cognition must have some mental one or more representational systems. The form – use of these systems is not limited to cognition through online perception, but can take the form of various kinds of imagining as well. These are certainly not limited to perspectives that one has actually occupied in the world e.g., I can always ask – would that look like if I moved over there?” Even more plainly, they are not “What limited to perspectives I am presently in. But they are also not limited to perspectives that I really could be in. Perhaps I can now be in a position to look down (say, from a crane or a hot air ballon) upon a house under construction in ways most generations of my ancestors could not. But I cannot really be in a position to what the organelles of a cell look like from a position in-between “see” them though I can certainly imagine it, and use that imagining to explore things – about it. Let us now try to be a bit more careful and precise. I am suggesting that I have mental models of such things as my childhood home. (Perhaps there is a single integrated model of it in my mind, perhaps a constellation of models of parts and aspects of it.) But by this I do not mean that a mental model” means that “having there something” in my mind that has the same geometric features as my house. “is That, indeed, would strike me as a category error. What, then, do I mean by “having a model” of my house in my mind? One thing I mean is that there is something call it X in my mind that allows – – me to store and explore features of the house itself. And in these examples, I am particularly concerned with forms of features” that bear a good deal of “exploring phenomenological resemblance to what I might do to extract information about the
cognition must have some mental form – one or more representational systems. The use of these systems is not limited to cognition through online perception, but can take the form of various kinds of imagining as well. These are certainly not limited to perspectives that one has actually occupied in the world – e.g., I can always ask “What would that look like if I moved over there?” Even more plainly, they are not limited to perspectives I am presently in. But they are also not limited to perspectives that I really could be in. Perhaps I can now be in a position to look down (say, from a crane or a hot air ballon) upon a house under construction in ways most generations of my ancestors could not. But I cannot really be in a position to “see” what the organelles of a cell look like from a position in-between them – though I can certainly imagine it, and use that imagining to explore things about it. Let us now try to be a bit more careful and precise. I am suggesting that I have mental models of such things as my childhood home. (Perhaps there is a single integrated model of it in my mind, perhaps a constellation of models of parts and aspects of it.) But by this I do not mean that “having a mental model” means that there “is something” in my mind that has the same geometric features as my house. That, indeed, would strike me as a category error. What, then, do I mean by “having a model” of my house in my mind? One thing I mean is that there is something – call it X – in my mind that allows me to store and explore features of the house itself. And in these examples, I am particularly concerned with forms of “exploring features” that bear a good deal of phenomenological resemblance to what I might do to extract information about the
DRAFT-Horst-Cog-Pluralism-Part-2-copy.docx