naïve, and gullible.’ But he decided to go because he believed that war was the worse violator of human rights to be avoided at any cost. In his Nobel Peace Prize address in 2002, he noted that may sometimes be a necessary evil, but no matter how necessary, it is always evil” “war (Creekmore, 2006: xv). Twelve years after the visit, Carter said that although, in 1994, the world marching “was forward a war that was neither wanted nor necessary… No top official in Washington was willing to meet one-on-one with Kim Il Sung.” In Carter’s view, however, had to “someone determine firsthand whether Kim Il Sung wanted conflict or preferred to resolve the serious nuclear crisis diplomatically.” Since Carter a long-standing invitation to visit North Korea “had and consult with him,” he finally decided to go. Although Carter acutely aware of “was Washington’s reservations” and knew that his would bring sharp and enduring “failure condemnation,” he that Kim Il Sung was looking for a way to resolve the crisis “hoped peacefully, and believed that his views should be explored before the United States risked a dangerous and costly war” (Carter, 2006: xxi-xxii). Carter went on to say that, intervention into the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 “My reflected my basic beliefs about existing and potential conflicts and how third party mediation can sometimes help prevent or resolve such confrontation.” Carter believed that both “where sides see—or can be helped to see—real value in avoiding or ending violent confrontation but do not know how to achieve this goal, then an outside mediator may be able to help them break through their own intolerance and ignorance of the other’s views, create an atmosphere of mutual respect, and frame a final settlement that protects the fundamental interests of each” (Carter, 2006: xxiii).
naïve, and gullible.’ But he decided to go because he believed that war was the worse violator of human rights to be avoided at any cost. In his Nobel Peace Prize address in 2002, he noted that “war may sometimes be a necessary evil, but no matter how necessary, it is always evil” (Creekmore, 2006: xv). Twelve years after the visit, Carter said that although, in 1994, the world “was marching forward a war that was neither wanted nor necessary… No top official in Washington was willing to meet one-on-one with Kim Il Sung.” In Carter’s view, however, “someone had to determine firsthand whether Kim Il Sung wanted conflict or preferred to resolve the serious nuclear crisis diplomatically.” Since Carter “had a long-standing invitation to visit North Korea and consult with him,” he finally decided to go. Although Carter “was acutely aware of Washington’s reservations” and knew that his “failure would bring sharp and enduring condemnation,” he “hoped that Kim Il Sung was looking for a way to resolve the crisis peacefully, and believed that his views should be explored before the United States risked a dangerous and costly war” (Carter, 2006: xxi-xxii). Carter went on to say that, “My intervention into the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994 reflected my basic beliefs about existing and potential conflicts and how third party mediation can sometimes help prevent or resolve such confrontation.” Carter believed that “where both sides see—or can be helped to see—real value in avoiding or ending violent confrontation but do not know how to achieve this goal, then an outside mediator may be able to help them break through their own intolerance and ignorance of the other’s views, create an atmosphere of mutual respect, and frame a final settlement that protects the fundamental interests of each” (Carter, 2006: xxiii).
Reconsidering%20Jimmy%20Carters%20Foreign%20Policy%20Legacy%20in%20the%20Two%20Koreas%20Paper%205%20(FINAL).docx