There are three overarching choices to make: Focus on (as above) or denotational de re epistemically strong de re? Does the distinction most fundamentally distinguish kinds of or de re/de dicto belief kinds of ascription? If either of (of either kind) or (beliefs or ascriptions) is to be explained de re de dicto in terms of the other, which is more basic in the order of explanation? Tradition and current conventional wisdom says: epistemically strong de re, ii) it is a special kind of belief, that kind of belief is basic in the order of explanation—a kind of nonconceptual content (by acquaintance) that is more fundamental a point of contact of our beliefs with the world than the conceptual content of beliefs. de dicto This constellation of ideas is encouraged by thinking of theories of causal demonstrative and indexical content, vs. theories, thought of as the form descriptive of content. conceptual Intimate connection seen between and epistemically strong de re beliefs speaker’s (and reference de dicto beliefs and semantic reference). This constellation of ideas is way of putting representation at the center of one one’s understanding, rather than inference. It is resisted, in the form of resisting the distinction for beliefs, in de re/de dicto different ways by Davidson, Searle, and Dennett (all of whom liked my way of sorting things out here). view: MIE i) Denotational is basic phenomenon. de re ii) distinguishes kinds of De re/de dicto ascription. Argument from iteration: not just two kinds, but a recursively generated indefinite multiplicity. But there is a special kind of belief: object-involving belief (such that one cannot have that kind of belief unless the object exists and one is appropriately connected to it) iii) ascriptions more basic, ascriptions are formed from them. De dicto de re Strategy: a) We have already looked at technical, systematic, theory-laden representational vocabulary: It has a distinctive which is achieved by expressive role, anaphora. ‘true’, ‘refers’, ‘denotes’.
There are three overarching choices to make: Focus on denotational de re (as above) or epistemically strong de re? Does the de re/de dicto distinction most fundamentally distinguish kinds of belief or kinds of ascription? If either of de re (of either kind) or de dicto (beliefs or ascriptions) is to be explained in terms of the other, which is more basic in the order of explanation? Tradition and current conventional wisdom says: epistemically strong de re, ii) it is a special kind of belief, that kind of belief is basic in the order of explanation—a kind of nonconceptual content (by acquaintance) that is more fundamental a point of contact of our beliefs with the world than the conceptual content of de dicto beliefs. This constellation of ideas is encouraged by thinking of causal theories of demonstrative and indexical content, vs. descriptive theories, thought of as the form of conceptual content. Intimate connection seen between epistemically strong de re beliefs and speaker’s reference (and de dicto beliefs and semantic reference). This constellation of ideas is one way of putting representation at the center of one’s understanding, rather than inference. It is resisted, in the form of resisting the de re/de dicto distinction for beliefs, in different ways by Davidson, Searle, and Dennett (all of whom liked my way of sorting things out here). MIE view: i) Denotational de re is basic phenomenon. ii) De re/de dicto distinguishes kinds of ascription. Argument from iteration: not just two kinds, but a recursively generated indefinite multiplicity. But there is a special kind of belief: object-involving belief (such that one cannot have that kind of belief unless the object exists and one is appropriately connected to it) iii) De dicto ascriptions more basic, de re ascriptions are formed from them. Strategy: a) We have already looked at technical, systematic, theory-laden representational vocabulary: ‘true’, ‘refers’, ‘denotes’. It has a distinctive expressive role, which is achieved by anaphora.
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