section 19 enables a guarantor of an obligation of a tenant, having been called upon to make good that tenant's default in paying rent, to demand an overriding lease. Miss Jackson submitted that it may be a moot point whether a guarantor has a right to call for a reversionary lease under section 19 where the relevant lease has been disclaimed. The guarantor may be left only with a right to call for a vesting order under section 181 of the 1986 Act. I do not need to decide this point; and certainly if there is such a right, the nature of the lease obtained is moot. It seems to me that, on the basis of the analysis of the authorities to which I have referred, despite the use of the term "reversion expectant", the overriding lease once granted is something different from the former lease that the tenant had before disclaimer. In any event, WFL has not sought such a lease, and, therefore, its nature is not in issue here. Section 19 does not support the contention that, prior to the vesting of any interest in the property in the guarantor, the landlord as freeholder has anything short of an immediate and exercisable entitlement to possession. Consequently, in my firm view, the appellants did have the right to immediate possession once the lease in respect of the property had been disclaimed; and, although for reasons somewhat different from those of the District Judge which largely reflect – the additional reasons relied on in the Respondent’s Notice I therefore consider the – answer to the question she posed for this court to be, "Yes": she was correct to find that the first appellant was the owner within the meaning of sections 45(1)(b) and 65(1) of the 1988 Act, and thus liable for non-occupied rates for the property. The liability order was therefore properly made; and I dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed
section 19 enables a guarantor of an obligation of a tenant, having been called upon to make good that tenant's default in paying rent, to demand an overriding lease. Miss Jackson submitted that it may be a moot point whether a guarantor has a right to call for a reversionary lease under section 19 where the relevant lease has been disclaimed. The guarantor may be left only with a right to call for a vesting order under section 181 of the 1986 Act. I do not need to decide this point; and certainly if there is such a right, the nature of the lease obtained is moot. It seems to me that, on the basis of the analysis of the authorities to which I have referred, despite the use of the term "reversion expectant", the overriding lease once granted is something different from the former lease that the tenant had before disclaimer. In any event, WFL has not sought such a lease, and, therefore, its nature is not in issue here. Section 19 does not support the contention that, prior to the vesting of any interest in the property in the guarantor, the landlord as freeholder has anything short of an immediate and exercisable entitlement to possession. Consequently, in my firm view, the appellants did have the right to immediate possession once the lease in respect of the property had been disclaimed; and, although for reasons somewhat different from those of the District Judge – which largely reflect the additional reasons relied on in the Respondent’s Notice – I therefore consider the answer to the question she posed for this court to be, "Yes": she was correct to find that the first appellant was the owner within the meaning of sections 45(1)(b) and 65(1) of the 1988 Act, and thus liable for non-occupied rates for the property. The liability order was therefore properly made; and I dismiss this appeal. Appeal dismissed
2014-EGILR43-Schroder.docx