merely a of public opinion. While citizens do not believe their vote to matter, they “soft” issue are free to use it carelessly, which in this case stands to usher truly anti-democratic parties – including fascists, anarchists, and ultra-nationalists into positions of power. Furthermore, if – voter turnout drops for the eighth consecutive election, the European Parliament and the EU as a whole will lack a democratic mandate; if only a third of Europeans participate in European governance, who can the EU claim to represent? If these democratic catastrophes are to be avoided, or at least mitigated, two barriers must be overcome. Firstly, citizens must understand how the EU works to a sufficient level where they recognize the validity of its democratic structures, including the upcoming election. Secondly, they must trust the EU to act in their best interest, or at least in the interest of the majority. Public Diplomacy and Democratic Legitimacy Considering these parameters, it makes sense to approach the crisis of EU’s ongoing democratic legitimacy through a public diplomacy framework. Defined by Nicholas Cull as “an to manage the international environment through engagement with a international actor’s attempt public diplomacy is generally employed with the dual purpose of promoting foreign public,” mutual understanding between foreign publics and influencing these publics to adopt a particular opinion or action. Because the EU is a multinational entity, when it communicates with any public, internally or externally, it is useful to conceive of that action as one of public diplomacy. engagement with its own citizens is characterized by the same cross-cultural and Brussels’ multilinguistic challenges as foreign engagement initiatives. Furthermore, the traditional states’ importance of overcoming inherent distrust of the is central to internal EU “foreign” actor communications. There is only a very weak imagined community between Germany and Greece, and almost none between the United Kingdom (UK) and any continental state. Only 10% of
merely a “soft” issue of public opinion. While citizens do not believe their vote to matter, they are free to use it carelessly, which in this case stands to usher truly anti-democratic parties – including fascists, anarchists, and ultra-nationalists – into positions of power. Furthermore, if voter turnout drops for the eighth consecutive election, the European Parliament and the EU as a whole will lack a democratic mandate; if only a third of Europeans participate in European governance, who can the EU claim to represent? If these democratic catastrophes are to be avoided, or at least mitigated, two barriers must be overcome. Firstly, citizens must understand how the EU works to a sufficient level where they recognize the validity of its democratic structures, including the upcoming election. Secondly, they must trust the EU to act in their best interest, or at least in the interest of the majority. Public Diplomacy and Democratic Legitimacy Considering these parameters, it makes sense to approach the EU’s ongoing crisis of democratic legitimacy through a public diplomacy framework. Defined by Nicholas Cull as “an international actor’s attempt to manage the international environment through engagement with a foreign public,” public diplomacy is generally employed with the dual purpose of promoting mutual understanding between foreign publics and influencing these publics to adopt a particular opinion or action. Because the EU is a multinational entity, when it communicates with any public, internally or externally, it is useful to conceive of that action as one of public diplomacy. Brussels’ engagement with its own citizens is characterized by the same cross-cultural and multilinguistic challenges as traditional states’ foreign engagement initiatives. Furthermore, the importance of overcoming inherent distrust of the “foreign” actor is central to internal EU communications. There is only a very weak imagined community between Germany and Greece, and almost none between the United Kingdom (UK) and any continental state. Only 10% of
Public%20Diplomacy%20and%20Democratic%20Legitimacy%20in%20the%20European%20Union,%20Henrietta%20Levin.docx