fundamental property entails a complex property under account. To be fair, Armstrong’s Chalmers does not assume that phenomenal properties are the result of simply summing together the relevant protophenomenal properties; he allows that phenomenal properties might be determined more than this. (See, for instance, Chalmers 1996, “holistically” 299.) But this is also consistent with account of complex properties. Recall Armstrong’s that Armstrong does not maintain that all complex properties are merely sums of other properties; some complex properties—structural properties—also include relations as constituents. Finally, recall that Armstrong allows that an assemblage of (more fundamental) properties could result in a complex property that conveys that are less or causal powers more than the sum of the powers that would be conveyed by its individual parts considered in isolation of one another. In a similar vein, Chalmers (1996, 154) maintains that an assemblage of protophenomenal properties results in a complex property that has an overall that the relevant individual protophenomenal introspectible character properties, considered in isolation of one another, lack. On the basis of these to assume that if they are similarities, I’m going properties, then phenomenal properties are a type of “Armstrongian” (Later in this section, I will consider way in which Chalmers could complex property. reject this assumption and the potential costs of his doing so.) This means that if phenomenal properties are derived from non-fundamental properties, then they contain other properties—protophenomenal properties—as constituents (or parts). If, in contrast, they are fundamental properties, then they are simple properties that do not contain other properties as constituents (or parts). As a result, the question of whether phenomenal
fundamental property entails a complex property under Armstrong’s account. To be fair, Chalmers does not assume that phenomenal properties are the result of simply summing together the relevant protophenomenal properties; he allows that phenomenal properties might be determined more “holistically” than this. (See, for instance, Chalmers 1996, 299.) But this is also consistent with Armstrong’s account of complex properties. Recall that Armstrong does not maintain that all complex properties are merely sums of other properties; some complex properties—structural properties—also include relations as constituents. Finally, recall that Armstrong allows that an assemblage of (more fundamental) properties could result in a complex property that conveys causal powers that are less or more than the sum of the powers that would be conveyed by its individual parts considered in isolation of one another. In a similar vein, Chalmers (1996, 154) maintains that an assemblage of protophenomenal properties results in a complex property that has an overall introspectible character that the relevant individual protophenomenal properties, considered in isolation of one another, lack. On the basis of these similarities, I’m going to assume that if they are properties, then phenomenal properties are a type of “Armstrongian” complex property. (Later in this section, I will consider way in which Chalmers could reject this assumption and the potential costs of his doing so.) This means that if phenomenal properties are derived from non-fundamental properties, then they contain other properties—protophenomenal properties—as constituents (or parts). If, in contrast, they are fundamental properties, then they are simple properties that do not contain other properties as constituents (or parts). As a result, the question of whether phenomenal
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