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603.

SPESIALISTS* ASSESSMEITS OF HOSE™KO
Opinions on Intelligence and Personality
Grephoicaical Analysis

Three pages of penciled notes and Jottings in Russian made
: Guring en early debriefing session were submitted on
March 1964 to CIA handw together with a nwater
ling NOSENKO. The
ly that the writer was a Rucsian male

, that he had a university-level education, and that he was
én intelligence officer by profession.

Their report, which was
qualified due to limitations on the amount of NOSENKO's handwriting
em, is quoted below. .

specimens submitted to th



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2. Reports by Psychologist

&. Psychological Testing Results

A CIA psychologist interviewed NOSENKO and administered a
series of psychological tests on 9 July 1964, The psychologist's
report, including answers to questions raised by the CIA handlers
of NOSENKO is quoted in the following paragraphs.


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'& A comparison of information obtained during this series of

ec. Psychological Interrogation:

. Por fourteen days between 3 and 21 May 1965, the same CIA
psychologist interviewed NOSENKO on his entire early history,
from birth until about 1953, when he said he entered the KGé,
The main purposes were to collect additional information on this
period,* to gain further psychological insights into NOSENKO's
personality, and to find possible ways of obtaining a truthful
account. Although conducted under the. physical conditions of
interrogation, the questioning was relaxed and fo!lowed no rigid
outline.- There were relatively few changes of story from pre-
vious versions; at the same time, however, NOSENKO described in
detail some incidents which he has subsequently admitted to be -
untrue, An extract from the psychologist's report of these
interrogations is given below.

interrogations with information given earlier and later by

NOSENKO-can_be_found_in_Part IV.



3. Report by Psychiatrist

During the year April 1964-April 1965 NOSENKO was under the
medical care of a CIA psychiatrist who visited NOSEUIXO at regular
intervals, usually weexly, to examine him physically ard to listen
to any comments NOSENKO might have about himself and his situation.
The psychiatrist femiliarized himself with available materials on
NOSENKO, particularly with reports of his behavior in the months
immediately following the dcfection. <A report which he submitted

on 20 December 1964 is given below.



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» FOP SECRET

C e
615.

B. Views of Intelligence Personnel

1. Statement by DERYARIN

@ Introduction

Former KGB officer Peter Sergeyevich DERYABIN has followed
closely the entire course of CIA's investigation of NOSENKO and
his information. He took pert in the interrogations of NOSENKO
in April 1964, January-February 1965, and Octoker 1966 as an ob-
server and consultant, and he personally questioned NOSENKO during
July and August 1965 concerning certain aspects of his personal
past and early KGS career. On the basis of his direct, personal
knowledge of conditions within the Soviet Union and of KGB organi-
zation and procedures prior to his @efection in February 1954,

_*supplemented by continuing study of later information from a
"variety of sources, DERYABIN is of the opinion that much of what
NOSENKO has said akout himself and the KGB is purposefully false
or distorted. Although DERYABIN has been able to offer authorita-

” tive comment on many aspects of HOSENKO's story, the following

_.gection of this paper is limited to his remarks concerning NiOSEN-
KO's entry into the KGB (then MYD) and-his Communist Party affili-
ation, both of which fall into the period when DERYABIN was active
as a KGB (then MVD) staff officer, DERYABIN personally interro-
gated NOSENKO on these topics in the summer of 1965. Since DER-
YABIN was a personnel officer of the KGB (then MGB and MVD) in
Moscow, with long experience in Communist Party ectivities, at
the time NOSENKO claims to have entered the American Department
of the KGB Second Chief Directorate, he is particularly qualified
to comment on these aspects of NOSENKO's story.

DERYABIN, as a Soviet Army officer, vas gracuated in 1945
from the higher counterintelligence school of Snersh (counter-
intelligence sith the Soviet Armed Forces). Following this he
@orked in Naval.Smersh in Moscow and in March 1947 began to work
in the MGB as a case officer in the Central Personnel Directorate.
Shortly afterwards, when his superior was appointed Deputy Chief
of the Chief Guards Directorate for Personnel, DERYABIN trans-
ferred with him to the Guards Directorate. He served as a Guards
Directorate personnel officer until May 1952, rising through the
ranks from case officer to the position of Chief of Section. One
of his responsibilities was the approval of personnel for service
in various units of the Guards Directorate, and he was also in
charge of supervising personnel and security matters concerning
one of the Directorate’s surveillance sub-sections.

After requesting a change from personnel to operational
duties, DERYABIN was transferred in May 1952 to the Austro-German
Department’ of the MGB Foreign Intelligence Directorate. Until
December 1952 he served as the Deputy Chief of a sub-section in
the Counterintelligence Sektor (desk) of the Austro-German Depart-
ment. He was then appointed Deputy. Chief of the intelligence

:.. .Sektor of. the same department, a position he held until March

- '¥953.. From March until September 1953, DERYABIN was the Deputy

Chief of the section in MGB Headquarters which was responsible
for the security of Soviets stationed in Austria and Germany. |
In September 1953 he was transferred to Vienna, where he became
Deputy Chief of the section in the MVD Legal Residency respons-
ible for the security of Soviets in Austria. He defected to
American authorities on 15 February 1954.

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DERYASIN joined the Kemsomol in 1936 wad remained a memver
until 1940, when he became a candidate member of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union; he became a full Party member in
August 1941. During his Party career he reld a number of responsi-
ble posts. Before the war, when DERYABIN was a teacner in Altay
Kray, he as the secretary of a local Komsomol unit and simultan-
eously served £8 a member of the Komsomol Plenum in the rzyon
where he lived. Prom October 1940 uncil November 1941 he was
Secretary of the Komsomol Committee of the 107th Engineer Battalion
of the Red Army and from June 1945 until April 1946 held the same
position in the Komsomol Committee of the tlaval Smersh. This was
the unit which had particular responsibility for counterintelli-
gence work within the Naval GRU, which NOSENKO said he joined in
1951, ‘In the MG@ DERYABIN wae a member of the Party Committee of
the Personnel Section of the Guards Directorate and, after his
transfer, was elected Secretary of the Party Bureau of the Austro-
German Department of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate. He held
this post from January 1953 until his transfer to Austria in Sep-
tember 1953. .

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rele renres

b. DERYABIN's Comments

The following statements by DERYAGIN are based on his question-
ing of NOSENKO between 26 July and 13 August 1965. The questions
asked and the statements attributed to NOSENKO (referred to as
Subject) sere during this period. Although the Soviet State Secu-
rity Service did not become known as the KGB until March 1954,
this term is use@ for convenience sake, except where the specific
organization of the MGB or MVD is under discussion. DERYABIN's
comments follow:

“"NOSENKO's Acceptance into State Security*

- "Taking NOSENKO's. own statements at face value, it is highly
improbable that a person such as he has described himself to be
would be acceptable for a position as a staff officer in State
Security. The following factors are important in this regard: o

a. It was the policy of State Security to avoid hiring
the children cf high government officials. :

b. Until STALIN's death in March 1953, KO2ULOV, the
man who supposedly helped NOSENKO gain @ntrance into the
service, had no influence inside the MGS apparatus. From
about 1948 until 9 or 10 March 1953, KOBULOV had no office
irside the MGB or the “VD buildings... I know personally that
in these years KOBULOV worked in Germany as Deputy Chief of
the GUSIMZ (Chief Directorate of Soviet Properties Abroad) **
which was once directly under the Council of Ministers and
later under the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The office was
located.on Chkaiova Street, near the Kurskiy Railroad

Station (three blocks from my. former apartment)... | . ae

*# See also Part V.B.

#* WISMUT A.G. in Germany was subordinate to GUSIMZ: for a
further discussion of KOBULOV's role in helping NOSENKO
join the KG3, see Part V.B.


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@ > jue SECRET @ -

617.

c. It was physically impossible at the time for NCSENKO.
to be recomended for and accepted into State Security, as he
has told us, all in one month, March 1953. (If one accepts
his earlier version that he had his talk with KOBULOV in Jan-
uary or February, his account is similarly impossible because
KGBULOV was not then in State Gecurity.) It would normally
have taken a much Jonger time, but in addition to this it was
a pericd of reorganization and the personnel staff was not
actively conducting their work at that time, and perasanent
staff officers were rot sure that they would retain their
positions,

@. In March 1953. NOSEXKO was’ already twenty-five and a
half years old and only a member of the Komsomol. He had no
recommendation for Party membership. and could not become a
member for a full year because of his transfer from one ser-
vice (GRU) to another. It is impossible that State Security
would accept him knowing in advance that on his birthday fhe
would be twenty-six years old and without either Komsomol or
Party membership. ven for the son of a Minister, the Secre-
tary of the Komsomol Committee of the KG3 would have to talk
with the Personnel Cffice and would not give a recommendation
for his acceptance, especially for the Internal Counterintel-
ligence (Second Thief) Directorate. In the case of a son of
a Minister and one who is recommended by KOBULOV, the secre-
tary would request from NOSENKO a recommendation for Party
membership from the members of the Communist Party where
NOSENKO uséd tO work, in this case the GRU. In this way the
secretary of the Komsomol would be sure himself that NOSENKO

would become a candidate member of the Communist Party during
the next year, .

““However, even accepting that despite these obstacles and

"contradictions the KGB sould have accepted him, ore must also

remember (according to NCSENKO's own statemenis) that NOSENKO's
file contained the foliowing negative points.* They are serious
factors and certain of them alone would be enough to cause the
rejection; the totality makes it difficult to believe that at a
time of crisis in the State Security organs anyone would take the
resporsibility of accepting him:

a. Subject was already married and divorced before entry
into State Security.

b. He had been married to General TELEGiIN's daughter
and TELIGIN had been arrested by State Security and was in
jail the day that Subject entered State Security.

c. NOSENKO said that there was a file on "!IOSENKO's
father in which compromising material was collected on. -
-. - Subject's family. NOSENKO agreed that one piece of infor-
- mation that would-have-been in this file was the fact that
his maternal grandfather died in a Soviet prison while under
sentence as a counter-revolutionary.—

d. The social status background in the life of Subject's
mother was nobility.

—_
* "See also Part IV.B.

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618,

e. The shooting incident in Leningrad during World
War Il and his desertion from the Naval School in Baku
would have played a very negative role in any consideration
of his acceptance into State Security.

f. Subject never completed high school in the normal
fashion. ose

a

g- Subject was a poor student at the Institute of Inter-
national Relations. :

h. It should be added that the KGB would definitely
krno# that NOSENKO was involved in an automobile accident
in 1947 and was interrogated by the Militia (traffic court),
‘found guilty, and fined. This would definitely play a
negative role in NOSENKO's admission to the KGB,

4. NOSENKO would never be allowed to enter the KGB having
just recovered from tuberculosis.* In fact, there was a rule
at that time that no person who ever had tuberculosis (even
twenty years earlier) would ke permitted to work in the KGB.

“In addition, after acceptance, the fact that KOBULOV was a
personal friend of Subject's father, as he has told us, would
hav2 keen noted in the file and would have piayed a negative role
in permitting Subject to continue to work in State Security after
KOBULGV's arrest in June 1953. '

“I asked Subject how he answered some of the questions in the
anketa (entry questionnaire), particularly the questions on his
former wife, her relatives, and on his mother's ancestry.** I
then asked Subject how it was, taking into account his mother's
aristocratic ancestry, the fact that her father died in jail, the
Trotskyite allegations against Subject's father, the fact that
Subject's former father-in-law (TELEGIN) was still in jail, and
the fact that Subject was present when TELEGIN's apartment was
searched--that he had been accepted into the KGS, particularly
in 1953 during the confusion and chances after the death of STALIN.
Subject admitted that the question was logical, and said that he
could only assume that the influence of KOBULOV and the important
and influential position of his own father outweighed these nega-
tive factors. He also cited his GRU experience in this connection.

“I then asked Subject how he had reported his second marriage
tc the KGB. He replied that before the marriage he had mentioned

* NOSENKO first mentioned having had tuberculosis during the June
1962 meetings, when he described it as a minor case but said he
was under out-patient treatment until 1958. He next mentioned
his ilIness in 1966, describing how he sometimes coughed up a

- “glass of blood" at a-timey Although DERYABIN's questioning” = toot

covered this part of NOSEIKO's life in detail, there was no
mention of tuberculosis in July and August 1965. DERYABIN's
comment is based on the 1966 information but is included here
for purposes of context.

**The anketa and DERYABIIN's questioning on this subject are dis-
cussed further below,

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619.

it briefly to GORBATENKO, and that he hed unofficially run a name
check on his prospective bride (which was ‘clean'), and that after
the marriage he had £illed out another anketa in which he included
all the required data on his wife and rer relatives. After con-
siderable prompting, Subject said that he tad indicated that she
and her parents had been in France, but that he had concealed the
fact that her grandmother nad been in German-occupied territory
during the war. (He admitted that the KGB would have learned this
in a routine check, however.) I then reviewed for Subject the
negative security factors mentioned above, adding the arrest of .
KOBULOV, the fact that his nea wife and her parents had been
abroad, the fact that her grandmother was in German-occupied
territory. the fact that Subject was now over-age for the Komsomol
but not yet a Party member or candidate, and the fact that Subject
received a 15-day sentence for misuse of cover documents and in-
curring venereal disease, and asked if ‘he didn't think that his
personnel file had been reviewed in 1954, and if so, what grounds
there could have been for retaining him in the XGR. Subject said
that he thought that his file probably was reviewed but that

again the influence of his father had saved him. Subject added
that another important factor was prooably his language qualifi-
cation and particularly his higher education. I pointed out to
Subject that if his second wife and her parents had been abroad

it was impossible that her name check could have been negative.

He admitted it was illogical, but insisted that this was 50.

"NOSENKO's Knowledge of KGB, 1952-54

“Entry Date into KGB: NOSENKO was reminded that he had pre-
viously given varying dates for his entry on duty in the KCB. He
replied that he did not remember the exact @ate, but he was sure
that it was in the middle of March 1953 - perhaps 13 or 15 March
(15 March 1953 was a Sunday). He would give no explanation for
why he previously claimed to have entered the KGB in «+> . ° -
1952.* In fact it would be very unusual for a KGB officer to
forget his exact entry-on-duty date to the very day because it
is used to compute length of service and must be entered on vari-
ous forms from time to time.

"Numerical Lesiqnation of the Intelligence and Counterintelli-
gence Directorates in 1953: Asked to aescribe what directorates
existed in tne MVD while BERLYA was Minister (March-June 1953),
NOSENKO named the First Chief Directorate (FCD) and the Second
Chief Directorate (SCD) which he said were the intelligence and
counterintelligence directorates respectively. Asked if he were
sure, NOSENKO said he was positive, and that the only change: that
took place was that later, under KRUGLOV, for. a few months only,
the FCD became the ScD, ard vice versa, NOSENKO stuck to this
even when told he was wrong; he did not say he did not know or
did not rememker,. perhaps realizing that he could not claim not
to remember what directorate he served in. (Actually, the change
4n numerical designations was instituted by BERIYA right after
STALIN's death in March 1953 and persisted until the KGB was
organized in March 1954. Thus, NOSENKO does not know what the
correct designation of his own directorate was at the time that
he allegedly entered on duty with Soviet State Security and for
the entire first year of his alleged service there.

eo
_ * NOSENKO on other occasions has given various reasons why he

told CIA that he joined the KCB in 1952. See Part V.B.


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620.

“MVD Leadershi 1953-54: Asked to nane the chiefs cof the
directorates and separate departments of the MVD under BERIYA
and KRUGLOV, NOSENKO named nine out of 28, He was unable to name
the Chief of the Intellicence Directorate, saying that he remem-
bered only SAKHAROVSKIY (PANYUSHKIN was chief untis 1955). «sked
to name KRUGLOV's deputies, NOSENKO named only RO:4ASHKOV ani
SEROV, and was ignorant of such prominent deputies es LUNEV a:
SHATALIN, Told that a Secretary of the Central Committee of th
CPSU was one of KRUGLOV's deputies at this time (SHATALIN), Nos-
ENKO flatly denied that this was possible.

"Organization of KGB: NOSENKO did not know when the KGS was
organized (March 1954). He said that it was in early 1955 or
late 1954, Told thet he was a year off and asked to think it
over, NOSENKO insisted that he was right.

"Processing Procedures for Employment with KGB: NOSENKO's
story about how he was processed for employment with the KGB in
1953 is inconsistent with the procedures used at that time. He
does net know many of the things that he should know about en-
trance procedures; he is wrong about many of the things that he
claims to remember, The disparities are so creat that they can-
not be explained (as NOSENKO attempts to do) by the claim that
KOBULOV's recommendation resulted in a simplified entrance pro-
cedure for NOSENKO.

“The most important document filled out by prospective em-
ployees of Soviet State Security is a detailed personal history
questionnaire, called in Russian Anketa spetsialnoco naznacheniya
sotrudnika KGB. This exhaustive questionnaire is 16 pages long,
and filling it out is an experience that one is not likely to
forget. A background investigation ig run on the basis of this
questionnaire, which itself becomes a permanent and prominent
feature of the employee's personnel file. NOSENKO remembers

. filling out a questionnaire, but does not know its designation.

He asserts that it was only 4-6 pages long. He asserts that he
filled it out at home, and submitted it in two copies shortly
before entering on duty. Actually, this questionnaire was re-
quired in ore copy only, and was never permitted to be taken
home since it was a classified document (even when not filled
in) .* .

"NOSENKO insists that he did not have to take a medical exam-
ination prior to entering the KGB. This is not possible. Such
an examination was a routine and mandatory part of the processing.
I cannot think of any instance in which it would be waived.**

* DERYABIN's views are based on NOSENKO's statements in August
1965. In his original biographical statement (1962), NOSENKO
said that no enketa was required. He implied as auch in his
most recent statement in April 1966, after being questioned
by: DERYABIN. This- statement is given in Part V.8. _

**See remarks above concerning NOSENKO's alleged treatment for
tuberculosis from 1952 to 1958. _ oo -


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Ror secre & |

621.

Ve af

“"NOSENKO's description of the secrecy agreemen* that he
signed #when entering on duty with the KGB is completely unlike
the agreement that was in use at that time for staff employees.
It may be significant that NOSENKO's description of tha secrecy

- agreement he recalls signing resembles the serrecy agreements
that were taken from agents.

“NOSENKO insists that he did not fill cut any otner forms,
questionnaires, or papers when entering the KGs. Actually, there
were a number of other routine forms that had to be £ilicd out by
applicants and new employees.

“Location of ROZHENKO's Office: NOSENKO says that all his
entry processing was handled by a personnel officer ramed ROZHEN- ;
KO and his staff. He asserts that ROZHENKO's office, which nOS-
ENKO visited several times in early 1953, was located on the 6th :
floor, 8th entry, S3uilding No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Street. In fact,
neither ROZHIENKO nor any officers or units of the Personnel De-
partment were located in the 8th entry. They were all (including
ROZHENKG) located on the 6th and 7th floors of the 7th entry of
Building No. i2.*

"Rank Pay: Asked about his salary when he first started to
work in the KGB, NCSENKO said he got a basic salary of 1700 rubles
as a case officer, 500 rubles for his rank of lieutenant, plus
secrecy, languace, and longevity pay. He insisted that this was
correct, even «nen told that KGB officers were no longer being
paid for cenk in March 1953, and said that although he remembered
that there was one year--1954--when they were not paid for rank,
he was sure that when he first entered on duty he received this
pay. Salary for rank was taken away from State Security officers
in September 1952 and was not restored until April 1954. °

"promotion to Senior Lieutenant: In giving the chronology
of his promotion to various military ranks, NOSENKO claimed to
have been promoted to senior lieutenant in April 1953, shortly .

‘after joining the KGB, Told that this was impossible, and that
no one in the KGB was promoted at this time, NOSEXNKO replied that od
he couldn't say about anyone else but he was sure that he had re-
ceived his promotion at that time. In fact, this is impossible:
all promotions in the KGB were frozen from the time BERIYA took
over as minister (March 1953) until late 1953.

“visitor's Pass Procedures: In talking about his first visit

to. the KSB to process for employment, NOSENKO was unable to re-

call the procedures employed by the KGS Pass Office in issuing

visitor's passes. Specifically, he maintained thet the name of

the interviewer was not indicated on the pass. In fact,. the

name of the interviewer did appear on the pass and the inter-

viewer had full responsibility for the visitor while he was on

KGB premises. While it is understandable that NOSENKO might

have forgotten the details involved if he had only visited there

“a few times more than ten years ago, if he worked at KGB-Head=- -— -.
~—-~quarters for over ten-years-as a staff officer and particularly. .—- .

as a supervisor he would have frequent occasion to admit visitors,

_and thus should know visitor's pass procedures quite well.

Ee

*NOSENKO has since said that he spoke to no personnel officers
prior to acceptance by the KGB or afterwards, thereby indicatiag
that his statements to DERYABIN were untrue. See Part V.B.

Hl
1


420098

Jor steal
622.

"Unescorted Entry into KGB Building with Visitor's Pass: In
describing his first day at work, NOSENKO saié@ tnat he went from

the Pass Office, where he optained @ visitor's pass, to the 4th
entry of the Building No. z, where his pass was checked by the
quards, and then went unescorted to KOBULOV's office on the third
floor. Challenged on this point, he said he was sure that it was
possible to enter without an escort. In fact, it was absolutely
impossible to go through any entry of Building No. 2 without
escort if you did not have a properly stamped KG5 (MVD) identity
@ocument (see below).

"KGB Identity Document: NOSENKO was asked to describe the
KGB identity document that he received when he first entered the
KGB. He was then asked if there was anything unusual in connec-
tion with this document at that time. He replied thet he knew of
nothing unusual. He was then reminded that ef:er STALIN'S death
and again after EERIYA's arrest 1t was necessary to have special
stamps placed in the identity documents to vatidate them. With-
out the right stamp it was impossibie to ente: the KGB Duilding.
NOSENKO was ignorant of this and was unable to recall anything
about it despite a numrer of hints and leading questions, Actu-
ally, during the period of upheaval following STALIN's death and
again after 3ERIYA's arrest, all KGB identity documents were tem-
porarily withdrawn in order te have special validation stamps
placed in them, and it was literally impossicvle to get in the
KGB kuildings if one did not have the right stamp. This was the
subject of numerous anecdotes at the time and is hard to believe
that an officer who served in the KG@ at the time could have for-
gotten it completely.

"Gastronom: Asked to describe the sign in front of the KGB
Club, NOSEXKD said that he did not remember any sign (there was
one in 1953) but mentioned that there was a Gastronom (food store)
next to the KGB Club. Asked when the Gastroncm was cpened, he

said firmly that it was already there when he started to work

in the KG3. In fact, this Gastronom was definitely not there as
of 1954. It was opened sometime ketween 1955 and 1957, as Moscow
directories show. The KSB Club is in entry No. 1 of Building

No. 12, Dzerzhinskiy Square, and NOSENKO would have had to pass
it every day he went to work.

“Chief Directorate of Militia: Asked where the Chief Direc-
torate of Militia of the USSR was located in 1953-54, NOSENKO

replied that he did not know, and knew only that later it was
lecated on Ulitsa Ogareva. Actually, in 1953-54 it was located
next to the main KGS building at Dzerzhinskiy No. 2. A staff
officer in the counterintelligence directorate would have fre-
quent occasion to deal with the Chief Directorate of Militia.

®K.1. (Committee of Information): Asked where the Intelli-
gence Directorate of the MVD was located in 1953, NCSENKO replied
that it was scattered between Dzerzhinskiy No. 2, the Acricultural
Exhibition, tne K.I. building, and Kiselniy Pereulok. This is

a confused and incorrect answer. “Asked for clarification, NCS-="— ~

ENKO said that he had never visited either the K.I. or the First
Chief Directorate building at the Agricultural Exhibition. Thus,
NOSENKO seems to be unaware that the K.I. has not existed since
1951, and that the K.I. building and the building at the Agri-
cultural Exhibition were one and the same place.

|

Spemmenan UN eae


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%

| “" Top secreT * og

““NOSENKO's Claim to Have Been a Komsomol: Secretary in the
Second Chief Directorate, KGs

. “NOSEXKO claimed to have become a member of the Komsomol
Organization (K/O) of the KGB when he entered on duty in March
1953, to have been elected as Secretary of Komsomol Organization
of the Second Chief Directorate in the fall of 1953, and to have
served in that capacity until the fall of 1954, when he was re-
moved because he used operational—alias documents in obtaining
treatment for a venereal disease he had incurred. He claims to
have been excluded from the Komsomol, without prejudice, when he
attained his 27th birthday in October 1954.

"Asked to describe how he transferred from the Kei;somol Crgan-
ization of the Naval Intelligence Post in the Baltic to the Kom-
somol Organization of the KGB, NOSENKO qave an entirely incorrect
description of this procedure, both as regards deregistration from
the K/O in the Baltic, and registration with the K/O in the KGB.
He stated that he was issued a new Komsomol registration card by
the KGB K/O, without reference to the previous K/O in the Baltic;
this is impossible.

"NOSENKO gave an incorrect account of how a K/O secretary is
elected, stating that he was elected at a meeting of the K/o. In
fact, the K/O meeting can only select the K/O committee, which will
convene separately to elect the Secretary.

“NOSENKO could not describe the duties of a K/O secretary ina
specific manrer.

"NOSENKO did not know who was the secretary of the overall KGB
. K/O. The secretary of the SCD K/O would be directly subordinate
| : _ to him and would deal with him frequently.

“NOSENKO was unable to describe his dealings with the KGB K/O
or the identities or responsibilities of the people with whom he
dealt there.

: "NOSENKO insisted that in 1953-54, the maximum age for a Kom-

: somol member was 27. In actual fact, the maximum age was 26 (it

: was raised later). This point is important, both because NOSENKO
should know exactly if he had served as a K/O secretary, and also
because it refutes his story that he was excluded from the Kom-
somol for over~age in 1954.

1

; "NOSENKC maintained that all the members of his K/O paid dues

i in the amount of 2 percent of their monthly salaries. This is

i incorrect, as monthly Komsomol dues were calculated on a sliding

f . scale determined by wage group: at that time, Komsomol members

{ . . earning up to 500 rubles monthly paid 0.5 percent: those earning

: 500 to 1500 rubles paid 1 percent, and those earning over 1500

_ rubles paid 1.5 percent. The K/O secretary collects the dues, ~ : :
and must know the right™ amounts ~~ > 00 ree

_ "NOSENKO did not know whether or not a Komsomol Congress
took place while ne was K/O secretary, saying that they took
place every year. In actual fact, the 12th Komsomol Congress

which convened in March 1954 was the first since 1948? at this

12th Congress a number of changes were made in the Komsomol Rules

(Ustay). As secretary of a K/O NOSENKO would have been involved


14-0900
»

> yup SECRET % —-

624. ; a

in a good deal of preparatory work for this Congress, which was
a big event in the life of every Komsomol worker at the time, and
could not be forgotten," .

Although DERYABIN's direct knowledge of the KGB ended in 1954,
his detailed information of KGB procedures has been updated BY :
his _more recent examination of reports from other sources. Wit :
regard to what NOSENKO has said about KG3 procedures, DERYABIN
stated: "Asked to describe how he conducted name checks on a
Seviet citizen and on a new arrival to the American Embassy in
1953-54, NOSENKO gave a superficial descripticn of how such
checks were done. However, he resisted every attempt to get him
to describe this process in detail, and he mace several blunders
which show that he never actually ran such a check himself. For
example, he did not know where the records of all Soviet citizens
who have been tried are kept, and he attempted to improvise an
answer (completely wrong) that they would check with the Militia
about this. NOSENKO correctly said that Archives were located
on Kirov Street, but he was completely unabie to stretch his
limited knowledge to provide a description of now these various
repositories were actually checked. NOSENKO was also asked to
describe in detail how he ran such a check on a Soviet citizen
in the 1956-59 period. Here again he was in difficulty and re-
fused even to try. He did not even know the everyday term Spets-
proverka, which means a check for clearance.

"It was particularly interesting that he did not feel able to
dispute my challenges of his infgrmation, even though he undoubt- :
edly knows that I do not have first-hand knowledge of procedures . oo}
in this period. I even tested this on one occasion by asking So.
NOSENKO the difference between the lst Spets Otdel (Special '
Department - KGB cards and files) and the Operativno-Uchetniy
Otdel (Operational Reports Department - the functional name for
the lst Special Department). He answered that the lst Special
Department holds the files on Soviet criminal cases wrile the
Operational Reports Department is for political and ¢spionage
cases. It seems he invented this answer on the spot. In addi-
tion, it is wrong that political and security cards are separate
from criminal enes in the lst Special Department, They’ were
in my time and must still be combined in one card file.

ary

“NOSENKO states that he’ knows nothing about the files of
the First Chief Directorate. It is unkelievable that in ten
years of service in the Second Chief Directorate NOSENKO never
faw a First Chief Directorate file; how else would he be able
to check information on foreigners, especially on American En-
bassy personnel? The first stage in such a check is an inquiry
to the First Chief Directorate and a check of aay files they
May have on the subject. According to his own account, NOSENKO
should have keen doing this type of thing the whole of-his ten

' years of service, without regard to whether he was_assigned to a
- _ | the” American Department or the Tpurist Department."

SSS A CER Pe ere re

.

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TOP SECRET

625.

2. Remarks by CIA Handlers

wat =
a. Introduction inate
gery -

Five CIA case officers who worked directly with NOSENKO have
recorded their personal observaticns on his behavior and actions.-
The principal case officer, the first CIA representative to meet
NOSENKO in 1962, participated in all of the meetings and inter-
rogations (either personally or monitoring from off-stage} since
then; he is a senior officer with 17 years of operational experi-
ence, including extensive agent handling and dealings with more
than 10 officers of Soviet and Satellite Intelligence and Security
Services who were defectors or agents in place; he has also had
desk or supervisory responsibilities connected with at least 20
other such sources. A second case officer, who participated in
the meetings in Geneva in 1964 and in all subsequent phases of
the operation, has spent the 16 years of his career solely in
Soviet operations and has handled several Soviet sources in place,
as well as defectors. Three othar officers, who began to work
with NOSENKO after his arrival in the United States and conducted
the bulk of both the debriefing and the hostile interrogations,
have spent most of their careers in Soviet counterintelligence
operations; “mong them, they command an extensive knowledge of
the Soviet Intelligence Services, and they have had a variety
of agent- and defector~handling experience.

NOSENKO was talked to and questioned in several types of
circumstances:

; _- In five tightly organized meetings in 1962 in
Geneva with limited time available for each of a wide
range of topics, none of which could be ignored but none
of which could be covered in detail.

- In cgncentrated, but somewhat longer meetings in
place in Geneva in January-February 1964, with the know-
ledge by all participants that items not adequately covered
then covld be dealt with after the defection.

- In routine debriefing sessions after his defection,
first in a Frankfurt safehouse, then in a safehouse in
the Washington area, where a spectal effort was made not
to put pressure on NOSENKO or express doubts about his
statements.

. - Under detailed hostile interrogation (especially
April 1964 and January-March 1965).

- In extended, detailed debriefing sessions which
NOSENKO could not evade (May-November 1964, May 1965,
July-August 1965, and Ogtober 1966).

Thus there were opportunities to note his per formance and reac-_ _

“tions. under varied degrees of stress and control.

7 The features of NOSENKQ'’s conduct, manner, and. techniques
@iscussed below are confined to those which were clearly and con-
sistently observed by all of the officers involved.

fe tenet

14-0000

ero secre

626.

b. NOSENKO's Conduct in Meetings

NOSENKO in brief, superficial, uncritical debriefings (of
the sort which characterized the 1962 and 1964 Geneva meetings
and the debriefings.prior to 4 April 1964) was reasonabiy con-
vincing in his manner. For example, on the basis of the hur-.
ried sessions of June 1962 in Geneva, which did not allow time
for systematic or detailed questioning, the CIA case officer
in commenting on NOSENKO's conduct mentioned “the ease of his
manner, the sureness of his knowledge of matters which he should
have known, and the amount of checkable information he provided,”
NOSENKO seemed to that case officer to be “urder little or no
restraint as to the amount and nature of what he told us” and
“made a convincing and good personal impression: a vigerous,
temperamental and vital man.” Similarly, nothing in NOSENKO'S
manner caused doubts on the part of the Fal representatives who
took NOSENKO's reports in February, March, and early April 1964.

It became apparent, however, when the cases KOSENKO had
mentioned briefly in early meetings were taken up in detail in
leisurely debriefings after the defection, that he could not add
facts consistent with what he had said before. He was unable to
recall related incidents or additional Circumstances which did
not come to mind in the first telling, despite being aided by
questioning from different angles or in different coatexts. The
same results were obtained in exhausting his store of operational
leads (with a half dozen exceptions) and his information on XGB
procedures, installations, and operational methods: Having once
reported on these general topics, NOSENXO could offer nothing
more when debriefed again, regardless of the method of question-
ing tried. Repeatedly he used the same stories to illustrate
his points; new stories did not emerge. In a peric? of nine
months, NOSENKO was drained of information "6n nis personas and
professional experiences and knowledge., Never before hag the |
CIA case officers encountered a. defector who was totally ce-

1 briefed. - - comers re ee

A technique NOSENKO has frequently used to explain his in-
» ability to supply details and to forestall further questicning
<ahas been to claim poor memory. "Different people have cifferent
at s of memories,” he has said on many Occasions, Or on Others:
YT Fave-tora what I remember.” The case officers who have
handled NOSENKO agree, on the other hand, that he has an excel-
lent memory, although perhaps a peculiar one: NOSENKO did not
always recall most easily those events which had occurred most
recently, or those incidents which were most closely related to
{ him. He was able, for example, to remember detailed information
i on the penetration of the Courier Transfer Station in Paris and
: to give a long, detailed, and ordered account of she compromise
i of PENKOVSKIY, in neither of which he claimed any personal role;
| he has been able to name hundreds of KGB officers, to give the
dates on which many of them transferred from one component of
the Second Chief Directorate to another, and to describe their ©
responsibilities at particular times. Yet NOSENKO forgot where
he himself served in the GRU; he could not consistently dis-
cribe the circumstances of his divorce; he failed to provide a
consistent date for his entry into the KGB and fcr his transfer
| from the American Department to the Tourist Department in 1962.
I
I

Likewise, NOSENKO remembered details of KGB operations which,
like the “ANDREY” case in 1953, took place in the relatively dis-
tant past, but he could not recall the travels, friends, and
activities of his own target,cohn V. ABIU.AN or details of opera-
tions against many American code clerks in 1960 and 1961. ©

ee ee coud ik

and a lack of emotion when describing the compromise. of Soviets:

Cc ‘ :
TOP SECRET |

red

627.

These limitations of krowledce ar.d quirks of memory were
evident rot only during meetings when NOSENKO wes being desriefed.
They were also apparent in the interrogations which supplanted
the debriefings.

c. NOSENKO's Behavior Under Interrocation

(i) Introduction

In the many and long interrogation sessions there emerged
habits of behavior noticeable t> each of the CIA officers present.
Trese characteristics of NOSENKO were his manner of recounting
events and his evasiveness, improvisétions, ard other defensive
techniques. They are reviewed below.

(ii) Manner of Recounting Events -

Typical of NOSENKO's performance in the interrogations were
the following points.

- Talking about operations he supervised and about his per-
sonal role in the KGB Headquarters aspects of other operations,
NOSENKO habitually used the passive voice ("it was decided") or
indicated that he was not alore in these activities ("there was
no atcounting on who was working on any ccde cierx case--it was
GRYAZNOV, XOSCLAPOV, NCSENKO, and also working was KLYPIN, GRIBAN-
OV," or “We made the decision--1 and KOVSHUK and GRYAZNOV," or "I
and GRYAZNOV discussed this with him.") When asked where a par-
ticular conversation took place, he rarely !ocated it in his own : 8
office ("I was in KOVSEUK's office when, KCSLCY called him about
the trip" or “I was in KLYPIN's office and he was talking to
KOVSHUK") . .

- At the other extreme from being impersonal, NOSENKO some-
times quoted conversations in which he tock part (“I then said,”
“he said to me," etc.), but it was in just such matters that
KNOSENKO most often contradicted himself (e.g.. his relationship
with GRIEANOV ard his part in the recruitment approach to the
American ¢ode clerk James STORSBERG).-

- In repeating certain stories (the CHEREPANCV case and the
provocation against Professor Frederick BARGHOCFN are examples)
NOSENKO gave them in precisely the same order, without addition
or omission. -In relating the PENKOVSKIY story, which he stressed
he iearned “little by iittle' from several different sources, he

_ presented the facts each time in nearly identical order. Asked

for more details on these cases, he invariably insisted--often
with irritation--that he knew nothing more and if he did, he
would have reported it. Other factors contributed to the im-_
pression that in such instances NOSENKO had delivered his infor-
mation by rote: Statements like “I don't remember what I told
you before" when queried agair on a particular case: detachment

who, like himself, had cooperated with American latelligence:

POPOV, PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV; an inability to correlate

dates and events in different operations which he said he was

handling (such as conflicts in the timing of his approach to :
W.E. JOPNSON and in the date he gave for John V. ABIDIAN's visit re
to the Pushkin Street dead drop. and conflict between the dates :
of his participation in the MCRONE. case and his travel cto Cuba).

14-0000

2 TOP SECRET

628.

ihe

- ~ NOSENKO, with a few excupticns (notably the compromise of
PENKOVSKIY and the ASIDIAN visit. to the dead drop site), could

not supply specific or approxisate dates for operational activi-
ties during the period of his service in the U.S. mimbassy Section.
Beyond recourse to the phrase "1960, 1961,” he refused to estimate
the dates or to associate these activities with the time of the
year or events in his personal life.

week Be etree.

(411i) Evasion, Improvisation, and Other Defenses

In the debriefings before the interrogations, NOSENKO avoided
questicns and topics not of his own choosing, saying that he would
give full details “later,” when systematic debriefing began.

When the question or topic came up anew in a later debriefing, ft
re would plead fatigue or boredom and propose: “This morning :
we drink; tomorrow we work.” prior to 4 April 1964 he provided

only accounts of operations selected by himself; it was only

after 4 April 1964 that he could be, constrained to reply to de-

tailed questioning on other matters. -

From that point on, other evasive tactics became familiar

to his interrogators. He would try to change the subject or

to shift from the specific event to a generalized account of how

such things were done in principle. He would claim bad memory .

on grounds that, for example, operations against U.S. Embassy

personnel were hopeless and useless anyway. lie would dismiss the ‘

details or the entire operation as unimpertant (for example, the

microphones in the U.S. Embassy). He would set out reasons for

his ignorance of things he admittedly should have known (his own

"poor performance,” preoccupation with other matters, inattention

to duty, absence from the KGB while on yacation, lack of time to

master details because he was a superviscr). Unable to name or

talk about KGB indigenous agents working against Americans, in-

cluding those in operations under his supervision, NOSENKO

disparaged the quality of, such agents ("they never reported any-

thing of interest on anyone"); he cited their low educational

level and their inferior status 4s servants and employees as

one reason none of them could give the KGS operationally useful |
i

renee

information. In fact, the record of many indicated previous em-
ployment which would demand at least the equivalent of a college
degree or certificate from a technical institute. Numerous maids
were former school teachers, one was formerly a chemist.

When evasion failed, it seemed to the interrogators that
NOSENXO improvised his answers. Some of these evident improvisa-
tions led him into unacceptabie statements or positions. To use
i his responseg to the questioning on Jchn V. ABIDIAN as an example:
: Not knowing about ABIDIAN's car, he said the KGB could not get
i at it. (In fact, the car was held by. Soviet customs for two
; weeks, and later NOSENKO himself spoke about the way the KGB used
t Embassy chauffeurs for access to cars.) Not knowing of ABIDIAN'S

trips out of the USSR, he claimed that the KGB had no way to

find out where Embassy officers went when they made trips out of

the country... (In fact, ABIDIAN had told his languege teacher —

each time and she, as NOSENKO said, was a KGB agent; a130, ABIDIAN
_ arranged_his trips by long-distance phone from Moscow to his des- |

tination abroad, and the KGB can cover such calls.) Not knowing

of ABIDIAN's trip within the USSR, he spoke of a vacation which

he latter admitted to be false. Asked why he did not know personal

o

“ $
10P SECRET

629.

data on ABIDIAN from the State Department Bicqraphic Register, é
he said “only the First Chief Directorate” uses pe; when tne, ;
interrogator parsued the point, NOSENKO said he romembered that
KOVSHUK did have a copy in his office, “but an old one, 1956,
which didn't list ABIDIAU." Under pressure about ABIDIAN's visit
to Pushkin Street, NOSENKO said the FGB thought that ABIDIAN may
not have entered the building on Pushkin Street; yet he had earl-
der given extensive details about how the KG3 had analyzed the
precise number of seconds ABIDIAN had been inside, to‘determine
where the drop, if any, might be. As another example, when he
was initially asked about Gcozgé BLAKE, tl.2 KGB agent in MI-6,
the context of the question was a discussion of Second Chief
Directorate operations. NOSENKO labeled it as such and said it
“was not ag important as VASSALL." Later, when the name was men-
tioned again, he asked: “Who's BLAKE?"

On other occasions, when his self-contradictions were pointed
out or when he admitted ignorance of matters he acknowledge he
should have known, NOSENKO would fall back upon cne of the follow-
ing lines of defense:

- “What I know I tell you; what IT remember I tell
you," or “I den't know," "I can't cxplain," -~ or a shrug.

- The details, even if confused or contradictory, are
not important. What is important is the “whole” or entirety
of the facts, their importance and their “reality." It is
this that American Intelligence should evaluate, not de-
tails. —

= He must be genuine because otherwise “how could I
have been working with ‘SARDAR' and 'PROKHOR'?" (Johan
PREISFREUND whose KGB cryptonyr was "PROKHOR," did con-
firm NOSENKO’s role.} “How else could I “tel? you about
STORSBERG?" “The KGB would not use a staffer as a provo-
cateur,” nor would the KGB supply information on "live
cases" such as the Paris case (JOHNSON) and VASSALL,, and
reveal the names of its officers abroad.

~ If American Intelligence checked his story "fully,"
it woula learn that despite all this confusion, he was genu-
ine. He repeatedly urged that his interrogators check
via an independent penrcration of the KGB--there it would
verify that his name is registered as the case officer who
opened, held and turned over the ABIDIAN file and thus that
he was a KGB officer.* a

NOSENKO referred to this method of corrcborating him at least

20 times during the interrogaticns of January-March 1965. He said
on 1 February 1965. that “maybe the day will come when you have

a source to check and you will find out" (that he was ABIDIAN's

case officer). Later in the same interrogation session, he added:_
-*T see how poor and miserable I'm looking with ragarad to ABIDIAN's
file, but anyone who can check in [KGB] Archives will see.“ On

> February he said, "I greatly wish that you will have as. soon - -— ~
as possible an agent in the KGB. It is simple to look at the

a was the only such source at the time.

TAN orearTr ,

nae eet oh A ne mcneegeme anqeeemyanne ee temiine <= +

te pe geen

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14-0000

> Top secger >

630.

file on ABIDIAN. On the first pege is written thet ‘I, NOSENKO,
Yuriy Ivanovich, opered this file'.* On 1é February he said: “Time’
will show I am what I say." On 3 March he referred nine times with-
in one hour to a check via such a source. He repeatedly stated

that “time will show" that he is not a provocateur. At one point
he engaged in the following dialogue with his interrogators:

er or

NOSENKO: I'm telling you that, if you check, you'll find
that I‘m right.

INTZRROGATOR: We're not disputing that you worked for the KGB.
We're disputing that you held the positions you
say you held in the KGB.

NOCSENKO?: That's what I'm saying.  I£ you could check you
would find thet I was only in these two departments
and only in these positions...

(later in the session)

ce meee oe ene tes nega

NOSENKO: I can't tell you anything wore. TI can't prove
anything. Maybe the future will shew.

INTERROGATOR: What can the future show?

NOSENKO: X don't know. But from what I understand the check~
ing has not gone very far. Maybe you can check
further... I mean, if you have any possibility now,
I mean by chance, have anyone in the KGB or out of
the KGB, with any of my acquaintances, friends.

INTERROGATOR: You mean our acquaintances, don*t you?

NOSENKO: Yes, but maybe your acquaintances can check wi
someone, because anyone in the KGB should know
that, yes, there was a NOSENKO.

INTERROGATOR: Should we ask someone like VAKHRUSHEV or SUSLOV?

i NOSENKO: — No, of course not, because I gave you their names.
: Check someone else, not known to me, so you can be
sure.

ad. Additional Observations

(i) Inquisitiveness About CIA

NOSENKO’s questions about CIA and its activities seemed to his
interrogators to be beyond the interest or curiosity expected of
-. Soviet Intelligence defectors. Frequently he asked, even while
! discussing his own KGB responsibilities: "You tell me about a case,
i and I will remember details." Other examples of NOSENKO's inquisi-
-o tt veness- include--the- following: ne <a =o

- When shown the CIA publication "Checklist of Soviet
Officials Abroad” during the 1964 meetings in Geneva, NOSENKO
_- -  - made inquiries about what organization prepared “t and to what
part of the U.S. Government that organization is subordinate.


14-0000

=_—

- In January 1964, entirely out of context, he asked
whether GOLITSY! had reported to CIA that Finnish President
KEKKCNEN was a KGB agent. (He was not able to explain in
later questioning why he had not informed CIA about the case
before he made the foregoing inquiry.)

- NOSENKO asked precisely how American Intelligence col-
lection in the USS& is directed and coordinated. The CIA case
officer responded: “What was that question?” NOSENKO there-
upon said: “It was not a question--just general interest.”
When the case officer urged him to repeat the question, he re-
fused to talk about it and diverted the conversation to other
matters.

- He asked where CIA secretaries resided in the Washing-
ton area. ,

- NOSENKO tried to find out the grades of the CIA offi-
cers in contact with him.

- NOSENKO inquired in early 1964 whether the CIA of fi-
cer who met him in Geneva two years earlier had received a
medal for that phase of the operation.

(li) Acceptance of Contrary Information from Other Sources

Under interrogation, even when accused of lying, NOSENKO
rarely challenged the validity of CIA's information nor claimed
superior knowledge. The only facts he challenged strongly were
incontestably true, such as the date of GOLITSYN‘'s defection, the
date of ABIDIAN's visit to the Pushkin Street dead drop, KOSC-
LAPOV's travel separate from JENNER, and KOSOLAPOV's November 1960
trip to Helsinki. It seemed at all times that he accepted that
CIA knew more than he did on tovics including ccnditions in the
USSR and cases and people for whom he claimed direct responsibility.

‘Be never challenged DERZABIN's statements abcut KGB procedures,

although: aware that his own information was more recent.
(e) Discussions with NOSENKO on His Own Performance

After admitting his inability to respond to questions about
operations in which he said he participated, NOSENKO sometimes
gave a general appraisal of his own performance. He would admit
that it was “impossible to have such memory breaks" and agree
that his response was neither reasonable nor acceptable ("In your
place I wouldn't believe it either," or on another occasion, "It
will look bad to your boss"). Admitting that the questions were
fair, logical, and clearly put, he acknowledged at least a dozen

_times during the January-March 1965 interrogation that his per-

formance under questioning was bad and unacceptable.

largely useless. Out of the 150--or—so--he-said_he_had_ provided,

he stated that the great majority were "no good,” unimportant, or
people with whom the KGB had not worked ("Maybe “ANDREY' became

- not interesting to KGB, changed jobs, and was not so important any

more"; “some of the agents recruited by the Seventh. Department _
weren't meeting the KGB"; etc.) He consistently estimated, how-
ever, that there were about 20 to 25 "good" leads. :

___ __He also admitted that most of the leads he had passed were : |

l ur SECRET «


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Cc. Polygraph Testing

a.) Test in Apral 1964

Shortly after his defection, NOSENKO agreed to undergo a
polygraph examination which tre CIA handlers had told him was a
routine part of his defector processing, He was informed on
3 April 1964 that the test would be administered the following
morning, and that it was therefore advisable for him to get a
good night ‘s rest and to refrain from alconolic Leverages. NOS-
EXKO @rank heavily on the night of 3 April, did net enter his
bedroom until 0290 hours on 4 April, and following breakfast at
0739 hours on 4 April consumed several gin-and-tonics. Subse-
quently, when NOSENKO thought he was not being observed, he was
geen to remove nis hand from his lips hurriedly.*.

Following a medical examination by a physician who noted
that NOSENKO had been drinking, he was ir.troduced to the CIA
polygraph operator. An expes:ernced interroga-or, Fluent in the
Paussian language, this polygraph operator conducted the test in ;
Russian from 1045 to 1515 hours on 4 April. His report is quoted ‘
below.

“The question of Subject's {NOSENKO's) willingness to par-
ticipate in the polygraph test was one of minor consideration,
since he had, on previous occasions: agreed that he would take
the test. However, whether Subject would continue with the
polygraph testing if confronted with atrempted deception after
an initial test run, was one of the considered problems. Con-
sequently, in order to preclude the possibility of Subject's
terminating the test prior to its completion: it wes decided
that a minor deviation. from the accepted poiysreph technique
would be used during the polygraph testing: specifically, to
insure that a polygraphic rece:¢ of Subject's rezctions to all
the pertinent questions be obtained prior to challenging him on
any significant polygraphic deception ungications his charts
might reflect... This plen was followed throughout the poly-
graph interview...

ee

* On 18 May 1964 a report was received on the chemical analysis
of six types of tablets which had been taken fren NOSENKO's
personal effects. In this report, a CIA chemical expert made
the following remarks based on chemical, microscopic, and in-
strumental analysis including the use of X-ray: “Sample No.
4238 consisted of three (3) gray tablets wrapped in a piece
of paper with the name ‘Phenomin' written in Russian. Micro-
scopic analysis of these tablets established the presence of

cee ee ee a a te

_a@-small.amount_of dl-amphetamine sulfate, a large amount of .
lactose, and a small amount of corn starch; dl-azphetamine is—--——-—

|

ee eR ERI 6

pe, Penn em

a sympathomimetic agent employed mainly as a central nervous
system stimulant. The effect of taking amphetamine as a drug
in conjunction with a polygraph test could exaggerate decep-
tion responses especially for a weak reactor. No phenothi-
azine (a tranquilizer) which 1s the active ingredient in
'Phenomin' was present in these tablets. The tablets do not
appear to be of U.S. manufacture. ...ASs a result of the above
examinations it was established that none of the items sub-
mitted are of the barbiturate family. Although either sul-
faguanidine (Sample No. 4242) or aspirin (Sample No. 4240)
could be used (and indeed have been used) as secret ink, they
are also rormal medicinals which a traveler might carry, and
there (a nnathine ir the farmilation of the tablets to suadest

14-0000

633. "

drug prior to testirg, there is no guestioa, based both on analysis

of Subject's polygraph charts as well as persoral observation dur-

ing the interview, that Subject has attempted ccliberate ceception

in the specific pertinent areas which are mentioned below in this ; |
t

: i
“Although the Subject had used both alcohol and some unknown ; . {
\

repe st.

"rt is [my] conclusion that Subject is not a bona fide defector,
but is a dispatched agent sent by Soviet Inteliigence for a spe-
cific mission or missicns.

“According to the plan, the differert phases involving various
pertinent areas were covered with Subject polyagrachically. Chal-
lenge of Subject's reacticns was indirect and ‘sort.’ On no occa-
gion did Subject even attempt to volunteer any explanation of the
possible causes for his polygraph reactions. He continually denied
and refused =o admit that there was anyching to any of the questions
which were asked of him. when the final test questicns were com~
pleted and a record was cbtained of all of Subject's polygraphic
responses, the nature of the caallenge and probing was changed.

bc cengpneetes

"Subject was told thet he was lying to numerous pertinent ques-
tions and was accused of being a dispatched agent. Subject's only
explanation to [ay] direct accusation was that ne could not be a
dispatched agent because of the amount of information he had volun-
teered to American Intelligence.

cone ee

"Subject, who before and throughout testing reflected com-
plete self-control and ccmposure, now exhibited a completely dif-
ferent picture. His composure was non-existent, his eyes watered,
and his hands tremblei. Prior te being confrontec with (my] opinion
thac Subject was a dispatched agent, when Subject was asked on
one of the last test runs (a) 1f he were sent to penetrate Ameri-
can Intelligence and (b) if Subject received instructions from KGB
on how to attempt to beat the polygraph, his answers were given
in a voice that actually trembiec...

"Listed below are all of the questions asked of Subject.
“series #1:

Were you born is the Soviet Union? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born in the city of Nikolayev? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you born on 30 October 1927? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you deliberately give any kind of misinformation when
you told us your autobiography? No. (Reaction)

Is NOSENKO the surname which you had at time of birth?

- “5 o-——----+ - --¥ess--(Reaction)- aa nel

Are you concerned about the fact that the polygraph test
- may discover that you are hiding the truth from me? .No.
(No reaction) : .

Was your father the Minister of Shipbuidling? Yes.
(No reaction)


14-0000

sameeren teen nen ass em es see

634.

Were you a member of the Comnunist Party before 1356? No.

(No reaction) .
(Subject stated that he applied for candidacy to the Commu-
nist Party in 1956, and 1n mid-1957 was accepted as a member.)

Die you deliberately give any misinformation about your work
and service in the KGB? No. (so reaction)

Besides your children, is there anything in your life on

the basis of which someone may blackmail you? No. (No re-
action)

(Subject stated that his love for his children was the only
thing that is of any consequence which the Soviets might use
for blackmail purposes. “However, Subject said he was not
worried, because reyardless of threats against the welfare
of his children, he would not allow himself to be black-
mailed or controlled.)

Have you ever engaged in any homosexual activity? No.
(Reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your education?
No. (No reaction)

Did you ever commit a major crime? Ne. (Xo reaction)

Did you give deliberate misinformation about your military
service? No. (No reaction)

"Series #2:

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in Geneva
in 1962? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence in
Geneva in January 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you voluntarily defect to the Americans? Yes. (No
reaction)

Did you ask for the right of political asylum from the
Americans? Yes. (No reaction)

Were you sent to the Americans by the organs of Soviet
Intelligence (with a special mission)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have a sincere desire to fight against the KGB and
all other punitive organs of the Soviet Union? Yes. (No
reaction)

Did you establish contact with American Intelligence on
_orders of the KGB? No. (Reaction)

oe

Did anyone know of your intention to defect to the Americans?
No. (No reaction) ;

Does the KGB have a pre-arranged signal for establishing
contact with you in America? No. (Reaction)

te eee Annan

y


14-0000

ry

.

~~

w joe SECREEC

635.

Do you have a pre-arranged signal for establishing contact
with Sovict Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

Do you have a concrete plan to return to the Soviet Union
sometime in the future? No. (Reaction)

Are you performing a4 special mission for Soviet Intelligence
in connection with your defection? No. (Reaction)

Are you deliberately hiding penetrations made by Soviet
agents into American Intelligence about which you are
aware? No. (Reaction)

_ Are you witting of other recruitments made by Soviet Intel-

ligence of American Embassy personnel which occurred after
RHODES and 'ANDREY'? No, (No reaction)

Are you an agent of the KGB or other Soviet Intelligence
organs? No. (No reaction)

Was there any pre-arranged signal included in the letters
you wrote to your wife (since your defection)? No.
(No reaction)

"Series #3:

Did you defect to the Americans in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans in Geneva? Yes. (No re-
action)

Did you defect to the Americans with the assignment of un-
covering plans of American Intelligence against USSR? No.
(Reaction) ot .

Did you defect to the americans with the assignment to find
out more about the structure and methods of operation of
American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of penetrating
American Intelligence? No. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans because you were dissatis-
fied with the Soviet system? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim cf discredit-
ing Soviet officers of the KGB who defected earlier? No.

(No reaction)

Did you defect to the Americans with the aim of giving mis-

information about Soviet'agents' -penetration of American.

ab

re

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te oe

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ee

we the ae

it renee ertaenee _—eresbemenscenenmemngemions - +

pee ng ee mm pee

2 an een +

Intelligence? No. (No reaction)

"Series #4:

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to Geneva in 1962? No. (No reaction) ;

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to Geneva in 19647 No. (No reaction) a

| ee eee — weemmuemaentatenat

14-0000

EERE nnAnRenenan

\“ jue SECRET

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to Cuba in 1960? No. (Reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to London in 1957? No. (No reaction)

Did you hide anything from American Intelligence about your
trip to London in 1958? No. (Xo reaction)

Did you personally participate in the search for CHEREPANOV
in December 1963? Yes. (Reaction)

Is it true that KOVSHUK visited the United States in 1957?
Yes. (Reaction)

Did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1962? No. (Ko reaction)

To your knowledge, did GRIBANOV visit Switzerland in 1964?
No. (No reaction)

Was CUK in Switzerland in 1964? Yes. (No reaction)

"Series #5:

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 19622? Yes. (No
reaction)

Did you work for Soviet Intelligence in 19642 Yes. (No
reaction) ;

Did you tell us the truth about Lee Harvey OSWALD? Yes.
(No reaction)

Did you tell us the truth about Yuri KROTKOV? Yes.
(Reaction)

Were the CHEREPANOV papers especially prepared and ‘passed
to the Americans by the KGB? No. (Reaction)

Is it true that Soviet Intelligence has an agent, whose
name is unknown to you, among the American representatives
in Paris? Yes. (Reaction)

Did you bring with you personal identity documents which
were fabricated by KGB? No. (Reaction)

Did you give truthful information about the structure of
the First and Second Chief Directorates of the KGB? Yes.

