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Chief of Station, JMWAVE

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Chief, WH Division a ———

“*""JMZIP/Operational - Contact with Dr, MIRO Cardona

ing

INFO

FROM

ACTION RAQLIRGD RUFEHENCES

For your information, transmitted herewith is a report of contact with
subject written by Theodore F. PASSAVOY, and a memoof WH/4 comments.

{END OF DISPATCH)

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DATE TYPto

19 Oct 6

Ctra Cr SYMBOL AND AUMLER

UFGW-606

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' HEADQUARTERS PLE NUMBER

19-124-25


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10 Cetovor 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mosting with Dr, N:UkO Cardona on 6 Cctobor

1, Dr. MIRO arrived about 9:50 a.m. for the meeting we had
set at 29:60; ayain he waa driven by his secrotary whom he introduced.
As during tha (irat meeting, cha remained outside in the car, Cur

““mosting lasted unt{! 12:09 noon.

2 Fivet, De, MIRC handed me a aote In longhand Heting the
topics discussed with mo on 5 Uctober, These points aro:

a. Groups conducting propayanda, ete. with Aroncy support
should reccive their eupport and be cousdinated through the Council.

b, A propazanda campaiin ohauld be waged by the Council
almad at:

(1). Cuba, via a long wave radio station in Koy W eet,
(2) Cubans fa Miami and other U, 3, areas by:
{a) Subsidizing Diario de las Amaricag.
' (b) Contracting for time on radio stations.

(3) Latin America, with a plan such as the Operacias
Grista,"'

¢, Underground ctivities.

(1) Provision of monthly funda to Council for procuring
Cuban peavs to eond to the seven-odd resistance
groups in Cuba through rellable channels (such as
.previously sent through the Walian Cmbassy),

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(2) Commando action as. outlined in plan presented
to ine on 6 Cetober,

3. Commando Plan

Thon Dr, MIRO handed me a plan (in English) for clandestine
action prepared by hie military collaboratars, whom he named as
Colonel Manue! VARELA Castro, an officer of the Academy, Captain
Enrique DESPAIGNEZ, and Colonel (inu) MONTEAGUDO, He stated
that they were of the BARQUIN group and had heen prisoners,

With respect to the pian for clandestine operations ia Cuba,
he stated that 300 men could be counted upon for coramando action, part
of them here, part in Cuba, Ho reiterated that a commando operation
was eascntial to boleter morsie arnung tho anti-Castro elements in Cuba :
and in exile ag well as to conduct sabotage that would further weaken
Cuban economy and the Communist regimes, He aaid that for this operation ‘
U. 5. help would be neceonary tn providing woapons, ammo, demolitions,
equipment, and funds. He proposed that if thie plan waa considered to
have merit, that arrange to have somoone muct with hia military men —
to work out the detaile, After all proparatiuns had been made and
matcrial provided, etc. the operation would be purely a Cuban affair,
(NOTE: Plan turned over to Thompaon at our oe eting at 15:35 on
6 October for transmiszion. ) :

4. Request for Arms, ctc. to send to Eacambray

Dr.MIRO yemarked that over a rnonth ago he had made a request ;
to Clark for arms for the anti-Caatro inagurgenta in the Esca:mbray, but ;
to date had heard nothing rolative to the request, He commented wryly, :
“Taak but never hear an answer." He said that the fishtera there should
bs cupported. Dr. MIKO stated that he had a boat (provided by us) and
@ means for delivery of the arms, Cevaldo RAMIREZ is chief of the

Eecambray group. |
COMMENT: Has anything been done about this request?

