Schedule September 28 - Organization and Median Voter Theorem Organization + Calvert (1985) Marina Morton (1993) Marina October 5 - Valence models Groseclose (2001) Aragones and Palfrey (2004) October 12 Signaling in Electoral Competition – Banks (1990) Calander and Wilkie (2007) October 19 Candidates Citizens – Osborne and Slivinski (1996) Cadigan (2005) October 26 Paradox of (not) Voting – Several explanations overview lecture Marina – Levine Palfrey (2007) November 2 Multilateral Bargaining (part 1) – Baron and Ferejohn (1989) Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer (2003) Marina November 9 Multilateral Bargaining (part 2) – Morelli (1999) Frechette, Kagel and Morelli (2005) November 16 Veto power in committees – Winter (1996) Kagel, Sung and Winter (2010) November 23 Political Accountability (part 1) – Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) Marina Coate and Morris (1995) November 30 Political Accountability (part 2) – Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) Maskin and Tirol (2004)
Schedule September 28 - Organization and Median Voter Theorem Organization + Calvert (1985) Marina Morton (1993) Marina October 5 - Valence models Groseclose (2001) Aragones and Palfrey (2004) October 12 – Signaling in Electoral Competition Banks (1990) Calander and Wilkie (2007) October 19 – Candidates Citizens Osborne and Slivinski (1996) Cadigan (2005) October 26 – Paradox of (not) Voting Several explanations – overview lecture Marina Levine Palfrey (2007) November 2 – Multilateral Bargaining (part 1) Baron and Ferejohn (1989) Frechette, Kagel and Lehrer (2003) Marina November 9 – Multilateral Bargaining (part 2) Morelli (1999) Frechette, Kagel and Morelli (2005) November 16 – Veto power in committees Winter (1996) Kagel, Sung and Winter (2010) November 23 – Political Accountability (part 1) Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) Marina Coate and Morris (1995) November 30 – Political Accountability (part 2) Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) Maskin and Tirol (2004)
syllabus_SS210.docx