[individuals with disabilities] at serious risk of institutionalization.”); Pashby v. 709 F.3d 307, 321-322 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); 663 F.3d Delia, M.R. v. Dreyfus, 1100, 1116-1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“an ADA plaintiff need not show that institutionalization is or that she has choice’ but to submit to ‘inevitable’ ‘no institutional care in order to state a violation of the integration mandate. Rather, a plaintiff need only show that the challenged state action creates a serious risk of institutionalization”), 697 F.3d 706 as amended on denial of rehearing en banc, (9th Cir. 2012); 335 F.3d 1175, 1182 Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Auth., (10th Cir. 2003); 133 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2015); M.A. v. Norwood, O.B. v. 107 F. Supp. 3d 1186 (N.D. Ill. 2016); 293 F.R.D. at 263; Norwood, Kenneth R., 283 F.R.D. at 598 (D. Or. 2012); No. C 09-4668, Lane, Oster v. Lightbourne, 2012 WL 685808, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012); Makin ex rel. Russel v. Hawaii, 114 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1033 (D. Haw. 1999). The U.S. Department of Justice, to which Congress delegated the authority to interpret and enforce Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12134, has come to the same conclusion. In its 2011 of the Department of Justice on “Statement Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Department makes clear that the Olmstead v. L.C.,” protections of the ADA and its integration mandate extend to persons serious “at risk of institutionalization or segregation” and are not limited to individuals
[individuals with disabilities] at serious risk of institutionalization.”); Pashby v. Delia, 709 F.3d 307, 321-322 (4th Cir. 2013) (same); M.R. v. Dreyfus, 663 F.3d 1100, 1116-1117 (9th Cir. 2011) (“an ADA plaintiff need not show that institutionalization is ‘inevitable’ or that she has ‘no choice’ but to submit to institutional care in order to state a violation of the integration mandate. Rather, a plaintiff need only show that the challenged state action creates a serious risk of institutionalization”), as amended on denial of rehearing en banc, 697 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2012); Fisher v. Oklahoma Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1182 (10th Cir. 2003); M.A. v. Norwood, 133 F. Supp. 3d 1093 (N.D. Ill. 2015); O.B. v. Norwood, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1186 (N.D. Ill. 2016); Kenneth R., 293 F.R.D. at 263; Lane, 283 F.R.D. at 598 (D. Or. 2012); Oster v. Lightbourne, No. C 09-4668, 2012 WL 685808, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012); Makin ex rel. Russel v. Hawaii, 114 F.Supp.2d 1017, 1033 (D. Haw. 1999). The U.S. Department of Justice, to which Congress delegated the authority to interpret and enforce Title II of the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12134, has come to the same conclusion. In its 2011 “Statement of the Department of Justice on Enforcement of the Integration Mandate of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead v. L.C.,” the Department makes clear that the protections of the ADA and its integration mandate extend to persons “at serious risk of institutionalization or segregation” and are not limited to individuals
AR-v.-Dudek-Amicus-brief-12-3-17.docx