A variety of of fluctuating size and nature up in MPI discourse. ‘publics’ First, there is the used by the media in its self-justifying rhetoric. This ‘public’ public is essentially the market of consumers who will only buy what interests them and whose demands must be met if papers are to survive the very – existence of the press depends on it. In this narrative, the consumers are empowered, in charge, and papers are merely giving them what they want; doing so is essential to their watchdog function. Though as Fiss notes, be ‘[T]o a consumer, even a sovereign one, is not to be a citizen.’ Second, there is the more subtle of in the justifications for free expression that ‘public’ underpin this area. It is clear that the dominant justifications concerning democratic debate and truth rest upon Enlightenment-era ideals where the is a monolithic entity comprised of a homogenous group of politically ‘public’ engaged, intelligent citizens, always keen to debate serious social issues. These members of the public reflect the contradictory co-existence of noble ideals and elitist assumptions. And finally, despite their claims, judges are no more immune than others to this tendency to co-opt the for their own ‘public’ rhetorical purposes. Whilst critical of the media for self-interestedly conflating public interest and interesting the public, other judicial comments betray certain preconceptions of their own regarding the public. Their evident (and justifiable) distaste for much of the reportage in MPI disputes on occasion tilts over into a caricature of the (or public’) that consumes it. This public is ‘public’ ‘a implicitly characterised as a voyeuristic, licentious mob, ironically echoing the Greek origins of the word which meant rule of the people ‘democracy’ (‘demos’), but with connotations of the unruly multitude. This arguably gives the impression of a well-intentioned paternalist elite reinforcing certain stereotypes about the public (and what it), whilst drawing upon ‘interests’ specific Enlightenment-era liberal ideals of what is truly for the public’s own good. This is evidenced by judicial use of the Profumo example which is underpinned by the somewhat patronising assumption that though the public has
A variety of ‘publics’ of fluctuating size and nature up in MPI discourse. First, there is the ‘public’ used by the media in its self-justifying rhetoric. This public is essentially the market of consumers who will only buy what interests them and whose demands must be met if papers are to survive – the very existence of the press depends on it. In this narrative, the consumers are empowered, in charge, and papers are merely giving them what they want; doing so is essential to their watchdog function. Though as Fiss notes, ‘[T]o be a consumer, even a sovereign one, is not to be a citizen.’ Second, there is the more subtle of ‘public’ in the justifications for free expression that underpin this area. It is clear that the dominant justifications concerning democratic debate and truth rest upon Enlightenment-era ideals where the ‘public’ is a monolithic entity comprised of a homogenous group of politically engaged, intelligent citizens, always keen to debate serious social issues. These members of the public reflect the contradictory co-existence of noble ideals and elitist assumptions. And finally, despite their claims, judges are no more immune than others to this tendency to co-opt the ‘public’ for their own rhetorical purposes. Whilst critical of the media for self-interestedly conflating public interest and interesting the public, other judicial comments betray certain preconceptions of their own regarding the public. Their evident (and justifiable) distaste for much of the reportage in MPI disputes on occasion tilts over into a caricature of the ‘public’ (or ‘a public’) that consumes it. This public is implicitly characterised as a voyeuristic, licentious mob, ironically echoing the Greek origins of the word ‘democracy’ which meant rule of the people (‘demos’), but with connotations of the unruly multitude. This arguably gives the impression of a well-intentioned paternalist elite reinforcing certain stereotypes about the public (and what ‘interests’ it), whilst drawing upon specific Enlightenment-era liberal ideals of what is truly for the public’s own good. This is evidenced by judicial use of the Profumo example which is underpinned by the somewhat patronising assumption that though the public has
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