DARAAN
\104-10332-10007 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

298 PSHe COUR AS WONG

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. CONFIDENTIAL
we. . £
CHO quide
. None é
7 January 1994 Cala a

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
FROM: Bryant Rogers
SUBJECT: . . MEETING WITHEINDAPRLORES ;
REFERENCE:
On 6 Jan we mat with{Linda Flores from the DO to discuss HRG concerns with regard to CIA's contacts in the 60's with well

known Cubans and Cuban Organizations.

The outcome of this discussion was that the DO agrees that we can release.the names of thosa major players with whom CIA
worked with as long as we stay within the 60-63 time frame, with some overlap into 1964 for continuity, when needed. We then
discussed aur relationships with major anti-Castro organizations. It was agreed that we could retease the fact that as a funding vehicle
for.the US Govt, CIA provided support including funding in general terms. In some cases we may find it necessary to reveal gross ballpark
figures for annual budgets. The-D0. would prefer that we continue to protect specific funding amounts where possible. They were
specifically concerned about releasing specific amounts paid to individuals or families of Bay of Pigs members where individuals could
claim that one was paid more than enother. In supporting these organizations it was acknowledged by the DO that wa could relaase
generic operational activities: such as publishing journals or financing goodwill tours by prominent exile Cubans to.Latin America The DO
reminded us that in reviewing these relationships with Cubans and organizations, it was important to protect CIA personnel agents and —
assats and any specifics on tradecraft. ;

When asked about Bay of Pigs training sites, Linda felt that the actual location should still be protected i in spite of the fact that
they have been mentioned i in open literatura.

’ With regard to DO location numbers (19 for Cuba) she thought this was OK for the 60-63 time frame but would check with LA
Div. She had no problem with the release of the Belt location in cables since it was no longer used.

cc: J. Barry Harrelson @ DA
: Richard D. Kovar-Y- @ DA
John F. Pereira @ DA

CONFIDENTIAL

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a, SECRET
: ? v . Co
8 November | +1995 _
e b ; ea es _
MEMORANDUM FOR: Jeremy Gunn,
, ARRB Staff
FROM: Barry Harrelson,
; CIS/CSI/HRG wn
SUBJECT: — Issues re Cryptonyms, Country

Designators, Action Indicators and
Employee True Names (UV)

Attached is memorandum from the DO Focal Point. for, the
ARRB addressing the release of cryptonyms, country” .
designators, action indicators and employee true names. ‘The:
memorandum is’ intended to provide. guidance to you and’ your
staff and complements. information provided in previous —~
discussions. Ellie and I welcome the opportunity | to dfscuss -
these issues with your staff. (0) S 5

pot pa

ey

Attachment. . 5. 7 oo , oS

Unclassified When Separated
From Attachment.

SECRET

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SECRET JFL

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief,- Historical Review. Group

FROM: Fredrick C. Wickham, on.
. ' DO, Focal Point for ARRB
SUBJECT: —- Position on Release of Cryptonyms, Country
a Designators, Action Indicators and Employee. True

Names

‘

During the period since the ARRB last met, the DO ‘has
considered the four issues listed below that have not yet been
addressed with the Board. These issues appear throughout the JFK
collection and by stating our position up front we hope to
facilitate the Board’s review and to reach an agreement that will _ -
be mutually satisfying to the Board and the Agency. ;

Cryptonyms ~ Except for cryptonyms related to-

operational assets or activities involving Mexico or - Miami,
the Agency will release the main component of cryptonyms and
withhold only the two-letter digraph.. Treating cryptonyms
in this manner will. protect the nationalities of individuals ~
and operations that are not pertinent to Oswald or the JEK | ~
investigation and render an easiér reading of the written .

' material. — ‘

Country File. Designators ~ We will delete the first:
element of operational activity and operational interest
files in those instances when the credibility of: the .
narrative is not affected. The first element of the file

“number corresponds to the alphabetical position of the
country name which is easily discernible, whereas the
subsequent .two elements relate to type of activity or
interest and specific subject.

Action Indicator (Slug) Lines - Generally, we will:
release the entire-action indicator line of a document.

Occasionally, however, we will withhold portions when the

a oe CL ‘py (oss50a0~ .
CR " .  ) DECL OADR®
oS . '  DRV HUM 4-82 —

SECRET

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DBUREL

SUBJECT: Position on Cryptonyns, Country. Designators, Action
Indicators and Employee True Names —

‘context identifies a source or a relationship with a
specific liaison ‘service.

True Names of Staff: Employees - In most instances we

-will release names of employees who have retired in an overt
status. and were serving in Headquarters when cited in a
document. We will continue to protect the true names of
employees cited as serving in a field position. References.
to field personnel in true name are uncommon, however, since
pseudonyms are normally used in correspondence between ;
Headquarters and the field. .

SECRET

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Assassination Records Review Board
600 E Street NW - 2nd Floor - Washington, DC 20530
(202) 724-0088 » Fax: (202) 724-0457

November 9, 1995 a
| CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
; DECLAS SHS AOS it AND/OR
HAND DELIVERED RELEASE OF CIA iNFORMATION
IN THIS DOG “UMEN iT
Mr. John Pereira, Director
Historical Review Group .
Center for the Study of Intelligence ;
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C., 20505 _

Re: RRB requests for evidence

Dear John:

I thought that it might be helpful to you if I were to provide you with our current

-assessment of the status of our review of the Agency's assassination records and-point ©

to where we would like to proceed i in the future.

I would like to begin by acknowledging the efforts made by the Historical Review
Group to facilitate our review of records. It has been, as you know, a difficult and time-
consuming process both for the Agency and the Review Board. We very much
appreciate the personal cooperation of you and your staff.

We continue to be concerned by the slow progress that has been made. Although we
perceive that the task has-been more difficult and time-consuming than Cohgress
anticipated; -wec+have found that the careful education process in which we have been
involved has. helped educate us with respect to your concerns and, we hope, has helped
demonstrate to you the Review Board's concerns.

- We must, however, begin to pick up the pace. In many circumstances we are reviewing

and then re-reviewing the same documents over and over again. We are also
frequently put in the position of not being provided with evidence in a timely manner
so that we can make our presentations to the Board. While many of these difficulties

_ are understandable -- and perhaps even inherent to the start-up of the process in which

we are engaged —~ we must expedite the process. Rather than dealing with dozens of
records.at Board meetings, we need to move towards a schedule where hundreds of

records willbe reviewed at Board meetings. From our perspective, it seems that it is

essential that the Agency be prepared to allocate significant additional resources to the ©

process of reviewing the records and making evidence available to the Board.

Boarp Memeers: John R. Tunheim, Chair « Henry F. Graff + Kermit L. Hall - William L. Joyce - Anna K. Nelson -
Executive Otrector: David G. Marwell

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Mr. John Pereira
November 9, 1995

_ Page 2

We also believe that the Agency still is not providing the type of evidence that will be
the most convincing to the Board. Where issues exist that the Board has not yet
addressed, and where the Agency would like to see postponements upheld, specific
information must be provided to support a postponement. General statements, while
useful in identifying the underlying issues involved, do not provide the Board with the
complete knowledge and understanding of the issue that is necessary to make an
informed judgment regarding release of the information. —

‘The Board is looking forward to receiving the CIA's evidence in support of the

postponement of true names. As you know, we have planned for some time to devote —

_ the Decemiber (12 and 13) meeting to this important issue.

Additionally, you will find enclosed with this letter the next in our series of information
requests, covering boxes 7-9 of the Oswald collection. We are submitting these requests
now inan attempt to give HRG as much advance notice as possible.of which records we
will be reviewing for the January 4 meeting. Evidence for records to be reviewed
January 4 should be provided no later than December 13, 1995. ae

We hope that during HRG's review of the January documents, the standards outlined in
this letter will be kept in mind. If at any point an issue is deemed so sensitive that a

_ briefing i is required, ARRB staff will meet with you at your convenience.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely yours, | \:

i yeah Mois We le {?

David G. Marwell —

Executive Director

Enclosures.

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SECRET
11 December 1995

NOTE FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Briefing of JFK Board Staff: Cover

1. Onr ‘December} Barry Gibson, Deputy Chief of the
Office of Central Cover, briefed the Executive Director of

' the Assassinations Records Review Board and other Board

staff members. Also participating from CIA were (John. Goins }

and Eleanor Neiman of IMS; (Linda Ciprian i), ‘occ; and Barry
Harrelson and I from HRG.

2. The focus of the briefing was on the need to protect
the names. of former Agency employees that appeared in the
JFK records. Gibson discussed the risks involved for people
who retired under cover if they were identified in the ;
public record as former CIA employees. He discussed the .

‘efforts made by his office to obtain written statements from

the more than 100 individuals whose names appear.

3.0 The purpose of the briefing assist the Board
in its review of names when it ‘meets 42-13 December The
Agency was asked in particular to present, in writing,
evidence of risk. for each of the names that will be
discussed at the Board's meeting.

Clee

“John F. Pereira

asy TOL

CL BRASON: Cov —- sa SE

DECL ON: AE
DitV FROM: —At8 fe= 7

SECRET

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MEMORANDUM
. March 20, 1996 GIA HAS NO OBJECTION Yo
ied ATION AND/OR
To: | ———- Review Board THIS DOCUMENT
cc: . David Marwell
CIA Team
From: ——sT.. Jeremy Gwi ih
Subject: Board Guidelines on Kelens (a TA Officer Names.

x

The Staff understands the Review Board to accept the following general guidelines o1 on
the release of true names of CIA officers: _

When the true name of a CIA officer (i.e. past or present employee of CIA) appears ina
document, the Board will bring to its review a presumption that the true name will be

. released. In order to overcome this presumption of release, CIA must provide evidence

demonstrating that release of the name would be harmful. In order to meet its burden
of proving harm, CIA must tailor the evidence to satisfy one of the three categories
identified in Part I (below). However, when the name of an officer is of such
importance that the public interest would not be served in postponing a name, the
Board may release the true name consistent with the principles identified in Part I
(below).

Part I. Categories of Officers.

1. Living officers. For living (present or former) officers, CLA must prove that:
. (a) the officer is living outside the United States (or reasonably is expected to
_ reside or travel outside the United States in the foreseeable future); (b) the officer
_ is either working or is retired under cover; and (c) the officer objects to the
release of his or her true name. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board
| presumptively (see Part II below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the
officer’s true name until the year 2010.

2. Where current status of former officer is unknown. Where CIA has been
unable to contact the former officer because his or her location is unknown, CIA
must present a good faith showing that reasonable attempts have been made to
locate the officer. If the Board is convinced that CIA has‘made a good faith
showing that it was unable to locate the former officer, the Board will postpone
the true name until June 1, 1997. However, the Board may Postpone the true

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name beyond: June 1, 1997, if CIA provides to the Board, prior to May 1, 1997,
additional evidence that satisfies the criteria of either category 1 (above) or
category 3 (below).

3. Names having effect on current intelligence interests. If CLA believes that
the release of a true name may compromise currently existing intelligence
operations or might otherwise cause an identifiable harm, it must provide
evidence that: (a) the officer currently is engaged in clandestine activities; (b) the
release of the true name would compromise ongoing intelligence operations or
-would compromise operations with current intelligence value; (c) the release of
the true-name would reasonably be expected to cause significant harm to a living
person (including family members), or (d) the release of the true name would

 causea significant harm to the national security or the foreign relations of the _
United States. If CIA satisfies this burden, the Board presumptively (see Part I
below) will release a pseudonym and postpone the true name until 2010 or until
such other date as CIA reasonably shows to be a date on which the release could
be made without causing harm.

\

Part II. Names of Officers Who Are Important to the Assassination Story.

The Board presumptively will postpone the release.of names consistent with
categories 1-3 of Part I. However, for certain persons whose names appear ina
context that is important to the assassination story, the Board may nevertheless
vote to release the true name. In all such instances, the Board will notify CIA of
the importance of such a person and provide CIA with the opportunity to
provide additional information in support of postponing the release of the
names. These names shall be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, with due
consideration being given to the importance of the person to the assassination -
story and such evidence of harm as CIA may provide.

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’ e: : vo ,
. . ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of Linda C. Cipriani:

NOTE FOR:

FROM:
DATE: I:
SUBJECT: JFK - Central Cover appeal

The General Counsel and { met with the JFK Review Board on Friday and discussed, among other things, how to-deal with the potential .
public release of the identities of former employees retired under cover. The Board clearly wants to do the right thing here, but they feel:

they are not getting enough information to make that decision.

