found and she disputed that she had assumed more responsibility than DS Webber had delegated to her. She said that she was surprised that SC Flitton had said that he placed the Abrahimzadeh reports in DS basket for vetting rather than hers. Webber’s SC Coleman acknowledged that her decision to forward the Abrahimzadeh PIRs to the Crime Management Unit for filing were wrong. She accepted that her vetting process was insufficient and did not in fact constitute vetting. She accepted that she was not qualified for the role of vetting the PIRs and that she had not understood at the time she was doing the work that she was not qualified for it. She had only come to that appreciation as a result of being questioned about the matter later. Conclusion as to allocation system in Elizabeth Family Violence Investigation Section It is apparent from the evidence of DS Webber and SC Coleman that there is a dispute about this matter. DS position was that SC Coleman was only to allocate Webber’s PIRs requiring simple victim contact. His position was that he would allocate all PIRs disclosing an offence where an offender or suspect were still outstanding in that the patrols had not reported or arrested the suspect. By contrast, it was SC Coleman’s evidence that she had the responsibility to deal with all offence PIRs up to and including those disclosing minor indictable offences. DS directions to SC Coleman were not written down. It is therefore Webber’s impossible to resolve the dispute between them authoritatively. Perhaps the fact that the Crime Management Unit was regularly sending PIRs to SC Coleman that were outside the limitations claimed by DS Webber to have been imposed suggests that she is more likely to be correct in this than he. In the result it is not necessary for me to resolve the dispute. I comment only that the existence of the dispute was in itself a systems failure and that, in all probability, had the system worked properly with the PIRs going to DS Webber, they would have been returned for further investigation. That may have prevented tragic death and is therefore a matter of great Zahra’s concern. On any view, DS Webber was responsible for ensuring that his directions to SC Coleman were written and clear. Furthermore, he was responsible for ensuring that they were duly complied with. It is more than regrettable that he did not do any of those things.
found and she disputed that she had assumed more responsibility than DS Webber had delegated to her. She said that she was surprised that SC Flitton had said that he placed the Abrahimzadeh reports in DS Webber’s basket for vetting rather than hers. SC Coleman acknowledged that her decision to forward the Abrahimzadeh PIRs to the Crime Management Unit for filing were wrong. She accepted that her vetting process was insufficient and did not in fact constitute vetting. She accepted that she was not qualified for the role of vetting the PIRs and that she had not understood at the time she was doing the work that she was not qualified for it. She had only come to that appreciation as a result of being questioned about the matter later. Conclusion as to allocation system in Elizabeth Family Violence Investigation Section It is apparent from the evidence of DS Webber and SC Coleman that there is a dispute about this matter. DS Webber’s position was that SC Coleman was only to allocate PIRs requiring simple victim contact. His position was that he would allocate all PIRs disclosing an offence where an offender or suspect were still outstanding in that the patrols had not reported or arrested the suspect. By contrast, it was SC Coleman’s evidence that she had the responsibility to deal with all offence PIRs up to and including those disclosing minor indictable offences. DS Webber’s directions to SC Coleman were not written down. It is therefore impossible to resolve the dispute between them authoritatively. Perhaps the fact that the Crime Management Unit was regularly sending PIRs to SC Coleman that were outside the limitations claimed by DS Webber to have been imposed suggests that she is more likely to be correct in this than he. In the result it is not necessary for me to resolve the dispute. I comment only that the existence of the dispute was in itself a systems failure and that, in all probability, had the system worked properly with the PIRs going to DS Webber, they would have been returned for further investigation. That may have prevented Zahra’s tragic death and is therefore a matter of great concern. On any view, DS Webber was responsible for ensuring that his directions to SC Coleman were written and clear. Furthermore, he was responsible for ensuring that they were duly complied with. It is more than regrettable that he did not do any of those things.
ABRAHIMZADEH%20Zahra.docx