreign intelligence secrets has been recognized by the Congress in its
- direction to the Director of Central Intelligence-td protect intelligence sources
_ and methods from unauthorized disclosure. This responsibility was complemented
.. by authorizing certain expenditures "for objects of a confidential, extraordinary,
_ or emergency nature," to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director
of Central Intelligence. Such expenditures -would apply, for example, toa
: secret agent operating abroad in.a hostile climate whose identity must be pro-- |
_'. tected not.only so that he can continue supplying the intelligence involved, but >
_ also because his freedom7and.on ocpagion his, life--weighs i in the balance. | ;
. ais ae LS rey
a “Other intelligence activities do not have such obvious sécurity require =
‘ments, but are, nonetheless, within the sources and methods concept. Liaison .
with foreign intelligence and security agencies is extremely important in fields of _
both positive intelligence and counterintelligence. Such liaisons to be effective
., depend on the confidence of each service that the other will protect not only the
mere fact of the relationships, but also its‘sources and methods and sensitive
information. Compromise of any of these brings not only protests from the foreign
liaison service , buti aim some cases a lessening or even cessation of its copperation.

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‘Even overt activities have 2 their own ‘security problems Thus, many U. Ss.
, éitizens and others are willing to provide sensitive information to overt intelligence _
ae units s only « on condition. that their cooperation in this respect, be absolutely protected.
. cee eg

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: This need for the Special protection of intelligence sources and methods has
been well recognized by officials in the executive, judicial, and legislative _
‘branches of our Government. Mr. Lindsay C. Warren, then Comptroller General -

’ of the United States, in a letter dated March 12, 1948, to the Director, Bureau of ..
the Budget,” addressed the provision granting the Director of Central Intelligence
the power to certify the expenditure of confidential funds by stating that while it
provided "for the granting of much wider authority than I would ordinarily
recommend for Government agencies, generally; the purposes sought to be
a obtained i in the establishment of the Central. Intelfigence Agency are believed to:

. bé of such paramount importance as to justify the extraordinary measures pro-
. posed therein." He went on to-say that the "necessity for secrecy in such matters
' ds apparent and the Congress apparently recognized this fully in that it provided |

in section 102(d).(3)_of Public Law: 253, that the Director ‘of Central Intelligence ~
“shal be responsible. for-protecting intelligence sources and methods from ~
unauthorized disclosure." - Under these conditions, he stated,” ‘I do=riot feel
:. called PPR. to object to the = Proposals advanced. eee ;

“it has been and it remains ‘the policy of CIA to o rely upon vouchered funds —
“wherever possible. (Vouchered furids are those which can be accounted for and -
'- audited in conformance with the laws that apply to other Government agencies.
, + and with standard Government regylations and procedures.) Currently more |
.--. than half of the Agency's appropriafions are disbursed as vouchered funds.
_-.. The confidential funds certification authority referred to by Mr. Warren in his.
_ March 12, 1948 letter is reserved for “objects oF of a confidential, SEROTEDAEY  -
ox emergency nature." i oo Ba Con.
. From the beginning of CIA: records for ait\vouchered fund expenditures
. | were made available to and were subject to a voucher audit by the GAO. Use of
| the voucher audit procedure allowed the GAO to examine expenditure and
_ collection. vouchers and related documents to determine whether expenditures

", were made'legally and solely for the objects for which appropriations were made.
Use of the voucher audit procedure also allowed CIA to protect those activities of
a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, i.e., intelligence | sources,
and methods ? . .-

neoaprehenetve ‘audit. se eroach, ” and raised with the CIA Subcommittee ¢ ‘of the Fe
' House Armed Services Committee the desirability of an expanded audit of Agency -

” activities. The Comptroller General stated by letter dated May 29, 1959 to

. Subcommittee Chairman Kilday that he did "not recommend any change in section 10
(now section 8) of the Central Intelligence Act" and that "any broadening of our
audit activities should not include an evaluation of the intelligence activities of

the Agency."

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' were made.known to the CIA Subcommittee in a letter of May 16, 196] from the
. Comptroller General in which he said the.GAO planned to discontinue the audit
of CIA activities. He acknowledged that various steps were taken by the CIA "to

ae activities of the litelligence Component, but such reviews, in our opinion; will "nok: as

y Director of Central Intelligence lagreed tha that GAO
should expand its current audit activities in a letter to the Comptroller dated ;
October 16, 1959, cautioning, however, that the comprehensive audit would have.
to be limited so as to remain outside the area of sensitive security operations for
which: by law the Director! s certificate must be deemed a sufficient voucher. oe,

'. SThe results of the trial, period of comprehensive audit from 1959 to 1962 |

place the General Accounting Office in a position to make a comprehensive audit |

. of the overt activities of CIA." Nevertheless, he stated that GAO "cannot effectively
_ review and evaluate-activities of the Support Component because the confidential ;

_and overt activities of this.component are integrpted to such an extent that. we
cannot make reasonably comprehensive audits." He further stated "we have been. eo
- given sufficient access to make reasonably comprehensive reviews of the overt

“be productive’ of significant evaluations because we cannot feasibly evaluate the -: om
- extent to which needed overt. information is available for collection or ‘determine’ a
the need for the intelligence inforniation selected for collation and use in the pros -

- duction of intelligence reports.". In short, the Comptroller General was recognizing
the conflict between the philosophy underlying a "comprehensive audit approach"
‘and the Director's satutory responsibility and authority to protect i intelligence | :
‘sources and methods. ; . _ whee: wee

cor Both the Director and Chaifinan Vinson, of t the House Committee ¢ on a Armed.

a genes requested that the Comptroller General continue to audit Agency affaiis

\. 7 are necessary, I believe, for the proper protection of its intelligence activities -

, v.and shéuld be maintained.” The Chairman agreed, however, that in view of).

“..-+" the Comptroller General's opinion that a continued: audit was ‘not a worthwhile “+725 »
_ . effort, GAO might withdraw from further audit activities i 1m the Central 7 Intelligence

+ ona limited basis, but after another trial period the Comptroller General reiterated ©

‘his earlier view. In a letter to Chairman Vinson dated June 21, 1962, tHe Comptrolle:
.General stated his belief that for maximum effectiveness "it would be necessary .

’ for our GAO audit staff to have nearly complete access to CIA activities," and

' that even to:perform reasonably comprehensive reviews would require "complete -
access to the administrative activities ... that are performed in support of both
sensitive and nonsensitive operations of CIA. " , ;
Chairman Vinson replied to the Comptroller General c on n Iily 18, “1962,
stating that, "the restrictions you met within the Central Intelligence Agency -

Agency...

os Ty summary, T believe that several: supoints are » deserving of emphasis i in
assessing the nature and history of GAO's audit activities with respect to > this

Agency: a a _ - eo

13-00000, ls,

* (a) CIA cooper, d fully i in all respects in exten ig
administrative support and in granting security clearances | ae
' -and access to information related to vouchered fund activities. 7

- b) The Chairman of the interested oversight committee -
ip the House of Representatives was fully informed of the nature |
ahd Status of the activity. ;

(c) ‘This Agency. encouraged ¢ GAO to conduct and to”
continue to conduct its activities consistent with the operational .
’ and statutory requirements imposed upon | this Agency. - 0.

oy :
-. fay The decision. to. discontinue the audit activities
was made solely by.GAO and was: approved? by the Chairman. 7
., of the House Armed 1 Services Committees. co

= “ :
7 wy Ww. E. ‘Colby ; ;
-~.. > Director

“Orig = Addressee a
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.- 2 -OLC Subject (GAO). nw[batic:
:..11 ~ OLC Proxmire file’: 2 “
J == -}=OLC Chrono’. 2
_ OLC: WPY: Feg (13 Jun 75) -


13-00000 ,

o

Farce ea

hae a © DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL a
. SO, ; WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505 .

