Second, in relativity physics, the additivity of mass in the relevant sense (that is, rest mass) does not hold at all (McQueen). Third, according to Jonathan Schaffer, it is conceivable that mereological sums of parts with mass should have mass. So the necessity of the zero exclusion principle has yet to be explained in accredited Armstrongian fashion. In (2013), ‘Just is’ statements and ‘why’ questions. The Construction of Logical Space Agustin Rayo introduces two notions that are highly relevant to issues in this paper: is’ ‘just statements and why-closure. Suppose someone says, see clearly things composed of water are composed of H2O, that “I but I want to know things composed of water are composed of H2O.” Rayo would reply, why can you possibly mean by asking Your demand for an explanation makes no “What ‘why?’ sense. For something to be composed of water for it to be composed of H2O” (54-56). just is When a question like the one about water and H2O makes no sense—when the demand for an explanation is illegitimate—Rayo says that the statement p in p?’ is why-closed (or ‘why as I shall sometimes put it, the question p?’ is closed). Clearly, the notion of why-closure ‘why is in the same ballpark as the notion of autonomy I have been using. Some things are not apt for explanations the demand for explanations is illegitimate the question why they are true does ≈ ≈ not make sense. is’ statements are statements of the form it to be the case that for it to be the ‘Just ‘for φ just is case that Examples from Rayo’s list on p. 3 are ψ’. (1) For to be a sibling for her to share parents with someone else. just is (3) For such-and-such a mental state to be instantiated for thus-and–such brain states and just is environment conditions to obtain. (6) For there to be a table for there to be some things arranged tablewise. just is
Second, in relativity physics, the additivity of mass in the relevant sense (that is, rest mass) does not hold at all (McQueen). Third, according to Jonathan Schaffer, it is conceivable that mereological sums of parts with mass should have zero mass. So the necessity of the exclusion principle has yet to be explained in accredited Armstrongian fashion. ‘Just is’ statements and ‘why’ questions. In The Construction of Logical Space (2013), Agustin Rayo introduces two notions that are highly relevant to issues in this paper: ‘just is’ statements and why-closure. Suppose someone says, “I see clearly that things composed of water are composed of H2O, but I want to know why things composed of water are composed of H2O.” Rayo would reply, “What can you possibly mean by asking ‘why?’ Your demand for an explanation makes no sense. For something to be composed of water just is for it to be composed of H2O” (54-56). When a question like the one about water and H2O makes no sense—when the demand for an explanation is illegitimate—Rayo says that the statement p in ‘why p?’ is why-closed (or as I shall sometimes put it, the question ‘why p?’ is closed). Clearly, the notion of why-closure is in the same ballpark as the notion of autonomy I have been using. Some things are not apt for explanations ≈ the demand for explanations is illegitimate ≈ the question why they are true does not make sense. ‘Just is’ statements are statements of the form ‘for it to be the case that φ just is for it to be the case that ψ’. Examples from Rayo’s list on p. 3 are (1) For to be a sibling just is for her to share parents with someone else. (3) For such-and-such a mental state to be instantiated just is for thus-and–such brain states and environment conditions to obtain. (6) For there to be a table just is for there to be some things arranged tablewise.
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