198-10004-10076

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HY 50955 Docld: 32276061

Agency Information,
ARMY
198-10004-10076

CALIFANO PAPERS

Document Information

ARMY
JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.

00/00/1963
123

EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND

CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA

U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
Secret

1B; IC

Redact

07/24/1997

Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

J TEK Acsossrcten Local

oct of the Army EO 13596
Declassify Exclude © Exempt

Review Date By

wR

Page 1

A

‘
me . a
. apes ‘ t, )

: pe v => f

NO. .SUBJECT . a . . DATE

i CLA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 9 . 17 Jan 63
(SECRET -NOFORN) oo

2 «Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec: Comm(C) 22 Jan 63

_w/6Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)

3 Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy 23 Jan 63
Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe).

4 .~ Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET) 23 Jan 63

5 Memo for NSC Exec (Gomi, subj as’ above, from 23 Jan 63.

DeD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE) _
6 DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards 23 Jan 63
Cuba; Cy 2:of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/l
Incl, Coord of Cuban. Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm,
. Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)

7 Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for . 24 Jan 63
NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan.63.(TOP SECRET)

8 National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and _, Undtd
, Closed) (TOP SECRET) — :

9 ; Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examina- 4 Feb 63

_ tion of Principal Sources of. Policy and Contingency
_ Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET- -SENSITIVE)

HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 2

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=

February 4, 1963

Peo +: 8/P ~ Jebn @. Pord

Examinetion of Epping Sources ot * Folley

z have yeviewsd the aein seurese of poldey on Guba. The problem

ao ZT define it as follows:
the Proble

Peier te the establishnen
lag Comaittes of eaban a Affeixe, | ane?

. werk bec been done on Gaba,

beth in the policy and eoutingerey fields. The purpose of the
curvent exercige ig te review end identify the mie aources of
sueh policy ami cootingency planning im en effert te deternine
if any of the work previaiely doae will be ef value te the
efiieers of your eommlctes af we go forward with implementation
of the newly stated

Cuban policy and ecbjestives.

The principe! soureas of policy aad contingency plaming
which wey of my aot be of value te the work of your committes ere
ag follows:

i. The dstiomal Security éotion Hemorendea emanating
from the Waite Howes

2. ‘the Actions of the Hetieaal Security Ceunci1
3. The Bagie Bational gacurdty Policy o2@ the 0.2.
(eeu awaiting finel stages of forasl clearance
before presentation te Netiossal Sacurity Council).
& The Records

HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 4

ne of the Interdepartmental Coordinet-

Do

»

8C deeieion or &

4, The Reterde of Action of the Recentive Gommittee
of the Setional Security Council as they pectain

3. The Seporte of the dub-Gomilateae of EXGR -
éuring the Guben Uriede.

& The Resolutions of the Orgauizetion of American
States and the Punta del Este Conference.

7. Bublic Stetesante of Government Officials, in
Paveiculer Proce Conference of President Zennedy
of September 13, 1962.

i &. Meeting of Secretary Rock with Yoredgn Ministera
: ef Latin Awerice during Guben Orisis.

%. Recently Approved Rew Palley Statement and
Objectives es Drewa Up by the Interdepartwental
Gomaltrae of Guban Agiaixs.

10. Guben Guideliaca Paper.
(& guidelines paper es auch doos not axlat on
Cubs an te the otae in a majority af other
aountries. >

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with
Gaba, pexrtiewlarly thet generated du
thie review 1a nearing completion, aud I am eagrevating particular
teportes which may be of value bo the eembers sf your comaitece
#9 we go fotward with implementation of tae new policy and
objectives. Im the attached decumentatium, I heve sagregated —
thoge National Seewrity Council deciztons and Batdodel Security
Ssetion Nenorsads ubtoh ave carried as ponding or clesed in the

of ©. partment of Seta, Whete ection on a vartievlar

th SaP hee been tranefarved fo ZKOOM, section
reapousibility ot these decisions would epeear aed te be within
the purview of your Courdinating Committees. Trom my review

to date,

HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 5

the recent Getcber crisis.


. €@ date, 12 appedig Chat all of these éeeielons call for action
whieh hove already been conaidered by your Gommittes. You @Lil

note that ig séae iaatences gotion veegonaibilicy an aa REC

decioign or RASAM bes bean trimeferrved to the Seoeeiel Group

Aetachwant:
List of Pending anal Close

HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 6


g

C)

|
|
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Page Tf

32276061

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Page 6


483 NSC 24228
5/5/64

483 NSC 24224
5/5/61

483 NSC 24226
$/5/64

433 NSC 2422¢
5/$/E1

453 HSC 24221
5/5/61

483 NSC 2422
3/3/61

HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 9

Agreed that US policy toward —
Gube should eim at the downfall
of Castee regime.

Status

(Pending)
According te
files, out of
this NSC direct-—
ive grew a policy
paper, to be ;
hendled different!
ly fron regular
guidelines papers

oa each country.

ag @f 9/4/o2, uhite Beuse

was ingerned that aetion on this

HSC¢ divective would be reportad
im eompliance with NSAM 181
which transferred certaia Néc &
HASAN actions to apecial group
{Alexis Johazen) .

Importance President
attaches to obtaining,
adequate iatelligence
on Cuban pilitery
g¢apabilicies.

Importesce Prealdent
attaches to publication

ie free world prese of
termeriet ectioens of

Gsetre regime, ete. and

te possible pelitice] ection
to end current texroz.

Reletions with Cuban
Revolutionary Council
should be improved.

Cubsen vefagees to be given
wefugea atatua; refugees in
Wiaml to be relocated;
vetagees to be eligible te
apply for teevel privileges.

Initiation of negotiations
te enlarge willingness of

other Aneglean states to

join in ackfon ageinst Castro,

setion to be

(Pending)

veported in
coupliance with _
NASAM 181 |
(Jehusen channel)

(Pending)
Action trang~
ferred to EXCOM

_ (Pending)
Setion trance
ferred to EXCON

(Pending)
Action trang+
fevred to EXCOM

(Pemiias)
Section trang-
ferred to EXCOM


Substesce Status

&B3 NSC 24622m USTA #211 expand 1 (Pending)

8/3/64 ptogron, but not initiate Action trans-

. éleetzonie warfare againet ferred to
Caetee;, means ef propaganda Jebnson channel.
should be madeoyallable Per MASAM
to nemelS groupe. €iGi.

463 BSE 24228 US military officers under . (Cleved}
5/5/61 general guideace te be eéupleted aetion
prepared by Dept of State, ag of 11/28/61.
would diseuse Cagtre thresc :
£o ahh bids with bee Bie orfivers.
463 USC 24220 Dept of State should prepare (Closed)
5/8/61 a report on a possible new $/P paper

justeiank & epee tor effective “eosdible new
ti~eoumunier a Beads for Antie«:
Communist Action"

7/28/61
483 NS@ 2422p Rebert Noodmard’s assumption Clesed.,
(5/3/63 of vesponsibilicy of Task Force
en Cuba on apnoenceneat of
appointment.
683 MSG 24226 Re US milleary intervention Closed.
5/5/61 . wow. Do sothing which would
foveclese posedbliiey allitary
intervention in future.
483 HSC 2422¢ He naval bleckade ox alewar Closed.
5/3/64 ageiaee Cuba,
683 MSC 24232 Detailed study te be aade Slesed.
5/3/61 by CIA with ether Departments Bissell memo to
ef possible weeknesses and éehilies
vulnerabilities in eleneats 11/21/61 we:
which control Cuba. "Sitnation and
Preapeecte in
Cabe"by Shermen
. Rent 11/3/61.
Gim SECRET

HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 10

SS LS a a


483 NSO 2422h
5/5/62

&63 NEC 24224
5/5/61 .

483 NSC 24291
5/3/61

MASAN 196
10/2/62

10/3/61

3/44/62
BA HAGAM G16

8/26/62

HY 450955 Docld:32276061 Page 11

Glesad,
DEY rereumended
te Pree ocra kt

Ho separate Cuban military
forces should be orgenized.
ie 0.3. Guben natie

be encourcged enlist in OS pregran be
Avwed Porees. terminsted
6/30/62 dee to -

modéat resulta. —

ho iamedlate trade embargo
én Cuba.

Closed,
with Preaident's
getlon ef 2/3/62
éeclering otal euberge on trade
with gba with exception
nedieina ang feed on fueontitarian

grounds .

Allience for Pr
strengthened,

go Maite Beuse.

Polley Toward non-ble
ships Ried an trade (Action
& peopases to
take with vegetd to

sbhipplag te Cubs.)

Contingeacy Plenmiag for
Cobs.

US Government aust heve wendy
4@ Waite Paper en Cuba and be
Seedy to give aseletenme to
Cuban Poteliote in similar
effort.

yea only « Lindted Dletrib=

wbion. feporting te be through

another chaanél and handled —
petconally by Beputy USecy

Jobascn _fundexatond this. authorised vesponse
DE, 3 pening ESC Actions, 2

8/61

Closed,
Weekly report
now trom ALD

Pending.
Action tverne~
eeread ta

Pending
Action trane-
fervad te .
Jebnsen cheomel,

Closed,
Paper prepared
and translated:

“The Castro
Regime ie Ceba™

| BAGSMs thera

CUBA HASAM 196
40/22/82
CUBA NAgAM 208

42/6/62

1/8/63

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A RR TST a ae oe a TorTe TOPO NE A RE SOT NN

Establishment of NSC Executive Closed,
Committee .

Cuba Gverflights. (This Report Submitted.

Pxevidential directive

egproved aon attached

Guidelines for the Planning

of Cuban Qverflights, and
wequested CLA te come up with

en estimate of the adequacy of

such « ayetes of intelligence
eellection te weet the eriteria

set forth, om assumptian it ia
supplemented by energetic collection
of informetion by all other evaileble
seana.)

interdepartuental Orgenization Clesed.
of Cuban Afiaixe - with

cespousibliity yasted ta «

Coordinator of Cuban affairs

Le Department of State,

Page 12

4

; :
4 a
a ond

lo ne ~ ee ee et em - Poor che es 2 Ane = = Z
HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 13 . :


“el

Loe
*
%

TOP_SECRET ATTACHMENTS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORCE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee
Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary. of
Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States °
Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to -. -
members of the NSC Executive Committee for considera-
tion at the meeting of the Committee on Friday,
January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8
‘for, the paper entitled “United States Policy Toward. ~
the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted
on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be. con-
sidered at the Friday meeting. They are"United States:
Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States”
and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

LY, a ee
Mele
ne (a

Executive Secyétariat

Attachments:

As stated.
Copy No. .

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 14

‘
\ G a oo . @
f

@@m SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL" S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : _ Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: — United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
Lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in _ the
following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the

_Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall
neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
hemisphere. ' ;

“We will not, of course, abandon the political,
economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But
these policies are very different from any intent to
launch a military invasion of the island.”

‘aa SECRET

HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 15

@mgm SECRET

-2-

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States
policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States (OAS) by assuring that
offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;

‘4, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other Hemisphere states; ee

“ §. .Encouraging and supporting any developments | within
Cuba that offer the possibility of sivoteing
. the. Cuban Government from its support
‘Soviet Communist purposes; . MP

6. Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,
it being understood that our ultimate...
objective. : is replacement of the regime “by
one’ fully compatible with the goals of the
United States;

‘Qap SECRET

HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 16

10.

@@m SECRET

-3-

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;

Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other free world states,
and especially from states of the OAS.
Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization
of American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;

Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

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A.

