1444 12.12.3.4.1 The handshaking for FAA Stop a broadcast frame Rejected begins with a beacon from the PCP/AP to initiate 1) Due to the which is broadcast by the the handshake. Replace FAA nature of usage PCP/AP. This frame with SAE and collapse the for EDMG FAA contains the Anonce exchange into which is which is put into the KDF. "(Re)Association Request, essentially point But if two DMG STAs (Re)Association Response, to point for UC both receive the same and FAA Authentication #1. It's safe to beacon, a distinct Ack", use special DMG use in this case. possibility, after action frames to transmit 2) SAE is a slow discovering the PCP/AP SAE, or just require DMG process of the then the Anonce will be STAs to use 802.11 password/psk the same for two Authentication frames now based, very different sessions. This is if they want to implement computational a problem because the FAA. intensive. it's not security of the 4-way fit for the usage handshake, from which of UC #1. it look like FAA has borrowed, is based on the nonces being randomly generated, unique, and ephemeral for each 4-way handshake. If you reuse a nonce you adversely affect the security of the handshake. It seems FAA can very easily reuse a nonce. 1446 4.5.4.2 "The FAA authentication What are the 3 entities Revised exchange is utilized with involved? The STA isn't a . a non trusted third party third party. Delete the cited (TPP)" text.
1444 12.12.3.4.1 The handshaking for FAA begins with a beacon which is broadcast by the PCP/AP. This frame contains the Anonce which is put into the KDF. But if two DMG STAs both receive the same beacon, a distinct possibility, after discovering the PCP/AP then the Anonce will be the same for two different sessions. This is a problem because the security of the 4-way handshake, from which it look like FAA has borrowed, is based on the nonces being randomly generated, unique, and ephemeral for each 4-way handshake. If you reuse a nonce you adversely affect the security of the handshake. It seems FAA can very easily reuse a nonce. Stop a broadcast frame from the PCP/AP to initiate the handshake. Replace FAA with SAE and collapse the exchange into "(Re)Association Request, (Re)Association Response, and FAA Authentication Ack", use special DMG action frames to transmit SAE, or just require DMG STAs to use 802.11 Authentication frames now if they want to implement FAA. Rejected 1) Due to the nature of usage for EDMG FAA which is essentially point to point for UC #1. It's safe to use in this case. 2) SAE is a slow process of the password/psk based, very computational intensive. it's not fit for the usage of UC #1. 1446 4.5.4.2 "The FAA authentication exchange is utilized with a non trusted third party (TPP)" What are the 3 entities involved? The STA isn't a third party. Delete the cited text. Revised .
11-18-1097-01-00ay-comment-resolutions.docx