176-10036-10098 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10098
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO:
- TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 5/18/1963 :
PAGES #3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS : ,
CURRENT STATUS : i
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
"COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

?4an A VORA “08 AO BEES
INFURMATION REPOKT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE-AGENCY

~ This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of: the United States within tha meaning of tho- Eipionage Laws, Title (8, US.C Secs.
: 793 and m4, the ftrensmission or revelation of which la any menser to en unautherized perton is prohibited by law, : mo, :

. CONFIDENTIAL ICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

(eaen Ped NO FOREGH Hse

COUNTRY SOUTH: VIETNAM REFORT NO. TOCS- FT, 672

TELEGRAM.

SUBJECT PLANS FOR A. COUP. DETAT. 1N.-CENTRAL "DATE DISTR, «1G way 1963
VAETNAM BY THE REFORMED _¥N@oD _
PRECEDENCE 9 ROYTINE

DATE OF REFERENCES , IN Waar
INFO. EARLY. “MAY: 1963 ., ML PG1 -

OAT HED. VLETNAMy-SALGON (13 may, 1963)

aoe FIELD REPORTNO. Fvs &
; “THis is UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE. DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE,

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (¢) WITH, EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES, :

APPRAISALS {7.18 PROBABLY TRUE. THAT THE VNQDD 1S BEING REFORMEGS ITS CAPAGILITHES

IN CENTRAL VIETNAM ‘CANNOT. BE. JUDGED. a

1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IM HUES NGLIVEN VAN

Luc RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A cour DIETAT IN CENTRAL -WAETNAH "FROM THE .
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM ‘THOAT XAC PHON'. TRAQ te ce i
(TXPT). (SOURCE COMMENT. 5 TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE. MEANINGFULLY .
INTO ENGLISH, THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOINGS our. IN MIND AND . s
SPIRIT XAC. MEANS BODY, 1.Es, PHYSICALLY} PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT

THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND,. SPIRIT, AND BODY Mage BE ONE TRANSLATIONS
A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VN@DD.) - THE TXPT HAS Bein DEVELOPING SINC E

LETN. quoc my DANG ‘(VNQDD$ VIETNAMESE NA ATIONAL 137 FAR
7 1958 FROM ‘THE. ie SBARTICU RLY? THOSE BEMIS IN SERPRAL vi eTNaM,

CLASSIFICATION al ie

bal Ka ‘ORsOLETa PREVIOUS EDITIONS pes : pt

Sartives t NU OU197& 10k

CLASSIFICATION— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

QONFIDENTIAL mn FOREEN DSSEN | rocssioener

THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER
VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION
“AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE
ITS FORMATION. CLANDEST INE POLITICAL ORGANIZAT ICH NAS PROCEEDED
FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING
THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS YHL OLDER LEADERS
OF THE VNQDD , THE ULTIMATE INTENT BING A REVITALI ZED REVOLUT {ONARY
SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC 1S THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN
VAN CU, ( ONE OF THE Two “PILOTS HU SOMBER Lye ot STENT ERE ALALE
ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.) |

2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMIND DED LUC THAT THE ORGAN I-
‘ZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IM CENTRAL + ETNAM
. EFFECTIVELY, POINTING ouT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT coatRoLLeD
., COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE
"CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER
is.) THE ANT|-BUDDH|ST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY
| FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH
THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIER
_ AND QUANG"NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,
THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM!S
|. TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, 1.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL

OVER “CENTRAL VETETNAM . THEY. WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM

.CLASSIFICATION— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

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“CLASSIFICATION= DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COWROENTAL B® FOREIGN DISSEM

TDCcS~3/547,672

AND , AT. THE: ‘SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THE
REGIME IN-SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS
AFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM, |
3. Luc SENT A TRUSTED” FOLLOWER , ONE VIET > TO’ SAIGON TO DISCUSS
THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT.
VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE
AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD
"MEMBERS -IN.CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A CouP THERE,
WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH
THE VIET CONG (vc) COULD IMMEDI ATELY USE TO THEIR Own ADVANTAGE.
¥C REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL
AREAS: NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE:

ULTIMATE “POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A

POS1T1ON TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING
ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS - ‘THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS
FOLLOWED LuC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NoT
INA POSITION’ 70 ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET
THOUGHT THAT ‘LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN.
CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S
ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

ly, FIELD DISSEM., STATE ARMY NAVY. AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS
j
CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATJON PND ALR. DIVISION

CLASSIFICATION— DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSER

A4QNf1 Naanta.saraca-n -

