to fashion new procedures. We may not sanction procedures of dubious constitutional validity.” (Ibid.) Here, without any indication F.R was traumatized to the she would not be able to reasonably communicate, the trial court imposed the most drastic of all accommodations—it erected a barrier or screen . . . between appellant and the “physical witnesses as they testified.” (Sharp, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783.) I view this supra, procedure as a clear violation of Arredondo’s constitutional rights and therefore cannot agree with the majority view that the barrier was less intrusive than any other “far alternative procedure would have been.” (Maj. opn. at p. 43.) A survey of the ante, various alternate procedures appellate courts have upheld reveals nothing as invasive to the face-to-face confrontation right as the accommodation used here. (See People v. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 [allowing child’s mother to sit next to him as a support person during testimony]; (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1503, People v. Chenault 1520 [permitting two children to testify with a support dog]; at pp. 1780-1786 Sharp, [allowing child witness to testify angled away from defendant]; (1993) 15 In re Amber S. Cal.App.4th 1260, 1266 [permitting one-way, closed-circuit TV in juvenile proceedings where Penal Code section 1347 does not apply].) Indeed, as the majority acknowledges, other jurisdictions do not allow opaque barriers of any sort, regardless of size, shape, or what the jury may think of them. (Maj. opn. at p. 43, fn. 8.) ante, The majority emphasizes its holding a narrow one . . . based on the particular “is facts of this case.” (Maj. opn. at p. 28.) The majority explains, older a child ante, “[t]he
to fashion new procedures. We may not sanction procedures of dubious constitutional validity.” (Ibid.) Here, without any indication F.R was traumatized to the she would not be able to reasonably communicate, the trial court imposed the most drastic of all accommodations—it erected a “physical barrier or screen . . . between appellant and the witnesses as they testified.” (Sharp, supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1783.) I view this procedure as a clear violation of Arredondo’s constitutional rights and therefore cannot agree with the majority view that the barrier was “far less intrusive than any other alternative procedure would have been.” (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 43.) A survey of the various alternate procedures appellate courts have upheld reveals nothing as invasive to the face-to-face confrontation right as the accommodation used here. (See People v. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 550, 556 [allowing child’s mother to sit next to him as a support person during testimony]; People v. Chenault (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1520 [permitting two children to testify with a support dog]; Sharp, at pp. 1780-1786 [allowing child witness to testify angled away from defendant]; In re Amber S. (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1266 [permitting one-way, closed-circuit TV in juvenile proceedings where Penal Code section 1347 does not apply].) Indeed, as the majority acknowledges, other jurisdictions do not allow opaque barriers of any sort, regardless of size, shape, or what the jury may think of them. (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 43, fn. 8.) The majority emphasizes its holding “is a narrow one . . . based on the particular facts of this case.” (Maj. opn. ante, at p. 28.) The majority explains, “[t]he older a child
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