However, Sue would not have a duty to run in the charity race, since Sue’s duty to help others can be multiply realised. Running in the charity race would help others, but so would making a donation to Oxfam; so would helping her elderly neighbour repaint his window frames; and so on. Because a general principle can be adhered to in various ways, declining to take any one opportunity to realise it does not constitute a failure of duty. So long as other opportunities are taken up, one has realised one’s general duty. Since this is so, we can see that having a general duty to benefit gives us moral reasons to carry out any act that would benefit, but does not imply a duty to perform a particular beneficent act, and thus does not warrant moral criticism. What this means for breastfeeding, then, is that even if we accept that breastfeeding is beneficial (even and furthermore accept that mothers have a “best”), general duty to benefit their children, it does not follow that mothers have a defeasible duty to breastfeed their babies. Because of this, it is not the case that mothers are liable to moral criticism if they decline to breastfeed without strong countervailing reasons against doing so. THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO BENEFIT Even if one accepts that Sue does not have a defeasible duty to run in the charity run because she has a general duty to help others, one might still think that mothers have a defeasible duty to breastfeed, since it’s commonly assumed that mothers don’t just have a duty to be of some benefit to their children, but rather, they have a duty to do they can’ ‘all to benefit their children. According to this line of thinking, while Sue has a sufficiency duty to help has, say, a duty to help others some decent amount, but does not have a duty to do every last thing she can to help others—mothers have a maximal duty to benefit their children: they have a duty to do everything they can to benefit their children. We reject this
However, Sue would not have a duty to run in the charity race, since Sue’s duty to help others can be multiply realised. Running in the charity race would help others, but so would making a donation to Oxfam; so would helping her elderly neighbour repaint his window frames; and so on. Because a general principle can be adhered to in various ways, declining to take any one opportunity to realise it does not constitute a failure of duty. So long as other opportunities are taken up, one has realised one’s general duty. Since this is so, we can see that having a general duty to benefit gives us moral reasons to carry out any act that would benefit, but does not imply a duty to perform a particular beneficent act, and thus does not warrant moral criticism. What this means for breastfeeding, then, is that even if we accept that breastfeeding is beneficial (even “best”), and furthermore accept that mothers have a general duty to benefit their children, it does not follow that mothers have a defeasible duty to breastfeed their babies. Because of this, it is not the case that mothers are liable to moral criticism if they decline to breastfeed without strong countervailing reasons against doing so. THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO BENEFIT Even if one accepts that Sue does not have a defeasible duty to run in the charity run because she has a general duty to help others, one might still think that mothers have a defeasible duty to breastfeed, since it’s commonly assumed that mothers don’t just have a duty to be of some benefit to their children, but rather, they have a duty to do ‘all they can’ to benefit their children. According to this line of thinking, while Sue has a sufficiency duty to help has, say, a duty to help others some decent amount, but does not have a duty to do every last thing she can to help others—mothers have a maximal duty to benefit their children: they have a duty to do everything they can to benefit their children. We reject this
jmebreastfeedingdraftjuly2016.docx