3, Infurroation on Arms Received by Castro Regime

Dr. MIRO handed me a long report which he said was brought
to him by the Argentine Avibassador to Cuba when the latter came to the
U. S. af the time of Fresident FRONDIZI's visit.” He said the Ambassador
would not divulge the sourca of the iaformation but commented, “You will

know, " .
* Report turned over to Thompson on 6 October. 1

2

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Dr. MIRO sald there wag no way to determing the accuracy
of the (tgurea given of planes, guna, ete, received from ths Soviet blee
(and Ltaly and Canada) but even if-the figurea were exaggerated 100 por
Cont, they would still be impreosive, ,

He added that Castro is daily bocoming stronger militarily
with weapons and with a largo militia of close te 300, 060 being trained
to use them while the econumy coutinues to deteriorate, Perhaps only
half the militia would be effective. But that is siseable. Thus, he said,
the langer the delay in positive military action to overthrow Castro, the
greater will be the task, “We muaet act soon, vigorously and effectively,
to lisurs victory. Another defeat would be disastroua and would make
Cubans, Latin Americana and others bolleve Castro to be invincible,
Then would come accommadationsa and even worse, the implanting of
Castro-backod rayimas in tha hemisphere. And the U. S. would auffer
worst of all, being discredited for defeat and “guilt of interference, "

oe tt

“In tha UN no nation would stand beside the U, 3,

6, Proposal that Council go to Cuba with Canimando Group and
Establish a Government on Cusan Sal) .

Dr. MIRO then declared that he was convinced that Castro
would never ba overthrown by all tne Propacsands, the sabota.s, commaada
raids, guerrilla activities, rupture of diplomatic relations and deteriorating
economy, ard that it was inconceivable to establish a Rove Png at-ir exile
for nuthing would ¢: me of it, that the only solution far defeating the

. Castro regime waa fer the Revolutionary Council to go to Cuba and estab-

lish &@ yovernment cn Cuban soll, aak recoynitioa by all friendly count+ive
and military aasistance of its priripalally, the U. 5., and that the UL8,
be voady to intervene immediately with ite Forcea, ‘This would all have
to take place in a cautter of 48 hours, otherwise {t would fall. 1 recognise
that this lo a bold plan, but boldness is necessary. There will be many
Fiaka, many may be killed, As for myself, I don't care it I dic. Thave
loat all my personal possessions and my son is a prisoner, '' He reiterated
that all neust be well prepared in advance, there must be no vacillation,
everything muat proceed rapidly, Firet, a commando raid in force to
ceize a piece of Cuban territory, preferably noar Guantanamo, and imme.
diately the members of the Council go ashore, proclalin a provisional
government, broadcast by radio to all natinne an appesl for recognition
(and cableo prepared in advance weuald alao be sent out), request UL 3.
assistance, and ths U, 3. should furnish ouch assistance at once in ade-

quate atrongth to ensure victery,

oP ge Tarte e't oe a BS eee pe

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wage or”

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Before such an action [a undertaken, tae enemy must be
softened by propaganda, sebotage, raids, underground action, and the
mags uf the people of Cuba must be prepared to accept the provisional
government through propayanda, increased knowledge of the Council

and ite unifying efforts.

Ov, 1URO asked are what Il thought of this project; did 1 think
that Castro could be overthrown in any uther way. admitted that
strong inilitary action appeared nocessary. I stated further that
of course hia plan would have to bs studied at the highest sovernment
levela, He prepesed that he inisht elaborate a pian with nis militar y
collaborators,and I suzsested that he do thie 30 that it might be examined

and considerad,

Dr, MIAG declared thar he waa convisced that this Coinmuntat
dagger in the side of the Statea could only be eradicated by such action,
that the U.s. ig and will be blarned for al! ant{-Castro propazanda,
sabotage, stc. and that enemy states will denouace It for intervention
in Cuba, but that if the U. 5. goes ta the ald of a friendly revolutionary
regizae established in the country aad helpa it defeat the Sovint-backed
Comrouaist regime, all friendly governments will applaud.

