nothingness [Nichtigkeit] of the first, it is what experience has made of The idea is that it” [86]. skepticism consists in taking the sense in which the second object is negation of the first to be or abstract negation, rather than negation. Doing that is the result formal determinate “allowing which emerges from an untrue mode of to into an empty knowledge” “dissolve nothingness.” The point is that the sense in which the second object the nothingness of the is “contains first” not that stick is is succeeded by stick is It is that it is succeeded by not “The bent,” “The bent.” the realization that stick is is not saying how things really are. It is an appearance, a “The bent,” That is the materially incompatible commitment for which mis-representation of a straight stick. the bent-stick representation was discarded, changing its normative status. The original commitment is not revealed by its incorrectness as an appearance—but as the appearance a of It is genuinely an appearance of that reality: a way that reality shows up for reality. consciousness. It is wrong, but it is not simply wrong. It is a path to the truth. When Hegel says that result which emerges from an untrue mode of “the knowledge” must grasped as the nothingness a result which contains what is true of that whose result it is, “be in the previous this is so in a double sense. First, the original take on things is not knowledge,” simply cancelled, leaving a void, as a bare contradiction of it would do. It is replaced by a contrary, substantive commitment—one that is materially, not merely formally incompatible with it. Something positive has been learned: the stick is straight. Second, the transition from the original object to the second, true object is a change of status from a propositional attitude ascribable to the subject to one ascribable (also) Where before we, and the de dicto de re. subject, could say the stick is after the experience of error and the “S believes that bent,” rejection of the original endorsement in favor of a materially contrary one, the very same attitude
nothingness [Nichtigkeit] of the first, it is what experience has made of it” [86]. The idea is that skepticism consists in taking the sense in which the second object is negation of the first to be formal or abstract negation, rather than determinate negation. Doing that is “allowing the result which emerges from an untrue mode of knowledge” to “dissolve into an empty nothingness.” The point is that the sense in which the second object “contains the nothingness of the first” is not that “The stick is bent,” is succeeded by “The stick is not bent.” It is that it is succeeded by the realization that “The stick is bent,” is not saying how things really are. It is an appearance, a mis-representation of a straight stick. That is the materially incompatible commitment for which the bent-stick representation was discarded, changing its normative status. The original commitment is not revealed by its incorrectness as an appearance—but as the appearance of a reality. It is genuinely an appearance of that reality: a way that reality shows up for consciousness. It is wrong, but it is not simply wrong. It is a path to the truth. When Hegel says that “the result which emerges from an untrue mode of knowledge” must “be grasped as the nothingness of that whose result it is, a result which contains what is true in the previous knowledge,” this is so in a double sense. First, the original take on things is not simply cancelled, leaving a void, as a bare contradiction of it would do. It is replaced by a contrary, substantive commitment—one that is materially, not merely formally incompatible with it. Something positive has been learned: the stick is straight. Second, the transition from the original object to the second, true object is a change of status from a propositional attitude ascribable to the subject de dicto to one ascribable (also) de re. Where before we, and the subject, could say “S believes that the stick is bent,” after the experience of error and the rejection of the original endorsement in favor of a materially contrary one, the very same attitude
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