analysis was discussed and agreed upon as highly relevant prior to searches from 2002 through 2006. However, this relationship was ignored in the formal selection strategy. This led to a series of failed career starts, recurring recruiting expenses and organizational stress at the college. New leadership implemented a policy in 2007 that experienced candidates be given formal preference. With this strategy error corrected the college had a series of successful hires and low turnover. Daniel Kahneman’s (Kahneman, 2011) recalls how he noticed the now famous of “illusion validity” and how it leads to decision errors. The error is continuing a tactic that is proven to not work. Illusion of validity is the opposite situation in which the strategy decided upon is based on relationships that have repeatedly been demonstrated to be in error. We can also juxtapose this to Type I correlation error: when we hire experienced candidates despite no repeatable observational evidence that experienced candidates perform better on the job, we are making a Type I error. When we fail to give preference to experienced academic candidates despite repeated observational evidence that they do perform better on the job, we are making a Type IV error: choosing a course of action that will not be effective. Why do leaders and decision makers choose from the pool of possible solution courses of action that do not work, even in the face of evidence that they have not worked in the past, or that they probably will not work in the near future? The voluminous literature on cognitive biases and decision biases certainly helps explain this. However, specific research is needed to more tightly link the decision error literature with strategy development and selection. Error of the 5th Kind, Action (Type V), and Error of the 6th Kind; Inaction (Type VI) occur when deciding whether to act on a proposed solution. Managers, after Action errors deciding what needs to be done, face a decision of whether or not to take action. Distinct from other parts of the overall process, there comes a time when the manager or leader must the “make
analysis was discussed and agreed upon as highly relevant prior to searches from 2002 through 2006. However, this relationship was ignored in the formal selection strategy. This led to a series of failed career starts, recurring recruiting expenses and organizational stress at the college. New leadership implemented a policy in 2007 that experienced candidates be given formal preference. With this strategy error corrected the college had a series of successful hires and low turnover. Daniel Kahneman’s (Kahneman, 2011) recalls how he noticed the now famous “illusion of validity” and how it leads to decision errors. The error is continuing a tactic that is proven to not work. Illusion of validity is the opposite situation in which the strategy decided upon is based on relationships that have repeatedly been demonstrated to be in error. We can also juxtapose this to Type I correlation error: when we hire experienced candidates despite no repeatable observational evidence that experienced candidates perform better on the job, we are making a Type I error. When we fail to give preference to experienced academic candidates despite repeated observational evidence that they do perform better on the job, we are making a Type IV error: choosing a course of action that will not be effective. Why do leaders and decision makers choose from the pool of possible solution courses of action that do not work, even in the face of evidence that they have not worked in the past, or that they probably will not work in the near future? The voluminous literature on cognitive biases and decision biases certainly helps explain this. However, specific research is needed to more tightly link the decision error literature with strategy development and selection. Error of the 5th Kind, Action (Type V), and Error of the 6th Kind; Inaction (Type VI) Action errors occur when deciding whether to act on a proposed solution. Managers, after deciding what needs to be done, face a decision of whether or not to take action. Distinct from other parts of the overall process, there comes a time when the manager or leader must “make the
AMP_Meckler&Boal_Decision_Errors_Iatrogenesis_Error_7thKind_2018.docx