‘The Honorable Otis G. Pike, Chairman .
Select. Committee on Intelligence
House of Representatives
- Washington, De. c. 20515,

Dear Mr. Chairman:

oe In our. conversation on . Friday you asked for the statutory .
. basis fer the compartmentation principle. I wish first to mo,
respond to your inquiry and then suggest a manner-in which your ...
a staff can receive access to the sensitive material Protected °
ly special com artmentation systems. | . one, woe

. , The current basis: for the U.S. Government security _ oa
.°'. Classification system is Executive Order 11652, promulgated ae
-- ..,0mn 8 March 1972. Historically, foreign. intelligence. has
“i. been treated as. one category of classified national. security
 , information. There are numerous. statutory recognitions. of - 7
“.. the importance of national security information, e.g., the — -"
:.. Freedom of Information Act... Consequently, much foreign. .
- dntelligence is classified CONPIDENTIAL, SECRFT or TOP
- SECRET according to specifications set forth -in-the Order: .
- Not‘all foreign intelligence, -however, is classified national
security information under. the provisions of the Executive
_ Order (e.g., an American:source providing foreign information
. or assistance). Also, the potential risks attendant with
' the compromise of a foreign intelligence. source or method
‘differ substantially from the risks attendant with much ;
classified defense information. a ee

Section 102 (d) (3) of the National Security Act of 1947,
as amended, provides: "That the Director of Central Intel-—
“ligence shall be responsible for protecting intelligence
sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure:" In
reccgnition of this responsibility, National Security.
Council Intelligence Directive No. 1 (17 February 1972)
instructs the Director of Central Intelligence to, :
",..develop and review security standards and practices-as _
they relate to the protection of intelligence and of .
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. "


13-00000 *, %*

Since the . National Security Act ‘aia not provide for | an authority
- . corresponding with the DCI's responsibility in this area,. . a
the Directive provides that the Members of the U.S. Intelligence -
- Board are responsible for: "The supervision of the dissemination — |
and security of: intelligence. material." The Director of Central
Intelligence, acting with the advice of the U.S. Intelligence
Board, has promulgated a-number of. directives, regulations
'. and ‘security: manuals.,.:related to the protection of foreign
>. intelligence and foreign: intelligence sources and methods,
a and applicable. to. the’ overall Uz S- intelligence community.

+ 9 The. fundamental. ‘security principle. involved in the pro-- .
“tection of foreign intelligence and. of its sources and. methods
dis a strict application of "need to know" --a principle ;
referred to in Executive Order 11652, Section 6(A). This © -
‘applies the simple mathematical premise that the fewer the ©
number of individuals: made- privy to a secret, the less likely
that it will. be disclosed..:..The security principle of v
“compartmentation" involving. special access and information
dissemination controls is designed to ensure that only those
individuals whose "need to know” has been specifically
approved by some higher authority, who have been specially
indoctrinated, and who. undertake ‘special commitments to |
protect it are provided acéess to a particularly™ sensitive
category of foreign intelligence sources and. methods. “ .
Compartmentation assists in “the: application of the "need- to-
know” principle by ensuring that individuals are. provided

; access to only that information clearly essential to the

, Performance. of their duties.” a

Compartmentation. was undoubtedly a major contributing
"factor involved in. the nation's secret development. of ‘the
_,, atomic.bomb during World War II, and the principle is still Mole
-. implicit in security procedures related to ERDA’s "RESTRICTED ©
‘DATA™ as reflected in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. In the ©
. field of U.S. foreign intelligence activities, compartmentation:
_.was practiced throughout the development and operation of the
a U-2 reconnaissance program. One of the major foreign ;
oe intelligence categories of activities using formalized com-
.. partmentation procedures today involves the matter of
foreign signals intercept for intelligence purposes, i.e.,
: communications intelligence. Title 18 of the U.S. Code
-. Section 798 recognizes the special character of this
material by providing specifically for prosecution for the
unauthorized disclosure. of information concerning any -
communications. activities of the United States without the


13-00000

necessity to show intent ‘to harm the United | States. - The |
reason for. the application of strict compartmentation pro-
cedures to communications intelligence and other foreign
intelligence activities reflects the extreme vulnerability
of the sources. Once an opposition becomes aware of which
- of. its communications we are intercepting, it can take swift —
remedial action, and the. source can be forever lost.

; “On Friday afternoon, copies of the secrecy oath’ used >
. by. the executive branch.with respect to three compartmented -
“ access. control systems were made available to you along with | .
‘the. revised forms. developed for and executed by certain members :
of the staff of the: Senate Select Committee to Study Intelligence
Activities .-I. would: hope that the enclosed agreement modified
for the House Select: Committee, combining all “three ;
compartments . into: one. document,, would meet . Your, Particular .

Committee’ s use of the modified secrecy oath dealing with
compartmented access, the following House and Senate committees
have : obtained compartmented. ‘access. for their staffs, which “
was granted after the normal briefings and | signing | of the -
secrecy Oatii:. - 7 oo, a : : oS

RE) gebvices Committee
:Appropriations Committee _. oo
Aeronautical and Space Sciences: Connittee

“May 1 ‘reiterate: ‘the ‘points I made on. a Friday:

- a. No: material. is being withheld from members of .
_ the Committee. mo a os od 2 ey

, be We are prepared to and aid brief the state of the
+ Committee on. noncompartmented matters, based upon your
certification of their security clearance and the fact .
‘that they entered into an appropriate secrecy agreement
with you, a copy of which. you provided.

4

-  ¢. -The compartmentation procedures of the.
- Intelligence Community have been established pursuart
‘to statute and National Security Council Intelligence
Directives. The simplest way for the staff to obtain
‘“‘access to this compartmented material would be to
_.' accept the normal secrecy arrangements as modified
- in the enclosed. This would ensure against difficulties
in access to such compartmented material throughout the


13-00000 *,

ite Bec

a: a a He e ner -  @

Intelligence’ Community. It is clear that the
obligations assumed here would run between the staff
member and the Committee and in no way would provide
any control or influence over them by me or any
element of the, Intelligence Community .

dy Tt would undoubtedly be. feasible to develop _
another procedure to ensure special protection of the
sensitive matters currently included in the compart:
mented systems, but this would involve review and
-s.. discussions: with various interested parties which
- would: undoubtedly take. some ‘time | and delay your
investigations

Ee ‘hope: you will agree that this” is the simplest and...
easiest manner of solving a practical matter so that we can
roceed with the substance. of your, investigations.


13-00000 « , '

2 “ a
Rene ee ag hee

Distribution:

4. -pct
‘J-DDCI
1-IG
_1-OLC Lon,
1-E.H. Knocke
I- -SC/DCL

| White House’ Distribution:
L-Rod. Hills

‘L-Phil Buchen

ihe “Jay! French

. i ae aie et i i ie a eae an nr a

meetin eer

ar OT eNOS OU CE ea Ea
“3 .

“CONFIDENTIAL:

COMPARTMENTED INTELLIGENCE INDOCTRINATION” ~~

r have been. “informed ‘that pursuant to law (Sections 792,
.° 793, 794, 795, 797 and. 798 of Title 18, United States Code) I --
am not. to discuss: ‘with or disciose to.any person any information
~- Yelating directly:or indirectly to the below identified compart
_. mented Programs, unless such person is currently authorized to.
discuss or receive such informa*ion or material of the particula
category involved.::..I:.am.aware that: the responsibility of —
ascertaining that:such an authorization for another. person is
Valid and current rests with me. - we

tr: ‘acknowle get at it ds ny ‘tesponsibility * to , inform,
myself of. the contents’ of the above mentioned sections of 7
itle:18, U.S. 'Code,.'as. they pertain to performance of my >
duties. I.am-aware further that if a change in my status
‘renders: it no longer necessary for me to receive compartmented
‘intelligence, my name will -be removed from the list of Persons
authorized to receive. such material. Bw ns : :

ae Ne ews media “reports | concerning any of ‘these compartuented
aterials does not relieve me of my obligation under the oath .
Signed below. - ok an . boy a

te a

F ‘I acknowledge: that. r have been briefed on the ‘following an
: compar’ meated » SyStems or _ Programs: _

- Fre
OATH OF SECRECY

. I do solemnly swear “that I will not | discuss with or Do.
disclose to any person, regardless of his official position ..
or status, any information: relating directly or indirectly to —
Compartmented Intelligence, any information derived therefrom,
. or the nature of the sources of such intelligence, until I

have ascertained that such ‘Person has _been authorized to discuss: ‘

-E-2 IMPDET
CL BY -

CONFIDENTIAL | .
BO Sy

oF

13-00000 «

‘and handle this material, and that his authorization has not
been revoked, except. in the performance. of my official duties.
‘on the staff of the House Select Committee on Intelligence ‘and

in accordance with the requirements set forth in the rules’ of
such Committee. . re Foote OY

