due process protection.” 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (emphasis added). Addington v. Texas, Additionally, the Court has long held that civil detention is unconstitutional absent a sufficient justification and strong procedural protections. See generally, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; 504 U.S. 71, 80–83 (1992); Foucha v. Louisiana, United States v. 481 U.S. 739 (1987); 441 U.S. at 425–27, 433; Salerno, Addington, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Moreover, as detention grows in length, the justification for the increasingly severe deprivation of individual liberty must also grow stronger. See, e.g., 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997); 783 F.3d at Kansas v. Hendricks, see also Chavez-Alvarez, 474 (citing 656 F.3d at 232, 234); 535 Diop, Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to preclude prolonged categorical detention without individualized review in the context of period detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In the Supreme Zadvydas v. Davis, Court held that post-removal period detention under § 1231(a)(6), like other civil detention, is subject to due process limitations. 533 U.S. at 690-92, “nonpunitive” 696-700. Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Supreme Court limited detention under § 1231(a)(6) without an individualized justification to a presumptively reasonable period of six months—the time necessary” to ensure “reasonably though § 1231(a)(6) is silent on the length of detention it authorizes. at 689, Id. After the six-month period has passed, noncitizens can demand that the government justify their continued detention on an individual basis. at 689 (explaining that courts Id. must construe statutes to avoid constitutional concerns where possible”). “fairly
due process protection.” Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court has long held that civil detention is unconstitutional absent a sufficient justification and strong procedural protections. See generally, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80–83 (1992); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Addington, 441 U.S. at 425–27, 433; Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). Moreover, as detention grows in length, the justification for the increasingly severe deprivation of individual liberty must also grow stronger. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363-64 (1997); see also Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 474 (citing Diop, 656 F.3d at 232, 234); Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court has applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to preclude prolonged categorical detention without individualized review in the context of period detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that post-removal period detention under § 1231(a)(6), like other “nonpunitive” civil detention, is subject to due process limitations. 533 U.S. at 690-92, 696-700. Applying the canon of constitutional avoidance, the Supreme Court limited detention under § 1231(a)(6) without an individualized justification to a presumptively reasonable period of six months—the time “reasonably necessary” to ensure though § 1231(a)(6) is silent on the length of detention it authorizes. Id. at 689, After the six-month period has passed, noncitizens can demand that the government justify their continued detention on an individual basis. Id. at 689 (explaining that courts must construe statutes to avoid constitutional concerns where “fairly possible”).
template-for-prolonged-detention-habeas-petition.docx