political agenda increasingly being set by the UK Independence Party (UKIP), led by the MEP Nigel Farage. Ultimately, David Cameron chose to escalate his response, and in his Bloomberg speech in 2013, committed to include a promise to hold an ‘in / out’ referendum on EU membership in the Conservative manifesto for the 2015 general election. A diluted version of this position was set out by the Labour Party in response – an ‘in / out’ referendum would be held in the event of major change to the EU treaties. Yet while the idea of a national referendum on EU membership – in one sense or another – seemed therefore to be attracting support from both major political parties, many regarded the prospect of it actually coming to fruition as unlikely. Key indicators, such as opinion polls and historical precedent, meant that another hung Parliament was widely expected to be the outcome of the 2015 election, and there was consequent suspicion that, if Cameron was returned to office at all, the EU referendum manifesto pledge would be something he would gladly bargain away with prospective coalition partners, despite advance protestations to the contrary. The surprise result of a Conservative majority government in 2015 meant that the returning Prime Minister could not rely on coalition with the Liberal Democrats to dilute his manifesto commitment. With the referendum to be held at some point before the end of 2017, David Cameron launched an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s membership of the EU. Proposals for change were agreed across four ‘baskets’ representing key concerns on immigration, sovereignty, euro governance, and competitiveness. Many were surprised at the level of concessions ultimately made by the EU, but even this package was never likely to satisfy the most ardent eurosceptics. While it was sufficient – finally – to convince the Prime Minister that he could recommend a vote to remain to the electorate, the Cabinet was split, and the ensuing campaigns left much to be desired. Little attention was ultimately given to the terms of the deal agreed through the renegotiation, and still less to the major ‘balance of competences’ review conducted between 2012 and 2014 under the coalition government, which explored in some detail the suitability of the existing division of power between the EU and the UK. Instead, the ‘leave’ campaign prioritised concerns associated with immigration and sovereignty, and made deceptive claims about the extent of the UK’s financial contribution to the EU, and about
political agenda increasingly being set by the UK Independence Party (UKIP), led by the MEP Nigel Farage. Ultimately, David Cameron chose to escalate his response, and in his Bloomberg speech in 2013, committed to include a promise to hold an ‘in / out’ referendum on EU membership in the Conservative manifesto for the 2015 general election. A diluted version of this position was set out by the Labour Party in response – an ‘in / out’ referendum would be held in the event of major change to the EU treaties. Yet while the idea of a national referendum on EU membership – in one sense or another – seemed therefore to be attracting support from both major political parties, many regarded the prospect of it actually coming to fruition as unlikely. Key indicators, such as opinion polls and historical precedent, meant that another hung Parliament was widely expected to be the outcome of the 2015 election, and there was consequent suspicion that, if Cameron was returned to office at all, the EU referendum manifesto pledge would be something he would gladly bargain away with prospective coalition partners, despite advance protestations to the contrary. The surprise result of a Conservative majority government in 2015 meant that the returning Prime Minister could not rely on coalition with the Liberal Democrats to dilute his manifesto commitment. With the referendum to be held at some point before the end of 2017, David Cameron launched an attempt to renegotiate the UK’s membership of the EU. Proposals for change were agreed across four ‘baskets’ representing key concerns on immigration, sovereignty, euro governance, and competitiveness. Many were surprised at the level of concessions ultimately made by the EU, but even this package was never likely to satisfy the most ardent eurosceptics. While it was sufficient – finally – to convince the Prime Minister that he could recommend a vote to remain to the electorate, the Cabinet was split, and the ensuing campaigns left much to be desired. Little attention was ultimately given to the terms of the deal agreed through the renegotiation, and still less to the major ‘balance of competences’ review conducted between 2012 and 2014 under the coalition government, which explored in some detail the suitability of the existing division of power between the EU and the UK. Instead, the ‘leave’ campaign prioritised concerns associated with immigration and sovereignty, and made deceptive claims about the extent of the UK’s financial contribution to the EU, and about
Gordon%20EU%20Const%20Brexit%20paper%20Sept%202016%20-%20accepted%20final%20version%20w%20abstract.docx