9) In thinking about determinateness in terms of material incompatibility, and so in terms of inference, we should also distinguish between and relations processes. I think it is helpful to construe the distinction between the incompatibility of objective situations, properties, states of affairs, or the determinate elements of an "infinite" holistic conceptual relational structure, on the one hand, and the incompatibility of subjective commitments, on the other hand, on the Harmanian model of and (or relations processes practices). The on the side of that corresponds to the of process subjective certainty relation incompatibility of facts or properties on the side of is incompatible objective truth resolving by revising or relinquishing one of them. As a version of the point was put above, commitments, incompatible properties characterize the same object (objectively objectively cannot incompatible facts cannot characterize the same world), while incompatible subjectively commitments merely to characterize the same subject. Any case where they do is a ought not case of the acknowledgment of which (as Hegel has argued in the what error, Introduction) is taking one's commitments to be answerable to an objective world (in the sense constitutive of treating them representations such a world) consists in. But to acknowledge an error, that as of is, to acknowledge the incompatibility of two of one's commitments, is to acknowledge an obligation to something, to one's commitments so as to remove or repair the do alter incompatibility. I think that the idealism that emerges from the expository transition from Consciousness to claims, broadly, that one cannot understand the relations of Self-Consciousness objective incompatibility that articulate the conceptual relational structure in virtue of which the objective
9) In thinking about determinateness in terms of material incompatibility, and so in terms of inference, we should also distinguish between relations and processes. I think it is helpful to construe the distinction between the objective incompatibility of situations, properties, states of affairs, or the determinate elements of an "infinite" holistic conceptual relational structure, on the one hand, and the subjective incompatibility of commitments, on the other hand, on the Harmanian model of relations and processes (or practices). The process on the subjective side of certainty that corresponds to the relation of incompatibility of facts or properties on the objective side of truth is resolving incompatible commitments, by revising or relinquishing one of them. As a version of the point was put above, objectively incompatible properties cannot characterize the same object (objectively incompatible facts cannot characterize the same world), while subjectively incompatible commitments merely ought not to characterize the same subject. Any case where they do is a case of error, the acknowledgment of which (as Hegel has argued in the Introduction) is what taking one's commitments to be answerable to an objective world (in the sense constitutive of treating them as representations of such a world) consists in. But to acknowledge an error, that is, to acknowledge the incompatibility of two of one's commitments, is to acknowledge an obligation to do something, to alter one's commitments so as to remove or repair the incompatibility. I think that the idealism that emerges from the expository transition from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness claims, broadly, that one cannot understand the relations of objective incompatibility that articulate the conceptual relational structure in virtue of which the objective
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