14-0000

104- 10210- 10009 ja

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TO TRE

TATE SEAL REVERSED AY CV HEALS OULAPLERS hy

SELNGE COPLUPLEE OM ASSASSEBRATTONS SPARE HEMBERS

ut :
PBER/VGLUID : LEROLUSTEDI S Yen

CSE: vk

: are j
nrc, vw 1) to!
.
J . :

[ares eae 7
i . . : I
[SNST/LOCAT Or: ee ee _ 7
it : .

| .

as semmnanenarene sur enntns pentose Logorpen ons nar app tess mutate oe ane neem nent Nn I

IP any: APO GEAR IAE Ft) SeCUIT YC Le

seen Rantittemnennenere sree

i a |
CATE BT GHATURE OFF
ry, ’

URNED te IENING OFFICT AR

tails care

NTS MAY BE COPTED OP RLMOVED ERO THIS PILe.


14-0000

rs

CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTS
IN THE CASE OF : ‘

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO

Dalen ame So ae Liter See hae”

. ed

7 |
—_ : i
ae

j
i
* Bhs ee -, 4
ane Phetne net Peter sll: wel j
: i,
: . i
, , . at !
a : f

w

14-0000

Per

4

ney tha te bee

a 7 ; 1 Ociaber 1965

L : o. . ,

MEMORANDUM FOR: Directoy of Security

1)

FROM Desuty Chicl, Security Rescarch Stall

oe

DOSENKO, VYusly ivanevich

Soe : SUBJECT

4
5

1, Jn accordance with the request of thp Deputy Circctor
‘.. of Central Intelligence, attached is a cummary| with cenclusioas ‘ .
'. ' eeaceraing the bona fides of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO. Sub- : ty
@$ ° . conclusions are coniained ia tic sumraary concersiag several ;
wmasjor areas which were csiven primary consideration in iaz maticr .
“5 “gf the bona fides of NOSDNKO. coe ;
. 2. Included in this cumraary arc coinments concerning
conclusions in thu previcus sumraary and an annex contafrina ce-
marks on three separate suujecto relisted to the NOSINKS cage.

renee yee te

meee ear

3. In bricf, the conclusica of this suramary

po fe the person he claims to be, thit ke heid bic claimed positions in
: : the KGS during 1953 ~- January 1954, tact NCOENKO was act dis-

. patched by the HOS, and tast bis previcus Nes and exagyerations
wa ; . aro notactually of material cinniiicance at this time. :

ocademsietemniuentadsee amide ba ceeera tea

Bruce L.. Solis

Attachment: . :
“Summary

go0LCG2

TIT me or reassert Aiea ah ak awh

eee
NTs
SES

14-0000

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 intreduction
1a Summary of Developmerxis in NOSENKO Case Since
30.October 1967 :

os _ iL Analytical Comments Concerning the Bona Fides of Yuriy
o - - Ivanovich NOSENXO .

aA. NOSENKO Identical to the Person Whom He Claims
to be? 7

_B. Is the Claimed 433 Carcer of NOSENKO Plausible?

Gc, Has NOSENKO Given an Acceptable Explanation of
His Motivation ta Contacting CIA in 1962 and For
His Defectioxn in 1964?

D. Is the Information Furnished by NOSENKO to CLA

ot : : Concerning KGB Operations, Personalities, and
. Organization Reasorabty Commensurate With Ki
: - . « ° Giaimed KGB Career?

: —=&z. Can. the Information Furnished by ? XOSEXKO be
Consicered in Toto as Having Resulted in Materia?
.. Damage to the KGB anc/or Has the information
- ° Furnisned by NOSZNKO Been of Signiticazt Benefit
- to Western Intelligence? -
F, Is There Evidence of KGB Deception or "Give-Away"
in Information Furnisked by NOSENKO Which Wout
: _ | Warrant a Coxnclusica that NOSENKO was Dispa sckeg
- ' 5 by the KGB? . ,

GOLACCS

i
4
4

oy

Lo tetteaeg

‘
'
2

“ft

14-0000

G. is Taere Evicesace of & Polii.cal or Any Gtler Type
Odjective Wrich Cowd Jusiily a Quspaicn of NOSENKO
by the NGB With Pesmission to Speak Freely to CiA

. Concerning iis Knowiedge of the KGB and W shout
toy Lo. NOSENKO Being Given a Specific Mission or Missions?

. CLA Were Known to the AGE Prior
to His Deicction or That NOSENKO Was Xver Bricied
Tyee by the AGB Relative to: Behavior or KGS Oxjective
During Txese Contacts or After His Defecticn?

12)

Ho IV. Comments Concerning Previous Conclusions in Regaré to NCSENKO

: A. NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the Naval. RU in Azy y of the
Capacities or at the Places and Times He Claimed

& _B. NOSENKO Did Not Enter the KGB in the Manner or at the
Time He Claimec

mo vey a 4

c.: NOSENKO Did Not Serve in the American Embassy Section
Throughout the 1953 - 1955 Period as He saimed

D, During the Period 1955 - 1960, He Was Noithe: a Senior
Case Ociicer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh
Department American-British Commonweaih Section
E, NOSENKO Was Neither Deputy Chiez of the American Embassy
© ‘Section nor a Sénior Ofiicer or Suser rvisor in the Section
‘ -  " During the Period-i961'- 1962{sic) a

F. NOSENKO's Claims, That in 1962 He was Chiei of the

“4 . Armerican-Britisn Commonwealta Section and Was

. loot 0 Thereafter a Deputy Chici of the Seventh Department,
Are Not Credible

G. NOSENKO Has no Valid Claim to Certainty That the KGB
Recruited No American Embassy Personnel Between
1953 and His Defection in 1964

i 0004004

at rage et

Ag


14-0000

wn

SENAO

fe)
PA
.
a
3
~

nex A = Si

aut

Text

in

ed

Se Vee # of

_
ee acelk

te]

c aaAov Papers

ahe Cacrep,

Annex C «


14-0000

Okt

SE

ODSCTION

Creed
~<8

id

. -
we . -
.

“TEE

YTS TR

«

8

i

ae

$f

af

q

:

x


14-0000

teed,

- _INTRODUCTION

The following summary and analysis is not intended to be ; _

all inclusive, that is to contain a specific comment on all organi-

zational, operational, personality and case type information furnished

, Uby Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO: To attempt to do so would be repetitious

and confusing to the reader and would not be of material benefit in the Se
‘formation of logical conclusions concerning the rather limited areas of

primary concern.

. 4
: so. This summary will not contain a detailed psychological an . 4 a |

” assessment of NOSENKO nor will it contain'a xecitation of the numerous

theories which have been-promulgated in the past concerning varying

‘aspects of the NOSENKO case. This summary will be primarily

.directed toward the question of whether NOSENKO was or was not : mo - - |

“ dispatched by the KGB, whether his claimed KGB career is relatively

plausible and whether he has since late October 1967 been cooperative in Cw,
a ‘reassessment of the entire case for or against NOSENKO. NOSENKO
has admitted certain lies and exaggerations in the past but claims that

. these were of a personal nature, intended to enhance his own importance . Coe : va


14-0000

ty : —
Pia COR airy

Vad.

~

but not to mislead this Agency in any material matters of an operational

or policy nature.

In order to avoid any misunderstanding of the phrase "bona

nee

fides" as considered in this summary, NOSENKO will be judged primarily ; oof
on whetocr he voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB knowledge,
and whetaer his 1962 and early 1964 contacts with representatives of this .
Agency were known to the. KGB. . Motivation and certain other pertinent
aspects will be considered, but his admitted previous errors, lies and Ot : .
exaggerations will not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is nota
@ "“wona fide"! defector.
There is not an accurate standard or scale of measurement ; : 7
against which information concerning NOSENKO can be balanced or - .
correlated to determine if he is or is nota dispatched KGB officer. For
purposes of this analysis and summary, an arbitrary list of areas
considered pertinent has been compiled, | Readers may differ in regard to
whether this arbitrary standard is a completely accurate standard, but it :
ia felt that the information from NOSENKO and information from other : ‘
sources derived through independent investigation will permit the reader ; , . .
to assess the information in toto against any standard he considers

appropriate. . “

The previous summary on NOSENKO entitled, "The. Exami-

nation of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector, "has been considered in

’ he a :
e . . :
goa ht EA SRCICES ash 1 inte moore mcerimten me

howe

SRISSIUA RECN a SSaEN SESE : RASS
aS ane

:
tabi caiseA RRA Lanai

14-0000

oC 4

the preparation of thie summary. [2 will be cormmented on in part
end thie summary will include conclusions correlated with the seven
primzry conclusions est forth on page 3$8 of the above summary. -
Remarks concerning certeiz crrore, inconsistencies, omiastons and
unsupported conclusions in ine previens summary ia regord to specific
cases or sub-areas will be included in this summary. However, this
eummary will not include a point-by-potat comparison of all areas of OS z i
agreement or disagreement with information contained in the provious
summary. .

: A positive decteion in regard to NOSENK® based on all

avallable information should be made in the Immediate future. Thore

a ir are wo known sources currently available'to provide new positive 0° :
. information concerning NOSENKO and his bona fides. it te recognized
i thet there fo always a possibility tn the future a new source or sources
will be able to furnish additisnal information in regard to NOSENKO.
> However, this possibility {oe exceedingly tenuous and it is felt there
is cuffictent information available on which to base a conclusion in - Meets

- : the KOSENKO matter.

Se ae gs oe Fectres ih be ~G00LCCS. ;

_ MARSA AT RIT tL, SOREN YE CH

bh

re eel Meares AN gee Lupus tre tame nnnn se eH

14-0000

vote a : . ,
~ ok.
: bd
nn
wt - 3
ra £35
¢ . Seah.
os deg fo
— ‘ * : . : :
Go GR |
aoc € a . ob
hw) 3 !
wo . fe a, j
:
: Ss . ;
a : , }
° j : .
. ‘ te . ;
+g ee _ ——
, eh +
‘ 4

14-0000

emnnry
one aoe Y

SUMMARY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN NOSENKO CASE

SINCE 30 OCTOBER 1967 oe 7 7

Since 30 October 1967, interviews with Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO a So
have been conducted by one individual not previously known personally to
NOSENKO but who has been aware of the NOSENXO case since June 1962.

Interviews have been detailed and very extensive in scope, have oo
been recorded and transcribed, and have covered the entire life and caree: ° .
of NOSENKO without regard to whether @ particular aspect had been,
covered during previous interview or interviews,

NOSENKO, although naturally apprehensive during the firet few
interviews, has been cooperative, has developed a relaxed attitude, and
the interviewer has noted no gignificant reluctance to discuss any aspect
of his life, career, or activities. On occasion NOSENKO has indicated a 7 ‘ : ¢

. reluctance to make positive statements in certain areas previously
considered at a minimum extremely controversial. This reluctance

was understandable and when it became apparent to NOSENKO that the

'

SECRET ©

bale? 3
Exsis?23 tea sr't=ati
taznday sat
¢odeenticsha

G00L011

ms

= . . t. vr

NSAI SA
SO

ARHHEEMY

14-0000

S:

interviewer would not Cispute or disparage his statements without adequate
reason, this reluctance on the part of NOSENKO, in the opinion of the
interviewer, totaly disappeared,

During the interviewing period, particularly in the first 5ix months,
SNOSENKO materially assisted the interviewer by preparing approximately
sixty memoranda on such diverse subjects as his life, motivation for de-
fection, individual cases, notes which he furnished to CLA in 1964, KGB
organization, and KGB officer and agent personalities, As an example
of the scope of this work by NOSENKO, four of the memoranda included

_0b %
remarks concerning approximately [875|KGB ofiicers, {roo\xcB agents,
3 35 GRU officers, and[ago other Soviet nationals. These lists were alpha-
beticaliy arranged and the above indicated cooperation of NOSENKO has
materially assisted in the organization and evaluation of intormation
furnished by him curing current interviews.

Copies of transcripts of interviews with NOSENKO and related
memoranda have been disseminated to the FBl and the Cl Staff. Special
Agent Elbert Turner and Special Agent James Wooten of the Washington
Field Office/FBI in particular have given great assistance in research
and compilation of new or additional information and the FBI has inter-

viewed or reinterviewed a number of United States citizens concerning

whom NOSENKO has furnished pertinent information,

2 c001012

Cote SECRET

mentee teats Be eet ew te eee

TO ee’


14-0000

ut
~

aaa . In addition, throe professionals frorn the $B Division bave

reviewed the current information and asasteted in the retrieval of

previous information from NOSENKO and collation of current
information with previous informatk-a. The latter ‘s a trernendous

task because of the volume of material; the aumber of individual

cases irvolved; and the extensive information in regard ta KGB .
persenplities, procedures, organizational structure and activities. |
The 8B Diviston elso provided tha services of an expert
translator to translate the tapes of the 1965 interrogation of NOSENKD 7 H ; _ “
_ by Petr DERYABIN and one of the previously mentioned three pro- .
feneionala completed a new translation of the 1962 interviews with , tt

NOSENKO. In addition, transcriptions of certain other particularly

pertinent previous interviews of NOsENKO have been completed by
the Office of Security.
Approzimately 7000 pages of traascripta and related material
have been compiled and disseminated since late October 1967. Com-~ .
iments concerning the value of the information contained in the sbove
: material ase contained tn another section of tats summary. As of the
- a present thine, a complete analysis is not possible since a considerable
. portion of the material hes not been fully processed. In tha preparation

"of this summary all areas of major significance have been examined.

‘ “ Because of the voluminous’ information, all analytical and: ‘collation work

aede,

has nat been completed; but it ie not considered that,. based on all -


14-0000

6% avatlable information, the remaining work will materially affect
tha conclusions drawn in this summary. '

The polygraph interview of NOSENKO was initiated on. _
2 Auguet and concluded on 6 August 1968. Approximately sixty a
questions of a pertinent nature wore tndhided in the polygraph tater-
view. No probleme were encountered dosing the polygraph interview
and no eéditional tenting ‘of NOSENKO te anticipated. Attached ts a
copy of the self-explanatory report on the exalts of the polygrapy _
tntorview. —_ co Co ‘

zy :

- {Interviews with NOSENKO have continued since the polygraph ot

ponte oe

. interview on a temporarily reduced scale in order to permit.a review

of previous information and Preparation of. thie, summary. There te,

Bo doubt that fature interviews with NOSENKO will reveal information ;
of intelligence value, but information developed thus far will parmit ;

& doctelon in the case of Yurly Ivanovich NOSENK®.

7

“Attachment:

2 iat St

suv cutee

i
OS REE so diigo He Tear

14-0000

ect RSS

@ intention to defect? Xo.

comes REE Ss

. ro bie ©

. a . . . .
2G : Cniet, Security Research Steff 12 Avuguss 1968
FRO 3: Interrogation Research Division

biveveson

Yurty ivanovich NOSIIKO IRD # 67492

g
ei
§

SoRNEIT YE NG DACA

atts

Subject is a 40 year old former KGa Stafter wo defected so the
U.S. in 96h : in Geneva.

BACKGROUND ' aed)

iy. Bruce L. Solie of the Security Research Staff has béen de- ©
‘oriefing and interrogating Subject since Octoser 1967. in order to
resolve the issue whetier> Suoject was a dispatched agent of the KG.
die hae conducted @ vast amount ox research and checking with sources
* in en effort to estaolisa the veracity of Subdject's statements.

PURPOSE
@ "She ‘primary purpose of the poiygraph test was to deternine:
l. ‘Whether Suoject was a Gispatched Agent of the KGB;

2. whether Suoject had intentionally given Mr. Solte
any faise inforaation.

PROCEDURE

Subject was given a polygraph examination on 2 August 1968 at
a safesite in the vicinity of Washinston, D.C. The examination was
conducted in the inglishs language. Suoject's comprehension and the
aollity to express nimself in Engiisn was completely adequate for
‘ purposes of polygraph testing. Suoject was completely cooperative
in all respects. Suoject displayed no evasiveness and appeared to
be completely frank whenever he was questioned or gave inforzation
on @ topic.
x

The following relevant questions were asked auring the first test:
Is your true name Yurly Ivanovich NOSENKO? Yes. ;
Were you bora in the year 19277 Yes.

Besides the Acericans, did you tell anyone élee ebout your

- Shon? +
EtssGd G22 what
Cieesrediee sod

BaMercttacton _ Lee

abr een i ate sors na attadimnctre2~

LEAN Une e we

vat

a


14-0000

wh . 6

©

oad you ever teil anyone in the Kos about your contact with '
fwerscan, Intelligence? ii0..

seve you given instructions by tre KGB to get in contact wita

t
i]
‘zerican Intelligence? iio.
Were you told vy she KG3 to defect in order to carry out an :
Inteiiigeace mission? io. : '
The following relevant questions vere asxed during the second test: : ' y
'
Did the KGB actusliy serd oa comcunication for your recall to bo: \
the USSR on the Gay of your defection? iio. . '
Were you acquainted with CHSREPANOV? Yes. : . r
i .
Did you actually travel to Gorxiy in tiovemver 1963 to hunt for :
CiTEREPANOV? «Yes. . :
6 Ave you deliberately withholding from us any information about . : |
+, ‘the KGB recruitcent of Acericans? No. : . : -
Does tne XGB Lave MECKA and NEPrUuc 607 Yes.
Were you the responsible Case Officer for Jona Abidian in 1960-617 ; .
Yes. 1
\
vo you Know tne true name of ANDASY or SASHA? Hoe . :
Dia you ever nave tucercuiasis? Yes.
Gne following relevant questions were asxed on test three: .
aa a’ serve in Navy inteligence from 1951 to 19532 Yes. — :
Was] Sidi |in the USSR during the period 1957 to 19597 Yes. .
s . :
To the best of your knowledge, were you in the Seventh ;
Department at this time? Yes. . : , a
Dia you telephone the GRU about[SHUDIN]at this time? Yes. Jd. |
: : Go the best of your knowledge, was POPOV couprouised because i
. . Of the letter Mr. sinters wailed? Yes. } .
. . - 1
oe ot . _. (001016 i . ;
a : , ; ' v1 Sy
ae meee ee les | 4
}
‘
; af
a a
ces

SES, t

caseieyens : : : os ~amegereens : : RRR TERT HUAN eT
JUNC ont SS ASS aS
HAE CERES S SERRE SSS 8 aed “ees


14-0000

-

Sane
raD st Gh
Puce --3 .

To tne vest of your iocvlccce, was TINOVaGY e:moesed to the
333 decauce Of the 5155 Gurveliiance oa tie Driticn Scoassy? == +
Yes. .

wag them any nisleading tnforuation ia tue notes you-brougnt
out from the Soviet Union? io.

oat a8 you intentionally exaggerate ycur personal association witha
sOVT Oe .

Ave you niding any adverse information avout your background? No.

SudSect's poiygrapn test refiected no significant responses indicative
of deception regarding the relevant questions assed. iio further polygraza
tests vere aduinistercd on a ets date occause the examiner did not want to
run tne risk of fatigue se “@ in and thus possibiy ceusing adrenalin

' exhaustion.

Polygrapn testing was resuzeé. on 6 August 1963. Tne Toliowing
relevant questions were asied ca test four: ~
4
: Did you join the KGB in arch 29537 Yes.
Were you a KGB officer from 1953 to i964? Yes. . ,

.

Were you a Deputy Chie? cZ the Seventh Deparment? Yea.
Were you only a Captain at tris tine? “Yes.

Were you an officer in the U.S. Emoassy Section frém March . ..
1953 to May 19557 ‘Yes. .

In 1958 and 1959 were you the Deputy Chie? of the ‘merican-
Britisn-Canadian Sectica in the Seventh Department? Yes.

Froa January 1960 to Decexber 196i | were you the Deputy to the
Coie? of the First Section of the First Deparwent? Yes.

From January to July 1962 were you the Chiez of the First + Section
. of the Seventh Departcenv? Yes.

Were you an officer in tze First Section, First Department, SCD,
&t the tine of the Stalingrad operation against [Senson, Mule] and

[Stroud Yes. | . . ar) bo -
er Ob Oo
q . 7 | . 6001017

. ' SECHFT .

-_


14-0000

oe

ese

.

’ © witht

TRO ft 67+

Page 4&

The following reievant questions were asied on tesy Tive:

Since 1953 do you “now of any other G2 recruitcczts in the
American Eubassy besides ict and fiiouanbp Ne.
ob

Did the KGB xnow avout tie cotes you vrougit «7.5 ho.
Nave you told us the complete truth about your “U3 career? Yes.

Did you intentionally exagcerate your nersonal involvement in
eases in 1962 ani i964 ia onier to misicad us? io.

Did you intentionally give us any faise opcratiorar
information? io.

Did GRIBANOV offer you the position of Deputy Chie? of the
First Departuent? Yes.

Was an order actually prepared promoting you to Deputy to the
Chief of the First Departuent? Yes.

in early 1960 Gié GRIBANOV <ell you that your prizary responsibility
was to Work against Auerican Code Cicrxs? Yes.

Other than you xentioned, are you niding any other reasons for
your defection? iio.

Are you deliverately witnnoiding any inforuation on any foreigmera °
reeruited oy the 43? No.

Tne following relevant questions were asked oa test 6ix:

Did you enter the KGB througa the influence of General BOGDAN
KOSULOV?: «Yes.

Did you succeed BAKEVALOV as Deputy Chief of the First Section?
Yes. .

Did GRYAZNOV succeed you as Deputy Crief of the First Section?
Yes. -

“Were the CHEREPANOV papers passed to the Anericans with KCB

Knowledge? No. | LO

Lo *, a  go04018

ot en teeter ee woe eee - t

14-0000

é

¢< co
C.
Cc
x3
rr

To: mnowledge wav there any ulsiending inforsation in the
China: nov papers? io.

: “fe 7 - . nt
Did you ever personaiiy ueet GOLITSCYN? ito.

_ . yo
Was there @ cable sex. to Geneva for you to assist ARSE . . “
in the BOLITSKIY case? Yes.

Did you personally maxe an approach to |KavSEA3 at the Moscow '
Airport? Yes.

Tne foilowing relevant questions were asxed on test seven:

Did you actualiy review the GB file on 0S4/LD? Yes.

Did LEE HARVEY OSWALD receive any KGB training or aseiguuents? a a
' No. . .

+ . + te
Were there any microphones instailed in the North Wing of the ‘
U.S. Emoassy in Moscow? No.

¢4

Was the review of microphone reports one of your duties in
. 1960-617 Yes. :

_ Are you withholding any information mow to you concerning
KG3 microphones or electronic activity against tne U.S. i }
Enoassy? iio.

Before your officiai transfer to the Seventh Departrent did :
; you read the survelliance report on the visit of ABADIAN wy. ‘
. to PUSHAT street? Yes. ,
. c J

Did you personally conauct a certain investigation of SHAXOV : i!
in 1962 in Geneva? Yes. ‘

Was the ranx of Lieutenant Colonel on your travel document . . . \
to GORKTY only a uistake by KASHPEROV? § Yes. . : ‘

_The following relevant questions were asxed on test eight:

‘While in the U.S. Exoassy Section did you obtain a typewriter
, + for BORODIN for the preparation of a letter-to Edward Zilis
SMITH? Yes. .

a 001019.

7 erepet. Le |
pete ene: Te Ct reds venom ne erene am oe . wa te hy

Rane
SENTRA SoS
ARHEE AREER,

14-0000

i a
. ’ . Weevos a ‘ . . .
re] . te tow
oe & .
ad #6792 , soe '
Page Oo _ 7
‘ os se passe a panne . ot
Dad you read the official FOmOvs OC KGGGAOOY on hia contact
: with vena on & traia ire. Ueisini to moscow? «= Yea.
. . Are you intentioniliy vishal tay intonation conceming
:, KGB xnowsedge of CIA personnel La “OGCOW? NO. , i. .
: is there any possivility iLas uie KGB woured dispatch an officer
a tO Gexect to tie Acericans? Xo. . .
. - . '

; Subject's polygrapn test of 6 Aagust lixewise re2ieoted xo '
i indications of céecepiion. -

eed ort
. CONCLUSION : ' ‘ . o'
. ——s : we
oe ' Dased solely on the overali oniysis of Suvject's polygraph . ,
‘ testa, it 1a the opinion of the Wierolgaed that the Suoject naa
: been sUdstantially trucnAd in Oneweralg tha relevant gucetions _
acked. . . tone TORS: ee ee oe me en eo es
9 .
a \ . ' .
: : yo
. a om
. . ' .
._ yyy
aoope . . .
% eo? ‘ . . . tas
s.
nO oo.
: , : .
: . .
. . . .
poh ro .
pe So GOOLC2R
vee ott . ° toe . a Va fo te .
es oot,
_ SFERET. te
. wilt OU .

ERR

okt
Pasha ATA.

{mq means sree


Fe ome tsar.
?

~
.

See Sr ee

14-0000

SECRE!

ay tt tae

ANALYTICAL COMME?

rm

OTE NE ag Crem

DE at ITU To hag 5 RMA oe caer atee meencter tone | nemeen gememtene at os meme ynemgena mma

sper et me a

TR oe tere ee rma tee ne

14-0000

a
whe

mee

BS ee

ANALYTICAL COMMENTS CONCERNING THE BONA FIDES OF

YURIY IVANOVICH NOSENKO oo, | oth, 2
: ; os
_ - . As indicated in the introduction to this summary, information in :
i , regard to Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO will be considered against an arbi- Ii
; trary but realistic list of areas considered pertinent to the question of ‘
° whether NOSENKO voluntarily defected to this Agency without KGB :
‘ knowledge,” and whether his. 1962 and early 1964 contacts with represent- -

‘ atives of this Agency were known to the KGB. !

on 0 oe ; : .
bo. oe It was noted that motivation and certain other pertinent aspects o>

ed but that his admitted ‘previous lies and exag- . .

‘also be consic:
om : gerations. would not per se warrant a conclusion that NOSENKO is not a : a

"bona. fide defector,"

The following is a list of the areas considered pertinent and which
are being given specific consideration, Attached is a separate section 4 _
,containing remarks in regard to the designated areas of A - H. os

' A. Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims

ae to be? : . \

B, . Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible?

SECRET = guagoae il

tongs 128
secacaltiotia

See

RR cAae bak

RR ICON BO en WEA Mid Wats tan net v= mmm TTT meen earsand sieaiener mani dines ek tone

NO, oo


14-0000

C. Has NOGSENKO given an acceptable expianation of
his motivation in contacting CIA in 1962 and for his Ve ;
gefection in 1964? - : : . | ‘ : . :

D.. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA

Lo Oo concerning KGB operations, personalities, and organi-

zation reasonably commensurate with his claimed KGB .

career?

Ls

Can the information furnished by NOSENKO he con- + : :

sidered in toto as having resulted in materia] damage

a
x

to the KGB and/or has the information furnished by , 7

NOSENKO been of significant benefit to Western Intelli-

ms gence?

hy

Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in

information furnished by. NOSENKO which would warrant
a conclusion that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB?

G. Is there evidence of a political or any other type objective

et bie ot

# . which could justify a dispatch of NOSENKO by the KGB ' of :

SNE

with permission to speak freely to CIA concerning his

as knowledge of the KGB and without NOSENKO being given ©

a specific mission or missions?

6004023

poveseittbineanse smart: Witte. tote pony


14-0000

SECKE:.

a
a,

OSENKO

N

Is there any evidence that the contacts of

H.

1962 or in 1964 with CIA were known to the KGB

in

KO was ever briefed

EN

N

is

toh

_ prior

defection or that:

KGB objectives

by the KGB relative

; behav

rs

toh

ior or

during these contacts or after his defection?

ft nF on negete


SECRET

™

is NOS

che

a

a US ne re Sate Mee te ee teeny

LTE NRE one fe a RN ak tery ON ARENT

14-0000

eees: fiom esiczatit

°° Gungratiog arg
Geclassification

wd

A. | Is NOSENKO identical to the person whom he claims to be?

During interviews NOSENKO has furnished detailed information in regard
to his family, his activities as a youth, the schools he attended, assoc- A
jates of his father and mother, and his own associates, The period : , . 4
under consideration in this section is the period preceding his. entry

‘ . ar t

into the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, -in mid- _— tfc vs

March 1953.

Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning his father and

> mother and his early, life, together with other information such asa

_comparison of photographs of NOSENKO and a photograph of his father

and confirmed travel of his mother to Western Europe in 1956 with
Madame KOSYGINA, conclusively establish that he.is Yuriy Ivanovich
‘-NOSENKO, the son of Ivan Isidorovich NOSENKO, the Minister of Ship-
building in the USSR prior to his death in 1956. This is also satisiactorily . . ; a =

supported by pexsonal-type information furnished by NOSENKO concern- 4
y ‘ a . . . . . : ‘ .

ing other associates of his father and mother. . . yf
e Since, as indicated above, there is considered to be no doubt

that Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO is the son of the former Minister of . 7

Shipbuilding, a detailed study of his life prior to 1945 (age 18) is of:

Ghoue 1
Esctated trea aztonatic
Saagracizs and
fechossitestey

a

shade Tt

AEE he

14-0000

joa SECC;

hittie or no value in assessing U.c bona fides or non-pbona fides of
NOSENKO. An expose of his youtniul indiscretions, of which he has
admitted a number, is of no import in a discussion of whether NCSENKO
Was or was not dispatched by the AGB. Obtaining any collaterai first-
hand information in regard to NOSENKO beiore 1945 would be of
negligible value, but there actually is supporting information from
Nikolay ARTAMONOYV, a defector from the Soviet Navy, concerning
the claimed attendance by NOSENKO at a military-naval preparatory
school in Leningrad,
NOSENKO, during current interviews, has stated that he grad-
. ‘
ry uated from the Institute of International Relations in 1950 and had ,
attended the Institute ‘since: 1945. He has explained that he should pve 0
graduated in 1949'since it was a four-year course, but failed the final
examination in Marxiem and therefore was required to attend the Institute
for a longer period of time and again take his final examinations.
Based on information furnished by NOSENKO concerning co-
students and the Institute, there is no reason to doubt that he actually i
attended and graduated from the Institute of International Relations in

1950. The previous controversy in this matter was complicated by

NOSENKO who, in 1964 after his defection, stated in a biography that

ee

“ he had graduated from the Institute in 1949. Actually this statement

\ a G001027

me

STENT Ta ; f RY aa 4 i RR RR SIRT
Sa RUS UC ERAC UENO i EN aS at ERNE R 33 a ‘ iS ts ca SG

14-0000

a Be

Rie BRI:

aN

by NOSENKO in 1964 resulted in conflicting information since NOSENKO

on 9 June 1962 during his first contact with CIA had stated that he

"completed the Institute of International Relations in 1950." NOSENKO

has given the explanation that he changed the date of his graduation to

1949 because he did not wish to admit that he had failed to graduate in.

1949, NOSENKO explained that this change in his date of graduation

caused him to pre-date his actual entry into Navy Intelligence to 1950
instead of 1951 and his actual entry into the KGB from 1953 to 1952.

The above action by NOSENKO is included in what NOSENKO has

' characterized as his “stupid blunders."' The latter is a rather apt:

characterization of his now admitted lies and exaggerations but is not

” evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. It is evidence of -

a certain personality trait of NOSENKO who has in the past by his own
admission tended to enhance his importance and astuteness by graphically
portraying his personal participation in KGB activities concerning which
he had knowledge but did not personally participate, .
The claimed service of NOSENKO in Navy Intelligence during
March 1951 to early 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas has been

seriously questioned in the past. Specific comments on this period of

re a a at GP AEA Be SIL LIN OT halaman TE IN


14-0000

ponerse

eres PRON UI 2 Seria

SEL...

_ time are contained in a separate section of this summary, but it is

considered that the recent interviews of NOSENKO satisfactorily sub-
stantiate his claimed service in Navy Intelligence during March 1951
to early 1953.

Attached is a typed copy ofa handwritten memorandum completed
by NOSENKO on 31 October 1967. This is a biographical statement con-
cerning his life and KGB carcer. No effort has been made to correct
grammatical errors or Spelling since to do so would be in conflict with
the manner in which current interviews were conducted; namely, to give
NOSENKO an opportunity to recdéunt his life.and activities to permit a re-
examination of the entire case. The comprehension and fluency of
NOSENKO in the English language was adequate for interview purposes
in October 1967 and both have materially improved since that time.

_ Interviews of and memoranda prepared by. NOSENKO since

* 31 October 1967 have not indicated any material discrepancies with the
statements of NOSEN KO in the attached memorandum, One change that
has-been made by NOSENKO is that he now dates his transfer from the.
‘First Department, Second Chief Directorate (SCD), KGB, to the Seventh
Department, SCD, as occurring in the latter part of May 1955 rather

. than June - July 1955 as indicated in the attached statement. NOSENKO

, also now dates the period in which an unsatisfactory "characterization"

. oa rn +
ak TE en Nt TNA Ma Se eh bate et be SAE

k
4


14-0000

: {personnel evaluation) was prepared on NOSENKXO in March - April

. 1955 rather than May - June 1955. Since the unsatisfactory personnel
report was directly related to his transfer to the Seventh Department,
neither of the above changes are considered to be of a significant nature,

An- effort has been made during current interviews to differentiate between

errors due to faulty memory and discrepancies indicative of deception by

. NOSENKO.

Attachment:
31 Oct 67 Memo

-) oe ‘

cL ~~ 0001030

aie

pee Manes re ee en re ea . coy

ey

Sey
SAN

Bs
SESS tant


14-0000

RUE Wado ANE 814 LAPIN IIT ON NE die 183

: "Sudsmech" from summer 1934,

tee

at :
o arr joe ‘, . : ‘ ae

' i * Operational Memo # N-2
. SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich :

The foliowing is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
furnished by Subject on 31 October 1967, following a request on
., 30 October 1967; .
“1 ‘NOSENKO, George; was born 30 October 1927 in the city
Glee. , ‘ ne
. Nicolaev, Ukraine, ,

ade.

n

My family: the father - NOSENKO, ivan, b. 1902, was working

-at the” ehipbuilding plant and studied at the shipbuilding institute, which .

he finished in 1928; the mother - NOSENKO, Tamara (nee MARKOVSKI),

b, 1908, a Housewife; the brother - NOSENKO, Vladimir, b, 1944, a

-student,

In September 1934 I began to study in the school (0 claas) out

_ Studied a short period of time because in October with the mother went

“in Leningrad where the father was working at the shipbuilding plant, .

In Nicoiaev I was living at the Street

. Nicolseki 7, All relatives of my family were living also in Nicolaev.
7 a in Leningrad I was living with parents in three places till 1938:

“at the Street Stachek (1934 - summer 1935}, St.. Canal of Griboedov,

154 (1935-1938), St. M.. Gorky (short period in 1938). From 1935 till

GUULU31

y Geue? 1 : :

‘ Enthoted trv antemaiic! : !
° Gm reer a .
aera manera Bevate


14-0000

er ere ene nes

7 . OLE . . _ Jo

shoe

. oe . ; ’

1938 I studied at the schools, which were close to my places of living. :

‘In 1938 the father began to work in Moscow and soon 1 with the mother

went to live in Moscow in the end of this year. 0 ; 7

wa : In Moscow we were living at the St, Serafimovich, 2, Here : ‘ qo a

I waa ‘continuing to study at the school 585 (St. Be Polianka), In 1941

‘I finished 6th class and went with parents to rest to the south (Sochi)

Sot, : +
71" “put goon began the war and we returned in Moscow, . {

re In October 1941 I with my mother went in the evacuation in . : . i

Cheliabinsk (Ural), where I] finished 7th class in spring 1942. In i Lt,
on an . ' ., mi

- Cheliabinsk I lived in the poselok ChTZ, beizg there I tried to run to

7 2 the front with my playfellow BUSKO, but.we were caught and returned : . er

home. . In 1942 (summer) I went with the mother.in city Gorxi and in

. July-August we returned in Moscow,

” _ In August I enter ed in the Moscowite military-navy special
- ., school, which was evacuated in Kuibyshev, where 1 iinished 8th class ane
7 _. + dn summer 1943 and after that I arrived on a leave in Moscow, This .
: . . *«

S11 1 . achool must be evacuated from Kuibyshev in Achinsk (Siberia) and I : ;

. did not want to go there, With the help of father J was accepted in the

Se Baku's military-navy preparatory.school and in August went in Baku, 7 Soe “oy

3

where I wae studying at the second course (9th-class). In this school - i

a : ‘I twice tried to be sent as a volunteer to.the front but failed, Soon : a , “ :

¢

-G0UL032 “>.

DIT EON, tain “aPRANE NY

: ae TT

N
eRe

SENG, iunnniasab


14-0000

1

REPRE DRT SMT heme ae ne a Mk a

‘ Leningrad,

“after that I run witha friend (RADCIIENKO) home in Moscow (January
. ae

1944), In Moscow I studied at the courses (Russian word), finished
9th class and wae accepted again in the military-navy preparatory

school, which was located in Leningrad. In August of 1944 I went in

arr ie

booq tb es .
! All cadets of this school were sent to forest (about 200 km.

eee
ty, ~

from Leningrad) to prepare wood for winter, where we have been two

‘months. In November I wounded by chance the left hand. and was put

in the navy hospital, When I was in the hospital I decided-act to return
in the school. but to finish 10th class in Leningrad about what I have
‘written a letter to'my father asking his help and agreement with such
my decision, With the help of the father's friende I quited with the school
and entered in the shipbuilding college on the second course in January
1945 and studied there till the end of May, The WWII finished and I
decided to return to Moscow. The director of the shipbuilding college
had given me a document that I studied in this college at the second
course and finished this course {though I was not passing exams), In
“Leningrad Iwas living in the-hostel of this college (St. Tolmachev).
. In May 1945 I arrived in Moscow and was living with parents

(St. Granovexi, 3).

Aso csentceseupsiea SECRET |S

re Te ne TE oN

*


14-0000

We pe tee an tot

Na EIEN CS PERRI IR ROS NINN nine U8 pak aia mattis

He pee Er manent fae ee ee

OL’

i _ , In summer 1945 there was created the institute of the inter~

national relations in Moscow and in July 1 entered in this institute.

z : , In july my father went in Germany with the group of engineers

and he took me (I received a temporary rank of a senior lieutenant,

documents and a uniform),

: In-1945~1950 I studied at the institute. In 1946 1 acquainted -

ed '

with a girl.- Shishkov FLAVIA, student of the medicine insiiiure. I

was.in close recjutions with this girl, because of the pregnancy i married
her and she made an abort. My parents were against the marriage and

we did not live together and we soon divorced, In the end of 1946 I was

_aequai nted with Telegin AUGUSTINE and was going to marry her, re+ ;

ceived a flat in 1947 (St.. Mira - former Ist Uecyehckad, 162/174). In
a November hhex father, General TELEGIN, was arrested, but I married <
: a her, The marriage was not succesaful. I foundout about her close
relations with the brother, and the child -girl was born with patnological
changes. Iwas not the father of this child. After that I broke with her

and we were living separately (end of 1948 - beginning 1949).

