revolution’ (Orford 2011: 109). Referencing Thomas Hobbes’s Orford notes Leviathan, that, to Hobbes, the lawful authority is recognisable as the one who achieved ‘[a]ccording protection in the broad sense of bringing into being a condition in which the safety of the people can be achieved’ (Orford 2011: 36). This argument was revived, according to Orford, by Carl Schmitt in the twentieth century, though Schmitt used the idea of protection to justify authoritarian government. Thus, was concerned with conjuring up the ‘Schmitt figure of an all-powerful sovereign who could restore order and issue commands that would be obeyed’ (Orford 2011: 132). Such a figure would function on the basis of its to ‘capacity represent the will of an similar, entire, unified people”’ (Orford 2011: 37) “indivisibly against both within and beyond the state’ (Orford 2011: 130). In the words of ‘enemies Schmitt, requires [. . .] first homogeneity and second if the need arises ‘[d]emocracy – – elimination or eradication of heterogeneity [. . .] A democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and an equal that threatens its homogeneity’ (Schmitt 1988: 9). This defence of totalitarianism realised ‘was in the fascist states of 20th-century Europe’ (Orford 2011: 37). Therefore, Orford is clearly well-aware of the paradox of the to protection’ ‘turn within the context of the responsibility to protect, which challenges the tyranny of States and insurgents by providing an authority to protect to someone or something. In the case of the responsibility to protect, that something is the rather ephemeral and unidentified community.’ The power of the international community is, therefore, to ‘international secure protection, ultimately through the potentially tyrannical power to distinguish between friend and enemy. It is at this point that Orford makes clear her primary concern with the concept of responsibility to protect: history of attempts to ground authority ‘[t]he
revolution’ (Orford 2011: 109). Referencing Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan, Orford notes that, ‘[a]ccording to Hobbes, the lawful authority is recognisable as the one who achieved protection in the broad sense of bringing into being a condition in which the safety of the people can be achieved’ (Orford 2011: 36). This argument was revived, according to Orford, by Carl Schmitt in the twentieth century, though Schmitt used the idea of protection to justify authoritarian government. Thus, ‘Schmitt was concerned with conjuring up the figure of an all-powerful sovereign who could restore order and issue commands that would be obeyed’ (Orford 2011: 132). Such a figure would function on the basis of its ‘capacity to represent the will of an “indivisibly similar, entire, unified people”’ (Orford 2011: 37) against ‘enemies both within and beyond the state’ (Orford 2011: 130). In the words of Schmitt, ‘[d]emocracy requires [. . .] first homogeneity and second – if the need arises – elimination or eradication of heterogeneity [. . .] A democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and an equal that threatens its homogeneity’ (Schmitt 1988: 9). This defence of totalitarianism ‘was realised in the fascist states of 20th-century Europe’ (Orford 2011: 37). Therefore, Orford is clearly well-aware of the paradox of the ‘turn to protection’ within the context of the responsibility to protect, which challenges the tyranny of States and insurgents by providing an authority to protect to someone or something. In the case of the responsibility to protect, that something is the rather ephemeral and unidentified ‘international community.’ The power of the international community is, therefore, to secure protection, ultimately through the potentially tyrannical power to distinguish between friend and enemy. It is at this point that Orford makes clear her primary concern with the concept of responsibility to protect: ‘[t]he history of attempts to ground authority
Responsibility_to_Protect_Lessons_from_Libya_and_Syria_Final_Version.docx