delay. The court further found that Arandis had failed to place sufficient facts before the court to condone its delay. to appeal required? Mr Heathcote, who together with Ms De Jager appeared for Xaris, took the point that the order of the High Court is of an interlocutory nature and that leave to appeal is required. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon this court’s judgment in Di Savino where the Chief Justice carefully set out the meaning to be given to s 18(3) of the High Court Act after a thorough survey of decisions of this court and of the approach in South Africa before (and after) the procedure on appeals had been amended there in 1982. The Chief Justice concluded: would appear to me therefore that the spirit of s 18(3) is that before a party can ‘It pursue an appeal against a judgment or order of the High Court, two requirements must be met. Firstly, the judgment or order must be appealable. Secondly, if the judgment or order is interlocutory, leave to appeal against such judgment or order must first be obtained even if the nature of the order or judgment satisfies the first requirement. The test whether a judgment or order satisfies the first requirement is as set out in many judgments of our courts as noted above and it is not necessary to repeat it here.’ Mr Heathcote argued that the judgment of the High Court only dealt with the preliminary point of delay which entailed a condonation application and that it is consequently interlocutory. That approach however fails to appreciate the approach in Di Savino and the nature of the defence raised in this matter.
delay. The court further found that Arandis had failed to place sufficient facts before the court to condone its delay. to appeal required? Mr Heathcote, who together with Ms De Jager appeared for Xaris, took the point that the order of the High Court is of an interlocutory nature and that leave to appeal is required. In support of this contention, reliance was placed upon this court’s judgment in Di Savino where the Chief Justice carefully set out the meaning to be given to s 18(3) of the High Court Act after a thorough survey of decisions of this court and of the approach in South Africa before (and after) the procedure on appeals had been amended there in 1982. The Chief Justice concluded: ‘It would appear to me therefore that the spirit of s 18(3) is that before a party can pursue an appeal against a judgment or order of the High Court, two requirements must be met. Firstly, the judgment or order must be appealable. Secondly, if the judgment or order is interlocutory, leave to appeal against such judgment or order must first be obtained even if the nature of the order or judgment satisfies the first requirement. The test whether a judgment or order satisfies the first requirement is as set out in many judgments of our courts as noted above and it is not necessary to repeat it here.’ Mr Heathcote argued that the judgment of the High Court only dealt with the preliminary point of delay which entailed a condonation application and that it is consequently interlocutory. That approach however fails to appreciate the approach in Di Savino and the nature of the defence raised in this matter.
Arandis%20Power%20(PTY)%20Ltd%20v%20President%20of%20the%20Republic%20of%20Namibia%20(SA%2040-2016)%20[2018]%20NASC%20(16%20March%202018).docx