187-10002-10152| = | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

oe Date:10/05/93
Page:1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002~10152

RECORDS SERIES :
INTERVIEW SUMMARY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : »
TO: .

TITLE :
INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH

DATE : 05/29/75

PAGES : 21
SUBJECTS :
PAPICH
FBI
CIA
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
CUBA
CASTRO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

Box 256
Folder 4

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HY 450955 Docld: 322781992 Page i

[TERVICH WD MEETING SUTARY
SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH: Sam Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT

VATE~TIMELOCATION: Ma 2 1975; a.m.; Carroll Arms

PRESENT: morning: John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly

afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly

WAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: poe Y. Vins

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S) :

seam BY FBIJEK cAna=
| ON SIs ley 92 _
__AT RELEASE in eu,

~ RELEASE jy PART
C) TOTAL pew

EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES __jio

2 BY: SAG SLB) ude

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HY 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 2 po

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HY 50955 Docld: 32261992

—<EeRE Oe

FILE:

Papich began with a brief summary of his experi-
ence in the FBI. During World War II and there-
after he ran certain operations in Latin America.
In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations
in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil

and bloc intelligence agents. In 1952 he became
FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating

and planning, including the development of sources
He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover

Papich presented the following overview of the
issues. He has a high respect and regard for the
Soviet intelligence service, its efficiency, andg@
effectiveness. He must be shown that their
philosophy has changed since 1970. c
of the U. 8. i i oa
KGB and GRU is very limited. In 195g
the U. S. intelligence community_ ‘
lieved was good information oy, @t@

er neW defectors
Bowing that the
ed "they've taken

and new operations succeed®t
few years". There

premises were false.
us to the cleaners in the las
is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in

the United States. The old view was that illegals
would aim at middle-class government and business ed
positions. It has been discovered that they take 2
jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment a
background. There is no knowledge of Soviet =<
objectives. Illegals may do nothing for years so 2
they can be tapped for the future. There may be brag
100, 500, or 5,000 of them. Some were sent in as 25
early as the 20's and 30's. They are the Rudolph u =
Abel-type. His network was never identified.
Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U. S. ly
KL

results in identifying Soviet operations in the
United States.

Papich stated that he played a controversial
"devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the

CIA. He did not confer with Attorney General
Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell'
attention. Papich assumes Heims wanted Mitchell

to get a review of the history of PBI-CIA relations.
Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without
‘checking with-other FBI officials.

PARA TeTIAN TY

Pye

Page 3

ASE IN FULL

Cl RELE

A REL

PART Cex taba )

“1 TOTAL DENIAL

EASE IN

@

HY 50955 Docld: 32281992

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY pase 2 of X/

To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is
necessary to g0 pack to World war If, according

to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into

the foreign intelligence field in World War It.
Overnight the FBI had to generate the capability

to move into Latin America against the German
espionage operation which ineluded business covers,
radio networks, and influence in Latin American
governments. The FBI had no precedent or guidance.
Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegs conferred with
the British in London for assistance. FBI agents
went into Latin America first under business covers,
then in the embassies, which was thin cover. The
legal attaches established official liaison wight
Local authorities. The FBI's role was prime@@t
counterinteliigence but some positive ipo
was gathered about the stability of g
FBL agents learned on the job. Mog
headquarters was ridiculous until %
were reported back. Cos

The OSS ran operations # Oe

as Latin America. Donovaiia He ran undercover
operations in the United sfites. see the book

by Donald Downs. OSS had a very close relation-
ship with MI 5 and MI 6. The British also ran
operations in the United States in 1939-41. No
one knows how many. They saw the FBI as neophytes
knowing little about the business. The British
developed closer relations to OSS than to FBI.

At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but
Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in

the Un ted State Sang One XAMpP Le ; the OSS bugging. IB :
ace Spanien peep) Other complaints came from (S (Fst)
Latin America. eatetion between Hoover and

Donovan is important background for Hoover's view

of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regard-

less of their packground if he thought they had

the capability to penetrate the access: The OSS

use of Communists tshook the hell" out of Hoover,

as aid OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation

with the NKVD. Hoover would never work with

Communists. Hoover saw CIA roots in oss. Papich

stressed that oss had some great people, extremely

capable and dedicated, but oss had an element that

Hoover would never buy.

