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Taod. 10306- 61006 Bey, as 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

26 March 1963

ADDITIONAL NOTE IN MY MEMORANDUM OF DISCUSSION WITH THE
PRESIDENT:

The President and I engaged in a brief discussion of the Soviet
plans with respect to Cuba. He indicated that he once felt that the
Soviets would withdraw all of their forces from Cuba, but that he had
now reached the conclusion that the plan had changed. Bundy volunteered
that they.at no time had said specifically that they were to withdraw all _
of their forces, in fact their particular wording was somewhat vague.
McCone ‘stated that indicatorg were conflicting. On the one hand, certain
information such ps the mee Brazilian)intercept, jand report of Castro's
own statements would lead one to the. conclusion that a gradual and
continuing withdrawal would take. place;. that the Cubans were trained and
became proficient in operating advanced sophisticated Soviet equipment,
This would take many months, probably the balance of the year and
_ Castro welcomed this period of time because it would mean a continuing
Soviet interest in Cuba, On the other hand, DCI pointed out that building
of permanent installations and the arrival of undisclosed but apparently
sophisticated equipment, although in small quantities, nevertheless
important volume would indicate a conclusion that Soviets were there to
stay, but perhaps on a somewhat reduced scale,

_JAM/ji_ (taped)

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SUCHET.

The President then suggested a meeting be held this
afternoon to determine a number of matters.

“1. We should establish what our contacts are with the groups
so that we can guide them effectively, whether we can stand down
the operations.

2. A policy statement which State is undertaking.

3 The question of prosecution which the AG would undertake.

4. Discussing with UK since there is evidence that much of this
originated in the Bahamas. ;
~ 5, The question of any informal discussion with the Soviet Union.

At the meeting attended by AG, McNamara, McCone, .Cotrell,
Douglas Dillén, it was decided to send a group to Miami this afternoon
for discussion with the Miami representatives of the FBI and CIA, Immigratio:
iununionex officials, Coast’'Guard, etc. Principal purposes would be to:

1. Find out all we know about the groups, who they are, where
they are, and what can be done about them.

2. Lateral transfer of information between CIA and FBI Miami.
Apparently there is not sufficient exchange between CIA and FBI in Miami.

3. Ways and means of using Customs and Coast Guard for some
of this.
4, Warning the unauthorized groups in advance of actions we

intend to take against them. Also warning the suppliers of explosives;
arms, etc.

5. FCC shut down illicit radio stations, provide a truck equipped
with DF-equipment to locate the stations.

6. Explore what could be done to influence the groups away from
Soviet targets. In this connection, the AG favored a complete standdown
before any attempt was made to guide the groups.

7. Alexis Johnson expressed greatest concern over the plane’
matter and asked that the group take immediate action to immobilize
the plane.


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Excerpt from President's Press Conference -- April 3

THE PRESIDENT: As you know, our best information is
that they did not come from the United States. We have already
indicated that we do not feel that these kind of raids serve a
useful purpose. It seems to me in some ways they strengthen
the Russian position in Cuba and the Communist control of Cuba
and justify repressive measures within Cuba which might other-
wise not be regarded as essential. So that we have not supported
this and these men do not have a connection with the United States
Government. I think a raid which goes in and out does indicate
the frustrations of Cuban exiles who want to get back home and
-who want to strike some blow, but I don't think that it increases
the chances of freeing Cuba.

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_ a 7 CONFIDERTIAL Attachzent Orbe a. Ae Crpee_/
; Los . ‘ORE TREN 3 y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Executive SECRETARIAT

March 26, 1963

Draft letter to the Preatdent
‘ from the Secretary regarding
_ the problem presented by
Cuban refugee growpe

- The President Ine called an BEC Executive Comat ttes
Meeting for Priday, Merch 29 at 22:30 p.m, to discuss
the prodles posed dy Cuhan refugee Groups.

The Secretary ins esked me to make available to
you the attached proposed letter from him to the Presi- |
‘dent vhich will serve as @ beatae for discussion at
tomorrow's secting.. The tetter has sot yet deen

signed by the Secretary but presumbiy will go to the
‘Presidest io ite present form. If any subdstentive
changes are ede st the tiue of sigonture I shall so

tefora you.
lites ¥.
Gaecutive Geretary
Attachwent:
As stated.

