Supported a symmetric scheme. Did not consider it appropriate for all NSPs (especially those that had responded to incentives). SP AusNet Stated that the changes to the NER should result in more balanced forecasts and that the ex post review for capex strengthened the incentives to remain within the forecast already. Respondent Comments Issue Supported a symmetric scheme similar to that previously applied in Symmetry of a CESS Jemena Victoria. Supported an asymmetric CESS with greater penalties than COSBOA rewards. Supported the reasons for this in the issues paper. Strength of the CESS Supported a moderate reward, recognising that a high reward NSW DNSPs reward could result in inefficient underspending. Supported a reward of around 35 per cent for all NSPs (that is, EUAA/ CEM government-owned and private NSPs). Supported rewards being equal across opex and capex. Failing EnerNOC that, supported rewards being at least as high as for opex. Supported a reward at the lower end of the 20 to 30 per cent range due to concerns about capex deferral and over-forecasting PIAC by NSPs. Suggested that the power could be increased if the AER's information improved allowing it to determine whether a NSP had deferred inefficiently. Stated that perhaps the current incentives are not strong enough SP AusNet but perhaps 20 to 30 per cent would be a good starting point. CitiPower, Powercor and Stated that the reward should be the same as for opex so as to SA Power Networks limit substitution between the two categories of expenditure. If a CESS is introduced, supported it being low powered. Energex Energex also supported the strength being balanced with incentives for opex and service. Strength of the CESS TEC Supported a penalty that is greater than 30 per cent. penalty
SP AusNet Supported a symmetric scheme. Did not consider it appropriate for all NSPs (especially those that had responded to incentives). Stated that the changes to the NER should result in more balanced forecasts and that the ex post review for capex strengthened the incentives to remain within the forecast already. Issue Respondent Comments Symmetry of a CESS Jemena Supported a symmetric scheme similar to that previously applied in Victoria. COSBOA Supported an asymmetric CESS with greater penalties than rewards. Supported the reasons for this in the issues paper. Strength of the CESS reward NSW DNSPs Supported a moderate reward, recognising that a high reward could result in inefficient underspending. EUAA/ CEM Supported a reward of around 35 per cent for all NSPs (that is, government-owned and private NSPs). EnerNOC Supported rewards being equal across opex and capex. Failing that, supported rewards being at least as high as for opex. PIAC Supported a reward at the lower end of the 20 to 30 per cent range due to concerns about capex deferral and over-forecasting by NSPs. Suggested that the power could be increased if the AER's information improved allowing it to determine whether a NSP had deferred inefficiently. SP AusNet Stated that perhaps the current incentives are not strong enough but perhaps 20 to 30 per cent would be a good starting point. CitiPower, Powercor and SA Power Networks Stated that the reward should be the same as for opex so as to limit substitution between the two categories of expenditure. Energex If a CESS is introduced, supported it being low powered. Energex also supported the strength being balanced with incentives for opex and service. Strength of the CESS penalty TEC Supported a penalty that is greater than 30 per cent.
AER%20Explanatory%20statement%20-%20draft%20capital%20expenditure%20incentive%20guideline%20-%20August%202013.DOCX