- a SECRET

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 3 of </

In 1943-45, the government began looking toward
a worldwide intelligence system. The alternatives
were the military, OSS, State, and FBI. FDR
allegedly assured Hoover that he would be respon-
sible for setting up the post-war system. Papich
never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted
this job. The Latin American operation was
successful but Hoover never understood or had a
feel for the problems. He felt insecure. He never
traveled outside the U. S., and only saw things
from Washington, D. C.

Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a
"warm" relationship with the President. When the
Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947
Act drafted, Hoover's attitute was mistrust and
lack of confidence in the group creating CIA.
were a different type of people, not law-=g
oriented. Ivy League students of forag
did not speak Hoover's Tanguage. ~<

Papich states it was a "ble egies Hoover did
not get the job. Hoover "Wis fomfortable" when
confronted with worldwidqgie stg. ~ He did not under~
stand relationships and opeMRtions abroad. In the
U. S., for instance, if Hoover had a problem with

a police chief, he just cut off relations. He
couldn't do that with foreign police. A foreign
intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic
intelligence agency.

In 1952, when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, rela-
tionships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle
Smith was CIA director. There were many flaps
between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psycho-
logical warfare, especially regarding the funding
of labor groups, student groups, and political
parties. At the time of the 1947 Act, these tech-
niques of "covert action" were the subject of
‘tremendously heated battles between CIA and State.
There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence
field.

In the field of political and psychological warfare
operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped people.
The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional
agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a

_ | SRE

HY 50955 Docld:322781992 Page 5

19

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page of of <7

e SEGRE!

possible assignment, the newsman would contact
the FBI to ask what was going on, this would go
to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA
director. But Beedle Smith was tough.  Communi-
cation between the FBI and CIA was almost non-
existent by 1952.

Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is

so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels,
exchanging ideas for operations. He would push
CIA ideas in the FBI. Flaps would come up. He
would stamp them out and say "get on with the job".
The FBI was easier to control since it was ceng
tralized. Papich's relations with Hoover EN

go up and down. He frequently asked to gage
field -- and sometimes Hoover consider
him there. But by the 1950's, most
foreign intelligence talent had dig

No formal consideration was
to limiting its role to “¢é
probably thought it shouldg@ep tag

expressed a desire to give his intelligence
job. Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's
reasons for doing what he did. He had his own
conversations and contacts in the White House,
Congress, and his personal sources. He knew what
he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the
political climate in Washington”. This was true
for "risky" operations.

Papich believes it would be disastrous to give
both foreign and domestic intelligence duties to
a CIA. While there would be advantages in
coordinating fragmented sources, it is a risk to
liberty, like a national police.

Papich did not recall any significant plan to
improve coordination in 1958 when FBI joined USIB.
FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group.

The CIA would suggest joint fleld operations but
Hoover would rarely buy it. This was like his

reluctance to join any operation with any other
agencies. He thought the FBI should always have

control, a commanding role. For example, Allan
Dulles discussed gaan United Nations \ ian Hoover. (S } Gs

SECRET

HW 50955 Docld: 32281992 Page 6 ts

aa
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page S of -</

~E)

when fon: een en a Hoover objected
to the plan, Dulles dropped it. Another example:
Angelton might be disturbed about our lagk,of_
information about KGB operations out athe eN3)
He would discuss with Papich how to pene erator
KGB.

Friction would develop in "the gray area" of posi-
tive intelligence. For example, a top foreign
“official came to the United States for medical
treatment. The CIA knew he was coming to the U. S.
.and wanted to know his relationship with Communists
and wanted intelligence on the instability in the
country. The CIA wants him surveilled to find out
his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or
bug. The FBI would not do this since he was not
an intelligence agent and not within FBI Jurisd
tion. The CIA would be upset. There were s
cases like this, one involving }la=Boliviangs
Over the years, Papich sold Hoover on
but it was always a gray area. The
tion never worked with the FBI g@%

In summary, the sources of Fy™
(1) the OSS experience, (2) Oy Scal and psychological
warfare by CIA, and (3) the CIA desire for positive
intelligence gathering in the U. 8.

There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to
develop "€ptendst-in the U.S. Papich recalls no
more than three to six instances of disagreement.
The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization
for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because
it moved on its own. The CIA Office of Security
advised Papich that they had a relationship with

the National Student Association. This never gave
the FBI a problem.