To achieve the foregoing objectives, the

U. S. Government will be prepared to increase

the political economic, psychological and
military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
present themselves or can be created. The

actions listed below are those requiring immediate
approval and would be initiated in the sequence
set forth below. Recommendations for further

SECRET

Page i7

on _ SECRET
-4-

actions based upon the re-examination of
existing programs and upon the development
of new programs related to the foregoing
objectives will be forthcoming. :

1. In addition to current covert program, such
as intelligencé collection, recruitment of
Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
and other exile group activities and infil-
tration of propaganda materials:

a. Intensify covert collection
of intelligence within Cuba, ‘especially
within the regime;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
exiles, who are associated with |
the original aims of the 26 of July
Movement and who believe that the
Castro regime.can be overthrown from
within in order. that they may:
1) cause a split in:the leadership
of the regime at the national or
provincial levels; and 2) create a _
political base of popular opposition ~
to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to Launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials

_ from international waters into Cuba.
. Launch propaganda balloons. after an
“operational capability has been
established.

qm SECRET

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 16

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SECRET |

-5-

With respect to the actions listed below,
the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
the 20-odd American prisoners should first
be ascertained, If these actions were taken
before the conclusion of the negotiations
they could jeopardize the release of the
Americans.

If these negotiations fail, or when the
prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
following timetable:

Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance

of the proclamation of the four point _
shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days).
These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all
vessels of a country whose vessels
engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship
which has carried goods in the Bloc-
Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
it. seeks to enter a United States port;

c. Prohibit all United States flag ships
and all ships owned by United States
nationals or residents from entering
any ports of Cuba and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

GP SECRET

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Page 20

te SECRET

~6-

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department of the United States from
being shipped on vessels owned or
controlled by persons who own or
control vessels engaged in the trade
between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at

a later date dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
another representative of the President
will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
and Brazil to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
its actions which continue to endanger
the peace, deploring refusal to allow
inspection, condemning the presence of
Soviet troops, recommending continued
surveillance and continued vigilance
against subversive activities, and
terminating the invocation of the Rio
Treaty on the missile crisis, together
with

b. An OAS resolution which would
recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
to all items of trade except food and
medicine (fall back position: extension
of arms embargo to all strategic items);

@@G SECRET

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Page 271

ina SECRET.

2) prohibition of ships of OAS
member states from transportating
embargoed ‘items and deny uSse-of '
ports:to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3)* denial of Soviet over-flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba; _
and 4): a.call on other states’ to mee
take. similar action. ¢

After obtaining the 1 maximum possible
support of the key countries of Mexico,
Chile and Brazil, the other OAS

members will be approached in Washington
and in their respective capitals,
simultaneously. It should be possible
for this corisultation and OAS action on
the resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval
of the resolutions, we will inform our’
NATO allies of the > impending OAS action.

At the first NATO: meeting after ‘formal °

OAS action on the resolutions, we will
request that NATO include Cuba on the ;
list of countries to which shipment °

of. €OCOM list (strategic). items > Prohibited.

After | ‘WATO decision on our cocom request’
we will seek to get epreement from Free
World industrial nations to prevent
shipping of critical spare parts and
equipment to Cuba, ‘not on the COCOM list.

Sos

In addition to the four point shipping

resolutions, and action under Section

107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue
to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping < out of: Blac- Cuba trade.

eee SECRET

= SECRET

-8-

B. Contipency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our
objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
action in other parts of the world; as a result
of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
result of uprisings or internal conflict within
Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be
undertaken immediately, should include preparations
for increased multilateral and/or bilateral ,
political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive
air activity including both high and low level
flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro
government and keeping the Castro forces on ,
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a
POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
other countries; severance of communic ations
to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
destined for Cuba and on key installations to
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately,
the use of U. S. military force. To the extent
feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U. 8. militarily-
trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U. S. effort.

@@8 SECRET

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 .Page 22

SECRET =

-~8-

Our programs should be designed to encourage
the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
community and engage in constructive pursuits
pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
them some special assistance but not to the extent
that they become a perpetual privileged class
within the community, Presidential action on their
behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

HY 50955 Doclad: 32276061 Page 23

MEMORANDUM FOR THE. NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1753, 10 a.m.)

i

FROM: Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

. \
1.

U. S.. Policy Objectives
--«* The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
respect to Cuba: ,

a. Protecting the security of the United States
and the.other states of the Organization of
American States by assuring that offensive
weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;

d, Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other OAS states; _ oo

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
divorcing the Cuban Government from its
support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes,

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments.
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
‘that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

(SECRET

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 24

j.

SECRET

-2-

being understood that cur ultimate objective
is replacement of the regime by one fully
compatible with the goals of the United States;

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;

Maximizing the politicai isolation of the

Castro regime from otner Free World states,

and especially from states of the OAS. When-
ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should
be multilateral, preferably based upon the
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
resolutions adopted. by the Crganization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which mighc splic the hemisphere;

Being prepared to meet, with the employment
of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.

2. Supvorting Actions

Actions .in support of these objectives and their
time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
entitled "U..S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061

SECRET RET

Page 25

SECRET

-3-

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches
to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.

Existing programs will be reviewed and further
recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
at once, , ,

In addition to current covert programs sich as
intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
other. exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are.
recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence
within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
return the 26 of July Movement to its
original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
foregoing actions may impair our ability
-to.accomplish objective b. (Removal of
remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because

_ taking these actions could provide the
U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval
of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Suban BELEaes

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
specially tailored civilian and military program for
Brigade members.

SECRET
nr eae

HW 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 26

SECRET

whe

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
and individual members urged to accept civilian training
or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program
for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade
members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
community would be avoided.

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 27

HY 450955 Dacld: 32276061

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: “Top SECRET

—

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF. DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

January 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR, VANCE

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC
Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now
been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m... The revision
consists essentially of what is now denominated as
"ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy
and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supple-
mented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at
the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This
supplemental material is derived from portions of the text
of “ALTERNATIVE If" in the original paper.

At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed hiyn
the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my
reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to
include the supplemental material referred to above. He,
in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will
thereafter be in touch with you. if possible, will you let me
khow by noon tornorrow where you ‘and he stand with regard
to the revised paper.

Enclosure
SIGii.

ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC
ce: Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Yarmolinsky

Pena te RL 2 bane econ

EXCLULED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD BIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

. “GA sy @o3/ cera SECRET COPY a OF ‘ COPTES.

HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 29

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_ | , 9 P SECRET

M _ . DRAFT/23 Jan 63

PY9.3 53. DUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
us GOMMITTES

BRAM : Geordinater of Cuban Affairs

SUBS ECT: United Staten Policy Toward Cuba

Po United Stateo Policy

Vn November 20, the Preoident set forth the broad guidelines of
United Stateo policy with reopect to Cuba in the following words:

"Ac for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in

the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,

and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggrecaive .
communist purposes, there will be reace in the Caribbean.
And, ao I caid in September, 'we shall neither initiate

nor permit agerescion in thic hemisphere’.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, econcznic
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
from Cuba, nor our purpese and kere that the Cuban people
shall come day be truly free. But chess policies are very
different from any intent to launch 2 military invasion of
the island,"

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with eeapect to Cuba
ARG: : . .

i, Protecting the security of the United States and the
other atates of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by acouring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba;

‘Ge SECRET

HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 30


Romoval of remaining Soviet fercon from Cuba;

Proventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action againot othor Garibboan otaton;

Reducing the capabilitios of the Castro zeRgime to direct
and oupport oubvorcion and inourroction within the
other OAS otateo;

Zacouraging and oupporting any developments within

‘Cuba that offer the pocolbility of Mvorcing the Cuban

Government from its Ouppost of Sino-Seviot Communist
purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
which would accomplick thio purpose; .

Maximising the coct to the Soviet Union of cupporting
the Castro rogime;

Marimizing the political ioolation of the Castro regime
from other free world states, and especially from
states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
against Cuba cheuld be multilateral, prefe rably based
upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance {Rie Pact)

or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
American States, The newly-won hemiophe ric
solidarity on the Cuban isoue chould not be joopardized
by secking OAS actions of marginal value and which
might split the hemiophoro,

Being prepared to mect, with the employment ef
Appropriate U.S. combat claments and/or logictical
oupport, the wide varioty of military contiagencies

that may orice from purouilt of tho foregoing objectives;
ang . : ;

5

WR SECRET

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HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 31


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9. Producing comprehencive intolligence related te the above
objectives,

‘Our ultimate objective with beopect to Cuba remains the overthrow
of the Castro/Communiot regime and its replacement by one compatible
with the objectives of the U.S. and, where poosible, sharing the aims X

ue

hel

of the Free World. To achieve this ebjective, the U.S. Government ay n
will be prepared to apply increacing degrees of political, oconomic,
poychological and military preaaureo, ac appropriate opportunitico prosont
themselves or can ba created, until the Cactro/Communist regime is
overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist
regime through the oxereiog of all fcacible diplomatic, econemic,
psychological aad covert actions may achieve the immediate objoctives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward
our ultimate objective,

Supporting etions 7
The chowine actions chould be initiated in the sequence set forth /
below: .

1, Await reoults of Mr, Donovan's imminent nogotiation with
Fidel Cactveo for feceing the 20-0dd American prisoners,
Prior aggressive U. &, action could jeopardize their release.

2, - If theoa negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered,
proceed om tho following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve kcurs in advance of the proclamation
of the four point chipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
tho ordora to go into effect in five days). Theoe orders:

a close United States ports to all veasels of a
country wheoe vessela engage in carzying AFMO
to Guba;

& close United States ports to any chip which has
carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days
of the time it cecko to onter a United States poxt;

6, prohibit all United Statco Mag chips and all ships
owned by United States nationals or residents from
entering any porto of Cuba aad from carrying any
geods bound to or from Guba; and

ER SECRET

momen ro — = —— _ fo ee

HY 60955 Docld:32276061 Page 32

Bey

& prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department or agency of the United
States ¢vom botag shipped on vessels
owmed ox controlled by persons who
om or control vessels engaged in the
erade batwoea Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

a

4, , At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission
Confercacc im El Salvador oa January 28230
Aseistant Seexctary Marcin will visit the Presidents
of Calle, Mexieo and Brazil co convey to chem the
importance President Rommedy attaches co maintaining |
hemispheric solidarity by cupporting the sollowiag
ecasolutlones ;

a. An OAS resolution condesming Cuba for its
netiens waleh' contimuc to endanger the peaco,
deploring refusal te allew iaspection,
condomaing the presence of Sevict troops,
eocemmendiag continued surveillance and i
continued vigllaace against subversive
activities, and terminating tho imyecation
of the Ris feeaty on the missile crisis,
cogecher with

b. dm OAS resolution which would ececcmmend
1) axtension of axms embargo to all items
of teade cxecat food and medicine (fall back
position; extension of ames embargo to all
atrategic items); 2) prohibition of AR
ships €com transporting eabargecd icems and
deay usc of ports to chips ia Bloe-Cuba
exade; 3) demtal of Soviet over-flights ‘and
evomeit rights for flights to Cuba; apd
&) a call om ether states bo take similar
aeCLon.

8, A€ter obtaining the wmaximua pesclble cupport of
the key countries ef Moxleo, Galle and Beagil, the
ether OAS mewboro will be approachod in Washington

HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 33

—

OQ © |

Top SECRET

@Se

and in their respective capitals, simulcancously.
Zt should be possible for this consulcation and OAS
action on che resolutions to be completed within
ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the
resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the
impending OAS action.

