exhausted focused on the own conduct cannot itself afford any relief. – complainer’s – (Accord, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 739 [peer review process the Payne, supra, wasn’t remedy for claims of race discrimination].) The distinction was bolstered by the allusion to a point made in high court’s at least two of its earlier decisions (Arbuckle and to the effect that a prerequisite Runyon), of a judicial mandate proceeding would seriously compromise the legislative purpose of whistleblower statutes. Such proceedings are very hard to win if the hospital’s procedures were fair. (Fahlen, 58 Cal.4th at p. 678.) supra, Then came the coup de grace, found in dissection of the Fahlen’s legislative history of section 1278.5 especially the amendments of 2007 that added – subdivision (h) to the statute in its current form: legislative history of section “The 1278.5, subdivision (h) is consistent with a conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to require postponement of a section 1278.5 action even while peer review proceedings until the final peer review decision against the plaintiff were still in progress, let alone had been set aside by (Fahlen, 58 Cal.4th at p. 680, italics added.) supra, mandamus.” The legislative history to which the court alluded is important for our purposes because it demonstrates a harmony between the raw text of subdivision (h) and the intent in writing the text the way it did. Section 1278.5 is a relatively Legislature’s recent statute, having been enacted in 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 155 (S.B. 97), § 1.) In 2007, the Legislature extended its coverage to hospital staff physicians. (See Fahlen, 58 Cal.4th at p. 679.) With the 2007 amendments came new subdivision (h), supra, which is so critical here. The own shorthand paraphrase of subdivision (h) asserts a Fahlen court’s view of subdivision (h) with which we find reassuring: The Legislature was obviously contemplating the possibility that section 1278.5 actions could happen at the same time as hospital peer review proceedings. In addition to what we have already quoted, the court said: this provision, a medical staff may petition the court for an “Under hospital’s
exhausted – focused on the complainer’s own conduct – cannot itself afford any relief. (Accord, Payne, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at p. 739 [peer review process wasn’t the remedy for claims of race discrimination].) The distinction was bolstered by the high court’s allusion to a point made in at least two of its earlier decisions (Arbuckle and Runyon), to the effect that a prerequisite of a judicial mandate proceeding would seriously compromise the legislative purpose of whistleblower statutes. Such proceedings are very hard to win if the hospital’s procedures were fair. (Fahlen, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 678.) Then came the coup de grace, found in Fahlen’s dissection of the legislative history of section 1278.5 – especially the amendments of 2007 that added subdivision (h) to the statute in its current form: “The legislative history of section 1278.5, subdivision (h) is consistent with a conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to require postponement of a section 1278.5 action even while peer review proceedings against the plaintiff were still in progress, let alone until the final peer review decision had been set aside by mandamus.” (Fahlen, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 680, italics added.) The legislative history to which the court alluded is important for our purposes because it demonstrates a harmony between the raw text of subdivision (h) and the Legislature’s intent in writing the text the way it did. Section 1278.5 is a relatively recent statute, having been enacted in 1999. (Stats. 1999, ch. 155 (S.B. 97), § 1.) In 2007, the Legislature extended its coverage to hospital staff physicians. (See Fahlen, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 679.) With the 2007 amendments came new subdivision (h), which is so critical here. The Fahlen court’s own shorthand paraphrase of subdivision (h) asserts a view of subdivision (h) with which we find reassuring: The Legislature was obviously contemplating the possibility that section 1278.5 actions could happen at the same time as hospital peer review proceedings. In addition to what we have already quoted, the court said: “Under this provision, a hospital’s medical staff may petition the court for an
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