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TITLE :
SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16, 1975):
DATE : 09/01/75

PAGES : 678
SUBJECTS :

SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-J
| "AB A: PROLOGUE
“=~ TAB B: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

TAB C: COVERT ACTION o

TAB D: CUBA 7

TAB E: CONGO

TAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY

TAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

TAB H: CHILE

TAB I: SOUTH VIETNAM

TAB J: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS =:

TAB K: RECOMMENDATIONS

TAB L: EPILOGUE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED ,
CURRENT STATUS : P {f
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93 ,

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS. : .
COMMITTEE'S DRAFT REPORT |
(UPDATED OCTOBER 16, 1975)

TOS MM COR NOTE TOE owe

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
. HW 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 1

Date: 10/05/93
Page:2
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
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1) (, adate)

Oetober 16, 1975

C SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT
Se ET A ADO ENALLON REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB A: Prologue
TAB B: Introduction and Summary
TAB C: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation
TAB OD: Cuba
lL. Introduction
2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or
' Known About Within the CIA
3. The Question of Authorization Outside the Central
Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration
4. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs
_— 5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy
Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs
8 The Qt of lotr he fe 163 Apres pled
7. The Question of Authorization in che Johnson Administratic
TAB E: Congo
TAB F: Executive Action Capability
TAB G: Dominican Republic
TAB H: Chile
TAB I: South Vietnam preset
TAB J: Findings and Conclusions — tats
TAB K: Recommendations aa ro
TAB L: Epilogue . @ 4

oN
On &
\.

HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 3 -

£ *,

Diy tid: WF id Soe i
taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a
contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this
operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as
Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or
Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely
that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed
his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized
the plan as "“cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside
with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura
foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule
bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states

that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different

diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified

that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. ae
(e) AMLASE

(1): Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico
City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine
if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G.,

p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been

rr an Eee
*Donovan was not aware of the plan.

HY 50955 Docld: 32202487 Page 4

—

39

{PAID pee or
oN PL, SUMED Brae

Sucked pupa a 1965, stated

that B-l had given AMLASH-1 a Silencer and that AMLASH-1 had

"small, bighly concentrated explosives." on February 11, 1965

}\Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive “one

‘pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-l's

secretary" (I1.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that
"B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical
people and delivered to AMLASH-1} in Madria” (I.G., p. 103

In June 1965, Ci# terminated all contact with
AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities

were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).

"4, Bel is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination
of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know
B-1l's location.

"S. B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin
American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and
a junta is formed. This junta will be established even
though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive
and may still be in control of the part of the country.
This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able
to establish some control over one of the provinces so
that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel,
B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a
maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the
people inside Cuba. [In all communiques, in all radio
messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate
that the raid was possible thanks to the information
received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from
the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "PM,
This will be AM/LASH~1l's war name."

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Meru 2

Pending (1) "Re
Editing and ¢

SAO EO Ly AVS ee
write per Subcommitte.
2) Insertion of

Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS -- ~

CONGO

Introduction

Dulles Cableai Leopoldville That "Removal'"'

of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in “High

Quarters"

Page
1
L

CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate"

Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even
After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective

Custody ...

The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

.€a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination"

14

of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to

Congo With a Highly Sensitive
Assignment coe ee ee

(b) [Gott1ieb\ Delivered Lethal Substance to
Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassi-

nation of Lumumba: September 1960
(c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlied| Told

Him That President Eisenhower Had

Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination

Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes

Steps in Furtherance of It

(e) The (Chief of \Station Moves Forward
With Assassination Plot .....,

(i) The Chief of) Station Testified
That He Reqtfested and Received

Confirmation of the Assassination

Plan from Headquarters

15

18

22

24

31

31

(ii) The (Chief of |Station Took "Explora-

tory Steps"-in Furtherance of the
Assassination Plot and Testified

That He Destroyed Cable Traffic
Related to the Plot te ke te

HY 50955 Docld:322024687 Page 6

34

~ii-

Page
(£) Testimony of Bisseil and Tweedy About the
Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the
Assassination Plot... ... 2.2... DL, . 4h
(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
To Poison Lumumba... .......,.22.., 4l

(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With
Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating
Lumumba and Ile Cabled Hedgman About Gaining
Access to Lumumba for the. Purpose of
Assassination... 2... ee, 4a

(iii) Bissell Testified That le Did Not Recall
Whether the Assassination Operation Had
‘loved from Planning to Implementation
But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to the Congo 48
5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination
Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives
in the Congo... .......062.20.2-20220242., . 52
(a) O'Donnell 's )Operations in the Congo .....,....., 53
( (i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That
say a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to
the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassi-
nation Operation ete ew ee ee ee kk ee 53
(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of
Lumumba With (O'Donnell) and Sent Him
to Congo: October-November 1960 ......... 54
(iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked(0'Donnell)
to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination
Operation a 59
Civ) (0'Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and
earned That a Virus Was in the
Station Safe ..... 60
(v) (0'Donnell) Planned to "Neutralize"
Lumumba by Turning Him Over to
Congolese Authorities and Requested
the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to
‘Leopoldville as His Alter Ego toe ee 65
(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-
December 1960 ...., ee 67

on,

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DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975

TOP SECRET
Frederick D. Baron For Tlnroen

For Internal Committee
Use Only

D. CONGO
1. Introduction

The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA
plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to
the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically
intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands
of the CIA kniet of |station in Leopoldville by an Agency
scientist. .

_ Although these instruments of assassination were never
used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case
which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's
assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives |

C in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?
ae

Second, how high in the United States government was the
source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally,
was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led
to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these
broad questions together with the documents and testimony re-

ceived by the Committee.

HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page &

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-3-

Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of
the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody
of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its
own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese
authorities announced Lumumba's death,

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing
of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the inci-
dent concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.%*

2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That ''Removal" of Lumumba

ig an Urgent Objective in “Uist Quseeeee oma

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence
from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the.CIA assigned a new Chief of|
Station to the Congo. The \chies of| Station said that the briefings
he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure
contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice
Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to head-
quarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late
July, the thief of|station again heard no discussion of assassi-
nating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political
strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers
of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured

* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN
Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October,
November, and December.

** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing
anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by

minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the
testimony of high Administration officials.

Docld: 32202467 Page 9 . .

a by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters
by the new phiet of\Station:

EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING
CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT.

MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST
PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR
INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE
FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF, WHETHER
OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING
COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-
WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND ;
THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION
TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable(IN 39708,
Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)

This cable also stated the (Chief of| Station's operational "OBJECTIVE
{OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60).
Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clan-
destine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State
Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR
BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA cable (out 59743)
Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell,
Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up
cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION"
(CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

Several days later, the niet of| Station reported that a plan
to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by

Congolese leaders:

ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU
_ WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU
REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT
VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT
STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable (IN 4276y),
Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.) ;

HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 10 . —

a
(~

HY 50955

The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to

the Leopoldville iChief of| Station which stressed the urgency of

_

"removing'’ Lumumba:

IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-
CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CON-
TINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE
RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST
PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE
CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF
THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY

WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN
URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING
CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH, PRIORITY OF
OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, (QUT 62966),
Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)

Dulles cabled that the (Chief of] Station was to be given "WIDER
AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized opera-

tion to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "“ENCLUDING

EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable,

8/26/60). “WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT
THEMSELVES TO YOU,"' the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are
a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the
importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.

** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified
that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to
refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48)..

Docld: 32202487 Page 11

SR

Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 ''TO
CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPOR-
TUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the
chief of\Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT
COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point
of assuring the [Chief of\ Station that he was authorized to act
unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the
Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE

TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK. HIS CON-

CURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE

DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT

ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT

PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).
This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contem-
plating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the
Ambassador would want to be in a position to “plausibly deny"
United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he
was “almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable
shortly after its transmission and that it was his “belief" that
the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the

President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33,
64-65) .*

* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell
on the question of authorization for the assassination effort
against Lumumba.

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 12

C to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might
assassinate Lumumba:

TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS

ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [ THE

CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD

AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE

LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 49679 ,) Leopoldville

to Director, 9/7/60.) -
The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered
to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM"
and assured him that the United States would supply technicians
(CIA Cable, 9/7/60).

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of por”

the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. Ss,

apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the

- Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official
position: |

LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVER-

RIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION

EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS

EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST

WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE ,

(CIA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville,

9/13/60).

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported
that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "elimi-
nate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have

~ been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded
a safe base of operations:

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 13 . - oe

HY 50955

-LO-

' STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS
SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS
ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED
[TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK
WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMI-
NATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE
LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK.
ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST.
(CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director,
9/15/60.) :

On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met
with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator
requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some

Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning

the meeting reported:

[CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE
SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS
RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ...
[THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE
ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT
ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES
LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS
[ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE
- PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION
LUMUMBA. (CIA cable, (i 14228,) Leopoldville
to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE
POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters
that they should

HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT

NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES ]}

DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECES-
SARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60) .*

* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale
planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support

.€0 anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and

Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the |Chief of~
Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department repre-
sentatives or operational contacts:

continued on next page : _
Footnote. so} Page gy pag ) . :

Ssaaperas?

HW 50955

-Ll-

Several days later, while warning a key Congolese
leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters,

the Chief of Station

URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL
OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable,
(IN 15643>) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were

leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

[IN] VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOP-
MENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING
FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS
PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION
IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLAN-
DESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED
OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.

CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS ,
SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-
LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.

(CIA cable (our 04697, ) Director to Leopoldville,
10/6/60.) :

Doclda: 3227027487 Page 15

~l4-
4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the Fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters
delivered to the bhies of\Station in Leopoldville lethal bio-
logical substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba.
The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving
confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the
scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take “exploratory steps"
in furtherance of the assassination plot. The |ohies of \Station
testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA
scientist, fidney coctnied | he was informed that President Eisenhower
had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba.
lcottiienls mission to the Congo was poth preceded and followed by
‘general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA

headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eves Only" channel --

including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were never used by the (Chie of!
Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in
the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly
before the poisons were delivered to the /Chief of| Station, there
is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was termi-
nated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence

of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events

which actually led to Lumumba's death.*

* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about
the circumstances that Ted to Lumumba's death in Katanga.

HY 50955 Docid: 32202467 Page 16 . a

-15-

(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba ,
and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly
Sensitive Assignment
On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed him-
self in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping
force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed
a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting
between the(Chies of) Station and "€idney) Braun," who was traveling
to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:
. Gra") SHOULD ARRIVE-APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL
ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS ‘(SID) FROM PARIS". . . IT
‘URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ['{SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE
AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY
HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU.
(CIA Cable, (QUT 71464) Bissell/Tweedy to Chief
of Station, 9/19/60.) °
C. The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator --
LE" .
“PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the

Chief of the Africa Division.*

* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review
Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used ''to

denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick
A. 0. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this
sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized
by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution
of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable
traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel
did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting
additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 17 . a

~16-

( The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chiet of )station that
he was to continue to use this indicator for
ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU
INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.
(CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)
The (Chief of)Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* --
testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such
a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a
“most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp.
43). The cable advised, in his words, that:
someone who I would have recognized would
arrive with instructions for me.... I
believe the message was also marked for my
eyes only... and contained instructions
ry that I was not to discuss the message with
\ | anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)
Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instruc-
tions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any
way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12). .
Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was
to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensi-
tivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only"

basis (CIA Cable, our 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

= * Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the( Chief
of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testi-
fied under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75,
p. 4).

HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 18

ll,

-L7-

C Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be

required as an agent in the PROP operation:

IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES,
BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH
THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN]
ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable,
9/22/60.)

Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station
was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A
THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT
FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about
the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the (chief of )
station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as
("sia")ho was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP

operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude
in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ

OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS

OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE

CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUT-

STANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES

CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY

ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE

BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL
JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

oe ;
_ - * This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later
dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections
, and , infra.

HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 19 : : -

-18-"

On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to
Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to “eliminate”

Lumumba :

WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN
ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY
RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE
FAILS IN LEOP(OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF
IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,

( ovr 7357), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the
v4
presence of the President at an NSC meetings stating: )

“Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in \
j the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not \
| yet disposed of and remained a grave danger /
\ as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC f
\ Minutes, 9/21/60)

a |
(b) (Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the (Chief of)
station “in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba
the (Chief of) Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson

Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville

with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable

IN 18989), Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same
id

HW 50955

week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba
and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that
existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".
Hedgman testified about the identity of("s1D") -- the messenger
referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:
Q: ‘Who was the messenger who arrived?

Hedgman: Mr. (Sidney Gottlieb \
Ly - Jf

DoclId:32202467 Page 20

- 19 -

@ ~ Q; And at that time, you knew who he was?
Hedgman, I recognized him as an officer of the
gency ... . . I believe he referred to the
fact that I had received a message and that he
was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
pp. 15-16)

4

The message carried by (Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to

DDP Richard Bissell,) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or
my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.

Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?

Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was .. . my under-
standing of the primary means. I don't think it was
probably limited to that, if there was some other way
of doing it.

Q:. Of doing what?

ee Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political
(~ threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)

Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb) also may have discussed non-
lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but
he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 28).

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination,

however:

Q: And what did Mr. (Gocciici) inateate with regard to
thé possibility of physically ‘eliminating him?

Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was
probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)

And again:
Q: I take it that once you started discussing these
lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that

eye the kind of elimination he was there particularly to
Coe discuss was killing Lumumba?

HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 21

>,

-29-

Hedgman: There was no doubt in hy mind that

this was one of the way{s], and probably what
they thought was the only way that would work
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).

: tue oye
Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means

of assassination:

Re And what did he tell you with regard to
ow that might be accomplished?

Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents.

I assume that that's the correct word. But in

any case, poisonous agent with him, which he

passed to me.... mo,

Q: These were lethal biological substances?

Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding

asa non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)
Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a
syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb )instructed hin

in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that

this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

HW 50955

Q: [When ne ({Gottlieb]) came to the Congo

to give you lethal biological agents for

the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear

at that time that the means for administering
those biological agents was to inject them™ °° ©
into a substance that was to be ingested by
Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or
toothpaste or any other substance that was

to be ingested?

Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes,
(Hetenan, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)
Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted
to use of the poisons provided by (Gottlied):
This was not a sine gua non that I employ this. _

If there were another method, another way, it
would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Bocld: 322024387 Page 22

-21-

‘For example, Hedgman testified that he may have “suggested"'
shooting Lumumba (co Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29). |
, There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassi-

nation should not be traceable to the United States:

The biological substance, or specimens, what .
have you, I think it was up to my judgment,

and if there was a better Way ~- certainly.

