what criteria are necessary and sufficient to qualify as a Stanfordite. One need not accept every claim in corpus to be a Stanfordite. In particular, one need not believe Stanford’s those claims about which Stanford himself expresses some uncertainty; this is why a holist about confirmation can be a Stanfordite. I use the term primarily to distinguish position from those positions that Stanford claims are importantly distinct Stanford’s from his view—in particular, from the often ‘classic’ pessimistic induction(s) (most associated today with Laudan) and Constructive Empiricism. So, in the van Fraassen’s way I here, you could reject many of assertions and am using ‘Stanfordite’ Stanford’s remain a Stanfordite, but only if those rejections did not convert you into e.g. an adherent of the classical pessimistic induction (from which Stanford distinguishes his view). There is most likely a continuum of positions between the conjunction of claims in and that of the classic pessimistic induction, and I have no interest Exceeding our Grasp in drawing a precise line distinguishing the Stanfordite and the classic pessimistic inductor. This may seem potentially inconsistent with my titular question, but the aim of the arguments in this paper is to show that: (1) position suffers from some Stanford’s problems that the classic pessimistic induction does not, and (2) amending Stanford’s position to save it from those objections pushes one much closer to the classic pessimistic induction. But, for example, this paper contains no argument that the PUA and NI fail. Rather, the view is that the PUA leaves out important evidence that many historically motivated anti-realists have used, and if one adds that evidence to the PUA and NI, one’s position will be much closer to the classical pessimistic induction. 3. The Problem of Unconceived Unrepresentativeness
what criteria are necessary and sufficient to qualify as a Stanfordite. One need not accept every claim in Stanford’s corpus to be a Stanfordite. In particular, one need not believe those claims about which Stanford himself expresses some uncertainty; this is why a holist about confirmation can be a Stanfordite. I use the term primarily to distinguish Stanford’s position from those positions that Stanford claims are importantly distinct from his view—in particular, from the ‘classic’ pessimistic induction(s) (most often associated today with Laudan) and van Fraassen’s Constructive Empiricism. So, in the way I am using ‘Stanfordite’ here, you could reject many of Stanford’s assertions and remain a Stanfordite, but only if those rejections did not convert you into e.g. an adherent of the classical pessimistic induction (from which Stanford distinguishes his view). There is most likely a continuum of positions between the conjunction of claims in Exceeding our Grasp and that of the classic pessimistic induction, and I have no interest in drawing a precise line distinguishing the Stanfordite and the classic pessimistic inductor. This may seem potentially inconsistent with my titular question, but the aim of the arguments in this paper is to show that: (1) Stanford’s position suffers from some problems that the classic pessimistic induction does not, and (2) amending Stanford’s position to save it from those objections pushes one much closer to the classic pessimistic induction. But, for example, this paper contains no argument that the PUA and NI fail. Rather, the view is that the PUA leaves out important evidence that many historically motivated anti-realists have used, and if one adds that evidence to the PUA and NI, one’s position will be much closer to the classical pessimistic induction. 3. The Problem of Unconceived Unrepresentativeness
SyntheseAnti-realistStanforditeSubmittedOct2015.docx