contrast between the Yangzi relationship with its peripheral region in central Delta’s China and relationship with its non-European peripheral region, arranged England’s around the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, that makes imperialism so central to argument. colonial periphery was coercively maintained, Pomeranz’s England’s whereas the relationships that other core territories maintained with their own peripheries were characterised more by mutual growth and were a closer approximation to free market economics. and of comparative analysis Pomeranz’s “reciprocal” “encompassing” forms have drawn attention to the globally distinctive forms of European historians’ imperialism and its crucial role in Global history. They have also set the tone for much of the comparative Global history that has followed. For instance, Victor Lieberman has argued that fruitful comparisons can be drawn between the northern and western regions of Europe on the one hand, and mainland southeast Asia on the other. Pomeranz has found in the early modern research “surprising resemblances” period: Lieberman’s has revealed, in an equally evocative turn of operating in the phrase, “strange parallels” period between c.800 and 1830 CE. Yet not all agree with approach to the globe. In one of Pomeranz’s “re-spacing” the most significant engagements by an Imperial historian with the field of Global history, C.A. Bayly has rejected entirely the method of “reciprocal comparison”. For Bayly, the role of Global history is to the compartments which historians “blow down have made between this region and that region, or between this subdiscipline of history and that For Bayly, it is unnecessary to ponder how best to divide the world up one.” into meaningfully comparable units: regions can meaningfully be compared, all because parts of the world were undergoing similar changes during the period all between the French Revolution and the First World War. All regions were becoming more like one another, partly as a result of widely-felt “modernizing”, economic transformations, but especially due to the spread of common forms of state organization and intervention. Bayly thus argues for what we might label a “great rather than a by the global diffusion of the convergence” “great divergence”, driven model of the and information-rich European countries “patriotic state.” Northwest pioneered this model, and as a result enjoyed an early imperial sway over global flows of information, wealth and power. Yet by the end of the nineteenth the gap was
contrast between the Yangzi Delta’s relationship with its peripheral region in central China and England’s relationship with its non-European peripheral region, arranged around the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, that makes imperialism so central to Pomeranz’s argument. England’s colonial periphery was coercively maintained, whereas the relationships that other core territories maintained with their own peripheries were characterised more by mutual growth and were a closer approximation to free market economics. Pomeranz’s “reciprocal” and “encompassing” forms of comparative analysis have drawn historians’ attention to the globally distinctive forms of European imperialism and its crucial role in Global history. They have also set the tone for much of the comparative Global history that has followed. For instance, Victor Lieberman has argued that fruitful comparisons can be drawn between the northern and western regions of Europe on the one hand, and mainland southeast Asia on the other. Pomeranz has found “surprising resemblances” in the early modern period: Lieberman’s research has revealed, in an equally evocative turn of phrase, “strange parallels” operating in the period between c.800 and 1830 CE. Yet not all agree with Pomeranz’s approach to “re-spacing” the globe. In one of the most significant engagements by an Imperial historian with the field of Global history, C.A. Bayly has rejected entirely the method of “reciprocal comparison”. For Bayly, the role of Global history is to “blow down the compartments which historians have made between this region and that region, or between this subdiscipline of history and that one.” For Bayly, it is unnecessary to ponder how best to divide the world up into meaningfully comparable units: all regions can meaningfully be compared, because all parts of the world were undergoing similar changes during the period between the French Revolution and the First World War. All regions were “modernizing”, becoming more like one another, partly as a result of widely-felt economic transformations, but especially due to the spread of common forms of state organization and intervention. Bayly thus argues for what we might label a “great convergence” rather than a “great divergence”, driven by the global diffusion of the model of the “patriotic and information-rich state.” Northwest European countries pioneered this model, and as a result enjoyed an early imperial sway over global flows of information, wealth and power. Yet by the end of the nineteenth the gap was
Potter_Saha_Connected_Histories_FINAL.docx