At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action
on the resolutions, we will request that NATC
include Cuba on the List of countries to which
shipment of COCcoM list (steacegic) items is
prohibited.

After NATO decision on our CCCOM request, we will
seek to get agreement from Free World industrial
nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts
and equipment co Cuba, not on che COCOM list.

in addicion to four point shipping vesolutions,
‘and action under Sectiim LOF ck the Foreign Assistance

Act, continue tc press Prec Woertd nations to keep
theix shipping cu> of Elsce-Cuba trade.

In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence ecilection, radio broadcasts,
vecruitment cf Cuban cfficials as agents, support

of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities,
and infileratic= of propagarcs materials, the
following are vocommended for approval and immediate

initiation:

a. Intensify to maximum degree possible
iatelligence and counterintelligence coverage

of Guba;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who ave associated with the original. aims of
the 26 July Movement and who believe that
the Castro regime can be overchrown from
within in order that they may: 1) cause

qm SECRET

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061

Page 34


[i

a apes
Vai SECnne
Bae

a split in the leadership of the regime
at the national or »rovincial levels; and,
2) create a political base of popular
opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;

ec. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials from
international waters into Cuba. Launch
propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established.

HW 450955 Docld: 32276

061

Page 35


Q en”

‘ Tn addition to these immediate actions, we should make

preparations now so that we are able to seize Opportunities for more
positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise °
either as a‘result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, asa i
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/ j
Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal / ‘
conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
with these situations, '

: {

| . i

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large- }

scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including |
both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on *
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the
imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other
countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of |
sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in

Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S, .
military forces. {

We should be in a position to respond with open military support
{to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special
Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
forces), to a request for ezeistan-o from any anti-Castro/Communist
group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,

which threaten the present regime, and whose alms are compatible
with those of the U.S.

{
i

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U.S. effort. ;

tee SECRET

HY 450955 Docld: 322776061 Page 36

o> a
— a

HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 37

He ee

aoe

, is Ll wok
; MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

on (Prepared for the Meeting of Thureday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.) co

- FROM : Department of Defense Representative. on: the Inter = cm 7
departmental Coordinating Committee On Cuba My,

-°° SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

, "Policy mo —
Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the . : =: |
| overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement -

by. one compatible with the objectives of the U. S.. and, where —

- possible, sharing the aims of the. Free World, . To achieve this.
“objective, the U.. S. Government will apply increasing degrees. of |
. political, economic, paychological. and military pressures, as

‘ appropriate opportunities present themselyes or can be created,
7 %

_ until the. Castro/Communist regime is overthrown, Our immediate 7
; objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free a Poe
: World and from . the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal wie
° dissension, erode its domestic political, gupporti frustrate ite ssub- he
versive activities; negate its. influence in. the hemiepheres increase

“the cost ‘to the Bloc. of custaining | the regime; and obtain. a the withdrawal pe

ke.

, Sof Russian troops from Cuba,

EXCLUDED PRO AUTOMATIC FRORADING “)
“DOD DIR 5200.10 DOSS HOT APPLY =,

wae

HW 509055 Docld: 32276061 “Baye 38

ty ae

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist on

regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic,
psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives

a . and could create propitious conditions in Cuba. for further advance

- ‘toward our ultimate objective.

We should be. ina position to respond with open military sup- a
port (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and

“Special Forces: support and, 3 if necessary, up to. the full range of

fompaste wit those of.the U.S. i”

Invasion of Cuba by U. ‘S. military forces, as distinguished.

from military support upon weauee° of indigenous forces, should

hemaephere,, This does not t preclude appropriate | Ue Ss. retaliation

HW 50055. Docld: 32276061. Page 39


' To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces. employed

© “against Cuba should be accompanied by U. s. militarily- ~trained

desirous of participating in the UL.S. ‘effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence

"og the national intelligence. effort.

Whenever possible, U,.S, actions against Cuba should be

7 multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal

7 Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking’ OAS actions. of

“marginal value and which might split the hemisphere. | _
Overt. and covert annexes of specific actions in support 0 of |

cy

., this policy » will be’ prepared.

Discussion

“6

HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 40,00 ~ 7.0 _ S

* free Cubans and by the armed forces of those. Latin American nations 7 7

gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified asa primary objective 7 fa.

oo Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization — a _

“\of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity o on. the a a


-and military actions. .Such actions might include. leaflet dropping; —
. propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; ,
a psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of.
«Cubans in. the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive -
- : air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed
toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also .
have-the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping -

_ the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appro~., =

; priate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of.
- Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications. to ©

Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on .-

key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ‘ultimately, - a a
- the use of U.S. military forces.” a a _ Se So o Te ce fe
In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut ..
of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert. actions, : v : a :

: such a as OAS. sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified

” surveillance. of and publicity concerning Castro/ Communist subversive: seat

i

- activities | in ‘Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restric- | 7

tions and other economic: sanctions, and ¢ a series of actions designed

- ‘to. obtain, “to. the ‘greatest. extent possible,’ multilateral approval of and : 7

‘ participation i in the campaign to unseat ‘the Castro/Communist regime,

ne

Se a ee te Ce Cae

seremenaene i

HW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 41

.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the

‘objective more rapidly and.under more controlled conditions than. °°"

” the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the cps j
_ _only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. 7 a. - oo “|

: : It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure _

of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel,

From. the standpoint of international politics,. the U.. S,

owill probably be subjected to criticism for aggression fromthe 2: 2"
“uncommitted nations. ' It. is difficult to predict | the reaction of
; ‘the Latin. American governments, They may attack the U.S. for = a

“intervening” or they may react: favorably {as- they did during the

missile crisis). To a large ‘extent, the reaction of the nations

oa
:

“

i
an

‘ork
ot
an
J
|

throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, -
will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For - _
example, there may even-be advantages to the fact that our active “e
policy and the courses of action. under it may eventually become |
Impossible to conceal, | if properly handled, the overt aspects of ,
this policy may serye! not E only: to ) mitigate any unfavorable reactions _

. from other countries, but also to gain, ‘particularly in Latin America,

a ; \ increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/ Communist Cuba.

Ww -50955 Boold:32276061 Page 4a

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that

“ "the UL S.. will not permit.the maintenance of a communist base in pen.
, “the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the - |
_ more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from
. ' the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures
on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to

overthrow the Tegime, Ue 5S. prestige becomes more deeply

involved. . The further we ¢ progress along this route, the more |

The successful execution of this policy will require careful |
timing : and | coordination of our actions and the development of detailed oa et

While such plans would be- designed to bring about the over="

. plans. =.
%

. throw ‘of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning

: purposes, they would have to. be sufficiently flexible to accommodate.

eae

=. changes to the international situation,
. j :

we),

os *. ’ Bape

In any case, at.crucial points along the way,.it will be neces=" :
sary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions 7
already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages

of ‘continued and escalated activity against the. disadvantages and

sgh CO BR

, dangers of such activity. -

‘HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 43

eee S Senet

Commitment to this course of. action does not exclude the
— possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of of the ‘Castro regime o

. from the Bloc. a 3 . 7” ~

' Coordinator's Recommendation

I do not concur | in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. — a:
| The objectives stated in the ( ‘Coordinator! & paper do not sufficiently ~ 7
‘commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. .
> The Coordinator! r) paper degonds too much upon events outside the
_ ne - control of the U. S,. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate

“the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/_

: ‘Communist regimes. The specific actions recommended in the

Coordinator’ 5 paper are . consistent with the policy recommended in 7.

this paper and, in many. cases, would be "among the initial steps that |

would be taken in executing that t paler, we

‘Recommendation vale

1 recommend. that the e policy. stated above be adopted as ‘the. a

y United States policy tow: : rd Cuba,

HW 50955 DocTd:32276061 “Page 44:

¢ C) ReP=SECRET QC

DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE
: COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cubam Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of
United States policy with respect to Cuba im the following words:

so “As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems aré
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean.
And, ae I said in September, ‘we shall neither imitiate
nor permit aggression im this hemisphere’.

"We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
different from any intent to launch a military invasion of
the island, “

Objectives . 2

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with reapect to Cuba
are: ,

i, Protecting the security of the Umited States and the
other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba;

7 sateen nes a eye EE
ye

HY 50955 Docld: 322776061 Page 45

O @OT SECRET O

Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military

action against other Caribbean states;

Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct
and support subversion and insurrection within the
other OAS states; ,

Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban
Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
purposes or replacing the Government with a regime
which would accomplish this purpose;

Maximising the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting

_ the Castro regime;

Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime
from other free world States, and especially from
states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions
against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based
upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)

or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should net be jeopardized
by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which
might split the hemisphere.

Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U.S. combat clemente and/or logistical
support, the widd varisty of military contingencies

that may arise from Pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and;

HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 46


a OQ. WP SECRET O

3

9, Producing comprehensive intelligence related to tac above
objectives. ‘

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow ~
of the Castro/Communict regime and its replacement by onc compatible
with the objectives of the U.S. and, where poooible, sharing the aimo
of the Free World, To achieve thio objective, the U.S. Government
will be prepared to apply increacing degroes of political, sconomic,
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate eppertunitico procont
themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is
overthrown,

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communict te
regime through the exercioe of all feanible diplomatic, economic,
poychelogical and eevert actioas may achieve the immediate objectives
and could erento prepitious coniitieas im Cuba fos furthor advances toward
our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated ia the sequence set forth
below:

1, Await results of Mz. Donovan's imminent negotiation with
Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American prisoners.
Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2, If these negotiations fail, or when the prisemers ars recovered, |
proceed on the following timetable:

3, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours im advance of the proclamation
of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calle for
the orders to go into effect in five days}, These orders:

a clese United States ports to all vessels of a
country whose pesesls engage in CaErying arEAo
e Cuba;

b. cleas Uaited Statoo porto to any chip which bas
carried goods im the blec-Guba trade within 120 days
of the time it seeks to onter a United States port;

ic. prohibit all United States flag chips and all ships

i owned by United States nationals or residents from

entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any
goods bound to or from Cuba; and “

Gee SECRET

HY d0955 Docld: 322776061 Page 47

re

—

, Qo.

Se

é prohibit any cargo sponsored by aay

department or agency of the United

States frem belag shipped on vessels

ewned or controlled by persons who

own or control vessels engaged in the

trade between Cuba and the Sewlet bloc.
8 the coralantion of the U. 8. Exiogo 8 ilsoten
Conforcace fa BL Salvader ea Jonmary
Assistant Secretary Martia will visic the Presidents
ef Calle, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the
importance President Kennedy attaches to malataining
hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following
vegolutions:

a. 4m OAS resolution condeaming Cuba for its
actions which centinue to endamger the peace,
deploring refusal to allow inspection,
condeming the presense 6£ Seviet troeps,
recommending continued surveillanse and
continued wigilence against subversive
activicies, and terminating the invocation

- of the Rilo Treaty on the missile crisis,

together with

db. Am OAS resolution which would recommend ©
1) extension of arms embargo to all items
ef trade except food and medicine (fall back
position: extensica of args embargo te all

'  eteacogie fecneds 2). peohibielen of AR

‘ships eem traneporting embargead iteas and

deny use o£ ports to ships im Bloe-Cuba |
trade; 3) deaial of Soviet evor-flights and
transie rights for flights te Cuba; aad —
6) ao call om ether states to take similar
aetion.

