employed at defendant’s preliminary examination.” (Gonzales, 54 Cal.4th at pp. supra, 1267-1268.) noted with approval observations that the alternative Gonzales Sharp’s seating arrangement in only the most minimal interference with appellant’s “‘resulted right to confront his accuser’” and was by the state’s interest in protecting the “justified child witness and obtaining accurate testimony.” (Gonzales, at p. 1267, citing supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783.) Sharp, supra, also pointed out that: the trial court [in had not made the Gonzales Sharp] “While findings required by the court had no difficulty ascertaining from the record Craig, Sharp that the seating arrangement was fully justified. [Citations.]” (Gonzales, 54 supra, Cal.4th at p. 1267.) noted that state courts have approved the use of Gonzales “[o]ther similar seating arrangements, without the findings required by (Id. at p. 1267, fn. Craig.” 17 & cases cited.) And the preliminary hearing court made no factual findings on “while the need to shield Ivan, Jr. from defendant’s gaze, the trial court made extensive findings that the child would be traumatized if he were made to testify at trial.” (Id. at p. 1268.) The defendant did not the vulnerability of the young witness, either at the time “dispute of the preliminary hearing or the time of trial.” (Ibid.) Thus, concluded: Gonzales as in . . . the seating arrangement for the child witness’s testimony was fully Sharp “Here, justified by the record, and defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated when the videotape was introduced at trial. The seating arrangement at the preliminary hearing satisfied the central concerns of the confrontation clause: presence, oath, ‘physical
employed at defendant’s preliminary examination.” (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 1267-1268.) Gonzales noted with approval Sharp’s observations that the alternative seating arrangement “‘resulted in only the most minimal interference with appellant’s right to confront his accuser’” and was “justified by the state’s interest in protecting the child witness and obtaining accurate testimony.” (Gonzales, supra, at p. 1267, citing Sharp, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783.) Gonzales also pointed out that: “While the trial court [in Sharp] had not made the findings required by Craig, the Sharp court had no difficulty ascertaining from the record that the seating arrangement was fully justified. [Citations.]” (Gonzales, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 1267.) Gonzales noted that “[o]ther state courts have approved the use of similar seating arrangements, without the findings required by Craig.” (Id. at p. 1267, fn. 17 & cases cited.) And “while the preliminary hearing court made no factual findings on the need to shield Ivan, Jr. from defendant’s gaze, the trial court made extensive findings that the child would be traumatized if he were made to testify at trial.” (Id. at p. 1268.) The defendant did not “dispute the vulnerability of the young witness, either at the time of the preliminary hearing or the time of trial.” (Ibid.) Thus, Gonzales concluded: “Here, as in Sharp . . . the seating arrangement for the child witness’s testimony was fully justified by the record, and defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated when the videotape was introduced at trial. The seating arrangement at the preliminary hearing satisfied the central concerns of the confrontation clause: ‘physical presence, oath,
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