Wing walkers should remain in sight of the flight crew, but the captain did not see the ramp supervisor signal to indicate reducing clearance between the two aircraft. The captain’s attention was to the incoming A320. Safety action Whether or not the ATSB identifies safety issues in the course of an investigation, relevant organisations may proactively initiate safety action in to reduce their safety risk. The ATSB has been advised of the following safety action in response to this occurrence. Aircraft operator As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety actions: Flight crew operational notice The aircraft operator issued a flight crew operational notice (FCON) which stated that: When taxiing out of power-out bay, crew shall ensure the aircraft maintains the apron lead-out line until: the end of the lead-out line; or the lead-out line joins a taxiway centreline. This may involve an exit turn of more than 180 degrees to assure clearance from adjoining bays. Should the aircraft be stopped before completion of the entire turn to exit the caution should be made when re-initiating movement to ensure the above requirements are maintained. If at any time aircraft clearance cannot be assured, the aircraft should cease taxiing and request assistance. Training and checking notice The aircraft operator also issued a training and checking notice (TCN) that stated Check ‘All Captains and Training Captains are requested to ensure that wingtip geometry, turn markings, turn procedures and hazards are well understood by flight crew during line training and recurrent line checks’. Flight crew information bulletin The aircraft operator published a flight crew information bulletin (FCIB) for educational and standardisation purposes titled and applicable to Boeing 737 aircraft. Wingtip Clearance Hazard The FCIB included information about taxiing in accordance with lead-out lines, appropriate use of ground crew, images of Hobart and other airports used by the operator, and wing and tail turning geometry for the aircraft. The FCIB stated In summary, it is recommended that taxi guidance lines be adhered to, whenever practical. Continued vigilance should be employed by crews in the monitoring of obstacles during ground manoeuvring. If is any doubt whatsoever regarding wingtip clearance, STOP and seek guidance. Safety message This incident highlights the importance of aircraft operators conducting a thorough risk assessment where ground movement is confined, particularly movements involving congested power-out bays. Effective risk assessments ensure that hazards are clearly identified and well understood, and that the associated risks are appropriately managed.
Wing walkers should remain in sight of the flight crew, but the captain did not see the ramp supervisor signal to indicate reducing clearance between the two aircraft. The captain’s attention was to the incoming A320. Safety action Whether or not the ATSB identifies safety issues in the course of an investigation, relevant organisations may proactively initiate safety action in to reduce their safety risk. The ATSB has been advised of the following safety action in response to this occurrence. Aircraft operator As a result of this occurrence, the aircraft operator has advised the ATSB that they are taking the following safety actions: Flight crew operational notice The aircraft operator issued a flight crew operational notice (FCON) which stated that: When taxiing out of power-out bay, crew shall ensure the aircraft maintains the apron lead-out line until: the end of the lead-out line; or the lead-out line joins a taxiway centreline. This may involve an exit turn of more than 180 degrees to assure clearance from adjoining bays. Should the aircraft be stopped before completion of the entire turn to exit the caution should be made when re-initiating movement to ensure the above requirements are maintained. If at any time aircraft clearance cannot be assured, the aircraft should cease taxiing and request assistance. Training and checking notice The aircraft operator also issued a training and checking notice (TCN) that stated ‘All Check Captains and Training Captains are requested to ensure that wingtip geometry, turn markings, turn procedures and hazards are well understood by flight crew during line training and recurrent line checks’. Flight crew information bulletin The aircraft operator published a flight crew information bulletin (FCIB) for educational and standardisation purposes titled Wingtip Clearance Hazard and applicable to Boeing 737 aircraft. The FCIB included information about taxiing in accordance with lead-out lines, appropriate use of ground crew, images of Hobart and other airports used by the operator, and wing and tail turning geometry for the aircraft. The FCIB stated In summary, it is recommended that taxi guidance lines be adhered to, whenever practical. Continued vigilance should be employed by crews in the monitoring of obstacles during ground manoeuvring. If is any doubt whatsoever regarding wingtip clearance, STOP and seek guidance. Safety message This incident highlights the importance of aircraft operators conducting a thorough risk assessment where ground movement is confined, particularly movements involving congested power-out bays. Effective risk assessments ensure that hazards are clearly identified and well understood, and that the associated risks are appropriately managed.
ao-2016-167_final-report.docx