' A€eer obtalning the maximum pessible support of
the key countries ef Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
ether OAS menbers will be approached in Washiagton

HY 40955 Docld: 322776061 Page 48


| | GE) SECRET
<5

and in theixy respective capitals, simultaneously, —
It should be possible fer this consultation and OAS
action on the resolutions to be completed within
ten days, Prior te formal COAS eppreval of the
resolutions, we will imform our NATO allies of the
depending OAS action.

~ 6. At the Cirse RATO meeting after formal OAS action
eon the resolutions, we will request that NATO
imelude Guba on the list. of countries to which
. shipment of COGOM List (strategic) items ie
prokibitod.

7, A&tor NATO deelolon on our COCOM request, we will
sack to get agreement from Free World industrial
nations te prevent shipping of critical spare parts

3 Of immeme eo (Gaba, Ree Ca the COC WAGE 0° .

in. eddiedon: ee four point. chipping resolutions,

and. action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
Aet, continue te press Free World nations to keep
thelr shipping ouc ef Bloc-Cuba trade.

In addicion to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, radie broadcasts,
xecruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support ,
of the Cuban Revolutionary Coumeil (CRC) activities,
and. infiltration ef prepaganda’ materials, the
following are regonmended for approval and immediate
initiation: /

/

Go Intensify to maced masa éegree possible
yj ; intelligence and counterintelligence coverage
a of Guba;

 & Support the efforts ef certain Cuban exiles,

who ave associated with the original aims of
- ghe 26 July Movemsat and who believe that
|: «  @he Castze zogime cam be overthrewa. praraey 3)
_ withia im order that they may: 1) cause


Pn

@e@_ SECRET
a Geo

a split in the leadership of the regime
at the national or »rovincial levels; and,
2) create a political base of popular
opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials from
international waters into Cuba. Launch
propaganda balloons after an operational
capability has been established.

HY 40955 Dacld: 32276061

=a

Page 50


In addition to these immediate actions, we should make
preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more
positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of
the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise
either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a
result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/
Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal
conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal
with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-
scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including
both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance
and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of
embarraasing the Castro government and keeping the Castre forces on
continual alert; retaliatory meagures, as appropriate, including the
imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other:
countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of
sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S.
military forces,

We should be in a position to respond with open military support

(to imclude such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special

Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military
forces), toa request for assistance from any anti-Castre/Communist a
group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive,

which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible

with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily -trained free Cubans
and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of
participating! in the U.S. effort.
i

€EP SECRET /

HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 51

~ 7 «
ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy i :

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is
the overthrow of the Castro/Commnist regime and ‘its
replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the
U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free
World. \To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government
will apply increasing degrees of political, economic,

‘psychological and military pressures, as appropriate
opportunities present themselves or can-be created,

until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the
Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from
the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal
dissension, erode its domestic political support;
frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence
in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of
sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian
troops from Guba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting .the
Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all
feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and
covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives
and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for
further advance toward our ultimate objective,

4. We should be in a position to respondwith open
military support (to include such items as materiel,
advisors, training, and Special Forces support and,
if necessary, up to the full range of military forces),
to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist
group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an abllity to
survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose
aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as
distinguished from military support upon request of
indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the
absence of aggression or other Castro/Commmist and/or

Soviet

@@® SECRET

HY 40955 Docld:322776061 Page 52


- 8 ~

Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the
hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S.
retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ ,
Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces
employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S.
militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces
of those Latin American nations desirous of participating
in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligene
gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a pri
objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty
of Reciprocal Assistance (Ric Pact) or on resolutions
adopted by the Organization of American States. The

‘ newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue

should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of:
marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in @&
support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective in-
volves a phased and controlled series of political,
economic, psychological and military actions. Such
actions might inclgde leaflet dropping; propaganda urging
sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psycho-
logical operations urging defections; large scale training
of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside
Guba; extensive air activity including both high and low
level flights primarily directed toward suyveillance and
collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

ep SECRET

HY 450955 Docld: 32276061 Page 53


| WW §0955

eG? SECRET

~ Px:
A
Y

effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the
Gastro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the impesition of a POL blockade;
harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries;

severance of commmications to Cuba; major acts of
sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key
installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and,
ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a

_ broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psy-

chological and covert actions, such ae OAS sanctions,
Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance
of and publicity concerning Castre/Comaunist subversive
activities in Latin America, application of Four Point
shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and

a series of actions designed to ebtain, to the greatest
extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation
in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining
the objective more rapidly and under more controlled
conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator.
Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will
accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater
visks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of
money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

,- From the standpoint of international politics, the

ww. &. will probably be subjected to criticism for
‘aggression from the uncomaitted nations. It is difficult

“to. predict the reaction of the Latin American fovernments.

nL

Z
f

They may attack the U. S. for “intervening or they may react
favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a

vAarge extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the
‘world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will

depend upon how adroitly theee actions are handled. For
example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our
active policy and the courses of action under it may

@ee SECRET

Bocld: 327776061 Page 54


ME SECRET
~10e

eventually become Impossible to conceal. If properly
hendled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not
only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other
countries, but alse to gain, particularly in Latin
Awerica, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/
Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
thet the U. 5. will net permit the maintenance of a
communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of
military posture, the more active approach may be
subjected to counteractions from the Sine-Soviet Bloc
elsewhere. As we Increase the pressures on Castro/Communist
Guba and the extent of our commitment te overthrow the regime,
U. &. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further
we progress along this route, the more significant will be.
the loss of U, 5. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require
careful timing and coordination of oux actions and the
development of detailed plans. While such plans would be
designed te bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will
be necessary fer the highest levels ef our Government to
review the actions already taken and these contemplated and
to assess the advantages of continued and escalated
activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such
activity.

Commitment to this course of action dees not exclude
the possibility of actively pursuing the isclation of the
Castro regime from the Bloc.

eB SECRET _

HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 55


‘wee SECRET
wLl=

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION
ea EEE PEA SSE NRA EP SeeaM HORACE

iI recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE
SR ARTETA mA IER fo eer aa tac

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the.
Coordinator, Alternative I dees not make the overthrow
of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. §.
In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently
contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the
downfall of that regime. The specific actions
recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the
policy recommended in Alternative IT and, in many cases,
would be among the initial steps that would be taken
im executing that poliey. I recommend adoption of
Alternative II.

HY 450955 Docld:322776061 Page 56


an
Ny

()

HY 40955 Docld:322776061 Page 57

oo rn pe Te
ee. SECRET .

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY ‘COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMME TTEE

Prepared, ‘for ‘the > Meeting of Thursday, January, 2, 1963, 10 Be asm.) ook

a FROM = “Coordinator of Cuban ‘Affairs:

Super: United States Poliey.’ ‘Tovar cuba Q

Oe! 3 .

“There | are - submitted ‘for your consideration two “alternative :

‘statements of policy and related courses of action with respect’

-to Cuba. . Alternative I was prepared by the Department — of State.
oe, Alternative Il was prepared by the Department of Defenses’.
* Coordinator! s Recommendation that Alternative I be approved,

‘and the Department. ‘of Defense | non-éoncurrence “appear at the.

- "end of this paper.

ALTERNATIVE I:

ated | ‘States Policy

ines of United States Policy » with, A respect to. Cuba, in the.
following words: a a er

'As ‘for | our ‘part, ‘te ‘all ‘offensive ‘weapons. ‘systems

are removed from ‘Cuba and kept out.o of ‘the hemisphere —

-in the future, “under ‘adequate verification and safe~
‘guards, a and if Cuba is not used | for the export of.
aggressive communist. purposes, there will be peace ‘in |.
‘the Caribbean, ; And, as [> said in ‘September, . "we | shall -
either initiate. nor: “permit aggressi n ine this i

hemisphere’ a

"We will’ ‘not, “of course, “gbendon ‘the political,”
‘economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to-
halt subversion from Cuba, “nor our . F Purpose. and

é.

AW 50955 DovTd: 32276061. Page [5B ee

The. op

‘On November 20,. “the President. ‘set “forth ‘the ‘proad- guides on


| @gp SECRET

oP ow ~

‘and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be
truly free. But these policies are very different — .

- >. from any. intent: fo _taunch a military. invasion, of the
vi ieland. " ee ne oS en:

9 Objectives ;

ve ‘Accordingly,’ the’ objectives, of ve. 8. “policy with |
respect. to Guba are: ; a

“L. Protecting the security of the United States and.

"+. the other states of the Organization of American.
States (OAS) by assuring that offensive. weapons ..

al are not reintroduced into Cuba; mE ats

Removal, of venaining Soviet forees from ‘Guba;

3.) Preventing Cuba. from taking : any “ageressive ailicary
action against other Caribbean states; -

“Reducing ‘the capabilities ‘of the Castro regime | ‘to

‘the other OAS states; me, Oe Be

* Encouraging and supporting any developments. within os
Cuba that offer the possibility of. divorcing: the
“Cuban Government from its, support of | SinoeSoviet :
‘Communist purposes or replacing the .Government with |

a regime which. would accomplish this Purpose.

‘Maximizing the: cost to the. Soviet ‘Union of.
Supporting. the Gastro regimes. ee

“Maximizing the political isolation of the noe
~~ Castro regime: from other free world states, and
especially from § states of. the OAS; .

. Being prepared ‘to: mest, with the employment of
~ appropriate U. $4: combat. elements_ and/or logistical
‘support, the wide variety’ ‘ of/eontingencies that. a
may arise: from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;

HW “50955 Docid:32276061 Pa

‘direct and support subversion and insurrection within _—

Sa cde ee

 Q@BBRSECRET
Be

Oe Producing. conprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives... pe .

Supporting Actions.

coe The following actions should be intttated in the .
_ Sequence set forth below:

Le Await results of Mr. Donovan! s inminent negotiation .
‘. s with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American
-.. prisoners. Prior aggressive U.S. action. could -
_» jeopardize - their releases wy tt

. te these negotiations fail, or: when: the: ‘prisoners... +
“are recovered, Proceed « on the following timee~
“tables oo! %, to

“Inform NATO. and OAS. ‘twelve ‘hours in advance of i
© the proclamation of the four point shipping orders...”
» (The proclamation calls for the orders to, BO into.
effect: in five days). These orders? °

 elose United States ports ‘to: yal vessels. :
- of a country whose vessels engage in a
“earrying arms.to Cuba; 6 +>" “
‘close United States ports. to ‘any ship -
which has carried goods in the bloceCuba

trade within 120 days .of the time it seeks:
to enter a United ‘States: ports. a

“prohibit. all ‘United States ‘flag ‘ships and
- all ships owned by United States nationals
or residents. from entering any ports of
_ , Cuba and “from carrying. any goods bound to

HOE from Cuba; and. wes
ar

@WP SECRET.

CNW. 50955 . DocTd:32276061 . Page 60.


de prohibit any cargo sponsored by any
department or agency of the United
ee “States. from being shipped on vessels
eee ae . owned oF controlled by persons who wo |
"own or control vessels engeged. in the |,
‘trade between Cuba and- the Soviet blee.

