The that action implies” is between what is purposed and what is “distinction “that accomplished in the realm of existence.” More specifically, when we look at the internal articulation of the process that in its unity we identify as an action: The simple original nature now splits up into the distinction which action implies. Action is present at first...as End, and hence opposed to a reality already given. The second moment is the movement of the End...hence the idea of the transition itself, or means. The third moment is...the object, which is no longer in the form of an End directly known by the agent to be his own, but as brought out into the light of day and having for him the form of an 'other'. The broadly Davidsonian understanding of this up” of the action can be “splitting exploited so as to explain how the deed, unfolding consequentially beyond the ken or compass of the purpose of the agent, can nevertheless be acknowledged by the agent as the agent’s doing—so that the agent does not in its practical activity a riddle to “become itself." 5. How does Hegel understand the difference between the different kinds of what I have been calling or of the deed? The short version of the ‘descriptions’ ‘specifications’ answer I will offer here is, first, that it is a distinction of between the social perspective, agent, who acknowledges a specifically contentful responsibility, and an audience, who attributes and assesses it. Second, that difference of social perspective is a one normative in a dual sense. What they are perspective is a normative status: a question of the on imputation of a specific And the perspectives are defined by distinct seats responsibility. of concerning the characterization of what the agent is responsible for. Third, authority the ultimate determinate (unity) of the content of the action—what we should identity understand as common to its inner (in the Hegelian sense of implicit, rather than the
The “distinction that action implies” is “that between what is purposed and what is accomplished in the realm of existence.” More specifically, when we look at the internal articulation of the process that in its unity we identify as an action: The simple original nature now splits up into the distinction which action implies. Action is present at first...as End, and hence opposed to a reality already given. The second moment is the movement of the End...hence the idea of the transition itself, or means. The third moment is...the object, which is no longer in the form of an End directly known by the agent to be his own, but as brought out into the light of day and having for him the form of an 'other'. The broadly Davidsonian understanding of this “splitting up” of the action can be exploited so as to explain how the deed, unfolding consequentially beyond the ken or compass of the purpose of the agent, can nevertheless be acknowledged by the agent as the agent’s doing—so that the agent does not in its practical activity “become a riddle to itself." 5. How does Hegel understand the difference between the different kinds of what I have been calling ‘descriptions’ or ‘specifications’ of the deed? The short version of the answer I will offer here is, first, that it is a distinction of social perspective, between the agent, who acknowledges a specifically contentful responsibility, and an audience, who attributes and assesses it. Second, that difference of social perspective is a normative one in a dual sense. What they are perspective on is a normative status: a question of the imputation of a specific responsibility. And the perspectives are defined by distinct seats of authority concerning the characterization of what the agent is responsible for. Third, the ultimate determinate identity (unity) of the content of the action—what we should understand as common to its inner (in the Hegelian sense of implicit, rather than the
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