[T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I

implemented these instructions, no way could

it be traced back to the United States. It

had to be a way which could not be traced

back ... either to an American or the United

States government. (lHedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said Gottlieb] assured him that.the poisons were pro-

duced to meet this requirement:

f ' I believe I raised the point that poisons left
Nae ' txaces in the human body, which could be found
on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured
that these ... lethal agents would [leave]

normal traces found in people that die of
_certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an “emotional reaction of great sur-
prise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb) was there to discuss
an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the (Chiet of )
Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not
carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he
told Gottlieb jhe “would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46)
and left him with the following impression:

I think it would be a fair impression that he would

take away the thought that I was going to look into it
and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I

om,

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 23 . 8

~22-

( stressed the difficulty of trying to carry
hos out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
-)

p. 47

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his
initial contact with(Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response
to the assignment. thef Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb)
were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH ."' (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to
Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman’ was "afraid" that |Mobutu's |government
was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation
with Lumumba , and said:

HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT
WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

ce

(c) Hedgman Testified That (cottiied) Told Him That

President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination
of Lumumba

agin

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in~

Leopoldville, (Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhower

had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

Q: Did you raise with him the question of authori-
zation of such instructions to you?

Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong
recollection, that I did.

Q: What do you recall in essence was what you
said to him?

Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed
out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic,
and I may have probably said that I never heard of

_ it being done, which I had not, never in my training
or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any
references to such, in my recollection at least, such
methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose
authority these instructions were issued. :

Q: And what did Mr. Gotttiet) reply?

HW 50955 Dockd:32202487 Page 24 . _

-~24-

Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot
bet per cent certain, but I have always, since
that date, had the impression in my mind that these
orders had come from the President. (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 34.) 23.

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":

: fou have a very firm recollection that he
(Téotelieb) represented to you that the President
of the United States directed the assassination of
Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?

Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman,
, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d) Head uarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest

Pelority" and Authorizes Stese ie Forth eae eee,

On the basis of his talks wien("sid, Hedgman listed a
number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At
the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent
be used in the following manner:

"HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER.

WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP

DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by re-
calling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He in-
formed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED
ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60) «

On September 30, the Chiet of) Station urged that head-

quarters authorize “exploratory conversations" with this agent .so

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 25 . oe


~26-

The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received
authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority

plan:

ORLZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS
WITH (CH OMROMEEYTO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE
‘ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE.
... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPR CH TO
PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, (OUT 73900,) Fields ito
Leopoldville, 9/30/60.) :

In this cable, (Glenn Fields,| Assistant Chief of the Africa Division,
expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable (our 75900,)
Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.) ; .
According to the report of the (Chief of| Station, (Gottlieb)
left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of
the “EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable (IN 24171) Leopoid-
or ville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's)
"materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances
would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of
the "expiration date" to (Gottlieb's)departure is unclear from the
cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances
had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chiet of) Station indi-
cated that (Gottlieb) Left some biological substances that were still

lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination

operation:

ULNESS. ({CHIEF OF STATION]) PLANS CONTINUE
TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171,)
Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/6 .) ‘

(oy ry cane ITEMS OF. CONTINUING USE-

Bocld: 32202487 Page 26 . Lo.


~27-

(- By this point, Hedgman had conducted his “exploratory con-

° versation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining
access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified
that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a
means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman,

8/21/75, p. 60):

I believe that I queried the agent who had
access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in
detail about just what that access, what
access he actually had, as opposed to speak-
ing to people. In other words, did he have
access to the bathroom, did he have access
to the kitchen, things of that sort.

I have a recollection of having queried him
on that without specifying why I wanted to
know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)

On October 7, the fries of \Station reported to headquarters
—
on this meeting:

CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH
{AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES
[AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY
HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE
HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN
LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with
doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:
[C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild
scheme professionally. I did not think that
it ... was practical professionally. —
~ Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....

I explored it, but I doubt that I ever reall
expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 27

~28-

However, his cables indicate that he was planning to con-
tinue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do
it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate
operative for the assassination mission in ‘the event that they
found his first choice unacceptable:

IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES]
BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECES-
SITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD
COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable{IN 24171,
Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

Tweedy cabled the (niet of )station the same day that he "HAD
GOOD DISCUSSION. YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to
a de-briefing of(Gottlieb}upon his return to the United States.
(CIA Cable our 78336), Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy
indicated that he was

CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY
NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES,
SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER
PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY
ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS.
(CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to (Chief of )
Station, 10/7/60.) . .f

This expression of support for the operation was followed by
an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15,
1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's
Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as

Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA

channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to

BW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 26

appropriate personnel in thé CIA Statidén and the United States
embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of
covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and
military aid (CIA Cable bur 81476) Director to Leopoldville,
10/15/60). This cable atso delimited the kind of action against

Lumumba that would be authorized:

ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND
IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING
[LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE
ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD
HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable
(OUT 81476,) Director to Leopoldville,
10/15/60.)

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second
cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally

by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for

XN

Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable our 81396) Tweedy to Chieg of)
Station, 10/15/60). -_

YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL
CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH]
ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RE-
CEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC
[LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL
STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DIS-
POSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CON-
SIDERATION.

RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY
APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND
ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable [ovr
81396} Tweedy to(Chief of) Station, 10/15/60)

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indi-

cating that communications about the assassination mission were

HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 29 . oo.

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 30

~30-

restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination
mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's
reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to
the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY
THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable (ur $1396) Tweedy to Chiet of) Station,
10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer/Justin O'Donnel] who
testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to
undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional
officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason
that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly
under the Chief of Station:

SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY
GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. | (CIA
Cable (OUT 81396) Tweedy to (Chief of) Station,
10/15/60.) - ‘

Again, in contradiction of the Limitations on anti-Lumumba
activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels,
Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba :

POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR
ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], ELTHER VIA ASSAULT
ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE
PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS "ANOTHER
BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST (chi VIEWS.

(CIA Cable OUT 81399), Tweedy to (Chief of )
Station, 10/15/60.) ; /

'

a
= * For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and
(0: Donnell and O'Donnell’ '5) subsequent activities in the Congo, see
ection 5(a), infra.

oN

/

|

\
N,

HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 31 ; oo.

-3L-

This series of cables sent during, and after
(sottiied)'s visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA
headquarters to authorize and support rapid Progress on the assassi-
nation mission. The cables also show an intent to severely re-
strict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in
CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the
Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other

covert activities.

(Ce) The (Chief of )Station Moves Forward With Assassination
. PTot*

The testimony of the Chieg of) Station, taken fifteen
years after the events in question and without benefit of review
of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture
derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted
assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from
the cables only with respect to the lack of. vigor with which he
claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an
affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables,

(i) ghe Chief of Station Testified That He Requested
rose onlirmation of the Assassination

Pian from adquarters

Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlie})'s
instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that
he was to carry out Gortiied}'s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gotetier) by
name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President

in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).

g

ee

-32-

Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he
took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination in-

structions:

There was some special channel ... because

it was handled differently than any other
normal message. For example, it was not puc
on a regular cable form, which, you know,

you have several copies for your various files.
And it was my recollection that IL personally
carried the message to the communicator to
encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk
way that even the communicator would not
necessarily know what it was about."
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for
all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for con-
firmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment,
he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

I believe I received a reply which I interpreted |
co mean yes, that he was the messenger and his
instructions were ... duly. authorized.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)
Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was con-
vinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from
[Gottiseb lor by cable, that he was to await further authorization
-before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman ex-
pressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free
hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving

"final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 32 . : so

~33-

( Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his

second appearance:

I probably had authority to act on my own
but... it was possible that I had to go
back and get clearance for my action.
siesgmen. 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75,
p. 39.

Hedgman testified, however, that a “policy decision" had been
made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of

eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).

I thought the policy decision had been made

in the White House, not in the Agency, and

that the Agency had been selected as the
Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out

a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)

( Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally
selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under
the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so

and to proceed to take action:

Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the
President had said, you use this system.
But my understanding is the President had
made a decision that an act should take
place, but then put that into the hands of
the Agency to carry out his decision.

a; Whatever that act was to be, it was
clearly to be assassination or the death
of the foreign political leader?

Hedgman: Yes.
Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?

— Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if (pr. Gottlieb} s
(Os Lethal agents were employed, that would have been

the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)

‘HW 50955 Docla:32202487 Page 33

HY 50955

-34-

Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out:
these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not
he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without
seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked
with headquarters before taking action:
I think probably that I would have gone back
and advised that I intended to carry out and
sought final approval before carrying it out
had I been going to do it, had there been a
way to do it. I did not see it as ... a :
matter which could be accomplished practically
certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)
He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval
would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the
specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 53).
(ii) The [Chief of }/Station Took "Exploratory Steps!’ in
Furtherance | the Assassination Plot and Testified
That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot

Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's) visit, he locked

the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably"
sealed in an envelope marked “Eyes Only" with his name on it
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was
the only other person with access to the safe and that she would
not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 3/21/75,
p. 49).

Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he pre-

served the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any

Docld:322024387 Page 34 -_

os.

art

HY 50955

-36-

The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For
two months after (cocelieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream
of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief off Station and
headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early
October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority _
plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have
sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison
Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of) Station
that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and

he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to in-

.tensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy

to Chief of/Station, 10/15/60) .**
These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on

October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission

* CIA Cable (IN,18989, (Chief of )Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60;
CIA Cable (IN 20857, (chief of) stati to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable
OUT 75900, Fields to (Chief £)Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable (nN 24171)
Chief of )Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section , supra, for
ull treatment of these cables. ~~

** See Section , supra, for more complete text of this
cable.

Docldad: 3227027457 Page 35

es

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HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE.

THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS

INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable

(IN 28936,)(Chief of)Station to Tweedy,

10/17/60.) ‘ ,
Hedpman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime
in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access
to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 61). the (Chief of) Station continued to communicate with head-

quarters about finding a means ‘to move forward with the assassina-

tion operation and securing the hecessary manpower to do so.

Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassination
operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with
responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate
on the progress of the assassination mission:

ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS
OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME,
VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable,
(IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the Chief of) Station responded enthusiastically

to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:
BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE
OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF) STATION] WOULD
DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING

D DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable
(tN 28936 ,) 10/17/60.)

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The (chiet of) Station concluded this cable with the following
cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he
may have "Suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlied as an alternative
to poisoning (liedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):

IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS

POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE

RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER.

HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT.

HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN,

WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING

OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable (tu 28936.)

10/17/60.) :

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers
to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The
‘rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the
possibility of shooting Lumumba at the “OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" --
in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside
the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This
interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by
the Chies of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's “EYES
ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from
mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on

November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but

inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:

TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL
WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY
CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... CONGOLESE
TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S
ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS .
UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF
PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS
OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSER-
VATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

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COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF
HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED
MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS, MEANS SEEMS
REMOTE. (CIA Cable CN 42478) (Chief. of
Station to Tweedy.) , ’
Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the
assassination question would have been sent with the same
extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably re-

ferring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb" 9 visit

and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

i

I would have sent in a special channel
anything dealing with Lumumba, at least
that would touch upon his removal’ in one
way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)

The (hier of Station also testified that sometime before
leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to
the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's
best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy
those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never
before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed
cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91).
But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were

destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a
sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

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that eventually

I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because
the Congo was a highly sensitive area in
which -- at one period I recall we had all
of our files in the burn barrels. I mean,
when you wanted a file, you went over and
dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman,
8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination

plot, the bhies of) Station was asked to give a general characteri-

zation of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times

in which it took place. His response indicated that although he

was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized

order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating

Lumumba:

I looked upon the Agency-as an executive
arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I
suppose I thought that it was an order
issued in due form from an authorized
authority.

On the other hand, I looked at.it as a
kind of operation that I could do without,
that I thought that probably the Agency’
and the U.S. government could get along
without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the
kind of person who was going to bring on
World War ILI or something.

I might have had a somewhat different
attitude if I thought that one man could
bring on World War III and result in the
deaths of millions of people or something,
but I didn't see him in that light. I saw
him'as a danger to the political position
of the United States in Africa, but
nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
pp. 110-111.)

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(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree
oF Support for and Ter etration of the Assassination
PIE en ERE Resa etnation
There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard
Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination
plot presented by the Chiet of\ Station and the cable traffic from
the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that
the assassination effort was the “highest priority" at CIA head-
quarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct
recollection of fottLieb's) mission to the Congo and Tweedy can
recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an
assassination attempt.

(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation
To Polson Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal
liaison at CIA headquarters with the nies of} Station in Leopoldville
for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the
effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the
Special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations
cabled to headquarters by the Chief of) Station on the assassination
operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only.”

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed
the bhiet of) Station that "SID") would arrive in Leopoldville, with _
an assignment (CIA Cable our 71464), Bissell/Tweedv to (Chieg of)

: \

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Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he
had debriefed Got e1ied) upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable
ve /
Gut 78336), Tweedy to Chief of)Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also
the “Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on (Gottlieb's)
arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable (IN 18989} (Chief of Station to
Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan
which emerged from the discussions between Gorttier) and Hedgman
as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's en-
Courage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA
x XN
Cable Gn 20857 Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable,
\ : ;
Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, (Chief of) Station
to Tweedy, 10/17/60). .
Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these
cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba: .
%. Do. you have any knowledge of a messenger
from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo
to provide the Chief of)Station in the Congo
with instructions to carry out the assassination
of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him
with the tools to carry out such an assassination,
namely, poisons and medical equipment for admin-
istering them?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

errr eae tenn nnn tye peer,

* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent
in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the (Chief of) Station in
Leopoldville.. , ’

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'

When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received
by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by
(cottsieb), who carried instructions that they were to be used in
the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:

There is nothing in my experience with the

Agency which would really bear on that

point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)

Tweedy added that if Gottlieb) went to the Congo as a courier,
"I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35),
Tweedy testified that it was “perfectly possible" for lethal bio-
logical substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't
recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable
from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to
the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be
“very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recoll-
ection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of
the Chief of) Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through
a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions
were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, Pp.
32-33).

Tweedy. commented that rather than questioning the truth of the

testimony of the (Chief of) Station, * the discrepancies in their

ae ee ender orange pee

X Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the
(Chief of} Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt
Hedgman'’s veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory
and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

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testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:

I’really am having trouble with this. I had to

be reminded of so many things. . .[T]he things
that I recall the most vividly about all my
African experiences were. . . the things I was

basically concerned with all the time, which was
putting this division together and the rest of
it. When it comes to operational detail I start
fuzzy and you would have thought with something
like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms,
that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking
about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the
case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)

fe ky
Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gort lie) would
have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have
empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any
further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32,
36). Tweedy said:
In such a matter of this kind; headquarters would

have wanted to have a last.word up to the last
minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell
the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He
Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba
For the Purpose of Assassination

Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to
poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assass-
. ination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassina! in:

Lumumba “more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960

(Tweedy, 9/9; pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know

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whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about
exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy,

9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruc-

tion from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assump -

tion that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

I would proceed with it on the basis that he
was authorized to give me instructions and it
was up to him to bloody well know what he was
empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assass-
inating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):

Tweedy. . . .I think it came up in the sense that
Dick would have said we probably better be
thinking about whether it might ever be necessary
or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case
we presumably should be in position to assess
whether we could do it or not successfully. —

Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him
in any other sense but a planning exercise, ...
never were we instructed to do anything of this
kind. We were instructed to ask whether.such a
thing would be feasible and to have the (Chief of)
Station be thinking along those lines as well.
(Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his con-
versation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers
sending to the Chief of) Station asking him

to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever

have had to Lumumba. . .[{in] the eventuality that

we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)

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Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for
the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p.. 24);
rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were

being explored: .

Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this
be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might
have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)

Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the
feasibility of an assassination operation, did
poisons come up as one_ means that was being con-
sidered and which the (Chiet of) Station should explore?

Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there
are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison
him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or
something like that. But basically you are talking
. about a contingency plan which I assume has the best
( possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S.
“ae Government and if you want to do it in a manner which
would be as distant, if that is the right word, as
possible, I think poison would then stand high on
the list of possibilities.

Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the (Chief
of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious
answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction’ from headquarters"
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).

Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a
special channel concerning the ‘messenger" to the Congo or confirm-

ation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring

access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been

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sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the
normal CIA ‘cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy
said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the
discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether
Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).

Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't” have a conver-
sation with Gidney Gottlieb} about "anything in his inventory that
could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances
(Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first
conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held
between Dick Bissell and Gidney Gottlieb}, " which Tweedy then would
have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).

Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the
means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning
interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was im-
minent that somebody would say ‘go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):

Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the
time. anything like this should occur there would
have been some kind of real focus on the problem
at probably a very considerable policy level with-
in the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that
I-would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come
down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we
ever in a position where he said that I would
merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got
that far.

Q. You didn't have any action plans for the

assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or
~ were aware of? ;

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Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that
ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's
testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authoriz-
ation for implementing the assassination operation, authorization
for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's
entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries
about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the
(chies of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT op" (CIA Cable {IN
24171)(chies of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile
with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never
imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week.
which told che (chief of) Station that Lumumba's

DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE
CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR
SPECIFIC PURPOSE. YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE

AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable
OUT 81396) Tweedy toChief of) Station, 10/15/60)

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall

Whether The Assassination Operation Had

Moved From Planning To Implementation

But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to

Send Poisons to The Congo

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing

the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it
seemed “entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place

(Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).

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Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about
steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did
not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that
exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information
from the Chiet of) Station about access for poisoning ~~ would have
been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but

he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this
subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was
aware that the Chief of) Station had an agent thought to have direct
access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables
that Tweedy sent to the nies of) Station seeking information about
gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell,
9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:

I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral author-
ization from me, would have had the authority to
send such a cable without my signing off on it.
(Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) —

Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of (Gottliet)'s trip
to the Congo, although it-was possible that Tweedy was “cut out of
knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21).
Bissell’s lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to

Gustin O'Donnellj*with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that

% Bissell's assignment to(0'Donnel}) is discussed in Sections 5(a)

(i) and 5(a)(ii), infra.

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Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of (Gottlieb )s
visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22). .

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a
messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were
to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . . I
would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would
have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

mW

Tt was '‘very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed

the assassination of Lumumba with (Sidney Gott lied), who was then
[nis Science Advisor \(Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a
number of occasions he discussed with Gottlict) "the availability

of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10,

(. p. 60).

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed
that, if Gottlieb) went to the Congo, he had approved the mission,
(which “might very well" have dealt with the assassination of
Lumumba} (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 4h). Despite his absence of
specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is
nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the
testimony of the (Chies of) Station chat (octiieb) carried poisons to
the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy

in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

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He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still
in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged,
however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which
to administer them was an extraordinary event:

It would indeed have been rather unusual to send

such materials -- a specific kit. .-. of this .

sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless

planning for their use were quite far along.

(Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).

"Nonetheless, Bissell said that he “probably believed" that he

had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to
move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10,

pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of

these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr.

n re
( . (Cottiied) took specific instructions ‘to implement,’ " Gottlieh)
‘vould not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by
Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot “had then passed
into an implementation phase" and that “authorization was given"

(Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).

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ection Between the Assassination

3. The Question of a Conn
Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives

in the Congo

Gustin 0" Donel), a senior CIA officer in the clandestine
operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he
had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry
out the assassination of Lumumba (Donne) 6/9/75, pp. 11-12). -
(o‘Donnet1) said that he refused to participate in an assassination
operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba
away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in
the hands of Congolese authorities (0 Donne1) 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).

Shortly after ('Donnel}'s arrival in the Congo he was
joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the
following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by
assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of
the Chies of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of
(0'Donne1 ly s with a proposition to join an "execution squad” (CIA
Cable (iu 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).

Despite the fact that 6" Donne) was initially approached

to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is un-
likely that (0'Donnet} was actually involved in the implementation
of that plot by the (Chief of) Station. Whether there is any connec-
tion between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives ~-

QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

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Meee

on™,

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(a) (Q'Donnell\'s Operations in the Congo
(i) Tweedy and the (Chief of)Station Apreed That a
; Senior Case Geese see }st be Sent to the Congo
to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation
In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the
specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior
case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of) Station with the
assassination operation.* On October -7, Bronson Tweedy informed
Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR
CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national

operative (CIA Cable (our 78336), Tweedy to(chief of) Station, 10/7/60).

On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the sugges-
tion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to

concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396),

_Tweedy to niet of) Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief

of) Station replied affirmatively:

BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER
HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable
(m8 28936), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy).

\ ;
The (Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for “MULTIPLE
OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the

assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

** See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.

C . (ii) .Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With

( O'DonneTT jand sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960
; — Oe ober=-November 1960

Probably shortly after the Cniet off Station's cable of

October 1? requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to

concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached

the subject with CIA officer Gustin O'Donnell),

At that time, (0'Donnel1) was the Deputy Chief of a com-
ponent of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm
/

(O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 8).

AL

o XN :
(sustin O'Donnell) testified that in October of 1960, he
was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassi-

nating Patrice Lumumba (P'Donnell), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75,
pp. 19, 43):

> . : \

sei (o'Donnel): lle called me in and he told ne
‘he wanted to po down to the Zelgian Congo,
the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate

Lumumba

Q: What did you understand him to mean by

eliminate?
(o'bonne1): To kill him and thereby eliminate
nis infTuence.

Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his
remarks, whatever his precise language, as
meaning that he was talking about assassination
rather than merely neutralizing him through

some other means?

(O'Donnel): [t was not neutralization . .
‘Clearly the context of our talk was to kill
him. (P'Donnel}), 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.).

p'Donnel!) reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:
I told him that I would absolutely not
( have any part of killing Lumumba. . He said,

I want you to go over and talk to\Sidney © ‘
'Gottlied). (O'Donnel), 6/9/75, p. 12.)

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 53 : -

-55-

(cottlieb) was a CIA scientist who was at that time the/Science

Advisor /tol Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).
(0' Donnell) said it.was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct
such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles"
[co donne 1, | 9/11/75, p. 44), But the question of authorization
was never raised by Bissell:
I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles
in such an important issue; but it was not dis-
cussed, nor did he purport to have higher
authority to do it. @ Ponneny) 6/9/75, p. 15.)
(0 Donnel}) promptly met with (Gottlieb) and testified that he was
“sure that Mr. Bissell had called (ottliet) and told him I was coming
over" (e' Donnel}, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). (0: Donnell} said
that ‘fottLiet) told him ‘that there were four or five ... lethal
means of disposing of Lumumba" (O' Donnel}), 6/9/75, p. - (0 Donel
recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others in-
cluded poison" 'bonner), 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). (O'Donnell)
said that Gottlieb) "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the
Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo"
(6'Donne1}), 9/11/75, p. 7-A).
After speaking with Gottlieb) (O'Donnell) said:
I then left his office, and I went back to
Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no
way would I have any part in the assassina-
tion of Lumumba ... and reasserted in

absolute terms that I would not be involved
in a murder attempt. (P"Ponnel1) 9/11/75, p. 43.)

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Suhr

HW 50955

-56-

x. (o'Donneti) said that in one of his two conversations with
Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy

to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be
in violation of federal law" (6 'Donne1}), 6/9/75, p. 14). He said
that Bissell “airily dismissed" this prospect (6 donnett) 6/9/75,
p. 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (O'Donnel?)
agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba "as a political factor" (@'Donnel}), 9/11/75, pp. 43-44) :

C said I would go down and I would have no

compunction about operating to draw Lumumba
out [of UN custody], to run an operation to
neutralize his operations which were against

Western interests, against, I thought,
American interests. ( ‘Donnel)), 6/9/75, p. 13.)

(O'Donnell) added that his objective was to

neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his
activities against [a Congolese leader],
whom at that time you might say was our close
instrument, he was the man we had put our

_ chips on. (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that; after their discussions about assassi-
nation, (O'Donnell) went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of
looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 53).

Although (0'Donnel} did not formulate a precise plan until he

reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:

Doclda: 3227027487 Page 55

~5]-

Me. lo'Donnet}) I told Mr. Bissell that I
wou e willing to go down to neutralize

his activities and operations and try to bring
him out fof UN custody] and turn him over to
the Congolese authorities, that is correct.

Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that
his Life might be taken by the Congolese
authorities?

Mr. (O'Donnel): It was, I think, considered
im tne -- not to have him killed, but then
it would have been a Congolese being judged
by Congolese for Congolese, crimes. . Yes,

I
think it was discussed. (P' Donel), 6/9/75,
p. 38.) \

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would re-
ceive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities,
\ - .
according to ("Donel (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 24), But (O'Donnell)
/ . ,
“had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him
tried by a jury of his peers" (@'Donnel1), 6/9/75, p. 14).
Although (O'Donnel had expressed his aversion to assassination
to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize"
Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still
interested in the assassination of Lumumba:
in leaving at the conclusion of our second
discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't
rule out that possibility -- meaning the
possibility of the elimination or the killing
of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other
words, even though you have said this, don't
rule it out.... There is no question about
it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out,
Meaning the elimination or the assassination
(©'Donnel1) 9/11/75, p. 45).
/
(O'Donnel) had a distinctive recollection that after his second dis-

cussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order

HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 56 . Loo.

-~58-

to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of

record (©'Donnel1), 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):

[I]n the Agency, since you don't have
documents, you have to be awfully canny
and you have to get things on record, and
I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I

said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell
proposed to me, and I told him that I
would under no conditions do it, and Helms
said you're absolutely right. (O'Donnel),
6/9/75, pp. 15-16). \ /

Richard Helms testified that it was “likely" that he had such a

conversation with (0'Donnel}) and he assumed that (0'Donneli)'s version
. : ~ A

of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*

William Harvey testified that ('Donneli) had informed him

about the conversations with Bissell:

( . \
= ite. (O'Donnell) came to me and said that he
had ‘been approached by Richard Bissell
to undertake an operation in the Congo, one
of the objectives of which was the elimina-
tion of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me
that he had declined to undertake this
assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)
Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told
him that he had asked (O'Donnell) to undertake such an operation
(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).
(0'Donneti) said that within forty-eight hours of his second dis-
cussion with Bissell, he departed. for the Congo )(0 "Donnell, [9/11/75 ,
pp. 45-46). .
* Helms testified that he did not follow-up n this conversa-
Po tion in any way. He did not recall why (O'Donnell) had gone to the
es Congo or what his mission was (elms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 57 ; _

a

-59-~+

(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked (O'Donnell) to Plan
and Prepare for an Assassination Operation
and rrepare for an Assass ac ton’~peration

_ Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and 6 ‘Donne 1)
discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell,
6/9/75, p. 75) and that (O'Donnel) reacted negatively (Bissell,
9/11/75, p. 18). According’to Bissell, 0 Donne) said that he
thought that assassination “was an inappropriate action and that
the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways"
(Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked

6" Donnell to see; (Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).

Bissell differs with (0' Donnel1)'s account on only one
important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assign-
ment to! 0" DonnelL)contemplated the mounting of an operation as
opposed to contingency planning. @: Donnel!) flatly testified that
Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first
testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked b: 0" Donnel1)

"to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell,
6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 53; 75). In a later appearance,
however, Bissell stated that 0" Donne11) “had been asked to plan
and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 24).

Bissell said that after his conversations with [o Donnell), he
felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination

operation because, "given (0° Donne) S reaction, there was a risk

HW 509545 Docld:32202487 Page 58 : -

fe

HY 50955

-60-

that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell

9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have de-

activated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time

Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/
e, . :

\Gobblieb\ poison plot continued to move foward:

\~ ’ a

{[T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive
assignment to him, limited -- with the
knowledpe of it limited very narrowly even
within the Agency. And it is difficult to
separate recollection from inference on -
occasion. But I seem to recollect that
after this conversation with him, I wanted
this put very much on the back burner and
inactivated for quite some time. ow that
doesn't rule out the possibility that some
action through completely different channels
might have gone forward. But the best of
my recollection is, I viewed this not only
as terminating the assignment for him, but
also as reason for at least postponing any-
thing further along that line. (Bissell,
9/10/75, ‘pp. 25-26).

In Tweedy's mind, (0'Donne11)'s eventual mission to the Congo was
linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba

rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody

(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).

Civ) (2 Donnell) Arrived in the Congo and Learned That
Virus Was In the Station Safe

On October 29, the Chies of Station was informed’ through **"*:

the PROP channel that (Justin O'Donnel) was soon to arrive in Leo-
poldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS: PROJECT" (CIA Cable our 86798, Fields)
to (chiet of) Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, 0" bonnet} arrived

Bocld: 322024387 Page 59

ems

-6l-

in Leopoldville {CIA Cable Gn 38052), Leopoldville to Director,
11/4/60). (chief of) Station ‘Hedgman testified that he had been

made aware by cable that (0' Donnell) was coming to the Congo

(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 49). Hedgman said it was "very possible"

that as a new Chief of) Station he took the dispatch to the Congo

of a senior officer Like (0'Donneli) as a signal that CIA headquarters
was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb) instructions
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42). .

Hedgman had a general picture of (0'Donnel})'s mission:

TI understood it to be that -- similar to
mine, that is, the removal or neutrali-
zation of Lumumba ... I have no clear .

recollection of his discussing the assassi-
nation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)

x

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of ©'Donnel}) indicating
one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as
a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55).
Hedgman said, “in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that
he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Gen-
erally, however, Hedgman perceived ©'Donne1}) as being unenthusiastic
about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).

wien (0 Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he met with the (chiet of)
Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe"
(O'Donnel, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he

ra

assumed it was a “lethal agent" (O'Donnel 1, 6/9/75, p. 37), although

\
Hedgman was not explicit:

I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio
shot up to date, (O'Donnel 1), 6/9/75, p. 16.)

s

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 60

HY 50955

~62-

He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes,
‘it would have been in the custody of the State Department"
personnel, not the CIA station (@' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 36).
(0'Donnet1) said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned

the source of the virus (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 8).* But (0'Donne11)
assumed that it had come from(Sidiey Gottlied)'s office:

It would have had to have come from Washington,

in my estimation, and I would think, since it

had been discussed with Gottlie} that it

probably would have emanated’ from his office.
(O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.) -

Hedgman did not recall discussing ‘Gottliet)'s trip to the Congo
with (0'Donne1)), but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
pp. 60-61). |

@'Donnet} was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he
did (Q'Donne1t), 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that
such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because
he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the
Congo (®' Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 17).

(O'Donnell)stated that he knew of no other instance where a

lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station

(6' Donel) 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was

assassination:

\

When \O'Donhelljwas informed about Hedgman's testimony on
the visit of (Gottlieb) to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba,
he said, "I believ absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell)
9/11/75, p. 53). (O'Donnel) found nothing in the facts as he knew
them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that
testimony. (O'Donnell) regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent
man" (O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 19) -- “a totally truthful man"
(O'Donnel), 9/11/75, p. 56). .

