(8) , anyByContingency (9) The symmetric key that OPTIONAL Only to be present if the [0] plaintextSymmetricKey will decrypt the Contingency Key arrangements IMPLICIT encrypted Contingency are being used (so if OCTET Key held on the Device STRING The = anyByContingency). contents provide the symmetric key to decrypt the Contingency Public Key in the (root, digitalSignature, Trust Anchor Cell management) DEFAULT Only to be present if the Remote [1] disapply(1) applyTimeBasedCPVChecks Party sending the Command is IMPLICIT apply instructing the Device not to apply INTEGER time based checks as part of Certification Path Validation. This should only be in exceptional circumstances (e.g. root credentials on the Device have expired without replacement for unforeseen reasons) OPTIONAL This structure identifies which [2] authorisingRemotePartyTACellIdentifier Public Key on the Device is to be IMPLICIT used in verifying KRP Signature. SEQUENCE The key is identified by way of Trust Anchor Cell and so the nature of the check, by way of the KeyUsage parameter, is also identified. can only be omitted when the Access Control Broker is
(8) , anyByContingency (9) plaintextSymmetricKey [0] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING The symmetric key that will decrypt the encrypted Contingency Key held on the Device OPTIONAL Only to be present if the Contingency Key arrangements are being used (so if = anyByContingency). The contents provide the symmetric key to decrypt the Contingency Public Key in the (root, digitalSignature, management) Trust Anchor Cell applyTimeBasedCPVChecks [1] IMPLICIT INTEGER disapply(1) DEFAULT apply Only to be present if the Remote Party sending the Command is instructing the Device not to apply time based checks as part of Certification Path Validation. This should only be in exceptional circumstances (e.g. root credentials on the Device have expired without replacement for unforeseen reasons) authorisingRemotePartyTACellIdentifier [2] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE OPTIONAL This structure identifies which Public Key on the Device is to be used in verifying KRP Signature. The key is identified by way of Trust Anchor Cell and so the nature of the check, by way of the KeyUsage parameter, is also identified. can only be omitted when the Access Control Broker is
GBCS_v0.8.1.docx