as the respondent made it out to be in its heads of argument. Thirdly, Mr. Barnard argued that the said judgment does not even deal with review applications. He was correct on all accounts. [39] Regarding the issue of prejudice it was argued that the respondent instituted the review proceedings by way of action, so as to avoid the need to file an application for condonation explaining why, review proceedings were only instituted after eleven months and not sooner. In conclusion, it was argued that invariably in almost every review application there are disputed facts. If same cannot be resolved on paper, it is referred to oral evidence. On Behalf of the Respondent [40] Mr. Heathcote correctly argued that, before the summons could be set aside for irregularity, such irregularity would have to be proven. He further argued that proving an irregularity alone was not sufficient to warrant striking the respondent’s combined summons, but that the applicant needed prove the prejudice it would suffer due to the irregular step or proceeding alleged. It was his further contention that, firstly, if one has a claim, one does not sue the Board, but the company. Secondly, if one cannot sue the existing Board, one certainly cannot sue a defunct Board. Thirdly, he further contended, a company cannot sue itself. Lastly, he submitted, the provisions of rule 76 are there to be used by private persons against whom the administrative body or official has taken an adverse decision and which they wish to have the said decision set aside. [41] According, to Mr. Heathcote, the applicant wishes to protect the decision that was taken in its favour and thus cannot rely on rule 76, which is intended for applications to set aside an adverse decision of an administrative body or official. He also argued that where there are delays in instituting review proceedings, the consequence is that the review would not succeed. He further submitted that in the first letter, addressed to the
as the respondent made it out to be in its heads of argument. Thirdly, Mr. Barnard argued that the said judgment does not even deal with review applications. He was correct on all accounts. [39] Regarding the issue of prejudice it was argued that the respondent instituted the review proceedings by way of action, so as to avoid the need to file an application for condonation explaining why, review proceedings were only instituted after eleven months and not sooner. In conclusion, it was argued that invariably in almost every review application there are disputed facts. If same cannot be resolved on paper, it is referred to oral evidence. On Behalf of the Respondent [40] Mr. Heathcote correctly argued that, before the summons could be set aside for irregularity, such irregularity would have to be proven. He further argued that proving an irregularity alone was not sufficient to warrant striking the respondent’s combined summons, but that the applicant needed prove the prejudice it would suffer due to the irregular step or proceeding alleged. It was his further contention that, firstly, if one has a claim, one does not sue the Board, but the company. Secondly, if one cannot sue the existing Board, one certainly cannot sue a defunct Board. Thirdly, he further contended, a company cannot sue itself. Lastly, he submitted, the provisions of rule 76 are there to be used by private persons against whom the administrative body or official has taken an adverse decision and which they wish to have the said decision set aside. [41] According, to Mr. Heathcote, the applicant wishes to protect the decision that was taken in its favour and thus cannot rely on rule 76, which is intended for applications to set aside an adverse decision of an administrative body or official. He also argued that where there are delays in instituting review proceedings, the consequence is that the review would not succeed. He further submitted that in the first letter, addressed to the
IBB%20Military%20Equipment%20and%20Accessory%20Supplies%20CC%20v%20NAC%20(HC-MD-CIV-ACT-OTH-2017-01488)[2017]%20NAHCMD%20318%20(8%20November%202017).docx