Jeremy Gunn (JFK Board's General Counsel) will soon provided me with some of the Board's suggestions on how to deal with this which |

will pass on to you (including how:to deal with Whitten). :| would at the very least like to be able suggest that we attempt contact again

(either through CIA or the Board) with those retirees who have not yet responded to our letter. Of course; any suggestions you have at
this point will be extremely helpful. My sense is that this issue of protecting retirees is something everyone at CIA will want to appeal
just on the principal of it, but that we should do everything possible to avoid an appeal. [Until we work out an agreement with the Board,

you should continue to prepare that appeal you are drafting]

In the meantime, can you please provided me the following figures:

1. The # of people we sent letters to regarding the potential Board releases. {isn't jt 150?) and the following breakdown if

available: ,
- # living abroad
- # of those retired under cover vs. thse whose cover has been rolled back or lifted

- # of those who still work for us in covert/avert capacity
2. The # of responses we received to date. .
3. The # of responses to date requesting that we don’t release.
4. The # of responses to date saying that they didn't care.

| realize you are all out of the office these days, but [ would appreciate getting this as soan as youcan, Thanks.

cc: J. Barry Harrelson.
Eleanor E. Neiman @ DO
Frederick Wickham @ DO

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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ae mo ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

8 March 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Barry Harellson
John Pereira

FROM: — Linda.C.Ciptiani’
DCVOGCILD

SUBJECT: - JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

REFERENCE:

ADMINISTRATIVE -. INTERNAL USE ONLY

From the Desk of kinda C. Ciprianis,

NOTE FOR: ‘ Paula A. Sweeney @ DCI
. Robert 0. Davis @ DCI
Robert 0. Caudle @ DCI

FROM: Linda.C. Cipriani
DATE: 03/08/96 02:50:39 PM
SUBJECT: JFK - March 18 Board Meeting

| have been informed that: Dave agers will be attending the next JFK Board meeting. | If this is the case, it would seem that Jeff should
go as well.

Two issues need to be discussed with the Board: stations and cover employees.

1. Jeff and the Board agreed in principal to a “window” in which all stations would be opened (1980;64) Of course, if.
there are particular stations which need to be exempted from this the Board will consider it upon the presentation of substantive
evidence.

- HRG and the Board think this is a good idea that would enable tham to avoid raising potential appeals every month

Dave! Edger Teeds to be signed onto this idea.
- Jeff, last month, presented additional information on ‘Osto,Stocktiolm; and Gopenhagen. Jeff and Dave should be
prepared to answer questions or provide more information so that the Board will agree to protect these stations.

2. _The Board recently released the names of! 16 cover employees. An appeal is being prepared (or sol am told). The
thirty days runs on March 18. We need to finalize with the Board how to handle this issue. At the last meeting the Board agreed that
this was a really important decision, but that they were not getting the information they need to make the right decision. At the fast
meeting, the Board intimated that they might be willing to delay this release, if CIA and the Board could come to a mutually agreeable
way to deal with cover employees. | understood from Jeff that this is an issue that CIA will appeal on just.the principal. If this is true,
the Board should understand what our ultimate position is on this, but that we are willing to cooperate with them to find a suitable —
alternative (using pseudos of generic descriptions like "case officer")

3. { will be out all next week but Barry Harellson/HRG (30292) and John Pereira/CSI) (30373) will be happy to fill you .
in on the details. Barry will be contacting Bob Caudie next week to find out how the March 18 meeting will be handled.

ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

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FROM:
SUBJECT:

1.

29 July 1996

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief Historical Review Group

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.
_ DO, Focal Point for ARRB

Proposal for Dealing with Employees’ Names

Cover mechanisms are an integral part of conducting .

clandestine operations. We are concerned about individuals that
continue to. be dependent on ‘particular cover legends and on the
organizations. that. cooperatively work with us to provide those
cover legends. The following proposal is offered to streamline
the process of handling names and minimize the potential damage
an inappropriate release could cause.

A. Incomplete and Unidentifiable names:

a. We will release the occurrence of a name when a
common last name appears by itself or in conjunction ~
with a common first name such that it does not tend
to specifically identify the individual.

b. We will release the occurrence of a name if it.
remains unidentified after a reasonable search is
conducted.

B. Identifiable names for employees that retired

overtly:

In most cases, overt employees’ names will be released,

-but..in some cases overt employees may have a
‘portion of their employment remain under cover. Such

cases will require the same review as that of an
employee who remained under cover into retirement.

ADMENES PRATIVE..._INTRRNBL Usr ony.

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SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

; C. Identifiable names for employees that retired
covertly:

a. We will make a reasonable attempt to locate a
current address and contact the person. If the person
ebjects to the release of his or her name for reasons

‘associated with current life style issues, we will
object to the release of the name. If the person does
not have objections based upon personal circumstances we
will review the name for: organizational issues j-- (See
para C. c.) L ; 3

\ . °

b. If reasonable efforts fail to locate the
current address, but it can. be determined that the
individual is still receiving a pension, insurance or
other benefit based upon-cover legend, we will need to
continue to protect the name since source of income or
benefits can not be altered without prior notification |
to the individual. If we fail to identify a pension or
other active benefit, we will review the name for
organizational issues. (See para c. c.}

c. We will make a reasonable attempt. to review the
name to look for identifiable harm to. the person’s
safety, family, ongoing operational activities, national
security. or foreign relations. Assuming that none of
the previous concerns are identified, we will review the
potential damage to the cover mechanism or cover
provider by the specific occurrence of. the name if
released.

'* 2. Because families of deceased employees could be the
beneficiary of pensions or insurance provided under the employees
cover legend, we must review them the same as we would the’
employee. We also have second and third generation officers
following in the footsteps of their parents that could be
negatively impacted by the revelation.

3. Our efforts to locate current addresses will include. all
internal record systems maintained by Office of Personnel
Security, Retirement Branch and Insurance Branch. We will
include a checklist reflecting completion of these searches

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w

SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees' Names

within the documentation when requesting continued protection of
the name. a 3

4. We considered options of contacting IRS or OPM during
our attempts to locate current addressing information, but based
upon the_fact that these offices would be unwitting of the cover
arrangement for the individual, it was determined to be an —
unreasonable risk to the cover of these officers.

ft

a
a

va te

va _

Z . ue, ay a . : ae

aa PPL fre © y |
bell

Fredrick C. Wickham, Jr.

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SUBJECT: Proposal for Dealing with Employees‘ Names

IMS/RPG Fwickham:mjk (29 July 1996)

Distribution: _
' Orig & 1'- Addressee
* J - C/occ

1 - IMS/ESG/ALB
1 - IMS/ESG/IRB
1 - IMS/ESG/HCS
1 - IMS/ESG-OIT/MSG/RDP
1

~, ESG Chrono _ . | .

74

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- | Dree dew are,
oo CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASEIN FULL
~~ 2000

11 February 1997.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
FROM: Gary M. Breneman, IC
SUBJECT: Comparison of ARRB and DO Memoranda re
Treatment. of CIA Officer Names: in JFK
Collection
1. This memorandum is in response to an assignment to
compare a 20. March 1996 ARRB memorandum written: by T. Jeremy
Gunn and The Directorate of Operations response: dated 20:
July 1966, authored by Fredrick on Wickham, gr. Both deal
with the treatment of CIA officer true names which appear in
the JFK collection -- when they will be postponed and when
they will be released. | _

2. Fixst the ARRB Memorandum Gunn describes in legal
terms. the Board's position on the postponement or release of
cIA officers' true names . He makes a proffer which states

that: there is. a ‘presumption in ‘favor of release akin to a
legal evidentuary rule. which . causes. a burden to shite to the
other party (CTA) to prove something. In this. instance, it
is factual evidence/proof sufficient to shift. the burden not

only back to neutral but to the. other, side of neutral which .

permits postponement .

3. The Gunn memorandum then sets out the ‘criteria

required to meet the burden under several situations.

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A. For officers who are still alive he states that the

proofs required to postpone release of a name are three in
number and all three must be met:
i. @ FE be_livii id f the U.S

.. (presumably ,

ii.
. a current staff officer, contract employee,
or independent contractor) -.- or ig retired
under cover; |
her.true'n am me. ,

COMMENT : Mr. Gunn! 8 criteria are a little confusing

and reach beyond the Board's authority. First, note. again .

that! the three elements are joined by an a i ANDRE meahing all

etencnt must be met to satisfy a postponement. Second, the

firgt requirement of living or. traveling outside: of the U.S.
is not tied to % cover. # Many officers: who do not work
under cover all of the time are, in fact, ‘provided cover
for. overseas TDY's ‘Thus, any officer who might. |

reasonably’ be expected to travel outside of the U.S.

would warrant postponement of his true name. This would

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seem to include every CIA employee, contract employee and
independent contractor past and present.

With respect to the third element, Mr. Gunn and the
Board are simply in error. To my knowledge they have no !
authority to require that an individual be consulted

concerning his or her wishes to maintain cover, thus having

his.or her true name postponed, or to give up his cover,
. thus having the name released. This decision does not lie

... in the. ‘first instance with the individual but is an

"institutional decision which lies solely within the purview
of the Agency and the executive branch of the government.

- CIA as an executive agency charged with the creation,

 maintenance,. and dissolution of cover mechanisms is the only
entity competent to make such a decision. It alone knows if
. release of an officer's true name will compromise an
existing cover mechanism which will, in turn, ‘expose others -

“who share | or have shared the. same cover. It alone knows if

lease of an officer’ 6 hame will expose CIA sponsorship (a

gpitity) of-a sensitive activity, It alone knows if

“release of an officer's name. will violate a promise of

on ‘identiality toa commercial cover sponsor which could

. ‘gause both embarrassment and possibly, financial hardship to

the: ponsor and, in turn, substantially hinder the Agency's

“ability to secure subsequent commercial cover sponsors.

va Lo * .
. Turning next to the wishes of a particular officer
(either current or retired) vis a vis staying with his or _

her cover, these thoughts come to mind. For current

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employees, the decision is again not entirely theirs. If,
after careful review, the Agency does not have a strong
position on the employee maintaining the cover, the officer
should be permitted to decide. He or she should -be .
counseled however, that an action to remove cover could have
an adverse impact on future assignments or TDYs. With
respect to retirees, if, after careful review, the Agency

does not object to the removal from cover, the individual

sho 1d be permitted to decide. Note, that the responses to

. this inquiry will be mixed. As a historical note, the

; Agency over the years has been on an ever-swinging pendulum

with respect to % cover into retirement,# % cover for

life,® etc. There will be officers who petitioned hard
unsuccessfully to have their cover removed when they retired.
and will gladly consent to lifting the cover. There will be

. those. officers who do not want their cover lifted under any

aintenance « or lifting of cover.

Be Former officers, status unknown. While the

heading to this section would seem to suggest the CIA does

nd know the cover/non-cover status of some of its former
officers, the section does not rally deal with this issue.

‘Rather, within the section, Mr. Gunn simply recognizes the

fact the CIA may not be able to find all of its former

officers to ask if they want to be opened up or remain under

q

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as

cover. The test required by Mr. Gunn to satisfy the Board
and thus continue postponement until 1 June of this year.is
a % good faith showing that reasonable attempts were made
to locate the officer and failed. _

The section contains the additional provision which

advises the Board may continue a postponement beyond 1 June

of this year (i.e., until 2010) if the CIA provides the
board with evidence which satisfies the criteria of either

category 1 or category 3. Such ¥& additional -evidence# must

be provided by 1.May 1977.

The requirements or tests of this section for the

Agency are not onerous but should be set~-out as a series of

uniform actions or check-off's taken in the attempt to_

locate each % current status unknown officer. The record
of these actions: could then be. ‘presented. to the ARRB .in

support of a request for continued to postponement. The DO

Memorandum mentions of the possibility. of asking the IRS or

the OPM for assistance. in this regard: anc t is shoul d

probably, be ‘done: I ‘recall however, ‘that ‘the ‘Service will

assist, through cleared contacts at the National Office, but.

- only to the extent of determining the whereabouts of the

individual and then contacting him and’ “ask that he be in

touch with his former employer. I have. ‘no current knowledge

of Cleared: contacts at the OPM ‘but they existed ‘in. the past

and’ T ‘assume they continue.

C. Names having effect on current intelligence

interests. The Gunn letter appears to subscribe a higher
OO »
t

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“anyone who shared the same. cove

fhe

level of concern to this section and its criteria than the

previous two, not recognizing the plain fact that the

‘eriteria of all three sections are inextricable. It sets -

out four separate criteria which, if CIA satisfies its
burden, i.e. provides sufficient evidence to prove any one
of them, will operate to postpone a true name until the year

2010. Note again, the criteria required are four separate

‘ones, each separated by a comma’ and between numbers 3 and 4

and “ OR.” They are:
i. The officer must be currently engaged in
clandestine activities; OR,

ii. The release of the officer's name. would

compromise ongoing intelligence operations or operations

with current “intelligence value. (presumably, the latter

‘Penitee s a review into the officer 8 past activities, agent

“person (including family. members read broadly, this

| Broyision would include, the. ind dual, former agents,

x cover position, i.e. a

dedicated: Department of State ‘glo within an } embasey) ; OR,

iv... The’ release, of the officer’ 8 name ‘would cause a

sigti ficant harm to the national. security or the foreign

relations of the U.S. (a criteria which is broad enough to

-drive the proverbial Mack truck through) .

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of the -

. from a f

4. In Part II, the Gunn memorandum takes back part of
what it gave in the previous section. It sets up a test of
% importance to the assassination story vs. evidence of
harm.# Essentially, it advises that the Board will weigh

the CIA's evidence but, if within its view, the true name

being considered for postponement is important to the

assassination story, the Board will release it. This means

for those few individuals who may be viewed as % important

to ‘the story, § | truly substantial evidence must be brought

to bear. - Absent such evidence, ‘the Board will release, and
the ‘only recourse left to the Agency would be an appeal to
the President.