The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI prob-
lems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down
the drain when contacts through student groups were
curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts

, HY 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 7

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page © of 4/

had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence
community could have dealt with the New Left
dater. The CIA would have had assets to assess
the issues. Such questions involved New Left
travels overseas and relationships with foreign
agents. ;

The FBI and CIA did discuss developing a cover

in the U. S. to get intafMeWiaymeltravelers gainea(S) G» IR
very little. The immediate prop em was the pr

posal for a joint approach. When Papich was there,

it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did

set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no

support. However, if the CIA desired to use a

company it would ask for a check of FBI files. os

Papich is not aware of any political organiz S

created by the CIA, although it may have
in the 50's or 60's. There was discuss}
FBI about creating its own group aimed,
and discussion of whether or not to, nee TA™
know about it. There had to be cod wae with
CIA. Papich does not know if ply soreate
organizations were implementeg®
have been at Hoover's level

Mie Gecision would

PBI informant travel overse@Q wads limited mainly

to CPUSA members. The FBI wofild not tell CIA

about informant trips to Moscow or Paris before-
hand. The reason was that the CIA would have
notified its field agencies that the informant's
life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed
the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.

The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven
agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA.
Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security
Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and
the Office of Security. Papichn and Creager backed
each other up in their respective areas. There
were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The
liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other

liaison agents were not so deeply involved in in-
elligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison
at NSA was Bil] M Te although Papich was also | 7 aon. >)

involved wit hiiMShg)

HY 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 6 : : fa

HY 50955 Docld: 322781992 Page 9

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page / of X/

Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies,
Hoover was "goddamned careful". He was sensitive

to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support
had to be established firmly. Hoover never
responded “let them do it" within the United

States. Hoover did not give other agencies any
blessing or approval for question dome \
activities such as the case of vn iatetdet festa)
mentioned above. >

In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich stimulated
interest in covering and recruiting people in

the United States, for example \gem J ysketaceh
The CIA wanted to use its sourcdes™es"
foreign officials in the United States
officials went home. These officials, éfe
spies, therefore, when the CIA asked
recruit them, Hoover said no. Thig¢t
ups and downs, depending on the
times Papich did convince Hooy
recruit a foreign official jgp¥

rather than the DoW
Hoover was back-sto
to the Attorney G . SNK ee Gk: ScONe | eve er
ncaa ylesreatoover sometimes refused. ee
based his. evaluatign on the feasibility of the (S)

operation. Neither\@ysi§\nor State had their own
capabilities and there“Was no formal discussion
of their developing it. Papich tgessed that

Hoover treated State, CIA, and@i@fleach differently CSG

There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA
recruited without clearing with the FBI. The CIA uw
Migeeamckino more than five or six se)

times. Papich™ sked by FBI officials whether

the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly

oie S uthority. Papich says this may have @y
per not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys

General would have stuck their neck out. It was a

possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where

UNE, Le meme ceaeh was unusually close. Papich = OY)

Mieould only have happened once or

et

ce ” BI would have detected it most of
the time. If it was done it would be through CIA

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Office of Security, although that office had an
excellent relationship with FBI. Allan Dulles
would not have condoned it since he had great
respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same
is true of McCone and Helms, Papich also con-
cedes the possibility of entries by the CIA,
citing the Andependent operation conducted regard
jonmpe woover opposed goi
eT in a, Joint

wo &. < .

S

United States. CIA tried t
the 50's FBI involvement
some thought anew FBI qa mar would be needed
for it. The FBI as conStygrs
trained personnel or cagé Ss ity to develop foreign
targets. The CIA had this capability. Papich

& proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the
United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest
in a target, the purposes of the contact, and any
results. If the FBI had no interest in the target,
that is, an interest in a KGB contact for example,
it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that
CIA furnish it any information relevant to its
needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left
was handled separately from the memorandum of under-
standing procedures). re]

Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division
before Sullivan. A capable administrator, he
operated behind the scene, stayed out of politics,
had good rapport with agents, and was able to
handle Hoover. When Belmont retired, the FBI: “lost
a rudder". This was a crucial point in FBI history,
with Hoover getting old. Belmont stressed to his
subordinates the need to develop a strong case for
any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case was
ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and
Belmont did disagree on such matters as counter-
intelligence operations against the KGB.

