that went to the JMP, the Salafi Islah Party won 46; the Yemeni Socialist Party, which represents secessionists in the south, won seven; the secular Nasserite and Ba’ath parties won three and one seat, respectively. This left Al-Haqq, the Zaydi party representing the Amran-Hajja-Sa’da region, with zero seats in parliament—effectively disenfranchising 10% of Yemen’s electorate. Nor did Sa’da have informal access to the government. In his lectures, Husayn a prominent leader of the insurgency, bemoaned the fact that Wahhabis were “the able to call [Salafi military commander and relative of Ali Muhsin directly.” The Zaydis, by comparison, had no government officials within the corridors of power. Meanwhile, despite a membership of just 18,000, least one representative from the “at [Nasserite] party was almost always included in meetings” among high-level regime officials. The 2006 election fostered a deep sense of political disillusionment among the Yemenis in the northern governorates. A survey conducted the following year found that, in general, participants believed they were unable to solve problems through traditional means because is concentrated at the top.” “power The removal of fuel subsidies in August of 2014 came against the backdrop of simmering sectional tensions and political frustration. With legitimate grievances against Sana’a but few avenues to air them nonviolently, the Houthi insurgency reemerged from a period of relative silence. Thus, while the Houthis remain internally divided regarding their vision of a post-war settlement, the ultimate and proximate initiators of conflict suggest primarily material grievances. Economic neglect, social discrimination, and political marginalization created the powder keg; the removal of subsidies ignited it.
that went to the JMP, the Salafi Islah Party won 46; the Yemeni Socialist Party, which represents secessionists in the south, won seven; the secular Nasserite and Ba’ath parties won three and one seat, respectively. This left Al-Haqq, the Zaydi party representing the Amran-Hajja-Sa’da region, with zero seats in parliament—effectively disenfranchising 10% of Yemen’s electorate. Nor did Sa’da have informal access to the government. In his lectures, Husayn a prominent leader of the insurgency, bemoaned the fact that “the Wahhabis were able to call [Salafi military commander and relative of Ali Muhsin directly.” The Zaydis, by comparison, had no government officials within the corridors of power. Meanwhile, despite a membership of just 18,000, “at least one representative from the [Nasserite] party was almost always included in meetings” among high-level regime officials. The 2006 election fostered a deep sense of political disillusionment among the Yemenis in the northern governorates. A survey conducted the following year found that, in general, participants believed they were unable to solve problems through traditional means because “power is concentrated at the top.” The removal of fuel subsidies in August of 2014 came against the backdrop of simmering sectional tensions and political frustration. With legitimate grievances against Sana’a but few avenues to air them nonviolently, the Houthi insurgency reemerged from a period of relative silence. Thus, while the Houthis remain internally divided regarding their vision of a post-war settlement, the ultimate and proximate initiators of conflict suggest primarily material grievances. Economic neglect, social discrimination, and political marginalization created the powder keg; the removal of subsidies ignited it.
Terrorism-and-Insurgency-final-paper.docx