DARAAN
\it04-10534-10773 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
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SECRET

1. Attached is Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials
About NOSENKO - which is part of the summary entitled,
Conclusions and Comments in the Case of Yuriy Ivanovich
NOSENKO, (copy number 7) dated 1 October 1968. The
aforementioned summary was forwarded for your review on

13 March 1978.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
deleted since it contains information which bears on the
security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related

thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 7) and Annex A

when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

Declassified and Approved for Releas
by the Central Intelligence Agency 3

Date: > 003

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

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: es
; 1,

1. Attached are the following pages of the Top Secret
study entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB
Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO, dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier for

your review.

2. We have deleted certain portions of these pages
containing information which bears on the security of

ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10), Annex A

and Attachment when your review has been completed.

Attachment: Pages vi, vii, 20, 46, 47, 49, 50, 266, 277, 278
281, 294, 295, 297, 313, 324, 325, 326, 336 and
357

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOR—SEERET

DB O.O 00 Oe SE

oN, Top Secret
' CONTENTS
PAGE
VIIT SEVENTH DEPARTMENT (January 1962- ~January 1964)
(Cont.) _-
Deputy Chief of Seventh Department. ; ;
(July 1962-January 1964) 291
KGB Operations 3 q . 292
Recruitment of [SVENCHANSKIY> - : 292
Investigation of SLESINGER’ . ; 293
Arrest and Interrogation of KOTEN. 295
GRU Agent..SHUBIN. 2.96
“Atrest of BARGHOORN 7 298
‘Investigation of OSWALD ~ - 303
Residence in USSR ; 303
‘Request to Return to USSR 305
Post-Assassination Review of KGB File 307
The CHEREPANOV Papers 309
Contents 314
NOSENKO's Travel Document 315
Return to Geneva (January- February 1964) 316
Purpose of Trip 317
Visits to KGB Legal Residency , 318
Availability for Meetings with CLA 318:
.NOSENKO's Written Notes - 319
NOSENKO's Defection . - 320
The Recall Telegran 324
Knowledge of ‘Other Seventh Department a,
Operations _ 325
Operational Activities (July 1962-
January 1964) : 326
KGB Counterintelligeice Operations Among
American Tourists 326
Information Furnished thé KGB. by ,
Géorge BLAKE | ; 327
KGB Study of American Intelligence
ra Tourist Operations ~~. 327
NOSENKO's information , 330
Summary ; 331
Sumaty and Conclusion - ‘331
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CONTENTS
PAGE
IX OTHER ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMED KGB SERVICE 335
Relationship with General GRIBANOV 335
. Communist Party Status 338
Knowledge of KGB Forms and Procedures 342
Awards and Decorations 345
Sourcing : 349
Ranks 350
X PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PSYCHIATRIC ASSESSMENT , ° 355
XI SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS: NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES 357
Annex A - Statements of Soviet Officials About

NOSENKO 361
Annex B - Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text 399
Index of Personalities . 437

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(FOUNDATIONS OF NOSENKO'S CLAIMS)

Soviet Officials' Statements About NOSENKO

The portrait of NOSENKO which emerges from Soviet
efficials' statements about him since his defection coin-
cides markedly with NOSENKO's self-description, According
to the comments of Soviet officials, principally intelli-
gence officérs most likely to be speaking authoritatively,
defector NOSENKO was the son of the deceased ifinister, he
served over a decade in the KGB, his personal shortcomings
were overcome through the patronage of KG3 General GRIBANOV,
and in connection with operations against Americans he
occupied positions of progressively greater trust and
responsibility, ultimately becoming Deputy Chief of the
largest department in the key Second (Counterintelligence)
Chief Directorate. According to these sources, his defection
wrought severe damage "for years to come" to the KGB
because of his knowledge of KGB operations against American
targets, and his treachery prompted the expulsion and
disgrace of numerous senior KGB personnel, the recall of
Many others from abroad, the virtual suspension of KGB
operations in the United States, and extraordinary plans to
assassinate him.

These statements are related in chronological order in
Annex A.

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(PRE-KGB BIOGRAPHY)

Baku), where he finished the Eighth Class in spring, 1943.
In a second version [more probable since entry to the Moscow
Special Naval School required prior completion of the
Seventh Class] NOSENKO- said that when the war broke out ha
and his mother were evacuated to Chelyabinsk, where he
completed the Seventh Class in summer of 1942. They returned
to Moscow afterwards, and NOSENKO was then enrolled in the
Moscow Special Naval School (then in Kuybyshev) where he
completed the Eighth Class in 1943; in the fall of 1943
NOSENKO was enrolled in the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School (then in Baku).

After just six months in Baku, without completing the
Ninth Class, NOSENKO ran away from school and returned to
Moscow.

Comment: NOSENKO has asserted variously that he ran
away and fought on the front at Tuapse, and
that he had finished the Tenth Class in Baku
and then spent the period 1943-1945 at the
Frunze Higher Naval School, the equivalent of
Annapolis. He has retracted both assertions.

NOSENKO completed the Ninth Class in June 1944 at the
Moscow Mining Institute, and when the Leningrad Naval
Preparatory School returned to Leningrad from Baku, he
resumed his studies there. Early in 1945, however, NOSENKO
received a gunshot wound in the hand, and after being
hospitalized for a month, he left the Naval school.

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed both that he was shot by
a jealous naval officer whom he then protected
by stating that the wound was self-inflicted,
and that he actually did accidently shoot him-
se wees a quoted Ge See to
the effect that NOSENKO shot himself to avoid
being sent to the front while attending a naval
college in 1942.

a sensitive source

a KGB offic

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Comment: (Continued)
After NOSENKO's defection was publicized,
Soviet Naval defector ARTAMONOV volunteered
to CIA that he had known the son of the
Minister NOSENKO in the naval school in
Leningrad from 1944 to 1946.

NOSENKO completed the Tenth Class at the Leningrad Ship-
building Tekhnikum in June 1945, and he successfully passed
the necessary examinations to qualify him for entrance to
the Moscow Institute of International Relations that summer.

Birth to 1945: Summary and Conclusion

NOSENKO is virtually the sole source of information on
his early life. However, this portion of his claimed
biography is consistent with the NOSENKO family's where-
abouts as publicized in press accounts at the time cf his
father's death in 1956, and with the existence of the
schools he claims to have attended.

Allowing for exaggerated claims of boyhood heroics
(fighting at the front, attending the Frunze Academy, and
formal induction in and discharge from the Navy), all of
which NOSENKO has retracted under interrogation, NOSENKO's
claimed identity as the son of Minister Ivan I. NOSENKO
and the substance of his claims about his life until 1945
are accepted as true.

ca a4 ae ay r

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NOSENKO has said at various times that the Institute
course was of four years' duration and that he entered the
Naval RU on graduation in 1949; that it was four years'
duration and that because he failed a state examination he
was graduated later, in 1950; that it was of five years'
duration and he graduated in 1950, on schedule; and that it
was of five years' duration but he failed an examination
which delayed his graduation for three months.

Comment: See p.jo7 for report that NOSENKO joined the KG
upon graduation from the Institute in 1947.
The duration of the Institute course and the
date of NOSENKO's completion are material to
the plausibility of his claimed Naval RU service,
which he said followed almost immediately upon
his departure from the Institute.

Naval RU Service (ca. 1951 - ca. 1953)

NOSENKO claims that upon completion of his studies at

the Institute of International Relations he entered the
Naval RU, serving in the Far Fast and then in a Baltic post,
finally successfully "transferring" to the KGB through the

intervention of his father's friend, KGB General KOBULOV.
A sensitive source

: EP is the sole source also asserting
served in the RU. According tag a

the Military-Diplomatic Academy and then served in the RU
Information Department for about a year before securing a
transfer to the KGB through his father's influence. NOSENKO
denies having attended the Military-Diplomatic Academy and
has never claimed service in the RU Information (Reports)
Department, although he had on occasion claimed to have held
Reports assignments. ,

that NOSENKO

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A sensitive source :
has quoted /KGB officers® Be IRE,
respectively, as stating NOSENKO joined the KGB in 1947

or 1949,

~

THe significance of NOSENKO's.RU service is the fact
that he claims it launched his intelligence career and
served as the means through which he secured appointment
to the KGB after once having been rejected. The two or more
years he claimed to have served in the RU represent a
significant period of his adult life for which he should
have no difficulty accounting. Finally, the date of his
actual transfer from the Naval RU to the KGB is critical to
determining the time from which his claims about KGB service
can be judged credible.

NOSENKO volunteered extensive comment on his Naval RU
service at his first meetings with CIA in 1962. After his
1964 defection, it was the topic on which he made one of
his initial retractions and his first admission that he had
earlier made a false claim. The subject of his Naval RU
service was consequently prominent in interrogations in
1964, 1965 and 1966. However, throughout these interrogations,
challenges of his assertions about his RU service prompted
adjustments in his claimed date of graduation from the
Institute or claimed date of entry into the KGB, just as
challenges on those latter topics prompted amended state-
ments with respect to his RU service. The extent of the
still-unreconciled discrepancies and contradictions in
NOSENKO's various accounts is best perceived in comparison
of his statements made in 1962, 1964, 1965 and 1966.

