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DOCUMENT INFORMATION

OSD
CYRUS R. VANCE

: MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS

CUBAN AFFAIRS IN-THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
06/26/65

27

ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA

SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CONFIDENTIAL

LA, LC

RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
05/15/98

gcS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to
SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban
Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. TCCCA report on

Possible Retallatory Actions by the Castro Government.


wes

OSA

a) Y

a : x oe 31 December 1963 SON
_— cia HIS an oN oe
| pes of Ws 8 nowt

| oi

. MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG

OFFICE.OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL , DA
Subject: Payehological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. Ap informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee 7
(Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i

Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The

agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced, Present from VA
State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and. Montenegro; COA
from CIA, Tilton and| Holloway from USIA, Murphy; and the Ca
undersigned. er,

@. The following topics were discussed:

MPa Montencere.” State Labor advisor for Latin tmerice;

described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage

of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and commnists who
will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes
that there will be a concerted effort by the communists

_ sto wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were

- discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ..
\ “aseertain the degree to which local. (mot national):
. governmental elements will support disruptive and
“harassing actions before and during the meeting.

mae (2) State to circularize Latin American posts .
with the suggestion that local influences be brought

to bear in order to discourage country delegates
from attending the meeting. _

ae (3 USIA to consider VOA broadcasts. to Latin
America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban,
East German, and Chinese. Communist Labor conditions. _

oe (4) CIA.to continue black propaganda operations
we Ad[presit nich suggest | postponement of the: meeting. — COI
a NY

Sp

“DOWNGRADED AD 7 YEAR INTERVALS;

| ma ig years. | fo
1 A8 ¢ dm. mig br 200.20 ee “a
|


Septernber 21, 1963

. MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JORN HH, CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

- Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro

Reference: - Memorandom. from the Coordinator of Cuban Affaire

a

In response. to reference mernorandum, outlined below is the
status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed’
upon at our meeting of Septamber 12, 1963, The numbering of the para.

_ §taphe below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
_ §8eference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
eee | Defense apeéific or related military contingency plane exist,

£

“WAL Actions Against Ue S. Targets in Guba
Be Harassment of Guantaname

fa) outing off of the water supply"

Boe Hie ia made ee

cae which would require

: of e en day. g and which would be implemented on order
» of CINCLANTFLT,/ In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel
in 24 hours or ledS can be accomplished if directed.

"(b). Closing access to the base by Cuban workerg
who > commute”

ia Tes O2dy

_ STE REVIEWED
Cony” cere ~=3 a ai

ao i Pay
POWRGRADED AT 12 YEAR FNTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

poo piR $200.10

BW 50955 .DocId:324275002 Page 3

SUBJECT: ny Interdepartmental Coordinating Conirmittee of Cuban © . _ € : < ie

Government (U) i ee

Dept. ae State, subject as 8 above, 13 Sep 630 7

(hot /bore Saela (a9 ver 8) 001 B/E 01 b

cosa 21/634


Big em, ;
oe ae

7 oe
| Piwtpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. - pO Raia
fighter airerafe to veach the scene. fuch overflights may be author cee

lized only by specifically designated commandera,

“5S. ditteck on staping areas employed by exiles in the
Garlbbean'! —

con Actions Against Targets im the US : _—

“1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings'*

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actiona contemplated within
the context of the poser ia not coneidered to exceed the capabilities of
law enforcement agencies to control, There are military contingency
plans to protect ageinst this tye of activity at a much higher level of ©
Intensity. oe - So,
ae . -

“é.  dexaming of US padio stations*

oe COMMENT: There are tianding operating procedures ta overcome
_daterference and jaramiag methods employed against military communi
ations, OL

tollitary plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up te and include adall —
Seale military invasten of Guba, me ue

re itwas generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 mecting of -
ee ‘he Gonmnittes that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are
_ ' thowe which would not provoke United Stites retaliation seriously and

a immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely
that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

8 ge
’

“NW 50955 Daecid: 32425002 Page 4

: The sumesries of actions at forth above are essentially defensive a
 Peactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related ~ = [


fo ce
bey
“sages”

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY |
ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds

_ to the numbering of those actions for which specific or
Pelated military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"As Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4, Harassment of Guantanamo

RM 1d i
implemented rde INCLANTPLT

OF non-essential personnel in 24 hou vr iless if -
~ directed and consistent with national poliey.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who ©
eonmmute!