&

In spring 1950 before state exams in the institute was working

to the ‘commission, which was deal ing with future works. of the students of

+ .

my 5th course. I expressed a wish to work in any military organization

asta

6001034 |

wee te Nowe,


14-0000

. : to? Nite ste he : Qo : ; \
7 ee 7 : .
: . ; ; . . wv . :
: _- @nd soon I was invited to visit personnel department of MGB (Ministry
i
» .of State Security). ‘But MGB did not accept me. After that with the
help of the father I began to deal with the personnel department of the — !

intelligence of the ministry of military navy concerning my. future work.

1

rr : Passing state exams I failed Marxism-Leninism and with a

I group of fails Iwas passing state exams once more, Jn October 1950

.

tT finished the institute and received a diploma,

1 was accepted in the navy intelligence in the 13 of March 1951 ;

‘ ..and in March 17 went by a train to Soviet Harbour (intelligence of 7th

lay Fleet, as an interpreter.of the inforrnation department). Before going

Far East I began my divorce with the former wife.

+ ‘to the

At the end of April 1952 I went on a leave in Moscow, Immediately

after returning in Moscow:I had a blood cough out, J: the middle of May |

1 went to a tuberculous sanatorium not far from Moscow, In July I

finished my treatment and returned in Moscow. Because of the health

. "Tcould not return back to the Far East and te personnel department of . ‘ |

* the navy intelligence sent me to Baltic Sea (as a senior interpreter of
: ithe navy intelligence point of the intelligence of 4th Fleet - in Sovietsk,
Kaliningrad's dietrict),

When. I studied at the institute.I as all the atudents received a

rank of junior lieutenant. of administrative service after finishing the

cn qe Contam 5 oe meme me beware secre ent

Day entiecttvetrar ever . oar ee 4 i sreseeteery
| i at :
CRU AUS

ApS ASML ERGO ESE

+ red

wtebeee

anne

Bore Het eains


14-0000

eee

ta DTS

ttc ep SARIS GAB IS es RAEN HE AEE ta 8

wae thinking about change of the Job. KOBULOV was Speaking with me

ond this theme and propose we work and his help in MGB, but nothing

It \

Ree ote

second course in 1947, In 1951 the ministry of navy nad given me also

the rank of junior lieutenant when I was accepted in the navy intelligence,

In September-October 1952 I received a rank of lieutenani,

In Sovietax the work was not interested and for me it was nothing
to do. Besidea this the climite was not good for my health and I décided

to change the job. With this purpose before new year at the end of 1952
re tal . .,
I took a leave and went to Moscow. January 1 Iwas with my parents

ak

_at the evening party 2 at the cottage of General MGB KOBULOV, whom 1

a At
did not know before, but I knew his son-in-law Vahrushev Vasili-a

former student and my friend. I told him about my job and that now I

more definite was ‘said about my work, This month I reported to the

“head of the personnel department of the navy intelligence KALOSHIN

about my decision and that I will be working in MGB.

In the end of January I went again in the tuberculous sanatorium, .

_where I was in.1952. ‘In the days of funeral of STALIN I has come to

" Moscow and visited the ministry where my father was working. There

ol have seen General KOBULOV who has come to the father and he said : a

te

: that the would settle my “question concerning my jor After several days -

Vee

wea’ aloud "mat
ere ane le mn enh ae >in Stennis +

wots nected £98 eee mane

wee

i
|

wie


14-00000
:
4
H
' : : 3
. 7 . an oe .

come to KOBULOV. There I have spent about two hours in the re-"
* . é

,. ception room of KOBULOV, but he was too busy and his assistant

SAVITSKI sent me to the Deputy of the Chief of the Second Directory . . — i

~ . SHUBNIAKOV, who told me that there was signed an order and I was

‘accepted in the 1 department of 2 cniei. jirectory as a case officer. : ; s

_ ; (who was acting as the chief of 1 Department because the chief of the

fa department KOSLOV, Anatoli, was appointed to the special department

of extraordinarily affairs {investigation} | ). SHUBNIAKOV and

mye GORBATENKO said to me that I would be working in the 1] section of

' the department, Then I.with GORBATENKO.went tothe 1 department, -.,

- Was acquainted with the chief of section KOSLOV, Veniamin. KOSLOV

- .teld me that I will be working against the American correspondents,

tae

.~ showed me room, my desk and acquainted with the officers, who were
: - working in this room: KUTIREV, RACOVSKI, GROMOV and TORMOSOV,.

The last officer must give files on. the correspondents and agents, I _ ; _

', Was said to come next day and began to work,

° --.. When Iwas resting in the tuberculous sanatorium I acquainted

see poten ot

‘with KOJ EVNIKOV, Ludmila, a student of the Moscowite University,

2 AER eesti

ve

"+ and in June 1953 we married. Before it I was living with my parents eo

at Ste Gorky, 9, but after marriage was living with the wife at —_ oy _ ce i

| son COLES :

I

Diiseltelomed Tac ernment: OL ALE Foe ee Tn eee enact le

SHUBNIAKOV invited the deputy of the chief of 1 department GORBATENKO , i . |


14-0000

3

WED Be eo tthe

wer weet h WET Ft,
’ ~

St. Serafimovich, 2 (the flat of her parents), In 1955 I received a flat
at St. Narodnya, 13, where was living with my family. ; ; ‘ ¥

In 1954 I contracted a disease (gonorrhea) and on the advice

of the friend IVANOV went to medic point at St. Negliunya. Doctors | { . ‘
‘ -* agked to show a document, I had with me only MVD certificate and an :

operative passport and showed them the passport. Doctors had- given

me a.treatment, after that twice they made tests and asked to come once 7
ar “more, ‘but I did not come, They wanted to see once more and sent a
letter to the place of work, which was written‘in the passport, The .f

Plant with MVD found out about it. The deputy of the chief, SHUBNIAKOV,

a a oot

{
t
'
!
i. ;
. was apeaking with r me, I shad written my explanation, and punished by the - | -
|
i
|
i

7 chief of the 2 directory, FEDOTOV - 15-days of arrest. The komsomol's |

organization also puniehed me, I received a strict reprimand and wae , |

ae

{reed of the head of komsomol's organization of the 2 chief director,

Iwas a member of komsomol's orgarizationfrom, October 1943.

"In the end of 1954 before leaving komsomol (because of age) the komsomol
organization of KGB took off thie strict reprimand, ‘
In 1955 on all officers of the 2 chief directory were written

; characterizations (May-June). In my characterization was written that

I. did not appropriate to the 1 department 2 chief directory. In June- . : 7 ots ce

July iv was ‘appointed to the 7. department 2 chief directory as a case

001038


14-0000

eens

. + ging -

wat

officer of 2 section,

Le Ve seen, Nw’

This section was new created (the work against

tourists), The chief of 7 department - PERFILIZV, the chief of the

2 section - GUSKOV.

4

In 1956 Iwas accepted as a candidate in the Communist Party,

senior case officer,

In 1457 Lwas accepted in the Party as a member.

| |} In Augiet 1956 my father died.

‘soon received a rank oi a senior lieutenant and got a promotion -a

In 1957 or 1958 I was promoted a deputy chief of 2 section. In

7th department Iwas working. til 1960 and in January 1960 was sent to :

work : asa deputy ‘chief of the 1 section in ‘the 1 department 2 ‘chiet

directory (chief. of the 1 department, KLIPIN, Viad,, chief of the

i section - KOVSHUX).

‘My family was consist of the wife and two daughters: Oksana,

born in 1954, and Tamara, born in 1958, Oksana wae ill (bronchial

asthma) from 1957 and almost every year till 1963 2-3 months was in

hospitals. In 1960 Iwas thinking about change (temporary) place of

Mving and there was a possibility to goto work in 2 departments. KGB

‘in Lvov and Odessa. But there was another question if I go from Moscow’

2 department, PIATROVSKI, Propos ed to. me to BO. to work i in » Ethiopia

: I would lose the flat in Moscow. At this time the. chief of the section: of:


14-0000

a
Sto op

&N
eRe dl one

i (counter -intelligence worx among Soviet specialists in Ethiopia), The — !
; : . i, ;
, chief of 2 chief directory agreed and the question was almost decided Lot To
t : n
ai . !
‘4 ‘but in the last moment the personnel department of KGB did not agree, - 1
i .

The reasone were the case of 1954 (illness and use of the passport for 3

cover) and a checking in the place of my iiving (some of agents report : :

that drink and on this base have quarrels with the wife)...

I was working in the 1 department till 1962. In January 1962 -

» .J.was appointed again in-the 7 department as the chief of the 1 section

(work. against tourists from the USA and Canada).

In December 1959 I got a rank of a captain. . a con,

When I began to wors in the 7 department I knew that soon I “ i ,

must be promoted a deputy chief of the department, when would free

a place - the deputy chief of.department BALDIN waa preparing to go

| "to work in astern Germany, : , : ; ; - ;
: ; ; ‘
In July 1962 I was appointed the deputy. chief of 7 department ; ! ,
poo : : 7 ; : a “ay
7 ' (the chief of the department was CHELNOKOV) and here 1 was working . i

till January 18, 1964.
7 During my work in MVD-KGB I did not study in any school, -

only in 1953+1954 was visiting courses of foreign languages of MVD-

.

Weer epee at 8 at Semmes ewe tie eae:

. KGBrat'St. Kiselni,

SE : : OSE

14-0000

i
.
”

' >

]
-; - Five times J was sent abroad;
} :

Nou “eh vty
Sivict oy

eport delegation; in 1958 was again in Engiand with a sport delegation;

in 1957 I wae in England with a

‘in 196) Iwas ‘sent in Bulgaria with the aim to help to } department 2

. ‘ directory MVD; in 1962 I wae in Switzerland = the conference of dis-

armament.

Working in MVD-KGB every year Ihad leaves for rest, In

; | 1953.with the wife I was resting in the tuberculous sanatorium.

I was with the family at the cottage.

the cottage.

rested in Sochi,

Kislovodsk.

Nicolaev,

In 1958 I was resting at the cottage.

In 1957 iw wae in Leningrad two weeks with the wife and then rested at .

In 1989 I with the wife”

in 1960 I was in Cuba with a delegation of specialists of nickel industry; .

In 1954
In 1955 I was resting at the cottage.

In March 1956 I was résting with the wife in Karlovi Vary, Czechoslovakia,

In January-February 1960 1 rested with the wife in

In. 1961 + August - I rested with the wife and daughters in

In October 1962 1 rested with the wife in Sochi.

‘ ' L rested with the wife and daughters in Anapa.
i

UCT Mew meenete: meat ie ener ete

In July 1963

i
3

r

soe Sadibeed

cine tee seme eeege
*

re eee terenmntiwien en eet meee ate nae etal

14-0000

’

CAR

n
OF)

IMED K

Set eeed

Spee anseieR aetna ee

" i
= “ . .
’ Ch) an
. . Me aa
' _ El -
of ERE. |.
a 3 ao
ry
.

ee

14-0000

bbe ged 8.

. :
os. Situ. Proms . +f . ;

wlan 3 Hes 4%

B.._Is the claimed KGB career of NOSENKO plausible? Inthe |
past the theory has been advanced that NOSENKO was never an officer -

in the KGB. information of a detailed nature from NOSENKO concern- : a

: ing the KGB, particularly the Second Chief Directorate, has ‘been so
extensive as to invalidate any contention that he was not a KGB officer. :
It is considered that NOSENKO was a KGB officer in the claimed. : :

Departments during the claimed periods of time and served in the claimed ,

(J)

yee

positions in’ each Department. It is interesting to'note that NOSENKO has we a oe
not materially varied in his statements in regard to the above since his’
original contact in June 1962 (with the exception of his change to 1952 aa
‘date of his entry into the KGB and then later reverting to the date given:

in 1962), There have been some variations in dates of'a minor nature, : tte

‘

i as indicated elsewhere in this summary, but these are of month or day ; ‘

mye chee i : . 4
i 3S

of transfer irom one Department to another and not considered critical’

or evidence of deception. NOSENKO has admitted previously giving false .

formation in regard to rank and medals, but his basic story concerning ~ — 7 ue
: { . . .

SECRET

Chive. 1
Eechte4 tea wraty
Coungrauiar sas

este tt ty ‘

 go0to43

RIPON TRAE SRE HEA EIN RY OH a he mn an

ees spon —o ene ee eT er petetovemans wont


14-0000

7 4
his KGB career today is not significantly different from the fragmentaryi . . : ,
version he gave in June 1962. ‘ :
Basically the following is now considered to have been the KGB i 4 ;
. career of NOSENKO: - oo . a _ , a E (
" ' Mid-March 1953 - late May 1955, First Section, . | |
“ " “ Pirst Department, SCD , =. :
-. "| Late May 1955 - December 1959.(1958 = December > - pas . -
. . ve : ve
1959 - Deputy Chief of Section) Seventh : ‘3
Department, scD o 7
“~ January 1960 - December 1961, Deputy Chief of ’ iH
oo ~ wort . Section, First Section, Firet:Department, ns ee -., 4
. ScD |
: January 1962 - July 1962, Chief of First Section, ot | . 7 :
oe . Seventh Department, SCD = ; 2 |
. : July 1962 ~ January 1964, Deputy Chief of Seventh : : 7 :
7 . Department, SCD a : | _ - Sot
(NOTE; The term. Deputy Chief is being used throughout this a 7 7
: summary, but the better terminology probably is "Deputy to Chief," =
: The position of "Deputy Chief" in United States Government parlance, :

Saree oe Ae

. 6 . ae 4
= sat ch yale eSAAE TTD ne ru RECA Nm ee
fA

14-0000

te at Pe RAE NL et Paeae teer =H

Aw ae Ve emma

in Soviet organizations and more spécilicaily in the KGB. As an example,

a Chief of Department in the KGB or the Chief of a Residentura adroad |

First Deputy. This particular deputy acts in the absence of the Chief
of Department and in genera] has supervisory functions over all the
Department sections. The exception to the latter is when the Chief of - ae . ‘

Department retains direct supervision over what hé may consider the ‘

over designated sections or organizational components. )

During current interviews and in prepared memoranda, .NOSENKO ‘ ‘

contained in separate sections of this summary.
It ie realized that GOLITSYN, although confirming that NOSE> sKO

was a KGB officer in both the First Department and Seventh Department,

circa 1958 and that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section,

First Department, in 1960, It is impossible to correlate this information

+ TR te a BNI ORAS Ad de Re RR ar

may. have 2, 3 or even 4 deputies, one of wnom is given the title of \

. most important section, Other deputies. have supervisory functions only. y

has furnished detailed information which it is considered substantiates ae

-his. claimed positions in the KGB, . Detailed remarks on these topics are

scp, has stated that NOSENKO- remained in the First Department until

' with the above indicated opinion that NOSENKO left the First Department
“in late May 1955 and was Deputy Chief of the First Section, First Depart-

- ment, in 1960, nor is an adequate explanation of these variances available

SECRET

t
1

gouLc45

Sedan Bre


14-0000

whee te Mean et

RAEN ATTEN RD Hct Tete Sed ffene +

ao

Te

2 me oe 3 ene :
antowan aetna hac ete e Loe ae are

snunel

at this time. Onthe other hand, it is not reasonable that NOSENKO
would lay claim to the title of Deputy Chief of the First Section, First
Department, if this were not true when he clearly knew of the visits of
GOLITSYN to the First Section in 1900 - 1961 and of his conferences
with officers closely associated with NOSENKO at that time.

NOSENKO has also mentioned a number of officers of the SCD
or former cificers of the SCD who transferred to the FCD with whom

he was personally acquainted and who were also known to GOLITSYN.

, A number of these officers were officers from whom GOLITSYN has

stated he obtained certain information or through whom he became aware _ : Fl

of cértain activities including Vladislav M, KOVSHUK, Gennadiy I.

GRYAZNOV, Viadimir Ivanovich PETROV, Yuriy I GU, Vladimir

A. CHURANOV, Yevgeniy GROMAKOVSKIY and Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV, :

The statement of NOSENKO that although he had heard of
GOLITSYN he had never personally met GOLITSYN, stands in conflict.
with the statements of GOLITSYN that he, GOLITSYN, had met and
talked with NOSE NKO in the SCD in the late 1950's, The description
of GOLITSY®N of this meeting is that of a casual encounter in the halls

rather than a specific office visit. In light of this, the absence of any

reason why NOSENKO from his point of view should remember such

‘an encounter and the absence of any reason for NOSENKO to lie on this |

a a Fe bey

SECRET

RRR,
Set SEES

9001046."

ARES
RN OMNSERSRGS


14-0000

issue, it is eminently reasonable to conclude that the encounter took
place but that NOSENKO simply has no recollection of it, There is :
no reason to attach signlicance to this lapse of memory.

The previous opinion that NOSENKO did not hoid the claimed
position of Deputy Chier, First Section, First Department, during 1960 - . .
; 1961 has had the most mer:t in the controversy over his statements | |
, relative to-his KGB career, This particular aspect will be covered in. 7

detail in another section, but of note at this time is the controversy
. over what duties the position of Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD, KGB,

to, entails or does not entail. It is a fruitless exercise to attempt to judge ,

whether NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 - 1961 °”

on the basis of whether his knowledge of the total activities of the Firat —
Section was commensurate with the knowledge of a Deputy Branch Chief
in CIA in regard to the activities of the entire Branch,

Whether NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief of Section in the SCD,
KGB, must be judged on the basis of what were the duties of a Deputy
Chief of Section in the SCD and in particular what were his duties in
: the particular assignment, The organizational structure oi the KGB

| may or may not have some similarities to the organizational structure

|
| ‘

of CIA, but any similarities are surely not such as to permit a judgment ; -

5

SECRET

| eee gtenatnt Seemmemenee, enter kT Fone negeee


14-0000

ceeeenyy

ST hype”
~ Vocus’, Hl

as to wnether NOSENKO held a certain claimed position on the basis
of a comparison of his activities and responsibilities. with that inherent
in a.somewhat similar position in CIA. ; :
One of the most important differences between United States
e agencies or organizations, inciuding CIA, andthe bureaucratic structure

of agencies or organizations in the USSR, including the KGB, is the !

‘salary structure. Pay of a KGB officer is-based on military rank and

tae san Ts ete

i “on actual position held with an additional percentage increase for longevity

'
'

and language qualification. ‘Actual position held is important from a

*
t
ai

‘monetary viewpoint in addition to the prestige, As an example, the

om,

; ‘! " . : difference in monthly salary between a captain and a major is twenty

rubles and the difference in salary between a Senior Case Officer and

a Deputy Chief of Section is also twenty rubles, An increase in military

rank alone has limited pay advantages, as for example a Lieutenant ‘
. ?

Colonel who is only a Senior Case Officer receives less pay tnan a major

who holds the position of Chief of Section,

i / | ' During current interviews, an eifort has been made to obtain

from NOSENKO statements concerning his responsibilities in the various

Claimed positions, The judgment on whether he held or did not hold

‘the various claimed positions, in view of the absence of any factual

~~ SECRET

s * o
TIN 058 RRO Dore ches oe amie Uy Newer tine So opie “ : 4

LNT Sats
PSS


14-0000

th ot os

‘supporting or refuting information, has necessarily been based toa

.considerabie degree on the logic of the statements made by NOSENKO.

ving the

,
A

isf

is no

Admittedly this

actory way of reso

t the most sat

' questions, but itis the oniy met

time.

15

e at thi

1
be

b

hod possi

fem semen

waATD

Fa te ettinn toe

LAREN eA OT Dy ot EERIE FEAL ALTGELD

14-0000

Me dar et ee

SECRET

“

CIVIN

NO

SE.

HAS NO.

c.

c

on

D FGR HIS D

ON I

3

7

tee . . . io Bs

. ee a

- 7 . : +
; it 5s 7
: | 4
. oad

7 ens eid POA er ON PERRIS OAL PEN


14-0000

‘ in the matter of the bona fides of NOSENXO, this category is probably

SECREL

C. Has NOSENKO given an acceptable explanation of his
motivation in contacting CLA in 1962 and for his defection in 1964? Of

the eight listed categories which are being given specific consideration

tau. 7

the most difficult in which to present a logical position with factual .
support, There are too many intangible aspects involved and although
motivation is an important factor, full resolution of the motivation .
problem is not a paramount factor in deciding whether NOSENKO is or

is not a‘dispatched agent, NOSENKO could have contacted this Agency in

of : i aa ee “ . wo oye - . et .
1962 and-defected-in 1964 without KGB knowledge and yet even at this late
date have failed to disclose some important events ofa personal nature

which actually were important ingredients in his ultimate decision.

Defectors are humans and have at least the normal reluctance to admit
7

_unfavorable information which-they consider of a personal nature.

. On 31 October 1967 NOSENKO, following.a request, furnished a.

handwritten memorandum on the topic of his motivation, a typed copy of

’. which is-attached. The memorandum, although not grammatically correct,

is quite ‘understandable and is worthy of‘review, The tenor of the memo-

randum ‘is one of increasing disillusionment with the Soviet regime.


14-0000

NOSENKO and others of his generation have lived in a Soviet society : ; ‘
throughout their entire lives. The environment is an important factor : ’
of influence in the life of an individual and true disillusionment is at

best usually a graduai process in which many factors, some recognized - .
coy

and some not’ recognized by the individual, have played a role in varying —

degrees,

re . NOSENXO, until 1955 and possibiy until the death of nis father , ‘ a
: ini August 1956, could be compared to the.profligate son of wealthy
‘parents in the United States who finally graduates from colle ge and obtains

' ~ .-employment.perhaps in the firm of his.father without actually earning any of

. the; luxuries he has enjoyed, “The father of NOSENKO was not only wealthy

by Soviet standards but also held a high government position. The

influence of his father and the name. of his father undoubtedly was an

. important if not the most-important factor in NOSENKO éven being
‘y permitted to enter the Naval RU and,the KGB even though NOSENKO is
“ particularly reluctant to admit, perhaps even to himself, .that this was:

the primary reason.

.The above should not be construed as any reflection on the

wee actual intelligence of NOSENKO, but rather as an explanation of how

““NOSENKO could have even entered the Naval RU and KGB. His

~900Les2

enema ememanpetermenemesars Rt Rese Sten teeceeen ete o

a eet evento Celt aaa fe Beant

14-0000

SECRET. —- er
performance in both prior to 1956 by his own admission was such that
he probably would have been summarily terminated if he had not been
the son of the capable,. respected Minister of Shipbuilding. —— . . 7

“ a-certain amount of speculation is permitted, the |

disillusionment of NOSENKO, who lost, many personal advantages

following the death of his father inciuding a personal automobile, may ~

i have actually started soon after the death of his father. _Taat? NOSENKO. : a

ge ee eee - . : rn)

is undisciplined is supported by his admissions relative to his life in _ , . :
+ ‘the USSR ‘and his behavior both in 1962 in Geneva and for a period of time — ;

-- after his defection in 1964. _NOSENKO was addicted:to women, ‘liquor, ‘and | . : ‘ .

; . «the material things which can be purchased with money or obtained through

.-influence. . 4
A question has been previously raised regarding his motivation - ; aan
in contacting CIA in 1962, particularly his statement that he needed money. , : ,

and would sell "two pieces of information. '' NOSENKO has stated that he ~ ue !

wanted to make a contact with the Americans, thathe vas not emotionally |

pte enay oe

ready to defect, but that he subconsciously believed that if he made a . Oo : :
. contact he would be making an ultimate commitment from which he could oo, :

'no.longer retreat.

RAIS LONER D AAA ARIMA AL ane RS RAE EDN ma Tk

ee a Nas cere Nreeneneane ner 2cee Gaerne tt


14-0000

oe SECRET 7 _ 7 Jot

NOSENKO has stated that he gave considerabie thought to the

best way to contact the Americans 60 that he would be believed and not

rejected and came to the conclusion that he would offer to sell some. . a ] ; :
“information. NOSENKO stated that he thought if he approached the —— a
Americans stating he was a "KGB counter intelligence officer who wanted - . .
to give information, "he would not have been believed and would have

‘ been peremptorily rejected. NOSENKO stated he had difficulty deciding : . : ; “

, = how much money to ask for and now to make the approach, but finally

decided to do it tnrough( iil AGRI whom the KGB considered was with
American Intelligence. .

» | The above statements by NOSENKO are not in conflict with the ge ts

record, . NOSENKO did offer to sell “two pieces-of information, " almost
immediately gave more information, made no significant demands for ; t
money, and in fact his price for "two pieces of information" was
ridiculously low by American standards. NOSENKO has during current
: interviews stated, as he first. stated in 1962, that he had spent excessive
i 7 amounts of money’ in one or two riotous evenings. However, NOSENKO

has during current interviews stated that he could have covered his ‘

expenditures 1 by other means without z receiving any money from the : poo os .
ka a aa Sy | Pe

Americans,

EEDA Ee, PER ne ncaa ney, Heratlitede sede dete

_SoReT

aj tnabiaremeetone TS ee trae neat ene etc ane oF LP MER EET SHEA MAST

14-0000

eee eerie . ..
nee treme anne ee ee ee on nen

ASR
TOE SER SSN CNSR

- SECRET

NOSENKO has ptated that the night before bio departure from

Geneva to the USSR he gave serious thought to defection but wae not

_ emotionally adapted to defect at'that time. Following his raturn to tha

Soviet Union, NOSENKO, during a@ period of time, made his flaal
decision to defect-at the first opportunity, renlining that it meant
leaving bis wife, children, snd othor members of hig far.ily in the
USSR.

Some aspects of the motivation of NOSENKO are obscure and

will probably so remsin. It would be preferable Lf an exact datailed

- ghronology of all the factore involved could be prepared or if even

cortsin obvious factors could be accurately delineated. These are both

impossible at this time and Probably at. any: time {a the fatare, What

is. important at thie | time ie a decision ee to whether the motivation of

NOSENKO was Lesed on personal reasons with no implications of KGB

dispatch. It lo considered that the explanation of NOSENK® concerning

his motivation ia acceptable and thet hie statement that no one except

_ the Americans was aware of his contacts with the Americana tn 1962

ox hts intent to defect in 1964 te supported by other information of a

collateral nature. (See Section I, H.)

‘Attachment:
Typed cpy} Memo from NOSENKO -

ee


14-0000

Operational Memo # N-4

'
’ 4

: _ The following is a typed copy of a handwritten memorandum
a . + furnished by Subject on 1 November 1967, following a request on
: 31 Octover 1967: . ;

I. ‘What were the motif and the reasons which have led me to
the decision to breake with the Soviet Russia? The only definite is an
understanding of the situation in the Soviet Russia, the knowledge of

the methods.of the communist regime, the knowledge.of the real foreign

and interior policies of the Soviet government and the faith in the right+ -

nese of the free world,

It waa not a decision which was accepted or could be accepted :
4 , in a month or a year. This decision was slowly growing inme, 1 |
a think that the beginning was in the studentship.
Living with my parents.and being in the circles of the parent's.
; and my acquaintances I knew more then there was written in newspapers
and periodics and that was propagandized by radio and TV, Working in

i . the Far East and later being in trips in different regione and cities of

ih 7 Russia I found out much better the life and conditions of the life of the

~ people of the Soviet Russia.

24 . . me - coetsded trea astenalic
i - . - “{ & preeting and
21 gy eesti Tae sat Sent enn tee stan meee = Maetenettiontton

cor MRSrgeT rere :
au 1 . “ . . i, : aa WERE END
Ne - . wes pote . .

SUBJECT: NOSENKO, Yuri Ivanovich i

=

seeded eater

wae weet

a


14-0000

-” When I worked 11 years in MVD-KGB i understood and found |

out very many things, detaile and the real deal of the existing regime,

about methods of the work of MGB-MVD-KGB and about their doings, | , st 7 7 :
about hundreds of thousands of the people of Russia who were (and .
still are) considered "politically" dangerous and around whom was
{and still is) going an active work of all organs KGB.

At the same time when I was several times abroad I have , . _ :

seen personally the so-called "decay" at the Weet. “Lhave seen in *

reality how is living people.

weet

Several times when I was abroad I was thinking about staying’

', at the West and not returning in Rugsia, but only one thing was keeping

"ome «= my family.

In 1962 in Switzerland I made the acquaintance with the

‘ . '. Americans, From my part "the sell of the information" was a real-
show, Iwas thinking that they would not beiieve me otherwise, In
that period of the time there was going a big struggle in me to stay.

; | _ abroad ‘or to return home till the last days of living in Geneva and even : : - 7
when I was returning home in Vienna.

4
!
|
|
| mc In 1962-1963 I decided definitely that I did not want and could
| not live more in the Soviet Russia, In this period of time I have done.
|

all my best to go as soon as possible abroad, . . a . cle wee

ate ee 2 re

SECRET.

a - -

yee 8 AEN Be ee Past a tert rhe

aR
SEY

14-0000

VeVi:

on

it was very difficult

his decision,

It waa not easy to make t

I do not regret,

ine

ite of everyth

an 8

And now

etry

a


14-0000

t
t

I8 THE INFORMATION FURNISHED

D

CONCERNING KGB OP

‘3

\ND ORGANIZATION 2

uy

LY COMMEN

SCNAB

SA

_WITH_HIS CLAIMED KGB CAREER?

Sika ety

ines

why

SENET EN!


14-0000

H

)
ive)
m
Cc?
Pa
’ Coal

. ; an ' -D. Is the information furnished by NOSENKO to CIA concerning
. “KGB operations, personalities, and organization reasonably commen-

surate with-his claimed KGB career? The conclusion is that the infor-
mation furnished by NOSENKO concerning KGB operations, personalities,

Boe _ * . and organization is more than reasonably commensurate with nis claimed

-ss 2 * Career in the KGB from mid-March 1953 to his: defection in early February

yh. 1964,

.~. Ly reaching the above conclusion, consideration has been given

oe to his. claimed. departmental assignments and claimed positions in each

: department, Certain allowance has been made ‘for faulty memory with

consideration being given to whether there is any indication of deception

or whether the failure to recall a particular item of interest can logicaliy
, a : 5

be attributed to the vagaries of the human mind, There is, of course, no

-'. ‘ae€curate atdndard of measurement which would permit a positive deter-

iv. + mination as to whether inability to recall certain details or events is

a actually due to the fact that the human mind cannot recall all past events

‘ ’

oF. could be attributed to willful deception.

Cas? 4

Gem astomitic
BaaGag 194.
ecassitvestiaa

14-0000

fw WO bem ay
,

«

An effort has been made to determine if there are any particular

patterns or areas where NOSENKO has indicated he did not recall
: _ specific matters or certain details, and’no pattern or specific areas
oo have been noted. NOSENKO, in fact, ‘has an unusually good memory
: , as evidenced by the extensive information furnished by NOSENKO purely : ; ”
from recollection, In addition, there has been no material reluctance |
on the part of NOSENKO to discuss his entire life, KGB officers he has

known, KGB organization and procedures, or other topics of interest. : . :

NOSENKO has furnished considerable detail concerning KGB : , :

ce er

the

poo officers whom he has known at various periods in his entire KGB career,

; He. has been very consistent in information furnished and has frequently
poof added certain details which he recalled ata later date, mo ce
’ Certain remarks will be made in another section in regard to
the volume and scope of information furnished by NOSENKO. This in-
formation is not selective, but isan excellent indicator that NOSENKO
was assigned to the First Department-and Seventh Department, SCD, \
during the claimed periods of time and held the claimed positions. Con-
sideration has been given to his various claimed KGB assignments in

evaluating the information furnished in an effort to assess whether-his

i ' indicated knowledge was commensurate with his claimed position during

re : .

a0). GOULCEL

J casei dlascuits pettiminnermes were) Ho an ema abeet atan inner des cence me


14-0000

~

a particular period of time or suggested the possibility that he did not
occupy the. position which he claimed to have held.

It is considered that information furnished by NOSENKXO supports |

‘his claimed positions in the SCD. It has not been possible to substantially

confirm through collateral sources that NOSENKO served in his claimed

positions. ' Neither has it been possible to obtain from other sources an

applicable.description of the duties or responsibilities of an individual

, holding any of the positions NOSENKO claimed to have held after 1958. It

is felt there: can be no question that NOSENKO served in the capacities of

junior case officer, case officer, and senior case officer during 1953 - 1957.

As regards the duties and responsibilities of a Deputy Chief of Section,

Chief of Section, ‘and Deputy Chief of Department, and whether NOSENKO.
held ‘these various claimed positions, a considerable amount of personal
judgment has been necessary. This personal judgment has been made in

as judicial a manner as possible, with full knowledge that any opinion in

' regard tothe above is largely dependent upon information from NOSENKO.

_| || .NOSENKO has compiled detailed diagramé of the actial officés

he claims to have occupied and surrounding offices curing the four pri-

" mary periods of time: 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961, and 1962 -

He has prepared specific memoranda concerning his co-officers

- 0001CE2


14-0000

tbe alae

EB eee

and other personnel, and changes of personnel, as well as diagrams

of the offices of the Chief and Deputy Chiefs of the SCD during 1956 - : : : i
1964, This material is internally consistent. Furthermore NOSENKO

Pee ee

could not possibly have known that this detailed information could not

we immediately be checked for accuracy,- at least in. part, with a source : . ;
or another officer who has defected since mid-1964. If these diagrams .~ _ -
. and memoranda were not relatively correct, NOSENKO, who is quite
astute in matters of counterinteNigence, would hardly have voluntarily
prepared the material in such detail. This type of information is
peculiarly adaptable for analysie by a knowledgeable source or by another
: defector ‘and could, if not relatively correct, permit a ‘rather positive cone ; ao a - 4
clusion that NOSENKO was lying or fabricating ‘information.
NOSENKO has furnished quite specific information on KGB
operations during the 1953 - 1955, 1955 - 1959, 1960 - 1961,, and 1962 -
1963 periods of time. As might be expected, his specific knowledge is
jess.éor the 1953 - 1955 period; but his own personal situation and attitude: ve
until 1955 - 1956, which are mentioned elsewhere, should be given
consideration. In any event, he has furnished adequate information so
‘that his claimed assignment during 1953 - 1955 is considered suificiently

substantiated even though his actual job periormance. undoubtedly SO ES

oa deserved a low rating. ; os ; mo, OO
rn §CO0LEES

edat

SECRET

anne wee ns ann nent en Ce pais meena 2 oo Se ee teeter ser ee poe ee


14-0000

The knowledge of NOSENKO- concerning cases, KGB operations, oo :  &£
and other officers can consistently be related to his claimed department a . oo

- and position assignment during the 1953 to January 1964 period. The Ct a mo, :

scope of his knowledge ‘of his own department when considered in toto a a,

is broader after 1957 than before, which is compatible with his claim of

‘increased responsibilities. His knowledge of the work of other departments = ° .

of.the SCD {from the late 1950's on is also more-extensive, which is also a.

: further indication that NOSENKO actually held the claimed positions

during this pericd of time.

i
a

eRe ce SE


14-0000

\

ty

TION

LATE

CAN THE INFORN

IN MATERIAL DAD

SAS

AND/ORE

THE XGB

AGE ZO

ra
a

v

ORMATION FURNISHED 3

=
z

-
a

HE IN

SIGNIFICAN

BE

~


14-0000

» cea teoriteenetanemrnen mame 1B moe ars mere ete Shen yen TMS St emt OT

. x
3
mo - oad
r
was eee : . x
- . ~ . . te a t
. eee ie : J o8
: 4
. yok
saat We . .
- . . : i
?
: cman . ae
W¥ NOSENND Ut eo, 5
: . ;
- - +
?
Western invellivence? The conclusion iz ‘ .
Guestions is allirrmative, even ougn tt te Toulined Tout. : a,
. * , . *
= - —_ : =a a ote Po ke a fo ane ee ee . . \ ve 7
ww tee XGB and ullimate Gonciit to Weston Intelligence eve boc sacly .
of an intangible navure anc wweESUTGMEN ;

VOUT SS

mercer t acd > Boe Tm me eyrtows Se peceente Tote : uy , vob
tg current and previous interviews. Aw accusats total : : :

s is not possibie at this time aud would at vest

ute, Tae actual sizaidicance of wick would ce

Pracucally every interview wits NCSENMS, even ac ore - : . ”
joa ee : ? .
information of courievinielligence interest aud itis expecied cic this . '
Te ee cee en ee a re a ne
production cen continue for a considevcole peviod cf time. This should. : _
rm ee — . , Sone
OD °

mov be construed as an indication taat NOSENKO is intentonally w

molding information, Sut rather that stiinulicvion of bis memozy

normal questions axe discussions has been and can continue to be : : : -

productive,

i

a,

Cn
ey"

8
i

14-0000

. .
~

NOSENAO Las farniened ins ote Concerning

AGB ollice pues Gf Gveretive coniacts

Fallve Coinaets Gre useu wo reler to Soviet nationals) '

Olicers betweea the SCO and SCD. in ucdition, numerous ollicers

: . ste sh +
~The . ‘ - : : . : > : ‘ t
of the SCD and other internal KG3 organizations travel abroad with

delegations, tourist grouys, anc as visitors to various major exhisitions
such as Wor.d's Fairs. itis imposoisie at this time to estimate the

numbers of AGS officers iéentizied by NOSENXO who have deen outsiée

the Soviet Bloc since his defection or who will be out sometime in th

ae

There has ceern very ittie atiempted exploitation of informeiion

cannot be estimated nor can the potential Camage to the KGB be esti-

Disclosure of

j
:
!

be a necessary part of any dispatch of a AGB agent or officer to the

West either ior purposes of contact with Western Intelligence for a

o001C67

| caee

14.90000

a

ne et wets oe

Lirnitea pesion of time ur fos tue L..cl., of the incivicual in a delectus
hae Tt aye we Sgt eet itn. Nd ates "Sa eee «, ue ee -
status, however, iGestuli.wue ue. AGG O.r.cers or ugents to West

intelligence is nectaskrly &@ wutier of concesan io the AGG as.

vs.

posure of the icentities of approximcier,[2, vod

bs

‘nuncred|SGE agents could noi ve considered of negligible importance.