Witness


13-00000 |
Toa UN | =

CE “RAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY - a . a
. WASHINGTON,D.C, 20505 . :

WSC MAT. FURAN.
Review Staff: 752563
20 ) August 1975

Mr. A. Searle Field

taff Director:
Select Committee on Intelligence.
Room 232
Cannon House Office ‘Building
Washington D,C. 20515

_ Dear Mr, Field: | . : yee

.. ‘Around the end of July, Mz. Roeder, obviously impressed ;
. by your admonitions about the need for security, asked ifI —-
'. gould work up a package of guidance on how to handle classified
documents, Our Office of S security put this together, and while
I think Mr, Roeder had in mind something more applicable to
. _. a8 individual than to an office, I thought I would pass this on to
: I a you for whatever use you care to make of it, co

; “Incidentally, we have not yet carried out the: ‘physical survey
'. of your quarters which you requested on 29 July. I have been
“. in touch with Ms, Hess, and our Office of Security will conduct
"one as soon as she is ready. We may have some other recom-
mendations for your consideration when that is done, _

‘Sincerely, ce - Oy

\ .
i
SUL
Jerrold B.A Brown
Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

ce: D/OS - _ - ; | soWNTION - AL

&
=
5 ;

Uaget sorbed viecocure ube ect to
Criminal Sarctions


13-00000 « :

:

“t

“ay

(PRN ENTIAL

= 14 AUG 1975

|

| MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff
| ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B. Brown

: a VIA 2 Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligeace -
a Protection of Classified Materials _
| REFERENCE : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold.
7 B. Brown, subject: Request for Security
_ Aids :

i In accordance with the request in the roferenced
memorandum for a “package'’ to be used by the House Select.
Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified
material, the attached suggestions are provided for your
assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys-
ical security survey of thse area which will be used to
if ' store the Committee's classified material, specific rec-

i ommendations must be deferred. In this connsction, we

plan to have Nr. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security

Division {extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent-

atives of the Committee for the specific purpose of con-

ducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the

i Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field,

Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,

' requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the re-

i sults of this survey and its recommendations, the attached -
4 general physical security measures are recommended in an

effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com-
ar mittee's classified material.

Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

- Atts.
Distribution: . ES. IMPDET
Orig § 2 - Adse . CL BY 056566

1 - ADD/A
OS S 12 065

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

i
__. ATTACHMENT


13-00000 + |

CONFIDENTIAL

GENERAL SUGGESTIONS
_ FOR THE
PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL

Designate a Committee member as the Security
Officer responsible for the overall control
handling and protection of the classified
material. —

‘Establish and maintain a register of all
Committee personnel who are authorized to

review classified material and insure that
no unauthorized personnel will have access to
the material.

Establish a central document control system
whereby all classified documents are properly
logged upon receipt and annotated as to
disposition.

Designate a Document Control Clerk who will
be specifically responsible for the logging
and control of all classified material.
Appropriate records should be established

to reflect that all classified material is
properly logged in and out, by date and time, —
to authorized members of the Committee.

In the event material is designated as being:
of a codeword or compartmented nature, spscial
physical security features as enunciated by
the Ad Hoc Security Committee of the United
States Intelligence Board and later adopted
as policy should be adhered to. (Specifics
regarding these requirements will be provided

in the course of the pending survey.) -

All guards assigned to the physical security
control over the Committesa'’s storage area
should be U. S. citizens and possess appro-

priate security clearances.

If feasible, a reading room should be es-
tablished within the designated storage area

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

8.

10.

Li.

13.

14,

“CONFIDENTIAL

for the Committee’s classified material, and
all research and review activities of the
material should be restricted to this area.

In those instances where the Committee meets

in Executive session, every effort should

be made to insure that the site being used has
been subjected to a technical security inspec-
tion to negate the possibility of unauthorized
transmitting or recording devices. This area
of concern could pese serious security deficien-
cies in the event the same area would be used
initially in public session and then closed for
the Executive session without such an inspection
being made..

Adequats safeguards should be utilized 4n the
transnission of classified material under the
cognizance of the Committee from one area to ~
another.

~A

Reproduction of any portion of ‘the Committee's
classified material should be prohibited
without the express approval of the Staff
Director. In this instance, notes, extracts,
summaries, etc., mada from classified material —
must also "be provided the same degree of .
protection as that provided to the source

material.

Access controls to the storage and reten-
tion area should be established to insure that
only authorized personnel are allowed entrance.

Storage of all classified material should be
within the designated area as opposed to any
areas or outside offices.

Security protection should be provided to
all Committee transcripts during the tran-
scription process as well as during the
periods while they are in transit.

A security check procedure should bea estab-
lished to inspect the areas where the Com-
mittee meats at the termination of each.
session to insure that no classified material

2

‘CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

CONFIDENTIAL

or notes, etc., are inadvertently left un-
secured. (Attached are examples of Security
Check Sheets.)

_Arrangements should ba made to insure that

there are adequate facilities for the
destruction of classified waste material.

In this instance, such waste material should
be provided protection until its final
destruction.

Only approved classified material destruc-

tion methods should be utilized. (Details
regarding this can be obtained in the course
of the pending survey.) oe

All Committee personnel granted access to
classified material by the Staff. Director
should be briefed on their obligations end
responsibilities regarding the unauthorized.
disclosures of such material.

Specific physical security recommendations —
applicable te the proposed storage area for the
Committee's classified material, consistent

with sound security principles, must be deferred
until the completion of the survey. This would
also include recommendations relative to the
type of storage containers which the Commitise
proposes to use.

Pending the completion of a security survey at
the new storage site, it-is suggested that the
protective measures currently in effect at the
temporary storage facility in Room 232, Cannon

' Building, not be changed.

CONFIDENTIAL

13-00000

ATTACHMENT - . my : a re ow,

arene

13-00000 ° , ‘1 ’

SECLuITY CHECK SHEET.

FRoW: |" _ ens ——_]

TO LOCK
: TO CHECK

SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL DRAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING
EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON
“HERRING*HALL*MARVIN” SAFES TURN ORAWER HANDLE TO RIGHT
(on new type, raise latch) AND PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD,

VAULTS AND DOOR SAFES: TURN HANDLE BACK AND FORTH

WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD. .
ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO “NIGHT” POSITION

CERTIFICATION

1 CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT | HAVE OPENED OR
PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM

MONTH({S) . .

OPENED BY | CLOSED BY rnccxes ay To GUARD CHECK
hNiTiALs| Time [iNiTIALs| Time [INITIALS] Time [INITIALS) TIME |

SECURITY CHECK SHeeT

{TO >: Office of Security ~
THRU: Component Security Officer |

| TO LOCK
| ROTATE DIAL FOUR CONSECUTIVE TURNS IN ONE DIRECTION

TO CHECK

SAFES: DEPRESS CONTROL ORAWER LATCH WHILE DEPRESSING
EACH DRAWER LATCH AND PULL OUT BOTH DRAWERS. ON
i *RERRING-HALL-MARVIN® SAFES TURN DRAWER HANOLE TO RIGHT
H (on new type, ralze latch) ANDO PULL DRAWERS OUTWARD.
‘VAULTS AND DOOR SAPES: TURN HANDLE BACK ANO FORTH
: WHILE PULLING DOOR OUTWARD,
: i ALARM SWITCHES: TURN TO “NIGHT® POSITION

CERTIFICATION

4 CERTIFY, BY MY INITIALS BELOW, THAT | HAVE OPENED OR
PROPERLY SECURED THIS VAULT, SAFE OR CABINET AND ALARM.

MON TH(S)

P[_orenco ey | eveseo ey | enecnen sy | GUARD Heck
E [inrvacs]_ tie [iwirtacs] rine [mrrvacs] tine [iniriacs] TOME | y

EXE K's CY REE dddddaaaneeee eee

jf | | | ft | eR
Ht

. 738" 108 ossoLeTe PREVIOUS EDITIONS


13-00000 , \,

€
‘ t
e

Area Security Check Sheet

Items to be Checked
Desks (Including Drawers)
Tables (Including Drawers)
Chairs

Floor

e
:

Window Ledges
Typewriters

Stenotype Machines
Reproduction Equipment
Trash Receptacles

7 Charts, Exhibits,
a : ‘Chalkboards

Notebooks, Paper Pads, etc.
(Check to insure that
imprints of classified
notes not present)

ANIL

Checker

a

13-00000° | ‘ ,

} UNCLASSIFIED I. NAL oan ENTE CONFI. .ATIAL [secret
pos ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

House Select Committee on Intelligence -
Protection of Classified Materials

ch sate 7S5+25G 3 Ao AaG ria

EXTENSION

Director of Security _ 6777

; 14 AUG 1975
boii Gesignation, rem number, and DATE OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom

INITIALS to whom. Drow a line ocross column after each comment.)
ave [ome

Edward Ryan

ADD/A
7D-26, Hqs.

