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REFERENCE: DIR-14742 jw --- i

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1. INTRODUCTION, As a follow up to reference, Haj. Watlington |
arrived in Miami on 6 June 1962. After Maj. Watlington had an op- l
portunity to discuss the local situation with Lt. Col. Carlos Causes ‘|
‘the local ACSI representative, arrangerents were made for a lengthy i

., session on the subject of Agreed Activities. It was agreed that
this discussion would take place at 1000 hours on 7 June 1962 at a H
JENMAVE safehouse facility. This meeting subsequently took place as |
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_ scheduled and was participated in by Lt. Col. Causes, Maj. Watlington,
Dudley R. JENTONS, Charles B..WIESINGER and Andrew K. REUTEMAN.
The specific points which were outlined in this discussion are
covered in the following paragraph.

2. DISCUSSIONS. In the course of the 7 June 1962, conversations
with ACSI representatives the following topics worthy of recording
were discussed.

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a. Opa Locha Refugee Referral Procedures. ha).
Jatlington made the point that in accordance with the |
agrecrents which had been reached between ACSI and :
KUBARK, local procedures were to be agreed upon in |
order that ACSI might obtain refugee referrals fron
Gpa Locka which could be used as a basis upon which to
mount OB collection operations, Maj. Watlington under—
scored the point that ACSI had no interest or charter
to run other than OB collection operations. At the
sane time if any of their operations produced intelli-
gence on subject matter other than OB, this intelligence
would be reported via existing ACSI reports chansels.
REUTEMIAN indicated that JLAVAVE,acknowledged the validity |
of ACSI's mission in the OB field, and we were therefore
_. wAlling £9 42 merate fully in this regard. On the other
_-Y pamared BeLliéved that it was essential that certain

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ocofeguards bo built into any Opa Locka rqferral inorder
that we could minimize the possibilities for duplication
‘of effort and/or wire crosging. This concept was readily
aceopted by Haj. Watlington, It did not, however, strike
a totally responsive chord in Lt. Col. Causes. This was
noted but in order to proceed with preliminary arrange-
nents, REUTENAN put forth the proposal that ACSI register
a list of ‘igent requirements with Opa Locka and that this
‘Vast could then be used as a basis upon which refugee
screenings could be conducted. It was suggested that Col.
Kail would be the logical point of reference in Opa Locka f.
through which the referral system could be managed. In |
“this connection it was pointed out that once Col. Kail 2
identified an individual whom he considered to ‘be pri- —~
marily of ACSI interest, he could arrange for this indt-
vidual to be referred to Lt. Col, Causes’ covert unit.
At the same time Col. “ail would make arrangements to pass
, to KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and to Station
JMWAVE a copy of the Opa Locka debriefing of the individual
who had been referred to ACSI. Upon receipt of this in- ;
formation KUBARK representatives at Opa Locka and at
Station JMWAVE would review the referral. If this review
revealed that the individual was not of operational
‘oan interest to JMWAVE and his primary access was not in fields
Y other than OB, no objections would be expressed relative
to ACSI retention and full exploitation of the body. Maj.
Watlington expressed satisfaction with this proposal and
“gtated that he would be prepared to discuss it further
once he had an opportunity to personally review the func-
tioning of the Opa Locka center. *
an 4, Eel AgB eR Re woe by auctharUs. Agency Tew 6)
t OY b. Antonio *CUESTA Valie. “Lorn 13 dune 1926. Lt.Col.
,{" Causes asked if wo could clarify the current status of
« our relationship with Cuesta. As this name did not ring
y a bell with any of the JHWAVE representatives, Lt. Col.
Causes was asked for further details. This produced the
ptatement that ACSI was interested in CucSta ‘and wanted
to uso him in an infiltration cperaticn. ACSI had allegedly
previously traced Cuesta with Station vliVAVE and had re-
ceived the reply that’ KUBARK had been in touch with the
individual but had terminated nim because he was unreliable.
' in view of this response Lt,. Col. Causes wanted to know
whether we would recommend the reuse of Cucsta by ACSI.
We responded to this by stating that we would review our
files and would forward a written reply to Lt. Col. Causes
within tho noxt few days.

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ce. baureano *BATXYSTA Palla. Born 1 May 1935. ..Lt.
Col, Causes asked i¥%We Stil retained an operational
interest in Batistal If we did not ’ACSEY was interested-
in using this individual in an infiltration operation and-
a3 a resuit wanted JHVAVE'’s opinion as to Batista's
eapability and reliability. We advised Lt. Col. Causes
that we would check our files and would forward a written
reply relative to Batista within a matter of a few days.

