Two questions arise in the context of the mentioned hearsay statements, namely, whether they are admissible as evidence at all, and if so, what are their evidential value. When it comes to their admissibility counsel for Aupindi submitted that they are admissible as they were not tendered as proof of their contents but as proof of a state of mind of the magistrate. In criminal matters an accused is entitled to rely on evidence of statements or conduct of others to establish his state of mind. An example would be where an accused is found in possession of stolen property he can give evidence as to what the commercial traveller from whom he purchased the property informed him at the time he purchased it without calling the traveller as this would be relevant to his state of mind, i.e. whether he knew that the goods were stolen. In civil matters such evidence has been received where it was tendered to corroborate other evidence. Thus, a person claiming ownership of cows was allowed to present evidence of a conversation he had with his brother to borrow money from the latter to purchase cows, so as to establish his intention to become the owner of the cows. Hoffmann refers to this topic in civil law as a one and points out ‘vexed’ that England, at least in civil cases, statements of intention have been received to ‘in corroborate other evidence’ and that in America this is also the position. As pointed out in Halsbury’s hearsay may be hand, second hand or more distant. It is first hand when a witness says what he heard someone else said. It is second hand, when the witness relates what he was told someone else said and so on. From a perusal of the cases referred to by the parties in their respective heads of argument and from my own research, it appears that the hearsay evidence is admissible and relevant where the state of mind of a person has to be proved is only first hand hearsay evidence. As is also evident from what is stated above the evidence must also corroborate other evidence. Other evidence in this context refers
Two questions arise in the context of the mentioned hearsay statements, namely, whether they are admissible as evidence at all, and if so, what are their evidential value. When it comes to their admissibility counsel for Aupindi submitted that they are admissible as they were not tendered as proof of their contents but as proof of a state of mind of the magistrate. In criminal matters an accused is entitled to rely on evidence of statements or conduct of others to establish his state of mind. An example would be where an accused is found in possession of stolen property he can give evidence as to what the commercial traveller from whom he purchased the property informed him at the time he purchased it without calling the traveller as this would be relevant to his state of mind, i.e. whether he knew that the goods were stolen. In civil matters such evidence has been received where it was tendered to corroborate other evidence. Thus, a person claiming ownership of cows was allowed to present evidence of a conversation he had with his brother to borrow money from the latter to purchase cows, so as to establish his intention to become the owner of the cows. Hoffmann refers to this topic in civil law as a ‘vexed’ one and points out that ‘in England, at least in civil cases, statements of intention have been received to corroborate other evidence’ and that in America this is also the position. As pointed out in Halsbury’s hearsay may be hand, second hand or more distant. It is first hand when a witness says what he heard someone else said. It is second hand, when the witness relates what he was told someone else said and so on. From a perusal of the cases referred to by the parties in their respective heads of argument and from my own research, it appears that the hearsay evidence is admissible and relevant where the state of mind of a person has to be proved is only first hand hearsay evidence. As is also evident from what is stated above the evidence must also corroborate other evidence. Other evidence in this context refers
Aupindi%20%20v%20Magistrate%20%20Shilemba%20(SA%207%20-%202016)[2017]%20NASC%20(14%20July%202017).docx