157-10014-10185

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JFK Assassination System Date: 7/7/2015

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SSCIA
157-10014-10185
MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
07-M-90

Document Information

SSCIA
THE CONGO

08/22/1975
5

CIA
MOBUTU
LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

SUMMARY
Unclassified
IB; 1c
Redact

05/3 1/2000

v9.1
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Page 1

Date : 08/07/95
Page : 1

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RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10185 .
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ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
‘TO ;
TITLE : THE CONGO
DATE : 08/22/75
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
CIA
MOBUTU
DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/99

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

"Victor Hedgeman" 9

tt

INTERVIEW WITH:

REGARDING:

DATE-TIME-LOCATION:

PRESENT: “Bill Bader

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: SEE PAGE 5 -- POSSIBLE INTERVIEWEES

EXECUTIVE SESSION: YES NO

\

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Interview and Meeting Summary ~- "Victor Hedgeman"
w/Bill Bader, August 22, 1975, S201

After an extended tour with the United States Army and
some education at San Diego State, Hedgeman went to Harvard
where he studied in the Department of International Relations
working to a degree in political science. He didn't finish
his degree but went after being recruited at Harvard into
the OPC. ‘He then became an NOC in Europe and for a number
of years worked in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. His pri-
mary responsibility in Belgium was that of surveillance of
Soviet operators in Europe. While in Brussels in 1959 he cam
to meet a good percentage of the Congolese who would be
important in the Congo after independence: Ileo, Mobutu,
and Adoula. In January of 1960 he became the first Chief
of Station in the Congo; prior to that time the Agency had
had merely a liaison service. In late July of 1960 Hedgeman
returned to the United States with Ambassador Timberlake to
press for a U.S. policy of political action in the Congo.
Hedgeman's position was that the Soviets were moving large
amounts of equipment and manpower into the Congo and that
something had to be done to head it off. At the time he
first went to the Congo he was the only man in the Station.
A year later there were five or six and eventually the Sta-
tion would reach upwards of twenty.Hedgeman mentioned that
the relationships and staff that he built in the Congo per-
sisted, and that when the Laotian operation started the
group would move almost intact to Laos. Hedgeman believed

that the Congo was vitally important to American interests,

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page __


ay

important to the United States' future, and ;sthat it was

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page °°

despite some criticism of that point from the State Depart-
FILE:
ment. He felt that the economic wealth of the Congo was

equally important that the Congo remain a viable unit. He
said that there was very strong resistance at the State

level for political action involvement in the Congo. For-
tunately the Congo operation became one of Allen Dulles'
projects. At the beginning, with the approval of the

Special Group, it. was agreed that the CIA would begin to
provide financial support for moderate Congolese politicians
By August of 1960, however, Hedgeman and Timberlake were push
ing for instructions that would allow them to pursue a course
that would lead to a change in government. Hedgeman said tha
those close to Lumumba at that time were Soviet agents. The
way that it was initially pursued was to the building of
personnel assets investing in labor unions to help them

with their propaganda, a lobbying campaign, direct payments
to politicians.

The first major effort to rid the Congo of Lumumba came
with a plan developed by Hedgeman to bribe enough members of ©
the Senate in order to induce them to vote Lumumba out..This
plan was to have taken place on the 7th of September, 1960.

Hedgeman had arranged that the radio would be denied Lumumba

after his defeat so that he would not be able to go on the
radio to try to change the decision of the Senate. Unfortuneately

and for reasons Hedgeman does not know to this day, Mobutu

"jumped the gun and threw Lumumba out. Lumumba in turn went . sean

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page °°

to the Assembly and harangued them and got the vote and also got
x FILE:
the vote in the Senate by bringing troops out and surrounding

the Senate building. Hedgeman said that up to this point he

had been thinking largely in parliamentary terms; that the

way to rid the country of Lumumba was through the paramilitar
method. After this experience of the 5th through the 7th, he
decided more drastic and direct methods had to be employed.
Hedgeman contends that the coup of Mobutu seized control was
arranged and supported, and indeed, managed, by the Central
Intelligence Agency. During the course of the interview
Hedgeman spoke glowingly of Mobutu, who he feels is a man wit
good political judgment, a sense of history, and the capacity
te be a Pan African leader. Mobutu was only twenty-nine at
the time. Hedgeman says his most difficult time with Mobutu
came in February of 1961 when the Kennedy administration decided
that a federalized government, including all political factions
was the only hope of averting civil war.. Hedgeman was charge
with going to Mobutu and telling him that the United States
had decided to withdraw all support from him and that he
would have to resign. He said Mobutu was utterly shocked
by this and could not possibly believe the United States
could believe that the Congo was ready for parliamentary
government. He said Mobutu was so upset that he drew his gun
and waved it in the direction of Hedgeman and said "If this
happens, I will die," and, looking at Hedgeman, "so will others."
Hedgeman said Mobutu only put his gun away when Hedgeman
told him that he did not personally agree with the decision,

that he was just carrying out orders like a good soldier.

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Hedgeman stressed that in. this period, 1960-1961, the

Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he sais that what

they were running was a Scotch tape and baling-wire opera-

tion. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman: said they be-

gan seriously in the end of 1962 with the arrival of a number

of T-6's that he and Ed Guilion had asked for. He said that these
aircraft were not intended to be used in combat, but only to
reassure the Congolese that the United States was with them a
provide them with a bit of black magic. Hedgeman professed t
the paramilitary combat missions of 1963, in support of anti-
rebel activities, were really quite minor affairs.

Some specifics. Hedgeman contended that he had no knowle

of the approval of funding of South African mercenaries and
tribal leaders capable of resistance as approved by the 303
Committee. He also said, though, that he had important conta
with Mike Hoare mercenaries, they gave no direct or indirect
Support to them. He also said there was ne, repeat no, com-
plicity or support on the part of the CIAm the ouster of
Kasavubu by Mobutu in November of 1965.

Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman interspersed the
most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter's brushes wit
death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, ranging

' from being placed before two different firing squads during
one day and his evening as the selected victim of a hit con-

tract given by the Union Miniere.
As for CIA employees who might testify well, should the

Committee handle the Congo issue in executive session, Hedgeman

recommended Edward Korn-Patterson, Bronson Tweedy, and Glen

Fields,

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