Obtaining specific information in regacd to KGB oflicers o:
KGB assets.is important to Uniied S:ates inelligence anc a consicer-
abie arnount of manpower and money is spent on this activity. Even

ging that it is much more Giliicuit for CLA to obtain this type

oi information about the AGB, which oncrates in a closed soc

itis for the KGB to ootain the icentity of CLA

Goubiiul any reacer of this summary would co

- wy

cation of} 2; GoO|CLA empioyees anc

everal Tuncred|agent assets to

sale
Gaal.

the KGB would be any iess than a very serious compromise of value
information,

Prior to the deiection of NOSENXO, little was known of the

organization of the SCD or other

sternal AGS organizations, The

iniormation provided by NOSENKO concerning both has been deviled

and extensive, That this information is of vaiue to the United Siates

Intelligence community is hardly subject to dispute, although analysis

3 ; c001C68

SECRET

me me ee ke ee see

Seeks

ARES
SESS
TAD

MAINTE
SS Sa

PONY
HEETT TO at RRS
RAVAN SER NER BREE HRM

+
wy
.

ay
SASH

inthe

_—-

é
be
eR ee 5 Seen Teng


14-0000

to ihe value of this

can Giiier as to the weignt which should

type of information, — ; . : cor

NOSENXO has furnished iniozmation concerz.ing SCD, «G3,

yvecruitments of United States citizens and

sy,

oreign nationais covering

the period of 1953 through 1963. This should not de interpreted as a

formation in regard to all

statement that NOSENKO has furnished ¢
rn coe SCD recruitments, even of Americans, Gurizig this period. His infor-
“mation based on personal knowledge is in peneral limited to the First

Department and Seventh Department. He hag furnished information ; _

" -concerning cases of several other Gepartments in the SCD and some

¢ . a

FCD-cases, but this information was in generai acquired indirectly

from social or business conversations with other KGB oificers.

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a number of . | : -

ose! >

cases which weré previousiy known to United States intelligence, Wail
° . > : : : : eos
the value of such information cannot be considered high, the additional
- detaiis which NOSENKO has provided in a number of cases cannot be , . .

' |. dismissed as being of no value to Western Inteliigence, even if the

‘|. information cannot be regarded as damaging to the KGB, Furthermore,

‘inasmuch as there is no reason to question his sourcing of infjormatioa a _

already known, there is no basis for suspicion of NOSENKO for his so, ale”

‘ ant

having. provided such information. .

,

_ oo0need

heeeaeihatiiednienereentbaiiieie ct RIE Lo Page PH Ta eT ie Be a

iS
y
SOREN UR

tah


14-0000

.

. NCOSE240 has furnished informa:ion in regard to a number of
, o

recruitments by the KGB oi nor-Bicc nationals who weve. known by a)

iad
bs

Wester tellivence to be pro-Coramunisi or even connected with

Communist Organizations. The identification as a recruited 4KG3
agent of an individual previous.y ‘known to be pro-Commiunist is of
considerable value to Western intelligence and may be considered to
a . have resulted in some damage io the FOB. Admittedly, she potential
to the KGB of an agent who is known as pro-Communist is less than
- that of a “politically clean" individuzi, However, 'pro-Communist"

or even "Communist" are not synonymous with "recruited KGB agent."

‘ "" * NOSENKO has furnished additional information on cases in

which there was some previous but limitee information. In a number

of these instances the additional information from NOSENKO has per- wa
mitted identification of the individuals oi interest and the closing of an o-

° nea
"Unimown Subject" case, In such instances the information from

' So NOSENKO must be considered valuable to Western Intelligence since

the incomplete information known previously would in many cases not

have permitted ultimate identification of the individual of interest.

: . This category of cases must be considered as having: resulted in damage
. _ - . . . t
to the KGB and in benefit to Western Intelligence, ; , - oe ‘ i

asa

enn cence en ee

eS E DoT
seston anes maps SECRET .
3 asain eA rman aise aE eae CEN Ite neh ie vee ;

Fee A eee


14-0000

i * -. fat sof s : : : + ra
jn. NOSENKO has furnished iutosr.ition in regard to &@ umber of

. individuals, both American anc non-bloc foreign, who were recruited

e¢ AGB anc concer:

3+

NOSENKO, particularly in the touriet cziégory, would sreuicly never

have actually materialized as procuctive KG
. v

AT

for various reasons including la

_', graphical inaccessibility to th

@
2
€)
tu
°
i)
ns
©
et
ise
re
&
3

g either ot the time

of SCD recruitment or later in a position to furnish. injormation o-
mo . *

Av,

“| interest to the KGB. inthis regard, NCSENKO has steic

.,wntil 1962 there was a definite. tencency in the Seventh Desa

make a "recruitment" as a siatistic for the end-of-year report even

though it was apparent th

it was-highly unlikely there wouid De a potential in the futere.

“NOSENKO has furnished information on or leads to a mumoser of

cases, primarily third nationais but some American, in which be hes

ossible after acditional research anc investigation, Until an icenti-

: ideation is made, the value of any particular lead to. Western invelli-
fr ‘ we : .

es tay

gence cannot be estimated, but that there may be a potential value

gouEc74

Abe ane tant alee


14-0000

cannot be ignoreé, As an exarple oft

furnished a lead, stihl uncer invesiigziion, t

probably not an American, who in 1962 was ina positica to remove

the "NATO Emergency Codes," ccliver the codes to ine AGS ior

is

@, anc then

- agent is as yetunideniificd, his current access to i
eR oS re

' the security of the United States cannot be sauged,

aa

'... Inali, the information irom: NOSENXO in the category of cases
where ‘Western Intelligence dic not previously have signizicant. intor-

" ,mation must be considered on balance as having resulted ix material

_-. 1 damage to the: KGB and of signi

cant Seneiit to Western intelligence.

Quantity alone of Cl or Fi information ivom a KGS defector is

not a siancard on which to juage vona ices, The question is whether

sormaiion is reasonably comyr

tlie amount-of his 4

.; Claimed positions.in the KGB. This question es regards NOSENKS
top has-been examined, with aifirmeative ndings, in another section of
v ie o -
. 7 oe

.. ‘ this paper,

1 wo me

A few examples from the above cited categories oi injoxrmation

“ifaarnished by NOSENKC are listed below. These cases arc siven as

illustrations and are not necessarily listed in order of importance,

]


14-0000

Tle Chou uw RGovert Lee JGHIION ane uu velo 6 ce Ge :
Jamies Alen MINT ADS NGAUGE eve Seen COvesue an the 0 juee ;
SU ary. Th ca OU Cute erece ECE VA VGSEG AE on
of @ leaG iroc, NOSENIO wh BOS 1G Sesto OF DOLINS ON,
. A
Another American caod is That ol Puech HOWARD, ven] 06, bg
employee who spent consicezazie time inthe Us in 1962 ~ 2953,
ota
NOS) tay heed Tecsu.ied 2 .
.. . : Na
the First Section, ;
thar[ HOWARD furnish nis! “* 9 tne XCB.
interviewed in 1964, OWwARD cic NOt ECAIT Ne had Veen cecsu.icd,
” !
but suspicion o:[ MUBCICY RD]was Oreas ENOUGH So inet Lie Conccet With :
SiA\was not renewed. bb a “Rs oo
lo €etermine how much
(Son as Dh wile in the :
Siaies Fimbassy. There is guu
recruited, it was he wno was * :
ma CLA Was atierazting to
‘ H
establish contact using
NOSENKO in 1964 ormation in regaré toa "ZHARI" :
(apparentiy a KGB code name, |

‘ _ Ofparr. , oo
: youl .

iO/SR | |


14-0000

eee nen ecieniemenntinenneamnimahaaementeeiemmnadatemmbiiemnatea sen. an pos-sanas_nntnnuncse munerenanmaanemmemnenmanidnumnmmmnuaniiieatt

a. my fare

ae Cb

mame). He tdentified "ZHARI" (phonetic) ae an American code clerk
who defected to the USSR tn 1961. An internal assumptlon was made
Baced om the original lead tofermation from NOSENKO that "ZHARI"
was Victor Norris HAMILTON, aka Fev-t hiltrt HINDALY, a former
NSA employee who defected to the USSR In 1962, and the information
from NOSENKO waa nover disseminated or investigated,
Prior to the surfectng of John Discoe SMITH by the Sovicts
fn the fail of 1967, Ect ames information concersing KGB knowledge
of American code clorks was being investigated; and John Discoe
SMITH was a loading suspect, After the curfacing of SMITH by the ; e
Soviets, it became eppzrept that SMITH, rather than HAMILTON, was
identical to "ZHARI,” Investigation disclosed that no definite informa-
tlen could be established {n regard to the actual whereabouts of SMITH
after circa mid-1960. It cannot be positively etated that appropriate
tavestigzetion tn 1964 of tha "ZHARI" lead would have led to the identi
fleation of Joha Discos SMITH as "ZHARI," However, such (dontifi-
cation would bave been of considerable interest to the Departinsnt of
Stete amd CLA, and could wery well bave permitted certain action which i
would bave at least lessened the propaginda effect. of the surprise

aanourcement by the Soviets in the fall of 1967.

i

NOSENKO, in June 1962, furnished trformation from which
William VASSALL could be quickly identified. GCLITSYN, tn late
1960 + carly 1961, bed furnished information concerning a Soviet pens-

tration of the British Government on the basle of, which the British
Wuu Kote

9
SPOKE

Stead. EUR alte


14-0000

i

Servicos had compiled a llet at twenty suspects, including VASSALL,

. Even though it may be presumed that Investigation of the twenty suspecta

would ultimately have resulted in a determination that VASSALL wag
the agent on whom GOLITSYN had furnished certain information, the
information from NOSCNKO tn June 1962 resulted in the carlier termi-
nation by the British Services of s still valuable productive KGB agent.

Although not the case cf a KGB agent, the matter of tha micro-
phones tin the United States Embassy should also bo mentioned.
GOLITSYN, following his defection in Cecernber 1961, furnished
certain information in regard to microphones inthe United States
Embassy (Chancery). Since in fact the microphones we.s connected
to coutral cables, location of ona microphone would logically have led
to the exposure of the entire set of inicrophones. However, appro-
priate action wae not taxon on this information and the KGB would have
been aware Sh2t no action was taken prior to Juns 1962 when NCSENKS
firet contacted CIA.

Lf NOSENKO® ts 2 diepatebed KGB agent, it is not clear why the

e

KGB would attract spscific attention to a system of microphones which
cust have etill had some value ae of June 1962. A preeumption may
be made that, if NOSENKO was a dispatched agent, the KGB had, as of
1962, an advanced system of monitoring davices which rendered the
above microphone system obsolete. However, no concrete evidence
of such an advanced system is available and it should be noted that it
aa GOULC75
SEGiNE

we tmeereeren ageing es ne ng Samer ReNEr: Seearereeave teat a tonsa EEO 0

|
i
i
[
i
{


14-0000 :

~\ ; '

WAS Lot uniu. circa April iGo, tact aay elect ve aClicd Wao acs io

A iew genera, . (eGnte ince

nisheeé by NOSZNKO wae be nopie”

arés leads furnience Sy NOSL. oo

oi these leaés have Geen meniioned Lac Devious Sur

>

interviews with NOSENKO have resuhecs in apor

mew Amervican icads which ave being exarsince by ' ‘
Ww, I Se e
. ‘ } fd
view : , :
number of casts previously m ; :
a ; Hl
ucGitional Ceveropment Of tucoe cases '
: |
NOSENKO was provided lcids te ove . :
i :
agenis, Geogrepvhicaily theese ieics ace wice in scoge, inciucing ‘ :
. t
: Pre . ~ oe : soe . ~ we - 1 +
niticnais of such courtries as indonesia, Ausivid, Ureguay, the Unied : ;
. . . . 1
!

Mungcom, France, West

Swecen, Australic, o2;
Mexico, ita

included in the more itsyortant of these ager. “tor other leads

s

are leads to high ieveis of government and intelligence to code clerks, . :

to access agents for Armerxicin targets, to actual or possible illegal

a - a 0001076

11
! i
it 1
i SCAT TS ‘
: !
. elbini ;
' {
* ’
eye Ft = wt cede ‘ H
: |
!

a


14-0000

PaeeG LSS Loew Cor seebusnenio, regres

Bae ae eT tee ea Le TOU ee
> .

erates G2 .Gose

Ae SUPATAE LY Of Lae DOS Le cee Eee Ser

woe : ew oe eget tee
es -- ey eres *Glen mlecliee
esas ee Vet Y A Sasst BUT Cign Te Xe

im
ie
ra]
<
v
ss
be
gt
G
ty
we
ra
:
a
Q
w
°
Ly
o
in
wh
HY
fon
G
v
e
ts
ta

in Moscow, inchiding actual AGS cluscesine cocess inte certain Western

bee ye

wmoasSies pout not the

NOSZNAO has a1s0 fucnlencc leads 1a Costain FOS

cant value to Western Inteligesce one Game:

Talis evan

Asa final note, the implicc conclusion in the previous summary
3s accepted that the failure of NOSZNKD to provide usable positive -

, | . | 000/07THa-

4

!


14-0000

any

A
ss
“Ad
co

inteliigenco information is wot a significant factor in a daterminatizn

- of bis bona fides. The qualification should, however, be added that

it ts not felt that NOSICNKO has, as of this tima, been fully debrisfed

fa many areas of positive intelligence interest.

13 600141077

SECRET


14-0000

~
F, IS THERE 2VIDENCI OF NIL DECEPTION OX "OLIVE ANALY?
IN INFORMATION FURNIEE DD BY NOSINEMO WHICH
WOULD WARRANT A CONCLUSION THAT NOSENZO
WAS DISPATC
. . . :
: . r . . .

a
-
20
a
~

ses A mire te * wh mate mem


14-0000

—

F. Is there evidence of KGB deception or "give away" in
inforrnation furnished by NOSENKO which would warrant a conclusion
that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB? The conclusion in this
summary is that NOSENKO was not dispatched by the KGh,. in

reaching this conclusion, a full examination of the above «,..: siion has

been both a necessary and integral part,

It is inherent that the volume of information furnished by
NOSENKO is only one of the factors which should be given consideration
in arriving ata conclusion that NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by
the KGB. If NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, the KGB would have
surely deen willing to sacrifice certain information of value to the KGB
in order te support the bona fides of NOSENKO. However, if NOSENKO
was dispatched, it must have been to accomplish or further a KGB
purpose or mission, the nature of which has been and continues to be
unknown,

An examination of the circumstances under which NOSENKG first
contacted CLA in Geneva in 1962 and his behavior during thése contacts is
particularly pertinent since during this period of time NOSENKO would
have surely been under direct KGB control if there are any implications

of KGB dispatch in the NOSENKO case.

SECRET GOOL079

wd

nn...” een

14-0000

emeees.

cee grantee taee Bester noe

NOSENKO has stated that his original approach to ''sell two

pieces of information" was his own idea as to what was most lixely to

“pe successful. NOSENKO has stated that he wanted to make a contact

with the Americans, was not psychologically adapted to defect at the
time, and felt that if he merely stated that he was a "KGB counter-
intelligence ofiicer who wanted to give information," he very possibly
would be rejected, It should be noted that NOSENKO even during his
first contact did not limit his remarks to the "two pieces of information"
and began to talk quite freely on other matters.

If NOSENKO was dispatched, it is felt that he, during his 1962
contacts, would have been very carefully briefed and that his remarks
or statements would have not been of a nature which could cause any
suspicion in regard to the bona fides of NOSENKO. Instead, a current
review of his statements and remarks during his five contacts in 1962
indicate that his many errors, exaggerations, and actual lies were quite*
likely typical of a braggadocio element in the personality of NOSENKO
and may also have been evidence supporting the statement by NOSENKO
that he usually had a few drinks of liquor before each contact in

Geneva,

0001080

SECRET

i
A
ul

4


14-0000

a

CTA ie

eee alan j

NOSENO, during his five contacts in Geneva, made many
statements which in retrospect were impossiole, and the investigation
of which could only have raised certain questions con 2rning NOSENKO.
The following is a list of the more obvious areas in which NOSENKO
made gross cxaggerations or mace incorrect or impossible statements.

(a) NOSENKO claimed he personally was with

Oleg M. GRIBANOV, Chief of the SCD, during the

recruitment pitch to[Tames sfUasnzad (This was

a lie and an interview with BronBzndwita display -

of photograph would have disclosed that NOSENKO

did not participate. )

(b) NOSENKO was involved in the recruitment
, approach to Russell LANGELLE. (This was a lie and

LANGELLE was available for interview. )} ps

(c) NOSENKO said he recruited |LUNT (Horace

LUNT)lin Bulgaria. (Actuaily NOSENKO never met

Eon)
%

c001Cs1

. my . ee ee en err es FO aeyee

(BR

14-0000

(d) NOSENKO claimed personal contact with] Edmund O6
STEVENS |who, according to NOSENKO, had been recruited
by the KGB. (NOSZNKO actually had never personatiy met
(Stevens) and only had seen[STEVENS|once ata distance. }
(e) NOSENKO dated the recruitment of "“ANDREY"
in Moscow as 1949-1950. At ithe same time he furnished
information that "ANDREY" (who is considered identical to
\ Dayle Wallis SMITH) was in Moscow during a part of the time
that Roy RHODES, also a recruited agent, was assigned to
Moscow, 1951-1953. “ANDREY" (SMITH) was actually in
Moscow 1952-1954.
f) NOSENKO said he, GRIBANOV, and another officer
met Edward Ellis SMITH. (NOSENKO has since stated he did
not meet SMITH and that his only role was obtaining a ioreiga
typewriter and paper for a KGB agent involved in the SMITH
operation. )
(g) NOSENXO in a number of instances spoke in the
first person, saying We did this," or "We did that," in

reference to a particular KGB activity in which he now admits

~~:

G061082

3/&R

Sk

ad

14-0000

oe BMS TE
tye

he was not involved but had some knowledge. (Lf

NOSENXO was under KGB control in 1962, both he

and the xGB should have known that these indicated

exaggerations would eventually lead to a question

concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO. )}

In 1562-1963 a number of similarities were noted between
information furnished by NOSENKO and information which had been
furnished by GOLITSYN prior to June 1962. These similarities were
quite striking and gave riseto certain suspicions of NOSENKO because
he provided information which the KGB would presumably have considered
already compromised as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN. Certain
of the similarities at the time could only be explained in terms of
NOSENKO being a dispatched agent, The following are some examples of
the similarities noted.

(a) Both furnished information in regard to
[Johan PREISFREUND} O6
(b) Both iurnished information in regard toa
[Fnilitary code clerk case (James STORSBERG}, 0%, OG
(c) Both furnished information in regard toa
trip of Vladislav KOVSHUK, under an as sumed name, c

to the United States. (GOLITSYN was sure it was

connected with a reactivation of an agent formerly in

a ; (G009LBS

, ee

mesa ree ee cen ne senemeatttatnn oo «


14-0000

_ . ery

Moscow, or a recruitment of an American formerly
with the United States Embassy in Moscow; and NOSENKO
related it directly to the "ANDREY" case, giving the
assumed name which KOVSHUX used. )
(4) Both furnished information in regard to
microphones in the United States Embassy in Moscow.
(e) Both furnished information in regard to
Eenle STEVENS|andfisaac pont Snarnd
The above list is not complete nor does it indicate the acmal :
differences in the amount of information furnished on any particalar
topic by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO. To cite the above in detail in this
summary ia believed unnecessary since the only point of real interest
is whether the fact that NOSENKO was aware of certain events, cases, 7
ov situations of which GOLITSYN was also aware raises a legitimate
question concerning the bona fides of NOSENKO.
The above area of concern has been thoroughly examined and
it is considered that the fact that NOSENKO furnished some information
on certain cases or situations previously mentioned in lesser or

greater detail by GOLITSYN cannot logically be construed as evidence Zz

g001084

”
me
o>
pas)
rv}
|
aed

5 2
AR Me ecm mee Pee ae IR Sb 8 TN PSO rahe RA ot

° 7 ZIG a

14-0000

ite. +
i
i
<
a

i
~‘ wr j 4
, reed he t~ a
Wai iis ; oa 4

‘that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB. NOSENKO has during
current interviews satisiactorily sourced his information in alm: st oe, 3
every instance. Ina few instances he has said ne did not recall -
how he learned of a particular piece of information but these -
apparent lapses of memory were not large in number and are
considered to be in no way suspicious. j

The general area in which there was a similarity between
information furnished by GOLITSYN in late 1961 - early.1962 and
information furnished by NOSENKO in June 1962 and which would have
been the most significant insofar as the security of the United States
Government was or is concerned related to certain activities centering
around or in the First Department, SCD.
. It is the conclusion of this summary that NOSENKO was an

officer of the First Section, First Department, SCD, during 1953-1955
, and was Deputy Chief of the same section in 1960 - 1961, Therefore,
the fact that NOSENKO furnished information concerning certain cases
or situations in the First Department and the fact that GOLITSYN
furnished information concerning the same case or situation ia not

unusual or necessarily suspicious. NOSENKO has stated that GOLITSYN

gous

eteeinneanemm cmeeNC RE oe eee NS re a

‘Sicebi a i ati ede EWR EIS BSS SDLP 8 Sac i Sedge sete oe He neeneeee


14-0000

a,

ivet Sectios

KNEW 2260 Was in coniact wah Giuner alcers OF Une F

GOLITSS

furnisneé by GOLITSYN and NOSENMNO on

ctorly correlate Cevinh, information from GOLITSYN

mat lomo:

ne, ars cao anes Paes
702 - 163 OF the previous

with information from NOSENXO.

summary refer to iniormation from GOLITSYN whics is charccterizcc

as “Ivformation about AGB Operations Against Zmbassy Code Clerks in

meres

al Ape :
GOLITSYN sosca

on remarks by Geanadiy ivanovica GCRAYAZNOV a

KOSOLAPOV of the First Section, First Departin

Scction, First Department, SCD, durin

: : - +

responsibility was wor agains coce clerks at the United Siates Emcessy

m Moscow, and that both KOSOLAPOY and GRYAZNOV were enz

pee

the’ same work anc under his supervision. Tne statement by GOLITSYN

To en i re ae gate et DceROe OE RETR Re eta ee


14-0000

that NOSENKO was not Deputy Chief of the First Section in 1960 has
been noted and commented on in another section of this summary,

GOLITSYWN has furnished certain information which he re-
ceived from officers of the First Section, rirst Department, SCD. t
In each instance where this information, which was fragmentary, couid
not be immediately correlated with information from NOSENKO, it was
previously considered to be evidential of deception or lying on the part
of NOSENKO, This position, however, failed to allow for the possibility
that the discrepancies between the two sources were, at least in certain
instances, more apparent than real.

In certain instances it has now beer possible to correlate frag-
mentary information from GOLiITSYN with information from NOSENKO,
making it evident that in these instances the differences could not be
construed as in any way reflecting against NOSENKO. The four examples
cited below represent two probable correlations, (a) and (b); one possible
correlation, (c); and one instance where,no correlation is possible at this
time, (d):

(a) GOLITSYN furnished information which he
received in April-May 1960 from Gennadiy GRYAZNOV
: that an attempt had been made by the KGB to recruit an
. . co
9 91067

SECRET.

14-0000

|

i

2
eect ny eee

- was not a female secretary in the American Embassy, but

aTAAcT
via heaves,
American female employee of the American Embassy
in Moscow through a male Soviet friend, but that tae
attempt had failed. GOLITSYN also furnished inicrmation
that the woman had left Moscow by the time he learned of
the information but that the Soviets hoped she would return
to Moscow so that further work could be undertaxen to
efiect her recruitment, He did not recall the name of the
secretary, but did recall) that it was|a long and "German OS
sounding"|name,

NOSENKO has furnished information in regard to a
recruitment attempt against (Collette SCHWARZENBACH,| Hk
who it is considered is identical to the "American secretary"
referred to by COLITSYN. However| §CHWARZENBACH

ok 0

had been.employed as a secretary to the wife of Ambassador j
BOHLEN during 1955 - 1956 and from 1958 - 1959 was employed

as a correspondent by the United Press in Moscow The
recruitment attempt against{SCHWARZENBACH| according to, OG
NOSENKO, occurred in 1959 and was an operation of the First

Section, First Department, SCD.

c001088

oe
o

e>
Bia
o>
Ee)
Lay
ont


14-0000

ey

wats
=~ SUK:

he

H
|
(b) Page 163 of tie previous summary contains infor ; |
mation that GOLITSYN also learned from GRYAZ>.OV in

the spring of 1960 that GRYAZNCV had deveioped an operation |
against an American Embassy rnilitary code cler« in which the

KGb was "99 per cent sure" that the target would be recruited,

This is believec to undcubiedly be a reference to the case of

|

Game SroasazRElwine was actually the subject of a recruit-
ment approach in 1961.
There is considered to be a good possibility that
GOLITSYN actually learned of the above information from
GRYAZNOV in early January 1961 when he was again in Moscow
rather than during the spring of 1960 when GOLITSYN was
‘preparing for his assignment to Helsinki, Finland. This
theory is supported by information on page 163 of the previous -
summary that GOLITSYN has stated he learned in January
1961 from Viadisiav M. KOVSHUK (Chief of the First Section)
that| Johan patSernondiped recently been used in the |
successful recruitment of an American employee ot the
Embassy. [Johan PREISPAEUND|wae used in ine{StonsS ERG]
operation, according to NOSENKO, and NOSENKO was also
3 6004029
ll

SECRET

een eee ca . see a.

g/&Q


14-0000

7
+ ee A

gop aTe

ULV lee
aware that GOLITSYN had a conversation with KOVSHUK about
BarsrnzunSpince GOLITSYN wanted to vse[PREiSr bund]
in Helsinki, NOSENKO has stated he was not present during
the above conversation, It is very possibie that KOVSHUK
exaggerated a little in his conversation with GOLITSYN in the
matter of why GOLITSYN could not use(PRESFREUND jas an
agent.

NOSZ£NKO has furnished extensive information in regard
to the) James STORSSERG |case and with due consideration to
the accuracy and recoilection of GOLITSYN, there does not
appear to be an adequate basis for questioning the bona fides of
NOSENKO on the basis of the differences between the report-
ing by-GOLITSYN of information he received from GRYAZNOV
concerning what is considered to have been thei James G
STORSBERG)case and Setaited information furnished by
NOSENKXO concerning th James STORSBERG|case. The
exact date of the recruitment attempt against|STORSBERG|
has not been positively established, but it is considered to
have occurred before early May 1961 and probably in the
March-April 1961 period, The statement by[ ames | 06

g001C90
12

SECRET

comet on et a ees \


14-0000

- see

~ OLE,

[Stoaspend|iat it occurred in October 1961 is com-
pieiely unacceptable and is even contradicted by other
statements by ST hang himseil,

(c) Page 163 of the previous summary contains
information fromm GOLITSYN which he had received from
GRYAZNOV in April or May 1960 tnat an American
employee of the Embassy in Moscow was either recruited
or prepared for recruitment on the basis of a homosexual
compromise beginning in 1959 and concluding in 1960.

The previous summary also states that according to
GOLITSYN, the KGB had photographed the American in
various homosexual acts, but SHELEPIN, who had just
become Chairman of the KGB, was at the time atressing
ideological rather than biackmail recruitments. SHELEPIN
Gid not exclude future use of the photographs which the KGB
would hold in reserve.

NOSENKO has furnished information concerning the
homosexual compromise of[Robert ARRETT,L who was a
guide at thé United States Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, and

with whom "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY", two homosexual

| . G001C94
13

SECRET


14-0000

_ although the photographs were of a good quality, the KGB

the recruitment operation, [BARRETT following his return

ws he oon

agents of NOSENKO, became acquainted, Work against
the United States Exhibition was the responsibility of
the Nintn Department, SCD, but various Departments
were particip. iing under the direction of the Ninth
Department, \

One of the above homosexual agents succeeded in
invotving{ BADR rin homosexual activities which were

photographed by the KGB but, according to NOSENKO,

was unable to use the photographs in 1959 because ofa

general ban by the Central Committee on the recruitment

of the United States Exhibition guides due to the planned

visit of President EISENHOWER to the Sovict Union.
NOSENKO also stated that the compromising materiai

and information oof BARAETH was later given to the First

Department and that BARRETT was recruited by the Second

Section, First Department when he returned with another

Exhibition in 1961, and that he, NOSENKO, was not involved in

06

m 0001092

aon

Woe

> enna A PADS ASCE CTSA SE PP TT IE PFO RE RET IO eR! Berne AnEFTTTMEARMED eon Setar -rusersvenrs A revs ne TEES nse onmen mare mien ere RIOORORY AAI tena renner So nee anette

14-0000

-™

+ caer nee eet es eae ve

OCADTT

VLU,

to the United Staies in January 1962, confessed to the
FBI that he had been recruited in 1961 on the basis of
compromising photographs which had been taken
during his 1959 trip to Moscow.

Although it cannot be established at this
time, it is possibie that the information furnished
by GOLITSYN which he had received from GRYAZNOV
actually refers to tne[Robors 8 RRETT fase, It should
be noted that [Robert BARRET7 |could not actually be
characterized as an “American employee of the Embassy
in Moscow,"

(a) Page 162 of the previous summary contains infor-
mation from GOLITSYN that in the spring of 1960 when he
visited the First Section, First Department, SCD, he learned
from GRYAZNOV that GRYAZNOV had as an agent an Embassy
code clerk who was scheduled to be transferred to Helsinki,
GRYAZNOV indicated to GOLITSYN that the code clerk had

already furnished the KGB with some information, that he was

15 - G001053

SECRET

SORE ao ate

2l6R


14-0000

considered by the KGB to be a "real" agent and that if.
the transier of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN
might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki. _* -
NOSENKO has furnished no information which ca-. be
correlated in any way with the above information from

GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN

resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
which has been conducted in the matter, Although this is
considered to be a, valid lead, it need not necessarily refer

toa

code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in

7a

Moscow during 1960 - 1961. It is also possiole that the previons
remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks
in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information
obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible. a

i ; . ' The trip of Vadim Vv. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in

fad

November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information :

from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

goo1Csd


14-0000

# considered by the KGB to be a "real'' agent and that if
the transfer of the code clerk materialized, GOLITSYN
might have the code clerk as an agent in Helsinki.
NOSENKO has furnished no information which can be
correlated in any way.with the above information from
GOLITSYN, but neither has the information from GOLITSYN
resulted in an identification despite the considerable investigation
which has been conducted in the matter. Although this is
@ considered to be a valid lead, it need not necessarily refer
to a code clerk who was in the United States Embassy in
es Moscow during 1960 - 1941, It is also possible that the previous
remark by GOLITSYN concerning the above "code clerk" who
might be transferred to Helsinki as well as his cited remarks
in a-c could be clarified or at least additional information
obtained if a specific reinterview on these matters was possible.
The trip of Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, Finland in
November 1960 should be mentioned in any comparison of information

from NOSENKO with information from GOLITSYN. This conflict is

es) 6 goose’s |

14-0000

fe

SECRET a :

also mentioned in another section pertaining to the 1960-1961 career
of NOSENKO. GOLITSYN stated that KOSOLAPOV came to Helsinki
a) accompany an American Embassy code clerk on the train to
a . Moscow and that KOSOLAPOV planned to strike up an acquaintance
with the code.clerk which could be continued’in Moscow.
. The American Embassy code clerk referred to above was
Ob

undoubtedly|J John GARLAND]|and the train manifest liste[John GARLAND]
and Viktor KOLOSOV (Vadim V. KOSOLAPOV) as passengers on the

- same train from Heisinki to Moscow. NOSEXNKO is aware of the io

nee

7 identity of|John ee claims no 5 imowledge ‘of the above trip
of KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki, although being well aware of a previous trip. |
NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief of the First Section. specifically
. charged with work against code clerks, should have been aware of the
November 1960 trip of KOSOLAPOY to and from Helsinki. His lack of
; . . - Inowledge may or may not be explainable in terms of his other activities
such as his trip to Cuba in November ~December 1960 but it cannot be

interpreted as evidence NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB since, if

“he haa been, the KGB should have briefed NOSENKO on the trip of

OSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November 1960, as this was an event the — ot ; ag

a ee

cGB knew GOLITSYN was aware of.
oe 600105 5

‘SECRET ©

Ep Ae A HGP EB ee ABE Ste at See aan a se tphee sera ee a oe Sh Bee Sate ate eee

14-0000

In connection with this theory, it should be noted that NOSENKO during

‘potential damage which could result from the defection of GOLITSYN, |

A theory which has previously been given consideration and -
warranted full consideration was that if NOSENKO was dispatched,
his mission was to confuse leads furnisied to American intelligence

and/or to denigrate the. value of information furnished by GOLITSYN.

current interviews 5 has not made any remarks which could in any way a

be. construed : as derogatory to GOLITSYN. In addition, NOSENKO does
not claim to lave any detailed knowledge of the FCD and frequently,

when some topic peculiar to the FCD has been. broached with NOSENKO,

his immediate reply hhas been to the effect that "1 didn't work in the FCD, "

ou ‘should a ask GoLiTsyN ‘about that."

In-connection with any consideration of whether the contact of
NOSENKO with CIA in Geneva in June 1962 could have been initiated by
the KGB as a result of the defection of GOLITSYN,: the timing of certain
events should be noted.. GOLITSYN defected on 15 December 1961,
NOSENKO Geparted from Moscow in March 1962 for Geneva, ‘Switzerland,
where he remained until 15 J une 1962.

‘It is felt that it would have been ‘practically impossible if not

impos Jséible for KGB officials to complete an assessment of the. actual ¢ or

: : ATTN
Se a Se Sas


14-0000

i

vy eae es
S: EOVEL

ww ae

select NOSENKO as the individual who would be Gispatched to counter-

act tne possible damage, and appropriately brief NOSENKO prior to

his departure for Geneva in March 1962. Therefore, if NOSENKO
was dispatched by the KGB, it would appear that pians for this would
have predated the defection of GOLITSYN and that any GOLITSYN
aspect could only be a related aspect and not the basis for the original
plan to dispatch NOSENKO. In addition, if NOSENKO was dispatched, so : 4
it would hardly seem necessary for the KGB to send NOSENKO to
Geneva two and one-half months before his first contact with CIA.

The theory has also been considered that NOSENKO could have
been dispatched to confuse and divert American inteiligence and thus

‘to protect an important KGB penetration or penetrations of the United

States Government, particularly CIA. This is a theory which should /

and has been given full consideration, but it is not possible to factually a ,
substantiate or refute this theory in the absence of specific information.
- that high-level KGB penetrations do or do not exist.
Actually, as regards NOSENKO, the primary area which should
be given consideration in the above matter is if all the information from

NOSENKO is accepted, what effect would or could it have on the efforts

eareesy

SECRET at

SN te nee ae eee tae Wg ee street oe SI ee nee ee a ae Sn ety

,
sates ates alesse os pth!

; SRTR ERNE AREAS UNRAGRIEAT ATTN SAT
aA RRA EHO RC CoE

SECRET | | _

of American counter-inte.jigence td determine the identity of and
take ‘appropriate action against KGB penetrations of the United
States Government, The only answer to this question seems to be . “
that there would be little consolation or assurance to American intelli- .
gence even if every statement by NOSENKO was accepted at face value.

The only specific area in which NOSENKO could be even con-
sidered to claim full knowledge is the United States Embassy in Moscow.
In this area hie statements could be construed as assurance that there
were no recruitments of American personne] in the United States Embassy

oN in Moscow from 1953-December 1963 with.:he exception of "ANDREY" : |

. «(Dayle Wallis SMITH) and|Herbert HOWARD} The basis for this —

expressed. opinion of NOSENKO is considered elsewhere in this summary
and analysts may differ as to whether a recruitment could have occurred
of which NOSENKO did not have knowledge, assuming that his statements
are made in good faith. It should be noted, however, that at this time
there is no specific information which is in direct conflict with the

expressed opinion of NOSENXD. . , : _ :

NOSENKO, as previously mentioned, has never claimed any

particular knowledge of FCD activities. In addition, he does not claim

- e ‘

to be aware of all recruitments of Americans by the SCD. Asan .

eS _ 7 gooseee

A ets ae

6 we tebiclicae ree Mey

gO eon

ot
A aol yt ge at

14-0000

-_ Ceo
mt SECRES

oa

example, -he has made it clear that his knowlecge of SCD activities
against members of delegations, foreign businessmen, foreign students,
and individuals in the USSR on the iavitation of a Soviet organization or
a component of the Soviet Government is extremely limited and at best
mainly of a collateral nature.

NOSENKO does not even claim any detailed knowledge of
activities of the Second Section (Active Line) of the First Department, SCD,
nor does he claim to know all of the cases of which the Chief of the Seventh
Department was aware. The latter is-specifically supported by certain
notes brought out by NOSENKO which are short references to a number
of Seventh Department cases which are identified only by the KGB code
name, These notes, according to NOSENKO, were made when he had an
opportunity to review a notebook held by the Chief of the Seventh Department

and constitute the only knowledge NOSENKO had of these particular cases,

?

SECRET

mith web jad ako Says deb agin nhaitir germane oe weet ee nae

~ ee seem ok meet,

4

San heathen alt wo oe


14-0000

SECRET | os

G, JIS THERE ZVID.CNCE GF A POLITICAL GR.ANY

: : OF NOSEXKO BY THE KGR WITH

a8)
t]
a]
<
if
n
ue)
4
ce)
vA
}
1@)
tn
rf)
y
BG

FREELY TO ClA CONCERNING HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE KGB

AND WITHOUT NOSENKO BEING GIVEN A SPECIFI _

H MiSSION OR MISSIONS ?

CBOar 3
Extindes trom astraatic

Gcwagreding and
Gectacsificetion

w~
rm
oD

=<)

rr

—

-_--- tee tg ee - .. 4
'. ee TT a ca . * 7 7
as
4
= . ;

ix!

14-0000

“7

tr pean fe ee mn Tf een
OO SUSAN Phu ee Gee SOS
—-- pe

LCLLLoONe

we Nr oa a

as NOSENAS,

g
Ne
by
te
i
@
w
re
un
64
al
&
&
4
a
@
mS
e
eA

political er other type sdjective wkics

ampoxtance by the KGS 10 warrant tac Clopatch Ul a ACE ofiicer with

the knowledge of NOSENAC to s

QR
St.
<
o
3
Pp
we

ae]
6
fe)
9,
Bay
ian
a
Ss
ry
ge
mw
wh
“
is)
u
°
*
a
ay
we
u
v,
i)
ay
th

limitations on tae KGS + crce infovrnation he m

chat

that Such act would, in the estimate oc the leadership, re loin ae net

tytn

positical gain for the USSA, For such a possibility to be seriously

entertained by the Soviets, however, it would Rave to involve an issue of
major importance to the Sovies leacership and presumabiy would have to

"  g001i101

at


14-0000

. ‘ :

V—~
™o
: .
a :
a .
‘The ory on ba Lay Way by NOSE NAG wick
vey Goweld ia tie 6852 :
end his association with the Sovict Unica. ae Aee aot ut : mo Cas
1
obtaining at the time that there wis se ew
. : : : - +
v assassination, premise tcat . 5
. . o- 2 vt
. invoivement, and (c) a Lypothesis tha
concerned lest erroneous conclusions de Erawa which could icad to
irreversable actions, it is conceivable thet the Sovict leadersiip mignt ve
’. have been prepared to take extreme stevs to convince ;

autnorities of their non-involvemcnt in the assassing bod

i to the United States Governmen: of tne aliegeciy coz oo
file on OSWALD was, in ; , SS

ns

iight of the fact that among the intczmation NOSENKO provicec was

;
i
4 tiinside" KGB information on OSWALD: information waick purporzceciy
|
i
:

SE

at rn aerate on Oe bn

%

APOE eA et ARR ee ern cate een ee entered ote

eevee ENT
aes peitins ET BNsay

NRE SHRC OST ROERERRT ETON TERE Tiny

ES

5
SR nedaietdeseanes


14-0000

1 MRS ew tata at a ee ~ ~ wentaet
Tais information clearly inclecio® Vt these was no ACD vreler

we,

‘

os hella ee

Poo,

: en ”

STE e) a ene eae ene

vevealeé the subsiance of the concont of the AGB Tiles on OSWALD.

wita OSWALD, that the KOS hal us opovational insevest in OSWALD,

- a. mee ane f fe ne air. t
and that as a matier of fect OS WAL

sented the WAT yice c
CSSnWS We Te Worse

U

continuing series of proolems.

an Upon examination, however, NOSENXS Coes not meet the
?

