the rules of court and to hear the matter as one urgency, given the self created and self induced nature of the urgency with which the application had been brought. I accordingly struck the matter from the roll with costs. [15] Having set out what occurred in that application and the ruling made, I turn to refer to the applicable legal principles concerning recusal. Principles governing recusal applications [16] The applicant contends that he has a reasonable likelihood or apprehension of bias if I were to preside in the review application. The principles applicable to recusal were, with respect, recently succinctly summarised by the South African Constitutional Court in Bernert v Absa Bank in the following way: apprehension of bias may arise either from the association or interest that the ‘The judicial officer has in one of the litigants before the court or from the interest that the judicial officer has in the outcome of the case. Or it may arise from the conduct or utterances by a judicial officer prior to or during proceedings. In all these situations, the judicial officer must ordinarily recuse himself or herself. The apprehension of bias principle reflects the fundamental principle of our Constitution that courts must be independent and impartial. And fundamental to our judicial system is that courts must not only be independent and impartial, but they must be seen to be independent and impartial. The test for recusal which this Court has adopted is whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, in the mind of a reasonable litigant in possession of all the relevant facts, that a judicial officer might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to bear on the resolution of the dispute before the court.’ [17] The court in Bernert then referred to the proper approach to an application for recusal articulated in one of its previous decisions in SARFU and Others v President of South Africa & Others as: follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this application for the recusal of ‘It members of this Court is objective and the onus of establishing it rests upon the applicant. The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath
the rules of court and to hear the matter as one urgency, given the self created and self induced nature of the urgency with which the application had been brought. I accordingly struck the matter from the roll with costs. [15] Having set out what occurred in that application and the ruling made, I turn to refer to the applicable legal principles concerning recusal. Principles governing recusal applications [16] The applicant contends that he has a reasonable likelihood or apprehension of bias if I were to preside in the review application. The principles applicable to recusal were, with respect, recently succinctly summarised by the South African Constitutional Court in Bernert v Absa Bank in the following way: ‘The apprehension of bias may arise either from the association or interest that the judicial officer has in one of the litigants before the court or from the interest that the judicial officer has in the outcome of the case. Or it may arise from the conduct or utterances by a judicial officer prior to or during proceedings. In all these situations, the judicial officer must ordinarily recuse himself or herself. The apprehension of bias principle reflects the fundamental principle of our Constitution that courts must be independent and impartial. And fundamental to our judicial system is that courts must not only be independent and impartial, but they must be seen to be independent and impartial. The test for recusal which this Court has adopted is whether there is a reasonable apprehension of bias, in the mind of a reasonable litigant in possession of all the relevant facts, that a judicial officer might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to bear on the resolution of the dispute before the court.’ [17] The court in Bernert then referred to the proper approach to an application for recusal articulated in one of its previous decisions in SARFU and Others v President of South Africa & Others as: ‘It follows from the foregoing that the correct approach to this application for the recusal of members of this Court is objective and the onus of establishing it rests upon the applicant. The question is whether a reasonable, objective and informed person would on the correct facts reasonably apprehend that the Judge has not or will not bring an impartial mind to bear on the adjudication of the case, that is a mind open to persuasion by the evidence and the submissions of counsel. The reasonableness of the apprehension must be assessed in the light of the oath
Januarie%20v%20Registrar%20of%20High%20Court%20and%20others%20(I%20396-2009)%20[2013]%20NAHCMD%20170%20(19%20June%202013).docx