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| 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 | ...

10 Cetober 196)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Nesting with Dr, N:1KC Cardona on 6 Cctober

R. De, i414 arrived aboubd 3:50 ®.m, for the mocting we had
set at 16:56; again ne was driven by his secratary whom he introduced,
As during the first meeting, she remained outside In the car, Our
meeting lasted uxtii 12:00 noon, _ woe

2. Fivet, De, MIRO handed me a note in t\ongland lating the
topics diceussed with ms on 5 Wctobor, These points ara:

a. Groups conducting propaganda, etc. with Agency support
Should receive theiz support aad be coordinated through the Council,

‘ b A propaganda campalsn should bo waged by tho Council
aimed at:

a) fuba, via a tong wave radio station in Koy Woar.
{2) Cubans. in Milami and other U, 8S, areas by:

fa) Subsidiaing Diario de las Americas.

{b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latio America, with a plan auch ao the Cperacicn
! Grieta,"

c. Usaderground Activities.

(1) Provision of monthly funds to Council fur procuring
Cuban pesca to send to the seven-odd reslatance
sfoupa in Cuba through rellable channels (such aa
previoualy sent through the ftalian & mbaaey),

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(2) Commando action as outlined In plan presented
to me on 6 Cctober, .

3. Commando Plan

: Then Dr, M120 handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine.
action prepsred by his military collaborators, whom ho named ag
Colonel Manuel VAKELA Caotro, an officer of the Acadomy, Captain
Enrique DESPAIGNE, and Colonel (fnu) MONTBACUDL, He Statod.
that they were of the BAROUIN group and had boon prisonara,

With reapect to tho plan for ‘clandestine Operations in Cuba,
he otated that 300 ren could be counted apon for commando action, part
of them here, part in Coba, Ho reiterated that @ Commande operation
was essential to bolster moraje among tha anti-Castro elamonts in Cuba
acd in exile aa well as to conduct sabotace that would furthor weaken
Cubana economy and tae Communist regime, He gaid that for thia operation
U. S. be'p would be arceseary in providing weapons, arnmo, dernolitions,
equipment, and funds, ta pyoposed that ff this plan was considered to

- havo merit, that J arrange to have someone rooet with his military men

to work out the detatis. After all preparations had pean made and
materie! provided, etc, the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,
(NOTE: Pian turned over to Thoinpson at our nz eting at 15:30 on

6 Cetobor for tranarmnission, )

4, Request for Aria, etc, to send to Facambray

Dy. MIRO reroarked that Over a2 month ago ho had made a requeat
to Clark for are for the anti-Castro insuryents in the Hecambray, but
to date had heard nothing relative to the request. He commented wryly,
“Taek but never hear an answer," He said that the fightere there should
be supported, Dr. MI2O stated that he had a beat (provided by us) and
& means for delivery of the arms, Cavaldo RAMIREZ ie chief of the

Escambray group. }
COMMENT: Has anythlag boen done about this request?

5. Information on Arma Received by Castro Ra ime
an ne ae celved by Castro Ragime

De. MUAC nanded mo a long report which he said was drought
to him by the Argentine Ambassador to Cuba whon the latter caine to the
U. 3. at the time of resident FRONDIZ ['g visit.* tle sald the Ambassador

would not divulye the source of the inforinatioa but commented, "You will

know,"
*Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October,

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_ to ineure victory, Anothor defeat

Cay.
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Or, LIRG said there was Do way to deiermine the accuracy
of tho figures given of Plaves, gung, ete. received from the Soviet blac
(and aly and Canada) but even if the figures were exageeratod 100 per
cont, thoy would still be impresatve,

; - Ha added that Caetro ie daily becoming stronger militarily
with weapons and with a large militia of close to 300, G00 being trained
ta use them while the economy continues to deteriorate, Perhaps aunty
half the militia would be effective. But that is sizeable, Thus, he eaid,
the langer the delay fn positive aullitary action to overthrow Castro, the
Greater will be the task, ‘We oust act goon, vigorously and offectively,

would be disaatroua and would make
Cabans, Latla Asoertcange and others believe Caatro ta be invincibte,
Thea would come accommodationa and even werss, tho lraplanting of
Castro-backed regiroge in the heaulaphere. And the U.S. would suffer
woret of all, being discredited for dsfeat and “guilt of interference."
“In tho UN no nation would stand boeide the U. 5.”

