Relations with China were much more volatile, despite Chen Shui-bian’s image as a zealot in promoting the declaration of de jure Taiwan Independence. Chen’s pushing the envelope on the Independence issue commenced in the summer of 2002 when he proclaimed the theory that country on each side of the “one Taiwan Strait” existed, provoking significant unhappiness in both Beijing and Washington. After that, he periodically set off contretemps with Beijing and Washington until he left office in 2008, as he challenged China’s lines” on Taiwan Independence “red by, for example, proposing or holding referenda on issues that might affect Taiwan’s international status and by advocating fundamental change to the country’s Constitution. Yet, there were also signs of pragmatism in Chen’s policies toward Strait relations. He was fairly conciliatory toward an unresponsive PRC for his first two years in office and negotiated a Point Consensus” with the widely perceived pro-China James “Ten Soong in early 2005. More broadly, he followed a pattern of being aggressive toward China during electoral campaigns to appeal to the Green” Taiwanese nationalists and then “deep sounding much more conciliatory after the election was over. Indeed, he only became stridently pro-Independence consistently in 2006 when burgeoning scandals deprived him of support from almost everybody except the deep Greens.
Relations with China were much more volatile, despite Chen Shui-bian’s image as a zealot in promoting the declaration of de jure Taiwan Independence. Chen’s pushing the envelope on the Independence issue commenced in the summer of 2002 when he proclaimed the theory that “one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait” existed, provoking significant unhappiness in both Beijing and Washington. After that, he periodically set off contretemps with Beijing and Washington until he left office in 2008, as he challenged China’s “red lines” on Taiwan Independence by, for example, proposing or holding referenda on issues that might affect Taiwan’s international status and by advocating fundamental change to the country’s Constitution. Yet, there were also signs of pragmatism in Chen’s policies toward relations. He was fairly conciliatory toward an unresponsive PRC for his first two years in office and negotiated a “Ten Point Consensus” with the widely perceived pro-China James Soong in early 2005. More broadly, he followed a pattern of being aggressive toward China during electoral campaigns to appeal to the “deep Green” Taiwanese nationalists and then sounding much more conciliatory after the election was over. Indeed, he only became stridently pro-Independence consistently in 2006 when burgeoning scandals deprived him of support from almost everybody except the deep Greens. Strait
Clark,%20Cal%20and%20Tan,%20Alexander.docx