in fact be the case that ~p. When is derived from testimony, as we saw p earlier in a discussion of Pinocchio (p.89), these mental mechanisms plausibly operate in the background and are triggered only in the event of certain cues indicating incompetence or insincerity on the part of the testifier, or by discovering significant and irresoluble clashes between the proposition and the existing web p auditor’s C; by carrying out a process of removing and its corollaries from the ~p existing stock of beliefs; learner’s by attaching to some defensible warrant, so that in the event of some p future candidate indicating ~p, resources are available to ‘knowledge’ protect from derogation. p If any of these ways is missing, then the learning has been neither fully intellectually virtuous, nor warranted nor secure. Furthermore, in the case of (ii) (that is, counterfactive removal) not occurring, the learner does not really believe that For p. consistency, to believe that requires the learner not to believe that ~p (together with p all its implications), so even if ~p is not apparently present in the web, there is learners’ still a need on his part to inspect this web for the presence of ~p to or its implications, make sure that he truly is free of mental contamination by ~p. This process can be taken too far, however. As we saw earlier (p.170), one distant implication of rejecting ~p and asserting is that the world is knowable, and thus that the sceptical “that p” hypothesis (that there exists a who maliciously distorts all our h genium malignum, perceptions) is untrue. Thus, only close implications ought to be considered. In less simple cases, in which there is some sort of cognitive dissonance between the new proposition and prior the requirements placed on the learner to p C, ‘knowledge’ deal with candidate knowledge virtuously are even more demanding. There is now p the possibility of some significant change in the web occurring, a change learner’s which may mutilate the web rather than merely add another example to (say) a securely-enwebbed set of propositions that where x is a bird. ‘x flies’,
in fact be the case that ~p. When p is derived from testimony, as we saw earlier in a discussion of Pinocchio (p.89), these mental mechanisms plausibly operate in the background and are triggered only in the event of certain cues indicating incompetence or insincerity on the part of the testifier, or by discovering significant and irresoluble clashes between the proposition p and the auditor’s existing web C; by carrying out a process of removing ~p and its corollaries from the learner’s existing stock of beliefs; by attaching to p some defensible warrant, so that in the event of some future candidate ‘knowledge’ indicating ~p, resources are available to protect p from derogation. If any of these ways is missing, then the learning has been neither fully intellectually virtuous, nor warranted nor secure. Furthermore, in the case of (ii) (that is, counterfactive removal) not occurring, the learner does not really believe that p. For consistency, to believe that p requires the learner not to believe that ~p (together with all its implications), so even if ~p is not apparently present in the learners’ web, there is still a need on his part to inspect this web for the presence of ~p or its implications, to make sure that he truly is free of mental contamination by ~p. This process can be taken too far, however. As we saw earlier (p.170), one distant implication of rejecting ~p and asserting “that p” is that the world is knowable, and thus that the sceptical hypothesis h (that there exists a genium malignum, who maliciously distorts all our perceptions) is untrue. Thus, only close implications ought to be considered. In less simple cases, in which there is some sort of cognitive dissonance between the new proposition p and prior ‘knowledge’ C, the requirements placed on the learner to deal with candidate knowledge p virtuously are even more demanding. There is now the possibility of some significant change in the learner’s web occurring, a change which may mutilate the web rather than merely add another example to (say) a securely-enwebbed set of propositions that ‘x flies’, where x is a bird.
PhD%20Sean%20FINALL%202011.docx