6. FPrepozal that Counei! go to Cuba with Can:mando Group and

Establish a Government on Cuban doll

Dr. MING then declared that he was coavinced that Castre
weld never be overthrown by all the propaganda, the Babctace, commaado
ralde, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
Sconomy, and that it waa inconceivable to establish a governmont-inexile
for nothing would ¢- mo of it; that the only solution for defeating tho
Castro regime wae for the Revolutidnary Couacil to go to Cuba and estab-
lish @ governmert on Cuban Bol, ask recognition by all friendly countries
and military assletance of its priminal ally, the U. 4., and that the U.S.
be ready to intervenc immediately with its Forces, This would all have
te take place ina matter of 49 hours, otherwise it would fail, I recognise
that thio is a bold plan, but doldnoss ia necessary, There will be many
risks, many may be killed, As for myoelf, I don't care if Idie. Tt have
lest all my persona! posseasiona and my oon is a prisoner,’ He rejterated
that all must be well prepared in advance, there nrast be no vacillatioa,
Svorytiing must proceed Fapidly. Firet, a comaisado raid in force to
ssize a piece of Cuban territory, prefarabiy near Cuantanamo, and imme-
diately the members af the Council yo ashore, proclaim a provisional
govarament, broadcast by radio to all nations &@n appeal for recognition
{and cadles prepared in advance would algo bo cent outs, requset UL 5S,
Sesistance, aod the U. S. should fursish such assistance at once in ado-

quate strangth to casure victory,

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Before such an acticn ia undortaken, the enemy must be
softened by propaganda, sabotage, raids, underground action, and the
mass of the psople of Cuba muct be prepared to accept the Provisions)
government through propaganda, increased knowledge of tha Council

and fte unifying efforts,

- Dr. MIRO asked me what I thought of this project; did I think
that Castro could be overthrown in any other way. I adroitted that
strong military action appoared necessary, I stated furthor that
of ¢ourso his plan would have to be studied at the highast government
levels. He proposed that he michi elaborate a plan with hig military
collaborators, and I suggested that ha do thio co that it might be examined

and considered,

that the U.3. (9 and will be blamed fsr al! anti-Castro Propazanda,
Sabotage, etc. and that enemy states will denounce it for intervention
in Cuba, but that U the U. ©. £08 to the aid of a fricadly wevolutionary
regime established {a the country and holpa it defeat the covtet-backed
Communist regime, ail friendly governments will applaud,

“I have no personal political ambitions," declared MIAO,
“I merely am trying to chair the Council, whose mission is to unify the
Sati-Castro clemeats inside and eutside of Cuba, If the team ton't con=
sidered effoctive, then change the pitcher, But I believe the Council must
establizh itself on Cuban oufl, and secon. Time {3 againat as."'"The . unta
del Este agreement will bacifira avainst the U. 8, if Castro ie allowed
to remain fn Cuba, Ina year, after the politicos of the countries ra-
ceiving U. &. aid have gotten their hands oa U. 5. gold, they will say,
*Thanke to Cactro, wa got this.’ And they wil) Spend It aa in the past
with no benefits to the Social and economic welfare of the people,”

7. Views about the Judzes and Lawyers
EOS ane Lawyers

I queried Dr, MIRC as to his views relative to the judges and
lawyers and their futare status. He said he hoped that they could all
Feunite and that they could be civon assistance ais in the past. He dee
clared that Dr. ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that be.was
doing acthing but making politics and trying to discredit the Council
and MIRC and VARGNA, Dr. AlIRO declared that he, as Prime Minister
in the early days of the Castro government, had named - LABAU to the

Say :

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Supreme Court, but that now he considered « LABAU unfit to hold any
judicial position.

8. Members of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that ho had a meoting of the Council on
10 Cetober. I asked what elements now Composed it and what he pro-
posed to add, Ho named the following as progently in the Consejo:

Raacate

30 ds Noviembra .
MRR -

Accion Demoeratica

20 de Mayo

AAA Independienta

MDC

Monteeristi

Ho said he had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited thetr reply,

Ke would also lke to have the Workers, Students, and the
Profeasionais (Doctors, Lawyers, ctc.) come into the Council, He be-
Heves Batistianos and Cormunistas and eloments unwilling to cooperate
should be excluded, but that al! other groups should bo brought together

under the Council,

He contends that all anti-Castro activities, except clandestine
and military, should be coordinated by mombers of the Council, but that

the excepted activities should be known only to him (MIRO),

9. Probable Argentine Rupturo of Relations with Cuba

Dr. MIRO declared that he belfeved imminont the Argentine
rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the Argentine Ambassador to
Cuba (Julio AMCF LO) «za ordored to return to Havana fhe had bean
vacationing in the U. S. after FRONDIZI's visit); that VILLANUEVA, a
Secretary of the Argentino Embassy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
today; and further that he (MIAC) had received a phone call last night

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from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenco Aires, urging MIRO
to go to Buenos Aires to arouse antl-Castro sentiment of the people,
inaamuch 39 some Argontine action against Cuba appeared imminent,
{FERNANDEZ said he had already written MIRC a letter.) MIRO eays,
“Of course, I cannot go. Thave the Consojo meeting un the 10th.
Furthermore, lam going to New York on October 11th oF 12th for the
SIP (Socieded Interamericans de Prensa) meeting and have been allotted
12 minutes to addrecs the meeting.” . ; cs

10, MIRO to attend Homage to LACE RDA (Brazilian who

Precipitated GUADKCY' resiznation) on October 15

_,, De. MIRC sald he planned to remain in New York City {after
M1 and 12 Cctober SIP macting) until October 15th to attend the homage

‘for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil. MIRO
. Probably will stay at the Park Chambers Hotel, but will advise Clark

of his location.

