Top Secret., Printed for the War Cabinet, 6 June 1944. P.H.P. (44) 13 (O) Final., Copy No. 2 WAR CABINET. Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee EFFECT OF SOVIET POLICY ON BRITISH STRATEGIC INTERESTS. Report by the Sub-Committee 1. We were instructed to appreciate the probable long-term impact of the policy of the U.S.S.R. on British strategic interests, with the object of formulating basic principles on which the Chiefs of Staff should found their military advice when called upon to express an opinion upon questions of policy affecting the U.S.S.R. We were told that the basis of this appreciation should be that it remains the policy of to foster and maintain the friendliest His Majesty’s Government possible relations with the U.S.S.R.. 2. Our full appreciation is attached, and our conclusions are set out below. These have been prepared in close consultation with the Foreign Office, and have taken account of all available evidence of intentions. It should Russia’s post-war be noted, however, that no attempt has been made to deal with the possibility that Soviet Russia might attempt to extend her influence over Western Europe and thus dominate the whole continent. Nor has any attempt been made to deal with the possibility that the Russia of the future, as a result of the development of Siberia, might attempt to dominate the continent of Asia. Obviously, if either of these situations were to arise, there would be a serious threat to British interests, but the evidence at present available does not in any way suggest that the desire for the wholesale domination of this sort is in the mind of the Soviet leaders or their people.
Top Secret., Printed for the War Cabinet, 6 June 1944. P.H.P. (44) 13 (O) Final., Copy No. 2 WAR CABINET. Post-Hostilities Planning Sub-Committee EFFECT OF SOVIET POLICY ON BRITISH STRATEGIC INTERESTS. Report by the Sub-Committee 1. We were instructed to appreciate the probable long-term impact of the policy of the U.S.S.R. on British strategic interests, with the object of formulating basic principles on which the Chiefs of Staff should found their military advice when called upon to express an opinion upon questions of policy affecting the U.S.S.R. We were told that the basis of this appreciation should be that it remains the policy of His Majesty’s Government to foster and maintain the friendliest possible relations with the U.S.S.R.. 2. Our full appreciation is attached, and our conclusions are set out below. These have been prepared in close consultation with the Foreign Office, and have taken account of all available evidence of Russia’s post-war intentions. It should be noted, however, that no attempt has been made to deal with the possibility that Soviet Russia might attempt to extend her influence over Western Europe and thus dominate the whole continent. Nor has any attempt been made to deal with the possibility that the Russia of the future, as a result of the development of Siberia, might attempt to dominate the continent of Asia. Obviously, if either of these situations were to arise, there would be a serious threat to British interests, but the evidence at present available does not in any way suggest that the desire for the wholesale domination of this sort is in the mind of the Soviet leaders or their people.
1944-06-06-top-secret-war-cabinet.docx