Budget conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government is a topic which is frequently studied by political scientists. New York is an interesting state to examine because of its clearly established constitutional executive budgeting system. By analyzing data from four different governors and twenty seven years, it is possible to obtain a better understanding of why some governors are more successful at advancing their preferred agency appropriations within this system. The factors emphasized in this study were the length in office of individual governors, their governing style and interactions with the Legislature, the election cycle, and solitary events such as court cases and political disputes. Several conclusions can be drawn from the correlations which were observed. There was no support for the hypothesis that governors gain more influence over agency appropriations over time. Fluctuations persisted throughout each in office. governor’s time Individual governors may have been able to develop stronger relationships with legislative leaders and learn how to navigate the budget process, but budgetary conflict was unavoidable. For the majority of the years studied, the Assembly was controlled by the Democratic Party and the Senate was controlled by the Republican Party. Regardless of each political governor’s affiliation, one of the houses of the Legislature opposed most of his agenda, which likely contributed to the constant conflict observed. None of the governors studied showed any indication of getting more influence over agency appropriations the longer they were in office. None of the governors had significantly higher or lower level of influence over appropriations when compared to each other. Governor Cuomo had slightly higher influence than Governor Pataki at similar points in their tenure for a number of years, but the difference was not particularly large. These findings suggest that it may not be possible for one governor to be more successful than others at advancing preferred agency appropriations. Despite efforts to
Budget conflict between the executive and legislative branches of government is a topic which is frequently studied by political scientists. New York is an interesting state to examine because of its clearly established constitutional executive budgeting system. By analyzing data from four different governors and twenty seven years, it is possible to obtain a better understanding of why some governors are more successful at advancing their preferred agency appropriations within this system. The factors emphasized in this study were the length in office of individual governors, their governing style and interactions with the Legislature, the election cycle, and solitary events such as court cases and political disputes. Several conclusions can be drawn from the correlations which were observed. There was no support for the hypothesis that governors gain more influence over agency appropriations over time. Fluctuations persisted throughout each governor’s time in office. Individual governors may have been able to develop stronger relationships with legislative leaders and learn how to navigate the budget process, but budgetary conflict was unavoidable. For the majority of the years studied, the Assembly was controlled by the Democratic Party and the Senate was controlled by the Republican Party. Regardless of each governor’s political affiliation, one of the houses of the Legislature opposed most of his agenda, which likely contributed to the constant conflict observed. None of the governors studied showed any indication of getting more influence over agency appropriations the longer they were in office. None of the governors had significantly higher or lower level of influence over appropriations when compared to each other. Governor Cuomo had slightly higher influence than Governor Pataki at similar points in their tenure for a number of years, but the difference was not particularly large. These findings suggest that it may not be possible for one governor to be more successful than others at advancing preferred agency appropriations. Despite efforts to
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