‘requirements premisec above ior serious Soviet consideretion of @ iree

XGB defection. Tae following rezsons rencer this unacceptasle;
: o +e

a. The chronoiogy, in itseli, presents virtually impossibie

problems, for such a theses, viz, NOSENKO's" proach to CIA
Mette fe ‘

in June 1962, 17 montis prior to thc assassinatio:
. er RR

enti Aennecy.

. b, While tac information from NOSZNXO oa OSWALD is

dee ray ned sawn ee Te ee fa eee as mes neers
anterestiing ana porunesc, i023 Nol, am nature, Scope, ana Content,

utaorities to reasonaesly Se

A
Be
re
o
go.
o
B
“<—
a
3)
3
5
Q
i
03
»
qr
RR
a
3,
+
n
wn
#
cr
&
we
)

‘ expected to concluce that it resresencted unequivocal pros: of Soviet

r,

. non-involvement,

c. itis implausible not to assume that the Soviets would

assume that United States authorivies, in any examination of the
be .

| possibility of a Soviet (KGB) hand in the asszssination, would presume

OS RSE Sah Gira

RTT
PARSER fs

ce ee

wok

ee

re Pees


14-0000

on
\
: Gwivs mintve?s Gi thls mevare. :
. Leven serious
GS COU Lave Logica ly SGea fitted ints the '
above very limited category. ; 7 , co oe 3
It ‘is accordingiy concluded tit ;
; motivated free dispatch can in the case of NCSENKO be satisfactorily : .,
eliminated, oo wo . ; . 7 Lb eel ts
. The possibility Las also Deen
‘ ;

bave theorized that by dispatching an
with nurnerous leads to non-valuable ox non-current KGS agents cz

" cases, the facilities of the Unitec Staves intelligence community woud

tad poet me mast
206 Of tarmc. 14.415 COUuLc -

be practically neutralized for an extonced pe

a

+ -.

omy be based on an assumption that che United States Intelligence Le

a
w

*
G
a)
w&
o
x]
33
a
e
9
Ee
°
ky
oO
iti
ce
w

comrnunity. would involve a major porvion oz 2

in the investigation and resolution of cases waich had ttle or no current

or potential value to the KGB. The above nossidility cannot be

re. . *

i "arbitrarily eliminated.without.full consideration. It is not beleved chat
H

}
i
}

Nted et oat T6r Peer awe ane

Men re en ee eR webct

Far aja slid phe i ae |

free
&
Ee

Pel ed tne

SEG TRSTETITITS
RSs

stehernt nant RSIS HE
SBERSAS SAA RARE No

RANTS
SERS

14-0000

” - . Z
~
: ~ }
NOSENXO in the absence of on. ;
ov wiissions to fulfill comes Within the wsove cates . ‘
overall assessme the
' ee ast see : * : 7 : . !
exploitation of his. ini ation would be quite Gama
Considevation of the euove possisilicy mus
evaluation of the Ceterrent eiicct on tic prospecss of future recrulmments . “
by tre KCB caused oy Lega) action taken azainst incivicuals exposed by 2
information from the cisnatched agent or officer. The deterrent cficct ;
on others of the conviction aud sentescing of persons woo have commitied bo,
a crime or crimes has long been a vart of the legal theory of why persons : o
who commit a crime sould be iaprisoned or punished. |° '” -
The detelrent effect on others of the trials anc convictions of
— a.
William VASSALL, Robert Lee JOHNSON and James Allen MINTKIN~
a ER NO ie a =, —
BAUGH -snould not be uncesestimaied, . The KGS aiso could not have
CR ae er ne a :
Known that injormation turnisked by NOSENKO would not result in the .
. at
trial and conviction of otser KGB agents or recruitments concerning nn
» > aan :
whorn NOSENKO had some knowledge. ‘ - :
. . . . e ‘ 1 .
. ° , . .
: of. ; .
t . :
bose, : . :
im .
{ 7) 5
' .
i we ne fac :
nee eee a eee ceteris mee te cn Dear one oo nee aman tr ee aN NM eee ve

CT emerneeee a aay mre nti oe OPT Oe Sa eS

4
Perey


14-0000

SECRET

rote
Nee

aN

NY EVI.

2

IS THERE

H,

NKO

T NCSE

TT

‘THA

KGBR

IS DEFECTION G2
‘THE t

3

GB PRIOR TO
‘WAS EVER BRIEFED BY

HAVIOR

ATIVS TOFS B

E CONTAC

TS OR

ING THES

R

CTIVES D

nm
a

“OR KGB OBJ

As

=HCTION?

IS DEE

h.

AFTER

ec od

ten ne ete ae ee te

4
j
4
i
}
‘
4
i
i

i

ee

14-0000

mATN Se

oO :
fad cal te 8 . : . ‘e
OLbi mee, . 2 4

H. Is there any evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO in 1962
or in 1964 with CIA were known to the XGB prior to his defection or

that NOSENKO was ever briefed by the KGB relative to his behavior

or KGB objectives during these contacts or aiter his defection? The

conclusion is that there is no evidence that the contacts of NOSENKO

in 1962 or in 1964 with CIA were shown to the KGB prior to his
defection and that NOSENKO was never briefed in any manner by the KGB.
The basis for the above conclusion is substantially contained in .
_ Previous sections. It is being. treatec here as a separate area of interest wD -
‘since it is a sufficiently important area as to warrant individual consideration. .
It is recognized that since positive factual confirmation such as

the KGB file on NOSENKXO is not available, any conclusion concerning

whether NOSENKO was or was not dispatched by the KGB can only de : :
. based on the full review of availabie information from NOSENKO,
collateral sources, independent investigation and the opinion of the

individual analyst concerning the significance or non-significance of

L ‘each item of available information.

. The conclusion that the contacts of NOSENKO with CIA in 1962

and 1964 prior to his defection were not known to the KGB is

001i?

‘Sa Sag NESE RED OE Cte Were dad ane mate Deemer ot abet gE neat mem

STANSTED

SERS Eats ethy

see matyayg

14-0000

)
og)
rm
©.

necessarily based in part on a judgment as to whether any of his
activities or information logically warrant a substantial suspicion
that they were or could be in any part the result of KGB direction
or control. One of the particular areas considered was his apparent
behavior during his contacts with CIA in June 1962 and the conclusion
was that it was incomprehensible that he could have been under KGB
control at that time,

Consideration has been given to the possibility that his 1962
; _ contacts with CLA were not known to the KGB," but became known to

i the KGB later and NOSENKO was doubled by the KGB, it was con-

+ or information which would warrant

cluded ‘that there was no basis fo
! serious consideration of the above possibility aside from the separate
conclusion that the KGB would be very unlikely to reward a traiter in
. KGB eyes by sending him again to Geneva where he would be quite free
to defect. ; 7 _ : ; -

~ Worthy of comment in this section is the fact that NOSENKO,
‘dur ing his 1962 contacts, expressed considerable concern over his

: “personal security, requesting that knowledge concerning his identity be

_ ve “kept to an absolute minimum, that no communications be sent to the

SECRET

ht teen eet a AERA SLA AAA ATA momar ne ome eee tem cee


14-0000

-_ - ny

Bee CO oT

a wouid ne

moms

COnimct Withia the Soviet Union. NOSINN

BM.OTMEUGA SF

tat, oe _

wits CLA become .nows in the Usha Sites

‘ers to NOSENKO in any cos.ccs ol et

BIASES CONC. Wil NCSINAG

S TECOZL464 Coes toe Goove &

about his personal security is not substantial evicence thas NCSENKO

was noturndcer AGS co

savidence that NOCSENNO wes |

2ulj however,

. no: in any Way encouraging c4 tine contact of NOSENKO wicin the
Boo LT oO : . “
" ‘USSR, Which very likely would
was uncer 435 control,
uo: The matevial waies NCSENAG iuznisked to CIA in 1964 tas been
carefully veviewed to ce ¢ XGBE
‘
participated in any way in the assursbling of this ravher unique collection :
i. of material. None of the material zpoears to have deen of an eocountable
, type and, on the contrary, it appears that NOSONAG sould have furnished
all of the material to CIA an , veout the KGB ,
“ever ata later date becoming awaze that the materiai was actually missing.
: ; ‘The latter statement even includes the travel document whic authorized
~ :

‘the trip of NOSENKO to Gorkiy in December 1963.

TTY nee AO ad tk ne Re aE Magee |


14-0000

. Soom

ae ti dn Des SaNA

acceralag to NOSENACG, was vo

Keeney CANAD PANOV, «cco

NOSENKO, this particu,

3. 358 Lo tar ft in pees
OMY HeCessary O turn 2am Woe

expenses. NOSENAG ssaiced mac. 2s nad not

C.BeteG We PRT Seas

TAOUNE G2 TLOneY tO Which Le Was Untied on

6

seally Drougat the document dloag buccuss it gi

os Lieutesax: Coloacl,

NOSENKO. has completely retvactedc Lis cleiu so naving hac th

-
; 6

vank of Lieutenant Colunel, stating chat even as a Diputy Cali ol Deposte

ment he was only a Capiain although be was cntided te anc expecid to

receive the rank of Major

wae, ane

285 So

tae error of KASHPZEAOGV, the officer on cuty in the SCD.om Sunday, aad
that practically all Deputy Chieés of Department in the SCD nec at lecst
the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

The above explanation by NCSENAG may soil we Considered by
readers with at least a cegzee oi skepticism. However, i: NOSENKO

was dispatched by the KGB, it would

vw

eem taat he could save seen sro-
vided with something a little more substaniiai to Cocument Lis cizim of

the rank of Lieutenant Colone:, in addition, it woulé seera that the KGB

GO01110

sevem rece cenemeamamemencerse be A wer sene cone

ete . wes

.:
meen A Rare RN a a WN Acoma oma wed Oe pete

Sn cee aenentenen meena: N on

1

TTR TT
CNUs


14-0000

G

COC

Gl OMe type 0.

‘
"h
-

ow

Le

ry

a

pos

ONS

proaiee

imea 7

pope sare

‘
ip)

ary Chis

a?

“3

Se Gi One

us.

uso

oo
ow

i.NOSEN:

OL

»

~ee

nN

2 Tae

ara

eet ELS TD tet ate

Nee Ne ae eam re et

> eet ma


14-0000

bes

uO IV. COMMENTS COMCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS : bo

- : . on

. INREGARD TONOSENKO - Do, .

” . ‘ : tA,

y : “C32 1 Soot ,
Cc BP &netaces 2m ar‘esatie] © Lots i
u OTT C@rrass ads f ’ , a
er Cee 2, Do beat tes wos 3 : . . . +
+ 1 + + . 7 a . a . “4.
: - + . a : ne . t
7 8 woke . , — od - mo. . “4
alee Oo ete tenet a AtntthnnanecAie a Mee Cane 98" ereaeedi aa Gerba Aga cieertcatettienta inc cnttlemmannaiaa in ete ne :

Baa

SEMEN aw

14-0000

m
a)
rr}
—

~ — Sn

COMMENTS CONCERNING PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS

IN REGARD TO NOSENKO

Attached is a verbatim copy of pages 357 - 360 of the "Examina- :
tion of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"! which contains seven (A - G)
. , . - 7.

_, ‘primary conclusions concerning the claimed Naval RU (Navy Intelligence)

- and KGB career of NOSENKO, These conclusions or findings are

independently. treated in separate attachments.

. With the exception of "G, " the conclusions in this “‘sixrnmary are

in diréct conflict with the above conclusions and are basically tha

_:.. NOSENXO served.in.the Naval RU from March 195] to early 1953, was.
a KGB officer from March 1953 until his défection in February 1964,
_and held his claimed positions in the *XGB during the March 1953 =~

February 1964 period,

* For purposes of clarity, the term KGB is used to refer to the

: , |... Committee for State Security and predecessor-organizations, ;
i ‘unless otherwise indicated, -_
;
pos. ‘Attachment: te :
, aCpy Pgs 357-360 of "Examination .
} 9f the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector"
t ‘ aan : oe TTR
z votes : ' _ Penctates tea avcostic|
. “5 (OLE : essciay 334
ee SEORET Sees

SRN TRTTI sentisinarerstrencacens SATAN AinecineareeraT?
$ sa . an Ure FRINTON CTU TIS TTS
AS ACRES aN RO x RSRESERS at SS

eee Sah
Uschi SA

14-0000

Seunes,

PREVIOUS CONCLUSIONS RE NOSENKO
AS CONTAINED ON PAGES 357 - 360 OF
"THE EXAMINATION OF THE BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECTOR"

- ,

The foliowing is a quote of the previous conclusions in the case of Yuriy

Ivanovich NOSENKO. (The specific conclusions have been given the designation
of A - Gifor purposes of easier correlation with other sections of this summary.)
"SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
| CONCERNING NOSENKO'S BONA FIDES"

"NOSENKO claims that he served for a decade in the KGB in
successively: senior positions of auhoriy from which he derived
extensive knowledge of the scope, character, and results of KGB
operations against Americans in the Soviet Union in the period
1953-1963. To substantiate his claim, he provides an impressive.
array of information about KGB personnel, organization and opera-
tions which, to the extent that it has been confirmed, is presumptive
evidence of his bona fides. Various Soviet officials, including
intelligence officers, have generally corroborated NOSENKO's
claims. According to some of these sources, NOSENKO was a

.. senior KGB officer who occupied a series of sensitive. positions, who

ple  OO0LIEG

Fo ee eRe Seer met on sme ee

im

RFE
Lea


14-0000

a | Nya ents

enjoyed considerable authoriiy and trust despite personal short- : . a

comings, and whose aefection, 'the greatest loss ever suffered

‘e
,

by Soviet Intelligence',. paralyzed the work of _ KGB
- Legal Residency, and justified the formulation of plans to assase~.
sinate him,"
“The examination has compared each element of NOSENKO's
biography relevant to his claimed KGB service with known |
facte and reasonable surmise. The examination reflects the
test to which his accounts were put: whether his accounts are

- internally coherent and consistent with known fact, and whether

-,. He actually gained the information he has from occupying the.
KGB positions he claims to have. held. In short, is he what he .
says he ie, according to his own-accounts?"

“This examination had led to the iollowing findings, arrived
at independently; : _
A. NOSENKO cié not serve in the Naval RU
in any of the capacities or at the places and times he
_ Claimed,
cone B. NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the

manner or at the time he. claimed.

"©. NOSENKO did not serve in the American. a” :
mo nnn sere EN GUOLLAS -
y, Section throughout the 1953-1955 periodas

: er : acnart | , we
OUR NAT GTI AAAS A NEO peered ned Rey ab are ant emaerS S re emit nd Stle e


14-0000

‘a senior case oificer in, nor Deputy Chiei of, the Seventh : _ . * _

of the American-3ritish Commonwealth Section and was as

‘not-credible,

Crees ea

D. During the period 1955-1900, ne was neither

Department American-Britisn Commonwealth Section. '
? ,

+ . : . . q

E. NOSENXO was neither Deputy Chief of the — .

American Embassy Section nor a senior oificer or
supervisor in the Section during the period 1961-1962. (sic) ; ee nos
F, NOSENKXO's claims, that in 1962:he was Chief , _

thereafter a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are a . ps , . :

- : : ‘y

“..° G"NOSENKO has no valid claiin to certainty _

that the KGB recruited no American Embassy personnel

between 1953 and his defection in 1964. _ oy

These findings differ somewhat with respect to degree of probability

‘or certitude, but they reflect the preponderance of available evidence

in each instance." ; ,

'

of NO

as a whele unacceptabie. While truth and fact.in this case frequently — - : ae

of his. life and KGB service are s0 extensive as to make his claims

“The above judgments, if correct, rebut presumptive evidence

SENKO's bona fides, The contradictions in NOSENKO's accounts *

ee rs

4

—_ “004416: re ve

eeeumeemnn taaratee

pre itaiatats Oye eS ANS Nein I ne SL meee Lang artic tan Pageants


14-0000

od,

Waevatue

Ta tatie vies

“Cannot de established with certainty, it is evident that truth and

fact are not what NOSEN&O relates. By almost any test, virtually co

any of NOSENKO's above claims are impugned by iact or probability, _ :

or contradicted or retracted in his own statements. NOSENKO is

not what he claims to be, and thus he is not a bona fide defector,"
"Given the conclusion that NOSENKO is not a bona fide

deiector, itis necessary to attempt to determine his true motives

for contacting American intelligence and for providing the information

- hehas given. Here, it must be recognized that the evidence, largely : sO —

consisting of NOSENKO's own assertions, does not permit unequivocal

conclusions. Nevextriess, the question cannot be ignored, The
character of the information NOSENKO has conveyed, the fact that
some of his false claims have been corroborated by Soviet officials,
and the necessity to make decisions about NOSENKO's future all
require that at least a provisional judgment be made."'

i "Of the reasonable explanations advanced ior NOSENKO's
misrepresentations, the chief ones are that he is a swindler posing
as a former KGB officer for reasons of personal advantage; that he

suffers from a deranged personality or unbalanced mind; that he has

. greatly exaggerated his actual rank, status and access in the KGB, for : “ cog

ae

simply personal reasons; or,. finally, that he is a dispatched KGB a ; _ !
hhh meee pagene tts 5 by

a
aah nels

ee “SECRET.

77 Scene aan Me TN ne 8 we ane a ae
st: ae ee


14-0000

C7
fe
¢
re

"The iirst two possibilities are easily dismissed. That
. NOSENKO is aot sitnply a swindler who falsciy claims for personal
‘advantage to have been a KG3B ofiicer is evident, we believe, from

the confirmed details of KGB organization, personnel and operations

which he has provided and which couid only derive from within the

“KGB itself,"

: "Second, as noted in the text, extensive psychiatric and

: “psychological examination by Gualified specialists rule out the‘
’

| ' ‘possibility.that NOSENXO's actions and testimony are the product

of a deranged personality or unbalanced mind." -

oot

"It ig somewhat more plausible that NOSENKO is a KGB
‘officer who served in at least some of the components for some

or all of the time periods that he claims, but who greatly exag-

. gerated his positions, Tank and access to iniormation, and

_ invented some matters outright, to achieve greater status with

. American Intelligence. This explanation, however, fails to
accommodate the fact that several XGB ofiicers have asserted
that NOSENKO did in fact nold senior positions in the KGB. Also,

_ NOSENKO's assertions with respect to his rank, GRIBANOV's

pt eens =

tot


14-0000

y

Sea

"Because none of the above explanations is consistent with
the data developed in interrogations and investigations, we are
left with the hypothesis that NOSENKO was dispatched by the
KGB. While this explanation does not reconcile all the anomalies,

none of them renders it untenable, "

"In the absence of further revelations by NOSENKO, or . . :

other persuasive evidence to the contrary, CIA finds that the

evidence establishes a presumption that NOSENKO was dispatched

by the KGB, and. believes that prudence requires that he be

regarded as still responsive to KGB control, and that his infor-

mation should be assessed accordingly." . :

es eager ee:

Pip nme TUE Ted. CAPM geet oe enimncn A a Od Moe ta eects wera Le


14-0000

SECRET

Oper

™
~

RV

bee

NKO DID NOT S

NOSE

A.

IN ANY OF THE CAPAC.

N

C=s

=S ORAT THE PL

tree
wad

z
=

s

TIMES

CLAIMED ©

2
* .
: A
{
: i
i
i.
H
: b :
. 4
{
i
f | ;
: i
i:
. {
. ‘ }
. }
. . i
. ;
- .
, q
4 #3
. - 4 A
| CZ
| | 2

14-0000

fete

A, NOSENKO did not serve in the N i RU in any of the capacities

or at the places and times he claimed. (Previous conclusion)

The above is conclusion "A" in the previous summary in regard
to NOSENKO, The current conclusion is that the claimed servicé of : a
NOSENKO in Navy Inteliigence (Naval RU) during March 1951 to early

. 1953 in the Far East and the Baltic areas is adequately substantiated ao . Ot

and should be accepted.

The interrogations of NOSENKO prior to 1967 were complicated ._-

by. NOSENKO changing the date of his graduation irom the institute of
‘International Relations from 1950 to 1949. because he did not wish to
admit that he had failed to graduate in 1949. with the majority of hie class.
However, ‘previous eforts of NOSENKO to revert to his original 1962
statement that he graduated in 1950 were not accepted and an unwarranted . , .
significance was given to the 1949 - early 1953 period of time.

It is considered that NOSENXO has adequately explained his

“stupid blunders" as they relate to the above and to certain other personal |

matters and that his claimed service in Navy Intelligence from March

Gai?
Extisted toe aatecatie!

Coecgracaz asd
Geclsesificatisy

14-0000

. 0,
. NOSENKO regarding approximately] 875 KGB officers,| 100;/KGB agents,

" (35 GRU officers and| 400 other Soviet nationale,

“DeLee cme as

1951 to early 1953 both in the Far East and the Baltic area is fully
acceptabie, Jt is not considered necessary to comment concerning all
of the remarxe in the previous summary regarding the claimed Naval
RU éeivice of NOSENKO as reflected on pages 49-59 and remarks will,
for purposes of brevity, be limited in scope,

The statement is made in the previous summary that "The sole

° Headquarters RU officer NOSENKO identified was the Personnel Chief,

Colonel KALOSHIN, He identified no ranxing officers in either the Baltic
or Far East Intelligence Staffs, Some 30 GRU officers he did identify,
by his own admission, NOSENKO knew not {rom his Naval RU service,
but through social acquaintance, later, in Moscow, or througn his visits
to.Geneva."

Attached is a copy of a handwritten memorandum voluntarily
prepared by NOSENKO in late i967 containing the names of a number
of GRU personnel of whom he had some knowledge. The attached was
not prepared as the result of any inquiry concerning his claimed Naval
RU service, but was only a small part of the material prepared by

NOSENKO at this time. The entire material included remarks by

0

- gpoit22


14-0000

ae
Rose

It is interesting to note that the attached list contains the names
‘of approximately 20 GRU officers whom NOSENO relates to the early . y
1950's period. In addition, NOSENO has, during current interviews
and in other memoranda, furnished the names of additional Navy Intelii-
gence personel whom he knew in the 1951 - early 1953 period.

Page 52 of the above summary and other related pages question
whether NOSENXO ever served in the Baltic area with Naval Intelligence . ; To
and even question his geographical knowledge of the area. Attached is a
copy of a handwritten memorandum with certain diagrams prepared by
NOSENKO on 21 February. 1968 concerning his assignment with Navy

a eta Antelligence in the Far East and the Baltic area, The memorandum was
.. completed by NOSENKO without any reference material and a review of
his diagrams indicates they are quite accurate.

NOSZNKO had previously stated that his service in the Baltic

area was at Sovetsk Primorskiy and during current interviews recalled

*

that the former name of the place, an aimost deserted fisnermen's
village, was Fishausen, The previous designation given by NOSENXO
for this place as having the mail address of Sovetsk Primorskiy had

; : | caused the conclusion that his alleged place of assignment was non-

existent. A further checkin the matter would have disclosed that the . ; od

‘ . ,
nN

place was not nonexistent, that it is currently known as Primorsk and Oo - - ot


14-0000

~ . VuWetinn

The previous summary 4:50 stated that despite nis claimed

active cornmissioned service in the Navy, NOSENKO knew nothing of

. . oh

Soviet Navy tradition, doctrines, or organization of procedures. It
should be noted that there is a considerable difference between being . ; ¢
a member of the Naval RU and being.an actual member of the Soviet - : :

Navy. The situation could be compared to a career civilian employee

of the Office of Naval Intelligence and a line officer in the United States

i

Navy. , , .

i : . . . ; . Gm :
Attachments: . . ¢
| List. of GRU Personnel as Prepared by NOSENKO 4

‘Diagrams and comments as Prepared by NOSENKO

001124 eG

SECRET

ee ra ane ee rr Seat
haa tteeten ce BNR th oy a eed ete,

a ne

ers


14,0000

—_ oe a Keener deen - LOC dbs; w 67 4I43 a Mepity pile p nag .
ph Ph ag

Late Me heey Hee ache, fpr | mallliginee , lader ks f wth & dept sfolef
if £ Mul ( Sezel dren w aad Jrash Fhe Len], J heard he tad we bay atfacte br A hip,
a PoE ’
ob, Bespeblar = a meiper, ‘coc bak of Ta “mer i tate Bazence wccip hflet |
“ Suit, ferbool region ts L451- 1362,
2: Pephectiny date rshiry =cut dey vty of cheek » f te ey ne a
Stesl (o m agents) oh sin SATII . :
4 bubald tee «fives ef he heey hdtgece pecal of iatebijou.
BUATEA jn Sovieteh Makeniyyrnd's desteial ’x AS, |

S 6 Chikirs -& Ie, a cokt nel ,tertled te Ke ptive of. L frtecgn 3
“ag, 42 fe ninizty fidifesee, _ |
ns Mauriksheg na Buel, ti Cael tpt Fe
fore m4 a fans f Lee ft iad yp off Aopetee.: a
® Aetuchents Newclenhe Bhan ; ‘ Weer ba aecy tnlelly (ence patep yA 2 stele jones Lf + Wit
ie Soviets , Lliuer cen pred § 4 tid reed

I Bolt Bobrstalor fir: on eiticr ffili[elome§), teed tee Whe LEA, |

; took. Leader corer of fleets - ayrney Meers * - it

. .  &.  bubperio, Lor NC - ba th. S araeled te GRU, os a

ne te Saliyere = ae. - 44 fpecer fh fue, es ged WE od Serber)._ 7 3
ts ld. hebeshen’ - accrued, by AD -146§ hile ff porsewncl de iG pertieat”
th. base. bi bles fuee » — eOuL125

Pee Denison be - om Witte a raililary whacke Pisiotestay tu Bean,

+
, Laatrpabe - a Ligh Sort od ¢ ‘wilt B Zé ff inlecoal oad exlatin 5 :
Ta Talen ¢ ter he ey ertellgenee, walsed Bank ’ ler beelalbncees , ,

x


14-0000

td kepablin - an hie lifos Tele buy of lof Lie Mititon ot oo :

Aiple madi wonders. he keg bre beng: i zprbken 1 Le rem Rinteked Lh aeantn:

ty Ab, weeks in GRU, wavled in Hab) Tp wrd 6a Fox une, tes afew Mag kite ef |
4s: hassle Fimesheake bya {i fiiecrhedl the shila « f frreega tredt); Fipellein be Ve a
he - « tok ¢, rd “ed cshdeat ie ta the. Usd clin teorkes ea a Cdl,

Pee Glob i a A a
- ; _&.« Kha bowen _ th tse Se “ depuly ‘sol f “9. aa alckin ead
44 of vA wary nlelle gence “f P Five: tC. - a ~”

wt og he

tf. Magtor S.J. -a deputy ¢ ! tchig (em Womtip nea i vuole - |
gta fF Feel ta 7S40-S A.
_ &. konther capil flesh ney iiteld zeus f PPL & en 7s2,.
_&. Leslershery - - ba LHF tn of fecer AL dipcrtecal ff foreign Aiess; fie: :
Meehes v “f defense, oe

7 0 Mtolehater — Aa ‘fives f gel 404) ve ences
. Ae Orelber, fetesads’ ~ ta USI-54 he ctlincntst tice re fice £ he heey 6 la— :

- tly Cipence if fi Flue _ | . *
. .. . Pegedin bores ~ a chip. fi be scowl linia 4 f meg ‘eb bipence fitie. |
te 80 -/952. , __) App rye Cricguenrge,.

 «B. ke egenliee - A lttansntdee a dary sil Liyeuse pot of he bedi cute. ’
th Rect A. Soviet, febeainyratt Ab ful és HQ ‘

ue, A Seales, ~ 4 oe lis tye. Hoes & hil ta the eal diplematic as -
ayy ate : g math, ve yen eb a ah So gene i, Biased

enti 169 90 Sesame Made eneaemee
t

ian

mp

* oes mgt, ee” oe x


14.00000

QL.” Mel ncker neler Se: ayy —a def uf tir heoes cite eCligeuce s y Ot Hit a sp,
i | ape ‘Matuaatadyg ~ a tected y a ehasfe fmey biofeligace. ral Black sxe, We Sb

Bp. Seegeyere — as cag eancer ~ fat celined 4 Sendor ffecer of f Aa wey, A!

wleblsjenee af vA Thetis a ONV- Sb [carlicr hh. sovrbed te te Farteey)
, ff, . Sucslovick a ta LIL 0. Sob at Ce esini tad ex. f sag edo datcke elif.
ney sbsliigene. ft File,

itn from aching wos re0ckligf . a “ “ °
Wt Feshbe, - a wed wale rel be £850- « pity haf, ff h my! ‘th
Lei pease af. th miserly fe inclebery fut. “y. |

ace Teselewshey Greve - wordy ih Seu , Svec be e poe thel feqEn,

Bs tetenker, AC fat al officer ft Abs maeg jul dpe ds ff lect te L568. .

ae

oe Srishelunor eu fii ef pee “igo a Y WA, betpae * edhe 7

if. inorder Aickee é. A tee. aluecral a fosnect hifi Any iuelijee “9

apg baecety La ~eedy Tag shins sles ict acral rnp shoves gers
A EEETON rbivsescgencl cl, .

: a Yeas wu = ah fleece ff potieruce fhe ney allipes f FT bet~

#8, Mswws einige. ay I ge poe

a nn
te .

“erapey
SEGRE

’ " . > a a
pares pa senna ene meme wo tees

Sgt beiedee


14-0000

. rgd
; Ke ue fe Nias i“ AZM “Leaf wept wel. an CRER bow sity ‘bp —
jee wheat 4 ae euler lod. ff he he Y fi lell, Ceyenec fre Gel

ih Soveet frbur, Province eohiy Let liel™, _ ackins S nec. we

by uw Drieet anol votied 4 his pla ce ff *Y, yy itia Chee C en EL,
Crud 6 ff ey A f ati fen Ategeeu~ le bbe Lake Bs. &, ‘thes here
ehaccgeel nx Corti ZL Kewsoinelsh. -en oi neee, Men crested the -

Pues teat fins ladies Ferret! ace Te Sevied he (is
EL °

ee ee a ee

. \ }
_ wee ee . j
by lincge ‘| if

/

5
fag festeraga ‘3 \ bakes, .
4y — ; te vlad & te

~ Ny
sells, nents Zhillerbs €—_——— od ¥

ak ta a i

herfesse

‘

7 ee an ee EE

$e; qe |
Tenens ene eee a eee eee eo yy Looe moe - ee ~ wee ee
. : \ cee we me ee eee

NON

© dle iatblizence if J Hct ve | oveted i by Letevss ye, dex
deine , abeo [ott tial Miceiory f 0 Hot, jubrc tine “sl chili 2h bites,
: de head Guartirs of of Ff Fecct wat beast Teed “a BEE Coseeretl Lililerbet,
Ale corcta neater -t4 lil 7 7 Klcl jcxd admiral ba ag her draws, .

oa heck if staf. - - tree wdicctal hegatin ee , . GOULL28 »

de chip ff Mery falelejeuee A 7. Fle a “goad 4 espe fd L/ eet .

Rn Cheloor / vg: ke des yh ~ uy lei pe? mak by, rglenarely ia

wea! a tars f act eet ome ere eas

WOKE lane iigptins

acne ee vers
q ae
ast atig FO Be


14-0000

finer Rode working ty Uber th ee lace ar. hey « f frees vf te ale

oo

(tyes aly ey, ye tuent) Ce ivtien A le “ Zz CleytirS weeea Safe ere v lire
herbal, later f “ac “y Kouit bere ey. tate pea, Gee rkewe€

Leake - Te cotmi star),
J “ef workeg th Le. dif vten hein of hip Tee ut: Yfiecas. bad elon . “0

Puce

ley 7 “ee

a Le gp

ACW heclewast - crlrnel. Loyyes Luetewest lrow how Abvert,
Eeshes, “ee Vteing Orckher Redes tei Vegeclin, bes, a Coe anol PL we

: (fies. Here $6020 lee SearpenTs Ak pre waley,

_ ebhcen , it Stones hel & Mite. Fillouser.

Ms fet emit a

A, th, ee pub, MIS J fiw bia tho tecu CHirperg fi et
lege eee lshronl fr 4 Case, ; ‘ eUsefe ob ebicetory of

A jt - a AR we peesenil dyn heal” of Ui vin ey "titel.
jouee (a haf - colonel kalo ghein) weg ial iy a pecslete "don a |
ny Tin foronae. becacte fF hess, Mud baat epwiull tr tle heey
tale lec: “deee pret sp Aas Culeldsyin ec t 4 Fel tn Seve ek [bo
ele vA dfer & petisesucke t biklrips he ~ ~ fortcer fitéau), tekese vA
enced ty duzett, ty ft Cebicugrastss aivteiet frace Fecssin),

Sit Care Lette se Cy vellige oe force fori witla Ape ¢ fo -

- Levatd Svitel. ~ a etees eile! LUG fu 4, _ bare dex
-- ze < Atte, Melee sete. seit stad’ (72.
| ee Mle they debacle sou Chl

Be):
on da 60029 - ao.

ca

ct le abet aetna w. ne

~~ oe wee ee nee

he Px aed a se sed bad wha f. 188

AE yt eet lege we

ee pnts ae

Cos

14-0000

She beret niatestee - ha haf « of 74 Hee SC wet aticliucl + febrile NG.
ihe fe cliff ny ee oy teen pri ters een la tn 7, YD auk hi hye janlecr,
teu becne ffs: Fisegrecder, b hula “be rete "ale earl ethers ack seedyeals
tnd priced _ a
bifirs iy hes wuijel (2 diy) Ma ancy sale ll; ence petal aes Fe hafl a
. ted free. LA pereaeg | “ Srriesl, y, tn ferunuy Ue ceouk ft Thee
~~ tect wat deruceted well « gel 4 werk, here? Chess. leg aaothes,
th - a puparelicn 1 if a9 C-e8 fez seein peste bee Oat SL. sf new oo a
(EF pessens ceal poet], — an hiv ltl; peenley Teobinelg . ;
A hee cod of Metec er I te La Gese tiaseneng st nile by Mes,

Ler Lreri fe petigl a Lrensforensie. + Oi) eter es ye eree, .

: he nel h March, t4§9 j Reza t : G ceeel Pel elif tity ee
G sheet my. E

Lee ee _ See ee |
; :
an - ;
ee ce _ venetian ee a
m a ‘
: i
. Le ae : co eee ete wee ite ee J
i
: tee we eee ee ee eee wi
i
i
woe ae ne tee eee ee ene eee ee ee ee cee _- _- ee ee ee nee ee betes ee?
: 7 fo ececvee ees nenne me menmtemn me Be one Oe come, - - . a0 ee ee ee 8 cee! A
; : “ me _— co 7 Tt es ne mma nme en mame s , . :
be. : . i Cog who. . H
Prt ny re tegrmrgnn aennnntns eetene cnn cere a green cy aae er atone panne mena marinas manana —emat atest # endian «amen?
ee GULL
FT i ne ee ey
F] . ° .
ge : . . La ‘ toe ao
be eS Sas Se ea ei {-
rE eR
* “7 Some re mmm mec mere ee ae . ae nn samme r bt: ” é

ry . . wg Ope teen et fev aneme ae wu Reralspras sb sh
ellen, talpben nt aatlta aR etna od tomar red eel we chemi 2 Dea Sage ag 2
Ng Et. Sema . .

‘

14-0000

SECRET

°

TER

“aN

NOSENKXO DID NOT

3B.

Rue
-~WnZ
i
. a

|
|

.

i
{
i
t
4
:

Ser rucrenattaie in meaner ee te came Hae tes Wetee.

14-0000

“6

B. NOSENKO dic not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time i

claimed. (Previous conclusion) : |

The above is conclusion "B" in the previous summary in regard _
te NOSENKO. The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO entered

the then Second Chief Directorate, MVD, in mid-March 1953 and that his

eee rea

entry was not only facilitated by but due to the influence of General
Bogdan Zakharovich KC3ULOV.

Previous statements by NOSENKO and changes relative to date of
entry into the KGB have been mentioned in another section of the summary
and will not be repeated here, His statements during current interviews

: that he entered on duty in mid-March 1953 as a case officer in the Firet
Section, First Department, Second Chief Directorate, MVD, are con-

sidered adequately substantiated and should be accepted.

j

The conclusion of the previous summary (pages 61-74) that

NOSENKO did not enter the KGB in the manner or at the time claimed

>

“was primarily based on conflicting statements by NOSENKO as to when -
he entered the KGB (MVD). In 1962 NOSENKO said March 1953 and in

1965 NOSENKO again said March 1953, soon after the death of STALIN. : : a .

_ SECRET = onata2

Cae 4
Exclaced em automate!

. donngrasiag 200

Seclassiticatica

G

i
i

’

+ Ree ee es in Abe sacha neo 7 eoeeane - — : .
, eID Cs,” cine siren h ore : . ; RS

Ast nets ee

3

SY
Re

ef

14-0000

—~

~ . . : ‘le
Sane inn ad
in 1964, NOSENKO had given two dates in 1952 as nis time of entry into
the KGB in an effort not to'admit that he had failed to graduate from the
Institute of International Relations in 1949.
The previous summary gave considerable weight to the statements
of NOSENKO indicating that he. did not enter the KGB (MVD} under what
are considered normal KGB procedures. ‘Proper allowances were not
given tor position of the father of NOSENKO, the Minister of Shipbuilding,
‘sand the influence of General KOBULOV: An analyst can either accept or
reject the statement of NOSENKO that he entered the KGB (MVD) through
_ -the influence of.General KOBULOV:;. but,. if the statement is accepted, ‘then
sthe failure. of NOSENKO to be required to follow normal, KGB, procedures
.should.also.be.accepted. - A Communist society or.a Soviet intelligence
organization is not and could not be immune to influence by a high official.