4. The Review Staff

6D-0120
5s.Attn: Mr. Jerrold B.

ret G1Oiete C] secrer CRUISE =) ERM, «UNCLASSIFIED

13-00000

’
1

CONTEENTIAL

14 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION : Mr. Jerrold B.. Brown

VIA : Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT . : House Select Committee on Intelligence -
Protection of Classified Materials

REFERENCE . : Memo dtd 31 Jul 75 to D/Sec from Jerrold
B. Brown, subject: Request for Security
Aids ©

In accordance with the request in the referenced
memorandum for a "package" to be used by the House Select ©
Committee on Intelligence for the protection of classified
material, the attached suggestions are provided for your
assistance. In view of the lack of a comprehensive phys-
ical security survey of the area which will be used to.
store the Committee's classified material, specific rec-
ommendations must be deferred. In this connection, we
plan to have Mr.. Edward J. McGrath of the Physical Security
Division (extension 3494) meet with appropriate represent-
atives of the. Committee for the specific purpose of con-
ducting a security survey of the proposed quarters in the .
Rayburn Building. For your information, Mr. Searle Field, ~
Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Intelligence,
requested such a survey on 29 July 1975. Pending the re-
sults. of this survey and its recommendations, the attached
general physical security measures are recommended in an

-effort to provide the requisite protection for the Com-

mittee's classified material.

ME fay Ee,
~ Robert W. Gambino
Director of Security

Atts.
Distribution: E3 IMPDET
Orig & 2 - Adse CL BY 056966

1 - ADD/A
OS 5 12 065

CONFIDENTIAL

13000005:

a
7.

SECRET swaps) ann

: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

; i
WASHINGTON, D. C.° 20505

i
ee pc er ne

Intelligence Community Staff DCI/IC 75-2620

2 September 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Members of USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence

‘

Attached is a paper from the Chairman, USIB Security

Committee, outlining security arrangements made by the House -

‘Select Committee on Intelligence.

E Thine

Jack E, Thomas
Major] General, USAF (Ret. )
Chiet/ Coordination Staff, Ics

Attachment

This Document May Be Downgraded
to Unclassified When Removed From
Attachment

chasstpizn sy 3290792 a
EX.M2T TROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE CE £. 0. 12352, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ sb! ., @. (33 or (4) (circle one or more)
“AGLOMIATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

Date Impossible to Determine

(unless iaposzible, insert date or rvent)

SECRET

13-00000 . *:
ee SECRET

re — UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
| SECURITY COMMITTEE

SECOM-D-105
2 September 1975,

MEMORANDUM FOR:. Chief, Coordination Staff, ICS

SUBJECT : House Select Committee on Intelligence

On 29 August 1975, Mr. Robert Gambino, Director of
Security/CIA; Mr. William H. Standiford, Deputy Chief, Physical
‘Security Division, Office of Security/CIA; and I viewed the
permanent space of the staff of the House Select Committee on
Intelligence at the invitation of Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director
of the Committee. We believe the security arrangements made
and being made are satisfactory for the storage of compartmented
-information.” Attached is a memorandum outlining the security 9-0...

arrangements.
£
PtrahE Mle
Donald E. Moore
Chairman
Attachment

This Document May Be Downgraded
to Unclassified When Removed From
Attachment

cLassirizo Ey _ 320793

EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEGULE OF E. O. 11553, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5b, @), (2) of (4) (circte one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine

(unless imyossible, insert date or event)

SECREI

ede tee

13-00000

NY 07)

; , ‘ oo 2 September 1975

i 7 House Select Committee on Intelligence

1, The House Select Committee staff is now located in its
permanent space, B-316, Rayburn Building. Ms. Jacqueline Hess
is the Security Officer, telephone number 225-9696.

2. The only entrance is through B-316 and the space consists
of several adjoining offices all served by an inner walkway. A member
of the Capitol Police is stationed at a guard desk inside the door and
admits only authorized individuals. Visitors must sign in with the
guard, who'calls the appropriate staff employee and visitors are
allowed access to the space only in the company of staff employees.
‘Interview rooms are located in the staff area but separated from the

_ work area. During non-work hours two guards are on duty in the
space. :

3. All classified material is kept in a secure area at’ the. | ;
“Aréar of the space with one éntrance to the secure room, ‘This room
is to be locked at all times when specified.employees are not on
duty in the room. At the present time, Ms. Hess is the only one
who will be able to open the secure area and unless circumstances
‘change this arrangement will continue.

4. All classified material is kept in this secure area, and
stored in approved safes with three-way combination locks. At
present, Ms. Hess is the only Person who possesses the combination

.. ,t0, these, safes. ” og Age ne Ph a vee re ne
5. Reading of classified documents is to be in a reading area,
consisting of several tables, in the secure area. A staff employee
desiring access to a classified document must make a request for
it, Ms. Hess then obtains it, the employee reads it in the secure
area and it is then returned to Ms. Hess for return to the safe
cabinet. Staff employees have been advised that notes.taken from
classified documents and material prepared from such notes or the
documents must respect the original classification and receive
corresponding security. Copying of classified documents is to be
strictly controlled, is to be done only on a copying device located
in staff space, and copies are to receive the same security protection

as the original.
chassistzn 57 __ 356793
___EXESIOT FROM GENERAL DACLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E, 0. 11352, EXEMPTION CATEGORY

d (3) of a) (circle one or ——

AU MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON

(uuless impos vides in insert date or ave vent)
a ene

13-00000 “

pe SECRET

6. The entire space has been swept and plans call for
additional periodic sweeping. There is a motion detector in the
secure area which rings at the guard desk in the staff area and
also at the main office of the Capitol Police in the Rayburn Building.
Tests have been made of this device and the response by the Capitol
Police was immediate. Two doors which normally serve as access’
to the secure area from space occupied by other House Committees
have been secured from the inside and alarms are to be installed
‘ on these doors. , ,

7. Mr. A. Searle Field, Staff Director, and Ms. Hess:
advised that staff employees have been alerted to telephone security
; and this will be continually stressed, Also they have tried to instill
! _ strong security consciousness among all the staff. Mr. Field
; indicated that at present it is not expected the staff will total more
than 35,

SECRET.

~! ‘APY "sae ots mented prom te
M STRATE STERNAL fea gt {

House Armed Services
Subcommittee on
Intelligence

and Military Application of Nuclear Energy"

The Subcommittee on Intelligence and. Military Application of Nuclear
Energy is newly established and the successor to the Special Subcommittee
on Intelligence Chaired by Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. The new Sub-—
committee has picked up the responsibility of the soon to be abolished
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and is expanding its staff accordingly...
Representative Melvin Price's Chairmanship is due to his long years of
membership on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. There will be an ever-
increasing involvement by the Subcommittee in military application of
nuclear energy and -we undoubtedly will be called upon to provide required
foreign intelligence.

* Members of the Subcommittee are as follows:

Melvin Price (D., I11.), Chairman
. Charles H. Wilson (D., Calif.)
Jack Brinkley (D., Ga.)
Dan Daniel (D., Va.) -
G. V. Montgomery (D., Miss.)
- Ronald V. Dellums (D., Calif.) — ’
Bob Carr (D., Mich.)
Charles E. Bennett (D., Fla.)
Samuel S. Stratton (D., N.Y.)
Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)
William L. Dickinson (R., Ala.)
Marjorie S, Holt (R., Md.)
Robert W. Daniel, Jr. (R., Va.)

