57. Subject, nevertheless, to these quite critical considerations, I nevertheless am of the view that Barr J. fell into error in concluding that the remedy of judicial review was in itself an ineffective remedy for the purposes of Article 39. I accept, of course, that the remedy of judicial review has inherent limitations of the kind identified by Barr J.. Where I respectfully part company with Barr J. is that I do not see that these limitations (e.g., no power to substitute findings of facts for those of the decision-maker and a power of annulment only) as otherwise depriving judicial review of the character of an effective remedy. What is critical is that - as Diouf makes clear - the judicial review court can subject the reasons of the decision maker to thorough review. For the reasons I have endeavoured to state, I believe that this task can be performed by the High Court using contemporary judicial review standards as explained by the recent authorities. Conclusions 58. In conclusion, therefore, I am of the view that the fact that the applicant may challenge the validity of any decision of the Minister to refuse to her to the asylum process in accordance with s. 17 of the 1996 Act (as amended) by way of judicial review means that the State has provided her with an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 39 of the Procedures Directive. 59. The corollary of this conclusion, of course, is that the High Court must ensure that, in the words of the Court of Justice in Diouf, the reasons which led the Minister reject the application “to for asylum as unfounded… [must] be the subject of a thorough review by the national court.” As, for the reasons I have just stated, there is no reason why this cannot be achieved by the High Court in judicial review proceedings by reference to the Meadows principles (as explained in cases such as ISOF and Efe), it is clear that contemporary judicial review does indeed provide an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 39. 60. It follows, therefore, that for these reasons I would allow the appeal of the Minister against the decision of the High Court.
57. Subject, nevertheless, to these quite critical considerations, I nevertheless am of the view that Barr J. fell into error in concluding that the remedy of judicial review was in itself an ineffective remedy for the purposes of Article 39. I accept, of course, that the remedy of judicial review has inherent limitations of the kind identified by Barr J.. Where I respectfully part company with Barr J. is that I do not see that these limitations (e.g., no power to substitute findings of facts for those of the decision-maker and a power of annulment only) as otherwise depriving judicial review of the character of an effective remedy. What is critical is that - as Diouf makes clear - the judicial review court can subject the reasons of the decision maker to thorough review. For the reasons I have endeavoured to state, I believe that this task can be performed by the High Court using contemporary judicial review standards as explained by the recent authorities. Conclusions 58. In conclusion, therefore, I am of the view that the fact that the applicant may challenge the validity of any decision of the Minister to refuse to her to the asylum process in accordance with s. 17 of the 1996 Act (as amended) by way of judicial review means that the State has provided her with an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 39 of the Procedures Directive. 59. The corollary of this conclusion, of course, is that the High Court must ensure that, in the words of the Court of Justice in Diouf, the reasons which led the Minister “to reject the application for asylum as unfounded… [must] be the subject of a thorough review by the national court.” As, for the reasons I have just stated, there is no reason why this cannot be achieved by the High Court in judicial review proceedings by reference to the Meadows principles (as explained in cases such as ISOF and Efe), it is clear that contemporary judicial review does indeed provide an effective remedy for the purposes of Article 39. 60. It follows, therefore, that for these reasons I would allow the appeal of the Minister against the decision of the High Court.
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