 CONPIDENTZAL Attachwent

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CONFIDENTIAL a Group I
Excluded. from

automatic down-

THE SECRETARY OF STATE grading and de-

. ‘classification
Washington

DRAFT LETTER
TO BE USED AS A BASIS FOR DISCUSSION AT THE NSC EXECUTIVE

COMMITTEE MEETING FRIDAY, MARCH 29 at 12:30 p.m

Dear Mr. President:

I am concerned that: hit and run raids by Cuban exiles
may create incidents which work to the disadvantage of our
national interest. Increased frequency xf these forays
could raise a host of probiems: over which we wouid not
have control.

Actions such as yesterday's exile attack which
ceused substantial damage t-. a Soviet vesse’ may
complicate cur relations with the USSR without net
advantage to us. :

I therefore propose several measures which eculd
impede or deter further attacks of this nature,

First, the intelligence community could increase its
efforts in Miami to develop hard information about

_ projected raids. This is current?ly communicated to Customs

authorities charged with invest# gation of violation of
arms control.

Second, Customs and the Coast Cuard, on the basis
of this infcrmation can ston and search the vesse's.
(They now do this, and picked un about 50 men and four
boats last year.) Arms and vessels are confiscated,
and participants arraigned if'-a violation of ‘aw has

The President,

The White House.

CONFIDENTIAL

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

' occurred. Bail is set in accordance with the severity

of the violation. An increase of one or more vessels
to facilitate current customs and Coast Guard operations
in the Miami area would be helpful.

Third, CIA, FBI and Customs officials in Miami
could quietly inform suspects in the exile community
that the United States intends to intensify enforcement
of violations of pertinent laws relating to exile raids.

Fourth, the FCC could locate and close down i! lega!
radio transmitters operating out of the Miami area in
connection with these raids.

Fifth, we can inform the British Government 2f our
plans to try to control these activities and.express
our understanding that the British Government has
become increasingty concerned about the possibility
that British territory in the B-hamas may be used for
these raids and may be considering action to pstice
these areas more effective'y.

_ These measures have not been discussed with any 2f
the senior officials of the Departments concerned, but
if any of the measures commend themselves to you, I
suggest that a meeting 2f the interested Departments

_be called to discuss the rrob1em.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk

| CONFIDENTIAL
March 28, 1963

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29 March 1963

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Cuban Raids

1, Organizations such as the Second Front of Escambrey, Alpha 66,
and Lamba 66 are well-known in the Cuban colony in Florida and Puerto
Rico. Their plans are discussed openly, are picked up by CIA and
reported almost daily in our CIA bulletins.

2. There is no doubt that the individuals are in and out of Florida
and Puerto Rico. The boats, outboard motors, guns, ammunition and
explosives originate in the United States from legally licensed or
unlicensed sources (of which there are many). We believe that the
operations are staged out of the Bahamas and other non-U,S, areas.

3, The operations are skillfully executed by men of obvious
courage and dedication, Apparently the organizations are building up
and we can expect more rather than fewer instances in the future.

» 4, Obviously raids of this type will exascerbate problems with
Castro and more particularly the Soviet Union and, from that standpoint,
areAdesirable, However, successful harrassment will create very
considerable annoyance, will stimulate internal dissension, will
complicate Castro's problems and will have very considerable effect
in discrediting Castroism in Latin America, Inability of Castro to deal
with these raids might cause the Soviets to question the strength of
his position and therefore reappraise their own position in Cuba. It is
impossible to predict the result of such reappraisal. On the one hand
it might cause them to question their presence in Cuba; on the other
to reinforce it; and finally, might cause them to open up a discussion

. of their presence with the United States.

5, Finally, although it is outside of the competence of the
Intelligence Community, itis my personal view that a concerted and
publicized effort to "stand down" these operations would probably draw
more public and press criticism in the United States than would result
from tolerating these acts while officially disassociating the government
from them through denial of both responsibility and control,

JOHN A. McCONE
Director
