squared normalized ideological distance between these members’1st dimension DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) i.e., , the interaction between these theoretical causal – variables, a binary dummy variable accounting for female-male donor differences (denoted by predicted by our theory, where = 1 for female donors, = 0 for male donors) and its WD) WD WD interaction with relative group size and preference divergence variables; a generic dimension kth X vector of ancillary control variables at election cycle which comprise of donor-specific t effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term. The hypothesized coefficient signs consistent with the key predictions generated from the unified theory of colleague valuation model are as follows: < 0 and > 0. That is, we expect α2, β2 α5, β5 that male House members will lower their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women trigger increases in the level of threat men feel. Similarly, we expect that female House members will increase their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women allow women to work together to affect change within an institution. Because the data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad that are likely not independent across election cycles, we report robust standard errors clustered on dyad. Ancillary Control Variables We also include several variables that are likely to be related to the valuation of a colleague, but unrelated to the theoretical predictions. First, several variables indicate that legislators might, ceteris paribus, be more likely to donate to those colleagues who have personal characteristics other than gender that the potential donor might find valuable. For this reason, we include are two binary variables, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient Same State, represent the same state, 0 otherwise, and coded 1 if the donor and potential Same Region,
squared normalized ideological distance between these members’1st dimension DW-Nominate scores (Poole and Rosenthal 1997) – i.e., , the interaction between these theoretical causal variables, a binary dummy variable accounting for female-male donor differences (denoted by WD) predicted by our theory, where WD = 1 for female donors, WD = 0 for male donors) and its interaction with relative group size and preference divergence variables; a generic kth dimension X vector of ancillary control variables at election cycle t which comprise of donor-specific effects, recipient-specific effects, donor-recipient dyadic specific effects, plus a disturbance term. The hypothesized coefficient signs consistent with the key predictions generated from the unified theory of colleague valuation model are as follows: α2, β2 < 0 and α5, β5 > 0. That is, we expect that male House members will lower their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women trigger increases in the level of threat men feel. Similarly, we expect that female House members will increase their valuation of female colleagues because increases in the proportion of women allow women to work together to affect change within an institution. Because the data include multiple observations per donor-recipient dyad that are likely not independent across election cycles, we report robust standard errors clustered on dyad. Ancillary Control Variables We also include several variables that are likely to be related to the valuation of a colleague, but unrelated to the theoretical predictions. First, several variables indicate that legislators might, ceteris paribus, be more likely to donate to those colleagues who have personal characteristics other than gender that the potential donor might find valuable. For this reason, we include are two binary variables, Same State, coded 1 if the donor and potential recipient represent the same state, 0 otherwise, and Same Region, coded 1 if the donor and potential
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