I commented that I would probably romain tn Waehington next
week in view of his plans, but that 1 might go to New York City to meet
with him; if so, [{ would get in touch with him and arrange 4 mecting

time and place through Clark,

11. Propaganda Commission

Tasked Dr. MIRO about hie ideas on the future organization
and structure of the Propaganda Commission. He otated that it is out-
side the Consejo and net uncer his direct control, although the Couneil
accountant has been passing funds to it. Ho said CATR RILLO had resigned
as heed of Propaganda and that he would lke CONTE AGUERC to handle
it. He claimed that MESTRE had not dona anything with propaganda,

12. MIRO's Views Relative to Supreme Court Juatice or PRIO

being Kecounized as Head of a Provisional GCoveramoent
aoing Mecoyunized ae Head of a Provio: ee AE

lasked Dr, MIRO If he believed that there were many anti-
Castro Cubans (both 1a and cut of Cuba) who favored PRIC, or the head
of the Supreme Court to be the provisiona! president if a government were
to be established on Cuban soll, Dr, MIRO declared that the revolution
fa a fact, and that practically nobody wants to go back to any former
regime. The people in Cuba would resist any ouch poseibility, He de-

cae

. MIRO said, “The business phone is also in my ho
excep? in my house, but that phone io always busy (JEfforson 2- 4680),

whl
nounced PRIO's activitica against the Council and ito efforts to unify
the anti-Castro elements. He said that the People should be given an
Opportunity to elect their chief of atate aiter Castro's overthrow and

reestabilahment of ordcr in tho island,

13. Offices of Council (Consejo Revoluciona rio)

When questioned about his business and private telephones,
use, Ihave no office

So use tha other phone (JEfforson 4-275}) when you wish to call me, "

"I nged to have a small office somewhere away from my home
decauge all the activitics there are driving my wife crany. I want to
find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation «
merely a room for myself, one for my secretary, and ono for meotings,
of tho Council, etc. The FRD had a place but at that place also was the
proses, the rofugee center, ete. R would not bo satiofactoty, The FRD
is aow practically dead, BR wae the forerunner of tho Consejo as the

unifying agency of the anti-Castro resistance,"

14, MIRO's Views oa Coordinating the Activities of Cther Exfle
G

Foups

After Dr, MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
channel for {unde and coordinating the activities of groups outside the
Consejo such as the Students, FORD (Labor), ote., I said that I under
Steod that sore of these elomonts weve unwilling to function under the
Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did ho consider that an .
Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate from each of
these groups and under the chatrraanship of a member of the Consejo.
Thie would serve to coordinate their activities, give them a tie-in with
the Consejo, yet not make them subservicnt to it. Dr. MIRO replied
that this would morely set up cncther Conoejo outside of and parallel to
the exiating Consejo. I did not pursus this (urther, not having enough
background of thege organisations to be able to distuge tho matter.

effectively.

15, Telephone Convorsation with MIRO on 7. Cctober

Before my departure from Miami for Washington oa 7 Cctober,
Ttelephaned to Dy. MIRO from the airpert. He appreciated the call and
asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action taken yesterday by

wal. sa

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the ALABAU Lawyers’ group in proclaiming Julio CARCE RAN (one
of the chief justices tn exils) aa 'Prosident of Cubs at War, " He exe
preosed his indignation at this unilateral "political" move by ALADAY
and his adherents amonz the exiled lawyors and judges. Ho added his
best wishes to ms and retninded mo that ho would probably go to New
York on Cetobsr 11th or 12th for the SLP (Sociedad Interamericana de
Pronsa) meetiag. 1 ropiied that I would appreciate if he would contact
Clark after his arrival to give his location in Now York City, and that
Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him, if
thie seamed doolrable, 1! suggested that tn future phone conversations
I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleasure that this would

be a geod procedure, I wieshad hirn Godspeed and he rapiled ikawtse

to me.
16. Comment

During these first two meotings 1 andea:,ored to establish
myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing

up dotalls of budget or opposition to any of hie specific proposals.
I listenod, asked various questions, and ho talked at length,

in future mectings, after I have gAined further background and
have more policy guidanco, 1 6hal} be able to discuss with him apeeific
issues and endeavor te reach agreements of Compromises, aa may be

- wequired,

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