We evaluate whether a proposed settlement satisfies the “public interest” standard by a preponderance of the evidence of benefits, and such burden can be met by showing a likelihood or probability of public benefits that need not be quantified or guaranteed. 594 Pa. 583, 937 A.2d 1040 (2007) (Popowsky) Popowsky v. Pa. PUC, public interest standard discussed in the context of a merger reviewed under (“substantial” Section 1103 of the Code, 66 Pa. C.S. § 1103). The pertinent inquiry of a reviewing court in the context of the analysis of the public interest of Section 1103 of the Code, is supra, stated as follows: In summary, as indicated in the appropriate , legal framework requires a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that a merger will affirmatively promote the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public in some substantial way. In conducting the underlying inquiry, the Commission is not required to secure legally binding commitments or to quantify benefits where this may be impractical, burdensome, or impossible; rather, the PUC properly applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to make factually-based determinations (including predictive ones informed by expert judgment) concerning certification matters. 594 Pa. at 611, 937 A.2d at 1057. Popowsky, This Commission has historically defined the public interest as including ratepayers, shareholders, and the regulated community. What is in the public interest See is decided by examining the effect of the proposed Settlement on these “stakeholder” entities. The public interest is best served, however, by ensuring that the underlying Id. transaction complies with applicable law. See Dauphin County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Pa. 2015 WL 5238841, 2015 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 381 (September 9, 2015) PUC, (Commonwealth Court Order reversing Commission approval of a joint settlement due to
We evaluate whether a proposed settlement satisfies the “public interest” standard by a preponderance of the evidence of benefits, and such burden can be met by showing a likelihood or probability of public benefits that need not be quantified or guaranteed. Popowsky v. Pa. PUC, 594 Pa. 583, 937 A.2d 1040 (2007) (Popowsky) (“substantial” public interest standard discussed in the context of a merger reviewed under Section 1103 of the Code, 66 Pa. C.S. § 1103). The pertinent inquiry of a reviewing court in the context of the analysis of the public interest of Section 1103 of the Code, supra, is stated as follows: In summary, as indicated in , the appropriate legal framework requires a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commission's finding that a merger will affirmatively promote the service, accommodation, convenience, or safety of the public in some substantial way. In conducting the underlying inquiry, the Commission is not required to secure legally binding commitments or to quantify benefits where this may be impractical, burdensome, or impossible; rather, the PUC properly applies a preponderance of the evidence standard to make factually-based determinations (including predictive ones informed by expert judgment) concerning certification matters. Popowsky, 594 Pa. at 611, 937 A.2d at 1057. This Commission has historically defined the public interest as including ratepayers, shareholders, and the regulated community. See What is in the public interest is decided by examining the effect of the proposed Settlement on these “stakeholder” entities. Id. The public interest is best served, however, by ensuring that the underlying transaction complies with applicable law. See Dauphin County Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Pa. PUC, 2015 WL 5238841, 2015 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 381 (September 9, 2015) (Commonwealth Court Order reversing Commission approval of a joint settlement due to
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