Directive, as this is in line with ATJ’s interpretation of Article 15 of Decision 486. However, patents on genetic resources would only be possible if the objectives of Article 1 of the CBD were met, particularly benefit sharing. Therefore, it is now important to discuss how Colombia should implement the ABS regime in order to increase capacity, so they could benefit from the exploitation of genetic resources. Benefit Sharing and Capacity in Colombia Chapter 4 highlights that developing countries rich in biodiversity seek to counterbalance the linkage of international trade and IPRs, for a different trade-off that includes restricting the scope of patents on genetic resources and securing ownership control on those resources in order to bargain with them for access to technology. This can be observed in the third objective of the CBD: users of genetic resources are obligated to share the benefits from the utilisation of genetic resources with countries where those genetic resources are located (i.e. developing countries rich in biodiversity). The third objective of the CBD, in which countries are allowed to counterbalance TRIPs provisions that might affect them, is particularly reflected in Rawls’ work. For instance, as explained in the Introduction of this Thesis and Chapter 4, in the light of Rawls’ social contract theory, developing countries rich in biodiversity are entitled to claim ownership control of genetic resources as a result of a bargain between developed and developing countries rich in biodiversity – despite the fact that developing countries rich in biodiversity do not carry out any intellectual labour that adds value. However, such a trade-off between access to genetic resources and access to technology does not depend exclusively on having control over genetic resources, but also on users of genetic resources that hold technology which employs genetic resources for drug development. Therefore, it is important that users of genetic resources can actually have access to those
Directive, as this is in line with ATJ’s interpretation of Article 15 of Decision 486. However, patents on genetic resources would only be possible if the objectives of Article 1 of the CBD were met, particularly benefit sharing. Therefore, it is now important to discuss how Colombia should implement the ABS regime in order to increase capacity, so they could benefit from the exploitation of genetic resources. Benefit Sharing and Capacity in Colombia Chapter 4 highlights that developing countries rich in biodiversity seek to counterbalance the linkage of international trade and IPRs, for a different trade-off that includes restricting the scope of patents on genetic resources and securing ownership control on those resources in order to bargain with them for access to technology. This can be observed in the third objective of the CBD: users of genetic resources are obligated to share the benefits from the utilisation of genetic resources with countries where those genetic resources are located (i.e. developing countries rich in biodiversity). The third objective of the CBD, in which countries are allowed to counterbalance TRIPs provisions that might affect them, is particularly reflected in Rawls’ work. For instance, as explained in the Introduction of this Thesis and Chapter 4, in the light of Rawls’ social contract theory, developing countries rich in biodiversity are entitled to claim ownership control of genetic resources as a result of a bargain between developed and developing countries rich in biodiversity – despite the fact that developing countries rich in biodiversity do not carry out any intellectual labour that adds value. However, such a trade-off between access to genetic resources and access to technology does not depend exclusively on having control over genetic resources, but also on users of genetic resources that hold technology which employs genetic resources for drug development. Therefore, it is important that users of genetic resources can actually have access to those
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