COMMENT Provision is made for the introductio
“Callored Naval Construction Battalion unit
ntaining necessary skills, the requisite labor
force, and the possibie stationing of a repair
ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel
{with appropriate skills. Critical personnel
jwould be transported by , to arrive within
48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT. ———

ssa

n offa

"(e) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates" —

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb-

nee, ranging ‘from no.action. UCh measures! —- f.
ee th Pipe . e a
Db se,

e of fire hoses
nea be te a

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury
or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure

OO 50955. Docld: 32425002 Page 3


&
| pease
Ngee”

circumstance and situation ranging from no action,
through action taken in self de nse by a wounded
Sentry or those assisting hin, (through increased

(defense conditions, placing pex onnel in positions

\protected from fire, and n of fire if appro-
| e and red as. d by the Commander

priate ane
\Naval Base

cise nature of .

GUC)

"Ce) Sabotaging of base facilities™ -

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S,
Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
taken would depend upon the nature of the
Sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel,
Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
approved by the highest national authority
provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the
arca may take immediate protective measures

ie i but not into, Cuban air.

Commanders are

oo BOS Lae iberately a -

Tsuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized

to attack unless either they or the ship they

are defending is endangered by Cuban attack.
in the event Cuban aircraft limit their action ._
| to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making
their presence known by flying close aboard the
Cuban plane.

"CG. Actions Against Cuban Exiles:

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
registry.

"2, Hot pursuit of or attack on ralding planes over
the high seas or another country's territory. toe

Wie ML . 2 Enclosure

RW 50955. Docld:32425002 Page 6


ERRFTDENAL ”

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
high seas or another country's territorial’ waters

th, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
aircraft 1s discovered to be under Cuban attack
it may be diffieult to identify it as a "pirate!
"raider", "mother ship" or ‘exile raider", even
though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
Situations, set forth above, are covered, at
least in part, by the rules of engagement which
have been approved by the highest national
authority. However, the action summarized below
is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
aircraft and those not clea. ide .
perng of foreign registry. Commanders are not,
Suthorized to organize deliberately a pursuing
force, however fips or sires rt oodercd to che a
area of the attack r diate protective.

; but not into,

hey are defending
In the event Cuban.
; rt limit: action to harassment, U.S.
BO ay : are limited to making their
GYY) _ presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban
: <a plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft —
ahh S$ authorized only ih those instances where it.
has been established that Cuban attack is being»
made ona U.S. ship or aircraft and then only
for the purpose of substantially reducing the —
time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft
to reach the scene. . Such overflights may be
\Eieeandere only by specifically designated ©

wee

commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in
the Caribbean

COMMENT|With regard to Castro att
America, plans exist fo milit. :
espond. to requests for stance.by Latin,
erican governments subject rrangenent for tq]

the

acks on areas se eta) |
» U. coe ,

military:

“\approval. There is also an arrangement for

3 Enclosure

HW 50955. Docid: 32425002 Page 7

va


HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page 8

interchange of information between the U.S,
Coast Guard and British naval forces wity
regard to possible Staging areas which m-y be

ed by exiles in the Bahamas,:

"Ee Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristie bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensit
; within the context of +

agencies to control, There are mi

Plans to protect against this type of activity
at a much higher level of intensity.

"2, Jamming of US tadio stations"

COMMENT There are standing Operating procedures to
overcome interference and jamming methods
employed against military communications,

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
_ dikely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
‘ment in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most
Likely category." It is inferred that what the committee
Radin mina by the most likely "level of intensity"
provoke the United States
into taking extensive counterteasures whie
endanger the Castro regime. The summaries

There are, however, existing
plans, retaliatory in nature, which

qopee up to and include a full seale military invasion of
ba * ~

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the
Cuban government are those which would not provoke United
States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering —
the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro mieht
intensify his Support of subversive forces in Latin America

u Enclosure


HY 50955 BDocld: 32425002 Page 9

. ae
to 31 December 1963 wg yo DEST oR
. rae . Cia MES SIRICATION yg utHEN
s .

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subjects Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee —
(Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in i
Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The
agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from , @
State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; CO

from CIA, Tilton an “from USTA, Murphy; and the GCA)

undersigned.

