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SECRET
. 30 October 1962
URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall S. Carter

At the Executive Committee meeting this morning, the President
directed as follows:

1, CIA do everything possible to insure no refugee or
emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
without our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
station and the MONGOOSE Task Force should be alerted to exercize
every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made..
This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. CIA should attempt to estop Alpha 66 actions during the
next several days. The President was informed by DCI we have no
contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
through every resource available to influence Alpha 66 to stand down
operations during the next several days.

3. The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped
during the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for
sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be
reconsidered after current negotiations are completed. ,

NOTE: After the meeting McCone, Bundy and the AG
discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships

or shipping (Item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)

and it was the opinion of Bundy, DCI and the AG that these

operations should be suspended for the next seyeral days.
NOTE: General Lansdale was informed by DCI by grey
phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M.

4, The President requested that all the principals who are
attending Executive Committee meetings and those in the Departments
who were in intimate contact with the Committee's procedures and

. decisions not contact anyone of the Press for the next several days.

Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a

representative of State. Any necessary Press contacts by CIA, and

these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps should be made by Col. Grogan.
(This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.)


13-00000

SECRET.

30 October 1962

URGENT

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Marshall 8. Carter

At the Executive Committse meeting this morning, the President
directed as follows:

1. CIA de everything possible to insure ne refugee or
emigre provocative actions against Cuba are undertaken with or
withoat our knowledge during the next several days. The Miami
station and the MONGOOSE Task Forea should be alerted to exercize
every precaution to see that no unauthorized attempts are made.
This should be done without discussion or disclosure to the refugee groups.

2. GIA should attempt to estep Alpha 66 actions during the
next several days. The President was taformed by DCI we have zo
contact with or control over Alpha 66. DCI was instructed to attempt
through every resource available to influence Aipha 66 to stand down
operations during the next several days.

3, The activities of Operation MONGOOSE are to be stopped

. daring the next several days and therefore all prior approvals for

sabotage, infiltrations, guerrilla activities, caching of arms are to be
temporarily suspended. The direction of Operation MONGOOSE will be |
reconsidered after current negotiations are completed.
NOTE: After the meeting MeCone, Bundy and the AG
discussed the approved plan of sabotaging Cuban ships
or shipping (item 2-B of Lansdale's memorandum of 10/26)
ané it was the opinion ef Bundy, DCI and the AG that these
operations should be suspended for the next several days.
MOTE: General Lansdale wae informed by DCI by grey
phone of 1, 2 and 3 above - 10/30 at 11:00 A.M,

4. ‘The President requested that all the prineipats who are

decisions not contact anyene of the Press for the next several days.

Press contacts are to be made by Salinger and Sylvester and a
representative of State. Any neceseary Frese contacta by CIA, and

these must be kept at a very minimum, perhaps chould be made by Col. Grogan.
(This was not mentioned in the Executive Committee meeting.) _

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SECRET,

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| ‘The above has been communicated te you by telephone. This .
ne / memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-
wa tion by you. |

JOHN A. MeCONE
Director

JAM/mfb
lee - DCI chrono

i 1ee)- DCI $5 file


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ee SECRET

'

The above has been communicated to you by telephone, This
memorandum serves to confirm decisions which require implementa-

tion by you.

JGHN A. McCONE
Director


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November 14, 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: General Carter, DDCI

Attached is a copy of a memorandum for my file outlining
policy decision in connection with the Cuban prisoner transaction.
In your absence this memorandum was discussed with Megsrs,
Helms, Houston, Miskovasky and McManus, and upon receiving

- final approval from higher authority at 1:45, Mr. Houston was
instructed by me to initiate appropriate actions.’

It ie exceedingly important that great care be exercised ~
; to minimize the publicity and to emphasize humanitarian interest
or the part of the United States Government in securing the release
of the prisoners. Both the President and the Attorney General are
- anxious that the explanations giventhe Cuban Families Committee
‘be handled with great care. I agree with this and urge that extreme
caution be taken to avoid attribution or CLA implication in this matter.

SIGNED:

John A. McCone
Director

Attachment

JAM:at
1 cc - DCI Chrono
utce - DCI Memoranda
1 cc - Memo for the Record _..

Lo Oil


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14 November 1962

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
CONCERNING THE NEGOTIATION FOR THE RELEASE OF THE CUBAN
PRISONERS.

The meeting took place at the residence of the Attorney
General at 10:30 a.m., on A Thureday, November 14, at the DCI's

request.

- MeCone explained that he had had dinner the evening before
with Mr, Edward Foley (former Under Secretary of the Treasury,
legal representative and a Director of the Drug Industry. Association).

Mr. Foley had questioned DC] concerning the negotiations ,
for release of Cuban prisoners in exchange for some 50 million |
dollars in druge, and stated that Mr. Donovan had been in touch with
members of the industry (presumably Pfizer and Merck) in the past
few days, that indications were that the transaction was to be worked
out promptly, and the subject would undoubtedly be discussed st
length at the Industry's Board of Trustees meeting in New York on
November 16th.

Mr. Foley stated that the Industry had no clear understanding
of the Government's position, most particularly in view of Cuban

develepments of the last three weeks.

Alter explaining to Foley the background of the transaction

" -Tteld him that Mr. Donovan had been told to do absolutely nothing

in this matter and expressed great surprise that the subject was a
topic of current discussion among members of the Industry.

In the meeting with the Attorney General I. expressed. grave
concern over the situation, poin: GIA hac, 20;million |. .
dollars on covert deposit in the Bank [ot Ca adajend that swo. Letters _

. of Credit pea pose issued by the Baik, one in the amoun joomnitiion | Q

dollars to/Pfidex, ‘and one for \eVenimillion dollars to[M yaaa As!
long as this money was on deposit and: ‘the letters outetanding. “there >
was a. danger of publicity emanating from either Donovan or the drug
industry, or both. Despite the fact that'no official government

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Bil
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SECRET-EVES Guill

connection had ever been admitted, publicity would implicate the

’ Administration and CIA in the negotiation because of recent press

stories (most particularly the Herald Tribune articles). identifying
Administration and CIA activities and citing the exact amount of

17 million! dollars as representing the Government. cost of the drugs.

I pointed out that certain elements of competition between the members
of the drug industry | made it almost a certainty that "leaks" would
come.from industry sources as long ae the letter of credit were —
outstanding, regardless of Mr. Donovan's denials.

Furthermore, consummation of the transaction seemed
totally unrealistic in view of current difficulties with Castro and if
an article appeared indicating we were still pursuing this transaction,
the American public and a great many othera would be confused and
disenchanted,

For the above reasons, and feeling that damaging publicity
undoubtedly would appear, I strongly recommended that we arrange
for the bank to. withdraw the. Letters of Credit, and for the withdrawal

/ of a substantial part of ‘the. money from the (Bank [of Cehaaiay: Also

advise Mr. Donovan that the pursuit of this effort must await a better
climate although our interest remained constant. I urged that
action be commenced today.

The Attorney General, after some discussion involving an
exploration of possible alternatives, agreed with the course of

action.

We agreed that we should carefully explain to the Families

| Committee and possibly te Miro Cardona that we were in no way

abandoning our intention to secure the release of the prisoners but
were forced because of circumstances beyond our control to set the
negotiation aside pending further developmente on other Amportent
problems involving ¢ our Guben relationship.

- MeCone discussed the above with Mr. Bundy who personally
approved the action and, in turn, received approval from higher
authority. The latter. was communicated to the DCI by telephone
at 45 p.m

‘Copy to General Carter wi
covering memo - JOHN A. McCONE .

Director

Le Eee

TRUM 7