NOSENKO's Information-19

NOSENKO finished the Institute of International Relations
in 1950 and immediately reported for duty with the RU.
{He did not amplify how he drew such an assignment.] In
September 1950 he was offered assignments in Leningrad,
Moscow, and in the Far East, and he chose the Far East "so
no one would think he would take advantage of his father's

position". He was assigned to a radio signals interception

unit in Sovetskaya Gavan' {on the Soviet coast opposite
Sakhalin), where he collected Order of Battle information by
monitoring the communications of American units operating in

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>FRIPPEL was.a weak agent: "he was afraid and gave practi-

cally nothing." NOSENKO said that alfiiough he had | recruited
him, “honestly speaking, FRIPPEL was not an agent. The KGB

nevertheless hoped that FRIPPEL would be evaceioned to Mos-
cow at some future date. (See p.137 for details of the
FRIPPEL case.)

Comment: FRIPPEL agrees with NOSENKO that they met twice
in the USSR in 1963. However, FRIPPEL asserts
he also met NOSENKO in Odessa in February 1962.
which NOSENKO flatly denies. FRIPPEL 1s known
to have planned to travel to the Soviet Union

at that time, and tiere is no apparent reason
why he would make a false claim on this matter.
According to Miapeeay FRIPPEL, who 1s now

in New York City, 1s a current target of the RD
: vee “Dyk FALSE B Soviet intelligence service,

a sensitive source

~

Johannes PREISFREUND

The KGB considered PREISFREUND compromised to American
Intelligence after GOLITSYN's defection [in December 196]] and
thus unsuitable for further usé aqainst Americans at the Em-
bassy in Moscow. For this reason, NOSENKO was told to take
PREISFREUND with him when he transferred to the Seventh De-
partment. As the agent spoke only FPinnish’and Russian, however,
he was of no use against English-speaking tourists. NOSENKO
met with PREISFREUND on the latter's visits to Moscow in 1962,
but did not use him in any operations.

Comment: PREISFREUND asserts that he was no longer a KGB
agent after the STORSBERG operation (see p.175)
and that although he saw NOSENKO on his frequent
return visits to Moscow, it was only because
NOSENKO sought a companion for wenching and
drinking.

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who was [erroneously] considered to be a CIA officer.
SHAKHOV “mavbe" hac seme contact with MARK in 1960 or 1¢%él1,
but NOSENKO did not know the substance of it. A counter-
intelligence officer of the First Chief Directorate, S.i.
GOLUBEV, had once been on a delegation with SHAKHOV and he
had noted “little details". While SHAKHOV was in the United
States, earlier, he had been terminated [as an agent] by

KGB officers who had submitted a report stating that SHARHOV
liked life in the Unites States, American products, anc
money. in that KGB report he was depicted as “not gocd”

and ‘not wanting to work as an agent”.

NOSENKO stated that SHAKHOV had served with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the United States and that during that
service he acted as an agent-recruiter for the KGB. SHAKHOV
was permitted to travel abroad even though suspected cf being
an American agent, because he belonged to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, and "the KGB could do nothing about his
trips abroad". "There was no proof, only suspicions, and
furthermore, SHAKHOV was a member of the personal staff of
the head of the Soviet delegation, S.K. Tsarapkin." According
to NOSENKO, SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB cfficer.

Comment: SHAKHOV has served in and visited the United
States since 1942, when he was assigned toa the
Soviet Consulate General in New York. He at-
tended the 1945 Conference on International
Organization in San Francisco, and he had at-
tended a number of sessions of the UN General.
Assembly. Most recently SHAKHOV was assigned
to the U.S. in 1963 as a member of the Soviet
Mission to the UN. KGB officer RASTVOROVY iden-
tified him as an MVD [KGB] officer whom he is
certain he saw at MVD Headquarters in Moscow,
a sensitive sowceg me identified him as "an employee of the
KGB": and KGB defectors PETROY and DERYABIN
have reported that from a photograph, SHAKHOV's
face “was familiar". An FBI source, however,
in 1964 said that SHAKHOV was a “pure diplomat”
and that to his knowledge, SHAKHOV had engaged
in no Soviet intelligence activity until that
time.

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NOSENKO iiescribead the various ways he had tested suspicions
of SGHAKHOV in Geneva. le gave SHAKHOV disinformation and then
watched for an indication that he passed it on to his American
contacts. SHAKHOV was told to perform countersurveillance
tasks during a meeting hy NOSENKO with an imaginary agent,
wnile other KGB officers checked for signs that SHAKHOV had
forewarned the Americans about the meeting. Finally NOSENKO
revealed to SHAKHOV the location of a KGB dead drop and
checked five days later to see whether the specially prepared
materials empiaced hed been disturbed in any way. NOSENKO's
conclusicn was that SHAKHOV was absolutely free of suspicion,
and it was his intention to report this finding when he re-
turned to KGB Headquarters from Geneva.

comment: Currently in the United States, SHAKHOV is still
“under suspicion", according to 4 Ww a sensitive

Security Escort Officer for Soviet Disarmament Delegation

NOSENKO said that he was the sole KGB officer with the 94-
man Soviet delegation to the bisarmament Conference and as
such he was responsible for the security and behavior of ‘the
entire delegation. (KGB officers I.S. MAYOROV and M.S.
TSYMBAL came with the delegation to Geneva, but they had left
Geneva before NOSENKO made the foregoing statement to CIA.]
To assist nim in carrying out his security functions, NOSENKO
had the services of a number of coopted informants of the KGB
who were serving in the delegation. [NOSENKO has never re-
ported what, if any, security checks he ran on the delegates
in his charge, or what, if any, information his informants
provided him. j

NOSENKO has never been precise about how he spent his days
and nights in Geneva, but he has indicated that he disposed
of his time as he saw fit, and for the most part had little
to do. He explained in 1962 that he could come and go as he
pleased because Ambassador %orim knew who he was, as did most
of the delegation. No one paid him any attention. It was
known that he was not really a Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officer, and ne could absent himself from conference meetings
at any time.

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Yu.l. GUK
Implying that their friendship was of long standing,

NOSENKO related in i962 that he and GUK were togetier nea:iy
every day in Geneva,-where they went out to chat and have a
few drinks. As a consequence, NOSENKO was granted access ¢
the residency and was able to elicit information about some
of GUK's operations 1 Geneva. He described his "big. big
friend" GUK as the Deputy Legal Rezident in Geneva and the
only "strong officer" in the residency. ,

or,

Comment: In 1964 NOSENKO attributed his gaining access
to the residency in 1962 to TSYMBAL, not to
GUK. According to several sources (see Annex A’,
because of his friendship with NOSENKC, GU was
dismissed from the KGB.

M.S. TSYMBAL

2 Gh 6 3 22 23 3 GG € «&35

In 1962 NOSENKO reported TSYMBAL's presence in Geneva end
identified him as Chie’ of the Lliegals Directorate of the
KGB Pirst Chief Directwrate. He alluded to having spoken wrth
him, but placed no particular emphasis on their relationshiz.

In 1964 NOSENKO claimed that he had been dealing with
TSYMBAL since 1960 or 1961, when he was looking for some
candidates for recruitment aud: came across some whose back-
gxound would have made them suitable for the Special [TLllegals:
Directorate. NOSENKO met TSYMBAL in Moscow in the KGB Head-
quarters and TSYMBAL had asked him several times to transfer
to the First Chief Directorate and suggested that ne might be
assigned to the United States. In Geneva, he and TSYMBAL had
dinner together several times a week, sometimes accompanied
by KISLOV and sometimes alone. It was TSYMBAL's influence,
NOSENKO said, which secured NOSENKO access to the residency
in 1962 and established the precedent from which he was
granted access in 1964.

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NOSENKO's Information

SLESINGER came under suspicion by the KGB First
Chief Directorate because of his business’ transactions
with a number cf Soviets who visited his store and in
whom he seemed to show more than casual interest. The
First Chief Directorate was of the opinion that
SLESINGER was trying to become closely acquainted with
some Soviets, to study them. SLESINGER had visited the
Soviet Union several times. Learning SLESINGER planned
another trip to the USSR, the KGB suspected that "he
might make some contacts or do something interesting"
while visiting the Soviet Union. The KGB wanted to
resolve its suspicions that SLESINGER was possibly an
agent or operational contact of the FBI. The KGB had
a file on SLESINGER, md a senior case officer in the
American Section of the Seventh Department, Yu. M.
DVORKIN, was the responsible case officer. An agent
of the Seventh Department who was director of a photo-
graphic shop in Moscow was instructed to become friendly
with SLESINGER while the latter was visiting the Soviet
Union, and the two men later exchanged correspondence.
SLESINGER went to Odessa-to visit relatives, and DVORKIN.
directed‘ the Odessa KGB to "surround" him with agents. who
could watch his behavior. If there had been any indication
of intelligence activities, the KGB would have attempted.
to recruit SLESINGER, but since no evidence was developed,
no approach was made. SLESINGER had travelled to the
Soviet Union before, several times.

A sensit ive source

Comment :

é eee nad reported to the
FBI that the KGB suspected SLESINGER to
be an FBI “plant" and that KGB officer
Gitte “might be trying to develop
SLES INGER to act as a courier or in some
other agent capacity."

NOSENKO's information was substantially
correct. Alfred Lazarevich SLESINGER,
. reported to the FBI in July 1962 of his
June 1962 visit to Moscow and Odessa.
In Odessa SLESINGER was contacted by a
Soviet official who exhibited "intimate |
knowledge" of his business in New York
City and had asked whether SLESINGER had
“ever been bothered by the FBI."