At the termination of the U.S. Chiefs of Mission ~~
Conference in E1 Salvador on January 28-30. ee
-' Assistant Secretary Martin will visit’ the Presidents -
’ of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the oe
7 importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining -
“ hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following ,
‘resolutions: | Ne

Sa. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its
wo actions which continue to endanger the peace, ©
. deploring refusal to allow inspection, me
-eondemning the presence of Soviet troops,
- recommending continued surveillance and /
“ ceontinued vigilance against subversive.
~~ aetivities, and terminating, the ingocation a
_... o£ the Rio Treaty on the missile.crisis, 9.
“> gogether with 90 nr ne
* An OAS resolution which would recommend 1
-L) - extension of ‘arms. embargo to all items
of trade except food and medicine (fall back .—
position: . extension of arms embargo to all
strategic dtems);. 2). prohibition of AR
“ships fro transporting embargoed items and
‘deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba
“trade; .3)- denial of Soviet. over-flights and
7, transit rights for flights to Cuba; and
““" 4) ‘acall on other states to take similar

actions on

‘After obtaining the maximum possible support of
“a: the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the
“other OAS members will be approached in Washington

HW 50955: BocTd:32276061 page 64,0 0° = cee
rage Ol. | a ' SECRET


SECRET

5a!

~~ and in their respective capitels, simultaneously. a
It should be possible for this consultation and OAS’ **.
action on the resolutions to be completed within

. ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the ~.
ee -oa5. J. vesolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of. the

oe eves 8. impending OAS action. * o a

; wo 5" 6 At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action -

ye , ss 1, on the resolutions, we will request that NATO ° .

_ ne , include Guba on the list of countries to which |

’ shipment of COCOM list (strategic) | items is.
prohibited. ;

7.° After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will
“geek to get agreement from Free World industrial
', nations to prevent shipping ‘of critical spare parts
+ and equipme nt to Cuba, - not on | the coceM Aiste

‘e-—-iIn addition to four’ point shipping resélations,
“and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance
— Aet, continue to press Free World nations to keep .

oo their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba | trade. wh

“In addition to current ‘covert programs - ‘such as ae
. intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, ee
. reeruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support

Of the Cuban Revolutionary Cor uncil, (CRC) activities

and infiltration of propaganda materials, the »
following are recomended for. epproval: and immediate |
initiation:. Ste ee are

-- Tatens ify to maximum degree possible
intelligence. and counterintelligence coverage
of Cubas Foe TE oo
© Support the efforts of | certain. Cuban exiles,
: who are associated with.the original aims of
~ the 26. July Movement and who believe that
_ i the Castro regime can be overthrown from
ce within’ ‘in \ order that hey may? 1) - cause

lb lee ge a

eee

“HW/90955 Docld:32276061 Page 62 |


50955": Docld:32276061 |

Assist Cuban exiles in developing a.

: ~eapability I has been established.

SECRET

aba

a split in the leaders! nip. of the regime .

. at the national or provincial levels; and).

2} ereate a political. base of popular -

. opposition to. the regime; and, 3); secure
a intelligence; ; ; oe

capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials fvom

» imternational waters into Cuba. Launch

propaganda balloons after an operational


be created,
Tere

2. Our immediate ©! : _
Castro/Communist regime fror: Ere vom
the Bloc; weaken it sconomir
‘dissension, erode its domest
_ frustrate its sebversive act
“in the nemisphere ; increase the cost

ustaining the regime; and obtain +h
trope. from Cuba, ... .

3. Isolating, undermin
Castro/Communist regime thre:
feasible diplomatic, economic, ads
covert actions may achieve the inme a ay 5
and could create propitious conditions in Caba for
further advance toward our ultimate objective, re

_ 4. We should be ir a position to respon?
ttary ‘support (to inciude such items as mat:
ore, training, and “+ Forces support
es . ‘ange of military “88 } es

2e (rom any anti-Castro/Commmi«:
whic. demonstrate an ability to
sed th threate:: the gresent regime, and whose |
tible with those of the U.$.

wees, as

a

" undertal Le ae
“other Castro/Comi.'

. ° . . a
‘HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 64 i 8

sencche peace or sec
mot preclude appropriat
“hostile acts by the C

empioyed aga Z

_militer?ty- <t ined, free Gsbans and by the, arned
. of, those acti asierican aations desirous of ‘pat
in the U.S, effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing 2: ¢,
_ gathering in depth on :@ should be identified as a pxix
objective of the natios ince.lligence effort.

3%, actions against Cuba .
~ably based upon thelTreaty
- Pact) or on reeoiufions
tion of American States
sa Marity on the ‘Cuban

8. Sihenever poss

“newly-won hemispher
should not be jeopa:
marginal value and which ‘night split the

Overt and covert annexes of specif’:
support of this policy will be prepare«:

Discussion

The act!
‘volves a phased
economic, neyehological “snd military aétions.
actions might’ inclgde leaflet Gropp ins
sabotage, strikes, and opposicion to
‘logical operations urging defections
‘of Subans.in the U.S. anc’ the use of * gach “Cub
‘Cuba; extensive air activit% including both hi ‘

level flights primarily directed toward surveil ian:
eter idection of: ‘intelligences and which ay” also have the

~~ ~ oe effect

res (*

| HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 65. — Jo ee

trPolss and,”

. H
the use or U.

broad gx awe of on efuliy t big
chological and covert 2ctiz
Saribbean security arrange:
of and publicity concerning Sa
ectivities in Latin America, app laewche
shipping restrictions and other economic senc cions, and
a series of actions ssigned to obtain, to the Breet est
extent possible, rx:
in the camealgn to us

4
4
|
BI
i
4
al
i
1
i

; io This course of action has the advantage of attaining
Fee o, the ebjecuive more rapidly and under more ce vatrolled

. conditions than the alternative stated by chs Coordinator,
indeed, this may be the only course of acting that will

4 ' gecemplish the ulcimate objective, it inve greater
yo: *. gisks; and, in the short run, a greater exp: ture of
oa ae money and material end far Bre numbers o£ -sergonnel.

sCional politics, the

> eriticism for

as. It is difficult
LB American governments,
xvening™ or they may react .
“he aissile eri neuen oe :

_ From the standpoint
 S. will probably be sur
«geression from the wncommit
| ‘go predict the reaction of :
| They may attack the U. S.
1

i

Favera ably Aes eee did during ¢

{NW 50955 Dochy: 32276061 Page 66

wel. .L£ properly
policy may serve not
seiy to micigate any uniavorable reactions from other
acumtvies, but alse to sain, ticularly in Latin
‘erica, increasing appreciation ek the: threat of Castro/
Comeunist Cuba. -

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear
‘ thet the U. 8. will net permit the maintenance of a
. communist base in the hemisphere. rom the standpoint of
“military posture, the more active approach may be —
“ subjected to counteractions from the Sinc-Soviet Bloc
° elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Commnist
> Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime,
-U. S. prestige becomegmore deeply involved. The further ,
we progress along this route, the more significant will be |
' the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.
The successful execution of crhkis policy will require
' careful tiaing and ccordination of ovr setions and the
development of detailed plans. While plans would be
designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime
within a given time frame for planning purposes, they
_ would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate
“ ghanges to the internationsi situation.

In any case, at crucial noints along the way, it will
be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to

review w the actions already texen and those contemplated and
toe assess the advantages of continued and escalated |
iv

‘ty against the disadvantages and dangers of such
aA : . : . . ‘
ra

action does ist exclude
ng the isolatisn of the

WW 50955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 67°

| GR PY ATS

Ut RS COMMENDATION

acer

“?'--LT xecomnend approval of Alternstive I,

2

Seb tee

STATEMENT UF DOD REPRESEN TAT:
ie ecient a acmenrnt onan tage it eet ERS

2:

ats

; . I do not concur in the policy recommended by the -
_. Goordinator, Alternative I does not make the overthrow _
of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S..
in addition, Alternative 1 does not sufficientiy

contemplate the creation oi opportunities to effect the
' downfall of that regime. The speclfile actions

# would be among the initial steps that would &

daw 50955° Doct: 32

recomnended in Alternative I are consistent with the’™
policy recommended in Alter:x fe iL-and, in wany cases,

'. in executing that policy. I recommend adoptic:. of
- Alternative II. 7 os

; an a : E27 prey pares
. ee Mere es
é a vot,

276061 Page 68°


; HW $0955 Docld: 32276061

Page 69

. e@ . SECRET, Dot Draf¢23 Jan 63
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.),
FROM : Coordinator of Cuban-Affairs:: *~

SUBJECT: United States Policy. Toward Cuba

United States Policy _ 7
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines
of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following
words : |
"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace, in the Caribbean.
And, as 1 said in September, ‘we shall~néither initiate
nor permit aggression in this: hemisphere. '
“We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic:
and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion
-from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people
shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very
different from any intent to launch a military invasion of |

the island.

Objectives

‘
*

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to

_ Cuba are:

HY 50955 Docld:32276061. Page 70


4
A
.

@ ee oe .
ee. SECRET _ al
1. Protecting the security of the United States and the .
other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not
reintroduced into Cuba; _ .
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

*

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military

EASA plat hetdeath Set tigtowad® auptvaste.. Des Daslbag tS tang cag b a it neice ee
ENE hL eet StL SS titer Mit ae iy Latch a lena a lla ais calle ee tk and atin i le Snalate atti adis

action against! other Caribbean states!

|

Ae Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct

Hemisphere

other DAS states;

‘ and support subversion and insurrection within the

’ 5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within. .
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban |
Government fom its support of Sino-Soviet Communist
purposes; * | | |
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban
Government with a regime that vould break with the
\ : Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our
ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the United
States; | ‘
7. Maximizing] the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting

|
the Castro) regime; —

MW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 71 | , : ; 8.

& - | | - — a ; &
| fifty SECRET |
—— :

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro
regime from other free world states, and especially
from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. s.
actions: against Cuba. should be multilateral,

, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal

. Assistance. (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by.
the Organization of American States, The newly-won
hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not
be jeopardized |by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split. the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of
appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical
support, the wide variety of military contingencies
that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;

. and; . | | | | |
“10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the

5

-above objectives.

