seem to follow from my proposal that human minds do not traffic in mental representations. The question remains open, for all that I’ve argued here. References Kathleen. 1996. Sensory Systems and the of Mental States.” “Of ‘Aboutness’ 93 (7): 337–372 Journal of Philosophy Chemero, Anthony. 2009. Cambridge, MA: MIT Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Press Churchland, Paul M. 1981. Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.” “Eliminative 78: 67–90 Journal of Philosophy Clark, Andy, and Josefa Toribio. 1994. without Representing?” 101: Synthese “Doing 401–31 Cummins, Robert. 1989. Cambridge, MA: MIT Meaning and Mental Representation. Press Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. ——. Dretske, Fred. 1981. Cambridge, MA: MIT Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Press 1988. Cambridge, MA: MIT ——. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Press 1997. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Naturalizing the Mind. ——. Egan, Frances. 2014. to about Mental Content.” 170: Philosophical Studies “How 115–135 Eliasmith, Chris. 2003. beyond Metaphors: Understanding the Mind for What It “Moving Is.” 100 (10): 493–520 Journal of Philosophy Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Representations. 1987. Mind. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of ——. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 1990. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press A Theory of Content and Other Essays. ——.
seem to follow from my proposal that human minds do not traffic in mental representations. The question remains open, for all that I’ve argued here. References Kathleen. 1996. “Of Sensory Systems and the ‘Aboutness’ of Mental States.” Journal of Philosophy 93 (7): 337–372 Chemero, Anthony. 2009. Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Churchland, Paul M. 1981. “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.” Journal of Philosophy 78: 67–90 Clark, Andy, and Josefa Toribio. 1994. “Doing without Representing?” Synthese 101: 401–31 Cummins, Robert. 1989. Meaning and Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ——. Representations, Targets, and Attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Dretske, Fred. 1981. Knowledge and the Flow of Information. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ——. 1988. Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ——. 1997. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Egan, Frances. 2014. “How to about Mental Content.” Philosophical Studies 170: 115–135 Eliasmith, Chris. 2003. “Moving beyond Metaphors: Understanding the Mind for What It Is.” Journal of Philosophy 100 (10): 493–520 Fodor, Jerry A. 1981. Representations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ——. 1987. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press ——. 1990. A Theory of Content and Other Essays. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
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