demand for sex, she told her supervisor it would never happen again. at 211.) Id. If the court concludes that it is appropriate to follow the approach taken in and Jin Holly a question that, as noted above, appears to be unsettled then the court should consider D. – – whether to refer only to a employment rather than an tangible ‘tangible action’ ‘adverse employment 310 F.3d at 101 (holding that it was error to the phrase action.’ See Jin, “use[] adverse instead of employment and that such error was ‘tangible action’ ‘tangible action’” significant in the context of this case, where we hold that an employer is liable when a “especially supervisor grants a tangible job benefit to an employee based on the to employee’s submission sexual demands”). Definition of “supervisor” employee is a for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or “[A]n ‘supervisor’ she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim....” 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 870 F.3d at 217 Vance v. Ball State Univ., See also Moody, (“[T]he record here supports the conclusion that Marshall was supervisor because (a) the Board Moody’s empowered him as the custodial foreman to select from the list of substitute custodians who could actually work at New York Avenue School; (b) the Board conceded that while Moody was on … school premises, Marshall served in a supervisory role; (c) the record identifies no other person who was present full time or even sporadically on the premises, or anywhere for that school’s matter, who served as supervisor; and (d) primary benefit from her Moody’s since Moody’s employment was hourly compensation, and since Marshall controlled 70% of her hours, his decision to assign or withhold hours significantly affected her pay.”).
demand for sex, she told her supervisor it would never happen again. Id. at 211.) If the court concludes that it is appropriate to follow the approach taken in Jin and Holly D. – a question that, as noted above, appears to be unsettled – then the court should consider whether to refer only to a ‘tangible employment action’ rather than an ‘adverse tangible employment action.’ See Jin, 310 F.3d at 101 (holding that it was error to “use[] the phrase ‘tangible adverse action’ instead of ‘tangible employment action’” and that such error was “especially significant in the context of this case, where we hold that an employer is liable when a supervisor grants a tangible job benefit to an employee based on the employee’s submission to sexual demands”). Definition of “supervisor” “[A]n employee is a ‘supervisor’ for purposes of vicarious liability under Title VII if he or she is empowered by the employer to take tangible employment actions against the victim....” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). See also Moody, 870 F.3d at 217 (“[T]he record here supports the conclusion that Marshall was Moody’s supervisor because (a) the Board empowered him as the custodial foreman to select from the list of substitute custodians who could actually work at New York Avenue School; … (b) the Board conceded that while Moody was on school premises, Marshall served in a supervisory role; (c) the record identifies no other person who was present full time or even sporadically on the school’s premises, or anywhere for that matter, who served as Moody’s supervisor; and (d) since Moody’s primary benefit from her employment was hourly compensation, and since Marshall controlled 70% of her hours, his decision to assign or withhold hours significantly affected her pay.”).
5_Chap_5_2018_March.docx