Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist Be a Stanfordite? Abstract: Suppose one believes that the historical record of science provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one of adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific version this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA)? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, challenge cannot use Stanford’s many of the strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism, namely: prima facie (i) superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and (ii) superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences. Attempts to accommodate (i) and (ii) within framework are incompatible with other Stanford’s commitments Stanford holds, such as anti-realism being piecemeal instead of global. As separate lines of criticism, I argue that there are problems with both claim that Stanford’s the PUA is the most important challenge to realism, and with his view of instrumentalist theory endorsement. 1. Introduction Many opponents of scientific realism appeal to the history of science as evidence for their position. The most important recent development in this tradition is probably Kyle Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA), which underwrites his New Stanford’s Induction (NI) over the history of science. According to the PUA, “our cognitive constitutions or faculties are not well-suited to exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious alternative theoretical possibilities from which our fundamental theories of nature are In other words, in scientific theorizing, scientists drawn” (2006, p. 45). ‘fundamental’ lack the cognitive ability to devise all plausible hypotheses that would explain the evidence available to them. The NI states that historical scientists often failed to exhaust the space of scientifically respectable hypotheses that would explain the data available to them at that historical time; therefore, present scientists are probably failing similarly. For example, General Relativity can explain all the data that was available to Newton, but theory was not conceived until the early 20th Century. Stanford claims this Einstein’s creates a problem for realism, because many fundamental scientific theories are inferred via elimination of alternatives (also known as (2006, p. 28). In ‘disjunctive syllogism’)
Should a Historically Motivated Anti-Realist Be a Stanfordite? Abstract: Suppose one believes that the historical record of science provides good evidence against scientific realism. Should one adopt Kyle Stanford’s specific version of this view, based on the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA)? I present reasons for answering this question in the negative. In particular, Stanford’s challenge cannot use many of the prima facie strongest pieces of historical evidence against realism, namely: (i) superseded theories whose successors were explicitly conceived, and (ii) superseded theories that were not the result of elimination-of-alternatives inferences. Attempts to accommodate (i) and (ii) within Stanford’s framework are incompatible with other commitments Stanford holds, such as anti-realism being piecemeal instead of global. As separate lines of criticism, I argue that there are problems with both Stanford’s claim that the PUA is the most important challenge to realism, and with his view of instrumentalist theory endorsement. 1. Introduction Many opponents of scientific realism appeal to the history of science as evidence for their position. The most important recent development in this tradition is probably Kyle Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives (PUA), which underwrites his New Induction (NI) over the history of science. According to the PUA, “our cognitive constitutions or faculties are not well-suited to exhausting the kinds of spaces of serious alternative theoretical possibilities from which our fundamental theories of nature are drawn” (2006, p. 45). In other words, in ‘fundamental’ scientific theorizing, scientists lack the cognitive ability to devise all plausible hypotheses that would explain the evidence available to them. The NI states that historical scientists often failed to exhaust the space of scientifically respectable hypotheses that would explain the data available to them at that historical time; therefore, present scientists are probably failing similarly. For example, General Relativity can explain all the data that was available to Newton, but Einstein’s theory was not conceived until the early 20th Century. Stanford claims this creates a problem for realism, because many fundamental scientific theories are inferred via elimination of alternatives (also known as ‘disjunctive syllogism’) (2006, p. 28). In
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