interferes with property rights of millers This is likely to reduce the … … profitability of future mill investment and dampen longer term innovation and productivity compared to no additional regulation. Conclusion On balance, the review found little benefit in retaining duplicative and non-operative provisions in the code. The inclusion of these provisions may hinder the ability of the Sugar Industry Act to be changed to meet the needs of the Queensland sugar industry. It may also risk creating inconsistencies between Australian and state sugar industry law and future policy. The Queensland-specific grower choice provisions should be removed from code. The code could then provide a robust national framework for dispute resolution across the industry—a common feature of other prescribed industry codes. This change would not affect growers’ choice of marketer rights because this would continue to be provided for under the Sugar Industry Act. Potential conflicts with Part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 The code has an exemption from the Part IV anti-competitive conduct provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), which authorises the of things’ under the ‘doing code. However, the CCA only allows this exemption to last for two years, after which time it sunsets. There was a concern that the code may be found to be inconsistent with Part IV of the CCA after the exemption sunsets. For example, agreements under the code may involve a cartel provision. This could be in conflict with sections 45 and 47 of the CCA, which deal with conduct that has the purpose or effect (or is likely to have the effect) of substantially lessening competition. On 5 May 2017 the ACCC authorised growers to collectively bargain with millers for 10 The authorisation applies only to growers represented by CANEGROWERS. The ACCC is also seeking submissions on a potential collective bargaining and franchising class exemption. The exemption would provide eligible businesses and franchisees with legal protection to collectively bargain with customers or suppliers without having to apply to the ACCC. Collective bargaining by cane growers with mills could be covered by this potential class exemption. The risk of inconsistency between the code and Part IV of the CCA is deemed low.
… interferes with property rights of millers … This is likely to reduce the profitability of future mill investment and dampen longer term innovation and productivity compared to no additional regulation. Conclusion On balance, the review found little benefit in retaining duplicative and non-operative provisions in the code. The inclusion of these provisions may hinder the ability of the Sugar Industry Act to be changed to meet the needs of the Queensland sugar industry. It may also risk creating inconsistencies between Australian and state sugar industry law and future policy. The Queensland-specific grower choice provisions should be removed from code. The code could then provide a robust national framework for dispute resolution across the industry—a common feature of other prescribed industry codes. This change would not affect growers’ choice of marketer rights because this would continue to be provided for under the Sugar Industry Act. Potential conflicts with Part IV of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 The code has an exemption from the Part IV anti-competitive conduct provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (CCA), which authorises the ‘doing of things’ under the code. However, the CCA only allows this exemption to last for two years, after which time it sunsets. There was a concern that the code may be found to be inconsistent with Part IV of the CCA after the exemption sunsets. For example, agreements under the code may involve a cartel provision. This could be in conflict with sections 45 and 47 of the CCA, which deal with conduct that has the purpose or effect (or is likely to have the effect) of substantially lessening competition. On 5 May 2017 the ACCC authorised growers to collectively bargain with millers for 10 The authorisation applies only to growers represented by CANEGROWERS. The ACCC is also seeking submissions on a potential collective bargaining and franchising class exemption. The exemption would provide eligible businesses and franchisees with legal protection to collectively bargain with customers or suppliers without having to apply to the ACCC. Collective bargaining by cane growers with mills could be covered by this potential class exemption. The risk of inconsistency between the code and Part IV of the CCA is deemed low.
review-sugar-code-of-conduct.docx