157-10014-10178 | 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992 |
JFK Assassination System Date: VWH2015
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AGENCY:  SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: = 157-10014-10178

RECORD SERIES: MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER:  07-M-85

Document Information

ORIGINATOR:  SSCIA
FROM:
TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 00/00/1975
PAGES: 161

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO, FIDEL
LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: REPORT
CLASSIFICATION: — Declassified
RESTRICTIONS: = 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS: = Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: — 05/31/2000

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HY. 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 1

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n
ep
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00/00/75
161
LUMUMBA,

ee 8 8¢ ca

CIA
CASTRO,
REPORT
REFERRED

POSTPONE
01/19/99

cC Box 7

PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

FIDEL

TOP SECRET

D IN FULL

3

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[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED.

Page 2

| DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 ~ 12:30-3:30 p. nm, =.
Room 608, Carroll Arms ‘

PRESENT! Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron


‘MEMORANDUM

TO: _ Files
FROM: Frederick Baron
DATE : August 20, 1975

SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination
Plan and Related Events in the Congo

Staff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson,
Frederick Baron

The following is a summary of the contents of an interview
conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961)
in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was
conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the
Carroll Arms Hotel. |

At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to
take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter

as "COS".

COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS

COS said that he arrived in the Congo. as Chief of Station in
early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before
he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either
Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief, Africa Division)
about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after
arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in
late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination

at those meetings, either.

HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 4

-2-

After his return to the Congo, probably in early September,
COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words,
"someone IL would recognize would appear to give me instructions for
a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb
arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb
from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made
clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable.

| Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this

meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early
September, 1960 . COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal
biological agents had been developed for the assassination of
Lumumba. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and
probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag.
But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived
shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber
gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment
for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances
were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else
that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of
the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were
approximately three different types of lethal substances provided
to him.

COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment
to him of the assassination of Lumumba. COS said that he was a
junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down"

the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 5

-~3-

heard of anything like this." COS's best recollection was that he

had the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb:

cos: Where did this brilliant idea come from?

Gottlieb: The top.

cos; Who at the top?
Gottlieb: The Director has instructions from President

Eisenhower.

COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the
interchange, although this was his best, recollection. He said
Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to
remove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explained
the source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made it
clear that the President was the source. COS said it was possible
that Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that he
mentioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President." In
response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import
of Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told him
something to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest
authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said that
Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place by
means of the biological agents he was supplying.

COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility
of assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassi-
nation. "They were serious about it .. . it was clear that the

policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said

HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 6...

he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed
with the assassination operation. .

COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connec-
tion with the United States if the biological agents were to be
employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for
use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved
forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said
that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the
assassination, Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find
a way to do it."

COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would
lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long
period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what
the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his
bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there
were no customs checks in the Congo.”

COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only
he had access. He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime ~
later -- probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose
of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no |
training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons.

COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him
that it left the traces of a normal disease.

COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the

poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't

HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 7

-5-

think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not
tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it. |

cOS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance
for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and
the DCL, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment
of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a
double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and re-
questing confirmation. I then received a cable containing double-
talk confirmation, something like ‘your assumption confirmed. '"

COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They
also said ‘Director’ and I sent my cables with a special slug. My.
cables were probably marked to 'Director" which is never actually
seen by the DCL. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables
on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said
that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo
Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was
not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy.
cOS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields.
He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with
Dr. Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early
fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance.

COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad
idea, both morally and practically." However, cos said that he
may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was
so taken aback at receiving the assignment. cOS thought that he

told Gottlieb that he did not have.a good means of access to Lumumba .

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~6-

COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with
Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the
context of his (COS's) feeling: ‘Thank God I never had to use it."
cOS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as
a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation.
COS-does not recall that anyone other than the President and the
DCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassination

operation, -

O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO

COS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in the
Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COS
said that O'Donnell “came to eliminate Lumumba." COS did not re-
call whether O'Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell.

COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he had
the impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of
Lumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was drag-
ging my feet and that I might be relieved."

COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting with

Sidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have a
specific recollection, COS said he would not dispute O'Donnell's
testimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison virus
was.in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded"
as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use. i
But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included

as one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussed

HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 9

with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from “protective custody."
But he does not specifically remember this.

COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of
the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of
time drinking." COS said that he was not aware of any action
O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of
Lumumba . |

COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the
beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some
action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it.”

COS said that he asked-O'Donnell to clear with him any major
actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that
O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately

Christmas.

LUMUMBA 's ESCAPE

COS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was
a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do
with it, although they investigated the incident.

COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about
where Lumumba was and how he got out. But T did not get much good
information. It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville.
‘The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on
this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the
Congolese." | ;

COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect

that Lumumba might start an uprising against ‘white devils.’ But

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-8-

when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned
from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thys-~ a,
ville.

COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESSINES IN ROME

In November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome
to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines
(then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events
in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS
remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's
escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he dees not recall
any specific discussion of assassination. He said, "Perhaps we
did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. [I

had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination,"

BRONSON TWEEDY =

cos assumed that Tweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination
plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan
with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in
possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson’
Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank Cod nothing
was ever done.'"

COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before

Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have'come later. COS
said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would

- have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission.

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 11

-9~

COS INFORMS DCI.SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that in response to Schlesinger's request for reports
on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him,
cos said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received
instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba. COS said that he did
not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger. COS said that Schlesinger
did not make a response to this information. COS was unaware of

any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger,

OTHERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY, BISSELL, and DULLES were
witting of the assassination plan. COS said that he did have
occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to time, but he does not
remember discussing assassination in any form with DULLES .

cos said, “I might have mentioned the assassination plan to
COLBY when he became Director." However, COS does not have any
specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY.

COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassina-
tion plan. ;

COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL
in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations.

COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with

ARNOLD SILVER.

PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN

ee .
COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William

Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE). COS said he never discussed

assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey.

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 12

-10-

COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O'Donnell
may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said,
however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the

Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJWIN's activities.

WIROGUE
COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor why
or how he came to the Congo. When his recollection was refreshed
by seeing cable traffic, COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man.
to handle. For .a short time, WIROGUE became a major in the Congolese
Army. COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a sur-
veillance team. COS did not recall discussing WIROGUE with 0' Donnell.
COS's only specific recollection is of being in WIROGUE 's
apartment and discussing an assassination squad. COS does not
think that he mentioned the use of QJWIN in connection with this
"execution squad." COS said that it was conceivable that he had
approached WIROGUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba.
But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE
did not know what he was doing. COS also said it was unlikely
‘that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE's approach to |
QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related
to the actual assassination mission. Instead, it was merely

evidence that WIROGUE was out of control.

. MOVING LUMUMBA TO KATANGA , , -
COS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Eumumba

was being held there. COS was in contact with various Congolese

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~L1-

officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to
fly to Thysville to put down the munity. COS attempted to con-
vince them not to go together. They did succeed in putting down
the mutiny. _—

COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga
until after it happened. cos said his discussions with Mobutu
about Mobutu's intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression
that Lumumba might be executed.

cos said that Jack Hasey was the Acting Base Chief in
Elizabethville, and was succeeded by David Whipple, who became

Base Chief in Katanga. COS also said that Ambassador Clare H.
Timberlake worked closely with COS, but they never discussed with

him the general question of assassination.

TESTIMONY UNDER ALIAS

At the outset of the interview, the Committee staff agreed ©
to honor COS's request to testify under alias. COS, who is still
in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal
danger there if he were linked to this story, He said, "They
might make me take the big high jump. I've been on the ‘zap list!

before."

HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 14

ARPIDAVEL Villon. “Ub |

° UNITED STATES OF AMERICA —— See 47
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

BY

ot, c. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath
depose and state:

._From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under |
Secretary of State. During approximately, 35-40 percent of ;
‘that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of
Secretary Hexrter's absence from Washington.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State,
had served as the State Department: representative on the 54/12
Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When
I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my a
earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord-
ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was |
designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert |
Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State
Department's responsibilities on the nate Committee.

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of
State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com-
Mittee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee
and participated in its deliberations..

During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-
cussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of
either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August. of 1960, shortly
after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-
-ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-
cussed. During the discussion, which covered.a great variety
of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the
possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba’ was
briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency
did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended considera-
tion of ‘this subject. With this. one exception I never heard any
discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

TRE ye

Dated this A/ ay of May, 1975.

aon ‘ye * ie —

‘ae Ly ia
Cc. Dougla illo

Subscribed and sworn to before me

this.-Vy day of May 19753

co

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Pea Eto
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_ District of Columbia

HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 15

MEMORANDUM

TO: William G. Miller
; Fritz Schwarz

Curt Smothers
Bill Bader
Burt Wides
Rhett Dawson

‘FROM: - Frederick Baron

RE: Douglas Dillon Interview

DATE: August 28, 1975
I ‘spoke today by phone with Douglas Dillon, who was on vacation
in Maine, concerning a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the
' Rockefeller Commission on May 21, 1975. The paragraph records Dillon's
recollection that
"On one occas jon in late July or early August of 1960, shortly
after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a.meet-
ing in -the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-
cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of
matters, my recollection ts that a question regarding, the possi-
bility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly
raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did |
not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration
of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any
discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.
I explored the subject of this meeting generally with Mr. Dillon on the
phone and set an appointment for him to review documents and testify on
Tuesday, September 2, at 3:00 p.m. in Room.G 308.
On the phone Dillon gave the following background information
on the meeting at the Pentagon:
L. This was hot a small meeting; eight or ten people attended.

He did not think it was a meeting of a small body. He said it- was

not a Special Group meeting or NSC meeting. But he was.clear that

HW 50955 Docld:324293566 Page 16 7}

“coo¢muewes a high-level meeting du to the participants.

=== «62. ~-He believes the participants included the Secretary of
iisvense because Dillon's recollection is firm on the fact that

comin. ummeeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense.

—ion did not rémember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting,

me ed ES

ne said "top CIA people were present". Dillon said Richard

zonsell was probably present. Dillon does not’ recall a man named

sensqek

Johnson, nor does he recall whether such a man was present

sae Ieeting, but he said: that we might be able to refresh his

courmmilection by giving him more backgreund on Robert Johnson.

o-ni1.did not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson's

coomrrctimony before the Committee; I simply asked if Johnson was

sent at the meeting.)

3. The mention of the subject of assassinating Lumumba was

- ._tinited States, which had "convinced us that Lumumba was

_ cshopathic, not in a well=balanced mental state. ‘After his

umm -.t we wondered whether there was any way.of changing the scenery :

che Congo." Dillon said the subject was raised in the general

sooo. sent of "eliminating Lumumba", but the discussion did not

scomcceed.as far as mentioning means to be used.

coc. 4. Dillon said that the response of the "CIA representative"

wo. not necessarily a moral objection to assassination but was

—-ooom in the sense of indicating that the CIA did not have that
un of capacity".
oo Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who

vz the remark.

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 17

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September 23, 1975, |
7
Dear Mr. Dawson:
[ enclose herewith Mr. Dillon's ‘Signed and notarized
affidavit. . | |
| Sincerely yours, .

Dorothy de Borchgrave

Mr. Rhett Dawson
Senate Select Committee

.. Room G-308'
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

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Commission Expi hee W we

Hy 509
O55
F Docld: 327475566 Pag
e 19

STATEMENTS BY C: DOUGLAS DILLON

TO. RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975

“J, Cc. Douglas piilon, do wish to make the following
statement. - . __

1. On September 15, 1975 1 was shown by Rhett Dawson,
Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities, what he represented to
me to ‘be documents of the National Security Council of the below
dates:

Exhibit 1. Minutes of the 451st Meeting
. of the
National Security Council . ;
held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
on Friday, July 5; 1960, 9:00-11:00 a

(1960, 9200-1100 Fe
(Approved by the President on July 19; 960).
Exhibit: 2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting

of the National Security Council, a ;
Thursday, July 21, 1960.

“Exhibit 3, Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday » August 18, 1960

Exhibit 4. Minutes of the 456th Meeting
; of the
National Security Council .-
held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
on Thursday, August 18, 126), 9:00-11:00 a.m.

(Koproved by the President on Kugust 24, 1960)

Exhibit 5. Minutes of the 458th Meeting
of the
National Security Council
held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
on 4 cinesday, September 7, 120%: 2:30-4:30 p.m

n_Wednesce sptembe 1960, 2:99
: {hpproved by the President on September 15, [960

Exhibit 6. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Wednesday, September 21, 1960

wf

; ff
HW
50955 ' Soora:30409566 Page 20°

ae ~2-

2. The documents shown to me do not in any way refresh my
recollection beyond the statements contained therein as to events related to the °
Congo in the summer and early fall of 1960. I still do not have an independent
recollection of any specific conversation regarding the assassination of Patrice
‘Lumumba other than that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission
and in my testimony before the Select Committee on September 2.

/ 3. [Twas informed by Mr. Dawson that Mr. Robert Johnson has testified
that he recollected a statement by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which >
he construed as being an order for the assassination of Lumumba. After seeing
the documents listed above Tam of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC
meeting of August 18, 1960 i is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson. Although
the record shows that I was present at that meeting I have no personal recollection
of any such statement or order by the President.

4, [note that as to the Memorandum of. Discussion at the 456th Meeting
_ of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above)
a page or pages immediately before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing,
5. [tis my understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be

appended to this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee,

Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975.

Rhett Dawson,

Counsel

Senate Select Committee to Study
Government Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 21 I

MEMORANDUM

To: The Files INVENTORIED:
From: Frederick D. Baron on 3}3//17 _
p&
BY —.. — a
Date: September 5, 1975
Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was
Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration
from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him
in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that
in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting
(at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi-
nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely
to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he
never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised
in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even
on anyone's mind," he said.

.Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon
in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where
the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas
says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but
he has’ no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some
regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended
by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said
that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Depart-
ment and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing
law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of
Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.

x

HY 509545. .DopId:32423566 Page 22


HW 50955  DocTd:32493566 Page 23 0 0,

Memo to Files
‘September 5, 1975
Page Two

I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of
September 8, 1960. -Douglas was in attendance at this
meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped
that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."
Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the
discussion to which it related.

