Finally, in any case, how exactly can this Court parse the facts of record de to decide the relationship between the post-2006 structural asbestos-related novo negligence and the waste issues when there is absolutely no averment or record? The Court mistakenly adopted legislative history disfavored by this Next, assuming, Congress did really intend event” to Court. arguendo, not “an mean event, and the phrase ambiguous, how should the phrase be evaluated? an is the absence of any plain meaning of the statutory language, [a court “In looks] to the legislative history of the statute to determine whether Congress provided any guidance concerning its intent.” 568 World Fuel Corp. v. Geithner, F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting 500 F.3d 1327, United States v. Fields, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007)). However, any history so adopted must be “reliable.” 675 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2012). Knepper v Rite Aid Corp., authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative “[T]he history.... Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” ; see . . . . also Here the court cited what it (and other courts making a similar, incorrect distinction) was reliable legislative history of CAFA. Judge Bartle did so believed for the proposition that Congress voted on this bill after being advised (in the report) that the Committee did not intend continuing environmental tort-like events or chemical spills” to be considered event” and should be excluded from “a “an federal jurisdiction. Based on this intent, he stated, as the lynchpin of his decision:
Finally, in any case, how exactly can this Court parse the facts of record de novo to decide the relationship between the post-2006 structural asbestos-related negligence and the waste issues when there is absolutely no averment or record? The Court mistakenly adopted legislative history disfavored by this Court. Next, assuming, arguendo, Congress did not really intend “an event” to mean an event, and the phrase is ambiguous, how should the phrase be evaluated? “In the absence of any plain meaning of the statutory language, [a court looks] to the legislative history of the statute to determine whether Congress provided any guidance concerning its intent.” World Fuel Corp. v. Geithner, 568 F.3d 1345, 1349 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Fields, 500 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir. 2007)). However, any history so adopted must be “reliable.” Knepper v Rite Aid Corp., 675 F.3d 249, 259 (3d Cir. 2012). “[T]he authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history.... Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they shed a reliable on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous terms.” ; see also . . . . Here the court cited what it (and other courts making a similar, incorrect distinction) believed was reliable legislative history of CAFA. Judge Bartle did so for the proposition that Congress voted on this bill after being advised (in the report) that the Committee did not intend continuing environmental tort-like events or “a chemical spills” to be considered “an event” and should be excluded from federal jurisdiction. Based on this intent, he stated, as the lynchpin of his decision:
SCRG%20Petition%20-as%20filed.docx