[14] The court a quo declared that the CCMA does not have jurisdiction to issue writs of execution in respect of arbitration awards issued by it. It consequently set aside both awards”. “enforcement [15] It is trite that, when interpreting any document, regard must be had to the language used as well as the context under which the document saw the light of the day. This holds true for any document including contracts and legislative texts. There is no need for any ambiguity before the context is considered. [16] The successive amendments of section 143 and the reasons therefore as set out in the affidavit of the Directors of the CCMA gives a very instructive background to the section. In Hleka v Johannesburg City Council, it was said that in order to ascertain the real meaning of words used by the legislature and the evil that it intended to remedy, it is permissible to have regard to: What the law was before the measure was passed. What the mischief or defeat was, for which the law did not provide. What remedy the legislature appointed and The reason for the remedy. After considering the above factors, I am then enjoined to construct section 143 in such a way that it shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. [17] Section 143(1) as originally enacted by Act 66 of 1995 provided as follows: An arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding ‘1 and may be made an order of the Labour Court in terms of Section 158 (1) (c), unless it is an advisory arbitration award.’ [18] The Director of the CCMA indicated in her affidavit that one of the major problems with CCMA awards was that employers paid no attention to them because they were aware of the cumbersome enforcement provisions of the Act. It is self-evident that this procedure was onerous, time consuming and expensive. It created a two stage procedure in cases where the employer
[14] The court a quo declared that the CCMA does not have jurisdiction to issue writs of execution in respect of arbitration awards issued by it. It consequently set aside both “enforcement awards”. [15] It is trite that, when interpreting any document, regard must be had to the language used as well as the context under which the document saw the light of the day. This holds true for any document including contracts and legislative texts. There is no need for any ambiguity before the context is considered. [16] The successive amendments of section 143 and the reasons therefore as set out in the affidavit of the Directors of the CCMA gives a very instructive background to the section. In Hleka v Johannesburg City Council, it was said that in order to ascertain the real meaning of words used by the legislature and the evil that it intended to remedy, it is permissible to have regard to: What the law was before the measure was passed. What the mischief or defeat was, for which the law did not provide. What remedy the legislature appointed and The reason for the remedy. After considering the above factors, I am then enjoined to construct section 143 in such a way that it shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. [17] Section 143(1) as originally enacted by Act 66 of 1995 provided as follows: ‘1 An arbitration award issued by a commissioner is final and binding and may be made an order of the Labour Court in terms of Section 158 (1) (c), unless it is an advisory arbitration award.’ [18] The Director of the CCMA indicated in her affidavit that one of the major problems with CCMA awards was that employers paid no attention to them because they were aware of the cumbersome enforcement provisions of the Act. It is self-evident that this procedure was onerous, time consuming and expensive. It created a two stage procedure in cases where the employer
JA%2094-15%20CCMA%20v%20MBS.docx