5. “The Directorate of Operations Memorandum. The »

basic concern with the steps for handling names as contained

within the memorandum’ is as. follows. For. officers who

retired under cover, the first ‘step will be to contact them

- and ask’ if _they want their true 3 name: released. Per the

 conménts 0 on page, three supra this should be the last step

eview, not the first.

AL Other Comments. The resources. and data bases

"which will be. researched for éach name should be clearly

‘established and followed ain a uniform manner. Deviation

. orderly process, will open CIA determinations to

. eriticism, objections and dismissal, i.e. release of a name
a : :

that should be postponed.

B. In. addition to the data bases described --

retirement records, annuity pay records, the office of

f

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an

“. °
nar

‘there. is ‘some’ question,

need t otis a8 our, ealen

security, insurance lists -- consideration might be given
to the Northwest Federal Credit Union, and overt data bases
such as Phonedec. Like the IRS and OPM, the credit union
might not be able from a legal standpoint to provide an
address. However, it would probably be prepared to contact
an individual and ask that he be in touch.

C. A comment must be made about the idea of
universally releasing the true names of overt employees. To

the extent that any current employee, even overt employee,

may ‘be ‘gent overseas on TDY ‘under light cover, the release

of his ‘or her true name via these JFK documents which will

receive widespread review could jeopardize his overseas

, mission and possibly, place his life in danger.

6. These thoughts are intended to be talking points as

we commence to ‘sort out the manner in which we will deal
: with. the true names. clearly, we “need to begin. to quickly

; identify those names which can be released, those on which

and those few on which we really

Gary M. Breneman

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

5 March, 1997

Memorandum For: Chief/HRG .

From: Barry Harrelson
Subject: Name Issue / Status of Review
Reference: - _ Meetings with ARRB staff (Marwell & Gunn)

4 March 1997

Name Issue

I met with Gunn and Marwell (separate meetings) to
discuss the reopening of the names issue per my memo to you.
Both Gunn and Marwell reacted positively. They found the
proposal to be reasonable one and they are willing to work
with us in approaching the Board. However, both said they
could not predict the Boards reaction. Per Marwell, one
member of the Board (Anna Nelson) seems to believe that if a
person worked for the CIA it should be known.

Apparently our timing is excellent. Marwell is
planning to propose to the Board that they change the
process from the focus on individual postponements to
documénts.. Under the new approach his staff would have the
authority to negotiate with the Agency on the release of
documents, and only issues/documents of disagreement would
be placed before the Board. Marwell is convinced that evén
with an additional year they will not finish the project
with the current approach. He sees our proposal on the
hames as an example of how the process would work.

Marwell recommends that we include examples of
documents containing names of little or no connection to the
story. Bob Skwirot (he was in the meeting with Marwell)
said that there were a number of names that appeared in only
one document and that the number of names had reached{ 590:
Marwell wants to start immediately on preparing a joint™ Tist
of important/releasable individuals.

Action: Advise DO, OGC, upper management of our proposal to
reopen the name issue (how?). Need to decide what level
would sign the memo to the Board, and who would prepare the
memo. If you agree I can send a copy of my memo to you to.
Linda) and Fred for background use.

HRG and DO team will collect examples of documents and
prepare (with ARRB staff) a list of individuals. The DO
should focus on any person on the list that needs protection
and prepare the evidence ASAP (i.e. not wait for the issue
to be resolved).

SECRET

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

New ARRB Review Process

Marwell and I spent some time discussing how a new
process would work. He would like to test the process for
the April meeting. The following is a rough outline with my
comments:

1) HRG reviewers would review the documents the same
as they do now (postponements would be blue highlighted).
{no change in our procedures]

2) ARRB staff would review the blue highlighted
document.

a) If they agree, they would stamp the document
“ARRB approved” and return it to HRG to process
for NARA.

b) If they disagree they would highlight in
yellow (creating green highlighting). If the two
staffs cannot resolve the issue, then the document
would go before the Board.

[Major change: ARRB staff would no longer record all the
proposed postponements, no DO damage review, no detailed
determination letter requiring HRG reviewers to use the
“grid” to determine what happen.]

3) Non-issue documents would be sent to the ARRB
staff when ready for NARA. At that time the ARRB staff
would prepare a simplified final determination notice and
letter to the Agencies.

[ No action would be required; HRG would file. the final
determination notice with the document].

4) “Green” highlighted documents that go to the Board
would be handled the same as today.

[The expectation is that a lot less documents would require
Board action. ] !

Comments: With some fine tuning, I think this process could
work, and we would be able to complete the re-review of
documents released in 1993 and 1994 by Oct. 1998.

Completing the entire project will depend on how quickly the
“non-related” material and the “addition records” are
reviewed by the ARRB staff.

SECRET

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SECRET - WORKING PAPER

Pending Issues

As part of the change in process, Marwell wants the
Board to focus on outstanding substantive issues as opposed

‘to micro managing the review. We discussed the following:

1) Nosenko. ARRB staff needs to review the non-related
material and make a recommendation to the Board. Marwell
leans toward not treating all of Nosenko as assassination
related. Could be a hard sell with some Board members.

Should we request that Nosenko meet with the Board? Marwell
thinks they would react favorably.

2) Personnel Files. Again the first step is to have
his staff confirm that only a part of a file is related and
that those documents are in the released material.

3) \. Gibson). FBI file issue; we need to present case to
the Board :

4)( LI. 9h Continuing to protect will be a hard sell

a Continul
given that( Newman . has 8 published} identity; we need to present

5) CRC Financial Files. ARRB staff needs to review

Annual Report and Extension

Marwell ask me to draw you attention to the Annual
Report and the request for an extension. He would still
like a letter from the Agency (could be addressed to him)
along these lines: “reviewed Annual Report”

“note that the Board has ask for extension”
“support the request/feel it is in interest of
Agency and public /or something along these lines

”

Other igsues (not discussed with Marwell/Gunn)

C Linda] (0GC). says CI Staff has ask Gunn to rewrite his

- notes, and opposes Gunn's suggestion to release pages from
the CI histories he reviewed. Gunn indicated in his notes

that some of the pages should be released and might be
considered assassination records. We are going to run into
similar problems with the other histories. Gunn will be in
HQ tomorrow to re-do his notes. She will discuss the “pages
issue” with the goal of having him drop the request to
release. As to the question of designating the pages as
assassination records, she will inform him that CI will
oppose. If he insist, she will refer back to HRG.

SECRET

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rf 97 . P : ;
gy 08/23/07 WED 15:53 FAX 202 724 0457 © __ARRB ues

S$ H-E E T
‘To: J. Barry Harrelson ; ——-
Fax 703-613-3063 _ _ CIA HAS NO OBJECTION To
Subject: _ Segregated Collections ' DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
“Dates = Aptil23,1997 | RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT’
Pages: _7, including this cover sheet.
Today the Board adopted the attached guidelines.
From ths desk of...
. T..Jeremy Gunn
: . General Counsel
Aseaesination Recorde Review Board
600 E Street, N.W.
Washington, 0.6, 20630
(202) 724-0088.

Fax: (202) 724-0487

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et ele —_ Se z a . "6
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION To _
DECLASSIFICATION ANDYOR-

RELEASE OF THI6 DOCUMENT

Assassination Records Review Board
Guldelines for Review of Postponements in the Segregated Collections
_ Adopted: April 23, 1997

Background

In order to ensure that the Review Board will be able to complete Its task of reviewing
all identified assassination records, the Board recently took two significant steps. . First,
on November 13, 1996, it adopted guidelines with respect to reviewing “Segregated
Collections” with regard to information that is “not believed relevant” (NBR) to the -
assassination. Second, in February 1997, the Review Board requested Congress to

- extend its tenure for one additional year.

It is the Review Board’s Judgment t that, even with the assumption that our operations

- may be extended through Fiscal Year 1998, the Review Board cannot hope to complete
review of postponements in-the Segregated Collections under the current method of
review. In particular, a reasonable modification of current postponement standards ~
would greatly expedite and facilitate the release of.additional Information and records.
Otherwise, the Review Board might cease operations without having reviewed. claimed
postponements in tens of thousands of pages of FBI and CIA records.

Postponement Criteria for the Segregated Collections

In a further effort to enhance the Review Board's work, the Review Board now issues
these revised guidelines for the review of records in the Segregated Collections.’ :
(These guidelines do not affect the FBI's Core and Related Files or the CIA's 201 file on. _
Oswald.) The four principal factors that underlie these review guidelines are: first,
continuing, to the greatest reasonable extent, the Review Board's established _
guidelines for postponemenis that have emerged over the past two years; second,
establishing guidelines corisistent with the Review Board’s decision regarding NBR
records; s; third, establishing reasonable and workable » uidelines that will enable the.

The regulations adopted by the Board on November 13, 1996, define
“Segregated Collections” as including first, FBI records that were requested by: (a).the
House Select Committee on Assassinations (“HSCA”) in conjunction with its
investigation into the Kennedy assassination; (b) the Church Committee in conjunction
with Its inquiry Into issues related to the Kennedy assassination; and (c) by other bodies
(e.g., Pike Committee, Abzug Committee, etc.) that relate to the Kennedy ;
assassination; and second, CIA records including (a) the CIA's Sequestered Collection
of.63 boxes as well as one box of microfilm records and the microfilm records.(box 64),
and (b) several boxes of CIA staff “working files.”

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ian

Review Board, the ARRB staff, the CIA, and the FBI to complete the signifi icant amount ;
of work that remains; and finally, to provide reasonably consistent standards for the .
review of postponements that would apply equally to CIA: and FBI records..

The following are, in summary form, guidelines for reviewing postponements in the
‘Segregated Collections.” ;

CIA Source and FBI Informant and National Security Asset. Postponements |

There are, of course, similarities and differences between FBI informants and CiA .
sources, Like FBI.informants and national security assets, CIA sources may or may not
be paid for the information that they provide and they may or may not be providers of.
information over the long-term. .When.providing Information to the Bureau, FBI .
informants generally are understood to be cooperating with law enforcement officials for |.
a legal and legitimate purpose. It is often the case; although not always, that FBI
informants understand that at some point their name might surface in conjunction with a
criminal prosecution and that they may need to:testify in court. Foreign CIA sources

and FBI national security. assets, however, are not necessarily deemed to be >»
cooperating with law enforcement officials but may, in fact, be committing the crime of
espionage against their native country by cooperating with US authorities. Furthermore,
unlike FBI informants, CIA sources and FBI national security assets presume that thelr
names will not be released publicly and they certainly presume (in the ordinary course) ~
that thelr identities will not surface in criminal trials. As a practical matter, it is generally
much easier today for the FBI to locate a former informant who resides in the United
States than it Is for the CIA and FBI to locate former sources and national security:

assets.

Despite these differences -- differances which would generally suggest a greater
degree of protection being owed to CIA sources and FBI national security assets -- the
issues in terms of postponements are fundamentally similar.

*The existing “NBR” guidelines allow the Review Board to remove from detailed .
consideration those records or files that truly have no apparent relevance to the
assassination, Nevertheless, a significant number of files in the Segregated Collections
contain records that shed some light on Issues that the HSCA explored as potentially
relevant to the assassination of President Kennedy. The following criteria would apply
to all records In-the Segregated Collections, including records containing sc some NBR
redactions,

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re ee i er

oA Sources a

The Review Board established guidelines, during Its December 1996 meeting, for
handling CIA source iesues and applied those guidelines at the January 1997 meeting.
These guidelines directed the protection of names and identifying information of CIA ~
sources in cases where the identity of the source Is of low public interest or is peripheral
to the JFK assassination. The Board's decision was based on two factors: the:concem -
that since CIA sources generally live outside the United States, they could risk harm If
their identities were revealed. Moreover, many of the sources referenced In CIA.
records appear infrequently and are of relatively fow public interest. Therefore, In
records where the identity of the source Is of Importance for understanding the
assassination, the CIA will be required to provide additional evidence to support the
protection of the source’s identity.° In cases where the identify of the source Is
peripheral to the assassination story, the information will be postponed until 2017.

FBI National Security Assets

FBI national security assets should be treated in the same manner as CIA sources.

FBI informants

informant issues represent the largest category of postponements in the FBI's
Segregated Collection, as they do in the “core” FBI assassination files. They also
provide the greatest opportunity for streamlining the review process, Currently, there
are ten.members of the Bureau’s JFK Task Force who are responsible. for researching
individual informants in response to evidence requests from the Review Board.‘ They
retrieve and review the informants’ files and attempt, through DMV, Social Security, and
other database. searches, to determine if the informant is alive. Under current Review
Board standards for “core” files, this work is necessary to provide evidence to support

_ redacting the informant’s name, regardless of whether the informant provided
Information. Removing the requirement of proving whether informants are alive in the
‘Segregated Collections would free up significant regources that could be deployed tc to
reviewing unprocessed HSCA subject files.