General KOBULOV as of mid-March 1953 was, First Deputy to BERI

YA,

the Minister of the then MVD. ;

The previous summary raises several points concerning the

‘ ,

“eligibility of NOSENKO for the KGB (MVD).' It points out on page 67
that other than his undistinguished period of service with the Naval RU,

whe was no more eligible for a KGB. appointment in 1953 than he was at

the time of his previous rejection in 1950, This statement is not contro-

ras tthe w
co
SIR


14-0000

“was not sponsored by any person of influence as was tne case in 1953
with General KOBULOV who in mid-March 1953 was the First Deputy
to BERIYA.

The previous summary also states that according to KGB .
defectors familiar with the standards in force at the time, no candidate

was accepted who had ever had tuberculosis, This is a flat statement

which it is doubtiul any defector or series of defectors could fully ©

ee

substantiate; namely, that it never happened. Until and unless it is
medically Proven that NOSENKO did not have tuberculosis, itis accepted
i that he did have tuberculosis in 1952 and was at a sanitarium --. xest-

the KGB.

a

after mid-March 1953. The influence of KOBULOV could undoubtedly

place in n Kubinka, | Tei is also accepted that he was an officer. i

have permitted NOSENKO to enter the KGB even though he previously
‘ had tuberculosis, but the flat statement that no candidate was accepted who
had ever had tuberculosis is not and cannot be sufficiently substantiated.
The previous summary contained a number of additional remarks
: and conclusions intended to show that NOSENKO was not eligible for and
therefore could not have entered the KGB (MVD). Comments concerning
, these will be brief since there is considered to be no adequate basis at
“this ‘time on which to contend that NOSENKO did not enter the KGB oo

a (MVD) as an officer: in. mid-March 1953. .A comment was made that” - a

SECRET

seminamepmasammanineneataamaee ware te cee Aart Semin Le RRA cae Bae as elt Neeraemtet |

Leena tent +


14-0000

- WY ae eee

NOSENKO Gid not take a physical examination in connection’with his
processing ior KGB entry, and that such a medical examination was
a routine and mandatory part of the processing of a KGB candidate.
This statement makes no allowance for the influence of General
KOBULOV; but, in addition, does not consider the fact that the Naval
RU dossier on NOSENKO was available to the KGB (MVD).

7 The previgus summary also failed to note that the MVD would
have had independent information in regard to NOSENKO ‘since the MVD ss
would have conducted any necessary inquiry in connection with the entry

_ of NOSENKO into. the Naval RU. As of 1953, the MVD undoubtédly also

had a-dossier on the father of NOSENKO since this was still the STALIN

pont . Se ie

" efa,
The summary also states’ that NOSENKO did not complete the

necessary lengthy Anketa before entry into the KGB (MVD) and did not

’ speak to any personnel officers or visit the personnel office, It would

en.

eee

seem that the influence of General } KOBULOV could have permitted the
elimination of most if not all of the necessity of complying with normal -
procedures, but NOSENKO has during interviews stated that he com-

pleted the Anketa while sitting at his desk aiter entry into the KGB (MVD).

Page 70 of the previous summary states that NOSENKO did not

-LO0L135

naeectesncenrtmnen rants en seawnn eet om aes oe

SECRET

Tne aU AS yi a Hm Tamed aoa eT 6 Lom tg 8 VATE anew ae ied eons yen

[sae os

Se

‘ know.the designation of his own Directorate either at the time he allegedly . 7 US


14-0000

entered on duty or during his first year of KGB service. While . a :

NOSENKO has claimed that the designation of his Directorate at the

time he entered the KGB (MVD) in mid-March 1953 was the Second
Chief Directorate and that it subsequently was redesignated the

First Chief Directorate, DERYABIN 2bas stated this reversal of

designations occurred in March 1953.
STALIN died in early March 1953 and that same month the’ ; - JA

MVD and the MGB were merged under the name MVD with BERIYA

as Minister. BERIYA held this position until his arrest in early June ae : 4 2

1955. BERIYA was succeeded. by KRUGLOV, who held office for less

. than.a year, Yuriy RASTVOROV, was recently queried concerning the ne, an - cor a zs
date of the reversal of the designation of the FCD,and SCD and places
it as the end of April or early May 1953. GOLITS-YN has indicated that

te . : .
the change occurred "soon after the advent of BERIYA as head of the

,

MVD in April 1953," In the light of our inability to fix the effective date

of the reversal of the designations of the SGD and the FCD, it is oo -?
unreasonable to impugn NOSENKO on his statement as to the designation

of his Directorate at the time of his entry into the KGB (MVD).
There is a disagreement between NOSENKO and others as to-who
was responsible for the reversal of designations of ‘the FCD and the. SCD.
oe NOSENKO is ofthe opinion that-it occurred under. KRUGLOV, which is z j _
eB aa uy SOULESE:
SECRET

matte Saegette Reis SRR “tan to

tty,

- . oe
. eo
ime rraman tame sence Neen nme § cartons tee


14-0000

.GOLITSYN, all of whom maintain that BERIYA was responsible for

in conflict with the staternents of DERYABIN, RASTVOROV and hg,

the changes. As for the issue of who was responsibie for the reversal
of designations, it would appear that NOSENKO is in error. However,

the fact that he was a new junior officer and that this was a period of
_—-—

upheaval in the KGB (MVD) effectively eliminates any significance in

this issue. a

NOSENXO is criticized in the previous summary for not knowing
the location of the Chief Directorate of the Militia or the history of the
KI (Committee of Information). NOSENKO has stated that he had no
contacts with either office during 1953-1955 and there is no adequate reason
to disbelieve this.statement. He is not aware of when the XI ceased to
exist (1951 given ia the summary, but other information indicates the KI
continied to exist in a nominal capacity until the mid-1950's), but care
should be used in stating what NOSENKO should know if he held a certain
position. Readers of this summary may wish to reflect on their, own
memory concerning the location and their knowledge of Agency facilities at
any given period of time or when Agency components or related organizations

were organized or ceased to exist, .

6

SECRET

x

wegen Ppa 2 ereaneeeen me ae ee rnin tT

ae ere es

eon Rear oe te

ote y

wee tee


14-0000

a

The point has also been made that any career of NOSENKO

in the KGB should have ended or he should have at least encountered
difficulty when his benefactor General KOBULOV, together with the
brother of General XOBULOV, was arrested with the BERIYA group in
a early June 1953. NOSENKO has during current interviews stated that he
encountered no difficulties but is aware that the KOBULOV connection . - :
- was discussed.by an officer from the Personnel Directory with an ., 7 : a : Sty

official of the First Department. ‘Under other circumstances NOSENKO

would very possibly have encountered difficulty; but, it shouldbe noted , ps

that the father of NOSENKO retained his position, that. NOSENKO only, © is.

met General KOBULOV through his father, and that NOSENKO has. stated lt. .
that although his father knew General KOBULOV, his father could in no

way be considered a member of the BERIYA group.

a Rb

‘ ie o - cr) re ‘ ~ pene eee
1 ge gh TOT NIA SCARF a AT OS nee Licance Come I ar LIN Meee asada get a coe BERET TE RE IS | :

RYO ARE ROR Hee Ree ert on

MES

14-0000

SECRET

fo

vo
Veet

CAN

rs

ssv"

MER

“A

a ee

cere

THE 1953 -.1955 PER‘OD

He)

CTION THRO

‘SE

AS HE CLAIMED

.

Sr ee ene ene ee eee, enema

See net en erntnets oa att eo

RE
Oe

of

a

ze

es

se

SMB

io)

t

bey

Nee

we fe

14-0000

C.

¢
g} 8
s| 3
Oo] So
9 8
a °
ti)
.)
al 3
§ 8
ont
e| 3
fs] Py
S
ws =
VU
ag .
|
(3) v
—l €£
<| 38
v rt
a i>)
bed 4)
ce} oo
ot n
my) 3s
4
vo} 8
a Me
Poy g
i) p.
& Ww
3] 8
3) on
g '
Pal
“A wn
fh
a
3)
“| 8
4a
3
fo)
1
3
}
isl
4

The

"C" in the previ

usion

sy
7

10us Summary.

. The above is conc.

irst

£ the Fi

is that NOSENKO was an off

ion in thi

conclus

icer o

nis summary 18

Section (American Embassy Section), First Department, from mid-March

1953 to late May 1955 when he was transferred to the Seventh Department,

SCD.

n detail with NOSENKO

that NOSENKO was an

ye

This period of time has been covered

ion is

The conclus

“¥

;

‘during current interviews.

but was not a very

ion

icer in the First Secti

fre
ak

°

effective officer and that

both his work and behavior were decidedly influenced by the fact that he

NOSENKO is reluctant to

was the. son of the Minister of Shipbuilding.

curing

admit that he was other than slightly lackadaisical in his work

that h

1 be-

it

dof time, but is not hesitant to adm

is perio

th

is persona

havior was such as to cause him to be removed as Secretary to the

Komsomo] unit in 1954 and to cause an unsatisfactory "characterization"

6061140

SECRET

a
qe
os
25
ry
i
3
=

Liars tee)

bet oe tee eh Erde eered Mel gy BS

TT TT a ae

ten ae

thas

ore


14-0000

os

to be prepared in early 1955 which necessitated a decision as to whether
he would be fired from the KGB or transierred to some other component.
The influence of his family is quite apparent in the above since
. his father was advised of his difficulties in 1954 by an official of the
KGB and his mother interceded on his behalf in 1955 with the Chief of
SCD. The result in 1955 was that NOSENXKO was transferred to the
Seventh Department and not fired from the KGB. .
The question has been raised as to how NOSENKO could remain

omy

in the KGB when after 1954 he was not a member of the Komsomol and

thts ry . ve

-. , Was not eligible to become a candidate for the Communist Party. This

is.a valid question but a plausible explanation is again the fact that he was ue 2

the son of the then Minister of Shipbuilding.
NOSENKO has stated curing previous and current interviews that

following his entry into the KGB and until circa mid-1954 he was respon-

sible for work against American correspondents in Moscow. He has not
claimed that he had any successes and has stated that the work with news-
paper correspondents already recruited was being handled by other officers.
NOSENKO has explained that during this time he was a "new officer,"
indicating he could hardly have been expected to act as an experienced .

officer.. His knowledge of correspondents in Moscow during this period .

poy of time,: together. with his knowledge of other. KGB.officers and his _

co “GOOLL44:

SECRET

Liane SER See itn te chile al ot enh mete wel re ae meme nt wae x

eRHRTTTRTTRAT

HORNE aH

14-0000

: information concerning his own agents is delieved of sufficient weight
to accept the statement of NOSENKO that work against American cor-
respondents was his assignment irom mid-March 1953 to mid-1954.
From circa mid-1954 until his transfer to the Seventh Depart-
ment in late May 1955, NOSENKO claims and has claimed he was an
officer of the First Section with the responsibility of work against the
Military*Attaches (Army) at the United States Embassy in Moscow. It.

is considered, based on his knowledge of the various Military Attache

personnel and other collateral information furnished by NOSENKXO, that

NOSENKO was an officer. of the First Section during the mid-1954 - late
May 1955. period of time, that his primary work was against members
of the Office oi the Military Attache, but that the quality of hia work
undoubtedly left much to be desired.

In circa mid-1954, NOSENKO was removed as Secretary of the
Komsomol unit and by early 1955 his performance was such that at least
certain officials in the First Department desired his removal from the

. 2
First Department, if not the KGB. Under these circumstances,

NOSENKO could be criticized as having been a very poor if net
undesirable KGB officer, but his knowledge of the First Section during

this period of time and his knowledge of the members of the Office of

a

3 gg oat. 42

gp eT

eR cee ete en ee ie eet

“r Ste Ub ee

ak Se AARNE

14-0000

EUDORA ONS NES AOE TEASE OBL! I CLR ES METER FTTH CLA ONE NN TELEF CDE EI TEI I IE DAI TRIED SEM AEH TRE IRE I EN NM in EL

ve
ri
c>

oe

rei
=I

the Military Attache supports the claira of NOSENZXO that he was an
officer oi the Firs? Section with the indicated assignment as related
by aim.

NOSENXO has stated that the work against the Military ’
Attaches was not primarily directed toward development of recruitment
possibilities, but was directed toward control of the Military Attaches
on trips in order to prevent observation of sensitive areas, sensitive
sites or sensitive activities in the USSR. This attitude by the KGB
would appear to be compietely plausible and NOSENKO noted as
exceptional in this regard the recruitment attempt against Captain Waiter
MULE. NOSENKO explained this exception as retaliation for approaches
to Soviets in the United States in that period,

NOSENKO has been criticized because he did not know all the
details concerning the Military Attaches which it was considered he
should have known if he had the specific responsibility for work against
the Military Attaches during the indicated period of time, it is submitted

that this may be evidence o: his failure to satisiactorily fulfill his

2 4 | 0001143

SECRET :

oes mete

14-0000

o
we
ba
:

uu
7
.

ack} ~- , toys te Cr eect
IOAS, bab Weekes ty @liowaesce In: the uscest

uel Jture un the KGB

Ps +

Bites wie - 1954. oy

NOS 2a Bae peevvadly .cleaied and otlll indicates a dcisnice

tack of avis during approxiac. ly

:

March - May 1935. NO, Was when an un-

satisiaciory "characiezization" was being prepared’ on NOSENKO, a
ducision was being mace on his case, anc a period of.time in wick he

2

Pages 84 - 387 of ine previous summary suzzest thas NOSE NLS

hed wor Zurnisned swiicient decails ahout nis alleged agent actwork foe

It is considered that CS

ormation concerning '". 7 LODINA

2 Weuld appeer that there was ao wt nc by

Venn ete fee eet
NOLENAG 2 withscic

foi. The. LO Was HeVET ble ED.

me. Vid Gels.

Cen A>
wa feat
SECRF

soatsencanvee
ual

es pea tate tanennacesty =

cota Hite


21 NRBMMG FA cutee aeetyneuenemenenmaine ens ue eee seu «

roy

Re ts
x
a

pres
—

‘The effectiveness or non-eifectivenéss, of. NOSENKO during his

'

assignment to the First Section, First Department, ‘from mid-March

1953 to late May 1955 can have little pertinency in the. question of the |
bona fides of NOSENKO if it is accepted that he actually was an Officer
in the First Section during this period of time, It ie felt that information
furnished by NOSENKO in current interviews and in previous interviews
is of sufficient scope and detail that his claimed service as an officer

in the First Section during this period of time is completely acceptable.

6001145

6

SECRET

Ae se cette nd Sees a te ree

+

14-0000


14-0000

Rs A ALORS OE A gamer Inne ae ae a ee Oe me I eect oe

7 g eAtRa

ARERR

D. DURING THE PERIOD 1955 - 1960, HE WAS NEITEES

SENIOR CASE OFF iCER’ IN, NOR DEPUT TY CHIEF OF,

THE SEVENTH DEPARTMENT AMERICAN-BRITISH

COMMONWEALTH SECTION

e Looe ‘ v
ve ” Spe 4 we ; why
1 y Ke
4 . +
1 .
t oy s “ toa .
. too. *,
. °

ve tecet tye mcrcaticy ~~

te . érwasratss and
“ee . Gectssel seetioa

Baer gee rao .

i
:

wee


14-00000
RNS agit meet ae vte eta
SE 3 conie ats 8

q

D. During the period of 1955 ~ 1960, NOSENKO was neither a

senior case officer in, nor Deputy Chief of, the Seventh Department, | x =

American-British Commonwealth Section, (Previous conclusion) .

if
‘

The above is conclusion "D" in the previous summary. The
current conclusion is that NOSENKO was an officer in the Seventh ‘
Department, SCD, from late May 1955 to December 1959 and was
Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section, Seventh

Department from 1958 to December 1959.

During current interviews, NOSENKO has furnished extensive

- information concerning his own activities in the Seventh Department

during the 1955-1959 period. Interviews of persons who were the sudject . =

of KGB interest collaterally confirm that NOSENKO was personally in- .
volved in certain claimed activities during 1955 to December 1959.
These activities include among others the recruitment of fRichara BURGI| oO
)
in June 1956, contact with|Sir Allen Lane hendlistnee BIRS in the
summer of 1957, the recruitment oi[Gieeife HARRIS in 1958, the re-

0
cruitment off George DREW|in the spring of 1959, the recruitment of

| - 6001148 ky
SECRET

eae A tees. a A es em es en seme me NR ete es Esa

5/64

Bh new sense

14-0000

ol | 06 7

[wintiam Stanley WiLBY}in June 1959, the recruitment of David TAYLOR] . |
- in the summer of 1959, the recruitment of|Gerard MERTENS |in July - |
. . ; . 6 igs
August 1959, and the recruitment of [Arsene FRIPPEL}in i959, The
foregoing is not a complete list of a]l cases in whicn NOSENKO ciaims
pexsonal involvement, but is representative of cases in which his alleged
participation has been contirmed by interviews with the individual who

06, Oo, OC

[Sir Allen LANE, Arthur BIRSE, William Stanley WILBY, and

was the KGB target.

[ace TAYLOR were[Byieifctizens and the other above-named indi-
viduals were[Unitelcated]citizens, This would seem to substantiate
the claim of NOSENKO that during 1955 - December 1959 he was an
officer engaged in KGB operations against American-British Common-
weaith tourists in the USSR,

in addition, NOSENKO has furnished specific information about
an operation againei(Kiasti MALI an American tourist who was in
the Soviet Union from approximatcly September 1955 to December 1955,

(MALIA has not been interviewed and eviil not be interviewed, so at this

time no particular 1955 case in which NOSENKO claims involvement

or personal knowledge has been substantiated by interview of the

individual involved.

goci149

gre ee cate eee

aE a ane Bee . wot ee ae es

Rene ©

eR


14-0000

ULV

NOSENKO nas turnisned information on tre travel of certain
United States Government oiiiciais, inciuding Congressional represent-
atives to the USSR in 1955 - 1956; and the trip of Supreme Court Justice
William 0, DOUGLAS in 1955 which, when consiuered with the previously

\
mentioned specifics, adequateiy substantiate his . .imed service in the
Seventh Department and work against American-B ritish Commonwealth
tourists during the late May 1955 - December 1959 period,

NOSENKO has stressed that when he transferred to the Seventh
Department, the Tourist Section had just been established and an agent
network was not .vailaole for operations against American and British
tourists, This seems quite logical since the infiux of tourists into the
USSR was jut in.a formative stage.

NOSENKO has spoken in detail about an agent network he de-
veloped after 1955 which primarily consisted of Intourist personnel
and two homosexual agents, "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" (AGB code
names), whose extensive use in KGB operations has been confirmed by
interviews with individuals who were the subject of homosexual com-
promise operations,

The previous summary contained remarks on pages 101 - 150 roo
in regard'to the claimed 1955 - 1959 Seventh Department service of

g0g4159

NOSENKO. To comment on all the aspects mentioned in those fifty

wet


14-0000

. --:
CTAAT

VLU wwe

pages would be repetitious and in many instances superfiuous. Ii is
considered that even ji the statemenis were accepted in toto, there
woud stili not be an adequate basis for 4 conclusion that NOSENKO
was not an officer in ihe claimed positions in the Seventh Department
during the period of late May 1955 - Decemoer 1959. Ner is it con-
ceded that, if all the sub-conclusions and the interpretations of various
areas of information were accepied without quaiification, there is any
evidence that NOSENKO was dispatched by the KGB, "However, there
are certain assumptions and interpretations which appeared in the
previous summary which are particularly worthy of comment ang which
are considered erroneous or require additional clarification.

On page 145 it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO

was an English-speaking specialist in sexual entrapment, not a counter-

mr
a
WW
a
a

intelligence officer responsible for the identification of forcign a
among tourists or for the development, recruitment, and exploitation

of agents for the KGB. The Second Chief Directorate, KGB, and the
MVD have used homosexual and heterosexual compromise in numerous
known (and presumably unknown) successful recruitments and recruit-
ment attempts, This activity has not been limited to the Seventh Depart-
ment, SCD; and the innuendo that NOSENKO was "only an English-

speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" and not a KGB gsi wien

‘ 4

7 ‘SECRET |


14-0000

Seventh Departrnent personnel, activities, procedures, and topics of

a similar nature is not considered to have any foundation in fact.

{
4
{
\
rt a - .
WOLVi ews
considered with the cetaiied information NOSENKO has proviced on |

Page 145 of the above surnmary lists eleven operations which

were Seventh Department cases prior to 1960 and which were included ‘
in the notes furnished to CLA in 1964 by NOSEXKO. The named operations

were those against Bernaré PECHTER, Patrick PRESSMAN, John RUFE, Ob ds bby OL, 06,06, db dp
Gerald SEVERN, Sofia SHATTAUER, (inu) KARLOV, Norman FISK, ,
Ralph MATLAW] Marvin KANTOR { Michael GINSBURG, and William Ob bb

TARASKA), The criticism made in regard to the above eleven casea

was that NOSENKO could not describe the individual operations other |

than to say that he had recorded the name of the target and such details

ment in 1962 following his return from the First Department.
The notes brought out by NOSENKO axe considered in another
section of this summary, but it should be noted here that a full review

as he could acquire when he reviewed. the activities of the Seventh Depart~ |

of all of the notes of NOSENKO currently availabie indicates that his - |
I

statements as to how and why he obtained the information in tne notes ~~

are completely plausible. A detailed explanation of the notes furnished

by NOSENKO would almost. necessitate a separate listing of the approxi-

mately 150 cases or names mentioned in tae notes,

GovLL52
- SECRET


14-0000

cae

er

During current interviews, NOSZNKO furnished specific
information on certain of the above cleven cases, including| Wiliiam
TARASKXA, Bernara PECIiITER, Michaei GINSBURG and John RUF

.
It shouid aiso be noted that certain of the cases suchas Marvin KANTOR.
and William TARASKA| were cases in which the tourist was visiting
e Soviet Union and that NOSENKO has given a satisiactory

relatives in tr

expianation oi how he iearnea oi the KANTOR case. NOSENKO has, in

' discussing his cuties as Deputy Chief of the American-British Common-

wealth Section, also explained that if a tourist indicated that he intended

to visit relatives in the USS-., the case automaticaily was assigned toa

group of officers in the Section who reported directiy to the Chief of

Section and were, not under the supervision of NOSENKO,

NOSENKO has stated that he noted the names of three of the
individuals when retiring the files of "GRIGORIY" and "SHMELEV,"'
two homosexual agents of NOSENKO previously mentioned. NOSENKO
has explained that "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY" had the assignment of
identifying American travelers with homosexual tendencies, that they
had contact with numerous Americans, and that they had homosexual
activity with individuals on whom they reported but on whom no overt

action was taken by the Seventh Department. In some cases the individual

gouLLos

SECRET

Papeete we

3 06,06 06,06 08


14-0000

ye

‘
my
ae)
rey
pant

a

was not considered a worthwhile target and in others the information

' was just maintained for possible use at a later date if the individual

revurned to the USSR.
o6
NOSENKO has aiso explained how he learned of the[Patrick ;
Ob

PRESSMAN land (Gerald SEVERN cases; and, tne listing of the Sofia OG
SHATTAUER |case in connection with the 1955 - 1959 period is in com-
plete error since page 427 of the previous surmmary contains information
from NOSENKO on her recruitment in 1962, During ‘current interviews
the notes which NOSENKO brought out in 1964 have been discussed in
detail with NOSENKO. He has given a detailed explanation of the material
which he brought out and his explanation of all aspects is very convincing.

The previous summary (page 144) suggested that the involvement
of NOSENKO in certain cases being handled by other Sections in the
Seventh Department or by the KGB Directorate of Moscow was unusual,
An examination of the cited cases does not indicate that his participation
was unusual, but rather that his explanation of why he was involved is
logical and normal, No consideration was previously given to the English
language capability of NOSENKO or the fact that his own homosexual agents
were used in two of the four cited cases.

The summary alsv.noted that there was a question concerning

whethex| Gisella HARRIS was necessarily a Seventh Department case,

ob govit54

. SFORFT


14-0000

a b 5
This question seems quite superfiuocus since A: \98 in the USSR
on a tourist visa and "reai" tourists are the respoissoility of the Seventa
Department. Departmental responsibility within the SCD ior an indi-
vicual traveling in tue USSH is decided on the basis of how the individual °
is traveiing; i.e., whether on a tourist visa, as a member ‘of a dcicgation,
as the invitee of an organization in the USSR, as a iormer diplomat ,
stationed in Moscow, as a Ciplomat not previously stationed in Moscow,
as a member of the Cultural Exchange program, as a student attending
a university in the USSR, etc. There are also various other factors
which affect the determination of which Department or organizational
component of the SCD has the responsibility for a tourist case, These
factors include whether the individual is already suspected of foreign
intelligence connections and whether the individual is a businessman,
In addition, certain actual tourists in the USSR may never become the
responsibility oi the SCD if the individual is of specific interest to the
FCD.

6

: On pages 148 - 149, NOSENKO is criticized for not knowing at
least some of the substance of the information furnished by George
BLAKE in regard to the CIA-MI-6 program of utilizing tourist agents

in the USSR. This criticism completely ignored the fact that NOSENKO

made severai references in 1962 to the KGB having such information

6001155

(ba


14-0000

although he dic then and still suspects that Willlam VASSALL was the

source, The references by NCSENKO to the KGB naving such inior-
. .

mation were not developed in 1962 or later interrogations, and it was

.
not until current interviews inat it was estabiisned that NOSENZO had
. ———~. “a _ -

‘actually seen excerpts oi information passe’ by George BLAKE.
According to NOSENKO, the information which was obviously only

aber

partial was furnished to the FCO by the SCD and could oniy have come
from an agent. ,

The previous summary (page 149) also notes that in 1961 CIA
acquired a lengthy Top Secret study on the subject of the use of tourists
by American Intelligence for espionage and operational support in the
Soviet Union (document was iurnished by GOLITSYN following nis de-
fection in December 1961). it was noted that the summary contained
references to certain 1958 - 1959 tourists whom the KGB counter-
intelligence identified as Amirican agents and noted that NOSENKO
claimed he was Deputy Chicf of the American-British Commonwealth
Section in this period of time and that he claimed the KGB icentified
no American Intelligence agents during this period of time, What later

is described as a claim by NOSENKO is neither an accurate reflection

of what NOSENKO said prior to 1967 or has said since 1967,.

90041156

-?


14-0000

“aes

we

Ne Ge

Leemines

NOSENKO Las never clairned to kiiow all activities against
American traveiers in the Soviet Union curing 1958 -.1959, Many
of these travelers would have been the responsibility of a section in
the Seventh Departinent, other than the American-~Britisn Commen-
wealth Section, or another Depariment in the SCD, NOSENKO was
quite aware that certain of the American tourists in 1958 - 1959 were
acting suspiciously from a KGB point of view,

NOSENKO has stated he was aware thata document which the
Seventh Department had prepared and furnished to the FCD in an efiort
to obtain further assistance from the FCD in the work against tourists
had been compromised by GOLITSYN. NOSENKO stated he was not in
the Seventh Department when the document was prepared and did not
review the document wnitil after tne defection of GOLITSYN and foliow-
ing advice from the FCD to the Seventh Department, SCD, that the
document had been compromised. The document furnished by GOLITSYN
has never béen reviewed with NOSZNXO to determine if it contained
additional information not in the document which he waa aware had
been prepared by the Seventh Department for the FCD.

NOSENKO has been impugned on his apparent unfamiliarity with

a number of cases cited as examples in the document furnished by

GOLITSYN. In current interviews, however, the descriptiqn is POSENKO

ee ne eee .

ed


14-0000

tae GlStlly eel Go Deno lillies Wwlin ene Od foe

wees ~ oe a er - mete TTR eee : eta t
Ver eGee Cett SOLE ds Ge abee-,, Se Oa UV ee we 2D Boe
. wD ate se Te
Ye SENG Do

sree CL en Ue 2 Te

. . “a Pe ee FO ewe Tee sons
af ven le ween DC Aw On Ve COS & Bee.

SECO ween WeSC OTe) LOGY, & are
net we Are ee - ene i . foe Dec ab + as
aVDE goes craven OED as Vaca, SCA Toveon

ern Mn ce cee bap emt foe cla
WES thG SestOno eaby Ga tc DPourlee 2c.

Sma coef ee pt rey atiree tn ti TIS fe te te ee te
oe 2G CO LUMNGSE Ga WO VEAGIS WS US CO, BC AUEIN SS chon ees
cue wae tery Mine anton etn
Men, DETSous Craven eT OT,

loa wp eee a eh *
2 Gl Oe UT ESSAVEG SLOS.C™

5 wt : - eA nee an

Loy NOSINAG of tes

[ena ssusin}c: ea velid United

et of tne Sevenva Dezartq-

true mame in the USSR and, therefore, a tar

ment, a5 NOSINKO claims. lvnough several avenues o/ possisly

ation Lave not yet been fully explored, thete is 2

Cas.

14-0000

- - . +
af ‘s
a a .
a ‘
‘a > FE
~ 4 e be vet
Ps a as
fo} ? ae a oH 3
n 2 WS wa a ¥ ‘
” oo ua Q iH a .
a 9 i 3 “4 a a °
id Be a "J ‘ . :
os 3 sso 2 3 . Ms : Lo
bow "gg SE Ag
“ “t % a 8) “f 8 . . . 4 ai?
: : .. . : : :
* S$ 3 8 F B 8 oO — ea
3 8 8 2 2 «kt - es B
N a ii 9 o , L _— ae
a at 2 ny He gy 4 ° : Be
¥ 4 2 r ad - B ia
ado 9 ~ FR . ‘ 7
S a3 4) 9. Q Hh ; | :
4 “ Qo db 4 ‘ : i ‘
re) gS fe ; : ae
a gy “4 ‘f 33 . . ; . 7
ort ue a fey z HW ~ woe ee
> a 3 3 : , ao
9 2 g Q a : - 7
a 9 go ~ . 74 ;
9 y nt 4 3 5 , j ;
- o a am no. ms : ot § i i
2 goa d 4 7 a0
9 aoe od 8 Sy
" " ns y > a j :
Q 9 3 33 0) : = :
“4 > >» 4 wW oy Sy
A ' Ss . :
i 5 06d os) . - oS ae
3 a8 Gy 3
3 4 8 } 4 . - “3
. + *, ° . ;
fs 4 i 2 4 ‘ ‘ ; ; :
" . : 7
3) . a o 3
2 a 3 Le) 4 oN .
: s 3 te sho ‘‘ .
ory et fay ry Q 1 ‘
ue ret ay Se 8 ;
ue a 6 rr ry “
eS .
3 ‘ H
¥P) 7) Q 2 u 63 Z 7 .
NM i~o ‘ gy ¢ _
3° 7 42 8. a ¢ YF OS ” . he ,
a a fx] ‘s g 8 - a * “ . . an
a iP 2) .
3 8 a 3 t be
t4 > t) " i 19 “g °
34 9 3 6 § 3s
a 4 42 @ Sf gg 4 &
a wy : 4 ‘ ™ : , oe : ~
a 4 3 & 6@ <¢ #8 a oO .
bd

1 Sant Treen ees oe meen ene RR CG ity dat

14-0000

SECRET

NOSENKO WAS NEITHER

ECTION NOR

EMBASSY S

fy

PERIOD 1961 ~ 1962 (sic).

wee Cann eo HD eceremnamnnete ne H

aan antag enone

FP ea ee ie sin a eae a a

‘
i
4

x

eth

ih

RY
oy

wy

oS

a veneneg tees |
ONS RESINS
ln AE


14-0000

TR ARON Lemna ens etn tecelin te merit meee vey met

‘
se gee gpmmnere 01 a sited O86 Sento
we

ERY
Skee

ay

RARE

AP Betats ar ObOH

©)

E. NOSEN

Embassy Section nor s

curing the veriod of 1961 +

It is the conclusion of this summucsy that NOSENXO Lele ite

position of Deputy Chiei, First Section (fJaserican Emoassy Section),
ScD, from January 1960 - December 1981.

Tare claim of NOSE NKO that he hele the above position in 2956

- 196] has been the m, tion of NOSENXO co

satisfactorily resolve anc accept. Acc

his claim to have held this particular
a decision as to whether the remainder of his claimed KGB career
is valic. Itis believed scasoneole to presume that if NCSENKO wes
Deputy Chief of the American-Britiso Commonwealth Section, Seventh
Department, prior to December 1959 in the absence of any indicasion
that he was demoted, he should ha: ve been as seast a Deputy Chiez of
Section curing 1960 - 1961,

Position in the SCD, KG3, and througaout the XGB is important

from a monetary point of view as well as a prestige point of view. If

Vee wet

gouri6h

AeA ene


14-0000

ee

k

5 apparent that the knowledge of NOCSENXO concezing a

: |. * ‘aspects of activity in the First Section, First Department, curing i¢50 -

1961 is incompiete wea iucged by whe: are considered the normai

mat interviews,

ities os NCSENK

et

ies of & Deputy Cr

: Ts ~o¥esponsibils

an eiiort was made to Getermine what the responsibi

ba

swe : ,

ae

actually were in 1960 - 196i and whether his statements in this area
were impossible or could be accepted as not negating his claim to have
-been Deputy Chief, First Section,

According to NOSINKO, in the early 1960's there were only Loot

{7 .: .: approximately fizteen Deputy Chieis ci Section in the entire SCD and

i Dae ees og : . tae :
: ‘'. ' 9 'isMcertain departments none of the sections nad a Deputy Chie! of Section,
: . . f

be roe

in acaition, transier of a Deputy Cuiel oi Section was not always followed

. «by a replacement in kind, according to NOSENXO who stated that he was

not replaced by another Deputy Chief when ne transferred to the First

Section, First Department.

gooise2


14-0000

According to NOSANAO, wiese wes muta Job

_—

is

rc

eg ote. fs ol tlhe wereetiaestees Spee Praeed
2 LMG Ve wees OS ie pariiculay Dizuty Cries

el of Deriwimnest anc Chiel of Sovivoa

The previous summary Couw avez

VER. Com.ct

between early siarements oF NOSINAS thet he replaced no ene when he

entezved on cuty in th

a

claim that he replaced Mi:

Section. Along with tunis he had first ere

other ofticers in the Section wich previous responsi

matters which were assigned to him uvon his arrival there, then later

‘stated that BAKHVALOV had been responsibie for these matcers, The

previous summary noted that interrogation had never resolved these

contradictions.

cture of the nature of &

In the light of the present clearer

Deputy Chief of Section, the statements of NOSENKO on BAKHVALOV
i nena

and on the issue of who he, NOSENKO, Gid or did not replace are not
contradictory, There is no reason to cuestion that BAKHVALOV, with

«

whom NOSENKO, incidertaliy, did not overlap, was a Deputy Chiel of

"Section in the First Section before NCSENXO, ane that he was respon-

sible for certain areas which later fell to NOSENKO, On the other

7 a 2 GOGLLES

: ms
ATA . Tee an
Netyprs ‘ °

neh gy nem &

e

§
,
;-
+
y

BRUNT T ECS
TESS

DRRSERSEES

14-0000

anes ee TNS le oplee ised) renscon foe Bie Sele:
Hane, GCCGluang io LCSZNAG, vac PVN sal Teason 267 Gao oer, 2@

to the iret Section was to concestvate on a new arca of tinphusis (code

Saat

clerks), There cowd of course have been no specie predecessor for
‘ < . oxvea rostered or atl in we ee ee TL ES mt Cee

@ Sudsiantively Dew areca. Therefore, in one sesee SADZAVALOV wos

the prececessor G2 NOSGNAO anc in another stase ne was noi. The

interpretation of ihe various sicitemenies of NOSENKS on

being in conilic wut OF comrusio. on

ecorcing to NO at tac time of Kis transfer to the Firs . . :
A z NOSE ENKO, t t: + t
-' Section, First Department, in early 1960, he nad not been told and for ,

(a short period thereawier was not told -vhat his actusl duties woule Sew tS

KOVSHUK, Caiei of the. First Section, wanted to assign NCSENKAS to

supervise the work asainst Service Attaches at the Unized States oribassy. . ~
NOSENKO ‘felt that tre proposed assignment by KOVSHUA was intence ot

to keep NOSENKO cecupiec with nonproductive work since AGS policy
e
for work against the Service Attaches was primarily one of conirel on oe
: .
trips and not active wor towards possible recruitmen:,

After a short period of time, NOSENKO was iniormed by

GRIBANOV that he, XCSENKO, had been tranoferred to supervise whe a : - :

work against code clerks (also code machine mechanics) at the United

ot States Embassy. GRISANOV defined this work as being of the greatest re c we
gouLied rs

Pecpanitee Doonan patintile eo,

we

eaten geet ee

ARCANE

ne) SHB

14-0000

importance, anc Use recruiimesi Of code cleras 25 a priovity airn of

. wrt we way: we -

wae AGB, ALY PIN, who was Cale: os che First Department, later sce
peated the avove and & group coneisiing of NOSINKO, Gersacty i.

GAYAZNOV and Vadim V. ACSOLAPOV was forvaed win NOSENAG

ft tame A Ae

responsible for supexvision of the work, GAYAZNOV anc ACSOLALTOG
were not new KGB oiiicers, experienced ofiicers

nA oe wee - ~ Cos : rd al tas sge porte “hae NATENCS
aithough bots as Senior Case O Fe of lesser yank than NOSENKC,

er or to minutely

NOSENKO coes not claim that he hac to trainee

scrutinize every action or proposed action of GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV.

jexvision over their -

NOSENKO does claim he was responsibic.

work,

AccorGing to NOSENKO, GAIZANOV sinpnasized that work
against code clexsks was to be his primary work in the First Section

_ and that it would take precedence over any ovnex activity. Other than
. work against code clerks, NQSENKO has generally defined his reszon-
i an ‘ . —_ - :
Do sibilities as joliows: - .

(a) Responsidility for fiie of {work agains?) Joan :

: : ABIDIAN, Security Oiiicer at United Szates Embassy.

(b) Responsibility for preliminary review of re-

mee on,

. ports sxom OTU (XGB technical unit) o: take" izom

> . _.. microphones.in the United States Embes sy.

vars

anemia et tee ce vert eect

x


14-0000

i
iL
k
i
i
I.

>: a nee ee :
z

avst Section, wien AOVSUA was absent.

As can be scen from the above,

by NOSENKO, wouid not coincide with the normal responsibilities of a

‘ Deputy Chief of Branch or Section in CLA. An analyst can either accept

or reject the theory; that there is necessariiy an equation between the

responsibilities. of.a Deputy Cnief in CLA aad the AGB, but i: the analyst

accepis the theory, ne must offer some supportin

cad
o

+ Pages 151 - 261 of the previous summary contained comments

and conclusions and sub-conciusions in regard to the ciaimed service

oi NOSENKO as Deputy Criei of First Section, First Depart

1961, The previous primary conclusion was that he was neither Deputy

Chief of the First (American Embassy} Section nor a supervisor in that
. section, Tne conclusion of this summary is that he was Deputy Chief

and had supervisory responsibilities for work against code clerks, The

: matter of the responsibility of NOSENXO for work against code clerks

-- sibilities listed in (a) ~ (d) above.