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not
be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter.
Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September
29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

cc: Rhett Dawson
Burt Wides
Fritz Schwarz
Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm

MEMORANDUM

To: The Files INVENTORIED:
From: Frederick D. Baron ox 3]
BY bo
Date: September 5, 1975 ;
Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was
Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration
from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him
in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that
in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting
(at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassi-
nating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely
to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he
“never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised
in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even
on anyone's mind," he said.

. Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon
in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where
the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas
says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but
he has’ no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some
regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended
by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security Affairs during that period, Douglas said
that Irwin was “more actively in contact with the State Depart-
ment and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing
law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of
Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.

BW 50955. Docld:32423566 Page 24

HW 50955 . Docld:32423566. Page 25

Memo to Files
September 5, 1975
Page Two

I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of
September. 8,.1960. Douglas.was in attendance at this
meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped
that CIA people were “fully aware of the top-level feeling

in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss."
Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the
‘discussion to which it related. _

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not
be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter.
Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693=1353 (until September
29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

ce: Rhett Dawson
Burt Wides
Fritz Schwarz
Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm


- Ke f
FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN ~ i —_ \W iR wl)
JOUN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN 777 IX - gs 4 - ae
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR * * le . - ao
* WALTER fe-}oNDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, AW‘,
WALTER D. HUDOLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.

Shnvamrreoon Manna s Sowemamsre Wkwited Btafes Denate

WILLIAM G, MILLER, STAFF DIREGTOR
FREDERICK A. 0. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL,
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

ICC

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY. GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 06TH CONGRESS)

WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510

1l October 1975

t
j
‘
i

INVENTORIED: :
on 38/77
. : . + cca, H
Mr. John N. Irwin II a ay C :

Patterson, Belknap and Webb — oo
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Thank you. for sending the rewritten version of your affida-
vit. All of the changes you have made are perfectly satis-
factory and accurately reflect my understanding of the state-
ments you made ‘on September 22.

I am enclosing the statement with my signature so that.you
may .proceed to sign and swear to Lt.

Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, it. would be
appreciated if you will not retain a copy-of the affidavit. A
copy will remain on file at the Committee and accessible to you
at any time.

I look forward to receiving the sworn statement. Once
again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention
to this matter.

Sincerely, . O
Pdr relen vaae oe.

ae
Frederick D. Baron 7
Special Assistant to the
Chief Counsel

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 26 9

STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN Il

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower
Administration, 1 served as Assistant Secretary of Defense:
.for International Security Affairs. My current business —
address is c/o Patterson, Balknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller
Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020.

1. On September 22, 1975 in my office I reviewed with
Mr. Baron the following documents in-an attempt to refresh
my recollection on discussions that took place at certain
governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of
the Special Group. meetings of June 30, 1960 and August
25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National
Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and
September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC

7 Meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. These
documents indicate that I attended all of these meetings
except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, which Mr. Hadyn
Williams of ISA attended. I also reviewed the affidavit
of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter
alia, toa meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection
by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no

direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize.

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 27 ES

I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan
connected to.-the United States Government during the entire
course of my government service. I do not recall ever
hearing of the.CIA adopting any assassination plan, nor do I
recall ever hearing the President make a statement that
could be construed as an order for the assassination of
Patrice Lumumba.

3. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that
in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the
Record of the Special Group Meeting of August 25, 1960 is
sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a
‘discussion of assassination:

tt was finally agreed that planning for the
Congo would not necessarily rule out "con-
sideration" of any particular kind of activity
which might contribute to getting rid of
Lumumba.
However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have
any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that
in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the
Record of the NSC Meeting of September 21,°1960 is. sufficiently

broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of

assassination:

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 26 7

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power

in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba.

was not yet disposed of and remained a

grave danger as long as he was not dis-'

posed of.
However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do'I
have any direct recollection of the substance of that
meeting. | |

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me
on the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18, 1960, I
do not have any recollection of such a report, nor do I have
any other recollection of learning by another source of any
of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.
| 6. It is possible that I was present at the meeting
at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. How-
ever, I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting;
nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where
the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.
7. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said

that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassi-

nation operation without an express directive from the

President.

; . . ; yp.
Prepared by me on this / th day of October , 1975
eo eh cle ke ~p. Bo —
Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 29 C

(n- C- L Gg wy FI - .

File:

September 23, 1975

Mr. John N. Inwin IT
Patterson, Bellknap & Webb
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Hr.- Irwin:

Enclosed please: find a copy of the statement I
prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions.or correc~
tions in the statement. It would be appreciated if you
would mall a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon

as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the
Chief Counsel :

Enclosure

FDB/do

bee : wei Dynes,

Fai bo Soe speepe 2

HW 50955 Docld:32493566° Page ‘30

STATEMENTS OF JOUN N. IRWIN IL
TO FREDERICK. D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Admin-
istration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense. My
‘current business address is c/o Patterson, Bellknap. & Webb, 30

Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York. 7

1. ‘On September 22, 1975 in my law. office I reviewed the
following documents to refresh my recollection on discussions that
took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for
the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and
August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National
Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and
September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings
of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. As indicated in these
documents, I attended all of these meetings except the NSC
‘meeting of August 18, 1960, where I was represented by Mr. Hadyn
Williams. I also reviewed the affidavit of Cc. Douglas Dillon
‘dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a Meeting at the
Pentagon in the summer of 1960. . .

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by
reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct
recollection of the discussions which they memorialize. I do
not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to

the United States government during the entire course of my

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 31

government service. I do not recall whether I ever heard of the
CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I
ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed
as an order for the assassination of Patrice: Lumumba.

3. It is my opinion as a former member of the Special
Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25, 1960 that
the following language from the Memorandum for.the Record is broad
enough: to cover a discussion of assassination:

It was finally agreed that planning for the
Congo would not necessarily rule out "con-
sideration" of any particular kind of activity
which might contribute to getting rid of
Lumumba, : ;
However, I do not remember. any such discussion. I do not have
any direct. recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4, It is my opinion as a frequent participant in WSC
meetings and as a participant in the meeting of September 21,
1960, that the following language-from the Memorandum for the
Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

Mobutu appeared to be the effective power
in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was
not yet disposed of and remained a grave
danger as long as he was not disposed of.
However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have
any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.
- 5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the

substance of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have

HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 32

any recollection of such a report nor do I have any other recol-_
lection of learning by another source of any of the substance
of the discussion at that. meeting.

6. It is likely that I was present. at the meeting at the
Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do

“not remember if I was at this particular meeting, nor do I re-

menber whether I was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where
the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.

7. It is my general opinion that it would be improper for
the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination

operation without an express directive from the President.

Prepared by me on this 22nd day of September, -1975.

Frederick D. Baron,
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect. to
Intelligence Activities

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 33

HY 409545

“State of New York

County of

SS:

Nene See St

JOHN N.° IRWIN II, being duly sworn, deposes and says:.

I have read the attached statement consisting of three pages

prepared by Frederick D.-Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select

Committee te Study Governmental Operations With Respect. to
Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him

on September 5, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-

ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge,

John N. Irwin IL

Sworn to before me this |
day of September, 1975, . :

Notary Public

Docld: 32473566 Page 34

WW 509557:

@1d:32493566 Page 35

pte Or Be @ - WhToln cee

SUBITCTs ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMBA
PARTICIPANTS : MR. JOHESON AKD MR, WILLIAM G. MILLER

DATE: JUNE 10, 1975

Mr. Robert Johnson whe is now at the Overseas Development Council
for the curmer, telephone 234-8701, was a member of the National Security
Council staff working on Asian affairs in the lest two years of the
Figenhower Administration and the first year of the Kennedy Administration.
He said that on occaston, when people were on vacation, he was assigned
the. task of taking notes eat HSC meetings. In July or August of 1960,
ir. Johnson hed the task of note toking. After a review of world evente,
by Director of CIA Dulles, which included a description of Mr. Lumumba 's
activities in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the meeting in
the full hearing of all those in attendance, and said something to the effect
that Lusamba should be eliminated. According to Mr. Johneon, there was
a stunned silence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continued. He
eaid he wrote the notes and that if they still exist, they are probably
in the Eisenhower Presidential papers. He said that notes generally in
presidential papers, official documents of the NSC, remain with the NSC.
He said that the impression at the time was cone of great shock. He ceaid
he had heard of nothing like that since, He eaid &t was uncharacheristic
of Elsenhower to speak of anything of substance during R&C meetings,
reserving judgaent to private meetings. He dcee not remember exectly

who wae at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulles, and possibly James lay,

Gordon Grey end Robert EMory.

ws

Be

I asked if he would be willing to &ey this under gvorn testimony.

He said that paving gone this far he would, but he cautioned that 15

years hed passed and he could not youch for the exaet wording, although

'

i

|

nis menory of the 4nypact of the meeting 4s firm.

|

\ My. Johnson called one hour after the meeting gay ing that upon
| . :

i
|

reflection, he would prefer not to testify. if at all possible unless it

| yas absolutely escential. He fears retribution, saying that such
| testinonies in the past have plackballed people who were interested in

yorking for the government « Again, he cited people who had testified
for the right cause such as the Podd case- He said he would testily

if it were deened to be absolutely necessary put he ada cant to raise

| this question.

ee

ee

HY 40
94545 Docld: 32423566 Page 36

MEMORANDUM

PROVES T ORT ED:

To: The Files

From: Frederick D. Baron

Date: September 5, 1975"

Re: Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case.

I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon
to supplement the earlier interview (June 10, 1975) and
examination (June 18, 1975) that the Committee conducted
with him. At the beginning of the conversation I explained
there were a number of questions raised by his interview
and examination that needed to be answered on the record.
Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington
in the near future and becawse of the limited amount of addi-
tional information he was able to provide, we agreed that I
would memorialize the important points of our interview in the
form of an affidavit to which Mr. Johnson would swear.

‘The following points are related as faithfully as
possible in the manner in which Mr. Johnson made them:

lL. I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba
with lethal biological substances.

2. To the best of my recollection, President EFisen-
hower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made
the statement relating to Lumumba about which I
have testified.

3. After the meeting at which I heard the statement
by President Eisenhower which I described in my
testimony on June 18, 1975, I must have consulted
James Lay (Executive Secretary of the NSC) for
advice on how to treat the President's statement
in my memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Lay was
meticulous about including in the record some form
of reference to every major subject that was dis-
cussed at NSC meetings. So we probably included
the President's statement in some form, but in
what form I do not know. In general, these memo-
randa would be as complete as we could make them.
Nevertheless, on something as sensitive as this,
we may have decided to handle it with euphemism.

4, The NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 is probably
not the meeting at which I heard the President's

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 37 t

Memo for the Files
Page Two

HY 450955 Dacld: 3274273566

September 5, 1975

statement in reference to Lumumba. Based on Mr.
Baron's representation that I am not listed (either
by name or position) among the participants in the
Memorandum of record, I am convinced that I heard
the President's statement at a different meeting.

After hearing Mr. Baron read portions of the minutes
of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 to me, I

do have a recollection of some of the subject matter
that was discussed at that meeting. This would not
be unusual, however, because as a member of the NSC
Planning Board I received a debriefing on the sub-
ject matter of each NSC meeting. I do not, however,
have a recollection of the statement by Mr. Dulles
as related in the minutes of the meeting: "Lumumba
was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger
as long as he was not disposed of.

Page 36

= (Xe 2- 4 we at
: A

; INVENTORIED:
STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY : DN Bhd.

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1995-—_

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley,
Virginia 22851.

1. TL am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary’
of the ‘NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board,
to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in
NSC meetings during 1966. My principal function at NSC meetings

was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and
not as a policymaker. I cannot at this: time recall the substance

of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba
in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assas-
sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

.3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a
remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed ag an order
to assassinate Lumumba. |

4. 1 do not recollect whether any reference was made at any
NSC meeting to an assassination plan ‘or attempt in which the United
States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of. the NSC Staff as
the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive
Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a

first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and

if

HW 50955. Docld:32493566 Page 39°. ~~

revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

| 6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC
meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official WSC
minutes would record only the general subject discussed without
identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion.
In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be
made in the NSC minutes.

| According to my recollection at this time, there was-no

fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive
matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance.
Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not
need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full
record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circu-~
lated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members
for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and
decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved
by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these
extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly con-

trolled distribution.

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975:

wa S PDP. B

fina Ln Ain few VP Derr
Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel ©
Senate Select Committee to Study

Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities

Oo

HW 40955. BocId: 32423566. Page 40. .


“State of Virginia )

, Ss:
-- County of fig )

JAMES. LAY, being duly.sworn, deposes and says: [I
have read. the attached statement consisting of two pages pre-
pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation ‘with him
on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-

ment which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

BRACES
James Lay

Sworn to before me this JL th

day of September, 1975.

Notary Public
PNEECOMMISSION -EXPIRES AUGUST. 20.3407

4
\
HW 50955 Docld: 32423566 .Page.41 ..

4 | EO RG LOC)

SEL COM
File:

September 23, 1975

Mr. James Lay
Route 2, Box 273-A
Stanley, Virginia 22851

Bear Mr. Lay:

Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I é
prepared as a result of our recent discussion. ~
Please feel free to make any additions or correc-
tions in the statement. It would be appreciated Lf you
would mail a sworn copy of your statement toe me as soon
as possible. oe ;

Thanks very much for your help in thig matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick BD. Baron
Special Assistant to the
Chief Counsel :

Enclosure

bee: Rhett Dawson
Fritz Schwarz

FDB/do

aw 50955 Docld: 32423566 Page 42

STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY

.TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975.

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
chroughout. 1960. My summer address .is Route ‘2, Box 273-A, Stanley,
Virginia 22851. | .

1. Iam unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary
of the NSC and subsequent ly of the. United States Intelligence Board,
to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in
NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings
was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and_
not asa policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance
of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba.
in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was: any discussion of assas-
sinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings. |

3, I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a
remark at an NSC meeting that could ‘have béen construed as an order
to assassinate Lumumba.

