permissible costs. In this case, this value exceeds 1/3 of the produced added value to some extent and is close to American empiric standard of 35%. Secondly, Table 3 also demonstrates a very high stability of 2 type Laffer’s point which fluctuated in the range of 36,34-36,68%. Thus, the range was only 0,3% which considering the value of q** seems quite narrow for such a fiscal indicator. Given that the average value of q** made up about 36,50%, we can ensure that in the short term (from 2000 to 2005) increasing taxes for the producer exerted only positive impact on the Russian budget. Besides, the change of 2 type point Laffer’s had a very weak tendency for lessening which means that the reliability of the tax constituent of the budget grew slowly but confidently. country’s Thirdly, the state effectiveness was not the same in different sections policy’s of the period analyzed. Thus, for example, actual tax burden for the period from 2000 to 2004 was lower than 1 type point, let alone 2 type point. In Laffer’s Laffer’s fact, the tax burden during this period in Russia was moderate. During 2005 the actual tax burden exceeded the values of both q* and q**. Geometrically, the Russian economy moved to a descending branch of production and budget curves. That means that year the state did harm to itself and, therefore, the fiscal policy of that stage may be regarded as ineffective if not absolutely erroneous at all. Though the following 2006-2011 years, the actual tax burden moved in the range between values of q* and q**. It is extremely interesting that the fiscal gap between 1 and 2 type Laffer’s points is very narrow and made up just about 2,50%, which allows to state that the budget reaction is not much different to a In other country’s consumer’s reaction. words, as soon as the tax burden starts exerting a de-stimulating impact on the producer, the fiscal income immediately begins to fall. This means that when state’s manipulating tax rates, fiscal should be aimed at the producer as its bodies’ attention reaction will be automatically reproduced by the budget. Therefore, enhancing financial pressure on the producer will automatically worsen the budget, country’s which confirms a high sensitivity of fiscal system to production dynamics in Russia’s this period.
permissible costs. In this case, this value exceeds 1/3 of the produced added value to some extent and is close to American empiric standard of 35%. Secondly, Table 3 also demonstrates a very high stability of Laffer’s 2 type point which fluctuated in the range of 36,34-36,68%. Thus, the range was only 0,3% which considering the value of q** seems quite narrow for such a fiscal indicator. Given that the average value of q** made up about 36,50%, we can ensure that in the short term (from 2000 to 2005) increasing taxes for the producer exerted only positive impact on the Russian budget. Besides, the change of Laffer’s 2 type point had a very weak tendency for lessening which means that the reliability of the tax constituent of the country’s budget grew slowly but confidently. Thirdly, the state policy’s effectiveness was not the same in different sections of the period analyzed. Thus, for example, actual tax burden for the period from 2000 to 2004 was lower than Laffer’s 1 type point, let alone Laffer’s 2 type point. In fact, the tax burden during this period in Russia was moderate. During 2005 the actual tax burden exceeded the values of both q* and q**. Geometrically, the Russian economy moved to a descending branch of production and budget curves. That means that year the state did harm to itself and, therefore, the fiscal policy of that stage may be regarded as ineffective if not absolutely erroneous at all. Though the following 2006-2011 years, the actual tax burden moved in the range between values of q* and q**. It is extremely interesting that the fiscal gap between Laffer’s 1 and 2 type points is very narrow and made up just about 2,50%, which allows to state that the country’s budget reaction is not much different to a consumer’s reaction. In other words, as soon as the tax burden starts exerting a de-stimulating impact on the producer, the state’s fiscal income immediately begins to fall. This means that when manipulating tax rates, fiscal bodies’ attention should be aimed at the producer as its reaction will be automatically reproduced by the budget. Therefore, enhancing financial pressure on the producer will automatically worsen the country’s budget, which confirms a high sensitivity of Russia’s fiscal system to production dynamics in this period.
281_aidea2013_banking-and-finance.docx