Docld:32202487 Page 61

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ote

-~63-

My feeling definitely is that it was for a
specific purpose, and was just not an all-
purpose capability there begin held for tar-
gets of opportunity, unspecified targets.
(O'Donnel 9/11/75, p. 49.)

At several points, (0'Donnel}) stated that he did not think that
Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (0'Donne11)

6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very
possibly Lumumba, but very. possibly in connec-
tion with other people. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75,
p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the “specific
f
purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (0'Donne11)

9/11/75, p. 50).

(¢"Donnett) said that the (Chief of\Station never indicated that

f
f

~@'Donnelt\was to employ the virus (O'Donnell; 9/11/75, p. 52). In

5

\
fact, (0'DonneLy testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassi-
nation effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (6'Donne1})

9/11/75, p. 54.)

While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his
assassination operation with-(0'Donne11), he "assumed" that he had
at least discussed with (O'Donnell) the problem of gaining access to
Lumumba for the purpose o£ assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

/ 5
pp. 55, 60). (0'Donnell} testified, however, that because he was

"morally opposed to assassination" he would “absolutely not" have

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 62

-~64-

explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would
he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assess-
ment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone
else (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 26).

(0'Donneti) was "sure" that he "related everything" to Medgman
about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination

f . .
of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no

recollection of learning this from ('Donnet) (iedgnan 8/21/75,
p. 56).
Beyond this, (0 'Donnell) said that his discussions of assassi-

nation with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with

“the morality of assassinations" (© 'Donnet}) 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):

From my point of view I told him I had
“ee moral objections to it, not just qualms,
but objections. I didn't think it, was
the right thing to do. ()'Donnel),
9/11/75, p. 9). ‘

Cc,

\
When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination

based on those discussions, |0' Donnell) said:

Io will answer your question just as fairly
and as scrupulously as I-can. I have a

great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if

he said something, I would believe him to

be speaking the truth as he knew it without
shading it.... The best I could say, I.
think, would be this, that he would not have
been opposed in principle to assassination in
the interests of national security.... I
know that he is a man of preat moral per-
ception and decency and honor, and so forth.
And that it would disturb him to be engaged in
something like that. But I think I would
have to say that in our conversations, my

- memory of those, at no time would he rule it:
f° ' out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell)

* 9/11/75, p. 18.) \ !

HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 63

=65-

,

- (v) (o'Donne11\ Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turnin

( : Him Over ‘to Congolese Authorities and Requested the

~ Assignment of Agent OJWIW to Leopoldville as His
Alter Ego

After Gustin O'Donnel) arrived in the Congo, he formu-
lated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from

the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

(0'Donneti): {[W]hat I wanted to do was to
“get him out, to trick him out, if I could,
and then turn him over ... to the-legal
authorities and let him stand trial. Be-

cause he had atrocity attributed to him for
which he could very well stand trial.

Q: And for which he could very well have

—

received capital punishment?

(o:DonneL I} Yes. And I am not opposed to
.capital punishment. (@'Donnely, 9/11/75,
pp. 20-21.)* 7 4

To implement his plan, b'Donne1}) made arrangements to rent "an ob-
an

servation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"

* According to an earlier report from the Cnies of) Station, it
was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General
of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was /‘JUST
A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop . . Chief
of)Station to Director, 10/11/60). The (Chief of) Station proceeded
to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:’ ;

STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS
ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE
THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM
SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).

HY 50955 Doecld: 322024687 Page 64

“™.

HW 50955

-~66-

(' Donnell} 6/9/75, p. 20).* (Donnell) also "spotted" a member
of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an
attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (@'Donnet¥)
6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21). ;

(o'Donnei} said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to

CIA headquarters (0'DonneLY), 9/11/75, p. 26). We also said that

’

he informed the (Chief of Station about his plan (6 'Donnet}), 9/11/75
5 58). . / Ok -

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN cus-
tody, (O'Donnell Jarranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was

\

QJIWIN, to come to the Congo to work -with him ('Donne1)), 9/11/75,
p. 19):

What I wanted to use him for was .
counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen
the U.S. participation in this ..; by
using a foreign national whom we knew,
trusted, and had worked with ... the
idea was for me to use him as an alter
efzo. (O'Donnell) Tr., pp. 19-20.) ©

In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA head-
f
quarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable EN 41261),
Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:
LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE
IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO

LEOPOLDVEILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556),
Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

* A cable from the (Chief of) Station to Tweedy in mid-November

reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese
troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC
RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE"
(CIA Cable (IN 42478), (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60) .

Doclda: 3227027487 Page 65

ao

-67-

The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about

the "operational circumstances."

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November~-December
T

QUWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background,
recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re:
Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer (mien
Silwciny In November 1960, at(0'DonnelI)'s request (O'Donnel), 6/9/75,

. ° ;

p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by (Qiliyes to under-

take a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk."

(CIA Cable/IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

_

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip
to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to

his mission:

In view of the extreme sensitivity of the ob-
jective for which we want him to perform his
task, he was not told precisely what we want
him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that
we would like to have him spot, assess, and
recommend some dependable, quick-witted
persons for our use.... It was thought best
to withhold our true, specific requirements
pending the fina] cision to use [him].

(CIA Dispatch, QR 147, 11/2/60.)

* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to-
send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspeci-
fied mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained
in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various sta-
tions that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN com-
pleted this mission. (O'Donnell) said he had no knowledge of any
mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country ( ‘Donnell,
9/11/75, pp. 32-33). Ne

0955 Docld: 32202467 Page 66 . se

Nine

-63-

This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained
at the station: ‘this dispatch should be reduced to eryptic
necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA

2
Dispatch, (ER 147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable

f *
{TH 49486; 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960

(CIA Cable (QUT 54710), Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).
The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QIWIit
i o>
had been recruited earlier eRArmold Dives
for use in a special operation in the Congo

{the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be
run by(Justin O'Donnel. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)

”

However, both (0'Donnet) and Bissell testified that (O'Donnel) re-
fused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead,
(0’Donnei1) said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba
from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in

the hands of the Congolese army. @'Donnety), 6/9/75, pp. 13-14,

37.)
f “
According to (O'Donnel), QJWIN was a man who was capable of

undertaking an assassination mission:

(o'Donnel?: ... I would say that he would not

‘be a man of many scruples.

Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
(o'Donnel): I would think so, yes.
Q: “and that would include assassination?
(0'Donnel)): I would think so.
(O'Donnel), 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)

% See Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii) above.

Docla: 32202487 Page 67 . . .

~69-

‘\
( But (0' Donnell) had no knowledge that QJNIN was ever used for an
, assassination mission (p' Donnel), 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).
fo" ‘Donne1l) said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA
officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did
not report independently to anyone else (0'Donnel}), 9/11/75, p. 28).
When asked if it was possible pas QJWIN had a mission independent
of that he was performing for 6: Donnell), he said:
(0'Donnel i: Yes, that is possible -- or
Tt “could have been that somebody contacted
him after he got down there, that they
wanted him to do something along the lines
‘of assassination. I don' E know. e 9"DonneL
9/11/75, p. 29.)
But he discounted this possibility as “highly unlikely” because it

would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent

officer 6" ‘Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).

Despite 0" Donnell''s doubt that QJWIN had an independent line
of responsibility to the Chief of) Station, a cable of November 29
shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.

In that cable, the Chief of) Station reported through the PROP
channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to
“PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba 's residence
and ''PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA cable (tN 49486) (Chief
of) Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). (0" Donne11) said that he had directed

- QJWIN to make ‘the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force

whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

HW 50955 DocId: 32202487 Page 68

ina position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising -

-70-

(9 ‘Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at
this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This
did not deter QJWIN:

VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN

ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED

DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT

USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).
It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassina-
tion as well as abduction. An affirmative xeply from headquarters
came through the PROP channel the next day which was also suscep-
tible of interpretation as an assassination order:

CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.... WE ARE

PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJIWIN

BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING OW SECURITY

FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED

STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable QUT 98314)

Chief of Africa Division to €hief of)Station,

11/30/60.) . :

(o'Donne1}) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-
extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I
did." 6" Donne1y), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (0'Donnely said he left the
Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands
of Congolese authorities. ‘Donnell, p. 20.) QJUWIN left in
December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities
in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom ('Donne1}) had worked
- before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the

success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 69

-~71L-

( specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been
completed"! (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
1/11/61). (0'Donnelt) explained Harvey's reference to the fact that
QJWIN's inission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba
was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for
the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (P'Donnel1),
9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for
Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, (' Donne11°
said: ‘Absolutely not" p" Donnel, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not
recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that (0' Donnell) s
return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QUJWIN's

mission (Harvey, affidavit, p. ).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that

,

Neate QJIWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission
and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November,
there is no clear evidence that QJWIM was actually involved in any
assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved
in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave

_ no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.

The (Chief of \Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN
was in the Congo working for (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. |
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of
Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson

Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 70

C

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 7il

infra; on the "Executive Action Capability."

-~-72-

(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).
William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for
his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities

in the Congo:

I was kept informed of the arrangements for
QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently,

of his presence in the Congo. I do not know |
specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo, . I
do not think that I ever had such knowledge....
If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination -
mission, it would have been cleared with me,

I was never informed that he was to be used
for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. )

He stated that (Wanokl sien probably wrote the memoranda con-
cerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Ilarvey
affidavit, p. >.
(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QUWIN was used by
CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE,
a project which included research into a capability to assassinate
foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT"
figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents
by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation

of Project ZRRIFLE:

* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section

-~73-

(Sees wker had not previously used .
IWIN as an assassination capability or

even viewed him as such. (Harvey affi-

davit, p.
Although Harvey also had discussions with (Sidney Gottlieb) in connec-
tion with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb) never mentioned
to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Cottlieb)'s own
trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, Pp. ). Harvey had con-—
sulted with seminal Sililweny

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE

The Chief of} Station in Leopoldville testified that he had
never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project
to develop the capability of assassinating. foreign Leaders.
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was

(cor “quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities
or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.)

ZY
SHbivergpcame to the Congo on a counter-

Hedgman testified that (ignore
intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss
the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded Qawin by the CIA.
and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that emp loys
Ann ord! Dies)
in 1962, The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial

hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters tof

in Europe on smugg Ling charges. The cable suggested:

IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISIl ATTEMPT QUASII

CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN .FOR

OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable (OUT 73943), 4/18/62.)
\ :

$5 Docld: 32202487 Page 72

Nee

HY 50955

-~74-

(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedeman's Operative WIROCUE
to Join an "Execution Squad”; December 1960

The one incident where there is an explicit reference to
assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with
WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.

WEIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European) who was
"a forger and former bank robber" fana had‘ fought with the French
Foreign Legion] (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was
sent to che Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee
by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling
through the Congo. (I1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was

assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT

ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable (ou 865544

Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).

The niet of) Station described WIROGE as "a man with a
rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least."
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility
agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, develop-
ing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96,)
liedgman supervised WEROGUE directly. and did not put WIROGUE in
touch with Justin O'Donnel), (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector
General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he

received:

Docldad: 3227027457 Page 73 : . foe

-/5-

( On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa
MS Division met with him to discuss "an opera-

.tional assignment in Africa Division." a

connection with this assignment, WIROG /l

was to be trained in demolitions, small arms,

and medical immunization.... In October 1960

a cable to Leopoldville stated that ,

Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as

utility agent in order to "(a) organize and

conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept

packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute -

other assignments requiring positive action.

His utilization is not to be restricted to

Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on
December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable (Gn 18739) 12/17/60). He was given two
instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;"
and (2) to “spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence

assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA

Cable fix 18739), 12/17/60.)

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached
QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is
described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station’ Hedgman in a cable to
CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):

JWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED |
LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, AN, SOUTH |
AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROP QIWIN
SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS,
STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJIWIN
REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS
PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER
“EXECUTION SQUAD.'' WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED,
WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS.
UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORK-

_ INF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.

. IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTLONED
“ QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM.
( THEN. [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE
; HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS.
(CHIEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT
WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable,
MW 50955 Docla:32202se9p@hgvthle to Director, 12/17, 60.) o

-76-

( The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's

actions:

. LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING
AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEAD-
ACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO HOT
ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING
FOLLOW LHSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING
KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE
DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST
SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director,

12/17/60.)

WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is
explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as
an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

f
The Chief of) Station testified that he had not instructed
\ /

WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else.

“oo

sn (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

I would like to stress that I don't know what
WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution
squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to

go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WLROGUE may have concocted the idea of an

execution squad:

His idea of what an intelligence operative
should do, I think, had been gathered by
reading a few novels or something of the
sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)
Gustin O'Donnell) had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone

connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollec-

HW 50955 Doecld: 32202467 Page 75

-77-

( tion of WIROGUE 6" Donne1}) 9/11/75; pp: 39-42). (0'Donnetl} men-
| tioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a “strong arm
squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than

. . )
assassinations: .

surveillance teams where you have to go
into crime areas ... where you need a
fellow that if he gets in a box can fight
his way out of it. (O'Donnel) 9/11/75,
p. 36). \ J

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to
QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that
WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo
(Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would
“absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against
Lumumba because “he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt
with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people
in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy Glenn
Fields ->) who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba
was being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The (Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was
connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted
a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which
this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was
sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much
wider distribution than the PROP cables that he ‘sent and received
concerning the Goterier) assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75,

p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 176 : : -

-78-

‘a WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would “normally do ... when you
speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75,
p. 101) .

The Chief of) Station Maintained that WIROGUE's proposition
to QJWIN to join an “execution squad" could be attributed to.
WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:

I had difficulty controlling him in that he
was not a professional intelligence officer
as such. le seemed to act on his owm without
seeking guidance or authority ... I found

he was rather an unguided missile ... the
kind of man that could get you in trouble: be-

fore you knew you were in trouble..
(Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:

Ce {I}£ you give a man an order and he carries it
id 2
out and causes a problem for the Station, why
then as (Chief of) Station, well, you accept

responsibility.“ (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pb. 97.)

In sum, the niet of) Station testified that despite the fact
that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during
this. period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an “execution squad"
was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA. assassi-
nation plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in “medical
immunization" (1.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility ,
that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lunumba by means

of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE’s case

HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page Tf? . -

aa

-79-

by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The
report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of
his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved
in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But,
when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office,
the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one

of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in

assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be dis-
carded out of hand as ‘exceeding instructions.'" (1.G. Memorandum,
3/14/75)

6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing
About Lumumba’s Death in Katanga

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bring-
ing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely
connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that
they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba 's death.

