Kant to locate the content as removed from our possible experience of objects though not so removed as to render it an arbitrary or dispensable product of rationality. He introduces the notion of an ideal in section one of chapter three by appealing to the idea of something being represented Something is in concreto. represented when it is represented by appeal to a particular instance of the in concreto thing (see A713/B741; also A241–2 note, A711/B739). The categories can represent – something Kant claims, when they have sensible appearances as their in concreto, material.” This is to transform them into of experience.” They do “proper “concepts not contain within themselves the conditions of their own application to things and to that extent they represent objects at all.” However, ideas of reason are more “no “still remote from objective reality” since these concepts cannot be even satisfied possibly by the presentation of a particular object, as appearances can be found in which “no they may be represented (A567/B595). in concreto” These aspects of Kant’s model of cognition risk presenting the ideal as an “empty” concept, i.e. as one lacking any possible object as a referent (A51/B75, A62/B87, A77/B103, A155-6/B194-5). However, Kant introduces the notion of the ideal which is idea not merely but i.e., as an individual thing which in concreto in individuo, “the is determinable, or even determined, through the idea alone” (A568/B596). Although sensibility allows particular things to be given, and although reason is the capacity farthest removed from sensibility, the ideal nevertheless is the notion of a particular thing. More specifically, the ideal is the notion of a particular thing that is somehow given itself. This is the connotation of something being an idea in the idea in whereby the metaphysical gap between a representation and its object is individuo, occluded, and the idea itself somehow provides its own exemplification.
Kant to locate the content as removed from our possible experience of objects though not so removed as to render it an arbitrary or dispensable product of rationality. He introduces the notion of an ideal in section one of chapter three by appealing to the idea of something being represented in concreto. Something is represented in concreto when it is represented by appeal to a particular instance of the thing (see A713/B741; also A241–2 – note, A711/B739). The categories can represent something in concreto, Kant claims, when they have sensible appearances as their “proper material.” This is to transform them into “concepts of experience.” They do not contain within themselves the conditions of their own application to things and to that extent they represent “no objects at all.” However, ideas of reason are “still more remote from objective reality” since these concepts cannot be even possibly satisfied by the presentation of a particular object, as “no appearances can be found in which they may be represented in concreto” (A567/B595). These aspects of Kant’s model of cognition risk presenting the ideal as an “empty” concept, i.e. as one lacking any possible object as a referent (A51/B75, A62/B87, A77/B103, A155-6/B194-5). However, Kant introduces the notion of the ideal which is “the idea not merely in concreto but in individuo, i.e., as an individual thing which is determinable, or even determined, through the idea alone” (A568/B596). Although sensibility allows particular things to be given, and although reason is the capacity farthest removed from sensibility, the ideal nevertheless is the notion of a particular thing. More specifically, the ideal is the notion of a particular thing that is somehow given in the idea itself. This is the connotation of something being an idea in individuo, whereby the metaphysical gap between a representation and its object is occluded, and the idea itself somehow provides its own exemplification.
The_Ideal_of_Reason_Pure.docx