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National Security Files

Johnson
Rostow :
Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961

5

9/10/2000

National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-"

Fe ne re ene te re eine ©

C. C. SECRET
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+. . June 20, 1961 NUK- 75-26
. . Nox OZ2- Ble, 1/03
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW
SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961

intelligence Briefing

Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence
briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian
border problem,.. .Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of
Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At
present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily -as-a safe
haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from
which operations are mounted, The Embassy provided specific’
information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested,
should be shown to Sihanouk, There was also a report that the
Indian member of ‘the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body
should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused
the Polish member to ask fora recess of the ICC in order to

- permit him. to prepare a ‘reply. _(This report, if confirmed). is.
in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions
Along these lines had gone” to the Indian’ member of the cc, ).

It was also reported that on Friday there may have’ been a
clash between Pathet’ Lao and South Vietnamese forces just in-
side Laos ‘on the highway connecting Laos.and South Viet Nan.
‘(South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.)

The. following table. on operations for May was also presented.’

Killed Captured Surrendered Deserted
Viet -Cong “B24 "30 37 one —
GVNe.- 240 158 © none © ‘HL

The Local Currency: Costs _ Problem

Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the.

"problem of meeting the local currency sosts of the 20,000 nan

increase, A message has beer sent to $éigon. requesting the
Embassy to undertake negotiations with=the GVN ana offering
three. alternatives. in descending, order of preference:

a. The U. Ss. would commit $5.1 -million equivalent . in
piasters, provided the GVN ‘proceeds without. delay with
mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency
costs’ from its own resources.


C SERRE

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“be. If the proposal ‘under a above is not adequate to
obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85
million in piasters., This is estimated to be sufficient
to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of
the additional 20,000 men,

ce If neither of the above proposals roves accept-
able, the U.S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in
assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a. dollar/
piaster rate of 73, would be ‘sufficient to meet the piaster
cost for 19616

‘As of yesterday afternoon,: no reaction had been obtained
from Saigon. In a long coriversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy
Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left. the
U. S..of our offer: under a above. On the basis of this offer,
he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to in-
itiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a .
final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on ‘its way

toward solution.
\

The Situation in Laos in: Relationship to South Viet. Nam

A large part. of. the meeting was devoted to discussion of .
a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force con-
taining his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and
what should be done about it; You are generally familiar with
his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him. —
.I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but |
his proposal runs along the following lines.

Cottrell does not - believe that any arrangement. to create
‘-a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we
-should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos, The French
‘cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment
‘of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former
Indo-Chinese states; The military situation in Laos is alarming.
‘The Pathet Lao are: now posing a serious threat in southern Laos,
-Cottrell proposes that: we seize upon some plausible excuse to
break off. the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to
stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would
then introduce Thai special forces and “hunter-killer" forces
now being trained ‘in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an
effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the
discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to.
whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary.
Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real ‘possibility and
emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in
Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that ‘Should
prove necessary.

SECRET

Tee

Co SECRET ©

Members of the Task Force were asked for their.reactions

' to the paper. ‘There was a rather surprising degree of agree-

ment that something along this line must be done or it will be
virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet
Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at
the time except Cottrell himself.). The ICA member and the
representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to
whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was
not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than

military action in Laos<.

I made the following points. about. the proposal: First, I
observed. that this would seem to/me to raise important questions
of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at
the highest levels of government. I. indicated that I would be’
unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I ex-
pressed.:some surprise about ‘the. apparent, unanimity of view that,
unless’ we undertake military action in Laos, it would be
virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in
Viet Nam. I said that; while I could see no objection to the
Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me
that they should be raised: much more clearly in the context of
the Viet Nan problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should
make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it -
difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program

against the Viet Cong in Viet. Nam. -Cott¥ell agréed to take’

~

_ agreement in the Task Force). © se 7 7

account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to. be some

Ts

Vie feeling: of frustration. which has

. prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum; I. specifically

share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into

‘Laos. (I had. thought that this proposal -had .been dropped as a

result of adverse reaction from various sectors. .)> The: Cottrell

‘ proposals, howéver, raise. very directly the question: of U. 5S.

military ‘intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable

-that his objective’ could be achieved without such intervention.

The proposals also’ would have the effect, it seams to me, of -
merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam.’ I.do not

- think that this would be a good: idea..

I think that. there is a sérious question as to whether the

situation in Laos, is not deteriorating’ so Senaouniye that any —

i tical”solution will mat leave it as a serious source
nto: both Viet Nam and Thailand. .But I wonder
whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context
of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this’ connection,

I do feel that the military contingency plan that’-we have seen.
for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency. -- i.°8., a -
clear failure’to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a
cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the


|

C . SECRET”

SECRET

possibility that the Geneva Conference will be. prolonged in-
definitely and that meanwhile the PL-will take over Southern
Laos piece by piece and bit. by bit “as it appears to be doing.
I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson
on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it

isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the
Laos situation? : :

‘Other Matters

I raised the question as to the next step in consideration
of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces... I
was told that the matter was being studied in Defense, It was
the view of the DoD representative that the possibility‘of such
an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it .
would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized

and the. 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would

be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using 4 170,000 man base. ).

‘I also raised the question of whether food supplies were
being cut off by the. Viet Cong.(as suggested. to you by a

‘Vietnamese. I was'told that the onl € of Viet Cong

action in this area-was the recent seizure of seven barges |
carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has
given this fear as“an explanation for reduction in rice ex-
ports. That is, the GVN has.withheld rice from international
markets because of a fear that ‘the rice .may..be needed in Viet
Nam if the:VC. should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it
may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange

peMenesy 6SeyVeS.-

There seemed to be’no great concern in the. Task. Force
with this as a current'real problem. Following the meeting I
talked to the ICA representative about whether it would’ be de-
sirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of
their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to. per-
mit them to sell more of their rice abroad; “He indicated that
politically it was’very difficult to ijustify export of rice to

_ Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.

; (Today I talked with Jack King of CIA. (ONE) about*this
question,. He had not made a specific study of it, of course...
It was-his impression that, while there was .some VC interference
with rice movements; the problem was not one of independently
serious proportions. That is,.it was .a.reflection of the ;
general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cause
for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice

had been surprisingly well maintained.) -

-nh -

SECRET


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Finally; I raised the question of what planning was: . being
done to internationalize the border problem. In response
Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the.
situation in Laos. .Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State
about the same poitit; He referred to the arrangements that are
being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries
in the area sometime in July at which the border problem,
among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact
that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan

_to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked

to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I finda
great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy,

‘whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means

to involve the international community in the border question.
Neither Cottrell nor the State Department: representatives..seem
very much. interested; Have you ever discussed this question
with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do “so.)

Following the ‘meeting ‘I followed up with Cottrell. on the
conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking hin
whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General
Taylor to South Viet Nam-to consider the request for-a=k00,000
man increase and also to make surb that our military activities
in South Viet Nam were... ‘really being reoriented. He reacted"
negatively. to ithis ‘proposal, taking the view that it was’ un-
desirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work —
of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone
else in State I gota much more favorable reaction to this idea.
The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would
be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about
the situation. : - ;

Robert H, .Johnson