“thave no persanal political arnbitiona, ° declared hilkKO,
“Limerely am trying to chair the Coureil, whose ciisaion ia to unify the
anti-Castro elemeats inside and cutaide of Cuba, [If the team ian't cone
sidored effective, then changs the pitcher. Hut 1 believe the Council must
establish itself on Cuban evil, and soon, Time is against us.""Thas unta
del Fete agreeinent will backfire ayninat the U, 5. if Castro is alowed
to remain in Cuba. Ina year, after tha politicos of the countries ro-
cetving U, 3, sid have gotten thetr hands on U. 4. gold, they will say,
‘fharke te Castro, we got this.' And they will epend it as in the past
with no benefita to the accial and economic welfare of the paople.”

7. Views about the Judges and Jawyers

T queried Dr. MIRC ae to his views relative to tha fudges and
lawyers and their future gtatue. He said he honed that they could all
reunite and that they could be given assiztance as in the past. Ne de-
clared that Dr, ALABAU was not qualified to be a justice and that he was

fMoing nothing but making politica and trying to discredit the Council

and MIRC anl VARGNA. Dr. MIRC deciared that he, ag Prime Minister
in the early daye of the Castro geverument, had named .LABAU to the

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Supreme Court, but that now he considered 4LABAU unfit to hold any
judicial position.

8. Mambers of the Revolutionary Council

Dr. MIRO remarked that he had a meeting of the Council on

10 Cetober. I asked what elements now composed it and what he pro-
posed to add, He named the following as presently in the Consejo:

Rescate

30 da Noviembre

MRR

Accion Dermocratica

20 de Mayo :

AAA Independienta

MDC ;

Montecristi

He gaid ho had invited to join:

MRP
Unidad Revolucionaria

and awaited their reply.

Me would also like to have the Workers, Studentsa, and the
Professionals (Doctors, Lawyers, otc. ) come into the Council, He be-
lieves Batistianos and Comunistas and elements unwilling to cooperate
should be excluded, bet that all other groups should be brought together

under ths Council,

He contends that all anti~Castro activities, except clandestine
and milltary, phould bs coordinated by members of the Council, but that
the oxcapted activities should be known only to him (MTRO),

9. Probabie Argantine Rupture of Relations with Cubs

Dr. MIRO declared tast he believed imminent the Argentine
rupture of relations with Cuba. He said the *rgentine Ambassador to
Cuba (Julio AMGEDU) was ordered to return to Havana fhe had boon
vacationing in the U. 5S, after FRONDIZIs visit); that VILLANUEVA, 8
Secretary of the Argentins Embaasy in Cuba was coming to see MIRO
today; and further that he (MIRO) had received a phone call last night


er)
Con ow

Wake de 4

from a Spaniard (Nicanor FERNANDEZ) in Buenos Aires, urging MIRO

_ to go to Buenos Airea to arouse antl-Caatro sentiment of the people,

inasmuch aa somé Argentine action against Cuba appearod {mminont.
(FERNANDEZ said he had alroady written MIRC a letter.) MIRO oaya,
“Cf course, Icannot go. Ihave the Conaajo meeting on the 10th,
Furthemmora, Iam going to Now York on October 11th or 12th for the
SIP (Socieded Interamoricana de Prensa) meeting and have beon allotted

.12 minutos to addréss the mooting. "

10, MIRO to attend Homage to LACE RDA {Brazitian who
Precipitated QUADKO.! rooiynation) on Cetober 15

Dr. MIRO said he planned to remain in New York City (alter
11] and 12 Cctober SIP mesting) unti) October 15th to attend the homage
for LACERDA, the Governor of Guanabara province in Brasil, MIRO
probably will stay at the Park Chambera Hotel, but will advise Clark

of hia location. .