2, The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America)
meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 2 = 28 Jamary 1964. -

Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America,
described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage
of left-wing Labor leaders, socialists, and communists who
will attempt to resolve their differences, State believes
that there will be a concerted effort by the communists

-to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from
‘Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were
discussed:

(L) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to.
~ ascertain the degree to which local {not national)
~ governmental elements will support disruptive and

‘harassing actions before and during the meeting.
(2) State to circularize Latin American posts .
.. with the suggestion that local influences be brought
. oto bear in order to discourage country delegates
' from attending the meeting.

7 (3). USTA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin
America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, ;
East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

en CIA .to continue black propaganda operations Va) |
a4 : nich suggest postponement of the meeting. cy) |
mS 2 . |

we uf

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS; |

Aes Ag cade, * : . S Ss weet Ths ra YEARS
O84, ASS Covtral 1k ooy-—~ PEERS aD DR 8200.10
ect eect ts nsec to sists cecimasmemnnese


September 21, 1963 9 SO

nb MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS Cel ge
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs a |
Department of State vo

-. SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban | ge Bae
: aa . Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro, veg EES
. Government (u) ; mars 2

- Reference! — Mernorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs —
ae Dept of State, subject ag above, 13 Sep 63... _

. In response to reference mernorandum, outlined below la the
- gtatas of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed
- upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963, The numbering of the paras _
graphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to
: reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department
-. of Defense specific or related military contingency plans. exiat. :

3

* ‘"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Guba
“4 Harassment of Guantanars
“{a) Cutting off of the water supply"
__ COMMENT:

in addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel —
GUrs OF loos can be accomplished if directed.

"(bp Closing access to the base by Cuban workers
who commute!

phot bogt CislaloowerD ori Clee k

a &S OR RS) top
SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED * owing AT 12 YEAR ENS
‘ i

A Nees rls | ear AR 289--c5stes CONFIDE! I

NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASS! tHE

“poo DIR $200.10

OCOFSA 7 21/684

HY 50955 Docld: 32425002 ‘Page 10 : : : ee pedis |


COMMENT: Provision is made for the intreduction of aa |

wae

| Mie} Staging demonstration and rote at the gates”

COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, king, F |

aed exact. location of the disturbance, ranging from no action| Z Soe
- . eee a ee. cal
“(d} Sniping at base sentvies resulting in injury or

death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances
_ 8nd situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self. defense .
CMY) . by a wounded sentry or those assisting hive, Voce,

aa

ome

"{e) Sabotacging of base facilities"

j/ COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken te prevent guch
i Sabotage by the Comrnander U, 8, Naval Base, Guantanamc, The nature —
of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be
designed t@ aasure the continued functioning of the Base.

"D, Actions <gaingt WU. S, Alrerate and Shisolng

"1, Havassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel,
Plorida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: . The rules of engagen nent; whieh have heen approved by
the highest national authority pvovide that ships or aincrait ordered te

Fre
a

|
|
|
/
|
|

HY 50955 BDocld: 32425002 Page 11


pote “ BORFIDENTIAE
take imme. eotective mondure: ee oe
. .. Actions Agzinst Guban Exiles €-

a om a2, Hot pursuit of or attack om raiding planes over the
BORG OF Bnother country's territory.

of another country's territerial waters,

ao _ "4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high
: - Of in another country's territerial waters."

“ _ SOMMENT: itis acted that it is contrary to national policy to permit _
Die waide on Cube originating from U. S, territery, however, at the time
athip er aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be diffie
cult ta identify it ag a “pirate,” “raider,” "mother ship" of “exile raiders"
even though thig, in fect, may be the case. All the situations, set forth
above, ave covered, atleast in part, by the rules of engagement which
have been approved by the hishest naticanl guthority. However, the a¢ton —

“1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US reglatey.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding beats on the high seas
x

fumimarized below ig authorized only in the case of U.S. shies and aire ee

bigh _
“

Stag

- Seatt and those not cleasly identified as being of foreign registry.

