Bernoulli proposed a theory very similar to the modern kinetic theory of gases in had 1738 (Brush 1976, p. 20), a century before the kinetic theory was widely accepted. A Stanfordite who appeals instead to (b) (viz. the objection from holism) would stress that some of arguments against the use parts of Ptolemy’s Earth’s diurnal rotation Aristotelian physics for premises. Thus, the appropriate hypothesis here is ‘alternative’ not the bare claim that the Earth rotates (which this Stanfordite grants was conceived in time), but rather the conjunction of this claim and the relevant parts of Ptolemy’s Newtonian or general relativistic dynamics. And those larger conjunctions were unconceived by Ptolemy, so this more holistically-conceived theory would be part of the inductive base for the NI. This deserves two replies. First, although against the Ptolemy’s arguments appeal to Aristotelian physics, his other arguments do not. For Earth’s diurnal rotation example, the arguments from lack of stellar parallax and the fact that every observer sees half the zodiac are independent of Aristotelian physics; they only rely on celestial phenomena. Second, more generally, this objection is in tension with Stanford’s professed aversion to confirmational holism. The that were unconceived in ‘alternatives’ this response are not individual hypotheses, but whole conglomerations of theories. I will not weigh the pros and cons of confirmational holism here, but Stanford himself expresses anti-holist sentiments (2006, §2.2). However, he does not declare conformational holism definitively false, so Stanfordites might well accept such holism to rescue their view from objections. Before beginning the next section, I should first clarify my use of the word its appearance in the title of this article, I take no stand concerning ‘Stanfordite.’ Despite
Bernoulli had proposed a theory very similar to the modern kinetic theory of gases in 1738 (Brush 1976, p. 20), a century before the kinetic theory was widely accepted. A Stanfordite who appeals instead to (b) (viz. the objection from holism) would stress that some of Ptolemy’s arguments against the Earth’s diurnal rotation use parts of Aristotelian physics for premises. Thus, the appropriate ‘alternative’ hypothesis here is not the bare claim that the Earth rotates (which this Stanfordite grants was conceived in Ptolemy’s time), but rather the conjunction of this claim and the relevant parts of Newtonian or general relativistic dynamics. And those larger conjunctions were unconceived by Ptolemy, so this more holistically-conceived theory would be part of the inductive base for the NI. This deserves two replies. First, although Ptolemy’s arguments against the Earth’s diurnal rotation appeal to Aristotelian physics, his other arguments do not. For example, the arguments from lack of stellar parallax and the fact that every observer sees half the zodiac are independent of Aristotelian physics; they only rely on celestial phenomena. Second, more generally, this objection is in tension with Stanford’s professed aversion to confirmational holism. The ‘alternatives’ that were unconceived in this response are not individual hypotheses, but whole conglomerations of theories. I will not weigh the pros and cons of confirmational holism here, but Stanford himself expresses anti-holist sentiments (2006, §2.2). However, he does not declare conformational holism definitively false, so Stanfordites might well accept such holism to rescue their view from objections. Before beginning the next section, I should first clarify my use of the word ‘Stanfordite.’ Despite its appearance in the title of this article, I take no stand concerning
SyntheseAnti-realistStanforditeSubmittedOct2015.docx