157-10008-10241 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |

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Date:10/07/93
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JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
( IDENTIFICATION FORM
; AGENCY INFORMATION =st—<“‘Ca~C‘<‘<; CO!!!
AGENCY : SSCIA
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IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZEO
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R602 Of) 19

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO:

TITLE :
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

DATE : 07/24/75
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
; INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER
ow" ASSASSINATION INQUIRY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 438-3

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_ 43 3 S © TERVIEH AND PEETING SUARY REC

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( INTERVIEW WITH: Bruce Cheever UW
REGARDING: Assassination rnquiry SSC! Co 43 8- 3
SSE RON 858-5
DATE“TIME-LOCATION: July 24, 1975 (og |
PRESENT: Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova

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HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

EXECUTIVE SESSION: _ Yes __ flo

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY Page 1 of 6

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This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed
Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms. We focused on
Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force
WwW.

Background:

1938-43 Marine Corps

1943-44 OSS Parachute School

1944-46 Marine Corps

1950-53 Office Police Coordination; headed
Plans Section for Western European
Division 3

1953-56 GH r ons: Gio 4

1956-60 Deputy Chief, European Division

1960-3/62 Headquarters, U. S. European Command

(U. S. representative)

Deputy Director: Task Force W
1965-71 GGHPEEAOf Stationy
1971 Retired from Agency

3/64-2/65 Deputy Chief, Special Operations

Branch (developing paramilitary
capabilities for Agency)

3/62-65

Apparently selected for Task Force W because
of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure
whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.

Prior to his Task Force W'assignment, Harvey
was known to Cheever by reputation only. He des-
cribed Harvey as one of the finest operatives the
Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel.

Cheever understood that Task Force W was
Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro
regime; that the Cuban operations had White House
backing; and that the Agency had been given an
operational carte blanche, with the caveat that
each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval
prior to getting off the drawing board.

GIA HAS NO OBJECTION T
‘DECLASSIFICATION AND/OI

E OF THIS DOCUME
AS SANITIZED OCUME

14 SR 94
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Cheever told us: “You don't pull in fast~rising
men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid back-
ing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's
representative and that Task Force W would not
suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA with-
out Lansdale's approval.

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INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
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i a .

Cheever confirmed what we! ‘knew about ‘Harvey.
Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, he
told us that Harvey was a loner and most surely
would not inform him of operations unless he had
a "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion,
Harvey was one of the great believers in compart=-
mentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey
turned him into his staff man” (as compared to an
operational extension). Cheever also told us that
Harvey was a two martini man at Lunch with thyroid
problems; this often "led to problems for Harvey
at early afternoon meetings".

Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA
meetings. However ie*does*not recall RFK, only
recalls briefing Bundy. (Maybe Cheever atténded
other than SGA meetings -- the minutes do not re-
flect his attendance.)

Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGA
principals in Lansdale's office (Messrs... Califano,
Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever would
brief these designees on proposed operational
plans; discussion of the details would ensue.
Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principals
would meét and decide whether or not the particular
plan would be approved. Cheever did state that the
Group often rejected proposals. In one instance,

' Max Taylor vetced the maritime infiltration of a

small team. Taylor felt that the chances of success
were small and attributability great. (Cheever
agreed with Taylor -- “but it was one of Lansdale's
brain childs.")

Cheever told us that “around the Task Force W
shop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to get
rid of the Castro regime.” In order to get this
done, “the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency's ©
tail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations"
According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were ;
“geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to what
was happening",

However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban
operations were not pursued with the same sense of
urgency.

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