views or not. Even if someone accepted every purported problem with Stanford’s position above, it is still rationally open to that person to say I recognize Stanford’s ‘Yes, that view has certain weaknesses, but every other version of historically Stanford’s motivated anti-realism has even worse problems, or lacks the strengths Stanford’s position To respond to this, an alternative version of historically motivated enjoys.’ would have to be presented, and shown to have a better balance of strengths to weaknesses than version. That task must await another occasion. Stanford’s References There a Valid Experimental Argument for The Achinstein, P. (2002). “Is Realism?” 99: 470-495. Journal of Philosophy Barber, B. (1961). by Scientists to Scientific 134: Science “Resistance Discovery,” Black, J. (1806). Vol. I. Philadelphia: Mathew Lectures on the Elements of Chemistry, Carey. and Acceptance in a 102: Mind Bratman, M. (1993). “Practical Reasoning Context,” Brush, S. (1976). Book 1, New York: New Holland The Kind of Motion We Call Heat, Press. Carman, C. and Díez, J. Ptolemy Make Novel Predictions? Launching (2015). “Did Ptolemaic Astronomy into the Scientific Studies in History and Realism Debate,” 52: 20-34. Philosophy of Science Part A Realism and its 70: Philosophy of Science Chang, H. (2003). “Preservative Discontents,” 902-912. Cohen, J. L. (1992). New York: Oxford University An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. Press. Engel, P. (1998). and Philosophical Explorations “Believing, Holding True, Accepting,” 1: 140-151.
Stanford’s views or not. Even if someone accepted every purported problem with Stanford’s position above, it is still rationally open to that person to say ‘Yes, I recognize that Stanford’s view has certain weaknesses, but every other version of historically motivated anti-realism has even worse problems, or lacks the strengths Stanford’s position enjoys.’ To respond to this, an alternative version of historically motivated would have to be presented, and shown to have a better balance of strengths to weaknesses than Stanford’s version. That task must await another occasion. References Achinstein, P. (2002). “Is There a Valid Experimental Argument for Realism?” The Journal of Philosophy 99: 470-495. Barber, B. (1961). “Resistance by Scientists to Scientific Discovery,” Science 134: Black, J. (1806). Lectures on the Elements of Chemistry, Vol. I. Philadelphia: Mathew Carey. Bratman, M. (1993). “Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context,” Mind 102: Brush, S. (1976). The Kind of Motion We Call Heat, Book 1, New York: New Holland Press. Carman, C. and Díez, J. (2015). “Did Ptolemy Make Novel Predictions? Launching Ptolemaic Astronomy into the Scientific Realism Debate,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52: 20-34. Chang, H. (2003). “Preservative Realism and its Discontents,” Philosophy of Science 70: 902-912. Cohen, J. L. (1992). An Essay on Belief and Acceptance. New York: Oxford University Press. Engel, P. (1998). “Believing, Holding True, and Accepting,” Philosophical Explorations 1: 140-151.
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