Staff of the Subcommittee are as follows:

John Ford, Staff Director
‘William H. Hogan, Counsel -
Adam J, Klein, Professional

Mr. Ford is Staff Director of the full Committee and replaced
Mr. Frank Slatinshek, former Chief Counsel, who retired. Mr.-Hogan is
Counsel of the Subcommittee and will be the principal staff man on Agency
matters. Adam Klein is a specialist in atomic energy matters.

13-00000

ye

me

AN STRATE ITE

i

vee
a

PROBLEMS

A. House Subcommittee on | Intelligence and Military Application of
Nuclear Energy

Former Chairman Lucien N. Nedzi fully exercised his perogatives
as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Intelligence and we could look to
him for support in any problems developing with other committees and
other members of the House not on the Subcommittee. Based on the
reactions of Chairman Melvin Price in the few instances that we have
approached him in this Congress for assistance, it is quite evident
that he is not the dominant’ personality as was Chairman Nedzi and will
not stick his neck out to defend the Agency. Nor does it appear that
the new staff director will be of the forceful personality as was
Frank Slatinshek who was very helpful in a number of problems. A few

“weeks ago former Chairman Nedzi suggested that we resolve a problem

involving Representative Donald M. Fraser by going to Speaker O'Neill.
This may have been his indication to us that we may have to look to
House leadership to resolve problems. Mr. Nedzi also suggested that we
contact someone in the White House on a problem. We. may be faced with
needed White House support on a problem before we approach the leader-—
ship- : ; ios

B. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control
: ?

The extent of Chairman Lester L. Wolff's oversight of the Agency
in its narcotics collection activities still remains a looming problen.
As indicated by the request for the seal, Mr. Wolff intends to extend
the Agency's activities to where there is maximum effective collection
of foreign intelligence on narcotics trafficking leading to arrest and
conviction without regard to the Agency's statutory prohibitions. The
only solution rests with the Attorney General and the White House giving
the Agency clear and precise guidelines to operate in this area which
the Agency can then point to in any disputes that may arise with the
Select Committee as to what the Agency's role should be.

ADGEIST RATIVE INTERNAL USE GHLY

__ DMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS °,
House of Representatives ~

' DEMOCRATS
ees

JAMIE L. WHITTEN, Mississippi
ROBERT L. F. SIKES, Florida
_EDWARD P. BOLAND, Massachusetts
WILLIAM H. NATCHER, Kentucky
‘DANIEL J. FLOOD, Pennsylvania
TOM STEED, Oklahoma

GEORGE E. SHIPLEY, IMlinois
JOHN M. SLACK, West Virginia
JOHN J. FLYNT, Jr., Georgia

(95th Congress, Ist Session)
GEORGE H. MAHON, Texas, Chairman

ROBERT H. MICHEL, Illinois
SILVIO O. CONTE, Massachusetts
JOSEPH M. McDADE, Pennsylvania
MARK ANDREWS, North Dakota
JACK EDWARDS, Alabama
ROBERT C. McEWEN, New York
JOHN T. MYERS, Indiana

J. KENNETH ROBINSON, Virginia

Te pablicans

———
ELFORD A. CEDERBERG, Michigan

CLARENCE E. MILLER, Ohio
LAWRENCE COUGHLIN, Pennsylvania
Cc. W. BILL YOUNG, Florida

JACK F, KEMP, New York

WILLIAM L. ARMSTRONG, Colorado
RALPH 8S. REGULA, Ohio

CLAIR W. BURGENER, California
GEORGE M. O’BRIEN, Illinois
VIRGINIA SMITH, Nebraska

‘NEAL SMITH, Iowa

ROBERT N. GIAIMO, Connecticut
JOSEPH P. ADDABBO, New York
JOHN J. McFALL, California
EDWARD J. PATTEN, New Jersey
CLARENCE D. LONG, Maryland
SIDNEY R. YATES, Illinois
FRANK E. EVANS, Colorado
DAVID R. OBEY, Wisconsin
EDWARD R. ROYBAL, California
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio

GUNN McKAY, Utah

TOM BEVILL, Alabama

BILL CHAPPELL, Florida

BILL D. BURLISON, Missouri

BILL ALEXANDER, Arkansas
EDWARD I. KOCH, New York
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BUREE, California
JOHN P. MURTHA, Pennsylvania
BOB TRAXLER, Michigan .

ROBERT DUNCAN, Oregon

JOSEPH D. EARLY, Massachusetts
MAX BAUCUS, Montana

CHARLES WILSON, Texas
LINDY (MRS. HALE) BOGGS, Louisiana
ADAM BENJAMIN, Jr., Indiana
NORMAN D. DICKS, Washington

KeitH _F. MAINLAND
Clerk and Staff Director

[

Subcommittees
Whitten, Evans, Burlison, Baucus, Traxler, Alexander, Sikes,

AGRICULTURE & RELATED

AGENCIES - . Nateher
oe : Andrews, Robinson, Myers
DEFENSE Mahon, Sikes, Flood, Addabbo, McFall, Flynt, Giaimo, Chappell,
. Burlison

Edwards, Robinson, Kemp

- Natcher, Giaimo, Wilson, McKay, Burke, Benjamin
Burgener, Kemp

- Long, Obey, Koch, Wilson, Yates, Burke, Roybal, Stokes

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

FOREIGN OPERATIONS

Young, Conte, Smit)
HUD—INDEPENDENT AGENCIES Boland, Traxler, Baucus, Stokes, Bevill, Boggs, Burlison,

Alexander i
. Coughlin, MeDade, Young ,
INTERIOR Yates, McKay, Long, Evans, Murtha, Duncan, Dicks, Whitten a
McDade, Regula, Armstrong te
LABOR—HBEALTH, EDUCATION & Flood, Natcher, Smith, Patten, Obey, Roybal, Stokes, Early aie
WELFARE - Michel, Conte, O’Brien . oo
‘LEGISLATIVE Shipley, Benjamin, Giaimo, McFall, Murtha, Traxler
‘ Armstrong, Coughlin, Cederberg
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION McKay, Sikes, Murtha, Steed, Long, Chappell a
. McEwen, Regula —
PUBLIC WORKS Bevill, Boland, Whitten, Slack, Boggs, Dicks, Shipley, Chappell
Myers, Burgener, Smit
- STATE, JUSTICE, COMMERCE Slack, Smith, Flynt, Alexander, Burke, Early
& JUDICIARY Cederberg, Andrews, Miller
TRANSPORTATION McFall, Steed, Koch, Duncan, Benjamin, Smith, Addabbo, Evans
Conte, Edwards, O’Brien ~
TREASURY-POSTAL SERVICE— — Steed, Addabbo, Roybal, Patten, Boland, Flynt
GENERAL GOVERNMENT Miller, McEwen
NOTE: Mr. Mahon, as Chairman of the Committee, and Mr. Cederberg, as Ranking Minority
Member, are ex officio members of all subcommittees of which they are not regular members. -

ero = 86-238-b January 26, 1977.


13-00000 .