. will be considered later, Comments will first be mace on the respon-

g004166

me Leu ¢ _ .
Shuneh.

: x
cack som Teaches 2A AEST Bo Pin aldnaesenane oi OAT

evidence on this point.

arts

pnagitiet ees

14-0000

Pages 265 - 222 of the previous summary contain a cevalled
ws, tae 2 *% — Fase Pee Pee ee ee 2ST NS Te ae et WO o>
640.8 tor ihe previous Conclusion thas NOSSNKO was not the KGS cose
- mimcene

officer tor Gonn ABIGIAN, The cusrvest conc

restonsible case ofiicer sor ADIDIAN,

ABIDIAN compared favoradly with what is con

Daa

“Ya vesponsible CLA case ofcvicer is immaterial; w

twmhnether NOSENKO xeasonably fullilice the requirements. of the AGB . . . .

-» for work against the particuizr target, John ABIDIAN. itis felt thar ; od

the answer to ihis is that NOSENKO did. . , Joss

a the

he

Was

#.CCOLPGING to

direction of determining if ABIDLAN would iead the KGB to “anotier ;

POPOV," and no consideration was given to active agent work against
ABIDIAN for possible recruitment. This explanation by NOSENKO
appears reasonable and logical aad his knowledge of ABIDIAN and his
Gescription of his work against ABIDIAN should be considered omy

. y .
within that framework,

Admittediy NOSENKO was unaware of a considerable amount

: ' of details regarding the background of ABIDIAN, but on the other hand

if the statements of NOSENKO are accepted that the only aim of the

KGB was.to see if coverage of ABIDIAN woule lead to "ancther POPOV,"

;
| -"" |" S it follows that: such personalia information on ABIDIAN would have had oO rr,

ne goss? =

cine 5 ayRRA ICs RE eS ee a ae NS ai tat be Me weer .

m


14-0000

UREN eees pagar

PRS RE

BY Bh x ; By 3 ;
oS SE RARE EN RNAS BIRR an ee RRR RARE : ¥ Mesh, PADS

Iyyp-? - = Ie ath Com cee at woe ee ee
iva, GF ADLOLAN in the USSR Al ADLOLAN was consicered to

as
°
ct
+3)
oO
e
oy
4

ONG 1 CUG LION A.

Security Officer position formerly Lele oy Russell A, LANGILLE,
- sat wm ey ok dee er a ene On lee el pe ei ber th OAT
who was mown by the AGS to be CliA, No iivesiigation by the 50>

was necessary to Getermine if AZIDIAN was "“Amexican intei

Specizic siatements relative to ADIDIAN anc a Soviet mais, a AGS

ic
ray
it
we
.

operational contact according to NOSENKO, which are erron

This invalidates one oi tne bases for the previous conclusion the: 7

NOSEN KO was not the responsicie case uriicer fox ABIDIAN,

oy

NOSENKO haa previousiy siateé that th cizvca Cotoser 1960 he

ae mm anoecstt -4 Pe oo ee! awe te pte fa ow pee blag ee el
prepared an operational plan on ABIOLAN which incluced continuation

2
of the placing of Mecitxa on.the clotring anc effects of ASIDIAN by =:

maid who is mentioned above, Tatyana TIDOROVICH, The statement

.

is madein the summary that this coulé not be true because FEDOROVICH
did not works part time for ABIDIAN until ac least July 1961. ABIDIAN

has recently been reinterviewed concernin
invalidate the previous conciusion shat PEDOROVICE could net cave

treated the clothing and effects of ABIDIAN with Mezka prior to July i961.

— GOCA168

eee

TT

SN

aS
* a8

ay, NS
ORES

Na tee

‘f


14-0000

until she leit NM

a

oscow in rm BOMATIR

ASMNER, FEDOROVICE
e 7

entry for cleaning purposes.

+. ie

_ ABIDIAN Gid not mail any ogerationa: letters wituin the Soviet

1961 and therefore in view of the wbove, there

bt

Union until after Marc

nes ore eetn tag ee be hae
is no reason to contradict the statement oF NCSZTNXO thai the three fraile f ?

operational ietters intercepted by the KGS and mailed by ABIDIAN au
ee

showed evidence of Metxa. It is interesting to note that NCSENKO in
Sannnenamnenaintens

June 1962 warned CLA about the KGS use of Merka for sporting intesnal

letter mailings by J:

‘“ABIDIAN, accorcing to NOSENXO, was the subject of a 24-hour

surveillance with the Seventh Directorate assigning a specific surveillance

'. brigade to cover ABIDIAN, The actual surveillance of ABIDIAN was te

J responsibility of the Seventh Directorate wich submitted reports to the

GoGL1i69

TaN mena MOD pl

i
”
!


14-0000

ABIDIAN, thecAGS wouwig have attempred «

’
J

weamesses were Gisciosed, according t¢ NOSENXO, and the pattern . : .

oi coverage to see ii AZIDIAN woulé lead the KGS tc “another POPOV"
remained unchanged.

Pages 210 - 212 of tae previous summarxy notes th

=
y
g
(1
y
i
rs)

- . . " . .

Was unaware of countries visited by ABIDIAN

USSR and that no effort was made by NOSENKO through the SCD to find
out such information. According to the previcus summary, NOSZNKO
stated that the FCD "would not accept" suca 2 request ior "operational

“.
action against an American diplomat coming izom Moscow." The
surveillance which would have been required cn the part of the FCD

to achieve any sort oi reasonable coverage of ABIDIAN abroad would

certainly have placec a severe burden on the FCD. Further, NOSENKO . yy

contends that the results which might reasonably. be expécted would be

~. °  of.little or no practical value to tie SCD, .

o> ggoit70

. 6@eph
“ot

aan

(Oe ea AN. AE MEN oe EONS yor OL pated

emo


14-0000

m8 O2 NOSZNKO on this matter incicates

TAGTCS GAG G2G Mucs iG CoOmuSse tnt issue.

2Cast TANT Zing tie areas Gi

»

NOSZNKG was sot inthe First
. Section, First Department, jor any racterial period of time aiter

30 December 1961. Ik is also clear that he either read the surveillance

ws

report on ihe. visit of ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street ceacérop site or

Ags:

was fully briefed on the details oi the visit. NOSENXO insists that he
reac the surveillance report at the time or shortly avter the event.
There is no reason.to question his assertion that he read the report
since his accurate knowledge o: the route cf ABIDLAX azcé
,

in connection with the visit support this claim. However, his consistent
inability on his own to approximate the date of the visit or relaeit to bs
his change of assignments raises a question regarding when he actually
read the report.

a coe, NOSENKO claims tnat the visit of. ABIDIAN to the Pushkin Street

‘deaddrop area ledto the KGB setting upa stationary surveillance post

—

ay

co gg

Keer te

Sree nye renrmn a nena ata

an . x‘


14-0000 -

£6 Monts Lc wnat ae wos

informed on a caily dDasiv of The resus Of inis stake cul (a.ways

Seventh

Geneva in mid-March i962,

lt is conceivadie Vaart,

advised of developments or norcevelopmenis following the visit oz

ABIDIAN to tie Pusakin Street building sy Veniamin KOZLOV, a Chic: :

of Department in the Seventh Directorate who hac been known tu

, NOSENXO since 1953, or Viadisiav KOVSHUK or Gennadciy GRYAZNOV, my

Chief and Deputy Chief respectively of the First Section, First Depazrt-~

‘
iS)
ct
ot
a
tt
ct
on
o
3]
et
°
i
ee
vw
,
i
o
tt
°
%

ment, Even so, however, his failure to cal cu

nm June 1952 would seem to require explanation, especially in view of

“

the fact that he did warn us about the danger of operational letters mail- : :
ings by ABIDIAN --a warning waich would appear clearly to have been
derived from KGB coverage oi the activities os ABIDIAN in the spring-
summer of 1961.

It is to be noted that curing the June 1962 meetings NOSENKO ot
was not specifically asked for any additional information regarding

- any known or suspected intelligence activities of ABIDIAN. Beyond mL

ee QOH TZ

™~


14-0000

nis is not implausible, -/uucther possibie explaniiion, however,

derived from the alreacy noted inasi

for the visit, is th

, of the visit itself after his. meetings with us in Sune 1962, it should be

. noted in this context that with the puslic éxposure of the PENKOVSKIY
' case in the fai. of 1962, the Pushkin Strect deccdrop undoubtédiy became ’

2

the subject of widespread interest within the KGB.

That NOSENKO is.at a minimum still confused about the vi

ae
et

oi ABIDIAN to the Push«in Street ceaddrop and its consequences is clear
. from the record, While itis entirely possible that NOSENKO has con-
sciously exazzerated his involvement with the visit and its aftermaia,
° : -)
it is also possioie that the evident Gistortions of his accounts oz the
afiair derive 7-om honest coniusion,
Current interviews and a check of the tapes of previous inter-
views leave zo doubt that NOSENKO was aware of the visits of ABIDIAN

to the upper Gorkiy Street area circa March i961. These visits by

7: .. ABIDIAN were for cover ‘purposes and preceded his start of operatiozal

re — GooL73 _

BRK eater ements coe ce ae

-. 5 ate ea Re tee Loe
fe vralnwte Pita oy abe ae :
Ae owe wale bo
rine: x

Jeune eee ay

4

HGR
ay


14-0000

ad pe a tle
PE een

hai visiis 62 ADIDIAN toa comsnission

. axt shop, according to NOS=

place for picking up or piacin
was placed on the art snop for a perice oc time 2o-20wsr.g the visit of
ABIDIAN, Ojficiai recorcs coniiz: the visits of ABIDIAN at che time
and to the buildings Gescrizec by NOSENAG,
- Pages 21d - 220 of the previous summary contain no reference
to the specific statements of NOSENKO relative to KGB interest in the
- visits of ABIDIAN to the e upper Gorkiy Streetiarea, — it is also cicar

froma review of certain transcripts of previous interrogations tha

rt

no differentiation was rnace concerning his statements relative to KGB

coverage of the activities of ABIDIAN in the upper Goraiy Sivect arca

7

circa March 1961 and his s ements concern: ning Bis -Knowleéze o: the
es '.. ‘Pushkin Street Geaddrop site aiter the visit of ABIDIAN to that site

(30 December 1962).

i It is impossibie at this time to siate that a cetailed cebzieiing
| : _ of NOSENKO concerning ABIDIAN prior to hostile interrogation would

i>, have permitted the clarification of ali issues including the above, but

_ a 8 gg OKL74

14.

7 et res


14-0000

absence-to the Chief

wet eek eect tL feta ee
Vue baat te HOS Les ones

to impugn his claim to living been cuse clicer for ABIDLAN from eccl
1960 until iate 1961, Forihermove, te fact tus NOSENAG to noe E512 Lo

‘ proverly date the visit of ABIDIAN vo Pushin Siveei, is in ne wey indicative

oi KGB dispatch, If dispatched, NOSENKO presumably would have nad the
Gate right,

In regard to (b),. the responsi ‘ilty of NOSZNXO for preliminary re-

view of reports from GTU (Technical Unis of AGB; of "sake" from micro-

pnones in the United States Embassy, the previous conclusion was that his
claim that he personally reviewed tae KGS monitoring reports was not
Sustained,

It is not felt that tie previous conclusion mace suslicient allow-

ance for the explanation of NOSENKO of what the responsibility actually

entailed, Iniormation irom microphones in the Uniteé States Embassy,

according to NOSENKO, was handiec very specially, Telephone inter-
cepis were given to a designated oificer for distribution to the appropriate

case officer, but microphone reports, to prevent wide dissemination even

-  G004175:

within the First Section, were brought daily to the Deputy Chief or in hi

and then were distributed to. the individual responsible

amt


14-0000

cuse Oificer, In this way, according 16 NOSENKO, no one Leiow the

sank os Deputy Cries was aware of the tuial microphone Make! irom .
the United States Embassy as received sy tie section,
As regares political type invosmation, end wccosding to NOSENKAG

this was consicered tie most important sy tne MGB and OTU, NOSENKO

PF U.awmMate CisSeminenon Gs tA oy

had xo responsi

mation to the Ci : NIU, or the Central Commi

fay

since this was the responsibilty of @ unit in the oifice of the ChieZ, SCD.

H : NOSENKO has aiso stated that +2 be certain of the

wording microphones was "Gying' anc

ing a sufficient

o

reception difficulties was also having cifiiculty obtain

number of qualizied monitor-transiators. As a result, according to

——— meee oe oe

NOSENKO, OTU was uot providing complete verbatim transcripts Irom
“most microphones, but actually was repovziing only those portions which
OTU considered pertinent. Despite the fact that full transcripts oi ail
. “a
conversations in areas covered by active micropzones would have beea
' of interest to responsibie officers of the First Section, OTU, according ”
“i to NOSENKO, did not provide full transcripts and whea askee to provide

raore gave the routine answer of, "we could do so if we had more

personnel," According to NOSENKO, the tapes were maintained at

2) "+ QTU-and could: not be furnished.to the First Section, An officer _of

goose

apy Beda NONE abner aan a ag ome t To oe ancnmety ee

wee

win apes =


14-0000

ts

First Section could lisiea we pisiculs iape but ne Lic to 40 te OTU
ioe Gas a Tout this wes cone very infrequently.

Te fet? ee? ete e ae nee cece te ete ye TET ee gee te
ae 28 OCs CVES that any Presumpiion wire tae Ao Pecoverse Gs

NOSEN KO as hieing active microphones is nov reasonasle or even

realistic. Itis also unreulistic t

fe)
ae]
a
Q
A
i
w
et,
ty
ry
tt.
t
3
“
ia)
Y
ia)
<
G
a
we
fh
aN
ie
ay
3
o
a
$s
1

ecucted within reasonable distance of an active microphone was not

to be Cousideved in

ve been aware oc th

a

one had a conversation in one of the rooms in which there was an active
microphone and NOSZNXO has claimed he reviewed the "take! Irom
microphones in tne United States Embassy.

It is apparent that there are a number of imponcéerasie factors

to be consideree such as whether the. conversation cox

by the microphone, whether the monitor could recover sufficient portions

of the conversation to understand the gist of what was being saic, and

even ifhe did, whether he would consider it of suificient importance or

interest to incluce in his report in verbatim or in summary form.
In regard to (c), the claim of NOSZENXO that he was responsible

for maintenance of the physical security file on the United States Embassy,

go01177

2 AE gD TER

iene


14-0000

verted into a presumption that therefore NCSENKO knew everyting

‘example of this, NOSENXO has shown z lack of detailed knowlecge of
‘the work against diplomatic personnel in, che United States Embassy.

He has stated he is sure he would Have sown of anything “important”

"to have reviewed all the reports of the various officers of the First

of NOSENKXO that he was custodian of ve Dovbassy security file-was
Be Gasis ior this coAclusion was
current interviews with NOSENXO have further indicated inat his claim
on this point snouwid be accepted, ©

In regared to (é), the claim of NOSZNXO that he ected in piace

of KOVSHUXK, the Caief of First Section, wren KOVS?

itis consicered that this claim is accez

that KOVSHUX knew.

NOSENKO claims that he was nei responsible for the direct

supervision 6f approximately two-‘hircs oi the officers in the First

Section, ‘These osticers normally reported directly to KOVSHUX and

would only report to NOSENKO when 4OVSHUK was absent. Asan

euch as a recruitment or attempted recruirment, but he does not claim -


14-0000

adequaic, —

of most agents or Operative coniacis who were pari. of tae KGS nework

among the incigenous

recognize their photogra;

cerning their specizic activities is consiccred to be an unwarranted

eriticism. NOSENKO incicates that in generai the aanciing of agenis

.in the First Section was tne responsibility of incivicua:.case oificers.

It is also apparent that the philosophy in the KGB was to maintain

we

a single handler-agent relationship as much 4s possible, and that respon-

sibility for an agent would noi be transferreé merely bécause the agent

had access to a target who was the responsibility of a case oiZicer other

than the handler of the agent, Tais apparent philosophy is of particular

interest in connection with NOSSNAD, who even though he was the case
oificer responsible for ABIDIAN and together with KOSOLAPOV ane

GRYAZNOV worked actively against code clerks, did not have an agent

-network which he specifically handled. Mere use of an agent ior report-


14-0000

arpe

owt eo ont es
S4UNGsOC-EgCU. s

NOSENKO,

curing 2960 - 1961.

sib ity for supervision of work agains: ih

a

1960, he was, according to NOSENAO, responsivie for supervision of

the work of Vadim AL KOSOLAPOV, Cennaciy 2. GAYAZNGV, V.ac:
DEM IN and Yevgeny GROMAKOVSAIY
yo. » GRYAZNOV and KOSOLAPOV. worked ozly against code clerks

and therefore were supervised solely by NOSE[NKO, whereas DEMKIN

- and GROMAKOVSXiY, who handie

House, came uncer the supervision of NOSENXO oniy in those cases

where these agents were directed against code clerks,

It is quite ciear that the knowledge of NCSENKO concerning the -
: . , , , :

‘ code clerks, code machine mechanics and pouca clerks who, accozcing
i to NOSENKO, were incluéed in his targets in 1960 - 1961, was much
greater than his knowledge of any other category of American employees . \

at the United States Embassy during this period except for ABIDIAN.

are ga g0041180

ae ae iar ee ee

eatiesd


14-0000

+}

cases

AGB, in

KOSOLAPOV and GRYAZNOV.

The first case,| Ca..e5 S70RS2 226} is covered on te

7 fant

177 oc the previous summary. Little ecch

ai corament is consicered
necessary on this case since there Cocs nor appear tc be any acequate : :
reason to question the general story

eZiort agains{ SToRsB=aC) ob . a

It is recognized and mentioned elsewhere that NOSENKO in 1902 : . ; ;

exaggerated his personal involvement in the case, particularly in pleci

himself as present with GRIBANOV wi
i%
toSTORSBERG] NOSENKO has retracted this particular claim, but
_J .

there is no reason to count that he was engaged ior approximaicly a year

in the planning and activities which prececec the unsuccessiul approach
tol STORSBERG|

: An issue was previously made over the timing of the approach
— ob p& }
to(STORSBERG)|since BTCaSB=ERG fated this as October 1961, NCSENXO

has indicated about June 1961, and information from GOLITSYN, baseé

on.remarks by KOVSHUK to kim, had been interpreted as indicating the

Araceae cect Mis tent nnee mails et ne Sm Se Ante,

eee Mates, Ter

em lO Shue chtn ena ES!


14-0000

approach occurred at ine "end uo 1960."

NOSENAO, Guring current
&ccount of tnelS705 ven sie has
cate the approach ioe oabbg Dut tne

aor oach at ihe M oscow airpoy

e
©

f ‘ é
fh
+
iH
&
uw

When recently. reistervicwes, TORSSE.

that the approach occurred in Octcser 198i, : _

, his description of collatera. evenis rakes it clear that the approach had :
to have taxen place considerably earlier,

06
[Fosers MORONE| anotner code clerk at the United Siates Ombassy,

wao , will be the- sudject of further discussion beiow, nas seen interviewed

on the basis of statements by BTORSSERC|:hat soRO83was presect in

American House the night of the approach. Analysis oz the stacements

of JRONGNE) teas y

icates that the even ts[STORSZERG descrises
: could not have taken place later than the period Feoruary to early May
1961,°

. The best estimate possible at this time is that the approach to,

[stonse bn occursd in March - April 1961, which is quite compatible
with the approximate dating of the approach by NOSENKO, In the face

of this approximation oz the date of the approaca to}S Sroadheaty it is - oo
So G001182 . :

bene et baba ieee ot


14-0000

believed reasonable to assume WAGt The rer

end of 1569, referred vofSTCRS3 =A) and thus SOVSHUX either was

faneing t6 = fae a ae tee se oe 8 the Gt eer las wae Shen th a eee?
Perersing 10 & COMPTomMmse Pinse G2 tae Osere.on Tatner tnan tue Gorue.
eee

_approach, or was prematurely clair:

summary contain information

Ob. ext

@mes Aas SERS}

4

ard to the attempted

As of this time, it is considered that there are x

©
iw
His
wv
i?)
+
&
{
iy
B
ie]
be
te
w
o
o
@
B

agm

m from NOSENXO waieh in any way

refiect age inst 3 NOSZNKO. (& a5 ic not zea pactogra

record iniormation ance informa

=

NOSEN “£0 as the Soviet who ma ée a fast appvoachk to him at the <eir-

242

+ port, but this does not provice a va tid reason to é “ eve the statement

of NOSENKO that it was he who tried to talk {Eawhag, ob

= :

There are certain statements relative to sae \KEYSEAS cas¢ as
set forta in the pr evious summary wnich require specizic comment.
(a) Tnhe-ssatemeni is mace that no KGS oiticer ob
‘directly connected with the “OL could segare[KEysz2s) :
§ *

as the replacement for/STORSB=AE in fact, [REY =R5| OG

_actually was being trained oy[STOASS=RGIas a substitute,

» nota replacement, evea though his primary assignment
6001183
23 . .

EGRET | _

cli ate

premarin ones Nee coher, vam mre ane

Pecan Foca

dermal en aied

FER deere es OF

14-0000

:
i

CUTTeEnt wteETVaEews Tesacu 26%

pas

irom the OTU veports o. co

had beer away irom coce work for 2 consicerable period

,

-oftime., In any event, che impression oi NOSENKS we

" shai[STOASBEAGhwas having @
the particular work to RoYohsy] Tae coservations of
-NOSENKO are of interest since sors URE a coca had .
1, Ok been a coae ciera but, as noted, was being trained .
vy[SroasBBaG)so that he could act as a substitute. Under
the circumstances, it is consicered quite Logical that the

KGB would assume at the time that}KEy SRS fwas to be the

eventual replacement G-oakhaagy : .

_(b) The previous summary stated that, "prior to hi

= 06 | ;

departure from Moscow, [REYSEAS|acknowledged to his

supervisors fCoronel URBAN] his homosexual tendencies

| and he admitted involvement in three homosexual inciderts,

‘all at the American House" (gaze 179).

gociie4

wont: : Inna tet Beales natin" “eat foe cecede te ital aaveneen “rons tg Naan ace eee Sane whet ere meter een g
: rs oak La Anne warns :


14-0000

, €ateé 216 Sune 196i, of Colonel Ob

wa at } = eI tes a
VR BAN}re [« SAS Was Koi informec by

Rot to ager
while withia the Soviet Union."
- (c) On page 230 of the previous summary, the

statement is made that, "In the singie case in which he

JNOSENKG/ asserted that he velicd on information pro-

B : me _ |

> cured from microphones (KEYS=RS\ ialure io report

receipt of the defection invitation) he was in error,"

While the official record shows thax[KEYSERS) DG
.Gidg indeed report receipt of the defection. letter to}Colozel OG.
URBAN}n the office of Geienel aa it should be noted

that this occurred less than one hour before

uw

se ‘

the Embassy for the airpoxt. NOSENXO has stated that

b

be

3
the absence of information to the contrary izom micvopibone .

and telephone taps, the KGB had concluced snai{KEYSERS]

had not reported receipt of the defection letter and there-

Ob

.fore had Gecided to approach|KEYSERS atthe airport. Ih

PS

* ; view of the short time betweex[ KEYSERS| report of receipt

Ob 60041185

corner

ad

« Wi o
veg! ABeEdGaat Whemetnens mime wes - ee
yea x gs

4

: iH cue a aN


14-0000

Gi we lelier anc Lis cesirwure Jeora bDloscow, it would
4 + ees meee tee He SO ee YO eet .
nave Deen rermarkiuble if Uhe NCD Lad Leawaced tris ine
fugmation in ime zt

account of NOS=?

36 Considered co

Pages 18] - 134 of tne previous summary contain inicrmea

a at ad dda,

srotbonne a

a vegure rol Mathew UTES} who succe

saving arrived in Moscow in September 1961. GRYAZNOV was the
0G
ea ponsibie case Oilicer tor ES Bccoruing to NCSENKO,

Tae previous su ary stat es {page 333) tha ZUIUS), curing a
routine debriefing, confirmed aun Embassy report that in che summer of
1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman, "LILLIAN, " wao
visited the American House with someone from the United Aras Resubiic.
“LILLIAN was interviewed by the American House manager and she

claimed to be from Vienna but traveling wi

to.

tte

Further inquiry revealed that no Austrian passport nad been issucd

“"LILLIAN," and she was later asked for her sassport, "LILLIAN"

replied that she had forgotten it, then leit, and cid not return.
The previous summary stated that the above incident had been

described by NOSENKO but in connection with attempts to entrap Joseph

os [BioRx 1960, sotfEUtS|in 1962. “GOCLLE6

Net

i

|

| . .
7 - . 26 . . ;
j SO us A

oa TT
ne |

wv

me
ae

Se Co aera

wee Ea a OM BAT rag coals tee i tet aunts

eer MEBAI


14-0000

OA Acoli ele AReERAreteiie © cee

a . sow St ote a tee ee nt tml ares cline Sap.
Page 194 of tie previews sums; relates information irom

with NOSENKO, - “According to NOSENKO, GAYAZNOV avran ed for

these two women, agents of the Geriin KGS Residentura, to visit Moscow

"uncer false Cocumientaiion, One as a West German anc the ciher as an

Austrian, NOSONAO surther icentizzed the "West German" agent,
. o>

at
D.
we
z
et
o
mM
p*
o
o
ir
oa
-
a
P4
o
a

“EANNA, "as having the cover of a journalist, an

NHANNA! hac met] MORONE bt American House, Ina recent interview,

0b. ~
MORONS Fost med that in early 196] he had met a West German girl
‘at American Hodse who claimed to bea journalist. The statements of

a appear to substantiate tae report of NOSENKO,

Concerning the agent documented as an Austrian, NOSENKO re-

ported that sne was queried about her passport at American House and
as a result the KGB returned her to East Germany without further
atiempts to use hex at American House.. NOSENKO places this incident
in the same time period as the "HANNA" Case; i.e., 1960 ~ 1961, He
has never suggested any connection witl{ 2UIUS, nor is Reese onsen

0

.to assume that he could be referring to the experience of ZUSUS| since

this took place in the summer of 1982, after-NOSENKO haé left the

"99041187

American Embassy Section.

aed ETT HE marae ty ts OT

SANE


14-0000

NOSENKO :
Clic net KAOW enous oe aloe Gackyroune to Rave exercised
any supervi sion iF Granted that NOSZNAS a
c! 2 tact is thet NCSENKO 4

~
&
cf +

time any supervisory func

Zuo fh who .

cid not arrive in Moscow untill September 1951, remained in Moscow . ;

until January 1963. NOS=

f
Nad
oO
¢

e
oe
i
4)
e
ve
t.
aa
~~
o
o
b
©,
a
°
a
"iS

°o
3s

ve

es

uv

ee

o
oy

°
“

.

mowing anything aoous samen ex 1] January 2962,
co

. : Pages 165 ~ 169 of &

ravious summary contain a Synopsis of

previous information from NOSESNKO in reaaré to[Paul JENNER} ‘

- Basically, NOSENKO had reporied that when tse AGB learn2a tar
Paul LENNER| who was thought to be @ code clerk, was coming ta
&
: —!

Moscow through Helsinki, a plan was made to send Vadim V. KCSOLAPOV

to- Helsinki to travel on the same train aq JENNER to Moscow. «A iemale i

agent of GRYAZNOV was to be piaced on this train at Vyborg ater th : |

- train “er the USSR. The female agent was to become acquainiec

ee with JENNER]as a part of a iuiure operation againsy J alban in Moscew, . . 7
and KOSOLAPOV was also to become acquainted with|J [FENNE =R} dG

F _ XNOSENKO has stated that the opexation was successiul, that both

-,| ‘KOSOLAPOV and the female agent made the acguainiance of JENNER} b6 °° 7

28 9001188

fee
1
gett os Same canteen etesnine eoaehis Rea eaeys

ve mente wee

ce cee rhe am etee oe

SASS
TSOP TORY


14-0000

ren -

oeu CLAD OV on . oa

wal ie Wao

ee te

ogo young Russians, “a Soy é

=f r
Cone - - .
NG StFUCK “peo LOnVEeD Sution.

0) of
According te] SENNza} they bora said that Agni Se ef FENNER am

Moscow, |About three months eof RRS eportced Seing approacaued

anc a girl, probably university stucents,

again by the same girl, this time at che Moscow airport where he nec

: gone on courier business, There wis 2 short conversaiion anc she give

06. . . .

i JENNER]a phone numver, insisting that ne cali her, The women aise

advised|JENNER mot t% mention the conversation to anyone, NOSONAO

i , rn we

has stated that in an effort to follow up the initial train acquaintance,

06

the KGB hae arrangeé Zor the iemale egent to encounter |JENNER at

So

‘ the Moscow railroac station cr airport waen he wert alone to meet

06 ;

. . Insofar as is known, |FENNER} mas never been shown a paotozrapa

couriers,
i . of KOSOLAPOV. ithough KOSOLAPOV was approxima sely 34 years of
age in 1960, his photograph and remarks by NOSENXO indicate that in
appearance he was much younger and that he could have passed as a

university student.

6001189

(nme. ite Enea a # er nC ern

14-0000

PGE LG Seime

Oo. a

NNER] wes we only Moscow-bound passe

KGLOSSOV ja name NOSINKO nassicentiiied as an aitas

_KOSOLAPOY)- was on the 2 April 1960 train to Moscow,
The above obvious Giscrezancy has not been and cannot oe clari-

- - . fied withavailable information, NOSOLAPOV (XOLCSSSOV) w

~on.the same train as(FENNER or he was neoz, Train ilests indicate
7 that KCSOLAPOV was not, Neveriaciess, ine "Boy anc girl, probably

Struck up a conver-

university students" who, accorcing
sation with him on the train would appear clearly to be part of the
operationa: eiiort described by NOSENAO, particularly in view of the

later approach of this same girl to[SENNER|s: the airport. Thereis
- |

mo reason to question that tris girl was the female ager of CRYAZNOV. |

In view of the conflict between the train manifest and siarements by
: ' “NOSENKO, however, it is not clear who the “boy student" was; whether

this somehow was KOSOLAPOYV. or whether it may have been some

-other person entirely. GO 041150

30 —
ernsty
oLvre i

cack pbs we TN Te tame

HE hearer ateMNited vee wes

Dee

14-0000

evidence that KOSOLAPOV could not have Gees

Ob ;
JENNER, Neither is

Tnexe is just nota satisfactory ans

enz of NOSENKO wnat

petween the train manifests anc tne

06

KOSOLAPOV anc|JENNER| Were on

ase

cic mot travel with|JENNE: , SiS COGS UG eStaslish as than -
that NCSENKO is wrong; it is evicerce tiaz he Coes not know somecining ”

he, 45 the supervisur of KOSOLAPOV, should nave known accoréing to

his own statements.

Pages 190 - 192 contain a summary of previous information in
regard to the ohn EARLANB)case, [GARLAND]was idertified by
NOSENKO as & code clerk whom the KGS was stucying, but on whom
no cerogatory information was developed. NOSENKO provided practicaliy
no details in regard rofSan bans other than to identity him as a cede
clerk,
GOLITSYN has reported on an incident which it is considered
relates to the trip ot GAnDRNS rom Helsinki to Moscow on 16 November :
1960. GOLITSYN reported that in NovembSer 1960 the Helsinki KGB
Residency received a cable from Moscow advising that an American

code clerk would be arriving in Helsinki en route to Moscow and that }

gouuigg

Sua eRetttae waren tte fenepam meen cen o
w
ro
”

fmprnter TS ee eet

Banat cate

4

14-0000

tee

SCD hoped to Costinus in Mesceow, GOLITSYN talked to ACSULAPOV

a place in the compartment of the Amevsican on the irain irom Helsing’

to Moscow,

The previous summary also stated GOLITSYN heed céviscd ¢

3)

Section" (First Section, SCD) about the case on waich he had nelsed

?] ‘
os KOSOLAPOV. According to GOLITSYN, the ofcvicer resusce to ciscuss : so vf
the case and he, GOLITSYN, conclucéed from this reaction that it must

have resulted ina successiul recruitment.

It has been Getermined that GOLITSYN, in an interview with the
€BI on 20 March 1962, referred to the above "SCD oficer from the
Embassy Section" as (fnu) ZENKIN of the American Devartment.
GOLITSYN also statec that the ofiicer was in Helsixxi uncer the alias
of SERGEEV (SERGZYEV), but was unabie to-furnish a rst name and
patronymic for SERGEYEV. GOLITSYN referred to (inu) ZENXN zs

' being from the American Department, SCD.

It is considered that there is no Goubt that the (Inu) ZENKIN :

referred to by GOLITSYN is the individual of the same last name Ds -

~ ga0Lis2

poe et mieten cates ine Tra eae oy
weeds we fa

tes

&
oy
7 AL


14-0000

On A crmeremine ne ne nttnee rl wee eee eo

lee a
i
concerning whoin NOSENKO nas furnisnce information. NOSINKO

has identified ZENAIN (whose cirut mime nc Coes nor secall Sur

against American intelligence anc that ZENAIN was a member of tris

group, NOSONKO has acvised that ZENIIN traveled abrazd in connection
with activities of the Second Section, Sur that ne had nu speciiic knowleége

'. yegarding the activities of ZENKXIN oa these trips. NOSENKO has iur-

nished some izagmeatary information wnics he learn

ZENKIN ane when the full name of SERGEYEV (ZENKIN) to ether with

is photograpa is obtained, this fragmentary information from NCSENKO

As regards tne KOSOLAPOV{GARLAND fatter anc the opinion

expresseé ay GOLITSYN based on the resusal of ZENKIN to G

bt

Tay prove quite useiul,

case (GARLAND) that it must have resuited ina successiul recruitment,

there appears to be an inadequate basis for this presutmpiion. According

NOSENKO, and there is no reason to disbelieve NOSZNXO on this

point, ZENKIN was in the Second Section, not tae First Section, in

1960 - 1961, He was not Chief of the Section, but only a Senior Case

33 — g001:4193

a ee


14-0000

it Coes noi appear that ZONAIN would nucessarily have knowe

eu

any

, ‘ folowing the lead trom G
. _ the physical description of KOSOLASOV on the Melsinki-to-Moscow
~ trip, and denied ever being approached by Soviet InteHizgence, Later

interviews by the FBl and a polygraps interview did not indicate that he

. rae,

had ever met KCSOLAPOV or that ne cad ever knowingiy been coniaciec
by any foreign intelligence agent.

It is accepted tnat KOSCLAPOV went.from Moscow to Helsinsi

in November 1960, thai he talked with GOLITSYN there, anc that he

was on the same train as}|GARLAND|izom Helsinki to Moscow. it is

also accepted that NOSENKO is unaware that HOSOLAPOV made a tri;

‘to Helsinki in November 1960,

ide the USSR or Bloc countries

Travel for an SCD officer out
requires high-level approval, according to NOSENKO. It does not

poctis4
3¢

RET

Se ere ee

VME AS bb 8 6 gay hee Me tiineeetticateinhe aatne re en casas ©


14-0000

\
_ :
1
; ; thus must inevitaaty ° nave been 2 involve
: os turtie * support 3. have x. WOW? DEOUS . 4
. the x
7 . Om taken by/NCSENKG Gz thi :
7 ; the statement Dy. the inseaviewer thes ROSSLAD
. net “but he says at be, NOSENKO, 5
: chtet it. He adds only that had anything sé; ' :
eect ofeatlans, : he would have Seen aware of it. . vt
eee iia NOSENXO, a6 supervisor. ¢ of the | group working against coce ,
re . wend clerks, should i have known ‘ of any, trip of KOSOLAPOV to Fintand :
. JOS TI OAT SOI BEE NAD Be
" .. _1960.0r 1961, NOSENKO himself was out of Moscow on a trip to Cuba 1
he tbe _from 18 November 1960 to circa 37 December 1960. _ The possisiiiy
cee xists that this could 7 have accounted ed ior his iack Gi maowzed ge of the so :
i. trip of KOSOLAPOV to Heisinkt and revurn to Moscow on 16 Noverber
lola. af. Pe wee ee tees oN .
ee meen However, NOSENKO } has not a trempted to use his Cuban trip 43
: - a possible | explanation ior not mow ang oz tae 2 Novembe x KOSOLAPCV
| Tet the Paces mereenne *
Looe
Lthe frp. 7 rn PIV erie fey , ‘

La tele SV ee

As with the |JENNE ERLKOSOLAPOV case, it is not poppe at

this time to resoive the discrepancies pextaining to melGAR LAND} . :

, erent teen an wee

'  KOSOLAPOV trip. The fact that NOSENXO denies any knowledze,¢¢ i ‘
an HAUS We ss) ;
Ce (@fane i- :
Milas ‘ : H
’ + Aaemaaonenan ena ene eS Alencar wit etary. Lat OL et ty tegen =o oe 7 a F mae H
7 |
t

“
6


14-0000

lee ag ts etka, oi his not knowing something ne, by his own

Vode -- statements ;’ should - have known, .

eee ace eel oe Voewed in-the context of the total kncowledze of NOSENKO of ~

eee "operpeions against code clerks, owever, neither the problems in the

Tae ose: ~ ean nor those in daa cae singly ‘or combined,

= in any’ way: represent conclusive evidence that NOSENKO Was not suDer-.

or-of- KOSGLAPOV or that he was not responsible for the code clerk

CHa gone “operations: described -by NOSENKO, This statement, Aowever, was not.

Wha ne ayy,

+. '-4 igubstantiated in the previous summary. wale

ve. vet s+ + + Pages 193'- 199 of the previous summary contain an account of

¢..5-. °" KGB activity against code clerk[Joseph NA RONE rom various sources,

“+ inéluding NOSENKO.” -NOSENKO first mentioned the casein 1962.

meet Accoxting to NOSENKO, the responsible case officer for work
; v) . ;
web sate against|[MORONE|was: KOSOLAPOV. When it was leartied trailwoxox 3] OL

wo itso Tang an-‘Embassy colleague, a Marine guard by the’ name of Babes] were
ss. c .loplakbing a vacation trip to Warsaw, arzangements were made with the
i. LS 2 CLUB (die Polish Sécurity.Service) for a iemale Polish agent to come to

vse) Moscow and travel rom there to Warsaw on the same train as|M@MORONE

, ~ana[BEGCS} The-intent was. for the agent, either on the train or sub-

06.4...

" sequently in Warsaw,-to meet and comprossise] MORONS ettaly. She
. -? Vey
fro

. | CO . . 0041496


14-0000

succespsully accompiis.ed this, put Cue to ceriain problems in KG3-UB
liaison relations, it was not poosivic ior the KG3 to expioit this cirectiy. .

