more likely to use protests and boycotts relative to civil suits and proxy votes. Model 5 adds that extra-institutional actions are significantly more likely for activist SMOs and institutional actions (the inverse of extra-institutional) are significantly more likely for religious groups and activist investors. This is similar to how Models 6 and 7 showed that the effects of religious groups and activist investors on environmental risk perceptions were due to their particularly effective use of institutional tactics, rather than the use of institutional tactics in general by any type of activist. In contrast, in Model 8 when we interact SMOs and extra-institutional tactics we find that the media attention effects primarily result from the use of extra-institutional tactics. The effect is driven more by the tactic than by SMOs being particularly effective with this tactic relative to other groups. Finally, in examination of the first four control variables listed in Table 3, we find several interesting firm targeting patterns not anticipated in light of the extant literature. First, while high R&D is thought to protect firms from activism (Vasi and King, 2012), we find that R&D relates to fewer protests but to greater civil suits. Perhaps this is because the general public and the media may look more favorably upon more R&D intensive firms, yet investors and others who are the relevant audience to influence via civil suits may be less inclined to look past risks, especially when firms are making costly R&D investments. We also find that while slack resources are believed to relate to greater activism (Lenox and Eesley, 2009), cash flow is associated with greater protests but fewer civil suits, perhaps because it signals resources available for legal defense. While past research finds previous media attention can protect firms from protests (King and Soule, 2007), we find that it is associated with greater boycotts and proxy votes, maybe because media attention makes more types of stakeholder groups aware of the firm, placing it on their radar. Finally, while extant research suggests that firms who
more likely to use protests and boycotts relative to civil suits and proxy votes. Model 5 adds that extra-institutional actions are significantly more likely for activist SMOs and institutional actions (the inverse of extra-institutional) are significantly more likely for religious groups and activist investors. This is similar to how Models 6 and 7 showed that the effects of religious groups and activist investors on environmental risk perceptions were due to their particularly effective use of institutional tactics, rather than the use of institutional tactics in general by any type of activist. In contrast, in Model 8 when we interact SMOs and extra-institutional tactics we find that the media attention effects primarily result from the use of extra-institutional tactics. The effect is driven more by the tactic than by SMOs being particularly effective with this tactic relative to other groups. Finally, in examination of the first four control variables listed in Table 3, we find several interesting firm targeting patterns not anticipated in light of the extant literature. First, while high R&D is thought to protect firms from activism (Vasi and King, 2012), we find that R&D relates to fewer protests but to greater civil suits. Perhaps this is because the general public and the media may look more favorably upon more R&D intensive firms, yet investors and others who are the relevant audience to influence via civil suits may be less inclined to look past risks, especially when firms are making costly R&D investments. We also find that while slack resources are believed to relate to greater activism (Lenox and Eesley, 2009), cash flow is associated with greater protests but fewer civil suits, perhaps because it signals resources available for legal defense. While past research finds previous media attention can protect firms from protests (King and Soule, 2007), we find that it is associated with greater boycotts and proxy votes, maybe because media attention makes more types of stakeholder groups aware of the firm, placing it on their radar. Finally, while extant research suggests that firms who
act_tactics_forthcoming_7_9_15.docx