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Comment: (Continued), _ a

'  ° . Jn 1966 SLESINGER: repertéd to the FBI. that.
he was in. touch: with a Moscow photographic
shop proprietor; and he described evidence
of KGB interest in him during his visit to
Odessa in 1962. Previous to visiting the
Soviet Union in 1962, SLESINGER had been. in.
Contact with a number of Soviet officials »
from the United Nations.

NOSENKO was not specific in describing how he learned
of SLESINGER, who may répresent a First Chief Directorate
. case. .

(KOTENTS) Arrest and the KGB Agent

NOSENKO was asked in Geneva in 1964 whether he was
involved in the arrest of an American tourist in the
USSR in the fall of 1963. Almost at once NOSENKO
identified the case as that of (Bernard guide
Fton Tours in New York City /(and hence an eupioges of
lexander SVENCHANSKTY,/ see above) who had been arrested
on homosexual charges in Kiev. NOSENKO. said that
was involved with an American agent of the KGB Sciéntific
and Technical (S&T) Directorate. NOSENKO did not know. the
agent's name, but from the description he idéd he is
believed identical with : ma KGB S&T

® identified earlier on the basis of a May 1962 report

mea sensitive. source.

NOSENKO's Information

Was a longtime member of the American Communist

‘Party’ and a frequent visitor after the Second World War

to the Soviet Union, where he had extensive contacts among
dissident: literary figures and other Soviet citizens,
particularly among Russian Jews. [NOSENKO explained in
another context that: the: KGB is wary of foreigners' contacts
with: Soviet Jews because the Israeli Intelligence Service
has: frequently inspired such contacts.] Because of these.
“many suspicious contacts, both the_KGB First and Second
‘Directorates had concluded that WY might be a "provocation
agent" planted in or recruited from the ranks. of the
Communist. Party in the United States.

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NOSENKO's Information

SHUBIN was a native of California of Russian ex-
traction, a Russian speaker, and a university professor
in New York City. SHUBIN, who had visited the Soviet
Union twice before, visited the Soviet Union in 1958
or 1959, while NOSENKO was serving his first tour of
duty in the Seventh Department. At that time, SIIUBIN
was the target of Severith Department case officer
A.A. VETLITSKIY, NOSENKO heard later that SHUBIN was
placed under surveillance, and when the KGB surveillance
observed SHUBIN as a passenger in a Ilinistry of Defense
automobile, the GRU was asked about the American. "They
very furtively said that they were interested in him,"
from which the KGB concluded that SHUBIN was a GRU agent.

In 1962 (sic) NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign
visitors to the Soviet Union and he noted SHUBIN's name
and recalled his earlier identification as a GRU agent.
NOSENKO himself telephoned GRU General SOKOLOV's office
and informed SOKOLOV of SHUBIN's presence (or, according
to another version, SOKOLOV's office was advised by
others). SOKOLOV's office eventually apologized for
having failed earlier to notify the KGB of the GRU's
interest in SHUBIN.

4

a sensitive source

Comment: Earlier, € identified a@™
agent apparently identical with SHUBIN
and FBI sources reported SHUBIN's travel
to the USSR in summer 1961 and in
September 1963.

SHUBIN had no valid U.S. passport

between 1940 and June 1961; if he visited
the Soviet Union during that period it was
not as an American tourist under his true
name. Consequently, he could not then have
been the tourist target of the Seventh
Department case officer, as NOSENKO claimed.
If NOSENKO erred, and actually was referring
to SHUBIN's visit in 1961, there is a further
contradiction: NOSENKO could not have
noticed his name while reviewing tourist
lists in the Seventh Department, because
he claims he was in the American Department
at the time. .
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NOSENKO went to Gorkiy on the fourth day after CHERE-
PANOV's disappearance. The area was covered with very deep
woods, "where a person could los himself for life". On the
seventh day CHEREPANOV was located and arrested in Baku,
where he was on his way to the Iranian border.

A special plane was immediately sent to Baku, carrying
S.M. FEDOSEYEV and several other American Department offi-
cers. They brought CHEREPANOV immediately back to Moscow,
interrogating him on the plane. He immediately confessed
to having given the documents to the Americans. When asked
why, he said he was “angry at the KGR, very angry", and
besides, he thought he might ask the Americans for some
money in return for the documents. He confessed that on
4 November he had passed the documents to an American tourist
who was a librarian interested in Russian books. He said he
had given the documents to the American in the entrance
haliway in the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the building in which the Ministry of Foreign Trade was also
housed.

Because CIEREPANOV had eluded the KGB between the two
fixed surveillance posts which had been established, the
Second Chief Directorate suffered considerable criticism
for not putting CHEREPANOV under full, round-the-clock
surveillance, CHEREPANOV himself, however, told the KG?
that if he had detected his surveillants he would have
written to the yovernment and newspapers a letter of protest
against "such an indignity, such persecution", and then
would have committed suicide, leaving the KGB without proof
of his guilt.

sensitive sources,

Comment: Other sources, including @g ae.
have also reported various aspect
CHEREPANOV incident.

NOSENKO's assertions with respect to the
CHEREPANOV case, however, are not material to
his claim that he was Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department at the time.

of the

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The Recall Telegram
NOSENKO's Information

On 3 February 1964, NOSENKO claimed, he visited the KGB
Legal Residency once during the morning before he met with
CIA and again that evening after 1800; there were at those
times no KGB telegrams concerning him. On the morning of
4 February he again stopped in at the Residency, but there
were again no such messages for him. Later in the morning
of 4 February, however, after attending a session of the
Disarmament Conference, he returned to the Residency and
found that a telegram from KGB Headquarters had arrived,
instructing him to return to Moscow immediately to partici-
pate in the KGB conference on tourism. After relating the
substance of the telegram, NOSENKO defected and was thence-
forth in CIA custody.

Comment: ##Special Intelligence does not confirm NOSENKO's
assertion regarding the existence of the recall
telegram. According to Special Intelligence,
there were enciphered communications from Moscow
to the Soviet Mission in Geneva earlier and
later, but there was none from 1815 on 3
February until 1730 on 4 February, several hours
: was in custody of CIA.

324

PE No. 197124
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NOSENKO's Eventual Retraction Regarding Recall Telegram

NOSENKO maintained throughout his interrogations
in 1964 anc 1965 that there was the recall telegram and that
it prompted his defection. In October 1966, however, while
being questioned again, NOSENKO stated that there had been
no telegram recalling him to Moscow from Geneva, and he
signed the following statement:

"On 4 February 1964, I told my CIA contact
in Geneva that a telegram from Headquarters in
Moscow had been received in the KGB Residency in
Geneva recalling me immediately to Moscow. I said
at the time that this telegram said that I was
recalled to participate in a conference to plan KGB
activity against tourists for the 1964 season. I
maintained this story as fact throughout subsequent
interviews and interrogations by American authorities
in 1964 and 1965. No such telegram ever existed.

No telegram was received in Geneva. I admit that
the story was a lie. I myself invented this tele-
gram in order to hasten my defection. I was nervous
and afraid that my contacts with American Intelli-
gence might be noticed."

Knowledge of Other Seventh Department Operations

The notes NOSENKO brought to CIA in Geneva in 1964
(see p.319) included Lrief reference to thirteen other KGB
operations conducted against what NOSENKO described as
tourists during the 1962-1963 period. For reasons cited
in the description of these operations in Annex B, these
operations are not. material to NOSENKO's claim to service
in 1962-1963 as cither Chief of the American-British
Commonwealth Section or as Deputy Chief of the Seventh
Department.

325

TS No. 197124

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13-00000 pense skeen _ —
Top Secret

(SEVENTH DEPARTMENT - January. 1962-January 1964)

Operational Activities = July 1962-danuary 1964: Summary

To substantiate his claims to having served as Deputy
Chief of the Seventh Department during this period, NOSENKO
describes KGB invealvement in the recruitment 6f
the arrests of Y and BARGHOORN, and the investigations
of SLESINGER, OSWALD, and of former KGB officer CHEREPANOV,
his discovery that SHUBIN was a GRU agent, and his aasignment
to Geneva. Even if NOSENKO learned of the operations as
he described and they were as hé described (there are substan-
tial reasons why they might have been donducted by KGB
elements other than the Seventh Department), they are atypical
with respect to NOSENKO's own description of Seventh Depart-
ment eperations. They do not accurately characterize, as
NOSENKO claims, KGB counterintelligence operations against
tourists, and thus do not substantiate his Seventh Department
service. -NOSENKO's explanations: for his assignmerit to
Geneva in 1964 are no more plausiblé than for his earlier
assignment there in 1962. NOSENKO has asserted that he was
not a lieutenant colonel as the teriporary duty authorization
indicated, but a Gaptain, a rank incofgruous with a Deputy
Chief of Department and one from Which he presumably would
have been promoted as he assumed the senior KGB positions |
which hé claimed to have held. fe :

KGB Counterintelligence Operations’
~ Among Américan Tourists
. 1962-1963 i

“Because of his position as a Deputy Chief, then First
Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, NOSENKO claimed
awareness of what the KGB posture was with respect to |

xS No. 197124
Top Secret 3


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Top-Secret

(OTERR ASPECTS OF NOSENKO'S KGB CAREER)

Other Sources - 1964 and 1965

io

a sensit ive source
As indicated in Annex A, 4 SEs eported
several items of information he stated he obtained from
various KGB colleagues. According to these reports, GRIBANOV
was expelled from the KGB as a consequence of NOSENKO's
defection, it was rumored that GRIBANOV was to be fired
because he had been NOSUNKO's friend and patron, that
GRIBANOV was held responsible for the defection of his
protege, that GRIBANOV had approved NOSENKO's assignment to
Geneva in 1964 despite knowledge of facts making NOSENKO
ineligible, that GRIBANOV was a long-time friend of NOSENKO's
father, that NOSENKO had been a deputy to a Department Chief
d@cspite his junior rank because of GRIBANOV's influence,

and that GRIBAHWOV was dismissed from the KGB and Party
because he willfully withheld information about NOSENKO's
procuring women for parties which he and the General arrarged.

