m9 vevrry4iaenl begin pgp signed message hash sha1 james knott schreef m9 wrote alexey eremenko schreef project big kde code going go alpha release quality less 2 months expecially one still missing vast expanses functionality kde 4 ready prime time yet ready prime time 8 weeks complete nobrainer absolutely agree best solution would allow choice kde3kde4 like choise gnomekde 103 choice dont afraid glad hear based demo kde 4 saw ontario linux fest back october saw kde 4 makes show stopper wouldnt want os crap choice many issues fixed since still long way go match predessessor nice day m9 time exists os linux 26221701default x86_64 huidige gebruiker monkey9amd64x2sfn1 systeem opensuse 103 x86_64 kde 357 release 726 begin pgp signature version gnupg v204svn0 gnulinux comment using gnupg suse httpenigmailmozdevorg id8dbqfhtfjbx5x5x6lpdgraolmakddpnxav60jiqlw5yq7ddieankugcg4evm y17evpylkobdptwix1nmeq klp7 end pgp signature udcatmailabuseorg sun feb 24 103133 2008 message 1 date sun 17 feb 2008 051957 0800 douglas otis subject ietfdkim issue 1547 ssp02 mx record publishing mandateto reduce dns overhead ssp discovery detectfraudulent messages hector santos cc dkim list messageid 96b6e17163ec42e1ab0a15a77b4b04f8mailabuseorg contenttype textplain charsetusascii formatflowed delspyes feb 16 2008 824 hector santos wrote technically approach creates problem domain uses dkim publishes policy record support smtp well saw thread input since 80s multimail format networkinggateway products served millions course time think pretty good idea practical aspects primarily idea attempting obtain gateway perfection persistent mail integrity dkim transformation processes expecting bit much public protocols may implement dkim messages enter smtp infrastructure result future may require policy based upon public transport carrying message treat dkim protecting messages related smtp infrastructure preserving mime tells gateway import save mail raw save local proprietary format text separated attachments preserving mime become important years customers users began use offline readers eg pop3 news readers era html mail acceptable another reason users turning option customers security reasons dont even offer option users save users mail native format important comes type mua question less secure means deal delivery corruption would rely something like authenticationresults headers assured filtered border mtas awhile approach trusted generally distributed applications keep focus dkim x822 mail system imv regardless x822 mail sent moved gated transformed retransformed still x822 system finally gets ever domains may wish declare smtp messages signed time sign news im messages domains may also wish declare news im messages sent limit risk caused gateways apply different policy messages carried different public transports introduced smtp infrastructure needs qualified either policy records scope public transport policy record must limited messages destine smtp infrastructure public transport policies enter smtp infrastructure published separately keeping policy one record would help simplify application policy public protocol gateways otherwise dkim policy must published separately likely structured differently scoping information gateways bridging public protocols would need apply policy based upon destination protocol likely might cause messages considered noncompliant b internally track display public reception protocol unlikely tolerant approach messages converted protocol gateway smtp policydiscovery record check would detect smtp supported think proposing method domain declare policy says expect mail purported originate qwk fidonet news nntp xyz protocol posted system sounds like good idea think overkill believe benefits using policies restrict 3rd party signatures expectation seeing firstparty signature causes message categorized noncompliant expectation needs calibrated public transport communication become disrupted needlessly policy based upon public transport appears essential otherwise dkim dkim signing im news message dkim value mua scaling overhead much less problem depends kind mua referring online offline see vendors deal design implementations many mail reading device methods online offline offline mua different considerations online mua ignore dkim users want pickup mail via pop3 think online users think good reason chaotic discussions subjective product designs imposing feature list everyone else extension supporting offline message validation could offer authenticationresults header includes declaration public transport related public keys policy whether ever happens depends upon marketplace free low cost solutions online check plugins already available instead focus functional logical points fundamental protocol let implementators decide best fits product lines agreed instead get people mandating cant might ok made sense considerations general case systems dkim may provide basis reputation replacing use ip address becomes important ipv6 use increases dkim provided simple autonomous means authorize third party providers expecting thirdparty providers hold thousands domains private keys within online servers unwise security standpoint domains using thirdparty providers setting dns delegations cnames exchanging keys applying customer specific signatures expensive manage error prone addition unsafe really isnt hard either sign dont idea vendor product independent want know domain intended expected asked begin looking new level mail information ok looked see really simple concept always expect 1st signature yeah ok well dont see one reject message sometimes ok fine status quo assurance guarding original signature strict assertion changed discardable dont even bother reject worthless category messages strict assertion could beneficial expect 3rd party signature ok reject dont care ok fine status quo statement confusing mean signature added already signed message leads rejection b domain signed signature damaged removed acceptable thirdparty signature added meant b would agree etc etc really dont see matters sent preferred type