The solution are to be rejected because it is grounded in a confusion—the conflation of similar harms with equal harms. It posits degrees of moral status that bear explanatory weight that can make a difference to the strengths of reasons against two harms, even when these are equal harms. Once we reckon that the similar harms that motivated the potentiality problem are not equal harms, we no longer have to endorse the existence of degrees of moral status. We do not have to deny that there is only one type of moral such that harms to one matter morally—and that difference in strength of reasons against harms are wholly explained by differences in the harms themselves. Another solution to solve the potentiality problem is through the following observation: that potentiality may affect the strength of reasons not to harm babies by affecting how those harms are, but without at all affecting harms to embryos matter harmful whether morally. Potentiality makes harms to babies’ worse, but does not at all affect how much moral status babies have. If potentiality does not affect moral status babies have, then it how much need not affect embryos have moral status. Potentiality does make many harms worse whether for embryos, but it does not contribute at all to make those harms matter morally. The key insight is to move the significance of potentiality from whether something has moral status (whether harms to it matter morally) to how harmful individual harms are. Then the question of whether there is moral status can be solved in a different way, without reference to potentiality. In a nutshell potentiality has a particular kind of significance—it is important in the sense to decipher how harmful a particular harm is, but not to whether that particular harm matters morally. 4. Conclusion The embryonic debate has been characterised by an exploration for balanced that helps to attain a mid-position between the standpoints that embryos be protected and their use
The solution are to be rejected because it is grounded in a confusion—the conflation of similar harms with equal harms. It posits degrees of moral status that bear explanatory weight that can make a difference to the strengths of reasons against two harms, even when these are equal harms. Once we reckon that the similar harms that motivated the potentiality problem are not equal harms, we no longer have to endorse the existence of degrees of moral status. We do not have to deny that there is only one type of moral such that harms to one matter morally—and that difference in strength of reasons against harms are wholly explained by differences in the harms themselves. Another solution to solve the potentiality problem is through the following observation: that potentiality may affect the strength of reasons not to harm babies by affecting how harmful those harms are, but without at all affecting whether harms to embryos matter morally. Potentiality makes harms to babies’ worse, but does not at all affect how much moral status babies have. If potentiality does not affect how much moral status babies have, then it need not affect whether embryos have moral status. Potentiality does make many harms worse for embryos, but it does not contribute at all to make those harms matter morally. The key insight is to move the significance of potentiality from whether something has moral status (whether harms to it matter morally) to how harmful individual harms are. Then the question of whether there is moral status can be solved in a different way, without reference to potentiality. In a nutshell potentiality has a particular kind of significance—it is important in the sense to decipher how harmful a particular harm is, but not to whether that particular harm matters morally. 4. Conclusion The embryonic debate has been characterised by an exploration for balanced that helps to attain a mid-position between the standpoints that embryos be protected and their use
Revisiting%20Potential%20Argument%20in%20embryo%20research.docx