The fact that identity is shaped through dialogical relations with others raises serious political questions about how adequate recognition can be achieved. On the one hand, proponents of a of argue that recognition can only be accorded if all individuals “politics equal dignity” enjoy the same rights and entitlements. On the other hand, advocates of a of “politics difference” argue that individuals and groups in all their diversity can only be properly recognized – – through an acknowledgment of their distinctness from others (Taylor 1992, 37-40). Taylor proceeds to elaborate an approach that traces a middle ground between these two positions (Nicholson 1996, 1). Ultimately, he argues that which rigidly upholds “procedural liberalism,” undifferentiated individual rights is to difference because it “inhospitable can’t accommodate what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is (Taylor 1992, 61). survival” What is necessary, therefore, is a form of liberalism that while still upholding basic rights like – is willing to diverge from uniform treatment if the survival of a minority culture habeas corpus – requires it. In words, the challenge then with their sense of Taylor’s becomes “to deal marginalization without compromising our basic political principles” (1992, 63). Taylor is careful to note that the imperative of cultural survival does not mean that all cultures are automatically owed equal respect (1992, 66). However, what is required is a of worth. Based on this presumption, people must approach other cultures with a presumption willingness to engage in what Gadamer called a of in Taylor 1992, 67). “fusion horizons” (quoted What Taylor means by this concept is meaningful engagement with the other so that one can make a judgement of value based (at least partly) on standards learned from the other culture. While there may be aspects that we choose to reject, we will almost certainly find other aspects worthy of our respect (Taylor 1992, 67; Schaap 2004, 528-9). Given the reality that, to an increasing degree, diverse cultures must find ways to live together, Taylor views this approach as both a practical and moral obligation.
The fact that identity is shaped through dialogical relations with others raises serious political questions about how adequate recognition can be achieved. On the one hand, proponents of a “politics of equal dignity” argue that recognition can only be accorded if all individuals enjoy the same rights and entitlements. On the other hand, advocates of a “politics of difference” argue that individuals and groups – in all their diversity – can only be properly recognized through an acknowledgment of their distinctness from others (Taylor 1992, 37-40). Taylor proceeds to elaborate an approach that traces a middle ground between these two positions (Nicholson 1996, 1). Ultimately, he argues that “procedural liberalism,” which rigidly upholds undifferentiated individual rights is “inhospitable to difference because it can’t accommodate what the members of distinct societies really aspire to, which is survival” (Taylor 1992, 61). What is necessary, therefore, is a form of liberalism that – while still upholding basic rights like habeas corpus – is willing to diverge from uniform treatment if the survival of a minority culture requires it. In Taylor’s words, the challenge then becomes “to deal with their sense of marginalization without compromising our basic political principles” (1992, 63). Taylor is careful to note that the imperative of cultural survival does not mean that all cultures are automatically owed equal respect (1992, 66). However, what is required is a presumption of worth. Based on this presumption, people must approach other cultures with a willingness to engage in what Gadamer called a “fusion of horizons” (quoted in Taylor 1992, 67). What Taylor means by this concept is meaningful engagement with the other so that one can make a judgement of value based (at least partly) on standards learned from the other culture. While there may be aspects that we choose to reject, we will almost certainly find other aspects worthy of our respect (Taylor 1992, 67; Schaap 2004, 528-9). Given the reality that, to an increasing degree, diverse cultures must find ways to live together, Taylor views this approach as both a practical and moral obligation.
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