role of power in embedding legitimacy and co-operation in supply chains to the importance of trust and the way it mitigates the expedient and opportunist use of coercive power. It is worthwhile revisiting this literature briefly. The study of power has come some way statement that since Dahl’s (1957) original has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not ‘A Applying this definition to a supply chain context was always fraught otherwise do.’ with difficulties when, for example, it was never clear what B would in ‘otherwise do’ the absence of power, when B was locked into a relationship with A because B was A’s reliant on A to purchase his/her goods or services, and the relation between A and B might be was cost). zero sum (B’s margin A’s One response was to refine and make it more relevant for a supply Dahl’s definition chain application. Hence Wilemon (1972) argued that: to the ability of ‘power refers one channel [supply chain] member to induce another channel [supply chain] member to change its behaviour in favour of the objectives of the channel member exerting This made subtle distinction more apparent: power is not just influence.’ Dahl’s something one but is also something that one partner power is partner ‘has,’ ‘exercises’; a relation as much as a possession. This distinction led to what Gatski (1984) referred to as the growth of power and the study of the impact of one ‘channel conflict theory’ – supply chain power (its character, source and extent) on the amount of member’s conflict with their chain partners. For some authors the results were predictable and conclusive. Robicheaux and (1975) for example argued that when one partner possessed significantly higher levels of power, this led to an increase in the coercive use of that power. This was reinforced by many laboratory studies which demonstrated a positive correlation between power and coercion (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Roering 1977). But others were
role of power in embedding legitimacy and co-operation in supply chains to the importance of trust and the way it mitigates the expedient and opportunist use of coercive power. It is worthwhile revisiting this literature briefly. The study of power has come some way since Dahl’s (1957) original statement that ‘A has power over B to the extent that A can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.’ Applying this definition to a supply chain context was always fraught with difficulties when, for example, it was never clear what B would ‘otherwise do’ in the absence of A’s power, when B was locked into a relationship with A because B was reliant on A to purchase his/her goods or services, and the relation between A and B might be zero sum (B’s margin was A’s cost). One response was to refine Dahl’s definition and make it more relevant for a supply chain application. Hence Wilemon (1972) argued that: ‘power refers to the ability of one channel [supply chain] member to induce another channel [supply chain] member to change its behaviour in favour of the objectives of the channel member exerting influence.’ This made Dahl’s subtle distinction more apparent: power is not just something one partner ‘has,’ but is also something that one partner ‘exercises’; power is a relation as much as a possession. This distinction led to what Gatski (1984) referred to as the growth of ‘channel power and conflict theory’ – the study of the impact of one supply chain member’s power (its character, source and extent) on the amount of conflict with their chain partners. For some authors the results were predictable and conclusive. Robicheaux and (1975) for example argued that when one partner possessed significantly higher levels of power, this led to an increase in the coercive use of that power. This was reinforced by many laboratory studies which demonstrated a positive correlation between power and coercion (Dwyer and Walker 1981; Roering 1977). But others were
Pragmatic_engagement_in_a_low_trust_supply_chain_Beef_farmers_Al_edits.docx