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[2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992
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| SECRET - SENSITIVE
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| , | Draft Memorandum to the DCI from William Harvey
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: Dated 27 November 1962
This is not a controlled item
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RETURN TO O48
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27 November 1962
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Note: Biscussed 27 tcyvece:

1862 by DD/T with Cl
end approved gener: |:
ip principle by £CT,
Pally concurred (yn

: MEMORARDOM. FOR Director of Central Intelligence :

 PEROUGH: . ° Deputy Director (Plsns)
SUBJECT: - Operstioual Plen for Continu! ing

Operrt tens Ageinst Cubs

it. Action: This memorandua is for your information

‘and pursuant to your request. Recommendations for action rre
contained ia Parugraph V below. The purpore of this memerrors!
' iw to col ineate an operational pina for the action whick we

believe should be taken by CIA ogsinst Cubs fur the predictshle
future. In summary the plan provides for cratinuing, even
intensity ing, the intelligence effort egeinst Cubs and f+

the reorientation of the current effort inte » long tern

denied area type of operation of the highest prtlority.

I, ASSUMPTIONS:

A. The United States Government will , lve public
assurances that, provided no nuclerr or offeusive weapers © +r
present or re-introduced into Cuba, end provided Cube dees

von not take action to threaten the pesce ond security of the
Western Henisphere, the United Btatés dees tot intend tc

Creve rs
Lnvade Cuba or ‘support #n invasion of Cuba: a seine .
[ue sxcust - SENSITIVE ] PAPER BO.
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——=20_ HOT praznoy

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a These assurances will preclude ony ‘meaningful CIA
actlon “on a phased basis to Provoke a revolt inside Cubr, since
unless there are major changes in operational and internal con-

oe ditions’ in Cuba, such a revolt if provoked would be totally
| destroyed by Cuban counteraction in a. matter of hours or, at

7 riya! watens, oupyorted, by a najor, United States
Sik Litszy! “commitnent. ia addition, ‘the ‘non-invasion assurances
mo e8 a practical matter will. preclude invading Cuba on the pretext

‘of a contrived provocation such as an attack on Guantanano,.
2Oe CIA. operations Anvolving a high noise level anda

" distiget @lenent. of -attributability, particularly paramilitary,

“guerrilla, and comaando type operations will. be unacceptable

ag a matter of ‘policy.

Dy The Castro-communist regime will remain in power for

a

ithe indefinite future, with its security and control apparatus

{

, relatively intact and with the capability not only of erushing

unsupported resistance activity, but of making operational

, conditions in Cuba increasingly difficult. While it. is
possible that recent and future developments including the
Soviet action in renoving the offensive weapons from Cube ney
serve to weaken and discredit Castro, there is as yet no herd
indication that the control of the Castro-communist regime over

Cuba bas ‘been substantially weakenod. |

. . Bs ., The United States assurances of no invasion and no

- support of' an invesion will, in effect, constitute giving tr:

Castro and his regime a certain degree of ssnctuary. This will


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- | a

| i* weverely denage the aorale and motivation of anti-regine Cubenes
| _ both insiide sad outside of Cube, Which will make it ineressingiy
- dittioult for us to. recruit agents, maintain agents already

recruited, and. continue or intensify our iatelligence and other
ar efforts Against Cuba and the Castro-communist regine,
. - . eokog 8 Pespite. ‘the Bbove. factons,; Higher, Authority probebly
y a ot “will; gontione ‘heavy. proamire, on: the’ cu: for a maxioun ‘effort
ne against, ‘Cuba ‘end may even ‘cont Anue to contend that the ultinate.
7 . objective ig the overthrow of the Castro-communist regime.
“This. is an unrealistic objective, however, except.on o very
4 long-term basis as thie. United States Government, we believe,
a 7 will be unwilling in the. innediate future to commit troops
to support wach an overthrow. The United States Governzent
ia its overt dealings with the Capea exiles probably will not

"express, ‘the above factors to them in the context or with the

bdluntness: stated here. : .
" -@. In view of these factors, the so-called ‘“Iesck Tru",
. course of action, 1.@., unlinited support of Cuban exiles
end exile groups. with no real control or objective purposes

in the hope that ‘these groups will be sable to shake the
Castro regine will, although unrealistic, become _increzs ing ty .
attractive et various levels in the United Sta tes Government.
H. As a matter of policy, political pressures and
i . economic: prensures short.of blockade, raids, snd | aggressive

sabotage against Guba: will be continued.


