Different Trauma Requires Different Care Strategies is intuitive that combat and civilian trauma are •It different, BUT… TCCC principles are now determined by physicians and is difficult to devise and implement needed •It combat medical personnel working as a team. changes. In the past, the failure of these two groups to one of medical professionals has all of •No communicate well slowed the implementation of critical the necessary skills and experience. trauma care measures. docs and combat medical personnel •Trauma We will look at a dramatic example of this. have different skill sets. Both are needed to optimize battlefield trauma care strategies. are one striking example of how •Tourniquets battlefield trauma care has sometimes been slow to change. Tourniquets in WWII Wolff AMEDD J April 1945 This report was written by an Army doctor in World War II. Provided very clear input on tourniquets. believe that the tourniquet “We A tourniquet seem to be a simple thing to fix. in common use is ineffective in most instances Now, fast-forward 25 years. under field conditions…it rarely controls bleeding no matter how tightly applied.” 25 later, we had still not learned the tourniquet Vietnam lesson in Vietnam. 2500 preventable deaths from extremity hemorrhage were the result. Over 2500 deaths occurred in Vietnam secondary Surely, we would have learned the lesson after this to hemorrhage from extremity wounds. experience. casualties had no other injuries. Maybe not - fast-forward another 25 years.
Different Trauma Requires Different Care Strategies •It is intuitive that combat and civilian trauma are different, BUT… •It is difficult to devise and implement needed changes. •No one of medical professionals has all of the necessary skills and experience. •Trauma docs and combat medical personnel have different skill sets. Both are needed to optimize battlefield trauma care strategies. •Tourniquets are one striking example of how battlefield trauma care has sometimes been slow to change. TCCC principles are now determined by physicians and combat medical personnel working as a team. In the past, the failure of these two groups to communicate well slowed the implementation of critical trauma care measures. We will look at a dramatic example of this. Tourniquets in WWII Wolff AMEDD J April 1945 “We believe that the tourniquet in common use is ineffective in most instances under field conditions…it rarely controls bleeding no matter how tightly applied.” This report was written by an Army doctor in World War II. Provided very clear input on tourniquets. A tourniquet seem to be a simple thing to fix. Now, fast-forward 25 years. Vietnam Over 2500 deaths occurred in Vietnam secondary to hemorrhage from extremity wounds. casualties had no other injuries. 25 later, we had still not learned the tourniquet lesson in Vietnam. 2500 preventable deaths from extremity hemorrhage were the result. Surely, we would have learned the lesson after this experience. Maybe not - fast-forward another 25 years.
010301%20TCCC-MP%20Intro%20to%20TCCC%20IG%20160603.docx