l\.iarx's student friend KOppen (caricature by Engels) in reality are blended presents itself as a complete and total world which idea and in with absolute harmony, is faced actual together reality whose petty restrictedness makes it seem a hostile contrast. a The world is thus split, but it is faced with a philsophy that is totality in itself. The way in which this philosophy is seen to act is therefore also split and contradictory; its objective universality gets turned round into subjective forms of the individual consciousness in which it is alive and active. . . . Anyone who does not understand this historical necessity, must as a result deny that it is possible al for men to live at in accordance ,vith a total philosophy; or else he must hold the dialectic of proportion to be the highest category for a mind cognizant of itself, and must, together ,vith some maintain mediocn'ty of those who mis- understand Hegel, that is the normal appearance of the absolute mind• • . . Marx in considers it incorrect to explain a number of weaknesses the Hegelian system (as many HegeJians do) as a 'compromise' with reality, i.e. usually political reality; it him seems to necessary to analyse Hegel's ideology itself: It is conceivable that a philosopher should be guilty of this or that inconsistency; he may himself be conscious of it. But what he is not conscious of is that in the last analysis this apparent compromise is
l\.iarx's student friend KOppen (caricature by Engels) presents itself as a complete and total world in which idea and reality are blended together in absolute harmony, is faced with actual reality whose petty restrictedness makes it seem a hostile contrast. The world is thus split, but it is faced with a philsophy that is a totality in itself. The way in which this philosophy is seen to act is therefore also split and contradictory; its objective universality gets turned round into subjective forms of the individual consciousness in which it is alive and active. . . . Anyone who does not understand this historical necessity, must as a result deny that it is possible for men to live at al in accordance ,vith a total philosophy; or else he must hold the dialectic of proportion to be the highest category for a mind cognizant of itself, and must, together ,vith some of those who understand Hegel, maintain that mediocn'ty is the normal appearance of the absolute mind• • . . Marx considers it incorrect to explain a number of weaknesses in the Hegelian system (as many HegeJians do) as a 'compromise' with reality, i.e. usually political reality; it seems to him necessary to analyse Hegel's ideology itself: It is conceivable that a philosopher should be guilty of this or that inconsistency; he may himself be conscious of it. But what he is not conscious of is that in the last analysis this apparent compromise is mis-
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