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a alee Men oem ga cetaenat cosets 6 cae

t. 3 view of the above assumptions prramilitary, commanuth

end sabotage. operations, except in rare selective instonces

will serve little purpose; algo they will be counter-pracuct tye
since, 4t ‘undertaken, they will make the collection of intelli-
gence more ditfieult and should only be undertrken in those very

' few instances. whore an upusually high return can be demonstreted,

Regardless of what other pressures are placed on CIA for
action against Cube, it would eppear clear that Higher Author diy

. whl insist on 2 continued, . even intensified, latelligence

coverage of Cuba.
J, In. view of the policy factors, an increased use of

facilities, veal estate aud basing outside the United States,
' particularly in’ Latin Auerico, Will be both necessary snd _

desirable. .

x. Adequate aerial reconnaisssnce of Cuba will continue.

iz. oBEcTivEs:

_ Based on the ‘above assumptions, the following objectiven
appear to be proper for continuing CIA operations against

‘Cuba;

4, Take all feasible clancestine sction to isolate
and assist in isolating the Castro-commnist regime in Culn
from the rest of the Western Hemisphere and the rest of the
Free World. ;

“Bo” Fo. the maxinum extent possible, discredit the Castro-

commnist. regine tn Cuba and in the Yestern Heuisphere and the

rest of the world.
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. one

Cc. Maintein through clandestine means, short of commands
and guerrilla type operations, the maximum_economic and
political pressures’ on the Cuban regiue and economy not only

_ for the Purpose of hampering the Cuban regime, but for the

additional purpose of insuring the maximum possible drain on

°° Bles resources used to support (Cuba.

De Maintain. moximua ‘possible intelligence and counter-

“intent igence coverage of Cubs, "including particular emphasis

ls. Capsbilities and intentions of the government.

‘eer yw ‘ Activities of the Cuban G-2 and its other

security. organs. a
3, Soviet and Bloc activities in Cuba,
ss a: State of potential resistance, including the
morale and tenper of the ‘populace.
| 8. " waritie and military order of battle snd equip-
nent.
. 6. The loci of power and of possible stresses
snd strains in the power centers in the Cuban goverunont.
-%. Belationships between Cuba, USSR, Red China,
the Bloc, Latin American nations and other Free World
‘end uncommitted nations.
8. The level of and the weaknesses in the Cubsn
, economy, oe |
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Pruthe |

‘R. Teko mnxzimua ection to induce a split in the Cuben
regine gad maintain the capability of capitalizing immediately
through clandestine neans. to the extent possible on any

: significent uprising, revolt, resistance, split in the regina,

or strains end stresses among Cuban leadership or tn Cubrn/
1 Abbe, , Felationships,
oie OPEZRATI Pua

_ Espionage and Intelligence Collection - Ald fersible .

‘effort “shoul be undertaken to continue end intensify intelli-

gence: collection concerning Cuba. The status of our iatel1i-

gence’ collection and xelated operational activity at the

' present time and its development during the past six months

-is delineated . in detail in Attachment A, which wes preprred tr

serve as the basis for. the: ists report on this particuler

; matter to the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign

Intelligence. "You will. uote that this lengthy docusent
breaks down under nunerous sub-beadiogs the intelligence
coverage which has been developed. by the Clandestine Service.
Set out below are specifics of operational action it is
proposed to take to continue and, ag possible, increase in-
telligence coverage of Cuba.

l. Jutelligence Exploitation of Refugees: As yu
know, with the quarantine and the cessstion of sir
braver t the heavy’ flew of Cuban refugees bse dwindled

f “almost to nothing. In view of this and in connection
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with the contingency plenning for supporting any persihis

military action in Cuba, the Opa-Locke Interrogation -
Center as such was disasntled, although. the personnel
of the ‘Center have been retained intact. In order to
- re-establish. the flow of intelligence from refugees,
it is. proposed that. Pan Auerican Airweys and KLY be
" dndusea’ to. reiastitute their: regular: flights from
Havané ‘to Miami.’ This should be done 28 soon as ;
- possible after the settlement of the current nogotinttons
and UN discussions. Coincident with this, the Opa-Locka
yefugee interrogation center will be re-established
re vt ce oe pérsomnel. |
. | . Resident Agents in Cuba: Every effort will be
"made to continue to exploit to the fullest, preserve the
viability of and, where necessary, re-establish communica-
' ¢iens. with the 131 recruited agents now resident in Cube.
". 9 an extent, the speed and effectiveness of this effort
. Wall of course depend upon the stringency of future
. Cuban security sad control action, which it is imposstble
as yet to accurately forecast.

