understanding of would have in our thinking about how gender hierarchy works in global “sex” politics. For example, while many feminists have a more complicated understanding of ‘gender’ than biological sex, sometimes even feminist participation in things like gender mainstreaming is reducible to representation of people and interests associated with people understood to be biologically Often, feminist theorists have trouble understanding what (if any) ‘women.’ ‘other’ to the masculine and the feminine exists. Trans- theorists tend to talk about gender not in terms of masculinities and femininities (which feminisms almost always pluralize but still often set in opposition to each other) and more in terms of diversity,” which might enhance “gender feminisms’ (and IR’s) understandings of diversity in global politics (Lane 2009; Moreno 2008). Thinking of and genders as multiple provides several insights that might complicate feminist thinking about gender in IR. First, it urges us to critically interrogate the ease with which we adopt social constructionist approaches as an alternative to biological essentialism without either looking for the downsides or for a third approach. As Lane warns, methodology tends to invite ontological belief that gender is produced by socialization” (2009, 144). Lane’s concern is that feminist IR’s constructivist and poststructuralist epistemological choices reflect (and produce) an understanding of gender as social construct or as performed that does not resonate with trans- people’s experiences. Instead, taking trans- theory seriously might encourage rethinking the role of the biological in a way that acknowledges the strong role that it plays in some gender narratives (particularly those of many trans- people) without falling into the traps of essentialism. Perhaps work like that of Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000; 2005), Lauren Wilcox (2010), and Iver Neumann (2008) which thinks seriously about questions of embodiment alongside questions of performance and
understanding of “sex” would have in our thinking about how gender hierarchy works in global politics. For example, while many feminists have a more complicated understanding of ‘gender’ than biological sex, sometimes even feminist participation in things like gender mainstreaming is reducible to representation of people and interests associated with people understood to be biologically ‘women.’ Often, feminist theorists have trouble understanding what (if any) ‘other’ to the masculine and the feminine exists. Trans- theorists tend to talk about gender not in terms of masculinities and femininities (which feminisms almost always pluralize but still often set in opposition to each other) and more in terms of “gender diversity,” which might enhance feminisms’ (and IR’s) understandings of diversity in global politics (Lane 2009; Moreno 2008). Thinking of and genders as multiple provides several insights that might complicate feminist thinking about gender in IR. First, it urges us to critically interrogate the ease with which we adopt social constructionist approaches as an alternative to biological essentialism without either looking for the downsides or for a third approach. As Lane warns, methodology tends to invite ontological belief that gender is produced by socialization” (2009, 144). Lane’s concern is that feminist IR’s constructivist and poststructuralist epistemological choices reflect (and produce) an understanding of gender as social construct or as performed that does not resonate with trans- people’s experiences. Instead, taking trans- theory seriously might encourage rethinking the role of the biological in a way that acknowledges the strong role that it plays in some gender narratives (particularly those of many trans- people) without falling into the traps of essentialism. Perhaps work like that of Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000; 2005), Lauren Wilcox (2010), and Iver Neumann (2008) which thinks seriously about questions of embodiment alongside questions of performance and
Sjoberg.Towards%20Transgendering%20IR.docx