NOSENKO's Information - Post 1964

Immediately following his defection NOSENKO continued to
refer to this special and personal relationship, which
touched on nearly every aspect of NOSENKO's KGB service.
Under interrogation, however, NOSENKO could not sustain
this claim. The extent NOSENKO's statements were retracted
or contradicted with respect to GRIBANOV or contradicted by
other evidence, is seen from the following examples excerpted
from the earlier chronological examination: GRIBANOV wrote
the very best fitness report on NOSENKO that could be given
{(Retracted. GRIBANOV wrote none of NOSENKO's fitness
reports); NOSENKO and GRIBANOV carroused together with women
provided by NOSENKO (Retracted. NOSENKO recalled only two
occasions, and could relate only one in any detail.);
recruited Edward SMITH (see p. 3%) together with NOSENKO
(Retracted. NOSENKO played no active role in SMITH recruit-
ment attempt and was not in Embassy Section at time.);
NOSENKO accompanied GRIBANOV to diplomatic receptions in
1961 at which the latter learned that Prench Ambassador -
DeJean was GRIBANOV's agent (Retracted, NOSENKO accompanied

aS 336
\ \ TS No. 197124

\ \
\ \ ~Fep-Secret— Copy

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SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES

NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively senior positions of authority from which he
derived extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and
results of KGB operations against Americans in the Soviet
Union in the pericd 1953-1963. To substantiate his claim,
he provides an impressive array of information about KGB
personnel, organization and operations which, to the extent
that it has been confirmed, is presumptive evidence of his
bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including intelli-
gence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was

a senior KGB officer wno occupied a series of sensitive
positions, who enjoyed considerable authority and trust
despite personal shortcomings, and whose defection, "the
greatest loss ever suffered by Soviet Intelligence”
paralyzed the work of @& ; ARES PG

The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known
facts and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects

the test to which his accounts were put: whether his
accounts are internally coherent and consistent with known
fact, and whether he actually gained the information he has
from occupying the KGB positions he claims to have held.

In short, is he what he says he is, according to his own
accounts?

357 TS No. 197124

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. s.

~TOP_SECRET

1. Attached is Annex A of the Top Secret study

entitled, The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB

Defector - Yuriy I. NOSENKO dated February 1968 (copy 10).
Copy 10 of this study had been forwarded to you earlier

for your review.

2. Certain portions of Annex A of this study are
deleted since it contains information which bears on the
security of ongoing, viable CIA operations, or is related

thereto.

3. We request return of the study (copy 10) and Annex A

when your review has been completed.

Attachment: As Stated Above

WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS
INVOLVED

E2 IMPDET CL BY 011340

TOP-SECRET

13-00000
> ST

Top-Secret—

Annex A

Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO

4 February 1964

NOSENKO defected in Geneva.

6 February 1964

The Chief of che Soviet Disarmament Delegation notified
the Soviet Ambassador in Bern shortly before noon that
NOSENKO had disappeared, correctly placing the date as
4 February. They speculated privately between themselves
that he might have been "poisoned" or injured in an auto-
mobile accident.

8 February 1964

An official spokesman of the Soviet Mission in Geneva
reported to the Swiss police that NOSENKO, an "expert

temporarily assigned to Geneva", had been missing for four
days.
9 February 1964

Evening news broadcasts in Geneva carried reports
attributed to both Soviet and Swiss sources that NOSENKO
had disappeared.

10 February 1964

The Swiss press quoted unidentified Soviet sources
as saying it was presumed that NOSENKO had defected.

361 TS No. 197124

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s CE eae ae eee!

(Annex A) .

10 February 1964 (continued)

A U.S. Department of State press release was issued
identifying NOSENKO as KGB officer and acknowledging his
request for political asylum in the United States.

According to a sensitive source,

SERN RRET aaa ee el Because of his
long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO would have a great deal of
important information which he could impart to intelligence
agencies of other countries. Certainly, he would be
acquainted with many KGB employees and could identify them.
He alse would be intimately acquainted with a large number
of Soviet agents working inside the USSR against American
and British nationals.

According to a sensitive source,

SOREL Raa ae eae The bulk of NOSENKO' s knowledge concerning
KGB activities would revolve around the intelligence
operations of the KGB in Moscow and also KGB personalities
working in Headquarters. NOSENKO was also undoubtedly
familiar with ali KCB personalities in Geneva and certainly
knew some KGB personalicies in other countries.

Comment: NOSENKU identified a number of KGB officers in
Geneva; he asserted that scme others, known
by CIA to be connected with the KGB, were not,

362
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(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)
According to a sensitive source

Seat 2 La Dat Rac De Sg NOSENKO was affiliated with the KGB for
approximately sixteen years, since about 1947, and was an
employee of the Second Chief Directorate in Moscow. His
father, now dead, was a Deputy to the Prime Minister of the
Soviet Union and also Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry.
There is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in the
Ukraine.

Comment: NOSENKU claims to have served in the GRU until
1933, when he entered the EGR,

According to a sensitive source,

It appeared quite certain to Sapa Soc REDON PARAS a RRC NRE S be
officers that NOSENKO had the rank of lieutenant colonel in the KG8.

Comment: NOSENKO was at the time claiming to have been
a KG Lieutenant colonel,

According to a sensitive source,
aE from KCB officers :

fm ia ; The
photograpk U.S. newspapers is not that of
NOSENKO.One mia i Vorked with NOSENKO for several years
in KGB Neadquarters; he described NOSENKO as a person who
likes to be fashionably dressed at all times and is fond

of women, by nature a friendly individual and generally
well-liked by his fellow workers. NOSENKO worked in the
Second Chief Directorate.

363
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Top Secret

(Annex A)

10 February 1964 (continued)

Comment:

: The photograph accompanying American
and Swiss press accounts of NOSENKO's defection

wus by error not that of NOSENKO but of
a sensitive source” Vladimir SHUSTOV, whom *@@@RBGW and NOSENKO both

identified as a "clean" Soviet diplomat at the
Geneva Disarmament Conference.

Noting the publicity accompanying the defection of KGB
officer NOSENKO in Switzerland, GOLITSYN recalled that
NOSENKO had been a Second Chief Directorate efficer working
against American citizens,

Comment: Routinely, GOLITSYN had reviewed in March 1962
(before NOSENKG contacted CIA) a list of
Soviet delegates to the Disarmament Conference.
NOSENKO's name, which was on the list, did not
at that time prompt any comment from GOLITSYN.

il February i964

Ambassador DOBRYNIN informally notified the Department
of State that a Soviet note would be delivered later to ask
how NOSENKO had left Switzerland, to request hia release,
and to demand an immediate interview with him.

12 February 1964

S.K. TSARAPKIN, the head of the Soviet Delegation to the
Disarmament Conference, read a statement at a press conference
in which he strongly condemned the Swiss autiorities for
permitting NOSENKO's "kidnapping" and for hindering efforts
to locate him. TSARAPKIN demanded that immediate steps be
taken to return NOSENKO to Soviet custody.

364
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(Annex A)

32 February 1964 (oonurinued)

At simultaneous press conferences in Sern and Geneva, the
Swiss rejected these accusations of non-cooyeration and noted
the Soviet delay in advising the police of NOSENKO's disappea-
rance asd Soviet failure to cooperate with Swiss authori¢ies
in locating NOSENKS.

The Soviet note earlier promised by DOBRYNIN was delivered
to the State Department. A noncommittal reply was given to
Soviet queries concerning the requested interview and the
means of NGSENKO's departure from Switzerland.

The Swiss Embassy asked for a meeting with NOSENKO in
order to obtain assurance that the defection had been
veluntary. Arrangements were made to have NOSENKO meet with
Swiss and Soviet representatives in Washington as soon as
possible.

NOSENKO arrived in Washington at 213¢ hours.

12-13 February 1964

14 February 1964

In Moscow, Soviet Foreien Minister GROMYKO read to
Ambassador KOHLER a statement deploring the “evasive” reply
of the State Department to Soviet inquiries in Washington
and terming the whole event of NOSENKO's disappearance a

365
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(Annex A)

i4 February 1964 (continued)
“gross provocation by American Tutelligence orgens"”.
GROMYKO repeated the cemand for NOSENKO's immediate release
from American custody

The Counselor of the Swiss Embassy interviewed NOSENKO at
the Washington offices of the U.S. Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service. The Suviet confrontation immediately after-
wards was handled by Minister Counseior G.M. KORNIENKO, and
Third Secretary V.F. TSAKOV, a recent arrival in Washington.
NOSENKO told both che Swiss and the Soviets that he had
defected of his own free will after careful consideration
and that he had no desire to return to the Soviet Union. In
response to KORNIENKO's questions, he specificaliy renounced
his status and rights as a Soviet citizen.

1&@ February 1964

Feliks KOVALEV, a Soviet diplomat in Buenos Aires, told
a CIA agent that he had attended the Institute of Inter-
national Relations with NOSENKO. According to KOVALEV,
NOSENKO had twice married, had a good family background,

was the son of a Minister in the Government, was notorious
1

for his “adventurous” nature, and ‘famous for his character”.

