III Hegel thinks of Spirit—the realm of the normative—as produced and sustained by the processes of mutual recognition, which simultaneously institute self-conscious selves and their communities. I have presented this picture as motivated by the problem of how to construe in a way compatible with the determinateness of conceptual contents, while seeing autonomy those conceptual contents as in the same process of experience in which they are instituted (the fundamental commitment). I have suggested that Hegel thinks that the applied pragmatist’s boundaries around what one has and has not committed oneself to by using a particular concept (and what is and is not a correct application of it) are determined by a process of negotiation among actual attitudes of application and assessments of applications. This motivation for understanding subjects of determinately contentful selves—the commitments and responsibilities, concept users, and hence subjects of experience, knowers and agents—in terms of mutual recognition explains why the process of reciprocal specific recognition should be taken to provide the within which concepts are both applied and context their contents instituted and determined. But it does not yet evidently explain why the structure and unity imparted to selves and communities by their institution by reciprocal recognition should be taken to provide a for concepts—to explain structure and unity. The model their reason that the process of reciprocal recognition, and so the structure and unity of selves, provides not only the of but the for the institution and application of conceptual context model norms is that it is not just one example of how norms are constituted by reciprocal authority (mutually dependent moments). a can properly be discerned, there be Wherever norm must
III Hegel thinks of Spirit—the realm of the normative—as produced and sustained by the processes of mutual recognition, which simultaneously institute self-conscious selves and their communities. I have presented this picture as motivated by the problem of how to construe autonomy in a way compatible with the determinateness of conceptual contents, while seeing those conceptual contents as instituted in the same process of experience in which they are applied (the pragmatist’s fundamental commitment). I have suggested that Hegel thinks that the boundaries around what one has and has not committed oneself to by using a particular concept (and what is and is not a correct application of it) are determined by a process of negotiation among actual attitudes of application and assessments of applications. This motivation for understanding selves—the subjects of determinately contentful commitments and responsibilities, concept users, and hence subjects of experience, knowers and agents—in terms of mutual recognition explains why the process of reciprocal specific recognition should be taken to provide the context within which concepts are both applied and their contents instituted and determined. But it does not yet evidently explain why the structure and unity imparted to selves and communities by their institution by reciprocal recognition should be taken to provide a model for concepts—to explain their structure and unity. The reason that the process of reciprocal recognition, and so the structure and unity of selves, provides not only the context of but the model for the institution and application of conceptual norms is that it is not just one example of how norms are constituted by reciprocal authority (mutually dependent moments). Wherever a norm can properly be discerned, there must be
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