3. Third Country Operations: The priority on re-
eruiting agents in third countries for dispatch to Cubs
will be. reiterated gnd strengthened and every effort

at hie be nade to increase. this coverage, both through
— . “the development of sdditional resident sgents in ‘Cuba

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the saaec services] who are assisting ud in the ‘effort
.  agninst Cuba for additional coverage, including the
- recruiting of agents ance their own areas for joint
wre dtepateh, to Caba., | The [services|Jacst effectively co-
. operating at ‘this. point in this connection are the
[Bastian Dutch,.. reach, Spanish, Italian, Greek,
Norwegian,. Danish, - West German, Mexican, Argentinian,
‘Uruguayan, Cansdian, Chilean, and. Taraeii.J Direct
os ‘ approaches to several of these (services either by you
" personally or. in your name, as you prefer, sare
being separately recommended, Personal representation
| . by you to the[ services] underlined sbove would be useful.
in addition, we will re-survey all other Gitaison services]
. with which ve are in contact aad reiterate to those
. ‘appearing. to. have any assets usable aga lnst Cuba our
extrene interest in maxim coverage of this problem.
In connection with the fitaison] probien generally, we will
' endeavor to induce. all of the [tiaison. services] to make
greater use of their [national] assets, both inside and
. outside of Cuba. Particular attention will be given to
. - possible utilization of the[Vatican]
_ a -— 5. ritime rations: In addition to increasing

,
4
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i ee efforts to get at seaman agents end other aaritine
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asscts through (Tinison: services;| we will continue our

unilateral third country efforts to recruit seamen anc

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prrticularly Cubon seamen, to increane the twenty
officers and. crew nenbers aboard gix Cuban vessels we sre
now rupning. as controlled agents.

- 6. Penetration of Cuban Installations Abroad: At

' the: present tine we are running 12 Cuben diplomats

stationed outsides Cube as controlled agents aad have visable

|" operations ained: at. an ‘additional 20 cuban diplomats.
' We ‘propose to continue and intensity the current progten |

of attempting to recruit or defect every Cuben officia!
representative abroad to whom we can gzin access ond

soncerning whom. we have eny reason to believe a

susceptibility to approach exists. These additionat

penetrations will be attempted both through[untiatere)

operations end where appropriate in conjunction with

; [taison services, }

4. Audio Penetrations of Cuban Installations
Abroad: At the present time we have audio and/or

_telephose tap coverage of Cuban officisl installations

in Chile, Italy, uextoo! The Netherlands, England,
Uruguay, Greece, Spain, France, and Cenaca | No

major expansion of this coverage is presently

contemplated, but we will continue to survey additicnst

targets ef opportunity and wherever possible insts11
coverage in those cases where the additional intelii-

“getica tion this type of source over and above whet we

.3re now receiving would appear ‘to make such Lustalirtien
worthwhile,
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esteem a aetna ne a eee tee erent

ra St a nt ee ESE SESSION AN ARR rab

PB, Sonunmunicrtions Intelligence: Fe will continus
our present CIA Close Support coversge from the KOLA

SL SO Ne Wh Nn

station snfudentJa the same level end will continue
to pross NSA: for sdditionsl coverage of Cuban comaynicr-
* tions. As the current situation "nermelizes" it shewli
be possible for NSA to reinstitute and perhaps even
ye. Anerease their, seoborne intercept coversge of: Cuban
| couunies tions. . .
ss Communist Party Operations: A complete survey

bas been made world-wide of all Communist Party

penetration operations and wherever any such penetration
“ean be directed egainst Cuba either by dispatching the
egent to Cuba or by pointing the agent. against Cubsn
‘targets, “this will be done, except in those cnses vhers
such action would result in unacceptabl¢prejudice ta
the operations in the srea where the agent ig now based.
” It is believed that the. most lucrative field for the
 sedivection of such operations to the Cuban target will
“pe Latin America where there sre 65 penetrations of
various communist parties. Of this 65, the survey
we bave conducted indicates that 23 have some direct
pertinent access to Cuban targets, All of these 27 wi)
be directed against these targets unless in any case
there. are overriding. reasons .to the: contrary, The
yemaining cases in the total of 6s are bein individually
exanined to see if they can be diverted to Cuban trrgets.


