necessary in order to resolve the matter fairly and justly”. Normally applications raise an issue of law and disclosure is unnecessary See Lord Bingham at para 2/3. – Disclosure should be limited to the minority of cases where the facts are “precise significant”. Lord Brown thought the impact would be simply that courts may “the be expected to show a somewhat greater readiness than hitherto to order disclosure of the main documents underlying proportionality decisions” and that orders for disclosure would remain exceptional [para 56]. In R (Hoppr Entertainment Ltd v [2011] EWHC 3693 (Admin) [2012] EWHC Office of Communications Ford v FSA 997 Burnett J refused disclosure of correspondence between the FSA and third parties about the use of confidential information because there was reason to “no suppose that anything is amiss”. If an application for disclosure is made then it must be focussed on “properly auditing the legality of public decision making” para 11. Bredenkamp – Disclosure may be ordered despite the fact that documents are confidential and in appropriate cases the court may require documents to be produced to it so that it can assess whether disclosure is necessary [2013] NIQB 45, (Re Finucane’s application [2014] EWHC 4349 (Admin)) or it can order disclosure of the gist R (NAPO) v SSJ of information (A [2010] EWHC 1748 (Admin)). (a Child) v CC Dorset Disclosure may be ordered to make the decision under challenge intelligible. For example, in [2003] EWHC 1611 R (Firstgroup Plc) v Strategic Rail Authority (Admin) anonymised disclosure was ordered of scores in a rail franchise exercise, in part so that the court could evaluate an irrationality challenge. It may also be necessary to make disclosure so that cross examination can be effective (below): Al Sweady – trial to have been effective cross-examination, it was vital for full disclosure to “For occur as otherwise the evidence of those witnesses could not be effectively challenged and appraised with the consequence that the truth would not have been
necessary in order to resolve the matter fairly and justly”. Normally applications raise an issue of law and disclosure is unnecessary – See Lord Bingham at para 2/3. Disclosure should be limited to the minority of cases where the “precise facts are significant”. Lord Brown thought the impact would be simply that “the courts may be expected to show a somewhat greater readiness than hitherto to order disclosure of the main documents underlying proportionality decisions” and that orders for disclosure would remain exceptional [para 56]. In R (Hoppr Entertainment Ltd v Office of Communications [2011] EWHC 3693 (Admin) Ford v FSA [2012] EWHC 997 Burnett J refused disclosure of correspondence between the FSA and third parties about the use of confidential information because there was “no reason to suppose that anything is amiss”. If an application for disclosure is made then it must be “properly focussed on auditing the legality of public decision making” – Bredenkamp para 11. Disclosure may be ordered despite the fact that documents are confidential and in appropriate cases the court may require documents to be produced to it so that it can assess whether disclosure is necessary (Re Finucane’s application [2013] NIQB 45, R (NAPO) v SSJ [2014] EWHC 4349 (Admin)) or it can order disclosure of the gist of information (A (a Child) v CC Dorset [2010] EWHC 1748 (Admin)). Disclosure may be ordered to make the decision under challenge intelligible. For example, in R (Firstgroup Plc) v Strategic Rail Authority [2003] EWHC 1611 (Admin) anonymised disclosure was ordered of scores in a rail franchise exercise, in part so that the court could evaluate an irrationality challenge. It may also be necessary to make disclosure so that cross examination can be effective – Al Sweady (below): “For to have been effective cross-examination, it was vital for full disclosure to occur as otherwise the evidence of those witnesses could not be effectively challenged and appraised with the consequence that the truth would not have been trial
The-substantive-hearing-2.docx