Re ABUSE FR Re Woe 2 OTA REY §, cise ity Tene Ef
a“ “: ad. Antonio *ORDONEZ Hernandez. Eorn 24 August 1918,
Lt. Col, Causes asked if Wa Ware currently in touch with
Ordonez. Ag this name rang a bell with RBUTEMAN we remy
eponded by stating that7~Subject vas of interést to ual In
this connection we indicated we were{willing to reexaning]s:,
Our relationship with Ordeiez7in order to detérmine his ~ 4
full potential or Capability, and if his capability was :
‘greater in the OF field than in fialds which were of interest_-

to us, we would certainly consider/ relinquishing our interest] aw |

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SECRET. UFGA-4322 —

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Lt. Col. Causes stated that he felt that ho had
established his equity in Ordonez through the name
trace procedure. Despite this, he had found that
Ordonez had disappeared from circulation; and, there-
fore, he assumed that we were debriefing this man.

e. Third Country Diplomats. REUTEMAN asked the
ACSI representatives whether they were currently in
touch with any third country Giplomats. aj. Watlington
stated thatKACSI had previously tried to harness they

€apabilities of the_Spanish, Uruguayan and Canddian §
diplomatic pouches ./ Coordination of these activities
With KUBARK had resulted in ACSI's being denied the use
of these facilities, As a result Maj. Watlington stated
that at tho present time ACSI was not in touch with any
third i Bieta, On the other hand, ACSI was

idterested in pursuing the third country diplomatic

channel ds a means of establishing communications with

inside dssets. At this point Lt. Col. Causes stated

that he was very disappointed at KUBARK's refusal to

allow him to use the facilities of the{Spanish, Uruguayan’2 y
or Canadian pouches}} ft was indicated that KUBARK under- —

stood I”. Col. Catises' reaction; however, the KUBARK

position was based on sound security principles and

could not be altered. The additional explanations which

were made relative to the security implications which

were inherent in the use of third country diplomats and

how misuse could affect long standing government to

government or service to service agreements between

ODYGKE and free world countries did not make any impact

on Lt. Gol. Causes. This gentleman was predisposed to

interpret KUBARA's refusal to ailow him to use certain
diplomatic pouch -hanneis as a clear indication that

Geof KUBANKS “primary responsibilities in the Hiand

area was to restrict and inhibit ACSI operational activity.
Gnce this attitude was identified no further attempts were
made to persuade Lt. Coli. Causes that our actions had

been taken in the best interests of‘ the intelligence
community.

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£. Maritime tagiltwatien of ACSE Agents. A dis-
cussion of thode Gupport services which KWEAIK might
render to ACSY operations revealed that Lt. Col. Causes
was still interested in having JMWAVE infiltrate two of
his egents into PBRUMEN, Xn this connection the point
was mado by ACSI that under optimum circumstances they
would prefer that JMVAVE assume responsibility. for tho
agents in. the lizami area and then deliver them through a
Gecure mechanism to liavana. ff this were not possible
ACSY would reluctantly accept infiltratibn of their agents
into arly point in PBRUMEN, L¢e. Col. Causes was toid in
very precise terns that JLWAVE would not undertake to
infiltrate any of his agents into Havana. On the other
hand, we would consider any proposal for the infiitration

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of selected agents to a beach area in PBRUHEN, The point
was rade that in this connection Lt. Col. Causes had to
understand that our maritime capabilities were limited
and we were currently committed to the full exploitation
of these assets for at ieast six weeks in advance. As a
result any operational plan which he might subnit to us
should be keyed to the agsumption that approximately siz
to eight ‘weeks would paGs before we could realistically
consider the servicing of his request. Lt. Col. Causes

agreed to project his operational plans within this Yrane
of reference. .

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RTITUATION OF
“DISPATCH”

“GLAGDIFICATION = * Posarcts GYMOL AKD FeRanER

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SECRET UFGA-4322

. Ge Documentation. A discussion of the documentation —
problem réiative to agent infiltrations revealed that at

* the ponent - ACSI aid not have any.documentation problems
which they felt warranted discussion at this session,

. h. ' Coordinatioa Forms. The discussion of opsra~
tiopal coordination revealed that ACSI was willing for
JLWAVE to coordinate locally those operational. proposals
which might be received from.Lt. Col. Causes. Once this
coordination was effected and if there were disagreement,
then the operation could be reforred to the Washington ;
headquarters of both ACSI and JMWAVE, Maj. Watlington . >
stated that the forms for effecting coordination in ac- .
cordance with procedures which had been agreed upon at
Washington would be sent to both JMWAVE and the ACSI unit
in Miami in the near future. In view of this Maj. .
Watlington suggested that we -not initiate the coordination
mechanism until these forms were on hand circa 1 July 1962.