366
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(Annex A)

367
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é k NOSENKO had been in the Second Chief Directorate
for about 14 years and was acquainted with almost all of the
employees of this directorate. He was aware of the structure
of the KGB and knews many personne) of the First Chief
Directorate. ag : £ : Pea

S a NOSENKO, as Deputy to the Chief

of the Seventh Department, had in his possession a telephone
directory which listed the names of some 10,000 KGB employees

in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of De artments had officer
these phone books. @& pexpressed the

opinicn that "NOSENKO ts much more valuable to the FBI and

CiA than was Oleg PENKOVSKIY because of the fact that he

knows so much about the methods of work of the First and

Second Directorates of the KGB and is familiar with so many
individuals in the KGB both in Moscow and abroad. e@@@y@mmgmmba KGB office
Qe said that PENKOVSKIY was able to furnish American and
British Intelligence with a lot of information concerning

defense secrets of the Soviet Union, but NOSENKO is much

more knowledgeable in intelligence and counterintelligence
operations of the KGB."

Comment: NOSENKO has never commented on the KGB
telephone book referred @& BEG, YO above.

369
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«

Sa

According to a sensitive source, @QMEM in.@ response bo a question

whether NISENKO actually cef

ected or whether Qi the defection might be a

KGB "trick", the source replied fhat from his own knowledge of this matter,

22 February 1964,

he was convinced that MOSENZ

O's defection was not a "trick" by the ‘KGB,

According to a sensitive source from conversations with varénus unnamed KGB
{

officers: NOSENAO worked agai

stationed at the Asn

nst personnel

rascow, and with his

& .

erisan Y4assvo in M
help agents were developed amenyg these Americans. It is
assumed by the KGE that ne is Eamiliar with the number and
location ef micropuenes in the Embassy.
Camment: Alchscen NOSENKO knew that there were micro- Fy
phones in three reneral locations in the
Embassy, his specifie information regarding
the number and location of microphones was
limited to that contained in a written list
breunhc to Geneva in 1964, a list waich he
claimed no one in the EGR knew he had.
24 February 1964
Women claining :« te the wife and mother of NOSENKO rg
visited the American Embassy in Moscow for the first time,
expressing disbeliet that he had voluntarily betrayed his
family and country ond vequesting a personal meeting with

him.

371

Top Secret —

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a

enenercastlic memesenineenneemnnmn ssn

“on Seesst— ; t

(Annex A)

24 February 196° (coatiuuad)

Comment: NOSENKO confirmed their identities as hia wife

and mother on the basis of physical deacrip-
tions. On only one previcus occasion have
members of a defector's family called on a
foreign embassy in Moscow. " Following the
defection of Yuriy Vasilyevich KROTKOV in
England in 1963, his wife appeared at the
British Embassy to make inquiries about him.

205 aceite z Bb PE ek EE SE a es ET cre A RR SS KURGCHKIN (fnu),

a KCB S&T officer scheduled for assiganent to Washington,
will not be sent as he is "well-known" to NOSENKO. In the
course of his duties in Moscow, KUROCHKIN had very often
visited the department where NOSENKO worked and, as a
result, NOSENKO is "more tian casually acquainted with him".

Comment: NOSENKO has never identified KUROQCHKIN nor
referred to the name.

TS No. 197124
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(Annex A)

“Eobrvary . 1964

Nikolay ‘ARTAMONOV, who defected from. the Soviet Navy in
the late 1950's, noted the publicity accompanying NOSENKO's
defection. ‘He volunteered to CIA that he attended a naval
preparatory school with the son of Minister NOSENKO ‘ina
1944-1946.

Comment: ARTAMONOV's description of. the school and of
the dates involved differs from these. chaimdd
by NOSENKO.

KGB officer Vladimir TULAYEV mentioned NOSENKO to a
double agent in Vienna TULAYEV' said that NOSENKO,
e knew well, came from a wonderful family, lovad his
wife and children, and earned a good salary. (TULAYEV
later said on another occasion that he had’ friends who
knew NOSENKO well.) :

Comment: NOSENKO never identified TULAYEV by name or
; photograph. When asked, NOSENKO denied:
knowing him. : .

373
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a

According to a sensitive source

.

ae : : Vln peas Poche act Paha | ya tus A KGB commission.
was in the process of studying "the scale of loss" [caused
by NOSENKO's defection] to the USSR. The commission was
very large, formed from different departments of the KGB.
The study (sic) was made "because it is aupposed that
NOSENKO had access to many rocket matters, to many nuclear
matters, to many strategical objects of the country...many
details about life of the leaders of the country, in the
government...that he knew very much about internal relations
between the people working in the KGB, that he hed many
close friends among them and [spent] daye and nighta
together with them. The whole history of his life was
studied step by step very carefully."

TS No. 197124

13-00000

According to a sensitive (jp source,~ ;
ee (from conversations with various unnamed KGB x

officers fe Be ; NOSENKO knows many

of the chiefs and deputies of the KG8 directorates and

departments at KGB lieadquarters in Moscow. In KGB Head-

E quarters there are four separate dining rooms for personnel

who work there; one such dining reom is reserved for chiefs

and deputies of departments. Because of this fact, NOSENKO

has a vast knowledge of the hierarchy of the KGB.

ae

Comment: NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms
until the January-March 1965 interrogations,
when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally
in the “chfefs' dining room".

¥

TS No. 197124

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_Top Secret

(Annex A)

23 March 1964

The two women claiming to be the wife and mother of
NOSENKO made the last of five visite to the Embassy in
Moscow. NOSENKO'’s wife had explained that she required
some definite statement in writing from her husband so that

she could plan for her own future and that of the NOSENKO
children.

376
TS No. 197124

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Bate,

‘Top Secret

(Annex A)

27 March’ 196%
“According to to a sensitive source -
Qiages (from various unnamed KGB officers @Riiee :
Ge: here seems to be unanimous opinion Papers
chiefs GRRBmmae® that NOSENKO...could do the KGB a tre-
mendous amount of harm. NOSENKO in his position as a de-
puty chief in one of the departments of the Second Chief
Directorate would have been entitled to have oné personnel
.‘directory of approximately 30 pages setting for the iden-
‘tiries of all of the supervisory officials in KGB Head-
“quarters. NOSENKO would also have had a 200-page directory
listing by name and telephone number all the rank-and-file
employees working in Moscow. The opinion was expressed by
' some @@iimy KGB "chiefs" Qi : MeeP that if NOSENKO
were merely able to ‘make these two directories available
to American Intelligence, the KGB would be sevetely damaged
for the present and for several years to come.

certain

Commefit: NOSENKO has never referred to the KGB direc-
Be tories described...

KGB officers (1.1. PETUKHOV nad P.P..BORISO in Canada )
told their agent \George Herman SPRECHER Ato cease ali intel-
ligence activity-for a year, to destroy: any incriminating
materials in his possession as well as to supply the Soviets
with passport photographs so that “escape” documents could
be prepared for himself and his family. (SPRECHER asked
whether the action had any cotinection with NOSENKO's recent-~-
ly publicized defection, but the KGB officers denied it,

“asserting NOSENKO "was just a secretary"

377 :
TS No. 197

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yee

Top Secret:

(Annex A) a RE

—_—_

31 March 1964 (continued) Ee ae *

»* }
won

Comment :. When /P recontacted/SPRECHEW in February :
, _ 1965, 2 acknowledged that NOSENKO ‘had ..
a in fact been Ehe cause of KGB concern, that he ~ -

had had some connection ‘with: NOSENKO, and
NOSENKO may have known something of what the

KGB was doing in Canada, a
NOSENKO désetribed a KGB Illegal, whose name

wag unknown to hin, who apparently ia identical |
to §

March
fcco ding toa sensitive source who

ees | . beh Pe Tine, was
briefed tn his office in KGB Headquarters by.a Second Chief
Directorate officer of the Americs Spartments Personnel
of that Departement, in which NOSENKO hed gerved until his
defection, were so shocked at the event that: they would not

‘mention it at all.

oo, _ ooo ta ‘sengitive source
Ng Comment:. In this and other contexts @ ® has stated
of implied that NOSENKO served in the American :
Department in. 1963- 1964: “*NOSENKO asserts he
left the American Department in January 1962:
and served in the Seventh! Department uatil his
defection.

378

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(Annex A)

April-May 1964

KGB officer G.N. VLASOV, case officer of Robert Lee
JOHNSON in Paris, began to meet JOHNSCN on the street rather
than in varicus restaurants as had been their habit. At one
of their final meetings before JOHNSON returned to’ the United
States, VLASOV cold JOUNSON that a Soviet Intelligence officer
had defected to the Americans in Geneva, and that extreme
caution must therefore be exercised in JOHNSON's contacts :
with the KGB. VLASOV said that the defector-could not identify
JOUNSON but that JOHNSON should dispose of everything he had
which might link him to Soviet espionage activities. (See
p. 24for a summary of the JOHNSON case.)

May 1964: According to a sensitive source
aE (from unidentified sources, presumably from KGB
officers <a : Suites): Two commissions have
been established by the CPSU for the purposes: (a) to -
Jjdetermine why KGB employees such ag DERYABIN, GOLITSYN, ’
_S and NOSENKO defected while serving abroad, and (b) to attempt.

to eliminate the "weak" employees and improve the effictency
of the KGB. .

