124 N.C.App. 462, 478 S.E.2d 16 (1996), and Johnson, North Carolina School Boards Assoc. v. 359 N.C. 474, 614 S.E.2d 504 (2005). Most recently, the Court of Appeals decided Moore, __ N.C.App. __, 776 S.E.2d 244 (2015). Richmond County Board of Education v. Cowell, i. v. Edmisten arose from a declaratory judgment action in which the Clerk of Court v. Edmisten sought a declaratory judgment regarding how to dispose of money collected in thirty-four criminal cases in Guilford County, and designated in those judgments as being collected for disbursement to various state and local agencies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the money collected in thirty-three of the thirty-four cases amounted to punishment and therefore fell under the ambit of Article IX, Section 7 and had to be remitted to the school board. In reaching this determination, the Court in made a number of important observations shedding light Shore on the application of Article IX, Section 7. First, the Court noted that statute purporting to “any give what are in reality fines either to an individual or to another governmental agency [i.e., not a school board] violates this constitutional provision.” 290 N.C. at 633, 227 S.E.2d at 558. Shore, In reaching this determination, label given by the judge (or the legislature) is not “the determinative.” (parenthetical phrase in original). The Court went on to explain that a Id. governmental agency other than a school board can properly be made the recipient of restitution in criminal cases the offense charged results in particular damage or loss to it over and “where above its normal operating costs.” at 633-34, 227 S.E.2d at 559. By way of example, the Id. Court explained that a defendant may be required to reimburse the State for court appointed counsel. at 634, 227 S.E.2d at 559. In contrast, would not, however, be reasonable to Id. “[i]t require the defendant to pay the State’s overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him.” Id.
Johnson, 124 N.C.App. 462, 478 S.E.2d 16 (1996), and North Carolina School Boards Assoc. v. Moore, 359 N.C. 474, 614 S.E.2d 504 (2005). Most recently, the Court of Appeals decided Richmond County Board of Education v. Cowell, __ N.C.App. __, 776 S.E.2d 244 (2015). i. v. Edmisten v. Edmisten arose from a declaratory judgment action in which the Clerk of Court sought a declaratory judgment regarding how to dispose of money collected in thirty-four criminal cases in Guilford County, and designated in those judgments as being collected for disbursement to various state and local agencies. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the money collected in thirty-three of the thirty-four cases amounted to punishment and therefore fell under the ambit of Article IX, Section 7 and had to be remitted to the school board. In reaching this determination, the Court in Shore made a number of important observations shedding light on the application of Article IX, Section 7. First, the Court noted that “any statute purporting to give what are in reality fines either to an individual or to another governmental agency [i.e., not a school board] violates this constitutional provision.” Shore, 290 N.C. at 633, 227 S.E.2d at 558. In reaching this determination, “the label given by the judge (or the legislature) is not determinative.” Id. (parenthetical phrase in original). The Court went on to explain that a governmental agency other than a school board can properly be made the recipient of restitution in criminal cases “where the offense charged results in particular damage or loss to it over and above its normal operating costs.” Id. at 633-34, 227 S.E.2d at 559. By way of example, the Court explained that a defendant may be required to reimburse the State for court appointed counsel. Id. at 634, 227 S.E.2d at 559. In contrast, “[i]t would not, however, be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the State’s overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him.” Id.
template_costs-and-fees-motion.docx