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104-10306-10003 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

26 March 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes on Special Group Meeting, 26 March 1963

GB

1. Low-level reconnaissance of Cuba. Comparative result of high-
level versus low-level photography were demonstrated by Mr. Lundahl,
After considerable discussion, it was decided that the matter would be
held in abeyance for a week pending further developments on the Donovan
matter, In general, Gilpatric's attitude was against low-level on the basis
of Defense intelligence needs, but would agree if State felt periodic low-
levels would establish "right of access", Johnson expressed general ‘
objection at this time. McCone expressed two prevailing viewpoints within
CIA, but recommended proceeding with low-level, Bundy agreed to put 2
the matter to higher authority for final decision. McCone suggested he
was willing to accept responsibility for further delay.

Action: Matter to be reconsidered each week. ]

2. [Reconnaissance of Lo snesia. State, Defense, and Bundy alli
opposed overflying Indonesia. McCone recommended we support the
British effort and it was agreed that the matter would be put to higher
authority for decision, 7

GE

3. {Monthly Report of NRO was reviewed. McCone reported in detail
on the failure of recent CORONA shots; specifically referred to failures
of January, February, and March, and the fact that November and
December were not usually productive of good photography. He advised
Special Group that new estimates of Soviet capability could not be made
until the Fall, rather than in June and July as is customary. He advised
that the next flight was scheduled for Saturday, 30th of March, and it
will be a standard CORONA, Gilpatric reported that adequate emergency
back-up arrangements were being made, and delays of a type occurring
in the last 90 days would not be recurring.

McCone reported the difficulties incurred with the U~-2 generators
and brushes and the fact that this had caused a standdown of flights in the
Far East, but not in Cuba. Condition was reported as having been cor-~
rected and the North Korean, North China flight is on a weather alert.]

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4, The two papers from tne Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
on sabotage operations and additional covert programs were
returned for consideration by the Cuban Affairs Committee. It
was noted that the Cottrell Committee had not acted on these papers,
The procedure adopted was for Cottrell Committee action and
recommendations in much the same way that we now get Ambassador
endorsement of covert activities elsewhere. There was a general
concensus that actions against Cuba shipping would not be final
although it would be an irritant, since plan called for damaging and
making ships inoperative rather than destroying them. Several
details of the additional Covert Action Program were discussed,
The paper is to be revised and reviewed by the Cottrell Group.

_5. [Col, Steakley reported on the results of several recent
Elint missions, and Elint destroyer operations in the Far East and
Elint operation into the Baltic, Dr. Scoville reported on the
Chasse operation.]

c

6. [Question was raided as to the results from overflights over
Laos.

Action: I would like a thorough briefing on this as I have
heard nothing on this. 7

Te fic was reported that SAC seriously questioned CIA's con-
clusion that the SA-3 sites in Russia are low-level intercept
ground-to-air missile sites, Apparently SAC has prepared a report
on this, Gilpatric noted the March 18th CIA memorandum reaffirming
our conclusions,

Action: DD/I must pursue this matter and explore with
SAC their reasons for questioning our conclusions, This

is the second time in weeks that these conclusions have been
questioned, Advise mee]

JAM /ji

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26 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) meeting, 25 April 1963

Attended by Bundy, Johnson, Gilpatric, McCone

1. CIA weekly report on our activities was reviewed without
comment. No requests were made. No actions are needed.

2. (Extensive discussions of DCI's recommendations for low -
| level reconnaissance of Cuba. Gilpatric raised the question of political
| consequences. Johnson responded that Mr. Hughes had submitted a
paper to him indicating the Soviets would take a harder line under these
provocations. He reported that Thompson appeared to feel that low-
levels would be used as a basis to halt withdrawal and possibly intensify
the situation in Laos and eleewhere and that our interests would be
adversely affected. I took the position that intelligence requirements
were such that low-levels must be tontinued. It was agreed to go to
higher authority with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense
present. Arrangements were made for a meeting about 6:30, 25 April]

3. Mr. FitzGerald presented the proposed new covert policy
toward Cuba, reviewing the situation and specific operations in con-
siderable detail. The Group were impressed with the planning. They
were not prepared to act, and suggested the matter be discussed with
higher authority, and also that action be withheld until the Standing
Group had further deliberated on the question.

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4. (covert action in the Congo was discussed. Bronson Tweedy
reported briefly. The CIA proposal was approved. /

5. [The proposed (be operations of GROSBEAK were discussed

. in some detail. Colonel Steakley suggested this operation might prejudice
their ELINT operations. However, it was agreed that the exercise would
be undertaken during the May dark-of-the-moon period and the results
reported back to the Special Group prior to reaching a decision for reaching
approval of continuing operations. Jorgenson was instructed accordingly.

ACTION: CIA is authorized to undertake this operation;
it should be watched carefully, reported accurately and
fully, and brought before the Special Group at the time
we're considering the © June operations. /

Fine.

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78
6. {The status report on the Italian elections was briefly
discussed. Approval was expressed on the manner in which this
had been handled. Apparently, the poHtical observere on Mr.
Bundy's staff views coincided with those reported by the Rome

Station.) ° y €

7. (MeCone reported on the proposed plan for the April 30-
May 1 meeting on British Guiana. Mr. Bundy and Mr. Johnson
expressed the view that it was important that the strike be continued.
They were concerned that it might be settled prior to May 30 and
CIA was instructed to look into this and jointly with MIG take euch
action as might be indicated as desirable to ensure the continuation
of the strike. Mr. Bundy expressed the view that the $10,000 a day
figure in the CIA paper would be cheap if a continuation of the strike
for a protracted period would ensure the fall of Jagan and the destruc-
tion of his political support.

ACTION; McCone should discuss with Helms and,

if desirable, to arrange for a discussion with Fulton
by Cline or by McCone in Paris over this coming
weekend. ]

JAM/bd (tape)

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ll April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Special Group (5412) Meeting, 11 April 1963

1. [Reconnaissance of Laos and North Vietnam was reviewed. .
The Group expressed approval of the CIA program. They authorized two
flights over Laos and North Vietnam on the assumption that one of the
NEFA flights would cover the extreme western targets desired by Sarit.
If, on the other hand, the four India - Communist China border flights
were not executed at thistime, then CIA was authorized to fly three
flights over Laos and North Vietnam to cover all of the targets desired
by both Sarit and COMOR.]

2. [Status of negotiations for India - Communist China recon-
naissance was reported. It was agreed that this question should be
pursued further by CIA. No immediate action was indicated. Dr. Scoville
reported that no further information would be forthcoming from either
India or Thailand until about the 20th of April]

3. Cuban operations. The proposed infiltration-exfiltration
operations, past and projected, were reviewed and approved. The
proposed program of sabotage and harrassment, both the general
program and the detailed plan, was discussed at length. It was reported
by Mr. Bundy that this program was developed more or less at the
direction of higher authority. It was not the intention of higher authority
to approve and authorize specific actions; what he was seeking was de-
tailed information concerning our capability and what might be expected
ona series of operations which were within our capability. I took the
position, which was supported by Alexis Johnson (somewhat less vocally,
however) that I questioned the advisability of proceeding with the program
until we had crystallized the total policy designed to remove the Soviets
from Cuba and also remove Castro. I said I was not clear as to how this
was to be accomplished, nor did I feel that there was any agreed series
of actions designed to meet this end objective. Therefore, it appeared
to me that we are projecting a few of the annoying operations, none of