(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custod , Capture b

Congolese Army, and Imprisonment ae Thyeit [te

flovenber 27-Deceaber 3-190

The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved
in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure
from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from’
the Chiet of) Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478,
(Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedeman re-
ported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's

POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT

HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO

THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY.
(CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 78

HY 50955

-~80-

The €nief of) Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge
of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that

eventuality:

DECISION Oi] BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE

SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY

[AGENT] OF DECISION WHEW MADE.... STATION

HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT . -
OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF

ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually
gained prior knowledge of Lumumba‘s plan to depart for Stanleyville.
In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's
escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circum-
stances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable bes 48484), Leopoldville
to Director, 11/28/60). . |

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether

the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese

troops:

{STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT ]
TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED .
[BLOCK] POSSIBLE. ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable,
11/28/60.)

A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates
against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Conpolese
forces as the source of the station's information (CIA cable (tN 10643;
Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).

The (Chief of) Station testified that he was "quite certain that

there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure

Doclda: 322024687 Page 79 - : Loe

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 60

-81-

from Uil custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's

plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted

with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might

take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in track-

ing down Lumumba prior to his capture (lledgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).
Despite the fact that (O'Donnel) had planned to draw Lumumba

out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he

insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked

by the CIA ($" Donel) 9/11/75, p. 22).

(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed:
January I7, L966

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was
kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of
1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba

a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of

CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the
testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, (O'Donnell,) and Helms
(investigative report) should be inserted. \ °

HW 50955

-83-

Group
agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily
rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of ac-
tivity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.
(Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)
The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special
Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of) Station in Leopold-
ville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
. A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION' (CIA Cable our 62966)
Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: “YOU .CAN ACT ON
YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."
Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassina-
tion, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the as-
sassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in
his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group
meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assas-
Sination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-
34, 61-62; see Section. 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the
primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba,
testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure,
including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to re-
move Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).
On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of).

Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later,

in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

Bocld: 322024387 Page 31

Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave
danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th
NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scien-
tist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (hiet of) Station
with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate
Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this
operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that
it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authoriza-
tion for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration re-
sponsible to the President for national security affairs testified
( - that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an
; assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National
Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit
Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary
of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the ac-
tual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism
for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19).
NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong pos-
sibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order
would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphe-

mism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 82

7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these
early meetings was vehement:

Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a

person who was a Castro or worse . . . Mr. Dulles went

on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he de-

scribed as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the

assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Commun-

ists; this also, however, fits with his own orienta-

tion. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)
The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After look-
ing at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to deter-
mine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the
President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the

Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's, testi-
mony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series

‘of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopold-

ville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The Septem-

ber 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.
ee

* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in de-
tail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows:
The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group
was informed of the President's “extremely strong feelings about the
necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to
consider “any particular kind of activity which might contribute to
getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this
meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments
referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vig-
orously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60;
see Section 7(a) (iii), infra). The next day, Dulles senk an "Eyes
Only" cable under his personal signature to the/Chief of station in

HW 50955 Docld:32202467 Page &3

ug

HW 50955

The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before
the “quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu
-- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard
the President's Statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson
could have heard the statement by the President was held on Septem-
ber 7, two days after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960,

indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced

ee

* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUAR-
TERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE
AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION"
(CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to(chies of/Station, 8/26/60). The Dul-
les cable added:

WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY |. - INCLUDING EVEN MORE
AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . _ YOU CAN
ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT RE-
FERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60) (See Section 2, Supra,
for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters
to the Congo on an extraordinarily Sensitive assignment (CIA Cable
OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of)Station, 9/19/60: see Section
4(a), Supra). On September 21, in the Presence of the President at
an NSC IReeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave
danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see
Section 7(a) (iv), infra). Finally, on eptember, 26, the CIA scien-
tist arrived in the Congo, Provided thef Chief of Station with lethal
biclogical substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and in-
formed him that the President had Ordered the DCI to undertake an ag-
Sassination effort (see. Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The (Chief of)
Station stated thar he received confirmation from CIA headquarters
that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section

4(e) (i), supra).

we In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the “number two

position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently

changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this Position, he frequently
(Continued)

Bocld: 322024387 Page 84

-107-

on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of
Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba
had been deposed from his Position as Premier and was in UN
custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a4 threat, especially
in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between
Lumumba and the Ppost-coup Congolese government:
Mobutu appeared to be the effective Power in the
Congo for the monent but Lumumba Was not yet
disposed of and remained a grave danger as long
as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes,
9/21/60.)
Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a
Personal cable to the/ Chief of Station)in Leopoldville which
—
included the following message:
uo WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING
( LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL
POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE] , SETTING
HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable,
(our 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville. 9/24/60.)
On September 26, (Sidney Gottlieb), under assignment from
CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldyille (CIA Cable (iw 18989),
Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the (Chief of)
Station with poisons, instructed him CoO assassinate Lumumba ,
and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for
this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(e), upra).
Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote

the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not

interpret Dulles’ remark as referring to assassination:.:.

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 65

ft Eh

-114-

Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active
in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of
Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political
Affairs Livingston Merchert, and Deputy Secretary of Defense
James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion
about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2;

Merchant atfidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).

(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of
a Specific Recollection, He Strongly Inferred”
That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was
Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles
Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level
authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is prob-
lematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection
of receiving such-authorization and that all of his testimony
on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell,

9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject

by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed

(sustin O'Donnell) to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell,
6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based
on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating
to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an
assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels.
of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62,
65).

HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 86

_ AW 50955

-115-

As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes
of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the
NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was con-
templated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means
of "getting rid of Lumumba'' (see Sections 5(a) (ii) and 5(a) (iii),

supra).

There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the

cable from Allen Dulles to che(chier of )Station in Leopoldville

on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized
Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a
direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had
attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell
was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles
cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12).
Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of
the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated
within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):

It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted

by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of

the Special Group as authorizing implementation

[of an assassination] if favorable circumstances

presented themselves, if it could be done covertly.

(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)

Dulles’ cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presi-

dential authorization for him to order action to assassinate

Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):

Bocld: 322024387 Page 387

-116-

Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower
wanted Lumumba killed?

Mr. Bissell: Tf am sure he didn't.

Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously
through this kind of cable?

Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect.
(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)

As for discussions with Dulles about the source of autho-
rization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell
Stated:

I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles
would have said either the President or President
Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said,
this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I
would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
p. 48.) ;
When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the
(acr consideration or planning of assassination to order implementa-
tion of a plan, Bissell Said, “I probably did think I had [such]
authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).
When informed about the (Chief of )station's testimony
about the instructions he received from (Goce Liel), Bissell said
that despite his absence of a specific recollection: .
I would strongly infer in this case that such an
authorization did pass through me, as it were,
if Gid ttlieb) gave that firm instruction to the
Stationf Chief- (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)

Bissell said that the pcr would have been the Source of this

authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40),

HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 68

-117-

‘Bissell did not recall being. informed by (Cote1ied) that

botetied)had represented to the(Chief of) Station that there

was Presidential authorization for the asSassination of Lumumba
(Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he
had instructed Gotetied)eo carry poison to the Congo, "there
was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruc-
tion without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75,

P- 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell (ote 1ied)
that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower
(Bissell, 9/10/75, P. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion
that if, in fact, the testimony of the(Chieg of) station about
(Coveried)'s actions is accurate, then Gortlied)'s actions were

fully authorized:

Ce . Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency
i Mr.

that the President had instructed the DCI to
carry out this mission would not have been beyond
the pale of Mr. Gottliet)'s authority at that
point? Sor:

Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75,
Pp. 65).

Bissell further Stated:
Knowing Mr. Gottlieb) it is literally inconceivable
to me that hé would ‘have acted beyond his instruc-
tions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)

With respect to his assignment to Gustin O'Donnel) to “plan

and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75,

Pp. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

. HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 99

-118-

i

q (° Donnell) this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he

‘said that this specific assignment was made in the context

that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had autho-
rization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p
also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).

50; see

HY 50955 Docld:32202467 Page 90

that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any
urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later
@#ppearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of
the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and
not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and

Save no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he
never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was “almost certain"
chat on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials/ Sidney
Gottlieb | the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and
Gerold SLives

of creating a capability within the Agency for “executive action"

a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility

(Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those

meetings ,* Harvey testified thar they took place after his initial

* As to the.dat of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his no-
tations "'25/14Sid GY a ( »26/1$ER sindicate that he spoke to [Sidney
a

¢ Gottlieband GENS Silver) in 19617 ag Opposed to 1962, Harvey testi-
fied as follows. oy"

Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and
is about the subject of Executive Action?

Harvey: Yes, it is,

Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Lissell that
you have recounted?

Harvey: ., , - (Wjell, when I first looked at this, [ thought
this, well, this has got to be ‘62, but LI am almost certain
now that it is not. IF this is true, this might place the
~ first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early
January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were
several such discussions in varying degrees of detail] during
the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall
of '61 period, but-f did find out fairly early on that Silwer)
( . " oe .

@ 955 Docld:32202487 Page 91

discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said,”
might have transpired in “early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p.
52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey

about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75,

p. 10).
ee
had -- or t t?dissell had discussed the question of assassi-

nation with (ge
least, had ¢¢
discussed the matter with @h

and this discussion, at the very
I, know Bissell already had
Lwer [larvey, 6/25/75, p. 52),

~

llarvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial in-
structions to establish an executive action capability:

the firse thing I did... was discuss in theoretical
terms with a few officers whom Crusted quite implicitly
the whole subject of assassination, our Possible assets,
Our posture, going back, if you will, even to the funda-
mental questions o£ A, is assassination a proper weapon
of an American intelligence Service, and B, even if you
assume that it is, is it within our Capability within

the framework of this government to do it effectively

and properly, securely and discreetly, (Harvey, 6/25/75,
Pp. 37-A, 38). ©

; nyt} _t
The Inspector General's Report connected (FAMED) anu Foceies| Co the
early stages of the executive action Project as follows:

Harvey says that Bissell had*41lread discussed certain
aspects of the problem with Gtwold Silwe:\ERe with JSidney 3
-° - Gottlieb Since (aR tas already cut in, Harvey used
him in éveloping™the njGotcts Agtion Capability...
[

Harvey's mention of him. Gottlieb]] in this connection
may explain a notation tf Dr.\ Gunn that larvey instructed
Gunn to discuss techniques with] Goctlieblwithout associa-
ting the discussion with the Castro Operation. (L.G.

It is evident from the Cestimony of tlarvey and, Bissell that the turn-
Over to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 196] was discussed
4S pare of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d) , infra), Thus, their initial
discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before
Noveiaber 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" hotations would have to

refer to January 1961.

£55 Docld: 32202487 Page 92

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell,

6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the

White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November

meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given
administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three
months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated
aS a Capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55).
Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were
related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my
mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However,
Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the
Syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the
ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75,

P. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action
“capability . .. for assassination" was “used against Castro",
Bissell replied that it was “in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75,
Pp. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15;
1961, however, Preceded the reactivation of the ClA~syndicate assas-
ination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal back-

ground who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive

Programs involving Surreptitious entries which Pre-dated Project

HY 50955 Doclda: 32202487 Page 93

see

-19-

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent
of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of.
potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was
assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent

Sasa

QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Gana whi

his

Supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the
Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which GRR worked.
had ordered QJI/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch (apm) 147,
11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission
afterward (Memorandum Co Finance Division from William K. Harvey,
1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail
in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ——? Supra. ]

There are two factors which may raise a question as
to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc Capacity to develop
an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated,
First, there is 2 Similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey,
qu/win, CRS and \Gortlieb were connected with the Lumumba Matter
and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of
ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of
an assassination Capability had already been discussed with Gye
and Gottlieb |before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75
p. 52; I.G, Report, pp. 37-38).

.Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm

evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate

Lumumba,

Documents indicate that consideration was given within

the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic.

aa)

oO 1
SOMME TTA of the CIA

LD)

At a June 21, 1960, meeting wit

Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly
suggested possible sites for the drops.
(CIA memo, 6/21/60)
Documents also indicate that a meeting was held
around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and
Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division.
Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view
regarding “To what extent will the u.s, government participate
in the overthrow of Trujillo.” A number of questions were
( raised by King, among them:
"oe. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles
Or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people
from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to
*

that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)
On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting
Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's
signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy,
[ Rudy Gomez \{I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that
a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked
Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate
trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arins
( * Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does

either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles.

(Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.). . no

f pdb, _— bet yey j
Pps Pocld:32202487 Page 95 f{ ii}. re AG aid


Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved

Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and
the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom

that the dissidents were
"le. in ne way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary

activity in the foreseeable future except the

assassination of their Principal enemy."

(Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

Tt is uncertain what portion of the information provided
by Dearborn to State waS passed above the Assistant Secretary
level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom,
his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant [Frank Devine,

to
were, within the Latin American Division of the Department,

~

aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (devine to Dearborn
— letter, 8/15/60) *
. By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom
as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and (Prank
Devine] had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While
serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, | Devine|
reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State

activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that
ane

Devine maintained almost daily communication with Epea
and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division
(Devine, p.7)

*Déarborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960
raised concern with the Department and ne was advised that certain
Specific information should more 4Dpropriately come through "tne
other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was
_ advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19
Ns different recipient offices, {Id.)

‘ : : :
1 wo coe 4
Lot Lob an

55 Docld:322024387 Page 96

ro
!
A955 Docld: 322023487 Page q7 |

wd Yee i Bees tes Ay ky cheb Bi
bd War ks Rey bee top Sb a

have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly °

more, and we are not prepared to make them

available. Last week we were asked to furnish

three or four pineapples for a party in the

near future, but I could remember nothing in my in-

structions that would have allowed me to contri-

dute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't

tempted. I have rather specific guidelines

to the effect that salad ingredients will be

delivered outside the picnic grounds and will

be brought to the area by another club.

(Dearborn letter to [Deving), 3/16/61)
After reviewing his "picnic" lettér, together with the requests
in the Marcn 14 and IS cables discussed above, Dearborn con-
cluded during his testimony before the Committee that the
“pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation
grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients
outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to
refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group
orcéer that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic,
(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

In a March 15, 1961 cable, [chiet of| Station Gas reported

that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue
to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret
no authorization exists to Suspend pouch regulations against
shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coor=
dinated with State. {HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The
Station |chief \then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary
authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had

received pistols via the pouch for "worthy Purposes” and,

yuo.

ho. : i

Porm . moe, : .

fl rs | Bo

oye id mbH rt oy. ws
wat is aie

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable,
3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the Pistols
and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station
[chiet| was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station
cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction

oy Not to Tell Dearborn

Sal segs :
fae testified that he believed the "don't tell Dear-
born the pistol is being pouched" language Simply meant that
the sending of firearms through the “iplomatic pouch was not
7]

something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Grea pp. 78,79)

ta
od

Dearborn Said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew
VERS had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn,
7/29, p. 33)
c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?
ee WO ASSASSination?
Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single Pistol
for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination con-
Sideration, (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been
approached by a Dominican contact who lived ina remote area
and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event

of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

* “The Inspector Generail’s Report, issuea in connection with
a review of these events, concludes that:

“There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files
that the pistols were actually pouched. The request

for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a sub-
sequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)

le. This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March
fo: 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:

"C. Pouching: revolvers-and ammo--requested TRUJI 0462
(in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted)
pocta: 5S40$4Ba tenga bsbeing pouched. Explanation follows."


o

the man's fears were well~founded and had promised to seek a
pistol.”