Lo © Quaste alien
: Sepeus | 4
House Appropriations Committee team 14

| Room 2D 0117. Telephones: 5848, 5849 (B) and 1570 (R) se pag

“Leonard M. (Bucky) WALTERS,
Badge: blue House Committée
Clearances: SI, TK,*’ BYECOM

a. ;
Charles #. (Chuck) HAYNES
Badge: green. ne: escort
Clearances: TK, BYECOM

Eugene B ILHEL
Badge: soe Ee se Co VECO
Clearar I, TK, /BYECOM

George C. BAIRD (Carter)
Badge: blue House Committee
Clearances: SI, TK, BYECOM

Leon F. (Frank) SCHWARTZ
Badge: blue House Committee

John LaytTen

Supervisory officials of HAC Surveys 4 Investigations Staff
(not to be stationed at Hqs bldg, but may visit from time to
time):

Cornelius: R. (Lefty) ANDERSON, Chief
-Badge: green no-escort

Marion S. RAMEY, Deputy Chief
Badge: blue House Committee
OX 7-9371

James Brian HYLAND
Badge: mene blue House Committee

13-00000 :

2 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Initial Meeting with House Appropriations
Committee Survey Group

1. ‘An initial session was held on 30 July 1976 of
about one and a half hours with six persons from the Surveys
and Investigations Staff of the House Appropriations
Committee, to-discuss the purpose of their survey of the
Directorate of Operations and to propose some arrangements
to govern their access to Agency personnel and documents.
The following attended:

Mr. Cornelius (Lefty) Anderson, Chief of
Surveys and Investigations Staff

Mr. Marion Ramey, Deputv

Mr. Leonard (Bucky) Walters, who will head the
team inspecting the Directorate of Operations

Mr. Charles (Chuck) Havnes, team member

Mr. Eugene Wilhelm, team member (former
Agency employee)

Mr. George C. Baird, team member

Attending for the Agency were:

Mr. Theodore Shackley, who chaired the meeting
Mr. Robert Gambino

Mr. Lyle Miller

Mr. Thomas B. Abernathy

Mr. Richard Point

Mr. Philip F. Fendig

~ 2. The meeting followed reasonably well the attached
agenda, which was made available to all at the beginning of
the meeting. The following paragraphs summarize the
important points covered.

3. Scope: Mr. Shackley asked the group to define its
mission, noting some of the topics mentioned in recent
conversations with Mr. Snodgrass suggested particular
interests whereas the Committee's report on the FY 77 budget

13-00000. °

ry

had suggested a different orientation. Mr. Anderson,
characterizing the enterprise as a survey rather than an
investigation, stated that his instructions were from the
Chairman of the Committee: .they called for a detailed
review of the operation of the Directorate in its entirety.
Mr. Walters would mention certain particular interests,
noted below, but that did not set limits to the ultimate
scope of the survey. Mr. Walters then took over:

“a. He expects to do a complete review, from
the managerial and substantive standpoint, of the
Directorate. His initial interests indicated an
auditor's approach to these questions - how budgets
are compiled, examination of accounting procedures
for. regular and special funds, cost systems and

the like.

b. He went on, however, to the management
aspects which they would also pursue to
determine the results of the Directorate's
operations - the value of intelligence produced
versus the costs involved in procuring it, and
areas of possible overlap in collection with
the military and with NSA.

c. Specific areas which would be explored,
given, as examples, included contingency reserves,
the "special retirement fund" (presumably
referring to MHMUTUAL), the procedures for
reimbursing the State Department for cover and
support, proprietaries (how created, their
justification, value and effectiveness), safe-
houses and. "CA cadres."

Mr. Anderson reluctantly agreed to Mr. Shackley's request
for a memorandum spelling out these objectives in sufficient

_detail so that we could take the managerial steps necessary

to resolve any conflicts in the priority of the time of our
managers and senior operations officers who would be

involved in current operations as well as overlapping
inquiries from other groups concurrently overseeing the
Directorate. Mr. Anderson also asked for any ongoing studies
which the Directorate might have which would aid the team

in its work.

eee ee

13-00000 -

4. Duration: The team's first objective will be to
render an interim report to the Committee by 1 January 1977,
in order to meet the mandate that the survey be used in.
considering the Agency's FY 1978 budget. The team wishes
to start work immediately and will consist of either six or
seven members who will occupy. space in Headquarters building
and presumably do most of their work here; it was brought
out, however, that the team would also interview users of
our intelligence and other collectors. There was ambiguity
in the projection of the total length of the survey; I
interpreted Mr. Anderson's remarks to indicate that he
expected the team to be with us for most of calendar year
1977.

-

S. Security: Mr. Anderson explained the arrangement
by which the Committee limits access by even the members of
the Subcommittee to the reports of his group; they must be
reviewed in a specified area and they are stored, in very
limited numbers, in the tower of the Capitol in the special
facilities there for the Joint Atomic Energy Committee of -
Congress. Mr. Gambino explained the arrangements for badges,
certification of. clearances, and provided for the team's
consideration a copy of the "non-disclosure agreement" which
we would like members to sign. There was considerable
discussion, and some objection, to the issuance of blue

‘badges which will provide access to virtually all parts of

the building but which must be turned in and picked up at
the entrance each day. This arrangement was reluctantly

‘accepted but it was made clear at lunch and in later

discussion with the team and with Mr. Anderson they are
unhappy with this slight infringement on their convenience
and physical access to the building.

6. Access: Of more concern was the Agency position
that the SA/DO/70 would serve as a control point for the
team's further access to individuals and documents in the
Directorate. The requirement was explained in terms of the

“need to record, against later requirements such as in fact

now in progress stemming from another investigation, the
names, subject matter and general content of matters discussed
by Agency officers with team members. The requirement to
"monitor'' was explained as an effort to keep this type of
record, rather than to impose a third party from the office

of SA/DO/O on all interviews; the latter was clearly
considered by the team to be an unreasonable intrusion. It
was agreed after some discussion that we would proceed with

Ss Atma eee Me NN A rm RTE RRR EEN a ca eet cee EAE a GRP eects ee ennnntnmentrne sere

13-00000.

system outlined in the attached agenda, and that we would
reconsider procedures later if they seemed clearly to be
unwieldy. . We anticipated, however, that once the team
splits into smaller groups as is planned, and pursues
particular areas of inquiry, it will be possible to evolve

a workable system which meets the objectives. of both parties.

7. Other: There appears to be no difficulty in
protecting identities of sources, providing documents in
sanitized form, maintaining notes only in this building and
at the appropriate security level and introducing some
officers under cover in alias where necessary; all these
points were noted and none was objected to. Space and
other facilities may be cramped but it appears to be possible
to provide adequate space adjacent to the SA/DOQ/0O offices.
Mr. Anderson began by noting the outstanding cooperation on
the Angola and COMINT surveys done in the building (in which
relatively free access to personnel and files had been
afforded his team), and ended by stating that the coming
survey was not a witch hunt nor an investigation of abuses
and that therefore he believed that such access could have
very beneficial results for the Agency. It was agreed to
begin the survey formally with a briefing by the DDO or
ADDO on 3 or 4 August 1976. Mr. Walters with several team
members will, however, set up shop on 2 August to review
such general briefing papers as Mr, Fendig can make
available to them at that time.

(signed)
Philip F. Fendig.

Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/O:PFFendig:j1 (7368/1398)

Distribution: (all w/att)
Orig & 1 - DDO

a 1 - ADDO

1 - OLC (Mr. Miller)

1 - D/SEC (Mr. Gambino)
1 - COMPT (Mr. Point)

1 - SSA/DDO

1 - SA/DDCI (Mr. Bolten)
4 - SA/DO/O

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012860


13-00000 |

+. a 7 SECRET

AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH e
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF
30 JULY 1976

/Imlly

A. Request Statemeyt “from Committee representatives of
scope, duration and proposed procedure to be
followed by Committee investigators.

‘B. Discussion of arrangements for investigation:

1. Facilities: DDO will provide office space,
telephones and secure storage facilities for
investigators. Parking spaces and cafeteria
priveleges will also be provided.

Zz. Security:

a. Badges allowing unescorted access to
Headquarters building will be issued,
to be picked up and left with
receptionist. Agreement to be signed
when badge issued, per current
procedures governing all Congressional
staffs. ;

b. Clearances through necessary level to
be obtained prior to commencement of
briefings or interviews, level to be
determined on' basis of first meeting.

3. Access:

a. Orientation briefings on Directorate
and its subdivisions to be offered.

rs b. Access to personnel and docume s within.
gency to_be controlled by office of |
SA/DO/O, which will maintain record of
. all_interviews and_of documents provided .
c. Documents to be provided upon specific

request for study within building.
They will be sanitized. to protect sources

and methods usin uidelines previously ©
established for HSC and SSC.
cree esse eee

13-00000

d. Documents to be exam

examined by the
investigation team within Headquarters ;
building. If copies of documents are ;
desired, investigators will request
them from SA/DO/O who will see that

they are provided promptly in
‘ appropriate classified and sanitized
form. If required by the Committee
(outside Headquarters building), same
procedure will be followed but will
be subject to review by SA/DO/O.
vee ee eee OO

e. Formal questions are to be put_in ©
writing in order to provide proper
and full context so that most

complete and pertinent answers can
be provided.

