deliberation any interpretation of the contract it at 139. While finding that Id. approved.” the parties retained private rights under substantive contract law, the Court held that the NYPSC was not a forum available to review the continued economic viability of the contract under the guise of revisiting the regulatory that had approved the contract order as opposed to the contract itself. Two additional cases, decided in 1995 by our Commonwealth West Penn, Court shortly after was released, and Freehold Grays Ferry Cogeneration Partnership v. 998 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Grays in which the PECO Energy Company, Ferry), position we took as a party remains insightful today, were not addressed by the ALJ but are also instructive to our disposition. In Commonwealth Court described the then-evolving and West Penn, “legal market landscape behind the as follows: dispute” These concerns [of non-competitive mandatory QF purchased power in a move to competition] are at the core of the disputes concerning PURPA contracts taking place before courts and regulatory bodies throughout this country.... The fear is either QFs will supply energy that the utility no longer needs because customers have walked away with their demand and are purchasing from independent power producers or that the avoided costs paid for QF power is at a cost higher than the cost of power that may become available in the potential competitive marketplace.... However, despite Congressional intent to foster competition and the concerns of utilities and FERC, Congress has yet to amend or repeal PURPA and the requirement that utilities purchase QF power. 659 A.2d at 1059 (citations and footnotes omitted). Reciting what it described West Penn, as the but long and of the QF “overused” “certainly appli[cable] torturous history” disputes at issue, the Court acknowledged that, while not bound by the Third Circuit’s decision in it nonetheless concurred in its effect: Freehold,
deliberation any interpretation of the contract it approved.” Id. at 139. While finding that the parties retained private rights under substantive contract law, the Court held that the NYPSC was not a forum available to review the continued economic viability of the contract under the guise of revisiting the regulatory order that had approved the contract as opposed to the contract itself. Two additional cases, West Penn, decided in 1995 by our Commonwealth Court shortly after Freehold was released, and Grays Ferry Cogeneration Partnership v. PECO Energy Company, 998 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Grays Ferry), in which the position we took as a party remains insightful today, were not addressed by the ALJ but are also instructive to our disposition. In West Penn, Commonwealth Court described the then-evolving “legal and market landscape behind the dispute” as follows: These concerns [of non-competitive mandatory QF purchased power in a move to competition] are at the core of the disputes concerning PURPA contracts taking place before courts and regulatory bodies throughout this country.... The fear is either QFs will supply energy that the utility no longer needs because customers have walked away with their demand and are purchasing from independent power producers or that the avoided costs paid for QF power is at a cost higher than the cost of power that may become available in the potential competitive marketplace.... However, despite Congressional intent to foster competition and the concerns of utilities and FERC, Congress has yet to amend or repeal PURPA and the requirement that utilities purchase QF power. West Penn, 659 A.2d at 1059 (citations and footnotes omitted). Reciting what it described as the “overused” but “certainly appli[cable] long and torturous history” of the QF disputes at issue, the Court acknowledged that, while not bound by the Third Circuit’s decision in Freehold, it nonetheless concurred in its effect:
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