(No reaction)

Are you misinforming American Intelligence according to a
specially--developed—KGB-plan?_—No. (No_reaction)

-&

c+ eee cataract

= twee ete poe eer =

ena

iii eeed noid

i
:
H
t
:

Is it true that AGAYANTS is the Chief of Department D (Dis-
information)? Yes. (Reaction)

To your knowledge, was PEDOSEYEV the Chief of the American
Department of the Second Chief Directorate in 1963 and 1964?
Yes. (Reaction)

t


14-0000

; a i) - 0p secret ro) - a >

637.

"Series #6: ; { i

Did you drink more than you told me? No. (Reaction) oa
(Subject admitted to having only one gin and tonic prior
to testing.)

Did you know that American Intelligence uses the polygraph? , _
Yes. (No reaction) \ .

Did anyone in the Soviet Union explain to you anything about” ; i
American Intelligence's use of the polygraph. . (No - ‘,
reaction) .

Did anyone in th: KGB explain anything about the polygraph j
to you? No. (No reaction) i

During the last twenty-four hours, did you take any medi-
cine or pills? No. (Reaction)

Did you receive instructions from the KGB on how to attempt
to beat the polygraph? No. (Reaction) \

Were you ever hypnotized by anyone? No. {No reaction)

Did you bring any types of medicine or pills with you (from |
abroad or from the Soviet Union)? No. (Reaction)

Do you have any pills or medicine about which you have not
told me? No. (Reaction)

pills with him which he brought from Mescow and which [were]

in his portfolio, he declined to admit that he had had more liquor
than he told [me], that he had received specific instruc- Sant
tions about the polygraph from the KGB, or that he had taken any

{

“Although Subject later admitted that he had two types of |
type of pills during the last twenty-four hours.* |
|

t


14-0000

Cres tots
yu MS

638.

2. Test in October ).965 on Lee Harvey OSWALD
a. Introduction

CIA conductec ¢ volygraph examination of NOSENKO on
18 October 1966 on tte subject of Lee Harvey OSWALD. *

Since the previous polygraph test in April 1964, NOSENKO
had been under close security guard, his movenents restricted,
and tn the interin had been interrogated in detail and accused
of bad faith in dealing with U.S. Government authorities.
NOSEAKO had not been interviewed by CIA during the six months
prior to October 1966. He had had no access to alcohol or
drugs, his food consumption had been normal, ard his sleep
had been adequate. .

NOSENKO was given no advance notice of the polygraph
examination. Upon entering the room where it was to take
place, he immediately recognized the officer present as the
person who administered the first CIA polygraph test two and
one-half years earlier. NOSENKO correctly said that they had
first met on 4 April 1964.

In the pre-test interview, questions on the OSWALD case
were put to NOSENKO in Russian, his answers (also in Russian)
were recorded, the operation of the machine vas explained,
and clarifications of the questions ard his answers were
made. The three series of questions pertaining to the OSWALD
case are given below in their entirety, and they are followed
by the conclusions of the polygraph expert.

b.. Results
"Series No. 1
1. Was Lee Harvey OSWALD ever in the Soviet Union?
ARfswer: Yes. (No reaction)
2. Was OSWALD in the Soviet Union from 1959 to 1961?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

3. Did you receive special instructions about what to
tell the Americans about the OSWALD case?

Answer: No. (Reaction)
4. Did you personally meet OSWALD?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

a eae ee tee Speman

i

5. Was OSWALD recruited by KGB as an agent?
Answer: No. (No reaction)

6. Were you glad that President Kennedy was killed?
Answer: No. (Reaction)

7. Other than what you told me, did you'actively parti-
cipate in the OSWALD case prior to 1963?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

Ne a aa nen
ee 22. Mek KONE Bae Jae dT ae MCUTAT I


14-0000

_ =). _ 7 4 =)- as
~-TOP:SECRET

.

639.

8. Did you see a photograph of OSWALD in 1963?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)
9. Was Marina PRUSAKOVA an agent of KGB?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

9a. Before her marriage to OSWALD?
Answer: No, (Reaction)

9b. After her marriage to OSWALD?

Answer: No. (No reaction) i
10. Did you personally meet Marina PRUSAKOVA?
Answer: No, {No reaction)

ll. Did OSWALD have any kind of contact with the 13th
Otdel of the First Chief Directorate?

cage ie oe me

Answer: No. (No reaction)
12. Did KGB prepare OSWALD for committing assassinations?
Answer: No, (No reaction)

13. Was OSWALD prepared (trained) by KGB to kill President
Kennedy?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

24.* Did you hear of OSWALD (case) prior to President
Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction) .

"“Subject's (NOSENKO's) most significant reactions on
this test series were to questions 3 and 24--other reactions
of a lesser significance were evident to questions 6, B, 9a,
and 10.

"Series No. 2

20. Is the name OSWALD familiar to you?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

21. Did-you ever read the OSWALD case?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

22. Was this the full and official KGB case on OSWALD?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

23. Did you give us any kind of information about
OSWALD?

Answer: Yes. (No reaction)

*Before the beginning of the examination, the polygraph operator

14-0000

i, —_
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640.

Fr
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i
Be,
:

24. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) prior to President
: Kennedy's assassination?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

24a. Did you hear of the OSWALD (case) only after President
Kennedy's death?

oo eepeecenere:

Answer: Instead of the usual yes or no énswer,
Subject answered: ‘Before and after.‘
When the question was repeated, he again
answered: ‘Eefore and after.' Only when
the question was asked a third time on a
subsequent test did he answer ‘No.' (Reaction) i
(Subject reacted when he answered ‘Before and
after,' and when he answered ‘No,"

A ap

25. Did the KGB consider OSWALD atnormal?
Answer: Yes. (No reaction) {

26. As far as you know, did Marina OSWALD know about her
husband's plen to kill President Kenneay?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

: 27. To your knowledge did OSWALD talk with a KGB officer

i in Mexico?

i io

‘ Answer: No. (No reaction) ; an |
28. Did OSWALD return to the United States in 19612? , ,

Answer: Yes. (No reaction) Subject's reaction

: to this question was inconsistent when he

i answered 'Yes.' hence the (No reaction)

4 notation. However, it is noteworthy that

' Subject did not attempt to correct the

! date of OSWALD's departure to the U.S.? Hy

OSWALD returned to the U.S. in June 1962
and not. in 1961. ‘

29. Is your contact with the OSWALD case part of your
legend (cover story)? :

Answer: No. (Reaction)

30, Did you really take part in the OSWALD case in 19597

- “Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

"Subject's most significant reactions were to questions
22, 24, 24a, 29 and 30.

“Series No. 3


er

13.

17a.

18c.

3a.

collect material cy “SWALD?
Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

Did you personally talk on the V. Ch. with Minsk
about the OSWALD case in 1963?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction)

Were you instructed on the OSWALD case by one of
the KGB operational officers?

Answer: No. (Reaction)
Did the KGB instruct you to tell us OSWALD was
a bad shot?

Answer: No. (No reaction)

Do you know definitely that OSWALD was not of opera-
tipnal interest to KGB?

Answer: Yes. (Reaction).

Did KGB give the OSWALDs asy kind of help in their
departure from the Soviet Union?

Answers No. (No reaction)

“Did you receive special instructions from the KGB

about what to tell the Americans about OSWALD?
Answer: No. (Reaction)

"Subject's reactions to the questions so: indicated

were about equal in consistency and significance. .

°
“On the basis of an analysis of the polygraph charts

obtained during Subject's polygraph interrogation and

‘testing during the 18 October 1966 session, it is [my|
rt

opinion that:

a. Subject was not personally or actually
involved in the OSWALD case from 1959 to 1961 while
OSWALD was in the Soviet Union.

b. Subject heard of OSWALD only after Kennedy's
assassination; however, he was not an active partici-
pant in 1963 as he indicates, but was probably
briefed on the case by a KGB officer.

. se + ene -
JOP SECRET
641. |
16, Did you personally order RASTRUSIN, in 1959, to |
|
|

OAR IER AR eee ERROR nA A NRNRNTS oo OA * A RASA BRI FOS TS SS SS eg tee

Cre Subject-received-special instructions
(from the KGB) about the OSWALD case and what to
tell American authorities about it."

TAD CECRQET

14-0000

D 2.

642.

L ery .
sud otbnil : ~
VIIZ. NOSENKO'S BONA PIDES: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

h. Introduction

It is standard procedure to assecs the bona fides of each
intelligence and counterintelligence source, and special care is
required in assessing sources of information relevant to the secu-
rity of the. United States.

One difficulty in doing so with a Soviet source is that
Soviet realities, particularly in the KGB, are imperfectly known:
Bxcept where independent informatic>, is available, it is risky to
say ard impossible to prove what the Soviets--most notably the
KCB--would or would not do in any given situation, or what any
given KGB officer should or should not know. Independent informa-
tion, voluminous in quantity although never comprehensive and
entirely current, nevertheless has been assimilated from the re-
ports of the several KGB staff officers who have defected, from
the KGS agents who have confessed, and from the Western services
which nave investigated KGB activities. There is, therefore, 4
base of reliable knowledge upon_whicn to predicate an assessment
of a source reporting on the KG3, even one who peincipally covers
a KGB component (in this instance the Second Chief Directorate) :
upen which there previously had Leen relatively little inside |
i
\

|
|

Pe OTE Deen

cnformation. Moreover, in the absence of direct evidence from
other sources, it would be arbitarily confining if an assumption
dece not made that certain KGB standards are at least comparable
to these of Western services. Such prior knowledge and, to a
limited extent, such an assumption are factors in the assessnent
of Yuriy Ivanovich NOSENKO that is submitted here.

A much more prominent factor in this assessment, however,
is NOSENKO's ow testimony. CIA has exhaustively debriefed and
interrogated NOSENKO, his leads were checked, his information wa3
studied, and a large body of facts pertinent to his bona fides
was thus assembled. These details, a5 well as direct evidence
from other sources and the views of specialists affiliated with
CIA, have been presented in Part ITi. through Part VII. of this

paper.

Tre basic questions with recard to the bona fides of
NOSENKO are the following:

_ I5 there reason to question the general accuracy
aud completeness of NOSENKO's accounts of his situation
and motivations in contacting CIA and later defecting,
his personal life, military service, positions in the
KGB, personal participation in KGB operations, know-
ledgeability about KGB activities and the way he learned

of them, and his associations with KGB personnel?

| . - If£ there are grounds for doubting the general
accuracy and completeness of these accounts, then what
are the explanations for NOSENKO's actions, for the , |

nature of the information he has provided, and for
\ other Soviet sources having authenticated his personal
- \ life and KGB career?

In assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO, the classic method
has been used: evaluating his production and sourcing, examining
his autobiography, and appraising him and the circumstances of
this operation. These points, with the conclusions drawn from
each, are reviewed below. Tne ciscussion continues with a survey
of the sources who have corroboratec NOSENKO's background and .
status, and this is followed by argumentations on the various
hypotheses which could explain NOSENKO as a source. The final
portion is a summary of conclusions about NOSENKO's bona fides.

14-0000

B. Evaluation of Production

1. Introduction : “oe

What a Soviet source reports is one factor in assessing his : tk
good faith. Rarely, however, can it be conclusive: Even a genuine . :
and conscientious source may be poorly informe’ or misinformed; he
may be hampered by forgetfulness, mental shortcomings, or lack of
education; his reporting may be incomplete because he is not avail-
able long enough to permit amplification and clarification of his
information. On the other hand, a Soviet-controlled agent who is
planted on the opposition may be supplied with useful, voluminous,
and accurate information.

There are several standards which may be applied to the assess-
ment of a source's production. Each of them is qualified; none ts
likely to be conclusive by itself; and ali of them tougeliier may not
permit a definite conclusion, although they do contribute to a
broader assessment cf bona fides. The standards are:

First, how does the information equate, in terms of complete-
ness, accuracy, and detail, with the source's claimed or proven
position and access to information? (In this, one judges the in-
ternal consistency of the source's reporting and also compares it
with information from other sources and fron investigations.)

Second, dces the information harm the opposition? (This point
is risky to judge, for a genuine source may simply not know any-
thing harmful to his country. Also, information which seems harm-
ful to the USSR may not actually be such in Soviet eyes; for ex-

— ample, the loss of an apparently valuable agent could be mitigated
po by the KGB‘s possession of better or comparable assets still un- :
; exposed. } . a |

Third, is the information important or useful to us? (This
point may in some cases ke irrelevant, for information useful to
us may not harm the opposition, ard the apparent usefulness of in-
formation may not balance against the time and effort required to
process and investigate it.)

These standa.ds have been applied in evaluating the production _
of NOSENKO on the topics discussed below.

NOSENKO's production is exclusively in the field of counter-
intelligence information. As described in Part VI.A., he did not
have any useful positive intelligence. This coes not necessarily

: affect the question of his bona fides, however, for NCSENKO ciaims
: to have been a KG3 internal counterintelligence officer. From a

: comparative standpoint, not one of the previous KGB officers who
defected to Western services has protuced significant military,
economic, or scientific information on the USSR, and only a few
-have supplied political intormation (usually concerned with the
personalities and relationships in the ruling group of the Comu-

nist Party). Therefore, nothing of positive intelligence conse-.--—-—-—- oe bee

quence is expected of NOSENKO, altt.ough some question might be
raised about his inability to report on the leadership of the
Soviet regime in view of his father's position and NOSENKO's
continuing contacts with the leadership after his father's death.
The failure of NOSENKO to respond to questionnnaires along posi-
tive intelligence lines is not considered unusual.

14-0000

a

fo he ocuncl ~

644.

NOSENKO's counterintellicence production includes all of his
information on the Soviet intelligence and security organs?

~ their structure, functions, methods, end procedures;
~ their officers, and their agents of Soviet citizenship:

- their operetional activities inside and outside the
USSR.

For the most part this portion of the paper (as in Fart ViII.C.
through Part VIII.F.) follows a format in which the evidence is
summarized, the facts interpreted, and conclusions presented.

2. SB Orgenization, Personalities, Methods

Ability to discuss the structure of his service in general
and at least some of its components in particular is an absolutely
minimal requirement for aryone who claims to have beer employed
within that service. At the same time, current infoms:ation or the
organization of an intelligence service is of class:c interest to
opposing intelligerce and security services.. Organizational
changes are indicators of policy and planning trends in the ser-
vice: shert of a penetration of the service's leadership, such
changes are perhaps the most reliable reflection of changes in
operational emphasis and tactics.

Had NCSENKO's information on the organization of the KGB
been novel in this sense, it would have been of corsiderable
value, while the exposure of this information--elthough perhaps
rot a major loss to the Soviets--woule nonetheless have been
against the KGB's best interests. MOSENKO's reperts on the
organization of the. KGB in 1964 (Paces 352-358) agree with and
are a logical extension of that framework of KGB organization
newly revealed py the 1961 sources, but this weighs neither for
nor against him as the source: In the absence of contradictory
information, he cannot be subject to criticism or to suspicion
because his reports show no redirection of the thrust of the
KGB. Purtnermore, SNOSENKO's statements indicating that there’
have been no major changes in the years between the 1959 re-
organization and 1964 are acgeptadie in the light of available
information from other sources. The information which NOSENKO
provided on the KGB's organization therefore neither supports
nor discredits his bona fides.

ROSENKO's information o: some 1,090 Soviets connected with
intelligence end security activities is an impressive echieve-
ment of memory. These identifications, however, must be evalu-
ated according to the Gamage inflicted upon the Soviets by his
exposure of these personalities. In tnis respect, the discus-
sion must concern new identifications, for intelligence person-
alities previously exposed could not be damaged any further by
a repetition of their compromise. This discussion mzst be fur-
ther restricted to new identifications of staff persoznel, be-
cause the entire Soviet population is available to the KGB for
occasional use as it sees fit, with the loyalty and discretion
of the individual as the only limiting factors; to learn that a
Soviet employed at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow is an agent re-
porting to the KGB is to learn nothing that has not already
been taken for granted, and besices, no action on such infor-
mation can be taken. Finally, the new identifications also

anrancrnt

'
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'

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14-0000

a 2 Vi eevuel a

645.

must be amcng persons who are tdentifiabte ane accessible, or the
information is useless to Western services ar2 4s ro loss to the

t. Soviets. On this kesis, omy ¥GB First Chief L:rectcrate as well
as GRU identifications merit inclusion ir this -weluation, since
“hese are the officers who normally appear akroad and participate
in agent operations. Although KGY Second Chief Directorate per-
sornel have in the past transferred to the First Chief. Directorate,
this ig rot a predictable event and cannot be considered in dis-
cussion of current damage.

i

NOSENKO idertified 165 First Chicf Directcrate personnel, but
only 149 could be located in CIA files (i.9., were identifiable ty
name); the remaining 16 nanes from NOSENKO were valueless as they
were untraceable. Of the 149, there were 37 «ho were not knoen or
suspected as intelligence officers prior to the receipt of NOSENKO's 4
information. Cr 37, there were 24 who ex;ther resided sbroad at the ; ‘

_time of NCSENKO's defection or were cont abroad since that time.*
! Assuming that NUSEIKO was correct in his idertifications of all
| 24 members of the KGB who were accessible, ** 4% cannot ve said _
that the nurber is so large that the danage to XGB agent opora- t
4 cions «as substantial. None of NOSENKO's unique GRU idencifica-
tions were abroad et tne tine of nis defection or have been eince.
These personality identificazions hence do not serve as evidence
of NGSENKO's bona fades. At the sate tine, nis inability to do
further measurable t.arm to the KCB ir this regacd cannot be: held
against him, either, for he has clai:sred service only an the Second
Chief Directorate throughout his cereer and zo cannot be expected '
to know a high percentage of the First Chief virectorate comple-
ment. Therefore, NOSENKO's intelligence personality identifications
do not constitute a factor in finding for or acainst his bona fides.

NOSEKKO has been the source of many interesting details and
examples of KGB modus operandi (Pages 359-360), but while useful
for ilizstrative purposes and valuable because of the fact that
the meterial was easily coliatable for study purposes, none of
the methods described could ke consicered new and revealing, and
their exposure in any event would rot prevent their continued use
in the future. NOSENKO's ciscussior of the only double agent case
in whicn he claimea to have played a role, however, demonstrates
his lack of knowledge of the principles and purposes of such an
operation. This case, PELITSKIY, is a subjeawt of sensrate

sensitive sources f eg Sa >
* CE these 24, ten were identified by % pee yice wei as KGB
if and thereafter, and two became prominently ecrive in

insecure KGB operations shortly after NOSENKO identified them.

i *#Cther evidence has contradicted staterents by NOSENKO to the
effect that certain Soviets were not affiliated with the KGB; i
in Geneva, for example, where he had daily access to the KGB |
Legal Residency for months and claimed nearly complete know- |
ledge of KGB personnel, he ramed 15 of a KGB staff which he .
said totalled ac the most 18; CIA identifications of KGB of fi- :
cers in Geneva on the basis of other sources, investigations
and analysis totalled at least double this number and probably

: triple, as many as 55 of the approximately 120 Soviets station-
- 1 : . -ed there (a proportion which ts consistent with other areas:
and defectors' estimates). NOSENKO was not entirely accurate
: concerning even KG8 officers on his own delegation in Geneva,
i as noted on Pages 12 and 13. Therefore, the accuracy of oo {
i NOSEIKO's original idertifications. positive or negative,
cannot be accepted without question.

en eenermemnnnne ee

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discussion below. This subject, tuo, must be considered neutral
evidence in the bona fides assessment.

NOSENKO has shown himself to be both uninformed and inaccurate

‘in nis answers to questicns on KGB Headquarters staff procedures

(Page 360 and Pages 619-624). He has been unadie to contribute
any new information, although there has been no detailed repcrting
on the subject since 1954, (GOLITSYN in 1962 provided some new
material on procedures but was never comprehensively cebriefed on
the topic.) Thus, information on the more up-to-date forms, co-
ordinaticn requirements, mechanization of records and tracing
mechanisms, etc., could have been a singular contribution to our
knowledge; NOSENKO could not describe anything of this sort. When
he replied to questions about such matters for the period covering
his entry into the KGB. on which vorevious reporting is available
in detail, he answered incorrectly ca numerous points. NOSENKO's
tendency to improvise when he did not know the correct answer or
when he had. forgotten has been characterized by a CIA psychelogist
as the behavior of a pathological liar saviny face in a tight
psychological situation. When he could not produce a correct
answer in this area of reporting, NOSENKO may have improvised
because he is a liar or because he is concealing an ignorance

[based on Aot having been a KGB Headquarters officer.

3. Cperational Leads

a. Introduction

Consideration of NOSENKO's operational leads must take into
account the KGB positions and personal associaticns (with attendant
access to information) which NOSENZO has claimed for himself. He
todicated that the Leeadth of his knowledge about KGB agent opera-
tions and development cases increased as he rose from case officer
in the U.S. Embassy Section in 1953-1955 and in the American Yourist
Section in 1955-1958 to become Deputy Chie of the latter section
in 1958-1959, Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Secticn in 1960-1961,
and finally Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department from 1962 until
his defection. Simultaneously he established iasting contacts with
his KGB colleagues so that, for example, even after leaving the
U.S. Embassy Section for the second time, in December 1961, NOSENKO
kept abreast of its most important activities. On these grounds
NOSENKO presented himself as an authoritative source, one who
could detail the successes and failures of the KGB in recruiting
Westerners--especially Americans--in the USSR over the years from
1953 through 1963. Repeatedly NOSENKO asserted that his leads to
KGB agents constituted proof of his bona fides.

b. Operations Involving Americans

NCSENKO drew a picture of the recruitment scene in Moscow
showing that: .

- Since the—"ANDREY"-case of the early 1950's* the KGB
recruited no Americans on the U.S. Embassy staff, succeed-
ing only in recruiting one contract employee who was in
Moscow on TDY. NOSENKO reported on recruitment approaches
to six American officials stationed in Moscow, all of whom

FHONENET placed thre recnied tment date prior to hia entry into
the vat in earty bel, fat Dayle Wy EMETH Ceo eryptonym
PANUKEY") said he became 4 KGB agent 20 Novemler or December
1953.

TNb Ornn.


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refused to collaborate with the KCB, He discussed 14 develop-
ment cases which never culm:cated in recruitment approaches

to these U.S. Government employees in Moscow, and he named

(2) officials at the Moscow Embassy who were investigated by
the KGB, ‘These operations, NOSENXO assertcd, comprised ther
total KGB activity acainst Embassy personnel] with the ex-
ception of the technical penetrations (see Part VIII.B.4.).

~ Seven American correspondents in Mescow had been re-
cruited Ly the KGB, four cf them known to NOSENKO from the
years 1953-1954 when he was working against U.S. newspaper-
men. Another two were under development by the KGB during
that period. .

- The Arerican Express Company representative in Moscow,
Arsene FRIFPEL, had become a KGS agent in 1959; NOSENKO was
the case officer. .

- The number of American visitors recruited by the KGS
in 1962-1963 was 14, and if there had been others, NOSENKO
would have kaown ebout them in light of his senior position
in the Tourist Cepartment curing tnat period. Moreover, for
the years kefore 1962, NOSFE::KO provided leads to 19 other
American tourists whem the KGB recruited, plus one who was
serving the GRU when he came to Moscow. NOSENKO also de-
scribed 18 development cases and nine investigations in
which the targets were American tourists.

As for KGB operations outside the Soviet Union, NOSENKO gave leads
to four recruited Americans about whom he learned through conver-
sations with KGB associates:. a U.S. intelligence officer having
the KGB cryptonym "SASKA" (still unidentified), a pen2tration of
Orly Courier Transfer S5:ation (identified as Sergeant Robert Lee
JCHNSCN), and two agents in Geneva (naines not given and as yet nct
positively identified). NOSENKO leagned of the KS5 agent status
CoG afre G. LUNTA an Averican professor, because he toc

(LUNT's recruitment while on TDY_ in fia, and of the & ;
Legal agent GRE farm because of the connection
between pand Bernard K an American tourist with whose
case NOSENKO was personally involved. In addition, NOSEIKO de-
scribed two development cases with U.S. citizens. From his know-
ledge of the "SASHA" operation, NOSENKO also knew that the KGB
had no ager.t sources able to supply information concerning the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962.

esidenc

{i) Completeness, Accuracy, Detail and Consistency of Reporting

If he occupied the various KGB positions as claimed, if his
access were as broad as he said it was, NOSENKO has provided a.

. comprehensive. review of KGS: operations involving Americans in

the USSR.

Other information, however, contradicts NOSENKC's assurances
that he reported on all major cases involving Americans working
at the U.S. Exbassy in Moscow: -

_- GOLITSYN's reports indicate that a U.S. military code
Clerk was recruited in 1960, and other factors point toward
this person being James STORSBERG or possibly William HURLEY
(Pages 166-182). NOSENKO, the supervisor of Operations
against Embassy code clerks.in 1960-1961, stated that

|


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648.

y

—
2M Ohaa Wi

STORSBERG rejected the recruitment approach, and when inter- :
viewed on the basis of the NOSENKO lead, STORSBERG confirmed . :
this. Both agree the approach was made in the latter part

of 1961. wl

~ GOLITSYN's reports cover six other operatipns (Pages
595-598) which NOSENKO has not mentioned: The KG3's recruit-
ment of a female employee at the Embassy in 1957, the pre-
sence of a code clerk in the Embassy in 1960 who was a KG3
agent, an unsuccessful recruitment approach to a female sec-
retary at the Embassy prior to July 1960, the KG2 plan to
complete the recruitment of en Anericen Giplomat following
his reassignment from Moscow in 1959, the KGB's recruitmer.t
of or planned recruitment approach to a U.S. Embassy employee
(possibly a code clerk) prior to April/May 1960, and a KGB
officer's trip t9 Helsinki to accompany ar Embassy ‘code clerk:
traveliing py train to Moscow. (There is documentary evi-
dence to support the accuracy of GOLITSYN's statements ebout
the last of these cases; see beiow.)

|
|

oo ee ee ee

On the basis of available information, NOSENKO cannot be
faulted on the completeness of his reporting about American tour-
ists recruited, approached, and under development by the KGB, but
he could cite only one instance of KGB investigations uncovering |
tourists dispatched to the USSR by American Intelligence (Pages . i
145-150).* He knew nothing concerning two documents of CIA origin su
which described "legal travel" operations, one discussing forth- se
coming tasks of American agents in the tourist season of 1959, a See
year in which NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the American Tourist toe 4
Section. These documents were placed in the hands of the KGB by _
George BLAKE of MI-6 in July 1959 (before the end of the tourist arene 5
: a season) and in 1960; NOSENKO was not familier with any aspects of 4
, : the KGB operation with SLAKE, That the Tourist Department was :
aware of U.S. Intelligence sending agents under tourist cover to
the Soviet Union in the years when NOSZNKO was Deputy Chief of
the American Tourist Section is demonstrable by four cases of
1958 and 1959 cited in‘a KGB document supplied by GOLITSYN, NOS-
ENKO, although having no information on KGB countermeasures
. against American tourists in 1958 and 1959, knew that the docu-
: . ment had been passed to CIA by COLITSYN and that it had been
i written in the Tourist Department. Where NOSENKO's reporting
io on American tourist cases is checkable, therefore, it has been
found to be incomplete.

t

i ee

! * NOSENKO reported that of nine other tourists investigated by

po, the KGB, eight were suspected of having current connections

| ; with American Intelligence. The KGB was correct with regard
-- ..2°° go Thomas BARTHELEMY and Robert CERISTNER, who were on CIA

: missions, and Alfred SLESINGER, an FBI informant who neverthe-

a poe less had no American Intelligence mission when he visited the

USSR in 1961° and 1962: Frederick BARGHOORN, arrested in the —

i USSR in 1963, had been affiliated with U.S..military intelli-

; gence many years before, and Ray GARTHOFF had severed his

por. association with CIA as an overt employee before he went to

Moscow in 1963. Concerning the rest reportedly suspected by

the KGB--Donald ALBINGER, Bernard KOTEN, and Gabriel REINER--

none was associated with American Intelligence in any way.


14-0000

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649.

NOSEXKO's reporting on individual cases wherein he was 8 per- ‘
sonal participant or supervisor is not, with few exceptions, con- f |

° tradicted by information available from other sources. Nearly all {
of his statements have proven accurate when they could be compared
with collateral information: In fact, the Americans whom he cited

dia visit or live in the Soviet Union, and many of them are known

. to have been of operational interest to the KGS, as NOSENKO said.
+ The exceptions to his general accuracy of reporting, however, are
of major importance in thenselves and in reference to his claimed

positions in the U.S. Embassy. Section during 1960-1961:*

rod

NOSENKO Collateral .
U.S. Embassy Security Officer CIA records on the PEXYKOVSKIY i
John V. ABIDIAN, for whom NOSENKO case, in which the Pushkin :
was the responsible KGB officer, Street dead drop was used, show :
visitea the Pushkin Street dead that ABIDIAN visited the site {
drop site in 1960 or at the begin- only once, on 30 December 1961 !
ning of 1961, Later that same at 1130 hours. KOZLOV left New ,

day KOZLOV, Chief of.the KGB Sur- York City on the same day, :
veillance Directorate) went to the travelling via France, at the :
scene. -oON completion of a TDY in the i
i United States. (Pages 231- |

j let af 2357 this subject is discussed
on at greater length in Part
VIII.B.6.)
; KOSOLAPOV, NOSENKO's direct sub- Travel records show that KOSO- Ae a
ordinate, made but one TDY to LAPOV was twice in Helsinki : '
Helsinki in the 1960-1961 period; during 1960, in March-April
- NOSENKO would Nave Known about if and again in November. (Pages
. not approved other TDY's in these 186-200).
years wher. he was Deputy Chief of .
the U.S. Embassy Section.
Returning from his single TDY to Travel records show that JENNER .
Helsinki, KOSOLAPOY was abroad and KOSOLAPOV travelled on. ;
‘ the same train as his target, the separate days. (Pages 186-200)
oe American military code clerk Paul
pot JENNER; as supervisor of all oper-
- ations against code clerks at the
U.S. Embassy, NOSENKO was familiar
Tee, with the details of all such major
. : activities.
i =) he KGB knew that the U.S, mili-  KEYSERS reported the recruitment
tS tary code clerk James KZYSERS, approach immediately after it }
i . whom NOSENKO personally contacted occurred, and the report was
{- * gn an effort to persuade him to submitted in an Embassy room j
defect, did not report the earlier later found to have a concealed
recruitment approach by the KGB. microphone. (NOSENKO stated that |
7 - to - os . ~~ he was a customer for microphone
: intercepts at the time and that ace ©
. . | this micrephone was monitored on ot
a continuous basis by KGB per- ;
sonnel.) (Pages 213-219) |

ee

* An example of NOSENKO's inaccuracy on events during his later
service in the Tourist Department related to his accounts on the
arrest of American Professor Frederick BARGHOORN: According to
NOSEIKO, the approval for this KGB action in which he had a per-
sonal part was obtained from BREZHNEV in KHRUSHCHEV's absence
from Moscow, and the arrest was made a few hours later; BARG-
HOORN was arrested on 31 October 1963, and on that day and the
day before KHRUSHCHEV made public appearances in Moscow, (BREZH-
NEV was not seen in Moscow between 29 October and 2 November |

cg enennatnes anaes am eneeets emen et eee me Re ee oe

erie nrers eterna nn

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i C¢

vu? SECRET
650.

In addition, a number of Americans--e.g., Walter RASK, Adam
BROCHES, Henry APISSON, Herbert HOWARD, Vasiliy VOLKOV, dilliam
WALLACE, Thomas Whitney, and Stanley ZIRING--denied having keen
recruited by the KGB, as NOSENKO said they had been.

The only noteworthy internal inconsistencies in NOSENKO's
reporting on KGB operations involving Americans appear in the

HARMNSTONE case, where he has given conflicting information on the -.,

KGB's ability to obtain photographic evidence of tis nomosemality,
and in his advace on how to identify "ANDREY"--that he was the only

witness to testify in Roy RHCD=S' trial and that he did not testify J

at Roy RHODES' trial but was enly interviewed in the pre-trial in-
vestigation once, Part VIII.D. covers the extent of his kncewledge
about American cases in which he took part persoreliy or as 4
supervisor. Regarding others to which his official positions did
not give him access, NOSENKO has indicated that it was his per-
sonal contact with KGB colleagues which enabled him to report on
nine recruitments (Herbert HOWARD, Sam GAFFE, the KGB agent in
France, the YOUNGER couple, "SASHA", and two unnamed agents in.
Geneva); three development cases (George VAN LAETHEM, Attorney:
General Robert KENNEDY, and Stephen HOFFMAN) ; three unsuccessful
recruitment approaches (Richard HARMSTONE, Peter BINDER, and
Collette SCHWARZENBACH); and three investigations (Thomas BARTHE-
LEMY, Lewis BOWDEN, and George WINTERS). NOSENKO's alleged asso-
ciates in the KGa thus gave him the names of four recruited agents
and sufficient details for one more to be identified by subsequent
investigation, JOHNSON. All of the NOSENKO leads to developmental
operations, unsuccessful recruitment approaches, and investigations
have been identified.

(11) Damage to the Soviets

Three criteria can. be used in assessing the harm to Soviet
interests caused by NOSENKO's operational leads to Americans:

First, the originality of his information on recruited
agents and unsuccessful recruitment approaches;

Second, the agents' access to classified information
at the time he reported on them; and

Third, the possibility of identifying them on the
basis of the details provided or in ectiins tion with details
received from other sources. ~

There is no reason to believe that NOSENKO's information on 22
Americans under investigation while in the USSR could have damaged
the KGB, especially since all of them had left the Soviet Union
before the NOSENKO leads were received (Pages 402-410). In an-

(Pages 379-397), there is no means for evaluating their impor-
tance to the KGB because it is impossible to estimate with con-
fidence the likelihood of the KGB recruiting some or any of these
targets; vulnerability and assessment data, when coupled with
spasmodic or even continuing KGB access to the target, would be
ho guarantee that he is recruitable. Nevertheless, following

the criteria listed above, NOSE..KO0's statements on KGB operation-
al interest stemming from their homosexuality did bring about’ the
recall of Robert ARMSTRONG and Stephen HOFFMAN from the U.S.
Embassy in Moscow.

|

-- --other- category, -NOSENKO-'s. leads. to.35.-Americans under development. __

orinast
on agg

!
1
Aj
i
i
\
{
:
i
}

14-0000

651.

NOSENKO was the first source to report on tue KGB recruit-
ments of 22 tourists (none with access to Classified meterials
and on 11 of whom there was previous derogatory information) ;
four correspondents (one gaid by NOSiL.KO to have becone inactive
and on two of whom there was previous derogatory information) ;
the American Express Company representative in Moscow: a contract.
employee of USIA who had earlier declared his intent to marry 4
Soviet national; and two agents wnose names were not known to
NOSENKO but who were identifiable. The latter two agents were:

a eee saenertee ren

- Dayle W. SMITH (KGB cryptonym "ANDREY"), a cipher
machine mechanic at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow recruited in
1953. Despite NOSENKO's statement that "ANDREY" was current-
ly supplying valuable information in June 1962, SMITH lost
his access to classified information through retirement from
the U.S. Army on 30 November 1961, or about six months before
NOSENKO first reported on him (Paces 413-4726).

_ - U.S, Army Sergeant Robert Lee JOHNSCN, who with his

A wife Hedwig began collaborating with the KGB in i952 and

, who made James MINTKENBAUGH an agent of the KGB in 1953
(Pages 427-462). Hedwig JOUNSCN discontinued her role in
the operation in 1953, although thereafter remaining know-
ledgeable of the KGB activities of her husband and MINTKEN-
BAUGH; according to MINTKENBAUGH, who lost access to classi-
fied information in 1954, he had no direct contact with the
KGB after the late summer or early autumn of 1963 (about
three to five months before NOSENKO first gave the lead on
JOHNSON); JOHNSON was still on active duty with the U.S.
Army and in contact with the KGB when NOSENKO reported in
January 1964 about the existence of this agent.

Thus from a total of 30 original and identifiable leads, only one
agent had access to classified information as of the date when
NOSENKO's reporting on him began. By the criteria given in the
preceeding paragraph, the single operational lead from NOSENKO
which could have damaged Soviet interests was that which un-
covered JOHNSON,

It is debatable, however, whether the JOHNSON lead consti-
. tuted a serious loss to the KGB. In the first place, if JOHNSON
: can be believed, he gave the Soviets but one classified document
while in charge of the "“C‘assified Control Center" at Camp Des
Loges between August 1963 and May 1964. His KGB case officer
later told him, JOHNSON said, that the information he could pro-
vide was not worth the risk involved and that no future attempts
of this sort should be made. JOHNSON also stated that he felt
his espionage work at Camp Des Loges had not been very profitable
for the Soviets, adding that his case officer had shown dis-
co interest in his proposal to obtain for the KGP a top secret
—-.-- —-t- - ---. document he (JOHNSON) thought_of greater importance than any
: other to which he had access. (NOSENKO indiceted that JOHNSON =
; lost his access in the spring of 1963, while at the Orly Courier
Transfer Station.) In the second place, as the KGB knew, the
behavior of Hedwig JOHNSON, a mental case, was unpredictable.
Finally, the JOHNSON couple and MINTKENBAUGH repeatedly dis-
regarded the KGB's instructions to compartment their activities
and to observe other routine security precautions. The KGB
seems to have #voided full exploitation of JOHISON in the latter i
stages of the operation, to have been concerned over Hedwig's . re 3
mental condition as early as 1962, and to have regarded the

TAN arance

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swnnestee en DEERE Tee 8

652.

threesome as difficult handling problems. Given these apparent
factors, the NOSENXO lead may have been consicered expencabie by
the KGB, without iong-lasting adverse effect cn the fulfillment
of its overall! intelligence requirements.

cee nn eee

r

|

i

i NOSENKO was the first source to identify James STORSBEPG, a

| U.S. military code clerk stationed at the Moscow Embassy, as a

\ target who had rejected the KGB's recruitment offer (Pages 165-

i 185). The information was received from NOSENKO after STORSBERG

! was discharged from the U.S. Army, and when interviewed on the

| basis of this information, STORSBERG generally confirmed NCSENKO'S :
reporting on the case. GOLITSYN had earlier reportec cn what may i:

{ have been the same KGB operation, but GOLITSY.é believed the mili-

} tary code clerk had ween recruited; from what GOLITSYN had pre-

| viously told CIA and from later investigations, it seems possible

s

I

|

i

|
}

that the KGB recruited either STOKSBERG or William HURLEY (who l
NOSENKO said was rect recruited or approached by thé KGB). If it

is assumed that STCRSBERG was not recruited in the approach de-

scribed by NOSENKO and in the operation discussed by GOLITSYN,

the KGB suffered no loss in the American services learning of

this case. 1f€ it is assumed cn the other hand that STCRS3ERG or

HURLEY was recruited, the reporting by NOSENXO assisted the KGB-- ;
not the American services--by deflecting security investigations

from a recruited agent of the KGB. .

ee cneqemtietn ies en

(iii) Importance or Usefulness

‘@pe American leads from NOSENK9O enabled U.S. security euthor-
ities to: :

- Confirm previous information en the recruitments of
-—~ 13-tourists and three correspondents;

- Verify previous derogatory informatioa on 11 tourists,
two correspondents, and perhaps one ‘military code clerk,
STORSBERG;

- Remove two homosexuals from the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow; and

~- Identify 32 KGB agents including Hedwig COHNSON and
MINTKENBAUGH. * . :

One or possibly two of these 32 agents (SMITH and possibly HOWARD)
in the past had been in a position to pass classified infcrmation
to the KGB, and a third (JOHNSON) had current access to Classified
information and current contact with the KGB; the two homosexuals
at the Moscow Embassy (APMSTRONG and HOFFMAN) presumably also had |

. access to classified information. From the standpoint of pro- -._ _ |

____tecting the security of the U.S. Government, NOSENKO brought to

an end the JONNSON Operation and the KGB's potential for rect’
ing ARMSTRONG and HOFFMAN. . : - ct

Against this product of NOSENKO's reporting must be balanced
the amounts of money and manpower that were needed for U.S. secu-
rity authorities to exhaust and investigate NOSENXO's information
on 49 recruitments, 35 developmental targets, seven unsuccessful
recruitment approaches, ard 33 investigations by the XGB--a total
of 113 operational leads. CIA carried the burden of the debriefing :
and interregation of NOSENKO on these cases, but the investigative

 _W"Rnong these 32 agents were many whom the GB had not recontacted
after their return to the United States from the Soviet Union, J
others who had breken contact with the KGS, some who were known 3

iste

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~

© ie SECREL . ©

653. Loge
work in the United States was accomplished mostly by other
agencies. It would seen, however, that the JOHNSON operation
was the only NOSEXKO lead to be important or useful.

(iv) Remarks

Judged by his major inaccuracies and by the cemonstrable in-
completeness in scme of his reporting, NOSENKO is not an authori-
tative or reliable source of information on operations against
Americans by the U.S. imbassy Section and the American Tourist
(Section. Proven uatrustwortay in other categories of operational
ileacs, there is no reascn to accept at face value NOSENKO's state-
iment that SMITH’was the only Moscew Embassy emplcyee working with

“the KGB from i953 thrcugh 1963; indeed, evicence to the contrary

exists. The same may be true regarding Americes tourists and
Correspondents in Moscow, i.e., other recruitmeats not mentioned
by NOSENKO could have occurred. Furthermore, with the question-
able exception of the JOHNSON case, the KGB lost nothing of great
value in consequence of NOSENKO's leads but gained an advantage
by occupying the attcenticn and facilities of American security
authorities.

It is therefore concluded that NOSENKO has withhold infor-
mation on recruitrents of Americans in !oscow, or he is unable to
provide a comprehensive review cf such activities because he did
not_hold.the claimed positions in the U.5. Embassy and American
Tourist Sections. Either explanation forces strong reservations
about the bona fices of NOSENKO as a genuine scurce, and these
reservations are reinforced by the relative costs to the KGB and
U.S. security authorities of the NOSENKO leads. By itself, this
evaluation of his production on American cases suggests the possi-
bility that the KGB dispatched NOSENXO to report to CIA, and that
the KGB did so for the purpose of misleading the U.S. security
services.

®

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c. Cperatiors Involving Other Westerners
(4) Introduction

As already indicated, NOSENXO's principal knowledgeability
of KGB operations is related to Americans in the Soviet Union.
with the exception of one German and one Norwegian tourist case,
his only other personal participation in third-national (i.e., non-
American) operations stems from his ageociation with the section
of the Tourist Department concerned with United kingdom and Canad-
ian, as well as fimerican, tourists. Where he has commented on
gources for the rest of his tnird-national leads, he indicated
his knowledge was acquired either through conversaticns with
other officers or through his position as Reputy Chief of the
Tourist Department in 1962-1963. Thus he made no clain for com-
pieteness of his coverage, nor necessarily for absolute accuracy
and ful} details on ery one case. No attempt will be made here,
therefore, to compare his infcrmution with cther sources, except
in terms of whether NCSENKO's reportiny harmed the Soviets and
assisted American security.

(ii) Discussion

a of the 90 third-naticaal recruitment leads (Pages 474-562),
\22 have not yet~bean positively icentitics. These cannot be
evalueted at all except to point cut that only two si then 2rc.
potentially significant, the_sAto penetra:ion_in. Belyiun ip ich?
(which may be the sare as _a_lead from another source) and a code
clerk in the west Cernan Embassy in Moscow in T3627 Without
knowing the status of these tro overaticns at the time NOSENKO
told CIA abcct them, it is not possible to measure the value to
tus or the damage to the Soviet Union threugh the compromise of

these cases.

Of the remaining 68 known or possible agents who have been
identified, 35 were unique leads when NOSENKO provided them. No
eenclusive investigation results have yet been obtained on 30 of
these, but the majority were said by NOSE'NKO to be travel agency
employees (guides, bus drivers, etc.). Five of the .30 held
positions of trust in their respective governments; these five
leads are discussed below in terms of fotential value to U.S.
security and potential damage to the KGB. Of the five who have been
interviewed on the basis of the NOSENKO_ information, four denied
bei ited by the KGB, including& map tthe only one
or those interviewed holding @ government rosit:cn), discussed
below. Reporting on the one remaining lead, a Dutch woman, is
unclear and inconclusive--she admitted only to having been ques-
tioned while in the USSR.

Among the’ 35. new leads from NOSENKO, a total of five had
positions of trust, with known or presumes access to sensitive
information, in their respective governments: .. -. oe

KGB was w rking
in Moscow,

: fie b2VS tt

Soviets whom he suspected of dDeing intelligence officers,
and in 1964 he reported a social visit in Vienna by
General GORBUNOV (an operational alias of GRIBANOV), whom

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LS erapviewed directly
or hoes he ceported a re-

he nad known jn iinscow. he
on the casis of the NCErNro
cruitment approach.

Sis, 1S see
Ree ele BAe
- P c PSB NOSESEO has identified him as

a KGB ace wath be further information. itationed at tha
Indian Exmtassy in Moscow frir 19%? to 19951, ze e
a : eee TS 2; re Ne te

Al tide

ak PREG een
atory internation on nim in CIs files.

- Indonesian atehe
in Moscow: ldet

1 tre KS5 recru

-. at eat 9"

Agree Retake Fee FES

: 5 hough NCSENKO had
spelled out the name in .¥ ] could recall no
such case but thought this must h. . a Pistake for the
case of (RS «ho had reen the Bigg Pepe hat
time. Aside from the fact that corditicss in Indonesia
precluded CIA's passing this lead to the Indonesian service
for investigation, Indonesia‘s fosition until 1956 was thet
_ of a semi-satellite of the Commrenist Else, and revelation
- of such a recruitment in the prevailing satuation would

‘Rave been of no value to the United States nor harm to the
Soviet Union.

Thus of the third-national leads oriaginiting with NOSENKO,
five micht be considered to be important e of their posi-
tion in government. In two cases (@RRL Re he was
not able to say whether there was a recruitmer:, mowever, while
a third (assumirg that there was no further corfusion om NOSEN-
KO's part) cannot ke considered in imports.t lead because of che
Communist bias of the Indonesiszn Governnent. AMBRE position as
an agent or contact loses siqnificance tr view of nis previously
reported support cf a powerful leftist political figure, The
possible importance o: the & lead carnot be assessed
without investigation results. °

The William VASSALL case (Pages 307-507) was the one third-
national lead which NOSEXKO himself considered most important.
He invariably included this lead when talking about the impor-
tance of his reporting. The British security services neverthe-

: Lbncden ice wd we

i
a

settee tae

———ee

ey

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less vere Wel ne atat to identifying the source of the
Aamiralty documents identified by GOLITSYN, having narrowed
their list of suspects to 20 {including VASSALL) ky 11 June 1962.
When they received the fragnent of NOSENXKO information which
focused on the British Embassy in Moscow, the number was reduced
to VASSALL and one other. Although the HOSENKO information
apparently confirmed the already solid suspicions of VASSALL,
there is reascr lieve that the identification would have
been Sccomplished without this information. The lead was theré-
fore not new or exclusive information, and NOSENKO himself ad-
mitted in 1964 that he knew that GOLITSYN had known of the case
from the latter's work in the Information (Reports) Department.

Of the identified third-nationals whom NOSENKO said were
being targetted or investigated by the KGB, nore held positions
of significance, with the le excention of the then member of
the British Parliament. ae «Whose personal life
and career the Soviets subsequently ttemptcd--with considerable
success--to cestroy through a campaign of scandal.

(iii) Remarks

On the basis of the avove examination, NOSENKO's information
on KGB operations against third-nationals cannot be considered 8
positive factor in the assessment of his bona ficese 28 8 poss-
ible negative factor in consideration of his bona fides, the in-
significance of NOSENKO'sS reporting on third-national leads must
be measured against the criteria of his claimed access and con-
trary evidence. In the case of foreign tourists his leads show--
ard he himself has commented--that such _reqruirments Were of no
particular value; assuming that NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of th2
Tourist Department, he snould be able to make such a statement
without challenge. To cate no independent evidence of foreign
tourist recruitments has emerged which contradicts him. Opera-
tions against other Western embassies in Moscow are a slightly
different matter. NOSENKO's information, or lack thereof, can-
not be evaluated on the basis of completeness because he has made
no claim to full access to such information or to positions which
would have given him better access. -Except for tnose he said he
was informed of in connection with possibie use agéinst U.S.
Embassy targets, he has usually sourced such third-national
leads as he did have to particularly close relations with the
responsible case officer. ‘It weuld not be valid to argue that
a source cf one lead should have told him of others, Or that he
should have had mere close friends in the KGB. Thus on all
applicable criteria. the NOSENKO leads to operations against
third-naticnals must be excluded as a factor weighing for or
against his bona fides.

- RA mt ee OE TTS AS OT

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657. a

4. Technical Operations Against the u,S, Emtag oy

a. Discussion

2 v9, Pubacsy (Pages
n reporting on KGB microphones in the “e rae tdme a our

248-269), NOSENKO said in 1962 that there were 4 i

or five points," later adding a sixth, from which conver Bat oe
were heard. They included the offices of the Minsatec Counselor,
the Military Attache, the Naval Attache, the Alr ALcaches One
(unidentified) "State Department employee, " and the aye iculeura
Attache. He also referred to a non-productiva microphone OKO.
code room but did not count this as one of the pointes Bee ed
did not supply details of the information which Ely KAM OBER sD
from any of these microphones except to make qenrral atluston®
to the importance of the materials from thore in the Oecd
the Minister Counselor and the Military Attache. tle al roBee
that the existence of these microphones was the Kai's biage ee
secret" and that only a very few people know of Lhielie in 19
NOSENKO gave more details and provided a written hist of the |
ones where microphones were actively monitored 1960 an

NOSENKO's information on the microphones would appear, on
the basis of the findings of the sweep team in {yoa, to ba gener
aliy accurate. Where NOSENKO reported there waa
but microphones were found audible, the discrepancy c
plained by KGB technical failure to receive the iniervepts after
they left the point at which the sweepers tented? whers HOSENKO
reported materials were obtained (such a3 from the AIT Attache's
office) and the sweepers found the microphone inaudible, Le could
be conjectured that the microphore died between nat ly 1962 and
the date of the sweep in 1964. However, NOSENKO 'a Peportsng did_
not harm the Soviets, because GOLITSYN knew and hal seported on .
one specific microphone, and another earlier (ana provably come
promised) source had also reported that the micti) ined Were
there. The microphone known to GOLITSYN, when focal
back to the point where its wires left the pulling, would lead
to the uncovering of all the other microphones, 9 in fact happen-

ed with the find in Room 1008 (Page 256).

NOSENKO was unabl ophone information
a nable to expand on his microp jatatla of the

after his defection. Questioned repeatedly (ur § h
operation or examples of the product of those micrephonas, Ae gave
almost no cperational details* and could supply only re alread
three generalized exemples of their product which We hat phon y
given in 1962: the unproductivity of the code Loon ML CFOPHONS?

oe
One of the few concrete incidents which NOSEUKO recounted

connected to the microphone operation (with the except ton

of the North Wing planning, see below) was tha jase uh &
document reporting the product from one of Lhe mbecopnoness
GOLITSYN had already told the same story (Page 20776 COLIT~
SYN said he was present during the search for hia document
and it was under these circumstances that he jearhed apect=
fically that there was a microphone in the arrice OF Ehe
Minister Counselor. NOSENKO in 1962 streaaed What Ande
microphone was the most important in the Empaa bys

eg and traced:

?

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658.

the Minister Counselor's dictation, including fitness reports
which NOSENKO said were of operational interest to the KGA but
could not say how many of them there were or whom they concerned;
and the Military Attache’s planning of trips «hich permitted the
KGB to seize equipment in Stalingrad 1n 1955. Of these three
examples given by an efficer who séid he culled all the micro-
phone materials for two years, one concerned a non-operating and
therefore useless micrcphone, the second concerned a microphone
(in the Minister Courselor’s offices already reported by a pre-
vious defector, and the third concerned a well known incident
which took place years earlier (and which NOSEiKO should have
plerned and helped corduct, according to his claimed position in
1955; KOSENKU said he played no such role).* .
In 1964 NOSENKO Erought to CIA a sheet of paper which he
said was in KOVSHUK's handwriting ard which had been obtained in
1960 or 1961 during a conference (Pages 260-251). This, he said
then, was how he knew of the exact locatioas of all the actively

—_———— Ss oC PND .

* K comparison betweer. NOSENKO'S cshird exanple and a 1956 messace
from a sensitive 3ource who is believed to have been compromis~
ed to the KGB after that messace (but before 1962) reveals sim-

ilarities which may not be coincidental,

~ NOSENKO (11 June 1962; see Page 260): "We are listening
to your Military Attaches there. We know where they intend
to travel, what they want to find out. We know what machin-
ery and what targets interest ttea... Some of the things
they say are surprising. They discuss, among other things,
where to go, what to see, what to take with them - electric
equipment or not. And we are hunting for this electronic
equipment and now have permission, if we are absolutely cer-
tain that one of your people is taking electronic apparatus
with him on an intelligence trip outside Moscow, to take, to
steal it. We-now have authorizstion to take any necessary
steps to steal 1t. Because you now have improved your equip-
ment. .We stole some equipment in Stalingrad in 1955..."

- Sensitive source, 1956 (see Pase 254): %... All rooms
are being monitored by the KSB... The 'flap' involving the
American directios - finding specialists in Stalingrad in
the summer of 1955 «as organized by the KGB because conver-
sations were overmeard in the rooms of the American Embassy.
As you know, as 4 result of this flap, the KG3 seized valu-
able direction-finding equipment from the American Intelli-
gence officers.«.” .

It is possible that both NOSENKO and the sensitive source were
reporting a well-knowm event, because GOLITSYN reported in
1962 that the 1955 Stalingrad incident was written up in KGB
training materials as an example of Second Chief Directorate
work. The training version may have included the role of the
microphone information (although GOLITSYN did not report that
it did), which may thus have come naturally to the attention
of NOSENKO and the sensitive source. However, this would call
into question NUSENKO's allegation of direct access to all of
the microphone product.

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- 659.

monitored and productive “points” in 1960-1961. NCSENKO was not
able to explain why he would need this List to know the locations
of the microphones when he had been daily receiving, selecting,
and distributing the product of all of them for two years. Sim-
flarly, it was never clear why NOSENKO did not remember in 1962
that there were eleven points--as the List showed--rather than
the four-to-3ix NOSENKO reported on in 1962.

NOSENKO's account of how the product from the microphones was
distributed and exploited would inevitably mean that all KGB case
officers who had served in the U.S, Embassy Section since the
microphones were installed would know of their existencs--despite
any effort to paraphrase and disguise the product 43 “agent re-
ports." NOSENKO nonetheless maintained in 1962 that “it is a
tremendous secret that we are listening to you," and that the
microphones were known to so few that any countermeasures the
Americans might take on the basis of NOSENKO's statements could
reflect dangerously cn him as’ the source.* :

Accepting at face value NOSENKO's claimed lack of aptitude

and interest in technical matters, and therefore nis inability
© provide specific technica! details concerning electronic oper-
ations against the American Embassy, it is still noteworthy that:

- NOSENKO did not know the purpose of the so-called
"Moscow beam," sometimes saying it was to jam Embassy
communications and at other times that it was used to
monitor them.

- Although he claimed to have personally participated
in the planning for the installation of audio devices in
the North Wing of the Embassy, he did not know of the ex-
istence or the purpose of the coaxial cables and grill
found there ky American technicians in 1964. (NOSENKO
insisted that there were no audio devices installed in the
North Wing at the time of its, renovation for occupancy
by Americans.)

~ NOSENKO knew nothing of the general lines of research
and development to substitute for or improve the fading
microphone coverage of the U.S. Embassy.

These three points relate to aspects of the KGE's audio-technical
attack on the U.S, Embassy in which the reporting of a source in
NOSENKO's claimed position, no matter what his technical aptitude,
could have been detrimental to Soviet interests.

¢ * Both GOLITSYN end the 1956 source cited on Page 254 were First

Chief Directorate officers. That they both knew of the micro-
phones suggests that NOSE\KO exaggerated the sensitivity of
the microphone cperation, which had moreover always been
assumed by the Embassy to be active.

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659a.

b. Remarks

NOSENKO's sourcing of his information on electronic opera-
tions against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was unclear and unlikely.
His knowledge of the location and production of these microphones,
as well as the existence, nature, and purpose of other electronic
operations directed against the Embassy, was not ccemensurate with
his alleged position in the U.S, Embassy Section and his particu-
lar responsibility for audio sperations. Significartly, the
essential element of the information which NOSENKO did report,
the exister.ce of the microphone in the Minister Counselor's
office, would presumably have been considered by the KGB to have
been compromiked Six months earlier, with the derectron of WriT-
SYRr——Discovery of this microphone, as an outgrowth of action on
GOLITSYN's informstion, would have !ed t2 all the others. Thus
the Embassy microphones must have D2en ccnsidered by the KCB to
have been compromised before NOSENKO first spoke of them in 1962.
radec to this is the fact (supported by NOSENKO himself) that
the efficiency of the Embassy microphone installation as a whole
had seriously diminished by late 1961 oc early 1962 due to, first,
nomaal deterioration of equiprent and wiring and, second, the
installation of secure rooms and the implerentation of more
stringent security precautions at the Embassy. For these reasons
and in the absence of any information concerning other forms of
electronic attack against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, it cannot
be considered that the information provided by NOSENKO in 1962
and 1964 was harmful to the interests of the KGB nor helpful to
American authorities, NOSENKO's Genial of any installations in
the north wing, in the light of the later discovery there of
coaxial cables, the purpose of which appears serious and is as
yet unclarified, and in the light of NOSENKO's specific claim to
have been responsible for the operational planning for the north
wing at the time it was being prepared for Anrerican occupancy,

would appear to be purposeful deception.
Ae eS

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nat 660,

5, The BELITSK!Y Case

a. Introduction

NOSENKO reported to CIA in June 1962 (as one of the two items
he wanted to sell) that One of its agents. the Soviet interpreter
BELITSKIY, was in fact a KGB double agent who had been planted on
CIA (Pages 517-529). NOSENKO said that this wa3 a case run by the
Second ("Active Line") Section, but that he personally had a role
in the management of the case in May 1962 in Ceneva. NOSENKO was
able to give certain inside information on this case; for exemple,
he knew the nicknames used by the CIA case officers with the egent.

b. Discussion

NOSENKO's information, at least in its general outlines, was
correct. CIA had been running BELITSKLY as an agent, and the CIA
case officers (alias "Bob" and "Henry," the latter from Washington
as NOSENKO said) nad just completed a series of meetings with
BELITSKIY in Geneva. Important aspects of his information were
inaccurate: BELITSKLY had been recruited a year before NOSENKO's
date of 1959, and in Brussels, not London. Also, NOSENKO's claim
that this was a Second Chief Directorate operation aimed at en-
ticing CIA into meetings in the USSR was not borne out by the
history of the case or by PELITSK1Y'sS conduct, although it cannot
be excluded that this was a long-term objective which the KGB
still sought without appearing to. NOSENKO's account of the case
thus is not as accurate as could be expected if his own role in
it had been as claimed.