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these
pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA
memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source,

states that two of the three pistols were Passed by lowen! to
7 }

~

mo. Winey” Ram United States citizen who was in direct

contact with the action element of the dissident group. It

should also be noted that the assassination was apparently con-
ducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether
one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols
eventually came into the hands of the assassins

and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the
assassination, remain open questions.

as weapons for self-defense Purposes and they never

Both Dearborn and testified that they regarded the pistols:
considered them in any way connected with the then-current

i °
assasSination plans, (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; ren) pp.38,73)
However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the
Purpose for which the handguns were sought and (ans cable

Stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents.

(Station to Has cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

*Dearborn is clear in hie recollection that ne asked {omen to
request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, PP-30,31) [fe
on the other hand, testified that if his cables requés?
pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three
Pistols .03(@@wen} p.72)

The pistols’were, however, apparently sent in one package
(HUS to-Station cables,3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testi-
fied that, what he believed to be the one gun, came “wranped
up" and that he passed it. | (Dearborn, -7/29,p.30)


iT Ni ~ Besa | i

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the

very cable which was sent in response to a request by the
dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination

effort which had been previously described to Headquarters,

As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little,

if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over Passing these

weapons to would-be assassins,

3. Passing of the carbines

a. Request by Cuan and “Dearborn and Approval. by. CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Bb actos
for permission to Pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1
carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by
Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations
in Auyust 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred
in the proposal to Supply the carbines to the dissidents.
(Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) on March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters
cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to
Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group concace ETI | April 7,

1961. (Station to Hos cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found

their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio

de la Maza. (Station to HOS cable, 4/26/61; I.c. Report

{
PP. 46, 49) Both Dearborn ond (BiB testitiea that the

re 2 .
carbines were at'allstimes viewed’ ‘as ‘strictly a token show

Docld: 322027487 Page 100

,

Wha -@acibaic |

of support, indicating u.s, Support of the dissidents’ efforts

O23
to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, PP. 46-48; Go. 39

c. Failure to Disclose to State Department
Officials in Vasnington

There is no indication that the request or the passage
of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in
Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on
Avril 5, lieadquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn
not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines

and ammunition were being passed to tke dissidents. This cable

was sent while] was in Washington, and it indicated that
upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain
tne request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not com-
mented on the éarbines and ammunition in his correspondence

witii State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station

to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the
time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State De-
partment had been consulted in advance and had approved the

passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

Docld: 32202487 Page 101

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns
aE 03

2] :
a. fiwery Requests Machine Guns (for Use
Ssassination

The Station (hie#) suggested that Headquarters consider

pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 196 1
Station to HQ9S cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again

in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Sas cabled
a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns
Specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic
pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that
delivery by air drop or transfer at Sea would overly-tax their
resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly
identified, in G2 « cable, as being sought for use in connec-
tion with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to
Kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according

\ : to (Cran cable:
4

" To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-
guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in
event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic
job." “(d.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an
assassination was wrong. a. told that Precipitious or
uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist,
Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create
more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position
that:

...we should attempt to avoid Precipitous action

by the internal dissidents until Opposition group

and HQS are better Prepared to support /assassination/*,
effect a change in the regime, and cope with the after-
math."' (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

Word supplie y CIA in previously sanitized cable.


See geet

The cable also stated
to deliver machine guns and

they developed a capability

-22.
that Headquarters was prepared
ammunition to the dissidents when

fo received them, but that security

considerations precluded use of U.S. Facilities aS a carrier.*
s thereaft n April 6, 1961, whil in Washi
r i
oon, ereafter, on Apr ; , While repey| 2S in Washington
for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in
the Dominican Republic and
“especially on the insistence of the Enory (dissident]
leaders that they be provided with a limited number
of small arms for their own Protection (specifi-

cally, five M3 caliber -45 SMG's)." (CTA memo
for the record, 4/11/61)

b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved
by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver
Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to
pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a
Priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used

for self Protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request, submitted on.behalf of the Chief, Western

Hemisphere Division, further provided:

"B. A determination has been made that the issuance
of this equipment to the action group is desirable
if for no other reason than to assure this important
group's continued cooperation with and confidence in

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, Is the one which advised
that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched,

an bog
Vad cite Ads
tf ee Bp phar
Tate Port a rat

“ .

Ovo advised Headquarters that

had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was

— yOing to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2.

Cuca also reported that this attempt would use the three
carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with
whatever else was available. (1a.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated
that there was no approval to Pass any additional arms to the
dissidents and requesteda(EBen) to advise the dissidents that the
United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with
the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments,

Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) ‘the following day, April 27,
1961, CW peptica that, based upon further discussions with
the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S, government not now
prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from
attempt." (Station to HOS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that
an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and

testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were
unsuccessful. . In effect, the dissidents informed him that
this was their affair and it could not be Curned off to suit

the convenience of the U.S. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

Docld: 32202487 Page 104

~ 33-

additional Support, coupled with fact ref,
C items [the carbines] already made available
to them for Personal defense; station authori-
zed pass ref. A items {the machine guns] to
Opposition member for their additional bro-
tection on their Proposed endeavor,” (Draft of Hos
to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characteri-
zed his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns
as:

"

. . having made already a considerable
investment in this dissident group and its
plans that we might as well make the addi-
tional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)
7
The following day, May 3, 1961, [Ray Herbert,, Deputy Chief

of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted
as liaison with the State Department in Matters concerning
covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph
Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force
on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that jHerbert

informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Pepublic

‘wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose,

The menorandum continued:

. “On cross examination it Geveloped that the
real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they
wanted guns for that purpose, Lulerbert |wanted
to know what the policy should be. ,

"I told him I could not care less for Trujillo
and that this was the general sentiment. But

we did not wish to have any thing to do with any,
assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert |
Said he felt the same way." (Berle, Meno"of
Conversation, 5/3/61)

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 105

j :
MW 50955 Docld:32202487 bage 106

3
a
{

Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr;

the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs,

and to Special Assistant |Frank Devine].

Both Herbert and Devine|, who had been in almost daily
contact with each other since August of 1969, had been advised
of the assassination plans of the dissident group. -In fact,
lHerbert|, along with Bissell, had Signed off on the Proposed
cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

C. Special Group Meetings of Jay 4 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berlefilerbert meeting, the
Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

“The DCI referred to recent reports of a new
anti-~Trujillo plot. He said we never know if
one of these is going to work or not, and asked
what is the status of contingency Planning should
the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point
is covered in the Cuba paper which Will be discussed

at a high level in the very near future.” (Special
Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Grouo Minutes
makes subsequent analysis as to the Scope of matters discussed
Speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail
Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo
plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was
Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent ASSaASSination
attempt potentially utilizing U.S.~supplied weapons,

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the

situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

i. - ' |

to. continue to take the Same line until he received contrary

instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in

advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was

approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)
[ray Herbert\ referred to Dearborn's Nay 16 request in a

memorandum he sent to \pevine|on the same date and asked to be

advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of

the machine guns. [Herbert] noted that when this request was

last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the

weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to hierbert's) memorandum on the same day,
. a

advising /iierbert| that the Department's policy continued to be

negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.* [Herbert's )
attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group

limitation concerning the Passage of arms outside of the
i

Dominican Republic. aA copy of |Devine's| memorandum to fitexbert |

Le

was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State,
to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott.
(Devine to herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation --
Drafting of Contingency Plans
a ane SANS

Ata meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961,
the question of u.s, Policy toward the Dominican Republic was
considered and it was:

“Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would
Prepare promptly both emergency and long-~
range plans for anti-~communist intervention
in the event ofcrises in Haiti or the

( Fr
, By Hay 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that
the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the

fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State
ny 50955 WetPd@o207a8%/6hdge 107


“oN

fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would
Serve very little Purpose and expose the United
States to great danger of association with
assassination attempt."
The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President
Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept.

to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

vil, May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambusned
and assassinated near San Cristobal, .Dominican Republic. The
assassination closely paralleled the Plan disclosed by the
action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic
and passed on to officials in dashington at both the CIA and
the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The
assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to
whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy
information as is available indicates that one or more of the
carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when
Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, Pp. 60-61). This evidence indicat:
however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by
handguns and shotewris. (I.G. Report, p.61l)

B. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, poth Consul

a3

General Dearborn and Station |chies GMM) sent replies, According

to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable
aS a cnange in U.S. policy concerning Support for assassinations.
(Dearborn 1/29/75, p. 74),

a rn
Hist Stes teu heles |
Docld:32202487 Page 108

-46

He interpreted the May 29 cable as Saying:

",..we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate
Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want
anything to pin this on usS, because we aren't
doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing
it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)
Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he Said had
always been his personal belief: thae the U.S. should not be
involved in an assassination and that if an 4Ssassination
occurred it would be Strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn

7/29, pp. 100, 101) - |
In contrast the CIA Station |chier, @MMN) aia regard the
“tier cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, Particularly on
the questionof Supplying arms. G5 >. 120) He believed the
May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter
and consequently felt that the government had retreated from
its prior position, of offering material Support: to the dissi-
dents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such sunnort.

i responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

"HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already
associated with assassination. If we are to at least
cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in
assassination preparation must be withdrawn."
(Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)


If.

IIl.

Iv.

ARAYA FOS GNA
SCHNEIDER REPORT

Summary

The President's Initial General Instruction
and Background

A. September 15 White House Meeting
B. Background: Tracks I and II
C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project
CIA's Implementation of Track II
A. Evolution of CIA Strategy
1, The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

2. Military Solution

B. The Chile Task Force

C. The Use of the(arny nesache and Tnteragency

Relations
Dd. The (False Flag \Base
E. Chief of Station
CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup
A. The Chilean Conspirators
B. Contacts Prior to October 15

C. October 15 Decision

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October L5

E. The Killing of General Schneider
F. Post October 22 Events

CIA/White House Communication During Track II
A.. September

B. October

C. December

D. Did Track If End?

Eos,
SE ae

46

Page

17
17
17
18

19

26
27
29
29
30

34
36
39
4]
43

45

54

8

Ue

~L7-

\ ILI. <CIAts Implementation of Track II
rn A. Evolution of CIA Strategy
— . an: SE A Otrategy

The President's instruction te the CIA on September 15 to prevent

Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S, : —_—
Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction
to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup
d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military
circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place e
? without active U.S. encouragement and support.
There was much talk among Chilean officers about
the possibility of some kind of coup...but this
was not the kind of talk that was being backed by,

you know, serious organizational, planning.
(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1, The "Constitutional Coup" Approach a
ee Loup Approach
Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende
( victory continued Simultaneous with Track If, the Agency premised its
activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end.
On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:
Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assump-
tion of power, Paramilitary legerdemain has been
discarded. Military solution is objective.
' (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)
The initial Strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting
a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency

decided to promise “help in any election which was an outgrowth of a

Successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger)

7

Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the

4

Congress, and Proclaim a new election. (s private U.S. citizen who had

sy
5

been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see his ) ; ’
; i


-18-

(wien this message on:September 24, (Task Force Log, September 23) )
Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:
Ly So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a a
va sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully s-
non-violent military coup....This was abandoned
when the military were reluctant to push Frei
publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant
to leave on his own in the absence of pressure
from the military....There was left as the only
chance of success a straight military coup.
(Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)
At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:
Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor
Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario
in which either has to play an active role now
appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower
echelon officers (e.g., Valenzueha) can of course
be made. This involves promoting Army split.
(Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)
2. Military Solution
President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party
. ( convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended
ere
all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18
memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, t
it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be
found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leader-
ship of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, censti-
tuted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439,
September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly
unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented
by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence

of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested

oy MD fe ~ a ‘ -f + 4 | id
ex cia ete re (dy poem

in a coup.

. ww ears a
A three-fold program was set into motion: “aA fi yes
8 ‘

C |

EERE Ss Te ARS


\ -20-

Y a a

ee Joavsa'a A. Phillips » pater of Station/in Rio de Janeiro, \was summoned

AN "back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the
A
Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy[ Jones Flannery\ and the head a *.
of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the _

task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had respon-

sibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to

Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II.

(November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the mm
Significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and
Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involwed with the task force des-
cribed the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines
has said that Kissinger “left no doubt in my mind that he was under the
heaviest of Pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was plac-

wt

ing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished. (Kara-
messines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the
Western Hemisphere Division) Janes Flannery, | testified that pressure was ae
"as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery| ceses- noe
mony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone
through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just .
constant, constant....Just continual pressure....1t was coming from the
White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. The Use of the/army /accache and Interagency Relations

~ dd

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the

Chilean military to carry out its task. However, [the U.S. Aray| At-

| <TH wore

tache in Santiago! Colonel Paul winere,] knew the Chilean military
: tt, a .

te
Hn

r

ok Seng ee 5


. LY
es ANE ay
wow le ns

_ wn , cn Cc an
very well due-to his |five years of service there and| his broad personal

tees

among the Chilean officers, Following a Proposal by the Chief

1
of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimeret \in collecting in-
— —}
telligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a
channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. §, support

for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

have, but which we felt confident that our military represen-
tative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to
enlist the cooperation of (Colonel Wimert}in our effort to pro~
cure intelligence, ~ -
(Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)
To obtain Wimerti's Services, CIA officials Prepared a suggested mes—

Sage for the Director of DIA to send to the[ ray [at cache in Santiago
through CIA communications channels, Because the DIA Director, General
Donald V,. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy
Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28,
1970.* During that neeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of
the lirny Jactache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized
trangnigston of a message directing the (army| Attache:

++-to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence,

his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal mili-
tary figures who might Play a decisive role in any move which
might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.

' Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense At-—
tache of this message, or give them any indication of its
portent. In the course of your routine activities; act in
accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously,
I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion
with the CAS chief,

- ts” - : ms
ey .

Fa

* General Bennett returned to-théd United States on the ‘evening of October
od > &

10, 1970. General Philpott was*

cting Dfrector in Bennett's absence.

*

VL a “

he

<3

Eg

Sea

poo -22-
ann

“— ? -

at ON

. "This message is for your eyes only, and should not be dis~

4 Sel \ cussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will

Me " ' " be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380
: to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the [sswy Jateacke,
the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that ini-
tially the (Army! attache would be used only to "obtain Or procure” in~
telligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, Pp. 11; Karamessines,
P. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the/Aray] Attache, however, did
in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to
the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the
Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages
ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to
take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the [army }
Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track It
and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did
he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the army Attache.
General Philpote also testified that he had no recollection of anything
connected with Track LI after his initial meeting with General Cushman
on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert c. Roth, who in September and October 1970
was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

ee ere a eer eeeecemniennnnee

* In this connection it should be noted thac when questioned about
this letter, General Philpott testified that. he recalled.signing
an authorization such as that contained in the first. paragraph of

Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall .the authorizations and

instructions in paragraphs two and a al
“wh a das a

‘A


Bains 23-00 ue as

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on
“a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be
helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile."
(Roth, Vol. I, P- 6) Though Roth recalls ho mention of Track II as such,
the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message
of September 28 bearing Philpote's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities
connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting
on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean
generals which focused on their willingness to Participate in a military
coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended.

