on Globalization and Security argued, time, all states—not just the United States and its allies—will “Over share access to much of the technology underpinning the modern military” (Hicks, 1999). They are trying to replicate the U.S. India and China are building new, technologically advanced militaries. model of close relations between the defense sector and private high-technology companies, and they are busy buying and using software, computers, and telecommunication equipment in order to modernize their armies. Second, the United access to the most advanced technologies is no longer guaranteed. The States’ leading edge of innovation in individual technological sectors may be located outside of the United States. Moreover, the leading edge may be to situate as it jumps around from country to country. In addition, the dispersal of the components of the American innovation system to other countries—manufacturing to China or R&D to India—may disrupt the ecosystem of innovation at home. Third, even as the United States remains the predominant science and technology power, the long lead times it historically has had over potential competitors are likely to disappear. The United States will have to begin to think about how to respond when its technological lead is measured in months or years, not decades. During the Cold War, the American and Soviet economies were essentially two separate entities with little or no contact between them. For security (and analytical) purposes, the ownership, operation, and control of technology were all fairly limited and Those neat distinctions no longer exist; the Chinese and American economies, for example, are highly interdependent, and production chains stretch across the involving Chinese, American, and Taiwanese enterprises, managers, and technicians. In the section, I raise some of the analytical questions brought about by the globalization of science and technology. This report analyzes the importance of science and technology power and the negative consequences of the United recent decline. The most important use for this card is to provide the link between the States’ declining S&E education in the US and rise. China’s
on Globalization and Security argued, “Over time, all states—not just the United States and its allies—will share access to much of the technology underpinning the modern military” (Hicks, 1999). India and China are building new, technologically advanced militaries. They are trying to replicate the U.S. model of close relations between the defense sector and private high-technology companies, and they are busy buying and using software, computers, and telecommunication equipment in order to modernize their armies. Second, the United States’ access to the most advanced technologies is no longer guaranteed. The leading edge of innovation in individual technological sectors may be located outside of the United States. Moreover, the leading edge may be to situate as it jumps around from country to country. In addition, the dispersal of the components of the American innovation system to other countries—manufacturing to China or R&D to India—may disrupt the ecosystem of innovation at home. Third, even as the United States remains the predominant science and technology power, the long lead times it historically has had over potential competitors are likely to disappear. The United States will have to begin to think about how to respond when its technological lead is measured in months or years, not decades. During the Cold War, the American and Soviet economies were essentially two separate entities with little or no contact between them. For security (and analytical) purposes, the ownership, operation, and control of technology were all fairly limited and Those neat distinctions no longer exist; the Chinese and American economies, for example, are highly interdependent, and production chains stretch across the involving Chinese, American, and Taiwanese enterprises, managers, and technicians. In the section, I raise some of the analytical questions brought about by the globalization of science and technology. This report analyzes the importance of science and technology power and the negative consequences of the United States’ recent decline. The most important use for this card is to provide the link between the declining S&E education in the US and China’s rise.
AdvancedLevelFebruary2013PFBrief.docx