neither indefinite nor prolonged. 538 U.S. at 530-31; at 529–30 (relying on evidence id. that, at that time, removal proceedings were completed in an average time of forty-seven days and a median time of thirty days in 85% of cases, and that the remaining 15% of cases, in which an there is an appeal, were completed in an average of four months). Indeed, although the Court upheld a narrow exception to the general civil Demore detention rule that is the norm” absent procedural protections to ensure that “liberty detention is justified, 481 U.S. at 755, this exception was narrowly tailored to Salerno, the relatively brief period at issue in at 513, 523, 527–29; 804 Demore. Id. see also Lora, F.3d at 614 (“[I]n [the Supreme Court] emphasized that, for detention Demore v. Kim, under the statute to be reasonable, it must be for a brief period of time.”); 351 F.3d at Ly, 276–77 (Judge Haynes, concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the crucial fifth vote in Justice Kennedy acknowledged in his Demore, concurrence that continued detention bec[omes] unreasonable or unjustified,” a “if noncitizen could be to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and “entitled dangerousness.” 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring); at 532-33 (“Were see also id. there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”); 804 F.3d at 614; 715 F.3d at 1137. Lora, Rodriguez II, time that each immigrant spends in detention has . . . risen Demore, “the substantially.” 804 F.3d at 604-05. Circuit courts now rely on the six months of Lora, detention at issue in as a touchstone for determining whether no-bond detention Demore
neither indefinite nor prolonged. 538 U.S. at 530-31; id. at 529–30 (relying on evidence that, at that time, removal proceedings were completed in an average time of forty-seven days and a median time of thirty days in 85% of cases, and that the remaining 15% of cases, in which an there is an appeal, were completed in an average of four months). Indeed, although the Demore Court upheld a narrow exception to the general civil detention rule that “liberty is the norm” absent procedural protections to ensure that detention is justified, Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755, this exception was narrowly tailored to the relatively brief period at issue in Demore. Id. at 513, 523, 527–29; see also Lora, 804 F.3d at 614 (“[I]n Demore v. Kim, [the Supreme Court] emphasized that, for detention under the statute to be reasonable, it must be for a brief period of time.”); Ly, 351 F.3d at 276–77 (Judge Haynes, concurring in part and dissenting in part). As the crucial fifth vote in Demore, Justice Kennedy acknowledged in his concurrence that “if continued detention bec[omes] unreasonable or unjustified,” a noncitizen could be “entitled to an individualized determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness.” 538 U.S. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also id. at 532-33 (“Were there to be an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other reasons.”); Lora, 804 F.3d at 614; Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1137. Demore, “the time that each immigrant spends in detention has . . . risen substantially.” Lora, 804 F.3d at 604-05. Circuit courts now rely on the six months of detention at issue in Demore as a touchstone for determining whether no-bond detention
template-for-prolonged-detention-habeas-petition.docx