HY 50955 Docld: 32281992 Page 10

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in

the 50's the CIA's general attitude was not to
investigate or surveil Americans overseas. FBI-
CIA communications rarely involved U. S. citizen
targets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent.
In the 1960's, Papich recalls two early incidents
of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas. One
was the Republic of New Africa, a black group

with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals
(note by Elliff -- the individual was Robert
Williams?). The second was Stokely Carmichael, who
traveled around the world. The FBI asked the CIA
for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas

but there were no results since the‘CIA had no
capability. In retrospect, Papich thinks his
importance was exaggerated.

Papich does not recall any case or interest of the
CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests
on the CIA regarding Dr. King. Papich recall ge
the PBI thought a black Communist Party m vo
contacts with King. The assumption w
CPUSA was supported and financed py i
This influenced the FBI's vie ‘ Sblem.
There was no way the CIA jg@Wvs

the CIA had no penetra Ce he “Communist Party
in Russia. The CIA hadWge@Wiss on the CPUSA links
to the Soviet Union. ,@% But little or no effort
abroad into developing information on this. It

was not a CIA priority. CIA was satisfied with FBI
coverage of the Communist Party. If the KGB was
using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would
uncover it. The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA
activities. Regarding CPUSA, FBI determined that
there was Soviet financial support into the 1960's
The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the
CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA
links to the Soviet Union. There were no leads for
the CIA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc.
If a Communist Party member went to Rome or London,
then FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave
it low priority and produced little. This led to
FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through
its legal attaches, who would contact foreign
security services. Normally, the CIA was informed
but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI
called it "an internal security” matter. Papich

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page £2 of 207

ve: SEGRET

stresses that this is a problem. What is the dif-
ference between "internal security" and "counter-
intelligence" and "positive intelligence"? FBI
would use these distinctions as an excuse not to
notify CIA.

Regarding the legal attaches, Papich was in Rio

de Janerio after World War II. The FBI had moved
out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to
have someone there anyway. Papich stayed a year
but wanted out since he disliked doing only
liaison work with local police and CIA. The legal
attaches were never operations and dealt with

foreign security pq and inal police. A [ (
major exception wasgiiichaler) [eri ; u) FRI

acquiescence, the FBI was operational.
"age was through sources going back ¢
and may still exist. The ¢t Be ty
and CPUSA officials a ;
ing fugitives. The FP

There were six or sevewi\legal attache offices
from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970. Papich
feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should
be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their
assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA. A
FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence
community through his liaison with local police.
6.9 Ehemcounterintelligence field of a RB a
} SO Snould be by the CIA. Coverage ofS) (Fal)
“a ber should be joint FBI-CIA. There
never has been such coordination. The legal

attache should be involved in operations through

his liaison contacts.

Papich gave the following example: the CIA and i)
Reve french DST fnave good liaison for co reranter &) Ne (perce
(< a it

igence coverage. If a jointheGeASrrench [coverage
target is coming to the U. > the FBT legal int
attache should be involvedttaim Eranice |to prepare (S) (> (sta)
for the transfer of coverage to FBI in the U.S.
Papich sees the implications of this for the need
to have a single counterintelligence agency. There
would be advantages of centralization, communication,
and security.

AW 50955 Docld:32261992 Page 12 SEORET: DR

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY page /L of XY

When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence
service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for
any information rather than specifying the data.
This is because foreign services may be penetrated
by the KGB.

Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft
in France or the "17 wiretaps".

through the roof. Hoover
these investigations 9
would be a top offic =
For example, under P#® pt Kennedy the FBI did
identify a top source ST leaks, gave the informa-
tion to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The secu-
rity committee was created to deal with leaks.
Bach agency would handle its own, although the
President could still order the FBI to enter the
case.

Z would be done.

Papich did not recall anything about Anna
Chennault, but he did recall that during the
Korean War there was a request of a top American
citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich
says he talked them out of it.

Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens,
Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage
of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not
recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the
time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on
antiwar protests.

Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request
to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up.
He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his

unit but he did know of its existence after it was
established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular
group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there
was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders.
These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not

know CIA project codewords). There WO CIA Oe yn

bil Benet op-/(oaUy (FB!)
Comees fche CIA's attitude toward this new issue®

similar to the old assumpt tons about the CPUSA.

