prefer. Hallett’s interpretation is by no means the consensus view, but it does have important textual support. For example, since God is defined in the Ethics as absolutely infinite (1D6), God can in no way be limited or be in any way determinate, for to be determinate entails being related to another that it is not. As Spinoza argues in his letter to Jelles, determination is negation,’ ‘all and hence substance cannot be determinate if is to be absolutely infinite and affirmative, which is precisely how Spinoza understands it, as he makes clear in a letter to Lodewijk Meyer where he claims substance is the enjoyment of existing.’ This is also accounts for why God is ‘infinite absolutely infinite rather than infinite in its own kind, as the attributes are, since this would require being a determinate form of infinite and hence a form that when understood could, conceptually by way of the understanding namely the infinite mode of understanding—be – related to what it is not, to what is other than it. Yet another reason for adopting Hallett’s reading follows from a claim Spinoza makes in a letter to Jelles (letter 50) that anyone who God ‘calls one or single has no true idea of God’ because, as we’ve already noted, all determination is negation and God, as substance, is the enjoyment of existing,’ or infinite power as ‘infinite Spinoza will also put it. To further clarify Spinoza’s position, and the Spinozist context within which Deleuze’s thought navigates, we can turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s claim, in that God is a A Thousand Plateaus, lobster, a double articulation. It is all too easy to underestimate the philosophical importance of this claim, but we see it at work in Deleuze’s essay on Gueroult, where the first eight propositions correspond to the first articulation; or, as Deleuze puts it, first eight ‘the propositions represent a first series through which we ascend to the differential constitutive elements’ the attributes. As Deleuze had stressed earlier in the essay, there is ascension – ‘no
prefer. Hallett’s interpretation is by no means the consensus view, but it does have important textual support. For example, since God is defined in the Ethics as absolutely infinite (1D6), God can in no way be limited or be in any way determinate, for to be determinate entails being related to another that it is not. As Spinoza argues in his letter to Jelles, ‘all determination is negation,’ and hence substance cannot be determinate if is to be absolutely infinite and affirmative, which is precisely how Spinoza understands it, as he makes clear in a letter to Lodewijk Meyer where he claims substance is the ‘infinite enjoyment of existing.’ This is also accounts for why God is absolutely infinite rather than infinite in its own kind, as the attributes are, since this would require being a determinate form of infinite and hence a form that could, when understood conceptually by way of the understanding – namely the infinite mode of understanding—be related to what it is not, to what is other than it. Yet another reason for adopting Hallett’s reading follows from a claim Spinoza makes in a letter to Jelles (letter 50) that anyone who ‘calls God one or single has no true idea of God’ because, as we’ve already noted, all determination is negation and God, as substance, is the ‘infinite enjoyment of existing,’ or infinite power as Spinoza will also put it. To further clarify Spinoza’s position, and the Spinozist context within which Deleuze’s thought navigates, we can turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s claim, in A Thousand Plateaus, that God is a lobster, a double articulation. It is all too easy to underestimate the philosophical importance of this claim, but we see it at work in Deleuze’s essay on Gueroult, where the first eight propositions correspond to the first articulation; or, as Deleuze puts it, ‘the first eight propositions represent a first series through which we ascend to the differential constitutive elements’ – the attributes. As Deleuze had stressed earlier in the essay, there is ‘no ascension
realismantirealism.docx