that he w[ould] be allowed to remain in the United States and w[ould] be released from custody”); 667 F. Supp. 2d at 183 & n.10 (granting habeas relief in part Bourguignon, because, unlike in the noncitizen in contest[ed] the Demore, Bourguignon “vigorously issue of his deportability,” arguing he was eligible for deferral of removal under CAT); 804 F.3d at 1072 (noting that who vigorously see generally Rodriguez III, “[n]on-citizens pursue claims for relief from removal face substantially longer detention periods than those who concede removability” and that individuals persevere through this “who lengthy process are often successful”). In Mr. Kargbo’s case, the BIA agreed that he may not have been convicted of an aggravated felony and that his challenge to the CIMT charge merited reopening his case. at 18-19. Upon reopening, even if the government succeeds in meeting its See infra burden to establish his removability, Mr. Kargbo can seek protection in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(3)(A) (placing burden on the government to establish removability); Hittler Decl. Ex. EE. Applying mandatory detention in his case violates due process because ultimate purpose behind [§ 1226(c)] detention is premised upon the alien’s “the deportability,” and there is a reasonable likelihood that he will never be deported. 538 U.S. at 531 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Demore, CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION PROLONGED DETENTION VIOLATES 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
that he w[ould] be allowed to remain in the United States and w[ould] be released from custody”); Bourguignon, 667 F. Supp. 2d at 183 & n.10 (granting habeas relief in part because, unlike in Demore, the noncitizen in Bourguignon “vigorously contest[ed] the issue of his deportability,” arguing he was eligible for deferral of removal under CAT); see generally Rodriguez III, 804 F.3d at 1072 (noting that “[n]on-citizens who vigorously pursue claims for relief from removal face substantially longer detention periods than those who concede removability” and that individuals “who persevere through this lengthy process are often successful”). In Mr. Kargbo’s case, the BIA agreed that he may not have been convicted of an aggravated felony and that his challenge to the CIMT charge merited reopening his case. See infra at 18-19. Upon reopening, even if the government succeeds in meeting its burden to establish his removability, Mr. Kargbo can seek protection in the form of asylum, withholding of removal, or relief under the Convention Against Torture. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (c)(3)(A) (placing burden on the government to establish removability); Hittler Decl. Ex. EE. Applying mandatory detention in his case violates due process because “the ultimate purpose behind [§ 1226(c)] detention is premised upon the alien’s deportability,” and there is a reasonable likelihood that he will never be deported. Demore, 538 U.S. at 531 (Kennedy, J., concurring). CLAIMS FOR RELIEF FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION PROLONGED DETENTION VIOLATES 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
template-for-prolonged-detention-habeas-petition.docx