requirement in G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) has come to mean that an employee must spend more than half of his or her time engaged in those duties. The Division of Administrative Law Appeals has so decided multiple times. CR-12-56 *8 E.g., Jo Ann Neusner v. State Board of Retirement, (DALA 2015). The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board agrees. E.g., Kathleen Bailey v. State CR-07-724 *6 (CRAB 2012); Board of Retirement, Theresa Currie v. State Board of Retirement, CR-10-461 *4 (CRAB no date). I am not sure that this 51% rule is correct. The and are related words “major” “majority” but they are not the to mean of may misread same. To interpret “major duties” “majority duties” the statute. Furthermore, if an employee is engaged in duties more than half of the time, the duties are necessarily regular. does mean of then If “major duties” “majority duties,” “regular... duties” is superfluous. However, in a statute should be International “no word considered superfluous.” Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Atlantic and Gulf Maritime Region, AFL-CIO v. 392 Mass. 811, 813 (1984). Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket Steamship Authority, If no statutory word is considered superfluous, then must mean something and “regular” “major cannot mean of duties” “majority duties.” Perhaps the 51% rule should be revisited, but for now, I am bound by embrace CRAB’s of it. Mr. Forbes testified that he spent of his time engaged in the care, custody, or “about half” supervision of youth who were, in turn, in care. Twenty-four years after he ended his DYS’s service as a case work manager, he cannot be more specific. He may have spent 55% of his time directly caring for youth, but he may have spent 45% of his time. Mr. Forbes has the burden of proof. CR-07-605 (DALA Deborah Herst Hill v. State Board of Retirement, 2009)(“The
requirement in G.L. c. 32, § 3(2)(g) has come to mean that an employee must spend more than half of his or her time engaged in those duties. The Division of Administrative Law Appeals has so decided multiple times. E.g., Jo Ann Neusner v. State Board of Retirement, CR-12-56 *8 (DALA 2015). The Contributory Retirement Appeal Board agrees. E.g., Kathleen Bailey v. State Board of Retirement, CR-07-724 *6 (CRAB 2012); Theresa Currie v. State Board of Retirement, CR-10-461 *4 (CRAB no date). I am not sure that this 51% rule is correct. The words “major” and “majority” are related but they are not the same. To interpret “major duties” to mean “majority of duties” may misread the statute. Furthermore, if an employee is engaged in duties more than half of the time, the duties are necessarily regular. If “major duties” does mean “majority of duties,” then “regular... duties” is superfluous. However, “no word in a statute should be considered superfluous.” International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Atlantic and Gulf Maritime Region, AFL-CIO v. Woods Hole, Martha's Vineyard & Nantucket Steamship Authority, 392 Mass. 811, 813 (1984). If no statutory word is considered superfluous, then “regular” must mean something and “major duties” cannot mean “majority of duties.” Perhaps the 51% rule should be revisited, but for now, I am bound by CRAB’s embrace of it. Mr. Forbes testified that he spent “about half” of his time engaged in the care, custody, or supervision of youth who were, in turn, in DYS’s care. Twenty-four years after he ended his service as a case work manager, he cannot be more specific. He may have spent 55% of his time directly caring for youth, but he may have spent 45% of his time. Mr. Forbes has the burden of proof. Deborah Herst Hill v. State Board of Retirement, CR-07-605 (DALA 2009)(“The
Forbes%20%28Peter%29%20v.%20State%20Bd%20of%20Retirement%20-%20Decision%20-%2012-23-2016.docx