The new approach to HSCA subjects Is to protect Informant-ldentiying information,

3An example would be the case of John Scelso (pseud.), The Board found that
his identity is relevant to the assassination story and CIA offered evidence of a
continuing need to protect the identity. In.this case, “Scelso” documents would.
_ continue to be scheduled for release in five years.

‘Six work full-time on informant evidence, four devote about half their time to
informant evidence, .

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-4-

without requiring the Bureau to make a showing that the informant is alive. This
protection would extend to individuals characterized as symbol-number informants,
“PSls,” “PCls,” “established sources,” “panel sources,” and the like — designations that
indicate an ongoing relationship with the FBI. It would not extend to individuals who

requested that their identity be protected In an isolated contact with the FBI. or to local

and state law enforcement officers.

The. “intormant-identitying: information” to be protected would include the customary
(ie., informant-specific) portions of informant symbo!.numbers and file numbers,
informant: names, and -- at least potentially —- descriptions of, and information recéived
from, the informant. How much, if any, of the latter type of information should be:
redacted would be the principal focus of staff-level discussions with the FBI. The staff's

“principal goal in this process, with regard to each informant, would be to release as

much information that is relevant to understanding the assassination as possible. In .
discussions with the FBI, the staff would be prepared, if necessary, to concede

. redaction of informant-identifying information that is unrelated to the assassination in
order to ensure that more pertinent information is released.®

The presumption will be that an informant’s identity will be released if the informant
provides “positive” information about an assassination-related Issue. To overcome this _
presumption of release for informants with “positive” information, the FBI would need to
make a particularized showing that the identifying information should not be released.

To the extent that an informant's identity is protected, it will be postponed until 2017,

CIA Employee Name Postponements..

Over the past year the CIA has addressed the employee name issue and has released
some names that it had previously asked the Board to postpone. But during that time

_the list of names has grown to a size that had not been imagined at the time the work

began. To date, the Review Board staff has identified in the JFK Collection over 650 .
names of CIA employees. These names appear in more than 1000 documents already
reviewed by the Board and numerous additional records that have not yet been
processed. While some of these employee. names are important to the assassination
story, many appear only a few times in the entire JFK Collection and seem to add Uttle,
if any, important information.

Sin HSCA subjects, there typically will not be information about Ruby, Oswald or
the assassination itself. However, in a file on, for example, Sam Giancana, there may

-be informant reports on Giancana’s support of anti-Castro activities, and reports from

the same informant on day-to-day numbers operations in the Chicago area. The staff
would set a higher priority on telease of the former reports than on the latter.

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— —_— .

ee ea

"+

CIA's argument to protect employee names emphasizes a number of points. . First,
since many employees are “under cover,” the maintenance of that cover is critical to
gathering intelligence. CIA argues that identification of a name can identify the cover
provider and jeopardize operations, Second, although the majority of names are of
retired CIA employees, CIA has a confidentiality agreement with them and many do not
want their past Agency affiliation released, The argument here is that release may
jeopardize business relationships or personal safety. Such:arguments have already.

‘been presented to the Board.  Their.merit can only be determined on a case-by-case

basis. However, due to the volume of names in the JFK Collection, the individual -
review and evaluation of each case would delay significantly the review of documents
and ultimately lead to less total information becoming available to the public.

CIA has proposed, and the Review Board agrees, that CIA employee names be treated

in a manner similar to that applied to Source names: to postpone until 2017 those
employee names that are of low public interest or are of peripheral interest to the
assassination. It will be presumed that employee names will be released If their
identities are important to the assassination story unless the CIA is able to provide
specific information of a potential harm of release. (CIA acknowledges the presumption
of release unless specific evidence is provided to the Review Board that harm to
national security ¢ or to. personal safety would result from the release of the employee
name. 2.)

FBI “Foreign Counterintelligence” Postponements

it is presumed that the FBI will, at least partially, carry over its post-appeal standards for -

disclosing “FCI” activities targeting Communist-bloc nations. To the extent that the
HSCA subjects reflect “FCI activities against other nations that have not been
addressed by the Review Board in the “core” filés, the FBI will be allowed to redact .
direct discussion of such activities, unless the information in the proposed redaction
meaningfully contributes to the understanding of the assassination.

FBI and CIA Foreign Liaison Postponements

The criteria for these postponements would not, in the abstract, depart significantly from
the Review Board's current approach of releasing information received through liaison -
channels, while protecting direct acknowledgment of the source of the information. in
practice, however, the staff would be more flexible in protecting text that implies,
although may not unambiguously state, that a foreign govemment Is the source of
particular information. Nevertheless, the more significant the information Is to any -
assassination-related Issue, the more information n would be released under these

- guidelines.

aves

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_ CIA Stations and:Other Issues

Over the past two years the Review Board has established other guidelines that will
continue to guide the review process, some of which will be outlined here. For CIA

stations, all locations related to the Mexico City story will be released during the period
1960-69. “Outside of that window, they will be released on a case-by-case basis should —

the identity of the station be critical to understanding the assassination. Other stations,
except for those identified as particularly sensitive, will be released from the beginning
of the Kennedy administration until the publication of the Warren Commission report,
(Le., January 1, 1961 to October 1, 1964). Outside of these windows, stations will be
postponed. Cable pretixes, dispatch ‘prefixes, and field report prefixes would be

postponed or released according to the same windows as the stations to which they

refer. CIA job titles also are redactéd or opened along with the Station at which the
officer served.

Crypts would be released along lines similar to other information. ‘All “LI? crypts, except

those considered particularly sensitive would be released through October 1, 1964, as
are "AM" crypts and U.S. goverment crypts. In other aréas, only the digraph Is _
protected. Again, the exception is sensitive crypts, which would be protected in their.
entirety. After October 1, 1964, the presumption shifts towards protection of the crypts,
except those that provide meaningful information about the assassination story. (For
example, crypts pertinent to: Garrison-era documents would likely carry the same _.
presumption of release as those generated during the Warren Commission.)

Surveillance methods will be released if the nature of the surveillance has a material
bearing on information related to the assassination unless CIA provides evidence
demonstrating the political or operational sensitivity, i in which case the Information will
be released In 2017.

santvogsievow.wpd

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"APR 15 "97 @4?55PM USGOVERNMENT “ors

to the Review Board that harm to the national security or toa

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

15 April 1997 _

MEMORANDUM FOR: David G. Marwell
Executive Director
‘Assassination Records Review Board ©

SUBJECT: CIA Employees

x

oo, (We request that this memorandum be returned to CIA *.
once the Review Board has completed its deliberations on the
issues discussed below.) ; t

1. (U) Iegye. The purpose of this memo is to relate '
CIA's concerns to the Review Board regarding the release of
the true names of CIA employees that appear in the JFK
Collection and to present a proposal on how this problem
might be addressed.

.

I. ctyal fa} fe)

2. (U) To date, approximately 600 true names of CIA
employees have been identified in the JFK Collection. Some
of these employees are important to the JFK story, and CIA

‘ will continue to work with the Review Board to release as

many of these names as possible. Many names, however,
appear only a few timea in the entire JFK Collection and
appear | to ada nothing to the historical record.

3. (U) Under guidelines adopted by the Review Board
on or about 20 March 1996, any names of CIA employees are
presumptively released unless CIA provides specific evidence '

the employee would likely result from such release. Singe
these guidelines were adopted, it has become increasingly
clear that the number of names at issue, and, in most cases,
their tenuous connection. to the JFK story, make this 8
approach unworkable with regard to both CIA's obligation to

CL BY: - 2224130

CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM:- HUM 4-82

SECRET

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: ‘APR 15 ’97 @4:S55PM USGOVERNMENT ; P.3/14
SECRET.

Subject: CIA Employees

protect national security information and the Review Board's
duty to inform the public about the JFK assassination in a
timely and accurate fashion. The task of locating and

- informing hundreds of former employees scattered all over
the country and the world has been a formidable one. Some
employees have contacted us to report their concerns about a
“suspicious" letter purporting to be from CIA which they had
received. It would not be surprising, therefore, if many
former employees ignored the letter for similar reasons,
even though they might have legitimate needs to protect
their identities.

4. (U) Contacting every named employee and collecting
information on each of them to present to the Review. Board
will clearly take more time and effort than any of us had
anticipated. This will have obvious ramifications for how
and when the Review Board releases information to the
public. More importantly, the decision to publicly.
acknowledge employees who may have been living for over 30 «
years under cover is a critical one that should be made not _,
by default, but rather by careful planning ‘and .
consideration.

5. (U) Relevant to this discussion is the fact that
the Review Board and CIA have recently agreed upon a policy
for releasing true names of sources of intelligence
information. It was agreed at that time that there would be
a presumption of protecting source names; but in cases where
a source was particularly important to the JFK story and
there was no overriding national security interest, the name
would-be released. Although the CIA recognizes that there
are some sensitivities involved with sources that do not
apply to covert employees, there are also many legal and
operational similarities, which are described herein, that
justify similar treatment by the Review Board. As is-
further detailed in Section Iv, CIA, therefore, proposes
that the Review Board adopt a general policy of protecting
employee names that appear in the Collection,. with .
exceptiona for those individuala whom the Board believes are
important to the JFK story.

II, Legal Considerationg

6. (U) As both covert CIA employees and clandestine’
reporting assets are types of “human sources" of
intelligence, many of the same laws apply. Although Section
11(a) of the JFK Act provides that, when the Act requires
release of information, it takes precedence ovar ail other
laws that would otherwise prohibit release, there are strong
governmental national security interests in protecting the
true names of CIA employees. CIA believes that it is

2

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PR 15 97 G4:56PM USGOVERNMENT

SECRET
Subject: CIA Employees

important for the Review Board to reconsider the laws which
protect classified information, because they clearly reflect
a larger US Government policy to protect covert CIA
employees from disclosure.

7. (U0) By Executive order and statute, the President
and Congress have made the Director of ‘Central Intelligence
responsible for protecting sources of intelligence. In his
Directive of 22 January 1946 that established the Central
Intelligence Group, President Truman made the DCI
responsible for protecting sources.~ With the establishment
of CIA, Congress also gave the DCI this responsibility. The
National Security Act of 1947, Section 103(d) (3),. codified
at 50 USC §403(3) (c) (5), requires the DCI to protect
intelligence sources from unauthorized disclosure. In
addition, §403(3) (d) (2) requires the DCI to ensure that
risks to the United States and those involved in the
collection of intelligence through human sources are
minimized...

a. (U) Protecting the identity of individuals working
for CIA, not only covertly but overtly as well, has been of
particular concern to US lawmakers since the establishment
of the Agency. For example, with Section 6 of the Central
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, 50 USC §403g, Congress ;
specifically exempted the CIA from the provisions of any law
requiring the publication or disclosure of the organization,
functions, names, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel
employed by the Agency.

“9. (U) In 1980, Congress. passed the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) which sets out pretrial,
trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving
or potentially involving classified information. Working .
with the Department of Justice and the courts, CIA has
successfully protected the namea of CIA employees from
public release even in criminal trials where there are
heightened (i.e., constitutional) considerations favoring
disclosure to the defendant of all government information |
relevant to the defense. CIPA allows for in camera ex parte
hearings in which the judge can rule on questions of
admissibility and relevancy of classified information,
including the identity of CIA employees who may have
information pertaining to the defense, before it is
introduced either to the defendant, defense counsel, or in
open court. In some cases involving CIA, the judge has
ordered that CIA information be turned over to the defense,
but only in some unclassified form-such as in’a summary. In
other cases, judges have reviewed the classified information -
and xculed that the harm to national security outweighs the

3

SECRET

P.4714

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os . “APR 15 °97 @4:58PM USGOVERNMENT P.5714
SECRET ‘

Subject: CIA Employees

defendant's legal rights to the information. In still other
cases, the defense wag never notified that CIA even had
information bearing on the case, ag the judge ruled that the
mere fact that CIA possessed this information was classified |
and outweighed any rights the defendant had. Moreover,

under CIPA, the Attorney General has the authority to drop a
prosecution in those cases where the risk to national
security is too great. —

10. (U) In 1982, Congress again acted to protect CIA
employees by passing the Intelligence Identities Protection
Act of 1982, 50 USC §421 that criminalizes the revelation of~"
a covert employee or the identity of a source. This act
subjects anyone who reveals information that identifies a
“covert agent" to prosecution and provides up. to 10 years in
prison and $50,000 in fines as punishment. This act
specifically defines a “covert agent" as including “an
officer or employee of an intelligence agency... ."

11. -(U) Most recently, President Clinton signed
Executive Order 12958 on classified national security
information that became effective in October 1995. Although
it requires generally that agencies make greater
declassification efforts than under the prior executive
order, Executive Order 12958 affords human sources of
intelligence information, which would include employees,
extra protection from the declassification provisions.
Under £.0. 12958, information that is over 25 years old and
having historical value must be declassified within five
years. However, information revealing the identity of a
human source may continue to be protected.

