In circumstances where competitive markets do not work to deliver the most efficient outcomes it may be in the public interest to allow certain restrictions on competition. This is particularly true where there are features in a market that may lead to market failure where the market left to itself does not achieve the most optimal outcomes. – In many ways the authorisation and notification provisions of the CCA allow the ACCC to consider the benefits from allowing conduct that addresses a market failure but which nonetheless restricts competition. Authorisations The ACCC may businesses to engage in conduct that might otherwise ‘authorise’ amount to a breach of the CCA where it is satisfied that the public benefit outweighs any public detriment. In assessing the likely public benefits and detriments of an authorisation application the ACCC undertakes a transparent public consultation process, placing submissions on a public register subject to any claims of confidentiality. considering submissions, the ACCC will issue a draft decision and provide an opportunity for interested parties to request a conference to discuss the proposal. The ACCC will then reconsider the application in light of any further submissions and release a final decision. Table 2: Authorisations received and decisions issued Number of applications (number of forms1) Total authorisations received 1 April - 30 June 2015 2014 - 20152 5 (8) 20 (36) New 0 (0) 1 (2) Revocation 4 (7) 13 (29) Revocation and substitution 1 (1) 1 (1) variations Number of applications (number of forms1) Decisions issued 1 April - 30 June 2015 2014 - 20152 5 (8) 30 (62) Draft determinations 4 (10) 33 (62) Final determinations 4 (8) 11 (31) Interim decisions (prior to draft) 1. The Competition & Consumer Act Regulations require applicants to submit specific separate forms for different types of conduct. 2. The full year totals include statistical corrections arising from year- end reconciliation processes. Significant authorisations Authorisation
In circumstances where competitive markets do not work to deliver the most efficient outcomes it may be in the public interest to allow certain restrictions on competition. This is particularly true where there are features in a market that may lead to market failure – where the market left to itself does not achieve the most optimal outcomes. In many ways the authorisation and notification provisions of the CCA allow the ACCC to consider the benefits from allowing conduct that addresses a market failure but which nonetheless restricts competition. Authorisations The ACCC may ‘authorise’ businesses to engage in conduct that might otherwise amount to a breach of the CCA where it is satisfied that the public benefit outweighs any public detriment. In assessing the likely public benefits and detriments of an authorisation application the ACCC undertakes a transparent public consultation process, placing submissions on a public register subject to any claims of confidentiality. considering submissions, the ACCC will issue a draft decision and provide an opportunity for interested parties to request a conference to discuss the proposal. The ACCC will then reconsider the application in light of any further submissions and release a final decision. Table 2: Authorisations received and decisions issued Total authorisations received Number of applications (number of forms1) 1 April - 30 June 2015 2014 - 20152 New 5 (8) 20 (36) Revocation 0 (0) 1 (2) Revocation and substitution 4 (7) 13 (29) variations 1 (1) 1 (1) Decisions issued Number of applications (number of forms1) 1 April - 30 June 2015 2014 - 20152 Draft determinations 5 (8) 30 (62) Final determinations 4 (10) 33 (62) Interim decisions (prior to draft) 4 (8) 11 (31) 1. The Competition & Consumer Act Regulations require applicants to submit specific separate forms for different types of conduct. 2. The full year totals include statistical corrections arising from year- end reconciliation processes. Significant authorisations Authorisation
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