Germany as a bulwark against herself. Especially is this assumption safe during the first five years or more after the war, while Russia must herself repair the damage she has suffered and further exploit her own internal resources in order to render herself invulnerable against all comers. […] 8. The remedy is the continuance of the closest possible degree of with the Soviet Government, especially in all that concerns Germany, and the avoidance so far as possible of all signs of friendship for Germany or weakness towards her. No doubt we in this country, and more still the Americans, will find it difficult to agree with all the Russian draconian ideas about the treatment of Germany. When such cases arise we must do our best to meet the Russians half-way and should be at pains to explain convincingly to them the reasons for our disagreement. 9. We must also be careful in all our dealings with other European countries, and especially the countries of Eastern Europe, to give the Soviet Government no cause to think we are building up a against her. For the bloc Soviet Government would rightly consider that such a would inevitably bloc sooner or later require German co-operation. […] ANNEX 3. Central Europe. [1]. THE main Soviet interest in Central Europe is to prevent conditions returning in which Germany will again be an actual or potential threat to Russian security and in which Central European States between Germany and Russia will be faced with the choice of either co-operation with or being overrun by Germany and so ceasing to exist as independent nations. The maintenance of the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria against German infiltration, and the linking up of at least the first three within the Russian security system in Eastern Europe is as vital an interest of the Soviet Government: as is the independence of the Western European States to us. Russia has hitherto shown
Germany as a bulwark against herself. Especially is this assumption safe during the first five years or more after the war, while Russia must herself repair the damage she has suffered and further exploit her own internal resources in order to render herself invulnerable against all comers. […] 8. The remedy is the continuance of the closest possible degree of with the Soviet Government, especially in all that concerns Germany, and the avoidance so far as possible of all signs of friendship for Germany or weakness towards her. No doubt we in this country, and more still the Americans, will find it difficult to agree with all the Russian draconian ideas about the treatment of Germany. When such cases arise we must do our best to meet the Russians half-way and should be at pains to explain convincingly to them the reasons for our disagreement. 9. We must also be careful in all our dealings with other European countries, and especially the countries of Eastern Europe, to give the Soviet Government no cause to think we are building up a bloc against her. For the Soviet Government would rightly consider that such a bloc would inevitably sooner or later require German co-operation. […] ANNEX 3. Central Europe. [1]. THE main Soviet interest in Central Europe is to prevent conditions returning in which Germany will again be an actual or potential threat to Russian security and in which Central European States between Germany and Russia will be faced with the choice of either co-operation with or being overrun by Germany and so ceasing to exist as independent nations. The maintenance of the independence of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Austria against German infiltration, and the linking up of at least the first three within the Russian security system in Eastern Europe is as vital an interest of the Soviet Government: as is the independence of the Western European States to us. Russia has hitherto shown
1944-08-09-Eden-memorandum-to-War-Cabinet.docx