staff, acting as an independent body instigating a peer review proceeding, the hospital to itself. But the most basic reason to construe not to mean “medical staff’ of the medical is to further the legislative intent which engendered “members staff” section 1278.5 in the first place. The idea was to protect doctors who spotted problems with patient care or conditions. Applying section 1278.5 liability to individual hospital doctors could greatly complicate the achievement of that purpose. Peer review proceedings are not just potential instruments of retaliation. They can also be the instrument by which alarms about patient care can be aired. Thus doctors Douglas and Clark have the same right to be whistleblowers about Armin’s allegedly substandard care that Armin has to be a whistleblower about theirs. And it makes no difference if the for Douglas and complaints is a peer review vehicle Clark’s proceeding. Construing as Armin urges would make it harder to root out “medical staff” bad practices rather than easier. We therefore affirm the trial judgment court’s dismissing the four individual doctor defendants from the case. C. The Religious Discrimination Claims religious discrimination causes of action survived the Armin’s defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, and that survival is the subject of a cross-appeal by the hospital. In denying the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial judge noted the obvious: According to Armin, Douglas and Clark attempted to use religion against him by imposing on him Armin’s assignments incompatible with Jewish holidays long prior to any allegations of malpractice made against him. The court thus concluded religious Armin’s discrimination claims do not come within prong one of anti-SLAPP analysis, and hence were not vulnerable to an anti-SLAPP motion. The hospital does not attempt to argue that vexatious scheduling is itself protected activity under section 425.16 an obviously untenable position. Rather, it – argues that because claims here are the Armin’s somehow “intertwined” with, “same
staff, acting as an independent body instigating a peer review proceeding, to the hospital itself. But the most basic reason to construe “medical staff’ not to mean “members of the medical staff” is to further the legislative intent which engendered section 1278.5 in the first place. The idea was to protect doctors who spotted problems with hospital patient care or conditions. Applying section 1278.5 liability to individual doctors could greatly complicate the achievement of that purpose. Peer review proceedings are not just potential instruments of retaliation. They can also be the instrument by which alarms about patient care can be aired. Thus doctors Douglas and Clark have the same right to be whistleblowers about Armin’s allegedly substandard care that Armin has to be a whistleblower about theirs. And it makes no difference if the vehicle for Douglas and Clark’s complaints is a peer review proceeding. Construing “medical staff” as Armin urges would make it harder to root out bad practices rather than easier. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing the four individual doctor defendants from the case. C. The Religious Discrimination Claims Armin’s religious discrimination causes of action survived the defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion, and that survival is the subject of a cross-appeal by the hospital. In denying the anti-SLAPP motion, the trial judge noted the obvious: According to Armin, Douglas and Clark attempted to use Armin’s religion against him by imposing on him assignments incompatible with Jewish holidays long prior to any allegations of malpractice made against him. The court thus concluded Armin’s religious discrimination claims do not come within prong one of anti-SLAPP analysis, and hence were not vulnerable to an anti-SLAPP motion. The hospital does not attempt to argue that vexatious scheduling is itself protected activity under section 425.16 – an obviously untenable position. Rather, it argues that because Armin’s claims here are somehow “intertwined” with, the “same
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