sale), there is no conflict. In some circumstances, a trustee’s failure to act is deemed a rejection. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d)(1) (failure to See assume or reject residential lease within sixty days in liquidation bankruptcy deemed a rejection), 365(d)(4)(A) (failure to assume or reject nonresidential lease within 120 days deemed a rejection if the debtor is the lessee). But those circumstances are not present here, and the parties agree that the Pinnacle and Opticom leases were not prior to the sale. Under our interpretation, then, “rejected” section 365 was not triggered.6 We base our interpretation principally on the reasons given by the Seventh Circuit. To that court’s sound textual analysis, we add the following observations to mitigate the concern that an attempt to harmonize the two statutes results in the effective repeal of § 365(h).” Dishi “arguably 510 B.R. at 704. & Sons, First, we note the mandatory language of section 363(e). A bankruptcy court provide adequate must protection for an interest that will be terminated by a sale if the holder of the interest requests it. Moreover, “adequate protection” includes any relief—other than compensation as an administrative expense—that will in the “result realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent” of the terminated interest. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3). In Dishi & the district court concluded that adequate protection Sons, could take the form of continued possession. 510 B.R. See at 711–12. Since Pinnacle and Opticom did not ask for adequate protection until after the sale had taken indeed, until they had appealed to the district court, see note 2—the question of what protection the supra bankruptcy court could have or should have awarded is not before us. Still, we think it worth mentioning that the broad
sale), there is no conflict. In some circumstances, a trustee’s failure to act is deemed a rejection. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(d)(1) (failure to assume or reject residential lease within sixty days in liquidation bankruptcy deemed a rejection), 365(d)(4)(A) (failure to assume or reject nonresidential lease within 120 days deemed a rejection if the debtor is the lessee). But those circumstances are not present here, and the parties agree that the Pinnacle and Opticom leases were not “rejected” prior to the sale. Under our interpretation, then, section 365 was not triggered.6 We base our interpretation principally on the reasons given by the Seventh Circuit. To that court’s sound textual analysis, we add the following observations to mitigate the concern that an attempt to harmonize the two statutes “arguably results in the effective repeal of § 365(h).” Dishi & Sons, 510 B.R. at 704. First, we note the mandatory language of section 363(e). A bankruptcy court must provide adequate protection for an interest that will be terminated by a sale if the holder of the interest requests it. Moreover, “adequate protection” includes any relief—other than compensation as an administrative expense—that will “result in the realization by such entity of the indubitable equivalent” of the terminated interest. 11 U.S.C. § 361(3). In Dishi & Sons, the district court concluded that adequate protection could take the form of continued possession. See 510 B.R. at 711–12. Since Pinnacle and Opticom did not ask for adequate protection until after the sale had taken indeed, until they had appealed to the district court, see supra note 2—the question of what protection the bankruptcy court could have or should have awarded is not before us. Still, we think it worth mentioning that the broad
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