reject—as the very first step in the critical enterprise—is just this claim about its semantically character. What if Hegel is to think that one can say at all what he is saying monolithic wrong if in the of the one say it in terms that are in a sense that entails rest Logic, then must systematic being semantically monolithic? Of course, a oneself to a Entitling “what if?” proves nothing. response of this general shape (that is, relinquishing the commitment to thought having Hegel’s to take the shape of a system) requires performing a dissection that semantically monolithic distinguishes within system an autonomous, viable conceptual core from a discardable Hegel’s husk of optional collateral commitments, and further locates the strong holist aspect of the systematicity of the semantics of its and concepts and claims in that shell. logical philosophical Doing that would require specifying other master-commitments or insights of can what Hegel’s be made sense of apart from the systematicity claim, so as to see that they do in fact require not or entail it. How one might go about doing this should be clearer at the end of my story than it can be made at this point. But the short version is: good reasons to endorse a strong holism concerning the senses (but not the referents) of ordinary determinate concepts do oblige one not to adopt a corresponding thesis concerning the contents expressed by the logical and philosophical metavocabulary we use to discuss and explicate those ground-level concepts. II. The First Move: A Distinction The critical perspective on thought that I want to explore and expound here Hegel’s begins by comparing and contrasting views about the nature of the contents of ordinary Hegel’s determinate concepts with his views about the nature of the contents of what he calls “form determinations of the logical, philosophical, and speculative concepts. The first Concept”:
reject—as the very first step in the critical enterprise—is just this claim about its semantically monolithic character. What if Hegel is wrong to think that if one can say at all what he is saying in the rest of the Logic, then one must say it in terms that are systematic in a sense that entails being semantically monolithic? Of course, a “what if?” proves nothing. Entitling oneself to a response of this general shape (that is, relinquishing the commitment to Hegel’s thought having to take the shape of a semantically monolithic system) requires performing a dissection that distinguishes within Hegel’s system an autonomous, viable conceptual core from a discardable husk of optional collateral commitments, and further locates the strong holist aspect of the systematicity of the semantics of its logical and philosophical concepts and claims in that shell. Doing that would require specifying what other master-commitments or insights of Hegel’s can be made sense of apart from the systematicity claim, so as to see that they do not in fact require or entail it. How one might go about doing this should be clearer at the end of my story than it can be made at this point. But the short version is: good reasons to endorse a strong holism concerning the senses (but not the referents) of ordinary determinate concepts do not oblige one to adopt a corresponding thesis concerning the contents expressed by the logical and philosophical metavocabulary we use to discuss and explicate those ground-level concepts. II. The First Move: A Distinction The critical perspective on Hegel’s thought that I want to explore and expound here begins by comparing and contrasting Hegel’s views about the nature of the contents of ordinary determinate concepts with his views about the nature of the contents of what he calls “form determinations of the Concept”: logical, philosophical, and speculative concepts. The first
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