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¢

i” 10. Illegally Infiltrated Agents: The two

siccessful black infiltrated teams (COBRA and AMTORGID)
' Sliich have produced substential intelligence will be

TE carl A aa OG IS EE NN NY EET A ly A ee
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continued, resupplied, snd reinforced but pointed
‘primarily at continued intelligence cotlection and rt
- the recruituent’ for intelligence collestion purposes of
"other. Cabans who already are ‘legelly resident in Cubs
in the sress where. the tenns are opersting (Pinar del

Rio and Oriente). In addition, on the nost careful ly

f | - selected basis, where it appears feasible, additional
{ . agents. and tens will be. infiltrated black into Cuba

in en effort ‘te duplicate the performance of the COBRA

8nd ANTORRID teans and psrticularly to. recruit and, ca
_ possible, train additional agents legally resident in
Cuba. :

, 11. Extiltration: As feasible, egents end potentirl
recruits now in Cuba will be exfiltrated for
training, indoctrination, supplying with communications,
and motivation. They will then be re-infiltrated inte
Cuba, primarily on intelligence missions. Where possible,
this will be done through legal trave! channels, but
where this is not possible, it will be done wherever
- feasible through our black infiltration-exfiltration
facilities, primarily our maxvitine assets.
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B, Much of the above effort as noted will be primarily
directed ‘towards developing all possible evidences of stress
or strain within the regime ond between the regine and other

: antions, particularly the Bloc. An intensive program wi}
be. continued to. take. asena soe. of any possible opportunity

a | fashions fashion. This as ‘pastcally ® long: tera effort. sh great deal
” of work. already has. goue into this and the current
status of this prograa and the proposed further expldtation
| of the nunercus’ leads wo ‘have daveloped is being. made, in
the dniterests of brevity in this memorandum, the subject of
g separate ‘compilation. The effectiveness of sssets aimed rt
actually splitting the regine, i.¢., @ pairce revolt, will of
| “course depend, to an extent, on the willingness of the United
., 7 | States Governnent to support thea and it is entirely possible
_ ‘that any: ‘gach effort might fstl unless supported. with militery
forces which om ‘the basis of the assumptions in Paragraph I
above would appear ‘unlikely.

c. Sabotage: On the basis of the sesumptions set cut
above, comendo type sabotage, minor sabotage, and other
acta of sabotage inside Cuba would appear to serve little
purpose end should not be undertaken except in the rare
instances where an opportunity is presented with ecceptabic

risk. to do za jor danage to the Cuban econony. it is proposed

' to. contiiue searching for. such ‘Limited opportunities, but.

no active or wide scale program is contempleted..

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Se ee meee eter tee

Given the Assumptions ia Paragraph I above, no wide scale

D. Parnnta itary, Coumando, and Guerrille Type Operationm:

program ot Buch activity should be undertaken, However, we
, - Propese to “maintain in being our present facilities sand
the eipabiiity of undertaking. such operaticns in order to
"Sally exploit any: substantial change in internal Cuban con
ditions or ‘any substantial revolt or uprising which night oceny,
Eg, Economic Warfore: It is proposed to continue end
- intensify the progras already undertaken to deny through
- olandestine aud covert means critical materials to the Cuben
- ecotiony.. ‘This consists primarily of denizl operations, possibly
sone preciusive buying and inducing friendly U.S. and allied
firnas and governuents to prevent the shipments of atrategic
"materials, to Cuba.

ae a 2 Counterinteliigence: (The current counterintelligenca

= and counterespionage progran agninst the Cuban GZ ond
related services will be continued end as possible intensified.

. This ‘program hes developed Substantially and it should be
possible within the. coming tenths to increase its effectiveness
considerably in countering not only Cuban but Bloc intelli-.

