discussion in 489 U.S. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, Court’s 189 (1989), relied on language in stating that the substantive due process DeShaney “[i]n analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty – – which is the of the protections of the Due Process Ye, ‘deprivation liberty’ triggering Clause.” 484 F.3d at 640-41 (quoting 489 U.S. at 200). The Court of Appeals reasoned that DeShaney, just as an assurance that someone will be arrested does not meet the affirmative-act requirement, see 443 F.3d at 284, neither does a assurance that the patient is fine, 484 Bright, see Ye, doctor’s F.3d at 641-42. The court recognized that the opinion focused much of its attention on the Ye DeShaney theory of liability (as distinct from a state-created danger theory), see Ye, “special relationship” 484 F.3d at 641, which raises some question as to whether the of concept “deprivation liberty” should provide the template for judging all state-created danger claims. Perhaps for this reason, the Court noted that act that invades a plaintiff's personal liberty may not always be a Ye “[t]he restraint, as in the 484 F.3d at 641 n.4. 515 Ye, See, e.g., Phillips, specialrelationship context.” F.3d at 229, 243 (holding that complaint properly alleged statecreated danger claim where it alleged that 911 dispatchers gave their coworker confidential information that enabled him to locate and kill his exgirlfriend's current boyfriend). See the discussion of the second element, above, for a summary of Walter v. Pike County, 544 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2008), in which the claims failed because the plaintiffs’ defendants’ affirmative acts occurred at a time when the defendants did not (yet) have the requisite culpable state of mind.
Court’s discussion in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), relied on language in DeShaney stating that “[i]n the substantive due process analysis, it is the State's affirmative act of restraining the individual's freedom to act on his own behalf – through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty – which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Ye, 484 F.3d at 640-41 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200). The Court of Appeals reasoned that just as an assurance that someone will be arrested does not meet the affirmative-act requirement, see Bright, 443 F.3d at 284, neither does a doctor’s assurance that the patient is fine, see Ye, 484 F.3d at 641-42. The Ye court recognized that the DeShaney opinion focused much of its attention on the “special relationship” theory of liability (as distinct from a state-created danger theory), see Ye, 484 F.3d at 641, which raises some question as to whether the “deprivation of liberty” concept should provide the template for judging all state-created danger claims. Perhaps for this reason, the Ye Court noted that “[t]he act that invades a plaintiff's personal liberty may not always be a restraint, as in the specialrelationship context.” Ye, 484 F.3d at 641 n.4. See, e.g., Phillips, 515 F.3d at 229, 243 (holding that complaint properly alleged statecreated danger claim where it alleged that 911 dispatchers gave their coworker confidential information that enabled him to locate and kill his exgirlfriend's current boyfriend). See the discussion of the second element, above, for a summary of Walter v. Pike County, 544 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2008), in which the plaintiffs’ claims failed because the defendants’ affirmative acts occurred at a time when the defendants did not (yet) have the requisite culpable state of mind.
4_Chap_4_2014_spring.docx