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page “Zof A/

: mb | on SEER

The accepted view at CIA was that it was impor-
tant to determine if there was foreign support or
sabotage training. After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts
on this topic developed rapidly. There were few
really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained
through the FBI, the legal attaches, or informants
going abroad. ;

Papich referred to the climate of préss commentary,
assassinations, allegations of sabotage plans, and
bombings. There was "a potential for panic within

the intelligence community" since no one had the
coverage they thought they needed. Travel of U.S.
antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed impor-
tant, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals
were found not to be important. Therefore, time was
spent on targets who should not have been targets

but this was a new task.

Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought

New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich
never thought the CPUSA responsible for development
of the New Left or SDS. CPUSA did try to use the
New Left. Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled \
CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had

been proved wrong. In World War II days, yes,

the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment. In the

late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their
policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose.
Hoover was never convinced of tnis change. Papich
recognized the possibility that there might be a
reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but
Papich's top concern has always been KGB penetra-
tion of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question
of how good the double agents are.

Regarding the theory of KGB aims) for using U.S.
dissidents, the main problem was lack of knowledge.
In the 40's and 50's, the FBI was confident of its
knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to
influence U. S. politics, but in tne late 50's

the Bureau's coverage of new grouscs was tremendously
weak. The FBI recognized this. The CIA stressed
it also for three reasons: (1) the increase in FBI
requests for CIA information, (2) the White House
requests, and (3) CIA officials cwn concern about
inadequate coverage. The conciusicn was that
intelligence regarding people who went abroad was
inadequate. ,

HW 50955 Docid: 32261992 Page 14

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Papich had no personal involvement with White
House requests. There was discussion both in the
FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage
and development of sources. For example, does
CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS?
The Katzenbach report had'limited the CIA to
foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited
abroad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this,
but also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP).
Papich believes anything Ober said and did
reflected CIA policy from the top. The operation
grew like Topsy. CIA compartmented it ver a Se
tightly and Ober was very security conscigt¥s
the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned
by the assassinations, riots, and he
put on the pressure to find out @
He pressed Papich to Pressurgm

convinced and Belmont was anced that Oswald
acted alone. No one k@ ered the question

of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union. Did he

get any guidance? Why did they permit him to
leave? Papich had frequent discussions with

Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission
aithough he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim
Malloy. The question as to whether Oswald was a

U. S. intelligence asset never arose. Critics at
the time said the FBI should have surveilled
Oswald. Papich recalls discussions of a plan to
have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such
plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was
not worth the risk. He does not know whether the
CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not likely
to use "nuts".

Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was
not the reason for his retirement. Instead, there
were problems with Hoover on operations and policy:
decisions. Pap iS} an aggressive stand

on coverage off (Ss

Regard 's proposal on expanded FBI cover-
age offs elPapich stated that others in the « )
CIA infIuenced McCone to press for more coverage.

MeCone was aggressive. Papich pusned it too.
This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

“HW 50955 Docld:32281992 Page 15

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page Mkt 2
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Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues

but proposals for major new operations went to

PFTAB for support. Clifford was chairman. Papich
doesn't know what Hoover said to Clifford, but the
answer on the proposal was negative. The proposal
involved more extensive and sophisticated elec-~

tronic surveillance. This was at the time of dis-
covery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in S
Moscow, as well as an increase in the numb ergy
KGB attempts to recruit U. S. citizens
does not think COINTELPRO was deve long
alternative to this. e-

; Oia influence
CIA attitudes toward the me wtalA saw the FBI as
not being "a clandestine gageWry". CIA's view was
that FBI had to reject CIA™broposals as illegal.
When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted
to orient CIA to the FBI's limits. On the other
hand, FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad.

Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed
that he clashed with Hoover every year and that
their relationship had declined steadily after
1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil.

In December '69, he decided to retire the follow-
ing.spring. In February 1970, while winding up

his normal business, the Riha incident arose.
Professor Riha disappeared from the university.
There was faculty and press interest in Boulder,
Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI.
But FBI opened no case or investigation. In March
of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado
came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in
Boulder to inquire about the disappearance. The
CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office.
FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and dis-
covered that marital problems had led to the dis-
appearance. CIA man told the university president
what he learned from "reliable government sources".
The president told the press. The local district
attorney called the president and asked his source.
The president went back to his CIA source. The CIA
source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in
Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC. The CIA

officer suggested that he and the SAC go to the 4
district attorney to say that the original source Loos
was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and (A.