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; i a es nner ceerens
* no were ima pmmnnaarinne ncemreratinn, mevemmenceermiin nme oem

ct Sarbanes Tee ort sate names Percy pert ge ean-eeeryyererceereengmerean och neenre-oor=eerense” ng Cena

Top Secret .

(Antiex A) . oo BE

s

20 May 1964 , :
‘Kee ording to a sensitive source from a ‘KGB officer,

quan : ¥
: The KGB. was lucky that the ‘Americans found only

a0 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. ‘Actually,
about 200 microphones were concealed. by the’ Soviets in the
Embassy, NOSENKO was responsible for furnishing information

'té the Americans Which resulted in ‘the microphones being
found. NOSENKO knew only the general location of the 40.

microphones which were found and daes not have’ any knowledge
of the remaining ones... :

12 June 1964

(Professor John M, THOMPSON reported ‘at. the American oe
Embassy in Moscow that an unnamed Soviet offictal with whom _
he was acquaintéd told him that NOSENKO was a ‘profligate
with two wives and many debts and is considered in Moscow:
to be someone they are well réd of. on
22 June 1964 L ee

According to a sensitive source ~~ E oe —_ COON
BES (from various unnamed KGB. officersé
+ The consensus amongakGB employees q rca EA eg
is that in the future the KGB will be feeling sharply the
effects of NOSENKO's escape to American. Intelligence. |
NOSENKO is considered to be vastly more -importatt than either \
GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appears to be based on
Several factors:. Firet,: NOSENKO worked against personnel
Stationed at the American Embassy in Moscow and: with his help
agents were developed among these Americans. Second, it is.
assumed by KGB personnel that because of his ¢loseness to

esta Top Secret © «=: Copy 10


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'

22 June 1964 (continued)

the American Ex spassy In the past, NOSENKO would also be
familiar with the number of microphones which had been
installed in the fmbassy by the KGB and the locationa of
these microphones. Third, as a Deputy Chief of a depart-
“ment, NOSENKO would normally have had access to a telephone
directory listing all personnel in all directorates of the
8GB in Moscow. Another factor, which is a forridable one
in the minds cf other KGB employees, is that NOSENKO
travelled in a cather influential circle of. friends in
Moscow who were high in the Soviet Government. All these
comments were cited as reasons for NOSENKO being an
“important catch" for American Intelligence, but no one in
the KG8 really knows exactly how much information NOSENKO
had concerning the KG#

29 june 1964
~ GOLITSYN (from personal acquaintance): NOSENKO, the son

of the former Minister of Shipbuilding, was a KGB officer

who had worked in the American Department and the Seventh
Department of the Second Chief Directorate. GOLITS$YN, while
on his own First Chief Directorate business, met NOSENKO two .
or three times in the American Embassy Section in 1953, ~

and had seen him occasionally at work during 1958 and 1959.

: When COLITSYN asked him where he was working in 1959, NOSENKO
| replied that he was assigned to the Seventh Department.

i NOSENKO served in the American Embaesy Section from 1953

until 1957 or 1958, and was specifically responsible for

KGB coverage of American military peraonnel in Moscow during
1953. For the remainder of his service in the Embassy Section
until 1957 or 1958, NGSENKO may have had the same responsi-
bilities or may have been working against other Embasay
personnel or correspondents, but he was definitely in the
American Department during the entire period. In 1957 or

1958 NOSENKO was transferred to the Seventh Department, and
was a senior case officer there as of 1959. NOSENKO did not
work in the American Department of the Second Chief Directorate
American Department at any time during 1960; GOLITSYN visited
the Embassy Section on at least three eccasions from early
1960 to early i961, and would have known if NOSENKO had been
in the Section, particularly {f NOSENKO had been Deputy Chief.
G.I. GRYAZNOV was acting as assistant of the Chief of the
Section during this perlod.

382 ,
“4s No. 97124

_Top-Secret— Copy


13-00000

CAnnex A}

29 June 1964 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO claims he left the. Embassy Section in
1955 and wags assigned to the Seventh Department
until 1960, when he returned to the Embassy
Section as Deputy Chief. NOSENKO did not
identify GOLITSYN's photograph and had denied *

since defection that he has ever met or even
seen him. ,

wune 3964
According to a sensitive source

x*

“Just after" NOSENKO' 8

defection V.S. MEDVEDEV from the Exits Commission of the

CPSU Central Committee travelled to Geneva to speak to the
Soviets stationed there and to Soviet delegates to the Disarn-
ament Conference. MEDVEDEV underscored the seriousness of

the defecticn and urged greater vigilance against such acts.
The defection caused the recall of Nina Ivanovna YEREMEYEVA,

a KGB secretary in Geneva. It was rumored that some sédxty
Soviet officials stationed abroad would be transferred from
thetr assignment as a consequence of the NOSENKO affair.

V.A. POCHANKIN, a KGB officer with the permanent Soviet
Mission in Geneva, speculated that he had been completely
exposed by NOSENKO and would therefore have to return “to
Moscow. Yu. I. GUK who was known eee. E ren pag
had been discharged from the KGB because he had: recommended
NOSENKO's travel to Geneva. “According to one rumor, the
chief of the Department in which: /NOSENKO had been employed,
would also lose his job. : : .

ource

by .a sensitive source

Comment: MEDVEDEV, a KGB officer formerly/stationed in
New York City, was said by. to be one
of those from the CPSU Central Committee who .
conducted interviews with KGB personnel: going ©
abroad. g@ : identified MEDVEDEV, a

x

ee -*4§ No. 197124
Too Secret — "Copy


13-00000

(Annex A) : , .

June 1964 (continued)

Comment: (Continued)
SM a Counselor of the Soviet Mission at the

United Nationa, as the Communist Party organizer —

and possibly a member of the KGB, but said that

MEDVEDEV's role is not important and that he

worked mainly with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
POCHANKIN, who NOSENKO had identified as a ;

KGB officer, was still in Geneva in December 1966.

29 July 1964
Accordin

eS Crrom. snnamed sourees, presumably KGR officers Sm
piemnney) © «6 AN vuinvestigating commission of the
CPSU Central Committee checking into the circumstances
surrounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been responsible
for the expulsion from the KGB of 15 Second Chief Directorate
employees. Thess include GRIBANOV, who was also expelled
from the CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small pension, like
an ordinary Soviet citizen. This drastic action was taken
since the primary responsibility for the defection was placed
on GRIBANOV. It was realized that, in addition to being Chief
of the Second Chief Directorate at the time of the defection,
GRILANOV was a personal friend of NOSENKO and had more or -
less treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many steps
to further NOSENKO's career within the KGB. It was felt
that GRIBANOV sho.ld have been aware of .NOSENKO's plans to
defect. Three of GRIBANOV's deputies were also expelled
from the KGB, cone of whom was a Major General BANNIK .
[BANNIKOV]. Of the 11 other Second Chief€ Directorate employees
expelled, some were found to have been personal friends of .
NOSENKO and some of them were found to have confided to NOSENKO
details of operations in which they were working. S.M. GOLUBEV,
a KGB officer stationed in Washington, would be leaving for
Moscow because the investigating commission had determined
that Yu. IT. CUK, a mutual friend of NOSENKO and GOLUBEV ‘told
NOSENKO that GOLUBEV had been assigned to the Washington Legal
Residency. GOLUHEV had himself worked with NOSENKO in KGB

TS No. v97i24 -
Copy: -


13-00000

(Annex A)

29 July 1964 (continued)

Headquarters sometime in the past, but. subsequently NOSENKO
and GOLUBEV were given different assignments within the KGB
and tiereafter did not associate with one another in the
course of thelr daily activities. ~

neat: NOSENKO retracted in 1965 his earlier claims
that GRIBANOV had been instrumental in his
advancement and assignments. NOSENKO identi-
fied by name and photograph GOLUBEV, whom he ©
had known personally since 1959, but NOSENKO
said he had never worked with him at KGB Head-
quarters since GOLUBEV had always been in- the
First Chief Directorate. GOLUBEV left for the
USSR on 28 August 1964.

July-August 1964
a

ensitive source: ;
information Qeigeeeenns WE ECR Wa ahh eee : wey about
NOSENKO was @geyeems from KGB Headquarters which reported
the conclusions of the commission which had been appointed
to prepare the damage report on NOSENKO's defection. The
letter, which was very brief, said that “the loss was very
great and some new forme of work should be created to be
efficient in the future". The Legal Residency hdd not
before received any “reports or commentaries on NOSENKO's
escape". : .

“TS No. 197124

< Top Secret Copy 10

Le eR ND aR LR seta eo

~~

13-00000

(Annex A)

November 1964

Asked while visiting the United States if the Russian .
people had been told of the ABEL-~POWERS exchange, Soviet: :
mathematician R.V. GAMKRELIDZE replied to an American |
acquaintance that they had not been told officially but!
they knew about it since there was "quite a grapevine" in.
Moscow. It was in this way,,GAMKRELIDZE stated, that he
learned of the NOSENKO defection and of its significance.
According to the "grapevine", the defection was very
damaging to Soviet Intelligence in that NOSENKO waa the.
Chief of the American Section, and he knew the identities
of all Soviet agents in the United States.

