Leading and Following the Conversation. We next examined how our manipulations of and dominance affected how much negotiators led the conversations and how much they followed the conversational lead of their counterparts. A mixed-models analysis revealed a significant main effect of power (F(1, 163.0) = 4.09, .05, = .24), such that high-power p = d negotiators were perceived to have led the conversations more (M 4.05, 1.13) than were = SD = low-power negotiators (M 3.76, 1.24). There was also a marginally significant main = SD = effect for dominance instructions (F(1, 303.1) = 3.09, .08, = .19), such that negotiators p = d receiving dominance instructions led the conversations more (M 4.02, 1.18) than did = SD = negotiators not receiving those instructions (M 3.79, 1.20). No other main effects or = SD = interactions were significant. A mixed-models analysis of how much negotiators were perceived by their counterparts to follow the lead of those counterparts revealed only a significant Own Power x Own Dominance instructions interaction, 320.8) = 3.87, .05. Negotiators followed the lead of F(1, p = low-power counterparts who received dominance instructions (M 4.72, 1.10) more than = SD = they did low-power negotiators who did not receive such instructions (M 4.40, 1.06), = SD = = 1.87, .06, = .30. Negotiators, in contrast, did not follow the lead of high-power t(162) p = d negotiators who received dominance instructions (M 4.46, 1.10) more than they = SD = followed the lead of high-power negotiators who did not receive such instructions (M 4.62, = 1.06), = -0.90 , .37, = .15. No other main effects or interactions were SD = t(163) p = d significant. Discussion Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that the effects of dominance in negotiations depend upon whether dominance is expressed by a relatively powerful or relatively powerless
Leading and Following the Conversation. We next examined how our manipulations of and dominance affected how much negotiators led the conversations and how much they followed the conversational lead of their counterparts. A mixed-models analysis revealed a significant main effect of power (F(1, 163.0) = 4.09, p = .05, d = .24), such that high-power negotiators were perceived to have led the conversations more (M = 4.05, SD = 1.13) than were low-power negotiators (M = 3.76, SD = 1.24). There was also a marginally significant main effect for dominance instructions (F(1, 303.1) = 3.09, p = .08, d = .19), such that negotiators receiving dominance instructions led the conversations more (M = 4.02, SD = 1.18) than did negotiators not receiving those instructions (M = 3.79, SD = 1.20). No other main effects or interactions were significant. A mixed-models analysis of how much negotiators were perceived by their counterparts to follow the lead of those counterparts revealed only a significant Own Power x Own Dominance instructions interaction, F(1, 320.8) = 3.87, p = .05. Negotiators followed the lead of low-power counterparts who received dominance instructions (M = 4.72, SD = 1.10) more than they did low-power negotiators who did not receive such instructions (M = 4.40, SD = 1.06), t(162) = 1.87, p = .06, d = .30. Negotiators, in contrast, did not follow the lead of high-power negotiators who received dominance instructions (M = 4.46, SD = 1.10) more than they followed the lead of high-power negotiators who did not receive such instructions (M = 4.62, SD = 1.06), t(163) = -0.90 , p = .37, d = .15. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Discussion Experiment 1 provided initial evidence that the effects of dominance in negotiations depend upon whether dominance is expressed by a relatively powerful or relatively powerless
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