there remain uncertainties over how the two crimes co-exist. Even though they are independent offences, the term (or assault”) is frequently used as a “assault” “common generic label for assault battery. This practice further impedes fair warning. The courts or have attempted to correct that confusion by separating the offences as assault” and “common by beating”. This continues to have implications for prosecutors who must draft the “assault appropriate charge. Notwithstanding this problem, one common feature of assault and battery clear: D may use V’s consent to harm as an answer to a charge under either offence. No is liability will ensue. Importantly, such consent will negate D’s liability for any harm not caused above a battery, unless D does not intend or foresee that harm. Where such harm falls within a specified exception, D will also not be liable. Framing fault As with conduct, incoherence similarly features at the of fault. Much of this concerns the imposition of constructive liability, although it also extends to assessment of culpability in disease transmission cases. Again, these tricky matters are highlighted by the SCP. (a) Section 18 At the head of the injury hierarchy, the text of s.18 stipulates as the required mens “malice” rea standard. Nowadays, this term is understood as meaning intention or recklessness. However, despite this, s.18 can be committed intentionally; recklessness is insufficient. only Significantly, the actus reus of s.18 wounding or causing GBH attaches to two mens rea – – modes: intention as to causing GBH intention as to resisting/preventing the lawful or apprehension or detention of any person. This produces four variants of s.18: wounding with intent to do GBH;
there remain uncertainties over how the two crimes co-exist. Even though they are independent offences, the term “assault” (or “common assault”) is frequently used as a generic label for assault or battery. This practice further impedes fair warning. The courts have attempted to correct that confusion by separating the offences as “common assault” and “assault by beating”. This continues to have implications for prosecutors who must draft the appropriate charge. Notwithstanding this problem, one common feature of assault and battery is clear: D may use V’s consent to harm as an answer to a charge under either offence. No liability will ensue. Importantly, such consent will not negate D’s liability for any harm caused above a battery, unless D does not intend or foresee that harm. Where such harm falls within a specified exception, D will also not be liable. Framing fault As with conduct, incoherence similarly features at the of fault. Much of this concerns the imposition of constructive liability, although it also extends to assessment of culpability in disease transmission cases. Again, these tricky matters are highlighted by the SCP. (a) Section 18 At the head of the injury hierarchy, the text of s.18 stipulates “malice” as the required mens rea standard. Nowadays, this term is understood as meaning intention or recklessness. However, despite this, s.18 can only be committed intentionally; recklessness is insufficient. Significantly, the actus reus of s.18 – wounding or causing GBH – attaches to two mens rea modes: intention as to causing GBH or intention as to resisting/preventing the lawful apprehension or detention of any person. This produces four variants of s.18: wounding with intent to do GBH;
Crim%20LR%20OAPA%20Piece.docx