Alerting the burglar and buying the bond of a soon-to-be-bankrupt company are things genuinely even though they were not intentional under those descriptions. For they intentional done, were under descriptions of the same event: turning on the light and buying an XYZ bond. The other performance is an action under its descriptions and specifications, including all the distant, all unforeseeable, consequential ones that come in under the accordion principle (an extensional matter). But what it an action is that it intentional under such specifications (an makes was some intensional, that is, specification-relative, matter). What distinguishes some descriptions as ones which a performance was intentional is their role as conclusions in processes of practical reasoning. Turning on the light and buying an XYZ bond were things I had to do, provided by reasons ends, or I endorse, I acknowledge, or I embrace. Those reasons in purposes, goals commitments values the form of ends, purposes, goals, commitments, or values provide for potential pieces of premises practical reasoning justifying the practical conclusion that I ought to bring about an event satisfying a description such as being a turning on of a light or a buying of an XYZ bond—but not being an alerting of a burglar or a buying of a bond of an incipiently bankrupt company. That securing the applicability of descriptions is in this way practically justifiable is what makes them the ones those under which what I go on to do is and hence something that counts as an intentional, action. The structure of such an account is quite different from one that identifies three distinct kinds of events standing in sequential causal relations: prior internal intentions or states of intending, actions, and consequences of those actions. The place of events or occurrences distinct of intendings and consequences has been taken by different descriptions of the thing done: one intentional and consequential ways of picking out the same doing. That is why it makes no sense to talk about an intention apart from what was done intentionally. What qualifies an occurrence as an
Alerting the burglar and buying the bond of a soon-to-be-bankrupt company are things genuinely done, even though they were not intentional under those descriptions. For they were intentional under other descriptions of the same event: turning on the light and buying an XYZ bond. The performance is an action under all its descriptions and specifications, including all the distant, unforeseeable, consequential ones that come in under the accordion principle (an extensional matter). But what makes it an action is that it was intentional under some such specifications (an intensional, that is, specification-relative, matter). What distinguishes some descriptions as ones which a performance was intentional is their role as conclusions in processes of practical reasoning. Turning on the light and buying an XYZ bond were things I had reasons to do, provided by ends, purposes, or goals I endorse, commitments I acknowledge, or values I embrace. Those reasons in the form of ends, purposes, goals, commitments, or values provide premises for potential pieces of practical reasoning justifying the practical conclusion that I ought to bring about an event satisfying a description such as being a turning on of a light or a buying of an XYZ bond—but not being an alerting of a burglar or a buying of a bond of an incipiently bankrupt company. That securing the applicability of those descriptions is in this way practically justifiable is what makes them the ones under which what I go on to do is intentional, and hence something that counts as an action. The structure of such an account is quite different from one that identifies three distinct kinds of events standing in sequential causal relations: prior internal intentions or states of intending, actions, and consequences of those actions. The place of distinct events or occurrences of intendings and consequences has been taken by different descriptions of the one thing done: intentional and consequential ways of picking out the same doing. That is why it makes no sense to talk about an intention apart from what was done intentionally. What qualifies an occurrence as an
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