consistent with, that very right. Thus the right is not just dominated by its opponent, but also conveniently self-subverting. The Art 8/10 framework reveals little about the privileging of either right per se or the broader values that influence it. Free expression, in Fish’s terms, not ‘is an independent value’, has no content’’, but constitutes a ‘‘natural’ ‘political prize’ for partisan struggle. For Fish, the First Amendment [right to free speech] is successfully ‘When invoked the result is not a victory for free speech in the face of a challenge from politics, but a won by the party political victory that has managed to wrap its agenda in the mantle of free speech.’ Arts 8 & 10, each formulated in manipulable abstract terms, can thus be viewed as generalised statements of political ideals that do not have fixed meanings per They require political or social argument to be constructed around the se. privacy/free expression dualism in the form of rights versus rights conflicts, but do not provide specific guidance about how such conflicts should be dealt with. Instead, Articles 8 & 10 defer the of potential conflict by delegating ‘resolution’ the interpretation of meaning in any specific context to the judiciary. Indeed it is only through their relationships with particular factual contexts that the Articles’ very meanings are produced. This ultimately highlights the perceptiveness of Griffith’s observation that the text of Article 10 ‘sounds the statement of a political conflict to be a resolution of it.’ pretending Ultimately, the inevitable privileging of either privacy or free expression in MPI must be guided by more abstract-level level principles employed by judges. Deconstructive analysis must therefore be undertaken at this level by investigating the emerging body of principles that determine which of the two
consistent with, that very right. Thus the right is not just dominated by its opponent, but also conveniently self-subverting. The Art 8/10 framework per se reveals little about the privileging of either right or the broader values that influence it. Free expression, in Fish’s terms, ‘is not an independent value’, has no ‘‘natural’ content’’, but constitutes a ‘political prize’ for partisan struggle. For Fish, ‘When the First Amendment [right to free speech] is successfully invoked the result is not a victory for free speech in the face of a challenge from politics, but a political victory won by the party that has managed to wrap its agenda in the mantle of free speech.’ Arts 8 & 10, each formulated in manipulable abstract terms, can thus be viewed as generalised statements of political ideals that do not have fixed meanings per se. They require political or social argument to be constructed around the privacy/free expression dualism in the form of rights versus rights conflicts, but do not provide specific guidance about how such conflicts should be dealt with. Instead, Articles 8 & 10 defer the ‘resolution’ of potential conflict by delegating the interpretation of meaning in any specific context to the judiciary. Indeed it is only through their relationships with particular factual contexts that the Articles’ very meanings are produced. This ultimately highlights the perceptiveness of Griffith’s observation that the text of Article 10 ‘sounds the statement of a political conflict pretending to be a resolution of it.’ Ultimately, the inevitable privileging of either privacy or free expression in MPI must be guided by more abstract-level level principles employed by judges. Deconstructive analysis must therefore be undertaken at this level by investigating the emerging body of principles that determine which of the two
08_FINAL_PI_article_JML.docx