burglar knocking door many different doors could helped dkim might expectation knocking front door validate affiliation may different expectations back door difference might simply buying wares back door someone escorts front door might asked validate affiliation although likely unprepared moving everyone common doorway may seem ideal creates significant problem front door carries greater obligation different doors need different policies different levels trust based upon door used distant point future perhaps doors treated time arrived doug mwbfbflsantronicscom sun feb 24 103133 2008 message 2 date sun 17 feb 2008 123240 0500 hector santos subject ietfdkim issue 1547 ssp02 mx record publishing mandateto reduce dns overhead ssp discovery detectfraudulent messages douglas otis cc dkim list messageid 47b86fb88010201santronicscom contenttype textplain charsetiso88591 formatflowed douglas otis wrote really dont see matters sent preferred type burglar knocking door many different doors could helped dkim might expectation knocking front door validate affiliation may different expectations back door difference might simply buying wares back door someone escorts front door might asked validate affiliation although likely unprepared moving everyone common doorway may seem ideal creates significant problem front door carries greater obligation different doors need different policies different levels trust based upon door used distant point future perhaps doors treated time arrived doug time came long ago remember predominately anonymous vs nonanonymous transactions systems always treaty anonymous nonanonymous transactions differently anonymous back door last thing want although strongly appears asp model promoting sincerely hector santos cto httpwwwsantronicscom httpsantronicsblogspotcom _______________________________________________ note well list operates according end ietfdkim digest vol 107 issue 12 mwbfbflsantronicscom sun feb 24 103134 2008 message 3 date sat 16 feb 2008 020517 0500 hector santos subject ietfdkim issue 1547 ssp02 mx record publishing mandateto reduce dns overhead ssp discovery detectfraudulent messages douglas otis cc dkim list mh michael hammer 5304 messageid 47b68b2d8020705santronicscom contenttype textplain charsetiso88591 formatflowed douglas otis wrote feb 15 2008 349 pm damon wrote case need tie breaker 1 summarize bunch 1 says little know dont hate call follow chieftain syndrome opinion votes came reason explanation position might help sway others push back generated concept dkim policy applicable transport protocols might bridged smtp doug record mx lookup must ssp record discovery setup imo prefer may even historically requirement therefore highly possible mx exist keep mind steps ssp recommendation long end result people dont follow steps possible mx lookup already done places look way way view keep must mx lookup requirement ssp discovery steps 1 would agree also must addinghaving mx record x822from domain used domains new dkim signing mail operations less problem idea general dkim deployment recommendation domains consider even possibly recommendation mx record x822from standpoint dkimssp protocol consistency especially differs return path sender domains ability clearly indicate whether message fraudulent without incurring additional transactions also important general domain protection standpoint jim right policy made include scope also offers flexible workable solution message abuse demand negotiated changes accommodated extent policy assertions keeping lid added overhead represents remaining challenged 1 youre right important part implementation considerations consider mandate x822from mx must also least allow verifier policy based handling removed current emasculated model since policies allowed implementators optimize scale dkim processing removal reduces mda adoption incentive dkim verification thus little payoff resulting additional overhead less reason even bother overhead sincerely hector santos cto httpwwwsantronicscom httpsantronicsblogspotcom udcatmailabuseorg sun feb 24 103134 2008 message 4 date sat 16 feb 2008 052015 0800 douglas otis subject ietfdkim issue 1547 ssp02 mx record publishing mandateto reduce dns overhead ssp discovery detectfraudulent messages hector santos cc dkim list mh michael hammer 5304 messageid contenttype textplain charsetusascii formatflowed delspyes feb 15 2008 1105 pm hector santos wrote douglas otis wrote feb 15 2008 349 pm damon wrote case need tie breaker 1 summarize bunch 1 says little know dont hate call follow chieftain syndrome opinion votes came reason explanation position might help sway others push back generated concept dkim policy applicable transport protocols might bridged smtp doug record mx lookup must ssp record discovery setup imo prefer may even historically requirement therefore highly possible mx exist horse died leaving barn mx mandate discovery record would imposed domains 1 implemented dkim 2 published dkim policy record scheme impact domains publishing dkim policy records correct mx record may never published cases would nice impose simple limitation domain tree walking polices mandating discovery record mx case smtp published along policy records existence two records provides means detect fraudulent use domain without examining record content approach tolerates policy record format changes still safely minimizing impact daily onslaught spoofed references existing domains even handle messages mandate would offered means squelch series policy key transactions cases invalid signature may occur many reasons leaves result category significantly weaker finding domain publishing policy record without also publishing discovery record technically approach creates problem domain uses dkim publishes policy record support smtp messages converted protocol gateway smtp policy discovery record check would detect smtp supported return path instantiated protocol gateway could provide conversion dsns domain return path would unrelated dkim signature yes might seen disadvantage also closes avenue abuse controlled dkim limitation would