concluded, relying on that the NYPSC was preempted from engaging in any Freehold, act to reform the contract terms. As stated by the Court: [U]nder PURPA and the regulations adopted by the FERC, qualifying facilities like Crossroads are exempt from state utility-type regulation, including regulation of of “rates electric We have interpreted these regulations to utilities.” prevent state regulatory commissions from modifying the terms of a power purchase agreement between a utility and cogeneration facility after it has been approved by the state. In other words, while PURPA allows the appropriate state regulatory agency to approve a power purchasing agreement, once such an agreement is approved, the state agency is not permitted to modify the terms of the agreement. To do so would be to engage in the utility-type regulation from which PURPA exempts QFs. 159 F.3d at 137-38 (citations omitted). Further relying on the Crossroads, Freehold, Court stated the qualifying authority waives its PURPA rights in the agreement, “unless the federal law prevents the state from of its prior ‘reconsideration approval.’” 159 F.3d at 138. Crossroads, Instructive to our resolution in this proceeding is the description of Court’s the grounds for asserting jurisdiction over the issue. In order to find a path of NYPSC’s relief from the pricing term, the state commission asserted its traditional contract’s jurisdiction over its own prior order rather than asserting jurisdiction over the PPA itself. The NYPSC acknowledged but carefully Freehold’s “contract non-interference policy,” circumscribed its resolution of the dispute by distinguishing its action as an parties’ interpretation of of the agreement and not interference with the agreement its approval itself. 159 F.3d at 138-39. As the Court noted, the NYPSC accepted the Crossroads, QF’s jurisdictional defense and for that reason out of its way to hold that it was Freehold “went without jurisdiction to grant [the relief requested] but that it did have jurisdiction to interpret its approval [of the contract at 140. The NYPSC of Id. terms].” itself, “because the limitations it perceived on its own jurisdiction, deliberately excluded from its
concluded, relying on Freehold, that the NYPSC was preempted from engaging in any act to reform the contract terms. As stated by the Court: [U]nder PURPA and the regulations adopted by the FERC, qualifying facilities like Crossroads are exempt from state utility-type regulation, including regulation of “rates of electric utilities.” We have interpreted these regulations to prevent state regulatory commissions from modifying the terms of a power purchase agreement between a utility and cogeneration facility after it has been approved by the state. In other words, while PURPA allows the appropriate state regulatory agency to approve a power purchasing agreement, once such an agreement is approved, the state agency is not permitted to modify the terms of the agreement. To do so would be to engage in the utility-type regulation from which PURPA exempts QFs. Crossroads, 159 F.3d at 137-38 (citations omitted). Further relying on Freehold, the Court stated “unless the qualifying authority waives its PURPA rights in the agreement, the federal law prevents the state from ‘reconsideration of its prior approval.’” Crossroads, 159 F.3d at 138. Instructive to our resolution in this proceeding is the Court’s description of the NYPSC’s grounds for asserting jurisdiction over the issue. In order to find a path of relief from the contract’s pricing term, the state commission asserted its traditional jurisdiction over its own prior order rather than asserting jurisdiction over the PPA itself. The NYPSC acknowledged Freehold’s “contract non-interference policy,” but carefully circumscribed its resolution of the parties’ dispute by distinguishing its action as an interpretation of its approval of the agreement and not interference with the agreement itself. Crossroads, 159 F.3d at 138-39. As the Court noted, the NYPSC accepted the QF’s Freehold jurisdictional defense and for that reason “went out of its way to hold that it was without jurisdiction to grant [the relief requested] but that it did have jurisdiction to interpret its approval [of the contract terms].” Id. at 140. The NYPSC itself, “because of the limitations it perceived on its own jurisdiction, deliberately excluded from its
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