addition, the interrelationships among the available policy instruments make calibrating them simultaneously an extremely difficult empirical exercise. The fact that the differentiated products approach is contextual and nuanced should not obscure its basic analytical power. Indeed, the intuitions that the theory reveals about the relationship between access and efficiency, the manner in which the various aspects of IP protection interrelate, and the true relationship between IP and public goods theory are sufficient to justify further inquiry. References to Abramowicz, Michael. 2004. “An Industrial Organization Approach Copyright,” 46 William 33–125. and Mary Law Review Archibald, 2–28. Review of Economic Studies G.C. 1961. “Chamberlin Versus Chicago,” 29 and of Consumer Demand and Monopolistic ——— G. Rosenbluth. 1975. “The ‘New’ Theory 569–90. Quarterly Journal of Economics Competition,” 89 Trademark Texas Intellectual Property Law Barnes, David W. 2009. “One Per Source,” 18 1–54. Journal Intellectual Property and Impure Public Northwestern ———. 2011. “Congestible Goods,” 9 533–63. Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property Baumol, William of Optimal Product and Retailer Characteristics: The J. 1967. “Calculation Abstract Product 674–85. Journal of Political Economy Approach,” 75 Beath, John, and Yannis Katsoulacos. 1991. The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berry, Steven T., and Joel Waldfogel. Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio 1999. “Free 397–420. RAND Journal of Economics Broadcasting,” 30 Patent Length and 233–40. Empirica Beschorner, Patrick F. E. 2008. “Optimal Height,” 35
addition, the interrelationships among the available policy instruments make calibrating them simultaneously an extremely difficult empirical exercise. The fact that the differentiated products approach is contextual and nuanced should not obscure its basic analytical power. Indeed, the intuitions that the theory reveals about the relationship between access and efficiency, the manner in which the various aspects of IP protection interrelate, and the true relationship between IP and public goods theory are sufficient to justify further inquiry. References Abramowicz, Michael. 2004. “An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright,” 46 William and Mary Law Review 33–125. Archibald, G.C. 1961. “Chamberlin Versus Chicago,” 29 Review of Economic Studies 2–28. ——— and G. Rosenbluth. 1975. “The ‘New’ Theory of Consumer Demand and Monopolistic Competition,” 89 Quarterly Journal of Economics 569–90. Barnes, David W. 2009. “One Trademark Per Source,” 18 Texas Intellectual Property Law Journal 1–54. ———. 2011. “Congestible Intellectual Property and Impure Public Goods,” 9 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 533–63. Baumol, William J. 1967. “Calculation of Optimal Product and Retailer Characteristics: The Abstract Product Approach,” 75 Journal of Political Economy 674–85. Beath, John, and Yannis Katsoulacos. 1991. The Economic Theory of Product Differentiation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berry, Steven T., and Joel Waldfogel. 1999. “Free Entry and Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting,” 30 RAND Journal of Economics 397–420. Beschorner, Patrick F. E. 2008. “Optimal Patent Length and Height,” 35 Empirica 233–40.
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