The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to
: ~
Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to cor. Wimertc \
that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:
FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has
been rescinded. This action does not repeat not imply
change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary,
it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can
formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situa-
tion develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situa-
tion. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters
934, 21 October 1970)
Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he

followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on

Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that

At ra rere anne

* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this
message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a re-
sponse from Broe to an earlier message to (Colonel Wimer ce]. (Roth,
Vol. II, p. ) ,

er

on
oR


( of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth,

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described
by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified;

I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is
that I was informed that there was concern at the highest

hy

.Q. Tt was your sense at the time that you were working on a
project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had
the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

saan

* Roth's chronology alse indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe
be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Winer?)
and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communi-

cate with Cushman if the need arose, (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testi-

_: fied that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert \would
. be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)

PRMD (AE ars om

f
Wap oof Oty i

ee
vi.


(..

-24- ;
oe had

Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time,
Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department
that the highest level of government usually indicated the
President of the United States?
Colonel Roth. I would assume that.
The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify
Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among

these documents is a message relating to Track If which bears Philpott's

Purported signature. (Undated Message. ca. 14 October 1970) General

Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that

it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it, (Philpeec,

p. ) CIA also produced messages of. October 14 (Headquarters 762)
and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General
Bennett to the [Army JActache. General Bennett testified he did not
authorize these messages:
Tt is. beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military
assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I
action of this magnitude, This message would not have been
Signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)
According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to
issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testi~-

mony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bear-

ing on the issue of inert} Track II instructions or responses. A

DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel oO. Graham, the
Present Director of DIA, Produced no copies of communication documents

for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, P- 6) However, Roth

testified that detailed aie for the record which he prepared on

'
+

his activities are missing ; ‘from the | files. (oth, Vo Il, Pp. )

i sae
flee.

eas

UF il
oe |

sy

my’
_#
vy


ot ed

messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a
message without Proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was Particularly
forceful in this regard:
-+-I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central
Intelligence Agency in which a Message was received for an
individual, an officer of the B0vernmenc anywhere, in what-
ever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly
and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his
duly authorized representative,
(Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
We may have Played tricks Overseas, but it stopped at the
water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or
among our colleagues within the Agency or in Other agencies,
. (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been
the practice of the Agency. [t would have been ho time at
all before we would have been found out, a single instance
of the kind of thing you are Suggesting might have taken
Place would have Put us out of business,
(Karamessines testimony, p. 80)
fp ny
Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army ‘Attache's
(7
“
role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the [Army Mat tache,

(Kissinger testimony, p. 22)

statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are

four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals

Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track It and communicated their
general instructions to the /Arny [at tache, This Possibility would be
contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware

of Track IL but General Philpott was and communicated Reneral instructions to
the /Arny |Attachie. This Possibility is Supported by Roth's testimony

but would be contrary tc Philpotr's Sworn testimony and his duty to

keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own + and,

after receiving initial authority, from General Philpott, comopted and ordered

took - n . .

mys +
TN.

prey


7 yh 26>

a
the [Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department
4 of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to
the sworn testimony off David Phitlips,| William Broe, Thomas Karamessines,
and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized —
the CIA to convey orders to the hrny| Attache on the basis of high or
highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff
directed that the krmy \Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be in-

formed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. ‘6

Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

f \
D. The /False Flag Base )
a

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident
Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a
(“False Flag Base," Ji-e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as room
“Nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert' s contacts

or zt with Chilean military officers (* )civen the limitations of the Station's

resources and (colonet Wimert's \visibility, Headquarters felt the use of

wR te

("raise Flag officers" \was necessary because "We don't want to miss a
. - } —
y
chance." /One of these officers posed as a (STUzMNA ntelligence officer
\ _
so that “any flap would be a GraziifarSone." (Headquarters 363, oa

September 27, 1970) )

/ ~
/ *The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, \

H “an unusual practice," either by the CIA or. Eqrpige intelligence os }
services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47~48) ‘ Pp ctre. \ ;

pO, vA : ee
F

oops


-27-

The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported
separately on their contacts ‘to a "deep cover" CIA of ficer|in Santiago

who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the

oe a

Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and —

not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27) }
é

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of
Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and a
the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. i 7
The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

tohad Left no doubt in the minds*ef my colleagues

and superiors that I did not consider any kind of \
intervention in those constitutional processes : oe. :
desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my : ‘y
last recall (to Washington) was to be read: the riot ie
act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very
intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at
that time that the Agency was not too interested in
continuously being told by me that certain proposals
which had been made could not be executed, or would
be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix)
testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10) a .

nae

The Chief of Station's objection to Track IL did not go unnoticed.
The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report

should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on

action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters

wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.


“om,

7 ol ener a ~-29-

CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup
A. The Chilean Conspirators
Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key
individuals. Ome of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General
who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before. Following the
“Tacnazo” revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the
support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being
the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA :
Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July ~~
15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting. centered was General Camilo

Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was *:
0G ng °
in league with several other Getive et officers a

06,0
re adit
= fi L

iEnOw MINS ealnygcademy, : F :
Cire) cu Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, *

1970) All of these officers, with the possible cxceorson ot GSS : es) ‘ .

were in contact with Viaux as well.”

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of drama-

cizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as
an abortive coup. ;

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military | officers
is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with 2:
dueicaparound October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On Oc

ober 12
Taux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October) .) One

U
:
cable from Santiago indicates that (Admibsiggieadopmay have been a member.
of Viaux's inner cirgle of conspirators 0b (Station 545, 16 October 1970). y -
At the very least, eto in contact with Viaux. . i - a
rst! e . ~ ts ‘ pe

Although a distinction can be made between the.Viaux and Valenzuela groups,
as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the
principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty
military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The

record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three

Schneider kidnap actempts -

oe ¥, ~IQ-

. . s* ws fe
A mh \ how of

- Loe
. ‘ Nae
sf a

og
. ee) - There was considerable communication among the various plotting
elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:
--L might add here that it seemed that a good
dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers tee
were privy to what was going on (in addition to :
President Frei nd) they were all talking to one
another exchanging views and trying to see how
best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted
to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)
B. Contacts Prior to October 15
The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within
the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-
Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police),
but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the
Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider,
Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the
Constitution.” (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 Novem-
eo ber 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical,
constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)
Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General &.
Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the
idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the
second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S.
Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.”
(Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in

f \ .
earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert )informed both an Army General

("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro~coup
me fie Ss coe 3
ae |
ha : i . Diy 7 frames

*the military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be 7 B

prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostra- —

cized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and main-

tenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

?

Rig werd ee Mar then yp on Gy Stee Pegs oe ee
PE ROO a eta FE

4

“73

soe

U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)"

XX

of the Carabineros that “the U.S. Government favors a military solu-

tion and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright

eae < * tf / , , a atte
military intervention. (Task Force Log, 9 October) (Ga Bue nea
informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean
Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)
{
On October 7, ‘Colonel wimert \approached members of the War Academy

in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was

f N\

f \ ?. “
‘Colonel Wimert!s first contact with the Army (Ca Gollenei whom he
: Sd .

kk

would ultimately pass-three submachine guns «on October 22. At this

meeting, the f ; eM) told (Colonel Winert] that. he and his colleagues

were

trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate
Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send
him out of the country. They had even stud-
ied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the
main barrier to all plans for the military
to take over the government to prevent an
Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

* according. to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5

and October 20, the CIA Station and che (Army Attache--for the most part
the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials.
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

w* | megrereioreerE fo Sox
In his testimony, (Colonel Wimert) indicated that the \Gee footone!

affiliated with General GEREN" (Wimert Yestimon : a able
sent to Headquarters on October 18,° in which the Casares request
for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert)
believed the Army officer, and his companion, a vay aan rere in
league with Admiral (MENGG06 (station 562, October 18}~-At another point
in his testimony, \Wimert jstated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy
Captain’ and the Army (t.’ Colonel} and the Air Fotce General over here."
(Wimert )testimony, p. 107) :The Committee has been unable to determine my

the exact affiliation of the Arny Ce. Colone mv lowever, as previously ,
stated, both General (Ganaesy” nd Adinirangiitrado)were affiliated with

General Valenzuela and Admiral [itrado iwas in contact with General Viaux.

ror

r

z

aT

|


aes _— -32-

~ °
pra i \ ; ohn
a EA The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response
. i /.. geo = .
( to the( Wimert fs (Galas) meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's

resistance to coup plans and stated:

py

».-This would make it more important than _

ever to remove him and to bring this new

state of events...anything we or Station

can do to effect removal of Schneider? We

know this rhetorical question, but wish

inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
(Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success

Tee Im
| me

looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

frresident Frei and |the highest levels of the
armed forces unable to pull themselves together
to block Allende. The Chilean mMitary's tradi-
tion of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to
tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's
firm constitutional stand, and most importantly,
the lack of leadership within the government and
military are working against a military takeover.
(Task Force Log, 8 October)

2

The following day the Station made reference to the “rapid(ly) waning

chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not
dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux
solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three
days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention
on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing
to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak

rae

Z \.
indeed. His own colleagues, General‘s(Wuenta and Walenzuela described him
oN og

ert ew iene

as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the :

first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the‘ best hope for. Was”

carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate. yf _ F

— os eect nd

+


~33-

4
\

Although (Colonel Wimert |was instructed not to involve himself with

ee

(~ a Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he

served initially as a contact to Viaux through /an (eee nititary

Attache. The |@QEEHEITS) reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several
hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago
476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that

a “mini~coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux
should postpone his plans, “while encouraging him in a suitable manner

to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if

it materializes."

(Headquarters 585, 6 October)
The primary purpose of the ("False Flag hase"|was to contact Viaux,
and it very rapidly relieved (Wimert and the (AEEEHEMERS Attache) of that +
task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the
“False Flagger!,": and again the response was the same: reject the demand
( for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency
was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and
refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions."
(Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Head-
quarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000

in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of

U.S. support. (Headquarters. 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider
by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early
hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join

Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that

same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within — ; i{

hort t

a the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,


-34-

ae poor bey S
AY . ‘* .
i eas Oc Ober) * This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Sta-

4!

tion "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)
( At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its

other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was

LL
to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:
Now we are beginning to see Signs of increasing
coup activity from other military quarters,
specifically,an Army General (name deleted),
Admiral @EMEAd) the forces in Concepcion and ;
Valdivis /and perhaps even Frei and Gs 0G ‘,
(Task Force Log, 14 Octobér) w
C. October 15 Decision
To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his con-
tact a desire to proceed with a coup, had ifdicated he would deal with
the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Gen- >
era Eeyore Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.* vom

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander
( ; Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According

to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines “provided a run-
4 i]

down on Viaux, the (BB ccrine with/f¢isitead

» and, in some detail,
‘ ,

the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint."
(Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October
1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot,

at least temporarily:"

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable
from Santiago to Headquarters:

We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup at-
tempt because of (False Flag Officer} s impending visit. Other re-
porting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this
weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

yom

“4

“18

Sih

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental
in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

|

Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met
with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to at-
tempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

: E274 spon wo te he
e090 $e * DR ot BE oer aoe Re ee Te


-35-

“\ \ ft was decided by those present that the Agency
7. must get a message to Viaux warning him against
’ any precipitate action. In essence the message

should state: "We have reviewed your plans and
based on your information and Ours, we come. to

the conclusion that your plans for a coup at
this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may re-
duce your capabilities in the future. Preserve —
your assets. We will stay in touch. The time
will come when you with all your other friends
can do something. You will continue to have
our support.” (15 October Memorandum of Conver-
sation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. *
Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure
on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October,
after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching

orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.'**

Paarl
my

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White
House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to

generate maximum pressure toward this end utiliz-
ing every appropriate resource.

3. After the most careful consideration it was
determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out ; —
by him alone with the forces now at his disposal
would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive
to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that
CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against
precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 Octo~
ber)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him
(Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other
coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded:

“There is great and continuing interest in the activities of

0 —_
(ext) Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.) E
Cr

x -
Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not ‘ ‘
in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802)

that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This mat-

ter will be discussed in Part V of this report.


bts

*Two coup plotters, Generals (6% x
persuade General Schneider to change his dnti-coup position on October 15.) °

Q

oy A | =36-

*. eee ©) ene
ejon October L?. The@ilagihiay responded that it did not
matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case.

y
(Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA/"False
- . \

rather:

\ :
Flagger") and Viaux's inewawyon October 18, the Agency was in-

formed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduc-
tion of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come."
(Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication

with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task -Force Activities,
18 November 1970, page 21) ~

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter

*
for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.

4s a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

Coup possibilities afforded by the active
duty militar feroup led by General Valenzuela
and Admiral (iiirada) had always seemed more
promising than" the capabilities of the Viaux
group. These military officers had the abil~
ity and resources to act providing they de-
cided to move and organized themselves ac~
cordingly. ;
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from
the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in
this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert)met with the Army(t?
ok. .

GoronelN\and the Navy Serpent) They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades,

Pa *

ou .
and Caria), made one last attempt to

The Station reported that the meeting turned out: to be a “complete fiasco.
Schneider refused to listen to General @anaWes\eloquent presentation of
Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement
stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)

OF ERE ab, Sea iin i eae

jo

pee

as

1 Re

r


-37-

. ‘three “45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy

by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to
use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) (colonel Wimert land the Chief

of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns

for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were
intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider.
The fact chat the weapons were provided che @OMCSTETEN) and the Navy

recon.
Gaptaiin Err that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing

f
7

suggests that the guns were not involved.

The machine guns and ammunition were seat from Washington by diplo-
matic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was
puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them

but find our credulity stretched by Navy)

Gaptad 7 eading his troops

‘EE

with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will
try send them whether you can provide explanation or. not." (Headquarters

854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the aray QE

x, '

OO
eStore) and the savy CE, late in the evening of October 18 and con~

sisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*

* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in
Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--
rather than Viaux.g6An example of this Ss ift_in focus was the decision to
provide the Army Cowonelly and the Army (Gapivaim) the tear gas grenades
originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of
this action: . - 0

Station plans give six tear gas grenades to

(Colonel Wimert) for delivery to Armed Forces

officers (deletion) instead of having(False

Flag Officer) deliver them to Viaux group.

Our reasoning is chat Wimert)dealing with a

active duty officers. Also’False Flagger)

leaving evening 18 October, and will not be

replaced but(Wimert) will stay here. Hence

important that(Wimert) credibility with Armed

Forces officers be strengthened.
(Santiago 562, 18 October)

‘A/S

‘ea.


pty MO -33-
ae yt . ‘, “

hots : _

“sy ! That same day, General Valenzuela informed/Colone1 Wimert) that he,

(General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General’ were prepared
7

\ “

coo

“tO sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18
November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General
Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military

dinner being given for Schneider ,* after which Schneider would be flown

to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral [Tirado \rould

‘ee,

head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the

kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports: -

General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation
but not directly involved. He has been sent to
Vina to stay with prominent physftian. Will be
Seen in public places during 19 and 20 October
to demonstrate fact that above operation not his
doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at
end of week. Military will not admit involve
ment in Schneider's abduction which is to be 4
blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)

( “ The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider

left in a private vehicle, rather than in his. official car, and his police guard

failed to be withdrawn, but the Army /f Nassured') colonel Wimert [that an-

other attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October)

\ Colonel Wimert| was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 “which was the price
Sener — °

agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

Se
\ .