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i. W/T Assets. The discussion of the use of W/T
facilities in terms of PBRUMEN operations revealed that
the Miami ACSI unit did not have any W/T assets in
PBRYMEN at this time. On the other hand, Lt. Col. Causes
was’ interested in establishing W/T assets in PBRUMEN. In . +]
view of Ghis he asked if JMWAVE would continue to assess,
polygraph and train those individuals that ACSI thought
wore suitable W/T candidates, It was indicated that we
were certainly prepared to review all appropriate cases
and would render whatever support was required. This then
resulted in a discussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing
to monitor ACSI W/T transmissions from PBRUMEN in those
instances where the W/T operator had not been assessed,
polygraphed or trained by KUBARK. We indicated that we
would be glad to moniter,such transmissions if we were
told in advance of the date, time and frequencies on which
the broadcasts were to be made. This then led to a dis-~-
cussion of whether JMWAVE would be willing to transmit
C/V messages for ACSY agents. Here again, we stated that
we would favorably concider any requests for C/V trans-
missions providing that we knew the content of the message,
the identity of the agent who was to receive it, and the

« agent's location and equipment which he might be using.
Lt. Col. Causes stated that in view of this discussion we
could anticipate that he would be levying requirements on
us in the near future for support in the W/T field,

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j. Secret Writing. A discussion of 3/W teéhniques
revealed that TY a réquest for the issuance of S/W were
recolived from their Hianil representative it would be re-
viewed, and if ACSY approved the operation KUBARK would
be asked to issue a system. If JMWAVE agreed via local
coordination that the operation in question required the
use of B/W, then this recommendation would be cabled to
our Washington Headquarters where coordination would be
effected with ACSY. Once this was accomplished, KUBARK
Washingtgen would cable to JHWAVE the number of the system
which was\to be issued. JMWAVE would then issue the
system to the ACSI representative in Miami.

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3. COHMENT, At the conclusi6a of the above discussion arrange-
nents were made for lunch, but Lt. Col, Causes chose not to partici-
pate in the luncheon session. During -the luncheon conversation
Haj. Watlington indicated that he did not believe that Lt. Col.

. Causes would cooperate within the spirit of the DCID's. As a result
he asked that JMWAVE be extremely patient with ACSI until such time -
as Lt. Col. Causes retired and could be replaced. Maj. Watlington

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CLATDIICATION + ">, ” | DIRAATCH GYESEOL MieD WUMGEEN

TGGpininanaMON 6 GP

BicAveN a SECRET. UFGA-4322

indicated that the retirement was scheduled to take place. at the
end cf September 1962, At the end of the luncheon session ar-
rangonents wero made for JENTONS to take Maj. Watlington on a ~
tour of Gpa Locka. Based on this tour additional discussions
wore to be held with Maj. Watlingzon.particularly in regard to
the development of proceduves for referral of agents to ACSI
from the Opa Locka flew.

4. OPA LOCKA, Maj. Watlington and JENTONS subsequently Hoe
went out to the interrogation center at Opa Locka. Here they —_—
had an interview with Col. Kail, “the tenor of which was, on the fo
part of Maj. Watlington, to assure himself that the ACSI repre-
sentative, Francasi, was having adequate access to operational 7
leads. Col. Kail said that operational leads were shared ac- . Hot

, cording to their abilities between the KUBARK representative and fo:
the, ACSI man. However, there were occasional difficulties in
assuring that the men best qualified received the body in question.
Yn addition, he said KUBARK occasionally pulled a man out of the boo:
Center without his completing the full treatment which precluded —_
the ACSI representative's getting his hands on someone who might x
be well qualified for their operations. Maj. Watlington believed
that assurance that the ACSI representative got a fair deal .
night be achieved through a more complete briefing of Col. ‘a
Trudencio Ulibarri, who is in charge of the preliminary screening
so that he would more fully understand what was needed. JENTONS I -
said that this would be a very good idea, but that it would be
better if it were a dual briefing with a KUBARK representative
belng present as well. Maj. Watlington said that he would ask
his headquarters for permission to have such a briefing given.
Col, Kail expressed his opinion that the assignment of JENTONS ;
to formal liaison with the ACSI representatives would do much to ho:
eliwinate present difficulties and all present echoed this pious HF
thought. fo:

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5. AGREEMENT, When JENTONS turned Maj. Watlington over to sag
Lt. Col, Causes after the meeting at Opa Locka, the two ACSI
representatives said that they believed that, for the time being,
it would be better to continue the system as at present, pending
JENTONS' permanent arrival at the beginning of July 1962. As. Lt.
Col, Causes is obviously skeptical about the outcome, this was
agreed to as a stopgap measure,

END OF DISPATCH

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