318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted). Bancorp, Inc., In 2013, the Supreme Court held that the mixed-motive proof framework is unavailable for Title VII retaliation claims. 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for (2013) (“Title causation, not the lessened causation test stated in [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e–2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the The Court reasoned that Congress legislated against Nassar employer.”). a background tort principle of causation, 133 S. Ct. at 2523; that Title see Nassar, “but for” VII’s retaliation provision uses the which is incompatible with a mixed-motive test, word “because,” at 2528; that Congress would have structured the statutory framework differently had it see id. wished to encompass Title VII retaliation claims among those eligible for the statutory test set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and 2000e5(g)(2)(B), at 2529; that policy see id. considerations support a restrictive approach to the standards of proof for retaliation claims, see at 2531-32; and that the that Congress set in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 id. “careful balance” forecloses the use of the mixed-motive test for Title VII retaliation claims, Price Waterhouse id. at 2534. The Committee has not attempted to determine what, if any, implications and Nassar 557 U.S. 167 (2009), have for ADA retaliation claims, but Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., users of these instructions may wish to consider that question.
Bancorp, Inc., 318 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2003) (footnote omitted). In 2013, the Supreme Court held that the mixed-motive proof framework is unavailable for Title VII retaliation claims. See Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S.Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013) (“Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of but-for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in [42 U.S.C.] § 2000e–2(m). This requires proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.”). The Nassar Court reasoned that Congress legislated against a background tort principle of “but for” causation, see Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2523; that Title VII’s retaliation provision uses the word “because,” which is incompatible with a mixed-motive test, see id. at 2528; that Congress would have structured the statutory framework differently had it wished to encompass Title VII retaliation claims among those eligible for the statutory test set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) and 2000e5(g)(2)(B), see id. at 2529; that policy considerations support a restrictive approach to the standards of proof for retaliation claims, see id. at 2531-32; and that the “careful balance” that Congress set in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 forecloses the use of the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive test for Title VII retaliation claims, id. at 2534. The Committee has not attempted to determine what, if any, implications Nassar and Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009), have for ADA retaliation claims, but users of these instructions may wish to consider that question.
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