"supporting Actions | | .
A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-

ment will be prepared to increase the political, \ economic, /
psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

a | | opportunities

. ge SECRET

HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 72

é
= gm SECRET

Ll 4e

| opportunities present themselves or can be created, The actions
listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would
be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations=
for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing
programs and upon the development of new programs related to
the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.
1. In addition to current covert program,. such as

intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban

officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of
the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other
exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda .
materials: |
a) continue to intensify covert collection of
intelligence within Cuba, especially within
the regime;
b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles,
who are associated with the original aims of
the 26 of July Movement and who believe that
- the Castro regime can be overthrown from
within in order that, they may: 1) cause a
split in, the leadership of the regime at the

national or provincial levels; anc#2) create

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 73

re
. .  @i SECRET ©
-5-
a political base of ‘popular opposition to
the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;
e.. Assist Cuban ‘exiles in | developing a capability
to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other
propaganda materials from international waters
into Cuba, Launch propaganda balloons after an
operational capability has been established.
WiTw KESPECT T0 THE ACH ONS LISTED BELO, THE
2. Awet, results of Mr. Donovan' s imminent negotiations
with Fidel ai Fe for freeing the 20-odd American
prisoners Le Oe TLE: cet tetow, ES bee
active quit. taken before the conclusion of the, negotiationgygbuta
jeopardize the release. le Loesteceaug
3. If these negotiations fa¥l, or when the prisoners are
recovered, proceed on the following timetable:
4, Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the
proclamation of the four point shipping orders, .
(the proclamation calls for the orders to go into
_ effect in five days). These orders:
a. close United States ports to all vessels of
a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms
to Cuba; ° a | .
, b. co

QB SECRET

WW 50955 DocId:32276061 Page 74


on | at —_ . |  @
| _ Qe SECRET

b. close United States ports to any ship which has
carried. goods in the bloc+Cuba trade within 120

days of the time it seeks to enter a United

S9 CTSA TD ee tree per git en ernment

‘States port;

ears

e

c.é prohibit all United States flag ships and all

i

i
fs
e
a
fe

‘ships owned by United States nationals or residents
from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying

any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SP Oma rede IE

on
é
norman yore

y

aed

ramen spre ek ae

HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 75

ee SECRET
~J- ,
d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department
or agency of the United States from being shipped
on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own
or control vessels engaged in the trade between
‘Cuba and the Soviet bloc. |
5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference
January 20-30, or at a later dateg dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representa-
‘tive of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile,
Mexico and Brazil. to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric
solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:
a. ‘An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions
'. which continue to endanger the peace, dep loring

refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence

any

of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance
- and continued vigilance against subversive
activities, and terminating the invocation of the
Rio Treaty on. the missile crisis, together with
“b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension
of arms embargo to all items of trade except food

oe. SECRET

HY 50955. DoclId: 32276061 Page 76

qm SECRET
. . -8-
and medicine (fall back position: extension of
arms ‘embargo to ‘all ‘strategic items); 2) prohibit-
ORS AremGer Holes
ion of 4 ships, from transporting embargoed items
‘ oe and deny use of ports to- ‘ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; -
3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit
rights for flights to Cuba; and
4) a call on other states to take similar |
action. 7 | |
' 6. After obtaining the maximum possible’ support of the key
countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS
. members will be approached in Washington and in their
respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be
possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform
our NATO allies of the impending OAS action..
7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
* resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the
list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic’

items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 7 = .
. . ms OUrOTT

rr

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations

to prevent shipping» of critical spare parts and equipment |

to Cuba, not on the COCOM list. 7 a
Ape |

9, En addition to, four point shipping resolutions, and

action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act,

continue to press Free ‘World nations to keep their

deci, necnneenanpas 4 emt SER TRON PLD TEE TE

shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

f ‘Be Contingency Planning

New 7 opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise

fr. either as a result of Bloc action in other: parts of the world; as a
4

result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the

‘internal conflict within Cuba.

&

| Castro~ -Communist, regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
\
\

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,

\ should include preparations | for increased multilateral and/or
. ;
bilateral political and. economic measures, large scale use of

Cubans who are nop/ inside Cuba; more ‘extensive air activity

7 ~ including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward

|| surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also
\

‘ have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping

the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as

appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrass-

AW 30955 Docld: 32276061

Page 7&

@® SECRET.

S0955 Bocld: 32276061 Page 79

| QP SECRET

-10-

ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of
‘communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping _
"destined. for Cuba’ and on key’ installations in Cuba; intensive
naval patrols} and, ultimately, ° the use of U. ‘S. military
force. To the extent. feasible, v. Ss. military forces employed

against Cuba should be accompanied by U. 8, militarily-trained

free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin Anerican nations.

art

desirous of participating in: the U.S. effort.

«oe


@P_SECRET  ofraff23 Jan

oe - a, . ¥ . _ = i
- pee FOR THE cane is COUNCIL"S EXECOTIVe comarrez:

AO ye 1G O81 1563, Y. P om a

- FROM . Coordinator ° Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: ‘United States Poltey Toward Gaba

United States Policy —
On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines [aa

a ‘of United Statea poltey. wich respect to Cuba in the following

words!

“As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are

renoved from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
commynist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean,
And, ag I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate |
nor permit aggression in thie hewlsphere.

We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic
_and other efforts of this hemi sphere to halt subversion

_ from Guba, nor our purpese and, hope thet the Cuban people

. shall sone day be truly free. But these policies are very

different from any intent to launch a military invasion of

the feland.. . | | _
“Oblectives | | — | a

- Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to

“Cuba are i


4, ‘Protecting the security of the United States and the
| other states of the Organization of American States
(OAS) by assuring, that offensive weapons are not
| reintroduced into Cuba; .
2, Removal of remaining Soyiet forces from Cuba;
3, Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military
action against, other ‘Caribbean states}
Reducing - the capabilities of the Castro regime to ‘direct
and semen and insurrection within the
other OAS avatess
Encouraging: and supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the. Cuban

Government from tes support of Sine-Soviet Communist

t

. purposes;
Encouraging and supporting any developments within
Gaba that offer the possibilicy of replacing the Cubap
Government with a regine that would break with the | |
Sino=Soviet Bloc it being understood that our |
witimate objective is replacement of the regime by

one fully compatible with the goals of the United

States;

ny

- Maximizing the cost #@ the Soviet Union of supporting

the Castre regime;

A,

Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro

regime from other free world states, and especially

. from states of the OAS, Whenever possible, U.S.

actions against Cuba should be multilateral,
preferably based upon t the Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance (Rio. Pact) or on resolutions adopted by
the Organization of American States, ‘The newly-won -

hemispheréc solidarity an the Cuban issue should not

be jeopardized. by. seeking OAS actions of marginal

value and which might split the hemisphere.

Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U. Ss. “combat. elements and/or logistical

support, the wide variety of military cone ingencies

that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives;
and; . _

Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the

above objectives.

Supporting Actions

To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Govern-

. Ment will be prepared to increase the political, .economic,

psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities:

aaa SECRET


present themselves or can be created. The actions

- opportunities
oval and would

ow are those requiring immediate appr

listed bel
t forth below. Recommendations:

-pe initiated in the sequence se

etions based upon the re-examination of existing

for further &
t of. new programs related to.

progrems and upon the developmen

the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. tn addition to current covert program, | such &

intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban

officials as agente, radio broadcasts, support of

the Cuban Revolutionary Coune!1 (cRE
and infiltration of propaganda

) and. other

exile group “activities

materials: —
atensify covert collection of

a) continue ‘to! fn

intelLigence within Guba, especially within

the regime} _
in Cuban exiles,

b) Support the ‘efforts of certa

who are associated with the original aims of

the 26 of July Movement and who believe that

the Castro regime can be overthrown from

within in order that they may? 1) cause &

split in the leadexship of the regime at che

national or. provincial levels; afd. 2} cweshes |

wm mevse,
a be,

a political base of popular opposition to |
the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

— Assist ‘Cuban exiles in developing a capability
to launch balloons carrying leaflets and sther.
propaganda matertals from international. waters

into Cuba, Launch propaganda balloons after an

operat ional capability has been established.

2. Await results of. Mr. Denovan' @ imminent negotiations

zapubelshios 2,

with Fidel’ Castro for freeing the 20-0dd American
prisoners, Any of the actions Lteted below, if

see Fark aC I seh

taken before the conclusion of tre negotiations could

ry S

jeopardize their release.

od ote

If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are

recovered, proceed on the following timetable;

&. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the

Pe eer eT ee

proclamation of the four point shipping orders.

(The proclamation calls fer the orders to go taco

effect in five days). These orders:
a. close United States ports to all vessels of 4 i

a country whose vebiels engage im carrying arms

to Cuba;
be:

a2 bots he
. Lett ate

- =" 6 - :

b. close United States ports ‘to any ship when hae

carried. pode. ‘in the blossCuba trade within 122

days of. the ine te seeks to enter. a United

States ports

prohibit. all United States lag entps end all

ships owned by United ‘States nationals ox residents

“from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying

any: good ‘Wound. te or from Cubs; and

tral ve:

cad
a

}

<e

Q

or

3

ft

the

ot

%

lo

9

st

a

ned


6.

and medicine (fall Back position: extension of
‘arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibit
Lon of AR. ‘ships from transporting embargoed items
and deny. use of ports to ships in Bloc- Cuba trade;
3) . “denial, of Soviet over-flights and transit
rights for. flights. to Cuba; and
4) a call oni other states to take similar
action, -_
After obtaining, the maximum possible. support of the key
countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, ‘the other OAS
members will be approached in Washington and in their
respective capitals, simultaneously. Ic should be
possible for this consultation and OAS action on the
resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to
formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will infora
our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.
At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the
resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the.

list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategie)

items is prohibited.


. om ) SECRET
po
to get agreement from Free World industrial nations
to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment
to Cuba, not on. the cocom, list: .
9; dn addition to: four point shipping resolutions, and
action under Section 107, of: the Foreign Assistance Act,

continue to press, Free World. nations to keep their

shipping out of Bloc~Cuba, trades

B. Contingency Planning —

New opportunities for ‘accomplishing our objectives may arise
either as a result of Bloc ‘action ‘in other parts of the world; as a
result of aggressive moves “(or Asolated hostile actions) by the
Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or
internal conflict within Cuba.

Qur contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately,
should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or
bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans who are nop inside Cuba; more extensive air activity
including both high and Low level flights primarily directed toward
aurveillance and collection of. intelligence, atid which may aleo
have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping

the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as

@@ SECRET

o1Q«

-ment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of

communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping

destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba: intensive

naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military

force, To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed

against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained

desirous of

a a

HY 50955 Docld:322776061 Page 90

og (wim evisiws)
; =P OENTIAL

(WITH TOP £2 7RET “NCLOSURES)

ee
&

January 22, 1963 .

. Mo ONDUt FOR: Tne Honoval e Mele... ce “ume,
oe . .
foo a Te : All Members of she NSC Executive Committee
aeees ae . 3 CUBA - Back-up ?apers and a Summary of-

Recommendations of the Coordinator
of Cuban iffairs

; The enclosed navers are submitted by the Coordinator
of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.

3. United States Policy. in Cuba in the Organization
‘of American States.

4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigace.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be
considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on
Thursday, January 24.

Enclosures:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL
_ (WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURzS,

HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 91

x BE
. SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 19532, 10 a.m.)

wy

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. _U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with
respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of the Organization of
American States by assuring that offensive
weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
divorcing the Cuban Government from its
support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of

replacing the Cuban Government with a regime
that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it

SECRET

NW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 92

Ps,

SECRET

Ja

being understood that cur ultimate objective
is replacement of the regime by one fully
compatible with the goals of the United States;

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;

Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from otner Free World states,
and especially from states of the OAS. When-
ever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should |
be multilateral, preferably based upon the
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on
resolutions adopted by the Crganization of
American States. The newly-won hemispheric
solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeovardized by seeking CAS actions of marginal
value and which might split che hemisphere;

Being prepared to meet, with the employment
of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.

2. Supvorting Actions .,

Actions in support of these objectives and their
time sequence are set forth in the attached paper
entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the
four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO

HY 50955 Docla: 32276061

SECRET

Page 93

HW 50955

SECRET

-3-

action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches

to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and
shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade.

Existing programs will be reviewed and further
recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the
variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken
at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as
intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and
other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda
materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are
recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence
within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to
return the 26 of July Movement tc its

original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the
foregoing actions may impair our ability
to accomplish objective b. (Removal of
remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because
taking these actions could provide the
U,S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining
its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, avproval
of the foregoing actions is recommended,

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a
specially tailored civilian. and military program for
Brigade members.

SECRET

Docld: 32276061 Page 94.

a ~

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit
and individual members urged to accent civilian training
or to enlist in the existing U. 5. military program
for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter.
Our moral obligation would be discharged tc the Brigade
members and creation of a privileged class in the exile
community would be avoided.