4. Ido not recollect whether any reference was made at any
NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United
States was engaged.

5. ° In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as
the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive
Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a

first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and

HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 43 , : 7

be. i fe : . ay . . -2-

revision for elrculation to the NSC members for approval.

6.. Lf extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC.
meeting, it was. sometimes the practice that the official NSC
minutes would record only the general subject discussed without
identifying. the specially sensitive subject or the discussion.

In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be
‘made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no’
fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive
matters which were usually discussed ina very limited attendance. |
Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not.
‘need'to be recorded, Others were of such importance that a full
record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and cireu-
lated by highly classified memorandum to each’ of the NSC members
for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and
decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved
by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these
extremely sensitive matters were circulated. on a very strictly con-

trolled distribution,

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975,

Frederick D: Baron ,
“Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 44 -

State of Virginia /
SS:

County of

JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: L
have read the attached statement consisting of two pages pre-
“pared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to
‘Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him
‘on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this state-

ment which is true and, correct. to my direct knowledge.

James Lay

Sworn to before me this
. day of September, 1975

Notary Public

HY 50955 Docld: 327423566 Page 45

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HY 409545 Boctld: 32423566 Page 46

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HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 49

STATEMENT BY "ROBERT MARANA" i
TO FREDERICK BARON ON NOVEMBER 14, 1975 a ila oe

\ vo

PO nan

i

Tama current ‘employee of ‘the Central Intelligence
Agency. My current address is c/o Review Staff, Central In-
‘telligence Agency, Langley, Virginia.

Ll. In -1960, I was employed by the CIA and one of my
responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as
the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under
the eryptonym "WIROGUE . “Tread most of the cable traffic re-
lating to WIROGUE until the. point of ‘the termination of his re-
‘lationship with the Agency. .
| 2.  To'the best of my knowledge, I participated in all.
training that WEROGUE received in preparation for his assignment
to the Congo in 1960.

3. WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in
my presence. I am not aware that he was provided with any such
training.

| 4. -I have no knowledge of any CIA plot to assassinate
Patrice Lumumba, I have no knowledge that WLIROGUE was ever
connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba, nor have I heard
"any hint or suggestion of such a connection.

5. ‘I hereby affirm that “Robert Marana" is an alias which

is registered at the CIA along with my true identity. My true

signature is affixed to this affidavit. The Senate Select

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Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit.,.from which

my true signature will be deleted. This statement will remain

on file at the CIA and will be available for verification purposes |

for not less than five years.

Frederick D. Baron, Special Assistant
to the Chief Counsel, Senate Select

. Committee to Study Governmental

Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities Se

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i. J

INVENTO RIED:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES ey ON IA

LI
From: Gregory rreverton {| (M

| Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963
National Security Council Meeting

August®29-;--£9-25. Dee

On this date, I listened to a portion of the tape
of the March 13, 1963 meeting of the National Security
Council (President present). I listened to it several
times in order to check it against the Library trans-
cript of that meeting.

The relevant portion of the statement by John McCone
reads as follows:

"With respect to Cuba, the thinking in the Agency is...

we have to first get rid of the Soviets’...troops, and

as stated ((several words garbled)) and use every resource we
have available--political, diplomatic, otherwise--to accom-
plish that. Once that is done, then we believe that the
monolithic structure of the Castro regime can be broken up.
Maybe we'll have to catalyze it a little bit. But we think
that there are enough indicators of distress within the
military and within his political organization so that

once the Soviets are out some...military coup can be..

will be brought about which will remove the Castro
government, and with a strong possibility of replacing

that government with a government more favorable to our
interests in the Western Hemisphere. Now, this is...
there's a lot of ifs connected with that, but it seems

to use, after having thought about this a good deal, that
some guch action as that is a more probably course of
action that would be successful than to try to out..to
envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the
absence of the military...With the military and security
forces on behalf of Castro, they can very easily frustrate
and defeat any civilian uprising. I think, as time goes
on, that our principal problem is going to be dealing

with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America.

I think the problems of the Bay of Pigs and the October
incident and the missiles will disappear, and more and

more attention is going to be brought on the part of the
people on the Hill...is going to be...is how we're going

to dispose of this problem."

Then the President speaks.


io - .

as

nS
NATIONAL SECURLTY INFORMATION

_ .. . ORIGINAL AL
. rem SARE Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
a BM Es 3
it a‘ Sle was Vol.l OF 3 to Criminal Sanctions

PIOIS

INVENTORIED:

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

tal

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmen

Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 2, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL

410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

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1 WRT CONTENTS

2 Testimony of: Page

z Cc. Douglas Dillon ; 2

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

8 Exhibits
9 Exhibit No. 1

10 Exhibit No. 2 35

tyhibi No.
ll Exhibit No 3 37

12 Exhibit No. 4 ; 44

13 Exhibit No. 5

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EXECUTIVE SESSION
Tuesday, September 2, 1975

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock
p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart
presiding.
Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).
Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson,
Professional Staff Members.
Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the
record, please?
Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address
is Far Hills, New Jersey.
Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we |
must go through with every witness.
I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have
the right to counsel here today?
Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware.

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TESTIMONY OF C. DOUGLAS DILLON 7 2

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Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering
questions at any point to seek advice of counsel?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me.

Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appearing here today
without counsel?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your
constitutional rights intact here before the Committee,
including your Fifth Amentment rights?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, could you please give the

‘Committee a general idea of your position in the Government

from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961?

Mr. Dillon. In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State,

which was the number two position in the State Department.

And I continued in that position until 1961.

My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as
the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting
Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity
I had to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything
that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill
in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those
days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because
there were travels abroad, and various reasons. I think I
mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting

Secretary at least a third of the time during that period.

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My other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be
in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which
included economic areas of the State Department, and also
included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which
was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I
had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the
Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the Legislation passed
each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a directo
of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a

military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was

-xun through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State

Department official involved in that area.

So I had those two aifferent functions. And for that
reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on
intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been
prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the
Under Secretary had always ahndled that. Mr. Herter, who was
my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before.
When I became: Under Secretary I became so under a new law that
had been passed in 1958, at which time I was promoted to
Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the
number three job in the Department. That legislation provided
that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under

Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretar

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t

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8 1 for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be
8 :
: 2 the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under
i 3 Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area,
5 4 which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under
5 Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under
6 Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities.
y | So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for
8 Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr.
9 Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of
10 the Special Group.
Ll Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA?
; 12 Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not
‘ 13 handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it
14 was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got
45 above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political
16 Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important,
W I was notified, because I had to know about them if an
18 "emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town. But
. 19 that was not my particular problem.
: 20 Mr. Barron. So you would be kept notified of major
: 21 developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr.
i 22 Merchant? .
4 23 Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments.
: 24 And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionall
: 25 on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealt

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with economic assistance to the various political groups in
different countries when they needed help.
Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings
regularly?

Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite
regularly whenever I was in town, eith in --

(Off the record discussion)

Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, ao you swear that the testimony
you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you. God?

Mr. Dillon. I do.

Senator Hart. Justtfor the record, you also understand
that all of the testimony you have given will be covered by
the oath?

Mr. Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your
constitutional rights?

Mr. Dillon. They have.

Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer?

The witness' last answer was read.)

ur. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of
State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the
Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had
overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and

economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was

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important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at

8
3 1
$ National Security meetings. And they took place as you know,
a
2
8 at that time on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was.
< 3
2 morning.
oO
a 4
Mr. Baron. Andtwhere.did. they take* place? ss: 2: sjie-Y
5
Mr. Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House.
6 ;
Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of
7
State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a
8
foreign leader or a foreign government?
9
Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would
10
assume that I would have been aware of them.
11
Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any
12 ee
3 communications or orders running from the President to the
z 13 ;
a Director of Central Intelligence?
sud
Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been.given.in my presence
15
and. I had. heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of
16 . ;
them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State
1?
Department to be aware of it, ~~ and they usually did, there
18 . - . .
was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special
19 . —— as a
3 Assistant and would; keep:everybody notified. But that weraien
oO
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* wouldn't necessarily mean that we knew of every particular
E 21
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§ 22 ;
d Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major
a 23 saga
2 CIA covert activities?
2 24
é Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were all
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discussed at one time or another in the National Security
Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, becaus
the major activity that was just getting underway at that time
was very much aware of the development of the capability to
move against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of
that development?

Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was
the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban
exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were
rather general in nature, but 6f which I was aware of in some
detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would
not be| ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until
sometime next year. So if a decision was to be made to use “!:
them, it would have come in the following Administration.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA
plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Dillory. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that subject?

Mr. Dillon. None:whatsoevér.is: © A.28 uy

“Mir «Baron s/Sosal though. you-wereawarevofsCIA- covert
activities against.thé+Cuban régime, -you:.were: completely
unaware of tany..assassindtion. effort against CaStro?.;
1M. Dillons .cThe major activity-was.the-butlding up of.

this: capacityvamong..the .Cubah:exilés, .orisupposed capacity,

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to invade: Cuba and cause a change in regime.

Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the
Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of
Administrations you resigned from the State Department in
contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy
Administration as Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

I might as well explain that in some detail, because it
was an unusual situation.

That fall, I think it was in October, just prior to the
election in early October, due to some mishap in London, the
Bank of England failed to support the price of gold ata
given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an
aounce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation
in the financial markets over this, the first time that it
had happened since the thirties when the price had been set.
And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the 2»
rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in
those days. And it was very disturbing.

That continued through the election. And if anything, it
intendsified after the election.

During the election, of course, as a member of the
Republic Administration while the State Department was not
involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt

from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously a

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supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at
that time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after the
election, about three weeks after the election, I received a
telephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whom

I did not know. And he told me on the telephon that Senator

Kennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the Foreign
Relations Committee -- would like to come and see me that
night.

And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal,
I will go see him.

He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to
come to see you.

And r said, very good. I will be home all night.

So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he told
me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the
lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US and
the world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trusted
him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he
was going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anything
about finances.

And so whatshe.wanted was to appoint someone whom he
thought would carry weight around the world, and yet who was
sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. And
he had read some speeches Iv had made at one time or another

in my economic capacity with the State Department which

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10
° pretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite
g .
3 ag : :
$ contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue
g 2
“ where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our
cs 5 .
@ growh.° And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report
& 4 ;
that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year
5
if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so
6
forth.
7 : . °
And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in
8 .
Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just
5 .
great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of
10
course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to
11
it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had béen
12
- 3 released, he had been there and madesa speech and said some of
ge 13 }
3 it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull
x
<
14 .
° an ary as a result. It was written largely or suggested
“15
largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the
16 . 7 :
Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find
17 . .
anything wrong with that.
18
And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't
3 19 doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he
. 20 thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency
2 e1 and all that.
* 22 Well, this came as a great surprise to me. TI had made
- 23 |
3g all my plans to go back home.
7)
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including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury
And he said I: should do this. And quite a few people did.
And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did
do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic
advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice

that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was

serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways. And one
commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that
it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a
very easy thing for me to agree to.

And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of
the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at
which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December I
had a call from him when IT got back that morning saying that
he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do
this if I would agree.

So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my
meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator
Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much . And I saw him.

And we talked about certain financial things that might be a
problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to
be.

And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise,
went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and too

me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before

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- Dillon Exhibit S weptember 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting TO
\ of the National Security Council,
Wednesday, September 21, 1960

Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the-President of the

United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon);

the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of

Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the

Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the

Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget;

the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce

j Ttens 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett)
Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import

Bank of Washington (Items 1 end 2); and the Chairman, Council on

Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Als& attending the Meeting were

the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Steff; the Director of Central Intel-

ligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Secu-

rity Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant

Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin,II; Mr. Robert Packard for the

Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency;

=, the White House Staff Secretary; the A: Assistant White House Staff |
Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NS NSC; end the |} Deputy Executive
Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting
and the main points taken.

1. WESTERN SUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE FAST PETROLEUM
(NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Seer Stary
same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC
6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August. 9 and 29,and
September 19, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of
Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filled in the Minutes of the Meeting
and auother copy is attached to this Memorandum).

At the conelusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President
said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects
for petroleum production in Libye. He had been told that the
Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked

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untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was
announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary
of the Treasury.

That rather limited my capacity in the State Department.
But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things
up and make a proper turnover.

And then I resigned from the State Department in January
and continued that preparation for the new job.

And that is how that happened.

Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department -- you said
earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd?- 7
%s Mtv: Difbon.. OF 4thooer: 5tho;2sometime:in .the'.first. fouri:.
ore:fiveetor six days: “And aftér-that one thing I ought to
make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in
the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I
think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had
probably dominated President Eisenhower in some asptects,
which I don't think was an accuare description of what
happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time.
So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he
put in some new people there.

And we came to be very close, and worked very well

together. And I had the greatest admiration for him.

He never at that time or later ever asked me anything about

my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy

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> thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all.
: : Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan?
z 2 Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me.
< ° And I think I might. have been of some: help to him if he had,
6 :
. 7 because i: had. beensaware-of "it right-up through January, and i
° particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at
6 the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the
? use of our naval air if those peophe got in trouble. And I
8 don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy.
9 And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he
10 reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would
it “have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this
5 ie much about it.
e
2 18 Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did
$ 14 you have contact with the CIA in any other: capacity on a
18 routine basis?
16 Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis.
Ww Senator Harts. Occasional basis?
18 Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back --
3 19 when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions,
: 20 for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department,
3 a1 or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by
: Pe the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor,
; 29 he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that
E 24 capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear
3 25

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those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so
from time to time there were those moreorless informal
contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were
generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and
they needed something from the State Department.

Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of
questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to
get some questions on your experience during the US situation
on the Doctrine of “Plausible Deniability”.

Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal
to say about.

Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.

Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your
affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you
joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for
advice on your State Department expértence.

Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when
they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive
Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay
of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me
better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he
called me in right at the beginning, and I had a: very active
role in this period.

Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Admini-

stration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo

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affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as
itefell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this
was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of
my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me,
moreorless as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury
should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the
US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was
going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And
so I did do thta.. And that was the only foreign policy job
I did. And that was economic in nature.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit
to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other
things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the
Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true
copy of your affidavit?