NOSENKO's description of his own involvement is not consis~
tent with observed Soviet practice or with operational logic.
NOSENKO said in both 1962 and_1964 that he had had orders to
supervise the handling of this case in Geneva in the spring of
1962. The reason was that the case officer for BELITSKIY in
Gereva (ARTEMEV) was young and inexperienced and had not even
worked on the BELITSKIY case before. NOSENKO was saying in
effect--with the authority of direct knowleige and official re-
sponsibility--that BELITSKiY, a prominent Soviet citizen having
personal contacts with well placed memkers of the Soviet Govern-
ment, a man who had been under the ostensible control of a hos-
tile intelligence service (CIA) for four years, was sent by the
: KGB to Geneva for the purpose of recontacting CIA, with pre-

i pared information, but that the KGB did not send with him the

: responsible case officer or any member of the section responsible

i for the operation. Instead, the KGB turned over the responsi-

i bility to a young and inexperienced KGB officer who happened to
be in Geneva to protect the security of a delegation and who

: had had no prior connection with the BELITSKIY case nor even

i local knowledge of Geneva cenditions; then, after BELITSKIY was

: already in Geneva, the KGB had cabled instructions that NOSENKO,

who had no need to know of the case and had learned of it only

unofficially from conversations in 1960-1961 with the Section

Chief responsible, who had no experience or training in handl-

ing double agent operations, and who was similarly in Geneva

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661. . ea

by chance with delegation security functions, shoulé guide the
other “less experienced” case officer.* As NOSENKO showed
under questioning, he did nct know the contents of any of the
positive intelligence BELITSKIY waa to pass to CIA a8 disinfor-
mation; he did not know BELLTSKIY's Moscow or Geneva pattern

of movement or contacts; he did not know in detail how or when
the operation started; he did not know the nature of degree of
British involvement, nor the operational details and contact
arrangements. NOSENKO said that BOLITSKIY had been placed ona
Geneva delegation in the hope that CIA might be able to *find"
and recontact him, **

c. Remarks

The circumstances above not only cast doubt on NOSENKO's
version of the case and his own access but also suggest that
KNOSENKO did not have a theoretical appreciation of how double
agents are handled. The examples he gave of his “guidance” to
ARTEMEV are few in number. NOSENKO also stated in 1964 that he
had arranged the actual introduction to vELITSKIY of XISLOV, the
TASS man, to provide for BELITSKIY's neca of a notioral subsource
for some of his disinformation; NOSENKO by October 1966 had appar-
ently forgotten this event, for he stated unequivocally that KiS-
LOV had had no connection whatever with the aELITSKIY case. nNos-
ENKO claimed to have met RELITSKIY, but did not recognize his
pheto when shown it in 1966.

Did NOSENKO's report to CIA on the BELITSKIY case harm the
XGB? It was useful to CIA, since despite freguently expressed
doubts of BETITSKIY’s bona fides, CIA was handling the operation
as if it were genuine (but not intending to go to the extent of
exposing to BELITSKIY CIA assets inside the USSR). (The KGB is

© HOSENRO has reported that he handled only one American agent
(FRIPPEL); he had practically no knowledge of CIA nor even
vicarious exposure to the substance of any other double agent
operations. ARTEMEV had had extended contact with a CIA
tourist agent as early as August 1958, a role in other opera-
tions against American tourists in 1959--including clandestine
search (see Page 146), and continuous American Department
service since then. NOSENKO did not know of the 1954-1959
operational activities of ARTEMEV, although they feil in the
operational area NOSENKO claimed to have supervised at the
time as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section.

#* NOSENKO was seemingly unaware that BELITSKIY had contact
arrangements which would presumably guarantee recontact.


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662. “eens

aware, as Suviet Bloc counterintelligence guidance demonstrates,
of the dangers inherent in having disinformation recognized as
such.) The meetings in Geneva in May 1962 would have made it
clear to the KGB that CIA had no intentions of meeting BELITSKIY
inside the USSR, and, in KGB eyes, the case may have reached the
point of diminishing returns. It is perhaps significant that
NOSENKO did not contact CIA and report on the BELITSKIY case until
10 days after BELITSKIY's series of meetings with CIA in Geneva
had been completed, which would have given the KGB time for final
appraisal of the operation's potential.

NOSENKO's account of his own role in this operation appears
to have been false, and nothing in the available evidence would
preclude Soviet sacrifice of this already tired operation. Since
NOSENKO provided some inside details of a sensitive KCB operation
which could have been known to only a few, it is difficult to
find any other explanation of NOSENKO's access to.this information
except that the KGB briefed him about it.

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6. KSB Investigations®

8. Compromise of POPCY

(1) Introduction

663.

Fixing the date and cause of che compromise of POPOV, the

CIA penetration source in the CRY
the evaluation of NOSENKO's production.
is basically true, his story of
been reported by other sources)
has not harmed the KGB nor measuratly a

EUPCV's compromise
is not particularly important and
ssisted CIA:

Pages 530-534) could affect
If what ‘OSENKO has said

(which has also

The KGB

assumes an ewareness by CIA thet it conducts survelllance of U.S.

Embassy personnel,
erican Intelligence conneet ions
If NOSENKO or the other hand has been incemplete
in his statements about tie ccmpromise of Fc

especially those

(as with LANGELU

POV,

hevirg known cr suspected An-
E and, WINTERS).
or inaccurate
then his cl2ims

to knowledgeability on this subject mest be questioned.

(ii) Discussion

The information from NOSFNKS and other sources on the POPOV
compromise may be collated and summarized in tabular form:

Cause
KGB surveillance
KGB surveillance

KGB intercept of
letter

KGB surveillance
Embassy officer

KGB surveillance

KGB agent

* Under this heading,
and CHEREPANOV are considered; t
material available for an evaluation of

of WINTERS

of WINTERS .

WINTERS

of U.S.

of LANGELLE

vate Implied
21 January 1959

21 January 1959

21 January 1959

none

4 January 1959

7

pricr to 23 Nov-

- ember 1957

Source
NOSENKOt*

CHEPEPANOV
document

POPOV message
of 18 September

GOLITSYN, fron
the KGB orienta-
tion peper on
the PCPOV case

etarnt

GOLITSYN* @**#**

only the compromises of POPOV, PENKOVSKIY,
here is insufficient collateral
NOSENKO's information

on Vladimir KAZAN-KOMAREK (pages 569-570) and Alfred SLESINGER
(Pages 571-575).

#* NOSENKO reported that the KGB observed WINTERS| mailing a

letter which, upon bein
to POPOV; he has contradicted himsel

applied metka to this letter.
***DOPOV is believed to have been under KGB control in composing

his letter.

(Footnotes cortinued on next page.)

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checked, was found to be addressed
f about wnether the KGB

ee ewer atm nnanes'ee atl oe

seasitive
source

SAT UR. SP. ER ORIN Lat en ss etme = santa ene etn ne ott

ower ee AN oath RT AF

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664. —

The only other evidence avaiable is analytical. POPOV was
transferred to the Illegals handling unit in Berlin on 28 June
1957, an assignment of high sensitivity. Until mid-August he
handled five Illegals, thereafter only one, TAIROVA, in October
1957. - Following home leave €rom 12 December 1937 to 19 January
1958, he was again transferred, this time to a position where
Illegals and productive GRU sources of intelligence were not ex-
posed to him. Between March and November 1958 there were signs
of a KGB investigation of the Illegals handling. unit where POPOV

formerly served, and he was recalled to Moscow in:November of that:

year. These facts can be interpreted as follows::

- POPOV's status as & CIA source wags not compromised before
his transfer to the Illegals handling unit.

- POPOV's status was compremised before his recall to Moscow

in November 1958, probably before his reassignment from the
Illegals hendlinyg unit in January 1958, and possibly some time
earlier. The latter possibility is apperent from the Soviets’
knowledge that the TAIROVA couple was under surveillance in
December 1957 (and until March 1958); it is also noteworthy
that, after having met five Illegals in less than one and one-
half months prior to i3 August 1957, POPOV subsequently was
involved personally with only one other, TAIROVA, in October
1957.

- The KGB, realizing that POPOV was a CIA source, chose to
keep him in Berlin until November 1958 in order to investigate
the possibility of his operating in conjunction with other
CIA sources. ‘

This line of reasoning, if accepted, would confirm GOLITSYN's in-
formation that a KGB agent compromised POPOV prior to the arrival
of ZHUKOV in Berlin, an arrival date falling some time before

23 November 1957.

ne
(Footnotes from preceeding page.)

##***Since such orientation papers are written for general circula-
tion within the KGB, it is doubtful that KGB security prac-
tices would permit their conterts to reveal sensitive infor-
mation; other sources have indicated that orientation papers
-sometimes are sanitized; this particular paper, however,
reportedly did state that the KGB learned from an agent in
about 1957 (GOLITSYN's estimate) that American Intelligence
had a source which had provided GRU information.

*teettThis date, which is consistent with that cited in the final

sentence of the preceeding footnote, was derived from the

time when POPOV reported the presence of the KGB officer

ZHUKOV in Berlin; according to GOLITSYN, ZHUKOV was sent to
Berlin after POPOV had been identified by a KGB agent as

‘ being a source of CIA.

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665.
(444) Remarks .

The completeness and accuracy of NOSHNXO's information on
the compromise of PCPOV, supported as it is Dy %& g and the
CHEREPANOV document and POPOV's message but contradicted by

\ GOLITSYN and analytical evidence, cannot re finally evaluated.

Only with resoiution of the bona fides of NCSENKO can a judgment
be made on this part of his production.

TOP SECRET

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b. Carpromise of PEMKOVSE!Y*

(1): introjucticn

Hecause has direst responsibility for ccverage of ABIDIAN
1s an essential element in NOSENKC's story cf his 1960-2951 career,
becewse he insists that the FGB had no 1:sea of U.S. involivencnt in
the FINKCVSKIY case until Richard JADA wert te tre Pushkin Street
dead @rop on 2 Novemcer 1962, and recéuse he is alamart or the
point thet the KGs until elmose the end ef the FELKUVEKIY case knew
ef ro connection between PENRUVEKTY and the Fusnain Street site
Which ABIDI2 visited, NOSEIKO's story of the conpromise of PENKOV-
EKIY appears to bear directly on the question of SOSENKO's bona
fides. Each of the verious versions of the compromise cf PENKOV-
S41Y mast Le exam:ned and compared with NOSENKO:'s story and with
the establisnea facts.**

(ii) Discussion

sources agree ecm the cause, and two cn.the timing.
NOSENKO, GZORSOER, and the “official KG! report" attribute the
compromise to the fact that surveillance detected a meeting be-
tween Mrs. CHISHOLM and the Soviet wncem tre KCE later identified
a@s PEXKOVSKIY, NCSENKO dated this as around ‘overber or December
1961, the official report stated this cccurred on 30 December 1961,
ard GQSe NR did not give a date.

8 gave the cause as surveillance, tut of Greville WYNNE
and PENKCYCXLY rather than Mrs. CIHISUCIM, ard stated that the com-
promise Gated from siay 1962. Sey ge gave two diferent
accounts, one that FENSOVSKIY was invest.iygitea for reasons unre-
lated to eny suspicions of espionage and was thereby fourd out as
aspy. the other that his excessive spending ercd sale of foreign
mercnandise led to an investigation which resulted in detection of
his espionage activities. She placed the timing of the first ver-
sion in 1561, without citing the time cf year: ia the second, she
associated the taming with a warning against association with
PENKOVERIY which ene and rer husband rereived ae aout ovember

* See Paces 535-567 for discussion of this case,

**It does nct seem unusual for several sources to have reported
on the compromise cf PENKOVSK1Y: Fresumably this was the sub-
ject of widespread discussicn within the two Soviet services,
for it was covered in the Soviet press and ir. at least one
“official report" disseminated by the KCB. Altnough their
differing situations within the Soviet services could partially
explain the differirg versions thet these sources have given,
some of them revertreless have claimed either direct knowledge
of the compromise or specially informed sub-sources. There-
fore the discrepancies among the reporting of NOSENKO on the
PENKOVSKIY compromise, the accounts by other sources, ana the

facts on the hardling of the case by CIA and MI-6 are pertinent
to the question of NOSFIKO's bona fides.

t
cd

4
4
=

whos Pee 0 oe ore


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pate 42/7 7

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING
DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL
REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO. DATED:

paceyer 667

FROM:

CIA JOB NO.

pox no. YER Ree/ SG

FOLDER NO. Zz


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668"

PEIKOVSKIY that he had visited the site after he chose it in 1960, °°
although it is posa:ble, especially as he had not been informed
of ASIDIAN having been eent to check on a possikle signsl fron
him about the dead dro sensitive co:rec

- Avie ee KO nowever, makes it clear
that the ABIDIAN visit sas not the ‘first observed activity =|.
at Pushkin Street to stir KSB investigative intecest in the :
site. As the report states, when massive survceiisance of
U.S. Embassy targets detected an American visiting this
address the first time, he was not followed inside by sur-
veillants, but on the second occasion he was followed
closely and the surveillant observed that he was kneeling
down apparently tying his shoe.* eB went on to say
that, although this was not very unusual, it was sufficient
to arouse suspicion in view of the fact that this American
had been observed visiting the sane address on two occasions
for no apparent reason, There is no question about the
fact that ABIDIAN visited the Pushkin Street drop site on
one eccasion only, and that was on 30 December 1961. The
reference to this as a eecond visit to this address by an
American fron the Embassy is a clear indication that the
KGB hed surveilied the first such visit, which was mace

Ly the CIA officer MALONEY 0s ig January 1961, and not by
ABIDIAN. Thus where Ee ORO. erred by indicating
one Anerican went to Pushkin Street twice, the KG3 must
have known that MM!ONZY went there first, in January 1945)
and ABIDIAN went there next, on 30 December 1961. Ga S
said that the 24-hour fixed surveillance resulted from
the second visit,. and beccuse of it PEIKOVGOKIY was sub-
sequently observed to enter the vestibule of this address
but did not visit anyone there. it was determined that
no one living at thet acGdress knew PINKOVSKIY and he be-
came a target of KGS suspicion and investigation.

The rest of the ¥& story is completely in disagreement
with the facts of the case and does not warrant discussion here.
It must ke noted, nonetheless, that this is the only instance
among all the versions which places the compromise cn the Aner-
ican side of the case, and the only one which makes a direct
connection between the Pushkin Street dead drop and the KGB
Getection of PENKOVSKIY. (All others attribute the compromise
to surveillance of British Embassy personnel, and NOSENKO claim-
ed that the KGB was unaware of American Intelligence participa-
tion until the operation was terminated.) It is also in direct
conflict with NOSEXKO, who had no knowledge of any U.S. Embassy
official visiting the Pushkin Street site prior to ABIDIAN. In
this regard, NOSEIKO insisted that the date of ASIDIAN's visit

* RBIDIAN reported that a woman encered the vestibule behind
him while he was in there, and he knelt down pretending to
tie his shoelaces until she proceeded past him and on up the
stairs. .

**NOSENKO was not aware that MAHONEY had beer identified to the
KGB as a CIA officer well before MAKONEY's October 1960 arri-
val in Moscow. .

|

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6649

was the erd of 1960 or the very begirning of 1941. wrereas in
fact MAHOUEY's visit was in Januery 1961. Despite? the errors
relating to loadings and unloadings of deacaurwps et che Pushkin
Street locatigg aiter tie second (ARTDIAU) visit there, this
story £ron GELEF c seal ishes KGB knowletge of M’iGUTY's casing
of Pusrmkin Street. ;

Greville AINNE's testimony concerning his interrogations by

the XGB alse jAtroduce? el ticting the versions of
WOSEVKC, CQEMRESS hod ied hae bea BG and Qipasly Guimes
As indicated 1m agiscussisn Of ‘a stury of the ea con-

versation with LULACKI (Freges 536-538), the KB was convinced
that PINKOVSKIY's question about his girlfriend “ZzP" was an im-
portant allusion ana they demanded tnat dYsue explain t&. NE
either had forgotten the name cr had never known it, and he was
unable to tel) the KGi who “ZEP" was. The fact that tre MCB had
@ recorling of this 27 May 1961 conversation shows also that the
KGB was at least suspicious of the relationsnip before that con-
versation took place and must have then tecone aware of the con-
spiratorial aspect of the PENKOVEKLY-sUE relationship ty virtue
cf the cryptic nature of that conversation, The additional fact
that the KGB surveilled WYNNE to the apartment of an unidentified
officer of British Intellicence on the sarc day the “ZEP“ conver-
sation between WYNNE and PRAKOVSKTY was monitored 1s evidence
thac both #s¥NNE and PENKOVSKLY were under strong suscicion of
espionage as of that day. if not earlier. Nor could those 5u3s-
piciens have been explained away by the fact that POUMOVSKRIY and
WYNNE hed legitimate cover reasons for contact. in view of the
content of their conversation--there was nothing tn their overt
relationship which requiced secrecy or ever caution in conversa-
tion.

- The indication From ES) gee P that the KG2 was aware
of MAHOMEY's visit to the inside vestiouie cf the Pustkin Street
site in January 1961 18 not only missing from atl other vercions,
bat conspicuously so from NOSENKO's story? he claimed to know
everything the KGB knew about this Anerican dead drop site, be-
cause of ADIDIAN's visit there. NOSENKO on one occasion said
that he thougnt an Anerican tourist {not a U.3. Embassy officer) -
might have visited the site a year or two earlier than ARIDIAN.

(411i) Remarks

‘@

NOSENKO did not know or did not report to CIA that the
only other American who had visited the Pushkin Street dead drop
area was MAHONEY.. This fact suggests that either NOSETKO was
deliberately withholding from CIA information of vita, import-
ance in the PENKOVSKIY compromise. or he was unaware of the
KGB's possession of this information, despite his claimed posi-
tion in the U.S. Embassy Section ana responsibility for cover-
age of ABIDIAN. The fact that his story on the PENKOVSKIY
compromise, like the “official report” of the KGB, does rot
show the seriousness of the evidence in the KGB's possession
as of 27 May 1961 additionally points to his withholding of in-
formation on the subject of the timing of PEIKOVSKIY’s compro-
mise, which was definitely no later than this date. If NOSE!KO
was deliberately withholding information on this subject and
lying about the PENKOVSKIY compromise, then he is mot a bona
fide defector. If he is unaware of the information which the
KGB has in its possession, then he was not in the U.S. Embassy
Section in 1960 or 196] as claimed, ard hence his bena fides
would be disproven.

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nn O-. ne

670.
c. Ccnmoronmise of CHEREPANOV

(i) Introduction

NOSENKC’s stories on the compromises of POPOV and PENKOV-~
SKIY were examined for their accuracy as to timing and cause, In
the case of CHEREPANOV (Pages 548-558), there is no question about
when the so-called CHEREPANOV papers were passed, nor how the KGB
openly learned of the U.S. Embassy's possession of the papers.
The chief question is the authenticity of the documents themselves,
with the subsidiary implications, if they are not authentic, that
the passage of the papers was instigated by the KGB, and that
there could have been neither a compromise of nor a search for
CHEREPANOV, as described by NOSENKO and attested to by his travel
authorization (sae also Part VIII.D.8.).

(ii) The Operational Plan in Draft

Examination of one draft document--the- operational plan
against the CiA officer' WINTERS --reveals ‘the following points
related to forn:

- Although only a draft, the title of the case officer,
the designation of his office, the title of his supervisor
as approving authority, and the designaticn of his office
component as well as the title of the confirming authority
(the nead of the department) are spelled out in full, even
including the subordination of the KGB to the Council of
Ministers of the USSR. KG8 practice, as reported by
cther sources and as logic would dictate, does not require
that this be done, cumbersome as these designations are,
and the typist routinely fills them in as the official
copy is typed from the draft.

- Although only a draft, this document has been signed
by KOVSHUK as being approved, which is against common
sense and KGB practice. NOSENKO himself noted this dis-
crepancy, asking himself aloud why KOVSHUK had done’ this.

- Although only a draft, the name of the target of
the plan appears several times, but earlier KGB defectors
have stated and NOSENKO himself has confirmed that the
name is left out of drafts so the typist in the typing
pool will not know the identity of the subject of the
report; a blank line is used wherever the name is to-
appear to be filled in by hand by the case officer after
the document comes back from the typist.

- On the basis of references to LANGELLE and POPOV,
this plan (which is not dated) would have to have been
drafted sometime after October 1959. WINTERS by this
time had been in Moscow since August 1958, had been de-
tected in operational letter-mailing, and had been
associating with KGB officers, etc. Neither this

TOP SkURET = *


14-0000

671.

operational plan nor any other of the drafts included in
the CHEREPANOV package cited a KG3 cryptonym for hin, and
he ie always referred to in true name, put this is contrary
to the usage in the other operational plans in the package.
It ts also contrary to KGB practice, as described by NOSEI-
KO and other sources.

- The draft cited several technical aids to be used in

the clandestine study of WINTERS. It not only gives the KGB

eryptonym of metka and “Neptun-80" for two of these techni-
ques, but inmediately thereafter explains for what purpose
each one of them is used. In the other operational plans
from CHEREPANOV, and in conformance with the established
KGB practice of inserting cryotonvms for such devices,
these preparations are not only not described, but the
blank line typed by the typist has been filled in by hand
after typing.

In adaition to the above points of form, this same document
contains statements which run counter to rigid KGB practice and
which are internally contradictory, especially noteworthy in an
approved draft. One of the objectives amnounced in the plan is
to investigate two Soviet citizens who were detected in contact
with WINTERS in Moscow; one of the two is identified parenthetic-
ally as having gone abroad. This document, if genuine, would be
an admission on the part of the case officer, and an approval
thereof by his supervisor, that a Soviet citizen wno had been
observed in contact with an identified officer of Averican Intel-
ligence had been cleared by the KGB for travel abroad before the
nature of that contact had been satisfactorily determined by the
KGB, This is in contradiction to all available information con-
cerning KGB travel clearances, which are denied on the basis of
unauthorized contacts between Soviet citizens and foreigners in
the Soviet Union, not to mentaon Western Intelligence officers.
The draft, which consists of only three paragraphs, can be sum-
marized briefly by paragraph to demonstrate the internal contra-
dictions: .

- To establish the nature of WINTERS' intelligence
activities in the USSR, six special tasks will be carried
out, including round-the-clock surveillance, metka,
“Neptun-80," hidden microphones. other. audio-devices.
and investigation of already identified Soviet citizens.

- Because he already been identified as an intelli-
gence operator. and he has a hostile attitude toward the
USSR, there is no basis for recruitment; therefore the
actions outlined in the first paragraph will not be
carried out because they might alarm him and cause hin:
to leave the USSR prematurely.

- Despite the statements of the second paragraph,
which indicate that recruitment is out of the question
and which precludes putting into effect the measures
outlined in the first paragraph. this third paragraph
sets forth the expectation that just before WINTERS’
scheduled departure and depending on further accumula-
tion of materials on WINTERS, and the prevailing pelit-
ical climate the time. an opportunity 1s likely to
arise which will permit testing the possibility of
recruiting him. .

-Aner. aTeaCT:

ij Saree Ererenere


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672.

If the WiNTERS\operat:on plan were a draft like the others jn
this collection, the atove confifcting and confuzin.g paragraphs
might be explained as variations jotted down as possible ap-
proaches to presenting a plan for the future, as ye* undecided
in direction. This document, however, is the one which--to
NOSENKO's puzzlement--had been approved end signed in draft by
KOVSHUK, as Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section, fAmericen Depart-
ment, KGB Second Chief Directorate. The preparing case officer,
KUSKOV, had furthermore indicated to the typing posl that it was
to be typed in one copy, which gives the document the appearance
of a draft which had been or was about to be made 4 matter of
official KGB record.

The foregoing review of errors, contradictions, and dis-
regard for security considerations in preparation constitutes
evidence that this is not a genuine KGB draft cocument.

(414) Tue Summary on LANSELLE

A second document, a handwritten note in what NOS ENKO
identified as CHEREPAIOV's own handwriting, alse is pertinent
to the authenticity of the papers and of NOSENKO's account on
CHEREPANOV. This if a short sumnary of the operational activity
of the CIA officer LANGELLE, covering the compromise of POrOoV,
The document says in part: "In January 1959 a letter with secret

writing mailed by a co-worker of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow,

WINTERS, was intercepted and was addressed. to a Soviet citizen,
POPOV, a worker of the General Staff of the Soviet Army. Accord-
ing to the contents of the letter, it was clearly established
that FOFOV was an Averican agent..."

This coincides precisely with NOSENKO's account of POPOV's
compromise (see Pages 532 and 663). Unlike GOLITSYN's recollec-
tion of the official report which he read, there is no reference
in this document to che report of about 1957 from an agent source
that there was a leak of GRU information; nor is there reference
to the indication that the KGS knew that LANGELLE had been posted
to Moscow in order to nandle a special agent, for this reason
placing LANGELLE under heavy surveillance. If both of these
items were in the official report which GOLITSYN read, their
omission from the sumaary report in what purports to be CHERE.
PANOV's handwriting is noteworthy, particularly since CHEREPANOV
was supposed to have been in the same office (room) as the case
officer working against LANGELLE during the time the LANGELLE/
POPOV cperation was investigated by the KGB. The latter posi-
tion should lend authority to CHEREPANOV's version of the com-
promise and termination of the case; yet GOLITSYN--informed
only from the official, and presumably sanitized, account--had
more detail, as well es conflicting information, on the same
case. While it is reasonable that a sanitized case summary
would conceal an agent source of a lead by imputing the dis-
covery to surveillance, it seems less likely, and indeed un-
necessary, to conceal a detection via surveillance by imputing
it to an agent source, In this supporting NOSENKO ard others
as to the cause of PUPOV's compromise, and contradicting
GOLITSYN (who is supported by other evidence accumulated in-
dependently), this document too appears to be a XGB fabrica-
tion. : -

The authenticity of another passage in the sane document is

likewise open to question. This is the description of LANGELLE's
two visits to Lenin Hills, which the documents stated were for

TOP SFeRET


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wy toes wr _ .
673. mt

the purposes of casing & Grop site end putting down the dead
drop, respectively. The document further stated that the dead
drop had been put down for REPNIKOV, an agent of Auericen Intel-
ligence who had recently been arrested by the Moscow KGB. Two
errors of fact in this passage belie KGB practice 45 known from
meny sources!

- There is no reason to dovbt that the KGB observed \
LANGELLE on the two occasions of his visits to Lenin Hills,
both times to case a proposed dead Grom site. oth sites
involved staircases, but they were two different stair-
cases in the same general area of the Lenin Hills park.
Since it is a fact that LANGELLE did not put down a dead :
drop on either occasion, KGB survetllance cowld not have :
seen him do so. If the KGB nad reason to suspect that he .
had done so, but could not locate it (since it was not
there). the KGB would feel the necessity--even more than
in the case of ABIDIAN and the Pushkin Street drop--to put
2$-hour surveillance on the area for a reasonable length
of time, in order to apprehend tna agent for whom it was
intended. The dead drop was not actuelly put down until
7 June 1958 (during twilight), ten days after the second
casing. Assuming the KGB had not stepped its coverage
of the area after only ten days, the CIA agent who did
put down the dead drop must have been observed doing this.
CHEREPANOV's note thus erred by ettribating to LANGELLE
an action which the KGB knew he had not taken and which
the KGB almost certainly knew someore else had taken.

!
|

: ON

- At the time the dead drop was put down, it had not ° ,
been Gesignated for any agent. REPNIKOV included. It :
was a contingency dead drop, to be activated at some
time in the future as necessary; the agent for whom it
might have Leen designated could conceivably not even
be recruited until long after the dead drop was loaded.
REPNIKOV, identified in the document as the person in-
tended to unload it, was not a recruited agent of Ameri-
can Intelligence either at the time of the drop-loading
or at any time thereafter: neither was any cead drop
contemplated for him in the event that he might be re- /
cruited. Nothing that was in the drop could have sug-
gested REPHIKOV as the intended recipiert. Again,
GHEREPANOV's note erroneously and groundlessly assigned

* the dead drop to REPNIKOV whereas in fact this dead drop
was unassigned by CIA. .

‘

If this document were or purported to be the official
version of the activities of LANGELLE, in typed or printed
form, these errors in fact could be interpreted as intentional
and part of the sanitization, or part of an effort to make the
KGB investigative work look better than it was. As it isa |

ct eee eee meena a RN met

handwritten copy, supposedly in the writing of. the person who
intended to give the document to the U.S. Government and harm
the KGB, and since CHEREPANOV supposedly would have had access i
to the true facts, the absence of some comment further indi-

4 cates that the document was intentionally inaccurate and in-

t . complete.

_TOP SECRET_____

ees ene etatl ein ee on

eal
.
1
ry
- eh ane dhemmer>

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674.

ee ee a

(iv) Remarks

That at least two of the documents were not authentic is
evidence that the CHEREPANOV papers were designed by the KGB
for American Intelligence consumption. oo,

There is no sensitive information contained in any of the
documents; that is, they are not worth the risk of stealing
either in helping the West or a@amaging the KGB. It is further
questionable how CHEREPANOV was able to steal drafts destined
for destruction which are dated August 1958, March 1959, and so
on, if he had not acquired his motivation of bitterness against
the KGB until 1961, as indicated by NOSENKO and other sources.

It is also possible to question numerous other aspects of the
CHEREPANOV case, some dating from the earliest known history of
the man and others more recent. This seems unnecessary in view
of the analysis of the WINTERS document and the LANGELLE summary.

It follows that the CHEREPANOV incident was a’ provocative
plan of the KGB. NOSENKO's story about CHEREPANOV, a mutually
confirming source on KGB affairs, must be interpreted as an
indication that he has deliberately lied in reporting on the
CHEREPANOV case and his part in the investigation, now shown
to have been spurious. He has also lied in attesting to the
validity of the CHEREPANOV documents and thereby to the validity
of his own information on the same topics which those documents
also covered.

Tap sone

wet oe

ee va Te sttednanen inne daanaaendl

|

me

Ldemmeprnere te:


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“
#

C. Evaluation of Sourcing
1. Llatroducticn

NOSENKO was able to provide logical ana plausible sourcing ' - 3
for most of his American leads, through his claimed professional : :
assignments. Asong his foreign leads, these to which he haz no wos
plausible direct access have been variousty sourced to hearsay : ‘
from case officer friends (as with VASSALL, from nis friend
CHURANOV) and invoiverent in peripheral activities (su has his
TDY to the city of Viedimir after the A WEN IESE
had been spotted as + hemusexual during a visit Scere).
able sourcing by NOSENAG Has occurred in his statements cn his
one couble agent case, four American cases and three involving
foreigners. They are reviewsd below because they include the
most impoctant ieads FOSENKO has provided.

2. Discussion

There are two KGB Secon! Chief Directorate operations in-
volving fimericias which MOSEKKO has sourced inconsistently or
falsely.

He denunstrated uncertainty in his knowledse cf the facts

of the “ANDREY” case (Pages 412-420) by making veque allusions

to having heard of it in “bits and pieces" from c runber of case

officers involved in the case at Gifferent times; his first know-

ledge of it, he said, was due to his own etployment in the U.S.

Embassy Section in 1953-1955, “although I worked there quite a

bit later. But it was knewn." (in 1962 Le repeatedly dated the

reeruitment as 71949-50.") . Bayle SMITH, identified as "ANOFEY",

fixed his recruitment cate around December 1953, end he did not

jeave Moscow until April 1954. Sinze ‘SMITH was directly sub-

ordinate to the office of the Army Attache, which was responsible

for the Embassy's code roon, NOSENKO as case officer for the Army

Attechnes had a logicai reason for knowing rore than he claimed .

about the case, including the agent's name. MNULE, who succeeded fo
: VAN LAETHEM as ‘cryptographic security officer and S4ITH's super- 4
! visor, was supposed to be one of NCSENKO's more active cases at : * 3
‘ this time. It is clear from NOSENKO's inability to claim direct : -
knowledge of the case that he was not aware of these, facts.

: In the case of Edward Ellis SMITH (Pages 463-469), the U.S.

Embassy Security Officer from 1954 to 1¥58, NOSENXO’s ignorance

: of the objective facts of the case led him into statements con-

cerning his own knowledge of the case which cannot be true. IA

1962 he claimed to have played a significant role in the attempt

to recruit SMITH, but he admitted after the defecticn that tnese

claims were exaggerations designed to make him lock better than

he was at the time. He said the case officer was KOVSHUX, and

GRIBANOV was personally running the operation, but that ina ;
sense he did play 2 role; he was assigred to a phone watch in P
support of surveillance during the final phase cf the case. Once

again it is clear that he did not know tre dates of SMITH'S

assignment to Moscow (1954 to 1956) ner did he know that the

opezation he has described tock place between 1 and 5 June 1956,

and that SMITH was recalled from Moscow on 8 June i956. Tris is

a full year after NOSENKO said he transferred froa the U.S. Lmbassy

Section. -

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‘instance, as in the Edward SUITH case, SOSENKO's iuforaation ‘és
inadequate for his sourcing.

to have learned atout through his friend in that Directorate, GU.

676, :

NOSENKO clained to have kad a direct rote as the sunervisirg i

‘ease officer in the BELITSKIY case in tts 1962 Geneva phase. As \
“a first-hand source, however, he was wrong about the origins of
“the operation end ignorant of the content end the operational plas-

ning of the 1962 reetings he was supposedly supervising. In this

-NOSEXKO provided leads to nine KGS operations which had orig-
inated with the First Chief Directorate. 1x of these he clained

who was personally tnvolved in mest of these operations.* Of the

other three, two--the Paris agent (JCHNSON) and the Brussels/NA7T9O
case--ne said he picked up in bits and pieces from technicians of - :
the Second Chie‘ Directorate's Spccial Section sho had assisted tn ;
thes. For both of the latter operations, nuserous coincidences

were alleged by NOSENKO to have enabled him to obtain the fragaen-

tary ipformation froa his sub-fources, and he «as never able to

clarify what parts he learned from which cf the four technicians

be named as sub-sources.

Ip describing his acquisition of infornaton on the riath
case, "SASHA," NOSENKO has contradicted hinself: He first said he
had learned sbout “SASHA fron SHATYAPIN, providing lergthy and
involved explanations of how he became aequainted with SHALYAPIN
at the time of the latter's retirement fron the KGB in 1962. cater,
under interrogation, NOSENKO did not recall his statements that
CRSLYAPIN was the original source of the "SSSHA" story, first
attributing it to others and-later saying that he could not rémen-
ber wher and from whos he first heard itt, but SHALY4PIN and others
had talked about it. This was despite the fact that by the time
he heard of "SASHA" he had already met and agreed to cooperate
with CIA; furtherzore, when asxed if “SASHA” was an important lead,
ne agreed that it was a serious matter. Except for this one
occasion he had consistently failed to appreciate the significance
of such:a lead, indicating that it was not considered importast ia
the. KGB.

Also casting doubt on his sourcing of “SASHA" is the fact
that, in his first reference to “SASHA and the Cuban zissile crisis
of Cctcber 1962, NOSENKO said he had learred of this item fron a
SHALYAPIN, whereas later he said it was rot from SHALYAPIN (but ‘ke
fea) not identify arother source from whom'he had heard this de-
tail). ;

sterners, the case. of
Sthe RCMP‘ s sie
yo Bre EE r : “heey, as to sourcing.
BOSENKO first s m of the case un-
officially, GUX having been involved in the eperation in Soscow.
When asked why GiK should be involved in a Caradian. case in 1963
when he was supposedly working in the First Chief Directorate's
American Department against American targets, NOSENKO. retracted
his initial stateaest and said that GUX somehcw got in contact
with hin, not as a KGB officer but sinply as an acquaintance.
Despite the non-official nature of GLK's relationship as thus tia-
plied by NOSENKO, GLY. able to tell hia all the operational de-
tails coacerning GefS except his name. This case has an odd

th

*Although he had met GUK many years before, NOSENKO indicated that
they did not becore -friends untal his visit to Geneva in 1962. and
only then did GUK begin to reveal operational details to hia.

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aspect which NOSENKC failed to see: He said that chi d

ccme to Mosccw on a Soviet visa issusd on a separate

paper, rather than entered in the ran's passport, so re

would not ce a cercanent record of his trave: te the his
implies, and Pah Aes confirmed, that he travelied ur yrus

nane to Moscow. : urthermore confirmed thst gone :
as a tourist, enterzng the USSR cn a Soviet tuur.st In view

of the First Chief Directorate's operaticnal jurisdiction in this

otherwise normal tourist, there was an obvious necessity for coor- !
dination between the First Chief Directorate'’s Arcrican Departrent
and the Second Chief Directorate'’s fourist Lepartoeat, to prevent
any slippage (such as NOSEN‘O descrited in the SiUJIN case, when coe
the CRU failed to ccordinate with the KGP}. Yes despite logical “4
rofessional need-to-know on NOSENXO's part, he Cirst made his own . : '
xnowledzge unofficial, and then his subscurce's knewledge unofficial ‘ : :
as well.

was unable to in how he had learned of the case

oF: French @4aks re, shen pressed for a
subsource, he claiaed that he had attended a recention at the Indian : >
Exbassy in 1953 or 1959 wit) GRIEANOV, and when CFISANOV tolcohinm to : -
take a glass of wine to Heep he understood scnehow cha Sygite as :
an agent cf GRIBANOV's. :

His sourcing for the case of the French businesszan,
(Page 484), is not unlike that of Goat jie said he had known
that there was a French businessman enc kas an arent. On one occa-
sicn when NOSENKO was duty officer for the Second Chicf Directorate
a call for GRIBANGY cave_in and he ashed whos was calling. When he
was told it was then he knew somehow tiat this was
GRIBANCV's agent.

3. Remarks

NOSENKO's errors concerning "ANDREY" (particularly his early
insistence that “ANDREY" had Icft Moscew years before NOSENKO en-
tered the KGB) make it impossible that NOSENKO could have learned
of the case in the way he later said he did.

NOSENKO's acccunts of how he learned cf the "Paris agent" -are
vague and vary with each telling; they also depend heavily on coin-
cidence. Jt is noteworthy too that he clained to have been told of
this one operation by no less than four individuals, whereas the
rest of what he learned of First Chicf Directorate operations in
eleven years of KG3 service came from only two ether individuals.
Furthermore, his knowledge of "SASHA" stecned from elaborate and
apparently contrived sourcing which he himself was unable to recon-
struct when pressed for exact details. NOSENKO's inability to

. give any clear and consistent account of how he heard of either the
"Paris agent" or "SASHA" must be judged ia the light of the fact that
he first heard of beth cases only just after proaising to collect
such inforzation for CIA. because these were amcag the most ispor-
tant and the most fortuitous items he ever picked up, it could
reasonably be expected that he would remember how he did so, espe-
cially since only a little over a year elapsed until his next
meeting with CIA.

NOSENKO's sourcing for thes ng zi leads seens
illogical and fabricated. It also appears that NUTENKO has given an
§naecurate version of the way in which he would have learned of
‘not an Illegal as NOSENKO indicated, but an agent).

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’

678.

D. Examination of SOSENKO's Intelligence Carcer
1. Introduction

What follows is an examination of NOSENKO's accounts of his
Soviet Intelligence career, beginning with the years 1951 and
1952, in the naval GRU and continuing with his 11 years in the
U.S. Embassy Section and the Tourist Departrent of the KGS Sec-
ond Chief Directorate. NOSENKO’s naval service opens the dis-
cussion primarily because, according to his story, it provided
a springboard for his entrance into the KGB in 1953 with the
rank of lieutenant.

The discussion of each period in his career has two cen-
tral topics: First, NOSENKO's own descripticn of his positions,
responsibilities, and access: and second, arn assessment of this
description from the point of view of internal consistency,
accuracy, and the commensurability of his knowledge, cperational
activities, and performance with his claimed senior and respon-
sible posts with the KGB and his rise to these posts. This
assessment is based on a comparison of the information supplied
by NOSENKO with collateral information from a variety of overt,
official, defector, and clandestine sources.

NOSEXKO's accounts of the various periods in his career are,
of course, cumulative in that his clained positions and activi-
ties during one stage necessarily affect those of succeeding
periods. Insofar as possible, each period is evaluated witzin
itself and independently of conclusions earlier reached.

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2. Kaval GRU Service
a Introduction

' TROSENKO's accounts* of his naval GRU service (Pages 64-77)
have. teen. reviewed for their internal consistency and credibility,

and examined for accuracy against information from other sources.

th tro.
b. Discussion

Briefly, the outlines of NOSENKO's account of his military
service are about as follows:

- He studied for the equivalent of 7th, 8th, Sth and
part of 10th school years in naval schools in Kuibyshev, Baku
and Leningrad. This would normally have nothing to co with
military service, exceat that NOSENKO says he took the mili-
tary oath at the Baku School in the fall of 1943, at the
age of 16. (According to available collateral information,
the oath--fcrm:} entcy into the military forces-~was at no
time given before the age of 17, and never for purposes of
“show* or “morale” as NOSENKO claimed it was here.) He .
clains to have deserted this school after taking the oath.
Also, he shot himself in the hand only about two months
after starting anew later the same year in the naval school
in Leningrad and never finished school properly.

- He was comnissioned in the "reserves® in 1947 after
completirg his second year at the Institute of International
Relations in Moscow. However, he cannot renember what
branch of the service he was in, except that it was not the
navy. He avoided active military duty thereafter by volun-
tarily doing military translations at the Institute. while
at the Institute he contracted venereal disease at least
twice and this went on his record.

- In the spring of 1950, he was assigned to the Navy
by a mandate commission at the Institute. However, he
failed one of his examinations ("Marxism-Leninism") upon
completicn of the Institute of International Relations later
in 1950 which delayed his Ciploma--and hence entry into
the service--until successful re-examination later that
year. (At about the same time, he was considered and turned
down by the KGB [then G3] because of his scnool record,
drunkenness, and. other bad marks in his record.)

- He was processed for entry into the naval GRU in
1950. He said he visited the GRU personnel cffice several
times for interviews and to fill out questionnaires and
write his personal history in connection with the required
security check. He was accepted into naval GRU despite a
record which showed desertion, self-inflicted wound in

*— There is no Single account of this period of NOSENKO's life
which can ke examined because NOSENKO has altered the cir-
_cumstances and dates importantly from one telling to the next.

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680.

wartime, drunkenness, vencreal cisease, still-valid marriage
to a State criminal's daughter, rejection for MGB enoloy-
ment, and a bad academic record including failure of a
course in Marxism-Leninism just at thiactime.

LS.

- He was called to active duty as a senior lieutenant
on 12 Maren 1951, and without any indoctrination or train-
ing, he departed four or five days later in civilian clothes
for his fisst duty station, Scvietskaya Gavan in the Soviet

Par East. SOSENKO claims to have chosen this post, con- |
sidered generally to be the least desirable of all naval

assignments, on his own initiative, to prove to his father

that ne wae a man, (The above was his account in 1966, in

all earlier accounts he saie he went to the Soviet Far East

in the fall of 1950, and in fact saic that he had two months'
leave in 1952, one for each of two years there. However,

according to the i956 account, his service there lasted only |
one year.) {

- In fovetskaya Gavan NOSEMKO's job was to extract in- i
formation fron American publications reporting naval de-
velopments. Asked in April 1964 for any personal account t
of his own work, KOSENKO was able to think of oniy “four or :
five trips” on small ships to the coast of Sakhalin,* and
three to Hukxaido, to drop or pick up agents. His own role,
he said, was as a trainee; he was taken along oniy "to searn
how it was done;" he himself never trained or dispatched any
agents, nor did he know the identities cr missions cf any
others. is also could not descrite the ships he had travelled
: on. Questinned on the location of Sovetskaya Gavan’ in 1965,
. : NOSENKO insisted that this city is lccated in Primorskiy
Kray, although it is actually located in Khabarovskiy Kray.**

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,

~- NOSENKO said he returned on routine leave (or, accord-

ing to otter accounts, because of having contracted tubercu-
losis) in April 1952. We then spent two months either in
his parents’ Moscow home or, according to other accounts, in
a sanitorium near Moscow under treatment for tuberculosis.
He said he was coughing up “half a glass of biood at a time.”
(X-rays and medical examinations from February 1964 have

a detected ny indications that NOSENKO ever suffered from

‘ tuberculosis.)

i - At this time, the summer of 1952, NOSENKO said he was
i offered in ¥oscow ar opportunity to attend the GRU strategic
: intelligence school, the Military-Diplomatic Academy, but
turned it down because he had already studied most of the
course matter in the Institute of International Affairs; ba-
sides, NOSENKO said in October 1966, he failed the physical
examination when sugar was discovered in his faeces.

.- NOSENKO was then transferred--without returning to
the Far Bast--to the Intelligence Staff of the Baltic Fleet
at Baltiysx. He invented a story in 1964 about going there

¥ In October 1366 NOSEKKO was asked whether he had ever been
to Sakhalin; his answer was no.

** This is the equivalent of being stationed for a year in Port-
land, Oregon and thinking oneself in California.

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681.

via Naval Intelligence Points in Berlin, Rostock, and Sass-
nitz, but then said this was a lie he told because he felt

his interrogators would not believe hin if ne had said he
successfully turned down an assignaent to these points,

then closing down, and had travelled directly to Baltiysk.

(As pointed out to NOSEKO, the assignment to the cold,

damp Baltic climate of a recent 7B-sufferer appears unthink-
able, particularly when that person is a Government Minister's
son; he acknowledged this but said, “There were no other
positions available.”)

- He could not remember the name of the place he served
near Raltiysk. He had named it as Primorsk in 1962 (which
fitted his description of its size and location) but from
1964 on insisted it was Sovetsk. There is no such village
in the area, but there is in the region a well-known city
by that name (the former Tilsit) far inland and far away.

He did not know (as contemporary Soviet maps show) that
a rail line went to Baltiysk from Primorsk.

- In the Baltiysk area, he claimed in 1962, he had
trained agent teams to be sent behind enemy lines in time of
war. Under interrogation in 1964 he changed his description
of hie functions, saying he merely prepared training mater-
ials and delivered supplies, never having direct contact with
or knowledge of the agent work. His service there wa3
limited to about six months, since he said he left there at
the beginning of 1953. He either had had cne or two leaves
from there, depending on which telling is accepted: In 1964
NOSENKO said that in August or September 1952 he was given
a special leave from his duties in Sovetsk to travel to Mos-
cow in order to formalize his divorce from his first wife;
in April 1956 he wrote that he was divorced during his leave
before going to Sovetsk.

~ NOSENKO said he returned to Moscow on his own initia-
tive and against the wishes of nis commanding officer at the
end of 1952 and began steps to get out of the GRU. He has
told conflicting stories of where he stayed and in what
leave status. It was during this period, he said, that
his conversation with KOBULOV led him. to shift to the KGB.

- In April 1966 NOSENKO wrote that he was promoted to
the rank of lieutenant of the Administrative Services while
stationed in Sovetsk. In earl:er accounts he said that he
was promoted to the rank of lieutenant while stationed in
the Soviet Far East. ; .

Remarks

‘The notes above on NOSENKO's career do not treat most of the

changes cf story, contradictions, corrections, or inaccuracies in
ROSENKO's accounts: Variations of dates may be attributable to
faulty memory, changes in the story might have resulted from his
own elaborations and exaggerations, and inaccuracies might be
explained by his inattention or indifference to detail. IF all
the details were to be considered, the story would become even
more confused. . . .

Certain general aspects stand out, however:

nee eens peerage ne:

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632.

oe . ics rf
ser Settee here .
atcordin

yg to ail availa. ot have been accepted
into the naval GRU, one of the particularly sensitive parts

of the navy. Either the life history is false, or the GRY
officer service is, or both.

(z) ‘Ine story is vague, unsubstantial, and contra-
dictory; no substance has been added to the base outlines
of the story despite frequent questioning. One might expec:
of an educated or reasonably intelligent person some recol-
lection of military service completed 10 years eariler--the
locations whece he served, whether he did or did not have
TB, how and when he entered or transferred from one place to
another, and what he did or what he experienced,

(3) NCSENKO's knowledge of military procedures, of
the navy, and of the units with which he served is practic-
ally non-exiztent. He has provided no reason whatever to
make one believe that he actually was a naval officer.

(4) The functions he claims to have fuifilled involved
no direst involvement or personal respongeibilities: They
sound like the bare outlines of a legend, not like real life
or personal experience.

That this period is fictitious is supported by the findings
of the psychologist (Pages 665-611).

NOSE:KO'’s description of his naval GPU service cannot be
accepted as true. On the basis of his statements, it appears
moreover that he was never a naval officer, nor an officer of any
other regular military service.

Since NOSENKO claims that his GRU status and service provided
him the platform fora transfer into the KGB (without such for-
malities as medical examination, personnel interviews or question-
naires), this conclusion is relevant to his claim of KGB staff
status from 1952 or 1953. oe

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683.

3. Entry into the KGB
a. Eligibility

The previous section discussed NOSENKO'S eligisility for
admission to the naval GRU and concluded with the remark that,
on the basis of what NOSENKO has to!d CIA about his earlier

‘life, he could not have been accepted for service in Naval

Intelligence. According to information available to CIA from
several knowledgeable sources, the #GB has more stringent entry
requirements than any other Soviet organization. The candidate's
family background, personal conduct. and Party or Komsomol rec-
ord must be impeccable. NOSENKXO would have American Intelli-
gence believe that in his case the KGB--specifically the offi-
cers responsible for signing their nawes to the approval--accepted
a person whose record showed (a3 noted on pages 679-680 above)
desertion from the armed forces self-inflicted wound in wartime,
drunkenness, venereal disease, previous =arriege tc the daugnter

oF B state criminal, A bad déazeAte record including failure oF —

a~CuUTTe Li-Mareism-Leninism; and a prior réjection_by ‘the KGB
itseli. 1re-enty trange since the earlier’ rejection had been,
according to NOSENKO, two years of undistinguished military ser-
vice in the Naval GRU, 9 oT

Moreover, during this naval duty NOSENKO said he had con-
tracted tuberculosis, for which he «as still under treatment
at the Cime he entered the State Security Service. NOSENKO has
indicated on separate occasions that his illness was a matter

of record with the Gru, and that the reason he did not have to

take a physical examination for entry into the KGB was the avail-
ability of GRU records. According to DERYABIN, however, KGB
regulaticns at that time would have preciuded admission to KGB
ranks if there was a recent history of tuberculosis even though
already arrested.

b. Date of Entry .

NOSENKO has given a variety of dates for his entry on duty
with the KGB and has provided severa! reasons for his changes of
story (Pages 86-89). During nis first meeting with CIA, when
NOSENKO gave a brief personal anc professional autobiography, he
said that he had joined the KGB is. February or March 1953. In
1964, however, first while still ettached to the Soviet Disarma-
ment Delegation and later when reviewing and signing a bio-
graphic history prepared by CIA on the basis of his own account,
NOSENKO set this date back a year, to early 1952. During the
interrogations of April 1964, after naming several other dates,
NOSENKO returned to the original one, March 1953, and has remained
with this version since that time. NOSENKO has given two Gif-
ferent reasons for this change of dates (which, he said in Octo-
ber 1966, was conscious deception). In the April 1964 interrogations,
he explained that he had failed his examination in Marxism-Leninism
at the Institute of International Affairs, which forced hin to
take all his exams over again and delayed his career: This was
“unpleasant," NOSENKO said, and he was attempting to conceal it
from CIA. In the October 1956 interrogations, NOSENKO gave a new —
and different reason. He described how he had been rejected for
employment by State Security while at the Institute and was trying
to cover up for this because he thought CIA would not believe
that he had first been rejected and then, later, accepted by the KGB.

NOSENKO's change of story tock place in 1964 while still in the
relatively relaxed circumstances of an operational meeting in
Geneva; he came tack to his original account only during the
April 1964 interrogations. NOSENKO’s explanations of why he re-

vised the story have been inconsistent and have forced him into

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further inconsistencies. Because of this and, in the absence of
any pressure of any kind (including any apparent psychological
pressure) to lie about his date of entry, the most logical explana-
tion fer this change is that NOSENKO forgot in early 1364 either
when ke joined the KGB and/or what he nad told CIA in 1962.
DERYABIN has commer.ted on the significance which the date of entry
holds for a KGB officer. He expressed the opinion that it would
be unusual for a KGB officer to forget this date.

NOSENKO was questioned at length by DERYABIN (Pages 616-619)
concerning the taming of his entry on duty with the KG2. As a
result of this interrogation it was cetermined that NOSENKO was
unaware that at the time he said he joined the KGS, the present
First Chief Directorate was designated the Secord Chief Direc-
torate and vice versa. Therefore, NOSEXSO would have joined a
component entitled the First Chief Directorate in March 1953,
not the Second Chief Directorate as he says. NOSENKO cid not
know or had forgotten various other facts, including the date
that the MVD was redesignated the KoB, and misstated the loca-
tiors and existence of various buiidings and offices in the
vicinity of the KGB Headquarters building in early 1953.

Ir. June 1962 NOSENKO said’ several times, in different meet-
ings, that the KGB agent “ANDREY" (Pages 413-414) had been re-
cruited and had left Moscow before he, NOSENKO, entered the KGB.
Me estimated the date as 1949-1950. NOSENKO knew that "ANDPEY®
was associated in Moscow with RiODES and when told that RHODES
was there from 1951 to 1953, admitted that the date he gave might
be wrong. NOSENKO continued to say, however, that “ANDREY” was
recruited before he (NOSENKO) became a KSB officer, and later
reverted again to his estimate that “ANDRE1" was recruited in
1949-1950. Wher he returned to Geneva in 1964, NOSENKO changed
this story and said that during his 1953-1955 tour in the U.S.
Embassy Section he saw cipher specialist SELEZNOV, who had come
there to consult on the then-active "ANDREY” case. NOSENKO was
unable to explain how he could have been sure in 1962 that the
"ANDREY® case was before nis time) when ne said in 1964 that
this was not so. Dayle SMITH confessed that he was recruited by
the KGB in late 1953, and records show that he left Moscow in

early 2954.
c. Circurstances of Entry

NOSENKO has consistently related his entrance into the KGB
to discussions he had with General KOBULOV in early 1953 in Mcs-
cow, after returning from the Baltic. However, he has changed the
date of these discussions with KOBULOV virtually every time he
has told this story. In June 1962, NOSENKO said he talked with
KOBULOV at the NOSENKO decha while on leave in March 1963; during
the April 1464 interrogations he changed the date to February
1953; in April 1965 NOSENKO said he spoke to KOBULOV at the
KOBULOV dacha in January 1953 while on leave and that he lived
at home and was at the “disposal of GRU personnel” during Febru-
ary and March. Finally, in April 1966, MOSENKO said he first
spoke to KOBULOV at KO3ULOV's dacha on New Years Day 1953, that
he was subsequently “resting” at a sanitorium connected with his
tuberculosis of the year before, and that he spoke again to

_KOBULGV cr. the day of STALIN's funeral, while home for a few days

from the sanitorium, 1t was at this second encounter with KOBULOV
that the latter promised to concern himself with NOSENKO's entry
into the KGB. ;

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In 1962 NOSENKO described the simple procedure by which he
entered the KG3, volunteering that there was no need to fil! out
a questionnaire (arxeta) as the KGB already had his files from
the GRU. In April 1967 when asked if he had not been required
to fill out any questionnaires or other docutents, NOSENKO ces-
cribea the anketa and other forms he completed (saying he took
them home to do so) and his various interviews with KGB per-
sonnel officers. He was interrogated in detail on these claims
by DERYABIN in 1965, to whom he gave descriptions, albeit in-
accurate, of the varicus forms and of his visits to KGS Personnel.
In 1966 NCSENKO wrote in his autobiography that there were no
talks with KGB Personnel before or after his acceptance and in-
plied that there were no forms to fill out. .

d. Remarks

Accordirg to all of NOSENKO's stories, his GRU service was
the springboard for his acceptance into the KGB. He met KOBULOV
while home in Moscow from Primorsk/Sovetsk, he entered the KG3
as a lieutenant since this was his naval rank, his admission
according to the early version was facilitated by the availability
of his GRU personnel file; yet CIA has concluded that NOSENKO
was never a GRU officer and it appears highly improbable that he
waa ever in Primorsk under any circumstances.