HY 50955 Docld:322781992 Page 16 &

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page “Sof <7

FILE:

wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent

who gave the information. The CIA officer
refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things
like this had happened in the past. FBI field
agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always
told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent
a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go
to Helms and get the identity of the FBI sourge.
Helms called in the CIA man, who refused tg a
identify him. Helms sent Hoover a let
this and said he was "taking the oe
trative action". Hoover noted o "dis-
continue liaison with CIA".

Papich then wrote a long
Hoover instead of his Bf prief resignation

note. He strongly apn mo Hoover to reconsider
and keep communications oWen. He also raised
serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions.
Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been
dozens of incidents like this before. He did not
eonfer with anyone in the FBI about his letter.

W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring
things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI
it's OK with him for the Committee to get the

letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover.
The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)

esignation to

Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich-thinks it
started with the Long Committee hearings on the
Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy
general Clark. and especially under ee cisctr

W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at
USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA
11 Papich ase the need

HW 50955 DoclId: 322619392 Page if : pany

®

Regarding the CIA and cal police, the only thing
Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relation-
ship with New York City police. The purpose was
not operations, but protection of CIA New York
facilities. He was also aware of relationships
between Washington, D. C., and suburban police for
protection of CIA facilities and personnel. He

‘knew that some CIA employees joined questionable

groups and that the CIA was concerned about its
personnel associating with radicals and protesters.
The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in
1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six
sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in
protest groups. The information provided to the
FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap".
Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA
sources. He is not aware of any CIA activity re-
garding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware
of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose
of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations.

CIA should have relied on FBI.

Bill Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office
of Security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memo-
randa to the FBI Intelligence Division on all trans-
actions with CIA. Creager kept Papich advised,
especially of the potential for flaps and for
successful operations. Papich believes Office of
Security was restricted both in number of personnel
and by CIA rules. It could claim a need to protect
its own facilities and personnel but it didn't

have significant capability. If it did, it would
have been detected by the FBI.

Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich
recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President
and the National Security Council. Johnson may
have asked the FBI for help. An FBI agent from
the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly
from Mexico City, were sent to the Dominican
Republic. This was done with CIA approval and the
joint effort was successful. There were no flaps.
The FBI agent had sources all over Central America
going back to World War II. Other FBI activities
in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in
Havana beforé Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan.
In all these areas the FBI's capability was based

HW 50955 Docld:32761992 Page 16

CAD

on personal relationships going back to World
War II. In the late 1960's, the FBI went into
El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste
of FBI manpower.

Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps
with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to
recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the
exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would
get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA
cover companies screening exiles. The FBI investi-
gated one cover company until it discovered the
CIA cover. CIA tried to recruit FBI sources with-
out checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must
have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans.

But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest
when CIA took an interest in somebody FBI was
investigating. There would be general protests

to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence. Some
problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent
in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with

CIA operations. Some names involved here are (S)

Emreddy.:Frohbosé, Meceased; Bill Harvey; and a

tzgerald.

Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans

in New York, Papich said the policy was no
counterintelligence by CIA. He has no recollection
of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal
activities, but Papich admits he would have learned
only if there was a flap.

Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich

formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relation-

ships. The problem, as noted earlier, was CIA

Pee £9 ies Neato foreign officials in the U. S$

2 Hoover finally, reluctantly, S)
966 understanding. Papich warned

CIA that if there were continuing flaps, Hoover

would withdraw his agreement and "it would be my

putt". There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where

Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit

and failed to advise FBI. If CIA was interested

in a Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment,

FBI said no. If either Domestic Operations Division

or the counterintelligence staff was interested in

“any Soviet in the U. S., they touched base with FBI.

But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to
recruit they could have succeeded.

HW 50955 Docld:32231992 Page 19

(<14))

(<1)


INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page J of </

Regarding postal intercept, CIA came “up “with the

proposition, said they had entree, and desired it

for positive intelligence. CIA did all the cra S) (
ae Fat)

gave FBI the products where FBI nat stops” on
persons of interest and also where other informa-
tion might be of interest to FBI. It provided

some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls .
a brief mail intercept. int early 1950's on the
West Coast regardin 08 «Ne was stopped @)
anew postmaster arrived. Papich stated that the

New York operation was of greater >a nee relat

Papich recalls meetings with CIA andjalenlne . aie =
. fine coverage. ae not much worthwhile agmesnyiee
Q)® ere wad PCOMENT Jin the Miami area [Rone | on
& itoring. The FBI would get leads for gs spect.
(0 |RMICIAS “Division D.weresthe, cOMINT. people,
ts HE ieee eee aa sat
eth recalls no other “aread thor pang |t n the U. iS)

Regarding CIA Domestic Contact ete FBI would
get positive intelligence reports, for example,
on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI
was interested in his training in Russia as a
possible source regarding Soviet intelligence
activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would
provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field

on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They
got the information from faculty and students regard-
ing future riots.

