A student traced this discomfort surrounding around coordination between generations to state policies of the past: Hong Kong, for student movements, there was also a tradition that the CCP would “In like to establish a united front, so they would also allocate a lot of resources nurturing students who are be pro-Beijing. There has been a tradition starting in 50s, 70s. So when it came to recent years, students and alumni accuse the Executive Committee [of HKFS] of being Pro-Beijing. And that would trigger a fight. Alumni would be accused of influencing students no matter they are pro-Beijing or democracy.” The legacy of the machinations in student organizations to cultivate support for the Mainland meant that alumni on both sides of the struggle could be accused of using CCP tactics, which were deemed illegitimate. Students also resisted high levels of coordination with ghosts”; in “old order to make sure that their actions were taken seriously, and not seen as the product of intrigue. Moreover, students and NGO members began to see the Occupy Trio as closely coordinating with the pan-democratic party politicians. The arena seemed to be “conservative” for the pan-democrats, and the students and NGOs wanted to push the democrats “well-crafted” toward public nomination. Kinman Chan openly stated the Trio was moderate, and would have been happy without public nomination, so long as the final proposal met international standards. One student described Benny Tai’s strength as being his in balancing concerns,” but “kindness recognized that his pre-occupation with holding the pan-democratic camp together made him more responsive to political parties’ interests on occasion. The Trio now faced a dilemma, technically, the more radical sub players in their alliance had won the day. If they lost the moderates, not only would they lose allies who could provide public support, but also these allies were turning into detractors, which could lead to the
A student traced this discomfort surrounding around coordination between generations to state policies of the past: “In Hong Kong, for student movements, there was also a tradition that the CCP would like to establish a united front, so they would also allocate a lot of resources nurturing students who are be pro-Beijing. There has been a tradition starting in 50s, 70s. So when it came to recent years, students and alumni accuse the Executive Committee [of HKFS] of being Pro-Beijing. And that would trigger a fight. Alumni would be accused of influencing students no matter they are pro-Beijing or democracy.” The legacy of the machinations in student organizations to cultivate support for the Mainland meant that alumni on both sides of the struggle could be accused of using CCP tactics, which were deemed illegitimate. Students also resisted high levels of coordination with “old ghosts”; in order to make sure that their actions were taken seriously, and not seen as the product of intrigue. Moreover, students and NGO members began to see the Occupy Trio as closely coordinating with the “conservative” pan-democratic party politicians. The arena seemed to be “well-crafted” for the pan-democrats, and the students and NGOs wanted to push the democrats toward public nomination. Kinman Chan openly stated the Trio was moderate, and would have been happy without public nomination, so long as the final proposal met international standards. One student described Benny Tai’s strength as being his “kindness in balancing concerns,” but recognized that his pre-occupation with holding the pan-democratic camp together made him more responsive to political parties’ interests on occasion. The Trio now faced a dilemma, technically, the more radical sub players in their alliance had won the day. If they lost the moderates, not only would they lose allies who could provide public support, but also these allies were turning into detractors, which could lead to the
JMahlbacher-An-Ivory-Refuge-in-a-Storm-PPW.docx