the extension of that concept in a given world where that world is considered as actual. According to Chalmers, the analysis of a primary intension an concept’s “…is a priori enterprise, as it involves questions about what our concepts would refer to if the actual world had turned out various (1996, 59). In addition to its primary intension, a ways” concept also has a secondary (or intension that determines its extension in “subjunctive”) a given world where that world The extension of the is considered as counterfactual. secondary intension of a rigid concept in a given world—or, more specifically, the secondary intension of a which is the kind of rigid concept that natural kind concept, determined by first taking the extension of its primary intension we’re focusing upon—is in the actual world and then that the same extension is picked out by the “rigidifying” so secondary intension in all worlds (1996, 59). To see this framework at it to a specific concept: WATER. This work, let’s apply concept has a primary intension that picks out whatever happens to be the “watery in each possible world. To put it another way, in determining the extension of substance” the primary intension of WATER, we treat each possible world as though it were the actual world and pick out whatever is drinkable liquid in the oceans “the dominant clear, and (1996, 57) in that world. Since the primary intension of WATER picks out its lakes” extension via relatively superficial features of that extension—and not in virtue of its microphysical essence—the extension of the primary intension of WATER will change from world to world. (In a world where the local was XYZ, for “watery substance” instance, the primary intension of WATER would pick out XYZ.) To express the same idea using some helpful terminology from Chalmers (2003), WATER has a primary intension that is not in that it does not eliminate all the epistemic “epistemically rigid”
the extension of that concept in a given world where that world is considered as actual. According to Chalmers, the analysis of a concept’s primary intension “…is an a priori enterprise, as it involves questions about what our concepts would refer to if the actual world had turned out various ways” (1996, 59). In addition to its primary intension, a concept also has a secondary (or “subjunctive”) intension that determines its extension in a given world where that world is considered as counterfactual. The extension of the secondary intension of a rigid concept in a given world—or, more specifically, the secondary intension of a natural kind concept, which is the kind of rigid concept that we’re focusing upon—is determined by first taking the extension of its primary intension in the actual world and then “rigidifying” so that the same extension is picked out by the secondary intension in all worlds (1996, 59). To see this framework at work, let’s apply it to a specific concept: WATER. This concept has a primary intension that picks out whatever happens to be the “watery substance” in each possible world. To put it another way, in determining the extension of the primary intension of WATER, we treat each possible world as though it were the actual world and pick out whatever is “the dominant clear, drinkable liquid in the oceans and lakes” (1996, 57) in that world. Since the primary intension of WATER picks out its extension via relatively superficial features of that extension—and not in virtue of its microphysical essence—the extension of the primary intension of WATER will change from world to world. (In a world where the local “watery substance” was XYZ, for instance, the primary intension of WATER would pick out XYZ.) To express the same idea using some helpful terminology from Chalmers (2003), WATER has a primary intension that is not “epistemically rigid” in that it does not eliminate all the epistemic
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