and probably for some time after. It was vital to imperial geopolitics, especially during the long Napoleonic Wars and during the conflagration of the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s and 1800s. In addition, the British made several new acquisitions in the southern Caribbean and South America as a result of war between it and France and the Netherlands. Britain had good reason to covet Caribbean territory. The West Indies, despite a small economic dip during the American Revolution, remained a highly profitable part of the empire at least until the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. Indeed, some of Britain’s new acquisitions, notably Trinidad and what became British Guiana, formed a new frontier of high plantation profits for the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. The profitability of the plantations did not decline, despite Williams’ predictions, after the end of the American Revolution. The abolition of the slave trade, as Seymour Drescher argued in a famous intervention against a major plank of the Williams’ thesis, was not in the economic interests of Britain but was a variation of This abolition occurred in a period when “econocide.” planters were usually making good money from slavery. The one exception to this general tale of plantation prosperity from around 1790 is a short-term period of economic difficulty around 1805-7 which had, David Ryden tells us, a significant effect on the politics leading directly to the abolition of the slave trade. III Sven Beckert’s prize-winning global history of cotton presents a version of the Williams’ thesis that is stronger than anything Eric Williams considered. It has been a highly praised book, garnering the sort of laudatory reviews most authors can only dream about. The argument evades easy synopsis as it is a grand undertaking that covers a large range of topics and many countries, although it is decidedly United States-centric. Even critics
and probably for some time after. It was vital to imperial geopolitics, especially during the long Napoleonic Wars and during the conflagration of the Haitian Revolution in the 1790s and 1800s. In addition, the British made several new acquisitions in the southern Caribbean and South America as a result of war between it and France and the Netherlands. Britain had good reason to covet Caribbean territory. The West Indies, despite a small economic dip during the American Revolution, remained a highly profitable part of the empire at least until the abolition of the slave trade in 1807. Indeed, some of Britain’s new acquisitions, notably Trinidad and what became British Guiana, formed a new frontier of high plantation profits for the first thirty years of the nineteenth century. The profitability of the plantations did not decline, despite Williams’ predictions, after the end of the American Revolution. The abolition of the slave trade, as Seymour Drescher argued in a famous intervention against a major plank of the Williams’ thesis, was not in the economic interests of Britain but was a variation of “econocide.” This abolition occurred in a period when planters were usually making good money from slavery. The one exception to this general tale of plantation prosperity from around 1790 is a short-term period of economic difficulty around 1805-7 which had, David Ryden tells us, a significant effect on the politics leading directly to the abolition of the slave trade. III Sven Beckert’s prize-winning global history of cotton presents a version of the Williams’ thesis that is stronger than anything Eric Williams considered. It has been a highly praised book, garnering the sort of laudatory reviews most authors can only dream about. The argument evades easy synopsis as it is a grand undertaking that covers a large range of topics and many countries, although it is decidedly United States-centric. Even critics
Slavery-and-British-Industrialisation.docx