vs. contributions, including after labour market via contributions, safety nets. Some improvement of taxes or lower wages transitions depending on playing field between in the case of NSE if financing choices) employment and employers pass on the and some cost for contract forms with cost of their improving corresponding effects Partial de-segmentation of contributions transparency on competition and labour market, reducing factor allocation somewhat inequality, by incentivising the wider use of standard employment. Possible trade-off Limited increase between NSE and SE in social security Some improvement of Improved transferability and labour demand if the contributions. stabilisation function of transparency as well as rate of self-employed social protection reduction in coverage enrolling is low upholding aggregate differences strongly facilitate Possible financial demand by providing labour market transitions and burden to introduce counter-cyclical thereby, improve matching of administrative spending during Slightly higher risk people with jobs. reforms. economic downturns of some reduction in employment through possible adverse Partial removal of obstacles effects on labour that may discourage employees demand and supply from taking on the risks associated with improving factor allocation PACKAGE C More pronounced Marked improvement Limits to the freedom Marked reduction of High cost of Increase in increase in the cost of of labour market of choice and possibly number of self-employment extending coverage social security managing fluctuations in dynamism (depending inefficient and non-standard workers at (to be borne by contributions. production in line with on the rate of opting-in) overinsurance of the risk of poverty, when the public authorities, more pronounced cost self-employed through social risk materialises, i.e. taxpayers, or the Marked improvement increase of NSE. mandatory social including after labour market concerned groups of playing field between Possibly security schemes. transitions via contributions, employment and more depending on contract forms with pronounced financing choices), corresponding strong De-segmentation of labour reduction of and high cost of Depending on effects on competition market, reducing inequality, the expenditure changes in existing financing choices, more and factor allocation by incentivising the wider use on last resort system to move to pronounced of standard employment. safety nets. personal accounts redistribution within the newly covered, as Marked improvement Possible financial affected unequally by
Some improvement of playing field between employment and contract forms with corresponding effects on competition and factor allocation Some improvement of stabilisation function of social protection upholding aggregate demand by providing counter-cyclical spending during economic downturns vs. contributions, taxes or lower wages in the case of NSE if employers pass on the cost of their contributions Possible trade-off between NSE and SE labour demand if the rate of self-employed enrolling is low Slightly higher risk of some reduction in employment through possible adverse effects on labour demand and supply including after labour market transitions Partial de-segmentation of labour market, reducing somewhat inequality, by incentivising the wider use of standard employment. Improved transferability and transparency as well as reduction in coverage differences strongly facilitate labour market transitions and thereby, improve matching of people with jobs. Partial removal of obstacles that may discourage employees from taking on the risks associated with improving factor allocation via contributions, depending on financing choices) and some cost for improving transparency Limited increase in social security contributions. Possible financial burden to introduce administrative reforms. safety nets. PACKAGE C More pronounced increase in the cost of managing fluctuations in production in line with more pronounced cost increase of NSE. Marked improvement of labour market dynamism (depending on the rate of opting-in) Marked improvement of playing field between employment and contract forms with corresponding strong effects on competition and factor allocation Marked improvement Limits to the freedom of choice and possibly inefficient overinsurance of the self-employed through mandatory social security schemes. Depending on financing choices, more pronounced redistribution within the newly covered, as affected unequally by Marked reduction of number of self-employment and non-standard workers at risk of poverty, when the social risk materialises, including after labour market transitions De-segmentation of labour market, reducing inequality, by incentivising the wider use of standard employment. High cost of extending coverage (to be borne by public authorities, i.e. taxpayers, or the concerned groups via contributions, depending on financing choices), and high cost of changes in existing system to move to personal accounts Possible financial Increase in social security contributions. Possibly more pronounced reduction of the expenditure on last resort safety nets.
2954331_EN_impact_assessment_part1_v7.docx