A2 SMD Link No link-SMD doesn’t result in the deployment of offensive space weaponry Gruselle, 07 (Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, served in the policy department of the French Ministry of Defence for more than 10 years. Bruno, final frontier: missile defence in space?” UN Institute for Disarmament “The Research, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2600.pdf) Space-based assets could clearly play a role in both responses. Space-based sensors could give the necessary alert and tracking data to the interception network that land-based sensors would not be able to obtain. More important, space-based interceptors could be the most appropriate means to target long-range missiles fired from deep within a country’s territory or to rapidly destroy the launch capabilities of a rogue state set on defeating limited land-based interception system inventories. The latter clearly lies at the core of the debate on the nonweaponization of space as it means the deployment of a space-to- Earth strike capability. However, it is doubtful that weapon platforms will be deployed in space in the near future. Orbiting weapons capable of striking land-based systems are neither economically nor technically interesting for the moment, and other means to conduct anti-launcher operations already exist, such as piloted or unmanned airborne systems. Indeed, the proponents of missile defence are not asking for strike systems. Rather, they are advocating the development of space-based interception capabilities,23 which would have only a very marginal—and probably no—offensive potential against Earth targets.
A2 SMD Link No link-SMD doesn’t result in the deployment of offensive space weaponry Gruselle, 07 (Research Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, served in the policy department of the French Ministry of Defence for more than 10 years. Bruno, “The final frontier: missile defence in space?” UN Institute for Disarmament Research, http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2600.pdf) Space-based assets could clearly play a role in both responses. Space-based sensors could give the necessary alert and tracking data to the interception network that land-based sensors would not be able to obtain. More important, space-based interceptors could be the most appropriate means to target long-range missiles fired from deep within a country’s territory or to rapidly destroy the launch capabilities of a rogue state set on defeating limited land-based interception system inventories. The latter clearly lies at the core of the debate on the nonweaponization of space as it means the deployment of a space-to- Earth strike capability. However, it is doubtful that weapon platforms will be deployed in space in the near future. Orbiting weapons capable of striking land-based systems are neither economically nor technically interesting for the moment, and other means to conduct anti-launcher operations already exist, such as piloted or unmanned airborne systems. Indeed, the proponents of missile defence are not asking for strike systems. Rather, they are advocating the development of space-based interception capabilities,23 which would have only a very marginal—and probably no—offensive potential against Earth targets.
Space_Weapons_DA___NDI___2011.docx