risks list owner jirqdcslsricom riskslist risksforum digest monday 25 february 2008 volume 25 issue 06 acm forum risks public computers related systems comprisks peter g neumann moderator chmn acm committee computers public policy see last item information disclaimers caveats etc issue archived current issue found contents securing wrong spaces lesson paul ferguson via gregory hicks software problem london heathrow terminal 4 affects baggage peter mellor youtube outage blamed pakistan amos shapir one way conduct internet voting peter kaiser declared dead ruins life andrew koenig new rfid ticketless bus system brisbane goes live glitches george michaelson us treasury treasurydirect web site security enhancements jonathan kamens eu money 4 small businesses risk mgmt pilot patrick obeirne cold boot attacks disk encryption jacob appelbaum declan mccullagh illegal drag race kills eight john curran freetodownload password cracker peter mellor gps miracle steven bellovin abridged info risks comprisks bnmubfcadencecom sat apr 26 154924 2008 date thu 21 feb 2008 014157 0800 pst gregory hicks subject securing wrong spaces lesson begin forwarded message paul ferguson date thu 21 feb 2008 070858 gmt excerpt techdirtcom brand new japanese warship apparently countrys latest greatest radar system unable spot fishing boat path leading collision two missing fishermen raising sorts questions quality radar system saying collision really due human error radar system designed watch missiles air rather ships thats fair enough response point vulnerabilities come directions make best system world looking wrong thing wont stop something bad getting seem rather ironic set ship best world spotting threats sky forget include decent system find threats right next sea link httptechdirtcomarticles20080219021718291shtml great security lesson learned youre focused securing subset entire threat landscape insecurities generally occur places youre focusing focus big picture fergie aka paul ferguson engineering architecture internet fergdawgatnetzeronet fergs tech blog httpfergdawgblogspotcom gregory hicks cadence design systems 555 river oaks pkwy san jose ca 95134 4085763609 gcmoldwgereaolcom sat apr 26 154924 2008 date thu 21 feb 2008 194445 est gcmoldwgereaolcom subject software problem london heathrow terminal 4 affects baggage 19 feb 2008 british airports authority baa warned passengers via website software problem causing reduction baggage handling capacity httpwwwheathrowairportcom according website system fully operational british airways ba went one better warned passengers via website longhaul passengers turned checkin bags would allowed fly ban affected economy class course expect httpwwwbritishairwayscomtravelhomepublicen_gb update bas website dated 21st february also announces system reinstated bas ban extended transfer passengers precisely longhaul passenger transferred ba flight t4 already laden hold baggage supposed explained source story httpwwwtheregistercouk20080220heathrow_software_glitch peter mellor mobile 07914 045072 email gcmoldwgereaolcom telephone fax 44 020 8459 7669 polu729hotmailcom sat apr 26 154924 2008 date mon 25 feb 2008 172111 0200 amos shapir subject youtube outage blamed pakistan pakistans attempts block access youtube blamed near global blackout site sunday full story httpnewsbbccouk1hitechnology7262071stm looks like misguided attempt change dns routing etaresiakorg sat apr 26 154924 2008 date tue 19 feb 2008 231805 0100 peter kaiser subject one way conduct internet voting democrats abroad us democratic partys organization members living outside usa sends delegates partys nominating convention year democrats abroad held global primary select delegations candidate people could vote person places intention voting internet howard dean democratic party chair said party would observing process closely would significant democrats abroad held secure wellrun election internet global primary wasnt secure wellrun begin registration vote internet managed unsecured web pages extraordinarily basic error brought attention party official immediately credit brought objection national organization responded didnt matter actual voting would secure thats serious lack understanding registration isnt secure voting isnt secure registrees information hijacked information also kind thats used identity theft voting supposed secure required ballot number pin distributed email oops someone could capture eavesdrop outgoing mail stream delivering information could vote entirety someone could eavesdrop mail coming particular address could steal vote actual process voting handled secured web pages thirdparty company observed vote supplying ballot number pin voter informed browser lacked essential plugin would installed process could continue plugin java voter slow expensive dialup line would made painful find download software luckily happened java installer started oops voter using windows account without privilege install software sketchy voting instructions indicated nothing would happen voter interrupt process signin one time user stopped browser would process time give another chance vote later way know certain process couldnt continue browser could use java user hadnt privilege install software event used windows run install java administrative account voter able carry voting process end could users done doubt vote interesting along legitimate candidates presented formally withdrawn candidature eg john edwards indication happened votes noncandidates way know cant internet vote kept current begins simply presenting noncandidates near end process submitting vote voter given choice quitting printing page showing vote democrats abroad encouraged people print votes hard imagine since special voteprinting popup page indicated clearly wasnt binding bother wellknown risks every stage episode repeat whole process neither secure wellrun moreover collection personal information using unsecured web pages exposed participants risk information theft delivering notionally secure information email painfully bad judgment episode proves nothing except wellintentioned people continue make elementary serious errors designing setting processes must safe every step meaningful perhaps someone bring mr dean mail democratic national committee hasnt answered njracmorg sat apr 26 154924 2008 date tue 19 feb 2008 095446 0500 andrew koenig subject declared dead ruins life risks2505 item reminds something happened many years ago two colleagues id rather name youd surely recognize one habit letting paper mail pile inbox week two dealing bit