on the concept of “no first use” – one of the few countries to employ this doctrine - and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared in a policy statement in parliament in 1998 that India would maintain "a minimum but credible nuclear deterrent.” It claims that it is not engaged in an arms race, or that if it is, the opponent is actually China, not Pakistan. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon, Chagai-I in May of 1998 as well. With Chinese help, Pakistan built the Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, which became operational in April of 1998. It is estimated that they currently possess between 90 and 110 nuclear warheads, which are thought to be made with highly enriched uranium. President Pervez Musharraf in 2002 said Pakistan did not want conflict with India, but if it came to war between the two, he would respond with “full might.” Four main pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, as asserted by senior Pakistani government officials were described by Michael Krepon: First, they assert that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific. Second, Pakistan has embraced a doctrine of credible, minimum deterrence, as noted above. Third, the requirements for credible, minimal deterrence are not fixed; instead, they are determined by a dynamic threat environment. And fourth, given India’s conventional military advantages, Pakistan reserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in extremis. Pakistan is also possibly leading India in the number of nuclear weapons possessed by each, as it has put a huge focus on its nuclear weapons program. They claim, however, that there is not an arms race, with the Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar declared that, “[o]ur policy of minimum credible deterrence will obviate any strategic arms race.” The potential results of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan are dire. Not only would the immediate effects of the weapons lay waste to the region, but it is estimated that over one billion people would die due to the world wide climate disruption and global
on the concept of “no first use” – one of the few countries to employ this doctrine - and Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee declared in a policy statement in parliament in 1998 that India would maintain "a minimum but credible nuclear deterrent.” It claims that it is not engaged in an arms race, or that if it is, the opponent is actually China, not Pakistan. Pakistan tested its first nuclear weapon, Chagai-I in May of 1998 as well. With Chinese help, Pakistan built the Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, which became operational in April of 1998. It is estimated that they currently possess between 90 and 110 nuclear warheads, which are thought to be made with highly enriched uranium. President Pervez Musharraf in 2002 said Pakistan did not want conflict with India, but if it came to war between the two, he would respond with “full might.” Four main pillars of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, as asserted by senior Pakistani government officials were described by Michael Krepon: First, they assert that Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent is India-specific. Second, Pakistan has embraced a doctrine of credible, minimum deterrence, as noted above. Third, the requirements for credible, minimal deterrence are not fixed; instead, they are determined by a dynamic threat environment. And fourth, given India’s conventional military advantages, Pakistan reserves the option to use nuclear weapons first in extremis. Pakistan is also possibly leading India in the number of nuclear weapons possessed by each, as it has put a huge focus on its nuclear weapons program. They claim, however, that there is not an arms race, with the Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar declared that, “[o]ur policy of minimum credible deterrence will obviate any strategic arms race.” The potential results of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan are dire. Not only would the immediate effects of the weapons lay waste to the region, but it is estimated that over one billion people would die due to the world wide climate disruption and global
Peveler%20final%20paper.docx