of party platforms on legislative performance. He compared the state legislatures of Illinois and Wisconsin in the United States, examining the extent to which these fulfil legislatively their platform commitments. He differentiated between oriented’ ‘issue and parties’ on one hand and oriented’ and parties’ on ‘moralistic ‘job ‘individualistic the other. He argues that issue oriented and moralistic parties are likely to do well in the fulfilment of legislative platform agenda than the job oriented and individualistic parties. He described the Wisconsin parties as the issue oriented and moralistic, while the Illinois parties as the job- oriented and individualistic parties. oriented parties’ in Illinois, are described as parties that are characterised by an ‘Job- orientation towards winning office for tangible reward, while a concern with issues is notably lacking. On the other hand, oriented and moralistic parties’ in ‘issue Wisconsin usually have extensive state-making activity (especially by the Chicago Democratic organisation) and a closed primary does seem to translate into external party organisational control of state legislators by the Democrats if not Republicans. Richard, (1979) described the process of fulfilling party pledges as “Party Responsibility. In Nigeria, legislatures at both national and state level are ‘job oriented and individualistic parties’. This explains why legislatures in Nigeria are vulnerable to financial shocks. Thus bribes, gratifications and providing cover for the corruption of the executive for kickbacks are some of the ways in which the executive control legislature in Nigeria. This is even worse at state level where governors give directives to state Assemblies on virtually all issues of public concern. This scenario has made state governors godfathers of state legislators. In some instances, members of the state assemblies who are elected on different party platform with the governor are compelled by the dominance of the governor to decamp to the platform of the governor for incentives and personal favours. Similarly, Timothy (2000) examined the dynamics of congressional loyalty from 1947 to 1997. The rate of party defection among members of the U.S Congress within the stipulated period was also investigated. It is argued that one interesting thing about congressional loyalty in the U.S is that Congress members enjoy relatively free hand to cast roll call votes than their counterparts in the parliamentary system. This is because members of parliament only vote against their party preferences at the risk of severe party sanctions; and in the extreme, the possibility of government dissolution.
of party platforms on legislative performance. He compared the state legislatures of Illinois and Wisconsin in the United States, examining the extent to which these fulfil legislatively their platform commitments. He differentiated between ‘issue oriented’ and ‘moralistic parties’ on one hand and ‘job oriented’ and ‘individualistic parties’ on the other. He argues that issue oriented and moralistic parties are likely to do well in the fulfilment of legislative platform agenda than the job oriented and individualistic parties. He described the Wisconsin parties as the issue oriented and moralistic, while the Illinois parties as the job- oriented and individualistic parties. ‘Job- oriented parties’ in Illinois, are described as parties that are characterised by an orientation towards winning office for tangible reward, while a concern with issues is notably lacking. On the other hand, ‘issue oriented and moralistic parties’ in Wisconsin usually have extensive state-making activity (especially by the Chicago Democratic organisation) and a closed primary does seem to translate into external party organisational control of state legislators by the Democrats if not Republicans. Richard, (1979) described the process of fulfilling party pledges as “Party Responsibility. In Nigeria, legislatures at both national and state level are ‘job oriented and individualistic parties’. This explains why legislatures in Nigeria are vulnerable to financial shocks. Thus bribes, gratifications and providing cover for the corruption of the executive for kickbacks are some of the ways in which the executive control legislature in Nigeria. This is even worse at state level where governors give directives to state Assemblies on virtually all issues of public concern. This scenario has made state governors godfathers of state legislators. In some instances, members of the state assemblies who are elected on different party platform with the governor are compelled by the dominance of the governor to decamp to the platform of the governor for incentives and personal favours. Similarly, Timothy (2000) examined the dynamics of congressional loyalty from 1947 to 1997. The rate of party defection among members of the U.S Congress within the stipulated period was also investigated. It is argued that one interesting thing about congressional loyalty in the U.S is that Congress members enjoy relatively free hand to cast roll call votes than their counterparts in the parliamentary system. This is because members of parliament only vote against their party preferences at the risk of severe party sanctions; and in the extreme, the possibility of government dissolution.
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