On the basis of generally available information concerning
Soviet realities at the time of NOSENKO's claimed entry into the
¥GB, supported by the expert testimony of DERYABIN (who was in
the KGB, then MVD, in Moscow at tha time anda h-d been himself a
KGB personnel officer until less than a year earlier), a person
with the background NOSENKO has given could not be accepted into
the KGB in the manner he claims. His health alone would seem
to have precluded this, but in addition, NOSENKO described a
series of incidents in his life equally likely to cause rejection.
NOSENKO's mistakes, changes of story, and apparent fabrications
add to the unlikelihood of his account.

It is concluded that, aS in the case of NOSENKO's GRU ser-
vice, either NOSENKO and those who have supported aspects of
his story have seriously distorted his past life, or he did not

enter the KGB.

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4. Initial Service in the U.S. Embassy Section

‘ a. Introduction t
NOSENKO claims to have served in the U.S. Fmbassy Section of

the American Department, Second Chief Directorate, curing the
period-from his entry on duty with the “GB until June 1955. His
targets during these two years were at first American correspond-
ents in Moscow and later American Army Attaches at the Embassy.

NOSENKO sought to avoid discussion cf his o«nlor.other KGB
activity during this period and on occasion he has tried to dis-
miss the whole period as “not relevant" and "cf ne consequence.”
NOSENKO has repeatedly said that he “found himself” only after his
initial service in the U.S. Embassy Section, (He varicusly dated
his self-discovery as occurring in 1955, when he transferred to
the Tourist Department; in June 1956, in connection with his par-
ticipation in and awara for the BURGI case; ana after Aucstst 1956,
when the death of his father forced him to pull himsei: together.)

Before this, KOSENKO said, he was a wastrel and “did not pay
attention to the work.”

b. Work Against Anerican Correspondents

MNOSENKO exempted himself from reporting details of KGB work

against any specific American correspondent in Moscow in 1953-
1954 (Pages 93-96) by saying that, as a new, very junior employee
he had no access to operaticnal files and did not participate
personally in the handling of any of the corresponeents. Although
able to identify four correspondents in Moscow who were then re-
cruited KGB agents, NOSENKO learned this information either in
conversations with his superior KOZLOV or at some point and in .

: some undefined way after he no longer was working against these i

i targets. NOSENKO's early months in the job were spent reading

: personality (not operational) files on a number of the corres-

pondents in Moscow (none of which indicated the individual's de- i

velopmental or agent status) and familiarizing himself with KGB i

methods. Later NOSENKO was assigned the “agent network" of .

drivers, clerical personnel, and domestics surrounding four. of

the correspondents (two of whom were recruited ¥G5 agents at

the time); he met with them periodicaily to determine whether

they had. developed any important information. Even here, however, ;

NOSENKO appears to have been given very little responsibility: '

His superior KOZLOV often went along to the meetings with NCSENKO,

. first to show him how to handle the agents and afterward when-

H ever something interesting would begin to develop. In fact,

according to NOSENKO, KOZLOV would accompany him to meetings

with these Soviet citizens-agents even when there was a “hint”

that something of interest might develop. NOSENKO has been able :

to identify some of these agents, but for all but a few he re- : : : }

called neither their names nor personalia concerning them. : {

ce. Work Against Army Attaches

Regarding NOSENKO‘'s work against American Army Attaches, he
claimed a specific area of KGB responsibility, one for which he
alone was accountable and one about which something was previously : :
known from U.S. records. Only 20 months at the longest, it is

J

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the last period in which NOSENKO had no supervisory responsibility

. to divert his attention from personal operational duties.

NOSENKO could not remember when he touk over responsibility
for the Army Attsches, and he named two other KGB officers before
settling upon BUDYLDIN as the person from whom he received the
Attaches' files. Y¥hen belittling his earlier responsibilities
for correspondents, he has said several times that he had heen in
that job “only about six months.” Assuming that NOSENKO entered
the KGB in the middle of March 1953, this would date his transfer
to work against the Attaches in the fall of that year. In dis-
cussing this transfer itself, however, NOSENKO has consistently
said that it took place in 1954. Asked when in 1954, NOSENKO
bas variously replied “at the beginning of 1954," January 1954,
and Yey 1954. Under interrogation in early 1965, NOSENKO re-
fused to estimate when he took over this responsibility. He has
always said that he turned over these duties and transferred from
the U.S. Embassy Section in June 1955, when the Tourist Department
was established within the Second Chief Directorate. .

NOSENKO has said in different contexts that as the American
Department case officer responsible for cperations against the
U.S. Army Attaches he received and*was responsible for assinilat-
ing the product of a wide variety of gources on the indivicuals
who were’ his targets. He bas mentioned information received fron
the KGB First Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate; the
Archives of the MGB/MVD/KGB; micropnones which were enplaced
about a year before NOSENKO entered the American Department*; a
network of Soviet chauffeurs, cooks, language instructors, and
other agents in the Enbassy who together provided little uscful
information; permanent and roving surveillance patrois outside
the Embassy; fixed observation posts next to, across from and
near the Embassy; advance notification of intent to travel by
the Attaches and their itineraries; and reports from outside Mos-
cow, including surveillance, egent networks, the Militia, and the
military. The point of collecting and assimilating this infor-
mation, NOSENKO said, was to be able to know what the Attaches
were doing in Moscow ard thereby to control their intelligence
collection activities. Far less important was the goal of re-
ecruiting Military Attaches; NOSENKO knew of only several in-
stances when this was attempted, and all of these efforts fatled.

The KGB's principal interest in control rather than recruit-
went has been NOSENKO's explanation for knowing little about the
backgrounds ard personal lives of his targets--such information,
he stated, simply was not pertinent to the primary mission of

*0n some occasions NOSEAKO has said that the microphones in the
Argy Attache offices were his most valuable source of informa-
tion on his targets of 1954-1955; at other times he has said

that he knew nothing of these microphones until he reentered the
U.S. Embassy Section in 1960; and at still other times he claimed
to have known ooly of their existence during 1953-1955 but not

where any were located.


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deal of vulnerability data on an Army Attache, was described by
NOSENKO in connection with the approach to Walter MULE (Page 104).
On the basis of these cxpianations, NOSENKO's knowledge of the
official and unofficial activities of nis alleged targets in this

period deserves attention. ‘

independently to CIA, which were within the sphere of what he
claimed was his direct, personal responsibility:

_

688.

control. * He has also usec this:explanaticn to support his claim
that there were no recruitments of ailitary attaches during this
period. oo :

“An exception, wherein the KGB ‘did carefully compiie a great

fee ree ere

NOSENKO knew almost. nothing about the personal backgrounds

and families of the @ight ‘members of the Arny Attache Office :
whom he identified as his targets (Pages 99-106). Although he was r
able to identify each by rank and position in the "~bassy~--some-

times inaccurately--and in a few cases to cGescribe certain of

their operational activities, ne was unaware of or had forgotten

such facts as:

- Colonel Earl L. MICKELSCN, the Army Attactic in 1954
and 1955, was arrested twice Ly the Militia outsice of Mos-

cow in 1954.

- Assistant Army Attache Ira RICHARDS was a language
student of GROMOKOVA (identified by NOSENKO as a KGB egent);
by RICHARDS! account she sought to elicit biographic data
from him curing the lessons.

- William STROUD, the Assistant Amy Attache, travelled
to Kharkov in May 1955 to interivew an American defectcr.
(NOSENKO has identified Frank SISCOE, who accompanied STROUD;
as a suspected CIA officer; he was coopted by CIA.)

NOSENKO, furthermore, was ignorant of important events, known

~- NOSENKO claimed direct personal responsibility for
the file of and operational activity against Lieutenant
Colonel Howard FELCHLIN (Pages 191-103). He ciaimed to be
receiving agent information on him but could not recall the
names or cryptonyms of any such agents. (ie said, for
example: "I think FELCHLiN must have had a maid, and she
would have been a XGB agent.") NOSENKO descripecé FELCHLIN
as by far the most aggressive of his targets and hence the
object of special interest; yet he did not know or remember

*IOSENKO himself, when giving the reason why he did not know
more details about the U.S. Embassy Section's targets while

he was its Deputy Chief in 19€0-1961, said that as a supervisor
he was too busy overseeing subordinates; hence,. NOSENKO con-
tinued, he could not be expected to remember as many such de-
tails as would be possible had he been a case® officer working
daily with only four or five files. In another context, NOSENKO
explained why he was unable to supply the details of planning
and organizing operations against tourists in the period 1955-
1959; he contrasted operations acainst tourists, who often {
came and went in a matter of a few days, to the work against i
the Military Attaches and dipiozats stationed in Moscow on . in
permanent assignments, who could be studied systematically and |

slowly.

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anything about FELCHLIN's background, presutably well docu-
mented by the KGB beczuse FELCHLI: had been to the USSR in
two different capacities, merchant seaman and diplomatic
courier, pricr to arriving in Moscow as the Assistant Army
Attache; also FELCHLIN had had prior official association
with GRU officers in Austria, Germany, and the United States,
and he continued to be ir liaison with one of them in Moscow.
NOSENKO could recall nothing about FELCHLIN's intelligence
activities in the USSR or his trips about the country, or
what had been done about them by the KGB. In speaking of
FELCHLIN's expulsion from the Soviet Union, NOSENKO reported
the KGB file noted that FELCHLIN had been caught taking
photographs on some occasion, but he did not know trat FEL-
CHLIN in June 1954 was arrested in kiev with another Assist-
ant Army Attache, F.J. YEAGER. (Erroneously identified by
NOSENKO as an Air Force Attache, YEAGER likewise should have
been NOSENKO's target.) NOSENKO also did not know that

FELCHLIN, with another Army Attacne and two Air.Force Attaches,
in September 1953 had made an unprecedented train trip through-

out Siberia and that six months later, at the end of March
1954, had been the subject of a newspaper article which
charged that they had lost "spy documents" on the train.
NOSENKO was unable to crovide a date for FELCHLIN's expul-
sion from the Soviet Union, and he knew nothing of the un-
usual circumstances of FELCHLIN's departure from Moscow;

he insisted that nobody else was declared persona non grata
along with FELCHLIN. In fact, FELCHLIN was Eepetled atong
with Air Force Major ‘walter McKINNEY, and the Soviets re-
fused to permit the two to leave Moscow aboard the Ambassa-

dor's personal plane until ambassador BOHLEN himself protested.

Confronteé by his lack of knowledge of the persona non
rata action, NOSENKO said that he could not be expected to
now the details because this incident occurred after he
transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to the Tourist
Department in June 1955. NOSENKO was then told the recorded
date of the expulsion, 3 July 1954, and he replied that this
was not true.

- Discrepancies appeared in NOSENKO's account of one
of the best kncwn incidents in the history of KGB operations
against the American officials in the Soviet Union, the
subject of reports by GDLITSYN and other CIA sources and the
subject of training materials. This was the seizure of
sensitive technical collection equipment on 5 May 1955 in

‘Stalingrad from three Assistant Military Attaches from the
U.S. Embassy--Major John S. BENSON, Captain STROUD, and

Captain MULE--and their expulsion from the Soviet Union two
days later. NOSENKO claimed direct responsibility for KGB
work against these officers (Pages 103-105); he described
an earlier attempt to defect MULE, his own plans for seizing
this equipment at a railroad station outside Moscow, and his
role in developing plans for the successful operation in
Stalingrad. When NOSENKO was pressed under interrogation to

give the entire story of the equipment seizure~and the persona
5 out

non grata action, he said that the operation was carrie
after he was in the Tourist Department and therefore he knew
no more about it. when told that the operation took place
at least a month before his alleged transfer, NOSENKO could
offer no explanation for his lack of knowledge.

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- NOSENKO identified George VAN LAZTHEM as an Assistant
Air Attache in 1953 or 1954: he was a target of another U.S.
Embassy Section officer, and an unsuccessful KGB development
operation was carried out against him. NOSENKO did not know
that V+N LASTHEM-was actually an Assistant Army Attache, who
left Moscow in March 1953 and was succeeded by NOSENKO's own
target Walter MULE (see above). What NCSENKO additionally
did not know is that in Moscow VAN LAETHEM was the Attache
‘cryptographic security officer, the superior of Dayle SMITH
(the subject of NOSE:KO's "ANDREY" leaa--see below) and a
friend of the motor pool sergeant Roy RHODES, a KGB agent.
NOSENKO furthermore did not know that on 19 March 1955,
again as an Army Attache, and only two years after being
transferred from Moscow, VAN LAETHEM:was again sent to Mos-
cow, ostensibly on a PCS assignment but actually on tempor-
ary duty. During this latter assignment, when NOSENKO by.
his own account should have been responsible for him, VAN
LAZTHEM was in Moscow to review the entire electronics
program at the Embassy. (VAN LAETHEM's second tour in
Moscow invelved the planned use of the electronic equipment.
which was seized in Stalingrad while VAN LAETHEM was still
in Moscow.) ~

d. Additional Reporting

His information on two other operations involving Americans
was said by NOSENKO to stem from his 1953-1955 service in the U.S.
Enbassy Section. One was the recruitment of the military cipher
machine mechanic having the KGB cryptonym “ANDREY" (Dayle SMiTH,

‘See Pages 413-426 and further comments in Part VIII.B.3. and

VIII.C.). NOSENKO in 1962 was sure not only that this recruit-
ment tock place before he joined the KGB but that "ANDREY" had
left the USSR by then as well: he repeatedly estimated "“ANDREY's"
recruitment date as "1949-1950," At all times he has claimed
certainty that “ANDREY" was the last KGB recruitment in the
Embassy until the time of NOSENKO's defection in January 1964.

In 1964, however, NOSE:.KO changed his story and said “ANDREY"

was active while NOSENKO was in the U.S. Embassy Section ii. 1954-

~,

|

1955. The other operation was an unsuccessful recruitment approach

to the U.S. Embassy Security Officer Edward Ellis SMITH (see
Pages 468-469 and further comments in Part VITI.B.3. and VIII.C.
above) at a meeting with the KGB arranged through letters which
had been sent to SMITH. This occurred in 1954 or 1955, NOSENKO
said, and in support of the recruitment approach, he handled

the surveillance phone-watch, SMITH admitted to U.S. authorities
having received four letters from the KGB between 2 and 5 June
1956 (a year after NOSENKO dated his departure from the U.S.
Embassy Section), but he denied having had any personal meetings
with KGB officers.

e. Remarks

NOSENKO's accounts of the 1953-1955 period are confused,
contradictory, and, when compared with collateral information,
incomplete and inaccurate. He has been inconsistent in dating
his shift of responsibilities within the U.S, Embassy Section,
in dating his_departure from the Section (viz., the timing of
the Stalingrad incident and the approach to SMITH), and in dating
his first knowledge of the microphones in the Embassy. Having ~

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few new details of importance on the American correspondents,
NOSENKO has proven unreliable regarding his work against Army
Attaches: He misidentified two (YEAGER and VAN LAETHEM), he
claimed to have almost no information on the backgrounds and acti-
vities of the others; and he lacked even .the most important de-
tails on security affairs involving the majority of his eight
alleged targets. In addition, NOSENKO has told CIA almost noth-
ing about the work of his colleagues in the U.S, Embassy Section,

The statements by NOSENKO about this period therefore hold
so little substance and the manner of his reporting was so uncon-
vincing, that his claim to have been an officer of the U.S.
Embassy Section in the years 1953-1955 cannot be true.

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5. Tourist Cecsartment (June 1955 to January 1960)
a. Introduction

NOSENKO's activities from June 1955 to January 1966, his
first period of alleged sezvice with the Acerican-British-Canale
ian Secticn of Tourist Department of the KGB Second Chief Direc-
torate, are descrited in Pages 167-151. For the purposes of the
following digcussion, it ig ccnvenient to divide this period into
two parts. The firse uf these covers the ycars from June 1955
to June 1958, when NOSENKO said ke was a staff case officer,
handling and recruiting agents and planning ard minaging opera-
ticnal activity. The second part covers NOSENKO's service froin i
June 1953 to the beginning of 19€0 as Leputy Chiet of this secticn.
Rpart from his fgersonal involvement in a number of recruitment
Operations in the latter pericd, it is this service which provices
a basis for SOSENKO to claim awarencss of 61] important arrests
of spies and recruitments from emong American tourists visiting
the Soviet Unicn) it is also this survice as Ceputy Chief cf Sece
tion which NOCEN*O citcs as a bacis for his involvement in the
case of Lee Harvey OSWALD inside the Sovict Union.

b. The Early Period (1955 to 1958)
(i) General

Recording to NOSENKXO's story, he stegs among the First case
efficers in the Tourist becpartment. He arrived there just as
the Department was beir.y formed and took part with other officers
assianed in the acquisition of an agent network from within
inturist, in the establishment of facilities ard methods, and in
generally “getting things going." Several months later he parti-
cipated in what he says was his first operation against an Ameri-
can tourist. This was NOSENKO's behind-thce-scenes (and hence
uncor.firmed) organization of an unseccussful attempt to compromise
Martin MALIA (Pages 112-113). NOSENKO's next case (the first
operation in which his participation is confirmed) toox place a
year later, in June 1955, when he assisted in the homosexual en-
trapment and recruitment of Richard BURGI (Pages 113-120). This
recruitment, which cccurred close in time to the Minister NOSEMKO's
death, was by NOSENKO'sS account a turning point in his personal
and professional life. ‘itn it, NOSENKO began to acquire a sense
of self-confidence and responsibility and began to "grow" from a
wastrel into an effective and successful KGB officer. As a re-
sult of this cperation, the first successful recruitment in the
then short history of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO first came
inte personal contact with Gencral GRIBANO¥Y. according to ali

‘ accounts prior to October 1965, when he retracted the claim,

NOSEKKO received the first of a series of KG3 awards for opera-~
tional performance because of the BUFGI case--a ietter of con-
mendation. Within a month of this oreration, NOSENYO said, he
was prometed from the rank of lieutenant to captain, his last
promotion prior to defecting eight years later.

NOSENKO's direct operational activity ia the next two years,
before his appointnent as Deputy Chief of the Section, was des- _
cribed by NOSEXXO as follews: Sometime in 1957 he was involved

ecm ees netes ee

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dn—the- attempted -recruitinerit of the German businesscan §&
(Pages 120-121); after surrounding him with agents, KOSENKO . ‘

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personally spoke to him, NOSZNKO exypiained his (unconfirred)
participation in this case, which was not among the reaponsibili-
ties of hig section, by saying there was no ¥GS cfticer available
who spoke German put Bor WAR was kr.own to speak “a little Eng-
lisa," a language in whicn NOSENKO hed fair fluency. In 1957
NOSENKO was also irvolved in the sexval and bleckmarket entrap-
ment of Some Norwegian journalist (again, not a target of
NOSENKO'’s section, being neither Amesican, Lritish or Canadian):
NOSEXKO has rot explained how he cate to be involved in this
operation, but he said his role was that of inyelving Bw ith
women and blacxmarseteers so that arcther officer, ARKHIPOV, could
recruit hin. wee nas rot identifiec NOSENKO, but reported on
an indiviéval whose role corresponds to the one NOSENKO claimed

as his own (Pages 121-122). NOSENAO'S third operaticn in 1357

was really not an cperation at all. he was assigned to accompany
the British Ganyey Send the latter's interpreter Giee Ron
a tcur of Soviet publishing houses (Page 121). NOSENKO said his
purpose was only to watch (MRA a suspected intelligence agent
or officer. His presence was confirrec by (2m who recognized
NOSENKO's photograph.

This is the sum cf NOSENKO's reported, ecretimes verified,
operational role curing the three years preceding his promotion
in June 1958 to the position of Deputy Chief of the Anerican-~
Canadian-British Tourist Section, hereafter referred to as the
American Teurist Section. “

The onty case of the June 1955-June 1958 period resulting
in agent contacts abroad, and the one to which NCSENKO ascribed
the greatest importance, was the recruitment %f BURGI. For this
reason, the BUPGI operation is discussed in detail below, with
particular attention being given to those aspects of the case
which reflect upcn HNOSENKO's own personal role. :

(ii) The BURGI Case

NOSENKO's statements of this operation generally agreed with
that BURGI proviced to the F3I in 1957. The part NOSENKO played
in the case, both in his brief initial presence with the two
homosexuals in the Moscow restaurant on the evening of 3URGI's
compromise (20 June 1986) and in the fiev events (23-28 June 1956)
would appear to be one nermally taken by a KGB staff officer.

The identities of the other two KGb participants in the Kiev
recruitment, KGZLOV and PETRENKO, seem clearly established. There
were discrepancies between NOSENKO's and BURGi's versions, but
most of these could stem from NOSEXKO's faulty merory nine years
after the events. {Such discrepancies incluce “9S=NKO's Zailure
to remember his first Moscow meetings with BURGI;: the identity,
role, or even existence of the person “Anatoliy” whom BURGI says
introduced him to NOSENKO and participated in the homosexual
compromise; whether NOSENKO was at the Kiev airport to meet BURGI;
the locaticn of NOSENKO‘s bedroom in the Kiev Hotel as compared
to BURGI's; NOSENKO's reference to BURGI"s “interpreter® when in
fact BURGI neither had nor needed one; and NOSENKO's failure to
remember the unusual circumstances of BUFGI's departure from
Kiev.) Other contradicticns and omissions in NOSENKO's reporting
relate to matters of greater operationai consequence:

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~ NOSENKO was unable to say when or how the KGS first
learned that BURGI was a homosexual, nor could he remember
who first proposed an cperation against him.

- NOSENKO gave a confused and evasive account of his
dealings with the Pirst Chief Directorate on this case.

~ NOSENKO insisted that there was no official file on
BURGI, and that none was opened as a result of this opera-
tion. The initiative for the operation came, he said, fron
the Second Chief Directorate, and when NCSENKO traced BURGI:
in the First Chief Directorate, there was no information on
him there.* The KGB's only information on BURGE at the
time of the compromise came from BURGI's visa: application
(which showed him to be a professor of Russian) and a few
agent reports from the preceding days in Moscow: BURGI,
on the other hand, reportec that during the recruitment:
KOZLOV, the senior Soviet present, showed knowledge of the
names of BURGI's sister, mother and father and knew the
sister's occupation; details of BURGI's background, work, and
military service, BURG!‘s relations with the Russicum in
Rome, which BURGI said he had never mentioned in the USSR;
and BURGI's acquaintance in the U.S. with Alexander KERENSKY.

NOSENKO cited “his" recruitment of BURGI in Kiev in 1956 as
one of the main reasons for his rapid rise in the KGB. BURGI's ©
story of the recruitment, as reported to the FBI, definitely
establishes NOSENKO's role as having been subordinate to that of
KOZLCV-~it waa KOZLOV, not NOSENKO, who made the recruitment.

* DERYABIN interrogated NOSENKO on this case. NOSENKO's answers

to such detailed questions as how the traces were done, how

the travel to Kiev was arranged, details concerning the person-
nel involved, the contents of the file, and other mechanics

of the case, betrayed an almost total lack of memory.

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c. Promotion to Deputy Chief of Section

NOSENKO said that in June 1958, when the unit that had
formerly handled tourists from all countries was reorganized into
two sections, he was promoted from the rank of senior case offi-
cer to that of Deputy Chief of the newly created American Tourist
Section. NOSENKO said that this section was the most important
in the Tourist Department, and that he did not know why he,
in particular, had been chosen its Deputy Chief but was certain
that GRIBANOV had no voice in the decision.

d. Knowledge of Section’s Staff and Agent Personnel

NOSENKO has named with clarity and consistency the other
officers of the American Tourist Section during this period. The
Soviet agents of his section whem NOSENKO has identified were
mostly his own; he said that the agents were constantly shifted
from case officer to case officer znd hence it was “difficult to
say just who handled which agents." NOSENKO said he nad approxi-~
mately eight Soviet agents in 1958 ard about 12 or 14 in 1959, ~
most of them employed by inturist (Pages 109-112). With the ex-
ception of the two homosexuals, YEFPE!OV and VOLKOV. discussed
separately below, NOSENKO cannot suppiy personal cata on nis own
agents or remember specific jobs they did for the KGB.

e. Knewledge of Section's Activities

As of June 1958, according to NCSENKO, the work of the
section of which he was deputy chief was "just getting going."
Its mission was, first of ail, to detect Western Intelligence
officers and agents among the increasing flow of tourists visit-
ing the Soviet Union; only secondarily was the section directed
toward the recruitment of KGB agents from among these tourists.
In his new positicn NOSENKO was responsible for supervising
other officers in the section in efforts along these lines. Be-
cause of this and because at GRISANOV's request ne personally
reviewed KGB information on the use of tourist cover by Western
intelligence services and KGB counteraction thrceugh 1953 (Pages

-145-146), NOSENKO made a number of statements concerning these

subjects during the 1955-1959 period.

CIA started its so-called “legal travelle.” program in
1955 and by 1958 was deeply committed to such operations. Now
there is . firm collateral information on what the KGB knew of
this operational program. In view of NOSENKO's duties in the :
American Tourist Section and the section's prime mission, he should

have knowledge of agent compromises during 1958 and 1959. More-

over, thanks to collateral holdings, what NOSENKO aid and did not
know can be compared with information from other sources. These
facts are reviewed below. :

(i) BLAKE

A valuable source of information for the KGB in its planning

“€or the operational activity of its Tourist Nepartment in the

late 1950's and early 1960's was the Englishman, George BLAKE
(Pages 146-147). BLAKE has confessed that in the summer of 1959

-he—passed_the,KGB_a_19-page_summary of the_results_of_a three-day

|
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meeting during the first week of June 1959, between representa-
tives of CIA and MI-6; these sessions were on the subject of
“legal travel" intelligence operations against the USSR. This

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summary spelled out in detail the complete CIA operational doc- i
trine pertaining to tourist-type operations and stressed CIA's
reliance on tourist agents for the spotting, recontacting, aessess-
ment, and communications support of internal assets. ,

While NOSENKO has displayed some familiarity with CIA modus '
operandi in the field of tourist operations, he has never mer-
tioned that the KGB was in possession of documentary reporting i.
which described these methode in full detail. NOSENKO does :
not appear to be aware of who BLAKE was, much less of his im-
portance to the KGE. NOSENKO never volunteered the name of
BLAKE in his Gebriefings, and when specifically asked in 1962
about BLAKE, the KGB agent in Britisn Intelligence, he said
that he had read the dossier and thet BLAKE had been “an agent
of che Second (British) Depertment (of the Seccnj ict Dire

‘ as not nearly e3 valuable as the

r the other Englisnmman" (VASSALI.).
ia rot recall any such ecent of the British Department.

When the name SLAKE was mentioned, he asked: ‘Who's BLAKE?™

BLAKE had, in addition, passed to the KGB a photocopy of
a 2l-page summary report of a second, {s!i0w-up conference be-

tween CIA and MI-6 on “legal travel" op+:.:tions which was held
in Washington from 20 to 25 Apriai 1960. ‘0SENKO, although not
in the Tourist Department at the time the latter report was |. --s7 7

received by the KG3, said that he reviewed all important ma- .-
terials of the American Tourist Section when he became its Chief
in January 1962. Asked whetner the Tourist Department had re-
ceived documentary information from any agent source while ;
NOSENKO was away from the department in the years 1960-1961, te
he replied that none had and that he knew of no agent who could

have provided such documentary information,

we

(ii) GOLITSYN Document

NOSENKO in 1964 reported knowing that GOLITSYN at the time i
of his defection in December 1961 took with him an official j
top secret KGB documert concerning Western Intelligence opera- i
tional activity in the field of tourism (Pages 147-149). He }
did not mention this fact in the June 1962 meetings. Althoush :
NOSENKO also stated that this document had been prepared by
the Tourist Department, he has nct been able to cescribe the
document in detail and specifically did not mention that this
_ particular document was in large part based, as subsequent
i . analysis has shown, upon the above-mentioned reports submitted

; to the KGB by George BLAKE.

(iii) Tourist Agents

NOSENKO assertec that the KGB detected no agents among
American tourists during the years 1958 or 1959, and that no
tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servic- :
ing dead drops, or contacting agents, except one in 1959 whose i
name, NOSENKO said, was MacGUIRE (actually McGOWAN in 1958). i
NOSENKO signed a statement attesting to these facts. ‘

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The KGB document supplied cy GOLITSYN, however, refers to
a number of cases cf American tourists who were found by the
RGB to be engaged in intelligence coliection or intelligence .
support activities. In addition to McGOWeN, the GOLITSYN cocu-
ment cited the cases of SIMARD, GRAY and PRANCIS, all of them —
CIA agents detected ty the KGB in 1958 and 1959. These years
coincide with the time when NOSENKO claims to have been Deputy
Chief of the section which was responsible for monitoring and
uncovering activities of this sort, but NOSENKO has never =zen-
tioned them. Furthermore, the annual reports cf the section
which NOSENKO would have helped to write, by virtue of his
Claimed position as Deputy Chief of the American Tourist Section,
presumably included all of these cases.
f. NOSENKO's Tourist Paper ONY

NOSENKO was questicned at length on the review of Western
tourist operations which he claimed to have written for GRIBANOV.
He said he gatheced the material for this study from earlier
annual reports of the Tourist Department and by talking with
various case officers, then took the study to GRIBANOV's
office. NOSENKO could not remember whether he discussed his
findings with GalBANOV, could noc give any examples of the
information which ke included in the report (other than statis-
tical information on the increase in foreign tourism), could
not recall what the report said about CIA tourist operations
(other than there appeared to be increased use of tourists
travelling by automobile), and cid net know what other american
Intelligence services were sending egents into the Soviét Union
under tourist cover during these years. On the basis of his
research for this report and his cw experience, KCSENKO said
he knew that KGB operations against tourists had been develop-
ing slowly and that, ac the time the report was written during
the tourist season of 1959, the KGB knew little about the use
of tourism by the American services.

BLAKE's confession that he passed documentary information
on this subject to the KGB, but more particularly the intensity
of KGB operations against tourists at this time as reflected
in the GOLITSYN document and other reports indicate, that this
statement by NOSENKO must be erroneous.

g. The OSWALD Case

According to NOSENKO's account of his direct involvement
in the case of Lee Harvey OSWALD (Pages 136-144), his partici-
pation seemed to stem solely from his supervisory role as
Deputy Chief of the American Section. In this capacity, NOSENKO
said, he was the cne who made the Gecision that OSWALD was
“not normal" and of no interest to the KGB. On other occasions
NOSENKO has reported that he made this cecision together with
his subordinate KRUPNOV, or that “they decided,” or “it was
decided." NOSENKO’s information or the handling of OSWALD in
1959 is unique, and there is no collateral information against
which it can be reliably measured. The resuits of the poly-
graph examination in October 1966, hcwever, indicated that
NOSENKO lied in having said that he was personally connected

-with any aspect—cf the-CSWALD-case_and_that_ne_hac heard of.

sm Rs ee eget

OSWALD before the assassination of President Kennedy. The
polygraph results aiso indicated that the KGB gave NOSENKO
special instructions on the OSWALD case and what he should tell
U.S. authorities about it. ,

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h. WNOSENKO's Coerational Acrivitics 01950-21959)
(i) General

NOSENKO appeared in one operation snorely aftr: being pro-
moted to the position cf Deputy Chief, tne reeruictnent of the
American woman EAPRIS in September 19°38 on the b..3sis cf har
romantic involvement with a Soviet male. HARRIS tentatively
identified NOSENKO's vhotosraph as thet of one or two Soviets
who approached her in Moscow and said that, of the two, te was
“definitely the man in charge.” She denied having had further
contacts with the KGB after leaving the Soviet Union. In i963,
KOSENKO said, he also supervised the sexual entraprent of
but did not become personally involvei in the approach, which
was made by his superior DULAS. Scr time during this year,
NOSENKO said, he recruited the scconc of his pair of h mosexual
agents, YEFREMOV. Beginning in the srping of 1959 he used the
two in a series cf successful recruitvent approaches ti

1 and & ; oR
as a commercial representative @ in Moscow, was not the
reeponsibility cf NOSESKO's section, NOSENKO was asned to make
the appreacn because he was 2 “specialist” in this type of
operation.) In 1259 NOSENKO aiso use? these agents in opera-
tions against two Anerican guides at the Sokolniki Exhipit,
BRRRETT and WILLERFORD. Firally, KOSENSO said, in 1959 he
accomplished the recruitment of the fAcerican Express Company
representative in Moscow, FRIPPEL,on the basis of sexual coa-
promise.

+
(ii) The Pomosexuals YEFREMOV and VOLYOV

There is a preponderance of homosexual recruitment opera-
tions in NOSENKO's account ef his KG3 carcer. He has referred
to several homosexual agents with whon he has worked on Spe-
cific recruitnent-entrapzent cperations, Fut said that he nin-
self was never their cfficial case officer. They include
“LUCH,"” "“STROYEV," "NIKOLAYEV,® "SIBIRYAK” and KOSHKIN. de has
remembered only a few of their names end nas supplied no
personality inforraticn about thea. He identified caliy VOLKOV
ana YEPREMOV as his own agerts.

NOSENKO claimed to have re-recrvited VOLKOV, a former
agent (cryptcnyn "SHMELEV") end recruited YEFREMUVY (cryptonya
*"GRIGORIY") and to have bees their scle cese officer from the
beginning of their KGB carecrs in 1957-1958 until they were
deactivated in 1963 because they became too well «known. He met
them frequently, directing them in at least a dozen entrapment
operaticns or cther nomesexual encounzers. NOSENKO took then
with him shenhe transferred to the American Department in 1960
(but used them in no cperations during 1960 and 1961) and back
again in early 1962 to the Tourist Department (where they were
used only cnce, immediately after his return). He gave a rela~
tively clear account of the recruitment (Pages 107-108), buts

- He has never been able to remember YEFREMOV'S
patronys.

= He does not know the home address, general area
of Moscow resiJence, family circwastances, job details,

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- He said that during the five or six years he
handled them, he never was at their homes, never met thea
in a safehouse (only on the strect), and never met either
of them alone without the other's presence.

~ He did not know about VOLKOV's and YEFREMOV's en-
counters with and developrent of one Dutch and five other
Rnecicans, independently known to CIA. of the Americans,
three were CIA agents and a fourth was the well-known
fPeerican diplomat and author Charles . THAYER.

- He told about VOLKOV's anc YErFEMov's compromise
of Robert BA.REETY in 1959 (Page 126) but did net know that
they had met BARRETT again in 1°61, shortly before BAPRETT
was recruited on the basisof the 195% compromise.

- He did net know details of why or hew VCLKOV and
YEPREMOV first cane into contact with their most recent
target, W.E. JGHNECN, nor how they set up the compromise
which led to NOSENKO's entry as a “police official" under
the name Yuriy Ivanovich NiXOLAYEV (Pages 289-293).

(iii) Homosexual Entrapee: t Cperations

buring 1959 NCSEXKO said he made recruitment approaches
to five U.S. and British citizens cn the pasigs of homosexual
entrapment operaticns involving the agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV.
All five approaches were successful, and the four Westerners
who have row been idestified have, in turn, identified NOSENKO
in one way or another as the recruiting officer. With the ex-
ception of the FRIPPEL case and the homosexual compromise of
BARRETT and WILLORTCRD. (which did not result in approaches dur-
ing NOSENKO's tour in the American Tourist Section), these were
the only operations in which NOSESKO tock part in 1959 and
they represented, in fact, the caly recruitments by the section
during this year, 'OSENKO said. He claimed repearedly in 1962,
1964, and 1965 that at the erd of 1959 he received a cormenda-
tion from the KGB Chair;an for his recruitment of the Five homo-
gexuals and FRIPPLL (discusses separateiy below). In October
1966, he admitted that this claim was untrue.

In discussing the GMB case (Pages 123-124) NOSENKO had
forgotten details which, irom his confirmed participation, he
certainly once knew. He said that (as with the SREP case--
see below) another case officer (IVANOV) had the file materials
on the target before he did. NOSENKO stated tnat his agents

“VOLKOV. and YEFREMOY reported to NOSENKO in Mosccw on

homosexuality and then “IVANOV and I and possibly GUSKCV, the
Section Chief, reported this to DUBAS," Chief of the Tourist
Department. NOSENKO couid rot remember the arrangements for
taking the pictures, nor in what Moscow hotel the photography
took place. When nt to Leningrad, NOSENKO wa3_ sent
there to approach hin, flying alcne (as in the case).
All Leningrad arrangements were made by the local kGB. Asked
why he was assigned to the case, NOSENKO replied: “I was told
to go." Asked why IVANOV could not handle it, he answered:
"ve was not considered capable,” his English was “not bad but
he didn't have enough operational experience.” NOSENKO did
not remenber who wrote the request for permission to make the

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approach feuaybe 1 did, or maybe I dictated it to IVANOV") or
whether waS Btaying in the hotel where the Leningrad com-
promice and Sipproach took place. He named the Leningrad case
officer, FERELETCV, beat said that he, *OSENX%O, made the re- ;
cruitment Gaeta mm BAid another man was present, [

NOSENKO'9 account in general matches <apee statements ; a f
on this approach (Pages 125-126). The Wiscrepincies, as well : ano
‘as the omissions in the former's statements and his uncertainty
of the facts, may be attributable to faulty memory on the part:
of NOSFNKO. Although NOSENKO wae at this time Deputy Section
Chief, when asked to explain his own selection as recruiting
officer, he said that he did net know why “they" chose him \
and, when pressed as to who selected him, said "CUBAS, I think." i
when asked why the case officer VETLITSKIY, who originally had
the materials cn could not do *he jek, he answered:
"Y don't knew." NOSENKU clains that he himself arranged the !
transfer of a KS3 “agent or operational contact" (he did not ;
remenber which) to Uzhgorod from Odessa for this case, and
said he did this only by phone calls, with nothing written, i
He gave a physical description kut had no cther knowledge of \
this agent, neitner name nor code name nor job nor background
nor XGB status ("I wasn't interested"). The agent, he said,
travelled alone$ NOSE’KG did not arrange to receive hin in
Uzhgorod because the local KGB tock care of everything. NOSENKO
met him only once, and then in the company of a case officer
of the Uzhgorod KGB, whose name or other data he has also for-
gotten. NOSENKO said he did not report to Moscow about progress i
and plans on the case from Uzhgorod or other stops in this '
operation, nor obtain permissdon to travel alcne with the agent - :
to Lvov and Minsk after the recruitment; the local KGB's in ;
Uzhgorod, Lvov, and Minsk did that, he said. NOSENKO could
not describe KGB arrangements and support in Lvov and Minsk,
where he said “the only thing I needed was a car from the air-
port to the city.® said they travelled by train.)
Likewise, NOSENKO was unable to describe the KGB proceduzes
for clearance, tracing, reporting and other management of this
operation.

(iv) The Agent “PRIPPEL -

“FRIPPEL (Pages 129-135) is the only American citizen with

i whom NOSENKO ever had more than fleeting operational contact

: in his whole KGB career and is the only foreign agent he claims

! to have run for more than two meetings at any time in his car-.

! eer (with the exception of Seeks pages 201-212, and *"PROKHOR,.”
: Pages 173-181). Zhe American Express Company representative

: in Moscow, FRIPPEL. was not recruited so that he could report

i on American tourists visiting the Seviet Union, or on official

and unofficial Americans living there, but in hopes of learn-

| ing about approaches being made to members of Scviet delegations
a visiting the United States. With a weaith of reporting assets

| in Moscow, NOSENKO said, the KGB did net need him there. When
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PRIPPEL was reassigned to New York City, however, there were

no plans to contact him through the local KGB Legal Residency.
FRIPPEL. is identified by. XGB cryptonym in the CHEREPANOV papers
as a suspected American Intelligence agent. That FRIPPEL was

ce ee eee

. considered such by the KGS is confirmed by statenents of a self-
i - admitted KGB agent in contact with the American tourist ‘ROBERTS |
_ in 1962.

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NOSENKO said PRIPPEL was his agent and said, repeatedly:
“IJ recruited himmyself.” In 1962 no other KGB officer was
mentioned by NOSENKO, who qucted from a number of his conver-
gations with FRIPPEL. In 1964 NOSENKO said he and CHELNOKOV
°hzd carried out the recruitment together," but NOSENKO was the
case officer. According to FPRIPPEL's account, CHELNCKOV was
the senior officer in the recruitment and in the later meetings.

NOSFNKO never met PRIPPEL alone while FRIPPEL was stationed —

in Moscow. The only times he ever did so were later, he said,
when PRIPPEL returned to the USSR, and these consisted of a brief
‘visit to FRIPPEL's hotel room during FPRIP?EL's visit to Moscow
in the summer of 1962 and a short meeting in Odessa where FPRIP-
PEL was on a cruise in February 1963. (Both of these meetings
took place after NOSENKO, in his 1962 contacts with CIA, had
exposed FRIPPEL as a KGB agent.) According to FPRIPPEL, in the
February 1963 meeting. NOSENKO phoned someone to ask whether 7
he cculd accept FRIPPEL's invitation to board the ship; the
answer was evidently no. NOSENKO denied this, insisting that
there was no one in Odessa superior to nim, and as a Deputy De-
partment Chief, he would not have to ask anyone anyway.

NOSENKO, CHELNOKOV, and their wives dined at PRIPPEL's
house in Moscow some time after PRIPPEL's recruitment. NOSENKO
ackncewledged this to have been a most unusual procedure ard
could name no parallel in KGB agent handling. Asked why it
hapsened, he said: “Because he invited me," and when asked
why CHELNCKOV and his wife went along, NOSENKO said: “Because
he was also involved in the recruitment.”

NOSENKO said he retained operational control of PRIPPEL,
then still Moscow representative of a tourist firm, when KOSENKO
shifted in June 1960 from the Tourist Department to the Areri-
can Department; Later NOSENXO also maintained repponsibility
for contact duking FRIPPEL's visits to the USSR ater FRIPPEL's
PCS departure from Moscow in January 1961 and after his own re-
turn to the Tourist Department. According to FRIPPEL, who saw
no sign of change in NOSENKO's reponsibilities during his rela-
tionship with him, he recalled meeting CHELNOKOV (who had
stayed in the Tourist Department) alone, without NOSENKO, prob-
ably in 1960.

FRIPPEL said he was queried by NOSENKO and CHELNOKOV only
once concerning U.S. Embassy personalities, specifically on
BOWDEN and WINTERS. NOSENKO, who claimed case officer re-
sponsibility for Embassy Security Officer ABIDIAN in 19€0-1961
as well as for PRIPPEL said the two did not know each other;
in fact, they met socially several times. NOSENKO could re-
call nothing which FRIPPEL ever reported to or did for the KGB,
dismissing the subject on several occasions with: "He never
gave anything of value." The oniy question NOSENKO posed
when he cate to FRIPPEL in August 1952, FRIPPEL said, was
whether the agent knew “what the newspaper editors he was es-
corting were going to ask KHRUSHCHEV in an interview. Accord-
ing to FRIPPEL, in the February 1963 meeting NOSENKO posed
no questions and merely made polite conversation until PRIDPEL
excused himself.

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During the early 1965 interrogations, NOSENZO volunteered:
“1f you had Leen clever you could have made me work insize the
USSR; you could have ccntacted me through FRIPPEL..." NCSENKO
was asked in October 1966 whether he had expectel or hoped CIA
would attezpt to establish contact with nim insice the USSR i
through FRIPPEL. He strongly Jeniec this. }

4. Remarks

1OSENKO claims to have particirated directly or indirectly i
in every recruitne:t operation with American tcurists in the
‘years 1955-1959. itis presence in KSU operaticns during this
period has conetimes Leen ccatirmed, but not aiways did these +
cases involve tourists of the three nationalities--Arerican, i
British, end Canadian--fo: which NOSENKO said his section was :
responsibies : . i

Years  Nane Nationality Status in USSR Confirmed
1955 MALIA Rrerican ‘"Pourist No
1956 BUPGI American Tourist Yes
1957 German Commercial/Tourist No
British Tourists (under in- Yes

‘vestigation)

Norwegian Quasi-official visitor No
19538. Anerican Tourist Yes
KPAFT Americar. Tourist No
1959 DPEW_ American vourist Yes
: Britisn Tourist No
British Tourist No
British Resident Yes
American Tourist Yes

American Temporary Resident No :

WILLERFORD American Temporary Resident No |

FRIPPEL (to 1963) American Resident, later tour- |

ist Yes

This tabulation of 15 cases shows a higher number of operations
involving American (six) and British {chree) tourists than any
other category, but it nevertheless intermingles citizens of
other nationalities and having different status in the USSR.
FRIPPEL and B8i$¥ere neither tourists nor (according to them
and NOSENKO) used against tourists; GEER Ey ¥
from continental Europe; BARPETT and WILLERFCFD worked in Moscow
for several months. The tabulaticn also shows that, according
to NOSENKO, his operational work was ccnsiceracly more intensive
in the time after he became Deputy Chief of the section than.
before, when as a senior case officer his administrative respon-
sibilities presumably would have been far less demanding.

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Although NOSENKO's participation in five cases of the Aneri- .
can Tourist Secticn is confirmed, his acknowledged role in five i
othere of different varieties--with corroboration by other ‘
sources in two of them--raises doubts about whether he belonged ,
to that section as a senior officer. The Goubts ar2 strengthened |

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by the nature of his information about the four individual cases
reviewed at length above:

- In the BURGI case NOSENKO did not have knowledge
cf the extensive background information on the recruitment.
target which the KGE possessed at the time of the approach;
or of other significant details in what NOSENKO described
as an operation of greatest importance to the American Tour-
ist Section and to himself personally. In addition, NOSENKO
haa admitted lying about his having received an award for
his role in the recruitment of BURZI.

- Regarding the DREW case, NOSENKO said he was chosen
for the approach (made on the basis of homosexuality) be-
cause the regular case officer lacked operational experi-

ence. By April 1359, however, the KGB had arranged “hurdreds*

of homosexual compromises in the USSR, KOSENKO reported in
another context. His earlier personal experience with
Western targets had been limited to a secondary role in
the BURGI case and a principa: role in the HARRIS case,
the latter not an approach on homosexual grounds. It is
difficult to comprchend how NOSENKO would have qualified
for the task whereas the case officer IVANOV would not.

--There are gaps in NOSENKO's infcrr.ation about a
numper of significant aspects in the B gecase, includ-
ing staff planning and maneyement of the operation, opera-
tional support arrangements, and on personnel of the outlying
KGB units involved. NOSENKO was unable to explain. why he
was selected to make the approach togé

- CHELNOKOV was the senicr case officer for FRIPPEL.
NOSENKO never met this agent alone while he resided in
Moscow as the American Express Company representative,

. and NOSENKO reportedly acted on a supervisor's instruc-
tions at their later meeting in Odessa. Despite his occue
pation and his entree into the American community ir Moscow,
FRIPPEL reportedly was not exploited by the KGS against
tourists or U.S. Government employees but was targetted
to report on matters to which he had no access; hence
there seems to have been no logical reason for the FRIPPEL
case to have been transferred from the Arerican Tourist
Section to the U.S. Embassy Section and back again. Al- ‘
though available information verifies the ccntinuity of
NOSENKO as FRIPPEL'’s handler, it cannot be considered firm
evidence of NOSENKO having been an officer in either of
these sections and in fact might be interpreted as evidence
that he was not.

Similarly, while familiar with some but not all of the opera-_.
tional activities of the homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREIMOV,
NOSENKO failed to support his claim to being their American
Tourist Section case officer; he has been unable to provide
rudimentary background information of these two individuals,

who allegedly were prominent in operations of the section.
NOSENKO's statement that he retired the files of VOLKOV and

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‘YEFREMOV because they were too well known is incompatible with
hie other reporting to the effect that neither took part in an
operation between 1959 and early 1962.

In further reference to NOSENKO's claime to having been. |
the case officer in these various operations, he has been ugable
to recount in any detail FGB staff procedures involved. in these
Operations, such as name-tracing, coordinating with other com-
ponents, obtaining approvals for action, etc. Pinally, of his
alleged 54 months of service in the American Tourist Section,
NOSENKO's described activity against foreigners accounts for |
only about three months; if the bulk of his tine was spent with
recruiting or handling Soviet-citizen agents, he might be ex-
pected to remember something about some of them. He can barely
remember names (and only a few), haa given confused accounts of
their recruitment, rememberg nothing about any of their spe-
cific operations or activities for the KGB, and knew no per-
sonality background data on any of then. ;

Even if it were assumed that NOSENKO wag a case officer of
the American Tourist Section, his claim to the position of Deputy’,
Chief cannot be substantiated. He himself could rot explain
his appointment to the job. He did not know about the CIA: {Mere
"legal travel" operations compromised to the KGB in 1958 and
1953 when he was allegedly in @ supervisory capacity. NOSENKO
knew nothing about the documents on such operations which BLAKE
gave the KGB and which can be presumed to have been of the ut-
most interest to the American Touriat Section, among all KGB
Headquarters clementa. These documents offered material that
could have proven valuable to the preparation of. NOSENKO's own
paper on Western tourist operations; they were used in the genu-
ine KGB paper written by the Tourist Department and passed to
CIA by GOLITSYN. As with his status as a case officer in the
American Tourist Section, NOSENKO the Deputy Chief could not
Gescribe how data on tourists was received, general and spe-
cific plans laid, events discussed, decisions made, anc lpads
channeled.

The foregoing paragraphs suggest the conclusion that NOSENKO
as not a senior case officer or the Deputy Chief of the Ameri-
an Tourist Section. While the methods of the Tourist Depart-

Bent are not independently known in detail, it is conceivable

that what NOSENKO did on behalf of the KGS (not necessarily the

American Tourist Section) could have been accomplished by a

“~~ principal agent. These conclusions do not cast doubt about .

the facts presented by NOSENKO on the KGB investigations in the
: OSWALD case but merely rule out the possibility of NOSENKXO's
i having been involved with this case in any way prior to the

assassination of President Kennedy.

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795.
6. U.S. Embassy Section (1969-1961)
a. iIntrcduction

From January 1960 until January 1962 NOSESKY claims
to have been Deputy Chief of the U.S. Erbassy Section of
the American Department, KGB Second Chief Directorate,
under KOVSHUK. This period (described in Pages 152-285)
is the most eignificent in NOSENKO's account of his KGB
career for a number of reasons: .

- The section is the specific unit working against
the U.S. Embassy, by NOSENKO'S cwn statemcats the KGB's
most important counterintelligence target in the USSR.

Its operations (characterized on Page 152) directly

zffect American security. The section has the twe-

fold purpose uf knowing of and contrelling ati access

of Embassy personnel to Scviet citizens anc vf collecting,
assimilating, evaluating, and using informac.cn from

all possible sources to recruit Avtericans stationed

in Moscow.

- NOSENKO's position as Deputy Chief cf thig sec-
tion provided him his access to “ost of the major counter-
intelligence information ate has resorted, inciuding
recruitnents of foreicn embassy officials and micro-
phone operations against the U.S. Exbassy. Most impor-
tant, it provided HOSENKO with his authority for
stating that there were Ro successful recruitments
of or agents among official Americans in “oscow for
this two-year period, or for a tine both cetore and
after. (This is the same point made by incirection in
the CHEREPANOV papers; yet this view is contradicted
by information from GOLITSYN. Although the latter aid
not serve in the U.S. Fxabassy Section, he «new members
of it and gave leads to KGS operational interest in
and possible recruitments of official Americans in the
Moscow Embassy during this period. Some of these appear
to be related to information items NOSENKO nas provided.)

- The epparent importance of NOSENXO's information

on this period contrasts sharply with that from other

¢ periods. His accounts of recruitments in the tourist
field covering the five years prior to this assignment
and the two years following have been checked thoroughly
and not one of them represents a fenetraticn of any
government; none nas access to classified information:
most were inactive, suspect, or already known to
Western counterintelligence organs.

<= nNosexvo's work against the U.S. Embassy is con-

sensitive firmed by and less directly by other Scviet

sourced reporting to CIA and the FBI. It is Genied by
GOLITSYN. (GOLITSYN has said that NOSENKO was not in
the section during these years.)

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b. Entry into the Section

NOSENKO has given a detailed account of how he came to
be transferred into the U.S. Embassy Section, but he has
never given a precise date, usually saying “January 1960"
or “at the beginning of 1960."

Ags described on Pages 153-154, the shift vas made at
GRIBANOY's insistence and against NOSLNKO's own personal
wishes. GHIBANOV told NOSENKO during a personal interview,
at which KOSENKO voiced his objections, that the transfer
was part of his (GRIBANOV's) plans and was primarily to put
new life into operations against American code clerks, the
primary target of the Second Chicf Directorate. GRIBANOV
did not tell him why he, instead of another, had been
selected for this job, although NOSENKO had the impression
it was because of his achievements in the Tourist Depart-
ment. (see Part VIII.P.5.). NOSENKO's transfer could not
kave been a result of his close personal relationship with
GRIBANOV ox because his father was a friend of GRIBANOV's:
NOSENKO has admitted that he exaggerated the closeness of
his relattonship with the Chief of the Second Chief Directo-
rate and most recently (February 1965) said that he had few
personal contacts with him outside of work; NOSENKO has also
said that his father never met GRIBANOV,

NOSENKO initially said that he relieved nobody on
coming into the section. He eventually recalled, however,
that BAKHVALOV was hie predecessor but left the scction
before he (NOSENKO) arrived, NOSENKO's confusion on this
point, his description of how he assumed custody of certain
files from BAXHVALOV although the latter had transferred to
another department, and the opportunities NOSENKO had to
name BAKHVALOV as his predecessor before he eventually did
so are described on Pages 154-156.

c. Functions as Deputy Chief

In NOSENKO's view the transfer to become Deputy Chief
of the section from the same position in another section
was definitely an important promotion: He now became
second-in-charge of the most important operational section
of the entire Sccond Chief Directorate. As KOVSHUK's
deputy, NOSZNKO had the right and obligation to be aware of
all activities in order to exercise his general supervisory
functions and so as to be prepared to become the Acting
Chief of the section when necessary.

-NOSENKO said that consequently nothing was hidden fron
him for the two years 1960 and 1961. He claimed to have
had complete knowledge of the U.S. Embassy Section's activi-
ties during the relatively recent years of 1960 ard 1961

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: and to know of all significant operational successes achieved

! in the years before and after this period, He has alsa-said he
i has told CIA all he knows of these activities. It was on this
: basis that he was able to say in 1965: "Tell si. MeCone

; that there were no recruitments. I was there.”
|

When NOSEXKO reported for duty, he and KOVSHUK agreed
: on a division of supervisory duties within the section.
i KOVSHUK was, in addition to his over-all responsibility for

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the section's operations, to supervise in particular opera- i
tional activity against American diplomatic personnel assigned {
to the U.S. Fmbassy. NOSENKO had been specifically instructed
by GRIBANOV and American Departnment Chief KLYPLY to concentrate
his efforts on the supervision of operations against the

most important American recruitment target, the code clerks

at the Embassy, with the aim of revitalizing these acti-

vities and making recruitments. (NOSENKO said there had

been none since the early 1950's.) According to the agreed-
upon division of labor, NOSENKO also assumed cese officer
responsibility for Johns ABIDIAN. the Embassy Security offi.
cer (identified by NSOSENKO as a CIA officer. buc actually a

CIA cooptee). Additionally, he was responsible for maintaining '
the section's file on factors pertaining to the physical
security of the Embassy and for receiving and disseminating
materials frou the microphones concealed in various U.S.

Enbassy offices. These were functions held, NOSENKO said, t
by hig predecessor BAKHVALOV and were turned over by NOSENKO

at the end of 1961 to his successor GRYAZNOV: Apart from

these duties, which apparently were routinely assumed by :
the Deputy Chief, NOSENKO supervised, during the early part i
of 1960 (as NOSENKO first said in 1965), .the work of the

officers responsible for operations againat. the Amorican

Armed Forces Attaches in Muscow; in October 1966, NOSENKO

reported that he was personally responsible during this

period for the operatiorml activity against Naval and Marine

officers in the Naval Attache's office.

d. knowledgeability as Deputy and Acting Chief

As deputy to KOVSHUK, NOSENKO said. he was aware of
all the operations being conducted by the section during
this two-year period; by his own statenent, nothing was
kept from him. There were in these two years a total of
over three ponths when KOVSHUK was ill or on leave, and at
these times NOSENKO was acting chief of the section. In
the latter capacity, NOSENKO was responsible for supervising
the administrative work and operational activity of the en-
tiresection and, in particular, assumed KOVSiHUK's work in
directing operations against diplomatic personnel assigned to
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Therefore, pertinent to his
claims are the facts presented in the following paragraphs.

NOSENKO could not remember any operational decisions
that he made as acting chief, or any specific or unusual
occurrences during these times. In answer to a question,
NOSENKO said that the only specific responsibility of KOVSRUK’s
which he handled in the Chief's absence was reporting to the i
Chief of the First Department about all correspondence going
out of the U.S. Embassy Section.

NOSENKO did not meet any of KOVSHUK's agents during his
absences. He could not remember any of KOVSHUK's agents,
except GLAZUNIOV (whom NOSENKO said in April 1964 was his own
agent and later said was "KOVSHUK's and FEDYANIN's") and
the American correspondent STEVENS (about whom NOSENKO had
reported in connection with his responsibilities in 1953-55).
NOSERKKO also said that in 1960 KCVSHUX recruited PREISFREUND, :
although earlier he had reported that he (NOSENKO) had dose |

!

this. (Regardless of who ‘the recruiter might have been,
KOVSHUK attended NOSENKO's meetings with PRELSFREUND. )

earl ence bene

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WINTERS. He knew no details of KOVSHUK'sS contacts with (WINTERS,

7C8,

NOSENKO knew that his immediate supervisor KOVSEUK had per-
gonal contect, under Ministry of Foreign affairs ccver, with sore
U.S. Embassy offisers and was aware that one of these had been

nor that his own friend KISLOV, as well as his friend anc few-
quent source of operational information LOPUCYHOV, were also in :
touch with WINTERS | He could not remember who elise KOVEHLK BH
knew, cr what KOVSHUK was doing with them, or why. NOSENKO i
knew neither that William MORRELL (declared to the Scviet Govern- :
mant as a CIA officer) belonged to CIA nor that KOVSHUK, who

was aware of this fact, was in personal contact with MORELL.