SECRET

HY 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 95 -

se. SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATICNAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for tne Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United: States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guide-
lines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the
following words:

"As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are
removed from Cuba and kent out of the hemisphere in
the future, under adequate verification and safeguards,
and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive
communist purposes, there will be peace in the
Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall
neither initiate nor permit aggression in this
hemisphere. '

"We will not, of course, abandon the political,
economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt
subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that
the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. -But
these policies are very different from any intent to
launch a military invasion of the island."

oor SECRET

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 96

GOP SECRET

-2-

Objectives

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061

Accordingly, the objectives of United States
policy with respect to Cuba are:

1.

Page 97

Protecting the security of the United States
and the other states of thé Organization of
American States (OAS) by assuring that
offensive weapons are not reintroduced into
Cuba3

Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive
military action against other Caribbean states;

Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime
to direct and support subversion and insurrection
within the other Hemi gphere states;

Encouraging and. ‘supporting any developments within
Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing

the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-
Soviet Communist purposes;

Encouraging and supporting any developments
within Cuba that offer the possibility of
replacing the Cuban Government with a regime

that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc,

it being understood that our ultimate
objective is replacement of the regime by
one fully compatible with the goals of the
United States;

@e secart

10.

@ SECRET

-3-

Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of
supporting the Castro regime;

Maximizing the political isolation of the
Castro regime from other free world states,
and especially from states of the CAS.
Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba
should be multilateral, preferably based upon
the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact)
or on resolutions adopted by the Crganization

.of American States. The newly-won hemispheric

solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be
jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal
value and which might split the hemisphere;

' Being prepared to meet, with the employment of

appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or
logistical support, the wide variety of
military contingencies that may arise from
pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

Producing comprehensive intelligence related
to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

HY 50955 Doclda: 32276061

A,

To achieve the foregoing objectives, the

U. S, Government will be prepared to increase

the political economic, psychological and
military pressures, as appropriate opportunities
present themselves or can be created. The

actions listed below are those requiring immediate
approval and would be initiated in the sequence
set forth below. Recommendations for further

SECRET

Page 98

@Qp SECRET

whe

actions based upon the re-examination of
existing programs and upon the development
of new programs related to the foregoing
objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such
as intelligence collection, recruitment of
Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts,
support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC)
and other exile group activities and infil- .
tration of propaganda materials:

a. Intensify covert éollection
of intelligence within Cuba, especially
within the regime;

b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban
exiles, who are associated with
the original aims of the 26 of July
Movement and who believe that the
Castro regime. can be overthrown from
within in order that they may:
i) cause a split in the leadership
of the regime at the national or
provincial levels; and 2) create a
political base of popular opposition
to the regime; and, 3) secure
intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban éxiles in developing a
capability to launch balloons carrying
leaflets and other propaganda materials
from international waters into Cuba.
Launch propaganda balloons after an
‘operational capability has been
established,

SECRET

HW 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 99

HY 30955) Docld: 32276061

@ SECRET

~5-

With respect to the actions listed below,
the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent
negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing
the 20-odd American prisoners should first.
be ascertained. If these actions were. taken
before the conclusion of the negotiations
they could jeopardize the release of the

‘Americans.

Page 100

Lf these negotiations fail, or when the
prisoners are recovered, proceed on the
following timetable:

Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance
of the proclamation of the four point
shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for
the orders to go into effect in five days).
These orders:

a. Close United States ports to all
yessels of a country whose vessels
engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. Close United States ports to any ship
which has carried goods in the Bloc-
Cuba trade within 120 days of the time
it seeks to enter a United States port;

ec. Prohibit all United, States flag ships
and all ships owned by United States
nationals or residents from entering
any ports of Cuba and from carrying
any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

SECRET

ee SECRET

-6-

d. Prohibit any carge sponsored by any
department of the United States from
being shipped on vessels owned or
controlled by persons who own or
control vessels engaged in the trade
between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of
Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at
a later date dependent on the Donovan
mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or
another representative of the President
will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico
and Brazil to convey to them the importance
President Kennedy attaches to maintaining
hemispheric solidarity by their supporting
the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for
its actions which continue to endanger
the peace, deploring refusal to allow
inspection, condemning the presence of
Soviet troops, recommending continued
surveillance and continued vigilance
against subversive activities, and
terminating the invocation of the Rio
Treaty on the missile crisis, together
with

b. An OAS resolution which would
recommend 1) extension of arms embargo
to all items of trade except food and
medicine (fall back position: extension
of arms embargo to all strategic items);

Po SECRET

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 101

HG 50955 Docld: 32276061

Page i102

SECRET

=~J=

2) “prohibition of shi 3 Of OAS.
‘member * states. “from evdveporteting
embargoed © ‘items and deny use of
ports ‘to ships: ‘in Bloc-Cuba trade;
3) “denial of Soviet ovér- flights and
transit rights for flights to Cuba;
and 4) “a call on other states to
take similar action.

After’ obtaining the maximum ‘possible

support of the key countries of Mexico,

@ and Brazil, the other OAS”

inembers will be approached in Washington

and. in their respective capitals,

simultaneously. ‘It ‘should be possible

‘for this’ consultation and OAS action on

‘the resoluti fons, to be completed within

Prior: ‘to formal COAS approval

Of the’ resolutions, we will inform our ©
NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

‘at thé first: NATO meeting ‘after formal

OAS action on the resolutions, we will

Yequest . that NATO includé Cuba on the

list of countries’ to which shipment’

PE OSE (strategic) items prohibited.

shipping of critical spare parts “ahd
equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

In addition to the four point shipping
resolutions, and action under Section

107. of the Foréign Assistance Act, continue
to press Free World nations to keep their
shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

@g@ SECRET

B.

HW 50955 Docld: 32276061

@@ SECRET

-8-

Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our
objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc
action in other parts of the world; as a result
of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions)
by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a
result of uprisings or internal conflict within
Cuba. |

Our contingency planning, which will be
undertaken immediately, should include preparations
‘for increased multilateral and/or bilateral
political) and economic measures, large scale use of
Cubans whto are now inside Cuba; more extensive
air activity including both high and low level
flights. primarily directed toward surveillance

* and collection of intelligence, and which may also

vhave the ‘effect of embarrassing the Castro
“government and keeping the Castro forces on
continual alert; retaliatory measures, as
appropriate, including the imposition of a

POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in
other countries; severance of communic ations

to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping
destined for Cuba and on key installations to
Cuba; intensive naval patrols; anc, ultimately,
the use jof U. S. military force. To the extent
feasible, U. S. military forces employed against
Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-
trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of
those Latin American nations desirous of
participating in the U. S. effort.

oe SECRET

Page 103

oo —  SecRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

‘FROM + Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of
American States. .

2 8, invoked the RIS “MSaty’ on’ Setober’22, "19625" int
thereto. “se Council of the OAS {COAS) continues to.act provisi
ally as tue Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (0G)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanii
cassed'a resolution calling for the withdrawal of ali. cffensi
apons from Guba, recommending that member states take such ac
including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to preve
continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prever::
the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere.
In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. insti-
tuted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican
Republic cooperated with us inthe quarantine and 3 others offered
their assistance. and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the
Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Con+
sultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing
to concern themselves with subversion and possible. extension of
economic sanctions, the other American Republi¢s are waiting for
some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken,

COURSES

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COURSES OF ACTION |

(1) Continue the Coas/oc in being ‘under the Rio Treaty but

‘take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being

for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis.
If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either
be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed
circumstances.

(2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC_which

condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, .

deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of
Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued
vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would —
represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step. following the
conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is
believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insur-
rection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently
vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put
the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemis-~

phere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to
_ the Soviet Union.

' (3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This
would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions
‘TI and VIII of Punta del Este. (Which provided for a Special Consul-
tative Committee on Sgcurity and a a Special ala to study» ‘the
further suspension of trade. )

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was”
called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

Taken

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Considerations:

action.

>. ._
_ SECRET

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Taken by itself, this course of action might maise doubts
concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are
continuing our surveillance. ;

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would
appear aS though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence
of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification
surrendered (on-site inspection and -re~introduction of offensive
weapons) O

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

. This combination of actions is feasiblesand is likely to
obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination'of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the
resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed
resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3).
‘Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accom
panied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic
sanctions, ,

_ (5) Seek .to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was
invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a
Fesolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

~

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able
to obtain a substantial majority. .

.. Such action would’ give a better basis for urging such addi-
tional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless
we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement

(6) In addition to (5 seek authorization under the Rio
Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force,

to bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops in Cuba if the

- OAS call is not heeded. :

Considerations:

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Considerations:.

; This action should be seriously considered only if we are
determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet
troops. ;

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and
preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political
and ecoriomic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet .
troops, it would be difficult to-obtain the necessary 2/3 majority
for authorization of the.use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in.the COAS/Octo sever_all diplomatic
and consular relations with Guba (probably possible o in con-

Considerations:

_ This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase
the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies ;
encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.°

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for
such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would
be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile,
Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments’ would have some appeal.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained
for this. . : ;

(8) Seek_a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all. economic.
and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba .
(probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would
go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides
for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the
U.S..to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies.
Such action would: expose us to charges of inhumanity and would
probably nullify our. public statements that we have no quarrel
with the Cuban people. ,

A momber of telecommunications between Latin America and

_ Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services

would interrupt commnications vital to many of our Latin American
friends. Further, U.S.. communications with Cuba should be main-
tained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national
interest and those for humanitarian reasons. _—

These
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These considerations would make it extremely difficult to
obtain a 2/3 majority in the COoAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in . COAS under Resolution. VIII of Punta
del Este which would recommend: .

~(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of
arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed
items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet air-
eraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also
be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could
be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity.
should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual
effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned
4s more psychological than practical because Latin American countries
ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement
and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an
appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps. .

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. |
unilateral steps in’controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the
Foreign Assistance Act, and for ‘urging other states to control Soviet
flights to Guba. |

(10) Intensify through COAS and. SCCS programs of recommended
controls over subversive activities. Seek. COAS resolution warning .
Castro that continued subversive activity may 2 result in action
under Rio Treaty. a ;

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being.
presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and
should be continued... However, it would be difficult to get unani-
mous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because
of the reference to the Rio Treaty

Myatt

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‘MW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 109. |

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“

(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued

subversive activities. ,
Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs.
the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be. neces-
sary to invokethe Rio Treaty since the present functions given the
COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under
Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveil-
lance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in
the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive -
activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become
a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing
possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection
in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production
of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in
subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, in«
sufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS
menue (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under
way - oo

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory _

Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board {IADB}.

This could be done: 7 ;

(a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to.
the IADB; ;

. (ob) by the CoAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or

(ce) having the OAS member governments designate their
representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred
to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover,
amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and
requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governnents.

As to (b), this-is a feasible course of action which the

' COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be diffi-

cult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the
Council of the desirability of such action, —

As.
SECRET © .

—— SRORET .

-7-

As to (ce), member governments could take this course on an_
individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that
“exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this fl
. action under the OAS Charter. ST ,

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION |

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with
respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international |
complications were key factors which I have carefully considered. |

Courses of action: (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance
us toward our objective, would. be politically feasible, and would
involve minimum adverse international efféets. We could probably.
obtain a near-unanimous vote in thé OAS for these courses except |
(10) and (12)...

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (411) and (12) would advance us
considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11)
particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would
involve adverse international effects, including alprobable acute
confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best
interests at this time.

T recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio
Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to
endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns

- the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveil-
lance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and
(b) terminate the coas/OC on the missile crisis. This would still
leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII
of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative
Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suse.
pension of trade. oo ,

— .

Course: (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution

VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except
food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of
arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

ERE QTE ARON EOE RTE eC NN MI ETE TE TTS IT AUT IIH GT TE FUME LET WALES CTE ERE REE TES

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HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 110

‘ ‘SECRET
8.

(ob) prohibition of AR ships from transporting. embargoed items
and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

“ (e) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet air-
eraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.

(a) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar
actions.

Rationale

- ‘The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our
objective, carrying the OAS with uss without committing us to any
‘further action.

' After these initial measures are in effect, 1 we should assess
the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with
any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which
may be opened ‘to us by events.

‘I believe we should. develop our pressures steadily and gradu
ally, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation
under constant review for the optimum opportunity. to initiate
additional measures.

‘I do not: believe we should take’a track now utiich will break
heint spheric cuilty$ We may need unity later in. an. emergency.

Neither do I “Believe we should push the OAS into probable
acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

_ Both. of. sthese prices the U. 5. may find it necessary to: pay.
: for action, ata later date ‘but not NOWs in my opinion..

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTLVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

FROM 3 Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: — Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

“To determine the future of the Cuban

Brigade (participants in the Bay of
Pigs invasion recently released from
Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who
participated in or trained for the
invasion. To determine the future of
existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay
of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great
majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over
1100 were released. —_

- & decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and
- other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically
_proceed from whatever over all policy the U. 5. adopts
‘toward Cuba. .

, A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively _
marginal military value because of its quantitative
Limitations and restricted military capability, but its

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-2-

politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban
resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate
for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be
weighed.
COURSES OF ACTION
Three courses of action appear |
feasible with respect to the

'Brigade's future.

(1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military

unit, with no: further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and
their families would be eligible for the benefits now
accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area
(approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent
to those received by American citizens in Dade County,
Florida who are in need. The principal ones include:
financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family
and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization
and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals

for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities;

employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation
and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied

' children; special English and refresher courses for doctors

and Lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program

. for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides .

vp to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade
County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of
cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary |

and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part

of special language courses and vocational training; and

_ physical examinations and inoculations at time of

entry into the U. 5.

SECRET

ape neem pce ety
ery

DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the
a U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18
and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program
for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides
20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they
are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve ‘status.
They are not required to know English. A‘two week period.
for resettlement is also provided at the termination of
the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the
Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly
selective basis for programs in the U. &. Armed Forces.
Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is
necessary.. The officers are in civilian status. They
receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and
a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer
available. :

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and
most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide
equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent
to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for
service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill
and country knowledge could be distributed through various
U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that
it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade
as a result of Administration statements and actions; it:
would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique"
the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying
Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would
probably engender some adverse political. reaction
domestically as well as from the Brigade and its
sympathizers: Also it might have an undesirable effect
on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the .
Free World concerning the determination of the United States

SECRET _

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HW 50955 Docld:32276061 Page 114 .

- SECRET

when

to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to

arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence
with the Castro regime.

(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a
unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve
component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whater "mystique" the

. Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps
‘be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used

to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile

'¢

‘community.

It would constitute an immediate political and
psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans
within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin
Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a
striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the
present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed
by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit

_ among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with

the statements and actions of the Administration in
connection with. the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for
Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and
morale, discipline and esprit. would be difficult to
maintain over the long term without early employment to
retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and
military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups
in the U. S. armed forces reserve: component. There is a

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756

risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members,
as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of
serious embarrassment to the U.S .

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program -
for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue —
as_a ''fraternal'' unit similar to the "Flying Tigers".
Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current

military training program for Cubans to establish a
Brigade military reserve component which other U. S.
militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the
following additional benefits for Brigade members in
need, over and above those now offered: special emp Loy-
ment counseling and placement service; extended student
loans to provide for all institutional costs such as
tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per
year (living costs to be provided by another agency);
expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased
financial assistance to needy persons while in training;
increased distribution of surplus food (with approval —
of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be under-
taken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such

_ action would contribute to the defense and security

of the United States or advance its foreign policy
interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for
vocational training anywhere in the United States; an
expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of
Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost

of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure

of $2,5 500 ‘per person per year would be about $2.5 million.

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Establishment of additional programs, after a
Presidential determination, would increase’ costs even
more, and be subject to wider criticism as “unnecessary”

‘privileges for Brigade members. .

COORDINATORS 'S RECOMMENDATION
1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored
program for Brigade members.

2. I recommend against a Presidential determination
providing broader privileges for Brigade members.

3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military

training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve

unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should

be permitted to join. —

4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than
forced to accept this proposal, and intend.to arrange ©
consultation with them immediately if this course of
action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we
should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the
future desire the presence in the U..S.. Armed Forces of
militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade:
members to enlist in the existing. military training |
program for. Cubans and to enter-a U.S. Reserve Unit

thereafter.

SECRET.

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~8-

Our programs should be designed to encourage
the Brigade members to melt back into the exile
community and engage in constructive pursuits
pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer
them some special assistance but not to the extent
that they become a perpetual privileged class
within the community, Presidential action on their
behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

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AW 50955 Doclda: 32276061 Page 116

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‘ MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL" S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

a0,

oO (Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, (1963 at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba

Ll. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
' 2. Removal. of Soviet troops: from Cuba.

3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons PRE
Mr. Robert. Geddes, British subject married to a
Joc U. S. citizen. ae

~ +. & © Cuban subversive activities in the Western
Hemisphere. : .
poo ce — p. dd wade ;
: : De Future activities of Mr, Donovan. Af

6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a
political weapon against the Castro regime.

7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban
Revolutionary Council and exile groups.

8. Preparation of a’ Psychological Annex to the basic X
' paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.

7 9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in -
intensified intelligence collection; Policy on
illegal infiltration and exfiltration.

| ; 10. ‘ Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia
_ flights to Cuba.

bo ae SECRET

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‘ a“

HY 50955 Docld: 32276061 Page 1270 .

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= hissdgdumeat consists or

a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GkMcuee le —Sepies, z

° _Utie moatertal contatus information affecting the National Defense of the United Guates within the meaning of the Fsptenare Laws, Tithe
18, U.S.C, Gees. 793 and TH4, the trancmiasion or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorised petson {a probibited by law.

S-E -C- R-E~T: . .
“NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKG TROUND USE ONLY

+

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION, SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL CF CONTENT 1S TENTATIVE,

country Cuba. a "REPORT NO. = CS DB-3 /652,924
"SUBJECT Analysis of the Cuban © DATE DISTR. . 17 January 1963.
a Situation by the Italian . . a
Embassy in Habana .. : “ NO. PAGES 4
eo : REFERENCES RD~W-2088 GO :
Te ce a - RD-W-2107 4
DATE OF - | 6 December 1962 | . :
INFO - co
PLACE & italy, Rome . . } pedeed |
DATE ACQ. (21 December 1962) | ; FIELD REPORT NO.
{
al

source: -.-A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the
Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of :
.Content: 2, that the document is genuine, ~ | . : oo

The following is a translation of a report dated
. a 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in,
ee Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Aftairs,

In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the.
_ conSiderations. regarding the consequences which the recent
‘> erisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I
'. ‘will now add some comments on the ‘conjecture which has been
reported by some members of our representations. , Soe

1) The possibility that there will-soon be a loosening of -
: . the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me .
_.t0 be nil at this time. The fuct that the talks with Mikoyan
were long-and-difficult and that Castro expressed in private
- his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still
alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce ‘that |
Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance
cannot be replaced by the Chinese.

Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have a

‘done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and

in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspéction).
“Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is
intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR

.in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me

that /China7 can furnish more than it has furnished to date,

which consists of second quality foodstuffs, yather shoddy ©

Po :  gemeeR-EeT .
' NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY.

herr 1

GIour ya

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~2- CSDB-3/652 ,924

“wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores ;
im Habana are full. AS for machinery and spare parts, /China7

is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied

by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. : ;

In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined

aS pro~Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in.such a way that he
cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this”
regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during
the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations,
he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends ; : ;

Of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations. Lf

Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director ©
of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a ‘good aa
resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for ~ a
some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character a
and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by ._.
Moscow.’ b) The USSR will continue ‘to give all its economic ot

support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a. - y
grave , blow particularly in Latin America. ,

2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that .

_ ° the revo luv ionary regime of Castro can be changed into.a . CoA
“- "Pitousi” regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador me 4
Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some
Latin American countries desire’Such a change and ‘are doing
everything possible to provcke it. It is also possible that
* gome Cubans share these sentiments, But, in my opinion, it

is impossible that such a change can take- place while Castro -

is in power. AS I pointed out in my previous report, it is

not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned",' to

imitate anyone, and even less to’take Tito as a model.

Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this

possibility seems very remote.

3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for
Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime
will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate -
subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated
-by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including
Mexico) are taking Strong meaSures against the dissemination
of thie propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can
do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the
security of other countries, if only because he lacks the.
necessary funds, I tend to. share tHe opinion of the
Ambassador -to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to
concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and
that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, includ-
ing the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note
in passing that, according to what was told me by the afore-
_- mentioned Ambas ssador, ‘during the recent meeting of the OAS the
- Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the’
_ recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish
' proof, he was unable to do so. He

It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious
pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely
Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in

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Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The.”

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countries which could do it do not have the necessary material —

means. <A partial scluticn would worsen the situation and a
definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. [-

. think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by.
“material Strength can obtain results in Cuba. : ; -

In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is

necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament
of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the. —

" population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United
.. States. - It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary
‘regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example —

*-for other Latin American countries. This would not take into

. Daily Worker, "this is a battle to tho death with the United

_ adversary."

"account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly

their. chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to.

imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another.

path. AS Guevara said the other day in an interview for the

States in which the most possible damage must, be done to the.”

Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November,

day and therefore the revolutionury regime needs the

“ assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a
a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who. 7+ 0.7:
“heads ‘the most important institution of the country ~ the wo 05)
“Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go-°
«first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that ;
“new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits,

n

. . Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this
., Gescent will last no one can say today, The only certa@in  —
thing is that the economic Situation is getting worse every...

ports

to permit the Cubans to last through 1963,-which will cer-
‘tainly be the most difficult year,

But economic assistance cat permit this country to

'. survive, not resolve its problems. - For a definitive solu-

tion it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans

~.to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the

machines which they have, Agricultural production, princi-~

“ pally sugar cane, aS has been recognized even by the.

. ..fanaties of industrialization, constitutes the basis of

-the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good

“which should last ten years are ‘unusable after two years?

sent

harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary

~{t is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime
solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer

+ from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But? for another

year they will find a,way. to get by.

Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent
policy. followed by the United States in the recent months

"is the best and perhaps the oniy policy. After the danger

of Strategic weapons has. been €liminated, the wisest measure
is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will

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-4-° — -CSDB-3/652, 924

‘present Some more “headaches" to the United States; but the ~.
atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the ,
hypothetical coup d'etat of-Castro which would force the Bones,
~ Solution of the probiem - one can hope for a perhaps not too
distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the
‘Cubans. insist on the known five points and the United States
. . refuses any puarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to .
.: feed Castro to permit his Survival, the less uncomfortable...’
‘position appears to me-to be that of the. Government.ins':. —
|, Washington. . , : rr

oy, .

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