enforcing compliance will increase the number of participating countries that comply, but only provided that the IEA also enforces participation. This result is in keeping with the enforcement school because it shows that enforcement can enhance compliance. Third, countries will participate only if the IEA enforces participation, meaning that some enforcing participation will cause the number of participating countries to increase. This is true regardless of whether the IEA enforces compliance, provided that the number of type 2 countries is bigger than zero (N 0). If the IEA does not enforce participation (options 1 – z > and 2), only the type 1 countries participate. In contrast, if the IEA enforce z does participation (options 3 and 4), all countries will participate. This result may be said to be in N keeping with the spirit of the enforcement school, although schools have so far mostly both focused on compliance. Fourth, circumstances exist under which enforcing participation will cause the number of countries to Consider an IEA that does not enforce compliance noncompliant increase. (options 1 and 3). If this IEA also does not enforce participation (option 1), only type 1 countries will participate, and all participating countries will comply. In contrast, if the IEA enforce participation (option 3), all countries will participate, but only type 1 countries does N will comply; type 2 countries will not. This prediction has also been overlooked by both schools. Finally, an IEA that enforces compliance participation (option 4) will achieve higher both and compliance or higher participation, or both, than any of the other three options. In an IEA that does not enforce participation (options 1 and 2) type 2 countries will not participate. In an IEA that enforces participation, but not compliance (option 3) type 2 countries will participate but will not comply. Only in an IEA that enforces compliance participation (option both and 4) will both types of countries participate comply. This is another prediction overlooked and by both schools. Explaining Dictum Henkin’s Both schools acknowledge the validity of dictum. However, they explain differently Henkin’s countries comply. While the managerial school emphasizes factors such as norms and why administrative routines, the enforcement school attributes high compliance rates to the shallowness of many IEAs.
enforcing compliance will increase the number of participating countries that comply, but only provided that the IEA also enforces participation. This result is in keeping with the enforcement school because it shows that enforcement can enhance compliance. Third, some countries will participate only if the IEA enforces participation, meaning that enforcing participation will cause the number of participating countries to increase. This is true regardless of whether the IEA enforces compliance, provided that the number of type 2 countries is bigger than zero (N – z > 0). If the IEA does not enforce participation (options 1 and 2), only the z type 1 countries participate. In contrast, if the IEA does enforce participation (options 3 and 4), all N countries will participate. This result may be said to be in keeping with the spirit of the enforcement school, although both schools have so far mostly focused on compliance. Fourth, circumstances exist under which enforcing participation will cause the number of noncompliant countries to increase. Consider an IEA that does not enforce compliance (options 1 and 3). If this IEA also does not enforce participation (option 1), only type 1 countries will participate, and all participating countries will comply. In contrast, if the IEA does enforce participation (option 3), all N countries will participate, but only type 1 countries will comply; type 2 countries will not. This prediction has also been overlooked by both schools. Finally, an IEA that enforces both compliance and participation (option 4) will achieve higher compliance or higher participation, or both, than any of the other three options. In an IEA that does not enforce participation (options 1 and 2) type 2 countries will not participate. In an IEA that enforces participation, but not compliance (option 3) type 2 countries will participate but will not comply. Only in an IEA that enforces both compliance and participation (option 4) will both types of countries participate and comply. This is another prediction overlooked by both schools. Explaining Henkin’s Dictum Both schools acknowledge the validity of Henkin’s dictum. However, they explain differently why countries comply. While the managerial school emphasizes factors such as norms and administrative routines, the enforcement school attributes high compliance rates to the shallowness of many IEAs.
A%20theory%20of%20EPC.220109.docx