norms from the realm of empirical into the realm of noumenal activity. I think it is a nice question just how account deals with this issue. Kant’s 6. As I read him, Hegel criticizes Kant on just this point. He sees Kant as having been uncharacteristically and culpably uncritical about the origin and nature of the of determinateness the contents of empirical concepts. principal innovation is his idea that in order to Hegel’s follow through on fundamental insight into the essentially character of mind, normative Kant’s meaning, and rationality, we need to recognize that normative statuses such as authority and responsibility are at base statuses. He broadens account of synthesizing normative social Kant’s individual selves or subjects (unities of apperception) by the activity of into rational integration, an account of the simultaneous synthesizing of apperceiving individual selves (subjects of normative statuses) and their communities, by practices of How does reciprocal recognition. this response fit into the space of possibilities defined by the considerations I have been putting forward as motivating Kant? The problem is set by a tension between the autonomy model of normative bindingness, which is a way of working out and filling in the Enlightenment commitment to the dependence of normative statuses, on the one hand, and the requirement that the contents by which autonomous subjects bind themselves be at least relatively attitude-independent, in the sense that while according to the autonomy thesis the subject has the authority over the judging, in the sense of concepts are applied, which judgeable content is endorsed (responsibility is which taken for), one then becomes responsible for must be independent of taking what one’s responsibility for it, on the other. This is to say that the content itself must have an that authority
norms from the realm of empirical into the realm of noumenal activity. I think it is a nice question just how Kant’s account deals with this issue. 6. As I read him, Hegel criticizes Kant on just this point. He sees Kant as having been uncharacteristically and culpably uncritical about the origin and nature of the determinateness of the contents of empirical concepts. Hegel’s principal innovation is his idea that in order to follow through on Kant’s fundamental insight into the essentially normative character of mind, meaning, and rationality, we need to recognize that normative statuses such as authority and responsibility are at base social statuses. He broadens Kant’s account of synthesizing normative individual selves or subjects (unities of apperception) by the activity of rational integration, into an account of the simultaneous synthesizing of apperceiving individual selves (subjects of normative statuses) and their communities, by practices of reciprocal recognition. How does this response fit into the space of possibilities defined by the considerations I have been putting forward as motivating Kant? The problem is set by a tension between the autonomy model of normative bindingness, which is a way of working out and filling in the Enlightenment commitment to the of normative statuses, on the one hand, and the requirement that the contents by which autonomous subjects bind themselves be at least relatively attitude-independent, in the sense that while according to the autonomy thesis the subject has the authority over the judging, in the sense of which concepts are applied, which judgeable content is endorsed (responsibility is taken for), what one then becomes responsible for must be independent of one’s taking responsibility for it, on the other. This is to say that the content itself must have an authority that dependence
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