called the constraint tells us that what serves as a of standard of assessment “rational condition” judgeable contents must be able to serve as a for the assessment. This is to say that it reason must, at least in principle, be available consciousness a reason. To be serviceable as a to as reason, what plays the role of a standard of assessment must be in conceptual shape; it must stand to representings and representables in relations of material incompatibility and consequence. That is what is required for it to be able to serve as a reason for or against judgments, a standard with respect to which they can be assessed as correct or incorrect. The Experience of Error 9. With that thought, we arrive at the crux of functionalist account of Hegel’s representational purport. term for the process by which new commitments are integrated Hegel’s into a constellation of old ones is The aspect of that process on which ‘experience’ (Erfahrung). his account of the representational purport of judgeable contents turns is the critical one, in which incompatibilities that result from adding a new judgment are acknowledged and resolved. The systematic normative obligation along this dimension is a task responsibility: the responsibility to do something. What one is obliged to do is to restore the synthetic unity characteristic of apperception by repairing the incoherence that results when a subject finds itself with incompatible commitments. This process is the experience of error. Consider an example. A naïve subject looks at a stick half-submerged in the water of a pond and perceptually acquires a belief that the stick is bent. Upon pulling it out, she acquires the belief that it is straight. Throughout she has believed that it is rigid, and that removing it
called the “rational constraint condition” tells us that what serves as a standard of assessment of judgeable contents must be able to serve as a reason for the assessment. This is to say that it must, at least in principle, be available to consciousness as a reason. To be serviceable as a reason, what plays the role of a standard of assessment must be in conceptual shape; it must stand to representings and representables in relations of material incompatibility and consequence. That is what is required for it to be able to serve as a reason for or against judgments, a standard with respect to which they can be assessed as correct or incorrect. The Experience of Error 9. With that thought, we arrive at the crux of Hegel’s functionalist account of representational purport. Hegel’s term for the process by which new commitments are integrated into a constellation of old ones is ‘experience’ (Erfahrung). The aspect of that process on which his account of the representational purport of judgeable contents turns is the critical one, in which incompatibilities that result from adding a new judgment are acknowledged and resolved. The systematic normative obligation along this dimension is a task responsibility: the responsibility to do something. What one is obliged to do is to restore the synthetic unity characteristic of apperception by repairing the incoherence that results when a subject finds itself with incompatible commitments. This process is the experience of error. Consider an example. A naïve subject looks at a stick half-submerged in the water of a pond and perceptually acquires a belief that the stick is bent. Upon pulling it out, she acquires the belief that it is straight. Throughout she has believed that it is rigid, and that removing it
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