What, then, is the second object being talked about in this passage? It is not the straight stick (which is the second in-itself to consciousness). Hegel says here the second object is the of the first in-itself. What does that mean? When he introduces the “being-for-consciousness” movement of experience in the previous paragraph, Hegel says Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what had been to it the is in-itself not in itself, or, what was was so only [85] in itself for consciousness. What the subject discovers is that what it had taken to express the way things really are (the stick is bent), actually only expresses an appearance. The role the bent-stick representation plays for consciousness, what it is to consciousness, has changed. It to consciousness an object “becomes which is the in-itself only for The true is the bent-stick representation revealed it.” “new, object” erroneous, as a of what is now the subject the way things really are: a as misrepresentation to straight stick. This representing is not in the sense of representing how things really are, “true” but in the sense that what is now to consciousness is what really is: a mere appearance, a it misrepresenting. That is why new object contains the annihilation of the first; it is the “This experience constituted through that first object.” This is the sense in which the alteration of the object itself becomes “In knowledge…the to consciousness something which has in fact been altered as What alters is the status of well.” the bent-stick representing, what it is to consciousness. It had enjoyed the status of being to consciousness what the stick is in itself. But now its status has changed to being to consciousness only what the stick was consciousness: an appearance. Understanding that the for two are the bent-stick representation when it was endorsed and the bent-stick “objects”
What, then, is the second object being talked about in this passage? It is not the straight stick (which is the second in-itself to consciousness). Hegel says here the second object is the “being-for-consciousness” of the first in-itself. What does that mean? When he introduces the movement of experience in the previous paragraph, Hegel says Hence it comes to pass for consciousness that what had been to it the in-itself is not in itself, or, what was in itself was so only for consciousness. [85] What the subject discovers is that what it had taken to express the way things really are (the stick is bent), actually only expresses an appearance. The role the bent-stick representation plays for consciousness, what it is to consciousness, has changed. It “becomes to consciousness an object which is the in-itself only for it.” The “new, true object” is the bent-stick representation revealed as erroneous, as a misrepresentation of what is now to the subject the way things really are: a straight stick. This representing is “true” not in the sense of representing how things really are, but in the sense that what is now to consciousness is what it really is: a mere appearance, a misrepresenting. That is why “This new object contains the annihilation of the first; it is the experience constituted through that first object.” This is the sense in which “In the alteration of the knowledge…the object itself becomes to consciousness something which has in fact been altered as well.” What alters is the status of the bent-stick representing, what it is to consciousness. It had enjoyed the status of being to consciousness what the stick is in itself. But now its status has changed to being to consciousness only what the stick was for consciousness: an appearance. Understanding that the two “objects” are the bent-stick representation when it was endorsed and the bent-stick
WI%2013-8-29%20b.docx