conspiracy in order to use the existence of the conspiracy to demonstrate state action. See Melo v. 912 F.2d 628, 638 n.11 (3d Cir. 1990) (addressing Hafer, plaintiff’s argument and without deciding, that the complaint alleges the prerequisites of a “assum[ing], civil 502 U.S. 21 (1991). The court cited a Seventh aff'd on other grounds, Melo conspiracy”), Circuit opinion that provides additional detail on those elements. 912 F.2d at 638 & See Melo, n.11 (citing 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979), Hampton v. Hanrahan, in part on other rev’d 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). to suggests that the plaintiff must show grounds, Melo’s Hampton citation both a conspiracy to violate the federal rights and an overt act in furtherance of the plaintiff’s conspiracy that results in such a violation. 600 F.2d at 620-21 (discussing agreement See Hampton, and overt act requirements). Of course, in order to find liability under Section 1983, the jury must in any event find a violation of the federal rights; and it will often be the case that the plaintiff’s relevant act in violation of the federal rights would necessarily have constituted an plaintiff’s action by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. This may explain why the Supreme to the do not emphasize the overt-act-resulting-in-violation Court’s references “conspiracy” test requirement. 398 U.S. at 152. See, e.g., Adickes, In appropriate cases, the existence of a conspiracy may also establish that a federal official was acting under color of state law. 137 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1998) See Hindes v. F.D.I.C., officials are subject to section 1983 liability when sued in their official capacity where (“[F]ederal they have acted under color of state law, for example in conspiracy with state officials.”).
conspiracy in order to use the existence of the conspiracy to demonstrate state action. See Melo v. Hafer, 912 F.2d 628, 638 n.11 (3d Cir. 1990) (addressing plaintiff’s argument and “assum[ing], without deciding, that the complaint alleges the prerequisites of a civil conspiracy”), aff'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 21 (1991). The Melo court cited a Seventh Circuit opinion that provides additional detail on those elements. See Melo, 912 F.2d at 638 & n.11 (citing Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1979), rev’d in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980)). Melo’s citation to Hampton suggests that the plaintiff must show both a conspiracy to violate the plaintiff’s federal rights and an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy that results in such a violation. See Hampton, 600 F.2d at 620-21 (discussing agreement and overt act requirements). Of course, in order to find liability under Section 1983, the jury must in any event find a violation of the plaintiff’s federal rights; and it will often be the case that the relevant act in violation of the plaintiff’s federal rights would necessarily have constituted an action by a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy. This may explain why the Supreme Court’s references to the “conspiracy” test do not emphasize the overt-act-resulting-in-violation requirement. See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 152. In appropriate cases, the existence of a conspiracy may also establish that a federal official was acting under color of state law. See Hindes v. F.D.I.C., 137 F.3d 148, 158 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[F]ederal officials are subject to section 1983 liability when sued in their official capacity where they have acted under color of state law, for example in conspiracy with state officials.”).
4_Chap_4_2016_May%20meeting%20to%20be%20posted.docx