Mr. Dillon. It so appears.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have
affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of
1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington,

I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall
Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which
covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that

a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt
against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative

indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of ©

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operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With
this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassina-
tion attempts against anyone."

Do you recall this meeting now?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I
think probably should expand on that a little bit, because
in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be.

When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not
necessarily limited to -- or it might have been CIA personnel .

It also included encouraging one of the many factions that

‘might not like him there to take action on their own, with

CIA encouragement.

Senator Hart. what kind of encouragement, material
support, financial support?

Mr. billion. That, or moral support, if they did the US
would recognize them if they became the head, and would help
them.

Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can
recall of the passage o- weapons?

Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief,
very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that
time.

Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have
included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes.

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Mr. Baron. And it was a more general reference --

Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting some-
where. In one of those other papers something was said about
getting rid of Lumumba. That was really moreorless the
objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but
just to get him out of the Congo and away.

Mr. Baron. Your:.clear impression that the suggestion
contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of
Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. As a possibility.

Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the
meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place?

Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.

I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other
day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that

time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to

be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particula

meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took
place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there

or not. Tt could be that he wasn't even there. But I think

it was in his own office that it took place.

Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought
he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling?

Mr. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don't

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remember him being there or saying anything. All I remember
is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and

the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't
remember who they were -- and the fact that the CIA people,

whoever:. they were, were negative to any such action.

Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. I would say five or six, because I saw them
sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, or it
could have been seven or eight, no more.

Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body?

Mr. Dillion. No, I don't think so. It was not aomslties
note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the
table with somebody as the Chairman.

Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words?

Mr. Dillon. It was ad hoc.

Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the
nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent,
casual?

Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more orless silent, and
"there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral.

Senator Hart. There was no policy objection?

Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just
saying, no, it is not a possible thing.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather

than acméral objection, as you have just said, it might have

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> been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have the
8
e t capability to perform such an operation?
e 2 Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been just
: ° _something that they couldn't do, and therefore there is no
5 ;
7 “ use talking about it.
° Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meetingwas probahl
6 something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading! role |
° in designing a policy for, right?
8 Mr. Dillon. I don't recall the details of what was
9 ahppening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basic
10 recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty
it difficult situation, with UN forces in there, and all sorts
3 12 of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper
: 1s mines were, and trying to get people out 50 they wouldn't get
&
3 14 killed. There was always contingency planning, whether we
16 would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation
16 or something else. So it was a very mixed up and sort of a
W hot situation at that time.
18 So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen would
3 19 be interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that he
: 20 personally had not given primary attention at any time to the
: ei Congo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as I
; ae mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those
; RS - meetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was at
: a4 that time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the Air
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Force, and maybe still was at that time.

: i Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurance to convene such

Bd .

a 2 meetings at the Pentagon?

‘ 5 Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the

é 4 State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was
5 not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would
6 be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were
7 both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, we
8 would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible
9 would be this number three person in the State Department, he
10 would go to the Pentagon for many of?the meetings, the
11 briefings and things like that which would be in the area of

: 12 the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal.

; 13 I wasn't there in my capacity.

Q

< 14 Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in
15° attendance at this particular meeting?
16 Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with
17 the thing that I was talking with them about all the time, a
18 totally different subject, which was military aid. That could

9 19 well have been.

s 20 Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at

Qa

8 21 the meetina?

E 22 Mr. Dillon. Not by name.

; 23 On the telephone you.asked me about Bissell, whether he

é 24 “might! have been there. And I answered, in all probability he

it

: O5 might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for

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many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that tim
I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge
of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings.
there, orteven at the White House. He was an advisor to Mr.
Dulles. So I say that is very likely.
| Mr. Baron. By this sort of stufé would you mean covert
actions?
Mr. Dillon. Covert actions or anything that was important
enough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA,

the President. He was a person there, one of the people that

was talxed to about it. There were three people. There were:

really at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell.
‘Mr: Baron. Was it your general impression that this was

a high level meeting -- a sufficiently high level meeting so

that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. He could have been.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would have
been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the
meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Tf imagine there must have been some represen
tative of the military there. But I don't know who it would
have been. But there must have been someone else if the
Secretary of Defense.was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn't
allow these things, he might have been there. That is just

supposition.

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Mx. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that
despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA
people were there, it was clear to you that some top level
CIA people were there?

Mr. Dillon. Top enough, so that something like this could
be raised and moreorless dispdésed of without even: thinking
of it any further.

Senator: Hart. Let-me insert a question, if I might. This
is a philosophical question.

First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or|
informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or

President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever

‘arise?

Mr. Dillon. As far as I know, as I recall, in dealing

directly with either of them, no.

Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this
point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower,
and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think
the Committee would be interested in your view as to the
attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say
the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?

Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult, thing to speculate
on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably
both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way

most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence

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rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle.
That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few
cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy
of the US, generally both of them were very much opposed to
it.

Senator Hart. Off the record just a second.

(Off the record discussion) |

Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the
Pentagon, I wonder if you could fill in the nature of the
discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this

.
prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recally recall it, except that it

was bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and the

difficulty of working anything ait with him, or the impossi-

bility of working anything out with him, and the exploration

of other possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particular
event which took place?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must have
taken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba's
visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was
that it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it was
impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government
as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time.

I don't think it would have possibly have occurred before he

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came. We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to
better understanding with him.

Mr. Baron. why did he strike you as being impossible to.
deal with in any way? |

Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression
he made rather than the individual things he said. When he wa
in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the
Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a mannter that seemed
almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in

the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of

words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very

fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the
particular things that we wanted to discuss. And it was just
like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he

was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only

characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational

being.

Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you
charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that
right?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you
and others at a high-level in the State Department were,
extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position

in the Congo?

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Pia. ew

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the
prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't. It very likely could have come from
somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from
the Defense Department in the international affairs areas,
someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the
State Department. There was probably someone there besides
myself. Because it wasn't usual to just:be alone talking
about this.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a
question or as a suggestion?

Mr. Dillon. Wo, as a question.

Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you
mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that
this was not within the capability of the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would
have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell,
but I think most Likely Cabell.

Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met
with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960.
Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of
this conversation? It would be shortly after Lumumba's visit.

Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have

been it. And the record that you had must have been the

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record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to
earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were
supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his
visit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is why
they put this in. All I recall of the place and date is that
when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it must
have been the summer, July or August.

Mr. Baron. Let me fill you in onva-few-other events that
were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this
refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that
might have existed at a meeting such’as the one you attendec 2
in reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that on
the i2th of July the US had sent a carrier, the Wasp, to the

Congo, although’ we had refrained from sending troops to the

Congo. Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicated

that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do

everything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo.
Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year
contract with CINCO, a large American resources company. But
that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the
Congo the following day, on the 26th of July -- I am sorry, it
was disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the following
day. And it was in’that setting that Lumumba then came to
Washington. .
While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter

pledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was the

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in with that sort of general recollection, that it was

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Head of the 6IMCO Company that had this huge contract in the

Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the

situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed
or not in the Congo. .

Do you recall any of that background? And does that
refresh your recollection about the urgency of thessituation
at that time?

Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there
were -- which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informa
conversations ~- that there were talks at the time about the
possibility of using US military force in one way or another

-- I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits righ
something that we were very worried about. And I don't

I don't think I have ever heard of Gimco,;

Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of
the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo ~- or to the shores of
Africa?

Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do
remember that there was consideration of the use of military
-~- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and
things of that nature,too, at that time.

Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe

CIMCO, C=I:M-c-0O, stands for the Congo International Goncocue.

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Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they
had signed a resources development contract in the Congo.

Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just
Formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds like.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall a visit from Ambassador
Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the
Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the
pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No. But it think it would have been normal,
with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and
our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come
back prior to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it, to.
brief the Department on the latest developments there. That
was sort of standard operating practice. When the head of a
government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do
that.

Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA
Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to
Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for
his visit to report upon events in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't
remember that. But what I can say is that that would have
been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if
they hadn't.

Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have been

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getting at that time from the CIA Chiet of Station and the US
Ambassador?

Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever
reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of
Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except
in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us.

Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador
from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of
Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the
Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to
reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced

by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he

certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was

so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an
individual. I don't recall any pati¢alar urgins from the
Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural,
because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there,
and if he had been not warning against something, that would
have been very unusual.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and
the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and
the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there
not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him?

Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I

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don't recall. But there were those problems down around the
copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there
of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at
that time.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything else about the language
that was used in raising the question of assassination at the
meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anythin
but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up
generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA.

Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question of
assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served
as sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to develop
the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed any
authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use
them. And certainly it would not have been enough authoriza-
tion by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I thin
they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability
in this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concer
that everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they could
have done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that.
That is just developing their own internal capability, and
then they would have to come and get permission.

Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the

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development of a generalized assassination capability at the

CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without

specific authorization from authority outside the CIA?
Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so.

Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at

the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in
itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassi-
nation effort against Lumumba? |

Mr. Dillon. Not at all.

Mx. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action’
during your entire tenure in Government?

Mr. Dillon. No. The first time I ever heard it, I was
on the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA undertook a projec

‘which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means

for carrying off an assassination if required?

Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't.

tie. Baron. And your first knowledge of any such project
was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson,
who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and
serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert
Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so,

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because I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the
National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't
personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all.

Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson,
in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was
present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker,
at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated
to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of
Lumumba. And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr.
Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted
explicityly, and the meeting simply proceeded. He places
this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened
at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on
Septemb er 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting?

Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where
a recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba,
I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probabl
present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time.
It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly
for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise
I would have been there. It could have been in view of this
feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not
impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace
and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself,

we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him.

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T don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order
as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others
present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty
sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him,

shoot him or something -- I just can't conceive of him

doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take

action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless
along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a
remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take
action right away on this?

Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this
was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it
wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it.

Mr. Baron. So although you have no recollection of being
present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you
would find his testimony at least plausible?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything
like this was not a direct order to have an assassination,
but let's take sgome.action to get rid of Lumumba, get him
out of office.

Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicity authoriza-
tion?

Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what

they thought. And they could have well thought that. That

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is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it —
is Lumumba or Castro. And you won't be able in the Castro
area, or particularly in this areay to run it down, because
the people aren't here anymore. But the person who really mad
that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. I guess I was asking for your expert opinion
on the command and control structure as to what adequate,
implicit authorization would have been?

Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have been
quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization,
because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the
President directly in things of this nature. And he was
perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that

maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I

think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen

Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way the
system worked at that time?

Mr. Dillon. It was the way he worked; because he had a
very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting
too closely involved with anything that was unpleasant and
of this nature.

Mr. Baron. So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is
conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language

such as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into an

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authorization for an assassination within the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with
Castro, when that came-along the following year. That is
perfectly possible.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a
series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those
refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward
the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which
we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960.

(The above referred to document
was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2,

for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. and this document refers to the election of
Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and
recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo
financially and “may have secured some influence with this
potentially useful individual."

Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made?

Mr. Dillon. ‘No, I don't think I ever did.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting
from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department
representative at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would
have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important
enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a signi-
ficant figure in Congo politics?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your
recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was
taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as
Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo.

Mr. Dillon. I didn't realize that.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of
the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been

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notified by Mr. Merchant or Gerdon Gray about what transpired
at a Special Group meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job.
But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be
something that was of enough importance that it might be
something that I would have to act on or know about in my
capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying
financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate"
polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba

Mr. Dillon. Not in detail, but certainly the general
fact that we would be doing that, yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special
Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit
3.

(The above referred to document
was marked Exhibit No. 3 for

identification.)

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Mr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to a
report by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the Special
Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrott
outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of
trade unions in Ehe Congo and include the prospect that a
vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged.

Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraph
which describes the action of the Group as follows: "The
Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in

order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate had

expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very

straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether
the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this.
Mr. Dulles replied that he had takenthe comments referred
to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as
vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added
that he must necessarily put himself in a position of inter-
preting instructions of this kind within the bounds of
necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that .::.5
planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out
‘consideration' of any particular kind of activity which
might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."

Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. But

you would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know who

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they referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He
worked for the President.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony
from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes. for this meeting and

r

other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase

"Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring

euphemistically to the President.

Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed.
But as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is
probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr.
Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously.
And then he talks about those as instructions and the same
thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to
the same meeting that your friend Mr. Jchnson testified to,
which I presume took place before this. They are talking
‘about something that happened before this day, where he had

said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the

matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments

referred to seriously.

Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. pulles had
heard comments by the President previous to this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Certainly.

Mr. Baron. Comments which called for “very straight-
forward action?"

Mr. Dillion. Yes, I think that is certainly what this

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said. So I think that whatever records there are of NSC
meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records
in detail. And that meeting -- if you can find any meeting
that Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that

is probably the meeting.

Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language used
by the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated to
Mr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable
means of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the language
referred to here by Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Dillon. It would sound so, seems so.

Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledge
of Special Group meetings and the way the minutes were written
up, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism for
assassination?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. It
would just mean strong action to do something to get rid of
Lumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. I
think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out
consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if
they were really going to mount something, they probably would
have come back to the Group. But they might not have. And
again, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he would
have gone back to the President and said, now, I have got the

capability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it

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41

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»P SECRET

3 1 next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have
3 2 done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or
3
é 5 get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to
E 4 something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident.
5 Allen Dulles’ strong desire was to take the whole responsi-
6 bility for that, and resiaqn, and be fired in disgrace,
9 publically, in order to protect the President.. But the
8 President totally refused to accept any such way of handling
9 it.
10 Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about the
i character of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President?
; 12 Mr. Dillon. Of both, yes. |
é 43 Mr. Baron. That the President would be inerested in
14 taking responsibility for the orders that he had given?
1s Mr. Dillon. Yes. He was very strong that way. And Mr.
16 Dulles was so strong in wanting to protect the President that
7” he was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace after
18 ten years or more of service to the Government, just to pro-
19 tect the President, although there was nothing that he had
: 20 responsibility for, primary. responsibility.
3
: oy Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetings
: 22 and minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "it
z
4 23 was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not
: - 24 necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind
: 25 of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba ®

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-- you would read that senterice to indicate that an assassina-
tion was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might
be used to get rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would.

Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles
might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group,
to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being
mounted?

Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted,

I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would
probably come back and say what we are doing.

Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to
the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character,
it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the
Special Group with such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely
that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the
President.

Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President?

Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think
he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite
different from the President,, all of the, in other words, as
expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and
do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to

protect the President as the public representative of the uS

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from-.any bad publicity in connection with this or any other
similar thing. |

Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meeting
you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to
proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. 'No, I said that they would certainly have the
authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would
be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way
this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything

just on their own. TI think they would have checked back at

least with the senior people in the State Department or the

Defense Department.

Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way that

it would be available to appear on the public record at any

time?
Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a call

from the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly the

‘Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection --

Mr. Dillon. -~- and Gordon Gray. Tf think they would have
kept him notified, because he was sort of central in this
thing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowing
about it.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection of

being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have

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been discussing before you saw the minutes today?

Mr. Dillon. No, I did not.

Me. Baron. Let me show you now what we will marke as
Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September
38, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page
that refers to the Congo.where Gordon Gray indicates that
"there is top level feeling that: vigorous action would not: be.
a mistake."

(The above réferred:to documen
was marked Dillon Exhibit No.

4 for identification.)

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Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recolleciton of
being made aware of this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of
the policy at the highest levels of the American Government
toward Lumumba at this time?

Mr. Dillon. It fits inis with what I understood was the
general policy that we were very concerned with.

Mir. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in
early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was
a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power
which culminated in.a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and

on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective

custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you

f

‘recall that chain of events?

Mr. Dillon. .No. I knew that at some point there was a
change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this
time.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet
planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville?

Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it
does refresh my memory, because I do know -- I do remember
that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the
Soviets. |

Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was the

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stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was
concern at higher levels in the State bepartmentover the
connection between bumumba and the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes
of the National Security Council meeting of September 21,
1960.

(The above referred to document
was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 5

for identification.)

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Mr. Dillon. Yes, I Seecnow that I attended this as Acting
Secretary of State, this particular meéting.

Mr.. Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in
those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the
fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part
of Lumumba, and that there was some pressure being brought to
reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this
meeting. I don't recall the meeting itslef. But it fits
right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way
you looked at the Congo problems.

Mr. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for

Lumumba. Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's

desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate

representative of the Congo Government before the United
Nations? |

Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to cor
to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had
been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized
him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt.
I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized.
But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this
was a way cf getting.out.

And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big

complaint there.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Mr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quote

8
8 1
= Mr. Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African
a
2
co
3 Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation.
a Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the
a 4
moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a
5
grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."
6 +
Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks?
9
Mr. Dillon. I don't recall those particular remarks.
8 , ;
But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation,
9
"@isposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it
10
would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was
li
neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure
3 12
2 he was done with.
’ 13
a Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the
3 14 |
_ means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable?
15
Mr. Dillon. I guess the word “disposed” could mean that.
16 .
But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would
17
think once he was out of office, our concern would have been
18
deescalated to some extent, it would have been more to find
” 19
8 some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of
8
5 20
a getting him out, or locking him up, or anything.
g 21 .
& Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of
g 22 , , _ ;
uj the United Nations investigation of the circumstances
wi .
2 23
3 surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until
wn
2 24
ic February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late
. :
+ 25 ,

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September of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United
Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his
residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving,
but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops -
who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his
residence.

Mr. Dillon. I think I recall that now, because it is
rather unusual circumstances.

Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October
the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese army;
who had come withian:arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your
understanding that during this period of time, even after
Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations,
he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force
in the Congo by the US?

Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at
all surprised if.the then rulers or officials of the
Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned
about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a
crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and starte
to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably
would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes.

Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said
he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for
the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN

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custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army,

o
$ 1
3 where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would
a 2
3 _ receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands
aS oo) :
5 of the Congolese Army. Does this mission of the CIA officer
& 4 -
seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time
5
toward Lumumba?
6
Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so.
1
Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA
8
Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative
9
from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological
10
agents and the equipment with which to administer these
il .
substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that
12
ro]
F he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission,
13
Fa which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you
5 14 .
oO ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation?
15
Mr. Dillon. No, I never have.
16
Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with
17
the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those
18
Special Group meetings?
” 19 ,
3 Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one
5 20
a document you have showed me --~
2g 21
g ; Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting?
= 22
Mr. Dillon. Yes -~ if assassination is a real possibility
a 23
5 as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never
rd 24
i heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there was
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any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read
about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission ~:
with Castro, but not about this.

Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the
operational detail?

Mr. pittbn. Not in detail. But I am rather surprised

i
that it went this far and in my position I didn't know some-
thing about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight
that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of
State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it.

Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel
that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someone
in your position?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a
clearcut --

Mr. Baron. ~~ mandate to proceed with an assassination
operation?

Mx. Dillon. It is possible. That is just supposition,
but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles’
decision.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the
CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the

coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government

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in mid-September of 1960?

ur. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch
Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands
of the Congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of
questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I
would like to follow up on some of your statements about
Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I
think you made a very interesting and forthright observation,
that he was very interested in keeping the President protected
from things which may cause embarassment to him.

Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would
cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just
the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just
because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,
it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So
that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond cereurnt
personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should
not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the
basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that
that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known

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in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. Wo, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch
Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands
of the Congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of
questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I
would like to follow up on some of your statements about
Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I
think you made a very interesting and forthright observation,
that he was very interested in keeping the President protected
from things which may cause embarassment to him.

Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would
cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just
the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just
because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA,
it-is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So
that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond
personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should
not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the
basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that
that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known

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him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also
in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this
experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was
Acting Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of a
lot of that mix-up.

Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsible
individual in whom the President placed great trust?

Mr. Dillon. Very much so, great trust.

Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President do
you believe that President Fisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles'
desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a great
embarrassment?

Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thing
made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles'
view, but it was also the view of the State Department that _
this was the correct procedure, that the President should take
whatever action was necessary eithér with Mr. Dulles or with
senior officials in the State Department, and blame them for
both, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing
happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that.

Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in
Turkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge
this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibility

himself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for the

' President taking responsibility, because I think he had a

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little different view of this. I think he had a view that
the press looked on the President as someone who was not in
full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought
this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for
the President. So we were thinking of it more from the
international aspect. We had the contrary feeling.

Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dulles
diminish significantly after the U-2 affair.

Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with the

U-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it

specifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it.
The only bolix that came was in the after events, where this
silly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guess
it was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around and
got lost, or something like that. And we really had a very
difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the

news came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. The
President had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards,
including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and
Colonel Goodpastor.

Ang he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and
gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed on
all the cover stories or anything of this nature. And I
went back to the State Department and was working diligently

on this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say.

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And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told

Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the

State Department.

And the next thing we knew the statement came out from
the US from NASA which made no sense at all.

And of course what had happened was that Hagerty -- that
had been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was
to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred,
had the cover story.

Anca Goodpastor -- I never quite found out what happened
in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty
or Hagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was
more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor
at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he

had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't

know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And

that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to
explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement

which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts.

And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet
announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew
that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it
followed electronically. And but it was because of this
White House bolix that htis had happened.

Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout

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this period to protect the President was also -- I guess there

was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis

Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a
mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he
felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President
and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case
otherwise.

So this didn't change Mr. Dulles at all, it made him even

stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew

the President was difficult to protect.

Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis
you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence
operations?

Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security
Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the
meeting would be called to order by the President, and then
he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing,
which was the first item of business in all those meetings.

Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to

tell the President enough where he would have some idea of

wnat was going on, but not tell him directly what was
happening?

Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence

what other people were doing and what was happening. And it

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would only be exceptional when they would deal with what we
were doing ourselves.

Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles
wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he
go about achieving that or gaining that approval?

Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard,
to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up
whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the
Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, ar Acting Secretary of Defense, and then
taken to the President and approved by him before the flight
could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor
rather than through Mr. Gray.

Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis?

Mr. Dillon. Wo, that was the procedure.

Mz. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly?

Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that
was the case with the U-2. After the U-2 crisis there weren't
any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end.

Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you
brought up which were required to be brought before the
Special Group --

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if
it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be

through the person who would know the most about it. And

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that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very close
to the President, although he was a relatively junior officer
at that time, he was a young colonel -- I think he may have
even been a major when he started there in the White House.
But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all
those relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State
Department. If you wanted to see the President on something

important, it was generally through General Goodpastor rather

‘than through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most of

the detailed mechanics of setting up meetings, and that sort
of thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to the
President. And that job was held by General Goodpastor.

Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President was
going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government,
in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the
National Security Council, were you privy to some of those
occurances?

Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one.

Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attempt
or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more
sinister than an assassination was brought up?

| Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing a
capacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. “and we have
the minutes on that. That was considered a number of times

and reported a number of times.

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_ Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, in
the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Govern-
ment of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes a
routine order goes out to estand down intelligence, to take
positiveactions in that area, are you aware of that standard
operating procedure?

Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your question
is there.

Mr. Dawson. After the U-2 crisis did we for a period of
time stop agressive intelligence actions against the Soviet
Union?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural.

Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routine
matter?

Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously we
stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity
to shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again.

And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic
flights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept them
further away, or disconinued them for awhile.

Mr. Dawson. Are you aware of a similar stand down order
having been issued after Lumumba was captured?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you

might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when

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this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that
correct?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, hecause August
was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the
summer, it was likely to be in August.

Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August
because of the miserable summers?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. And my family had a summer place where
I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get to
I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of
times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting
and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of
Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it
could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those
summers for a few days. And it could have been in August.

Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon
that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me
before we began this testimony today that from what you have
read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the
CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said,
in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination
attempt against Lumumba, might have been made simply because
the group was too large for such a discussion?

Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of

what I have learned since, and I have learned more today --

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but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro.
But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that
is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have
been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that
they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't
have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in
August.

Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the
creation?

Mr. Dillon. The early stages, yes.

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely
appreciateive of your coming here today. This is obviously
a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have
been tremendously informative on it. So thank -you very much.

Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details
of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have
really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively
unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help
I am glad to.

Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now.
I know that before we: started today Bill Miller, the Staff
Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would
be interested’ in hearing you out at great length on policy

recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from

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your experience in the State Department and the Treasury
Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller
Commission. But I wondered specifically, in reference to the
assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our
investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some
recommendations aS soon as possible, do you have any specific
suggestions?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. I think that the recor
has shown that this is the type of thing that the US
Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage
in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repitition
of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties,
which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like
that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its
being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think
even those who believed that such action was morally proper
and might have been in the best intersts of both the US and
the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was
ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that

it does get traced back. So I think that there will be a

general agreement among those who are the type of people who
would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be though
of as US Policy.

Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you

would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool

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of foreign policy?

Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what
institutional changes are really necessary, but there should
be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever
name it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any
action by the CIA, whether it is assassination or military
action or anything else, in writing. I think that would be
fine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that the
President has to approve anvthing like that. I tend to agree
with Mr. Dulles that you shoulé not cet the President

personally involved in details of operations that might be

a

right. If am not judging just about

fe

on the sedge of what
assassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now is
that the President has to approve any covert operation. I
think that the result now will be that there wouldn't be
any. I think there may be times when we will need them, but
not violent ones. I have in mind such things as financial
help and such things as that. But I don't think the President
ought personally to sign the checks.

Mr. Baron. Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjcurned,

subject to the call of the Chair.)

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arripavizy = Yyllon Uh" |

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath
depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under
Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of
that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of
Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.

had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12
Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. Whén
I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my
earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accord-
ingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was
designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert
Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State
Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, Ee
i
}

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of
State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Com-
mittee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee
and participated in its deliberations.

During this entire period I have no recollection of any dis-
cussions or.decisions looking toward the assassination of
either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly
after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meet-
ing in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was dis-
cussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety

of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the
possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was
briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency
did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended considera-
tion of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any
discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

. | - Dated this A/ day of May, 1975.

Sif | a
LY igen ;

C. Botgfas Dillion =
Subscribed and sworn to before me of ie
this-gy day of May 197535 ent Ak "
A ae a WO?
fe xe Qe 7 Ate r
i

Notary Publix " or ve

2 a .
District of Columbia | i

ote re ted nh ge ENR
pete ay Doe tne nh ee ho rier,

BW 50955) Bocld:32423566 Page 120

\, - Ne =
; . ; war UM me |

a

Dien exhib tou

30 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Graup Meeting, 3%. dune 1960 a
|

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen, Cabell

ad
7

3, Conga _

Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Nea
to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted
him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to claim full
. credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close
contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have em
secured some influence with this potentially useful individual.

a /
NY f/7. Cuba

In an informal conver
Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that
all that it can afford to take from the Cas
and abroad is probably

sation after Gen. Cabell's departure,

the U.S. has taken publicly about -

tro government; that public oo
beginning to feel that there is
far this country can be pushed around; that this may
countries to take a similar tack; and that the
ffective economic and other action the harder we

opinion both here
mo limit as to how
encourage other small
longer we delay with e
may make it for ourselves.

with the stipulation that

Mr. Merchant and Mr. Irwin agreed,
n until it is prepared

the United States should not take affirmative actio

to follow through on a substantial scale.
oo Z
ifc- THOMAS A. PARROTT
3 PROPERTY ;

0
D tle THE WHITE HOU G20

Det
| erpnry Gyre pull
* | Foacg 7 Lice Boy

a vie

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 1231

to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group
views,

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr, Macy had raised a related

point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that

Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given
adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a
concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise -
of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn

of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the
necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact
directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

Ny » i} . °
CON OH ann th

THOMAS A. PARROTT

a

ergs
Sa om

ww eee

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know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente,
particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration

of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had
pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken
with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

in an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first
point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with
Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail
all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was ata loss to
understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA
is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer
to Mr, Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated -
and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view
was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just
why this is so; this explanation had included specilic comrnents on the
steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and
to assess their apparent leaders. Mr, Parrott said further that the

‘point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question V

for CLA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the
participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the
country.

