potential intervener failed to intervene when she knew or reasonably should have known of her stake in the case; (3) the prejudice, if any, the potential intervener may suffer if the court does not let her intervene; and (4) any unusual circumstances that weigh in favor of or against a finding of timeliness. 256 F.3d at 376; 18 F.3d at 1205; 558 F.2d at 264-66. Glickman, Sierra Club, Stallworth, The Supreme Court has emphasized that is to be determined from all the “[t]imeliness circumstances.” 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973); 78 NAACP v. New York, see also Edwards, F.3d at 1000; 427 F.2d 1118, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1970) Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., (motion to intervene more than a year after the action was commenced was timely when there had been no legally significant proceedings other than the completion of discovery and intervention would not cause any delay in the process of the overall litigation). Timeliness is not based on an absolute measure, nor is it a tool to punish the tardy intervenor. 18 F.3d at 1205. Where the original parties will not be Sierra Club, prejudiced and justice could be attained,” federal courts should allow “greater intervention. Id. Applying these factors to the instant case, the United States’ application for intervention is timely. The United States’ intervention will not cause any prejudice through delay of the proceedings. Since the filing of the initial complaint in December 2010, the Court has not entered a scheduling order, discovery has not begun and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss and the parties’ Joint Motion for a Protective Order are currently pending. The United States already filed a Statement of Interest with regard to the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss and does not seek to participate in the briefing of any other currently pending
potential intervener failed to intervene when she knew or reasonably should have known of her stake in the case; (3) the prejudice, if any, the potential intervener may suffer if the court does not let her intervene; and (4) any unusual circumstances that weigh in favor of or against a finding of timeliness. Glickman, 256 F.3d at 376; Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205; Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-66. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]imeliness is to be determined from all the circumstances.” NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 366 (1973); see also Edwards, 78 F.3d at 1000; Diaz v. Southern Drilling Corp., 427 F.2d 1118, 1125-26 (5th Cir. 1970) (motion to intervene more than a year after the action was commenced was timely when there had been no legally significant proceedings other than the completion of discovery and intervention would not cause any delay in the process of the overall litigation). Timeliness is not based on an absolute measure, nor is it a tool to punish the tardy intervenor. Sierra Club, 18 F.3d at 1205. Where the original parties will not be prejudiced and “greater justice could be attained,” federal courts should allow intervention. Id. Applying these factors to the instant case, the United States’ application for intervention is timely. The United States’ intervention will not cause any prejudice through delay of the proceedings. Since the filing of the initial complaint in December 2010, the Court has not entered a scheduling order, discovery has not begun and Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss and the parties’ Joint Motion for a Protective Order are currently pending. The United States already filed a Statement of Interest with regard to the Defendants’ Partial Motion to Dismiss and does not seek to participate in the briefing of any other currently pending
steward_partial_cd.docx