Cal.App.4th 864, 887.) For example, in Faust, the Court of Appeal held that the employer was on notice of the plaintiff’s disability when a chiropractor wrote to the employer and stated that the plaintiff was to perform regular job “ ‘unable duties’ and recommended that the plaintiff remain off ” work. (Ibid.) knowledge of the disability can be inferred from “While the circumstances, knowledge will only be imputed to the employer when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts. or conclusory ‘Vague statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on notice of its obligations under the [FEHA].’ (Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 ” Cal.App.4th 228, 237, italics added.) Moreover, “[e]vidence that a decision maker learned of a plaintiff’s disability after deciding to take adverse employment action is not probative of whether the decision maker was aware of the plaintiff’s disability when he or she made the decision.” (Avila, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251.) In addition, every “ ‘[n]ot illness qualifies as [a] disability.’ (Id. at p. 1249.) Indeed, ” federal courts have repeatedly rejected the contention that under the ADA condition requiring temporary “any hospitalization is disabling.” (Burch v. Coca–Cola Co. (5th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 305, 317 [citing cases].) simply, unless there is some evidence an employer “Put knows an employee is suffering from a disability, it is impossible for an employee to claim he or she was discharged because of it or that an employer refused to accommodate
Cal.App.4th 864, 887.) For example, in Faust, the Court of Appeal held that the employer was on notice of the plaintiff’s disability when a chiropractor wrote to the employer and stated that the plaintiff was “ ‘unable to perform regular job duties’ ” and recommended that the plaintiff remain off work. (Ibid.) “While knowledge of the disability can be inferred from the circumstances, knowledge will only be imputed to the employer when the fact of disability is the only reasonable interpretation of the known facts. ‘Vague or conclusory statements revealing an unspecified incapacity are not sufficient to put an employer on notice of its obligations under the [FEHA].’ ” (Brundage v. Hahn (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 228, 237, italics added.) Moreover, “[e]vidence that a decision maker learned of a plaintiff’s disability after deciding to take adverse employment action is not probative of whether the decision maker was aware of the plaintiff’s disability when he or she made the decision.” (Avila, supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 1251.) In addition, “ ‘[n]ot every illness qualifies as [a] disability.’ ” (Id. at p. 1249.) Indeed, federal courts have repeatedly rejected the contention that under the ADA “any condition requiring temporary hospitalization is disabling.” (Burch v. Coca–Cola Co. (5th Cir. 1997) 119 F.3d 305, 317 [citing cases].) “Put simply, unless there is some evidence an employer knows an employee is suffering from a disability, it is impossible for an employee to claim he or she was discharged because of it or that an employer refused to accommodate
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