Consciousness knows and this object is the essence or the But something, in-itself. this object is also the in-itself for consciousness; and hence the ambiguity of this truth comes into play. We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first and the second is the The in-itself being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into its self, a representation, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. But, as already indicated, the first object comes to be altered for consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is the And therefore it follows that this, the in-itself only for it. is the true, which is to say that this true is the of this in-itself, or new This new object contains the annihilation essence object. consciousness’ of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object. [86] The first thing to notice is that the first object is described as the in-itself”. That implies “first that there is (at least) in-itself. But there is only one real stick (and it is straight). What another is at issue here is the role something can play in experience. The role in question is being an consciousness. To be an in-itself to consciousness is to be what consciousness to practically takes or treats real. At the beginning of the experience, the subject in question as endorses the claim that the stick is bent. That is what the subject takes to be real. That bent-stick commitment expresses the in-itself to consciousness: how it initially takes things really, first objectively, to be. The in-itself to consciousness is expressed by the later straight-stick second endorsement.
Consciousness knows something, and this object is the essence or the in-itself. But this object is also the in-itself for consciousness; and hence the ambiguity of this truth comes into play. We see that consciousness now has two objects; one is the first in-itself and the second is the being-for-consciousness of this in-itself. The latter seems at first to be merely the reflection of consciousness into its self, a representation, not of an object, but only of its knowledge of the first object. But, as already indicated, the first object comes to be altered for consciousness in this very process; it ceases to be the in-itself and becomes to consciousness an object which is the in-itself only for it. And therefore it follows that this, the of this in-itself, is the true, which is to say that this true is the essence or consciousness’ new object. This new object contains the annihilation of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object. [86] The first thing to notice is that the first object is described as the “first in-itself”. That implies that there is (at least) another in-itself. But there is only one real stick (and it is straight). What is at issue here is the role something can play in experience. The role in question is being an to consciousness. To be an in-itself to consciousness is to be what consciousness practically takes or treats as real. At the beginning of the experience, the subject in question endorses the claim that the stick is bent. That is what the subject takes to be real. That bent-stick commitment expresses the first in-itself to consciousness: how it initially takes things really, objectively, to be. The second in-itself to consciousness is expressed by the later straight-stick endorsement.
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