The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities
were set by the intelligence community, for.
example, gather whatever they can about missiles.

. The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into opera-
tions, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good
officers who would note potential for counter-
intelligence use. There was no increase in DCS
traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.

The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who
feared an internal security role. It was set up

by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact
between FBI and the DCS at the rieid level. The
procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview

AW 450955 DBocld: 32261992 Page 20

ol.

an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. “Ctr then
got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so
it could protect any operation.

Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence
agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluates

the potential for a double agent or the possibility
of recruitment. FBI usually goes to the agency and
tells them the situation to prevent access to
sensitive information. Also, the agency can give
FBI assistance. The CIA Office of Security is
"paranoid" on this subject. It is very concerned
if there is a report on a CIA employee associating
with bloc nationals. Before telling the FBI, it
would do as much as it could on its own so there
would be something to discuss. In one case the

CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy,
predicated on its analysts’ conclusions from a
photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of
this alone. There were other cases where FBI and
CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It
depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier"
than FBI.

If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own
employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was
true for physical surveillance of its own employees.
If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell,

but it never came to FBI attention and there was

no policy discussion of the subject. If the CIA
wanted to do something with its own assets with
Attorney General or White House approval, it would
not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with
FBI if it saw a risk that FBI would discover.

Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen.
Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned
to Moscow is useful to the KGB. A newman who may
have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a
target in the U. 8.

Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity
"tainting" a criminal case. CIA would make sources
oe available for criminal prosecutions.

HW 50955 Docld: 32281992 Page 21 ’ 2 iz

Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls
proposals for developing cover in the U. 8S. for
going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the develop-
ment of sources in the U. S. to cover overseas
targets. -Papich would write a memo on the situa-
tion and provide any relevant FBI information. He
also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA
if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI
sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working
through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives
the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and
reported back through CTIA.

Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather
information on policy guidance, funding, and train-
ing of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large
volume of communication covering names like
Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.

FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investiga-
tion regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must
recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were
prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to
disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not ina
position to testify. Papich does not recall ask-
ing CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might
have originated with electronic surveillance over-
seas.

aay

If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic
matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew

about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief.
Papich would insist on identification of the
sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI
did get access to sources, sometimes working through
a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.

Papich recalls di og creation of "notional" ( ;
ina’ aud Russie. Als prosran(S) | ~ FR

groups targeted a Lh a

was not implemented before he left in 1970 It
could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence
Division but they would have come to Papich if
CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East
Division in CIA.

Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer.

to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the
@ entire intelligence community, including the White

; a
HW 50955 Docild: 32261992 Page 22 . aA

@

ence where ~ TSD provided documents to FBI and
he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of
CIA alias documentation or other document forging.
If this had been done, it would have had to go
through Papich.

Papich knew nothing about Vesco.

On Ober memos to ERI, £apich recalls a code b
designat icgig aedaly [PauT m@he purpose was 2o(S) ) re)

that when ? kK to CIA from FBI

it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter-
intelligence staff had an office to log communica-
tions. The determination as to what FBI informa-
tion would go to Ober was first based on Ober's
request for specifics.and second based on FBI
criteria which considered whether there would be
any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober
regarding an individual and ask for any informa-
tion generally about his overseas activity.

Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and enter-
ing operations in the 1960's

Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich
recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-
intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-
type" operation, doing research on penetration of
the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the
exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might
have been Communists or have had World War II
Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until
the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment

by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant
minds who might still have strong identification
with their home countries in eastern and middle
Europe.

Finally, Papich and Creager felt that “the guts of
liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not
on their internal security problems. With Office
of Security there was a small number of investiga-
tions overlapping FBI.

HY 50955 Docld:322819932 Page 23 : ; t