* The("False Flag Officer’) who was in contact with Viaux at the time

the Valenzuela plan was given to” Colonel Wimert) apparently understood ;

that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated: ,

Q. Were you told any of the details of how
the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out? oO mee:

Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be
at some sort of a banquet which the General
(Schneider) would be attending.

(Sarno testimony, p. 37)

Fee ate RS cee re tie gee gee oT -
sits he} Gre ea a Ee:

a

on,

co,

st, 4
: - Ewy gat mee:
EEE cre ee Oe ok

“uo.

Force Log, 20 October)

(Colonel Wimer q)'s testimony and the cable. traffic do
clearly establish the i

was affiliated (see page 31 wo CIA statements on Track I
weapons, and therefore the

ao -39-

failed and the Task Force concluded

Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having
considerable difficulty executing even the first
step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup
succeeding or even occurring before 24 October
now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

The Killing of General Schneider

\
In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), /Colonel Wimert )
livered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Arm

in an isolated section of Santiago. *

Ry

entity of the group to which the(@iiz

COME

---The only assistance requested by Valenzuela
to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion
through Schneider's abduction was several sub~
machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades
and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus
$50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon
demand.
(CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities,
18 November 1970, p. 22)

-..Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas
cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valen
zuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason
why they still wanted the weapons was because
there were two days remaining before the Congress
decided the Presidential election and the Valen-
zuela group maintained some hope they could still
carry out their plans. oN
(CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the
President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)

tie the
olonely to the Valenzuela group:

_  but(Wimert)insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the
money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela
assured Colonel Wimert) that the military was now prepared to move. (Task

The second abduction attempt on the 20th also

(‘a


ee nee ~40-

aa > 4 At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General

C Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the

findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider

“EN

killing, neither the neoy CHEB ro: the Navy ORE were there.

Shortly after 8 am,General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his

way to work, by the abductorsand he was mortally wounded when he drew

his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand

gurs had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found . Me

that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.
The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said

"Military Mission sources claim General Schweider machine gunned on

way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease 7

guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously

been described as “grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station

was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered

co

rears

3
‘ie. Galena

several hours earlier to the Army =) Santiago then informed

Headquarters "Station has instructed(Col. Wimert) to hand over $50,000

if Gen. Valenzuela requests (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating

that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valen-

zuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the
shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led
conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated
in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot

culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year

prison sentence for being “author of the crime of kidnapping which re-

sulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for con-

spiring to cause a military cou Also convicted on the latter charge

(were) Generals Valenzuela snd EE They received sentences of three
o

‘years in exile.

| “ATE ewe mee


Sea

-41-

2! ‘Station unaware if assassination was pre-

ac meditated or whether it constituted bungled

abduction attempt. In any case, it important
to bear in mind that move against Schneider
was conceived by and executed at behest of
Senior Armed Forces officers. We know that
General Valenzuela was involved,, We also

near certain thg, Admi ral Gers? Army Goupe
polonel vehi re tng and involved.

ehave reason for'be leveing that General
Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in,
but cannot prove or disprove that execution
or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to
elements linked with Viaux. Important factor
to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not
retired officers or extreme rightests, set
Schneider up for execution or abduction....
All we can say is that attempt against Schneider
is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity
to prevent Allende's election if they are willing
to follow Valenzuela's scenario...

(Santiago 598, 22 October)

F. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declara-

tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider

as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief

of Santiago province. These Measures, and others taken, caused the Chile °

Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional
runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack
on General Schneider has produced developments which
closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the
plotters’ positions have been enhanced.

(Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track If:

It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved,
and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a
successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a
point where a military solution is at least open to
them. (Task Force Log,~ 24’ October):

— wew

fe nme Oo

Spee renee bean


A. September ital er caFi

September 18 ane »

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As
Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a ..
plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA —_—
records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the
conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in
the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of con~ S
cern during the Last days of September. Apparently that pressure was

viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

ee

September 21
The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation

that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar : ppm

confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chair-

man, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review

his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings :

of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the i

meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet

privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances

save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no
evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines neeting
actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversa~
tion for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none

for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no

other such private meetings occurred.

jun

September 22 , an
é

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind ante et a G0 Gora ead a
Lee Bh

. me EX “
meeting called to discuss Track I. The two bet aus Boa Tl actions,

ceria the contacts with then-Chilean- ~President Fret.) According to


<r ae | Kissinger told Karamessines that “our

andling of the Problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect
and he added we were doing fine and keep it up.” (Memorandum for
the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a
report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals
-frrats,) Valenzuela /and CEE -naned in a cable of September 30.
(Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was
needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556,

5 October 1970) Karamessines Presumed such aa meeting had taken place,
although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony,
pp- 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40
Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger
chaired the 40 Committee. .
October 6 .

‘The Station reported that General Viaux was “ready to launch golpe
evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October.
1970) “In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one
“with scant chance of Success which will vitiate any further more seri-
ous action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered
action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux pian,
Supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of
an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below)

,

makes no mention of any previous’ plots. (Kigsinger testimony, p. 24)

sper

oy
t
' iF


tee gare

- 47a -

fj eee
It seems to me, although the records don't re~
flect it, that there waS a meeting in September
a very brief one, in which I must have been
told that there was a Specific program going
underway. That probably would have been by
Henry (Kissinger) and -perhaps with Karamessines
there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p: 12)

October 10
Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General
Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number
of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly
very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from ali."
- 2
(Memorandum (MUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)
Haig recalled the. telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th.
His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation,
I do know, and I know that from looking at the
record this morning, that Karamessines made a
telephone call to me in which he gave a’ progress
report. I recall that. It was in effect a nega-

tive progress report, that they were just not com
ing up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)


~43~
_ 7 ‘ . : . — 5 a uy

7

rd

4 ‘o) Maig indicated to the Committee that he would have Passed along the
. Substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his
role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:

Zo am quite confident that, given my own concep~

tion of my role at that time, that I would have

conveyed that information to Henry,...

(Haig testimony, p. 13)
Rk

Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr.
Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of
latitude did you have concerning what you would
Pass on to Dr, Kissinger?

General Haig. At that time I would consider I

had no degree of latitude, other than to convey
to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p-. 15)

October 14

A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert} ostensibly from General

. 7

Bennett, authorized (Wimert|to select two Chilean general officers and
convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington
has authorized you to offer material Support shore of armed interven-
tion to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to
prevent the election of Allende On October 24,..," (Headquarters to
Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in
this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President,
for no one else could have given (wimert) such broad authorization.
Karamessines Presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at
least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)

However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October l4th
cable. He found the Sequence of events puzzling: having been told on

the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the

7
t
i.

4

re

1

an


° - a. a re |

~ 49a ~

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-

cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines

C}
gave a run-down on viaux, Cry and Psi “the general situation in

Chile from the coup~possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twenty-~perhaps less-~to launch a
successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions

from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5. It was decided by those present that the
Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him
against any precipitate action. In essence our
mesSage was to state: "We have reviewed your
plans, and based on your information and ours,
we come to the conclusion that your plans for a
coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,
they may reduce your capabilities for the future.
Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.
The time will come when you with all your other
friends can do something. You will continue to
have our support."

6. After the decision to de=fuse the Viaux coup
plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-
ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in
Chile, working clandestinely and securely to main-
tain the capability for Agency operations against
Allende in the future.

8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note
that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-
sure on every Allende weak spot in sight~-now,
after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and
into the future until such time as new marching
orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that
the Agency would comply.

(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
October 1970)

tha a |


oa

He

‘ \ . .

meeting on the .l5th_(see below) to have discussed the Yesults of the
NTA LN

‘ qj phOctober 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any

ty jo Fee SCs BEER

such ‘discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

he
ae be
, é
October 14 —
The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)
October 15
Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to dis-
cuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines Mi
gave a run-down on Viaux, 4c a3and {libes and "the general situation in ~
Chile from the coup~possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux
did not have more than one chance in twentye-perhaps less--to launch a
Successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions
from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

5. It was decided by those present chat the
Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him

against any precipitate action. In essence our

MesSage was to state: "We have reviewed your

plans, and based on your information and ours,

we come to the conclusion that your plans for a

coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing,

they may reduce your capabilities for the future. —
Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch.

The time will come when you with all your other

friends can do something. You will continue to

have our support."

6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup

plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instruc-

ted Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in

Chile, working clandestinely and Securely to main- :

tain the capability for Agency operations against .
Allende in the future. ’

8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note

that the Agency should continue keeping the pres-

Sure on every Allende weak Spot in sight--now,

after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and pers
into the future until such time as new marching Pe:
orders are given. Mr, Karamessines stated that _—

the Agency would comply. : ,
(Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr.
Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15
October 1970)

E eR oat Rs CRIMES At ceren pee rch :
PASE EON ae

SA eh go

=

. -50-
Pan 4h

Kissinger in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA

{i *". memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat
4 more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52)
He believed the Agency had been told to “stand down and preserve your
assets,"

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as ©
recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA
issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the
October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the
meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a “high incentive to preserve the maxi-
mum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-5@) The October lé6th order °
indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous t

day, and stated:

2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende
be overthrown by a coup. It would be much prefer- -
( able to have this transpire prior to 24 October
*nase= but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously
beyond this date....

6
4, There is ergatvand continuing interest in the
activities of i (polesy \Valenzuela et al
and we wish them optimum good fortune.

(Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)
Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as “turning off
the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger
testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

The conclusions of that meeting were that we had
better not do anything rather than something. that
was not going to succeed....My ‘general feeling
was, I left that meeting with the impression that ;
there was nothing authorized." ~*~ , ;

(Haig testimony, p. 13) pre.
: mee . hot

eee yt ar Eee
2 RR Ae i

TE SN

my Loage L[urther warned that "the US must not appear publicly in
the matter, thus civing the ‘kiss of death! to its Friends”
(Cable, Lodya to Uarriman, 8/26/63).

* AY-56855 Docld: 32202467 Page 141

-5-

In a cable on August 25, CIA |chief of |Seation [ohn Richardson\
reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, True-
heart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command,
Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They
accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and
would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G.,
C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his
brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America
in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids.
and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation
that the United States contemplated Suspending aid to the South
Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, Pp. 212) .* Later on that
same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers
Conein and [Spera| were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh,
respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243,
but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial
action of assuming power of state. Entirely their ow action,
win or lose" (BATG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized
Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United
States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding,
but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was autho-

rized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272,

8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:

¥*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast
*“ had “complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating
pes “the possibility of the generals' effort achieving. surorise."
( Lodye further warned that “the US must not appear publicly in
: the matter, thus civing the 'kiss of death' to its Eriends”
(Cable, Ledce to Marriman, 8/26/63).

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 142

-3~

against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be
identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly +
approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-}16)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. ‘finh explained that a
coup was being planned, anda requested assurances of American
Support if it were successful. (tinh outlined three courses of
action, one of which vas the assassination of Sien's brothers,

Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).
oO

The {acting Chief of the cra\station, (33s Edgesntke)\ cabled on

October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set
ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the
other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a
protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

“(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating,
approving, or Supporting assassination, but on the other
hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every

such threat of which we might receive even partial know-
ledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem.
We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this
matter opens door too easily for probes of our position

re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently
believe best approach is hands off, lowever, ,ye naturally
interested in intelligence on any such plan,"

rr nn reer eye ener

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon
by various military units and direct confrontation between military
units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted
this cable for McCone. Colby testified:

"Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director
personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assas-
Sination?-

“Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

BDocld: 32202487 Page 143

:
uit

-9.

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and
the Attorney General, taking the position that “our role was
to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was
going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but
to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, P. 62). He believed the

United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone,

P. 62). MeCone testified:

"I felt that the President agreed with my position, des-
pite the fact that he had great reservations concerning
Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all

the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to
encourage more support throughout the country. My precise
words to the President, and T remember them very clearly,
was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball
team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether

he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that,

_ it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)
McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with
the President, but rather “whether we should let the coup go
Or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing

that the President agreed with his “hands off" recommendation

ip <> il ‘
(McCone, pp. 62-63). MeCone cabled SEED on October 6:

"McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to
ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone
instructions, as we cannot be in position actively con-
doning such course of action and thereby engaging our
responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, [DIR 73661,] 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

“Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM
Trueheart was also present when original recommendation
« was ade, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's
— instruction was Also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador
— Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon
Ne to cra, [sate 1463,\ 10/7/63)

moo) 6=6Docld: 32202487 Page 144

-14-

None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or .

indirect involvement of the United States.*

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge
notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders
for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation
(Saigon Station Cable /No. 2036), 10/30/63). Conein was charged
with obraining the airplane... Between 6: and 7:00 on the
morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked®Conein,to procure an
aircraft, Conein relayed the request to (availdeomiteh), Acting
Chief of |Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not
be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours,
since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified
that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country
that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in
any other country. There were no aircraft immediately avail-
able that had sufficient range to reach a potential country

of asylum (Conein, p..54). .

G75 = Docld: 32202487 Page 145

“lL? pre a po oo
peor yg | COE mon ge ey

HW sy Mey sly i.

Rw ears he: ota? &b

er ir Bes Mes i

< United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone

assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded ;
the United States would support the plotters.
d. Lumumba
The chain of events revealed by the documents and
testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference
that the assassination plot was authorized by the President.
It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.
The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of"
Lumumba and taking “straightforward action" against him at NSC
and Special Group meetings with Dulles’ cable to the Congo,
Bissell's representation co febtetied | about “highest authority"
( — and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support
an inference that the President and the Special Group urged
the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President
to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does,
as he said, offer a “olue” about Presidential authorization
which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record
of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of
others in attendance at the meetings, including the President.'s
national security advisors. The fact that both the{ Chief of |
Station and (Gott 1ib|were under the impression that there was

Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba

is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

HW 50955 Docld:32202487 Page 146

“A

a airy ~17A-

eT oar
ary Bie
ciog Obs
this impression was derived solely from) Gott Lieb's] meetings
with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither (Gore1ieb [nor the {Chief of |
Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements
about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed
that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles,
but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when.
this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and
DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate
Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that
President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination

effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty

in the evidence.

HW 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 147

<8
; pote AC oe is
er Ban Gove om
“i Ex) vss Oo Apa -19-
BARRE nia es
ee Gee 3 ~
4 First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a

matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles
went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action
which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than
Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of
plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third,
it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand
from a “circumlocutious" description that assassination was
being discussed.
The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the
Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not
able to speak for themselves. Moréover, it is inconsistent
( with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit"
approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary

to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men

closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order
to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against
Bissell's testimony concerning circuulocutious briefings of the
Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would
imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such
matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba
example indicates that the President would discuss such matters
openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be
approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's
testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had
told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have
told anyone else of that fact. Yet JGottlieb™s| testimony in the
Lumumba case states that he had been told 6f Presidential autho-
rization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he

on was told by Dulles. :

HY 50955 Docld: 32202467 Page 148

