result of the initial economic reforms but this trend changed drastically after the country specific intervention of vision 2020 initiative and its implementation (Ariyo and Jerome 1999:209). Finally, according to (ABD:2001)as cited in(Adhia 2004:10) claims that privatization benefits are much though thinly spread over a huge population over a long time period, however, its cost on job losses and business is accrued to a section that can successfully mobilize resistance to privatisation. Notwithstanding, the achievement of lowering costs to consumers that has increased the number of options, yet it has not convinced the opponents but furthered the discontent overtime. 2.5.2 Obstacles to the Implementation of Reform The implementation process may have slowed down due to governments attempt to counteract the adversity of the process of divestiture of increased unemployment, foreign ownership, concentration of property in the wrong hands, plant closure and pricing problems. Other issues that also contributed grossly to this backdrop was lack of transparency in making specific deals of sales at unstated prices, to dubious purchasers without a competitive bidding procedure (Nellis and kikeri,1989:667). However, the two writers (Ariyo and Jerome1999:207-09)give a caution that the implicit assumption that public bureaucracies and sector are endemically inefficient whereas the private sector is inherently efficient may not be valid in several developing countries. Especially where there is a harmonious relationship between the two sectors and also where the culture of private enterprise has not fully developed. Moreover, the role of foreign capital in financing public sector reforms and foreign participation in privatization may have been misinterpreted as concentration of wealth in foreign hands, yet it was essential, particularly for countries that considerably weak private sector. for instance “by 1992 in Sudan, firms from Scandinavia, Britain, the US and the Arab states dominated as bidders for SOEs slated for privatization under the country’s National Economic Salvation program introduced in June 1990”(ibid:203). Nellis and kikeri (1989:664), further claim that reforms without involving ownership change had mixed but modest results, given that economic theory views competition more crucial than ownership in determining efficiency outcomes. This point of view is supported by the assertion by opponents of privatization in developing countries that in
result of the initial economic reforms but this trend changed drastically after the country specific intervention of vision 2020 initiative and its implementation (Ariyo and Jerome 1999:209). Finally, according to (ABD:2001)as cited in(Adhia 2004:10) claims that privatization benefits are much though thinly spread over a huge population over a long time period, however, its cost on job losses and business is accrued to a section that can successfully mobilize resistance to privatisation. Notwithstanding, the achievement of lowering costs to consumers that has increased the number of options, yet it has not convinced the opponents but furthered the discontent overtime. 2.5.2 Obstacles to the Implementation of Reform The implementation process may have slowed down due to governments attempt to counteract the adversity of the process of divestiture of increased unemployment, foreign ownership, concentration of property in the wrong hands, plant closure and pricing problems. Other issues that also contributed grossly to this backdrop was lack of transparency in making specific deals of sales at unstated prices, to dubious purchasers without a competitive bidding procedure (Nellis and kikeri,1989:667). However, the two writers (Ariyo and Jerome1999:207-09)give a caution that the implicit assumption that public bureaucracies and sector are endemically inefficient whereas the private sector is inherently efficient may not be valid in several developing countries. Especially where there is a harmonious relationship between the two sectors and also where the culture of private enterprise has not fully developed. Moreover, the role of foreign capital in financing public sector reforms and foreign participation in privatization may have been misinterpreted as concentration of wealth in foreign hands, yet it was essential, particularly for countries that considerably weak private sector. for instance “by 1992 in Sudan, firms from Scandinavia, Britain, the US and the Arab states dominated as bidders for SOEs slated for privatization under the country’s National Economic Salvation program introduced in June 1990”(ibid:203). Nellis and kikeri (1989:664), further claim that reforms without involving ownership change had mixed but modest results, given that economic theory views competition more crucial than ownership in determining efficiency outcomes. This point of view is supported by the assertion by opponents of privatization in developing countries that in
Graduate_School_of_Development_Studies.nov2010.vrigdag_finale.docx