comprise with, the so-called special interests, the establishment of binding international structures of market, law and money is a potentially better alternative to liberalism “prevent being devoured by democracy” (Röpke 1969: 97). In this context, Röpke, and Friedrich Hayek (1949) too, explores the market-liberating function of a federated system of relations that are devoid of political sovereignty at the international level. Röpke (1998: 8) sees (inter-state) federalism as a potentially powerful defence the flood of “against modern mass democracy”. It national sovereignty” without transferring it to a “diminishes higher authority (Röpke 1955: 250). Any such transfer is a danger to the free economy because it tends to create a form of economic organisation (bloc economy)” “collectivist (2002: 231). In these arrangements the potential for economic planning is from “transferred the national level to the international level. It would mean the yet stronger and more inescapable domination of the planners, statisticians, and econometricians, the centralising power of an international planning bureaucracy, international economic intervention, and all the rest of it..., creating a giant European organisation” (Röpke 1998: 243, 245). Röpke rejects centralisation as non-European (1998: 244, 245) and argues that federalism and collectivism are incompatible (2000: 230). For him a federation” is a “genuine of price, market and settlement” without a controlling and directing centre “community (231). In contrast to a market-liberal Europe of nation states that govern their respective societies through a supranational framework of negative economic rights, competition law and sound money, political union brings to power an that is, “economocracy”, “domination” by a centralised bureaucracy”. Röpke offers a stark choice: either political union “planning or a federation of independent nation states (2002: 230). That is either a economy” or “bloc a community that facilitates decentralised decision-making (231). it is right and “Either desirable that money and credit policy should be operated like a switchboard by a
comprise with, the so-called special interests, the establishment of binding international structures of market, law and money is a potentially better alternative to “prevent liberalism being devoured by democracy” (Röpke 1969: 97). In this context, Röpke, and Friedrich Hayek (1949) too, explores the market-liberating function of a federated system of relations that are devoid of political sovereignty at the international level. Röpke (1998: 8) sees (inter-state) federalism as a potentially powerful defence “against the flood of modern mass democracy”. It “diminishes national sovereignty” without transferring it to a higher authority (Röpke 1955: 250). Any such transfer is a danger to the free economy because it tends to create a “collectivist form of economic organisation (bloc economy)” (2002: 231). In these arrangements the potential for economic planning is “transferred from the national level to the international level. It would mean the yet stronger and more inescapable domination of the planners, statisticians, and econometricians, the centralising power of an international planning bureaucracy, international economic intervention, and all the rest of it..., creating a giant European organisation” (Röpke 1998: 243, 245). Röpke rejects centralisation as non-European (1998: 244, 245) and argues that federalism and collectivism are incompatible (2000: 230). For him a “genuine federation” is a “community of price, market and settlement” without a controlling and directing centre (231). In contrast to a market-liberal Europe of nation states that govern their respective societies through a supranational framework of negative economic rights, competition law and sound money, political union brings to power an “economocracy”, that is, “domination” by a centralised “planning bureaucracy”. Röpke offers a stark choice: either political union or a federation of independent nation states (2002: 230). That is either a “bloc economy” or a community that facilitates decentralised decision-making (231). “Either it is right and desirable that money and credit policy should be operated like a switchboard by a
StatelessMoneyExc.State.AcceptedPrePub.docx