But, first, given the alleviating effect of the division of labour in place, the particular society in question would really have to contribute extraordinarily much in order for such individual effects to threaten. This might happen, given the world as it is, but notice that the same idea of division of labour could then be taken to the global level to counteract this tendency. This no doubt raises the question of global morality, i.e., what our duties are to societies that we are not members of. We will say more about the problem of global morality and the role institutions, hence institutional consequentialism can play in it, at the end of the paper. Second, the destructive influence of high societal contributions would have to affect the relevant projects and commitments of people. The fact that as a result of high societal contributions individual members would have to give up certain luxuries of life in order to help suffering others elsewhere, could hardly be persuasive. Finally, third, we do not find the idea of social practices being of one’s individual personality plausible. This is constitutive after all a distinctively communitarian thought that is subject to the criticism that people can reflect upon and decide about their aims, projects and commitments in life (Kymlicka 2002). Given the good moral reasons in support of the consequentialist cause, it might therefore well be the case that, instead of experiencing the results of high societal contributions as destructive of their personal life, people would see them as more in line with their new, reformed personality (that, though, does not have to be so reformed as to also conform to consequentialism when applied to their actions directly). However, having said all this, one problem is still looming. It could be pointed out that we have not paid adequate attention to the difference between maintaining (running) and setting up (or even just reforming) an institution. Bailey (1997: 149) identifies two sources of the difference between their respective demands. One, institutional reform typically requires political reform which in turn needs political activism to make sure that the reforms take place. Two, even after the reforms are enacted (e.g. as law), expenditures are needed to get
But, first, given the alleviating effect of the division of labour in place, the particular society in question would really have to contribute extraordinarily much in order for such individual effects to threaten. This might happen, given the world as it is, but notice that the same idea of division of labour could then be taken to the global level to counteract this tendency. This no doubt raises the question of global morality, i.e., what our duties are to societies that we are not members of. We will say more about the problem of global morality and the role institutions, hence institutional consequentialism can play in it, at the end of the paper. Second, the destructive influence of high societal contributions would have to affect the relevant projects and commitments of people. The fact that as a result of high societal contributions individual members would have to give up certain luxuries of life in order to help suffering others elsewhere, could hardly be persuasive. Finally, third, we do not find the idea of social practices being constitutive of one’s individual personality plausible. This is after all a distinctively communitarian thought that is subject to the criticism that people can reflect upon and decide about their aims, projects and commitments in life (Kymlicka 2002). Given the good moral reasons in support of the consequentialist cause, it might therefore well be the case that, instead of experiencing the results of high societal contributions as destructive of their personal life, people would see them as more in line with their new, reformed personality (that, though, does not have to be so reformed as to also conform to consequentialism when applied to their actions directly). However, having said all this, one problem is still looming. It could be pointed out that we have not paid adequate attention to the difference between maintaining (running) and setting up (or even just reforming) an institution. Bailey (1997: 149) identifies two sources of the difference between their respective demands. One, institutional reform typically requires political reform which in turn needs political activism to make sure that the reforms take place. Two, even after the reforms are enacted (e.g. as law), expenditures are needed to get
institutional_consequentialism_draft_january_2017_short.docx