Britain After Brexit: A Nation Divided and Robert Ford is professor of political science at the University of Manchester. Matthew Goodwin is professor of politics at the University of Kent and senior visiting fellow at Chatham Revolt of the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in House. They are coauthors of Britain (2014). On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted 52 to 48 percent to leave the European Union. The vote for the world, rocking financial markets and rekindling “Brexit” sent shockwaves around global debates about the power of populism and nationalism, as well as the long-term viability of the EU. Aside from calling attention to challenges to mainstream liberal democracy and international integration, the vote for Brexit also highlights the deepening political divides that cut across traditional party lines in Britain and now threaten to further destabilize an already crumbling two-party system. On one level, the shocking result served as a powerful reminder of the sheer force of and of the acrimonious splits among the Britain’s entrenched Euroskeptic tradition country’s political elite over relationship with Europe. But on a deeper level, Brexit should also Britain’s be seen as a symptom of longer-term social changes that have quietly been reshaping public opinion, political behavior, and party competition in Britain as well as in other Western democracies. What underlying social and attitudinal shifts made Brexit possible? To what extent was the vote for Brexit driven by the same social forces that fueled the electoral rise of the populist, right-wing U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), a party that surged to prominence in the decade before the referendum? And what do these momentous events reveal more broadly about the state of British politics and the divisions in British society? The social changes that set the stage for historic vote to leave the EU began Britain’s decades ago. As we have argued elsewhere, one key was a slow but “bottom-up” driver relentless shift in the structure and attitudes of the electorate—the growing dominance of the middle classes and of socially liberal university graduates. In the 1960s, more than half of those with jobs in Britain did manual work, and less than 10 percent of the electorate had a university
Britain After Brexit: A Nation Divided and Robert Ford is professor of political science at the University of Manchester. Matthew Goodwin is professor of politics at the University of Kent and senior visiting fellow at Chatham House. They are coauthors of Revolt of the Right: Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain (2014). On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom voted 52 to 48 percent to leave the European Union. The vote for “Brexit” sent shockwaves around the world, rocking financial markets and rekindling global debates about the power of populism and nationalism, as well as the long-term viability of the EU. Aside from calling attention to challenges to mainstream liberal democracy and international integration, the vote for Brexit also highlights the deepening political divides that cut across traditional party lines in Britain and now threaten to further destabilize an already crumbling two-party system. On one level, the shocking result served as a powerful reminder of the sheer force of Britain’s entrenched Euroskeptic tradition and of the acrimonious splits among the country’s political elite over Britain’s relationship with Europe. But on a deeper level, Brexit should also be seen as a symptom of longer-term social changes that have quietly been reshaping public opinion, political behavior, and party competition in Britain as well as in other Western democracies. What underlying social and attitudinal shifts made Brexit possible? To what extent was the vote for Brexit driven by the same social forces that fueled the electoral rise of the populist, right-wing U.K. Independence Party (UKIP), a party that surged to prominence in the decade before the referendum? And what do these momentous events reveal more broadly about the state of British politics and the divisions in British society? The social changes that set the stage for Britain’s historic vote to leave the EU began decades ago. As we have argued elsewhere, one key “bottom-up” driver was a slow but relentless shift in the structure and attitudes of the electorate—the growing dominance of the middle classes and of socially liberal university graduates. In the 1960s, more than half of those with jobs in Britain did manual work, and less than 10 percent of the electorate had a university
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