The previous summary stated that with respect te the female
UB agent, there was persuasive evidine

KOSOLAPOV playeé the roles in

NOSENKO, That summary cited th

ob

of KOSCOLAPOV to Finland at approximately the same time as tie] MORONS]

.KOSOLAPOV being invoivec personally in this part of the MORONS] 06
/ Case.
NOSENKO has stated that KCSOLAPOV met the Polish femzle
wagent and'made the arrangements to place ner on the train to Warsaw.
Fiona ALES coracte Moscow on 12 November 1960, itis not
‘mown when KOSOLAPOV leit Moscow for Helsinki, but he was on the
16 November 1960 train manifest zs ceparting Helsinki for Moscow.
NOSENKO departed Moscow on 15 November 1960 fox Cuda. The
: activities described by NOSENKO are therecore possible within the
known time frame, .

It is clear that NOSENKO in 1962 exaggerated his personal role

an) _
in the MORONE|case, particularly wnen he stated that he, NOSENKO,

.placed the female agent on the train. NOSENKO now clearly states that

6001197
37

Cu ne teettae 1 BE

+ hoe oem ne anaes RAE EAL ET et ne Oo Sete 2 Few dats

x
,

ORIN SER SS
ARGININE TS
POSEEES ay ES AUPE

ae

14-0000

NOSENKO previously stated that a HGB technician who was on the train
from Moscow to Warsaw reposted back to NOSENXO the cay after the

rrivec in Warsaw, Later NOSENAO said that instead of talking

wy

traia

to the technician personaly, he may have read the report of the technician

after he returned from Cuba,

.The activities Cescrisec by NCSENXO with re 5 od

tals Maries

‘are accordingty possibie within the Known time frame. It is not con-
‘sidered that the retractions NOS ENKO has made from his original
Statements on this operation are of sufiicient signiiicance to materially
‘discredit him.
Page 198 of the previous summary contains the statement that
4 :
| Mononz when interviewed, denied having been intimate with Svetiana
IVANOVA, a KGB agent employed at tne American House, NOSZNKO
“had stated that IVANOVA waa instructed to report everything she saw
or heard concerning) MORONE (page 194). The summary, sowever,
ae ate
cited a number of reports that[MORONE\nad been intimate with IVANOVA
and with Ella UMANETS, also a KGB agent employea at the American

House, and commented that NOSENKO therefore wa apparently unaware

: “of the sexual involvement of Bs with "IVANOVA's friends,"

G001138


14-0000

wt nn rn rr rr ret ne NES

Yas : i * ~~
2east SOMe invosvem

rey
e
-

ent of LVANOVA we

nished information on a developing operation against Marine
f
of b
[GARCIA (Anthony A. GARCH) based on tis inveivemen: of[Ga “s

with IVANOVA, He hes also staiedé that the poss bility was con

Ob
of using IVANOVA ageinsi]MORONE fo Gbiain compromising paotograpns,

This pian was seriously affectec when it wes

militiaman/XGB guard at the United States Embassy that IVANOVA,
Ob

her girl friezd, [MORCNE S}ene a@ Marine guzrd, possibly GARTAAL nad

been "in the city," then returned to the "slat! of one of the Marinss

where the girls spent the night, This apparently laced the reliability

of IVANOVA in question in the eyes of the First Section,

According to the previous summary, NOSENKO stated that Pictro

CECCHI, Italian coox at the American Embassy and agent of KOSOLAPOV,

reported on Americans at the Embassy, bus NOSENKO recalled sovning

Ob .

specific that CECCHI had reported abou MORON=| The surunary also
ie)
states that{MORONE\was said by other American Embassy employees

0)
to be a close friend of CECCHi and that MORON had admitted black

market money exchanges with CECCHI,

During current interviews, NOSENKO has statec that CECCH

Og

furnished "pieces" of information concerning| MORON but he, NOSENXO,

go01199

ANT)
COPwe |}
eee

jwi6R

14-0000

new of no black market invaavemes: ef MORONE with loprerersee

ners

NAO has also incicuted thai ue NGG sometines suspected,

Za
Le)
77)
td

fully report cveryt.

was aware that’ COCCHI was involvec in the black market, However,

yneiher he reporied to é : : th whore is
Open tO Questius; Viz., the [Maurice ZVWANG case Sciow,

' The comment was mace in the srevious summary that NOSEN

g oi

was unaware thay| oLSNE met some Soviet females in the spring

196] at the apartment of Sarwat el SHAZLY, en Sgyptian-national KGS
agent of the Sixth Department who was aiso reporting on Americans,
and was intimate with one in this apartment,

A review of oificial records incicates that[MORONZ}eie report
having met some Soviet giris at the apartment of Sarwat, but there is
no indication that he admitted or thet anyone ¢lse has reported that i.e
was intimate with any of them. The conciusion of the previous summery
inthis regard was baged on a misizzerpretation, Accordingly, since
there is no reason to believe that any compromise incident took place

in the Savwat apartment, the story of NOSENKO ona this matter is con-

sidered completely acceptable,

49 Gg001260

ule

14-0000

“

NOSENKO on these cases was cons

.
td
rt
read

A few comments

previous summary on pages 169 - 204. Comments were mice there

concerning[five code clerks, Mauvice ZWANG, Joan TAYLOR, Frank Os 06, 06, XG 06,06
. . . } /

=e

DAY, Robert DWELLY and Jose

sper ‘iically stated, the suggeszion is apparent t

hai the reporting of

perspective: L
(a) (Maurice ZWANG - ZWANG was identified by.
NOSENKO as a code clerk who was actively "worked on‘!
duririg 1960 - 1961. The previous summary suggested
that the “SL, edge of NOSENKO regarding XGB activity
ein BAT inadequate, First, reporting of
NOSENKO on|ZW Ba eo atained no reference to the
relationship ofl ZWANG]with th his maid, whom NOSENKO
in another case has identifiea as a AGB agent. Althouga
[EWANG]éentec sexual relations with his maid, he did
admit to some intimacies with her in her apartment,

Oe
During polygraph examination ZWANG) reacted when he

ET arene ee


14-0000

Loe

+ < fete Bi ig on, Oe Gg NOUSEN KO t9 ve
Telaions With his Maia. The c.lase OF NOSENAO to ze-

Dut also Can be DieuSibly eXploined by Jauky memory on

iis part or fail

oi this relationship to the AGE,

Secornc, NOSSNNO haan

was invoived ia the currency operations of Pietro CZCCEI,

. — > .

known from KGB agent CECCHI.) From

employees, making it plausible that CZCCril was eliner

unaware of the invoivem cit of1Z FANG or, as NOSENKO

himseli stated he suspectec, CECCHI did not report all
Getails of his currency opevations to bis AGB handijer,

{o) [John TAYLOR |- NogeNxo igentisied [FAYLoa] 06
)
as {a State Department code clerdjand target of KOSCLAPOV.

06

he KGB was aware of the involvemez:z of ay LOR|with

04

his Soviet maid, but no attemp: was made to recruit(TAY LOR] .

before his departure in early 1961 since to do so might

g001202

wibR

14-0000

LE ates tne ene rete

endanger the plans Jor a recruliment approach ro[Jemes

‘STORSBERG Gh WhO had Qcen uncer development for almost ‘

ib

a year and was consideced more valuable.

The implication of

the explanation given avy NOSENXO was suvject to question
ough[STORSBERG | 66

was not approacsed until aiter the departure oifFAY WOR} 06

failed to take into account the fact that aith

the ‘a against|STORS2=RG\was underway beiore
FAT LOAbecame involvec with his maid. Further, itis
apparent that the KGB did not abandon interest ial] TA FLORIO
since ne was approached ata later date outside the USSR
on the basis of his previous afiair with his maid
Ob
({c) [Exszs DAY \- NOSENKO identizied) Prank DAY|as
| y
[2 State Departmient code O8 who was ine target o: ciiner
KOSOLAPOV or GRYAZNOV. According to NOSENKO,
nothing "interesting' "was } learned abou «Dark nd no oper-

ational measures were taken agains BA The previous :

ob
summary noted that in July 1961 [Day|teav veiled to the

Caucasus with his friend ancfiermes overt CIA employee, (5 6& Q4

Agricultural Atiache G, Stanley ; sown} It was also

stated that the two were uncer surveillance by five persons :

: . 9001203


14-0000

|
|
|
|
|
|
|

at all tumes on the

local coverage of any emp.oyee at the Uni

KGB organization, not the SCD. Ik woule appear that the
locai organization was trying to do a thorough job on[ Day | Ob
(oe OG ee

and BROWN| ‘but it apparently was nonproductive. lt Goes

not seem justiziadie to expect that NOSENXO snould Lave
recalled a trip a procuced no resulis,

(a)) Robert DWwEiLy|- NOSENKO hes related in con-

siderable cetaii the eiforts of NOSES TO: RYAZNGOV anc
06) 0

KGSOLAPOV to involve|Robert DWELLY, a coce cier|
Moscow from April 1959 - July 1960, in & nomosexus. com-
promise operation. According to NOSENKO, a homosexual

: agent os GRYAZNOV was of the opinion wit. F]wae a - :

‘homosexuai, : . .

can | Gau42c4


14-0000

NOSENKO concerning MOL ellos to €ctermize wren

Ob

and a DWSLLY [was golag "into the city” (viescow)

Ca)
oO

that a homosexual compromise situation could be

aryanged, There were no speciiic Cevelosmenis irom

teeters

their eiiorts, OL rGing to NOSENXOG.

oO

Bwie ZLLY has categorically denied bein
sexual; NOSENKO has not said ne was, but only that the

homosexual agent of GRYAZNOV assessed] DWLLLY|as

a homosexuzi. There Coes not appear io be any reason

to consicer the statements of NCSZNKO adouy| DWELLY| Ob
as refiecting adversely on NCSENKO.~.
(e) [Joseph AS eee - NOSENKO has identified

\Joseph GAFFEY|as 2 ode cers} The previous summary

im that NOSZENXO had siated the KGB had tried to lure
pealtay into downtown Moscow, using | Svetlana IVANOVA,
an agent of DEM. GAIN in the Americ an House.
oe” way of comment, the previous suramary stated
snare seine in Moscow in Sepreniper 2961 and

taat| Fred KADERA had reported th. thai] GAP env nad told him

he had been intimate with a Russian girl-at the AmegeE2C 5


14-0000

ae ee ee

House, It was fusines noice thar\Gars

irom Moscow in

ness and Guring interview nad wcuitied being intimate

ment and that she had cliuimed pregnancy.
As to whether ine a5uve inlormation raises a
question concerning NOSENXO, the following sacrers
should be camsidered:
(1) NOSENKO has stated that curing the
Jatter part of December 1961 he was part tirce
in the First Department and part time in tie
Seventh Department, and that-he reported full
time to the Seventh Department after New
Years Day 1902.

(2) In addition to the information previously

mentioned as furnished bylGAFFeY Curing inter-
eo

. Ob:
view, Gar by|also Stated that he was first:
intimate with IVANOVA in kis room on 27 December
1961 and was also intimate with hes later on three
06

occasions at her apartment. According to|GAFFEY

_IVANOVA told nim of her pregnancy about 1 May

erpncy
Vode!

gooi2c6,

PE MNP TET NE


14-0000

1962, which is appsox

NOSENNO hee Steied i

Department.

puone coverage on the United States Embassy has pr

&
e
oO
ee
uo
te
we
o
o
G
te)

mentioned in tais summary.

fon

contained a deiailec account o
of microphones, countermeasures taken by the Americans in 1964, and

Gamage estimates prepared by the Americans. The previous conclusica

rye

was that his information did not sustain his claim to have been Deputy

Chief, First Section, or Lis claim rhat he personally reviewed the KGB

5

riicrophone monitoring reports. Cormments have been mace in this

summary in regard to this previous conclusion,

A few remarks, itis beiieved, will assist in a fuller understar7i-~

of the microphone matter. In the material brougat out by NOSENKO.u..

1964, there was a single sheet oi paper containing on one side haz.
written notes which NOSENKO ideniiiied as a list of tne active micro- -
phones (those which were being monitored) in tie United States Embass
This list is given on page 227 of the previous summary and need not be

. repeated here. The acquisition of this list by NOSENKXO was character-

- ized in the previous suramary as singular and it was stated that NOSENXO

go01207
47

SeCHet

ea De cea ent AIR ne eee Bataan ak sea”

14-0000

eee ne

tha NOSINKO than hac been

Gone delore, His expianaiion, both of

.

aces waicn lec to

g tne list as wellas oi his siilih

judgment: of the previous summary.

NOSENKO has statec that i... 139 - 5961 Viadimir I PETROV

Cahier of the Second Section, First Department, cesired some "soints"

for use against targets os his section, NOSENKO uses th

@3 the term “point”

not as meaning just a micropaone, but as referring to an OTU sub-unit

which includes microphones as well as the necessary monitors and

+}
@

mw “

transiatoys to covery the microphone end translate the "take,"
targets of PETROV were primarily Americans anc, therefore, there

was a transcription-translation problem.

According to NOSENKO, most of the available "points

assigzed to the First Section to cover microphones in the. Uniiec States
Embassy. The Chief of the First Department, Viadimir A. XLYPIN

held a meeting attended by KLYPIN, Chief of the First Sectioa Viadislav

oz which

6001208

KOVSHUK, Vladimir 1. PETROV, anc NOSENKO, the purpose

48

- SEPDET
rome!

neem ne ste ee tare Se

: ee: meer reese tt
SHEET Oe) MPT ANTI CMe anim denen eu ERE A ere rere one diieen sm ar -

et

sow


14-0000

Was to Giscuss the po50.0%
. Embassy "point

PETROV to use

pee Ba wey ee
gat to tae me

or Names of ceriain targets to which he wished to give tecanical cover- . ¢

rently took 4 piece o: paper

age. During?
which PETROV hac end wrote on it a list of active microphones in the
United States Embassy and resicences. When the meciing enced,
NOSENKO had this paper anc he took it back to his office,
Contained on the reverse side of che paper were the ioliowing

06,06 - if ob ; =.
names in Russian: [Luan, MoCH, With BURTIN| fan[Si; be BURTS 3} .

: Ar
The name A, A. MIXHAYLOV was listed next to the name of LUBin} 0b
and the name of ¥Y, E, CHERNETSEV was listed next to the name of
” Hb j
ed tha LUBIN, SMITH, Wil BURTIN] 06, 06,06

SMITH, NOSENKO has exypi
and [Sipe BU TiN|were among the targets of PET ROV; anc MIKHAY LGV

t

Bb

and CHERNETSEV were oizicers of the Secoxd Sectiozn,

non-Soviet

NOSENKO siated he imew nothing more about the Zou:
. ; .
names except that they were targets of PETROV, NOSENKO stated isat

he could not be positive of the cate of the meeting other than that i
occurred while KLY PIN was Chies of the First Deparimenx:, (Accoréing

to NOSENKO, KLYPIN was succeeded by Sergey M. FHEDOSEYEV as

“ — gouazc9 os

: ROP RIT Oo .
| . erbnél :

so . anal ee ee pe ek te Sten eo vate cated


14-0000

LUBING ang that Will GUATIN asc

ol U6

wink] Sipe being tne Wile of WV

7 pro oN Upper aa eee en net ae
CLO int Seon Th788 OTe AMETiCan

has still not Seen icertiziec.
In view of the above, it has Geen possibie to cecuce ce Gate

oi the meeting cailed by XLUYPIN as, cizca June 2962.

Bove

o

escrised

o.

According ta NOSENKO, the piece of pape

was placec by NOSZONXO wits olher notes he Kept between the pazes.
of a bound volume which NOSENXO cails a “working copy." This,
according to NCSENXO, wes an accouniable, registerec novebook

they were supposed to write a2] their

ued to all ofiicers

notes, cestroying any other notes,

According to NOSENKO, he, lixe many other oiticers, did not

completely foiicw regulations anc the tendency was to irecuently put

loose notes in the notebook so t: nae the notebook octen actec as a sile

rather than being used in the way required by regulations, NOSENKO

: kas stated that when ke leit the First Section he took various notes

' with him to the Seventh Departmect; these incluced notes he kad drafted

: concerning certain First Section activities for use in briefing FEDOSEYE

~ . C001210

we

aA AD cat inate ete ie oe
uw
°

ePrints MiemB RG AEB oe ee Be nk a mre om 7 ST Nee SY Mg

oth

14-0000

when PEDO SYEV succecded ALTPIN, anc noies ae had prenarec Jor

Departmen,

In consideration of the above explanation by NOSENKC, it should

be noted that

FEDOSEYEV
in the First Section; e.g., his notes (:. . . scture ta the Seventh
Directorate in regard to a "mass surve..lauce" on the American
Embas sy.

By including a section {pages 236 + 235} on tae know.edge of
NOSENKO of the KGB cryptologic attack on Unitec States Embassy
communications, he previous summary implies that there is some
reason to question his informatioz on this sub,

NOSENKO has asserted that the KGB hac never succeeded in
reading enciphered communications of the Service Attaches; however,
he said that the Eighth Directorate (the unit of the KCB responsible for
communications intercept and cryztologic anaiysis) was reaGing some
United States Embassy traific. While it is open to guestion to what

: extent knowledge of successes of the Eighth Directorate would be known

cOOL24it

”

(

oe)
ae
>
g
4
4

OTN pe te gin cantante Tate rhe nao eke ree mee nT an . Ot ee


14-0000

to anyone ia the

PAT © Rrverves

ie case Officer for any of the listed CIA oflicers, Accorcdin

see

to his claim, NCSENKO ss.ouid h jam N. MORSLU

¥
i
G
CO
ts
nh
<
G
t
i
t
tr
zs
bac
ete
wr
te

was CIA, but he has never identified MOXZLiLas CIA. Surely XOVSEU:z -
o . . *

anew MORELL was CIA but why NOSENKO is not aware MORELL was
CIA is not known, It has already been estadlisned, nowever, that
NOSENKO, as Deputy Chief, was not aware of ali of the activities ci
KOVSHUX,

As regards some oi the other listed incividuais, a-lew remarks
are appropriate,

@) NS OSENKO has never indicated any knowiecge
Paui GARBLER was CIA, and yet GARBLER was surely
known to the FCD as a CIA empsoy ee before gon, Z to

: Moscow, It is presumed that the FCD furnished the SCD

at least basic iniormation that Paul GARBLER was

—_ “American Intelligence." GARBLER, however, did not

= Nes gov1212 :

52 : .

aco
Hit h .
: QE! :

BE
. Mt ‘ _ ears ui Ra
wae se ate te ee ts ed Nisiteetee . * MESON SSN aS

14-0000

we ee

196., omly a raonta

ar

ve in Moscow until Nove

bpeiore NOSENXO iekt the Fire: Section for the Seventh

(5) The previous summary siuted that according

October 1960 to September 1961, The “intensive AGB

OS

surveillance" is based on statéments of/MAHGNEY|\and
may possibly be more a reflection of his personal concern
over surveillance rather than what was actually happening.
>

.(c) [Steve WASHENKO]was correctly iderntisied by
NOSENKO as CIA. William HORBALY was CIA ancé
ideniiiieé by NOSENKO as suspected of being a CA officer
or cooptee, :

i6) Lewis BOWDEN, who was not CIA, was, according
to NOSENKO, suspected oi being a CIA officer.

George Payne WINTERS, Jr., has stated that

KOVSHUK warned WINTERS that BOWDEN was the "FBI

officer" in the Embassy. The Cherepanov Papers indicate

g001215

; cungenee ven oe ne Neder
re gdb nee set wey

3
rf


14-0000

}

that the ICCB had rescone to consider the activitles of

BOWDEN with suspicion.

It io not balleved that the Hated fatlures of NOSENKO to identlly
CIA officers are of particular signifleance in establighing that he was
ev was not Deputy Chief of the First Section. Thero are too mary un-
kaown facters wich would need to be considered. Despite cur ascump-
tlons as to what the KGB knows, itis possible that (5) the KGB did not
know of the CIA affiliation of these people, (b} the taformatton known
te the KGB was not availabie at the Firat Section, First Department,
lewel, or (c) information available to the Chief of the First Section or
to a specific cass officer waa of no official concern to NOSENKO and .
was not made svailable to him. The last of theee possibilities to
suggested in spite of claims by NOSINKO that he had to have known
whatover was known in the Section regarding CIA identifications; a
propenoity on the part of NOSENKO to exeggerate the area of hia own
hnowledgeability hso been ceen elecwhere in this case.

Pages 252 - 258 of tha previous summary contala a report of
the 1960 trip of NOSENKO to Cuba and bis 1961 trip to Bulgaria. With
regard to the Cuba trip, there is collateral evidence of his traval 2s
deseribod by NOSENKO, and there is no substantive reason to doubt

his account of his activitiea on this trip. The statement was made la

s4 - goui2i4
SECnk


14-0000

AS NR IUNED ies Chm enema =

x)
i
Ge
be
o
i
6
mn
B
rf
€
ct
oO
ie]
t
o
p
te
we
an
os
Cre

the previous summary that the vr
damaged his claim that he was supervising onerations against Embissy

code clerks at the time,

say that no supervisor in the SCD would be permit

abroad unrelated to his supervisory function, a judgment for wl

there is no supporting evidence.

ey

As regards tie trip of NOSENKOG io Bulgaria in 1961, dor which
there is no collateral iniorraaiion, the previous summary concluced

that his account of the trip was untrue anc argued that such a trip to
Bulgaria, iz it did take place, at a time when he claimed the operation
aseine{StonSSEAG]was reaching a climax and his subordinates were
“apparentiy planning to exploit] KEYSERS} newly -ciscovered vulnerability, "

it would indicate that the presence of NOSENKO in Moscow was Cis-

pensable. There was, however, no evidence that NOSENKO Gicé not

travel to Bulgaria and only highly specwative reasoning as to why ais

account of the purpose of the trip was untrue, .

As to th STORSBERG fase, while it cannot at present be proved .)
that the recruitment pitch took place before NOSED NAO leit for Bulgaria,
it can be stated, on the basis of reporting cconfc Ob, that it had to

have taken place before the time NOSENKO returned from Bulgaria.

Since no serious question has ever been raised concerning nese nce
. Cublele


14-0000

.
.
.
u
ei
we
te
fe]
».
~
=
uw
$Y
pee
.
<
<
9
¢
te
t.
p
rel
us
icy
Ny
hal

of NOSINKO in Moscow at the dine

‘ that NOSENAO was Comparatively

phase of sa stonseag GJoperatson hac been compieted, .

et
§
&
G
e
.
o
g2
¢
lad
°
ts
f
a
G2
p
+
ets
i
y
o
o
»
¢
Gv.
o
e
$3
ad
w

As to nef SERS]ease, th re is nO Apparent proviera since
seis clear that the apsroach ro Kava
returned izom Bulgaria, and furthermore that the KGB probably cid
not become aware inat Poe a homosexual, and theresore
potentially vulnerable, until just before the pitch was mace,

In short, there is no reason to believe that the accounts by

NOSENKO of his trips to Cuba and to Bulgaria are not essentially true,

—<g

or that if they are true they necessarily reciect on nis claim io having

been supervisor of coée clerk operations.

v

o001216 oF

cae ANAL RET OIL cer wiyua

cAprT ;
SECREI

ma
=
R


14-0000

SECRET

| : =
FF, NCSENKO's CLAIMS, IAT 15 22 LE WAS CHISD>
OF THE Ad (ERICAN-BRITISH COMMONWEALTH SECTION AND ,
| WAS THEREAFTER A. DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE SEVENTH . ; , :
i | DEPARTMENT, ARE NOT CREDIBLE

QD
cab)
co *
pe
- 0
ia}

teem ene creer ee ar eee : wee eee

gan RE


14-0000

ros

F, NOSENKO's claims, that in 1962 he was Chief of the

American-British Commonweaith Section and was thereafter a

Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department, are not credible. (Previous

conclusion)

The conclusion of this summary is that NOSENKO was Chief
of the American-British Commonwealth Section (First Section) from

January 1962 to July 1962 and that he was.a Deputy Chief of the Seventh

- Department thereafter. |

_ NOSENKO has. stated that, although he was offered the position
of a Deputy Chief of the First Department, SCD, by Oleg M. CRIBANOV,
Chief, SCD, and although an order had been prepared and was in the
Personnel Directorate, he declined the proffered position.
According to NOSENKO, he knew that Sergey Mikhaylovich
FEDOSEYEV, the Chief of the First Department, did not want NOSENKO
as a Deputy Chief, but instead wanted to promote Vladislav KOVSHUK,

then Chief of the First Section, to the position. FEDOSEYEV was

C001218:

i
on
ry
&
3


14-0000

ee Me ee

webu

willing to promote NOSENKO to the position of Chief, First Section,
However, GRIBANOV cid not wish to promote KOVSHUK and NOSENKO
considered that under the circumstances it would be better for him to
return to the Seventh Department rather than to become a Deputy to
FEDOSEYEV who wanted KOVSHUKas a Deputy,

Vladimir Dmitriyevich CHELNOKOV had offered NOSENKO the
position of Chief.of the First Section, Seventh Department, pending the
reassignment of BALDIN to Germany at which time NOSZNKO would
become a Deputy Chief, Seventh Department, replacing BALDIN. The
above explanation of NOSENKO. seems plausible and credible and indi-
cates that GRIBANOV, the Chief of the SCD, for reasons best known to —
GRIBANOV, was assisting NOSENKO in his career in the KGB.

This ‘section actually covers two periods in the claimed career
of NOSENKO; namely, January - July 1962 as Chief of the First Section,
and July 1962 + January 1964 as a Deputy Chief of the Seventh Depart-
ment. Since NOSENKO wae in Geneva, Switzerland, from March to
June 1962, he actually cannot be seriously faulted for not having de-~
tailed knowledge of the activities of the First Section during January -
July 1962. The previous summary (pages 268 ~ 291) contains remarks

in regard to the January - July 1962 period, including the period of

March ~ June 1962 when he was in Geneva. Four specific tourist cases

go01219

bad mies Keely! Co pwh eae ec eee


14-0000

t me
—,

BRAUNS| Apparent conilicts between information from NOSENKO and
information derived from subsequent interviews with these individuals
were cited as evidence impugning NOSENKO, It is not believed that the
previous comments concerning these cases constitute any substantial

evidence that NOSENKO Gide not hold the claimed position of Chief of the , ’

cara

Oo lsee thee

are discussed in the previous summary; the cases of Wallace Everett OG 06, 0b, Oe

JOUNSON, William Carroll JONES, Natalie BIENSTOCK, and Horst

First Section, Seventh Department, during January ~ July 1962. That
there were KGB operations against[FOHNSON, JONES, ‘BIENSTOCK and 06, 06, 06 , 06

BRAUNS hhae been confirmed through interviews by the FBI of all four

individuals. .

A few additional remarks in regard to the above four cases are
warranted, not because it is considered that there are any substantial
discrepancies between what NOSENKO has said and what each individual
stated when interviewed, but because they may provide additional clari-
fication,

In the| Wallace Everett JOHNSONcase, it was previously noted-
that{JOHNSON brrived in Moscow on 31 December 1961 and that the KGB
operation against him occurred on 5 January 1962, The summary sug-
gested that the short lapse of time indicated that the homosexual tend~
encies offFOHRSON were known to the KGB prior to his arrival, contrary
to the statements of NOSENKO, NOSENKO during curg ant gintsgviews

3

SECRE]


14-0000

ne tet nn meee ae

'

aes a enry

06

has stated that the KGB learne of the homosexual tendencies oi JONSON]
“by chance" soon after his arrival. "SHMELEV" and "GRIGORIY," two
homosexual agents of NOSENXZO, were at the time operating out of a room
at the Metropol Hotei wnere FORGO) stayed, They mei(JCHiNSON|there
and reported his apparent homosexual tendencies,

d&
In regard to tne[ William Carroll JONES|case, NOSENKO curing

current interviews has furnished additional information on the AGB operation

agsine | JONES} including the woman indmila BUGAYEVA who was recruited:
O4 :
as an agent to work against{JONES|and was used in another case. The other
details furnished by NOSENKO concerning th TONES case are compatibie
with his claim to having been Chief of the First Section, Seventh Departments
In regard to the| Natalie aleSstock case, NOSENKO aid not claim
to have been the responsible case officer but was abie to provide enough
specific information concerning the case to bring about a confession when
she was interviewed by the FBI, That he did not know all the cetails con-
cerning mnBrexstbcR pase couid be explained by his claim to have been
Chief of Section and not the cay oiiicer directly involved with the case,
In regard to iniioret BRAGS case, in the previous summary
the criticism was levied that NOSENKO did not know wnyBRALASisitd

the USSR and was not able to identify any Soviet citizens whom |BRAUNS |

met in the USSR. It was also stated that NOSENKO had explained that

{

4 9001224

SECRET |


14-0000

23.
a

Pree iret thet aan etree emcee ts eeu

Bawtare cnree”

ee ae Sa et

the Seventh Department was not concerned wita ioreigners visiting
relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet expatriates. NOSENKO, accord-
ing to the previous summary, was aware sons BAAS vae a former
Soviet citizen and the summary siated that his plan to visit relatives
was information available to the KGB through his visa application,

In regard to the statement that the Seventh Department was not
concerned with foreigners visiting relatives in the USSR nor with Soviet
expatriates, this is not in agreement with current information from
NOSENKO, * Cases of "true" tourists, which were normally the respon-
sibility of the Seventh Department, could become the responsibility of
another department or KGB component where Soviet relatives were
involved. However, if the case was not taken over or assigned by higher
authority to another department or component, it was and remained the . ‘
xesponsibility of the Seventh Department, The fact wna fBRACRE wae a .
former Soviet citizen could very well have rnadef BAER 0 interest to

the Second Section, First Department, or a direction in the Service of

?

. the SCD, However, in the absence of an actual reassignment by higher

authority, the case. would remain the responsibility of the Seventh Depart-
ment sine BRAUNS|was visiting the Soviet Union on a tourist visa. The
previous summary also indicated thad BRA NS listed on a) isa appli-

cation that he planned to visit relatives in Leningrad. [ BRAUNS}had a a

* By 1962 there had been a large reorganization in the SCD and in the

. 9
Seventh Department. The situation was not the same GOD 8¢,

Monee Std Sedat oeRaa alle

. | |
SECRET. oaaeers


14-0000

Cai entensertmteiene + ceiver mare ese

06

relative or relatives in Leningrad. Although BRAUYS] when interviewed by
the FBI, mentioned a number of items of which the KGB was aware concern-
ing his background and occupation from his visa application, there is no
specific reference in these interviews indicating his statement of purpose

in visiting the USSR.

Pages 282 - 286 of the previous summary revicws remarks by
NOSENKO on the Boris BELITSKIY case and states that nis claimed role
in the case was not plausible. There are several siccific points made in
the summary which imply that NOSENKO was lying about his imowledge of
the case, Taere is adequate reason to believe that NOSENKO exaggerated
his own 1962 role in that NOSENKO now states he was to give assistance
to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV in the handling of BELITSKIY in Geneva
in 1962 and not to supervise ARTEMOV,

The more important aspect and the primary one is the difference in
what NOSZNKO specifically reported about the BELITSKIY case and infor-
mation from the actual CIA record of the case, There are major difier-
ences and without going into all the details of the case which is very involved,
an effort has been made toward determining whether these apparent differ-
ences necessarily indicate that NOSENKO was or is lying or whether there
is a possibility he is relating the actual KGB version of the case. .

' NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY wae a KGB agent whom

American Intelligence recruited in London in 1960 or 1961 and that the

. | 9001223
6

SEGRE

Sa BASEN aaah ee Latha we ate dade ere oct oeme mene N


14-0000

KGB purpose in running the operation was to lure American Intelligence
into meeting BELITSKIY inside the USSR. The previous summary stated
that NOSZENKO did not know when the BELITSXIZ operation started
(Brussels, Belgium, 1958), did not know the nature of the British
involvement, did n:t know the operational details anda contact arrange-~
ments BELITSKIY had with CIA, and did not know BELITSKIY's pattern
of activity in Moscow or Geneva,

NOSENKO during current interviews has indicatéd an awareness
that the KGB (Second Section, First Department) had been trying to use
BELITSKIY against the British. However, he still has dated the recruit-
ment of BELITSKIY as 1960-1961 in London and still states that the
primary purpose of the KGB was to involve American Intelligence in
contacts with BELITSKIY witnin the USSR, The latter was considered
completely inconsistent with the fact that BELITSKIY was recruited in
Brussels, Belgium, in 1958; that three letters had been mailed to
BELITSHIY in the USSR in 1959 and early 1960; and that BELITSKIY
had an accommodation address for contact outside the USSR.

There are at this time sufficient unresolved questions in the
BELITSKIY case to preclude any conclusion that the apparent dis=
crepancies between the statements by NOSENO on the BELITSKIY

case and the actual record are a reflection against NOSENKO,

/,

bo
|
7

poti224
a

- SECRET

4
4
{
;

+

we eee eee


14-0000

the other hand, there is some reason to believe NOSENKO has
furnished the actual KGB version of the BELITSKIY case and that the
KGB, at least as of 1962, did not xnow the true story of the relation-
ship of BELITSKIY with CIA, There is a distinct pos sibility the
44GB believed the BELITSKIY recruitment occurred in 1961 in London oo
and BELITSKIY did not then nor has he since admitted to the KGB
‘his association with CIA actually started in 1958 in Brussels, Belgium,
As a possible reason why BELITSKIY would have told the KGB in
1961 a partial story of his contact with American Intelligence, some:
at present unknown event may have occurred in 1961 which caused
BELITSKIY to believe his security was endangered and as a result |
he told the KGB of certain events in London in 1961, relating these
events as being the original approach to BELITSKIY by CIA.
| The following are certain of the points which suggest the KGB
actually considered that BELITSKIY was recruited by CIA in London
in 196] and that BELITSKIY may have never told the KGB of the
developments in his case prioz to 196]:
. (a) BELITSKLY was in London in April 1960 at which
time he was in contact with a British citizen who was also ~ | oo
reporting to MI-5,. This individual reported information

received from BELITSKIY which may have been a lead to

9001225

vom a aM te aa eae OR

SECRET.

a.


14-0000

vata tte eres

George BLAKE, (It seems highly unlikely the KGB would

ever have directed BELITSKIY to furnish information which

may have been a lead to George BLAKE, or at least could

have caused the employees of the unit in which BLAKE was

employed from June 1959 to August 1960 to come under .

suspicion as having passed information to Soviet Intelligence. )
(b) NOSENKO has stated that BELITSKIY, aiiter he went

to Geneva in 1962, managed to reinitiate contact with CIA

rather quickly because he met a girl he had previously known

whom he was sure was an American Intelligence agent and

that she must have reported his presence in Geneva to American

Intelligence. (If the BELITSKIY case had been controlled by the

KGB from its inception in 1958, the KGB would have known of

the internal mailings to BELITSKIY and the fact that BELITSKIY

had a cover address outside the Soviet Union through which to '

initiate contact, However, if BELITSKIY did not tell the KGB

anything about his contacts with CIA prior to 1961 and then

gave only a partial story of what happened in London in 1961,

BELITSKIY would not have told the KGB of the internal mail- '

ings to BELITSKIY in the USSR or the fact that he long had

. a cover address outside the USSR. BELITSKIY therefore : te . |
- ; 6001226


14-0000

ae

Nae cremate art

it
u

Meee wt

aes mae es Pe yO oe ed ane wee oe
Would not nave told the SCU how he actualy mode contact

with Arnaerican Liteliigesce in Ceneva .2 1902, but very well
Coule ave told ine KGS ne bid scen @ porticular woman

wom he Lad previously xcown, Lhe was sure one Worked

Acagrican Intelligence bese
Geseva. }
. (c) BELITSALY i. 2962 TO meet

within the USSR an indivicual rovreseniing Cla,’ However,
his agreement was. only under cortazia stipulatec co..citions,
the most interesting of wick was thot the incivicual mus
be unwitting oi the true nature of ibe relationskip of
BELITSALY with CIA. In addition, any message to
B=ELITSAHIY or any indivicual wke mez BELITSKIY must

*

make no reference to any previous meeting of SELITONIY

.

with CiA.

The above conditions ave quite explainable if
BELITSAiY had not been under KGB control betwees 1958
and 1961 and in 1961 gave the KGS oziy 2 partial story of

the 1961 events in Loncon.

GOUL227

nonmenpepnemeee nS Meee eer cern een net LE er nrnmnnrineiere inant manent mene enn eae eee

eer PS nS ASSN: GE oP eV YP AOL A fs Sa Ht nA a

14-0000

As previously indicated, the conclusion is there are a sufficient
number of unresoived questions in the BELITSKIY case so that discrep-
ancies between information i.om NOSENKO and the actual record in the
BELITSKIY case cannot at present be considered as a reilection against |
NOSENKO, and there is a distinct possibility the KGB actually did not .
know the true facts of the BELITSXIY case.

The previous summary noted on page 106 that Nataliya SHULGINA
was an Intourist interpreter recruited by NOSENKO in 1955. It also

noted that NOSENKO had stated Boris BELITSKIY "reported to the KGB

..that CIA had warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA," The previous

summary stated BELITSKIY reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB
agent and "CIA did not warn BELITSKIY,"

There appears to be no doubt at this time that the statement by
NOSENKO that BELITSKIY reported the "CIA had warned BELITSKIY
against SHULGINA," is a reasonably accurate description of what actualy
happened in May 1962 during Agency contacts with BELITSKIY in Geneva.
The record reflects that BELITSKIY stated SHULGINA had confidentially
told him of her status as a KGB agent, stating she had been doubled by
the KGB after having been forcibly recruited by American Intelligence

whi previously in Paris, France.