I commented that ! would probably romain in Washington next
week in view of his plane, but that I might go to New York City to meet
with him; if #0, I would get in touch with him and arrange a meoting

timo and place through Clark.

hl. Propazanda Commiasion

tasked Dr. MIRO about his ideas on the future organization
and atructura of tha Propaganda Commission. He stated that it ia out-
side the Consejy and not undor his direct control, although the Council

accountant has been passing funds to it. He said CAR RILLG had. roaigned

as head of Propaganda and that he would like CONTE AGUERG te handle
{t. He claimed that MESTRE had not done anything with propaganda,

12, MIROts Views Relative to Supreme Court Justice or PRIO

being Recognized as Head of a Provisional Guvernment

Tasked Dr, MIRC if he believed that there were many anti-
Castro Cubans (botk in and ont of Cuba) who favored PRIU, or the head
of the Supreme. Court to be the provisional president if a government were
to be ostablished on Cuban soil. Lr, MIAO declared that the revolution
{a a fact, and that practically nobody. wants to go back to any former
Frogime. The people in Cuba would rogist any such poasibility, He de-

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nounced PRIO's activities against the Council and ita efforts to unify
the anti-Castro slemente. He said that the seople should be given an
opportunity to elect thelr chic! of state after Castro's overthrow and

reestablishment of ordor in the ieland:

13. Cifices of Council (Consejo Revolucionario) ,

When questioned about his business and private telephones,
MIRO paid, “The business phone is aloo In my house. I have no office
except in my house, Sut that phono is always busy (JEMorson 2-4680),
So use the othor prone (JEffergon 4-2751) whan you wish to call me."

't need to have a amall office somowhere away from my home
because all the activities there are driving my wile crasy. I want to
find something modest so that no accusation can be made of ostentation -
morely a room for myself, one for my socretary, and one for meetings.
of the Council, ete. The FRD had a place but at that piace also waa the
pross, the refugee centar, ste, I would not be satiafactory, The FRD
ie now practically dead, It was tha forerunner of the Consejo as the
unifying agency of the anti-Castro reaistance, " :

14, MIRO'a Views on Coordinating the Activities of Cther Exile
Groups

After De, MIRO reiterated his view that he should be the
channel for funds and coordinating the activities of groupa outside the
Conesjo such as the Students, FOXD (Labor), etc., I said that I under-
stood that aonmw of these slemente were unwilling to function under the
Consejo; and that in view of that situation, did he considar that an
Activity Committee might be organised with a delegate fram each of
thease groups and under the chairmanship of a member of the Congajo,
This would serve to coordinate their activities, give there a tie-in with
the Consejo, yet not make them subservient to it. Dr. MIRO replied.
that this would merely eet up ancther Consejo outside of and parallel to
the oxisting Consejo. I did not pursue thie further, not having enough
background of these organisations to be able to ciscasa tho matter

effectively.

15. Telephone Conversation with MIRO on 7 Cetoder

a
Before my departure fram Miami for ¥ashington on 7 October,
I telephoned to Dr, MIRO [rom the airport. He appreciated the call and
asked if I had seen in the morning paper the action takea yesterday by

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o. E wed
the ALABAU Lawyors' group in proclaiming Jullo CARCERAN (one
of the chiof justicos in exile) as "President of Cuba at War." He ex-
pressed his indignation at this unilateral "political move by ALABAU
and his adhereats among the cailed lawyers and Judges. Hoe added hie
best wishes to ra9 and reminded me that ho would probably go te New
York on Octobor 11th or 12th for the SIP (Sociodad Interamericana de
Prensa) meeting. I replied thst I would appreciate if he would contact
Clark after his orrival to give his location in New York City, and that
Clark might have a request from me for an appointment with him,
this seemed daasirable. I suggested that in future phone conversations
I would be known as JUANITO, He agreed with pleaguro that thia would
be a good precedura. I wished him Godspeod and he replied likewise

to me,
16. Comment

During these first two meetings I endeavored to establish
myself favorably with Dr, MIRO and therefore refrained from bringing
up details of budget or opposition to any of his specific proposals,
LHstened, acked various questions, and he talxed at length.

In future meetings, after [have galned further background and
havo more policy guidance, I shall ke able to discuss with him epecific
igsues and endeavor to reach agreamenta or compromises, as may be

required.

