Thus, where at least one legal custodial parent has consented to the creation of parent.” the psychological parent relationship, the third party has standing to pursue the claim. in this context need not be explicit; instead, the focus must be on the intent “Consent” and actions of the legal parent during the formation of the disputed relationship. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court recognized that establishing psychological parenthood is an easy lack of consent may be used by the trial “not task.” One parent’s an appropriate as one factor in the That being said, court, “in context,” Court’s analysis. the Court noted in dicta its that, the longer and more established the “expectation” parental role of a third party has become, the more the lack of consent by one parent would diminish in significance. As to the trial determination that the matter should not proceed to a plenary court’s hearing, the Court found that D.M. averred sufficient facts that, if credited at a plenary hearing, would establish her standing to pursue her Complaint. Importantly, F.D. and K.A.F. disputed certain factual claims made by D.M. concerning the nature of her relationship with Arthur and alleged consent of the relationship, thus giving rise to F.D.’s the necessity of a plenary hearing. Finally, the Court reversed the award of counsel fees in favor of K.A.F. and F.D. and remanded the matter to a different trial judge. Observation: The basis behind allowing third parties certain rights under the theory of is to protect the children from psychological harm when they “psychological parentage” are separated from third parties who nurtured and lived with them and who have formed a parent-child bond with them. In cases where both parents are fit and engaged in the upbringing of their child, it may seem intuitive that parental autonomy should take
parent.” Thus, where at least one legal custodial parent has consented to the creation of the psychological parent relationship, the third party has standing to pursue the claim. “Consent” in this context need not be explicit; instead, the focus must be on the intent and actions of the legal parent during the formation of the disputed relationship. Notwithstanding this fact, the Court recognized that establishing psychological parenthood is “not an easy task.” One parent’s lack of consent may be used by the trial court, “in an appropriate context,” as one factor in the Court’s analysis. That being said, the Court noted in dicta its “expectation” that, the longer and more established the parental role of a third party has become, the more the lack of consent by one parent would diminish in significance. As to the trial court’s determination that the matter should not proceed to a plenary hearing, the Court found that D.M. averred sufficient facts that, if credited at a plenary hearing, would establish her standing to pursue her Complaint. Importantly, F.D. and K.A.F. disputed certain factual claims made by D.M. concerning the nature of her relationship with Arthur and F.D.’s alleged consent of the relationship, thus giving rise to the necessity of a plenary hearing. Finally, the Court reversed the award of counsel fees in favor of K.A.F. and F.D. and remanded the matter to a different trial judge. Observation: The basis behind allowing third parties certain rights under the theory of “psychological parentage” is to protect the children from psychological harm when they are separated from third parties who nurtured and lived with them and who have formed a parent-child bond with them. In cases where both parents are fit and engaged in the upbringing of their child, it may seem intuitive that parental autonomy should take
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