Reingen & Kernan, 1977), in courtship (e.g., Guéguen, Pascual, Marchand & Lourel, 2008) and in employment relations (e.g., & 2008). Herbout, Guéguen Grandjean, it has been shown to have a useful potential as a tool in the hands of Moreover, governmental agencies e.g., in an effort to curb teen smoking (Bloom, McBride, Pollak, – Schwartz-Bloom & Lipkus, 2006) or to minimize energy consumption (Meineri & Guéguen, 2008): a minimal initial interaction, such as agreeing to respond to a short questionnaire, significantly increases subsequent willingness to commit to the major cause. The research to date has thus emphasized interpersonal interaction and psychological processes experienced by the person being approached. On the face of it, it does not seem likely to be applicable to the context of influencing But, surprisingly perhaps, institutions. we believe that a very similar strategy is used by courts vis-à-vis other branches of government and the legal community at large. Consider for example the practice of courts to commonly make statements about the law that go beyond what is necessary to decide the specific case. Common law courts have developed the doctrine of obiter dictum, according to which such incidental statements are not considered to be part of the binding precedent. Arguably, courts use these statements which are not needed for the case at – hand and formally have no legal effect as a foot-in-the-door of sorts. Common law – courts that gradually develop the law are interested in encouraging smooth acceptance of new developments. The early exposure to new ideas which they put forward as obiter ensures that later on, when the time comes to formally change the law, less dictum resistance will be incurred. We thus argue that the can be understood at obiter dictum – least in some cases as a weapon of influence employed by courts. Whether judges use –
Reingen & Kernan, 1977), in courtship (e.g., Guéguen, Pascual, Marchand & Lourel, 2008) and in employment relations (e.g., Herbout, Guéguen & Grandjean, 2008). Moreover, it has been shown to have a useful potential as a tool in the hands of governmental agencies – e.g., in an effort to curb teen smoking (Bloom, McBride, Pollak, Schwartz-Bloom & Lipkus, 2006) or to minimize energy consumption (Meineri & Guéguen, 2008): a minimal initial interaction, such as agreeing to respond to a short questionnaire, significantly increases subsequent willingness to commit to the major cause. The research to date has thus emphasized interpersonal interaction and psychological processes experienced by the person being approached. On the face of it, it does not seem likely to be applicable to the context of influencing institutions. But, surprisingly perhaps, we believe that a very similar strategy is used by courts vis-à-vis other branches of government and the legal community at large. Consider for example the practice of courts to commonly make statements about the law that go beyond what is necessary to decide the specific case. Common law courts have developed the doctrine of obiter dictum, according to which such incidental statements are not considered to be part of the binding precedent. Arguably, courts use these statements – which are not needed for the case at hand and formally have no legal effect – as a foot-in-the-door of sorts. Common law courts that gradually develop the law are interested in encouraging smooth acceptance of new developments. The early exposure to new ideas which they put forward as obiter dictum ensures that later on, when the time comes to formally change the law, less resistance will be incurred. We thus argue that the obiter dictum can be understood – at least in some cases – as a weapon of influence employed by courts. Whether judges use
How%20Judges%20Use%20Weapons%20of%20Influence%20March%202011.docx