terms one lives under or one leaves. The same is true of nationalist theories as constitutional procedures for self-determination are a way for nations to gain political recognition if they decide that a multinational federation does not serve their cultural interests. Whereas for the just-cause theory, although constitutional procedures are envisaged as a way to condition political actors’ behaviour, for this theory the value of these procedures is not that they encourage political engagement, as it is for the republican theory, but they are thought of as a way for making living together simply possible, because of the continual spectre of political violence. For the republican theory, however, constitutional procedures for self-determination are thought of as a mechanism to perfect the collective democratic political life of citizens. Furthermore, another advantage for the republican theory of having constitutional procedures for self-determination is that it overcomes the problem of the when biased claims for self-determination are made. At present, when democratic claims for are made, they have to be negotiated between claimants and central government the latter being the party, which has nearly always created the claimants’ – domination. As there is no parity in these negotiations, central governments often either (i) offer referendums on bad terms, predetermining the outcome in favour of the status quo, such as when the terms of the 1978 Scottish Devolution Referendum were amended so that it could not pass with a simple majority, or (ii) that central government denies groups’ claims outright, as has been Catalonia’s recent experience in its negotiations with the Spanish central government. Indeed, often central governments only discretionarily permit referenda when they are confident they will win them, as was the case when the U.K. government permitted the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 which produced a much narrower result than – was comfortable for most anti-independence Westminster politicians. Moreover, constitutional procedures have another advantage for the republican theory because they prevent the continued domination of groups with a remedial claim they act as a safety – valve for groups, so that they are able to secede by right, rather than having to wait until it is discretionarily granted by central government, if indeed this right is granted at all. By having constitutional procedures for self-determination, these problems of discretion and the decision-bias can be overcome. Constitutional procedures for self-determination pre-commit both parties central government and potential to a set of terms that – – do not represent implicit or explicit advantages for either side. In this sense, the
terms one lives under or one leaves. The same is true of nationalist theories as constitutional procedures for self-determination are a way for nations to gain political recognition if they decide that a multinational federation does not serve their cultural interests. Whereas for the just-cause theory, although constitutional procedures are envisaged as a way to condition political actors’ behaviour, for this theory the value of these procedures is not that they encourage political engagement, as it is for the republican theory, but they are thought of as a way for making living together simply possible, because of the continual spectre of political violence. For the republican theory, however, constitutional procedures for self-determination are thought of as a mechanism to perfect the collective democratic political life of citizens. Furthermore, another advantage for the republican theory of having constitutional procedures for self-determination is that it overcomes the problem of the biased when claims for self-determination are made. At present, when democratic claims for are made, they have to be negotiated between claimants and central government – the latter being the party, which has nearly always created the claimants’ domination. As there is no parity in these negotiations, central governments often either (i) offer referendums on bad terms, predetermining the outcome in favour of the status quo, such as when the terms of the 1978 Scottish Devolution Referendum were amended so that it could not pass with a simple majority, or (ii) that central government denies groups’ claims outright, as has been Catalonia’s recent experience in its negotiations with the Spanish central government. Indeed, often central governments only discretionarily permit referenda when they are confident they will win them, as was the case when the U.K. government permitted the Scottish Independence Referendum in 2014 – which produced a much narrower result than was comfortable for most anti-independence Westminster politicians. Moreover, constitutional procedures have another advantage for the republican theory because they prevent the continued domination of groups with a remedial claim – they act as a safety valve for groups, so that they are able to secede by right, rather than having to wait until it is discretionarily granted by central government, if indeed this right is granted at all. By having constitutional procedures for self-determination, these problems of discretion and the decision-bias can be overcome. Constitutional procedures for self-determination pre-commit both parties – central government and potential – to a set of terms that do not represent implicit or explicit advantages for either side. In this sense, the
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