Rules of Court are couched in clear peremptory terms" and that they were "absolute". Failure to obey them, he concluded, was fatal and their must, without any allowance, result in nullification of the “disobedience application”. More so, he reasoned, because of the expeditious nature that the Legislature attached to election applications and the public interest in a speedy determination. Hence, he discerned a clear intention on the part of the Legislature and the "rule maker" that they wished to create a nullity where there has been disobedience of s 110(2) of the Act and rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On that basis, he sought to distinguish judgments which held that there was "a tendency towards flexibility" in the application of time periods. He noted that, any case, the time “in limits regulating election applications do not fall within the provisions of the Court regulating its own procedures” and that it was not necessary for him to decide whether there was properly a condonation application before the Court. The learned Judge a quo recognised that the registrar, in her discretion, could have accepted the late submission of the application but, he reasoned, the words exceptional circumstances” in rule 3 “in fettered the ambit of the discretion accorded to her. He held that the appellants bore the onus of proof on that issue; that it was incumbent on them to place sufficient evidence in the founding papers to show that the
Rules of Court are couched in clear peremptory terms" and that they were "absolute". Failure to obey them, he concluded, was fatal and their “disobedience must, without any allowance, result in nullification of the application”. More so, he reasoned, because of the expeditious nature that the Legislature attached to election applications and the public interest in a speedy determination. Hence, he discerned a clear intention on the part of the Legislature and the "rule maker" that they wished to create a nullity where there has been disobedience of s 110(2) of the Act and rule 3 of the Rules of Court. On that basis, he sought to distinguish judgments which held that there was "a tendency towards flexibility" in the application of time periods. He noted that, “in any case, the time limits regulating election applications do not fall within the provisions of the Court regulating its own procedures” and that it was not necessary for him to decide whether there was properly a condonation application before the Court. The learned Judge a quo recognised that the registrar, in her discretion, could have accepted the late submission of the application but, he reasoned, the words “in exceptional circumstances” in rule 3 fettered the ambit of the discretion accorded to her. He held that the appellants bore the onus of proof on that issue; that it was incumbent on them to place sufficient evidence in the founding papers to show that the
Rally%20for%20Democracy%20and%20Progress%20v%20Electoral%20Commission%20of%20Namibia(SA%206-2010)[2010](6%20September%202010).docx