Unlike KOVSHU:,ANTEMEV, KOSOLATOV, BORODI::, BIRYUKOV,
KRIVOSHEY and many other Second Chief Directorate officers,
NOSCNKO never had any direct contact, even for cultivation
or zssessment, with any Americar officials, either stationed
in the Embassy or visiting the USSR. However, his English
had been proven gcod cnough to quatify him particularly for
tourist recruitments and his operational flair hed been tested,
(It was this which caused him to be picked for tne. DPEW,

%F anc other approaches and the cnly 1easor why he,
an ingiish speaker, would have been specially selected to
work on the German’ who spoxe “sone Englisn.")

DERYABIN an2 other defectors from the KGB have stated
that the deputy chief of a section working against 2 foreign
exbassy in Mosccw would be responsible for arproving and
retaining monthly schedules for the planned use cf safehouses
by the section; that he would discuss agent meeting sciedutes
with indivieval case officers and approve and retain 3 list
of planned agent meetings for each case officer on an indi-
vidual basis; and that he would approve the acquisition of new
agents and new safehouses and their transfer from one opera-
tion to another. By contrast, NOSEUYO first did not list
these functions azong his responsibilities and later denied
that he had them. NOSE:NAO did rot understand the questica
when esxed whether he had any responsibility for supervising
the use of safehozuses in Moscow (Paze Jo2) and said that as
the agents and the safehouses belonged to the case cfficers,
they could use them when and how they liked without informing
anyone; only when they were meeting an active development
agent was it necessary to report to NOSENKO and this only
after the meeting. XOSENKO said that, while he was ceputy
Chief of the section, three or four subordinate officers had
safe apartments, but he did not remember the location of any
of them. Neither NOSENKO ner his subordinates GRYACNOV and
KOSOLAPOV had such apartments, instead using less secure
"meeting apartments” (which are used in the absence cf the -
full-time occupant). NOSEKKO was able to locate his own
*neeting apartment” (which he said ne brought with him when
he transferred from the Tourist Department and iater took .
back with him to the Tourist Department) by street and could
do the same for GRYAZNOV's. He was not sure of the iccation
of the apartment used by KOSOLAPOV.

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e. Knowledgeavility of U.S. Embassy Physical Security

According to NOSENKO, he maintained the file on physical
security at the U.S. Embassy, and it contained detailed
floor plans and photograpne of the installation. NOSENKO was
unable to give the location or the floor of the office of
any single individual or component of the Embassy, including :
those of the Ambassador, or his own targets (ABIDIAN, the !
military code room, and the State Department comaunicationg
room),  NOSKKAO said that all Vapor taint Kabvady of tives
were located {n the “gone of securtly.” which he han varloualy
reported as the "seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth floors,"
or “seventh and up," or the “top four floors." NOSENKO did
not remember how many floors there are in the Embassy, nor
was he even sure how many floors were included in the restric-
ted area. (The restricted area in fact consists of the top
three floors, the eighth, ninth, and tenth.)

f. Knowledgeability about American Intelligence Personnel

NOSENKO said that not only the deputy chief but every
officer in the section cculd identify the known end suspected
Anerican Intelligence personnel in the Embassy. Nevertaeless,
he himself did not know about three CIA officers (MAHONEY,
‘MORELL., and GARBLER) whom the KGB had definitely identified
as such before their assignments to Moscow in 1960-1961. For
example, -MORELL , whose overt Cla affiliation was offictally
announced by the Embassy to the Soviet Minister of Foretgn
Affairs, was under direct and active cultivation by KOVSHUK
and the KGB First Chief D:rectorate officer K.N. SMIRSOV in
1960-1961; NOSENKO knew nothing about this (although esked
leading questions znd given hints) and did not identify
-MORELL as a CIA officer. Four of the seven officers whos
he said the KGB suspected to be CIA had never had any such
affiliation. He could not give any information at all.on
the person he said the KGB considered to be the CIA chief
in Moscow, KLOSSON, either on his Moscow activity and contects
or on the extent and results of KGB coverage, .or on his per-
sonal situation and background. He could not explain why
KLOSSON was considered to be the CIA chief, but said that {
“every officer thought he was."

g- Knowledgeability of KGB Code Clerk Operations

As his main task, the prime reason he was moved into
the U.S. Embassy Section, NOSENKO alleged, was to supervise
the operational work against American code clerks. In this
capacity he closely guided the work of case officers GRYAZNOV
and KOSOLAPOV.* NOSENKO shared an office with his two sub-
ordinates, and the three were within sight and hearing of

——

*According to GOLITSYN, wio knew both men well. GRYAZNOV was
"a very experienced” case officer with some success; he had
spent about the last five years of his 16 years in the KGB

in the Amcrican Department and was a specialist in code

clerk operations. GOLITSYN seid that KOSOLAPOV had about

ten years' KGB experience and, like GRYAZNOV, was specializing
against code clerks in 1960. .

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one anothcr and used a single safe, which contained files

on the Agerican code clerks and the agents involved with them.
NOSENKO said that he carefully directed the work of GRYAZNOV

. and KOSOLAPOV during these two years, discussing their cases
with them, taking part in operational planning, and approving
or disapproving all operational measures. NOSENKO originally
asserted that he tad also read and studied all the files

kept on the American code clerks; under questioning on indivi-
dual cases, however, he retracted these statements ard said
that he may Lave skimmed some of the files, that he did not
study any of them, but that in any event he rcad all the
current incomirg materials on the code clerks from microphones,
agents, and the like and then routed them to the case officer’
concerned. .

CIA has two types of information against which the reo
ports from NOSENKO can be compared. The first consists of
the detailed cebriefings of code clerks returning from
Moscow, administered routinely by the Department of State
and the military services; it also includes the special de-
briefings and interrogations of the Departnent of State,
the FBI, and CIA as a follow-up to KGB opcrational activity
which has become known from various sources. On this basis,
CIA has accumulated a considerable amount of collateral
information on the activities of the U.S. Embassy Section
involving United States code clerks during the period NOSEN-
KO said he was its Deputy Chief. The second type of infor-
mation is the reporting on KGB operations by GULITSYN «ho,
from contacts with U.S, Embassy Section officers in Moscow
and Helsinki, was able to provide several leads to what he
said were recruited American code clerks. GOLITSYN's infor-
nation thereby directly contradicts NCSENKO's statement that
the KGB had no successes in its code clerk recruitment opera-
tions from the early 1950's to the end of 1963, and none of
the subjects of GOLITSYN's leads have been positively identi-
fied. Some of GOLITSYN's information has been generally
substantiated by other sources. ln one case, this confirma-
tion has come from NOSENKO himself, whose information on the
-STORSBERG operation, on the agent PREISFREUND's role in it,
and on GOLITSYN's knowledge of KGB use of PREISFREULND pre-
sents an explanation of one and possibly two of GOLITSYN's
leads.* Another of GOLITSYN's leads, that concerning an
operational trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in order’ to estab-
lish contact with a code clerk, is confirmed by documentary
evidence that KOSOLAPOV did in fact travel on the Helsinki-
Moscow train with an American code clerk at the time and
under the cover GOLITSYN reported. NOSENKO denied that such
a trip was made by KOSOLAPOV.

NOSENKO has beea questioned in detail about each of the
code clerks serving in Moscow during 1960 and 1961. His in-
formation concerning KGB activities involving five of these
Americans (STORSBERG, JENNER, MORONE, ZUJUS, and KEYSERS) and

*As discussed below, there are important differences in tre
accounts of GOLITSYN and NOSENKO, particularly regarding the
outcome of this operation.

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bis lack of information concerning a sixth (GARLAND) is

' discussed in detail in Pages 166 through 219. NOSLNKO’s
information on & number of other cases, less important in
his opinion, is deseribed in the tabulation of American
case leads given on Poges 364-410. Certain of these cases
are further examined below to determine whether NOSENKO'S
knowledge equates with details which the deputy and acting
chief of the U.S. Embassy Section could reasonably be

‘ expected to knov and retain.

(1) The STORSBERG Case

The operation against STORSBERG (Pages 166-185) was,
NOSENKO said, the must important case he had as supervisor
of code clerk operations. The KGB, while able to break

certain State Department ciphers, had had no success with
d therefore NOSENKO

z military cryptographic systems, an

3 “dropped everything for a year" to involve himself with the
i development of James STORSBERG, tte military code clerk at

: the U.S. Embassy. The following facts are pertinent to an

: evaluation of XOSENKO'S story of tris case.

%

i NOSENKO originally raised the STORSBERG case indirectly
z at his first meeting with CIA on 9 June 1962. He told how

GOLITSYN, during a visit to the American Department in 1960,
at a time NOSENKO was on leave, had requested permission

to use a U.S. Embassy Section agent, @ Finn, in his own opera-
tions in Helsinki. During his discussions in the American
Department, GOLITSYN learned that this Finnish agent was
being used in operations against Embassy employees living ip
America House. NOSENKO said that the KGB realized that
GOLITSYX had passed this information on to the Americans
following his defection, for the regulations governing

visits to America House by third nationals had been tightened.
At this meeting NOSENKO did not name the Finnish agent or
specify his involvement in any particular operational acti-
vity nor did he date the visit by GOLIITSYN.

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Later in the 1962 meet ings NOSENKO gave @& detailed
summary of the Finnish agent's involvement in the unsuccess-~
ful recruitment attempt against an Americas military code
clerk. NOSENKO, without naming the Finn or the American,
said that he personally conducted the recruitment confron-
tation with GRIBANOV present. These early accounts vere full
of quotes of shat SOSENKO said to the American and vice
7 versa. descriptions of the American's reaction to the confron-
po tation, and statenents of NOSENKO'’s admiration for the Ameri-
can despite his refusal to work. Following his defection,
NOSEXKO recounted the case in even greater detail, in fact,

' in more detail than he gave for any other case. He identi-

: fied the Finn as PREISFREUND ard the American as STORSBERG

: and described acd referred to the case whenever possible

: (over 50 times). When asked for details of other code clerk
: cases, for example, he repeatedly diverted to discussion of
the STORSBERG case to illustrate how the KGB operated against

code clerks in general.

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_ After defecting NOSENKO denied that he personally con-
fronted STORSBERG. He said that his personal role #as limited
to directing STORSBERG into the hotel room where the approach
was made; after first saying that he had never clained any
other role, he admitted that he may have been “painting”

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himself (exaggerating) in his descripzions of 1962, This ;
adaission came only after the tape of NOSENKO's 1362 :
statezents had been played to hina and he had successively
said that (a) it was not his voice, (b) he was drunk in

1962, (c) the CIA case officer in Geneva had made him
nervous, and (d) CIA probably spliced various pieces of

tape together to make this false one. Still, NOSENKO

said, he directed the entire operation from beginning to end,
and it was his most important case. Inuterrogated further
concerning his role in the STORSBERG operation in October
1936, NOSENKO said that he had never read the KGB file on
STORSBERG, which was held by GRYAZNOV, :

GOLITSYN, as NOSENKO reported, didvisit the American —-
Department, did request permission to use PREISFREUND operae
tionally in Helsinki, and did report this to CIA in late
196] following his defection. GOLITSYN also reported that,
in denying his request, KOVSHUK told him that PREISFREUND
had recently been used in the successful recruitment of an--
American Embassy employce, possibly a military man and pose
sibly a code clerk or diplomat; therefore, KOVSHUK said,
PREYSFREUND: could rot be used for six months or so in other
operations, for otherwise the Anericans might become suspi-
civus. NOSENKO has not reported these details, but has said
only that GOLITSYN was instructed to. drop interest in PREIS~=
FREUND because PREISFREUND belonged to the American Department
of the Second Chief Directorate. — .

NOSENKO volunteered at his first meeting with CIA that
he was on leave outside of Noscow on the occasioa of @MLITSYN's
visit to the Americen Department. Since defecting he has
insisted with absolute certainty that this visit took place

nm the late spring or carly summer of 1961 and has described
his leave, where he went and with whom. GOLITSYN's passport
and CIA travel data show that GOLITSYN was on TDY in Moscow
in January 1961.* Told this, NOSENKO said that it is untrue,
that he recalled being told of GOLITSYN's visit after his
return from leave in July ‘1961, and that he was certain that
ke (NOSENKO) was in Moscow: in January 1961.

NOSENKO has indirectly confirmed that the operation of
which GOLITSYN learned during this visit to the American
Department was the operation against STORSBERG. He did so by
his assertion that PREISFREUND, his own agent, was used in
only one operation, that against STORSBERG, Thus, as to the
outcome of this operation, there is a conflict between NOSEN-
KO's information and that earlier provided by COLITSYN.

There is also a conflict between NOSENKO's statements that
the recruitment approach took place some tims after May 1961
(XOSINKO's dates have varied from June to October 1961,.
STORSBERNG.said it was in October 1961) and GOLITSYN's state—
ment that this approach had already been made in January 1961
when he learned of it.

GOLITSYN provided a second lead which NOSENKO appears
to confirm and which may be related to the STORSBERG case.
GOLITSYN said that during a visit to the American Department

———

*#GOLITSYN has based his assertion that NOSENKO was not in
the U.S. Embassy Section in 1960 and 1961 partly on this visit.

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in the spring of 1960,* he learned from GRYAZNOV that he
(GRYAZKOV) had developed an operation against an American
military code clerk to the point that the KGB was "99 t
per cent’ certain that a recruitment approach to this code
clerk would be successful, GOLITS*N said that CRYAZNOV

told him that this would be the first recruitment of a mili-
tary code clerk (ag contrasted to a State Department code
clerk) in the history of the American Department. There
were only two persons meeting this criterion who were in
Yoscow at the tine GOLITSYN placed this visit, STORSBERG

ard NURLEY; the superior of STORSBERG, HURLEY per forned
back-up cryptographic duties in STORSBERG'’s absence. If
NOSENKO'S report that there was no developacnt of or approach
to HURLEY can be accepted, this lead from GOLITSYN would
apply to STORSBERG rather than HURLEY. There is a conflict
between NOSENKO's information on the STORSBERG case and this
second GOLITSYN lead in that GOLITSYN described an operation
which was in its final stages in the spring of 1960, whereas
NOSENKO (as well as STORSBEPG) asserted that the STORSBFRG
opuration was just under way at this time and wes long and
drawn-out. : .

(ii) The JENNER Case

Apart from the STORSBERG operation, NOSENKO has been
able to supply the greatest amount of detail concerning the
operation (also unsuccessful) against the State Departcent
pouch clerk Paul JENNER (Pages 186-196). This case developed
as a result of an idea originated by NOSENKO himself shortly
after ne arrived in the U.S. Embassy Section. Because or
the iraccessibility of American code clerks to the KGB in
Moscow, it was NOSENKO's plan to send a KGB officer to Hel-
sirki in order to strike up an acquaintance with rx code
‘clerk entering tho Soviet Union aboard the Yelsinki-Moscow
train. The first (ard last) time this was attempted, NO-
SFAKO related, was in March 1960, whea the KCB learned that
JENNER, listed as a "secretary-archivist” and thus assumed
by the KGB to be a code clerk, was scheduled to transit
Helsinki en route to his assignaent at the U.S. Embassy in
Moscow. Under NOSENKO's supervision KOSOLAPOV therefore
travelled to Helsinki and boarded the same train as JENNER.’
Additionally, GRYAZNOV took a KGB female agert to the town,
of Vyborg, on the Finno-Soviet border, and placed her on the
same train. Both KOSOLAPOY and the female agent met and
spoke with JENNER en route to Mascow, and the girl gave hin
her telephone number, asking hia to call her. After JENNER‘'s
arrival in Moscow, both KOSOLAPOV ard GRYAZNOV subnitted
written reports to NOSENXO describing the contacts on the
train. Although the KGB later found out that JENNER was only
a pouch clerk, not a cryptographer, he was considered of
interest and when JENNER failed to telephone the female
agent, the two were brought together in a "chance meeting"
at the Moscow airport. JENNER: would have no part of the
agent's invitations, however, and the operation therefore
went no further.

#¥hen NOSENKO was told of the.GOLITSYN visit in May or June
1960, he denied that it took place, saying that he neces-
sarily would know if it had.

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JENNER reported to the Security Officer at the U.S,
Embassy upon his arrival that he had been contacted hy two
Soviet students from Vyborg, & young mai and a woman, on
the Helsinki-Noscow train. He also reported having been
given a telephone nuzber by the girl and lator repprted
having been recontacted by her at the Moscow airport.

CIA has documentary eviderce, in the forn of official
Fircrish train manifests, that JENNER travelled from Helsinkt
to Hoscow by train on 31 March 1960. This document shows
that JENNER travelled alone and no Soviets werc aboard when
the train lett Helsinki. CIA also has an official travel
manifest showing that KOSOLAPOV, using the name KOLOSOV,
travelled from Helsinki to Moscow by rail on 2 April 1960,
two days later, and that no Americans travelled on this train
with him. KOSENKU identified KOLOSOV's photograph as that
of his subordinate KOSOLAPOV. (NOSEXKO earlier said that .
he did not know whether KOSOLAPOV used an alias for ‘this
trip, what that alias might have been, or whether KOSOLAPOV
had an alias passport; he agreed that he would have had to
authorize such a passport.) When he was told of CIA evidence
that KOSOLAPOV cid not travel on the same train as JENNER
and therefore could not have met and talked with him as
YWSENKO had reorted, NOSENKO refused to believe it; he in-
sisted that he had read the reports of both KOSOLAPOV and .
GRYAZKOV, and that the events were exactly as he described j
then. _ :

ene mee

(14ii) The GARLAND Case ae

GOLITSYN told CIA after his defection that while he was
stationed in Helsinki, probably in Novenber=-not March..-1960,
KOSOLAPOV travelled to Finland under alias and commercial
cover in order to make the acquaintance of an American code
clerk on the Helsinki-oscow train. KOSOLAPOV's arrival had
been announced by a cable from KGB Headquarters to the
Helsinki Legal Residercy. According to GOLITSYN, the Legal
Residency learned which train this American was to board and
succeeded in placing KOSOLAPOV in the sane compartment with
him. GOLITSYN saw KOSOLAPOV board the train with this Ameri-
can. Later, when another Americana Department officer visited
Helsirki, GOLITSYN asked him how KOSOLAFOV's operation with
the code clerk had gone; from the officer's refusal to ansver,
GOLITSYN assumed that it had been a success.

CIA travel records show that KOSOLAPOV made a second
trip to Helsinki in Novemoer 1960, again under the KOLOSOV
alias. Finnish railroad manifests show that KOSOLAPOV left
Helsinki by train on 16 November 1960 and that one -¢ his
travelling companions on this train was GARLAND, who was
en route to Moscow to assume his duties as chief of the
State Department code room at the American Embassy (Page
198). There were no other Americans on this train.

Told that KOSOLAPOV had made a trip to Helsinki in
November 1960 and had travelled to Moscow on the same train
as an American code clerk, one of his on targets, NOSENKO
said that this could not be. He agreed that, as in the case
of KOSOLAPOV's trip to meet JENNER, he would necessarily
have been involved in the planning of such a second trip
and would have had to approve arrangements and correspondence
in connection with it. Even if such a trip took place when
NOSEKKO was out of Moscow, he said, the details of it would

an aren

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have beon known to him upon his return, and he would not
have forgotten about the trip. (In fact, CEA travel records show |
that KOSOLAPOV arrived in Helsinki on 12 November 1960 and
that NOSENKO left Moscow for Ansterdam, en route to Cuba,
on 15 November.) NOSENKO has not changed his position that
there was no such trip.

(iv) The MNOROE Caso

Like the STORSBERG operation, the MORONE case Was men-
tioned at NOSENKO's first meeting with CIA; he cited it as
an example of a technique which NOSENKO introduced for using
third nationals to obtain access to American code clerts who
were reluctant to establish contacts with Soviet citizens.
According to NOSENKO's most recent version, given in early
1965, the KGB learned that MORONE and a Marine Guard (BEGGS)
planned to travel to Warsaw on leave. KOSOLAPOV thereupon
drew up an operational plan, edited by NOSENKO and KOVSHUE
and approved by GRIBAXOV, proposing that a ferale agent of
the Polish UB be introduced to MCRONE on the “‘oscow to War-
saw train for the purpose of obtaining comprosising materials.
KOSOLAPOV arranged with Polish liaison officials in Noscow
to have such an agent sent to Moscow, met her when she
arrived, and briefed her on the operation, She was then
placed on MORONE's train together with a KGB technician
whose task it was to obtain tape recordings of the compro-
mise. Events went according to plan: MORONE. «ct the girl
and was intimate with her on the train, but when the tech-
niciar reported to NOSENKO the day after the train arrived
in Warsaw, he said that the tape recordiugs were of low
quality and unsuitable for their intended purpose. Ina
further attempt to acquire comproukxing material on MORONE,
KOSOLAPOV later brought the UB agent to Moscow, and on this
occasion photographs were obtained of their intimacies in
a woscow hotel room. Still, the xGB felt, there was not

: enough blackmail matcrial to ensure recruitment, and it was

: further planned to have the America House maid IVANOVA

attempt to lure MORONE to a room in Moscow where truly
cospreoising photographs of intimacies with a Soviet citi-

: zen could be obtained. Possibly because they noticed MORONE's
to interest in IVANOVA, NOSEMKO said, the Americans ordered
MORONE out of Moscow before further steps could be taken.

Although NOSENKO provided a considerable amount of
detail on MORONE's trip to Warsaw, there were numerous
variations in his different accounts. In 1962 he said
that he had handled the entire operation himself, including
telephoning Warsaw with the request for the girl; he also
said that the UB obtained compromising photographs in Warsaw
and that several months lates the female agent was brought
to Moscow expressly for the purpose of introducing MORONE to
a Soviet girlfriend. This, NOSEXKO said, was successful and
MORONE was soon having intercourse with a KGB agent. While
still in place in Geneva on 1 February 1964 NOSENKO gave &
different version: We," he said, arranged for the girl by
a dispatch pouched to the KGB advisor in Warsaw; moreover,
the Poles, who had obtained compromising photographs in War-
Saw, sent the KGB only pictures of the two kissing, keeping
the best oncs for themselves, and this is why she had to be
brought to Moscow. NOSENKO told the FBI later in February
1964 that compromising photographs had been obtained in War-
saw but no recruitment was attempted because KHRUSHCHEV had

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given instructions that no actions were to be taken which

might embarrass then existing good relations with the United |

States. When in February 1365 it was pointed out that MORONE j
arrived in Warsaw on 14 December 1960 and that NOSENKO left a
for Cuba on 15 Ncvember 1960, NOSENKO revised his story of f
receiving the ptreonal report of the technician to say that
he had perhaps reed the technician's report after returning ~~; ‘
from Cuba in vecember 1960. an i

CIA learned of the MORONE train. trip and subsequent :
involvement witn the UB agent in 1961 from a Volish scurce 4 |
who had provided much sensitive and reliable information D4
previously. The Polish source submitted a considerable 7 :
amount of detail incleding the date of the operation (which ;
NOSENKO did not recall) and the fact that the Polish agent’... : vorcrs tS
was handled in Moscow by a KGB officer named “Volodya.* {
It was on the basis of ‘this report that MORONE was withdrawn 2,
from Moscow in May 1961.

In accounts given since his defection, NOSENKO has con- a
gistently named KOSOLAPOV as MORONE's case officer. KCSOLA~ aC
POV drafted tne plan for the operation on the train, discussed
it with NOSEN4%O and KOVSHUK, met with a U3 official in Mcscow
to arrange for the agent, met the agent on her arrival, and
briefed her on her assignment. NCSENKO hes not been asked
and has not volunteered who specifically placed the agent
on the train. Records show, however, that MORONE left Moscow
on 13 November 1960, arriving in Warsaw on the ldth; from
12 to 16 November 1960, KOSOLATOV is confirmed to have been
in Helsinki, apparently in connection with an operation in-
volving the American code cler% GARLAND (see above). It is
also noted that travel records show that NOSENKO, the officer
supervising this (as well, presumably, as KOSOLAPOV'Ss trip

. to Helsinki), left Moscow on 15 November 1960 with a dele- :
_ gation going to Cuba.

NOSENKO has been questioned concerning the KGB agents b
in contact with MORONE and what was learned from them. He . 4
reported that an Egyptian agent visited America House, met -
MORONE there, but did not report anything of interest con-
cerning him. NCSEMKO also mentioned IVANGVA, a maid at
America House, who knew MORONE and whom the KGB wanted to use
to lure MOPONE into a compromising situation (see above).
NOSENKO said that he, himself, had met with IVANOVA several
times to discuss MCRONE, but that he could not recall any-
thing specific of interest or use that she reported concerning

’

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him. Another agent who may have reported on MORONE, NOSENKO
gaid, was an East Gcraan girl sent to America House to pose
as an Austrian; NCSENKO was not sure what she might have
reported or when this was, other than it occurred when he
was working against “ORONE and that It wes durirg ABIDIAN's
tour in doscow, for he had coze tu Anerica House to question
the girl.

Various reperts indicato that VORONE was. involved in
illegel currency speculation with the Egyptiar agent and
that on at least one occasion the Feyptian introduced MORONE
to a Soviet female, with whom MORONE was intimate. NOSE*KO
did not know that SORONE. «as also involved in illegal cure
rency dealings with G@mkggERahon NOSENKO has identified as
KOSCLAPCY's agent aid who, ne said, was involved with and
reporting on NOSEXKO's target ABIDIAN. NOSENKO did not know
that IVANOVA once incroduced SORONE to a Soviet female, with
whom NORONE was intinate; additionally MORONE was reported
by a nusber of his co-residents at America House to nave been
intimate with LVANOVA herself (which MORONE denied). Some wtet
of these samc Amcricans reported also that MORONE was inti- -
mate with UMANETS, another KGB agent identified by NOSENKO;
WORCNE hinself said he knew LYANETS "voll." Finally, the
incident involving the East German girl posing as an Austrian
involved the code clerk ZUJUS, not MORONE, and took place
after NOSENKO clains to have heen transferred frem the U.S,
Embassy Section; she was interviewed by ARILIAN's suce- ssor,
NONTGOXERY. .

(v) The KEYSERS Case

The approach tu KEYSERS is the only tine during his
service in the U.S. Embassy Section that NOSENKO claims to
have had direct contact with an American stationed in ilose
cow. (NOSENKO said on one occasion that this was the only
face-to-face encounter he could recall; and, on another, -
that it was possible that STORSEFRG--the only other possibility--
may not have seen hia on the night he was approached in the
Moscow hotel.) KEYSERS therefore is the only independent
Americap source sho could confirm that NOSENKO was involved
in operations against Aacrican Embassy personnel in 1960 or
1961.  NOSENKO himself pointed cut, however, that this con-
tact was of very short duration, and that it was possible
that KEYSERS would not recognize him. This was the case:
KEYSERS failed to identiiy NOSENKO's photograph and described
the officer wno approachcd him as a man considerably older,
shorter, and probably of a much heavicr build than NOSENKO
was, Although NOSENKO was able to provide a description of
this incident, he did not know much about the overall KCB
case against KEYSERS and a number of discrepancies have been
noted. ; .

In 1962 NOSENKO first reported the approach to KEYSERS,
without naming him, but saying he was the successor to STORS-
BERG. Since dcefecting in 1964, NOSENKO has continued to
identify hin as STCRSBERG's replacement. In fact, KEYSERS
was sent to Moscow as an assistant to the Embassy medical
officer; he also worked in the office of the Air Attache as
a collateral duty and for a short while in 1961 was under
training in the military code room aS a "back-up" crypto=-
grapher for STORSLERG. STORSBERG'Ss replacement in Moscow
was ZUJUS. .

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On 24 and 28 January 1964, before the defection, NO-
SENKO incorrectly mamed ZUJUS, who he said was STORSBERG 's
replaccment, as the target of this operation. On 2 February
1964 KOSENKO called & special meeting with his CIA handlers.
to correct this mistake. He said that, in fact, KEYSERS
was STOHSBERG’s replacement, and the approach kad been nade
to him. (Thus NOSENKO had forgotten the name of the one
American Embassy official he ever approached. )

In Pebruary 1965 XNOSENKO said that the KGB believed
that KEYSERS did vot report the receipt of the defection
letter end that there was no indication that he had fron
microphones or telephone coverage of the U.S. Embassy. In
fact, KEYSERS reported the letter at once in the office of
the Military Attache, where a microphone as discovered in
1964. NOSENKO had ecarlicr said that this particular micro-
phone was being monitored around the clock by the KGB.
(XEYSERS' homosexuality and drinking problems kad also
been discussed widely in Embassy offices. NOSENKO was
unawere of these discussions.) ” .

NOSENKO did not know correctly where or how the KGB.
dedivered to KEYSERS the letter which preceded the airport
approach which NOSEXKO claimed to have made.

(vi). Other Code Clerk Cases

Frark DAY: NOSENKO identified DAY as a State Nepartment
code clerk and the target of either KOSCLAPOV or GRYAZNOY.
As with all other code clerks, NOSENKO was asked whether he
knew of eny interesting information about DAY, whether he
knew of any of DAY's friends in Moscow, or of his travels
inside and outside the Soviet Union, etc. NCSENKO answered
"no" to all these questions. He said that the KGB had no
derogatory information on DAY, was unaware of any vulner-
abilities he might have had, and that no operational mes-
sures were taken against him. Records show that DAY was in
Moscow fros way 1960 to October 1961. In July 1961 he tra-
velled to the Caucasus with his friend, the U.S. Agricul~
tural Attache BROWN, formerly an overt CIA employee. DAY
later reported that the two were under surveillance by five
persons at all times on this trip, that on ore occasion they
found four “repairmes” in their hotel room upon returning
unexpectedly ahead of schedule, and that another time during
this trip an “attractive and available Soviet female" was
plsced in their train compartment.

John TAYLOR: NOSENKO said TAYLOR was a State Department
code clerk ard the target of KOSOLAPOV. NOSENKO did not
know of TAYLOR‘s previous service abroad or of any back-
ground information the KGB might have had about hin, He
described an operation against TAYLOR which centered around
his intimacy with a Russian maid (a KGB agent) and his sym
pathy tovards the Soviet Union and its people. No compro-
mising photographs were obtained of TAYLOR and the maid,
however, and no approach was made to hin, possibly because
the KGB did not want to jeopardize the more important STORS-

BERG case by creating a "flap." According to TAYLOR, he was _

intimate wito his maid from about September 1960 until the
beginning of 1961. On one occasion they were intimate in a
“friend's apartment” in Moscow. NOSENKO did not know that
the maid told TAYLOR she wes pregnant or that TAYLOR offered

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her. money for an abortion. TAYLOR left Moscow in February.
1961, whereas the epproach to STORSPERG wes reported by
NOSEXEO and STORSBERG to have occurred four to cight months
afterward.

Maurice ZWANG: NOSENKO identified ZWANG es a State
Departnent code cTerk who was “actively worked on” during
the 1960-196] period. An Fgyptian agent, whose naze NOSEN.
KO did not recall, introduced ZRANG to e ferslo KCB agent
in an attespt to obtain compromising phctcgraphs, but the
agent did not like ZWANG and refused to have intercou:se
with him. At the time NOSENKO left the U.S. Embessy Sec-
tion tn January 1962, there was no further activity sur-
rounding Z*¥ANG, The KGB had no agente in corctact with hia,
and there wes co vulnersbility data concerning hin. Shen
ZWANG wag interviewed by the State Departcent afier returving
from his Moscow assignment, a polygraph exsninstioa indicated
that Z¥WanG hed had intercourse with his Russian raid, else-
where identified by NOSENXO as a KGB agent; 2¥*4N5 edmitted
visitirg the maid's apartment several tines but dented
intimacies. In March or April 196), ean rgyptian intreduced
ZWANG to another Soviet female; ZdANG also acnitred visiting
her apartrent on several occasiors, but again denied having
had intercourse with her. ZWANG was reported by various
other Americens stationed tn Moscow to have been active in
currency speculation and blrckzarketecring with the Egyptian
and MES and agent of KOSOLAPOY according to XOSEXKO.
NOSENKD Sas unaware of this.

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h, Respons bility for and Knowle.tce of ‘31IDi...

NOSENLO said taat, as Deputy Chief of the U.S, Embassy
Section, he was directly s¢sponsible, £8 case officer, for
all coveraye of the Embassy Security Officer Joba V. ABIDIAN.
Thin was NOSEXEO'’s only individual target responsibility,
end no KGB officer shared it with hin. NOSENKO said that
he opened the KAUR 7ile on ABITLAN before ABIDIAN'S arrival)
in Moscow in early 1950, and that he turned tris file over
officially to his successor, GRYAZNOV, when transferred from
the U.S. Entass; Soction at the end of 11. It was NOSERKO
sho urotre the kGd plan for operations agoinst ABIDIAN in
about October 1969. ARIPLAN, according to NOSENKJ, was con-
sidered by the KGB to be 2 CIA officer e:d, as LANG ELLE's
suceessor, +45 also considered to be the nost important
counterintelligence target in the Enbassy. ABIDIAN was thus
made a special target of surveillance fron the cay of his
arrivel in the USSR; this seant he was alweys under surveil-=
lance by suveral teams of the KGB Seventh (Surveillance)
Pireetorete. The intensive coverage of ALIDIAN included
fail censorship, telephone taps, and agent revrorting; it was
instituted, NOSENKO said, “in the hore that he might lead
the KGB to another PCPOV." ABIDIAN was detected, NOSENKO
continued, in turce letter-mailings--ali to agents already
under KGB control. We *as scen to enter a suspected dead
drop site on Pushhin Street, the significance of which dld
not becene known to the KGB until later, «nen it *as learned
that this site scs to be used by PENFOVSAIY. In the hostile
interrogations of carly 1965, NOSENEG agroed tuat ie was the
single person in the KGB responsible for knowing everything
possible about “bIDIAN. .

KOSENKO ssid he knew nothing abeut APIDIAN's personal
background, his educatio:, his studies i: France, his alli-
tary service, his date of entry into the State Nepartment,
his State Departnent rank, his previous foreign assignments
with the State Department, or his status as ex Foreign Ser-
vice Reserve, Staff, or Officer status (FER, FSS, FSO).
NOSEXKO said he tried to learn these things, but the tnforna-
tion was unavailable in the Second Chief Directurate cr in
KGB Central files. and although he requested information
from the First Chier Dircctorate, nothizg was received. The
only information the KGB had on ‘ABIDIA, insofar as NOSENKO
knew, was that contained in ABIDIAN's visa request and in
ae report from one of the Legal Residencies in the United
States; the report provided a basis for believing him to be
a CIA officer.

NOSENKO was unaware of the meaning of the initials
FSR, FSS, and FSO. When asked whether he had checked the
Depastment of State Biographic Register for information on
ABIDIAN'S background, hie replied thes this document was not
available to the U.S. Embassy Section; he subsequently.
recalled that there was an old copy of the Biographic Register
“from about 1956" tn KOVSHUK's office, but That it contained
no information on ABLDIAN.

NOSENKO reported that one of the reasors ABIDIAN was
considered a Cla officer was his behavior «thile serving as
a Department of State Security Officer witt KERUSHCHEV's
deiegation when tre latter visited the lnited States in

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1959. NOUSENKO never mentioned that KOSOLAPCY. whe ne
said was his immediate subordinate and shared SOSENKO’s
office in KGB Headquarters. was a member of this same ;
delegation.

NOSENKO did not know where ASIDIAN'S office was located
in the U.S. Exbagsy. Ne erid ne did not knoe and was
unable to find out who ARIDIAN's secretary was. He reported
that some agent told the KG that ABIDIAN fad a sign on
the door of his office shich said "Security Officer."
There was no such sign. ;

Le eee ee

SOSENKO did not know where ARIDIAN'S apartauent was
located. He did not knus its conteats anda said that the
KGB was nut interested in this. He did not znew whether
ABIDIAN changed apartzents in “Moscow, which tre did.

NOSENKO ides: tified GROWAKOVA, an Enbassy language
teacher, 2S a KG agent who was valuable because she was
intelligent and was able to provide personality sketches on
her students taved on classroon discussione. He never
associated ABIDIAN with GROVASUVA. “sien told that ABIDIAN
had taken language lessons from iver. NCSELNKO resalled that
ABIDIAN took “severrnl” lessons from GEOMAKUVA at the beginning
of his tour bur discontinued; she repurted tothing of sigrii-
ficance and vhere vis no regular repurting froa her on
ABIDIAN. ABIDIAN, however, reported that he took regular,
private Russian lessons from GROM(OVA throvghout his tour
in Moscoe and that they discussed ic class h:s past personal
life, travel, education, fiancee, and his trips abroad to
see his fiancee.

NOSENKO knew that ABIDIAN :sravetled out of the USSR
two or three times, but had no idea when these trips took
Place or what countrivs ABIDIAN visited. NOSENKO said that,
as ABISIAN's predecessor LANGELLE wos known toe nave travelled
outside the USSR for operational reasons in consection with
the FOPOV case. it would have teen of interest to learn
where ALIDIAN had gone, but the KGR hal no way of finding
this out. (Note in the previous paregraph that CKOMAKOVA
knew.) When XOSENKO’S interrovetor pointed aut the possibi-
lity of photographing ABIDIAN'S passpore upon nis return to
tne USSR, NOSENKO replied that the &GB dues not photograph
the passperts of foreign diplozrats entering the soviet Unto...

NOSESKO said that ABIDIAS made no trips outside Moscow j
within the USSK and explained tliat. as case officer. he :
would necersarily have Leen aware of any suca trip as he
would have had to Nandle all arrangements for surveillance
during it. When NOSENKO was told that ABJDIAN travelled to
Soviet Armenia ir October 1960, NOSENKO said fcr the first
time that he was on leave in that month. NOSENKO admitted | :
in October 1966 that he krew nothing of ABIDIAN's trip. i

NOSENKO said that he did not know who were ABIDIAN's
close American friends in Moscow or his friends and profes-
sional contacts among foreigners there.

MOSENKO said at the esd of the January-February 1965
interrogations concerning ABIDIAN that tw reason he knew
so little abovt ABIDIAN was because ne was “working badly"
as ABIDIAN's case officer. The reason for his poor work, he

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said, was that he hed te concentrate on Supesvising tio work
against code clerks ard therefore had vesy Little tine
left for ACID:AN (sce above concerning code clerks.

In 1962 SCSENKC correctly described all of toe three
clandestine letter mailings carried out by AMTDIAN in Mose
cow at CIA request (Pages 226-236). He a}so proviced ace
curate information cn CIA lettor-mailings in generi:.
pointing out that none et ell were mailed for a year and a
half after the arrest of LANGELLE in October 1959. (No
letters were mailed fros V2 February 1960 until 1 April
1961, when ABIDIAN mailed his first one.) NOSESKO explained
that the KGB conpletely centrolled this activity through the
use of metka, a thicf powder applied to the clothing of
foreigners ia the USSR; a trace is left on anything coming
into contact with treated areas, and this can be detected
by spectal machines through which all mail passes. .Despite
the fact that all of ABIDIAN's letters were mailed to KGB
double agents and would therefore have becn detected enyway,
it was metka, NOSENKO said, vhich in each case led to their
initial” identification. After his defection NOSENKO described
how the metka had becn applied to AMLUTAN’s clothing (anc
hence to the letters) by the agent PLOOROVICH, aho began
working as ALIDIAN's maid several months efter ABIUIAN ar--
rived in Moscow in March 1360. NOSENKO insisted under inter-
rogation that FEDOROVICH was the gnly agent who had access
to ABIDIAN's apartment, that he, NOSENKC. had personally
briefed her on the application of metka, and that he was
sure that ARBIDIAN'’s letters were defected by means of muetka.
From a CIA debriefing of ASIDIAN, however. it eppeats that
FEBOROVICH did not begin working as ABIDIAN'S maid until
some time in July 1961, whereas ARIDIAN mailed his first
letter in “oscow on 1 April 1961 and “is second Vetter on
2 July 1961. ABIDIAN's third letter was mailed on 1 Septcm-
ber 196], after FELOROVICH began to work tor him.

i. Reporting on ABIDIAN’s Visit to the Pushkin Street Dead
Drop ae ee

NOSENKO's account of the visit by ABIDIAN to the
PENKOVSKIY déad drop site on Pushkin Street in Mosocw is
described in cetarl on Pages 231-225. In summary, NGS ENKO
reported that at the end of 1560 or early 1961 KGB surveil-
lance followed ABIDIAN from the U.S, Embassy to Pushkin
Street, where ABIDIAN was noted to enter a residential building.
Upon exanination it was decided that this was a likely
dead drop site, and a stationary surveillance post was as-
signed to watch it. After three months, since nothing sus-
picious had beep noted, this post was renoved. jne true
significance of the location did not become known to the
KGB until after the arrest of PENKOVSKIY in 1962. NOSENZO
said he was still in the U.S. Embassy Section ard was ABIDIAN's
case officer when this event took place. He heard of it |
while sitting in KOVSHUK's office on the day it haprened.
visited the site the following day with V. KOZLGV (Chief of
the Anericen Department of the KGB Surveillance firectorate),
placed the original surveillance rcport in ABIDIAN'S Zile,
and discussed the results of the stationary post with KOZLOV
on an almost daily basis during the first monti ard periodi-
celly thereafter until the post was removed. It was ECZLOV
whe told NOSENKO that after threé suonths the stationary

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surverllance had been discontinacd. NOSTNYO did net tell
CIA about this iscident in 1362, he said, because ae krew
that the watch Lad bein Ciscontinsed and thet notning suse
picious had been notcd; therefore, he thought the ane ieent
would not nave been of futerest to american Intelligence.

NOSLNEO has stressed that ALIDIA™ $35 vader special
surveillance by at least tvo surveiliscce teams at Bil tines
ang that, oa the asy he virtied Pushkin Street. SLILIAN vas
under cuntinucus watch froma the gonert he left ibe tabagsy
NOSENSG has teen able to pive a detrilece descriotion of
ABILIAS’6 covezent to the dead deep site.

inspite the special eurveidlasee coverage of ADIDIAS,
NOSENKU Shia, he 88s unaware of avy unusual “tovements UF
ABIDIAN during tne days ammedirately preceding his visit
1o Fusakin Street. SOSENKU said tha: he knew definitely
that surveillance had rcported nothing unusual during this
period and that ne was Sure ASIDIAN had not cluded the sur-
veilia:ce at any time during it. According to CIA records,
three cays before ABLUTAN wont to Fushxin Street in response
to indications tnat tne dead drop had beer loaded. ABIDIAN
left tne U.S. Embassy in his private car for Spastu ifouse
at about nine o'clock in_the evening: at about two o'clock
the next :.orning he and GARELER [CIA Chief of Station) went
in SBILIAN's car to check the telephore pole fer the signal
PENKOVSKLY was to leave us part of his signal that the drop
had been loaded. Two days before ABIDIAS went to Fushein
Street ke drove nis car to the apartment of Air Force Captain
DAVISGN; he again checked the telephone pole from & wisdow
in the apartzent and then valked by it on Poot. SOSENKO
identified GARULER Las aU.s. navel officer but not as 8 CIA
enployee (see above),

Asked why. in his opinion, ABILIAN went to Fushkin
Street at the tite he did, XCSENKO replied that in about
peu an Anerican ivuurist or delegation mexber had gone tu
this address. It was the "opinion of the Secure Cuief
Directorate” that thas American had selected the site as a@
dead drop lucetion, end that ASIDIAN wert tnere serely
to check the suitability of the site for this purpose. In
fact, ABIDIAN scut to Pushkin Street in respanee to what

appeared to be & prearrenged telephone Signal froa PENKOVSa«l=

signalling that we had lnaded the dead crup there. It has
been confirmed that FZNKOVSEKIY did not give this signal

and, Lecause of the circumstances and type of signal given, |
the possibility of coincidence 2a5s been ruled cut. CIA has
therefore concluded that the signal came from the «KGB.

The Pusnkin Street dead drop site was proposed by
PENKOVSKIY himself in the August 1960 Letter through which
he initially contacted CIA, There 18 110 record that a
“tourist or delegation neuber" visited this eddress, The
only known visit3 by Anericans to the building on Fusbkin
Street--the only ones having any connection with i¢s use
as a desd drop. locatica--occurred on 12 November and 4
Decenber 1960 when the CIA officer MAHONEY checked the
ecdress from cutside, and on 21 January 1261 vhen MAHONEY
entered the building asd dhecked the specific Iscation of
the dead drop. AAHONEY is known to have been identified
to the KGB as a CYA officer before arziving in “oscow ard
was tke target of heavy surveiliance throughout ris tour.
(NOSEXKO did not know about MAHONEY or nis CIA status.)

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724.

NOSENKO’s cate of “Late B60 or carly 186U" 18 incorrect,
almost exactly by a year. XCSENXKO said he tucned ABIDIAN's
file over to GKYAANOV about 28 Veceader 1296), ABIDOIAN
cheeked the Fushkin Street dead drop en 20 Cecember 1961.
NOSEXAKAO hes described his gerticipatio:. in ai approach 10
the American touriet W.E, JOHNSON as happening ' ‘right after
returnirg to the Tourist Departgent in 1962." Becevee
XOSENKO's participation in thig cese vas confirned by SOUNSON.
and because the approach to JOHSSCN took place on 53 January
1262 (:e reported it to the U.S. Favassy at once), it car
be said with certainty that NSOSENKO's ertire story of his
own participation in the surveillence of the Pushkin Street
dead drop sitc is false. NCSENKO: (a) could not have
visited the dead drop site with KCZLOV (who in any event
was not in Moscow at the tise); (b)} could rot have placed
the original surveillance report in ABIDIAN's file,
which GRYAZXOV held as of 28 December 1961; (c)} could not
have received alaust daily reports from KOZLOV for about a
month and periodic reports thereafter; and (d) could not
have neglected to tell CIA of ABIDIAN's visit to the drdp
in 1962 on grounds that the surveillance of Pushkin Street
had been discontinued after three months without anything
suspicivis boirg noted. (NOSENKO was in Geneva on 15 March
1962, only two and a half months after ABIDIAN checked the
deed drop.)

NOSENKO has refused ty admit that he lied avout his
part in this incident. The page containing true contradic-
tions listed in the preceding paragraph was the only poge of
a “protocol” waich NOSENKO refused to sign during the hostile
interrogations of early 1965. In October 1950, snen he was
again asked whether he went to the Pu:hkin Street dead
drop site with KOZLOV, NOSENKO said that he could noi remea-
ber whether he had gone there at all.

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. 725.

j- Responsibility ot Supervising Military Attache %perations
On 29 January 1965 NOSEXEKO told his interrogator that

for the first five or six months of 1960, immediatoly after _

transferring to tke U.S. Embassy Section and as part of his
responsibilities as its Deputy Chief, he supervised Second
Chief Directorate activities against American service at-
taches tn ¥oscow. Ey this.he meant, NOSEXKO said, that. when
GAVRILEXKO (the case officer for Air Force Attaches),
KURILENKO (Army Attaches), or BELOCLAZOV (Naval Attaches and
Marines) had any questions or reports to submit, they would
coze to him rather than to KOVSHUK, the Chief of the section,
After about six months he wag relieved of this duty because
his other duties did not allow sufficient time for this
function and because it was considered more suitable that
ALESHIN, recently assigned to the American Department as
Deputy Chief, be given this responsibility.

NOSENKO had previously been questioned in detail on
his resmesibilities in the U.S. Embassy Section, and had never
before mentioned this one. SOSENKO told CI. in June 1964
that when he reported for duty tn the U.S, Embassy Section
ip January 1960, DRANOVY was the responsible case officer for
the Naval Attaches and Marines. Soon after his own arrival,
NOSENKO said, DRANOV was transferred from the section and
his reeponsibilities were taken over by BELOGLAZOV, who had
earlier been as=i:tting DRANOV against these targets.

NOSENKO said on 20 October 1966 that immediately upon,
or at the latest a few weeks after, arriving in the U.S.
Embassy Section, he went on leave for a month. Either
immediately before or right after this leave KOVSHUK told
him that he would be responsible for activities against
the Naval Attaches, DHANOV was retiring and gave NOSENKO
the files on Naval and Warine personnel. This was NOSENKO's
first mention either of the leave period in early 1960 or
of having had case officer responsibilities for personnel
of the Naval Attache's office in sfoscow. (At the same time
1960)" that he had lied about going on leave in November
1960.

NOSENKO was reminded on 25 October 1966 that he had
said in 1965 that in 1960 he was supervisor of operations
against all U.S. service attache personnel. NOSENKO re-
plied: "I took the files only on the Navy, but I was working
on [supervising] all of thea.”

NOSENKO has never volunteered details of specific
operational activity he handled as the case officer for U.S.
Naval Attaches or supervisor of operations against all. .
attaches in early 1960. He said that Marine Colonel DULACKI's
contact with (or attempt recruit) the Indonesian KGB agent
which he has described in detail (see Page 488)
after he was relieved of these functions.

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k. DY to Bulgaria and the LUNT Case

In the spring of 1961, NOSENKO said, four months after
returning from Cuba, he was told unexpectedly that in. about —:—.-
a week's time he would leave for Bulgaria to consult with :
the American Departuent of the Bulgarian MVR concerning
operations against the American Legation in Sofia (Pages
279-283). NOSENKO flew to Sofia in early April 1961, where
he was met by A.S. KOZLGV, an advisor there and a former
employee of the Second Chief Directorate whom NOSENKO had
known at KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO remained in Bulgaria
until about the niddle cf May. While there he discussed
both genera) matters and particular cases with the Bul- j
garians, gave several lectures on operations against Ameri- }
Can installations and personnel as well as against tourists, -
and finally directed the successful honosexual operation
against the American Professor LUST. .

wen ee ee

Aside from being told that he would be advising the
Bulgarian service cn operations against Americans at the . ;
Legation in Sofia, NOSENKO apparently received no preparae ae
tion for this trip. He said in answer to specific questions \
that nobody told him what he was sunposed to discuss with:
the Bulgarians, that he did not meet with the Bulgarian
liaison representatives in Moscow before leaving, and that
he knew nothing of the organization, personnel, area of
responsibility, or problems of the American Department of
the Bulgarian service before arriving in Sofia.

NOSENKO was selected for this mission despite the fact
that he was extremely busy with his duties in the U.S. Embassy
Sectien (see above discussion of his responsibilities for

code clerks, ABIDIAN, and the military attaches) and despite

the fact that KOZLOV was permanently assigned as an advisor
in Sofia. NOSENKO described KOZLOV in another context as a
“"yery experienced officer” and has said that KOZLOV was. Chief
of the American Departeent until 1953 and then from June 1955
until sometime in 1958 was Deputy Chief of the Tourist De-
partment, Second Chief Directorate. (KOZLOV, assisted by .
KOSENKO, had recruited BUPRGI in June 1956.) Asked why KOZLOV
could not have advised the Bulgarians, NOSENKO said that he
was too busy advising on higher levels and had been away

from active operations in Moscow too long. .

ere eee een ae

NOSENKO gave only a general description of his duties
as an advisor on operations against the American Legation.
On the other hand,:he accidentally became involved in a hono- .
sexual entrapment operation against an American tourist who
was visiting Bulgaria, and he has described this operation
in considerable detail. (NOSENKO's previous speciality was
tourist operations, particularly those involving homosexual
compromise.)

NOSENKO's story about his role in the LUNT case changed
greatly between 1962 and 1964, During the first meeting ~
series he’ described in detail how he set the operation up .
and what he said to LUST when he personally confronted the
American with the evidence. Since defecting in 1964, how-
ever, NOSENKO has said that he took no personal part in the
approach itself, that he remained in his office, and that he
merely advised how to set it up. (A comparison of his account
and that of LUNT indicates that he was not on the scene at
the time.)

cramming ardent

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727.

“ KOSENKO said that the Bulgarian service tecsne a: are
of LUNT's honosexual tendencies only after he ¢aw LUNT's)

name or heatiit mentioned; he recognized the name as that..of

a professor. who had been assessed as a homosexual when

%
carlier visiting Moscow, and traces with the KGR Second Chicf
Directorate conritmed that this was the same man. In state-
ments rade to U.S. authorities after the approach, LUNT said
he had had horosexual relaticns at least five difrerent times

with a Bulgarian during an earlier trip to Sofia. LUNT
gave this Rulgarian travellers’ checks, which the latter
planned to sell cn the biacknarket, was on one occasion
stopped on the sireet with nin by a Sulyxarian civil pelice-
man, and corresponded with him in the interim between his

first visit and the one during which the arproach tock place.
LUNT had written the BuJgsrian hemosexual that he was retyrning

to Sofia tefore arriviny on the second occasion.

NGSENKO said that’ in October 1960 he was zssicned to
accompany a delegation of autonctive speciaiists cn a visit
to the United States but thit when this trin was ceccelled,
he went on FLY to Cuba (Jages 274-278). After he had com-
pleted arrangements for his passport and had submitted his
true name to the U.S. Embassy for a visa, the Soviets were
informed by U.S. authorities that the delegation could not
then be accepted in the United States. At about the same
time, a delegation of nickel industry experts was being

readied for departure to Cuba. At first, NOSEN"G explained,

it was not considered necessary for a security officer to
accompany this delegation to a friendly country, tut ar the

last roment, two days before the delewation was scheduled to

leave Moscow, the Central Committee of the Comsunist Party
demanded that such an officer go along. Because there was
no time to do otherwise, NOSENKO was chosen for this job

since he already had a valid passport and authorization. to
travel abroad. Visa arrangements were made for the transit

countrics and NOSENKO left with the delegation, returning to

Moscow in mid- or late December 1960.

NOSENKO's U.S. visa request submitted to the U.S. Em-

bassy in Moscow on 29 October 1960 was his first use of this

name in connection with travel aoroad. (He travelled to

England in 1987 and 1958 as NIKOLAYEV, NOSENKO said. because

he had used this name with Eritish citizens ®

in the Soviet Union; a5 ‘aa Suspected ot 0
ligence officer, NOSENKO was exposed under this identity.
He applied for U.S. entry: under true name, however, cGespite
the fact that he had also used the NIXOLAYEV naxe with
Americans; one of them was FRIPPEL who, according to the

CHEREPANOV papers and one other source, was suspected by the

KGB to be an American intelligence agent. NCSENKO further
explained that he could not use the name NIKOLAYEV because
the automotive delegation cover he planned to use in the
United States conflicted with the sports/cultural cover he
had used in Great Britain, and the KGB feared that this.
would be ncticed «hen the American and British services ex-

changed notes. The proposed automotive cover, however, con-

flicts in the same way with the Ministry of Foreizn Affairs

cover NOSENKO used, again under true nane, in Geneva in 1962.

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NOSEXKO said that the decision to send him to Cuba
was made two days before the delegation left Moscow because
a security officer was required ard he happened to have a8
passport and authorization to travel. ~The delegation left-—-
Moscuw on 15 November 1960, acd therefore ‘this cecision
was reached on 13 November or thereabouts. NOSEXKO, who
had been transferred to the U.S. Enbassy. Section in order
to supervise and revitalize operations against code clerks,
the Section's most important recruitment target, consequently
left Moscow on the day that HORONE also departed by train
for Warsaw and at a time that his subordizate KOSOLAPOY was
in Helsinki (12-16 Novenber 1960), apparently in connection

_ with an operation against John GARLAND.

NOSENKO has given widely divergent accounts of the
purpose of his assignment to Cuba. In 1962 he related in
detail how he had been sent to investigate how the Cuban—
intelligence service was operating against Americans sta=-
tioned in Havana, particularly intelligence officers. and
described what he did to fulfill this mission. Since 1964,
however, NOSEIKO has claimed merely to have been the security
officer with the delegation.

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729.

1. Personal Handiirg of Agents

When NOSENKO transterred from the Tourist Department
to the American Departneat, he took along a number of the
agents he had used in tourist operations witb tim: YEFREWOV
and VOLKOV, FRIPPEL, DMITRIYEV,. and RYTOVA.. Durirg this
period he also handled LEVINA, @ Librerian and language
teacher at the U.S, Enbassy who was turned over to him by

“YS. Embassy Section case officer WASSYA in 1960; and

PREISFRELND and degree who were used in code clerk opera-
tions. These agents and NOSENKO's handling of them are dis-
cussed below.

(i) YEFREOV and VOLKOV |

NOSENKO continued to mect with these to homosexual
sgents during his two years as Deputy Chief of tte section.
He did not use ther in any way, however, according to his
geecount. The ocly contact of the tzo known to CIA was B
mocting in 1961 with BARRETT. In 1999, while in Moscow and
a Cl2 agent, BARRETT was compremised vy YEFRE!MOV and VOLKOY:
in 1961, srortly after an upparently chance neering with
then, BARRETT ves recruited by the KGZ on the basis of the
materials obtained in 1959, NOSENDO deserited the compro-
sise cf BARRETT in 1959 and knew that he had been recruited
in 1961. He did not know of BARRETT's contacts Fith YEFRE-
WOV and YOLKOV in 1961.

(11) FRIPPEL

XOSENKO said he continued to handle FRIPFEL during the
19Gu-1961. period, despite the fact that he sever provided
anything of value, because he and CHELNOKOV (the Chief of
the Tourist Department who was always present at these
meetings) “kept hoping he would give something.” FRIPPEL
left the Sovict Union in January 1961, but NOSENKO continued
to be registered as his case officer.

