p. 234), the proper way to draw the line between projective and eliminative inference is by distinguishing inferences that are to construal as a kind of inductive “amenable from those inferences that are not amenable to such construal (2010, p. 235). projection” That is, Stanford thinks inferences that cannot be couched as projective inferences should be viewed with more than those that can. This seems to rule out ‘considerably suspicion’ the inference in for Stanford, since all that is required for an ‘eliminative disguise’ route inference to be projective in the sense Stanford considers epistemically important is that the inference be framed as projective—and the above examples certainly can be can framed as projective. Stanford accept the PI? 4. Can’t The previous two sections aimed to show that a proponent of the NI cannot appeal to many of the in the standard historically-motivated anti-realist’s ‘Greatest Hits’ catalogue, without giving up some of other central commitments. Stanford might Stanford’s respond that he can agree with everything in the previous two sections along the following lines. Chapters 6 and 7 of defend (more or less) the Exceeding Our Grasp PI from realist criticisms. And Stanford himself view the problem of says: “I unconceived alternatives as with the traditional challenges of not competing underdetermination and the pessimistic induction so much as bringing out what was most significant and compelling about those challenges to (2006, p. 45; my begin with” emphasis). I agree that the PUA and the NI are consistent with the PI: historically based anti-realists can make the new induction, but keep the old. However, accepting the PI is inconsistent with piecemeal instrumentalism (4.1). Furthermore, I disagree Stanford’s
p. 234), the proper way to draw the line between projective and eliminative inference is by distinguishing inferences that are “amenable to construal as a kind of inductive projection” from those inferences that are not amenable to such construal (2010, p. 235). That is, Stanford thinks inferences that cannot be couched as projective inferences should be viewed with ‘considerably more suspicion’ than those that can. This seems to rule out the ‘eliminative inference in disguise’ route for Stanford, since all that is required for an inference to be projective in the sense Stanford considers epistemically important is that the inference can be framed as projective—and the above examples certainly can be framed as projective. 4. Can’t Stanford accept the PI? The previous two sections aimed to show that a proponent of the NI cannot appeal to many of the ‘Greatest Hits’ in the standard historically-motivated anti-realist’s catalogue, without giving up some of Stanford’s other central commitments. Stanford might respond that he can agree with everything in the previous two sections along the following lines. Chapters 6 and 7 of Exceeding Our Grasp defend (more or less) the PI from realist criticisms. And Stanford himself says: “I view the problem of unconceived alternatives not as competing with the traditional challenges of underdetermination and the pessimistic induction so much as bringing out what was most significant and compelling about those challenges to begin with” (2006, p. 45; my emphasis). I agree that the PUA and the NI are consistent with the PI: historically based anti-realists can make the new induction, but keep the old. However, accepting the PI is inconsistent with Stanford’s piecemeal instrumentalism (4.1). Furthermore, I disagree
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