Berlusconi agreed to the reforms before asking his supporters to leave the Senate. And how did the members of the Senate agree to vote for a reduction of their own powers? Historical examples of this sort are rare (the reduction of the powers of the House of Lords comes to mind), but in these occasions, a serious threat of appointment of new members was a necessary part of the deal that produced the results. But in the Italian case, the reduction of powers of the Senate on policy matters was escorted by the preservation of symmetric bicameralism on constitutional issues. This ambiguous and inconsistent choice was included in the initial text of the committee of men” reporting on “wise 15, 2014. Newspaper information has shown Renzi denying that he ever said or thought to abolish the Senate, while others argue that this was a b”. If this information is correct, the wise “plan men plan was a compromise among the current constitutional provisions and an alternative, more radical approach. This is why I am referring to the constitutional revisions as “compromesso astorico”. The compromise achieves its goal in one dimension (policy), but as I will demonstrate, it compounds the situation in another (constitution). I will be waiting for the political history of the events to be written. Here, however, I work backwards, looking at the institutions themselves and examining the ramifications of the impending constitutional changes. To do so, I employ Veto Players theory to assess the effects of Italy’s reforms on its constitutional revisions process, policymaking outcomes, and the balance of power between its governing institutions. More specifically, I argue that while Italy’s constitutional reforms will achieve the goal of greater policy change in the legislature (by decreasing the number of relevant veto players), they will render constitutional revisions more difficult and strengthen the role of the court in constitutional interpretation (while decreasing its power in statutory interpretation). In this sense, reformers’ ultimate goal has been only partially achieved, as legislative flexibility will be
Berlusconi agreed to the reforms before asking his supporters to leave the Senate. And how did the members of the Senate agree to vote for a reduction of their own powers? Historical examples of this sort are rare (the reduction of the powers of the House of Lords comes to mind), but in these occasions, a serious threat of appointment of new members was a necessary part of the deal that produced the results. But in the Italian case, the reduction of powers of the Senate on policy matters was escorted by the preservation of symmetric bicameralism on constitutional issues. This ambiguous and inconsistent choice was included in the initial text of the committee of “wise men” reporting on 15, 2014. Newspaper information has shown Renzi denying that he ever said or thought to abolish the Senate, while others argue that this was a “plan b”. If this information is correct, the wise men plan was a compromise among the current constitutional provisions and an alternative, more radical approach. This is why I am referring to the constitutional revisions as “compromesso astorico”. The compromise achieves its goal in one dimension (policy), but as I will demonstrate, it compounds the situation in another (constitution). I will be waiting for the political history of the events to be written. Here, however, I work backwards, looking at the institutions themselves and examining the ramifications of the impending constitutional changes. To do so, I employ Veto Players theory to assess the effects of Italy’s reforms on its constitutional revisions process, policymaking outcomes, and the balance of power between its governing institutions. More specifically, I argue that while Italy’s constitutional reforms will achieve the goal of greater policy change in the legislature (by decreasing the number of relevant veto players), they will render constitutional revisions more difficult and strengthen the role of the court in constitutional interpretation (while decreasing its power in statutory interpretation). In this sense, reformers’ ultimate goal has been only partially achieved, as legislative flexibility will be
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