with the corporation (indicating institutional pressure), and to utilize corporate resources and capabilities (which can be an effect of parental pressure or voluntary choice). Second, we observed that not all programs perceived the parental pressure and the opportunity to utilize parental resources to the same extent. Some programs perceived high parental pressure and a greater opportunity to utilize corporate resources and aligned with the norms of their parent (internal focus of isomorphism). This led to an ‘integrated’ placing strong emphasis on corporate investment practices. Other programs perceived lower pressure from the parent and lower opportunity to utilize parental resources, and aligned with the norms of the VC world (external focus of isomorphism). This led to an investment-logic placing moderate emphasis on corporate investment practices ‘arms-length’ . Despite the fact that the data pointed towards a discreet choice between two competing logics (integrated versus arms-length) it could be that these are the two extremes of a continuum. It is possible that CVC programs pick and choose different corporate investment practices. The clear distinction in our model could be because of the choice of cases (our data was polarised but it is possible that there are also hybrids), or because of the participants’ interpretation. Categories are often socially constructed to ease meaning, and they are created by unintentionally exaggerating the partitions between observations (Zerubavel, 1993). To put it simply, what the participants interpreted and labelled as an “integrated” (or “arms-length) CVC program could really be a program towards the integrated (or arms-length) end of the spectrum regarding its investment practices. We collected two sets of CVC data over a decade (six cases in 2002 and seven cases in While practices of individual companies might have shifted over time (see future research directions), we reported results that are broadly replicable across the two sets of data. The eight corporate investment practices, the reasons behind these practices and the
with the corporation (indicating institutional pressure), and to utilize corporate resources and capabilities (which can be an effect of parental pressure or voluntary choice). Second, we observed that not all programs perceived the parental pressure and the opportunity to utilize parental resources to the same extent. Some programs perceived high parental pressure and a greater opportunity to utilize corporate resources and aligned with the norms of their parent (internal focus of isomorphism). This led to an ‘integrated’ placing strong emphasis on corporate investment practices. Other programs perceived lower pressure from the parent and lower opportunity to utilize parental resources, and aligned with the norms of the VC world (external focus of isomorphism). This led to an ‘arms-length’ investment-logic placing moderate emphasis on corporate investment practices . Despite the fact that the data pointed towards a discreet choice between two competing logics (integrated versus arms-length) it could be that these are the two extremes of a continuum. It is possible that CVC programs pick and choose different corporate investment practices. The clear distinction in our model could be because of the choice of cases (our data was polarised but it is possible that there are also hybrids), or because of the participants’ interpretation. Categories are often socially constructed to ease meaning, and they are created by unintentionally exaggerating the partitions between observations (Zerubavel, 1993). To put it simply, what the participants interpreted and labelled as an “integrated” (or “arms-length) CVC program could really be a program towards the integrated (or arms-length) end of the spectrum regarding its investment practices. We collected two sets of CVC data over a decade (six cases in 2002 and seven cases in While practices of individual companies might have shifted over time (see future research directions), we reported results that are broadly replicable across the two sets of data. The eight corporate investment practices, the reasons behind these practices and the
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