IV. ARGUMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY FOR § 212(c) RELIEF. In the adopted a uniform nationwide rule for § 212(c) relief Matter of Abdelghany, eligibility consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions in 132 S. Ct. 476 Judulang v. Holder, (2011), 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1491 (2012), and 533 U.S. 289, 326 Vartelas v. Holder, INS v. St. Cyr, (2001). The petitioner in was a lawful permanent resident whom DHS Matter of Abdelghany charged with deportability for having an aggravated felony conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) & (U), based on a 1995 arson conviction. 26 I&N Dec. Matter of Abdelghany, at 256. The Immigration Judge ordered his removal, holding that Abdelghany could not apply for § 212(c) relief because there is no inadmissibility ground in INA § 212 comparable to the charged aggravated felony deportability ground. The Board reversed. Id. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in compelled it to do so, the Board Judulang overruled both and and 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) as well as prior Matter of Blake Matter of Brieva cases finding LPRs ineligible for § 212(c) relief if their conviction(s) did not trigger inadmissibility. Specifically, the Board reasoned that consistent with this test Judulang, “places inadmissible and deportable lawful permanent residents on a truly level playing field while disregarding mechanical distinctions that arise from the statutory structure and that bear no relation either to deportable aliens’ fitness to remain in this country or to the overall purposes of the immigration laws.” 26 I&N Dec. at 265. Matter of Abdelghany, In addition, the Board found that the Supreme Court’s decisions in and St. Cyr Vartelas further compelled it to eliminate the distinction between convictions based on guilty pleas and convictions entered after for purposes of § 212(c) eligibility, and thereby abrogated the regulatory prohibition in 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h) against granting § 212(c) relief to immigrants
IV. ARGUMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE ERRED IN DENYING RESPONDENT THE OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY FOR § 212(c) RELIEF. In Matter of Abdelghany, the adopted a uniform nationwide rule for § 212(c) relief eligibility consistent with the Supreme Court’s decisions in Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011), Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1479, 1491 (2012), and INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 326 (2001). The petitioner in Matter of Abdelghany was a lawful permanent resident whom DHS charged with deportability for having an aggravated felony conviction under INA § 101(a)(43)(E)(i) & (U), based on a 1995 arson conviction. Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. at 256. The Immigration Judge ordered his removal, holding that Abdelghany could not apply for § 212(c) relief because there is no inadmissibility ground in INA § 212 comparable to the charged aggravated felony deportability ground. Id. The Board reversed. Because the Supreme Court’s decision in Judulang compelled it to do so, the Board overruled both Matter of Blake and Matter of Brieva and 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f)(5) as well as prior cases finding LPRs ineligible for § 212(c) relief if their conviction(s) did not trigger inadmissibility. Specifically, the Board reasoned that consistent with Judulang, this test “places inadmissible and deportable lawful permanent residents on a truly level playing field while disregarding mechanical distinctions that arise from the statutory structure and that bear no relation either to deportable aliens’ fitness to remain in this country or to the overall purposes of the immigration laws.” Matter of Abdelghany, 26 I&N Dec. at 265. In addition, the Board found that the Supreme Court’s decisions in St. Cyr and Vartelas further compelled it to eliminate the distinction between convictions based on guilty pleas and convictions entered after for purposes of § 212(c) eligibility, and thereby abrogated the regulatory prohibition in 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(h) against granting § 212(c) relief to immigrants
2014_18Mar_abdel-motion-recon.docx