probation backslide by perhaps failing a drug test or skipping an appointment—but this does not mean that they cannot or do not rebound to a level of satisfactory overall performance. . . . [¶] Our goal, after all, is to support the re-entry, rehabilitation and employability of juveniles having justice system histories, and not to impose lifetime barriers to success based on probation performance criteria that are too rigid or unrealistic from an adolescent (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, development perspective.’ ” Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 666, at p. 10.) The Language of Section 786 Does Not Permit the Juvenile Court to Use Two Different Standards to Dismiss and Seal. to the completion of probation, judges and litigants often use the “When referring terms and But the terms are not always ‘successful’ ‘satisfactory’ interchangeably. interchangeable and even the same term can have different statutory definitions. Differing statutes require that care be taken to identify the statute at issue, use the correct statutory term, and apply the definition specific to that statute to avoid confusion as to the nature of the finding and its (In (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 521, 525.) re J.G. court’s effect.” For example, successful completion of probation, for purposes of dismissal under Penal Code section that a defendant successfully complete every condition of 1203.4, “requires for of (In (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th probation re Timothy N. ‘the entire period’ probation.” 725, 738.) By contrast, section 786 requires only with “satisfactory completion” probation and, to underscore the point, specifically defines as “satisfactory completion” (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).) Substantial compliance is not perfect “substantial compliance.” compliance. Substantial compliance is commonly understood to mean with “compliance the substantial or essential requirements of something (as a statute or contract) that satisfies its purpose or objective even though its formal requirements are not complied of Law with.” (Merriam-Webster’s Dict. (as of May 12, 2017).)
probation backslide by perhaps failing a drug test or skipping an appointment—but this does not mean that they cannot or do not rebound to a level of satisfactory overall performance. . . . [¶] Our goal, after all, is to support the re-entry, rehabilitation and employability of juveniles having justice system histories, and not to impose lifetime barriers to success based on probation performance criteria that are too rigid or unrealistic from an adolescent development perspective.’ ” (Assem. Com. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 666, at p. 10.) The Language of Section 786 Does Not Permit the Juvenile Court to Use Two Different Standards to Dismiss and Seal. “When referring to the completion of probation, judges and litigants often use the terms ‘successful’ and ‘satisfactory’ interchangeably. But the terms are not always interchangeable and even the same term can have different statutory definitions. Differing statutes require that care be taken to identify the statute at issue, use the correct statutory term, and apply the definition specific to that statute to avoid confusion as to the nature of the court’s finding and its effect.” (In re J.G. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 521, 525.) For example, successful completion of probation, for purposes of dismissal under Penal Code section 1203.4, “requires that a defendant successfully complete every condition of probation for ‘the entire period’ of probation.” (In re Timothy N. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 725, 738.) By contrast, section 786 requires only “satisfactory completion” with probation and, to underscore the point, specifically defines “satisfactory completion” as “substantial compliance.” (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).) Substantial compliance is not perfect compliance. Substantial compliance is commonly understood to mean “compliance with the substantial or essential requirements of something (as a statute or contract) that satisfies its purpose or objective even though its formal requirements are not complied with.” (Merriam-Webster’s Dict. of Law (as of May 12, 2017).)
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