On the second point, Mr, Dulles said that we do know a good
deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and
cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion
of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had
issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly aan
as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as _
to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this
was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance
of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans!
point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do
80. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future
and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as
appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political
ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be
clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He
added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these
politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement
of objectives, our primary operational task hag been to hold the FRD
together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

ty veo ped
PRM re rai ay PRO: meee bE
A ea Pepys SATA oy PCO bic ie Ge et
GLUE R + £4 pid THE WHITE RUSSEL Cre
tes Le b I

Bocld:32423566 Page 1233

~

A V4. Cuba

‘The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing
contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection
he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which
had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities
(after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

” He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of
' approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer
to Mr. Irvin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating
the tactical combat phase,

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the
Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray
that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as
a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that
he would like Gray to look into.

*’ One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his
discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest
withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received 'no evidence" that any
effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had
answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and
Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups. )

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

PROPE
THE WHITE nuuSe QE REGE

BW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 124

outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously
well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other
individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church

hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black
Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this,
but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

’

PRUE as

THE WHITE HOUSES be

HW 50955 DoclId:32423566 Page 125

25 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

‘l. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later
described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in

mounting an anti~Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included:

operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions;

the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of

no contidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged

leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the
latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing

the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much.
in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had
expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very
straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether
the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulle

S

replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had

every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits
or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself ina

position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of

necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that, planning for the
Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particu
kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

lar —

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have

given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic

Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In
this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been
made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope ~ the

assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

Lo ijt
PROPERLY i CIR on
. a _ ne how
“THE WHITE HUUSt Boeke Ln
erence oper FAFES 1.3
NYG ae gebyes
oht Sane Rial NO LOT

HW 50955

Bocld:32423566 Page 126

DOSTAO f—

“4, Dominican Republic

Mr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted. to discuss
the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter
retire’ from office. At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his
opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation
as to the efficacy or wisdom of sucha letter. ‘He said that it seemcd
to him much more useful to make a personal approach,which not only
stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denicd,

‘He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time
apo, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it
off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an
unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than
the previous individual, ;

Mr. Merchant said that he realized his own name had been
suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He
said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of
State to get out of office - either through tie medium. of a letter or
personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed
him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validity of Mr.

Gray's wry comment that Mr. Merchant's ethics and his pragmatism)

. o
Wray S wry Comimen

might be somewhat intertwined.

Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having any U.S.
official sign such a letter. He thought that an unofficial letter might
be a different matter.

The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the
effort to get Mr. Pawley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor;
it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even,
but that no great harm could result.

“5, Contro

ene came

There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and
the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he

hoped that Agency people in the field are fully awareof the top-level
feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss.

Xp . aoe
che ocd ct
THOMAS A, PARROTT
- PRG

THE WHITE fyee>

HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 1237

os Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued
for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears
to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A
recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles
then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with
funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu bad relieved our
messenger of the funds. We cannot get funds to Mobutu because
he does not have complete control over his guards. A new
development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers,
most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have
been turned out of office and their offices have been taken
over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temp-
orery period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered
a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had
been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced
out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats,after
departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know
whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked
whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary
Dillon said the Soviet press has not Yet admitted that the
Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplo-
mats indicated to the press before leaving that.they would be
back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets
had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the
Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet
men merkings which they painted over the Congo markings on their
planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles seid the
Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting
a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the
effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was
not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as
he was not disposed of. aan —__-

Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still
confusing and that little progress had been made toward the
settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threctening
situation in Sam Neua Frovince, however, had been quieted as
a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that
area. ‘The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao
and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem
of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settie-

- . ment. The King has requested that General Cuane and General
Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Fhoumi's forces and
Vientiane forces has been reported at Pak Sane, but little
bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Fhoumi has adopted tactics
of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has
.. been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi
apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile,

15. TOP SECRET

a a ee . Ty ag Moy
a aa wa 7 ‘ .

BW 50955 DoclId:32423566 Page 128

kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested

™ departments and agencies to ensure that it serves
the vurposes of retarding the growth of the war
potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its
unity. ~ Noted that, with respect to paregreph ll of
NSC 5701/3, U.S. export controls over such materials,
equipnent, technology and services as can be unilater-
ally controlled by the United States may be imposed
not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on
the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but
also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially
with regard to technology and services.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President,
subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.

5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURTTY

Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in
the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts
to save Lumimbea. An intercepted message between Egypt and Ghana
indicates that Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to
concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to
bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr.Dulles
remarked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had

“s been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the

Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province.
Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that
a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic
representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The
UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with
the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to per-
suade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On Sep-
tember 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no egreement
with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper
purporting to be en agreement with Kasavubu.

Secretary Dillon reported that Lumwaobe had requested a visa
for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to
the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Govern-
ment of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. How- _
ever, if. Lumumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private
eitizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down.Mr.Dillon
added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumbe
if he attempts to leave the country.

1h. "TOP SECRET

HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 129

\\

~Sanewsnt eretiie
Special Group 2¢

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Mesting, § September 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles

/

1, Supply Drop to Cuban Dissidents

Mr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cuban
dissidents inthe Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group
approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether
approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of
a similar nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The

agreed to this, with Mr. Dulles stating that the other

members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of
convening a meeting.

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 130

N

i Cr Rom Ey . .
“ vi. 9 mM 75 CUBA apa O14
fe. .

mye

PEDEL CASTRO INPERVIENED WY DAGENS IZHES

Stockholm DAGERS YHEPER in Swedish 3 dul 75 pp 1, 12 LD

Longer Wants To Assassinate Net]

fexcerpts] Havana, 2 July--For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death
list, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro Looked remarkably unconcerned, He sat ona sofa

in the Swedish Embassy a few nours: before Olof Paline'ts departure from Cuba and when
attempts to assassinate him, he raised

' .
| (vats Holmberg interview with Cuban Prime Minister Castro: “'The United States No

: he was questioned. about the CIA's repented
: | poth hands to the ceiling in a gesture of resignation:

“Good Lord," he said. "We have known ail. that for a long time. It seems a little
ridievious," Fidel said, "to hear today of disclosures of new assassination plans when

here in Guba we already knew of them,
oe .
“vet what is now being disclosed in the United States is only a small part," he said.
"te could deseribe a dozen simt{lar assassination plans and we will also do so when if

‘the U.S. investigations are over."

‘But he did not belLeve that he ran the risk of being assaguinated by the CIA any

longer.

"yf there are such plans today, we at least, do not know of then," he said. "TF
believe that the United States is no longer so interested in assassinating me--and
Tt believe that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or

later it must come to an agreement with us.

"Bat no one can be absolutely certain," he said.

Raised Eyebrows

“What Fidel Castro said while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some

| oat eyebrows to be raised in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international

i .- allies.

: ._: One of the key phrases of Olof Palme!sLatin American trip has been “a new economic

: world order." Jt is a term which embraces small countries! rights to control their
natural resourees, and in both tne o4] power, Venezuela, and the potential oil power,
Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthustasm.

When Pidel Castro explained his om skepticism concerning talk of "a now economic

after dinner at the Swedish Embassy, he did so in a violent attack on

world order”
the world's oll-producing countries.

fle believed that a new world order could not be created by the introductton of new

privileges for aA new proup of countrics.

The Poor Are Affected

orn \ eraniea . fent to a tina .
y | VETS P insuffielent to demand that all countries have control over their own ray

fe.
yi
an matertals,” he sata. "All privileges are created at another's expense, and today

' 14 19753" 4a not the industrialised countries which are affected by the ofl countrics'
JUL “profits but the poor countries which do not have ofl, .

in
\

RENT ea
eae

HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 131

cee Sones Geo nee mgt Ae bad ofS Ba we a ttn eet nt SMS ee
sro rae

Bie! q 4 sud

oO . SL AA S18

Yh. 9 Jul 75 : Q2 CUBA _

GA 7 :
MHow can you compare cocoa and o11?7" he asked "hat benefit is Lt to countries Like
Sri Tanta and Tanzania that all countries control their vay materials when all this
neans to them is that they must pay more for both off and industrial goods?

"Tam not speaking for nyself," he explained. "ue receive oil from the USSR on favorable |
terms, -But if the of] countrics demand, solidarity from the Whird World, they must ;
concern thenselves with the problems of the Third Vorld. They are, as yet, reluctant

to do this. _ :

"mare has the oil revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question.

"It has been deposited in the economies of the industrial world and has been used for
aras purcrases. The industrialized countries will emerge from the economic crisis stronger
than ever. It will be the developing countries which will be affected." —_

Thay Do Not Dare
_ Fidel Castro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish journalists with an expression of 7
_ genuine alara, cre sO ts
‘Dg you think I am speaking too severely?" he asked worriedly. "Bub you must under--

puand that someone must talk about this. There is no one else who dares, since all
are hoping for loans from the oil countries," ; . oa

And he gave those wno sat next to him. a comforting slap on the back. Lo . . ot
-In yarions Udtin American countries Latin America is deseribed today as a changing : ‘:
and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olof Palne Listened to the revolutionary

continent,

and anti-imperialist diatribes which are inereasingly:part of both these countries! a, .
official language. - ; . ; a ” :
Pidel Castro did not appear especially impressed by this change. Ne did not mention Loe 7 eee
Mexico and Veneyuela at all when he was asked about the prospects for social revolution — : _

in South Ameriea--but he did mention the military governments of Peru and Panama. ~ oo :
Better Than Nothing : ce . ; . : : oa

"No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and we aro witching the :
progressive regimes in Peru and Panama with great interest, It is meiniingless to i
diseuss whether an armed struge#le is necessary for revolution--all that can be aald
ia that a revolution must be based on real force, whether it be in Chile op Cuba,"
Ho mmiled sadly when-asked for his opinion of the governments in Venezuela and Mexico,
vnich, by their own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long time
before answering: "It is better than nothing."

Someone asked if it is true that Cuba is receiving econoiatc aid from the ussr in
conflict with its own ideology and that it his its "stomach in Moscow and its head in

Peking." ; : ;

Fidel Castro was ooviously upset by the question. ; 7 .

Cuban revolution," he said, “it vas us, But the

‘rt was not they who contrived the
and wa cannot forget that. We have not com-

: USSR helped us when no one elses would,
. promised with either the USSR or anyone else, and who else could have helped us?

The United States?”

panne

HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page 132

THE EVENING STAR (Washington), Monday, S September 1963, .
Pour Star Edition, Page B 4, Columns 4 - 5 .

"Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro"

by Daniel Harker, Ap Staff Writer

«
'

Y denouncing wha
Cuban territory,

"J... Bitteri t he called recent U.S.
| Prompted’ raids on

Mr. Castro said:

"We are prepared to fight them and answer
in kind. u.s. leaders should think that if
they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate

Cuban leaders, they themselves Will not be
safe, _ _

"The U.S. is always ready to negotiate
and make promises which later it will not honor.
-- This has happened to Promises made during the
October crisis. They have been broken as can
be seen with new attacks. .

"But I warn this is leading ‘to a very. ; _ oe
dangerous Situation that could lead toa 7
- Worse Crisis than October's

oot

_ (From an. improm tu interview given b Castro at a Brazilian
P PB Y
' Embassy reception this week. ] ‘ ;
; ao fA
nepet ad
ie Ci sot .
JuL 14 1915

42
HW 50955 DoclId: 32423566 Page 133

ty oe

SINE-PICAYUNE, New Orleans, Monday, 9 September 1963, page 7,
Columns-5 - 7

HW 50955

"Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders
Imperiled by Aid to Rebels."

Thais item was introduced by an editor's note
referring to the fact that Castro had turned
up ata Brazilian Embassy reception Saturday
night (7 September) where he had submitted to
én impromptu interview. Harker's account of
the interview reached New York Sunday after-

‘noon.

“Havana (AP) ~ Prime Minister Fidel Castra_
Said Saturday night: ‘U.S. leaders would be
in danger if they helped in any attempt to do

_ away with leaders of Cuba.'"

"Bitterly denouncing what he called
recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory,
Castro said:. 'we are prepared to fight them
and answer in kind. JU.s. leaders should think
that. if they are aiding terrorist plans to

' @liminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will .
' not be safe.'" : :

“...-World affairs +... Seemed to be

- entering a more peaceful climate a few days

ego, but now this trend has changed with

attacks." |

"'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate
and make promises which later it will not honor.
This has happened to promises made during the
October crisis. ‘They have been broken as can
be seen with new attacks. | :

"But I warn this is leading to a very

Cangerous situation that could lead to a worse
crisis than October's....'" a

RECENTER Full
| JUL 14 1915

Bocld: 32423566 Page 134

ff ame 4 “ it
Ch) Mid- 1956,

aud Qubyte
Proydnor

revolutionary araup, Tavler Sague, e@ "gansta,
j vac through Punta Hieacas zone in Matanzas

ajdast Gastro ond other Lerrorism and sabotage. TNT,
revolvers. and cutometic pistols. a high-powered rifie, and large quantities
of anmunttion were supplied by the O24.

us counterravelubionary groups were trained and armed by
sated theouch the north of Havana, to assassinate Castro

vo infiltrated to coordinate the activittes of various
onary groups directed by the CIA inside Cuba. weaponry
tic weapons, high-powered mfles with scopes, ammunition,

UBTS ¥
countearraya Tut

and explosives.

(3) June, 1961, the "Frente hayeluctonario Democratico"” (FRD) met with individual
infiltrated into Cuba with instructions for a plot against Castro. Jeeps .

1
with bazookas were placed tn @ ysrage at an intersection in Havana and a
truck with grenades was placed in sports city. Pian was to ambush Castro
ad other leaders. Two particlpants -- Gulliermo Caula Ferrer and Higinto.
Monendaz -- said when arrested that the CIA was in charge, and that contact
was maintained through Cuantanaio and the Swiss Embassy.