12. .(U). The above federal laws show a long-standing
practice by the US Government to protect CIA employees from
disclosure to the public. In carrying out its statutory
obligations, the Review Board should give serious weight to
this policy and afford the protection of CIA employees a
‘high priority. oo te

IIL, Operational Considerations —

13. (U) For current CIA employees whose names may
appear in the JFK Collection, the operational considerations
for protecting their identity are similar to those for
sources. Many of these employees have worked “under cover"
for CIA. Cover igs used to disassociate entire installations

- and offices from open linkage to intelligence activities, to
enable intelligence personnel to enter and work effectively
in foreign countries, to shield Agency employees and
authorized clandestine activities from attention by hostile
elements and from madia exposure, to facilitate access to

; 4

SECRET

13-00000.
; . “APR 15 ’97 @4:S9PM USGOVERNMENT . P.6714
SECRET

Subject: CIA Employees

certain individuals of intelligence interest, to prevent
embarrassment to host foreign governments, and to permit
plausible denial of CIA's presence and activities in foreign
countries.

14. (U) The ability to maintain one's cover is
erucial to gathering intelligence. In either a "hostile" or
“friendly” country, should the local service become aware of
who the CIA employees are, it would increase surveillance
and make unilateral operations difficult if not impossible.
In some countries, the local $y oenment tolerates the CIA
presence and agrees to work with us as long as the local
population is not aware of the circumstances. Once it
becomes known among the locals that certain US Government
officials are actually CIA, pressure may be placed on the
government to el those Americans, disrupting liaison and
diplomatic relationships. More importantly, covert
employees and their families would face increased risk to
their personal safety. Even in "friendly" countries, our
employees could face some personal risks as well as risks to
ongoing operations from extremists who may be living among
an otherwise benign local population. In any of these
cases, should a covert employee's cover be publicly
compromised, that employee may have to be recalled from the
field; and it could be difficult to place him elsewhere in
an operationally and physically secure location. ‘Thus,
maintaining cover is important to a case officer's
effectiveness and to the continuation of a career with CIA.

15. (8) Maintaining the confidentiality of cover is
also important to cover providers. The Review Board will
recall from prior briefings by the Agency that covert CIA
employees, both in the United States and overseas, can work
under *official" (e.g., State Department) cover or "non-
official” (e.9., private company) cover. Disclosure of a
covert employee would not only be official acknowledgment of
the specific cover mechanism employed by CIA but would also
negatively affect the governmental or business mission: of
the cover provider, especially those who provide non-
official cover. Acknowledgment of an employee who had been
under non-official cover in a host country and possibly in
other countries could have a negative impact on the
provider's business interests and activities. It would also
cast suspicion on that provider's legitimate employees and
their families. Further, exposure of cover providers could
affect the recruitment and cooperation of such providers by
the Agency and Intelligence Community.

16. (8S) Although the majority of names that appear in
the Collection are retired CIA employees, the operational
considerations in revealing their affiliation with CIA are

5

SECRET

13-00000 .
; + *APR 15 797 @S5?QQPM USGOVERNMENT P7714
SECRET

Subject: CIA Employees

not diminished. Similar to sources, many former employees
still do not want their past. affiliation with CIA revealed.
Perhaps their current friends, family, or employers are not.
aware of this past affiliation; and revelation of that fact
could negatively affect personal and professional
relationships. Some former employees still live, overseas
where a revelation of CIA affiliation poses risks to their
personal safety. Other former employees travel overseas on
business, where a revelation of a past CIA affiliation can
threaten their business interests and personal safety.
One example of an amployee in this category is Robert
Fulton, whose name apparently appears only once in the
Collection.. Fulton retired under Department of State cover;
he currently has a consultant business and frequently
travels to China. Release of hia name would jeopardize not
only his business but perhaps even his safety. A similar
example is Walter McCabe, who also retired under State
cover. He is now working in Russia and several East
EBuropean countries for a private firm. He does not want his
name published, because it could be damaging to his current
employer and his professional status.

17. (8). Even if a former employee agrees to the
revelation of his name in the JFK Collection, thia might nor
be possible for other reasons. In some cases, officially
acknowledging a covert employee could threaten ongoing
operations on which that employee worked. Foreign nationals
recruited by the employee and still providing information to —
the US Government would be at risk of exposure. Public
acknowledgment could reveal the location of. CIA stations
where. the employee worked throughout his career, including
some not released by the Review Board. Any individuals who
had substantial contact with a former employee overseas and
may have believed they were legitimately providing
information to a US corporate representative would be upset
to learn they were, in fact, aiding the US Government.

18. (U) Finally, the identification of case officers
by their own service would have a chilling effect on
prospective assets. Prospective assets would be unlikely to
enter into a clandestine relationship with American
intelligence if they believe that CIA does not protect even
its own staff employees from public disclosure.

2Y. Proposal

19. (U) In light of the foregoing, CIA believes it is
important to work toward a general policy of protecting CIA
employees identified in the JFK Collection, with exceptions
made for those individuals who are important to the atory of
the assassination. The Agency proposes that in most cases a

6

SECRET

13-00000
: _ APR 15 ’97 @5:@1PM USGOVERNMENT ; P.8/14
SECRET

' Subject: CIA Employees

substitution for the true name be used. If the Review Board
ida concerned about tracking particular employees throughout
the records, a particular identifying substitution can be
used for a particular employee.

20. (S) CIA believes that this approach will not
undermine the Review Board's. obligations under the JFK Act.
A review of the JFK Collection reveals that approximately 44
‘of the 600 names appear only once in the entire Collection.

_ In such cases, it is difficult to see how the individuals'
identity can add anything of significance to the historical -
record; yet there may be some security concerns still

. associated with these individuals. For example, Arthur H.
Stimson retired under cover and is currently living in
Europe. When the CIA notified him that his name appeared in
the JFK Collection and was subject. to public release, he
told CIA that he was opposed to having his name released and

- believed such a release could pose personal and security
problems. Furthermore, he could not understand why his name
even appeared in the Collection, since he had no
recollection of being involved in anything related to the
assassination.

21. (9) With regard to the approximately 500 names
that appear more than once in the Collection, the vast
‘majority of these individuals played almost no role in the
-OFK story. One example of this is former DO officer
Alexander Brasko. His name appears approximately 20-30
times.in the Collection simply because he signed off on name
trace requests. Mr. Brasko was a covert CIA employee and
retired under cover. The public release of his name would
provide the public with no additional significant
information about JFK. Tom Flores ig another example of a
covert CIA employee whoge name appears in the Collection but
has little or no connection to the JFK story. Flores
retired under cover, is living in South America, and objects
to the release of his name. Mr. Flores' recent letter to
CIA is also attached for your convenience.

22. (8) The Agency, of course, recognizes that some
names may be particularly important to the JFK story
regardless of how frequently or infrequently they appear in
the Collection. One such example is former COS Mexico
Winston Scott who CIA has acknowledged as a CIA employee.

In such cages, the CIA will continue to work with the Review
Board for an appropriate regolution. The CIA proposes that
the Review Board and its staff identify those individuala

- whom it believes are important to the JFK story and whose
names should be released.to the public. These names would —
carry a presumption of release unless specific evidence is
provided to the. Review ‘Board that harm would likely. result

7

SECRET

13-00000

APR 1S 797 @5:@2PM USGOVERNMENT

P.9v14
SECRET

Subject: CIA Employees

from such release. The CIA will conduct the appropriate
searchea to determine whether release would pose national

‘security concerns for the US Government or personal safety

concerna for the individual. In this way, CIA and the Review
Board can concentrate their. efforts on individuals who are
g@ignificant figures in the JFK story, expediting the review
of the sequestered collection.

23. (U) It is our hope that the CIA and the Raview
Board can agree on. and work out a mutually acceptable policy
regarding the identity of CIA employees that will not
undermine the important principle of protecting those who
work covertly for the US Government. My staff and I are
ready to discuss this matter with you at your convenience.

General Counsel.

Attachment
A. Tom Flores", letter

8

SECRET

13-00000

. - + APR 15 797. @5:@3PM USGOVERNMENT P.1a/14
; SECRET
~ ps

“ Subject: CIA Employees

DCI/OGC/LD/LCCipriani 76124 (10 Apr 97)
0GC-97-50971 -

Distribution: .
Original - Addressee
- a
Lit File - LDGO0021
Lcc Signer
RDC - FYI
OGC Registry

Bee

9
SECRET

13-00000

a Secret
26 June 1997

Memorandum to: Jeremy Gunn

ARRB Staff

’ From: Barry Harrelson

JFK Project Office

CIA/CSI/HRG ©
Subject: Employee Names Scheduled for ARRB Review
Reference: 201 File and “A” Names Lists

(We request that this memorandum and its attachments be
returned to CIA once the Review Board has completed its
deliberations on the names discussed below.)

1. The above reference lists identify the protected CIA
employee names in the Oswald 201 file and on the ARRB ;
staff's key figures list scheduled for action by the ARRB at
its.9-10 July 1997 meeting. This memorandum is a partial \
response to the ARRB's request for evidence and addresses
those individuals on the list currently employed by the
Agency and the changes in status of names.

201 List

Current employees requiring continued protection. “(see
attached Cover Staff reports):

Walter C. D'Andrade (Andrade, FNU)
‘Robert J. Austin
Robert F. Litviak

Release: - FNU Coplewood

, Joan Field
N. Judkins
FNU Patten
Harrison L Scott
Carl Trettin
W. Walker

Corrections: Remove Kurt Johansson (source) --
incorrectly identified as an employee
Add Barbara Graham. (B. Graham) --
incorrectly dropped from latest list

CL BY: °©611637

CL REASON: 1.5(c)
DECL ON: X1
DRV FRM: COV 2-87

SECRET

13-00000 a 2 a so
_— ; Secret

‘Figures (A) List

Release: — FNU Connally
FNU Feinglass |
Daniel. Flores
Lorna McKay
George Misko
' David Wilsted

; 2. For the remaining 38 names on the lists, we will
provide evidence supporting their cover status and the need
for continued protection as available. By ‘7 July you should
have either specific evidence or a status of sgearch
statement for each individual. ;

Barry Harreison

Attachments:

Cover history printouts (3) [available in CIA SCIF]

SECRET

13-00000

ee

“

§

¢ .

~

CONFIDENTIAL.

wm Lona

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1. 1, aecton Moubras Lal oem TE, understand that upon enter-

"ing on duty with the Central Intelligence Agency I am undertaking a posi-

tion of trust in that Agency of the Government responsible to the Presi-
dent and the National Security Council for intelligence relating to the
security of the United States of America. I understand that in the.
course of my employment I will acquire information about the Agency and
its activities and about intelligence acquired or “produced by the Agency.

2. I have read and understand the provisions of the Espionage Act, Title

18, USC, secs. 793 and 794, and I am aware that unauthorized disclosure
of classified information relating to the national defense may subject

me to prosecution for violation of that Act, whether such disclosure be |
made while I am an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency or at any
time thereafter. . ,

3. In addition, however, as I am undertaking a position of trust, I have
a responsibility to the Central Intelligence Agency not to diselose any ,
classified information relating to the Agency without proper authoriza-
tion. I. undertake, therefore, not to discuss with or disclose to any
person not authorized to hear it such information relating to the Central

Intelligence Agency, its activities, or to intelligence. material under

the control of the Agency. I further understand that this undertaking
is a condition of my employment with the Central Intelligence Agency, that
its violation may subject me to immediate dismissal for cause or other
appropriate disciplinary action, and that this undertaking shall be equally

binding upon me after my employment with the Agency as during it.

4, I understand that the burden is upon me to ascertain whether or not
information is classified and if so, who is authorized to receive it,
and, therefore, I will obtain the decision of authorized. officials of
the Agency on these points prior to disclosing information relating to
the Agency, and failure to obtain such a decision will be grounds for my
dismissal.

5. I understand that my unauthorized action or utterance in the nature

of a publication or which would reasonably be expected to result. in pub-
licity on intelligence or intelligence activities would be in violation

of Government and Agency regulations and would be grounds for -my dismissal.

~ CONFIDENTIAL
FORM NO- 368 oasoLeTE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

1 DEC 55

13-00000

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

6. I understand that, for all grievances and complaints there are estab-
lished procedures within the-Agency permitting appeal by any employee of
the Agency and to carry any such grievance or. complaint outside the Agency
will be considered a violation of the undertaking set forth above in
paragraph 3... If the appeal procedures are inadequate in any situation,

I am aware that the Inspector General is at all times available to any
employee with a legitimate criticism, grievance, or complaint.

7. I further understand -and agree that my employment by the Central In-
telligence Agency is conditioned upon my understanding of and strict

_ compliance with CIA Security Regulations, and the appendices thereto.

8. Inasmuch as employment by the Government is a privilege not a right, ~

-~in consideration of my employment by CIA I undertake not to publish or

participate in the publication of any information or material relating to
the Agency, its activities or intelligence activities generally, either
during or after the term of my employment by the Agency without specific
prior approval by the Agency.

9. I agree that all information or intelligence acquired by me in con-
nection with my official duties with the Central Intelligence Agency
remains the property of the United States of America, and I will sur-.
render, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Agency or upon -
separation from the Agency, any material relating to such information |
and intelligence in wy possession.

