This distinction between and problematizes the very idea of rights homo persona because it causes rights to fall on the side of the legal which is constructed precisely persona, by separating it from the dimension of the separation falls exactly into the distinction homo: between (tied to and (tied to Thus a human being is divided into zoe homo) bios persona). “a biological body and a site of legal imputation, the first being subjected to the discretionary control of the second…. The person is actually superimposed onto the human being but also – juxtaposed with it as an artificial product of the very law that defines it as such” (). The – hypothesis is that the idea of always serves to separate in the human being a part of “person” itself as a and a part of itself as a rights adhere only to the latter; and they “thing” “person”: all fundamentally relate to life and the body, to embodiment, as if it were a matter of possession of the body-thing and of the body-life. It is in this sense that Esposito agrees with Marx’s early critique in that all of Man” had On The Jewish Question “rights as their fundamental principle. Thus, Esposito’s central claim is that essential “security” “the failure of human rights, their inability to restore the broken connection between rights and life, does not take place in spite of the affirmation of ideology of the person but rather because of it” (). Biopower, according to Esposito, depends on this dualism that is internalized into every individual, separating and reifying the common element of life into the aspect of the from the individualizing element of the through this dualism, life falls “body” “person”: outside of law. Similarly to Agamben’s archeology of subjective rights in the Franciscan polemics against ownership, for Esposito the root of the problem is that be the owner of a “to body, the person cannot be coextensive with it; in fact, the person is specifically defined by the distance that separates it from the body” (). The appears to be an artificial screen “person that separates human beings from their rights, a confirmation that something like ‘human rights’ is impossible” ().
This distinction between homo and persona problematizes the very idea of rights because it causes rights to fall on the side of the legal persona, which is constructed precisely by separating it from the dimension of homo: the separation falls exactly into the distinction between zoe (tied to homo) and bios (tied to persona). Thus a human being is divided into “a biological body and a site of legal imputation, the first being subjected to the discretionary control of the second…. The person is actually superimposed onto the human being – but also juxtaposed with it – as an artificial product of the very law that defines it as such” (). The hypothesis is that the idea of “person” always serves to separate in the human being a part of itself as a “thing” and a part of itself as a “person”: rights adhere only to the latter; and they all fundamentally relate to life and the body, to embodiment, as if it were a matter of possession of the body-thing and of the body-life. It is in this sense that Esposito agrees with Marx’s early critique in On The Jewish Question that all “rights of Man” had “security” as their fundamental principle. Thus, Esposito’s central claim is that “the essential failure of human rights, their inability to restore the broken connection between rights and life, does not take place in spite of the affirmation of ideology of the person but rather because of it” (). Biopower, according to Esposito, depends on this dualism that is internalized into every individual, separating and reifying the common element of life into the aspect of the “body” from the individualizing element of the “person”: through this dualism, life falls outside of law. Similarly to Agamben’s archeology of subjective rights in the Franciscan polemics against ownership, for Esposito the root of the problem is that “to be the owner of a body, the person cannot be coextensive with it; in fact, the person is specifically defined by the distance that separates it from the body” (). The “person appears to be an artificial screen that separates human beings from their rights, a confirmation that something like ‘human rights’ is impossible” ().
vatter_community_and_subjectivity_in_italian_biopolitics_5.docx