type of representative. Instead, districts will be internally heterogeneous and competitive elections will be common. One party controls the map-drawing process. They Partisan Gerrymander: “pack” members of the opposed party into a small number of ideologically homogenous districts, creating some safe incumbents. But they also create a large number of districts that favor their own party. How homogenous and these districts are will depend on how “safe” the gerrymander is. If the map-drawers create many districts that tilt only “aggressive” slightly in favor of the majority party, they risk having the map and losing “backfire” many seats in the event of a modestly averse partisan tide. When maps are drawn by legislatures or committees, I posit that the partisan composition of that body will determine which the map should resemble, possibly influenced by other “regime” institutional factors. However, the paper offers no general supposition when maps are drawn by courts; although an ostensibly nonpartisan institution, the resulting maps are influenced by many factors, including the circumstances and issues which lead the process into court, the state’s judicial selection systems, and the personal partisan leanings of the judges. To more fully explain the difference between the three procedural gerrymandering regimes that serve as the primary dependent variable in this project, examples of each regime is shown in both a state” of 25 voters, and a short case study from the 2001 redistricting cycle. “toy The Bipartisan Gerrymander In further detailing each of these gerrymandering regimes, let us begin with a simple toy state. Consider a state with 25 voters, to be apportioned into 5 legislative districts of equal population. As shown in Figure 1, assume that the most liberal voters are on the left side of the state, and the most conservative are on the right side of the state; the 10 most liberal voters
type of representative. Instead, districts will be internally heterogeneous and competitive elections will be common. Partisan Gerrymander: One party controls the map-drawing process. They “pack” members of the opposed party into a small number of ideologically homogenous districts, creating some safe incumbents. But they also create a large number of districts that favor their own party. How homogenous and “safe” these districts are will depend on how “aggressive” the gerrymander is. If the map-drawers create many districts that tilt only slightly in favor of the majority party, they risk having the map “backfire” and losing many seats in the event of a modestly averse partisan tide. When maps are drawn by legislatures or committees, I posit that the partisan composition of that body will determine which “regime” the map should resemble, possibly influenced by other institutional factors. However, the paper offers no general supposition when maps are drawn by courts; although an ostensibly nonpartisan institution, the resulting maps are influenced by many factors, including the circumstances and issues which lead the process into court, the state’s judicial selection systems, and the personal partisan leanings of the judges. To more fully explain the difference between the three procedural gerrymandering regimes that serve as the primary dependent variable in this project, examples of each regime is shown in both a “toy state” of 25 voters, and a short case study from the 2001 redistricting cycle. The Bipartisan Gerrymander In further detailing each of these gerrymandering regimes, let us begin with a simple toy state. Consider a state with 25 voters, to be apportioned into 5 legislative districts of equal population. As shown in Figure 1, assume that the most liberal voters are on the left side of the state, and the most conservative are on the right side of the state; the 10 most liberal voters
Chapter-1-Introduction.docx