duration of protection where the benefits to holders are matched by the costs to The users’. Productivity Commission summarizes such work: studies find that a term of around ‘These 25 years enables rights holders to generate revenue comparable to what they would receive in perpetuity (in present value terms), without imposing onerous costs on consumers.’ The Productivity Commission reviewed a variety of studies, which have attempted to estimate the duration of copyright protection. The Productivity Commission ‘optimal’ considers the work of leading law and economics specialists: Landes and Posner (2002) argue a term of around 25 years enables rights holders to generate revenue comparable to what they would receive in perpetuity (in present value terms), without imposing onerous costs on consumers and suggests that a term of around 25 years is sufficient to incentivise creative effort. However, this is only an indicative period because the lower the discount rate used, the greater the term should be, and the authors used a relatively high real discount rate. In addition, any estimate of optimal term duration must make assumptions about the pattern of demand for the works over time a difficult task. The truly period may accordingly be more or less than 25 years — ‘optimal’ after creation but it is completely implausible it could ever be 70 years after death. The Productivity Commission also notes the work of Pollock (2007) who uses an alternative methodology to estimate the optimal length of copyright protection: work suggests a ‘His copyright term around 15 years after creation balances the benefits and costs of the system.’ The Productivity Commission concluded has no unilateral capacity to alter ‘Australia copyright terms, but can negotiate internationally to lower the copyright term.’ Draft Finding 4.1 lamented that copyright system has expanded over time, often ‘Australia’s with no transparent, evidence based policy analysis demonstrating the need for, or quantum of, new Draft Finding 4.2 observed: hard to pinpoint an optimal copyright rights.’ ‘While
duration of protection where the benefits to holders are matched by the costs to users’. The Productivity Commission summarizes such work: ‘These studies find that a term of around 25 years enables rights holders to generate revenue comparable to what they would receive in perpetuity (in present value terms), without imposing onerous costs on consumers.’ The Productivity Commission reviewed a variety of studies, which have attempted to estimate the ‘optimal’ duration of copyright protection. The Productivity Commission considers the work of leading law and economics specialists: Landes and Posner (2002) argue a term of around 25 years enables rights holders to generate revenue comparable to what they would receive in perpetuity (in present value terms), without imposing onerous costs on consumers and suggests that a term of around 25 years is sufficient to incentivise creative effort. However, this is only an indicative period because the lower the discount rate used, the greater the term should be, and the authors used a relatively high real discount rate. In addition, any estimate of optimal term duration must make assumptions about the pattern of demand for the works over time — a difficult task. The truly ‘optimal’ period may accordingly be more or less than 25 years after creation but it is completely implausible it could ever be 70 years after death. The Productivity Commission also notes the work of Pollock (2007) who uses an alternative methodology to estimate the optimal length of copyright protection: ‘His work suggests a copyright term around 15 years after creation balances the benefits and costs of the system.’ The Productivity Commission concluded ‘Australia has no unilateral capacity to alter copyright terms, but can negotiate internationally to lower the copyright term.’ Draft Finding 4.1 lamented that ‘Australia’s copyright system has expanded over time, often with no transparent, evidence based policy analysis demonstrating the need for, or quantum of, new rights.’ Draft Finding 4.2 observed: ‘While hard to pinpoint an optimal copyright
subdr611-intellectual-property.docx