In duly, 1961, after Bay of Pigs, CIA worked to eansolidate counterrevolutionary
groups inte the "Unidad Resistencia” (united Resistance) organization. Jose
Pujais Mederas made an undercover visit to the United States te meet with CIA
officers Jim Bender {er Boulding), Harold Bishop and Carl Hitch. There Mederos
was appointed head of CIA operations in Cuba in place af the arrested Aldredo
Izaguirre. Programs includad “selfaggression” against Guantandmo to jJustity
counter-attacks on other countries to provoke war against Cuba.
(4) igh tho infiltration of CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero

le fRaul} and Jorge Garcia Rubio (Tony). and others,
e grcup developed a plot against Castro during the
tion In Oriente Province.

duly 26, 1961, the same group planned another plot tne same day against

Castro during a rally at Revolution Square, Meetings were held at the

Guanterianea Naval Gase, where war material, including large quantities
of small arms, was supplied by base conmmender Captain Car] £. Schenweias.

—
ait
et

(68) Also

in July, 1961, pletting against Castra was undertaken by representatives
oF "3d de Noviembre," "Movimente Bavelucionario de] Pueblo,” and “Frante
Revoluctonario Uemucratice." The assassination attempt was to be carried |
gut near the home af Celiz Sanchez Manduley in Vedado. CIA tnstructions
cane through contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel Ray and Aurellano

Sanchez Arange, and through agmiral Burke and CIA agents on Guantanamo.
Weapons included explosives. mortars, high-powered rifles. and 30-caliber
machine guns.

(7) Séptember 13, 1961. the same groups listed in (6) above, in contact with the
"ovinienta de Recuperacion Revelustonarta" (MER), led by Juan dose Martare
Silva, made an attempt on the life of Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez when he
was returning from Matanzas to Havana. They worked with a CIA agent th
Matanzas and a counterrevolutionary band there. Weapons inciuded automatic
handguns, machine guns, and a high-powered riffe with telescopic site.

{8} October 4, 1961, the MRR and “IT Frente del Eseambray,” under CIA direction,
agreed upon a plan for sabotage in Havana, timed to coincide with the return
of Cuban President Osvalda Torrado from Punta del Este. A bazooxa was to be
Fired toward the President at the former presidential palace ‘rom a nearby
apartaent butiding, with the withdrawal covered by launching grenades against
the public. Meapans recovered inc -d autumatic rifles and grenade launchers.

Lyte
PURE

mn

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 135

(9) In early 1962, with CIA instructions through Guantanamo, Jorge Luis Cuervo
Calvo reorganized several groups into the “Union de Unidades RevoTuctonartas"
(UDUR). A meeting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangements which
had been made to receive equipment through Guantanamo. CIA was pressing
both attempts against Castro and staged acts of agression against Guantanamo.
Calvo outlined "Plan Z" -- a scheme to kit] Foreign Minister Raul Roa, and
then attack other Cuban leaders who would attend the burial. ‘The authors "
of the plan are listed as Cay Hernandez and Cay Gispert and members of the
DRE organization headed by Julio Hernandez Rojo, listed as a CIA agent
infiltrated into Cuba. Weaponry included a double-barreled shotgun,
explosives, grenades, and demolition timing devices, one labeled "Block
Demalition, M5 Al."

In 1963 another consolidation of groups was carried out with CIA direction from
abroad through agent Nino Diaz. The umbrella group was "Rasistencia Civica
Anticomunista” (RCA), and it incorporated the "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional"
(ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperacton Revoluctonaria" (MRR), and "Agrupacion
Montecrist?,” among others. The overall objective, as instructed by the CIA,

was to create the imaression of a strong internal resistance to Castro, and to
inspire a deciston for armed intervention at the meeting of OAS presidents. Again,
instructions came through Guantanaino.

(10) March 13, 1963, the RCA initiated a plan to assassinate Castro from a house
near the Univeristy of Havana, by firing a mortar. People arrested included
Samuel Carballo Morerio, identified as a CIA agent. Attacks were to be made ~-
simultaneously on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and on
- National Revolutionary Militia sites. Bazcokas, mortars and machine guns
were taken. °

(11) Apri? 7, 1963, the RGA developed a plan involving sixteen men armed with
pistols and fragmentation grenades, who were to attack Castro at the Latin
Anerican Stadium. Those arrested were Enrique Rodriguez Valdes (known as
"Mulgado"}, Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo, and Jorge Carlos
Espinosa Escarles.

(12) duly 26, 1963, the RCA grouping planned to assassinate the Minister of the
Armed Forces, Raul Castro, at Revolution Square during the 26th of July
celebration. Leading these groups involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin

ernandez.

September 28, 1963, another group was formed through a relationship with

CIA agent Pierre Gwen Diez de Ure, who was a French citizen living in

Cuba. Their plan was to dynamite sewage pipes under the presidential palace.
de Ure confessed that he had been working for and giving information to the
CIA for a period of two years. .

(13

—

(14) March, 1964, a plan to assassinate Castro by Marto Salabarria Aguiar, a
"gangster," who had contacts with the CIA through its agent Br. Bernardo
Milanes Lopez, who sought support in Spain from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch,
listed as friends of Salabarria. The CIA gave Salabarria weapons and "great
sums of money” for a scheme which invelved installing a 30 or 50 caliber
machine gun th a vehicle and waiting for Castro to pass by.

(15) Mid-1964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of
“Movimiento de Liberacton Nacional," part of the RCA block controlied by the
CIA. The effort involved CIA agents Alberto and Ramon Grau Sierra, members
of a network headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who attempted
to poison Castro in 1965. The mid-1964 plan called for throwing grenades
at Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Nine men were involved.

September, 1964, members of “Ejerctto de Liberacion Nacianal” (ELN) and "Frente

Interna de Liberacion" (FIL), who had been engaged in intelligence for the CIA,
began, under CIA instructions, to seek unification.

HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 136

al

{16} One af the members of tris Geaups f ames to Cubiiles Perez, told Angel Miguel
Aranctoia Vira. Rolando Gel dos hen ols aad others af a plot against Castro
to accur a® Ti Sh. ¥edado.

(17) tn early 1965, counterrevalutioneries Julio nar Cruz mecihias Fermin Gonzalez
Carballo and Giraida k aide Uiego Setanc -- manbers of an RCA sub-group
Known as ‘elte de Liberactan Nacional” ~- were working on a plot against
Castro in Santiego de las Veqat. This pian was dropped in favor of a plan
to hit Castro at the Latin Averican Stadium, with another group in a nearby
butiding set up to Fire machine guns imte the crowd to create panic and
facilitate the escape.

(18) In June, 1985. thers was an arrest of the group esaded by Ramon and Marta

Leopaldina Grau Aisina (see (15) abovel, which Was pare of the "Rescate"

sand “Movimiento Anticommuniste Revaluctenaria’ (MAR} grougs sponsored by the.
CIA, Maria Leapoldina Grau nad received CIA ints ructions far poisoning
Castro at the Havana Libre Hot ei. Jesus Companiond Souza and Santos de la
Caridad Perez Nunez, members of MAR, were to carry out the poison tng. When
thts attemot fatied, another 509 capsule bottie oF poisan was sent by Tony
Varona. Marta Alsina, also knawn as “Poltta," also race tved weapons with
Silencers and special assassination orojecti tes frem the CIA,

(iS) in duly of 1965, there wets cn arrest of a group which represented another
CIA attempt to orgentze count orrevolutionaries, this time under the name
"Unidad Resistencia." This group deve Toned a plan to assassinate Castro
with a Thompson submachine gun at Vita Nouva's rastaursnt, firing also at
the Ministry af Interlor across the straet to create confusion and permit the
escapes. Equipment included weapons and communications gear

(20) Also in 1965, there was an arrest of former Cuban commander Rolando Cubela
Secades. Cubele was recruited during a trip to Madrid hy CLA agents Manuel
Aytine, Jorge Robreno ("The Nagichan }, Luis Enrique Trasancos. and Carlos
Tepeding. The tianning alsa involved an official et the Cuban Embassy in
Madeid, dose Luts Gonzales Gal lavrata, and Albarto Blanco for "61 Laco").

In Madrid, Artie promised boats, eapons and ynen for an invasion af Cuba
within 72 howrs to support the ass sination of Castro. Before returning
to Cuba, Cubaia recetyed from tai larrets a rifle with a telescopic site and
silencer,

(21) In mid-1965, two o¥oups » with CIA connections and contacts in the United
States, the "Commences L' and the “Movimiento 30 de Noviembre,” planned
te infiltrate Sube. That effort was given up, end Instead they Fired from
gunboats at the "senoelarship zone" in itvamar and at the Riverta Hotel. fn

tlm

the dipactton of the presidential residence.

(22) In Mav, 1966, these same groups were inflltrated into the Monte Barreto
zone in Havana with the mission of ansassinating Castro. In the action
Armande Romero Maritnez and sande :i19 Hermlata Diag Garcia were killed, and
Anténio Cuesta Valie ~~ head o Conant tos i", and Eugenio Enrique Zaldivar
Cardanas were arrastec nese. er had been trained in Puerto Rico by the
CIA, and some had been trvolved in the bomperdment of the "San Pascual,"

a merchant vessel anchtorec at the Cafbarien Pert in was Villas Province.

(23) On March 37. 1967, three Infittrators fram the United States -- Felix

Asencia crecne, Wil fredc Martine: haz, and Gustava Avaces Alvarez ~- WEre
arrested while attemoting to lana by Gayo 3 Fragess. Thely planned activity
ssinate Castra ane conduct : Systanat) c sabotage to create the image
voTu tionary graugs in me United

ef a papular uprising, to help counter
States got official backing.  Thes a : had been trained d by t the CIA
through "M-d0-77," "HECE." “Las Dinas iyevos..” Comandos LL." "Alpha~56," and
ather organ izations. They bad airtemacic rifles, boats, piastte exolosi ves.
and communications equipment.

HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 137 zd

(24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile.

The main protagonist was Jesus Dominguez Benitez, known as “The Islander,"
who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions
inside the United States. In 1970 he had participated In an unsuccessful
attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge
at Guantanamo, where he was arrested for bond violation. Nonetheless, he

_-was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban
counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed
4n a television camera. He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban_
exiles in that country. The plan was aborted. Those involved in the plot
feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape.

Hid

HW 50955 Docld:32493566 Page 138 Ag

CLOSING STATEMENT FROM CUBA DOCUMENT

We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer,
the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities
possess and have not been published, allows us to affirm that
the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders,
aspecially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been

a reiterate] policy of the United States through its subver-
sive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries,
U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside

the country as well as abroad, witheut taking into considera-
tion the victims that would result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the participants with
a great num of weapons, explosives, technical means of
transportation and communication for the accomplishment

‘of their plans.

These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the
numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out
aimed to the assasgination of the leaders of the Revolutionary
Government of Cuba.

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LOP

THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON
YES ONLY
November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY
SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba
l. Irefer to your interest in hearing more about the

Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment
of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at

bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of

Cuban machinery.

2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted
‘for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964, Item 5
would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald
is now conducting.

_Thave not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting.

(As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted
and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While.I do
not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached

- memo, they indicate that Themn2 Wes. approved. My own

strong recollection of the feller from the meeting was

.that Items 1 through 5 were O.K, and that the only serious

: “82,

Fa,

An.

problems concerned Items 6 and 7.

3. Iassume that you still want to hear a status report on the
Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I
will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.

IT think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop,
if indeed we do want to stopit. In any event, you will be able
to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives

Ca
Ka Gordon Chase

ao pt crm at OK PY?
™ 4 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY.

his status report.

Copy’

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HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 140

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TOP SECRET | April 7, 1964

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

U.S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently
been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of

issues are presented which require discussion and decision ata .
higher level,

The present covert program is designed in support of a general
policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro,
accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro
regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in
fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to
decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities

- Should be (a) actively continued; {b) held in readiness; (c} reduced,
or (d) abandoned,

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

ME -

tates 1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and ex
RL

filtration of agents-and covert supply of agent operations.
—rRecommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this pro-~
9 ree

“gram be continued.
, .

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“2, Govert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of

active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the
;j>, regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
Qh Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be
“~~ continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

—

3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selec-
tive economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban

, /> economy. |
YO Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con- /
tinued. ; ; . /
; f
4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential - “
dissident elemenjs near the power centers of the regime, bee
Q Ww Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be con-
XM tinued, :

TOP SECRET _— feo

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dundan 8. johnson Ligrary |.

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HW 50955 Docld:324273566 Page 141

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TOP SECRET , So

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5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and
detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas
sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating

. yin .
: We elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).
“ Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be
continued. .

conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before
x -authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons. .
“3 Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recom-
, \ mended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

f 6, ClA~controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which

aS,

7. ClA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban
exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will
begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.
Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended
that higher authority hear the arguments.

., ae

ard

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HW 50955 DoclId: 32423566 Page 142

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ‘THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR, BUNDY

. SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group
meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely
because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one
for the usual reasons, ‘DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluc-

' tant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff
will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that
could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East.
For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably
prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course
of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it
would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we
finally do cut him off, will be reduced,

On this one, Iam inclined towards the DOD view.

2, Pesticides - The CLA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange

to have diluted Cuban pesticides, State and DOD are both likely to oppose this
one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch
Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal
with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be
turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should
dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange.
Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of
the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either,

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to
start giving some low-risk support to RECE, While State and DOD, at the
working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their
position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

| Copy |
Lwnden 8. Johnson Library

HWY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 143 9 “~


(
TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY ‘

Mr. Bundy. -2- March 4, 1965

attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to com-
promise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop

aid to Artime?),

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give
them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of
its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple
months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the:
small contributors, Arguments in favor of giving them the money are:

(a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will
not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they
are "good guys"'), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault.
We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have
liked,

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; Llagree that
$17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off,

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having
Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble
between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might
_be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man
wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the
job if it needs doing, :
; x

While Ladmire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them
invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg con-
traption. Iam against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose ©
CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD

that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability
to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this
capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again ina
very short space of time. ;

EC

Gordon Chase

we ttees chan ot

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY -

Copy’

/ : Lyndon B. Johnson Library

HW 50955 DocId: 32423566 Page idd


TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

, SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba

In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that
he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the inter -
departmental Coordinating Commitiee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate
interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the
JCS. ;

In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square
Dance,'' I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve
serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected
without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required
to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on
“just! international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could under-
take such operations without having our role discovered and resulting
in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dancc"!
were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the
Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid
and control would be increased.

