was prepared in this case, as it will in the future, to find SDG&E’s conduct is reasonable and prudent, if the facts warrant such a conclusion. Discussion and Analysis In this section, the Commission analyzes the Witch, Guejito, and Rice fires separately and determines SDG&E’s prudency in managing its facilities. As the Applicant seeking recovery, SDG&E must affirmatively satisfy the Commission that it acted prudently. We weigh evidence presented by SDG&E that it acted prudently, against evidence presented by the intervenors that SDG&E did not act prudently. In each analysis, we find SDG&E to have failed its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence, that it complied with the Commission’s prudent manager standard. Witch Fire Witch Fire Background The Witch Fire, which later merged with the Guejito Fire, was the second largest fire to occur in San Diego County in 2007. The SDG&E facility involved in the ignition of the Witch Fire was Tie Line (TL) 637. TL 637 is a 69 kilovolt (kV) transmission line that connects the Santa Ysabel and Creelman substations. TL 637 is approximately 14 miles long and runs along a remote backcountry section of San Diego County. Although there were no eyewitnesses to the ignition of the fire, the Cal Fire investigator determined that a fault on TL 637 between poles Z416675 and Z416676 on October 21, 2007 led to arcing of the lines, which dispersed hot particles to land in the grassy field below the powerlines. These particles were determined to have ignited the Witch Fire which was then spread by wind. There was a Red Flag Warning in place at 4:45 a.m., prior to the Witch Fire’s ignition on October 21, 2007.
was prepared in this case, as it will in the future, to find SDG&E’s conduct is reasonable and prudent, if the facts warrant such a conclusion. Discussion and Analysis In this section, the Commission analyzes the Witch, Guejito, and Rice fires separately and determines SDG&E’s prudency in managing its facilities. As the Applicant seeking recovery, SDG&E must affirmatively satisfy the Commission that it acted prudently. We weigh evidence presented by SDG&E that it acted prudently, against evidence presented by the intervenors that SDG&E did not act prudently. In each analysis, we find SDG&E to have failed its burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence, that it complied with the Commission’s prudent manager standard. Witch Fire Witch Fire Background The Witch Fire, which later merged with the Guejito Fire, was the second largest fire to occur in San Diego County in 2007. The SDG&E facility involved in the ignition of the Witch Fire was Tie Line (TL) 637. TL 637 is a 69 kilovolt (kV) transmission line that connects the Santa Ysabel and Creelman substations. TL 637 is approximately 14 miles long and runs along a remote backcountry section of San Diego County. Although there were no eyewitnesses to the ignition of the fire, the Cal Fire investigator determined that a fault on TL 637 between poles Z416675 and Z416676 on October 21, 2007 led to arcing of the lines, which dispersed hot particles to land in the grassy field below the powerlines. These particles were determined to have ignited the Witch Fire which was then spread by wind. There was a Red Flag Warning in place at 4:45 a.m., prior to the Witch Fire’s ignition on October 21, 2007.
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