386

TS No. 197124
Copy —


13-00000

(Annex A)

November 1964 (continued)

Comment: GAMKRELIDZE is suspected of having connections
with Soviet Intelligence because of his
statements, actions, and unusual freedom of
solitary movement while on visits to the United
States. GAMKRELIDZE rebuffed a CIA recruitment
attempt in 1964, but added that he "welcomed
the opportunity to meet with an American
Intelligence officer...to compare the Soviet
Intelligence officers he had met with their
American counterparts. During that 1964
meeting GAMKRELIDZE again raised the subject
of NOSENKO, describing him as “obviously a
traitor to his country".

December 1964
@ Qe source

Nikolay RESHETNYAK, NOSENKO's/roommate in Geneva at the
time of his defection, told 4% ® that he had been
interrogated by the KGB in connection with NOSENKO's defection,
and that he had later attended the Moscow trial in which
NOSENKO was sentenced to death in absentia. RESHETNYAK
“reported to-Qimm the dismissal of large numbers of
KGB officers, ae GRIBANOV and GUK. From what
RESHETNYAK said, @& > thought the KGB might go so far

source

387
TS No. 197124

a ret | 7 Copy 10

13-00000

(Annex A) —— - - 7 o ‘

December 1964 (continued)

ag to send someone to the United States to locate and kill

NOSENKO. later identified RESHETNYAK ae a KGB
officer.) -_ :

Comment: NOSENKO identified RESHETNYAK as a Ukrainian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officer on the.
staff of the Disarmament Delegation.

29 January 1965

According to a sensitive source

~GB employees that GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and
CPSU and is now on pension, parttal rather than full, as a
result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO was being
considered for assignient to Geneva (in 1964), a dgummary
statement of his activities was prepared in the Second Chief
Directorate and sent to GRIBANOV. This. summary contained
considerable “compromising information", concerning NOSENKO;
if acted upon properly, it would have removed him from
consideration for this trip. GRIBANOV read the summary:
material, ran a line through all of it,’ and, added the nota~
tion: "Send him to Geneva." The general feeling is that
GRIBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO's os
deficiencies because of GRIBANOV's. long-time friendship -

with NOSENKO's father.

Comment: NOSENKO originally asserted that GRIBANOV
was responsible for sending him to Geneva in
1964, but after retracting his claim that .
GRIBANOV had played any special role in hia
assignments, he asserted that BANNIKOV approved
the 1964 trip. . NOSENKO denies that his father
and GRIBANOV were acquainted. ;

388

Ts Ne. 197124
Copy


13-00000

(Annex A)

8 February 1965

According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

Lae Prior to NOSENKO's
Chief of a department in the
While working in the Seventh

defection he was Deputy to the
Second Chief Directorate.
(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow, ag

the KGB office

foes on three

separate occasions participated in conferences between
important people" of the Second Chief: Directorate and the

Seventh Directorate. NOSENKO was present at all of these.

Although NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he held only the rank .

of captain in the KGB. Qe actributed this (the the KGB officer

disparity between job and rank) to the influence which

GRIBANOV exerted on the behalf of NOSENKO

the KGB officer
Comment: NOSENKO has never identified & B  NOSENKO
always claimed tiat he had been a lieutenant
colonel in the KGB until October 1966, when he

retracted that claim and asserted that he had
been only a captain.

Accor dane to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

a mP: GRIBANOV has been dismissed from
| the KGB, expelled from the CPSU, and is presently living on
asmall pension. His dismissal occurred immediately after
NOSENKO's defection. In addition, not less than 50 other
people were dismissed, many of whom were close friends of
GRIBANOV. Most of these were from the First and Second
Chief Directorates, with the majority from the Second Chief
Directorate. The present Acting Chief of the Second Chief
Directorate is a Major General BANNIK, whose appointment
has not yet been approved by the Central Commiectee of the

CPSU. One of his deputies {is a Major Generai (F.A.)
SHCHERBAK. ,

389
TS No. 197124

Den Bo ne
ae

13-00000

(Annex A)

8 February 1965 (coutinued)

Comment: GRISANOV was reported in operational contact
with a senior Westera diplomat until late
autumn 1964 (almost a year after NOSENKO's
defection}, when he turned over that contact
to another KGB officer.

9 February 1965
According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

: iam mg): The amount of damage caused
by NOSENKO? s defection is "unpredictable". NOSENKO knew

few employees of the First Chief Directorate working abroad,
but knew many such employees serving in KGB Headquarters by
virtue of seeing them in the dining room which {ts reserved
for chiefs and deputy chiefs of KGB departments.

Early June 1965
AS

rding to a sensitive source
2 (Fron conversations with KGB officers & i

ew: Major General BANNIKOV is cureently
temporary Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, having
replaced GRIfZANOV who was expelled from the KGS because he
supported NOSENKO in his career. GRIBANOV is working in a
small city outside Moscow as the chief of security at an
unimportant military plant and is now a "nothing"

390
TS No. 197124

Fop-Seeret- —_ Cony ___....

13-00000

2 <
“According to a sensitive source from a KGB officer

@SRSA who attended the Moscow meeting described): <A meeting
of all First Chief Directorate personnel at KGB Headquarters
was held on 15 July 1965. The meeting was devoted to the

i circumstances of the expulsion of the Chief of the Second

(British) Department of the First Chief Dixectorate, Ye. A.
TARABRIN, about three and a half months eariter. I.A. BELOV
and other officers also attended the meeting. According to
official statements made at the meeting, after the defection
of NOSENKO the KGB conducted an extensive investigation to
determine which employees knew him and the nature of théir

é relationship. During this TARABRIN was questioned; he said

he knew NOSENKO, but only casually and only because of Limited
contacts within the KGB. The-“inveetigation determined, how-
| ever, that TARABRIN attended several parties at which NOSENKO
was present. Giris invited by NOSENKO were also there.
described one such party. Thereafter, TARABRIN was
afforded a hearing and was accussed of willfully concealing

Foource vital information. As a result he was expelled from the KGB

and the CPSU and was deprived of all pension rights.

a sen-—
itive

Comment: NOSENKO had most recently asserted that he mat

A GRIBANOV socially only three times during his
KGB service, and on each:occasion TARABRIN was
present. NOSENKO said he twice provided girls
for GRIBANOV and TARABRIN, once in October or
November 1963 in circumstances similar to those
referred to. NOSENKO said that TARABRIN was
Chief of the British Department from 1958 to
1963, when he became Deputy Chief of “Service
No. 2", the reorganized Counterintelligence
Department of the First Chief Directorate.

391

TS No. 197124

_Top Secret _ Copy:_10 _

13-00000

x

(Annex A)

AS Deresult of NOSENKO" O's efecnnen many

aitiad, aat fram tha Party, and

: ne rii. These sichuded KOt Cheirmen SERDV, and Second
Chief birectorate Chief GRIBANOV had been expelled from the
Party and from the KGB. GRIBANOV had been especially
friendly with NOSENKO, had given him many privileges, and
they were "buddies aud night buddies"

Comment: SEMICHASTNYY, not SEROV, was KGB Chairman in
1965. SEROV became head of the GRU in 1958.

Winter 1965-1966

Source, a

a ay self-professed former KGB Second
Chief Directorate agent (from KGB officer V.G. SVIRIN, a
colleague of her husband at the State Committee for Science
and Technology (GKKNR) in 1960-1962. @ Rass
that SVIRIN was later head of a KGB unit conducting operations
against the American Embassy in Moscow):

NOSENKO's father was a Minister or General and his mother
was Jewish and "always involved in some blackmarketeering".
NOSENKO was not a KGB officer but a “civilian” connected
somehow with the KGB. When NOSENKO defected, everyone said
he was detestable. NOSENKO told the Americans about the
microphones and things (sic) in the Embassy.

392 a
. TS No, 197124


13-00000

(Annex A)

Winter 1965-1966 (continued)

Source's
Comment:

Hees af allegation is the single report
from any source describing NOSENKO as other than
a KGB officer.

Source

March 1966

According to a sensitive source,

cas (from unidentified sources in Moscow): NOSENKO,
fas not personally known tog 7, was an important

who Source

_boss in the KGB. When NOSENKO was a young man, he was in

the GRU Military Academy and was then sent to the GRU
Information Department for a short time; in all, perhaps

for a year. NOSENKO had been a very undisciplined person
while in the GRU and “not very good". He was to have been
discharged from the GRU; however, his father, who was a very
influential person in the Ministry of Shipbuilding, was

able to get NOSENKO tr nsferred to the KGB. It was the opinion
of persons to whom @ oe talked that NOSENKO had given
very, very good information to the U.S. after his defection
and that NOSENKO had had great access to KGB information
which included all means of KGB coverage of people in
Moscow, microphone systems in the embassies, etc. Based on

NOSENKO's information the American Embassy found many of the
microphones.

393

TS No, 197124
. Copy 10


13-00000

_lop Secret—

March 3966 (continued)

Comment: NOSENKO has claimed that he rejected an offer
to attend the Military Diplomatic Academy
(which he, Like &@ Rm, called the GRU Source
Military Academy), by choice accepting assign-
ent to the Far East on entry to the GRU in
1951. At the time, the Military Diplomatic
Academy was a four-year course; if NOSENKO
did attend the school, he could not have
served as he claimed in the GRU. Gage
the sole source (besides NOSENKO) who alleged
NOSENKO served in the GRU.

Wad R eT OF tat?

Yale! /

i,

TS No. 197124
Top Secret —. Copy ———_—_.

