worthiness of individuals for job training and dispense a document, tentatively called a of eligibility,” that would entitle the recipient to social services and employment “certificate opportunities. The Commission had no illusions about the price tag of this huge endeavor (“Creation of jobs for the hard-core unemployed will require substantial payments to both public and private employers to offset the extra costs of supportive services and trainings.”), but thought the policies do-able so long as citizens were willing to be taxed. In addition, the Kerner Commission recommended that the federal government should repair and replace the deteriorating buildings and transportation systems within Black urban communities, and help finance a host of social services, from garbage collection to pre-school education. Allegedly, extant municipal governments were too financially strapped and bureaucratically inefficient to service their communities properly. To do this, the federal government should create a new level of administration. In theory, elected officials, leaders of private businesses and local unions, and spokespersons for neighborhood residents would meet regularly, discuss ghetto conditions, and propose remedies. The local proposals, if reasonable, would then be implemented through a mixture of federal government monies and private philanthropy. This vision of local-level consultation, the Commissioners added, was not the sort of participatory democracy and system of neighborhood independence that contemporary theorists of Black Power proposed. After all, to attain equal opportunity with whites, blacks needed the resources that white society controlled. Otherwise, a system of black self-rule would perpetuate the current economic gap between Black and White society. The economy of the United States and particularly the sources of employment are preponderantly white. In this circumstance, a policy of separate but equal
worthiness of individuals for job training and dispense a document, tentatively called a “certificate of eligibility,” that would entitle the recipient to social services and employment opportunities. The Commission had no illusions about the price tag of this huge endeavor (“Creation of jobs for the hard-core unemployed will require substantial payments to both public and private employers to offset the extra costs of supportive services and trainings.”), but thought the policies do-able so long as citizens were willing to be taxed. In addition, the Kerner Commission recommended that the federal government should repair and replace the deteriorating buildings and transportation systems within Black urban communities, and help finance a host of social services, from garbage collection to pre-school education. Allegedly, extant municipal governments were too financially strapped and bureaucratically inefficient to service their communities properly. To do this, the federal government should create a new level of administration. In theory, elected officials, leaders of private businesses and local unions, and spokespersons for neighborhood residents would meet regularly, discuss ghetto conditions, and propose remedies. The local proposals, if reasonable, would then be implemented through a mixture of federal government monies and private philanthropy. This vision of local-level consultation, the Commissioners added, was not the sort of participatory democracy and system of neighborhood independence that contemporary theorists of Black Power proposed. After all, to attain equal opportunity with whites, blacks needed the resources that white society controlled. Otherwise, a system of black self-rule would perpetuate the current economic gap between Black and White society. The economy of the United States and particularly the sources of employment are preponderantly white. In this circumstance, a policy of separate but equal
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