is 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion); City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, see final.” 350 F.3d 399, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing also Brennan v. Norton, Praprotnik); LaVerdure v. 324 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2003) though Marino himself lacked County of Montgomery, (“Even final policymaking authority that could bind the County, LaVerdure could have demonstrated that the Board delegated him the authority to speak for the Board or acquiesced in his statements.”); 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. second means of Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 1990) (“The holding the municipality liable is if Tucker knowingly acquiesced to the decisions made at AID.”). In an appropriate case, Instruction 4.6.5 may be modified to refer to a policymaker’s “agreeing after the fact to a decision to engage in the subordinate’s violation.”
is final.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988) (plurality opinion); see also Brennan v. Norton, 350 F.3d 399, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Praprotnik); LaVerdure v. County of Montgomery, 324 F.3d 123, 125 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Even though Marino himself lacked final policymaking authority that could bind the County, LaVerdure could have demonstrated that the Board delegated him the authority to speak for the Board or acquiesced in his statements.”); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1481 (3d Cir. 1990) (“The second means of holding the municipality liable is if Tucker knowingly acquiesced to the decisions made at AID.”). In an appropriate case, Instruction 4.6.5 may be modified to refer to a policymaker’s “agreeing after the fact to a subordinate’s decision to engage in the violation.”
4_Chap_4_2014_fall.docx