of sex” while continuing think of gender sex: to see it as a in terms of “independent “to social dichotomy determined by a natural dichotomy” (3; emphasis added). I want to underscore the second of these unrealized possibilities, the conceptualization of gender as the of partition.” This phrase, tucked away so as “principle virtually to pass unnoticed in the unfolding of the list, is one of the least heralded but most insightful points in Delphy’s work. U.S. feminists, theorists and empirical researchers alike, were taking gender literally as a fact or a standpoint by their preoccupation with women’s different psychological development, and the moral “roles,” or political this made possible. In this context, Delphy proposes “voice” “standpoint” something quite different. As a principle of partition, gender is active. It does not rest on, express, or in any other way presuppose difference; it and, so, creates difference in the singular “partitions” where there would otherwise be differences. Delphy (1991, 4) illustrates with a vegetable analogy: can be, and are, multiple. Alongside cabbages and carrots, …differentiations which are not of each other, there are courgettes, melons, and “opposites” potatoes. Moreover, distinctions are not necessarily hierarchical: vegetables are not placed on a scale of value. Differentiation, as a phenomenon, is multiple and plural; is already “difference” organized normatively, in relation to power, as dichotomous and more or less explicitly hierarchal. The analogy both enables and constrains her from thinking through her provocative re-conceptualization of gender as the of partition.” At this point, “principle Delphy is still primarily concerned with relations of hierarchy not with grouping per se.
“independent of sex” while continuing “to think of gender in terms of sex: to see it as a social dichotomy determined by a natural dichotomy” (3; emphasis added). I want to underscore the second of these unrealized possibilities, the conceptualization of gender as the “principle of partition.” This phrase, tucked away so as virtually to pass unnoticed in the unfolding of the list, is one of the least heralded but most insightful points in Delphy’s work. U.S. feminists, theorists and empirical researchers alike, were taking gender literally as a fact or a standpoint by their preoccupation with women’s different “roles,” psychological development, and the moral “voice” or political “standpoint” this made possible. In this context, Delphy proposes something quite different. As a principle of partition, gender is active. It does not rest on, express, or in any other way presuppose difference; it “partitions” and, so, creates difference in the singular where there would otherwise be differences. Delphy (1991, 4) illustrates with a vegetable analogy: …differentiations can be, and are, multiple. Alongside cabbages and carrots, which are not “opposites” of each other, there are courgettes, melons, and potatoes. Moreover, distinctions are not necessarily hierarchical: vegetables are not placed on a scale of value. Differentiation, as a phenomenon, is multiple and plural; “difference” is already organized normatively, in relation to power, as dichotomous and more or less explicitly hierarchal. The analogy both enables and constrains her from thinking through her provocative re-conceptualization of gender as the “principle of partition.” At this point, Delphy is still primarily concerned with relations of hierarchy not with grouping per se.
disch2013.docx