6001228

11

SECRET


14-0000

(3

ene e Reediod

it was determined there was no collateral information which
would indicate that the staternent by SHHULGINA had any factual basis
and BELITSKIY was warned SHULGINA may have been acting on behaif
of the KGB in stating to BELITSKIY she had been “iorcibly recruited by
American Intelligence" ata previous date, It was also suggested to
BELITSKIY that he should go to the KGB as a loyal Soviet citizen and
report the apparent indiscretion of SHULGL™A, .
Pages 282 ~ 286 of the previous summary, in connection with
the BELITSKIY case, made reference to Vladimir Lvovich ARTEMOV.
It was stated that ARTEMOV had been involved with a series of America::
tourist agents in the Soviet Union and although NOSENKO was allegedly
familiar with ARTEMOV, he was unaware of the involvement of ARTEMOV
with American tourist agents in 1958 - 1959, The summary noted this
was during a period when NOSENKO claimed to have been Deputy Chiet
of the American-British Commonwealth Section of the Seventh Depart~
ment, Although not specifically stated, the above suggested ARTEMOV
was actually in the Seventh Department in 1958 ~ 1959 and that NOSENKO
was not even aware ARTEMOV was in the Seventh Department. NOSENKO
has consistently stated that ARTEMOV was assigned to the First Section,
First Department, from the time he entered into the KGB in approxi- |
mately 1957, .
12 Q001223
SECRET |

. -
ne ec oe

PS te a eae N

beeee maine nencners wecmmenncen weer Mtr ene ne nee -

Frreereyiaesen sre mem fe aoe


14-0000

A closer examination of the cases described in the previous
summary as "CiA American tourist agents," reveals there is no con-
flict in the involvement of ARTEMOYV in these cases and tne statement
by NOSENKO that ARTEMOV was w.th the First Section, First Depart- '
ment, As an example, one of the cases is the case of| Edward McGOWAN| O06
NOSENKO has furnished information concerning this case, stating it was
originally a Seventh Department case and that after the mailing of a letter ‘
by the individual in Minsk, the case was immediately taken over by the
First Department, There is adequate reason to believe ARTEMOV only
became involved after the case was transierred to the First Department,

Another of the cases involved the contact of ARTEMOV witha CIA

o¥,24, 1441

officer who was under Department of State cover in Helsinki, Finland,
and visited the USSR ona teurist visa. Such an individuai would under
no circumstances be considered a true tourist or the responsibility of
the Seventh Department, particularily since apparently the individual was |
even traveling under a diplomatic passport, it is,assumec the individual
\ .
was of interest to the First Chief Directorate and if the Fiist Chief
Directorate required or desired support from the SCD, it would normally »
request the First Department for such assistance and it is extremely un-

likely that the FCD would request the Seventh Department for assistance

é in a case involving an American diplomat,

: beg 0001230 ii kt

13

oo SECRET

re “ ees wee a Sea ae


14-0000

ame . . Wom ter tm

Pages 332 ~- 333 of the previous summary contain the basis

for the previous conciusion that the claim of NOSENKO that he wasa ..
Deputy Chief of the Seventa Department from July 1962 to January
1963 was not credible. It is considered that a detailed rebuttal is
not necessary since this conclusion was apparently based on inadequate
information. During current interviews, NOSENiXO has furnished
details concerning his duties and other aspects of his claimed position -
which substantiate his claim to having been a Deputy Chief of the
Seventh Department from July 1962 to January 1964,

An example in support of the statement that the previous conclu-
sion was based on inadequate iniormation is the matter of the written
notes which NOSENKO brought out and furnished to CIA in early 1964.-
The description of these notes on page 319 of the previous summary is
inadequate, inaccurate, and misleading. Prior to current interviews,
an effort had not been made to obtain from NOSENKO a detailed explan=
ation of his notes or of how he obtained the information in the notes.

° 7 During current interviews, NOSENKO has given detailed informa-
tion concerning all aspects of his notes. This information supports his
claimed position of Deputy Chief of the Seventh Department and includes

collateral support to his claim of being Deputy Chief of the First Section,

. First.Department, in 1960-1961. 6001231

oe SECRET

ak


14-0000 .

Wiese

Primarily the notes of NOSENKO can be categorized as

follows: .

- (a} Short case summaries by the Chiefs of the

First Section, Second Section and Sixth Section, Seventa

i Department, NOSENKO has stated that he was in 1962 -
1963 responsibie for supervision over these Sections and
that Filip Denisovich BOBKOV,. Deputy Chief, SCD, who >
supervised the Seventh Department, requested a list of all
recruited agents of the Seventh Department. According to
NOSENKO, the order from BOBKOV was to only retain the
files (cases) of agents in tourist firms and that the files of
other recruited agents should be sent to the FCD or Archives.
NOSENKXO has stated that ne in turn levied on the Chiefs of
the three Sections the requirement of BOBKOV, but also ex~
panded the request to include all 1960 - 1962 cases, not
excluding previous cases or cases which had already been
given to the FCD. The notes of NOSENKO included hand-
written reports from the Chiei or Acting Chief of each Section
on recruited agents, with information varying from agent to
agent and even including some human errors.

Many of the above cases had previously ‘been trans-

ferred to the FCD, but the remarks of NOSENKO about thei 4232
15 ‘

ecency

WLVi ows -
oN ane . Loot be ede ene Be gee ages . oo

We Ne oes


14-0000

Fat AD SUI AIG ete a ee

inclusion ‘support his statement that he had expanded
the original request from BOBKOV so that he would have
some "pieces of information to give CIA,"

(b) Notes by NOSENKO on other cases which he learned
of. during the 1962 ~ 1963 period. Certain of the notes were
made from a review of a notebook kept by the Chief, Seventh
Department, to which NOSENKO had access on at least two
occasions. Most of his notes were not detailed but were
sufficient to refresh the memory of NOSENKO at a later
date and yet were somewhat innocuous to maintain before

his defection.

(c) Notes for lectures to officers of the Seventh Directorate
prepared while with the First Department, 1960 - 1961, and
the Seventh ‘Department, 1962 - 1363.

{d) Drait report for the briefing of the new Chief, First
Department, in the latter part of 1961, .

(e) One of three copies of an unregistered report pre-
pared by the Chief, Seventh Department, and two Deputy Chiefs,
including NOSENKO. This was a briefing paper for use by the’
Chief (CHELNOKOV) in an appearance before the Collegium

of the KGB which was reviewing the activities of the Seventh

0001233

16 .

SECRET

ee eee tee Pe

cn ne

eee
SHOES
BN een Shs


14-0000

SECRE!
ye a? ‘
in a

dbiee

Department. According to NOSENKO, the prepared

report was never typed as a forrnal cocument,

The view has been set forth that NOSENKO took undue risk in
carrying written notes with him out of the Soviet Union, An examination
of this material suggests -nat NOSENKO was using extrerne care in
collecting material and was not attempting to obtain documents, the
possession of which might be incriminating er which if he had brought
out would have been immediately missed. Instead, he collected a con-
siderable amount of valuable information which he could bring out with
little or no fear that a search of his effects in the KGB after his depart-
ure for Geneva would disclose that certain material was missing. None
of the material was registered and all could have previously been des-
troyed by NOSENKO.

The previous summary stated that NOSENKO brought three. KGB
documents to Geneva. These were typed papers but none was registered ; cd
or actually accountable, The reference to three documents was to:

* (a) The drait report for the briefing of the Collegium
which has been mentioned previously. tee
i . (b) A.typed two-page report on several cases. Actually
a Chief of Section had typed his notes on cases instead of

on, submitting in handwriting as the others did. .
" G001234

SECRET Fs

aarti yt meee mate tem A ee me
‘

te tegen oe

FACS Poca ineg gc haan aloes Be


14-0000

kept by the Ca-2:f which he reviewed and that ne kept one,

leet eg,

(c) A second copy of a summary on a XGB agent.

NOSENKO stated that there were two copies in the file

Of interest is the fact that the copy was not a registered
document and did not contain the usual information as to .

number of copies typed.

heclaisd sat ale

Ladrecceicl

6001235


14-0000

SECRET

4

me
eae

nee.

HAS NO V

NCSENKO

G.

wy

Qa
“
re

nor

CRUITE

3 RE

we
J

rus
ES Tied

CTION IN

wes

EIS D

ANS

3

a

6001236

#

then tae!

§
7

ror
Care

SS,
read

eet
PSRARENE RNS

vy

eet
Rae

Naas

at

rate,
N
i


14-0000

a

Teli A het SE Lt

vouncl

G,_NOSENKO i's no valid claim te certainty that the KGB

recruited no American Embassy versonnel between 1953 and his
a neers ins trast nh arr gaara

éefecticn in 1964. (Previous conclusion}

The conclusion in this summary is that NOSENKO is of the
opinion that there were no KGB recruitments of United States Embassy
personnel in Moscow between 1953 and December 1963 with the exception
of "ANDREY" {Dayle Wailis SMITH) and ierbert HOWARD} who actually
was afin employee but did work part of the time in the Embassy.

The question here is whether or not the expressed opinion of
NOSENKO is sufficiently based on actual knowledge so that this opinion
can be accepted as absolute evidence that there were no other KGB
recruitments of Embassy personnel during this period of time. -The
only logical conclusion is that the opinion of NOSENKO cannot be
accepted as absolute fact and, therefore, there is a possibility that’:

a recruitment could have occurred and NOSENKO not be aware in any
way of the recruitment, This should in no way be interpreted as a
suggestion that NOSENKO could be lying, but rather that an unbiased
observer without personal knowledge could and should be hesitant to
accept the expressed opinion of NOSENKO jn this particular area,

- -The actual basis for the stated opinion of NOSEMEGT ST? be .

examined and can be cited as follows.

syasuasiog std
toelasssficatics

i
Rea

Sabet tae Ty


14-0000

‘ (a) During Marca 1953-late May 1955 NOSENKO
was a case oificer in the rirst Section, First Department,
SCD, NOSENKO does not claim that he would kave known
the detaiis concerning any recruitments (other than
"ANDREY") in this period, dut states if there had been
he would have heard "something."

(b) During late May 1955 to December 1959 NOSENKO
was in tne Seventh Department, not the First Department,
but continued to have contact with certain officers in the
First Section, First Department. NOSENKO is of the
opinion that if there had been a recruitment in the United
States Embassy during this period he would have heard
"something" even though he would probably have learned |
few details,

{c) During the January 1960-December 1961 period
NOSENKO was Deputy Chiei of the First Section, First

Department, and he has made the categorical statement
that there were no recruitments by the KGB of United
pO . '* States Embassy personnel during this period of time.

He has also stated that if there had been any recruitments

- during the 1953-1959 period he is sure he would, during

C

1960-1961, have heard or learned some details of thg)(}{ 238

case or cases. There is merit to this contention by

BP Cee pee Yates +


14-0000

os

NOSENKO since the Chief of Section was Vladislav
KOVSHUK who had been an officer of the First Depart-
ment since 1953, actually working in the First Section

except for the periods of time that he was in the United

States to reactivate "ANDREY" in 1957-1958 and a Tos
period of time that he was Deputy Chief of the First
Department. |
{d) During 1962-1963 NOSENKO was again in the
Seventh Department. However, he continued to maintain
contact with certain officers of the First Section, First
Department: in particular, Gennadiy I GRYAZNOV,
who succeeded NOSENKO as Deputy Chief of the First

Section, then became Chief of Section, and in the latter

fod

part of 1963 became a Deputy Chief of the First Department,
According to NOSENKO his relationship with

GRYAZNOV was sufficiently close during 1962-1963 that
he is sure GRYAZNOV would have furnished NOSENKO
some information in regard to any successful recruitments

. of United States Embassy personnel. NOSENKO pointed

06

out that he learned of the existence of the [Herbert HOWARD]

case from GRYAZNOV in 1962, although it was not until

— : 1963 that NOSENKO heard the name. NOSENKO actually
| 9001239

SECRET

eae Se ee Bl nO me Fee Se et


14-0000

ie SECRET

learned of the name when the First Section, First
Department, needed the services of the Seventh
_ Department (Third Section) in obtaining a room ina

06 ‘.
certain hotel for the Soviet girl friend of[H WARD] !
$

‘In general the above constitutes the basis for the stated opinion

0s
of NOSENKO that "ANDREY" and[Herbert HOWARD }were the only

successful KGB recruitmenta during 1953 - December 1963. It should
be noted that there are no other identified KGB recruitments during
this period of time which would specifically refute the opinion of
NOSENKO. However, in view of the cited actual basis for the opinion

of NOSENKO, acceptance of the opinion of NOSENKO as being an . }

honest opinion should not be converted into a statement that it is
absolute proof that another recruitment could not have occurred.
NOSENKO may be completely correct in his opinion, but since

NOSENKO was only in the First Department 1953 - 1955 and 1960 - 1961

hiz opinton that he wovld have heard something" about a recruitment

in 1955 - 1959 or 1962 - 1963 @annot be accepted as infallible.

6001240
4

SECRET

|
|
|
|
=
}
!


14-0000

Lo. oe . ~ } . . woe aA
. . =z t -- fee
te SEES : 2 o . &
we . +7) ne a
os gies : os
oe) : “HES : -
td . - a: ‘ ' . a
Se) ‘ : i et
. . “OE oe
. 4 .
. . i a. . . . i - , :
. . . . . . F -
. ~ . _ Tose . . to

eaten

. ead ot

14-0000

~~ toe a

Ne mee eee '

ANNEX
j
The previous summary contained an Annex "A' and an Arnucx
"B" covering pages 316 - 435. Limited comments concersing Annex
'
"A," Statements of Soviet Officials About NOSENKO, and Annex "3B,"
Summaries of Cases Not Examined in Text, are attached, In addition,
1 - . cm - : . -
: there is an Annex "C" to this summary whica is entitled, "The
Cherepanov Papers," ;
:
a-
itachments: ‘
: Annex A
Annex B
Annex C ‘
:
4 . . . *
.
+ .
i oO. 7 . 001242 |
; : 1
! -
i
ca
rman Seis veclie  dae tata J woe ese were _—— . “ .
7 . . :
i .
2 ' : .
Pet ‘ . aah

THC NICasy ssh * eee: any cas
Pada rsandy b menditadet ed am so

©

TO mates sagen Se wee

“SECRET

ANNEX B - SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT

EXAMINED IN TENT

“$ _ GO0L243
CRET Ered na


14-0000

SUMMARIES OF CASES NOT EX. DIN EXT

Pages 399 - 435 oi the previous summary contain sume
>

0

mericans who, accorci

@ 00 MLO ING LLOn 2S ON

NOSENKO, were oi KGB intevest, were approacked by the KGB, or

a

were actually recruited by the AGB, It was stated that these cases

did not clearly relate to the syeciic KGS positions held at particular
times by NOSENKO and thus could not de usetully employed in exnminin
his claimed KGB service. The sourcizn

in detail curing the curxent interviews wita NOSENKO, and it is now

rs

. possible to establish a certain relationsnip detween these cases and
certain claimed positions of NOSENKO in the KGB, : 7 :
8)

It is the conclusion of this summary that any group o2/<9 leases,
§rOu;Z

as well as all other cases concerning waica NCSENXO has furnisnzed
information, must be fully considered, noz necessarily for the importance
or unimportance of the information, but to determine how NOSENAG
claimed to have learned of che case and whether his statements con~
cerning each idertified case are supported by collateral information,

, ‘These factors are important in assessing the overall validity of infor~

_ . ™ation from NOSENKO as well as being supporting evitdhdet4is

. : -¢laimed positions in the KGB. _

QeeneT

meee enue gm te ee a ag


14-0000

K

NOSENAO in approximately fad jof whe Rs _

fact that NOSENHO has

5 TAS

G
pte
uo

cases, Of even move significance

logically sourced his infovrsation in ctl exces: perharzal Zourlecases,
o ? wes

The indicated inability of NOSENKO to corspleicly source aii[ed fos

a ettote wl clea nis bay
Pereacsaray Since 215 4even

the cases is not consicered

knowledge of all the cases is quite compatible with his claimed positions
in the KGB. In addition, criticism of NOSEZNXO sor not seing able to
source all of his information would be unveasonable since it makes

no allowance for normal lapses of memory ox failure to recali some-
thing which was iasignidicant at the time it occurred,

Without citing in detail any of the/49|cases, the ways in whics : -

NOSENKO iearned of a number of the cases ere cons

since there is a direct relationship to his claim

scaliy the pos

during 1960 - January 1964, speciz ion of Deputy ChieZ,
First Section, First Department, 1960 - 1961; Chief, First Section,
Seventh Department, January - July 1962; anc as Deputy Chief, Seventh

Department, July 1902 - January 1964, Certain examples of the adeve

‘are as follows:

a 6001245

rd 2) -
o>
eS)
rm

. .
ene ete pan gente ne TO a en ee

ge meeaaet
MISES


14-0000

(a) NOSENKO ieaened of a wumuer of the Seventh

o
ou
i
-
Ss)
rox
Q
1
pe
al
ce.
o-
w
v

Depariment cases whieh nad occurr

Ww
Ne)
a
2
v
6
v
ro
i
is}
g
Fy
by
°
*
%
a
cs]
"
G
+
”%
@
ish
w
“s

well as several 1955 -1

the Chici or Acting

Section a 1 Section in 1903, These notes were gre-

pared at the request oi NOSENKO who as a Deper

~~
a
tr
th
Q
ms
en ae

Seventh Department, was responsivie for supervision of
oo these three sections; and the request was aciually an ex- '

pansion of tne original rccuest irom BOBKOV, Deputy Chief

of the SCD, for information on recruitments of the Severth

Bh ener noneemenmnn nnn:

Department, NOSENKO brought with him in 1904 the noies

OE “ERE Er TRL AICO enw aioe deer

preparea by the Chiez or Acting Caiei of the First Section,
Second Section and Sixiu Section anc his knowledge of many .
of the cases which had occurred prior to 1962, particularly
1960 ~ 1961, was limited to information contained in the
notes. Irom these noices, NOSENKO had prepared his re-
port to BOBKXOV eliminating those which were nét applicable

to the request.

(b) NOSENKO learned of several 1962 - 1963 cases of

the First Section, First Department, frors Gennadiy lL.

Sr mE Rey ORE

GRYAZNOV who succeeced NOSENKO as Deputy Chiei, . -

po _ 6001246

wee oe vlpter amet Lee :
. Seer thers Seek are pA eta 1 oh


14-0000

eon
First Section, First Depavivaent, This inforraation was

urnisned tg NOSENAO oriinarily decause a

Laly
ey

with GRYAZNOV anc noi a5 tae result of mutual operailons.

was furnished additional cetails as a result of @ vequest

. from the Sevetis Depuriment te the First Section, >

08

Cestain of the[49 pases sisted were cases of the Seventh Devari- ‘
ment prior to 1960 or in 1962 - 1963 waen NOSENKO was in the Sevente

Department, Certain of the cases were cases ia Wai)

be
iP
re)
hy
oo
a
u.
e
wn
@
Qo
fh
ra)
N
#

ns :

First Department, was involved prior to 1960 or i960 - 196i. The
knowledge of NOSENKO concerning these tvo groups of cases Goes not
materially support his claimec positions in the First Department and
Seventh Department, but does support his claimed assignment to te
Seventh Department prior to 1950 and in 1962 - 1963, anc nis claimed
assigament to the First Depariment in 1960 - 1961. 0X

It is difficuit to specisically comment conceryaing these Es|cases
since they do not ial) into one ox two specific categories. Instead, they
constitute a rather motley group of cases remaining aster completion of
the detailed sections of the previous summary, Included are First

Department and Seventh Department cases covering a period of approxi-

(

mately five and one-half years. It should be noted, hoyetrry Zhat the

. 4
. orenry

oN ne ng tet or Hoe ee eee ree oonennd Marta tans wet ne - cette com A et :

yee

teste


14-0000

primes eee

pas Soin ONS
SUCRE MEESINSCUSSIRRTINNS

SODA ANA SRST

5.
_CEpeey

OF

0001248

1
. )
t
[
4
:
. :
, i
ead .


14-0000

=
ANNEX C - THE CHIRTPANOV PAPERS
; }
” 1
a 2
e
4
{
: .
: %
; 0001249
| 7
! . ‘ on: .
| SECRET founrsaas aaa *
~ neeanh (hay :
Nn Sa sete tats GRIER TET TTT re reine Seine rite teen emt te tenn etree : i” we aaa ‘ .


14-0000

an

Pages 309 - 316 of the previous si

oi tne Cherepanov Papers, ane how Alexsandr Nikoiayevich CHERSPANCV

passed a package of documents io an American tourist in Moscow i

November 1963. The conclusion, however, was that the assertions of

NOSENKO with respect to the CHEREPANOV case were not material to

the claim of NOSENKO that he was Deputy Chiei, Seventh Department,

*

in late 1963. .

The definite relationship of the Cherepanov Papers to the bona

fides of NOSENKO cannot be ignored anc must de given specific consic-

»

eration, li CHEREPANOV was under KGB controi wien he passed the
papers to the American tourist, or if the papers contain "deception
information," the bona fides of NOSENKO are subject to very serious ‘

question,

NOSENKO had personal knowledge of CHEREPANOV who was, ; ,

, according to NOSENKO, aa ocficer in the First Section, First Depaxtment,

C

%

001250

ee : noe sees eet wae enero aa
en, noe Soot me eegn em tare ee oy fen oe

wey

an


14-0000

Mee ae ae,

-been Deputy Chief, First Section, wiizou

re

Garing i940 - mid-.961 when he was fozced in

Mal

G3. During the above period

—_

acd a direct supervisory respoasibility over CHEREPANOV excess

b

et ro

na ike absence of tue Ciics o

we

NCOSENAKO

ilso claims vo have participated in the bunt Sor CHERIOPANGY in
December 1963.

Considevation has previously 5 been given to the cueory “het tee
Cherepanov Papers were passccé to Amevicans Sy the KGB tarou
CHERZEPANOV to support che bona Zides of NOSENKO, This theory
seems to have iittle credibility since the papers conte
which would even support tae claim of NCSZNKO that be was in the
First Section, First Depaviment, 1956 - 1961. The pape x6 also contain
no inzormation waich would indicate there was even a Deputy Cnici of
the First Section during 1958 ,- 1950.

Statements by NCSZNKO are empiatic that CHEREPANOV was

not under KGB control, that se passed the papers wuich it iavexr Cevelopec

he had taken from tie Fivst Section prior to his retirernent because he
was Cisgruniled with his treatrnent by the KGB, and that the action by

CHEREPANOV caused consternation in the KGB.

There is no coliateral evidence which contradicts any of

.the.statements by NOSENKO about CHEREPANOV. Further, there is

GO01251

a - SEORE T

TN pe we eT ee eT te


14-0000

notaing in either the orm or suyvsiince of the papers which provides

a basis for suspicion as to their authe

and sudsiance of ihe papers ave in hee

G

& CHINAS PANSY case nus seen

were originally shown to NOSZNAC in 1964 anex Lis cefection, have
also been covered in cevail
NOSENKO does not claim to have speciiicaily seen any particular item
prior to 1964, his statements in regard to the various candwritings, ‘ =
types of notes, and Grait memoranca leave no Coubt that NOSENKO

was very famiiar wita personne! in the First Section, First Depaxt-

ment, ané with First Department procedures.

papers and a detailed analysis will be prepared eta later Gate, it
should be noted that a considerabie amount of pexvsornal judgmeni nas .

o
been necessary ia maxing an assessraent of tae Caexesanov Papers
since there are no exemplars with wiich to compare any of the material,
However, based on iniormation ceveloped thus far, and there is no
reason to believe additional work will alter the conclusion, there is

te not an adequate basis for an opsnion that CHEREDPANOV was under KGB

control, that the Cherepanov Papers contain "deceptive infer ean” : a
. “& .

.
Parent a een PARNER Me Sete Cray tee bbe ee ee ee

pe cepa OH MVE cee


14-0000

or taat the papers were oiser thin the colicction of material uy a

runtled employee which he very carefully selected or accumulacd,

the removal of which would ony Lave constituted @ minimal visk to

The entire Cherepanov Piz

i

there is any information whics could ve considered "Cecepiive intor-

mation" either by direct siatemerxt ox implication. ‘Two possibie arezes

have been noted and civen ull consideration, These areas ures
o

(a) There is no specitic information that there
were any recruitments by the KGB of American per-
sonnel in the United States Zmbassy durin,

nor is there any iniormation suggesting

the <GB had an
. American source or American agent in the Embassy )
during that period of time.

jb) Petr 5. POPOV, a GRU ofxficer who sad deen
?
an extremely valuable Cia source from 1953 on, was,
according to tne papers, exposed to the KGB in January
1959 as a result of a letter mailing by Ceoxge Payne
WINTERS, Jr. WINTSRS was a CIA ermployee under

Be

‘[Depastment of State cover bssigned to the Embassy in
Moscow, The letter, which was to POPOV, was obtained :
Nw by the KGB aiter mailing by WINTERS and was a direct
result of KGB surveillance of WINTERS. _ ‘ -

a | ~  G001253 SG

sete meee, erate ee


14-0000

G

only a rather a

st Section curing

t
3
rg
@
uw
w
“
°
w
‘v
a)
Du
vy
Pay
a
i]
Q
a3
pe
a
ray
uw
°
A
vb
o
a
.

sm the Emuassy Curin

¥ COneicevaiion, Ibis not conclusive
prooi tuat a recruiiment was not mace or that an Amevican source
Gic not exist, The papers éo not contain a pOsiiive statement on
either matter.

In regard to (5), the quite speciic information in the papers
that Petr S. POPOV was uncoverca by tac KGB 25 4 result oz AGB
surveiliaace on Georze Payne WINTERS, Jr., who ‘mailed a letter to
POPOV in January 1959, this information should be considered as
possibiy information of a deceptive nature unless an adequate explanation
can be made for its presence in the papers, POPOV was recalled to

ox TOY.

Hy

Moscow irom East Germany ia November 1958 ostensibly
The circumstances under which Le was recaiied and coliaterai infor ~
mation have given adequate grounds for a belief that by November
1958 POPOV was suspected by tae KGB of cooperating with Western
Intelligence or that the KGB may even have been sure POPOV had
been cooperating with Ua ited States Intelligence,

It may be presumed that any lead to the KGB. in regard to

POPOV or the fact that United States Intelligence, more 8 0135 4

5
SECRET.

fee ite tat ene te ee ee

oo


14-0000

eater tearm cones mene

: FY
Grve ee CTEM oaeetaneniaal

CIA, had a source in ise GRU would have come irom ana

source of the FCD, KGB, noi ine SCD, It can aiso be presumed tha

e

a& source or agent of the PCD ina position to fuvnisa a lead to a
penetzaiion of the GRU by Western intelligence would be carulully
protected even within the KGB. The possibility of course oxists wnat
a leac fxom George BLAXE, an SCDa
of POPOV to the KGB, but itis noc established that it did nor is there
any reasor. to believe the TCD cou:d not or Gid not have another a
or agents who furnished informatioa to the KGB pertinent to cevelop-
ment of the case against POPOV.
‘The primary question, however, as regards the Cherepanov

Papers is whether, even ii itis presumed the KG3 obtained information

irom an FCD source or agent waica le suspicion of POPOV or

nioxvmation

ror

identification of POPOV, ‘nis would be incompatible with
in the papers and could only lead to the comciusion that the pasexs contain
"deceptive information,"

The conclusion in regard to the above is that the faci the papers

attribute the exposure of POPOV to the KGB to surveillance on WINTERS

when he mailed the letter to POPOV in January 1959 is not incompatible

with the distinct possibility taat the KGB had previously obtained infor-~

mation from an FCD agent or agents which actually led to suspicion in

regard to POPOV or actual identitication of POPOV.

. 6
ECR

GO0L255

T

rey

3 WS
SS Be RS

SAE Ra Pe RENE TORN ERR,

Tesi. eset hte mee a ers war ~ woe


14-0000

Pecaiapate, nn'f S

pant Mowe aaring bean ere = ee

{ informuiion was received from an important TCD agen:
suck as George BLAKE or inrouzgas another vaiuaole FCD agent waich
led to KGB suspicion of POLOV ysiox to his return to Moscow in
November 1958, it is highly unlinely suca information would reccive

wice distribution within the KGB, elither in the

ty

CD or th2 SCD,

is also possible the limited group within the AGB wao would be awe

that the KGB had received inforsmction leading to suspicion of POPOV

irom a valuable agent would be very interested in attvibutin
exposure of POPOV to the fortuitous mailing of the letter to POPOY
by WINTERS, The possivility szouid be considered that prior to the
retrieval by the KGB of the letter io POPOV tseve was only a dee

suspicion of POPOV but that the ietter compietely so.idizied the case
against POPOV.

Consideration has been given to the possibility chat CHERIS PANOV
was under KGS control when le pavsed the papers to the American
”

tourist and that it was done by the KGB with the ho ope os involving Si

in a KGB-control’ed operation within the USSR. In that event, the
papers passed by CHEREPANOV would most likeiy be genuine since

this would have been the initial step in waat tas KG hoped would become
a successful operation.

The above theory has beex rejected since there are a number

of factors which militate against it. These factors inclice the fact that _

eunteuoapecrnnaenenyt ry
Ri PASS Sh
xf RUAN

OE EN

”


14.90000

: nae :
on ” .
; oS toe “>
the Pavers wes &t least thre
telat wees laeles ce O72 * OW me no cue v
~ Welle WOU BGA Cs sealae te YO Cus .
aay. a eariagn MRR Wo oo tees wt ‘
Was 10 indication CHER SPLNCY suture Comact.
‘ 1
. \
'

: ™“
: ;
, rer ad , _
‘ .
:
t
i
‘
4 - ‘
1 . .
H : . :

’
:
H .
\ ; ; .
i
H

. : a
\ x
Te atlas Bg ag ERNE _ 7 . .
. -

,

:
wo . 1 7 . . . '


14-0000

~ a
}
]
ABIDIAN, John - IV, E, 5, 715,19, 20, 52 |
“ANDREY" (Dayle Wallis SMITH) - IV,G,)-4 :
ARTAMONOV, Nikolay - I,A,2 4
ARTEMOY, Viadirsir Lvovich - 1V, F, 6, 12, ‘e .
BAKHVALOV, Mikhail - IV,E,3,4 7
BALDIN, Boris Andreyevich - IV, F,2 |
[banners Robert]- 11, F, 14,15
“ob [BEGcs, Frank|~ IV, E, 36,37
BEL:TSKIY, Boris - IV, F,6-12 7
BERIYA, Lavrentiy Ivanovich ~ 1V,B,2,3,5¢7
Ve (BieNstocx, Natalie]- Iv, F,3,4 |
OG Birsz, Arthur}; 1V,D,1,2
BLAKE, George - IV,D,9; IV, F, 9: V,C, 6,7
BOBKOV, ‘Filip Denisovich ~ IV, F,15,16; V,B,3
BOHLEN, Ambassador - II, F,10
. ~ e
; BOWDEN, Lewis - IV, E, 53,54 ; oe rn
Ob [BRauns, Horst]- 1V, F,3~6
OG Brown, G. stantey}- Iv, 8, 43 _ 7 001258

~ SECREY

‘ oy 1 ' :
~ ’ . + 6 ' soe Be . .

. roo - Ae : ! toe -

nee ie cane meanest kee et meen me eee tes Nena eet onan peed ce atk mp tee toe ee cece
we bg ye MOI : - - > os }


14-0000

BUGAYEVA, Ludmila - IV, F, 4
ab [Berat, Richard “IV,D,1
Do [Bue TIN, Sipe |} IV, E, 49, 50 .
0G [surtmn, wal} LV, E, 49, 50 a .
CECCHI, Pietro - IV, E, 39, 40, 42
CHELNOKOV, Vladimir Dmitriyevich - IV, F, 2,16
CHEREPANOV, Aleksandr N. - Il, H, 4; V,C,1-4, 6-8
CHERNETSEV, Y. ©. - IV,E,49
CHURANOV, Vladimir A. - ill, B, 4
Ob [pax, Frank| 1V, F, 41, 42
“) DEMKIN, Vladimir - IV, E,20,45
DERYABIN, Petr Sergeyevich - IV,B,5, 6
DOUGLAS, William O. - IV,D,3
06 {prew, George|- IV, D,1
Ob Pwexty, Robert} IV, E, 41,44, 45 7
-FARMAKOVSKAYA, Olga A. - V,A,1
FEDOROVICH, Tatyana - IV,E, 8,9
FEDOSEYEV, Sergey M. - IV,E, 49-5; IV, F,1

Ob [Fisk, Norman|- IV,D,5

OG [FRIPPEL, Arsene |- IV, D,2
’ 04 [GAFFEY, Joseph | IV, E, 41, 45, 46
o
r !

2

ea aE Comte ne ren a man ‘

CEPRET ng ee

0001259


14-0000

a
GARBLER, Paul - IV,E, 52

eo oe

ot [GARCIA, Anthony za) ~1V,E, 39:

Ob, (GARLAND, J: John ¥ IL, F, 173 2V, E, 31, 33-36
Ol [exsspure, » Michael]! Iv, D, 5,6

GOLITSYN, Anatoliy Mikhayiovich - UI,B,

IV,B,

VA,

3,4; IM, E,9-11;
5

1

GRIBANOV, Oleg M. - UI, F,3,4; IV,6; 1V,6; IV,E,4,5,21; IV,F,1,2

"GRIGORIY" - IU, F,13; 1V,5,3,6; IV,F,4

GROMAKOVSKIY, Yevgeniy - DI,B,4; IV,E,20

4 Ill, F, 5-13, 15-19;
6; IV,0,9,10; IV,E, 21,23, 31-34;

GRYAZNOV, Gennadiy I. - 10,B,4; Wi, F,8-13,15; IV,E,5,12, 19-21, 26-28,
. ; 30,43-45; IV.G,3; V,B,3,4

- GUK, Yuriy I. - 10,B,4

HAMILTON, Victor Norris - I,E,9.
(aka: HiNDAL, Fouzi Mitri)

"HANNA" - IV,'E, 27
OC LHarnis, Gisella|- IV,D,1,7,3
HORBALY, Wi iam - IV, E,53
Ok [HOWARD, Herbert} 11, £,8; 10, F,20; 1V,6,1,3,4,
IVANOVA, Svetlana - IV, E, 38,39, 45, 46
Gb (FENNER, Paul . IV, E, 28-31, 35-36
JOHNSON, Robert Lee - IH,E,8; 11,G,5
dL [ZOHNSON, Wallace Everett) -1V,F,3,4
 & (Bones, William Carroll}- IV, F, 3,4
<3 , 5
SECRET

bm a ee RT

GV0L1260

a/6A

.
if
7
a
i
{
FS:
ag
re
49
ra
cy:
e
bt

UP ELAN WreTe} eringctoee hy Sena ce

APC ee

14-0000

I, eTADIT

i : Cinerenrs
KADERA, Fred f IV,E, 45

KANTOR, Marvin - IV, D,5,6

O6[Karvov, fnul- IV,D,5

KASHPEROV, Mikhail - UI,H,4 . |
KEMMER, Myra -I1V,E,9

Ob[KExsERs. James|- IV, E, 22-26, 55, 56
KLY PIN, Vladimir Azekseyevich - 1V,E,5,48-51
KOBULOV, Bogdan Zakharovich (General) - 1V,B,1-4,7

KOLOSSOV, Viktor - IV, E, 30, 34
(Alias used by KOSOLAPOV)

KOSOLAPOV, Vadim V. - 10,5,4; I,F,8,16,17; IV,E,5,19-21,28-32,
. : 34-39, 42-44

KOSYGINA, Madame - IJI,A,1

KOVSHUK, Vladislav M. - I,B,4; I,F,5,11,12; 1V,§,3,4,6, 12, 18,21,
23,49,52,53; IV,F,1,2; 1V,G,3; V,C,2

KOZLOV, Veniamin - IV,E, 12
KRUGLOV, Sergey Nixiforovich - IV,B,5
pee ee
Ol/| BANE, anew IV,D, 132

LANGELLE, Russell - II, F,3; IV,E,8

-¢

"LILLIAN" - IV, E, 26

Ob [Lusin, George) IV, E, 49, 50 |

- Ob (Eunt, Horace\ m1, F,3

Ob (MAHONEY, Eugene|- IV, E,53

flan. Martin k IV,D,2

6001261

Ep SP hE ae ona ae vee See ee as

wean swine > . . oe wea Tae ee
cig, atten © woe oa
© ey TSE

ots Dene

14-0000

(2

Nest aa f
VouUNNe

06

[ea _David|- =, U1, c,4¢
ua aw, Ralph|- IV, D,5
(MERTENS, Gerard -IV,D,2
. MIXHAYLOV, A, A, - IV,E,49
MINTKENBAUGH, James Allen - Ill, E, 8; U1,G,5
MORELL, William N. - IV,E, 52
. forone? Joseph}- IV, E, 22, 27, 36,37, 39, 40, 55
MULE, Walter (Capt.) - IV, C, 4
AM AC iC GOWAN, Edward -~IV,F,13
"ob fesciren, aeraahd} IV, D, 5, 6
PENKOVSKIY, Olcg Vasilyevich - IV,E,13
: PETROV, Vladimir Ivanovich - HI, B,4; IV, E, 48,49

POPOV, Petr S. - IVES? 10; V, C/4-7

"RAKETA" - Iv,Cc, 5
“(RASTVOROY, Yuriy (+ iv,B,5,6
" RHODES, Roy - In, F,4
O06 ure, Jona] IV, D, 5,6

OL, [SCHWARZENBACH, Collette]- 111, F,10

‘ashe eae akg agar

LRN RE TUNE Ne N O EPSRC RE IEE:

ES.

0001262

|

iCiB

14-0000

em rayne tet ON RAGE LANL NAAR PANE AEE LONI AE
cpm ante NE RED ERAN AEE EAA LD LENCE PEEL REN oe et OLS Sem no ct

my .
es

T

} oo . mp.

pe

+

SERGEYEV (SERGEEV), FNU - IV,£, 32,33

(Very poasibly Igor Alekseyevich ZENKIN, but is now considered also _
identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alekseyevich SUKHOV
and very possibly Igor A. SNURNOV. } : .

66 |SHAPIRO, Isaac Henry|- uLF,6

ob [SHarTAuER,. Sofia]- 1V,D, 5,7
SHAZLY, Sarwat el - IV,E, 40
SHELEPIN, Aleksandr Nikolayevich - I, F, 13
“SHMELEV" + iil, F, 13; IV,D, 3,63 IV,F, 4

Ob [SHUBIN, Joba\- IV,D,

7 SHULGINA, Nataliya - IV,F,l, 12

SMITH, Dayle Wallis - Lu, F, 4,26; 1V,G,1
SMITH, Edward Ellis - Ut, ¥,4

06 (Smite, “Fohn Discos] - UI, E, 9; IV, E, 45, 50
STALIN - IV,B,5

OG [STEVENS, Edmund Lm, F,4,6

06 [SToRSBERG, James - Ui, F,3,5,11-13; IV, E, 21-24, 26, 43,55, 56

Ob [TARASKA, William} IV,D, 5,6

Qb[FAYLoR, David Hiv, D,2

OL [TAYzoR. John }-1V, E, 42, 43

UMANETS, Ella -IV,E, 38 6001262
aed

6

SECRED

mR

;

14-0000

- x

ve
STROM 0 = TENET CANARY 8 ROI ES A | SO RRRENEEMI Atm MU mI tee, MIE! EE Ae vie NEE a ge ee Nw we

“~ QT Ie
Viner

URBAN, {Colonel} IV,E,24,25

VASSALL, William - IU, E, 9; UI, G, 5; IV,D,9

06 [(arASHENEO, Ste: Steve} IV, E, 53

OS ¢ William Stanley\- iV, D,2Z
WINTERS, George Payne, Jr. - IV, £, 53; V,C,4+7
. ZENKIN, FNU - IV,E, 32-34
a : (Very possibly Igor Alexseyevica ZENKIN, but is now considered also

aad : and very ‘possibly Igor A. SMIRNOV. }
Of [ ZUJUS, Matthew IV, EB, 26-28
or) ZWANG, Maurice} IV, E, 40-42

| SECRET

identical to Igor Alekseyevich SERGEYEV, Igor Alexseyevich SUKHOV

GUOL 24.

trhta Vp tractor e: rane ART Themen LE WORE eeeb: H, -aner oe fags

