California Rules of Court, and subject to the rules of (Franklin, 63 supra, evidence.” Cal.4th at p. defendant] may place on the record any documents, 284.) “[The evaluations, or testimony (subject to crossexamination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the culpability or cognitive juvenile offender’s maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors. The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that juvenile offender’s the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to great weight ‘give to’ youthrelated factors ([Pen. Code,] § 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is to committed a he was a child in ‘fit rejoin society’ despite having serious crime ‘while the eyes of the (Ibid.) law’ [citation].” In this case, Petitioner asserts, record of [his] characteristics and “the circumstances at the time of the offense is bare bones at best, with the probation officer’s report consisting of less than a half page of as opposed to ensuring a ‘personal history’; full and accurate record, the report noted that the information in that personal history section was ‘not independently verified.’” We agree with Petitioner. In 63 Cal.4th at page 284, it Franklin, supra, was whether the defendant sufficient opportunity to put on the record the “not clear” “had kinds of information that [Penal Code] sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a youth offender parole in contrast, it is clear that Petitioner was not given hearing.” Here, sufficient opportunity to make such a record. sentence was imposed before Petitioner’s the decision in and before enactment of Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801. We Miller noted in that the trial court, when sentencing Petitioner, did not consider his age, Cook youthful attributes, and capacity for reform and rehabilitation. (Cook, G050907.) supra, Thus, rather than direct the trial court to make the determination whether Petitioner had sufficient opportunity at sentencing to make a record of that “information
California Rules of Court, and subject to the rules of evidence.” (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) “[The defendant] may place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to crossexamination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender’s culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors. The goal of any such proceeding is to provide an opportunity for the parties to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender’s characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to ‘give great weight to’ youthrelated factors ([Pen. Code,] § 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is ‘fit to rejoin society’ despite having committed a serious crime ‘while he was a child in the eyes of the law’ [citation].” (Ibid.) In this case, Petitioner asserts, “the record of [his] characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense is bare bones at best, with the probation officer’s report consisting of less than a half page of ‘personal history’; as opposed to ensuring a full and accurate record, the report noted that the information in that personal history section was ‘not independently verified.’” We agree with Petitioner. In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 284, it was “not clear” whether the defendant “had sufficient opportunity to put on the record the kinds of information that [Penal Code] sections 3051 and 4801 deem relevant at a youth offender parole hearing.” Here, in contrast, it is clear that Petitioner was not given sufficient opportunity to make such a record. Petitioner’s sentence was imposed before the decision in Miller and before enactment of Penal Code sections 3051 and 4801. We noted in Cook that the trial court, when sentencing Petitioner, did not consider his age, youthful attributes, and capacity for reform and rehabilitation. (Cook, supra, G050907.) Thus, rather than direct the trial court to make the determination whether Petitioner had sufficient opportunity at sentencing to make a record of “information that
G050907.DOCX