against him . . . .” The confrontation clause the defendant a face-to-face “guarantees meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” (Coy (1988) 487 U.S. v. Iowa 1012, 1016 (Coy).) The right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute, however, and alternative procedures may be used when (1) necessary to further an important or compelling state interest, and (2) the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. (Maryland (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 844, 850 (Craig).) v. Craig The defendant in was convicted of sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. Coy (Coy, 487 U.S. at p. 1014.) The girls were allowed to testify against the defendant supra, through a large screen, which allowed the defendant to perceive” the girls but “dimly which blocked the girls’ entire view of the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1015, 1020.) The defendant objected to the use of the screen on confrontation grounds. (Id. at p. 1015.) The high court reversed the judgment, finding that the use of the screen violated the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation. (Id. at pp. 1020-1021.) emphasized that the Amendment’s guarantee of face-to-face encounters Coy between the criminally accused and their accusers has lineage that traces back to the “a beginnings of Western legal culture.” (Coy, 487 U.S. at pp. 1015-1016.) Like the supra, right to cross-examine one’s accusers, which is less explicit component of the “a Confrontation Clause,” the right to face-to-face confrontation ensures the integrity of the factfinding process. (Id. at pp. 1019-1020.) elaborated: State can hardly Coy “The gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very phenomenon it relies upon to establish the potential
against him . . . .” The confrontation clause “guarantees the defendant a face-to-face meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.” (Coy v. Iowa (1988) 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (Coy).) The right to face-to-face confrontation is not absolute, however, and alternative procedures may be used when (1) necessary to further an important or compelling state interest, and (2) the reliability of the testimony is otherwise assured. (Maryland v. Craig (1990) 497 U.S. 836, 844, 850 (Craig).) The defendant in Coy was convicted of sexually assaulting two 13-year-old girls. (Coy, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 1014.) The girls were allowed to testify against the defendant through a large screen, which allowed the defendant “dimly to perceive” the girls but which blocked the girls’ entire view of the defendant. (Id. at pp. 1015, 1020.) The defendant objected to the use of the screen on confrontation grounds. (Id. at p. 1015.) The high court reversed the judgment, finding that the use of the screen violated the defendant’s right to face-to-face confrontation. (Id. at pp. 1020-1021.) Coy emphasized that the Amendment’s guarantee of face-to-face encounters between the criminally accused and their accusers has “a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of Western legal culture.” (Coy, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 1015-1016.) Like the right to cross-examine one’s accusers, which is “a less explicit component of the Confrontation Clause,” the right to face-to-face confrontation ensures the integrity of the factfinding process. (Id. at pp. 1019-1020.) Coy elaborated: “The State can hardly gainsay the profound effect upon a witness of standing in the presence of the person the witness accuses, since that is the very phenomenon it relies upon to establish the potential
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