for example we have found that the prospectus of Seddon’s Pneumatic Tyre was advertised in a Dublin daily, in 1892 prior to listing on the Dublin exchange. It was not Freeman’s Journal, advertised in the therefore we exclude it from our sample. Therefore Times Book of Prospectuses our sample will have a slight bias towards London companies, although it must be stressed that many companies from across the United Kingdom and around the world did advertise in the even if the firm subsequently listed on a provincial exchange. Times Book of Prospectuses Company promoters had a mixed reputation at the time, often trading off reputational concerns against the desire to make a quick profit. One of the most infamous promoters, E.T. Hooley, claimed that: was never one to concern myself with what happened afterwards.’ ‘I Assistance with organizing an IPO did not usually include underwriting the IPO (see Burhop, Chambers, and Cheffins, 2012), and we do not find any instances of commitment’ ‘firm underwriting. The financial press would discuss prospectuses currently circulating, although there was often the suspicion that this coverage had been by the companies ‘compromised’ coming on to market (see Cheffins p. 201). Asymmetric information concerns between promoters and potential shareholders were paramount, and Kennedy (1984) argues that: company promoters were ludicrously better informed about the prospects of the ‘Victorian … ventures they were selling than were the vast majority of potential buyers.’ Company promoters would seek to overcome the information asymmetry problem by methods such as portraying personal financial success (see Cheffins p. 208), adding politicians or nobles to the board of directors (see Armstrong, 1990 and Braggion and Moore, 2013), or seeking local investors (see Lavington, 1921; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009; Chambers and Dimson, 2009, and Cheffins p. 211).
for example we have found that the prospectus of Seddon’s Pneumatic Tyre was advertised in Freeman’s Journal, a Dublin daily, in 1892 prior to listing on the Dublin exchange. It was not advertised in the Times Book of Prospectuses therefore we exclude it from our sample. Therefore our sample will have a slight bias towards London companies, although it must be stressed that many companies from across the United Kingdom and around the world did advertise in the Times Book of Prospectuses even if the firm subsequently listed on a provincial exchange. Company promoters had a mixed reputation at the time, often trading off reputational concerns against the desire to make a quick profit. One of the most infamous promoters, E.T. Hooley, claimed that: ‘I was never one to concern myself with what happened afterwards.’ Assistance with organizing an IPO did not usually include underwriting the IPO (see Burhop, Chambers, and Cheffins, 2012), and we do not find any instances of ‘firm commitment’ underwriting. The financial press would discuss prospectuses currently circulating, although there was often the suspicion that this coverage had been ‘compromised’ by the companies coming on to market (see Cheffins p. 201). Asymmetric information concerns between promoters and potential shareholders were paramount, and Kennedy (1984) argues that: ‘Victorian company promoters were … ludicrously better informed about the prospects of the ventures they were selling than were the vast majority of potential buyers.’ Company promoters would seek to overcome the information asymmetry problem by methods such as portraying personal financial success (see Cheffins p. 208), adding politicians or nobles to the board of directors (see Armstrong, 1990 and Braggion and Moore, 2013), or seeking local investors (see Lavington, 1921; Franks, Mayer and Rossi, 2009; Chambers and Dimson, 2009, and Cheffins p. 211).
c8b17686-c8d5-4888-ad96-2ae17d45a43f.docx