issued the order sequestrating the estate (or liquidating the company). In casu, the applicants contend in the founding affidavit (made by Victor Manuel Ferreira Gravato (the first applicant)), an insolvency practitioner in South Africa, that the sequestration of the respondent was made by the competent court of the domicile, South Africa. respondent’s [5] The respondent takes issue with this piece of evidence in the founding affidavit and evidence it is (see Stipp and Another v Shade Centre and Others – 2007 (2) NR 627 (SC); Tranet Ltd v Robenstein 2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA)) on the – basis that the applicants only make a that sequestration order ‘bald allegation’ ‘the of 20 March 2008 was granted by the Court of the domicile and respondent’s they no facts to what the respondent characterizes as ‘provide substantiate’ ‘this to the respondent, no factual allegations are bald allegation’. Thus, according made in the founding affidavit and that it is in the replying affidavit that the applicants allege certain facts. And so, Mr. Barnard, counsel for respondent, respondent has no opportunity to refute and explain this new matter submits, ‘The raised for the first time in the replying counsel for the affidavit.’ Mr Dicks, applicants, argue contrariwise. As I see it; Mr. submission is, with Barnard’s respect, disingenuous, and at best petitio principii. Mr Barnard submitted that the so-called not justify an inference that the respondent was ‘allegations do domiciled in South Africa at the time (of his sequestration) and further that these further do not refute the facts stated by the respondent to show that ‘allegations he was in fact domiciled in Namibia at the these are the contentions of time’. If the respondent why would the respondent want to have an to ‘opportunity ... refute and the refute and explain what, if I may explain’ ‘bald allegations’? To ask? That which is as the respondent contends? That which not refute ‘bald’, ‘do
issued the order sequestrating the estate (or liquidating the company). In casu, the applicants contend in the founding affidavit (made by Victor Manuel Ferreira Gravato (the first applicant)), an insolvency practitioner in South Africa, that the sequestration of the respondent was made by the competent court of the respondent’s domicile, South Africa. [5] The respondent takes issue with this piece of evidence in the founding affidavit – and evidence it is (see Stipp and Another v Shade Centre and Others 2007 (2) NR 627 (SC); Tranet Ltd v Robenstein 2006 (1) SA 591 (SCA)) – on the basis that the applicants only make a ‘bald allegation’ that ‘the sequestration order of 20 March 2008 was granted by the Court of the respondent’s domicile and they ‘provide no facts to substantiate’ what the respondent characterizes as ‘this bald allegation’. Thus, according to the respondent, no factual allegations are made in the founding affidavit and that it is in the replying affidavit that the applicants allege certain facts. And so, Mr. Barnard, counsel for respondent, submits, ‘The respondent has no opportunity to refute and explain this new matter raised for the first time in the replying affidavit.’ Mr Dicks, counsel for the applicants, argue contrariwise. As I see it; Mr. Barnard’s submission is, with respect, disingenuous, and at best petitio principii. Mr Barnard submitted that the so-called ‘allegations do not justify an inference that the respondent was domiciled in South Africa at the time (of his sequestration) and further that these ‘allegations further do not refute the facts stated by the respondent to show that he was in fact domiciled in Namibia at the time’. If these are the contentions of the respondent why would the respondent want to have an ‘opportunity ... to refute and explain’ the ‘bald allegations’? To refute and explain what, if I may ask? That which is ‘bald’, as the respondent contends? That which ‘do not refute
Gravato%20NO%20and%20Another%20v%20Redelinghuys%20(A%20401-2009)%20[2012]%20NAHC%206%20(20%20January%202012)%20.docx