10. I take the obligations set forth above freely, without any mental
reservations or purpose of evasion.

ZB

; . . . : -
_IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have set my hand and seal this 7 day of

. Sely » 1962.
Vater Meeabats fpfpue “(seal)

Witness:
JUL 1962

YE ne cacy

CONFIQENTIAL

13-00000

‘

Se i
- oe .

2. THE. UNCLASSIFIED SAE, COORDINATED |
CCS/0SB, tS AS FOLLOUS: ' " PRAFT nme te

__ SUMMARY: | TRILINGUAL SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE OFFIC
(DEPARTMENT OF STATE 1962-1990) WITH EXTENSIVE EXPERIENCE
WORKING WITH THE U.S. CONGRESS, MORE THAN 16 YEARS WORKING AND
LIVING IN LATIN AMERICA (ECUADOR, URUGUAY, ARGENTINA, BRAZIL,

“PERU AND. MEXICO). ELEVEN OF THOSE YEARS WERE IN SUPERVISORY
"ANO SENIOR MANAGEMENT POSITIONS. RECEIVED A SENIOR EXECUTIVE
: SERVICE AWARD FOR HAVING MADE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTIONS “TO

OVERALL RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS HOUSE COMMITTEES CONCERNED Lye

WITH FOREIGN POLICY (TO INCLUDE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVIC
APPROPRIATIONS,. SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, er Leet
COMMITTEE ON NARCOTICS, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS). THIS WAS
COMPLEMENTED BY INDIVIDUAL LETTERS OF COMMENDATION FROM
MAJORITY AS WELL AS MINORITY MEMBERS OF THOSE COMMITTEES. IN
MEXICO, MAINTAINED. FRUITFUL CONTACT WITH CABINET MEMBERS AND
WAS A nAdOR PLAYER IN THE 01 ALOGUE AND POLICY GUIDANCE- BUILDING
OTIA Ml

Connect Ratt) GOTIATIONS AGREEMENT AND ENSUING
DETAILS: -42° tO Loe

ode .

-TOP SECRET AND SPECIAL COMPARTMENTED CLEARANCES.

“DRAFTER AND/OR COORDINATOR ON MYRIAD POLICY, POSITION
AND GUIDANCE PAPERS IMPACTING ON US PUSLIC AND PRIVATE SECTOR
- RELATIONSHIPS WITH MEXICO. MAJOR PLAYER IN ENSURING THAT
HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG. FULLY UNDERSTOOD. THE. COMPLEXITIES OF
THE EVOLVING POLITICAL ANO ECONOMIC SITUATION IN MEXICO.

; ~DAILY INTERLOQUTOR WITH MEXICAN CABINET OFFICERS
DURING SLIGHTLY LESS THAN FOUR YEARS IN MEXICO CITY.

-IN PREVIOUS WASHINGTON ASSIGNMENT, OEALT EXTENSIVELY
WITH THE FULL RANGE OF FOREIGN POLICY ELEMENTS OF THE USG.
GAVE IN HOUSE AS WELL AS NUMEROUS INTER AGENCY SPEECHES ON A
VARIETY OF MATTERS OF MUTUAL CONCERN.

~1980-1984 ~- FLAGGED. TRE THEN EMERGING SENDERO LUMINOSO
AS A SERIOUS THREAT TO PERUVIAN SECURITY AND WAS THE FIRST
SENIOR OFFICIAL TO INSIST THAT PERUVIAN COCA PRODUCTION WAS TEN
TIMES THE PREVIOUS ESTIMATES. (SADLY, BOTH OBSERVATIONS HAV
TURNED OUT TO BE ALTOGETHER ACCURATE.) . .

~IN 1978-1980 PERIOD, WORKEO FOR THE OFFICE OF
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES FOR OVERALL RELATIONS
WITH ALL COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RECEIVED
A SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE AWARO AND EFFUSIVE LETTERS OF
APPRECIATION FROM MEMBERS OF SIX COMMITTEES. ,

-IN VARIOUS MANAGEMENT POSITIONS, TWICE WAS IN CHARGE
OF UNITS WHICH EXCEEDED TWO HUNDRED PERSONS. HIRED, FIRED, ©
NEGOTIATED, AND PROVIDED ADVICE, GUIDANCE “AND DIRECTION AS
APPROPRIATE. .

tose

SECRET

SecRET

re

Ay r

13-00000

EN ce ae

I understand that the Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
defines the outer limits of what I may disclose to unauthorized

persons concerning my employment by the Central Intelligence

‘Agency. I further understand that disclosure of information

about my Agency employment which is not contained in my SAE may
constitute. a violation of my Secrecy Agreement. I promise that
all statements which I make to unauthorized. persons concerning

my Agency employment will be consistent with my, SAE and limited

by its content.

Lex O93 [lat 7 fl

Date Signature

13-00000

a
OCcc-95-149
87 vee 1895

MEMORANDUM FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Boar¢

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations
Associate Deputy Director for. Operations/Human
Resources and Programs

FROM: Eric L. Qualkenbush
Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release of names of
individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or
separated employees. .As described below, this action would
breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed. to work
under cover in addition to breaching our obligations. to the cover
providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement (Attachment A) upon
entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the
employee’s secrecy to information which is classified and has not
-been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and requires the
employee to protect such information from unauthorized
disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in
force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities
of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well
‘as legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency
policy to protect the names of former employees who have
separated under cover unless the Agency. and the employee mutually
agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees
who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,
Department of State or the “ABC” Corporation, for their entire
Agency career as well as into their years after separation from
the Agency, jeopardizes: :

e the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING... NOTICE os CL 0489932

INTELLIGENCE SOWRCES CL REASON: 1.5. (c)
OR METHODS INVOLVED ; DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SECRET

13-00000
~ . SECRET *

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

e the second careers of former employees;

e the cover and identity of other employees who worked
with the covert employee whose name is released as.
CIA; and,

e the protection of sources and methods (what
individual would agree to a clandestine relationship
with American intelligence knowing the secret
association would become public knowledge?) .

4. Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will
affect. individuals follows:

e Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State
cover and is currently working in Russia and several
Eastern European countries for a private firm which
converts “wartime” factories into peacetime use.
Revealing his name would damage his relationship
with his current employer, his position with the
firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host
countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's
acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied
as.a CIA employee and Attachment C is his signed
secrecy agreement.

e Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.
John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which
shows that he was aware that he would be denied as
an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from
the date he entered on duty through the date of his
departure. Attachment E is a personal letter
received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that
his name might be released in connection with
declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is.
Mr. Whitten’s signed secrecy agreement. It should
be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.

e Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE)
written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the
Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr.
Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in
-hig, SAE and understands disclosure of other ©
infortratdon would be in violation of his secrecy

~ 2

“ SECRET

13-00000

. SECRET ‘

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer’s signed
secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.
Palmer resides in Mexico.

5. Our relationship with cover providers would be
jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing
cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well
raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing
importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of
private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector
would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if
we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert
relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency
operations which in turn could severely damage national security.
In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities
and substantial monetary damages.

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency’s
regulation on cover. It states that “cover is required for all
Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including
‘personnel in PCS or TDY status.” HR 240-2, the Agency’s
regulation on cover after separation, states that “the
determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his
or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon
the judgment that separation in an overt status could result in
damage to the national security by compromising intelligence
sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm
to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-
by-case basis.” Please note that all Agency employees who retire
abroad must retire under cover.

7. Release of names of former employees who separated under
‘cover will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and
detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct
sometimes dangerous. activities necessary to carry out the:
Agency’s mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK
Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for
public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true
names of former Agency employees adds no value to the documents
in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from
our public detractors. "We propose and emphatically encourage
that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk
officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish ©
the impact of the documents. _

7 mR og,

TO 3

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET '

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

8. After your review and consideration of the above
information, we would appreciate notification of your final

decision prior to taking any action.

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Attachments:
As stated above

CONCUR:
Christine W. Wiley
nristine W. Wiley DEC 0 8 8
Associate Deputy Director for Date

Operations/Human Resources
and Programs

David N. Ea, ..

Associate Deputy Director for
Operations

Date, PES 81995 .

7 : 4

SECRET

13-00000

SECRET:

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board’

DC/OCC/OS G/EMathias: lae/37076 (6 Dec 95)

“Distribution:

Orig & 1 -

PPR PEO RPP
1

JFK Assassination Records Review Board
IMS/HRS ;
ADDO

ADDO/HRP

DDO Secretariat

DO/IRO

-OGC/LD - Linda ‘Cipriani

occ Chron’
occ/OSG Chron a
OCC/OSG File 785-120-034

— 5

SECRET

13-00000

DEC 11°95 11:14AM

P.1

4 ~

FAX

To: Mr. Bury Hanetsca
Fax®& — (703) 351-2114

_ Subject: Decomber mocdng

Date; December 11, 1995

Pages: 3, including this cover sheet,

COMMENTS:

The types of information thatthe Rourd necds to know about each ofthe truc names on
the attached Ust for which CLA seeks continued protection are listed below:

1 a the individual a current or former CLA employee? If so, in what capacity
did that individual serve, and dld he or aha serve overtly or ccwertly? if
currently a retired CIA employee, did the individual retire under cover?

2. Ifnata CIA officer, dld the Individual verve CIA 08 an agent or asset oe in any
other capacity? -

4. Is the individual alive or dead? alive when ee o he eng and wha
is his or her current activity?

4. Wiatepeic an camping dmg wold asf i individual's true
namic pose to him or her at this time?

Of oun, yx donot do nyhng oer thn Hay ase ndvdua whos
true names CIA no longer saake to protect.

| - Sec ret Alach nent = -

a
ToetvicalAaltut or Aman Sah enna
Assateination Boer!

' Swider

_ WL. OBrien.
; 104-10017-10042

PNU. Patten
104-10015-10163
104-10016-10006
104-10015-10138

Dave

Milly Rodsiguay.
104-10095-10001

Jane Roman
104-10015-10163

Tom

D.W. Schroeder

i

Forrest Shivers

104-10017-10031

‘Mr. Snight  -
* 104-]0015-10143

Mr. Swenson
104-10015-10233

104-10015-10298

: Reardon :
104-10095-10001

Ryan
104-10018-10096

_ 194-10017-10042

SECRET’
De, Stangjevic
_ 104-10017-10001
Borla Tarnsoff , -
104-10095-10001
——
104-10018-10062

RT, Wabh © ;
'104-10015-10386
(Sanse as Mr, Walsh in
104-10017-100357)

T. Ward .
104-10004-10257

Franklin Anthony Wheelock Garcia
104-10015-10192

Zeltnes Rick
104-10017-10056

SECRET

13-00000

7

dae awews

B

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' Chaslone Abarg

104-10018-10089
104-10095-10004

Ray Brewer
104-10015-10001

Peter Buranowsk! .

~ 104-10016-10013

104-10016-10033

Leona Cotter

104-10018-10099

Dasinti

|: 104-10018-10062

104-10015-10043
DeSanti .

104-10018-10062

104-10015-10305

PL, Dilloa _
104-10017-10042

jaquero .
"104-10017-10052

Flick *
104-10095-10001

104-10015-10043

104-10017-10082

Harvey
104-10015-10158

104-10018-10062

William Johnsoa

104-10015-10396
(“Johnson® released ig 104-10015-

10375)

Jim Jung

“Tom Keenan

104-10017-10002

104-10095-10001

Pam Lee

~ 104-10015-10160

104-10015-10110

104-10015-10339

_ Anne McDonnell

104-10015-10155

SECRET _.

13-00000

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13-00000

~

SECRET

; Occ-95-149
07 bEC 1995

MEMORANDUM = FOR: JFK Assassination Records Review Board

VIA: Associate Deputy Director for Operations. .
Associate Deputy Director for Operations/Human
Resources and Programs

FROM: _ Eric L. Qualkenbush
Chief, Office of Central Cover

SUBJECT: Proposed CIA Name Release

1. The Agency strongly objects to the release: of names of
individuals presently under cover, whether active employees or
separated employees. As described below, this action would .
breach Agency commitments to these individuals who agreed to work |
under cover in addition to breaching our obligations to the cover
providers.

2. Employees sign a secrecy agreement. (Attachment A) upon
entering on duty with the Agency. This agreement pledges the
employee's secrecy to information which is classified and has not
been publicly acknowledged by the Agency and.requires the

employee to protect such information from unauthorized
disclosure. This secrecy agreement, as long as it remains in
force by mutual agreement, obliges CIA to protect the identities
of Agency employees, our cover providers and covert activities.

3. Because this secrecy agreement creates a moral as well
as. legal bond between the Agency and the employee, it is Agency: —
policy to protect the names of former employees who have
separated under cover unless the Agency and the employee mutually
agree to remove the cover. Identifying as CIA those employees
who are mandated by the Agency to use a cover story, i.e.,
Department of State or the “ABC” Corporation, for their entire
Agency career as well as into their years after separation from

"the Agency, jeopardizes:

e the personal safety of former employees;

WARNING NOTICE: CL 0489932

INTELLIGENCE SOURCES CL REASON: 1.5 (c)
OR METHODS INVOLVED ; DECL ON: X1

DRV FROM: COV 2-87

SECRET

13-00000

at

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to. JFK Assassination Records Review Board

the second careers of former emplovees;

the cover and. identity of other employees who worked
with the covert employee whose name is released as
CIA; and, =.

the protection of sources and methods (what
individual would agree to a clandestine relationship
with American intelligence knowing the secret
association would become public knowledge?) .

