system was not installed, or was only installed to a limited extent, in areas where the fire took hold. This meant that there were significant areas of the mine that were unable to be prepared or ‘wet prior to the fire entering the mine down’ and suppressed by water sprays. By late afternoon, firefighting efforts were further impeded by the loss of power, which affected the GDF Suez reticulated fire services water system and the Emergency Command Centre. The fires were so widespread by early evening that firefighting in the worked out areas of the mine was considered too dangerous, and firefighting was limited to suppressing the fires at grass level. Fire services took command of the firefighting that evening. The second phase of firefighting was led by fire services. Planning of a suppression strategy was undertaken across incident, regional and state
system was not installed, or was only installed to a limited extent, in areas where the fire took hold. This meant that there were significant areas of the mine that were unable to be prepared or ‘wet down’ prior to the fire entering the mine and suppressed by water sprays. By late afternoon, firefighting efforts were further impeded by the loss of power, which affected the GDF Suez reticulated fire services water system and the Emergency Command Centre. The fires were so widespread by early evening that firefighting in the worked out areas of the mine was considered too dangerous, and firefighting was limited to suppressing the fires at grass level. Fire services took command of the firefighting that evening. The second phase of firefighting was led by fire services. Planning of a suppression strategy was undertaken across incident, regional and state
Hazelwood_Mine_Inquiry_Report_Part02_PF_24_pt.docx