£. SA/DO/O to monitor all interviews. az
a

g- Discussion of note-taking and reports:

(1) Maintenance of proper security
and classification

(2) Notes to retain same level of
security Classification as

documents or interviews on which
they based.


13-00000

1

ao

1

a ~ ADMIT" “STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONT’ “,
This notice expires 31 January 1978 | .

DON 5-218

DDO NOTICE GENERAL —
NO. 5-218 4 August 1976

SURVEY BY MEMBERS OF
THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE STAFF

1. GENERAL

Members of the staff of the House Appropriations Com-
mittee began an extensive examination of the Directo-
rate of Operations beginning the week of 2 August 1976.
They expect that it will take approximately 17 months
to complete this study. They state their activities
are necessary to better understand the appropriations
process. They emphasize that their objective is not
to dig out evidence of wrongdoing or improper activi-
ties. The staff members' activities will be coordi-
nated through SA/D0/O. The following paragraphs -
attempt to anticipate the procedures necessary to
exercise orderly control over the staff's activities. .
These procedures may be subject to modification as
future experience may dictate.

2. LOCATION

Members of this Congressional staff have been issued
blue badges bearing the words "House Committee” which
permit wnescorted access to all non-specially controlled
areas of the building, including the main cafeteria.
The staff will be provided suitable private office
space in Room 2 D 0117, adjacent to the office of the
SA/DO/O, which will be relocated in Room 2 D 0109 as
of 6 August 1976. It is expected that they will initi-
ally have a greater interest in interviews than they
do in documents. Since they will have adequate office
space, interviews should be conducted within their
‘premises. . :

3. CONTROL OF DOCUMENTS

a. The staff is expected to make any requests for.
documentation to the SA/D0/O. Individual officers

ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAT, USE, ONLY _


13-00000

“ % - > ADMIN*“TRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY ~ - =.
DON 5-218
DDO NOTICE a . . GENERAL
NO. 5-218 4 August 1976

h,

who receive requests from staff members for docu-
ments should ask that the request be put to the
SA/DO/O. All documents provided to the SA/DO/0
for transmittal to the staff will be logged in by
the SA/DO/O and logged back to the component after
the staff has completed its study. The SA/DO/C
will not, as a matter of routine procedure, retain
a copy of the document concerned.

All documents will be properly sanitized to protect
sources and methods. The staff has indicated that
it does not anticipate any need for such detail
and accepts the principle of sanitization. Any
questions concerning the degree of sanitization
should be referred to the SA/DO0/O. Growd rules
for sanitization are similar to those applied
during the activities of the Select Committees.
General guidelines will be provided separately.

On receipt of a document back from the SA/DO/O

the recipient should indicate the date received,
and that it had been made available to the staff.
The document should be retained by the recipient
in the form in which it was provided to the staff
for possible further reference; the record copy
of the document should also reflect the fact that
a sanitized copy was provided to the staff. Any
further copies of documents requested by the staff
will be made only by the office of the SA/DO/O.

INTERVIEWS

ae

A representative from the office of the SA/DO/0

._ will not necessarily be present during interviews.

All interviews should be requested by the staff
through the SA/DO0/O. The SA/DO/O will maintain

a record of the date of interview; the name of
the person interviewed, and by whom; the alias

if one is used; and the subjects discussed. A
form will be provided to the interviewee to record

2
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY


13-00000 :

. +4 ae ADMIP"STRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ON}.
| DON 5-218
DDO NOTICE GENERAL
NO. 5-218 h August 1976

CF .

the essential facts. He should retain one copy
for possible future reference and one copy should
be forwarded to the SA/DO/0.

b. It is recognized that the badge access and the
length of the stay in the building by the staff
members may lead to unscheduled contacts. If
such contacts are connected with the official
duties of the staff, then appropriate comments
should be forwarded to SA/DO/O on the form cited
above. Officers should be careful not to allow
conversations to drift to areas of interest not
covered by official interviews. If this does take
place, however, we shall rely on the officer
concerned to inform the SA/DO/O of these develop-
ments. ;

SECURITY _

_ The blue badge should be sufficient to indicate that ~

staff members should be treated as visitors in the
presence of persons not connected with their official
duties. Persons introduced under alias should be
careful that the alias is protected if a chance
meeting takes place in the presence of other col-
leagues. In this connection, persons interviewed
should be careful not to expose associates who have
not been interviewed.

William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

A/DIC/ (te. Ott) (Fury a

3
ADMINISTRATIVE-INTERNAL USE ONLY

13-00000

|

t

27 August 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chiefs of Divisions ‘and Staffs

. FROM : Philip F. Fendig
SA/DO/0
SUBJECT : Guidance for Interviews with House
Appropriations Committee Staff
REFERENCE - : DON 5-218, 4 August 1976

L-

1. You have been scheduled at the time indicated on
the cover sheet of this memorandum for a briefing to be
given to the five members of the Surveys and Investigations
Staff team from the House Appropriations Committee. The
subjects which the team would like you to cover are contained
in the memorandum distributed prior to the DDO staff meeting
on 25 August 1976 and discussed at that meeting. I have
explained to the Surveys and Investigations team that topic e
(personnel policy and practices) will be discussed at a- .
separate briefing to be given by the Chief, Career Management
Group. You should touch on the other topics suggested in the
memorandum mentioned above.

2. General guidelines are contained in reference
notice. The following may bé helpful, however, in preparing
your briefing. Our general intention is to be as forth-.
coming as possible while drawing the line clearly at any
information which would lead to the identification of a
specific source, intelligence method, cooperating person or
group with which the.Agency has a relationship of confidence,
or confidential matter involving a cooperating foreign
intelligence service. The fact of liaison with foreign
services can in most cases be acknowledged, but details of
the relationship and the subject matter of joint or shared
operations should not be disclosed.

3. In the briefing contemplated. on management policies
and practices, most of the above sensitive areas would not
appear to arise, but you may find that questions will tend
to bring out some more sensitive areas and these should be
deferred with an agreement of looking into the possibility of
providing further information later. The staff has already
had access to basic budgetary material, including funds and

CONFIDENTIAL


13-00000

ae — QUINFIDENTIAL

personnel strengths broken down by component,.and a listing
by cryptonyms and funding levels of all OPACTS. They have
been given a briefing on the current organization of the
Directorate of Operations and are aware that its staff
elements will shortly be reorganized. They have a listing

. Of all overseas stations and bases. If you have further
questions on material already provided to the Committee,
please check with this office.

4. Most of the briefings are scheduled to take place
in room 2 D 0117; if possible, a member of my staff will be
present. We would appreciate, however, a short Memorandum

' for the Record, using the attached "Interview Form" as a

general guide. Space is somewhat limited, but you should
bring any supporting personnel you desire to have participate
in your briefing. The Surveys and Investigations team is
aware that aliases may be used by those with solid cover
status; please’ advise this office if any persons intend to
use an alias during these briefing sessions.

; 5. We will be happy to assist in any way, including |
follow-up matters which may be developed in the course of
these briefings. ;

att

E2 IMPDET

CONFIDENTIAL CL BY 012860


13-00000

Laas

|
bg ag 7s
i

August 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR; Mr. Philip F. Fendig
SA/D0/0

FROM . pn. Walters, Staff Member

House Appropriations Committee
Surveys and Investigations Staff

Request arrangement for comprehensive briefings with
appropriate officials regarding the subjects outlined below
be provided to HAC S&I Staff members George C. Baird and
Leon F. Schwartz.

1. Paramilitary Covert Action Cadre

Provide in this briefing data relating to the
organization, utilization and cost data .for this activity
for the periods FY 74, 75, 76 and projected data for FY 77
and FY 78. Organizational data should include manning and
equipment levels for the aforementioned periods.

2. Reorganization of the Directorate of Operations

Briefing should include rationale behind the proposed
reorganization and manpower and dollar savings to be effected
by such a change. If additional expenditures in either
dollars or manpower. positions are involved, justification
should accompany the presentation. Explain in detail how the
Directorate of Operations plans to absorb the FY 77 loss of
100 manpower positions, if imposed in the pending Appropriations
Bill.

3. The Special Projects Group

Explain the rationale behind the transfer of Israel
from the Near East Division and providing it with special
status by placing it directly under DDO. Additional manpower
and dollar costs accompanying this change should be addressed.

