required but because the enterprise itself is revealed as ill-conceived. On the quietist reading, the of empirical inexhaustibility and fallibility persist, although the terms in which they phenomena are described evolve in concert with other metatheoretical innovations. Hegel’s I think either of these approaches is sustainable. The eliminative view cannot be right, don’t because it is clear that even after we have learned the lessons of the Logic, language remains “the existence of We are still supposed to use declarative sentences to express ourselves, as Spirit”. Hegel does when applying the conceptual apparatus of the Logic to nonlogical material in the lectures on aesthetics, religion, and the philosophy of nature. And Hegel remained actively interested in introducing new words for distinctive empirical phenomena—for instance the term which he coined in 1817, to describe colors newly discovered to appear in transparent ‘entoptic’, media when they are heated (an innovation for which Goethe praised him extravagantly). The process of forming, applying, and criticizing determinate empirical concepts and claims in natural science, for instance, is clearly supposed to continue even after we have achieved the sort of self-consciousness about that process that logic affords—as evidenced by his Hegel’s dedication to support and promulgate such research in the Hegelian Yearbook of Scientific he edited from 1826 to 1831 (for instance, in its treatment of the researches of the Criticism Humboldts). But the quietist view, according to which no ground-level change at all is supposed to be occasioned by that new philosophical self-understanding cannot be right either. For one aspect of that we must give up in order to achieve the perspective of is the Verstand Vernunft semantic that sees the determinate identity of empirical concepts as wholly unaffected by the atomism judgments applying them that we endorse. According to holistic successor conception, Hegel’s
required but because the enterprise itself is revealed as ill-conceived. On the quietist reading, the phenomena of empirical inexhaustibility and fallibility persist, although the terms in which they are described evolve in concert with Hegel’s other metatheoretical innovations. I don’t think either of these approaches is sustainable. The eliminative view cannot be right, because it is clear that even after we have learned the lessons of the Logic, language remains “the existence of Spirit”. We are still supposed to use declarative sentences to express ourselves, as Hegel does when applying the conceptual apparatus of the Logic to nonlogical material in the lectures on aesthetics, religion, and the philosophy of nature. And Hegel remained actively interested in introducing new words for distinctive empirical phenomena—for instance the term ‘entoptic’, which he coined in 1817, to describe colors newly discovered to appear in transparent media when they are heated (an innovation for which Goethe praised him extravagantly). The process of forming, applying, and criticizing determinate empirical concepts and claims in natural science, for instance, is clearly supposed to continue even after we have achieved the sort of self-consciousness about that process that Hegel’s logic affords—as evidenced by his dedication to support and promulgate such research in the Hegelian Yearbook of Scientific Criticism he edited from 1826 to 1831 (for instance, in its treatment of the researches of the Humboldts). But the quietist view, according to which no ground-level change at all is supposed to be occasioned by that new philosophical self-understanding cannot be right either. For one aspect of Verstand that we must give up in order to achieve the perspective of Vernunft is the semantic atomism that sees the determinate identity of empirical concepts as wholly unaffected by the judgments applying them that we endorse. According to Hegel’s holistic successor conception,
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