Eric Olson Thinks that each adult human being is identical to some fetus that did not have any psychological states. Says that it is implausible that a being will suddenly cease to exist by acquiring new abilities, so the fetus would not disappear when the person’s mind comes into being. Says that it is implausible that the fetus still exists after the person is born, but is not identical to the person. Endorses the view that numerical identity involves biological continuity. Susan Brison Looks at the testimony of survivors of trauma, which shows that: Trauma can prevent persistence. Sometimes, the person who occupies a body after a traumatic experience is not numerically identical to the person who occupied the body prior to the trauma. Talking about one’s trauma with others can restore a person’s identity. Sometimes, the person who occupies a body after talking about a traumatic experience is not numerically identical to the person who occupied the body before talking, but is identical to the person who occupied the body prior to the trauma. What is her view of personal identity? She does not say. But it probably has something to do with some of the following: A’s sense of who they are (self-narrative). Other people’s sense of who A is (narration to others). A’s ability to envision their past or future “self.” A’s control over their own psychology. Elizabeth Schechter Thinks split brain cases involve two minds, but one person. So, a person is not just their mind. One person can have multiple, separate consciousnesses and psychologies. What makes the split-brain person one person rather than two? (this is relevant to numerical identity) Inability to see self as two people; taking responsibility for decisions made by either mind. Seen by others as one person (connection to narration). Deborah Tollefsen Groups have mental states. These are distinct from the mental states of their group members: the group can believe or desire things that no group member believes or desires. Are these emergent properties? Evidence that groups have mental states: We say they do. We hold them responsible for their actions. What are mental states? When do we have them?
Eric Olson Thinks that each adult human being is identical to some fetus that did not have any psychological states. Says that it is implausible that a being will suddenly cease to exist by acquiring new abilities, so the fetus would not disappear when the person’s mind comes into being. Says that it is implausible that the fetus still exists after the person is born, but is not identical to the person. Endorses the view that numerical identity involves biological continuity. Susan Brison Looks at the testimony of survivors of trauma, which shows that: Trauma can prevent persistence. Sometimes, the person who occupies a body after a traumatic experience is not numerically identical to the person who occupied the body prior to the trauma. Talking about one’s trauma with others can restore a person’s identity. Sometimes, the person who occupies a body after talking about a traumatic experience is not numerically identical to the person who occupied the body before talking, but is identical to the person who occupied the body prior to the trauma. What is her view of personal identity? She does not say. But it probably has something to do with some of the following: A’s sense of who they are (self-narrative). Other people’s sense of who A is (narration to others). A’s ability to envision their past or future “self.” A’s control over their own psychology. Elizabeth Schechter Thinks split brain cases involve two minds, but one person. So, a person is not just their mind. One person can have multiple, separate consciousnesses and psychologies. What makes the split-brain person one person rather than two? (this is relevant to numerical identity) Inability to see self as two people; taking responsibility for decisions made by either mind. Seen by others as one person (connection to narration). Deborah Tollefsen Groups have mental states. These are distinct from the mental states of their group members: the group can believe or desire things that no group member believes or desires. Are these emergent properties? Evidence that groups have mental states: We say they do. We hold them responsible for their actions. What are mental states? When do we have them?
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