provisions were important in persuading them to accede to the treaty; a good example is the Republic of Korea, which initially expanded its domestic CFC production, but realizing the disadvantages of being shut out of Western markets, became a party” (Brack 2003: 220). Finally, consider an IEA that enforces compliance and participation. Furthermore, both assume: (1) that the threatened punishment for non-participation is credible and sufficiently severe to outweigh the incentive for nonparticipation, and (2) that the threatened punishment for noncompliance is also credible and sufficiently severe to outweigh the incentive for noncompliance by participating countries. The utility-maximizing course of action will then be to participate and comply. Thus, all countries (both type 1 and type 2 countries) will N participate. Moreover, all countries will also comply. N The current (second) compliance system provides an example of an Montreal Protocol’s attempt to enforce both compliance and participation. Montreal is widely regarded as highly successful. While several reasons exist for this enforcement system might success, Montreal’s partly explain it. While the first compliance system enforced only participation, provisions for enforcing compliance were soon added. Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that Montreal’s compliance enforcement system has induced some members to fulfill their commitments. Several examples exist of cases where the use of measures from the indicative list of consequences has been threatened against noncompliant use has been members: “Their threatened, in a series of MOP decisions, usually in the measures following terms: ‘These may include the possibility of actions available under Article 4, such as ensuring that the supply of is ceased and that exporting parties [parties exporting to the CFCs … party] are not contributing to a continuing situation of non-compliance’. So far, this provision has never had to be used, but, as with the former non-parties that decided to accede, its existence appears to be important in (Brack 2003: 220). encouraging compliance” Table 1 summarizes these point predictions for the number of participating countries and the number of compliant countries for each of the four options. Table 1:Number of participating and compliant countries in a deep IEA, depending on its enforcement system Enforcing Compliance?
provisions were important in persuading them to accede to the treaty; a good example is the Republic of Korea, which initially expanded its domestic CFC production, but realizing the disadvantages of being shut out of Western markets, became a party” (Brack 2003: 220). Finally, consider an IEA that enforces both compliance and participation. Furthermore, assume: (1) that the threatened punishment for non-participation is credible and sufficiently severe to outweigh the incentive for nonparticipation, and (2) that the threatened punishment for noncompliance is also credible and sufficiently severe to outweigh the incentive for noncompliance by participating countries. The utility-maximizing course of action will then be to participate and comply. Thus, all N countries (both type 1 and type 2 countries) will participate. Moreover, all N countries will also comply. The Montreal Protocol’s current (second) compliance system provides an example of an attempt to enforce both compliance and participation. Montreal is widely regarded as highly successful. While several reasons exist for this success, Montreal’s enforcement system might partly explain it. While the first compliance system enforced only participation, provisions for enforcing compliance were soon added. Again, anecdotal evidence suggests that Montreal’s compliance enforcement system has induced some members to fulfill their commitments. Several examples exist of cases where the use of measures from the indicative list of consequences has been threatened against noncompliant members: “Their use has been threatened, in a series of MOP decisions, usually in the following terms: ‘These measures may include the possibility of actions available under Article 4, such as ensuring that the supply of CFCs … is ceased and that exporting parties [parties exporting to the party] are not contributing to a continuing situation of non-compliance’. So far, this provision has never had to be used, but, as with the former non-parties that decided to accede, its existence appears to be important in encouraging compliance” (Brack 2003: 220). Table 1 summarizes these point predictions for the number of participating countries and the number of compliant countries for each of the four options. Table 1:Number of participating and compliant countries in a deep IEA, depending on its enforcement system Enforcing Compliance?
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