compared to monetary judgments. Exc. at 16-18. In this objection, PGW repeats its basis for distinguishing a municipal lien and judgment lien. PGW repeats its description of the municipal lien procedures under the MCTLL and states that the municipal lien, by itself, is not conclusive as between the parties concerning the amount owed. Exc. at 16. There is a legal process to establish the final amount of indebtedness represented by the municipal lien and the lien merely secures payment of a sum that can, eventually, be modified. Id. Fourth, PGW asserts that the ALJ in her reliance on Equitable Gas v. and the doctrine of merger of judgments. Exc. at 18-20. In this section of Wade, supra, its Exception No. 2, PGW again asserts that dual procedures, and are in rem in personam, permitted under the MCTLL, to enable a municipal entity to recover on the debt represented by the municipal lien. Exc. at 18. PGW distinguishes the holding in based on the fact Equitable Gas v. Wade that in the action before the court resulted in a valid and final Equitable Gas v. Wade, personal judgment against the utility customer. Therefore, in Equitable Gas v. Wade, PGW observes, there was a judicial determination as to the amount owed by “conclusive” a ratepayer to a utility concerning the ratepayer’s personal liability for the utility service. Also, PGW places special emphasis on the fact that in contrast to Equitable Gas v. Wade, neither PGW nor SBG, commenced the statutory process for adjudicating the final amount due on the municipal lien. Exc. at 19. PGW states, has been no valid “[t]here and final determination by the Court of Common Pleas as to the valid [sic] or amount of the debt owed on the municipal lien.” Id. Additionally, PGW asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on the doctrine of merger in this proceeding. Exc. at 19. As PGW argues that none of the circumstances necessary to achieve a merger of judgments are present as neither the original claim nor any defenses to that claim have been extinguished. Id.
compared to monetary judgments. Exc. at 16-18. In this objection, PGW repeats its basis for distinguishing a municipal lien and judgment lien. PGW repeats its description of the municipal lien procedures under the MCTLL and states that the municipal lien, by itself, is not conclusive as between the parties concerning the amount owed. Exc. at 16. There is a legal process to establish the final amount of indebtedness represented by the municipal lien and the lien merely secures payment of a sum that can, eventually, be modified. Id. Fourth, PGW asserts that the ALJ in her reliance on Equitable Gas v. Wade, supra, and the doctrine of merger of judgments. Exc. at 18-20. In this section of its Exception No. 2, PGW again asserts that dual procedures, in rem and in personam, are permitted under the MCTLL, to enable a municipal entity to recover on the debt represented by the municipal lien. Exc. at 18. PGW distinguishes the holding in Equitable Gas v. Wade based on the fact that in Equitable Gas v. Wade, the action before the court resulted in a valid and final personal judgment against the utility customer. Therefore, in Equitable Gas v. Wade, PGW observes, there was a “conclusive” judicial determination as to the amount owed by a ratepayer to a utility concerning the ratepayer’s personal liability for the utility service. Also, PGW places special emphasis on the fact that in contrast to Equitable Gas v. Wade, neither PGW nor SBG, commenced the statutory process for adjudicating the final amount due on the municipal lien. Exc. at 19. PGW states, “[t]here has been no valid and final determination by the Court of Common Pleas as to the valid [sic] or amount of the debt owed on the municipal lien.” Id. Additionally, PGW asserts that the ALJ improperly relied on the doctrine of merger in this proceeding. Exc. at 19. As PGW argues that none of the circumstances necessary to achieve a merger of judgments are present as neither the original claim nor any defenses to that claim have been extinguished. Id.
1491938.docx