Chapter Eight Some Pragmatist Themes in Idealism: Hegel’s Negotiation and Administration in Account of the Hegel’s Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms This chapter could equally well have been Themes in titled ‘Some Idealist Hegel’s Both and are capacious concepts, encompassing many idealism pragmatism Pragmatism’. distinguishable theses. I will focus on one pragmatist thesis and one idealist thesis (though we will come within sight of some others). The pragmatist thesis (what I will call semantic ‘the pragmatist is that the of concepts determines their that is, that concepts can use content, thesis’) have no content apart from that conferred on them by their use. The idealist thesis is that the structure and unity of the is the same as the structure and unity of the The semantic concept self. pragmatist thesis is a commonplace of our Wittgensteinean philosophical world. The idealist thesis is, to say the least, I believe there is any serious contemporary semantic thinker not. don’t who is pursuing the thought that might best be understood by modeling them on concepts selves. Indeed, from the point of view of contemporary semantics it is hard to know even what one could by such a thought what relatively unproblematic features of selves are supposed to mean illuminate what relatively problematic features of concepts? Why should we think that understanding something about, say, personal identity would help us understand issues
Chapter Eight Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms This chapter could equally well have been titled ‘Some Idealist Themes in Hegel’s Pragmatism’. Both idealism and pragmatism are capacious concepts, encompassing many distinguishable theses. I will focus on one pragmatist thesis and one idealist thesis (though we will come within sight of some others). The pragmatist thesis (what I will call ‘the semantic pragmatist thesis’) is that the use of concepts determines their content, that is, that concepts can have no content apart from that conferred on them by their use. The idealist thesis is that the structure and unity of the concept is the same as the structure and unity of the self. The semantic pragmatist thesis is a commonplace of our Wittgensteinean philosophical world. The idealist thesis is, to say the least, not. I don’t believe there is any serious contemporary semantic thinker who is pursuing the thought that concepts might best be understood by modeling them on selves. Indeed, from the point of view of contemporary semantics it is hard to know even what one could mean by such a thought what relatively unproblematic features of selves are supposed to illuminate what relatively problematic features of concepts? Why should we think that understanding something about, say, personal identity would help us understand issues
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