(1983). Although a police officer has reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation to justify a stop to investigate that violation, he may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion of a drug offense, in order to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). 772 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2014) See also United States v. Thompson, (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion for a drug sniff after a traffic stop because the defendant was with a shaky voice and a vein on his his “visibly nervous, neck pulsating rapidly,” to questions came out and the amount of his to be “answers hesitatingly,” luggage “appeared inconsistent with the stated length of the trip”). A stop carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion. In Terry Carman 749 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014), 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014), an officer v. Carroll, on other grounds, rev’d was searching for an armed man and encountered an unidentified man who turned away and appeared to reach for his waist. The officer grabbed the until he saw that the man was man’s arm unarmed. The court upheld a jury verdict that the officer acted reasonably in grabbing the man’s arm. As noted in the Comment to Instruction 4.12.2, in the case of a warrantless arrest, Third Circuit caselaw divides as to the burden of proof regarding probable cause. By contrast, the caselaw does not appear to have addressed the burden of proof regarding reasonable suspicion in the case of a stop; but one district court decision concerning an analogous issue suggests that Terry the burden would be on the plaintiff. 767 F. Supp. See Armington v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 661, 667 (E.D.Pa.) (in Section 1983 case involving order that bus driver undergo school district’s urinalysis, holding that the bus driver plaintiff the burden of proving that defendant lacked “has reasonable 941 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1991). without opinion, suspicion”), aff’d
(1983). Although a police officer has reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation to justify a stop to investigate that violation, he may not extend an otherwise-completed traffic stop, absent reasonable suspicion of a drug offense, in order to conduct a dog sniff. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). See also United States v. Thompson, 772 F.3d 752, 759 (3d Cir. 2014) (holding that an officer had reasonable suspicion for a drug sniff after a traffic stop because the defendant was “visibly nervous, with a shaky voice and a vein on his neck pulsating rapidly,” his “answers to questions came out hesitatingly,” and the amount of his luggage “appeared to be inconsistent with the stated length of the trip”). A Terry stop carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion. In Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192 (3d Cir. 2014), rev’d on other grounds, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014), an officer was searching for an armed man and encountered an unidentified man who turned away and appeared to reach for his waist. The officer grabbed the man’s arm until he saw that the man was unarmed. The court upheld a jury verdict that the officer acted reasonably in grabbing the man’s arm. As noted in the Comment to Instruction 4.12.2, in the case of a warrantless arrest, Third Circuit caselaw divides as to the burden of proof regarding probable cause. By contrast, the caselaw does not appear to have addressed the burden of proof regarding reasonable suspicion in the case of a Terry stop; but one district court decision concerning an analogous issue suggests that the burden would be on the plaintiff. See Armington v. School Dist. of Philadelphia, 767 F. Supp. 661, 667 (E.D.Pa.) (in Section 1983 case involving school district’s order that bus driver undergo urinalysis, holding that the bus driver plaintiff “has the burden of proving that defendant lacked reasonable suspicion”), aff’d without opinion, 941 F.2d 1200 (3d Cir. 1991).
4_Chap_4_2016_May%20meeting%20to%20be%20posted.docx