A in the primary sense is thus an of representing (that act “representation” things are thus-and-so). (E.g., objected to Hill’s representation of the “Smith facts of the case.”) In a secondary we may speak of the vehicle through which this representing-as-thus-and-so takes place as a It is in this “representation”. sense, for example, that we speak of token symbols and diagrams as representations. To the extent that there are features of the vehicle that allow vehicles of that kind to be used systematically to represent things as being thus-and-so, we may apply the term to the type as well as the token. (This ‘representation’ distinction is necessary because some types of representation-tokens, such as scribbled diagrams, may not fall into representational types, while others, such as symbols, typically do so.) We may use the notion of things as being thus-and-so” so broadly that “representing it can apply both to cases that are communicative (A represents things as being thus-and-so to B by uttering sentence S) and to cases that are purely mental (A represents things as being thus-and-so (to herself) in the sense of, say, judging that they are thus-and so). The notions of and one “representing” “representation”, should note, are mental and intentional through and through. These notions of can be applied only to beings that think and to the representational “representation” tokens and types that they employ as aids in thinking and communication.
A “representation” in the primary sense is thus an act of representing (that things are thus-and-so). (E.g., “Smith objected to Hill’s representation of the facts of the case.”) In a secondary we may speak of the vehicle through which this representing-as-thus-and-so takes place as a “representation”. It is in this sense, for example, that we speak of token symbols and diagrams as representations. To the extent that there are features of the vehicle that allow vehicles of that kind to be used systematically to represent things as being thus-and-so, we may apply the term ‘representation’ to the type as well as the token. (This distinction is necessary because some types of representation-tokens, such as scribbled diagrams, may not fall into representational types, while others, such as symbols, typically do so.) We may use the notion of “representing things as being thus-and-so” so broadly that it can apply both to cases that are communicative (A represents things as being thus-and-so to B by uttering sentence S) and to cases that are purely mental (A represents things as being thus-and-so (to herself) in the sense of, say, judging that they are thus-and so). The notions of “representing” and “representation”, one should note, are mental and intentional through and through. These notions of “representation” can be applied only to beings that think and to the representational tokens and types that they employ as aids in thinking and communication.
DRAFT-Horst-Cog-Pluralism-Part-2-copy.docx