The court also acknowledges service in the military. Respondent is a respondent’s Vietnam Veteran and served with distinction. Discussion The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (1989) 49 Cal.3d. 103, (Chadwick v. State Bar 111; (1987) 43 Cal.3d. 1016, 1025; Std. 1.1.) Cooper v. State Bar In determining the level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for guidance. (1991) 52 Cal.3d. 1085, 1090; (Review Dept. (Drociak v. State Bar In the Matter of Koehler 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628). Second, the court looks to decisional law. (Snyder v. (1990) 49 Cal.3d. 1302, 1310-1311; (Review Dept. 1991) State Bar In the Matter of Taylor 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 580.) Standard 1.7 provides that if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are found, they should be considered alone and in balance with any other aggravating or mitigating factors. Standard 2.15 is applicable to the misconduct in this matter. Standard 2.15 provides that culpability of a member of a violation of rule 4-100(B)(1) shall result in reproval or suspension. The Supreme Court gives the standards and will reject a recommendation “great weight” consistent with the standards only where the court as to its propriety. entertains “grave doubts” (In (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-92; (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) As the re Silverton In re Naney standards are not mandatory, they may be deviated from when there is a compelling, reason to do so. (Bates (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1056, 1061, fn.2; v. State Bar Aronin v. State (1990) 52 Cal.3d 276, 291.) Bar Respondent has been found culpable of a single violation of rule 4-100(B)(1). In mitigation, respondent had been admitted to practice law in California for more than 32 years
The court also acknowledges respondent’s service in the military. Respondent is a Vietnam Veteran and served with distinction. Discussion The purpose of State Bar disciplinary proceedings is not to punish the attorney, but to protect the public, to preserve public confidence in the profession, and to maintain the highest possible professional standards for attorneys. (Chadwick v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d. 103, 111; Cooper v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d. 1016, 1025; Std. 1.1.) In determining the level of discipline, the court looks first to the standards for guidance. (Drociak v. State Bar (1991) 52 Cal.3d. 1085, 1090; In the Matter of Koehler (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 615, 628). Second, the court looks to decisional law. (Snyder v. State Bar (1990) 49 Cal.3d. 1302, 1310-1311; In the Matter of Taylor (Review Dept. 1991) 1 Cal. State Bar Ct. Rptr. 563, 580.) Standard 1.7 provides that if aggravating or mitigating circumstances are found, they should be considered alone and in balance with any other aggravating or mitigating factors. Standard 2.15 is applicable to the misconduct in this matter. Standard 2.15 provides that culpability of a member of a violation of rule 4-100(B)(1) shall result in reproval or suspension. The Supreme Court gives the standards “great weight” and will reject a recommendation consistent with the standards only where the court entertains “grave doubts” as to its propriety. (In re Silverton (2005) 36 Cal.4th 81, 91-92; In re Naney (1990) 51 Cal.3d 186, 190.) As the standards are not mandatory, they may be deviated from when there is a compelling, reason to do so. (Bates v. State Bar (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1056, 1061, fn.2; Aronin v. State Bar (1990) 52 Cal.3d 276, 291.) Respondent has been found culpable of a single violation of rule 4-100(B)(1). In mitigation, respondent had been admitted to practice law in California for more than 32 years
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