exclusion). Together, these two sorts of relation define what Hegel means by "conceptual" [begrifflich]: To be articulated is just to stand in material relations of conceptually incompatibility and (so) consequence (inference). In this sense, conceptual articulation is a perfectly objective affair. It has nothing obviously or explicitly to do with any or Showing that it nonetheless does subjective psychological process. have an connection to such processes, and what that connection is, is the task of implicit motivating objective idealism (that is, idealism about the objective conceptual structure of the world). Given this definition, Hegel's realism can be seen as just the form taken by a conceptual realism. There really are modally qualified states of affairs: possibilities and necessities modal (necessitations being the inferential version of this categorical notion, and conditional possibility being the corresponding weaker conditional modality). Further, without acknowledging them, we cannot make intelligible ordinary descriptive predicates and properties. Again, Hegel will claim that modal realism requires objective idealism. Second, I started this story with the idea of how things are—the idea that there is some way the world is. Understanding how things are is grasping a certain sort of In talking content. about objectivity and subjectivity in terms of 'truth' and 'certainty', Hegel wants us to start by focusing on this notion of rather than on the of (claims to) knowledge. One content objects reason to do this, of which Hegel's reminds us, is so our philosophical idiom Introduction will not rule out from the beginning as incoherent the possibility that how things are in themselves might also be how they are for some consciousness—that there is a sense of
exclusion). Together, these two sorts of relation define what Hegel means by "conceptual" [begrifflich]: To be conceptually articulated is just to stand in material relations of incompatibility and (so) consequence (inference). In this sense, conceptual articulation is a perfectly objective affair. It has nothing obviously or explicitly to do with any subjective or psychological process. Showing that it nonetheless does have an implicit connection to such processes, and what that connection is, is the task of motivating objective idealism (that is, idealism about the objective conceptual structure of the world). Given this definition, Hegel's conceptual realism can be seen as just the form taken by a modal realism. There really are modally qualified states of affairs: possibilities and necessities (necessitations being the inferential version of this categorical notion, and conditional possibility being the corresponding weaker conditional modality). Further, without acknowledging them, we cannot make intelligible ordinary descriptive predicates and properties. Again, Hegel will claim that modal realism requires objective idealism. Second, I started this story with the idea of how things are—the idea that there is some way the world is. Understanding how things are is grasping a certain sort of content. In talking about objectivity and subjectivity in terms of 'truth' and 'certainty', Hegel wants us to start by focusing on this notion of content rather than on the objects of (claims to) knowledge. One reason to do this, of which Hegel's Introduction reminds us, is so our philosophical idiom will not rule out from the beginning as incoherent the possibility that how things are in themselves might also be how they are for some consciousness—that there is a sense of
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