°° AAR: FEE a RET me Serpe ene ee ne

is Source

13-00000

(Annex A) :

395
TS No. 197124

. copy 10:


13-00000

(Annex A)-

‘Top Secret i 7

Mid=1966

Yurdy Dmitriyevich KOROLEV, a Soviet journalist, visited
Paris and spoke with representatives of the French magazine

Paris Match. KOROLEV indicated that he would like to serve

as a stringer for the Freich journal and proposed that he
begin with a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet
secret agent". As KOROLEV epoke only broken French and
English, the magazine staff did not seriously pursue the
matter at that time, ,

Comment: KOROLEV ig believed identical with Yurty KOROLEV
: who, as of 1964, was employed part-
the United Press Internacional

Second Chief Directorate} KOROLEV has travelled
previously to Brussels as a correspondent for
the Soviet publication Gputnik, and to Japan

and the United States as 6 correspondent for,
Novosti, the Soviet news Agency. The offer by.
an official Soviet presse representative of
information on.a "Soviet secret agent", which
turned out to refet to NOSENKO, is without.
precedent. :

O€tober 1966

Soviet journalist Yu. D. KOROLEV returned to Paris with

an interpreter to renew his offer to Paris Match editers to

provide’a story on the life of the family of a "Soviet secret
agent". The story was to concern NOSENKO's family and their

396
oo TS No. 197124
Tep Secret — Copy -


13-00000

(Annex A) , -

October 3966 (continued)

life in Moscow since NOSENKO's defection. A short background
statement KOROLEV provided Paris Match editors stated:
"NOSENKG, about 30-38, an officer of the Soviet Secret Police
organization, defected to the USA without his family about
two years apo and asied for political asylum in the U.S.:

it was granted te him. This was the most serious defeat of
the Soviet Security organs as NOSENKO occupied important
positions in espionage and counterespionage departments and
also was closely acquainted with the country's leading
families and homes. NOSENKO's family consists of a wife,

35, two daughters, 10 and 12, a mother and a younger brother.
The family is net prosecuted (sic) but feel very badly about
the incident [the defection]. Very soon the wife will apply
to the International Lawyers Organization for a divorcee and
compensation. It is possible that this case will be given
much publicity. tis wife has not heard from him since he
defected, but it is obvious that he is still in the USA."
KOROLEV displaye: a photo spread showing NOSENKO's wife and
family going about their daily affairs in Moscow, and
indicated that additional photographs of NOSENKO's family
could be obtained and that interviews with then and with
others knowing NOSENKO could be arranged for a Paris Match
correspondent.

Comment: A divorce from a defector from the Soviet Union,
who is legally considered to be an enemy of the

state, is granted automatically upon the wife's
request.

28 January 1967
A rding to a sensitive source

e (from personal knowledge) : Referring to his own
Ze of KGB organization, said if NOSENKO heard
his explanation, he would call a child, since NOSENKO
knew these matters better chanl@ pbecause he had served
at KCB Headquarters longer.

Source

397
TS No. 197124

—Fop-Seeret— Copy -


13-00000

(Annex A)

Eebruery 1967
~ According to a sensitive source
go (from unidentified GRU sources in Moscow):
NOS ENKO worked only in Ri! Information Department of the GRU,

and only for about five or six months, after which he weat
to the KGB. :

May 1967 .
"According to a sensitive source

The KGB assumes that NOSENKO divulged the whole
syst of survetllance of Americans. He worked on it, knew
all about it and exposed the whole system of work. He knew
ali the posts, the sources (few words unclear) he knew all
the surveillance groups and knew surveillants by sight.
According to a sensitive source

: : : : ‘ ; : mee: |6When
NOSENKO worked in the GRU Information Departmen he worked
only #8 the Center (Headquarters) in Moscow. lle worked badly
there, and received bad efficiency reports, as a result of

which he had arguments. Then with his father's help he went
to the KGB. ;

5 June 1967
ccording to a sensitive source

& 7: There had been some
KGB suspicions of Pavel Fedorovich SHAKHOV while he was in
Geneva, because he had allegedly had many American contacts
which he had not reported, and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva to

investigate him. Rezident KULEBYAKIN is still suspicious of
SHAKHOV.

Comment: NOSENKO claims he was sent to Geneva in 1962
to investiyate SHAKHOV.

398 7
TS No. 197124

—FepSeeret— Copy -


13-00000

ANNEX A - STATEMENTS OF SOVinT OFFICIALS

ABOUT NOSENKO


13-00000

STATEMENTS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ABOUT NOSENKO

Pages 361 - 398 of the previous summary contain statements
by Soviet officials including sev eral sources in regard to NOSENEO.
These remarxs cover the period of February 195% to June 1967.

. 4 .
None of the quoted information with the exception of a statement
i

a Source (a self- “professed former KGB Second Chief Directorate agen

by M who siaicd NOSE NKO was nota KGS

officer buta "civilian" connected somehow with the AGB, raiscs a
’

question concerning the identity of NOSENKO or whether he was

actually a KGB oificer. it is not considered that the remark by
SOURCE

can be given any particular weight or that it repre-
sents any material evidence he was aot a KGB officer,
Of the cited information from Soviets in regard to NOSENKO,

the most important, other than statements by GOLITSYN which are
; sensitive Source #1, sensitive Source #3
cited elsewhere, is the information from 3a, aan @ and

sensitive Source #2 Source #1, Source #3
5 B and probably in that order, S@QSi, “QERzEEE

and

So 2
teen had no personal knowledge of NOSENKO and most of their

comments were based on information from third parties or obtained

Source #1
through conversation, There are discrepancies between what
P

Source #2

and

have reported about NOSENKO and what NOSENKO has


13-00000
s

Source #1 Source #2
said, but under the given circumstances of how Gia@e@RRR and a

acquired the information, certain discrepancies should be expected,

No discrepancies would appear highly suspicious. It should be noted
Source #2, Source #3 and Source #1
that Hie > SS es a nd ARMEe have furnished no inforrnation

is

that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector.

Sou€fce #1, Source #3 and Source #2
It is felt that information from Gia, GRIREREEEE and Gina

is a factor which should be given due consideration in the NOSENKO case,
but the fact that they furnished no information indicating that NOSENKO
is not a bona fide defector should not be considered as absolute proof

» _ he was not dispatched by the KGB. A decision as to whether NOSENKO
was or was not dispatched should be based ona full consideration of
all available information, It must be realized there is a possibility

Source #1, Source #3

Seat Ek Seg

Pee

NOSENKO could have been dispatched by the KGB and
Source #2
and 4

#be completely unaware; conversely, a determination that

NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGB does not establish the bona
Source #1, Source #3 or Source #2

fides of GEE, <& or GEE

NOSENKO, until October 1966, stated that a telegram had been received

in the Geneva Residentura ordering NOSENKO to return to the USSR in

ay

hee 8

3 connection with an expected conference on tourist matters. The telegram,

13-00000

@

according ta NOSENKO in interviews prior to October 1966, had beer.
reccived is the Residentura the morning of the sarme day he mez his
CIA contacts and stated he had defected,

In October 1966, NOSENKO responded iv a casual mention of
the "recall telegram" with a complete retraction of his previous state-
ments on the subject, NOSENKO stated, and has subsequently maintained,
that there was not a ‘recall telegram.'' He has explained that he invented
the recall telegram" matter because he was concerned about his personal

safety in remaining "in place" for a ionger time, NOSZNKO has stated

_he thought the alicged "recall telegrara" would Le accepted by CLA as

& logical reason ior his precipitate deiection,


13-00000


13-00000

Certain of the ciscrepancics noted in the previous summary
b L Pa

Source #] Source #2
between iniormation Jc orn <BR and aes

vand irom NOLEARO

have been clarified and certain discrepancies could not be clarizicd.

Source #1 and Source #2

ane

taal

of the reporcn, vy

the absence

of any reason to Guestion this his life as sclated by NCSENEO.

Exemples are information from


13-00000

Source #2.

that NOSENKO attended the GRU Military Academy and that NOS ENKO

worked in the GRU Information Department in Moscow, There are also

Source #2,

certain discrepancies between information furnished by
Source #1 and Source #3 in
fv and? fl in regard to the life and career of NOSENKG

prior to 1964,

In regard to discrepancies previously noted between information
Source #1 . : Source #1
BY as to certain KGB officers whom oer? understocd

NOSENKO had personaily met and concerning whom NOSENKO had pre-
viously indicated no knowledye, a satisfactory cxplanation has been
obtained for certain of the discrepancies during current interviews with

NOSENKO. In certain other instances, a completely adequate explana-
, 7 re *

tion is not available but there is just as adequate reason to believe
Source #1

@ had obtained incorrect or incomplete information as there
is to believe NOSENKO is being deceptive in his iailure to recognize
a name and/or photograph,

Ags an example of previous noted discrepancies which have now
been completely clarified, it was previously stated that NOSENKO had

Source #1

never commented on the KGB telephone book which had re-

ported NOSENKO, had in his possession.

During current interviews, NOSENKO, in response to a query concerning

13-00000

how an officer in the SCD wouid obtain the telephone number of an
FCD officer, gave a detailed report including informaticn that there
was at least one complcte SCD telephone directory in each room
occupied by SCD officers, In addition, NOSENKO stated he had access
toa directory which was maintained in the office of the Chief of the
Gepartment and which listed the KGB officers down to Section Chiefs
in the various geographical Directorates throughout the USSR.

It is interesting to note that there is a discrepancy between the

; Source #1
information furnished by aaaam

coucerning the telephone directory

and the description furnished by NOSENKO, This is quite logical!
#1 :
# could hardly give an accurate description of a telephone

directory which he had never seen,