(iii) DMITRIYEV

DWITRIYEV, 8 specialist on Japan and Thailand who
spoke Japanese and English, had teen NOSENKO's agent during
the 1955-1960 period. DUITRIYEV was then eaployed by the
Japanese Exhibition in Moscow, and NOSENKO did not indicate
how he was used in tourist operatious. NOSENXO did not
describe any operational use of hin in 1960 or 1961.

(iv) aAYTOVA

RYTOVA was NOSENKO's agent in the Tourist Depsrtnent
after 1956 or 1957, at which tize she was employed at the
Russian Permancnt Exhibit in Moscow. An English speaker,
she reported any interesting information concerning visitors
to the exhibition. NOSENKO has not referred to any KGB opere-
tions in Moscow in which she participated during his service
there.

(v) LEVINA
LEVIXA worked as a language teacher and librarian at

the American Enbassy and NOSENKO handled her because she
had a number of code clerks in her language classes. He

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730.

eet vith PEVINA @ cusher of times, but she never reportcd
anything interesting ard ves never uned directly in opere-

tions involving tie Anericans. ‘She 28 fired froa the ;
Enbassy ut the end of 1960 or early 1951.

(vi) Jochen PREISFREUND

As described in Pages 173-1481 and discussed above,
PREISFREUND was, NOSENKO said, recruited by KOVSHUK in 19860
ard was bandied b¥ NCSENKO in the operation against Janes
STORSBERG. Coth NOSENKO and PREISFREUND said thrt this vas
the only operation in which he took part. NOSENKO suggested '
to CIA that PREISFREUND would be able to attest to his . as
description of this case, and CIA interviewed PREISFREUND .
in Helsinki. and Stockhola during the sunmer of 1965. PREIS- =. -
FREUND's account generally agreed with SOSENKO's ond he was CC
able to supply a considerable amount of personeiity and
background information concerning his former case officer.
From PREISFREUND's menner during these interviers, the nature
of his responses and statements, and his actions after the
interviews were completed, there was ho reesonshle doubt
that ho remaincd under KGB control while meeting the CIA
representatives.

(vii)

(KGB cryptonyn "“SARDAR") was recruited by NOSEN=
KO in 196l. A Syrian Beye Wai in Moscow, @7ais4
was first targetted against waerice House in Geacral, but
was chen used only in the development operation against
ZUIUS, the successor to James STGHKSLERG as nilitery code
> clerk in Moscow, @2@Eamet and developed ZUJUS, but nothing
had come of the operetion at the tine NOSZNKO transferred
fron the American Department. No other use was made of this
agent and there was ho approach to ZUJUS. NOSENKO first
sugeested that CIA actempt a “false flag’ recruitcent of
sing his (NOSENKO'§) name for thés purpose; he pro -
vided CIA with QRamgearte ogee min Danascus 50 that
contact could be established, Jater NOSENKO said that
: like PREISFREUND, could verify NOSENKO'S position as his
; handler in the ZUJUS operation (Pages 209-212). CIA inter-
: viewed ZUJUS, who vaguely recalled having ret QE ick
i recall his name and denied that his relationship ¥
was as close as NOSENKO reported. sO

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731. .

a. -Transfer to the Tourist Department

Some time in the fall of 1961, NOSENKO said, he heard
of GRIBANOV's decision to promote himto the position of

Deputy Chief of the eatire Amcrican-Department. NOSENKO, —-. -

however, knew that his chief and friend KOVSHU* wanted the
job. and that FEDOSEYEV (Chief of the Department) also favored
KOVSHUK for this position. Realizing that his own appoint-
ment would therefore place him in a difficult position and
wishing to avoid this, NOSENKO spoke to the Chief of the
Tourist Department, CHELNOKOV, about returnirg there. At
CHELNOKOV's suggestion, NOSENKO went to GRIBANOV with the
request to be returned to the Tourist Department as Chief |
of the American Tourist Section, with the understanding that
he woulaé be made Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department

upon the retirement of the incumbent. BALDIN, in July 1962.
To this GRIBANOV agreed. NOSENKO said that GRIBANOV did

- not discuss with himhis reasons for wanting to appoint hin

Deputy Chief of the American Department or for appointing
him Chief of the American Tourist Section, nor did he discuss
with NOSENFKO his personal requirements for these positions.
On one occasion, in early 1965, NOSENKO said that it was
because GRIBANOV "thought I was a tough guy, a good case
officer. In 1959 I saw him often and was involved ir a lot.
of questiors which were reported to him." According to

his most recent version, NOSENKO was officially transferred
from the American Départment at the end of December 1951
and reported for duty in the Tourist Department on about

3 January 1962. .

KOVSHUK, who was also a candidate for the job as Reputy
Chief of the American Department, had earlier held this po-
sition, according to NOSENKO and GOLITSYN. He had been per-
sonally involved in many of the nore significant American
Department operations during the previous decade. These in-
cluded the recruitments of RIODES and SMITH (the latter one
of NOSENKO's most inportant leads, according to KOSENKO) ;
the handling of ‘SHAPIRO; the attempts to recruit. STORSBERG, .

STONE, and MANNHEIM; the development of the CIA officer
WINT:
“the

ERS;] acd the interrogation of LANGELLE in connection with

“POPOV arrest.

By contrast, GRIBANOV's original candidate forethe job,
NOSENKO, was present when KOZLOY recruited BUPGI;and himself
recruited EARRIS)and five homosexual tourists who visited
the Soviet Union in 1959: Furthermore, NOSENKO's perfor-
mance as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy Section. as he
admitted under interrogation, was “not good."

; NOSENKO has given many contradictory dates for his
transfer to the Tourist Department. In 1962 NOSENKO said

at various times that this took place in January 1962 and

in February 1962: in 1964 he timed the transfer as falling
some time between 15 and 20 January 1962; and in February
1965 he arrived at the date of 2 or 3 January 1962, after
it was pointed out that he appeared in the approach to W.E.
JOHNSON on 5 January: (On this basis, he said that the
official order was issued about 25 December 1961 and that
he turned over his files to his successor GRYAZNOV several
days later.) NOSENKO contradicted this latter estimate.
however, by saying that he was in the U.S. Embassy Section
for the entire period of the three-month surveillance of

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732.

the Pushkin Street dead drop, i-e., until late March 1962,
and by his insistence that he had returned to the Tourist
Department by the time GOLITSYN defected; ho placed this on |
15 January 1962 and refused to belleve the correct date of
15 December 1961. .

p. Remarks

For no single responsibility has NOSENKO gubstantiated
his alleged service as Deputy Chief of the U.S. Embassy
Section in the vears 1960-1961. His statements about the
appointment to and transfer from this position have been
inconsistent; his comparatively narrow experience and his
acknowledged falsehoods about a personal relationship with
the Chief of the KGE Second Chief Directorate, GRIBANOV,
dispel the likelihcod that these personnel assignoents were
made in the way he claims. Repeatedly he has becn contra-
dictory about his activities during this two-year period,
shifting his story to suit the occasion and ignoring how
each succeeding version made all of his claizs increasingly
incredible. The Limited extent of NOSENKO's information
betrays a lack of familiarity with details on the duties,
targets, and most of the cperations which he has ascribed
to hinself; in a certain few instances, however, such as
his description of ABIDIAN‘s route to the Pushkin Street dead
drop, he has recounted events just as they are known from
other sources to have occurred. Nevertheless, where col-
lateral information has covered the few subjects on which
he provided details, it has almost invarlably contradicted
him and showed hin to be ignorant of significant facts.

The reporting by NOSENKO thus was so superficial, so in-
conplsute, and so demonstrably erroneous as to suggest_without_
. reservation that he never eerved as an. officer. in the_U.S._.

Embassy Séction, much less a3_its Deputy.Chief.. All avail-
‘able evidence, excluding that from certain Soviets who were
CIA and Fal sources (see Parts VIII.H. and VII,1. below),

combines to formulate this conclusion.

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& 7. Tourist Department (1962-1964)
Fe :
ba a. Introducticn t
: NOSLNKO ajreed during the interrogations at the beginning
of 1965 that he must have reported for duty as Chief of the -
; - American Tourist Section on about 3 January 1962.* In this t
‘ job he was responsible for pianning and supervising KGB acti-
& vities against all tourists of American, British, and Canadian
3t

nationalities arriving in the USSR, and his duties also encom-
passed preparations for the coming tourist season (Pages 225-
287).

evens

In July 1962, in conformity with GRIDANUV's intentions,
NOSENKO was promoted to the position of Deputy Chief of the
entire Tourist Department; it had a table of organization of
close to 100 staff officers, was responsible for handling opeta~
tions against all tourists to the Soviet Union, and maintzined
the facilities used in these operations. A year later NOSENKO
received the title of First Deputy Chief of the Departnert, a
“paper” promoticn as there was no other deputy. During this
pericd in the Tourist Department, in addition to his supervi-
sory duties (concerning which he has not been questioned in
detail), NOSENKO took personal part in approaches to several
tourists, organized and directed the arrest of an American
tourist on homosexual charges, and met with a number of agents.
It was his senior supervisory position that involved him in two '
of the most widely publicized cases of this pericd, the arrest
of BARGHOORN. and the case of OSWALD.

iia duina ane

CF

b. Absences from Moscow:

During his two years in the Tourist Department, NOSENKO
was available to perform his assigned duties only part of the
time. -After arriving in the American Tourist Section and after
‘the approach to JOHNSON on 5 January 1562, NOSENKO spent sev-
eral weeks “getting the feel" of things by talking to case offi-
cers, reviewing reports of the section's activities during the
previous tvo years, and discussing plans for the up-coming tour-
ist season. In mid-February he began preparations for his assign-

enn er

: ment to Geneva with the Disarmament Delegation. NOSENKO has wt ee

| said that this involved discussions with the Eleventh Depart- —_ .

i ment of the Second Chief Directorate, responsible for arranging “ST 7 ;
for security coverage of Soviet delegations going abroad, as i &

well as with the case officers responsible for the investigation a
of suspected American agent SIIAKHOV. NOSENKO said that he did~ i

this on a part-time basis in addition to his regular duties,

but has noted in another context that these preparations required
sufficient time to make it impossible for him to take a personal '

part in the recruitment of BIENSTOCK in February 1962. On

15 March 1962, NOSENKO arrived in Geneva, remaining there with
the delegation until 15 June, when he left Geneva by train to
return to Moscow to reassume his duties as Chief of Section.

(He said that he had no deputy chief in this position, and it

is unclear who performed these functions in his absence.) Thus,
according to NGSENKO's account, of the six months he was Chief

*—This date was settled upon after he acknowledged that his
approach to the American tourist W.E. JOHNSON must have
occurred on 5 January, as CIA records show.

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of the American Tourist Section, he was in Monstow only three |
months and for much of this time was involved in breaking in
on his new job or in preparing for his temporury assignment ;
Chrocds NOSEUKO said ne hed “no accomplishments” in this | F
period. a : H
!
j
|

In the fall of 1962, NOSENKO went on leave for a inonth in|
Sochi with his wife end mother. fOSENKO has estimated that 31x
months of 1963 were spent cn various temporary assignments in
the Soviet Union outside cf Moscow, plus a one-month's vacation
in 153. From 15 June 1962 to ns arrival in Geneva on 19 Janu-
ary 1964, a period of 18 months, GSENKO was aksent from KGS
Hezdquarters for eight months. Tres in the period 1962-63,
holding supervisory pysitions, NOSEIKO was absent or "reading
in" for about 13 months, cr akout SO percent of the time.

ce. Personal _Participal.ioz in Cperaczons
HOSENXO had dairect operational corzact with three Americans
during 1962 and i963. Two of these (the approach to JOHNSCN
and the interrogation o: haRshHOOHs) were unusual in that they
were provocations without any attempt to recruit the target;
NOSEVKO could nane no cther examples of. such operations, In
poth cases, the victim of the provccation has verified NOSENKO's
presence. The third cate, the recruitment approach to BRAUNS,
was unsuccessful. Additionally, NOSENKO supervised the homo-
sexual compromise of KCTEN, who was closely tied in with atom
is % sensitive source and related.

(1) The W.E. JCHNSON Prevovaticon

JOHNSON (Pages 289-293), NOSENKO said, was in Moscow as
a tourist in early January 1962. ard was considered for recruit-
ment, but a cecision was made thet he was net worth the effort
as he had no access to Classified aateriats and lived too far \

; from the KGB Legal Residencies in #ashington and New York City. i

(JCHNSON's home was in Texas.) Severai days after this deci-

: sion was made, postal intercepts showed tnat JCHNSON was writing
abusive letters concerning tne Soviet Union. They were "so
bitter" and critical that the KGi decided that something had
to be done to stop him. At about the sane time the KGB received i
an indication that JOHNZON was a roemosexual, and it was decided gee
to entrap him on this basis and force him to promise not to :

i write any more letters or criticize the USSR in articles when foe

; he returned to the United States. The compromise was effected

by use of NOSENK9O'Ss homosexual agents, and NCSENKO was able to ;

i

describe the confrortation scene, his second meeting with JOHN-—°
SON; and JOKNSON's frigntened telephone call to the u.S. Enkassy
reporting that NOSENKO had recontacted hin.

NOSENKO told CIA in June 1962 that he had taken part in
this operation “in January.” When he contacted CIA in Geneva
: in 1964 he had a scrap of paper on which was noted JOHNSON's _
i name and the date “5 January 1962." This was the actual date
: of the approach, but NOSENKO insisted that the date bore no
relationship to the name, and that the approach to JOHNSON took

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place in the summer of 1962, a fact he recalled distinctly be-
cauge he wore no overcoat. It was only when confronted with
official U.S. records that NOSENKO agreed in early 1965 that
the apprcach was in January and recalled that it was made
immediately after NOSENKO returned to the Tourist Department. *

NOSENKO said that when JOHNSON first arrived in Moscow
there was consideration of recruiting him, but that there was
a decision against this as he was of little intelligence value.
Phen JOHNSON mailed insulting letters which were picked up
through postal intecept. “About the same time there were indi~
cationg of homosexuality. Then the operation was mounted

‘against him. This implies a very tight time schedule. JOHNSON

arrived in Moscow on 3) December 196); NOSENKO said he reported
for duty as Section Chief on 3 January 1962; JOHNSON reported
his first contact with NOSENKO'’s homosexual agent VOLKOV the
evening of 4 January; and the approach by NOSENKO was on 5 Janu-

ary.’

Although NOSENKO impl$ed in 1962 that his homosexual agents
VOLKOV and YEFREMOV: were the ones who originally determined

JouNson "S| homosexuality, he said in 1964 only that there were
“"gigns.”

NOSENKO did not know what these indications were or
where they came fron. JOHNSON reported that he firet met the
agent VOLKOV on the evening of 4 January when the latter sat
down at his restaurant table; on this same occasion VOLKOV in-
vited JOHNSON to his hotel room the next day. The fact that
VOLKOV joined JOHNSON uninvited anc set him up for the approach
without leaving the table suggests that there had, in fact,
been signs of his homosexuality beforenand and that operational

plans had been laid by this time.

NOSENKO has described the caution taken in other homosexual
entrapment cases and has named several which were called off
because of a risk of scandal. It is, therefore, unusual that
the KGB would take this risk merely to force JOHNSON, an

American and a Baptist minister, to stop writing insulting let-

ters and articles.

NOSENKO did not know why he became involved in this opera-

- tion the’day after he reported for duty in the senior position

of Section Chief. He said only that BOBKOV, a Deputy Chief of
the Skcond Chief Directorate, told him to do it. During his
talks with JOHNSON, NOSENKO introduced himself to JOHNSON as
*“Georgiy Ivanovich NIKOLAYEV,"” (rendered by JOHNSON as NIKOLOV)

the "Chief of Police."
({i}) ‘The BARGHOORN Provocation-Arrest

. The arrest of Professor BARGHOORN (Pages 304-309) took
place at the end of October 1963, at the time NOSENKO said he
was First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department. NOSENKO has

Slow NOSENKO'’S self-stated and confirmed participation in a
Tourist Department operation on 5 January 1962 carries
lications for his account of ABIDIAN's visit to the

_ PENKOVSKIY dead drop is Giscussed above.

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described in cetail the selection of BA2SHOGPN as & hestege for
IVANOV (the KGB officer arrested chortiy before in New York
City as a result of @ BS bor ha: Pei et } the planning
of the provocation, Oct & Seo be ing BAIGHDORN
which were not related to the provocation, BANGHOORN's arrest
in Moscow, and the early stag?s of his interrogetion, Except
for sone variaticn in datcs, MOSENKO'& accounta of BARGHOD2I's
movements and of;the sequence of events in the provocation~
arrest matched that of BARGIHOOPR!. This case is in two ways
gimilar to the approach to W.E. JOUNSON: It was an operation
in which there wag_no thought of recruitment, and BARGHCOM was

able to identify NOSENKO as a perticipant.

BARGHOORN reported that the day after his arrest he was
questioned by the same officer who had interrogated him the
evening before abcut the "compromising materials" which had
been planted on hin. With this officer on this one occasion
was his “chief,” whom PARGHOORN subsequently identified by photo-
graph as NOSENKO. HOSE:NKO has said that he was tolduby the
Chief of the Tourist Department that GRIBANOV wanted him (NOSENKO)
present in the interrogation room it the time when BARGHOOPN
admitted that he had the. conpromising information in his posses~
pion at the time cf arrest. NOSENKO did not knew why his pir-
ticular presence was needed or desired, tut he complied deszite
the fact that he did not want to reveal hig face to BARGHOOPN
as he kncw BARGHOORN would be released. NOSENKO said that he
stayed in the interrogation room only until the interrogating
officer secured this admission ana then he left. BARGHOORY
has reported that NOSENKO attended one of the interrogatica

sessions, that th:s session covered only biogrepnic and bacxground

matters, and that the cempromising documents ard his possession
of them had been discussed the previous evenirg, right after his
arrest.

In deseribing the planning of this provecaticn, NOSENKO
told CIA that the suggestion to provide SARGHOOEN came fren
GRIBANOV, who took the idea of arresting BARGHOORN to KGB Chair-
man SEMICHASTNYY, Dut did not divulge to him thet it would be.
based on provocation. Shis was on the day before the arrest.
SEMICHASTNYY agreed with the idea of the arrest ard secured
permission to carry it out from BREZHNEV, as KHRUSHCHEV was
out of Moscow at the time. Reliable scurces show, however,
that KHRUSKCHEV was in Mcscow on 30 October, the day when SEMI-~-
CHASTNYY allegedly called BREZHNEV, and was also there on 31
October, the day cf the arrest. BREZHNEV was not seen by
Westerners in Moscow from 29 October until 2 November 1963.

iii) The Approach to BRAUNS

NOSENKO said he personally approached the American tour-
ist BRAUNS (Pages 293-295) shortly after returning to Moscow
from Geneva in 1962. BRAUNS had lived in Leningrad until World
War II, had left with the fleeing Germans, and had eventually
settled in the United States, where he was 4 technician working
at an “interesting company making computers, adding machines,
or other instruments.” NOSENKO had originally instructed his

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subordinate KRUPNOV to handle the case, but KPRUPNOV was not able » :
to get anywhere with BRAUNS and in the middle of the approach : :
called NOSENKO fcr help. NOSEUKD went to the Mcscow Hotel where
KRUPNOV and BRAUNS were talking, and he eventually secured:
ERAUNS! agreement to cccuperate, against threat of imprison:cent
for treason on the basis of his wartime flight from the Soviet
Union. BRAUNS left Moscow the next day for Leningrad, and be-
: cause NOSENKO felt the recruitment was “shaky,” KRUPNOV was |
pent after him to consolidate the agreement. BPAUNS refused
- to gee KRUPNOV however, 80 again KOSENKO went to help him. It
was clear to NOSENKO, however, that BRAUNS was 8¢ frightened
that he would never work for the KGB; NOSCNKO thereupon decided
to terminate the case, and BRAUMS wad sent on his way. r-

NOSENKO could not recall his position at the time he approached ‘
BRAUNS, he did not know why SRAUNS had visited th. Soviet Unics, i
and he was unable to name any Soviet citizesrs with whom BrAUNS :
came into contact while in the USSR. BRAUNS, in fact,.had spent
almost a week in Moscow before the approacu was mace... During
thie time’he spent his days with an Inturist tour ard his even-
ings with an old girlfriend he had knows Cefore the war. She
had been writing to BRAUNS in the United States for about a year,
telling him of her unhappy marriage an@ itpendiry divorce.

ERAUNS had written her cf his intenzion to visit the USSR, and
che travelled specially from her hene in tenincrad to Moscow to
spend this time with hin.

According to the account given by BRAUNS, the man (NOSENKO,
acceréing to NOSENKO) who jeined him and his original interre=-
gator in Moscow was the person who first epproached him in Lenin-
grad. This suggests, i£ correct, that it was NOSENKO who was
sent there to consolidate the recruitment, not KRUPHOY. BRAUNS’
wag unable to-identify NOScNKO's photograpn but explained that
he was so frightened that he probably cculd not recognize any-
one involved. Other aspects of his story therefore may be ccn-
fused.

(iv) The Arrest of KOTEN

NOSENXO said he supervised the horosexual provecation anc
arrest of American tour guide KOTEN in 1963 and the develop-

‘e ments in the case were reported to him (Pages 292-303); he was .
not in face-te-face contact with KOTEN. NOSENKO explained that
KOTEN, a member or the CPUSA, had freguently visited the USSR
since the war, hed numerous suspicicus centacts there, and was °
considered possibly to be a “plant” (presumably of the FBI) ir :

he Copmunist Party. Prior to his arrival in-1963, @RERG ae i

: egal Residency reported thay KOTEN was in contac. ,

with an c=portant eesent in 3 that he was carrying

the addcess of relatives of this agent with Limon bis trip,

and that he intended to visit them. On this basis, it was

eonsidered that he might have the mission ef invescigatina LE

the (<9 the USS2. GF Ay PEPE SER be Ee De

15 rap’ Oe eee oes Da ak aE
SPATE AS it was suspectea iron e2ra.er trips that KOTEN
was a homosexual, the KGB planned to conpromise his, arrest oe
him, break him, and provide time for the GEE agent to make his “ o¥

escape from the United States. KOTEN was arrested, but the G#B

Se Conn

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agent refused to leave the United $
protested the arrest of one of its

tates, and wien the CPUSA
ROMDErS, KOTEN was released.

FKOTEN was 4 long-tine Cormanist, and there are no apparent
reasons why the KGB should doubt his loyalty. Nis homogexuality
was well-known to hig acquaintances within the CPUSA, and at ©
the time of his trip to the Soviet Union he was acting as a tour

uide for the New York firm “Afton Tours,” which is owned by
SVEKCHANSKIY. (NOSENKO said that SVENCHANSKIY, also a Conmunist,
was his. own agent at the time of KOTEN's ‘arrest.)

NOSENKO was able to give a consi
ing data on the "important gee agent”

This egent had been identified
m Rr wrEy Fe

oie

The fact that KOTEN had been arcested on chargas of homo-
sexuality was leaked by Inturist to press services two days
after the reported date of the arrest, resulting in wide pub-
licity in Western newspapers. (‘tha U.S. fmbassy was nc” noti-
fied officially until cwo days later.) There was no apparent
reascn fcr this extrenezy unusual step by the KG3, which can

2 assumed to manipulate Inturigt for operational support pur-

poses.

After the CPUSA had protested the action, KOTEN was re-
jeased {rom priscn. He was told that the incident was a mistake
which had been corrected, that he was free co go anywhcre he
wanted in the Soviet Union, and that he co..d return anytime.
see RHE the @fgpagert. has since repatriated to the Soviet

enon.

d. Agents Handled by HOSENKO

hen NOSENKO transferred from the U.S. Embassy Section to
the Tourist Department, he took with him the two homesexual
agents VOLKOV and YEFR=MOV, PREISFREUND, WGA and RYTOVA
(Pages 287-289). The homosexuals he used the day after his
return,’ in the operaticn against W.E. JOHNSON. This was their
first operational use since the fall of 1959; they were never
used again before being terminated at the end of 1962 or early
1963, NOSENKO said, because they were "too well known." PREIS~
FREUND was considered compromised to Emerican Intelligence
follcwing the cefection of GOLITSYN, so he also was never used
again, although NOSEKKO met him socially when PREISFPEUND re-
turned to Moscow on business trips as recently as 1963. During
the first part of 1962, on instructions from KOVSHUK and the

SENKO continued tc meet

with Be, who was still involved in the development of ZUJUS,
the Anerican code clerk. NOSENXO last saw GSeaiwR before going

to Geneva in March 1962; WEISS left ‘he Soviet Lnion to return

to Syria while NOSENKO was avay. RYTOVA, NOSENKO said, had
been his agent since 1956 or 1957. Some time in 1962 she moved
from her position as an instructor of Greek at the Institute

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of International Relations to a position in the school of the
CPSU Central Committee and ceased agent work. Alth.evgh she
was inactive, NOSZNKO continued to be registered as wer case
officer until 1964, when he defected. ;

(i) PRIPPEL
Having left his assignment in Moscow in early 1961, PRIPPEL

"(Pages 129-133° and’ Part Vi11.D.5.) returned several times to

the Soviet Union in 1962 and 1963. NOSENKO, who remained his
case officer although FRIPVEL now lived and worked in New York
City, met him each time. FRIPPEL said there were three such ~
occasions, in February 1962 when he met once with NOSENKO and
CHELNOKOV in Odessa, and two later times in Moscow and Odessa,
when NOSENKO came alone. NOSENKO denied that he met PRIPPEL

in Odessa in February 1962 with CHELNOKOV, but said that he met
twice with him alone after returning to Moscow from Geneva. ~
The first of these meetings was in the summer of 1962 when FRIP~
PEL was accompanying a group of American newspaper editors tour-
ing the Soviet Union, FRIPPEL gaid NOSENKO called briefly at
his hotel room to enquire what questions ‘the editors planned

to ask KHRUSHCHFY during 4 planned interview. When FRIPPEL-

’ gaid he did not know, NOSENKO departed and FRIPPEL later re-

ported that he did not see NOSENKO again on thia trip. (NOSENKO
gaid he called again after the interview to learn the “reactions”
of the editors.) The second meeting was in Odessa, when FRIPPEL,

_yisited the. Soviet Union as a guide on a tour ship. According

to FRIPPEL, it was on this occasion that NOSENKO apparently made
a phone call to ask permission to go aboard FRIPPEL's ship, and
it might have been at this meeting or the earlier one that
NOSENKO told him something of his personal background. (FRIPPEL
knew a considerable amount of information about NOSENKO's father
and family.) NOSENKO denied the possibility that he would have
to request permission to board the vessel and said that if he
had told FRIPPEL anything about himself, it was when! he was
drunk. Both FRIPPEL and NOSENKO agreed that FRIPPEL provided
no information of value during any of these meetings. .

(ii) SVENCHANSKTY

NOSENKO has cited SVENCHANSKIY, KGB cryptonym “ANOD,"” as
an example of the Second Chief Directorate's use of foreign
travel agents to signal the KGB when an interesting tourist is
about to visit the Soviet Union (Pages 295-298). SVENCHANSKIY
was recruited for this purpose, NOSENKO said, in 1961 and used
to send open-code signals to the Tourist Department by marking
visa applications whenever he spotted anything significant.
Some of SVENCHANSKIY's :signals had been, considered, NOSENKO
said, “of definite operational interest.” In September 1963,
NOSENKO took the case over from the previous handling officer,
NOSKOV, and his name was listed in SVENCHANSKIY's file as the
responsible officer. | .

NOSENKO first said that he had read SVENCHANSKIY's file
and then changed this to say that he had only skimmed it. He
met twice with his new agent, once in September 1963 and once
later in the year. On both occasions, NOSKOV was present.

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NOSENKO said that at the time SVENCHANSKLY #a3 recruited
in 1961 that, because SVENCHANSKIY was known *o have had con-
tacts with AMTORS in New York, there was some suspicion that
he mignt be an FBI agent. NOSENKO was unable to be more pre~
cise as to the basis for these suspicions and, when asked how
NOSKOV had resolvec them, was able to say only that NOSKOV
*felt" that SVENCHANSKIY was not an American agent.

NOSENKO knew little about SVENCHANSKIY's background from
the one-volume file kept on him in the Tourist Department: He
did know that SVENCHANSKIY was recruited in 1961 on the promise
of commercial favors, that he had 2t one tine been detected
in blackmarket transactions in the USSR, and that in addition
to his travel agency, SVENCHANSKIY ran a Russian-language book-
atcre in Chicago. FBI ana CIA records show that SVENCHANSKIY ~
has becn employed by a series of registered Soviet Government
organizations in the United States since the early 1930's,
that he was released from his position as a United Nations radio
officer broadcasting to the Soviet Union in 1952 when he failed
to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Comittee
concerning alleged subversive activity. and that both his travel
agency and his book store are affiliated with registered Sov-
jet agencies, Inturist and Mezhkniga. Allegation3 on file of
SVENCHANSKLY's Communist sympathies and probable Soviet espion-
age activities aate back to the Second World War. In August
1950, Harry GOLD linked SVENCHANSKIY to the Soviet espionage
network in the Unites g during the war. The FBI has re-

a : yi

: augmes vey meet «ee Tt Aes a ease one time been the
cenridential cecretary of GOLCS, the “director of Soviet espion-
age in the United States.” (NOSENKO knew that someone called
Sonya worked for SVENCHANSKIY in New York, but said that she

is not a KGB agent and was not the one who marked the visa

‘ applications.)

e. The OSWALD Investigation

As First Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department, NOSENKO —
said, he was directiy involved in the investigation of OSWALD 's
activities in Minsk which was ordered after the assassination
of President KENNEDY (eages 136-144 and Part VIII.D.5.). It
is from his role at this time and his reading of the Minsk KGB
file on OSWALD that NCSENKO derived his authority to state that
the KGB “washed its hands of OSWALD” after his attempted sui-
cide in the USSR, that there was no attempt to recruit either

- OSWALD or his wife, and that KGB interest in OSWALD while he

lived in Minsk was restricted to passive observation. .

f£. The CHEREPANOV Investigation

Part VIII.8.6.c. contains a discussion of the CHEREPANOV
ease, in which NOSENKO claims to have been involved in Novem
ber 1962 while Deputy Chief of the Tourist Department.

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74.

g- Remarks

Leaving aside NOSENKO’S unsubstantiated claims to super=
visory jobs in the Tourist Department in 1962-1953, when he
indicated he was absent from KGB Headquarters neazly half of
the time, bis persorsl rose ia operations and investigations
of the period appears artificg$4l in some instances and im-

lausible in others. KOSENKO’s knowlecge of the origins of
the JOHNSON ‘case is incomplete, the timing conflicts with other
activities attrabuted to himself, the expressed purpose of
tne compromise in unigue, and the outcomes seems to have little
consequence beyond enabling JOHNSON to confirm that NOSENKO
appeared in it. Althosgh BRAUIS may have been in a position
to corroborate NOSExKO's appearance in that operation, he has
rot done so and his staterents contradict NOSENKO on the part
the latter played. So too do the statements of BAPRGHOORN, who ‘ j
recognized NOSENKO ag a person who was seen briefly during the :
interrogation sessions; certain facts from other sources Con~
tradict NOSENKO on one important detail (KHRUSHCHEV’s presence
ir, Moscow) of the EARGHOORN arrest. explained as_a retaliation-
hostace acticn for events in a PS P apleten ;

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information on the bacagieued 2 cperation is
fragmentary, lacking evea the most impertant facts krown froz
‘several, mainly overt, scurces} his attendance at meetings
with SVENCHANSAIY: was confined to the two times when the -
original handler wes also present. The position of NOSENKO in
the FRIPPEL and OSWALD cases ig discussed in Part VIIT.D.5.
In summary, NOSENKO'Ss operational work was not commensurate
with that of a Section Chief and Deputy Department Chief, nor
with that of a case officer, regardless of rank. Where the
participation of NOSENKO in Tourist Department activities has
been or might be confirmed by other sources, it is therefore a
. wnproven that he was in a supervisory position in tne KGB or C__
that he was even a case officer. 7

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742 A

B. Examination of Other Aspects of NOSENKO's Biography

1. GB Awards and Ranks

a. Awards

At various times since contacting CIA in 1962, NOS EXNKO
described a series of awarcs and decorations which he received
over the years for his performance of duties in the Second Chief
Directorate (Pages 319-321). He claimed to have received the
Order of Lenin, the Order of the Red Star, and the Order of the
Red Banner; he said he received a special commendation from
KGB Chairman SEROV for his role in the BURGI recruitment and
the same award in 1959 for his recruitment of all of the Ameri:
can or British tourists recruited that year by the KGB (three
British and three American homosexuals). NOSENKO told of a
number of other commendations which he received--almost one a
year--for his “general good work." In October 1966 NOSENKO
said that he never received any awards for his KGB operational
performance, only a medal for satisfactery completion of 10
years of KGB service and a Red Army anniversary medal.

b. Ranks

NOSENKO's descriptions of his various rank promotions fol-
low a similar but more complicated pattern (Pages 322-326).
He has given two separate sets of circumstances for hfs .first
promotion, frem junior lieutenant to lieutenant. According to
the first of these, the one NOSENKO adnered to during 1964 and
1965, he was promoted to che rank of lieutenant while serving
in the Far East with the naval GRU at the beginning cf 1952.
NOSENKO explained chat the required time in grade is sometimes
cut in half for cfiicers serving at this undesirable post, and
that this is why he was promoted after only six months of
active duty. In 1966 NCSENKO said for the first time that he
aid rot enter on active duty until March 1951 and that his
promotion to lieutenant was in mid-1952, while stationed in
Sovetsk, on the Baltic. In all his accounts, HNOSENKO has said
that he entered the KGB with the -ank of lieutenant as this
had been his rank in the naval GRU.*

During his first meetings with CIA in Geneva during 1962
NOSENKO claimed then to be a KGB major and said that he had
already completed the necessary time in grade for a lieutenant
colonelcy. NOSENKO gave an apparently accurate description
of the structure of his salary as 6 major (so much for rank,
go much for longevity, etc.) and pointed out that he was fill-
ing a position (Chief of Section) normally held by a lieutenant
colonel. On contacting CIA again in 1964, NOSENKO claimed the
rank of lieutenant colonel. He supported this claim with the
TDY authorization issved for the CEEREPANOV search,**™. which

¥-— Se Part VIII.D.2. for a discussion of the likelihood that
NOSENKO served in the naval GRU.

*#* See Part VIII.B.?.c. for an analysis of the CHEREPANOV
case.

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gave NOSENKO's rank as lieutenant colone’. and was signed by
GRIBANOV himself and testified to it by his signature on the
“official biographical stetement" prepared in Frankfurt.

The first major change in NOSENKO's story of his promo-
ticns came during the interrogations of January 1965 wnen he
volunteered out of context and for no clear reason that he hed
never held the rank of major but rather, because of a scrics
of administrative slip-ups and GRIBANOV's advitze and help, had
jumped directly from the rank of captain, which hy received
in 1956, to the rank of lieutenant colonel in late 1963.
NOSENKO was later to claim that he had never said in 1962 that
he was a major.*

t
!

qe

In. an unsolicited statenent given to CIA in April 1966,
NOSENKO wrote that he was only a captain and that the TDY authori-
zation for the CHEREPANOV search had been filled out in error.

Cc. xemarks

NOSENKO's admissions regarding his awards and promotions
directly affect hig self-portraiture as a successful and rapidly .
rising KG3 officer. They also have a beari © the
alleged reasons for this rise & pen}
GRIBAXOV's favoritism, NOSENKO ; ,
BANOV's name to each cf the awards he earlier claimed to have
received. In most cases it was GRIBANOV who ceCided that
NOSENKO should get a particular award; in the rest, it was
GRIBANVY who physically presented the award to NCSENKO. The
same. is true of NCSENKO's account of his rank premoticns:
GRIBANOV, NOSENKO said, had promised him that he would be pro-
moted Girectly from senior lieutenant to major in 1959; when
the Personnel Department made a mistaxe and caly vromoted
NOSENKO to captain, GRIDANOV adviscad him to accept this rank
and promised that when he had conpleted sufficier.. time in grade
for promotion to major, GRIBANOV would see to xt that he was
promoted directly to lieutenant colonel. fhis is what happened,
NOSENKO said in i965, and after he received his rank of lieu-
tenant colonel, GRIBA!!OV called him in and congratulated him,
On the basis of NOSEXKO's admissio.s, there is aiditional rea-
son to quegtion his relatienship with GRIBANOV.**

a

NOSENKO carried with him to Geneva, against 1G regulation
and for no reason he could explain, an official SOB docunent
listing him as a lieutenant colonel and signed by GRIBANOV him-
self as well as by two provincial euthorities. This suggests
strongly that the lie concerning NOSENKO's rank was not NOSEKKO'S
alone. (If, in fact, as pointed out above, the CHEREPANOV

_ papers were fabricated by the kGB, then there was no genuine search
- for CHEREPANOV and NOSENKO's document is also fabricated and
not a mistake ag NOSENKO claims.)

* "This change of story coincided
in the information reported by §
defection
made ite

v in time with a change
Shortly after NOSENKO's
had said that remarxs by his KGB associates
othe SENKO was 3a lieute t colonel.

that
was only a Captain.

_## NOSENKO's. retractions and changes of story concerning his
personal and cperationa! relationship with GRIBANOV are -
discussed elsewhere (Pages 327-336).

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2. Affiliation with Communist Party Organs

a. Introduction

NOSENKO drifted into the Komsomo!, he said, in 1943 or
1944 without giving the step any thozght whatsoever. All of
his friends at the Baku school were joining, s0 NOSENKO did
too. He remained an indifferent member of this Communist
youth organization throughout his scnool and university years,
in the GRU, and during his first year as a KGB officer. On
arriving in the U.S. Embassy Section of the American Depart-
ment in 1953, NOSEKKO told CIA, he was appointed Secretary of
the small Komsomol Organization of the Second Chief Director-~
ate, a group of about 17 members.

b. Discussion

NOSENNO was questioned by DERYABIN on his duties as Kom-
somol Secretary (Pages 623) and, although able to give a super-
ficial account of these functions, was found to be unaware of
certain basic information which DERYABIN felt a person in this
position should have. Thus, for example, NOSiNXO proviced a
description of the system of levying dues on Kemscmol members
which was substantially incorrect and was unaware that a Kom~
somol Congress (the first in many years and therefcre a major
event) had been held curing his claimed tenure 2s Secretary.

NOSENKO said that he held the position of Komosmol Organi-
zation Secretary until the late spring or early summer of 1954,
when he got into trouble for having used official KGB alias
documentation to conceal the fact that he received treatment
for venereal disease contracted from a prostitute. Immediately
aiter this incident, said NOSENKO, he was removed from nis
position and a “strict reprimand" was placed in his Kom-
somyl file. Several months thereafter, on the eve of his 27th
birthday, NOSENKO was forced out of the Komsomol because he was

too old. For over a year, until January 1956 when NOSENKO was

admitted as a candidate member of the Communist Party of the

’ Soviet Union, he was the only cfficer in the KGB who was neither
_a Komsomol nor a Party member. BOSENKO's account of his expul-

sion from the Komsc=ol on reaching his 27th birthday is con-
tradicted by the official Statutes of the Komsomol in effect

at that time. These regulations stipulate a maximum age of

25 years and NCSENKO should therefore have been forced cut at
the end of October 1953, upon reaching his 26th birthday. This
was explained to NOSENKO, who insisted that he remained a member
until he became 27 years old and that no special exceptions
were made in his case.

ce. Remarks

The fact that NOSENKO is incorrect regarding the age limi-
tation makes it doubtful that his account of the venereal
disease incident and his removal from the Komsomol Secretary-
ship is true. The date which he gives tc this incident is
after that on which he should have been expelled from the Kom-
gomol. (Additionally, NOSENKO's descriptions of the veneral
disease incident, his use of false documents, and his subsequent
punishment by the KGB and the Komsomol have been inconsistent;
see Pages 80-81).

.

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The evidence that NOSEXKO lied about this particular
aspect of his first tour in the U.S. Embassy Section further
suggests that his entire account for this period of his
career is fabricated (See Part VIII.D.3.).

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3. Schooling

There is relatively little reliable collateral information |
concerning NOSENKO's schooling up until 1950, Other than what

. he himself has reported, available information consists of overt!

‘press releases pertaining to the Minister -NCSENKO's career (and.

giving his location at various times) and comments by one KGB :
officer and one defector. NOSENKO's own account, together with |

With the exception of minor variations in dates, attribut-
able to memory, NOSENKO‘s. story of his early years until the
beginning of World War If, «shen he had just completed the sixth
grade in Moscow, has been generally consistent in its various
tellings. Moreover, his accounts of having studied in Lenin-
grad and Moscow agree with informetion concerning the positions
and movements of the elder NOSENKO during these years. In con- ¢
trast, the pericd immediately following, during which NOSEXKO :
allegedly received his early training in naval matters {s char- —
acterized with freyuent changes of story, contradictions, and
admitted falsehood.

t
references to these other sources, is summarized below. H
| I

b. Discussion

In 1964 and 1665 NOSENKO recalled that he enrolled in the
Moscow special naval school in the summer of 1941, immediately
after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, and was evacucted
with the entire school from Moscow to Kuybyshev in September
to begin studies in the seventh Grade. (An article in the Sov-
jet Army newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) on 14 Jenuary 1967
confirmed that seven special naval schools were established in
the Soviet Union in April 1940. Ore of these was in Moscow, :
However, to be eligible for admission, one had to have completed!
the seventh grade. The article did not indicate that the Moscow:
school was evacuated.) In April 1966, NOSENZO remembered that i
he did not go to Kuybyshev at this time but rather had been
evacuated to €helyabinsk with his mother and entered the seventh
grade of a regular scrool.

1964 ard 1965 that he returned from Kuybyshev in the sumer of
1942 ard secured admission to the Leningrad Naval Preparatory
School, along with which he was evacuated Ly train to Baku in
the fall of that year. In April 1966, after inserting the year
spent at Chelyabinsk with his mother, NOSENKO moved all events
up a year and wrote in his autobiography that he entered the
Kuybyshev school in the fall of 1942 rather than the fall of
1941. NCSENKO also wrote at this time that he transferred to
the Leningrad preparatory school and travelled to Baku in the {
fall of 1943, not 1942.* ‘
|

{

In keeping with his respective accounts, NOSENKO said in |
{

'

a
* Describing the reasons for his transfer to the Leningrad Naval

-Preparatory School, ‘OSENKO explained that the Moscow special .
naval school was evacuated further to Achinsk in Siberia and {
‘that this was farther from heme than he wished to go. The
Rea Ster article menticned above said that the special naval
schools were all closed in 1943, however. The special school
‘apparently therefore was not transferred further to Achinsk, +
-but was shut down.

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Rqain to accommedate the added year in Chelyabings«, OSZNKO
gaid in 1966 that he spent half a year (actually, according ty
the rest of the story, about three months) in Baku before run-
ning away from schocl back to Mescow in January 1944. in

_ earlier accounte te said he was at the preparatcry school there

from Cctober 1942 until January 1944. Earlier he had also
giver expansive and chargirg accounts of his escape fron school
to join the Soviet front against the Germans at Tuapse; now he
admitted thet this was a lie. By cutting the time he was in
Baku from 15 months to about three, NOSENKO also admitted im-
plicitly that his accounts of the basic training he received
in the preparatory school, of the sumer he spent working at
the school rather than returning to Moscow on vacatica, and of
his “certainty” that he celebrated his 15th birthday in Baku
were also false.

NOSENKO has been relatively consistent in recounting the
events of 1944. In 1964, 1965 and again in 1966 he told of
studying as an “external” student in Moscow to complete his
ninth year of schooling and of rejoining his classmates from
Baku when the naval preparatory school returnad to Leningrad
in the autumn of 1244. On several occasions during 1964 and
1965, NOSENXO described how he and his classmates spent Octcber
and November 1944 working in the woods near‘Leringrad before
beginning their tenth grade studies late in the year; he omitted
this account from nis April 1966 autobiography.

NOSENKO's account of the next years is similarly marked
with a number of inconsistencies and falsehoods. (In the
latter category he has claimed and later admitted as untrue that
he attended the Frunze Kaval Academy from 1943 to 1944, that
he was on active military duty until being demobilized in 1945,
ana that he was ehct in the hand by a jealous ycung naval offi-
cer in 1945.) According to the account given under interroga~
tion in April 1964, NOSENKO was shot in the hand at a party in
the end of April 1945, was hospitalized, resigned from the ;
preparatory school, and received a certificate of satisfactory
completion of the tenth grade, although he had been in school
only since November 1944. In 1965 and 1966 NOSENKO said, re-
spectively, that he was shot by a naval officer in February
or March 1945 and that he shot himself in “early” 1945; since
the 1964 interrogations he has claimed only that he received
a statement of the courses he had attended at the preparatory
gchool and that he completed the tenth grade at the Shipbuild-
ing Tekhnikun in Leningrad.

Phe earliest collateral information specifically cuncern-
ing NOSEKKO's educational backgrounc, gayi22rs to a} te fhe
cereral sericd described above. geet ’
USas Se Sie tis tag ince ee Fa A neh 5 ot; Cee ae EE ts Gk Geeks
the Soviet Navy defector ARTAMONO said he attended 4 naval
preparatory school with NOSFNKO during the period 1944 to 1946.
ARTAMONOV, after NOSENKO'S defection was publicized, said he
had known a son of the Minister NOSENKO in the nzval school in
Leningrad from 1944 to 1946. He was then shown a picture of
NOSENKO and confirmed this was the man. However, acccrding

to NOSENKO's statements, NOSENKO would have been about two


14-0000

classes behind ARTIMGLOV, anc wouid have heen at the scnool

for only about two months. It is conceivable that the presence

of the son of the Minister of Snipruilding woule be widely known

in the school and later remembered, but so would that son's i
self-inflicted wound ard disappearance, «hich ARTAMONOY has not
mertioned. it is unlikely, moreover, that ARTAMONOV could (20 !
years later) reliably recognize a photo of a person who had been
there such a short tine and not in ARTANONOV's class. (NOSERKO a
claims not to have knewn ARTAMOLIOV nor to recognize the name.) .

In all eccounts, including his 1962 statements, NOSENKO
has said that he entered the Institute of International Rela-
tions in Moscow in 1945. His descriptions of cuurses, events
and friends are as vague and unsubstantial as his accounts of
his earlier schooling. He has given various cates for his
Graduation and has explained that he did so to cover Up the
fact that he failed his finai examination in the subject of
“Marxism-Leninism,” of which he was asnamed. ‘tiOSENKO inost re-
cently ciaimed that he received his diploma in the end of the

Gummer of 1950.  @-SaTERatgt pera ny ene Ai pel eee

c. Remarks

NOSENKO's own admissions, as «cil as the small amount of
collateral informatior. available, make it clear that auch of his
account of his education has been false. ‘The reasons for tris
are not at all clear and perhaps, in fact, there is no logical
explanation. The CIA psychologist wno tested and questioned
NCSENKO about his youth sucgested that, under corditiors of
interrogation, he may lie for no other reason other than his
nee@ to save face. Tnis view is an accurate aescription of
HOSENKO's behavior wnen questioned in Cetarl on this and other

spects of his pre-XGE life; it is not so with regard to ques-
tioning on his intelligence career. Nor does the psychologist's
view appear to explain way NOSENKO forgot or *as unwilling to
tell CIA about an entire year of his life, particularly such a
significant one, after consistently and apparently accurately
(judging from the Soviet press accounts cf the Minister's
activities) describing the years preceding it. It is rot
apparent why NOSEXKO originally voluntecced the story of his
travel to Baku in the fall of 1942, when this was untrue, or
why he said that the Mosco# Special Naval School was evacuated
to Achinsk in 1943, when he must be aware that the school was
closed, if he was there.*

ee

* The possibility that NOSENKO is not the person he claims
to be (and with a completely false life history, or one
lived ky someone else) has been examined earelully, but
no clear conclusion can be drawn or the basis of available
evidence. :

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F. Appraisals of NOSENKO, his Motivation, and Other Opera-
Exopal Circusstances

1. Introduction

Appraisals of NOSENKO the man and of his motivations
must be founded, 48 with any source, on factors which are
often immessureable, but fewer reservations need be attached
to an appraisal of the other circumstances affecting the
course of events in Geneva in 1962 and 1964, These opera~ -_
tional circumstances Can be analyzed .and evaluated ino much
the same manner as were NOSENKO ‘s production, sourcing, and
biography for they are tangible pieces of. evidence. In the
next portions of this paper are presented these appraisals,
which draw chiefly upon Pages 603-641 (for NOSENKO the man),
Pages 20-29 (for his motivations), and Pages 11-19 and 30-
43 (for the operational circuzstances).

2. NOSENKO

The CIA specialists who assessed NOSENKO fouhbd him to
be of above-average intelligence, cne of them saying that
“his effective intelligence is more cleverness than intel-
lectuality, more shrewdness than efficiency." He_is capeble
of good memory and, a8 illustrated »x bis repeating certain
facts_in Tle same sequence, Capable of what appears to be
good memorization o} details. On the other hand, there were
numerous internal contradictions in NOSENKO's recountings
of various events, he himself claimed an odd or poor memory,
and he was the oxceptional defector by having been totally
debriefed within a relatively short period.

Parts VII.D. and VILI.E. discuss NOSEXKO's truthfulness
with reference to his Soviet Intelligence and personal
backgrounds. Here nay be added other observations by the
CIA specialists: NOSENKO can exercise deception cleverly,
he improvised and was evasive under interrogation, and he
hes a “remarkable” disregard for he truth where it serves
his purposes. The results of the polygraph examination were
that KOSENKO “attempted deliberate deception."

The gaps and errors in, NOSENKO's testimony therefore
do not seen attributable to low intelligence or to consis-
tently poor semory, but to a conscious attempt to mislead
American Intelligence. Independently, then, this conclusion
raises the questions of whether NOSENKO was dispatched by

_ the KGB and !{f so, why he was chosen. Regarding the latter

point, it is noted that a CIA psychiatrist observed: "This
man is capable of playing a role and playing it effectively,"
and that a CIA psychologist stated: "From a distance NO-
'SENKO looks very good [to his KGB superiors] es a possible

penetration agent, but close up he leaves much to be desired."

It was "close up," in the CIA debriefings and interrogations,
that NOSENKO displayed ao inability to explain the gaps and
errors in his reporting. .

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3. Motivation

Part of one's uotivation for such a drastic ect as
treason or defection may not be wholly cooscious, and there
may be underlying causes which any source might not went
or be able to admit even to hinself. Thus, what SOSENKO
said about motivation need not be taken at face value, and
for this reason the whole question of his motivation must
remain a minor weight in the overali asscssment of bona fides.

NOSENKO has tried to present a meaningful explazation
and has changed or adjusted his story to this end. He
initially insisted that he had no ideological motives -but
simply wanted to “make a deal“ in order to get out of
trouble; yet thisclaim is open to question: The enount of
operational money which NOSEXKO needed to replace was hardly
enough to have driven him to treasoa, especially since :
there were friends in Geneva like GUK and KISLOV who might
have helped him make up his loss. Furtheraore, only two
days after CIA had rescued him with the funds, NOSESKO
“Spent _the CTA moncy in another drunken debauchery (with the
Same companion) and came back needing more. The discre-
pancy between the degree of the necd and the seriousness of
of the act was s0 evident that the CIA case officer commented .,
to NOSENKO at the outset that there must be some deeper
explanation for his act. Thereupon NOSENKO added sew
reasons: His distaste for certain aspects of the regize,
his resentment of KHRUSHCHEY, and his liking for Americans.

By his defection ic 1964 NOSENKO chenged the course of
his life, although he had said in 1962, forcefully and
unequivocally, that he would never do so unless in acute
danger. In 1964 he could give no coherent explanaticn for
the change of heart and in October 1966 he denied, for the
first time, that: hehad said in 1962 that he would not de-
fect. His only motivation was that, having risen to the
level of Deputy Department Chief, he would not get to travel
abroad any more. (This contradicts NCSENKO's 1962 state-
ments:. anticipating imminent promotion to’ Deputy Cepartment
Chief, he said that he would Leave the USSR at least once
a year in the future.) For no visible reason NOSENKO seems
to have abandoned a purportedly successful and promising
career, an undisturbed ramily life and children of shom
he was fond, cast shame on his father's menory sud his re-
maining relatives, and departed forever from his ofr country.

His own unease concerning his motivation evidently con-
tinued until, in 1965, he wrote one cohesive explasation.
No part of this statement was ever borne ovt by his conduct,
attitudes, remarks or reactions. He appeared, wherever his
reactions seemed spontanedus, to dislike the United States,
to have po interest in it politically, culturally, or
scenically, and to preserve 4 preference for the USSR. A
CIA graphologist commented oa KOSENKO's “strong emotional
ties to his traditionel background,” while ea CIA psycholo-
gist reported: "Emotionally he has not defected in spite
of his attempt to intellectually rationalize that he has."
The psychologist also said that it is “almost impossible to
determine his true loyalties and true beliefs.”

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4. Operational Circumstances
a. Presence in Geneva (1962)

£962

When he came to Geneva in mid-March 1962,;NOSENKO
was a newly appointed Section Chief in the KGB Second Chie?
Directorate, havirg held this position for two months. . i
He binmself acknowledged to CIA that it appeared strergze
for the KGS to send a new Section Chief on an extended trip
abroad unconnected with hig on work. His reasons for being
in Geneva have varied and to some degree contradict one ,
gnother: The Disarnaancnt Conference was not expected to . aa
Jast more then "a few peeks," but NOSEN KO did not begin his .
work egainst SHAKIOV (one of the main rezsons for bis being
there) until six weeks after arrival; GRISANOV played &
rote in his TDY, but NoSE¢KO Tater denied this; tkere secre
in 1962 “new rules” requiring & staff officer to accompany
a Sovict delegation, but in 1965 NOSENKO said he did not
renenber such regulations. He was permitted to go to Geneva
in 1962 and 1964, as well es to Cuba in 1950 and Freland
in 1957 and 1958, under no supervision or restraint cespite
his claim to a record so bad that he was not clearcd by the

KGB for persancnt posting ta Ethiopia in 1960.

b. Presence in Geneva (1964)

\USENKO said on one occasion thet GRIBANOY was cne of
those who allowed him tu come to Geneva in January 1964,
as a personal favor;* he later not only denied this tut said
in 1965 that GRIBANOV knew acthink about the TY. He re-
ported the 12964 TOY might, tecause of his nev position,
be his last trip to the West, hence the "favor" of his
superiors to permit hin this last trip; in 1962 NOSENKO
said he had the assurance that as Leputy Lepartment Chief
(which he knew he was about to kecore) nc would in the future
cone to the *est at least once a year. Also, NOSENKO could
not explain why a First Deputy Departacnt Chief, if allowed '
out of the USSR as 8 “treat,” would go atroad for a conference ;
which could be expected to last many weexs, probably months. :
This question is compounded by the fact that NOSENEO would — ‘
be needed in Moscow: He Said that a KGS conference to plan .
the handling of the tourist season was to be held at about
this time, end he stuck to this story even siter admitting
that the telegraa recalling him for this Moscow conference
was ap invention (see below).

c. Access to KGB Residency and Availability to CIA

NOSEXNKO in 1962 routinely visited the KGB Legal Resi-
dency in Geneva every weekday morning. although he claimed
that he had ne reason and that it is normally forbidden (as
other sources hve confirmned).** When atked how ead vhy he

ser3zitive source

FE ff :

Feat pagcited GRIBANUY's personal authorization of NOSENKO's
rip in the face of derugatory information as ore cause of

_ GRIBANOV's dismissal. .

*#¢NOSENKO said he did not visit the KGB Legal Residency fn
London nore thaa once during his visits there in a sinilar
capacity in 1957 and 1958, nor during his trip tc Cuba in

1960.

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752.

did so ip Geneva, NOSENKO has given different ansvers at
different times. His stories of sizply “drooping 1b and
hangirg erourd” for lack of anything better to co are
unacceptable in terms of known or likely Soviet practice.
His explanation that it was due to TSYMBAL's auspices or

or intervention sere contradicted by: First, his ovr con-
fused accounts of his relationship with TSYMBAL; and second,
his own statements at other times that it was GUK who as
primarily responsible for NOSEXKO's visits to the Residency.

NOSENKO had a full day free for meetings on ill June

1962, although thereafter he limited meeting tines to shorte: it

and shorter seriods until his departure. This seened

natural at the time since he would presumably huve his own
responsibilities and would need to be seen by his Soviet
colleagues ia his proper surroundings. However, in 1964.

he seemed not to save any official responsibilities or any
calls on his time: He was willing to spend all his time in
mectings with CIA. Although this could be explained by the
fact that he planned to defect anyway, it nevertheless vould
have involved unnecessary risks to a genuine source about

to become a defector. He showed no concern at tne time,

but later (in 1966), he said that he had been in fact afraid;
it was for this reason that he invented the Moscow recall
telegram, in order to hasten ais defection and put an end

to his fears of getting caught. It is, of course, impossible
to make conclusive judgments on Soviet practice, but one
would expect, if NOSENKO were not engaged in security duties,
that he would be required to participate for cover reasons

in more of the Soviet delegation's official activity. He
said that any absence could be explained as “security duties,"
since everyone on the Soviet Delegation knew or suspected
that he was a KGB officer. This unconcern for the suspicions
of other Soviets conforms neither with obsérved Soviet
practice nor with reports from other sources that Soviet
intelligence and security officers under cover go to some
pains to hide their true affiliation.