4, Examples of how identifying covert employees as CIA will
affect individuals follows:

Mr. Walter McCabe retired under Department of State
cover and is currently working in Russia and several
Eastern European countries for a private firm which
converts “wartime” factories into peacetime use.
Revealing his name would damage his relationship .
with his current employer, his position with the
firm and would be awkward at best regarding the host
countries. Attachment B is Mr. McCabe's
acknowledgement that he was aware he would be denied
as a CIA employee and Attachment. Cis his signed |
secrecy agreement.

Attachment D is a signed ackowledgement from Mr.
John Whitten who retired under cover in 1970 which
shows that he was aware that he would be denied as
an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from
the date he entered on duty through the date. of his |

-departure. Attachment E is a personal letter

received from Mr. Whitten after he was notified that

-his name might be released in connection with

declassification of CIA documents. Attachment F is
Mr. Whitten’s signed secrecy agreement. It should
be noted that Mr. Whitten resides in Austria.

Attachment G is a Summary of Agency Employment (SAE) -

. written by Mr. Morton M. Palmer and approved by the

Agency. Attachment H is a certification by Mr.
Palmer that he will abide by what is contained in
his SAE and understands disclosure of other
information would be in violation of his secrecy

2

SECRET

13-0000

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

agreement. Attachment I is Mr. Palmer’s signed
secrecy agreement. It should be noted that Mr.
Palmer resides in Mexico. ‘

5. Our relationship with cover providers would be
jeopardized if it became publicly known that they were providing
cover to CIA employees. The Department of State could very well
raise objections to our future use of State cover. Of increasing
importance to the Agency at this time is the critical use of
private sector (nonofficial) cover providers. The private sector
would no doubt drop contact and avoid future dealings with us if
we reveal a covert relationship. Identifying covert
relationships with cover providers would paralyze Agency
operations which in turn could severely damage national security.

-In addition, in the past it has exposed CIA to legal liabilities

and substantial monetary damages.

6. Headquarters Regulation (HR) 240-1 is the Agency’s
regulation on cover. It states that “cover is required for all
Agency operations, activities and installations abroad, including
personnel in PCS or TDY status.” HR 240-2, the Agency’s

regulation on cover after separation, states that-“the

determination that an employee will retain all or a part of his
or her cover after separation from the Agency will be based upon
the judgment that separation in an overt .status could result in
damage to the national security by compromising intelligence ©
sources, methods, activities, and/or information, or cause harm
to foreign relations. This determination will be made on a case-
by-case basis.” Please note that all Agency employees who retire

‘abroad must retire under cover.

.7. Release of names of former employees who separated under
cover. will make the entire Agency cover program vulnerable and

_ detract from our continuing efforts to enhance cover and conduct

sometimes dangerous activities necessary to carry out the
Agency’s mission. We can accept the purpose of the JFK
Assassination Records Review Act to declassify documents for
public consumption; however, we submit that the release of true

names of former. Agency employees adds no value to the documents

in addition to risking physical harm to these individuals from
our public detractors. We propose and emphatically encourage
that pseudonyms, aliases or generic job descriptions such as desk
officer be used in place of true names which would not diminish
the impact of the documents.

3

SECRET

13-00000

’

Associate

SECRET

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board.

8. After your review and consideration of the above .
information, we would appreciate notification of your final

decision. prior to taking any action.

Eric L. Qualkenbush

Attachments:
As stated above

CONCUR:

Operations/Human Resoyrces
and Programs

. oe i: C , 7 —, a ;
nl thy — 6 ki eS
’ Associate Deputy Director. for : Date °

Operations

4

SECRET

13-00000

a rs

a .

SECRET |

SUBJECT: Memo to JFK Assassination Records Review Board

DC/OCC/OSG/EMathias:lae/37076. (6 Dec 95)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 -

PPPBPE NEE
\

JFK Assassination Records Review Board

' IMS/HRS-

ADDO

_ ADDO/HRP

DDO Secretariat

DO/IRO ~

OGC/LD - Linda Cipriani

occ Chron

occ/OSG Chron .
occ/OSG File 785-120-034 . ‘

5

SECRET

13-00000

“ , c
Hy
- CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)
Tape meg
. “Alem |
SECRECY OATH
I, John M. Whitten » am about to terminate my association

with the Central Intelligence Agency. I realize that, by virtue of my duties

. with that Agency, I have been the recipient of. information and intelligence which

concerns the present and future security of the United States of America.. I am
aware that the unauthorized disclosure of such information is prohibited by the
Espionage Laws (18 USC secs. 793 and 794), and by the National Security Act of
1947 which specifically requires the protection of intelligence sources and

‘methods from unauthorized disclosure. Accordingly, I SOLEMNLY SWEAR, WITHOUT

MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF DURESS, AS FOL-
LOWS:

1. I will never divulge, publish, or reveal ty writing, word, conduct, cr
otherwise, any. information relating to the national defense and security and
particularly information of this nature relating to intelligence sources, meth-
ods and operations, and specifically Central Intelligence Agency operations,
sources, methods, personnel, fiscal data, or security measures to anyone, in-
cluding but not limited to, any future governmental or private employer, private

-citizen, or other Government employee or official without the express written

consent of the Director of Central Intelligence or his authorized representative.

2. I have been invited to submit in writing any monetary claims which I-
may have against CIA or the United States Government which may in any way neces-
sitate the disclosure of information described herein. I have been advised that
any such claims will receive full legal consideration. In the event, however,
that I am not satisfied with the decisions of CIA concerning any present or
future claims I may submit, I will not take any other action to obtain satis-
faction without prior written notice to CIA, and then only in accordance with
such legal and security advice as CIA will promptly furnish me.

3- I do not have any documents or materials in my possession, classified
or unclassified, which are the property of, or in custodial:responsibility of
the Central Intelligence Agency, having come into my possession as a result of

my duties with the Central Intelligence Agency, or otherwise.

4, During my exit processing and during my period of employment with the
Central Intelligence Agency I have been given an opportunity to report all in-
formation about the Agency, its personnel, and its operations which I consider
should receive official cognizance. Hence, I am not aware of any information,
which it is my duty in the national interest to disclose to the Central Intel-
ligence Agency, nor am I aware of any violations or breaches of security which
I have not officially reported, except as set forth on the reverse “side of this
sheet or on other attachments.

CONFIDENTIAL

FORM USE PREVIOUS .
: : (12)

4-62 305 EDETION.

SECRECY AGREEMENT

1, I,.JOHN M. Witten, understand that by virtue of my duties in the

Central Intelligence Group, I may be the recipient of information and intelligence

which concerns the present and future security of the United States: and which be-

_ longs ‘to the United States. This information and intelligence, together with the

methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to standards set
in the State, War, and Navy Departments. JI have read and understand the pro-
visions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as amended,
conceming the disclosure of information relating to the National Defense md I.
am familiar with the penalties provided for violation. thereof, »

2. I agree that I do not now, nor ‘shall I ever possess any right, interest,
title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of
collecting or handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by
virtue of my connection with the Central Intelligence Group, but shall always
recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such
mat ters.

3. Ido solemnly swear that I will never divulge, publish nor reveal either
by word, coriduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence

‘ or knowledge, except in the performmee of my official duties and in accordance

with the Laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in~ .
each case by the Director of Central Intel Ligence.

lee I understand that no change in my assignment or employment will relieve |

a of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will

remain binding upon me even after the termination of my services with the United

' Stated. .

Se I understand that my employment by the Central Intelligence Group is
conditioned upon my understanding of and strict compliance with "Security
Regulations cle, " and the appendices thereto.

6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose
of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set my hand ‘and seal this » Bada of AUG z UST u 196%

Ph. Le (Seal}

Sworn to before me this aoindiay of

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at:

MY Commmniasion i ;
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RETIREMENT AND- RESIGNATION EXIT COVER BRIEFING |

Name (Last, first,middle) ' : STAFF OR DIVISION ccs FILE NG.

Fi/ors | 386%.

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13-00000

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OP inn teal Vien, oes

SENSITIVE. SPECIAL, OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS

LIST RELATIVES EMPLOYED @Y CIA ‘ . CIA AWARDS

MEDALLION | CERTIFICATE OF DISTINCTION

INTELLIGENCE MEDAL |” LENGTH OF SERVICE CERT.
OTHER (specify)

| | EMPLOYEE HAS seen] | pectareo | —_—‘| COMPROMISED

CREDIT BUREAU RECORDS INDICATE Ta | wow GERET NONAGENCY

THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY ON PAGE 1 (S THE ACTUAL DESCRIPTION OF SERVICE. THE EMPLOYMENT HISTORY BELOW 15 THE COVER
STORY CONTRIVEO FOR USE AFTER DEPARTURE FROM AGENCY EMPLOYMENT. .

DATE

AREA
OF ASSIGNMENT


13-00000

wike A _NEE twsunanee —_—____ CONVERT

, ee - DEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

'T acknowledge that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff | on the date
noted below and do understand that I will be _

as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency from the date I entered on duty through

the cate of departure in accordance with instructions as outlined above.

= have deen informed as to the employment references applicable in ny case.

SIGNATURE

REMARKS

. COORDINATION ; . : |

FINAL APPROVING AUTHORITY

SECRET © oo | ae

13-00000
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BANKING INSTRUCTIONS

FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN 8Y COVER OFFICER

BLOCK RECORDS IN OFFICE OF PERSONNEL [Xx] vs] ves]
NOTIFY OFFICE OF FINANCE TO. HANDLE THE CSC COMPUTATION FORMS IN A COVERT ane
MANNER FOR BLOCKING RECORDS AT CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

ve i CREDIT UNION QUERRIED

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE

FORWARDING ADORESS NEW EMPLOYMENT ADORESS

IDENTITY AND ADORESS OF EMERGENCY CONTACT

tF SUBJECT HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE 010 SUBJECT USE?

SUBJECT MAS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER DOCUMENTATION (OENTIFY OOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.

ANNUITY PAYMENT TO BE CHANNELED BY BANK TRANSFER

CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS: 1099 MAILING INSTRUCTIONS

: SUMMARY OF re OATE RECEIVED “| DATE. APPROVED :
“AGENCY EMPLOYMENT : a
cREDITS

SHOULD NOTICE or RESIGNATION BE se nestitrevep _PNHOUSE

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13-00000

. *h . . : onan ; 7 . . al oy
} toe tl « , . ios ‘A «
; SECURITY REMINDER

i ee an

I, _ Walter C. McCabe shave “been reminded
that, by virtue of my duties with the Central Intelligence
Agency, I have been the recipient of classified information and
information concerning intelligence sources and methods, and —
that my. Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement requires me to pro-.
tect such data. Moreover, I have been given an opportunity to
review my Entrance on Duty Secrecy Agreement.

2. I have also been reminded that I ‘am not permitted to.
retain any documents or other materials which are the property
of the CIA or the custodial responsibility’ of CIA, and I affirm
that I do not have in my possession, nor am I taking away from
CIA any such documents or materials.

3. Finally, I am aware of my responsibility to notify the
_CIA promptly in the event I am called upon by properly constituted
authorities to testify or provide information that I am pledged
not to disclose and I will advise said authority of my secrecy
agreement and request that my obligation to testify be established
before I am required to. do so.

‘Witness:

FORM 30 GCSSOLETE PREVIOUS |
£-97 5 cortions

13-00000 (
: ft (— SECRECY AGREEMENT
, . ‘ . : . ' ' * ° .
' hbo (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my.

being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central, Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of
the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the‘ ‘Central Intelligence Agency’),
the obligations contained in this agreement.

2. L understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency I may be
given access to information which is classified in accordance with the standards set forth. in Executive Order 12065 as
amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive Order, and other information which, if disclosed in an unauthorized
manner, would jeopardize foreign intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by being granted
access to such information I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become obligated to protect. the
information from unauthorized disclosure.

3. In consideration for being employed or otherwise retained to provide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, |
hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form or any manner any of the following categories of information or
materials. to any person not authorized by the Central Intelligence Agency. to receive them:

a. information which is classified pursuant to Executive Order and which I have obtained during the course of my
employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency;

b. information, or materials which reveal information, classifiable pursuant to Executive Order and obtained by me _
in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency but which, because of
operational circumstance or oversight. is not formally marked as classified in accordance with such Executive Order
and which I know or have reason to know has not been. publicly acknowledged by the Agency;

c. information obtained by me in the course of my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence
Agency that identifies any person or organization that presently has or formerly has had a relationship with a United
States foreign intélligence organization, which relationship the United States Government has taken affirmative
measures to conceal.:.

4. I understand thatthe burden will be upon me to learn whether information or materials within my control are
~? :.’ .eonsidered by the Central- ‘Intelligence Agericy' to fit:the descriptions 'sét forth in paragraph 3; et whom the Agency has
authorized to receive it.”

