can be taken both to form contents and to be the adoption of an attitude towards those ‘operation’ contents, the need to deal with compound judgements shows that predication is inadequate for purposes. Endorsing hypothetical (conditional) judgeable contents is not happily thought of both as predicating, and those contents are not happily thought of as formed by predication. III. Most Basic Idea Kant’s 4. For this reason, Kant could not take over the traditional classificatory theory of consciousness, which depends on understanding judging as predicating. But what can go in its place? Here is perhaps deepest and most original idea, the axis around which I see all of Kant’s his thought as revolving. What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way for. Judging and acting responsible involve They are exercises of Responsibility, commitments. endorsements, authority. commitment, endorsement, authority—these are all notions. Judgments and actions normative make knowers and agents liable to characteristic kinds of assessment. most normative Kant’s basic idea is that minded creatures are to be distinguished from un-minded ones not by a ontological distinction (the presence of mind-stuff), but by a normative one. deontological This is his of the mental. normative characterization Drawing on a jurisprudential tradition that includes Grotius, Pufendorf, and Crusius, Kant talks about norms in the form of Judging and acting—endorsing claims and maxims, rules. committing ourselves as to what is or shall be true—is binding ourselves by norms. It is making
‘operation’ can be taken both to form contents and to be the adoption of an attitude towards those contents, the need to deal with compound judgements shows that predication is inadequate for both purposes. Endorsing hypothetical (conditional) judgeable contents is not happily thought of as predicating, and those contents are not happily thought of as formed by predication. III. Kant’s Most Basic Idea 4. For this reason, Kant could not take over the traditional classificatory theory of consciousness, which depends on understanding judging as predicating. But what can go in its place? Here is perhaps Kant’s deepest and most original idea, the axis around which I see all of his thought as revolving. What distinguishes judging and intentional doing from the activities of non-sapient creatures is not that they involve some special sort of mental processes, but that they are things knowers and agents are in a distinctive way responsible for. Judging and acting involve commitments. They are endorsements, exercises of authority. Responsibility, commitment, endorsement, authority—these are all normative notions. Judgments and actions make knowers and agents liable to characteristic kinds of normative assessment. Kant’s most basic idea is that minded creatures are to be distinguished from un-minded ones not by a ontological distinction (the presence of mind-stuff), but by a normative deontological one. This is his normative characterization of the mental. Drawing on a jurisprudential tradition that includes Grotius, Pufendorf, and Crusius, Kant talks about norms in the form of rules. Judging and acting—endorsing claims and maxims, committing ourselves as to what is or shall be true—is binding ourselves by norms. It is making
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