be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, has a duty to use reasonable care to give warning of the dangerous condition of the product or of facts which make it likely to be dangerous to those who the supplier would expect to use the product or to be endangered by its probable use, if the supplier has reason to believe that they will not realize its dangerous condition.’” (Valentine, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1481-1482.) Under these instructions (as pertinent here), the appellate court held that the defense verdict in the first on plaintiff’s strict liability failure to warn claim of any liability for failure to warn,” because strict “disposed “the liability definition of defective product, coupled with instructions on the strict liability duty to warn physicians of the potential risks or side effects of silicone breast implants that were or knowable,’ more than subsumed ‘known the elements of duty to warn set forth in the negligence instructions.” (Valentine, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1482.) The trial explained: [trial] court defined a product as defective if “The its use involved a substantial danger that would not be readily recognized by the ordinary user and the manufacturer knows/should have known of the danger but fails to warn. Under the negligence warning instructions, the manufacturer was charged with knowing/having reason to know that the product is dangerous or likely to be dangerous for its intended use.” (Valentine, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1482.) The appellate court found no difference between a warning to ordinary users about a product use that “real involves a substantial danger, and a warning about a product that is dangerous or likely to be dangerous for its intended use. The former warning [applicable for strict liability] centers on the term A product whose use ‘use.’ involves a substantial danger may or may not harm any particular user. The
be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied, has a duty to use reasonable care to give warning of the dangerous condition of the product or of facts which make it likely to be dangerous to those who the supplier would expect to use the product or to be endangered by its probable use, if the supplier has reason to believe that they will not realize its dangerous condition.’” (Valentine, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1481-1482.) Under these instructions (as pertinent here), the appellate court held that the defense verdict in the first on plaintiff’s strict liability failure to warn claim “disposed of any liability for failure to warn,” because “the strict liability definition of defective product, coupled with instructions on the strict liability duty to warn physicians of the potential risks or side effects of silicone breast implants that were ‘known or knowable,’ more than subsumed the elements of duty to warn set forth in the negligence instructions.” (Valentine, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1482.) The explained: “The [trial] court defined a product as defective if its use involved a substantial danger that would not be readily recognized by the ordinary user and the manufacturer knows/should have known of the danger but fails to warn. Under the negligence warning instructions, the manufacturer was charged with knowing/having reason to know that the product is dangerous or likely to be dangerous for its intended use.” (Valentine, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1482.) The appellate court found no “real difference between a warning to ordinary users about a product use that involves a substantial danger, and a warning about a product that is dangerous or likely to be dangerous for its intended use. The former warning [applicable for strict liability] centers on the term ‘use.’ A product whose use involves a substantial danger may or may not harm any particular user. The trial
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