* gence operations mounted ageingt United States interests
from Cuba,

G. Political Action, Propaganda, Paychologics1 Warfare:

tom in thin fiele the following tasks will be continued and where

neal

appropriate intensified:

‘

le. Assist and support State in any. feasible acticn,
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oy” seb agg

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: ” ad co os
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to davelop ead exploit current OAS and Latin Aneric:n
attitudes favorable “to the containzent end/or overtheny
of the ©. Costro~communist regine,
‘Assist State in the developnent of post-Cestro
- coneyte, leaders, and political Broups.
. . 3, Stimulate, Support. and Suide covertly the
ae Propaganda and political action Rotivities of the cnc
ond, other Cuban political Groups rnd individuals, fa
. 'ppropriate, who offer a potential for impact inside
Cuba, .
ie the Dinetpy ndaten and exploit the will of the
- Cuban people | to resist Castro-communian, making maximun
use. of the downgrading of Castro and his regime during —
‘the missile crisis,
|» 8. Diweredit and ridicule castro and bis regine
“in Cuba, in the Hewisphere snd elsewhere, with emphasis
On the thene the missile crisis dexoustrsted con-
Clusively that Castro is nothing but a sere pawn of
Soviet imperialisa,
6. Continue "Radio Auericas" fad other CIA-

‘

Sponsored Cuban exile radio brosdeasts «3 *Ppropriate.

7. Leunch propaganda balloons after an operations!
capability has been sstablished and policy authority is
| Granted to conduct propaganda balloon operations,

8. * Continue the infiltration of propaganda materini

dato Cuba vis open mails, legal travellers and couriers,

‘with special emphasis on selective black operations,

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Se et Ae

i H, Exploitation o of ExLlo Groups: We Will continue

the claidestine exploitation of exile groups for intelligence |

7 Rae

collection; psychological warfare pnd other approved missicns.
‘As tesathle, we will act to mount a8 much of this effort cs
-- posmible from: areas outside the continental United States, end
particularly fron Latin Anerica. ig Higher Authority decides
"Ont a “Track Two" concept. or on. any, ‘pimilar concept which

: —— contemplates heavy uncontrolled and only generslly directed
) , ection. operations of Cuban groups egainst Cubs, it is believer
that efforts should be made to ‘transfer @B much as possible
\ Sof the. esponsibility, for this non-clandestine, non-intelligencs
| type operation intd the politics! field, which is the province
.. 10% the Departuent of State, In this connection, -it igs believed
jit would be sdvisable to press for the creation within the
. | Departuent of. State of on office of Cuban Exile Affairs to
mo hendie the overt governnent relationships with } Cuban exile
| eroups.
- ‘IV, ORGANIZATIONAL AND PROCEDURAL CHANGES:
Maximum inplomentation of the above plan which provices
for the most intensive feasible collection of tntelligenc:,
- the implomentationof related programs as outlined, and the
muintenance of capabilities to exploit targets of opportunit:

ag well as take advantage of any future substantial changes
"4m internal Cuban conditions will, it is believed, permit
and make advisable the following:


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caer sree

A, A gracual but substantial reduction ‘n the expenditures

and pergonnel of Task Force W. . “
B. Consideration of the repositioning of Task Force W

within: the Clandestine Service, possibly ag 8 major conponent

of. the wa JAviaion under different direction.
Cc... The abolition of the operational Mongoose mechaniaia,
‘D. The removal of the past ‘frauework: which required

detailed | consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) cf

even minor operstional deteils and decision by comnittee on

, points which it, is: believed ore completely within the purviar
of the DCI and those officers to whom he delegates decision.
_¥., RECOMMENDED ACTION:

A. Your concurrence in the above general operations plan

is recommended.

B, -It is recommended that you discusa this plan with .

the © Special. Group (Augmented) and secure its comeurrence.

c. It is recounended that you secure from the Specin
Group (Augmented) policy approval to attempt to induce Fan
American Airways and KLM to resume their flights between Ajax!
ond. Hevena at the appropriate time,

p. It ig recommended that if eny “Track Two" concept
is proposed, you endesvor to transfer te the Department «f£
State all possible overt aspects of this type of uncontrolled

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me. oud Support of. Cuban ile groups. _ 7 —

at is: Fecomnended that: the: Mongoose operat
nectinnion be abolished,

= Rs it you soncur in this concent,

done 1

Specific recommendat fon.


