mean anything determinate, and it is only by engaging in processes of the second kind that we can what we mean or think, making that content explicit to ourselves or others. say This second sort of enterprise depends on the use of some sort of logical vocabulary. The adequacy of a system of logical concepts is to be evaluated by its expressive capacity to make explicit the essential, content-determining features of both kinds of process or practice. Under the headings of and Hegel introduces two meta-metaconcepts for ‘Verstand’ ‘Vernunft’, classifying the most important kinds of logical metaconcepts. His own understanding of his distinctive philosophical contribution is epitomized in the slogan that the point of his work is to teach us how to understand our conceptual activity, and therefore ourselves, according to the categories of rather than those of The two claims about the contents of Vernunft, Verstand. empirical conceptual contents that we turn to next articulate central elements of the contrast between the metalogical standpoint of and that of Verstand Vernunft. IV. The Conceptual Inexhaustibility of the Empirical: The Tradition The tradition Hegel inherited took it that actual, concrete, determinate particularity could not be fully captured by the finite concepts deployed by nondivine minds. Their theoretical versions of the point start with the thought that although much of what I see when I look closely at my hand, or hear when I listen to a complex piece of music, can be expressed in judgments, no set of such judgments, certainly no set of judgments, can express of it, without finite all remainder. There will always be a residue that is as yet unsaid or unthought (sayable or
mean anything determinate, and it is only by engaging in processes of the second kind that we can say what we mean or think, making that content explicit to ourselves or others. This second sort of enterprise depends on the use of some sort of logical vocabulary. The adequacy of a system of logical concepts is to be evaluated by its expressive capacity to make explicit the essential, content-determining features of both kinds of process or practice. Under the headings of ‘Verstand’ and ‘Vernunft’, Hegel introduces two meta-metaconcepts for classifying the most important kinds of logical metaconcepts. His own understanding of his distinctive philosophical contribution is epitomized in the slogan that the point of his work is to teach us how to understand our conceptual activity, and therefore ourselves, according to the categories of Vernunft, rather than those of Verstand. The two claims about the contents of empirical conceptual contents that we turn to next articulate central elements of the contrast between the metalogical standpoint of Verstand and that of Vernunft. IV. The Conceptual Inexhaustibility of the Empirical: The Tradition The tradition Hegel inherited took it that actual, concrete, determinate particularity could not be fully captured by the finite concepts deployed by nondivine minds. Their theoretical versions of the point start with the thought that although much of what I see when I look closely at my hand, or hear when I listen to a complex piece of music, can be expressed in judgments, no set of such judgments, certainly no finite set of judgments, can express all of it, without remainder. There will always be a residue that is as yet unsaid or unthought (sayable or
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