immunity relates to a court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case.” Columbia Air “Sovereign Servs. v. DOT, 293 Conn. 342, 349 (2009). sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is “[T]he not absolute." While "there are [three] exceptions," only the second "when an action seeks – declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights" -- Id. (internal citations omitted) is even arguably relevant. In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, a plaintiff may not bring a monetary action against the state without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so. Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317 (2003). With respect to this second exception, our supreme court has ruled that in determining the nature of relief sought, whether the relief i.e., sought is declaratory or injunctive, a court must look beyond the manner in which the actually plaintiffs have worded the complaint. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 723 (2007) (“The plaintiff’s request for relief an order that the defendant refund all sales taxes for – which the plaintiff had submitted a claim for refund must be characterized as a claim for – damages.”) The plaintiffs here request that this trial, inter alia, that the existing school “declare funding system is unconstitutional, void and without effect…” and defendants to create “order and maintain a public education system that will provide suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities to plaintiffs.” Docket No. HHD-CV05-4050526-S, #163.00 at 46. While these prayers for relief seem to sound in equity and do not explicitly request the court increase state education funding, a thorough and fair reading of the entire complaint makes clear that plaintiffs really seek an increase in state funding of education. See id. at 3 ¶ 4 (“The level of resources provided by the State's education funding scheme is arbitrary and not related to the actual costs of providing a suitable education.”); 37 ¶ 125 (“The unsuitability and inequality of
“Sovereign immunity relates to a court's subject matter jurisdiction over a case.” Columbia Air Servs. v. DOT, 293 Conn. 342, 349 (2009). “[T]he sovereign immunity enjoyed by the state is not absolute." While "there are [three] exceptions," only the second – "when an action seeks declaratory or injunctive relief on the basis of a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights" -- Id. (internal citations omitted) is even arguably relevant. In the absence of a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity, a plaintiff may not bring a monetary action against the state without authorization from the claims commissioner to do so. Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317 (2003). With respect to this second exception, our supreme court has ruled that in determining the nature of relief sought, i.e., whether the relief sought is actually declaratory or injunctive, a court must look beyond the manner in which the plaintiffs have worded the complaint. See DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Law, 284 Conn. 701, 723 (2007) (“The plaintiff’s request for relief – an order that the defendant refund all sales taxes for which the plaintiff had submitted a claim for refund – must be characterized as a claim for damages.”) The plaintiffs here request that this inter alia, “declare that the existing school funding system is unconstitutional, void and without effect…” and “order defendants to create and maintain a public education system that will provide suitable and substantially equal educational opportunities to plaintiffs.” Docket No. HHD-CV05-4050526-S, #163.00 at 46. While these prayers for relief seem to sound in equity and do not explicitly request the court increase state education funding, a thorough and fair reading of the entire complaint makes clear that plaintiffs really seek an increase in state funding of education. See id. at 3 ¶ 4 (“The level of resources provided by the State's education funding scheme is arbitrary and not related to the actual costs of providing a suitable education.”); 37 ¶ 125 (“The unsuitability and inequality of trial,
CCJEFDefsPostTrialBrief.docx