extreme Still, approved of the following (1) a 250% increase Tackett ‘whittling.’” “whittling”: in drug co-pays, from $4.00 to $10.00 per prescription; (2) a $75 increase in the annual deductible, from $175 to $250; (3) and an 800% increase in the annual out-of-pocket maximum, from $500 to $4,000 per family. According to these unilateral changes were Tackett, so large that the district court clearly erred in finding [them] to be in light of “not ‘reasonable changes in health care.’” and Tackett Yolton By failing to limit to situations where there was different” from the Reese I “something ordinary context, seemingly authorizes employers to unilaterally Yard-Man Tackett “whittle” vested benefits unless the CBA contains to the contrary,” subject only to the “statements application of the standard. seems unaware that Tackett Yolton “extreme ‘whittling’” involved the same CBA language and, in particular, the same 1990 CBA that addressed. Reese seems unaware that the presence or absence of consent” restrictions—i.e., CBA Tackett “mutual to the contrary” restricting unilateral employer action—was not a factor in Yolton “statements and was the predicate of Again, the rationale for was the feature not Reese I. Reese I “historical of this case that, as best we and the parties can tell, has no parallel in That Yolton.” “historical feature” was the 1998 CNH negotiations which, according to resulted in a Reese I, “material alteration” in the benefits of existing retirees. That was the predicate in for Reese “feature” articulating and applying its standard. There was no remotely similar “reasonableness” feature” in and nothing to distinguish from or other Tackett Tackett Yolton “historical decisions—at least nothing that can be discerned from limited discussion of the Tackett’s facts and the law on this point. was a reaffirmation of the concept of vesting as it has been historically viewed. Yolton a welfare benefit has vested, the employer’s unilateral modification or reduction of “If
extreme ‘whittling.’” Still, Tackett approved of the following “whittling”: (1) a 250% increase in drug co-pays, from $4.00 to $10.00 per prescription; (2) a $75 increase in the annual deductible, from $175 to $250; (3) and an 800% increase in the annual out-of-pocket maximum, from $500 to $4,000 per family. According to Tackett, these unilateral changes were “not so large that the district court clearly erred in finding [them] to be ‘reasonable in light of changes in health care.’” Tackett and Yolton By failing to limit Reese I to situations where there was “something different” from the ordinary Yard-Man context, Tackett seemingly authorizes employers to unilaterally “whittle” vested benefits unless the CBA contains “statements to the contrary,” subject only to the application of the “extreme ‘whittling’” standard. Tackett seems unaware that Yolton involved the same CBA language and, in particular, the same 1990 CBA that Reese addressed. Tackett seems unaware that the presence or absence of “mutual consent” restrictions—i.e., CBA “statements to the contrary” restricting unilateral employer action—was not a factor in Yolton and was not the predicate of Reese I. Again, the rationale for Reese I was the “historical feature of this case that, as best we and the parties can tell, has no parallel in Yolton.” That “historical feature” was the 1998 CNH negotiations which, according to Reese I, resulted in a “material alteration” in the benefits of existing retirees. That “feature” was the predicate in Reese for articulating and applying its “reasonableness” standard. There was no remotely similar “historical feature” in Tackett and nothing to distinguish Tackett from Yolton or other decisions—at least nothing that can be discerned from Tackett’s limited discussion of the facts and the law on this point. Yolton was a reaffirmation of the concept of vesting as it has been historically viewed. “If a welfare benefit has vested, the employer’s unilateral modification or reduction of
ISRAEL.docx