Operation ANACONDA was the US first conventional combat operation of the military’s OEF campaign. It was the first time Chinooks and Apaches had ever operated together as a team in combat. Unfortunately, TF may not have had a sufficient of number of Chinooks Talon available to transport the entire force and its equipment to the valley all at the same Rakkasan time in one lift. whole mission economy of force due to the restricted footprint allowed in “The Afghanistan by direction of the Secretary of explained Colonel Scott Kubica, Talon Defense,” executive officer during ANACONDA. Ground commanders were forced to pick and choose which units and what supplies to take in first or leave behind. These decisions were difficult to make since intelligence estimates of the enemy situation in the Shahi Kowt were updated continually as new data came in prior to D-Day. In hindsight, for example, more mortars should perhaps have been included in the first lift. After inserting the first lift troops in the valley, the original six Chinooks returned to Bagram to pick up the remaining Soldiers and equipment. Inclement weather and enemy activity in and around the HLZs, delayed/prevented the second lift of from reaching the valley Rakkasans in a timely manner. More Chinooks, enough to move everyone and everything in one lift, may have been more deployment to OEF was done by USAF Strategic Airlift vice effective. “Our Sea us from taking more Colonel James Marye, TF Talon Lift…that kept Chinooks,” Commander emphasized. full up sixteen ship Chinook company would have been able to “Our accomplish the of transporting all of the Rakkasans and their equipment to the Shahi Kowt task” in just one lift. Marye conceded, however, that FARP TEXACO may not have been able to support more aircraft. had a pretty fair FARP capability, but it would have been a serious “We stretch with additional Chinooks, since they had to also fuel and rearm Apaches and Black Hawks, he later wrote.
Operation ANACONDA was the US military’s first conventional combat operation of the OEF campaign. It was the first time Chinooks and Apaches had ever operated together as a team in combat. Unfortunately, TF Talon may not have had a sufficient of number of Chinooks available to transport the entire Rakkasan force and its equipment to the valley all at the same time in one lift. “The whole mission economy of force due to the restricted footprint allowed in Afghanistan by direction of the Secretary of Defense,” explained Colonel Scott Kubica, Talon executive officer during ANACONDA. Ground commanders were forced to pick and choose which units and what supplies to take in first or leave behind. These decisions were difficult to make since intelligence estimates of the enemy situation in the Shahi Kowt were updated continually as new data came in prior to D-Day. In hindsight, for example, more mortars should perhaps have been included in the first lift. After inserting the first lift troops in the valley, the original six Chinooks returned to Bagram to pick up the remaining Soldiers and equipment. Inclement weather and enemy activity in and around the HLZs, delayed/prevented the second lift of Rakkasans from reaching the valley in a timely manner. More Chinooks, enough to move everyone and everything in one lift, may have been more effective. “Our deployment to OEF was done by USAF Strategic Airlift vice Sea Lift…that kept us from taking more Chinooks,” Colonel James Marye, TF Talon Commander emphasized. “Our full up sixteen ship Chinook company would have been able to accomplish the task” of transporting all of the Rakkasans and their equipment to the Shahi Kowt in just one lift. Marye conceded, however, that FARP TEXACO may not have been able to support more aircraft. “We had a pretty fair FARP capability, but it would have been a serious stretch with additional Chinooks, since they had to also fuel and rearm Apaches and Black Hawks, he later wrote.
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