Overview Australia’s anti–dumping and countervailing system (hereafter the anti–dumping system) provides some Australian industries with protection additional to that available through the general tariff regime. Such protection usually in the form of special customs duties — — can be granted when: either the export price of a good to Australia is lower than the price in the overseas supplier’s home market; or the supplier has received any of a specified group of subsidies from its government, and the or subsidised imports cause, or threaten to cause, injury’ to a ‘dumped’ ‘material local producer of goods’. ‘like Most countries have anti–dumping systems, but the merits of such protection have long been questioned. Like other forms of trade protection, antidumping duties protect some industries at the expense of other industries and consumers who use the imported goods concerned. And, like other trade protection, such duties give rise to broader economic costs by distorting consumption and investment decisions, muting the incentives of the protected industries to improve their competitiveness and deterring trade. As such, the central question has been how anti–dumping protection could be beneficial when it is widely accepted that trade barriers are harmful to both the country taking action and the global trading system more broadly. Australia’s anti–dumping system is based on internationally agreed rules and procedures under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but those rules do not endorse antidumping protection. Indeed, they do not oblige governments to take action against dumped or subsidised imports, nor prohibit or most types of subsidisation. Rather, the WTO rules seek to place bounds on any antidumping or countervailing actions by member countries and are essentially an attempt to limit the scope and stringency of protection and therefore the economic harm that it imposes. Why this study? Reporting on the effects of Australia’s anti–dumping system and the efficacy of industry assistance is not a new endeavour for the Commission. In addition to undertaking a formal public inquiry into the system in 2009, it has monitored developments in the system as part of its statutory role to report annually on assistance provided to Australian industries. Since the Commission’s 2009 inquiry, the degree of assistance provided by the system to claimants has risen.
Overview Australia’s anti–dumping and countervailing system (hereafter the anti–dumping system) provides some Australian industries with protection additional to that available through the general tariff regime. Such protection — usually in the form of special customs duties — can be granted when: either the export price of a good to Australia is lower than the price in the overseas supplier’s home market; or the supplier has received any of a specified group of subsidies from its government, and the ‘dumped’ or subsidised imports cause, or threaten to cause, ‘material injury’ to a local producer of ‘like goods’. Most countries have anti–dumping systems, but the merits of such protection have long been questioned. Like other forms of trade protection, antidumping duties protect some industries at the expense of other industries and consumers who use the imported goods concerned. And, like other trade protection, such duties give rise to broader economic costs by distorting consumption and investment decisions, muting the incentives of the protected industries to improve their competitiveness and deterring trade. As such, the central question has been how anti–dumping protection could be beneficial when it is widely accepted that trade barriers are harmful to both the country taking action and the global trading system more broadly. Australia’s anti–dumping system is based on internationally agreed rules and procedures under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but those rules do not endorse antidumping protection. Indeed, they do not oblige governments to take action against dumped or subsidised imports, nor prohibit or most types of subsidisation. Rather, the WTO rules seek to place bounds on any antidumping or countervailing actions by member countries and are essentially an attempt to limit the scope and stringency of protection and therefore the economic harm that it imposes. Why this study? Reporting on the effects of Australia’s anti–dumping system and the efficacy of industry assistance is not a new endeavour for the Commission. In addition to undertaking a formal public inquiry into the system in 2009, it has monitored developments in the system as part of its statutory role to report annually on assistance provided to Australian industries. Since the Commission’s 2009 inquiry, the degree of assistance provided by the system to claimants has risen.
anti-dumping-research-paper.docx