or of concepts. Only if this condition obtains -only if the complete maximal determinateness empirical concepts made available by judgements of reflection are and fully finally determinate—does the Kantian account make intelligible the application of concepts as being by the deliverances of sense, the correctness of judgements as constrained by the constrained particulars to which we try to apply the universals that are our determinate empirical concepts. Hegel wants us to investigate critically the transcendental conditions of the possibility of such determinateness of concepts. He does not find in Kant a satisfactory account of crucial this condition of the possibility of experience. The question is how we can understand the possibility of applying, endorsing, committing ourselves to, or binding ourselves by one completely determinate rule rather than a slightly different one. This problem is related to the one Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. It is the issue of understanding the conditions of the possibility of the of our conceptual commitments, responsibilities, and obligations. I want determinateness don’t to dwell on what I take Hegel to see as the shortcomings of answer. For my purposes it Kant’s suffices to say that Hegel takes a different approach to understanding the relation between the institution and the application of conceptual norms. In fact I think idealism is the core of Hegel’s his response to just this issue, and it is here that I think we have the most to learn from him. A good way of understanding the general outlines of account of the relation Hegel’s between the activity of instituting conceptual norms and the activity of applying them is to compare it with a later movement of thought that is structurally similar in important ways. Carnap and the other logical positivists affirmed their neo-Kantian roots by taking over Kant’s two-phase structure: one stipulates experience dictates which deployments first meanings, then of them yield true The first activity is prior to and independent of experience; the theories.
complete or maximal determinateness of concepts. Only if this condition obtains -only if the empirical concepts made available by judgements of reflection are fully and finally determinate—does the Kantian account make intelligible the application of concepts as being constrained by the deliverances of sense, the correctness of judgements as constrained by the particulars to which we try to apply the universals that are our determinate empirical concepts. Hegel wants us to investigate critically the transcendental conditions of the possibility of such determinateness of concepts. He does not find in Kant a satisfactory account of this crucial condition of the possibility of experience. The question is how we can understand the possibility of applying, endorsing, committing ourselves to, or binding ourselves by one completely determinate rule rather than a slightly different one. This problem is related to the one Kripke attributes to Wittgenstein. It is the issue of understanding the conditions of the possibility of the determinateness of our conceptual commitments, responsibilities, and obligations. I don’t want to dwell on what I take Hegel to see as the shortcomings of Kant’s answer. For my purposes it suffices to say that Hegel takes a different approach to understanding the relation between the institution and the application of conceptual norms. In fact I think Hegel’s idealism is the core of his response to just this issue, and it is here that I think we have the most to learn from him. A good way of understanding the general outlines of Hegel’s account of the relation between the activity of instituting conceptual norms and the activity of applying them is to compare it with a later movement of thought that is structurally similar in important ways. Carnap and the other logical positivists affirmed their neo-Kantian roots by taking over Kant’s two-phase structure: first one stipulates meanings, then experience dictates which deployments of them yield true theories. The first activity is prior to and independent of experience; the
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