respectfully disagree with its holding. Additionally, it is important to note that the writ of mandate contemplated in did not—as specifically stated by the Glendale Glendale court—force legislative action. Rather, expressly stated that it was upholding Glendale the appellate judgment, because it considered the calculation of salaries in court’s accordance with the memorandum of understanding to be a act, not a ministerial legislative one. PERB cites to [(Santa (1960) City Council v. Superior Court Barbara County)] 179 Cal.App.2d 389 (Santa which we do not believe is dispositive. Barbara County), There, the appellate court concluded that it could not compel the city to raise rates for trash collection, which was a legislative act. (Id. at pp. 391, 394395.) The court noted that most cases which upheld interfering with legislative acts are toward the “directed right to undo what the legislative or quasi legislative body has done, not toward directing it to perform an act which is prospective in (Id. at p. 394.) Santa Barbara operation.” however, did not explain what it meant by the to what the County, “right undo” legislative body has done. (Ibid.) The court did not expressly state that the right to undo what the legislative body has done somehow encompasses the right to the direct legislative body to take legislative action to rescind or vacate its prior act. Additionally, the erroneously passed legislation can be accomplished “undoing” by means that are not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine. (See City and (1975) 13 Cal.3d the absence of some County of San Francisco v. Cooper 898, 916 [“in overriding constitutional, statutory or charter proscription, the judiciary has no authority to invalidate duly enacted a judicial body could declare legislation”].) For example, legislation void and invalidate it, as was done in 244 Cal.App.4th at El Dorado, supra, page 963. Similar action was taken in (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 283, Bowles v. Antonetti where the appellate court considered whether a writ of mandate could compel the city council to annul its resolution vacating a street, which was a legislative act. In Bowles,
respectfully disagree with its holding. Additionally, it is important to note that the writ of mandate contemplated in Glendale did not—as specifically stated by the Glendale court—force legislative action. Rather, Glendale expressly stated that it was upholding the appellate court’s judgment, because it considered the calculation of salaries in accordance with the memorandum of understanding to be a ministerial act, not a legislative one. PERB cites to City Council v. Superior Court [(Santa Barbara County)] (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 389 (Santa Barbara County), which we do not believe is dispositive. There, the appellate court concluded that it could not compel the city to raise rates for trash collection, which was a legislative act. (Id. at pp. 391, 394395.) The court noted that most cases which upheld interfering with legislative acts are “directed toward the right to undo what the legislative or quasi legislative body has done, not toward directing it to perform an act which is prospective in operation.” (Id. at p. 394.) Santa Barbara County, however, did not explain what it meant by the “right to undo” what the legislative body has done. (Ibid.) The court did not expressly state that the right to undo what the legislative body has done somehow encompasses the right to direct the legislative body to take legislative action to rescind or vacate its prior act. Additionally, “undoing” the erroneously passed legislation can be accomplished by means that are not offensive to the separation of powers doctrine. (See City and County of San Francisco v. Cooper (1975) 13 Cal.3d 898, 916 [“in the absence of some overriding constitutional, statutory or charter proscription, the judiciary has no authority to invalidate duly enacted legislation”].) For example, a judicial body could declare legislation void and invalidate it, as was done in El Dorado, supra, 244 Cal.App.4th at page 963. Similar action was taken in Bowles v. Antonetti (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 283, where the appellate court considered whether a writ of mandate could compel the city council to annul its resolution vacating a street, which was a legislative act. In Bowles,
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