endorsement of the bent-stick and straight-stick perceptual judgments conjoined with the straight-stick belief constitute an argument against the bent-stick belief. In undergoing the experience of error, our subject in practice treats reality (the straight stick) as providing rational constraint on the assessment of various appearances as veridical. In proceeding this way, the subject in practice takes or treats the bent-stick belief as expressing just what things are for consciousness, and the straight-stick belief as expressing what things are in themselves. These statuses, in turn, are what the beliefs are consciousness, or implicitly. to For the subject of the experience of error need not explicitly deploy concepts of reality and appearance, represented and representing, what things are themselves and what things are in for consciousness, noumena and phenomena, in order for what it does in retaining one of the (contextually) materially incompatible dyad of commitments and rejecting the other to be intelligible as practically taking or treating one as presenting how things really are and the other as presenting a mere appearance. One is consciousness what the stick is in itself (straight), to and the other is consciousness what the stick is (was) merely consciousness. This is what to for Hegel means when he says that provides itself with its own how “consciousness standard,” “in what consciousness within its own self designates as the or the true, we have the in-itself standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure its knowledge.” The Two Sides of Conceptual Content are Representationally Related
endorsement of the bent-stick and straight-stick perceptual judgments conjoined with the straight-stick belief constitute an argument against the bent-stick belief. In undergoing the experience of error, our subject in practice treats reality (the straight stick) as providing rational constraint on the assessment of various appearances as veridical. In proceeding this way, the subject in practice takes or treats the bent-stick belief as expressing just what things are for consciousness, and the straight-stick belief as expressing what things are in themselves. These statuses, in turn, are what the beliefs are to consciousness, or implicitly. For the subject of the experience of error need not explicitly deploy concepts of reality and appearance, represented and representing, what things are in themselves and what things are for consciousness, noumena and phenomena, in order for what it does in retaining one of the (contextually) materially incompatible dyad of commitments and rejecting the other to be intelligible as practically taking or treating one as presenting how things really are and the other as presenting a mere appearance. One is to consciousness what the stick is in itself (straight), and the other is to consciousness what the stick is (was) merely for consciousness. This is what Hegel means when he says that “consciousness provides itself with its own standard,” how “in what consciousness within its own self designates as the in-itself or the true, we have the standard by which consciousness itself proposes to measure its knowledge.” The Two Sides of Conceptual Content are Representationally Related
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