Figure 2. Source: Calculated from Election data from Data; Census 2011. The upward slope and tight bunching of dots around the line indicates that BNP support is strongest in wards that were relatively White British in 2001 but experienced a fast increase in ethnic minority share during the 2000s. For example, a number of wards in Outer London or Essex boroughs such as Redbridge, Barking and Dagenham or Thurrock changed quickly and saw high BNP support. The line is considerably less steep for UKIP: in the local elections of 2010-12, UKIP supporters were much more likely to live in whiter, rural constituencies than BNP voters. This reflects the fact that UKIP is concerned with a broader suite of issues than the BNP, encompassing, in particular, European integration. When one factors in the age and class profile of UKIP voters, their views on immigration are less distinct from the average than those of the BNP, whose voters are younger and more urban. Our data are for local elections of 2010-12, however, and there is some evidence from the 2014 British Election Study (see Matt Goodwin and Rob Ford's contribution) that UKIP's support profile may have moved in a more working-class, northern, immigration-focused direction since. The increase in minority share is associated in a less direct way with UKIP support insofar as increases in minority share at ward level correlate with a higher share of White British people identifying their national identity as English rather than British. Even more so than the BNP, UKIP-supporting wards in the 2010-12 local elections are located in Local Authorities where a disproportionate share of White Britons identify as English rather than British. Moreover, English national
Figure 2. Source: Calculated from Election data from Data; Census 2011. The upward slope and tight bunching of dots around the line indicates that BNP support is strongest in wards that were relatively White British in 2001 but experienced a fast increase in ethnic minority share during the 2000s. For example, a number of wards in Outer London or Essex boroughs such as Redbridge, Barking and Dagenham or Thurrock changed quickly and saw high BNP support. The line is considerably less steep for UKIP: in the local elections of 2010-12, UKIP supporters were much more likely to live in whiter, rural constituencies than BNP voters. This reflects the fact that UKIP is concerned with a broader suite of issues than the BNP, encompassing, in particular, European integration. When one factors in the age and class profile of UKIP voters, their views on immigration are less distinct from the average than those of the BNP, whose voters are younger and more urban. Our data are for local elections of 2010-12, however, and there is some evidence from the 2014 British Election Study (see Matt Goodwin and Rob Ford's contribution) that UKIP's support profile may have moved in a more working-class, northern, immigration-focused direction since. The increase in minority share is associated in a less direct way with UKIP support insofar as increases in minority share at ward level correlate with a higher share of White British people identifying their national identity as English rather than British. Even more so than the BNP, UKIP-supporting wards in the 2010-12 local elections are located in Local Authorities where a disproportionate share of White Britons identify as English rather than British. Moreover, English national
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