As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though |
aderstand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend,
“however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration
of "Square Dance! at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee
and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals,
we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.

a 2
Oo [CP

NS, R.‘C, BOWMAN
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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
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Lyndon 3B. Jonson Library

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HY 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 145 “hn

TOP Sl DRET INFORMATIC | -
COVER SHEET COPY NO.

L. .
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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE : |

INFORMATION COVER SHEET

OFFICE OF
TOP SECRET

The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauchor-

zed disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, cus-

} tody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations,
to.

Tris cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) iden-

cifted Sy number shove.

Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shel! sign and fill in the information requirad
aedaw

REMARAS

RELEASED (lodicate portions and all of dacumenis read)

focument| attached hereto.

\
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3 authorized one year from

$0 FCM Gu  anewern, a

{When attachments are semovead, this rac+
TOP SECRET INFORMATION
COVER SHEET

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TOP SE SECRET - SENSITIVE NO, 2
JCS 2304 /eku-1 _ : DISTRIBUTION G

30 October 1964

Pazes 2 - 8, incl.

Reference: JCS 2304/eh4

1, At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making
amendmen nts, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recom-
mendations in paragraph 12 of this report. -

2. This Decision replaces pase 2, Holders are requested
to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised
white pages 3 and’ 5, incorporating the amendments, and to
destroy the Superseded pages in accordance with security
regulations

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, tegether with its

Appendices A; B, and C) was forwarded as JCSM-9l2-G4,

ae dated — November . 1968, to: the Secretary of Defense,

f=
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ihe)
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he Commandant hed expressed direct concern of

che Marine Cores in this matter, the provisions of.Titie 16,

US Cede, 141 (c) applied :and were followed.

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Wheeler (C/7cS) Gen. Burchinal (D 38)"

Gen. Johnson (CSA) Gen. Manhart (VD/JS).._

Sdm. McDonald (CNO) Adm, Davis (DD/S) ee

Gen. LeMay (C3 anny fdm. Mastin J-3)
Emrick (J-5)

HW 50955 Docld:324293566 Page 147 a ah

ee

.
4 Ore SEC RE T.

SQUARE DANCE (U)

THE PROBLEM
1. To respond to a memorandum* by the Cnier of Starr,
US Army, tc consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of

Staff recommend to the President that the United States

KF WM

covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding**5
to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cube, 6
stated that the President would be advised of any new and 7

promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure &

Na)

upon the Cuban regime.

3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent 1c

a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding. a ii
study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime ie
by covertly attacking she Cuban sugar industry. The Chief i8
of Staff, US Army, we commenced tnabt tne Toint Starr accomplish ae
interage aney coordination ‘on the 3% ndy proposals; and thas 15
the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it 16
by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint 17
Chiefs of staff support the conclusions and recommendaticns i8
of the study and consider that the outline program therein ig

provides.an adequate framework for the development of detailed 20
supporting programs and plans for participating agencies. , el

“4. on 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered 22
the ‘recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and aereed 23
to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation 24
of a report. . en 7 2

—ERELESHGSRE Eo UES BION ap me Song eras rem
** Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3 | 7 Copy”
aS Lyndon B. “Johnson Library

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE IVE
J-5 2304/2443 So 3

Toy TOP SECRET.

HW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 148 en ae

TOP SECRET ~ SENSITIVE .

5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were
presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some
of the issues of the proposed actions.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Appendix A.

| CONCLUSIONS

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the
ultimate US ob jective toward Cuba must be to establish a
government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

8. The. proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar
industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and

rits consideration by other appropriate governmental
agencies as another option, in concert with other actions,
for causing the collapse of the Castro regime.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are
possible political consequences which could result from

proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.

Hi
Hs

10. -The rdepartmental Coordinating Committee for
_ Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-
agency coordination.

11. The study should be forwarded to ‘the Secretary of
Defense “for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating
Com meittee for “Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation
preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint
Chief's of Starr. . | |

"RECOMMENDATIONS
+2. It is recommended that:
a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its
Appendices A, B, and Cy, which reflects the above conclu-

8ions be forwarded to, the, Secretary: of Defense,

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
JCS 2304 /244-1 ee

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af or WwW SRC] IQ 1s a

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10

HW 50955

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

b. This paper NOT
unified or specified

c. This paper NOT
to NATO activities.

ad. Tnis paper NOT

Delegation, United Nat

pe forwarded to the’ commanders of
commands .

be forwarded to US officers assig sned

be forwarded to the Chairman, US

sions Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: Captain J. 0. Sherman, USN
J-5, Extension 78926.

Copy | a
“Ayan 6 Jobson Library”

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE
ICS 2304/244-1

Docld: 32423566 Page 150

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| AW 50955 Docld:32423566 Page 151 foe

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in respond-
/ing toa Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba,
stated that the President would be advised of any new and
promising courses of action which could possibly bring
pressure upon the Castro regime.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a
study which examines world sugar economics and the vulner-
abilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an
outline program which would undermine Castro's economy,
deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political
instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's
sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on tite
world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a
three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent
reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by
introducing aerlally from off-shore, a sugar cane plant
parasite, Bunga. © Subsequently, the economic and political
disturbances’ caused by this attack could be exacerbated and
‘exploited by such measures as spreading hoof~and~mouth disease
among ‘draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding,
mining canefields, burning cane, ana directing other acts
of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and
transportation systems.

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GROUP. 1. re

* Selboto apes AUTOMATIC.
DOWNGRADE 2 Pay DECL ASSIFICATIO

_tyndon | iB. Jonson ‘Ubrary

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JCS 2308/2uH-1 — le GN _ Enclosure

“POP SRORE
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) onees A

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| | SECRE|

7]

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the

ultimat te US ooJec etive toward Cuba wust be to establish ao
government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.
The concent of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert -
means would furnish another option to the United States in

bringing abouts the collapse of the Castro regime.

4, Although the Joint Chiefs o

bey
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possible political consequences from proof of the US involve-
ment in suena a program, they believe that proposais related
te the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market,
the stabilization of the free market, and the covert intro-
duction ve Boas ase os Cuba, merit serious consideration.
Other forms of attack proposed in the study.mignt be taken

subsequently to.exploit resulting economic and polit cical

turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A

5. it is recommended that the attached draft memorandum
(Appendix B) and study {Appendix ¢) be forwarded to the
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs
for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a ‘
ws a

»asis for consideration of further recommendation by the

Joint Chiefs of Staff..

. Copy” ob :
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TOP SECRET - SE ENSETIVE To 0 i Enclosure
FES 2304 /eH4 1 oe . ‘ : a
(Revised by Decision 3. Novenber 1954)

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TOP SECRET

APPENDICES A, B, AND C

(6 pages)

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APPENDIX A

CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK.
COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would
depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic
controls for the stabilisation of world sugar prices.

It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual
production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of
sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of
convertible currency as it had before the program was
undertaken, The arguments and rationale in favor of the
economic proposals in the study appear to have validity.
However, world economics is a most complex subject and
involves many variable factors, The important points on
economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate
agencies in the government having responsibility for such
matters,

Ce Assuming that success of the actions of the outline
program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this
would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or
that af it did fall, a government friendly to the United
States would be installed, Russia has too much at stake,
politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime
for economic reasons alone, Success of the proposed actions
would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro
Government and would be an additional means of exerting

pressure against that government.

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Lyndon 8. Johnson Library

TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE 1 Appendix A

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5

3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by
the study. The approval for implementation of such a
concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war
methods and would require a major change in national
policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the
event of discovery. There is also an obvious political
risk associated with this proposal, should any credinle
evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political
loss to the United States would be great, Quite apart
from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence
of the United States in international organizations such
as the United Nations and the Organization of American
States would be impaired seriously.

4, Nevertheless. it is the responsibility of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the
President apprised of the capabilities of the military
establishment. The subject study presents measures which
should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after
coordination with appropriate government agencies it would
represent another option for positive actions against the
Castro regime. |

5. NSAM 213% dated & January 1963, established a
committee to coordinate the management of all aspects
of US policy toward Cuba, The President looks to the
Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs
for the effective coordination of the execution of policy
decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses
of action, The subject study should be referred to this
committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to
reporting to the President.

So Copy
* Enclosure to JCS 2304/]yiadon B Johnson Library

POP SECRET - SENSITIVE — 2 Appendix A

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have a responsibilicy to

advice to the Comronder in Chief and the

Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that
a matter such as the provcscals under consideration, bec
sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation

basis for considerstion of further recommendations by tne

TA tat ener wa)
foinsy Chiefs of

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TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE 3
Samm Ws ata , OMe aiahe Sh
(Revised by Decision - 9 November L9o4

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APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM TOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL
COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN APFATRS

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1, On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed
the President that they would continue to review the probier
of putting addit ional pressures on Castro and that the
President would be advised if any new and promising courses
of action were uncovered.
2, The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on

the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attack-

“ing the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world

sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry,
and proposes a phased interagency program which would:

a, Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by
approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1956
production level.

bd. Expand US influence in the world sugar market

by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate

ct

a

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>

free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses,
3. Apart from econcmic measures, the proposals made in
the study are within existing or attainable military capa-
bilities, Several actions are proposed. Key among these
is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite
against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce

fo

gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a bas for plaus

a
Se

te

disavowing US involvement,

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TOP SECRET - SENSITTVE 4 Appendix

9 Hsia Gee ees a

MOP SECRET -

4, Mindful of the risks attending such actions, che Joint 1
Chie®’s of aff hseve reviewed the voroposals of the stucky and 2
believe that they offer an ontion for exerting new pressures 3
against Castro. They believe that prostossls related to the 4
expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the 5

tabilization of the free market, snd the covert introduction 6.
of Bunga into Cube, merit serious consideration, Cther forms 7
of attack croposed in the study might be t avien subsequent Ly 8
to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence 9

. 5. the study is forwarded nerewith wlth es request that ane)
the concept and actions proposed in the outline proeram of il
the study be coordineted by your committee with other movern~ 12
mental depertments end agencies, Upon eccompletion of your 13
review and coordination, it is fu egher requested thet your 14
comments made available to the Seeretary of Defense and 15
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16

TOP SECRED - SENSTLTVE
(Revised oy Dect

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TOP SECRET — SENSITIVE

APPENDIX C

Army Report on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

(See Attachment to JCS 2304/ahe4.,
beginning on page 6 of the white attachment)

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a ed BV geo aay
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5 November 196. ; a DISTRIBUTION. G.

“NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to. the -
HOLDERS OF JcS 2304/2u4-1
78 Report by the J-5
| on

SQUARE DANCE (U)
FIRST CORRIGENDUM
At the request of. the originator, holders are requested

to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the

superseded page in accordance with security reguiations.

: R, C. FORBES
J. BE. MANSFIELD

Joint Secretarlat

‘UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment

RORR

ist Cooris to Jcs 2304/e44-1

6 TOP SECRET

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él July 1975

INVEMTOMMED:

. on 33
MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF 6c
BY

SUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to
Covert Actions Against Cuba

FROM: Loch Jotinson

Among the many documents which IT examined at the Johnsen Library in sam
Texas this past week is one that I find particularly alarming. I wish
bo draw it to your attention.

The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of
Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert
action against Cuba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE,

On 21 March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for
new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new
promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be
brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright
new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached).
The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by intro-
-ducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called
Bunge. The program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of antici-
pated Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six :
years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved. ‘The re
economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be fale
exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures
as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling
rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefieids, burning cane, and direct- be
ing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and
transportation systems" (6, emphasis added). In sum, SQUARE DANCE
"would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about
the collapse of the Castro regime" (7). :

In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal, the memo notes that ~
the approval for implementation of the program “would introduce a new
dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in
national policy." Indeed it would—or at least one hopes we have not
used such methods before! The proposal is nothing less thon a variant
of germ warfare which would heve had serious consequences for the
civilian population. , ; oe

At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE
concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially.
(The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC staffer, to Bundy suggests
that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.) To me, though,

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the mere writing of this kind of propose] is a reprehensible first step
toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief. I find it even more
repugnant than contingency plans for assassination. These are not the
kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from
the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of
what is acceptable policy, legally and morally. As in the Huston Plan,
the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and un-
ethical options. ‘The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic
death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba. The feeble efforts
of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by
comparison with this Army proposal for covert action.

{ believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination
is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant
and animal life through covert germ warfare, Somehow (probably through
hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the
point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy.
These Limits may not be easy to define, but we must try.

Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for
Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference
is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive
Cuban imports (not food})." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC
staffer) indicates that'this proposal received Presidential backing.

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ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: Castro

‘Newspaper accounts report that prior to-the
April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly
or thr/ Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and
Johnny Réselli in organizing assassination attempts against
Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or
about 3/13/61. The first attempt used poison and it was
hoped that with Castro dead,the invasion planned and
executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success.
There were five more attempts made on Castro's life after
3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of
1963.

Allegations(from Newspaper sources):
1) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu
enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to «=

organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro.

2) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against
through
Castro from late March or April 1961 / late February or

March 1963.

3) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it.

es
4) Rosetli recétived poison capsul/ from the CIA which

he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro

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(2)
C4, con't.)

before the Bay of Pigs. One of the Cubans was related

to one of Castro's cooks.

5) The assassination was intended to take place before
invasion
the planned Bay of Pigs/in order to insure that CIA

operation's success.

6) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which
included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas

apartment.

7) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA

agents William Harvey and James O'Connell.

8) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly
with Cuban Refugees:

Roselli

Maheu

Hunt

Liddy

Gilancana

James O'Connel
William Harvey

AOU uw MH

Questions:

1) Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963?

2) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals
to determine if there were any Castro intelligence

agent information?

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(3)

3)

4)

5)
6)
7)

8)
2

10)

Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees
ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on
Castro's life? If so, how was the situation handled?

In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination
or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and
positive step towards the success of the invasion?

Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by
Cuban nationals?

Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters
made known to the agency by the Cuban nationals in
advance?

Did the CIA clear such actions?

Was the CIA aware of Roselli's actions?

Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of

-Johnny Roselli?

At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam
Giancana?

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