515: Total Reliability Value ($/kW) For a 2-hour battery on Jackson-Sunrise feeders Customer Class Utility dispatch Full Battery all Year Residential $1.20 $1.90 Commercial $126 $201 Industrial $108 $172 Ratepayer Neutral Incentive Analysis In this section we discuss the maximum ratepayer neutral incentives that a utility pay to customers for installing SIS units in the scenarios studied. SMUD customers already receive an SGIP adoption incentive, but this incentive was shown to result in a net cost to non-adopting ratepayers in cases other than the large SIS unit, PG&E demand charge tariff, and high generation capacity price sensitivities under utility dispatch. To calculate the maximum ratepayer neutral incentive, we subtract the customer’s bill savings from the utility benefits shown in the RIM test. Table 515 shows the maximum ratepayer neutral incentive for the base case and sensitivities analyzed in sections 5.5 and 5.6. The table also shows the utility benefits and customer bill savings used to calculate the maximum incentive. The incentive depends on the value that the SIS unit creates for the utility, which can largely depend on distribution deferral value. This results in a maximum incentive that varies based on the location of the SIS unit in the distribution network. The distribution network location is indicated in the column marked Feeder, with JS representing Jackson-Sunrise and WG representing Waterman-Grantline. The column labeled w/o SGIP’ gives the net participant cost or benefit ‘PCT without an SGIP incentive for each scenario. In the ancillary services sales case, we have accounted for the ancillary service revenues as a customer benefit in the No SGIP PCT. There are two cases where the maximum incentive is larger than the SGIP incentive: the large SIS unit sensitivity and the maximum generation capacity price sensitivity. The only case where the maximum ratepayer neutral incentive would be sufficient encourage adoption is the maximum generation capacity price sensitivity.
515: Total Reliability Value ($/kW) For a 2-hour battery on Jackson-Sunrise feeders Customer Class Utility dispatch Full Battery all Year Residential $1.20 $1.90 Commercial $126 $201 Industrial $108 $172 Ratepayer Neutral Incentive Analysis In this section we discuss the maximum ratepayer neutral incentives that a utility pay to customers for installing SIS units in the scenarios studied. SMUD customers already receive an SGIP adoption incentive, but this incentive was shown to result in a net cost to non-adopting ratepayers in cases other than the large SIS unit, PG&E demand charge tariff, and high generation capacity price sensitivities under utility dispatch. To calculate the maximum ratepayer neutral incentive, we subtract the customer’s bill savings from the utility benefits shown in the RIM test. Table 515 shows the maximum ratepayer neutral incentive for the base case and sensitivities analyzed in sections 5.5 and 5.6. The table also shows the utility benefits and customer bill savings used to calculate the maximum incentive. The incentive depends on the value that the SIS unit creates for the utility, which can largely depend on distribution deferral value. This results in a maximum incentive that varies based on the location of the SIS unit in the distribution network. The distribution network location is indicated in the column marked Feeder, with JS representing Jackson-Sunrise and WG representing Waterman-Grantline. The column labeled ‘PCT w/o SGIP’ gives the net participant cost or benefit without an SGIP incentive for each scenario. In the ancillary services sales case, we have accounted for the ancillary service revenues as a customer benefit in the No SGIP PCT. There are two cases where the maximum incentive is larger than the SGIP incentive: the large SIS unit sensitivity and the maximum generation capacity price sensitivity. The only case where the maximum ratepayer neutral incentive would be sufficient encourage adoption is the maximum generation capacity price sensitivity.
CSIRDD_Sol4_E3_DRAFT_final_report_Aug2016.docx