Underestimated costs and overestimated benefits to get projects approved without adequate economic justification Project selection, Costly designs that increase consultants’ Government ministers design, and fees and contractors’ profits Senior civil servants budgeting Designs that favour a specific contractor Procurement officers Incomplete designs that leave room for Private consultants later adjustments (which can be (e.g., planners, manipulated) designers, engineers, High cost estimates to provide a cushion and surveyors) for the later diversion of funds Political influence to get projects into the budget without appraisal Tender for Bribery to obtain contracts (leaving costs Procurement officers and supervision to be recovered at later stages) Private consultants contracts Collusion among bidders to allocate (e.g., supervising contracts and/or raise prices (potentially engineer) with assistance from procurement Contractors officers) Interference by procurement officers to favour specific firms or individuals Going to tender and signing contracts for projects that are not in the budget Implementation Collusion between contractor and the Procurement officers supervising engineer (with or without the Private consultants client’s knowledge) that results in the use (e.g., supervising of lower quality materials and engineer) substandard work Contractors and Collusion between contractors and the subcontractors supervising engineer to increase the contract price or adjust the work required in order to make extra profits, cover potential losses, or recover money spent on bribes Operation and Agreement by the supervising engineer to Procurement officers maintenance, accept poor quality work or work below Private consultants including the specification, leading to rapid (e.g., supervising evaluation and deterioration of assets engineer) audit A lack of allocated for maintenance, Contractors and as new construction takes precedence in subcontractors the project identification stage for future projects
Underestimated costs and overestimated benefits to get projects approved without adequate economic justification Project selection, design, and budgeting Costly designs that increase consultants’ fees and contractors’ profits Designs that favour a specific contractor Incomplete designs that leave room for later adjustments (which can be manipulated) High cost estimates to provide a cushion for the later diversion of funds Political influence to get projects into the budget without appraisal Government ministers Senior civil servants Procurement officers Private consultants (e.g., planners, designers, engineers, and surveyors) Tender for and supervision contracts Bribery to obtain contracts (leaving costs to be recovered at later stages) Collusion among bidders to allocate contracts and/or raise prices (potentially with assistance from procurement officers) Interference by procurement officers to favour specific firms or individuals Going to tender and signing contracts for projects that are not in the budget Procurement officers Private consultants (e.g., supervising engineer) Contractors Implementation Collusion between contractor and the supervising engineer (with or without the client’s knowledge) that results in the use of lower quality materials and substandard work Collusion between contractors and the supervising engineer to increase the contract price or adjust the work required in order to make extra profits, cover potential losses, or recover money spent on bribes Procurement officers Private consultants (e.g., supervising engineer) Contractors and subcontractors Operation and maintenance, including evaluation and audit Agreement by the supervising engineer to accept poor quality work or work below the specification, leading to rapid deterioration of assets A lack of allocated for maintenance, as new construction takes precedence in the project identification stage for future projects Procurement officers Private consultants (e.g., supervising engineer) Contractors and subcontractors
Ch.-11_April2018_v5.docx