5. As a further condition of the special confidence and trust reposed in me by the Central Intelligence Agency, I
hereby agree to submit for review by the Central Intelligence Agency all information or materials including works of fiction
which contain any mention .of intelligence data or activities, or contain data which may be based upon information
classified pursuant to Executive Order, which [ contemplate disclosing publicly or which I have actually prepared for public
disclosure, either during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency or at any time thereafter,
prior to discussing it with/or showing it to anyone who is not authorized to have access to it. I further agree that [ will not
take any steps toward public disclosure until I have received written permission to do so from the Central Intelligence
Agency.

6. I understand ‘tha 4 purpose of the review described in paragraph 5 is to give the Central Intelligence Agency an
opportunity to. determin’ ‘bet ther the information or materials. which 1 contemplate disclosing publicly contain any
information which I have.agre at to disclose. 1 further understand that the Agency will act upon the materials I submit
and make a response_to. ‘mer withinra. -yeasonable time. : ; ape See

ga

. Lunderstand that? CAlinteeiao. or materialg which I may. acquire in the colitse of 7 my employment or other service
with the Central Intelligenée Agency which fit the descriptions set out in paragraph’3 of this agreement are and will remain
the property of the United States Government. J agree to surrender all materials® ‘reflecting such information which may
have come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of my employment or other service with the Central
Intelligence Agency, upon demand by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligence Agency, or upon the conclusion of
my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event that I am called upon by judicial or
congressional authorities to testify about, or provide, information which I have agreed herein not to disclose.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligeace activities which I
consider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President or to any
successor body which the’ “President may establish. | recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such
matters to the attention of the AgencySinspector General or to the Director of Central Intelligence. I further understand

“that any information which I may report to the Intelligence Oversight Board continues to be subject to'this agreement for all
other purposes and that such reporting does not constitute public disclosure or declassification of that information. -

FORM OBSOLETE PREVIOUS . _*
9-79 368 EDITIONS, .

each case by the Director of Central Intelligence.

ft | RestRicTeD = 70978

SECRECY AGREEMENT

. 1. I, Na (hus Att Mc Cre , understand that by virtue of my duties in
the Central Intelligence Agency, I may be the recipient of information and intel-

ligence which concerns the present and future security of the United States and

which. belongs. to. the United States. ‘This information and intelligence, together cm
with the methods of collecting and handling it, are classified according to

security standards set by the Central Intelligence Agency. I have read and under- —
stand the provisions of the Act of Congress of June 15, 1917 (Espionage Act), as

amended, concerning: the disclosure of information relating to.the National Defense

‘and I am familiar with the penalties provided for violation thereof.

2. I. agree that I do not: now, nor shall I ever possess any right, interest,
title or claim in or to any of the information or intelligence or the methods of
collecting or. handling of it which has come or shall come to my attention by
virtue of my. connection with the Central. Intelligence Agency, but shall always
recognize the property right of the United States of America in and to such
matters.

3% Ido eolemly swear that I will never divulge, publish 1 nor reveal either
by word, conduct, or by any other means such classified information, intelligence”
or knowledge, except in the performance of my official duties and in accordance
with the laws of the United States, unless specifically authorized in writing in

4, ‘I understand that. no change in my assignment or employment will relieve ee
me of my obligation under this oath and that the provisions of this oath will .

’ remain binding upon me. even after the termination of my services with the United

States.

“Ss. I understand that my -employment by the Central Intelligence ‘Agency is
conditioned upon my. understanding of and strict compliance with "Security Regula-
tions CIA", and the appendices thereto.

‘6. I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or pur-
pose of evasion.

In witness whereof I have set. my hand and seal wna ZL1 day oc Lobuuady 19. SS

Witnessed by me this/ © ey

at WASHINGTON, D 0, .

oo Cbisee B. anton

A eee cade

FORM HO.
OCT 1959. 99-33

RESTRICTED

13-00000

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REIGN TRAVEL PLANS

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'
| .

NSITIVE. SPECIAL, OR COVERT SITE ASSIGNMENTS

. EMPLOYEE HAS not BEEN DECLARED‘ OR COMPROMISED

EMPLOYEE HAS “BEEN [| DECLARED {| compromised (specify)

BACKSTOPPING is NECESSARY CLIVE REASON

COVER BRIEFING

ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY EMPLOYMENT FOR COMPLETE PERIOD OF ASSIGNMENT

DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE AGENCY €MPLOYMENT, FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED SELOW

ACKNOWLEDGE PARTIAL AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS INDICATED GZLOW

‘E EMPLOYMENT HISTORY SELOW is THE COVER STORY CONTRIVED FOR USE AFTER SEPARATION FROM THE AGENCY.

oaTe AREA TYPE OF : ; .
FROM OF ASSICNMENT COVER. COVER ORGANIZATION Jor TITLE

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FOLLOW-UP ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY COVER OFFICER

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. MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION PERTAINING TO DEPARTING EMPLOYEE :

if EMPLOYEE HAS APPLIED FOR NEW EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO CONTACTING CCS WHAT EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE WAS USED?

BLOCK CREDIT RECORDS

BLOCK TELEPHONE LOCATOR RECGRDS

SUBJECT i : #AS NOT RETURNED ALL COVER OOCUMENTATION. IDENTIFY DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE NOT BEEN RETURNED.

RELATIVES EMPLOYED BY Cla (name and relationship)

Aone:

OEPARTING EMPLOYEES ACKNOWLEDGEMENT =~ . .

I certify that I have been briefed by the Central Cover Staff on this date and I
understand that: :

“| I will be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency in.
accordance with the instructions set forth in the Cover Briefing Section above.

™ I will not be acknowledged as an employee of the Central Intelligence
‘Agency.

i have been informed of the employment, references applicable in wy case.

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StGNATURE

REMARKS

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13-00000 .. .
, DEC @7 795) 11:54AM
wotaa SECRECY AGREEMENT P33
1], (print full name), hereby agree to accept as a prior condition of my
being employed by, or otherwise retained to perform services for, the Central Intelligence Agency, or for staff elements of the
Director of Central Intelligence (hereinafter collectively referred to as the ‘Central Intelligence Agency’), the obligations
contained in this agreement.

2. T understand that in the course of my employment or other service with the Central” Tntelligence Agency I may be
given access to information or material that is classified or is in the process of a classification determination in accordance
with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12356 as amended or superseded, or other applicable Executive order, that if
disclosed in an unauthorized manner would jeopardize intelligence activities of the United States Government. I accept that by
being granted access to such information or material I will be placed in a position of special confidence and trust and become
obligated to protect the Information and/or material Losure.

3. In consideration for being employed or oth mpese Seine Weal ovide services to the Central Intelligence Agency, I
hereby agree that I will never disclose in any form 6r-@ e-aky person not authorized by the Cenrral Intelligence.
Agency to receive it, any information or material in githé fotidwi & categories:

Invlligener Agency that I Arow i ia in the process of wclassjfication determination.

4. I understand that it is hep responsibility to consult With appropriate managemen¢ Qs thorities in the component or
Directorate that employs me or/b bx ained my services, or with the Central Intelligence A *s Publications Review Board
if am no longer employed b qe Hed with the Agency, in order to ensure that Tia - Whether information or material
within my knowled DF ay Be catgsories paragraph 3 is

considered by the Cent shh
receive such ern te i)
5. As a further condidoire
by agree to submit for revied™by_ th
work of fiction, which contatfitas
might be based upon either dfh
actually prepared for public gi om
at any me thereafter, prior ssingat wi
set forth in paragraph 3.1 oa :
permission to do ul re the Paral Ses “4,
6. I und at mits mee

opportunity to d Ne Gihether trey
or material that J ed not to ais

a has authorized to

i A piligence Agency, I here-
bt beet in any form, including a
sformation or material that
Ll, @ publicly or that I have
With th Intelligence Agency ot
& shed oii Ave access to the categories
Cage a — til I have received writen

D NS Poon iniptt ig ¢ Agency an
ten ae oe wpa yar aly information
re

Bae ikem

- response to me Sab os 4hnable Ef cy’s peed sla tion on the basis
that the informs Sas “ INT uestion der: a y be called upo: yp be ‘ally identify such
sources. My failure prreka S159 iio so may a asa ‘r, ds WZ lose the information

or material in seer
7, L under tf eed iy Te: ae is

ii <a aig <a service with

the Central Intelligence a4 ither of the g dee prj h in n paragraph 34 Agreement are and will remain
the property of the United States: Govemnnent unles tay ¥ term! orming is <Y “ihe ppropriate official or final ruling
of a court of law. E agree to surrender ¢ yining co ing o Feet Fi mation or material upon demand -

- by an appropriate official of the Central Intelligencé, P alison of y’employment or other service with
the Central Incelligence Agency.

8. I agree to notify the Central Intelligence Agency immediately in the event thar [ am called upon by judicial or con-
gressional authorities, or by specially established Investigatory bodies of the executive branch, to testify about, or provide, in-
formation or material that I have agreed herein not to disclose. In any communication with any such authority or body, I shall
observe all applicable rufes or procedures for ensuring that such information and/or material is handled in a secure manner.

9. I understand that nothing contained in this agreement prohibits me from reporting intelligence activities that’! con-
sider to be unlawful or improper directly to the Intelligence Oversight Board established by the President, or to any successor
body that the President may establish, or to the Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives or the Senate.
I recognize that there are also established procedures for bringing such matters to the attention of the Agency’s Inspector -
General or to the Director of Central Intelligence, In making any report referred to in this paragraph, I will observe all applicable
tules of procedures for ensuring the secure handling of any information or material that may be involved. I understand that

- any such information or material continues to be subject to this agreement for all other purposes and that such reporting does
not constitute public disclosure or deciassification of that information or material.

or 368 saat rremous

13-00000. DEC wr “YS L1tDoHM _ ; Peed
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* "10. Tunderstand that any breach of this agreement by me may result in the Central Intelligence Agericy taking admin-

‘istrative “action against me, which can include temporary loss of pay or termination of my employment or other service with

the Central Intelligence Agency. I also understand that if I violate the terms of this agreement, the United States Government

may institute a civil proceeding to seck compensatory damages or other appropriate relief. Further, I understand that the

disclosure of information that I have agreed herein not to disclose can, in some circumstances, constitute a criminal offense. —

11. T understand that the United States Government may, prior to any unauthorized disclosure that is threatened by me,
choose to apply to any appropriate court for an order enforcing this agreement. Nothing in this agreement constitutes a waiver .
on the part of the United States to institute a civil or criminal proceeding for any breach of this agreement by me. Nothing in
" this agreement constitutes a wavier on my part of any possible defenses [ may have in connection with either civil or criminal
proceedings that may be brought against me.

12. In addition to any other remedy to which the United States Government may become entitled, T hereby assign to the
United States Government all rights, title, and interest in any-and all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted
or will result or may result from any divulgence, publication or revelation of information or material by me that is carried out
in breach of paragraph $ of this agreement or that involves information or material prohibited from disclosure by the terms of
this agreement.

13. IT understand and accept oe tht, unless I am provided a written release from this agreement or any portion of it by t the
Director of Central Intelligence. or the Director's representative, all the conditions and obligations accepted by me in this agree-
ment apply both during my employment or other service with the Central Intelligence Agency, and at all times thereafter.

14. Lunderstand that the purpose of this agreement is to implement the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intel-
ligence, particularly the responsibility to protect intelligence sources and methiods, as specified in the National Security Act of
1947, as amended,

15. These restrictions are consistent with and do not supersede conflict with or otherwise alter the employee obligations .
rights or liabilities created by Executive Order 12356; section 7211 of tide 5, United States Code (governing disclosures to
Congress); section 1034 of tide 10, United States Code, as amended by the Military Whistleblower Protection Act (governing
disclosure to Congress by members of the Military); section 2302(b)(8) of title 5, United States Code, as amended by the
Whistleblower Protection Act (governing disclosures of illegality, waste, fraud, abuse or public health or safety threats); the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (50 U.S.C., 421 er seg.) (governing disclosures that could expose confidential
Government agents), and the starutes which protect against disclosure that may compromise the national security, including
section 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of title 18, United States Code, and section 4(b) of the Subversive Activides Act of 1950
(50 U.S.C. section 783(b)). The definitions, requirements, obligations, rights, sanctions and liabilities created by said Executive
Order and listed statutes are incorporated into this Agreement and are controlling.

16. I understand that nothing in this agreement limits or otherwise affects any provision of criminal or other law that .
may be applicable to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information, including the espionage laws (sections 793, 794 and
798 of Title 18, United States Code) and the Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-200: 50 U.S.C., 421 er
5€q.). .
17, Each of the numbered paragraphs and lettered subparagraphs of this agreement is severable. If a court should find
any of the paragraphs or subparagraphs of this agreement to be unenforceable. 1 understand that all remaining provisions will
continue in full force.

18. I make this agreement in good faith, and with no purpose of evasion.

19. This agreement shall be interpreted under and in conformance with the law of the United States. -

Signature

Date:

The execution of this agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who accepted it on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency as a prior condition of the employment or other service of the person whose signature appears above.

WITNESS AND ACCEPTANCE:
Signature _ ere
Printed Name ~

Date

