person, container or premises or to seize any matter, to declare any matter forfeited or to dispose of any matter.’ [34] The reference in the section to Chapter’ is to Chapter 2 of the CPA which ‘this contains sections 19 36 and refers to search warrants, entering of premises, – seizure, forfeiture and disposal of property connected with offences. This saving provision clearly fully retains the power conferred in any other law to search, seize, forfeit and dispose of matter’. The word is defined in the CPA as including ‘any ‘law’ a law as defined in "The Interpretation of Laws Proclamation, 1920" (Proclamation 37 of 1920), which in turn defines the term to and include any law, proclamation ‘mean or other enactment having the force of law’. This definition does not include regulations. However, its seems to me that by virtue of section 9(3) of Act 9 of 1933, the Exchange Control Regulations, 1961, could be equated with an Act of Parliament (cf R v Maharaj 1966 (3) SA 679 (RA); Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development 1991 (1) SA 158 (A)). [35] Applying the maxim which is to the effect generalia specialibus non derogant that the legislature has given attention to a separate subject and made ‘when provision for it the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provisions, unless it manifest that intention very clearly’ (R v Gwantshu 1931 EDL 29 at 31), it seems to me that Act 51 of 1977 cannot be construed as intending to interfere with the specific power given to the Treasury under regulation 3(5). [36] The Court in Candimba’s case did not refer to section 9(3) of Act 9 of 1933 or section 19 of the CPA and it would appear that these provisions were not brought to its attention. In view hereof the remarks made in paragraph [11] of that judgment which suggest that the power in section 35(1) may be used in cases where the regulations were contravened are, in my respectful view, made per incuriam and are not binding. [37] My earlier adoption of the approach in the case could be interpreted Armbruster as being in conflict with the sentence in paragraph [11] of Candimba’s case which
person, container or premises or to seize any matter, to declare any matter forfeited or to dispose of any matter.’ [34] The reference in the section to ‘this Chapter’ is to Chapter 2 of the CPA which contains sections 19 – 36 and refers to search warrants, entering of premises, seizure, forfeiture and disposal of property connected with offences. This saving provision clearly fully retains the power conferred in any other law to search, seize, forfeit and dispose of ‘any matter’. The word ‘law’ is defined in the CPA as including a law as defined in "The Interpretation of Laws Proclamation, 1920" (Proclamation 37 of 1920), which in turn defines the term to ‘mean and include any law, proclamation or other enactment having the force of law’. This definition does not include regulations. However, its seems to me that by virtue of section 9(3) of Act 9 of 1933, the Exchange Control Regulations, 1961, could be equated with an Act of Parliament (cf R v Maharaj 1966 (3) SA 679 (RA); Khumalo v Director-General of Co-operation and Development 1991 (1) SA 158 (A)). [35] Applying the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant which is to the effect that ‘when the legislature has given attention to a separate subject and made provision for it the presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special provisions, unless it manifest that intention very clearly’ (R v Gwantshu 1931 EDL 29 at 31), it seems to me that Act 51 of 1977 cannot be construed as intending to interfere with the specific power given to the Treasury under regulation 3(5). [36] The Court in Candimba’s case did not refer to section 9(3) of Act 9 of 1933 or section 19 of the CPA and it would appear that these provisions were not brought to its attention. In view hereof the remarks made in paragraph [11] of that judgment which suggest that the power in section 35(1) may be used in cases where the regulations were contravened are, in my respectful view, made per incuriam and are not binding. [37] My earlier adoption of the approach in the Armbruster case could be interpreted as being in conflict with the sentence in paragraph [11] of Candimba’s case which
Vincente%20v%20Magistrate%20D%20Uusiko%20(A99-2009)%20[2013]%20NAHCMD%20365%20(29%20November%202013).docx