are norms that better accord with equal respect. other It seems that our understanding of freedom of association within the domestic context fits Blake’s model, rather than Wellman’s construction. For one, it does a good job of explaining why private golf clubs, for example, do not have the right to wrongfully discriminate in selecting their members, even if individuals do in choosing their marriage partners. The key difference between marriage and golf clubs is that one’s desire to marry another does not fall within the scope of justice, even if their life may be affected by the other party’s decision not to marry them. the character of marriage demands that the best way to treat individuals with equal concern and respect to interfere inoiczzrightly no, if four men propose marriage to a woman, even if decision about whom, if any of them, to marry ‘her importantly affects each of the lives of those four persons, her own life, and the lives of any other persons wishing to marry one of these four men, and so on’, nobody would propose a democratic solution to the issueLikewise, even if a decision not to marry someone is in discriminatory beliefs, the state ought not to interfere. zzzGiven the character of immigration, the same criticism can be made of wrongfully discriminatory immigration policies. Arguably, the serious impact of disrespect on the demeaned group trumps the state’s right to freedom of association. b. It might be objected that In contrast, religious employers may do so, Overall, it seems that as long as skill selection can be shown to be in service of some purpose’ of the state, it is morally ‘legitimate permissible. woproblems , obvious issue is that, on the account I have argued for, discrimination is not wrongful when it fails to serve some purpose’, but is wrong when it In line with disrespectful. ‘legitimate Mackay’s observations, it is not generally wrong for governmental or for-profit offices to hire
are other norms that better accord with equal respect. It seems that our understanding of freedom of association within the domestic context fits Blake’s model, rather than Wellman’s construction. For one, it does a good job of explaining why private golf clubs, for example, do not have the right to wrongfully discriminate in selecting their members, even if individuals do in choosing their marriage partners. The key difference between marriage and golf clubs is that one’s desire to marry another does not fall within the scope of justice, even if their life may be affected by the other party’s decision not to marry them. the character of marriage demands that the best way to treat individuals with equal concern and respect to interfere inoiczzrightly no, if four men propose marriage to a woman, even if ‘her decision about whom, if any of them, to marry importantly affects each of the lives of those four persons, her own life, and the lives of any other persons wishing to marry one of these four men, and so on’, nobody would propose a democratic solution to the issueLikewise, even if a decision not to marry someone is in discriminatory beliefs, the state ought not to interfere. zzzGiven the character of immigration, the same criticism can be made of wrongfully discriminatory immigration policies. Arguably, the serious impact of disrespect on the demeaned group trumps the state’s right to freedom of association. b. It might be objected that In contrast, religious employers may do so, Overall, it seems that as long as skill selection can be shown to be in service of some ‘legitimate purpose’ of the state, it is morally permissible. woproblems , obvious issue is that, on the account I have argued for, discrimination is not wrongful when it fails to serve some ‘legitimate purpose’, but is wrong when it disrespectful. In line with Mackay’s observations, it is not generally wrong for governmental or for-profit offices to hire
selecting_immigrants_by_skill.docx