treated in the same manner as debit card service. The POD acknowledges that TracFone’s theory is plausible enough to mitigate the need for penalties in this case. However, TracFone’s ability to come up with a creative, self-serving and expansive theory of the debit card exemption does not mean that the law was not already sufficiently clear enough to give TracFone fair notice of its legal obligations. Therefore, as the POD already stated, due process is not implicated by requiring TracFone to pay the PPP surcharges incurred for services before issuance of D.12-02-032. Similarly, TracFone attempts to link the rationale for the AEUS mechanism for collecting PPP surcharges to TracFone’s assumption that their prepaid service should be treated in the same manner as debit card service. The AEUS mechanism and rationale are discussed at 23-24 of the POD. The POD considers the reasonableness of TracFone’s theory that it was exempt from PPP surcharges in Section 8 (Penalties and Interest). 11.2. Past Due PPP Surcharge Amount is Calculated in Accordance with Law TracFone next argues that even if the POD is correct in finding that TracFone must pay PPP surcharges for the period prior to issuance of D.1212032, the POD has “supersized” the past due amount. Each of TracFone’s arguments are summarized below, along with citations to where TracFone’s arguments have already been addressed in the POD: (1) TracFone argues that it should only be required to remit PPP surcharges after May 2009 when it received a direct email from the Commission. As has been repeatedly stated in the POD, TracFone is subject to the law whether or not it received an individualized notice of its legal obligations. (See, e.g., POD at 19-21; 27.) The POD also specifically addresses notice requirements under GO 153 at 2728 of the POD.
treated in the same manner as debit card service. The POD acknowledges that TracFone’s theory is plausible enough to mitigate the need for penalties in this case. However, TracFone’s ability to come up with a creative, self-serving and expansive theory of the debit card exemption does not mean that the law was not already sufficiently clear enough to give TracFone fair notice of its legal obligations. Therefore, as the POD already stated, due process is not implicated by requiring TracFone to pay the PPP surcharges incurred for services before issuance of D.12-02-032. Similarly, TracFone attempts to link the rationale for the AEUS mechanism for collecting PPP surcharges to TracFone’s assumption that their prepaid service should be treated in the same manner as debit card service. The AEUS mechanism and rationale are discussed at 23-24 of the POD. The POD considers the reasonableness of TracFone’s theory that it was exempt from PPP surcharges in Section 8 (Penalties and Interest). 11.2. Past Due PPP Surcharge Amount is Calculated in Accordance with Law TracFone next argues that even if the POD is correct in finding that TracFone must pay PPP surcharges for the period prior to issuance of D.1212032, the POD has “supersized” the past due amount. Each of TracFone’s arguments are summarized below, along with citations to where TracFone’s arguments have already been addressed in the POD: (1) TracFone argues that it should only be required to remit PPP surcharges after May 2009 when it received a direct email from the Commission. As has been repeatedly stated in the POD, TracFone is subject to the law whether or not it received an individualized notice of its legal obligations. (See, e.g., POD at 19-21; 27.) The POD also specifically addresses notice requirements under GO 153 at 2728 of the POD.
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