HW. 50955 Docld: 32425002 Page iz


"8. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the
Garibbean"

om

COMMENT: (

“WE, Actions Against Targets in the US

“i. Sabotage or terreristic bombings"

the context of the poper ig not coneideved to exceed the capabilities af
law enforcement agencies to control. There ave militasy contingency
plane to protect against this tyne of activity at a much higher level af -
intensity. . es
a

"&. Jeroming of US waddle stations"

SOMMENT: There are blanding operating procedures te overcome
anaes reicenieanianerseenntey . *. .
interference and jamming methods employed egalast military commuuni«
cations, : re

écale milltary invasion of Cuba,

4 tee itwas generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 rneeting of

- the Committee that the rocet Mkely actions of the Cuban goverament are
a“ _ those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and_
immediately endangering the Castro regime, It appease more ikely
that Castro might intensify his support of aubversive forcea in Latin

# Abn
‘

HY 30955 . Docld: 32425002 Page 13

COMMENT: . The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within —

The summuvies of actions sét forth above are essentially defensive — = |
reactions to Cuban initiatives, Thore are, of course, existing and related —
military plans, retallatory in mature, which Tange up to and include afull


REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY
ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

le The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds
te the numbering of those actions for which specific or
~Yelated military contingency plans exist. A brief summary
of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided. ~
"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cubs .
"4, Harassment of Guantanamo .

"Ca) Cutting off of the water supply" -

: Mouation.
ag “OSSeitlal personne. in 2 no less if
directed and consistent with national policy.

COMMENT

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who
commute!

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction offs .

ee

ie)

cence

: enone

"(e) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"!

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the
degree, kind, and exact location of the disturb~_

DCB Vane ye? Pee : a

"Cd) Sniping at base Sentries resulting in injury
or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

art DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
AL NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure

I $0955 DoclId:324275002 Page i4


ecireumstance and situation ranging from no action, —
through action taken in self defense b a wounded _
sentry or those assisting hin, '

Cle)

“"Ce) Sabotagine of base facilities": -

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to
prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. —
Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action
taken would depend upon the nature of the

sabotage and be designed to assure the continued
functioning of the Base,

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel ,
Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been
approved by the highest national authority _
provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the

_ area may take immediate srotective measures

60NL) a

eee

"Cc, Actions Against Cuban Exiles:

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US
registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attaek on raiding planes over
the high seas or another country's territory. 7

HAS 2 Enclosure


- GBNFIBENHAL |
"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the
high seas or another country's territorial’ waters

"4, Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the
high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national
policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from
U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or
aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack —
it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate!!
"raider", “mother ship" or "exile raider", even
though this, in fact, may be the case. All the
situations, set forth above, are covered, at..
least in part, by the rules of engagement which
have been approved by the highest national
authority, However, the action summarized below.
is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and
alreraft and those not cleatly identified a5

being of foreign registry... |

a

"5, Attack on:staging areas employed by exiles in
the Caribbean a

So

COMMENT)

oC)

3 Enclosure

iW 50955. Docld:32425002 Page 16


BocId: 32425002 Page 17

Sereciill

"E. Actions Against Targets in the Us
"1. Sabotage or terroristic bonbings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions ec atemplated
within the context of the paper is not considered
to exceed the capabllities of law enforcement
agencies to control, There are military contingency
plans to protect against this type of activity
at a much higher level of intensity. —

"2. Jamming of US tadio stations"
COMMENT There are Standing operating procedures to

overcome interference and Jamming methods
employed against military communications,

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing
Of related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other
likely actions which might be taken by the Castro govern-
tent in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also
requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory
actions by the Castro government were of "the level of
intensity which the committee agreed to be in the rost
likely category." It is inferred that what the cormittes
had in ming by the most likely "level of intensity"
was that level which would not provoke the United States
into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously
endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions,
set forth above, which might be taken under existing
military contingency plans are essentially defensive
reactions to Cuban initiatives, There are, however, existing
and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which

aange up to and include a full seale military invasion of

Enelosure


NW.50955 Docld:32425002 Page 16

than risk direct confrontation with the United States, In

the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult

to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke
“immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such
actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declara~
tions that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration

for the “inevitable” Latin American revolution. Whereas an
inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a

few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the

training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas

than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably
would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees
to Latin American countries, their establishment of @vuerrilla
training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and
engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately
provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo.
Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who
commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange.
While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out
of Guantanamo," or ‘ithe harassment of US aircraft operating in
the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be Added to the list,
it is considered that Specifie provocative actions are less
likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support
to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only

is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support
"national liberation movements of Oppressed peoples" but may

be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military
countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus,
they are considered as of that level of intensity which places
them in the most likely category as well as being in the
category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the
United States.

iat —— 5. Enclosure


