Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. (1962 [2004]). The Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Chung, Hun. (forthcoming). State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian “Hobbes’s Analysis.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association. Ernst, Zachary. (2005). Plea for Asymmetric Games.” Journal of Philosophy 102: 109-125. “A Friedman, Jeffrey, ed. (1996). The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gaus, Gerald (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Cambrodge: Cambridge U uversity Press. Gaus, Gerald and John Thrasher. (2015). Choice and the Original Position: The “Rational (Many) Models of Rawls and Harsanyi.” In The Original Position, edited by Timothy Hinton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gauthier, David. (1986). Oxford: Clarendon Press. Morals by Agreement. (1991). Contractariansim?” In Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by —— “Why Peter Vallentyne: 15-30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gintis, Herbert (2009). The Bounds of Reasons: Game Theory nad the Unification of the Behavior Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I.” Journal of “The Theoretical Biology, vol. 7: 1-16. Hampton, Jean. (1986). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harsanyi, John. (1953). Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of “Cardinal Journal of Political Economy 61: 434-435. (1955). Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of —— “Cardinal Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 63: 309-321. (1974). the Maximin Principle Serve as the Basis for Morality?” American Political —— “Can Science Review 69: 594-606. Harsanyi, John and Reinhard Selten. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Buchanan, James M. and Gordon Tullock. (1962 [2004]). The Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund. Chung, Hun. (forthcoming). “Hobbes’s State of Nature: A Modern Bayesian Analysis.” Journal of the American Philosophical Association. Ernst, Zachary. (2005). “A Plea for Asymmetric Games.” Journal of Philosophy 102: 109-125. Friedman, Jeffrey, ed. (1996). The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered. New Haven: Yale University Press. Gaus, Gerald (2011). The Order of Public Reason. Cambrodge: Cambridge U uversity Press. Gaus, Gerald and John Thrasher. (2015). “Rational Choice and the Original Position: The (Many) Models of Rawls and Harsanyi.” In The Original Position, edited by Timothy Hinton. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Gauthier, David. (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press. —— (1991). “Why Contractariansim?” In Contractarianism and Rational Choice, edited by Peter Vallentyne: 15-30. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gintis, Herbert (2009). The Bounds of Reasons: Game Theory nad the Unification of the Behavior Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hamilton, W. D. (1964). “The Genetical Evolution of Social Behaviour I.” Journal of Theoretical Biology, vol. 7: 1-16. Hampton, Jean. (1986). Hobbes and the Social Contract Tradition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Harsanyi, John. (1953). “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Journal of Political Economy 61: 434-435. —— (1955). “Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility.” Journal of Political Economy 63: 309-321. —— (1974). “Can the Maximin Principle Serve as the Basis for Morality?” American Political Science Review 69: 594-606. Harsanyi, John and Reinhard Selten. (1988). A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge: MIT Press.
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