induce assurance direct return path domain would indicating dont want protocol translation gives originating domain greater control dummy records might published achieve desired effect keep mind steps ssp recommendation long end result people dont follow steps possible mx lookup already done places mx record queried policy record found check existence domain mx record accessed recently could cache mandate publish policy discovery records together would greater advantage checking mx record look way way view keep must mx lookup requirement ssp discovery steps 1 would agree also must addinghaving mx record x822from domain used domains new dkim signing mail operations logic would way around would seem wg wishes keep options open adding scope policy record effect possible somewhat larger policy records less problem idea general dkim deployment recommendation domains consider even possibly recommendation mx record x822from standpoint dkimssp protocol consistency especially differs return path sender domains represents minority view however ability clearly indicate whether message fraudulent without incurring additional transactions also important general domain protection standpoint jim right policy made include scope also offers flexible workable solution message abuse demand negotiated changes accommodated extent policy assertions keeping lid added overhead represents remaining challenged 1 youre right important part implementation considerations consider mandate x822from mx must also least allow verifier policy based handling removed current emasculated model pairing policydiscovery records content policy record matter preventing spoofing existent domains support smtp hand term discardable instead strict sole exclusive words effect means transactional domains wishing thwart spoofing instead likely find much communications lost take time signature integrity mature problem due mailinglists discardable term likely ensure needed level integrity never occurs much essential feedback whether domain spoofed whether signature integrity problem likely lost since policies allowed implementators optimize scale dkim processing removal reduces mda adoption incentive dkim verification thus little payoff resulting additional overhead less reason even bother overhead dkim value mua scaling overhead much less problem triage process mta could guided policy assertions dkim validation mta may limited domains history targeted abuse domains unwilling make signature assurances filtering must relaxed reduce rate false positives regard appears agreement ssp01 better respect seem problem signatures added thirdparties however admitting understanding thread doug mwbfbflsantronicscom sun feb 24 103134 2008 message 5 date sat 16 feb 2008 112406 0500 hector santos subject ietfdkim issue 1547 ssp02 mx record publishing mandateto reduce dns overhead ssp discovery detectfraudulent messages douglas otis cc dkim list mh michael hammer 5304 messageid 47b70e2610105santronicscom contenttype textplain charsetiso88591 formatflowed douglas otis wrote technically approach creates problem domain uses dkim publishes policy record support smtp well saw thread input since 80s multimail format networkinggateway products served millions course time think pretty good idea practical aspects primarily idea attempting obtain gateway perfection persistent mail integrity dkim transformation processes expecting bit much small part system major framework user option preserve mime yesno preserving mime tells gateway import save mail raw save local proprietary format text separated attachments preserving mime become important years customers users began use offline readers eg pop3 news readers era html mail acceptable another reason users turning option customers security reasons dont even offer option users save users mail native format important comes type mua question keep focus dkim x822 mail system imv regardless x822 mail sent moved gated transformed retransformed still x822 system finally gets ever messages converted protocol gateway smtp policydiscovery record check would detect smtp supported think proposing method domain declare policy says expect mail purported originate qwk fidonet news nntp xyz protocol posted system sounds like good idea think overkill believe benefits using policies restrict 3rd party signatures dkim value mua scaling overhead much less problem depends kind mua referring online offline see vendors deal design implementations many mail reading device methods online offline offline mua different considerations online mua ignore dkim users want pickup mail via pop3 think online users think good reason chaotic discussions subjective product designs imposing feature list everyone else instead focus functional logical points fundamental protocol let implementators decide best fits product lines instead get people mandating cant might ok made sense considerations general case systems really isnt hard either sign dont idea vendor product independent want know domain intended expected asked begin looking new level mail information ok looked see really simple concept always expect 1st signature yeah ok well dont see one reject message sometimes ok fine status quo expect 3rd party signature ok reject dont care ok fine status quo etc etc really dont see matters sent preferred type burglar knocking door sincerely hector santos cto httpwwwsantronicscom httpsantronicsblogspotcom nonlmuutbbiwnet sun feb 24 103134 2008 message 6 date sat 16 feb 2008 165850 0800 nonlmuutbbiwnet subject ietfdkim admin mipassocorg dkimorg mailing list host change 21617 16pm pacific tme dkim ietf wg messageid 47b786ca5030602bbiwnet contenttype textplain charsetiso88591 formatflowed folks scheduled transition mipassocorg dkimorg accounts appears complete sites appear normally accessible receipt email via mailing list final test experience change problem please let know immediately dhcnoticedcrockernet nonlmuutbbiwnet ok might take bit longer see call 14082468253 dave crocker brandenburg internetworking bbiwnet wed 06 aug 2008 014442 0100 opensuse opensuse 110 nonready kde4