4, Coordination Within the Intelligence Community

Briefing should show the identity and purposes of the
various task groups established (both within CIA and community-


13-00000
4 1 a ‘ i - on

wide) which have been specifically established to deal with
the collection vs. analysis problem. Impacts and changes
brought about or anticipated within DO as a result of these
groups' actions should be covered.

5. Management Policies and Practices of Each DO Staff
sand Division, (a separate briefing by each) including but
“not- limited to: ,

ae Overview of role of staff or division

b. Decision-making processes and how coordinated
in DO, CIA and intelligence community

c. Organizational structure

d. Program development, and execution from
initiation to budgeting to implementation, including
development of annual plans, their flexibility, and degree
of autonomy of case officers, chiefs of stations, desk
officers and division or staff directors.

e. Personnel policies and practices including
recruitment, training promotion, position classification,
establishment of station complements and rotational policies.

f. Management and accounting controls to assure
compliance with laws, executive orders, policies and
regulations and assurance that funds and other assets are
properly used, expended and receipted for.

While the order of arranging the presentations is not
critical, it is suggested that, if possible, item (1.) be
presented earliest and that item (5.) be instituted the week

5 of August 30. Please coordinate with either Mr. Baird or

myself for prompt scheduling of these sessions. Also, it
would be appreciated if a copy of charts or other documentary
material used in the presentations could be provided to the
attendees during each briefing session.


13-00000

| Remarks: ¢ yess: To Shaperek, Seven

| ere Aft Ca teks )

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|_| CoNcuRRENcE ~—s|_—s| INFORMATION | [SIGNATURE  —s_

Fon yun fo F haar ehlehal spe
bila DO/6 26- 3259 7 26 preg 1976, .
Lyrunauy Lis AlPOO% porekiin with
Me SNODERASS om MBG.

Oly 2a haet ato page frm Ge
DUI phodinud fs Lies. Crvavdle, ov he.

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME. ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. | pate |

Wane jo Spf 16
[ [UNCLASSIFIED |_| GONFIDENTIAL | | SECRET _|
: (40)

ron x 237 tse previous editions

2 ee amen age:

elie petntar petit ateteeeees a ee Ea


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in attempting to be both forthcoming and helpful to him and the
«Committee in understanding the DDO's problems. At the same time
‘Mr. Snodgrass pointed out that while he had no quarrel with Mr. Shackley,

he continued to be irritated with the totality of the Agency's attitude toward
providing him with data. Mr. Snodgrass then launched into a long litany

‘on how the Agency had not been responsive in terms of his needs as he
perceived them in the time frame February to May J976. With thatas a
backdrop Mr. Snodgrass then launched into his inquiry as to why the Agency
was not willing to give him full access to Management by Objective docu-
ments. The dialogue which followed on this topic had a natural ebb and |
flow to it, but the key point that emerged from this is that Mr. Snodgrass
continues to feel that unless he can see the Management by Objective
documents he will not be able to have a firm understanding of DDO map-

} ower allocation proce . Secondly, Mr. Snodgrass claims that CIA's
position that it will show Management by Objective documents to members
of the Committee and not the Staff is an obstructionist tactic. His point.
being that the members of the Committee do not have the time to look at
such documents and they thus depend on the Committee Staff y_ thus depend on the Committee Staff for this type
of substantive review. According to Mr. Snodgrass this means that if the
Agency will not provide data to the Staff, it is in fact denying information
fo the Committee members. Attempts were made by Mr. Shackley to show
Siow men of good will on both sides of this question could have an honest
difference of opinion on the issue. In this framework Mr. Shackley re-

iterated the DDO position that access to Management by Objective docu-
ments by Mr. Snodgrass would impact adversely on the whale question of ~
sources hods as well as the integrity of the reporting system. As
a followup to this position an effort was made to find out exactly what it
was about the DDO manpower allocation system that Mr. Snodgrass did
not understand and which he thought he might find out about from an ~
examination of the Management by Objective documents. it was hoped

that through this line of inquiry an alternate approach could be discovered
which would enable us to deal with Mr. Snodgrass' problems. Our probes
in this direction were unsuccessful in clarifying the issue. One can only
conclude that Mr, Snodgrass is committed to finding some sort ofa
formula oregquation which will enable him to test our manpower aliscation /
system. "We have repeatedly outlined to him the variable factors that go

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into making judgments on operational deployment of manpower such as

what targets are in a country, what are the preat power interests in a
particular country, what is the operational environment in the country |
i.e., permissive or not, what are the cover possibilities, what are our
liaison equities, and what are our needs for regional support from a
particular country. These explanations are taken aboard by Mr. Snodgrass,
but he is looking for somethin se which has less variables in it when,

in fact, there is no magic formula for determining how one gets people to

commit treason. This portion of the meeting ultimately ended on a friendly
note but left unresolved the question of what was it that Mr. Snodgrass

’ really wanted on the issue of manpower allocations and what could CIA tell

him that we haven't already told him. (ACTION REQUIRED: Mr. Snodgrass
is currently preoccupied with drafting his report on the House Appropria-
tions Committee Mark-up of the DDO FY 77 budget. Once this task is.
completed Mr. Chin, OLC, will return to see Mr. Snodgrass and will try -
to obtain an elaboration of what specifically are the manpower issues that
trouble Mr. Snodgrass. In this context Mr. Chin has been asked to try to

determine if a review, position-by-position, of two or three typical Stations
within the DDO mi ive Mr. er rass the insight into manpower allo-
cations that he is currently seeking. )

9. Comment. In net assessment terms one would have to conclude
that the 25 May meeting achieved the optimum that could be expected from
this kind of an encounter. On the one hand the attached briefing book which
was examined by Mr. Snodgrass was accepted by the latter as a first rate
product. For this the A gency gets high marks. On the other hand, the
Management by Objective system, because he can't see the documents,
leaves Mr. Snodgrass frustrated and irritated. This evokes acrimonious
complaints from Mr. Snodgrass with the end result being that the burden

ee
for seeking a solution toa problem created by Mr. Snodgrass is placed on
the Agency. In short, we have ended up where we expected to be. Put

another way,. there appears to be no prospect for. establishing the type of
dialogue with Mr. Snod i isfi i ests of both parties.

e are

i in an adversary relationshi rith him,
although it is incumbent on us to continue to minimize, to the extent that
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Mr. Mahon. Would you please provide the Committee staff with
ened .

some samples of these performance reports, sanitized as you think
_ appropriate?

Mr. Bush. I would be willing to bring some down and discuss them with
the Committee off the record, Mr. Chairman. But I am reluctant to do that,
and I am even more reluctant to provide the documents themselves or to have
their contents described to the Committee by anyone who is not intimately
familiar with espionage, counterintelligence and covert. action operations
and with the entire managenent system used by the Operations Directorate.

There are a number of reasons for my position. One serious concern

revolves around. the effects on our internal processes of the sort of inquiry
. you propose. One of the primary reasons that our internal management. system
-is effective is that partici tion is_strictl limited to those immediately
concerned. Given that we are all human beings, there is no escaping the;
Se neat
“fact that knowledge that the reports in question are being read, or may at

some future time be read, by outsiders will lead to their being written 7

with a view to their possible impact on an extended readership, There will

bea tendency for the managers in the field to slant their discussions of -
“problems and to exaggerate accomplishments: ° Inevitably, the net effect »

_, will be’ to reduce ‘the usefulness of the system. .

_ Another difficulty involves security. To be useful for judging per-

formance, the reports must be very detailed. Thus they discuss ’ recruitments
ne

in terms “of numbers, ‘the ‘specific access s of agents to information, recruit-
OE TED ba)

ment techniques, and so forth. By the time all this. sensitive material on

mt

. sources and methods is removed, any samples are going to consist primarily
- ; o£ disconnected bits and pieces or of - unenlightening generalizations.

And I have a third problem with this request. The reports. themselves

are but one part of a very complex and thorough process we use for internal

management, It takes a detailed familiarity with the process to appreciate

its effectiveness. Thus, I feel strongly that someone from the. Agency ¥ who
a a nen .

' has that intimate Knowledge should be present if and when you want to.

vag
wo ft

consider the reports.


