(1), 4.9 for government responsiveness (column (2), and 3.5 for effectiveness in corruption control (column (3). The coefficient on the dummy however, is negative and non-government, statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of this coefficient is rather large for government responsiveness (-0607) and effectiveness of corruption control (-0.448). Regression results for scores on selected governance issues Table A3: Dependent variable Citizens, in general, City government is City government is Explanatory satisfy with city responsive to citizens effective in corruption variable government control (1) (2) (3) Non-government -0.301** -0.607*** -0.448 (0.128) (0.125) (0.155) Constant 4.779 4.921 3.518 (0.087) (0.084) (0.113) 492 492 N 492 0.13 Adj-R2 0.05 0.14 Note: the regressions are on model (1) presented in Section 3, using Stata areg command.
(1), 4.9 for government responsiveness (column (2), and 3.5 for effectiveness in corruption control (column (3). The coefficient on the dummy non-government, however, is negative and statistically significant. Moreover, the magnitude of this coefficient is rather large for government responsiveness (-0607) and effectiveness of corruption control (-0.448). Table A3: Regression results for scores on selected governance issues Explanatory variable Dependent variable Citizens, in general, satisfy with city government City government is responsive to citizens City government is effective in corruption control (1) (2) (3) Non-government -0.301** -0.607*** -0.448 (0.128) (0.125) (0.155) Constant 4.779 4.921 3.518 (0.087) (0.084) (0.113) N 492 492 492 Adj-R2 0.05 0.13 0.14 Note: the regressions are on model (1) presented in Section 3, using Stata areg command.
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