A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to look his accuser in the face and have his accuser do the same originates from deep in human nature that regards “something faceto-face confrontation . . . as to a fair trial.’” (Coy (1988) 487 U.S. v. Iowa ‘essential 1012, 1017 (Coy).) In the trial court permitted the use of a screen that allowed the Coy, defendant to perceive” the two 13-year-old witnesses and entirely blocked their “dimly view of him. The United States Supreme Court found the physical barrier unconstitutional, stating it was to imagine a more obvious or damaging “difficult violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face encounter.” (Id. at p. 1020.) Two years later, in (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig), the Supreme Maryland v. Craig Court created a narrow exception to the prohibition against accommodations eliminating face-to-face confrontation. The exception applies when the trial court has “hear[d] evidence” and made case-specific finding” that a would be child witness “a “traumatized” if made to confront the defendant face-to-face in court. (Id. at pp. 855-856, 858.) The emotional distress must be anxiety or reluctance to testify is not enough. (Ibid.) severe; Additionally, although the accommodation will eliminate confrontation, it face-to-face must otherwise assure the testimony is reliable by preserving the other aspects of confrontation, which include a defendant’s ability to view a witness’s demeanor as he or she testifies. (Id. at p. 851.) This aspect is crucial. The ability to view the witness’s demeanor only permit[s] a defendant to and undo the false accuser, or “not ‘confound reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult,’ [citation], but may well aid a defendant in eliciting favorable testimony from the child witness.” (Ibid.)
A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to look his accuser in the face and have his accuser do the same originates from “something deep in human nature that regards faceto-face confrontation . . . as ‘essential to a fair trial.’” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (Coy).) In Coy, the trial court permitted the use of a screen that allowed the defendant “dimly to perceive” the two 13-year-old witnesses and entirely blocked their view of him. The United States Supreme Court found the physical barrier unconstitutional, stating it was “difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face encounter.” (Id. at p. 1020.) Two years later, in Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836 (Craig), the Supreme Court created a narrow exception to the prohibition against accommodations eliminating face-to-face confrontation. The exception applies when the trial court has “hear[d] evidence” and made “a case-specific finding” that a child witness would be “traumatized” if made to confront the defendant face-to-face in court. (Id. at pp. 855-856, 858.) The emotional distress must be severe; anxiety or reluctance to testify is not enough. (Ibid.) Additionally, although the accommodation will eliminate face-to-face confrontation, it must otherwise assure the testimony is reliable by preserving the other aspects of confrontation, which include a defendant’s ability to view a witness’s demeanor as he or she testifies. (Id. at p. 851.) This aspect is crucial. The ability to view the witness’s demeanor “not only permit[s] a defendant to ‘confound and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult,’ [citation], but may well aid a defendant in eliciting favorable testimony from the child witness.” (Ibid.)
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