free-ride on the altruism of others that do sacrifice, since everyone will benefit from decreased emissions regardless if they personally make the sacrifice. Climate change can be thought of in terms noncooperative game theory and modeled similarly to the prisoner’s dilemma. The players in this case are those responsible for the GHG emissions: countries, institutions, companies, and/or individuals. The strategies of each player can be simplified into two categories: by decreasing emissions of GHG or continue to mitigate conduct (BAU). Similar to the prisoner’s dilemma problem, the climate change business as usual payoff matrix is provided below. In this case, the players are referred to as Country A and Country B. Country B Mitigates Country B BAU Country A Both countries benefit from long-term Country A: : disadvantaged economically in sustainable eco-system services, better the short term due to conservation efforts Mitigates human health, diversified and including reduced industry and decreased independent economies, as well as an production improved sense for justice and the Country B: benefits economically by of others maximizing industry and production Over the long-term both countries suffer from I heightened GHG concentrations in the atmosphere II Country A Country A: benefits economically in the short-term by maximizing industry Both suffer from environmental and economic BAU and production degradation in the long-term Country B: disadvantaged Both benefit economically in the near term economically in the short term due to conservation efforts including industry and production Over the long-term both countries suffer from heightened GHG concentrations in the atmosphere III IV In the table above, it is to cooperate and restrict overall emissions collectively rational because each country prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome produced by no one doing so. However, it is for each country not individually rational to restrict its own pollution because when each agent has the power to decide whether or not to
free-ride on the altruism of others that do sacrifice, since everyone will benefit from decreased emissions regardless if they personally make the sacrifice. Climate change can be thought of in terms noncooperative game theory and modeled similarly to the prisoner’s dilemma. The players in this case are those responsible for the GHG emissions: countries, institutions, companies, and/or individuals. The strategies of each player can be simplified into two categories: mitigate by decreasing emissions of GHG or continue to conduct business as usual (BAU). Similar to the prisoner’s dilemma problem, the climate change payoff matrix is provided below. In this case, the players are referred to as Country A and Country B. Country B Mitigates Country B BAU Country A Mitigates Both countries benefit from long-term sustainable eco-system services, better human health, diversified and independent economies, as well as an improved sense for justice and the of others I Country A: : disadvantaged economically in the short term due to conservation efforts including reduced industry and decreased production Country B: benefits economically by maximizing industry and production Over the long-term both countries suffer from heightened GHG concentrations in the atmosphere II Country A BAU Country A: benefits economically in the short-term by maximizing industry and production Country B: disadvantaged economically in the short term due to conservation efforts including industry and production Over the long-term both countries suffer from heightened GHG concentrations in the atmosphere III Both suffer from environmental and economic degradation in the long-term Both benefit economically in the near term IV In the table above, it is collectively rational to cooperate and restrict overall emissions because each country prefers the outcome produced by everyone restricting pollution over the outcome produced by no one doing so. However, it is individually rational for each country not to restrict its own pollution because when each agent has the power to decide whether or not to
intro_game_theory_collective.docx