We therefore reaffirm that the definition of "willful" -- that the employer Thurston either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute -- applies to all disparate treatment cases under the ADEA. Once a "willful" violation has been shown, the employee need not additionally demonstrate that the employer's conduct was outrageous, or provide direct evidence of the employer's motivation, or prove that age was the predominant, rather than a determinative, factor in the employment decision. 507 U.S. at 616. Accordingly, the instruction does not include any requirement that the conduct must have been outrageous. 54 See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., defendant’s F.3d 1089, 1099, n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the Third Circuit’s “outrageousness” requirement in had been effectively overruled by Dreyer Hazen). The amount of damages to be doubled under the ADEA liquidated damages provision does not include front pay. 829 F.2d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., that a front pay award the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of and “is reinstatement” therefore is not part of the that are to be doubled under the terms of the statute). “wages” Liquidated damages are of course not available in disparate impact cases, as liquidated damages are premised on a knowing or reckless disregard of the law. In contrast, disparate impact liability is not dependent on a knowing or intentional violation. In 357 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2004), the court held Potence v. Hazleton Area School District, that the ADEA authorizes the imposition of liquidated damages against government employers who engage in willful age discrimination.
We therefore reaffirm that the Thurston definition of "willful" -- that the employer either knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the statute -- applies to all disparate treatment cases under the ADEA. Once a "willful" violation has been shown, the employee need not additionally demonstrate that the employer's conduct was outrageous, or provide direct evidence of the employer's motivation, or prove that age was the predominant, rather than a determinative, factor in the employment decision. 507 U.S. at 616. Accordingly, the instruction does not include any requirement that the defendant’s conduct must have been outrageous. See Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1099, n.2 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the Third Circuit’s “outrageousness” requirement in Dreyer had been effectively overruled by Hazen). The amount of damages to be doubled under the ADEA liquidated damages provision does not include front pay. Blum v. Witco Chem. Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 373 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that a front pay award “is the monetary equivalent of the equitable remedy of reinstatement” and therefore is not part of the “wages” that are to be doubled under the terms of the statute). Liquidated damages are of course not available in disparate impact cases, as liquidated damages are premised on a knowing or reckless disregard of the law. In contrast, disparate impact liability is not dependent on a knowing or intentional violation. In Potence v. Hazleton Area School District, 357 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2004), the court held that the ADEA authorizes the imposition of liquidated damages against government employers who engage in willful age discrimination.
8_Chap_8_2017_March_.docx