practical joker one day took mail piled inbox wrote deceased piece put outbox told took many months sort resulting mess dappoboxcom sat apr 26 154924 2008 date sat 23 feb 2008 154711 1000 george michaelson subject new rfid ticketless bus system brisbane goes live glitches brisbane deployed rfid based ticketless smartcard bus system calling go card integrated travel system described httpenwikipediaorgwikitranslink_28south_east_queensland29 ticketing system provider cubic httpenwikipediaorgwikicubic_transportation_systems2c_inc system test northern part network deployed citywide monday 25th actually already live card supplydistribution issue formally released next week system demands cardswipe computes journey values intersystem transfers uses gps buses ferries station boundaries observations system uses gps quite heavily drivers low level engagement time least system concentrating hopefully fewer cash paying fares got son card found live friday used one days use one problem 2 journeys one bus uses gps bus drivers extremis stop nonscheduled stops readers designed enable card operations except either commanded driver scheduled stops able cardswipe presumably driver training know enable second recorded yet getting another bus inside 5 minutes carded first bus system refused consider legal transfer recorded two journeys one maximum fare refund pending 10 day turnaround rang third fault recorded local newspapers system doesnt work underground stations without driver overrride presumably gps cant work resolved training commandoverride system already upgrade day failure attempted test locations accidentally took major portion network railway stations observation new system going glitches experience failure random singleton bit worry least son perfect score one operator training would resolved problem still lacking 2 days official launch worry refund phone desk going melt next week take best case 2 sample individuals 4 journey instances 8 buses thats still 12 failure lightly loaded system us card users journeys could complain system uses simply awful warning messages card reader service bus moving rather something humancentric bus motion swipe disabled something system whole quite obviously working readers implying dysfunctional worryingly systems designers seem making system design mistakes humans human systems black boxes designing system gps attempts forbid fare dodges refusing card except scheduled stops taken two useful side effect behaviours bus system getting bus nonscheduled stops getting bus stops common entirely normal many users system apparently outside system design plan strong financial penalty driver doesnt cant commandoverride system designing system gps cant work underground stations system least two several planning seems odd thirdly seems unfortunate card first bus card second cant shortcircuit excess fare reclaim im trying understand likelihood represents attempted gaming system vs legitimate user continuing trip would expected within system loss tolerances least try start preferencing good case instead dont register online audit card wind loosing quite significant amounts money journey dont card high maximum value instance stop get stop get next bus within 150m wonder gps precision dialed high nobody care bus journeys 150m card used inside 30min inside 150m distance looks like valid event still laud brisbane transport integrated ticketing wonderful anyone used hong kong system worldwide oyster card deployments believe followed comparison sydney transport imploded smartcard contract bus operator buying surplus exbrisbane driveroperated ticket consoles expand prerfidsmartcard system securityconscious level bus passengers use system register card claim refunds ensure cardloss hold au 200 value positionally accurate bus within 10m presumably philipkdick manifestation policeman amongst us vegkamensbrooklinemaus sat apr 26 154924 2008 date tuesday january 29 2008 806 pm jonathan kamens subject us treasury treasurydirect web site security enhancements us treasury offers wwwtreasurydirectgov purchasing managing portfolio securities issued federal government theyve made effort time make site secure theyve recently beefing security id like share details two new security features log site asks account number password however cant type password instead presented virtual keyboard whose keys scrambled hunt around characters password click one one order enter keyboard says virtual keyboard keys display random order available deter others learning password words virtual keyboard link pops following text click virtual keyboard virtual keyboard one many new security features introduced treasurydirect part ongoing commitment heightened password account security protect customers investments advantage using virtual keyboard keys display random order time log others deterred learning password access card information javascript enabled time arrive access treasurydirect account page log presented virtual keyboard enter password youll use mouse virtual keyboard enter letters numbers special characters contained password received access card youll also use virtual keyboard enter access card values access card minute enter password new keyboard must move mouse slowly search characters password pause one click look count number characters password field confirm last one entered correctly made least one mistake first time keyboard full view anyone see screen unfathomable people designed feature could possibly think secure typing password keyboard access cards weeks ago got email treasury notifying going sending access card would required future accessing account week ago sent separate email message notifying card would arriving soon contact receive within ten days also said shortly received card would longer able log site without card bar code ninedigit decimal serial number grid ten columns labeled j five rows labeled 1 5 intersection row column random letter number total fifty access card enabled account enter username password site display dropdown list several serial numbers one actually mine three grid coordinates eg c2 finish logging select correct serial number enter using virtual keyboard three characters corresponding displayed grid coordinates demonstration works viewed dont know whether technology purchased third party invented treasury interesting attempt implement inexpensive twofactor authentication better nothing obviously useless preventing illicit access people physical proximity account owner since simply sneak photocopy card owner isnt looking thu 07 aug 2008 160328 0800 risks risks digest 2506