NOSENKO explained the contrast between his freedom
and availability in 1964 and his limited free tine in 1962
by the fact that in 1964 he had no personal friends in
Geneva; in 1962 both GUK and KISLOV expected to see him io
his free time. (This story does not explain his ability io -
1964 to get away during conference working hours; peither .

| GUE nor KISLOV affected this in 1962.)

@. Timing of .1962 Contact

NOSENKO had been in Geneva for three months in 1962
when the incident which brought him to CIA occurred; it
was only two weeks before his departure. He cane to David
MARK only 10 days before leaving. This bad tke effect of
limiting CIA's time with him. NOSENKO's contact cane only
about 10 days after CIA had completed, in the same city, a
series of meetings with BELITSKIY, a Soviet interpreter who
hed been recruited and handled as an agent by CIA during
earlier visits to the West. NOSE‘KO, as one of the two
primary items he wanted to "sell" revealed that BreLITSKIY
had been under KGB control from the outset (Page 517).

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e. Willinoness to Meet CIA

Although in 1962 NOSENKO claimed that he wanted to
sell only two specific items for the money he had lost, and
then disappear, there were indications from the outset that
he expected and planned to come back for further meetings
with CIA. At this first meeting he called attention to
certain information in his possession about POPOV, hinting

that he would teil it later; even as he protested hia unwilling-

ness to continue meeting with CIA, he was giving ample
details about himself which would inevitably have compro~
mised him to CIA and forced his future ccllaboration. Before
he finally agreed to retura for more meetings, he said:
"Mayke I'l] meet you again Monday* (two days after the first
meeting). NOSENKO refused, despite repeated inducenents,

to meet on the intervening Sunday. in fact, when he did
return on Monday, ne said that he had spent Sunday with
friends, drinking and “discussing recent USSR foreign policy
moves and speeches by KHRUSECHEV." .

f. Tre Recall Teleoran

NOSENKO's confession that he fabricated the story of
his having been urgent\~ recalled te Moscow by a telegran
hetina ek CSET he ees Leaves only two

i tera ;
possicle interpretations:

- There was a telegren, but NCSENKO'S ming has
slipped and he is no longer able to distinguish between
fact and fancy. This, however, is not borne out by
his general conduct nor his performance under interro~
gation in 19€6.

in fact, no telegram. (This is borne
Yi -o.) Thus, the invention was
ae i Ea not NOSENGO's but the
KG ; the KGY prietec N-SENKO to report to CIA that a
telegram was sent; anu NCSENKO made an errer in later
admitting that it was rot.

g- Remarks
the operational circumstances so far reviewed point
out the facts that: _

- NOSENKO was inconsistent if not contradictory in
stating his reasons for being in Geneva in 1962 and
1964;

- He had unusual access to the KG Legal Residency

and an availability for meeting CIA that seemed to
impinge upon his security;

- He was willing to return to meetings with CIA al-
though having at first said that there were but two
items of information for sale;

- He was “in place” as a CIA source for the last
six of his 100 or so cays in Geneva in 1962, thus
restricting the amount of time he could provide continu-
ing reporting on the local Legal Residency; and ,

- After 12 days in the same status in 1964, he

forced the defection by the KGB recall telegram, which
appears to have been a fabrication.

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154. . t

Taken together, these facts suggest the possibilities
that the KGB sent NOSENKO to Geneva on both occasions for
the purpose of contacting CIA, that the KGB wanted the
opportunity to gauge CIA's reactions to the walk-in in 1962
and to the defection plans in 1954, and that the KGB guid d
NOSENKO after contact was established in both years.

A further examination of the operational circumstances
in Geneva lends credence to these possibilities. During the
1962 meetings. NOSENKO would frequently answer CIA questions
by saying: “I will have to think about that tonight," or
"] wiil have some time tonight to jot down and prepare a
good answer for you," or "I don‘t xant to give you an answer
to thet right off--I am afreid to mislead you." He would
return to a later meeting with the information, efter having
visited the Legal Residency. In 1964 there were other
exazples of what may have been backstage guidance by the
KGB: . .

-~He called for an urgent special meeting to cor-
rect sumething he had said in an earlier meeting.
Initially KOSENKO had nemed ZUJUS instead of XEYSERS
as the U.S. Embassy code clerk whom he had personally
approached. in 1961. This seened remarkably urgent snd
important to him at the time, and in retrospect this
case gains special importance: It was the only time
he clmimed to have had direct contact with 8 U.S.
Embessy staff employee during his alleged tour in the
American Department in 19G0-1961. If he could not
remember this one name, it might call his entire story
into question. It is hard to find another explanation;
had he simply made 8 careless mistake, with his cus-
tomery indifference to names and dates. XOSENKO would
be unlikely to mull over what he hed said at the meeting
nor to bother about correcting a minor misstatement.
Much less would he feel compelled to call an emergency
meeting to do so.

~He came to meetings with "chance" items picked
up at the Legal Residency, esch of which would require
quick action and the commitment of assets on the part
of CIA in Geneva. Also, NOSENKO originally said io
January 1964 that he wanted to defect right away, but
various steps taken or plenned by his CIA handlers
kept him in place for a time. Each step, however. was
quickly negated--usually at the next meeting--by some
information NOSENKO had picked up by chance.

-He asked, out of context end without apy explapa-
tion, whether GOLITSYN had told CIA that the President
of Finland was a Soviet agent, and later could not
coherently explain where be had heard this, why he had
not told CIA about it in 1962, and why he hed asked.

In addition. the Soviet reactions to the defection were
unprecedented and contrasted sharply with, for exsnple, the
Soviets' avoidance of publicity concerning GOLITSYN's defec~
tion in 1961. The post-defection actions by the Soviet
Government created publicity which had the superficial effect
of underlining NOSENKO'sS authenticity, establishing him as
@ public figure, confirming that he had eB family, and veri-
fying that his defection was of alarming consequence. These

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755.

reactions seem purposeful in light of the approach in Paris

in 1966 of a Soviet photographer to Paris Match; the photo-
grapher passed photographs of NOSENKO’s wife and children
as part of a proposed story to dramatize the abardoned
family of a “top Soviet intelligence officer" whose cefec@-
tion had caused the “biggest blow ever suffered by Soviet
Intelligence. ”® There ig no independent press in the USS2&,
no Soviet journalist’ Allowed to publish as he pleases, and
the Soviet Government in the past has shown no predisposi-~
tion to dramatize defections from its most secret agency.
The photographer can only be presumed to have been acting on
KGB instructions.

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A uP SECREL, >

TE6,

G. Sources Supporting HOSENKO

1, Introduction

”
|
|

i The preceding portions of fart VITI. present an

! analysis of the NOsSENKO case without yiving etailed con-
cideration to information about him fron Soviets re-
porting tc CIA and the FBI. because their evidence generally

‘yuna counter to the results of the foregoing analysis, it
js revicwed here separately so that the concentrated exanmina-
tion of NOSESKO wculd not ba diverted by asides as to the
authenticity and rcliability of these Soviets. 435 indicated
below, tne CIA and FBI sources who havy pensar sucosrted
oy os x

NOSEHEO's intelligence background are OF "4 sensitive sources
See aeee and the cefeccors ee and GOLITSYN. :

One eacupt CUuLITSYN claimed tu know GOT RO Tere onaily or
to have worked with him, and WorOnko contradicted GOLITEY
by saying they haa never ret. Som: ot then, as well as
CHERE®ZNOV, Supported NOSENKO indirectly through overlapping
information on specific ¥GB Cperations, but th's asgect

of their reporting is reviewed in Part 1X.

2. Cyrroboraticn vf KOSENFO's Inteltigence Career
Ba. a
The statements of (psy the sources confirm that:
KOSENKO was 2 KGB officerwith access to sensitive information:

oats Vive cure?

~ Dre Be SWS AAA, ite! Qh Cet vr: :

EERE said NCSiNKO was a KGB Licutenant colenel (Later

changed to captain), a friend and protege cf the head

of the KG3 Secunda Chief Directorate, GRIBAISV, who
ry.

oe oe

a

approvec NCSFNEO'S (2964) Toy co Geneva. (fe. A aa
OTHE S I a ee i eee mags ,
rors 2 gt NCSENK

"chief," with access to detarts en-KG2 .pera-
tions against the U.S. Ercassy, and was mosc revently
Daputy Chief of the Tourist Cepartment. fic also stated
that NCSENKO, with his information on U.S. Embassy micro-
phones and KG3 operations involving cocrespondents and
tourists, was “more valuuvle [to American intelligence]
than PENKOVSKIY,"  NOSEKSS "could do tremendous harn
to the kG2," Gham Eee eR and morecver, tie
: KGB “will not be able to operate normally tor cwo years*
: (i.e., until 1956). fe described the repercussions ia
\ the KGS caused by NCSENKO'S defection: new NGB regu-
lations to increase secucity, the lismissai of many
KGB officer 1a GRILANOY and the recall of many

poem ee ee

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*
.

wt BAUS OCR ae Te tty eee sensitive source
stated that .OSENKO had atteniied the GaU's Mili- . . t

CE ie Smatic Academy (NOSENKO has indicated he de-
clined the opportunity to enroll in this strategic
intelligence schcol in the early 1959's.) ‘Afterwares,
A ETAL 5. SSP NOSENKO served in the GRU and then! entered

UE. nn ae te

nee Pe

se memter ee

}4-00000

- According to G&S Sf NOSE!KO was in *Intelli-
gence." His defection Lrought about the recall of a
KGB secretary from Geneva, the rumored transfer of some
60 Soviet officials from assignments abroad, and the
dismissai of KGB personne} including NOSENKO's friend

& GUK, whe had recomnended the TDY to Geneva. In addi-

tion, & pee reported, immediately after the de-

fection Spresentative of the Exits Commission of

the cpsu central Committee went to Geneva to speak to

the Soviet Government employees there. @

said thet NOSENKO had been tried in cugentia in
for treason and sentenced to death (see Pages 46 and

342).

- GOLITSYN feiled to comment wen shown SOSENKO'S
@ there 15 ede cyciceeaenca SELES! having

name in L96S, alc

eT a vn > =
WEnEDOned woth kn) prior To At ern press anncunce” |
ment oz pat Cefection in 1964, though i.e had naned

peooie knoan to him in the Americal Bart .ichz ef the
KGB econd Chief Directorate. (Snertry arter Cefecting
GILITSIN saic tract ne Hac visited this Deparctzent in
3960 and at tne turr of the year 1360-1961.) After
NOSENKO defected, GCLITSYN was given a suimery of
NOSENKO'S Liography. ‘hereupen GOLITISYN reported that
NOSENKO was a KGB officer whon he first met in 1953 and
last saw in 1959. Fren 1953 to 1957 or 1958, GOLITSYN
stated, NCSENKG was in the U.S. Embessy Sceticn of the
American Department, responsible for coverage of U.S.
military personnel and later either for cthers in the Mss- H
cow Fmvassy or for correspondents. As of 1953, GOLITSYN
said, BOSEWUKO was a senior officer in the Tourist Department; |
as of 1960, he was definitely not in the American Depart-
: ment. GOLITSYN added that GUK, CHUBANOV, and KASHCHEYEV |
! were friends in the KGa whom he shared with NOSENKO (see
: Pages 343-344). ; :

Source

Soviet source, Sein BRB, indicated she had :
. been told by her XGB friend SVIKIN that NOSENKO was a {
: ®civilian”; he had nevertheless provided information on :
microphcnes in the U.S. f7:b353 1d had caused “considerable
damage.” Se :

Te 2 . pyr, iso nave Cor
roborated certai- mnon-Intellagence aspects of ts SENKO'S
background.

3. Remarks -
wOurcey,

Era wi aside, the Soviet sources have certified
that NOSEXXO was a senior KGB officer, amu all asserted or
implied that he had access to information valuable to Ameri-
can Intelligence--the mic= -ag in the U.S. Erbassy being
one item in common,&

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Or. ae. .

7 ond

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758.

PATIOS OER. Most of them have described the serious repercus-
sions cf NOSENKO's defection, The possihilities with regard to
the accuracy of these sources’ reporting are:

First, they arc correct. If s0, the foregoing
analysis is in error, they ore valid sources, and
CSENKO igs what he claims to be: a genuine defector
Whose previous positions in the KGb enabled hir to
divulge all important details on operations against
Westerners, mainly Amcricans. :

Second, they are misinformed. If so, the fore-
going analysis is correct, they may be valic sources,
and NOSESKO has always beea under KGB control. For
this to ke true, it would have been necessary for the
KSB to dispatch NOSERKO with only @ highly restricted
numker of FGB personnel (including CRILANOV) aware of
the actual circumstances of the oneration. The K338,
at the same time, would hove propagated within and out-
side of the Soviet Intelligence Services the fiction
that NOSENKO was an actua) bet aisloyal KGB officer
poorted this fabricatton in vearisus

r . 20f:
epout tne severicy of tre TOSS OL NULSLNEO, etc.).

Third, they have teen purposefully misleading:
Rnerican Intellicence for their own or KG3 purposes.
If so, the foregeing analysis is correct, and some or
all of them have participated in a KGS conspiracy to
support the bona fides of NOSENKO, a KGS-controlled
source.

These possibilities are discussed further in Part IX,

Sera and te AEE MEU Re the rsvor spreadin

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STU BPS! ae Renee a ace gunner anes ee et an ee

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759,

“

H. “Alternative Explanations
le Introduction

-“Pparts VIII.B. through VIII.P. have discussed the
inaccuracies, self-admitted contradictions, inconsistencies,
and incompleteness of NOSENKO's reporting about himself ‘and
the KGB. Collectively, these important flaws in the story
of and by NOSENKO make it necessary to choose an explanation
for his actions and the nature of his information. There
are three alternatives:

Pirst, NOSENKO was a KGB officer but (a) has
a faulty or selective memory, has embellished or
boasted, or his reporting has been influenced by a
combination thereof; or (b) he is insane.

Second, NOSENKO lied about himself in order to
save face. .

Third, NOSENKO has misrepresented himself, either
on his own or at the instigation of the KGB.

Each of these mutually exclusive alternatives is discussed
below.

2. First Alternative

According to one postulate, NOSENKO was an officer in
the KGB but has a faulty memory, has a selective memory,
and/or has embellished or boasted:

a. Faulty Memory

NOSENKO himself has repeatedly appealed for understanding
that “different pecple have differcnt memories" and that
his own is, "funny," and this is supported by his forget ful-
ness and errors concerning events he is kn i cendently
to have lived through, such as the BURGI and cases.
But it cannot be said that he is, in general, “very bad with
names," because he nas almost total rec2il of names and
positions of hundreds of KGB officers in the Aserican and
Tourist Departments. He has a good memory for teces and
rarely failed to recognize photegraphs of people he claimed
to know. He remembered consistently details about certain
operations (the compromise and investiga~10n of PENKOVSKIY,
the surveillance of ABIDIAN to Pushkin Street, the JENNER® ;
case, the arrest of ‘BARGHOORN, and the search for CHEREPANOV,
to cite a few examples). NCUSENKO was precisely accurate in
his recollection of most of his dealings with CIA personnel
from June 1962 onward.

b. Selective Memory

Although having a selective memory is probably true of
nearly everyone, a CIA psychologist has described NOSENKO as eos
a@ psychopath who would register each passing event only in .
relation to its effect on himself at that moment. This
would inevitably make him indifferent to the characteristics
of other people, for example, anc to the sequence in which
events transpired; the aspects important to him might rot
appear so to a more objective observer. Such a person would

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760,

suppress unpleasant memories and would have no real appre-
ciation of or respect for an “objective truth." His re-
porting, like his perception and his memory, might therefore aaanenee

. peem distorted. He right recount events according to his

mood of the monent. Thus, fo~ example, if real attachments = et
to family or friends is irpossible for a psychopath, there os
be an explanation as to why NOSENKO cannot easily remember wot

his childrens! birthdays, why in 1962 (or 1965) he appears

to have lied--or been indifferent to the truth--about his

older daughter's schooling, and why he cannot recall whes

he first married. In theory this hypothesis can explain

any aberration, since it involves the unknowable. In its

most extreme form, by describing NOSENKO as one unable to

discriminate between fact and fancy, it would encompass and

explain away the facts that his story is obviously untrue

and contradictory in major ways, that his uccount of his

personal and professional lite and his rendition of the.

information he knows are so vague and unsubstantial; that

he cannot (and/or does not care to) remewver or recount

how he did the things he did. Most important, it woula

dismiss any conciusions based on NOSENKO's testimony siace

nothing NOSENKO said could be taken seriously. This hypo-

thesis, however, is unsupportable because of several

factors.

First, NOSENKO claims--and other sources confirm--that
he quickly rose to high supervisory responsibility in a
counterintelligence organization which is known to require
attention to detail. He would have risen in the KGB while’
overcoming the black marks in his file; scandal, indiscip-
line, negative background factors, and bed Party record.
NOSENKO admits that his performance was not good; he was
dnattentive and inactive and almost none of his operational
activity was carried out unaccompanied. That his rise re-
sulted from his father's influence or GRIBANOV's is unten=
able, for his father died in 1956 and GRIBANOV's patronage
(itself open to the strongest doubt) would not and could not
be dispensed upon such a mental case. Mental aberration to
the degree which would explain his poor performance under
CIA interrogation would necessarily have hindered his pere~
formance of KGB duties, denied him special privileges, and
and hence cost him the career which NOSENKO has claimed for
himself.

A second factor negating this hypothesis of a psycho-
pathic personality is that such a person could be induced
to recall certain details with the help of discussion,
questioning, and reminders, whereas NOSENKO's vague and hazy
reports seem to represent the absolute limits of his memory
or knowledge. Years of questioning have not succeeded in
dredging up any new details or incidents. Even when reminded,
be could not recall, for example, one of KOSOLAPOV'’s TDYs to
Helsinki, the details of the seizure of electronic equipment
from the U.S. Arny Attaches at Stalingrad, the correct date
of GOLITSYN's defection, or the presence of KHRUSHCHEY in
Moscow at the time of the decision to arrest BARGHOORN,.

Another factor is the impossibility of applying this
hypothesis to the totality of NOSENKO's reporting. If the
hypothesis holds that some things are important to him and
others are not, and that he therefore remembers the former
and forgets the latter, it is refuted by the inability ‘to.

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1400008.

a ee cal A

761.

find a category of information about himself which he con-
Gistently remenbered nor any that he consistent y forgot:

f what is important is his cwn direct experiences, for
example, it is odd that he recéfled the operations of others
better than his own; he remembered the names of hundreds of
KGB officers, but could not recall names of his own agents
and people involved in his own career; he could recount
details of the PEXKOVSKIY investigation, in which he did
not participate, but not of the discovery of American spies
among tourists, such as NcGOWAN, for which he was responsible,
he remembered details uf the 1955 MALIA case in which he
did not meet the target personally but forgot details of the
1961 KEYSERS case in which he did. If it is the importance
to him of recruitment operations against U.S, Embassy em-
ployees which permitted him to recall some details of the
STORSBERG and MULE operations, it is not important enough
to help him recall some of the other details which were
equally pertinent to nim personally; and it ts not selective
memory which made him forget almost every detail about CIA
personnel in Moscow and KCB actton against them. If it is
said that his parental faniiy is important to him ( hence
his memory of his father's funeral and the names of his
uncles and aunts), it is odd that he cannot recall details
about his childhood. If drinking with important people is
meaningful to him, it would explain why he remembers one
GRIBANOV evening with sharp clarity, but it does not explain
why he cannot remember the other two times, not even in what
season of the ycar or in what restauraht they took plece.

Finally, with reference to the “selective memory" hypo-
thesis, it is precisely in matters NOSENKO said he remembers
best and which he told most confidently that the majority of .
inexplicable contradictions arise. Nothing could shake him
from his claim to have been directly responsible for ABiDIAN
or on his story of the Pushkin Street dead drop, among
numerous exanples.

ce. Embellishment

The third possibility is that he has simply enbel lished
and boasted, while underlying his story is a core of truth
somewhere near what he has reported. NOSENKO has, after all,
admitted many “white lies" and boasts ("painting” himself, as
he called it). Also, in the interrogations there were
repeated signs that he was fabricating and improvising, often
in ways which led him into more contradictions and further
admissions of white lies. Perhaps then, according to this
hypothesis, he simply invented, on his ovo, various aspects
of his career. Perhaps he dated his entry into the KGB

earlier to make himself seem more experienced, and invented
“his service in the American Department to make himself more

interesting to American Intelligence. Perhaps he was only
a principal agent, not a staff officer, but learned enough
from his operations and from his handlers to think he could

‘pose as one. This hypothesis would certainly explain many

of the dubious aspects: the story of his career, his lack
of information on KGB staff procedures, his ignorance of
major KGB events and sources, the degree of his relationship
with GRIBANOV, etc. This theory, however, founders on &
number of points: “

Le ee este


14-0000

“wo sources reported the recall to Mose

oath untdy

- - 762.
The validity of the information he 138 provided.

geet such information te xould have to be a KOR
staff officer, sust bave worked in eth the Awmcrican
and Tourast Departments 4° te says he did, azd wust
nave been & fair)y senior of ficer with brosc respor-
sibilities (in view of the number of Tourist Department -,..
operetiors revesled by naze in his 1964 notes). 79
pane a few other exarples from among huncreds possidle:

(a) NOSENKO not only kaew the identity of @ KGB
double agent agaiast CIA, BELISSKIY, but gave checsable
details from inside the cASC. including the nenes by
which the CIA case orficers identified themseives <0

the double agent;

(b) NOSENKO was able to report, with almost com~
lete accuracy, that C14 ceased clandestine letter-
Soviet Union for over 4 year after

mailings. inside the

the arrest of Russell LANGELLE in late 1959;
(c) He identified several Americans recruited oF

gppreached by the KGB in operat ions in which he said

be did rot directly participates including “ANDREY"

(Dayle SYUITH), Sergeant Robert JOHNSON, and Henry

SHAPIRO; :

(4) NOSENKO kres inside informatisn oD Amer icacs

at the gEabassy in YWoscouw, including operational activi-

tics of Jobnr Y TDL AN CWI STERS? mailing of a letter to

popoy, the horosexuality of two diplomatic officers.

etc; erd

tain details of the story of Alek-

(e) “We knew cer
ja not have been available

sandr CHEREPANOV which wou
outside the KGB staff.

Thus there would not be any great need nor nuch roo
for enbellisbrent-
He appeared before

-The om nfirnations of others.

RN and cthe® KGB targets 4
: syubsuurces confirmed XNUSESNKO"S unusual

ispoiTe.. that he was 2 Deputy Pepartmeat Chief ia
the XCB, that his defection was 2 severe blow to Soviet
Jnteliigence: that he was morc importast
and so on. A Soviet journalist told Par
NOG ENKO'S aefectioa was the createst [Tass 2
by Soviet Intelligence-¥

m5 en og nay &: a gee
ow of many nob staffers 85
e defection, and these officers did

to the Soviet union.
only miaor details such

a result of th
jndeed retura

Liishment must concern

Thus any enmbe
which he has already admitted.

as his rank,
d. Corbination of Above
Another possibility might be that NOSENSO'S poor per-
formance ¥as due to a combination of bad senory, psycho-
pathologically selective memory, and eabellishnent. while
this theory is yntrinsically nore logical acd might correct
and rovnd off some obvious weaknesses in any one of the

u
“yf?
ma
rom)
17)
ym
_—

s a “cnicf " and sensiti
. nsitive soureelg


14-0000

+ ce wemeeeee oe lt HR, rtm ame et

tot

763.

(ndividual theories, {t cannot explain the counterarguzents
discussed under corponcat parte above.

e. Insaaity
aa

It might ve postulates that NOSENKO weat insano and that
this ves the cause not only of his seentingly unmotivated
contact with CIA 35 1962 but of shortcomings tin his story.
However, NOSZNXO thereafter iandled senior KGB functions
well enough to be promoted aru to be percitted abroad in
1964; he has Seca excnined periciically by a CIA psyciolo-
gist and a CIA psychiatrist; he has heen in contact over
considerable periois of time and under veryirg degrees of
stress with experienced CIA and FRI persenanel; he has saine
tained his equilibriun under difficult circunstances. Nore
of the fcregoing results in an irdication of fnzanity and
there are countless other argunents which would invalidate

this hypothesis.

3. Second Alternative

It has also heen postulated that NOSENKO is a psycho-~ ee

path, is what he says he is, but that rer psychological
reasons and while under interrogation, he dia not want to
tell whet he knew. By this line of reasoning, NOSENKO has
lied for no other reason than to save face; by dwelling on
the inconasisteacies in NOSENKO'sS statements, the interro-
-ator merely caused nore inconsistescies or else received
the false answers tnat NOSENKO did not know or did not re-
menber the fucts. Uncer interrogation, hewever, NOSENKO
recalled ard repeated what he had previousiy said in the
less inhibiting atmosphere ef the relaxed debricfings prior
to 4 April 1964. Tnis alternative explanation
thus does aot account for the factual contradictions in
NOSENKO's reporting before the interrogations, such as the
errors in dates, in sourcing on the "ANDREY" case, in de-
tails about the Pushkin Surect dead drop, etc. It also
fails to account for KOSESK?'s retractions about his rank as
lieutenant cvelonel, in tie {ace of the ¥GB TDY travel autho-
rization which shows hin to be a Lieutenant colonel, and
about the telecraa recallia. hia to SOS Headquarters ia

b ray

January 1961. €¢ WT fener ROE OE Ee Ue

SAREE The suczestion that NOSENKO lied to
cn ee a gm ere
save face Consequently cau be disnissed.

4. Third Altersative

The only other postulate is that NOSENKO is not what
he claims to be, in which casc his sisrepresentation was
done either on his own or as part of a KGB operation.

if he is misrepresenting himself on his own, there are
(even in theory) only two possibilities: He ts rerely exag- \
gerating (discussed above, under the "First Alternative") or
he is a fabricator. He cannot be a fabricator, however, since
the Soviets have certified him in wany ways; includirg his:
diplonatic status at the Geneva Conference, Soviet oficial
protests and Sovict Embassy confrontation in Washington,
Soviet officials’ renarks in various ereas of the world, and
reports fron @iGnasoam other sources on his KGB status end
importance. sensitive saree and ; :

~ 2 SECRET

14-0000 . .

7164,

There remains the possibility that NOSENKO has misrep-
resented himself and is a witting part of a KGB operation. This
hypothesis could accormodate the argument that the KGB would —
not dispatch a KGS staff officer ag a Gouble agent against a
hostile service because, whether or not the arguzent is valid,
NOSENKO (as indicated in Part VIII.9. above) has not proven his
claim to having served as an officer of the KGB. If he has
been and is now under KGB control, it would eppear that he was
being built up for years to look like an officer and was shown
to Kesterners in certain recruitment operations.* This could
explain NOSENKO's revelations to.FPRIPPEL and others about his
family and background; the otherwise pointless W.E. JOHNSON
case, and NOSENKO's appezrance in the BARGHOORN interrogation.

; It could explain NOSENKO's uneven memory and performance under
. detailed questionirg: Much of what he should have known by
personal experience could have been merely memorized as part

of his KGB briefing. Nothing in NOSEN“O'S production (see

Part VII1.B. above) would preclude his being a KGS-dispatched.
agent. That he was a KGB-dispatcnes agent was the conclusion
independently arrived at by the CIA speciaiist who administered
a polygraph examination to NCSENKO in April 1964.

4. Pemarks

The first alternative above has been rejected while the
possibility that MOSESKO on his own misrepresented himself
is unacceptable. The remaining possibility is that NOSENKO
has been manipulated by the KGB in an operation directed
against American Intelligence.

eee
‘
+

© fis American Department service in 1960-1961 was not supported
by any such “shew” appearances--he did not insist on the
truth of his claim to participation 15 the KEYSERS case,
which, moreover KEYSERS ¢ a t confirm; PREISFPESUND is an
unreliable witness; ancg is not accessible to
interview.

greener acer
chan one

he 10P SECRET -

Si eeetian ae

1400000

ve:

sitive

sources vipat —-" NOSENKO and others to tie contrary

I. Sunsary of Conclusions

CIA has considered every major aspect of the NOSENKO
case for the purpose of reaching & definitive corelusion
about the bone fides of this ap aho says he is a KGB
officer-detector coslaborattng with Ancr.can Intelligence.

As this point-by-point analysis has denonstrated,
there is no reason to accept any of SOSENKO'S eclaina to
a carcer as 8n officer it Soviet Intelligence, to authority
concerning the range and degrec of KGB operational successcs
in the USSR {particularly with U.S. offictals and private
citizens), to accurate knowledge regarding rajor security
cases in that country, or to cooperation with Arerican Intel-

ligeree.

it would be surficient proof of his mala fides to
yerify that NOSENKO Jied about a singic HeEnent OF his
cereer in the KGB. lic cannot have becn truthful in saying
that he was the Doputy Chief of the u.s. FE bassy Section,
Azerican Departacnt, KGN Secons Chicf Directurate. dn 1960-
3961 and a Deputy Catef in the Pourist Departacrt af the
sane directorate fron 14962 until als defection. Sucerous
indications make it duubtiul that SOSFNKO, as he contended,
Delengea to the naval GNU in 1951-1952, to the U.S. Enbassy
Section in 1953-1955, and to the American [Tourist Section
in 1959-1959. He wes unable to support his alleged staff
officer status in the EGB, providing incomplete ard inaccu-
rate information on his sub-sources and on such topics 85
Headquarters staff procedurcs while making illogical statae
rents on modus operandat. Neither a supervisor nor, proe
pably, a case oTTicer, it remains dubious but possible that
he wes a KGB principal agent whose speciality ta the past
was conpronising Western hoanscaxuals. énatever the capacity
in which NOSENKO served, it was not in the KGD rans, holding
the KGB titles, oF with the KGB honors he has ascrited to
hirself, and this fact is enough to prove the falsity of
his claims to being a genuine defector.

There is no question, hosever, that NOSENKO has had
the benefit of inside information fron the KCb. He has
eatd so, other sources have said so. the Sovict Government's
yeactions to the defection ypplécd as puch, anc his reports
contain details which could have coze enly from the KGe.
He was introduced into several operations, the first as
early as 1953, in a position appear ing “senior” to known KGB
staff officcts. He has provided data on organization, per=-
sonrel, and methods ccaplerent ing ard suppienenting that fron
others affiliated with the KGB. purposefully nisleading
about hinself, NOSENKO has aleo Deon deceitiul in discussing
the compromises of CHEREPANOV, PENKOVSKIY, and perkaps POPOV,
although here yas reporting ofte: correlates with that from
several CUA RE. IEE eres A Analysis shovs

~- CHEREPANOYV sas

a KGB provocateur, PE KOVSKIY was detected at the latest in
early 1961 pot 1952, and POPOV was probably uncovered earlicr
than January 1959 because of & KCB agent rather than survetl-
lance. KOSENKO thus has not merely misrepresented hinself but
has practiced deception uncer KGB guidance. Appraisals of
KOSENKO's performance under interrogatioa, his alleged motiva-
tion, and the operational circuastances support this view.

‘

st een eee

14-0000

W TopSECRET 7

cee eo ene

766, \
Furthermore, it 18 the only acceptable oxplanation, em0ag f. -
the alternatives, for what bas transpired since contact with ‘

CIA began in 1962.

CIA's conclusion about the bona fides of NOSENKO is
unequivocal: ie is a dispatched agent controlled by the KGB,

Part 1X contains a discuasion of the impitcations of
the forezoirg conclusion for the Soviet scurces who, G)g¥ eR
EUR TTS hs tae Qi, have corrcborated the bona

i
i

pete apne ae ee es

TOP SECRET


14-0000

Ce a | oe 1 ne

;

Bt eae on a Po Eee at = ve : ot _ : <
“ike GEES PR OER
Ae deueetuetion _ tensitive cowees

is). The conclusion that NOSENKO did not serve in the KCB
- positions he claimed contradicts information reported to CIA

"+ and the FBI by (two categories of Seviet Inte:
(2), Jthe ¢ TSYN (2) a

SRST :

whom have claimed to be collaborating honestly with Acaerican

Intellisence, stated or impiied that NOSENXO held erator

positions itn the KG3 Second Chief Directorate."* %f the con-

clusion cf this study of 'iCSEiKO's beng Ziges 15 accurate, none =
-. sources can be correct, ind they nist therefcre be re

in assessing whether and how Gseusd . Sa seacitive
souress could have been innocently misinformed adout SENKU efter he /
defected, 1t is necessary to consider the ways in whict the KGB
might Mave create? end supported a legend for a counterfeit KCB
officer-cefector like NOZJENKO, ‘The FSB might have accorplished
this by the following mear.s:

- NOSENKO's legend would have required the KC to
brief Kim in depch on sune:ous cases and various tergets
which he would be free to discuss wath CiA. The KGS
would also have to familiar:ze nim with KSE staff organi-
cational structure and procedyies,*** e7d KSB officers
prominent in his story le.g., GUx, KOVENLK, TSMeaL, .
GRIEANOV) so that he could noc only recesnize their i
photographs but also leri reality to his remarks arout
them, NOSENKO would also have co visit KG3 installations
and other 2reus which appeared in his legerd.

a“?

® Sources whose reporting tended to support NOSENKO but who
have not been members of the Soviet Inrelligence Services
are elimanated from Cetailed ccnsidecation here because
their connections with NOSEXKC are lees direct then the
sources with service in the KGB and GRU. @& Rome has) Source!
never reen a Soviet Intelligence officer, enc hia support
for NOSENKO has been relatively i:mated. Nowever, he re-
ported cn repercussions in Geneva caused sy NCSENKO's ce- A
: fection and like NOSENKU, he said that the KGB suspected
: , the U.S. State Department officirai David MARK of belonging
i to CIA. He has also reported on certain personalities
prominent in NOSENKO's reporting, including Yu. I. GUK
ana V.V. VAKRUSHEV,

** Although all of them supported NOSENKO by confirming his
KGB status, there is nevertheless a distance differerce
between GOLITSYN's opinion about him ane the statements
by the other sources. GOLITSYN believed NISENKO to be a ;
KGB-cispatched agent, while the rest indicated that he was i
a genuine defector. |

pete eee

te*That these preparations were imperfect, cr at least that
NOSENKO imperfectly mastered his briefing, was shown in
his performance urder interrogation.

be seer renee

j a FoR SEGRET


14-0000

te 768,

° tte .

co “ . Mwother phase of the praperations vould have been
1" WOSMSND's artval and doowmstrable participation in opers-

Spt Ata ee

2°“ e1oce, eeentngly aa & X58 officers Preaunably this sould
* "Se done so that Festerners (6.G., BARGIOS?N, FRIPPEL, afd

WE. SHASON) could sertify that they hee scan HOSENKO. in
some such role.* a

~ The KGB presumably would have restricted the number

of {ts officers aware of sae or all of the operational
plan; it would nonetheless ke faced with the problem of
how public krowlecce of NCOSENKO's defection might affect
others in the service, G3 officers abroad uninformed cf
the operational plan micht be indiscreet with foreigners,
in meeting Westerr. double agents, or before micropheres in
their hotes and office3, aking sich remarks es “I. never
heard of this man NOSEIKO” or specslating close to the
mark. Thus the KG3 might : co eo, r thea rosa
fides of INKC SSR <a ; eg
+ ESSEC Se eb SE “iE
rumors about his authuaricity (this on the part of the
limited few awere of the facts of tre case), Sy recalling
KGb officers trom the poate in the west (osteasibly be-
cause they were rKhown to NOSENKO), zy announcing the whole-
sale dismissal of those responsibie inciuding GRIBALOYV
(although in fact they may have routinely retired cr may
have been removed from tn main streem of KGB Heacdcuarters
activities). and by making ¢ announcener.ts within
the KGB ,anzonurn the "loss" Fs cu the defection ae
‘ einictes RoE be oe ee Fucther-
more, S15 MAD EOviet Practice t2 maxe a bad ex-
ample of defectors, such annvuncements might be expected

to denagrate WCSENKO is a “pad character ‘with venereal
‘disease; an oda Party record, self-inflicted wound, etc.,

in his packsground. The KG2 mignt a1s0 have taken pains

to support hOSENKO further by having Western Intelligence
sources, notabay double agents recognized by the KGB to

be such, told cf the seriousness of the defection.

ive cs urees

one misht judge whether

WP concerning NOSENKO

& H

It is within this
the reperts off Mak es
were unwitting repetitions of wise.y <o:55

or whether their reports constactted purposeful passage of KGB
disinformation. .

igi

Their direct and indirect support of NUSENKO's bona fizes,
as well as the statements by GOLITSYN, are presented and evaluated
in the next sections kelow, tocether with presentations and
appraisals of their informaticn on topics OF porting inc
with NOSEXKO's. Certain reports by ;

on

Source

* It 2:8 noteworthy that guch participation was linited to Tourist
Depertrent operations. NOSENKO did not claim physical partici-
pation in any contacts with American mnbassy officials during
the periods 1953-55 cr 1960-61, except for MULE and STORSBERG
(where his clained role was uncheckacrile since it involved only
holding a door) and KEYZERS (whachn KEYZERS did rot ‘confirm
ard on wnich NOSENKO did not insist, admitting that he doubted
KEYZERS. would remember or recognize hin.

ror secret

i
)
‘

oe

14-0000

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; ’ 769. 7 ok
. -, ae J 7 os * . ses ,
‘ a mye vot a syct ne “! wt aon we wE .
to ecdinaenrn ; are elso conaidered be
2. overlap HCSES* g sme extent, although by saying he was a

F 74 Civilian, @MASoE Mame contradicted his claim to KG3 atale
‘pte Jk) officer status. A number of general correlsticns batween the |
17 1°" MOBENKO case ard the prep is Vane a Tae Santee Re Dee Pate Ee ee

tterces . operations are then reviewed. kha final section of rart IX is &

pumary of conclusions about the relationship between the NOSENKO 9 oy 3

‘case snd the reporting about him by GOLITSN, GIRS As Re “7
Sr aaa = -

‘

i

f

:

ger

: Tor se

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be ‘ 4 hey
: . a rr 1
. a tT aA
bug
hoe TRE Wa

ty ’
yeatiun fae Teor cughrzcc the

Sane a8he, atten aAts unst stings with SCSENKO
iarge overlap Of NOSLNKO'S anZormation and con-
aa of the CLA care of f.etrs who hau net
Low:eth GOLITSVN to G2 Pain tas Comments On Sue
SOLATSYN todd ClA had receive:
let.er i certarnm informs:
ota Le GOLUB that

‘aa, ANCl wi fa

te
,

Lib

t .
moon ‘ LOYiaue Lt
rot an frum WOS!,
’ . : Chic?
i an sii
: i
. v4
Lowe,
~ f
st

yok wrda
ra ah general, .
ew cowl Soy | tat re WOE
ee We.l seen; “(e wor at Lo se
Tt was not j ven to hit.

on 40 Februscy 1964 Nuor

hols uercation trea the Sovret Pis-
acnmaument Celeyation rm Genevt, Suitevrband wa. tal red, anclud-
ing bis RGB afti.l:alron. When GOLETA Boar t s he am.edci-
ately recalled the ace jue2d “hucter” froma Seivcerbang snd linsed
HOSENZG to 1t; ne wiereepor stated thut ue recsided MOSENKO as @

member of tue Second Chtef urrectoraha working
e*tizens.

equsnst Awerican

Qn gl PeLsuary Joes
partacinstion in inte rr
‘was given some bickgs
reservations abour br
mentns GOLITSYN was provided f€ataa tren tuc 1962 and 1964
meetings with NOSENKG ins land, amd at nis rcequcest was
supplied with ull the avallutle Diugraphic data ob NOSENKA to
ossist nim in analyzing the wperatasn. On 2) dune L964, GOLITSYN
was interviewed an cetaatd on the subject of hesa vu. He confirmea
NOSENKO'S adentaty as the eva of the former Miraster or Ship-
buildany und said trat he was a KGb ctiicerc whe had worked in the
American Depactment and the ‘Tourrsh Dep tre at the KGB's Second
Chief Directorate. te wes shewn « plat ogre ef S05 0. thot
buried in a pheto sore wo oganety) and dia cfentabhed 2t as a
photeyruph of the mun he hanew., Ae thers
abou. UWOSESKO whach 1s summa zed below.

TOP SECHET

tne wad PAE,

Lore he gave the information


14-0000

'
ood
|
-

The NUSENKU case hus not heen discussed with GOLITSYI since

the 23 dune 1964 jatervied; thus he nas not Leen questioned

further on the eireunstunces which led to the encounters with

HOSENKU descrihed by him, nor have the results of subsequent

detailed reinterrogutions of NUSENKO - discussed st length in

the foregoing sections of this paper - been made available to

him for review, analysis, or commente

2. Resume and Discussion of Infermation*

american Departmont = 1953
ed the KGB in arch 1953**

NUSLUKO has said that he enter

and was first assiqned to the U.S. Embassy Section of the Ancrican

Department of what Js now the Second Chief Directorate, KGB. He

atetad that his duties from hig entry until sometime in 1954, per-

haps about June, were to work on files of american correspondents

on permanent assignment to “osco# and to meet with the Soviet

he corres-

citizens who were jgents Or informants reporting on t

pondents to the KGB.

GOLITSM stated that he met NOSENKO in the #merican Depart-

ment of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate***® a couple

of times in 1953 when he, GLITSYN, was there on other matters.

GOLITSYN had earlier identified his owm job between becember

1952 and April 1953 as Chief of the american Sector, Counter-

intelligence (Ninth) Department, Foreign Directorate, under the

Chief Intelligence Directorate (formed in December 1952 and re-

organized in April 1953). From April 1953 until his departure

oars ae
* The relationship between the reporting by GOLITSYN and NOSENKO

on specific operations is shown on Pages §94-595, with comments

thereon appesring on Pages 647-659, while in this section are

a discussion and an evaluation of what GCLITSYN said about

NOSENKU's assignments in the Second Chief Directorate (see

Pages 343-344).

#® «mong the various dates civen by NOSENKO for this entry. March 1983

has bean given more often than others and is more consistent with

the rest of NOSENKO's story. ;
KGB Second Chief prreceorece OP gps, éi

eeemin da now Aeaicnated the

b.

for Vienna in October 1953 GOLITIY% ‘was Deputy Chief of “the

Emigre Secter, Counterintellicence vepartment, Foreign Intzlligenc?
Department, Foreign Intelligence Directorate. COLITSYN has not
indicated the nature of his responsibilities in either of these

positions whicn would have necessit3ted his visiting the American

b
i:

‘

Department of the Internal Counterintelligence Directorate, although

certain activities of cormon interest with the latter would appear
- logical. NOSENKO's description of his alleged duties with corres-
pondents, however, did not encompsss his having official contacts
with representatives of any component of the Counterintelligenc?
Department of the Foreign Directorate. According to NOSENKO'2
description of the location of his claimed office in the American
Department, and his description of the duties of the co-worzers

he said shared it with his. chance contecta there with such a

representative would have been’ precluded. Even by NOSEIKO's account,

then, an encounter between GOLITSYN and himself could not have
been in the course of interdepartmental lisison between their
respective units, nor could it have occurred in NOSETKO's office.
GOLITSYS*s lack of reporting on KCB operations against American
correspondents (other than his conversation with KOVSHUK in 1956
or 1957 about Henry SHAPIRO) is further evidence that his business
. in the American Department was unrelated to NCSENKO's claimed
activities at that time, and GOLITSYN's own statexent on the 1953
encounters implied that his meetings with NOSENKO were accidental.
Pleeting as their contacts would therefore have been, it could
have led GULITSYN to make the unfounded assumption that NOSENKO ©
was a member of the staff within the smerican Department.
feerican Cepartment/Tourist Department - 1955-1960

NOSEXKO stated that he transferred from the American Depart-
went to the Tourist Department in June 1955, and remained in the
Tourist Department until 1960, becoming a deputy chief of section
there in 1958.

GOLITSYN, however, insisted that NOSEXKO remained in the

- American Oepartment until at least 1957, or possibly as late as

wet
nae
2


14-0000

swore

TOP SECEET

HOStEAU's true position in the american Vepactnent in 13957 or

1958. GOLITSM did not tndscate how he accuuired his knowledge

on this nor why the KGB subsequently would have Dean unable to
determine thet ne had. If nis access to this information was in-
decd that remote (a3 GULITS(I's assignment ia 1957 and 1958 ould
indicate - see below), it is readily apparent that {it could Llike- us
wise be sonewhat garbled. COLITSYN was unable to explain the I
fact that NOSEKKO's physica} presence in exclusively Tourist
Department cases had been ,ositively established through photo |

identifications made by several of the individuals “involved, who

met NOSEIKO a9 eurly as 1956.

From 1955 to 1959 (the same years when NOSENKO claimed to
have becn in the Tcurist Departrant) GOLITSYY was enrolled in
the KCB Higher School. le was detached from the school, in the
period January-larcn 1959, in order to gether material for his
thesis. At that time GOLITS Al spent just under tvo months in
the Tourist Department,* but GOLITSYN’s work did not involve hia
in any day-to-day operational activities of this department. He
has reported having “occasionally” met NOSENKO in 1959; althcuch
he did not specify that it was at precisely this time, it seems
probable that it woulec have been. GOLITSYN said that he asked
NOSENKO in 1989 where he wes working and NOSENKO told him the
Tourist Department. Again it appears from this that his encounters
must have been brief, superficial, 3nd not work-related, hence
insufficient for GOLITSYN to arrive independently at a well-founded
conclusion as to NOSENKO's sctual status and function with the

Touriet Departrent.

ee .
*In describing his own and others‘ responsibilities in the Teurist
Department, NOSEYKO has made no reference to this unit having a
formal or regular relationship with the KGB School or to students

fran the school having been detached to the department.

hae

14-0000 v

WwW N) a : 7 a . Ae i

inforazttion es ef villable to VOLIs iss igs . ‘ as
Tno detulled interrogattons of SOSGEIKY cur vagernina his claims. : .
to KGB positions betwean 1953 and 1964, did not toke place until
many months after GOLITSY: made his statenant a, and they were: ya3ed | :
upon all collatersl information knownyiréLabing to each phase. None- ,
of the results of these interrogations wags made available to
GCOLITS’N, so he was not aware of the countless points on which
NOSEXKO contradicted known facts and revealed his ignorance of
activities which were carried out by the KGB during his alleged
tenure in thess-Seportments. -
3. Comments on GOLITSYN
Several factors influence the evaluation of GOLITSYN's states
ments on WOSENKOs
, - First, aS stoted in Part VIII.I., it is concluded
that NOSENKO aid not serve in the KGB positions ha claimed.
GOLITSYI's testimony verified this conclusion insofar as
NOSENKO's claims about service in the U.S, Embassy Section
of the American Department in 1960-1961 are concerned. hore-
over, in 1962 GOLITSYN concluded that the KGB “letter-writer®
(actually NOSExKO) was under KG control in submitting infor- ,
mation to American Intelligence. At issue, therefore, is the
evidence from GOLITSYN to the effect that NOSENKO was an
officer in the American Department (until 1957 or 1958, “shereas
NoSAIKG said he was reassigned from the department in 1955)
and in the Tourist Department subsequently.

- Second, GOLITSYN made no comment about or identification
of NOSENKO prior to the public announcement of the latter's
defection, despite many previous opportunities to do Prey (e.gee |
in discussions of GUK, CHURAHOV, and KASHCHEYEV) ard despite
GOLITSYN'’s proven excellence of memory for names and tasks of
KGB personnel. GULITSYN gave little detail on the eircun-
stances of his encounters with NOSHIKO, and. he has not been

questioned further sbout them. Neverthelze9s. a% indicated in

the foregoing remarks on the circumstances in which the two tee
. a:

men could have met, it seems apparent that any contact would» .

have been brief, tnfrequent, casual, extra-official, an lp see Rael
ewtinldie we et dar tn? racy (5) acrtnre siorvéd SAU va

: : : Ave, vewome se oo woe oe

the Following discussion considers CULITS EN, information.
about Nosiiku in conjunction with NOSAKO' 3s dental about havin: ; jo
b2en in contact with WULINSYI.* vossible axpl ametion: for . i
COLITSYN's having referred to their encounters bat having mis- a
identified NUSENKO's positions in the KCB are: First, GOLITS¥
could have erreds second, COLITSYN cculd have lied for personal _
reasons;y and third, COLITSM! could heve lied st the direction
of the KGB because he (like NOSEVKO) is under G3 control. To
examine each of these points scparetely:

~ GOLITSYH could have erred. Apart free toe dental

by HUSEXKO, who is an unreliable source, there 13 no evidence

to refute COLITSYJ's statement that he and NCS2iKO met in

the ¢merican Vepartment in 1953 and in the Tourist Department

in 1958 or 1959. (the conclusion# é2"W'art VIII.I. about

NOSFUKO's bona fides do not rule out the possibility that

‘— he was physically present on occasion on the pramises of tha
two departments in these yoars, although not in the cepacities
that he has claimed.) The nature of their encounters, however, i
could have been such thst GOLITSY.I erred in assuming - becs3use

HOSENKO was secn on or near the premises of the two departments,

and because NOSENKO told GOLITSYN in 1958 cr 1959 that he was

in the Tourist Department - that NOSEIKO was therefore an
officer of these specific elements of the 7.23 Second Chief

Directorate. Thus, if COLITSYN met NOSENKO as he said, he

mistakenly identified NOSENKO ag being a menber of the staffs

. of the ¢merican and Tourist Departments at these times.
- GOLITSYN ‘could have lied for personal reasons. He may

have believed that to say he met NOSENKO or to say he knew

* There is insufficient information available te reach a conclusion ‘
‘ about, or even speculate on, why NOSENKO was so certain GOLITSY:A's |
defection occurred in January 1962, as contrasted with the fact

¥ that it took place on 15 December 1961. '
t

oo 10? SECRET ’


Hus: Likuts. posi tiene in 1 the Kuy would ahd ‘uthenticity to

his garlier evalu. tion of the NUsENKO Anforastion of 1962,

to hts. contradictions of NUSLNKO'S st atements concerning
service in tho U.5. Embassy Section an] the operations of
thet section, and to his contention thot the KGB would try
to counteract his (GOLITSYN's) informition by spreading
purportedly authoritative but purposefully misleading reports
on the same subject matter. In surmary, COLITS“'s intention
in lying about NOS2ixO could simely have heen te add greater
credibility to his expresseé opinion that (kJc:h0 was a ROB
provocateur,

-~ CULITSYN could have lied ut the direction of the KGB,
an explanation that is examined here for the sake of completeness
and not Lecause Cla has any reason to relieve GOLITSYN is under
KG3 control. This explenation would mean that COLITSYN,
although offering partial confirmation for NOsSmKO's claims,
directly attucked the bona Fics of another KGB-dispatched
agent of allegedly comparable rank and knowledgeability. acting
under KG3 instructions, GOLITSYN would have sought to undermine

ROSENKO's acceptability, regardless of the fact that NOSCNKO

said he wes providing reliable and comprchensive information

about KGB overations against «merican officials and tourists.

in the USSR. At the sume time, NOSEN¢O wis not giving an

account of their relationship that waa consistent with COLITSYN'‘s,

‘ by implication NOSENKO was distorting or diluting the earlier
reports of GOLITSYN on KGB operations in the Soviet Union,

oo and ROSENKO was seeking to gain acceptance by CIA equal to that

. experienced by GOLITSN. According to this hypothesis, two
sources under KGB control - each striving for acceptance -
deliberately gave conflicting stories of their ralationship,

and each tried to undermine the bona fides of the other,

GOLITSYN explictly and NOSENKO by implication, This explanation

fs so illov‘cal, as well a3 so detrimental to the KGB, that

eet

it must be rejected from serious consideration.

ror SECHET, 7


a

or

WPS

he

‘Shea choice thus secms to lin betwoer tha first tvo “explanations

for GLITS I's misiduntification of NUSLNKO, one un understand. thle

error of s3aumption éraun from thoir fea chancs encounters, ‘the

other a misguided uttempt thet had no sinister goals. In either

ecuse, GOLITSYN's testimony does not eontribute to 4 determination

of the status of NOSENKO within the KGB aa of the years prior

to 1960.

There are two explanations for NOSHIKO's denial about having

met CULITSYI. One explunation is that they were never in personal

contect, the KGB was uware of this fact, and - unprepared Cor

GULITSYN's statements to the contrary - the KGB briefed NOSAIKO

accordingly. If in this particular instance NOSEMKO told the

truth und (as discussed above) GOLITSYN did not, no additional
or different conclusion cain be drawn spout the bona fides of
SOSENKO and his clains of service in the KGB.

is that, as GOLITSYN said, these encounters did take plece in 1953

The second explenstion

and again in 1956 or 1959, but becuusa of their casual and fleeting

nature, NOSENKO (unlike GOLITSYN) has not remembered them.

eo * JOP SEGRE

cone ee ee

wn ee ee

2. Resume gf _intorirvatsop*

Aevordiny Co COLPUSYR, he personally meq TOSEREG two or
three Cones at boos, whale visetane the US. Embassy inceson of
the Averican tapartueit, « Component of the internal .ccucity
directorate, und «gain in 1958 and 1958. On the orher hand, -
NOSEUKO: «as unable to identafy COLITSTI's photograph and he denied
ever havirg seer has GOLITSY sail chat GUK, CHURANGV. ‘ond
RASHGIEVEV were triends of SOSENKO as well as of COLITIYN.  (NOS-
ENKO claimed ta ne on firendly terms with each of ely ve three
KGH offieerss tee wohnouwledaed, hewowes, that his sequaintance |
with GUK had bees merery cauzal uruil NOCENKO's three-month TDY ,
to Coneva an iden wlocu made them the pest of fracnds.) From j
$952 to f9=7 ap TOLR CULITSYN said, HOSENKO was @ cane officer
tm the Vos. Batestoy See tron, chen Creansterred 1 the: Vourtst
Departacnt . wheres bie aes es Sembee ae oMface-e ate 19% tOLETSYN
Stoted uneqaiveacally cbat BUSENKO was now uw Deputy Chick of, Ube i
U.S, Einnassy Section or uorherwise setving an chat section or in .
the Anccican Lepactment. as of the time he (GOLITSYM) wonsulted
with various otfiacers there in April-June 1960 and January 1961.°%*
GOLITSYi spoke there with officers svicry NOSENKO claims as close
colleagues ite dud ng KOVAHURK ard CRYAZIGV, and would doursless
have known 1f NOsrKO weee supervising or otherwise involved in
code clerk operations. Ir summary GULITSYN concobor ited some
of NOSE..K3 s slleswed o:si¢mzent an tiie KGW Second Chi-:{ Direcrorare
cut not all of tiem while SCOSEUKO contradicted GOLI'T bY by saying
that the «wo men iad ewer met

|

3. Comsunts on Geli rsvs

From Decenier 1952 untal Apral 1953 GOLITSYN was Chief of
the Amesican Des« Counterintellicer ce Depactment. Foreign
Directorate. FG (then 448) and foc most of the period from,
January to March 1959 ne was on TOY creaining assigunents to the
Second Chief Gsrestorare In the firse yoo at lease OLITSYN
presumaoly would have had regular cecalings with the U S. Embassy
Section, and periap: also in the secaund he would have been in !
contact with the fourist Lepartmenr, in which NOSENKO claimed
to have been then serving Despite this and de:pite his
proven excellence: of memory for ther ranes and tasks of KCB
personnel, GOLEPSYN never mentioned MeSENKO in debrictings
éuring the years 1962 ond 1963, nor commented on his name on
the two occasions when ait was shown to him. although he had
numerous opportunitics to mencion him in connection with the

- mames of CHERASICV, FACECHEYEV, ang GUK.

se ee

” The relationship between the reporting by GCOLETSYN and
NOSENFO on specific Operations 1s shown on Puqen 994-595,
with canments tiereun appearing on Pages 647-659 while an
the section which follows below are a discussi07 and an
evaluatyon of what GOLITSYN said anout NOSENKO’s assignments
in the Secord Chief Directorate,.s described on Pages 343-344,

eee a: ete

*e¢AS stated in Part VILLI, howewrer. 1¢ is not eredible chat
NOSENKO served tn the U.S. Embassy Suction in 19591. 5% or
wn 1960-298.

fs TOP SECRET

i : . : . .

ee Oe

SE Be ne gine ree En CTO PIER eS


14-0000

x

ri

FS
AIEN TS cid

we

ot
o

TOP SeoRET

14-0000

cage Seunen

Vt).

There would appear to be: no reason why NOSEUKO, af he had
ever met CULITSYU, should noc have zaid ro to &ericen Intelir-
gence Representatives. * fu have: date 20 would have gqaven NOSFLIKO
concrete oipport for nas ecliins of Kis scuff service, which he
knew to be in questvon. Gr. the contrary, however, NOSENKO consis-
tently denred any contact end ninufacturcd a demonstrably false
story to explain his on eksence during GOLITS s admitted visit
to the section in which 1:0S2-70 claims to have served in January
1961. Sen Page 183, secon footnote.)

On the othe: hand, COLITLYN's claim must le eecasured against
the backcround ond circumstances of his statements. In the ab-
sence of any coments atout or identiticatien of KCSENKO by GCLIT-
SYN praor to the public announcement of his defection from the
KGN, and in view of the anourt of informo:ion mute avarlable to
him trom NOSURKU matuertais prior to ta ahing any clatements
about his alieged acquairtsance with ham, COLLITS’2 s “identifica-
tion" of MOSENKO as a KGE staff officer known to him personally
cennot be considered as spmitencous Or uncentaminated' information.

