in practice as a representing is taking or treating it as subject to assessment as to its normative in a way in which what thereby counts as represented serves as a correctness, standard. A second semantic constraint on epistemological theories that I take to be implicitly in play in understanding of the epistemological GKC is that if the representational relation is to be Hegel’s understood semantically in a way that can support genuine knowledge, it must portray what is represented as exerting constraint on representings of it. That is, how it is with what is rational represented must, when the representation relation is not defective, provide a for the reason representing to be as it is. What we are talking (thinking) about must be able to provide reasons for what we say (think) about it. We can call this the Rational Constraint Condition (RCC). Though he does not argue for this constraint in the I think in many ways it is the Introduction, key premise for the argument he does offer. The thought is that the difference between merely responding differentially to the presence or absence of a fact or property and it, comprehending having thoughts that are it in the sense that counts as knowledge if everything goes well, about depends on the possibility of that fact or property being able to serve for the knower as a reason for having a belief or making a commitment. The central sort of semantic aboutness depends on being able to take in how things are, in the sense of taking them in providing rationally as reasons for our attitudes. Hegel learns from Kant to think about representation in terms. What is represented normative exercises a distinctive kind of over representings. Representings are to authority responsible what they represent. What is represented serves as a kind of for assessments normative standard of the of what count as representings of it (correct or incorrect) just in virtue of being correctness
in practice as a representing is taking or treating it as subject to normative assessment as to its correctness, in a way in which what thereby counts as represented serves as a standard. A second semantic constraint on epistemological theories that I take to be implicitly in play in Hegel’s understanding of the epistemological GKC is that if the representational relation is to be understood semantically in a way that can support genuine knowledge, it must portray what is represented as exerting rational constraint on representings of it. That is, how it is with what is represented must, when the representation relation is not defective, provide a reason for the representing to be as it is. What we are talking (thinking) about must be able to provide reasons for what we say (think) about it. We can call this the Rational Constraint Condition (RCC). Though he does not argue for this constraint in the Introduction, I think in many ways it is the key premise for the argument he does offer. The thought is that the difference between merely responding differentially to the presence or absence of a fact or property and comprehending it, having thoughts that are about it in the sense that counts as knowledge if everything goes well, depends on the possibility of that fact or property being able to serve for the knower as a reason for having a belief or making a commitment. The central sort of semantic aboutness depends on being able rationally to take in how things are, in the sense of taking them in as providing reasons for our attitudes. Hegel learns from Kant to think about representation in normative terms. What is represented exercises a distinctive kind of authority over representings. Representings are responsible to what they represent. What is represented serves as a kind of normative standard for assessments of the correctness of what count as representings of it (correct or incorrect) just in virtue of being
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