the polygraph as a lie detector). Dr. Honts recognized the existence of countermeasures and agreed that, if successful, they go undetected impacting the validity of the polygraph examination and conceded that he trained in approximately thirty (30) minutes, in the laboratory, students to employ countermeasures with a success rate of 40%. However, he gave little credence to the idea that countermeasures are a general concern in determining the accuracy of polygraph examinations. It seems to be Dr. Honts’ opinion that only with his training on countermeasures can they be successfully employed and impact the accuracy of a polygraph examination’s results. This self-centered reasoning is another example of why the court attributes little weight to Dr. Honts’ opinions on reliance on the studies undertaken to test accuracy, as well as calling into doubt the results of a given polygraph examination. If successfully employed, countermeasures (about which much has been written and disseminated to the public) go undetected and sabotage the result of the examination. Recognizing the problems with the studies attempting to test the validity of polygraphs, the fact that lying does not produce a set of verifiable physiological responses, and the other environmental and situational factors impacting these examinations, the NAS report concluded that estimates of polygraph accuracy is overstated and that evidence is insufficient to “[t]he allow a quantitative estimate of the size of the overestimate.” The NAS reached the following conclusion in attempting to estimate the accuracy of polygraph examinations: Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations
the polygraph as a lie detector). Dr. Honts recognized the existence of countermeasures and agreed that, if successful, they go undetected impacting the validity of the polygraph examination and conceded that he trained in approximately thirty (30) minutes, in the laboratory, students to employ countermeasures with a success rate of 40%. However, he gave little credence to the idea that countermeasures are a general concern in determining the accuracy of polygraph examinations. It seems to be Dr. Honts’ opinion that only with his training on countermeasures can they be successfully employed and impact the accuracy of a polygraph examination’s results. This self-centered reasoning is another example of why the court attributes little weight to Dr. Honts’ opinions on reliance on the studies undertaken to test accuracy, as well as calling into doubt the results of a given polygraph examination. If successfully employed, countermeasures (about which much has been written and disseminated to the public) go undetected and sabotage the result of the examination. Recognizing the problems with the studies attempting to test the validity of polygraphs, the fact that lying does not produce a set of verifiable physiological responses, and the other environmental and situational factors impacting these examinations, the NAS report concluded that estimates of polygraph accuracy is overstated and that “[t]he evidence is insufficient to allow a quantitative estimate of the size of the overestimate.” The NAS reached the following conclusion in attempting to estimate the accuracy of polygraph examinations: Notwithstanding the limitations of the quality of the empirical research and the limited ability to generalize to real-world settings, we conclude that in populations
2014_THE_LIE_DETECTOR_IS_BULL22411.docx