The weight of andeperndenc evicence against NCSENKG'S alleged
service in those positicne waich GOLITSIN corroLorated, combined
with the conflict ketveen GOLITSYN s and BOSEUKO's testimony about
their personal acyuaintencesrip, maxes it impossirle to accept
GOLITSYN's verification of MOSENKO'S Claimed KGB status during
any stage of the latter's career.

Sit Is not likely that he weuld forget it. Direct relationship
with or knowledge of a defector would be interesting and im-

portant to rencin
post-defection reminiscences would alinost certainly bring back

memories of such recent az direct contacts as GOLITSYN relates.

Toe SECRET.

ing KGH officers? even if temporarily forgotten,

ce een: ae

sae met me

fee eee re ae


14-0000

2. NOSFENKO’& Background and Carecr

Date of Information

/
“Ly february 1964 (Re-

ported tos the Fei on
ln February 1964)

7

/

10 February £964 (Tee
Eorted to the FRI on
{2 Feprusry 1964)

i

16 February Lvb4 (Ren
ported to the FRI on
}2 February 964)

1e64

19 February (Re-

gorted to the ERT on
29 Fobruury 1964)

oy rt: Se

Lady

oes -geeheeial
BP TRIN My

.

ititdot-— cana Rtas dene SP ae

Piet. neo Poe TE MO

+e

Information Peported bh

NOSENKO was affiliated with the KG" for approxi-
mateiy 16 vears, since about 1947, and wa3 an
employee of the Second Chief Directorate in
Moscow. THis tather, now dead, was a Deputy to
the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union and also
Minister of the Shipbuilding Industry. There

is a shipyard named after NOSENKO's father in
the Ukrainc.

The photograph

which appeared an U.S.
papers is not that of NOSENKO,** sb :

newse-

: “rs NE Wg
werked with NOSENKO fer several yours in FoB

Head yuarlers; he deseribed NOSENKO as ao person
who iixes to be fashionably dressed at atl

times ard is fond.of women, by natire es tricndly
individual an! generally well-liked by his fei-
low workers. NOSENKO worked in the Second

Chief birecturate.

quite certain Winacat eres
what NOSENKO ha:i the ranr

al

TOP SECR


14-00000


14-0000

es
a res hae a ws

Ries was asked apie hes. whether hea felt
ee S actually defected af whether-he felt

the aogection might.be a "trick" by the KGB.
og ceplied that from his own knowledge of g

(Reported co tye FBI

on 20 Febru: 1904)

va matter, he was convinced that NOSENKO's
defection was not a “trick” by the KGA.

NOSENHO worked against personne) stationed at
‘the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and with hig help
agents were developed among these Americans.
It is assymed by the KGB that. he is familiar
with the number and location af microphones in

bs
vod

3
the U.S. Embassy, tA

to the FBI
ary 1964)

(Reported
Jeon 22 Febs

Prior to NOSENKO's defection he was Deputy Lo
the Chief of a department in the Second Chief
Porectorate. while working ia the Se cake
(Surveillance) Directorate in Moscow °
on three separate occasions participated in
conferences betwaen "important poop a" of the
Second Chief Directorate and the. Seventn Direce-
torata, NOSENKO was present at all of these.”
Althcuyh NOSENKO was a Deputy Chief he hela gs
only tha rank of captain in the KGB, o.
attributed this (the disparity between joo a
rank) to tha influence which GRIBANOY exerted
on tha behalf of NOSENKO.

(Paported pO CIA by
the Fi of 2 February
2925) |

ee


14-0000

DATE Sk) +

LOST/MISSING MATERIAL

THE DOCUMENT OR PAGE(S) LISTED BELOW WAS/WERE MISSING
DURING THE DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW BY THE HISTORICAL
REVIEW GROUP, CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF INTELLIGENCE.

DOCUMENT NO. DATED:

OR
PAGE(S) 177

FROM:
CIA JOB NO. .
pox no. Reel ¥
2F

FOLDER NO.

14-0000

PTC ee a : . seared be emma ae oe ie teen eee

el

ported : FRI on
12 iebruary Ta)

$904 (Pe-
the ¥SI on
)

cae arenes pee ee

| cee nine yes ee
oo oh rs : _ F
Because of his long tenure in the KGB, NOSENKO . . ga
would have a great deal of important informa= a
tion which he could impart to intelligenve
agencies of cther countries. Certainly, he
would be acquainted with many KGB employees
and could identify them. He also would be
intimately acquainted with a large number of
Soviet agents working inside the USSR against
American and British nationale.

The bulk of MUSENKO's knowledge concerning KGB
activities would revolve around the intelli-
gence operutions of the KGB in Moscow and also -
YGB persenalition working in Neadquarters.
NOSENK vas alse unduultedly familiar wath ajl
KO's personalities in Geneva’ and certainly knew

som? KGB personaiities an ether countries. —
haa:

ho ata SEY oSEuKO had been an 3

the Seaune Chef biu:wtherato for about 14 years te
and was woymetoted with almost alt of the cm- a
ploynes of this wirectorate. He was aware of Ss
the structure of the KCL ant nnows many person~ —

nel oof the First Chief
oye

Srabce

Directorate.
are tee”

as Deputy to the “Ourist Department,
had in his possession a telephone ¢cirectory
which lasted the names of some 10,000 KGB em~ he
ployecs in Moscow. Only Chiefs and Peput Pisies, 5 Be aed
rtments_pad these phone books.** aU Git. te:
P@expressed the opinion that"NUSENKO ¥


14-0000

7796

(Reporttd to the
FBI on ’ ho19c64)

is much more valuable to/the FBI and CIA than.
was Oleg PENKOVSKIY becayiso of tha fuct that he
knows so much about the methods of work of t.ho
First and Second Directorates of the KGB und

is familiar with so many lindivi the KGB
both in Moscow and abroad. @@ipZ.dm ZA AB My
that PENKOVSKIY was able;to furnish Anerican
and Britith Intelligence jwith a lot of informa-
tion concerning defense sacrets of the Sovist
Union, but NOSENKO ig much more knowledqeable
in intelligence and counterintelligence opera-
tions of the KC."

NOSENKO knows many of the chiefs and deputies sm
of the KGB directorales gnd departments at KGB —_
Headquarters in Moscow, !Jn EG3 Keacquarters bed
ther: are four sepsrate dining cooms for per- ES
sonnel who work there; one such dining room is tad
reserved for chiefs and deputies of departments. ald
Because of this fact, Nol EKO has a vast know- : BS

tha KGB.* ~—

e—NUPLNKO voluntecred for the first time during the January-March 1965 interrogations that he had eaten
occasionally in the “chiefs' dining room." He had not mentioned this dining room earlier.


14-0000

(Repor EN, to the FBI on "There seems nariimous opinion among the
27 March JS : amy ehat NOSENKO... could do
‘the KGB a tr anount of harm." NOSENKO
in his position as a deputy chief in one of the
‘ : departments of the Second Chief Directorate
! . would have been entitled to have one personnel
directory of approximatiely 30 pages setting
forth the identities cf all of the supervisory
‘ officials in KGB Headquarters. NOSENKO would
also have had a 200-pade directory listing by
name and telephone number all the rank-anud-
file cemployces working The Ob ean
expre sod mY some a

—
pri

l

Vk su two dired«tories available to
Ameracan Intelligence, |lthe KGB would be guverely
damaged for the present and for several years

to come,* :

TN? SECF

20 May 1 (Ro-
ported to
on 21 May

10? § vat

The KGB was lucky that [the Americans found only
40 microphones in the U.S. Embassy in £COW.
Actually, about 200 madeepnones piel concealed
by the Soviets in the Embassy. @
quite aure that NOSENKG was respractree for
furnishing anformation ‘to the Amecicung which
resulted in the microptiones being found. It
was his opinion that NASENKO knew only the gen-
eral location of the 4({ microphones which were
found and does not have any knowledge of the
remaining ones. i

Report
by the
1l June l

* "Sea above; NOSENKO did not mention these directories.


14-0000

(nepoceed Ye inet The aeneral consensus among cu employees Ga”
on 22 June l is that in the future the KGB will
3 we tee@ling pharply the effects of NOSENKO'sS es
cape to American Intelligenze. NOSENKO is con-
sidered to be vastly more important than either
‘ GOLITSYN or DERYABIN. This opinion appearr to
be based on ceveral factors: First, NOSENFKO
worked against personnel stationed at the U.8.
Embagsy in Meacow and with|his help asygcnts were
developed among theve Americans. Second, it
as assumed by ECB Rots. | that because cf”

his closeness to the U.S. fmbassy in the post,
NOSENKG would also be famijiar with the number
wf microphones which had bien anstalled in
the imoussy by the KGB and|/the locations of
these microphones. ‘ihird,;as a Deputy Chief
of a department, NOSENKG hs normally nave

t

—
tu
cc
co
ul
ws
ao.
fom]
a

nad access to a telephone jlirectory listing

all personnel in all direcyorates of the KGR in
Moscow. Another fuctor, which is a formidable
one 1 the m.nds of other KGB employees, ib
that MOSENKO travelled in a rather influential
circle of frienes 10 Moscow “hago oigh in
the Soviet Government. Game pe ‘e"
these comments cited as reusons for hOSEUKC
being an “important catch" for American Intel-
liyence, but Gamm ET TE Te pee no one in the
KGB really knows exactly hpw much information
NOSENYO had concerning the; KGB.

ius Uwe’

tebe

The amount of damage caused by NOSENO's de-
fection is “unpredictabla.|' NOSENKO knew few
employees of the First Chief’ Directorate worke
ing abroad, but knew many buch employees serving
in KGE Neadquarters by virtue of seeing them in
the dining room which is riserved for chiefs
and deputy chiefs of KGB dppartments.

(Reported Oo CAA
by the Far 8
Fobruary 1, )

aa


14-0000

TOP SECRET

4.

19 Bob tary 1564. (Re~
ported ro ™‘e Sat on

2) Fe} raaryt964)


14-0000

KG

Set

aifa

fee

or
eaaneton, whli not
to NOSENKO || In tae o nis
OlCOW, KUROCHEIN has Vers Ofte: wisited

ent where NOSENKD worked anc
SEUNG

aoe

’
is "more than Casually uryuai.eed*

iA MaLippapronrors
PORTER

14-0000

(Reported »
2R Februa:y WN

ete

“a

14-0000

t
Qo a
eas
~ tag
Sat
ae as
ook
Fea
2 bie
M7)
nue
Nwo-
ue
27 Ot:
a orn

&
~
-

mer hed

'
aay

14-0000

(Paported to FS:

on 5 May L9é43

am "
Two meant woes have been establashod by the CPSU

ero ee

rer oes Ves

for the yucposes: (a, to determing why KOU em-
ployees such as DEKYAUIN, GOLITSYN, and NOSENKO
defeeted whale serving abroad; and (b) to attempt
to eliminate “weak" KGB employees and improve the
efficiency of the KOR.

weve

An investigating commission of the CPSU Central
Committe: checking into the circumstances surm
rounding NOSENKO's defection has thus far been
responsible for the expulsion from the KGB of 15
Secon? Chicft Lirectorate employees. These in-
clude GRIPANOV, who was also expelled from the
CPSU and was stripped of his rank of lieutenant
general. GRIBANOV has been given a very small
pension, like an ordinary Sovict citizen, This
drastic action was taken sinde the primary re-
sponsibility ror the cefectian was placed on .
GRIBANOV. Tt was realized that, in addition to ‘
being Chie € of the Secong ‘ef Directorate at .

Nee ne AEGIS ETL gy PERE RT WRI ONE eT Se 8
ae

_ . . 7 3 ede
ne eee evnen s wae ae ter ie alan deheanieant oe A Ee cant eames A oo “mali eeth


14-0000

787.
the time of the defaction, GRIBANOV was a port]
sonal friend of NOSENKO and had more or less
treated NOSENKO as a protege and had taken many
steps to further NOSENKO's garecr within the KGB.*®
It was felt that GRIBANOV should h
of NOSENKO'S 1 defect. Te
mrierer yipee neva No Wie Ee ee Ne ;
Tnree of GRIBANOV's deputics were also expelled
from the KGB, one of whom was a Major General
BANNIK of the 11 other fone Chief Direc-

torate Unployees expelled, fome were found to
have been personal fraends pf NOSENKO and some
of them were found to have fon ney to NOSENKO

shat tagey were working.
‘ pu pate S.M. GOLUBEV,
a “Gb oifiver stataoncd in Hashangton, would be
leaving for Hascaw because rhe anvestigating com=
mission had determined that|Guk, a mutual frienc
of NOSENKO and GOLUBFV told] NOSENKYU that GOLUBEV
had been assigned to the Waphington Legal Resi-
7 dency. GOLUREV had himself) worked with NOSENKO
my ‘in KGB Headquarters sometimp in the past, but
subsequently NOSENKO and GOLULEV were given dif-
ferent assignments Within tic ¥GB and thereafter
did not associate wath one jdnother in tho course
of their daily activities. .

Aeeiataa ey aceue

¥ See Pages 327-356 an which NCOSENEG's description of his relationship wath GRIBANOV.is discussed.
ate ig a cae rol IR

OT Aaa hy 3 ah. saphena etl .

bees A? ral mk va ce, <3 ia | .

#40 NOSENKO identified GOLUBEV by name an] photograph as a First Chief Directorate counterintelligence officer,
who had served in New York City under United Nations cover in 1960 and 1961. NOSENKO said that he first
met GOLUREV in 1959 and knew nothing of his earlier career. Because GOLUBEV had at one point been assigned
to Geneva with the Soviet Disarmament. Delegation, NOSENKO went to him in 1962 for a briefing on Forcign
Ministry personnel in the delegation before his own assignment to Geneva. NOSENKO said he last saw GOLUBEV
in KGS Headquarters in 1963. At that time GOLUBEV was asgigneé to the New York Direction of the Counter=-
intelligence Hugactment of the First Chief Directorate, and NOSENKO said that GOLUBEV had been in this
Department as tong as he had known. hin.

tad
Ges
cw

ows
oOo.

=e oon : . 2 EE EN I AE RR A


14-0000

Lvoted

(OP S

It is commen knowledge among KGB employees that
GRIBANOV was expelled from the KGB and CPSU and

is now on pension, partial rather than full, as

a result of the NOSENKO defection. When NOSENKO
was being considered for assignment to Geneva

(in 1961), a summary statement of his activities
was prepared in the Second Chicf Directorate and
sent to GRIBANOV. This summary contained con-
siderable "compromising information” concerning
NOSENKO; if acted upon properly, at would have
removed him froin connideration for this trip.
GRIBANOV read the summary material, ran a line
throng! all of it, and udded the notation: “Sand
him to Geneva." The general feeling is that
GRLBANOV was willing to overlook a lot of NOSENKO'S
derreiencins because of GRIBANOV's lony-time
triendship with NOSENKO's father. * erat

(Reported to by fie
FBI on 29 Jarnua 5)

he sat Pad

GRIBAXOV has been dismissed from the FGB, ex-

pelle@ from the CPSU, and is presently Living

on a emall pension. His dismissal occurred
immediately after NOSENKO's defceotion.** in '
addition, not less than 50 other people were dis-
missed, many of whom were close friends of GRISANOV.
Most of these were from the First and Second Chief
Directorates, with the majority from the Second

(voported TCL by
the FRI on 9 Peli

ary 19€5)

Tees

Chief Directorate. The present Acting Chie? of Bd
the Second Chief Directorate is a Major General eS
BANNIK, whose appointmont has not yet been approved rer
by the Central Committee of the CPSU. One of oo
his deputies is a Major General (F.A.) SHCHERBAK. Ss

-—

. ROSENR said that bis father and GRIBANOV were not acquainted.

** GRIBANOV was reportedly in operational contact wath a senior Western diplomat in Moscow as recently
as late autumn of lu64. At that time he turned his contact over to another KGB officer.

earn Te ee Ee teaddind

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Early June oee (Re-
orted to CIM by the

p
FRY on 29 gunosyu5)

Major General BANNLKOV is currently temporary
Chief of the Second Chief birectorate, having
replaced GRIRANOV who was expelled from the KGB
fecause he supported NOSENKO in his carcer.®
-GRIBANDV ia working in a small city outside
Moscow 2% the chief of security at an import=
ant military plant und is new a “nothing.”

After the dofection of MOSENKO the KGB conducted
an idttensave investigation to determine which
employees new him and the natuce of their rela-
tuenship. During this TAPARRIN was questioned;
id he knew NOSESKO, but only cusually and
because of Latcdted contacts within the KGB.
irventicatacn Guternined, however, thet
wrababkLn aid GhIBALG wero égiends socially and
that TARAGKIN attenéad several parties at which
NOLEMES was presepe.  dyyis invited by NOSENKO
were ulkQ thare & deseribed one such
party. Thereatter, i AWHRIN was afforded a hear-
ipg and was aeeused on willfully concealing
wital anfurmation, As a rasult he was expelled
from the KGB and the CPSU and was deprived of
all. ponsaon rights.***

nutnovined his 1964 trip to Geneva, during which he defected, and
i ‘ Qid not know that he (NUSENFO) was making this trip. Never-
chat GRIBANOV maght be fired from the K03 as a result of his defection
wa ahead.” NOSENKO suid that BANNTKOV would not be punashed because

* bam as a candidate fur the 21964 Geneva assignment (sce Pages 333-334).

NOSENnu seid that .t wes
that to the best of ris
theless, NOSENKO said &
becuuge"he was rccsponsiyl:
he had done nothing other

NOSENKO reported that TARAGAIN was Chief of the British Department from 1958 to 1963, at which time he be-
come Deputy Chief or “Service No. 2," the reorg nize Counterintelligenes Department of the First Chief
Directorate.

NOSENKO said he saw GRIBANOV tures Ciimes souLally during his KGB career: on each oceasion TARABRIN was presont.
NOSENKO reported that he provided githa for ERUDANOV and WARAGRIN at parties io 1962 and 1963, but not in 1961.
He could not recall any cotarle of the iver party fe.y., who the girls were, where they went, what they did,
ete.). He was, however, abla te deseribe the 1903 party, which took place in October or, in con=
Siderable Cctail Gon Ra a eee a ag ROP ‘ ee ere PR te At MT es ax iy

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b. The Conpromise of PEX“OVSKIY
(4) Introduction

SEAS? and NOSENKO agree on only one aspect ef the
PEXNKOVSKIY compromise (sce Part Vtll. B.6.b.): They both
attribute the i compromise te HGP surveillance. Al-~
though & 3 : w renort sgrees with NCSENKO that
the KGR ertcan participation in the operation
only after PENKOVSKiY was arrested, iipsubsequent reports
contradict this by ty ing the comprotise directly to survoil-
lance of U.S. Emba personnel visiting the Pushkin Street
dead drop sitc. sta Za story of the events stenming from
the corpromise of the gead drop site is at odds both with
the facts of the case and with all other reporting by
Soviet sources of CiA and the FBI.

(iid) Discussion

after the KGB terainated the Ce ated that the
KGB had been aware of PENXOVSXIY's involvement with Aneri-
cans, and specifically with the CIA officer JACOB, for about
two and one half months prior to the arrests. This state-
ment is inaccurate concerning JACOB, wino was a last-ninute
substitute for the servicing of the Pushkin Street dead drop
on 2 Movember 1962 and who never hefore had personally par-

ticipated in the opcration. statements otherwise aS :
agree with NCSENKO's subseavent report aad the “official

report" regarding KG3 ignorance of the role of American
Intelligence in the PENKOVSKIY cose.

ae BUport on the case, however, is contra-
dictory tu his first repert and to the othex sources: He

“said in 1963 that surveillance of U.S. Embassy tar-

gets detected a visit to the Pushkin Sircet site by an

American, and that the resulting 24-hour surveillance of the

site caught PENKOVSKIY visiting the same location, whereupon

he was arrested and confessed. CIA, however, has no evie

gence besides the statements b¥ Bthat PENKOVSKIY ever a
went to the Pushkin Strect site after it was visited by CIA
personsel.

In Gye 1963 Gahae reported at greater length about
the role of Pusnkin Sireet in PENKOVSKIY's compromise. At
this time he explained that the American had visited Pushkis
Street not once but twice: surveillance had observed Lim on
both vccasions when he went inside the entrance, but followed
‘him inside only on the second visit. The surveillant who wn ne
entered the building reported that the Ascrican appeared to :
be tving his shoe; although this was not unusual in itself,
: Swcontinucd, the ract that it was the second visit to
the same address for no visible purpose caused suspicion,
and as a result the KGB installed a cJosed circuit TV camera
to provide 24-hour coverage of the site. PRNKOVSKIY was ob-
served checking it (see preceding paragraph): an jmerican
was observed loading a dead drop behind a lubby heating unit
(radiator); the KGB tagged the dead drop material with a
radioactive substance; PENKOVSKIY was observed unloading the
dead drop and proceeding to his office where he secreted the

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the £56 also
continued in ¢erveallisee of the deat dour site, observed
PENKOVSKITY lend the 2-2 crop, and oe an JAnericin
(JacOR) vho came te unlord it. PENECYSELY vis thea confroated
with photosrapnie evidence of the Loadings and unloadiags and

could offer no defers Tnis report s5 the caly indicaticn
froa a Soviet source taat the EGG iad veilled the two
vindts ty the Pusbhis Street site made Ly U.S, Enbasay of -

g ficers: ohile SEB report stated whet one Asericain
visited the @ tTeice, in face teo difserenat Anericars
wvacited the site once cach, MAHONEY on 2] Jaccary i961 end
ABIDIAN on 30 becenber W6l.

re
2

(iv) Remarks

The Pushtin Street dead drep was never used fcr communi-
cation to PENKOVSKIY. and in fact was loaded only once, vhen
the KGP Git suo and activated it on 2 Novenmbcr 1962, thereby
1 apprehending JACOB, Worcover, the first visit to Pushkin
Strect, in January ifs}, predated any rersonal contect bet-
ween PENEOVSALY and Ugstern Intelligence, either Americaa or
British. Thus, @sM@eee report on Ancricans visiting there
is only partially oecuraiec., and the use of taese “surveilled"
visits 2s an explanation for how the KGB detected PENKOVSKIY
i is unsupportable. in reporting inccrrectly cr this matter,
co ee ——" eee conls have orrec merely tecause his sub-seurces (one & -

unnamed, the othe: aprorcaicy cezpite the conflict in
reporting sieur his position) repested erroneous infera-

tion in his presecn:e.

MELEE cccorsscless is the c :.arce t2 reveal that the
¥GE was aware of 4: ienkin ead Gro as early -as
21 January LAG SLU. ge, there- ¢
fore has c= £ NOSEND- cy showing
KG2 awarere une to the zead drop
site il i re, end even before

PENKCVSETY ing porsonai centact
with Western intelliceice servic was the ABIOIAN visit,
KOSEUKO said, snich first arouse: nicrest in the site at

Pushrin Street.

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i. Introgueétior.

ay

While in general terms corroboratins "OSENKO's claims to °
service in both the GRU and the KGB, EEUES. bas supplied scme ;
details which are incompatible with the statenente by NOSENKC on
his intelligence career. Althouunh roy 38 prolific a reporter on
BOSENKO as €& Er Ty UN suet tugemtics had several topics in
common with NGSENKO: UPON, Ke VSKIY, CHEREPANCV, SHUBIN,
SLESINGER, and the contacts hetween the GRU officer BOLSKAKOV and
Attorney General Fobert KFEGNFDY in 1962, “Wien compared with
NOSENKO's information, the ceports Ly gs Don the case of FOPOV,
PENKOVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV #re interlock:ng:

~G Band NOSENKO agree that FOPOV was compromised
after his return to Moscow from East Berlin in November 1958
ard in consequence of KGP surveillance.

- CHEREPENCV and NOSENKO likewise agree about POPOV's
compromise.

7 concurred with NOSENKO by indicating that
CHEREPANOV was a genuine source of American Intelligence, and
this statement by € j

: Ape: gge™ learned some of his
details cn the compromise Of FENKGVSKIY, end WRIiEgEBAand
ROSENKO lave indicated thet this compromise resulted from
KGB surveillance of PEXKCV3KLY's British contacts in Moscow,

Presented below are @Xgige s remarks about NOSENKO, followed by
a review of the topics conmon to these two sources.

2. Statements. on NOSENKO

When disevssing HOSENKO for the first time, EMSRS said on
. SSE NS Spee Pcthet they were not cversonelly acquainted, but
that. “various persons” in Moscow (whom he did rét identify) had
spoken to him about NOSENKO, The statements by WESERgsse and NOSENKO
on the latter's background are compared in the following tabulation:

HOSENKO
As a young man, NOSENKO attended NOSENKO said his entire ser-
the GRU's Military-Diplomatic vice in the GRU, in the years
Acadeny (MDA) end then was in 1950-1953, consisted of duty
i the GRU Information Department -- in the Naval GRU, first in
wide _ in all, perhaps a year of service the Far East and then in the .——. -
: in the GRU,* Baltic.**

/* Qntil the late 1950's, the course at tne MDA, the strategic
“intelligence school of the GRU, lasted for four years; more
recently, the course has been of three years’ duration.

**During the 1950-1953 period and before, the Naval GRU was
separate from the rest of the GRU, :

‘
4 . . TOP SEE

14-0000

ae
that NCSENKO had provided.

Typ secest

810.
NOSEKO

A “very undisciplined person“ NOSENKO's statements abcut him-
while in the GRU and “not very self during the 1950-1953 period
good," NOSEIKO was to have been appear to acree with the evalu-
Giecharged from the GRU. ation, but he has said rothing

about facing discharce by the

. Navel Gu,

ROSENKO's father, “a very in- His transfer from the Saval GRU
flventiai person in the Miz istry to the KG3 jn 1953, NOSINKO
of Shipbuilding," was able to said, wrs at the initiative of
get NOSSNKO transferred to the KG" General KOBULY, e friend
KGB. of } ris father: the eléer ROSENKO

was Minister of Snipbuiiding.
NOSEXKO was “an important boss" Aecording to NOSEVKO, his most
in the KC8 (directorste or recent KG3 title crior to de-
depertment unkno:m) . fecting was Deputy Cnief

Teurist Department, KG3 Second
Chief Direcrorate.

ASS See stated that NOSENKO cave ‘very, very geod information"
to the enited States, having hed “great access" to KGB information
which included "all means of KGP coveraze of people in Moscow,

srophore systems in the emLassies, etc." ihe U.5. Enkassyv. 4
“ae-ontinued. hed found micrephones on the basis of information

3. Parallels with NOSENKO's Reporting
a. The CHEREPANOV Case

(i) Summary

One of the two ways in which EBX nas corroborated NOSENKO
on the authenticity of CHEREPANOV asa ceruine source of American.

the KGB; CHEREPAN ‘OV cave some papers to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,
which returned them to che Soviet Miniscry of Foreign Affairs
(MFA); the MFA turned the papers over to the KGB, which traced
them by analysis to CHEREPANOV; meanwhile, CHEcREFANOV had tried

to flee the USSR, but he was captured near the Turkisn border and
executed. In every major-respect, therefore G@igho@Magrees with
NOSEIKO's version Of the case When asked whether the CHEREPANOV
incident might Pave heen “a trick" by the KGS to emcarrass the
U.S. Embassy, 255 replied that it was definitely not.

The second way in which Pad has certified that CHEREPANOV
was a Genuine source is indirect. Like NOS@mIKO and-cme-of the
CHEREPANOV documents. sgemep hac ~ ‘GidicStec that KGB surv~:llance
of a U.S. Embassy officer creugnt about the compromise of POFOV.

(ii) Remarks
As stated in Part VIII.B.6., the GIEREPANOV incident was a

KGB provocation against the U.S. Embassy, but it is conceivable
that statements suggesting the contrary could have been made

qr seco


14-0000

TOP SEE".

81k.

k @égreement with:
e cause of POPOV! 8 compromise,
rowever, appears to Le based on direct involvement, and
does rot eppeer to be attributeb: suD-sources having provided
him with erroneous informstion; this £s discussed further below.

b. The Conpromise of PEXKKOVSKLY

G Pmepy dates on the conpronise of PE'KOVS¥IY are at vari-
ance with NCSZNKO's end they disagree on wrecker the ¥GD knew
American Intelligence to te involved in this operation befcre
JACOB of CIA was apprenended at the Pushkin Street dead drop on
2 November 1962. Soth sorces stated, however, that eurveillance
led to the detection of PEXKCVSKIY, although acain they differ on
the person with whom PEXYOVSXiY was firet seen by the KGB: ees
said this individual was the Britian busirecsnan wm while NOS.
EXKO said it was the Exglisnwonan brs. CHISECLM.

According t QGERETED PELKOVSKIY had been working openly
with WYNNE, explcaning tnat he was trying to develop WANE, and
the KGB learned cf their meetings througn surveillence,* CiA
records show that WYNNE ret PENKOVENIY in Moscow dtring April-
“av 1961, May-June 1961, Aagust 1961, and June-July 1962, EC

repert that PENXOVSKIY cane under fuspicion in May 196
therefore {1s not consistent with his staterent about KGS surveil-
lance of the WYNNE-PENKCVSKIY meetincs, nor does this report co-
incice witl. the evidence from WYNNE himself that the KC3 was
sufficiently Suspi Ci Oe of their meetings to record a conversea-
ticr they had had aaah 1951 (one year earlier than in the

version). NOSE: 9 dated the FENKOVSKIY compromise at a
month or two after he was first Setn, Eut at the time not iden-
tified, in contact with Mrs. CHISHOLM in November cr December
1961.

Whereas NOSENKO said the KGB was unaware of the participa-
tion of American Intellicence in the FESKOVSKIY operation until
JACOB was detained, reported that while PENKOVSKLY was
at a reception in Moscca, te was ocserved making contact with an
American in a lavator;. did sot date this event, but

CIA reccrds show that it “as on 27 Avgust 1962, added
that the KGB “invented” the incidert at Fushxin Street on 2 Nov-
ember 1962, the month after PENKOVSKIY's arrest, in order to
catch the American unlcading the dead drop. **

_—_
* The sane statement was made by NOSEWKO ard in the official
KGB document on PENKCVSKIY's compromise,

t*This is obviously true. although the cate cf PSNKOVOKIY's
arrest may have Leen more than a month Lefore.

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14-0000

TR SECT

G12.

ce The Compromi3ze of POPOV

(4) Introductacn

Of all the sources available to American Intelligence, SIFU
is the 1 best placed to report on the compzomi $e of FOPOV: Cos eee

em.

Paze eae i xm 2 Ltr. that provided by NOSENKO "and
CHERES POV, es well as that in the 16 September 1959 message fren.
POFOV to CIA (kolieved to have been dictated Ly the KGB). These
four sources have indicated that the ccmpromise resulted from KG3
surveillance of a U.S. Foabessy official following the recall of
' PCPOV in Nevembver 1958. GEESE however, ras not precisely dated
the incident (Gated by inrerence cy the cthers at 2} January 1959),
has asscciated it with an Averican Intelligence dead drop for POPOV
(whereas the otters have said it was CIA's mailing of a letter to
POPOV), and has not rived tne CIA officer involved {(George WINTERS) 2]
The evidence fr : @Piike that from NOSENM“O, CGHEREPANCV, and
the PCFGV message, conflicts with that from CULITSYN whose state-
ments on the compromise of FOPCV ere supported by andlysis of events
in 2957 and 1358 on which FOPOV reported (se: Pages 663-665),

(ii) Letails

have been che prelude to the POPOV compromise:

“a¥ had rade a “very serious mistake" by using an

i accommodation acdre3s Supplied by Acrerican Intelligence to receive

' mail from a girlfriend in Austria.** “In secre hion” chis came

. to the attention of the Austrian poiice, ¢ age ARE and
it was determined that she had been sending 7al O28 Soviet offi-
cer in Berlin, The Austrian police notified the Soviets, and

| eventually FCFIV was confronted ty the chief of his GRU component
in Berlin.*** GRU Headquarters was notified, POPOV was recalled

ie ier se

Of providing in-
Jo sub-source for this remark
ee’ * 2 Fos : f and since then %

resolved the discrepancy pdetween this version ana the other
one treated at length here.

Sie ote

** CiA did not supply POPOV with en acconmodation address, but.
he did secretly ccrrespond with KOCHANEK.

Cs so emits Ss

? went to the Austrian police on 25 Auqust 1958 with
Hl intormation that included the identification of POPOV as a Te
' Soviet Intelligence officer.  POPOV’s superior confronted him :
on 4 November 1958 about KOCHANEX ard received from him an
; admission to having had some correspondence with her corcern-
ing his search for gperasional leads: the superior told POPOV
that the Soviets believed "she was working for someone” ard
that “possibly she is the cause” of the Perlin unit's opera-
tional difficulties. PCPOV was recalled to Moscow on 17 Nov-
enber 1958 ostersibly for a weex's TDY to discugs the case
of an American whom he was developing under CIA aegis. He
did not return to Berlin.

Foe cee tn ae

TOP SECT

ened.

“ 9 ~~
TOP Senet.

813.

to Moscow to explain the ejtuation, and when he was unable to do
so, the facts vere turned over to the KG3 for full-scale investiga-
PLAY ae SEE REMC eer it not been for POPOV's
correspondence with an woman, "they would never have
caught hin," and that FOP ecause of a connection
with a girl;" also, eae 1959 POPOV
was recelled to Moscow ~ “ee y fee
While the foregoing KGB investigation was in progsess B
routinely placed under surveillance a U.S. Emoassy official in
Moscow, This person was observed renting a boat in Gorkiy Park,
going to the vicinity of a new bridge near the Moscow Stadium,
and there taking photographs of the bridge and surrounding arec.
Its suspicions aroused, the KGB covered this area and observed
POPOV unloading a dead drop. He was arrested, doubled, and |
"operated" against American Intelligence for a year ard one-half.*
Eventually, the KG3 put in motion a plan to attempt to compromise
the Amcrican official who was meeting POPOV. The KGS photographed
a meeting in a Moscow resraurant, then arrested the official and
showed him pictures of his necting with POPCY and of FOPOV UNn-
loading the dead Grop at the bridge. iter the Awerican refused
to work fer the KGB, he was released and declared persona non

grata.**

ar Pee CLA quest ioneaE eon popov's
compronise. He fala at tu:s time that he hed hesrd POPOV was
apprehended through a desd droup- PCrOV “apoarently was under
suspicion there in Perlin., and when tacy (presumably the GRU)
recalled him to Moscow, they wondered who his future contacts
would be, and they were told rhe following: 'KGB workers place
American I:nbassy employees uadec surveillance.' They observed an
American at the staircese... and they found a dead: drep unijer the
staircase. ‘So they established coverage of the dead drop and ob-
served POPOV come and unload the drop. They made a report, and
after this POPOV was under surveillance... Then he was called in
and told thus-and-so. They showed him photographs. They told
him he was going to work for them to expose his contacts. He
agreed to it..."***

_

* Since POPOV returned to Moscow in November 1958 and LANGELLE
was arrested the following October, he could not have been
doubled against CIA for more than eleven months.

** Starting on 4 January 1959, POPOV had a series of six brush
contacts in Moscow with the CIA officer Russell LANGELLE of
the U.S. Embassy, culminating in the detention and interview
of LANGELLE by the KGB on 16 October 1959.

**#*As previously stated, no Moscow dead drops were used by CIA
in the POPOV operation, but LANGELLE did survey the possi-
bilities for dead drops to ke used in other operations, One
Of these was bocated-in-benin-Hills,-an_area of Moscow_not___
far from the new bridge near Moscow Stadium, and it was

meituated beneath a staircese; a4 rte as EG FEES
‘ EXE ree OLANIGELLE visited the area vs tne aeac

ecn <4 28 May 1959, but the dead drop was loaded
py a CIA legal travel agent (on 7 June 1958) rather than by
LANGELLE. The CHEREPANOV @ocument, discussed on Pages 563-
564, stated, in the course of reviewing LANGELLE's operation-
al activities in Moscaw, that this dead drop was for use with
an agent named REPNIKOV; in fect, it was not intended for

the REPNIKOV case.

Top secre! | a

14-0000

JOP Scurct poe

SE, that he had learned these
details aivut’ ine c =rorise me POPC! fcom a converset
ons
B22 FRE A: ena AS TPS vs Conductca some of the aie

Veetrgalion or POPUV secattse at Che time he vas art

a ide FS Paes Sig’ Tae sane: sul-s
information L2 supplied CIA in

Civ) hemarks

Porte? BIG rreporcea, ineecurately, that Arerican Inteliigence
gave cress an accomaedation address in Berlin, that a dead drop
Wes used in tne Moscow puase cf the operation, and that the KGB
doubled FOPCV for a year and one-half before terminating tne case.
Fach of these inoorrect items cane to WER SSE. :
since Wry di Fs SF re participaced in tne investigation of
PCFOV, pres: iniBLY re would have recoonized then to_be untrue. One
cyplanation for the inacctracies mignt be that ¢
prscisely what he had been told, but. @@RREeymS c sldberately mis-
informed nim, There is, however, no evident reason why ere aC ERG

wold have done this. Another explanation might be thal eEiggiat ,
migundecstoog his sub-source, or in relaying + the infor aticn to

the details. Tuis . s

attentive to d.tails on a pe sal acguaintunce who had gainzd

notoriety, details wnich he was tole at a time when he was in a

positfioa comparable to Po ino cantact with aes intelli-
i as 2

~ ie. naIse explunztioas :
entirely satisfactory, amd the enswer may lic elsewhere.
+

: a8 been inconsistense about the deqree of suspicion
surrounding POFOV hen ne was recalled to ho November 1958:
in connection mach his correspendence with Cr one hand,
_ Eo Geena eg evacn nis ce thet the KGF surve ce of the U.S.
Enbassy officer was _Coincidenta? with the separate investigation
of POPOV's wip With this Acstrian woman. Ci: the other
han in Sac W?implied that as a result of the suspicion
of ZOPOV in Berlin, tnere was interest 1n POFOV's future contacts
in Moscow, an interest whicn would he covered by the KGB's sur-~
veillance of U.S. Entassy employees.

*However, .in another version @QRaee said that ag soon as the
Illegals reported their compromist in January 1956, POPOV
irmediately fel) under suspicion. The conflict between <BR

Statements hes not been resolved.

t

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14-0000

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“TOP Siuist eS

BL5.

dg. suurin, “PLESINGER, ard ROLSHAKCY i

In three instanc(Gagmp6s NOSDXO confirmed reports made by
BEX ke 7 the izui@tfication of SHUEIN as a GRU agent, the
Soviets‘ suspicions that SLZSINGER was in cortact with the FBI, and
che status of BCLSHAKOV as a GRU officer.* ,

SHUBIN was previously known to have Leen associated with two
GRU Illegals in the United States during the 1949's, put indepen-
dent of NOSRNKO and qikpRieker there 1s no verification of his having
more recéatly been an agent of the GAU. «ir gine Ss ewe ae

een

POLSHAKOV, the only claimed mutual acquaintance of LEE
and KOSENKO, hag not bren named as @ GRU off:cor by eny other :
source, Ter has ne Leen observed if *tinns with GRU agents, Both

: GP and NUSPNNO spoke of ROLSH ‘s heving met Attorrsy
General Robert KENNEDY in 1962, NOZSEIKO added that, in initiating
the contact, the Attorney General kuew HOLSHAEOV to be a “military
intelligence officer," hut this repory has rot been corrokorated.**

4. Comments on <exeeEe

[2 F confirmation that SOSZ[IKO is = cenuine KGB officer-
1s comprised of hearsay evidence. and hence the conclusion

ENKO was dispatched by the 855 woula not necessarily bring

“Pr bora Lides into question: much would depend upon @& Wine

-fources, as yet unidentified.

ality tind on the compromise
+ AS ity ar MAS: eae end both

have authenticated & Eee Cie validity of a CHERE-
PANOV document whicn concerned the FurOV compromise and which was
prepared by toe KGB for trensmittal to American Intelligsnce. In
addition, and NCSFNKO ‘support one another about the PENKOV-
SKIY comprenise pabout the contact between SULSHAKOY caging
Pats peueas acd Robert KEWIEDY, and about SHiUBIN and vomit
aT ineormetion or BOLSHAKOV and SHUNIN is unique; on SLESINGER
it is ccrrororated by actions taken by the KCB, as reported by
SLESINGER; on POPOV, PFNKCVSKIY, and CHEREPANOV it is confirmed
by KGS controlled sources.

of POPOV, a Pman

With the exception of his details on PCEOV Gg RELEESDR report-
ing on NOSENKO and on common topics <an be explained, individually,
by misinformat ion Ga-ERgeeR eceived and innocently passed along.
These items taken togetnec, however, in the light : state-
ments on the compromise of POPOV (which conflict with GOLITSYN's
reporting and analytical evidence) are indications that
is contrelled by the KGB.

**#I1€ Robert KENNEDY indeed knew BOLSHAKOV to be a GRU officer,
the question remains as to how NOSENKO was aware of the fact,

since as the only source to have made this identifica-
tion before the time when KENNEDY and BOLSHAKOV met. :

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F.

1. Introduction

¢ BF) BY courterintellicgence production has been ex-
tremely limited. For the most part sic has provided only super-
ficial reports, generally only ir response to questioning and
frequently citing her cwn lack of access to information of value.
Her profe3sed personal involvement in, and dramatic accounts of,
certain situations on which XOSENKO's reporting is demonstrably
false is’ therefore nctreworthy in the context of her total perferm-
ance. Gee ppereys reporcing on NCSENKO, despite vequeness
ané contradictions, fas the net effect of supporting his bona
fiees und affirming the importance of the information he nas re-
ported. Her accounts of the CHEREPANOV czse emphasized the depth

¢Yy of nis treason ard the retrituzio: xGL--thermes +

as

Gomirate the NOSENKO account oa i BELG Z :
Ker reports on the compromise ct PENKOVSKIY, while differing
markedly from NOSENKO’s in basis, scope, ana detail, confirmed
almost to the month NOSENKO's dating of the compromise. Her
confessed pirticipetion as an egent of the KGB Second Chief
Directorate, despite her repeated claims to know rotiing of im-
portance concerning its operations, has placed her in NOSEiKO's
milieu, and the KCB officers who figured in her reporting are
(with two exceptions) personzlities who have previously been
identificd as KG3 officers only by NOSENKO.

2. NOSENKO's Packground and Career

Phas claimed no first-hand or authoritative
knowlcéGe of NCSZNKO, reporting at various times that she had
heard gossip, had heard about him from her KGB friend SVIRIN
(who she believed only "knew about" NOSE:KO, i.e. did not know
him personally), or h2d heard about him from “someone froa the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, not SVIRIN."| She has reported frag-
ments on NOSENKO's background: his father's positicn, his mother's
ethnic background, and NOSENKO's non-KG2 status. She initially
said that NOSEVKO's father was a general, iater said she was not

od sure of that, and still later amended her description to “general

: or minister," adding that he was Ukrainian - thus approaching
an accurate statement only efter several conversations about
him. Her consistent statement that NOSENKO‘s mother was Jewish
and involved in black market activities has not keen elsewhere
reported, and her statement that NOSENXO was a civilian, rather
thar. a KGB officer, contradicts his ow account and that of
other sources who have confirmed his KGS status. gaia
sourcing of her limited information on NOSENKO to her KG
SVIRIN nevertheless demonstrates at least potential access to
some information about NOSENKO. (SVIRIN was identified by
NOSENKO as an officer of the Third Section of the American

————— Department, Second Chief Directorate, since 1963, and oefcre

that of the Thizd Department of the Directorate of the KGB

Second Chief Directorate, where he participated in and received

an award for his part in the investigation of PENKOVSKLY.)

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822.
3. NOSENKO's Knowlecze - Damage to the K33 one

OER ; ures to the
Americans concerning the “microphor. es in tne U.S, Embassy - her
only reference to inforzation he miont have provided - on each
occasion when she has discussed NOSENKO, She ence ettributed to
SVIRIN the renark in October i19€6 that MOSENKO had done consider-
able harm to the Sceviet Unicn by revealing this information, thus
(and specifically only in thiscor.text) underscoring the importence
of NCSENKO's infcrmation, (NOSENKO himself has characterized this
information es the most important he has provided.) The context
in which she has discussed MO5FKO has been the gereral one of
Gefectors frcm tne Soviet Unicon: she has rereatedly emphasized
that the Soviets 2tterre to ccnvince all Seviet cttizens that

ind tne Land nf KGS

oy

; ke: ‘ : erence to NCSENKO, she

ite wiving Saad that NCSEK9,. too, would one
Gay be extermin vated, thes ciearly implying shat NOSENKC was a
Genuine cefectcr.

4. Parallels with SCEE:KO's Keporting
a. The CHEREPANDY Czse

SALT EIES S account of CHEREPA‘OV's cisalfection, treason,

arrest, and execution co.tirts ir general oaths he and in emphasis
that of SCSEXNKO. PEERS
ease through her own ana 15
ERP ENON ang his wit e.

a to that

She introduced her account of the CHERLFANCV case, as in her
discussions of NOSENKO, Ly references to the deternination ard
effectiveness cf the KGB in apprehending and executing those wno
were “running away"; she cffered GiZFCPANCY as an example'of a
Soviet traitor sno had ceen caught and executed. Her account c=
the details, however, differs sharply froa thet of NOSENKO (and
others). Her identification of CHEPEPANOY as 4 classmate of her
husband at the GkU's Military Diplomatic Acedemy (MCA) fron 1956

> to 1959 is unique amorg the sources who h revorted on CHERE-
PANOV, For the period Guring which FA said CHEREPHIOV
attended the XOA, NOSENKO has made no specific statements con-
cerning CGiEREPANOV's career; he has said only that at some un-
specified date after CHEREPANOV’s return from Belgrade (elsewhere
reported as mid-1956) and before earhy 1960 CHEREPANOV had been
assigned to the U.S. Enras American Cepartment, KG3
Second Chief Directcrate. : zlsc stated, however,
that after his craduation rrom tne MUA in 1959, CHEREPANOV
"finally" obtained a job in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, s19-
gesting that he had no intervening assignment. Wnere NOSENKO
has failed to establish a clear motive for CHEREPANOV's having
collected KGS cocumerts during his assignment to che UL 54, F-tassy
Section for later trarnsnuitctal to the Anericars, ; ; has
described his increasing bitzersess from the dat
the MPA in 195&. . She was not sure that he had been. a KGB officer;
she neither mentioned ror dig her account allow for nis assign-
ment to the U.S, Emkassy Section in 1960-1961 (as st tated by

ror See"

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14-0000

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823.

by NCSENKO); and she described the dvxcuments which he turned over.
to the scericans as raving come from the Ministry of Foreign Trade.
She stated, therefore, rather than dencrstrated, the point that
“these were such imporcant decum nts, impoctant enough that...he
was enot.

~ Dering her seccn@ account of the GCERErPANOV affair;
2 “Y sourced her information differently ard added first-hand
Get:ils waich she hac previously disclaimed having. ‘She said that
"In teo days this man was arceste?...in two ronths he was snot."
Tnis is alto at variance with NCSiNMl's account of a KGB investiga-
tion sf tp to 29 cr 23 days, folluwei ry the KSr officer's visit
to CHEREFANOY on 8 Decemter 1963, GiZZEPeNOV's fiight, and a seven-
eay search for iim before his arrest

dD. The Compromise cf PRIKOVSKTY

Clesely conforming in tyis roscece ta NOSSNKO'S account cf
PRIKCVSAIY's comproa:se, S ea laced the date of initial
suspicion of PENKOWSHKiY at about Cccocer cr November 1961. Her
statemenzs of the casis for this cuspicien, however, differ com-
pletely from the reeszens advanced by NOSENKO (and other sources).
Her account 4s vacue, in consonance with her claimed lack of any
first-hand contezperery knowleds2 cf the investigation leading to
his errest, and ig celored py her expressed personal dislike for ,
FENKCWSXLY the man and by the professicenal asf ef her hus-
pand which resulted from FENKOVSKAI Y's arrest.
her KG3 friend SVIRIN as the source of some of her information,
as the scurce cf the indirect warring to her husband to stay away

from PEXKOVSKIY, and as scmcone «ho knew adcut PEIKOVSKIY's trial
end had beer, somehow essociated with the investication - thus
confirming KCSEXKO on SVIRIN's perticipzation tn’the PENKOVSKIY
investigation. —

c. Reports or KGS Fersornel

d Pas neomed reiatively few KG3 officers who have
figured ror careers as a K&B ager: cr about whom she cculd re-
port any sucstance. Of Her KGB handlers:

- CIA has been unable to identify one, Gennadiy Fedor-
ovich, whose last same she did rot know, her handler while
she worked at the Embassy cf Nepal in 19€4. NOSESKO has not
referred to operations against this Embassy.

~- Two KGa handlers were assigned to in
Leningrad - V. i. DEMIDOV and Georgiy PGiELIN. Soth OE these
officers had previously been identified by WOSENKO as officers
of the Leningrad KG3 and have not been identified by any
other source. They were two of the total ef four Leningrad
KCB officers named Ly NOSENKO, ,

- Her KGB hendler while she was employed by a Canadian:
correspondent in Moscow was Visd=mir Ivanovich KCSTYRYA.
Only NOSENKO has identified KCSTYPRYA as the KGB officer who
had been in the United States under the name Vladinir .
Vixtorovich WLADIMI2¢V: NCSEXKO cernsidered this, as he said

‘ : : 3 among KGB per

tn tte UsS. uncer int “OVER?

work, however, Lut her connection with a foreign corres-
pondent, which was KOSTYRYA's respensibility after his re-
turn to Moscow.

relationship with him was not related to her. earlier SAvurast

"00000 9 9
) TOP SECRET

824.

Of the four other KCB officers cn whom ® ,
reported in any cepth, three were previously ident fed by NOSEMKO
and only Ly HOSEIXO:

- V.G. SVIS1N, her KGS frierd, is mubicuitous figure |
in much of her reporting on other subjects ard in her account
of her personal life, as weli as her primary candidate for a
Western recruitment approach, SVIRIN had previously been
identified by NOSE.KS es a KGB officer of the American De-
partment, Second Chief Cirectorete, previously involved in
the PENKOVSKIY investigation (both of which assignments
Fas contirned).

fees epee is ee tem e

~ Im connection with SVIRIN, recounted an

incicene in whech a KuB officer woos riped in ceroga- ;
tory terms Valencin MJZEYUIK, hid narrowly escaped dismissal :
asa result of a Grunken brawl with a militteman. MUZEYNIA i
had not only survived, however, bit continued to bear a :
higher KGB rank than his former friend, colleague, and sub- i
Crdinate, SVIRIN. SOS&iKO said MUZEYNIX was an officer of i
the Directorate cf the KGB Second Chief Directorate.

- Vadim bZRYUKOV was identified by eX aa as the
KSB officer under Novesti cover 7ss1cged cto are on tha
ace 1 66 of SPOOR IIE

id iia at 30-4) te Pana hs Knead

NOSENYKU had previously given information concerning BIA‘UKOV,
a KSB officer of the Tenth Department, KGB Second Chief
Dircctcrate, targetted against foreign correspondents,

information on NOSENEO and incomsistency in her statements that,
on one hard, he was a civilian but on the other, he was aware of
microphones in the U.S. Embassy. These facts indicate that if she
the KCB to report to American Intelligence on 805-
Pas inadequately prepared. Otherwise, however,
2 aed 38d personally supported the bona fides of NOSEWKC’
by offering Cirect confirmation of the bona fides of CHEREPANOV,
by corrororating NOSENKC's cetails om the PENKOVSKIY compromise,
and by verifying his identification of KGB Second Chief Director-
ate personalities.

5. Remarks
There is confusion in QeeapeeeSEes suv-sourcing for her
'
|
{

. Note: Aside from her sup € NOSENKCG and CHEREF ANOV, |
H there are many aspects of the : case which in- “
dependently led CIA and other W ervices to conclude

that she is a KGR-adispatched agent. Some of these aspects
are as _ follows:

- The circumstances of her claimed. ‘relationship with
the KGB contradict KGB practice as known from other sources.

og description of her husband's recall
from Stockhelm afc his punishnaent for havirg previously

worked as a GRU colleague of PENKOVSKIY in the GKNNR fit

neither the treatment of other GRU officers whom PENKOV-

SK1Y also identifie2 nor the logic of the situation: Her

husband was sent to Stockholm after PENKCVSKiY was un- :
covered and even after he was arrested. (That the brief |

eae etal

TOP SECRET

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‘ 825.
: assignment in Scockholm may have ter a KGU-orgenized pre-
lude to the defection of @aiayer: 1s alco suggested by

the fact that the one operational cuntact ner husband 15
knoen to have had there was a Western double agent, 6nd
4 PF was able to provide identifying data on this

agent.

- Nearly all of ee ueags s identifications of
- Soviet Intelligence persorelities were previously known.

- She has given confliczing accounts cf her motivation
for defectirg, of her relationship with her husband, and of
her associations with KG3 personnel.

- Against the background of the claimed difficulties
in which she and husband found themselves, it seoms un-
likely that would have teen permitted to leave
the USSR. ” .

- There are oddities in he: relationship with the
Canadian correspondent who employsd Fez in the USSR and who
was her allcyed KGB target, as Well 23 in her conduct in
the West and in her husband's situaticn and behavior since
the defection.

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anotner ineloge tne foriowing:

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that the Survertlance eu,

KGp Sur ce barertore’e includes epecial paint invisible
to tne naked ore Ov" visible tnrovan ese ot & Special Gesice
It a3 used an cconsunceien with Bend eprecs ciosed cirecuas
televisien at Lricaes. wenncas 6tL A Sinilar tecrnige?

was Gescribed by . i

-k PPAdOV Capris have coes-
criped @ LenSities CG GoGs tay nos
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yocre CHIPEPANOV papers.

“PATO papers Gave tne KGB

develorad a :
tnat they can bat arm one
also can ce comeeniew in
concealed. tisy ac used
conversaticrns ceiween foc
Eorel Merropo. and ine s
Cevices nave 3ALi0 ¢
NC SESEZO
Bintcr s.1a
cryp.onym 3:5

feparred ine KB reennique
of swWwit.nirg Lereprane oan batetee a for tie & S. Rabassy
in Moscow to a KiB ingtatsataon  enere tney are intercepred
by a Soviet posing as an American

Weere tne butik of KOSEIKO s reporting of KGB ocecrations was
concerned witn tnosr of tne Secoid Cares Sireitora.e. tnis nes
» tO4e@ WIT oa wo nere.

: nave a.su
SDL Mak Sounierintsisigence activi-

nob

given Gerails on

ties in eGdition to inelir starements on tree comprem1 se of CIA
asserts witnin che UFHk ta tupic of reporiing > .q CUERE-

r4i). The anturmation from gy
is summarized reiow

4 ADLe Lo provi Sel BULL CeTOn
Chief Dire-rorate activity. He reporied tne FGt's discovery of
an American empioyea at tne Sokotniki Fanibirion ir Moscow 1n

sterile

+
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verified.

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clandestine comract with an unidenritie.: Soviet female. (Tnis
contact 1S rot identifies With any ClA coerencaa at the Exhibition
in 1959.) he vpuke Of the Kons nowsbewo: of ar American Intelii-
gence Geaddrop uncer & be ~gceiculcural

eeh an the area of the

Exhibition, He said chat the KCS contrcelied ai: YS. agent con-
tacts 1n Moscon, including on wits an old aax in his 60's
ENKG reported cn an indiviaue! who isay re jaocti:e#) with this
agent).

mene

Vee

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vers have vest toed as steciurd procedure 2n
yoaue the Soviet Urion.

Tocrace agent

As previously medrese at eb rhe defecerans of
the genuine sources GCLI Sys Ri ieee "N6, that ¢merican
Intelligence Eegen to re. 2..e volsuinols ard cursally currcccrative

: neg

of . XOR Sccons Thief

on thas, anferma*Lan

tion ta the overlap of
y sources, even

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torace informatic , ae a ee Kt decision to em-

phasize cr sacrifice at. ‘°

informeticn fron others on tne achratt
and Surve:llance Directordies. whe ¢
therefore acpeers to ke sicnaficent in ae

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B35,
H. Evaluation

The conclusion thar BOSENFO 12 on a KG# m:3ss.ion could carry
damaging implications tor tne American intelligence sources wno
have Supported nis bona tides. Unless trzir statements or, NOSENKO
can be convinecinzly explained es innocens repetition of misinfor-
Mation spread by tre Fs within tne Sovier servicss. tnese sources
mignt be conciuced to nave been deliberately misleading eitner as
promotors cl tnéfir own persona! interests or as parties to a KGB
co.spiracy.

Regarding GCOLITSYN. tne opinion of CIA -1s tnat ie purpose-
fully gave false support for NOSENKO in an attempt to make his
opinions more @utnhoritative. This a satisfactory explana-
tion for the remarks on NOLENKO by : } P
however, there seem to oe no perscnai j Tac Uneal

“Support of SOSENKO's bona fides mignr Lave served. The choice
thus seeus to lie bewweoen tnese tnrec officers beiss genuine
Sources of ¢merican incelaigence wut eneitcing ¢nannels of KG
misinicrmation az: On tne otner mand, cne or more of tnem being
in league with tre KCL,

@ The possibiisty chi: Gee ! ee
K3E control was tested rurttier am the concexe cf nne NOSENKO opera-
tacr Cy reviewing caraiicis in their reperting ard his. and c:neral
correlations that ¢< fron one case to anotner. At the same
: ~~ connections were sroen for compar-
found tnat would eliminate
from considecracion as possibly being

aS ome

are uncer

Sars at

rovocation asent=.

This €xzmiration against the conclusion tnat
pntrol, has brougne the bona f14 of

gy isto Serious question. if Nos O 1s
tne KGB, these ctner so-rces cern also to ce.

ano

TOP SE! -

