is a form of benevolent superpower, based on sagely morality and political wang power that leads by example. If China becomes a great power, others will wang-style see its magnanimous ways and will want to emulate them. Therefore, the Chinese elites will never need to use coercion, because everybody will want to become like them. The juxtaposition between US and Chinese leadership is thus rendered in stark opposition: Chinese lead the American wang “humane authority” means “to world”; means dominate the (Ibid.: 71). How should we ba “hegemony” “to world” understand development of and in this manner? Most immediately, Yan’s ba wang analysis conceptualises self and other, good and bad, and in strongly wang ba Yan’s dichotomous terms. If this Chinese development of pre-modern thought exemplifies a it falls back on precisely the kind of dichotomous thinking that it “Chinese ontology”, is said by thinkers like Zhao to guard against. What is more, and Yan’s others’ imagination of a good Chinese self in opposition to a bad US/Western other falls back on essentialised ideas of these categories, and perhaps of in particular. “Chineseness” chapter in this volume engages with the of Matthias Liehr’s “internal Orientalism” Han relation to Tibet. Bhavna Sing describes, in another chapter, how the China’s deployment of Chinese abroad has led many to understand their “soft power” diasporic self and host country in antagonistic terms. These “Chinese” “other” analyses reflect something similar, perhaps, to the chauvinistic self-strengthening logics that are at work in Chinese discussions of hegemony. The concept is ba-style used as part of a that is widespread in Chinese nationalist “patriotic worrying” scholarship (Davies, 2007), and that is primarily concerned with offering policy advice that can help China rise and, as Yan puts it, (Yan, 2011b). “defeat America” To one commentator, Yan thus draws from historical discourses to pass “liberally moral judgement and promote realist foreign policy in the Republic of … People’s China” (Schneider, 2014: 6).
wang is a form of benevolent superpower, based on sagely morality and political power that leads by example. If China becomes a wang-style great power, others will see its magnanimous ways and will want to emulate them. Therefore, the Chinese elites will never need to use coercion, because everybody will want to become like them. The juxtaposition between US and Chinese leadership is thus rendered in stark opposition: Chinese wang “humane authority” means “to lead the world”; American ba “hegemony” means “to dominate the world” (Ibid.: 71). How should we understand Yan’s development of ba and wang in this manner? Most immediately, Yan’s analysis conceptualises self and other, good and bad, wang and ba in strongly dichotomous terms. If this Chinese development of pre-modern thought exemplifies a “Chinese ontology”, it falls back on precisely the kind of dichotomous thinking that it is said by thinkers like Zhao to guard against. What is more, Yan’s and others’ imagination of a good Chinese self in opposition to a bad US/Western other falls back on essentialised ideas of these categories, and perhaps of “Chineseness” in particular. Matthias Liehr’s chapter in this volume engages with the “internal Orientalism” of Han China’s relation to Tibet. Bhavna Sing describes, in another chapter, how the deployment of Chinese “soft power” abroad has led many to understand their diasporic “Chinese” self and host country “other” in antagonistic terms. These analyses reflect something similar, perhaps, to the chauvinistic self-strengthening logics that are at work in Chinese discussions of ba-style hegemony. The concept is used as part of a nationalist “patriotic worrying” that is widespread in Chinese scholarship (Davies, 2007), and that is primarily concerned with offering policy advice that can help China rise and, as Yan puts it, “defeat America” (Yan, 2011b). To one commentator, Yan thus “liberally draws from historical discourses to pass moral judgement and … promote realist foreign policy in the People’s Republic of China” (Schneider, 2014: 6).
Hegemony_in_Chinese_submitted_22.03.2014.docx