Schopenhauer justifies the claim that the intelligible character is chosen through the fact free.” that we responsible for our deeds. Because our empirical character is incapable of acting feel freely, we must feel responsible for another reason. Schopenhauer says a person feels responsible because he knows if he were he could have acted otherwise. He a different person, writes, and hence under the motives that have determined him, an …in existing circumstances entirely different action, in fact the very opposite of his, was quite possible and could have happened, Because he is this person and not if only he had been another person. another; because he has such and such a character, naturally no other action was possible for in itself, however, and thus it is possible. Therefore the him; objectively, of which he is conscious concerns the deed only in the first instance and responsibility ostensibly, but at bottom it concerns it is for the latter that he feels himself his character; responsible (all italics). Schopenhauer’s A different person in the same situation could have performed a different action; however, because the particular person has chosen to be person and not a different one, there was only this one possible action that he could perform. He still feels responsible for his action although he could not have done otherwise, because he knows he is accountable for being the person he is. He has, in view, created himself through choice. Schopenhauer’s Having elucidated the free chosenness of the intelligible character, I will move to the second key characteristic. Schopenhauer asserts that the intelligible character serves as the uniting thread that holds together the other conscious features of a human being. Kleist’s description of the intelligible character as a teleological unity of conscious states and actions is accurate. Kleist points out that Schopenhauer uses the intelligible character to account for the unity of conscious states. Schopenhauer says there must be an extent to which our human’s consciousness is not subject to pure incoherence and disarray. Therefore there must be a guiding thread to consciousness that arranges representations and ideas; otherwise we would be only a mixture of different fragments of thoughts. Schopenhauer rejects memory as a possibility for
free.” Schopenhauer justifies the claim that the intelligible character is chosen through the fact that we feel responsible for our deeds. Because our empirical character is incapable of acting freely, we must feel responsible for another reason. Schopenhauer says a person feels responsible because he knows if he were a different person, he could have acted otherwise. He writes, …in existing circumstances and hence under the motives that have determined him, an entirely different action, in fact the very opposite of his, was quite possible and could have happened, if only he had been another person. Because he is this person and not another; because he has such and such a character, naturally no other action was possible for him; in itself, however, and thus objectively, it is possible. Therefore the responsibility of which he is conscious concerns the deed only in the first instance and ostensibly, but at bottom it concerns his character; it is for the latter that he feels himself responsible (all Schopenhauer’s italics). A different person in the same situation could have performed a different action; however, because the particular person has chosen to be this person and not a different one, there was only one possible action that he could perform. He still feels responsible for his action although he could not have done otherwise, because he knows he is accountable for being the person he is. He has, in Schopenhauer’s view, created himself through choice. Having elucidated the free chosenness of the intelligible character, I will move to the second key characteristic. Schopenhauer asserts that the intelligible character serves as the uniting thread that holds together the other conscious features of a human being. Kleist’s description of the intelligible character as a teleological unity of conscious states and actions is accurate. Kleist points out that Schopenhauer uses the intelligible character to account for the unity of human’s conscious states. Schopenhauer says there must be an extent to which our consciousness is not subject to pure incoherence and disarray. Therefore there must be a guiding thread to consciousness that arranges representations and ideas; otherwise we would be only a mixture of different fragments of thoughts. Schopenhauer rejects memory as a possibility for
Idealistic%20Studies%20manuscript.docx