justice by which we can evaluate current social arrangements. So far as the political constitution of society goes, justice requires that such arrangements are democratic. Keeping both of these notions in focus at the same time, we can say that while democratic deliberation determines justice, justice is necessary to ensure that such deliberation is fair. 3. Two preconditions Although, as I have said, I accept general claim that there is a Fraser’s circular relationship between democracy and justice, I shall now argue that her particular account of this relationship fails. In sub-section (a), I contend that there may be vicious circles of democratic justice, in which a lack of democracy and injustice reinforce one another. Then, in sub-sections (b) and (c), I argue that Fraser does not provide a plausible account of how such vicious circles can be avoided or escaped. I shall organize my critique around her discussion of two preconditions which she says are necessary if the boundaries of political communities are to be determined democratically. My argument will be that each as it stands is inadequate, and that even both together are not sufficient to escape vicious circles. (a) vicious circles There is no doubt that in many cases the conditions needed for a virtuous circle to exist do hold, so that democracy and justice do support one another. Yet there are also plenty of cases in which such fortuitous conditions are not
justice by which we can evaluate current social arrangements. So far as the political constitution of society goes, justice requires that such arrangements are democratic. Keeping both of these notions in focus at the same time, we can say that while democratic deliberation determines justice, justice is necessary to ensure that such deliberation is fair. 3. Two preconditions Although, as I have said, I accept Fraser’s general claim that there is a circular relationship between democracy and justice, I shall now argue that her particular account of this relationship fails. In sub-section (a), I contend that there may be vicious circles of democratic justice, in which a lack of democracy and injustice reinforce one another. Then, in sub-sections (b) and (c), I argue that Fraser does not provide a plausible account of how such vicious circles can be avoided or escaped. I shall organize my critique around her discussion of two preconditions which she says are necessary if the boundaries of political communities are to be determined democratically. My argument will be that each as it stands is inadequate, and that even both together are not sufficient to escape vicious circles. (a) vicious circles There is no doubt that in many cases the conditions needed for a virtuous circle to exist do hold, so that democracy and justice do support one another. Yet there are also plenty of cases in which such fortuitous conditions are not
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